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\
HISTORY
OP THB
GREC IAN WAR.
WRITTBX BT
THUCYDIDES.
TBAJISLATED
BY THOMAS HOBBES,
MALMSBURY,
TO WHICH ABB ADDKD
A REFERENCE TO THE CHAPTERS OF THE ORIGINAL,
AN ANALYSIS, THE VARIOUS READINGS OF DUKER, BAVEB,
AND BEKKER, AN INDEX, AND SMITH'S SURVEY
OF THE HISTORY.
A NEW EDITION.
LONDON:
PRINTED FOR G. & W, B. WHITTAKER, AVE MARIA LAHH}
J. PARKER, AND R. BUSS, OXFORD.
1823.
ADVERTISEMENT.
The editor of this edition of Hobbes's translation of
" Thucydides' History of the Grecian War " would
have considered any attempt to modernise the lan-
guage of the writer as injudicious, without pulling
do^vn the whole structure, and rebuilding it.
In the present edition ^vill be found, not only a
reference to the chapters of each book of the original,
an analysis, and the various readings of Duker,
Baver, and Bekker ; but the masterly Survey of the
Histor\' by Smith, as well as an Index, which, it is
presumed, are not to be found, in a combined form,
in any other edition.
London, May. 1823.
TO
THE READERS.
Though tliis Translation have already passed the censure of
some, whose judgments I verj' much esteem ; yet, because there
is something, I know not what, in the censure of a multitude,
more terrible than any single judgment, how severe or ex-
act soever, I have thought it discretion in all men that have to
do with so many, and to me in my want of perfection, neces-
sarv, to bespeak your candour. Which that I may upon the
better reason hope for, I am willing to acquaint you briefly,
upon what grounds I undertook this work at first ; and have
since, by publishing it, put myself upon the hazard of your
censure with so small hope of glorj-, as from a thing of this
nature can be expected. For I know that mere translations
have in them this property, that they may much disgrace, if
not well done ; but if well, not much commend the doer.
It hath been noted by divers, that Homer in poesy, Aristotle
in philosophy, Demosthenes in eloquence, and others of the
ancients, in other knowledge, do still maintain their primacy,
none of tliem exceeded, some not approached by any in these
later ages. And in the number of these is justly ranked also
our Thucydides ; a workman no less perfect in his work than
any of the former; and in whom (I believe with many others)
the faculty of wTiting histor}' is at the highest. For the prin-
cipal and proper work of history being to instruct, and enable
men by the knowledge of actions passed, to bear themselves
prudently in the present, and providently towards the future,
there is not extant any otiier (merely human) that doth more
fully and naturally perform it, than this of my author. It is
true, that there be many excellent and profitable histories writ-
ten since ; and in some of them, there be inserted very wise
discourses both of manners and policy : but being discourses
VI TO THE READERS.
inserted, and not of the contexture of the narration, they in-
deed commend the knowledge of the writer, but not the liistory
itself; the nature whereof is merely narrative. In others, there
be subtile conjectures at the secret aims and inward cogitations
of such as fall under their pen ; which is also none of the least
virtues in a history, where the conjecture is thoroughly grounded,
not forced to serve the purpose of the writer, in adorning his style,
or manifesting his subtilty in conjecturing. But these con-
jectures cannot often be certain, unless withal so evident, that
the narratiou itself may be sufficient to suggest the same also
to the reader. But Thucydides is one, who, though he never
digress to read a lecture, moral or political, upon his own text,
nor enter into men's hearts, further than the actions themselves
evidently guide him, is yet accounted the most politic historio-
grapher that ever wrote. The reason whereof I take to be this :
he filleth his narrations with that choice of matter, and order-
eth them with that judgment, and with such perspicuity and
efficacy expresseth himself, that, as Plutarch saith, he maketh
his auditor a spectator. For he setteth his reader in the assem-
blies of the people, and in the senates, at their debating ; in the
streets at their seditions ; and in the field, at their battles. So
that look how much a man of understanding, might have
added to his experience, if he had then lived a beholder of their
proceedings, and familiar with the men, and business of the
time ; so much almost may he profit now, by attentive reading
the same here written. He may from the narrations draw out
lessons to himself, and of himself be able to trace the drifts and
counsels of the actors to their seat.
These virtues of my author did so take my affection, that they
begat in me a desire to communicate him further, which was
the first occasion that moved me to translate him. For it is an
error we easily fall into, to believe that whatsoever pleaseth us,
will be in like manner and degree acceptable to all ; and to
esteem of one another's judgment, as we agree in the liking or
dislike of the same things. And in this error peradventure was
I, when I thought that as many of the more judicious as I should
communicate him to, would affect him as much as I myself did. I
considered also that he was exceedingly esteemed of the Italians
and French in their own tongues, notwithstanding that he be not
very much beholding for it to his interpreters. Of whom (to speak ^
TO THE READERS. - vii
no more than becomes a candidate of your good opinion in the
same kind) I may say this, that whereas the author himself so car-
rieth with him his own light throughout, that the reader may
continually see his way before him ; and by that which goeth
before, expect what is to follow ; I found it not so in them.
The cause whereof, and their excuse may be this : they fol-
lowed the Latin of Laurentius Valla, which was not without
some errors, and he a Greek copy, not so correct as now is ex-
tant. Out of French he was done into English, (for I need not
dissemble to have seen him in English) in the time of king
Edward VI. but so, as by multiplication of error, he became
at length traduced, rather than translated into our language.
Hereupon I resolved to take him immediately from the Greek,
according to the edition of iEmilius Porta; not refusing or
neglecting any version, comment, or other help I could come
by. Knowing that when with diligence and leisure I should
have done it, though some error might remain, yet they would
be errors of but one descent ; of which nevertheless I can dis-
cover none, and hope they be not many. After I had finished
it, it lay long by me, and other reasons taking place, my desire
to communicate it ceased.
I saw that for the greatest part, men came to the read-
ing of history, with an affection much Uke that of the people
m Rome ; who came to the spectacle of the gladiators, with
more delight to behold their blood, than their skill in fencing.
For they be far more in number that love to read of great ar-
mies, bloody battles, and many thousands slain at once, than
that mind the art by which the affairs both of armies and cities
be conducted to their ends.
CONTENTS.
Advertisement p. iii.
To the Reader t.
Of the Life and History of Thucydides . . ix.
Smith's Survey of the History xxv.
An Analysis Ixvii.
The various Readings of Duker, Baver, and
Bekker, with the translation of Hobbes . . bucxiv.
Index 481.
REFERENCE TO THE CHAPTERS OF THE ORIGINAL:
BOOK I.
CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page.
i
11
xxni
13 xl» .
24
IxtH
32
ii
8
xxiv
ib. 1 xlvi .
ib.
Ixviii
33
m .
3
XXT
14 1 xUii
25 j Ixix
34
ir . .
ib.
xxvi
15 xlviii
ib. ilxx
ib.
w
ib.
xxvii
ib. xlix .
ib. < Ixxi
35
*i
4
xxviii
16 1
26 Ixxii
36
Tii .
ib.
xxix
ib. Ii
27 Ixxiu
ib.
Tiu .
5
XXX
17 Iii .
ib. IxxiT
37
ix
ib.
XX xi
ib. liii .
ib. ixxv
38
X
6
xxxii
18 liv .
28 Ixxvi •
ib.
xi
7
xxxiii
ib. U .
ib. Ixxvii
39
xii .
8 xxxir
19 Iri .
ib. Ixxviii
ib.
xiii .
ib. 1 xxxY
ib. vii .
29 Ixxix
40
sir .
9 zxxvi
80 l»iii .
ib. Ixxx
ib.
XV
ib.
xxxvii
2] lix .
30 Ixxxi
41
xri .
10
xxxviii
ib. Ix
ib. Ixxxii
ib.
xrii .
ib.
xxxix
2S Ixi .
ib. Ixxxiii
ib.
xTiii .
ib.
xl .
ib. ! hcii .
31 Ixxxi*
42
xis .
11 xli .
23 Ixiii .
ib. JIxxxT
ib.
XK .
ib. xlii .
ib. I.\i» .
32 jlxxxvi
43
xxi .
12 xliu .
ib. 1 Ixv .
ib. jIxxxTJi
ib.
xzii .
ib.
ixliv .
24 1 Uvi .
ib.
'inzriii
44
CONTENTS.
CI A p.
]xxxix
xc
Kci
xcii
xciii
xciv
xcv
xcvi
xcvii
xcviii
xcix
c
ci
cii
ciii
Page.
44
ib.
45
-16
ib.
47
ib.
48
ib.
ib.
49
ib.
ib.
50
ib.
CHAP.
( civ
CT
cvi
cvii
cviii
cix
ex
cxi
cxii
cxiii
cxiv
cxv
cxvi
cxvii
cxviii
Page.
51
ib.
52
ib.
i>3
ib.
ib.
54
ib.
ib.
55
ib.
hG
ib.
ib.
CHAP.
cxix
cxx
cxxi
cxxji
cxxiii
cxxiv
cxxv
cxxvi
cxxvii
cxxviii
cxxix
cxxx
cxxxi
cxxxii
cxxxiii
Page.
57
ib.
58
59
ib.
CO
ib.
ib.
62
ib.
63'
ib.!
64
ib.
65 I
CHAP.
Page.
CXXXIV
6i
cxxxv
06
cxxxvi
ib.
cxxxvn
67
cxxxvui
68
cxxxix
69
cxl
ib.
cxli
70
cxIii
71
cxllii
72
clxiv
ib.
clxv
73
clxvi
ib.
BOOK II.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page.
i
75
XX vii
89 , liii
. 101
Ixxix
. 115
ii
ib.
xxviii
ib.
iiv
ib.
Ixxx
ib.
iii
76
xxix
ib.
Jv
K'2
Ixxxi
. 116
iv
ib.
XXX
90
Ivi
ib.
Ixxxii
. 117
V
77
xxxi
91
Ivii
103
Ixxxiii
ib.
vi
78
xxxii
ib.
iviii
ib.
Ixxxiv
118
vii
ib.
xxxiii
ib.
lis
ib.
Ixxxv
. 119
viii
79
xxxiv
ib.
Ix
104
Ixxxvi
ib.
ix
80
XXXV
92
Ixi
ib.
Ixxxvii
120
X
ib.
xxxvi
93
Ixii
105
lx;;xviii
. 121
xi
ib.
xxxvii
ib.
Ixiii
106
Ixxxix
ib.
xii
81
xxxviii
ib.
Ixiv
ib.
xc
122
xiii
82
xxxix
94
Ixv
107
xci
123
xiv
83
xl
ib.
ixvi
108
xcii
ib.
XV
ib.
xli
95
Ixvii
ib.
xciii
124
xvi
84
xlii
96
Ixviii
109
xciv
ib.
xvii
ib.
xiiii
ib.
Ixix
110
xcv
ib.
xviii
85
xliv
97
Ixx
ib.
xcvi
126
xix
86
xlv
ib.
Ixxi
Ill
xcvii
ib.
XX
ib.
xlvi
98
Ixxii
ib.
xcviii
127
xxi
87
xlvii
ib.
Ixxiii
112,
xcix
ib.
xxii
ib.
xlviii
99
Ixxiv
ib.
c
128
xxiii
88
xlix
ib.
Ixxv
113 ci
129
xxiv
ib.
1
too
Ixxvi
ib. cii
ib.
XXV
ib.
li
ib.
Ixxvii
114 ciii
130
xxvi
89
Hi
101
tx xviii
ib. •
BOOK III.
Hi
Pagei'
:cai^.
Page.
CHAP.
P..ge.
CHAP.
Page.
131
vi
. 133
xi
1S5
xvi
138
132
vii
134
xii
136
xvii
ib.
ib.
tiii
ib.
xiii
ib.
xviii
. 139
133
tx
ib.
xiv
137
xix
ib.
ib.
x
. 135
XV
ib.
XX
ik.
CONTENTS.
CBxr.
Page.
CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page.
CBAP.
Page.
xxi
140
xlv
152 Ixix
. 165
xciii
. 176
sxii
ib.
xlvi
1.53 Ixx
ib
xciv
ib.
xxiii
141
xlvii
ib.
ixxi
166
xcv
177
xxi»
142
xltiii
154
Ixxii
ib.
xcTi
ib.
XXT
ib.
xlix
ib.
Ixxiii
ib.
xc»ii
178
xxvi
ib.
1
155
Ixxiv
ib.
xCTiii
ib.
xxvii
143
li
ib.
Ixxv
167
xcix
179
xxviii
ib.
lii
ib.
Ixxvi
. ib.
c
ib.
XNIX
ib.
liii
156
Ixxvii
168
ci
ib.
XXX
144
liv
ib.
Ixxviii
ib.
cii
ib.
xxxi
ib.
Ir
157
Ixxix
ib.
ciii
180
xxxii
ib.
Ivi
ib. I XXX
ib.
civ
ib.
xxxiii
145
Uii
1.58 Ixxxi
169
CT
182
xxxiv
ib.
Iviii
ib. Ixxxii
ib.
cvi
ib.
XXXV
146
lix
159 Ixxxiii
171
crii
ib.
XXX vi
ib.
Ix
160 Ixxxiv
172
cviii
183
xxxvii
147
Ixi
ib.
IXXXT
ib.
cix
184
xxxviii
ib.
Ixii
161
Ixxxvi
ib.
ex
ib.
xxxix
148
Ixiii
ib.
Ixxxvii
173
cxi
ib.
xl
149
Ixiv
162
Ixxxviii
ib.
cxii
185
xli
l.j()
Ixv
ib.
Ixxxix
174
cxiii
ib.
xlii
ib.
Ixvi
163 xc
ib.
cxW
186
xliii
. 151
Ixvii
ib. xci
175
CXT
1B7
xliv
152
Ixviii
164 xcii
ib.
cxTi
ib.
BOOK IV.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Pag".
i
189
xxviii
204 Iv
ib. , Ixxxii
231
ii
190
xxix
205 Ivi
217 1
Ixxxiii
ib.
iii
ib.
XXX
ib. Ivii
ib.!
Ixxxiv
232
ir
191
xxxi .
206 Iviii
218
Ixxxv
ib.
T
ib.
xxxii
ib. lix
ib.
Ixxxvi
ib.
Tl
ib.
xxxiii
207 Ix
ib.
Ixxxvii
ib.
Tii
ib.
xxxiv
ib. Ixi
219
Ixxxviii
234
Tiii
. 192
XXXV
508 Ixii
220
Ixxxix
ib.
ix
193
xxxvi
ib. Ixiii
ib.
xc
ib.
X
ib.
xxxvii
209 Ixiv
ib.
xci
. 235
xi
194
xxxviii
ib. \xv
221
xcii
ib.
xii
ib.
xxxix
210 Ixvi
ib.
xciii
237
xiii
. 195
xl .
ib. . ixvii
222
xciv
ib.
xiT
ib.
xli
ib. Ixviii
223
xcv
238
XT
196
xlii
. 211 Ixix
224 xcvi
ib.
xvi
ib.
xliii
ib. ; Ixx
ib. xcvii
239
xvii
197
xliv
212 Ixxi
225
xcviii
ib.
xyiii
198
xlv
ib. Ixxii
ib.
xcix
240
xix
ib.
xlvi
2 13 Ixxiii
. 226
c
ib.
XX
199
xlvii
ib. Ixxiv
ib.
ci
241
xxi
ib.
xlviii
214 Ixxv
. 227
cii
ib.
xxii
200
xlix
ib. . Ixxvi
ib.
ciii
248
xxiii
ib.
1
ib. • Ixxvii
. 228
civ
ib.
xxir
201
li
215 Ixxviii
ib.
cv
243
XXT
ib.
lii
ib.
Ixxix
ib.
CT
ib.
xxvi
202
iui
ib.
Ixxx
. 230
evil
244
xxvii
203
liv
. 216
Ixxxi
ib.
ctHI
ib.
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
cix
ex
cxi
cxii
cxiii
cxiv
cxv
Page.
245
ib.
246
ib. cxix
ib. cxx
ib. cxxi
247 ! cxxii
CUAP.
cxvi
cxvii
cxviii
Page,
247
248
ib.
250
ib.
2.1 1
ib.
CHAP.
cxxiii
cxxiv
cxxv
cxxvi
cxxvii
cxxviii
cxxix
Page. CHAP.
252 I cxxx
ib. I cxxxi .
253 cxxxii
ib. cxxxiii
254 , cxxxiv
2.55 , cxxxv .
ib. i
Page.
256
257
ib.
ib.
258
ib.
vii
▼iii
ix
BOOK V.
CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page, CHAP.
Page. CHAP.
Page.
i
259
XXX
. 276
lix
294
Ixxxviii
. 308
ii
260
xxxi
, 277
Ix
ib.
Ixxxix
ib.
iii
ib.
xxxii
ib.
Ixi
295
xc
ib.
iv
261
xxxiii
. 278
Ixii
296
xci
. 309
9
ib.
xxxiv
. 279
Ixiii
ib.
xcii
ib.
vi
262
XXXV
ib.
Ixiv
ib.
xciii
ib.
vu
ib.
xxxvi
. 280
Ixv
297
' xciv
ib.
viii
. 263
xxxvii
ib.
Ixvi
298
xcv
ib.
ix
ib.
xxxviii
. 281
Ixvii
ib.
xcvi
ib.
X
. 264
xxxix
282
Ixviii
299
xcvii
ib.
xi
. 265
xl
ib.
Ixix
ib.
xcviii
ib.
xii
. i!66
xJi
283
Ixx
300
xcix
. 310
xiii
ib.
xlii
ib.
Ixxi
ib .
c
, ' ib.
xiv
ib.
xliii
• 284
Ixxii
ib.
ci
ib.
XV
, 267
xliv
ib.
Ixxiii
301
oil
ib.
xvi
ib.
x!v
. 285
Ixxiv
ib.
ciii
ib.
xvii
268
xlvi
ib.
Ixxv
302
civ
ib.
xviii
269
xlvii
286
Ixxvi
ib.
cv
311
xix
271
xlviii
288
Ixxvii
'303
cvi
ib.
XX
ib.
xlix
ib.
Ixx viii
304
cvii
ib.
xxi
272
1
289
Ixxix
ib.
cviii.
ib.
xxii
ib.
1!
290
Ikxx
305
cix
ib.
xxiii
ib.
Iii
ib.
Ixxxi
ib.
ex
312
xxiv
273
liii
ib.
Ixxxii
306
cxi
ib.
XXV
ib.
liv.
. 291
Ixxxiii
ib.
cxii
ib.
xxvi
274
Iv
ib.
Ixxxiv
3(17
cxiii
313
xxvii
ib.
Ivi
29a
Ixxxv
ib.
cxiv
ib.
XX viii
275
Ivii
293
Ixxxvi
308
cxv
ib.
xxix
ib.
Iviii
ib. Ixxxvii
ib.
cxvi
314
BOOK VI.
Page. CHAP.
315 x
31 6 I xi
317 j xii
ib. i xiii
318
ib.
319
320
ib.
CHAP.
xix
XIV
XV
xvi
xvii
xviii
Page.
32J
322 XX
ib. I xxi
323 ! xxii
ib.
ib.
S24
325
ib.
XXIII
xxiv
XXV
xxvi
xxvii
Page.
327
ib.
ib.
SS8
ib.
ib.
3S9
ib.
330
CHAP.
Page.
XXVIll
. 3:^0
XXIX
ib.
XXX
• 331
XXXI
ib.
XXXII
338
XXXIII
. SSS
XXXIV
. S34
XXXV
. SS5
XXXVl
. 336
CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Pige.
en A?.
Page. CHAP.
Page,
CHAP.
Page.
sxxrii *
336
1«
34i , Ixxii
353
Ixxxix
362
xxxviii
ib.
Ivi
ib. Ixxiii
ib.
xc
363
xxsix
337
Ivii
345 Ixxiv
354
xct
ib.
Ix
ib.
Wiii
ib. Ixxv
ib.
xcii
364
hii
338
Ux
346 Ixxvi
ib.
xciii
365
xlu
ib.
he
ib. Ixxvii
. 355
xciv
S66
xliti
339
Ui
347 Ixxviii
356
xcv
ib.
xliv
ib.
Ixii
3^8 Ixxix
ib.
xcvi
367
xlv
340
Ixiii
ib. Ixxx
. 357
xcvii
ib.
xlvi
ib.
Isiv
349 Jxxxi
ib.
xcviii
lb.
xlvii
ib.
Ixv
ib. isxxii
ib.
xcix
. 368
xiriii
341
IXTi
350 Ixxxiii
. 358
c
ib.
xllx
ib.
Ixrii
ib. Ixxxivr
ib.
ci
369
1
34«
Isviii
351 Ixxxv
. 359
■ cii
370
li
ib.
Ixix
ib. ' Ixxxvi
ib.
ciii
ib.
lii
ib.
Ixx
. 3b'2 ixxxTii
ib.
civ
S71
liii
. 343
1 Ixxi
ib. Ixxxriii
. 361
cv
ib.
iir
ib.
i
BOOK VII.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page,
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page
i
373 1
xxiii
383
xlv
397
Ixvii
407
ii
374:
xxiv
S8-i
xivi
ib.
Ixviii
408
lii
375 '
XXV
ib.
xlvii
ib.
Ixix
ib.
i»
ib.
XX vi
385
xlviii
398
Ixx
409
V
:")76
xxvii
386
xlix
399
Ixxi
410
vi
ib.
xxviii
ib.
1
ib.
Ixxii
411
vi!
377
xxix
387
li
40O
Ixxiii
412
viii
ib.
XXX
388
lii
ib.
Uxiv
ib.
ix
370
x.txi
ib.
liii
ib.
Ixxv
413
X
ib.
xxxii <
389
liv
. 401
Ixxvi
U4
xi
ib.
xxxiii
ib.
Iv
ib.
Ixxvii
ib.
xii
ib.
xxxiv
390
Ivi
ib.
Ixxriii
415
xiii
379
XXXV
391
Ivii
402
Ixxix
416
xiv
ib.
xxxvi
ib.
Iviii
. 403
Uxx
ib.
XV
. 380
xxxvii
. 392
lix
404
Ixxxi
417
xvi
ib.
xxxviii
ih.
Ix
ib.
1 xxxii
418
xvii
ib.
xxsix
393
Ixi
. 405
Ixxxiii
ib.
xviii
. 381
xl
ib.
Ixii
ib.
Ixxxir
ib.
xix
382
xli
394
Ixiii
406
Uxxv
419
XX
ib.
xlii
ib.
Ixiv
ib.
! Ixxxvi
ib.
xxi
. 383
xliii
, 395
Ixv
407
1 I xxxvii
420
xxil
ib.
xliv
396
Ixvi
ib.
i
BOOK VIII.
Page,
CHAP.
4T3
VI
. 424
VII
425
Via
ib.
IX
ib.
X
Page.
CHAP.
Page.
CHAP.
Page.
426
XI
. 428
XVI
430
427
xii
429
xvii
431
ib.
XUI
ib.
XVIII
ib.
428
XIV
ib.
XIX
ib.
ib.
XV
450
x\
432
CONTENTS.
Page.
CHAP.
cuAr,
Page. CHAP,
xxi
432
xliv
444 1 Ixvi
xxii
433
xlv
ib. i Jxvii
xxiii
ib.
xlvi
445 Ixviii
xxiv
434
xlvii
446 Ixix
XXV
435
xlviii
ib. , ixx
sxvi
ib.
xlis ;
447 Ixxi
xxvli
436
1
448 Ixxii
xxviii
437
]i
ib. Ixxiii
xxix
ib.
Hi
449 Ixxiv
XXX
438
liii
ib. Ixxv
xxxi
ib.
liv
430 Ixxvi
xxxii
ib.
Iv
ib. Ixxvii
xxxiii
439
Ivi
431 Ixxviii
xxxiv
ib.
Ivii
ib. Ixxix
XXXV
ib.
Iviii
452 Ixxx
xxxvi
. 440
lis
ib. Ixxxi
xxxvii
ib.
Ix
453 Ixxxii
xxxviii
441
Ixi
ib. Ixxxiii
xxxix
ib.
Ixii
ib. ' Ixxxiv
xl
442
Ixiii
454 Ixxxv
sli
ib.
Ixiv
ib. j Ixxxvi
xlii
. 443
Ixv
455 ' Ixxxvii
xliit
ib.
1
Page.
455
456
ib.
457
458
ib. I
459 i
ib.i
460
ib.}
461
462
ib. I
ib.;
463
ib. !
464
ib.
ib.
465
ib.
466
CHAP.
Page:
Ixxxviii
467
Ixxxix
468
xc
ib.
xci
469
xcii
470
xciii
471
xciv
472
xcv
ib.
xcvi
473
xcvii
474
xcviii
ib.
xcix
475
c
ib.
ci
476
cii
ib.
ciii
ib.
civ
477
cv
ib.
cvi
478
evil
ib.
cviii
. 479
cix
ib.
OF THE
LIFE AND HISTORY
THUCYDIDES.
We read of divers men that bear the name of Thucydides. There
is Thucydides a Pharsalian, mentioned in the eighth book of this
history ; who "was public host of the Athenians, in Pharsalus, and
chancing to be at Athens, at the time that the government of the
four hundred began to go down, by his interposition, and per-
suasion, kept asunder the factions then arming themselves, that
they fought not in the city to the ruin of the common-wealth.
There is Thucydides the son of Milesias, an Athenian, of the
town of Alope, of whom Plutarch speaketh in the life of Pericles ;
and the same in all probability, that in the first book of this His-
tory, is said to have had the charge of forty gallies sent against
Samos, about twenty-four years before the beginning of this war.
Another Thucydides the son of Ariston, an Athenian also, of the
town of Acherdus, was a poet, though of his verses there be no-
thing extant. But Thucydides the writer of this Historj*, an
Athenian of the town of Halimus, was the son of Olorus, (or
Orolus) and Hegesipyle. His father's name is commonly written
Olorus, though in the inscription on his tomb, it was Orolus.
Howsoever it be written, it is the same that was bom by divers of
the kings of Thrace, and imposed on him, with respect unto his
descent from them. So that though our author, as Cicero saith
of him, lib. 2. de Oratore, had never written an history, yet had
not his name not been extant, in regard to his honour and nobi-
lity. And not only Plutarch, in the Life of Cimon, but also al-
most all others that have touched this point, affirm directly that
he was descended from the Thracian kings. Adducing this for
proof, that he was of the house of Miltiades, that famous general
of the Athenians, against the Persians at Marathon ; which they
X OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY '
also prove by this, that his tomb was a long time extant amongst
the monuments of that family. For near unto the gates of
Athens, called Melirides, there was a place named Coela, and in it
the monuments called Cimoniana, belonging to the family of
Miltiades, in which none, but such as were of that family, might
be buried. And amongst those was the monument of Thucydides,
with this inscription, Thucydides Oroli Halimusius. Now Mil-
tiades is confessed by all, to have descended from Olorus, king of
Thrace, whose daughter another Miltiades, grandfather to this,
married, and had children by. And Miltiades, that won the me-
morable victory at Marathon, was heir to goodly possessions, and
cities in the Chersonesus of Thrace, over which also he reigned.
In Thrace lay also the possessions of Thucydides and his wealthy
mines of gold, as he himself professeth in his fourth book. And
although those riches might come to him by a wife (as is also by
some affirmed) which he married in Scapte-Hyle, a city of Thrace,
yet even by that marriage it appeareth, that his affairs had a rela-
tion to that country, and that his nobility was not there unknown.
But in what degree of kindred Miltiades and he approached each
other, is not any where made manifest. Some also have conjec-
tured that he was of the house of Pisistratides j the ground of
whose conjecture hath been only this, that he maketh honourable
mention of the government of Pisistratus, and his sons, and exte-
nuateth the glory of Harmodius and Aristogiton ; proving that
the freeing of the state of Athens from the tyranny of the Pisi-
stratides, was falsely ascribed to their fact (which proceeded from
private revenge in a quarrel of love) by which the tyranny ceased
not, but grew heavier to the state, till it was at last put down by
the Lacedemonians. But this opinion, as it is not so well
grounded, so neither is it so well received as the former.
Agreeable to his nobility, was his institution in the study
of eloquence, and philosophy. For in philosophy he was the
scholar (as also was Pericles and Socrates) of Anaxagoras, whose
opinions, being of a strain above the apprehension of the vulgar,
procured him the estimation of an atheist, which name they be-
stowed upon all men that thought not as they did, of their ridi-
culous religion, and in the end, cost him his life. And Socrates
after him, for the like causes, underwent the like fortune. It is
not therefore much to be regarded, if this other disciple of his
were by some reputed an atheist too. For though he were none,
yet it Is not improbable, but by the light of natural reason, he
might sec enough in the religion of these heathens to make him
think it vain and superstitious ; which was enough to make him
OF THUCYDIDES. XI
an atheist in the opinion of the people. In some places of his
history, he noteth the equivocation of the oracles ; and yet he
confirmeth an assertion of his own, touching the time this war
lasted, by the oracles prediction. He taxeih Nicias for being too
punctual in the observation of the ceremonies of their religion,
when he overthrew himself and his army, and indeed the whole
dominion, and liberty of his country by it. Yet he commendeth
him in another place for his worshipping of the gods, and saith
in that respect, he least of all men deserved to come to so great a
degree of calamity as he did. So that in his writings our author
appeareth to be, on the one side not superstitious ; on the other
side not an atheist.
In Rhetoric, he was the disciple of Antiphon, one (by his de-
scription in the eighth book of this history) for power of speech
almost a miracle, and feared by the people for his eloquence. In-
somuch iis in his latter days he lived retired, but so, as he gave
counsel to, and wrote orations for other men that resorted unto
him, to that purpose. It was he that contrived the deposing of
the people, and the setting up of the government of the four hun-
dred. For which also he was put to death, when the people again
recovered their authority 3 notwithstanding that he pleaded his
own cause the best of any man to that day.
It need not to be doubted, but from such a master, Thucydides
was sufficiently qualified, to have become a great demagogue, and
of great authority with the people. But it seemeth he had no de-
sire at all to meddle in the government, because in those times it
was impossible for any man to give good and profitable counsel
for the commonwealth, and not incur the displeasure of the people.
For their opinion was such of their own power, and of the facility
of achieving whatsoever action they undertook, that such men
only swayed the assemblies, and were esteemed wise and good
commonwealth's-men, as did put them upon the most dangerous
and desperate enterprises. Whereas he that gave them tempe-
rate, and discreet advice, was thought a coward, or not to under-
stand, or else to malign their power. And no marvel ; for much
prosperity (to which they had now for many years been accustom-
ed) maketh men in love with themselves ; and it is hard for any
man to love that counsel which maketh him love himself the less.
And it holdeth much more in a multitude, than in one man ; for
a man that reasoneth with himself, will not be ashamed to admit of
timorous suggestions in his business, that he may the stronglier
provide; but in public deliberations before a multitude, fear,
(which for the most part adviseth well, though it execute not so)
XII OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
seldom or never sheweth itself, or is admitted. By this mean it
Cfime to pass amongst the Athenians, who thought they were able
to do any thing, that wicked men and flatterers drave them head-
long into those actions that were to ruin them ; and the good
men either durst not oppose, or if they did, undid themselves.
Thuc}'dides therefore, that he might not be either of them that
committed, or of them that suffered evil, forbore to come into the
assemblies, and propounded to himself a private life, as far as the
eminency of so wealthy a person, and the writing of the History
he had undertaken, would permit.
For his opinion touching the government of the state, it is
manifest that he least of all liked the democracy. And upon di-
vers occasions he noteth the emulation and contention of the
demagogues, for reputation, and glory of wit ; with their crossing
of each others counsels to the damage of the public ; the incon-
stancy of resolutions, caused by the diversity of ends, and power
of rhetoric in the orators ; and the desperate actions under-
taken upon the flattering advice of such as desired to attain, or
to hold what they had attained of authority and sway amongst the
common people. Nor doth it appear, that he magnifieth any
where the authority of the few ; amongst whom he saith every
one desireth to be chief, and they that are undervalued, bear it
with less patience than in a democracy ; whereupon sedition
followeth, and dissolution of the government. He praiseth the go-
vernment of Athens, when it was mixed of the few and the many;
but more he commendeth it, both when Pisistratus reigned
(saving that it was an usurped power) and when in the beginning
of this war, it Avas democratical in name, but in effect monar-
chical under Pericles. So that it seemeth that, as he was of re-
gal descent, so he best approved of the regal government. It
is therefore no marvel, if he meddled as little as he could in the
business of the commonwealth, but gave himself rather to the
observation and recording of what was done by those that had
the managing thereof. Which also he was no less prompt, dili-
gent, and faithful by the disposition of his mind, than by his for-
tune, dignity, and wisdom, able to accomplish. How he was
disposed to a work of this nature, may be understood by this,
that when being a young man he heard Herodotus the historio-
grapher reciting his history in public, (for such was the fashion
both of that, and many ages after) he felt so great sting of emu-
lation, that it drew tears from him, insomuch as Herodotus him-
self took notice how violently his mind was set on letters, and
told his father Olorus. When the Peloponnesian war began to
OF THDCYDIDES. XUl
break out, he conjectured truly, that it would prove an argument
worthy his labour : and no sooner it b^an, than he began his
History ; pursuing the same, not in that perfect manner, in which
we see it now, but by way of commentarj', or plain register of
the actions and passages thereof, as from time to time they fell
out, and came to his knowledge. But such a commentary it was,
as might perhaps deserve to be preferred before a history written
by another. For it is very probable that the eighth book is left
the same it wiis when he first wrote it, neither beautified with ora-
tions, nor so well cemented at the transitions, as the former seven
books are. And though he began to write as soon as ever the
war was on foot, yet began he not to perfect and polish his History,
till after he was banished.
For notwithstanding his retired life upon the coast of Thrace,
where his own possessions lay, he could not avoid a service of
the state, which proved to him afterwards very unfortunate. For
whilst he resided in the isle Thasus, it fell out that Brasidas the
Lacedemonian, besieged Amphipolis, a city belonging to the
Athenians, on the confines of Thrace, and Macedony, distant from
Thasus about half a day's sail. To relieve which, the captain
thereof for the Athenians, sent to Thucydides, to levy a power,
and make haste unto him, (for Thucydides was one of the strate-
gi, that is, had authority to raise forces in those parts, for the ser-
vice of the commonwealth.) .And he did accordingly. But he
came thither one night too late, and found the city already
yielded up. And for this he was afterwards banished, as if he had
let slip his time through negligence, or purposely put it off", upon
fear of the enemy. Nevertheless he put himself into the city of
Eion, and preserved it to the Athenians, with the repulse of Bra-
sidas, which carae down from Amphipolis, the next morning, and
assaulted it. The author of his banishment is supposed to have
bpen Cleon, a most violent sycophant in those times, and thereby
also a most acceptable speaker amongst the people. For where
affairs succeed amiss, though there want neither Providence, nor
courage in the conduction, yet with those that judge only upon
events, the way to calumny is always open, and envy, in the like-
ness of zfaZ to the public good, easily findeth credit for an accusation.
After his banishment he lived in Scapte-Hyle, a city of Thrace,
before mentioned, as Plutarch writeth ; but so as he went abroad,
and was present at the actions of the rest of the war, as appear-
eth by his own words in the fifth book :" where he saith, that he
was present at the actions of both parts, and no less at those of
the Peloponnesians, by reason of his exile, than those of the Athe-
XIV OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
nians. During this time also he perfected his History, so far as
is now to he seen 5 nor cloth it appear that after his exile he ever
again enjoyed his country. It is not clear in any author, where, or
when, or i-n what year of his own age, he died. Most agree that he
died in banishment ; yet there be that have written, that after the
defeat in Sicily, the Athenians decreed a general revocation of all
banished persons, except those of the family of Pisistratus ; and
that he then returned, and was afterwards put to death at Athens.
But this is very unlikely to be true, unless by after the defeat in
Sicily, he meant so long after, that it was also after the end of the
Peloponnesian war, because Thucydides himself maketh no men-
tion of such return, though he out-lived the whole war, as is ma-
nifest by his words in the fifth book. For he saith he lived in
banishment twenty years after his charge at Amphipolis ; which
happened in the eighth year of this war, which in the whole lasted
but twenty-seven years complete. And in another place he mak-
eth mention of the razing of the leng-walls between Peirseus and
the city 5 which was the last stroke of this war. They that say he
died at Athens, take their conjecture from his monument which
was there. But this is not a sufficient argument ; for he might
be buried there secretly, (as some have written he was) though he
died abroad ; or his monument might be there, and (as others
have affirmed) he not buried in it. In this variety of conjecture
there is nothing more probable than that which is written by I'au-
sanias, where he describeth the monuments of the Athenian city,
and saith thus : The ivorthy act of CE.nohius, in the behalf of Thu-
cydides, is not without honour (meaning that he had a statue.) For
CEnobius obtained to have a decree passed for his return ; who return-
ing was slain by treachery, and his sepulchre is near the gates called
Melirides. He died, as saith Marcellinus, after the seven and
fiftieth year of his age. And if it be true that is written by A.
Gelliiis, of the ages of Hellanicus, Herodotus, and Thucydid^,
then died he not before the sixty-eighth year. For if he were forty
when the war began, and lived (as he did certainly) to see it end-
ed, he might be more when he died, but not less than sixty-eight
years of age. Wliat children he left is not manifest. Plato in
Menone maketh mention of Milesias and Stephanus, sons of a
Thucydides, of a very noble family ; but it is clear that they were
of Thucydides the rival of Pericles, both by name Milesias ; and
because this Thucydides also was of the family of Miltiades, as Plu-
tarch testifieth in the lifft of Cimon. That he had a son, is af-
firmed by Marcellinus, out of the authority of Polemon, but of his
name there is no mention, save that a learned man rcadcth there.
OF THUCYDIDKS. XV
in the place of deo... (which is in the imperfect copy) Timotheus.
Thus much of the person of Thucydides.
Now for his writings, two things are to be considered in them,
truth, and elocution. For in truth consisteth the soul, and in elocu'
tion the body of history. The latter without the former, is but a pic-
ture of history, and the former without the latter, unapt to instruct.
But let us see how our author hath acquitted himself in both. For
the faith of this History, I shall have the less to say, in respect
that no man hath ever 5'et called it into question. Nor indeed
could any man justly doubt of the truth of that writer, in whom
they had nothing at all to suspect of those things that could have
caused him either voluntarily to lie, or ignorantly to deliver an
untruth. He overtasked not himself by undertaking an history of
things done long before his time, and of which he was not able
to inform himself. He was a man that had as much means, in
regard both of his dignity and wealth, to find the truth of what
he relateth, as was needful for a man to have. He used as mncb
diligence in search of the truth, (noting every thing whilst it was
fresh in memory, and laying out his wealth upon intelligence,) as
was possible for a man to use. He afiFected least of any man the
acclamations of popular auditories, and wrote not his History to
win present applause, as was the use of that age, but for a monu-
ment to instruct the ages to come, which he professeth himself,
and entitleth his book, Kr^ju-a ej ail, a possession for everlasting.
He was far from the necessity of servile writers, either to fear or
flatter. And whereas he may peradventure be thought to have
been malevolent towards his country, because they deserved to
have him so, yet hath he not written any thing that discovereth
any such passion. Nor is there any thing written of them that
tendeth to their dishonour, as Athenians, but only as people ; and
that by the necessity of the narration, not by any sought digres-
sion So that no word of his, but their own actions do sometimes
reproach them. In sum, if the truth of a history did ever appear
by the manner of relating, it doth so in this History ; so coherent,
perspicuous, and persuasive is the whole narration, and every part
thereof.
In the elocution also, two things are considerable, disposition or
method, and style. Of the disposition here used by Thucydides, it
will be sufficient in this place briefly to observe only this. That
in his first book, first he hath by way of exordium derived the
state of Greece from the cradle to the vigorous stature it then was
at when he began to write 5 and next, declared the causes, both
real and pretended, of the war he was to write of 3 in the rest, in
XVI OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
which he handleth the war itself, he followeth distinctly and
purely the order of time throughout 3 relating what came to pass
from year to year, and subdividing each year into a summer and
winter. The grounds and motives of every action he setteth
down before the action itself, either narratively, or else contriveth
them into the form of deliberative orations, in the persons of such
as from time to time bare sway in the commonwealth. After the
actions, when there is just occasion, he giveth his judgment of
them, shewing by what means the success came either to be fur-
thered or hindered. Digressions for instructions cause, and other
such open conveyances of precepts (which is the philosopher's part)
he never useth, as having so clearly set before men's eyes the ways
and events of good and evil counsels, that the narration itself doth
secretly instruct the reader, and more effectually than possibly can
be done by precept.
For his style, I refer it to the judgment of divers ancient and
competent judges. Plutarch in his book, De Gloria Athenien-
sium, saith of him thus : Thucydides aimeth always at this, to make
his auditor a spectator, and to cast his reader into the same passions
that they were in, that were beholders. The manner how Demosthenes
arrangued the Athenians on the rugged shore before Pylus. How
Brasidas urged the steersman to run his gaily a ground ; how he
went to the ladder, or place in the galley for descent, how he was hurt,
and swooned, and fell down on the ledges of the gaily ; how the Spar-
tans fought after the manner of a land-fight upon the sea, and the
Athenians of a sea-fight upon land. Again, in the Sicilian war, how
a battle was fought by sea and land, with equal fortune. These things,
I say, are so described, and so evidently set before our eyes, that the
mind of the reader is no less affected therewith, than if he had been
present in the actions. There is for his perspicuity. Cicero in his
book entitled Oratore, speaking of the affectation of divers Greek
rhetoricians, saith thus : And therefore Herodotus and Thucydides
are the more admirable. For though they lived in the same age with
those I have before named, (meaning Thrasymaclius, Gorgius, and
Theodorus) yet were they far from this kind of delicacy, or rather
indeed foolery. For the one without rub, gently glideth like a still
river, and the other (meaning Thucydides) runs stronglier, and in
matter of war, as it were, bloweth a trumpet of war. And in these
two, at saith Theophrastus, history hath roused herself, and adven-
tured to speak, both more copiously, and with more ornament than in
those that were before them. This commends the gravity and the
dignity of his language. Again, in his second book, de Oratore,
thus : Thucydides in the art of speaking, hath in my opinion far ex-
OF THUCYDIDES. XVU
ceeded them all. For he is so full of matter, that the number of his
sentences doth almost reach the number of his words ; and in his words
he is so apt, and so close, that it is hard to say, whether his icords do
more illustrate his sentences, or his sentences his words. There is for
the pithiness and strength of his style. Lastly, for the purity,
and propriety, I cite Dionysius Halicarnasseus, whose testimony
is the stronger in this point, because he was a Greek rhetorician
for his faculty, and for his affection, one that would no further
commend him, than of necessity he must. His words are these :
There is one virtue in eloquence, the chief est of all the rest, and with-
out which there is no other goodness in speech. What is that ? that
the language be pure, and retain the propriety of the Greek tongue.
This they both observed diligently. For Herodotus is the best rule of
iite Ionic, and Thucydides of the Attic dialect. These testimonies are
not needful to him that hath read the History itself, nor at all, but
that the same Dionysius hath taken such pains, and applied so
much of his faculty in rhetoric to the extenuating of the worth
thereof 3 moreover, I have thought it necessary to take out the
principal objections he maketh against him, and without many
words of mine own, to leave them to the consideration of the
reader. And first Dionysius saith thus : The principal, and most
necessary office of any man that intendeth to write a history is to
choose a noble argument, and grateful to such as shall read it. And
this Herodotus, in my opinion, hath done better than Thucydides -.for
Herodotus hath written the joint history, both of the Greeks and Bar-
barians, to save from oblivion, S;c. But Thucydides writeth one only
war, and that neither honourable, nor fortunate ; which principally
were to be wished never to have been ; and next, never to have been re-
membered, nor known to posterity. And that he took an evil argu-
ment in hand, he maketh it manifest in his proem, saying, that many
cities were in that war made desolate, and utterly destroyed, part-
ly by Barbarians, partly by the Greeks themselves : so many
banishments, and so much slaughter of men as never was the like
before, &c. So that the hearers will abhor it at the first propound-
ing. Now by how much it is better to write of the wonderful acts both
of the Barbarians and Grecians, than of the pitiful and horrible cala-
mities of the Grecians, so much wiser is Herodotus in the choice of his
argument than Thucydides.
Now let any man consider whether it be not more reasonable
to say ; that the principal, and most necessary of him that will write
a history is to take such an argument, as is both within his power well
to handle, and profitable to posterity that shall read it. Which Thu-
cydides, in the opinion of all men, hath done better than Herodotus.
XVm OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
For Herodotus undertook to write of those things, of which it was im-
possible for him to know the truth ; and which delight more the ear
with fabulous narrations, than satify the mind with truth. But Thu-
cydides writeth one. war, which, how it was carried from the beginning
to the end, he was able certainly to inform himself. And by pro-
pounding in his proem, the miseries that happened in the same, he
shewed that it was a great war, and worthy to be known, and not to
be concealed from posterity , for the calamities that then fell upon the
Grecians ; but the rather to be truly delivered unto them, for that men
profit more by looking on adverse events than, on prosperity. Therefreo
by how much men's miseries do better instruct, than their good success,
by so much was Thucydides more happy in taking his argument, than
Herodotus was wise in choosing his.
Dionysius again saith thus : The next office of him that will
write a history, is to know where to begin, and where to end. And in
this point Herodotus seemeth to be far more discreet than Thucydides.
For in the first place he layeth down the cause, for which the Barbarians
began to injure the Grecians ; and going on, maketh an end at the pu-
nishment, and the revenge taken on the Barbarians. But Thucydides
begins at the good estate of the Grecians, which being a Grecian, and
an Athenian, he ought not to have done; nor ought he, being of that
dignity amongst the Athenians, so evidently to have laid the fault of
the war upon his own city, when there were other occasions enough to
which he might have imputed it. Nor ought he to have began with the
business of the Corcyraeans, but at the more noble acts of his country,
which they did immediately after the Persian war, (which afterward
in convenient place he mentioneth, hut it is but cursorily, and not as he
ought.) And when he had declared those, with much affection, as a
lover of his country, then he should have brought in, how that the La-
cedemonians, through envy and fear, but pretending other causes, began
the war, and so have descended to the Corcyrcean business, and the de-
cree against the Megareans, or whatsoever else he had to put in. Then
in the ending of his history, there be many errors committed. For
though he profess he was present in the whole war, and that he would
write it all, yet he ends with the naval battle at Cynossema, which was
fought in the twenty-first year of the war ; whereas it would have been
better to have gone through with it, and ended his History with that
admirable, and grateful return of the banished Athenians from Phile,
at which time the city recovered her liberty.
To this I say, that it was the duty of him that had undertaken
to write the History of the Peloponncsian war, to begin his narra-
tion no further off, than at the causes of the same, whether the
Grecians were then in good, or in evil state. And if the injury.
OF THUCYDIDE9. MX'
Upon which the war arose, proceeded from the Athenians, then
the writer, though an Athenian, and honoured in his country,
ought to declare the same, and not to seek, nor take, though at
hand, any other occasion to transfer the fault. And that the acts
done before the time comprehended in the war he wrote of, ought
to have been touched but cursorily, and no more than may serve
for the enlightening of the history to follow, how noble soever
those acts have been. Which when he had thus touched, without
affection to either side, and not as a lover of his country, but of
truth, then to have proceeded to the rest, with the like indiffer-
ency. And to have made an end of writing, where the war ended,
which he undertook to write ; not producing his History beyond
that period, though that which followed were never so admirable
and acceptable. All this Thucydides hath observed.
These two criminations I have therefore set down at lare:e, trans-
lated also verbatim, that the judgment of Dionysius Halicarnassius
may the better appear, concerning the main and principal virtues
of a history. I think there was never written so much absurdity
in so few lines. He is contrary to the opinion of all men that
ever spake of this subject besitles himself, and to common sense.
For he makes the scope of history not profit by writing truth, but
delight of the hearer, as if it were a song. And the argument of
history he would not by any means have to contain the calamities
and misery of his country, (these he would have buried in silence)
but only their glorious and splendid actions. Amongst the vir-
tues of an historiographer, he reckons affection to his country ;
study to please the hearer ; to write more than his argument leads
him to ; and to conceal all actions that were not to the ho-
nour of his country. Most manifest vices. He was a rhetori-
cian, and it seemeth he would have nothing written, but that
which was most capable of rhetorical ornament. Yet Lucian, a
rhetorician also, in a treatise, entitled. How a History ought to
be written, saith thus : That a tcriter of history, ought in his writings
to be a foreigner, without country, living under his own law only,
subject to no king, nor caring what any man wUl like, or dislike, but
laying out the matter as it is.
The third fault he finds, is this : that the method of his History
is governed by the time, rather than the periods of several ac-
tions. For he declares in order what came to pass each summer,
and winter, and is thereby forced sometimes to leave the narra-
tion of a siege, or sedition, or a war, or other actions, in the
the midst, and enter into a relation of somewhat else, done at the
same time, in another place, and to come to the former again
XX OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
when the time requires it. This, saith he, causeth confusion in
in the mind of his hearer, so that he cannot comprehend dis-
tinctly the several parts of the History.
Dionysius aimeth still at the delight of the present hearer ;
though Thucydides himself profess that his scope is not that, but
to leave his work for a perpetual possession to posterity. And then
have men leisure enough to comprehend him thoroughly. But,
indeed, whosoever shall read him once attentively, shall more
distinctly conceive of every action this way than the other ;
and the method is more natural ; for as much as his puipose
being to write of one Peloponnesian war, this way he hath
incorporated all the parts thereof into one body, so that there
is unity in the whole, and the several narrations are conceived
only as parts of that ; whereas the other way, he had but sowed
together many little histories, and left the Peloponnesian war
. (which he took for his subject) in a manner unwritten j for
neither any part, nor the whole, could justly have carried such
a title.
