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NOTE

While Dr. Allen has considered in a general way the
.charges of atrocities in Volume III it was deemed unsuit-
able to include in a volume intended for general circula-
tion the details of the proofs offered by various belligerent
governments as evidence of the truth of these charges.
A selection from such details will be printed separately.
No person who has not read the official reports can have a
true conception of the horrors of war as it is practised even
in these enlightened days.

Subscribers are warned that these details are horrible,
that the illustrations are not pleasant to look upon ; the
justification for their reproduction is that they are official
proof of the revolting conditions brought about by war in
invaded territories, and they are issued only in the hope
that these reports and illustrations, revolting as they are,
may exercise an influence which will militate against wars
in the future and in that way may be made of service to
humanity.

This matter will be printed in a supplementary mono-
graph, not offered for sale, and issued exclusively to adult
subscribers for the whole series and ONLY AFTER RECEIPT
OF THE ATTACHED COUPON, which is not transferable.

THE GREAT WAR

THIRD VOLUME

THE ORIGINAL GERMAN
PLAN AND ITS CULxMINATION

(U'/lll ll>//l/ f /ftiK/f ''Ji//l/i'.^ i'.'.

NICOLAi ALEXANDROVITCH
NICHOLAS II

Emperf)r and autocrat of all the Russias.

THE

GREAT WAR

THIRD VOLUME
THE ORIGINAL GERMAN
PLAN AND ITS CULMINATION

GEORGE H. ALLEN, Ph. D., formerly of the University
OF Pennsylvania, History Department; Fellow in Classical
Archeology, American School of Classical Studies, Rome, Etc.,

HENRY C. WHITEHEAD, Captain in the
United States Army, Served in Europe, by
Official Assignment, for Observation, Etc.,

AND

Admiral F. E. CHADWICK, U. S. N.

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY

GEORGE BARRIE'S SONS

at PHILADELPHIA

Copyrighted, 1916, by
GEORGE BARRIE'S SONS

Among the Illustrations in this Volume
ARE Reproductions of Photographs Copy-
righted BY Underwood and Underwood,
BY Paul Thompson, and by the
International News Service Company
Entered at Stationers' Hall, London

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGES

List of Illustrations XI-XVI

Preface XVII-XX

I Formation of the Great German Plan . 1-29

Geographical position of Germany in relation to the plan of campaign.
Possible advantages of a central position. Napoleon's method. Special
factors in the situation of 1914. France to be crushed before Russia is
ready Rapidity necessary in the execution of the German plan. Physical
features of the theater of hostilities in the West. Possible routes for a Ger-
man invasion of France Reasons for the choice of the route via Belgium.
The German doctrine of tactics and strategy. Concealment of the real
nature of the German plan The French plan. The German aim is to
envelop the opposing army, the French is to pierce it. Successive periods
in the development of the plans: (1) August 4-15; (2) August 15-22; (3)
August 23-September 5; (4) September 6-10; (5) September 10-23; (6) Sep-
tember 23 October 15; (7) October 16-November 11; (8) November 11-
December 31 Subordinate position and character of operations in the
East Minor questions regarding the development of the German plan.
The German and French Chiefs of Staff, von Moltke and Joffre.

II The Die is Cast 30-48

The German occupation of Luxemburg. Casting the die; the crossing
of the Belgian frontier on August 4th. Seizure and destruction of Vise.
Desperate resistance of the Belgians. Participation of civilians in the
fighting and its consequences. Liege and its defenses. Assault and cap-
ture of Liege. Bombardment of the forts. Consequences of the resistance
of Liege on the subsequent course of the campaign.

III The Deluge Released {August 15-22, 1914) 49-65

Renewed proposals by Germany rejected by Belgium. Disposition of the
German forces in the West about August 10th. The situation of the Ger-
mans at Liege. German cavalry foreshadowing the main advance of the
German army through Belgium. Dramatic contrast in the feelings of
assurance and consternation in the Belgian towns ; Tirlemont, Aerschot,
Louvain The Belgian capital transferred to Antwerp. The Gorman
march through Brussels. Reasons for the occupation of Brussels. The
German front swings to the left pivoting on Namur.

VI The Great War

CHAPTER PAGES

IV The French Counter-Offensive . . . 66-82

Criticism of the French counter-offensive. The French incursion into
Alsace; entry into Miilhausen, August 8, 1914, French defeated west of
the city two days later. The clearing of the Vosges by the French.
Miilhausen retaken by the French on August 20th. The French offensive
in Lorraine, beginning August 12th, French advance to Saarburg. Turn-
ing of the tide, August 20th. Battle in Lorraine, August 20-24. General
collapse of the French offensive. German invasion of France and occu-
pation of Luneville Evacuation of Miilhausen by the French. Invasion
of France from Luxemburg by the army of the German Crown Prince.
Defense of Longwy- French defeated at Neufchateau. The battle at
Dinant, August 15th.

V The Flood-tide of German Invasion

{August 23-September 5, 1914) 83-115

The Kaiser goes to the front. Disposition of the forces in the West, the
seven German and five French armies and the British contingent. Con-
centration of powerful German forces against the Meuse-Sambre salient,
far outnumbering the Allies. Defenses of Namur. Operations against
Namur : first attack, August 20th ; occupation of the city, August 23d ;
bombardment of the forts, August 22-25. Effect of the sudden fall of
Namur. The Germans drive the French from the Sambre. Arrival,
significance, and composition of the British Expeditionary Force. The
Germans attack the British, August 23d. The " retreat from Mons. " The
night encounter at Landrecies. The critical situation on August 26th.
The real objective of the German operations. Situation on August 29th.
The moral crisis in France and Joffre's decision. Continuation of the
German advance. Frantic exodus of civilians from Paris. Transference
of the French government to Bordeaux. Alarming progress of the Russian
invasion of Galicia.

VI The Russian Offensive 116-152

Early operations on the Russo-German border. Exaggerated impression
of Russian might. Natural objective for the Russian offensive. Why the
Russians did not set out for Berlin from the nearest point on their frontier.
Lack of natural boundaries. Important rivers : Niemen (Memel), Vistula,
San, Bug, Narev, Bobr. Strategic consequences of the position of Rus-
sian Poland as a great salient. Teutonic fortresses and Russian fortresses.
Russian invasion of East Prussia; the German forces, the Russian Vilna
and Warsaw Armies. Encounters at Stalluponen and Gumbinnen. The
Masurian lakes. Von Hindenburg and the Battle of Tannenberg : von
Hindenburg, the man and his hobby ; his appointment to the command in
the East, August 22d ; his concentration of troops and chances of success ;
his plan of battle resembling that of Hannibal at Cannae ; Battle of Tan-
nenberg : the contest at Hohenstein, August 26-28 ; the German occupation
of Soldau and its results, August 26-27; operations by the German left
wing, August 26-29 ; the consummation and extent of the victory. Opera-
tions against Rennenkampf. The situation in Galicia. The Austrians
invade Poland while the Russians invade Galicia from the east. The
operations of Russky and Brussiloff and the evacuation of Lemberg
by the Austrians on September 3-4. Collapse of Dankl's offensive in
Poland. The defeat of the Austrians on the Grodek-Rawaruska line and
their withdrawal from most of Galicia.

Contents VII

CHAPTER PAGES

VII The Battle of the Marne {Septem-

ber 6-10, 1914) 153-186

Germans in the neighborhood of Paris. The deviation in von Kluck's
march and the reasons for it ; the fundamental change in the German plan,
the design of crushing the center of the Allies. Von Kluck's oblique
movement and passage of the Marne. Joffre's tremendous responsibility
and his plan of battle. Relative strength of the combatants and the positions
of the forces. The assumption of the offensive by the Allies on the 6th.
The concentric attack on von Kluck's army. The plight of the French
Sixth Army on the 8th; the Paris "taxis" to the rescue. The climax on
the 9th and the German retreat. Violent German attack on the Anglo-
French center. General Foch's successful tactics. Discomfiture of the
Prussian Guard. The Crow n Prince's attack on Troyon. The retirement
of the Duke of Wiirttemberg and the Crown Prince. General reflections
upon the character and consequences of the Battle of the Marne. The
fall of Maubeuge.

VIII Operations on the Line of the Aisne

iSeptefnber 10-23, 1914) 187-198

Significance of the operations on the Aisne. The new German front.
Natural features of the valley of the Aisne. The position of the Anglo-
French forces. The action on September 12th. The passage of the Aisne
by the Allies, on the 13th, and their subsequent penetration of the heights
to the north of the valley. Great difficulties and hardships suffered by the
Allies in their exposed trenches. Their abandonment of frontal attacks.
Great buoyancy shown by the German military organization.

IX The Race to the Sea {September 23-

October 15, 1914) 199-232

The more complicated character of the second part of the first campaign
in the West; the diversity of purposes. The Allies' offensive and the
race to the sea ; every effort of the Allies countered by the Germans.
Transference of the British to Flanders. Lille taken by the Germans.
Resumption of the German offensive. Intimate connection of Verdun
and Antwerp in the deliberations of the Germans. The perforation of
the French eastern barrier at St. Mihiel and its futility. Retrospect of the
situation of the Belgian army. Destruction of Louvain. The German
operations against Antwerp : the fortifications, the opposing forces, the
beginning of the bombardment of the forts, September 28th, the removal
of the Belgian base, the penetration of the outer girdle. The general out-
look and departure of the Belgian field-army. The fall of Antwerp. The
race from all sides towards the southwestern section of the Belgian coast.
The arrival of the Belgian army on the line of the Yser and completion of
the barrier from the Swiss boundary to the North Sea.

X The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders

{October 16-November 11,1914) .... 233-272

VIII The Great War

CHAPTER PAGES

"soldiers of Liege," October 19th. Renewed attack, terrible bombard
ment and burning of the town. Passage of the Yser by the Germans near
Tervaete, night of October 21-22 ; the Germans west of the river. Arrival
of the French to reinforce the Belgians, October 23d. Bombardment of
the German positions by British warships. Violent renewal of the attack
on Dixmude, October 24th. Belgians at the limit of their resources and
endurance. The gradually rising inundatioa The culminating moment
and German retirement, November 2-3. The situation on the British
front. Desperate combats in the region of Ypres with repeated attacks of
the Germans in dense masses, October 20-23, The contest at Neuve
Chapelle. The very critical moment before Ypres on the 31st. Renewal
of the battle on November 1st. Storming of Dixmude. Supreme effort
of the Prussian Guard to crush the British lines, November 10th and 11th.

XI The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia . 273-314

Poland and the war. General situation in the eastern theater about Octo-
ber 1st. Operations on the East Prussian frontier. Von Hindenburg and
the Teutonic general offensive. The culmination of this great move-
ment: the failure to take Warsaw, the conflict before Ivangorod, and
retreat of the Austro-German armies. The fluctuating course of the strug-
gle in Galicia ; Peremysl relieved and reinvested. The German retreat in
Poland, lightning change of front, and counter-offensive in November.
The combats around Lodz. The increasing deadlock. Operations in
Serbia. Failure of the first Austrian invasion ; Battle of the Jadar, Septem-
ber 15-20. The renewed invasion in November and the occupation and
loss of Belgrade and severe defeat of the Austrians in December. Atroci-
ties in the Austro-Serbian hostilities. Reflections on the results of the
Eastern operations.

XII The Close of the Campaign in the

West and the Land Operations
Outside of Europe 315-333

The waning of the campaign in the West. Attempted Allied offensive
in December. Some characteristics of trench-warfare. Christmas at the
front. The war outside of Europe. The rally of the British dominions
and dependencies : colonial and Indian troops sent to Europe ; operations
in colonial territory, the campaign in Togo, Kamerun, German East Africa,
and German Southwest Africa; the insurrection in South Africa. Ger-
many swept from the Pacific. The siege and fall of Tsingtau. Turkey's
advent into the war ; Turco-German designs, Egypt and the British Em-
pire ; Cyprus ; events on the Persian Gulf.

XIII War's New Aspects 334-349

Principles of strategy universal, their application variable. Changed
international considerations as to Belgium. Plan of passing through Bel-
gium and the German offensive. General advantages of the offensive.
The tactics of the campaign : German mass attacks ; the part of the in-
fantry; the use of the cavalry; artillery support. Transportation: the
railways and their various uses ; motor-propelled vehicles. Air service :
types of aircraft; anti-aircraft guns; improvements in air-machines; the
modern Zeppelin ; the captive balloon. Means of communication. The
lesson of the campaign.

Contents IX

CHAPTER PAGES

XIV The Alleged Atrocities in Belgium

AND France 350-388

Accounts of outrages imputed to the German armies in Belgium and
France received with amazement and horror, followed by an involuntary
reaction of doubt. The committees for investigation and their indictment.
The attitude and counter-charges of the Germans. Various forms of evi-
dence. Destruction incidental to military operations; doubtful cases:
Reims, Arras, Ypres, Mechlin. The essential distinction between isolated
and irresponsible, and deliberate and systematic acts of brutality, and the
paramount importance of the latter. Needful restrictions in the material
admitted to discussion in the present chapter; the confinement of the
argument to undisputed facts. Intentional destruction of property and
acts of severity against the civilian population. The alleged organized
people's war in Belgium; Aerschot, Dinant, Louvain. The international
conventions relating to the people's warfare and the contrasted attitude
of the combatants respecting the conditions for the possession of the rights
of belligerency. Conclusion.

XV' Signs and Expressions of Public Opin-
ion AND Sentiment 389-404

In France : the hopeful outlook of the French people, M. Viviani's speech
on December 22d. In Great Britain : truce between the two great political
parties, the Prime Minister's speech at Guildhall, the king's visit to the
front, the raiding of the east coast, civilian deaths at Hartlepool, Scar-
borough, and Whitby. In Germany: the general view of the nation's
obligation, hatred for Great Britain, the session of the Reichstag on Decem-
ber 2d, the position of the Socialists. In Austria-Hungarj- : New Year's
address of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. In Turkey : demonstra-
tions and predictions, opening of parliament. In Russia: alleged mis-
treatment of Mohammedan population, disaffection in the Ukraine, popular
impressions and the sur^'iving discords. Bismarck's foreign policy and
the later policy of Germany. General tendencies.

XVI The Naval Situation at the Begin-

ning OF THE War 405-422

Indications of the outbreak of war. Strategy of the belligerent powers.
Obstacles to a British blockade. British and French fleets in the Mediter-
ranean. British forces in home waters. Mobilization of the British fleet
and its review by the king. The Turkish force. The belligerents' forces
in the Far East and the Pacific. Seizure of German merchant ships in
enemy ports. Relative power of Great Britain and Germany. The North
Sea as the great area of naval action. The Baltic and Germany's control
of that sea. Strategic value of the Kiel Canal. Safety of the German
coast. The German base at Heligoland. The British bases at Scapa Flow
and Rosyth. Status of power in the Mediterranean. Mine-laying. The
German ships Goeben and Breslau.

XVII Operations in European Waters . . 423-447

In the North Sea : August 5, 1914, the German mine layer Konigin Luise
destroyed. The British cruiser Amphion mined. August 9th, German
submarine attack. August 28th, battle off Heligoland, German losses.

X The Great War

CHAPTER PAGES

The Pathfinder torpedoed. Victims of the U-9 on September 22d and
October 15th. Loss of four German destroyers. October 26th, sinking of
the British battleship Audacious. British monitors in Belgian defense.
Isolated casualties. German cruisers raid the east coast of England. Great
battle on January 24, 1915, loss of the German cruiser BlUcher. In the
Baltic : German casualties. A German submarine sinks a Russian cruiser.
In the Mediterranean : Austrian casualties. British submarine success in
the Dardanelles. Russian losses in the Black Sea.

XVIII The War on the Ocean 448-478

Teutonic ships in the Pacific and in German East Africa. Entente forces
in eastern waters. Early movements of the German squadron in the East
Destruction of the British Cable Station at Fanning Island by the NUrn-
herf^. Capture of the German Samoan Islands. German attack on Papeete,
Tahiti. Battle off Chile, November 1, 1914, destruction of the British
ships Good Hope and Monmouth. Combat at the Falkland Islands, De-
cember 8th, destruction of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Leipzig, and Niirnberg. Destruction of the Dresden. Exploits of the
cmiser Eniden in the Indian Ocean ; escape and adventures of part of her
crew. Operations of the Karlsruhe in the Atlantic. Career and destruc-
tion of the Kbnigsberg. Surrender of the German protectorate of Kiau-
Chau. Loss of Germany's oversea possessions. German auxiliary cruisers.
British auxiliary cruisers.

Table of Naval Losses to February 1, 1915 . 479-482

Chronological Table 483-488

Index 489-500

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FACING PAGE

Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia Title

Map showing the highly developed railway systems across Germany 5
Map showing the German strategic railways leading to the frontiers

of Belgium and Luxemburg I2

Map showing northeastern France and Belgium 15

General Joseph Jacques Cesaire JofFre 24

Map showing by the shaded portion the extent of the German ad-
vance into Belgium and France, August 10, 1914 .... 32

General von Falkenhayn 37

King Albert and General von Emmich at Belgian army maneuvers

before the war 37

Proclamation prepared in advance and distributed by the first of the

German cavalry which invaded Belgium 40

Notice posted by the Belgian authorities warning the people not to

take part in the hostilities 40

Bridge at Liege destroyed by the retreating Belgians and pontoon

bridge constructed by the Germans 44

The citadel and the city of Dinant on the River Meuse .... 44

German engineers mining a bridge 52

Germans digging out a tunnel which had been blown up by the

retreating Belgians 52

First page of the ultimatum delivered by the German Minister to the

Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 2, 1914 ... 56
Map showing by the shaded portion the extent of the German ad-
vance into Belgium and France and the French advance into

Alsace and Lorraine, August 20, 1914 58

XII The Great War

FACING PAGE

Adolfe Max 6i

The white flag used by the municipal authorities of Brussels pre-
liminary to the meeting between Adolfe Max and General von

Arnim 6 1

General Sixtus von Arnim 6i

The last telegram from Brussels before the Germans entered . . 64
The German forces marching through Brussels, August 20, 1914 . 64
Frederick William, Crown Prince of the German Empire and Prus-
sia, with two officers of his personal staff 69

Map showing the Franco-German frontier 72

Illustrations from Mon Village 76

General de Curieres de Castelnau 81

General Foch 81

Duke Albert 84

General Alexander von Kluck 84

Map showing by the shaded portion the extent of the German ad-
vance into Belgium and France, August 30, 1914 .... 88

Lieutenant-general Sir Douglas Haig 93

Major-general Edmund H. H. Allenby 93

General Sir Horace L. Smith-Dorrien 93

Notices posted in the city of Amiens lOi

German infantry marching through Amiens, August 31,1914 . . loi

The effect of the heavy German artillery on one of the forts at Liege 108

Steel cupola of one of the forts at Maubeuge io8

Field-marshal Paul von Beneckendorff and von Hindenburg . . .116

Map of Poland and the Russo-German frontier 120

Field-marshal von Potiorek 125

General Victor Dankl 125

General Moritz von Auffenberg 125

Burial of Austrian dead after repulse of a Russian attack on Peremysl 129

Neidenburg in East Prussia 129

Map showing the disposition of the German and Russian forces at

the Battle of Tannenberg 136

General Russky 144

General Ivanoff 144

General Rennenkampf 144

List of Illustrations XIII

FACING PAGE
Lieutenant-general von Heeringen and staff 149

German dead on the field of battle after a charge 149

Paris motor-buses transformed into army transports 156

Facsimile showing in what form General Joffre's order of the day,
issued on the morning of the first day of the Battle of the

Marne, was communicated to the troops 156

Map showing by the shaded portion the extent of the German ad-
vance into Belgium and France just prior to the Battle of the

Marne, September 5, 1914 160

Scenes of destruction in and around Senlis 165

A corner of the garden of the Chateau de Mondemont . . . .172

Bridge at Lagny destroyed by the British forces 172

German guns captured near La Ferte-Milon 182

Limber-wagons left by the Germans during their retreat in the Battle

of the Marne 181

Map showing the Paris- Verdun district 184

General Gallieni 188

General de Maud'huy 188

The Cathedral of Notre-Dame at Reims 193

Map showing by shaded portion the territory occupied by the Ger-
mans after the Battle of the Marne, September 13, 19 14 . . 194
German Red Cross men at work under fire in the Argonne district . 197
German dead in a trench just captured by French troops . . . .197
One of the principal streets in Lille after an engagement between

German Uhlans and French infantry 204

Map showing the defenses of Antwerp, their relation to Louvain and

Brussels, and the close proximity to the Dutch frontier . . . 208
From the Quay Van Dyck looking towards the Cathedral, Antwerp . 213

The Bourse, Antwerp 213

German soldiers in front of the Town Hall, Antwerp 220

Ruins in the Rue de Peuple, Antwerp, after the bombardment . . 220
Barbed wire entanglements used for defense in the streets of Antwerp 225

Method of barricading street in Diest, Belgium 225

Belgians in flight from Antwerp 229

Belgian refugees taken to England on fishing boats 229

General Maunoury 236

XIV The Great War

FACING PAGE

General Sarrail 236

General d'Amade 236

Cavalrymen asleep on heaps of straw in a French town .... 240

Infantrymen in a trench near Ypres 240

Field-marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Earl of Khartoum . . 245

Indian troops watering mules at canvas troughs 252

Indian troops of the British forces in France 252

Field-marshal Sir John Denton Pinkstone French 264

Crowds in the streets of Lodz awaiting the entry of the German

troops 276

Officers outside the headquarters of General von Mackensen at

Lodz 276

General W. A. Sukhomlinoff 285

General Vaivode Putnik 285

Field-marshal Alexander, Ritter von Krobatkin 285

The Wawel, or Citadel, of Cracow 289

The museum of Belgrade after the city had been bombarded by the

Austrians 289

Map showing the Austro-Serbian frontier 296

Austrian siege-gun hauled by motor-tractor 304

Serbian field hospital 304

Dead in a room in a villa near Shabatz , 309

Barbarity of war in Serbia 309

The facades and tower of the Cloth Hall and Town Hall at

Ypres 316

The ruins of the Town Hall, Cloth Hall, and Cathedral at Ypres on

November 24, 19 14 316

French infantryman in act of throwing hand grenade 321

Trench after capture by the French forces and before the removal

of the German dead 321

Intrenchments made by British native Indian troops in defence of

the Suez Canal 024

Artillery of British East African forces 324

Map showing by the shaded portion the territory held by the opposing

armies, December 31, 19 14 028

Fort litis, Tsingtau 000

List of Illustrations XV

FACING PAGE

German 28-centimeter howitzer and turret at Tsingtau destroyed by

the Japanese gunfire 333

French guns mounted on special railway trucks 336

French one hundred and fifty-five millimeter guns 336

Photograph of enemy positions, showing one of the uses of flying

machines in warfare 341

Arrangement of the German defensive and protective trenches . . 348
Reinforced trenches: Details of roofs, loopholes, and the form of

the excavations 348

Facsimile of an account of how a company of Germans sheltered

themselves behind non-combatants 357

Pages from the note books of German soldiers 361

Vandalism in Louvain : ruins of the Hotel du Nord and other

buildings 364

Louvain. The Town Hall unscathed, while of the church of Saint

Pierre and of the university nothing remains but the walls . . 364
Part of the ruins of the archbishop's house at Reims and of the

chapel which connected it with the rear of the cathedral . . 369
Sand bags being arranged in an attempt to protect some of the

remaining sculptures of Reims cathedral 369

Facsimile of typical proclamation posted by German commandants . 377

"The shields of Rousselaere" 384

"Culture from the air" 384

Longwy after bombardment and capture by the Germans . . . .401
Statues placed in front of the Eberlein Museum, Berlin, in the early

days of the war 401

Chart showing North Sea and English Channel 408

Diagram showing ranges and angles of fire of British and German

naval guns 416

The sinking of the German cruiser Mainx off Heligoland , . . 436
Boats from the British battleships rescuing survivors from the

Gneisenau 436

The German cruiser Blucher as she capsized 445

Vice-Admiral Beatty 453

Rear-Admiral Cradock 453

Vice- Admiral Sturdee 453

XVI The Great War

FACING PAGE

Admiral Count von Spec 460

Commander Karl von Miiller 460

Plan showing the various phases of the battle between the British

and German fleets off the Falkland Islands 464

Map showing the scene of actions between the British and German

fleets on November i and December 8, 19 14 469

Plan showing the positions of the Sydney and the Emden during the

action off Cocos Islands 469

The Emden ashore on North Keeling Island 476

Landing party from the Emden 476

PREFACE

Odiis etiam prope maioribus certarunt quam
viribus. . . . Livy 21, 1.

[They fought with almost greater animosity
than strength.]

Once in the waning of a summer afternoon I slowly
climbed the long acclivity that leads from Spa towards
Stavelot, refreshed by the cool shadows of the tall fir-
trees and by the balsam-scented atmosphere, and tarried
at the hushed, mysterious hour of twilight on a summit
near the boundary. The gathering dusk, subduing every
contrast, blending all the landscape in evasive, neutral
tones, produced a grateful sense of absolute serenity.
Behind me stretched the variedly fascinating, rugged
tract of eastern Belgium; before, through the filmy mist
that half obscured the yellow fields and rolling mead-
ows, the fancy helped the eye to discern the undulating
outline of the hills in Germany. The situation lured to
meditation.

I seemed to stand upon the common margin of two
mighty streams of human culture, my spirit quickened by
a sense of intimate communion with the Latin and the
Teutonic genius, to be lost in them, and to thrill with
consciousness of common heirship in all that the long
succession of their yearning, striving, impressionable gen-
erations had wrought. In weariness and tribulation the
image of that hour still lingers wistfully.

XVII

XVIII The Great War

Some of us had yielded to the seductive vision of
a world in which the nationalities, each through the
medium of its own peculiar usages, without aggression
or constraint, should strive in friendly emulation for the
benefit of all, — the preservation of the rich diversity of
human life without the hard, intolerant spirit that had
nourished its vitality.

Our blissful dream was suddenly transformed into a
hideous nightmare. Startled, chagrined, outraged in our
tenderest emotions, we quivered with impulsive, inconsid-
erate fury. Our feverish resentment cried for vengeance,
sought the author of our anguish, claimed a victim. The
most conspicuous factors attracted our inflamed imagina-
tion: the anachronism of a military caste intolerant of
criticism, arrogantly self-sufficient, disdainfully refractory
to popular control, violating our instinctive sense of polit-
ical propriety. Our impotent rage was deeply stirred by
trite, invidious catchwords. We reviled with passionate
abuse the Chauvinistic spirit which sows suspicion, empha-
sizes contrasts, hides its ugly, sordid countenance behind
the mask of sacrosanct traditions, the insidious deceit by
means of which reactionary parties seduce the multitude
from the pursuit of righteous aspirations.

But all our abstract speculations, optimist's reproach and
cynic's sneer, are vain beside the one, supremely vital fact,
that millions do not hesitate to hazard every good and life
itself for these irrational, inveterate conceptions, superbly
unconcerned by calculations of utility; that for preposter-
ous motives, men will fight with eager, frenzied zeal, and
joyous hatred.

Not for its cruelty, nor for its injuries alone, do we
consider war with hate and detestation. But we execrate
in it the element that dissipates our fondest dreams
and most cherished prejudices. War is the relentless.

Preface XIX

but transcendent realist, that tries our theories and de-
signs not merely by the test of concrete facts, but by
the rigorous standard of consistency with stubborn human
nature.

Shattered by the awful cataclysm reason is forced,
despoiled of every preconception, to cling with humble
confidence to sober observation as its sole support and
guide.

Heraclitus taught that strife is the father of all things,
and Hegel recognized in it the antidote for torpor and
stagnation, the mighty agency for progress. Schopenhauer
regarded war as the inevitable collision of the blind, un-
reasoning forces of volition that compose the universe.
Nietzsche found a single means of deliverance from this
chaos in the conscious will to power. A superior type, a
superman, must be developed by the encouragement of
the military qualities, courage, boldness, obedience, at the
expense of the passive virtues, charity, compassion, humil-
ity. In Lasson's theory warlike development is a source
of health for every nation, a fountain of youth for decrepit
peoples. Von Treitschke declared, "the hope of driving
war from the earth is not only senseless, but profoundly
immoral; realized, this aspiration would convert the world
into a great temple of egotism."

War is the fiery crucible that exterminates the moral
dross of indolence and self-indulgence. War is the stern,
avenging angel that with flaming sword expels its mournful
victims from the languorous paradise of self-complacency,
condemning them to cultivate with unrelenting toil the
rugged wilderness of disillusionment and rigid self-exami-
nation.

In estimating war's stupendous process the sway of
sentiment must sternly be repressed. It is a test of forti-
tude for one who feels inductively the heart-throb of

XX The Great War

diverse contending nations to await the issue with unper-
turbed detachment and stoic acquiescence. But despite
subjection to the severe supremacy of fact, the emotions
recover all their fervid function in the contemplation of an
unparalleled tragedy in which whole armies act as single
characters, and an organization of unprecedented efficacy,
strength, and flexibility, — angel of light or demon as you
will, — plays the role of hero.

George H. Allen, Ph.D.

CHAPTER I

Formation of the Great German Plan

Geographical position of Germany in relation to the plan of campaign.
Possible advantages of a central position. Napoleon's method. Special
factors in the situation of 1914. France to be crushed before Russia is
ready. Rapidity necessary in the execution of the German plan. Physical
features of the theater of hostilities in the West. Possible routes for a Ger-
man invasion of France. Reasons for the choice of the route via Belgium.
The German doctrine of tactics and strategy'. Concealment of the real
nature of the German plan. The French plan. The German aim is to
envelop the opposing army, the French is to pierce it. Successive periods
in the development of the plans: (1) August 4-15; (2) August 15-22; (3)
August 23-September 5; (4) September 6-10; (5) September 10-23 ; (6) Sep-
tember 23-October 15; (7) October 16-November 11; (8) November 11-
December 31. Subordinate position and character of operations in the
East. Minor questions regarding the development of the German plan.
The German and French Chiefs of Staff, von Moltke and Joff re.

The Great German Plan of Campaign ! For years it had
been the object of anxious speculation. Its existence had
lurked in the background of the imagination like a vague,
but stupendous, apparition. There were indications that
beneath the peaceful surface of German society dwelt a
latent, unfathomable force which could be invoked to
action in accordance with a mysterious design with results
that would baffle all human prevision. There was a dim
consciousness of the existence of a power which could
instantaneously galvanize the whole outward machinery of
life with a terrible, frenzied energy. Often at night the
great square block of the building of the General Staff
with all its windows illuminated stood out in striking con-
trast to the deep shadows of the quiet Tiergarten, like a
great factory working overtime. Whoever is familiar with

2 The Great War

German method and thoroughness can conceive how
laboriously provisions were perfected in anticipation of
every emergency. The general outline may have been
some individual's flash of inspiration, or the complex
product of the sagacity of a group of eminent authori-
ties. But just as a building is erected gradually brick
by brick in accordance with the architect's design, so the
general ideas for hypothetical campaigns were diligently
worked out and elaborated in every detail by a vast num-
ber of individual contributions, ranging in scope from
the comprehensive treatises of a General von der Goltz,
embodying mature reflections based upon a lifelong expe-
rience, down to the myriad of petty dissertations, mono-
graphs, and articles written by students and young aspiring
officers. Military science had become an obsession in
Germany. About seven hundred books were added to the
literature on the subject every year.

The most elementary factor in the formation of the
German plan has been the system of European alliances.

We are frequently reminded that Germany was shut in
between her two most redoubtable probable antagonists;
and this situation was a source of continual apprehension
to the German military authorities. But a central posi-
tion is not necessarily an element of weakness in a conflict
with foes who possess a collective superiority in numbers.
The armies of a central power like Germany, operating on
interior lines and with highly developed railway communi-
cations across the country, can be employed in very inti-
mate correlation in pursuance of a single, homogeneous
plan, whilst the forces of its adversaries are incapable of
such combined and united action.

Napoleon's most brilliant successes were his repeated
victories gained with a smaller, but undivided, army against
opponents whose aggregate strength was very much superior

Formation of the Great German Plan 3

to his own. Mustering all his available forces, Napoleon
would fall upon his adversaries individually, crushing the
first, leaving a containing force to overawe him, and then
leading the bulk of his army to crush the next. Thus by
repeated blows with the same weapon he beat down his
antagonists one by one. As long as he could keep them
asunder their collectively superior numbers did not avail.
But his most remarkable maneuvers and illustrious victories
were achieved when the isolation of his principal adver-
saries was far less complete than the separation of France
and Russia in the world-war of the present. The sup-
posed disparity in the time required for mobilization in
France and Russia offered apparently a very suitable occa-
sion for applying the Napoleonic method in the present
situation.

The special factors in 1914 which bore upon the German
plan, as expressed by Herr von Jagow before the outbreak of
the war and repeated later many hundred times by others,
are almost a commonplace. Germany's adversaries would
eventually be able to dispose of far greater forces than
those of Germany and her allies. But Germany's forces
would outnumber those of France alone, and surpass at
the beginning of the campaign the available field strength
of Russia. It was believed that fully six weeks would
intervene before the progress of Russia's concentration of
troops on her western frontier would make her a formid-
able antagonist. In the meantime Austria-Hungary with
minor German forces could restrain her while Germany
dealt with France. The German General Staff saw their
one chance of achieving a speedy, decisive victory in deal-
ing a swift, paralyzing blow at France. France must be
crushed before Russia could move; then the greater part
of the German forces in the West could be conveyed
rapidly to the eastern frontier producing an overwhelming

4 The Great War

superiority over the Russians. The situation offered an
enticing possibility, a chance that might never return. It
would be a race of vigor, determination, and endurance
against time. The consequences of failure might be ap-
palling, but modern Germany had been schooling herself
to "live perilously."

"Germany had the speed and Russia had the numbers,"
and it seemed indispensable for the security of the former
not only to inflict a decisive blow on France in the event
of war before the Russian concentration had been com-
pleted, but even to initiate hostilities so as to prevent
Russia, under cover of alleged pacific intentions, from
bringing up great masses of troops from all parts of her
vast dominions to neutralize the German advantage of
rapidity. Delay would be profitable for Russia, but might
prove fatal to Germany.

For Germany rapidity of action seemed to be the essen-
tial condition for success. She had to strike down her
neighboring enemies in turn by utilizing to a considerable
extent identical forces, first on her western, then on her
eastern frontier. With this Napoleonic method once
adopted, the strategic problem for such a campaign as that
of 1914 resolved itself into the two main questions of the
order and the method of attack. The fact that France
would be ready first made her the suitable recipient for
Germany's first and most vehement attentions.

The determination of the general method for the German
assault on France was the function of strategy. In conse-
quence of the frequent confusion in the use of the two terms
strategy and tactics, a very brief digression may not be out
of place at this point for the purpose of defining as clearly as
possible the distinction between them — a distinction which,
as will presently be shown, the continuity and magnitude
of the battles of the first campaign tended to obliterate.

Formation of the Great German Plan 5

Strategy and tactics together comprise the art and prac-
tice of war. The scope of strategy is broader than that of
tactics. Strategy is the method of disposing the troops in
masses and directing their movements towards the object
of the campaign while they are not actually engaged in
battle. Tactics is the method of conducting the evolu-
tions of the military forces while engaged in battle. The
field of strategy is the whole theater of operations; the field
of tactics is confined to the battlefield. Strategy relates to
the movement of armies when not in contact with the
enemy, tactics to the maneuvers carried on when hostile
contact has been established.

A brief survey of the prominent physical features of the
territory where a campaign between France and Germany
might conceivably develop will illuminate the considera-
tions which influenced the German General Stafi^ in devis-
ing their method for delivering the intended staggering
blow against France, which determined, in other words,
the general lines of their strategy in the West.

Two river systems first claim our attention; the Rhine
with its tributaries, the Moselle and the Meuse, which sur-
pass it in immediate strategical importance for this cam-
paign; and the Seine with its tributaries, the Oise (with
the Aisne) and the Marne, which likewise surpass in sig-
nificance for our present purpose the larger stream which
receives their waters. Between the Moselle and the Rhine,
the Vosges Mountains, rising to an elevation of nearly
5,000 feet, form a natural barrier along about one-half of
the common boundary of France and Germany. They are
extensively wooded and recall somewhat in appearance
the Alleghany Mountains of Pennsylvania.

In its general physiognomy Belgium may be likened to
two isosceles triangles of unequal size, the larger one above
with its base to the north, the smaller one below with its

6 The Great War

base against the lower right-hand side of the upper triangle,
the line of contact formed by continuous sections of the
courses of the Sambre and the Meuse. The generally
rugged region of the Ardennes occupies the greater part
of the area of the lower triangle. It is relatively arduous
for the passage of armies, as compared with the conditions
generally in western Europe. But the employment of
motor-vehicles for transporting suppHes has greatly dimin-
ished the difficulties of operations in this region. A glance
at the plan of the German strategic railways recently con-
structed in the region of the Eifel, in Germany, directly
eastward of the Ardennes, would seem to indicate that the
Germans were not dismayed at the prospective difficulties
of provisioning large armies in this region of Belgium.
The Meuse runs through a deep ravine, bounded in many
parts by rocky, precipitous walls, from Mezieres to Namur,
and through a somewhat less abrupt depression from
Namur to Liege.

The upper triangle is occupied by the Belgian plain,
rolling in the east, but gradually becoming absolutely flat
towards the west. It is traversed in all parts by the lines
of the densest network of railways in Europe. Its lines
of communication eastward converge on Liege near the
eastern extremity of the triangle. Liege is not only the key
to the valley of the Meuse directly above it, but it gathers
within itself practically all the railway traffic between Bel-
gium and Germany. It scarcely yields precedence in
strategic importance to any of the fortified points which
we shall have occasion to consider.

The obvious goal for a German offensive against France
was Paris, and three general routes were available to this
objective point, as follows:

(1) From Cologne across the Belgian frontier near Aix-
la-Chapelle, through Liege, up the valleys of the Meuse

Formation of the Great German Plan 7

and the Sambre, into France near Maubeuge and thence
down the valley of the Oise.

(2) From Coblenz and the valley of the Moselle west-
ward across Luxemburg, into France by Longwy and
Stenay, across the Meuse and down the valley of the Aisne.

(3) From Strassburg and Alsace across Lorraine, between
the Vosges and Metz, through Nancy, between the great
barrier fortresses of Toul and Epinal, and westward down
the valley of the Marne.

Of course these indications must not be taken in too
narrow or literal a sense. The course of armies advanc-
ing in these general directions might be represented on
the map more appropriately by broad bands than by lines.

Alleged forays by German cavalry patrols, even before
hostilities had actually been declared, near Luneville and in
front of Longwy, might have served as portents of impend-
ing invasion by the second and third of these routes.

The invasion of France by the first route involved the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium; an advance by the
second route, that of Luxemburg.

The German authorities professed to regard it as a matter
of life and death to advance into France by the quickest
and easiest route so as to strike their overwhelming blow
at the earliest possible moment. The strongly fortified
eastern border of France was the most palpable argument
for the selection of the Belgian route. But the momen-
tous decision of Germany to disregard the neutrality of her
friendly but feeble neighbor was based at the same time
upon a strategical principle of universal appHcability.

In their simplest terms the German doctrines of tactics
and strategy were essentially identical. The second was only
the expansion of the first to cover the wider field; and the
truth is, that, with the vast extent of the battle lines in the
present war and the often continuous fighting for long

8 The Great War

periods, the distinction between the two could not in
any case have been considerable. The German doctrine of
tactics is based upon a presumption of available numerical
superiority. As superior forces naturally advance upon a
front more widely extended than the front of their enemy,
so as to make their superiority effective, their most natural
course of action is to turn their adversary's flank, roll
his battle line back upon itself with the almost inevit-
ably ensuing panic and confusion, stifle him in a deadly
embrace, and so annihilate him as a combatant. German
authorities prescribed the most energetic application of
the enveloping maneuver with a formidable pressure at the
same time on all parts of the enemy's line to engage and
pin down his forces. The enveloping maneuver was the
essential feature of official German tactics. The German
General Staff employed it in directing the movements
of the tremendous forces operating against France with
almost the precision of the deployment on a single battle-
field. In their unity of design, the movements through-
out the greater part of the first campaign in France
might almost be regarded as a single battle of enormous
dimensions.

Interpreting the spirit of German strategy, we may re-
gard it as the operation of swift, tremendous momentum,
of well-considered boldness, of a studied conviction of
superiority. German strategists had been attentive students
of Napoleon's campaigns, and Napoleon declared that the
force of an army, like momentum in mechanics, is the
product of the mass multiplied by the velocity. German
principles of strategy are based upon the presumption of
an immediate, though perhaps only transient, numerical
superiority. The natural goal of German strategy is, there-
fore, to force on decisive action while this superiority is
still available at the critical time and place.

Formation of the Great German Plan 9

The common frontier of Germany and France afforded
no room for the great enveloping movement. The French
armies completely filled it, supported by their almost im-
pregnable barrier fortresses, their wings covered by neu-
tral Belgium and neutral Switzerland. The characteristic
maneuver of German strategical teachings could not be
employed without the violation of the neutrality of one of
these two states whose territories flanked the French posi-
tion, and every consideration of expediency demanded that
the turning movement should be made across Belgium.

The German General Staff had probably decided as far
back as 1904 not to hesitate to take any step which would
insure success in the event of war with France and Rus-
sia, and particularly to snatch promptly the advantage of
traversing Belgium to invade northern France, where the
immense German forces could conveniently deploy in
the rear of the French armies concentrated along the
eastern frontier. This plan had been set forth in a note-
worthy memorandum by General von Schlieffen. The
irrepressible General von Bernhardi had done his best to
advertise it, and many pamphlets and articles had been
written in Belgium and France to sound the note of warn-
ing against this very project. Yet, strangely enough, the
disposition and operations of the French forces, even after
the violation of Belgian neutrality had actually taken place,
were such as to indicate either an utter failure to suspect
that the bulk of the attacking forces would pass through
Belgium, or, what is even more incomprehensible, a feeling
of confidence that the inadequate garrisons of Liege and
Namur and the only half-prepared Belgian field army
would be able to stem such a human torrent.

The concealment of the real nature of the great German
maneuver in its early stages was a masterpiece of secrecy.
While the public in the western capitals was beguiled with

10 The Great War

the notion that the Germans were hopelessly embarrassed
in the execution of their plan, or exulted in tidings which
magnified trivial engagements into splendid victories, the
human deluge was mounting higher and higher behind
the floodgates. Before long the barriers were swept away
and a sea of belligerent humanity burst over the Belgian
plain. Nobody had fully anticipated the astounding bold-
ness of the German plan, which consisted in throwing a
defensive screen of troops along the line of the Vosges,
engaging the attention and arousing the apprehension of
the French in Lorraine, but gathering the chief strength
for the tremendous blow in the north, crossing the Meuse
wherever possible between Vise and Dinant, taking Liege
and Namur by assault, marching by way of Brussels, and
utilizing the various routes from there towards Paris.

A combination of theories and circumstances made the
French methods of warfare the opposite of the German.

After the French disasters in 1870-1871 the opinion pre-
vailed in France that the Germans had won by the audacious
methods of Napoleon I, and it became a settled conviction
that the imitation of his generalship was the key to victory
French professors of military science reduced their observa-
tions of Napoleon's methods to a practical system. His
practice in tactics, according to their teaching, was not
based upon a predetermined plan of battle. It consisted
in rapping on all parts of the enemy's front to discover the
weakest place and, when this vulnerable spot had been
found, in directing against it a sudden, shattering blow with
all available forces, particularly with strong reserves held
in anticipation of this critical movement at some distance
in the rear of the battle front. With this theory as its
prototype, the offensive is described by the French Field-
Service Manual of 1895 as composed of three distinct opera-
tions: (1) the preparatory conflict in search of the weak

Formation of the Great German Plan U

spot; (2) the decisive attack at the feeble point; (3) the
entry into action of the general reserve. The purpose of
this system of tactics is to perforate the enemy's line and
roll the parts thus severed back upon themselves.

With the French, the offensive in tactics and strategy
had as the common essential element the piercing of the
enemy's front. But in spite of the general precept that
the offensive alone will produce decisive results, strategy
includes the defensive action also. The situation seemed
to demand of the French a more cautious attitude. It
made the expediency of the offensive and the occasion for
its application debatable points for them. French strategists
were confronted with the prospect of a serious numerical
inferiority in a war with Germany. The French had con-
stantly before them the problem of compensating for this
weakness by the employment of greater flexibility and
discernment, by circumspection and economy in the use
of their resources in men, and by maintaining a relative
degree of compactness in the general disposition of their
masses of troops to permit rapid movement to and fro for
support.

The conditions seemed to preclude a general French
offensive in a war against Germany, except perhaps in very
close concurrence with the operations of Russia, and the
supposed sluggishness of Russian mobilization and con-
centration seemed to exclude the hope of an opportunity
for such combined action in the early weeks of hostilities.

The normal plan of campaign for the French, as adopted
after an initial period of vacillation in 1914, may be de-
scribed as follows. The forces are grouped in a certain
number of separate masses, placed in positions with con-
nection on interior lines, in expectation of the enemy's
offensive movement. The mass which first receives the
hostile impact retreats fighting, decreasing as far as possible

12 The Great War

the momentum of the enemy's mass by its resistance while
it retires. The compactness of the general disposition of
the different masses of the French forces increases in pro-
portion as this fighting mass falls back towards the common
center. The capacity of this one mass to withdraw fight-
ing before a vastly superior invading army without losing
its organization is crucial for the success of the general
scheme, and even for the safety of the entire army. Finally,
by a common converging movement of all the masses,
the others take their places by the side of the first. Ad-
vantage is then taken of the local superiority thus produced
to crush and break through the portion of the invading
forces directly in contact, and then to overwhelm sepa-
rately the parts of the enemy's extended line, when,
after wheeling about, they approach the critical point of
operations, embarrassed and delayed by their change of
plan and direction.

A French general plan of strategics was thus opposed to
a German one. Each was suited to the circumstances,
though not necessarily to the temper of the respective
combatants. For the waiting attitude prescribed by the
French plan was at variance with the traditional, and
generally accepted, theory that the French were tem-
peramentally incapable of fighting at their best on the
defensive.

The Germans concentrated their efforts on enveloping
their enemy, the French aimed to penetrate the front of
their adversary. The Germans wished to push operations
to a decisive issue with the utmost possible speed. It was
natural that French strategy should aim to delay as long as
possible a decisive collision. For time would fight for the
side whose antagonist's initial superiority was subject to
progressive diminution. The French held large forces in
reserve for the decisive moment; the Germans, scorning

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Formation of the Great German Plan 13

such a precaution, brought all their forces into immediate
action for the single, tremendous maneuver.

It was naturally to be expected that the ultimate issue of
the campaign would depend mainly upon which of the
two plans should prove more effective. But curiously
enough, before the campaign was many weeks old, the
rapid course of events led each antagonist to employ the
peculiar maneuver of his opponent's strategy, as will be
explained in the appropriate connection.

In the treatment of the period embraced in the present
volume it will be convenient to observe a number of sub-
divisions based upon the successive stages in the develop-
ment of the principal action, as follows :

(1) August 4-15. The attack on Liege was the natural
beginning of the execution of the German plan. Before
the swelling tide of invasion destroyed the barrier at Liege,
operations in the Belgian plain west and north of the
Meuse, growing chiefly out of cavalry reconnaissances,
were of slight importance.

(2) August 15-22. The remaining obstruction was swept
away on the 15th and the deluge rolled with irresistible
momentum across the Belgian plain. In the space of a
week the principal masses of the army of invasion ad-
vanced without opposition of serious consequence from
the Meuse at Liege to the line Namur-Charleroi-Mons,
while other bodies of German troops advanced to the
upper Meuse.

(3) August 23-September 5. The capture of Namur
and the defeat of the Allies on the line of the Sambre and
between Charleroi and Mons opened France to invasion.
The grayish-green billow rushed forward with awful vol-
ume, tearing away every restriction in its course, and broke
with angry violence at the very foot of the defenses of
Paris and along: the banks of the Marne.

14 The Great War

(4) September 6-10. A battle of unprecedented magni-
tude was the turning point in the campaign. The initial
momentum of the German invasion was finally checked.
A dike was successfully interposed against the flood that
was inundating France. The conclusion of the Battle of
the Marne and the commencement of the German retreat
to the Aisne might seem to be a suitable termination for
this present volume. But considerations of proportion in
the division of the material as a whole, and the continuity
of all the military action in the West in the autumn of
1914 make it appropriate to interpret the operation of the
original German plan in a broader sense and include the
treatment of events whose dependence on the original im-
pulsion is not quite so immediate.

(5) September 10-23. The receding tide halted after
passing the Aisne. Strong positions had been prepared
in the hills on the north side of the river, heavy artillery
had been mounted, and what the Allies at first regarded as
only a rear-guard action to cover the further retreat devel-
oped into a general battle, which raged for about two
weeks with intermittent periods of exceptional fury, and
fixed the limit of the Teutonic inundation for many
months.

(6) September 23-October 15. The forces of invasion
restrained in front expanded laterally. A formidable con-
centration of Allied forces at Amiens on September 21st
threatening the right flank of the enemy's position and an
important movement of German forces to St. Quentin in
response mark the beginning of a veritable race in pro-
longing the two opposing fronts, each party striving to
outflank the other, until their progress was halted at the
coast of the North Sea. This movement furnished the
chief immediate motive for the determined attack upon
and capture of Antwerp.

Formation of the Great German Plan 15

(7) October 16-November 11. The German armies
were still impelled by a frenzied resolve to achieve the
purpose of the campaign. A tremendous blow was
launched at the northwestern extremity of the Allied line.
The much-heralded intention of penetrating to Calais was
perhaps a somewhat n:iisleading indication of the chief
intent of the enterprise, which was probably designed
as a renewed attempt to fulfil the original purpose of the
campaign by turning the general Allied position. Des-
perate encounters continuing for about three weeks with
terrible bloodshed served only to consolidate the positions
of the opposing armies.

(8) November 11-December 31. An equilibrium of
forces was thus produced in the West. The fighting be-
came intermittent and finally subsided into comparative
calm. The first great plan had reached its culmination
without decisive results.

Sound considerations of strategy, as already explained,
prescribed for the French army a firm defensive attitude
in the early stages of a war with Germany, until a Russian
invasion of Germany on a formidable scale had been fairly
launched, or until the Germans had been drawn into a
position in the West where the French could bring superior
strength to bear against them at the strategically critical
point. But contrary to this principle by which the opera-
tions of the French forces were in general conducted, the
French at the very outset yielded to the impulse of invad-
ing Alsace and Lorraine, an action which deviated entirely
from the regular development of events according to the
normal plans of the two adversaries, as outlined above.

In the first period of the campaign French advance
guards hastily penetrated both Alsace and Lorraine, but
were driven back to the frontier in a few days. A very
much stronger French force invading German Lorraine

16 The Great War

between Metz and the Vosges in the second period was
defeated on August 21st and 22d and thrown back into
France, suffering considerable loss. A similar invasion
of Alsace from the direction of Belfort was likewise
fruitless.

From the point of view of the German plan and the
operations conducted in the endeavor to accomplish its
fulfilment, which we regard as the unifying principle for
the treatment of the first campaign, events in the East, in
spite of the enormous forces involved in them, are subor-
dinate to those in the western theater. During the most
important part of this campaign the Germans possessed
the initiative. They were able, in other words, to attack
wherever they wished. They chose to direct their supreme
effort against France. Russia could evade defeat a long
time by reason of her vast size, and therefore the first deci-
sive results had to be sought in France. The destruction
of the army of the Allies in the West was doubtless re-
garded by the German General Staff at the beginning of
the war as the necessary antecedent to offensive operations
of a decisive character against Russia.

For these reasons it is suitable that the narrative of
events in the East should be adjusted to the general scheme
of treatment for the entire campaign based upon the con-
tinuous course of events in the West. The original plan
of the Central Empires provided, doubtless, that Austria-
Hungary should dispatch a sufficient army to subdue Serbia
and with the rest of her forces invade Russian Poland with
the object of embarrassing and breaking up the Russian
concentration, which would be in progress chiefly behind
the Vistula. This operation would serve to prolong the
time available for the great offensive movement in the
West. Meanwhile Germany would leave a few army
corps on her eastern border as a covering force.

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REFERENCE

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REFERENCE

statute Miles

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^ Naval Arsenals

•• 0 Ports, Redoubts & Batteries

Principal Railways

Other Railways

v:^ Woods and Forests

538 Altitudes in feet

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Map showing northeastern France and Bclgiui

Formation of the Great German Plan 17

The prompt concentration of a considerable part of the
Russian forces disappointed the expectations of the Teu-
tonic Empires, and contributed to the failure of the Ger-
mans to reach the goal of the campaign in the West by-
compelling them to transfer a number of army corps from
France to the eastern theater of war at a critical time.

In the second period, just as the great turning move-
ment in the West had fairly started on its way, about
August 16th, the Russians invaded East Prussia and Galicia
simultaneously. They overran all the eastern part of
Galicia, forced the Austro-Hungarian army in Poland to
retreat, and took Lemberg after an eight days' battle on
September 3d. But the Russian army invading East Prussia
from the south was shattered in the Battle of Tannenberg
on August 28th by General von Hindenburg, who routed
the other army under General Rennenkampf which was
invading the same province from the east on Septem-
ber 10th.

Later, the Germans in the West attained what may be
regarded, from the comprehensive point of view of the
progress of their general plan, as a partial success in closing
their front from Switzerland to the North Sea in such a
way as to secure for the time the possession of what they
had won and to exclude the danger of a turning move-
ment by the Allies, and so to be able to transfer consider-
able forces to the eastern front. In this way they were
enabled to carry on the campaign in Poland somewhat as
originally planned. The striking feature of the remainder
of the year in this quarter was the successive desperate
attempts of the Teutonic allies to penetrate to Warsaw.

The German peaceful penetration of the Ottoman Em-
pire was described in the first volume, and a forecast was
made of its tremendous military, political, and commercial
possibilities. Very likely the German General Staff counted

18 The Great War

from the first on the participation of Turkey in the war,
which would be especially serviceable in effecting the iso-
lation of Russia by closing the Dardanelles. But it is very
doubtful whether they expected that military operations of
major importance in that quarter would be required for
their purposes. They were doubtless convinced at the
beginning that the war would be decided in Europe. A
Turkish offensive against the Suez Canal and Egypt was
planned with the concurrence, and probably at the sug-
gestion, of the German officers in Turkey. But the Ger-
mans probably regarded this movement, originally, like the
insurrections which they were prepared to encourage in
the dependencies of their opponents, as a diversion, calcu-
lated to distract their adversary's attention from the pre-
sumably critical field of operations in France.

Many are the minor questions relating to the formation
of the German plan which stimulate our curiosity. But
there is space for the treatment of only a few of them here.

A discrepancy as to German intentions is implied in the
representations made in London on August 1st and those
on August 3d. On the former date Prince Lichnowsky
hinted to Sir Edward Grey that Germany might promise
to respect Belgian neutrality if Great Britain would engage
to remain neutral in the war. On the latter date, to judge
by the proposals for British neutrality formulated by Baron
Kuhlmann of the German Embassy in London, Germany
was prepared only to engage not to make any warlike use
of the seacoast of Belgium. We may assume that the final
decision of Germany in respect to Belgium would in any
case have been made in accordance with the requirements
of the General Staff, and it would be very interesting to
know whether the attitude of the military chiefs of the
German nation underwent any change between the 1st
and 3d.

Formation of the Great German Plan 19

In treating this question we must take several possibilities
into consideration. In the first place, Prince Lichnowsky's
hint was either made at his own initiative or in consequence
of instructions from Berlin. In connection with a matter
of such gravity it seems likely that Prince Lichnowsky
spoke in accordance with a suggestion from Berlin.

The question next arises whether such a suggestion was
made by the German Foreign Office from purely political
motives regardless of the plans of the General Staff or with
conscious reference to the opinion of the General Staff.
In the second case we may assume that it reflects an atti-
tude of indecision on the part of the General Staff as late
as August 1st with regard to the Belgian field of opera-
tions. The final decision to invade Belgium must then
have been made between the conversation on the 1st and
the publication of the German proposal to Great Britain
on the 3d. Perhaps the decision of Italy to remain neu-
tral influenced the attitude of the General Staff in this
matter between these two dates. Italy's decision was un-
doubtedly a great disappointment to them. But it is much
more consistent with all the other evidence of German
military plans and intentions to suppose that the design of
traversing Belgium had been definitely adopted before
August 1st. If this is true Prince Lichnowsky's suggestion
does not in any way reflect the military attitude. It might
indicate a lingering lack of harmony of view between the
German General Staff and the Foreign Office. But it is
far more likely that Prince Lichnowsky's inquiry, whether
Great Britain would remain neutral if Germany would
give an engagement not to violate Belgian neutrality, was
merely a bluff, a diplomatic maneuver intended to make
Great Britain appear as the irreconcilable party.

It is quite natural that the suggestion should have been
made that political and economic, in addition to strictly

20 The Great War

military, considerations were a prominent factor in the
deliberations of the German General Staff for determining
the direction of the offensive movement in the West; that
special circumstances outside the field of strategy invested
Belgium vv^ith an alluring influence of great potency for
the leaders of German military policy.

With the vivid impression in one's mind of Germany's
discontent with her inadequate colonial possessions, it
is difficult to escape the suggestion that the invasion
of Belgium in 1914 was related to the desire to attain
control of the great Belgian dependency in the Congo
basin.

When the annexation of the Boer republics by Great
Britain blighted German hopes of a future Teutonic South
Africa, Germany turned her attention to other suitable
opportunities for colonial expansion in the Dark Continent.
She apparently conceived the idea of a consolidation of ter-
ritory in Central Africa with the Congo Free State as the
core. This project might naturally lead to the extension of
German rule across the continent from the Atlantic to the
Indian Ocean. The existence of such an aspiration was
revealed by the terms for the conclusion of the Agadir in-
cident in 1911, when Germany received as compensation
for the strengthening of French influence in Morocco an
extension of territory in the French Congo which brought
the German Kamerun practically into contact with the
coveted Belgian Congo. Railways were constructed both
in Kamerun and German East Africa towards the western
and eastern boundaries of the Belgian Congo respectively,
as if the eventual connection of these two lines by a
German line across the present Belgian territory were a
part of manifest destiny. Was it not conceivable that the
situation created by the passage of German troops across
Belgium and the destruction of Belgian neutrality, if

Formation of the Great German Plan 21

judiciously exploited, would give Germany control of Bel-
gium's colonial possessions, and is it not likely that the
German General Staff was moved partly by this prospect
in planning the campaign of 1914?

We turn our attention for a moment to the conjecture
that industrial and commercial considerations were among
the factors which concurred in influencing the judgment of
the leaders of Germany in their choice of a plan of opera-
tions. An imposing array of evidence can be marshalled in
support of this opinion. More than ever before, iron and
coal are fundamental elements of strength in war and peace
alike, while the metallurgical industries are now recognized
to be the corner-stone of military as well as manufacturing
supremacy.

In the utilization of her coal supplies for the production
of mechanical energy and in the manufacturing of iron
and steel, Germany had been advancing with giant strides.
Her coal production had nearly doubled since 1900, and her
production of iron had grown from about 9,000,000 tons
to 19,000,000 tons by 1913. Coal is the modern talisman
by which treasures are amassed in the localities which pos-
sess it. Westphalia contained the leading coal-producing
area in Germany and the chief centers of the metallurgical
industries. It is the heart of manufacturing Germany. A
group of flourishing cities near the junction of the Ruhr
with the Rhine, occupying an area not too large with mod-
ern conditions to constitute a single urban community, only
require to be incorporated to take their place in the census
lists as one of the great world-cities, the prospective rival
of Berlin and Paris. Their fuel supplies, sufficient for cen-
turies, lie beneath and around them. The same carbonif-
erous basin extends under Belgium into northern France,
determining the location of the leading industrial centers
in those countries also.

22 The Great War

In a war that was to be waged as much by industry as by
arms, Germany crippled her opponents from the start by
occupying precisely these regions of Belgium and France.

Again, the great industrial center of Westphalia does not
enjoy convenient access to the sea in national territory.
Rotterdam and Antwerp have grown and prospered amaz-
ingly, chiefly because they are its natural seaports.

There are said to have been no fewer than 20,000 Ger-
man residents in Antwerp before the war, and there were
important German colonies in Brussels and other leading
cities of Belgium. Ostend and Blankenberghe were be-
coming German watering-places. Antwerp was regarded
as an outpost of Westphalia. The shipping interests of
Antwerp were largely in German hands. A large part
of the tonnage of imports and exports consisted of wares
which were destined for Germany, or originated there,
and traversed Belgium in transit. Just as in Italy and else-
where, Germany was establishing an economic supremacy
in Belgium. It is not surprising, therefore, that the belief
has been expressed that Germany already intended that
this peaceful penetration should some day ripen into an
opportunity for annexation and that she regarded the crisis
of 1914 as the culmination of this process.

Yet in spite of all this striking evidence it seems probable
that the minds of the German General Staff were domi-
nated by the purely military considerations. They could
scarcely have been blind to the great possibilities which
have been enumerated. They may have regarded them as
incidental advantages which a happy chance had placed in
their way, a sort of strategical by-product.

The evidence for the theory that the military policy of
the German General Staff was determined by the above-
mentioned extraneous motives is, after all, entirely circum-
stantial, while purely military considerations growing out

Formation of the Great German Plan 23

of the problem of confronting enemies on both the western
and eastern fronts might suffice to explain the action of
Germany in every respect. The evident supposition of the
German government that Belgium v^^ould offer no real
resistance, and therefore no pretext for political subjec-
tion, and the obvious desire to restore friendly relations,
even after the capture of Liege, contradict the opinion
that the German plan of campaign was deliberately manip-
ulated to subserve the ambitions for aggrandizement which
have just been described.

It seems likely that the original intention of the German
General Staff, exactly as implied in the text of the demands
sent to Brussels, was to occupy only enough of Belgium to
secure lines of march into France and lines of communica-
tion for their armies after their arrival in France. In other
words, the expressed intention of respecting the integrity of
Belgium was probably sincere. If this conjecture is true,
it might appear, at least to the Germans, that the Belgians
by their obstinate resistance merely played into the hands of
the extreme expansionist party in Germany, by forcing the
German government to do what in its moderation it would
not otherwise have done, namely, to occupy practically the
entire country with a plausible excuse for retaining it.

Field- Marshal Count von Moltke, the illustrious Prus-
sian Chief of Staff in the three wars which led to the estab-
lishment of the present German Empire, declared in his
essays on war :

"In the assembling and placing of the different armies
at the beginning of the war, all the various and many-sided
political, geographical, and strategical considerations must
be taken into account. It is hardly possible during the
whole course of the campaign to correct a mistake com-
mitted in the initial disposition of the armies. But there is
an abundance of time to weigh these dispositions carefully.

24 The Great War

and if this is done, they must without fail bring about the
result desired, provided, of course, the army is ready and
the system of transportation perfectly organized."

This utterance conveys a comprehensive impression of
the essential function of the General Staff, the brain of the
German army. This organ was stamped with its peculiar
character by the genius of the great von Moltke, who may
be regarded in a certain sense as the originator of the office
of Chief of the General Staff, since he brought about the
separation of this position from the post of Prussian Min-
ister of War in 1857. To-day the German General Staff
is generally regarded as the most thorough body of its
kind in the world. It has served largely as the model or
prototype for the corresponding organizations of other
countries.

General Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke was
Chief of the General Staff at the commencement of the
Great War. His appointment to this supremely responsi-
ble position in 1906 was severely criticized. It was thought
to be a consequence of the fact that he was nephew of
the illustrious strategist of the preceding generation, and
was regarded by many as a foolish act of deference to an
illustrious name. This distinguished relationship has been
at once an advantage and a misfortune for the younger
soldier. It furnished him an inspiration, an ideal, and an
example; but it suggested an ignominious distinction be-
tween von Moltke the Great and von Moltke the Less.

The almost superhuman demands upon the Chief of
Staff require a man of almost unattainable endurance, am-
plitude of intelligence, and determination. A certain simi-
larity to the uncle in outward appearance and character
suggested that the nephew was not destitute of these
essential qualities. He possessed the same sharply-cut
features, though his countenance and figure were cast in a

GENERAL JOSEPH JACQUES CESAIRE JOFFRE

Commander-in-chief of the French army.

Formation of the Great German Plan 25

more generous mold. He had the same quiet, unassuming
manner, plainness of speech, and aversion for popular dis-
play. Reserve and unobtrusiveness had become a principle
of conduct at the General Staff.

The younger von Moltke was born in Mecklenburg-
Schwerin on May 23, 1848. Determined to devote his life
to the career of an officer he joined the 86th Regiment of
Fusileers as ensign and received his commission as second
lieutenant in time to serve with distinction in the Franco-
German War, where he won the Iron Cross. He spent
the three years, 1876-1879, at the Kriegsakademie and was
ordered to duty with the General Staff at the termination
of his studies there. He was appointed captain in the
General Staff in 1881, and the next year became adjutant of
his uncle, with whom he was henceforth in intimately per-
sonal relationship until the field-marshal's retirement from
the position of Chief of Staff.

As major the younger von Moltke became personal aid
on active duty to the Kaiser in 1891, which was the begin-
ning of a long period of personal contact with the sover-
eign that was of fundamental significance for the remaining
course of his career. He w^as raised to the rank of colonel
in 1895 and commanded the 1st Grenadier Regiment of
the Guards. As major-general in 1899 he was assigned to
the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade of the Guards,
and as lieutenant-general in 1902 to that of the First Divi-
sion of the Guards. In the meantime he had became
adjutant-general to the Kaiser.

Count von Schlieffen, who enjoyed a distinguished repu-
tation as an authority on the art of war, then Chief of the
General Staff, discerning the ability of General von Moltke,
selected him as his first assistant in the post of quarter-
master-general, February 18, 1904. From this time his
ultimate advancement to the post of greatest importance as

26 The Great War

the culmination of his career could be regarded as prede-
termined. He became Chief of Staff on the retirement of
Count von Schlieffen, sixteen years after his uncle's death,
in 1906, being elevated at the same time to the rank of
general of infantry.

The supreme command of the land and naval forces of
France is nominally vested in the President of the Re-
public, and he is not excluded, constitutionally, from the
exercise of this function. But in normal circumstances
his command is exercised through the minister of war,
to whom the Chief of the General Staff is responsible.
The latter is automatically designated, as generalissimo,
in case of a serious conflict, to wield the full military
authority of the president in commanding the armies in
the field.

For nearly a century the rule has existed in France that
all generals shall retire at sixty-five, — a senseless rule that
would have deprived Germany of the services of Count
von Moltke before the triumphs which made his name
illustrious, if it had been applied in Prussia. As the French
Chief of Staff is not a commanding officer, his selection is
not subject to seniority of rank, and it was possible to pass
over generals who were nearing the age of retirement in
favor of one who had time before him for the develop-
ment of a systematic, progressive policy. In these circum-
stances General Joseph Joffre was summoned to the post
of Chief of the General Staff in 1911 as the choice of the
Caillaux ministry then in power. The appointment was
received by the press with considerable adverse criticism,
like the selection of General von Moltke to the corre-
sponding position in Germany five years before. The fact
is, that the qualities which commend an officer for appoint-
ment to this position of paramount importance are not
those most likely to win notoriety, especially in time of

Formation of the Great German Plan 27

peace. General Joffre was almost as unknown in France
in 1911 as he was abroad before the outbreak of the war
in 1914.

His conception of the duties of his position and of the
function of the General Staff is clearly expressed in the
following quotation from an address delivered at a reunion
of former students of the Ecole Polytechnique :

**To be prepared in our days has a meaning which those
who prepared for and fought the wars of other days would
have great difficulty in understanding. It would be a sad
mistake to depend upon a sudden burst of popular enthu-
siasm, even though it should surpass in intensity that of the
volunteers of the Revolution, if we do not fortify it by a
complete preparation. To be prepared to-day we must
assemble all the resources of the country, all the intelli-
gence of her children, all their moral energy, and direct
them towards a single goal : Victory !

"We must have organized everything, foreseen every-
thing. Once hostilities have begun, no improvisation will
be worth while. Whatever is lacking then will be lacking
for good and all; and the slightest lack of preparation may
involve disaster."

General Joffre brought to his position a spirit of method,
thoroughness, and efficiency which is not unlike the pre-
vailing atmosphere in the General Staff in Berlin. His
appointment has been regarded as an expression of the
new feeling of patriotism which was beginning to take
hold of the French people in 1911. His ardent republi-
canism doubtless recommended him to the Caillaux gov-
ernment. The fact that he was a Protestant enabled him
to suppress the disruptive anti-clerical agitation In the army
without exciting suspicion or diminishing his prestige. He
combines indomitable energy with thorough technical in-
formation and a comprehensive practical experience, the

28 The Great War

chief features of which we shall presently note. The
judgment of his colleagues undoubtedly confirmed his
nomination to the position in which he was to bear with
composure an unforeseen responsibility of appalling weight.

Joffre was born of comparatively humble parentage at
Rivesaltes in the extreme South of France, near the Pyre-
nees and the Mediterranean Sea. He entered the Ecole
Poly technique at the age of seventeen in 1869 for the pur-
pose of becoming an officer of engineers. He served as
sub-lieutenant in one of the forts of Paris during the siege
in 1870-1871. Raised to the rank of captain in 1876 he
was employed on defensive works on the border of France
and on the construction of some of the forts of the new
entrenched camp of Paris. He went to Indo-China in
1885 and built the defenses of Haut-Tonkin. Later, he
constructed railways and erected fortifications in the French
dependencies in Africa, and won the distinction of leading
the first French expedition to Timbuctoo.

He became brigadier-general in 1902 and director of the
engineering department at the Ministry of War. He was
raised to divisional rank in 1905, and subsequently com-
manded army corps at Lille and Amiens, a circumstance
of fundamental importance, since it gave him a thorough
knowledge of the conditions in the northern theater of
the Great War.

General J off re's activity down to 1911, while charac-
terized by usefulness and efficiency, gave no indication of
brilliancy or genius. But the signs of the times fore-
shadowed a kind of warfare in which thorough prepa-
ration, a flexible organization, administrative talent, and
firmness would count for more than daring, sensational
feats of strategy.

The three years of Joffre's administration before the war
were an indispensable period of preparation. He worked

Formation of the Great German Plan 29

in conjunction with patriotic statesmen to recreate the spirit
of enthusiasm and devotion in the army by freeing it from
the demoralization due to political intrigue. Efficiency he
made his watchword and all France was astounded by his
boldness in dismissing generals who did not measure up
to his standard of competence. If Joffre deserves to be
called the Savior of France, he deserves this title no less
by the loyal, fearless performance of his task of renovating
the army than by the unexpected brilliancy of his strategy
in the Great War.

CHAPTER II

The Die is Cast

The beginnings of great events are bathed in an atmos-
phere of solemnity when viewed in historical perspective,
even though they may be comparatively insignificant in
themselves. The incidents even which attended the initial
movements of the Great War in the diminutive Grand-
duchy of Luxemburg assume this illusory appearance. As
the clouds grew heavier in the murky, midsummer days
of 1914, the leading individuals of the Grand-duchy of
Luxemburg were chiefly concerned about the continua-
tion of their fuel supply. A war between the Great Powers
might very likely cause an interruption in the importation
of coal, upon which their principal industry depended.
The closing of the smelting works in consequence of lack
of fuel would throw a large part of the laboring class out
of work and fill the grand-duchy with want and misery.
Their supply of coal was derived almost exclusively from
Germany. Apparently they felt even less apprehension than
the Belgians about a possible violation of their neutrality.

Just as in Belgium, the shock of consternation came in
the night. Between one and two o'clock in the morning

The Die is Cast 31

of August 2d the first body of German troops crossed the
Moselle at Wasserbillig and set foot on the soil of the
grand-duchy. An automobile containing German officers
appeared in one of the suburbs of Luxemburg about five
the same morning, but withdrew at sight of Major van
Dyck, commander of the forces of the grand-duchy, the
gendarmerie of 155 men, who had taken his stand on the
famous viaduct by which the road from Trier enters the city.

The Belgian minister learned of the violation of the
territory of the grand-duchy about six and immediately
telegraphed the ominous news to Brussels.

A German armored-train of nine box-cars, and a flat-car
loaded with rails, drew up in the station of the capital about
nine in the morning. The captain of the company of
engineers who arrived in this train announced that he had
orders to occupy the station and railways. Shortly after-
wards the viaducts leading into the city were occupied and
German sentinels were posted before the post office and
other public buildings. Other trains loaded with German
troops arrived in great numbers during the day from all
points.

On the 4th M. Mollard, French Minister at Luxem-
burg, was dismissed at the dictation of Herr von Buch, the
German Minister, and the latter proposed that French
interests in Luxemburg should be entrusted to the care
of the Belgian minister for the duration of the war.
This rather obscure circumstance testifies to the belief of
the German government that Belgium would comply with
their demands, or would not, in any case, carry her resist-
ance so far that a complete rupture in diplomatic relations
between the two countries would be necessitated. For of
course Germany would be no more disposed to tolerate in
Luxemburg a diplomatic representative of a hostile Bel-
gium than of a hostile France.

32 The Great War

On the 8th the German military authorities in Luxem-
burg demanded that Count de Jehay, the Belgian Minister,
should leave the grand-duchy, and in compliance with this
command, as reluctantly transmitted by the Minister of
State, President of the Government, M. Eyschen, he de-
parted the next day by w^ay of Coblenz, Cologne, and
Holland.

Germany endeavored to justify her action in Luxem-
burg by the specious argument that the state of war made
it necessary to provide for the safety of the railways in the
grand-duchy, which were operated by the German gov-
ernment as a part of the imperial railway system of Alsace-
Lorraine. In formulating the terms of the lease by which
the grand-ducal government turned over its railways to the
German imperial management every precaution had been
taken to prevent the use of the lines for any military pur-
pose incompatible with the neutrality of the country. The
section of this agreement, which was dated November 11,
1902, bearing upon this point, article 2. is drawn up with
unusual explicitness, as follows:

"The Imperial Government binds itself never to employ
the railways of Luxemburg, as managed by the German
Imperial Directorate of the Railways of Alsace-Lorraine,
for the transportation of troops, arms, material of war, or
munitions, and not to use them during a war in which
Germany shall be involved for provisioning the troops in a
manner incompatible with the neutrality of the Grand-
duchy, and in general not to institute or tolerate in the
management of these lines any act which should not be in
strict accord with the duties incumbent upon the Grand-
duchy as a neutral state."

It is scarcely necessary to remark that Germany violated
the spirit as well as letter of this compact in every single
respect.

Map shiiwing by the shaded portion

The Die is Cast 33

The whole subsequent course of the campaign of 1914
is evidence, — if further evidence is needed, — of the hollow-
ness of German professions regarding Luxemburg and
Belgium. The German government represented the oc-
cupation of these territories as an absolutely indispensable
and, at the same time, very distasteful measure of self-pro-
tection, and then at once made Luxemburg as well as
Belgium the base from which to launch the most stupen-
dous aggressive movement recorded in history. Can any-
one frankly believe that the direction of all this mighty
force was merely secondary, incidental to Germany's con-
cern for the safety of her flank ? Can anyone contemplate
the human avalanche which swept from the Meuse to the
Marne, premeditated and elaborately prepared in all its
parts, the culmination of years of indefatigable toil and
forethought, the supreme effort to which all the varied
resources of Germany contributed, and then admit for a
moment that this tremendous phenomenon, proceeding as
it did, was circumstantial in the sense that any degree of
innocence or discretion, any attitude of candor or concilia-
tion on the part of these two neutral states, any precaution
short of the creation of a military establishment which
would have made Germany's enterprise clearly unprofit-
able, could have shielded Luxemburg and Belgium from
the violation of their territories ?

The German General Staff drew up their plan of cam-
paign, no doubt, with supreme indifference for all but
strategical considerations, leaving to the civilian chiefs of
the state the thankless task of palliating the violence and
injustice incidental to its execution, as best they could, in
the eyes of the world. We may safely assume that the
military leaders dictated the traverse of Belgium as the
indispensable condition, without which they refused all
responsibility for the safety of Germany.

34 The Great War

The events in Luxemburg which have been narrated
w^ere only the prelude to the drama whose real action
began on August 4th.

We considered in Volume II the circumstances of Ger-
many's brief hesitation before venturing into a game of
fortune in which the stakes were believed to be world-
power or downfall, a gamble with destruction. The fatal
die was cast on August 4th and the German boundary
near Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) became a second Rubicon
in world-history.

In several instances there is a striking coincidence in
date between important events in the first campaign of the
present conflict and those of the Franco-German War.
Thus the German forces crossed the Belgian frontier on
precisely the same date and at almost the same hour that
they commenced the invasion of France forty-four years
before. One is tempted to believe that such concurrences
were not entirely accidental. There is little doubt, for in-
stance, that the Germans put forth every effort to strike a
blow on September 1st or 2d which should repeat the
decisive victory of Sedan. We cannot suspect that the
General Staff, or even the Kaiser, was actuated by supersti-
tion or a subjective sentimental impulse in arranging the
program of the great offensive drive. But in their zeal for
arraying every favorable condition on their side, the mili-
tary authorities probably recognized, and tried to profit by,
the common human weakness for the association of dates.

The first requisite in the accomplishment of the great
German venture was the capture of Liege, the key to the
valley of the Meuse, by surprise, if possible, before the
Belgian army was concentrated or the Allies had pene-
trated the nature of the German design or had had time to
come up. General von Emmich, Commander of the Ninth
Army Corps, was doubtless a very fortunate selection as

The Die is Cast 35

leader of this first operation in the West, a stroke upon
which so much depended.

The appearance of General von Emmich in the early-
hours of August 4th among the German troops which had
been hastily concentrated on the Belgian frontier was
greeted with the most animated expressions of enthusiasm.
The hour of destiny had sounded. The crossing of the
boundary at Gemmenich in the dim gray light that pre-
cedes the dawn must have thrilled with the suggestion of
mysterious possibilities the imagination of the youthful
soldiery, convinced as they were of speedy victory, but
probably somewhat confused as to the immediate purpose
of their march. The hour in which this expedition was
set in motion had not yet taken on the character of awful
gravity with which the gradual revelation of its significance
has subsequently invested it. We now know that the im-
mense travail with which the ever prolific civilization of
ancient Europe was to bring forth a new era in the life of
man commenced at that fateful moment. Who could
realize at that time that the mere crossing of an invisible
boundary, while humanity still slumbered, would transform
the whole aspect of Hfe ? The old appearance of Europe
was rolled together as a scroll, and men awoke on the
morning of the 4th to changed impressions and a different
outlook.

The territory directly eastward of Liege is hilly, broken,
and wooded in parts. It may be regarded as the northern
extremity of the region of the Ardennes. The principal
railway line connecting Liege with Germany ascends the
valley of the Vesdre, passes through Verviers, the center
of the woolen industry of Belgium, traverses the more
rugged parts of the section by means of tunnels, and
reaches the German boundary at Herbesthal, proceeding
thence to Aix-la-Chapelle and Cologne. Northward the

36 The Great War

valley of the Meuse expands and the elevations towards
the German frontier are less abrupt.

The German columns advanced towards Liege by sev-
eral different routes. A flying column was dispatched by
the easier northerly route, from Gemmenich directly west-
ward, to seize with the least possible delay a bridge across
the Meuse at Vise ten miles below Liege. From there
forces could proceed along the left bank of the river to
cooperate in the attack on Liege, and a cavalry screen could
be extended westwards to intercept reinforcements for the
embattled city, spread panic far and wide across the Belgian
plain, and prepare the way for the further march of the main
armies. An advance-guard of 1500 men hurried forward to
Vise in 150 motor-cars, followed by the marching column.

The Germans encountered resistance from the first in
their advance on Liege. In many places the Belgians cut
down the trees which stood in rows along the highways,
causing them to fall across the roadway, and appropriated
whatever other material came to hand for the erection of
barricades. Attempts were made to blow up the railway
tunnels, and when one such effort failed near Verviers, the
Belgians started seventeen locomotives into it at full speed
from opposite directions hoping that the ensuing collisions
would fill the opening with an inextricable mass of twisted
wreckage. But the German engineers cleared out the
passage in a single night, finding several of the locomotives
practically unharmed.

The inhabitants of some of the Belgian towns and villages
appear to have taken part in resisting the invaders. Who
can be surprised? Later, notices were posted up by the
Belgian authorities warning the people not to take any part
in hostilities. But the Germans had invaded Belgium in
the night of August 3-4 without any declaration of war.
The civilian population in the villages first traversed by the

z ^

The Die is Cast 37

Germans had not been warned of the serious legal aspect
and grave consequences of their participation in acts of
hostility. Germany's final notification of her intentions
was not presented in Brussels until about 6 o'clock on the
morning of the 4th. The people, who were surprised
and startled by this sudden irruption, regarded themselves
as victims of a treacherous outrage. They believed that
they acted in righteous defense of their homes, but the
Germans retaliated upon them with the severity which
was soon to become proverbial.

In the midst of their intricate and generally accurate
calculations, the German strategists had failed to anticipate
the heroic resistance of the Belgian nation, which occa-
sioned a very annoying and perplexing delay in the execu-
tion of their great plan. The Germans had industriously
collected a vast store of knowledge about the material
resources and political conditions of their possible antag-
onists. But very likely those whose duty it was to assimilate
and utilize as a guide to policy this mass of intelligence
were embarrassed by a plethora of information. The
German government displayed an incapacity to appreciate
the more subtle, emotional forces which actuate the con-
duct of nations in grave emergencies, the revulsion of na-
tional feeling, and the outburst of patriotism. They failed
to attribute to their adversaries the same spiritual qualities
upon the existence of which in their own nation they so
largely depended for the success of their bold design.
Afflicted with the characteristic myopia of national egotism
they could only perceive the lofty impulses of their own
people. They assumed that the German nation would alone
be impelled by an irresistible outburst of enthusiasm; while
the spirit of its enemies would remain comparatively cold.

In the moment of elation, in eager expectation of a
rapid, brilliant consummation of their immediate enterprise

38 The Great War

against France, the German leaders encountered a bitter,
irritating, determined resistance where it had not been
expected. The civilian population, roused to a fury of
resentment, unfortunately took part in some instances in
this resistance. The invaders were exasperated, inflamed
with a spirit of unreasoning indignation. The strictly lim-
ited time at their disposal for the rush to Paris, the exact-
ing marching schedule, and consequently frantic concern
for promptness of movement intensified their irritation at
any unforeseen cause for delay. It is not surprising, how-
ever outrageous it may seem in the tranquil remoteness of
abstract reflection, that they retaliated most harshly upon
the civilian population, making the innocent suffer with
the guilty, interpreting the conventional rules of war in the
most relentless fashion.

A German official communique characterizes the opera-
tions leading to the capture of Liege as follows :

** Our difficulties lay in the very unfavorable character of
the hilly, wooded country, and in the treacherous partici-
pation of the whole population, even the women, in the
conflict. They fired from ambush, from the cover of vil-
lages and forests upon our troops, upon the surgeons who
tended the wounded, and even upon the wounded them-
selves. There was severe, desperate fighting; whole vil-
lages had to be destroyed to crush the resistance, until
finally our gallant troops forced their way through the
girdle of forts and took the city.'* Making reasonable
amplification to compensate for the probable reserve of
such an official description, the imagination unfolds a lurid
tragedy of hatred, rage, and fury, and depicts the melan-
choly spectacle of a devastated, ruined countryside.

A discussion of the methods employed for repressing
the supposed intractability of the civilian population in Bel-
gium must be postponed to a subsequent chapter, where

The Die is Cast 39

the general subject of the alleged atrocities will be treated.
One observation may be made here with regard to the
activity and punishment of franc-iireurs, as the irregular
combatants are commonly called. To whatever conclusion
the sifting of the evidence will lead, the majority of the
American people will, for the present, ascribe to the discus-
sion in relation to Belgium a merely speculative significance.
For, until the Germans can prove their right to be in Bel-
gium at all, until they can divest their forcible presence of
the appearance of outlawry, unbiased opinion will not
admit that the unqualified guilt of the Belgian franc-tireurs
can be established on the basis of the charges preferred
against them.

It is always difficult to secure the concurrence of neutral
opinion in the condemnation, of civilians for participation
in acts of warfare, because, by the very nature of the situa-
tions from which such accusations originate, they are
always made by invaders, oppressors, or alien rulers, so
that those who are thus incriminated enjoy the advantage
of an assumption in their favor of justifiable motives, as
defenders of their own homes. Humanity is inclined to
condone their guilt even when it is sufficiently authenti-
cated. It may be remarked that the same German press
which denounced the resistance of Belgian civilians in a
tone of righteous indignation in 1914 greeted similar action
by the civilian population of the Boer republics as deeds
of gallant heroism at the time of the South African War in
1899-1902.

Vise was a tranquil little town of about 4,000 inhabitants,
two miles south of the Dutch boundary, lying pleasantly
along the eastern bank of the Meuse. The Belgian engi-
neers from Liege blew up the iron bridge at Vise before
the Germans could seize it. For some time the Belgian
artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, and notably the

40 The Great War

guns from Pontisse, the nearest of the forts of Liege, which
was about five miles away, prevented the construction of
pontoon bridges at this point, but finally the Germans
effected a crossing. Later, some of the inhabitants of Vise
were charged with firing on the Germans, and as retribution
the town was pillaged and burned, earning the melancholy
distinction, heralded throughout the world, of being the
first town to be destroyed in the track of the invaders.

Liege, the " Birmingham of Belgium," with its popula-
tion of about 185,000 souls, is the center of the metallurgi-
cal industries of the country. Its fuel supply has been
accumulated by nature beneath and around it. The ugly,
cone-shaped mounds of refuse in every direction reveal
the location of the pit-mouths of the collieries. The city
is stretched out in the winding valley of the Meuse at the
point where it receives the waters of its tributaries, the
Ourthe and the Vesdre, from the right. The heart of Liege
lies on the left bank of the Meuse, where the level space
by the river is quite narrow, and the city seizes every
opportunity to climb the irregular, confining hillsides.
There is an extensive tract of level land between the rivers
where the buildings were located for the international ex-
position of 1905, held in commemoration of the seventy-
fifth anniversary of the establishment of Belgium as an
independent state. At Seraing, above the city on the
Meuse, are the famous John Cockerill Works, founded by
an Englishman in 1817, famous steel and iron manufac-
turers, well-known makers of firearms.

We are too apt to think of Liege as a single fortress,
with close communication between all its parts, and conse-
quently to feel astonishment at the apparent confusion of
statement as to the date of its capture. The truth is that
Liege as a stronghold was a combination of entirely separate
defensive units. The city itself possessed no immediate

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The Die is Cast 41

fortifications. But a series of twelve isolated forts, sit-
uated at distances varying from 6,500 to 10,000 yards from
the center of the city, formed a girdle around Liege. The
perimeter thus outlined was about thirty-three miles in
circuit. The fall of the city did not necessarily imply the
fall of the forts, nor did the loss of any individual fort
inevitably involve the loss of its neighbors.

The forts were either triangular or trapezoidal in design.
They were constructed chiefly in concrete on the cupola
system, steel domes protecting the guns and gunners. The
forts were divided into two classes according to their size,
the larger ones alone being capable of very effective resist-
ance. Of these, Forts Barchon, Fleron, and Boncelles were
situated on the left side of the Meuse, and Forts Pontisse,
Loncin, and Flemalle on the right. The larger forts except
Flemalle were roughly triangular in plan with the base
towards the city and the apex in the supposed direction of
attack. Each consisted of a huge concrete mass and was
surrounded by a moat. According to the normal scheme,
there was a steel turret in the center with two 15-centimeter
guns, and there were four other turrets, placed in such a way
as to form the corners of a quadrilateral enclosing the first,
which mounted 11-centimeter guns. There were also dis-
appearing turrets at the corners of the forts with smaller
quick-firing guns. As we shall presently observe, the guns
in the forts were in the end hopelessly outclassed by the
siege-artillery brought up by the Germans. In the subter-
ranean chambers, formed in concrete, the ammunition was
stored and the garrison could take refuge. There were also
outer defenses whence infantry with rifles and machine-
guns could repel the attacks of storming parties.

Most of the forts were invisible from the interior of the
city. In fact a stranger would scarcely have suspected
their existence. The intervals between successive forts in

42 The Great War

the girdle varied from 2,800 to 7,000 yards. These inter-
vening spaces had never been fortified in any way. It is
reported that more than 50,000 men were hastily set to
work, shortly before the arrival of the Germans, preparing
earthworks to facilitate the defense of these open spaces;
but the work was far from complete and of little value
when the attack began.

The garrison of Liege and the forts was altogether in-
adequate. The total Belgian forces in the intrenched camp
of Liege did not exceed 30,000 at any time. They were
manifestly too weak to defend the broad intervals between
the forts. They should have been at least twice as numer-
ous. Most of them withdrew after the Germans occupied
the city. The garrisons left in the forts were small, and
many of the gunners had received no adequate training.

The storming of the city was a distinct performance in
the series of operations carried on by the Germans in the
vicinity of Liege. A few of the forts were taken at the
same time. The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth German
Army Corps had been hastily concentrated on the Belgian
frontier without waiting to be mobilized. Light columns
were thrown forward without siege-artillery or extensive
supplies. They expected to take the city by surprise, where
abundant stores of provisions would presumably be found.
The German soldiers who first arrived before Liege doubt-
less suflFered considerable hardship from lack of food in
consequence of the prolongation of the resistance of the
city beyond the prevision of their commanders.

At most about 40,000 Germans were engaged in the
operations which culminated in the capture of Liege itself.
General von Emmich afterwards declared that his forces
did not exceed this number, a statement which is not incon-
sistent with the official announcement that Liege was taken
by six brigades on a peace footing, with cavalry and artillery.

The Die is Cast 43

On the evening of the 4th troops of the Seventh Corps,
who had advanced by the direct route from Aix-la-
Chapelle via Herve, attacked Forts Fleron and Evegnee.
By August 5th German columns were advancing into
Belgium wherever the routes were practicable. On the
5th and 6th the German infantry made repeated attempts
to capture some of the forts of Liege by rushing forward
in dense masses to reach the supposed zone of safety inside
the range and below the trajectory of the heavy guns. But
there they were received by the defenders of the outworks
with volleys from rifles and machine-guns and repulsed
with serious losses. On the 5th Prince Frederick Charles,
grandson of the victor of Orleans and Le Mans, won his
first laurels by penetrating momentarily into the city with
a small detachment of cavalry. An airship, Zeppelin VI,
coming from Cologne flew over Liege on the night of the
5th. It hurled a bomb from an elevation of about six hun-
dred yards, and then, descending to a height of three
hundred yards, it dropped twelve others in succession,
setting fire to the city in several places and causing tempo-
rary consternation.

Portions of the Tenth Army Corps, approaching by way
of Spa, probably from Malmedy, arrived before Liege on
the morning of the 6th, and attacked Chaudfontaine and
Boncelles to the southeast and south of the city. The
Ninth Army Corps received the task of attacking the forts
to the north, probably on both sides of the Meuse. As
on subsequent occasions, the Germans exhibited in their
operations before Liege a predilection for night attacks.
Some of their fiercest assaults on the forts were delivered
in the darkness, when the fitful gleam of searchlights, the
glare of bursting shells, and the reflection of conflagrations
invested an actual Inferno with the added terror of a weird,
fantastic setting.

44 The Great War

The severest fighting took place on the 6th. The Ger-
man attacks were repelled in several quarters, particularly
on the left bank of the Meuse, with heavy loss. But at
nightfall General von Emmich forced his way at the head
of the 14th brigade into the obsolete fort and barracks of
La Chartreuse, situated on a commanding elevation directly
east of the city. General von Emmich won enormous
popularity with his soldiers by his personal bravery, dash,
and vim, and by his active participation in the fighting
before Liege where he was frequently exposed to fire.
During the night of the 6th the Germans advancing from
the east took possession of three of the bridges spanning
the river within Liege, and in the morning the occupation
of the city was accomplished. Several of the forts were
stormed or silenced on the same day.

The capture of Liege was officially announced on the
7th by one of the Kaiser's aides-de-camp in the Lust-
garten opposite the palace in Berlin. This apparently
signal achievement on the sixth day of mobilization was
the cause of great rejoicing. But the populace undoubt-
edly made no distinction between the forts which were
still holding out and the city itself, and believed that every
obstacle to the further progress of German arms at this
point had been overcome. The Order pour le inerite was
conferred by the Kaiser upon General von Emmich in
recognition of his service at Liege.

After the occupation of Liege there was a lull in the
operations until the heavy siege-artillery was brought up.
It was reported that the Kaiser himself gave orders that no
more German lives should be sacrificed in storming attacks
on the remaining forts. The Germans had apparently
reaped what advantage they could gain by rapidity of
action. The forts still commanded the railway communi-
cations westward. But they could be silenced one by one

Bridge at Liege destroyed by the retreating Belgians and jiontoon bridge construeteil

by the Germans.

Dinant : The citadel on the heights, with tlie city close to the Ri\ er Meuse. All tlie
houses, with the Church of Notre-Danie and tlie bridge on the riglit, were desfroyeil by

the (leiiiKin shell-hre and incemliarisni.

The Die is Cast 45

as soon as the heavy artillery arrived. The Germans would
then have the advantage of bombarding the forts from
the reverse, the inner side, whence attack had not been
anticipated in their design. In the meantime, the German
concentration for the main advance across Belgium was
not complete.

The forts on the right bank of the Meuse were the first
to be taken. With the German siege-artillery which was
brought up some of the new 42-centimeter (16.8-inch)
Krupp mortars made their first appearance. Vague rumors
of such mammoth engines of destruction were already
afloat. A temporary track was laid to a public square in
the heart of Liege by which some of these pieces were
brought up and set in position. They deliver projectiles
weighing about a ton and a quarter. The violence of the
discharge broke all the windows in the vicinity, caused
the buildings to quiver and vibrate, and made ceilings col-
lapse. Five projectiles launched from these fearful mon-
sters are said to have silenced two of the girdle forts.

When compelled to retire from the city, General Leman,
the heroic commander of Liege, withdrew to Fort Loncin,
which dominated the railway westward to Louvain and
Brussels. The bombardment of Loncin by 28-centimeter
howitzers was begun on August 13th and continued about
twenty-six hours at the rate of six shells a minute. When
the fort was finally taken General Leman was found lying
in one of the passages below the surface, unconscious from
the effect of the poisonous gases diffused by the explosion
of the German shells. The steel turrets of the forts were
smashed and the solid concrete was fairly pulverized by the
masses of metal discharged by the German siege-artillery.

The Germans took about 4,000 prisoners in the opera-
tions around Liege. Otherwise the losses of the Belgians
were probably not very heavy.

46 The Great War

The fact that the capture of Liege inaugurated the
greatest war in history and the most dramatic movement
in that war; the sensation created by the appearance of
the new German siege artillery, the greatest surprise of the
war; and the intimate association in the minds of so many
people in neutral countries with the feeling of indignation
aroused by a course of action which outraged their most
elementary conceptions of right and justice, emphasize,
perhaps unduly, the impression produced by the events
described in the present chapter. The Germans proclaimed
the capture of Liege as a unique event in military annals,
which is probably saying too much. Admirers of Bel-
gium, deeply moved by the self-immolation of the Belgian
people on the altar of national honor, and eager to acclaim
the benefits of this sacrifice, have declared that the embar-
rassment in the execution of the German plan occasioned
by the heroic resistance at Liege, by giving time for the
concentration of the armies of the Allies on the northern
border of France, saved the French and British from an
irreparable calamity. This statement is clearly incapable
of positive proof.

It is erroneous to measure the extent of the delay in the
execution of the German plan occasioned by the Belgian
resistance as equivalent to the number of days consumed
by the Germans in capturing Liege and its forts, the period
from August 4th until August 17th. For the Germans
would in no circumstances have been ready to advance
in force as early as the 4th and the principal masses of
their field army did pass Liege before the 17th in spite
of the continued resistance of some of the forts. If
we assume, as a conservative basis, that the concentra-
tion of the German forces would not have proceeded far
enough before the 11th, the tenth day of mobilization, for
the commencement of the g-enecal offensive movement

The Die is Cast 47

westward, the extent of the delay in the execution of the
German plan of invasion caused by the resistance at Liege
would be represented by the interval of four days between
the 11th and the 15th, when the masses of the German
armies were actually set in motion, after the capture of
Loncin, which commanded the railway to Brussels. To
appreciate fully the very great importance of a four days'
respite at this very critical period for the cause of the Allies,
we need only recollect that almost all the available forces of
France had been concentrated along the eastern frontier
with practically no provision to meet the situation created
by the German movement in overwhelming strength across
Belgium. It is said that one hundred and fifty-nine trains
were immediately set in motion to effect the modification
in front required by Germany's strategy. But every day's
time was precious beyond all computation.

With the vast and complicated organization of service re-
quired by modern warfare the advantages of the offensive
are even greater than formerly. The party who assumes
the offensive translates into action his own premeditated
plan, perfected in months or years of prevision and careful
preparation. And unless his adversary correctly divines the
direction and nature of the coming blow he confronts it in
a state of frenzied agitation with arrangements hastily
adjusted and in imminent peril of falling into hopeless con-
fusion. The feverish energy of a few days in the face of a
mortal crisis can never compensate for a long period of
forethought and anticipation. In the actual situation in
August, 1914, there was the special danger that flying
squadrons of the German Crown Prince's army, which had
invaded France through the Gap of Tiercelet about August
10th, would intercept the more direct railway lines between
the eastern and northern frontiers of the country and thus
greatly impair the French communications.

48 The Great War

The world awaited breathlessly, and in part impatiently,
the arrival of French and British forces on Belgian soil.
We now know how hopeless were the predictions at that
time current in England of an impending decisive battle
somewhere near the field of Waterloo. But assuming that
the respite due to Liege was of four days' duration, with-
out this impediment in their course the German army
would have reached the line of the Sambre on the 18th
instead of the 22d, when the concentration of the French
forces in that quarter was still far from complete and the
British Expeditionary Force had not made its appearance.
The entire value of the service of the British force in the
memorable first days of the retreat from Mons was involved
in the defense of Liege, and this was at least considerable.

CHAPTER III

The Deluge Released
(August 15-22, 1914)

Renewed proposals by Germany rejected by Belgium. Disposition of the
German forces in the West about August 10th. The situation of the Ger-
mans at Liege. German cavalry foreshadowing the main advance of the
German army through Belgium. Dramatic contrast in the feelings of
assurance and consternation in the Belgian towns ; Tirlemont, Aerschot,
Louvain. The Belgian capital transferred to Antwerp. The German
march through Brussels. Reasons for the occupation of Brussels. The
German front swings to the left pivoting on Namur.

There is every reason to suppose that the German gov-
ernment thought it probable that Belgium would yield
under protest to the requirements presented in the ulti-
matum of August 2d, perhaps after offering a semblance
of resistance. The German authorities still hoped that
Belgium, after vindicating her honor by the determined
defense of Liege, would be disposed to comply with their
demands on the original terms or similar stipulations.
After the occupation of Liege, Germany repeated her
offer of friendship and the guarantee of the eventual
independence and integrity of Belgium on the condition
of the free passage of the German armies through the
country.

At the request of the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the Belgian Minister at The Hague, Baron Fallon, for-
warded to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs on
August 9th the renewed proposals of the German govern-
ment for a peaceful settlement. Germany had first solicited

50 The Great War

the mediation of the American minister at Brussels, appar-
ently with the concurrence of Mr. Gerard, the American
Ambassador at Berlin. After Mr. Whitlock, who under-
took the protection of German subjects in Belgium, de-
clined this special mission, pleading lack of instructions
from Washington, the German government through its
representative at The Hague begged the Foreign Minis-
ter, Jonkheer Loudon, to act as its intermediary in the
negotiation.

The text of the German document forwarded by Baron
Fallon to M. Davignon was as follows:

"The fortress of Liege has been taken by assault after a
brave defense. The German Government most deeply
regrets that bloody encounters should have resulted from
the Belgian Government's attitude towards Germany.
Germany is not coming as an enemy into Belgium. It is
only through the force of circumstances that she has had,
owing to the military measures of France, to take the
grave decision of entering Belgium and occupying Liege
as a base for her further military operations. Now that
the Belgian army has upheld the honor of its arms in the
most brilliant manner by its heroic resistance to a very
superior force, the German Government begs the King of
the Belgians and the Belgian Government to spare Belgium
the horrors of war. The German Government is ready
to make any compact with Belgium which can in any way
be reconciled with its contest with France. Germany
gives once more her solemn assurance that she has not
been actuated by the intention of appropriating Belgian
territory for herself, and that such an intention is far from
her thoughts. Germany is still ready to evacuate Belgium
as soon as the state of war will allow her to do so.

"The United States ambassador here concurs in this
attempt at mediation by his colleague in Brussels."

The Deluge Released 51

The final sentence remained in the original document
which was evidently forwarded to The Hague by the
American Legation in Brussels.

On August 13th M. Davignon sent the following reply
to the Belgian minister at The Hague for transmission to
the German government through the medium of the For-
eign Minister of the Netherlands:

*'The proposal made to us by the German Government
repeats the proposal which was formulated in the ulti-
matum of August 2d. Faithful to her international obli-
gations, Belgium can only reiterate her reply to that
ultimatum, the more so as since August 3d her neutrality
has been violated, a distressing war has been waged on
her territory, and the guarantors of her neutrality have
responded loyally and without delay to her appeal."

The general disposition of the German forces in the
West was first discernible about August 10th. There were
at the time apparently nineteen German army corps, and
one Austrian corps which had come to reinforce them.
The latter was the Fourteenth Corps which shared with
the Fifteenth German Corps the defense of Alsace. The
Twenty-first Corps was posted in Lorraine on the line
between Strassburg and Metz. Almost the entire extent
of the German frontier on the side of France was seemingly
guarded only by these three army corps. Notwithstanding
the elaborate preparations for the rapid concentration of
troops throughout the Reichsland, particularly the strategic
railways terminating near the French border and extensive
detraining facilities, the bulk of the German forces lay
northward of Metz. The available evidence indicated
that the forces between Metz and the Swiss frontier were
scarcely sufficient for defensive purposes.

On the contrary, as might be expected from the discus-
sion of the German plan, prodigious masses of troops were

52 The Great War

being concentrated along the western front from Dieden-
hofen (Thionville) northward. The Thirteenth Corps and
First Bavarian Corps were at, or near, Saarbriicken. These
were afterwards pushed forward to the frontier of Ger-
man Lorraine opposite Nancy. The Sixteenth Corps and
Second Bavarian Corps were at Diedenhofen and Metz.
The Eighth and Twelfth Corps were in Luxemburg and
the Third Bavarian Corps either in Luxemburg or at
Diedenhofen. The Fifth and Nineteenth Corps were in
the Ardennes, the former probably at Rochefort, the latter
at Bastogne. The Third and Eleventh Corps had crossed
the frontier further north, and occupied positions south of
the Meuse, in touch with the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Corps which still lay about Liege. The Fourteenth and
Eighteenth Corps and the Guard had apparently not
reached their final destination at the front. The Four-
teenth Corps eventually made its appearance in Lower
Alsace on the left wing of the German army operating in
Lorraine. The Eighteenth Corps was probably sent to
Diedenhofen. The Guard took part in the operations in
the Ardennes.

Thus the Allies were confronted with twenty army
corps, and probably eight divisions of cavalry in the West.
If we reckon a single reserve division for every corps of
the first line, a minimum assumption, we shall have an
aggregate strength of about 1,200,000 for Germany's mo-
bile forces in the western theater at the close of the period
of mobilization or a little later. The fighting strength
would consist of about 850,000 rifles, 65,000 sabers, 4,400
guns and field howitzers, and 1,500 machine-guns.