Fourthly, he accuseth him for the method of his first book, in
that he deriveth Greece from the infancy thereof to his own time j
and in that he setteth down the narration of the quarrels about
Corcyra and Potidsea, before he entreateth of the true cause of the
war, which was the greatness of the Athenian dominion, feared
and envied by the Lacedemonians.
For answer to this, I say thus : for the mentioning of the an-
cient state of Greece, he doth it briefly, insisting no longer upon It
than is necessary for the well understanding of the following His-
tory. For without some general notions of these first times,
many places of the History are the less easy to be understood, as
depending upon the knowledge of the original of several cities,
and customs, which could not be all inserted into the History it-
self, but must be either supposed to be foreknown by the reader,
or else be delivered to him in the beginning, as a necessary pre-
face. And for his putting first the narration of the public and
avowed cause of this war, and after that the true and inward mo-
tive of the same, the reprehension is absurd. For it is plain that
a cause of war, divulged and avowed, how slight soever it be,
comes within the task of the historiographer, no less than the
war itself, for without a pretext no war follows. This pretext is
always an injury received, or pretended to be received. Whereas
the inward motive to hostility is but conjectural, and not of that
evidence, that a historiographer should be always bound to take
joiotice of it j as envy to the greatness of another state, or fear of
OF THUCYDIDES. XXI
an injury to come. Now let any man judge, whether a good
writer of history, ought to handle, as the principal cause of war,
proclaimed injury, or concealed envy. In a word, the image of
the method used by Thucydides in this point, is this : The quarrel
about Corcyra, passed on in this manner ; and the quarrel about Po'
tideea, on this manner ; (relating both at large) and in both the A-
thenians were accused to have done the injury. Nevertheless the La-
cedemonians had not upon this injury entered into a war against them,
but that they envied the greatness of their power, and feared the
consequence of their ambition. I think a more clear, and natural
order cannot possibly be devised.
Again he says, that he maketh a funeral oration (which was
solemnly done on all occasions through the war) for fifteen
horsemen only, that were slain at the brooks called Rheiti ; and
that for this reason only, that he might make it in the person
of Pericles, who was then living, but before another the like oc-
casion happened, was dead.
The manner of the Athenians was, that they that were slaia
the first in any war, should have a solemn funeral, in the suburbs
of the city. During this war, they had many occasions to put
this custom in practice. Seeing therefore it was fit to have that
custom, and the form of it known, and that once for all, the
manner being ever the same, it was fittest to relate it on the first
occasion, what number soever they were that were then buried j
which nevertheless is not likely to have been so few as Dionysius
saith. For the funeral was not celebrated till the winter after
they were slain, so that many more were slain before this so-
lemnity, and may all be accounted amongst the first. And that
Pericles performed the office of making their funeral oration, there
is no reason alleged by him why it should be doubted.
Another fault he finds, is this; that he introduceth the Athe-
nian generals in a dialogue, with the inhabitants of the isle of
Melos, pretending openly, for the cause of their invasion of that
isle, the power and will of the state of Athens, and rejecting ut-
terly to enter into any disputation with them concerning the equi-
ty of their cause ; which he saith, was contrary to the dignity of
the state.
To this may be answered ; that the proceeding of these gene-
rals was not unlike to divers other actions, that the people of A-
thens openly took upon them : and therefore it is very likely they
were allowed so to proceed. Howsoever, if the Athenian peo-
ple gave in charge to these their captains, to take in the island,
by all means whatsoever, without power to report back unto them
XXll OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY
first the equity of the islanders cause, as is most likely to be true,
I see then no reason the generals had to enter into disputation with
them, whether they should perform their charge, or not, but only
whether they should do it by fair, or foul means 5 whicli is the
point treated of in this dialogue. Other cavils he hath, touching
the matter, and order of this History, but not needful to be an-
swered.
Then for his phrase, he carpeth at it in infinite places, both for
obscure and licentious. He that will see the particular places he
reprehendeth, let him read Dionysius himself, if he will ; for the
matter is too tedious for this place. It is true, that there be
some sentences in him, somewhat long, not obscure to one that
is attentive ; and besides that, they are but few. Yet is this the
most important fault he findeth. For the rest, the obscurity that
proceedeth from the profoundness of the sentences, containing
contemplations of those human passions, which either dissembled,
or not commonly discoursed of, do yet carry the greatest sway
with men in their public conversation. If then one cannot pene-
trate into them without much meditation, we are not to expect a
man should understand them at the first speaking. Marcellinus
saith, he was obscure on purpose, that the common people might
not understand him. And not unlikely ; for a wise man should
so write (though in words understood by all men) that wise men
only should be able to commend him. But this obscurity is not
to be in the narrations of things done, nor in the descriptions of
places, or of battles j in all which Thucydides is most perspicu-
ous, as Plutarch, in the words before cited, hath testified of him.
But in the characters of men's humours and manners, and apply-
ing them to affairs of consequence, it Is impossible not to be ob-
scure to ordinary capacities, in what words soever a man deliver
his mind ; if therefore Thucydides ih his orations, or in the de-
scription of a sedition, or other thing of that kind, be not easily un-
derstood, it is of those only that cannot penetrate into the nature of
such things, and proceedeth not from any intricacy of expression.
Dionysius further findeth fault with his using to set word against
word, which the rhetoricians call antitheta. Which, as it is in
some kind of speech a very great vice, so is it not improper in
characters ; and of comparative discourses, it is almost the only
style.
And whereas he further, taxeth him for licentiousness in turn-
ing nouns into verbs, and verbs into nouns, and altering of genders,
cases, and numbers, as he doth sometimes for the more efficacy of
his style, and without solacism, I leave him to the answer of Mar-
OF THUCYDIDES. XXIU
cellinus ; who says," That Dionysius findeth fault with this, as
heins ignorant (yet he was a professed rhetorician^ that this was
the most excellent, and perfect kind of speaking.
Some men may peradventure desire to know, what motive Dio-
nvsius might have, to extenuate the worth of him, whom he him-
self acknowledgeth to have been esteemed by all men for the
best by far of all the historians that ever wrote, and to have been
taken bv all the ancient orators, and philosophers, for the mea-
sure and rule of writing history. What motive he had to it I
know not; but what glorj' he might expect by it, is easily known.
For having first preferred Herodotus, his countryman, a Hali-
carnassian, before Thucydides, who was accounted the best, and
then conceiving that his own History might perhaps be thought
not inferior to that of Herodotus, by this computation he saw the
honour of the best historiographer falling on himself; wherein
(in the opinion of all men) he hath misreckoned. And thus
much for the objectious of Denis of Halicarnasse.
It is written of Demosthenes the famous orator, that he wrote
over the history of Thucydides with his own hand^ eight times.
So much was this work esteemed, even for the eloquence. But
yet was this his eloquence not at all fit for the bar, but proper for
history, and rather to be read, than heard. For words that pass
away (as in public orations they must) without pause, ought to
be understood with ease, and are lost else ; though words that
remain in writing, for the reader to meditate on, ought rather to
be pithy, and full. Cicero therefore doth justly set him apart
from the rank of pleaders, but withal, he continually giveth him
his due for history, lib. 2. De Oratore : ' What great rhetorician
' ever borrowed any thing of Thucydides ? Yet all men praise
' him, I confess it, as a wise, severe, grave relator of things done.
* Not for a pleader of causes at the bar, but a reporter of war in
' history. So that he was never reckoned an orator, nor if he
* had never written a history, had his name therefore not been
' extant, being a man of honour and nobility. Yet, none of
* them imitate the gravity of his words and sentences ; but when
* they have uttered a kind of lame and disjointed stuff, they pre-
' sently think themselves brothers of Thucydides.' Again in his
Book, De optimo Oratore, he says thus : ' But here will stand up
* Thucydides ; for his eloquence is by some admired ; and justly.
* But this is nothing to the orator we seek ; for it is one thing
* to unfold a matter by way of narration ; another thing to ac-
* cuse a man, or clear him by arguments. And in narrations, one
' thing to stay the hearer ; another to stir him.* Lucian, in his
XXIV OF THE LIFE AND HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.
book entitled, ' How a History ought to be written,' doth con-
tinually exemplify the virtues which he requires in an historio-
grapher by Thucydides. And if a man consider well that whole
discourse of his, he shall plainly perceive, that the image of this
present History, preconceived in Lucian's mind, suggested unto
him all the precepts he there delivereth. Lastly, hear the most
true and proper commendation of him, from Justus Lipsius, in his
notes to his book, ' De Doctrina Civili,' in these words : ' Thucy-
' dides, who hath written, not many, nor very great matters, hath
' perhaps yet won the garland from all that have written of mat-
* ters, both many and great. Every where for elocution grave ;
'short and thick with sense; sound in his judgments; every
* where secretly instructing, and directing a man's life and ac-
* tions. In his orations and excursions almost divine. Whom the
' oftener you read, the more you shall carry away, yet never be
* dismissed without appetite. Next to him is Polybius, &c.' And
thus much concerning the Life and History of Thucydides.
SURVEY OF THE HISTORY;
FROM smith's trans. OF THUCYDIDES.
In the preceding Discourse we have examined into the capacity
and qualifications of our author for writing historj, and settled
his character. Let us now take a view of the work itself j first
casting our eyes upon and noting the general disposition of the
whole i and then surveying it more distinctly in its parts.
The disposition of the whole is most eleborately exact. Order
is scrupulously observed j and every incident so faithfully ar-
ranged in its proper time, that some have doubted whether annals
were not a more proper title for it than history. If we should
call it annals, it must be owned at the same time that annals
were never composed with so much majesty and spirit j and ne-
ver was history more accurately distinguished by the punctuality
of dates so nicely interwove. Thucydides states every occur-
rence in just place and time. But he is forced for this purpose to
make frequent transitions, and to drop a particular narration,
perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be most fixed
upon and most eager for the event. If they cannot bear a dis-
appointment here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning
over a few leaves, they will find it regularly resumed in due place
and time : and they at once may satisfy their own curiosity, without
disarranging the author's scheme, or perplexing that work which
he was determined to keep quite clear and unembarrassed. They
will afterwards forgive, perhaps applaud him, for his great care
to prevent confusion, and to give a neat and precise conception of
all that passeth. He constantly gives notice, when he is necessi-
tated, by the method he laid down for himself, to make such
transitions ; and, when we have been amused with what looks
like a ramble from an engaging part of history, but is really a co-
incidence of events not to pass unheeded 3 when wc have been
b
XXVI A SURVEY
SO long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no
excursion at all; yet we are glad to see him reconnect, and land
us on a spot, where we are already well acquainted. He shews a
steady and inviolable attachment to chronology, a necessary at-
tendant upon history. But the chronology of Thucydides is like
a herald, that exactly marshals a long stately procession, adjusts
the rank, clears the way, and preserves every step distinct and un-
incumbered.
No writer had done this before him. No settled sera was yet in
use, not even the famous one of the Olympiad. The several states
of Greece computed time by a method of their own. It was not
easy to make those methods coincide with one another. The
Athenians reckoned by their annual archons ; the Lacedemonians
by their ephori ; the Argives by the years of the priestess of Juno.
The seasons of the year, when the two former entered on their
offices, were fixed, but did not suit together in point of time ; the
beginning of the years of the latter was variable, since it de-
pended on the death or removal of a predecessor. Thucydides, to
avoid confusion, left all these artificial jarring rules, and adhered
to the course of nature. He divided the natural year into two
halves, into a summer and winter. His summer includes the
spring, and reacheth from the vernal to the autumnal equinox j
the other half-year is comprehended in his winter. He always
records eclipses, as strange events, and proper concomitants for
the horrors of this war. I must not be so sanguine as to imagine,
that he supposed such appearances might some time or other be
reduced to exact calculation, and astronomy be made the faithful
guide of chronology.
Book 1. The First Book of Thucydides is introductory to the
rest. It is a comprehensive elaborate work of itself. It clears
away rubbish, opens a view from the earliest ages, strikes out
light from obscurity, and truth from fable, that the reader may
enter upon the Peloponnesian war with a perfect insight into the
state of Greece, and the schemes, interest and strength of the con-
tending parties. The author unfolds his design in writing, mag-
nifies his subject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of
mankind, rectifies their mistakes, removes all prejudice, and fur-
nishes us with the knowledge of every thing proper to be known,
to enable us to look at the contention with judgment and discern-
ment, when the point contended for is no less than the sove-
reignty of the sea, which that of the land must necessarily follow.
He begins at the source, and traces the original of the Greek
communities from certain and indisputable facts j and the growth
OF THE HISTORY. XXVll
of Attica in particular, from the natural barrenness of the soil,
which tempted no invasions ; and from the shelter its inhabitants
gave to all, who would settle amongst them, and share their
polity. — He shews the invention of shipping to have been ex-
ceedingly mischievous at first. It filled the sea with pirates, to
whom it gave a ready conveyance from coast to coast, enabling
them suddenly to seize, and at leisure to carry ofiF and secure their
booty. No considerable commerce, or rather none at all, could
be carried on, till the shore was cleared of such annoyance. And
when few durst venture to settle on the coasts, no marts could
be opened for trafl^ic, and no ports were yet secure. A ship was
merely the instrument of ready conveyance from place to place :
it was not yet become an engine of attack and defence on the
water. Minos king of Crete made the first attempt with suc-
cess to obtain a naval strength *, by which he cleared the isles of
the pirates, who had settled upon them to set out readier from
thence on their plundering excursions. — The grand fleet, that car-
ried such a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of
transports, Thucydides gives us a just and clear idea of that fa-
nK)us expedition. After this celebrated aera f, the Corinthians
were the first people of Greece, who bfecame in reality a maritime
power. Their peculiar situation gave them an inclination and
opportunity for commerce ; and commerce must have strength to
guard and support it. They first improved a vessel of burden into
a ship of war :J, and set power afloat as well as wealth.
Their neighbours in the isle of Corcyra soon followed their ex-
ample, and, though originally a colony of their own, became a
rival power at sea. They fought on their own darling element
for superiority §. This was the most ancient sea-fight, but it was
decisive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and
jarring powers ; till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which poli-
tically joined with one to gain the ascendant over them both, and
to assert the empire of the sea for itself.
The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidam-
nus had occasioned their most recent embroilment ||, and a hot
war, in which the Corcyraeans applied for the alliance and aid of
Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the first pretext for the
Peloponnesian war, and therefore our author opens the aflFair at
large. Athens held the balance of power in her hands. How she
came to be possessed of it, wiU soon give room for as pertinent a
digression as Thucydides could have wished. Ambassadors from
* Years before Christ 1006. f Before Christ 904.
X Before Christ 607. ^ Before Christ 667.
1) Before Christ 438.
XXVIU A SURVEY
both parties are soon at Athens ; one, to negociate alliance and
aid ; the other, to traverse their negociation. The people of Athens,
in whom the supreme power was vested, admit them both to au-
dience, and orations of course must follow. Our grave Historian
is now retired, to make way for statesmen and orators to mount
the stage, who are very well worth hearing.
The Corcyraens, who take the lead, recognize " the necessity
" of alliances, which, though sometimes entanglements, are gene-
" rally security and defence. Wronged as they now are, they sue
" for alliance as the means of redress. In granting it to them, the
" Athenians would shew honour and virtue, and at the same time
" promote their own private interest. The accession of the na-
" val strength of Corcyra to their own was very well worth the
" gaining ; in the end, it might preserve their state. — They open
" the nature of colonies, shew the original contract between them
" and the mother-country ; obedience and protection are recipro-
" cal and imply one another. — They prove that Athens may
" grant them alliance, in consistence with all other engage-
" ments ; by doing it, may secure herself in time against
" the envy and attack of the Peloponnesians ; since the naval
" strength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the latter
" in a future war, will be weak and ineffectual against the com-
" bined fleets of Corcyra and Athens."
The Corinthians, in their answer, inveigh highly against the
Corcyroeans. " They describe them as a very designing iniquitous
" set of men, and a colony in the highest degree undutiful to its
" mother-state. They endeavour to prove it unjust, and ungrate-
" ful too, in the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet
" their criminal behaviour. They mantain, that true honour
" points out another conduct ; and schemes of interest should
" never supersede the laws of equity and good-faith. What may
" happen should be less regarded, than what on present occasions
" is strictly right. They entreat at last, though with a menac-
** ing air ; and close, with warmly adjuring the Athenians, to
" stand neutral in the quarrel."
The Athenians however resolve to enter into a defensive al-
liance with Corcyra. The war is renewed ; and the Athenians
send the Corcyraeans a petty aid, which they afterwards reinforce.
Corcyra is secured, and all the projects of the Corinthians arc
baflled, who are highly exasperated against the Athenians, and ne-
ver will forgive them.
Another affair soon happens, to embroil them more, and to
make the second pretext for a general war. I'otidiua, a town in
the Isthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, but at this
OF THE HISTORY. XXIX
time tributary to the Athenians. Its situation between two bays,
and amongst the Athenian colonies on the coast of Thrace and
Macedonia, would enable it to gall the Athenians sorely in case of
a rupture. They order it therefore to be dismantled. The Poti-
da;ans refuse obedience, and revolt. A war ensues. The Athe-
nians attempt to reduce Potidaea ; and the Corinthians to support
the revolt. It is at length besieged by the former. The siege
runs out into a great length of time, and at last becomes one of
the considerable events of the Peloponnesian war.
The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of re-
sentments, and leave no stone unturned to stir up a general war
in Greece. They were parties themselves in the Peloponnesian
league, of which the Lacedemonians were the head. Tlie Corin-
thians never set up for a leading state. They were ever content
with the secondary rank, though the first in that rank. Their
turn was always more to commerce than war. Commerce had
long since made them rich ; riches had made them luxurious ;
and, though they often produced great and excellent soldiers, yet
they never piqued themselves on being a martial or formidable
people. Athens indeed they hated : Athens had rivalled them in
trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One
of the gulfs on which Corinth is seated, that of Sarone, was now
entirely in the jurisdiction of the Athenians, who had also begun
to curb and straiten them much in the gulf of Crissa. They were
consequently bent on the demolition of this all-grasping rival, but
were unable to effect it by their own strength. They solicit all
the confederates to repair to Lacedemon, all full of complaint and
remonstrance against the Athenians. The Corinthians reserve
themselves for the finishing charge ; and our author repeats (or
makes for them) their most inveigling and alarming speech on
this occasion.
' They address the Lacedemonians with an artful mixture of
* commendation and reproach ; of commendation, for their strict
' adherence to good ftiith ; of reproach for their indolence and
* sloth. They had suffered the state of Athens to grow too
' mighty for her neighbours. Though the acknowledged deli-
' verers of Greece, they had now for a length of time taken no
' notice of the incroachments of the Athenians ; but, through
' wilful ignorance and habitual supineness, had let them grow
' too big, and able now to enslave them all. — ^They do all they
' can to irritate and provoke them. They draw an admirable pa-
' rallel between them and the Athenians 5 invidious and re-
*' proachful, but directly tending to exasperate those whom they
XXX A SURVEY
' want to exasperate. — Then, they warmly renew their applica-
' tions to the pride of the Lacedemonians ; they alarm their fears ;
' they flatter and reproach their foibles. They even threaten to
' abandon their league, unless they exert themselves in defence of
* their friends ; they endeavour to prove the necessity of active
' and vigorous measures ; and end with a very artful stroke of in-
' sinuating and persuasive address.'
An Athenian embassy, now residing at Lacedemon, being in-
formed of these loud and bitter outcries against their masters, beg
an immediate audience. Accordingly, they are admitted j not
indeed to plead before Lacedemonians, as their judges or supe-
riors— Athenians scorn such self-debasement ; but, to vindicate
their state from misrepresentations, to clear her reputation, and
justify her power.
' With this view, they run over the great services they had
' done to Greece, in the time of the Persian invasions : they had
' ever been the most strenuous, most disinterested, and most gal-
' lant champions for liberty. They pompously detail their battles
' of Marathon and Salamis ; their evacuating Athens on the last
' occasion : and, when they had no polity of their own subsist-
* ing, fighting ardently and successfully for the other communi-
* ties of Greece. Their power had been nobly earned ; and, must
* they forego it, because it was envied ? They had honourably
' gained, and justly used it ; much more justly, than the Lacede-
' monians had it either in will or ability to have done. They are
' calumniated merely from that spite and discontent so common
' to mankind, who ever hate and abuse their superiors, and ever
* repine at subjection though ,to the most gentle masters. — Lace-
* demonians have neither skill nor judgment for large command,
* and though most eagerly grasping at it, are unable to manage
* it with any measure of dexterity and address. They should re-
* fleet again and again, before they ventured upon war : it might
' last longer, and involve them in more calamities, than they
' seemed willing to apprehend. They had better submit their
' complaints to fair arbitration : if not, the Athenians invoke the
' gods to witness their readiness to defend themselves, whenever
' and however their enemies shall attack them.'
All parties now withdraw ; and the Lacedemonians go to coun-
cil amongst themselves. Exasperated by the Corinthians, and
mortified by the speech of the Athenians, the majority are for an
immediate declaration of war. Archidamus, one of their kings,
ro°? \'.\j lo temper their fury. And the speech of his Spartan ma-
jesty on this occasion, carries all the marks of a good king, an
OF THB HISTORY. XXXI
able statesman, and a thorough patriot. It does honour both to
his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure
but at the head of an army : then he reigaed indeed. And yet,
Archidamus retains no selfish considerations j they are lost in his
regard for the public welfare.
He tells them, ' he is not fond of war himself ; raw unexpe-
* rienced youth alone is liable to such weakness. The war now un-
* der consideration is a most important point. It may run out into
* a great length of time. It is against Athenians — a remote people
' — a naval power — abounding in wealth — excellently provided
* in all respects. He demands, in every single article, whether
* they can presume to become a match for such antagonists ? They
' should remember the high spirit, the habits of activity and per-
* severance so natural to these Athenians, who are not to be de-
' jected at the first loss, nor frightened at big words or haughty
' threats. Insults indeed must not be brooked 3 but, adequate
' preparations should be made to avenge them, and time be gained
* to make such preparations. It would be most prudent to begin a
* negociation, to spin it out into length. If affairs can be amicably
' adjusted, it would deserve their choice ; — if not, when they are
* competently enabled, it will be soon enough to act offensively.
' He dreads not war himself, yet, war cannot be carried on with-
' out money. Ample funds must be provided, a work of time
* and deliberation. Circumspection is no real reproach j precipi-
* tation draws positive mischiefs after it. Lacedemonians are
* used to be calm and considerate ; they should not now be ca-
* joled or exasperated out of their judgment. The Athenians are
' a wise and dextrous people. The Lacedemonians should keep
* that in remembrance, and support their own characters of calm-
* ness of spirit and true manly resolution : they should begin with
' caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they
' can ; if not, when duly prepared and adequately provided, they
' might trust the decision to arms.'
The kings of Sparta were ever justled on their thrones by the
haughty overbearing Ephori. Sthenelaidas, one of that college,
answers Archidamus in a short, blunt, properly laconic speech.
' He is severe upon the Athenians, sneers Archidamus, and avers
' that Lacedemonians should not deliberate upon, but instantly
' take the field and avenge their wrongs.' He then put the ques-
tion— Whether the peace was broke ? — divided the council ; told
the votes ; and declared, in the English stile, that the ayes had it.
The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the
resolution. Yet, it seems the advice of Archidamus had carried
XXXU A SURVEY
some weight, and actual war was to be deferred, till all the parties
in the Lacedemonian league had ripened their measures, and were
ready to act with unanimity and vigour.
Here the author again makes his appearance, and assures us
the true motive of the determination for a war at Sparta, was a
JEALOUSY of the Athenian power now very great, and a dread
of its more extensive growth j the latter of which they were de-
termined to prevent, and to reduce the former within less dis-
tasteful and terrific bounds.
Then follows a most pertinent digression, in which Thucydides
points out the steps, by which the Athenians had so highly ex-
alted their state. In a close and succinct manner he runs over the
history of Athens for fifty years, from the invasion of Xerxes to
the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war. He arranges all
the incidents in due place and time. Herodotus hath related the
splendid passages of the Grecian history during that invasion j
hath exhibited Themistocles in all the lustre of his command at
the battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned
their all, fought, and through the address of Themistocles obliged
all parties to fight, for liberty against Xerxes. On this day they
earned a greater title than that of citizens of Athens ; they
were afterwards acknowledged the sovereigns of the sea. The
Lacedemonians became mortified at itj but the Athenians had
gloriously deserved it. Themistocles was the very life and soul
of Greece on this occasion. In the midst of difficulties he formed
a most extensive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to
execute at once. Thucydides describes his address and foresight.
He soon sets the city beyond the reach of envy and jealousy. And
though soon after he lost his country, through the malice of his
personal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction
with them, yet the statesmen and patriots left behind pursued his
plan of naval power : and the steps of its progress and advance-
ment are minutely traced out by our Historian.
Themistocles had made all safe and secure at home. The long-
walls were built ; the Piraeus, a spacious harbour, opened and
fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arsenal for war. Aristides,
as true a patriot as ever lived, made all secure abroad. Through
his honest management, all Greece submitted to an annual tax,
for the guard of their common liberty against future invasions j
and the leaders at sea were made collectors and treasurers of this
naval fund. The isle of Delos was the place, at first, of lodging
this fund ; but, it was soon after removed to Athens j — a shrewd
political step, yet capable however of an ample if not full justifi*
OF THE HISTORY. XXXUl
cation. The war Is briskly carried on against the Persian monarch;
the isles and seas are cleared of the common enemy ; the cities
on the coast ape regained or conquered. Cimon also performs his
part nobly ; he earns two victories the same day, by sea and land,
on the coast of Ionia from the Persians. He completed a nego-
ciation with the petty maritime states, confederate with Athens,
who were tired of incessant warfare, for accepting sums of money
instead of ships and personal attendance. By this means the
shipping of those states soon mouldered away, and their money
was by their own agreement sent thither, to increase and
strengthen the maritime power of Athens. In spite of all the op-
position, which the Corinthians and Boeotians gave them at home,
whose rancor to them was never to be appeased, in the course
of no large number of years, they had established a very ex-
tensive and formidable empire indeed. The isles and coasts of
the ^gaean sea were mostly their own. The bay of Sarone was
entirely, in their own jurisdiction : and, by being masters of Nau-
pactus, they considerably awed the bay of Crissa. Their squadrons
cruized round and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their
interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them
the accession of the naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them
masters of the Ionian, and they had colonies to extend their traffic
and influence both in Italy and Sicily.
These points are opened step by step in this digression by Thu-
cydides, till jealousy in the Lacedemonians and malice in the Co-
rinthians irritaled all the Peloponnesian states and their allies
against them, and ended in the determination for war. The Co-
rinthians Jiad now carried their point, and soon hoped to gratify
all their resentments. Accordingly, at the second grand congress
at Sparta, when all the rest of the states had declared their minds,
they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an oflFensive
war, in a very studied and elaborate speech.
' They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedemo-
' nians. They animate the landed states of Peloponnesus to join
' effectually with those on the coasts. A firm and lasting peace
* can only be obtained by a vigorous war ; and the power of
' Athens must needs be reduced. — They open a plan — for esta-
' Wishing fbnds — for weakening the marine of Athens, and con-
* sequently for improving and strengthening the marine of her
' enemies — for effectuating the revolts of her dependents — and
* raising fortifications in x\ttica itself. Independence can never
' be earned at too great a price 5 it costs as much to be voluntary
' and obedieQt slaves. A single state should never be suffered to
XXXIV A SURVEY
' play the tyrant in Greece. Their own reputation, their dignity,
' their liberty, their welfare, a most righteous cause, nay the very
' gods themselves summon them to action. They close with a
' very warm and pathetic recapitulation, sounding as it were the
' alarm for the destruction of Athens.'
. Now war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are or-
dered to get ready, with the utmost dispatch, to begin its opera-
tions. In the mean time, the Athenians are to be amused with
embassies and negociations merely to gain time and save ap-
pearances. Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely
details them, as they give him an opportunity of introducing some
notable passages relating to Cylon, Pausanias, and Themistocles.
He then shifts the scene to Athens ; and introduces Pericles, the
most commanding orator, the greatest general, the most consum-
mate statesman, and at this time prime minister of the republic —
introduces Pericles, I say, in the assembly of the people, to give
them an insight into the schemes of their enemies, and a plan for
their own conduct ; to encourage them to a brave and steady re-
sistance, in strict adherence to such methods, as in the end will
infallibly not barely secure but aggrandize their state.
The thoughts in this speech of Pericles are so grand, so nervous
so emphatically and concisely just, that if the reader be not im-
mediately struck into an adequate conception of them, I know no
method of opening his eyes or enlarging his understanding. He
says but little, but says every thing in that little. He demolisheth
all the assertions of the Corinthians in their last speech at Sparta,
as if he had heard them speak. Perhaps Thucydides here hath
not sufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the. speech is
entirely in character, completely suited to the heart and head and
mouth of Pericles. Pericles, I observe it with pleasure, is an
Englishman both in heart and judgment. England hath adhered
and will adhere to the lessons which Athens neglected and forgot
— ' Of vast consequence indeed,' (says-this enlightened statesman)
' is the dominion of the sea. But consider it with attention. For,
' were we seated on an island,' (as the force of his argument evi-
dently implies) * we could never be subdued. And now you ought
' to think, that our present situation is nearly as posaible the
' same, and so to evacuate your houses and lands in Attica, and to
' confine your defence to the sea.' If this can need a comment,
Xenophon will give it in his Polity of the Athenians. — ' In one
' point,' says he, ' the Athenians are deficient. For if, beside their
' being sovereigns of the sea, they were seated on an island, it
' would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleasure, and
OF THE HISTORY. XXXV
* yet they could not be ravaged themselves so long as they held
' the masten' at sea : their lands could never be laid waste, no
* enemv could post themselves upon them. But now, the oc-
' cupiers of lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders ;
' whilst the people in general, conscious they have nothing to be
' burnt and nothing to be plundered, live exempt from fear nor
* fly before an invader. The expedient used on such occasions
* is, that the former deposit their most valuable effects in the
' isles, and trusting to their superiority at sea, slight all the de-
* vastations an enemy can make in Attica.' England is com-
plete where Athens was deficient. And how fond must both Peri-
cles and Xenophon have been of the island and maritime power
of Great Britain ? I will not pretend to anticipate the reader's
pleasure by descending into more particularities. It may suffice
to add, that the final answer of the Athenians is drawn up by the
advice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by command ; they
" had already offered to refer all disputes to a fair judicial deci-
*' sion ; so far only, but no farther, compliance must be expected
" from Athens." Here all negociation comes to an end j and
the war will very soon commence.
Thus I have endeavoured to give some idea of the first book of
Thucydides. It is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But
Rapin thinks our author hath overdone it " out of a desire
" of prefixing a too stately portal to his history." Could the
portal have been thought too stately, if the whole fabric had
been completely finished ? To form a right judgment here,
we should examine the design and not the execution : the latter
is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the park, the Ban-
queting-house at Whitehall is too big and towering for what
stands near it. But hath it that ap(>earance in the original plan of
Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once designed to be erec-
ted ? Something of this nature may justly be pleatled in favour of
Thucydides, and teach us not to judge too hastily of a whole,
when we cannot survey all the parts, because they never were fi-
nished. Moved by decorum, I would gladly justify my author,
but I by no means pretend to decide the point.
Book II. The Second Book opens with the first act of hostili-
ty. The Thebans march by night, and enter by surprise the city of
Plat«a. This city and petty state, though just within Boeotia,
was not comprised in the union, of which all the other cities of
Boeotia were constituents with Thebes at their head, but had ever
been firmly attached, even in the worst of times, to the common
liberty of Greece, and wsjs under the protection of and in fast al-
XXX VI A SURVEY
liance with Athens. This surprise of Plataea our author describes
in all its turns, till its enemies are driven out or slaughtered, and
a place is secured for the Athenians.
A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be
general. Thucydides, sounds the charge in all the disposition and
spirit of Homer. He catalogues the allies on both sides. He
awakens our expectation ; and fast engages our attention. All
mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be
decided. Endeavours are made to disclose futurity. Heaven it-
self is interested in the dispute. The earth totters, and nature
seems to labour with the great event. This is his solemn and sub-
lime manner of setting out. Thus he magnifies a war between
two, as Rapin styles them, petty states ; and thus artfully he sup-
ports a little subject by treating it in a great and noble method.
Writers who have been long contemplating the vast gigantic
size of the Roman empire, if they cast their eyes on the state of
Athens even at the present juncture, are apt to form a low idea of
it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the highest meridian of
her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the most disad-
vantageous and incongruous parallels ? His subject was certainly
the greatest that to this day had occurred in the world : and, ought
Thucydides to be degraded, or even lessened at all, because he was
not born in the same age with Livy ? As much amusement
at least accompanies, and as much instruction flows from reading
carefully the history of Athens, as from that of Rome. Wonder
may be more raised by the latter, and the wonder may end in de-
testation of a people, who became enormously great by the mi-
series and destruction of their fellow -creatures. The Romans
were but brute-like men : they were not tolerably humanised, till
they had conquered Greece. Greece reconquered them, and esta-
blished a better and more lasting triumph over mind, than the
others over body.
Groecia capta feruin victorcin cepit. Hob.
Who then best deserve the applause of the heart, the citizens of
Athens, or the citizens of Rome ? I am not at all in doubt, how
men of a calm and considerate spirit will decide the question. Or,
let such as judge only by numbers, consider a little more sedately,
whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty state,
which could be magnified and ennobled only by artifice. The
first army, that invaded her territories in this war^ consisted (ac-
cording to Plutarch) of sixty thousand men. This is an object big
enough to fill the eye. The state of her revenue, when the value
of money is adjusted, will turn out by no means trifling. They
OF THE HISTORY. XXSVll
were possessed, at the breaking out of the war, of three hundred
triremes fit for sea. Two hundred and fifty of them were at one
time in commission, in the fourth year of the war. Consequently
at two hundred men a ship, the number of seamen employed must
have been fifty thousand. If the reader be not yet convinced,
that Athens was not a petty state, nothing can get the better of his
prejudice. It would be pity, any one should sit down to Thucydi-
des with such low pre-possessions against his subject.
The confederate army of Peloponnesians is now assembled, and
ready to march into Attica, under the command of Archidamus.
Like an able and cautious general he harangues his troops, " en-
" courages them with a sight of their own numbers, but guards
" them from catching at that sight a contempt of their foes. The
" strict obsen'ation of discipline is always necessary to armies,
" be they never so large. No enemy ought ever to be despised
" much less Athenians. Though an enemy, he speaks in high
" commendation of the latter, and establishes the dignity of their
** characters. He ends with an exhortation to his troops, to observe
" rules, conform to discipline, and bravely to execute orders ; and
" Spartan-like, concludes with an encomium on the beauty and
" strength of strict military obedience.'*
He then sends a messenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet
to be avoided. The Athenians are as determined as ever to make
no submissions. The messenger is conducted out of their territo-
ries, and parts from his escort with a pathetic prediction of tiie
miseries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica soon
after is invaded. The mischief done by the invaders is described ;
and the sense at Athens of their sufferings and distresses repre-
sented at large. The reader, on this occasion, will be let into the
form and constitution of the Athenian polity. He will see, how
they began to be moulded into one community by the prudence
of Theseus one of their earliest kings. Other historians expa-
tiate on the method, by which from being under a regal they had
varied gradually into a purely republican form. I shall only men-
tion an observation *, that, contrary to most other nations, they
had abolished the regal government, not from distaste but reve-
rence to kings. Codrus, the last of their kings, had devoted him-
self for his country, and was so worthy a man, that they resolved
no mortal should afterwards wear that title amongst them. They
declared Jupiter king of Athens, about the same time that the
Jews rebelled against theocracy, and would have a man to reign
over them. Archons for life succeetled, whose term was afterwards
abridged to ten years ; then to a single year. All general histo-
♦JourrtilN Preface llistorique.
XXXVIU A SURVEY
ries point out the variations, till they came to the popular form
•which now prevailed.
The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated At-
tica ; and the Athenians take the field to retaliate upon them.
Their squadron had been all the time at sea, cruizing upon and
infesting the coasts of Peloponnesus. But, in the winter, we are
called to Athens to see the public funeral of those, who were
killed in the first campaign. Here, the first time it occurs, our
author describes this solemnity, and Pericles makes the funeral-
oration.
I shall make no reflections on this celebrated performance.
Should the reader not think it deserving of its high reputation, I
fear the translator will be sadly to blame. It is hard to give such
noble ideas their proper energy, and such refined ones their due
exactness. The great orators of Athens were always glad to dis-
play their abilities on the same occasion. Plato bath entered the
lists with a high spirit of emulation, and with a high degree of
success : and a great master * this way hath lately made him En-
glish. If Thucydides suffers by a comparison, which now the
unlearned but judicious reader is impowered to make, the latter
must be entreated to observe, that the eloquence of Plato was
beyond dispute more smooth and fluent, more accomplished in all
that is beautiful and sweet than the eloquence of Thucydides, but
an adjudged inferiority in any other respect must be laid at the
door of his translator.
After such an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for such it
must have been to all who heard it, and must have determined
every Athenian to suffer any thing with intrepidity and patience
in the cause of his country, a very mournful scene immediately
succeeds, which lays them under such a load of affliction and
distress, as no arguments, no philosophy can alleviate. The
plague breaks out at Athens ; and the reader must be ready to
feel very sharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in
behalf of morality and virtue too. Amidst their accumulated dis-
tresses, Pericles is the only support of the community ; and, like
the greatest benefactors to ungrateful men, is cursed for being
their support, and reproached for being steadily wise and in the
right. At last he convenes them, and addresses them with such
an air of ingenuity, such spirit, and conscious dignity, and firm
reliance on a good cause, as only two orators that I know of
have ever equalled on parallel occasions. Those I mean are De-
mosthenes and St. Paul. All the world of letters and good taste
are well acquainted with the oration of the former against iEschi-
• Mr. W^
OF THE HISTORY. XXXIX
nes about the crown ; and every class of readers is surely well versed
in the Second Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians. I can but hint
these resemblances, since now I must attend on Pericles, who sooths
or thunders his countr\'men out of all their discontent and ma-
lice, and sends them home convinced and ashamed. But domestic
distress soon efifaceth any other impressions ; their passions are
a£;ain inflamed by inwardly corroding anguish, and Pericles after
all must be fined, and turned out of his employments. Yet peo-
ple are not always mad ; good sense and conviction return upon
them } and he is begged, because most worthy, again to accept
the sole administration. He enjoys it but a little time, before he
is carried off by the plague. Athens then lost her ablest, honest-
est statesman. He was able to have 8at at the helm of govern-
ment, to have steered the republic safe through every storm, and
to have insured her not bare security but open triumph. His
successors were very alert at catching hold of that helm ; but,
none of them could hold it long ; and the vessel, through their
mutual quarrels, must needs run aground or founder at last.
But the next remarkable passage in the history, is the march of
the Peloponnesians to invest Plataea, and the solemn parley held
at their approach. Archidamus is at the head of this ungenerous
enterprise. The malice of the Thebans must be gratified, since
the alliance of BcBotia in this war is of mighty consequence, and
to be purchased at any rate. Archidamus indeed struggles hard
for the Plataeans ; he would fain spare them, could he persuade
them to a neutrality. But the Plataeans have too much honour
and gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian
and ally, is principally struck at. They remonstrate in vain from
the topics of honour, justice, gratitude, the glory and sanction of
the great progenitors on either side. The siege is formed, and
strenuously plied, though without success. Our author always
shines in exact description : no method of annoyance or defence
is omitted. It is at length turned into a blockade ; and a suffi-
cient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the main
army marcheth off.
The war grows warm in more remote quarters ; in Thrace ;
and in Acarnania. An Athenian squadron, stationed at Naupac-
tus in the bay of Crissa, awed all the motions of the Corinthians
and allies on their own coasts ; and it was determined, to clear
away this annoyance. Accordingly, they launch out against it
with more than double the number of vessels. The Athenians,
at one exertion of skill, drive them all on a heap, defeat them,
and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedemonians, excellent land-
xl A SURVEY
men but very aukward seamen, think this an unaccoutable event.
They send down their most active commanders to refit and rein-
force the fleet, and to try their fortune again at sea. Much arti-
fice is employed on both sides. The short harangues of the ad-
mirals let us into all the views and designs of either party. Phor-
mio at length is snared ; the enemy blunders ; then Phormio
extricates himself, and gives them a second defeat. The rea-
der sees every tack, and the motion of every vessel.
Disconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to surprise
the Piraeus by night, and to finish the war in a moment. The
project is described, and the probability of success established. But
the very grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. Athens
indeed is alarmed, and thrown into a great consternation j but,
the project totally miscarries, and the Piraeus is better secured for
the future.
All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces against Perdiccas king
of Macedonia, A vast army of Barbarians is assembled, marches
over a great length of country, strikes a general panic, eflFectuates
no real service, and soon disperses or moulders away. Such
bulky unwieldy armies make an aukward figure, compared with
the regularity, exact discipline, and personal bravery of the dimi-
nutive armies of Greece,
Thucydides gives us once more a sight of horm io and his gal-
lant squadron ; and then closeth the book, and the history of the
third year of the war. " Never history," says Rapin, " comprised
" so much matter in so little room, nor so much action in so few
*' words. If any thing can be found fault with, it is that the ex-
*' ploits are too closely crowded with one another, so that the co-
*' herence seems somewhat intricate and confused, and the
" multiplying of objects tends only to dissipate the attention
" of the reader," An historian however is to take his incidents
in their natural order, as they subsist in fact. He is not so much
to dispose, as to describe them. If he does the latter pertinently,
accurately, and with a due attention to their importance, he hath
acquitted himself of his duty. The poet or writer of fiction must
pick out and heighten his incidents, with a view to fill up pro-
perly, and to give to every distinct object its needful splendor :
he is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciously to gain
applause. The historian is not to pick but to make the best use
of his materials. He may give them indeed all possible lustre j
but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader may
be embarrassed with the number, yet nobody can be justly
blamed.
OF THE HISTORY. xlt
Book III. The Third Book is no less full of matter than the
preceding. The incidents crowd fast upon one another, and po-
litics and oratory are in full employ. The revolt, Lesbos is the
first occurrence of importance. The people of that isle had been
long in the Athenian league : but the members of this league
were dependents rather than confederates. Thucydides always
employs the same Greek word (a-vufjici^oi) for the members of ei-
ther league : the idea it gives is that of companions in war. But
there is great difference between such as accompany, because
they choose it ; and such as accompany, because they are sum-
moned and cannot help it. The former was in general the case of
those who sided with Sparta j the latter, of those who sided with
Athens. The least thought of compulsion is grating to any state,
which thinks it ought, and is able, to be quite independent. This
was the case with the Lesbians, a people considerable in many
respects, but especially for their naval strength. It was well
worth the while of the Lacedemonians to gain such confederates ;
it must be a sad blow to the Athenians to lose such dependents.
The fact was ; all the cities of Lesbos, except Methymne, declare
a revolt. The Athenians lose no time, but are at once with a
powerful squadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mity-
lenaeans had sent ambassadors to beg immediate aid from the ^
Lacedemonians. They had an audience from them and the rest
of their league at Olympia, so soon as the games were ended.
The speech they make on this occasion is very artful, very insi-
nuating, and nicely adapted to carry their point.
" They open the nature of a revolt, and the cases in which it
" merits protection and succour from others. They have been
" ill used by the Athenians ; have been made their tools in en-
" slaving their compatriots of Greece ; have been long caressed
" indeed, but are well assured what their own fate would soon
" have been. Every state hath a natural right to take preven-
" tive measures against the loss of their liberty and to stand on
" their defence. They had revolted sooner, would the Lacede-
" monians have countenanced the measure : they had declared
■" it on the first invitation of the Bceotians. It was a noble re-
" volt ; it had disengaged them from a combination to enslave
" the rest of Greece j it had associated them in the cause of ho-
" nour and liberty. It had been made indeed with too much
" precipitation ; but this should make others more zealous and
" active in their protection, who would reap a great accession of
" strength by it ; an accession of maritime strength ; whilst the
" Athenians would be weakened in point of shipping, and in
Xlii A SURVEY
" point of revenue. It would be a signal of revolt to others,
" and assurance to them that they might do it safely. It would re-
" fleet abundant honour on the Lacedemonians to succour the
" distressed, to save men whose preservation would give them
" glory and strength, and prove them those hearty friends to
" liberty, which all Greece with united praises acknowledged them
" to be."
Interest without rhetoric was strong enough to ensure their
success. But the latter helped to gain them a prompt reception
from the LacedemonianSj who resolve on sending them a suc-
cour, and making diversions on the Athenians, in order to oblige
them to raise the siege of Mitylene.
The blockade of Plataea by the Peloponnesians still continuing,
our author relates the bold project, and bold execution of the
project, of a party of Platseans, in making their escape over all
the works of the besiegers. It is a most circumstantial, and a
most clear and intelligible relation.
Mitylene is now forced to surrender at discretion. The prin-
cipal agents in the late revolt are sent prisoners to Athens, where
the people vote that " not they only but all Mitylenaeans in gene-
" ral be put to death ;" and an order is immediately dispatched to
their commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the sentence.
This bloody decree was carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue.
It was he, who worked up the people of Athens to such a pitch
of inhumanity J which, however, instantly subsided. They are
struck with horror at their own resolution, and will have it again
debated. We shall hear the two speakers on each side of the
question, Cleon and Diodotus.
" Cleon sets out with all the fury and fire of a man, who hath a
" bad heart. He hath abjured humanity to shew himself a most
" zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged to have been,
" and so appears in his invectives against his own masters, and
" his own tools, the people, for their foolish commiseration,
"for their being the eternal dupes of orators, of subtle and
*' venal speakers. For his own part, he loves his country, and
" hates her enemies. Guilt shall never find an advocate in him;
" he calls out for vengeance on the Mitylenajans ; none but their
*' pensioners, none but men who are bribed and corrupted can of-
" fer a plea in their behalf. He bids his audience throw away all
" foolish pity, all womanish forbearance ; to fix their attention
•' on the crimes of the guilty, and not on the horrors of their pu-
" nishment ; and give this proof to their dependents, that death
" shall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, that their arms
OP THS HISTORT. xlui
" may be henceforth employed in opposing their public enemies,
" and not in chastising their own subjects."
Diodotus replies in a speech that shews him a real patriot, and
a man who thought good manners, a calm considerate temper,
and a regard to humanity, to be very consistent with the true
patriot-spirit. " He therefore defends the recommitting of their
" former resolution, since repeated consultations cannot be pre-
*' judicial to the public welfare. It is a base and odious method
" to lavish the charge of ignorance and venality on men who dif-
" fer in sentiment ; it robs the public of its ablest counsellors and
" sincerest friends. Strict justice, in the present instance, may be
" with Cleon ; but the future and lasting welfare of their country
" is the object now to be kept in view. The punishment of death
*' hath never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make
** men desperate is very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is
" lopping off their own limbs, and ruining their own revenue.
" Men should be retained in their duty by mild discretionary pre-
" cautions ; severe and sanguinary proceedings never answer the
" purpose. And, what cruelty to doom a whole people to destruc-
" tion ! to involve the innocent with the guilty ! to murder even
" such as had been their friends and benefactors I He advises
" them not to give too large a scope to mercy, but to punish the
" guilty, and the guilty alone. This will sufficiently intimidate
" others ; will secure their interest in Lesbos better for the fu-
" ture ; and convince the world how soundly Athenians can deli-
" berate upon all their concerns."
Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, crviel only in the
fit of choler but habitually humane, repeal the bloody sentence ;
and dispatch a vessel with all haste to stop execution, which
arrives at Mitylene but just time enough to prevent the massacre.
The next event of importance contrasts the Lacedemonian cha-
racter with that of the Athenians. The author takes no pains to
point it out ; but it lies too ready and obvious to pass unobserved.
— Plataea, after a tediuus blockade, is obliged by famine to sur-
render. They surrender however to the Lacedemonians, on
condition of being brought to a judicial trial, and only, if found
guilty of unjust behaviour, to be put to death. Some delegates
arrive from Sparta to preside in this court of mere inquisition,
since the whole process is confined to a single question — " Whe-
" ther they had done any positive service to the Lacedemonians
" and allies" — that is, to their declared and determined enemies —
" in the present war r" The question plainly manifested a delibe-
rate resolution to put them all to death. And all the faYour theyob-
jt^V A SURVEY
tain is, to be suffered to make a kind of dying speech before men,
who were styled indeed judges, but in fact were butchers. It was
a case of great commiseration, and the speaker lays it open with
all that natural eloquence which flows from an inward and keen
sensibility. If men were not deaf to persuasion, it must have
persuaded. The cause was most alarming, and a more pathetic
plea hath never been exhibited.
" They insist that on a fair and explicit condition they had sur-
" rendered to the Lacedemonians, whereas now they were pre-
" judged and precondemned to gratify their unrelenting foes the
" Thebans. The insidious question left them no plea at all. They
*' could not answer it, and must not be silent. Since life is at
" stake, something must be said even by men who despair of
" persuading. Their quarrel with the Thebans had been just
" and honourable ; quarrel with the Lacedemonians they never
" had any. Nay merely at the desire of the latter, had they cul-
" tivated Athenian friendship, that unpardonable crime, for which
" they were now doomed to destruction. They expatiate with
" truth and energy on the great services they had done to the
" liberty of Greece. All Greece was bound in honour, in grati-
" tude, in deference to positive and solemn oaths, to preserve
" th» Plataeans. Ought every tie to be rent asunder, generosity
" to be quite expunged, and all benevolence to be thrown aside,
" to serve a private turn ? Ought Plataeans to be thus basely re-
" duced, as they really had been, either to be starved or to be
" butchered ? The Lacedemonians should entreat the Thebans
" for them, should beg them to save the lives of friends and be-
" nefactors ; at least, should replace them within their walls,
" and leave them to the fate of war. They apply to their gene-
" rosity, to tlieir humanity ; they strive to give them some emo-
" tions of pity ; they represent the liableness of mankind to cala-
" mity J how brutal it is to be deliberately hard-hearted ; how
" sinful it is to be resolutely ungrateful ! They call upon heaven
" and earth to interpose in their behalf ; they run over every pa-
" thetic and persuasive topic ; until they can add no more, and
*' yet dare not end ; and, again entreat the Lacedemonians to
" save those worthy patriots, to whom all Greece is indebted for
" her liberty and independence."
The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedemonians had a higher
sense of honour and gratitude than they really had, demand also
to be heard.
In the speech they make on this occasion, " they first accuse
" the Plataeans of slander and invective. They endeavour to pal-
OF THE BISTORT. kIv
*' liate the reproach on themselves, for deserting the cause of li-
" berty, and joining the arms of Persia. The Plataeans had
" been active ever since to betray it to the Athenians ; that
*' wicked scheme, which with all their power the Thebans had
" ever opposed. By such iniquitous conduct the Plataeans had
" extinguished their former glory, had effaced all their former
" merits. Nobody was bound to redress or pity them, but their
*' friends the Athenians. Their temper had been always bad ;
" always bent on violence and mischief 5 always addicted to set up
" tyranny in Greece, provided Athenians were the tyrants. They
" then endeavour to throw an anti-pathetic into their own repre-
" sentaiions. They paint the death of their countrymen slain at
" the surprise of Plataea in a mournful light, as put to death con-
*' trary to every law, and murdered in the very act of stretching
** out their hands and pleading a promise of life. The lives there-
" fore of such butchers are forfeited to justice ; and they insist
" the forfeit shall be taken : the Lacedemonians are bound in
" honour to take it. They beg them therefore to be deaf to vain
*' complaints and entreaties, to revenge the injured, and to punish
*' the guilty ; to regard what bad men have done, and not what
" they have said ; to defy eloquence, and heed only simple unso-
" phisticated truth ; by which alone men, who preside in judg-
" ment, can satisfy their conscience and their duty.*'
An alliance with Thebes is necessary in this war to the Lace-
demonians, and they purchase it at a mighty price indeed.
The wretched Plataeans, by all mankind abandoned, are butchered
one after another, to the number of two hundred ; their wives are
sold for slaves 3 their city is rooted up from its foundations.
Thucydides soon after describes the sedition of Corcyra, the
horrors of which are scarcely to be paralleled in story. He paints
all the dreadful consequences of faction in a community. And
what pity it is, that a warm, generous, and innate love of liberty,
when carried to excess, should be the source of so much misery
to reasonable creatures ! Our author, contrary to his custom, runs
out here into many grave and judicious reflections, in the interest
of no party, a champion of no particular form, but as a friend to
man, and a friend to virtue. It is the lust of power, that throws
embroilments and confusions into all communities. In govern-
ments strictly republican, the ambitious are eager to obtain more
than an equal share. In an oligarchical form, the few in power
want ever to retain and often to enlarge their share ; and the cry of
liberty is shouted loudest by those who want most to overthrow it.
But yet, was the matter ever mended, or the miseries of mankind
xlvi A SURVEY
prevented by setting up a single tyrant ? Communities have suf-
fered more, for the caprice, for the support of the nominal glory
of such a head, than they have done by a number of popular se-
ditions. The reader will certainly all along reflect on the fine
model of government established in his own country ; and own,
that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the
power of the one and of the few and of the many may be tem-
pered into an apt and lasting consistence j and, as it hath been
for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but unhurt by intes-
tine faction, may last to the dissolution of this great globe itself.
After this tragical business of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon
the affairs of Sicily. The seeds of war are sowing in that island,
which will afterwards grow into a mighty harvest. — He relates
other incidents, until he comes to a remarkable scene of war in
^tolia, where Demosthenes the Athenian commander is totally
defeated. — He describes the purification of the isle of Delos by
the Athenians ; and hath found the art to make it a cheerful and
entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath been
engaged in so many scenes of horror and destruction, and is soon
going to be engaged in more. — The battles of Olpe and Idomene
are sufficiently stored with slaughter, to glut any reader who
delights in blood. The armies in this history have been often
thought not to be sufficiently numerous. They make no havoc j
they do not knock one another on the head fast enough to pre-
serve attention. But these old Greeks were men and not brutes.
And it is a pity, that the history of men should be so much a his-
tory of the destruction of the human species.
Book IV. In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedemo-
nians, principals in the war, are matched directly against one
another. Demosthenes, a wise and brave commander had seized
and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed such
a garrison in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end
might wound the very vitals of that state. The Lacedemonians
slight it at first, as if their bare appearance would remedy all.
But upon trial, their land-armies and their squadrons are unable
to dislodge the enemy. It is with the true martial spirit of an
experienced and gallant commander, that Demosthenes harangues
his small body of Athenians, when he draws them up on the
beach of the sea, to beat off the ships of the enemy. Thucydides
shines on these occasions ; in him the addresses are always made,
and pertinently made, to the soldiers who are present ; they in-
terest and animate but never run out into declamation and com-
mon-place.— The turns of war at Pylus are sudden, and engage
OF THE HISTORY. xlrii
attention. They 6ght by land, and Hght by tea. ; nay, \?liat is
more, land-battles are fought from the water, and naval battles
fought from off the shore. The eye will distinctly view these
strange occurrences ; they are painted strong 3 the groapes are
not mere heaps of confusion, and the principal figures are emi-
nently distinguished. The body of Spartans intercepted in the
isle of Sphacteria, who must either starve, or what to Lacedemo-
nians is full as bad, must surrender their persons and their arms, is
a point that exceedingly alarms that martial community. Things
had long since gone against them j but now, their hereditary ho-
nour and military glory, on which and which alone they piqued
themselves, are in danger of being miserably tarnished. Their
proud spirits condescend to beg a truce, that they may send an
embassy to Athens to solicit an accommodation.
It must have afforded a high degree of spiteful joy at Athens,
to find the Lacedenaonians lengthening their monosjUables and
petitioning for peace. It is curious to hear in what manner they
solicit, when admitted to audience. They declare themselves sent,
** in behalf of their countrymen, to propose an expedient very
" much for the honour of Athens, and which would extricate
*' themselves from difficulties that now bore hard upon them.
*' Athens never had so fine an opportunity of raising her credit,
*' securing her acquisitions, and carrying her glory to the high-
*' est pitch. They should not be puffed up, but reflect on the
" strange vicissitude of human affairs. Who could expect, the
*' Lacedemonians should ever be sunk so low, as to sue for
*' peace ? Yet what was the lot of Sparta might possibly become,
" some time or other, the lot of Athens. The latter should be mo-
*' derate now, should accept of offered friendship, should cheer-
" fully receive a submission, made only to prevent desperation
" in great and gallant souls, and open a field for mutual benevo-
*' lence. The rival states may now be reconciled j and only now,
" before things are brought to extremities, and disgrace hath ren-
" dered one party desperate. At this crisis, the Athenians may
" confer on Greece the blessing of a firm and lasting peace, and
*' reap all the honour and advantage of it, since all the credit of
" it will be their own. Lacedemonians may be obliged, but
" will not be compelled. At length, they propose their expe-
" dient, not explicitly, but with a shrewd insinuation, that would
" the Athenians strike up a bargain with them, they might
" jointly lord it over Greece for the future, beyond control."
Had Pericles been now alive, we may easily guess, how readily
he woidd have laid hold on this opportunity to end a burthen-
xlviii
A SURVEY
some and distressful war, which on the side of Athens had at first
been necessitated and merely defensive. But success had ele-
vated Athens quite too high j and no real friend to the state had
at present so much influence as Cleon, that loud and boisterous
demagogue. Hence it comes, that such terms are insisted upon
as the Lacedemonians cannot in honour accept. The truce ex-
pires ; and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important
scene of contention at Pylus,
The author here interposeth an account of what was now do-
ing in Sicily, and then returns to Pylus. The Spartans in the
isle seem as far off a surrender as ever. The people of Athens
murmur at the slowness of their troops, and begin to think that
after all they shall not carry the point. Cleon amuses them with
lies, and exasperates them by slanders : in short, though quite
undesigning it, he bullies himself into the command ; and, at
the head of a reinforcement, joins Demosthenes at Pylus. The
author describes the event with so much state and dignity, that
he raises it into another Thermopylae. There three hundred Spar-
tans stopped for a long time the whole numerous army of Xerxes,
and perished in the service. About the same number of them
struggle here as long as they can against the troops of Athens j
but, to the disappointment of all Greece, they at last surrender
prisoners of war, and are carried, nay, are carried by Cleon, in
triumph to Athens.
The territories of Corinth are invaded soon after by the Athe-
nians under Nicias, the consequence of which is the battle of
Solygia. We are then recalled to view the last acts of the tragi-
cal sedition of Corcyra, quite of a piece with, or rather in cruelty
and horror transcending the preceding.
In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with suc-
cess. The conquest of the isle of Cythera by Nicias is another
sad blow to the Lacedemonians. They are quite dispirited ; and
dare no longer face in the field these active and lively, and now
more so because successful, enemies.
Our author repasseth to Sicily. The Athenians had been ho-
vering with a squadron on that coast, on pretence of aiding the
Egestaeans, but in fact to excite a war and embroil the states of
that island. Syracuse, the leading state, perceived all their
schemes, and endeavoured to prevent them. They first obtain a
suspension of arms amongst all the parties at war 5 and prevail
on the Sicilians to hold a general congress at Gela, for the ami-
cable adjustment of all their quarrels and a perfect re-union
against foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from
OF THE HISTORY.
xliX
Syracuse, opens the true interest of Sicily on this occasion. The
warrior must now give place to the politician, who shews him-
self a master in the business.
* He is here (he tells them) as representative of the greatest of
' the Sicilian states. As such, he cannot speak from pusillanimi-
' ty or a sense of fear, though he declares himself averse to war.
* It is diffijcult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check am-
* bition. But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn j a
* prudence, which points out the proper season for every pursuit.
' It was separate interest, that first kindled the flames of war in
' Sicily ; but separate interests should always be hushed, when
' the general welfare is at stake. The Athenians have been busy
' amongst them, to inflame their mutual resentments, to note
* their indiscretions, and turn them to their own advantage; that,
' when the Sicilians have warred one another down, they may
* seize the whole island for themselves. The great passion of
* these Athenians is conquest ; they regard no ties of consangui-
* nity 3 they aim at acquiring vassals, no matter who. He blames
' them not ; he can never blame men, who are desirous of com-
* mand ; but he must blame such as are ready and willing to put
* on their chains. The Athenians have no strength in Sicily, but
' in the division of its states. Let those states but once re-unite,
' and Athenians must get them gone ; and may depart with a face
' of success, as if they had united whom they really wanted to
* disunite, and had effectually re-settled peace, when their latent
' design was war.' — He toucheth every topic in a succinct but
masterly manner. He hath recourse often to figures ; renders his
addresses emphatical, by making his own community speak from
his mouth. He applies the first person and the singular number
with great energy and weight. He useth those figures in the same
manner as Saint Paul does in the Epistle to the Romans. He
presseth harmony and cordial re-union amongst them in a man-
ner best fitted to persuade. The whole speech, in a word, is a
very interesting and persuasive piece of oratory.
The consequence is, a peace is settled \u Sicily to general sa-
tisfaction ; and the Athenian commanders are obliged to return to
Athens with their squadron, to be punished there for what they
could not possibly prevent.
The Avar continues hot through the remainder of this book.
The Athenians take their turn in being checked and vanquished.
Their attempt on Megara is related at large ; and this piece of
narration, is by far the most intricate of the kind to be met with
in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he
1 A SURVEY
endeavours to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents
of this struggle for Megara, the fluctuation of events, the views
and motives of the parties engaged. Brasidas at last secures the
city, and quite disconcerts the main project of the Athenians. —
The latter also had another great scheme in agitation for a total
revoluton in Boeotia. Arms and intrigues were at once to act,
both without and within. The whole force of Athens takes the
field on this occasion, under the command of Hippocrates. The
famous battle of Delium ensues, before which the generals ha-
rangue their troops. Pagondas the Theban is an excellent speaker
on this occasion. The Boeotians are not represented in this his-
tory, as that gross and stupid people, which was their character
from the succeeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins
also to harangue his troops, but is cut short by the attack of the
enemy. The battle is finely described, and the dispute afterwards
about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful blow,
which will soon make them begin to accuse their own judgments,
in refusing the accommodation lately offered from Sparta.
In other quarters also, the balance of war begins to incline in
favour of the enemy. Brasidas, that active and accomplished
Spartan, had now completed a march, at the head of a small ar-
my, through Thessaly aud Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace.
His bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins
Perdiccas king of Macedonia from the Athenian league. When-
ever he fights, he conquers ; and whenever he harangues, he effec-
tually persuades. His speech to the Acanthians is strong, perti-
nent, laconic. He says all that can be said in favour of his
countrymen, in recommendation of the cause of liberty. There is
that air of sincerity and good-faith in it, which were constantly
approved and verified by his personal deportment. The towns
revolt to him as fast as he hath opportunities to address them.
The reader will follow him with pleasure through his many and
great exploits, and acknowledge he wears his laurels deservedly,
and with peculiar grace.
Book V. In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the stage,
to stop the rapid conquests of Brasidas. The former had been
laughed into a general, and is now grown so conceited that he
wants to enter the lists against that truly heroic Spartan. He
accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a squadron and a fine
body of land-forces. He retakes a town or two j is confident he
shall soon recover the important city of Amphipolis ; and, though
contemned by his own soldiers, he endeavours to brave the enemy.
Brasidas, having harangued his men with his usual spirit, throws
OF THB HISTORY. "^fi
open the gates, sallies out of Amphipolis ; and routs him in an in-
stant, Cleon falls a victim to his own cowardice, and Brasidas
also falls a victim to his own valour. The latter lives long
enough to know his own side had conquered, and then expires,
admired by all that knew him, and most highly regretted by the
allies of his country.
Their ridance from Cleon diminished the loss of Athens in
this defeat, and the Lacedemonians had dearly purchased the vic-
tory with the loss of their hero. As the principal states were now
pretty nearly balanced, and sadly tired of the war, a truce is con-
cluded for a year, and a peace soon after settled by the manage-
ment chiefly of Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of
negociating and drawing up treaties. They are curious morsels
of antiquity, and the reader will see with admiration, how solemn,
how concise, and yet how guarded they are. The peace turns out
to be merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot relish it at
all, set their invention to work in order to embroil Greece afresh,
and to re-kindle a general war. Several wars break out, in which
the Athenians and Lacedemonians are concerned as auxiliaries.
And another state in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and
saving its strength entire endeavours now to seize the primacy of
Greece for itself. We shall be made privy to all her negociations
for carrying on the plan, and see it all blasted by one battle at
Mantinaea. This state was the republic of Argos in Peloponnesus,
which had been in long alliance with but in no dependence at all
upon Athens, and had been for a long time also at peace with
Sparta, by means of truces for thirty years. Young Alcibiades
doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of
Sparta and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Man-
tinsea. Thucydides introduceth the battle with all the spirit and
precision of Homer. The auxiliaries are marshalled, and anima-
ted by such exhortations, as are best suited to the peculiar cir-
cumstances of each. The Spartans are exhibited at last in all
their glory. Trained up for a camp and the day of battle, we
shall view them in their discipline and actual exertion of their
personal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed ; and
the reader will judge, whether Thucydides did not love good sol-
diers, and take a pleasure in doing them justice. It was the great-
est battle which for many years had been fought in Greece. ITie
Spartans, on this occasion, wiped ofiF all the imputations that had
lately been thrown on their bravery, because they had not been
always successful : and the aspiring state of Argos is compelled
lii A SURVEY
to acquiesce in her usual rank, and still leave the contention for
supremacy to the leading states of Athens and Sparta.
This Book affords but one incident more, of consequence
enough to be particularly distinguished j and that is the conquest
of the isle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell out in the six-
teenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and
encamped on that island, they summon the Melians to a confer-
ence, of which Thucydides hath drawn out the particulars. It is
really an uncommon one, and had sadly puzzled the critics, whe-
ther they should praise or condemn it. But, is there any thing
more unnatural in reciting what was said at it, than in holding
a conference ? It is my business only to look at the management
of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as they are
avowed on this occasion, since my author was too impartial to do
it. Nothing could tempt him to make palliating representations,
or to suppress the truth.
" The Athenians, on this occasion, avow without a blush that
" principle on which conquerors and tyrants have always acted,
" and yet have been ashamed to own : they are ever hunting for
*' colourings and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a
*' little of the air of equity : but here, without the least shame or
*' remorse, the Athenians assert their right to enslave another com-
" munity, because it suits their own interest, and because they
** have power to do it. This is the principle from which they ar-
" gue ; and, how scandalous soever it be, they argue strongly from
" it. They represent the politics of their own state, of the Lace-
" demonian state, nay of all mankind, as encroaching, oppres-
" sive, rapacious, and to tally estranged from humanity, good faith,
" and the least tincture of morality. The whole conference yields
** perhaps a just representation of human nature in the gross ; but
" then, the representation is distateful to a mind, that is cool and
** disengaged. Suqh a mind must interest itself on the side of
" the Melians j and be sorry, that the Athenians have not more
" equity and honour to qualify their power ; or, that the Melians,
*' with the regard they shew to honour and justice, should not have
" had more power, or been able to interest at least one ally in de-
** fence of their liberties and rights. In short, through the whole
" course of this History, the Athenians never make so scandalous
" a figure as on this occasion."
Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a spacious theatre is opened for a
renewal of the war. The scene is going to shift from Greece to
Sicily. The Athenians, who have so bravely resisted all their ene-
OF THB HISTORY. lui'
mies in Greece, are now going to do for those enemies what they
could not do themselves. No patriot, no statesman, no orator
is able to dissuade them from lavishing their strength on the pro-
jects of sanguine ambition and foreign conquests. Their enemies,
iu the mean time, are at leisure, to note their indiscretions, and
improve them all to their own advantage, till the great name of
Athens is quite eclipsed, and an end is put to that empire of the
sea, which she had maintained for seventy years with great lustre
anrf reputation.
The Sicilian war, which some critics * are inclined to think
hath no connexion with the subject of Thucydides, and to be mere
digression, whatever it may appear at first, the reader will at
length be satisfied was an essential part of the Peloponnesian war,
and hastened its decision. But, supposing it remote from the
principal subject, it much however be acknowledged, that it is the
history of a war nobly related, well connected, very closely fol-
lowed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and
Interest the passions. Thucydides in the course of it, which takes
up the two following books, will display the excellencies of the
poet and the painter as well as the historian. Let his merit be
regulated from this portion of his work, it is presumed that, with-
out a negative, he will be allowed the master of histor\'.
He begins with describing the theatre on which two mighty
states are going to enter the lists. — The geography and antiquities
of Sicily could not in their nature be very entertaining, and there-
fore they are drawn up in the concisest manner. — The soaring en-
terprising genius of Alcibiades hath formed a superb plan for the
aggrandizement of himself and his country. Alcibiades could plan
with all the magnificence and wild ambition of an Alexander; but
a citizen of Athens could not have the means of executing in so
imperial a manner as the monarch of Macedonia and captain-
general of Greece. He was able soon to convince the younger
and more numerous part of the Athenian community, that the en-
terprise was most inviting, and carried with it such a probability
of success as over-balanced all expense and hazard. It was long
the subject of general conversation ; it gradually inflamed the
public ardour ; and at length engrossed all their hopes and wishes.
In a word, the expedition to Sicily is formally proposed and de-
creed in the assembly of the people. A second assembly is con-
vened on ways and means. On this occasion a grand debate en-
sued, the managers of which are Nicias and Alcibiades,
• See Rapin's comparison of Thocydides and Litj.
liv A SURVEY
Nicias declares himself ' totally averse to the expedition ; but
' doth it with that diffidence, which was a principle foible in his
' character. The honour conferred upon himself, in his nomina-
' tion to the command, shall not suppress his real sentiments.
' He is neither fond nor prodigal of his life : but he loves his
' country, and would advise them to give up the expedition. — He
' next runs over the political topics, and shews it to be in every
' light an undesirable and ill-judged project. And then, without
' naming him, strikes at Alcibiades ; proves him not qualified in
' any respect for so important a command j he reflects with, some
' severity on his life and behaviour j and, though owning him-
' self afraid he shall be out-voted, yet would fain have the question
' put again, whether the expedition shall proceed ?'
Beside all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alci-
biades was now provoked by the personalities that Nicias had
thrown out against him. He had been a constant opposer of the
latter, who was beloved at Athens for his amiable qualities. For,
though Nicias had not spirit enough to lead the people, yet he
had influence enough oftentimes to check and restrain the aspir-
ing busy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this occasion
strongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades ; and
delivered with that life and grace, and pretty lisp for which he
was remarkable, must have engaged all the attention of his hearers,
and drawn their approbation perhaps in spite of their judgment.
' Censured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindiea-
* tion of himself. He maintains his right to the command. He
* hints at the splendor of his birth, his public spirit, the genero-
' sity of his heart. He recites, with an haughty and exulting air,
' his victories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home,
' and his capacity for political intrigue already and successfully
' exerted. He then justifies the wisdom of the decree for the Si-
' cilian expedition. He shews all the political topics in adifl"erent
* light from Nicias. He insinuates the advice of the latter to pro-
' ceed from indolence and a desire to sow dissensions amongst
' them. He exhorts to union, and to the observation of order.
'So Athens rose; so Athens may yet be much higher exalted."
. * The fire of youth, the temper of the middle-aged, and the expe-
' rience of the old should ever duly accord and act together.
' Sloth ruins a community j practice enables it to go through
' every conflict, and to triumph over all opposition."
Such an address could not but affect, such arguments could not
but be persuasive with the people of Athens : the expedition must
go forwards. But Nicias makes a second effort, if possible, to
divert them from it.
OF THB HISTORY. Iv
He begins with * a prayer for its success ; and a desire, that
* the preparations may be adequate to the ends proposed. He
' states the nature, the power, and strength of the people they are
* going to invade. He then, in general terras, gives in a bulky
' roll of necessary articles for those who invade them. He hopes
* to frighten and deter his audience by the vast expence, which he
' shews must necessarily be incurred on this occasion. The Athe-
' nians must provide every thing themselves, and trust for nothing
' to the care and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public wel-
' fare, and the safety of all, who are to be employed in this expe-
' dition, demand all manner of previous foresight and care.'
This speech had a different effect to what Nicias designed. In-
stead of discouraging, it animated his countrymen more than ever
for execution. Accordingly, a decree was soon passed, investing
himself and his colleagues, who were Alcibiades and Lamachus,
with full power to provide every thing needful for the service.
All hands now were soon at work. The quotas from the de-
pendents were demanded ; the fleet was equipped and manned j
the levies went on briskly, since all men came into the service
with alacrity ; and every thing was soon ready for the expedi-
tion.
At this juncture, some drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was
engaged, threw Athens into consternation. They were soon con-
strued by his enemies into a plot to bring about a revolution in
the government. Informers came in, and he was directly ac-
cused of being a party. He avowed his innocence, insisted on an
immediate trial, which he was sure would end in his justification.
The plot, which in fact was a plot against Alcibiades, was not
yet ripe enough to ruin him ; and therefore, by a strange pre-
posterous stroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the ex-
pedition, and take his trial at his return.
Our author next describes the departure of the grand arma-
ment in all its solemnity, and with all the medley of hopes and
fears shewn by the whole people of Athens on this occasion. He
lays open to our view the very hearts of the spectators. The
prime flower of their strength, nay Athens itself is now sailing
out of the Piraeus, never again to return. They make the best
of their way to Corcyra, where they are left for a time, that we
may be made privy to the consultations and defensive measures
of Sicily. The scene is now removed to Syracuse, the most pow-
erful state in that island, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed in-
ferior yet second at this time to no other state in Greece but
Athens alone. It had frequently been harassed by seditionSj
VH A -SURVEY
had often been plagued with tyrants, but was at present under a
democratic constitution.
Advice had been received there of the intended invasion. The
people are convened about it. Harangues are made ; and the
temper of mankind, when party is fermenting, justly exemplified.
Some are incredulous ; others magisterially pronounce it all a
falsehood. At length Herraocrates riseth up, and gives them his
own sense of the affair.
He assures them, " his country is eminently endangered, and
" neither incredulity nor ridicule shall awe him into silence.
" To his certain knowledge, the Athenians are already at sea, fully
" bent on the conquest of Sicily. The Syracusans ought to be-
" lieve it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all
" Sicily against the invaders. Athens will only reap disgrace,
" but Syracuse abundant glory on this occasion. Large arma-
" ments are seldom successful ; they moulder away for want of
" supplies, or are ruined for want of conduct. They should
" therefore prepare for gallant resistance, by getting every thing
" in readiness at home, and strengthening themselves by fo-
" reign alliances. They should do more ; they should at once
" put out to sea, and dispute their passage with the enemy. A
" defeat, or even delay thus given them, might oblige them to
" give up the project. He supports his advice by many strong
" and judicious arguments ; and ends with warm exhortations to
" his countrymen to be lively and active, by no means to de-
" spise the enemy except in action, but vigorously and with all
" their foresight to prepare for resistance, since their enemies are
" undoubtedly at sea, and only not arrived on their coasts."
Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuse by
Hermocrates. That community, it is evident, was full of cabal
and faction, since this worthy patriot was regarded as a party-tool
and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the blustering demagogue
who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence shews, that
he regarded Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means
whatever to force himself into employment. He seems more
alarmed for the lucrative posts of the state than for the welfare of
his country. He throws out a deal of good sense, but in a very
impertinent and scurrilous manner. Such are the persons, who
study popularity more than duty, and sacrifice all their talents to
ambition or private lucre.
He affirms, that * none but cowards and traitors wish the Athe-
* nians might not invade them, and so infallibly meet their de-
' struction : but the whole account is a glaring falsehood, the for-
OF THE HISTORY. IvH
' gery of n fiictious cabal. He appeals to his audience whether it
' carries the lea^t probability with it. Athenians invade them !
' The Athenians esteem themselves happy they are not invaded
* by the Syracusans. Yet, supposing them so mad, nothing but
* their own disgrace and ruin can be the consequence. But it is
* all a fiction ; a scheme to dishearten the friends of the people,
* and seize the government of the state. Some men have ever
' been, and ever will be dabbling in such vile machinations. But,
* let them not hope to escape detection. The intention is plain
' already, and ought to be punished like open treason. He then
' exhorts the people or the many to support their friends, and en-
' tirely to disarm the malice of their domestic foes ; and inveighs
* severely against the few, or the party whom he supposeth to be
* bent on the overthrow of the democracy at Syracuse.*
This speech of Athenagoras was so full of ill-timed choler and
party-animosity, that had the debate proceeded, dissensions might
have run very high at a season when unanimity was so needful
in all the members of that community. A general of great emi-
nence and weight thinks it high time to interpose ; who, in a
short speech, reprimands Athenagoras, recals the general atten-
tion to their own preservation from the imminent danger, and
adjourns the assembly.
The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to sea from Corcyra.
The historian takes a review of the whole, and gives a short ac-
count of its number and strength. They arrive on the coast of
Italy, where they are refused a reception. Every thing yields
them a discouraging and gloomy aspect. They soon find, they
had been grossly deluded by their Sicilian friends, who instigated
them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, which the Egestsans
had put on their ambassadors, is particularly recited. The com-
manders, at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at last
come to no sound resolution. They hover about the coast of Si-
cily, and parade in sight of Syracuse, Alcibiades endeavours to
persuade the Catanxans to join with and receive them, but a mere
accident accomplishes what his eloquence could not. The com-
mand of Alcibiades came here to an end. One of the state-vessels
arrives, and summons him to Athens, to take his trial for the late
frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, ever since
the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confusion and hor-
ror. A plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there
must be, to set up a tyrant, that most odious sound to Attic ears.
Recollection of the dismal things they had heard about the tyran-
ny of the Pisistratidee increased their fears, and drove them into
d
Iviii A SURVEY
furious and desperate proceedings. Thucydides here digresseth to
settle some facts relating to that set of tyrants, and their demoli-
tion ; particularly, the affair of Harmodius and Aristogiton, one
of the most famous incidents in the annals of Athens, He differs
indeed from most other writers, and the moderns have not thought
proper to rest the point upon his authority, great as it is ; or
though no man ever traced out facts, or made his inquiries with
more sedateness and impartiality.
But to return to Alcibiades : he was obliged to quit the com-
mand, and he seemed quietly to submit to the orders of the. state.
But, determined not to face his countrymen in their present "mood,
nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were sent for him the slip,
and sheltered himself in Peloponnesus. He became instantly a
most violent and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to
pave the way for the ruin of Athens ; of Athens, which he loved
better than any thing, except the parade of his own personal im-
portance, and the gratification of his private caprice.
Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the comitiand of
the fleet, by help of a stratagem, land at Syracuse without oppo-
sition, and seize a strong post for their encampment. The Syra-
cusans determine on a battle to dislodge them. Both sides form
in order. Nicias encourages his men by a short, but spirited, and
forcible harangue. Thucydides painte the battle with the exact-
ness, perspicuity, and ardour of Homer. The Athenians had the
better J yet not so decisively, as to think proper to continue in
their post, since they re-imbark, and sail back to Catana.
The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both sides spend
in negociations for the acquisition of allies. That at Camarina,
where ambassadors from both the warring parties are at the same
time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. Hermocra-
tes, in behalf of Syracuse, makes the first address, " It is mas-
" terly, like all that Hermocrates performs. It is designed to con-
" vince the Camarineeans, how insidious and how vile the schemes
" of the Athenians had ever been, and still continue to be. He
" arraigns all their politics and all their conduct since the Persian
" invasion ; and gives that artful turn to his remarks, which '
" might well deter others from entering into any connexion or al-
" liance with them. His strokes are severe aud cutting. He makes
" use of the figures, which give force and energy to discourse.
" No person better understood the common welfare of Sicilyj and no
" person could better explain it. He unfolds the political scheme
" at present in agitation j declares the consequence in case the
*' Athenians prevail, to alarm the concern of the Camarinsans for
OF THE HISTORY. lix
*' their country, and further to alarm their fears for themselves.
" He even threatens them with a severe revenge, in case the Sy-
" racusans, without their aid, get the better of the invaders." In
short, if the Camarinaeans had been good Sicilians, his arguments
must have prevailed.
Euphemes, who is the mouth of the Athenian embassy on this
occasion, makes a bold and spirited defence for his country. " He
** at once briskly attacks Herraocrates for the bitter imputations
" he had cast upon Athens. He asserts her fair reputation, and
"justifies her series of politics ever since the invasion of Xerxes.
'* Liberty had been the object of all her care and all her conduct.
" The Athenians had guarded, had established it in Greece ; and
" were come to support and secure it in Sicily. He throws back
" the charge of inslaving projects on the Syracusans, who now
" are eager to deprive the rest of Sicily of their best defence, by
** raising distaste towards the .Athenians. He spares no artifice,
" omits no topic that is likely to aficct. He proves a notable
" advocate for his .\thens, pompously celebrates her passion and
" her care for liberty, and most ingeniously strives to conceal
" her present ambition under a veil of most generous and dism>
" terested principles."
The issue is, that the orators have just counterpoised one an-
other's arguments, and the Camarinaeans declare a neutrality.
The embassies from Syracuse succeed much better in Pelo-
ponnesus. The Corinthians are zealous and active in their behalf ;
and they have now got an advocate to rouse up and inflame the
phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to
be the best support of whatever party he by times espoused. It is
the exiled Alcibiades, who pleads most effectually in their behalf at
a grand consultation at Sparta. His speech on this occasion is a
masterpiece. " He insinuates himself into the favour and confi-
" dence of men who had feared and hated him. Whilst he is mak-
•' ing his own personal justification, he praiseth and magnifieth
" himself. He betrays all the schemes of Athens, discloseth all
" her plan, points out her weak and unguarded parts, directs to-
" wards them the attack of her foes ; and, full as he is of resent-
*' ment against and skilful to annoy her, she totters whilst he
*' speaks." Syracuse and Sparta are now to grow famous by the
debasement of this mighty and imperial republic Her glory hath
reached its summit : it immediately will begin to sink, and her
laurels will fade away apace.
In the summer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians
stand away from Catasa, and land by night at Syracuse. They
Ix A SURVEY
instantly march, and seize Epipolae, a strong post that commanded
the city. The Syracusans fight, but without success, to beat them
from it. The siege now commenceth in form. It is clearly re-
presented in the whole of its progress, in all its forms. Every
skirmish is a distinct and lively picture. In one of them old La-
machus is killed, and Nicias of course left singly in the whole com-
mand. He carries on the siege with vigor and success for a short
space of time j but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponnesian
aids are now only not arrived.
Book VII, " If you would read truly great things," said a Spar-
tan to Augustus Caesar, " read the Seventh Book of Thucydides."
Thither we have now brought this cursory survey. The reader of
it will undoubtedly own, that no historian ever executed so closely,
so strongly, so clearly, and so pathetically, as Thucydides, " No
'' fleet but that of the Athenians," it is the observation of Ci-
cero *, " was ever able to enter the harbour of Syracuse. The
♦' fleet was only able to acheive it by the mighty force and num-
" ber of three hundred ships. But here first was the power of
" Athens defeated, lessened, depressed. In this harbour the fame,
" the empire, the glory of Athens are judged to have suffered a to-
" tal wreck," Schemes projected and actions conducted by Her-
mocrates and Gylippus Ihe Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whose
phlegm and natural diffidence are no match against such vigilance
and activity. The besieging party soon becomes as it were the
besieged. The letter of Nicias to the people of Athens represents
all the difficulties, to which he finds himself reduced. No man ever
wrote so precisely and perspicuously about military affairs. The
reader of it wants no light, no dictionary of arts, or an adept in
war to explain the terms ; and can judge, as could the meanest
citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done.
Secure in the consciousness of his own integrity, he neatly repri-
mands his countrymen for the great foible in their behaviour, jus-
tifies his own conduct, and begs to be recalled. In short, Nicias
is finely characterised by his own pen in this epistle.
The Athenians are too high-spirited to recal their troops and ,
have too good an opinion of Nicias to dismiss him from the com-
mand. Though Attica was now invaded by the Peloponnesians
and a fortress raised by them within sight of Athens itself for their
lasting annoyance, they send a powerful reinforcement to Nicias
under the command of Demosthenes. They empty Athens of the
residue of her strength, so highly wanted for domestic support.
• Oral, qiiinta in Vtrrern.
OF THB HISTORY. hi
The Syracusans, when advised of this reinforcement, redouble their
alacrity, and hope to finish the war before it could arrive. They
had had a career of success against Nicias, had just beat him both
bv land and sea, when Demosthenes steered into the harbour of
Syracuse. The sight caused a strange alteration of elevating hope
and dreadful apprehensions in the contending parties. The Syra-
cusans again become the besieged ; and Demosthenes is intent to
put an end to the siege, if possible, by vigorous and daring mea-
sures.
His attempt to retake Epipolae is, in our author's description of
it, as fine a night-piece as can possibly be drawn, and no pencil
could express it stronger. The moon shines just bright enough,
to shew us the Athenians gaining the ascent, and to give a glimpse
of the approaches of the armies and their first struggles with one
another. The whole soon becomes gloomy confusion and horrid
tumult. What a medley of singing their paeans, of conflict, of
flight, of pursuit ! friends and countrymen routing one another,
till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and perish in
the fall ! The hope of the .\thenians is blasted : Syracuse erects
her trophies fast.
Demosthenes is now convinced, the most pnident step they
could take is to raise the siege, and Nicias at last complies. The
very moment they are going to embark their troops, the moon is
eclipsed. Who bift must pity the weakness of Nicias at so danger-
ous a crisis ? who but be sorry indeed, that so good and amiable
a man should stop an army from a principle of superstition, and
detain them for so long a time on a spot of ground, where nothing
but ruin and destruction could befal them ? Men so dispirited can
make but faint opposition against an always high-spirited and now
successful enemy. They soon lose another battle, and the decisive
engagement is fast approaching.
But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than
historic spirit, emulates his admired Homer, reviews the parties
concerned, and catalogues the troops now warring against and
in defence of Syracuse. This catalogue is far from being a mere
muster-roll of names. It is full of such strokes as must imprint
many useful and moral reflections in the mind. His little inci-
dental sketches represent mankind in a true light, as Homer's do
the world of nature. Homer paints the soil, and Thucydides the
people.
The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The
Athenians must fight their way out ; or, burn all their ships and
Ixii A SURVEY
march off by land. It is determined to attempt the former : and
the consequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuse. A
more striking, more astonishing battle-piece was never exhibited;
and a masterly pencil, though none but a masterly one, might ex-
actly delineate it from this description. The present temper of
the combatants on both sides is strongly marked in the harangues
before the engagement. Nicias then said all, and the Athenians
in action did their best j but all was unavailing. I shall say no
more about it, since the reader hath nothing to do but to turn his
eye towards it, and distinctly view it through the whole of its' pro-
cess, till the Syracusans sail in triumph to their city, and raise the
most glorious of all their trophies.
The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raising of the
siege, the mournful decampment, the good heart of Nicias sym-
pathising in all their distress, and endeavouring to cheer a little
their desponding mind, their laborious marches whilst the enemy
is harassing them both in front and in rear and on all sides, the
surrender of the column under Demosthenes, the carnage in the
river Asinarus of the troops under Nicias, his surrender too, the
butchery of the generals, and the miseries of the captivated resi-
due of once so flourishing and gallant an army — these are the se-
veral incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give
the highest commendation to the Historian, when he hath read
them through: he will have no leisure until then to think of
Thucydides.
Book VIII. The catastrophe hath now taken place in this
history, and the reader is assured how all will end. The wings of
this soaring republic of Athens are clipped, never to reach their
full growth again : yet, like an eagle in the same situation, she
will struggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons,
and would yet repulse her assailants, did she not grow sick at heart.
Intestine faction will assist her enemies to finish her ruin, as a
state imperial and commercial. A regular deduction of such
incidents as these is the subject of the Eighth and last Book of
Thucydides. As a writer, he now performs in a more faint and
less engaging manner, compared with what hath gone before.
He hath but drawn his lines, but just sketched his pieces : but
the drawings and sketches will still manifest the master's hand.
We will give them a cursory view : the reader will give them a
more exact and deliberate perusal.
He sets out in his usual grave and solemn manner, to describe
the people of Athens, dispirited and distressed as they are by the
OF THE HISTORY. IxJiJ
overthrow in Sicily. All the passions and emotions of the human
nature take their train. They are incredulous 5 they are angry ;
they are convinced ; and then, they despond ; they pluck up their
spirits again, and are resolved to stand it out, nor abandon their
own preservation. They now cast their thoughts towards every
resource, and prepare again for war with spirit and resolution.
All the rest of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party j
all are eagerly running in to share the glory and the spoil. Their
own dependents are meditating revolts, and some make them at
once without premeditation. The Lacedemonians, amidst the
many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the revolt-
ing states they shall first countenance and assist. Alcibiades is
busy at Sparta, advising proper measures, and guiding their coun-
sels. Even tlie Persian monarch, by his lieutenants, enters into
league against them ; and some of their finest islands are imme-
diately rent asunder from subjection to the Athenians.
The various turns of the war at Chios,'and on the coast of Ionia,
are distinctly but concisely related, until Alcibiades appears in ac-
tion, and exerts his busy and intriguing genius. Suspected at
length and hated by the Lacedemonians, he became again their
enemy, and turned all his projects on accomplishing his return tu
Athens, and saving his country from impending ruin. His parti-
zans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now lying at Samos, cabal
in his favour. A change of government is judged a necessary
measure to bring about his recalment. It is the scheme of Alci-
biades himself ; but it is opposed and disconcerted by Phrynichus ;
by Phrynichus, who soon after turns out a violent enemy to the
democracy, whilst Alcibiades is active and zealous in its support.
None but our author's pen could have so clearly unfolded that
series of caballings, that fluctuation both in principle and conduct,
and that horrid embroilment of the leading members of the Athe-
nian state amongst themselves,which brought on seditions amongst
the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of
Athens. The democracy is at length overturned ; and an oligar-
chy, consisting of four hundred persons, erected in its stead. The
' Athenians at Samos, where the project was first laid, declare
against the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a
hearty republican ; and Thrasybulus alone manifests throughout a
sincere love and regard for his country. Parties newly formed
are broke again into divisions ; and Athens was indebted to no-
thing but the indolence of the Lacedemonians, that she did not
fall immediately into their hands, through the violence of her own
Jxiv A SURVEY
intestine seditions. But the new administration proved of short
continuance; the democracy, though on a model somewhat varied,
is again established j and Athens thus obtains a respite.
Full of matter as this part of the history is, Thucydides hath kept
his narration clear and unembarrassed. But then, it is a simple
unadorned narration, and never received the finishing hand. There
are scattered occasionally throughout it some short accounts, in
what manner the principal agents delivered their sentiments at
important junctures. They seem to have been memorials, laid
down as the ground-work, for regular and full orations. The
reader will be sorry the author was hindered, by what accidents
can only be guessed, from drawing out some of them at least into
full proportion ; particularly that of the deputation from the ar-
my at Samos to Athens, in which " the people are persuaded to
" part with their darling democracy ;'* of Thrasybulus to the
troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the democracy,
in which, " he must pathetically have expatiated on the revolt of
" Athens from liberty and her choicest patriots, who might now
*' form another Athens at Samos, and preserve her empire, though
" they had lost the city ;" that of Alcibiades further, when on his
recalment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him,
where " he deplores the malignity of his fate, magnifies his abi-
" lity yet to serve his country, and again shines in the charac-
" ter of an able statesman, a subtle politician, and a zealous pa-
" triot."
Upon the whole. One point more must be particularly distin-
guished in honour of the Athenians. The characters of them and
of the Lacedemonians are strongly contrasted through the whole
course of this History, and highly to the credit of the former.
Their spirits rise with difficulties, and patriotism starts out of mu-
tiny and faction. The Lacedemonians are indolent in success,
and shew neither alacrity nor address in promoting that cause of
liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this destruc-
tive war. They seem at last more intent on pocketing the royal
subsidies, than doing their duty as leaders and champions of
Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at sea. The
last view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-sema, where
they receive a signal defeat from those very men, whose ruin they
judged was well nigh completed. When Athens is totally to be
vanquished, as her doom is fast approaching, she must aid her
own conquerors and tyrants, in demolishing her own trophies,
and trampling under foot her liberties and rights. Her own fac-
OF THB HISTORY. IXT
tions will help to accomplish, what without them no foreign
enemy could have done. Whatever is human must decay. The
best-constituted state in the world may be undermined by its own
members, when they could not be conquered, and at len^h
be rendered an easy prey to foreign powers. May GREAT-
BRITAIN prove an exception to this affecting but just observa-
tion !
THE
HISTORY OF THE GRECIAN WAR.
ANALYSIS.
BOOK I.
THE stale of Greece before the Trojan war — 2. Tlie original of the name Het-
las. The Trojan war was the first enterprise where the Grecians combined
their forces. Miuos, the king of Crete, the first that had a navy. A digression
touching the piracy and robberies of old times ; with other notes of salvageness.
Robbing had in honour — 3. Continual wearing of armour in fashion. The
Athenians grew first civil — 4. The cities of Greece how seated and for what causes.
The Carians and Phcenicians were those that committed the most robberies.
The action of Troy — .5. Mycena-, i hough no great city, yet was of great
power. The city of Sparta less, and the city of Athens gr^.ater, than for the pro-
portion of their power. A survey of the fleet sent to Troy. The poverty of the
Greeiis was the cause why the Trojans could so long hold out — 7. The stale of
Greece after the Trojan war. liceoiia more anciently Cadroeis. The lonians
were the colonies of the Ailienians. The ditference between tyranny and regal
authority. At Corinth were made the first triremes, orgallies of three tires of oars,
one above another. The means of the wealth of Corinth. Corinth surnamed the
Rich— 8 The lonians had a navy in Cyrus's time. Polycrates, tyrant of Samoa,
had a nary in the time of Cainbyses. The shipping of Greece very mean be-
fore the Medan war. The causes why the Grecians never joined their forces in
any great action — 9. The lonians kept down by the Persian* — 10. The Laced «-
monians put down tiie tyrants through all Greece. All Greece divided into two
leagues, the Laceda:raonians and Athenians — 10. The manner how ihe Lacedae-
monians dealt with their confederates. The manner how the Atheiiiiins handled
iheir confederates. Digression to shew how negligently men receive the fame of
things past, by the example of their error, touching the story of Hip'pia*, the son
of Pisistratus, which it seems he willingly mentions both here an<l hereafter, on
light occasion — 11. The diligence of the author in the inquiry of the troth of what
he wrote, both touching the orations and the actions — 12. '1 he use of this history.
Earthquakes, eclipses, fatiiines, pestilence?, cuuconiitants of this war. The causes
oftlie war. Fear necessitates the war in the Lacedaenioniaiis. The first pre-
text— lo. The Epidamnians neglected by their mother city Corcyra, procure
the protection of the Corinthians — 14. The Corinthians send inhabitants to
Epidaiunu.s. The Corcyrseans angry at the aids sent by the Corinthians, make
war on Epidamnus. The Corcyraaiis besiege Epidamnus. The Corintiiians send
an army to relieve it — 15. The Corcyraeans offer to stand to arbitriment. The
Corinthians unwilling to accept it, arid not without cause. The Corinthian
fl^e' — 16. The Coicyra?an tieet. The Corcyrseans have the victory at sea, and on
the same day take the city. Tlie Coicyrarans r;iasters of the sea. The Corin-
thians prepare a greater navy — 17. Both Corcyrseans and Corinthians send their
ambassadors to Athens. Tub oration oj th« aiibassasobs ofCobctba— 18.
/
Ixviii ANALYSIS.
/
The oration or the ambassadors of Coriitth — 21. A league defensive made
between the Atlienians and Corcyraeans. The Athenians aid Corcyra with ten
gfallies. The Corinthian fleet— 24. The Corinthians set forward. The battle — 2.5.
The Corinthians have the better. The Athenians and Corinthians fight. Sybota of
the continent a iiaven — 26. A supply of twenty sail from Athens. The Corinthian*
fall off. The Corcyra;ans offer battle again. The Coriniliiaiis expostulate with
ihe Athenians to sound their purpose — 27. The answer of the Athenians. The
Corinihiansgo home. Both the Corcyrasans and Corinihians challenge the vic-
tory, and both set up trophies. The Corinthians in their way home take Anac-
toriuiii, and keep two hundred and fifty of the best men prisoners, being Corcy-
raeans, and use them weli. The second pretext of the war — '<i8. Polida:a suspec-
ted and commanded to give hostages, and to pulldown part of their wall. The
Athenians give order to the generals they were sending against Perdlccas, to se-
cure their cities in those parts. The Potidaeans seek the protection of the Lace-
demonians. The revolt of Potidsea, Boiiiea, iind Chalcidica from the Atheni-
ans — 29. Ihe Athenian fleet, finding Poiida-a and other cities already lost, go into
Macedonia. The Coi inihians send their forces to Potidisa to defend it. The Athe-
nians send forces against Potida-a — 30. The Athenians and those with Aristaens,
prepare themselves for battle. The victory falleih to the Athenians — 31. The
Athenians begin to besiege Potidaja. The Athenians send Phormio with sixteen
hundred men of arras to Potida;a. Potidsea straiily besieged on all sides.
The advice of Aristaeus to carry all the people but five hundred men out of the
city, that their victual mlghl the longer hold out, refused. Hegetteth out of the
city unseen by the Athenians, and staying in Chalcidica, slew certain of the city
of Sermyla by ambushment. Pliormio wasielh tl:e territories of the Chalcidteans
snd Botiieans — 32. The solicitation of the war by the Corinthians, and other con-
federates of the Lacedasmonians. Complaints exhibited against the Athenians
in the council of Sparta. The oration of the ambassadors of
Corinth — 33. The Athenian ambassadors residing in Lacedaemon upon tbeir
business, desire to make answer to the oration of the Corinthians. The ora-
tion OF THE ambassadors of Athens — 36. The Lacedaemonians amongst
themselves take counsel how to proceed. The oration of Archidamus — 40,
The oration of Sthenelaidas. The Lacedaenjonians by question conclude
that the Athenians had broken the peace — 43. The true cause of this war
being' the fear the Lacedaemonians had of the power of Athens, the author di-
gresseth to shew how that power first grew up. The Athenians return to their
city. Repair their city and wall it — 44. Themistocles adviseth them to build
on. His subtiliy in deluding the Lacedaemonians. The building hastened.
Themistocles goeih to Lacedaemon ambassador. The Lacedaemonians dis-
semble their dislike of the conduct of the Athenians. The walls of.'\theni
built in haste. Tliemistocles advises the Athenians to assume the dominion
of the sea, and to fortify Peiraeus — 46. The reason why he was mo«t
addicted to affairs by sea. Pausaiiias sent general of the Greeks to pursue
the relicksof the Persian war. Pausanias, growing insolent, the lonians offended,
desire the protection of the Athenians. Pausanias sent for home, to answer certain
accusations ; and in his absence the Grecians aive the Athenians the leading them.
Pausanias acquitted, but sent general no more. The Grecians refuse the command
of Dorcis, sent from Sparta to be their general — 47. The Athenians assess their
confederates for Ihe sustaining the war. The history of the time between the
Persian and Peloponnesian war, preterinitled by other wiifers, briefly delivered by
Thucydides. The steps of the Athenians toward their great dominion ; they take
Eion, Scyros, CarystuS and Naxus— 48. The cause of revolts from the Athenians.