The position of the German forces at Liege remained
somewhat precarious even after the city had fallen into
their hands. There were three army corps, about 120,000
men, in and around Liege by the 7th or 8th. Thousands

The Deluge Released 53

were daily pouring into this part of Belgium. The reserve
formations followed quickly upon the heels of the army
corps of the active army. Most of the detached forts were
still holding out and their guns commanded the principal
lines of communication leading from Germany to Liege,
and from Liege westward. The Germans who first arrived
before Liege had brought with them only very scanty
supplies of food. The resistance of the forts embarrassed
the conveyance of supplies and hampered the progress of
the Germans westward where their forces could expand
and gain elbow-room. There was a threatened congestion
in the narrow valley of the Meuse. The Germans would
soon have become embarrassed by their own numerical
strength. The situation was like forcing a stream of water
at high pressure through a narrow spout partly blocked
by a sieve.

The resistance at Liege did not entirely prevent an
advance westward. General von Emmich remained only a
day and a half in Liege and then pushed on up the Meuse
in the direction of Namur with the bulk of his corps, not
waiting to witness the action of the heavy siege guns upon
the recalcitrant forts. The first German cavalry patrols
appeared before Namur on the 14th.

The Germans threw out a screen of cavalry, infantry,
and light artillery across the Meuse to the westward, to
cover the siege operations at Liege, interrupt communica-
tion with the forts, reconnoiter the Belgian positions, and,
in general, prepare the way for the main advance of the
army by spreading consternation as far as possible.

Two divisions of cavalry, the First and the Fourth,
crossed the Meuse on the 8th or 9th, chiefly at Lixhe,
close to the boundary of Holland, as far as possible from
the guns of the northern forts of Liege. They proceeded
westward through Tongres and St. Trond, in the direction

54 The Great War

of Hesbaye, scouring the country and engaging in numer-
ous skirmishes. They were followed, and at times sup-
ported by detachments of infantry and field-artillery. The
appearance of the 35th Uhlans caused a panic in Tongres
Sunday morning, the 9th. On the 11th the Germans seized
the station at Landen, twenty-four miles west of Liege on
the line to Louvain and Brussels, thirty-eight miles east
of the capital. On the 12th there was skirmishing near
Tirlemont in which the Germans were supported by their
field-pieces.

The novel use of cavalry by the Germans in the present
war was no less a surprise, although its effects were some-
what less startling, than the heavy siege-artillery. In their
maneuvers the largest organization had been the cavalry
brigade of 1,600 sabers. But in the campaign of 1914 each
brigade was frequently accompanied by a battalion of in-
fantry with field and machine-guns mounted in armored
automobiles, so that it could move independently with far
greater assurance.

In the meantime several German army corps were ad-
vancing westward through the Ardennes. As the reader
has probably observed, the Meuse offers a convenient and
natural line of defense for French and Belgian forces re-
pelling a common attack from the eastward. But the
Meuse by its course between Verdun and Liege makes a
deep depression in this defensive front. It gave the Ger-
mans an opportunity of occupying at once a very useful
salient. The strategic advantages of the Ardennes for an
enemy taking the offensive against the Franco-Belgian
front on the Meuse made ample compensation, in the
special circumstances, for the relative difficulties of trans-
port in this region. The contour of the Ardennes is, in
general, favorable to the movement of an army from east
to west. The streams descending to the Meuse flow

The Deluge Released 55

generally westward or northwestward, so that the valleys
extend in directions which correspond with the German
lines of advance, and lie athwart the direct line from Verdun
to Liege. The Germans encountered practically no resist-
ance in their advance through the Ardennes until the
French counter-offensive was launched about August 20th.
They pushed westward as far as the line formed by the
Meuse directly above Namur as readily as they reached
the Meuse below the forts of Liege. The advance-guard
of the German army in the Ardennes came in contact with
the French at Dinant as early as August 15th, before the
forts at Liege had all been taken. The description of this
engagement may be postponed until a convenient point is
reached for the consideration of the really significant opera-
tions in the region of the Meuse which took place late in
August. We may observe, however, in anticipation, that
the occupation by the Germans of the salient formed by
the Ardennes was not only one of the factors which
hindered the timely cooperation of the French forces in
Belgium, but it afforded an opportunity of attacking the
flank of the Allied armies in southern Belgium and so
turning their entire position and endangering their retreat.
The capture of the fortress of Huy, midway between
Liege and Namur on the Meuse, on August 12th, gave
the Germans undisputed mastery of a crossing-place on
the river.

The operations of the German cavalry westward of
Liege foreshadowed the march of the main invading army.

Either the intelligence department of the Belgian army
was entirely inadequate or the Belgian authorities con-
sciously allowed the people to be deluded by untrust-
worthy information regarding the nature and prospects of
the military operations in progress between Louvain and
Liege during the ten days following the entry of the

56 The Great War

German forces into the latter city. For there was nothing
in the accounts published in Belgium to indicate that a
disaster impended, or that the progress of operations was
other than satisfactory. Stranger still, the belief seemed to
be quite universal that the encounters, which were being
daily recorded, were really significant battles in which
considerable forces of the enemy were taking part.

It is incredible that the progressive concentration of a
million men in eastern Belgium could have remained con-
cealed to airmen of ordinary skill or to a military intelli-
gence department of moderate capacity for discernment.
Perhaps the Belgian authorities were misled by the hope
that the French and British would come to assist them in
time to offset the tremendous disparity in numbers; that
the French would extend their own front on the left, link-
ing it with the Belgian right, so as to present a continuous
front to the invaders and hold them to a contest on parallel
lines. This expectation, if really ever cherished by the
Belgian Staff, was vain. The hope that the French could
arrive in sufficient strength to offset the superiority of the
Germans could scarcely have been justified excepting on
the assumption that the invasion in the north was only a
secondary feature of the German plan of campaign. As
soon as it became evident that the Germans were throw-
ing the bulk of their prodigious forces into Belgium, the
notion that the French could make the necessary funda-
mental change in their entire plan of campaign and in the
disposition of their forces in time to meet the Germans in
Belgium on an approximately equal footing became absurd.
It is not to the purpose to compare the distances from the
French and the German frontiers respectively to the battle-
lines near Louvain. The problem requires us to compare
the distance from the French eastern front with that
from the Belgian frontier of Germany to the prospective

Imperial Brussels, August 2, 1914.

German Legation

IN Belgium j/ rj .• 1

I ery confidential.

" Reliable information has been received by the German government to the
eftect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by (livet
and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France
to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

"The German government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the
utmost good-will, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a
French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guar-
antee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of
Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German
government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an
act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's oppo-
nents force Germany for her own protection to enter Belgian territory.

"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German
government makes the following declaration :

"i. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the
event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of
friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German government binds itself, at
the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the
Belgian kingdom in full.

" 2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evac-
uate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in cooper-
ation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops
against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may
have been caused by German troops.

"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should
she throw difficulties in the way of their march by resistance of the fortresses
on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works,
Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

" In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium,
but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two states must be left
to the decision of arms.

"The German government, however, entertains the distinct hope that this
eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian government will know how to
take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those
mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighboring
states will grow stronger and more enduring."

Deutfd]e (SffoniitfdjQft

in Brlgicn n^

momm> ih*^'/r€ yU£^^ ^ 6^^^^^ Jftsr^cjtte^:^^ ^

First page of tlir ultiniatiiiii cklivLTiil hv tlie Cicrman Minister to tin-
Belgian Minister c)t Foreign A Hairs on August z, 1914.

The Deluge Released 57

battlefield in Belgium, and to bear in mind not only that the
French, in shifting their forces to the Belgian theater of
operations, had to avoid the Ardennes, but that even the
railway following the valley of the Meuse down to Namur
was menaced or even interrupted as early as August 15th.
It was necessary, therefore, that the French should make
an extensive detour westward.

It is probable that the Belgian Staff resigned itself as
early as the second week of hostilities to the humbler task
of merely delaying as long as possible the irresistible prog-
ress of the enemy without any expectation of shielding
their capital or the greater part of their country from
speedy submersion. They could only hope in this way to
furnish their allies a few valuable days' respite for consoli-
dating their position, and to make their contribution in
this way to the final victory which should eventually re-
deem their own country from subjection. Considerations
of expediency might naturally recommend that the pros-
pect for the immediate future should be concealed. The
announcement a week before that Brussels would probably
be abandoned to the Germans might have occasioned
great consternation and panic without any corresponding
advantage for the national cause. The charge brought by
the Germans against the leading journals of Brussels of
having deliberately beguiled the Belgian people with their
glowing accounts of fictitious victories is probably un-
grounded. Numerous examples may be cited to prove the
amenability of the press, even with the most faultless in-
tentions, to the deceptive influence of enthusiasm at the
commencement of all great wars. It may be recalled that
war was an absolutely unique experience to the Belgians
of the present day. With the exception of the insignificant
visitation in 1830-1831, the war-god had spared for ninety-
nine years the soil of Belgium, once the cockpit of

58 The Great War

Europe. The Belgians only felt at second hand the
disillusionment of the French in 1870 as a sobering
experience.

There were reports that bodies of French troops were
present with the Belgian army before the latter's with-
drawal from before Brussels in the direction of Antwerp.
Such cooperation was probably limited to the French cav-
alry which entered Belgium as early as the 14th. But the
Fifth French Cavalry Division was repulsed by German
cavalry in an encounter at Perwez, north of Namur, on
August 19th.

The Belgian forces were concentrated mainly on the
line of the Dyle with Louvain as headquarters. The rapid
development of the campaign, after the principal mass of
the invading forces started westward from Liege, reveals
the trifling character of the engagements in the Belgian
plain which had taken place before that time. It is not
likely that the resistance of the Belgians after Liege occa-
sioned any perceptible delay in the advance of the principal
masses of German troops. There was some sharp fight-
ing before the Germans entered Brussels. But only the
advance-guard of the German armies was engaged in it.
The main body of their forces had no occasion to deploy
for action. The rate of progress of the bulk of the forces
seems to have been determined solely by the marching
capacity of the soldiers. Those who arrived in the vicinity
of Brussels on the evening of the 19th probably left Liege
on the morning of the 16th. They probably reached posi-
tions opposite the Charleroi-Mons line of the Allies by
August 22d.

A remarkable feeling of buoyancy and assurance pre-
vailed in the towns on the line of the approaching invasion
until the enemy was at their very gates, when this impres-
sion of confidence was suddenly transformed into a frenzy

Majj showing by tht shaded porlion the extent of the German advance into Belgium and France and the French adv:
Alsace and Lorraine, August 20, 191 4-

The Deluge Released 59

of dismay by the roar of hostile artillery. The contrast
was impressively dramatic. The spectacle of the diminu-
tive Belgian army persisting confidently in its hopeless
struggle with an adversary whose might was as invincible
as destiny, and exhibiting noteworthy examples of indi-
vidual heroism, stirs the deepest sense of pathos.

On the morning of the 17th the distant rumble of
cannon was first audible in Brussels. On the same day the
seat of government was transferred to Antwerp, a large
part of the archives having been transported thither in
motor-vehicles during the night.

Soon after noon on the 18th the Germans began shelling
Tirlemont, and immediately the roads leading westward
were thronged with thousands of the panic-stricken in-
habitants who were leaving all their possessions behind
them. Towards evening the Germans, chiefly cavalry and
artillery, occupied the town.

The Germans, who had been repulsed before Aerschot
on the 18th, resumed the attack early on the 19th. There
was a spirited contest for about two hours, when the Ger-
man infantry, supported by machine-guns, assailed the
defenders on the right flank and forced them to withdraw
in the direction of Louvain.

Fugitives from Tirlemont and Aerschot, and from many
villages in the vicinity of these places, brought terrifying
news to Louvain, and the Germans followed closely upon
the grim tidings of their approach. There was great ex-
citement in Louvain and many of the inhabitants swelled
the streams of fugitives which were filling the roads that
led westward. This movement was constantly augmented
by the populations of numerous villages which lay in the
track of the relentless invaders and had either been burned
or were threatened with destruction. Each group of
country-folk contributed its tale of brutalities which were

60 The Great War

exchanged and repeated with inevitable exaggeration and
even distortion.

The Belgian General Staff left Louvain for Antwerp on
the 19th, the Second and Third Divisions covering the
withdrawal of the headquarters and the bulk of the army.
There was some sharp fighting near Louvain with the
troops of the German vanguard.

Brussels was unusually exuberant during the early days
of the war. It retained its cheerfulness and equanimity
until the 18th. Every afternoon and evening the prin-
cipal boulevards were thronged, and a great multitude
stood in the Place Rogier, in front of the Northern Rail-
way Station (Gare du Nord), in eager expectation of news.
Crowds sat before the brilliantly lighted cafes until late at
night discussing the situation and devouring the latest bul-
letins, or seizing hopeful bits of information from persons
who strayed in from the front.

Life for a few days was invested with a peculiar zest, as
though grim Fate moved by a fitful impulse of compassion
was treating with exceptional indulgence those whom she
had condemned to so many months of gloom.

A change in the temper of the capital is said to have
become apparent about three in the afternoon of the 18th.
The truth about the situation was being revealed by
startling evidence, the train-loads of hopeless refugees
pouring into the city, the piteous troops of fugitives, some
of them bringing a tithe of their possessions in carts and
wheelbarrows, others plodding along with a few belong-
ings in sacks thrown over their shoulders, others who had
abandoned everything in the feverish haste of their flight.
This picture of speechless despair contrasted strangely with
the idle gaiety of the city.

The last train left Brussels for Ostend on the night of
the 18th and people fought for places in it. Then the

■z t ^

The Deluge Released 61

locomotives and rolling-stock were withdrawn as far as
possible from the lines between Brussels and Ghent. By
the 19th communications were severed on all sides. Som-
ber crowds stood in the principal squares, their feelings
benumbed, deadened, by the crushing weight of anxious
foreboding.

During the greater part of the 19th almost uninterrupted
processions of automobiles traversed Brussels fleeing west-
ward before the storm of war, while the movement of
humbler refugees presented its never-ending spectacle of
misery and despair. Some barricades were erected and
there was talk of defending Brussels to the last. The
Civic Guard, said to have numbered about 20,000, were
posted at the principal approaches to the city. The Amer-
ican and Spanish ministers, who remained in Brussels, urged
upon the municipal authorities the futility of resistance,
which would only result in useless destruction of lives and
property, and endanger, particularly, the city's priceless
treasures of art. During the following night the order
came from the king's headquarters that Brussels should be
surrendered without resistance.

About ten on the morning of the 20th shops and houses
in Brussels v/ere closed and shutters were closely drawn as
the news spread throughout the city that the foe was at
the gate. An interview took place just outside the city
between the Burgomaster Adolfe Max and General Sixtus
von Arnim, commander of the German forces, in which
the capitulation of Brussels was arranged on terms which
may be briefly stated as follows :

1. The free passage of the German troops through
Brussels.

2. The quartering of a garrison of 3,000 men in the
barracks of Lailly and Etterbeek.

3. Military requisitions to be paid in cash.

62 The Great War

4. Respect for the inhabitants and for public and private
property.

5. The management, free from German control, of the
public affairs by the municipal administration.

The booming of cannon and the sound of military
music conveyed the information to the people of Brussels
that the triumphal progress of the German forces through
their city had commenced. The Germans made their
entry at about two o'clock in the afternoon, after the Civic
Guard had been disarmed and disbanded. Although the
German march through Brussels v^as undoubtedly deter-
mined by strategic considerations, those who managed its
details evidently proposed to secure all the incidental ad-
vantages or satisfaction from an impressive display of the
varied might and efficiency of the German military machine.
All branches of the service and all departments of military
activity were represented or suggested while the German
host defiled through the streets of Brussels.

Squadrons of Uhlans headed the march followed by one
hundred motor-cars mounting quick-firing guns. Every
regiment was preceded by its own band. The soldiers
sang their national anthems. Die Wacht am Rhein and
Deutschland, Deutschland iiber allesy to the sledge-hammer
time-beat of their heavy boots on the stone pavements.
There were cavalry, infantry, and artillery, rapid-fire guns,
howitzers, and even heavy siege-guns. The columns kept
on one side of the roadway with unfailing precision, leav-
ing the other side unimpeded for the passage of automo-
biles, the service of communication between different parts
of the fine by mounted orderlies, motor-cyclists, etc. Porta-
ble kitchens accompanied the columns, and food and re-
freshments were served to the soldiers on the march. Even
letters and postcards were collected and distributed by those
appointed for this service while the column was in motion.

The Deluge Released 63

The Germans entered Brussels by the Louvain Road,
descended past the Botanical Garden to Place Rogier in
front of the Northern Railway Station, and then passed
through the principal boulevards to the heights near
Koeckelberg, where many of them encamped. All wore
the new German field-uniform of a greenish-gray color, a
most neutral, evasive tone, which makes all objects blend
completely with their natural environment at a very short
distance. The helmets of the soldiers were covered in
this same color. The entire material equipment of the
army, — gun-carriages and caissons, wagons, motor-vehicles,
and the like, — was painted to match. It was an example
illustrating the comprehensive scope of German efficiency
and prevision. An eye-witness compares this color to the
"gray of the hour just before daybreak, the gray of unpol-
ished steel, of the mist among the trees."

Artillery was posted at important positions to command
the principal streets and squares, before the ministries and
railway stations. The Germans suspected that fully 10,000
Belgian soldiers were concealed in the city in civilian cos-
tume. But the people of Brussels maintained a quiet,
dignified bearing. Crowds watched the German host as
it defiled through the streets with silent, unbending amaze-
ment. But Brussels gave no cause for reprisals.

Hour after hour, day after day, the greenish-gray column
wound like a serpent through the city, until its duration
seemed unearthly, uncanny. Probably about 300,000
Germans passed through Brussels and its vicinity within
three days.

The Germans had hoped to overpower the forts of Liege
by their unexpected, impetuous assault and straightway
open the road into France by way of the valleys of the
Meuse and the Sambre without occupying any more Bel-
gian territory than was necessary to afford a passageway

64 The Great War

across and a covering for their lines of communication.
The occupation of Brussels was regarded at the time by the
press of the Allies as a spectacular coup intended to over-
awe the Belgians, impress the world at large, and fore-
shadow the triumphal entry into Paris. It has also been
said that the resistance of the Belgians forced the Germans
to take a somewhat longer route leading through Brussels.
Namur barred the direct route from Liege to Paris. The
fact that the Germans appeared on the line of the Sambre
above Namur as early as the 21st, while many of the forts
of Namur held out until the 25th, shows that they had to
pass northward of Namur.

But the occupation of Brussels by the Germans was
probably not due solely to the opposition of the Belgians,
even the resistance of Namur, although this in itself neces-
sitated a detour northward. It is absolutely essential for
the provisioning and orderly progress of large armies that
they should advance by many parallel roads. The tremen-
dous forces which traversed Belgium from the vicinity of
Liege westward must in any case have utilized all the main
highways between the line of the Meuse and the Sambre
and a line extending through Brussels. The actual effect of
their march was like drawing a great comb across the coun-
try, with the teeth moving in the principal lines of com-
munication. The Germans advanced from east to west in
parallel columns with a common front extending north and
south. When the southern extremity of this front reached
Namur about the 18th it was delayed until the 25th or 26th
by the resistance of the forts. Meanwhile the front of the
advancing columns from Namur northward wheeled to
the left, pivoting on its left extremity which remained
stationary near Namur, until it faced almost to the south
and confronted the Allies on the line of the Sambre and of
Charleroi and Mons, in a position extending at an angle

The last telegram received from Brussels. On the morning of August 20, 1914, the
Amsterdam telegraph office received the above message vchich states, " The Germans have
arrived, we are retiring, good-bye/'

Die tJerman torecs nuiic'liing tiuougii Brussels, A\igust zc, 1^14.

The Deluge Released 65

of ninety degrees with its original one. The forces on the
German right, at the flying extremity of the wheeling
masses, those for instance which passed through Brussels,
had to cover a comparatively great distance while those at
the pivot were merely marking time. Troops arriving in
the vicinity of Mons on the 22d, after passing through
Brussels, must have marched a hundred miles from Liege
in about seven days. In fact the extent of continuous
marching performed by some of them must have been
considerably greater; for it is reported that many who
passed through Brussels on the 20th had been marching
continuously all the way from Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle).
The divisions nearer the axial point at Namur reached
their positions on the new front sooner than those on the
flying wing, as is shown by the fact that the French on
the line of the Sambre were attacked at least a day before
the British near Mons.

The possession of Namur, while eventually almost indis-
pensable, was not immediately necessary for the progress
of the German plan of campaign. The excellent high-
ways and railway system of Belgium enabled the Germans
to disregard for the time the obstruction at Namur.

CHAPTER IV

The French Counter-Offensive

Criticism of the French counter-offensive. The French incursion into
Alsace; entry into Miilhausen, August 8, 1914, French defeated west of
the city two days later. The clearing of the Vosges by the French.
Miilhausen retaken by the French on August 20th. The French offensive
in Lorraine, beginning August 12th, French advance to Saarburg. Turn-
ing of the tide, August 20th. Battle in Lorraine, August 20-24. General
collapse of the French offensive. German invasion of France and occu-
pation of Luneville. Evacuation of Miilhausen by the French. Invasion
of France from Luxemburg by the army of the German Crown Prince.
Defense of Longwy. French defeated at Neufchateau. The battle at
Dinant, August 15th.

As was explained in the first chapter, a general doctrine
for the offensive had obtained the official stamp of approval
in France. It did not follow from this that the French
should in all circumstances take the offensive from the first.
In fact, considerations of prudence, based upon relative
conditions of strength, seemed to recommend a defensive
attitude for the French in the early stages of the Great
War. As the event showed, the Allies would have done
better to receive the shock of the German offensive in
prepared positions in France, since they were too late to
intervene decisively in Belgium, and not to pass to the
attack until the initial force of the enemy had been
considerably diminished by attrition and the Russian
invasion of Germany had been fairly started. But it
was difficult to believe that any Fabian policy would
commend itself to the French with their impetuous
temperament.

The French Counter-Offensive 67

While in the main the first campaign was actually con-
ducted by the French in accordance with this more prudent
policy, there was at the commencement a period of uncer-
tainty and confusion, perhaps of divided counsels, as to the
suitable moment for applying the offensive. In th*e early
weeks of the war the French troops advanced with impet-
uous eagerness beyond the borders of their own country
throughout almost the entire extent of the contested fron-
tier, even before their mobilization had been completed.
The French invaded Alsace by the Gap of Belfort, dis-
lodged the Germans from their positions on the Vosges
Mountains, penetrated into Lorraine as far as Saarburg,
made their way into the Ardennes to Neufchateau, and
took up positions along the line of the Sambre in southern
Flanders.

These movements are not all to be judged by the same
criterion, although they may all have been regarded by the
French General Staff as closely related parts of the same
general offensive action.

The incursions into Upper Alsace were hastily conceived
and rather carelessly executed with insufficient forces.
They were dictated by political rather than strategical
motives. The government was naturally eager to inflame
national enthusiasm at once by a brilliant stroke appealing
to popular sentiment, by taking definite steps towards the
redemption of Alsace, and the realization of the hope so
passionately cherished for forty-four years. The expedi-
tions here referred to left no permanent results of any
consequence. They involved many persons in Miilhausen
in the charge of treason, some of whom were brought before
a court martial and executed by the Germans after their
return. They dissipated uselessly the energy of the French.

The occupation of the summits and passes of the Vosges,
while an almost indispensable preliminary step for the

68 The Great War

conquest of Alsace, might also be justified as a defensive
measure.

The principal invasion of German Lorraine from the
direction of Nancy was apparently planned with the object
of cutting the railway line between Strassburg and Metz,
of isolating Metz and Diedenhofen (Thionville) and threat-
ening the communications of the army invading France
from Luxemburg, perhaps also of menacing Strassburg
and Lower Alsace. It is only fair to judge this project
according to the intention and outlook of those who de-
vised and directed it. Strange as it may seem at present,
at the time when this maneuver was commenced, the
French General Staff probably believed that the Germans
would deliver their principal blow through Luxemburg
and that the invasion by way of Liege was only secondary.
On this assumption there were very good grounds for a
vigorous offensive in Lorraine even as a defensive measure;
for there was a fair chance that it would paralyze the Ger-
man effort through southern Luxemburg. On the other
hand, the French may possibly have intended this move-
ment as the execution of the characteristic paramount act
in their offensive, the penetration of the vulnerable point in
the enemy's front. In the first weeks of the war the fron-
tier of Lorraine had probably seemed weakly guarded.
The concentration was proceeding at some distance to the
rear. The failure of the French invasion of Lorraine was
largely due to inadequate intelligence and a miscalculation
of the available German defensive forces in this section.
The convex contour of Lorraine on the side of France
gave the Germans the advantage of maneuvering on inner
lines. It was comparatively easy, for instance, for the
Germans to shift their forces to and fro between Dieden-
hofen and Saarburg, the extreme points of military im-
portance in the province. The Germans, moreover, were

Frederick. William, Crown Prince of the German Empire and Prussia, with two officers

of his personal staff.

The French Counter-Offensive 69

well intrenched against the French counter-offensive in
Lorraine as well as in Alsace.

Even though the main effort of the Germans was to be
made far from Lorraine, on the extreme right wing of
their line of concentration, it was scarcely conceivable that
they would have denuded this portion of their exposed
territory of sufficient forces for effective resistance. The
remarkable character of the railway system of the Reichs-
land reflects, no doubt, in part an earlier German project
of penetrating their opponent's lines by way of Nancy,
between Toul and Epinal. Several railway lines cross from
Alsace-Lorraine into France, notwithstanding that the
range of the Vosges bars half the common frontier, while
eight or nine other lines end abruptly at the French border.
These lines were provided with very extensive sidings and
there were eighty unloading platforms in Lorraine alone,
each more than 1,500 feet in length, capable of accom-
modating the longest troop-trains. It was estimated that
Germany could detrain between 150,000 and 200,000 men
daily between Metz and Strassburg.

The same criticism may be made of the French advance
into the Ardennes as of the movement into Belgium gen-
erally. It was too late to have any fundamental effect. It
drew the French further from their base, away from their
prepared positions. It deprived them of the inherent ad-
vantages of the defensive without giving them the special
advantages of the offensive.

With reference more especially to the French advance
to the positions on the Sambre, it may be said that the
movement into Belgium was probably made in response to
a popular and parliamentary demand that the French should
cooperate directly with the Belgian forces in the defense
of Belgium. The French troops were first reported on Bel-
gian soil August 14th, the day before the first encounter

70 The Great War

at Dinant. The advance into Belgium would have been a
judicious measure if the French could have arrived early
enough in sufficient strength to reinforce and prolong the
Belgian front at Louvain and impose upon the Germans a
parallel battle. But for this, preliminary arrangements
elaborated before the v^ar would probably have been
necessary. Either the Belgian and French General Staffs
had not formulated any such arrangements for common
action in case of the invasion of Belgium, or, if they had,
the French authorities, acting in accordance with the
letter of Belgium's communication declining their prof-
fered assistance on Augu>st 3d, directed the concentration
of their forces to follow its normal course, as if the main
attack were expected on their own German frontier.

Commendable as it seemed in itself, the French move-
ment northward into Belgium, in the actual circumstances,
undertaken some time after the outbreak of hostilities as
an afterthought, did not accord with the general plan as
already adopted for the French armies. The stupendous
movement of the Germans through Belgium inevitably
necessitated a fundamental readjustment of the disposition
of the French forces at great expense of time and energy.
The possibility of this unfortunate necessity was inherent
in the general situation and in the relative strength and
efficiency of the opposing forces in the West. Unless the
French foresaw the direction of the chief blow of their
opponents and concentrated their forces against it from
the first, renouncing their favorite maneuver of piercing
the enemy's weakest point, they ran the risk of being
compelled to shift a large part of their forces at a critical
period when every hour was immeasurably valuable. The
advance into Belgium, at the time when it was made,
merely served to increase this inevitable dissipation of
energy. The position on the Sambre, a compromise after

The French Counter-Offensive 71

the failure to cooperate with the Belgian field army, was
seemingly fortunate in view of the support of Namur
and the supposed capacity of this fortress for an effective
resistance.

But the defeat of the French army -on the line of the
Sambre, even before the forts of Namur had fallen, as well
as at Neufchateau, shows that the French forces were
entirely inadequate for successful offensive operations in
this direction. It is probable that General Joffre sanc-
tioned the advance into Belgium against his better judg-
ment. Very likely he would have preferred to await the
German attack on the Lille-Valenciennes-Hirson line.
While this line did not possess the unparalleled strength of
the barrier in eastern France, it nevertheless afforded several
quite appreciable advantages for a defensive action, such as
the fortifications of Lille and Maubeuge, several detached
forts between these two cities, and the Scheldt running
like a moat along part of the front.

A few days after the collapse of the French counter-
offensive there were rumors of a misunderstanding be-
tween the French government and General Joffre and of
the latter's resignation. A divergence of view regarding
the principal aims of French strategy may very likely have
contributed to this state of friction, if it really existed.

A confusion in the counsels of the French at the begiiv
ning of the war had been anticipated, at least by their
adversaries. It is a condition which has been repeated in
several crises when the destiny of the nation has not been
guided by the strong arm of a military dictator. In a
country where parliamentary control is so complete, while
the balance of power among the various parliamentary
factions is so unstable, it is very remarkable that the situation
in this particular instance was not more serious. One
of the surprising phenomena of the war has been the

72 The Great War

comparatively prompt establishment in France of a stead-
fast leadership with a clear, consistent policy.

General Joffre issued the following proclamation to the
people of Alsace on the occasion of the French invasion
of the province :

** Children of Alsace!

"After forty-four years of sorrowful waiting French sol-
diers once more tread the soil of your noble country.
They are the pioneers in the great work of revenge. For
them what emotion and what pride !

"To achieve this work they have made the sacrifice of
their lives. The French nation unanimously urges them
on, and on the folds of their flags are inscribed the magic
words, * Right and Liberty.'

"Long live Alsace! Long live France!"

The first incursion into Upper Alsace from the direc-
tion of Belfort was merely a reconnaissance in force, a$
spectacular as it was unimportant. It began on August
7th. The French soldiers who crossed the frontier in the
radiant sunshine of the summer morning were thrilled
with the conviction that the hour for the fulfilment
of the national yearning was at hand and elated by
the thought of their own participation in this glorious
achievement.

The expedition, consisting of about a division of the
covering troops, was led by General d'Amade, the con-
queror of Fez. Towards evening the advance-guard, one
brigade, appeared before Altkirch and drove the Germans
from their field-works at the point of the bayonet, suffering
very slight losses. They received an enthusiastic welcome
from the people of the town.

On the next day, about five in the afternoon, the French
entered Miilhausen, the Germans retiring towards Neu-
Breisach, a fortified town about eighteen miles away.

— ^H^aldiM,

'^Wt

The French Counter-Offensive 73

Miilhausen, situated on the 111, fifty-eight miles south-
southwest of Strassburg, a great center for the cotton and
woolen industries, with its 100,000 inhabitants, rich and
prosperous, set in the midst of a smiling, fertile plain, was
one of the jewels of the Reichsland. The upper classes
favored the French, while among the laboring class it is
said that a sentiment of loyalty to Germany more generally
prevailed.

Jubilant crowds filled the streets of Miilhausen, eager to
behold again the tricolor and the once familiar red panta-
loons of the French soldiers in their midst. They regaled
their transitory liberators with wine, beer, and food, and
the women pelted them with flow^ers.

It was a triumphant revelry of short duration. On the
next day, Sunday, the 9th, General von Deimling, com-
mander of the Fifteenth Army Corps at Strassburg brought
up superior forces to an intrenched position north of Miil-
hausen and threatened the French outposts. A battle
ensued the following day, just outside the city to the west,
and the French, who were only a single brigade, were
overpowered by the superior effectiveness of the German
artillery and forced to retire. It was futile to endeavor to
defend Miilhausen, which is an open town. Nevertheless
the battle was renewed in the streets during the night;
and after the French had been driven away, a number of
citizens occupying houses from which shots had been fired
upon the German troops were sentenced by court martial
and promptly led before a firing squad.

The Germans took 523 prisoners, including ten officers
in the fi^^hting at Miilhausen. By the 11th the French
were back again on their own frontier. The sudden col-
lapse of the expedition was apparently due to the inadecjuacy
of the French forces, the superiority of the German artil-
lery, and the deficiency in the French intelligence service.

74 The Great War

A similarly impulsive incursion into Lorraine was in-
augurated by a mixed brigade of the Fifteenth French
Army Corps. They encountered the German covering
troops near Lagarde on the 11th and v^ere defeated and
driven back across the frontier with the loss of about
1,000 prisoners, about one-sixth of their entire number,
and found refuge in the Forest of Parroy, northeast of
Luneville.

By the 13th the German authorities reported that Alsace-
Lorraine had been entirely cleared of the French.

The French claim that the observance by themselves of
a neutral zone along the border within their own territory
just before the outbreak of the war was utilized by the
Germans as an opportunity for occupying important posi-
tions on the crest of the Vosges Mountains. One of the
first undertakings of the French after war had been de-
clared was to gain control of these eminences. In this
endeavor they were favored by the fact that at least in the
south the ascent from the French side of the mountains is
comparatively easy. As the forces involved were rela-
tively small in consequence of the rugged character of the
ground, these operations have not received as much atten-
tion as they merited. Generally not more than a battalion
or a regiment, at most a brigade, were engaged. But the
difficulties in some places were considerable and much
skill was exhibited in surmounting them.

Starting in the south the French captured successively
the Ballon d' Alsace, Col de Bussang, Honeck, and Schlucht.
Operations against the Col du Bonhomme and Col de
Sainte Marie-aux-Mines were much more arduous. In
this quarter the slope on the French side is steep, the
mountains are densely wooded, and the ridges are mostly
so narrow that it is difficult to plant artillery on their
summits. The Germans had mounted their guns in

The French Counter-Offensive 75

well-chosen positions which had already been artificially
strengthened. The French Alpine troops and mountain
batteries here rendered valuable service. There were seri-
ous encounters before these points were taken, but finally
the French secured positions on the flank and in the rear
of the Germans, who were forced to retire.

By the 17th the passes and summits of the Vosges and
the slopes on the side of Alsace were generally in the
hands of the French. At this time the general forward
movement was Inaugurated throughout the entire front of
the French armies, in Belgium and on the eastern frontier.

The French renewed their invasion of Upper Alsace.
The two regiments which lost Miilhausen on August 10th
retook it on the 20th, capturing the German batteries in
the outskirts at the point of the bayonet. By the 23d
Colmar also fell into the hands of the French.

The Great War has taught the sobering lesson that the
day for spontaneous popular uprisings has past, that the pas-
sionate enthusiasm of the untrained multitude is of no avail
against regular armies, and that a discontented province is
bound hand and foot by the mobilization and removal of
its military youth. Thus the supposedly seditious peoples
of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy made not the slightest
move when the crisis came, which was supposed to be
their opportunity.

The French invasion of the lost provinces was actuated
in part, no doubt, by the expectation that the smoldering
fires of discontent in Alsace-Lorraine would flame up in
open rebellion, and that the population would eagerly join
forces with their professed deliverers. Several sensational
occurrences just before the war had tended to provoke the
resentment of the nationalists in Alsace. The initial act in
the most recent of these irritating episodes took place in
Colmar. Johann Jacob Waltz, a German by birth and

76 The Great War

citizenship, but a French Alsatian in sentiment, known by
the pseudonym **Hansi" through his books and sketches^
was brought before a tribunal in Colmar and bound over
for trial before the Supreme Court at Leipzig on the charge
of treason. His offense consisted in the publication of a
book entitled My Village iMon Village), with drawings
lampooning the Germans in Alsace, caricatures depicting
the supercilious attitude of officers, the petty arrogance of
the police, the officious pedantry of the schoolmasters. In
Leipzig " Hansi " was condemned to a year's imprisonment
on the lesser charge of inciting class hatred and libelling
public officials. He was granted three days in which to
take farewell of his relatives, but he promptly took farewell
of Germany. The report of his arrival in France came
almost on the eve of the international crisis. Without
his prosecution the fame of the Alsatian ** Hansi" would
scarcely have transcended the limits of his own prov-
ince. Governments are often stupidly insensible to the
fact that persecution only serves to sharpen the edge of
ridicule.

General de Castelnau, who commanded the imposing
concentration of French forces on the rivers Moselle and
Meurthe with Nancy as center, started a general advance
along the entire front from the Moselle to the slopes of the
Vosges on August 12th.

The French forces along this extensive front may have
amounted to eight army corps or their numerical equiva-
lent. The Germans were driven back by the French
left near Font-a-Mousson and Pagny. The French right
attacked one of the Bavarian corps intrenched in front of
Blamont on the evening of the 14th. The battle was
resumed on the next day. Blamont and Cirey were taken
by the French at dawn, and the Germans were outflanked
and driven from the heights to the northward.

The children and schoolmaster gathered to -n:elcome the stork --whose coming heraldtu
of spring. The German policeman is seen goose-stepping in the backgroun

i//t umi'til
d.

The Fete of Messti cannot officially commence until the German policeman has inspected the
booths to see that there is nothing displayed ivhich carries the French colors. "For,^^ says Hansi,
"it appears that the German Empire, ivith her thousands of soldiers, fortresses, Krupp cannons,
cuirassiers, and Zeppelins, runs an immense danger if at the fete of my -village one small boy
bloxvs a tri-colored nvhistle. ' '

Illustrations from Mow r/7/rfi^<'," For the little children of France," bv Hansi, for which he was tried
and sentenced by the German authorities to one vear in prison. Published by H. Floury, Parts.

The French Counter-Offensive 77

On the 14th the French occupied Mt. Donon near the
northern extremity of the Vosges, a commanding position
at the angle between the boundary of Alsace and that of
Lorraine on the side of France, at the extremity of a
salient in the outline of the French territory. In conse-
quence of their temerity two battalions of German fortress
troops from Strassburg exposed themselves to the fire of
the French artillery on Mt. Donon the same day in a pass
near Schirmeck. They were put to rout, abandoning their
guns and evacuating Schirmeck.

In the center of their battle-front the French poured
into Lorraine from the valley of the River Seille and the
cavalry occupied Chateau Salins on the 17th. On the right
the French advanced towards Zabern, occupying Saarburg
on the 18th, and severing railway communication by the
direct line between Metz and Strassburg. The left had
advanced as far as Morchingen, nineteen miles southeast
of Metz.

The French were pressing upon the entire front of
Alsace-Lorraine and the Germans were apparently every-
where retreating, and already a considerable zone of terri-
tory on the German side of the frontier was in French
hands. But the rapidity of their progress, which was more
apparent than real, may have served to put the French off
their guard. Apparently they were not fully aware of the
formidable concentration of German forces in progress at
some distance from the frontier on a line roughly indicated
by Morchingen, Finstingen, and Pfalzburg.

The futility of the French counter-offensive is fully
realized if we reflect that the ephemeral achievements of
the French invasion were all made before the completion
of the German mobilization, while the movement col-
lapsed at once as soon as the concentration of the German
field-armies was complete.

78 The Great War

The army of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria which
encountered the French offensive in Lorraine consisted
probably of five of the regular army corps, and contained
in addition a large number of troops in reserve formations.
In fact there was probably no great numerical disparity in
the French and German forces which confronted each
other in this field of operations.

The course of events suggests that the systematic retire-
ment of the Germans from the 13th to the 19th of August
may have been in complete accord with a definite inten-
tion of luring the French into a position where both their
flanks would be open to sudden attack while their front
would be exposed to the fearful pounding of the heavier
German artillery in concealed positions. The turning point
was about eleven o'clock on the morning of the 20th, when
the First Bavarian Corps took the offensive near Saarburg.

Apparently the French were surpassed in generalship
and in the efficiency of their intelligence service. They
had invaded a region with which all the German officers
had become thoroughly familiar in the course of recent
maneuvers. A division of the French Fifteenth Army
Corps was surprised by the German shrapnels as it was
preparing its noon meal near Saarburg on the 20th. It
was subsequently stated that the defeat of the French in
the general conflict which followed was due to the con-
fusion and flight of this division. But it is doubtful
whether the failure of a single division to maintain its
position was the sole decisive factor in the issue of a battle
which raged almost continuously for several days along a
very extensive front.

The possession of Saarburg and Dieuze was very hotly
contested. In spite of the occupation of the summits of
the Vosges, and especially of Mt. Donon, by the French,
which would naturally render their position on the battle

The French Counter-Offensive 79

line In Lorraine more secure, the Germans by crossing
the Rothe Saar executed a turning movement against their
right flank. Partly in consequence of this maneuver the
French were forced back to the frontier on the 21st.

On the 23d the French army received reinforcements
from Nancy, but their renewed attack on the German right
wing failed, and they retired at evening to the Luneville-
Blamont-Cirey line within the French border.

On the 22d, 23d, and 24th there was desperate fighting
along the front of all the armies, on the Sambre and the
Meuse, in the Ardennes and in Alsace-Lorraine. Perhaps
we may regard these terrific encounters as a continuous
battle raging along a line 350 miles in extent, from
Flanders to the Jura. The concentration of the first-line
troops was now complete and both sides looked forward
eagerly to significant action within a very few days. The
natural converging point for the hopes and speculations of
the whole past generation seemed to have been reached.
The world awaited decisive results with tremulous expect-
ancy. Later, after many monotonous months of almost
stationary trench fighting in the West, the palpable effect
of this first tremendous collision of the opposing forces
seemed astounding by comparison. But the results were
nowhere decisive.

On the 20th the French press was announcing the sen-
sational progress of the invasion of Germany. A few days
later it took comfort in the reflection that the defenses of
the country were still intact.

The Allies were everywhere overpowered and beaten
back, but without being broken or crushed. The Ger-
man Twenty-first Corps entered Luneville on the 24th.
The defeat of the French in Lorraine necessitated the
withdrawal of their forces from the position in the northern
Vosges, particularly from Mt. Donon and the Col de Saales.

80 The Great War

The French abandoned their offensive in Upper Alsace
on August 25th. In consequence of the failure of their
offensive movement in the north and northeast, and the
invasion of France, it became necessary to contract their
lines and to send all available forces to the threatened
regions. Miilhausen was again evacuated. The French
retained possession of only a small section of the province
adjacent to the French border opposite Belfort as a sort of
protruding bastion, from which future sorties might con-
veniently be made.

Skirmishing was reported in the corner of France that
borders on Luxemburg as early as August 3d. The Ger-
man army advancing through Luxemburg under command
of the German Crown Prince began the actual invasion
of France about August 10th. It encountered at once
the resistance of Longwy on the railway line penetrating
France from the direction of Luxemburg and Trier. This
resistance, conducted with unexpected stubbornness, was
prolonged beyond all prevision. It must have been a
veritable thorn in the flesh for the Germans, embarrassing
their communications and the movement of supplies for
the large army of invasion in this quarter. The defense
of Longwy, although comparatively insignificant in respect
to the strength of the garrison and the means with which
it was carried on, not being one of the major events in the
evolution of the larger strategic plans of the war, is one of
the most noteworthy episodes of the conflict. The Ger-
mans doubtless tried to mask it and continue on their
route, but its presence in their rear must have been a con-
tinual cause of annoyance.

On the 22d the army of the German Crown Prince re-
pulsed strong French forces which had been pushed for-
ward from Verdun to the vicinity of Longwy, in accordance
no doubt with the general offensive movement along the

-e^

The French Counter-Offensive 81

entire French front at just this time. The old fortress,
Longwy, designed by Vauban, once regarded as the gate-
way of France, had been captured by the Germans on three
previous occasions, on August 23, 1792 ; September 11, 1815 ;
and January 25, 1871. Garrisoned in 1914 by only a single
brigade, it held out until August 26th although subjected
to continual bombardment for at least five days.

The prolonged resistance of Longwy was only possible,
of course, because the German siege-artillery was employed
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the defenders gave ample proof
of resolution and courage by holding out so stubbornly in
an antiquated fortress against the fire of the heaviest artil-
lery which accompanied the German armies in the field.
The garrison capitulated only when nearly the whole town
had been destroyed, all but one of their guns had been
rendered useless, and they themselves were threatened
with immediate annihilation. The governor. Lieutenant-
colonel d'Arche, was made Officer of the Legion of
Honor as a reward for his valor.

This northeastern border of France, vulnerable at any
time because the barrier forts do not extend northward of
Verdun, was an especially sensitive point during the shifting
of the French forces from the east to the north.

Partly, no doubt, for the purpose of threatening the
flank of the Crown Prince's army the French launched
an offensive movement from the Meuse below Verdun
into the Ardennes. The French army crossed the Semoy,
encountered the army of Duke Albert of Wijrttemberg
near Neufchateau, and suffered a defeat. The victorious
Germans advanced and crossed the Semoy and the Meuse,
penetrating into France.

The vanguard of the French army which had been con-
centrated for operations in the north probably entered
Belgium on August 14th, a part of it advancing along the

82 The Great War

left bank of the Meuse. At the same time the advanced
forces of the Germans were pushing westward through
the Ardennes. The first collision took place at Dinant,
situated eighteen miles south of Namur, at the foot of
almost perpendicular cliffs on the left bank of the Meuse.

Early in the morning of the 15th a cavalry division of
the Prussian Guard, the Fifth German Cavalry Division,
and several battalions of infantry with machine-gun com-
panies occupied Dinant and drove the French from the
citadel. Later, in crossing the Meuse, they were attacked
by two French infantry regiments, six batteries, and a regi-
ment of cavalry. The French artillery was brought into
action on the heights commanding the river on the west
and checked the advance of the Germans. The French
infantry in a violent onslaught forced the Germans back
over the bridge, driving some into the river at the point
of the bayonet and dispersing the others. They quickly
cleared the town and recaptured the citadel.

The subsequent progress of events growing out of the
movement of the French forces into Belgium was merged
with the tremendous course of the German rush towards
Paris, from which its treatment cannot be separated.

CHAPTER V

The Flood-tide of German Invasion
(August 23-September 5, 1914)

The Kaiser goes to the front. Disposition of the forces in the West, the
seven German and five French armies and the British contingent. Con-
centration of powerful German forces against the Meuse-Sambre salient,
far outnumbering the Allies. Defenses of Namur. Operations against
Namur: first attack, August 20th; occupation of the city, August 23d;
bombardment of the forts, August 22-25. Effect of the sudden fall of
Namur. The Germans drive the French from the Sambre. Arrival,
significance, and composition of the British Expeditionary Force. The
Germans attack the British, August 23d. The " retreat from Mons. " The
night encounter at Landrecies. The critical situation on August 26th.
The real objective of the German operations. Situation on August 29th.
The moral crisis in France and Joffre's decision. Continuation of the
German advance. Frantic exodus of civilians from Paris. Transference
of the French government to Bordeaux. Alarming progress of the Russian
invasion of Galicia.

The Kaiser took leave of his capital on August 16th to
join the headquarters at the front. The concentration of
the German forces had reached a point where great events
were expected almost immediately. Before leaving Berlin
the Kaiser issued the following farewell decree:

"The course of the military operations compels me to
transfer my headquarters from Berlin. My heart requires
that I should address to the citizens of Berlin a farewell
and my deepest thanks for all the demonstrations and proofs
of affection which have been so abundantly given to me in
these great days fraught with destiny. I trust firmly in
God's help, in the bravery of the army and navy, and the
unshakable unanimity of the German people in the hours
of danger. Victory will not fail our righteous cause."

84 The Great War

The general forward movement followed the completion
of German concentration with the automatic precision and
promptness of the thunderclap that succeeds the flash of
lightning. Tremendous blows were delivered all along
the front with the bewildering regularity of action of
intricate machinery. It requires an unusual effort of
the imagination to correlate the movements of so many
parts and to perceive in all the varied operations of
these most strenuous days the unity as of a single battle-
field expanded to the geographical dimensions of a whole
campaign.

We have already taken note of the intense activity be-
ginning with August 20th that manifested itself in different
parts of the German front, the hurling back of the invading
forces in Lorraine, the defeat of the French near Longwy
and at Neufchateau, and the general advance of the Ger-
man forces towards the Meuse below Verdun. There
remains to be described the most spectacular phase, as it is
the most important feature, of this, the first of the gigantic
combats of the world-war, namely, the German movement
on the extreme right, which had been gathering momentum
for a week, as we have already seen.

The great design of the General Staff was growing out
of the confusion of preliminary vanguard skirmishes as the
walls of a great edifice rise and are gradually distinguished
from the welter of surrounding scaffolding. Their pur-
pose was revealed in the general disposition of their forces
in the West.

' The German field forces in the West were grouped in
seven different armies numbered consecutively from right
to left along the German front, that is, from its northwest-
ern to its southeastern extremity. The First Army under
Colonel-general von Kluck was advancing against the Brit-
ish Expeditionary Force on the extreme left wing of the

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The Flood-tide of German Invasion 85

French front. The Second Army, commanded by Colonel-
general von Billow, and the Third, by Colonel-general von
Hausen, were directed against the salient formed by the
Sambre and the Meuse. The Fourth Army under the
Duke of WUrttemberg, after driving the French out of
the southern Ardennes in Belgium, threatened the front
on the Meuse between Mezieres and Montmedy. The
Fifth Army, led by the German Crown Prince, was ad-
vancing into France from the Grand-duchy of Luxemburg
on a line of operations passing between Montmedy and
the fortress of Verdun. The Sixth Army under the Crown
Prince of Bavaria, after repulsing the invasion of German
Lorraine confronted the French on the line Nancy-Lune-
ville. The Seventh Army, commanded by Colonel-general
von Heeringen, after the evacuation of Southern Alsace by
the French, was engaged chiefly in watching the northern
passes over the Vosges.

Opposed to these seven there were at first only five
French armies and the British Expeditionary Force. They
were numbered from right to left along the French front,
in other words, from southeast to northwest. It follows
that the First French Army under General Dubail, in the
neighborhood of St. Die, confronted the Seventh German
Army in the region of the Vosges. The Second Army
under General de Castelnau occupied the position from
Luneville to Nancy. The Third and Fourth Armies,
commanded by Generals Ruff^ey (afterwards succeeded by
Sarrail) and Langle de Cary, guarded the line of the
Meuse from Verdun to Mezieres, or somewhat below,
facing the German Crown Prince and the Duke of Wiirt-
temberg. The Fifth Army under General Lanzerac (sub-
sequently succeeded by Franchet d'Esperey) held the angle
between the Meuse and the Sambre, particularly the cross-
ing places on the rivers. Its front along the Sambre was

86 The Great War

prolonged on the left, where the river no longer formed a
natural obstacle, by the British contingent.

Throughout the greater part of the western front single
German armies were matched against single French ones.
But the two armies which the Germans now possessed in
excess of the French were added to the right wing, the
northwestern extremity. This was not all. For, while
the average effective strength of the individual armies on
both sides was probably between 200,000 and 250,000 men,
the German armies varied greatly in size, the First and
Second being especially powerful.

About 500,000 Germans traversed the plain of Belgium
in the great movement westward, while from 150,000 to
200,000 crossed the Ardennes in the direction of Namur
and the section of the Meuse directly above Namur. All
these threatened the salient formed by the line of the
Meuse and the line of the Sambre as extended westward
by the front of the British Expeditionary Force.

The Germans possessing the initiative distributed the
weight of their attack as they chose, baffling their adver-
saries by the mysterious concealment of their intentions.
It presently became evident that the most strenuous effort
would be made to turn the Anglo-French left flank, and
that therefore the British force occupied the position of
gravest danger, since it was posted at the extreme left of the
Hne of the Allies. Von Kluck was leading the First Army
composed of five army corps, probably the Second, Third,
Fourth, and Ninth of the active army, and the Fourth of
the reserve, against the British, who were numerically
scarcely the equivalent of two normal army corps. To the
Second German Army Corps from Stettin was allotted
the all-important task of turning the British left from the
direction of Tournai. This corps, which made its first
appearance at this time, must be added to those already

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 87

enumerated, as the twentieth German, or twenty-first
Teutonic, active army corps in the western theater. Gen-
eral von Billow was bringing up the Second German Armv
composed of four corps, probably the Seventh, Tenth, and
the Guard, and the Tenth of the reserve, against the Fifth
French Army under General Lanzerac, which consisted of
only three corps. Moreover, the Third Army, commanded
by General von Hansen, probably four army corps, was
directed mainly against the Fifth French Army, although
a portion of the three army corps of the Fourth French
Army may have received a part of its pressure. We should
probably not be very far wrong in assuming that in this
section of the front the Germans outnumbered the Allies,
including the Belgian division at Namur, in the proportion
of nearly two to one.

The Allies grossly underestimated the numerical supe-
riority of their adversaries. They doubtless calculated that
the investment of the forts at Namur would absorb an
appreciable part of the enemy's forces. The Meuse,
moreover, was a considerable obstacle protecting their
right flank against attack from the east.

The defenses of Namur, like those of Liege, with
which their construction was contemporaneous, consisted
of a ring of detached forts, in this case nine in number,
built of concrete with armor-plated turrets. These forts
were likewise armed with 15 and 11-centimeter guns and
21-centimeter mortars. General Michel, who commanded
the Belgian Fourth Division forming the garrison of
Namur, about 22,500 men, endeavored to close the intervals
between the forts by means of trenches with barbed-wire
covering.

German patrols made their first appearance before Namur
on August 14th. The main bodies of the Germans began
to arrive in the vicinity about the 18th. They did not

88 The Great War

repeat the infantry assaults in dense formation which had
characterized the early operations at Liege. This method
of attacking the forts, which had cost them so many lives,
was not required at Namur, partly because this stronghold
did not constitute so serious an obstacle as Liege, and partly
because the heavy siege-artillery was available soon after
the arrival of the main bodies of troops.

On the evening of Thursday, August 20th, the Germans
first opened fire against a section of trenches two and
one-half miles in length between the Forts Cognelee and
Marchovelette, northeast of the city. Without exposing
themselves the Germans swept the improvised Belgian
field-works with a tremendous fire of artillery, against
which the feeble armament of the Belgians was useless.
The Belgians held out for about ten hours, crouching in
their trenches, and then withdrew with difficulty to escape
annihilation, permitting the German infantry to penetrate
the space within the girdle of the forts on the morning
of the 21st. The Germans did not force their way into
the city until the 23d, when six of the forts were still
holding out.

The bombardment of the forts was mainly carried on
by the 15-centimeter heavy field-howitzers and by the
21-centimeter (8.4 inch) and 28-centimeter (11.2 inch)
siege-artillery, discharging shells weighing 250 and 760
pounds respectively. These pieces can be transported by
automobile tractors and fired from the wheeled-carriages
upon which they are conveyed. One of the 42-centimeter
(16.8 inch) mortars is said to have been employed also in
the bombardment. The 42-centimeter pieces cannot be
fired from their travelling carriage. They are usually trans-
ported by rail, although it is reported that they were some-
times conveyed by highway in four separate parts, each
part being hauled by three broad-wheeled traction-engines

Maji showing by the shaJed |>orli<m the extent of the German ad

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 89

of steam-roller type, an extra engine preceding the convoy
to test the road. As has aleady been mentioned, their
enormous projectiles weigh 2,500 pounds.

The German artillery took up positions beyond the effec-
tive range of the 6-inch guns of the forts. The intensity
of the bombardment may be appreciated by the record of
shots fired into Fort Suarlee, 600 on the 23d, 1,300 on the
24th, and 1,400 on the 25th. The turrets of this and the
other forts were wrecked and the concrete structure shat-
tered. Fort Suarlee surrendered at five o'clock on the
afternoon of the 25th, and all the forts were in the hands
of the Germans by the next day.

The Germans overpowered Namur suddenly and unex-
pectedly. The reason, as we have seen, was simple. Their
siege-artillery, which greatly surpassed in range the guns
in the forts, was placed in positions where it subjected the
forts to the full effect of its fire without receiving any dam-
age in return. The facility with which the capture of the
fortress was accomplished was an alarming fact for the
Allies. The possession of Namur was of almost vital
importance for the safety of the French forces in the angle
formed by the Meuse and the Sambre, and even for the
British force which continued the line of their front west-
ward. The fact that the Allies expected to maintain their
position in this salient can only be explained on the as-
sumption that they were confident that Namur would
make a much more prolonged resistance. Vastly supe-
rior forces were advancing against them with furious
momentum, urged on by commanders of reckless deter-
mination. Namur at the point of the angle was like the
prow of a ship, which cleaves the billows, but receives the
full fury of the blast.

If the forts of Namur had held out, the position of the
Allies between the two rivers might have been an excellent

90 The Great War

one, since they could shift their forces to and fro on in-
terior lines and strike in either direction. The position of
the German forces attacking on the two fronts would have
been an awkward one, their communication being ham-
pered by the control of the adjacent river-crossings by the
forts at Namur.

But the failure of the Belgians to support the pressure at
Namur precipitated the whole course of events that led
down to the Battle of the Marne. It inaugurated the most
critical period of the whole campaign in the West for the
cause of the Allies. The last barrier to the invasion of
France went down with the submersion of Namur. The
human tidal-wave rushed forward with eager certainty of
engulfing its prey in its tremendous sweep. The invasion
did not wait for the reduction of the forts. It went around
and percolated between them. The Germans had gath-
ered their strongest force to shatter the Allies on this part
of the line at the first blow. With the resistance crushed
at Namur the salient in the Allied front was immediately
flattened out beneath the terrific impact.

A shell crashing through the roof of the railway station
in Charleroi at 7.20 on the morning of the 21st was the
prelude to the bombardment of the town by the Germans.
On the 22d the German infantry forced its way into the
city and at the same time seized the crossing-places on the
Sambre above and below. There was desperate fighting
in the streets of the city. The Germans gradually advanced
to the railway station where the French made their last
stand. The canal passes in front of the station and the
Germans only gained possession of the canal-bridge after
an encounter in which the French resisted desperately for
two hours. After retiring from the lower town of Char-
leroi the French bombarded it in their turn. Meanwhile,
the panic-stricken inhabitants took refuge largely in cellars.

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 91

On the next day, Sunday, the 23d, the French after being
reinforced returned and attacked the Germans in the streets
of the town and drove them back over the Sambre. A
striking feature of the engagement was a terrific hand-to-
hand encounter between the Turcos and a part of the
Prussian Guard. The French colonial troops inflicted
heavy losses on the Germans, but were finally repulsed by
rapid-fire artillery which had been held in concealment.
The French were finally driven from the city.

The crossing points on the Sambre were now in the
undisputed possession of the Germans. At once the im-
portance for the Germans of their occupation of the salient
formed by the Meuse in its deviation westward became
manifest. Just at the time when the Belgians were losing
hold at Namur, and the Germans were pouring across the
Sambre at every available point in front, the French army
was threatened on its flank and even in its rear by the Ger-
man forces which had advanced through the Ardennes to
the right bank of the Meuse.

A hasty retirement of the army of General Lanzerac
between the Meuse and the Sambre had become impera-
tive by the evening of the 22d. But the departure of this
army exposed the right flank of the British Expeditionary
Force, compelling it to retire the next day. It endangered,
moreover, the position of the French along the entire left
bank of the Meuse as far as Verdun.

The British Expeditionary Force originally dispatched to
the continent attracted from the first a degree of attention
out of all proportion to its comparatively diminutive size.
There were several reasons for this. The presence of a
friendly British army on French soil was an almost unique
phenomenon in history, and it was greeted in Western
Europe as a hopeful augury for permanent concord and
the progress of democratic ideals. The reports of the

92 The Great War

operation of the British force, submitted from time to
time by General French, its commander, were unusually-
clear and comprehensive. The intense feeling of bitter-
ness against Great Britain prevailing in Germany magnified
the significance of the presence of the British Expedition-
ary Force in the German imagination, so that victories
over it completely cast into the shade successes achieved
in action against the French where three or four times as
many men were involved.

The first encounter between the most highly developed
professional army and the most efficient national army was
everywhere awaited with intense, impatient curiosity.

The London Times published on October 1, 1914, the
text of an alleged order of the day, said to have been
issued by the Kaiser to the officers of the German First
Army advancing against the British, on August 19th, as
follows :

"It is my Royal and Imperial command that you con-
centrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon
one single purpose, and that is that you address all your
skill and all the valor of my soldiers to exterminate first
the treacherous English and walk over General French's
contemptible little army."

The authenticity of this document was afterwards denied
by the German government; but whether it is true or
false, it may serve as a fair expression of the common
sentiment in Germany.

The British Expeditionary Force was commanded by
Field-marshal Sir John Denton Pinkstone French, the
most distinguished soldier in Great Britain with the excep-
tion of Earl Kitchener. Born of Irish extraction at Ripple
Vale in Kent, September 28, 1852, he was nearly sixty-two
years old at the outbreak of the war. Though destined by
his parents for the church, he chose the navy at the age of

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 93

fourteen and served as cadet and midshipman, but passed
over to the army in 1874. He performed active service
with the 19th Hussars during the Soudan campaign of
1884-1885 and became their commander in 1889. After
serving on the staff and at army headquarters from 1893
until 1897, he became a brigadier, commanding the 2d
cavalry brigade.

The South African War was the great opportunity for
the establishment of General French's reputation. For
he was the one British general who may be regarded as
having been uniformly successful throughout the struggle.
He commanded a cavalry division in Natal in the autumn
of 1899 with the rank of major-general. Later, his con-
spicuous merit, as displayed in a position of very great
responsibility in charge of the operations around Coles-
berg, November 10, 1899, to January 31, 1900, in his
brilliant dash to the relief of Kimberley, and in his leader-
ship of the cavalry division in Lord Roberts's campaign
which ended in the capture of Bloemfontein and Pretoria,
was recognized by promotion to the rank of lieutenant-
general in 1900 and to command of the First Army Corps
at Aldershot in 1901. He served as Chief of the Imperial
General Staff from 1911 until 1914 and received the rank
of field-marshal in 1913. Military action being threatened
owing to the critical conditions arising out of the Home
Rule for Ireland Bill, Sir John French and other military
officers resigned their commissions in March, 1914. On
August 4th the British government having decided to dis-
patch the Expeditionary Force to France, Sir John was
appointed to its command. Short and stocky, though
wiry, in build, his appearance is enlivened by his clear,
penetrating eyes and his alert, sensitive countenance. His
coolness and sound judgment are associated with initiative
and well-calculated intrepidity. Of modest, unobtrusive

94 The Great War

personality, he is ever ready to praise the merit of his
subordinates.

Field-marshal Sir John French arrived on the continent
and visited the French headquarters on the 14th, and went
to Paris to pay his respects to the president the next day.
The first British troops reached the position at Mons
assigned to them in the French general plan of campaign
on August 19th. The concentration of the forces origi-
nally dispatched to the theater of operation was completed
by the evening of August 21st. They were composed of
two corps; the First Corps, commanded by Lieutenant-
general Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the First and
Second Divisions, and the Second Corps, under General
Sir Horace L. Smith-Dorrien, made up at this time of the
Third and Fifth Divisions. General Smith-Dorrien had
just succeeded General Grierson, who died of heart failure
on the 17th. A cavalry regiment was attached to each of
the divisions, and there were also five cavalry brigades, four
of which formed a division under Major-general Edmund
H. H. Allenby.

The center of the British position was at Mons. The
First Corps occupied a front extending eastward as far as
Binche near the western extremity of the French Fifth
Army. The Second Corps was assigned to a position
westward along the canal from Mons to Conde.

British aeroplanes, and cavalry scouts reconnoitering as
far as Soignies, reported no overwhelming force of the
enemy near on the 22d. But about three on the afternoon
of the 23d the situation changed. The Germans were
attacking some portions of the British front with increas-
ing violence. The severity of the fighting during the
afternoon of the 23d is illustrated by the fact that one
company of the Coldstream Guards lost twelve killed and
seventy-two wounded out of a total of 120 effectives. At

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 95

five in the afternoon General French received General
Joffre's alarming communication that at least three Ger-
man corps, a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps, and the
Ninth Corps, were moving against the British position in
front; that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning
movement from the direction of Tournai threatening the
British left flank; and that the retreat of the Fifth French
Army on the British right had commenced because the
Germans had gained possession of the passages of the
Sambre between Namur and Charleroi the day before.

After testing by means of his aeroplane scouts the accu-
racy of this information. General French, who had already
withdrawn his forces a little way from Mons and the line
of the canal, decided to retire to the line Maubeuge-Bavai,
where positions had already been reconnoitered. This
movement, the first stage in the famous ** retreat from
Mons," was commenced at dawn on the 24th, and was
successfully accomplished by ten at night, although the
retiring British were almost constantly assailed by two corps
on their receding front and one on their left flank.

The terms right and left as applied to bodies of troops
will always be used in their significance with reference to
the position of a member of the respective body in con-
fronting the enemy. Thus we shall do every army engaged
in a retrograde movement the formal honor of assuming
that it retreated with its face to the foe.

The Second British Corps bore the brunt of the fighting
on the 24th, threatened as it was with envelopment. On
the night of the 24th the British occupied the position
from Maubeuge westward. General French very wisely
resisted the temptation of seeking cover behind the de-
fenses of the fortress of Maubeuge.

The continued retirement of the French army necessi-
tated the further retrograde movement of the British;

96 ' The Great War

otherwise they would have been outflanked at both ex-
tremities and surrounded. Therefore, the British retreated
all day on the 25th to the line Landrecies-Le Cateau-
Cambrai, where positions had been in part prepared.
Landrecies is situated on the Sambre and Cambrai on the
Scheldt. The Fourth Division of the Expeditionary Force
which had detrained Sunday, the 23d, at Le Cateau, ad-
vanced to cooperate with the retiring forces on the 25th
and was incorporated with the Second Army Corps, reliev-
ing the pressure on its flank. The Second Corps arrived
at its appointed destination about six in the afternoon.
Meanwhile the First Corps following parallel routes skirted
the eastern border of the great forest of Mormal, which
contains 22,000 acres, pursued all day by the Ninth Ger-
man Corps which was advancing by a route leading through
the forest, endeavoring apparently, to intercept communi-
cation between the two parts of the British army.

The First Corps completed its appointed march between
nine and ten in the evening, after sixteen hours on the
road, and was immediately the object of a furious attack
by the Ninth German Corps. The Germans debouching
from the woods north of Landrecies assailed the 4th
Guards brigade in the town. Crowding into the narrow
streets they were met by the deadly fire of the British
machine-guns and repulsed with the loss of nearly 1,000
in a very short time. Meanwhile the First Division was
heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. The assist-
ance of two French reserve divisions and the skilful gen-
eralship of Sir Douglas Haig extricated the troops from a
very diflicult situation, so that the corps was able to resume
its march in the morning.

General French decided that it was necessary for the
British forces to continue the retreat until they could find
a temporary opportunity for repose and reorganization

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 97

behind the Oise or some other important barrier. The
26th was the most critical day in the whole retreat. The
First Corps was directed to retire towards Guise, the Second
on St. Quentin. The First Corps set out at daybreak, but
the Second Corps was attacked in such overwhelming
force by almost the entire army of von Kluck that it was
incapable of disengaging itself. The artillery of four army
corps was concentrated upon it. The Germans were mak-
ing a supreme effort to accomplish the design of crushing
their adversary's left wing. The most far-reaching con-
sequences hung upon the issue. General Sordet with a
French cavalry corps of three divisions retiring by routes
lying eastward of the British was unable on the 26th to
lend any assistance. After maintaining the unequal con-
test with remarkable stubbornness and pluck until 3.30 in
the afternoon, the British commenced their retreat, which
was covered by the cavalry and artillery with the utmost
courage. Nearly a whole battalion of the Gordons was
cut off in the evening. But the preservation of the Second
Corps, even with serious losses, in the face of such unpar-
alleled dangers, an achievement little short of marvellous,
would have been impossible without a commander of
exceptional coolness and determination.

The First Corps experienced less difficulty on the 26th.
But on the morning of the 27th the Munster Fusileers on
its extreme right were surprised and surrounded by the
Germans as they were breaking camp and were forced to
surrender.

Henceforward the pressure on the British was very much
relieved by the cooperation of General Sordet's cavalry and
of the Sixty-first and Sixty-second French Reserve Divi-
sions under General d'Amade, which withdrew from the
neighborhood of Arras. The retreat was continued through
the 27th and 28th, bringing the British to a position on the

98 The Great War

line Noyon-Chauny-La Fere in alignment with the general
front of the French armies.

From the 23d to the 27th the British Expeditionary
Force had retreated about sixty-four miles in four days,
an average distance of sixteen miles a day, fighting every
step of the way with characteristic stubbornness in rear-
guard actions, counter-attacks, and even desperate pitched
battles, against forces that outnumbered it more than two
to one. It had suffered serious losses; but had probably
inflicted heavier losses on its pursuers. Its organization
and spirit were still unbroken. The incidents in the retreat
thus far, one of the most brilliant episodes in the annals of
the British army, form an indivisible feature of the narra-
tive of the first campaign of the Great War.

In the meantime, the main part of the French Fifth
Army was retiring in a direction roughly parallel with that
of the British contingent, — and in accordance with the
general retrograde movement of all the French forces
eastward as far as Verdun, — by way of Philippeville and
Chimay to Hirson and later to the Aisne. The retreat of
the French Fifth Army commenced at least a day before
that of the British Expeditionary Force, as we have seen,
but after a day or two the British recovered contact with
the French on their right. The Fifth Army was engaged
with superior forces led by von Biilow near Avesnes and
Chimay at the same time that the British were fighting on
the line Landrecies-Le Cateau-Cambrai.

On the evening of the 28th, when the British were in
the position La Fere-Noyon along the Oise, the Anglo-
French front was practically continuous. The French
Fifth Army extended from La Fere to Guise along the
Oise, and thence eastward. The French armies had every-
where retired before superior forces, their own inferiority
being due to their somewhat slower concentration and

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 99

their failure to foresee the direction of their adversary's
principal attack and to dispose their forces accordingly.

The retirement of the British exposed the heart of in-
dustrial France to the German invasion. As soon as the
retreat of the Allies left it isolated, the Germans invested
Maubeuge, the most important fortress in the North,
which commands the principal railway line from Belgium
to Paris.

Thousands of the people in the thickly-populated north-
ern departments were driven from their homes by fear of
the Uhlans. Hunted from place to place they suffered
great privation. The bewildering rapidity of the German
advance deprived them of permanent safety for many days.
The railways were overflowing with the streams of refu-
gees. The French evacuated Lille, and later, Amiens.
The advance of German detachments in the direction of
the coast cut off the communications of the British army
with the channel ports nearest England. Consequently
Field-marshal General French changed his base to St.
Nazaire with an advance base at Le Mans.

Von Hansen with the Third German Army inaugurated
his movement southward by driving the French from
Dinant on the 22d and afterwards destroying the town.
After this encounter the French forces in this part of the
valley of the Meuse retreated southward. There was
almost continuous fighting on both sides of the river,
but the main body of the French retired along the left
bank, while the Germans advanced as rapidly as possible
on the right bank, eager to gain control of a serviceable
crossing place. The French in their retreat destroyed
no fewer than thirty-three bridges between Dinant and
Charleville.

In one of the delaying actions of the French rear-guard,
a body of 5,000 French at Marville is said to have held in

100 The Great War

check four times its number for twelve hours. The im-
mediate objective of the German advance in this quarter
was the important center Mezieres-Charleville, the most
convenient crossing-point on the Meuse. The two towns
are separated only by the river, which was here spanned
by three bridges. Charleville, situated on the left bank,
is by far the more important place.

The deep rumbling of cannon, becoming gradually more
distinct, and even more unmistakably the inevitable crowds
of fugitives from points in the valley further north, brought
to the people of these two towns the ominous warning of
the approaching storm of conflict. Public criers announced
in the streets at eight o'clock on the evening of the 24th
that Charleville had to be evacuated by its inhabitants at
once, since it was going to be bombarded in two hours.
Railway service had already been discontinued, and soon
the roads in the direction of the temporary rail-heads were
filled with frightened people groping their way in the
darkness and confusion, carrying as best they could their
most necessary belongings. The sudden and peremptory
dispersal of an entire population at Charleville, as else-
where, inevitably caused many pitiful occurrences and dire
distress.

The German advance-guard entering Mezieres on the
25th found the bridges intact and unguarded and they
hastened to occupy Charleville. They had no sooner
crossed the river than the bridges were blown up by
bombs which had been placed in position by the French
before they retreated. At the same time a French detach-
ment concealed in the apparently deserted houses opened
fire upon them with machine-guns with deadly effect. But
the Germans, who were likewise provided with machine-
guns, also sought the cover of the houses, returned the fire
of the French, and finally drove them from the town.

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\',.^ SiiKKIlAISUN, A, FlglKi

VILLE p'AMIENS

Douze oCa^es pris parmi !es r.,em-
bres du Conscil iVTunitipal auxquels
s'est ,aint M. le Procureur-General,
repor.dent sur leur vie de iengageiDent pris
Pcir h Munic.paliie qu'aiicun acte dhsstilite ne sera
couimis piir la popuialion conire les troupes 'illc-
inandes.

I V.,., .,. U,;..

A. ,F10UET.

Notices posted in the city of Amiens.

CITY OF AMIENS

The enemy's army is in our city : we are notified by
the Commander of the tfoops that the German Artillery
occupy the neighboring heights, ready to bombard the city
and set it on fire at the first hostile act committed against
the troops.

On the other hand, if no act of such a nature takes place
the city and its inhabitants will remain absolutely intact.

Amiens, August 31, 1914.
The Commander of the German forces. The Mayor,
Von STOCKHAUSEN. A. FIQUET.

CITY OF AMIENS

Twelve hostages selected from the members of the
Municipal Council, together with the attorney-general,
answer with their lives for the engagement made by the
municipality that no hostile act shall be made by the in-
habitants against the German troops.

August 31, 1914.

The Se nat or - Mayor ,
A. FIQUET.

German infantry marching through Amiens, August 31, 19 14. French women at a street
hydrant handing water to the soldiers.

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 101

The French artillery on the heights commanding Me-
zieres-Charleville occasioned much annoyance to the main
body of the German forces until the latter, after throwing
pontoon bridges across the river, brought up their heavier
pieces and drove it away.

The principal part of the German Third Army under
von Hausen, after taking the fortress Les Ayvelles on the
Meuse, advanced to Rethel on the Aisne, where it defeated
the French on August 30th. Givet, the frontier fortress
at the northern extremity of a narrow projection of French
territory extending far down the valley of the Meuse in
the direction of Dinant, held out against the Germans until
the 31st. Its prolonged resistance, like that of Longwy
in the northeast, was made possible by the fact that the
Germans concentrated their heavy siege-artillery against
Namur, and later transported it to the positions before
Maubeuge, leaving the lesser strongholds to be bombarded
by the howitzers which accompanied the field armies, for-
midable pieces, it is true, but far less disruptive in their
effect.

After the capture of Longwy the German Crown Prince
advanced resolutely towards the section of the Meuse below
Verdun. The old citadel of Montmedy on an eminence
commanding an important passage of the Chiers was taken
without much difficulty. The Germans claim to have
found hundreds of packages of dum-dum bullets in it.
The French attempted to blow up the railway tunnel at
this point, but the Germans employed the services of
their prisoners in clearing away the wreckage very quickly,
and even laid an extra track around the elevation which
the tunnel perforates.

There was some stubborn fighting before the Germans
effected the passage of the Meuse. But the French who
contested the crossing were finally driven from the heights

102 The Great War

on the left bank by the German artillery with its superior
range. The French destroyed the bridge at Stenay, but in
two days the German engineers had erected a temporary
structure to replace it.

German concentration in the West had scarcely been
completed when the civilian population in Germany was
gladdened by reports of the fortunate progress of the
offensive movement inaugurated in Lorraine on August
20th. Rumors of a great victory were greeted with rapt-
urous expressions of delight in Berlin on the 21st. Build-
ings were decorated along the leading thoroughfares. The
visit of the Kaiserin to the Crown Princess was the occa-
sion for a public demonstration before the palace where
the latter resided. In Unter den Linden crowds waited
until after midnight for more definite news.

Very keen satisfaction was felt in Bavaria because the
victorious army had been commanded by the Bavarian
Crown Prince and was largely composed of Bavarian troops.
The king addressed the throng before the Wittelsbach
Palace in the following words:

"I am proud to see my son win such splendid success
at the head of his intrepid soldiers. But this is only the
beginning; great victories still lie before us. I have con-
fidence in the quality of the German army, which will
remain the victor, however great the numerical superiority
of its enemies may be."

Tidings of a series of German victories followed with
bewildering regularity confirming or surpassing the most
sanguine expectations. The strongest fortresses had crum-
bled in a few days beneath the fire of the German siege-
artillery. The French invasion of the Reichsland had been
brought to a sudden and inglorious termination. The an-
nouncement that the British force, which had been joined
by three divisions of French Territorials, had been decisively

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 103

defeated north of St. Quentin with the loss of seventeen
field-batteries, a heavy battery, and thousands of prisoners,
was received throughout Germany in a spirit of exultation
as the righteous retribution for British perfidy.

By the 28th the Allies had apparently been everywhere
defeated and were in full retreat along the whole front
from Cambrai to the Vosges. The Germans were pressing
forward towards Paris with seemingly irresistible force, and
after the startling performance of the heavy siege-artillery
at Liege and Namur the reduction of the forts about the
French capital was scarcely regarded as a serious under-
taking. The vigor of the French army was apparently
being hopelessly impaired by the lack of concord in the
higher counsels of the nation. The fatal results of the
democratic political control of military policy in France, as
so often predicted in Germany, were manifesting them-
selves with unmistakable clearness. The Germans were
convinced that a consistent, progressive policy was impos-
sible in a country where there had been forty-two ministers
of war in forty-three years. J off re's strategical talent,
whatever its value might be, was evidently hampered and
embarrassed by the control of the president and ministry,
who in turn were subject to the caprice of parliament and
amenable to the fluctuating influence of public opinion.

Divergence of views might at times exist in Germany
in the war councils, but when the decision had once been
made, it received the unconditional sanction of a final
authority.

Germany was animated with absolute assurance of vic-
tory and a boundless spirit of elation. There was just one
shadow of apprehension. The Russians had burst into
East Prussia with unexpected promptness and thus men-
aced the Kingdom of Prussia in a very susceptible part, a
region in which the sentiment of the royal family and the

104 The Great War

material prosperity of an influential part of the nobility
were very intimately affected. But when, after a few days,
this danger also was suddenly removed, it seemed as if
the impossible had been accomplished. The Vossische
Zeitiing expressed this feeling in the following words:

"The mind is almost unable to conceive what is told the
German people about their victories from the East and
West. It is, as it were, a judgment of God which con-
demns our antagonists as the criminal originators of this
fearful war."

The French troops released by the abandonment of the
offensive in Upper Alsace on August 25th were hurriedly
transported westward. To the Seventh Army Corps, regi-
ments of which had been at Miilhausen, four reserve divi-
sions and General Sordet's cavalry corps were added to
form the Sixth French Army, which got into position to
the left of the British on August 29th, thus relieving the
pressure on the Expeditionary Force.

Yielding to custom and the convenience of a definite
geographical indication we have treated Paris as the obvious
goal for the German invasion of France. Paris is a unique
center of communications; it is the nerve center of the
country. Three times during the nineteenth century Ger-
man armies had marched to Paris as their objective. The
occupation of Paris in 1914 would have been a moral vic-
tory that would have created a profound impression in
consequence of the common habit of associating such an
achievement with the collapse of French resistance.

But the attribution of a definite point as the German
objective is correct in only a restricted and conditional
sense. For the supreme purpose of the Germans could
have been no other than to destroy the enemy's field
armies. The French capital was only incidentally the goal
because, by directing their armies in the general direction

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 105

of Paris, the Germans hoped to encounter and destroy the
field armies of their adversary on the way. Without the
destruction of the enemy's main armies, the possession of
Paris itself would have had no final importance. But after
the destruction of the field forces the resistance of no for-
tress would have availed to prevent a German victory.

Five of the German armies in the West were now
sweeping forward into northern France like a great arm
moving on the German position before Verdun as a pivot
stretched out to envelop all the French forces in its
course. The aim was not merely to outflank the Allies,
but to encircle and roll them in together, and clasp them
tight in a deadly embrace. The Germans proposed to
repeat the victory of Sedan by a maneuver embracing all
northern France. It was the most imposing military
movement ever attempted.

By the 29th, the front of the Allied forces, beginning on
the course of the Oise, extended on a line indicated by the
position of the fortresses La Fere and Laon and continued
eastward along the upper reaches of the Aisne and thence
across to Verdun. The forces on both sides southeast of
Verdun had become almost stationary.

The five German armies striking at the Allied front
west of Verdun were advancing on lines that tended grad-
ually to converge. Their common front presented a
somewhat hollow contour, the western extremity distinctly
protruding. The left flank of the Allies was correspond-
ingly pressed back, foreshadowing as it were the ultimate
success of the German turning maneuver.

The Germans probably hoped to bring the campaign in
the West to a victorious culmination in a gigantic battle
on the broad plains about Reims where the deployment
of their tremendous forces would be unrestricted and
where the Allies would be exposed on every side. A

106 The Great War

vigorous attack along the whole front would have served
as prelude to the envelopment of one or both of the wings
of the Allies and the gathering of all their field armies west
of Verdun into the fatal snare.

This, we may assume, was the nature of the German
plan as it appeared to General Joffre.

On the 29th the First and Third Corps in the Fifth
French Army on the Oise executed a brilliant counter-
attack in the direction of the Somme, driving back the
Prussian Guard with its reserve and the Tenth German
Army Corps and inflicting severe losses upon them. The
German official communiques which exultingly announced
the "total defeat" of the British near St. Quentin a day or
two before passed over in silence this exploit of the French.
The resulting protuberance of the French front near La
Fere must have accentuated the angle already created in
this part of the Allied line by the recession of the British
front towards the left in conformity with the course of
the Oise.

But the Allies did not endeavor to make this partial
success a turning point in the general course of their
operations. It is a self-evident maxim of good strategy to
do exactly the opposite of what the enemy wants. The
Germans wished to bring the campaign in the West to a
speedy issue while their vigor and numerical superiority
were unimpaired, and before the progress of the Russian
invasion in the East necessitated a redistribution of their
forces. The Allies had thus far evaded by their systematic
retirement the efforts of the Germans to accomplish their
purpose. The German turning movement, at one moment
on the point of execution, had not yet been achieved.

General Joffre subjected the whole situation to a careful
scrutiny and visited Field-marshal General French on the
29th to confer with him on the plan for the immediate

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 107

future. The situation was still fraught with imminent
peril for the Allies. The Germans were pressing forward
with undiminished vigor and greatly superior forces. The
advance of the Russians in East Prussia had not abated the
energy with which the offensive in the West was being
pushed. The left flank of the Allied armies remained
exposed. Apparently the conditions would have been ad-
vantageous to the Germans in a great battle fought in the
actual position of the contending armies. All the material
circumstances argued in favor of a further retreat for draw-
ing the Germans on until the situation became favorable
for the Allies to resume the offensive. Every day that
intervened before the supreme trial of strength taxed the
endurance of the invaders, increased the distance that sepa-
rated them from their bases of supply, added to the French
reinforcements concentrating in the rear, and intensified
the Russian peril in the East.

But a further retreat was beset with the greatest diffi-
culties of a moral nature. The inevitable abandonment of
the wounded and much of the equipment in a long-con-
tinued retrograde movement tends to depress the soldiers,
to undermine their morale. The temporary sacrifice of a
considerable portion of the national territory and the con-
sequent privations and suffering of millions of Frenchmen
and disruption of the intricate network of industry and all
human relations would react with tremendous force upon
public opinion. It was doubtful whether the patience of
an impetuous people, already sorely tested, would endure
this additional trial. It required an implacable resolution
to face such difficulties.

The evacuation of French territory had probably occa-
sioned a conflict from the first between the political and
military leadership of the nation. It is safe to assume that
the reorganization of the ministry on August 26th was not

108 The Great War

without a very close connection with this fundamental
disagreement. When the haze which still obscures the
more intimate course of events at that time will some day
be dispelled, a great moral victory of the French nation
will probably be revealed, an achievement fit to rank with
the defeat of the Boulanger conspiracy and the vindication
of Captain Dreyfus as the third essential step for the per-
petuation of the republic. In the two former crises the
French people rallied to the defense of liberty against the
artful intrigues of despotism. But in the late summer days
of 1914, as will probably become increasingly apparent,
this headstrong people, jealous of its freedom, abdicated
voluntarily, for the course of the war, its privilege of vacil-
lation, an essential attribute of liberty, and accepted the
firm, dictatorial control which was indispensable for unity
of plan and purpose.

General Joffre decided to continue the retreat, sacrificing
all other considerations to the single object of victory.
La Fere was evacuated after a sharp engagement.

About this time the Ninth French Army, made up of
three corps from the south, took its position at the front
between the Fifth and Fourth Armies to steady them
before the German onslaught.

The official German communication of General Quar-
termaster von Stein on September 2d announcing the defeat
of about ten French army corps between Reims and
Verdun the day before, while the Kaiser was actually
present with the army of the Crown Prince, was very
clearly an endeavor to elevate the daily rear-guard engage-
ments incidental to the systematic retreat of the French to
the imposing proportions of a decisive victory for the Ger-
mans worthy of the anniversary of Sedan Day.

The French evacuated Reims, September 4th. The
Germans fired about sixty shells into the city because there

The effect of the heavv German artillery on one of the forts at Liege.

Steel cupola of one of the forts at Maubeuge cracked by German high-explosive
Maubeuge was besieged bv the (iermans on August 27, 19 14, and held out under
bombardment until September 7th.

;hells.
severe

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 109

had been no formal capitulation after the departure of the
French troops. On the 5th the Saxon troops of the
German Third Army marched into Reims singing their
national hymns and occupied the city.

The British withdrew on August 29th to a position a little
north of Compiegne and Soissons, and continued their
retreat on the following days in conformity with the gen-
eral movement of the French armies, often by forced
marches of extreme length. Their route lay through
the great Forest of Compiegne which contains 35,000
acres. The rear-guard was attacked with special vio-
lence as it was emerging from the woods to the south
of Compiegne on September 1st. The 1st British cavalry
brigade and 4th Prussian Guards brigade were chiefly
engaged in the ensuing encounter. After a spirited con-
test the British repulsed the Germans, capturing ten of
their guns.

The British Second Corps followed the main highway
from Compiegne through Senlis and the Forest of Chan-
tilly in the direction of Paris, while the First Corps pro-
ceeded by a route further east. The British were closely
followed by the Germans and many other rear-guard ac-
tions occurred.

By the 27th the railways were bringing great crowds of
refugees to Paris from the north and east. This influx
was just beginning to tax the resources of the authorities
when it was more than offset by the exodus towards the
south and west of vast throngs who were terrified at the
prospect of another siege of Paris with all its privations and
danger. This migration had gained considerable volume
by August 30th, it was probably stimulated by the appear-
ance of the first German aircraft over Paris, and it reached
its culmination when the government's own example be-
came known on September 3d. The railways, subjected at

110 The Great War

this time to an excessive strain in effecting the redistribution
of the French forces, were unequal to the additional bur-
den thus laid upon them. Huge crowds in a tumult of
apprehension choked the railway stations and bivouacked
before the termini of the principal lines. Numbered
tickets indicating the order of admission to the trains had
to be procured forty-eight hours in advance of the intended
hour of departure. People gladly paid 250 francs ($48.25)
for passage to Havre by river, and as much as 5,000 francs
($965) is said to have been paid for the hire of an automo-
bile for conveyance to the same destination. There was a
veritable stampede of motor-vehicles whose owners wished
to leave the city before their machines were requisitioned
or the highways were barricaded. Endless processions of
vehicles of every description and of pedestrians filled the
roads. A vast torrent of humanity representing every sta-
tion of life poured forth from the metropolis, while Paris
itself remained strangely tranquil.

At length the authorities, recognizing the advantage of
reducing as far as possible the number of mouths to be fed
in Paris, offered free transportation by rail to those who
wished to depart for the provinces, making public an-
nouncement of the hours and places of departure and the
destination of the trains which were made available for this
purpose.

Paris is the center of an immense intrenched camp
formed by a girdle of detached fortresses, erected for the
most part in the decade following 1871, with a perimeter
of ninety miles. It was estimated that 150,000 troops
would be necessary to defend, and 350,000 to invest, the
fortified area. But the lessons of Liege and Namur had
shaken confidence in its impregnability. The open spaces
between the forts would have offered the same problem of
defense. Besides, it was evident that the Germans would

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 111

not have invested the whole circuit of the intrenched
camp. They would have massed their forces against a
section of the perimeter, shattered two or three of the
forts by the concentrated fire of their heavy siege-artillery,
and rushed through the wide breach thus created.

The rapid approach of the enemy bringing Paris itself
within the area of the war zone induced the government
to decide to transfer its seat temporarily to Bordeaux, so
as to remain in unrestricted contact with the country as a
whole. To justify this decision, the following proclama-
tion was issued on September 2d, signed by President Poin-
care and countersigned by the members of the ministry:

"People of France!

"For several weeks relentless battles have engaged our
heroic troops and the army of the enemy. The valor of
our soldiers has won for them marked advantage at several
points. But in the North the pressure of the German
forces has compelled us to fall back.

"This situation has compelled the President of the Re-
public and the government to take a painful decision. In
order to watch over the national welfare, it is the duty of
the public powers to depart temporarily from the city
of Paris.

"Under the command of an eminent chief, a French
army, full of courage and zeal, will defend the capital and
its patriotic population against the invader. But the war
must be carried on at the same time on the rest of the
territory.

"Without peace or truce, without cessation or faltering,
the sacred struggle for the honor of the nation and the
reparation of violated right must continue.

"None of our armies is impaired, If some of them
have sustained very considerable losses, the gaps have im-
mediately been filled up from the reserves and the levy of

112 The Great War

recruits assures us new reserves in men and energy for
to-morrow.

"Endure and fight! Such must be the motto of the
Allied British, Russian, Belgian, and French armies.

"Endure and fight, while at sea the British aid us in
cutting the communications of our enemy with the world.

"Endure and fight, while the Russians continue to ad-
vance to strike the decisive blow at the heart of the Ger-
man Empire.

"It is the duty of the Government of the Republic to
direct this stubborn resistance.

"Everywhere Frenchmen will rise for their independ-
ence. But to insure the utmost spirit and efficacy in the
formidable contest, it is indispensable that the government
shall remain free to act.

"At the request of the military authorities the govern-
ment is therefore transferring its headquarters to a place
where it can remain in constant touch with the whole of
the country.

" It requests members of Parliament not to remain away
from it, in order that they may form with the government
and their colleagues a bond of national unity in the face of
the enemy.

"The government leaves Paris only after having assured
the defense of the city and of the intrenched camps by
every means in its power.

"It knows that it does not need to recommend calm,
resolution, and coolness to the admirable population of
Paris which is showing every day that it is on a level with
its highest traditions.

"People of France!

"Let us all be worthy of these tragic circumstances.
We shall gain the final victory. We shall gain it by un-
flagging will, endurance, and tenacity.

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 113

"A nation which refuses to perish, and which, in order
to live, does not flinch either from suffering or sacrifice, is
sure of victory."

A special train left the station of Auteuil with President
and Madame Poincare and the ministry at eleven o'clock
on the evening of the 2d and arrived at noon in Bordeaux,
which had been selected as the temporary seat of govern-
ment. Other trains during the 3d brought the diplomatic
corps and Council of State. The offices of government
were distributed among the public buildings. The pre-
fecture became the president's residence and the faculty of
letters of the university was transformed into the Ministry
of War.

The eminent chief, to whom the defense of the capital
had been entrusted, General Gallieni, issued the following
proclamation :

" To the Army of Paris and the inhabitants of Paris !

**The members of the Government of the Republic
have left Paris to give a fresh impulse to national defense.
I have been entrusted with the task of defending Paris
against the invader. This task I will fulfil to the end."

This was the laconic utterance of a man of energy and
quiet determination. It contrasts favorably with the pre-
tentious rhetoric of General Trochu to whom the same
mission was confided in 1870.

Joseph Gallieni, who was born at Saint-Beat, in the south
of France, April 24, 1849, entered the military school at
St. Cyr in 1868, and like General Joffre served as sub-
lieutentant in 1870. He was a member of the group under
Commander Lambert who surrendered after the exhaus-
tion of all their ammunition at Balan, the village of the
''Dernieres Cartouches." Later Gallieni was engaged in
service in the French dependencies, where he showed him-
self to be a capable organizer and intelligent administrator

114 The Great War

as well as an energetic soldier. He organized the French
Soudan as lieutenant-colonel. After his elevation to the
rank of colonel in 1891 he executed important missions
in Indo-China and Madagascar. He was made brigadier-
general in 1896 and appointed Governor-general of Mada-
gascar, a post which he occupied until 1905. He wrote a
number of works on French colonial subjects, particularly
on the geography and administration of Madagascar. He
was the youngest general of divisional rank in the army
when raised to that grade in 1899. He was appointed
Military Governor of Lyons and Commander of the Four-
teenth Army Corps in 1906, and two years later he was
admitted to the Conseil Superieur de la Guerre.

The German armies in the extreme West were still
advancing in the direction of Paris at a speed that is only
attainable with the extensive use of motor transport on
such roads as the incomparable highways of France, and
in a level region. Both von Kluck's army and the British
whom they were pursuing covered as much as thirty miles
in a single day.

Suddenly an armed motor-car conveying about twenty
soldiers would appear on the German line of march.
Then groups of from five to twenty Uhlans would spring
up as if by magic at different points in the zone to be
traversed by the German columns. Larger masses of
cavalry supported by rapid-fire artillery mounted on auto-
mobiles would next appear; and then came the main
bodies of infantry, regiments, divisions, army corps. The
compact columns were followed by heavy artillery drawn
by motor-tractors. Air-scouts projected in every direction
the vision of the intellectual management guiding the
movement of the invading hosts with almost unfailing
accuracy. The whole was impelled by a relentless deter-
mination and iron discipline.

The Flood-tide of German Invasion 115

It seemed almost a question of hours whether the Ger-
mans would succeed in their great venture or be balked of
their prize before the very gates of Paris.

Just at the crucial moment, when the future of France,
and perhaps of democratic institutions in Western Europe,
hung in the balance, the dark war-clouds rose rapidly again
upon Germany's eastern horizon, and this time with the
menace of such immediate peril as to demand forthwith
very earnest attention. After a fortnight's continual battles
on a scale hitherto unknown, Lemberg was evacuated by
the Austrians on September 3d. The Russian deluge was
rolling westward across Galicia with irrepressible volume
bearing the sorely battered Austrian armies before it. The
gateway to Vienna and Berlin was in imminent danger.

CHAPTER VI

The Russian Offensive

Early operations on the Russo-German border. Exaggerated impression
of Russian might. Natural objective for the Russian offensive. Why the
Russians did not set out for Berlin from the nearest point on their frontier.
Lack of natural boundaries. Important rivers : Niemen (Memel), Vistula,
San, Bug, Narev, Bobr. Strategic consequences of the position of Rus-
sian Poland as a great salient. Teutonic fortresses and Russian fortresses.
Russian invasion of East Prussia; the German forces, the Russian Vilna
and Warsaw Armies. Encounters at Stalluponen and Gumbinnen. The
Masurian lakes. Von Hindenburg and the Battle of Tannenberg: von
Hindenburg, the man and his hobby ; his appointment to the command in
the East, August 22d ; his concentration of troops and chances of success ;
his plan of battle resembling that of Hannibal at Cannae; Battle of Tan-
nenberg : the contest at Hohenstein, August 26-28 ; the German occupation
of Soldau and its results, August 26-27; operations by the German left
wing, August 26-29 ; the consummation and extent of the victory. Opera-
tions against Rennenkampf. The situation in Galicia. The Austrians
invade Poland while the Russians invade Galicia from the east. The
operations of Russky and Brussiloff and the evacuation of Lemberg
by the Austrians on September 3-4. Collapse of Dankl's offensive in
Poland. The defeat of the Austrians on the Grodek-Rawaruska line and
their withdrawal from most of Galicia.

Minor operations on the Russo-German border were
reported as soon as war between the two countries was
declared. The Germans claimed that the Russians inaug-
urated hostilities during the night of August 1-2 by acts
of aggression committed by their boundary patrols, pre-
sumably before the result of the German ultimatum at
St. Petersburg had become known on the frontier.

On the 3d a battalion of the 155th German infantry
regiment and the 1st Uhlan regiment occupied Kalisz,
the frontier town in Russian Poland on the railway line
leading from Lodz into Prussia. It was at this place that
Alexander I in 1813 summoned the Germans to rise against

116

Field Marshal Paul von Bencckeiulorrt' iind von Himlcnhurg, commaiuling tlu' (nrnian
armies operating against the Russians.

The Russian Offensive 117

Napoleon's tyranny. On the same day German frontier-
guards occupied Czenstochowa, which possesses important
coal mines and a religious shrine of great sanctity among
the Poles, frequented annually by thousands of pilgrims.
Bendzin, likewise important for its coal mines, was taken
at the same time.

Allusion has already been made to the German method
of employing cavalry as a screen to hide artillery and in-
fantry. These tactics were successful in several minor
frontier engagements. On the 5th the German cavalry
near Soldau in East Prussia enticed a body of Russian
cavalry to a point within range of concealed infantry and
machine-guns, where they were mowed down or put to
speedy flight. The German covering troops with artillery
repulsed Russian cavalry near Eydtkuhnen on the 10th.

A profound impression of Russia's inexhaustible strength
was generally prevalent at the commencement of the Great
War. In spite of their exaggerated opinion of Russian
inefficiency and unwie^diness, the Germans shared in the
excessive feeling of awe produced by Russia's tremendous
magnitude. The danger of living next-door to such a
prodigy had lately become an obsession with them. Even
the German General Staff formed its plan of campaign
with Russia's potential might as the fundamental consid-
eration. The mad dash to the very heart of France, dis-
regarding the neutrality of Belgium, was prompted by
the supposed necessity of concentrating most of the Ger-
man forces later on the eastern frontier to repel the
tremendous hordes which the Tsar could muster in time
from all parts of his vast dominions. In the opinion of the
General Staff, the completion of the concentration of the
Russian field armies, which was supposed to require about
six weeks, set the inevitable limit for the accomplishment
of the necessary decisive action in the West. To the

118 The Great War

Germans, in the wild exultation over the early victories, the
thought of Russia's millions came like the dark specter of
a threatening doom; to the western Allies in the depression
of their first defeats, it was the token of ultimate victory.
Russia's armies were likened to a ponderous steam-roller
that would flatten out every obstacle in its course. The
feeling was very common in neutral nations also that Rus-
sia's numbers would eventually be the decisive factor.

All parties failed to discount the fundamental difference,
which all recent development in the art and practice of
war has accentuated, between a mere recruit and an effi-
cient soldier trained and equipped. The mobihzation of
Russia's armies of the first line was accomplished with a
rapidity which astonished all observers and lent some color
to the German insinuation that the Russians had been
making surreptitious preparations for several weeks. But
the process of concentration scarcely assembled a tithe of
the men of miUtary age in the Russian Empire. The
countless millions that had fired |he imagination of the
West were not available. Equipment was utterly lacking
for mobilization on a scale commensurate with the bigness
of the country. The supply of material of war was the
crucial problem for Russia from the beginning. The de-
velopment of Russian industry, satisfactory as had been its
progress in recent years, had not attained the capacity of
supplying unaided the material required for warfare on
such a vast scale, particularly the necessary munitions.

It was soon evident that the Russian army had under-
gone a far-reaching reorganization since the disasters in
Manchuria. The assumed degree of inefficiency and the
supposed phenomenal size of the Russian army were alike
fictitious. In the numerical strength of her mobile forces,
Russia did not stand in a class by herself. The aggregate
strength of her field armies in 1914 was considerably less

The Russian Offensive 119

than the combined strength of the German armies on
both fronts. But the rapidity and vigor of the Russian
offensive did much to embarrass, if it did not itself effec-
tively upset, the execution of the great German plan of
campaign in the West.

The natural objective for the Russian offensive was as-
sumed to be Berlin, just as that of the Germans was thought
to be Paris. The old-time tradition of the Seven Years' War
suggested this, and the supposition that the German capital
was exposed to attack from the east. Some surprise was
therefore felt when the Russians commenced their invasion
of Germany at the most remote extremity of East Prussia,
more than 400 miles from Berlin, rather than from the
western confines of Russian Poland, whence the distance
to be traversed was considerably less than half as great.
The point where the Warta coming from Russian Poland
penetrates Prussian territory, only 180 miles east of Berlin,
almost exactly in the direct line between Warsaw and the
German capital, is an apparently suitable spot from which
to set out on such an enterprise.

Yet never, throughout the whole fluctuating course of
operations in the eastern theater of war, were the Russian
aggressive movements directed along an approximately
straight line from Warsaw to Berlin. The tradition of
operations in the past may have contributed somewhat to
this. But the main cause must be sought in a considera-
tion of the physical features and political geography of the
whole eastern area of hostilities.

The lack of natural barriers to define political bound-
aries in this part of Europe was emphasized in the first
volume. Between the Carpathians and the Baltic Sea a
vast plain extends from the heart of Russia across northern
Germany. The Russian boundary of the Teutonic empires
taken as a whole resembles the figure of a capital S turned

120 The Great War

backwards, with East Prussia filling the upper recess,
Russian Poland the lower, and Galicia falling just below
the tail.

The physical character of East Prussia is scarcely dis-
tinguishable from that of the adjacent Russian provinces,
and the boundaries of Russian Poland in the direction of
Posen and Galicia are likewise, for the most part, marked
by no physical distinctions.

The noteworthy features of this great plain are its water-
courses. The general direction of the rivers is northwards,
since they mostly rise in the Carpathians or their foothills
and empty into the Baltic Sea. Beginning in the east we
encounter the Niemen, which flows past the Russian for-
tresses Grodno and Kovno, in a course generally parallel
with the eastern frontier of Prussia and about fifty miles
east of it. Bending to the west after passing Kovno, the
Niemen penetrates the Prussian boundary and reaches the
Baltic Sea as the German Memel. The Vistula, by far
the largest and most important river of this region, rising
in the Carpathians, flows by Cracow and reaches Warsaw
by a long, sweeping curve to the left, after forming the
northern boundary of Galicia throughout a third of this
section of its course. Just below Warsaw the Vistula turns
westward and reaches the German boundary, after flowing
in a generally northwestern direction, about twelve miles
above the fortress of Thorn. Then traversing West Prussia
it empties into the Gulf of Danzig. The Vistula receives
two very important tributaries: the San, approaching it
from the right near the point where it leaves the Galician
boundary; and the Bug, also from the right, eighteen
miles below Warsaw, after this latter tributary has been
swelled by the waters of the Narev, which empties into it
on the right. The Bug rises in eastern Galicia and flows
through Brest Litovsk, 150 miles east of Warsaw, where

..i^r:^^'^

f^M^^

The Russian Offensive 121

there was an immense military depot protected by a
ring of forts, the main base of supplies for all Russian
operations in Poland. East of Brest Litovsk there is a
large tract of almost impenetrable country, the Pripet
marshes, one of a number of such swampy areas in Russia,
which are a consequence and characteristic of the ill-
defined water-partings. The Narev with its tributary the
Bobr and the frequent marshes along their course are an
important defensive feature of the region opposite the
southeastern frontier of East Prussia.

Russian Poland, which, for the sake of convenience,
will be alluded to henceforth simply as Poland, occupies,
as we have seen, a great salient in the western front of
Russia, with the strategical attractions of a position pro-
truding far into the enemy's territory, but at the same time
beset with insidious perils. This westward extension not
only brought Russia to a point only 180 miles from Berlin,
but it bordered on Silesia, a hive of German industry,
second only to Westphalia in the importance of its coal
mining and manufactures of iron and steel.

But a Russian army advancing westward through the
center of Poland would be threatened on both its flanks.
The Teutonic allies could launch their blows from three
sides at the heart of Poland, and the remarkable efficiency
of their strategic railways enabled them to transfer their
forces from one part of the frontier to another with such
rapidity and secrecy that it was impossible for the Russians
to foresee from what direction a deadly thrust was to be
expected.