The Athenians defeat the Persians upon the river Eurymedon. They war on
Thasif, tiike Amphipolis and are defeated at Drabescus. The Lacedemonians
intending to invade Attica, are hindered by an earthquake — 49. Thasus rendered
to the Athenians. The Lacedaemonians send for aid to the Athenians in their war
against Ithome. The first dissention between the Lacedaemonians and Athenians.
The Athenians being had in suspicion by the Lacedferaonians, join with the
Argives. The Helots in Ithome, after ten years siege, compound, end quit Peio-
ANALYSIS. Ixi^
ponnesuj. The Aiheuiaus receive them, aad place them in Naapactus.
Alegararevolteth from the Lacedaemonians to the Athenians — 60. The Athenians
send an army into Eg^'pt, to aid the rebels against the king of Persia. Tlie Athe-
nians fight bv sea ag<iinst the Curinihians and Epidauriuns. After ihat, against
ibe Pelopunnesiaus. Then against the £ginei£. The Corinthians aid <£gina
— 51. The Corinthians receive a great loss in Alegara — 5'2. The L.cedsmo-
nians fight with the Athenians at Tanagra. The Athenians overthrow the Bceu-
tians at Oenophjta (that is to say, the vineyards) and subdue Baeotia and Pbocis.
Mgiai yielded to the Athenians. The Athenians sail round Peloponnesus, and
waste it. The end of the Athenians' forces in Egypt. A supply of Athenians
going to Egypt, defeated by the forces of the king — .^S. The Athenians invade
Thessaly. The Athenians uuder Pericles besiege Oeniades. Truce for five
years between the Athenians aud Pelopoiinf sians. The .\thenians war on Cyprus.
Cinion dietb. The holy war — 34. The Athenians defeated at Coroneaby the out-
laws, lose Boeotia. Euboea revolteth from the Athenians. Megara revoheth.
Euboea subdued by the Athenians. Peace for thirty years between the Athe-
nians and Peloponnesians. The Athenians are upon Samos. Samos yieldeth
to the Athenians — 55. The business about Corcyra and Potidaea, before related.
Between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, fifty years — 66. The oracle con-
sulted by the Lacedsmonians, encouragetb them to the war. Consultatioa of the
Peloponnesians in general, whether tbey should enter into a war, or not. Tbx
ORATION OF TBI AMBASSADORS OF CoRiNTH — 57. The waf decreed by all
the confederates. The Lacedaemonians send arobassages to the Athenians,
^bout expiation of sacrileges, only to pick better quarrels for the war — 60. Peri-
cles always adverse to the Lacedaemonians. The Athenians require the Lace-
dsmonians to expiate the violation of sanctuary also on their parts — 62. The
letter of Pausanias to the King — 63. The letter of Xerxes to Pausanias. Pausa-
nias accused of practice with the Helots. He s^nds letters to the king,
which are opened by the way. Pausanias by the art of the Ephori made to
betray himself. He flieth into sanctuary — 65. The occasion and manner of the
death of Pausanias in the temple of Jupiter CiialcicEC4. Pausanias practiseth with
the king of Persia against the stateof Greece- 66. Theu.isioclesin the same treason.
Themistocles, pursued by the Athenians and Prioponnesians. flieth to Corcyra.
"fheace is put over to the main land, and gocth to the king of the Molossians
— 66. Thence he is conveyed to Pydna. In danger to be cast upon the Athe-
nians' fleet at Naxus, he makeib himself known to the luaster of the ship. He
arriveth at Ephesus. His letter to Artaxerses — 67. The praise of Themistocles.
His death— -68- The Lacediemonians by ambassadors command thf abrogation of
the act against the .Megareans. The last ambassadors from Lacidxmon requir*
the Athenians to lay down their duminiun. The Athenians consult what to
answer. The oration of Psriclks — 69. The aoswer of the Atheuiaiu
t9 the ambassadors of Laccda:tnoo — 73.
BOOK II.
Year L The Thebans, by treachery, enter Platsea. The Thebans execate
not the design of the traitors. But offer composition. The Platsaus accept it.
The Plataeans take heart. And unite themselves by digging through the common
walls ol their houses — 76. They assault the Tliebans. The Thebans fly, but can-
not cet.out. The Thebans penned up in a house which they entered into by niis-
taJyng the door for the city gate. They yield to discretion — 77. The whole
power of Thebes come to rescue their fellows. The Thebans seek to intercept the
PUteans in the villages. The Platseans send to ibe Thebans to be gone, and pro-
mise to release their prisoners. The Thebans go off, and the Platasans fetch in
their men and goods, 9.nd kill their prisoners. The Athenians lay hands on such
Bffiotians a^ were in Auica. They victual Pl^taea, aud put a garrison into it, and
ta^e Qultiieir aimecessary people. Preparation uf both sides for the war — 78
Ixx ANALViSIS.
Prophecies and oracles preceding the war. Tlie affections of the Grecians to-
wards thd^ combatant states — 79. The confederates of the Lacedaemonians. The
confederates of the Athenians. Tlie Lacedajmonians' league, meet in the
Isthmus, invade Attica. The oration of Archidamus in ihe council ov
WAR, in the army of the league — 80. Archidamus sends before him an
ambassador to the Athenians — 81. And tries all other means to right his countrv,
before war. The ambassadors from Archidamus convoyed back without con-
ference. Archidamus marcheth forward. Pericles imagining Archidatnus
might spare his grounds, promiseth, if he did, to give them to the state. The
speech of Pericles to the assembly at Athens, touching the means of the war, &c.
— 82. The length of the walls to which the watchmen were appointed. Their
gallies. The Athenians fetch in their wives and children and substance into the
city. The Athenians accustomed ever to live in the country. The Athenians
remove out of the borough towns into the city unwilliugIy---83. Athens thronged
with the coming in of the country. The Athenians make ready one hundred
gallies to send about Peloponnesus. The Peloponnesians' army assault Oenoe,
a frontier town of Attica, in vain--- 85. Archidamus taxed of backwardness, and
favour to the Athenians. Archidamus with his army entereth into Attica. And
comes to Acharnas, and stays there long, cutting down tlieir corn and trees. The
design of Archidamus in staying so long at Acharnas-— 86. The Athenians hardly
contain themselves from going ought to fight. A skirmish between the Athenian
•nd Boeotian horse — 87. Archidamus removes from Acharnas. The Athenians
send one hundred gallies to infest the sea coast of Peloponnesus. The Pelopon-
nesians go home. The Athenians set by one thousand talents and one hundred
gallies, for defence against an invasion by sea. The Athenians assault Me-
thone. Brasidas defendeth it — 88. They take Pheia, a town of Elis. The in-
habitants of jEgina removed by the Athenians. And received by the Peloponne-
sians. Eclipse of the sun, and stars, discerned — 89. The Athenians seek the
favour of Sitalccs, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas, king of Macedonia. The Athe-
nians take Solium and Astacus, and the isle of Cephalonia — 90. The Athenians
invade Megaris. The Athenians' greatest army. The Athenians duly once a
year invade Megaris. The end of the first summer. Euarchus, the tyrant, reco-
vereth .4.stacus---91. The manner of the Athenians in burying the bones of the
first slain in the wars. The funeral oration made by Pericles
—92.
Year II. The second invasion of Attica, by the Lacedaemonians. The
plague at Athens — 98. It began in .(Ethiopia. The Peloponnesians supposed
to have poisoned their wells. The author sick of this disease. The description
of the disease — 99. Birds and beasts perished that fed on carcases — 100. No
man sick of it mortally the second time. Men died in the streets. Neglect of re-
ligion and law — 101. Predictions called to minil. An ambiguous prophecy ex-
pounded by the event — 102. The Peloponnesians depart out of Attica. The
Athenian fleet returned from Peloponnesus, go to Potidsea with ill success by rea-
son of the sickness. The Athenian people vexed at once both with the war and
pestilence, grow impatient toward Pericles — 103. The oration of Pericles —
104. Pericles fined in a sum of money. Athens at the greatest in the time of
Pericles. His death and commeiidation — 107. The Lacedemonians war against
Zachynthus — 108. The Lacedeemonian ambassadors taken by the Athenian am-
bassadors in Tlirace, and went to Athens. The Athenians put them to death.
The Ambraciots war on Amphilochia' — 109. The end of the second summer.
Potidaea rendered to the Athenians — 110
Ybar III. The siege of Plataea. The Plataeans' speech to Archidamus. The
answer of Archidamus to the Plaiseans — ill. The reply of the Plataans. The
answer of Archidamus to their reply. The Plataeans reply again and desire to
know the pleasure of the people of Athens. The Athenians' message to the
Plaiasans. The Platseans' last answer to Archidamus from the wall. Archida-
mus's protestation — 112. A mount raised against Plataja. The Platreans raise
their wall higher against the mount, by a frame of timber, in which tiiey layed
their bricks. The Plataeans devise to draw the earth from the mount through the
ANALYSIS. Itti
wall. The Peloponnesians remedy tint evil. The Plafsans fetch the earth away
from under the mount by a mine. The Plataans make another wall within that
which was to the mount — 113. The Peloponnesians assault the wall with engines.
The Plataans' defence against the engines. The Peloponnesiaus throw fagots
and fire into the town from the mount. A great fire. The siege laid lo Pla-
taea — 114. The Athenians send an array against the Cbalcidxans. The Athenians
fought with by the Chalcidxans at Spartolus. And overthrown with the loss
of three commanders. The Ambraciots invade Acarnania, together witb the La-
cedsemouians — 115. The army of the Ambraciots and their confederates. They
go toward Stratus. Stratus the greatest city of Acarnania — 116. Wariness of
the Grecians. Rashness of the Chaonians. Stratagem of the Stratians. The
Peloponnesians and Ambraciots retire without eflFect. Phormio, with twenty
gallies of .Athens, c»ercometh forty-seven of the Peloponnesian gallies. The
order of the Peloponnesian gallies — ll7. The order of the .Athenian gallies, and
the stratagem of Phormio. The Peloponnesians fly — 118. Preparations for
another fight. Twenty sail of Athenians, sent to aid Phormio, stay in Crete.
The Peloponnesians sail by the coast of Panormus — 119. Thk oa.4TiON op
Cnemus — 120. Phormio doubteth of the cojr.ige of his soldiers. And en-
courageth them. The oratios Of Phormio — 121. The stratagem of the Pe-
loponnesians— 122- The Peloponnesians give the onset. The Athenians have
the victory — 123. Timocrates a Lacedemonian commander slayeth himself. The
end of the third summer. The Peloponnesians resolve to attempt the surprise of
PirtBus. The Peloponnesians dare not execute their design, but turn to Salamis —
124. The king of Thrace maketh war on the king of MacedoD — 125. The de-
scription of Thrace — 126. The grejt power of the Scythians — 127. The begin-
ning of the kingdom of Macedonia. The Macedonian kings descended of the
Teraenidae, a family in Argos, of th? Peloponnesiins. The Macedonians retire
into their walled towns. Archelaus, the son of Pcrdiccas, the ninth king of
Macedon, of the family of the Temenidae — 128. Sitaices and Perdiccas come to
a conference about the motives of the war. The Grecians at the coming of this
army stand upon their guard, fearing they were called in by the Athenians to
subdue them. Seuthps corrupted by Perdiccas, persuadcth Siialces to return.
Phormio putteth suspected persons out of Stratus and Coronta — 129. Yhe
course of the river Achelous. Acarnania whence so called. Tbect.doftbe
third year of the war — 130.
BOOK III.
Year IV. The Peloponnesians invade Attica. The revolt of Lesbos. The
intention of the Lesbians to revolt, discovered to the Aihrniaus. The Athe-
nians send forty gallies to Lesbos. The .Athenians imprison such of Mitylenc as
were at .Athens, and stay their gallies— 132. The Athenians give the Mityle-
nians time to purge themselve» at .Athens. The Miiylenian ambassadors speed
not at Athens. They sally out upon the Athenians but without success. Thev
lie still expecting help from Peloponnesus — 133. The Athenians send for the aids
of their confederates. The Athenians send Asopius, the son of Phormio, witb
twenty gallies about Peloponnesus. Asopius slain. The Mitylenian ambassadors
sent to Lscedaeraon, are appointed to attend the general a>semt)ly of the Grecians
at Olympia. The ok.atio.it of the ambassadors op MixTtEifB — 134 The
Mitylenians taken into the Lacedaemonian league. The Lacedemonians pre-
pare for the invasion of Attica, both by sea and land — 137. The .Athenians to
make shew of their power, and to deter the enemy from their enterprise, send one
hundred ^'allies, not so much to waste Peloponnesus, as to confute 'he opinion
which the Lesbian ambassadors had put into the Lacedaraonians of their weak-
ness— 138. The greatness of the Athenian navy, an occasion of their great ex-
pence of money. The Mitylenians go with a power to Methymne, hoping to
have it betrayed. The Athenians send Paches with one thousand men of arras to
Wi
ANALYSIS.
Mitylene. The end of the fourtli summer — 139. The escai)e of two hundred and
twelve men out of Plata;a, through the works of the enemy. They make the
length of their ladders by conjecture upon counting the lays of brick. The de-
scription of the fortification of the Peloponnesians about Plataea. The descrip-
tion of the Plataeans going over the enemy's walls — 140. Sa!ajlhi|8, a Lacedaemo-
nian, entereth stcretl^' into Mitylene, and confirmed them with bone of spee-
dy aid— 142.
Year V. Attica the fourth time invaded — 142. Pausanias, king of Lacedae-
mon. Salajihus arras the commons for a sally. They mutiny and give up the
town. Some of the Mitylenians fearing the worst, take sanctuary. Whom
Paches perstiaded to rise. And sendeth them to be in custody at Tenedos. The
voyage of Alcidas with forty g-allies into Ionia — 143. Alcidas with his fleet at
Embatus is assured of the loss of Mitylene. The advice of Teutaplusin the council
of war — 156. The advice of certain outlaws of Ionia and Lesbos. The co-
wardly resolution of Alcidas. He killeth his prisoners. The Sumians sharply
reprehend him — 144. Alcidas maketh baste from Ephesus homeward. Paches
pursuetb the Peloponnesians, and is glad he overtaketh them not. Paches par-
lieth with Hippias — 145. His equivocation with Hippias whom lie put to
death contrary to promise. Paches takelli Pyrrha and Eressus. He appre-
hendeth Salaethus in Mitylene. The Athenians slay Salsethus, though he
offered to withdraw the Peloponnesians from the siege of Piatasa. The
cruel decree of the Athenians in their passion against the Mitylenians.
The Athenians repent of their decree, and consult anew. Cleon most popular,
and most violent — 146. The oration of Cleon — ^147. The oration
OP DioiJOTUs — 15(). The sentei.ce of Diodotus taketh place. A galley sent
out afier the farmer, with a sentence of mercy. The speed of the latter galley
to overtake the former that carried the decree of death — 154. The commons of
iVJitylene very ;jear destruction. Above a thousand principal authors of the re-
volt executed. Nicias taketh Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara, The PJa-
taians yield the city. The Lacedaemonians refuse to take Platsa by force, but
will have it by voluntary surrender. Unjust proceeding of the Lacedasmonians
— 155. The oration of the Pi.at^ans — 156. The oration of the THEBAWi
— 160. The Lacedaemonians proceed with their question. The Plataeans are put
to death. Twenty-five Atheuiaiis slain with them. Plataea pulled down — 164.
The Lacedajuionians in their sentence upon the Plataeans, liave more respect to
their own profit than to the merit of the cause. The forty gallies, with Alcidas,
come weather-beaten home. The sediiion of Corcyra occasioned by the captives
that came from Corinth; who persuaded the renouncing of their league with
Athens. Pithias, one of the Athenian jactjoo, accused; and absolved, accuseth
some of tlie other faction — 165. Pithias and others slain in the senate. The
Jjacedjemonian faction assail the commons. The commons overcome the oUgar-
chjcals — 166. Alcidas and the Peloponnesians arrive and fight at sea against
the Corcyraeans. Alcidas, a coward — 167. TlireesC/re sail of Athenians come
to aid the Corcyraean commons — 168. The Peloponnesians depart with their
fleet — 183. The people, upon the coming in of the Athenians, most cruelly put
to death whomsoever they can of the contrary faction. Description of the beha-
viour of the people in this sedition — 169. The manners of the seditious — 170.
In seditions and confusions, they that distrusted their wits, suddenly used their
h^nds, and defeat the stratagems of the more subtle sort — 171. The Athenian
fleet goes a^ay. Five hundred of the nobility that escaped, seize on such
places as belo;iged to the Corcyra'.ans in the continent. They come over and
fortify themselves in Istone. The Athenians send twenty gullies into Sicily, in pre-
tence to aid the Leontines, but with intention to hinder the coming of corn from
thence into Peloponnesus, and to spy out the posMbilily of subduing that island.
The end of the fifth summer — 17'^. The plague again at Aihens. The Allie-
nians invade the Lipareans, and islands called ihe isles of Aeolus — 173.
Year. Vf. Earthquakes about Eubcca, and inundations. The natural cause of
inundation given by the author. The Athenians win Mylae. And Mes-
lana— 174. The Athenian? «eud Dcmost%ne9 yf\\h thirty gallies about Pelopoa-
ANALYSIS. Ixxiii
nesBS. And Nicias with sixty gallies into the island of Melos. The army of
Nicias, and another army frora the city of Athens, meet upon a sign given it
Tanagra, in BcEOtia. They overcome the Tanagrians in battle. The Lacedaroo-
nians huild the city Heraciea. The commodious seat of this new city for the
war — 175. The Thessalians infest the new city with continual war, for fear they
should be too great. The severity of the Laccdamonians' government, dispeo-
pled ihe city of Heraciea, and frio^hted men from it. The Lacedaemonians al-
ways severe, not always just. ]>emostbenes warreth on Leocas — 176. Demos-
thenes invadeth /Etolia at '.he persuasion of the Messenians. The ambition of
Demosthenes, the chief cause of his unfortunate enterprise in i£iolia — 177. The
.^tolians unite against the invasion of Demosthenes. The ^tolians give Demos-
thenes a great overthrow — 178. Demosthenes afraid to come home. The Athe-
nian fleet in Sicily sail to Locris, and take Peripoliam. The i£iolians and Pelo-
ponnesians make a journey against Naopactas — 179. Demosthetaes relieTeHi
NaupactDS. The end of the sixth summer. The Athenians in Sicily assaoll
Nessa. Delos hallowed — 180. An edict that none should be sufi'ered to be bom
or die in Delos. Rhenea an island tied to Delos with a chain, and dedicated
to Apollo of Delos. The Athenians institute the quinquennial gnraes at De-
Jos — 181. The Ambraciois and Peloponnesiansmske war against tht AcBrnatiiani
and Araphilochians unfortunately. — ^They take Olpae. The Acarnauians make
Demosthenes their general. The Ambraciots at Olp» send to the .\mbraciots at
home to come to their aid — 182. Demosthenes chosen general. The battle be-
tween the A mbraciots and the Acamanians. The Ambraciois and Peloponne-
sians fly — 183. Demosthenes suffereth the principal Peloponnestans to retire from
01p;e secretly ; to disguard the Arabraciots of their aid, and procure the Pelopon-
nesians the hatred of the na^ons thereaboois. Demosthenes sendeih part of
his army to lie in ambush by the ways by which the .4mbraciot supplies were to
come from the city. The Mantineans retire from Otpte — 184. The Ainbraciots go
after them, and are slain to the number of two hundred. The rest escape to
Salynthiu», king of the .■^grxans. Demosthenes goeth out to meet the sopply of
Ambraciots that came from the city. The Ambraciois surprised in their lodgings.
The Ambraciots put to flight. The conference of the herald from the Ambraciots
in Agrseis, with one of Demosthenes' army, about the number of the slain
— 185. The Acarnanians will not let the Athenians subdue the Ambraciots ut-
terly, because they thought the Ambraciois better neighbonrs than ihe Athe-
nians. League for one hundred years between the Ambraciois and Acarnanl-
ans — 186. The Athenian fleet in Sicily invade Himerxa. Pythodords sent to lake
the fleet from Laches. The fire breaketh cot of i£tua, burnelh the fields of Ca-
una — 187.
BOOK IV.
Year \'IL Messana revolteth frora the Athenians— 189. The Locrians waste
the territory of Rhegium. The fifth invasion of Attica. The Athenians send
forty gallies into Sicily. Who are to put in by the way at Corcyra, being still in
sedition, the out-laws holding the field, and the commons the city. Demosthenes
urgeth to put in at Pylus. The fleet driven into Pylos hy weather— 190. The
commodity of Pylus. The Athenians build the fort of Pylus. The Lacedemo-
nians at home regard the taking of Pylus but lightly. The Lacedaemonians* army,
and Agis taki- it more to heart --191. The Athenians take Eion in Thrace, and
lose it again. The Lacedemonians by sea and land, seek to recover Pylus. Di-
roostbenes sends to call back the fleet to help him. The Lacedaemonians prepare
themselves to assault the fort. The situation of the isle Sphacteria--192. The La.
cedamonians put over four hundred and twenty men of arms, besides their servtnts,
into the isle of Spacteria over against Pylos. Demosthenes preparelh himself to
keep the Lacedsemonians from landing on the shore. The okation ot Dxhos-
TUKNEs TO HIS soiDiiBS — 193. The Athenians take heart, Tfcc Lacedemo-
bcxiv ANALYSIS.
niaiis assault the fort by land, and seek to force landing from their gallies. The
valour of Brasidas— 194. Brasidas swooneth by reason of his wounds. The Lace-
daemoninns after three days' assault, without effect, give over that course. The
Athenian flfet return from Zacynthus, to aid the Athenians in Pylus. The Athe-
nians overcome the Peloponnesian fleet in the haven of Pylus— 19.5, The Athe-
nians getting the victory, besiege the men cut off from the army, in the island —
The magistrates of Sparta come to view the state of the camp, and conclude
there to send to Athens about peace. Truce between the armies, till ambassadors
might be sent to Athens. The jirticles' of the truce — 196. The ora-
tion OF THE i ACEDSMONiAN AMBASSADORS — 197. The insolcnt demand of
the people of Athens, by the advice of Cleon. The Lacedaemonians desire to
speak before a private committee---l99. The ambassadors return without effect,
and the truce endeth. The Athenians cavil, and keep the gallies of the Lacedse-
monians. The war at Pylus goes on — 200. The Syracusians and Athenians fight
in the strait between Mebsana and Rhegium. The Syracusians and Athenians
fight at sea — 201. The Messanians war on ihe city of Naxus, and receive a
great loss. The Aihonians and Leoniines attempt to take Messana. The Athe-
nians are much troubled to watch the island — 202. The shift of the Laceditmo-
nians to relieve the besieged with victual. The Athenians are angry, that their
array is detained so long in the siege of the island — 203. Cleon, to avoid the
envy of hindering the peace, engageth himself, ere he was aware, to fetch those
that were besieged in the island home to Athens. Cleon undertakeih to fetch
those in the island prisontis to Athens. Cleon taken at his word, would have de-
clined the employment, but cannot. A glorious boast ot Cleon well taken — 204.
The reason why Demosthenes durs-t not Und in the island to subdue the besieged
by fight. The wood of the island burnt by accident — 203. Cleon arriveth at
Pylus. The Athenians invade the island. And kill those that were in the first
and most remote watch from Pylus. The Athenians divide themselves into many
troops against the main body of the Lacedaemonian soldiers — 206. The fight between
the Athenians and the Laceda;monians in the miildle of the island — 207. The
Lacedftmonians retire to the fort where the last guard was placed. The Athenians
assault them there. Some of the Athenians climb up behind the Laceda;monians un-
seen, and appear iit their backs — 208. The Lacedanionians yield. The Lace-
daemonians yield up their arms, and are carried prisoners to Athens. The
number of the slain, and of the prisoners. The vielding of the Lacedasnionians
was contrary to the opinion had of their virtue— -209. The Lacedaemonian pri-
soners kept in bonds at Athens, to be made use of in making the peace, or else
upon the first invasion of Attica to be slain — 210, Nicias warreth in the territory
of Corinth with good fortune. The Corinthians hearing of their coming, assemble
their forces to hindertheir landing. The Athenians and Corinthians fight — 211.
The Corintlii;ins are put to flight The Athenians waste other parts of the same
coast — 212. The execution of the Corcyraan banished men, and end of that se-
dition. Truce granted to the banished men, with condition that the same
should be void if any of them offered to luakean escape The fraud of the Cor-
cyrasans to entrap the banished men. The truce broken, and the outlavss put
into the hands of the commons. The Corey rseans take the outlaws out by scores,
and make iheni pass the pikes — 213. The outlaws refuse to go out to execution.
They kill themselves. The miserable end of the banished men. which was also the
end of the sedition. The Athenians take Anactorium from the Corinthians, and
put it into the hands of the Acarnanians. Artaphernes, an ambassador from the
king of Persia to the Lacedaimonians, intercepted, and brought to Athens, and his
letters read, 'ihe king of Persia's letters to the L.ncedaenioiiians translated into
Greek, and read at Athens — 214. The Chians are »u>-pe.cted, and forced to
pull down their new built walls.
Year VIIL The Lesbian outlaws make war upon the Athenians' dominions
in the continent near Lesbos. The Athenians led by Nicias, subdue Cythera,
an island over against Lacunia, and inhabited by Lacedaemonians — 2lh. The
Cytherians yield to Nicias, referring themselves to the people of Athens for any
thing but death. The Athenians remove them from their seals. TIic Lacedcemo-
ANALYSIS. Ixxv
niani b«'gin to be dejeded with their great losses. The Aihenians waste
the coast of Laconia, The Athenians burn Thyrea, slay and make prisoners of
all the inhabitants being ^Eginets — '217. Tantalns a Lacedaemonian captain
carried prisoner to Athens. The decree of the Athenian people concerning the
Cythereans, the ^gineize taken in Thyrea, and Tantalus a Lacedaemonian that
was amongst ihero. The .-Eginet* put to death. The Sicilians make a general
peace, by ilie advice of Hermocrates, and so dismiss the Athenians, that waited to
tale advantage of their discord. Thb oration of Hekmocrates for peace —
218. The substance of the conditions of the peace in Sicily. The Athenians depart
Sicily, and iht-ir commanders punished as suspected to have left Sicily for a
bride — 221. The Athenians attempt to take Megara by treason. Tbi- heads of the
commons do hinder the return afthe outlaws, plot the betiayingof the city to the
Athenians. The plot laid by the traitors for ihe putting of the Athenians
into the town. The plot of the traitors to give the Athenians the long-walls.
The Athenians win the long-walls — 222. The traitors give advice to open the
gates and give battle. The treason discovered — 223. The Athenians failing
of Megara, take Nisxa, and demolish the long- wall* Brasidas saveth Megara
from being rendered to the Athenians — 224. Brasidas desireth to put himself
into the city. Brasidas goeib back to Tiipodi»cus. The Boeotians come with
their forces, and join with Brasidas. The Bceoiian and Athenian horse skirmish
— 22.'i. The whole army on either side, face one another, but neither side willing
to begin. The Megareans receive Brasidas and his army — 226 The Megarean
outlaws recalled, and sworn to forget former qiiarrels. The outlaws being' in authority,
put to death one hundred of the adverse faction. The Mitylenian outlaws lose the
city of Antandrus, which they had intended to fortify and make the seat of their
war. Lamachus loseth his ten gallies by a sudden land flood in Puntus. De-
mosthenes goeth to Naupactus uf>on design against the Bceotians — 227. The plot
laid between certain Boeutians, and the Aliienians, how to bring Bceotia into the
power of the Athenians. Brasidas passeth ihruugh The^saly with fifteen hundred
men of arms, to aid the Chalcideans that deliberated a revolt — 228. The soft
answer of Brasidas, notwithstunding he was resolved to pass. Brasidas goeth apace
through Thessaly. The cause why Pcrdiccas and the Chalcideans called in the
Lacedemonians into those parts — 229. The cause why the Lacedaemonians so willing-
ly sent an army to them. An impious policy of the Lacedxmonians in destroying
their Helots. The praise of Brasidas — 230. Brasidas refuseth to make war on
Arrhibsus, for the offer of Arrhibaeus, and through the advice of the Chalcideans.
Giveth therein distaste to Prrdiccas — 23|. Brasidas curaeth before Acanthus,
and is received without his army. The oration op Brasidas — 232. The
revolt of Acanthus. The revolt of Stagyrus. The end of the eighth summer. De-
nosthenes approacheth Siphae by sea, to take it by treason, but failed. The treason
detected — 234. Hippocrates marcheih to Delium. The array of the .Athenians
having taken D«"Iium, be^in to retire. The Bceotians follow them. The oratiom
OF Pacondas to his sOLniins — 23o. The order of the army of the Boeotians.
The order of the army of the Aihrnians — 237. The oratiox of Hippocrates to
HIS SOLDIERS. Tlie Bceotians interrupt the oration. The Athenians fly — 238. Dis-
pute aboutgivingteave to tite .Athtniaus to take up their dead. The message of the
B<Eotiaus to the Athenians. The message of the .Athenians to the Boeotians, bv a
fijend of their own — 239. The reply of the Ba?otians. The form of an engfne,
wherewith they set the wall on fire — 240. Delium recovered by the Bceotians. The
Boeotians deliver to the Athenians their dead. Demosthenes landing in Sicyouia.is
beaten back by the inhabitants. Sitalces king of Thrace dieth, and Southes his
brother's son succeedeih him. Brasidas goeth to Ainphipolis. The original of.Amphi-
pojis — 241. Agnon founder of Amphipolis. The Argilians conspire to betray Am-
phipolis. Argilusrevolteth. Brasidas wiiineth the bridge, and is master of all be-
tween it and the city — 242. The Amphipolitans send for aid to Thucydides, the
author of this history. Brasidas fearing to be prevented by Thucydidis, hasteih by
easy conditions to procure the town to yield. Amphipolis yielded. Thucydides
comelh too late to relieve Amphipolis, and putteth himself into Eion — 243. And
defendeth it against Brasidas. Great inclination of the people of those parts to come
i
Ixvi ANALYSIS.
in toBrasidas. The Athenians begin to fear — 244. The Athenians send garrisons to
tTie places thereabouts. Brasidas envied at home. The Megareans demolish their
ling walls, which were before but disjoined from the city, by the Athenians. Brasi-
das invadeth the territory of Acte, where Athos'standeth. Torone rcvoltetli to Rra-
sidas. The manner how the town was betrayed — 245. The town taken. The
Athenians escape into a castle of the same called Lecythus — 246. Brasidas
his speech to the Toronaeans. Brasidas taketh Lecythus.
Year IX. Truce for a year. The motives to truce on either side. The articles
of tlie truce — 248. The revolt of Scione. Brasidas goeth over in a boat, but
with a galley before him, and his reason — 250. Brasidas's speech to the Scioneans.
The honour done to Brasidas by the Scioneans. Brasidas receiveth news of
the suspension of arms. Difference between the Athenians and Lacednemonians
about the restitution of Scione, which revolted after the truce made, but before
the Laced?eraonians knew of it. The Aiheni;ins prepare to war on Scione---25l.
Decree of the Athenians against Scione. The revolt of Menda. Perdiccas
and Brasidas jointly invade ArrhlbsBns---252. The Lyncestians fly. Perdiccas
expecteth mercenary aid out of Illyris. The Jllyrians come and turn to Arrhi-
bajus. The Macedonians upon a sudden fear run away and desert Brasidas.
Brasidas's retreat. Thk oration of Brasidas to his soldiees---253.
Brasid^ draweth away his army, and the Barbarians follow him. The II-
lyrians pursue the Macedonians, leaving part of their army to follow Brasidas.
Brasidas seizeth the top of the hill by which he was to pass. The spite of Brasidas''s
soldiers against the Macedonians for abandoning them — 255. Perdiccas and Bra-
sidas fallout. The Mendaeans encamp without the city. Nicias wounded. Sedi-
tion in Menda. The gates opened to the Athenians upon sedition — 256. Menda
pillaged by the Athenians. The Athenians lead their army against Scione. Per-
diccas maketh peace with the Athenians. The Laceda;monians make young men
governors of cities. The walls of Thespiae demolished by the Thebans — 257.
The temple of Juno in Argos burnt by negligence of an old woman priest.
Phaeinis, priest of Juno, in the place of Chrysis. Siege laid to Scione. The
end of the ninth summer. Battle between the Mantineans and the Tegeatse.
Brasidas attempteth Fotidasa, The end of the ninth year — 258.
BOOK V.
The truce for a year expired— 259. The Delians removed out of Delos upon
superstition. The Delians seat themselves in Adramyttium. Cleon goeih out
with an army into the parts about Thrace. He assaulteth Torone. Pasitelidas
with the garrison of the town, endeavoureih to defend it. Cleon taketh Torone.
Pasitelidas, a Lacedaemonian captain, taken alive. Seven hundred men sent
prisoners to Athens — 260. Panactum taken by the Boeotians. Cleon goeth to
Arophipolis. Phaeax sent ambassador to the Sicilians. The Leontine commons
driven out of the city by the Syracusians. The Leontine nobility become Syracu-
sians, and go to Syracuse to dwell. The Leontines make war on the Syracusians.
Pbajax nioveth the Sicilians to war upon the Syracusians. The Geians stop the
motion made by Phaeax — 261. Phaeax maketh peace with the Locrians. Cleon
maketh war on Amphipolis. Gampselus taken by Cleon. Brasidas sitteth down
overagainst Cleon at Cerdylium. The forces of Brasidas. Cleon goeth up to
Amphipolis against his own mind — 262. Cleon, not expecting a sally, vieweth
the situation of the town. Brasidas putteth himself into Amphipolis. A strata-
gem of Brasidas. The oration or Brasidas to his soldiers — 263. Brasidas
preparelh to assault the army of the Athenians. Cleon is admonished of a sally
towards : and leadeth his army back. Brasidas taketh this opportunity for
this sally. Brasidas is wounded and fall.-ih. Cleon flieth and is shdn. Brasidas's
army gettcth the victory. Brasidas liveth only so long as to know he bad
the victory — 965. The honour done to Brasidas after his death. Supplies go-
ANALYSIS. kx?i
ing to Brasidas, stay by the way at Heraciea. The supplies going to Brasidas,
hearing of his death, return to Laceda-mon. Tlie Athenians and Lacedsuonians
incline to peace — 266. The cause;, why the Athenians desired peace. The
causes why the Lacedaraonians desired peace. Cleon and Brasidas opposers of
the peace for seTeral ends — 267. Ple;sioanax and Nicias persuaders to peace.
Nicias's ends in seeking peace. — ^The reason why Pleistoanax desired the peace.
Pleistoanaz banished for withdrawing his army out of Attica — 268. The
Lacedaemonians desiring the |>eace make shew of war. Peace conciuded. The
Bdeotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, refuse to be comprehended. The
AKTICLEg OP THE PEACE BETWEEN THE AtHEMIANS AND LaCED.£M ONIANS
269. The true way of accouniiag the years of this war. The Lacedaemonians begin
to perform the articles, and presently deli»er their prisoners-- 27" 1. The Ampbi-
politans refuse to render themselves under the Atheiii.niis. Clearidas endeavour-
eth to dissolve the peace. The Lacedsemonians make league with the Athenians —
The artici-es or the league betweb.i the Laced.emo5Ia5» asd thk
Athsviaxs — 272. The -Atheniansdeliver the prisoners taken at Pylus — 273.
Year XI. The LacedaBn)onian5 slack in performance of the articles of the peace.
From the beginning to this end of the war, twenty-seven years. The time of this
peace, not to be esteemed peace. The number of years which the whole
war lasted. Tnucydides for bis ill success at Ampbipolis, banished Athens for
twenty years. The Corinthians contrive with the Argives to make a league in
Peloponnesus without the Lacedseiuoiiians — 274. Twelve men chosen at Argos
to treat about a league. The Maniineans enter leagTie with the Argives. The
rest of Peloponnesus incline to the same league — 275. The article of adding
and altering niisliked. The Lacediemouians exi>ostuIate with the Corinthians
about this league with Argos. The apolosy of the Corinthians for their refus-
ing the peace — 276. Their answer touching their league with Argos. The
Eleans make a league first with Corinth, then with .Argos. Quarrel of the Eleans
against the F.acedxmcnians. The Corinthians and the towns upon Thrace enter
into the league with Argos. The Athenians recover Scione. The Deliant re-
planted in Delos-— 277. Phocis and Locris in war. The Corinthians seek to
tarn the cities of Poloponnesus and other confederates from the Lacedsemonians
to the Argives. The Corinthians seek the ten days' truce with Athens, as the
Bflcoiians had it. The Bceutians takt; time to answer, concerning a league with
Argos. The .Athenians deny the ten days' truce toibe Corinthians. The Lace-
daemonians demolish the fott of Cypsela —278. The Lacedsroonians put a garri-
son into l.epreuni, of niei: newly enfranchised. The Lacedzmoniaii^ disable tbosc
that were taken in Sphacieria, to bear ciffice, or to make bargain. The Dictideans
take Thyssus from the Atheiii.ns. Jealousy between the .Athenians and Lacedie-
monians. .Ampbipolis not yet rendered, nor the peace accepted in the parts about
Thrace, nor by the Boeotians and Corinthians. The Athenians refuse to render
Pylus. The apology of the Lacedsinonians for not performing the articles — 279.
The Athenians draw the Messenians and Helots out of Pylus. The Laceds-
monian ephores endeavour to dis»ol»e the peace — 280. A proposition of a lea-
gue between the Lacedaemonian?, Argives, Bueotians, and Corinthians. The .Argives
propound a league to the Bccotians and Corinthians. And promise to send am-
bassadors into Boeotia to that purpose. Tlie B<eoiians propound an oath between
jhemselves, the Corinthians Chalcideans, and Megareans, of mutual assistance —
"281. The Argive league with the Boeotians falleth off. Mecybern taken from the
Athenians by assault. The Lactdirmouiaiis enter into a league with the Boeotians,
knowing it to be a>;ainst justice — 282.
Year XII. The .-irgives seek peace with the Laceda?monians — 882. The
territory of Cynuria, ground of ibequarrels between Luceda'mon and Argos. An
<»dd condition of a truce — 283. Tiie Lacedemonian an)bas«adors require Py-
lus in exchanixe for Panactum. The Athenians take in evil part, both the
razing of Panactum, and the league made with the Boeotians. The Argives make
league with Athens, by means of .Alcibiades. The cause why Alcibiades desireih
tobreakwith the Lacedaemonians. .Alcibiades sendeth for the Argives to Athens
to make a league — -284. The Ld<;edaMnoni;in ambassadors come in haste lo
Ixxviii ANALYSIS.
Athens, to prevent their league with the Argives. Alcibiades persuadeth the
Laceda;monian ambussadors, to deny before tlie people, that they had power to
conclude. Alcibiades iuveigheth against the Lacedsmuiiians. Nicias endeavour-
eth to have the peace go on with the Laceda-nionians — 285. Micias is sent
ambassador to Lacedsemon to get satisfaction about performance of the articles.
The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Ar-
GirES — 286. The Corinthians still refuse the peace with Athens, and incline
again to the Lacedaemonians — 288. Contention between the Lacedaemonians
and Eleans before the Grecians at Olympia, about a mulct set upon the Lacedae-
monians by the Eleans, for breaking the Olympic truce — 289. Lichas a Lace-
daimonian whipped upon the Olympian race — 290.
Yeah XIIL War between the Epidaurians and Argives — 291. Amttassadors
meet about peace, but cannot agree — 292.
Year XIV. Preparation of the Lacedaemonians against Argos. The Laceda-
raonians and their confederates meet at Phlius. The Argives go to meet them at
the forest of Nemea — 293. The Lacedsemonians come into the plains before
Argos. The Argives enclosed between the L;icedopnionians and the Boeotians.
And the Laceda;moniQns enclosed between the army of the Argives and their
city. Propositions of peace made by t > o private men of Argos. And accepted
by Agis without the knowledge of the rest of the commanders. Agis withdraw-
eth his army, and is censured for it by the confederates — 294. Thrasyllus
punished for propounding the peace — 295. The Athenians instigate the Argives
to break the truce. The Argives break the truce and besiege Orchomenus.
Orchomenus yielded. The Argives go next against Tegea, which displeaseth the
Eleans, and they go home. The Lacedaemonians question their king for suffering
the Argives to go oiFunfoughten. The Laceda;monians put their army into the field
to rescue Tegea — 296. The Lacedaemonians waste the territory of Mantinea
The Argives come down from their advantage, to seek the enemy — 297. The
Lacedaemonians put themselves in order hastily. The order of the battle of the
Argives — 298. The hortative to the Argives, and their confederates. The Lacedae-
monians encourage one another— -299. The fight — 300. The Lacedaemonians
have the disadvantage for order, but advantage of valour. The Lacedaemonians
liave the victory. The Lacedasmonians pursue not the enemy far. Num-
ber of the dead — 301. The Lacedaemonians recover their reputation. The
Epidaiuians enter the territory of Argos. The Athenians build a fort before
Epidaurus — 302. Peace concluded between the Argives and Lacedaemonians
303. — The Articles. The league between the Argives and Laced;emonian»
— 304. The Argives and Lacedasmonians make an order that the Athenians shall
quit the fort. They solicit the towns upon Thiace to revolt from the Athenians.
Demosthenes being sent to fetch ihqir soldiers from the fort, delivereth the game by
a wile to the Epidaurians. The Mantineans forsake the league of Athens. Sicyon
and Argos reduced to oligarchies — 305.
Year XV. The Dictideans revolt from Athens. Achaia oligarchised. Argos
relapseth into a democracy. The Argives come again to the league of Athens,
and with long-walls take in a way from their city to the sea. The Lacedae-
monians' army come to Argos, and razeih the walls which they were building.
They take Ilysiae, a town in Argia — 306. The Argives spoil the territory of Phli-
asia. The Athenians quarrel with Ferdiccas, and bar him the use of the sea — 307.,
Year XVL Alcibiades fetcheth away three hundred citizens of Argos for La-
ced»monisni. The Athenians war against the island of Melos. A uialogub be-
tween the .Athenians and Melians — 307. The Athenians and Melians agree
not. The city of Melos besieged. The Argives lose eighty men by an ambush-
ment of the Phliasians, The Athenians in Pylus infest Laconia. The Cotiathiai>»
war on the Athenians. The Melians relieve their town — 313.
ANALYSIS. Ixxix
BOOK VI.
The Athenians resolve to invade Sicily. The greatness of Sicily and the inha-
bitants— 315. The cause and pretence of the Athenians to invade it — 318. The
Laced asmonians waste part of Argolica, and put the outlaws of Argos into Omea.
The Athenians war upon Macedonia — 3l9.
Year. XVII. The Athenians decree the voyage of Sicily, and Alcibiades, Ni-
cias, and Laraacbus for generals. The oration of Nicias — 320. The motives of
Alcibiades to farther his voyage — 323. The oration of AlcibIadbs— 324. Tub
ORATION OF N'iciAS — SS?. Tbc Athenians upon this speech, made Jo deter them
from the enterprise, are the more encouraged to it — 329. The faces of all the ima-
goes of Mercury throughout Athens, pared plain. Alcibiades accused for
having in mockery acted the celebration of the mysteries of their relig-ion. He de-
sires to come tu bis trial before his going forth, but is not suflfered — 33(). The
Athenian fleet puttetb to sea. The description of the setting forth of the fleet —
331. The Syracusians upion the fame of their coming, do some believe it, and
some not. The oration of Hermocrates — 333. The oration ofAthbna-
goras — 336. The SPEECH op ONE OF THE Syracusian generals — 338. The
Athenians put out from Corcjra. The quantity of the army — 339. The Syra-
cusians certainly knowing of their coming, prepare for their defence. The hope of
the Athenians of money from Egesta frustrated. The fraud of the Egestsans —
The several opinions of the generals, touching how to proceed. The opinion of Nici-
as— 340. The opinion of Alcibiades. The opinion of Lamachus — 341. Alcibia-
des leeketh league with the Messenians, but is denied. The Athenians go with
part of their fleet to Naxas, and lo Catana. They send ten gallies to view Syra-
cuse and the havens. Catana surprised. The Athenians go to Camaiina, bat are
not received— -34li. Alcibiades called home, to answer abunt the Mercuries
— Digression touching the deposing of the lyrany of Pisistratus and his sons
— 343. Divers men accused of the paring of the Mercuries — 344. Presumptions
against Alcibiades. Alcibiades sent for home — 347. Alcibiades flieth. The A-
tbenian gener.-ils in Sicily go to Selinus and Cgesta. They take Hvccara — 348.
The Syracusians contemn the Athenians. Nicias's stratagem to get easy land-
ing and encamping by Syracuse — 349. The Athenians land, pitch their camp, and
entrench themselves ere the Syracusians return. The Syracusian army cometh back.
The Athenians and Syracusians prepare to fight — 350. The oration of Nicias
TO HIS ARMY. The battle between the Athenians and Syracusians — 351. The
Atheniens have the victory — 352. Hermocrates encoarageth the Syracusians, and
Is chosen general with two more. The Syracusians send for aid into Peloponne-
sus— 353. The .Atheniens attempt Messana, but fail. The Syracusians enlarge the
compass of their walls, and bum the tents of the Athenians by Catana. Am-
bassadors both from the Athenians and Syracuse unto Camarina, for the friendship
ofthatcity. The oration of Hbrmochates— 354. The oration of Euphe-
Mus — 357. The resolution of Camarinseans for neutrality. The Athenians
seek to win the Siculi. They bring their fleet to Catana. They send for aid to
Carthage, and into Hetruria : and prepare to besiege Syracuse — 361. The Syracu-
sians pray aid of the Corinthians and Lacedsraonians. Alcibiades at Lacedxmon,
' instigateth the Lacedjeroonians against his country-— 362. The oration of Al-
cibiades—362. The Lacedaemonians resolve to send Gylippus into Sicily.
The Athenians resolve to send provision and horsemen— 365.
Year XVIII. The Athenians burn the fields of certain towns of the Si-
culi, and take Centoripa. They receive money and horsemen from Athens. The
Lacedemonians invade Argia. TTie Argives take a great booty in Thyreatis — 366.
Epipolae a high ground before the city of Syracuse, liomilus slain. The A-
ihenians fortify Labdalum. The Athenians begin to build on the north side of the
fortification wherein they lay, the wall wherewith to begirt the city— 367. The Sy-
racusians make « cross wall in their way. The Athenians build from their own for-
Ixxx ANALYSIS.
tification, to the crags, towards the great haven — 368. The Athenianis take tlieir
palizado aj^ain. Lamachus slain — 369. Nicias assaulted in his carap, defendelh it
— 370. The Syracusians change their generals. Gylippus despaireth of Sicily,
aud seeks to save Italy. Nicias despiseth the coming of Gylippus 371.
BOOK VII.
Gylippus and Pythen resolve to go to Syracuse — 373. They took the aid of
the men of Himera. The Corinthian gallies left by Gylippus, make haste after
him, and Gongylus arriving first, keepeih the Syracusians from compounding.
Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse — 374. Gylippus offereth the Athenians five days
truce to be gone in. The Syracusians win Labdalum. The Syracusians build a
virall upwards through Epipolae, to slop the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians.
The Athenians fortify Plenimyiiura — 375. Nicias sendefh twenty gallies to lie in
wait for the aid coming from Peloponnesus. Gylippus goeth on with his wall,
and fighteth with the Athenians twice, and in the latter battle, having the victory,
he finished his wall, and utterly excluded the proceedingof the wall of the Athenians
— 376. The rest of the gallies come in from Peloponnesus, unseen of the Atbeii-
ans that were set to watch them. Gylippus goeth about Sicily, and sendeth into Pe-
loponnesus for more aid. Nicias writeth to Athens for supply, and to be eased of
his charge — 377. The Athenians besiege Am[)hipoiis. The end of the eighteenth
summer. The letter of Nicias to the people op Athens — 378. The
Athenians conclude to send a new army to Syracuse. They send twenty
gallies to Naupactus to keep the Corinthians from transporting their forces into
Sicily — 380. The Lacedajmonians prepare to invade Attica, and fortify Decelea,
supposing the Athenians to have broken the peace — 381.
Year XIX. The Peloponnesians invade Attica, and fortify Decelea. The Pelo-
ponnesians send away their men of arras for Sicily. The Athenians send out Demos-
thenes toward Sicily — 382. Gylippus persuadeth the Syracusians to fight by sea.
The Syracusians win Plemmyrium, but are beaten by sea. The Syracusians
win the works of the Athenians in Plemmyrium — 383. The Athenians get the vic-
tory by water — 384. Demosthenes in his way to Sicily, forti/ieth a neck of land in
Laconia. — The aids of the Thracians come too late to go into Sicily. The incom-
nodities which befel the Athenians by the fortification in Dt-celea — 386. The
Thracians sent back, in their way sack the city of Mycalessus. The barbarous
cruelty of the Thracians — 387. Eurymedon comelh to Demosthenes out of Sicily,
and telleth him of the taking of Plemmyrium — 388. Demostiienes and Euryrae-
don levy forces for Sicily. Nicias overthroweth the new supply going to Syracuse
from the neighbouring cities, and killeth eiyht hundred of them — 389. The battle
by sea, before Naupactus, between the Corinthians and Athenians — 390. Demosthe-
nes and Euryiiiedon come along the shore of Italy, and take up forces. The Sy-
racusians n.ake ready their gallies to fight with the Athenians there, before the
supply came. Their manner of strengthening their gallies — 391. The Athenians
and Syracusians fight — 392. The Athenians and Syracusians fight again. The
stratagem of Ariston.a master of a galley — 393. The Syracusians have the victory.
Demosthenes and Euryme<lon with a new army arrive at Syracuse — 394. Demosthe-
nes attemptelh to win the wall which the Syracusians had built throug'h Epipol?B, to
exclude the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians. The Athenians fly — 39.5.
The Syracusians send for more supplies, and hope to win the Athenian camp.
The Athenian commanders take counsel what to do. The advice of Demos-
thenes— 397. The opinion of Nicias. Gylippus returneth with another army
from the cities of Sicily — 398. The Athenians out of superstition forbear to remove,
because of an eclipse of the moon. The Syracusians assault the Athenian camp
with their land soldiers— 399. The Syracusians overcome the Athenians again by
tea — 400. The Athenians dejected, repent of the voyage. The Syracusians intend
to keep in the Athenians, and reckon upon the glory of a lull victory. The nations
that were at the wars of Syracuse on one side or other— 401, The Syracusians shut
ANALYS^S.
upihe haTcn — 404. Theobatiok or Nicias — 4<I6. Tbi osation of Ortxrrvt
A>-D TH« SyracuSian oesbr A 1 8- -407. Nicias Cncourageth his loldiers anew.
He prepareihio fi2ht---409. The Athenians and Sjracusians fi;iht --410. The
Athenians fly. The stratagem of Herniocrates, to hinder the escape of the
Athenian$--^12. Gjlippus coeth out with his forces, and hesets the way. The
Athenians march away from before Syracuse by land.— 413. The oration ot
NiciA$ TO HIS AFFt-icTED ARMY-- 414. The Athenians inarch, and the Syra-
casians assault them always as they b"--415. Nicias and Demosthenes rise in the
night, and march a contrary way, Nicias foremost, and in order, but Demosthenes
in the rear slower and more in disorder — 416. Demosthenes overtaken by the
enemy— 417. Resisteih as long as hecan, and is taken. Demosthenes yield etb.
The offer of Nicias to redeem his army, not accepted — 418.
BOOK VIII.
The fear and sorrow of the Athenians upon the hearing of the news— 423. The
Athenians resoUe to stand it out. The Grecians take part all of them against the
Athenians. The hopes of the Lacedsmonian?-- -424. Agis It-rieth money. The
Lacedasradnians appoint a fleet of one hundred gallies to be made ready amongst
the cities of the league. The Athenians build there navy, and contract their
charges. The Eubceans oflfer to revolt to .Agis. The Lesbians offer to revolt to
Agis---4^5. The Chians and Erithrseans desire to revolt. Tissaphemes, lieutenant
of the lower Asia, laboareth to have the Lacedaemonians come onto him. Phar-
nabazus, lieutenant of Hellespont, laboureih the like for himself — 426.
Year. XX. The Lacedsemonians send to Corinth to hasten away the fleet to
Chios. The confederates in council at Corinth set down an order for the war fol-
lowine, with which to begin, and which to follow — ^27. The Athenians under-
stand the purpose of the Chians to revolt. The Athenians drive the Peloponne-
sian gallies into Pierseus, a desart haren, and their besiege them — 428. The
voyage of Chalcideus and Alcibiadi's to Chios. Sixteen gallies of Pelopon-
nesus intercepted, and hardly han'ljpd, in their_ return from Sicily, bv the Athe-
nians, arrive in Corinth — 429. Chios and Erythrsea revolt. Clazomen'se revolteth.
The Athenians abrogate the decree touching the thousand talents reserved for the
extremities of state, and fumub out a fleet with the money — 430. Teas re-
volteth. Miletus revolteth. Leagve between Tissaphernes and
THE Lacbdemomans — 431. Lebedns and Erse revolt. Tlie Peloponnesians in
Peiraeus escape. Astyochus admiral of the Peloponnesians. Tissaplierncs razeth the
remainder of the .Athenian wall at Tens — 432. The Chians endeavour to turn! Les-
bos from the Athenians to the Lacedaemonians with their single power, and cause
first Methymn^, then Mitylene, to revolt The Athenians recover Mity-
lene. Astyochus seeing he could do no good at Lesbos returned to Chios. The
Athenians recover Clazomenas — 433. Chalcideus slain. The Athenians make
sharp war upon Chios — 434. The Athenians fight with the Milesians, and begin
to besiege the city. The Athenians rise from Miletus upon the coming of fifty-
five gallies from Peloponnesus— 43.5. The Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes take
lasus, wherein was Araorges rebel to the king, whom they take prisoner — 437.
The Athenians send part of the fleet against Chius, and part against Miletus.
Astyochus goeth from Chios to Clazomenw, thence to Phocea and Cvme. The
Lesbians offer to turn to Astyochus — 438. Astyochus and Pasdaritns the go-
vernor of Chios disagree. The Athenian gallies tossed with tempest. The
Athenians take the gallies of the Peloponnesians sent to waft in the ships of
corn from Egypt to Cnidos — 439. They assault the city of Cnidus, but cannot
win it. The SEccsn tEABUE BiTWEEv THB Laced.emoj»ians and the king
OF Persia — 440. Theramenes goeth to sea in a light horseman, and is cast
away. The Chians in distress send for aid to Astyochus. Astyochus refuseth to
aid them, and is complained of by Psedaritus in his letters to the state. The gal-
lies that were provided for Piiarnahazns set forth towards Ionia. Antisthenes and
eleven other Spartans sent with absolute authority into Ionia — 441, They arriv*
at Canaus in Asia, The Chians desire help of Astyochus. Astyochus u diverted
IXKxii ANALYSIS.
from helping (he Chians, and goeth to waft in the twenty-seven gallies of Pelo-
ponnesus, tliat lay at Caunns — 442. A fight between the Peloponnesian and
Athenian fleets, vfherein the Athenians had the worse. Tissaphernes and the La-
cedaemonians disagree about the articles of their league' — 443. Rhode- revollelh
to the Peloponnesians. Alcibiades flieth to Tissaphernes, and crosseth the busi-
ness of the Peloponnesians — 444. He adviseth Tissaphernes to shorten their pay,
and to corrupt the captains. The integrity of Hermocrates. Alcitjjades answer-
eth in Tissaphernes' name to the citit-s that call upon him for money, and puts them
otf. He counselleth Tissaphernes to prolong the war, and afflict both sides — 445.
He adviseth hira, of the two to favour the Athenians, the rather, as fitter to help
subdue the Grecians. Tissaphernes guided by the counsel of Alcibiades, hindereth
the success of the Peloponnesians. Alcibiades aimeth at his return to Athens, by
making shew of his power with Tissaphernes — 446. Motion made for the recall-
ing of Alcibiades, and deposing of the people. Conspiracy in the army at Samos,
against the democracy of Athens. Phrynichus is against the recalling of Alci-
biades— 447. The treason of Phrynichus against the state, for fear of Alcibiades.
He writes secret letters to Astyochus. Astyochus appeacheth him to Alcibiades.
Phrynichus sends to Astyochus again, and offers to put the whole array into his
hands. The device of Phrynichus to avoid the danger — 448. Alcibiades en-
deavoureth to turn Tissaphernes to the part of the Athenians. Pisander get-
teth the Athenians to be content with the oligarchy, and to give him and others
commission to treat with Alcibiades-— 449. Plirynichus accused by Pisander, and
discharged of his command. Leon and Diomedon war upon the Peloponnesian
navy at Rhodes — 430. Chios distressed, and Paedaritus tlie captain slain. Al-
cibiades unable to make good his word, in bringing Tissaphernes to the Athenians'
side, demandeth excessive conditions to make the breacli appear to proceed from
the Athenians, and to save his own credit. Tissaphernes hearkeneth again to the
Peloponnesians — 4.51. The third league between Tissaphernes and the
Peloponnesians — 452. Oropus taken by treason — 453.
Year XXI. The Chians fight against the Athenians that besieged them. Aby-
dus and Lampsacus revolt — 453. Strombichides recovereth Lampsacus. The d«-
mocracy at Athens put down by Pisander and his fellows. The authors of the
oligarchy resolve to leave out Alcibiades, and to govern the state with their pri-
vate means for themselves. The Athenians having set up the oligarchy iu Tba-
sus, it presently revoltelh from them — 454. The proceeding of Pisander in setting
up the oligarchy. The form of the new oligarchy — 155. Pisander a principal
man of the oligarchals. Antiphon another setter up of the few. The praise of An-
tiphon — 456. Phrynichus another author of the oli{>archy. Tiie four hundred enter
upon the senate, and dismis!! the senate of five hundred, called the council of the
bean---457. Agis in hope that the city was in st-dition, cometh to assault it, but
is repulsed- —4.58. The four hundred send to Lacedaemon to procure a peace.
They send to Samos to excuse their doings to the army. The oligarchy assaulted
at Samos by the populars — 459. The army send to Athens to signify their doings
against the oligarchy at Samos, not knowing that the oligarchy was then in autho-
rity at Athens— 460. The democracy re-established in the army. The army cn-
courageth itself against the city and state at home, by comparison of their strength
— 461. Upon the murmur of the soldiers against Astyochus, he goeth to Samos
to oflfer the Athenians battle, who refuse it — 462. The Athenians offer battle to
the Peloponnesians, and they refuse it. The Peloponnesians send part of iheir
fleet towards the Hellespont, but there went through only ten gallies. Alcibia-
des is recalled, and cometh to Samos. He manifesteth his power with Tissapher-
nes— 463. Alcibiades general of the Athenian army. The Peloponnesians mur-
mur against Tissaphernes and Astyochus. Mutiny against .Astyochus — 464.
The Milesians take in the fort marie in their city bv Tissaphernes. Min-
daru«, succcessor to Astyochus, taketh charge of the array, and Astyochus goeth
home. The ambassadors from the four hundred to excuse the change at Athens —
465. Alcibiades savelh the Athenian state — 466. Tissaphernes goeth to the
Phoenician fleet at Aspendus. Conjectures of divers upon his going. The opinion,
of the author. Alcibiades knowing that Tissaphernes would never bring on the
ANALYSIS. Ixxxiii
fleet, (roeth after him, to make the Peloponnesians think the fleet was staid for his
and the Athenians' sakes — 467. Sedition at Athens, about the change of the oli-
garchy into democracy again. Arabiiion of the oligarcfaicals amongst themselves,
overtbroweth their government — 168. The oligarchicaU fortify the mouth of the
haven of Feirsum. Theramenes murmuretb against their foitifyiag in Ectioaeia
— 469. The scope of the oiigarchicals. Phrynichus murdered. Theramenes
and his faction set themselves against the rest of the four hundred — 470. The
soldiers poll down the wall they had boilt in Eetioueia — 471. A day appointed
for an as-^embly, wherein to treat of agreement. The battle between the A-
thenians and the fleet of Hegesandridas at Ereiria — 47 -J. The Athenians defeated.
Euboea revolieth. The lamentable stale of the Athenians upon the loss of Euboea
— 473. The Lacedseojonians let slip the advantage which they might have had, if
in prosecution of the victory, they had come to Peirsus. The Lacedemonians
commodious enemies to the .Athenians. The Athenians settle their government, and
put an end to the sedition, by deposing the four hundred, and setting up the five
thousand. They recall Alcibiades. Most of the oligarchicals fly to the enemy.
Aristcirchas betraxeth Oenoe-— 474. Miudarus with the Fcloponnesian fleet,
seeing Tissapbernes and the Phoenician fleet came not, resolves to go to Ph.imaba-
zus in the Hellespont. Mindarus stayeth by the way at Chios, Thra^yilus iu
the mean time out-goes him, and watches for bis going by at Lesbos— 475. Minda-
ras and his fleet steal by into the Hellespont, unseen of those that watched their
going, in Lesbos. The Athenians at Sestos with eighteen gallies steal out of
the Hellespont, hut are met by Mindaras, and four of them taken. The Athenians
haste from Lesbos alter the Peloponnesians into Hellespont— -476. The Atheniaiis
and Peloponnesians fight, and the Athenians gtt the victory— 477. The courage
of the Athenians erected with this victory. The Athenians recover Cyzicus, and
take eight gallies of . the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians recover some of
their gallies taken at Elsns. They send for the fleet with Hegesandridas out of
EuboEa---478. .Alcibiades returneth t'rora Aspendus to Samos-— 61-. He fortifieth
Cos. The Antandrians put the garrison of Tissaphernes out of their citadel. Tiss*-
phernes goeth toward Hellespont to cover the favour of the Peloponnesians. The
end of the one and twentieth summer — 479.
TRANSLATION
THOSE PASSAGES IN WHICH THE TEXT OF
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER,
DIFFERS FROM THAT USED
By
HOBBES.
BOOK I.
Ch. III. p. 3. 1. 25. ^a>)
irXs'iM ;^ga)ju.evo», Bekker. And
to that expedition they came
together, making now more
use of the sea. to. ttAs/w xP'""
jxsvoi, Duker.
X. p. 7. 1. 24. ov TToAAol
<palvovTai eX^6vTs§j Bekker. Not
many appear to have c'ome,
considering that they were sent
in common from the whole of
Greece, f uveX^Sovrss j Duker.
XI. p. 7' !• 40. TOO aii ira-
povTh Bekker. But \\ ith that
part which was always present.
TTupaTu^ovTi, Duker.
XII. p. 9. 1. 6. XUTCOxli^S-
To, Bekker. Continued their
shiftings and the sending out
of colonies. fieijxai^sTO, Duker.
XIX. p. 11. 1. IS. Bekker
omits the full point after
^spaTrevovTsg, and the word ^g-
Xov. The Lacedaemonians, in
their government of the con-
federates, did not make them
tributaries, but only drew —
but the Athenians, in the
course of time, took into their
hands, &c.
XXIV. p. 14. 1. 2. xa)
TQv aXKov Aoopixou ysvovg, Bek-
ker. Consisted in part of
Corinthians, and of the rest of
the Doric nation. xa» aKXoi
Tov Awpixou ysvous, Duker.
XXXIII. p. 19. 1. 23.
»jjM.eTepov 8" atJ eqyov, Bekker.
It must, therefore, be our part
&C. {ifxeTsgov 8" av epyoVy Duker.
XXXV. p. 20. 1. 18. oTi
oi Ts auTo) 7roA.e/x.io» ijfuv ^aaVf
Bekker. Whereas they are our
enemies. u/x7v, Duker.
VARIOUS READINGS &c.
]xxxv
XXXVin.p.21.KS9. rr.cr-
TpaiTi'j6u.aVf Bekker, We have
not colour to war against them.
enf^xT-'kiixiVy Duker.
XXXIX. p. 22. 1. 7. A='-
ystv Ti Mxeiv £;>, Bekker.
But you are not tu think that
such a one says any thing, as
liath, &c. \iyeiy t< hoxaa Sa
Tr;^:(y, Duker.
XL. p. 22. 1. 25. 'as /Aev
ovv avTo'i Tz fjura Tr^Offi^xovrcev
eyxkYifjiaTxv l^^sarda, Bek-
ker. It is manifest then that
we come with fitting accusa-
tions. 'X2f fih oay avTol re /xera
5r^oa-r,xo>Ta!v Txv row Sijca/cy xt-
tuKul'MV ii i>[*^S epyoa-^a,
Duker.
XLIII. p. 23. 1. 45. 8e-
pi^saSr— i/x'Jvrrc, Bekker. And
do not receive these CorcvTae-
ans into league against our
will, nor defend them in their
injuries, Js;^ij<rdg--attuyijT5, Du-
ker.
L. p. 26. 1. 45. aj 1; £-
iriirXovv, Bekker. But it was
now late, and the Paean was
sounded by them, as if for an
attack, uii Itt/tAouv, Duker.
LXIIl. p. 31. 1. 28. (if
bfi^ TO ukKo <yTpa.T:'jfjia r^acrj;-
jxsvov, Bekker. And Aristeus
retiring from the pursuit, when
he saw the other part of the
. army conquered, w; excx,
Duker.
LXV. p. 32. 1. 29. Ta
re aAAa ^'jveTtohifj-Uy Bekker.
And remaining amongst the
Chalcideans, he both settled
other affairs of war with them,
and &c. £voK£fi.Uf Duker.
LXVI. p. 32. 1. 36. »^<r-
yryivriVTS ij aXXrjko'jg, Bek-
ker. These accusations were
made in addition by the Athe-
nians and Peloponnesians a-
gainst one another. Ttqosyiyi"
vr^vTo, Duker.
LXXVI. p. 39. 1. 7. y-
ys'wjVTai, Bekker. Who have
become justerfor their power
than they need. ysvoivrai,
Duker.
LXXXV. J). 42. 1. 46.
tXs^ev ly Toi; Axxsiuiftovloig y
Bekker. Spoke thus in the
presence of the Lacedaemoni-
ans. IXi^r/ Tc't: Aaxiiai^3>/oij,
Duker.
XC. p. 44. \. SI. n^^ovitpea--
Sslx, Bekker. Came with an
embassy. ^K^ov e; rperoi/av,
Duker.
XCIX. p. 49. 1. 14. axa-
puTXeVOt Koi aT£<^0<, Bck-
ker. Unprovided and with-
out experience of war. axopoij
Duker.
ex. p. 53. 1. 43. Ix 8=
Tcov 'A^vcuK, Bekker. Athens
moreover had sent &c. Ix U
Tav 'A'vr^va/wv, Duker.
CXVIII. p. 56. 1. 42. xa)
2cra TpofxTi; Tcy^e Toy voks-
fjiou, Bekker. And whatso-
ever pretext of this war. xai
TOXf'/XOU.
CXXVI. p. 61. 1. 1. Kw-
Aojy YjV 'OkvtjLTnsvUr,i, ivr;Q
'A^Tjvaio;, Bekker. There had
been one Cylon a victor in the
Olympian games, an Athenian.
Ku>vtov ^v 'A-Sijvalo:, ayr;p'OXjtjf/k»
9mUm, Duker.
Ixxxvi
VARIOUS READINGS OF
CXXXlV.p.66.1. 11. o5-
irsp Toug aoMOvpyoug, h[ji^a.Weiv,
Bekker. And they were about
to throw him into the Coeada,
where they t/?r€w malefactors.
ouvsp Tovg xuKOvpyoug 6/x,/3aAXg«v
slw^siaav, Duker.
CXLI. p. 7 J. 1. 12. oh-
TUi ^Xu^/siv, Bekker. And
every one supposes that his
own neglect can do little
liurt. /SAa^j/siv Toi KoivoL, Duker.
CXLIII. p. 72. 1. 32. el
aipt-yjv TTSJcrejv UjU-af, uvroug av
l^eX^ovraj, Bekker. And if I
thought that I should persuade
you, I would desire you to go
out yourselves and destroy
them, si ojfjt^jv TTsicreiv, OjW-aj au-
Tohg ay s^sX^ovro-g, Duker.
BOOK II.
IV. p. 77. 1. 22. C^CTTS 8»S$-
^slpovTo TToXXojj Bekker. So
that many of them perished.
c2(rTe Sie^dsjgovro ol ttoXAoi, Du-
ker. 1. 34. Ku) al TTKridlov ^vpoLi
avsojy/xavai, Bekker. And those
gates which were near hap-
pened to be open, xai a\ ^vqut
avecwyjt/Jvai, Duker.
VIII. p. 79. 1. 35. KOi mw-
TYig xa) TToXtc, Bekker. And
every one, both private in-
dividuals and the iv/iolr city,
endeavoured. zroXlrYig, Duker.
XIX. p. 86. 1. 25. .ttoi
Kgo/TTcIaf, Bekker. through
Cropeia. KsxpoTriag, Duker.
XXI. p. 87. 1. 23. m k-
Kpooi(r^an (ag sxacTOj togyijTO,
Bekker. Which each was in-
clined to interpret as suited his
individual interest, m ^xpoaro
dig sxu(TTog wpixriTO, Duker.
XLIV. p. 97. 1. 45. ocroi
5' au 7rap»)8y]P<aTs, tov ts TrXe;-
ova xegSof, ov evTuyj-iTS, ^lov
Yiysirr^s xrh. Bekker. As for
you that are past having chil-
dren, think that the greater
part of your life, during which
you were fortunate, was to
your gain, and that tliis xv/ric/i
remains will be short. o(toi 8*
ay 7ra^r;/3)jxaTf, tov rs TrXeiova,
xspdog ov, evTv^sirs ^lov^ i^ysicr^s
xtX. Duker.
XLV. p. ^)S. 1. 17. xa.\
v^g (XV SIT eAap^jtTTOV xrA. Bek-
ker. And great is the glory
of that woman, of whom there
is least rumour &c. xot) oig av
STT sKa^icTov xtK. Duker.
XLVl. p. 98. 1. 26. ov
Trpoa-Yjxn sxaaroc, Bekker. now
each having lamented whom
it behoves him lo lament^ de-
part, cv "Trpocr-^xsi 'sxa(7Tcpy Du-
ker.
XLIX. p. 100. 1. 1. ol
TTokXo) v(rTsgov 5<' avrrjv aa^BVsiu,
Bekker. many afterwards died
of weakness through it. ^loi
Trjv aa-^iveiav, Duker.
LIIl. p. 101. 1. 85. 0
Ti Se ^S)j T6 tjiv xu) iravrayo^sv
TO Ij auTo xepSaXsov, Bekker.
But whatever there was de-
lightful and profitable &c. 3, t»
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
Ixxxvii
avToy X:poct\;w, Duker.
LV. p. 102. 1. 27: jLt='-
^pi Au-jplvj, Bekker. As far as
L/aurium. fj-^x?^ Awjplo'j opovc,
Duker.
LXV. p. 107. 1. 10. 6
/t6v Sijaoj OTJ, Bekker. The
people, because &c. 6 fir/
irvjY^g oTi, Duker.
p. 108. 1. 23. Tfoj-
ysve<r.&a< Ta;y Il;Xo7rovy7]i7/a;y,
Bekker. They might easily
have outlasted the Pelopon-
nesiaus in the war. ■x-qiyrA<7^ui
Duker.
LXVII. p. 108.1.41. xa)
■KoxxsoLi fSoTj^riy T£ au7o jj . Duker.
These words are omitted by
Bekker.
LXVIII. p. 109. 1. 39. xn)
7rpo(r7ra.psixa\i(rciYTEg iu.^oTecoi
'A^Yivxlov;, Bekker. Both to-
gether calling in the Athe-
nians. xgotTrxaArTayro, Duker.
LXXII. p. 111.1. 41. xal
Tuh rifjilv apxhu, Bekker.
And this will be sufficient for
us. xaj Txlz r^UAV apidxsi. And
these things please us. Du-
ker.
p. 1 1 2. 1. 1 3. aTo$co<roa«y
Vfiiv a av xasaAa^iajv, Bekker.
We will restore unto you what-
ever we have received from you.
LXXyill. p. 114. 1. 23.
xocTaXi-KovTB: tvj c^TgaTOTTsiou,
Bekker. Retaining some part
of the encampment, tou (rrpu-
Tou, Duker.
LXXIX.p. 115.1. 12. 7r§o<r-
TSftvI/iyTcuy Si If'OAyvdov, Bek-
ker. Having sent forward to
Olynthus. irgnrsft^uvray, Du-
ker.
LXXIX. p. 115. 1. 16. T§^^
ayrp rp toXsi, Bekker. Against
the city itself, inf avr^ t^ xoX;i,
Duker.
LXXXIII. p. 118. 1. 9.
lTu^a.yTo xvxXov Toov vsmVy 00;
ft^yiTTov xtX. Bekker. The
Peloponnesians formed a circle
of their ships, as large as they
were able. hx^avTo, xuxXov toov
vedov xoii;<rayT£j ao; /tsyifov xxA.
Duker.
LXXXIV. p. 118. 1. 42.
PTriTa Si xu) ru<Tu:, Bekker.
And all the others after it.
VTBiTcx. 5; xa* rug aXXatj, Duker.
LXXXVII. p. 120. 1. 44.
X^S"'* M 'tpoXuTTovTzc , Bek-
ker. Not being the first
to forsake the place assigned
him. %Mpay fi^ Xs/xoyrsj, Du-
ker.
LXXXIX. p. 122. L 24.
0 ej Ts Ta -KoWa. tcuv tto-
Xfjiijxcoy, Bekker. As things of
great force, both in most mili-
tar)' actions, and especially in
an engagement by sea. mare
TO. ToXAit xtX. Duker.
XC. p. 122. 1. 35. Zi-
fiaJ xfga ^yoyoiyoj, Bekker.
The right wing leading the
way. Ss^i» xspet ^oyfcfyoi, Du-
ker.
p. 123. 1. 14. ftldvll
auTolg M)lpu.7iv elXoy, Bekker.
And one they took with the
men in her. /x/ay 5s atJrojj avSga-
ffiy £«Xov ^Sij, Duker.
XCI. p. 123. 1. SO. ^
'Att*xi7 yauj t^^xaoura, Bek-
ker. Now it chanced that
Ixxxviii
VARIOUS READINGS OF
there lay out at sea a certain
ship at anchor, round which
the Athenian galley being tirst
to sail, came back full butt
against it, &c. (p^x(r«<ra nca)
7rspmXs6<rci(ra, Duker.
XCIV. p. 125. 1. 11. T^v
T» "SfCtKufUva y^priJ^ui, Bek-
ker. And they in Piraeus
thought that Salamis was ta-
ken. TJjv T£ 5aA«/x»v/a)V ttoXiv
)jp^cr3aj, Duker.
XCV. p. 125. 1.33. Zvovvo-
<r;^scr£i;, Bekker. Wishing, of
two promises, the one to be
performed to him, and the
other himself to perform. Zioi
Suo vT:o(j-^i<rsiij Duker.
XCVI. p. 126, 1. 20. fte-
^pt Tpoictlwv Ticitovoov, Bek-
ker. To the Graaeans of Pae-
onia. {^^^^(^pi Vpualuiv xai Aealcov
Uamctiv, Duker.
CI. p. I 29. 1. 27. 0^0 Seu-
•&0W ToD 27r«^Saxou, Bekker.
Seuthes, the son of Spardacus.
ToO 27r«paS&xoy, Duker.
BOOK III.
XIX. p. 139. 1. 28. xu\
auToi i<Tsvsyx.6vTss xtX. Bek-
ker has altered the pointing of
this sentence ', in his edition it
stands thus: Both themselves
then for the first time made a
contribution of two hundred
talents, and sent also to their
allies twelve ships, with Ly-
sicles and four others, as com-
manders, to levy money.
XX. p. 139. 1. 32. ToXju,'.'-
8as . Ey7roj«.7rjSaf. Bekker. Tol-
midas, Eupompidas. Tj^t/Saj,
Eu7roX7rjS«s , Duker.
XXII. p. 141. 1. 5. 5oS-
TTov iTToirjff-e, Bekker. Sound-
ed. r|/0(pov l5roir](re, Duker.
XXV. p. 142. 1. 29. My-
tjX^v)). Bekker in this place,
as well as through the rest
of the history, puts Mytilene,
instead of Mitylene. M<ruAi9V>],
Duker.
XXXVIIL p. 148. 1. 8.
oy TO ^gatr^ev viaTOTsqav —
Ta>v Xoycu xaXooj e7riTi[x,r)(ra.v~
Toov, Bekker. But as to ac-
tions already past, not con-
sidering that, which you have
seen done, more worthy of cre-
dit, than that which you heard
from those who in their spee-
ches set a high value on them.
ou TO "Seadev vKTTOTspov twv k6-
ya>v xakios li:iriiur^(XOLVTMVy Du-
Ker.
XL. p. 149. 31. oyxoyv Sel
vrqo^sivui, Bekker. We must
not therefore hold forth, &c.
Trgocr^eivui, Duker.
p. 1 50. 1. 23. jtx.^ o3v vgodo-
Tcn y£V))trde yju.a;v ayraJv, Bekker.
Be not then traitors to your-
selves. Y^i^m avToivj Duker.
LVII. p. 158. 1. 37, vvv Se
^avuTou Kglvea-^otij Bekker. And
now of being adjudged worl/zi/
of death. ^otvuTou Sjxjj xplvs-
(T^ou, Duker.
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
Ixxxix
LXIV. p. 162. i. 26. T.'vj;
ay w/Acw xrx. Bekker. Who
caa be more justly hated by
the Grecians than you? tjvsj
av O'Jv uttctfT xtX. Duker.
LXVl. p. IG3. 1. 24. ;|/5'j-
(T^Elo-av 'jTTohs^iv, Bekker. And
the falsifying the agreement.
y7ro<r;^?<rjy, Duker.
LXVII. p. 163.1. 34. sIt*,'
apuKuMyhzTo, Bekket. If in-
deed there was any one at all.
ejT»V£C aca xoi lylvovTo, Duker.
p, 164. 1. 15. ov Xoya»v
Tobs aeyxvug xtA, Bekker. Not
making a trial of words, but
of facts, ou Xoyan Toyroij acyJi-
yas, Duker.
LXVm. p. 164. 1. 44. liix-
xocri'cov ToSaJv irayra^^, xuxXoo.
Bekker. They built a hospital
near the temple of Juno, of
t^o hundred feet on every
side, \nth chambers in a circle
above and below. haxo<!rixy iro-
hmVy "Ko.'na.yr^ xvxXw, Duker.
LXXlX.'p. 168. 1.32. Wi
TTjy xoX»v, ccj xgaTwyris, oiwoXr-
fiioi, Bekker. The Corey reans
fearing lest the enemy, since
they were victorious, sailing
against theur city should either,
&C. Ittj Try To'Xiv cuj x^aroOvT::
of •jToXspnoi, Duker.
LXXXVII. p. 173. 1. 20.
COOTS 'A-9»;va(a;v yt {jly, slvai, Bek-
ker. So that there was not
any thing which more aEBicted
the power of the Athenians.
' A5r,valovc, DukcT.
XCll. p. 175. 1. 32. x«i
avToi hp^slcovTo, Bekker. For
they also were infested by the
^taeans. iroXsfj.eo hif^elpoyro,
Duker.
CIV. p. 181. 1.24. Bek-
ker reads these verses thus :
" But when, O Apollo, you
*« are very much delighted
" with Delus, where the long-
" robed lonians assemble for
" you, with their children and
** wives at thy way : there
** mindful they please thee
" with pugilism, and dancing,
" and song, when they ap-
" point a contest. — But come,
" Apollo and Diana be propi-
" tious, and all you farewell,
" but remember me also af-
" ten^ards, when any other
'* wretched one of mortal men
** coming here inquires) * O
** damsels, what man was
** it, the sweetest of bards,
** who dwelt here, and \vith
" whom ye were most dellght-
" ed ?* do ye all answer kind-
" ly, * a blind man, and he
** * dwells in rugged Chios.' "
CXII. p. 185.1. 34. ev Txls
. vcfj<T)v^ s* Ssj, 5»a$-&ag^va», Bek-
ker. Thinking in their imme-
diate terror, that it was better
for them to be destroyed by
those in the ships, if they
mast be dcshcyedy than, &c.
Iv Ta7f vauaiy ^Si] Sia^ddt^^yai,
Duker.
CXIV. p. 186. 1. 31. ri»
rY,i Ahwxlai ^w/i^ocay, Bek-
ker. After the event of iEtolia,
or, after what had happened
in ^tolia. r^y iv A»t«»X»« ?w/*-
^ofaVf Duker.
p. 186. 1. 37. aertL-
vidTYiTctv Tcaqa. "^EuKov^tcv. Bek-
ker omits xsii 'Kypalo'jc.
xc
VARIOUS READINGS OF
CXIV. p. 186. 1. 45. ^ 6i/,rjpovi
'AftfjAo-^wv, Bekker. And that
the Ambraciots should restore
whatever towns or hostages of
the Amphilocians they had.
Ojttogous, Duker.
CXVI. p. 187. 1. 33. o*i en)
rp AiTvr), Bekker. Who dwell
over against mount JEtm.
vTTo T>i ATtvj], Duker.
BOOK IV.
X. p. 194. 1. 5. aTTOjSavTej
U h Tco 'ia-00. According to
the punctuation of Bekker,
this sentence runs thus. For
being in their gallies they are
most easy to be resisted, but
disbar/ced they are equcd ~j.nih
us : and their number is not
greatly to be feared.
XV. p. 196.1. 30. jBovKsvsiv
7rapoc^pYj[jiu opcovTo.;, Bekker,
To determine, immediately, on
view of their affairs, &c. ^ov
Ksusiv Trgog to ^pYiiJia, opcovraSj
Duker.
p. 196. 1. 34. /3<ao-^£V-
TU5 xgaT>]&>jva<, Bekker. Con-
quered, or of being oppressed
by numbers. /3»ao-^gvraf, ^ tcpcc-
TYj^evTocg, Duker.
XIX. p. 198. 1. 47. ^po;
TO iTTjajXSf XCt) UpSTYl CiVTO Vixfj-
aag, Bekker. But when, hav-
ing it in his power to do so if
he please, which power he has
obtained both lawfully and by
his valour, he contrary to all
expectation, &c. mpos to liriei-
xsf, x«» «gSTrj avTOg viKrj<ra§,
Duker.
XLIV. p. 212. 1. 19. Tovs
Ts vsupovg strxuXguov, Bekker.
Both spoiled their dead bodies,
and took away their own. too;
T5 aXXoTgious vsKpovs Ifl-JcuXsyov,
Duker.
LVI. p. 217. 1. 23. ^ Iri
jw-sv TYjs Kvvo(rovpiag y^j, Bek-
ker. Which is of the territory
called Cynosyria. >j Igri fj^sv rrjg
Kvvovglctg yr,g, Duker.
LXIII. p. 220. 1. 34. cov
'sKocg-og r» cpYj^Yjfji.sv -n-poc^siv, Bek-
ker. And taking these for hin-
drances sufficient to have made
us come short of those things,
of which we had each thought
to effect something, cov exaa-
rog Tig wT^^YjiJLSV TTga^eiv, Du-
ker
LXXI. p. 225. 1. 18. oh
Tig sir} svvovg, Bekker. And then
they to whom any one was
well-disposed, might go over
to the victors with greater
safety, oj-*? eT>j svvovg, Duker.
LXXX. p. 231. 1. 4. eg
TS Tov xp^^'i' yfspov xtA. Bek-
ker. And in the war, which
was later in point of time, after
the affairs of Sicily, the virtue
and wisdom of Brasidas. Tov
agrees with Tro'XsjU-ov, and not
as Hobbes has taken it, with
Xgovov va-Te§oVf or, XP°^f "S'e-
§ov. — ej TS tov xP'^^'^^ vg-spov,
Duker.
LXXXIII. p. 231. 1. 35.
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
va, Bekker. The ambassadors
of the Chalcideans instructed
him not to free Perdiccas from
apprehension, that they might
have him more prompt in their
o vn aflfeirs. ju.^ 'j~rJsA^fIv, Du-
ker.
XCIV. p. 237. 1. 3.9. xa-
IJLsXXovrcuv, Bekker. And when
they were in their order, and
now ready to join battle. Is
TYjy TOL^tv ^^);, xai jtx.sAA'kvrwv,
Duker.
XCV. p. 238. 1. G. vTtlg
T^S TifjisTspas 6 aywv eirai, Bek-
ker. For in their country the
contest will be for our own.
uju-sTsga,, Duker.
XCVIII. p. 240. 1. 14. T^
ju.^ 7rp=xovTa xojX»^s(76ai, Bek-
ker. That they are much more
impious who require them to
give back the temples in pay-
ment for their dead, than they
who are unwilling to redeem
what they ought not /o mi' em
by temples. -Ta Tgexovra, Duker.
cm. p. 242. 1. 27. x«7f'oi-
<rctv Tcv s^gaTov itco ex, Bekker.
Revolting from the Athenians
in that night, brought the army
forward before morning at the
bridge of the river. xarscrTijcray
TOV (TTiUTOV TTCCiVw, Dukcr.
CIV. p. 242. 1. 46. It. tov
STSQOV fguTYjyov Tciv err] 0pa-
xijc, Bekker. Sent unto the
other general, tv'fy n- as general
over affairs of Thrace. toV 1-k\
(S)fixr,i, Duker.
p. 243. 1. 10. T^v
'Hio'va TrgoKOLTuXoL^tiay, Bekker.
Otherwise being beforehand,
in taking possession of Eion.
rcsxaraXaSsiy, Duker.
^ CXVIII. p. 248. 1. 37.
e^off Aax-laifio'Aots xai roi;
^y«.,tta;^c»f, Bekker. It seemeth
fit to the Lacedffinionians and
their allies, roig aAAo*; ^vfifj.x-
X°*i> Duker.
CXXXI. p. 257. 1. 16. xai
fx-^XV ^'^xg'oycravTsc rovg sTrovras,
Bekker. And thrusting back in
battle those who followed, tow;
exiovrasy Duker.
BOOK V.
I. p. 260. 1. 6. OVTOOi BKO.-
GTOi wpfiT^Tco, Bekker. These
Delians stated themselves af-
terwards, so each was inclined,
in Atramyttium, &c. «;> exa-
oToj cupjxTjTo. Duker.
X. p. 264. 1. 47. olofisvos
<^bri(j-s<7^at, a-TsX^wv, Bekker.
Thinking that he should be
beforehand in retreating, o^^-
(r=(7-Sa». Duker.
XXIII. p. 273. 1. 13. iva-
vsova^cti, Sg xar' Ivjairrov, Bek-
ker. And that the Lacedeemo-
nians should renew them every
year, avavjovo-dai 8s TttxncL xctr
IviauTov, Duker.
XXXVI. p. 280. 1. 24. Hs-
vagxijf, Bekker. Here and in
other places Bekker substitutes
"xcu
VARIOUS READINGS OF
Xenarces for Xenares. asvap-^?,
Duker.
LII. p. 291. ]. 2. TcSv au-
Bekker. And taking with him
some of the allies from thence.
TMV avTo^sv ^vi^ixa^MV, xa) 7ra-
^aXa^cuv, Duker.
LXIV. p. 296". 1.41. oU ovTTco
TtpoTspoVj Bekker. With such
assistmice as had never been
before brought by th?m. cojouttw
TrpoTspov, Duker.
LXIX. p. 299. 1. 33. TO»au-
ra TrapYjvs^ri, Bekker. Such
things were said by way of
advice to the Argives and their
allies. TauTu %apYive^Yj, Duker.
LXXVII. p. 303. 1. 27.
TTsp) 8e TOi (Tioi a6[iaTog eluev X^v,
Bekker. Respecting the per-
son of the God, that it should
be allowed totheEpidauriansto
receive the oath, vrsp) 8e tm <jiSoy
<TV(i6ciT6(Tai[jisv xfiv, Duker. «<
8e T« doxfj Toi; ^ufi^i/^oi^oig , Bek-
ker. And if any thing should
seem tit to the allies, al U t<
xai aXKOy Duker.
XC. p. 308. 1. 40.'H(xs7j g^
voju,»^OjX£v ye ^pYj(nij.ov — ja^ xa-
TCiXvsiv iJiJ^ag xocl n xai IvTog
Tou axpi^ovs, Bekker. We in-
deed think it is useful, (for it
is necessary, since you have
put profit in the place of jus-
tice,) that you should not de-
stroy the common good, but
that reason and justice should
be considered by one who is
still in danger, and that any
one should be profited who
tries to persuade even some-
what within the strict point of
accuracy. '^H ju,£v ^ vojj,l^oi/,ev
jcai T» xa) exTOs tov uxptfious.
Duker.
CII. p. 310. 1. 25. xcc) ypv
TO jxev e(^«», Bekker. And if
we yield to you, immediately
we lose all hope, rj/xlv, Duker.
CXI. p. 312. 1. .84. 0 t>jtte7f,
^v eo /3ouX=y»)(r^e — This whole
sentence is pointed differently
by Bekker, and he changes
UTTOTrATJ for VTTOTSXslg' wlllch
you, if you consult well, will
beware of, and will not think
it disgraceful to be overcome
by a very large city, which in-
vites you to moderate terms,
viz. to become its allies, sub-
ject to tribute, enjoying your
own country, and when the
choice is given you of war and
safety, do not, through your love
of quarrelling,choose the worst.
CXV. p. 313. 1. 5. o<rct
7rXej(7Ta elCvavTO ^pY}<niJ.ci, Bek-
ker. Brought in corn, and as
many other useful things as
they were able. o<ru TrXsJcrTa
sivvavTO ^p^[XM(nv, Duker.
BOOK VI.
II. p. 316. 1. 32. /3a(7»Xea)5
Tivoj 2»xeXwv, Bekker. From
a certain king of the Sicilians.
jS«(r«X6ctfj Tivof'AgxaSwv, Duker.
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
XII. p. 322. 1. 30. aJTcSv
X'iyoug fji.ovcv, Bekker. Seeing
it maketli for them to tell us
a specious lie ; who contri-
buting only their own words,
&c. avTO'jc, Duker.
XIII. p. 323. 1. 10. x^Mfts-
voug Ttqlg "^fj'ig, o'J /xfjxirrojj,
Bekker. And decree that the
Sicilians possessing the limits
which they now enjoy in rela-
tion to us, those same limits not
being objected to. ^p-xfj^iyovg
Trpog ufjiJii o6 ]U,=a7rTolj , Duker.
p. 323. 1. 14. TOTTgW-
Tov woAr/xov, Bekker. Since
without the Athenians they
had first begun the war against
the Selinuntians. tov xpurrov
TroXsfuovy Duker.
XVIII. p. 326.1. 22. STTicr-
xsTTTroy u^iv, Bckkcr. Nor are
you to weigh quietness in the
same balance that others do.
r,fMv, Duker.
- p. 326. 1. 28. el U-
qo'm T,<Tv^luv, Bekker. If we
shall appear to disregard our
present ease, and sail against
Sicily. unspiiovTsg xa» oux aya,-
Trr,<rayTs; -r,v, Duker.
p. 326. 1. 34. voiU'
xoxTopsg yap Icro'jxsSa, Bekker.
For we shall be masters by sea
even in spite of all the Sici-
lians. a'jToxgaTo^fc, Duker.
XXXV. p'. 335. 1. 39. W av
Scao-riav. Bekker reads this
sentence with a mark of in-
terrogation: And if they did
come, what harm could they
do them, which they would
not themselves suffer in a
greater degree ?
XL. p. 338. 1. 5. a;, trpoi
aW^oftivo'jgy Bekker. Be freed
then from such rumours as
these, as if tkei/ izere brought
to men who perceived them,
but did not allow them. 005
TrpouiT^xvotx-ivovc, Duker.
XLIl. p. 338. 1. 39. "i/a
ftriTS xfix TrXsovTsg, Bekker.
That sailing together, they
might not be in want of water.
ayaTrXf'ovTSff, Duker.
XLIX. p. 341. 1. 34. xara
■jTuvra aiv xurovg lx^o/3J;Ta/,
That they would be terrified
at everything. £x^o§>iva»,Duker.
L. p. 342. 1. 15. IttI 2y-
paxo'j<rag eTrAiOv It» xspcoi, Bek-
ker. They sailed to Syracuse,
having the other ships on their
wing, h) Sy^axi'js-aj sTrXsov,
£71 i xi'ga;;, Duker.
LI. p. 342. 1. 28. el T.
/So'JAoyxaj, Bekker. But they
desired the generals, if they
wished any thing, to speak. 0,
T« 3z-j\ovTxi, Duker.
p. 842. 1. 37. /x5Ta8s
TouTo 5iarXr'J(7avTEf, Bekker.
And after this, the Athenians
sailing through to Rhegium.
ju-rra le towto BTXrv<rayr£j, Duker.
LVIl. p. 845. 1. 29. xfll
vj^vg uTTiQKTxsTTTaig , Bekker.
Duker omits the xa/. And
immediately falling on him,
without any regard to them-
selves.
LXVl. p. 350. 1. 19. xoJ
STTi TM AoKTXeOVl XTX. Bckket
has altered the pointing of
this sentence : And towards
Dascon they quickly erected a
VARIOUS READINGS OF
fortification, where it was most
easy of access for the enemy,
with stones and wood col-
lected toirether.
XCV." p. 366. 1. 29. (BoriS^Yi-
(ravTMv 0rj/3a»a;v, Bekker. The
Thebans having assisted them.
*Ad>jvai'aJv, Duker.
XCVI. p. 367. 1. 5. i^«-
xoa-lovg Xoyxdacg, Bekker. And
first they had set apart six
hundred men of arms, stttuxo-
(rlovg, Duker.
XCVIl. p. 367. 1. 19. Ik
TOu Xeifxcovoc y.a) Tr^g l^eratrsccf,
Bekker. Before the Syracu-
sians could come up from the
meadow and the muster, sy.
TOO Xsi[x.covog r^g e^sTaascec, Du-
ker.
XCVIl. p. 367. 1.21. oItts^]
Tov Alop-iXov s^uK07ioif Bckker.
And the six hundred with
Dlomilus. sTrrax-oa-ioi, Duker.
XCIX. p. 368. 1. 23. Ku)
ayM xa» hv TOVTca, Bekker. And
if they should attack them at
the same time also that they
were employed in this, xot)
afj^u h TovTcp, Duker.
CI. p. 369. 1.30. %gxg xou
^uAa, Bekker. Placing over it
boards and broad planks, xai
^upas xai ^'jXa, Duker.
CV. p. 371. 1. 31. !J,BTU TS
'Apyslcuv xot) M«vriv£a;v ^uvsxo-
Aeju-ouv, Bekker. They aged
war in conjunction with the
Argives and Mantineans. hro-
Ks^ovv, Duker.
BOOK VII.
If. p. 347. 1. S?^ oSe Tha,
Bekker. He having taken
Geta. 'Xsyxg, Duker.
IV. p. 376. 1. 11. o\ -KoX-
Xo) ^ts<p^s'ipovrOf Bekker. ol vtoX-
Xo) is omitted by Duker. Many
of them were destroyed by the
Syracusian cavalry, who were
masters of the field.
VI. p. 376. 1. 41. VO[A,l^OVTSS
xu) sl exeivoi, Bekker. Nicias
and the Athenians, who thought
it necessary, if not themselves
to begin the battle, &c. voju,/-
^ovTsg xa) hxsivoi si, Duker.
VIII. p. 377. 1. 34. hg Tois
'A^vug ocyysXXMV, Bekker. He
also himself sent to Athens
with news of every thing that
happened, &c. uyyeXXovrag,
Duker.
VIH. p. 377. 1. 40. Ixvr^l^Yig
eXXtTTsig yiyvoftsvoi, Bekker. Or
being deficient in memory..
yvoijar]?, Duker.
XI. p. 37-. 1. 20. BX TE
nfAoTTovvijcroo, Bekker. Having
an army both from Pelopon-
nesus and from some cities in
Sicily, ex rieAoTTovvi^crou, Duker.
XVI. p. 380. 1.- 30. ayovTu
slxotTi xolI exuTOV Ta.Xa.vra.,, Bek-
ker. Taking a hundred and
twenty talents of silver. bIxoiti
ruXuvra^ Duker.
XIX. p. 382. 1. 27. %co(nrsq
avTOig ouTOi ol OTrXiToct, Bekker.
Until these heavy-armed men,
&C. aoTolg oi onXlrai, Duker.
XXVI. p. 386. 1. 6. xcc\
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
XCl'
afjM Arjora* If awrou, Bekker.
Duker omits the ufut. And
at tlie same time freebooters
from thence, as from Pylos, &c.
XXVIII. p. 387. 1. 9. av-
Triv ys xab' a'j-rjv r^f ' A^iValuiV,
Bekker. A city of itself not
Sit all less than that of the
Athenians. Tu.-/A^r,v-ov, Duker.
XXIX. p. 387. 1. 38. TJ
xoXsi TrpocsxBiTO, ovrrj ov jtteyaAj;,
Bekker. He came to the city,
which was not a large one,
and took it. oucrj; /xjyaAj;, Du-
ker.
XXXI. p. 388. 1. 34. Scro-
"kXvmv liii Tr;j Kaxvgu:, Bekker.
And Demosthenes then sailing
away to Corcyra. Ix t^j Ksp-
-xvQx;, Duker.
XXXIV. p. 90. 1. 38. on
c'J -xoXv hi/.xv, Bekker. But
the Athenians thought that
they v.ere conquered, because
they did not obtain a great
victory, el /u-ij toAw Iv/x»v, Du-
ker.
XXXVII. p. 392. 1. 40- KM
Tcov '!S.'jf'Xy.'i<Tlao> r,(yxv oylortxovTX
l/AkicTu, Bekker. And there
were about eighty of the Syra-
cusians. xai u\ Tcov 'S.'jpaxxa-lcuy,
Duker.
XXXVIII. p. 393. 1. 10.
oXijv Ttjv rifx-igav, Bekker. The
whole day. oXjjv ii[jiipxv, Duker.
L. p. '400. 1. 6. Tzphy wf
ol ixuvTBis , Bekker. Before they
had remained the three times
nine days, as the prophets had
declared, aj ol ^vtsjj, Duker.
LIII. p. 401. 1. 3. ottAj-
Ta; Tz o'J xoWoui , Bekker. And
slew a few of their heavy- armed
men. orXiTas t= ttoXXoSs, Du-
ker.
LV. p. 401. 1. 32. TToXXa
^ fuxXXov eri, Bekker. They
were now still more in doubt.
TtoKki IriiiLaLXXov ^vJjxct/v, Duker.
LVII. p. 402. 1. 16. sxao-Toi
M'lag ui^zXtcts, Bekker. Duker
omits, cu^fX/af. Each for their
own particular profit.
LXIII. p. 406. 1. 10. a-xo-
Xuco-iai rj Toyg, Bekker. Do
not think it right for you to
part before you have beaten
the heavy-armed from the ene-
my's deck, rjv u.ij Touf, Duker.
LXXIU. p.' 412. 1. 23. T«i
OTzVOTtOQa Tajy ^sopicov SjaXa^ov-
Tst;, Bekker. And that they
should seize and guard the
narrow passages, xpo^^aa-av-
Txi, Duker.