Poland is the most thickly populated part of Russia, but
its railways were few as compared with the lines of Prussia
and Galicia, and those which existed were partly single-
track so that their capacity for military purposes was not to be
compared with the German and Austrian systems. There

122 The Great War

were no essentially strategic lines in Poland, and the lack of
a railway following the course of the frontier all around
was a very serious deficiency, especially in the operations
against East Prussia. Throughout the entire course of
the German, and practically all of the Austrian, frontier
one or more lines run parallel with the border, which ren-
dered invaluable service for the Teutonic allies in shifting
troops and material from point to point. A deliberate
adaptation of the railway system to strategic requirements
is evident even in Galicia, where at eleven points the rail-
heads approached the Russian frontier with no communi-
cation beyond it.

While the Teutonic powers relied chiefly on their field-
armies and splendid equipment of railways, they had not
entirely neglected the construction of modern strongholds
to support their defensive and serve as bases for offensive
operations. Konigsberg is a first class fortress, composed
of a double enceinte and twelve detached forts, the only
stronghold of much consequence in East Prussia. Danzig
and Graudenz are both strong fortresses. But Thorn has
been the most important German fortress for the opera-
tions in the eastern theater during the present war, although
it has never once been attacked. Thorn was the pivot for
von Hindenburg's railway strategy and one of the bases
from which he delivered his repeated blows against War-
saw in the autumn of 1914. The fortified area at Thorn
lies on both sides of the Vistula, eight of the detached forts
being situated on the right bank and five on the left.
While there is a very large intrenched camp at Posen, the
rich province of Silesia was practically destitute of all
natural or artificial defenses. Peremysl, sixty miles west of
Lemberg, the capital, was the principal fortress in Galicia.
But Cracow, the ancient capital of Poland, now in the
western extremity of Galicia, was in one respect a far

The Russian Offensive 123

more significant position. Cracow was the constant goal
of the Russians in their offensive in Galicia, although they
never reached it. The fortress of Cracow guards the nat-
ural gateway from the valley of the Vistula to that of the
Oder, a gateway that opens westward upon a natural vesti-
bule from which corridors lead to Vienna and Berlin re-
spectively. Cracow is defended by a girdle of six powerful
forts on both sides of the river.

At the beginning of the war the Russians prudently
abstained from any serious attempt to hold the western
part of Poland. They even withdrew their frontier and
custom house guards from some parts of the Austrian
border, so that the boundary control was entirely relaxed
and Poles were free to join the Polish regiments in Galicia.
The concentration of the Russian forces was carried on in
the eastern part of Poland, behind the Vistula, in the area
covered by the fortresses and more important rivers.

Besides Brest Litovsk, the Russians had two very strono;ly
fortified positions in Poland, Ivangorod, sixty-four miles
southeast of Warsaw, with twelve forts, nine on the right
bank of the Vistula and three on the left, and Novo
Georgievsk at the confluence of the Bug and the Vistula.

The conditions were such that the Russians could not
hope to advance into the heart of Germany before they
had cleared their adversaries from one or both flanks of
their position in Poland. The Russians undertook both
these operations at practically the same time. For several
reasons it is more convenient to consider first the move-
ment on their right wing. The invasion of East Prussia
advanced at first more rapidly than that of Galicia and was
watched with keener interest. But very soon it collapsed
entirely leaving very little impression on the subse(]uent
course of events, except that it afforded the opportunity
for the discovery of the greatest talent and the making

124 The Great War

of the most distinguished reputation on the German side
throughout the war.

As we have observed, it was the intention of the Ger-
manic powers to hold the Russian armies in check as far
as possible until the fate of France had been decided.
After presumably sufficient forces had been directed against
the Serbian army and an army corps had been sent to
help the Germans in Alsace, the remainder of the Austro-
Hungarian army, nearly 1,000,000 men, was concentrated
on the Russian border. But the Germans limited their
forces in the East at the beginning of the campaign almost
to the point of recklessness in their eagerness to give the
fullest effect to their initial blow in the West. Twenty of
their army corps were concentrated on the western front,
so that only five were left to guard the more extensive
eastern frontier, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Seventeenth, and
Twentieth. Only the First and Twentieth Army Corps
were in East Prussia, their headquarters being at Konigs-
berg and Allenstein respectively. The Sixth was sent to
reinforce the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia. The
Fifth was probably distributed along the boundary of
Fosen. The Seventeenth may have been held at its head-
quarters at Danzig in readiness to support the forces in
East Prussia. The First was brought up to the eastern
frontier of East Prussia. Probably an unusually large pro-
portion of reserve and Landwehr formations were assem-
bled in this part of the country to compensate somewhat
for the very great disparity in forces of the first line.

The Russian army corps ordinarily stationed near the
boundaries of the Teutonic Empires with their respective
headquarters were the following: Third, Vilna; Fourth,
Minsk; Second, Grodno; Sixth, Bialystok; Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, and Twenty-third, Warsaw ; Fourteenth, Lub-
lin; Eleventh, Rovno; and Twelfth, Vinnitza.

The Russian Offensive 125

The rapidity of the Russian concentration must have
been a very disconcerting factor in the plan of the Ger-
man General Staff. The general Russian advance into
East Prussia commenced about August 16th, just as the
German deluge was sweeping away the final barriers at
Liege, and at least a week before the systematic invasion
of France was begun.

Three railways which cross the frontier from Russia into
East Prussia determined the general course of the Rus-
sian invasion on converging lines. The Vilna Army, as it
was called, which had been concentrated on the Niemen,
composed of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Twelfth
Army Corps of the active army, and the Third and Fourth
Reserve Divisions, and five cavalry divisions, under General
Rennenkampf, was ordered to advance westward along the
main railway line connecting St. Petersburg and Berlin
which penetrates the East Prussian boundary at Eydtkuh-
nen. General Rennenkampf was one of the few Russian
commanders who earned favorable distinction in the Russo-
Japanese War, in which he commanded a division.

The task of the Narev, or Warsaw, Army, under General
Samsonoff, probably made up of the First, Sixth, Eighth,
Fifteenth, and Twenty-third Army Corps of the active
army, and the Twelfth Reserve Army Corps, with three
cavalry divisions, was to assail East Prussia from the south-
east, from the region of the Narev, advancing mainly along
the railway lines leading from Bialystok to Konigsberg and
from Warsaw via Mlava to Soldau and Danzig. Altogether
more than 500,000 Russians had thus been massed as early
as August 16th for the invasion of East Prussia.

The large complement of cavalry was a very useful
adjunct to the Vilna Army in its advance across the
northern part of East Prussia, a comparatively open, level
expanse of territory, well-developed and with good roads.

126 The Great War

A long-established popular tradition of the ruthless cruelty
of the Cossacks was one of the chief causes for the general
panic and exodus of a large number of the inhabitants at the
approach of the Russian cavalry, who were soon scouring
the country far and wide. The consternation and flight of
the inhabitants was not unlike the havoc occasioned by
the inroad of the Germans into Belgium at precisely the
same time.

The rounding contour of East Prussia and its excellent
network of railways might have provided the Germans
with an opportunity of keeping their own forces together
and striking the different masses of the invading forces
separately in quick succession. But at first the Germans
did not operate in accordance with such a plan, either
from lack of a single commander, or because they under-
estimated the enemy's strength.

General von Fran9ois confronted the Vilna Army with
the First and probably a part of the Seventeenth Army
Corps and their accompanying second line formations.-
The Russians outnumbered his forces in about the pro-
portion of two to one. The Germans tried to delay the
Russian vanguard at Stalluponen where there was a stub-
born contest on August 17th. The German reports of the
fighting in East Prussia at this time resemble in one respect
the Belgian notices of the operations of the Belgian army
at precisely the same period. Each series presents the
seeming incongruity of a succession of victories on an ever-
receding front. The public was informed, for instance, that
the German army took 3,000 prisoners at Stalluponen and
8,000 three days later at Gumbinnen, and that its eventual
retirement, leaving the way open to Insterburg, an impor-
tant railway center, was solely due to strategical consid-
erations. The advance of the Narev Army from the
south was menacing its line of communications. But the

The Russian Offensive 127

immediate cause of the hasty retreat of the troops under
General von Frangois was undoubtedly their inferiority in
number to the Russian army in front of them. The Ger-
mans were hopelessly outnumbered and overpowered; but
this, in the circumstances, was no disgrace. The Russians
advanced on a broad front. By concentrating the bulk of
his available forces at special points so as to gain a tempo-
rary local superiority, General von Francois was probably
able to delay and embarrass the Russian forces for a few
hours at a time.

The principal encounter in this period was fought before
Gumbinnen, twenty-two miles west of the Russo-German
frontier at Eydtkuhnen, on the 20th. The Russians at-
tacked the Germans in front in a succession of bayonet
charges. After a courageous resistance of fourteen hours
the Germans withdrew. In the broad sweep of their ad-
vance the Russians repulsed the Germans on the left at
Goldap and occupied Tilsit on the right. The Germans,
threatened with envelopment, retired in considerable dis-
order, abandoning much of their equipment along the
road. The Russians entered Insterburg on the 24th. They
did not at any time invest Konigsberg or isolate it, although
their cavalry advanced beyond Tapiau on the railway line
from Eydtkuhnen. *

Meanwhile, the Narev Army had invaded East Prussia
from the southeast. Its left wing put to flight a German
detachment which had occupied Mlava in Poland and
drove the Germans from Soldau, an important junction
point on the Prussian side of the border. At the extreme
right a secondary mass, detached from the main body of
the army, was advancing on Lyck by way of Osovietz.
The Russians had to traverse a dreary portion of the prov-
ince of East Prussia, but a region of exceptional strategic
importance, as the approaching great events were soon to

128 The Great War

prove. This is the region of the now famous Masurian
Lakes, a monotonous sandy waste, covered in large part
by forests of stunted pines and birches. Innumerable
shallow depressions retain the water in lakes, pools, and
morasses, the latter often concealed beneath a treacherous
layer of soil and vegetable growth.

This labyrinth can only be traversed in a few places by
narrow passages and causeways between the lakes. The
intricacy of these Hues of communication is very baffling
except to those who are thoroughly familiar with the
region. The different parts of an army advancing in
separate columns through these various defiles are neces-
sarily out of touch one with another and afford an excellent
opportunity for the enemy to attack them separately. The
region presents the gravest perils for armies in retreat by
reason of the difficulty of distinguishing the trustworthy
from the deceptive openings between the marshes and
sheets of water. The railway system of Bast Prussia was
admirably designed for making the most of the defensive
possibilities of this part of the province. A main line with
double track faciHtated the distribution and shifting of
troops and suppHes behind the cover of the lakes.

The Russian column arriving at Lyck separated, one
part passing south of the lakes through Johannisburg, the
other part proceeding to the northward of Lake Spirding.
Thus the army of General Samsonoff was spread out over
a very broad front where communication and cooperation
were rendered difficult.

The Twentieth Army Corps and some Landwehr forma-
tions opposed the march of the Narev Army, particularly
its right wing. The Germans made a stand for two days,
August 23-24, at Frankenau in a prepared position, and
then were forced to retire, and the Russians occupied the
headquarters of the Twentieth Corps at Allenstein, an

Burial of Austrian dead after repulse of a Russian attack on Peremys

Neidenburg in East Prussia. The destruction is said to have been wrought by Russian gunhre.

The Russian Offensive 129

important junction point on tlie main railway line from
Berlin via Thorn to Insterburg and Eydtkuhnen. General
Rennenkampf's front was now on the line Friedland-
Angerburg, and the cavalry of the two Russian armies had
nearly established contact.

The progress of the Russian offensive, particularly the
advance of the Narev Army, unless immediately arrested,
would in a few days have cut off the army of von Francois,
isolated Konigsberg, swept the Germans from all the rest
of their territory east of the Vistula, and so inflicted upon
them a national calamity involving even more serious moral
effects than the formidable physical losses.

By August 22d the German General Staff had become
convinced that drastic measures were required to cope
with the alarming situation in East Prussia. A dispatch
from the Kaiser summoned General von Hindenburg to
take command in the East, a man sixty-seven years of age,
who was as little known outside purely military circles in
his own country as many other commanders who have
won great distinction in the Great War.

Paul von Hindenburg (Paul Ludwig Hans Anton von
Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg) belonged to a family
of stalwart Prussian Junkers who had served the state with
loyalty for more than two hundred years. His career
began as a lieutenant at Sadowa, where he received a slight
wound. He took part in the battles of St. Privat and
Sedan and in the operations before Paris in 1870. Later
he attended the War Academy. While serving on the
staff of a division at Konigsberg during the years 1881-1883
his attention was enthralled by the strategical possibilities of
the Masurian Lakes for the defense of East Prussia. This
subject became at once his occupation and his pastime.
He was obsessed by it. He explored every nook and
corner of this bewildering region. Later, when called to

130 The Great War

the General Staff and to the professorship of applied tactics
in the War Academy, von Hindenburg had an excellent
opportunity to develop his favorite theme in the course of
his lectures. Some of his colleagues regarded his apparent
infatuation with good-natured ridicule. But von Hinden-
burg's military career gave him a comprehensive experience.
He rose through the various grades of troop commander
until he became commanding general in 1903. He resigned
his post at the age of sixty-four in 1911. At the com-
mencement of the war he offered his services, but he had
almost given up hope of an opportunity of actually con-
ducting the campaigns which he had so long anticipated
in imagination when the call finally came.

On the night of the 22d a special train conveyed von
Hindenburg from Hanover, where he had been living in
retirement, in company with his Chief of Staff, von Luden-
dorff, towards the eastern theater of hostilities. They arrived
at Marienburg, the temporary headquarters, the next after-
noon. Three days later the battle began which made von
Hindenburg famous throughout all the world.

Von Hindenburg is a man of relentless energy and pro-
digious capacity. The massive cast of his features suggests
an indomitable resolution. If genius consists in clear and
searching comprehension, unfailing adaptability to circum-
stances, and indefatigable patience, then von Hindenburg
is a genius. He used the means which were at hand, his
methods involved no startling innovations ; but all his opera-
tions were characterized by a marvellous grasp, rapidity,
and thoroughness.

He proceeded without delay to concentrate with the
utmost rapidity all the available German forces scattered
throughout this part of the country. An uninterrupted
procession of troop trains day and night taxed the capacity
of the main line from Thorn to Osterode, as far as the

The Russian Offensive 131

railwa}^ could be safely operated under German control.
No feature of von Hindenburg's generalship is more sig-
nificant than his extensive and effective employment of
the railways. To the Twentieth Corps and its Landwehr
auxiliaries, which were already in the vicinity, were added
the First Corps and Landwehr formations, part or all of
the Seventeenth Corps from Danzig, and a reserve corps.
Thanks to the faultless service of the railways the delicate
operation of withdrawing the troops of von Francois from
the front of the Russian Vilna Army was successfully per-
formed. But in all not more than the equivalent of nine
divisions was concentrated.

The aggregate Russian forces in East Prussia outnum-
bered this German army more than two to one. Von
Hindenburg's only hope of victory depended upon his
ability to deal with the Russian masses in detail. The
armies of Samsonoff and Rennenkampf were only two or
three days' marches apart. Von Hindenburg naturally
directed his attention first to the army of Samsonoff, the
nearer of the two. Every moment was precious ; for the
situation involved imminent peril. If Rennenkampf had
come up in time and united his forces with those of his
colleague, the Germans might have suffered an appalling
disaster. Just at this time in the West the sensational
dash towards Paris was entering upon its final stage. The
withdrawal of large forces from the western theater, which
would have been absolutely indispensable if the Germans
had suffered such an overwhelming defeat in the East,
would have been fatal to their entire plan of campaign.
Everything depended upon the chances for victory in East
Prussia and upon the skill of a single man.

In his calculations, von Hindenburg, who had been an
attentive observer of Russian methods during the Man-
churian campaign, assumed a degree of hesitancy and lack

132 The Great War

of initiative on the part of Russian commanders that justi-
fied the venture v^^hich he was about to undertake.

Four different railways form a convenient framework
for the region in which the decisive encounter between
von Hindenburg and Samsonoff took place: a section of
the strategic line which follows in Prussian territory the
sinuous course of the Russian boundary and a section of
the main Hne from Thorn to Insterburg, together with
portions of two other lines, as intercepted by these two
first mentioned, one between Soldau and Deutsch Eylau
and another between Ortelsburg and Allenstein. The four
junction points here mentioned may be regarded as the
corners of an irregular quadrilateral having a length of about
fifty miles from southwest to northeast. It contains other
railway lines of lesser importance. In fact, the remarkably
convenient communications for a German army confront-
ing an invader in this area was a factor of fundamental
importance in the situation. On the other hand, the east-
ern part of the quadrilateral, as defined above, consists in
large part of lakes and marshes, with few traversable open-
ings between them and infrequent highways. It is part of
the general region of the Masurian Lakes.

All the means by which an elastic but closely-knit polit-
ical organism, with its resources well in hand, controlled
by leaders of vigilance and discernment, can repel the
attacks of a vastly larger, but cumbersome, neighbor were
revealed in the rapid series of operations by which von
Hindenburg swept the Russians from the soil of Prussia
in the first part of his campaign of 1914.

Von Hindenburg's defeat of Samsonoff recalls very plainly
the crushing of the Roman army by Hannibal on the plain
of Cannae in 216 B. C. which afterwards became proverbial.
To Professor Hans Delbriick is due the clearest, most con-
sistent analysis of this very famous battle of antiquity, and

The Russian Offensive 133

on the basis of his able interpretation Count von Schlieffen,
formerly Chief of the German General Staff, once declared
that Cannae was the prototype of the kind of plan which
should be the ideal for the modern commander. We may
assume, therefore, that Professor Delbriick's explanation of
the Battle of Cannae was current in higher military circles
in Germany.

Both the Battle of Cannae and the notable contest which
will presently be described were victories of nimbleness
and dexterity against stolid, unintelligent force. In each
the more talented commander enveloped and hopelessly
ensnared his opponent. Hannibal led 50,000 men against
the 70,000 Romans. The Germans claim to have won the
no less complete victory in East Prussia against similar
odds, while the Russians assert that the Germans were
numerically superior to themselves. Both statements may
possibly be true, each in a particular sense. The entire
army of General Samsonoff was undoubtedly more numer-
ous than that of von Hindenburg, but it was scattered, as
we have remarked, and the Russians declare that only
seven divisions of their troops were actually engaged in
the decisive conflict against nine divisions of the Germans.
The difficult character of the country and the distance
separating the different routes by which the Russian army
was endeavoring to advance make this declaration seem
not entirely improbable. But even if it were admitted,
the circumstance that through quickness of perception
and skill in maneuvering von Hindenburg secured a local
superiority at crucial points no more detracts from his fame
than do such other favorable factors as his superior knowl-
edge of the country, a closer contact with his base, better
transportation facilities, and a more intelligent staff. Mili-
tary renown that could not endure analysis would rest
upon a very unstable basis.

134 The Great War

Hannibal at Cannae drew up his less effective troops in
the center of his battle-line in rather attenuated formation
against the solid mass of the Roman infantry, and placed
the more steadfast elements of his army in compact array on
the wings which overlapped the Roman front. The weaker
Carthaginian center received the shock of the Roman on-
slaught and yielded ground before it, but without breaking,
until the wings were in position on the Roman flanks. Then,
when the squadrons of Numidian cavalry had enclosed the
Roman rear, the essential maneuvers were accomplished.
The Romans were completely surrounded, compressed
into a congested position, where they were unable to de-
ploy and make their numbers count. The closer they were
crowded together the more unwieldy became their efforts
and the more deadly the action of the enemy. What fol-
lowed was not a battle ; it was simply wholesale slaughter.

Leading authorities on the art of war unanimously insist
that the paramount aim in military operations should be the
destruction of the enemy's field forces, not the occupation
of his cities or territory. Von Hindenburg perceived at
once that the successful prosecution of the campaign in
East Prussia required the immediate destruction of the
Narev Army and with iron consistency he directed every
resource to the attainment of this single purpose. He
adopted the plan of the victor at Cannae, the double turn-
ing movement for the envelopment of his opponent, the
method inculcated by German doctrine and confirmed by
a victorious experience for compassing the enemy's de-
struction. It is significant, furthermore, that this method
produced at Cannae the most conspicuous example in an-
cient times of the destruction of an adversary's army, and
in von Hindenburg's first great victory the only instance
in the present war where the same conclusive result may
be said to have been accomplished.

The Russian Offensive 135

The natural conditions and means at his disposal per-
mitted von Hindenburg to economize in the use of his
forces, as compared with Hannibal, in two very important
respects. The almost impenetrable character of the terri-
tory in the rear of the Russians served as effectually as the
Numidian cavalry to complete the hostile ring, while the
excellent railway communications across the rear of his
own position enabled von Hindenburg to shift his forces
quickly and secretly and thus use the same troops succes-
sively for the culminating operations of the conflict in
different parts of the field. By rapid intrenching he com-
pensated for the withdrawal of these troops from the posi-
tions which they had been chiefly instrumental in securing.

The Russians were advancing northwestward on a broad
front, evidently with the intention of cooperating with
Rennenkampf's army for completing the conquest of East
Prussia as the necessary prelude to an advance beyond the
Vistula.

The Russian intelligence department must have been
quite defective. Perhaps the Russians were thrown off
their guard by the inadequacy of the German forces which
they had encountered and dispersed thus far. The move-
ment of troops directed by von Hindenburg may have
been largely concealed by the forests which cover much of
this region. For Samsonoff was apparently not aware that
considerable forces were being concentrated against him
until the 26th, when he encountered the German army
posted along the line Gilgenburg-Lautern.

In his initial dispositions, von Hindenburg, like Hanni-
bal, concentrated his chief strength on his wings, reducing
the forces at the center to the lowest degree at all com-
patible with safety. The German right wing was composed
of the First Corps and a Landwehr division; the left was
formed of the Seventeenth Corps near Lantern and a

136 The Great War

Reserve Corps opposite Allenstein, which had been occu-
pied by the Russians. There remained only six Land-
wehr regiments for the position in the center opposite
Hohenstein.

The Russians advancing from Hohenstein attacked the
Germans who fell back at first without seriously engaging
themselves. The fighting near Hohenstein, which was very
severe, lasted from the 26th to the 28th. The function of
the German center was to hold firm before the Russian
attack until the double flanking maneuver had been exe-
cuted by the wings. That the German center did not
break before the repeated assaults of the Russians is
largely due to the superiority of the German artillery.
The Russian gunners were said to have handled their
pieces with exceptional efficiency and precision. But the
Russian shrapnels in exploding did not diffuse their charge
of bullets as extensively as the German. Besides, the move-
ment of the Russian artillery was rendered difficult by the
character of the country; whereas the Germans had con-
trol of a good provincial highway along which field-pieces
and munitions could easily be conveyed. Later, when the
Twentieth Corps, half of the Reserve Corps, and other
parts of the Landwehr Corps had come to the support
of the center, the Germans turned to the offensive.
They concentrated their heaviest artillery, subjected the
Russians to a pitiless shower of shrapnel, destroyed their
imperfect trenches, and fairly blew Hohenstein to pieces
with explosive shells. The Russians fled as best they could,
abandoning most of their guns. Hohenstein and its vicinity
presented a terrifying appearance for days afterwards. The
once cheerful town in the midst of the dark pine forests
was reduced to a blackened, distorted shell. Tall trees,
shorn of their branches, twisted and scorched, stood like
grim specters of an awful tragedy. The dead covered the

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The Russian Offensive 137

highway and filled the ditches along the sides, some of
them disfigured beyond recognition or literally torn to
fragments by the explosion of the larger shells. A slight
layer of gray dust that settled like a pall over all the hideous
wastage of war made the spectacle more revolting by its
mockery of concealment.

In the meantime, on the 27th, von Hindenburg concen-
trated strong forces on his extreme right and pressed the
Russians back from Soldau. This was part of the double
flanking maneuver. But its immediate purpose was two-
fold. It secured for the Germans possession of an im-
portant junction point, severing the only direct line of
communication or retreat for the Russians in the direction
of Poland, and it deceived the Russian commander as to
the point from which von Hindenburg's heaviest blow was
to be delivered. The Russians had committed the fatal
error of strengthening their center at the expense of their
wings. Samsonoff^ saw his mistake when it was too late.
He tried to collect sufficient forces to drive the Germans
out of Soldau, but the movements of his troops and artillery
towards this quarter of the battlefield were impeded by the
poor roads. Besides, the Germans had already intrenched
themselves in a position covered by marshes. Far from
recovering Soldau the Russians were driven back in the
direction of Neidenburg.

As early as the 26th there had been fighting on the ex-
treme German left, where the Seventeenth Army Corps
repulsed a Russian army corps which had been advancing
towards Lautern, driving it back in the direction of Ortels-
burg and capturing many cannon.

The field intrenchments protecting Soldau made it pos-
sible to dispense with a considerable part of the German
forces on that wing. These were rapidly transferred by
railway to Allenstein, which the Russians evacuated, whence

138 The Great War

von Hindenburg was planning to deliver his culminating
blow. The Germans advanced, driving back the Russians,
as far as Passenheim on the 27th. Von Hindenburg now
controlled the main railway line as far as AUenstein and the
branch line over to Passenheim. His army was in position
on three sides of the Russians, and on each side it had com-
mand of a good highway and all the motor-vehicles in
the countryside had been requisitioned to supplement the
railways in the conveyance of troops and supplies.

Von Hindenburg had only to draw the fatal noose closer
and closer about the entangled Russians. Eastward the
series of lakes offered an effective barrier to their escape.
It was a comparatively easy matter for von Hindenburg,
thoroughly acquainted as he was with the whole region,
to occupy most of the solid intervals between these lakes,
where small detachments operating in the necessarily re-
stricted spaces could hold their own against vastly superior
forces.

The uninterrupted pressure of the German wings on
the 28th and 29th bent back the Russian front into a semi-
circular outline. In proportion as the perimeter of the
Russian position was contracted in this way, the concentric
fire of the German artillery became more effective. Dis-
tributing their heavy guns as they chose the Germans
poured their shells into the congested masses of Russians
floundering hopelessly in the swamps or staggering con-
fusedly through the forests.

The Russian army was finally separated into two parts,
one escaping eastward by the only available defile, along
the railway in the direction of Johannisburg, leaving behind
their wounded and most of their heavier equipment, the
other surrounded and forced for the most part to surrender.

Whatever may be the degree of his responsibility for
this appalling defeat of the Russians by reason of his

The Russian Offensive 139

carelessness, Samsonoff died a hero's death, struck down
together with his chief of staff in a last vain effort to rally
his men on the 31st.

The Kaiser conferred the rank of colonel-general and
the Iron Cross of the first class upon von Hindenburg as
a reward for this auspicious victory.

An official German communication on the 29th, with
the customary terseness which these documents exhibit
when they relate victories as well as when they condescend
to report reverses, announced von Hindenburg's glorious
exploit in the following terms :

"Our troops in Prussia under the command of Colonel-
general von Hindenburg have defeated, after three days'
fighting in the region of Gilgenburg and Ortelsburg, the
Russian Narev Army consisting of five army corps and
three cavalry divisions, and are now pursuing it across the
frontier."

At first it was reported that the German army had taken
30,000 prisoners. But on August 31st Quartermaster-
general von Stein made the following announcement:

"The victory of Colonel-general von Hindenburg re-
ported in the East is of far greater importance than it
was possible at first to recognize. Although fresh troops
coming by way of Neidenburg made an attack, the defeat
of the enemy was complete. Three army corps were anni-
hilated, and 60,000 prisoners, including the commanding
generals, and many cannon and colors fell into our hands.
The Russian troops who are still in the northern part of
East Prussia have commenced a retreat." On Septem-
ber 1st came the news that the number of prisoners was
70,000 including 300 officers; and finally, on the 3d, the
following official communication was made public:

"The troops of Colonel-general von Hindenburg in the
East are garnering further fruits of their victory. The

140 The Great War

number of prisoners is growing daily ; it has already reached
90,000. It is impossible to determine how many cannon and
other trophies are still concealed in the Prussian forests and
swamps. Apparently not two, but three, Russian command-
ing generals have been captured. According to Russian
reports, the Russian army commander (Schilinsky) fell."
The reference to Schilinsky, who was Samsonoff's col-
league, was simply due to a confusion of identity.

If the Germans took 30,000 wounded prisoners, as has
subsequently been reported, in addition to 90,000 un-
wounded, the number of the Russians who were slain in
battle or perished miserably in the lakes and swamps was
probably about 30,000. The entire German loss in fight-
ing strength was from 10,000 to 15,000 at most.

The Germans have chosen to call this victorious contest
the Battle of Tannenberg, although no fighting of any
importance occurred in the vicinity of the village of this
name. But Tannenberg recalls a crushing defeat inflicted
by the Poles upon the Teutonic Knights, the pioneers of
German civilization in East Prussia, on July 15, 1410, a sort
of Prussian Kossovo. Thus the ignominy of a great defeat
inflicted by Slavs upon Germans was now after five centuries
erased by a glorious victory won by Germans over Slavs.

It was commonly supposed that the prompt invasion of
East Prussia by the Russians contributed materially to the
failure of the Germans to consummate their design in the
West by compelling them to detach large bodies of troops
from their forces in France. This view has undoubtedly
been exaggerated. Any great shifting of forces at a critical
period in the operations in the West would assuredly have
been made before the destruction of Samsonofl^'s army. The
earliest notice of an eastward movement of German troops
is the statement that on Friday night, August 28th, 160 Ger-
man troop-trains passed through Belgium travelling from

The Russian Offensive 141

southwest to northeast, presumably withdrawing at least an
army corps from the western front to reinforce the army
in the East. But these troops, reserves or Landwehr of
course, would undoubtedly have been entrained after the
climax of danger in East Prussia had already passed. If
the notice is authentic, the troops which were seen return-
ing through Belgium may have been intended for service
on the Galician frontier. It is not the least part of von
Hindenburg's title to glory that he won the Battle of
Tannenberg solely with the troops at hand in the prov-
inces immediately threatened, most of whom had already
suffered the moral depression of defeat by the Russians,
without making any extra demand upon the resources of
the Fatherland at a period of such extreme suspense.

As soon as von Hindenburg had disposed of the army
under Samsonoff he struck out towards the northeast,
scarcely allowing his soldiers any respite, for the purpose
of dealing with the Vilna Army. Instead of continuing to
push vigorously westward, or hastening to unite forces
with Samsonoff, Rennenkampf, grown suddenly cautious,
had begun to intrench himself on a line running from
Lake Mauer to Tapiau, where his army faced in the direc-
tion from which von Hindenburg's attack was naturally to
be expected.

The Vilna Army, drawn up in a generally concentric
position covering the entire northeastern part of the prov-
ince, presented far too extensive a front for the immediate
application of the supremely effective double turning
maneuver. But von Hindenburg hoped that the envelop-
ment of the enemy's left wing by a turning movement
through Lotzen, between Lakes Spirding and Mauer, in
the direction of Goldap would lead Rennenkampf to shift
the bulk of his forces southward, compressing them on the
narrow front Gerdauen-Nordenburg-Angerburg, where a

142 The Great War

repetition of the tactics of Tannenberg would probably be
successful.

In the interval following the Battle of Tannenberg the
Eleventh Corps, a Reserve Guard division, and a Saxon
cavalry division arrived as reinforcements for von Hinden-
burg. The Landwehr corps was left behind to deal with
the scattered remnants of the Russian Narev Army. For
the operations against Rennenkampf there were thus avail-
able four active corps, one and one-half corps of the
Reserve, and the Saxon cavalry division, besides some
minor auxiliary forces posted before Konigsberg.

The First Corps with the Saxon cavalry division was
ordered to turn the Russian left wing by marching north-
eastward in the direction of Goldap, while the other corps
advanced against the Russian front, their attack converging
towards Insterburg. General von Morgen with a Reserve
division, ordered to parry any blow from the southeast,
successively repulsed on September 7th, 8th, and 9th, with
severe Russian losses, a Siberian army corps which was
trying to attack the German right wing in the rear from
the direction of Lyck and Marggrabova.

The Germans commenced their main attack on the 9th.
The enveloping movement succeeded, and by the 10th the
Russian left wing, its front contracted into a narrow arc,
was retreating in the general direction of Insterburg and
Gumbinnen. But instead of leading his remaining troops
to the threatened wing and engaging his whole army in a
restricted position facing southward, thus exposing them
to a fatal snare, Rennenkampf abandoned the imperilled
left wing to its fate and retreated eastward as rapidly as
possible with the main part of his forces. Insterburg
was abandoned on the 11th. In some parts the retreat
became a rout, so that between thirty and forty thousand
prisoners and 150 guns were left in the hands of the

The Russian Offensive 143

Germans. In a very few days East Prussia was entirely
cleared of the enemy and the Germans advanced into
Russian territory, occupying Suwalki, where they set up a
German administration.

The splendor of von Hindenburg's rapid achievements
was somewhat clouded by the failure of his invasion of the
Russian territory lying eastward of East Prussia undertaken
in the latter part of September. There was continuous
fighting in the Forest of Augustovo east of the boundary
from September 25th to October 3d. The Germans
attacked Osovietz, a fortress guarding the crossing of the
Bobr. Situated in the midst of a marshy tract, the Ger-
mans could approach it only by a narrow defile. They
reached a point where the fortress was within range of
their heavy artillery. But the Russians made a sortie by
night, attacking and outflanking the Germans, who were
on difficult ground, and put them to flight after a conflict
lasting thirty-six hours. After the failure of repeated
attempts to cross the Niemen, von Hindenburg gave up
the ofl^ensive and fell back into East Prussia.

To the professional enthusiasm and impetuous tempera-
ment of the Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Russian
armies may be attributed in no small degree the initial
rapidity and dash of the Russian offensive, but probably
not the lamentable blunders which frustrated the impos-
ing invasion of East Prussia. The Grand-duke Nicholas
(Nikolai Nikolaievitch), second cousin of the present Tsar,
was born in 1856, and began his active military career in
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, where his father, a
brother of Tsar Alexander II, was commander-in-chief
of the Russian forces operating in Europe. Grand-duke
Nicholas became lieutenant-general in 1893, and held the
position of Inspector-general of Cavalry at the time of
the Russo-Japanese War. He was relieved of the post

144 The Great War

of President of the Council of Defense, to which he was
elevated in 1905, in consequence of opposition in the Duma.
The command of the military district of St. Petersburg,
conferred upon him in 1906, involved the assumption of
responsibility for the Tsar's person at a time when the dis-
turbed condition created by the revolutionary agitation was
still serious.

The grand-duke's marriage in 1907 with Princess Anas-
tasia, daughter of the King of Montenegro, the pledge of
a fervent attachment, is one of the forces that made him a
resolute leader of the Pan-Slavist movement. This cir-
cumstance and his thorough devotion to the military pro-
fession marked the Grand-duke Nicholas as the appropriate
supreme commander in the national struggle.

At the outbreak of the Great War he was the only
member of the imperial family who had dedicated his
time and energy unreservedly to the serious cultivation of
the art of war. Though a cavalryman by early training
and inclination, his experience extended to the command
of the other arms. Having a towering stature, graceful
carriage, and a keen, penetrating expression, and accus-
tomed to deal in a direct, open, compelling manner, his
appearance and qualities are such as impress and inspire
his associates and the vast armies ready to encounter any
difficulties and hardships with patriotic enthusiasm. The
operations inaugurated under his auspices were as signally
successful in Galicia as they were disastrous in East Prussia.

To the Austro-Hungarian forces had been assigned in
the general plan of the Teutonic powers the principal task
of embarrassing and breaking up the concentration of the
Russian forces, so as to prevent as long as possible the
commencement of their expected invasion of Germany.
This function would of course be performed by an aggres-
sive action launched from Galicia against the strategic

The Russian Offensive 145

positions in Poland. The forces assembled by the Dual
Monarchy in Galicia were divided into two armies intended
for the more active field operations and a third which was
held chiefly in reserve. The first of these armies resting on
Jaroslaw and Peremysl faced northward towards the heart
of Poland. This army was to undertake the vigorous offen-
sive movement in the direction of Lublin and Chelm. It
was commanded by General Dankl and consisted of seven
army corps with some minor reserve formations. It is
said that in general the more reliable elements of the
Austro-Hungarian military establishment were incorpo-
rated in this army.

The second army, with Lemberg as its base, faced to
the northeast. Its task was to protect the flank and rear
of the first army during the latter's advance into Poland.
Its commander was General von Auffenberg.

The reserve army lay westward of the two others. Its
active role in the plan for the earliest operations was
limited to the invasion of the parts of Poland lying west of
the Vistula, where no considerable masses of the enemy
were to be expected. Each of the active armies num-
bered about 300,000, and the reserve army about 200,000
effectives.

The Austrians evidently believed that while their second
army warded off invasion from the south of Russia, where
the concentration of the Russian forces might presumably
proceed more rapidly, the first army could strike a blow
with paralyzing effect at a sensitive point in Poland, where
the assembling of the hostile forces would still be in its
early stages.

The invasion of Poland by the first army commenced as
early as August 11th. General Dankl advanced rapidly,
encountering very little opposition at first, with the inten-
tion of cutting the railway between Lublin and Chelm

146 The Great War

and threatening the communications to the rear of War-
saw. His army repulsed two Russian corps near Krasnik
on August 23d. Then it moved forward to within eleven
miles of Lublin, and with such comparative ease as to make
it seem probable that the Russians were deliberately drawing
General Dankl as far as possible from his bases and from
contact with General von Auffenberg, and into a position
from which he would find it difficult to extricate himself.

The advance of this northern army was suddenly checked
by alarming news of a formidable Russian invasion of
Galicia from the east and southeast. The Austrians had
committed the fatal mistake of greatly overestimating the
relative tardiness of Russian concentration. They paid a
heavy penalty for their unfounded assurance. The Rus-
sians displayed, particularly throughout this campaign, a
surprising facility of movement independently of railways.
The broader gauge of the Russian railways, originally
adopted no doubt from a motive of self-protection, should
have embarrassed the Russians in an offensive movement
against Austria or Germany in consequence of the impos-
sibility of employing their own rolling stock beyond the
border. But the invasion of Galicia was pushed forward
with a remarkable degree of expedition in spite of this
serious drawback.

General Russky, to whom was entrusted the Russian
army operating directly against Lemberg, had been com-
mander of the military district of Kieff, where he brought
the organization to a high degree of efficiency. He was
thoroughly familiar with all parts of the country where
the early operations in Galicia were destined to take place.
The startling success of the Russian offensive was due to
General Russky's thorough administrative work in the dis-
trict of Kieff no less than to his intelligence and skill in
the field.

The Russian Offensive 147

His invasion of Galicia from the northeast with eight army-
corps commenced in earnest on August 17th. Russky's
army was directed against von Auffenberg's center and left
wing. Very^ soon another Russian army, composed of five
army corps and three divisions of cavalry, made its appear-
ance in the southeast, advancing against von Auffenberg's
right wing. This army was under command of General
Brussiloff. To oppose these two Russian armies von Auf-
fenberg seems to have had six army corps, the Third,
Seventh, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth,
together with five divisions of cavalry and possibly some
minor reserve formations. Thus the Russians were at first
vastly superior in numbers to the forces which confronted
them. In this situation a part of the reserve army already
mentioned, which was commanded by the Archduke
Joseph Ferdinand, was hastily moved eastward to the sup-
port of von Auffenberg. In the ensuing tremendous con-
flicts in Galicia, conducted on a scale hitherto unparalleled
in the annals of warfare, as many" as 1,200,000 men were
probably engaged altogether in the armies on both sides.

Russky^ occupied Brody on the 22d and on the same day
Brussiloff crossed the Galician border at Voloczysk, the
frontier station on the railway line from Odessa to Lem-
berg and Cracow. Russky advanced on a broad front.
With his right he struck out straight westward to outflank
the Austrian forces covering Lemberg and drive a wedge
between Dankl and von Auffenberg. The center and left
wing advancing directly against the army of von Auffen-
berg were soon engaged in desperate encounters, attacking
the Austrians in front in reckless onslaughts. It was the
task of Brussiloff to advance upon the right flank of the
Austrian armies. Thus the Russians proposed to envelop
the Austrians on both flanks and roll them together or else
force them to seek safety by evacuating Lemberg.

148 The Great War

After two days' delay before the Zlota Lipa, where he
finally forced a passage, Brussiloff established contact with
Russky's army. Von Auffenberg fell back to a position of
great natural strength on a line more than seventy miles in
length across the front of Lemberg, where trenches and
barbed-wire entanglements had been carefully prepared in
advance.

For days the furious attacks of the Russians, — their bayo-
net charges, — made no impression on the Austrian center.
An official communication on September 1st declared that
in a battle lasting a week the army of von Auffenberg had
won a complete victory, capturing 160 guns, and that the
Russians were retreating across the Bug. Whatever the
extent of this rather shadowy victory may have been, it
had no appreciable effect in impeding the progress of the
Russian offensive, which was being most actively carried
out on the flanks.

The left wing of Brussiloff's army particularly executed
an extensive outflanking movement. Sweeping far to the
south it attacked the Austrian forces defending Halicz,
broke their line by the evening of the 31st, and crossed
the Dniester on pontoon bridges after the Austrians had
destroyed the permanent bridge to cover their retreat.
Consequently, the Austrian retirement became a panic.
In the meantime, the Russian wedge was successfully
driven forward on the right as far as Tomasof, where the
Austrians were also defeated.

By September 3d the wings of the Austrian army before
Lemberg were pushed back like the extremities of a horse-
shoe, and the prompt abandonment of the city and sys-
tematic withdrawal from the neighboring region became
imperative to avert a catastrophe.

Lemberg was evacuated on the same day and the Aus-
trians were in full retreat by the 4th. The official organs

Lieutenant-general von Heeringen and staff, commander of the German Seventh Army.

German dead on the field of battle after a charge.

The Russian Offensive 149

were at some pains to emphasize the point that Lemberg
was not taken by force, but abandoned voluntarily by the
Austrians themselves, since its defense was not part of
their plan and would only have involved the city in useless
destruction, and that their retreat was due solely to strategic
considerations. The distinctions which the Austro-Hun-
garian authorities endeavored to establish in this way may
have satisfied national pride, but they were without any
practical significance. It is very doubtful whether the
Russians experienced any great chagrin at being deprived
of the supreme, but empty, glory of taking Lemberg by
assault, or at accomplishing their aim by strategical, rather
than tactical, combinations.

Von Auffenberg's army fell back by parallel routes in
the direction of Peremysl, harassed on the march by the
tireless Cossacks. Besides the gain in prestige, the acquisi-
tion of Lemberg was a very valuable advantage for the
Russians in a material sense. It is the most important
railway center in Galicia, where seven lines converge.
The capture of thirty locomotives and many cars of the
standard Austrian gauge was a matter of no inconsiderable
importance at just that moment. Vast stores had been
accumulated at Lemberg as a military base, and these fell
into the hands of the invaders.

While these very significant events were occurring in
Galicia, the Russians were collecting a large army on the
Hne Lublin-Chelm under General IvanofF. In conse-
quence, a general battle developed with the army of
General Dankl. The situation of this Austrian army very
soon became precarious and the turning point in the first
invasion of Poland was the failure to pierce the Russian
line, in a final effort on September 2d, when the Tenth
Austro-Hungarian Army Corps bore the brunt of the
fighting.

150 The Great War

The offensive in Poland collapsed and the initiative
passed to the Russians under Ivanoff. As the Austrians
fell back there was desperate fighting at Krasnik in which
two German divisions were engaged. Only skilful man-
agement saved the Austrian army from an overwhelming
calamity. It fell back with its left wing on the Vistula,
gradually contracting the breadth of its front from about
eighty to forty miles.

Besides the army of General Ivanoff closely pursuing
the retreating Austrians, a Russian force was likewise ad-
vancing along the left bank of the Vistula, keeping pace
with their march. Dankl arrived at the San on Septem-
ber 12th, hoping to be able to restore and reorganize his
exhausted troops beyond this barrier. The passage of the
river was effected only with the greatest difficulty and
frightful losses. The Russians occupied some elevations
commanding the bridges, shelled the Austrian forces while
they were crossing, and are said to have taken no less than
30,000 prisoners. They captured the bridge at Krzeszof
before the Austrians could destroy it, and were thus able
to surmount the supposed obstacle in their pursuit without
very much difficulty or delay.

Von Auffenberg resolved to make a determined stand
with the forces retreating from Lemberg on a line passing
through Grodek, in positions prepared in advance. Rein-
forcements had in the meantime been hurried forward to
strengthen and extend the left flank of von Auffenberg's
army, in an effort, probably, to fill the gap that separated
his forces from the army of Dankl. Eventually an entire
new Austrian army was formed from parts of the 3d army,
two corps hastily transferred from the Serbian frontier, and
some German contingents.

The new Austrian position was about sixty miles in
length, but the critical points were Grodek and Rawaruska,

The Russian Offensive 151

on the right and left wings respectively. For eight days
there was continuous, terrific fighting before Rawaruska,
becoming more and more intense as the Austrians were
gradually forced back from one trench to another and the
crucial moment approached. The defense was carried on
with the utmost valor, but the north wing of the Austrians
was finally dislodged. The attack on Grodek began on
the 6th, and the fighting continued for five days without
interruption. During the greater part of this time the
Austrians fought with the greatest stubbornness in trenches
choked with the decomposing bodies of their fallen com-
rades, and without regular supplies of food. By the 13th,
the official dispatches admitted that in consequence of the
superior forces of the enemy and the danger that the left
wing would be enveloped, the Austrians had been forced
to retire from this position.

The Austrian armies, outnumbered and repeatedly
worsted in battle, pursued and harried without mercy,
threatened with complete disorganization, retreated west-
ward seeking safety or a respite. The western part of
Galicia offers superior opportunities for the defensive.
The Carpathians and the Vistula, which furnish the requi-
site protection for the flanks of a hard-pressed army, con-
verge to'wards the west, so that the front to be defended
becomes continually shorter. This province is traversed
by the San, Visloka, and Dunajec Rivers, which flow
from the Carpathians to the Vistula, forming successive
natural barriers. The Austrians attempted to rally at each
of these rivers. The failure to hold out at Grodek and
Rawaruska compelled them to retire behind the San,
about seventy miles west of Lemberg. But the crossing
of the San near its mouth by the Russians and the fall
of Jaroslaw, an important fortress on the same river about
twenty miles below Peremysl, commanding the railway

152 The Great War

to Cracow, on September 21st, destroyed their hope of
defending this line.

Peremysl alone remained on the San, garrisoned by
about 100,000 men under General Kusmanek, like another
Maubeuge, an island in the midst of the spreading deluge
of invasion.

A brief stand on the Visloka was followed by a retreat
to the line of the Dunajec and Tarnow, eighty miles west
of Jaroslaw. But even this position was threatened by the
Russians who pressed relentlessly upon the heels of the re-
treating Austrians.

The heterogeneous character of their forces was prob-
ably a serious drawback to the Austro-Hungarian armies.
The Slavic sympathy of an important part of the popula-
tion doubtless contributed to the numerous desertions and
the vast numbers who surrendered. Thus in the short
period, September 11-14, alone, the Russians reported the
capture of 83,531 prisoners. But in spite of this factor,
and of the anticipated numerical advantage of the Rus-
sians, the Austrians had confidently expected, in view of
the superior organization and quality of their troops, to
carry on a successful campaign. Their conspicuous failure
and the rapid progress of their disasters seemed to portend
the approaching dissolution of the monarchy.

By the end of September the Austrian armies were ap-
parently on the point of complete demoralization. They
had seemingly contracted again their old-time "habit of
defeat." The results were manifesting themselves vaguely
but unmistakably in the attitude of neutral states, especially
Italy and the Balkan Kingdoms.

CHAPTER VII

The Battle of the Marne
{September 6-10, 1914)

Germans in the neighborhood of Paris. The deviation in von Kluck's
march and the reasons for it ; the fundamental change in the German plan,
the design of crushing the center of the Allies. Von Kluck's oblique
movement and passage of the Marne. Joffre's tremendous responsibility
and his plan of battle. Relative strength of the combatants and the positions
of the forces. The assumption of the offensive by the Allies on the 6th.
The concentric attack on von Kluck's army. The plight of the French
Sixth Army on the 8th; the Paris "taxis" to the rescue. The climax on
the 9th and the German retreat. Violent German attack on the Anglo-
French center. General Foch's successful tactics. Discomfiture of the
Prussian Guard. The Crown Prince's attack on Troyon. The retirement
of the Duke of Wiirttemberg and the Crown Prince. General reflections
upon the character and consequences of the Battle of the Marne. The
fall of Maubeuge.

It was commonly regarded as more important for the
Germans than for their opponents to bring the contest as
quickly as possible to a decisive issue. The Germans
themselves appear to have acted upon this conviction in
the most resolute manner, as we have already observed.
They did not scruple to spend their men and ammunition
lavishly whenever the saving in time justified the sacrifice.
They did not hesitate to employ all their available reserves
from the first so as to augment very greatly the striking
force of their regular army corps. They inaugurated the
great turning movement on a scale that far exceeded the
expectation of their opponents and promised to confound
all the latter's previsions and preparations. The flying
wing of the German armies had thrown aside or driven
before it all resistance in its path.

153

154 The Great War

At the beginning of September von Kluck was advanc-
ing with giant strides straight towards Paris. The Ger-
man advance-guards descended the Oise from Compiegne
towards Creil. The British cavalry executed the brilliant
rear-guard action on September 1st which has already been
recorded, but in general they retired before their adver-
saries. The Germans applied the torch to Senlis, one of
the most picturesque towns in France, situated only twenty
miles from the outer defenses of Paris. They raided Chan-
tilly, dispersing the army of English trainers, jockeys, and
stable-boys at the famous racing center. German advance
patrols penetrated as far as Pontoise; they were even en-
countered near the bank of the Seine. They arrived
almost within gunshot of the outer forts of Paris. The
world realized with a convulsive shudder that Paris might
be foredoomed to fall again a prey to the invader.

On August 30th the new military governor of Paris
issued a decree commanding all proprietors of premises in
the regions of fire of the forts and defensive works of the
capital to demolish and remove completely all buildings
from such areas within four days, failing which the author-
ities themselves would carry out the measure. This was a
stern reminder of the impending danger of a siege. The
population of Paris, temporarily reduced by more than a
third, awaited its fate with a stoical composure that belied
the predictions of the enemy, though hourly expecting
the commencement of a bombardment.

But at the very moment when Paris seemed in most
imminent peril, the tide of danger had been deflected.
The final stage in von Kluck's frenzied pursuit of the
British had been only a screen to cover the alteration in
the direction of the movement of his main forces. By
September 4th British and French air-scouts reported that
from the neighborhood of Compiegne the German army

The Battle of the Marne 155

had begun to move in a southeastern direction instead of
continuing southwest on the capital, and that von Kluck
w^as marching towards Meaux and Coulommiers.

Two theories have been advanced in explanation of this
sudden change. One view assumes that von Kluck was
entirely misled in regard to the strength and position of
his immediate opponents, believing that the British had
been crushed and disorganized and that no French field
forces worth considering remained beyond his grasp in
the west. According to this theory, von Kluck was con-
vinced that the culminating moment had arrived and he
swung to the left in expectation of performing his indis-
pensable function in the decisive climax by gathering the
French armies into the fatal snare.

Another theory explains the alteration in von Kluck's line
of march as the consequence of a deliberate change in the
fundamental method of German strategy and tactics inaugu-
rated with adequate knowledge of the actual circumstances.

The second view may be unreservedly adopted. True,
von Kluck was probably ignorant of the extent and exact
disposition of the forces on the extreme left of the Allies.
If it is true that British and French aircraft had estab-
lished a tactical superiority over that of the enemy, this
would doubtless have limited von Kluck's opportunity for
obtaining information. Furthermore, the buildings of
Paris concealed to a considerable extent the passage and
concentration of troops in the metropolis itself. Yet it is
scarcely conceivable that von Kluck, in swerving to the left,
was ignorant of the fact that considerable available forces
of his adversaries would remain beyond the reach of his
turning movement. The British Expeditionary Force had
certainly exhibited a vigorous sign of life in the spirited
action near Compiegne on September 1st when ten of the
German guns were captured.

156 The Great War

The Germans had hoped to repeat the exploit of Sedan
on a mammoth scale by encircling the Anglo-French
armies in an open region with no insurmountable obstacles
to impede the progress of their evolutions. On August
29th the advancing German armies extending across north-
ern France had presented a somev^hat concave front, the
right flank reaching forward as if to clutch the prey. But
the Allies still eluded the grasp of their pursuers. The
German front continued to move forward until its right
wing was about to encounter the defenses of Paris and
the left wing was already in contact with those of Verdun.
The Allies had now retreated to a position where both
their flanks were covered, the left by the intrenched camp
of Paris and the Seine, the right by the eastern barrier
fortresses. They had thwarted the German hope of en-
veloping them where their flanks were exposed. In the
circumstances the Germans could not think of investing
Paris. Even if they could have silenced one or two of the
forts by the concentrated fire of their heavy artillery and
rushed through the breach thus made, the achievement
would have been a sterile, or even a dangerous victory, as
long as the Allies had large, unconquered armies in the
field. The Allied lines were now inseparably bound to
powerful fortresses which it was inexpedient, if not abso-
lutely impossible, to beset. The Germans discovered that
the morsel which they had coveted involved a larger
mouthful than they were able to swallow at this time. It
would have been perilous to strain the front any further in
an effort to envelop Paris.

But the German armies could not safely remain station-
ary in the existing situation. It was necessar)^ for them
either to withdraw very quickly or to strike southward
with all their available energy so as to break through the
enemy's front and drive a wedge between the French

Paris motor-buses transtormed into army transports.

IV o

A R h\ E C
'AT-:aAJOH

:u ccHhAi'TDA:; 1^ z:t en?.}

G 3ripteJiibr©,0 h?uroa.

Au aornont oi\ c'ongago u::-) fcataillo dcr.t df'poiid Ir.
Baiut dij p-iy3,il iraport.e do rerpoier ;\ fcouo q'.v^ I'l :i:onf!nt. n'c^t
nluF, cii. i-OfT,urder tnarrlei-e .Toua lo3 of forte dqivviit ctrcy
oriployca £i att?.quor> ot. rofo'oidft I'or.KRTni.

■Jn?! troupe; qui n:> i-^ouT. plus avancr;-.' dsvra coOt.-; o;.:-*
coMto f'/j.rdr;r lo torraiT. conquis! et •.■c falro tuoi- s'^r plnco
T^lutot que ae reculor.Oans .IPs c: rco.ttnr.oon MOT,\iGl3.oo,av.cfU-.o
d-'re-illancc' no pcu.t otro .tol<5r^^.3.

Moei

im^dtatenoiit 5l tov.

Facsimile sliowiiig in wliat form Cienera! Joffre's order .if the dav, issued on the morning
of the first day of the liattie of the Marne, was communicated to the troops. (For translation
see page i~o.)

The Battle of the Marne 157

masses east and west. The first course would have been
a palpable admission of failure; the second, which was
actually adopted, offered the possibility of winning an im-
portant, perhaps a decisive, victory. The general situation
impelled the Germans to strike at once and to strike hard
so as to escape the fatal contingency pressing so closely
upon them, which threatened to arrest abruptly their great
effort in the West. The Austrians had evacuated Lem-
berg on September 3d and were staggering back under
the Tsar's tremendous blows. Austria-Hungary's military
power was crumbling and so the days of the German
offensive in the West were numbered.

Other considerations contributed also to determine von
Kluck's change of front. We are apt to think of the
German invasion as a broad curtain drawn down across
the north of France. But in reality this figure, though
convenient, is not strictly pertinent, for the invading armies
advanced in separate columns and not with an uninter-
rupted front. The columns of a single army were in
intimate communication; but the intervals separating ad-
jacent armies might naturally be greater, and the headlong
rush of the western armies in pursuit of their opponents
expanded the field of invasion to such a degree that the
communication between the different armies was undoubt-
edly threatened and the front as a whole was exposed to
the danger of penetration by a counter-attack of the enemy.
The situation required that the dangerous intervals should
be closed by the deflection of the western armies towards
the southeast.

The opinion has been expressed that the awkward posi-
tion of the Germans here described, and in a measure the
miscarriage of their whole plan for the offensive, was due
to the tardiness of the German Crown Prince, his failure
to keep up with the progress of von Kluck. The hitter

158 The Great War

masked the fortress of Maubeuge and hurried on, but the
Crown Prince allowed himself to be delayed by the resist-
ance of Longwy. Later, according to this view, the Crown
Prince was drawn aside and hopelessly entangled in con-
tact with the French barrier fortresses. The proverbially
impetuous Crown Prince erred, in other words, by reason
of his excessive caution! By September 3d, however, we
may assume that the Crown Prince at one extremity of
the German front was on approximately the same line east
and west as von Kluck at the other. The solution of the
question of possible responsibility for the German failure
rests upon the exact determination of the German objec-
tive. If the German plan required the convergence of all
the armies on Paris, the Crown Prince, who was still 160
miles from this goal when von Kluck was only thirty, was
hopelessly outdistanced. But so were all the other Ger-
man commanders, though in lesser and varying degrees.

Such an assumption, however, is opposed to the obvious
facts. The lines of march of the different German armies
had at no time converged on Paris. In general, their line
of advance bore southward, and in relation to this direc-
tion the Crown Prince seems to have progressed as far as
von Kluck, in spite of the latter's tremendous rapidity of
movement. The Crown Prince's movement, since he was
near the pivot, was necessarily much slower. Moreover, it
would probably have been perilous for the Crown Prince
to disregard Verdun. The position of the Germans with
respect to the forwarding of supplies was still somewhat
precarious, since Antwerp, Maubeuge, and Verdun threat-
ened the most serviceable lines of communication running
into northern France.

In defiance of the most elementary laws of prudence, von
Kluck marched diagonally across the front of his adversaries,
exposing his right flank to attack by the Anglo-French

The Battle of the Marne 159

forces concentrated near Paris, whose strength he prob-
ably underestimated. The British army which had been
falling back before von Kluck reached a position south of
the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets by Septem-
ber 3d. In accordance with instructions by General Joffre,
the British destroyed the bridges crossing the Marne on
their front and then fell back about twelve miles further
south.

Von Kluck was still moving with the frenzied speed of
his dash towards Paris. His main forces were probably in
the vicinity of Compiegne on September 3d. Moving
southeastward he passed the Ourcq and the Marne. His
forces and those of von Biilow were seen crossing the
Marne at Changis, La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Nogent, Chateau
Thierry, and Mezy on the 5th. By the evening of the
same day the head of von Kluck's column had reached
the neighborhood of Coulommiers.

No greater responsibility had ever rested on any indi-
vidual than that borne by General Joffre in the dramatic
situation now before us. The future condition and for-
tunes,— perhaps even the existence, — of France were at
stake. The awful significance of the moment bewilders
the imagination. Through twenty centuries swept the
imposing spectacle of French history, teeming with great
examples of virtue and baseness, lofty aspirations and dark
passions, a thrilling, sensational epitome of the life of all
humanity. France had been the leader in revolution, the
pioneer in political innovation, the guide and standard in
art and literature, the model in elegance and taste. The
experience of the French people had become an organic
and necessary part of the cultural equipment of all civilized
nations. But suddenly this brilliant course of development
was threatened with an immediate and sudden eclipse. A
nation of tougher fiber had arisen, a people who knew how

160 The Great War

to curb and utilize its individual energies for collective
effort, whose uneasy ambition sought joy in the conscious-
ness of difficulties surmounted through toil. With un-
bounded assurance in their w^ell-disciplined vigor, the
Germans challenged the traditional ascendancy of the
French, indifferent to the havoc involved in the world of
spiritual relationships. All the resolution, endurance, and
energy which the French nation could muster would
hardly avail to sustain it in this supreme and final trial.

But General Joffre faced the crisis with coolness and de-
termination. He had probably discerned the nature of the
coming great encounter as soon as the Allies were forced
to relinquish the line of the Sambre. He had probably
forecast the Battle of the Marne and planned its chief
details as early as his interview with Field-marshal French
on August 29th. The German armies were now gliding
into the positions which General Joffre had deliberately
selected, as molten metal flows into the prepared molds.
By the 5th he perceived that the strategical situation for
which he had been waiting had arrived. The time had
come for turning to the offensive. He visited Field-
marshal French and explained his plans to him. He issued
his orders in accordance with the dispositions for a general
assumption of the offensive on the morning of the 6th.
The Sixth Army on the extreme left under General Mau-
noury, which had been drawn up like a screen protecting
Paris from the northeast, was directed to advance eastward
in the direction of Chateau Thierry, so as to cross the
Ourcq between M ay-en- Multien and Lizy-sur-Ourcq
northeast of Meaux, with its front extending at an angle
of 135% with the general line of the Anglo-French forces.
The purpose was to strike at the flank and rear of von
Kluck's army and threaten his communications. The
British were instructed to execute a change of front by

The Battle of the Marne 161

wheeling to the right so as to form a sector of the battle-
line between the Sixth and Fifth French Armies. The
Fifth Army on the line Courtacon-Esternay was ordered
to attack towards the north, and the Ninth Army to hold
the line south of the marshes of St. Gond. The Fourth
and Third Armies also received directions in conformity
with the general plan.

In making the turning maneuver of his left wing the
significant feature of his offensive, General Joffre borrowed
the essential principle of his adversaries' tactics, just as the
Germans, in delivering a terrific frontal attack for the pur-
pose of penetrating the hostile battle-line, had adopted
precisely the characteristic tactical method of the French.
The main part of the Anglo-French line was expected to
hold firm against the anticipated violent onslaught of the
enemy, while the left wing turned the German flank,
rolled back the hostile line, and destroyed the enemy's
communications.

The strength of the position of the Allies depended upon
the security of their flanks. In consequence of the deflec-
tion in von Kluck's line of march the Allies were relieved
from apprehension regarding the safety of their left wing.
On the right the barrier fortresses shielded the French
from the tide that might have swept down upon them from
the east. The tenacity of this defensive line was an essen-
tial condition of success in the Battle of the Marne.

An element of German superiority throughout all the
early part of the war, — an advantage more striking even
than their superiority in numbers, — was predominance in
artillery. We have already considered the sensational effect
of the German siege-artillery, which had been developed
to such a size and degree of adaptability that it overcame
the resistance of the strongest fortifications with startling
rapidity. The existence of the powerful barrier fortresses

162 The Great War

on the French border had doubtless stimulated progress
in the heaviest types of mortars and howitzers. But the
ascendancy of the Germans in the various forms of artil-
lery which accompanied their field-armies was no less
significant. With 6.4 guns for every 1,000 rifles the Ger-
mans surpassed all nations in the relative strength of their
artillery, France followed with about 5.5, while the United
States, by way of comparison, with 3.1 guns per 1,000 rifles
was the weakest nation in this respect.

The French in their standard 7.5-centimeter field-piece,
the famous "seventy-five" (that is, 75 millimeters), had
developed an instrument of unequalled precision and effi-
ciency. But with too implicit confidence in the advantages
afforded by the superior merit of this single piece, the
French had allowed the Germans to surpass them very
greatly in all the other forms of mobile artillery.

The Germans had apparently foreseen that in conse-
quence of the more stationary character of battles and the
employment of motor-transport there would be a far
greater opportunity of using heavier artillery on the battle-
field. They had been engaged very diligently for four
years in supplying their army with heavy field-pieces, so
that about one-fourth of their field-artillery consisted of
10.5-centimeter field-howitzers, which deliver explosive
shells capable of destroying the smaller field-batteries of
the enemy. Moreover, a section of four batteries, each
of four pieces, of 15-centimeter howitzers was allotted to
each German army corps, artillery matching in caHber the
hitherto standard large fortress and siege guns.

The "seventy-fives" with their average effective range
of about 5,000 yards were helpless when exposed to the
fire of the heavier German field-artillery from points be-
yond their reach. The range of even the 10.5-centimeter
howitzer was more than twice as great as that of the

The Battle of the Marne 163

"seventy-five." But the French had been loath to intro-
duce heavy artillery into their field formations. They
were almost without field-howitzers at the beginning of
the Great War.

In general, the practice of estimating the relative numer-
ical strength of the belligerents on the sole basis of their
permanent army corps is apt to lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. For this method either ignores entirely the reserve
contingents or assumes that their strength is uniformly
proportionate to the number of the army corps. But a
comparison of the conditions in the German and French
military establishments will illustrate the fallacy of such an
assumption. At the beginning of the Great War Ger-
many had twenty-five army corps and France twenty-one.
But Germany's superiority in available trained men was
very much greater than this relationship would indicate.
The peace establishment, upon which the division into
army corps is based, did not stand in the same ratio to the
available war-strength in the two countries. For France
kept a much larger proportion of her trained men in the
active army in time of peace. The standing army of
France numbered 742,000 men, that of Germany, 870,000,
according to the modifications introduced in the two coun-
tries in 1913. But the efi^ective numerical strength in time
of war is based upon the size of the year-classes which are
available for mobilization, and it required three year-classes
to provide the 742,000 men of the French army, and only
two year-classes (except in the cavalry and horse-artillery)
to make up the 870,000 men of the German army.

In the absence of precise information regarding the num-
ber of reserves, including troops of the second or third line,
actually called to active service at the beginning of hostili-
ties, the proper basis for comparison of the a\'ailable forces
of the belligerent nations in which compulsory service

164 The Great War

prevails is obviously the size of the annual classes of recruits
as incorporated in the standing armies of the respective
powers and therefore provided with the necessary training
at the time of mobilization for war. For a number of
years preceding the enlargement of the German levy in
1913, the annual class of recruits accepted for active service
in France had been roughly equivalent to two-thirds of the
corresponding class in Germany. We shall not be very far
wrong, therefore, in adoptmg the ratio 8:12 to represent
the numerical relationship of the forces of France and
Germany respectively as available for active service in the
early stages of the war, the aggregate strength, in other
words, of the corresponding serviceable year-classes in each
country. Assuming that one-sixth of the German forces
were concentrated on the eastern frontier, we still have a
ratio of 8:10 to represent the relationship in numerical
strength of the French and German forces in the western
theater. Even the addition of the Belgian and British
armies would scarcely suffice to bring the aggregate strength
of the forces of the western Allies as compared with that
of the Germans confronting them to the ratio 9:10. In
other words, at the beginning of the contest the German
forces in the West had a superiority of 10-15% over the
combined strength of all their adversaries. While at first
the Germans do not seem to have called out as many year-
classes as the French, their more rapid mobilization and
concentration probably compensated for this difference in
producing the approximate initial superiority in numbers
here indicated.

The whole course of events in the early part of the cam-
paign in the West, especially the ability of the Germans
to drive back a formidable French invasion of Lorraine
at the same time as they were moving overwhelming
forces through Belgium, is incomprehensible on any other

The Battle of the Marne 165

assumption than that the Germans were considerably supe-
rior in number to all their opponents in the western theater.

But the relative strength of the German forces actually
available for fighting in the West must have diminished
continually in consequence of the detachment of second-
line troops for guarding the lines of communication, the
transference of reserve formations and possibly troops of
the first fine to reinforce the armies on the eastern fron-
tier, and the progress of the mobilization of the older
year-classes in France, until finally in the Battle of the
Marne the Germans were probably outnumbered by their
opponents.

The consideration of the numbers engaged must not be
allowed to obscure our impression of the formidable ad-
vantage possessed by the Germans in the bewildering
rapidity and impetuousness of their offensive, their una-
nimity of will and purpose, the numerical superiority and
more varied character of their artillery, and the phenomenal
thoroughness of their preparation in every detail.

The general region of the great encounter was the basin
of the Marne and of its tributaries, which is encircled by
somewhat elevated plateaus. The positions chosen bv
General Joffre, generally across the southern part of this
depression or along the low ridges bounding it on the
south, offered several distinct advantages for the Allies.
The Marne receives the Ourcq from the north and the
Petit Morin and the Grand Morin from the southeast in the
neighborhood of Meaux. All these streams flow in a west-
erly direction throughout the greater part of their course.
The Germans had to fight, therefore, with several parallel
water-courses in their rear hindering the transportation of
supplies, ammunition, and the heavy artillery. The Ger-
mans were separated from their most convenient lines of
communication by rail. The railways with which they

166 The Great War

were in immediate contact south of the Marne were com-
paratively few and of secondary importance. The Allies,
on the other hand, enjoyed excellent communications by a
network of railways, including several trunk lines in the
rear of their positions. Before the close of the battle the
Germans suffered severely in some parts of their line from
a shortage of food and ammunition.

When, shortly before the Battle of the Marne, the Ger-
man wings encountered the obstacles which arrested or
deflected their movement, the intervening masses were
still borne forward by their own momentum and by the
impulse of the new design of bursting the enemy's Hne,
and engaged themselves in the hollow produced by the
recession of the French center, giving the German front a
bulging, bow-shaped outline. Thus, in a general way, on
the eve of the battle, the contending forces occupied con-
centric, semi-elliptical positions nearly 150 miles in length,
with the extremities resting on a line from Paris to Verdun
as the common base.

It is very important to obtain as clear a notion as the
available evidence will permit of the composition and dis-
tribution of the opposing armies on the morning of the
memorable Sunday, September 6, 1914, when the greatest
battle of all history commenced.

The French Sixth Army, consisting of the Seventh Army
Corps, a reserve corps, three divisions of Territorials, and
Sordet's cavalry corps, under General Maunoury, was ad-
vancing eastward on a front extending from near Betz to
the vicinity of Meaux. The' five divisions of the British
Expeditionary Force faced the northeast with a front
stretching from the vicinity of the Marne to the neigh-
borhood of Vaudoy, the center being near Mauperthuis.
Conneau's cavalry corps occupied the interval between the
British and the French Fifth Army. The latter, composed

The Battle of the Marne 167

♦
of four regular army corps under General Franchet

d'Esperey, held a section of the front about twenty miles
in length from Courtacon to Sezanne, and faced north-
ward. The Ninth Army, three regular corps and two re-
serve divisions under General Foch, continued the French
front for a distance of twenty miles to Sommesous. The
Fourth Army, four regular army corps under General
de Langle de Gary, occupied an extensive sector of the
French front from Sompuis to Sermaize, twenty-five miles,
its center opposite Vitry-le-Francois. General Sarrail's
Third Army, probably three army corps, held the line
from Revigny to Souilly, facing nearly westward.

The interval of ten miles between Foch's right and de
Langle de Gary's left and probably the gap between the
latter and Sarrail were filled provisionally as well as possible
with artillery and cavalry, while a division from Verdun
was stretched across the opening between Sarrail's extreme
right and this great barrier fortress.

General von Kluck's First German Army, consisting of
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Corps, and the
Fourth (and possibly the Seventh) Reserve Corps and two
cavalry divisions was thus confronted by the Sixth French
Army, the British Expeditionary Force, and the left wing
of the Fifth French Army. The Second Army, the next
eastward in the German line, composed of the Ninth and
Tenth Army Corps, the Guard, and the Tenth Reserve
Army Corps under General von Biilow, was opposed by
the right wing of the Fifth French Army and by the left
of the Ninth. The Third German Army, made up of the
Twelfth and the Nineteenth Army Corps and the Twelfth
Reserve Corps, led by General von Hansen, was faced by
the right wing of the Ninth French Army and by the left
wing of the Fourth. The Fourth German Army, prob-
ably the Eighth and Thirteenth Army Corps and reserve

168 The Great War

corps, was directed against the Fourth French Army.
Finally, the Fifth German Army, probably consisting of
the Sixteenth and Eighteenth Army Corps, with probably
one of the Bavarian Corps and reserve formations, was
confronted by the Third French Army. We may safely
assume that reserve formations of considerable strength
were included in all the armies, as is indicated in the case
of the First, Second, and Third German, and Sixth and
Ninth French Armies.

In consequence of the extreme reticence of the official
communications it is impossible in most instances to deter-
mine the apportionment of the individual French army
corps to the different armies at this time.

In the early days of the campaign the First, Second,
Third, Sixth, and Tenth French Army Corps were prob-
ably concentrated on the Meuse below Verdun, while all
the others had either actually taken positions along the
border to the southeast of Verdun or were being trans-
ported in that direction. The Eighth, Twelfth, Four-
teenth, Fifteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-first seem to
have remained on the eastern frontier after the redistribu-
tion of the French forces in the latter part of August, while
the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, Thirteenth,
Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth were transferred
to positions westward of Verdun and the Nineteenth was
brought from Algeria to this portion of the front. The
Fifteenth and Twenty-first were transferred to the French
line south of the Marne during the course of the battle.

Accordingly, in the Battle of the Marne, conceived in
the broadest sense, including all the field operations west
of Verdun from the sixth to the tenth of September, the
Anglo-French armies contained at most nineteen and a half
regular army corps, the British being equivalent to two and a
half army corps, while the Germans numbered fourteen

The Battle of the Marne 169

and a half army corps, the three divisions of the Guard
being reckoned as an army corps and a half. Assumintj,
as seems not unlikely, that the percentage of second-line
troops or reserve formations at the front was at this time
about the same on both sides, and that they were about
half as numerous as the troops of the first line represented
by the regular army corps, we may estimate the aggregate
forces of all classes as somewhat more than 1,100,000 for
the Allies and rather less than 900,000 for the Germans.
Thus the Allies had now for the first time, as it would
seem, a distinct numerical advantage.

But of greater actual significance was the relative numer-
ical strength at the critical position, and in this respect the
situation had been completely changed since the Germans
shattered the resistance on the Sambre and the Meuse. The
Germans had surprised and disconcerted the French by
concentrating overwhelming masses of troops on the right
wing in Belgium so as to sweep around and destroy their
adversaries' left. This preponderance continued as the
tide of battle rolled across northern France. But all the
time the new concentration of French troops was pro-
ceeding in the rear. With unfailing discernment General
Joffre distributed the reinforcements in such a way that
they would offset the superiority of the enemy's right
flank. The formation of the Sixth Army reduced the dis-
parity. The introduction of the Ninth Army under Gen-
eral Foch between the Fifth and Fourth Armies was like
inserting the keystone in the arch. Finally, the move-
ments just preceding the Battle of the Marne completed
the process whereby the tables were turned. All the way
to Compiegne the Germans had been following the main
lines of communication leading to Paris, which afforded
convenient means for the conveyance of reinforcements,
munitions, and supplies. But by turning to the left the

170 The Great War

Germans forsook these lines, marched obliquely across
the routes to Paris, and shifted the relative position of
their right wing in such a way as to expose it to a con-
verging attack, so that the number of units which could
profitably assail it was very greatly increased. At the
beginning of the Battle of the Marne, instead of outnum-
bering its opponents nearly two to one, the German right
wing found itself in its turn outnumbered in about the
same proportion.

General Joffre made his headquarters with General
Franchet d'Esperey and the Fifth Army, practically at
the center of the battle-front. On the 6th he issued the
following memorable order of the day to the soldiers:

"At the moment of engaging a battle on which the fate
of the country depends, it is my duty to remind every one
that the time has passed for looking backward. Every
effort must be made to attack and to drive back the
enemy. Troops that can no longer advance must at all
costs stand their ground and let themselves be killed on
the spot rather than retreat. In the present circumstances
no hesitation can be tolerated."

The westernmost armies assumed the offensive on the
morning of the 6th. The Sixth French Army under Gen-
eral Maunoury advanced towards the Ourcq in the direc-
tion already indicated. The Fourth Reserve Army Corps
forming von Kluck's rear-guard which was descending
the valley of the Ourcq east of the river faced about to
meet this attack. The Second German Army Corps was
either in the same general position at the time or was im-
mediately sent back to support the Fourth Reserve. Upon
learning that the latter was hard pressed, von Kluck ordered
a Landwehr corps in Compiegne to advance to its assist-
ance. Compiegne was nearly two days' march from the
scene of battle. But the measures immediately put into

The Battle of the Marne 171

execution by the Germans seem to have been sufficient to
maintain an equilibrium in the fighting in the valley of
the Ourcq.

By advancing through Coulommiers to attack the French
Fifth Army, von Kluck very rashly exposed his right flank
to the British. This was probably due not so much to a
misconception arising in consequence of the gap between
the Fifth and Sixth French Armies, which existed as late
as September 5th, and was later filled by the British, as to
another, a more general cause.

Stupidly inflexible national prejudices or preconceptions
are often a most formidable obstacle to successful general-
ship. In spite of their intellectual keenness and scientific
detachment, the Germans are peculiarly subject to certain
prepossessions which, for the most part, have been either
designedly propagated for political reasons or produced by
the abstract process of academic speculation.

Misleading impressions of this kind had acquired enor-
mous influence by the force of their insinuating appeal to
national antipathy or conceit. Such delusive impressions
might expose an army to the gravest danger from the sub-
tle strategems of a wily antagonist. Prominent among
them was the conviction that the British forces were de-
fective in military qualities. It would be too much to
affirm that General JofTre had deliberately planned to ex-
ploit this particular vagary of the German imagination.
However, von Kluck exposed himself to the great peril of
a British flank attack in a manner most satisfactory to his
opponents, and he probably did so in contemptuous disre-
gard of any loss that the Expeditionary Force might inflict
upon him.

The British were now organized as three army corps,
Lieutenant-general W. P. Pulteney having taken command
of the recently formed Third. In conformity with the

172 The Great War

instructions of General Joffre, the British, who had retired
to a line running east and west about twelve miles south of
the Marne, wheeled to the right, at the same time advanc-
ing somewhat to the northeast, so as to swing into place
between the Sixth and Fifth French Armies. In this posi-
tion the British attacked the army of von Kluck on its
exposed right flank while the Fifth French Army assailed
it in front. The Germans were forced back, evacuating
Coulommiers, and by the evening of the 6th the British
occupied the left bank of the Grand Morin, while the
Fifth Army continued the line through Esternay.

Resuming the battle on the 7th the British continued to
advance while the Fifth French Army forced the Germans
back in the direction of the Petit Morin. Again on the
8th, the British, cooperating with the French, assailed
the Germans with the same success on the Petit Morin.
The French occupied Montmirail after a fierce attack.

In the meantime, Maunoury was not obtaining the
measure of success upon which the hope of a decisive
victory depended. Attacked with much violence on the
7th, his troops were forced to yield ground. The diffi-
culties which had probably impeded the conveyance of
the heavier German field-pieces to the principal battle-
front south of the Marne favored the overwhelming con-
centration of artillery against the French Sixth Army north
of the Marne. From the hills overlooking the Ourcq the
long-range guns and howitzers swept the French position
with galling effect.

Maunoury's situation was very difficult on the 8th, when
the Germans launched a turning movement against his left
flank and succeeded by attacks of great violence in occu-
pying Betz and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. The Germans in
the valley of the Ourcq were fighting with their faces set
towards Paris, with the possibility before them of a speedy

A corner of the i^:irilti» ot iht Cliateau dc Moudciiiont, wliich cluuigcd luiiuls tour times
in a few hours during the Battle of the Marne.

Bridt^e at Lui^ny destroyed bv the Britisli forces in their retreat betore tlie Clernians and
pontoon bridge built to pursue the latter on their retreat during the Battle of the Marne.

The Battle of the Marne 173

and glorious termination of the campaign to stimulate their
exertions, and the thought of the long weary routes behind
them, the peril involved in defeat far from their bases, and
the ignominy of failure to strengthen their resolution.
The French contested every foot with stubborn deter-
mination. The fate of Paris, and perhaps of the cause of
the Allies, depended upon the constancy with which they
sustained the onslaught of their opponents. To Maunoury's
appeals for assistance. General Joffre could only reply urging
the Sixth Army to hold out a few hours longer. By the
evening of the 8th it was apparent that the following day
must decide the issue of the entire battle.

The situation of General Maunoury's army had become
alarming by the morning of the 9th. The Germans,
supported by their powerful artillery, were hammering
it unmercifully in front and were driving home the
turning movement to envelop its left or northern wing,
where the arrival of the Landwehr troops from Compiegne
would soon increase still further the odds against the
French. The fighting had attained a terrible degree of
ferocity. That the Germans would win on the Ourcq by
the very tactics Joffre had chosen, that they would turn
the tables by outflanking the French flanking movement,
seemed to be almost inevitable. But Paris was free from
the danger of attack, for the time, at least, and a portion of
the garrison could safely be spared to reinforce the field
army engaged in a life and death struggle so near. General
Gallieni had decided to play the final card. On the even-
ing of the 8th the notice was quietly distributed to the
drivers of about 5,000 taxi-cabs and motor-vans in Paris
summoning them to assemble early the next morning at
certain indicated places to transport the garrison troops to
the support of the threatened left wing of the Sixth Army.
That soldiers should be conveyed to battle in taxi-cabs is

174 The Great War

only one of the many seemingly paradoxical innovations of
the Great War. In the early hours of the 9th interminable
lines of motor-cars roused the sleeping towns of the banlieue,
and stretched out like continuous, flexible bands along the
highways. The reverberation of distant artillery gained
volume and distinctness as they advanced. It was another
"Sheridan's Ride" on a mammoth scale, and in a modern
setting. The hour of destiny had sounded; the fate of
France was swaying in the balance. Every available ele-
ment was being thrown upon the scales on this supremely
eventful 9th of September. It might have seemed that the
future of democracy, with its inherent disorder, but with
all its sublime possibilities, depended upon the speed of this
amazing procession that rolled across the Ik de France.

General Gallieni succeeded in his brilliant, decisive stroke
of transferring possibly 50,000 men a distance of forty miles
in six hours and delivering a decisive blow at the enemy's
flanking movement. The danger of the complete failure
of the French maneuvers at the critical point was averted.

On the same day the British reached the Marne. The
First and Second Corps forced a passage after violent hand
to hand encounters in which they drove the Germans in
some places into the river. The Third encountered the
desperate resistance of the part of the German forces
which had retired into La Ferte-sous-Jouarre on the north
bank of the Marne. The bridges had been destroyed, but
after several ineffectual attempts to throw pontoon bridges
across during the day, the British finally forced a passage at
this point also after nightfall. On the same day the French
Fifth Army made its way to Chateau Thierry, driving the
Germans back across the Marne with heavy losses.

Von Kluck's situation rapidly became serious with the
changes in the situation produced on the 9th. He suffered
prodigious losses in vain attempts to repel the renewed

The Battle of the Marne 175

offensive in the valley of the Ourcq. The climax came
in the evening. Realizing that further hesitation might
involve the destruction of his whole army, he gave the
order for the general retreat. The decision had a solemn
significance; it was a palpable indication that the tide had
turned. For the first time since Jena, since the establish-
ment of the principle of universal, compulsory service, a
Prussian army had been defeated in a pitched battle. The
splendid prestige, the tradition of invincibility which had
flourished for more than a centur}^ suffered a first and
ominous disfigurement.

The Germans had felt absolute confidence in the sup-
posed infallibility of their General Staff. In all their sacri-
fices for military supremacy the resolution of the German
people had been sustained by the proud conviction that
their armies could at any time march to Paris. This belief
was generally held, however much individual opinions
might differ in other respects about the prospects of a gen-
eral conflict. To doubt it was regarded as heresy. Even
the most unwarlike persons were cheered by the comfort-
ing reflection that Germany could at any time take Paris, if
she wished, a source of satisfaction recalling a human trait
observed by Juvenal; **even those who want the will, pant
for the dreadful privilege to kill."

But now the first cloud of perplexit}^ appeared on the
superb horizon of national assurance. The German armies
had strained every faculty to accomplish a definite purpose
and had failed, and in spite of the efforts made to palliate
or disguise this failure, the fact is evident that although
they had advanced almost to the outer defenses of Paris,
they had been obliged to retreat to a considerable distance
and had accomplished nothing.

The thrilling incidents and impressive circumstances of
the contest in the western region, such as the imminent

176 The Great War

peril to the capital of France so barely averted, the most
striking features of General Joffre's inimitable tactics, the
palpitating suspense which attended the critical moment,
and von Kluck's precipitate retreat dramatically contrasted
with his sensational advance, — significant as all these are, —
must not monopolize the attention and interest at the ex-
pense of the operations at the center, where the contest
raged with even greater fury and the immediate danger to
France was more vital. The Germans hurled themselves
against the French center with all the force at their com-
mand. The Ninth Army commanded by General Foch
bore the brunt of this formidable onslaught. The most
violent attacks were delivered in the neighborhood of
Sezanne and especially of Fere Champenoise. The pres-
sure became severe on the 7th. The Germans were im-
pelled by a frantic determination to achieve their purpose
of breaking through the French lines, which quivered
beneath the terrific impact. The right of the Ninth Army
was pushed back as far as Gourgangon on the 8th and the
left wing, in spite of its obstinate resistance, was forced to
yield ground.

The 9th was the critical day in this section also. The
Germans were pushing forward in eager expectation of
winning a decisive victory. With the wings of both the
Ninth and Fourth French Armies bent back, the Ger-
mans were pressing through the gaps at the extremities as
a flood pours through crevices in a retaining dam. The
Twelfth (Saxon) Reserve Army Corps after penetrating the
cavalry screen that covered the opening on Foch's right
flank was entering Mailly. The Twelfth Army Corps had
driven the French from Sommesous, and further west the
Guard was forcing Foch's right center to retire before it
south of Fere Champenoise. The whole Allied center
was tottering. The impetuous invaders seemed about to

The Battle of the Marne 177

cleave the barrier and break France into two parts. The
situation was apparently almost hopeless when Foch sent
his heroic reply to the commander-in-chief: "My left has
been forced back, my right is routed; I shall attack with
the center."

But factors had been silently preparing which were soon
to be instrumental in reversing the tide of battle in this
very vital section. Foch is said to have discovered through
his air-scouts on the evening of the 8th that the Saxon
troops in their advance against his own right wing had im-
paired their contact with von Billow's army towards the
west. Furthermore, the Fifteenth French Army Corps,
hastily transferred from the front in Lorraine to reinforce
the right wing of the Fourth Army, had arrived in Bar-le-
Duc and repulsed the German Eighteenth Corps at Robert
Espagne on the 8th. This enabled de Langle de Cary to
shift the equivalent of an army corps to the support of his
hard-pressed left wing. After the capture of Montmirail
in the course of the victorious advance of the Fifth French
Army on the 8th, Franchet d'Esperey was able to direct
the Tenth Army Corps against von Billow's right flank on
the 9th so as to relieve the pressure on Foch's left wing.
Finally, during the 9th, the Twenty-first Army Corps
brought from the front in Lorraine, came into action in
the gap between the Ninth and Fourth Armies, attacked
the German troops who had penetrated the cavalry screen,
and restored the cohesion of the French front.

With these more favorable circumstances both Foch
and de Langle de Cary took the offensive on the 9th, the
former attacking Fere Champenoise and the latter Sompuis
with great energy. The struggle ra^ed throughout the
day with the utmost violence but without producing very
definite results. With what fierceness the possession of
every point of vantage was contested is iUustrated by the

178 The Great War

desperate combats engaged at the Chateau de Mondemont,
which is situated about six miles east of Sezanne on a slight
elevation overlooking the marshes of St. Gond from the
south. For three days the French had held this position
against repeated assaults. At the climax of the battle it
changed hands four times w^ithin a few^ hours. The
French, first driven out by the Germans, brought up
some of their *' seventy-fives," opened a breach in the gar-
den w^all and rushed the chateau. But the Germans re-
turned in greater force and occupied it again; and they
were so sure of undisputed possession this time, that prepa-
rations were in progress for the officers' midday meal,
when the French returned to the attack with very much
greater fury.

Crowding into the interior of the chateau, where the
restricted space barred the use of their rifles, the French
soldiers grappled their opponents of the Prussian Guard,
fighting like demons with whatever weapons came to hand.
An adjoining outhouse yielded a store of short iron bars
which the French employed with murderous effect. All
the passions which had provoked this war seemed to have
concentrated their fury to inflame the writhing mass of
combatants with a delirium of rage. The Germans were
finally ejected from the chateau, where the floors were a
welter of carnage and the ceilings were dripping blood.

By the evening of the 9th the Tenth French Army
Corps belonging to the Fifth Army had penetrated east-
ward as far as Baye, north of Sezanne, threatening von
Billow's rear. At the same time General Foch executed
the daring maneuver which turned out to be decisive.
After a heated contest on his left, in which a division from
Morocco under General Humbert had conducted itself
with special distinction, repelling many furious attacks, the
Germans had abandoned their offensive. The commander

The Battle of the Marne 179

of the Ninth Army accordingly moved all, or, at least, the
greater part of the troops composing his left wing east-
ward to the support of his center and right, assailing the
Prussian Guards and the Saxon corps unexpectedly on
their flanks and driving a wedge into the aperture between
the armies of von Biilow and von Hansen. Thus the Prus-
sian Guards were outflanked and driven into the marshes
of St. Gond, which were unusually treacherous in conse-
quence of the wet weather. There they were entangled
and subjected to the deadly tire of the French field-artillery.
They suffered terrible losses and many of their guns were
engulfed. Some detachments of the Guards who refused
to surrender were annihilated where they stood. Von
Biilow broke contact with the French as best he could and
retreated northeastward on the 10th. The Ninth Army
pursuing him crossed the Marne on the 11th at Chalons-
sur-Marne and in its neighborhood.

The progress of events in the fighting in the different
parts of the Battle of the Marne was apparently deter-
mined by impulses starting from the west. Each important
stage in the development of the conflict, inaugurated by
the action of the most western armies, was reached by the
others consecutively in the order of their succession
eastward.

The action of the German Fourth Army scarcely began
before the 8th and did not become severe before the 10th.
when the battle further west was practically terminated.
The attitude of the Germans in entering the Battle of the
Marne is illustrated by an order of the day addressed by the
lieutenant-general commanding the Eighth Army Corps
from his headquarters at Vitry-le-Frangois on the 7th, the
eve of battle, to his soldiers. The text is as follows:

"The object of our long and arduous marches has been
achieved. The principal French troops have been forced

180 The Great War

to accept battle after having been continually forced back.
The great decision is undoubtedly at hand. To-morrow,
therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well
as that of our army corps, is bound to be engaged all
along the line from Paris to Verdun. To preserve the
welfare and honor of Germany, I expect every officer and
man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights of the
last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last
breath. Everything depends on the result of to-morrow."

The retreat of the Fourth Army on the 11th was prob-
ably necessitated primarily by the exposure of its right
flank in consequence of the flight of the German forces
which had covered it.

The army of the German Crown Prince occupied St.
Menehould on the 6th, but its action was mainly directed
to the region eastward of the forest belt of Argonne
towards the French barrier fortresses.

The retirement of the French armies before the Battle
of the Marne left Verdun at the extremity of a salient
projecting at least twenty-five miles to the north of the
general front of the French forces. A rupture in the
line of fortresses reaching to Verdun would open a very
convenient avenue of communications for the German
armies to the west and isolate one of the most important
and formidable of the French strongholds. Accordingly,
the German Crown Prince commenced the bombardment
of some of the barrier forts on the 9th directing his chief
efforts against Troyon.

The inevitable necessity of falling back as a result of the
outcome of events to the west arrested the Crown Prince's
offensive on the 13th, just in time to save Troyon, which
was being battered to pieces. The fact that fluctuations in
the course of the Battle of the Marne started in the west
and the circumstance that the Crown Prince did not

German guns captured near La Ferte-Milon.

Linihtr-wagons left by the Germans during their retreat in the battle of the Marne.

The Battle of the Marne 181

withdraw until three days after von Kluck's retirement are
additional evidence disposing of the theory that the modi-
fication in von Kluck's movements just before the battle
was determined by the necessity of extricating the Third
Army from a perilous situation.

Coincidently with the great struggle in the region of the
Marne a very violent attack against the defensive positions
before Nancy was launched by the Germans in the pres-
ence of the Kaiser and the General Staff. The offensive
in this quarter, commenced on the 5th, was probably in-
tended to support the efforts of the Crown Prince in
blasting an opening through the French fortified barrier.
But the Germans abandoned the offensive and retreated
very suddenly on the 12th, probably because the impending
retirement of the Crown Prince would have released a
large part of the French Third Army which could have
been turned to the side of Nancy. The French imme-
diately recovered Luneville.

In the official reports of the progress of the Great War
the deliberate tendency to deception has generally mani-
fested itself in the suppression, disguise, or concealment
of disagreeable information. In other words, misrepresen-
tation in the official bulletins usually consists in implication
rather than specific falsehood. Many interesting examples
of this tendency might be cited; but perhaps the most note-
worthy was the effort of the German authorities to disguise
the fact that there was a general pitched battle on a grand
scale in the neighborhood of the Marne with the results
which have just been described.

The German authorities emphatically denied the truth
of the report from hostile sources indicating that they
had suffered a defeat. They themselves furnished the
information about the operations and their outcome which
we shall consider in the words of the original bulletins.

182 The Great War

Quartermaster-general von Stein announced on Septem-
ber 3d:

"The cavalry of Colonel-general von Kluck is pushing
its forays as far as Paris. The western army has crossed
the line of the Aisne and is continuing its march towards
the Marne, which some of its patrols have already crossed.

"The enemy is retreating before the armies of von
Kluck, von Billow, von Hausen, and the Duke of Wiirt-
temberg to the Marne and behind it."

Thus in the evident expectation that decisive results
were at hand, and that there would be no retrogression,
the military authorities made public the forward movement
to the Marne.

Another bulletin from the same source, dated the 10th,
announced:

"The units which had pressed forward to the Marne
and penetrated beyond it in pursuit of the foe east of Paris
have been attacked by superior forces from the direc-
tion of Paris and between Meaux and Montmirail. In
a severe two days' engagement they arrested the enemy's
offensive movement and even advanced themselves. At
the report of the approach of strong reinforcements for
the enemy the wing was withdrawn. The enemy made
no attempt anywhere to follow. Fifty guns and several
thousand prisoners have thus far been taken as spoils of
victory."

This was a very skilful attempt to represent von Kluck's
defeat in a favorable light. The first sentence is a concise
and accurate statement of the situation of von Kluck's
forces in the initial stages of the battle both south of the
Marne and north of the Marne in the valley of the Ourcq.
But the following statements are true only of the course of
operations north of the Marne, which was favorable until
the 9th. The statements in the last two sentences it is

The Battle of the Marne 183

difficult to reconcile with conditions in any part of von
Kluck's battle-ground.

After the Germans had retreated to the line of the Aisne,
forty miles to the rear, with a precipitation which in some
instances resembled a rout, it was too late to conceal the
previous advance to the Marne and beyond* it and very
difficult to account for such a conspicuous retrograde
movement when the goal of the campaign had seemed to
be in sight, without admitting that they had suffered a
serious defeat in a great battle. The General Staff tried to
evade the difficulty by suppressing every significant indica-
tion of locality in their reports of the renewed fighting on
the Aisne. Thus the following announcement was issued
at the Great Headquarters on September 17th:

"The battle between the Oise and the Metise has not yet
been brought to a final issue, but there are indications that
the resistance of the enemy is beginning to weaken."

The apparent indication of the western and eastern limits
of the battlefield has no practical significance. What is
really important about the situation of the battle-lines, their
position north and south, is conspicuously lacking. Any
great battle in Northern France at this time would naturally
have been fought "between the Oise and the Meuse." For
many weeks the German authorities continued to announce
progress between these discreetly irrelevant longitudinal
limits, without once mentioning tbe Aisne, although it was
the most conspicuous physical feature in the vicinity of the
new front.

German commentators have tried to disguise the defeat
on the Marne by denying the existence of such a battle
and by claiming that the German armies retreated at their
own discretion. According to their view the presence of
the Germans on the Marne was a casual circumstance and
the fighting there did not constitute a single, coherent

184 The Great War

pitched battle, but a series of local encounters with varying
results passing over by an uninterrupted transition into the
operations on the Aisne. The withdrawal of von Kluck
and von Biilow, as they assert, was a voluntary measure of
prudence for the elimination of a salient rendered awk-
ward and unprofitable in consequence of the extension of
the German front towards the northwest and the greater
attention henceforth paid to the French barrier fortresses
in the east.

As for the contention that the German armies were
merely maneuvering for position, or without a distinctive
purpose involving definite success or failure, we need only
remark that if pushing forward almost a million men with
so much energy and vehemence was a comparatively aimless
performance, the world has still to discover the tremendous
measure of exertion which the Germans would put forth
in a supremely significant undertaking. The assertion that
a single Battle of the Marne did not take place is a claim
that might equally be made in regard to any other great
battle of the war. For the vast territorial extension of the
great battles of the present necessarily deprives them of
the unity and compactness which characterized the pitched
battles of the past. But it makes no practical difference
whether the Germans were defeated in a single battle of
unprecedented magnitude or in a series of smaller en-
counters. The argument, moreover, that they were not
defeated on the Marne because the fighting there was
prolonged uninterruptedly by the operations on the Aisne,
which produced a draw, is mere idle jugglery with words
and definitions. The assertion that von Kluck and von
Biilow did not suffer a tactical defeat because they retreated
deliberately to avoid destruction is not unlike attempting to
prove that a victim of theft has not actually been robbed
because he voluntarily relinquished his valuables to escape

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The Battle of the Marne 185

the extreme violence of the malefactor. To account for
the retreat of von Kluck's army on the assumption that its
position had become an inconvenient salient is to disregard
the fact that it had stood in general alignment with the
German front and that its retirement preceded that of the
other armies farther east. It may be added that the western
German armies were withdrawn to the Aisne before the
prolongation of the German position, which is alleged as
the motive, had actually been undertaken, probably before
it was even contemplated. The resort to arguments based
on pretended considerations of strategic expediency has
become a very trite method of palliating disagreeable facts.
Even Napoleon's disastrous retreat from Moscow might,
by a conceivable exaggeration of this method, be inter-
preted as a well-calculated maneuver for the purpose of
removing an awkward salient.

All these attempts to shield or assuage German pride
hinge upon subtle distinctions in the definition of victory
and defeat and the factors which produce them, concep-
tions which are necessarily relative and subject to variation.
But no amount of casuistry can conceal the essential fact
that the Allies won an important victory, not conclusive in
the sense that a German army was destroyed or that the end
of the war was brought in sight, but decisive in the sense
that it was the turning point in the campaign. The Ger-
mans had launched a tremendous invasion of France with
the professed intention of striking a decisive blow as soon
as possible. In consequence of the prodigious struggle on
the Marne they failed to accomplish this purpose. But, on
the other hand, the German armies did escape from the
snare which Joffre had devised for them.

The dexterity and promptness with which the German
armies, after weeks of excessive exertion and a disconcerting
defeat, extricated themselves from a position of imminent

186 The Great War

peril and retreated to the Aisne are no less deserving of admi-
ration than their astonishing performances in the great rush
towards Paris. The tenacity displayed by the German mili-
tary organization under the terrific strain is almost incredible.

It is impossible to determine even approximately the
losses in the Battle of the Marne. Some authorities esti-
mate the aggregate dead and wounded at about 10% of the
numbers engaged.

The German armies retired to positions already prepared
for them on the Aisne. The capture of the fortress Mau-
beuge while the Battle of the Marne was in progress con-
tributed materially to the security and consolidation of the
German position in northern France.

We saw in a previous chapter how Maubeuge was left
like an island in the inundating flood of invasion. When
the Allies retired behind the Marne, Maubeuge, far away
on the Belgian frontier, was the only French fortress in
the north which still held out against the Germans. The
heavy siege-train was transferred from Namur to the posi-
tions around Maubeuge. The Austrian motor-batteries,
which had been employed at Namur, were conveyed
thither after the bombardment of Givet, and rendered the
same effective service.

The bombardment of the forts composing the ring
around Maubeuge began on August 27th and continued
until September 7th, when the white flag was displayed at
11.50 in the morning. The Germans took 40,000 prisoners
including four generals, 400 guns, and much material of
all kinds. It was jubilantly reported that a single German
corps had reduced an important stronghold with a garrison
equal to its own number. But of course the great supe-
riority of the German siege-artillery more than counter-
balanced the advantage of the defensive position of the
French behind fortifications.

CHAPTER VIII

Operations on the Line of the Aisne
{September 10-23, 1914)

Although the Germans undoubtedly still clung to the
hope of pressing the war in the West to a decisive issue in
the spirit of their original intentions, it became ever more
apparent that their first great design of shattering the re-
sistance of France once and for all by a sudden, irresisti-
ble blow had received a definite, conclusive check in the
desperate combats near the Marne. The war of rapid,
sensational maneuvers was now transformed into a war of
position. While we may assume that the course of Ger-
man operations in the West continued to be influenced,
although to a somewhat diminishing extent, by the original
strategic conceptions throughout the remainder of the cam-
paign of 1914, the fact that the Germans were the first to
dig themselves in, to sacrifice mobility for a definite line of
front and the assured possession of a limited amount of the
invaded territory, is a certain indication that the irrepressible
vehemence of their initial operations had been impaired.
The development of the international situation, as well as
the military events themselves, was exercising a sobering

187

188 The Great War

influence on the mental attitude of the German authorities.
In this connection we may only note the conclusion at
London on September 5th, on the eve of the momentous
Battle of the Marne, at the most critical moment in the cam-
paign in the West, of the following fundamental agreement
between the great powers that composed the Triple Entente :

"The British, French, and Russian Governments mutu-
ally engage not to conclude peace separately during the
present war. The three governments agree that when
the terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the
allies will demand conditions of peace without the previous
agreement of each of the other allies."

The German government had undoubtedly been en-
couraged by the confident hope that the coalition against
them would not endure to the end. That the association
of their enemies was an incongruous and unnatural, as well
as a monstrous, combination, seemed to the Germans to be
a perfectly self-evident proposition. By comparison with
it the alliance of the central empires presented a compact,
united front. The disparity of tradition, attitude, and inter-
ests of Germany's enemies, especially of Great Britain and
Russia, would, as it seemed, necessarily prevent a sincere,
lasting cooperation. While the agreement of September
5th did not destroy this German expectation, it was one of
many disappointing signs indicating that its fulfilment was
very much more remote than had been supposed.

The German General Staff must now have realized the
terrible extent and gravity of the task before them and that
the war would be a long, hard struggle. Consequently,
the desire to hold the enemy as far as possible from the
frontier of the German Empire began to assert itself,
coordinately with the aim of terminating the war by vig-
orous offensive strokes, as a motive influencing strategy
and military policy.

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Operations on the Line of the Aisxe 189

It can be said with much more truth of the ti'j;hting on
the general Une of the Aisne than of the Battle of the
Marne that it resolved itself into a number of partial,
detached engagements. The so-called Battle of the Aisne
was a transition battle, which could scarcely have been de-
cisive in any conceivable circumstances. The Germans
contested desperately the further relinquishment of every
yard of the French territory which they had occupied.
Their immediate aim was to delay the decisive stage of
the operations until the recuperation of their forces, a
favorable turn of events in the East, and the arrival of
reinforcements permitted them to resume an energetic
offensive. We ought to note as significant features of this
stage of the campaign in the West that for the first time
since the completion of their mobilization the Germans
had to accept the defensive role, which is so hateful to all
their strategists; that the struggle on the Aisne inaugu-
rated the comparatively stationary, siege-like operations of
trench-warfare; and that the outcome destroyed the eager
hope of the Allies that the repulse near the Marne would
result in the immediate collapse of the German campaign
in the West and that the Germans would be driven from
France without delay.

The movement to the line of the Aisne, or in other words,
the changes in the position of the opposing armies occa-
sioned by the defeat of the Germans in the Battle of the
Marne, was not fully carried out before the evening of the
13th. The German armies were compelled to take up one by
one, in order of their succession eastward, the retrogressive
movement inaugurated by von Kluck. In general we may
say that the German front in receding pivoted on the left
flank of the army of the Crown Prince east of the Argon ne.

The new German front between the Meuse and the
Oise, destined to mark the limit of German occupation for

190 The Great War

many months, left the Meuse near Consenvoye, traversed
the rough, wooded region of the Argonne, and the plains
of Champagne northward of Reims, followed the course
of the Suippe northwestward to its confluence with the
Aisne and crossed the latter just above Berry-au-Bac, gained
the elevated plateau of Craonne, and continued westward
along the summit of the heights on the north of the Aisne
to the left bank of the Oise. The Germans also retained
territory on the right of the Oise. The flanks of the new
position were thus protected by natural barriers, and a
considerable portion of the front, which was about 125
miles in length, offered exceptional advantages for defense.
The work of intrenching this front had undoubtedly been
undertaken as a precautional measure before the conclu-
sion of the Battle of the Marne. The German armies
retreating to this position were strengthened by the forces
which had been released at the capitulation of Maubeuge
and by numerous other reinforcements which probably
restored the equilibrium completely.