LXXVII. p. 415. 1. 16.
TrpcnrBvBftirTxi 8" 005 awTO'Js, Bek-
ker. But a message has been
sent forward to them, and they
have been desired to meet us,
and bring provisions, -zpo-
TTiflTrSTS h' WCf Dukcr.
LXXVIII. p. 415.1. 31. TO
§£ i-)^a}psi sv TcXat^i'dp Tsray/xe'vov,
TvpMTOv ftiv rjyo'jjjLsvoy to Nix/ou,
Bekker. And the army ad-
vanced, arranged in a square,
the division of Nicias leading
the way, and that of Demos-
thenes following. TO ?£ £%iuf6*
h ttXukti'm Trrayjxe'voy tow Nix/oo,
Duker.
LXXXI. p. 417. 1. 33. 6T
TM TTCoVSrV TSyT^XOUVTa, Bckkcr.
But the army of Nicias was
distant fifty stadia in advance.
sxxTov xai TTsrr^xovTa, Duker.
TCVl
VARIOUS READINGS OF
LXXXI. p. 417.1. 39. auT«
Trgoarca s-rrixfir^ui, Bekker. Du-
ker omits TrgMTco. Because the
enemy pressed upon him first,
being last in the retreat.
LXXXIV. p. 419. 1. 8.
hu^Yivui uuTog vpcioTos, Bekker.
Duker omits avrog, and points
the sentence differently. But
every one wishing himself to
pass over first, and the enemy
pressing on iogethcVy made the
passage difficult.
LXXXVI. p. 420. 1. 23.
S«a T^v Trarav Is oipsTYjV V£VO]«,j-
(rftsvYjv l7rjTyj5eua"jv, Bekker. On
account of his strict attention
to the performance of every
virtue. 8ia tyjv vsvoiJ.i(Jix,hriv s; to
Ssjov ETTjT^Ss'jo-jv, Duker. These
vv^ords are omitted by Hobbes.
LXXXVII. p. 420. 1. 25.
ovTotg xai oxlyao ttoAXouj, Bek-
ker. Duker omits xa) 6\lyao.
For being in a hollow place,
and many in a small room, the
sun first of all and the suffo-
catinor air troubled them.
BOOK Vlll.
V. p. 426. 1. 4. ev^vg Ijca-
<;a.yj><Ti Sejvof Trap^v, Bekker.
He was immediately dreaded
wherever he came. auT^g exa-
(TxoL.'/o'ji^ Duker.
X. p. 428. 1. 21. iTrrjyye'A-
hr[<Tav yup u\ mrovda], Bekker.
Duker omits ul o-TrovSa/. For
the truce had been proclaimed.
XII. p. 429. 1. 24. xx\ av-
Tog oTi riv, Bekker. And that
he himself, if he could reach
Ionia, would easily persuade
the cities to revolt, orav, Du-
ker.
XVI. p. 431. 1. 4. 6 Srpoja-
^ip^/Sijj e^avYjysTo, Bekker.
Strombichides being ac-
quainted with it beforehand,
weighed out to sea. irpocuvriysTo,
Duker.
p. 431. I. 9. mia-yov
lt.h o\ Tre^oi Bekker, And the
infantry held off. o\ %oKKoiy
Duker.
XXII. p. 433. 1. 25. At
the end of this section Bekker
has two lines which are omitted
by Duker ; but Hobbes sup-
plies the deficiency with a note.
XXIII. p. 433. 1. 35. «-
Trpocrfio'xrjTOj, xaracrp^ovTs^, Bek-
ker. In Duker, the comma
is put before a7rpo<r8ox>]To«. The
Athenians, contrary to expec-
tation, entering the haven, &c.
p. 434. 1. 9. Tov
sscvTov aTQOToy iTitpv^ Bekker.
His land forces. Duker omits
XXV. p. 345. 1. 13. The
beginning of this sentence is
pointed thus in Bekker : In
the end of this summer there
sailed to Samos from Athens
a thousand heavy-armed Athe-
nians and a thousand five
hundred Argives.
BEKKER, BAVER, AND DUKER.
XCVJl
XXXII. p. 439. 1. 3. ^ov-
XofjLiVOi audjg aTrofJivaJ, Bekker.
Duker omits au^is . Wishing
to revolt again.
XXXIII. p. 439. 18. LTTo
yyxra g7r»s-oX^?, Bekker omits
vwo v'JxTa. A letter having
come by night frora Pedaritus.
XLIII. p. 443. 1. 38. o^s
Taj Xa^xiSscoj, ours ra? Qsgoc-
fx,evovg, Bekker. Duker omits
the three former words. But
Lichas said, that neither of the
treaties was made properly,
n either that formed by Cha-
cideus, nor that by Therame-
nes.
XLIV. p. 444. 1. 17- 'Po-
Sjouj sTTSKTotv a7roo-n;va», Bekker.
In Duker, there is a comma
at 'PoSi'ooj. Persuaded the
Rhodians to revolt from the
Athenians.
XLV. p. 445. 1. 2. ol Tr Taj
vuvi a.7toKt'nTu:7iv ou^ wroXt-Komc,
Bekker. And others would leave
the ships, not leaving the pay
which was due to them as a
pawn, ol 8s, Taj vauj kiroki-
To'vTsj, Duker.
XLVI. p.445.1.24. ^EX-
Ai;(r< TTkuoa-i, Bekker. Nor
tjjte more Grecians into pay.
fieWrjOsi TrXs/ocri, Duker.
p. 446. 1. 10. At the
end of the section Bekker
adds ^yyr7roX;|u,=». And in o-
ther things he was more evi-
dently backward in giving his
assistance in war, than to be
able to escape observation.
XLVIII. p.447.1. 10. Sxws
ftij CTaff I acTwo"*' tw /SaxiXsT,
Bekker. That they should not
revolt ; but /le thought that it
was not easy for the king, the
Peloponnesians being now e-
qually with them on the sea,
&C. OTTois [/.tj rtaaiaaatxri too
/Sao-iAjj, Duker.
LIlI. p. 450. 1. 2. owe %^iv
r,u.n ysvBT^aij Bekker. This
we cannot now obtain. w/x,7y,
Duker.
LXXXIX. p. 468. 1. 23.
a■^^o'J^ Travu, Bekker. These
words are omitted by Duker.
And very anxiously joined in
sending ambassadors to Lace-
d{emon.
XCU. p. 470. 1. 35. T^v
lauToiJ ^wX^v Ep^cov, Bekker.
And hanng his own tribe with
)iim. (foXax^^y, Duker.
C. p. 475. 1.41. ew ecuT^v
Tacaij Talj vawo-i, Bekker. Du-
ker omits irao-aij TaTj. Thra-
syllus sailing to it with all his
ships.
CII. p. 476. i. 33. hr) rijj
"IjiA^pu xai ArjjjLvo'j, Bekker.
The greater number of them
escaped to Imbrus and Lem-
nOS. STTJ T^ J ^TTEIgOO XM Ar,lJ.VOUf
Duker.
THE
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK I.
CONTEXTS.
The estate of Greece, derived frovi the remotest known antiquity
thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The occa-
sion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of
the Athenians with the Corinthians, concerning Corcyra and Po-
tidcea. The Lacedemonians, instigated by the confederates, un-
dertake the war ; not so much at their instigation, as out of envy
to the greatness of the Athenian dominion. The degrees by
which that dominion was acquired. The war generally decreed
by the confederates at Sparta. The demands of the Lacedemo-
nians. Tlie obstinacy of the Athenians, and their answer, by the
advice of Pericles.
1 HucYDiDEs an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponne-
sians and the Athenians, as they warred against each otlier * ;
beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot, with expec-
tation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the rela-
tion, of all that had been before it : conjecturing so much,
both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner
of provision : and also because he saw the rest of Greece sid-
ing with the one or the other faction ; some then presently,
and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the
greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians,
reaching also to part of the Barbarians f, and, as a man may
t The common appollation girea by the Grecians, to all nations besides them-
•elres.
2 THE HISTORY book i.
say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded t'hls, and
those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them,
through length of time, cannot by any means clearly be disco-
vered ; yet for any argument that (looking into times far past)
I have yet light on to persuade me, I do not think they have
been very great, either for matter of war, or otherwise.
For it is evident, that that which now is called Hellas *, was
not of old constantly inhabited ; but that, at first, there were often
removals, ev^ery one easily leaving the place of his abode, to the
violence always of some greater number. For whilst traffic was
not, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear, neither by sea nor
land ; and every man so husbanded the ground, as but barely
to live upon it, without any stock f of ricljcs | ; and planted
nothing, (because it was uncertain when another should
invade them, and carry all away, especially, not having the de-
fence of walls) but made account to be masters in any place
of such necessary sustenance, as might serve them from day
to day, they made little difficulty to change their habitations.
And for this cause, they were of no ability at all, either for
greatness of cities, or other provision. But the fattest soils-
were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants j
as that which is now called Thessalia and Boeotia, and the
greatest part of Peloponnesus, (except Arcadia) j and of the
rest of Greece whatsoever was most fertile. For, the good-
ness of the land increasing the power of some particular men,
both caused seditions, (whereby they were ruined at home) and
withal, made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of stran-
gers. From hence it is, that Attica §, from great antiquity,
for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inha-
bited ever by the same people ||. And it is none the least evi-
dences of what I have said, that Greece, by reason of sundry
transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like aug-
mentation. For, such as by war or sedition, were driven out
of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of sta-
bility, retired themselves to Athens ; where receiving the free-
dom of the city, they long since so increased the same in num-
ber of people, as, Attica being incapable of them itself, they
sent out colonies into Ionia.
To make it appmr that this wnr was fjreater than any befure it, the author
shfiwrtii the imheciii^fy of fdriner tiiurs, descrihin";- three periods: 1. From the
bo^iiiiiiii^ of tiip (jiceiun mciiiory to tlie war of Troy. 2. The war itself. 3. The
time from tlicnce, to the preseirt war which lie writeth.
* Greeee.
-f- Tttsievriat ^^n/tareiit,
I XorifiaTa, Aristot. Whatsoever is estimated by money.
^ The territory of the Athenian city, so called from Atthis, the daughter of
Cranaiis.
II The Athenians had an opinion of themselves, that they were not descendect
from other nations, hut that their ancestors were ever the inhabitants of Attica -
wtiercfote they also styled themselves auri^^oas, »• e. Men of the same land.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 3
And to me, the imbecility of ancient times Is not a little de-
monstrated also by this [that followeth.] For before the Tro-
jan war, nothinjT appeareth to have been done by Greece in
common ; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one
name of Hellas ; nor before the lime of Hellen, the son of
Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum
(which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by re-
gions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But
Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in
for their aid into other cities ; these cities, because of their
conversing with them, began more particularly to be called
Hellenes: and yet could not that name of along time after pre-
vail upon thcvo all. This is conjectured principally out of Ho-
mer ; for, though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives
them not any where that name in general* ; nor indeed to any,
but those, that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were
the first so called. But in his poems, he mentioneth Danaans,
Argives,and Achaeans; nor doth he likewise use the word Bar-
barians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were
not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppo-
sitely answerable unto them. The Grecians then, neither
as they had that name In particular by mutual intercourse, nor
after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for
want of strength and correspondence, enter into any action
with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came to-
gether, by the means of navigation, which the njost part of
Greece had now received.
For Minos was the most ancient of all, that by report we
know to have built a na\"y : and he made himself master of the
now Grecian sea f ; and both commanded the isles called Cy-
clades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the
same, expelling thenee the Carians, and constituting his own
sons there for governors, and also freed the seas of pirates, as
much as he could, for the better coming in, as is likely, of his
own revenue.
For the Grecians in old time, and such Barbarians as, in the
continent, lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands,
after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, be-
came thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most
puissant men, both to enrich themselves, and to fetch in main-
tenance for the weak : and falling upon towns unfortified, and
scatteringly inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best
means of their living; being a matter at that time no where in
disgrace, but rather carrj'ing with it something of glory. This
is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst
• Tlrt' nnme of IleileDes not givcD to all the Grecians in die time that IIoiDef
wrote bis p<)€ins.
t Befi re that time it was called the Carian sea.
4 THE HISTORY book r.
whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an or-
nament. The same is also proved by some of the ancient
poets, who introduce men questioning such as sail by, on all
coasts alike, whether they be tiiieves or not ; as a thing neither
scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that
were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within
the main land : and much of Greece useth that old custom ; as
the Locrians * called Ozolae, the Acarnanians, and those of the
continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion
of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent,
from their old trade of thieving.
(^, For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed,
because their houses were unfenced, and travelling unsafe, and
accustomed themselves, like the barbarians, to the ordinary
wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live
so yet do testify that the same manner of life was anciently
universal to all the rest. Amongst whom the Athenians were
the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil passed into
a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were any
thing stepped into years laid away, upon the same delicacy,
not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats, and golden
grasshoppers f, which they were wont to bind up in the locks
of their hair : from whence also the same fashion, by reason of
their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient
lonians. But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable
to the wearing of these times, was first taken up by the Lace-
demonians ; amongst whom also, both in other things, and
especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed
the most equality with the commons. The same were also the
first, that, wiien they were to contend in the Olympic games t,
stripped themselves naked §, and anointed their bodies with
ointment : whereas in ancient times, the champions did also
in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years
since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst
the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of
fighting with fists, and of wrestling, and the combatants, about
their privy parts, wear breeches in the exercise. It may like-
wise by many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks
used the same form of life, that is now in force amongst the
Barbarians of the present age.
As for cities, such as are of late foundation, and since the in-
■/
* In distinction to tlie otlicr Locrians, called Opuntii.
f The Athenians, holding- themselves to be sprung from the ground they lived
on, wore the grasshopper as a kind of cognizance, because that beast is thought
to be generated of the earth.
I Exercises of divers kinds instituted in honour of Jupiter at Olyinpia in Pe-
loponnesus, to which resorted such out of Greece, as contended for prizes.
§ This was perhaps the cause, why it was a capital crime for women to be
spectators of the Olympic exercises.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 5
crease of navigation in as much as they have had since more
plenty of riches, have been walled about, and built upon the
shore; and have taken up Isthmi, [that is to say, necks of
land between sea and sea] both for merchandise, and for the
better strength against confiners. But the old cities, (men
having been in those times, for the most part, infested by
thieves) are built farther up, as well in the islands, as in the
continent. For others also that dwelt on the sea side, though
not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies ; and
even to these times, those people are planted up high in the
country.
But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islan-
ders ; namely, the Carians and the Phoenicians : for by them
were the greatest part of the islands inhabited *. A testimony
whereof is this : the Athenians, when in this present warf they
hallowed the isle of Delos, and had digged up the sepulchres
of the dead, found that more than half of them were
Carians J, known so to be, both by the armour buried with
them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And
when Minos's navy was once afloat, navigators had the sea more
free : for he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in
the most of them planted colonies of his own. By which
means, they who inhabited the sea coasts, becoming more ad-
dicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwelHngs ; of
whom, some grown now rich, compassed their towns about
with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort under-
went servitude with the mighty ; and the mighty with their
wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it
came to pass, that rising to power, they proceeded afterward
to the war against Troy.
And to me it seemeth, that Agamemnon § got together that
fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors || of He-
lena, bound thereto by oath to Tyndareus, as for this, that he
exceeded the rest in power. For they ^hat by tradition of
their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts of the Pe-
loponnesians, say, that first Pelops, by the abundance of wealth
which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, ob-
tained such power amongst them, as, though he were a stranger,
yet the country was called after his name. And that this power
* The Cyclades.
t Vide lib. 4. in the beginning'.
X The Carians having invented the crest of the helmet, and the handle of the
target, and also the drawing of images on tlieir targets, had therefore a helmet
and a buckler buried with them, and had their heads laid towards the west.
§ The son of Atreus the son of Pelops.
II The opinion was, that Tyndareus the father of Helena, took an oath of all bis
daughters suitors, that if violence were done to him that obtained her, all the rest
should help to revenge it. And that Menelaus having married her, and Paris
the son of Priam, king of Troy, takeu hor away, Agememnon in the behalf of hi»
brother Meutlaus, diew them by this oath to the siege of Iliiuu.
/c
6 THE HISTORY book i.
was also increased by his posterity : for, Euristheus being slain
ia Attica by the Heracleides*, Atreus, that was his uncle f
by the mother, (and was then abiding with him as an exiled
person, for fear of his father, for the death % of Chrysippus)
and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition,
had committed Mycenae, and the government thereof, for that
he was his kinsman ; when as Euristheus came not back, (the
Mycenians being willing to it, for fear of the Heracleides, and
because he was an able man, and made much of the common
people) obtained the kingdom of Mycenai, and of whatsoever
else was under Euristheus, for himself : and the power of the
Pelopeides § became greater than that of the Perseides || . To
which greatness Agamemnon *^ succeeding, and also far ex-
celling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as i con-
ceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon fa-
vour, as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred
most ships to that action, and that some also lie lent to the
Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer (if any
think his testimony sufficient) who at the delivery of tiie scep-
tre unto him, calleth him, ' Of many isles, and of all Argos
* king.' . Now he could not, living on the continent, have been
lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent, which
cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this
expedition, we are to estimate what were those of the ages
before it.
Now seeing Mycenae was but a small city, or if any other of
that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that
cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been
less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be. For,
if the city of Lacedemon were now desolate, and nothing of it
left but the temples, and floors of the buildings, I think it
would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence, of their
power, in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts a
of Peloponnesusb, it possess two^, and hath the leading of
the rest, and also of many confederates without ; yet, the city
being not close built, and the tcmi)lcs and other edifices not
costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited, after the
*A kindred and race of men, vvliereof was Ilcrcujes. This family was pcrse«
ciited by Euristheus, who was of the house of Perseus, and driven into Attica,
thither he following- then), was slain by the Athenians.
■\ Astidamia, the mother of Euristheus, was Atreus's sister.
i Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pelops, at the impulsion of their mother, slow
tiiis Chrysippus, who was their half brother, viz. by the father, and for this fact,
Atreus fled Euristheus.
§ The house of Pelops.
II The house of Perseus.
^The son of Atreus, heir to the power of both houses, both of the Pelopeides,
and of the Perseides.
« Laconia, 2 Arcadia, 3 Argolica, 1 Mcsscnia, 5 Elis,
'• Morca.
*.Lacuiiiu, Mcsscnia.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR, 7
ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to
the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one
would conjecture, by the sight of their city, that tiieir power
were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be in-
credulous, [concerning the forces that went to Troy] nor have
in regard so much the external shew of a city, as the power :
but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater
than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the
present age ; if in this also we may credit the poetry of Ho-
mer, who, being a poet, was like to set it forth to the utmost.
And yet even thus it cometli short ; for he maketh it to con-
sist of 1 200 vessels : those that were of Boeotians, carrying 1 20
men apiece, and those which came with Philoctetes, 50 ; set-
ting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort, and the least,
and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest he maketh in
his catalogue no mention at all : but declareth, that they who
were in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and
soldiers : for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were
all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not
likely that many went along, except kings *, and such as were
in chief authority, especially being to pass the sea with munition
of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and
pyratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least, dne
estimate the mean f of their shipping, it will appear, that the
whole number of men considered, as sent jointly from all
Greece, were not very many. And the cause hereof was not
so much want of men, as of wealth. For, lor want of victual,
they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped
might both follow the war, and also maintain itself. When
upon their arrival they had gotten the upper-hand in fight,
(which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their
camp) it appears, that from that time forward they en)ployed
not there their whole power, but that for want of victual, they
betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus,
and part to fetch in booties : whereby divided, the Trojans the
more easily made that ten years resistance ; as being ever a
match for so many as remained-at the siege. Whereas, if they
had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their
forces, eased of boothaling and tillage, since they were masters
of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they
strove not with their whole power, but only with such a por-
tion of their army, as at the several occasions chanced to be
present i when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won
• As Achilles, Ulysses, Ajax, Dioniedes, Patroclus ; and the like.
■f The whole Dumber of men, estimating the ships at a medium to carry 8.5
men apiece, which is the mean between 120 aud 50, come to lO-iOOi) men, carried
iu these 1200 ships. Yet the author makes it a light uiatter in respect of the
present war.
8 THE HISTORY book i.
the place, both in less time, and with less labour. But through
want of money, not only they were weak matters all that pre-
ceded this enterprise ; but also this, (which is of greater name
than any before it) appeareth to be in fact beneath the fame,
and report, which by means of the poets, now goeth of it.
For also after the Trojan war, the Grecians continued still
their shiftings and transplantations ; insomuch as never resting,
they improved not their power. For the late return of the
Greeks from lUum, caused not a little innovation, and in most
of the cities there arose seditions, and those which were driven
out built cities for themselves in other places. For those that
are now called Boeotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking
of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves
in that country, which, now Boeotia, was then called Cadmeis.
(But there was in the same a certain portion of that nation be-
fore, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy.)
And in the eightieth year, the Doreans, together with the He-
racleides, seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after
long time, Greece had constant rest ; and, shifting their seats
no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians
planted Ionia, and most of the islands ; and the Peloponne-
sians most of Italy, and Sicily, and also certain parts of the
rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the
Trojan war.
But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the
desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most
of the cities there were erected tyrannies : (for before that
time, kingdoms with honours limited, were hereditary.) And
the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to
the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the
first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that
which is now in use j and at Corinth are reported to have been
made the first gallies of all Greece. Now it is well known
that Aminocles the shipwright of Corinth, built four ships at
Samos. And from the time that Aminocles went to Samos,
until the end of this present war, are at the most but 300 years.
And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought
between the Corinthians and the Corcyraeans *, and from that
battle to the same time, are but 260 years. For Corinth seated
on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic ; because
the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus,
trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one
to another, but through the Corinthians' territory. And was
also wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have sir-
named this town the Rich. And after the Grecians had com-
merce also by sea ; then likewise having furnished themselves
* By tUls it oppears that Tbucydides out-lircd the wliulv war.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. ff
with a navy, they scowered the sea of pirates, and affording
traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in
revenue of money. After this the lonians in the times of
CyTus, first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got
together a great navy, and making war on Cyrus, obtained for
a time tiie dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their
own coast. Also Polycrates, wlio in the time of Cambyses
tyrannized in Samos, had a strong navy, wherevvith he subdued
divers of the islands ; and amongst the rest, having won Rhe-
nea, he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The Pho-
ceans* likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles,
overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.
These were the greatest navies e.xtant, and yet even these,
though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted as it seems,
but of a few gallies, and were made up with vessels of fifty
oars, and with long boats, as well as tliose of former times.
And it was but a little before the Medanf war, and death of
Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that
the tyrants of Sicily, and the Corcyreeans had of gallies any
number. For these last X were the only navies worth speaking
of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the
people of iEgina, and the Athenians had but small ones, and
the most of them consisting but of fifty oars apiece ; and that
so lately, as but from the time that the' Athenians making war
on /Eghm, and withal expecting the coming of the Barbarian,
at the persuasion of Themistocles, built those ships which they
used in that war ; and tiiese also, not all had decks.
Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and
modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval busi-
ness, gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money,
and in dominion over other people. For with their navies
(especially those men that had not sufficient land where they
inhabited to maintain themselves) they subtlued the islands.
But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power
by, there was none at all. And such as we're, were only be-
tween borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet
gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home;
because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the
great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals, in anv common
enterprise ; but such as were neighbours, warred against each
other, hand to hand. For the war of old, between the Chalci-
deans and the Eretrians, was it, wherein the rest of Greece
was most divided, and in league with either party.
•The Phoceans in the time of Tarqninius, came into the mouth of Tybcr, en-
tered into amity with the Romans, and thence went and built 31arseille« ainon<r,t
the sarai^e nations of the Ligurians and Gauls, Justin. I. 42. "
fJr, . . 1*"! ''!!'* P^".'^"'* used here promiscuously, the Medan monarchv bein*
translated to the Persians. ' ^
t Of the Corinthians, lonians, and Phoceans.
10 THE HISTORY book i.
As others by other means were kept back from growing
great, so also the lonians by this, that the Persian affairs pros-
pering, Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of
Croesus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to
the seaside, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed
in the continent, and Darius afterward, when he had overcome
the Phoenician fleet, did the like unto tliem in the islands.
And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who
forecasted opJ^ for themselves, how, with as much safety as
was possilile, to look to their own persons, and their pwn fa-
milies, they resided for the most part in the cities, and did no
action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neigh-
bours: for, as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already ar-
rived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time hin-
dered, that neither jointly it could do any tiling remarkable, nor
the cities singly be adventurous.
But after that the tyrants * both of Athens, and of the rest of
Greece, where tyrannies were, were the most, and last of them
(excepting those of Sicily,) put down by the Lacedemonians,
(Lacedemon, after it was built by the Doreans that inhabited
the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions
than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest
time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants. For
it is unto the end of this war 400 years and somewhat more,
that the Lacedemonians have used one and the same govern-
ment : and thereby being of power themselves, they also or-
dered the affairs in the other cities) [I say] after the dissolution
of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought
by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon.
And in the tenth year again after that, came the Barbarian f,
with the great fleet X into Greece to subdue it. And Greece
being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that
leagued in that war was given to the Lacedemonians, as to
the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed
so much before, and already stowed their necessaries, at the
coming in of the Medes, went on shipboard § and became sea-
men. When they had jointly beaten back the Barbarian, then
did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king,
and such as had in common made war upon him, not long af-
ter, divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athe-
nians, and the other with the Lacedemonians j these two cities
* PisistraluB and IiU sons.
■f Xerxes.
J A fleet of 1200 {rallies, and 2000 bulks of the round iiiiuuier of building.
Corn. Nepos in vitu; Tlieniisloclis.
(j The Atlieniaus being adnionislicd by tlic Oracle, for tbcir safety against tlie
Medes, to put themselves wiibin walU of wood: Thcuiistoclcs iuter|>retiu|j; tbu
Oracle, they went into their gullies.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 11
appearing to be the mightiest, for this had the power by land,
and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but a
while ; for afterwards, the Lacedemonians and the Athenians, be-
ing at variance *, warred on each other, together with their se-
veral confederates. And tlie rest of Greece, where any discord
chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. Inso-
much, that from tlie war of the Medes to this present war, be-
ing continually [exercised] sometimes in pea^, sometimes in
war, either one against the other, or against revolted confede-
rates, they arrived at this war, both v.ell furnished with mili-
tary provisions, and also expert, because their practice was with
danger.
The Lacedemonians governed not their confederates so, as
to make them tributaries, but only drew them by fair means
to embrace the Oligarchy f, convenient to their own policy.
But the Athenians, having with time taken into their own
hands the gallies of all those that stood out, (except the Chians
and Lesbians) reigned over them J, and ordained every one of
them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means
their own § particular provision was greater in the beginning
of this war ; than when in their flourishing time, the league
between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was
at the most.
Such then I find to have been the state of things past, hard
to be believed, though one produce proof for every particular
thereof. For men receive the report of things, though of their
own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one
as from another, without examination.
For the vulgar sort of Athenians think \\, that Hipparchus
was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton ; and
know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eld-
est son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were
his brethren, and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton suspecting
that some of tiieir complices had that day, and at that instant,
discovered unto Hippias, somewhat of their treason, did forbear
Hippias, as a man forwarned ; and desirous to eft'ect somewhat,
though witii danger, before they should be apprehended, light-
ing on Hipparchus, slew him near the temple called Leocorium,
* This variance bfgan upon this, that Siinoo havin^^ been sent for to aid the
Lacedemonians aorainst the Helots, was tient hack with his AthcDiaiis, ont of dis-
trnst the LaccdemoDiaus had of their furward spirit : which the Athenians took
for a disgrace.
+ The government of the few, that is to say, of the nobility.
X Hence it is, that through all this history siit/ccU and confederates are biken
for the same thing, especially with the Athenians.
§ Of the people of Athens itself, excluding their confederates.
II Digression, to shew how negligently men receive the fame of things past, by
the example of their error touching the story of Hippias the son of Pisistratus,
which it seems he willingly nicutioiu both here and hereafter, on light occa>iun.
J? THE HISTORY book i.
whilst he was setting forth the Panathenalcal sliow *. And
likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath
not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by
other Grecians ; as that the kings of Lacedemon, in giving
their suffrages, had not single f but double votes. And that
Pitauate X was a band of soldiers, so called there, whereas there
was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men,
in the search of tHith, and embrace soonest the things that are
next to hand.'
Now he, that by the argument here adduced, shall frame a
judgment of things past, and not believe rather, that they were
such as the poets have sung, or prose-writers have composed,
more delightfully to the ear, than conformably to the truth, as
being things not to be disproved, and by length of time, turned
for the most part into the nature of fables without credit ; but
shall think them here searched out, by the most evident signs
that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity j
he I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the
present war wherein they live, to be greatest ; and when it is
past, admire more those that were before it ; yet if they consi-
der of this war, by the acts done in the same, it will manifest
itself to be greater, than any of those before mentioned.
What particular persons have spoken, when they were about
to enter in the war, or when they were in it, were hard for me
to remember exactly, whether they were speeches which I have
heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any
man seemed, to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum of
truth §, of all that hath been uttered, to speak most agreeably
to the matter still in hand, so have I made it spoken here. But
of the acts themselves done in the war, 1 thought not fit to
write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself
did but think to be true ; but only those whereat I was myself
present, and those of which with all diligence I had made
particular enquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard
to know the certainty, because such as were present at every
action, spake not all after the same manner, but as they were
affected to the parts, or as they could remember.
To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it
no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful : but he that desires
to look into the truth of things done, and which, (according to
• Panatlienaica, were solemnities instituted by Theseus in memory of that lio
had drawn tog'ethcr all the Athenians that lived dispersed in Attica, into the city
of Athens. Pans, in Arcad.
-f- Lucan sccmetli to retain the same error, in Harmodios,
j A tribe of the Lacedemonians.
(j To the analog-y and fitness of what was to be said : so tliat tbougli he used
not their words, yet he used the arguments that best iiii<;iit serve to the purpose,
which at any time was in baud.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAX WAR. 13
the condition o'f humanity) may be done again, or at least their
like, he shall find enough lierein to make him think it profit-
able : and it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession*,
than to be rehearsed for a prize f.
The greatest action before this, was that against the Medes J,
and yet that, by two battles by sea, and as many by land §, was
soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and
the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like, in the like
space, had never been seen before. For neither had there
ever been so many cities expunged, and made desolate, what by
the Barbarians, and what by the Greeks warring on one an-
other, (and some cities there were, that when they were taken
changed theii" inhabitants,) nor so much banishing and slaugh-
ter, some by the war, some by sedition, as was in this. And
those things which concerning former time there went a fame
of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible : as
earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most
violent withal ; eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of
any former time ; great droughts in some places, and thereby
femine ; and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed
also its part, the plague. All these evils entered together with
this war, which began from the time that the Athenians and
Peloponnesians brake the league, which, immediately after the
conquest of Euboea ^, had been concluded between them for
thirty years. Tiie causes why they brake the same, and their
quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man
should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst
the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel, though
least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian
power, which putting the Lacedemonians into fear, necessi-
tated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league, pub-
lickly voiced, were these :
Epidamnus ^^ is a city situate on the right hand to such as
enter into the Ionian gulf || ; lK)rdering upon it, are the Tau-
lantii. Barbarians, a people of Illyris **. This was planted by
the Corcyraeansft, but the captain of the colony was one Pha-
llus, the son of Heratoclidas a Corinthian of the lineage of
Hercules, and according to an ancient custom, called to this
* Krnftm if iii.
t Both poets and historiographers of old, recited their histories to captate
glory. This ciiiiilaiion of glory in their writings, he calleth Siytiti*(ut.
\ When Xerxfs invaded them.
^ Two battles by sea, m. one at Salamis, and the other at Mycale in Ionia.
And two by land, one at TherniopylEe, and the other at Platea.
II Negroponte, by the Athenians.
» The first pretext of the war.
% Now the gulf of Venice, called so from liis an Illyrian.
♦* Illyrii, now Slaronia and Dalniatia.
ft Inliabitai\ts of Corey ra, now Corfu.
14 THE HISTORY kook i.
charge out of the metropolitan city * ; besides that, the colony
itself consisted in part of the Corinthians, and others of tlye Do-
ric nation. In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became
great and populous ; and having for many years together been
annoyed vvitli sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon
them by the confining Barbarians, brought low, ami deprived
of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the
last accident before this war was, that the nobility, forced by
the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the Barba-
rians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained
within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed
In this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra f, as being
their mother-city, praying the Corcyrrcans not to see them per-
ish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven
forth, and to put an end to the Barbarian war. And this they
intreated in the form of suppliants |, sitting down in the tem-
ple of Juno. But the Corcyraeans, not admitting their suppli-
catiovy sent them away again without effect. The Epidam-
nians novy despairing of relief from the Corcyraeans, and at a
stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending to Del-
phi, enquired at the Oracle, whether It were not best to deliver
up their city into the hands of the Corinthians, as of their
founders, and make trial of what aid they should obtain from
thence. And when the Oracle had answered, ^ That they
' should deliver it, and take the Corinthians for their leaders,'
they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the Ora-
cle, gave their city to tlvem, and declared how the first founder
of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the Oracle had given
them, intreating their help, and that they would not stand by,
beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook
their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, (as thinking
them no less their own, than the Corcyraeans' colony) but also
for hatred of the Corcyraeans, who being their colony, yet con-
temned them, and allowed them not their due honour in public
meetings ; nor, in the distribution of the sacrifice, began at a
Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies ; but being
equal to the richest Grecians of their time, for store of money^
and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in
contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much
they excelled in shipping ; and that Corcyra had been once
fnhabited by the Phaeaces §, who flourished in glory of naval
* Corcyra was a colony of Coiiiitli, and Epiilanmiis of Corcyra.
-}- Corfu.
J Eitlier the E|rulamiiians bad ofTendcft tlie Coroyra-ans, or the mnnnpr was in
those times to fako sanctuary, not only for crimes, l>nt for obtaining)- aid in v\trii-
mitits, tacitly disclaiininjj ail other liclp save that cf the gods, and those to whom
they ma<le snpplicntion.
§ Cy llomcr this i.sic is called Phtcacia.
BOOK t. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. IS
affairs ; which was also the cause, why tliey the rather provided
themselves of a navy; and they were indeed not without power
that way, for when they began this war, they had one hun-
dred and twenty gallies. The Corinthians therefore having all
these criminations against tliem, relieved Epidamnus willingly,
not only giving leave to whosoever wouUl, to go and dwell
there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciotes, Leuca-
dians, and of their own citizens ; which succours, for fear the
Corcyrseans should ha%'e hindered their passage by sea, marched
by land to ApoUonia, The Corcyreeans understanding that new
inhabitants, and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that
the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed ex-
tremely at the same ; and sailing presently thither with twenty-
five gallics, and afterwards with another fleet in an insolent
manner commanded them both to recal those whom they had
banished, (for these banished * men of Epidamnus had been
now at Corcyra, and pointing to the sepulchres of their ances-
tors, and claiming kindred, had intreated the Corcyrseans to
restore them) and to send away the garrison and inhabitants
sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave
no ear to their commandments. Whereupon the Corcyraeans
with forty gallies, together with the banished men, (whom
they pretended to reduce) and with the Illyrians, whom they
had joined to their part, warred upon them ; and having laid
siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidam-
nians as would, and all strangers might depart safely, or other-
wise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this
prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the
city in on ever)' side. Tlie Corinthians, when news was brought
from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready
their army, and at the same time caused a proclamation to be
made, for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as
would go should have equal and like privileges with those that
were there before : and that such as desired to be sharers in the
same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that
present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachms,
might stay behind. And they were very many both that went,
and that laid down their silver. Moreover, they sent to the
Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the
Corcyraeans, to aid them with some gallies, who accordingly
•tivyaitt. Divers (H"casion<! force mea from lh*ir coontry. Sentence of law
wfiiih is commonly callpd banishment. Proscription, when the sentence i»
death, for which cause they fly into banishment : but those that are here meant.
IC THE HISTORY book i.
furnished out eight, the citizens of Pale in Cephalonia four.
They also required gallies of the Epidaurians, who sent them
five ; the citizens of Hermione one, the Traezenians two, the
Leucadians ten, the Ambraciotes eight. Of the Thebans and
Phliasians they required money ; of the Eleans, both money
and empty gallies ; and of the Corinthians themselves, there
were ready thirty gallies, and three thousand men of arms *.
The Corcyrseans, advertised of this preparation, went to Co-
rinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedemonians,
and of the Sycionians, whom they took with them, and re-
quired the Corinthians to recal the garrison and inhabitants
which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city they said
wherewith they had nothing to do ; or if they had any thing
to allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried
in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should Isoth agree on,
and they then should hold the colony to whom the same should
be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer
their cause to the Oracle at Delphi : that war they would
make none, but if they must needs have it, they should by the
violence of them, be forced, in their own defence, to seek out
better friends t than those whom they already had. To this the
Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their
fleet, and dismiss the Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they
would then consult of the matter ; for before they could not
honestly do it : because whilst they should be pleading the
case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a
siege. The Corcyrseans replied to this, that if they would call
back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they
also would do as the Corinthians had required them ; or other-
wise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where
they were, and to suspend the war till the cause should be de-
cided. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propo-
sitions since their gallies were manned, and their confederates
present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with
seventy-five gallies and two thousand men of arms |, and set
sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyraeans. Their fleet was
commanded by Aristaeus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son
of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes : and the land
forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the
son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium §, in
the territory of Anactorlum, (which is a temple of Apollo, and
ground consecrated unto him in the mouth of the gulf of Am-
• 'OtXitui, men in armour. f Meaning' tlie Atlirnians.
J Eitlier here or l)fiforo, it is liliely the nmnbor Iintli been niiswritten : for a
little before lie says tlicy had made ready three thousand.
§ A haven famous afterward for tlie battle between Anjustiis Caesar and Mar-
cus Antoniiis.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 17
braci) the Corcyraeans sent a herald to them at Actium to for-
bid their coming on, and in the mean time manned out their
fleet ; and having repaired and made fit for ser\'ice their old
gallies, and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped
their munition, and went aboard. The herald was no sooner
returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to
peace, but having their gallies already manned and furnished,
to the number of eighty sail (for forty * attended always the
siege of Epidamnus) they put to sea, and arranging themselves
came to a battle, in which the Corcyraeans were clearly victors,
and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen gal-
lies. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that
besieged Epidamnus, had the same rendered unto them, with
conditions, ' that the strangers therein found should be ran-
* somed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as
* they should otherwise be disposed of.' The battle being
ended, the Corcyraeans, after they had set up their trophy f in
Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners,
but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the
Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Co-
rinth, the Corcyraeans, masters now of the whole sea in those
parts, went first, and wasted the territory of Leucas, a Corin-
thian colony, and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal
of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had, both with mo-
ney and shipping, given aid to the Corinthians.
And they were masters of those seas, and infested the con-
federates of Corinth, for the most part of that year ; till such
time as in the beginning of the summer following, the Corin-
thians sent a fleet and soldiers into Actium, the which for the
more safe keeping of Leucas, and of other cities their friends,
encamped about Cheimerium in Thesprotis J : and the Corcy-
raeans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against
them in Leucimna. But neither stirred against the other, but
after they had laid quietly opposite all the summer, they retired
in winter, both the one side and the other to their cities.
All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corin-
thians being vexed at the war with the Corcyraeans, applied
themselves to the building of gallies, and the' preparing of a
fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure ma-
riners out of Peloponnesus, and all other parts of Greece.
The Corcyraeans, having intelligence of their preparations, be-
• It is said before that the Corcyrfeans had in all one hundred and twenty g-al-
lies, which number agreetb nith this eighty that fought, and the forty that main,
tained the sie^e.
f TfTti. Turning, pnrticalarly tnrning the Lack. Trophies, monuments in
remembrance of liaving- made the enemy turn their backs. Thtse were usual in
those times, now out of date.
J Thesprotis, part of AlbaiHa.
C
18 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
gan to fear, and (because they had never been in league with
any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates, ei-
ther of the Athenians, or Lacedemonians) thought it best now,
to send to Athens, to see if they could procure any aid from
thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also
sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athe-
nian navy, to that of the Corcyraeans, might hinder them from
carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly at Athens
being met, they came to plead against each other j and the
Corcyraeans spake to this effect.
The Oration of the Ambassadors of Corcyra.
* Men of Athens, it is but justice, that such as come to im-
plore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do we) and cannot
pretend by any great benefit or league, some precedent me-
rit ; should, before they go any further, make it appear prin-
cipally, that what they seek conferreth profit, or if not so, yet
is not prejudicial at least, to those that are to grant it : and
next, that they will be constantly thankful for the same. And
if they cannot do this, then not to take it ill, though their
suit be rejected. And the Corcyreeans being fully persuaded
that they can make all this appear on their own parts,, have
therefore sent us hither, desiring you to ascribe them to the
number of your confederates. Now so it is, that we have had
a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to you,
and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For,
having ever till now, been unwilling to admit others into
league with us, we are now not only suitors for league to
others, but also left destitute by that means, of friends in this
our war with the Oorinthians. And that which before we
thought wisdom, namely, not to enter with others into league,
because we would not at the discretion of others enter into
danger, we now find to have been our weakness and impru-
dence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed the Corinthians,
in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to invade us
with greater preparation, out of Peloponnesus, and the rest of
Greece ; and seeing with our single power we are not able to
go through j and since also the danger, in case they subdue
us, would be very great to all Greece ; it is both necessary
that we seek the succours both of you and whomsoever else
we can ; and we are also to be pardoned, though we make
bold to cross our former custom of not having to do with
other men, proceeding not from malice, but error of judg-
ment. Now if you yield unto us in what we request, this co-
incidence (on our part) of need, will on your part be honourable,
for many reasons. First in this respect, that you lend your
help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have com-
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. I^
* raitted the injustice. And next, considering that you receive
' into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you
' shall so place your benefit, as to have a testimony of it,
' if ever any can be so indelible. Besides this, the greatest
* navy but your own, is ours : consider then, what rarer hap,
* and of greater grief to your enemies can befal you, than that
' that power, which you would have prized above any money,
* or other requital, should come voluntarily, and without all
* danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing with it
* reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those
* you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not
' happened at once to many. And few there be of those that
* sue for league, that come not rather to receive strength and
' reputation, than to confer it. If any here think that the war
' wherein we may do you sen'ice will not at all be, he is in an er-
' ror, and seeth not how the Lacedemonians, through fear of
' you, are already in labour of the war ; and that the Corin-
' thians, gracious with them, and enemies to you, making way
* for their enterprise, assault us now, in the way to the invasion
' of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the rest of
* their common enemies, but that they may be sure bcfore-
* hand, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate.
* It must therefore be your part, we offering, and you accept-
< ing the league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plot-
< ting, rather than to counterplot against them. If they ob-
* ject injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let
* them learn, that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong
* from their mother city, so long they honour her ; but
< when they suflbr injury from her, they then become alienate ;
* for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay,
* but to be their equals. That they have clone us the injury,
* is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the
' controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute
« their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that
' which they have done unto us who are their kindred, serve you
' for some argument, not to be seduced by their demands, and
' made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives
« most secure that hath fewest benefits bestowed by him upon
' his enemies, to repent of. As for the articles between you
' and the Lacedemonians, they are not broken by receiving us
' into your league, because we are in league with neither party.
' For there it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither
* party may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were
' very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have tlie li-
' berty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the
' league, and out of any other parts of Greece, (and not the
' least out of places ^' in your dominion) and we be denied
* As Cpphnlonia,
20 THE HISTORY
BOOK I,
* both the league now propounded, and also all other help from
' whencesoevcr. And if they imputed it to you as a fault that
* you grant our request, we shall take it for a greater that you
* grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are in-
* vaded, and be none of your enemies ; and them who are your
' enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not op-
' pose, but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your domi-
' nions ; whereas.you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to
' take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours
' also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves ; but
' especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us.
' Many commodities, as we said in the beginning, we shew
* unto you, but this for the greatest, that whereas they are your
' enemies, (which is manifest enough) and not weak ones, but
* able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you
* a naval, not a terrestrial, league ; and the want of one of
' these is not as the want of the other : nay, rather your principal
' aim, if it could be done, should be, to let none at all have
« shipping but yourselves ; or at least, if that cannot be, to
' make such your friends, as are best furnished therewith. If
* any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed
' profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were
' thereby broken J let that man consider, that his fear joined
' with strength, will make his enemies fear ; and his confi-
* dence, having (if he rejects us) so much the less strength,
' will so much the less be feared. Let him also remember,
' that he is now in consultation, no less concerning Athens
' than Corcyra ; wherein he forecasteth none of the best, (con-
' sidering the present estate of affairs) that makes a question,
' whether against a war at hand, and only not already on foot,
' he should join unto it, or not, that city which with most im-
' portant advantages, or disadvantages, will be friend or enemy.
' For it lieth so conveniently for sailing into Italy and Sicily,
' that it can both prohibit any fleet to come to Peloponnesus
' from thence, and convoy any coming from Peloponnesus thi-
' ther: and is also for divers other uses most commodious.
' And to comprehend all in brief, consider whether we be to be
' abandoned or not by this. For Greece having but three
' navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if you
' suffer the other two to join in one, by letting the Corinthians
' first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time, both
' against the Corcyraeans and Peloponnesians ; whereas by
' making league with us, you shall with your fleet augmented,
' have to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.'
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. ^1
Thus spake the Corcyrccans ; and after them iltc Corinthians
thus.
The Oration of the Ambassadors of Corinth,
« The Corcyrjeans in their oration haN-ing made mention not
* only of your taking them into league, but also, that they are
' wronged, and unjustly warred on ; it is also necessary for us
* to answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards
* to proceed to the rest of what we have to say : to the end you
' may foreknow that ours are the safest demands for you to em-
* brace, and that you may upon reason reject the needy estate
' of those others. Whereas they allege in defence of their re-
' fusing to enter league with any other cities, that the same hath
* proceeded from modesty ; the truth is, that they took up that
* custom, not from any virtue, but mere wickedness ; as being
* unwilling to call any confederate for a witness of their evil
' actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides,
* their city, being by situation sufficient within itself, giveth
' them this point, that when they do any man a wrong, they
* themselves are the judges of the same, and not men appointed
* by consent. For going seldom forth against other nations,
' they intercept such, as by necessity are driven into their har-
' hour. And in this consisteth their goodly pretext, for not ad-
' mitting confederates, not because they would not be content
* to accompany others in doing evil, but because they had ra-
* therdo it alone; that where they were too strong, they might
* oppress ; and when there should be none to observe them,
' the less of the profit might be shared from them, and that
* they might escape the shame when they took any thing. But
* if they had been honest men, (as they themselves say they
* are) by how much the less they are obnoxious to accusation,
' so mudi the more means they have, by giving and taking what
* is due, to make their honesty appear. But they are not such,
* neither towards others, nor towards us. For being our colony,
* they have not only been ever in revolt, but now they also
* make war upon us, and say they were not sent out to be in-
* jured by us ; but we say again, that we did not send them
* forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of them,
* and to be regarded by them, as is fit. For our other colonies
* both honour and love us much, which is an argument, seeing
* the rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just
* cause to be offended alone ; and that without some manifest
' wrong, we should not have had colour to war against them.
* But say we had been in an error, it had been well done in
* them, to have given way to our passion, as it had been also
* dishonourable in us to have insulted over their modesty. But
22 THE HISTORY book i.
' through pride and wealth they have done us wrong, both in
* many other things, and also in this ; that Epidamnus being
* ours, which (whilst it was vexed with wars, they never claimed)
* as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized by them,
* and so holden. They say now, that before they took it, they
* offered to put the cause to trial of judgment : but you are not
* to think that such a one will stand to judgment as hath ad-
* vantage, and is sure already of what he offereth to plead for ;
* but rather he that before the trial will admit equality in the
* matter itself, as well as in the pleading : whereas contrarily
' these men offered not this specious pretence of a judicial trial,
' before they had besieged the city, but after, when they saw
* we meant not to put it up. And now hither they be
' come, not content to have been faulty in that business them-
* selves, but to get in you into their confederacy ; no, but into
' their conspiracy ; and to receive them in this name, that
* they are enemies to us. But they should have come to you
* then, when they were most in safety ; not now, when we
< have the wrong, and they the danger ; and when you, that
* never partaked of their power, must impart unto them of your
* aid ; and having been free from their faults, must have an
< equal share from us of the blame. They should communicate
< their power before-hand, that mean to make common the issue
< of the same ; and they that share not in the crimes, ought also
< to have no part in the sequel of them. Thus it appears that
< we come for our parts with arguments of equity and right ;
< whereas the proceedings of these other are nothing else but
< violence and rapine. And now we shall shew you likewise,
i that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For al-
« though it be in the articles, that the cities written with neither
« of the parties, may come in to whether of them they please ;
i yet it holds not for such as do so, to the detriment of either ;
< but only for those that having revolted from neither part, want
* protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace
« to those (if they be wise) that receive them . For you shall not
* only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates,
« enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they must de-
« fend themselves, not without you. You should do most up-
< rightly, to stand out of both our ways ; and if not that, then
* to take our parts against the Corcyrseans, (for between the Co-
* rinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Cor-
< cyraeans you never had so much as a truce) and not to con-
< stitute a new law of receiving one another's rebels. For nei-
< ther did we give our votes against you, when the Samians re-
« volted, though the rest of the Peloponnesus were divided in
* opinion : but plainly alleged, that it was reason that every
* one should have liberty to proceed iigainst their own re-
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 23
volting confederates. Arid if you shall once receive and aid
the doers of wrong, it will be seen, that they will come over
as fast from you to us; and you shall set up a law, not so
much against us as against yourselves. These are the points
of justice we had to shew you, conformable to the law of the
Grecians, And now we come to matter of advice, and claim
of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt
you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought in
the present occasion, to be granted us by way of requital :
for when you had want of long barks against the vl^ginetae,
a little before the Medan war, you had twenty lent unto
you by the Corinthians ; which benefit of ours, and that
other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Pe-
loponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your
victory against the ^^ginetae, and of the punishment of the
Samians. And these things were done for you in a sea-
son, when men, going to fight against their enemies, neg-
lect all respects but of victory. For even a man's domestic
affairs are ordered the worse through eagerness of present con-
tention. Which benefits considering, and the younger sort
taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased now to
defend us in the like manner. And have not this thouglit,
that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet if
the war should arise, the profit would be found in the con-
trary. For utility followeth those actions most, wherewith we
do the least wrong ; besides that, the likelihood of the war,
wherewith the Corcyrasans frighting you go about to draw
you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you
to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians ; bilt
it were rather fit for you indeed to take away our former jea-
lousies concerning the Megareans *. For the last good turn
done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusa-
tion of much greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be
drawn on, by the greatness of the navy which now shall be at
your service by this league; for to do no injury to our equals,
is a firmer power than that addition of strength, which (puft
up with present shews) men are to acquire with danger.