The most important characteristics of the following san-
guinary engagements are due to the special physiognomy
of the western part of the region of hostilities, the valley
of the Aisne from its confluence with the Suippe to its
union with the Oise. This alone gives an unmistakable
appearance of unity to the series. The Aisne flows in a
winding course from east to west through a narrow, flat
valley from about a half mile to two or three miles in
width. An elevated ridge dominates this valley on the
north at a distance varying from three to five miles from
the river. A gradually sloping plateau, wooded in parts,
extends southward from the ridge and is terminated at a
distance of a mile or two from the river by an abrupt
descent of 300 or 400 feet to the level floor of the valley.
Deep ravines penetrate this hillside, scalloping the margin

Operations on the Line of the Aisxe 191

of the plateau above with many spurs and indentations.
The slope on the south side of the river is essentially similar
in character to that on the north. The valley through
which the river flows is chiefly occupied by unenclosed
meadows, interspersed with patches of woodland. It is
dotted with villages and intersected with roads bordered by
rows of poplars and fruit trees. The river itself is a formid-
able obstacle on account of its depth of fifteen feet, although
it is less than 200 feet in breadth. Most of the bridges
were destroyed by the Germans after they retreated to
the northern bank of the stream. Villages situated at the
crossing-points helped to make the bridges, or their tempo-
rary substitutes, conspicuous targets for the artillery posted
on the heights to the north, from which the Germans had
presumably measured all the ranges with the utmost care.

In advancing to the new line the armies of the Allies
preserved the same relative position among themselves,
with the French Sixth Army, the British Army, and the
French Fifth, Fourth, and Third Armies in the order
named, beginning in the west. The British experienced
very little opposition on the 11th. They crossed the Ourcq
where its course is east and west and bivouacked on the line
between Oulchy-le-Chateau and Longpont. The cavalry
arrived in the vicinity of the Aisne the same evening.

On the next day the Sixth and the British Armies ad-
vanced to positions overlooking the Aisne. The Sixth
Army took up a position extending from Soissons towards
the west, while the British drew up on a front about fifteen
miles in length from Soissons eastward. The Cjermans
were posted in strong positions on both sides of the river.
They occupied Soissons.

There was a long-range artillery duel throughout most
of the day on the 12th. The British artillery cooperated
with the right wing of the Sixth Army in the attempt to

192 The Great War

expel the Germans from Soissons and the French gained
possession of the southern half of the town during the
night. Eastward on the same day the Fifth Army reached
the line of the Vesle, which flows westward between the
Marne and the Aisne and empties into the latter about
eight miles east of Soissons.

There was general action throughout the valley on the
13th. The three British corps, which maintained the same
consecutive order as before, with the First on the right
wing, were ordered to cross the Aisne at the available
points along their front, and the movement ushered in the
miost spectacular stage of the operations in this region.
The First Division crossed on a viaduct by which a canal
traverses the river. The Second utilized boats and a single
girder of a half-demolished bridge at Pont-Arcy on which
they passed in single file. A pontoon bridge was com-
pleted by five in the afternoon. Only a part of the Third
succeeded in reaching the northern bank. The Fifth,
finding the bridge at Conde intact but swept by the enemy's
fire, were rafted across. The Fourth repaired the perma-
nent bridge at Venizel and supplemented it by a pontoon
bridge.

The Eighth Army Corps, forming part of the Sixth
Army to the left of the British, crossed the river west of
Soissons under cover of a furious cannonade.

The Allies everywhere encountered the most determined
resistance. There were desperate hand-to-hand encounters
in many of the villages, where the streets were filled with
dead. Furious fighting continued all day, the terrific action
of the artillery converting the valley into a hideous inferno.
The lower part of Soissons burst into flames from the
shower of projectiles poured into it. The meadows north
of the Aisne were swept by such a fierce fire that it seemed
impossible that living beings could exist in them. By

The Cathedral of Notre-Danic at Reims before the bombardment by the Germans, Built in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it is not only celebrated for its architectural beauties, the
facade being one of the masterpieces of the Middle Ages, but alio historically, as here used to be
cro'vjned the kings of France.

Operations on the Line of the Aisne 193

nightfall throughout the greater part of the front, the
Fifth, British, and Sixth Armies had established themselves
on the northern bank. Before morning the British had
placed eight pontoon bridges in position and had repaired
several of the damaged bridges in spite of the almost inces-
sant fire of the German heavy artillery.

The main part of the German forces withdrew to the
positions on the heights north of the river, where their
system of intrenchments had been very carefully prepared
and heavy artillery commanding all parts of the valley had
been mounted in cleverly concealed positions. At least as
early as the 15th, the heavy artillery from the positions
before Maubeuge was being employed by the Germans
on the line of the Aisne. The most numerous, and prob-
ably, in the actual circumstances, most useful, of the heav-
iest pieces were the 21-centimeter howitzers with their
effective range of 10,000 yards. Tremendous cannonading,
calculated to unnerve and terrify the Allies, preceded the
charges of the German infantry. The Allies had no means
of replying to the heavy artillery of their opponents.

The Germans left strong detachments in advanced posi-
tions where they could sweep the approaches to the
principal lines of trenches by the crosstire of held and
machine-guns. These outposts were placed on projecting
ridges or spurs of the plateau and even in the valley, as at
Conde, an important bridge-head. Powerful searchlights
disclosed any attempt of the Allies to approach the German
lines by night.

The most striking performance on the 15th was the bold
attempt of the British right wing to push northward up the
ravines. After a day of very heavy lighting the First Corps
under Sir Douglas Haig occupied a position on the line of
the main highway, called the Chemin-des-Dames, which
runs along a ridge on the plateau, and succeeded in

194 The Great War

intrenching themselves there. The great importance of
this position is shown by the repeated attempts to drive the
British from it, all of which were repulsed with great loss
to the Germans. The Eighteenth Corps in the Fifth
Army supported the British in this forward mo.vement.

The chief efforts of the Allies throughout the front were
directed primarily to securing positions on the plateau over-
looking the valley on the north, where the enemy would
be within range of their firearms, and the distance to be
traversed in the contemplated final onslaught would be
short. As they realized that the resistance of the Germans
was no mere delaying action to cover a further retreat, but
a determined stand in carefully fortified positions, the Allies
gradually elaborated their system of trenches to secure the
greatest possible protection against the shells of their oppo-
nent's heavy artillery.

In the early days on the Aisne the Germans by their
furious attacks, repeated at frequent intervals, deprived
their enemy of rest by day and night. After a very severe
but unsuccessful attack on the 15th against the right wing
of the Sixth Army and the left of the British, the Germans
delivered no less than ten distinct attacks in the following
night, all of which were repulsed.

The British Sixth Division arrived from England on the
16th completing the normal complement of the Third
Corps. It was posted on the south side of the Aisne as a
general reserve, making it possible to relieve regularly the
detachments on service in the forward trenches. Four
6-inch howitzer batteries arrived from England at Sir John
French's request on the 23d.

Very heavy rains continuing many days about the middle
of September transformed the usually placid Aisne into a
turbulent flood and impeded the restoration of adequate
communication between the two banks, and exposed the

Map showing by the shaded portion the tcrriton' occupied by tlie Germans after the Battle of the Majne, Septem

Operations on the Line of the Aisne 195

soldiers in the trenches to great discomfort, a forecast of
the many coming months of privation and excessive hard-
ship in consequence of the inclemency of the weather.

Service in the advanced trenches of the Allies, which
approached in some places to within two hundred yards
of the enemy's foremost line, required almost super-
human endurance. With the pouring rain for days the
water stood knee-deep in the trenches. Many of the
British had lost their great coats during the rapid retreat
from Mons to the Marne. The soldiers in the trenches
were covered with a stiff layer of clay from the saturated,
chalky soil. The frequent bombardment allowed little rest
or relaxation for limbs or nerves. In some sections of the
trenches it was almost certain death for the soldiers to
show their heads above the parapet during the day. Food
and water were brought and the detachments on outpost
duty relieved only by night, the men crawHng on all fours.
The trenches were repeatedly the target for the heavy
artillery firing at high angles in positions behind the Ger-
man lines. Falling on both sides of the trenches, the shells
detonated with terrific violence, throwing up great quan-
tities of earth and stones and perforating the surface with
bowl-shaped craters. Whenever one of the larger shells
exploded in a trench, there was no escape for the soldiers
in position near the spot. The howitzer shells were called
Jack Johnsons by the British soldiers, on account of the
great columns of black smoke which they discharged.

The general nature of such trench-fighting involved
some exceptionally terrible circumstances. With the lines
drawn as closely as possible and every yard of ground or
element of advantage either actually seized or jealously
contested, the tension of a single battle was continued in-
definitely without respite or truce for removing the dead
and wounded left in the track of successive attacks and

196 The Great War

counter-charges in the zone of death between the oppos-
ing: trenches. Soon the decomposing bodies of the slain
filled the air with foul, contaminating odors. The inevitable
suffering of the wounded was greatly augmented in the
more exposed trenches, from which they could be removed
only at night. The severely wounded in the trenches had
frequently to lie many hours in awkward positions or on
water-soaked straw. But the imagination is powerless to
comprehend the horrible fate of the severely wounded
left between the firing-lines, whom it was death for their
comrades to approach. Many, unable to crawl to either
side of the bullet-swept area, exposed continually to fresh
wounds or lacerations, awaited hours or even days for the
coming of death as a merciful deliverance from their agony.

During the early operations on the Aisne the Allies suf-
fered far more than the Germans from the inadequacy of
their trenches and their exposure to the fire of heavy
artillery, while the Germans endured considerable hardship
from the irregularity and insufficiency of their food supply.
The Germans did not suffer the terrible bombardment to
which they subjected their foes; but their losses in the
trenches from the fire of small-arms must have been greater
than that of their opponents, in consequence of the supe-
riority of British marksmanship.

Upon recovering Reims in consequence of their victory
in the Battle of the Marne, the French strengthened the
defenses of the city and made it a prominent point on the
fine of their front. The Germans commenced a counter-
offensive against Reims about the 20th and took the com-
manding heights of Craonelle near it. In accordance with
the approved method they supported their infantry attacks
by vigorous action of their cavalry, bombarding not only
the lines of trenches but the city itself, where some of the
French batteries had been posted, probably on account of

VTLTiiKin Retl Cross men at work under hrc in the Aruonne distritt.

German dead in a trench just captured by French troops.

Operations on the Line of the Aisne 197

the cover afforded b}' the buildings. Fires were caused in
several places and the city suffered considerable damage
from the German bombardment.

The Germans claim that their artillerists were ordered
to respect the white flag which was raised on the famous
cathedral, and that every effort was made to spare this beau-
tiful monument of Gothic architecture, until an observa-
tion post was discovered in one of the towers directing the
aim of the French artillery.

A German official communication stated that only shrap-
nel fired by the field artillery was employed for dislodging
the observers in the tower, but admitted that the roof of
the cathedral was afterwards seen to be in flames. It is
scarcely conceivable that such a conflagration was due to
shrapnel. A later communication added that a single pro-
jectile was fired by a mortar at the observation post, since
the field artillery had proved inadequate for the purpose.

Unfortunately, in this and subsequent bombardments
the cathedral suffered serious damage, but without being
destroyed as an edifice. The circumstance was eagerly
utilized for the purpose of inflaming the feeling of bitter-
ness against the Germans, especially in neutral countries.
But the supposition that the Germans were actuated by
purely wanton maliciousness is preposterous. In many
instances the rage and lawlessness of invividuals found vent
in senseless acts of destruction. But the systematic action
of artillery, as in defacing the cathedral of Reims, is not
controlled by freaks of individual passion, and the German
authorities were certainly not seeking gratuitous enmity.

It gradually became evident that without a far greater
preponderance of forces than the Allies were able to
muster they could not hope to surmount by frontal attacks
the stronger positions, innumerable machine-guns, and
powerful siege-artillery of the Germans. The offensive

198 The Great War

action against the front of the German position was there-
fore allowed to wane and General Joffre turned to the
plan of threatening the German right flank by striking
northward from the western section of the front on the
Aisne, under cover of the forests. This movement was
undertaken by the Fourth and Thirteenth Corps belong-
ing to the Sixth Army. But General von Kluck antici-
pated precisely such a turning movement by extending his
lines westward so as to intercept its line of advance. The
French Corps were defeated south of Noyon, losing several
batteries.

The German military organization exhibited its marvel-
lous tenacity and resiliency in the crisis created by the
defeat in the Battle of the Marne. At one moment the
prodigious enterprise in the West collapsed and the Ger-
man armies seemed to be entrapped or routed. In the
next, the necessary adjustments had been accomplished, the
armies in the West were in a firm position waiting an oppor-
tunity to resume the offensive, and soon we shall behold
the Germans, while displaying an astonishing amount of
activity in all sections where hostilities are in progress,
pushing operations in the East with apparently as much
vigor as we should have expected if their plans in the West
had been successful.

CHAPTER IX

The Race to the Sea
{Septejnber 23-October 15, 1914)

The more complicated character of the second part of the first campaign
in the West ; the diversity of purposes. The Allies' offensive and the
race to the sea; every effort of the Allies countered by the Germans.
Transference of the British to Flanders. Lille taken by the Germans.
Resumption of the German offensive. Intimate connection of Verdun
and Antwerp in the deliberations of the Germans. The perforation of
the French eastern barrier at St. Mihiel and its futility. Retrospect of the
situation of the Belgian army. Destruction of Louvain, The German
operations against Antwerp : the fortifications, the opposing forces, the
beginning of the bombardment of the forts, September 28th, the removal
of the Belgian base, the penetration of the outer girdle. The general out-
look and departure of the Belgian field-army. The fall of Antwerp. The
race from all sides towards the southwestern section of the Belgian coast.
The arrival of the Belgian army on the line of the Yser and completion of
the barrier from the Swiss boundary to the North Sea.

For reasons that have already been explained, we ought
to regard the Battle of the Marne as the great turning
point of the campaign of 1914 in the West, dividing it
naturally into two parts. The interpretation of much of
the action in the second part, the nature of the underlying
purposes, is not so clear as in the first part. The confu-
sion is inherent in the nature of the transition brought
about by the above-mentioned preeminent event. For the
immediate change in the purpose and method of the opera-
tions was not a complete revolution. Thus, although the
earlier dashing maneuvers and lightning strokes gave way
largely to the steady, comparatively stationary, grind of
trench-warfare, a conspicuous amount of mobility was still
displayed by the operations in some parts of the contested

199

200 The Great War

area for at least a month. With the turning of the tide in
the Battle of the Marne the initiative passed from the Ger-
mans, who had held it quite exclusively since the com-
pletion of their concentration, to their opponents. But the
latter were unable to retain it consistently very long. It fluct-
uated from time to time and from place to place and later
returned quite unmistakably into the power of the Germans.

Consequently, the imagination is no longer enthralled
by a single tremendous movement, beside which all else
is insignificant, as in the earlier part of the campaign.
Then the one great purpose of the invaders dominated
the field and determined the action of their opponents,
who strove for the time merely to hinder and delay their
progress. In the later period this unity in the course of
events is lost. Each contestant strove to carry out a dis-
tinctive, characteristic plan. The attention is claimed by
important series of operations developing simultaneously
in different parts of the western theater. The really sig-
nificant exertions of both sides were actuated by their own
positive, individual intentions. It is necessary then for us
to distinguish clearly the respective designs of both con-
testants as the indispensable condition for comprehending
the course of events, which is complicated by the fact
that one of the contrasted plans was not simply the coun-
terpart or reverse of the other.

The position of the initiative, resting with the Allies at
the outset, later fluctuating, and finally passing over com-
pletely into the hands of the Germans, suggests the proper
order of treatment. We shall consider, first, the purpose
of the Allies and the continuation of their offensive move-
ment which was started near the Marne on September
6th, and secondly, the intention of the Germans and the
renewal of their offensive, which had only been suspended
temporarily.

The Race to the Sea 201

The Allies, foiled in their frontal attacks on the line of
the Aisne, transferred their offensive to the left wing and
resumed the effort to outflank the enemy's right. But
every movement of the Allies for the purpose of circum-
venting their opponent's position and striking at his lines
of communication was matched or surpassed by the efforts
of the Germans, so that the net result of the struggle of
each army to outflank the other was the rapid extension
of the opposing fronts on parallel lines northward in a race
which terminated at the sea about the middle of October.
Meanwhile, the Germans, with renewed energy and greatly
augmented strength, had extended the range of their aggres-
sive action and consolidated their position in the invaded
territory. Finally, they took up a vigorous offensive and
hurled themselves in repeated attacks with fearful violence
against the position of the Allies in Flanders. Thus the
movement inaugurated by the French, which resulted in
the extension of the fronts to the North Sea, and the
determined resumption of the German offensive, which
culminated in the tremendous effort to break through the
barrier formed by the Allies, are the dominating features
of the operations throughout the remainder of the cam-
paign of 1914 in the West. The first is the main subject
of the present chapter, the second will be reserved for
treatment in the next.

A variety of considerations doubtless swayed the leaders
of the Allies in their choice of a plan for the continuation
of the offensive. In the first place it was natural for them
to revert to a method which had been successful in the
Battle of the Marne. Then the turning movement in
the west doubtless seemed at the time to offer the largest
prospect of success as well as the greatest advantages.
Alsace was too narrow for aggressive operations on an
extensive scale, and as long as the German lines were only

202 The Great War

sixty miles from Paris, a great offensive movement in
Alsace would have produced a dangerous dissipation of
forces. Another advance through Lorraine would have
been foredoomed to failure without the previous reduc-
tion or investment of Metz or Strassburg, which would
have involved insurmountable difficulties.

There was still the possibility of a flanking movement
directed from Verdun towards the north. But in respect
to facilities for the concentration of troops, Verdun was at
a great disadvantage as compared with any corresponding
base of operations in the western part of France. Besides,
the prospective advantages were apparently very much
greater in the case of a movement launched from the
western end of the intrenched position between the Oise
and the Meuse than in that of a similar maneuver started
from the eastern extremity. A movement in the west
would provide for the permanent safety of the Channel
ports and secure the possession of the most important in-
dustrial region of France in the north. Lille, for example,
a very wealthy city, on the border of Belgium, was the
great center for the manufacture of locomotives, automo-
biles, and sundry appliances constantly required in war-
fare. The Germans had evacuated Lille in consequence
of the Battle of the Marne. But the French held it by
a precarious tenure. Furthermore, a northward move-
ment in the west promised to bring the Anglo-French
forces into actual contact with the Belgian army, so that
the united efforts of all would become much more effec-
tive, and the advantages offered by the position of the for-
tress of Antwerp as a sort of projecting bastion would be
realized.

If supremely successful, the turning movement of the
Allies would sever the principal lines of communication of
the German army running northeastward through Belgium,

The Race to the Sea 203

crush the army of von Kluck, and drive the invaders with
great loss and confusion from French soil.

Strange as it may seem in comparison with later condi-
tions, the vast area extending from the western extremity
of the opposing lines, as they were at that time, near the
confluence of the Aisne and the Oise, to the North Sea
and the course of the Scheldt, was debatable territory, but
only loosely guarded or patrolled in parts by Territorial
troops or detachments of cavalry. But such a situation
was no longer compatible with the close, intensive disposi-
tion along the Aisne, where progress was measured in
yards, as in siege operations.

The armies on both sides were constantly being aug-
mented by the incorporation of reserve troops of various
categories whose state of training or preparation had been
inadequate at the beginning of the war. These impatient
masses, restrained by the baffling equilibrium of opposing
factors in front, tended inevitably to spread out laterally
and press eagerly into the unoccupied spaces. Since the
Allies still possessed the initiative, they naturally took the
lead in this movement. But the Germans had by no means
renounced their fundamental design of crushing France
as the preliminary step in the direction of an ultimate
universal triumph. There was every reason to suppose,
therefore, that von Kluck was merely awaiting a favorable
opportunity for resuming the turning maneuver in the
west which had so nearly succeeded before the Battle of
the Marne. The extension of the French lines on the
left might also be regarded, therefore, as an indispensable
measure of self-protection.

In the feverish contest for expansion northward the
Germans had a distinct advantage in the concentric form
of their front at its western extremity, which shortened
their transports. Both the French and the Germans were

204 The Great War

now bringing many new formations into the field. But
the unexpected alacrity with which the Germans thwarted
every attempt of the Allies to outflank them is an indica-
tion of their numerical superiority.

The German Ersatz Reserve is composed of those who,
although they are physically fit and have arrived at military
age, have never been enrolled for service in the regular
army. It was a reservoir of potential military strength, a
source of raw fighting material. The Ersatz Reserve was
required to report for training at the regimental depots on
the outbreak of war so as to supply the necessary drafts re-
plenishing the active units in the field. But the accumulated
margin between the actual annual classes of recruits and the
whole number of men qualified for military service was so
large in Germany that independent Ersatz divisions were
formed about this time, when the members of the Ersatz Re-
serve were completing their minimum emergency training.

About September 20th a new French army, the Seventh,
was concentrated between the Oise and the Somme, on the
left of the Sixth Army, under the command of General de
Castelnau, the capable leader who had saved Nancy from
the German counter-offensive which followed the unsuc-
cessful French invasion of German Lorraine. He was
instructed to extend his left flank to the north of the
Somme and to ascend the valleys of the Oise and Somme
in the direction of St. Quentin.

At first the movement thus inaugurated must have been
very perilous for von Kluck, whose right wing barely cov-
ered his principal lines of communication coming from
Belgium. By the 21st, de Castelnau's right wing had
reached the vicinity of Noyon, and on the left a detach-
ment occupied Peronne on the 23d.

But the Germans concentrated their forces in the neigh-
borhood of St. Quentin, the threatened point, with the

The Race to the Sea 205

utmost energy and speed. Reinforcements were dispatched
from different parts of the front, notably from Lorraine.
It is even said that the whole, or at least the greater part,
of the Sixth German Army was transferred to this section.
On the 25th the French began to retire from the vicinity of
Noyon under the formidable pressure of the Germans.

The almost uninterrupted fighting in this quarter from
the 25th to the 27th was part of a general conflict which
raged along the entire front in northern France from the
Somme to the Meuse in connection with repeated assaults
of the Germans. The 26th saw the renewal of activity on
the heights to the north of the Aisne and the determined
effort of the Germans to recover the advanced position
held by the British right. Some authorities regard the
waning of these attempts of the Germans to establish an
ascendency in this section on the 27th as the end of the
Battle of the Aisne.

The Germans again attacked with great fury the French
positions before Reims. The bombardment did much
damage to the city, setting it on fire in several places and
killing a number of the inhabitants.

In the extreme west the Germans repulsed a French
division advancing towards Bapaume, forced the French
to retire from Peronne, and attacked Albert, an important
crossing-point on the Ancre, north of the Somme, on a
main highway leading westward to Amiens. The contest
at Albert was prolonged for several days with great vio-
lence. In spite of the burning of the town the French
held their position tenaciously. They took the offensive
on the 30th, but their endeavor to advance eastward was
checked by the Germans.

On the same day the Germans occupied the heights near
Roye in the plain of the Somme about twenty miles north
by west of Compiegne, where they threatened the center

206 The Great War

of de Castelnau's army and the communications between
Compiegne and Amiens. But they were unable to pene-
trate further in this direction.

Thus while the converging movement of de Castelnau's
army on St. Quentin was frustrated, the German counter-
offensive was checked in return.

In the meantime, forces on both sides were pushing
northward with the greatest energy. It is even reported
that the French were compelled to march as many as
twenty-five miles a day in order to meet the advance of
the Germans, who were moving on interior lines. Every-
where the German cavalry appeared in advance of the
infantry, overrunning the country, spreading terror and
confusion, and seizing points of vantage.

To forestall the continued northward progress of the
Germans, which threatened to open the way for a formid-
able offensive movement. General Joffre decided to form
a new French army, the Tenth, about September 30th, in
the neighborhood of Arras and Lens, the hilly country
between the Somme and the valley of the Lys. As a pre-
liminary step, two cavalry corps were sent northward as far
as the Scarpe, where they were to cooperate with Terri-
torial forces which had advanced from Dunkirk to Douai.
But the French were immediately confronted in the dis-
trict of Arras by a strong German army consisting of the
Prussian Guard, four army corps, two reserve corps, and
two cavalry corps.

The French Tenth Army was placed under the com-
mand of General Maud'huy. With its right flank resting
on the Ancre, it was intended that it should secure the
front Arras-Lens-Lille, and then, probably, advance in the
direction of Valenciennes. The general aim of the Ger-
mans in this quarter was apparently to capture Lille and
turn Maud'huy's left flank.

The Race to the Sea 207

But a battle lasting many days commenced on Octo-
ber 1st east of Arras, a handsome city situated on the
Scarpe, a tributary of the Scheldt, thirty-one miles north-
northeast of Amiens, the birthplace of Robespierre. The
once famous fortifications of Arras designed by Vauban
have long since lost all practical significance. The Ger-
mans captured Douai and Lens and threatened to outflank
Maud'huy's left. Most of the French forces were thus
compelled to retire to the hills west of Arras. A large
part of the population of the city fled from their homes.
The rest took refuge for the most part in cellars during
the bombardment, which lasted intermittently for three
days, October 6-8. The venerable townhall, a beautiful
example of secular Gothic, was wofully shattered, although
the tower survived this first bombardment. The Germans
forced their way into Arras but were subsequently ejected.
But in this battle Maud'huy's ofi^ensive stroke was parried
before it had been fairly launched.

General Jofl^re decided to concentrate still another army,
the Eighth, to cover Maud'huy's left flank, establish the
front between Lens and Dunkirk, and stem the vast re-
turning tide of German invasion. The Germans had pene-
trated into the suburbs of Lille. They occupied Ypres,
October 3d, their cavalry had taken Armentieres and Bail-
leul and was pressing westward up the valley of the Lys.
Their outposts had arrived in the neighborhood of Haze-
brouck and Cassel. Dunkirk and Calais were menaced.
The French ofl^ensive seemed on the point of complete
submersion and the situation was rapidly becoming critical.
The Eighth Army was entrusted to the command of Gen-
eral d'Urbal.

The British army which had commenced the campaign
on the extreme left wing of the Allied forces, now found
itself, in consequence of the general lateral shifting of the

208 The Great War

lines and the expansion of the fronts towards the north-
west, practically in the middle of the Allied position.
Obvious considerations of expediency prompted General
French to urge that the British should resume their initial
place on the left, in other words, that they should be trans-
ferred to the section of the theater of operations in the
extreme northwest. Their position would thus be nearest
England. Their lines of communication, which, as matters
stood, crossed those of several French armies on the left,
would be greatly shortened and the transport of supplies
would be very much simplified. The conveyance and de-
ployment of the expected reinforcements of British, Indian,
and Colonial troops would also be facilitated.

The perilous situation in the north added weight to
Sir John French's arguments, and it was decided that the
British army should be transferred to a position on the left
of the French in Flanders. The process of withdrawing
the British from the foremost trenches in the region of the
Aisne and replacing them with French troops had to be
performed section by section in the night with the greatest
caution. For in some places the opposing lines were less
than a hundred yards apart. The operation of transferring
the British army was begun on the 3d and completed on
the 19th without loss and almost without any hitch. The
soldiers were transported partly by rail and partly by
motor-vehicles.

It was naturally hoped that the British would cooperate
effectively in the defense or recovery of Lille, where the
situation was precarious, since the garrison consisted of an
inadequate force of Territorial troops. Maud'huy's prog-
ress had been checked at Arras and Lens. The arrival of
the British in the northern section was not expected before
the 11th. Many of the inhabitants of Lille departed by
rail or on foot terrified at the prospect of a bombardment

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The Race to the Sea 209

and of the capture of the city by the Germans. There
were violent encounters in the vicinity on the 4th and 5th
consummating in the repulse of the German advance-
guard on the 6th.

But the Germans were constantly increasing their num-
bers. They took La Bassee and occupied the region be-
tween the Bethune-La Bassee-Lille Canal and the Lys, so
as to threaten Maud'huy's left flank and intercept any
attempt to relieve Lille.

General Foch, who deserves scarcely less than General
J off re the title Savior of France for his service in the Battle
of the Marne, was appointed to correlate the efforts of de
Castelnau, Maiid'huy, French, and d'Urbal, to supervise,
in other words, all the Anglo-French operations north of
the Oise. In a conference of the military chiefs held on
October 8th, the road from Bethune to Lille was adopted
as a convenient line to separate the activity of the armies of
French and Maud'huy operating to the north and south
of it respectively. Maud'huy's Tenth Army was now estab-
lished on a front extending from the Ancre across the hills
to Bethune in the plain of the Lys, with its center at Arras.

It was decided that the right wing of the British army
should pivot on the French at Bethune and strike northeast-
ward at the Germans who had been threatening Maud'huy's
left flank and that, if they forced them to retire, they should
advance concurrently with the French in the direction
of Lille.

The arrival of the British Second Corps, which would
constitute the right wing of the British army in the new
position was expected in the neighborhood of Aire and
Bethune on the 11th. The detrainment of the Third
Corps which would, for the present, form the left, was
expected at St. Omer on the 12th. The First Corps, whose
withdrawal from the advanced position on the right wing

210 The Great War

in the region of the Aisne was probably a more delicate
operation, was not looked for before the 19th. The British
left was to operate north of the Lys in conjunction with
General d'Urbal's army which was then being formed.

The country between the Bethune-La Bassee-Lille Canal
and the River Lys, west of Lille, is mainly an industrial
region abounding in coal mines and factories. The numer-
ous villages are frequently almost continuous. The service-
able cover thus afforded, together with the enclosures and
other obstructions, made operations very tedious and diffi-
cult for an attacking force. Great caution had to be used
in forestalling surprises and ambuscades. The Germans had
carefully intrenched themselves in many of 'the villages and
were well supplied with machine-guns which swept the
exposed approaches. The British infantry was powerless,
therefore, without the support of the field-artillery. The
Second Corps went into action almost immediately after its
detrainment in the vicinity of Bethune. But their progress
was slow and costly. The British relieved the pressure
on Maud'huy's left; but far from relieving Lille, the Allies
were unable to eject the Germans from their advanced
position at La Bassee.

The Germans transferred a part, if not all, of their First
Army to the region of Lille and supplemented it by units
drawn from other quarters. Thus the Nineteenth Corps,
which had been part of the German Third Army, marched
108 miles in five days from the German front east of Reims
to the vicinity of Lille.

The bombardment of Lille was begun on October 10th.
A great panic ensued and a renewed exodus of thousands
of civilians from the city, which was surrendered on the
14th to save it from destruction. Considerable destruction
of property was caused, however, by the bombardment, but
the loss of life was slight.

The Race to the Sea 211

Meanwhile, the British Third Corps detrained at St. Omer
and joined forces with the Eighty-seventh and Eighty-ninth
French Territorial Divisions and the Fourth Cavalry Divi-
sion under General d'Urbal. Together, they swept the
Germans from the region west of the line Comines-Ypres-
Dixmude and marched into Ypres on the 13th, thus alter-
ing the apparent situation in southern Flanders very quickly.

We must now turn our attention to parts of the western
theater where other movements were developing simul-
taneously which united eventually in the same tremendous
climax.

As long as the Germans expected to force a decisive
turn of the conflict in the West by rapid, overwhelming
strokes, they gave little heed to the symmetry or coherence
of the occupied territory. While their armies were sweep-
ing across Belgium or striking southward through northern
France in eager expectation of a speedy triumphal entry
into Paris, time permitted only the most elementary meas-
ures of precaution for covering their flanks and lines of
communication. The astonishing rapidity of movement
was therefore associated with a lack of definite demarcation
which afterwards seemed incredible.

But the repulse on the Marne and the prospect that the
war would be a long one, in which endurance would count
as much as brilliant maneuvers, compelled the Germans to
reflect upon their geographical situation and devote serious
attention to rounding out and consolidating their position
and securing consistent protection for their lines of com-
munication.

In this connection Verdun and Antwerp were intimately
linked in the motives actuating the conduct of the Ger-
mans, although these two places were situated near the
opposite extremities of the vast semicircular rim of the
chief mass of enemy territory which they occupied in

212 The Great War

the West. As long as the French held Verdun the chief
lines of communication for the huge aggregation of Ger-
man troops in northern France had to pass through Bel-
gium, where the hostile army under cover of the forts of
Antwerp was a constant menace. The reduction of one
or both of these two strongholds must have been regarded
by the German General Staff as a vital necessity. To illus-
trate this statement, the fact may be cited that the failure
to surround and isolate Verdun was followed immediately
by the attack on the forts of Antwerp.

The Germans were impressed from the first with the
importance of the position of Verdun, which holds the
railway from Metz to Paris at the northern extremity of
the chain of fortresses extending forty miles to Toul. The
design of capturing Verdun was part of the larger project
of widening the zone of direct communication between
Germany and the occupied portion of northern France, a
dream which the Germans never abandoned. It was de-
sirable to make their position in France self-sustaining in
case a mishap should jeopardize communications through
Belgium. The capture of the Verdun-Toul defenses,
furthermore, would have secured an advanced base of
supplies, one that was admirably situated on the shortest
lines from the heart of Germany to the most vital objective
points in France, capable of convenient connection with
the railway system in Germany, and in German hands
almost unassailable.

The principal aim of the German Crown Prince had
been to mask, and if possible to capture, Verdun and the
fortresses in alignment with it. During the Battle of the
Marne the Germans made a desperate effort to pierce this
fortified barrier and nearly succeeded. The garrison of
Troy on on the east bank of the Meuse, subjected to simul-
taneous bombardment by the Fifth Army on the west and

The Race to the Sea 213

the Sixth Army on the east, after defending itself with un-
flinching heroism and repelling many formidable attacks
by the German infantry, had finally been reduced to the
last extremity when the Germans were compelled to with-
draw on September 13th.

The disruption of the fortress barrier would probably
have reversed the tide of victory in the Battle of the
Marne. The ultimate purpose of the fierce attacks de-
livered before Nancy at the time of that great battle was
probably to open a way by which the Germans could
sweep around the southern extremity of this line at Toul,
attack the French Third Army in the rear, and completely
isolate all the fortresses northward to Verdun.

The prominent position of Verdun at the extremity of a
wedge-shaped salient in the French lines was particularly
galling to the Germans because it impaired the cohesion of
their front. The German positions east and west were
linked by only a narrow corridor of French territory, and
the Germans scarcely made any progress at this supremely
important point after the first few weeks of hostilities.
The only railway line aff^ording communication east and
west controlled by the Germans in this section of France,
between Verdun and the Belgian frontier, connecting Trier,
Diedenhofen and Metz with Sedan and the west, passed
through a tunnel only seventeen miles north of Verdun,
the destruction of which would have gravely embarrassed
the German transports. As matters stood, troops moving
between the German fronts in Lorraine and northern
France were largely conveyed by a long detour through
Belgium.

In the middle of September the Sixth German Army,
under the Crown Prince of Bavaria, reached from a point
on the German front opposite Luneville to Consenvoye on
the Meuse, about eight miles north of Verdun, where it

214 The Great War

connected with the left wing of the Fifth Army, com-
manded by the German Crown Prince. The Germans
naturally cherished the idea of breaking the Hne of for-
tresses and encircling Verdun by the combined action of
these two armies.

The Crown Prince of Bavaria launched a movement of
his right wing across the Woevre region in the direction
of the Meuse and the fortified barrier about September
20th. This maneuver was executed mainly by the Four-
teenth Army Corps and the Sixth Bavarian Division.

The Meuse is bordered on the east throughout almost
all this part of its course by abrupt, wooded elevations
constituting a rather formidable natural obstruction. The
forts composing the barrier are situated, now on one side
of the river, now on the other, according to the local con-
ditions. The German forces advanced towards the Meuse,
in part at least, along the Rupt de Mad, a stream which
rises very near Commercy on the Meuse and flows into
the Moselle in the vicinity of the German border, passing
through a defile which forms a natural thoroughfare from
one river to the other across the Woevre.

The wings of the German forces deploying in the
Woevre were checked and pressed back by the attack of
troops from the two great fortresses, Toul and Verdun;
but the center, encountering only weak resistance, pushed
forward to the Meuse at St. Mihiel midway between the
extremities of the fortress barrier. The resulting con-
tracted situation was preserved for many months in the
curiously-pointed salient of the German lines, touching
the Meuse with its sharp stiletto tip.

Close to St. Mihiel was the modern fortress. Camp des
Romains. After thirty hours of preparatory conflict and
bombardment, the 12th brigade of the Sixth Bavarian Divi-
sion took this fortress by storm in a desperate struggle at

The Race to the Sea 215

close range on the 25th, while the 11th brigade warded off
attempts to relieve the garrison. Of the latter 508 were
taken prisoners; the rest perished in the fortress, which
was reduced to a heap of ruins.

The Germans had now opened a breach in the fortified
barrier. But it remained to be seen whether they could
make profitable use of their partial success. They crossed
the Meuse at St. Mihiel and occupied the suburb on the
left bank on the evening of the 25th, and by the morning
of the 26th their heavy guns were in position on the
bank of the river, making useless any further resistance by
the French Territorial troops who opposed their progress.

If they had succeeded in driving home the wedge in
this section they might have undermined the French front
as far as Reims, besides securing the other advantages
already mentioned.

But the conditions had become far less favorable for
the direct cooperation of the German Crown Prince than
during the Battle of the Marne. At that time his army
held a front of about twenty miles from Revigny north-
eastward to a point not far from Verdun, while detach-
ments, at least, had advanced far enough to take part in
the bombardment of Troyon. But the general retirement
of the Germans carried the Fifth Army with it, as we
have seen. The wedge-like obstruction of the Forest of
Argonne separated the German armies as they retreated
northward, the Crown Prince passing to the east and the
Duke of Wiirttemberg to the west.

This forest, rendered famous by the stubborn contests
waged for its possession during many months, is a rocky,
densely-wooded plateau, about thirty miles in length from
north to south and eight miles in width, lying between the
Aisne and its eastern tributary the Aire. About the middle
of September the Germans were back at Varennes and

216 The Great War

Vienne-la-ville about nine miles apart on opposite sides of
the forest, while the French were installing themselves in the
forest itself for the purpose of threatening communication
between the German armies. Thus the Crown Prince's
front had been pushed back to a distance of thirty miles
from St. Mihiel and his right flank was threatened from
the Forest of Argonne.

Nevertheless, the Germans advancing from St. Mihiel
were on the point of debouching into the valley of the Aire,
where they could have assailed the rear of the French
army confronting the Crown Prince. The French chiefs
realized the peril before it was too late. The Twentieth
Corps, summoned in haste from Lorraine, marched west-
ward throughout the night of the 25th and most of the
26th, crossing to the left bank of the Meuse at Lerouville.
Its cavalry advance-guard came into contact with the enemy
late in the afternoon of the 26th, and during the night the
Germans were driven back to the Meuse. They retained
at least a bridge-head on the left bank and intrenched
themselves very carefully around St. Mihiel and the ruined
Camp des Romains, a position of little value except for the
constant threat which its possession implied.

The failure of the effort to isolate Verdun was evident
by September 27th, and the first gun was fired at the
defenses of Antwerp on the 28th. It is natural to assume
that the continuity was the result of calculation and not of
fortuitous circumstances. But this second undertaking,
to which the Germans were in a measure driven by the
obstacle on the Meuse in France, was rendered even
more urgent by the northward movement of the French,
whose lines had already been extended across the valley
of the Somme. It was indispensable for the Germans
to forestall the course of this new maneuver by taking
Antwerp.

The Race to the Sea 217

But before we consider the thrilling progress of the
attack on Antwerp we must trace very briefly the fortunes
of the Belgian army since we took rather unceremonious
leave of it to follow the breathless course of the German
armies in their race towards Paris and the heart of France.

At the beginning of the war fifteen year-classes had
been called under arms in Belgium. The eight younger
classes were enrolled in the field-army; the seven older
formed the garrison or fortress troops. The field-army,
divided, as we have seen, into six army divisions and one
cavalry division, numbered 117,000 men at first, and was
afterwards increased by 18,500 recruits. The Third Divi-
sion was stationed at Liege, the Fourth at Namur. The
others were concentrated on the line covering the capital
on the east. Later, the Third Division, retiring from Liege,
joined the principal mass of the Belgian army drawn up on
the line Tirlemont-Jodoigne. The approach of half a
million Germans forced the Belgians to abandon their
position on August 18th. Thus far only one corps of
French troops had arrived on Belgian territory, having
reached the line of the Meuse and Sambre. To await
the cooperation of the French would have been fatal and
therefore the Belgian field-army took refuge within the
fortified camp of Antwerp on the 20th. After the evacua-
tion of Namur, 12,000 soldiers of the Fourth Division
escaped into France and finally made their way to Ant-
werp, partly by sea, and joined their comrades in arms.

With the capital and a large part of Belgium in the
hands of the Germans, General Field-marshal von der
Goltz, famous foi his writings and for his reorganization
of the Turkish army, was installed as governor-general of
the conquered territory and District-president (Regierungs-
prasident) von Sandt of Aachen was appointed chief of the
civil administration, assisted by a council of five members.

218 The Great War

After the bulk of the German armies had swept across
Belgium and turned into France, an army of observation,
composed of the Third and Ninth Reserve Corps and
some Landwehr formations under General von Beseler,
was posted before Antwerp to cover Brussels and the
German communications on a line extending from Wol-
verthem to Diest.

In the absence of superior German forces the occasion
seemed favorable for the Belgian army to strike at the
German lines of communication in the general direction
of Louvain. Four divisions took part in this operation on
August 25th and 26th. But the Germans with their cus-
tomary foresight and thoroughness had already intrenched
their positions and taken the other necessary precautionary
measures, so that the Belgians were unable to make any
permanent impression on their lines. Finally, the Ger-
mans executed counter-attacks on the flank of the Belgians
and forced them to withdraw within the line of their
defenses.

An act was committed at this time in Belgium which
has been the subject of more passionate discussion than
any other event of the Great War. The Germans deliber-
ately destroyed an important part of Louvain by fire, a city
situated eighteen miles east of Brussels, containing 42,000
inhabitants, famous for its venerable monuments of beau-
tiful architecture and for its other artistic treasures, the
seat of a famous Catholic university and headquarters of
the Jesuits. A treacherous outbreak of the population,
instigated and engineered by the Belgian government with
the complicity of the priests, and carefully timed with
reference to the sortie from Antwerp on the 25th, was
alleged as the motive for this stupendous act of retribution.
The people of Louvain, who had presumably been dis-
armed several days before, are said to have opened fire on

The Race to the Sea 219

the soldiers from the houses in the evening when the
garrison had been reduced to a single Landwehr (or Land-
sturm) battalion in consequence of the conflict with the
Belgian forces from Antwerp. The claim was even made
that it took the Germans twenty-four hours to quell the
insurrection. Desultory conflagrations in Louvain on the
26th were followed by the systematic destruction begin-
ning in the night of the 26th-27th. Most of the inhabitants
were driven from their homes. Many persons were sum-
marily executed. A large number of men of military age
were transported as prisoners to detention camps in Ger-
many. The Town Hall, 500 years old, an even more
beautiful example of the Gothic style than the Town Hall
of Brussels itself, was saved through the efforts of the
Germans themselves. It served as their headquarters.
But the ancient Cloth Market was consumed, and with
it, the university library, which it housed, with priceless
treasures, fell a prey to the flames, an irreparable loss to
humanity.

The destruction of Louvain will doubtless remain noto-
rious as long as the memory of the Great War endures.
Rightly or wrongly, the imagination of mankind will asso-
ciate it with the devastation of the Palatinate by Louis XIV
as a conspicuous example of ruthless barbarity.

On September 4th the Germans occupied Termonde, at
the confluence of the Dendre with the Scheldt, dispersing
the Belgian detachment which guarded it, crossed the
Scheldt and menaced the communications of Antwerp
with the west. But the First and Sixth Belgian Divisions,
which were therefore transferred to the left bank of the
Scheldt, drove the Germans back and finally expelled them
from Termonde. The Belgians executed an offensive
movement from the intrenched camp of Antwerp on
September 9-13. They occupied Aerschot on the left and

220 The Great War

reached Cortenberg on the right, but gained no permanent
advantage, although they compelled the Germans to recall
some forces which had been sent to France.

An important topographical feature of the neighbor-
hood of Antwerp is the semicircular water-course to the
southeast and south of the city formed by the succession
of the Rivers Nethe, Rupel, and Scheldt.

The construction of defenses for Antwerp after plans
by the celebrated Brialmont was inaugurated in 1859. The
ramparts of the city itself and the detached forts, 2,200
yards apart, forming a ring around the city, about two
miles from the ramparts, were regarded at that time as an
impregnable system of fortifications. In course of time,
however, the gradual development of siege-artillery ren-
dered these defenses inadequate, and the construction of
outer forts, designed also by Brialmont, was begun in 1877.
The southern ones covered the approaches to the bridge-
heads on the Nethe and Rupel, permitting the garrison of
Antwerp to make sorties against an enemy coming from
this direction. The recent expansion of the defenses,
adopted in 1906, incorporated these outer forts in an ex-
terior ring of modern fortresses and redoubts completely
embracing the city, which was not finished until Novem-
ber, 1913. It formed the essential part of the system of
defenses confronting the Germans in 1914. The course
of this outer girdle lay considerably south of the line of
the Nethe and the Rupel at a distance of eight or ten
miles from the city. Mechlin is only about two miles
south of Forts Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine in the
outer circle. The general constructive principles of these
forts were the same as those of the forts of Liege and
Namur.

Upon the approach of the Germans the Belgians de-
stroyed many villages and farms in the zone of fire of their

German soldiers in front of the Town Hall, Antwerp. The people on the left arc waiting
for permits to pass in and out of the city.

Kuins in the Rue de I'ew])le, Antwirji, alter liie binni>:uiinu nt.

The Race to the Sea 221

forts, sacrificing without hesitation property of great value
to the stern requirements of warfare, and flooded the low-
lying fields bordering the Rupel.

The German army assembled under General von Beseler
for the operations against Antwerp consisted of the Third
Reserve Corps, two Ersatz divisions, a marine division, two
Landwehr brigades, an artillery brigade, a pioneer brigade,
and probably a Bavarian division, numbering in all probably
125,000 to 150,000 men, a somewhat stronger force than the
Belgian army, but composed chiefly of troops of the second
line. The Ninth Reserve Corps had been sent to France.

Numbers, however, were after all of secondary import-
ance. The Germans are said to have concentrated about
200 guns, and a large number of their pieces far exceeded
in range and destructive force the ordnance mounted in
the forts. The Germans were evidently too weak to invest
Antwerp so as to cut off the communications and eventual
retreat of the Belgian army. Their method was to con-
centrate the fire of their powerful artillery upon a limited
section of the fortified girdle, crowning the effect by the
furious charges of their infantry. Thus, they counted on
forcing their way to the heart of the city.

As a preliminary measure the Germans shelled Mechlin
on the 27th compelling the inhabitants to seek safety in
Antwerp. The operations against the actual defenses
of the latter were inaugurated by the bombardment of
Forts Waelhem and Wavre St. Catherine the next day.
At first the 21-centimeter mortars were employed; later,
heavier pieces were brought into action and the 28-centi-
meter howitzers and the Austrian 30.5-centimeter mortar-
batteries rendered their effective service. At least two of
the famous 42-centimeter pieces were probably used.

The Belgian field-army was posted along the threatened
front covering the intervals between the outer forts in

222 The Great War

improvised trenches, faulty and inadequate in construction.
The First and Second Divisions held the part of the front
corresponding with the course of the Nethe, the Third
and Sixth covered the line of the Rupel, and the Fourth,
with its headquarters at Termonde, guarded the line of the
Scheldt southwest of Antwerp and thus protected the lines
of communication through Belgian territory towards the
sea. The Fifth Division acted as a general reserve. The
Belgian field-guns were in masked positions between the
forts and behind the course of the Nethe and the Rupel.

Fort Wavre St. Catherine was silenced on the 29th.
The concrete fabric and steel cupolas were smashed and
the explosion of a magazine completed the demolition.
Nevertheless, it seems not to have been occupied by the
Germans until five in the afternoon of October 1st.

The Belgian authorities probably realized as early as
the 29th that without such reinforcements as they could
scarcely expect the defense of Antwerp could only serve the
purpose of a delaying action, since the German artillery
would eventually crush every obstacle in its path. It was
decided to substitute Ostend as the base for the Belgian
army, but the removal of the military stores already pre-
sented serious difficulties. Railway communication from
Antwerp through Belgian territory was reduced to a single
line starting from the left bank of the Scheldt and running
westward through St. Nicolas. There was still a continuous
connection by railway between St. Nicolas and Antwerp
over lines in Belgian possession crossing the Scheldt at
Tamise and the Rupel near Willebroeck. But the railway
bridge at the latter point was within range of the German
artillery. Nevertheless, the trains conveying military stores
successfully traversed this part of the route by night with
lights extinguished from September 29th until October 7th.
While this operation was in progress the Belgian cavalry

The Race to the Sea 223

division patrolled the line of the D^dre to prevent an
incursion of the Germans and the interruption of traffic
further west.

The Belgians were driven back to the Nethe on Octo-
ber 1st and counter-attacks on the 2d failed to recover their
original outer positions. Fort Koningshoyckt, which had
been partially destroyed on September 30th, had to be
abandoned at 2.30 on October 2d and Fort Lierre, pounded
by the heaviest artillery, was evacuated at six. Fort Wael-
hem was silenced the same day. The bombardment of
Fort Kessel was begun at six A. M. on the 3d and by eight-
thirty the same morning it was a heap of ruins.

The defenders of Antwerp had now only the 15-centi-
meter mortars and 12-centimeter cannon in two armored
trains, besides the ordinary 7.5-centimeter field-pieces, with
which to reply to the powerful siege-artillery of the Ger-
mans. There was manifestly only one possible outcome
for a struggle under such conditions. The Belgians retired
behind the Nethe on October 2d.

It is said that the Belgian government had decided to
leave Antwerp at ten on the morning of the 3d and had
n:iade the necessary arrangements, and that the foreign con-
suls had already embarked on a vessel at five on the after-
noon of the 2d, when the plan was abandoned on receipt
of the news that British reinforcements were approaching.
This assistance, for which the Belgian government had
made an urgent appeal, was hopelessly inadequate. A
British marine brigade of 2,200 men arrived in Antwerp
on the evening of the 2d and relieved a Belgian brigade in
the neighborhood of Lierre. Two naval brigades arrived
on the 5th. The expedition was commanded by Brigadier-
general Paris and was accompanied by no less a personage
than the Right Honorable Winston Churchill, First Lord
of the Admiralty. The British naval forces were employed

224 The Great War

because they could be dispatched at shortest notice. They
brought with them some naval guns.

The doom of Antwerp was unmistakably sealed. Forts
Kessel and Brochem were silenced and the town of Lierre
was occupied by the Germans on the 5th. The Germans
first gained a footing north of the Nethe at four on the
morning of the 6th. A reflection on the general situation
at the time will doubtless convince us that a prompt retire-
ment of the Belgian army had become absolutely indis-
pensable. Since the Belgians were manifestly unable to
withstand the attacks of the German forces now concen-
trated against them, their only salvation was to unite with
their allies. But the corridor of unconquered territory
stretching around the north and northwest of Belgium
formed a very precarious connection with the French and
British armies. Not only was it menaced by the repeated
attempts of the Germans before Antwerp to force the pas-
sage of the Scheldt in the general vicinity of their posi-
tions, but the northward progress of the German forces in
France threatened to intercept it completely. This was the
moment when the Germans seemed about to outflank the
French to the north of Arras. They were extending their
front to La Bassee and collecting large forces near Lille.
Their cavalry was active in the neighborhood of Armen-
tieres, and they had occupied Ypres. By throwing a
barrier across the intervening space to the North Sea
they could sever the territorial connection and isolate the
Belgian army.

Even assuming that the Germans were not in force
beyond Lille, the distance from Lille to Nieuport on the
Yser, the nearest seaport and natural goal for the advance
of the German flank, is hardly forty miles. But the dis-
tance from Antwerp to Nieuport is more than twice as
great, and it was now a matter of life and death for the

Barbed wire entanglements used tor defense in the streets of Antwerp.

Method of barric;iuiiiL; .--iri-ct in Diest, Belgiur

The Race to the Sea 225

Belgian army to forestall the Germans in reaching Nieu-
port and the line of the Yser. Nieuport became the con-
verging point for strategic movements of great significance.

The passage of the Nethe by the Germans under cover
of a heavy fire of artillery showed that the Belgian army
had no time to lose. King Albert gave orders for the
departure of the main part of the field-army on the night
of October 6-7. The garrison troops, Second Belgian
Division, and the three British brigades remained within
the intrenched camp to continue the defense. The cross-
ing of the Scheldt by means of a bridge of boats at Ant-
werp was accomplished in good order by the morning of
the 7th. The king left at three in the afternoon and
accompanied his army on a race to the sea and along the
sea to the line of the Yser upon which its very existence
depended. On the same day the Germans forced a passage
of the Scheldt at Schoonaerde.

At the same time the Fourth Corps of the British army,
so far as it was already mobilized, under Lieutenant-general
Sir Henry Rawlinson, the Seventh Division and the Third
Cavalry Division, disembarked at Ostend and Zeebrugge,
October 6-8. Indian and Territorial troops were after-
wards to be incorporated in this command. Parts of the
Seventh Division and a force of French marines proceeded
to Ghent to reinforce the garrison. The possession of
Ghent, a very important center of communications flank-
ing the line of retreat from Antwerp, was indispensable
for the safety of the Belgian field-army. The total force
of 25,000 to 30,000 Allies thus concentrated at Ghent pre-
vented the Germans from penetrating northward to the
Dutch border and intercepting the narrow strip of terri-
tory which formed the outlet from Antwerp westward.
German forces advancing on Ghent were repulsed at Melle
on the 9th.

226 The Great War

Meanwhile, on the 7th, the Germans installed their
heavy guns in positions north of the Nethe, where they
could train them effectively on the inner forts and the city
itself. Until the 6th calmness and a hopeful spirit had
prevailed among the population of Antwerp. But dis-
quieting reports spread on the 6th and civilians began to
leave the city in large numbers. The bombardment of
Antwerp began at midnight. The water supply had failed
because the reservoir situated just inside Fort Waelhem
had been damaged by the enemy's shells. Gas and elec-
tricity were likewise cut off. Panic-stricken people rushed
to the Central Station and found that no trains were run-
ning. Departing tugboats crowded to their utmost capacity
made no perceptible impression upon the size of the de-
spairing mass that thronged the river-front. The com-
plicated system of habits, associations, conventions, and
intercourse, which forms the basis of society and support
for the normal life of the individual had suddenly col-
lapsed. Here was the tragedy of Belgium in all its horror.
Every available avenue of escape from Antwerp was
crowded with dense columns of refugees, especially on
the 8th when the greater part of the population departed.
Such a sudden and complete interruption of the normal
activity of so large a city and flight of the inhabitants had
never been witnessed in modern times. The population
which poured forth wherever an egress was open had
already been swelled by thousands of homeless refugees
from the ruined towns and villages within the range of the
military operations. Thousands crossed the Scheldt by
ferry, but a far larger number, possibly a quarter of a
million, made their way by road to the Dutch frontier.
Vehicles of every class and description had been brought
into service and loaded with the most necessary or valuable
household articles. But the greater number of the fugitives

The Race to the Sea 227

were forced to walk, carrying their burdens as best they
could. To peasants and laborers, accustomed to the ruder
tasks, the physical exertion presented no unusual hardship ;
but invalids and persons habituated to a life of ease and
refinement suffered untold misery and discomfort. Fortu-
nately the weather was fine, for most of the fugitives had to
bivouack in the open. The Dutch had hastily improvised
the necessary arrangements for the shelter and nourish-
ment of the pathetic multitude, constrained to become
their guests, with admirable efficiency and unlimited, but
unpretentious, generosity.

The miHtary authorities in Antwerp set fire to the petro-
leum tanks on the left bank of the Scheldt so that their
contents should not be utilized by the Germans, and the
dense black columns of smoke rose all day on the 7th and
8th. But the appearance of Antwerp under bombardment
at night was a spectacle of terror unsurpassed in human
record. Masses of seething flames rising from the burning
oil-tanks illuminated the foreground, making the shadows
blacker and more spectral by contrast, and were reflected
with a strange, portentous glow in the undulating volume
of smoke above. Conflagrations had broken out in differ-
ent parts of the city and the buildings were silhouetted
against the ruddy background of flame. The incessant
roar of guns, meteoric shower of fiery projectiles, and
bursting of shells completed the frightful impression of a
stupendous outbreak of baneful, unearthly forces.

Antwerp, with all her historic buildings and precious
possessions ; her noble cathedral and its incomparable tower,
a marvel of elegant proportions and exquisitely beautiful
tracery, delicate as Mechlin lace; her Town Hall and stately
Grande Place, and her wonderful collections of art; the
city of Rubens and repository of his greatest masterpieces;
the seaport rivalling Hamburg, London, and New York,

228 The Great War

with its miles of granite quays, warehouses, and exceptional
harbor facilities; the embodiment of opulence and splen-
dor;— lay as a prostrate victim in passive expectation of
her fate.

Antwerp has become renowned for her sieges. After
the splendid era of her prosperity under Charles V, she
suffered the savage violence of the Spanish soldiery who
mutinied from lack of pay in 1576. She was besieged for
two years by the Duke of Parma in 1584-1585, and finally,
in the nineteenth century, her Dutch governor held out
for two years in the citadel after the Belgian revolution
until expelled by the intervention of the French in 1832.

The most powerful artillery was probably not employed
for the bombardment of the city in 1914, while the larger
part of the projectiles used in this final stage of the opera-
tions was shrapnel, so that the actual destruction of prop-
erty in Antwerp itself, while considerable, proved not to be
so great as was feared.

At five o'clock on the afternoon of the 8th, when the
fall of Antwerp was plainly but a matter of hours, the mili-
tary governor gave orders for the departure of the Second
Division of the Belgian field-army and most of the British
troops, who began to cross the Scheldt by the bridge of
boats in the evening. But the order failed to reach some
of the British in time, so that they did not begin their
retreat until the morning of the 9th.

The First Belgian Division had been transported from
St. Nicolas to Ostend by rail on the 8th, while the other
divisions which left Antwerp on the night of the 6th-7th
proceeded in the direction of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal
on foot. The main part of the forces withdrawing from
Antwerp passed this canal by the morning of the 9th,
after completing what was the most exposed stage of their
march, because a considerable Allied force, stationed at

Jiflgiaus In tiiglit trum Antwerp

Belgian refugees taken to England on fishing boats.

The Race to the Sea 229

Ghent, as we have seen, still covered their further retire-
ment westu^ard.

Even those vt^ho were traversing the first section of the
journey on the 9th used the railway, in part at least. But
the Germans were now in force to the west of the Scheldt
and they intercepted at St. Nicolas many of those who de-
parted last, forcing them to seek refuge across the Dutch
frontier. In all, 1,560 out of the 8,000 British sent to Ant-
werp and about 20,000 Belgian soldiers were interned in
Holland at this time.

Several of the inner forts at Antwerp were taken by the
Germans on the morning of the 9th. The bombardment
ceased about noon and the Germans entered the city
towards evening, but the formal capitulation did not take
place until the 10th.

The Germans captured between four and five thousand
prisoners in the course of the operations and at the final
surrender of the city, and took as booty 500 guns, consider-
able railway material, including an armored train, many
motor-vehicles, about 4,000 tons of wheat, together with
supplies of flour, coal, and wool valued at $2,400,000, copper
and silver worth about $120,000, and many cattle. They
found four British, two Belgian, one French, one Danish,
thirty-four German, and two Austrian steamers in the port.
The engines of the German vessels had been damaged.
The harbor was intact except that the gate of the great
sluice had been obstructed by large stones.

An irritating source of distraction to the Germans was
removed by the expulsion from Antwerp of the Belgian
field-army, which had been prodding them in the rear
whenever a critical situation demanded their undivided
energy and attention elsewhere.

Besides the great advantage of securing communications
in the north, the fall of Antwerp released a large force of

230 The Great War

men for service in the field. It enabled the Germans to
close in on the still unoccupied Belgian territory so as
to reduce very greatly the necessary length of their own
front and thus to make their position more solid. His-
torical and sentimental causes combined w^ith the practical
advantages to render the capture of Antwerp an exploit
which created enormous enthusiasm in Germany, and the
manifest futility of the assistance sent by Great Britain
whetted the feeling of satisfaction.

But the loss to the Allies, aside from the detriment in-
herent in advantages won by the Germans, was more of a
contingent than positive nature. For the actual benefit
which they had derived from Antwerp was slight as
compared with the service which the position might
eventually have rendered them. Their chagrin must have
been greatly assuaged by the successful escape of the
Belgian field-army and its junction with the British and
French. It was essential that the Belgians should join
with their allies in presenting a common front to the
enemy, since the most violent struggle in the whole cam-
paign was soon to begin and the united forces of the
Allies would be much stronger than equal numbers acting
separately. And since, in the actual situation, Antwerp
was too remote to be included in a common front, the
withdrawal of the Belgian field-army had become a neces-
sary operation.

Besides the German army which had been operating
against Antwerp, four reserve corps had been concentrated
in Belgium for the proposed offensive movement towards
Calais and Boulogne. These corps were now advancing
in the direction of the coast.

The Allies evacuated Ghent on the 12th, and the Seventh
British Division took up a position covering Ypres in
contact with the other divisions of the British army on

The Race to the Sea 231

the 14th. The Third British Cavalry Division referred to
above, commanded by Major-general the Hon. Julian Byng,
which had been posted at Bruges, was also transferred to
Ypres, arriving there on the 14th. The Belgian tield-army
was proceeding to Nieuport and the Yser by way of Eecloo
and Ostend, while the two opposing lines in France were
being pushed northward towards the same point as rapidly
as possible.

All eyes were suddenly turned upon an obscure corner
of Belgium bounded by the sea as the goal towards which
great armies were hurrying from all directions, and places
heretofore almost unknown abroad soon became forever
memorable as the scene of the most sanguinary struggles
in the world's most terrible drama.

The Belgian government, which had been transferred
from Antwerp to Ostend, was now compelled to accept
hospitality on foreign soil. It left Ostend on the 13th and
arrived at Havre the same evening, where it was installed
as the guest of the French Republic.

There was a frantic rush of fugitives endeavoring to
obtain passage from Ostend to England on the 13th. This
became a veritable stampede in Ostend on the 14th, when
the Germans occupied Bruges, only twelve miles away.
The last steamer departed on the same day, leaving a great
crowd of terrified refugees in a frenzy of despair. In
their desperate efforts to embark at the last moment several
persons were pushed into the water and drowned. A
Taube dropped a bomb into Ostend when the panic was
at its height. German patrols entered Ostend on the 15th
and the Third Reserve Corps was quartered in the vicinity
on the 16th. Meanwhile, the streams of fugitives were
moving along the muddy roads towards the French fron-
tier, drenched by the continual rain, sleeping in the fields,
a woful spectacle.

232 The Great War

The Belgians prepared to cooperate with their allies by
defending the last corner of their national territory. On
the 15th they took up a position along the River Yser and
the Yser-Ypres Canal from the sea to Boesinghe, a distance
of about twenty-three miles, with their right resting on
the British, The latter continued the front past Ypres
to the vicinity of La Bassee where the French Hne com-
menced. Thus for the first time, the Belgians were ranged
along the side of the British and French on a common
front, and the human rampart was complete from the
North Sea to the boundary of Switzerland.

CHAPTER X

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders
^October 16 -November 11 y 1914)

The situation on October 16, 1914. The revised plan of the Germans.
The nature of the battlefield along the Yser. The German forces before
the Yser front. Belgians attacked in their outposts and driven back. The
German attack on Nieuport, and on Dixmude, which is defended by the
"soldiers of Liege," October 19th. Renewed attack, terrible bombard-
ment and burning of the town. Passage of the Yser by the Germans near
Tervaete, night of October 21-22 ; the Germans west of the river. Arrival
of the French to reinforce the Belgians, October 23d. Bombardment of
the German positions by British warships. Violent renewal of the attack
on Dixmude, October 24th. Belgians at the limit of their resources and
endurance. The gradually rising inundation. The culminating moment
and German retirement, November 2-3. The situation on the British
front. Desperate combats in the region of Ypres with repeated attacks of
the Germans in dense masses, October 20-23. The contest at Neuve
Chapelle. The very critical moment before Ypres on the 31st. Renewal
of the battle on November 1st. Storming of Dixmude. Supreme effort
of the Prussian Guard to crush the British lines, November 10th and 11th.

The 16th of October, 1914, saw the beginning of a dis-
tinctly new stage of the struggle in the West. Then for
the first time the Allies presented a solid front on an un-
broken line from the North Sea to the frontier of Switzer-
land. Running northward from the Oise the Allied front
passed west of Rove, east of Albert, west of Bapaume, east
of Arras, west of Lens and La Bassee, and east of Armen-
tieres and Ypres.

The French held the line as far as the Bethune-La Bassee
Canal. From there the British, supported by the forces of
General d'Urbal, mainly Territorial troops, prolonged the
front across the boundary into Belgium. The Second
British Corps operated between the French left and the

233

234 The Great War

Lys. The British Third Army Corps and the Cavalry
Corps with two French Territorial divisions and a brigade
of marines occupied Ypres and the adjacent section of the
front. There they were joined by the Seventh British
Army Division and the Third Cavalry Division. Thus the
British with tlieir French supports established the front
as far north as Zonnebeke, while cavalry covered the
interval between this point and the right flank of the Bel-
gians. The First British Corps detrained at St. Omer on
October 17th, reached the front in the section of Ypres
on the 21st and extended the line of the British still
further north.

The original position of the Belgians in this period of
the contest corresponded, as we have seen, with the line
of the Ypres-Yser Canal from Boesinghe northward to its
confluence with the River Yser at Fort de Knocke, and
then with the course of that river to the North Sea. Dix-
mude stood at the center of the Belgian position, and the
most important part of the Belgian front lay between Dix-
mude and Nieuport, a seaport on the Yser, about two miles
from its mouth.

Again, a very brief recapitulation of the course of events
may serve to illuminate the purpose of the German attack
and the significance of the sanguinary struggles which the
present chapter will describe.

After the Allies had been driven for a time before the
irrepressible fury of the initial German dash into France,
they recovered their grasp of the situation before it was
too late, collected their forces, and faced the enemy in the
interior of the country. Whether the Germans over-
powered and scattered their opponents or recoiled before
the human rampart stretching from Paris to Verdun had
been, as we have seen, a matter of deep concern for the
whole human race. With dauntless determination the

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 235

Allies repelled the tremendous onslaught on the Marne,
grasped the initiative, forced the Germans to recede, and
tried by enveloping one extremity of their front to make
their defeat irremediable. At this moment of greatest
opportunity for the French, lack of material preparation
and equipment rather than available men probably cur-
tailed the measure of their success. The Germans col-
lected their resources, recovered their assurance, and strove
to regain the initiative. Their strength rose higher than
ever, and now, Hke a vast returning tide, they threatened
to burst every barrier that obstructed their progress. The
campaign was approaching its second crest of highest ten-
sion. Flanders was now the storm-center towards which
the destructive elements converged from all directions.

In a strictly technical sense the return of the Germans
to a violent aggressive action may be regarded as a counter-
offensive, since the Allies were still for a time unwilling to
relinquish the initiative. The offensive movement started
in the region of the Lys and of Ypres on the arrival of the
British army was still being pushed after the Teutonic
whirlwind had broken with terrible fury on the line of the
Yser further north. But the dominating factor in this, as
in the earliest part of the campaign, was the passionate
resolve of the German chiefs to obtain a decision in the
western theater at the earliest possible moment, and all
aims and efforts of friend and foe alike were subordinate
to the prodigious exertions put forth for the attainment of
this single purpose.

The aim of the German offensive at this time has been
the subject of much speculation and discussion. The view
that Calais was the objective for the renewed attacks was
extensively published and eagerly accepted by the Ger-
mans. But sound principles of strategy as well as the logic
of events demanded that the main object of the German

236 The Great War

offensive should be the destruction of the Allied armies by
the most direct and effective means.

Perhaps the German authorities intentionally obscured
the main purpose and ultimate direction of the renewed
offensive so as to avoid the appearance of insincerity in
their earlier declarations, v\^hich announced, or at least
implied, the accomplishment of the original plan in the
West. They seem to have encouraged the impression
that the initial campaign against the French, whose resist-
ance had now been reduced to a practically negligible
factor, had passed by a normal transition into a campaign
against the British army, now become the principal adver-
sary. The German press apparently responded to the sug-
gestion and the impending march to Calais became the
watchword of popular enthusiasm. In the imagination of
the German people and in frequent rumors the capture of
Calais was naturally associated with the prospect of a terri-
fying combined attack by sea and air against the British, of
a great naval battle, and of a victorious landing on the Eng-
lish coast. Many speculative schemes for the invasion of
England appearing at this time animated the spirit of the
German people, but served, on the other hand, no doubt,
to stimulate recruiting in Great Britain, where they excited
rather a feeling of curiosity than consternation.

But it is simply inconceivable that the German leaders,
believing themselves to be involved in a life and death
struggle and in a war in which time was a factor of the
greatest importance, should have employed the larger part
of their mobile forces in the West for any enterprise
which did not offer the prospect of decisive results. It is
regarded, moreover, as an incontestable principle of strategy
that the reduction of cities and strongholds has in itself no
final effect in modern warfare. Only the destruction of
the enemy's field armies is decisive. We must assume.

•i <

H ^

(A <

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 23

^j/

therefore, that the Germans struck at the northernmost sec-
tion of the Allied line because they believed that this would
be most conducive to the destruction of their adversaries'
armies. The German offensive, based upon the well-
fortified triangle, Antwerp-Namur-Liege, was facilitated
by the dense network of Belgian railways as means of
communication. Success in the initial stages would open
the way for the renewal of the turning movement on an
imposing scale, the crumpling up of the Allies' left wing,
and a new dash for Paris.

One important factor in the situation is often overlooked,
and that is, that the German blow at this time was first
launched against the only section of the Allied front where
almost insurmountable obstacles were not to be expected.
The initiative had deserted the front between the Oise and
the Meuse because a situation had developed there making
progress impossible. For experience had shown that suit-
able trenches were practically impregnable from the front,
and the completion of such defenses from the Oise to the
Meuse had produced a hopeless deadlock in that quarter.
Activity turned to the valley of the Somme and then to
the region of Arras, but in each of these the paralyzing
tendency soon made its influence felt. It was a contest of
defensive against offensive methods, a race of the spade
against the gun, in which the latter's original lead was
constantly diminishing. Thus in each successive extension
of the front mobility was soon followed by stagnation.
Hence the Germans delivered their present blow at the
most recent section of the front, where the defenders had
only just arrived, and where artificial defenses, if prepared
at all, would be least effective.

It is not to be assumed, however, that the German leaders
were actuated exclusively by a single, supremely signifi-
cant motive in framing their revised plan of attack. Lesser

238 The Great War

aims and incentives were doubtless mingled in the consid-
erations that produced the general design. For strategists
usually have in view a minimum as well as a maximum
objective. Calais, like Paris in the original offensive drive,
would serve as a convenient point of convergence for defin-
ing the direction of the movements, a sort of topographical
peg on which to hang the general scheme of operations.
The capture of Calais and the other Channel ports would
confer important specific advantages. It would presumably
create uneasiness and apprehension in England and hinder
thereby the sending of British reinforcements to the con-
tinent. It would embarrass, although not completely inter-
rupt, communications between England and the British
army in northern France. The harbor of Calais would
furnish a convenient base for submarines operating along
the English coast, and for mine-layers infesting the Straits
of Dover. The most powerful German artillery planted
on the French coast would create a zone of safety for the
operations of German warships extending almost across
the straits at the narrowest point. Even a partial success in
a movement southwestward along the coast would reduce
the length of the German front from the Meuse to the
North Sea and so effect a corresponding saving in the num-
ber of troops required to maintain it. Furthermore, the
presence of a German army on the English Channel would
exercise a tremendous moral effect in neutral countries as
well as in the belligerent nations.

The German offensive failed in the extreme northern
section and was renewed in the region of Ypres. The
struggle in Flanders may be conveniently divided, there-
fore, into two general phases, which might perhaps be
regarded as distinct battles. The first of these, the Battle
of the Yser, beginning about October 18th, passed through
its culminating stage of violence from the 24th to about

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 239

the 30th and died away about November 3d. It over-
lapped the second, the Battle of Ypres, which developed
during the last days of October, rose to very great intensity,
and subsided rapidly after November 11th. But to speak
of battles as distinctive episodes at this stage of the strug-
gle is apt to be misleading, for there were scarcely any
intervals in the warlike operations that could set off indi-
vidual battles. We give our attention almost exclusively
to the course of the most violent and determined offensive
efforts, neglecting the places where operations were desul-
tory and comparatively aimless. But the fact should not
be overlooked that hostilities were practically continuous
along the entire front. Only in the sense that in certain
sections and at certain times the action rose to a relatively
very much higher degree of intensity were there separate
battles.

The whole region where the Germans encountered the
Belgians is extremely flat, except for the dunes along the
coast, and in some parts it is lower than the level of the sea
at high tide. The Yser has been canalized and is confined
by dykes, and forms a serious obstacle for an attacking
army, although it is only about twenty yards broad. The
country on both sides is interspersed with streams, canals,
and ditches, and frequent rows of willows furnish cover
for the movements of troops. Aside from its petty mean-
derings the Yser forms in its general course from Dixmude
to Nieuport the arc of a circle swelling out towards the
northeast, with a railway line connecting the two towns as
the chord. The embankment of this railway from one
to two yards in height forms a second defensive barrier,
reinforcing the line of the river.

The total German forces finally concentrated for the of-
fensive in the north were divided into three distinct 2:roups.
The army of the Duke of Wiirttemberg nearest the sea

240 The Great War

comprised the Fourth Ersatz Division, Third, Twenty-
second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-seventh
Reserve Corps, a division of the Twenty-fourth Reserve
Corps, and probably a naval division; the army detachment
of General von Fabeck, next in order southwards, is said
to have contained the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps,
and three other divisions; and, finally, the army of the
Crown Prince of Bavaria included the Fourth, Seventh,
Fourteenth, and Nineteenth Corps, the Guard, parts of
the Thirteenth Corps, the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, and
the First Bavarian Reserve Corps. The formations men-
tioned were supported by numerous cavalry formations.
The forces of the Duke of Wiirttemberg and of General
von Fabeck and part of those of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria, in all about twelve corps, together with four cavalry
corps, operated between the sea and the River Lys.

Forces amounting to seven divisions, namely, the Fourth
Ersatz Division, and the Third, Twenty-second, and
Twenty-third Reserve Divisions, disposed in the order
mentioned on a front extending from the sea towards the
southeast, were advancing against the Belgians, who could
scarcely muster 60,000 for the defense, including the force
of 6,000 French marines under Admiral Ronarc'h, who
had retired from Ghent to Dixmude. The Germans,
furthermore, concentrated 400 pieces of artillery, many of
them of heavy caliber, against the Belgian position between
Dixmude and the sea, while the Belgians could reply with
only 300 field-pieces and twenty-four mortars saved from
Antwerp. The Belgians were fatigued from their long
marches and dispirited from their constant succession of
losses and the apparent futility of all their exertions. The
confident expectation that the Allies would speedily tri-
umph and deliver Belgium from the hands of the enemy
had been dissipated. Battered and war-worn, homeless

Cavalrymen asleep on heaps of straw in a Frenc'h town.

Infantry nun in a trincli near ^'jirej

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 241

and disappointed, they gathered courage for the final effort
to defend a pathetic remnant of their national territory.
The French commander-in-chief asked them as a supreme
performance to hold out for forty-eight hours until con-
siderable reinforcements of the French could come to their
relief, and even this, at the time, seemed an almost hopeless
request. But in reality the Belgians held out for a week
against the German onslaught with the sole assistance of the
French marine brigade, and even then bore the brunt of
an unequal contest with unsurpassable courage and deter-
mination for at least two weeks longer.

However, in spite of the absence of clearly-marked
physical features in this part of the country, the ground
did offer some distinct advantages for the defensive, as we
shall see. The convex curve of the river from Dixmude
to Nieuport was a possible element of danger for the Bel-
gians, it is true, since it made the escape of the defenders
along the bank more difficult, in case the extremities of
the arc were captured by the Germans. Furthermore, a
protruding loop-shaped bend in the river midway between
the towns just mentioned was a very positive source of
peril, because, if held, it exposed the Belgian lines within
its fold to cross-fire from the opposite bank, and if evac-
uated or captured by the enemy, it opened a breach in the
defensive line formed by the stream. But the dyke along
the left bank of the canalized Yser formed a suitable ram-
part for the Belgians. Yet the fact that the river is much
higher than the adjoining fields, the relative elevation of
the dyke being consequently much greater on the land
side, made it all the harder to dislodge the Germans when
once they had gained a foothold upon it.

Possession of the crossing-points at the different towns
and villages along the river was extremely important be-
cause the low country, interspersed in large part with

242 The Great War

canals and dykes, ditches and willow thickets, hedges and
fences, was very difficult to cross except by the roads
which led to the bridges. The marshy character of the
soil near the river, moreover, interfered with the prepara-
tion of artificial cover, since trenches very quickly filled
with water. But the most effective resource supplied to
the defenders by the physical conditions of the region will
be described at the point where it first became operative.

The immediate purpose of the Germans was to break
the enemy's line at Nieuport and Dixmude, converge on
Furnes, the Belgian headquarters, and thus enclose and
annihilate the Belgian army. The Belgians occupied a line
of advanced positions in the villages east of the Yser. The
first shots were exchanged on the 16th, but the German
attacks on the Belgian advanced posts did not become
serious until the 18th.

The Belgians were driven from their outer line on the
19th, retaining only the positions on the right bank of
the Yser near Nieuport, Schoorbakke, and Dixmude. The
heavy artillery of the Germans had now arrived from Ant-
werp and the bombardment of the Belgian positions com-
menced in earnest.

But the appearance off the coast of a British flotilla
under Rear-admiral Hood, which took part in the action,
reminded the Germans quite forcibly that without com-
mand of the sea their lateral movement for outflanking the
Allies had reached an impassable limit. This squadron
included three monitors which ha-d been built for the
Brazilian government and were intended for river opera-
tions. While mounting 6-inch guns their shallow draught
permitted them to approach so close to the shore that the
seamen employed even their small-arms with effect. The
larger vessels maneuvered at a much greater distance. Air-
craft directed the fire of the British, which inflicted severe

The STEMiMiNG OF THE TiDE IN Flanders 243

losses on the Germans who were attacking in the direction
of Nieuport in the vicinity of the coast. Nevertheless, the
latter pressed on, and after thirteen hours of uninterrupted
exertion took Lombaertzyde, the defenders retiring to
positions already prepared a little further back.

Dixmude was defended by the French marines under
Admiral Ronarc'h, who was in local command, the 11th
and 12th Belgian regiments of the line under Colonel
Meiser as chief-of-brigade, forming part of the Third
Division, known as the "soldiers of Liege," and a regi-
ment of artillery containing twelve batteries of field-pieces.

The Germans charged in dense masses about three on
the afternoon of the 19th, joining in a hand-to-hand strug-
gle with their antagonists, but retired at nightfall. Dix-
mude, set on fire by incendiary shells in the evening,
burned for several days, so that between the conflagration
and the converging fire of powerful artillery, the situation
of the garrison, harassed day and night by the attacks of
greatly superior forces, became almost unendurable.

Rain produced a comparative lull on the 20th; but the
21st was a very critical day for the Belgians and their allies.
The Germans, whose concentration in the north was now
complete, assailed their opponents all along the front from
La Bassee to the North Sea. They hurled themselves
upon the trenches protecting Dixmude in eight distinct
attacks, charging in dense masses sixteen or twenty rows
in depth. One after another the formidable gray-green
waves rushed forward, urged on by an unshakable deter-
mination to succeed at any cost, impelled by a veritable
frenzy of self-immolating patriotic devotion, crossing the
deadly zone swept by the fire of rifles and machine-guns
right up to the wire entanglements or even to the foot of
the Belgian intrenchments, only to waver and stagger back,
with ranks thinned and torn by the awful streams of lead.

244 The Great War

The townhall in Dixmude, which had been converted
into a temporary hospital, was threatened with immediate
destruction by fire and the enemy's projectiles. With self-
sacrificing courage the members of the Red Cross removed
the wounded while shells were crashing all about and trans-
ported them to the base hospital at Furnes.

A correspondent of the London Telegraph, who visited
Dixmude while the contest was raging on the 21st, has
given a vivid account of his impressions, and a few passages
from his account will serve to illustrate the terrible violence
of the struggle.

"No pen could do justice to the grandeur and horror of
the scene. As far as the eye could reach nothing could be
seen but burning villages and bursting shells. . . .

"Arrived at the firing line, a terrible scene presented
itself. The shell fire from the German batteries was so
terrific that Belgian soldiers and French marines were con-
tinually being blown out of their dugouts and sent scatter-
ing to cover. . . .

"Dixmude was the objective of the German attack, and
shells were bursting all over it, crashing among the roofs
and blowing whole streets to pieces. From a distance of
three miles we could hear them crashing down, but the
town itself was invisible, except for the flames and the
smoke and clouds rising above it. . . .

"The battle redoubled in fury, and by seven o'clock in
the evening Dixmude was a furnace, presenting a scene
of terrible grandeur. The horizon was red with burning
homes."

At sundown the Germans crossed the Yser south of
Dixmude, but were confronted by machine-guns and
driven back. On this day the length of the Belgian front
was contracted to about twelve and a half miles, the south-
ern extremity being withdrawn to St. Jacques-Cappelle

Field Marshal Horatio Herbert Kitchener, Earl of Khartoum, English secretary

of state for war.

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 245

about two miles south of Dixmude, the interval evacuated
by the Belgians being filled with French forces.

On the night of the 21st-22d the Germans captured a
bridge near Tervaete in the darkness and poured into the
loop formed by the river, bringing so many machine-guns
to this position that the Belgians were unable to dislodge
them in repeated attacks on the 22d. The presence of
the Germans at this point on the left bank of the river
compelled the Belgians to evacuate Schoorbakke on the
right bank on the morning of the 23d, since the trenches
there were exposed to enfilading fire.

The situation was becoming hourly more critical for the
Belgians. A new and very much more serious difficulty
was now added to their other preoccupations. The in-
tensity of action required of the Belgian field-guns to com-
pensate for the tremendous superiority of the German
artillery had made many of the pieces unserviceable and
reduced the supply of ammunition to less than 100 rounds
for each gun. Everywhere assailed day and night by supe-
rior numbers, with scarcely any available reserves, the Bel-
gians still held the essential points in their defensive line
with the feverish grasp of shipwrecked sailors clinging
desperately to a wave-swept raft.

The situation had been one of such uniform gloom
for the Belgians, stubborn resistance ending always in
retreat, unrelieved by any cheerful circumstances, their
hopes had been so often deceived, that they probably
heard the joyful rumor that reached the front on the
evening of the 22d with an instinctive feeling of incredul-
ity. The Forty-second French Division, commanded by
General Grossetti, had been transferred from Reims to
Belgium by rail and late in the afternoon of the 22d the
advance-guard marched in review before King Albert and
General Joffre in the market-place of Furnes. For the

246 The Great War

first time the Allies were coming in force to fight by the
side of the Belgians, and the latter, who may have been
embittered at times by the thought that their terrible losses
and hardship had been a gratuitous sacrifice for others who
ignored and deserted them, again took heart. The com-
radeship in arms of the western nations was a visible reality.
And yet, although the effect of the French reinforcements
in stiffening the resistance of the Belgian army was unmis-
takable, the situation became even more critical and the
climax was reached several days after their arrival.

The French marched to Nieuport on the 23d to relieve
the Second Belgian Division, which was to be brought back
into reserve for partial recuperation. The French forces
crossed the canal bridges under a shower of German
projectiles, traversed Nieuport, drove the Germans from
Lombaertzyde, and attacked Westende.

M. Emile Vandervelde, Chairman of the International
Socialist Bureau, who was appointed Belgian Minister of
State by royal decree on August 4th, so that all parties
should be represented in the government, witnessed the
operations in the vicinity of Nieuport on the 23d. He
relates that while he was standing only thirty feet from
Belgian field-guns in action he could hear nothing but the
thunder of the guns of the British squadron, probably
12-inch pieces, then two miles away.

The Germans continued their bombardment of Nieu-
port on the 24th and French heavy artillery which had
been brought to the Belgian front replied from behind
the town. At the same time the Germans attacked with
violence all along the front. The Belgians gave way at
St. Georges where the Germans captured a crossing-point
on the river. On the morning of the 24th one of the
brigades of the Forty-second Division came to the relief
of the hard-pressed Belgian troops who were struggling

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 247

against serious odds to confine the Germans at the loop in
the river near Tervaetef. During the day, however, the
Allied forces in this part of the line were forced back to
the Beverdijk, a canal running midway between the Yser
and the railway.

The Duke of Wiirttemberg was now making a supreme
attempt to capture Dixmude. Fourteen furious attacks
were repulsed by the Belgians and the French marines
during the night of the 23d-24th. The effort was renewed
during the day. The trenches guarding the bridge-head
were lost for a time, but afterwards recovered. In some
places the foremost opposing trenches were no more than
fifty feet apart at this time. It meant unremitting tension,
practically uninterrupted physical exertion, for those who
occupied them.

On the 25th the French resumed unavailingly their
attack on Westende. The Germans had now mounted
heavy artillery along the dunes, which kept the British
fleet at a distance.

By the 26th the German attack against the center of the
Nieuport-Dixmude line had advanced so far that the Bel-
gian General Staff even withdrew temporarily from Furnes.
The Allies were being forced back to the railway embank-
ment, the last line of defense in this region.

As early as the 25th the Belgian chiefs decided to resort
to an inundation as a final expedient for arresting the forces
which threatened to overwhelm them. Most of the
ground which was being so desperately contested lay below
the level of the sea at high-tide. Usually the sluices at
Nieuport were opened at low-tide for drainage and closed
at high- tide to prevent an overflow into the canals which
terminated there. By reversing this process and closing
the culverts and other openings in the railway embank-
ment, the area between the railway and the river could be

248 The Great War

gradually flooded. The process would be materially aided
at this particular time by the unusual rainfall which swelled
the streams supplying the canals.

It was natural that the Flemish in their present extremity
should appeal to the sea for assistance. The Low Coun-
tries have been the scene of struggles in behalf of liberty
which are scarcely less celebrated than Marathon, Ther-
mopylae, and Salamis, and every schoolboy has heard of
the heroism of the burghers of Alkmaar and Leyden who
foiled the arrogant Spanish invaders and preserved their
independence by the heroic measure of opening the dykes
and flooding the country. But this final analogy was hardly
necessary to make men's minds revert to the days of the
Duke of Alva and the "Spanish Terror."

Charles-Louis Kogge, the aged sluice-master, afterwards
created Knight of the Order of Leopold as reward for his
service rendered at this time. Captains Thys and Ulmo of
the engineers, and about twelve others toiled several nights
in succession under cover of the darkness, often between
the lines, raising and lowering the gates according as the
tide rose or fell, closing the outlets from the area to be
flooded, and executing the other necessary preparatory
measures. Their efforts seem to have escaped the atten-
tion or suspicion of a vigilant enemy.

The Germans gave no heed to a slight, but ominous,
rise of water in their trenches on the 27th. Later, the
realization of what was going on intensified the fury of
their attacks and fortified the determination of their com-
mander to forestall the impending obstruction. They
drove the French from Lombaertzyde on the 28th.

During the night of the 29th-30th in a violent storm of
wind and rain, the Germans drove the Allies from a section
of the railway embankment and captured Ramscappelle on
the southwest side of it. This brought the conflict to its^

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 249

climax and final stage. The Germans had penetrated the
last barrier. Nieuport and Dixmude might at any moment
become untenable. The Belgians might be dispersed or
swept into the sea. Their fate, now tottering on the brink
of calamity, involved immediate peril for the whole left
wing of the Allies, since the destruction of the Belgian
army would open the way for the envelopment of the
Anglo-French positions. Motor-vehicles of every sort
lined the highways of France for miles speeding northward
with thousands of reserves. The incessant reverberation
of the British naval guns and the German heavy artillery
replying from the shore shook the coast of Belgium and
was even heard in Holland. But the real decision was at
hand in the furious contest for the possession of Ramscap-
pelle with the advance of the flood as the dominating
factor. It was a race of time and tide against the pro-
gressive effect of superiority in forces. The waters were
rising behind the Germans, converting an area from two to
three miles wide and nearly ten miles long into a shallow
lagoon.

By the morning of the 31st the cannonading of the
Allies made Ramscappelle untenable and the Germans ad-
vanced to the west of it. Then the French and Belgians
charged them with impetuous violence, convinced that the
fateful moment had arrived. The Germans wavered before
the furious onslaught and were forced back. By nine
o'clock they lost Ramscappelle after a desperate engage-
ment in the streets. An hour later the Allies were over
the railway embankment. One more service was demanded
of the overworked Belgian "seventy-fives." They were
mounted on the embankment to riddle the Germans now
floundering in the slimy pool. The water was only three
or four feet deep, but this was enough to make opera-
tions practically impossible. Many of the Germans were

250 The Great War

drowned in the canals, the course of which had been
hidden by the inundation.

On November 2d the Germans withdrew hastily beyond
the Yser, abandoning wounded, cannon, and stores of mu-
nitions. Eventually they succeeded in capturing Dixmude,
as will be related, but it was too late for them to derive
any distinct advantage from its possession, since they were
unable to debouch from it towards the west.

It must not be forgotten that operations in the plain of
the Lys and around Ypres not only accompanied, but pre-
ceded, those on the Yser. Convenience and clearness
require that the two series should be treated separately,
although their intimate relationship makes the division an
arbitrary one. Precedence has been given to the treat-
ment of events in the northern section because the action
on the Yser had almost ceased several days before the
struggle around Ypres reached its final climax.

The operations between La Bassee and the Yser, to the
beginnings of which allusion has already been made in
Chapter IX, grew steadily to the intensity of a great battle,
while the balance shifted from side to side following the
alternate accessions of strength to the opposite forces. The
thoughtful observer must be impressed by the nervous
delicacy of the general equilibrium maintained throughout
this period by the rigid application of all the elements of
strength as rapidly as they became available, the utmost
tension of every resource, and the feverish employment of
every moment of time. The slightest acceleration or delay
in the arrival of the successive masses of troops on either
side might have altered profoundly the relationship of the
essential factors and destroyed the general balance of the
contending forces.

As late as October 11th definite lines of demarcation
between the combatants had not been drawn beyond

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 251

La Bassee. But the Second British Corps already encoun-
tered serious opposition in its advance towards Lille in the
region between La Bassee and the Lys after its detrain-
ment at Bethune on that day.

The Third British Army Corps and British Cavalry
Corps cooperating with the Eighty-seventh and Eighty-
ninth French Territorial Divisions and French cavalry
further north encountered only sHght resistance. As we
have observed, they dispersed the German detachments
and occupied Ypres on the 13th, and were joined the
next day by the Seventh British Army Division and Third
British Cavalry Division, which had marched from Ghent
and Bruges via Roulers. The turning of the tide in this
section scarcely set in before the 19th. An Allied army
of normal size might have turned the German flank
without difficulty and thrust itself forward like a wedge
between the German bases in Belgium and the armies
in northern France. The inability of Great Britain to
throw an additional army into a field of operations not
eighty miles from the British coast at this exceedingly
opportune occasion remains a most striking illustration of
the country's lack of preparedness. On the other hand,
an acceleration of four or five days in the arrival of the
main German forces must have produced alarming results
for the Allies.

After the capture of Lille, German forces pushed north-
westward, from French on to Belgian soil, as rapidly as
possible, while the German army released by the fall of
Antwerp was pursuing the Belgian field-army southwest-
ward along the coast. By the 19th the Twenty-sixth and
Twenty-seventh German Reserve Corps were pushing
westward from Courtrai. These, with the Twenty-second
and Twenty-third Reserve Corps a little further north,
filled the gap in the German front between the forces

252 The Great War

which had followed the Belgian army from Antwerp and
those which were moving northward from France.

The formation of this combination, and the consequent
German offensive, inaugurated the Battle of Ypres in the
more restricted sense. It shifted the balance at once to
the side of the Germans. The First British Corps, which
reached the front on the 21st, was unable to make head-
way against the German attacks. The curving form of
the front on the western sections in France complicated
the movement of the Allied forces from the line east of the
Oise to the new field of action. But French reinforce-
ments were nevertheless hurrying northward. The arrival
of the Forty-second French Division at Nieuport on the
23d has already been mentioned. The Ninth French
Corps came into line east of Ypres on the 24th. The
initial vehemence of the German offensive spent itself
without accomplishing significant results and a period of
diminished tension followed from the 24th to the 28th.

Then General von Fabeck's army detachment, contain-
ing many first line troops from other sections of the front,
came as support for the wearied reserve corps. The Ger-
mans resumed their attacks with far greater vigor around
Ypres, as along the Yser, on the 28th. The contest raged
with increasing intensity and the German offensive made
noteworthy progress. But a stream of reinforcements was
also augmenting the strength of the Allies.

The first Indian contingent of the British forces, con-
sisting of two divisions, commanded by Lieutenant-general
Sir James Willcocks reached France in September. They
were greeted with indescribable enthusiasm upon arrival
at Marseilles. As the first occasion that an Indian expedi-
tionary force had set foot in Europe, this was an event of
incalculable potential importance, at the same time an im-
pressive demonstration of the loyalty of Britain's imperial

Indian troops watering mules at canvas trtmghs.

Indian troops ot tlie British forces in Krancc.

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 253

possession and another token of the reality and unbounded
significance of the Franco-British alliance.

The Indian troops made a long sojourn at Orleans, since a
month was required for their acclimatization and the neces-
sary adaptation of their equipment. Finally, the Lahore
Division reached its concentration area behind the British
Second Corps on October 19th and 20th and the Meerut
Division arrived in the same vicinity shortly afterv^-ards.
The Sixteenth French Corps took its place in the battle-
line south of Ypres on the 31st. The German attacks
waned again about November 3d and there was another
period of comparative calm while the Germans efi^ected a
new adjustment of forces for the final effort. The renewed
offensive reached its climax on the 11th in the sensational
charge of the Prussian Guards, followed quickly by its
collapse and failure.

Thus the action as a whole was marked by three distinct
points of culminating intensity occurring on October 23d
and 31st and on November 11th, respectively.

It is now important to return for a more detailed exami-
nation of the operations. About October 17th the Second
British Corps supported by Conneau's French cavalry corps
extended from Givenchy northeastward to Radinghem.
The front of the Third, passing east of Armentieres and
terminating at the Bois de Ploegsteert near Le Gheir, was
broken by the course of the Lys at Frelinghien. The
British Cavalry Corps, now dismounted, stretched from
the Bois de Ploegsteert to Zandvoorde. The Seventh
British Army Division, soon to bear the brunt of the
German assaults, extended from Zandvoorde to Zonne-
beke. From there, the British Third Cavalry Division,
four French cavalry divisions under General de Mitry and
the two French Territorial divisions carried the front
northward as far as the right wing of the Belgian army.

254 The Great War

From the region of Arras to the plain on the north side
of the Lys the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria con-
fronted the Tenth French Army under General Maud'huy
and the British. The Fourteenth German Corps, a divi-
sion of the Seventh, a brigade of the Third, seven Jaeger
battalions, and four cavalry divisions faced the Second
British Corps with its cavalry supports, while the Nine-
teenth Corps, a division of the Seventh, and three or four
cavalry divisions faced the Third British Corps.

The Second British Corps advanced in the teeth of stub-
born resistance, fighting its way from house to house in the
villages along the ridge northeast of La Bassee.

The Third British Corps under Lieutenant-general
Pulteney captured Capinghem, lying between two of the
isolated forts of Lille, less than three miles from the city.

But the Allies met with a determined counter-offensive
on the 19th, which arrested their progress. The Second
British Corps suffered a serious reverse on the 20th east of
Neuve Chapelle. Fierce encounters continued during the
21st and 22d and the British were driven from most of
their positions on the ridge between the La Bassee-Lille
Canal and the plain of the Lys.

North of the Lys the Allies expected to continue with-
out interruption the forward movement which had brought
them into possession of Ypres. Their immediate purpose
was to occupy the main line of communication between
Lille and Ostend. With this in view, the Seventh British
Division advanced in the direction of Menin on the Lys,
but suffered a repulse. Meanwhile, on the 18th, De Mitry's
cavalry took Roulers, situated on the railway and highway
connecting Lille with Ostend and Bruges at the point
where they cross an important route leading to Dixmude.

The Germans began their counter-offensive in this
region also on the 19th, concurrently with attacks on the

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 255

Yser in the neighborhood of Nieuport, and drove the
French from Roulers and from the vicinity of the Lille-
Ostend railway. This opened the road to Dixmude, where
the first serious attacks were made by the Germans on the
21st. The presence of the four new German Reserve
corps, to which reference has already been made, seems to
have been a surprise to the Allies. Far from recognizing
the strength of the German forces, Sir John French in-
tended that the First Corps upon its arrival should push
northeastward by way of Roulers to Bruges and thus cut
off the German forces which had been following the Bel-
gian army along the coast.

The position of the Allies in front of Ypres took the
form of a triangle, with the general line of the Yser- Ypres
and Ypres-Comines Canals as base and the apex at West-
roosebeke pointed towards Roulers. On the 20th the
Germans struck this apex and shattered the triangle as
far down as Passchendaele and Poelcappelle. The British
First Corps, which was passing through Ypres on the
same day, was ordered to recapture these two localities.
A violent encounter with the Twenty-sixth German Re-
serve Corps ensued on the 21st. The British repulsed
the German attacks, but halted on the line Zonnebeke-
Bixschoote in consequence of the retirement of the French
on the left, whose position made them more sensitive to
the fierce attacks which were being delivered by the Ger-
mans at this time on the line of the Yser.

The French cavalry abandoned their attempt to occupy
the Houthulst Forest east of the Yser- Ypres Canal, an
especially advantageous position for the Germans, be-
cause it covered the highway from Roulers to Dixmude
and afforded convenient concealment for the emplace-
ment of heavy artillery and for the concentration of their
forces.

256 The Great War

On the same day the Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps
attacked the Seventh British Division between Zonnebeke
and Zandvoorde with great violence, but without effect,
and further south the Nineteenth German Corps took
Le Gheir. This was a crucial point because it lay in the
line of advance to a region of wooded eminences south-
west of Ypres terminating towards the west in the Mont-
des-Cats, which commanded the plain north and south.
The occupation of these hills by the Germans would have
severed the British front, threatened the forces around
Ypres in the rear, and probably compelled the Allies to
abandon all their positions between La Bassee and the
North Sea. Naturally, throughout the entire course of
the operations in this quarter, the Germans never lost sight
of this objective. But the British retook Le Gheir the
same day by bringing troops from across the Lys.

On the 21st and 22d the Third British Cavalry Division
was shifted to the section of the front between Hollebeke
and Zandvoorde, permitting the Cavalry Corps to restrict
to this extent the inordinate extent of its front.

The British Cavalry Corps, commanded by General
Allenby, was the principal guardian of the approaches to
these supremely important heights, because it held the
front from Le Gheir to the Ypres-Comines Canal, and
fortunately for the Allies the soldiers of this corps dis-
played no less energy and skill on foot than when mounted.
Scarcely 4,000 in number, stretched out to a perilous degree
of attenuation across a space of more than six miles, they
offered day after day a determined resistance to the attacks
of very much superior forces. On the 22d they received
the sorely-needed reinforcement of nearly a brigade of the
Lahore Division of the Indian contingent.

On the same day the German attacks against the now
semicircular projection in the Allied lines before Ypres

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 257

increased in violence. The Germans had brouglit their
heavy howitzers within range and opened a destructive
fire on the British positions. In the evening they forced a
breach in the line of the First Corps near Langemarck,
but a brigade held in reserve filled the gap before morning.
In this period of their offensive the German attacks reached
their greatest intensity on the 23d. In many places the
British were blown out of their trenches or buried alive in
them by the explosion of powerful shells. The Seventh
Division, covering the unusual space of eight miles, was in a
very critical situation. Depleted in number by the losses
already sustained in the desperate contest, it had no longer
a single man in reserve to support the firing line, which
threatened to give way at any moment. For seven days
the men had been almost incessantly engaged and the
strain had become unendurable. Reinforcements from the
First Corps reached them just in time to prevent a disaster.

The Germans charged repeatedly in dense masses on
the 23d, singing Die Wacht am Rhein. They rushed for-
ward each time as if to submerge the British lines com-
pletely, only to recoil, broken and torn, before the fire of
rifles and machine-guns operated with deadly accuracy at
close range. Unbelievable courage, — courage that advances
in the face of machine-guns or endures unflinchingly the
risk of sudden dismemberment in a shower of high-explo-
sive shells, — has become a commonplace phenomenon in
the Great War, while the most astonishing feats of daring
have lost much of their effect by frequent repetition.

From the very first days of the campaign the imagina-
tion of the world has been made to shudder at the practice
of the German commanders in urgent situations of hurling
their forces at the enemy in repeated, headlong attacks, in
compact masses, regardless of the dreadful effect of the
fire from the opposing intrenchments, and this method

258 The Great War

has been characterized as reckless prodigality, as proof of
ruthless indifference for the lives of the common soldiers.
But to assume that actions of such fundamental importance
were not guided by an earnest consideration of all the cir-
cumstances is to misinterpret the whole spirit of German
conduct. This method of attack was undoubtedly the
consequence of a thoughtful computation of probable
advantage and loss.

Only the thorough discipline and organization of the
German army made it possible to carry out attacks in
very close formation in spite of the appallingly rapid de-
pletion of the ranks under concentrated fire, and German
tacticians were undoubtedly convinced that the swifter
attainment of the object of the attack would compensate
for the terrible exposure and make the total wastage less.
Their theory had a reasonable basis. For such attacks can
be launched much more quickly, since deployment from
the marching column to a narrow, compact battle-forma-
tion requires far less time than the transition to a far-flung
line in open order, and blows delivered in dense masses,
having more weight, would presumably lead to a more
rapid decision.

Nevertheless, these fearful operations were frequently
unsuccessful, the heavy losses having been incurred in
vain. The Germans, however, assert that their ene-
mies likewise squandered the lives of their own men in
precisely this fruitless fashion. Each side, it would seem,
strives to impute to the other the reproach of inadaptability
to changed conditions, a peculiarly ignominious defect in
the eyes of the present age.

The British field-artillery was operated on the 23d with
feverish energy. A single battery consumed 800 rounds
of ammunition. The German howitzers exacted heavy toll
from the British trenches. But the German losses were

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 259

undoubtedly severe, and the exhaustion of the new reserve
corps after these days of terrible strain must have been
very great.

The reserve corps which attacked the British positions
were composed of the Landwehr, Ersatz Reserve, and
volunteers, with probably a small nucleus of troops of the
first line. The prisoners taken were either below the
regular military age or else belonged to the older classes,
often men thirty-nine or forty years of age, fathers of
families. This circumstance strengthened the groundless
opinion that Germany was already approaching the limit
of her available recruits. These troops were all newly and
faultlessly equipped. But one is apt to suspect that in-
stinctive contempt for the British had again led the Ger-
mans to commit a fatal error by sending comparatively
raw formations against professional soldiers. Although it
is clear in this terrible ordeal that the British excelled their
opponents in endurance, the Germans waited until the last
to bring up their most stalwart contingents. They counted,
no doubt, on wearing down the fortitude of the British by
repeated attacks in relays, and the recent formations would
serve as well as the well-seasoned troops of the first line
for the early stages of such a process.

The 23d, as we have seen, was a turning point in the
struggle in Flanders. On that day the Forty-second French
Division reached the Belgian front at Nieuport, and in
the course of the following night a division of the Ninth
French Corps took over a section of the trenches held by
the First British Corps northeast of Ypres.

But the situation was constantly becoming more difficult
for the British. The Second Corps had been almost
pierced at the center, the Third had been dangerously
pressed back, and the exhaustion of the Seventh Division
was hourly increasing.

260 The Great War

On the 25th the Indian contingent relieved the greater
part of the Second Corps, the Lahore Division taking over
the section of the front which included Neuve Chapelle.
Two days later Sir John French made a readjustment of
the dispositions further north. He suppressed the Fourth
Corps, merging the Seventh Army Division and the Third
Cavalry Division with the First Army Corps under the
command of Lieutenant-general Sir Douglas Haig, and
sending Lieutenant-general Sir Henry Rawlinson back to
England to supervise the mobilization of the Eighth Divi-
sion. In consequence of the arrival of the Ninth French
Corps, and of the changes in the disposition of the British
forces, the front of the Seventh Division was now reduced
to the space between Zandvoorde and the road from Ypres
to Menin, with the First and Second Divisions in successive
alignment with it towards the north as far as Zonnebeke.

The British were now ranged along a front. about thirty
miles in length, with the Indians and a part of the Second
Corps in the south, followed in order by the Third Corps,
the Cavalry Corps, and the First Corps, including its recent
accessions, as far as Zonnebeke. This arrangement did not
undergo any fundamental change for many months.

The first encounter between Indian and European troops
took place on the 28th. The result of this event was
watched with the keenest interest. For, although the
Indians were fearless in their native warfare, the absolutely
strange conditions of the European struggle, the hours of
anxious waiting in the trenches, the deadly showers of
shrapnel and shells of terribly destructive force, might have
bewildered and unnerved them. After a series of furious
attacks the Germans had taken Neuve Chapelle on the
evening of the 27th. To relieve a very threatening situa-
tion it was necessary for the British to retake this position
at once, and the 7th brigade and about an equal number of

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 261

Indians were assigned to the undertaking. Together they
stormed the village under heavy cannonading and expelled
the Germans at the point of the bayonet; the Indian soldiers
acquitted themselves with gallantry and distinction.

On the 29th, Mineiiwerfer, or trench mortars, were first
employed by the Germans in the plain of the Lys. These
inconspicuous, but formidable, engines, placed at the bot-
tom of pits, hurled bombs with a bursting charge of 150 to
200 pounds at a high angle and close range into the enemy's
trenches. The system of trench-fighting now commonly
employed in the western theater had created an unprece-
dented situation and new problems. The regular types of
artillery were unserviceable for contests at close range be-
tween the troops in the foremost opposing trenches, and
with the lines drawn so close, sometimes approaching to
within fifty feet, the shelling of the most advanced posi-
tions on either side by the artillery of the other, placed at
a suitable distance, would have been destructive to friend
and foe alike. Now for the first time a weapon had been
devised with special reference to these revolutionized
conditions.

The Seventh Division repelled a spirited attack by troops
of the German Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps at the ex-
tremity of a salient in the British front near Kruiseik on
the 27th. In the evening Prince Maurice of Battenberg,
youngest son of Princess Henry of Battenberg and brother
of the Queen of Spain, was mortally wounded during a
surprise attack by the Germans. He was lieutenant in the
King's Royal Rifle Corps and only twenty-three years
of age.

At this stage of the battle General von Fabeck's army
detachment came into action east of Ypres. The actual
composition of this body remains somewhat doubtful.
According to The French Official Review of the First Six

262 The Great War

Months of the War it consisted of the Fifteenth Corps,
two Bavarian Corps, and three (unspecified) divisions.
There is other evidence for the presence of at least parts
of the Thirteenth Army Corps, of an Eighteenth Corps
(probably the Reserve), and of the Twenty-fourth Reserve
Corps. The French troops transferred to the region of
Ypres noticed that some of the Germans taken prisoners
at this time belonged to the regiments from which they
had already taken prisoners in Alsace during August and
near Reims in September. These must have belonged to
the Fifteenth Corps.

The supreme importance ascribed to the contest around
Ypres in the last days of October is shown by the presence
near the battlefield, not only of Generals Foch and JofTre,
but of President Poincare and the Kaiser.

It was announced on the 25th that the Prussian Minister
of War, General von Falkenhayn, had assumed the duties
of the Chief of Staff in consequence of the illness of Gen-
eral von Moltke. Later it appeared that the latter's illness
was the same conventional kind of indisposition which had
probably afflicted General von Hansen, when he was super-
seded in the command of the Third Army by General
von Einem soon after the Battle of the Marne. Von
Moltke quietly disappeared and General von Falkenhayn
received definite appointment in December to the post of
which he was already exercising the functions. It was
rumored that the retirement of von Moltke was due to
fundamental differences of opinion as to the proper aim for
the German offensive, the former Chief of Staff insisting
against the view of the Kaiser that the main strategic objec-
tive should be the crushing of the French lines at Verdun.

The Kaiser came to Thielt and Courtrai in Belgium and
every moral incentive was employed to inflame the ardor
of the German troops. Consistently with the supposed

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 263

change in the object of the campaign, the instinctive
Anglophobia, a baffling compound of envy, suspicion, and
disappointment, flamed forth with increased violence at
this time in Germany. Many observers noticed the com-
parative absence of aversion to France as contrasted with
the intense bitterness displayed against England. France
was regarded with a feeling of compassion, or of respect
for her chivalrous, though misguided, devotion to an ideal.
But Great Britain was looked upon as the invidious, malig-
nant antagonist, who, unable to meet her principal commer-
cial rival in honorable competition, had secretly organized
the war for the purpose of ruining Germany, treacher-
ously concealing her own nefarious conduct until the
decisive moment had been reached. The British Empire
stretched its unwieldy mass and impudent pretensions
across the path of Germany's legitimate aspirations on
every side. The irritating assurance with which the British
continued the normal course of their affairs, *'doincr busi-
ness as usual," — "during alterations in the map of Europe,"
as Mr. Asquith added,— while Germany's trade was pro-
foundly disturbed and her splendid merchant marine was
rusting in the docks, exasperated the Germans. But they
were filled with contempt at the spectacle of a government
advertising for recruits, stooping to coax and conciliate the
different classes of its own people, and dependent upon
the favor of the labor unions for the maintenance of pro-
duction in the most vital branches of industry; and at the
prospect of an empire which claimed authority over more
than a fifth of the earth's surface and nearly a fourth of its
inhabitants pretending to oppose the Fatherland's organ-
ized might with a smaller force than was deemed suitable
for Belgium, and trusting in an assumed superiority of indi-
vidual resourcefulness to "muddle through" the supreme
trial of strength and efficiency.

264 The Great War

All influences conspired to fill the German soldiers v/ith
a fury of resentment, and to impress upon them the con-
viction that, for the present, one issue alone was paramount
and that England was the **one and only foe."

The spirit in which the Germans threw themselves upon
the British trenches may be conceived from the following
order of the day by the Crown Prince of Bavaria to his
soldiers, made public on October 28th.

"Soldiers of the Sixth Army! We have now the good
luck to have also the English opposite us on our front,
troops of that race whose envy was at work for years to
surround us with a ring of foes and to throttle us. That
race we have to thank especially for this war. Therefore,
when now the order is given to attack this foe, practise
retribution for their hostile treachery and for the many
heavy sacrifices. Show them that the Germans are not
so easily to be wiped out of history. Prove it to them
with German blows of a special kind. Here is the oppo-
nent who chiefly blocks a restoration of peace. Up and
at him!"

Another communication, emanating from the same
source on November 11th, revealed a similar sentiment
in the following expressions:

"Soldiers! The eyes of the whole world are upon you.
It is now imperative that in the battle with our most hated
foe we shall not grow numb, and that we shall at last break
his arrogance. Already he is growing pliable. Numerous
officers and men have surrendered voluntarily, but the
great decisive blow is still to be struck. Therefore you
must persevere to the end. The enemy must be downed;
you must not let him loose from your teeth. We must,
will, and shall conquer."

At the same time copies of Ernst Lissauer's famous
Hymn of Hate against England, which first appeared on

FIELD MARSHAL
SIR JOHN DENTON PINKSTONE FRENCH

Commander of the British expeditionary forces.

From the painting by "John St. Helier Lander.

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 265

September 1st, were distributed as an order of the day
among the soldiers of the Sixth Army.

On the 30th, the day on which the Germans took
Ramscappelle in the north, the British trenches were sub-
jected to a bombardment fiercer than any thus far expe-
rienced. In places the lines were temporarily broken, and
along the Ypres-Comines Canal the Germans advanced to
within three miles of Ypres, which was being shelled.
The fighting on the 30th and 31st was favorable to the
French from Zonnebeke to the Ypres-Yser Canal, but the
struggle in which the British were engaged reached a crisis
on the 31st in which the safety of all the Allied forces
was involved. The Germans directed a tremendous effort
against the entire British front. Terrible cannonading pre-
ceded each attack of the infantry. General von Deimling
directed the assault on Gheluvelt, which was quickly re-
duced to a mass of bloodstained ruins. Several British
regiments were practically annihilated in the trenches in
this section. The bombardment of Ypres had now com-
menced in earnest and the terrified inhabitants were fleeing
westward. The resistance of the First Corps seemed on
the point of collapsing under the formidable pressure of
overwhelming numbers. The troops had been driven from
the trenches and were being steadily forced backward.

Then, by an almost miraculous revulsion of spirit, the
British rallied in the woods behind the lost trenches. Im-
pelled by a spontaneous outburst the 2d Worcestershire
Regiment and the 42d brigade of the Royal Field Artillery
drove the Germans from Gheluvelt at the point of the
bayonet in a sensational charge, and by ten P. M. practically
all the British positions had been regained.

In the meantime, west of the canal, the British Cavalry
Corps, supported by the Indian brigade, four battalions
of the Second Corps, and the London Scottish Territorial

266 The Great War

Battalion, together with the small part of the Third Corps
north of the Lys, were struggling desperately to arrest
the onslaught of two German army corps which had cap-
tured Messines and Wytschaete on the very edge of the
hilly district which was so vitally important.

Thp London Scottish Territorial Battalion, the first com-
plete unit of the British Territorial Army to take its place
in the battle-line by the side of the regulars, intrenched
itself in this quarter on the 31st and repelled several frontal
attacks during the night. Finally, under cover of the
darkness, the Germans got into position on its flanks.
When daybreak showed that a prompt retirement alone
could preserve the battalion from capture or annihila-
tion, it retreated in good order across an area devoid of
any cover, swept by the galling cross-fire of German
machine-guns.

At this critical moment a part of the Sixteenth French
Corps arrived and relieved the pressure on the British
Cavalry Corps.

But, in general, the German offensive continued on
November 1st and 2d with unabated fury. The British
were again forced to evacuate Gheluvelt. Their lines
were pressed back towards Ypres, which was riddled with
shells. However, when the lull came on the 3d, they had
lost no vital position. A portion of the First Corps was
now relieved by eleven battalions of the Second, and the
Seventh Division, which had exhibited such conspicuous
proof of indefatigable courage, received a well-merited
respite for a few days. From the 4,000 men in the 21st
brigade of this division, who had landed at Zeebrugge
about a month before, there remained only 750 effectives,
while the officers had been reduced from 120 to 8. The
22d brigade could muster only four officers and 700 pri-
vates, and the second battalion of Royal Scots Fusiliers had

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 267

been reduced in the same time from 1,000 to 70. These
examples will typify the appalling losses suffered by the
troops which bore the brunt of the terrific German attacks.

A momentary recrudescence of German activity on the
Yser was probably timed with reference to the final blow
which was being prepared against Ypres. A bombard-
ment of Dixmude, commencing at two A. M. on November
10th, more terrific than any yet experienced at that point,
served as prelude for an infantry attack of overwhelming
force. No fewer than 40,000 Germans rushed upon the
Belgian brigade and the French marines about eleven in
the morning, drove them from three successive lines of
trenches back into the ruined town, where a hand-to-hand
encounter in the streets terminated with the expulsion of
the Allies. By five in the afternoon Admiral Ronarc'h
had withdrawn all his forces to the west side of the river.

The prestige gained by the capture of a place so stub-
bornly contested palliated the subsequent failure of the
German offensive before Ypres. But the possession of
Dixmude afforded very little actual advantage to the Ger-
mans, since they were not able to debouch from it towards
the west.

The Germans prepared for their final blow in the direc-
tion of Ypres by transferring two divisions of the Guards
from the front near Arras to the neighborhood of Gheluvelt.
These picked troops were chosen for the most difficult
operations. It will be recalled that they were engaged in
the fierce combats in the streets of Charleroi at the com-
mencement of the German dash for Paris, that they were
roughly handled in the brilliant counter-offensive of the
French between the Oise and the Somme on August 29th,
and, finally, that they bore the brunt of the furious attempt
to drive a wedge through the French center in the Battle
of the Marne and were decimated while stubbornly resisting

268 The Great War

in the marshes of St. Gond when the tide turned on Sep-
tember 9th. It was reported that they were reviewed by
the Kaiser and received his personal exhortation before
marching to deal the finishing blow at the British.

At daybreak on the 11th the German batteries near
Gheluvelt raked the British positions with a hurricane of
shrapnel and high-explosive shells. Suddenly, fifteen bat-
talions of the Prussian Guard emerged from a curtain of
fog, rushing forward with imposing momentum. Sheets
of rifle and machine-gun fire flashing from the British
trenches mowed down their foremost rows. Shrapnel and
shell tore bloody gaps in the surging mass. But the effect
was lost in the rapidity and wild enthusiasm of the charge.
They closed ranks, pressed on with irresistible vehemence,
and swept over the British trenches in three places, pene-
trating for some distance into a belt of woods that lay
between the British lines and Ypres. But, as is usually
the case when one side breaks through the front of the
other, they were assailed on three sides and enfiladed by
machine-guns. The vehemence of the general attack was
lost in a welter of small groups struggling desperately at
close quarters in the forest.

Gradually the British rallied, stood their ground, and
recovered most of their lost trenches. The last great effort
of the Germans failed and the Battle of Ypres could be
regarded as finished.

War's savage lust for destruction had nowhere raged
with more remorseless fury than in this devoted tract of
Flanders. The peaceful region of Ypres, smiling with
comfort and contentment had become an inferno of
slaughter and ruin. The seductive charm and picturesque-
ness of this old-world city had been rudely defiled. Its
venerable relics of the life and art of an age long past
had been destroyed, an irretrievable loss to humanity.

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 269

Prominent among them was the imposing Cloth Hall.
Its stately facade, composed of splendid rows of arcades,
wherein strength and elegance, dignity and beauty, were
intimately linked, was surmounted by a majestic belfry
of noble, commanding proportions. This sumptuous old
building, the pride and glory of Ypres, was shattered by
projectiles, devastated by fire, and reduced to a melancholy,
empty shell.

Throughout the fighting zone the villages had been
burned, the soil had been mauled and lacerated by repeated
showers of explosive shells, and the forests had been shorn
and scarred.

Dixmude had probably suff^ered a more intense bom-
bardment than any other town. Every house had been
perforated, every street had been torn and pitted with
shells. The plain from Dixmude to the sea, once densely
populated, cheerful, and prosperous had become a dreary
spectacle of water-logged desolation. The toil of many
centuries had been obliterated in a smaller number of days.

The movement of the campaign from the Marne to
Flanders had brought the battle-lines almost 150 miles
nearer London, and the greater proximity of the struggle
had undoubtedly afi^ected the attitude of the British people.
In August and September they had regarded the war as
an event of absorbing interest, but yet with a certain feel-
ing of detachment. Now it had gained the position of a
fundamental fact of the national life.

To those, however, who regarded the future with im-
patient solicitude, the British democracy was exasperatingly
slow to realize the imminence of peril and to bestir itself
to a degree commensurate with the emergency. Like the
passengers on a steamship, whom the thin plate of steel
alone separates from eternity, the people of England pur-
sued the uninterrupted tenor of their callings and pastimes,

270 The Great War

relying with stolid confidence on the protection of the
narrow Channel.

To the Germans such insensibility was unmistakable
evidence of the fatal torpor into which the British nation
was sinking. But the perception of both contestants was
probably obscured by the hazy medium of prejudice and
preconception created by the sharp contrast of their tradi-
tions and mental habits.

The inhuman character of warfare is partially obscured
in the Battle of the Marne by the brilliant generalship,
rapidity of movement, and palpable results; but in the
sanguinary struggles in Flanders, it reveals itself to our
imagination in all its undisguised reality of loathsome
cruelty, wallowing in apparently useless carnage, unre-
lieved by the dash of spirited maneuvers or the glory of
definite achievements. The contest raged incessantly for
nearly a month, with alternate assaults and counter-charges
carried out at appalling sacrifices. But in spite of the
** satisfactory progress" persistently heralded on both sides,
the lines remained at the close practically where they had
been at the beginning. With such an outcome, each party
disclaimed the offensive. For the offensive would imply a
purpose which failed, and failure carries with it the dis-
credit of defeat. But in its larger aspect the conflict may
unquestionably be regarded as the stemming of the fierce
German tide in Flanders. Dashing repeatedly, but in vain,
against the dogged resistance of the Allies, the Germans
were frustrated in their final great endeavor to retrieve the
disappointment on the Marne and consummate the cam-
paign as originally planned.

The fact that the British bore the chief brunt of the
onslaught suggests a reflection of very general significance.

The two peoples who now stood forth as the most con-
spicuous antagonists had sprung from a common stock

The Stemming of the Tide in Flanders 271

But the course of their development had diverged very
sharply from the time that the forefathers of the English left
the ancestral home by the Elbe and the Weser.

Protected by their insular position from foreign inter-
ference, the development of the English people was a
consistent evolution from the free customs of the ancient
German wilderness. The greatest political experiment in
history was here worked out and England conferred upon
humanity the inestimable gift of representative institutions,
her parliament becoming the mother of parliaments. The
passionate instinct for personal liberty, here unsuppressed,
devised the constitutional guarantees and safeguards which
have become a model and an emblem wherever freedom
is held in repute.

But the development of the Germans who remained in
the homeland, denied the privilege of immunity from
interference, was dominated by intercourse with other
peoples, by the vicissitudes of subjugation and conc^uest,
by political disunion, and by the introduction of doctrines
of Roman law, creating an atmosphere in which the old-
time freedom could not survive.

Elements of freedom and authority are inevitably present
in every normal community, but to every independent
people comes a time for determining which principle is to
be paramount. England's choice was made when her king
laid his consecrated head upon the block. Germany came
to the same parting of the ways two centuries later. She
rejected the liberal doctrines of the hour, fortified her
organization, and exalted the power and authority of the
state.

Without pressing the contrast too far we may say that
in England the rights of the individual, in Germany the
prerogatives of the collective authority, are the fundamental
elements of political feeling and doctrines. And thus,

272 The Great War

without intending it, Great Britain and Germany appeared
as the respective champions for two principles of supreme
significance; the first for liberty, a noble, uplifting ideal,
but unfortunately often powerless to deal with injustice,
inefficiency, and wastefulness; the second for intelligent
authority, guiding and correlating the various activities of
men for the common good, but disfigured often by arro-
gance, intolerance, and inflexibility. An ultimate victory
for either power would not create a universal empire, but
a triumph for Germany would inevitably win the world
for compulsory efficiency.

The invasion of America would follow ; not the physical
invasion which battleships and coast defenses might possi-
bly repel; but the subtle, imponderable, furtive invasion
of ideas and methods, which eludes the vigilance of the
strictest guard, and which conquers by the very means
which are devised to combat it.

CHAPTER XI

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia

Poland and the war. General situation in the eastern theater about Octo-
ber 1st. Operations on the East Prussian frontier. Von Hindenburg and
the Teutonic general offensive. The culmination of this great move-
ment : the failure to take Warsaw, the conflict before Ivangorod, and
retreat of the Austro-German armies. The fluctuating course of the strug-
gle in Galicia ; Peremysl relieved and reinvested. The German retreat in
Poland, lightning change of front, and counter-offensive in November.
The combats around Lodz. The increasing deadlock. Operations in
Serbia. Failure of the first Austrian invasion ; Battle of the Jadar, Septem-
ber 15-20. The renewed invasion in November and the occupation and
loss of Belgrade and severe defeat of the Austrians in December. Atroci-
ties in the Austro-Serbian hostilities. Reflections on the results of the
Eastern operations.

We turn from the West at the cuhninating point of the
Kaiser's persistent effort to blast a way to the Channel
ports, postponing for the moment consideration of the
slowly diminishing current of events that followed, and
complete our picture of the crucial weeks just passed by
tracing the progress of operations in the eastern theater,
which developed to a climax of magnitude and intensity
that will illuminate the frantic determination to force a
decision in Flanders at any cost. The conflict in the West
had been prolonged with undiminished energy until, in-
stead of dealing with their antagonists in turn, as the Gen-
eral Staff had expected, the Germans were confronted by
formidable forces on both their fronts, and the indispensa-
ble condition for the accomplishment of their original
design had vanished. The second act in the great world-
drama had begun before the actors of the first had evacu-
ated the stage.

273

274 The Great War

In spite of the exposed situation of Poland, only the
margin of the country had been disturbed by the violence
of war during the first two months of the struggle. But
at length the inevitable march of events made this central
region between the principal masses of the contestants the
theater of the most furious encounters. Vast armies crossed
and recrossed the plain of western Poland in every direc-
tion, despoiUng and destroying, and this unhappy country,
the passive victim of her own location, with little heart in
the struggle, was devastated to an extent and a degree of
thoroughness which were absolutely without parallel.

The fundamental strategic importance of Poland, the
value of her resources, and the passionate longing of her
people for the restoration of their unity and rights of
nationality made the favor of the Poles the object of the
most ardent and unwonted courtship by all parties at the
commencement of the contest. Teutonic aviators flew
over the country scattering broadcast an invitation for the
Poles to unite with the German and Austrian armies,
which were coming as their deliverers, for the restoration
of the ancient unity and autonomy of Poland under a
Catholic, German prince. The appointment of a Polish
archbishop at Posen under the Kingdom of Prussia at just
this time was probably not foreign to the German propa-
ganda for the support of the Poles.

On August 15th, the Grand-duke Nicholas, as com-
mander-in-chief of the Russian armies, issued the following
celebrated proclamation:

" Poles! The hour has struck in which the sacred dream
of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment.

"A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was
torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in hope
that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the
Polish nation and for a brotherly reconciliation with Russia.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 275

"The Russian Army now brings you the joyful tidings
of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annihilated
which cut the Polish nation into parts! May that nation
reunite into one body under the scepter of the Russian
Emperor. Under this scepter Poland shall be reborn, free
in faith, in language, in self-government.

"One thing only Russia expects of you: equal consid-
eration for the rights of those nationalities to which history
has linked you.

"With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched,
Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the
sword has not rusted which at Griinwald struck down
the enemy.

"From the shores of the Pacific to the North Sea the
Russian forces are on the march. The dawn of a new life
is breaking for you.

"May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the
sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and resurrection
of nations ! "

The calculating spirit that prompted these effusions must
have been plain to all but the most simple.

But the war had created an especially deplorable situa-
tion for Poland in the fact that at least a million Polish
young men were subject to compulsory military service
under the three belligerent powers among which the
former national territory had been divided and were liable,
therefore, to be dragged into fratricidal slaughter. Mobi-
lization destroyed in a moment of time the chance and the
will for national concerted action.

The Poles were joined with the Austrians in a common
faith, and with the Russians by racial affinity; but with the
Germans they had no moral bond of association. The
Austrian government had treated its Polish subjects mildly
and considerately, allowing them local self-government,

276 The Great War

and Polish universities and schools, and they were gener-
ally contented with the existing situation. The Russian
government had repeatedly broken the promises made to
its Polish subjects. It had persistently withheld local self-
government and repressed their nationality. But Prussia's
relentless policy of crushing the language and traditions of
the Poles and of driving them from their land, although a
conspicuous failure, had made her the object of the most
intense execration.

The concentration of all the Poles under a single gov-
ernment was unquestionably preferable to the existing
partition w^hich paralyzed all combined action, and the
Russian Poles were convinced that the surest way to obtain
this partial success was through a Russian victory. The
economic development in Poland has tended to strengthen
the ties uniting the country with Russia. Allusion has
already been made to the increasing industrial importance
of Poland, which is largely due to her coal supplies and the
natural intelligence of her laboring class. The annual
product of the factories and workshops amounted to about
$500,000,000 in value, and two-thirds of this was absorbed
by the markets of the Russian Empire. The rise of
Socialism, concurrently with the growth of an industrial
proletariat, created purposes which ran athwart the aspira-
tions of nationalism and tended to identify the interests of
the laboring classes in Poland and Russia.

The idea of conciliating Poland had never become en-
tirely extinct in Russia, and although the Poles had regarded
the Panslavistic program with suspicion, the grand-duke's
appeal to the sentiment of racial community and brother-
hood made at this moment of expectancy and exaltation
was received by a large part of the nation with sympathetic
approbation. Noteworthy was the the support of promi-
nent Polish authors, artists, and musicians, among them

Crowds in the streets of Lodz, a city <>f five hundred thousand inhabitants, awaiting the
cntrv ot the (jernian troops.

(Jthcfis 'unsulc tin- ht:ui(Mi:iiicis oT i.ifiui:il x'on Mackenseii at Loii/.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 277

the famous Sienkiewicz, who even exhorted his fellow
Austrian Poles to adopt the cause of Russia.

In view of all these facts it is not surprising that on
August 16th the leaders of the several political parties
assembled at Warsaw responded to the archduke's procla-
mation in the following resolution:

"The representatives of the undersigned political parties,
assembled in Warsaw on the 16th of August, 1914, wel-
come the proclamation issued to the Poles by his Imperial
Highness, the Commander-in-chief of the Russian forces,
as an act of the foremost historical importance, and im-
plicitly believe that upon the termination of the war the
promises uttered in that proclamation will be formally
fulfilled, that the dreams of their fathers and forefathers
will be realized, that Poland's body, torn asunder a century
and a half ago, will once again be made whole, that the
frontiers severing the Polish nation will vanish.

"The blood of Poland's sons, shed in united combat
against the Germans, will serve equally as a sacrifice, offered
upon the altar of her resurrection."
^Signed by)

The Democratic National Party.

The Polish Progressive Party.

The Realist Party.

The Polish Progressive Union.

The loyalty of the people of Russian Poland was an
essential factor in the general situation, at least as long as
the Russian armies maintained themselves on Polish soil.
The Russian government itself was doubtless surprised at
the apparent unanimity of sentiment, and a corresponding
wave of enthusiasm found practical expression at Moscow
and other large Russian cities in contributions for the war-
sufferers in Poland. It is doubtful to what extent the

278 The Great War

Teutonic powers had counted on the active cooperation of
the Russian Poles in a military sense. But they doubtless
expected that the attitude of the population would be a
substantial support for their own operations and a constant
source of embarrassment for those of the Russians; hence
the indifference to their own benevolent professions must
have been a bitter disappointment.

The concentration of the Russian forces was carried out,
as we have seen, on the borders of East Prussia and of
Galicia and in the eastern half of Poland under cover of
the Vistula and of the great fortresses. As none of the
Russian army corps had been stationed west of the Vistula,
the projection of the Polish salient was practically reduced
by about one-half. For Western Poland was only partially
covered by feeble detachments, largely cavalry, and was
therefore exposed to invasion. This situation may have
been regarded as an acknowledgment of weakness, but
events will show that it served the purpose of a snare.

The Russians had launched their attacks against East
Prussia and Galicia concurrently and with startling rapidity.
It was evidently their purpose to clear the positions on the
flanks of Poland before undertaking a decisive invasion of
Germany and Austria. While the incursion into East
Prussia ended in an inglorious failure, the sweeping suc-
cess of the Russian operations in Galicia profoundly dis-
turbed the plans and expectations of the central empires.

But the course of events towards the end of September
tended to modify somewhat this striking disparity in the
fortunes of the campaign in these two opposite regions, as
will be explained.

Von Hindenburg's attempt to prolong his brilliant course
of victories by penetrating eastward into Russia seems to
have terminated in a disappointing failure, as has already
been mentioned. For Rennenkampf s forces, shattered by

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 279

the early disasters, retired behind the Niemen under cover
of the great fortresses, Kovno and Grodno, for recupera-
tion, and later took the field again reinforced and refreshed.
On September 26th the Germans attacked on a broad
front along the Niemen so as to engage the attention of
the Russians while they forced the passage of the river at
a particular point. But after a bitter conflict continuing
four days they were forced to retire to a line running
through Augustof. The effective cooperation of the exten-
sive German forces had probably been hindered or paralyzed
by the swamps and tracts of almost impenetrable forest.
The course of the ensuing operations remains obscure.
The German communications offer us the same paradoxical
succession of victories on a constantly receding front which
marked the early stages of the fighting in August: the total
defeat of the left flank of the Russian army with the loss
of 3,000 prisoners near Augustof on October 1-2, the
repulse of the chief mass of the Russian army against East
Prussia with the loss of 2,700 prisoners near Suwalki on
the 5th, the checking of a Russian column near Lyck
on the 8th, and the discomfiture of a Russian turning
movement in the north by way of Schirvindt with the loss
of 4,000 prisoners on the 11th. At the same time the Ger-
mans announced that the great victory in the vicinity of
Augustof and Suwalki proclaimed by the Russians was
purely fictitious.

It is clear, however, that von Hindenburg abandoned
the siege of the fortress of Osovietz at the crossing of the
Bobr and left the principal field of hostilities east of the
Prussian border in the enemy's possession. The most that
we can concede to the German pretensions is that the
Russian achievements were only Pyrrhic victories. Con-
vinced of the uselessness of pushing the campaign in this
quarter, von Hindenburg moved his front back to the

280 The Great War

eastern line of the Mazurian Lakes and the Angerapp,
where strong intrenchments had been prepared, and with-
drew most of the troops of the first line for the new offen-
sive movement in another quarter, replacing them with
Landwehr and Landsturm contingents.

Meanwhile, the movement of the Russians westward
through Galicia spent its initial force about September 22d.
In fact, the Russian commander was probably removing
some of the troops from the Galician front as the prelude
for a renewal of the offensive in the north.

But at the end of September the eastern theater pre-
sented a singular appearance with the bulk of the Germans
in the extreme northeast, the Austro-Hungarian armies
concentrated in the extreme southwest, with the chief
masses of the Russians grouped before these two, and the
long intervening space but feebly defended on either side.
This was in striking contrast with the situation in the West,
where the contestants, filling all the spaces along the front,
struggled with the utmost vehemence for every available
position of advantage.

Here was a condition of affairs that favored the develop-
ment of the warfare of maneuvers on an imposing scale,
with rapid movement, dashing offensive and sudden coun-
ter-offensive. The general staffs of the central empires
were convinced that a vast offensive movement in the East,
before the termination of decisive operations in the West,
and therefore contrary to the original intention, had be-
come an indispensable measure at this time.

The Russian invasion of Galicia and menace to Cracow
would not alone account for such a radical departure. The
advance of the Russians in Galicia had, temporarily at least,
been arrested. In seeking the more general motives we
may safely assume that the most urgent features of the
situation were the wide dispersion of the Teutonic forces

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 281

and the excessive length of the eastern frontier of the
central empires to be defended in view of the actual and
ever increasing superiority of the Russian forces. There
is reason to believe that with most of Galicia in their hands,
the Russians were preparing to push their offensive in East
Prussia with redoubled energy, and were already redis-
tributing their forces with this purpose in view. In these
conditions it was perilous for the Teutonic armies to await
passively the Russian blow.

Once the great strategic line of the Vistula with all its
crossing points were in their power, the Russians could
utilize their superior forces for a sweeping offensive re-
strained no longer by concern for the safety of either
flank. The Austro-German staffs decided to forestall such
a dangerous emergency once and for all by a sudden offen-
sive from Posen, Silesia and the region of Cracow eastward
across Poland and Galicia to the central course of the
Vistula and the line of the San. In this way a straight line
would be substituted for the awkward concave section of
their front, a formidable natural barrier would be interposed
between themselves and their antagonist, and economy and
compactness in the disposition of their forces for defensive
purposes would be obtained. These were the minimum
advantages which the new project was expected to secure.
There was in addition the possibility of entrapping the
enemy and inflicting upon him a disastrous defeat.

The intervening region of western Poland which it was
necessary to traverse is an undulating plain, interspersed
with forests, where there are few good roads but much
marshy ground in rainy weather. Winter was expected to
create solid tracks for an advance of the Russian hosts
across this region, and the Germans were determined to
deprive their opponents of such an opportunity for the
offensive by securing for themselves the line of the Vistula

282 The Great War

before the ground had become frozen. It was an enter-
prise that involved a serious hazard and demanded the
utmost rapidity of execution, because a period of rainy
weather might at any time entangle the German armies in
an impassable quagmire.

Von Hindenburg left the frontier of East Prussia and
assumed chief command of all the German armies operating
in the East on September 25th. His strategic conceptions
and the views of the German General Staff doubtless con-
trolled the operations of the Austrian armies also during
the period of strenuous efforts which followed. Von Hin-
denburg proceeded to carry out the new offensive with
characteristic energy and unhesitating determination.

The forces of the Teutonic empires, now for the first
time ranged shoulder to shoulder for common action, were
drawn up on a general line that diverged slightly towards
the southeast from the Silesian frontier near Kalisz, passed
near Czenstochowa, Cracow, and Neu Sandez, and finally
coincided with the barrier of the Carpathians. The field
of action of the German forces or group of armies in the
north, possibly composed of as many as twelve army corps
or about 500,000 men, was the region between the lower
Vistula and the Pilica, and that of the mixed group of Ger-
mans and Austrians in the center, which was nearly as large,
was the territory between the Pilica and the upper Vistula,
while the principal Austro-Hungarian armies still operated
within the natural confines of Galicia. The Russians had
probably about 3,000,000 men under arms at this time,
while the Austro-German forces on the eastern frontier
seem to have amounted altogether to about 2,000,000.

The Teutonic offensive developed slightly more rapidly
in the south, where the Russian forces which had pene-
trated the Carpathian passes were compelled to retire from
Hungary. It was probably intended that the Austrians

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 283

should force the passage of the San as soon as possible so
as to assail the forces defending the line of the Vistula in
Poland on the left flank or even in the rear while the
German and the Austro-German forces attacked them on
the front.

This maneuver involved the relief of Peremysl which
was closely invested by the Russians. It is said that the
besieging army consisted of five army corps, but this num-
ber may have included bodies of troops which protected
the attacking operations against interference from the out-
side. This besieging force may be compared in size with
the German army of 125,000 to 150,000 which captured
Antwerp. The Russians completely surrounded and isolated
Peremysl, but the Germans, with their superior artillery,
confined their attacks to a restricted section of the fortified
perimeter of Antwerp, where their sledge-hammer blows
crushed every obstacle.

Threatened in their siege-operations against Peremysl
by the advance of the Austrians, the Russians intensified
their eff^orts to take the fortress by storm. Furious attacks
in the night of October 8-9 failed to accomplish their pur-
pose, and on the 9th the Russians were repelled on the
south front with heavy losses. By this time the approach
of the Austrian army compelled the Russians to relinquish
their positions on the west of Peremysl and communica-
tion was established between the relieving force and the
garrison. Gradually the Russians were forced to withdraw
from the north and south, and finally, on the 11th and 12th,
they were overpowered and driven from the east side as
well. The departure revealed to the Austrians gruesome
evidence of the reckless determination with which the Rus-
sians had pushed their assaults and the deadly efiiciency of
the defenders' weapons. Apparently whole battalions lay
in contorted masses as death had suddenly overwhelmed

284 The Great War

them. Shallow excavations with shovels scattered among
the bodies of the dead showed where the Russians had
been enveloped in a curtain of fire while intrenching them-
selves. Hundreds had sought shelter under cover of a
step-like scarp separating the two planes in which the
glacis of the girdle fortresses of Peremysl had been erected,
only to be mowed down by the lateral fire of hidden
machine-guns disposed in such a way as to sweep this
deceptive zone of safety.

The Russian forces withdrew behind the San and were
concentrated along the right bank of that river and of the
Vistula below their confluence. The German and Austro-
German forces advancing eastward from the border of
Silesia had to march nearly 200 miles across western Poland
and then attack armies of uncertain strength. It was im-
possible for the Germans to determine accurately the rapid-
ity at which the Russian forces were being redistributed
to meet the altered situation. It was to be assumed that
the lack of direct communication by railway between the
Russian front in Galicia and that in Poland would fatally
impede this necessary movement. But in this as in other
situations the Russian commanders showed themselves
capable of shifting immense forces, in spite of primitive
conditions, with a skill which their opponents had not
anticipated.

The German and Austro-German armies advanced with
remarkable expedition. On October 8th the Germans occu-
pied Lodz, the great industrial center of western Poland, a
city which had grown with phenomenal rapidity from
32,600 people in 1860 to 450,604 in 1912, thanks to the
fostering protection of the imperial Russian fiscal policy.
Its textile industry, in which it stands foremost in Poland,
with 650 plants producing goods to the value of about
$75,000,000 annually, was mainly in the hands of Germans

1,^

= 2<

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 285

who, by establishing themselves at Lodz, competed in
the vast market of the Russian Empire without tariff
restrictions.

By the 11th the German army on the left wing had
reached the Bzura, a tributary of the Vistula, the eastern
boundary of Prussia between the second and third Parti-
tions of Poland, less than forty miles west of Warsaw. No
serious opposition had thus far been encountered and about
seven German army corps were now advancing against the
Polish capital and the adjacent section of the Vistula, which
was still inadequately guarded. Further south the mixed
Austro-German forces advanced through Kielce and
Radom and were approaching the section of the Vistula
in which the fortress of Ivangorod is situated.

The struggle before Warsaw began on the 11th. The
city itself passed through days of the most intense anxiety,
of violently fluctuating impressions and emotions, of throb-
bing excitement. For a time its evacuation by the Rus-
sians seemed inevitable. Most of the foreign and Russian
residents departed and the funds of the national bank were
transferred to a place of greater security in the interior
of Russia.

The tragic history of Warsaw still in the making, its
majestic situation commanding the beautiful Vistula, the
vivacious temperament of its inhabitants, and its contrasts
of prodigality and poverty, splendor and squalor, gaiety and
gloom, are well-suited to captivate the imagination. A
central position where many important lines of communi-
cation converge and the nearness of the productive mineral
region of southeastern Poland have made it the seat of an
extensive and varied industry, with manufactures of iron and
steel predominating, and have contributed to the remarkable
growth of its population from 161,008 in 1860 to 872,478 in
1911, — Warsaw was a prize worthy of persistent effort.

286 The Great War

Thousands of fugitives from the villages west of Warsav^
fleeing in terror before the swiftly moving storm of inva-
sion poured into the city, filling halls, warehouses, and all
other available places of shelter. There were the aged
and infirm and many who had abandoned everything in
their hasty departure and were absolutely destitute and
in the direst misery.

Day by day the cannonading became louder as the Ger-
mans forced their way towards the city, until the buildings
vibrated with the tremendous roar. By the 16th they were
only seven miles away and on the 17th German shells ex-
ploded within the municipal limits. Hostile aeroplanes
made their daily visits dropping bombs upon the city, by
which a number of civilians were killed or injured.

The first reinforcements for the hard-pressed, greatly-
outnumbered forces defending Warsaw were a body of
Siberian troops who detrained on the 18th in Praga, the
suburb on the right bank, and marched across the Vistula
by the imposing Alexander Bridge. The passage of these
Russian troops through the streets of the Polish metropolis
was greeted with an ecstasy of enthusiasm which might
have befitted a triumphal procession, such a popular demon-
stration as would have seemed incredible only a few months
before. It has been said that the fall of Warsaw had been
scheduled for this very day, following the capture of Ant-
werp on the 9th, as double token of Germany's invincible
expansive energy east and west. But from this time addi-
tional troops were continually arriving in this section until
by the 21st the Germans were in full retreat and Warsaw
was saved.

The decisive factor had been the advance of strong Rus-
sian masses from the vicinity of Gora on the Vistula south
of Warsaw and especially from the great fortress of Novo
Georgievsk at the confluence of the Bug and the Vistula

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 287

below Warsaw, which threatened to envelop the wings of
the northern German army. By the 20th the Russians
attacking from the north had rolled back the German left
as far as Sochaczef, subjecting the position of the whole
army to a dangerous compression. The final episode in the
fighting near Warsaw was a desperate struggle at Blonie, in
which the Seventeenth and Twentieth German Corps, cov-
ering the retreat of the rest of the army, bore the brunt of
furious attacks, but without arresting the Russian advance.

The Russian counter-of?ensive was being pushed simul-
taneously on a front of 200 miles. The German forces in
front of Warsaw were the first to be compelled to retreat
before it, but the other Teutonic army groups had to
give way one by one in the order of their succession
southwards.

Seven army corps, of which two were German, under
General Dankl, had advanced against the Ivangorod sec-
tion of the Vistula line. Several attempts to cross the river
below Ivangorod on pontoon bridges were frustrated by
the Russian artillery on the right bank.

Finally, the Russians themselves took the initiative, crossed
the river below Ivangorod, traversed with unexpected reso-
lution a treacherous, marshy zone along the left margin of
the stream, and assailed the Austro-German positions on
the higher ground beyond. There followed a week of
terrific struggles in an extensive forest lying west of the
Vistula, in which the larger organized masses on each side
were dissolved into a confusion of minor groups often
fighting at close-range and with the utmost ferocity and
desperation. After they had finally been driven from the
forest, the Austro-German troops had to retire across open
.country exposed to the Russian artillery, where they suf-
fered heavy losses. Their retreat was continued by way of
Radom and Kielce.

288 The Great War

In Galicia the Austrians under command of General
von Auffenberg and the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand had
forced the Russians to abandon the entire left bank of the
San. They had recovered Czernowitz in the extreme south-
east, occupied Sandomierz in the north, retaken Jaroslaw,
and raised the siege of Peremysl. The relieving column
marched into Peremysl amid great rejoicing. The lifting
of the blockade, which turned out to be only temporary,
v^as an opportunity for replenishing the supply of provi-
sions and for removing a large part of the non-combatant
population, whose presence was only a burden.

The Austrians made many fruitless attempts to cross the
San, and their offensive in Galicia waned about October 22d
in response to the unfortunate turn of events in Poland.
Sandomierz was retaken by the Russians, November 3d, on
the 5th the Austrians were compelled to retreat from the
San after a series of fierce conflicts, and the Russians re-
sumed the siege of Peremysl on the 14th.

The Germans in Poland made futile attempts to check
the victorious advance of the Russians at Skierniewice
and Lovicz. The Austro-Germans engaged in a des-
perate rear-guard action near Kielce, in which they were
defeated with heavy losses after a struggle of twenty-four
hours.

In spite of the genius of von Hindenburg and the supe-
rior organization of the Germans the armies of the central
powers were compelled to relinquish all the ground which
they had seized. Their offensive had undoubtedly pre-
vented or postponed the renewal of the Russian attacks
against Cracow and East Prussia, but these were merely
negative advantages. The great struggles during October
along the Vistula resemble in some respects the Battle of ,
the Marne. In both cases the Germans must have arrived
on the field of battle with their energy impaired by forced

The Wawel, or Citadel, of Cracow. The mound in the center is a memorial to the
Polish hero Thadeusz Kosciuszko.

The museum of Belgrade after the city had been bombarded bv the Austrians.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 289

marches. The difficulties of transportation must have
increased enormously with the advance of the German
armies in Poland, where the means of communication were
very inadequate.

The offensive had been ventured in defiance of Napo-
leon's favorite maxim, never to do what the enemy wants.
The Germans and Austrians advanced with feverish haste
nearly 200 miles to throw themselves upon the front of an
enemy of probably 50% superior strength, installed on the
line of a strong natural barrier reinforced by powerful for-
tresses, and in the presence of his bases of supply.

The northern wing of the German army before Warsaw
was "left in the air," since the westward course of the
Vistula below the Polish capital, instead of protecting this
flank, exposed it to attack, as long as the Russians com-
manded the crossing-point at Novo Georgievsk.

The great offensive was a failure. The popular expecta-
tion that the German armies would pass the winter in
Warsaw, as well as Calais, was deceived. But with aston-
ishing agility the Germans avoided a calamity and recovered
the equilibrium.

The successful withdrawal of the German and Austro-
German armies was chiefly due to their unusually extensive
destruction of the railways and roads in their rear, which
greatly impeded the progress of their pursuers. Von Hin-
denburg and the Germans retreated in a southwesterly
direction towards the line Kalisz-Czenstochowa, the Austro-
German forces to the line Czenstochowa-Cracow.

By the beginning of November the Russians had con-
centrated enormous forces, possibly as many as thirty-five
army corps, in Poland and Galicia ready to pour into the
upper valley of the Oder, which dominates the rich indus-
trial region of Silesia, and to strike towards Vienna or
Berlin. In spite of the escape of the German and Austrian

290 The Great War

armies, the development of the operations on the eastern
front had reached an alarming stage for the central empires
at precisely the period when the attempts to penetrate the
lines of the Allies in Flanders, repeated with ever increas-
ing fury and feverish determination, were about to end in
failure. On November 9th Russian cavalry actually raided
German territory near Pleschen.

But von Hindenburg made the apparently hopeless situa-
tion an opportunity for delivering a brilliant counter-stroke
with such promptness and dexterity as even to give rise to
the conjecture that the German retreat itself was a strata-
gem deliberately designed as a favorable preliminary for
the renewed attack. The fortresses of Ivangorod, War-
saw, and Novo Georgievsk, with Brest Litovsk in the rear,
constituted, as we have seen, a sort of vast citadel in the
heart of Poland, the possession of which was a vital factor.
And so von Hindenburg, after leading the chief masses of
the enemy far afield in the course of his retreat, deftly
slipped aside, and by a loop-shaped evolution launched a
new blow from the northwest at the Russian line of com-
munications, thrusting himself between a considerable part
of the Russian forces and the portals of their great central
fortified position.

Never did the Prussian railways offer more striking proof
of the military utility of their unsurpassed efficiency. Enor-
mous bodies of troops were spirited from place to place
with an ease and celerity that seemed to violate the most
elementary conceptions of mass and inertia. News that
the tide of battle was approaching Silesia had scarcely been
received, when it was announced that von Hindenburg's
army had suddenly disappeared from this part of the border
and then, almost immediately, that it had reappeared in
the region of Thorn, and that the counter-offensive from
that quarter was already in progress.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 291

The success of this bewildering maneuver had been pre-
pared by the direction given to von Hindenburg's retreat,
and consequently to the Russian pursuit, which had swerved
far to the left of a straight line towards the heart of Ger-
many. This tendency gave the Germans ample room for
their revolving movement and impeded the readjustment
of the Russian forces through the lack of lateral communi-
cations on the Polish side of the border.

The Russian pursuit terminated about November 5th,
and the German counter-offensive was fully under way by
the 12th or 13th.

The initial disposition of the principal German forces
for the new attack was the reverse of the arrangement for
the offensive in October. Then the Teutonic front com-
menced north of Kalisz, followed the general direction of
the border of Silesia, and trailed off towards the southeast,
until it fell in with the Carpathian barrier. Now the
German line beginning near the same point followed the
Prussian boundary towards the northeast, stretching be-
yond the Vistula. But it was undoubtedly part of the
general plan on this occasion that the Austro-Hungarian
forces should rally on the old line, forming the comple-
ment, as it were, of the new German front of maneuver in
the north, so as to envelop the Russian forces west of the
Vistula on all sections of their semicircular position at the
same time.

While the retreat of the Austro-German forces after
the former great offensive was still in progress, six divi-
sions of cavalry had been transported to the prospective
theater of the renewed attack from various sections of the
Teutonic fronts, notably from Flanders, where mounted
troops could no longer be employed in consequence of
the transition to trench-warfare. These divisions were
thrown forward on both sides of the Vistula to mask the

292 The Great War

principal movement of the Germans. The most formid-
able masses of German troops were concentrated between
the Warta and the Vistula, where the rivers covered their
flanks, their left rested on the fortress of Thorn, and the
main railway line from Berlin and Posen to Insterburg
passed conveniently in their rear. From this position the
advance was pushed with vigor and rapidity along the left
bank of the Vistula and the railway line in the direction of
Kutno and Lovicz. Since there were only scanty Russian
forces in the space between the Vistula and the Bzura and
the Warta, it was conceivable that the Germans could
overwhelm the great Polish fortresses, which were prob-
ably garrisoned by troops of the second or third line,
before the principal mass of the Russian armies could be
withdrawn from the Kalisz-Czenstochowa-Cracow front
in the extreme southwest.

The German forces advancing into Poland from the
northwest were grouped in two armies. The left under
General von Morgen, the right under General von Mac-
kensen, with General von Hindenburg in chief command.
Von Morgen's army won a victory at Kutno on the 18th,
which opened the way to the Bzura, and on the next day
von Mackensen drove a wedge through the Russian front
between Zgierz and Strykof northeast of Lodz. The
Twenty-fifth German Reserve Corps under General von
Scheffer-Boyadel and the Third Guard Division com-
manded by General von Litzmann poured through the
opening thus formed, wheeled to the right and advanced
to attack Lodz from the east, but soon found themselves
enveloped by Russian forces of superior strength. The
troops defending Lodz stretched across the German front
and around the right flank, where reinforcements approach-
ing from the north formed a second hostile line. Russian
forces returning from southwestern Poland threatened the

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 293

German left flank, and Rennenkampf with still another
column was approaching in the rear from the southeast.
Altogether the Germans were actually attacked, or at least
threatened, by five Russian army corps.

After sanguinary combats on the 21st and 22d this Ger-
man detachment suddenly broke camp during the night
of the 22d-23d, marched rapidly eastward across the frozen
ground until it crossed the Miazga River at Karpin, and
then turned sharply to the north, and assailed the enemy's
left wing at Gatkof, before the latter was entirely pre-
pared to receive the attack. Breaking through at this point
and pushing forward with the same impetuous tenacity the
Germans stormed Brzeziny on the 23d.

Here they encountered the second enclosing line of
their opponents and sustained repeated violent charges, but
finally fought their way out after enduring very heavy
losses. Their escape was facilitated by the approach of a
German relieving column from the northeast on the 24th.
This series of events remains one of the most thrilling
episodes of the war.

Apparently the general plan of operations pursued by
the Germans embraced a revolving maneuver, with their
left flank near the mouth of the Bzura as the pivot, for the
purpose of sweeping back or rolling together the Russian
forces which were within reach. By November 22d the
German left wing had advanced to the Bzura, less than
forty miles from Warsaw, and Lovicz and Skierniewiece
were again in the hands of the Germans.

But the most serious fighting took place nearer the
extremity of the maneuvering wing, where the Germans
pushed their ofi^ensive in the direction of Lodz with the
utmost vigor. From their positions north of the city they
subjected the defenders to a very severe bombardment,
accompanied by many desperate assaults of the infantry.

294 The Great War

When the conflict was at its height the night was illumi-
nated by the flashes of exploding shells and the weirdly
shifting gleam of the searchlights, and the thunder of artil-
lery was said to have been faintly audible at Warsaw sixty
miles away.

A striking example of heroism was exhibited during this
bombardment by a Russian artillery colonel, who with
some assistants made his way under cover of darkness to
the vicinity of a German battery of heavy pieces which
was keeping up a very damaging fire on the defenses of
Lodz from a distance of seven miles at Zgierz. Creeping
stealthily forward he laid a field telephone wire to within
a mile and a half of the battery, and then, lying prostrate
on the ground as the rays of a searchlight passed back and
forth above him, he directed the action of the Russian
guns, which finally silenced the German battery.

A new German army advanced from Kalisz eastward to
cooperate in the siege of Lodz, and after a series of bitter
struggles terminating in a battle lasting three days in which
the Russians suffered very heavy losses from the German
heavy artillery, Lodz was evacuated on December 6th. Its
position at the extremity of a salient in the Russian lines
made any further sacrifices for its defense strategically
unsound.

The necessity of counteracting an advance of the Rus-
sians into East Prussia, where they occupied Soldau on
November 10th, and the desire to prevent another fatal
turning movement against the left flank of the German
army in the heart of Poland were probably the chief
motives for a German offensive undertaken from the
north, on the right bank of the Vistula, about December
7th. Experience had shown that the Russians possessed
one distinct advantage over the Germans in the Polish
operations, the opportunity of shifting troops rapidly from

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 295

one bank of the Vistula to the other, secured to them by
their possession of the great fortresses on the river. The
Germans might have been able to neutralize this advantage
in part if they could have overrun the right bank of the
Vistula as far as Novo Georgievsk and masked that fortress.
But repeated German attacks for about ten days on the
front Ilovo-Glovno produced no permanent results.

Just as the conflicts west of the Vistula in October were
similar in their outcome to the Battle of the Marne, the
subsequent struggles in the central Polish theater in No-
vember and December may be likened in their results to
the Battle of the Aisne, since they inaugurated a period of
stationary warfare, defining the general position of the
fronts in this region for several months to come. The
Germans, thrusting and struggling forward with titanic
force and indefatigable energy, gradually drove the Rus-
sian front, like a massive door swinging on a hinge near
the lower Bzura, from the line Sochaczef-Lodz back
through the line Sochaczef-Tomasof-Novo Radomsk, until
it rested finally in the position Sochaczef-Rava-Opoczno,
along the Ravka.

The forward progress of the Russian armies in the Aus-
trian dominions was not immediately checked by the re-
newed German invasion of Poland in November. The
Russians were in possession of the Lupkow Pass through
the Carpathians by November 25th and they cleared Buko-
vina of the Austrians before the end of the month. They
reached a point only three and a half miles from the outer
defenses of Cracow on December 2d. Then the Austrians,
their formations stiffened by German contingents, took the
offensive along the line of the Carpathians. They drove
raiding parties from Hungary and marched northward
over the Dukla Pass in great force, and although they
were unable to make much headway behind the Russian

296 The Great War

lines in Galicia or relieve Peremysl, the threat conveyed by
their presence helped to paralyze the Russian offensive
westward. The Russians abandoned their operations before
Cracow on December 12th, after suffering serious losses,
and fell back on both sides of the Vistula, in conformity
with the retreat further north, as far as the Nida and the
Dunajec, where they were installed at the close of the year.
Consequently, the Russian front, stretching across the Polish
plain from the lower Vistula along the Bzura and the Ravka,
reached the upper Vistula at the mouth of the Nida, and
was prolonged across Galicia on the line of the Dunajec.

The initial state of hostilities between Austria-Hungary
and Serbia, after creating a paroxysm of alarm and riveting
the attention of the whole world, soon passed into obscurity
beside the gigantic struggle of the Great Powers, so that
the alleged cause for the whole war was apparently almost
forgotten. The Austrians, compelled to face the Russians
with most of their forces, restricted themselves during the
greater part of the campaign to a temporizing course of
operations on the southern frontier. But on three occa-
sions they aroused themselves to convulsive efforts of con-
siderable magnitude to rid themselves once for all from
the goading activity of their diminutive neighbor.

The Austrians scarcel}^ condescended to regard the opera-
tions against the Serbians as regular warfare. Their inroads
into Serbia were "punitive expeditions," and they were cal-
culated to reduce the country with impressive despatch to
the position of another Belgium. This disdainful attitude
invested with special ignominy the absolute failure of all
the designs of the Austrians against Serbia in the campaign
of 1914.

The military unpreparedness of Serbia and the serious
inroads in the national resources resulting from the strain

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 297

and wastage of the two Balkan Wars are striking evidence
against the alleged complicity of the Serbian government in
any scheme to precipitate a war with Austria-Hungary
in 1914.

While the official declaration of war against Serbia was
dispatched from Vienna on July 28th at 11.10 A.M., uncer-
tainty as to the course that Russia would take restrained
the Austrians from striking with determination and vigor
before the Serbians had had time to concentrate the chief
part of their available forces near their northern border.
The boundary between Serbia and the hostile territory was
almost entirely formed by rivers. The Drina, separating
Serbia from Bosnia on the west, flows northward to the
Save. The latter, with the Danube, into which it empties
in front of Belgrade, separates Serbia from Hungary on the
north. The Austro-Hungarian strategic railways give
access to many available crossing points on the Drina and
the Save.

An invasion of Serbia from the northwest, as contem-
plated by the leaders responsible for Austrian military policy,
ofl^ered the opportunity of a concentric advance from sev-
eral localities towards a single strategically important con-
verging point. But the Austrians bestowed their chief
attention on the line of the Drina, and planned their
principal attack up the valley of the Jadar, a tributary of
the Drina, southeastwards in the direction of Valyevo.

The Serbians, uncertain where the impending blow
would fall, concentrated their main forces in the region
of Palanka, Arangyelovatz, and Lazarevatz in the central
part of the northern zone of the country, south of Bel-
grade, sending out strong detachments to points nearer
the frontier.

The Austrian bombardment of Belgrade and the many
attempts to cross the rivers on the north in the early days

298 The Great War

of the war were probably intended to distract attention
from the region where the serious invasion of Serbia had
actually been planned. The Fourth, Eighth, Thirteenth,
and Fifteenth Austro-Hungarian Army Corps, and parts
of the Seventh and Ninth, had been concentrated on the
Serbian frontier. Three brigades of the Sixteenth Corps
had been sent to restrain the Montenegrins, while the
other three were held in reserve at Sarajevo.

The protruding northwestern extremity of Serbia, which
is partially encircled by the Drina and the Save, is very flat.
But the country south of this is rugged in character, with
mountain chains and deep valleys and only a few service-
able roads.

The Austrians first penetrated Serbian territory at Loz-
nitza on the morning of the 12th, crossing the Drina by
means of boats and pontoons. The invasion was com-
menced about the same time at Shabatz and several other
points, so that six different Austrian columns headed in the
general direction of Valyevo. From the Drina in the gen-
eral vicinity of Loznitza successive mountain ranges with
intervening valleys extend laterally towards the southeast.
From the north southwards the Tzer, Iverak, and Guchevo
ridges occur in succession, the first and second separated
by the River Leshnitza, the second and third by the Jadar.
The Austrian commander. General Potiorek, planned his
principal advance up the valley of the River Jadar towards
Valyevo. The importance of the possession of the eleva-
tions confining this and the other routes can be readily
appreciated.

The Serbian Chief of the General Staff, Field-marshal
Putnik, who was responsible for the strategy of the Serbian
armies, first served in 1876 in the war against Turkey and
was captain of infantry during the Russo-Turkish War
which followed. Lieutenant-colonel at the time of the

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 299

ill-starred contest with Bulgaria in 1885, he was subse-
quently promoted to the colonelcy and named Chief of
the General Staff, but fell into disfavor with King Milan
for his Radical tendencies, retired and devoted his attention
for several years to military studies and writings. He was
promoted to the rank of general by King Peter and as
minister of war he directed the reorganization of the
Serbian army, which he commanded in the campaigns of
1912 and 1913. He is a man of plain, unpretending ap-
pearance and of few words, but a keen judge of men and
of human nature.

At the beginning of the Great War he disposed of about
125,000 troops of the first line, or possibly 200,000 com-
batants altogether, including the second Ban, volunteers
and recruits. But the unfriendly attitude of Bulgaria made
it necessary to detach considerable forces to guard the
eastern frontier and Macedonia, so that it is doubtful
whether much more than 125,000 were available for the
field armies which were to oppose invasion by the Aus-
trians in greatly superior strength.

As soon as Field-marshal Putnik perceived that the
greater part of the Austrian forces had been concentrated
for the invasion of Serbia from the northwest, he dis-
patched the principal field armies toward the threatened
quarter. All depended upon the rapidity with which these
forces could traverse the intervening country and the skill
employed in adapting their operations to the special physi-
cal features of the theater of hostilities.

It was of paramount importance for the Serbians to pre-
vent the junction of the Austrian forces advancing south-
wards from Shabatz with the main bodies coming from
the direction of the Drina, and accordingly the right wing
of the Second Serbian Army (a group of three divisions)
and the Independent Cavalry Division drove the Austrian

300 The Great War

advance-guards from the northern foot-hills of the Tzer
range, the prospective field of contact, on the 16th. The
tenacity with w^hich the Serbians retained possession of this
position on the northern flank of the battlefield, in spite of
the threatened collapse of the resistance of their comrades
further south, was the indispensable factor in the final
victory.

In the meantime, the center of the Second Army was
pressed back, but the left wing, coming into contact with
the enemy after performing a march of fifty-two miles in
twenty-foiu* hours, repulsed the attacks of the Austrians
along the Iverak range on the evening of the 16th. The
Third Army in the valley of the Jadar was outflanked on
the south and compelled to retreat from Jarebitze on the
road to Valyevo. This movement involved the left wing of
the Second Army, so that on the 17th, while the Serbians
prosecuted vigorously their offensive along the ridge of
Tzer, their lines were everywhere on the defensive or in
retreat in other parts of the battlefield. On the same day
the Serbians made an unsuccessful attack on Shabatz, where
the Austrians turned to the offensive on the 18th and re-
pelled them step by step.

The 19th was the critical day. The Austrians, striving
only to hold their own on the crest of Tzer were every-
where else pushing forward with alacrity and the Serbian
Third Army was apparently at the limit of its endurance.
It seemed inevitable that the Austrians, with their superior
numbers and equipment, and with an adequate, if not equal,
acquaintance with the territory, would sweep everything
before them. But suddenly came a turning point. An
Austrian flanking attack against the right wing of the
Third Army encountered a fresh reserve division and was
repulsed. The Third Army took the offensive at pre-
cisely the favorable moment, threw their opponents into

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 301

confusion, and chased them down the valley of the Jadar.
Meanwhile the Serbians, victorious on Tzer, attacked the
Austrians on Iverak and dislodged them from the positions
commanding the line of retreat down the valley of the
Jadar.

The Austrians everywhere took to flight and poured from
the lateral valleys and mountain routes towards the crossing
points on the Drina. The total collapse of the invasion
from the west permitted the renewal with greater strength
of the Serbian attacks in the direction of Shabatz, which
the Austrians evacuated on the night of August 23-24.

The losses in the Battle of the Jadar were heav}- on both
sides, but the possession of the field and the capture of
4,000 prisoners were palpable evidence of the Serbian vic-
tory, and the failure of the Austrians to overrun Serbia in
this first attempt created a deep impression throughout
Europe.

Shortly after this battle the Serbian First Army, two divi-
sions of infantry and one of cavalry, crossed the Save at a
place called the Kupinski Kut, where a tongue of land
projecting from the northern side and almost enclosed by
the river in a sharp detour, is commanded by tlie guns on
the Serbian bank. The invasion of Hungary thus inaugu-
rated progressed until September 11th, when the expedition
was recalled on account of the second Austrian invasion of
Serbia from the west.

Desultory operations had been proceeding on the Monte-
negrin front. One Montenegrin division under Prince
Peter occupied Mt. Lovcen, engaged in artillery duels
with the Austro-Hungarian ships in the Bocche di Cattaro,
and held themselves in readiness to cooperate with the fleet
of the Allies in attacking the Austrian positions on this
valuable inlet. Another Montenegrin division commanded
by General Martinovitch engaged the attention of the

302 The Great War

Austro-Hungarian fortresses in Herzegovina. Monte-
negrin divisions are much smaller than those of the con-
ventional type. The Montenegrins are born warriors who
never lay aside their weapons. They are unsurpassable in
guerilla fighting, but were unsuited by inclination and ex-
perience for military maneuvers on a comprehensive scale.

After the Battle of the Jadar the Serbians decided to
operate concurrently with the Montenegrins in the inva-
sion of Bosnia. A Serbian army crossed the upper Drina,
occupied Vishegrad on September 15th, and effected a
junction with General Vucovich at the head of at least two
divisions which had advanced from the Montenegrin side
across the frontier of the former sanjak, and together
these forces made some further progress in the direction
of Sarajevo. But in the meantime the Austrians resumed
the invasion of Serbia.

While three or four battalions of the Sixteenth Austrian
Army Corps with some contingents of Landsturfn and
recruits faced the Montenegrins, the remainder of this
corps and the Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth passed
the Drina somewhat above the earlier crossing places and
forced their way into the mountainous region of Krupani,
wheje fierce contests took place. Reinforced by the
troops which had returned from beyond the Save, the
Serbians drove the Austrians from many of their posi-
tions, but did not dislodge them entirely from Serbian
territory. For many weeks the operations were almost
stationary, with lines of trenches drawn through the
rugged tracts and every point zealously contested in minor
engagements.

About October 25th strong Austrian detachments over-
powered the Serbo-Montenegrin forces near Kalinovik in
Bosnia and compelled the Serbians to abandon Vishegrad
in their retreat.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 303

In consequence of the inadequacy of their forces, the
Serbians found themselves reduced in November to the
necessity of shortening their defensive lines by withdrawing
their contingents from the positions in the extreme north-
west and near the Drina, which fact furnished the occasion
for a third invasion of their country involving a far more
critical situation. The Austro-Hungarian forces swarmed
over the boundary in the west and northwest in such formid-
able numbers that Valyevo had to be evacuated on Novem-
ber 11th and the headquarters withdrawn to Kraguievatz.

This conspicuous initial success may have engendered an
excessive feeling of confidence on the part of the Austrians
that impaired their vigilance. They probably regarded
the Serbians as already demoralized and their own final
victory as at hand. But the Serbians prepared to make a
stand on the line of the Kolubara and of its tributary the
Lug and along the crests of the mountains which cover
the upper Morava valley.

Five Austro-Hungarian army corps were taking part in
the new offensive movement. A formidable action against
the Serbian positions, particularly those of the Second Army
near Lazarevatz and of the so-called Uzhitze Army, which
had been operating in the direction of Sarajevo, near
Kosjeritchi, was commenced on the 15th; but for five
days the repeated attacks failed to dislodge the Serbians.
Finally, on the 20th, the Austrians captured Milanovatz
and drove back the Serbian First Army, inflicting serious
losses upon it.

By the 24th the fighting had become general, the Serbian
Second Army had been dislodged from its positions, and an
Austrian turning movement was in progress towards the
Morava.

The problem of transportation became more difficult
for the Austrians as they penetrated deeper into Serbian

304 The Great War

territory. But the Serbians were almost out of ammuni-
tion. Marauding bands threatened railway communication
with Salonica and it was feared that Bulgaria might at any
time intervene. The Austrians were advancing in seem-
ingly overwhelming force, and the pressure was becoming
too great for the Serbians, whose resistance seemed to be
on the point of collapsing.

But suddenly, at the darkest moment, the ardor and
determination of the Serbians were revived by an unex-
pected reaction of spirit. Fresh supplies of ammunition
arrived and a vigorous counter-offensive was planned as a
final effort. But before this was carried into effect, Bel-
grade had to be abandoned to the Austro-Hungarian forces
on November 29-30 in the process of consoHdating the
Serbian positions.

Never was the essentially popular character of the great
movements in Serbia more evident than in the impulsive
effort which resulted in the expulsion of the invaders from
the national soil. It was produced by a spontaneous
revulsion of popular feeUng and was guided by leaders
who had sprung from the people. Colonel Givko Pavlo-
vitch, for instance, General Putnik's principal collaborator
as director of military operations, was the son of a farm
laborer, and General Mislutch, who was placed in com-
mand of the First Serbian Army, was another self-made
man, the son of a peasant. King Peter, despite his age
and infirmities, came to the front to exhort his troops to a
supreme effort by his presence and words.

The king's proclamation to his soldiers reflected the
lofty spirit of Thermopylae and of the legendary age of
early Rome: "Heroes, you have taken two oaths, one to
me, your king, and the other to your country. I am an
old, broken man on the edge of the grave, and I release
you from your oath to me. From your other oath no one

Austrian siege-gun hauled by motor-tractor.

Siilii.iM tielil hospital. /■"row a f^/ioloi^riif^/i riuuu :\ ,i >i>!':,in ojficer.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 305

can release you. If you feel that you cannot go on, go to
your homes, and I pledge my word that after the war, if
we come out of it, nothing shall happen to you. But I
and my sons stay here."

It is reported that not one single man left the army.

The Serbian counter-attack took the Austrians by sur-
prise just as they were trying to execute a double envelop-
ing movement on December 2d. The First Army under
General Mislutch stormed the positions in the region of
Suvobor at the Austrian center and threw the Fifteenth
and most of the Sixteenth Corps into headlong flight in the
course of an encounter lasting three days. The Serbians ad-
vanced with increasing enthusiasm and momentum, driving
the Austrians before them, reoccupying Valyevo, and taking
thousands of prisoners. This series of actions resulting in
the disorderly flight of the Austrians from Serbian territory
in the northwest is known as the Battle of Suvobor.

As soon as success was assured in this part of the field, a
portion of the Third Army was directed towards Obreno-
vatz on the Save, while an army group composed of the
remainder of the Third Army, the Second Army, and the
cavalry division, under Field-marshal Stepanovitch, ad-
vanced northwards for the recovery of the capital. The
Serbians closed in gradually on Belgrade advancing in con-
centric formation, their wings extending to the neighbor-
hood of the Save and the Danube respectively.

On the 14th they carried the defenses on Tarlak Hills
outside the city on the south, which the invaders had
greatly strengthened with earthworks and barbed wire.
The evacuation of Belgrade began on the same day and
continued all night. On the 15th the Serbians succeeded
in destroying some of the Austrian pontoons, causing panic
and much loss to the retreating army, while King Peter
made his entrance into the capital.

306 The Great War

In view of the animosity created on both sides by the
Austro-Serbian controversies, and of the traditional prac-
tices of warfare in the Near East, it is not surprising that
the campaign just described was conducted with great
ferocity and that it was prolific in alleged excesses and
violations of international law which recall the savage fury
of the Croatian revolt against the domination of the Hun-
garians in 1849. The experiences of the recent Balkan
wars loomed large in the imagination of the Serbian
people. Their impulsive temperament was thrilled with
elation and ardent devotion to their independence. War-
fare with them was the liberation of a wild, elemental
passion. It was hardly conceivable that they would con-
fine themselves to the conventional restrictions of the kind
of warfare which only was regarded as legitimate by their
opponents.

The Austro-Hungarian authorities charged the Serbians
with gross violations of the established usages of war and
with many abominable atrocities, the treacherous use of
the white flag, firing on Red Cross ambulances and hos-
pitals, the poisoning of wells, robbing and killing the
wounded and their prisoners and mutilating them in the
most revolting manner, in some instances, as it would
appear, before they were dead.

These charges were mainly preferred against civilians
and the comitadjis or irregular troops, whose hostile activity
and alleged barbarity were the constant subject of Austrian
recrimination. The most shocking enormities, in so far as
they were really committed, seem to have been due to
spontaneous outbursts of individual savagery. But the
general infraction, which was met by the systematic appli-
cation of relentless measures of retribution, was the partici-
pation in acts of hostilities of those whom the Austrians
refused to recognize as legitimate belligerents. This was

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 307

the essential factor in the question of atrocities, all else
was incidental.

The Austrians claimed that all classes of the Serbian
population, including women and children, engaged in
hostile action by firing on soldiers and convoys of wounded
and provisions from concealment in towns and villages
which were ostensibly peaceable, or lured their victims to
destruction by treacherous artifices. The atrocities com-
mitted, or alleged to have been committed, in Serbia are
associated with a fundamental distinction in the concep-
tions of the nature of warfare as entertained by the two
parties. The Austrians regarded it as a strictly organized,
professional activity, but this limitation was incompatible
with the traditional habits and practices of fighting among
the Balkan peoples. Irregular combatants, a survival from
the struggles for independence, are a normal feature of every
war in the Balkan peninsula. But the Austrians admittedly
put to death all comitadjis as well as civilians caught carrying
arms, and burned houses from which shots had been fired.
These severities, which were practised in retaliation for the
alleged infringements of the rules of war, were regarded
by the Serbians as outrageous acts of brutality, and probably
served very often to inflame the people to furious deeds of
vengeance. The activity of the comitadjis amid the habitations
of the civilian population must have involved many innocent
persons as victims of the harsh reprisals of the Austrians.

According to Serbian reports, the operations of the
Austro-Hungarian forces, particularly the Hungarians,
were stained by the most shocking enormities and crimes,
wholesale robbery and pillage, the useless destruction of
property, the slaughter and mutilation of the wounded
and prisoners, and the massacre of civilians. These accusa-
tions have been examined on the spot by Professor R, A.
Reiss of the University of Lausanne, whose integrity there

308 The Great War

is no reason to doubt, and while the limitations of a single
disinterested investigator were undoubtedly very great, the
principal facts seem to be sufficiently substantiated.

In some important instances the indications contained
in the Austro-Hungarian reports tend to corroborate the
conclusions derived from the information presented by
Professor Reiss. For instance, the Austrians declared that
for twenty-four hours after the occupation of Shabatz,
civilians persistently fired on soldiers from the rear and
that the mutilated bodies of many Austro-Hungarians were
found in the vicinity of the town, and, furthermore, that
the village of Prnjavor, situated in the rich Matchva dis-
trict in the extreme northwestern part of Serbia, excelled
in atrocities against Austro-Hungarian soldiers. As these
are precisely the localities where the Austro-Hungarian
forces are said to have committed their most sanguinary
atrocities, we naturally assume that such relentless behavior
was intended as retribution for the refractory conduct of
the local population.

According to a corporal of the 28th Austrian Landwehr
regiment, who had been taken prisoner, more than sixty
civilians were bayoneted by eight Hungarian soldiers by
order of the general in command near the church at Sha-
batz. Local reports placed the number of the victims on
this occasion as high as one hundred and twenty. Pro-
fessor Reiss caused a pit to be opened behind the church
where the bodies of at least eighty persons were found
lying just as they had fallen. A report that more than a
hundred women and children had been butchered and
thrown into the burning house of a certain Milan Milano-
vitch in Prnjavor and that similar outrages had been per-
petrated at the schoolhouse and in other parts of the village
was confirmed by an inspection of the ruins, particularly
by the bloodstains on the still extant walls of the buildings

Dead in a room in a villa near Shabatz, where the Austrians are said to have
bayoneted the wounded.

Barbarity t)t \v:ir in Serbia. Peasants of seventeen or eighteen alleged to
have been massacred in the environs of Loznitza by order of the Hungarian
commander Bazarek.

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 309

mentioned. Furthermore, a pit was opened at Leshnitza,
in which one hundred and nine peasants, who had been
collected as hostages from the neighboring villages, and
later tied together and despatched by a volley, were lying
in a confused mass as they had fallen.

According to the calculations of Professor Reiss, between
three and four thousand civilians were slain by the Austro-
Hungarian forces in Serbia. In pursuing their policy for
the suppression of alleged transgressions of the rules of
war, the invaders devastated much of northwestern Serbia,
burning villages and farmhouses and making thousands of
the people homeless. Moreover, they subjected open towns
such as Shabatz, Loznitza, and Belgrade to prolonged bom-
bardment, destroying factories, hospitals, public buildings,
the university, and the national museum in the capital.

By an examination of the wounds, the testimony of
prisoners and the ammunition found in their possession,
Professor Reiss confirmed the alleged use of explosive
bullets by the Austrians. These bullets explode upon
contact, frightfully lacerating the flesh and thus producing
far more serious wounds. Limbs struck by these bullets
usually cannot be saved. The Austrians admitted that
cartridges fitted with these bullets had been given to the
soldiers, but claimed that they were intended only for
determining the range by means of the flash or smoke
produced by the explosion.

The conclusions to which we are led by the examination
of the incriminations made by both sides in connection
with the first campaign in Serbia will be useful as a clue
for the interpretation of similar occurrences elsewhere.
The conduct of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Serbia
was undoubtedly marked by excessive crueltv, but they
were actuated in this by the Serbian violations of the strict
rules of legitimate belligerency. The brutality of the

310 The Great War

Austrians, which intensified the animosity of the Serbians,
the natural lawlessness of the irregular soldiery and the
other special causes of irritation gave the campaign in
Serbia a character of fierceness which was scarcely equalled
in any other quarter.

The outcome of the campaign in the East was regarded
with various sentiments by the three great powers which
had been the principal combatants.

The Germans had won brilliant victories and exhibited
sensational dexterity in their maneuvers. Nowhere had
the wonderful efficiency of their organization appeared to
better advantage. Compared with their achievements in
the West, the results obtained by them in the eastern
theater were highly satisfactory. The later weeks of the
campaign had established even more firmly the immense
popularity of von Hindenburg, and brought into promi-
nence another leader whose fame was destined likewise to
rise to a pinnacle of glory. General von Mackensen.

As reward for the illustrious exploits of the German
offensive in November, in which 60,000 Russians had
already been taken prisoners, Colonel-general von Hinden-
burg was elevated to the rank of field-marshal and his
chief-of-staff and son-in-law, von Ludendorff, to that of
lieutenant-general on November 27th, while the Order
pour le merite was conferred on General of the Cavalry
von Mackensen for his brilliant leadership of the Ninth
German Army. Lieutenant-general von Litzmann was
made general of the infantry and commander of a reserve
corps in recognition of his evasion of the Russian trap
near Lodz, and on December 22d General of the Cavalry
von Mackensen was raised to the rank of colonel-general.

But the futility of all predictions in the course of the
great struggle, even of those made by the most distin-
guished authorities, is evidenced by some observations of

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 311

von Hindenburg, who declared towards the close of the
campaign that though the Russians were good soldiers and
had learnt much since their war with Japan, they were
already becoming listless, their food and munitions were
giving out, and all the indications pointed to a speedy col-
lapse of their efforts.

As for the Russian leaders themselves, it is difficult to
penetrate their genuine expectations at the beginning of
the campaign, so as to compare them with the results
which were actually accomplished. The Russians suffered
some serious reverses and the much-heralded offensive
with overwhelming momentum failed to materialize. But
in view of the incompleteness of Russian preparation and
of the partly faulty generalship revealed by the course of
the operations, the results of the campaign were undoubt-
edly as favorable as could have been reasonably expected.

The Russian lines still held firm at the center in Poland,
though opposed by the most powerful forces and the
ablest generals, while on the wings, where the pressure
against them was less formidable, they held a considerable
slice of East Prussia and about two-thirds of Galicia and
Bukovina.

We have already considered the inspiring personality of
the Grand-duke Nicholas, the Russian generalissimo. But
the service rendered by General Sukhomlinoff, the Rus-
sian Minister of War, while less conspicuous, was probably
quite as essential, for the reorganization and development
of the Russian military system in recent years was in large
part his work. An impressive figure and personality, a
contagious good-humor, a clear perception for reality,
method, and industry made him appear as a Russian em-
bodiment of optimistic efficiency. His reputation for
administrative ability and his wholesome personal influ-
ence over his fellow officers date from the period of his

312 The Great War

headship of the Officers' Cavalry School in St. Petersburg.
Retained in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War, he
held various commands on the western frontier, devoted
close attention to the annual maneuvers in those parts, and
obtained an ample acquaintance with the future theater of
hostilities. His activity in the war office, which began in
1909 and coincided with the rapid expansion of Russian
military power before the war, was distinguished by two
particular aims, the elevation of the standard of efficiency
of the Russian officers and the development in Russia of
the essential industrial basis for the nourishment of modern
warfare.

He submitted the merits and failures of the officers to
careful scrutiny; amplified the establishment for their
higher training and urged them to frequent it; rewarded
vigor, energy, and genius ; and discreetly but systematically
facilitated the retirement of those whose increasing years
had not been matched by expanding talent. To him is due
the credit for the foundation of schools of military aviation
and of railroading for officers and the establishment of an
effective auxiliary corps of automobiles. He strove per-
sistently to ingraft into the financial administration of the
army the straightforward, effective methods of successful
business. The rumor that a German intrigue was launched
in St. Petersburg for the removal of Sukhomlinoff just
before the war, whether true or false, is proof of the
popular esteem in which his ability was held.

Von Hindenburg declared, on the basis of the expe-
rience of the first campaign, that the Austrians and Hun-
garians were excellent soldiers and that their officers were
spirited and courageous, and also that the relations between
the chief commanders of the Teutonic empires were
ideal, — a most fortunate situation, since it was evident from
the first weeks that Austria- Hungary had to lean heavily

The Campaigns in Poland and Serbia 313

upon the support of her more powerful ally. Infirmities
inherent in the heterogeneous character of the realm
were chiefly responsible for the disappointing situation of
Austria-Hungary at the close of the campaign. Partly for
the same reason, and partly perhaps as the effect of rival
intrigues in Vienna, the Dual Monarchy had no generals
who were popular idols like von Hindenburg and the
Grand-duke Nicholas.

General of the Infantry Conrad von Hoetzendorf, Chief
of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, is an international
authority of recognized reputation on military subjects.
His treatment of the fundamental principles of tactics has
been accepted as a text-book by all the war academies
throughout the world. His distrust of Italy and advocacy
of powerful fortifications on the Italian frontier almost
produced an international crisis a few years before the war
and led to his resignation as head of the army. He was
reinstated in 1912 and enjoyed the cordial support of the
Archduke Francis Ferdinand before the war and the con-
fidence of the army generally at the time which we are
considering.

But it was evident that a weeding out of some of the
principal commanders was essential to the indispensable
renovation of the Austro-Hungarian armies. General von
Auffenberg was one of those whose retirement was deemed
expedient. He had been superseded as minister of war in
1912 by Field-marshal Alexander Krobatkin, who held this
office in 1914. General von Auffenberg will be recalled as
the commander who was swept back before the first ad-
vance of the Russian forces into Galicia, evacuating Lem-
berg and suffering defeat on the Rawaruska-Grodek line.

Field-marshal von Potiorek's career underwent a similar
eclipse. A Bohemian by birth, for a long time assistant to
von Hoetzendorf as Chief of the General Staff, his post of

314 The Great War

head of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
military position, in 1914, made him the natural commander
of all the forces operating in the south. The Austro-
Hungarian authorities insisted that the final repulse of
their armies in Serbia was merely a temporary consequence
of the failure to apprehend the true measure of the diffi-
culties to be surmounted, the arduous character of the
country, the inadequate roads, the fearful state of the
weather, and the unexpected strengthening of the enemy's
forces, and that it would not have any permanent influence
on the outcome of the struggle. Yielding, however, to the
malady which so often attacks unsuccessful commanders,
Field-marshal von Potiorek petitioned to be released from
his command, and General of the Cavalry Archduke
Eugene was appointed to succeed him, with the general
approbation of military circles.

CHAPTER XII

The Close of the Campaign in the West and the
Land Operations Outside of Europe

The waning of the campaign in the West. Attempted Allied offensive
in December. Some characteristids of trench-warfare. Christmas at the
front. The war outside of Europe. The rally of the British dominions
and dependencies : colonial and Indian troops sent to Europe ; operations
in colonial territory, the campaign in Togo, Kamerun, German East Africa,
and German Southwest Africa; the insurrection in South Africa. Ger-
many swept from the Pacific. The siege and fall of Tsingtau. Turkey's
advent into the war; Turco-German designs, Egypt and the British Em-
pire ; Cyprus ; events on the Persian Gulf.

There was no sudden break in the course of operations
in the West after November 11th, the date which has been
adopted for convenience to mark the termination of the
Battle of Ypres. As late as the 13th the Germans pene-
trated the British trenches in several places. But the
fighting subsided gradually into the colorless, mechanical
routine of stationary warfare, a wearisome process of dis-
illusionment for all the early hopes and eager elation. A
period of four months from the close of the Battle of
Ypres to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle was almost barren
of eventful occurrences in the West. Juvenal, at one
time an officer in the Roman army, asserted in praise of
the military profession that a moment of time brought
sudden death or glorious victory. But he had evidently
gone through no experience resembling the agonizing
monotony of pain and exhaustion in modern trench-
operations.

315

316 The Great War

There was a recrudescence of activity in the West about
the middle of December. General Joffre issued an order
of the day on the 17th declaring that, after all the attacks
of the enemy had been repulsed for three months, with
the strengthening of the Allies in men and material and
the weakening of the Germans by the transfer of troops
to the East, the time had come for striking a blow and
clearing the French territory. British infantry and French
marines cooperating with the Belgians had already taken
the offensive in the extreme north. Barges mounting
British naval guns took part in the operations on the lower
Yser, where the British captured Lombaertzyde and the
French and Belgians stormed St. Georges.

Encouraged by these small successes the Allies under-
took to dislodge the Germans from positions west of
Wytschaete which they had held since the Battle of Ypres.
But two Scottish regiments and the Thirty-second French
Division, attacking on the 14th, failed to secure any appre-
ciable advantage.

On the 19th the Meerut and Lahore Indian Divisions
attacked the Germans near Givenchy and gained posses-
sion of some trenches, but were afterwards driven back,
suffering severe losses. On the next day the Germans
took the offensive in this section, drove the British and
Indians from some of their trenches, and engaged in a
fierce struggle for the possession of Givenchy. It was
captured by the Germans and afterwards retaken by the
British and Indians, but the situation remained so serious
for the Allies that one of the divisions of the British First
Army Corps then stationed in reserve was brought up to
reinforce the Indian troops on the 21st and the danger
was not entirely averted until the 22d. Concurrently with
these events the French assailed the Germans at various
points along the line. Northeast of Chalons they captured

The facades and tower of the Cloth Hall and Town Hall at ^'jircs : on the rigiit is the
tower of the Cathedral of Saint Martin.

Tlie ruins of the I'own Hall, L'iotli Hall, and Catlietiiai at \pres on Novenilnr 24, 19 14.

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 317

a section of the German outer trench but were unable to
maintain themselves in this position.

By the end of the year the war had become practically
stationary in the East and West alike. To Napoleon and
von Mokke, the great strategists of the nineteenth century,
unassailable positions were unknown. If the enemy's front
could not be broken, an attack could be directed against
his flank. But now the extension of the fortified lines
from the North Sea to Switzerland, a distance of about
350 miles, across the entire front in the West, and from
the Baltic Sea to the northern extremity of Roumania,
nearly 900 miles, in the East, had excluded all turning
movements. In the East, where the disposition of the
troops was generally less compact, there was still the pros-
pect of advantages to be obtained by aggressive action
without a wholly disproportionate expenditure of blood
and munitions. But the course of events and the condi-
tion of affairs in the western theater, and to a lesser degree
in the eastern as well, suggested the speculations of Fred-
erick the Great in his military testament as to his future
conduct in case Prussia were again attacked, as in the
Seven Years' War, by a coalition of states.

Frederick declared that in such circumstances he would
straightway advance far enough into his opponents' territory
to live at their expense and to hold the hostile armies, when
they should confront him, on lines chosen by himself and
already fortified. He would reconnoiter the country as far
as his patrols could be dispatched, so as to make himself
perfectly familiar with all the lines by which his adversaries
might advance to attack him. In places thus occupied and
strengthened, he would calmly hold himself on the defen-
sive,— not squandering his forces in assailing strong positions
where the advantages would be all on the side of the hostile
defenders, — until his antagonists wearied of the contest.

318 The Great War

A brief description of some essential characteristics of
the system of intrenchments which had now become the
chief feature of all parts of the principal war-zones in the
Great War may not be inappropriate at this point.

Two or more lines of earthworks extended along the
entire front of the armies on both sides. The outer lines
served for the protection of the troops who were regularly
under fire, while the others sheltered the relief troops.
The first and second trenches were usually from 800 to
1,000 yards apart, according to the local conditions and
contour.

The troops on duty in the foremost trenches were com-
monly relieved after nightfall every twenty-four hours,
when the substitution of fresh contingents from the inner
trenches and the removal of the dead and wounded from
the front were effected under cover of the darkness. The
troops brought with them all the necessary provisions for
their period on the outer line, where the preparation of
food was usually impossible. They were kept ever on
their guard against the enemy's surprises. There was
scarcely any protection against the rigors of the winter
climate, the rains and sleet, winds and cold. It was impos-
sible in many places to drain the outer trenches and the
soldiers stood for days or weeks in water, mud, or slush.
The possibility was always present that a well-directed
shell or bomb falling into these open trenches would blow
the soldiers to pieces, while the exigencies of the situation
required that the men should often expose their heads
and shoulders to the searching fire of hostile rifles and
machine-guns that raked the top of the earthen parapet.
The service there was one of exhausting tension, incessant
danger, and fearful hardship and privation.

But the inner trenches, often roofed over and protected
in large measure from the enemy's projectiles, as well as

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 319

from the severity of the weather, presented a spectacle of
relative comfort. There were mats frequently for the
floors, simple furniture, and arrangements for cooking and
lighting. In some places dugouts or subterranean apart-
ments, equipped with sleeping bunks, afforded an oppor-
tunity of repose with absolute freedom from danger, except
perhaps from the explosion of mines and the shells of the
heaviest siege-artillery. Officers' quarters of this kind,
especially on the German side, were remarkable for the
comfort, or even luxury, displayed in their furnishings.
But generally, the absolute cheerlessness of the forward
trenches made even the simple amenities of those in the
rear seem unusually attractive and cozy by contrast.

At times, when the development of the conflict required
the presence of the troops in the second line to support
those in the first, it was impossible to relieve the latter at
the regular intervals, so that they were often compelled
to remain days at a time in their exposed position with
scarcely any opportunity for sleep or relaxation, drenched
or besmeared with mud or benumbed by the cold, and
with only precarious nourishment.

Communication between the front lines and the shelter-
ing trenches further back was provided, as far as possible,
by excavated passageways, zigzagged and divided into sec-
tions by transverse earthen partitions, so as to localize the
enfilading shell-fire of the enemy.

The Germans usually conducted their frontal attacks
against trenches in the following manner. In order to
shorten the space which the infantry had to cross in the
open, exposed to direct fire, they advanced by sapping in
narrow zigzagged trenches or in subterranean galleries to
the proper distance for the final rush, where the various
channels were connected by a lateral trench approximately
parallel with the enemy's front. In this the forces were

320 The Great War

drawn up for the assault. But sometimes a sap was carried
by night right up to the hostile parapet, which was blown
in by the explosion of a mine, leaving a yawning breach.
Except in the supreme moments of the charge the most
noteworthy feature of a battlefield was the apparent absence
of human beings.

The spirit of the Christmastide found expression in a
very unexpected and remarkable manner. An unofficial
truce was observed throughout a large part of the front in
the West, and in many places the men on both sides issued
from the trenches, mingled, exchanged gifts, and sang
songs together. At one point there was a football match
between British and Saxon soldiers, in which the former
were defeated.

Very impressive was the Kaiser's celebration of Christ-
mas- among the soldiers who belonged to the General
Headquarters. The walls and ceiling of a great hall were
completely covered with evergreen. An altar was erected
at one end of this hall, flanked by tall Christmas-trees, with
a manger before it. Places for about 960 persons alto-
gether, of all ranks from Kaiser to simple private of the
Landwehr, were laid at long tables arranged lengthwise
down the hall, to which smaller Christmas-trees with their
many little lights added the customary, festive appearance.
The gifts from home were found on these tables; and in
addition, each guest received Pfefferkucheii, apples, and nuts,
and a picture of the Kaiser. The privates received cigars
and tobacco pouches also. After a short religious address
and the singing of the appropriate hymns, the Kaiser
addressed the assemblage as follows :

"Comrades! In a state of armed defense, we are here
assembled to commemorate this holy festival commonly
celebrated in the peaceful interior of our homes. Our
thoughts go back to the dear ones, whom we thank for

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 321

the gifts which we behold in such profusion upon the
tables before us. God let the enemy compel us to cele-
brate the festival here. Attacked, we are forced to defend
ourselves. God grant that from this festival of peace, with
God's favor upon ourselves and upon our land, ample vic-
tory may come from this bitter contest. We are on hostile
soil with our sword's point turned to the enemy, our heart
to God. We voice the words of the Great Elector: 'To
the dust with all the enemies of Germany. Amen.' "

Many of the most extensive conflicts of the past have
sprung from surprisingly petty or unworthy causes. As
Macaulay once remarked of the rapacity of Frederick
the Great, which precipitated the War of the Austrian
Succession:

"The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands
where the name of Prussia was unknown; and in order
that he might rob a neighbor whom he had promised to
defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel,
and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of
North America."

But the issues at stake in the present upheaval are cer-
tainly commensurate with its world-wide character, which
will directly be partially illustrated.

The unanimous feeling of loyalty which pervaded nearly
every corner of the British Empire, and the spontaneous
rally of the colonies and dependencies in response to the
danger that threatened the Mother Country, were one
of the most impressive spectacles which the Great War
afforded. And quite apart from every partisan sentiment,
one may regard this phenomenon from the broadly human
point of view with a generous feeling of gratification as a
palpable demonstration that unison of heart and action of
the most scattered communities may be created and pre-
served without the application of galling restrictions or of

322 The Great War

compulsion; in fact, without even the possibility of coer-
cion. Even neutrals have been tempted to compare w^ith
a trace of malicious satisfaction this impetuous flood-tide
of passionate loyalty with the pretentious but often super-
ficial arguments by which the inevitable dissolution of the
British Empire at the first serious shock was dogmatically
predicted in German academic circles.

The Australian Laborite Ministry, voicing the feelings
of all parties in the island-continent, proclaimed its unhesi-
tating support of the Mother Country in the hour of trial.
In the words of Mr. Millen, the Australian Minister of
Defense, ''Australia wishes the rest of the Empire to know
that in this momentous struggle for liberty and national
honor, the vigor of her manhood, the bounty of her soil,
her resources, her economic organization, all she pos-
sesses to the last ear of corn and drop of blood is freely
offered to help maintain the glory and greatness of the
Empire, and to battle in the righteous cause wherein she
is engaged."

Both Australia and New Zealand at once placed their
own naval forces at the disposal of the British Admiralty
and immediately offered contingents of 20,000 and 8,000
men respectively as a first instalment of troops, which were
followed by several other contingents from each of these
dominions.

The popularity of the Duke of Connaught, Governor-
general of Canada, of the Duchess his wife, and of the
Princess Patricia their daughter, made their presence an
appropriate symbol and rallying point for the loyal enthu-
siasm of the great Dominion. The duke's zeal and expe-
rience in military matters stimulated and sustained the
martial ardor of the country. The first Canadian contin-
gent which set sail for England about the end of Septem-
ber, consisted of about 30,000 men, including a regiment

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 323

of French Canadians, one of Irish Canadians, Princess
Patricia's Light Infantry, and Strathcona's Horse.

Generous contributions of supplies for the Mother
Country were raised by all the provinces, and the Domin-
ion government itself made a gift of 100,000,000 bags
of flour. Sir Robert Borden, Canadian Prime Minister,
announced on October 7th that the government in-
tended to raise and send forward a second contingent of
the same strength, and later he promised that 30,000
men would be kept continuously in training while the
war lasted.

At the very outbreak of hostilities the government of the
Union of South Africa offered to undertake the responsi-
bility for all the necessary operations in that part of the
continent so that the imperial garrison would be available
for service in the European campaign. Later, at the sug-
gestion of the Imperial government, the Union accepted
the task of carrying the war into German Southwest Africa.
The Right Honorable General Louis Botha, who had been
fighting against the British as commander-in-chief of the
Boer forces scarcely more than twelve years before, now
Prime Minister of the Union, announced his intention of
commanding personally the forces in the field against Ger-
man Southwest Africa.

The smaller colonies responded to the situation according
to their resources, Newfoundland, for instance, equipping
500 men for foreign service and 500 for home defense, and
Jamaica taking the necessary steps to provide for her own
protection.

The unswerving allegiance of India, where the supine-
ness of the British administration had been regarded by
German observers with undisguised contempt, turned out
in reality to be a most disconcerting element in the calcu-
lations of those who insisted that the British Empire was

324 The Great War

an unnatural association of incongruous elements which
would fly apart on the first serious test.

The rulers of the native states of India, nearly 700 in
number, ofl^ered their services and their resources at the
outbreak of the war. A number of the native princes and
nobles joined the expeditionary force at once, the corps
maintained by the larger states as Imperial Service troops
were immediately placed at the disposal of the Imperial
government, and many other contingents and contributions
in money and supplies were furnished by the native rulers.

The arrival and early exploits of the Indian Expedition-
ary Force in Europe have already been mentioned. It was
an imposing armament of about 70,000 excellent fighting
men, powerful Sikhs, the backbone of the Indian army,
Punjabi Mussulmans, gallant Gurkhas, Pathans, Brahmans,
and others, mostly battle-tried veterans and all thoroughly-
trained warriors.

A glance at the map will show why Germany was very
vulnerable, although for the most part rather insensible,
to attack in her colonial possessions. The Allies' naval
supremacy destroyed at once every chance of reinforcing
the mostly feeble German contingents scattered in the
dependencies and even shrouded their fate for a time in
obscurity. But the Germans contemplated the almost
inevitable loss of most of their colonial empire with com-
parative equanimity, convinced as they were that the de-
privation would be only temporary and that the real issue
would be decided exclusively on the European battlefields.

The operations in Africa during the present war, like
the early colonial conflicts in North America, have been
invested with a distinction out of all proportion to the
number of the forces engaged, by reason of the incalculable
importance of the eventual results for mankind and of the
exceptional and varied conditions, which off^ered unusual

liiiMiMfcihiMiiiitt II I .. J I nil

'j^%j^tm

•» I.'.

IiurcnchniciUi iikkIl- bv liiitiih iKUi\c i;

Artillery i)t Britisli K^st African forces.

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 325

scope for individual initiative. In the majority of cases tlie
forces were very small and consisted exclusively of native
police troops with a few local European volunteers for
special service and European officers. In some instances
marines were landed from the naval squadrons, but these
were available only near the coast.

Upon receipt of intelligence of the outbreak of hostilities
in Europe, Captain F. C. Bryant, who held the temporary
rank of lieutenant-colonel, as senior officer of the British
Gold Coast station, without waiting for orders, led a small
detachment eastward into Togoland, seized Lome, the
coast town and capital, and cooperated with a small French
force from Dahomey on the east in the pursuit of the
small body of German police troops with their white offi-
cers and a few white volunteers, who retreated in the direc-
tion of Kamina about 100 miles inland. The powerful
wireless station at this point, by which direct radiotele-
graphic communication between Germany and the Ger-
man dependencies in Africa had been maintained, was
dismantled in the night of August 24-25 by order of the
governor. Major von Doering, to prevent its use by the
enemy. After some minor encounters and an unsuccessful
attempt to obtain special terms, the Germans surrendered
unconditionally and the Allies marched into Kamina on
August 27th.

Soon after the commencement of hostilities the British
and French blockaded the coast of Kamerun and invaded
this German dependency at several points. One British
column, crossing the frontier on August 25th captured a
German fort at Garua, but was afterwards so heavily
counter-attacked that it was compelled to retreat into
British territory, losing its commander, Major (acting lieu-
tenant) Maclear. Another British column from Nigeria
occupied Nsanakang on August 25th. But the Germans

326 The Great War

attacked the British garrison posted there on September
6th and defeated them in a hotly-contested engagement,
in which both parties suffered heavy losses in proportion
to the numbers engaged.

In the meantime, a force of 300 Senegalese in the service
of France took by surprise the German post of Singa on
the Ubangi, a tributary of the Congo, in the eastern part
of Kamerun, while French forces advanced from Libre-
ville in the south. Late in September an Anglo-French
expedition under Brigadier-general C. M. Dobell, operat-
ing in the coast districts of Kamerun with the support of
an Allied squadron, captured Duala and Bonaberi, the
former considered a very strong post, and took several
hundred prisoners.

The native infantry and police and, in addition, a larger
white population capable of bearing arms gave the Ger-
mans much stronger available forces in East Africa than in
Togoland or Kamerun, stronger forces at first than any
which their opponents could muster against them on the
borders of the territory. In the conterminous British de-
pendency of East Africa there were the native police and
the East African Rifles, which were supplemented by local
volunteers and reinforced, as soon as possible, by strong
contingents from India.

The British promptly blockaded the coast of German
East Africa and the Germans evacuated the port Dar-es-
Salaam, destroying the wireless station. After several minor
attempts to raid the British territory, a German column
numbering about 400 crossed the border of Nyasaland on
September 8th, but were defeated the next day in an attack
on Karonga, near the northern extremity of Lake Nyasa.
About the same time a Belgian force operating between
Lake Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza was defeated and
expelled from the German territory.

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 327

The British campaign in the southwest undertaken by the
Union of South Africa involved eventually by far the most
considerable operations in Africa. For the German forces
in Southwest Africa consisted of about 10,000 mounted
infantry and artillery, all well trained and equipped, with
a camel corps numbering about 500. This dependency,
where the German government had found it necessary to
deal with serious native uprisings, was very effectively
organized for military purposes. Blockhouses, like nerve-
centers of the administrative organism, studded the coun-
try and were connected with one another by telephone
and with the capital, Windhoek, by wireless and under-
ground telegraph, while an extensive system of roads and
railways had been developed systematically in accordance
with strategical requirements.

Early in the campaign a German force numbering about
2,000 entrapped two squadrons of the First South African
Mountain Rifles and a section of the Transvaal Horse
Artillery in a narrow defile and forced them to surrender
after a gallant fight in which they suffered heavy losses.
The first important advantage for the British was the cap-
ture of Liideritz Bay on September 18th, the point where
German authority was first established in that part of the
continent, the only important harbor in the colony. But
on September 24th the Germans occupied Walfish Bay, a
port which had been retained by the British as an enclave
in the midst of German territory.

A British troop advancing eastward from Liideritz Bay
was defeated by German forces near Garuab on Decem-
ber 16th.

The partial success of a dangerous insurrectionary move-
ment among the Boers, which had been fostered by
German intrigues, necessarily interfered with the further
development of the British campaign in German territory.

328 The Great War

The progress of this interesting minor outburst, produced
as it were by sparks from the great conflagration, must be
reserved for comprehensive treatment later.

The inauguration of the w^orld-war w^as quickly follow^ed
by the efTacement of all the German dependencies and
stations scattered in the Pacific.

The Germans had just completed a wireless station at
Tafaigata in Samoa, when an Australian war-vessel escort-
ing a transport with an expeditionary force from New
Zealand entered the harbor of Apia, the capital of the
German colony, which was occupied on August 29th.
The German governor and several officials were taken to
New Zealand for internment.

A German wireless station was being completed at Bita-
paka on the island of New Pomerania in the Bismarck
Archipelago, when news of the outbreak of war was re-
ceived on August 5th. The seat of government was imme-
diately transferred from Rabaul to Toma in the interior,
and the colored poHce troops, 300 in number, strengthened
by a few German recruits or volunteers, prepared for de-
fense. But an Australian expeditionary force occupied
Herbertshohe on September 11th and Rabaul a few days
later, and, after some spirited bush-fighting in the neigh-
borhood of Bitapaka, captured the wireless station and
took Toma.

The Australian squadron seized Naura in the Marshall
Islands about September 1st without any opposition, and
destroyed the wireless station ; and with the capture of the
wireless station in the neighboring Caroline Islands, com-
munication between Germany and her dependencies in the
Pacific was completely abolished.

The crowning success of the Australian squadron and the
expeditionary force was the capture of Friedrich Wilhelm,
the seat of the government of Kaiser Wilhelm Land, the

Ma]> showing by ilu- shaded portion tlic tcrrit()ry hdd by the npposnig armies, Decem

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 329

German part of New Guinea, which had long been re-
garded as a possible menace by the Australian States.

A Japanese squadron occupied Jaluit, the seat of gov-
ernment of the Marshall Islands, on October 3d, taking
prisoner the chief official.

The feeling of annoyance with which Japan regarded
the presence of the Germans in the leased territory of
Kiau-Chau and the alacrity with which the Japanese
grasped the opportunity afforded by the Great War to
eject them are due to circumstances which have been ex-
plained in the first volume of this work. The Germans
regarded this possession with peculiar pride as the most
successful achievement of their modern expansionist policy.
During seventeen years neither resources nor energy had
been spared in making this vantage point a model colonv, a
pattern of German efficiency and thoroughness, and an im-
pregnable stronghold. Tsingtau, the urban center, had de-
veloped rapidly along systematic German lines, with costly
waterworks, fine streets and public buildings, and excellent
harbor facilities. The leased territory was a prosperous
offshoot of the Fatherland transplanted in the Far East.