And since we be come to this, which once before we said at
Lacedemon, that every one ought to proceed, as he shall
think good, against his own confederates, we claim that liberty
now of you ; and that you that have been helped by our vote?,
will not hurt us now by yours, but render like for like ; re-
membering that now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth
us, is our greatest friend ; and he that opposeth us, our great-
est enemy. And that you will not receive these Corcyreeans
* Thisniiich wns done against the Corintliiaas bj the Athenians that aided
Hegara, is related afterwards in this 6rst Book.
24 THE HISTORY book i.
* into league against our wills, nor defend them in their injuries.
' These things if you grant us, you shall both do as is fit,
* and also advise the best for the good of your own affairs.'
This "(SOUS the effect ofnaliat was spoken hij the Corinthians.
Both sides having been heard and the Athenian people twice
assembled ; in the former assembly they approved no less of
the reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyraeans ; but in
the latter, they changed their minds ; not so, as to make a
league with the Corcyraeans both offensive and defensive,
that the friends and enemies of the one should be so of the
other, (for then if the Corcyraeans should have required them
to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken with the
Peloponnesians) but made it only defensive, that if any
one should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their con-
federates, they were then mutually to assist one another.
For they expected, that even thus they should grow to war
with the Peloponnesians, and were therefore unwilling to
let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, fall into the hands of
the Corinthians ; but rather, as much as in them lay, desired
to break them one against another; that if need required, they
might have to do with the Corinthians and others that had
shipping, when they should be weakened to their hands. And
the island seemed also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy
and Sicily. With this mind the people of Athens received the
Corcyraeans into league ; and when the Corinthians were gone,
sent ten gallies not long after to their aid. The commanders
of them were Lacedemonius the son of Cimon, Diotimus the
son of Strombichus, and Proteas the son of l£picles ; and had
order not to fight with the Corinthians unless they invaded
Corcyra, or offered to- land there, or in some other place of
theirs. Which if they did, tlien with all their might to oppose
them. This they forbade because they would not break the
peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these gallies
arrived at Corcyra.
The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards Cor-
cyra with one hundred and fifty sail, viz. of the Eleans ten, of
the Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambra-
ciotes twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their
own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the
said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they
sent in ; and over those of Corinth, was Xenocleides the son of
Euthicles, with four others. After they were all come together,
upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they
sailed from Leucas and came to Cheimerium, in the country of
Thesprotis. In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from
the sea, the city of Ephyre, in that part of Thesprotis, which
BOOK 1. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 25
is called Eleatis; and near unto it, disbogueth into the sea the
lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through
Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name.
Also the river Thyanis runneth here, which divideth Thespro-
tis from Cestrine *, between which two rivers, ariseth this pro-
montory of Cheimerium. To this part of the continent came
the Corinthians and encamped. The Corcyraeans understand-
ing that they made against them, having ready one hundred
and ten gallies under the conduct of Miciades, .^simides, and
Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called
Sybota. And the ten gallies of Athens were also with them.
But their land forces staid in the promontory of Leucimna,
and with them one thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians
that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in tiie con-
tinent the aids of many Barbarians, which in those quarters
have been evermore their friends. The Corinthians, after they
were ready, and had taken aboard three days provision of vic-
tual, put off by night from Cheimerium with purpose to fight:
and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the gal-
lies of the Corcyraeans, which were also put off from Sybota,
and coming on to fight with the Corinthians. As soon as they
had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of
battle. In the right wing f of the Corcyraeans were placed the
gallies of Athens; and the rest being their own, were divided
into three commands under the three commanders, one under
one. This was the order of the Corcyraeans. The Corinthi-
ans had in their right wing the gallies of Megara, and of Am-
bracia ; in the middle, other their confederates in order ; and
opposite to the Athenians, and right wing of the Corcyraeans,
they were themselves placed with such gallies as were best of
sail, in the left. The standard X being on either side lift up,
they joined battle, having on botli parts botli many men of
arms, and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion,
as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so
artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the manner of a fight
at land. For after they had once run their gallies up close
aboard one of another, they could not for the number and
throng be easily gotten asunder again, but relied for the victory,
especially upon their men of arms, who fought where they
stood, whilst the gallies remained altogether without motion.
Passages through each other they made none, but fought it out
with courage and strength rather than with skill : insomuch
* Cestrine the territory of Cestrin, part nf Cliaonia.
■f Kf*s;, tbe gallies stood all one b? one in a row, anJ the right winj were
those that were on the right hand from the raiddest ; and the left wing, those on
tbe left hand.
I 2a/(ir«, a pictare or image belJ up. &s the eagle amongst the Romans.
26 THE HISTORY book i.
as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and
disorder. In which the Athenian gallies being always, where
the Corcyraeans were oppressed, at hand, kept the enemies in
fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood
in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right
wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for the
Corcyraeans with twenty gallies had made them turn their
backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent ; and sail-
ing to their very camp, went on land, burnt their abandoned
tents, and took away their baggage ; so that in this part the
Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the
Corcyraeans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the
Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior ; because
the Corcyraeans had twenty gallies of their number, which was
at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase
of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcy-
raeans were in distress, now aided them manifestly, whereas be-
fore they had abstained from making assault upon any. But
when once they fled outright, and that the Corinthians lay
sore upon them, then every one fell to the business, without
making difference any longer : and it came at last to this ne-
cessity, that they undertook one another, Corinthians and Athe-
nians.
The Corinthians when their enemies fled, staid not to
fasten the hulls of the gallies they had sunk under their own
gallies, that so they might tow them after ; but made after the
men, rowing up and down to kill rather than to take alive ;
and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had
been discomfitted) slew also some of their ovvn friends. For
the gallies of either side being many, and taking up a large
space of sea, after they were once in the medly they could not
easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the van-
quished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for
number of ships, that ever had been before, of Grecians against
Grecians. When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans
to the shore, they returned to take up the broken gallies and
bodies of their dead, which for the greatest part they re-
covered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land forces
of the Barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is
a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they re-
united themselves and made again to the Corcyraeans ; and
they likewise with such gallies as they had fit for the sea, re-
maining of the former battle, together with those of Athens,
put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to
land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent,
and the song * which they used to sing when they came to
'Psan, a byinn to Mars in tbe b«giuniiig of a fi<>;ht: to Apollo after the victory.
BOOK I.
OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 27
charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to
row a stern : for they had descried twenty Athenian gallies sent
from Athens to second the former ten, for fear lest the Corcy-
raeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten
gallies of theirs be too few to defend them. When the Co-
rinthians therefore had sight of these gallies, suspecting that
they were of Athens, and more in number than they were, by
little and little they fell off. But the Corcyraans (because the
course of these gallies was unto them more out * of sight) de-
scried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed a
stern, till at last some that saw them said they were enemies,
and then retired also the Corcyraeans. For by this time it was
dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their
gallies, and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted,
and the battle ended in night.
The Corcyraeans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian
gallies, under the command of Glaucon the son of Leagrus,
and Androcides the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst
of the floating carcasses and wreck, soon after they were descried,
arrived at the camp of the Corcyraeans in Leucimna. The
Corcyraeans at first, (being night) were afraid they had been
enemies, but knew them afterwards ; so they anchored there.
The next day, both the thirty gallies of Athens, and as many
of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota,
where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight.
But the Corinthians, when they had put oft' from the land, and
arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning
of their own accord to begin the battle ; both for that they saw
the supply of fresh gallies from Athens, and for many difficul-
ties that happened to them, both about the safe custody of
their prisoners aboard, and also for that being in a desert place,
their gallies were not yet repaired ; but took thought rather
how to go home, for fear lest the Athenians, having the peace
already broken, in that they had fought against each other,
should not suffer them to depart. They therefore thought
good to send before unto the Athenians, certain men, without
privilege of heralds, for to sound them, and to say in this
manner :
* Men of Athens, you do unjustly to begin the war, and vio-
* late the articles : For whereas we go about to right us on our
* enemies, you stand in our way, and bear arms against us.
* If therefore you be resolved to hinder our going against Cor-
* cyra, or whatsoever place else we please, dissolve the peace,
* and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.'
Thus said they : and the Corcyraeans, as many of the army
* (vh.) More bekiud their backs.
28 THE HISTORY book i.
as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them.
But the Athenians made answer thus :
* Men* of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war, nor
* break the peace ; but we bring aid to these our confederates,
* the Corcyreeans ; if you please therefore to go any whither
* else, we hinder you not ; but if against Corcyra, or any place
* belonging unto it, we will not suffer you/
When the Athenians had given them this answer, the Co-
rinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota
of the continent. And the Corcyreeans also, both took up the
wreck, and bodies of the dead, which carried every way by the
waves and the wind that arose the night before, came driving to
their hands ; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy
likewise in Sybota of the islands. The victory was thus chal-
lenged on both sides, upon these grounds : the Corinthians
did set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better
all day, having gotten more of the wreck and dead bodies than
the other, and taken no less than one thousand prisoners, and
sunk about seventy of the enemies gallics. And the Corcy-
raeans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty gallics of
the Corinthians, and had, after the arrival of the Athenians, re-
covered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by rea-
son of the wind ; and because the day before, upon sight of the
Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed a stern, and went away
from them : and lastly, for that when they went to Sybota the
Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each
side claimed victory.
The Corinthians in their way homeward, took in Anactorium,
a town in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, by deceit ; (this
town was common to them, and to the Corcyraeans) and having
put into it Corinthians only, departed, and went home. Of
the Corcyreeans eight hundred that were servants were sold,
and kept prisoners two hundred and fifty, whom they used with
very much favour, that they might be a means, at their return,
to bring Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians, the greatest
part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was
Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian gal-
lies went from them. This was the first cause that the Corin-
thians had of war against the Athenians; namely, because they
had taken part with the Corcyreeans in a battle by sea, against
the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same
articles of peace.
Presently f after this, it came to pass, that other differences
• The answer of tlie Atboiiians. f J^''*^ second prclcxt of the war.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 29
arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce
the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged,
the Athenians, who had tiieir hatred in jealousy, commanded
the citizens of Potidaea, a city seated in the Isthmus of Pallene,
a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the
Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that
stood towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to
send away, and no more receive the Epidemiurgi, (magis-
trates so called) which were sent unto them year by year from
Corinth ; fearing lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas* and
of the Corinthians, they should revolt, and draw to revolt with
them their other confederates in Thrace. These things against
the Potideans the Athenians had precontrived, presently after
the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and
they were now manifestly at difference ; and Perdiccas, who
before had been their confederate and friend, now warred upon
them. And the cause why he did so, was, that when his brother
Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians
had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both
sent to Lacedemon to negociate the Peloponnesian war, and
also reconciled himself to ihe Corinthians, the better to procure
the revolt of Potidaea ; and likewise he practised with the Chal-
cideans of Thrace, and with the Bottieans, to revolt with them.
For if he could make these confining cities his confederates;
with the help of them, he thought his war would be the easier.
Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the
revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet,
(for they were now sending thirty gallies, with a thousand men
of arms under the command of Archestratus the son of Lyco-
medes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas) both to
receive hostages of the Potideans, and to demolish their walls ;
and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they
revolted not. The Potideans, having sent ambassadors to
Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make
any alteration amongst them ; by" other ambassadors, whom
they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedemon,
dealt with the Lacedemonians at the same time, if need re-
quired, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long
solicitation at Athens, and no good done, the fleet was sent
away against them, no less than against Macedonia ; and when
the magistrates of Lacedemon had promised them, if the Athe-
nians went to Potidjea, to invade Attica, then at last they re-
volted, and together with them tiie Chalcideans and Bottieans,
all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For Perdiccas had
also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their
maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus, and that
• King: of Macedunia.
30 THE HISTORY book i;
one city to make strong : and to those that removed, gave part
of his own, and part of the territory of Maydonia, about the
lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athe-
nians should continue. So when they had demolished their
cities and were gone up higlier into the country, they prepared
themselves to the war.
The Athenian gallies, when they arrived in Thrace, found
Potidjea and the other cities already revolted. And the comman-
ders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible with their
present forces to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns
revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had
been at first sent out, and there staying, joined with Philip and
the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from
above.
In the mean time, after Potidaea was revolted, and whilst the
Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians,
fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger
their own, sent unto it, both of their own city and of other Pelo-
ponnesians, which they hired, to the number of one thousand
six hundred men of arms, and four hundred light armed *. The
charge of these was given to Aristaeus the son of Adimantus,
for whose sake most of the voluntaries of Corinth went the
voyage : for he had been ever a great favourite of the Poti-
deans, and tliey arrived in Thrace after the revolt of Potidaea
forty days.
The news of the revolt of these cities, was likewise quickly
brought to the Athenian people ; who hearing withal of the
forces sent unto them under Aristaeus, sent forth against the
places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty gallies, un-
der the conduct of Callias the son of Calliades. These coming
first in Macedonia, found there the former thousand, (wlio by
this time had taken Therme, and were now besieging the city
of Pydna,) and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with
the rest. But shortly after they took composition, and having
made a necessary league f with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by
the affairs of Potidaea, and the arrival there of Aristaeus) de-
parted from Macedonia. Thence comingtoBerrhteaJ, they at-
tempted to take it ; but when they could not do it, they turned
back, and marched towards Potidaea by land. They were of
the number of three thousand men of arms, besides many of
their confederates ; and of Macedonians that had served
with Philip and Pausanias six hundred horsemen. And their
gallies- seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast, by
* Arclicrs, darters, and tlie like, tliat wore not armour on their bodies, were
called ^f>i>.el, naked.
f Or scarce honourable.
J Veria.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 31
moderate journies came in three days to Gigonus, and there
encamped.
The Potideans and the Peloponnesians under Aristaeus, in
expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped
in the Isthmus, near unto Olynthus, and had the market kept
for them without the city ; and the leading of the foot the
confederates had assigned to Aristaeus, and of the horse to Per-
diccas ; (for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and
having left lolaus governor in his place, took part with the Po-
tideans.) The purpose of Aristaeus was to have the body of
the army with himself within the Isthmus *, and therewith to
attend the coming on of the Athenians, and to have the Chal-
cideans and their confederates without the Isthmus, and also
the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus,
and when the Athenians were past by, to come on their backs
and to enclose the enemy between them. But Callias the
Athenian general, and the rest that were in commission with
him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen, and
some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within
from making any sally from the town, and then dislodging,
marched on towards Potideea. When they were come on as far
as the Isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also
did the like, and not long after they joined battle. That wing
wherein was Aristaeus himself, with the chosen men of the Co-
rinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that
stood opposite unto them, and followed execution a great way.
But the rest of the army of the Potideans and Peloponnesians were
by the Athenians defeated, and fled into the city. And Aris-
taeus when he came back from the execution, was in doubt
what way to take, to Olynthus, or to Potidsea. In the end, he
resolved of the shortest way, and with his soldiers about him,
ran as hard as he was able into Potidaea, and with much ado
got in at the peer through the sea, cruelly shot at, and with
the loss of a few, but safety of the greatest i>art of his com-
pany. As soon as the battle began, they that should have se-
conded the Potideans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but
sixty furlongs off", and in sight) advanced a little way to have
aided them ; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves
likewise in order of battle, to keep them back. But the Athe-
nians having quickly gotten the victory and the standards be-
ing taken down, they retired again ; they of Olynthus into
that city, and the Macedonian horsemen into the army of the
Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry at the bat-
tle. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave
a truce to the Potideans for the taking up of the bodies of
* The Isthinas of Pallene, were they were.
32 THE HISTORY book. i.
their dead. Of the Potideans and their friends there died
somewhat less than three hundred, and of the Athenians them-
selves one hundred and fifty, with Callias, one of their com-
manders.
Presently upon this the Athenians raised a wall before the
city, on the part towards the Isthmus, which they kept with a
garrison, but the part toward Pallene they left unwalled. For
they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a
guard in the Isthmus, and withal to go over and fortify in Pal-
lene, fearing least the Potideans and their confederates should
assault them when they w^ere divided. When the people of
Athens understood that Potidaea was unwalled on the part to-
ward Pallene, not long after they sent thither one thousand
six hundred men of arms, under the conduct of Phormio the
son of Asopius, who arriving in Pallene, left his gallies at A-
phytis, and marching easily to Potidaea, wasted the territory as
he passed through. And when none came out to bid him bat-
tle, he raised a wall before the city, on that part also that look-
eth towards Pallene. Thus was Potidaea on both sides strong-
ly besieged; and also from the sea, by the Athenian gallies
that came up and rode before it.
Aristaeus seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without
hope of safety, save what might come from Peloponnesus, or
some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hun-
dred, taking the opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the
provision might the longer hold out for the rest ; and of them
that should remain within, offered himself to be one. But when
his counsel took not place, being desirous to settle their busi-
ness, and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by
sea, unseen of the Athenian guard, and staying amongst the
Chalcideans, amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush
before Sermyla, and slew many of that city, and solicited the
sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the
siege laid to Potidaea, having with him his sixteen hundred
men of arms, wasted the territories of the Chalcideans and Bot-
tieans, and some small towns he took in.
These were the quarrels between tlie Peloponnesians and the
Athenians. The Corinthians quarrelled with the Athenians for
besieging Potidaea, and in it the men of Corinth and Pelopon-
nesus. The Athenians quarrelled with the Peloponnesians,
for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt ; and
for that they had come thither, and openly fought against them
in the behalf of Potidaa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly
forth as yet, and they yet abstained from arms ; for this was
but a particular action of the Corinthians.
But when Potidaea was once besieged, both for their 'men's
sakes that were within, and also for fear to lose the place, they
B001& t. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 33
could no longer hold * j but out of hand, they procured of their
confederates to go to Lacedemon ; and thither also they went
themselves with clamours and accusations against the Athe-
nians, that they had broken the league, and wronged the Pelo-
ponnesians. The .Eginetae, though not openly by ambassa-
dors, for fear of the x^thenians, yet pri\nly instigated them to
the war as much as any; alleging that they were not permitted
to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the ar-
ticles they ought to have been. So the Lacedemonians having
called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any
injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians in the ordinary
council t of their own state commanded them to speak. Then
presented every one his accusation, and amongst the rest the
Megareans, besides many other their great differences, laid open
this especially, that contrary to the articles, they were forbidden
the Athenian markets and havens. Last of all, the Corinthians,
when they had suffered the Lacedemonians to be incensed first
by the rest, came in, and said as foUoweth.
The Oration of the Ambassadors of Corinth.
* Men of Lacedemon, your fidelity, both in matter of estate
* and conversation, maketh you tiie less apt to believe us, when
' we accuse others of the contrary. And hereby you gain indeed a
* reputation of equity, but you have less experience in the af-
* fairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes fore-
* told you, that the Athenians would do us a mischief, yet from
* time to time when we told it you, you never would take in-
* formation of it ; but have suspected rather, that what we spake
* hath proceeded from our own private differences. And you
' have therefore called hither these confederates, not before we
* had suffered, but now, when the evil is already upon us. Be-
' fore whom, our speech must be so much the longer, by how
* much our objections are the greater, in that we have both by
* the Atlienians been injured, and by you neglected. If the A-
* thenians lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs
* unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the
* same before you, as to men that knew it not. But now what
* cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that
* some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving
* the like against others, and especially against our confederates,
* and are themselves, in case war should be made against them,
* long since prepared for it ? For else they would never have
* taken Corcyra, and holden it from us by force, nor have be-
' sieged Potidaea, whereof the one was most commodious for any
* The solicitation of the war by the Corinthians, and other confederates of the
Lacedemonians.
t Of ihe ephorl, aud those who had the sorereignty, tliat is to say, before the
aristocracy.
34
THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
* action against Thrace, and the oth^ had brought unto the
* Peloponnesians a most fair navy. And of all this, you are your-
* selves the authors, in that you suffered them, upon the end of
' the Persian war, to fortify their city, and again afterwards to
* raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto deprived of
* their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued,
* but also your own confederates. For not he that bringeth into
* slavery, but he that being able to hinder it, neglects the same,
' is most truly said to do it ; especially if they assume the ho-
' nour to be the esteemed deliverers of Greece, [as you do.]
* And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed
' not yet, with any certain resolution what to do. For the ques-
' tion should not have been put, whether or not we have re-
' ceived injury, but rather, in what manner we are to repair it,
' For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it before-
* hand, use no delay at all, but come upon whom they mean to
' oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only
* that the Athenians have incroached upon their neighbours,
' but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they
' think they carry it closely, through your blindness, they are the
' less bold. But when they shall perceive that you see and will
' not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For (Lacede-
^ monians) you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still
' defend others, not with your forces, but with promises ;
* and you are also the only men that love to pull down the
* power of the enemy, not when it beginneth but when it is
' doubled. You have indeed a report to be sure, but yet it is
' more in fame than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the
* Persian came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of
* the earth, before you encountered him as became your state.
* And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as
* the Medes, far off, but hard at hand ; choosing rather to defend
' yourselves from their invasion than to invade them ; and by
' having to do with them when their strength is greater, to put
' yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we know
^ that the Barbarian's own error, and (in our war against the A-
* thenians) their own oversights, more than your assistance, was
* the thing that gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath
* been the destruction of some, that relying on you, made
* no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not
' any man think that we speak this out of malice, but only by
* way of expostulation ; for expostulation is with friends that
' err, but accusation against enemies that have done an injury.
' Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobrate his
* neighbour, we think ourselves may best do it, especially on so
' great quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem to have any
' feeling, nor to consider what manner of men, and how differ-
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 35
* ent from you in every kind the Athenians be that you are to
' contend withal. For they love innovation, and are swift to
' devise, and also to execute what they resolve on : but you
' on the contrary are only apt to save your own ; not devise
* any thing new, nor scarce to attain what is necessary. They
* again are bold bevond their strength, adventurous above their
* own reason, and in danger hope still the best : whereas your
* actions are ever beneath your power, and you distrust even
* what your judgment assures, and being in a danger, never
* think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers : they
* love to be abroad, and you at home the most of any. For
* they make account by being abroad to add to their estate ;
* you, if you go forth against the state of another, would think
' to impair you own. They, when they overcome their ene-
* mies, advance the farthest, and when they are overcome by
* their enemies fall off the least ; and as for their bodies, they
' use them in the service of the commonwealth, as if they were
' none of their own ; but their minds, when they would serve
* the state, are right their own. Unless they take in hand
* what they have once advised on, they account so much lost
* of their own. And when they take it in hand, if they obtain
* any thing, they think light of it, in respect of what they look
* to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they
' do what is necessary for the present, and enter presently into
* other hopes. For they alone, both have and hope for at once,
* whatsoever they conceive, through their celerity in execution
' of what they once resolve on. And in this manner they labour
' and toil all the days of their lives : what they have, they have
* no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more. Nor holyday
* esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter profita-
* ble ; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment
* than laborious business. So that in a word, to say they are
' men born neither to rest themselves nor suffer others, is to
* say the truth. Now notwithstanding (men of Lacedemon)
* that this city, your adversar)', be such as we have said, yet
* you still delay time, not knowing that those only are they, to
* whom it may suffice for the most part of their time to sit
* still, who (though they use not their power to do injustice) yet
* be\\Tay a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing
' equity belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others,
' nor receive it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing
* you hardly could attain, though the states about you were
* of the same condition. But, as we have before declared, your
* customs are in respect of theirs antiquated, and of necessity
* (as it happeneth in arts) the new ones will prevail. True it
* is, that for a city living for the most part in peace, unchanged
* customs are the best 5 but for such as be constrained to un-
36 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
' dergo many matters, many devices will be needful. Which is
* also the reason why the Athenian customs, through much
' experience, are more new to you than yours are to them.
' Here therefore give a period to your slackness and by a speedy
* invasion of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidaea and
* the rest, lest otherwise you betray your friends and kindred
* to their cruellest enemies, and lest we and others be driven
* through despair to seek out some other league. Which to do
' were no injustice, neither against the gods, judges of men's
' oaths, nor against men, the hearers of them : for not they that
' break the league, who being abandoned, have recourse to
' others ; but they that yield not their assistance to whom they
' have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the business se-
* riously, we will stay ; for else we should do irreligiously, nei-
' ther should we find any other more conformable to our man-
' ners than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well of these
' points, and take such a course, that Peloponnesus may not by
' your leading fall into worse estate than it was left unto you
' by your progenitors/
Thus spake the Corinthiatis.
The Athenian Ambassadors (who chanced to be residing in
Lacedemon, upon their business) when they heard of this ora-
tion, thought fit to present themselves before the Lacedemo-
nians, not to make apology for what they were charged with
by the other cities, but to shew in general, that it was not fit
for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but further
time to consider. Also they desired to lay open the power of
their city ; to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they
knew already ; and to the younger, for an information of what
they knew not : supposing that when they should have spoken,
they would incline to quietness, rather than to war. And
therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedemonians,
saying, that they also, if they might have leave, desired to
speak in the assembly, who willed them to come in. And the
Athenians went into the assembly, and spake to this effect.
The Oratioji of the Ambassadors of Athens.
' Though our ambassage was not to this end, that we should
* argue against our confederates, but about such other affairs
' as the city was pleased to employ us in ; yet having heard
' of the great exclamation against us, we came into the court,
* not to make answer to the criminations of the cities (for to
* plead before you here, were not to plead before the judges
' either of them or us) but to the end you may not be drawn
' away, to take the worst resolution, at the persuasion of the
* confederates, in matters of so great importance. And withal.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 37
touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform
you, that what we possess we have it justly, and that our city
deserveth reputation. But what need we now to speak of
matters long past, confirmed more by hear-say, than by the
eyes of those that are to hear us relate them ? But our actions
against the Persian, and such as you yourselves know as well
as we, those, though it be tedious to hear them ever objected,
we must of necessity recite. For when we did them, we ha-
zarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as you had your
parts in the substance, so must we have ours (if that be any
benefit) in the commemoration ; and we shall make recital
of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation, and
declaration of what a city (in case you take ill advice) you
have to enter the list withal. We therefore say, that we not
only first and alone hazarded battle against the Barbarian in
the fields of Marathon, but also afterwards when he came
again, being unable to resist him by land, embarked ourselves,
every man that was able to bear arms, and gave him battle
amongst the rest, by sea at Salamis, which was the cause that
kept him back from sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it
waste city after city : for against so many gallics you were not
able to give each other mutual succour. And the greatest
proof of this is the Persian himself, who when his fleet was
overcome, and that he had no more such forces, went away in
haste with the greatest part of his army. Which being' so,
and evident that the whole state of the Grecians was em-
barked in their fleet, we conferred to the same the three things
of most advantage ; namely, the greatest number of gallics,
the most prudent commander, and the most lively courage.
(For of four hundred gallies in the whole, our own were few
less than two thirds) and for commander, Themistocles ; who
was the principal cause that the battle was fought in the
streight *, whereby he clearly saved the whole business ; and
whom, though a stranger, you yourselves have honoured for
it, more than any man that came unto you ; and a forward-
ness we shewed, more adventurous than any other in this,
that when none of them had aided us by land before, and
the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into
servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city,
and lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the
common cause of the confederates, or divided from them, to
be unuseful ; but to put ourselves into our navy, and undergo
the danger with them, and that without passion against you for
not having formerly defended us in the hke manner. So that
we may say that we have no less conferred a benefit upon you,
• Of Salamis.
38 THE HISTORY book i.
* then we received it from you. You came indeed to aid us,
* but it was from cities inhabited, and to the end you might
^ still keep them so, and when you were afraid, not of our dan-
* ger, but your own ; whereas we coming from a city no more
* being *, and putting ourselves into danger, for a city hopeless
* ever to be again, saved both you (in part) and ourselves. But
* if we had joined with the Persian, fearing (as others did) to
* have our territories wasted ; or afterwards, as men lost, durst
' not have put ourselves into our gallies, you must not have
' fought with him by sea, because your fleet had been too
'small; but his affairs had succeeded as he would himself.
' Therefore (men of Lacedemon) we deserve not so great envy
' of the Grecians for our courage at that time, and for our pru-
* dence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo.
' Which dominion we obtained not by violence, but because
* the confederates, when yourselves would not stay out the re-
' lies of the war against the Barbarian, came in, and entreated
' us to take the command, of their own accord. So that at first
* we were forced to advance our dominion to what it is, out of
' the nature of the thing itself, as chiefly for fear, next for ho-
' nour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the envy of
* many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted,
' and seeing you were no more our friends as you had been,
* but suspected and quarrelled us, we held it no longer a
* safe course, laying by our power, to put ourselves into your
* danger; for the revolts from us would all have been made to
' you. Now it is no fault for men in danger, to order their af-
' fairs to the best ; for you also (men of Lacedemon) have
' command over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to
' your best advantage : and had you, when the time was -f, by
* staying it out, been envied in your command, as we know well
' you would have been no less heavy to the confederates than
* we, you must have been constrained to rule imperiously, or to
' have fallen into danger. So that, though overcome by three
* the greatest things, honour, fear, and profit, we have both ac-
* cepted the dominion delivered us, and refuse again to surren-
* der it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at, nor
* beside the manner of men. Nor have we been the first in this
« kind, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the weaker
' to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the govern-
* ment upon us, as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same ;
* The Athnnians, at tlie coming of the Persian, when tliey pnt ihemsrlvcs iut»
their gallits, left their city to the aniiy of the Persians by land, and sent thcLr
wives and children into ij)ginu, Suluniis, and Trazena.
f That is, when Pausitnias king of Lacedemon pursuing the relics of the Per-
sian war, through his pride and insolent command, procured the hatred of the
confederates so far as the Lacedemoniiin state calling hiui home, they put them*
selves under the leading of the Athenians.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 39
' and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the com-
' modity, you now fall to allegation of equity ; a thing which
' no man that had the occasion to achieve any thing by strength,
' ever so far preferred, as to divert him from his profit. Those
* men are worthy of commendation, who following the na-
* tural inclination of man, in desiring rule over others, are
'juster, than for their power they need. And therefore if
' another had our power, we think it would best make ap-
* pear our own moderation ; and yet our moderation hath un-
' deservedly incurred contempt, rather than commendation.
* For though in pleas of covenants with our confederates, when
* in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws, equal
' both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against
* us, we have nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of
' them considering that others, who in other places have domi-
' nion, and are toward their subject-states less moderate than
* we, yet are never upbraided for it ; for they that have the
* power to compel, need not at all go to law. And yet these
' men having been used to converse with us upon equal terms, if
' they lose any thing which they think they should not either by
' sentence, or by the power of our government, they are not
* thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse part the
* little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had
* openly taken their goods by violence ; for in that kind also
* they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way
' to the stronger. And men it seems are more passionate for
* injustice than for violence ; for that coming as from an equal,
* seemeth rapine ; and the other, because from one stronger,
' but necessity : therefore when they suffered worse things un-
* der the Medes' dominion, they bore it, but think ours to be
* rigorous; and good reason, for to men in subjection, the pre-
' sent is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you also, if you
* should put us down and reign yoiu-selves, you would soon find a
' change of the love, which they bear you now for fear of us,
' if you should do again as you did for a while *, when you
' were their commanders against the Medes. For not only
' your own institutions are different from those of others, but
' also when any one of you comes abroad [with charge,] he nei-
* ther useth those of yours, nor yet those of the rest of Greece.
' Deliberate therefore of this a great while, as of a matter of
'greajt importance ; and do not upon the opinions and crimi-
' nations of others, procure your own trouble. Consider before
*■ you enter, how unexpected the chances of war be : for a long
' war, for the most part, endeth in calamity, from which we
' are equally far off, and whether part it will light on, is to be
* Meaniagf the imperious aad t,vraaDical command of the Pausaoia&.
40 THE HISTORY book i.
* tried with uncertainty. And men when they go to war, use
* many times to fall first to action, the which ought to come
* behind ; and when they have already taken harm, then they
* fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such error our-
' selves, nor do find that you are, we advise you, whilst good
' counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace, nor
* violate your oaths ; but according to the articles, let the con-
* troversy be decided by judgment; or else we call the gods
' you have sworn by, to witness that if you begin the war, we
' will endeavour to revenge ourselves the same way that you
' shall walk in before us/
Thus spake the Athenians.
After the Lacedemonians had heard both the complaints of
the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenian's an-
swer, they put them every one out of the court, and consulted of
the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the
greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done
unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on : but Archidamus
their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as
foUoweth.
The Oration of Archidamus.
* Men of Lacedemon, both I myself have the experience of
* many wars, and I see you of the same age with me, to have
* the like^ insomuch as you cannot desire this war, either
* through inexperience (as many do) nor yet as apprehending
* it to be profitable or safe. And whosoever shall temperately
' consider the war we now deliberate of, will find it to be no
* small one. For though in respect of the Peloponnesians, and
' our neighbour states, we have equal strength, and can quickly
* be upon them ; yet against men, whose territory is remote, and
* are also expert seamen, and with all other things excellently
' furnished, as money, both private and public, shipping, horses,
* arms, and number, more than any one part of Greece besides,
* and that have many confederates paying them tribute ; against
* such, I say, why should we lightly undertake the war ? And
* since we are unfurnished, whereon relying, should we make
* such haste to it ? On our navy ? But therein we are too weak.
* And if we will provide and prepare against them, it will re-
* quire time. On our money? But therein also we are more
* too weak ; for neither hath the state any, nor will private men
^readily contribute. But it may be some rely on this, that we
« exceed them in arms, and multitude of soldiers, so that we
' may waste their territories with incursions. But there is
* much other land under their dominion, and by sea they are
' able to bring in whatsoever they shall stand in need of. Again,
HOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. M
* if we assay to alienate their confederates, we must aid them
' with shipping, because the most of tliem are islanders. What
* a war then will this of ours be ? For unless we have the bet-
' ter of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue
' whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt
' to ourselves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will
* be no honour for us, when we are chiefly thought to have
* begun it. As for the hope, that if we waste their country,
* the war will soon be at an end, let that never lift us up, for I
* fear we shall transmit it rather to our children. For it is
* likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be slaves to their
* earth, nor as men without experience, to be astonished at the
* war. And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suffer
' our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athe-
* nians in their plots against them ; but only not yet to take up
* arms, but to send and expostulate with them, making no
* great shew neither of war nor of suflferance : and in the
' mean time to make our provision, and make friends both
' of Greeks aud Barbarians, such as in any place we can get, of
' power either in shipping or money (nor are they to be blamed,
' that being laid in wait for, as we are by the Athenians, take unto
* them not Grecians only, but also Barbarians for their safety)
' and withal to set forth our own. If they listen to our ambas-
* sadors, best of all ; if not, then two or three years passing
* over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon
* them if we will. And when they see our preparation, and
* hear words that import no less, they will relent the sooner,
* especially ha\nng their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon
* commodities extant, and not yet spoiled. For we must think
* their territory to be nothing but an hostage, and so much
* the more, by how much the better husbanded. The which
* we ought therefore to spare as long as we may, lest making
* them desperate, we make them also the harder to expugne.
' For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the confede-
' rates, we waste their territor}', consider if in so doing we do not
* make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians,
* and also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against
* cities as private men may be cleared again, a war for the plea-
* sure of some, taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be
* foreseen, can hardly with honour be let fall again. Now let
* no man think it cowardice that being many cities, we go not
* presently and invade that one city ; for of confederates that
* bring them in money they have more than we ; and
' war is not so much war of arms, as war of money, by
* means whereof arms are useful, especially when it is a war
' of land-men against sea-men. And therefore let us first pro-
* vide ourselves of money, aud not first raise the war upon the
42 THE HISTORY
BOOK I,
' persuasion of the confederates. For we that must be thought
' the causes of all events, good or bad, have also reason to take
^ some leisure in part to foresee them. As for the slackness and
' procrastination, wherewith we are reproached by the confede-
^ rates, be never ashamed of it ; for the more haste you make
' to the war, you will be the longer before you end it, for that
* you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath been ever
'free, and well thought of. And this which they object, is
* rather to be called a modesty proceeding upon judgment : for
* by that it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good
* success, nor shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are
* we, when men provoke us to it with praise, through the de-
* light thereof, moved to undergo danger, more than we think fit
' ourselves ; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, doth
* the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this
' modesty of ours, maketh us both good soldiers and good coun-
' sellors : good soldiers, because shame begetteth modesty, and
* valour is most sensible of shame ; good counsellors, in this,
* that we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the
' laws, and by severity, more modestly than to disobey them.
' And also in that that we do not, like men exceeding wise in
' things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the
' enemy, and in effect not assault him accordingly ; but do
' think our neighbour's cogitations like our own, and that the
' events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech; and do
' therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy,
* as against men well advised. For we are not to build our
' hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe fore-
' sight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much
' difference between man and man, but him only to be the best
' that hath been brought up amongst the most difficulties. Let
' us not therefore cast aside the institutions of our ancestors,
* which we have so long retained to our profit ; nor let us, of
' many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much
' honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day, but at
* leisure, the which we have better commodity than any other
* to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about
* the matter of Potidaea, send about that wherein the confede-
* rates say they are injured; and the rather, because they be
* content to refer the cause to judgment : and one that offereth
' himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of
' injury, before the judgment be given, and prepare withal for
' the war ; so shall you take the most profitable counsel for
' yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy.'
Thus spake Archidamits.
But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of
all, and spake to the Lacedemonians in this manner :
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 43
Tlie Oration of Sthenelaidas.
* For my part, I understand not the many words used by
* the Athenians ; for though they have been much in their own
* praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they
* have done injury to our confederates, and to Peloponnesus.
* And if they carried themselves well against the Medes when
* time was, and now ill against us, they deserve a double pu-
* nishment, because they are not good as they were, and be-
* cause they are evil, as they were not. Now are we the same
' we were, and mean not (if we be wise) either to connive at
* the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to repair them,
* for the harm they suffer is not deferred. Others have much
* money, many gallics, and many horses ; and we have good
* confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be
* defended with words, (for they are not hurt in words) but to
* be aided with all our power, and with speed. Let no man
* tell me, that after we have once received the injury, we ought
* to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to
' spend time in consultation. Wherefore (men of Lacedemon)
' decree the war, as becometh the dignity of Sparta ; and let
* not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our
* confederates, but in the name of the gods, proceed against the
* doers of injustice.'
Having thus spoken, being himself Ephore, he put it to the
question in the assembly of the Lacedemonians; and saying af-
terwards, * that he could not discern whether was the greater
Cry' (for they used to give their votes viva voce, and not with
bails ^) and desiring that it might be evident that their minds
were inclined most to the war, he put it unto them ag-ain, and
said, ' To whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is bro-
* ken, and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise
* and go yonder :' and withal he shewed them a certain place :
' and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the
* other side.' So they arose, and the room was divided, wherein
far the greater number were those that held the peace to be
broken.
Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for
their own parts their sentence was, that the Athenians had done
them wTong. But yet they desired to have all their confederates
called together, and then to put it to the question again, that
if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent.
This done, their confederates went home, and so did also after-
* M'ii^«. Properly lapUliis, cali-ulus. A little stone or ball, which he that gare
his vote put into a box, either on the affirmative or ne^tive part, as be pleased.
The Atheniaas used beans white and black. The Venetians now use balls, and
the distinction is made by the box inscribed with yea and no.
44 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
wards the Athenians, when they had dispatched the business they
came about. This decree of the assembly, that the peace was
broken, was made in the fourteenth year of those thirty years
for which a peace had been formerly concluded, after the ac-
tions past in Euboea *.
The Lacedemonians gave sentence that the peace was bro-
ken, and that the war was to be made, not so much for the
words of the confederates, as for fear the Athenian greatness
should still increase : For they saw that a great part of Greece
was fallen already into their hands. Now the manner how the
Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which
they so raised themselves, was this :
After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land were de-
parted, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale f ,
were there also utterly overthrown ; Leotychides king of the
Lacedemonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale,
with their confederates of Peloponnesus, went home : but the
Athenians with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as
many as were already revolted from the king |, staid behind and
besieged Sestus, holden then by the Medes, and when they had
lain before it all the winter, they took it, abandoned by the
Barbarians ; and after this they set sail from the Hellespont,
every one to his own city. And the body§ of the Athenians, as
soon as their territory was clear of the Barbarians, went home
also, and fetched thither their wives and children, and such
goods as they had, from the places where they had been put
out to keep, and went about the reparation of their city and
walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit
of their wall, and likewise a few houses (though the most were
down) which the principal of the Persians had reserved for
their own lodgings. The Lacedemonians hearing what they
went about, sent thither their ambassadors, partly because
they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athe-
nians nor any other had had walls ; but principally, as in-
cited thereto by their confederates, (who feared not only the
greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also
their courage shewed against the Persians) and entreated them
not to build their walls, but rather join with them in pulling down
the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them
yet standing : not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy
• NegToponte.
f A promontory in Asia the Lpss, where the remnant of Xerxes fleet was de-
feated, the same day that his land forces were also defeated hy Paiisanias at IMatiea,
with the slaughter of Mardonius tlieir general, and almost their whole army of
three hundred thousand men.
X Of Persia.
() T» ««?»»», the state. That is, they made Athens Ofyain the seat of their go-
Ternment, whereas before it was ia the fleet aud ennip still removing.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 45
they had of the Athenians ; but pretending this, that If the
Barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the
seat of his war, as he did of Thebes : and that Peloponnesus
was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence
to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of
Themistocles, when the Lacedemonian ambassadors had so said,
dismissed them presently with this answer, that they would pre-
sently send ambassadors about the business they spake of, to
Lacedemon. Now Themistocles willed them to send himself
to Lacedemon for one, and that as speedily as they could;
but such as were chosen ambassadors with him not to send
away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised
as to fight upon them from a sufficient height; and that
all the men in the city in the mean time, both they and
their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public
edifice, that might advance the work, but pulling all down
whatsoever should help to raise it. When he had thus in-
structed them, adding, that he would himself do the rest at La-
cedemon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacede-
mon, he went not to the state, but delaying the time, excused
himself; and when any of those that were in office asked hira
why he did not present himself to the state, answered, * that he
* staid for his fellow-ambassadors, who upon some business that
* fell out, were left behind, but he expected them very shortly,
' and wondered they were not come already.' Hearing this,
they gave credit to Themistocles, for the love they bore him ;
but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall
went up, and that it was come to good height already, they
could not then choose but believe it. Themistocles, when he
.saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to
send thither some of their own, such as were honest men, and
having informed themselves, would relate the truth. Which
they also did. And Themistocles sendeth privily to the Athe-
nians about the same men, to take order for their stay, with as
little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them
till their own ambassadors were returned. (For by this time
were arrived those that were joined with him, namely Abro-
nychus the son of Lysicles, and Aristides the son of Lysima-
chus, and brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient
height.) For he feared lest the Lacedemonians, when they
knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians
therefore kept there those ambassadors, according as it was
written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his au-
dience before the Lacedemonians, said plainly, * that the city
' of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently, for the
' defence of those within : and that if it should please the La-
* cedemonians, upon any occasion to send ambassadors unto
/
46 THE HISTORY book i.
* them, they were to send thenceforward, as to men that un-
* derstood what conduced both to their own, and also to the
' common good of all Greece. For when they thought it best
' to quit their city, and put themselves into their gallies, he
* said they were bold to do it, without asking the advice of them.
* And in common-council, the advice of the Athenians was as
* good as the advice of them : and now at this time their opinion
« is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular, and for
* all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled.
* For that in strength unequal, men cannot alike and equally
* advise for the common benefit of Greece. Therefore,' said he,
' either must all the confederate cities be unwalled, or you
* must not think amiss of what is done by us.' The Lacede-
monians when they heard him, though they made no shew of
being angry with the Athenians, (for they had not sent their
ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish
them not to build the wall ; besides they bare them affection
then, for their courage shewn against the Medes) yet they were
inwardly offended, because they missed of their will. And the
ambassadors returned home of either side, without complaint.
Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls, the structure it-
self making manifest the haste used in the building. For the
foundation consisteth of stones of all sorts ; and those in some
places unwrought, and as they were brought to the place.
Many pillars also taken from sepulchres *, and polished stones
were piled together amongst the rest. For the circuit of the
city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening,
they took alike whatsoever came next to hand. Themistoclcs
likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Peiraeus f, (for
it was begun in the year that himself was Archon X of Athens)
as conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three na-
tural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much
conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he was indeed
the first man that durst tell them that they ought to take
upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently
helped them in obtaining it. By his counsel also it was, that
they built the wall of that breadth about Peiraeus, which is now
to be seen : for two carts carrying stones, met, and passed
upon it one by another. And yet within it, there was neither
rubbish nor morter [to fill it up,] but it was made all of great
stones, cut square and bound together with iron and lead.
But for height, it was raised but to the half at the most of
what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold
• The walls of Alliens made of chapels and tombs. Cor. Nepos in vita The-
tnist.
i" This was before a village, and now made the Atlienian arsenal.
\ The governor of the city for that year.
liooK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR, 47
out the enemy both by the height and breadth ; and that a few,
and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it,
and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was
addicted to the sea, because (as I think) he had observed, that
the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea
than by land ; and thought that Peiraeus was more profitable
than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the
Athenians, that in case they were oppressed by land, they
should go down thither, and with their gallies make resistance
against what enemy soever. Thus the Athenians built their
walls, and fitted themselves in other kinds, immediately upon
the departure of the Persians.
In the mean time was Pausanias the son of Cleombrotus,
sent from Lacedemon commander of the Grecians, with twenty
gallies out of Peloponnesus- With which went abo thirty sail
of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates, and mak-
ing war on Gyrus, subdued the greatest part of the same : and
afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzan-
tium *, which they besieged and won.
But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of
tlie Grecians, and especially the lonians, who had newly reco-
vered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came unto
the Athenians, and requested them for consanguinities f sake to
become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of
Pausanias. The Athenians accepting the motion, applied them-
selves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of
the rest of the affairs there, in such sort as it should seem best
unto themselves. In the mean time the Lacedemonians sent
for Pausanias home, to examine him of such things as they had
heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge
by the Grecians that came from thence ; and his government
was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command in war.
And it was his hap to be called home at the same time that the
confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred
to him, had turned to the Athenians. When he came to La-
cedemon, though he were censured for some wrongs done to
private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquitted, espe-
cially of medizing, the which seemed to be the most evident of
all. Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis,
and some others with him, with no great army; whose com-
mand the confederates refused, and they finding that, went
their ways likewise. And after that the Lacedemonians sent
no more, because they feared lest such as went out would prove
the worse for the state, (as they had seen by Pausanias,) and
* Constantinople.
t The lonians were all colonies of the people.
48 THE HISTORY book i.
also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiv-
ing the Athenians to be sufficient leaders, and at that time
their friends.
When the Athenians had thus gotten the command by the
confederates own accord, for the hatred they bare to Pausa-
nias, they then set down an order which cities should contribute
money for this war against the Barbarians, and which gallies.
For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by
laying waste the territories of the king. And then first come
up among the Athenians the office of treasurers * of Greece,
who were receivers of the tribute f, (for so they called this
money contributed.) And the first tribute that was taxed,
came to four-hundred and sixty talents J. The treasury was at
Delos §, and their meetings were kept there in the temple %.
Now using their authority at first in such manner, as that
the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted
to common council ; by the war, and administration of the
common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what
against the barbarians, what against their own innovating con-
federates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as
chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great
matters following ; which also I have therefore written, both be-
cause this place hath been pretermitted by all that have written
before me. (For they have either compiled the Grecian acts
before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only. Of
which number is Hellanicus, vi^ho hath also touched them in his
Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the
times,) and also because they carry with them a demonstration
of how the Athenian empire grew up.
And first, under the conduct of Cimon the son of Miltiades,
they took Eion upon the river Stryman, from the Medes by
siege, and carried away the inhabitants captives. Then the
isle Scyros in the ^Egean sea, inhabited by the Delopes, the
inhabitants whereof they also carried smay captives, and plant-
ed therein a colony of their own. Likewise they made war
on the Caristians, (alone, without the rest of the Euboeans)
and those also after a time, came in by composition. After
this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in
by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which con-
trary to the ordinance, they deprived of their free estate;
though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did
the like by the rest.
X 862501. Sterling.
§ Not at Athensj because they would not seem to clialleugc a propriety in
that money,
f Of Apollo.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN VfAR. 49
Amongst other causes of revolts, the principal was their
failing to bring in their tribute and gallies, and their refusing
(when they did so) to follow the wars. For the Athenians ex-
acted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a ne-
cessity of toil, which they were neither accustomed nor willing
to undergo. They were also othen^ise not so gentle in their
government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal
terms, and could easily bring back to their subjection, such as
should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were
the causes : for through this refusal to accompany the army,
the most of them, to the end they might stay at home, were
ordered to excuse their gallies with money, as much as it came
to. By which means the navy of the Athenians was increased
at the cost of their confederates, and themselves unprovided,
and without means to make war in case they should revolt.