Soon after the expiration of the time limit expressed
in their ultimatum to Germany, August 23, 1914, the
Japanese blockaded Tsingtau. The German defenses of
Tsingtau were equipped with about 600 guns. The garri-
son, commanded by the governor. Naval Captain Meyer-
Waldeck, numbered between three and four thousand,
mostly marines. Five or six hundred German civilians or
reservists hastened to Tsingtau from different places in
China to offer their services. There were eight German
war-vessels and the Austro-Hungarian cruiser Kaiserin
Elisabeth in the harbor at Tsingtau at the time.

It is said that the authorization of Japan was asked for
the removal of the Kaiserin Elisabeth to Shanghai, where

330 The Great War

she could be disarmed and interned, but that suddenly,
despite the favorable attitude of the Japanese, instructions
from Vienna directed the Austro-Hungarian ambassador to
take his leave of Tokio and the commander of the Kaiserm
Elisabeth to cooperate with the Germans in the defense of
Tsingtau.

The expeditionary force from Japan landed at Tsimo,
which was made its base, ten miles outside the limits of
the leased territory of Kiau-Chau, on September 12th, and
two days later the Japanese advanced against the Germans,
forcing them to retire within their defensive lines, and the
real siege of Tsingtau began. Twelve days later a British ex-
peditionary force arrived at Laoshan Bay. The Japanese and
British were repulsed in their first attack on October 6th,
when their right wing was exposed to the fire of the cruiser
Kaiserin Elisabeth and of a German gunboat, besides that of
the forts, and the Japanese suffered considerable losses.

But after a fierce bombardment of the German posi-
tions by land and sea with heavy artillery, including several
28-centimeter mortars, continuing without interruption for
nearly nine days, the Japanese and British advanced for the
final assault on the night of November 6-7. The conflict
raged with the greatest fury around the fort on litis Hill,
the most important position in the German defenses. The
capture of this final bulwark at the point of the bayonet
necessitated the capitulation of Tsingtau.

Early on the morning of the 7th a white flag was raised
on the observatory and later on the forts fronting the sea,
and at nine German officers appeared within the Japanese
lines to arrange the terms of surrender.

About 3,000 prisoners fell into the hands of the Japanese
and were transported to Japan for internment. There
were 436 German wounded in the hospitals of Tsingtau.
Captain Meyer-Waldeck, the German commander, had

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 331

himself been wounded in the defensive operations. The
losses of the Japanese in storming the forts were reported
to be fourteen officers and 426 men. The news of the fall
of Tsingtau was received in Germany with a universal
feeling of bitterness and chagrin.

The wide extent of the field reviewed in the present
chapter is answerable for unusual demands upon the imagi-
nation of the reader, who must gird himself for another
fanciful flight of several thousand miles, this time from the
eastern to the western extremity of the continent of Asia.

As evidence of Turkish chivalry or of the timeliness of
German diplomacy the circumstance may be mentioned
that Turkey entered the war at a moment of comparative
depression in the fortunes of her prospective allies, when
a formidable Teutonic offensive in Poland had just been
abandoned, the fruitlessness of the great effort in Flanders
was becoming daily more apparent, and Austria-Hungary
had accomplished nothing in her campaign against Serbia;
a moment, in short, when the accession of a warlike ally
was a peculiarly gratifying encouragement.

The reorganization of the Turkish army in fourteen
army corps, as before the Balkan Wars, had undoubtedly
progressed very rapidly since the outbreak of the European
war in August, under the able direction of General Li man
von Sanders. The plan of operations, prepared of course
in agreement with the views of the German General Staff,
contemplated a campaign against Ei^ypt and another on the
Caucasian frontier, while British initiative added a third
field of action in lower Mesopotamia.

The most interesting feature of the situation created
by Turkey's belligerency was the anomalous position of
Egypt, which was virtually under British protection while
acknowledging Turkish suzerainty. With the question of
Egypt's allegiance was intimately associated the security of

332 The Great War

the Suez Canal, which was commonly regarded as an abso-
lutely vital artery of traffic for the British Empire. The
ominous but unobtrusive steps have already been described
by which the Turks, with German encouragement and
support, had been approaching this tempting and loosely-
guarded prize. The apparent uniqueness of the oppor-
tunity stimulated the insidious activity of German secret
agents in Egypt. Presumptive evidence that the activity
of a certain Dr. Priiffer, who had been intriguing in Cairo,
had the indorsement of the German government seemed
to be afforded by his open, official connection with the
German Embassy in Constantinople after the outbreak of
the war. Lieutenant Mors, a German officer in the Alex-
andria police, who was arrested in October, confessed that
he had just returned from a conference with Enver Pasha,
to whom he had been conducted by a German official
formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo, and
disclosed some of the intrigues fostered by the Germans
and Turks against British authority in Egypt and India.

The Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha, who was visiting his
nominal suzerain, the Sultan, at the time of the outbreak
of hostilities, was won over to the Turco-German designs
in respect to Egypt, and it was announced that he would
soon return at the head of an army for the purpose of
liberating his country from British domination.

On December 19, 1914, the establishment of a formal
British protectorate over Egypt and the succession of
Prince Hussein Kemal Pasha, with the title Sultan, to the
throne of his dispossessed uncle, Khedive Abbas Hilmi
Pasha, were officially announced by the British government.

Turkish positions of considerable strength on the Red
Sea fell into the hands of the British. One of these was
Akaba, situated at the northern extremity of the eastern
arm of that sea, the intended base for one of the Turkish

'T^*^

Fort litis, at Tsing-Tau.

German twenty-eight centimetre howitzer and turret at Tsing-Tau destroyed
by the Japanese gun fire.

Close in West; Operations Out of Europe 333

army corps destined for the invasion of Egypt. Anotlier
was Sheich Seyd on the rocky peninsula threatening the
southern approach to the Suez Canal. Three battalions of
Indian troops landed under cover of a war-vessel on the
low isthmus connecting this stronghold with the mainland,
and captured all the Turkish positions.

The British government formally annexed the island of
Cyprus on November 6th, in consequence of the state of
war existing between itself and the Turkish government.
The British had occupied and administered this island since
1878, paying annually ^£"92,800 to the Sultan in acknowledg-
ment of his ultimate rights of sovereignty. In return for
this tenancy the British government had promised to defend
the Asiatic possessions of the Sublime Porte against the en-
croachment of Russia. But now, by the strange revolution
in policies, Great Britain, in league with the very power
which was then the chief source of her apprehension, was
striving to subvert the integrity of the Ottoman Empire
which she had once been most determined to uphold.

It was natural that the British should hasten to forestall
their enemies in the possession of the region of the lower
Euphrates and Tigris, the possibilities of which had been
emphasized by the construction of the Bagdad Railway.
An expedition from India under Lieutenant-general Sir A.
Barrett and Brigadier-general W. S. Delamain disembarked
at the head of the Persian Gulf, defeated the Turkish forces
in two engagements and occupied Basra situated at the con-
fluence of the two great rivers, the contemplated terminus
of the Bagdad Railway, on November 21st. The opera-
tions in this quarter, though commenced on a compara-
tively insignificant scale, held out the vague but seductive
promise of an imposing development, the possible con-
quest of the most ancient seats of dominion and opulence,
and the appropriation of the Garden of Eden.

CHAPTER XIII

War's New Aspects

Principles of strategy universal, their application variable. Changed
international considerations as to Belgium. Plan of passing through Bel-
gium and the German offensive. General advantages of the offensive.
The tactics of the campaign : German mass attacks ; the part of the in-
fantry ; the use of the cavalry ; artillery support. Transportation : the
railways and their various uses; motor- propelled vehicles. Air service:
types of aircraft; anti-aircraft guns; improvements in air-machines; the
modern Zeppelin : the captive balloon. Means of communication. The
lesson of the campaign.

Wars are no longer confined to the operations of pro-
fessional armies but are fought by whole nations. The
"nation in arms" has become a reality and if in war the
entire population does not actually stand under arms, it is
at least mobilized for war. The art of war makes use of
every product of industry, art, and science. The conduct
of modern war absorbs every branch of human activity,
coordinates, intensifies, and directs it for the sole purpose
of subduing the enemy. The principles of strategy are
universal and eternal and have for their object the destruc-
tion of the armed forces of the enemy, but the application
of those principles varies according to the character of the
peoples engaged in the conflict, with every war, in every
theater of operations, and in every campaign. A young,
vigorous, growing, progressive, and aggressive nation, con-
scious of its own strength, will as certainly carry the war
into enemy territory as a poorly organized, or a merely
fully developed and comfortably rich people will fail to

334

War's New Aspects 335

take the initiative. The surprises of the Great War have
been in the relative strength of the belligerents; in the
employment of the machinery and materials of war; in
the resources of the countries at war, which should have
been better known; in the character of the man behind
the gun; not in the numbers available, which were well
known, nor in the broad lines of operations w^hich had
been foreseen by the students and writers of the several
Great Powers engaged. That the armies of the central
powers, under the leadership of Germany, would take the
offensive was as well known to Great Britain, France, and
Russia as to the Great General Staff which planned the
campaigns; that they could take the offensive on only one
front at one time was a condition imposed by the numerical
superiority of the Entente armies; that the initial cam-
paign of the war would be the German offensive in France
was perfectly clear to all students of military affairs, and
even to the casual reader. Just what form this campaign
would take was known only to the German and Austrian
leaders responsible for the conduct of the war.

An invasion of France through Belgium w^as a proba-
bility which received the consideration of all the powers
concerned. Von Moltke, in outlining Prussia's primary
military measures in case of war with France, in a memorial
prepared in 1858, says: "Belgium sees in France the only
actual enemy to her national independence; she considers
England, Prussia, and even Holland as her best allies." He
argued that the Netherlands lay outside of the probable
theater of war, and that to occupy Holland at the very
start would be an unjustifiable splitting up of the Prussian
forces. Taking into consideration that the English army
was in India and would be required there for years, he
pointed out that Belgium could expect help only from
Prussia in case she was attacked bv France. He said: "If

336 The Great War

we respect Belgium's neutrality we will protect thereby
the largest part of our western frontier." The conditions
in 1914 were largely reversed, Belgium no longer con-
sidered France an enemy to her national independence.
Great Britain, from being the traditional enemy of France
had become her ally — an alliance directed against Germany.
Belgium, from being a protection to Germany's western
frontier in a war with France became, if not a probable
enemy, at least a constant preoccupation. It cannot now
be known when the campaign against France through
Belgium was decided upon.

The plan being adopted, the campaign in France became
at once the most gigantic as well as one of the simplest
movements known to the Art of War. It may be de-
scribed as an enveloping movement in which the holding
attack extended from Switzerland to Verdun and the en-
veloping attack from Verdun to the frontier of Holland
and in which the units employed were field armies. The
object of the holding forces in the southern half of the
frontier was to threaten the entire line so as to keep
the French in ignorance of the direction of the principal
attack, thus preventing them from shifting troops to other
threatened points, and to offer effective resistance to any
serious attack launched by the French against that part of
the frontier. The main attack was designed to envelop
the French left, including the Belgians and the British,
and roll it back on the center, producing a congestion and
confusion which would result in disaster, or to break
through the lines, detaching the French left wing from
the central group of armies. By very skilful maneuvering
the French were able to withdraw the armies of the north
without permitting them to be rolled up in confusion or
having them cut off by the great German drive until the
left rested on the intrenched camp of Paris.

•^

«^.ft*

French guns moiinicil on spcrial railway tnirks

Frcncli oni.- hiuulri-il and titly-tivc nullmutrc gim

War's New Aspects 337

It is difficult to overestimate the advantages of the offen-
sive in the initial campaign of a war in which the numbers
employed are so great. The aggressor virtually launches
his campaign when he orders his mobilization, and his
troops begin to move by prearranged schedule, each by
the shortest line, to the points on the frontier from w^iich
they are to begin actual hostilities. The defender must
order his mobilization at the same time. The mobiliza-
tions of the armies are based on the maximum capacity of
the railroads of the country, in accordance with schedules
prepared in time of peace, in which the day and hour of
the departure of every unit from its home station and its
arrival at its point of detraining are fixed. In the very
nature of the movement any departure from the prepared
schedules results, if not in confusion, at least in delays which
may prove fatal. It is impracticable to change the zone of
mobilization, once mobilization is ordered. Since the plans
of the offensive cannot ordinarily be known, the attack
must come in the nature of a surprise even though the
offensive plans become known before the mobilization is
complete. The army which assumes the defensive role in
the initial campaign will naturally mobilize its great reserve
in some central zone in the rear of the frontier, from which
it may be thrown to the threatened points by a system of
railways parallel to the frontier. Even this cannot be done
until the original mobilization is complete. The defensive
follows the lead of the offensive and much valuable time is
lost. The defender will be very fortunate if his lateral rail
communication is not cut before he can make use of it.

The Teutonic allies having initiated the war by a su-
preme effort in the West their defensive attitude in the
East was a necessity. The duties of all the belligerents
were at once clearly defined. In order to cooperate with
her allies, Russia, as soon as her mobilization justified it and

338 The Great War

sooner than had been anticipated, took the offensive in East
Prussia and in Galicia. Her prompt and vigorous action
probably saved the Allied armies in France from disaster.

In the tactics of the several arms it can be said that there
has been no violent upheaval as a result of the Great War.
Much space in the daily press was utilized in describing
the wasteful, mass tactics of the German infantry attack in
the great drive through Belgium into France. This may
be likened to the outcry from all sides about the use of
dum-dum bullets. The reports were in both cases largely
the product of the excited imaginations of observers unused
to war. The success or failure of the attack depends on
the ability or inability of the attacker to gain fire superior-
ity over the defender. The defense will put in action the
greatest number of rifles that his defensive lines will accom-
modate, which is one man per yard. The attack cannot be
expected to succeed with fewer rifles on the line and more
cannot be used. Reserves must be strong; the gaps in the
firing line must be filled and the line maintained at its
maximum strength until the moment of assault. A com-
mander who undertakes an attack is not to be excused for
failure so long as he has a formed reserve in hand. Re-
serves are provided to be used and if a position is carried
without the employment of all the reserves they find their
most important use in the pursuit. The attacker expects
heavier losses than he can inflict on the enemy until the
position is carried and the retreat begins. Then the suc-
cessful force begins to reap the fruits of its victory. The
vanquished loses according to the vigor of the pursuit and
his own skill in withdrawal, but always heavily.

That the German mass attacks received the exclusive
attention of the press is due to the fact that the Germans
were on the offensive and attacking constantly up to and
including the Battle of the Marne. It is likely that the

War's New Aspects 339

German commanders weighed carefully each situation,
knew their own needs, estimated the cost in lives, and
assaulted the desired position, or brought up heavy artil-
lery to reduce it, or left an investing force, according to
w^ell understood principles of strategy and tactics as applied
to the offensive. It is only the offensive that produces
decisive results; a defensive attitude can only be justilied
as a temporary expedient.

Infantry remains the arm that decides the final issue of
combat. The fact that in the trench warfare in France it
can neither advance nor maintain its line without artillerv
support does not diminish the relative value of infantry ; it
simply makes greater demands on the artillery, as is alu^ays
the case in siege warfare. The lines are covered by im-
passable obstacles which must be removed before they can
be assaulted. Only artillery is able to clear away those
obstacles and prepare the way for the assault. Only infan-
try is able to seize and hold intrenchments in the zone of
siege operations. The strongest points cannot be held
without artillery support, for the strongest fort of concrete
and steel and earth may be destroyed by the modern siege-
gun, once it is located. The number and power of the
heavy field-guns now in use with the armies in the field is
unprecedented. The Allies are said to be using 15,000
guns in France and Belgium. Since they have been un-
able to establish any superiority in artillery, their opponents
must be using an equal number.

The first few weeks of the war in France saw the cavalry
used to the limit of endurance. The German cavalry cov-
ered the right flank of the armies in advance, in retreat,
and in the race for the coast which followed the Battle of
the Marne. It was constantly in contact with the British
and French cavalry, and cavalry combats were of daily,
almost hourly occurrence. It is reported that a large force

340 The Great War

of French cavalry did not unsaddle their horses for five
days and nights. Corresponding demands were made on
the cavalry employed on both sides. The result v^^as a par-
tial destruction and complete exhaustion of the mounts of
the cavalry. It was a heavy toll on the opposing armies,
but horses can no more be spared than men when the
safety of armies, the existence of nations even, may depend
on them. As soon as the operations resulted in a deadlock
from Switzerland to the coast, the German cavalry took its
place in the trenches by the side of the infantry until it was
required in another theater of war. The cavalry of the
Allies had corresponding tasks consigned to it. Cavalry is
a resourceful arm ; it operates mounted habitually, but must
be in every way the equal of dismounted troops when
separated from its horses.

Not only the trench warfare in Europe but the increase
in power and efficiency of guns and gunners has added
greatly to the value of artillery. Prepared positions and
intrenchments cannot be successfully attacked without
powerful artillery support. Field-guns, before the war,
depended largely upon shrapnel. Shrapnel have much
greater efficiency against troops in the open than shell, but
are powerless to destroy earthworks. Only by the use of
high-explosive shells can the trenches and the obstacles
which cover them be destroyed and the way cleared for the
attack. Even with such ammunition the light field-piece
is not very effective. Heavy field-artillery has assumed an
unprecedented importance in warfare. One of the sur-
prises of the war was that guns had been developed capa-
ble of transportation in the field and of operation from
mobile or rapidly constructed platforms which were able
to destroy every class of permanent fortification in a few
shots. The French have perhaps the most efficient light
field-gun employed in the war, but the superiority of

War's New Aspects 341

the German heavy guns easily offsets the advantage thus
gained.

The Great War differs from previous wars first in the
unprecedented numbers of the armies in the field. The
mobilization, concentration, and supply of these armies is
made possible only by the development of modern means of
transport. First in importance is the railway, which takes a
place in war second only to arms and munitions. The first
great demand on the railroads was for the mobilization, in
which France and Germany each used probably 5,000 trains,
in addition to those used for concentration. Single-track
lines accommodated twenty and even more trains daily each
way, while the double-track lines were able to move an
army corps per day, handling in some cases more than 200
trains. Troops should move by rail from 300 to 400 miles in
twenty-four hours, while on foot they make from 12 to 25.
The great mobilizations and concentrations could, how-
ever, with certainty be made by marching if it were not for
the question of supply. The supply of rations and muni-
tions to the enormous concentrations in limited areas is not
practicable without mechanical transport, and only the rail-
road is adapted to the transport of the heavy material.

In addition to being a mere means of transport the rail-
way coach and car are adapted to a variety of military uses.
Water-cars and refrigerator-cars are extensively used; com-
plete sanitary trains with almost every convenience of a
stationary hospital transport the wounded from the front;
armored trains provide protection against small-arms fire;
and flat cars so arranged as to distribute the load over a
number of axles and to take the weight off the wheels
during action are used as gun platforms for siege-guns.
Railroads are not usually so vulnerable that the ordinary
means and time available for their destruction can render
them incapable of rapid repair or reconstruction. The

342 The Great War .

destruction of tunnels and large bridges are the only serious
obstacles to the engineer troops that accompany armies.
Unimportant bridges are hastily replaced by temporary
structures and tunnels may often be avoided by laying
track around them. Railroad construction corps are able
to lay new track in fair country and keep up with the
advance of the victorious armies against a stubborn foe.

An auxiliary to the railway, but one capable of a great
variety of uses, is the motor-propelled vehicle. It trans-
ports all but the heaviest materials on the good roads of
central and western Europe at a speed far greater than that
of the horse-drawn vehicle and approximating for short
distances that of the railway train. Every class of motor-
car finds its use with the army; private cars are requisi-
tioned for the use of staff officers and dispatch carriers,
while large touring cars, auto-omnibuses, trucks, and even
taxicabs have been extensively employed in the transporta-
tion of troops as well as of supplies. It has been estimated
that 1,000 or 1,200 omnibuses or trucks capable of carrying
thirty men can transport an army corps at the rate of seven
to ten miles per hour, and that they would occupy a road
space of only about two-thirds of the same force marching,
thus adding greatly not only to the rapidity of movement
but to the time required for concentration or deployment.
Such a movement is practicable for infantry only. The
cavalry and siege-artillery of an army corps cannot be
transported by motor-trucks, and the heavy artillery can
be conveyed only by heavy tractors at a much reduced
speed. The movement of an army corps then without
rail or water transport is limited to the rate of march of its
artillery.

The most important as well as the most spectacular
development in machines of war has been in the air ser-
vice. The captive balloon has long been used for purposes

War's New Aspects 343

of observation; free balloons have occasionally been used
by a besieged force for communication with the outside
world; dirigibles of various types have been experimented
with in peace; and the heavier-than-air machine had
demonstrated that it would find use in any future war.
But the armored, fighting air-machine equipped \\ith
♦ machine-guns and bomb-throwers is a creation of the war.
Before the war the Great Powers of Europe, notably
France and Germany, had developed the American inven-
tion of the Wright brothers until the aeroplane was a
familiar figure about the capitals and other large cities
of the continent. The centers of aviation offered diver-
sion and amusement daily to thousands of spectators who
thronged the aviation fields. There were monoplanes and
biplanes of almost as many types as there were inventors
and builders who sought their fortunes in the production
of craft for navigating the air. Flying became a popular
sport, more perilous, more exciting than racing, and re-
quiring greater expenditures without the corresponding
sources of revenue. The air-machine had no earning
capacity except as an exhibition feature and depended for
its support largely on the governments and on popular
subscription. Particularly in France, led by the press,
popular subscription for the control of the air amounted to
millions. France began by leading in the air. Conceding
the control at sea to Great Britain and the greatest strength
on land to Germany, supremacy in the air, as a national
aspiration, became very popular in France. Germany fol-
lowed in the use of heavier-than-air machines, but in a
characteristic German manner, under the leadership of the
government, which was quick to recognize its military
value, the German flyers w^ere not long in establishing
world records, notably the endurance flight of twenty-four
hours accomplished by a German aviator a few months

344 The Great War

before the outbreak of war. The same thoroughness
which directed her industry and created her army made
Germany superior to any of her enemies in the use of
aircraft for war purposes at the beginning of the war.

The demands made on the aviation service by the armies
in the field have resulted in the production of three types
of craft based on tactical requirements. The defensive
machine guards the front of the army of operations or im-
portant points in the interior against hostile aircraft. For
this purpose a light machine offering a small target is used,
in which armor protection is less important than extreme
speed and great climbing power. The reconnaisance ma-
chine flies over the enemy's line, directs the fire of the
artillery and photographs enemy positions. This requires
a steady, safe motor, to secure which it is necessary to
carry greater weight at a sacrifice of some of the speed
possessed by the light anti-aircraft guard. The machine
used to bombard hostile troops and positions must carry
great weight in explosives, in guns, and in fuel; this re-
quires a heavy, safe motor of great power, and results in a
machine which develops less speed than the other two
types. If at the beginning of the war it was recognized
that aeroplanes could serve any other purpose in war than
that of reconnaissance it was only the Germans who held
such belief. The air attacks on Paris during the great
drive in France, unimportant as they were, show that
Germany had not overlooked the possibility of using her
aeroplanes for attacking important points. The war soon
demonstrated, however, that air scouts can no more obtain
information without fighting for it than can cavalry. To
prevent the enemy's reconnaissance it is necessary to attack
him in the air. Defense by guns operated from the ground
below are ineffective against the flyer, whether they are
stationary or portable. Only important points can be

War's New Aspects 345

guarded with guns and the guns are effective at only very
limited altitudes. The pilot and the observer as well as the
vulnerable parts of the machine are protected from fire from
below, and have little to fear from small arms when flying at
a height of 1,000 or 1,200 yards. On the other hand, to
be protected from artillery fire the air-machine must main-
tain an altitude of two miles or more. However, neither
observation nor bomb-throwing is very effective at such alti-
tudes and the airman must take his chances. The aeroplane
makes a very poor target. The vulnerable parts present a
surface hardly greater than a square yard, while the largest
machine looks about the size of a postage stamp at 8,000
feet elevation. Considering, then, that it moves in three
dimensions at the rate of thirty yards per second the prob-
ability, or improbability, of hits by surface guns is apparent.
For the gunner, reducing the range increases rapidly the
difficulty of pointing.

At the beginning of the war Germany had 300 aero-
planes, Austria 100, France 300, and Great Britain 100.
The British machines were poorly organized for war ser-
vice; France had a number of squadrons of four machines
and some experiments in reconnaissance had been made;
the Germans had gone more thoroughly into the applica-
tion of flying to military purposes and were employing
many machines in long flights under conditions simulating
actual war. The result was the remarkable efficiency shown
by the German air service in the first months of the war,
although fighting on two fronts. The number of heavier-
than-air machines employed by the belligerents cannot at
this time be ascertained, but it is estimated that the Allies
are using more than 1,500 machines in France.

The French are reported to be making great efforts to
create a type of mighty triplane carrying twelve men and
four 1^-inch guns at a speed of eighty miles an hour.

346 The Great War

They are designed to be used to bombard enemy positions
in the actual zone of operations as an auxiliary to the land
batteries. The air scouts for the heavy machines are small
biplanes with great speed and climbing ability and armed
each with a machine-gun. These scout machines can be
manipulated without the use of the hands and carry only
one man, who is gunner as well as pilot and observer.
Great Britain has made great efforts to improve her air
service regardless of the cost, which it is estimated will
exceed one biUion dollars for the year 1916.

The Germans have made great improvements in their
machines. A British report credits them with having pro-
duced a type of tractor biplane driven by two motors, each
of 100 to 150 horse-power; the machine is said to carry a
pilot and two gunners armed with machine-guns, to have
tremendous speed, and to be able to remain in the air for
six hours. The Fokker, a Dutch invention used by the
Germans, is a small, high-power machine of great speed,
with a climbing power unequalled by any other machine
produced. Its superior maneuvering ability makes it a
powerful defensive weapon, but it is a small machine un-
suited for reconnaissance or bomb-throwing.

Full information on the subject of the air service of the
armies of the belligerents is naturally not available. A few
points of importance are, however, well known. There
are very few motors of less than 100 horse-power and,
except for the very heavy machines, the minimum speed
requirement is about 100 miles per hour. Before the war,
aviation schools counted on six months to develop a pilot;
the training camps of the armies now produce pilots in six
or seven weeks, and the student aviator who does not
become proficient in twelve weeks is declared inapt.

At the beginning of the war the efficiency of the Ger-
man air service, like that of some of her other war services,

War's New Aspects 347

had been underestimated by observers who should have
been better able to foresee the result in war of German
thoroughness, which was well known. Germany had an
air fleet consisting of about ten Zeppelins. She had an
equal number of smaller airships of the Parseval type with
a speed of from twenty-iive to forty miles per hour, but
they have not sufficient power to fly in adverse winds and
are so slow that they are easily attacked by aeroplanes.
Only the Zeppelins have been efficient.

A modern Zeppehn is more than 600 feet long, 60 or 70
feet in diameter, and develops a speed of 60 to 75 miles
per hour. It carries armor and armament which render it
reasonably safe from attack by aeroplanes, except from
above. It is said to be able to climb more rapidly than
the aeroplane and possesses the distinct advantages of
being able to rise vertically and to hover over the object
of attack. Before the war Russia had a number of small
airships, but they have not proved of any particular value,
and neither France nor Great Britain had accomplished
more than mediocre results with dirigibles. France has
employed ten or a dozen small ships of the non-rigid and
semi-rigid types, principally in coast guard duty, but none
of these ships has the speed or maneuvering ability of a
Zeppelin. Great Britain is said never to have produced an
airship that has proved a success. The only air-machine
that is capable of long distance raids is the Zeppelin. It
makes use of the aids to navigation employed by ships at
sea and may direct its course to distant points concealed by
fog or clouds without reference to directing points below.
In one of the bombardments of Paris the city is believed
to have been invisible to the observers on the airship. One
of the most important missions of the Zeppelin is believed
to be scouting for the navy; its ability to remain stationary.
receive as well as send wireless messages, and its possible

348 The Great War

destructive effect against submarines which are visible from
above even when submerged, seem to clothe it with all the
essential properties of an efficient naval scout. It is diffi-
cult to justify by results the expenditures of money and the
vital energy which have gone into Zeppelins, but Germany
continues to build them. Their raids have produced a
depressing effect on the British public. The Zeppelin,
which stands in a class by itself, is an offensive weapon,
to oppose which the Allies have nothing.

For purposes of observation the captive balloon stands
next in importance to the flying machines. The Germans
use a sausage-shaped balloon that is much steadier than the
spherical balloon, which is so unstable as to make observa-
tions very difficult and often produces such violent nausea
that observation is impossible even for the most seasoned
aeronaut.

Carrier pigeons still find their place in war. They have
been used probably as extensively, though not so exclu-
sively, as in former wars. Wire and wireless, aeroplane,
heliograph, flag, automobile, motorcycle, mounted mes-
senger, and dog are means of communication at once rapid
and reliable ; but they are not always practicable. An ob-
server landed from an aeroplane behind the hostile lines may
make use of carrier pigeons when no other means of com-
municating is available. If operating in friendly territory
occupied by the enemy he may avoid detection and secure
and transmit information of the greatest value. Dogs have
been employed in the Great War to an extent not hereto-
fore known. The " Dog of Flanders" drawing a machine-
gun has been made a familiar figure by the photographer.
To a less degree dogs have been used by sentinels on de-
tached posts to give quick warning of approaching danger,
and with patrols reconnoitering roads and by-ways in
advance. Sled dogs from Alaska have been carried to

P Otierva/ion Post

B b' .,..:... B"

Tieinforced franch

A A- ^- -

CcmmuiujLatiok Tiviich fnr ^1 j
refiiiiiient. upproacln revic/uo/iiitg

ShelterTrentlt

From JO to dOO metres /

CcnmunictlonTrenck ^ ^ fe^t^^^lt <^ilSl^

^ to lengCA of front ana t/ie^

(mporij/ice of I tie position )

Comnuun'catioii TJvnch

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^tie Section, er ef
.. ^' //*<> u/iii.

O \ o IH% O

Stu'lter Trencfi
a'"' Line

Com/ni/iitca^icti Tiv/icA

Slwifcr /o/' //tp CAir/" \
_^- 0/ t/teseotio/i

C C. Very pronounced ^c^ans
/or r

rejan/sir/'f
/^anJft/ig
O

•ft/ig A/e.

•b'heJter Tiencti
/" Line

Arrangement of the Ciernian defensive and protective trenches.

J Cover cf shelter, formed 0/
tree-truiiki coyereJ nitfi
30 to -to centimetre.} of
campresieJ anj turf -
ulcere J earth. .

loop -holes
Barik of the trench, turfed

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Block oF S loop hole for
jtone * machine-gun. .

Jnotker fern

Loop ho/e

Hole For
rations, etc. ;"

ReinA)rced trenches: Details of roofs, loopholes, ami tlie torni of tlie excavations.

War's New Aspects 349

France, where they are used in the mountains for trans-
porting supplies, munitions, and the wounded.

The appUcation of recent inventions in modern war is
startHng because of the enormous resources of the bellig-
erents, which permits their employment on such a gigantic
scale, but no machine of war has appeared which will
cause an upheaval in the principles of strategy and tactics.
Nevertheless, the Great War teaches many valuable lessons.
Leaders of troops will await impatiently the detailed his-
tories of operations which are to be their guides in future
wars; but the responsibilities and duties of the nation are
already clear. Modern war mobilizes the entire popula-
tion and organizes every industry of the State in the ser-
vice of national defense. " In time of peace prepare for
War" states the problem; universal military training is the
solution.

CHAPTER XIV

The Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France

Scarcely had the nations been launched upon the seeth-
ing flood of the world-war, when the most appalling rumors
of cruelties and atrocities began to emanate from the seat
of hostilities in the West, vague and desultory at first, but
quickly increasing in vividness and persistence, tales of
pillage and of the wanton destruction of property, of the
violation of women and children and of the indiscriminate
slaughter of innocent civilians, and finally of every kind of
abominable crime and brutality which had ever defiled the
blood-stained annals of warfare.

The world stood aghast, bewildered with amazement
and horror. The imagination was staggered by the enor-
mity of the offenses reported. Many persons whose judg-
ment was not swayed by prejudice or passion refused to
admit without indisputable evidence that a people whom

350

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 351

they had always regarded as preeminently kindly, culti-
vated, and orderly could have lost so suddenly all restrain-
ing sense of compassion and humanity. The nations
directly interested in the victims of the German invasion
took systematic steps to collect and publish the evidence
for the varions acts of cruelty and lawlessness which were
said to have been committed.

Space will hardly permit the rehearsal of even a repre-
sentative selection of the occurrences recorded in these
reports. But a summary account of a few of them, chosen
partly at random, partly for their connection with events
already narrated, and partly for their special importance in
connection with the general conclusions, which will be
developed later, will afford a general idea of the nature of
the entire series. The fundamental contradiction which
complicates the whole question of atrocities should be
stated clearly at the outset. In practically all cases where
property was deliberately destroyed and civilians were
killed, the Germans declared that they had been fired
upon or otherwise attacked in violation of the accepted
usages of war, while the Allies just as universally denied
this allegation. Indorsement of the accounts presented by
the different belligerents is not implied in the direct form
of discourse which is used for the sake of brevity in the
summaries of them that follow.

Within a few days after the outbreak of the war, the
Belgian Minister of Justice, M. Henry Carton de Wiart,
appointed a Commission of Inquiry composed of promi-
nent statesmen and jurists, charging them with the task of
examining into the violation of the rules of international
law and of the established usages of war. This commis-
sion sat in Brussels. But after August 18th, when the seat
of government was transferred to Antwerp and communi-
cation with Brussels was impeded, the minister of justice

352 The Great War

appointed a sub-committee of the Commission of Inquiry
with headquarters at the new capital. In a series of reports
the commission thus constituted has published evidence,
derived from the sworn statements of eye-witnesses, calcu-
lated to show that the invaders of Belgium resorted to pro-
ceedings which violated the most elementary conceptions
of humanity and are prohibited by the rules of warfare
sanctioned at The Hague ; that they maltreated and massa-
cred the peaceful population; sacked and burned open and
undefended towns and villages; reduced to dust historical
and religious monuments, and gave to the flames the
famous Hbrary of Louvain; and that they practised a de-
liberate policy of terrorism. On account of their excep-
tionally crucial character, some of the most conspicuous
examples of the alleged German outrages in Belgium are
reserved for a later part of the chapter, where they will be
treated on the basis of a comparison of the testimony from
all the sources.

We commence our survey of some of the other charac-
teristic incidents with the occurrences at Andenne, which
is situated on the right bank of the Meuse between Namur
and Huy and was connected by a bridge with Seilles on the
left bank, a circumstance which invested it with an ill-
omened significance in the early days of the German
irruption. An advance-guard of Uhlans arrived here on
August 19th but found that the bridge had been blown
up. A pontoon bridge was substituted and a column
of German troops began to defile through the town on
the 20th.

According to one of the Belgian reports a shot heard at
six P. M., followed by an explosion, threw the German sol-
diers into a fury of excitement. They began firing wildly
in the streets, sacked the town, set it on fire in several
places, and shot many persons whom they encountered.

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 353

Next morning the inhabitants were driven from their
houses and gathered together, and forty or fifty were
singled out and executed in expiation of a pretended attack
on the German troops.

Tamines on the Sambre between Namur and Charleroi
was one of those populous, prosperous villages which had
been the distinction and strength of thrifty Belgium. It
was occupied for several days in August, 1914, by detach-
ments of French soldiers, and these, supported bv a party
of the Garde Civique from Charleroi, resisted a German
patrol on the 20th, killing several Uhlans. On the next
day the Germans occupied the place, sacked and burned
264 houses, and arrested many of the inhabitants. On
the 22d, between 400 and 450 of the latter were col-
lected near the bank of the river and summarily executed
by the fire of rifles and of a machine-gun, some of the
wounded being finished off by bayonet thrusts, while
others, it would appear, put an end to their sufferings by
rolling into the Sambre.

The German troops who entered Nanmr at four P. M.
on August 23d, conducted themselves in an orderly manner
until the evening of the next day at nine, when suddenly,
without the slightest warning, they set fire to the citv in
several places, shot many of the defenseless inhabitants as
they attempted to escape from their burning houses, and
engaged in extensive plundering.

The Germans entered and sacked the village of Hastiere-
par-dela on August 23d, killed and wounded a large num-
ber of persons, burned the greater part of the houses, and
executed the parish priest, a professor of the University
of Louvain, the local schoolmaster and others upon con-
demnation of a court-martial composed of officers, some of
whom were intoxicated. About the same time eighteen
men, including several priests, were executed by a volley

354 The Great War

at Surice, because, as a German officer alleged, a girl of
fifteen fired on one of the German commanders.

By decree of the French government on September 23,
1914, M. Georges Payelle, First President of the Court of
Accounts (Cour des Comptes); M. Armand Mollard, Min-
ister Plenipotentiary to Luxemburg; Georges Maringer,
Counselor of State; and Edmond Paillot, Counselor of
the Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation) were appointed
a committee for the investigation of atrocities said to
have been committed by the German armies in the por-
tions of France vv^hich they had occupied. This com-
mittee professedly submitted the testimony, v^^hich had
been received under oath, to a severely critical exami-
nation and made a report on December 17, 1914, pre-
senting the facts which it regarded as established beyond
dispute.

In addition to a large number of infamous crimes of an
isolated character committed in ail parts of the territory
occupied at any time by the Germans, the report contained
the account of many systematic outrages.

At Triaucourt, for example, in the Department of the
Meuse, the Germans were said to have given themselves
up to the worst excesses, burning thirty-five houses and
killing indiscriminately many of the inhabitants.

During the first day or two of the occupation of Lune-
ville, they were content with robbing the inhabitants. But
about 3.30 p.m. on August 25th their attitude suddenly
changed. Claiming that the population had fired upon the
hospital and had made an attack by ambuscade on the Ger-
man columns and transports, they began shooting in the
streets and setting fire to houses. Although M. Keller,
the Mayor, made a tour of the streets with German officers
and soldiers to prove the absurdity of this allegation, the
synagogue. Hotel de Ville, and about seventy houses were

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 355

burned, several persons were shot, and a large contribution
was levied on the town as an indemnity.

At Gerbeviller, in the Department of Meurthe-et-
Moselle, the German troops, chiefly Bavarians, infuriated
by the stubborn resistance of sixty French infantrymen,
took vengeance on the civilian population. They rushed
into the houses with savage yells, pillaging and destroying,
and kiUing men, women, and children. About 450 houses
were partially or totally destroyed.

After the population of Baccarat, in the same depart-
ment, had been assembled at the railway station on August
25th, the town was first systematically pillaged under the
supervision of German officers and then set on fire by
means of torches and pastilles, 112 houses being destroyed.

The Germans entered Senlis in the neighborhood of
Chantilly, as already related, on September 2d, where they
were greeted by rifle-fire from African troops. Claiming
that they had been fired upon by civilians, they sacked the
town and set fire to it in two difl^erent quarters with gre-
nades and rockets, destroying 105 houses, killing many of
the inhabitants, and executing the mayor, M. Odent, on the
ground that he had participated, or instigated others to
participate, in acts of hostility.

The report claimed that arson was a favorite means for
inspiring terror and cowing the inhabitants, that the Ger-
man armies were provided with a complete outfit for
producing conflagrations, comprising rockets, torches,
grenades, petroleum pumps, fuse-sticks, and little bags of
pastilles made of compressed powder which is very inflam-
mable, and that thousands of Iiouses were burned in France.
German oflicers, whose supersensitive conception of honor
was imable to endure the remotest implication of an afl^ront
from a comrade, were presumptuously charged by their ad-
versaries with committing the basest and most ignominious

356 The Great War

forms of iniquity. They were represented as commonly
indifferent to the Hcentious fury of their troops, as sharing
in the exercise and profits of organized pillage, and as
utilizing their irresponsible authority for perpetrating
among a defenseless population the crimes of extortion,
rape, and murder.

The German soldiers had been systematically encouraged
to keep individual diaries of the campaign by the military
authorities, who little suspected the purpose for which
many of these documents were destined to be employed
by their opponents. For a large number of them were
taken by the French from the bodies of the German dead
or from German prisoners and preserved for the sake of
the incriminating information which they contained.

Professor Joseph Bedier, the eminent authority on med-
ieval French literature at the College de France in Paris,
carefully examined a number of these diaries, and published
extracts from about thirty, nineteen of them accompanied
by facsimile reproductions of the original text, in a pam-
phlet entitled, Les crimes allemands d'apres des temoigjiages
allemands — German Atrocities from German Evidence.
Professor Bedier proposed to establish the guilt of the
Germans by the testimony of the Germans themselves, and
he declared that in the diaries employed for this purpose
"the German soldiers depict themselves or their compan-
ions in arms as incendiaries, robbers, and murderers, who,
however, in ordinary circumstances, only burn, rob, and
murder to order and in the course of their military duty."

This pamphlet, which appeared about the first of Jan-
uary, 1915, was translated into most of the leading languages
and spread throughout the world in thousands of copies.
It made a very great impression at once, and with very good
reason; for the evidence of this class is the most significant of
all, because its ingenuousness and authenticity are beyond

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I bfr letift ^diluS trxib^rt Mr.-.

! am ir.fiitcn in .^ri??,

, SM^r.Icuinonl O. SiciUin (m)

Translation.

"We had arrested three civilians,
and suddenly a good idea struck me.
We placed them on chairs and made
them understand that they must go
and sit on them in the middle of the
street. On one side entreaties, on
the other blows from the butt-end of
a gun. One gets terribly hardened
after a while. At last they were seated
outside in the street. I do not know
how many prayers of anguish they
said ; but they kept their hands tightly
clasped all the time. I pitied them;
but the device worked immediately.
The shooting at us from the house at
the side stopped at once ; we were able
to occupy the house in front, and be-
came masters of the principal street.
Every one after that who showed him-
self in the street was shot. The artil-
lery, too, did good work during this,
and when towards seven in the even-
ino-, the brigade advanced to free us,
I was able to report that 'St. Die is
free of the enemy.'

"As I learnt later on, the . . .
regiment of reserve which had en-
tered St. r3ie more from the north
had had similar experiences to ours.
The four civilians that had been made
to sit in the street had been killed by
French bullets. I saw them mvself,
stretched out in the middle of the
street, near the Hospital."

Facsimile of an account of a company of Germans sheltering themselves behind
non-combatants, written by Lieutenant Eberlein and published in the Munchner Neueste
Nachrichten, October 7, 1914.

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 357

question, and it depicts the critical occurrences in the art-
less, confidential words of the actors themselves. In the
hearing of the momentous action brought in the name of
humanity against the German army, this is the defendant's
own unpremeditated deposition.

A few of the most striking of these narratives will serve
to illustrate the whole series.

The first quotation presented by Professor Bedier, a
passage from the diary of a soldier of the first infantry
brigade of the Guard, describes very graphically the fright-
ful retribution inflicted at night upon a village near Bla-
mont on September 1st:

**The inhabitants fled through the village. It was horri-
ble. Blood was plastered on all the houses, and as for the
faces of the dead, they were hideous. They were all
buried at once, to the number of sixty. Among them
many old men and women, and one woman about to be
delivered. It was a ghastly sight. There were three chil-
dren who had huddled close to one another and had died
together. The altar and the ceiling of the church had
fallen in. They also had been telephoning to the enemy.
And this morning, September 2d, all the survivors were
driven out, and I saw four little boys carrying on two poles
a child five or six months old. All this was horrible to see.
A blow for a blow. Thunder for thunder. Everything
was pillaged. The poultry and everything else was killed.
(There was a) mother with her two little ones ; one had a
large wound in the head and had lost an eye."

The diary of an officer of the 178th regiment. Twelfth
(Saxon) Army Corps, relates the destruction of a village in
the Ardennes in Belgium:

"The beautiful village of Gue d'Hossus has been de-
stroyed by fire, although entirely innocent, as it seems to
me. Apparently a cyclist fell from his machine, and in

358 The Great War

the fall his gun went off of itself. Straightway there was
firing in his direction. The male inhabitants were simply
consigned to the flames. It is to be hoped that such
atrocities will not be repeated."

The diary of a soldier of the first battalion of the same
regiment contains the following entry under August 23d:

" In the evening at ten o'clock the first battalion of the
178th regiment went down to the village that had been
burnt to the north of Dinant. A sad and beautiful sight,
and one that made you shudder. At the entrance of the
village lay the bodies of about fifty civilians who had been
shot for having fired upon our troops from ambush. In
the course of the night, many others were shot in the
same way, so that we could count more than two hundred.
The women and children, lamp in hand, had to watch the
horrible scene. We then ate our rice in the midst of the
corpses, for we had not tasted food since morning."

Reservist Schlauter of the 4th regiment of field-artillery
of the Guard mentions the following incidents of the march
through Belgium occurring on August 25th:

"Three hundred of the inhabitants of the town were
shot and those who survived the volley were requisitioned
as gravediggers. You should have seen the women at this
moment ! But you can't do otherwise. During our march
on Wilot things went better. The inhabitants who wished
to leave could do so and go where they liked, but anyone
who fired was shot. When we left Owele shots were
fired; but there, women and everything were fired upon.
At the frontier they have to-day shot a Hussar and de-
stroyed the bridge. The bridge has been rebuilt by the
gallant infantry."

Professor Bedier reproduces the text of an order of the
day issued by Major-general Stenger, commander of the
58th brigade, on August 26th, as follows:

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 359

"From to-day no more prisoners will be made. All
prisoners will be put to death. The wounded whether
armed or not will be put to death. Even prisoners grouped
in larger formations will be put to death. No enemy shall
be left alive behind us.
{Signed)

"First-lieutenant and Company-chief Stoy, Colonel and
Regimental-commander Neubauer, Major-general and
Brigade-commander Stenger."

According to Professor Bedier, furthermore, about thirt}'
German soldiers belonging to General Stenger's brigade,
who had been taken prisoners by the French, affirmed
under oath that this order of the day was transmitted to
them on the 26th and five of these declared that they had
actually seen instances of its execution. Other evidence
seemingly confirmed the tenor of their testimony.

The text of a personal narrative describing the German
occupation of St. Die on August 27th, written by a Bavarian
officer. First-lieutenant A. Eberlein, and published in the
Miinchner Neueste Nachrichten on October 7th, is quoted as
proof of the frequent but almost unbelievable assertion
that the Germans shielded themselves from the enemy's
fire by the shameful method of forcing civilians to stand or
advance in front of them.

Lieutenant Eberlein's company as advance-guard entered
St. Die in the belief that the town had been entirely evac-
uated by the enemy, but they were suddenly assailed by
French troops, who poured a volley into their ranks from
behind a barricade, while rifle-iire blazed from the win-
dows of the neighboring houses. A brilliant idea came to
the heutenant. Bewildered at first and entirely cut off, he
and his men barricaded themselves in a house while wait-
ing for reinforcements and by blows from the butt end
of a rifle compelled three male inhabitants, whom they

360 The Great War

had captured, to go into the middle of the street and
remain there seated on chairs during the fight. This
apparently produced the desired effect, as the firing
subsided soon after. Lieutenant Eberlein related further
that a German reserve regiment which entered St. Die by
another road had recourse to a similar stratagem. Of the
four civilians who were compelled to march in front of
this column, two were killed and two were severely
wounded, according to a later investigation made by the
French authorities.

In a number of instances the diaries offer corroborative
evidence of the allegations made in the French Official Re-
port. A striking example of such coincidence is afforded
by the accounts of the conduct of the Germans at Nomeny
in the Department of Meurthe-et-Moselle. According to
the French account the Germans, in a state of terrible ex-
citement, entered this town, where the inhabitants had
taken refuge in their cellars to escape the fire of artillery,
on August 20th, and gave themselves over to abominable
excesses, sacking and burning the town systematically and
killing many of the people as they were attempting to
escape from the burning houses. The report states further
"that an officer arrived at the end of the butchery and
ordered the women who were still alive to get up and
shouted to them : * Go to France ! ' " The town was almost
entirely destroyed. The French emphatically denied the
charge that the inhabitants had fired on the German troops.

The same incident is described in the diary of a private
of the 8th Bavarian regiment of infantry as follows :

"A shell burst near the 11th company and wounded
seven men, three of them seriously. At five o'clock the
order was (given) to us by the officer commanding the
regiment to shoot all the male inhabitants of Nomeny and
to raze the whole town to the ground because the people

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Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 361

were making a mad attempt to oppose with arms the
advance of the German troops. We broke into the houses
and seized all those who resisted, to execute them accord-
ing to martial law. The houses which either the French
or our own artillery had not yet set on fire were burnt bv
us, and in consequence almost the whole town was reduced
to ashes. It is a terrible thing to see women and children,
defenseless and henceforth destitute of everything, driven
along like a flock of sheep to be shoved off in the direction
of France."

A committee was appointed by the British Prime Min-
ister on December 15, 1914, "to consider and advise on
the evidence collected on behalf of His Majesty's Govern-
ment as to outrages alleged to have been committed by
German troops during the present war, cases of alleged
maltreatment of civilians in the invaded territories, and
breaches of the laws and established usages of war; and to
prepare a report for His Majesty's Government showing
the conclusion at which they arrive on the evidence avail-
able." The committee was composed of the former British
Ambassador to the United States, the Right Honorable
Viscount Bryce, as chairman; of the eminent lawyers and
jurists, the Right Honorable Sir Frederick Pollock, the
Right Honorable Sir Edward Clarke, and Sir Alfred Hop-
kinson, with Sir Kenelm E. Digby added later; the Vice-
chancellor of the University of Sheffield and distinguished
historian, Mr. Herbert A. S. Fisher; and the editor of the
Edinburgh Review, Mr. Harold Cox.

The highmindedness and sincerity of these gentlemen
and their well-founded reputation for discernment and judi-
cial capacity commended the results of their investigation
to the thoughtful consideration of neutral nations. Doubt
may have subsisted as to the reliability and adequacy of the
available evidence, which was mainly derived from the

362 The Great War

depositions of Belgian refugees, whose testimony might
naturally be biased, and as to the facilities for obtaining a
correct appreciation of the situation, inasmuch as the in-
quiry was necessarily conducted in places remote from
the scene of the occurrences. The committee endeavored
as far as possible to compensate for these unavoidable dis-
advantages by their zeal in enlarging the range of their
evidence and by the thoroughness and critical accuracy
with which they sifted it.

More than 1,200 depositions which had already been
taken from Belgian witnesses and British officers and sol-
diers by authority of the Home Office were examined by
the committee, and to this mass of evidence they added
diaries taken from the German dead and a number of
proclamations issued by, or at the bidding of, German
military authorities in Belgium and France.

The persons of legal knowledge and experience who
had taken the depositions in different parts of the United
Kingdom are said to have performed their task in a strictly
fair and impartial manner. They reported that the Belgian
witnesses exhibited very little vindictiveness or emotional
excitement. The committee, for their part, found that the
depositions, "though taken at different places and on differ-
ent dates, and by different lawyers from different witnesses,"
often corroborated one another in a striking manner.

After a thorough analysis and comparison of the material
the committee arrived at the following conclusions :

(1) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate
and systematically organized massacres of the civil popula-
tion, accompanied by many isolated murders and other
outrages.

(2) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent
civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large
numbers, women violated, and children murdered.

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 363

(3) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruc-
tion of property were ordered and countenanced by the
officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had
been made for systematic incendiarism at the very out-
break of the war, and that the burnings and destruction
were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged,
being indeed part of a system of general terrorization.

(4) That the rules and usages of war were frequently
broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including
women and children, as a shield for advancing forces ex-
posed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and
prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and
the White Flag.

Of special interest is the observation that most of the
systematic outrages or severities took place between August
4th and 30th, and along geographical Hues forming an
irregular Y, the trunk extending from the German frontier
to Liege, and the arms from Liege to Charleroi and from
Liege to Mechlin respectively, corresponding with the
invaders' most prominent lines of advance and later of
communication. In the words of the report, **for the first
fortnight of the war the towns and villages near Liege
were the chief sufferers. From the 19th of August to the
end of the month, outrages spread in the directions of
Charleroi and Malines (Mechlin) and reach their period
of greatest intensity. There is a certain significance in the
fact that the outrages round Liege coincide with the unex-
pected resistance of the Belgian army in that district, and
that the slaughter which reigned from the 19th of August
to the end of the month is contemporaneous with the
period when the German army's need for a quick passage
through Belgium at all costs was deemed imperative."

The charges elaborated in these reports, as briefly out-
lined, constituted the most formidable indictment for

364 The Great War

brutality which had been preferred against any enlightened
nation in modern times, and Germany's answer was awaited
with feelings of scornful incredulity or intense suspense.

While there was a tendency in some quarters in Ger-
many to regard any apology for the conduct of the army
as an indignity, the general outcry of indignation abroad
provoked the natural response. Voices were raised both
privately and officially to denounce the ''campaign of lies,"
and the civilian population of Belgium was accused of
having treated German wounded and prisoners with the
most inhuman cruelty.

But in vain the amiable character of the German people
and the proverbially inflexible discipline of the German
army were invoked as proof of the inability of their sol-
diers to commit the enormities charged against them. No
previous record, however lustrous, could alone avail against
the evidence of palpable and gruesome facts, the graves of
five or six thousand civilians recently slain, the ruin and
desolation of once prosperous communities, and the flight
of a miUion terrified inhabitants.

Wolff's Bureau issued on January 12, 1915, a reply to
the report of the French committee with an indignant
refutation of all the charges contained in it, but apparently
before full knowledge of its contents had been received,
for the article declared that "all the general points are
without specific particulars as to time, place, the guilty
parties, or proofs of these acts of murder, incendiarism, and
rape." It stated furthermore that wherever the French
government had quoted particular cases, the German gov-
ernment had ordered an investigation, the results of which
"could be awaited with calmness and confidence," but that
the French allegation that the German army had wantonly
burned seventy houses in Luneville could be immediately
refuted, since this severity had been necessitated by the

Vanchilisni in Louvain, tlie intellectual capital of the Low Countries since the Miiklle
Ages : ruins of the Hotel du Nord and other buildings.

Louvain. The Town Hall unscatlu-d, while of the church of Saint Pierre and ot tlie
university nothing remains but the walls.

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 365

treachery of the civilians who fired on German troops in
the Military Hospital on the afternoon of August 25, 1914,
and in the streets on the following morning.

A criticism of Professor Bedier's pamphlet appearing in
the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung in seven
columns on February 28, 1915, confined itself mainly to
the exposition of a few unimportant inaccuracies of trans-
lation and seemed to admit by inference the incontroverti-
bility of the general basis of facts, but at the same time
very pertinently emphasized the probability that the epi-
sodes narrated in the diaries of the German soldiers were
almost exclusively incidents in the franc-tireur warfare, an
argument which in reality constitutes the only effectual
basis for the attempted refutation of the charges.

Finally, on May 15, 1915, the German government pub-
lished an Official White Book for the purpose of proving
by the sworn depositions of a large number of eye-witnesses
in the German army that the Belgian people of all classes
and ages, and of both sexes, engaged in a contest with the
German troops in flagrant violation of international law,
making treacherous attacks in parts of the country, and in
towns and villages, which had already been occupied and
were ostensibly pacific, and that the severities practised by
the German troops against the civilian population of Bel-
gium were in all cases absolutely necessary and justifiable
measures for the suppression of this unlawful conduct.

The compilers of the report were convinced that this
popular outbreak was systematically planned at the instiga-
tion, or at least with the complicity of the Belgian authori-
ties. They claimed, furthermore, that the people, blinded
with rage or perverted by unscrupulous leaders committed
savage acts of cruelty, mutilating and killing the wounded
and captives, engaged in every form of treachery, violated
the sanctity of the Red Cross, and fired on surgeons and

366 The Great War

nurses who were engaged in performing their professional
services.

The arduous problem of reconciling the German report
with the statements made by the Allies, particularly by the
Belgians themselves, is strikingly illustrated by the case of
Andenne. Here, according to the German account, the
population received the German troops in a friendly man-
ner on August 20th; but suddenly, upon the ringing of
the church-bells at 6.30 in the evening, the inhabitants
barricaded their houses and opened fire on the unsuspect-
ing soldiers from cellar-windows and apertures in the roofs,
utilizing hand-bombs, hand-grenades, boiling water, and
even machine-guns for their furious onslaught. The Ger-
man troops upon recovering their presence of mind forced
their way into the houses, shot about two hundred persons
who resisted or were caught with arms, and burned the
buildings from which shots had been fired as rightful
retaliation for the treacherous attack. The Belgians, on
the contrary, insisted, as we have seen, that the inhabitants
of Andenne did nothing to offend the Germans or provoke
their resentment. Besides the testimony contained in the
official reports, many other accounts by eye-witnesses,
especially accounts of the occurrences in Belgium by Hol-
landers, citizens of a neutral country, are very important,
but cannot be discussed here in detail.

One general reservation must be made before we pro-
ceed to the weighing of the evidence.

The examination of the legal and moral principles in-
volved in the conduct of Germany toward Belgium in the
first and second volumes of the present work revealed
ample grounds for the opinion that the Belgian people
possessed within their national boundaries, collectively and
individually, the unqualified right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness, and the absolute use, disposition, and

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 367

enjoyment of their property both public and private, unre-
stricted by any intrusion or encroachment in consequence
of an external state of hostilities. And governed by this
strict, but theoretically irrefutable, opinion, many persons
will emphatically designate any infringement of these
incontestable privileges by foreign interference simply and
unconditionally as an odious enormity, regarding the inso-
lent treatment of the least of the Belgians as a grave mis-
demeanor, every curtailment of the use of property as a
trespass, every confiscation as a felony, every destruction
by fire as arson, every exaction as brigandage, every viola-
tion of personal liberty as an outrageous assault, and the
taking of human life in Belgium, in any situation whatever,
as homicide, murder, or assassination. In accordance with
this conception, the invasion of Belgium was tantamount
to a filibustering excursion, which justly exposed the par-
ticipants without any legitimate redress to whatever meas-
ures of self-defense or retribution the inhabitants of the
country were impelled to take.

This extreme opinion would eliminate all discussion
regarding the justifiability of the conduct of Germans in
Belgium, where the chief part of the alleged atrocities
occurred, by regarding the invasion of that country in itself
as the supremely culpable atrocity and consequently all
the particular actions of the invaders as inherently out-
rageous without reference to the circumstances in each
individual case.

For the sake of the present argument, therefore, we
shall disregard this extreme view altogether and assume
that the conditions of belligerency and the usages of war-
fare applicable to the operations in Belgium were precisely
the same as those that prevailed elsewhere. It may be
assumed, moreover, as established by the various reports, —
although space forbids a detailed exposition of all the steps

368 The Great War

by which these conclusions have been reached on the basis
of the evidence, — on the one hand, that the Germans com-
mitted acts of great severity in Belgium and France; on
the other, that the participation of civilians or irregular
combatants in the fighting, alleged as cause of these severi-
ties, actually occurred in many localities.

All destruction of property incidental to the develop-
ment of the hostile engagements of regular warfare, or
unavoidably produced in the course of the actual fighting,
must be excluded from the category of atrocities and from
every consideration of moral responsibility for lawless or
wanton conduct. For within the arena of combat, tactical
requirements unquestionably overrule or supersede all other
interests and considerations.

In many instances, however, it is impossible to trace the
distinction with such accuracy as to avoid every ambiguity.
The battle-lines in northern France and Belgium passed
very close to a number of cities and towns celebrated for
their artistic treasures, whose partial or total destruction,
defended by the Germans as a military necessity, has pre-
cipitated a series of prolonged and inconclusive contro-
versies. The German military authorities insisted, for ex-
ample, that the dismantling or destruction of convenient
points of observation for directing the fire of artillery,
whether cathedral towers or municipal belfries, was an in-
dispensable military measure for the safety of their armies.

As already mentioned, the cathedral at Reims, the an-
cient coronation place of the kings of France, was first
damaged by artillery-fire soon after the French reoccupied
the city. First-lieutenant Wengler of the German heavy
artillery, who directed the firing of the much-maligned
shots, stated that a French observer on the northern tower
of the cathedral was first noticed on September 13th, when
the firing of the French artillery became very much more

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 369

accurate, and that observation from this point continued
until the 18th, when a German projectile from a 15-centi-
meter howitzer struck the observation tower and another
from a 21-centimeter mortar fell on the roof of the
cathedral and set it on fire.

The Germans, while admitting the bombardment of
Reims for the dispersion of hostile artillery, maintained
that these were the only shots deliberately aimed at the
venerable old building. But Mr. Richard Harding Davis,
who arrived at the cathedral about three o'clock on the
afternoon of the 18th asserted positively that howitzer
shells had already penetrated the wall and killed two of
the German wounded who were lying in the nave, that,
twenty-four hours after Lieutenant Wengler claimed to
have ceased firing, shells set fire to the roof of the cathe-
dral and wrecked the archbishop's palace and the chapel
which connected it with the rear of the cathedral, and that
the whole quarter around had been largely reduced to ruins
by the bombardment. Mr. Davis was again in the cathe-
dral on the 22d, while it was again being shelled, in com-
pany with the Abbe Chinot, Mr. Gerald Morgan, Captain
Granville Fortescue of Washington, and the Honorable
Mr. Robert Bacon, formerly American ambassador to
France.

Throughout the remainder of the campaign Reims was
repeatedly shelled, the bombardment continuing many
days, or even weeks, almost without interruption. Showers
of projectiles often fell in the vicinity of the cathedral,
especially in the Place du Parvis in front of the western,
or main, facade.

Although in a structural sense the cathedral has not been
destroyed, the ineffable elegance and wealth of decoration
of its interior have been rudely treated. The priceless
sculptural adornment of the principal front has suffered

370 The Great War

the most grievous damage, caused in large part by the
burning of the scaffolding covering this entire facade,
which had been erected for the v^ork of restoration that
had been in progress for several years. This conflagration
extended to the interior and destroyed the confessionals,
choir-stalls, and other woodwork. Measures were event-
ually taken to protect the remaining figures on the west
facade from being damaged by the fragments of shells
exploding in the square in front.

In view of the effective activity of French artillery sta-
tioned in Reims, or in its suburbs, and of the cardinal
importance of the city as a center of military communica-
tions, the pretension that the Germans, by subjecting it to
their severe cannonading, violated article 25 of The Hague
Convention, which forbids the bombardment of unde-
fended places, scarcely seems tenable.

The same question of responsibility based on a similar
situation arises in connection with the monuments of Sois-
sons, particularly the beautiful Gothic cathedral, which was
perforated by shells in a number of places.

The graceful, richly decorated belfry of Arras was
completely destroyed, and the Hotel de Ville, a precious
monument of the Spanish-Flemish Transition style of the
sixteenth century, was mostly reduced to a sorrowful mass
of ruins.

Saddest of all are the losses at Ypres, which have already
been briefly described. The grand old Cloth Hall, unique
example of its kind, stands rent and shattered, a pathetic
wreck, the noble belfry reduced to a formless fragment,
the exquisite Renaissance addition at the side ground to
dust. The defense for the action of the Germans in de-
stroying the monuments of Ypres is undoubtedly weaker
than the justification of their conduct in the other in-
stances. For Ypres was at no time within the tactical field

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 371

of conflict. The defense of military necessity can only
be invoked on the ground that the bombardment of the
city impeded the passage of troops, or the reinforcing and
munitioning of the troops on the actual battle-line.

An unbiased judgment on the basis of a comprehensive
know^ledge of the circumstances would probably ascribe
the havoc wrought at Mechlin to the same category as the
damage inflicted upon the places already discussed.

Deplorable as these losses are, it is unthinkable that the
German military authorities were so heedless of every con-
sideration of expediency as uselessly to offend the sensi-
bility of the civilized world by the deliberate defacement
or destruction of artistic monuments, as is sometimes in-
sinuated, with no practical purpose in view. The idea,
moreover, that the destruction of these monuments was
part of a calculated policy of terrorism intended to destroy
the resolution of the enemy imputes to the German General
Staff an unbelievable ignorance of the fundamental impulses
of human conduct. For artistic monuments cannot be used
with effect like pawns to secure the tranquil behavior of an
infuriated people.

A similar problem respecting the limits of legitimate
warfare has been created by the bombardment of cities
and towns from aeroplanes and dirigibles. German air-
craft dropped bombs on Louvain, Namur, Antwerp, and
many other places, and for a time paid almost daily hostile
visits to Paris. This practice, which brought wounds and
death to many harmless non-combatants, excited intense
and widespread indignation, and has been regarded as a
part of the alleged German policy of calculated frightful-
ness. Although most of the places were defended by \ery
strong fortifications, the Allies contended that these attacks
were a gross violation of the regulations of The Hague
Convention of 1907, either because they were made without

372 The Great War

any previous warning, or else because, as in the case of
Paris, the points at which they were directed were so far
from the forts that they obviously served no strictly mili-
tary purpose whatever. As an exhaustive examination of
all the questions involved in this complicated problem
would detain us too long, we must dismiss it with the
general observation that the practice of bombarding indis-
criminately from the sky the streets and buildings of cities
and towns has not been justified by the familiar argument
of military necessity or success.

It is impossible not to recognize that a fundamental dis-
tinction for the purposes of the present discussion exists
between the isolated acts of brutality committed by indi-
viduals and the systematic acts of severity inflicted by com-
mand of the regular military authorities. In the gigantic
armies of even the most civilized nations in time of war
there must be many depraved individuals whose criminal
propensities are likely to be inflamed by the privations and
excitement of warfare and by separation from any restrain-
ing influences of their customary environment. The crimes
committed by such men may affect unfavorably the general
estimate of the state of morality and refinement among the
people whom they so unworthily represent, but they do
not involve the government or the military chiefs in the
charge of violating the rules of warfare, unless the latter
make themselves virtually accomplices in guilt by their
culpable laxity.

In spite of the indignant assertions of the German press
that the German commanders effected with full success
the maintenance of the strictest discipline, we feel con-
strained to urge in their behalf that many of the acts of
brutality which occurred in Belgium and France were
probably committed without their sanction. The occur-
rence in individual cases of such lawless excesses does not

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 373

seem to be entirely inconsistent with the recorded condi-
tions of criminality.

A comparison of analyses of available German Imperial
Statistics for the ten-year period (1897 to 1907) and of the
reports of the Home Office of the United Kingdom during
the nearest similar ten-year period published (1900 to 1910)
shows the following average yearly convictions for crimes:

In the
In Germany. United Kingdom.

Murders 350 97

Felonious woundings . . . 172,153 1,262

Rapes 9,381 216

Incest 573 56

Malicious damage to property 25,759 358

(These reports show also that during the same period
the average yearly number of illegitimate births in Ger-
many was 178,115; and in the United Kingdom 37,041).

It may be thought that the law is more strictly enforced
in Germany: this may be true as to the punishment of
minor misdemeanors, but certainly not as to serious crimes,
for British courts are proverbially strict in respect of
crimes such as those in the table given above. Of course
some allowance should be made for the difference in popu-
lation, but Germany has only about half as many million
more people than the United Kingdom.

In face of the abundant evidence, especially that fur-
nished by passages in the diaries of the German soldiers
themselves, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that
during the invasion of Belgium and France the German
troops fre(]uently plundered wine-shops and wine-cellars
and drank to intoxication.

But for the reasons already adduced our attention will be
directed mainly to the severities executed by order of the

374 The Great War

military authorities. The treatment of these will be based
upon the instances in which there is practically no question
as to the nature and extent of the severities inflicted.

Some particular cases in the chapter of atrocities have
been invested with particular interest and significance by
the sensational character of the occurrences themselves,
the extent of the losses, and the ardor of the ensuing
polemics. A clear statement of the basis of accepted fact
and of the chief points of controversy in a few of these in-
stances will help to illuminate the whole field of discussion.

We shall consider first the case of Aerschot, a town of
8,000 inhabitants about ten miles northeast of Louvain,
where the 8th German infantry brigade was quartered on
August 19th. The municipal authorities of Aerschot re-
ceived the Germans with every mark of respect, the mayor,
M. Tielemans, offered the brigade-commander. Colonel
Stenger, the hospitality of his own home which faced the
market-place, and the relations between civilians and the
military were apparently harmonious until about eight in
the evening, when shooting suddenly began in the streets
near the market-place.

According to the German account civilians opened fire
from the houses upon the soldiers in the streets and upon
the supply trains passing through the town. The houses
from which firing took place were accordingly burned
and a number of guilty or suspected civiHans were led off
for execution. Soon after the firing began. Colonel Stenger
was found lying mortally wounded on the floor of a front
room in the mayor's house, where he had been sitting near
the open balcony doors. He had probably been hit by a
shot from the opposite side of the market-place. The
circumstances of the outbreak seemed to show that it had
been deliberately prepared in anticipation of the coming of
the Germans.

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 375

But the Belgians and their allies affirmed that the exist-
ence of a plot, the participation of the population of Aer-
schot in acts of hostility, and the alleged guilt or complicity
of the mayor and of his family were pure fabrications. They
suggested that the commotion might have arisen from the
aimless shooting of drunken soldiers who were engaged
in terrorizing the inhabitants, and that the killing of the
commander might easily have been explained as caused by
a German shot discharged at random in the general excite-
ment and confusion.

However the case may be, the mayor, his son, and his
brother were executed by the Germans the next day on
purely circumstantial evidence of guilt or else as an act
of reprisal. Colonel Jenrich, the post-commander, had
warned the mayor that he would be held responsible with
his own life for any attack that should be made by the
civilian population.

Dinant was of fundamental strategical importance for the
Germans in the early weeks of the war, because, in the
development of their great plan for outflanking and envel-
oping the Allies, it was essential that the Twelfth Army
Corps should cross the Meuse at that point. The tenta-
tive occupation of Dinant on August 15th need not detain
us. On the evening of August 21st the 2d battalion of
sharpshooters of the 108th (Fusilier) regiment and a de-
tachment of pioneers made a reconnoissance in force as far
as this town, which was occupied in part by the troops of
the enemy.

The Germans coming from the direction of Ciney were
received with a fusillade from the nearest houses as they
were entering the town by the Rue St. Jacques. They
made their way as far as the bridge, but were assailed from
all sides and forced to retreat, setting fire to a number of
houses in the streets through which they passed.

376 The Great War

On the 23d the Twelfth Corps made a determined effort
to gain the left bank of the Meuse and advanced in the
direction of Dinant and its vicinity, the Thirty-second
Division towards the north and the Twenty-third Division
towards the south.

According to German accounts it required a desperate
conflict to overcome the resistance of the civilian popula-
tion in Dinant and the neighboring places. The first bat-
talion of the regiment of Body Guards was subjected to a
galling fire as it descended the steep slope into Dinant, and
the troops were compelled to storm each house separately.
The civilians who were caught with arms in their hands
were shot on the spot, while all those who were suspected
were held as hostages. The Germans themselves suffered
considerable losses. The 108th and 182d regiments ap-
proaching Dinant further north had a similar experience.
Eventually the troops had to be withdrawn from Dinant so
that the obstinate resistance of the population could be
crushed by a bombardment.

The German report is singularly reticent about the ulti-
mate fate of the town. But the ruin of this picturesque
and prosperous place, the destruction of all but 200 of its
1,400 buildings, and the conversion of an unusually attrac-
tive panorama into a mournful scene of waste and desola-
tion can neither be hidden nor disguised.

According to the statements published by the Allies the
Germans committed barbarous outrages in Dinant both on
the 21st and 23d without any provocation from the civilian
population. Finally, they sacked and burned the town sys-
tematically and executed groups of from 50 to 120 civilians,
massacring in all about 800 persons.

From the extensive testimony presented in the German
report and from some of the diaries of the German soldiers,
particularly a passage in the diary of a private of the 108th

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Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 377

regiment cited by Professor Bedier, it seems impossible
not to conclude that civilians engaged in acts of hostility at
Dinant and its vicinity. It is unlikely, moreover, that the
German commanders dissipated the strength of the maneu-
vering wing of their armies at this very critical juncture by
detaining considerable forces for the gratuitous spoliation
and destruction of an unresisting town, or merely for in-
culcating by another and rather superfluous example of
frightfulness their salutary lesson of submission.

It is of importance to note in this connection that the
civilians in Dinant did not wait until the town had been
occupied to attack the Germans, but openly contested
their approach.

After emphasizing the importance of the aim of the
Twelfth Corps to cross the river at Dinant, the German
Military Commission for the Investigation of Offenses
against the Laws of War comments upon the destruction
of the town, the shooting of civilians who engaged in
hostilities, and the execution of hostages, as follows:

"It was a military necessity quickly to overcome the
resistance of the inhabitants who opposed that aim, — an
aim which had to be attained by every means. From that
point of view it was certainly justiflable to bombard with
artillery the town which had taken active part in the fight,
to burn the houses which were occupied by franc-tireiD's,
and to shoot the inhabitants who were caught with arms
in hand.

** Likewise in agreement with the law was the shooting
of the hostages which took place in various localities. . . .
The hostages were secured in order to stop the action of
the franc-tireurs . As, nevertheless, the people continued to
inflict losses on the fighting troops the shooting of the
hostages had to be resorted to. Otherwise their seizure
would only have meant a vain threat."

378 The Great War

The first German troops marched into Louvain on
August 19th, but there was no interruption of peaceful
intercourse between the people and the troops until the
25th. On that day, as already noted, the Belgian army
made a vigorous sortie from the intrenched camp of Ant-
werp and there was an engagement in the neighborhood
of Louvain. The Ninth Reserve Corps, which was coming
to support the Third Reserve Corps was detraining at Lou-
vain and the column began to pass through the streets at
six in the evening. The staff of General von Boehm,
commander of the Ninth Reserve Corps, had made its
headquarters in the famous Town Hall.

As the Germans claim, about eight in the evening (Ger-
man time), soldiers of a Landsturm company (von Sandt),
which had just marched from the northwest exit of the
city to the railway station in the east, noticed the appear-
ance of a green and then a red rocket, and simultaneously
with this signal the inhabitants opened fire upon the Ger-
man troops at the station, and at the Town Hall and in the
intervening section of the city, throwing the transport col-
umn into confusion and kilHng and wounding a number of
officers and soldiers. It was natural to assume that this
outbreak had been carefully planned to synchronize with
the sortie from Antwerp. General von Boehm returned
from the battlefield to Louvain about H.SO and ordered a
Landwehr brigade to march into the city for suppressing
the uprising, seized the mayor and other leading citizens as
hostages, and caused them to be led through the streets to
summon the inhabitants to cease hostilities. This measure
was apparently without success, for the attacks are said to
have continued on the 26th and 27th.

In the meantime the Germans had been breaking into
the houses from which shooting was supposed to have
occurred, and setting fire to them. The conflagration

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 379

spread throughout the neighborhood of the Town Hall
during the night of the 25th-26th. By morning the Uni-
versity Library, the pride and delight of many generations,
had been consumed, and the flames were attacking the
Church of St. Peter, which was partially damaged. Dr.
Ingermann of the Landwehr is said to have been treach-
erously wounded while he was saving the pictures from
this church. As mentioned in a former chapter, the in-
comparable Town Hall was saved by the efforts of the
Germans themselves.

The alleged discovery of large quantities of arms and am-
munition and the detection of soldiers disguised as civilians
are used as evidence to prove the existence of a plot offi-
cially organized in which important functions were said to
have been attributed to the Garde Civique and to the clergy.

The Allies, on the contrary, claim that there is abso-
lutely no evidence to prove that civilians fired on the Ger-
man troops. The origin of the commotion is attributed
by many witnesses to a mistake due to the nervousness of
the German troops at the station who fired upon their own
comrades as they were returning from the battlefield. On
the pretext that civilians had shot at the soldiers the Ger-
mans burned and bombarded Louvain and slaughtered
many of the inhabitants as a deliberate act of terrorism
calculated to shatter the resolution of the Belgians.

Whatever may have been the real situation which fur-
nished the occasion for the connnotion, there is scarcelv
room for doubt that the German leaders decided after
deliberate reflection that the entire section of Louvain be-
tween the Town Hall and the railway station should be
systematically destroyed. This decision was relentlessly
executed on the 27th and one-sixth of the city, the most
important section, was reduced to a wilderness of black-
ened ruins.

380 The Great War

We have noticed that the severities v^hich v^ere de-
nounced as atrocities by the Allies were represented by
the Germans as necessary measures of retribution for
repressing the unlawful participation of civilians in acts of
hostility. The contradiction leads us to examine, first, the
rightfulness of the employment of retributory measures in
the given situation, and, secondly, the justice of the measures
themselves and of the manner in which they were applied.

The fact that in some instances civilians undoubtedly
attacked the German troops does not in itself constitute an
offense against the established rules of war. It is necessary
to distinguish between the conditions in which the levee eii
masse, or people's warfare, is lawful and those in which it is
prohibited, and therefore a question of law arises beside
the question of fact in connection with the first subject of
discussion just mentioned.

It has been shown that the atrocities practised in Serbia
were largely the consequence of a fundamental difference
of attitude respecting the extension of the capacity to
possess the rights of belligerency. We shall presently dis-
cover that a similar discrepancy existed between the views
of the antagonists in the western theater.

The question as to how far the rights of active bellig-
erency are to be conceded to irregular combatants was
discussed at The Hague Convention of 1907, when the
German delegation uniformly advocated a narrow concep-
tion of legitimate warfare, which would restrict the relative
defensive capacity of all states whose regular military or-
ganization is inferior to that of Germany by depriving them,
to a very large extent, of the right to defend themselves in
an emergency by improvised and informal methods. But
the conference adopted a broader conception of legitimate
warfare in conformity with the view of the British, Bel-
gian, and Swiss delegations. Recognizing in principle the

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 381

inalienable right of the inhabitants of an invaded territory
to take up arms in their own defense, the conference
formulated the legal basis for the belligerent rights of
irregular combatants in the first and second articles of the
Rules of The Hague Convention dealing with the Con-
duct of War on Land, as adopted in 1907. These rules
were eventually agreed to by the German delegation.

A distinction was made between an organized and an
unorganized people's warfare. In the former the militia
or bands of volunteer combatants, in order to be recog-
nized as belligerents, are obliged to conform with the
following four conditions: they must have responsible
leaders, they must wear a distinctive emblem recognizable
at a distance, they must carry their arms openly, and they
must observe the laws and customs of war. The unor-
ganized people's warfare is free from the first two condi-
tions, but in return is bound by two other particular
stipulations: it may only be waged in the territory not vet
occupied by the enemy, and there must have been lack of
time to prepare the organized people's warfare.

The German and Belgian governments agree, accident-
ally, in one very important affirmation, namely, that there
was no organized people's warfare in Belgium, the first by
declaring that the civilians who engaged in acts of hostility
had neither responsible leaders nor any distinctive emblem,
the second by denying emphatically that any measures
were taken which were calculated to induce civilians to
fight. It follows, therefore, unless both disputants are
wrong, that any hostile action on the part of the civilian
population must fall under the head of unorganized people's
warfare and ought to conform to the special conditions for
the same, which limit it to territory not yet occupied by the
enemy and to situations in which the government has not
had time to organize the people's warfare. Any civilian

382 The Great War

attacks on the German troops in Louvain, Aerschot, An-
dennes, or elsewhere occurring after the occupation by
the invaders had been effected must therefore have been
violations of the established usages of war, provided, of
course, that the hostile action occurred at the people's own
initiative, as the Germans claim, and was not provoked by
the lawless behavior of the soldiers.

But in other cases the circumstances seem to justify the
active resistance of the civilian population according to
the spirit of The Hague Convention. In many localities
the hostilities in which the civilians were accused of engag-
ing were attempts to repel the invaders as they approached,
not treacherous attacks in places already effectively occu-
pied. Dinant is the most striking example of this class.
The Germans themselves declare that they were fired upon
as they first approached the town, but insist that there the
unorganized people's warfare was a contravention because
the Belgian authorities had had ample time to organize
the people's warfare.

Without pausing to discuss the delicate question of the
proper limit for the term of legitimate exemption from
the obligation to organize the people's warfare, we shall
turn to a more convincing example of the unorganized
levee en masse in circumstances conformable with article 2
of The Hague Convention.

The Germans invaded Belgium almost before the in-
habitants of the country had received any warning of their
intentions, and to judge by the invaders' own accounts,
which doubtless merit reliance, they encountered from
the first the desperate resistance of the population. But,
•although this unorganized people's warfare was apparently
quite legal, since there had been no time for the other-
wise prescribed organization and the territory had not yet
been occupied by the enemy, the Germans punished the

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 383

combatants with the same implacable severity which marked
their conduct in the treatment of the hostilities that were
unquestionably forbidden by The Hague Convention.

The contention that the danger existing for years of a
Franco-German war imposed the precautionary obligation
of organizing the people's warfare implies a reproach of the
Belgians for their misplaced confidence in the German
government's own repeated pacific assurances.

A thoughtful consideration creates the impression that
the Germans neither made, nor intended to make, in their
treatment of civilians engaged in acts of warfare, any dis-
tinction corresponding to the principles adopted by The
Hague Convention. Their rule was absolutely simple and
could be expressed with laconic brevity in the words of
one of the diaries: ""der schoss, der wurde erschossen^ — "any-
one who fired was shot."

The application of the repressive measures was charac-
terized by the principle of collective responsibility and by
the summary infliction of severe reprisals. The first in-
volves vicarious expiation for the ofl^enses of isolated indi-
viduals, and it ofi^ends the most elementary sense of justice
by making the innocent sufi^er with, or for, the guilty. It
treats the lives of the people of whole communities as
rightly forfeit, severally or collectively, for local violations
of the laws of war, and exposes representative personalities
or others chosen at random to execution for the thought-
less conduct of the most worthless or irresponsible persons.

The conduct of the Germans on the basis of this doc-
trine constitutes the most serious tenable charge against
their practice. It is scarcely necessary to accunuilate exten-
sive evidence, since the Germans themselves acknowledge
it without any hesitation. The Kolnische Zeitung declared,
for example, in regard to the suppression of the people's
warfare :

384 The Great War

*'We all made one fundamental principle clear: for the
fault of the individual the community to which he be-
longed must suffer. The village in which our troops had
been shot at by the civilian population was burned down.
If the culprit was not discovered, a few representatives were
taken out of the general population and shot. Women and
children were not touched, except when they were found
with weapons in their hands.

"This principle may seem hard and cruel, — it has been
developed from the customs of modern and ancient mili-
tary history, and, as far as it can be spoken of at all, recog-
nized. It is also justified by the theory of setting an awful
example. The innocent must suffer with the guilty ; and,
when the latter cannot be found, they must suffer for the
guilty."

The practice here so clearly described is an unmistakable
violation of article 50 of the Convention adopted at the
Second Hague Conference, in 1907, which forbids expressly
the infliction of any collective penalty, pecuniary or other,
upon communities for the action of individuals for which
they could not be considered collectively responsible.

In vain the plea of military necessity was solemnly ad-
vanced as final argument for every sanguinary, wholesale
execution. The world instinctively condemned the hasty,
inconsiderate acts of retaliation with their inseparable com-
plement of hideous injustice. Was there time to weigh
with any semblance of judicial method the guilt imputed
to each victim of the days of wild commotion at Louvain,
Andenne, Dinant, and scores of other places? Bloody
execution must have overtaken many whose only fault was
physical inability to escape the dangerous proximity of
their suspected neighbors.

The impetuous incendiaries of Gue d'Hossus were uncon-
strained by any discriminating scruples. The promiscuous

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 385

shooting of the male inhabitants of Nomeny was mani-
festly unaccompanied by any judicial process. The little
children mutilated or slain in the wild nocturnal raiding of
the village near Blamont are silent witnesses to the brutal
iniquity of such proceedings.

The practice of taking hostages, a natural corollary of
the doctrine of collective or vicarious responsibility, was
generally employed by the Germans as a means for restrain-
ing the population in localities which had already been
occupied. An authentic illustration of this practice, as of
the application of the theory of collective responsibility in
general, is afforded by the proclamations issued by the
German military authorities in different parts of the con-
quered territory in Belgium and France. The following
extract from a proclamation of Field-marshal von der
Goltz, then Governor-general of Belgium, dated at Brus-
sels, October 5, 1914, will serve as a general example :

'Tn future the communities (localites) nearest the place
where such acts occur (destruction of railways or telegraph
lines), whether accomplices or not, will be relentlessly pun-
ished. To this end, hostages have been taken from all the
communities near the railways threatened by such attacks
and at the first attempt to destroy the railways or the tele-
graph or telephone lines, they will be immediately shot."

The proclamation issued at Grivegnee on September 8th
is an even more specific illustration of these repulsive
methods. It confers, moreover, a startling warrant for
impulsive acts of violence. In this case the exacting
harshness is explained, though scarcely palliated, by the
proximity of an important fortress. The gratuitous humilia-
tion of the inhabitants decreed in article 8 is an exam-
ple of the petty arrogance which makes the conciliation
of a conquered people by official Germany seem almost
hopeless.

386 The Great War

The practice of compelling individuals selected from the
civilian population to cover v^^ith their ov^^n persons the
march of the German soldiers through tov^ns and other
places where treacherous attacks by the inhabitants were
feared is a special application of "hostage-right." For in
such cases the apprehended attacks would inflict auto-
matically the retributory penalty upon the hostages. In
view of the confusion regarding the limits of legitimate
warfare it is not surprising that this practice should involve
the Germans in the charge of protecting themselves in
battle behind a living shield of civilians. From the Ger-
man point of view the justice of the conduct of Lieutenant
Eberlein at St. Die depends upon the character of the oppo-
nents, whether they were regular troops or franc-tireurs.

The foresight of the Germans, who had provided against
the hostihty of civilians as against every other contingency,
does not prove that a systematic policy of terrorism in enemy
territory was part of their original design. Our opinion
that they did not anticipate serious resistance on the part
of Belgium is incompatible with the supposed intentional
program of intimidation in that country. The opposition
of the Belgians, and especially the stubborn resistance of
the civilian population in the first few days of the cam--
paign, was a painful disillusionment.

The German commanders were doubtless exasperated
by this forced and unforeseen distraction from warfare on
the large and organized scale in which they had been
trained, and in which their superiority chiefly lay, to the
insidious conflict of irregular combatants whom they pro-
fessionally despised. Instead of showing any forbearance
in their behavior towards a people whom they publicly
confessed to have wronged, the invaders, treating every
hostile action by civilians, without distinction, as a violation
of the law of war, punished such offenses by the infliction

Alleged Atrocities in Belgium and France 387

of the severest penalties for which there was the remotest
semblance of a precedent.

In the conduct of the Belgian people's warfare there
were doubtless many instances in which the prescriptions
of The Hague Conventions were violated. The sinister
impression of these early days endured. The legend of
German barbarity growing more frightful by transmission,
which drove thousands to panic-stricken flight, probably
impelled others to desperate but hopeless acts of opposi-
tion. On the other hand, rumors of treacherous attacks,
rendered doubly terrible by hints of dark and awful muti-
lations, quickly spread among the German soldiers. Fear-
less in the face of visible opponents their fancy shuddered
at the hidden pitfalls of the narrow, overshadowed streets
of towns and villages, and perhaps at times their harassed
nerves gave way to groundless panic at an accidental shot
or other threatening circumstance.

In the execution of a maneuver upon which the whole
campaign depended, when every faculty was strained, when
the destiny of the universe seemed to hang upon the pro-
gress accomplished in a single day, it is not surprising that
the German leaders took drastic measures to eradicate
what they believed to be a vital menace.

But when a people not devoid of virile spirit believe
themselves to be the victims of a treacherous attack, when
they see their harvests rudely trampled under foot, when
they behold the ruthless desecration of places hallowed bv
the dearest ties, where their forefathers repose and they
themselves were born, where their ofl^spring learned to
prate their first uncertain accents at their knees, where
their tenderest sentiments and deepest feelings cluster, a
choking, palpitating passion grips their heart. The normal
range of their impulses narrows down to one intense,
resistless force of execration. Expediency and calculation

388 The Great War

are instantly forgotten, and the act of retribution bounti-
fully compensates for every sacrifice and risk. A common
fiery zeal coordinates their efforts and their rage supplies
the weapons. The legal subtleties and chivalrous affecta-
tions of formal warfare vanish before the concentrated
fury of their rage. They will fight with wild primeval vio-
lence, with the splendid ardor of the charge at Marathon,
with the grim persistence of the Minute Men, with the
glorious madness of the immortal Five Days' uprising at
Milan, with the obdurate ferocity of the populace who
dwelt between the German frontier and Liege, where the
invaders were compelled, not only to burn the villages, but
literally to level them with the dust, before resistance was
eradicated. Regardless of all conventions and of the con-
sequences, they will struggle with the fierce love of inde-
pendence which has thrilled the fancy of the ages, and the
sentimental enthusiasm of mankind will applaud their
magnificent perversity.

CHAPTER XV

Signs and Expressions of Public Opinion and
Sentiment

In France : the hopeful outlook of the French people, M. Viviani's speech
on December 22d. In Great Britain : truce between the two great political
parties, the Prime Minister's speech at Guildhall, the king's visit to the
front, the raiding of the east coast, civilian deaths at Hartlepool, Scar-
borough, and Whitby. In Germany: the general view of the nation's
obligation, hatred for Great Britain, the session of the Reichstag on Decem-
ber 2d, the position of the Socialists. In Austria-Hungary : New Year's
address of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. In Turkey : demonstra-
tions and predictions, opening of parliament. In Russia : alleged mis-
treatment of Mohammedan population, disaffection in the Ukraine, popular
impressions and the surviving discords. Bismarck's foreign policy and
the later policy of Germany. General tendencies.

The reports described in the last chapter were more than
mere collections of alleged historical evidence. Their
publication was a historical event in itself, because they
helped to confirm the spirit of determination in each of the
belligerent countries. The Allies were more than ever con-
vinced that they were fighting for freedom against military
despotism, that they were fighting the battle of humanity
against barbarism, while at the same time the indignation of
the Germans was sustained by the ostensible proof that after
Belgium had become the misguided tool in a wicked con-
spiracy against themselves, their soldiers had been victims of
the treachery and savage cruelty of the Belgian people.

Napoleon once declared that moral factors count for
three fourths in warfare and the conflict of the physical
forces for only the remaining fourth. The meteoric
progress of events in the field of physical conflict has thus

389

390 The Great War

far enthralled our attention in the present volume, but we
ought not to close without casting at least a fleeting glance
at the state of public opinion and sentiment in the period
about the end of the first campaign.

In the darkest hour, when the menace of a siege hung
over Paris, M. Alfred Capus, a talented academician, had
written an editorial for Figaro, expressing the highest spirit
of devotion of the French nation, in which he said:

"What is now necessary, — in fact, it is the sole condi-
tion of national salvation, — is an inexhaustible reserve of
moral force. . . .

"Let me repeat. The one condition is that the army
and its chiefs shall feel back of them a country ready for
all sacrifices, with undaunted souls, unflinching wills, and a
definite, coherent government.

"A weakening of the will, a feebleness of soul, would be
as detestable as desertion. To lack constancy to-day is to
desert before the enemy. It is treason. We all have our
duty, — the government, the press, public opinion. This
duty, in a single word, is firmness, which implies harmony,
calmness, the stoic acceptance of events, and ardent confi-
dence in the destiny of our country.

"At certain critical hours a cry of anger is a blasphemy,
a doubt may be a crime. The victory is hard to win, but
certain. Let the whole nation deserve it. Each man to
his post! Let us take for ourselves the simple and sub-
lime words of the great Englishman: * France expects every
man to do his duty.' "

In the period at which we have arrived the French
people could draw confidence from the reflection that the
political parties had adhered to the sacred union inaugu-
rated at the commencement of hostilities and that the de-
fense of the country had not been paralyzed by internal
dissension, that the nation had faced the most critical hours

Public Opinion and Sentiment 391

with unshaken firmness, and that, in addition to the tradi-
tional qualities of courage and fervor, it had given won-
derful proof of patience, tenacity, and stoicism.

In a celebrated speech delivered before the Chamber of
Deputies on December 22d, Prime Minister Viviani ex-
pressed the aim from which the French government has
never swerved, namely, that France must continue the war
until she and her allies could dictate the terms of peace.

"Just now," he declared, "there is only one policy, a
relentless fight until we attain definite freedom for Europe
by gaining a victory which shall guarantee peace." More
specifically he asserted that, faithful to her obligations,
"France, in accord with her allies, will not lay down her
arms until she has avenged outraged right and regained
forever the provinces which were torn from her by force,
restored heroic Belgium to the fulness of her material
prosperity and political independence, and broken Prus-
sian militarism so that the Allies may eventually reconstruct
a regenerated Europe founded upon justice and right."

A truce had been imposed upon the strife of the polit-
ical parties in Great Britain at the beginning of the war,
when the support of the Unionists was pledged to the min-
istry in the following note of their leader on August 2d :

"Dear Mr. Asquith, — Lord Lansdowne and I feel it our
duty to inform you that in our opinion, as well as in that of
all the colleagues whom we have been able to consult, it
would be fatal to the honor and security of the United
Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at
the present juncture; and we off^er our unhesitating sup-
port to the government in any measures they may consider
necessary for that object.

"Yours very truly,

"A. BoNAR Law."

392 The Great War

Only a small minority of Labor representatives main-
tained an attitude of protest against the prosecution of
the war.

The Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, formulated the in-
tentions of Great Britain in a noteworthy speech at the
Lord Mayor's banquet at the Guildhall on November 10th,
when he declared that they would "not sheathe the sword
until Belgium recovered all and more than all that she had
sacrificed, until France was adequately secured against the
menace of aggression, until the rights of smaller nation-
alities were placed on an unassailable foundation, until the
military dominion of Prussia was fully and finally destroyed."

In this connection allusion may be made to the visit of
King George to the British army at the front in Flanders,
because it served as a demonstration of the harmonious
cooperation of the three allies in the West. It was note-
worthy also as the first instance of the presence of royalty
with a British army in the field since George II fought at
Dettingen in 1743.

The king crossed to France in a warship on Novem-
ber 29th, visited some base-hospitals and reached the British
headquarters on the 30th. During his tour of inspection
along the front he met President Poincare, Prime Minister
Viviani, and General Joffre on December 1st and was re-
ceived by King Albert at his headquarters in the last frag-
ment of Belgian territory not occupied by the enemy on
the 4th. The return to England was effected on the 5th.

One of the factors which agitated public opinion in
Great Britain was the raiding of the east coast by a Ger-
man naval squadron in December, when 119 civilians were
killed by the bombardment at Hartlepool, seventeen at
Scarborough, and two at Whitby, many women and small
children being included among the slain. The German
authorities were probably actuated by the belief that a

Public Opinion and Sentiment 393

palpable demonstration of the vulnerability of Great Britain
would profoundly influence opinion both in the British
Isles and in neutral countries.

The Germans claimed that their bombardment of these
open towns was justified by the fact that Hartlepool ranked
as a coast defense and had a regular garrison, that there
were earthworks and a battery of six 6-inch guns at Scar-
borough, and that Whitby was a coast-guard station. But
the English regarded the affair as simply an application of
the German policy of frightfulness, which had recently
been enunciated by von Hindenburg in his remark that
the most ruthless manner of conducting warfare is in reality
the most merciful since it brings hostilities to the speediest
termination.

It is hardly too much to say that the raid was a failure, ex-
cept as an opportunity for practice, and that the results were
incommensurate with the risks. The chief effect seems to
have been to intensify the belligerent spirit in England.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of
gaining a clear, objective conception of the prevailing point
of view in Germany, unclouded by preconception or senti-
mental bias, because it is an absolutely fundamental factor
and an appreciation of it makes intelligible many things
which at first seem illogical, distorted, or incomprehensible.

There were doubtless many German extremists whose
attitude on every particular question of policy had been
colored by their instinctive conviction that with the exist-
ing unequal division of the earth's surface even abstention
from war on the part of Germany was in itself a striking
proof of magnanimity in the strongest military power, and
that any further demand upon her forbearance must neces-
sarily be regarded as an intolerable effrontery.

It seemed to the majority of the German people, as we
have had occasion to observe, that after Austria-Hungary

394 The Great War

had exhibited exceptional patience in the face of repeated
provocations, but had finally been compelled to take up
arms for her absolute self-preservation, safety and honor
alike made German intervention a bitter but inevitable
necessity. To the average German the war w^as essentially
a defensive v^ar.

We have seen how resentment against Great Britain had
grown in intensity and become a powerful motive force.
The fires of German wrath were fed by the seemingly
vapid argument that Great Britain was responsible for the
war because she could have prevented it, although it is just
as obvious that Germany herself, and in fact any one of the
other contestants, except Belgium, could have done the
same. For it is always possible to prevent a quarrel when
one of the parties is willing to resign his claim. But the
grounds for this belief on the part of the Germans were
probably less superficial than it might at first appear. Their
passionate conviction was proof of the weight attributed in
the popular imagination to formal alliances rather than of
intellectual obtuseness or a warping of the critical faculty.
Germany was pledged to support Austria-Hungary just as
France was pledged to help Russia in precisely the situation
which had arisen. For them it was a question of national
honor, there was no alternative. But Great Britain, accord-
ing to the specific statements of her responsible ministers,
had been free from every formal obligation of this kind.
Of course it did not occur to the German public that quite
apart from any formal obligation it was just as necessary for
the security of Great Britain that the integrity and vitality
of France should be maintained as it was for the safety of
Germany that Austria-Hungary should be preserved.

For German opinion it was just a step to the assumption
that what the British government was unwilling to prevent
it had in reality desired and devised. The image of Great

Public Opinion and Sentiment 395

Britain, perverted by envy from the course of her own
true interests and with characteristic hypocrisy conceaHng
her treacherous designs under the specious cover of pacific
and conciliatory proposals until the favorable moment for
striking her rival, when the latter was involved in a desper-
ate struggle on opposite fronts, hovered like an inflaming
fury in the German imagination.

Foreign observers, impressed by the strength of popular
opposition to the military and foreign policy of the Ger-
man government before the war and convinced that the
exceptional appearance of unanimity since the war began
must conceal profound currents of discontent, looked for-
ward to the assembling of the Reichstag early in December
with a vague anticipation that something sensational or
epochal might occur when an opportunity should be
afforded for free discussion and criticism.

The speech delivered by the Imperial Chancellor before
the Reichstag on December 2d has already been cited, but
another extract may appropriately be quoted in the present
connection. In the following words he voiced the yearn-
ing hope of many Germans that the spirit of harmony
created by the common peril might be preserved after the
war had been terminated:

**The wonderful fervor glowing in the hearts of the
German people, the unprecedented unity and uncondi-
tional self-surrender of one to another, must be and will
be victorious. And when a glorious and happy peace is
ours, we shall hold this national spirit sacred and regard it
as the holiest bequest of this terribly grave and great age.
As by magic the walls have fallen which separated for a
time, a dull and barren time, the various classes of our
people, the walls which we have raised against one another
in misunderstanding, envy, and mistrust. It is a liberation
and blessing that the rubbish heap of social prejudice has

396 The Great War

been swept away; that man alone has value now; that all
count alike and that each holds out his hand to his fellow-
man for a common and holy end. So once more I repeat
the Kaiser's words uttered at the outbreak of the war: *I
know no more parties, I only know Germans.' After the
war parties will revive; even the freest and most united
nation cannot fully live out its political life without parties
and political strife. But let us strive — I for my part promise
you to do so — that also in this strife there shall be nothing
but Germans."

The Social Democrats, who, after vigorously opposing,
had in the end complacently acquiesced in the war policy,
and had brought upon themselves the denunciation of their
comrades abroad by their alleged betrayal of the principles
of the International, reiterated their point of view of August
4th, in the following words of their leader, Herr Haase:

"In connection with the words of the Imperial Chan-
cellor regarding Belgium, I wish to declare in the name of
my party that no subsequent disclosures warrant in our
judgment a departure from our attitude of August 4th.
The Social Democratic party adheres to-day to the point of
view expressed on August 4th in its declaration concerning
the war, the cause of which in the final analysis was eco-
nomic rivalries. Our confines are still menaced by hostile
forces; hence the German people must exert their whole
strength for the protection of the country. For this rea-
son the Social Democratic party approves the new credits
demanded. . . . As on August 4th we still uphold, in
harmony with the International, the imperishable right of
every nation to integrity and independence. To deprive
foreign nations of these privileges is to sow the seed of
fresh war. We stand, therefore, by what we said on
August 4th. We demand that, as soon as the goal has
been reached in which the enemy is desirous of peace, the

Public Opinion and Sentiment 397

war be ended on terms conducive to friendship with other
nations."

The only spectacular event of the session was the soli-
tary vote of Karl Liebknecht against the war-budget in
violation of the discipline of the Social Democratic party
which requires that all members shall vote as a unit. His
action was repudiated by the following resolution of the
parliamentary group, as published in Vorwdrts:

"The Social Democratic party strongly condemns Karl
Liebknecht's breach of discipline, and it repudiates the
misleading information which he has spread concerning
proceedings within the party. The party is determined
that it shall vote as a unit in the Reichstag. If any deputy
is unable conscientiously to participate in the voting he is
at liberty to abstain, but he must not give his abstention
the character of a demonstration."

The Reichstag, after convening at 4.15 P.M. and sanc-
tioning the second war appropriation of 5,000,000,000
marks, was adjourned about 6 P. M. until March, 1915.

The position, unquestionable prominence, and personal
authority of the fiery controversialist, uncompromising
nationalist, and conservative statesman. Count Tisza, Prime
Minister of Hungary, made him a very significant spokes-
man for the hopes and aspirations of those who regarded the
Dual Monarchy with feelings of loyalty and attachment.

Replying to the New Year's greetings of parliamentary
supporters of the government, he delivered an address
which contained a number of noteworthy passages. He
recalled with satisfaction the chagrin of the enemy upon
discovering so many unexpected signs of vigor, harmony,
and self-sacrificing devotion in the supposedly decadent
monarchy. But they themselves, he admitted, had been
surprised by the rapidity and violence of the first attack in
the northeast. The bitterest surprise had been the forced

398 The Great War

evacuation of Serbia after their troops had victoriously ad-
vanced into the heart of the country.

"I am not so much disturbed," he said, "by the disad-
vantages of the present situation in a military sense, for we
shall very soon cancel the military consequences of the
retreat. But it grieves me that an army which has strug-
gled against the superiority of an altogether very competent
enemy and has carried on a heroic conflict with feverish
impetuosity for weeks and months in the midst of the
greatest physical difficulties, should lose this glory, at least
in the eyes of the public, simply because it was expected
to perform a superhuman task."

In regard to the harmonious cooperation of the Austro-
Hungarian and German troops. Count Tisza declared:
"Our troops are permeated with reciprocal feelings of
trust, afl^ection, and appreciation. German and Austro-
Hungarian troops accomplish marvels together. There is
absolute harmony between the leaders." His recent visit
to the German headquarters had given him ample proof of
the loyalty and candid sympathy of their ally. As to the
effect of the war upon the constitution of the Dual Mon-
archy, he declared: "Dualism, which offers a basis for the
preservation of Hungarian independence and nationalism,
has stood the fiery test of warfare. The centralizing tend-
encies which still crop out at times in Austria have lost
every justification in the trials of the great war; and in the
face of all that the Hungarian nation has accomplished and
sacrificed for the lofty common aims of the monarchy,
only a pernicious madness could return to an agitation for
centralization. History has definitely settled to-day the
problem of the constitution of the monarchy. Friction on
constitutional questions has no longer any place."

In Turkey the indispensable basis for public opinion in
the truer, comprehensive sense, homogeneity of civilization.

Public Opinion and Sentiment 399

a common intellectual outlook, and a general feeling of
community of interests and responsibilities, is manifestly
lacking. Its place is taken by the selfish impulses and
designs of the political cliques by whom the superficial
manifestation of popular enthusiasms or passions is surrep-
titiously controlled. The news of Turkey's plunge into
the vortex of the world-war was followed in the German
press by copious accounts of the demonstrations of satis-
faction at Constantinople. But the publication of these
glowing narratives at precisely the time when it was ex-
pedient to counteract in the imagination of the German
people the embarrassing retardation of the seemingly im-
pending victorious consummation of operations in the
western campaign is not free from suspicion that the
occurrences themselves were adroitly elaborated or that
the reports of them were judiciously embellished.

A popular demonstration before the German Embassy
on the evening of November 14th was described as an
event of special significance. The appearance of the Ger-
man ambassador at the balcony was greeted by a prolonged
ovation, and after the playing of the German national
hymn, "Heil dtr im Siegeskranz,'' Nazim Bey, the leader of
the Young Turks, delivered a fervent address, to which the
ambassador replied in the warmest tones, expressing his
conviction that the victory of the three allies would mark
the beginning of a new era of prosperity for Turkey and
Islam.

A proclamation announcing the Holy War on Novem-
ber 21st recalled that Russia, the inveterate foe of Islam,
had associated herself in the present conflict with Great
Britain and France, powers that held millions of Moham-
medans under their yoke and were driven by their insatia-
ble greed to plot the ruin of the caliphate. This document
declared that the powers composing the Triple Entente

400 The Great War

had robbed many Mohammedan peoples of freedom and
independence and it denounced them as instigators of the
recent Balkan War and of the present conflagration which
threatened the heart of Islam. All Ottoman subjects from
twenty to forty-five years of age were summoned to take
up arms, and all other Mohammedans, including those
who lived under the tyranny of the enemy powers, were
commanded either to take part themselves in the Holy
War or to contribute to it from their financial resources.

The Turkish Parliament was convened with an im-
pressive ceremony on December 14th by the Sultan in
person assisted by an imposing retinue, which included
the heir apparent and other princes, the Khedive, and
Goltz Pasha, and in the presence of the highest military,
religious, and civil dignitaries, foreign ambassadors, and the
German military mission. The speech from the throne
described how the great European crisis had broken in
upon Turkey while she was engaged in the peaceful work
of healing the wounds of the Balkan War and removing
the remaining sources of friction with her neighbors.
General mobilization had been carried out solely for the
preservation of Turkish neutrality. But Russia's unpro-
voked attack on the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea and the
hostile acts of Great Britain and France on land had com-
pelled the Sultan to declare war. The subversive designs
of Russia, Great Britain, and France against Islam made it
a religious duty to invoke the Holy War against these
powers. The Sultan was confident that the achievements
of the Turkish forces and of the other Mohammedan
warriors called out in the Holy War would match the
glorious victories of their allies in Europe.

After the withdrawal of the court, Halil Bey, President
of the Parliament, opened the session by a speech in which
he emphasized his conviction that the present contest did

Longwy after bombardment and capture by the Germans.

The British Lion between the Crown Prince, ' ' Conqueror of Longwy/ ' and von Hinden-
burg, "the victorious leader of the Army of the East." Statues placed in front of the
Eberlein Museum, Berlin, in the early days of the war.

Public Opinion and Sentiment 401

not involve solely an isolated question or the vindication of
national honor, that it w^as not a struggle for the protection
of a single province, but for existence itself. It was neces-
sary for the Turks to persevere with unsparing efforts until
they had won a durable peace which would guarantee to
their descendants the opportunity of pursuing their civiliz-
ing task in tranquillity. Formerly they had been compelled
to combat the Muscovite tyranny alone. Henceforth they
would struggle in defense of civilization in league with
Germany whose superiority in industry, administration,
and organization was no less marked than in war. " I am
convinced," he said, **that after the war the French and
English, who will have to acknowledge with sorrow that
the progress of Germany cannot be destroyed by violence,
will seek a reconciliation with us."

Soon after the collision which inaugurated the hostilities
between Russia and Turkey a deputation of Ruthenians
from the Ukraine came to Constantinople and issued an
address to the Ottoman nation, declaring that Russia had
always been the enemy of Turkey, that the treatment of
Mohammedans in Russia was inhuman, and that 30,000,000
people in the Ukraine looked for deliverance from oppres-
sion to Turkey, the old ally of the Cossacks of that region.
The world to its astonishment was informed at the same
time that such a question existed and that it had attained
the proportions and degree of bitterness thus indicated.
It is a well-known fact that there is a very marked tempera-
mental distinction between the Great Russians and the
Little Russians, the inhabitants of the Ukraine, and that
the intolerant attitude of the government in respect to
the dialectical peculiarities which distinguish the speech
of the latter has been a source of discontent. But the fan-
tastic tone of the address and its timely utility as a factor
contributing to an atmosphere of exhilaration in Turkey

402 The Great War

create the suspicion that a disagreement of only minor
significance was being exaggerated and exploited. The
fact remains, nevertheless, that the wave of patriotic fervor
which swept over Russia at the outbreak of the war had
no magic efficacy to obliterate every form of abuse and
dissatisfaction.

The war was commonly regarded as the consummation
of the long struggle for the emancipation of the Russian
national genius from bondage to foreign, that is German,
influence and institutions. The passionate devotion to the
native tradition found expression in a great variety of ways,
in acts and impulses, great and petty, sane and bigoted.
Thus on September 1st an imperial order directed that the
Russian designation "Petrograd" should be substituted for
the German **St. Petersburg" as the name of the capital
of the empire.

There was undoubtedly a tendency on the part of the
reactionary elements to turn the effusion of nationalistic
enthusiasm to the promotion of their own designs. On
the other hand, the Social Democrats, who in a body left
the hall of the Duma before the vote was taken in the
historic session of August 8th as a demonstration of their
abhorrence of the war, were still unreconciled. They de-
clared in a letter to M. Vandervelde their intention of con-
tinuing their war against Tsardom with greater energy
than ever. "The Russian government," they asserted, "as
well as the German government is the enemy of democracy.
Even now that it is at war it persecutes the working men
and the non- Russian nationalities, and should it be victori-
ous, it would propagate political reaction in all Europe."

Bismarck had always dreaded the possibility of a league
of hostile states and succeeded during the twenty years of
his chancellorship in preventing such a combination by a
foreign policy of circumspection, by cultivating useful

Public Opinion and Sentiment 403

friendships, and by isolating the chief potential enemies of
Germany. But later, as we have seen, by her policy of
gaining a dominating influence in the Balkan peninsula
and Turkey, while upholding the pretensions of her ally,
Austria-Hungary, by her unswerving effort to create a
formidable sea-power, and by her uncompromising deter-
mination not to recede from any part of the Reichsland,
Germany provoked the enmity of Russia and Great Britain,
and kept alive the animosity of France.

The military leadership of Germany undertook to shatter
the resulting coalition by crushing one of the partners be-
fore the others could effectively intervene. Possessing the
initiative on all the fronts throughout the greater part of
the first campaign, convinced that the supreme issues would
be decided upon the principal battlefields of Europe and
that a speedy decision was all-important for themselves, the
Germans concentrated their energy for the offensive in
the West and repeatedly hurled their tremendous masses
against the armies of the French and their immediate
supporters. But while these redoubtable efforts failed to
reduce France to helplessness, or to eliminate her from
the number of Germany's opponents, the unforeseen alac-
rity of the other foes compelled the Teutonic powers to
diveft an ever-increasing portion of their energy and
strength to other fields, and to make enormous efforts
where for the time only subordinate operations had been
contemplated in the original plan.

Consequently, in spite of the unprecedented scale of their
exertions and an astonishing succession of stupendous per-
formances, no decisive results were anywhere obtained,
and the execution of the original German plan reached
its culmination without success, although its failure was
mitigated by the occupation of the greater part of the
invaded territorv.

404 The Great War

Both sides had been deceived in all the specious expecta-
tions upon which their respective hopes of speedy triumph
had been founded. The British Empire had not been
paralyzed by Irish discontent, the Boer revolt, or Indian
disloyalty; France had not become the prey of discourage-
ment or partisan dissension; and Russia had not collapsed
from internal disorder or corruption; w^hile at the same
time Germany had displayed an almost universal spirit of
unanimity and unflinching resolution that belied all the
predictions of her enemies, and the supposedly incoherent
aggregation of Austria-Hungary had shown unexpected
tenacity and harmony. Contrary to the common notion
that the maximum warlike strength of autocratic states, by
reason of the concentration of authority, is available from
the start and therefore necessarily diminishes as a contest
proceeds, while that of democracies is only gradually
attained in the course of the struggle, the energy and
force of Germany were destined still to increase for many
months far beyond the utmost prevision of her antagonists.

The palpitating excitement and glamor of mobilization
and of the early spectacular operations of warfare had
faded into the grim monotony of incessant, mechanical,
exhausting toil requited by only microscopic results. But
the spirit of the peoples had lost none of its fervor, and each
nation deliberately schooled itself in the conviction that an
unconquerable determination to win at any cost would
make victory absolutely certain.

CHAPTER XVI

The Naval Situation at the Beginning of the War

That the great war was not unexpected is clearly shown
by published documents as well as by preliminary events
known to all. Among the documents one of the most
notable is the letter to the French ambassador in London,
dated November 22, 1912 (an enclosure to Document 105
of the British Diplomatic Correspondence), beginning
with : *' From time to time in recent years the French and
British naval and military experts have consulted together."
Such consultations could have but one meaning: looking
to common action in war. The withdrawal of the British
fleet from the Mediterranean to home waters, leaving this
sea practically entirely to the French was a strong indica-
tion of the British attitude which certainly was not lost
upon Germany. The German army increase of 1913 and
the return of the French to three years as the term of
service in the army were also marked indications of the
great tension which needed but a spark to produce the

405

406 The Great War

conflagration. Nor can the establishment of a great north-
ern dockyard at Rosyth on the Firth of Forth, the first
steps towards which were taken in 1903, be omitted as a
sign of the times. The general feeling is well expressed
in the published dispatches of the Belgian ministers at
London, Paris, and Berlin from 1905 to 1914.

The British naval strategy was, of course, of the simplest:
to clear the ocean of German shipping, naval and com-
mercial. Her forces were ample for the purpose, as results
have shown. In addition, her battle fleet concentrated, as
mentioned, in 1913, in the North Sea, was ready to resist
any attempt at invasion or attack upon the British coast, or
if opportunity afforded, to attack the German fleet at sea.

Of all these matters Germany and Austria were, of course,
fully aware. Germany could not expect to do much more
on the high seas than, for a time, to raid British com-
merce. Her foreign squadrons were small but of fast and
efficient ships. Two notable squadron actions were to be
fought, but the end was visible from the beginning. Natu-
rally, too, effort was to be made in the direction of raiding
by employing fast armed merchantmen. Germany, how-
ever, had a naval strategy in a large sense, in addition to
an offensive by submarines, thus expressed by Baron von
Maltzahn: "Our fleet law of 1900 was founded on 'Defense
by Battle.' It states in its preamble that 'Germany must
possess a battle fleet of such strength that war, even for
the most powerful naval adversary, would involve such
risks as to endanger the latter's supremacy.' By 'Defense
by Battle' is meant to bring the enemy to battle on the
high seas. It cannot be hoped to defeat him decisively
once for all — the difference of strength which is a pre-
sumption of the strategic defensive would indeed prevent
this — but it must be able to deprive him of so much of
his strength that what remains is not sufficient for his

The Naval Situation 407

purpose." Events later than the period covered in this vol-
ume shov^^ that Germany has held to this viev^^. There could
be, as von Maltzahn says, no hope on the part of Ger-
many of a decisive victory over the British battle fleet with
the great odds against her.

Germany could, too, in addition to the hope of decreas-
ing the British fleet by losses equal to the whole of her
own, have an expectation of wearing out in large degree
the endurance of men and ships, as in this respect her
situation was much more favorable than that of Britain.
Her ships were in immediate contact with her dockyards,
and her officers and men in touch with their home life in
greater degree than were the British.

The conditions in the Baltic gave the Germans much
the same superiority that existed for the British in the
North Sea. The fortress of Kronstadt, the base of the
Russian fleet, was practically unattackable, while the supe-
riority in naval force of the Germans gave them command
of the sea. The entrances to the Baltic were soon to be
mined and, for reasons to be mentioned later, there was no
danger in the Baltic from the British fleet.

The new element of submarines and mines prevented
the establishment by the British of a blockade. Any efl^ort
at the establishment of one in the sense known to inter-
national law would have resulted in losses too serious to
contemplate. The command of the Baltic Sea was thus of
great advantage to Germany, in enabling her to maintain
her commerce with Scandinavia — and would have been
immensely greater had the United States enforced its pro-
tests against British action.

French strategy in the Mediterranean was akin to that
of the British in the North Sea, and that of Austria akin to
that of Germany. The impregnable coasts of the Central
Powers were a factor of enormous weight in the naval

408 The Great War

part of the contest. As for Russia, her weakness in both
the Baltic and the Black Sea at the beginning of the war
precluded any real effort. Japan's action was to be con-
fined to the seizure of German islands and the fortified
port of Tsingtau.

The cataclysm of the war found the fleets of the bel-
ligerent powers distributed as had been arranged some
years before. The British had withdrawn, practically,
from the Mediterranean, leaving but 3 battle-cruisers, 4
armored cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 16 destroyers and depot
ships, 2 gunboats, 6 submarines (3 at Malta, 3 at Gibraltar),
and 16 torpedo boats. Thus, on the outbreak, the general
command was taken over by the French admiral, Boue de
Lapeyrere; Sir Berkeley Milne, the British commander-in-
chief, returning home. The entire French fleet, practically,
was now in this sea: 4 dreadnoughts, 18 pre-dreadnoughts
(all carrying 12-inch guns), 20 armored and protected cruis-
ers, 11 light cruisers, 84 destroyers, 153 torpedo boats (mostly
small and ill-adapted to modern war), and 70 submarines.

Similarly, nearly the whole of the British navy was in
home waters, organized as follows:

A. First Fleet (except Fourth Cruiser Squadron).

1. First Battle Squadron. Eight dreadnoughts, one

carrying ten 13.5-inch guns; seven carrying ten
12-inch.

2. Second Battle Squadrojt. Eight dreadnoughts, all

carrying 13.5-inch.

3. Third Battle Squadron. Eight pre-dreadnoughts.

King Edward type, carrying four 12-inch.

4. Fourth Battle Squadron. Three dreadnoughts, carry-

ing 12-inch; one pre-dreadnought.

5. First Battle-Cruiser Squadron. Four battle-cruisers.

>~^

The Naval Situation 409

6. Second Cruiser Squadron. Four armored cruisers.

7. Third Cruiser Squadron. Four armored cruisers.

8. First Light Cruiser Squadron. Four light cruisers.

B. Second Fleet.

1. Fifth Battle Squadron. (Pre-dreadnoughts, Bulns:ark

type.)

2. Sixth Battle Squadron. (Pre-dreadnoughts, Duncan

type.)

3. Fifth Cruiser Squadron. {County class.)

4. Sixth Ci'uiser Squadron. {Drake class.)

C. Third Fleet.

1. Seventh Battle Squadron. (Pre-dreadnoughts, M^yfj-//r

type.)

2. Eighth Battle Squadron.

3. Seventh, Eighthy Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth

Cruiser Squadrofis. (Cruisers of all sorts.)

D. Mediterranean Fleet.

1. Second Battle-Cruiser Squadron. Three battle-cruisers.

2. First Cruiser Squadron. Four armored cruisers.

3. Second Light Cruiser Squadroji. Four light cruisers.

In May, 1914, there was a mobilization of the fleet, thus
described by a British Service paper: ''The climax of
the test mobilization was reached July 19th, when King
George inspected his stupendous fleet at Spithead. Steam-
ing at 11 knots an hour, the imposing cavalcade was headed
by the first battle-cruiser squadron, consisting of four
ships in battle-line ahead, under the command of Rear
Admiral Sir David Beatty, who commands the squadron.
The honor of leading the way was given to these dread-
nought battle-cruisers — the Lion, Queen Mary, Princess
Royal, and New Zealand. The battle-cruisers were followed
by 29 ships of the first, second, third, and fourth battle
squadrons. These, the flower of the British navy, came

410 The Great War

in two columns abreast, Admiral Sir George Callaghan
(commander-in-chief of the home fleet) leading the way
in the flagship Irofi Duke. In the first battle squadron was
the Marlborough (flagship of Vice Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly),
with a displacement and horse-power equal to those of the
Iron Duke herself. Then came the Colossus and Hercules,
the Neptune and St, Vificent, the Superb and Collingwood.

**The powerful second battle squadron came next, the
King George V (flagship of Vice Admiral Sir George War-
render) being followed by the Audacious, Ajax, Ceiiturion,
Orion, Conqueror, Monarch, and Thunderer, all tremendous
pieces of naval architecture of the most modern type, but
showing variety in shape. The third battle squadron
brought before the notice of His Majesty ships of lighter
tonnage, and, as things move so swiftly in naval matters
nowadays, some experts say, almost out of date. These
were the King Edward VII (flagship of Vice Admiral E. E.
Bradford), which was launched at Devonport in 1903, and
others built from nine to eleven years ago. Closely in
their wake came the fourth battle squadron, consisting of
such fine specimens as the Dreadnought (flagship of Vice
Admiral Sir D. A. Gamble), and the Temeraire, Bellerophon,
and the Agamemnon. Other big ships, small ships, snake-
like destroyers, and gunboats, and the almost myriads of
tiny craft which go to make up Britain's first line of de-
fense, came along from the westward, submitted them-
selves to the inspection of the King, and proceeded on
their way. These were the vessels of the second and third
cruiser squadrons, light cruisers attached to the difi^erent
fleets, destroyers, and a regular swarm of small craft.
Although the big ships for the most part steamed two and
three abreast, the line was nearly 14 miles long, reaching
from near Osborne to the eastern end of the Isle of Wight.
Two hundred of the most complete sea fighters ever

The Naval Situation 411

known; the greatest congregation of ships ever assembled
had passed in view before the King, comprising 24 dread-
noughts, 35 pre-dreadnoughts, 18 armored cruisers, 7 pro-
tected cruisers, and 78 destroyers, together with mine-layers,
repair ships, and all kinds of auxiliaries."

The London Times of May 28, 1914, two months before
the outbreak of war, referring to the decision to send the
naval cadets from Osborne and Dartmouth to sea when the
fleet is mobilized in July, said: "That this is being tried in
July indicates that what Mr. Churchill calls the test of mobi-
lization of the Third Fleet is really a mobilization for war,
for this step would only be taken in view of the imminence
of hostilities." A startling statement in view of later events.

The fleets in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were
to play but a secondary role. The Turks had been de-
prived of their two fine ships, the Reshadieh of 23,000 tons,
built at Barrow, and carrying ten 13.5-inch and sixteen
6-inch guns, and the Birinji Osma?i of 27,500 tons, built at
Elswick, and«carrying fourteen 12-inch and twenty 6-inch
guns. The two had cost Turkey some ^£"6,000,000. The
money had been paid, but on the day it had been arranged
to hoist the Turkish flag both were seized by the British
government and the Turks were minus both money and
ships. The Turks, to be at war on November 5, 1914,
were, however, soon to have a reinforcement from Ger-
many in the Goeben and the Breslau, which arrived at Con-
stantinople on August 11th, after a week of daring escapes,
and went through the form of a sale to Turkey, thus
creating a difficult and unprecedented situation in inter-
national law. The story of these ships on the outbreak of
the war will have mention later.

In the Far East the Germans had two armored cruisers,
the Scharfihorst and the Gfieisefiau, of 11,600 tons, eight
8.2-inch, six 6-inch, 40 caliber guns, and 23 knots, the light

412 The Great War

cruiser Emden, of 3,500 tons, ten 4.1-inch, 40 caliber guns,
and 24 knots, three old cruisers, four other small vessels
and two destroyers; Austria, a small cruiser, the Kaiserin
Elisabeth. France had two armored cruisers, a destroyer,
a gunboat, and four river gunboats; Great Britain, a battle-
ship (the Triumph, of 12,000 tons), two armored cruisers,
two light cruisers, eight destroyers, four torpedo boats,
three submarines, and a number of small (chiefly river)
craft; Japan, of course, her whole navy.

In the Pacific, Germany had in Australian waters, three
old cruisers; in East Africa, the light cruiser Konigsberg
and the survey ship Mowe; and on the West Coast of North
America, the light cruisers Niirnberg and Leipzig. There
were one British battleship and two light cruisers in the
East Indies; three cruisers and a gunboat at the Cape of
Good Hope ; two submarines at Vancouver. There were
also the New Zealand navy of three cruisers and a sloop,
and the Australian, of one battle-cruiser, three light cruisers,
three destroyers, and two submarines. France had one
gunboat and a despatch boat in the islands.

Distributed in all seas was a great number of German
merchant ships. The war, though long brewing and
known to be certain finally to come, broke so suddenly
that none of these ships could have sufficient premonition
of the danger to reach home ports, except those near to
Germany. There was immediate seizure of all such in
enemy ports, the procedure going to the extent of detain-
ing some in British ports previous to the actual outbreak.
The whole was in marked contrast to American procedure
in the Spanish War, the President's proclamation, dated
April 26, 1898, allowing twenty-six days to reach a home
port, reading as follows:

"4. Spanish merchant vessels, in any ports or places
within the United States, shall be allowed till May 21,

The Naval Situation 413

1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and departing
from such ports or places; and such Spanish merchant
vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be
permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of
their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken
on board before the expiration of the above term; pro-
vided, that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish
vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval
service of the enemy, or any coal (except such as may be
necessary for their voyage), or any other article prohibited
or contraband of war, or any dispatch of or to the Spanish
government.

" 5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21,
1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port bound for any
port or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter
such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and after-
ward forthwith to depart without molestation ; and any such
vessel, if met at sea by any United States ships, shall be per-
mitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded."

The relative forces actually available at the outbreak of
the war, are given best in a table :

British. German.

Super-dreadnoughts ... 13 —

Dreadnoughts 11 16

Dreadnought battle-cruisers . 7 4 (Battle-cruisers)

Pre-dreadnought battleships. 38 24

Armored cruisers .... 30 9

Light cruisers 22 33

Protected cruisers .... 44 —

Destroyers 198 151

Torpedo boats 89 47

Submarines 72 38

Mine-layers 7 —

Repair ships 3 —

414 The Great War

It needs no labored analysis to show the very great
superiority of the British fleet — a superiority which in-
clines one to wonder at any fear of Germany's attaining, in
a generation at least, an approach to equality. Certainly
such fear is not understandable to the writer. Great Britain
was very soon to have afloat in ships of 18,000 tons and over,
forty 15-inch guns in five ships, ten 14-inch in one ship, a
hundred and fifty 13.5-inch in sixteen ships, and a hundred
and fifty-two 12-inch in sixteen; a total of thirty-eight
dreadnoughts and super-dreadnoughts. Five others, each to
carry eight 15-inch, had been laid down before the break-
ing out of the war. Germany had but twenty-six such
ships built and building, carrying sixteen 15-inch, one
hundred and sixty-four 12-inch, and eighty-six 11-inch.

Tabulated these are:

British.

German.

15-inch . . . . .

.... 40

14-inch

.... 10

13.5-inch ....

.... 150

12-inch

.... 152

164

11-inch

352 266

Leaving aside the 11-inch, which no navy is now using
as a primary battery, the relation of heavy guns was 352
to 180. A very careful estimate of the initial energy of
the heavy guns of the two fleets (including the earlier but
serviceable battleships) shows the power of the German
gunfire to have been but 48% that of the British. There
was, however, an element of superiority in favor of the
Germans, in the greater elevation of 30 degrees which
the}^ were able to give their guns, as against 15 degrees of
the British, and by a superiority in initial velocity. The

The Naval Situation 415

range of the German 12-inch is 47% in excess of the
British 13.5-inch, the former having an initial velocity of
3,080 foot-seconds, the latter 2,700. The newer British
12-inch has a range of over 1,000 yards in excess of the
British 13.5-inch, but it falls short of the German by 7,670
yards, or 38%, chiefly through its low^er possible elevation.
Naval battles are now fought at ranges undreamed of in
former days, a range of 16,000 yards being, for example,
used in the battle off the Falkland Islands. With the eye
at an elevation of 20 feet a ship is hull down at such a dis-
tance. But the danger zone extends thousands of yards
beyond this range, though the angle of fall in the greater
ranges becomes so obtuse that the danger of hitting is
much diminished. The flatter the trajectory the greater
the chances of striking the target.

The great area of naval action was, of course, to be the
North Sea, though in the peculiarly impregnable condi-
tions of the German coast, there could be no attack upon
the coast itself. Naval action in this sea was long to be
confined to minor operations, chiefly submarines. The
sea thus known may be taken as a rectangle, one end of
which is bounded by a line 315 miles long, extending from
the northernmost Orkneys to Bergen in Norway, the south
end, taken from the Wash to the Elbe, is of equal breadth.
The length of the northwest and southeast axis between
these lines is 480 miles. Between Texel and Yarmouth,
at the southwest corner, is a great teat with a general
breadth of about 110 miles narrowing quickly at the Straits
of Dover to about 25. The area of the sea is about twice
that of our five Great Lakes combined. In general it is
shoal enough to anchor at almost any point south of a line
drawn from Moray Firth to the north end of Denmark
(known as the Skaw), but north of this the water deepens,

416 The Great War

until at the Skagerrack, which extends along southern Nor-
way to the west coast of Sweden, there is a depth of several
hundred fathoms. Over the whole area of the shallower
(and much greater) part of the sea, mines can be anchored
without difficulty, but not in the Skagerrack or in the more
northerly parts except on the borders of the Scotch coast,
a depth beyond 360 feet precluding such action.

Leaving the Skagerrack, which extends northeast 120
miles with a breadth of 60, one turns suddenly south by
east into the Cattegat, another 120 miles in length with a
breadth varying from 30 to 60 miles. At the southwest
corner begin the Great Belt and Little Belt, circuitous pas-
sages for 90 miles among numerous islands and sandbanks
and the only entrances to the Baltic besides the still more
narrow and difficult passage of "the Sound," which sepa-
rates from Sweden the large island of Zealand, in which is
Copenhagen. For centuries, Denmark claimed jurisdic-
tion over these passages, and charged tolls which all nations
paid until they were abolished in 1857 by a payment, in
which all seafaring powers shared, of a quid pro quo to
Denmark. Excluding the Gulf of Bothnia (itself 400 miles
long), the Baltic is about half the size of the North Sea.
The distance from Kiel to the entrance of the Gulf of
Finland, at the eastern end of which lies the great fortress
of Kronstadt, is about 500 miles, the breadth, south of the
Gulf of Finland, is from 150 to 200 miles. This sea, like
the North Sea, is shallow and ships can anchor in most
parts. Navigation is, of course, greatly obstructed in winter
by ice. One can readily see that operations in these two seas
involve much greater distances (given here in statute miles)
than are generally supposed.

The strategic conditions almost wholly favored Ger-
many. The Russian fleet as compared with the German
was weak. The British fleet could not aid the Russians

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The Naval Situation 417

materially for two powerful reasons. They could not
weaken their main fleet in the North Sea lest the remain-
der should be attacked by the combined German battle
fleet, and any force sent into the Baltic would be subject
to like attack through the command by the Germans of the
Kiel Canal, officially the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. Further,
the Baltic ports of Germany were so heavily fortified (the
coast fortifications, as in most European countries, being
under control of the navy) as to be invulnerable to naval
attack. The Kiel Canal was thus an invaluable asset to
Germany both in war and peace. It had just been deep-
ened and widened to meet the needs of the largest ships.
It now has a surface breadth of 350 feet, instead of the
former 130, and a bottom breadth of 130, instead of 60. At
each end are locks, two of which (at Briinsbuttel), are
larger even than those of Panama, as they are 1,083 feet
long with a breadth at the entrance of 148; these are avail-
able for ordinary use in docking. The canal is 56 miles
long, and ends in the Elbe at Briinsbuttel, 50 miles below
Hamburg and 22 miles above Cuxhaven, the port on the
south side, 16 miles within the lightship marking the en-
trance of the Elbe. There is no need to set forth at
length the immense advantage to the Germans of this in-
terior connection with the two seas. In a day or so the
fleet can transfer from one sea to the other, avoiding the
dangerous navigation (in fact impossible in present condi-
tions) of 680 miles from the mouth of the Elbe round Den-
mark by the Cattegat to the Baltic. The two great war ports,
Kiel and Wilhelmshaven (the latter on the estuary of the
Jade and which during the war has been the headquarters
of the German fleet, of which Admiral von Ingenohl was
in chief command), are thus in close connection. The
mouth of the Jade is but 14 miles from the Elbe lightship,
38 miles above which is the entrance to the Kiel Canal.

418 The Great War

But the great safeguard and what makes the German
coast on the North Sea practically unattackable are the
sands, the deposits of the German rivers, which extend, in
a fringe of shallows varying in breadth from 10 to 20 miles.
The intricate channels through these ar« unusable except
by careful buoyage. Naturally the buoys have been re-
moved and only such marks are used as can be recognized
by the Germans themselves. Nature herself has thus done
more for the Germans than any degree of ordinary forti-
fication could do. She has, in fact, made the German coast
impregnable.

Fifty miles at sea, WNW of Cuxhaven and 40 miles
from the nearest mainland, lies the island of Heligoland, a
watering place in peace, a fortress and naval base in war.
It is but a small plateau, a mile in length and a third of a
mile in greatest breadth, with steep red cliffs some 200
feet high. On this plateau is a village. At the southeast
end is a low beach on which, as also on the sand island
known as the Diinen-Insel to the eastward and parallel with
the main island and once connected with it, are villages
made up of hotels and bathing establishments. The island
population is about 2,300. The conformation affords a
harbor for the largest ships, protected from attacks by
very strong fortifications. It is thus a very powerful and
practically unattackable advanced naval base. Until 1807
the island was Danish. It was seized in that year by the
British and remained under their control until 1890 when,
Lord Salisbury being British Premier, it was ceded to Ger-
many in return for release by the latter of any claim in
Zanzibar, and now forms part of Schleswig-Holstein.

On the outbreak of the war the British Battle Fleet,
with Admiral John R. Jellicoe as commander-in-chief, was
moved north to the Scapa Flow, a harbor formed by the

The Naval Situation 419

many islands at the southern end of the Orkneys, with five
deep channels for entrance and exit. The harbor is a quad-
rangle with sides of eight and ten miles with deep water
through its whole extent; it thus affords 80 square miles of
thoroughly protected anchorage. Here the large ships were
in comparatively easy reach of the great docks of Belfast and
the Mersey and were able to go to sea for gun practice with
comparatively small danger of attack from submarines.

The battle-cruiser squadron, with many adjuncts of
armored and light cruisers, destroyers and submarines, used
the newly established naval station of Rosyth, three miles
above the Forth Bridge, and nearer by 100 miles to the
German coast. Every precaution of nets and other obsta-
cles was established against torpedo attack. At the opening
of the war a beginning only had been made on the large
docks which were to form a part of the Rosyth equipment.
There were, however, many available on the east coast.

The British fleets were thus, the one about 400, the
other some 500 nautical miles from the mouths of the
Elbe and the Jade, or a 24-hours' run at 17 and 21 knots
for the one and the other.

The situation in the Mediterranean was so entirely
secondary in the beginning that it needs but short atten-
tion. The Italian fleet was neutral: the French fleet so
outclassed the Austro-Hungarian, both in numbers and
power (reckoned by experts as three to one), that there
could be no question of any great sea action; the Turkish
sea power, when Turkey entered the war on November
5, 1914, was practically represented only in the Goeben, pur-
chased from Germany. But the Austrian coast, stretching
some 360 miles along the Adriatic, was practically almost
as unattackable as that of Germany. This coast, south of
Istria, is fringed with a series of narrow islands, some as

420 The Great War

extensive as 40 miles in length, which are parallel with the
coast, and inside of which are deep, narrow passages, easily
mined, the important points of which are heavily fortified.
Practically no effort has been made against these.

The question of mine-laying rapidly assumed great im-
portance. The Germans at once mined the waters of their
own coast, and British reports of German mine-laying on
the British coast were communicated to the Washington
government, stating that "on or about August 26th an Ice-
land trawler is reported to have struck a mine 25 miles off
the Tyne and at least one foreign newspaper has stated that
the mine was English. Although the German action in
laying mines has forced the Admiralty to reserve to itself
the right to do likewise, the statement already made of His
Majesty's Government that no British mines have been
laid remains absolutely true at this moment." The ques-
tion of precedence is of small moment, as all the nations at
war were sure to use so effective a weapon. Thus the
London Times of the 3d October published an official
map of a British mine-field covering an area from latitude
51° 15' N. and 51° 40' N. and longitude 1° 35' E. and 3° E.,
an area 25 nautical miles broad and 43 nautical miles long.
As this area reached within three miles of the British coast,
it enabled the British to exercise control over all traffic to
and from Holland, as all ships bound to or from Holland
had to come into British waters. This fact was used to
claim the right to take off and examine mails, to which the
United States has made strong but, as yet, ineffective protest.

The extent to which mines were laid may be judged by
a dispatch of the International News Service via Sayville,
May 14, 1916: "A dispatch from Amsterdam says that
during April ninety mines drifted up on the Dutch coast.
Fifty were British, three French, thirteen German, and
twenty-four of unestablished nationality.

The Naval Situation 421

''Since the beginning of the war, continues the dispatch,
1,014 mines have landed on the Dutch coast, of which
535 were British, 61 French, 193 German, and 225 of
unknown nationality."

All the nations involved in the war were equally sinners
in mine-laying, though judged by the foregoing all were
not equally efficient in anchoring their mines, which often
drifted with fatal effect. The extreme depth at w4iich
mines can be securely anchored is regarded as three hun-
dred and sixty feet, but it is evident that much less may
cause mines to be insecure.

The first important incident of the war on the sea was
the escape of the German battle-cruiser Goeben and her
companion the light cruiser Breslau and their taking refuge
in Turkish waters. On August 2d, news having been re-
ceived at Messina of the declaration of war against Russia,
the Goeben and Breslau left, and on the evening of August
4th the Goeben was off Philippeville, the Breslau having
parted company with the purpose of bombarding Bona.
The two ports are on the Algerian coast, Bona being about
175 miles west of the city of Tunis, the other some 40
miles further. War with France being now known to
have been declared, the Goeben entered the port and
opened a bombardment which inflicted much injury in the
harbor, but being met with a heavy fire she withdrew.
She, now joined by the Breslau, met the British battle-
cruisers Indefatigable and Inflexible and the light cruisers
Gloucester and Weymouth, which closing in on them were
asked what was wanted. Reply was made that war was
threatening between Great Britain and Germany. The
Germans separated, putting on their best speed, and though
followed ran the British out of sight. The same night
they heard by wireless of the British declaration of war.

422 The Great War

On August 5th they were again at Messina, at which, as it
was a neutral port, they could stay but twenty-four hours.
The time was spent in coaling. A British squadron was
known to be on the watch for them in the strait, but in
the evening of Thursday, August 6th, they left. Just what
occurred in the strait is unknown, but the result was the
escape of the two German ships and a court-martial of the
senior British commander, who was finally exonerated of
the charges made against him by the Admiralty. The
German cruisers reached the Dardanelles on August 10th,
boarded several British and French ships, but did nothing
beyond destroying the wireless apparatus of the French
steamer Saghalien, facts in themselves which should have
thrown light on the Turkish situation. Shortly after reach-
ing Constantinople they passed under the Turkish flag, the
Goeben receiving the name Sultan Yawuz Selim and the
Breslau, Midellu, The situation was unprecedented in inter-
national law. The Goeben was to the Turks but a fair offset
in equity, though not in value, for the seizure of their
ships built in England.

CHAPTER XVII

Operations in European Waters

In the North Sea : August 5, 1914, the German mine-layer Koniflin Luise
destroyed. The British cruiser Amp/lion mined. August 9th, German
submarine attack. August 28th, battle off Heligoland, German losses.
The Pathjinder torpedoed. Victims of the U-9 on September 22d and
October 15th. Loss of four German destroyers. October 26th, sinking of
the British battleship Audacious. British monitors in Belgian defense.
Isolated casualties. German cruisers raid the east coast of England. Great
battle on January 24, 1915, loss of the German cruiser Bliicher. In the
Baltic : German casualties. A German submarine sinks a Russian cruiser.
In the Mediterranean. Austrian casualties. British submarine success in
the Dardanelles. Russian losses in the Black Sea.

The naval war opened promptly. On August 5, 1914,
a German mine-layer, the Ko/n'gm Luise, a Hamburg liner
of 2,163 gross tons, converted for the purpose, was sighted
off the Suffolk coast by the light cruiser Amphion of 3,500
tons, accompanied by three destroyers. The German ship
was chased some thirty miles and was sunk by gunfire
when nearing the Scheldt. The high speed of all four of
the British ships made destruction certain. The German
had a quick revenge, for the Arnphion when returning over
the region of the former's operations struck one of the
mines.

The official account says that a sheet of flame instantlv
enveloped the bridge, rendered the captain insensible, and
he fell onto the fore and aft bridge. As soon as he recov-
ered consciousness he ran to the engine-room to stop the
engines, which were still going at revolutions for twenty
knots. As all the fore part was on fire, it proved impossible

423

424 The Great War

to reach the bridge or to flood the fore magazine. The
ship's back appeared to be broken, and she was already
settling down by the bows. All efforts were therefore
directed towards placing the wounded in a place of safety
in case of explosion, and towards getting her in tow by the
stern. Twenty minutes after the mine was struck the men,
officers, and captain left the ship. Three minutes after the
captain left his ship another explosion occurred, which en-
veloped and blew up the whole fore part of the vessel.
The effects showed that she must have struck a second
mine, which exploded the fore magazine. The after part
now began to settle quickly until its foremost part was on
the bottom and the whole after part tilted up at an angle
of 45 degrees. In another quarter of an hour this, too,
had disappeared.

On August 9th the First Light Cruiser Squadron of the
main British fleet was attacked by submarines. They
approached submerged, only the periscopes showing above
water. The Birmingham by a lucky shot struck the peri-
scope of the nearest, and later on her rising above water,
rammed and sank her. The other got away. The lost
vessel was supposedly of the earlier type, of 300 tons dis-
placement. On August 19th the Press Bureau issued the
following statement: "Some desultory fighting has taken
place during the day between the British patrolling squad-
ron and flotillas and German reconnoitering cruisers. No
losses are reported or claimed. A certain liveliness is appar-
ent in the southern area of the North Sea." "A reassuring
statement was made by the Daily Chronicle's correspondent
in Hull to the effect that the mine-sweeping fleet of
trawlers had almost cleared the areas of the North Sea
that were strewn with mines by the Germans. Mean-
while, trading and passenger steamers have been resuming
their regular sailings. Cargoes of foodstuffs have been

Operations in European Waters 425

arriving at several east coast ports both in England and
Scotland. As the Times naval correspondent remarks,
* British fishing boats are putting out, coastwise traffic has
been resumed, mail and passenger boats are running to and
fro between Britain and Northern Europe, and a Nor-
wegian bark, the Ingrid, is said to have arrived at Dover
on August 13th from the Baltic, having crossed the water-
way without seeing any signs of war.' "

It was not until August 28th that the first real clash of the
war on sea came, the scene of this being the vicinity of Heli-
goland. The British preliminary movements are described
by Commodore Roger Keyes, commanding the submarine
flotilla. The whole of the British force was under the
command of Admiral David Beatty, who had his flag in
the battle-cruiser Lion, which, with three others of her
class, the Queen Mary, Prificess Royal, and Tiger, formed the
First Battle-Cruiser Squadron, under his immediate com-
mand. All carried eight 13.5-inch guns and several ex-
ceeded 30 knots speed, the Princess Royal on her trials
having reached 34.7. The Invijicible and New Zealand,
battle-cruisers of 17,000 and 18,000 tons and 26 knots,
joined him on August 28th. Accompanying were the
Light Cruiser Squadron, with the Euryalus (flagship of Rear
Admiral A. H. Christian), of 12,000 tons, and 21.5 knots,
as flagship, with the First and Third Destroyer Flotillas
and the submarines.

The movements of the British are best described by
Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt, whose broad-pennant was
in the protected cruiser Arethusa, of 3,560 tons, 29 knots,
and two 6-inch and six 4-inch guns.

He sailed August 27th with the First and Third De-
stroyer Flotillas to carry out the prearranged operations.
Four destroyers were absent, but he was joined by the
Fearless (of 3,450 tons and ten 4-inch guns) in the afternoon.

426 The Great War

At 6.53 A.M., on August 28th, a German destroyer was
sighted and chased. From 7.20 to 7.57 A. M. the Arethusa
and the Third Flotilla were engaged with numerous de-
stroyers and torpedo boats making for Heligoland; course
was altered to port to cut them off. Two cruisers, one
with four and the other with two funnels, were sighted at
7.57, the nearest of which was engaged. The Arethusa
received a heavy fire from both cruisers and several de-
stroyers until 8.15 (18 minutes), when the Magdeburg
transferred her fire to the Fearless. Close action was con-
tinued with the two funnelled cruiser (the Ariadne) until
8.25, when a 6-inch projectile from the Arethusa wrecked
the Ariadne's fore bridge. The latter turned for Heligo-
land, now slightly visible on the starboard bow. All ships
were now ordered to turn westward and shortly after,
speed was reduced to 20 knots.

The following are vividly descriptive paragraphs from
the commodore's report:

" During this action the Arethusa had been hit many times and was
considerably damaged ; only one 6-inch gun [of which, as mentioned, she
carried two and six 4-inch] remained in action, all other guns and torpedo
tubes having been temporarily disabled.

^'A fire occurred opposite No. 2 gun-port side, caused by a shell ex-
ploding some ammunition, resulting in a terrific blaze for a short period
and leaving the deck burning. This was promptly dealt with, . . .

"The flotillas were reformed in divisions and proceeded [westward] at
20 knots. It was now noticed that the Arethusa s speed had been reduced.

'■'-Fearless reported that the Third and Fifth Divisions of the First Flotilla
had sunk the German commodore's destroyer and that two boats belong-
ing to the Defender had been left behind, as our destroyers had been fired
upon by a German cruiser during their act of mercy in saving the sur-
vivors of the German destroyer. At lO a.m. hearing that the Lurcher
and F'lredrake were being chased by light cruisers, the Fearless and First
Flotilla went to their assistance until 10.37 a.m., when having no news,
and being in the vicinity of Heligoland, I ordered the ships in company to
turn to the westward.

"All guns except two 4-inch were again in working order and the upper
deck supply of ammunition was replenished.

Operations in European Waters 427

"At 10.55 A.M. a four-funnelled German cruiser was sighted, and
opened a very heavy fire at about 1 1 o'clock.

" Our position being somewhat critical, I ordered Fearless to attack, and
the First Flotilla to attack with torpedoes, which they proceeded to do with
great spirit. The cruiser at once turned away, disappeared in the haze,
and evaded the attack.

"About ten minutes later the same cruiser appeared on our starboard
quarter. Opened fire on her with both 6-inch guns ; Fearless also en-
gaged her, and one division of destroyers attacked her with torpedoes
without success.

" The cruiser was badly damaged by Arethusa^s 6-inch guns, and a
splendidly directed fire from Fearless^ and she shortly afterwards turned
away in the direction of Heligoland.

" Proceeded, and four minutes later sighted the three-funnelled cruiser
Main-z,. She endured a heavy fire from Arethusa and Fearless and many
destroyers. After an action of approximately 25 minutes, she was seen to
be sinking by the head, her engines stopped, besides being on fire.

"At this moment the Light Cruiser Squadron appeared, and they very
speedily reduced the Mainz, to a condition which must have been inde-
scribable.

" I then recalled Fearless and the destroyers, and ordered cease fire.

" We then exchanged broadsides with a large four-funnelled cruiser on
the starboard quarter at long range, without visible effect.

"The Battle-Cruiser Squadron now arrived and I pointed out this cruiser
to the admiral commanding, and was shortly afterwards informed bv him
that the cruiser in question had been sunk and another set on fire. . . .

'''-Arethusa s speed was about six knots until 7 p.m., when it was impos-
sible to proceed any further, and fires were drawn in all boilers except two,
and assistance called for.

" His Majesty's ship under my command was then towed to the Nore,
arriving at 4 p. m. on August 29th. Steam was then available for slow
speed, and the ship was able to proceed to Chatham under her own steam."

Of the part played by the destroyers and submarines in
this first serious naval encounter some important details
may be quoted from the report of Commodore Keyes,
commanding; the Submarine Flotilla (himself in the de-
stroyer Lurcher). He says:

"At midnight on August 26th I embarked in the Lurcher^ and, in com-
pany with Firedrake and submarines D 2^ D 8^ E ^^ £ 5, E 6^ E J^ E8y
and jEp, of the Eighth Submarine Flotilla, proceeded to take part in the

428 The Great War

operations in the Heligoland Bight arranged for August 28th. The de-
stroyers scouted for the submarines until nightfall on the 27th, when the
latter proceeded independently to take up various positions from which they
could cooperate with the destroyer flotillas on the following morning.

"At daybreak on August 28th the Lurcher and Firedrake searched the
area, through which the battle-cruisers were to advance, for hostile sub-
marines, and then proceeded towards Heligoland in the wake of submarines
E6^ Ey^ and E8^ which were exposing themselves with the object of
inducing the enemy to chase them to the westward.

" Lieutenant Commander Ernest W. Leir, commanding submarine E /j.^
witnessed the sinking of the German torpedo boat destroyer V i8j through
his periscope and, observing a cruiser of the Stettin class close, and open
fire on the British destroyers which had lowered their boats to pick up the
survivors, he proceeded to attack the cruiser, but she altered her course
before he could get within range. After covering the retirement of our
destroyers, which had had to abandon their boats, he returned to the latter,
and embarked a lieutenant and nine men of the Defender^ who had been
left behind. The boats also contained two officers and eight men of V i8y^
who were unwounded, and 18 men who were badly wounded. As he could
not embark the latter. Lieutenant Commander Leir left one of the officers
and six unwounded men to navigate the British boats to Heligoland. Before
leaving he saw that they were provided with water, biscuit, and a compass.
One German officer and two men were made prisoners of war.

" Lieutenant Commander Leir's action in remaining on the surface in
the vicinity of the enemy, and in a visibility which would have placed his
vessel within easy gun range of an enemy appearing out of the mist, was
altogether admirable."

The action of Lieutenant Commander Leir, which Com-
modore Keyes very justly describes as admirable, soon
brought the former well-merited promotion to the rank
of commander.

Commodore Keyes in dealing in general with the opera-
tions of the submarines speaks of the sinking, six miles south
of Heligoland, of the German light cruiser Hela on Sep-
tember 13th by submarine £ 9 and on October 6th, by the
same submarine (the commander of which was Lieutenant
Commander Max K. Horton), the sinking of the German
destroyer S 126. He also mentions the *' short steep seas
which accompany westerly gales in the Heligoland Bight

Operations in European Waters 429

[which] made it difficult to keep the conning-tower open.
There was no rest to be obtained, and even when cruising
at a depth of 60 feet the submarines were rolling consider-
ably and pumping, i.e., vertically moving about 20 feet."
The following is Admiral Beatty's report:

" I have the honor to report that on Thursday, August 27th, at 5 a, m.,
I proceeded with the First Battle-Cruiser Squadron and First Light Cruiser
Squadron in company, to rendezvous with the Rear Admiral, Invincible.

"At 4 A.M., August 28th, the movements of the flotillas commenced,
as previously arranged, the Battle-Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser
Squadron supporting. The Rear Admiral, Invincible., with New Zealand
and four destroyers, having joined my flag, the squadron passed through
the prearranged rendezvous.

"At 8.10 A.M. I received a signal from the Commodore (T) [Tyrwhitt],
informing me that the flotilla was in action with the enemy. This was
presumably in the vicinity of their prearranged rendezvous. From this
time until ii A. M. I remained about the vicinity ready to support as neces-
sary, intercepting various signals, which contained no information on which
I could act.

"At II A.M. the squadron was attacked by three submarines. The
attack was frustrated by rapid maneuvering, and the four destroyers were
ordered to attack them. Shortly after 11 a. M. various signals having been
received indicating that the Commodore (T) and Commodore (S) [Keyes]
were both in need of assistance, I ordered the Light Cruiser Squadron to
support the torpedo flotillas.

" Later I received a signal from the Commodore (T), stating that he
was being attacked by a large cruiser, and a further signal informing me
that he was being hard pressed, and asking for assistance. The Cap-
tain (D) [name not published]. First Flotilla, also signalled that he was
in need of help.

" From the foregoing the situation appeared to me critical. The flotillas
had advanced only 10 miles since 8 A. M., and were only about 25 miles from
two enemy bases on their flank and rear respectively. Commodore Good-
enough had detached two of his light cruisers to assist some destroyers
earlier in the day, and these had not yet rejoined. (They rejoined at
2.30 P.M.) As the reports indicated the presence of many enemy ships —
one a large cruiser — I considered that his force might not be strong
enough to deal with the situation sufficiently rapidly, so at 11.30 a.m. the
battle-cruisers turned to ESE and worked up to full speed. It was evident
that to be of any value the support must be overwhelming, and carried
out at the highest speed possible.

430 The Great War

" I had not lost sight of the risk of submarines, and possible sortie in
force from the enemy's base, especially in view of the mist to the southeast.

" Our high speed, however, made submarine attack difficult, and the
smoothness of the sea made their detection comparatively easy. I con-
sidered that we were powerful enough to deal with any sorties except by
a battle squadron, which was unlikely to come out in time, provided our
stroke was sufficiently rapid.

"At 12.15 P-M* Fearless and First Flotilla were sighted retiring west.
At the same time the Light Cruiser Squadron was observed to be engaging
an enemy ship ahead. They appeared to have her beat.

"I then steered NE to sounds of firing ahead, and at 12.30 p.m. sighted
Arethusa and Third Flotilla retiring to the westward engaging a cruiser of
the Kolberg class on our port bow. I steered to cut her off from Heligo-
land, and at 12.37 p.m. opened fire. At 12.42 the enemy turned to NE,
and we chased at 27 knots.

"At 12.56 P.M. sighted and engaged a two-funnelled cruiser ahead.
Lion fired two salvos at her, which took effect, and she disappeared into
the mist, burning furiously and in a sinking condition. In view of the
mist and that she was steering at high speed at right angles to Lion^ who
was herself steaming at 28 knots, the Lion's firing was very creditable.

" Our destroyers had reported the presence of floating mines to the east-
ward, and I considered it inadvisable to pursue her. It was also essential
that the squadron should remain concentrated, and I accordingly ordered
a withdrawal. The battle-cruisers turned north and circled to port to
complete the destruction of the vessel first engaged. She was sighted
again at 1.25 p.m. steaming SE, with colors still flying. Lion opened fire
with two turrets, and at 1.35 p.m., after receiving two salvos, she sank.

" The four attached destroyers were sent to pick up survivors, but I
deeply regret that they subsequently reported that they searched the area
but found none.

"At 1.40 p. m. the battle-cruisers turned to the northward, and ^ueen
Mary was again attacked by a submarine. The attack was avoided by
the use of the helm. Lowestoft was also unsuccessfully attacked. The
battle-cruisers covered the retirement until nightfall. By 6 p.m. the re-
tirement having been well executed and all destroyers accounted for, I
altered course, spread the light cruisers, and swept northwards in accord-
ance with the commander-in-chief's orders. At 7,45 p.m. I detached
Liverpool to Rosyth with German prisoners, seven officers and 79 men,
survivors from Mainz. No further incident occurred."

It is clear that the Germans, despite their loss of the
protected cruisers, the Koln and Mainz, both of 4,280 tons,
26 knots and twelve 4.1-inch guns, and the Ariadne^ of

Operations in European Waters 431

2,618 tons, 22 knots and ten 4.1-inch guns, and a destroyer,
had carried off the honors of the fight. Their opponents
(the Arethusa carrying the Commodore's broad pennant)
had withdrawn badly injured and, leaving the iield of
action at 20 knots, were going westward when the battle-
cruiser squadron, of overpowering force, came to the
rescue. Says Mr. Jane, the well-known British naval
critic: "Our popular press feeds us on apparent results.
. . . But from the naval war standard the fact remains
that if Admiral Beatty had not taken abnormal risks we
should have been badly beaten in the Bight of Heligoland
on August 28th." The best that can be said is that both
sides fought bravely and that no flag was hauled down.

On September 5th the light cruiser Pathfinder, of 2,940
tons, 25 knots and nine 4-inch guns, was torpedoed off
St. Abb's Head, East Scotland, by the German 11-21, which
had been previously reported as that sunk by the Birming-
ham on August 9th. But on September 22, 1914, the Ger-
mans scored a much more marked success in the sinking
of the three armored cruisers, Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy,
which were together on patrol duty off the Dutch coast.
These ships were 454 feet on the water line, 69 }4 feet
broad, and had an armor belt 11^ feet wide and 230 feet
long. They carried each two 9.2-inch, 40 caliber guns,
twelve 6-inch, 45 caliber, thirteen 12-pounders, three
3-pounders, and two 18-inch submerged torpedo tubes.
The guns were mounted in 6-inch turrets and barbettes.
They had 5-inch casemates. Altogether, though built
about 1900, they were powerful ships with complements
of 700 and, in the flagship, 745 men. Their foe was the
German submarine U-9, commanded by Lieutenant Com-
mander Weddigen, with a crew of 20 men. The sub-
marine had just been to the Shetland Islands, a journey
there and back of 1,200 miles. The commanders of the

432 The Great War

Cressy and Hogue give in their reports excellent descriptions
of what occurred, which are of special interest as illustrating
the present dangers of naval life in war. These officers were
the second in command, both of their captains being lost.
Commander Nicholson of the Cressy says:

'■^Jboukir was struck at about 6.25 a.m. [September 22d] on starboard
beam. Hogue and Cressy closed, and took up position — Hogue ahead of
Aboukir and Cressy about 400 yards on port beam. As soon as it was
seen that Ahoukir was in danger of sinking, all boats were sent away from
Cressy and picket boat was hoisted out without steam up. When cutters
full of Aboukir' s men were returning to Cressy^ Hogue was struck apparently
under aft 9.2 magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately
after the first explosion.

"Almost directly after Hogue was hit we observed a periscope on our
port bow about 300 yards off. Fire was immediately opened, and engines
put full speed ahead with intention of running her down. Our gunner,
Mr. Dogherty, positively asserts that he hit the periscope, and that the
submarine then showed her conning-tower, which he struck, and the sub-
marine sank. An officer standing alongside the gunner thinks that the
shell struck only floating timber, of which there was much about, but it
was evidently the impression of the men on deck, who cheered and clap-
ped heartily, that the submarine had been hit. This submarine did not
fire a torpedo at Cressy.

" Captain Johnson then maneuvered the ship so as to render assistance
to crews of the Hogue and Ahoukir. About five minutes later another
periscope was seen on our starboard quarter. Fire was opened. The
track of the torpedo she fired at a range of 500 to 600 yards was plainly
visible, and it struck us starboard side just before the after bridge. The
ship listed about 10 degrees to starboard and remained steady. Time,
7.15 A. M. All water-tight doors, dead lights, and scuttles had been securely
closed before the torpedo struck ship. All mess tools, and tables, shores,
and all available timber below and on deck had been previously got up and
thrown over the side for saving of life.

"A second torpedo fired by the same submarine missed and passed about
20 feet astern. About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo had hit,
a third torpedo, fired from a submarine just before starboard beam, hit us
in No. 5 boiler-room. Time, 7.30 a. m. The ship then began to heel
rapidly, and finally turned keel up, remaining so for about 20 minutes
before she finally sank at 7.55 a.m. A large number of men were saved
by the casting adrift of a pattern three target. The steam pinnace floated
out of her crutches, but filled and sank.

Operations in European Waters 433

" The second torpedo which struck Cressy passed over sinking hull of
Ahoukir^ narrowly missing it. It is possible that the same submarine fired
all three torpedoes at Cressy.

" The conduct of the crew was excellent throughout. I have already
reported the splendid service rendered by Captain Phillips, master of the
trawler L. T. Coriander^ and his crew, who picked up 1 56 officers and men."

Commander Norton of the Hogue reports :

" Between 6. 1 5 and 6.30 a. m. H. M. S. Aboukir was struck by a torpedo.
The Hogue closed the Aboukir., and I received orders to hoist out the launch,
turn out and prepare all boats, and unlash all timber on the upper deck.
The two lifeboats were sent to the Aboukir^ but before the launch could
get away the Hogue was struck on the starboard side amidships by two
torpedoes at intervals of 10 to 20 seconds. The ship at once began to
heel to starboard.

"After ordering the men to provide themselves with wood, hammocks,
etc., and to get into the boats on the booms and take off their clothes, I
went by Captain Nicholson's directions to ascertain the damage in the
engine-rooms. An artificer-engineer informed me that the water was over
the engine-room gratings. While endeavoring to return to the bridge the
water burst open the starboard entry-port doors, and the ship heeled rapidly.

" I told the men in the port battery to jump overboard as the launch
was close alongside, and soon afterwards the ship lurched heavily to star-
board.

*'A Dutch sailing trawler sailed close by, but went ofF without rendering
any assistance, though we signalled to her from the Hogue to close after
we were struck.

"The Aboukir appeared to me to take about 35 minutes to sink, floating
bottom up for about five minutes. The Hogue turned turtle very quickly
in about five minutes, and floated bottom up for some minutes. A dense
black smoke was seen in the starboard battery, whether from coal or tor-
pedo cordite I could not say. The upper deck was not blown up, and
only one other small explosion occurred as we heeled over.

" The Cressy I watched heel over from the cutter. She heeled over to
starboard very slowly, a dense black smoke issuing from her when she
attained an angle of about 90 degrees. She took a long time from this
angle until she floated bottom up, with the starboard screw slightly out of
the water. I consider that it was 35 to 45 minutes from the time when
she was struck until she was bottom up."

Somewhat more than half of the 2,200 officers and men,
who were aboard the three ships, were lost.

434 The Great War

The scene was dramatically described by a Dutch skip-
per to a temporary member of the American Legation in
Holland: "I was called on deck by my mate, who said
there were three British men of war in sight. I went up
and saw two, then one and then none," so rapid and effec-
tive was the action of the submarine. The British naval
expert, mentioned above, the late Fred T. Jane, said it was
impossible that the exploit could have been the work of
one vessel, but this was merely a case of dogmatism too
frequent with this writer, as there is no doubt that there
was but one submarine present.

The fate of the Hogue and the Cressy, due to the instinc-
tive and very laudable desire to render assistance, brought
an order from the British Admiralty that ships thereafter
should not be risked by approaching a vessel so wounded
and stopping to make a rescue — a hard necessity.

Three weeks later (October 15th) the cruiser Hawke, of
7,350 tons, was torpedoed by the same U-9, all but 46 men
and three officers of the 600 aboard being lost. Two days
after this, October 17th, the light cruiser Undaunted^ of
3,750 tons and 29 knots, accompanied by three destroyers,
sank by gunfire four German destroyers, S 115, S 117, S 118,
and S 119, each of 420 tons and of a class built at Elbing
in 1902-1903. Over 200 of the German crews, of some
240, perished.

On October 27th, however, the British suffered the
severest loss of the war up to that time, in the sinking by
a mine or torpedo (by which, is unknown) off the north coast
of Ireland of the Audacious, one of their latest and heaviest
battleships, of 23,000 tons and ten 13.5-inch guns. She
was at the time, in company with four other ships, carry-
ing on target practice and was just turning to make a run
past the target. The White Star steamer Olympic, home-
ward bound, was in reach and lent valuable aid in rescue

Operations in European Waters 435

of the crew, but two of whom were lost. The severity
of the blow was shown by the endeavor of the British
Admiralty to suppress for a long time the fact, the Olympic
being detained for a week at Lough Swilly, and the passen-
gers, who were released at Belfast, where the ship docked,
instead of Liverpool, warned to keep silence as to what
they had seen. There has never, so far as is known to the
writer, been any official acknowledgment of the disaster.

On October 31st the Hermes, a cruiser of 5,600 tons, 20
knots and eleven 6-inch guns, was sunk by an unknown
German submarine off Dover. Nearly 400 of the crew
out of some 450 were saved. The disaster was at 9 A. M.
The ship was struck twice, the first blow putting her pro-
pellers out of action, the second striking her in the vicinity
of the engine room, tearing a great rent in the bottom.
Notwithstanding, the ship floated, according to some re-
ports, nearly an hour, others, however, stating the time as
much less. The ability of a ship of so moderate a size to
remain afloat so wounded for at least a considerable time
is, in view of later events, of much importance.

Three monitors at this period were actively employed on
the Belgian coast, but with what success is not accurately
known, the accounts of the British Service papers being so
extremely lurid as to damage done by vessels whose gun-
fire, on account of their quick raft-like motion, is so
notably inaccurate, that the reports must be taken with
caution. These ships were building for Brazil, but were
taken over by Great Britain on the outbreak of the war
and named the Severn, Humher, and Mersey. They are
265 feet long with a draft of 8^ feet and a displacement of
1,200 tons, a speed oillj4 knots, and an armament of two
6-inch guns, two 4.7-inch howitzers, and four 3-pounders.
As instruments of war, they are of doubtful value in any
waters but those of smooth harbors and rivers.

436 The Great War

Affairs in the North Sea ran on with varying fortune.
The Germans on November 4th lost the armored cruiser
Torek, 9,350 tons, 21.4 knots and four 8.2-inch guns in
turrets, by the ship's striking one of their own mines at the
entrance of Jade Bay. Of her complement of some 700,
over 300 were lost. The captain was sentenced on Decem-
ber 23d by a court-martial held at Wilhelmshaven to two
years' detention in a fortress and the officer next in rank to
one year, the charges being disobedience of orders and
negligence. On November 26th the British battleship
Bulwark, of 15,000 tons, blew up in Sheerness Harbor,
nearly her whole complement of 750 men being lost, 14
only being saved. The misfortune is attributed to careless
handling in taking on board shells, one falling from such a
height as to cause an explosion which extended to the
magazines.

That the spirit of venture shown by the reconnais-
sance in force off Heligoland on August 28th was not
singular to the British was seen in the appearance on the
English coast, on November 13th, of a German squadron
of eight ships which included the battle-cruisers Seydlitz,
Moltke, and Vo7t der Tann, and the armored cruiser Bliicher.
These ships bombarded Yarmouth at long range, but with
small damage. The raid was probably more for moral
than material effect. This was followed on December 16th
by an attack, in weather described at an inquest on civilians
who were killed as "very thick and hazy," on Scarborough,
Whitby, and Hartlepool, with a considerable loss of life at
all three places. These attacks, of course, caused much
comment, as being unjustifiable. As the subject is of great
importance and interest it is not amiss to give space to some
authorities. Thus the London EcoJiomist, of December
26, 1914, said: "We have assumed the burden and respon-
sibilities of war and if the enemy is successful in piercing

The sinking of the German cruiser Mainz, oi\ Heligoland, during the action of
August 28, 1 9 14. British destroyer standing by to pick up sur\'ivors.

-^¥r.

.^A..

'■U»t

Boats troni ilic British hattUsiujis ii-sciiing surxnors triini the Grit :stn, 1:1, atter tlie
action off the Falklanil Islands, December 8, 19 14.

Operations in European Waters 437

our defenses, it behooves us to face the fact with calm and
fortitude. . . . The bombardment of undefended towns
is forbidden by the recognized Conventions of naval war-
fare. Unhappily, no agreement as to the definition of an
undefended town has ever been achieved. The term 'un-
defended' is certainly much wider than 'unfortified.' For
instance, in ratifying the Conventions of The Hague Con-
ference on this subject, the British government, supported
by those of Germany and France, insisted that the laying
of contact mines off a harbor should be sufficient to expose
the same to bombardment.

"The Conventions further direct that even in the case of
defended towns, the commander of an attacking force must
give due notice of bombardment, but only when military
exigencies allow, which clearly they do not in the case of
a sudden raid; that the enemy must do his best to spare
churches, civic buildings, hospitals and the like, where these
are distinguishable by the exhibition of large, rigid panels
divided into black and white triangles. And here it may
be remarked that the official British Majiual of Military
Law lays it down that a town and its defenses constitute
an indivisible whole.

"Finally, the immunity of undefended towns does not
extend to military works, establishments or depots, or to
any workshops capable of supplying military needs, excep-
tions that would probably be held to cover railway stations,
bridges, and coal stores, whether in public or private
ownership.

" Now, Hartlepool is clearly a defended town. The War
Office reported that the German vessels engaged the for-
tress, which replied and drove the enemy off. The Ger-
mans, on the other hand, pretend to have silenced its guns.
There were, presumably, other military targets as well, for
shells are reported to have been dropped on the royal

438 The Great War

engineers' and infantry lines. It is clear, however, that the
town suffered far more than the military works. This may
have been the result of malice, or carelessness, or incom-
petence, or it may have been inevitable in the case of a
bombardment at considerable range on a misty morning."

Passing, for want of space, the Economist's remarks of
somewhat like tenor as to Whitby and Scarborough, the
paper continues: "There is one consideration which seems
to have been lost sight of by some people. It is this — that
as indicated above, several proposed restrictions upon the
freedom from bombardment have been resisted by the
British government in the past. In view of our position
as a paramount naval power the decision was very likely a
wise one, at least from a military point of view, but we
must be prepared to take the consequences, and we shall
cut a very poor figure before the world if we complain
when others turn to our disadvantage the freedom we
have ourselves reserved. . . . Before we give vent to
an excess of fury, certainly before we indict a whole nation,
let us remember that our own navy has been enga^d in
similar operations fraught with possible loss to the life and
property of non-combatants . . . the fact remains that
coast towns have to take their chances. The killing of
women and children, and of civilians generally, is an abomi-
nation, but war itself is an abomination and will always
be so."

In the British naval maneuvers of 1888 there were simu-
lated attacks on several undefended coast towns which
brought protests denouncing the action as a breach of
international law. Replies were made by naval officers
and by several authorities on international law. Among
them was Admiral Lord Charles Beresford (now Lord
Beresford), who wrote in the London Times, of August 18,
1888: "I say boldly and openly that if an officer could

Operations in European Waters 439

damage his enemy and procure panic and demoralization
in the enemy's country, he would be wrong to demur a
moment in exacting a ransom or in bombarding a seaport
town if the opportunity occurs."

As a retaliation for this raid, an attack at daybreak on
Christmas Day, 1914, was made on Cuxhaven by seven
seaplanes, escorted by a light cruiser, destroyers, and
submarines. Seen from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, some
seaplanes and submarines were sent out. Apparently
nothing was accomplished on either side. Four of the
British aviators lost their machines, but themselves re-
turned safe.

On January 1st the British Formidable, of the Bulivai-k
type, of 15,511 tons, 18.1 knots with four 12-inch and
twelve 6-inch guns, was sunk in the English Channel by
an unknown submarine. Seventy-one of the crew were
picked up by a British light cruiser, 70 had been taken
from the water by a trawler, and 40 others, the survivors of
60, who were in a cutter, reached Lyme Regis after toss-
ing about in a heavy sea, without food or water, for twenty
hours.

A graphic account of the disaster, from an officer,
appeared in the Daily Telegraph. The following is
taken from an abridgment of this in the Army and
Navy Gazette. It is valuable not only as illustrating a
terrible and dramatic situation, but as throwing some
light upon questions involved, in the sinking, later, of
much larger ships as to the time they should have re-
mained afloat.

"I was sleeping in my hammock," the officer observed, "when about
2.20 [a.m.] I was awakened by a tremendous crash. I jumped out of
my hammock and ran to the upper deck. I noticed that there was already
a great list on the ship. At the same time we turned head on the wind.

440 The Great War

The explosion occurred on the starboard side, abreast of the foremost
funnel, and I should say that the resulting inrush of water flooded the
boiler-rooms, because immediately afterwards the electric light and steam
power failed on all the engines, and we came to a standstill.

" Just about this time — I should think a quarter of an hour after the
first explosion — a second occurred. This proved to be a blessing in dis-
guise, at least temporarily, because the great inrush of water which ensued
helped to right the vessel. We got nearly on to an even keel, and this
made it much easier for us to get about the deck. The second explosion
seemed to me to burst the boilers. All the men eventually got on to the
upper deck, each with some piece of woodwork in his possession or near
him. Each man wore an Admiralty swimming collar, which, while good
enough in a way, simply keeps a fellow's head on a level with the water,
with the result that if there is anything of a sea his mouth is nearly always
' awash ' — a very unpleasant experience. The officers were wearing a
Gieve waistcoat, which is a much better idea than the Admiralty collar. It
has a tube on it, and when this is blown up it supports the wearer higher
out of the water. There was not the slightest panic. I think this was very
creditable. They had been standing for a long time, too, very scantily
clothed, in a biting wind, and it was a great test of their courage.

"Everybody seemed to think the ship would hold out and float to dawn,
and she did actually float for about two hours and a quarter. She devel-
oped a terrible list, however, in spite of the good effect of the second ex-
plosion, and in order to correct this the turret crews tried to train their
guns on the beam, but there being no hydraulic pressure available, they
were unable to do this, and the effort had to be abandoned. Verrey's
lights were now sent up. The wireless apparatus was, of course, out of
order, there being no current. Then followed an uncomfortable three-
quarters of an hour while we waited. All our water-tight doors were
closed, and everything done that could be done to keep the ship afloat, but
as time went on it was evident she was going under, and her list was in-
creasing terribly. The crews of the starboard side — the side which was
in the water — had been down and closed the gun-ports, but it was easily
noticeable in one of the gun casements that the water was rising rapidly
inside, and coming up the ammunition hoists. During the last lO minutes
that the vessel was afloat — from about 4.20 to 4.30 — the list appreciably
increased, and matters had reached a climax.

" The captain came down from the bridge on the port boat-deck, and
sang out, ' Into the water with you; she's going.' Then it was a question
of each man for himself. You must understand that the ship was now
nearly flat on her side. Hundreds of the men had climbed over the rails
on the upper side, which was out of the water, and stood there in two
ranks waiting for orders, and on hearing the captain shout they all slid

Operations in European Waters 441

down the vessel's side into the sea. Many fell with some force against
the bilge keel, which was showing above the water, and got some nasty
injuries, but eventually swam off. . . . As to myself, I managed to
climb over the top rail with great difficulty and slipped down the ship's
side with the others. ... It was with heartfelt gladness that I noticed
a cruiser which had seen the end of the Formidable come up. I struck out
for her. A rope ladder was lowered to us, and I was just able to climb
up it with some others."

A large number of officers were saved but the captain
went down with the ship, which sank by the head.

It was not until January 24, 1915, that a battle of real
importance came in the North Sea, in which the principal
forces on the British side, under Vice Admiral Beatty, were
the five battle-cruisers Lio?t (flagship). Tiger, Princess Royal,
New Zealand, and hidomitable, and on the German, three
battle-cruisers, Seydlitz (flagship of Rear Admiral Hipper),
Derfflinger, and Moltke, and the armored cruiser Bliicher.
In the British squadron were twenty-four 13.5-inch guns,
and sixteen 12-inch; in the German, eight 12-inch, twenty
11-inch, and twelve 8.2-inch. The weight of British fire
to the German was 23 to 14, or about 60% greater. The
British battle-cruisers were of 28 and 28.5 knots, except
the New Zealand and Indomitable, which were of 25 and 26.
The Germans, in the order named, were 27, 29.2, 28.4, 25.3.
The lower speed of the last named, the Bliicher, was largely
the cause of her destruction.

The British Battle-Cruiser Squadron was accompanied
by four cruisers of the Southampton class, the Southampton
(carrying Commodore Goodenough's broad pennant), the
Nottingham, Birmingham, and Lowestoft. These ships were
of 5,440 tons, 25.5 knots, and each carried nine 6-inch guns.
A second cruiser squadron was the Arcthusa, Aurora, and
Undaunted (with Commodore Tyrwhitt in the Arethusa).
These were all of 4,000 tons, 25.5 knots and two 6-inch and
four 4-inch guns. The Germans were accompanied by the

442 The Great War

four cruisers Rostock, Stralsund, Graudenz, and Kolberg, of
from 4,280 to 4,832 tons and from 27 to 28 knots, each
carrying twelve 4.1-inch guns. The Graudenz and Rostock
were not engaged. There was the usual accompaniment of
destroyers and some submarines (on the German side at
least), the number of which is not mentioned.

At daybreak on January 24, 1915, says Admiral Beatty in
his report, his whole force was patrolling in company; he
continues later:

"At -7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed SSE. Shortly after a
report reached me from the Aurora that she was engaged with the enemy's
ships. I immediately altered course to SSE, increased to 22 knots, and
ordered the light cruisers and flotillas to chase SSE to get in touch and
report movements of enemy.

"This order was acted upon with great promptitude ; indeed, my wishes
had already been forestalled by the respective senior officers, and reports
almost immediately followed from Southampton^ Arethusa^ and Aurora as to
the position and composition of the enemy, which consisted of three battle-
cruisers and Bliicher^ six light cruisers, and a number of destroyers, steer-
ing NW. The enemy had altered course to SE. From now onwards
the light cruisers maintained touch with the enemy, and kept me fully
informed as to their movements.

"The battle-cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the southward.
The wind at the time was NE, light, with extreme visibility. At 7.30 a. m.
the enemy were sighted on the port bow steaming fast, steering approxi-
mately SE distant 14 miles.

" Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position on
the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to SE parallel to them,
and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our speed
until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the engineer staffs
of New Zealand and Indomitable — these ships greatly exceeded their normal
speed.

"At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear
ship, the battle-cruisers maneuvered to keep on a line of bearing so that
guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short. The
enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with light cruisers ahead and
a large number of destroyers on their starboard beam.

" Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9.09 a.m.
Lion made her first hit on the BlUcher^ No. 4 in the line. The Tiger
opened fire at 9.20 a.m. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to No. 3 in the

Operations in European Waters 443

line, at i8,00O yards, this ship being hit by several salvos. The enemy
returned our fire at 9.14 a.m. Princess Royal on coming into range opened
fire on Bliicher^ the range of the leading ship being 17,500 yards, at
9.35 A.M. New Zealand was within range of Bliicher^ which had drop-
ped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess Royal shifted to
the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable damage on her.

"Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a posi-
tion broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our rano-e
with their smoke ; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, the
Meteor and ' M ' Division passed ahead of us. Captain the Hon. H. Meade,
D.S. O., handling the division with conspicuous ability.

"About 9.45 A.M. the situation was as follows: Bliicher^ the fourth in
their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gunfire;
their leading ship and No. 3 were also on fire. Lion was engaging No. 1,
Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger^ which was
second in our line, fired first at their No. i, and when interfered with by
smoke, at their No. 4.

"The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen their
battle-cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared to have
altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and certainly the
rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, thereby increasing
their distance from our line. The battle-cruisers, therefore, were ordered
to form a line of bearing NNW, and proceed at their utmost speed.

" Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack.
Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and resume
their original course.

"The light cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port quarter
of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe and keep touch, or attack
any vessel that might fall out of the line.

*'At 10.48 A.M. the Bliicher^ which had dropped considerably astern of
enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, on fire,
and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently ordered Indomitable
to attack enemy breaking forward.

"At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I
personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our starboard
bow. I immediately turned to port.

"At 11.03 A.M. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of
immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course NW. At 11.20 a.m.
I called the Attack [a destroyer] alongside, shifting my flag to her at about
11.35 A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the squadron and met
them at noon retiring NNVV,

" I boarded and hoisted my flag in Princess Royal at about 12.20 P.M.,
when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the Lion

444 The Great War

fell out of the line, namely, that Blucher had been sunk and that the enemy
battle-cruisers had continued their course to the eastward in a considerably
damaged condition. He also informed me that a Zeppelin and a seaplane
had endeavored to drop bombs on the vessels which went to the rescue of
the survivors of Blucher.

"At 2.00 P.M. I closed Z/o«, and received a report that her starboard
engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 p.m. I ordered
Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 p. m."

No official reports have been published by the Germans,
but the account by a correspondent of an interview with
participants, mostly officers, gives what seems a fair state-
ment of the German side. This says:

" The Kolberg was the first to sight the enemy, a small British cruiser,
accompanied by destroyers. The remainder of the British fleet was still
below the horizon. The Kolberg immediately opened fire. After several
minutes the British ship opened with one of her forward guns, and then
began an artillery duel between the two smaller cruisers.

"The Kolberg steamed ahead and was planning to close with the enemy.
However, her sister cruiser, the Stralsund^ steaming further to the right and
a long distance ahead of the squadron, had sighted the main body of the
British fleet coming up, and signalled to the admiral on board the Seydlitz^
'Eight large hostile ships sighted on starboard bow.'

"The flagship thereupon signalled a command which swung the great
German cruisers around and closed the umbrella screen of destroyers.
The fleet now headed southeast.

"The British ships again had dropped out of sight, and did not reappear
until some time later, when the pilot of the Moltke called attention to five
big ships on the starboard quarter, that is, to the westward on the opposite
side from those seen before.

"The commander and the pilot were still studying through their glasses
the five scarcely visible shadows on the gray waves when a big shell struck
the water 500 yards away, throwing up a high pillar of water. The enemy
had unmasked himself. Either five hitherto unreported big ships had been
lurking undiscovered behind our ships, or else five of the eight previously
sighted had made a wide circuit around us.

"The German ships immediately answered the fire of the enemy. In
order to bring more guns into action, first the enemy, then the German
squadron took the familiar echelon formation, like a flight of steps, and
steamed along 13 miles apart, each ship trying by constant turning to bring
as many guns as possible to bear. The British concentrated their fire on
our rearmost ship, the Bliicher.^ and shortly landed a severe hit over the

Operations in European Waters 445

engine-room. This forced the Blucher to drop back slowly even before
she hoisted her last signal after a second shot reached the engine-room :
*A11 engines useless.'

"The Blucher was a mass of flame from fore bridge to stern, the pillar
of fire above her towering to the sky.

" Forty-five minutes later the quarter-deck of the Seydlifz. also began to
blaze.

"The Seydlitz^ of all the ships which returned, was the only one on
which the two-hour bombardment inflicted any real injury. The British
were shooting at a very extreme range in order to keep out of reach of our
middle artillery. This is probably the reason for the slight damage done
to the Derfflinger and Seydlit-z.^ which were each hit squarely. They each
show the mark of a shell which struck their armor, but so weakly that it
has not even been necessary to replace the damaged plate.

" The shell which caused the fire on the Seydlitz pierced the foundation
of a turret and set off some ammunition, causing a fire and some loss of
life within the turret. Otherwise the Seydlifz. was undamaged. Her
fighting ability was completely restored as soon as the fire had been
extinguished.

"The damage to the whole squadron, in fact, was so slight that the
admiral did not need to dock a single ship. They are all at this moment
ready to run out against the enemy. The patching of the Seydlitz's turret
is being done rapidly, and will take at the most only a few days.

*' But let us consider the effect of our artillery on the enemy during the
two hours of combat. The second ship in the British echelon was the
first to waver under the severe fire of the German guns. It sheered out
of line and the third ship closed up, leaving a gap between it and the fourth
ship. The lame duck was not seen again ; presumably she was the one
which sank later. After a little more fighting the two ships in the fore-
most group of English cruisers dropped astern or turned about. Five shells
had struck them causing fires.

"The British battle line was now in confusion and its fighting power
was broken. This was the reason why its admiral broke off the fight and
decided to limp home. He was nowhere near the German mine fields or
submarines of which the British report speaks. I'he fact is the British
were finished. They could not follow further. Three of their biggest
cruisers were out of action."

The German claim, at first made, of the sinking of a
British battle-cruiser, though very specific and evidently
believed by them, has never been substantiated and must
be regarded as an error. The only large ship lost was the

446 The Great War

Bliicher and her destruction was due to want of speed;
to-day, a main element of success, which demands as much
sacrifice of armor and of the smaller caliber armament as
can possibly be spared. The Bliicher (besides her main bat-
tery of twelve 8-inch) carried eight 5.9-inch and sixteen
3.4-inch guns, none of which were of any value whatever
in a long-range battle. Some of these could well have been
omitted to add a knot or so to speed. It would in this in-
stance, at least, have saved a ship and a ship's company.

Whatever the claims of the two sides, the fact is that the
weaker force withdrew unpursued. Against such over-
powering odds the loss of the Germans should have been
far greater. They came out of the fight, not victorious,
for victory was impossible in such circumstances, but cer-
tainly with untarnished reputation.

Few events of importance in naval operations occurred
in Europe in the minor field, as the Baltic, Mediterranean,
and Black Sea may, for the period treated, be termed,
however interesting and momentous were to be the later
operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the Baltic the Germans lost on August 28th the light
cruiser Magdeburgy of 4,478 tons, 26 knots and an arma-
ment of twelve 4-inch guns, by stranding on the Island of
Odensholm, one of the Aland Archipelago in the entrance
to the Gulf of Bothnia. Attacked, after grounding, by a
very superior Russian force, the ship was blown up by the
captain's orders, 85 of her crew, including the captain him-
self, being lost. On December 12th the armored cruiser
Friedrich Karl, of 8,858 tons, 20 knots and carrying four
8.2-inch and twelve 5.9-inch guns, was sunk by a mine off
the Russian coast, only 200 of her crew of 550 being saved.
An almost equally important disaster had occurred to the
Russians on October 11th in the loss of the armored cruiser
Pallada, of 7,775 tons, 22.5 knots and armed with two 8-inch

Operations in European Waters 447

and eight 6-inch guns, which was sunk in the Gulf of Fin-
land by the German submarine U-26.

In the Mediterranean the Austrian torpedo boat No. 19
was sunk by a mine near Pola on August 17th, and next day
the small cruiser Zenta was sunk by the gunfire of French
armored cruisers at Castellastua. A small monitor, the
TemeSy of 433 tons, carrying three 4.7-inch guns, was mined
and lost in the Danube on November 23d.

The old Turkish armored cruiser Messudieh, built in
1874, but reconstructed at Genoa in 1902, of 10,000 tons,
16 knots, two 9.2-inch in turrets and twelve 6-inch guns,
was torpedoed and sunk in the Dardanelles by the British
submarine B 11, which "in spite of the difficult current
dived under five rows of mines. . . . Although pur-
sued by gunboats and torpedo boats," she "returned safely,
after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours."

The Russians had lost in the Black Sea two gunboats of
1,200 tons, scuttled or torpedoed at Odessa on October
29, 1914.

CHAPTER XVIII
The War on the Ocean

Teutonic ships in the Pacific and in German East Africa. Entente forces
in eastern waters. Early movements of the German squadron in the East.
Destruction of the British Cable Station at Fanning Island by the Niirn-
berg. Capture of the German Samoan Islands. German attack on Papeete,
Tahiti. Battle off Chile, November 1, 1914, destruction of the British
ships Good Hope and Monmouth. Combat at the Falkland Islands, De-
cember 8th, destruction of the German ships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Leipzig, and Niirnberg. Destruction of the Dresden. Exploits of the
cruiser Emden in the Indian Ocean ; escape and adventures of part of her
crew. Operations of the Karlsruhe in the Atlantic. Career and destruc-
tion of the Kdnigsberg. Surrender of the German protectorate of Kiau-
Chau. Loss of Germany's oversea possessions. German auxiliary cruisers.
British auxiliary cruisers.

Germany, in 1914, had in the Pacific the armored cruisers
Scharnhorst and Gneisejiau, the light cruisers Emden, Dresden,
and Niirnberg, the river gunboats litis, Luchs, Tiger, and
Jaguar, three other small craft and two destroyers. In
the Atlantic was the Karlsruhe.

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sister ships of 11,420
tons and 23 knots. Each carried eight 40 caliber, 8.2-inch
guns, four of which were in pairs in turrets of 6.7-inch
armor and four in broadside battery. They had as second-
ary battery six 5.9-inch and twenty 3.4-inch. Each carried
four 18-inch submerged torpedo tubes, bow, stern, and
broadside. They had complete armor belts 5.9-inch amid-
ships, tapering at the ends to 3.2-inches. The comple-
ment of each was 765 men. Their fuel capacity was 1,968
tons of coal and 200 tons of oil.

448

The War on the Ocean 449

The Emden and Dresden were also sister ships of 3,592
tons and 24 knots, with armaments of ten 4.1-inch guns.
Their coal capacity was 836 tons, their complements 361.
The Nurnberg was 200 tons smaller, with the same arma-
ment, a half knot less speed, the same coal capacity and a
complement of 322. The Karlsruhe was of 4,832 tons and
27 knots, with twelve 4.1-inch guns. The squadron in the
Pacific was to record a great page in naval history.

In German East Africa were the Konigsberg, practically
the same as another Nurnberg, and the Mowe, a small sur-
veying vessel, with three 1-pounders.

Austria had in China the Kaiserm Rlisabeth, an old cruiser
of 3,937 tons, 19 knots and eight 5.9-inch guns. Neither
in speed nor power was she able to aid the Germans, except
as an accessory at Kiau-Chau.

The British force in eastern waters was made up in
China of the battleship Triumph, of 12,000 tons, with 20
knots speed and a battery of four 10-inch and fourteen
7.5-inch guns, two armored cruisers, two light cruisers,
eight destroyers, four torpedo boats, three submarines, and
a number of river craft, the last of no war value. In the
East Indies were a battleship and two light cruisers; at the
Cape of Good Hope, three cruisers and a gunboat; in New
Zealand, three cruisers and a sloop (belonging to New Zea-
land); and in Australia the Royal Australian Navy, of one
battle-cruiser, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and
two submarines. On the west coast of Canada were two
submarines.

France had in her Asiatic possessions, two armored
cruisers, a destroyer, a gunboat, and four river gunboats.
Japan, of course, had practically her whole fleet in Japa-
nese waters.

The Scharnhorst and GneiseTiau had been in the east, the
one since 1909, the other since 1910. They had, of course,

450 The Great War

Tsingtau, the free port of Kiau-Chau, the German pro-
tectorate, in China, as a base of repairs and supply. Rear
Admiral Count von Spee had been in command since
December 4, 1912. The Leipzig had been on the station
for eight years ; the Niirnberg and Emden for four.

The two armored cruisers had left Tsingtau at the end
of June for a cruise in Australasia. When the German
orders of mobilization reached them on August 1st, they
were at Ponape in the Caroline group, along with their
supply ship, the Titania. The Niirnberg, Dresden, and
Emden were called to join, the two last doing so at Ponape.
The Leipzig was ordered for the time being to remain on
the coast of Mexico, where in July she had relieved the
Niirnberg. All burnable material was put ashore. On
August 6th the squadron left the Carolines for Pagan in
the Marianna group (of which Guam is the southernmost
island), where it was joined on August 15th by the Niirn-
berg and Prinz Eitel Friedrich, the latter now an auxiliary
cruiser. The Emden here received special orders and
left for the Asiatic coast. Having coaled and provisioned
the squadron left for the Marshall Islands, 2,600 nautical
miles ESE of the Mariannas, and 2,200 WSW of the
Hawaiian Islands. The distances give one an idea of the
vast spaces of the Pacific.

Coaling again, the Niirnberg was sent eastward to call at
Honolulu, where she foifnd several German ships. The
crews of all wanted places aboard, but only thirty-seven
could be taken. On September 6th the NUmberg rejoined
the squadron and received orders to leave at once for
Fanning Island, a British cable station 550 miles to the
eastward. This island, 800 miles south of Honolulu, is
almost a desert rock, its highest point is but nine feet above
high water. Twenty-six white men and four white women,
all connected with the cable service, live amid a population

The War on the Ocean 451

of 260 natives. The Nurnberg and her collier consort
arrived on September 7th. Their visit is thus described
by the commanding officer of the repair vessel Kestrel,
which arrived September 25th:

"The cable employees were hard at work and were paralyzed to see a
German officer at the door of the operating room with a revolver. ' Take
your hands off the keys, all of you,' he demanded.

"The men were made to line up against the wall while the sailors with
axes smashed the delicate and costly instruments.

"Another party was engaged near the shore end of the cable, trying to
locate it. Failing in this, heavy charges of dynamite were planted and
the cable blown to atoms. A crew from the collier grappled for the cable
further out to sea with the intention of doing additional damage. Still
another party planted dynamite and gun-cotton in the engine-rooms, the
boiler-rooms, refrigerating plant, and in the dynamo-rooms. The explo-
sion from these charges was terrific, but no one was hurt. A search was
then made of the offices and a number of valuable papers were taken.
These papers were taken aboard the Nurnherg^ and a few hours later an
officer returned and hastily summoned a detachment of men. The papers
had revealed that several valuable instruments were buried — in reserve for
just such contingencies; that a quantity of hidden arms and ammunition
existed, and that there was 6oo/. in the office safe. The latter was blown
open and the money taken. The officer in charge of this section of the
expedition apologized, and said that this was the first time in his life that
he had acted the part of a burglar.

" The officers appeared to have a complete knowledge of what was going
on in the outside world, and seemed to be in possession of as much in-
formation as those who had been in daily cable communication with the
mainland. The collier was carefully disguised, and there was nothing
which would reveal her identity. She is about 2,200 tons register, and
had an elaborate grappling outfit aboard her, whilst her men seemed to be
experts in this class of work."

The Nurnberg learned from the station records of the
seizure on August 30th of German Samoa (a stretch of
1,700 miles from the Marshalls) by a combined British
and French force: the Australia, a battle cruiser of 18,800
tons, 25 knots and eight 12-inch guns (flagship of the Aus-
tralian nav}0, the Melbourne, of 5,400 tons, 24.7 knots and
eight 6-inch guns, three small cruisers, the Philomel, Psyche^

452 The Great War

and PyramuSy of 2,200 to 2,500 tons and eight 4-inch and
4.7-inch guns, and the French armored cruiser Montcalm, of
9,367 tons, 21 knots and two 7.6-inch and eight 6.4-inch
guns. The British vessels had carried from New Zealand
a force of 53 officers and 1,351 men in two troopships.
No resistance could be offered by the Germans against so
powerful a force ; the British flag was hoisted, the troops
landed and the naval force withdrawn.

On September 16th the Schamhorst and Gneisenau arrived
off Apia. The Schamhorst ran into the harbor entrance and
lay quietly some considerable time. There was a scattering
from the town and into cellars by the inhabitants, the beach
was cleared and the exits from the town were crowded.
The British account mentioning these details adds : ** At this
tense moment a squad of about 120 young volunteers came
out of the side streets and, marching in fours, swung into
the open and deserted roadway. Fully equipped with all
their marching swag, heads erect and with martial tread,
they proceeded on their course." What the course was is
not explained. **But nothing happened. It is impossible
to say what motives restrained the German admiral. At
any rate, the relief that was felt when the ship steamed
away can better be imagined than described." One should
at least recognize in the admiral the motive of humanity.
His withholding fire in such circumstances does him honor.

On September 21st the squadron arrived at the Society
Islands (1,000 miles E by S from Apia), coaled and provi-
sioned and next day were off the French harbor of Papeete
in Tahiti. Here the Germans sank by gunfire the French
gunboat Zelee, of 650 tons, silenced the batteries and
destroyed the wharves and coal supplies, the loss being
estimated at $400,000.

The squadron then left for the Marquesas, another
French group, 750 miles NE of Tahiti, where it remained

fe z

The War on the Ocean 453

eight days in Anna Maria Harbor. On October 2d it was
at Easter Island, 1,800 miles southeast of the Marquesas.
Here the Dresden, temporarily detached, joined, and a little
later the Leipzig from the west coast of Mexico; the latter
had destroyed British shipping of an estimated value of
$650,000. Having coaled and provisioned, the whole squad-
ron sailed on October 18th and again coaled on October
26th at Juan Fernandez, 1,500 miles ESE of Easter Island
and 340 a little south of west from Valparaiso. There thev
were joined by the Pri?iz Ritel Friedrich. On October 27th
von Spee left for the coast of Chile. The events w^hich
followed are best described by himself. Writing Novem-
ber 3d, he says:

" My squadron consisting of the large cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneise-
nau and the smaller cruisers Niirnberg^ Leipzig^ and Dresden ran south at
14 knots, distant 20 miles from the Chilean coast to intercept a small
English cruiser off Coronel [between Conception and Arauco]. On the
way the small cruisers were sent to stop some merchant ships. At 4.15
the Nurnberg was out of sight to the northeast and the Dresden i 2 miles
north of Arauco. At 4.17 we sighted to the W by S two ships, and at
4.25 a third ship about 15 miles off. The first two were the Alonmouth
and Glasgow^ the third was the Otranto. They were steering south. The
squadron chased at full speed keeping them four points on the starboard
bow. The wind was from the south with a strength of 6, with a heavy
sea. I had to try not to lose the weather gauge, and also to cut them off
from the coast.

*'At 4.35 the enemy held more to the west \t.e. off the land]. I fol-
lowed until our course was WSW, so that the Scharnhorst with a 22 mile
curve slowly drew up, while the Gneisenau and Leipxig closed up. We
interfered as much as possible with their wireless. At 5.20 the joining of
an enemy ship was signalled and at 5.30 she took the lead, so we judged
her to be the Good Hope^ Rear Admiral Cradock's flagship. At 5.35, I
held a southwest course, later a southerly, and slowed down to let mv other
ships come up. At 6.7 both lines were parallel and on a southerlv course.
The distance was 13.5 km. [kilometers = 8.5 miles, 7.3 nautical miles].
The Nurnberg was a long way off, the Dresden^ one sea mile. At 6.25 the
distance was 12.4 km. I made a turn toward the enemy and at 6.34 p.m.
fired at 10.4 km. [5.6 nautical miles, i 1,350 yards]. Wind and sea were
ahead J the ships, especially the smaller, labored heavily. The lookouts

454 The Great War

and those at range-finders suffered much from seas that came over the bows
so that they could not always see the enemy. The firing was good on both
our large ships and many hits were observed by 6.39 on the Good Hope.

"At this time my line was reestablished. The English then fired. I
suppose the high sea troubled them more than it did us. Their two big
cruisers were covered with our fire, while the Scharnhorst was only struck
twice, and the Gneisenau four times.

"At 6.35 I turned one point from the enemy: they fired less, while we
saw many hits. We saw the turret cover of the forward double turret [of
the Good Hope] removed and that she was on fire. The Scharnhorst thinks
she made 35 hits on the Good Hope. As the distance, notwithstanding
the turning away, diminished, we expected a torpedo attack. The moon
had risen at 6; this would help them, so at 7.45 I drew away. It had
grown dark. The range-finder aboard the Scharnhorst used the fire on the
Good Hope to measure by. At last all measurements were so uncertain
that at 7.26 we ceased firing. At 7.23 we had noticed aboard Good Hope
an explosion between her smoke-pipes. We think she never fired again.
Monmouth ceased about 7.20.

rCaptain Luce of the Glasgow in his report to the Admiralty says:
"Enemy firing salvos got the range quickly and their third salvo caused
fire to break out on the forepart of both ships, which were constantly on
fire till 7.45 P.M. At 7.50 an immense explosion occurred on Good Hope
amidships, flames reaching 200 feet high. Total destruction must have
followed. It was now quite dark."]

" The small cruisers, including Nurnherg that had come up, received at
7.30 a wireless to close in and torpedo. It was difficult to see at this time
and they could not find the Good Hope., but the Niirnberg at 8.58 hit the
Monmouth^ running close to her and firing at close quarters. She disabled
her before she had fired. Her flag was still flying. No rescue work was
possible in the high sea. As the Niirnberg thought she saw another ship
through the smoke, she pushed ahead. The Otranto [a converted cruiser]
turned at the beginning of the battle and withdrew at full speed. Glasgow
sustained her fire longest and then escaped in the dark. Leipzig and Dres-
den thought they had scored many hits on her. The small cruisers had
no loss or injury. Gneisenau two slightly wounded. The men went to
battle with spirit and all did their duty."

The British view of this notable action is well given in
the following letter, pu Wished in the London Times, Novem-
ber 12th, from an officer of the Glasgow, which escaped.
He gives also some interesting details antecedent to the
action.

The War on the Ocean 455

" We were joined by the Good Hope^ with Sir Christopher Cradock in
command, and the Monmouth (Captain Brandt) off the Brazilian coast.
We then cruised south together — Good Hope^ Glasgow^ Monmouth^ and the
armed liner Otranto — down to the cold Terra del Fuego and Straits of
Magellan.

" Well, after passing and repassing Cape Horn, sometimes twice in one
day, we were glad to get orders to proceed north on the Pacific coast and
to warmer weather. By this time we found that the two armored enemy's
cruisers, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst^ were probably coming over from the
Pacific Islands to join up with the cruisers Leipzig^ Dresden^ and Nurnberg^
as they had escaped the Australian and China squadron. We made a ren-
dezvous farther north for our colliers, and went into Coronel and on to
Valparaiso to pick up news and receive letters, etc., then back to rendez-
vous, coaled, and then got orders to go to Coronel alone to send cables,
etc. We left Coronel, Chile, on the second occasion about 9 o'clock on
the morning of November ist, and at about 4 p.m. sighted the enemy in
force. We put on speed and approached them until we made out four
cruisers in line ahead, the two big armored cruisers leading and two 3-fun-
nelled cruisers (about our class) following in open order. They imme-
diately gave chase, so we 'hopped it' in the direction of our own ships and
the P lag. Wc advised the Flag by wireless, but the enemy continually used
their wireless in order to jam our signals. We first picked up the Alon-
mouth and Otranto and ran a line ahead, Glasgow., senior, leading.

" In an hour or so the Good Hope (Cradock's ship) came up and we
wheeled into line behind her, and again approached the enemy, coming
round to south when about 7 miles oft. The sun by this time was getting
low on our starboard beam ; the enemy were to the east of us, all proceed-
ing south, they having the advantage both in guns and the light; we being
silhouetted against the horizon. Their strategical speed being equal to
ours, it was impossible to improve the lights before dark, I did not think
he would engage until next day. However, we were now gradually closing.
About 6.40 P.M. or so, the foremost armored enemy's cruiser opened fire
with her 8-inch, and shells shrieked over and short of us, some falling about
500 yards short, giving the impression of excellent shooting. Soon after
the Otranto began to haul out of line and edge away to the southwest, she
not being fitted to fight men-o'-war. We appeared to close a point or two,
and at 7 p.m. opened fire. The enemy replied in rapid salvos, making
good and deadly shooting, mostly directed against our Flag, and the Mon-
mouth., our next ahead. There was not much doubt as to the result. Shells
continued to straddle us, some bursting overhead, throwing pieces of broken
shell in all directions. About 10 minutes or so after this the poor Mon-
mouth sheered off the line to the westward a hundred yards or so, when I
saw her being hit heavily. She appeared to heel a bit and shake, her

456 The Great War

foremast turret (the 6-inch gun shield) in flames. She fell back again into
line and out again to the eastward, still firing her 6-inch intermittently.

" Shortly after the Good Hope was seen to be on fire, also about the fore
turret, and seemed to steer or fall away to the eastward or towards the
enemy. During this time we kept up a continual fire from our two 6-inch
and port battery 4-inch guns in the direction of the foremost light cruisers
of the enemy's line, the third and fourth ship, of the lines, but owing to
the big sea, our rolling, and the gathering darkness it was impossible to spot
the fall of our shells. We could only fire at the flash of their guns, and
when our heavy rolling allowed our gunlayers to see the flashes at all.
About 7.30 p. M. I was standing near the after 6-inch hand up when I felt
a shell strike us below deck. It seemed to pass out through the other side,
but didn't, and I awaited the explosion, expecting the deck planks to rise
up ; but nothing visibly occurred at the moment. I was second in com-
mand of the starboard battery and, as that was the unengaged side, super-
intended the supply of ammunition to the port guns and generally kept an
eye for casualties, so was able to use my binoculars to see what could be
seen. Hills, a marine, carrying ammunition to P5, was struck behind the
ear by a fragment of shell and was temporarily out of action, lying down
near S5 hand up.

"The Good Hope fell more and more out of line to eastward, burning
brightly forward, when suddenly an explosion occurred about her after
funnel, blowing up debris and flames and sparks some 200 feet high or so,
quite distinctly to be heard from our deck. Some of our men thought it
was the enemy's flagship, so near had she drifted towards them. Soon
after I could see nothing of her, and she never fired her guns again. Our
speed during the action must have varied from 7 or 8 to 17 knots or so,
and when the Monmouth dropped back in her distress we had to ease in
order not to meet the doses meant for her. The enemy now dropped
slowly back, and the armored cruisers directed their fire at us; we con-
tinued alone to reply when possible, now at about 4,500 yards. Every-
body was remarkably cool, as if at practice. Another shell struck our
No. 2 funnel, showing large holes around the casing, and it was this or
these shells which wounded three more of our men slightly.

"I cannot understand the miracle of our deliverance; none will ever.
We were struck at the water-line by in all five shells out of about 600
directed at us, but strangely not in vulnerable places, our coal saving us
on three occasions — as we are not armored and should not be in battle line
against armored vessels. We only had two guns that would pierce their
armor — the Good Hope's old two 9.2's, one of which was out of action 10
minutes after the start. A shell entered the captain's pantry and continued
on, bursting in a passage, the fragments going through the steel wall of the
captain's cabin, wrecking it completely. Again no fire resulted.

The War on the Ocean 457

" The Monmouth^ no longer firing, steamed off to the northwest, and we
stood by her signalling. She fell off to northeast, then we asked her if she
could steer northwest. She replied, ' I want to get stern to sea as I am
making water badly forward.' We followed close by. Shortly after I was
on the flying bridge when I spotted the enemy approaching in line abreast,
the ship to the right or southward morsing with an oil lamp to the others.
They were then about 6,000 yards off or so in the rain, mist, and dark-
ness. I told the captain, who gave me orders to bring them astern, and
put on full speed. We drew out of range. The Monmouth was silent
and hidden by our smoke. . . . Luckily our engines and boilers were
intact, and we were able to push through the heavy seas at 24 knots and
get away to give an account of the action, and warn the Campus^ who,
although she no doubt would have fought gallantly, could hardly hope to
successfully fight five ships."

The British losses were the armored cruiser Good Hope,
of 14,000 tons, 23 knots and two 45 caliber 9.2-inch guns
in turrets and sixteen 45 caliber 6-inch, with her crew of
900 men, and the Monmouth, of 9,800 tons, 23 knots and
fourteen 45 caliber guns, four of which were in turrets of
5-inch armor. She carried a complement of 655 men.

As the two German armored cruisers carried together
sixteen 40 caliber 8.2-inch guns and twelve 40 caliber
5.9-inch, their weight of fire was distinctly heavier in the
heavy guns, but equally distinctly weaker in the secondary
battery, as this was but twelve 5.9-inch of 40 caliber against
the British thirty 6-inch of 45 caliber. The muzzle energy
of each of the 9.2-inch guns of the Good Hope was 20,660
foot tons against 14,500 tons of the German 8.2-inch, and
that of the British 6-inch 5,830 against 5,340 of the Ger-
man 5.9-inch. As the battle was well within range of the
British 6-inch (11,000 yards diminishing according to the
account from the Glasgow to 6,000 yards), it is fair to sup-
pose, in view of the almost entire freedom from injury of
the Germans that the result was almost wholly a question
of superiority in gunnery, and of getting the advantage of
delivering the first injury.

458

The Great War

Von Spee took his squadron into Valparaiso, where, of
course, he could remain but twenty-four hours, and thence
to his doom off the Falklands, an error of judgment. In-
stead of risking such an adventure for the sake of, at most,
destroying a telegraph station and a coal supply, both easily
replaced, it would have been far better to return to some one
of the hundreds of points of refuge in the Pacific not touched
by cables, which he could use as a further base of operations.
The wireless telegraph, while so wonderful a means of com-
munication between the ships of a squadron, is also an in-
formant to an enemy of the other's vicinity and von Spee
might have carried on his operations in the Pacific (coaled,
as he apparently was, without difficulty), almost indefinitely.
The spaces of the Pacific are so vast, the points of refuge,
with no communication with the world, so numerous that
in such a region nothing but remote chance would have
brought him in contact with an enemy force which he felt he
had to avoid. In such a region he could have continued long
a thorn in the flesh to his foe. As it was he was to run into
the very jaws of death. Accompanied by the colliers Baden
and the Santa Isabel (the latter a new Hamburg freighter of
7,500 tons), the German squadron started for the Falklands.

The only British battleship in the South Atlantic at this
time was the Canopus, of 12,950 tons, 18.5 knots, carrying
four 35 caliber 12-inch guns in turrets of 8-inch armor. On
November 10th a squadron of seven ships left Plymouth,
England, under Vice Admiral F. C. D. Sturdee, composed of:

Ijivincible (flag!

Inflexible

Carnarvon

Cornwall

Kent . .

Bristol .

Macedonia

SPEED IN
KNOTS.

27.2

22.2

23.6

TONS.

} 17,250

10,850

} 9,800

4,829
A P. & O. converted cruiser.

MAIN ARMAMENT.

I Eight 45 caliber 12-inch.

Four 45 caliber 7.5-inch; six 6-inch.

Fourteen 45 caliber 6-inch.

Two 45 caliber 6-inch; ten 4-inch.

The War on the Ocean 459

The Glasgow (sister to the Bristol and escaped from the
fight in the Pacific), was in company, having been picked
up off Brazil.

The squadron arrived at the Falklands (claimed also by
Argentina and called by them the Malvina Islands, but
held by the British continuously since 1833) on the morn-
ing of December 7th and at once began to coal, with the
expectancy of leaving the next day in search of the Ger-
man squadron. The Macedonia was anchored at the en-
trance as a lookout ; the Invincible, Inflexible, Car?iarvon, and
Cornwall were in Port William ; the Glasgow and Bristol in
Port Stanley.

The following is a paraphrase of Admiral Sturdee's
report: At 8 A.M. a signal was received from the station
known as Sapper Hill that two steamers were in sight, one
with four, the other with two smoke-pipes. The Ke?it was
at once ordered to weigh and at 8.45 she passed down the
harbor and took station at the entrance. At 8.20 the smoke
of another vessel was reported. At 8.47 the Canopus re-
ported that the first two ships were 8 miles off and that the
smoke reported appeared to be that of two ships 20 miles
distant. At 8.50 another column of smoke was reported
to the south.

At 9.20 the Canopus opened fire on the two leading
ships (Gneisenau and Niirnberg), at a range of 11,000 yards.
They at once hoisted their colors and turned away. Their
masts were now visible from the upper bridge of the I?i-
vincible across the low land south of Port William at a
distance of about 17,000 yards. They altered course to
port apparently to attack the Kejit, now at the mouth of
the harbor, but it would seem that they now saw the battle-
cruisers over the land and they altered course easterly and
increased their speed. The Glasgow was ordered outside
at 9.40 and at 9.45 all the others except the Catiopus, Bristol,

460 The Great War

and Macedonia weighed and stood out in the order, Carnar-
von, Inflexible, Invincible, and Cornwall. On passing Pem-
broke Light (at the south side of the entrance of Port
William), the five German ships were clearly visible to
the southeast, hull down. The visibility was perfect, the
sea calm with a bright sun, a clear sky and a light breeze
from the northwest. At 10.20 was made the signal for a
general chase. The battle-cruisers, having the higher speed,
took the advance. The Glasgow was ordered to keep two
miles from the Invincible (flag) and the Inflexible was sta-
tioned on the latter's starboard quarter. Speed was eased
to 20 knots at 11.15 A.M. to allow each to get into station.
At this time only the smoke-pipes and bridges of the Ger-
mans showed above the horizon. Information now came
(11.27) from the Bristol that three enemy ships, probably
colliers or transports, had appeared, and the Bristol with
the Macedonia was ordered to destroy them. As the Ger-
mans maintained their distance it was decided to attack and
at 12.47 signal was made to open fire; the first shot was
fired at 12.55 from the forward turret of the Inflexible, at
the right hand ship, a light cruiser (the Leipzig), with a
range of 16,500 yards ; the Invincible opened a few minutes
later at the same ship. The fire from 16,500 to 15,000
yards caused the three rear ships iNiirnberg, Dresden, and
Leipzig) to turn to the southwest; the Kent, Glasgow, and
Cornwall were ordered to follow.

The fire of the battle-cruisers was now directed on the
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. These now (1.15 P.M.) turned
in column seven points to port (with the idea no doubt of
closing for a better range for their 8.2-inch guns) and at
1.30 opened fire. The British battle-cruisers then turned
together keeping a parallel course with the Germans, eased
speed to 24 knots and opened fire at 13,500 yards, increas-
ing to 16,450 (at 2). The Germans then (at 2.10) turned

The War on the Ocean 461

about ten points to starboard, the British following the
movement and at 2.45 again opening fire. The Germans at
2.53 turned into line ahead (in column, to use the American
technical phrase) and at 2.55 again opened fire. The Sc/iani-
horst caught fire forward but not seriously, her fire slackened
perceptibly ; the Gneisenau was badly hit by the Inflexible.
Admiral Sturdee's report proceeds as follows:

"At 3.30 P.M. the Scharnhorst led round about lo points to starboard;
just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly and one shell had shut
away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear
that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action.
The effect of the fire on the Scharnhorst became more and more apparent
in consequence of smoke from fires and also escaping steam; at times a
shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side through which could
be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.04 p. m. the Scharnhorst^ whose
flag remained flying to the last, listed heavily to port, and within a minute
it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very
rapidly until she lay on her beam ends and at 4.17 p.m. she disappeared.
The Gneisenau passed on the far side of her flagship and continued a deter-
mined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle-cruisers. At 5.08 the
forward funnel [smoke-pipe] was knocked over and remained resting
against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits and her
fire slackened very much. At 5.15 one of the Gneisenau' s shells struck
the Invincible; this was her last effective effort. At 5.30 p.m. she turned
towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped,
with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires
rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal ' Cease fire,' but
before it was hoisted the Gneisenau opened fire again, and continued to fire
with a single gun.

"At 5.40 P.M. the three ships closed in on the Gneisenau and at this
time the flag at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag
at the peak continued flying. At 5.50 P.M. 'Cease fire' was made.

"At 6 P. M. the Gneisenau heeled over very suddenly, showing the men
gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay on her beam
ends before sinking."

It is a fine story, one of unsurpassed heroism.

The British admiral made every effort to save life, but
the cold water quickly drowned many of the 200 who were
estimated to have been in the water unwounded, "life

462 The Great War

buoys were thrown and ropes lowered but only a propor-
tion could be rescued. The Invincible alone rescued 108
men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after being
brought on board; these men were buried at sea the fol-
lowing day with full military honors."

To return to the small cruisers which had turned away
about 1.00 P. M. with the Glasgow, Kent, and Cornwall in
chase. It was not until 3.00 P. M. that the Glasgow, well
ahead of her two consorts, exchanged shots with the Leip-
zig at 12,000 yards (6 nautical miles). At 4.17 the Cornwall
also opened fire, but it was not until 7.17 that with the
Leipzig on fire fore and aft that the Cornwall and Glasgow
ceased fire. At 9.00 the Leipzig turned over to port and
disappeared. Seven officers and 11 men were saved.

The Kent had been ordered to pursue the Numberg, the
nearest to her. She was in range at 5.00 P. M. and at 6.35
the Niirnberg was on fire forward and had ceased firing.
The Kent closed to 3,300 yards and also ceased fire. As
the colors were still flying the Keitt opened again. " Fire
was stopped five minutes later on the colors being hauled
down and every preparation was made to save life. The
Niirnberg sank at 7.27 P. M., and as she sank, a group of
men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff.
Twelve men were rescued but only seven survived. The
Kent had four killed and 12 wounded, mostly caused by
one shell."

The Dresden, with superior speed, escaped. The Glas-
gow was the only one of the three British ships which had
any chance in pursuit, but she had become engaged with
the Leipzig for over an hour before the Cornwall and Keftt
could get within range. A change of weather with less
visibility also came to the Dresden's aid.

The three transports at first reported to the commander-
in-chief had been reduced to the two previously mentioned

The War on the Ocean 463

as accompanying the squadron, the Bade?i and Sa?ita Isabel.
Both ships were sunk after removing the crews, apparently a
useless throwing away of two good ships with good cargoes
of coal.

There could, of course, be no other result in the circum-
stances, even in the cases of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
They were overmatched in speed, the Invincible making
on her trials 28 knots; xh.e Schar7iho?-st 22.7 ] in muzzle energy
of guns (in foot tons) they were as 47,875 to 14,500, or more
than three times the power. Notwithstanding, the so
much weaker ships made an exhibition of courage and re-
source than which history mentions nothing finer or more
heroic. Men of the sea, of all races, can be proud of such
a showing.

The Dresden, it may be said here, was destroyed under
circumstances akin to the destruction of the American
Essex in 1814 by the British Phoebe and Cherub, 101 years
before to the month. Both ships were destroyed in neu-
tral waters ; both were but a half mile from the shore, and
in each case the waters were Chilean.

The Dresden, escaping from the Falkland fight, was next
heard of at Juan Fernandez, where asking time for repairs
and this being refused, her captain decided to intern. On
March 14, 1915, at 9 A. M., there appeared off the road-
stead (there is no harbor in the true sense) the British
cruisers Glasgow and Kent and the auxiliary cruiser Orama.
Before the Chilean governor, who had put off to inform
the senior officer. Captain Luce of the Glasgow, of existing
conditions, could reach the latter's ship, fire was opened on
the Dresden. The captain set her on fire and she was blown
up, the crew, of whom 15 were wounded, being saved.

The story of the hostile squadrons ends with the destruc-
tion of the Dresden; any German ships that remained were

464 The Great War

of the weaker sort, which could only act as raiders. Of
these, the Emden was to be the chief. Her adventures
make an almost equally dramatic story.

As early as August 4th the Emden captured in Tsushima
strait the Russian merchantman Riasan, which was brought
into Tsingtau and receiving the guns of the Kormoran was
renamed the Kormoran II and became an auxiliary cruiser.
The Emden left Tsingtau on August 6th accompanied by the
auxiliary cruiser Markomannia and joined von Spee in the
Carolines, but on August 13th was detached on special ser-
vice in the Indian Ocean. Her first capture was on Septem-
ber 10th, after which her prizes came in plenty, many of them
of great value. Most of them were sunk, but some were
reserved to receive aboard for transportation to safety the
crews and passengers of the ships sunk. The captured col-
liers followed until they were emptied of their coal, when
they were sunk. Women and children seem to have been
carefully looked after. On the night of September 22-23
the oil tanks at Madras, containing some 600,000 barrels of
oil, were set on fire and destroyed by the Emden s gunfire,
which was ineffectively replied to from the forts. She
then cruised, with great destruction to shipping, in the
neighborhood of Ceylon, coaled at anchor off Pondicherry
on September 29th, and then continued her career of de-
struction off the Laccadives (south of Malabar).

On October 28th the Emden crowned her daring career by
entering the harbor of Penang, destroying the Russian cruiser
Jemtchug (of 3,130 tons and eight 4.7-inch guns), the French
destroyer Mousquety and leaving the harbor unharmed. Her
visit is excellently described by a correspondent of the New
York Times, a description worthy of being given in some
detail. Writing next day, he says:

" It was probably with the idea of crippling this base from which her
pursuers were radiating that the Emden made her raid here. Had she

5s ^urn ^o port and after running NE 37 minutes
le Gerrnan ships.now suffennc) heav\\y, slackens rapidly
isses her h) port and Q+ 6.00 sinKsiCXi^ors f^vin<j

\
\
\

/ \ \

*\ ;

/
/
/

OS sunK b'^ the CornwaW and G\asqovw ot 9prn T officers
lit 5.00, ttie latter sqhk at t.zt beinq ttien about \60 miles
le Dresden only escaped, b^ superior speed

tferrshortened)
/

en)

b Wosqow

» Oresien'

VICINITY OF

PORT STANLEIY

li«,IM,«>

FALKLAND ISLANDS

I and advantage of hei

SECOND PHASE.

dinq) AM2.15 the InvinciWe optntd ftrt(rBnge froTi

onrt lonejer ranqe quis Ranqe ot Iptri le.Sooyarrl

">^

THIRD PHASE

i the Germans (.1 old l) 'wn 10 poin

»rd, MZA5 ttit E

V \

At 2 55 (Im.nufM afttr lOi
Csas.lrT,V5)tXirn.Opom,S
The Sctiarnhorat ainKs o» *

-*6T PH^SE:

south of the FoiK

The Dresden only escoped. b^ superior apeed

■ F.iIkJ.-tn.l Isla^d^. Dct.nbiT

The War on the Ocean 465

found it temporarily undefended she could, at one blow, seriously have
embarrassed the English cruisers patrolling these waters and at the same
time caused a terrific loss to English commerce by sinking the many mer-
chantmen at anchor in the harbor.

" It was on Wednesday morning that the Emden^ with a dummy fourth
funnel and flying the British ensign, in some inexplicable fashion sneaked
past the French torpedo boat Mousquet^ which was on patrol duty outside,
and entered the outer harbor of Penang. Across the channel leading to
the inner harbor lay the Russian cruiser 'Jemtchug. Inside were the French
torpedo boats Fronde and Pistolet^ and the torpedo boat destroyer D' Iber-
ville. The torpedo boats lay beside the long government wharf, while
the D^ Iberville rode at anchor between two tramp steamers.

"At full speed the Emden steamed straight for the 'Jemtchug and the
inner harbor. In the semi-darkness of the early morning the Russian took
her for the British cruiser Tarmouth^ which had been in and out two or
three times during the previous week and did not even * query' her. Sud-
denly, when less than 400 yards away, the Emden emptied her bow guns
into the Jemtchug and came on at a terrific pace, with all the guns she could
bring to bear in action. When she had come within 250 yards she changed
her course slightly, and as she passed the Jemtchug^ poured two broadsides
into her, as well as a torpedo, which entered the engine-room, but did com-
paratively little damage.

"The Russian cruiser was taken completely by surprise and was badly
crippled before she realized what was happening. The fact that her cap-
tain was spending the night ashore, and that there was no one on board
who seemed capable of acting energetically, completed the demoralization.
She was defeated before the battle began. However, her men finally
manned the light guns and brought them into action.

'-^ In the meantime the Emden was well inside the inner harbor and among
the shipping. She saw the French torpedo boats there, and apparently
realized at once that unless she could get out before they joined in the
action her fate was sealed. At such close quarters (the range was never
more than 450 yards) their torpedoes would have proved deadly. Accord-
ingly, she turned sharply and made for the Jemtchug once more.

"All the time she had been in the harbor the Russian had been bom-
barding her with shrapnel, but owing to the notoriously bad marksmanship
prevalent in the Czar's navy had succeeded for the most part only in pep-
pering every merchant ship within range. As the Emden neared the Jetntchug
again both ships were actually spitting fire. The range was practically
point-blank. Less than 150 yards away the Emden passed the Russian,
and as she did so torpedoed her amidships, striking the magazine. There
was a tremendous detonation, paling into insignificance by its volume all
the previous din; a heavy black column of smoke arose and the Jemtchug

466 The Great War

sank in less than lo seconds, while the Emden steamed behind the point
to safety.

"No sooner had she done so, however, than she sighted the torpedo
boat Mousquet^ which had heard the firing and was coming in at top speed.
The Emden immediately opened up on her thereby causing her to turn
around in an endeavor to escape. It was too late. After a running fight
of 20 minutes the Mousquet seemed to be hit by three shells simultaneously
and sank very rapidly. The German had got a second victim.

" It was here that the chivalrous bravery of the Emden s captain, which
has been many times in evidence throughout her meteoric career, was
again shown. If the French boats were coming out, every moment was
of priceless value to him. Nevertheless, utterly disregarding this, he
stopped, lowered boats, and picked up the survivors from the Mousquet
before steaming on his way.

"The English here now say of him admiringly, 'He played the game.'

" Meantime, boats of all descriptions had started towards the place where
the Russian cruiser had last been seen. The water was covered with
debris of all sorts, to which the survivors were clinging. They presented
a horrible sight when they were landed on Victoria Pier, which the ambu-
lance corps of the Sikh garrison turned into a temporary hospital. Almost
all of them had wounds of one sort or another. Many were covered with
them. Their blood-stained and, for the most part, naked bodies, were
enough to send shivers through even the most cold-blooded person. It
was a sight I shall not forget for many a day. Out of a crew of 334
men, 142 were picked up wounded. Only 94 were found practically un-
touched. Ninety-eight were *■ missing.' It is not yet known how many
of the crew of 78 of the Mousquet were rescued by the Emden."

But the Emden' s career was about to close. On Novem-
ber 9th the cruiser appeared off the Cocos Islands, a small
group in the Bay of Bengal, west of British Burma, where
there was a cable station connecting Ceylon and Australia.
The visit was for the purpose of destroying this station.
The Emden arrived at sunrise and sent 3 officers and 49
men with 4 machine-guns under command of Lieutenant
von Miicke. But the station was quick enough to cable
for aid before the party landed, and after two hours' work
at cable-cutting the siren of the Emden sounded a recall.
But even before they could reach the landing stage, the
Emden had got underway and had begun firing. The

The War on the Ocean 467

Australian cruiser Sydfiey, of 5,400 tons, 24.7 knots and
eight 6-inch 50 caliber guns, which was serving as an
escort for a convoy of troops from Australia, hound to
Egypt, had appeared. The story of the encounter is told
best by an officer of the Sydney in a letter to his father:

"On November 9th we were steaming about 50 miles to the eastward
of the Cocos Islands (southwest of Java), heading for Colombo, when at
7 A.M. we took in a very interrupted wireless message from the Cocos
wireless station — ' Strange warship . . . off entrance.' The Melbourne^
as senior officer, ordered us to raise steam for full speed and go and
investigate.

"At 9.15 A.M. the tops of the cocoanut trees of Keeling Islands were
sighted. At 9.20 we sighted the Emden^ or rather the tops of her funnels,
12 or 15 miles away. At 9.40 a.m. she opened fire at a very big range,
and shortly after that we started in on her.

"Throughout the action I was almost constantly engaged running
backwards and forwards between the ammunition hoist and the forecastle
gun, or between the hoist and No. i starboard or No. i port.

"Once I heard a crash and looking aft saw that a shell had hit near
gun No. 2 starboard. But owing to the screen being in the way, I did not
know it had knocked out practically the whole of that gun's crew. . . .

"All the time we were going 25 and sometimes as much as 26 knots.
We had the speed on the Emden and fought as suited ourselves. . . .

" Coming aft the port side from the forecastle gun I was met by a lot
of men cheering and waving their caps. I said, 'What's happened?'
* She's gone. Sir, she's gone.' I ran to the ship's side, and no sign of a
ship could I see. If one could have seen a dark cloud of smoke it would
have been different. But I could see no sign of anything. So I called
out, 'AH hands turn out the lifeboats, there will be men in the water.'
They were just starting to do this when someone called out, 'She's still
firing. Sir,' and every one ran back to the guns. What had happened was
a cloud of yellow or very light colored smoke had obscured her from view,
so that looking in her direction one's impression was that she had totally dis-
appeared. Later we turned again and engaged her on the other broadside.

" By now her three funnels and her foremast had been shot away, and
she was on fire aft. We turned again, and after giving her a salvo or
two with the starboard guns saw hw run ashore on North Keeling Island.
So at 11.20 a.m. we ceased firing, the action having lasted i hour and
40 minutes. . . .

"We started chasing a collier which had been in attendance on the
Emden^ and when we boarded her we found they had opened the sea cocks

468 The Great War

and the ship was sinking fast, so we took every one off her and returned
to the Emden^ getting back there at about 4 p. M.

"They sent a man aloft to cut down the colors, and waved a big white
flag from forward. It was getting dark and we did not know for certain
that the cruiser Kbnigsberg might not be near, so we could do no rescue
work that night and had to steam away. A cry in the darkness, and we
stopped, and lifeboats were lowered to pick up a nearly exhausted but
very lucky German sailor. The fourth rescued from the water that day.

"November lOth. — Early in the morning we made for the cable sta-
tion, to find that the party landed by the Germans to destroy the station
had seized a schooner and departed. The poor devils aren't likely to go
far with a leaking ship and the leathers removed from all the pumps.
Although they had broken up all the instruments, the cable people had a
duplicate set buried, so that was satisfactory.

"At 1 1. 10 A.M. we arrived off the Emden again. I was sent over to
her in one of the cutters. ... I was received by the captain of the
Emden. I told him from our captain that if he would give his parole the
captain was prepared to take all his crew on board the Sydney and take
them straight up to Colombo. He stuck a little over the word ' parole,' but
readily agreed when I explained the exact scope of it. And now came
the dreadful job of getting the badly wounded into the boats. There were
15 of these. Luckily we have a very good pattern of light stretcher into
which men can be strapped. We got three badly wounded in each boai.
The Germans were all suffering badly from thirst, so we hauled the boats'
water casks up on deck, and they eagerly broached them, giving the
wounded some first.

*'I took an early opportunity of saluting the captain of the Emden and
saying, 'You fought very well. Sir." He seemed taken aback, and said 'No.'
I went away, but presently he came up to me and said, 'Thank you very
much for saying that, but I was not satisfied. We should have done better.
You were very lucky in shooting away all my voice-pipes at the beginning.'

"When I got a chance, with all the boats away, I went to have a look
round the ship. I have no intention of describing what I saw. With the
exception of the forecastle, which is hardly touched from forebridge to
stern post, she is nothing but a shambles, and the whole thing was most
shocking. The German doctor asked me to signal for some morphia,
sent me aft, and I never came forward again."

The Sydney had 4 killed and 8 wounded. The captain
of the Rmden in his report states his loss as 6 officers, 4 war-
rant officers, 26 petty officers, and 93 men dead; one com-
missioned officer and 7 men severely wounded.

The War on the Ocean 469

The captured British collier Buresk was recaptured, but
her valves had been opened and she sank. Her people,
with the German prize crew, were taken on board the
Sydney. The captain of the Sydney sent boats manned by
a German crew from the Buresk to state that he would
return to the assistance of the Emden next morning.

The Emdefi was, of course, certain of destruction in such
a contest. She had been long at sea and her bottom was
necessarily much fouled and her speed reduced. She was
smaller than her antagonist by 1,800 tons; her guns were
but 4.1-inch of 40 caliber against 6-inch of 50 caliber. She
had no chance. The Sydney had but to choose her dis-
tance and destroy at leisure, all of which was perfectly
correct tactics.

' The 3 officers and 49 men left ashore by the Emden,
determined not to fall into the hands of the British, seized
the schooner Ayesha, of 123 tons, lying at the island, but
without sails or running rigging. She had aboard a cargo
of rice and cocoa. With the assistance of the inhabitants
she was fitted out and at nightfall she was towed off the
land, and they set sail without charts or nautical instru-
ments. They had with them their four machine-guns, 28
rifles, and several thousand cartridges. According to Lieu-
tenant von Miicke's account, they headed for Padang, at
the middle of the west coast of Sumatra, which, as a Dutch
possession, was a neutral port. It was a thousand miles
south by east from the Cocos, but they arrived at Emma
Bay, a nearby port, on November 27th, a voyage of 18 days.
They had suffered much for want of water. They found
many German ships in the port, from the crews of which
they had an enthusiastic welcome. The Ayesha, being
claimed by Lieutenant von Miicke as an imperial naval
vessel, was allowed but 24 hours' stay. They thus left

470 The Great War

November 28th well provided with provisions and clothing
and with gifts of tobacco and beer. They had added a
Lieutenant Wellman to their number. Light winds kept
them on the Sumatra coast 14 days, after which they met a
severe gale. The Choisung, a German collier of the North
German Lloyds, which had been destined for the Emden,
was met, to which the party aboard the Ayesha was trans-
ferred and the latter sunk. They renamed their new
ship Ayesha 11. The African coast was sighted on Jan-
uary 4th, and in the night of January 7-8, Lieutenant
von Miicke's party, using four boats of their collier, passed
safely the Straits of Perim. The Choisung reached Massowa
on January 13th, but when Italy declared war she fell into
the hands of the enemy. The little flotilla was nine weeks
skirting the eastern shore of the Red Sea and then only
reached a port a little north of Hodeida, which itself is but
an eighth of the way to Suez. They stayed eight days in
the highlands of Sana to rest, and on March 15th took to
two small sailing vessels. They lost one, though apparently
there was no loss of life, and reached Lid, 120 miles south
of Djidda, the port for Mecca which is 60 miles inland.
They marched from Lid to Djidda and were attacked on
their way by some 300 Bedouins against whom they de-
fended themselves for three days, when they were rescued
by the Emir of Mecca. Lieutenant Schmidt and a stoker
were killed. As they could not go to Mecca, they were
obliged to take boats again at Djidda and after nineteen
days landed at El Weg (April 27th), 260 miles south of the
entrance to the Gulf of Suez. Here they met military
protection and were escorted inland 150 miles to the sta-
tion El Ula on the Damascus-Mecca railway. They took
train on May 7th and reached Damascus on May 9th.
There, says Lieutenant von Miicke, ''they were joyfully
greeted, but not to compare with their reception in

The War on the Ocean 471

Constantinople, May 24th, where they marched carrying
the Emden's flag amid wild cheering." It was truly a brave
and adventurous journey, well deserving its happy ending.

In the Atlantic, the Karlsruhe, a much larger and speedier
ship than the Emdeii, being of 4,832 tons with a speed of 27
knots, and a battery of twelve 4.1-inch 40 caliber guns, was
to have no such sensational career, though she was by no
means unsuccessful. Very little that is definite is known of
her doings beyond the fact that in the early stages of the war
she was reported sighted ofl^ Sandy Hook by a number of
vessels, which was sufficiently believed to cause for a time
a marked '*hold-up" in British shipping and that she was
given coal enough (as international law allowed) at San Juan,
Puerto Rico, to carry her to her nearest home port. On
October 24th, a cable despatch to the New York Herald g2iWe
the names of thirteen vessels captured and sunk, twelve of
which were British and one Dutch, the captures being
made chiefly in the South Atlantic. On October 26th she
captured and sank, 500 miles east of Para, the Va?i Dyck,
of 9,800 tons, one of the Lamport and Holt Line between
New York and Buenos Ayres. The total of her captures
seems to have been 17. The British Navy League Manual
states that it is believed that she was destroyed by internal
explosion at the end of October or early in November.
In any case, since then, she has not been heard of.

The only remaining German cruisers abroad were the
Geier, of 1,604 tons, interned at Honolulu, November 8,
1914, and the Kdnigsberg, slightly smaller than the Dresden
and Etnden, but with the same armament of ten 4.1-inch
guns, in German East Africa. After a considerable de-
struction of British shipping, she was obliged to take refuge
in the Rufiji River in German East Africa, where she
remained for some time undiscovered. She was shelled by
British cruisers unsuccessfullv and it was determined to

472 The Great War

block the river, for which purpose a merchant steamer,
the Newbridge, was sunk in the channel, two of the British
being killed and eight wounded in the operation. The
Duplex, a cable steamer which accompanied the Newbridge,
had five Lascars killed. Five days later it was reported
that "the Konigsberg was finally destroyed and sunk. This
is how her end came. The German cruiser had so effec-
tively concealed herself, not only among the palms, but
actually covering the ship with foliage, that it was impos-
sible to locate her exact position. To get over this difficulty,
the Kinfauns Castle arrived on the scene with an aeroplane.
This was soon soaring over the river and the position of the
hidden cruiser conveyed to the British by means of smoke
bombs. Very quickly the big guns of our ships got the
range and battered the Konigsberg till she was sunk."

This is the account appearing in the Army and Navy
Gazette, of January 16, 1915, which is now given as an
example of means employed in the very unusual circum-
stances, and as an instance of the unreliability of news,
apparently definite. The Konigsberg was not destroyed
until some six months after the exploit thus detailed, when,
in July, 1915, two monitors, the Severn and Mersey, were
used. The monitors were able to make a nearer approach,
the Weymouth, 5,250 tons, eight 6-inch guns, flagship of
Vice Admiral H. King Hall, and the gunboat Pio?ieer
attacking the batteries at the river mouth. Aeroplanes
were used to establish accurately the position of the Konigs-
berg and after a six hours' bombardment from the monitors,
during which they lost four men killed and four wounded,
the Konigsberg was finally destroyed.

On August 16, 1914, the Japanese government addressed
an ultimatum to Germany of an extraordinary character
declaring that:

The War on the Ocean 473

"We consider it highly important and necessary in the
present situation to take measures to remove the causes of
all disturbance of the peace in the Far East and to safe-
guard general interests as contemplated in the agreement
of alliance between Japan and Great Britain. In order to
secure firm and enduring peace in Eastern Asia the estab-
lishment of which is the aim of the said agreement, the
Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it to be
its duty to give advice to the Imperial German Govern-
ment to carry out the following two propositions :

"1. To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chi-
nese waters the German men-of-war and armed vessels of
all kinds, and to disarm those which cannot be withdrawn.

"2. To deliver on a date not later than September 15th
to the Imperial Japanese authorities, without condition or
compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau,
with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to
China."

August 23d was set as the date requiring an uncondi-
tional acceptance of these demands.

Kiau-Chau, directly west across the Yellow Sea from
Korea, was a territory of 200 square miles, leased by Ger-
many in November, 1897, from China for 99 years, and
occupied in March, 1898. On the eastern side of the nar-
row entrance to a great bay some thirty miles in diameter
and badly silted from the mud of the Yellow Sea, the
Germans built the city and fortress of Tsingtau. "They
excavated," says the Boston Herald, "at an expense exceed-
ing $7,000,000, an outer and an inner harbor. They erected
great granite piers, so arrano^ed that ships alongside could
receive cargo direct from railway trains. The docks and
railway terminals at Tsingtau are models of convenience.
. . . Some six miles back from the sea a typical
German city was built. The scale on which things

474 The Great War

were done is shown by the fact that the Casino . . . cost
more than $1,500,000. Included in the improvements
undertaken is the extensive afforestation of the erstwhile
treeless hills.

"There are said to be 12 forts; there were barracks
built in 1905 for 5,000 men; there is a floating dock 410
feet long and 100 feet wide which will lift 16,000 tons.
Exclusive of the Chinese [3,000] . . . the Tsingtau gar-
rison, strengthened by the German and Austrian guards
withdrawn from Peking, is about 8,000 men. To this
force may be added 1,000 reservists, for every able-bodied
German civilian in the colony will be called upon to per-
form military duty."

Japan declared war on August 24th. The operations on
land do not come within the scope of this chapter, but both
British and Japanese ships took part in the general attack,
though it has been reported that the Japanese looked with
disfavor upon the assistance of their allies. About the
middle of October the battleship Triumph was heavily
damaged by gunfire and compelled to withdraw; on Octo-
ber 17th the Japanese cruiser Takachiho, of 3,700 tons and
eight 6-inch guns, was torpedoed and sunk by the Ger-
man destroyer S-90, with the loss of all but twelve men of
her crew of 283 aboard. The same destroyer was stranded
and after stranding was destroyed by her own crew three
days later in attempting to escape from Tsingtau. On
November 6th, Tsingtau being on the eve of a surrender,
which occurred November 7, 1914, the Germans sank all
the vessels still in the harbor: the gunboats Jaguar, litis,
Luchs, Kormoran, Tiger, the destroyer Taku, and the mine-
layer Rachin.

Nearly all the oversea possessions of Germany were now
in the hands of her enemies : the rest were soon to follow.
Togoland, on the gold coast of West Africa, had fallen on

The War on the Ocean 475

August 15th; Apia and the nine Samoan Islands which Ger-
many owned of the group of fourteen, on August 30th ; on
September 11th the Bismarck Archipelago protectorate;
and on September 24th, Kaiser Wilhelm Land in New
Guinea. In regard to the last two, it was remarked that:
''their [the Germans] presence . . . has ever been re-
garded as a menace by Australian public opinion," a curious
commentary on the ever-existing greed which is envious of
possession by the other man, and exemplifying the need
of doing away with the monstrous system of ''spheres of
influence," by whatever nation exercised. An Anglo-
French expedition seized Kamerun on September 27th;
the Japanese announced on October 21st their seizure of
the Marianna and Marshall Islands. The whole of the
German possessions in the Far East were thus in British or
in Japanese hands.

The few auxiliary cruisers the Germans were able to get
afloat did not remain long uncaptured. They made the
great error of not mounting heavier and longer-range guns.
Instead of the 6-inch, which was a possible gun for such
vessels, they used the 4.1-inch. Thus the Kaiser Wilhelm
der Grosse, of the North German Lloyds, of 13,952 tons,
armed with ten 4.1-inch, fell a victim to the British cruiser
Highflyer, of equal speed and carrying eleven 6-inch guns.
The German ship was sunk ofl^ the Rio de Oro coast, a
Spanish possession south of Morocco. She is reported to
have held up several vessels on the Cape route. One of
the most notable was the Union Castle liner Galiciafi, which
was discovered by the German vessel on August 15th, off
Ferro, Canary Islands. The Galician was stopped, in-
spected, had her wireless destroyed, and the following
morning she was informed that "on account of the women
and children on board we will not destroy your vessel;
you are released."

476 The Great War

The Cap Trafalgar, of 18,710 tons, a new ship of the
Hamburg Line in the South American trade, was at Buenos
Ayres at the outbreak of the war. Here she coaled and
landed everything not necessary for war and went off the
Island of Trinidad, where she met the small gunboat Rber,
from which she took the whole of her armament, two
4.1-inch and six 1-pounders. The J5/^^r was sent into Bahia
with one officer, one engineer, two warrant officers, and
eleven men, where she interned. While the Cap Trafalgar
was coaling on September 14th, 300 miles east of Rio, she
was met by the British auxiliary cruiser Carmania, of 19,500
tons and carrying eight 6-inch guns. Notwithstanding, the
Cap Trafalgar made a defense for two hours (extraordinary
in the adverse conditions), when, having listed some 30 de-
grees, the crew was ordered into the boats. The Carmania,
according to German statement, withdrew. A last use of
the wireless attracted the German collier Eleonore Woer-
man, which picked up the survivors of the Cap Trafalgar,
numbering 291 men, and landed them at Buenos Ayres,
where they were interned. The captain and 12 seamen
perished.

There were afloat also as auxiliary cruisers the Prinz Eitel
Friedrich, the Kronpriwz Wiljielm, and the Kormoran II,
formerly the Russian Riasan, which was captured on
August 6, 1914, by the Emden, taken to Tsingtau and
armed. There is but little recorded of what they accom-
plished. All were to be later interned, the two former at
Norfolk, Virginia, in April, 1915, the last, at Guam, on
December 15, 1914. The names of some fifteen others, of
less importance, will be found recorded in the appended
list of losses.

A very much greater number of such vessels, naturally,
was used by Great Britain. The number and names have
not been published, but enough is known to show the

The Emden asliore on North Kft-ling Islanti, No\cniber i o, 1914. Boats from tiu-
Sydney taking off the survivors.

Landing party from tlie EnuUn, aftir liaving broken the instruments ;it the cal'k- station du
Direction Island, leaving to board tlte schooner Ayesha in which tliey made their escape.

The War on the Ocean 477

great extent to which the British merchant marine has
thus been utilized, perhaps more than the well-being of
her ocean carrying trade justified.

The great disparity in naval power between Germany
and Great Britain (the other powers involved being so
secondary that they need not be considered) had its natural
and inevitable sequence in the early disappearance of Ger-
man ships, naval and commercial, from the ocean. Though
Great Britain declared no blockade of German ports, the
former used what was fully the equivalent, in result, of a
legal blockade. Ships were stopped on the high seas and
examined or detained at will. Naturally all the neutral
powers concerned protested. This protest, in the Amer-
ican notes of earlier as well as later periods, was expressed
with much force, the later note of October 21, 1915, de-
claring (paragraph 33) the procedure "ineffective, illegal,
and indefensible" and that tl\e United States "can not with
complacence suffer further subordination of its rights and
interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic posi-
tion of the enemies of Great Britain requires or justifies
oppressive and illegal practices."

Notwithstanding, the offensive action continued with the
declared purpose of starving Germany into submission. It
is but an illustration of the great fact which has come
down to us in undiminished vigor through the ages: I?ifer
arma silent leges. It cannot be otherwise. War in itself is
the very negation of all law. In every exigency, the great
question of national existence always has taken, and always
will take, precedence, and Great Britain being preeminent
on the water but follows the procedure of all time, and
will do so until pressure, economic or other, may make it
better for her to yield her methods. Any discussion of
this part of the question, beyond the mere statement of

478 The Great War

what seem to the writer existing facts, is naturally beyond
our province.

Germany was thrown on her own resources, which were
supplemented by her trade with the Scandinavian countries
and with such trade as could enter through Holland and
Italy. She was able, with the labor in her fields undimin-
ished by reason of the employment of 2,000,000 or more
prisoners of war, to advance her agriculture to a degree
which made her independent of exterior supplies of the
more important elements of food. Her occupancy of Bel-
gium and of the chief industrial provinces of France, and
her unequalled chemistry rendered her likewise independ-
ent in the field of munitions of war. And though she has
lost her sea-borne commerce, she has a large compensation
in escaping the incurring of a heavy foreign indebtedness
which must, in time, hang heavily upon those who have
the world as a purchasing field. Nor can we yet say how
great a factor in such a war, if long continued, may be the
submarine or the airship. Thus, with a powerful battle-
fleet yet in being, Germany is still a menace to Britain
upon the water. To prophesy to what extent, is still too
venturesome.

The War on the Ocean

479

TABLE OF NAVAL LOSSES OF THE SEVERAL BEL-
LIGERENTS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR
TO FEBRUARY i, 1915

From the United States Institute Proceedings

Special acknonvledgment is here made of the courtesy of the United States Na'val
Institute in granting the •writer the use of the "valuable compilations appearing in its
Proceedings.

The following table is compiled from various articles appearing in the press of the several belligerent
nations. These reports are so contradictory that it is impossible to furnish an absolutely correct list of vessels
lost to date. In many cases the belligerent powers have failed to acknowledge the losses of all the vessels.
No attempt has been made to include herein a list of the various trawlers, mine-sweepers and such odd small
craft which may have been destroyed while mine-sweeping or on submarine patrol duty.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR TYPE OF VESSELS

Dreadnought battleships d. b.

Battleship b.

Armored cruiser a. c.

Protected cruiser p. c.

Cruiser c.

Light cruiser 1. c

Gunboat g. b.

Torpedo gunboat t. g.

Destroyer d.

Torpedo boat t. b.

Submarine sm.

Auxiliary cruiser ax. c.

Converted cruiser ». c.

Transport tr.

Mine-layer m. L

Hospital ship h. s.

Training ship tr. s.

Armed merchant ship a. m. v.

Naval tender n. L

LOSSES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND HER ALLIES

BRITISH WARSHIP LOSSES

NAME TVPR

Audacious d. b. .

TONNAGE
24,000 . .

Bulwark b. . . . • 15,000 .

Formidable b. . . . . 15,000 .

Warrior a. c. . . . 13,550 .

Hogue a. c. . . . 12,000 .

Cressy a. c. . . . 12,000 .

Aboukir a. c. . . . 12,000 .

Hawke a. c. . . . 7,350 .

Good Hope a. c. . . . 14,100 .

Monmouth a. c. . . . 9,800 .

Pathfinder 1. c. . . . 2,940 .

Amphion 1. c. . . . 3,360 .

Pegasus I.e. . . . 2,135.

Hermes I.e.... 5,600 .

Speedy t. g. . . . 810 .

I*g«r t. g. . . . Bio .

REMARKS DATE

Reported sunk off Irish coast. Cause unknown.

British Admiralty non-committal 29-10-14

Internal explosion at anchor in the Thames .... 25-11-14

Sunk by German sm., North Sea i- 1-15

By mine 5- 9-14

Sunk by German sm. U-29, North Sea 22-9-14

Sunk by German sm. U-29, North Sea 22- 9-14

Sunk by German sm. U-q, North Sea 16-10-14

Sunk by German forces in Pacific i-ti-14

Sunk by German forces in Pacific 1-11-14

Sunk by German sm.. North Sea 5- 9-14

Sunk by mine, North Sea 6- 8-14

Sunk by German c. Konigsberg at Zanzibar .... 20- 9-14

Sunk by German sm. U-27, North Sea 30-»o-i4

Sunk by mine. North Sea 3-9-14

Sunk by German sm. while at anchor 11-11-14

480

The Great War

NAME

Bullfinch

AE-i
E-3.
D-S.

D-2.

E-io
Oceanic
RohUla
Viknor

TYPE

TONNAGE

d. . . .
d

370.

sm. . .

725-810 .

sin. . .

725-810 .

sm. . .

550-600 .

sm. . .

550-600 .

sm. . .

725-810 .

ax. c. .

17.274 •

ax. c. .

7,400.

ax. c. .

5,386 .

REMARKS DATE

Sunk in collision with Dutch merchant ship .... 18- 8-14

Ran ashore, Scotch coast 27-12-14

Accidentally sunk off Australian coast 14- 9-14

Rammed and sunk by German vessel 18-10-14

Sunk by German mine. North Sea 3-11-14

Reported lost. Details not known 1-12-14

Missing. North Sea

Ran aground off north coast of Scotland in storm . 8- g-14

Ran aground off Whitby, completely wrecked . . . 30-10-14

Lost off Irish coast 14- 1-15

Zelee g. b.

No. 347 t.b.

No. 338 t.b.

t.b.

No. 219 t. b.

Curie sm.

Saphir sm.

FRENCH WARSHIP LOSSES

636 . . Sunk by German cruisers at Tahiti 22- 9-14

> Sunk in collision with each other g-io-14

Reported lost - 1-15

Sunk off Nieuport - 1-15

Sunk by Austrians at Pola 23-12-14

Sunk at the Dardanelles 15- 1-15

97
97

87.
392 •

6- ? .

RUSSIAN WARSHIP LOSSES

Pallada a. c. . . . 7,77s .

Jemtchug c 3,130 ■

Donnetz g. b. . . . 1,224.

Kubanetz g. b. . . . 1,200 .

Putschino t. b. . . . —— .

Prut ax. c. . . 5,440 .

Riasan tr. ... 3,522 .

Oleg m. 1. . . 1,125 .

Athos m. 1. . . 1,743 .

Portugal h . s. . . .

Sunk by German sm., Baltic 11-10-14

Sunk by Emden, Penang 28-10-14

Sunk by Turks, Black Sea. Raised by Russians . 31-10-14

By gunfire, Odessa 29-10-14

By gunfire 30-10-14

Scuttled to avoid capture 29-10-14

Captured by Emden 6- 8-14

Sunk, Black Sea 24-12-14

Shirotaye d. .

No. 33 t. b.

Name unknown . . . . t. b.

Takachiho tr. s.

JAPANESE WARSHIP LOSSES

380.
82.

3.700 .

Ran ashore, Tsingtau 4- 9-14

Sunk by mines while tnine-sweeping off Tsingtau . . 11-11-14

By mine

Torpedoed by German d., S-90, off Tsingtau . . . . 17-10-14

In addition to the two above, five special service ships were sunk during the operations off Tsingtau.

LOSSES OF GERMANY AND HER ALLIES

GERMAN WARSHIP LOSSES

Yorck a. c. . . . 9,350 .

Schamhorst a. c 11,420.

Gneisenau a. c. . . . 11,420.

Friedrich Karl . . . . a. c. . . . 8,858 .

Bluecher a. c. . . . 15,550 .

Mainz p.

Koein p.

Ariadne p.

4,280 .
4,280 .
2,618 ,

Hela p. c. . . . 2,005 •

4,280 .
3,592 •

Augsburg p. c.

Emden p. c.

Sunk by German mine near Wilhelmshaven . . . , 3-11-14

Sunk by English forces off Falklands 8-12-14

No official report. Press reports that she was lost

in the Baltic -12-14

Sunk by British forces off Doggerbank 24- 1-15

Sunk by British forces. North Sea 28- 8-14

Sunk by British forces, North Sea 28- 8-14

Sunk by British sm., E-9, North Sea 13- 9-14

By gunfire 7- 8-14

Sunk by Australian c. Sydney, Indian Ocean . . . 9-11-14

The War on the Ocean

481

NAME TYPE TONNAGE

Leipzig p. c. . . . 3,200 . .

Nurnberg p. c. . . . 3,396 . .

Berlin c. c. . . . 17,324. .

Patagonia c. c. . . . . .

Eber c. c. . . . 1,000 . .

Kormoran II . . . . c. c. . . . 3,508 . .

Magdeburg i.e.... 4,478 . .

Geier 1. c. . . . 1,630. .

Karlsruhe 1. c. . . . 4,822 . .

Moewe g. b. . . . 640 . .

Wissman g. b. . .about 300. ,

Planet g. b. . . . 640 . .

Kormoran g. b. . . . 1,604 • •

litis g. b. . . . 886 . .

Tiger g. b. . . . 886 . .

Luchs g. b. . . . 886 . .

Jaguar g. b. . . . 886 . .

Tsingtau g. b. . . . 168 . .

Vaterland g. b. . . . 168 . .

V-187 d 689 . .

S-115 d 413 ■ •

S-117 d 413 ■ •

S-118 d 413 . .

S-119 d 413 • •

S-90 d 396 . .

Taku d 276 . .

S-124 d 463 . .

S-126 d 487 . .

S-116 t. b. . . . 477 . .

U-15 sm. . . about 450 . .

U-18 sm. . . . . .

U-3 sm. . . . . .

Prince Adalbert .... a.\. c. . . 6,030 . .

Sudmark ax. c. . . 5,113 . .

Kaiser Wilhelm der

Grosse ax. c. . . 13,952 . .

Bethania ax. c. . . 7,548 . .

Spreewald ax. c. . . 3,899 . .

Cap Trafalgar ax. c. . . 18,710. .

Max Brock ax. c. . . 4,579 . .

Itolo ax. c. . . 299 . .

Rhios ax. c. . . 150 . .

Soden ax. c. . . 150 . .

Gneisenau ax. c. . 8,185 . .

REMARKS DATS

Sunk by English forces off Falklands 8-12-14

Interned, Norway 16-11-14

Seized by Argentina, violation of neutrality ....

Interned, Bahia . 9-14

Interned, Guam 15-12-14

Ran ashore in fog in Baltic ; blown up by own crew

after engagement with Russians 27- 8-14

Interned in Honolulu 8-11-14

No official report as to this vessel' s destruction.
Press reports state she was blown up by internal

explosion while cruising in the Atlantic -11-14

Sunk by her own crew at Dar-es-Salaam when Eng-
lish vessels appeared 14- 8-14

Captured by English on Lake Nyasa 20- 8-14

Sunk by her own crew at Yap Island on approach

of Japanese fleet 7-10-14

Sunk by Germans in Kiau-Chau Bay before surren-
dering Tsingtau to Allies 6-11-14

Sunk by Germans in Kiau-Chau Bay before surren-
dering Tsingtau to Allies 6-IT-14

Sunk by Germans in Kiau-Chau Bay before surren-
dering Tsingtau to Allies 6-11-14

Interned, China 17- 8-14

Sunk by British forces. North Sea 28- 8-14

Sunk by English destroyers. North Sea 17-10-14

Simk by English destroyers, North Sea 17-10-14

Sunk by English destroyers, North Sea 17-10-14

Sunk by English destroyers. North Sea 17-10-14

Driven ashore and wrecked by own crew off Tsing-
tau after having torpedoed the Japanese ship

Takachiho 30-10-14

Sunk by Germans in Kiau-Chau Bay before surren-
dering Tsingtau to Allies 6-11-14

Accidentally rammed and sunk by a merchant vessel

in the Baltic 22-11-14

By sm 6-10-14

Sunk by English sm. E-9, North Sea 6-10-14

Sunk by British c. Birmingham jo-io-14

Destroyed by English d. Garry off Scotch coast . . 23-11-14

Rammed 9- 8-14

Captured by British c - 8-14

Captured by British c 15- 8-14

Sunk by British c. Highflyer 27- 8-14

Captured by British c 7- 9-14

Captured by British c I2- 9-14

Sunk by British ax. c. Carmania 14- 9-14

Captured by British c - 9-14

Sunk by French g. b. at Kamerun 24- 9-14

Captured by English c. off Kamerun River .... 1-10-14

Sunk by Belgians prior to <vacuaticn of .Antwerp . . S-10-14

482

The Great War

NAME

TYPE

Graecia ax. c. .

Markomannia ax c. .

Navarra ax. c. .

Greif ax. c. ,

Comet ax. c. .

Kamac ax. tr.

Konigin Luise .... m. 1. .

Rufin m. 1. .

m. 1. .

Kingani a. m. v.

Locksum n. t. . .

TONNAGE

2.753 • •

4,405 • •

5,794 • •

977- •

4,437 • ■

2,163 . .

Captured by English c

Sunk by British c. in Indian Ocean
Sunk by English ax. c. in Atlantic

DATE

10-10-14
16-10-14
11-11-14

Captured by Australian forces 18- 10-14

Interned, Chile -11-14

Sunk by English d., North Sea 5- 8-14

Sunk by Germans in Kiau-Chau Bay before surren-
dering Tsingtau to Allies 6-11-14

Reported by the French captured outside of Havre

disguised as French collier

Captured by the British on Lake Tanganyika . . .

Interned, Honolulu 8-11-14

AUSTRIAN WARSHIP LOSSES

Zenta c 2,264

Kaiserin Elisabeth . . c 3,937

No. 19 t. b. . . . 78

t. b. . . .

t.b. . . .

. Sunk by French fleet off Antwerp 16- 8-14

. Sunk by her own crew at Tsingtau 7-11-14

. Struck by a mine and sank at entrance to Pola ... 18- 8-14

. Sunk by mine in Adriatic

TURKISH WARSHIP LOSSES

Messudieh b. .

Mejidieh c. .

Burak Reis g. b.

Issa Reis (type) . . . g. b.

Bezemialen tr. .

Bachriachmar tr. .

10,000

3,330
502
500

Sunk by British sm. B-ii, Dardanelles 14-12-14

Sunk by Russian mine

Scuttled to avoid capture 31-10-14

Scuttled 1-11-14

Sunk, Black Sea 14-11-14

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

DATE PAGE

14 10. The Teutonic Knights defeated by the Poles at Tannen-

berg 140

1807. Heligoland taken by Great Britain 418

1870. August 4. Germany began the invasion of France . . 34

1890. Heligoland ceded to Germany 418

1902. November 11. Germany signed an agreement with Lux-
emburg providing that she would not use the railways
of the grand-duchy for any military purpose whatsoever 32
1904. German plan of traversing Belgium to invade France prob-
ably approved 9

1906. General Helmuth von Moltke appointed Chief of the

German General Staff 24

191 1. Germany acquired extension of territory in Congo as com-

pensation for French influence in Morocco .... 20

General Joffre appointed Chief of the French General Staff 26

1912. November 22. Franco-British entente affirmed . . . 405

19 1 3. New German and French army laws enacted .... 405

1914. June 24. Kiel Canal extension completed 417

July 19. King George reviewed British fleet at Spithead 409

July 28. Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia . 297
August I. The German ambassador suggested to the

British government respect of Belgian neutrality as the

condition of British neutrality 18

August 2. German troops entered Luxemburg at Was-

serbillig 31

August 2. Germany presented ultimatum to Belgium . 49, 51
August 3. Germany proposed as the condition of British

neutrality not to use Belgian coast for warlike purposes 18
August 3. Belgium declined French aid in her defense . 70
August 3. The Germans entered France on Luxemburg

border 80

483

484 The Great War

DATE PAGE

1914. August 3. The Germans occupied Kalisz 116

August 4. Tlje p'rench Minister at Luxemburg dismissed

at the direction of Germany 31

August 4. The Germans crossed the Belgian frontier near

Aix-le-Chapelle 34

August 4. Sir John French appointed to command of the

British Expeditionary Force 93

August 4—15. Liege attacked and Germans overran Bel-
gium west and north of the Meuse .... 13, 44, 46
August 5. Germany began laying mines on the British

coast 423

August 7. The Germans captured the city of Liege . . 44

August 7— 10. The French invaded Upper Alsace . 67,72—73

August 8. The German military authorities in Luxem-
burg secured dismissal of the Belgian minister to the
grand-duchy 32

August 8. The Germans began their u'estward movement

near the frontier of Holland 53

August 9. Germany renev^ed her proposals to Belgium

for occupation of territory of that country .... 50

August 9. First German submarine attack made on British

squadron 424

August 10. The German army under the Crown Prince

began the invasion of France 47, 80

August 10. The Goehen and the Breslau acquired by Tur-
key 411,422

August II. French incursion into German Lorraine de-
feated 74

August 1 1— September 2. The Austrians invaded Po-
land 145, 149

August 12. The Germans gained control of the crossing

of the Meuse at Huy 55

August 12. Austro-Hungarian forces entered Serbia . . 298

August 12—25. The French made a general invasion of

Alsace-Lorraine . 16,67,75-79,80,84

August 13. Belgium confirmed her previous repudiation
of Germany's proposal that she violate her neutral-
ity • • • 51

August 14. The first French troops entered Belgium 58, 68, 81

August 14-26. Namur besieged by the Germans . 53, 87-89

August 15. The German general western movement from

Liege began . c 47

Chronological Table 485

DATE PAGE

1914. August 15. Battle fought at Dinant 55, 82

August 15. Grand-duke Nicholas issued his famous

proclamation to the Poles 274-275

August 15. Togoland captured from Germany . . . 475
August 15—22. The Germans advanced through Belgium

to Namur-Charleroi-Mons line 13, 58, 65

August 16. Russia began the invasion of East Prussia and

Galicia 17,125-142,147-152,278

August 16. Political parties in Poland espoused the cause

of Russia 277

August 16. Japan demanded cession of Kiau-Chau by

Germany 473

■ August 16—24. The Serbians defeated the Austrians in

Battle of the Jadar 300—301

August 17. The Belgian seat of government transferred

from Brussels to Antwerp 59

August 17. The French acquired control of the Vosges . 75
August 19. The Belgian General Staff left Louvain . . 60
August 19. The Germans reached the vicinity of Brussels,

great exodus from the capital 58, 61

August 19. First of the British troops reached Mons . 94
August 20. Brussels capitulated to the Germans ... 61
August 21. Concentration of British troops in Belgium

effected 94

August 21—23. Bombardment and capture of Charleroi . 90—91
August 22. Dinant captured and destroyed .... 99, 374
August 22. The Third German Army began its south-
ward movement into France 99

August 22. The French Forty-second Division entered

Flanders 246

August 22. Von Hindenburg appointed to command of

the German forces in the East 129

August 22-28. The French retreat from their line be-
tween the Meuse and the Sambre 91, 98

August 23—28. The British retreat from Mons . . 95-98
August 23— September 5. The Germans captured Namur

and advanced to the Marnc 13, 64

August 24. The Cjcrmans took Luneville 79

August 24. Insterburg occupied by the Russians . . . 127
August 24. Allenstein occupied by the Russians , . 129, 136
August 24. Japan declared war against Germany . . . 474
August 25. Last forts of Namur taken 64

486 The Great War

DATE PAGE
1914. August 25. The Fourth Division of the British Expedi-
tionary Force joined the main body 96

August 25. Engagements at Landrecies and Maroilles . 96
August 25—26. The Belgians attacked the Germans to-
wards Louvain 218

August 26. Fortress of Longwy captured by the Ger-
mans 81

August 26. The French ministry reorganized .... 108
August 26—27. Louvain destroyed by the Germans . . 219
August 26—28. The Russians defeated near Hohenstein . 136
August 27— September 7. Bombardment of Maubeuge . 186
August 28. Battle of Tannenberg . . . 17,130,138-140
August 28. Naval engagement off Heligoland .... 425
August 29. The Germans repulsed on the Oise . . . 106

August 30. Rethel taken by the Germans lOi

August 30. Decree issued ordering demolition of all prem-
ises in the line of fire of the defenses of Paris . . . 154
August 30. The British seized German Samoa . 328, 451, 475
August 31. Givet fortress captured by the Germans . . 101
September I. The Germans repulsed by the British near

Compiegne 109, 154, 155

September 2. The French government proclaimed the

transfer of its seat from Paris . . . 109, 111-112, 113
September 2. General Gallieni issued a proclamation to

the army and people of Paris 113

September 3. The British force continued its retreat be-
hind the Marne 159

September3. Lemberg taken by the Russians . 17,115,148,157
September 4. The French evacuated Reims and the city

bombarded 108

September 4. The Germans diverted their march from

Paris 155

September 5. The Entente Allies mutually engaged not
to conclude separate peace or demand terms of peace

except by common agreement 188

September 6. General offensive of the Allies begun in

the West 160, 170

September 6-10. The Battle of the Marne . 14, 165,170-179, 200
September 7. British cable station at Fanning Island de-
stroyed by the Niirnherg 451

September 7-10. The Russian Vilna Army defeated by

the Germans 142

Chronological Table 487

DATE PAGE

1 9 14. September 9. Garrison troops of Paris conveyed by auto

vehicles to support the PVench Sixth Armv north of

the Marne 174-175

September 9—13. Fortresses at Verdun bombarded . . 180
September 10. The Russians driven from East Prus-
sia 17,125-142,278

September 10-23. Operations on the Aisne . 14, 191— 198
September 11. Bismarck Archipelago captured by the

British 328,475

September 12. Battle at the San 150

September 12—13. Engagement at Soissons .... 191— 192
September 13. The Crown Prince abandoned attack on

the Verdun barrier 212

September 16. The British Sixth Division arrived at the

Aisne 194

September 20. The Germans again bombarded Reims . 197
September 21. The fortress of Jaroslaw taken by the

Russians 151

September 22. The British cruisers Aboukir^ Hogue^ and

Cressy sunk 431-434

September 22—23. Madras attacked by the Emden . . 464
September 24. Kaiser Wilhelm Land seized by the

British 328,475

September 25. The French repulsed near Noyon . . . 205
September 25. Camp des Remains captured by the Germans 215
September 25— October 3. The Germans unsuccessfully

invaded Russia 143, 278-279

September 26. The Germans repulsed north of the Aisne 205
September 27. Kamerun seized by the British and

French 325-326,475

September 28. Attack on Antwerp defenses begun by the

Germans 216,221

October 2-5. British troops landed at Antwerp . . . 223
October 3. Ypres occupied by the Germans .... 207
October 6. Bombardment of the city of Antwerp begun 226
October 6-7. Main part of Belgian army left Antwerp . 225

October 6-8. Arras bombarded by the Germans
October 8. Lodz occupied by the Germans
October 9. Antwerp captured by the Germans
October 1 1 -2 1 . Germans first attack against Warsaw
October 12. The siege of Percmysl raised .
October 13. Ypres captured by the Allies .

. 284

. 229

285-286

283,288

21 1

488 The Great War

DATE PAGE

1914. October 13. The Belgian government seated at Havre . 231
October 1 3— November 1 1 . Battle of Ypres . 239, 250—268, 315
October 15. The Belgian army joined the Allies on the

Yser 232

October 18— November 3. Battle of the Yser . 238, 242—250
October 21. The Mariannas and the Marshall Islands

seized by the Japanese and the British . . 328—329,475
October 28. The Emden destroyed a Russian cruiser and

a French destroyer in the harbor of Penang . . 464—466
November i. The Germans defeated the British off

Chile .453-457

November 5. Cyprus formally annexed by Great Britain 333

November 5. Turkey entered the war • 419

November 9. The Emden destroyed at North Keeling

Island 466—469

November 13. German squadron bombarded the east

coast of England 436

November 14. The Russians renewed the siege of Peremysl 288
December 2. The Austrians defeated by the Serbians in

the Battle of Suvobor 305

December 6. Lodz evacuated by the Russians . . . 294
December 8. The Germans defeated in battle off the

Falkland Islands 459—462

December 15. King Peter returned to recaptured Belgrade 305
December 16. Attack made on Scarborough, Whitby, and

Hartlepool 392,436

December 19. Great Britain proclaimed her Protectorate

over Egypt 332

December 25. The British raided Cuxhaven .... 439

1915. January i. The British battleship Formidable sunk . 439—441
January 15. Great battle in the North Sea .... 442—445

INDEX

Of some of the subjects presented in this 'volume ■vary-
ing phases appear in other 'volumes of this ivork
and the Indexes to all may be profitably consulted.

Aachen (See Aix-la-Chapelle).

Abbas Hilmi Pasha, deposed as Khedive

of Egypt, 332.
Aboukir, The, sunk by U g, 431-434.
Aerschot, taken by the Germans, 59, 219;

alleged atrocities at, 574.
Air service, types of craft in the war, 343-

344; aeroplanes and estimated number

in use, 345-346; the Zeppelins, 347;

balloons, 342, 348 ; carrier pigeons, 348 ;

raids and other services of aircraft, 43,

109. 3+4. 371, 444, 472-

Aisne, The, strategic importance of, 5, 7;
Germans retreat to line of, 14, 183,
189-190; new line of the Allies and
operations on, 1 91-198; renewed oper-
ations on, 205.

Aix-Ia-Chapelle (Aachen), 6, 35, 43, 65.

Akaba, 332.

Albert, battle at, 205.

Albert, King of Belgium, 392,

Allenby, Major-general H. H., in com-
mand of the British cavalry in France,
94; in battle of Ypres, 256.

Allenstein, 128, 136, 137.

Alsace, the French invade, 15, 67, 72-73;
a second invasion, 75-79.

Altkirch, taken by the French, 72.

Amade, General d', 72, 97.

Amiens, Allies concentrate at, 14; evacua-
tion of, 99.

Amphion, The, destruction of by mines,
423.

Andenne, 352, 3S2.

Antwerp, scat of government removed to,
59 ; Belgian General Start" retires to, 60;
strategic importance of, 158, 211,216;
Belgian forces retire within defenses of,
217; attack Germans from, 218, 219;
defenses of, 220; British troops land at,
ZZ3 ; main Belgian army abandons, 225;

bombardment of, 226, 227, 229; flight
of population of, 226-227; earlier sieges
of, 228; departure of last troops de-
fending, 228; capitulation of to the
Germans, 14, 229.

Archc, Lieutenant-colonel d' , stubborn de-
fense of Longwy by, 80-Si.

Ardennes, The, strategic importance of,
54; the Germans occupy the salient
of, 55; the French take up position in,
67, 69; are defeated at Neufchateau,
71 ; the French move into, 8 1 ; the
Germans enter, 82; engagement at
Dinant, 82.

Argonne, The, retreat of tlie Germans to,
215-216.

Ariadne, The, loss of, 426, 430.

Armentieres, taken by the Germans,
207.

Arras, destnictive bombardment of by the
Germans, 207, 370.

Artiller)-, 339; naval, of Great Britain and
Germany, 414-

Asquith, H. H., on the purpose of the
Allies, 392.

Atrocities, charges of against Serbia, 306-
310; Belgian report on alleged, 351,
— occurrences at Andenne, 352, 382,
Tamines, 353, Namur, 353, Hastiere,
353; French report on, 354, — occur-
rences at Triaucourt, 354, Luncville,
354, Gerbeviller, Bacarat, and Senlis,
355; Professor Bcdicr's pamphlet of
Ciennan evidence of, 356-560; Lord
Bryce's committee report to the British
government on, 361-363; German refu-
tation and counter-cliarges of, 365-366;
belligerent rights and usages of war,
368, 370, 371, 380, 3S1, 382, 383, 384;
individual and official responsibility for
acts of brutality, 372, 380; the Aerschot

489

490

The Great War

and Dinant charges, 374-377, 382; the
case of Louvain, 378-379, 382; Ger-
man defense of collective punishments,
383-384; destruction of Gue d'Hossus,
execution at Nomeny, raiding of Bla-
mont, 384-385; hostages seized, 385;
civilians used as shields for German sol-
diers, 386.

Audacious, The, alleged sinking of, 434.

Auffenberg, General von, Austro-Hun-
garian commander in Galicia, 145, 146,
147, 148, 149^ 150J 288; retired from
command, 313.

Australia, military and naval forces raised
for the Mother Country, 322; expedi-
tionary force seizes German possessions
in Samoa, the Bismarck Archipelago,
the Marshall Islands, and German Nevr
Guinea, 328-329, 475.

Austria-Hungary, strategic railways of in
Galicia, 121, 122; fortresses in Galicia,
122, 123; strength of the army on the
Russian border, 124; disposition of the
forces and plan of campaign of in Po-
land, 145; Russia invades Galicia, 17,
146, 147, 148-149, 151; armies of re- .
treat west, 1 51-152; Hungary invaded,
152, 282, 295; defense and relief of
Peremysl, 283; forces of advance to the
Vistula, 285; defeated at Ivangorod,
287; recovers positions in Galicia, 288;
and again forced back, 288; drive the
Russians beyond the Carpathians, 295;
"punitive expedition" to Serbia, 296;
defeat of in Battle of the Jadar, 299-301 ;
Hungary invaded by Serbians, 301 ; again
invades Serbia, 302; third invasion of
Serbia, 303-306; charges Serbians with
violations of usages of war, 306-307;
Count Tisza on the military and civil
sentiment of, 397-398; naval force of
in the Far East, 412, 449; in the
Mediterranean, 419; naval losses, 482.

Auxiliary cruisers, raids, losses, and in-
ternment of German, 475-477, 481-
482; British use of, 477.

Bacarat, destruction of by Germans, 355.

Bagdad Railroad, 333.

Baltic Sea, The, area and depth of, 416;
strategic advantages of Germany in,
416-417; losses in, August-December,
1914, 446.

Basra, occupied by the British, 333.

Battenberg, Prince Maurice of, 261.

Beatty, Vice-admiral Sir David, in com-
mand of the British First Battle-Cruiser
Squadron, 425; engages a German fleet
off Heligoland, 427, 429 ; and a battle-
cruiser fleet on January 24, 191 5, 441-
446.

Bedier, Professor Joseph, pamphlet of on
German atrocities, 356-360.

Belgium, physical difficulties and military
obstacles to German passage of, 5-6 ; early
operations in, 13 ; Germany's discrepant
proposals to Great Britain as to neutrality
of, 18-19; political and economic factors
bearing on Germany's treatment of, 19-
■23 ; minister of to Luxemburg dismissed
at request of German military authori-
ties, 32; Germany invades without de-
claring war, 35; civilians resist invaders,
36-39; opposes the enemy at Vise, 40;
defense of Liege and its forts, 41-45;
declines Germany' s repeated proposal to
violate her own neutrality, 49-51; Ger-
man forces begin westward advance in,
53 ; government moves to Antwerp, 59;
Tirlemont, Aerschot, and Louvain taken
by the Germans, 59; exodus from Brus-
sels, 60-61; the capital capitulates, 61-62;
German forces march through Brussels,
62-63; French troops first take up posi-
tions in, 69, 81; the French defeat the
Germans at Dinant, 82; Germans cap-
ture Namur, 88-90; Charlcroi taken by
the Germans, 90-91; army of and its
disposition, 217; retires within the de-
fenses of Antwerp, 217; German gov-
erning officials in, 217; unsuccessfiilly
attacks the Germans in the direction
of Louvain, 218; the Germans destroy
Louvain, 21 8-21 9; battles for Termonde,
219; attacks Germans before Antwerp,
220; defends Antwerp, 220, 221-229;
army of abandons Antwerp, 225, 228;
flight of population of Antwerp, 226;
part of army of escapes into Holland,
229; capitulates Antwerp, 229; seat of
government transferred to Havre, 231;
army of in position on the Yser, 232,
234,242; Battle of tlie Yser, 238, 242-
250; of Ypres, 250-268; renews opera-
tions on the Yser, 316; operations of
in German East Africa, 326; alleged

Index

491

German atrocities in, 351-353, 357-358,
362, 363, 364, 365-367, 370-371, 371,
373-380, 381, 382, 38+, 385, 386.
Belgrade, bombardment of, 297 ; evacua-
tion of by Serbians, 304; reoccupation

of, 305-

Bemhardi, General von, advocates the trav-
erse of Belgium by Germany, 9.

Beseler, General von, operations of against
Antwerp, 221-229.

Bethmann-HoUweg, Dr. von, 395.

Bethune, 234, 251.

Bismarck Archipelago, The, seized by the
British, 328, 475.

Bismarck, Prince, foreign policy of, 402.

Blamont, alleged atrocities at, 385.

Blucher, The, destroyed in battle in the
North Sea, 442-445.

Boers, insurrectionary- movement of, 328.

Borden, Sir Robert, Canadian Prime Min-
ister, 323.

Botha, General Louis, Prime Minister of
South Africa, 323.

Bothnia, The Gulf of, 416, 446.

Breslau, The, acquired by Turkey, 411,
422; operations of in the Mediterra-
nean, 421-422.

Brest Litovsk, fortifications of, 121, 123,
290.

British Expeditionary Force (See Great
Britain).

Brody (Galicia), occupied by the Rus-
sians, 147.

Bruges, 231.

Brussels, seat of government transferred to
Antwerp from, 59; terms of capitulation
of, 6 1 ; German troops march through, 6 2 .

BrussilofF, General, Russian commander in
the Galician campaign, 147, 148.

Brj'cc, Lord, report of on alleged atrocities
in Belgium and France, 361-363.

Bulow, Colonel-general, commander of
Second German Army, 85, 875 reaches
the Marne, 159; is defeated on the
Marne, 184.

Bulnvark, The, destruction of, 436.

Calais, strategic importance of, 238.

Camp dcs Romains, bombarded and taken
by the Germans; 214 ; the Crown Prince
advances from and is pushed back to, 2 16.

Canada, military forces raised bv in aid of
the Mother Countr)', 322-323.

Cannae, Hannibal's strategy at compared
with von Hindcnburg's at Tannenberg,
132-134.

Caroline Islands, The, seized by an Aus-
tralian force, 328, 475.

Cary, General de Langle de, commander
of the Fourth French Army, 85, 167,
177.

Castelnau, General de, commander of the
Second French Army, 76, 85; in com-
mand of the Seventh French Army, 204.

Cattegat, The, 416.

Cavalry, The, important place of in the
Great War, 339.

Chantilly, the Germans raid, 154.

Charleroi, German occupation of, i 3 ; battle
at, 90-91.

Charleville, engagement at, 100.

Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston, accompanies
British marines to Antwerp, 223.

Coblentz, 7.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands, 466.

Colmar, taken by the French, 75; irritation
in against German officials, 76.

Cologne, 6.

Compiegne, the British repulse tlie Ger-
mans near, 109, 154, 155.

Congo, French, 20; Belgian, 20; Free
State, 20.

Connaught, the Duke of, 322.

Coronel, naval battle off", 453-457.

Cracow, fortress of, 122; operations be-
fore, 295, 296.

Cradock, *Rear-admiral Sir Christopher, in
command of the British squadron in bat-
tle off" Coronel, 453; is defeated and his
ship sunk, 45 3-+57-

Cressy, The, sunk by U-o, 431-434.

Crown Prince of Bavaria, The, opposes
the French in Lorraine, 78; in com-
mand of the Sixth Army, 85; bom-
bards the Verdun barrier, 212; takes
St. Mihiel .ind C.-imp des Romains, 2145
army of in the Yscr region, 2405 in the
Battle of Ypres, 2545 inflammaton,*
orders of the day of, 264.

Crown Prince of Germany, Tlie, com-
mander of the Fifth Army, 85 ; dilatory
movement imputed to, 157-158; early
operations against Verdun, 180; attacks
the Verdun barrier but withdraws, 212-
213.

Cuxhaven, British raid on, 439.

492

The Great War

Cyprus, formally annexed by Great Britain,

333-
Czernowitz, 288.

Dankl, General, Austro-Hungarian com-
mander in Galicia, 145, 146, 147,
149, 150; in command of Austro-
German advance against Ivangorod,
287.

Deimling, General von, 265.

Diedenhofen (Thionville), 52, 213.

Dinant, battle at, August 15, 1914, 55,
70, 82; the French driven from and
town destroyed, 99; alleged German
atrocities at, 375-377, 382.

Dixmude, the Germans assault, 243-244,
247; and capture, 250, 267; devasta-
tion of, 269.

Dogs, use of in the war, 348.

Douai, captured by the Germans, 207.

Dresden, The, in battle off Coronel, 453;
escapes from the Falkland Islands battle,
462; destruction of, 463.

Dubail, General, commander of the First
French Army, 85.

East, The, naval forces of belligerents in,
448-449.

East Prussia, strategic railways in, 121-
122, 128} fortresses in, 122; Russia in-
vades, 17, 117, 123, 125, her successes
in, 126-129 ; von Hindenburg appointed
to command in, 131; great battle in the
Masurian Lakes district, 136-138; the
Russian Vilna Army defeated in, 142-
143; von Hindenburg invades Russia
from, 143; is repulsed and retires to,
143, 279.

Egypt, Turkey plans to capture, 18, 332;
German intrigues in, 332; the Khedive
deposed and a formal British Protectorate
established, 332.

Einem, General von, in command of the
Third German Army, 262.

Emden, The, captures, raids, and destruc-
tion of, 464-469.

Emmich, General von, commander of
Ninth Army Corps, 34, 35; in the
operations at Liege, 42, 44; moves on
Namur, 53.

Enver Pasha, 332.

Epinal, fortress of, 7, 69.

Esperey, General Franchet de, commander
(succeeding Lanzerac) of Fifth French
Army, 85, 167, 169, 170, 177.

Fabeck, General von, forces of in the Yser
region, 240; inBattleof Ypres, 252, 261.

Falkenhayn, General von, 262.

Falkland Islands, naval battle off, 459-462.

Fanning Island, the Nurnberg destroys the
British cable station, 450-451.

Flanders (See Belgium).

Foch, General, commander of the French
Ninth Army, 167, 176, 177, 179; in
control of Anglo-French operations
north of the Oise, 209; visits battlefield
of Ypres, 262.

Fokker, The, 346.

FormidabUy The, sunk by a German sub-
marine, 439-441.

France, physical aspects of country involved
in a German campaign against, 5; fails
to appreciate Germany's intention to
attack her mainly through Belgium, 9;
tactics and strategy of, 9-12; plan of
campaign, 11, 67; general summary of
operations, August 4-December 31, 13-
15; minister of to Luxemburg dismissed
at German dictation, 3 1 ; shifts her forces
on eastern frontier after fall of Liege, 47,
56, 70; invades Upper Alsace, 15-16,
67, 72-73; ^ second invasion, 75-79;
enters German Lorraine, 15-16, 68, 74,
77-79, 84; troops of take positions in
Belgium, 69; defeated at Neufchateau,
71, 81, 84; and on the Sambre, 71;
army of Alsace-Lorraine invasion retires
within border of, 7 9 ; defense of Longwj-^,
80-81; offensive movement in the Ar-
dennes, 8 1 ; defeats Germans at Dinant,
82; disposition and number of armies of,
85-87; defeated at Charleroi, 90-91;
retreat to line of La Fere-Guisc, 98; re-
treat from Dinant to Rethel, 99-101;
the front of the Allies on August 29th,
105; checks the Germans on the Oise,
106; ministry of reorganized, 107;
further retreat of the Allies, 109; the
seat of government transferred to Bor-
deaux, 109, III; proclamations of the
President and General Gallieni, iii-
113; Germans advance towards Paris,
154; then abandon this direction, 154-
160; relative strength of armies of and

Index

493

those of Germany, 163-164, 168-169;
position of forces of in Battle of the
Marne, 165-168; operations on the
Marne, 170-179; engages not to make
separate peace or demand peace condi-
tions except in agreement with her allies,
188; operations on the Aisne, 191- 194;
first troops of in Belgium, 217; partici-
pation of in the battles of the Yser and
Ypres, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
256, 259, 262, 265; resumes offensive
in Belgium, 316; operations of in Togo-
land and Kamerun, 325, 326; alleged
atrocities in, 354-356, 359-360, 368-
370; patriotic sentiment in, 390-391;
fleet of in the Mediterranean, 408;
naval force in the East, 412, 449, 465;
naval losses of, 480.

Fran9ois, General von, commander of the
German forces in East Prussia, 126, 127.

Frankenau (East Prussia), the Russians
occupy, 128.

Frederick the Great, tactics of, 317;
Macaulay on the rapacity of, 321.

French, Sir John D. P., commander of the
British Expeditionary Force to France,
92-94, 106, 160, 208.

Friedric/i Karl, The, sunk in the Baltic,
446.

Galicia, strategic railways and fortresses in,
121-123; the forces of Austria-Hun-
gary in, 145; successful invasion of by
Russia, 17, 147-152, 278; the move-
ment checked, 280; the Russians thrown
back to the San, 288; renewed Austrian
losses in, 288 ; the Russian line of occu-
pation in, 295-296.

Gallieni, General Joseph, proclamation of,
1 1 3-1 14; sends Paris garrison to the
Marne, 173-174.

Geier, The, 47 i.

Gemmenich, Belgium invaded through,

36, 39-

George V, visits battle headquarters, 392;
reviews fleet off Spithead, 409.

Gerard, James W., United States Ambas-
sador at Berlin, 50.

Gerbeviller, 355.

German East Africa, development of, 20;
British and Belgian operations against,
326; the British destroy the Konigsberg
in, 472.

German Southwest Africa, operations
against by forces of the Union of South
Africa, 327.

(icrmany, considerations involved in cam-
paign of against France, 2-7 ; tactics and
strategy of, 7-8, 12, 335; traverse of
Belgium by probably decided in 1904,
9 ; the plan of eastern operations, 1 6 ;
military relations of with Turkey, 18;
discrepant proposals of to Great Britain
as to neutrality of Belgium, 18-19;
colonial aspirations of, 20-21; violates
neutrality of Luxemburg, 31-32; orders
dismissal of French and Belgian ministers
to Luxemburg, 31,32; invades Belgium
without declaration of war, 3 5 ; advance
on Liege, 36; capture of Liege and its
forts, 41-45; offers conditional eventual
independence and integrity to Belgium,
49-51 ; disposition and strength of forces
of in West, 51-52; capture of Tirle-
mont, Aerschot, and Louvain, 59; Brus-
sels surrenders to, 61-62; defeats French
invasions of Alsace, 15-16, 67, 72-73,
75-79; and of Lorraine, 68, 74, 77-79,
84; invades France at Longwy, 80;
defeats French at Neufchateau, 81, 84;
defeated at Dinant, 82; disposition and
strength of armies in the West, 84-87;
captures Namur, 88-89; drives French
fromCharleroi, 90-9 1 ; operations ag^ainst
the British in their retreat to Novon-
Chauny-La Fere line, 95-9S ; and against
the French retreating on La Fere-Guise
line, 98; invests Maubeuge, 99; von
Hansen drives southward from Dinant,
99-101; operations of the army of the
Crown Prince west of Longwy, loi;
westward general advance of armies of,
105; French counter-attack on the Oise
checks, 106; rapid advance on Paris,
114, 154; initial operations against Rus-
sia, 116, 117; strategic railways of on
Polish frontier, 121-122, 128, 132, 135;
army corps of on eastern frontier, i 24,
125; the Russians invade Fast I'nissia, 17,
126-129; von Hindenburg sent to F^st
Prussia, 129; defeats the Narcv Army
in the Masurian Lakes district, 136-138;
defeats the Vilna Army, 142-143; ad-
vances into Russia, 142; and witlulraws
into East Prussia, 143; von Kiuck
diverts his army southeast from Paris,

494

The Great War

155; retires beyond the Mame, 159;
positions and strength of opposing armies
on the Marne, 166-170; is defeated in
Battle of the Marne, 170-179; denies
defeat, 181-183; retreats to line of the
Aisne, 183,189; establishes new front be-
tween the Meuse and the Oise, 189-190;
engagements on the Aisne, 191-194;
operations in the vicinity of St. Qiientin,
204-205; in Champagne, Picardy, and
Artois, 205-209; yields to the Allies
in southern Flanders, 211; operations
about Verdun, 212, 213-216; operations
against and capture of Antwerp, 221-
229; battles of the Yser, 242-250, and
Ypres, 250-268; principles championed
in the war by, 271-272; position and
strength of Teutonic armies in East at
close of September, 19 14, 282; the
campaign in Poland, 284-295; vulner-
ability of in her dependencies, 324;
operations in Togoland, Kamerun, East
Africa, and Southwest Africa, 325-327,
474; loses Samoa, 328, 451-452, and
New Guinea colony, 328 329, 475;
Kiau-Chau taken by the Japanese, 330-
331,473-475; secures military coopera-
tion of Turkey, 331; public sentiment
in, 393-397; naval strategy of, 406-
407 ; her naval forces in the Far East
and the Pacific, 411-412, 448; rela-
tive naval strength of compared with
that of Great Britain, 413-415; lays
mines in North Sea, 420; loses the
Konigin Lutse while mine-laying on
British coast, 423; begins submarine
attacks, 424; defeated by British off
Heligoland, 425-431; success of sub-
marines of, 431-434, 435, 439-441;
raids the cast coast of England, 436;
engages British in the North Sea, 442-
445 ; destroys British station at Fan-
ning Island, 450; defeats British in
naval action off Chile, 453-457; is de-
feated off the Falkland Islands, 459-
462; loses the Dresden, 463; raids
British Asiatic ports, 464-467; loses
the Emden, 467-469 ; her fleet in foreign
waters disappears, 471-472, 474, 475-
476; warship losses of, 480-481.

Ghent, 225, 230.

Givenchy, 316.

Givet, 1 01.

Gneisenau, The, 448, 449, 452; in battle
off Chile, 453-457; destruction of, 461.

Goeben, The, 411, 419, 421-422.

Goltz, General Field-marshal von der,
217.

Good Hope, The, sunk by the Germans in
action off Chile, 453-457.

Great Britain, Germany proposes discrepant
conditions to as to neutrality of Belgium,
18; Expeditionary Force of, 86, 92, 94;
the retreat from Mons, 95-98, 154; de-
feats Germans near Compiegne, 109,
1 54, 1 55 ; retires beyond the Mame, 1 59 ;
operations in Battle of the Marne, 160,
172, 174; engages with her Allies not
to conclude peace or discuss terms inde-
pendently, 188; actions of in advance to
the Aisne, 191; engagements on the
Aisne, 191 -194, army of transferred
from tlie Aisne to Flanders, 208 ; position
of troops of in Belgium in mid-October,
1914, 233-234; naval squadron partici-
pates in the defense of Belgium, 242,
246, 247, 249; operations of her army
in Flanders, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255,
256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261; 265, 266;
principles championed by in the war,
271-272; renews offensive in West in
December, 1 9 1 4, 316; state of stagna-
tion; 317; colonial loyalty and support
of, 321-324; operations of against Ger-
man African possessions, 325-327; seizes
German Pacific holdings, 328,451-452,
475 ; proclaims protectorate over Egypt,
332; formally annexes Cyprus, 333;
sends Indian expedition to Persian Gulf,
333; sentiment of people of, 391-393;
naval strategy of, 406 ; her navy in home
waters, 408-409; mobilizes navy as
*'test," 409; forces in Far East and the
Pacific, 412, 449; relative strength of
navy of compared with Germany' s, 41 3-
41 5 ; engages the Germans off Heligo-
land, August 28th, 425-431; losses
through submarine attacks, 431-434,
435, 439-441 ; Germany raids east coast
of, 436; makes raid on Cuxhaven, 439;
engages the Germans in the North Sea,
442-445; defeated in naval encounter
off Chile, 453-457; defeats Germans at
the Falkland Islands, 459-462; sum-
mary of naval losses of, 479-480.

Gue d'Hossus, 357, 384.

Index

495

Hague Conference, 1907, regulations of
as to usages of war and violations thereof,
306, 352, 361, 362, 365, 370, 371, 380,
382, 383, 384, 387, 437.

Haig, Lieutenant-general Sir Douglas, 94,
96, 260.

Hartlepool , German raid on,392,436,437.

Hastiere-par-dela, alleged atrocities at, 353.

Hausen, Colonel-general von, 85, 87, 99-
loi, 262.

Havre, seat of Belgian government trans-
ferred to, 231.

Haivke, The, sunk by U-g, 434.

Heeringen, Colonel-general von, 85.

Hela,T\\e, sunk by British submarine, 428.

Heligoland, fortress and naval base at, 41 8 ;
action off, August 28, 19 14, 425-431.

Hindenburg, General Paul L. H. von, 17,
1 2* j appointed to command in the East,
129-130; plans for attack on the Narev
Army, 130-135; defeats the Russians
under SamsonofF, 136-138; is promoted
and decorated, 139, 310; attacks and
defeats tlie Vilna Army under Rennen-
kampf, 141-143; barren advance of into
Russia and withdrawal to East Prussia,
143, 278, 279 ; takes chief command of
German armies in the East, 282; is
forced back in Poland, 288, 289; his
brilliant counter-stroke, 290-295.

Hipper, Rear-admiral, in command of a
German battle-cruiser fleet in the North
Sea, 441.

Hague, The, sunk by U-g, 431-434.

Hungary, unsuccessful invasion of by Rus-
sia, 152, 282, 295; by Serbia, 301.

Hussein Kamel Pasha, proclaimed Sultan
of Egypt, 332.

India, contingents of in Battle of Ypres,
253, 256, 260, 261; in France, 316;
loyalty of to the empire, 323-324.

Ingenohl, Admiral von, 417.

Intrenchments, system and service of, 318-
319.

Ivangorod, fortifications at, 123, 290.

IvanoiF, General, 149, 150.

Jadar, The, Battle of, 299-301.

Japan, ultimatum of to Germany, 329,
473; declares war, 474; Tsingtau sur-
rendered to, 329-330, 474; seizes Ma-
rianna and Marshall Islands, 329, 475.

Jaroslaw, 151, 288.

Jellicoe, Admiral John R., commander of
the British Battle Fleet, 418.

Joffre, General Joseph, Chief of the French
General Staff, 26-29; proclamation of
to the Alsacians, 72; confers with Sir
John French, io6, 160; decides on
further retreat of the Allied armies, 1 08 ;
orders an offensive on the Marne, 160;
plans the Battle of the Marne, 1 60-1 61,
165, 169; order of the day of on eve
of Battle of the Marne, 170; defeats von
Kluck, 1 71-179; visits battlefield of
Ypres, 262; orders an Allied offensive
December 17, 1914, 316; receives King
George at the front, 392.

Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 147, 288.

Kaiser Wilhelm Canal (See Kiel Canal).

Kaiser Wilhelm Land, 328, 475.

Kamerun, 20, 325-326, 475.

Karlsruhe, The, 471.

Kiau-Chau, blockade and capture of Tsing-
tau by Japan, 329-330, 474.

Kiel Canal, 417.

Kluck, General Alexander von, in com-
mand of German First Army, 84, 86;
limit of westward advance of on Paris,
154; his plan to destroy the Allies field
armies, 156; reaches the Marne, 159;
defeated in the Battle of the Marne,
171-179.

Kogge, Charles-Louis, 248.

Koln, The, loss of, 430.

Konigin Luise, The, sunk while mine-
laying, 423.

Konigsberg, The, 412; destruction of,
472.

Krasnik, 146, 150.

Krobatkin, Field-marshal Alexander, Rittcr
von, Austrian Minister of War, 313.

Kronstadt, Russian naval base at, 407,416.

Kusmanek, General, defends Peremysl,
152.

La Bassee, 209, 224, 251.

Landrecies, battle at, 96.

Lanzcrac, General, connnander of Fifth

French Army, 85, 87, 91.
Lapeyrere, Admiral Boue dc, 408.
Leipzig, The, 412, 450; raids of, 453;

destruction of, 462.
Leman, General, defends Liege, 45.

496

The Great War

Lemberg, 17, 115, 148-149, 157.

Lens, 207.

Lichnowsky, Prince, 18, 19,

Liebknecht, Karl, opposes the German
war budget, 397.

Liege, strategic importance of, 6, 9, 34;
Germans advance on, 34; physical and
economic features of, 40; fortifications
encircling, 41-425 garrison of, 42;
storming and capture of, 42-44; capture
of the last of the forts, 45.

Lille, the French evacuate, 99; evacuated
by the Germans, 202 ; operations near,
207, 209; bombardment and surrender
of, 210, 251.

Lissauer, Ernst, his Hymn of Hate against
England used as an order of the day by
the Bavarian Crown Prince, 264.

Litzmann, General von, 292, 310.

Lodz, 284, 292, 293, 294.

Lombaertzyde, 243, 246, 248, 316.

Longwy, German forays at before declara-
tions of hostilities, 7 ; stubborn defense
of, 80-81, 158.

Lorraine, the French invade, 15-16, 68,

74» 77-79» 84.

Louvain, Belgian army withdraws from,
60; destruction of by the Germans,
218-219; alleged German atrocities at,
378.

Luneville, German patrols near before hos-
tilities declared, 7; the Germans take,
79; reoccupied by the French, 181;
alleged atrocities at, 354.

Luxemburg, importance of in German in-
vasion of France, 7; Germans enter
and occupy, 3 1 ; French minister to
dismissed under German orders, 3 1 ;
Germany violates neutrality agreement
with, 32.

Lys, The, operations in valley of, 207,
234, 251, 254.

Mackensen, General von, 292, 310.

Madras, German raid on, 464.

Magdeburg, The, destroyed in the Baltic,
446.

Mainz, The, loss of, 427, 430.

Marianna Islands, 450, 475.

Marne, The, strategic importance of, 5;
the Germans reach, 1 3 ; and retire be-
yond, 159; region of battle of, 165;
positions and numbers of the contending

forces in, 168-169; Battle of, 14, 170

179; losses in, 186.
Maroilles, 96.
Marshall Islands, The, 328, 329, 450,

475-
Marville, 99.
Masurian Lakes, The, position of, 128,

132; von Hindenburg's study of, 1295

the Russians defeated near, 136-138.
Maubeuge, strategic importance of, 7, 1 58;

British retire to, 95; invested by the

Germans, 99; capture of, 186, 190.
Maud'huy, General, in command of Tenth

French Army, 206; in Battle of Ypres,

254.
Maunoury, General, commander of the

Sixth French Army, 160, 166, 190, 172,

173.
Max, Adolfe, Burgomaster of Brussels, 6 1 .
Mechlin (Malines), 221, 371.
Mediterranean Sea, The, naval forces of

belligerents in, 408, 419; losses in, 447.
Mesopotamia, British expedition to, 333.
Messudieh, The, sunk by the British, 447.
Metz, 16, 68, 77, 212, 213.
Meuse, The, strategic importance of, 5, 7,

10, 54; operations on, 13, 39, 53, 55,

8 2 ; the German line on after Battle of

the Marne, 190.
Michel, General, in command of the gar-
rison of Namur, 87.
Mine-laying, German and British in the

North Sea, 4205 by Germany on the

Suffolk coast, 423.
Mineniverfer (trench mortars), 261.
Mislutch, General, in command of First

Serbian Army, 304.
Mitry, General de, 253, 254.
Mobilization, conditions governing, 337,

341.
Moltke, Field-marshal Count von, 23, 26,

335-

Moltke, General Helmuth J. L. von. Chief
of German General Staff, 24-26, 262.

Mondemont, Chateau de, sanguinary strug-
gle at, 178.

Monitors, 242, 435, 472.

Monmouth, The, sunk in action off Chile,

453-457-

Mons, 13, 65, 94, 95.

Montenegro, operations of against Austria-
Hungary, 301-302.

Montmirail, 172, 177.

Index

497

Morgen, General von, 292.

Moselle, The, strategic importance of, 5,

7; Germans cross at Wasserbillig to

occupy Luxemburg, 31.
Motor vehicles, use of in the war, 114,

162, 174, 342.
Miicke, Lieutenant von, 469-471.
Miilhausen, 72, 73, 75, 80.
Muller, Commander Carl von, 466, 488.

Namur, defenses of, 8 7 ; bombardment and
fall of, 13, 64, 88-895 alleged atrocities

at, 353-

Nancy, strategic importance of, 7, 64; in-
vasion of German Lorraine from, 68;
objective of German plan to penetrate
French forces, 69; operations against,
181, 204.

Naval operations, questions of strategy,
406-407, 416; distribution of the bel-
ligerent fleets, 408, 41 1-412, 419; mine-
laying in the North Sea, 420; activities
of the German cruisers Goeben and Eres-
lau, 421 j the Germans defeat British off
Chile, 453-467; the British defeat a Ger-
man squadron off Falkland Islands, 459-
462; the activities of German raiders,
464-472 ; the Emden destroyed by the
Sydney, 466-469; at Tsingtau, 474;
summary of losses of belligerent vessels
to February i, 191 5, 479-482.

Neufchateau, French defeated at, 71, 81.

Neuve Chapelle, 254, 260, 315.

Newfoundland, participation of in the Great
War, 323.

New Pomerania (Bismarck Archipelago),
seized by an Australian force, 3 28.

New Zealand, military and naval forces
raised by for the Mother Country, 322;
expeditionary force of participates in
capture of German Samoa, 328.

Nicholas, Grand-duke, Supreme Com-
mander-in-chief of Russian armies, 143-
144; proclamation of to the Poles, 274.

Nieuport, important strategic value of,
224, 225; a British squadron operates
off, 242, 246, 247, 249; the Germans
bombard, 243, 246; French troops de-
fend, 246, 252; flood of the low land
along the Yscr operated at, 247-248.

Nomenv, alleged German atrocities at, 385.

North Sea, The, dimensions and depth of,
415-416; Gennan coast protection on,

418; mines laid in, 420-424; battle in,
425-431; submarine activities in, 431-
434; British monitors in aid Belgian de-
fense, 435; German raid on British
coast, 436; British raid on Cuxhaven,
439; great battle of January' 24, 191 5,
441-446.

Novo Gcorgievsk, fortifications of, 123,
286, 289, 290, 295.

Noyon, 198, 205.

Nurnberg, The, raids Fanning Island, 450-
451; destruction of, 462.

Oise, The, strategic importance of, 5, 7;
operation on, 106.

Ortelsburg, 137, 139.

Osovietz, the Germans defeated at, 143.

Ostend, Belgian military base transferred
to, 222, 228; British troops land at,
225; seat of Belgian government re-
moved to Havre from, 231; flight of
inhabitants and occupation of by Ger-
mans, 231.

Ourcq, The, encounters on, 170, 171, 173,
175, 182.

Pallada, The, Russian cruiser torpedoed,
446.

Papeete, 452.

Paris, refugees crowd into, 1 09 ; German
aircraft appear over, 109; the seat of
government transferred from to Bor-
deaux, September 3d, 109, 11 1; great
exodus from, iio; defenses of 110;
General Gallieni issues proclamation to
army and people of, 113; rapid advance
of the Germans towards, 114; limits of
the German ad\'ance on, 154; prepara-
tions in for a siege, 154; Cjallieni trans-
ports garrison troops from to the Marne,
173-174.

Pavlovltch, Colonel Givko, 304.

Penang, destructive raid of the Emden at,
464-466.

Pcrcmysl, fortress of, 122, 152; besieged
by the Russians, 283, 290.

Peronne, 204, 205.

Peter, King of Serbia, proclamation of to
his soldiers, 304; enters recaptured
capital, 305.

Peter, Prince of Montenegro, 301.

Poincarc, President, proclamation of to peo-
ple of France, i 1 i-i i a; visits battlefield

498

The Great War

of Ypres, 262; with King George in-
spects the front, 392.

Poland, invaded by Germany, 116, 117;
railway system of, 1 21-122; Austria-
Hungary invades, 145-146, 147, 150J
efforts of Germany and Russia to win
cooperation of, 274-275; political and
economic questions in, 276; declaration
of political parties in favor of Russia,
277; Teutonic forces invade from Silesia,
284; struggle for Warsaw, 285-286; the
Austro-German armies retreat, 287-289;
the great fortresses of, 290; Teutonic
counter-offensive, 291-294.

Pontoise, the Germans reach, 154,

Potiorek, Field-marshal von, 298, 314.

Pripet Marshes, The, 121.

Prussia, East (See East Prussia).

Prussia, West (See West Prussia).

Pulteney, Lieutenant-general W. P. , com-
mander of British Third Army Corps,
171.

Putnik, Field-marshal Vaivode, Chief of
Serbian General Staff, 298-299, 304.

Railways, The, importance of in vrar, 6,
32, 36, 51, 69, 121, 122, 212, 213,
284, 289, 290, 292, 337, 341.

Ramscappelle, 248, 249, 265.

Rawaruska, 151.

Reichsland, The (Alsace-Lorraine), in-
vaded by the French, 67-68, 72-73, 75,
77-79, 102; military railways of, 69.

Reims, 108,196-197, 368-370.

Rennenkampf, General, commander of the
Vilna Army, 125; advances into East
Prussia, 126, 127, 128, 135; is attacked
and defeated by von Hindenburg, 17,
141-143; repels German advance into
Russia, 279; in the Polish campaign,
293.

Ronarc'h, Admiral, 240, 243, 267.

Rosyth, British naval base at, 406, 419.

Ruffey, General, 85.

Russia, prompt concentration of forces by,
17; early frontier engagements, 116-
117; causes determining the direction
of her offensive, 119, 121, 123 ; railways
of Poland, 121; Polish fortresses, 121,
123; army of on western border, 124-
125; invades East Prussia, 17, 126-129;
defeat of, 136-138, 142-143; von Hin-
denburg unsuccessfully invades, 1435

invades Galicia, 17, 145-152; engages
not to conclude separate peace or de-
mand peace conditions except in agree-
ment with her allies, i88; proclamation
of Grand-duke Nicholas to the Poles,
274; position of forces of in Poland,
278 ; abandons invasion of Hungary and
retires behind the San, 282-284; cam-
paign in Poland, 284-295, and position
of armies of at close of the campaign in
1914, 295, 296, 311; popular sentiment
in, 402; naval losses of, 447, 464-465,
480.
Russky, General, 146, 147, 148.

Saarburg, 77, 78.

St. Mihiel, captured by the Germans, 214.

St. Quentin, 14, 97, 103, 106, 204-206.

Sambre, The, important strategic value of,
6, 7, 13; the Germans reach, 48, 64;
the French position on, 67, 69, 70, 71;
the Germans control, 91; the Allies
abandon line of, 160.

Samoa, German, seized by the British,
328, 451-452, 475.

Samsonoff, General, commander of the
Narev, or Warsaw, Army, 125; ad-
vances into East Prussia, 127-129, 135;
defeated by von Hindenburg in the
Masurian Lakes district, 136-138; death
of, 139.

San, The, 150, 283, 288.

Sanders, General Liman von, reorganizes
Turkish army, 331.

Sandomierz, 288.

Sandt, Herr von, 217.

Sarrail, General, commander of the Third
French Army, 85, 167.

Scapa Flow, British naval base at, 41 8-41 9.

Scarborough, German raid on, 392, 436,
438.

Scharnhorsty The, 448, 449, 452 ; in battle
off Chile, 453-455; destruction of in
battle off Falkland Islands, 460-461.

Scheich Seyd, 333.

Schlieffen, General von, 9, 25, 133.

Schoorbakke, the Belgians evacuate, 245.

Seine, The, strategic importance of, 5 ; the
Germans reach, 1 54.

Senlis, 154, 355.

Serbia, unpreparedness of at outbreak of
war, 296; preliminary military opera-
tions of Austria-Hungary against, 2975

Index

499

strength of armies of, 299; Battle of
the Jadar, 299-301 j invades Hungar)',
301 J cooperates with Montenegro in
invading Bosnia, 302; second and third
invasion of by Austria-Hungary, 302,
303 ; crushes the Austrian invasion, 305 ;
alleged atrocities in by Austro-Hun-
garians, 306-310.

" Seventy-five,' ' the French field-piece, 162.

Skagerrack, The, 416.

Smith-Dorrien, General Sir Horace, 94, 97.

Social Democrats, support the German
Imperial war policy, 396; in Russia
opposed to the war, 402.

Soissons, 191-192, 370.

Soldau, 137, 294.

Sordet, General, 97, 104.

South Africa, Union of, undertakes own
defense and war against German South-
west Africa, 323, 327.

Spec, Admiral von, defeats British squad-
ron off Chile, 453-457; is defeated and
killed in action off the Falkland Islands,
458-462.

Strategy and Tactics, definition of, 4-5 ;
as applied by the Germans, 7-S, 335;
the French plan, 10-12; von Schlieffen's
plan to traverse Belgium, 9, and his
model system, 133; principles of, 334;
naval of Great Britain, 406, of Ger-
many, 406-407.

Sturdee, Vice-admiral Sir Fredk. C. D., in
command of the British squadron, de-
feats the Germans off the Falklands,
458, 459-462.

Submarines, first attack on British squad-
ron by, 424; in the battle off Heligo-
land, 427-830; the Pathfinder sunk by,
431, the Abouktr, Hague, and Cressy,
431-434, the /y«'u-'^^, 434, the Hermes,
435; in raid on Cuxhaven, 439; the
Formidable sunk by, 439-440; in battle
of January 24, 1915, 442, 443; losses
in, 479-482.

Suez Canal, The, Turkey plans to seize,
18, 332.

Sukhomlinoff, General, 311-312.

Suvobor, the Battle of, 305.

Tamines, alleged atrocities at, 353.
Tannenberg, Battle of, 17, i 36-1 38.
Termonde, 219.
Thionville (See Diedenhofen).

Tiercelet, Gap of, German troops in\'ade
France through, 47.

Tirlemont, 59.

Tisza, Count Stephan, speech of on Jan-
uary 1, 1915, 398.

Togoland, the British and French capture,

325. 475-

Toul, fortress of, 7, 69.

Transportation, railway and motor vehi-
cles, 341.

Triaucourt, 354.

Trier (Treves), the Germans enter Luxem-
burg by way of, 31, 213.

Troyon, 212, 213, 215.

Tsingtau, siege and capture of by Japanese-
British forces, 329-330, 474.

Turkey, plan of to attack the Suez Canal
and Egypt, 18 ; reorganized army of and
plan of campaign, 331; the question of
•^oYP^j 331-33^; Great Britain seizes
strongholds in, 332-333; and formally
annexes Cypnis, 333; demonstration in
favor of the alliance with the Teutonic
Powers, 399; holy war proclaimed by,
399; navy of, 41 1, 419, 422; vessels of
lost, 482.

Ukraine, The, disaffection in, 401.
Urbal, General d', in command of the
Eighth French Army, 207, 211, 233.

Valyevo, 303, 305.

Verdun, army of Crown Prince moves
towards, 85, loi ; eastern limit of
Allied front, 105; strategic importance
of, 158, 211, 212, 213; the German
Crown Prince attacks and withdraws
from before Fort Troyon, i8c, 212-
213, 215.

Vise, 10, 36, 39, 40.

Vishegrad, 302.

Vistula, The, the Teutonic ad^-ance to-
wards, 282.

Viviani, Rene, on the purpose of the
Allies, 391 ; visits the battle front, 392.

Vosges Mountains, The, military value of,
5, 7, 10; the French drive the Germans
from, 67, 74-75, 77; but are forced
to retire to, 79.

Waltz, Johann Jacob ("Hansi"), 70.
Warsaw, im]iortance ot, 285; Germans
attack, 285-286; fortress of, 290.

500

The Great War

West Prussia, fortresses in, 122.

Whitby, German raid on, 392, 436, 438.

Whitlock, Brand, United States Minister
at Brussels, 50.

Wilhelmshaven, headquarters of the Ger-
man fleet, 417.

William II, farewell address of on leaving
Berlin for headquarters, 83; alleged
order of the day by, 92; visits the
Crown Prince's Army in the Argonne
district, 108; at the operations against
Nancy, 1 8 1 5 visits scene of operations
in Flanders, 262 j said to have reviewed
Prussian Guards at Battle of Ypres,
268; celebrates Christmas at the West-
ern Headquarters, 320; his speech on
the occasion, 320-321.

Wire and wireless communication, 348.

Wiirttemburg, Albert, Duke of, in com-
mand of the Fourth German Army, 81,
85. 2i5» 239. 247-

Yarmouth, raid on, 436.
Torek, The, loss of, 436.
Ypres, occupied by the Germans, 207,

224 J captured by the Allies, 211; Battle

of, 239, 250-268; devastation of the

city, 268-269, 37°"37'-
Yser, The, the Allies in position on,

225, 231, 232; Battle of, 238, 242-

250.

Zeebrugge, British troops land at, 225.

Zeppelin, The, 347-348; used in bom-
bardment of Liege, 43 ; raids over Paris,
344; in naval operations, 439, 444.

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