After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their con-
federates fought against the Medes both by land and by water,
upon the river of Eurymedon in Pamphilia ; and in one and the
same day the Athenians had victory in both, and took or sunk
all the Phoenician fleet, to the number of two hundred gallies.
After this again happened the revolt of Thasus, upon a differ-
ence about the places of trade, and about the mines they pos-
sessed in the opposite parts of Thrace. And the Athenians
going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at
sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same
time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates
people into the river of Strymon, for a colony to be planted in
a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis. They
won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Eidonians j
but advancing farther, towards the heart of the country of Thrace,
they were defeated at Drabescus, a city of the Eidonians, by the
whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new-
built town of the Nine-ways. The Thasians in the mean time,
being overcome in divers battles, and besieged, sought aid of
the Lacedemonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by
an invasion to Attica : which, unknown to the Athenians, they
promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake
that then happened, they were hindered. In which earthquake,
their Helotes *, and of neighbouring towns the Thuriatae and
i?i^theans revolted, and seized on Ithome. Most of these He-
lotes were the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into
servitude in former times ; whereby also it came to pass, that
they were called all Messenians. Against these had the Lace-
* The Lacedemonians employrd the captives taken in war, and tbeir postenty,
in hnsbandry and other servile works, which was all done hy this kind of men,
an 1 they were called by them Helotes, because the first »f theui so employed,
were captives of the town of Helos in Laconia.
B
m THE HISTORY book i.
demonians a war now at Ithomc. The Thaslans in tlie third
year of the siege, rendered themselves to the Athenians, upon
condition to raze their -walls, to deliver vp their gullies, to pay
hoth the money behind, and for the future as much as they 'were
•wont ; and to qidt both the mines and the continent. The La-
cedemonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long,
amongst other their confederates, sent for aid to the Athenians;
who also came with no small forces under the command of
Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in
mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege, seeming
to require men of ability in that kind, whereby they might
perhaps have gotten the place by force. And upon this journey
grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedemonians
and the Athenians : for the Lacedemonians, when they could
not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and in-
novating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed
of a contrary race *, might at the persuasion of those in Ithome,
cause some alteration, if they staid ; dismissed them alone of
all the confederates, not discovering their jealousy, but alleging
that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athe-
nians perceiving that they were not sent away upon good cause,
but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and
conceiving that they had better deserved at the Lacedemonians'
hands, as soon as tliey were gone, left the league which they
had made with the Lacedemonians against the Persian, and
became confederates with their enemies the Argives ; and then
both Argives and Athenians took the same oath, and made the
same league with the Thessalians.
Those in Ithome when they could no longer hold out, in
the tenth year of the siege, rendered the place to tlie Lacede-
monians, upon condition of security to depart out of Pelopon-
nesus, and that they shoidd no more return ,- and "whosoever
should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should
take him. For the Lacedemonians had before been warned by
a certain answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant
of Jupiter Ithometes. So they came forth, they, and their wives,
and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore
to the Lacedemonians, received them, and put them into Nau-
pactus t, which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of
Ozole. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedemonians,
and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were
holden down by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of
their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pcgae were put into
the hands of the Athenians, who built for the Megareans the
• The Lacedemonians were Dorcans, tlic Atlituians lonians.
t Lepantu.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECL\N WAR. 51
long walls from the city to Nisflea*, and maintained them with
a garrison of their own. And from hence it was chiefly that
the vehement hatred grew of the Corinthians against the Athe-
nians. Moreover, Inarus the son of Psammetticus an African,
king of the Africans that confine on iEgypt, making war from
Marea above Pharus, caused the greatest part of ^5]gypt to
rebel against the king Artaxerxes ; and when he had taken the
government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athe-
nians to assist him ; who chancing to be then warring on Cyrus
with two hundred gallies, part their own and part their confe-
derates, left Cyrus and went to him. And going from the sea
up the river of Nilus, after they had made themselves masters
of the river, and of two parts of the city of Memphis f, as-
saulted the third part, called the White Wall. Within were of
the Medcs and Persians, such as had escaped, and of the
/Egyptians, such as had not revolted amongst the rest. The
Athenians came also with a fleet to Halias, and landing their
soldiers, fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians,
and tl>e Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians
fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Ceory-
phalea J, and the Athenians had the victory. After this again,
the war being on foot of the Athenians, against the .-Eginetie,
a great battle was fought between them by sea, upon the coast
of ^-Egina, the confederates of both sides being at the same ; in
which the Athenians had the victory ; and having taken seventy
gallies, landed their army and besieged the city under the con-
duct of Leocrates the son of Straebus. After this, the Pelo-
jwnnesians desiring to aid the ^-Eginetae, sent over into iEgina
itself three hundred men of arms, of the same that had before
aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces
seized on the top of Geranea §. And the Corinthians and their
confederates, came down from thence into the territory of Me-
gara, supposing that the Athenians having much of their army
absent in .^gina and in ^gypt, would be unable to aid the
Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before
.-Egina. But the Athenians stirred not from iEgina, but those
that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the con-
duct of M\TonideSj went to Megara ; and after they had fought
with doubtful victory, they parted asunder again witli an opi-
nion in both sides, not to have had the worse in the action.
And the Athenians (who notwithstanding had rather the better)
when the Corinthians were gone away, erected a trophy. But
the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the an-
cient men of the city, about twelve days after came again pre-
• The haven and arsenal of Megara. + Cairo.
I Some island about Peloponnesns, nhosc situation 'n not now known.
§ A ridg-c of a hill, lying before the entrance into the IstbniDs.
52 TflE HISTORY book i.
pared, and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had
been theirs. Hereupon the Athenians sallying out of Megara
with a huge shout, both slew those that were setting up the
trophy, and charging the rest, got the victory. The Corin-
thians being overcome, went their way ; but a good part of
them, being hard followed and missing their way, lighted into
the enclosed ground of a private man, which fenced with a
great ditch, had no passage through ; this the Athenians per-
ceiving, opposed them at the place by which they entered, with
their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their
light-armed soldiers, killed those that were entered with stones.
This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their
army got home again. About this time the Athenians began
the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea,
the one reaching to the haven called Phaleron, the other to
Peiraeus. The Phoceans also making war upon Boeum, Cyti-
nium, and Erineus, towns that belonged to the Doreans *, of
whom the Lacedemonians are descended, and having taken one
of them ; the Lacedemonians under the conduct of Nicomedes
the son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanactes son of
king Pausanias, who was yet in minority, sent unto the aid of
the Doreans, one thousand five hundred men of arms of their
own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they
had forced the Phoceans upon composition to surrender the
town they had taken, they went their ways again. Now, if they
would go home by sea through the Crissaean gulf f, the Athe-
nians going about with their fleet, would be ready to stop them ;
and to pass over Geranea, they thought unsafe, because the
Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegae ; for Geranea
was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always
guarded by the Athenians. They thought good therefore to
stay amongst the Boeotians, and to consider which way they
might most safely go through. Whilst they were there, there
wanted not some Athenians that privily solicited them to come
to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government,
and to have demolished the Long Walls, then in building. But
the Athenians with the whole power of their city, and one
thousand Argives and other confederates, as they could be got-
ten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to
meet them, for there was suspicion that they came thither to
depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians cer-
tain horsemen out of Thessaly, which in the battle turned to
the Lacedemonians.
* The Doreans tlie motlier natiuii of tlic Lacedemonians, inhabited n little
country on the north side of Phocis, called Doris, and Tetra|iolis, from the four
fitics it contained ; of which tiiosc ii<ie nicatioiied were tiiree, and the fourth
vas Pindiis.
f Gulf of Corinth.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 53
They fought at Tanagra of Boeotia, and the Lacedemonians
had the victory, but the slaughter was great on both sides.
Then the Lacedemonians entering into the territories of Megara,
and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by the
way of Geranea and the Isthmus. Upon the two and sixtieth
day after this battle, the Athenians under the conduct of My-
ronides, made a journey against the Boeotians, and overthrew
them at Oenophyta, and brought the territories of Boeotia and
Phocis under their obedience ; and withal razed the walls of
Tanagra, and took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus one
liundred liostages ; and finished also at the same time their Long
Walls at home. After this, /Egina also yielded to the Athe-
nians on these conditions, that they should have their walls
pulled down ; and siiould deliver up their gallics, and pay their
taxed tribute for the time to come. Also the Athenians made
a voyage about Peloponnesus, wherein they burnt the arsenal
of the Lacedemonians' navy, took Chalcis *, a city of the Corin-
thians; and landing their forces in Sycionia, overcame in fight
those that made head against them. -^All this while the Athe-
nians staid still in -^gypt, and saw much variety of war. First,
the Athenians were masters of .^gypt. And the king of Per-
sia sent one Megabazus a Persian with money to Lacedemon,
to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that
means to draw the Athenians out of iEgypt. But when this
took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus
returned with the money he had left into Asia. And then was
Megabazus the son of Zopirus a Persian, sent into ^gypt with
great forces, and coming in by land, overthrew the ^Egyptians
and their confederates in a battle, drove the Grecians out of
Memphis, and finally enclosed them in the isle of Prosopis.
There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as
having drained the channel, and turned the water another way,
he made their gallies lie aground, and the island for the most
part continent, and so came over, and won the island with land
soldiers. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost, after six
years war; and few of many passing through Africa, saved
themselves in Cyrene, but the most perished. So iEgypt re-
turned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtaeus
that reigned in the Fens, for him they could not bring in, both
because the fens are great, and the people of the fens of all the
-^^gypti^HS the most warlike. But Inarus king of the Africans,
and author of all this stir in ^Egypt, was taken by treason, and
crucified. The Athenians moreover had sent fifty gallies more
into /Egypt, for a supply of those that were there already;
which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of Nilus,
• A
city of the Coriutliiaus, near the river Tuenas.
54 THE HISTORY book r.
knew nothing of wliat had happened to the rest: and being
assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the
Phoenician fleet, lost the greatest part of tlieir gallies, and es-
caped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended t]\e great
expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into /l^gypt.
Also Orestes the son of Echecratidas king of the Thessalians,
driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him.
And the Athenians taking with them the Boeotians and Pho-
ceans, their confederates, made war against Pharsalus *, a city
of Tlicssaly ; and were masters of the field as far as they stray-
ed not from the army, (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them
from straggling) but could not win the city, nor yet perform
any thing else of what they came for, but came back again with-
out effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after
this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the gallies that lay at
Pegffi, (for Pegfee was in the hands of the Athenians) under the
command of Pericles the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicy-
onia, and landing, put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made
head ; and then presently took up forces in Achaea, and putting
over, made war on Oenias a city of Acarnania, which they be-
sieged ; nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.
Three years after this was a truce made between the Pelo-
ponncsians and Athenians for five years; and the Athenians
gave over the Grecian war, and with two hundred gallies, part
their ovvn, and part their confederates, under the conduct of
Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these, there went sixty sail
into .'Egypt, sent for by Amyrtaeus that reigned in the fens,
and the rest lay at the siege of Citium. But Cimon there
dying, and a famine arising in the army, they left Citium, and
when they had passed Salamine in Cyprus, fought at once
both by sea and land, against the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and
Cilicians, and having gotten the victory in both, returned home,
and with them the rest of their fleet now come back from JE-
gypt. After this, the Lacedemonians took in hand the war,
called the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, de-
livered the possession thereof to the Delphians. But the A-
thenians afterward, when the Lacedemonians were gone, came
with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to
the Phocjpans. Some space of time after this, the out-laws of
Boeotia being seized of Orchomenus and Chueronea, and
certain other places of Boeotia, the Athenians made war
upon those places, being their enemies, with a thousand
men of arms of their own, and as many of their confeder-
ates as severally came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas,
the son of Tolmreus. And when they had taken Chaero-
• Famous for the bnltle bitwcrii Ctesfir niul P(HH|(ny.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 55
nea, thev carried away the inhabitants captives, and leav-
ing a garrison in the city, departed. In their return, those
out-laws that were in Orchomenus, together with the Lo-
crians, of Opus, and the Euboean out-laws, and oth^r of
the same faction, set upon them at Coronea, and overcoming
the Athenians in battle, some they slew, and some they took
alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Boeotia,
and made peace with condition to have their prisoners released.
So the out-laws and the rest returned, and lived again un-
der their own laws. Not long after revolted Euboea from
the Athenians, and when Pericles had already passed over into
it with the Athenian army, there was brought him news that
Megara was likewise revolted, and that the Peloponnesians
were about to invarle Attica, and that the Megareans had slain
the Athenian garrison, except only such as fled into Nisica.
Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had gotten to their
aid tiie Corinthians, Epidaureans, and Sicyonians. Wherefore
Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Euboea ; and the
Lacedemonians afterv^ards brake into Attica, and wasted the
countr}' about Eleusine and Thrlasium, under the conduct of
Pleistoonax the son of Pausanias king of Lacedemon, and
came no further on, but so went away. After which the Athe-
nians passed again into Euboea, and totally subdued it ; the Hes-
tiaeans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own
hands ; but ordered the rest of Euboea, according to composi-
tion made. Being returned from Eubcea, within a while after
they made a peace with the Lacedemonians and their confede-
rates for thirty years, and rendered Nisasa, Achaia, Pegje, and
Troezene, (for these places the Athenians held of theurs) to the
Peloponnesians. In the sixth year of tliis peace, fell out the
war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene ;
and the Milesians being put to the worse, came to Athens and
exclaimed against the Samians ; wherein also certain private
men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire
to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians
went to Samos with a fleet of forty gallies, and set up the de-
mocracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many
men for hostages ; which when they had put into Lemnos *
and set a guard upon them, they came home. But certain of
the Samians (for some of them, not enduring the popular
government, were fled into the continent) entering into league
with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes the
son of Hystaspes who then was governor of Sardis, and levy-
ing about seven hundred auxiliar}- soldiers, passed over into
Samos in the evening, and first set upon the popular faction,
and brought most of them into their power ; and then stealing
* Stalimiae.
56 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the
Athenian guard and such captains as were there, into the
hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against
Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines. The A-
thenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos
sixty gallies, sixteen whereof they did not use, (for some of them
went into Caria, to observe the fleet of the Phoenicians, and
some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos,) but with
the forty-four that remained under the command of Pericles
and nine others, fought with seventy galleys of the Samians,
(whereof twenty were such as served for transport of soldiers,)
as they were coming all together from Miletus; and the Athe-
nians had the victory. After this came a supply of forty gal-
lies more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five.
With these having landed their men, they overthrew the Sa-
mians in battle, and besieged the city, which they enclosed
with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their gal-
lies. But Pericles taking with him sixty galUes out of the
road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelli-
gence of the coming against them of the Phoenician fleet. For
Stesagoras with five gallies was already gone out of Samos,
and others out of other places, to meet the Phoenicians. In
the mean time the Samians coming suddenly forth with their
fleet, and falling upon the harbour of the Athenians, which was
-unfortified, sunk the gallies that kept watch before it, and over-
came the rest in fight ; insomuch as they became masters of
the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, im-
porting and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning,
shut them up again with his gallies ; and after this, there came
to him from Athens a supply of forty sail, with Thucydides *,
Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and An-
ticles ; and from Chios and Lesbos, forty more. And though
the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet un-
able to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege,
they rendered the city upon composition : namely, " To de-
" molish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their na-
*' vy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the
" war, at the days appointed." And the Byzantines also
yielded, with condition " to remain subject to them, in the
*' same manner as they had been before their revolt."
Now not many years after this, happened the matters before
related of tlie Corcyraeans and the Potidseans, and whatsoever
other intervenient pretext of this war. These things done by
the Grecians one against another, or against the Barbarians,
came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from
the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this
• Not the wiilcr of the History.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 57
present war: in wliich time the Athenians both assured their
government over the confederates, and also much enlarged
their own particular wealth. This the Lacedemonians saw,
and opposed not, save now and then a little, but (as men that
had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also
for that they were hindered sometimes with domestic war) for
the most part of the time stirred not against them, till now at
last when the power of the Athenians was advanced manifestly
indeed, and that they had done injury to their confederates,
they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessarj' to go in
hand with the war with all diligence, and to pull down, if they
could, the Atlienian greatness. For which purpose, it was by
the Lacedemonians themselves decreed, that the peace was bro-
ken, and that the Athenians had done unjustly. And also having
sent to Delphi, and enquired of Apollo, whether they should have
the better in the war or not ; they received (as it is reported)
this answer ; ' That if they warred with their whole power, they
' should have victory, and that himself would be on their side,
* both called and uncalled.'
Now when they had assembled their confederates again,
they were to put it to the question amongst them. Whether theif
should make v:ar or not. And the ambassadors of the several
confederates coming in, and the council set ; as well the rest
spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athe-
nians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians,
who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give
their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidaea should be lost be-
fore help came, being then present, spake last of all to tliis ef-
fect.
The Oration of the Ambassadors of Corinth.
* Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedemo-
* nians, they having both decreed the war themselves, and also
* assembled us to the same. For it is fit for them who have
* the command in a common league, as they are honoiu*ed of
* all before the rest, so also (administering their private affairs
* equally with others) to consider before the rest, of the com-
' mon business. And though as many of us as have already had
' our turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware
' of them ; yet it were good for those that dwell up in the
'■ land ; and not as we, in places of traffic on the seaside, to
* know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a
* great deal the more difficulty both carry to the sea the com-
* modities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the
' benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and
' also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned
' them not ; but to make account, that if they neglect those
* that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach unto them-
58 THE HISTORY book i.
^ selves ; and this consultation concerneth them no less than
us, and therefore not to be afraid to change peace for war.
For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless
they have wrong ; yet it is the part of valiant men when
they receive injury, to pass from peace into war, and after
success, from war to come again to composition : and neither
to swell with the good success of war, nor to suffer injury,
through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom
pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, shall quickly lose the
sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is
made proud by success, observeth not that his pride is
grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many
things ill advised, come to good effect, against enemies worse
advised ; yet more, thought well advised, have fallen but badly
out, against well advised enemies. For no man comes to
execute a thing, with the same confidence he premeditates
it, for we deliver our opinions in safety, whereas in the action
itself we fail through fear. As for the war at this time, we
raise it, both upon injuries done us, and upon other sufficient
allegations ; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the
Athenians, we will also in due time lay it down. And it is
for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory :
first, because we exceed them in number : and next, because
when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one
fashion *. And as for a navy, wherein consisteth the strength
of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both out of every ones
particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olym-
pia. For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw
from them their foreign mariners, by offer of greater M'ages : for
the forces of the Athenians are rather mercenary than do-
mestic. Whereas our own power is lesg obnoxious to such
accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in mo-
ney« And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in
all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold
out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval
affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to
theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the
valour that we have by nature, they shall never come unto
by teaching ; but the experience which they exceed us in,
that must we attain unto by industry. And the money where-
with to bring this to pass, it must be all our parts to contri-
bute. For else it were a hard case, that the confederates
of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their
own servitude ; and we should refuse to lay out our mo-
ney to be revenged of our enemies, and for our own preserva-
* All land soldiers, all of ouc inuniicr of aimin;^ and discipline.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 59
tion, and that the iVtlicnlans take not our money from us, and
even with that do us mischief. We have also many other
ways of war ; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the
principal means of lessening their revenue ; the building* of
forts in their territory, and many other things which one can-
not now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing
less than by the points of our account, but of itself con triveth
most things upon the occasion. Wherein, he that complies
with it with most temper standeth the firmest; and he
t|iat is most passionate oftenest miscarries. Imagine we had
dift'erences each of us about the limits of our territory, with
an equal adversary; we must undergo them. But now the
Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after
another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose
them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously,
they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know
that to be vanquished (though it trouble you to hear it) brings
with it no less tlian manifest ser\'itude : which, but to men-
tion as a doubt, as if so many cities could sufifer under one,
were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then
be thought tliat we are either punished upon merit, or else
that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our
ancestors ; for by them the liberty of all Greece hath been re-
stored; whereas we for our parts assure not so much as our
own ; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants
in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established
amongst us. Wherein we know not how we can avoid one
of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negli-
gence. For certainly you avoid them not, by imputing it to
that which hath done most men hurt, contempt of the ene-
my : for contempt, because it hath made too many men mis-
carry, hath gotten the name of foolishness. But to what end
should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the
business in hand ? we must now by helping the present, la-
bour for the future. For it is peculiar to our country to
attain honour by labour; and though you be now some-
what advanced in honour and pow^r, you must not therefore
change the custom ; for there is no reason that what was got-
ten in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confi-
dently go in iiand with the war, as for many other causes, so
also for this, that both the god hath by his oracle advised us
thereto, and promised to be with us himself: and also for
that the rest of Greece, some for fear, some for profit, are
ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the
• Though this be here «aid in the person of a Corinthiaa, yet it was never
thought on hy any of that tide till Alcibiadcs put it into their farads, when he re«
volled from his countrr.
60 THE HISTORY
BOOK i:
peace, (which tlic god, inasmuch as he doth encourage us to
the war, judgetli violated by them) but you fight rather in
defence of the s ame. For not he that breaketh the peace
that taketh revenge, but he that is the first invader. So that
seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since
in common we persuade the same, and seeing also that both
to the cities, and to private men, it will be the most profitable
course ; put off no longer neither the defence of the Poti-
dseans, who are Doreans, and besieged (wliich was wont to
be contrary) by lonians, nor the recovery of the liberty of the
rest of the Grecians. For It is a case that admitteth not de-
lay, when they are some of them already oppressed : and
others (after it shall be known we met, and durst not right
ourselves) shall shortly after undergo the like. But think
(confederates) you are now at a necessity, and that this is the
best advice. And therefore give your votes for the war, not
fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace pro-
ceeding from It. For though by war groweth the confirma-
tion of peace, yet for love of ease to refuse the war, doth
not likewise avoid the danger. But making account that a
tyrant city set up in Greece, Is set up alike over all, and
reigneth over some already, and the rest in intention, we shall
bring it again into order by the war ; and not only live for the
the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the
already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.'
T/17/S said the Corinthians.
The Lacedemonians, when they heard the opinion of them
all, brought the balls * to all the confederates present In order,
from the greatest state to the least ; and the greatest part gave
their votes for the war. .Now after the war was decreed, though
it were impossible for them to go In hand with It presently, be-
cause they were unprovided, and every state thought good with-
out delay severally to furnish themselves of what was neces-
sary, yet there passed not fully a year In this preparation, before
Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.
In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians,
with certain criminations, to the end that If they would give
ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be, for
raising of the war. And first the Lacedemonians, by their ambas-
sadors to the Athenians, required them to banish f such as were
under curse of the goddess Minerva, for pollution of sanctuary.
* ■4')i^»» Weywy^v. The faslitoii it scemelli, as now in some places, to present
n box or inn, uml a little liall, or stone or bean, to iiini tliat gaie liis vote, to the
end lift mi<'lit put his ball into the part of the nru that uas for uffirnmlion or ue-
g-ation, as he saw cause.
f Exconiuiunicatioii extending; also to posterity.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 61
Which pollution was thus. There had been one Cylon an
Athenian, a man that had been victor in the Olympian exer-
cises, of much nobility and power amongst those of old time,
and that had married the daughter of Theagenes a Megarean,
in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking coun-
sel at Delphi, the god answered *That on the greatest festival
day, he should seize the cattle of Athens.' He therefore having
gotten forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the en-
terprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holi-
days in Peloponnesus, with intention to take upon him the ty-
ranny : esteeming the feast of Jupiter to be the greatest, and to
touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the
Olympian exercises. But whether the feast spoken of were
meant to be the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, nei-
ther did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest *.
For there is also amongst the Athenians the Diasia, which is
called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and is celebrated
without the city ; wherein, in the confluence of the whole peo-
ple, many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but
such as was the fashion of the natives of the place f. But he,
supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the
enterprise ; and when the Athenians heard of it, they came with
all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel,
besieged it. But the time growing long, the Athenians, wea-
ried with the siege, went most of them away, and left both the
guard of the citadel, and the wliole business to the nine Ar-
chontes, with absolute authority to order the same as to them it
should seem good. For at that time, most of the affairs of the
common-weal were administered by those nine Archontes.
Now those that were besieged with Cylon were, for want both
of victual and water, in very ill estate ; and therefore Cylon
and a brother of his fled privately out ; but the rest, when they
were pressed, and some of them dead with famine, sat down as
suppliants by the altar X that is in the citadel : and the Athe-
nians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place,
raising them, upon promise to do them no harm, put them all
to the sword. Also they § had put to death some of those that
had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe goddesses ||, as they
* The oracles were aliravs obscnre, tbat evasion might be found to'«al»e their
credit ; and whttlifr tboy were the imposture of the devil, or of mm, which is the
more lifcelv, tliey had no |ireseiilion, nor secure wise coujtclure of the future.
•f- Images of liv-inj^ creatures made of (laste.
J; Of Minerva.
^ The Lacedemonians that in the rei»n of Codrus invaded Athens, and were
defeated : some of ibem beinq;- entered the cirj could not gel away, but sate at
those altars, and were dismissed safe, but some of them were slain as they went
home.
[| 2iftt3n dioi. Enmeaidcs.
62 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
were going away. And from this the Athenians, both them-
selves and their posterity, were called accursed* and sacrilegious
persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were
under the curse : and Cleomenes a Lacedemonian, together with
the Athenians, in a sedition banished them afterwards again : and
not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such
of them as were dead. Nevertheless tliere returned of them af-
terwards again, and there are of their race in the city unto this
day. This pollution therefore the Lacedemonians required
them to purge their city of. Principally forsooth, as taking part
with the gods; but knowing withal that Pericles the son of
Xantippus, was by the mother's side one of that race. For they
thought, if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more
easily be brought to yield to their desire. Nevertheless, they
hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him
into the envy of the city, as if the misfortune of him were in
part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his
time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things op-
posite to the Lacedemonians, not suffering the Athenians to
give them the least way, but enticing them to the war.
Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedemonians to
banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Toenarus.
For the Lacedemonians, when they had caused their Helots,
suppliants in the temple of Neptune at Toenarus, to forsake
sanctuary, slew them. For which cause they themselves think
it was that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta.
Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of
sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalcioeca ', which was thus:
after that Pausanias the Lacedemonian was recalled by the
Spartans from his charge in Hellespont, and having been called
in question by them, was absolved, though he was no more
sent abroad by the state, yet he went again into Hellespont in
a gaily of Hermione, as a private man, without leave of the
Lacedemonians, to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in
truth to negociate with the king, as he had before begun, aspir-
ing to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had
laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business
was at first from this : wlien after his return from Cyprus he
had taken Byzantium, when he was there the first time, (which
being holden by the Medes, there were taken in it some near
to the king, and of his kindred) unknown to the rest of the con-
federates, he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he
had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he prac-
tised with one Gongylus an Eretrian, to whose charge he had
committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners.
Also he sent letters unto him, which Gongylus carried, wherein,
as was afterwards known, was thus written :
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 63
The Letter of Patisanias to the King.
' Pausanlas, general of the Spartans, being desirous to do
« thee a courtesy, sendeth back unto thee these men, whom he
« hath by arms taken prisoners : and I have a purpose, if the
< same seem also good unto thee, to take thy daughter in mar-
« riage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece, into thy
* subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to
* pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If there-
' fore any of these things do like thee, send some trusty man
* to the sea side, by whose mediation we may confer together.'
These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased
with the letter, sends away Artabazus the son of Pharnaees to
the sea side, with commandment to take government of the pro-
vince of Dascylis, and to dismiss Megabates that was governor
there before : and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which
lie commanded him to send over to him with speed to Byzan-
tium, and to shew him the seal, and well and faithfully to per-
form, wliatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be ap-
pointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other
things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter, wherein
was written this answer.
The Letter of Xerxes to Pausajiias.
* Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias : for the men which thou
* hast saved and sent over the sea unto me from Byzantium, thy
* benefit is laid up in our house, indelibly registered for ever :
* and I like also of what thou hast propounded. And let nei-
* ther night nor day make tliee remiss in the performance of
* what thou hast promised unto me. Neither be thou hindered
* by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers rc-
* quisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come : but
* with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent unto thee, do
* boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit
* for the dignity and honour of us both.*
Pausanias having received these letters, whereas he was be-
fore in great authority for his conduct at Plataea, became now
many degrees more elevated ; and endured no more to live af-
ter the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparalled
at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia ; and when he went
through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and ^Egyptians, and his
table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to
conceal his purpose, but in trifles made apparent before-hand,
the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became
moreover difficult of access, and would be in such choleric pas-
sions toward all men indifferently, that no man might endure
to approach him ; which was also none of the least causes why
64 THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
the confederates turned from him to the Athenians. When the
Lacedemonians heard of it, they called him home the first time.
And when being gone out the second time without their com-
mand in a gaily of Hermione, it appeared that he continued
still in the same practices ; and after he was forced out of By-
zantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but
news came, that he had seated himself at Colone, in the coun-
try of Troy, practising still with the Barbarians, and making his
abode there for no good purpose : then the Ephori forbore no
longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the Scytale *,
commanding him not to depart from the officer; and in case
he refused, denounced war against him. But he desiring as
much as he could to decline suspicion, and believing that with
money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations,
returned unto Sparta the second time. And first he was by the
Ephori committed to ward ; (for the Ephori have power to
do this to their king) but afterwards procuring his enlargement,
he came forth and exhibited himself to justice, against such as
had any thing to allege against him. And though the Spar-
tans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies,
nor the whole city, whereupon to proceed to the punishment of
a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in
great authority : for Plistarchus the son of Leonidas being king,
and as yet in minority, Pausanias who was his cousin german,
had the tuition of him : yet by his licentious behaviour, and af-
fectation of the Barbarian customs, he gave nmch cause of sus-
picion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present
state. They considered also that he differed in manner of life,
from the discipline established : amongst other things, by this,
that upon the Tripode at Delphi, which the Grecians had de-
dicated, as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused
to be inscribed of himself in particular, this elegiac verse :
Pausanias, GiTok g-enernl,
Havin;T the Medes defeated,
To Plioebiis in record thereof.
This g\h liiith consecrated.
But the Lacedemonians then presently defaced that inscrip-
tion of the Tripode, and engraved thereon by name all the ci-
ties that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedi-
cated it so. This therefore was numbered amongst the of-
• Scytale, properly asiaff; here a fjnii of letter, used by the Lacedemonians, in
this manner; tliey had two round staves of one hig-ness, whereof tlie slate kept
one, and tlie man wlioin they employed abroad, kept the other; and when they
would write, they wrapped about it a sni;ill tlionir of parchment ; and having; there-
on written, took it oft' airaiii, and sent only that thong', which wrapped likewise
about the other staff", the letters joined a^ifain, and miffht be read. This served
instead of cypher. It sccnis Puusiuiias retained his stafl', from the linic he had
charge at Byzanlinnj,
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. •»
fences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present
design, so much the rather, for the condition lie was now in.
They had information further, that he had in hand some prac-
tice with the Helots, and so he had : for he promised them not
only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would
rise with him, and co-operate in the wlK)le business. But
neither thus, upon some appeachment of the Helots, would
they proceed against him, but kept the custom which
they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory
sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof.
Till at length, as it is reported, purposing to send over to Arta-
bazus his last letters to the king, he was bewrayed unto them
by a man of Argilus, in time past his minion *, and most
faithful to him : who being terrified with the cogitation, that
not any of those which had been formerly sent, had ever re-
turned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end
that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter
any thing in the letter, it might not be discovered) and opened
the letter, wherein (as he had suspected the addition of some
such clause) he found himself also written down to be murdered.
The Ephori, when these letters were by him shewn unto them,
though they believed the matter much more than they did be-
fore, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias 's
own mouth ; (the man being upon design gone to Tffinarus
into sanctuary, and having there built him a little room with a
partition, In which he hid the Ephori ; and Pausanias coming
to him, and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary,) they
plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated
with him for what he had written about him, and from point to
point discovered all the practice : saying, that though he had
never boasted unto him these and these services concerning the
king, he must yet have the honour, as well as many other of
his servants to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed
the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at
what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, en-
treating him to go on in his journey with all speed, and not to
frustrate the business In hand.
Now the Ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for
that time went their \\'ay, and knowing now the certain truth,
intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when
he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the
countenance of one of the Ephori coming towards him, what
they came for : and when another of them had by a secret beck
sjgnilied the matter for good will, he ran into the close * of the
^ Vlmih»i, taken both ia good ami bad gense, for a maa witb whom another man
is in love.
F
66 THE HISTORY book i.
temple of Pallas Chalciaeca, and got in before they overtook
him, (now the temple f itself was hard by) and entering into
a house belonging to the temple, to avoid the injury of the
open air, there staid. They that pursued him could not then
overtake him, but afterwards they took off the roof and the
doors of the house, and watching a time when he was within,
beset the house, and murredhim up, and leaving a guard there,
famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the
ghost, they carried him as he was, out of the house, yet breath-
ing, and being out, he died immediately. After he was dead,
they were about to throw him into the Cseada X, where they
used to cast in malefactors, yet afterwards they thought good to
bury him in some place thereabout : but the oracle of Delphi
commanded the Lacedemonians afterward, both to remove the
sepulchre from the place where he died, (so that he lies now in
the entry of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the
pillar) and also (as having been a pollution of the sanctuary)
to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciseca for that one.
Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the
same unto her for Pausanias. Now the Athenians (the god
himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary) required
the Lacedemonians to banish out of their city such as were
touched with the same.
At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lace-
demonians by their ambassadors to the Athenians, accused The-
mistocles, for that he also had medized together with Pausanias,
having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias, and desired
that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him.
Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment
by ostracism §, and though his ordinary residence was at Argos,
he travelled to and fro -in other places of Peloponnesus,) they
sent certain men in company of the Lacedemonians, who were
willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in where-
soever they could find him. But Themistocles having had no-
tice of it before hand, flieth out of Peloponnesus into Cor-
cyra, to the people of which city he had formerly been benefi-
cial. But the Corcyraeans alleging that they durst not keep
him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedemonians and
the Athenians, convey him into the opposite continent : and
being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually
* 'li^o*. Both tlie tcnijile and the around consecrated, wlierciii stniideth the
temple, altar, and edifices for tlie use of their religion.
-}■ Tiftivcs. The temple or church of the goddess.
I Ca;adn, a pit near Laccdemon.
^ A kind of banishment wherein the Athenians wrote upon the shell of an oyster
the name of him they would banish: used principally ug-ninst g'reat men, whose
power or faction they feared might breed alteration iu tiic state : and was but for
certain years.
BOOK 1. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. #9
which way he went, he was compelled at a straight, to turn iir
unto Admetus king of the Molossians his enemy. Tlie king
himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his
wife, and by her was instructed to take their son * with him,
and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not
long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired
him, that though he had opposed him in some suit at Athens,
not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight : saying,
that now being the weaker, he must needs suffer under the
stronger ; whereas noble revenge is of equals upon equal terms :
and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not
of life ; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for
what, and by whom he was followed) he deprived him of all
means of saving his Hfe. Admetus having heard him, bade him
arise, together with his son, whom he held as he sate : which
is the most submiss supplication that is.
Not long after came the Lacedemonians and the Athenians,
and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him
not, but sent him away by land to Pydna, upon the other sea f
(a city belonging to Alexander J) because his purpose was to
go to the king § : where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he em-
barked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the
Athenians that besieged Naxus. Being afraid, he discovered
to the master (for he was unknown) who he was, and for what
he fled, and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to
say, that he had hired him to carry him away for money. And
that to save him, there needed no more but this, to let none go
out of the ship till the weather served to be gone. To which
if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according
to his merit. The master did so ; and having lain a day and
a night at sea, upon the fleet of the Athenians, he arrived af-
ter\vard at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally re-
warded iiim with money, (for he received there, both what was
sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put
out at Argos,) he took hisjourney upwards, in company of a cer-
tain Persian of the low-countries j], and sent letters to the king
Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, newly come to the kingdom,
wherein was written to this purpose :
His Letter to Artaxerxes.
* I Themistocles am coming unto thee, who, of all the Gre-
* cians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded
* Tw srajSs. C.imeliiis Nepos in the 'Life of Themistocles, S9\ s it was theiK
daughter.
t The -Cgf an sea.
X King of Macedonia-.
4 Of Persia.
II The lo>v. countries of Asia lying to the iEgeaii sea.
m THE HISTORY book i.
* me, have done your house the most damages ; yet the benefits
* I did him, were more, after once I with safety, he with dan-
' ger was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due
' unto me, (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the
' Grecians' departure out of Salamis, and ascribing the then
* not breaking of the bridge, falsely unto himself,) and at this
' time to do thee many other good services, I present myself,
* persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship's sake. But I
* desire to have a years respite, that I may declare unto thee
* the cause of my coming myself.'
The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be,
and commanded him to do as he said. In this time of respite, he
learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the
place, and a year after coming to the court, he was great with
the king, more than ever had been any Grecian before ; both
for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he
promised to bring into his subjection ; but especially for the
trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in
whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judg-
ment, wherein he had something worthy of admiration, different
from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help
of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary mat-
ters upon short deliberation, the best discerner, and also of what
for the most part would be their issue, the best conjecturer.
What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate : and
what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge
of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was
best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And (to say all in
few words) this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and
quickness of deliberation was the ablest of all men, to tell what
was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick, he ended
his life : some say he died voluntarily by poison, because he
thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to
the king. His monument is in Magnesia * in Asia, in the
market place : for he had the government of that country, the
king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him
fifty talents by year for his bread fj and Lampsacus for his wine,
(for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine,)
and the city of Myus for his meat. His bones are said by his
kindred to have been brought home by his own appointment,
and buried in Attica, unknown to the Athenians : for it was not
lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. Tliese were
* There is another city of that name in Greece.
f Cornelius Ncpos in the life of Themistocles, says that the kin<f gave him
these cities with these words, Magnesia to find him bread, Lampsacus wine, and
Myus uieat.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. M
tlie ends of Pausanias the Lacedemonian, and Themistocles the
Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.
And this is that which the Lacedemonians did command, and
were commanded in their first ambassage, touching the banish-
ment of such as were under the curse.
After this, they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding
them to levy the siege from before Potidsea, and to suffer iEgiiia
to be free ; but principally, and most plainly telling them, that
the war should not be made, in case they would abrogate tlie
act concerning the Megareans. By which act they were forbid-
den both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian
dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in
the rest of their commands, nor in the abrogation of that act ;
but recriminated the Megareans, for having tilled holy ground,
and unset-out with bounds : and for receiving of their slaves
that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from
Lacedemon were arrived, namely Rhamphias, Melesippus and
Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were
wont, but only this, that * the Lacedemonians desire that there
* should be peace, which may be had, if you will suffer the Gre-
' cians to be governed by their own laws.' The Athenians called
an assembly, and propounding their opinions amongst them-
selves ; thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give
tiiem an answer once for all. And many stood forth, and deli-
vered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some,
that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in
their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles the son
of Xantippus, the principal man at that time, of all Athens, and
most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in
such manner as followeth.
The Oration of Pericles.
* Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion,
* not to give way to the Peloponnesians (notwithstanding, I
* know that men have not the same passions in the war itself,
* which they have when they are incited to it, but change their
* opinions with the events) but also I see that I must now advise
* tlie same things, or very near to what I have before delivered.
* And I require of you, with whom my counsel shall take place,
* that if we miscarry in ought, you will either make the best of
* it, as decreed by common consent, or if we prosper, not to
« attribute it to your own wisdom only. For it falleth out with
* the events of actions no less than with the purposes of man,
' to proceed with uncertainty : which is also the cause that
' when any thing happeneth contrary to our expectation, we use
* to lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedemonians, both
' formerly, and especially now, take counsel how to do us mis-
* chief, is a thing manifest. For whereas it is said [ia the arti-
yo THE HISTORY
BOOK I.
* cles] that in our mutual controversies, we sliall give and re-
* ceive trials of judgment, and in the mean time, either side hold
^ what they possess, they never yet sought any such trial them-
' selves, nor will accept of the same offered by us. They will
' clear themselves of their accusations, by war rather than by
* words : and come hither no more now to expostulate, but to
' command. For they command us to arise from before Poti-
* dsea, and to restore the iEginetae to the liberty of their own
* laws, and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans.
■* And they that come last, command us to restore all the Gre-
* cians to their liberty. Now let none of you conceive that we
* shall go to war for a trifle, by not abrogating the act concern-
* ing Megara, (yet this by them is pretended most, and that for
' the abrogation of it the war shall stay;) nor retain a scruple
^ in your minds, as if a small matter moved you to the
' war ; for even tliis small matter contained the trial and
' constancy of your resolution ; wherein if you give them way,
< you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men
** that for fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff
* denial, you sliall teach them plainly, to come to you hereafter
< on terms of more equality. Resolve therefore from this oc-
' 'casion, either to yield them obedience, before you receive da-
* mage ; or if we must have war, (which for my part I think
-* is best,) be the jiretence weighty or light, not to give way, nor
* keep what we possess in fear. For a great and a little claim,
' imposed by equals upon their neig:hbours, before judgment, by
* way of command, hath one and the same virtue to make sub-
*ject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished,
' and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the
* particulars, you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians
* are men * that live by th&ir labour, without money, either in
* particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars, and
' by sea, they are without experience ; for that the wars which
* they have had one against another, have been but short,
* through poverty ; and such men f can neither man their fleets,
* nor yet send out their armies by land very often, because
' they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be
* maintained ; and be besides barred the use of the sea. It
* must be a stock X of money, not forced contributions, that
* support the wars, and such as live by their labour are more
' ready to serve the wars witii their bodies than with their mo-
* ney. For they make account that their bodies will out-live
* the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent ;
* especially if the war (as it is likely) should last. So that the
* Peloponnesians and tlieir confederates, though for one battle
* AvT-.v^yii. ■\- Ati livi' U^v tliiir labour. J Vltaitvrixi.
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 71
* they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to
* maintain a war against such as have their preparations of ano-
' tKer kind, they are not able ; inasmuch as not having one and
' the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the
' occasion ; and having equality of vote, and being of several
* races *, every one will press his particular interest, whereby
* nothing is likely to be fully executed. For some will desire
* most to take revenge on some enemies, and others to have
* their estates least wasted ; and being long before they can as-
* semble, they take the lesser part of their time to debate the
* common business, and the greater to dispatch their own private
* affairs. And every one supposeth that his own neglect of the
* common estate, can do little hurt, and that it will be the care
* of some body else to look to that, for his own good : not ob-
' serving how by these thoughts of every one in several,
* the common business is jointly ruined. But their greatest
* hinderance of all, will be their want of money ; which being
* raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the
' occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here,
* and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. , For it were
* a hard matter for a city equal to our own, in time of peace to
* fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy,
' and we no less fortified against them. And if they had a gar-
* rison here, though they might by excursions, and by the re-
* ceiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory ; yet
* would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to
^ hinder us from sailing into their territories, and from tak-
* ing revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our
* strength lieth. For we have more experience in land ser-
* vice by use of the sea, than they have in sea service by
« use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of na-
* val affairs easily. For yourselves, though falling to it im-
' mediately upon the Persian war, yet have not attained it
* fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, whom
« also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it, by lying con-
' tinually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter
* of value? Indeed if they should be opposed but with a few
* ships, they might adventure, encouraging their want of know-
' ledge with store of men ; but awed by many, they will not
' stir that way ; and not applnng themselves to it, will be yet
* more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge
* of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be
* attended at idle times, and on the by f ; but requiring ra-
' ther, that whilst it is a learning, nothing else should be done
* Of the Peloponnrsinns and t!:i>ir rniif: ferrates, ^ome were Doreans, srtnie .to-
Jians, some Bcrotians.
72 THE HISTORY book i.
' on the by. But say they should take the money at Olympia
* and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw
* from us the strangers employed in our fleet ; this indeed, if
* going abroad both ourselves, and those that dwell amongst
* us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But
* now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing)
' we have steersmen, and other necessary men for the service
* of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are
* in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these
* strangers upon trial would be found content to fly his own
' country, and withal upon less hope of victory *, for a few
* days increase of wages, take part with the other side. In this
* manner, or like to this, seeraeth unto me to stand the case of
* the Peloponnesians : whereas ours is both free from what in
* theirs I have reprehended, and hath many great advantages
* besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade
* theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Pelopon-
* nesus, and they all Attica, yet shall theirs be the greater loss.
* For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory in-
* stead of that we shall destroy : whereas for us there is other
* land, both in the islands and continent : for the dominion
' of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this ; if we dwelt
' in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable ?
* We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that
* imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not
* for the loss of them, out of passion give battle to the Pelo-
' ponnesians, far more in number than ourselves ; (for though
* we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as
* many more : and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help
* of our confederates, which are our strength ; for when we can-
' not war upon them they- will revolt) nor bewail ye the loss of
* fields or houses, but of men's bodies; for men may acquire
* these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should
* prevail, I would advise you to go out, and destroy them your-
* selves, and shew the Peloponnesians that you will never the
* sooner obey them for such things as these. There be many
* other things that give hope of victory, (in case you do not f,
< whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and
undergo other voluntary dangers ; for I am afraid of our own
« errors more than of their designs,) but they shall be spoken of
* That is, of victory by sea, wliere tlicy were to he employed.
•j- Thucydides liatb liis mind here, upon the defeat in Sicily, wliich fell out inaay
yt-ars after the death of Pericles. VVhereby it seems lie frametb his speech more
to what Pericles might have said, than to what he did say. Wbicb also \te pro-
fesseth in general of his course in setlin^f down speeches. Besides he maketh Pe-
ricles here to answer |)oint by ])oint to the oration of the Corinthians at Lacede-
mon, as if Iielnid been by wbeu it was delivered : and nselh the same manner in
all opposite oration!).
BOOK I. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 73
' at another time in prosecution of the War itself. For the
* present let us send away these men with this answer : " that
* the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports,
' if the Lacedemonians will also make no banishment of us, nor
* of our confederates, as of strangers. For neither our act con-
' cerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbid-
' den in the articles. Also that we will let the Grecian cities
* be free, if they were so when the peace was made ; and if the
* Lacedemonians will also give leave to their confederates to
* use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacede-
* monians, but as they themselves shall every one think good.
* Also, that we will stand to judgment according to the arti-
* cles, and will not begin the war ; but be revenged on those
* that shall." For this isbothjust,andfor the dignity of the city
' to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity
' war there will be ; and the more willingly we embrace it, the
* less pressing we shall have our enemies ; and that out of great-
* est dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest
' honours. For our fathers, when they undertook the Medes,
* did from less beginnings, nay, abandoning the little they had,
* by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than
' strength, both repel the Barbarian, and advance this state to
* the height it is now at. Of whom we ought not now to come
* short, but rather to revenge us by all means upon our ene-
* mies, and do our best to deliver the state unimpaired by us to
* posterity.'
T/ius spake Pericles.
The Athenians liking best of his advice, decreed as he would
have them, answering the Lacedemonians according to his direc-
tion, both in particular as he had spoken, and generally ; ' that
* they would do nothing on command, but were ready to an-
* swer their accusations upon equal terms, by way of arbitre-
* ment.' So the ambassadors went home^ and after these there
came no more.
These were the quarrels and differences on either side before
the war : which quarrels began presently upon the business of
Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless, there was still com-
nrerce between them, and they went to each other without any
herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had
passed, were but the confusion of the articles, and matter of
the war to follow.
THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.
THB
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK II.
CONTENTS.
The entry of the Theban soldiers into Plattea, by the treason of some
within. Their repulse and slaughter. The irruption of the Pe-
loponnesians into .Attica. The wasting of the coast of Pelopon-
nesus by the Athenian fleet. The public funeral of the first
slain. The second invasion of Attica. The pestilence in the
city of Athens. The Ambraciots war against the Amphiloci.
Plataa assaulted. Besiesed. The Peloponnesian fleet beaten
by Phormio, before the straight of the gulf of Crissa. The
same fleet repaired and re-inforced, and beaten again by
Phormio, before Naupactus. The attempt of the Peloponne-
sians on Salamis. The fruitless expedition of the Thracians
against the Macedonians. This in the first three years of the
war.
I HK war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians be-
ginneth now, from the time they had no longer commerce one
with another, without a herald, and that having once begun it,
they warred without intermission. And it is written in order
by summers and winters, according as from time to time the
several matters came to pass.
The peace, which after the winning of Euboea, was con-
cluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen years ; but in the fif-
teenth year, being' the forty-eighth of the' priest-hood of Chry-
sis * in Argos : ^Enesias being then Ephore at Sparta, and
* Priestess of Jano, by whoae priesthood tbey began their years.
3
76 THE HISTORY book ii.
Pythadorus Archon of Athens, having then two months* of his
government to come, in the sixth month after the battle of Po-
tidaea, and in the beginning of the spring three hundred and
odd Thebans, led by Pythangelus the son of Philides, and
Diemporus the son of Oenotoridas, Boeotian rulers f, about the
first watch of the night entered with their arms irito Plataea a
city of Boeotia, and confederate of the Athenians. They were
brought in, and the gates opened unto them by Nauclides and
his complices, men of Plataea, that for their own private
ambition, intended both the destruction of such citizens as
were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under
the subjection of the Thebans. This they negociated with
one Eurymachus the son of Leontiadas, one of the most po-
tent men of Thebes. For the Thebans foreseeing the war,
desired to preoccupate Plataea, (which was always at variance
with them) whilst there was yet peace, and the war not openly
on foot. By which means, they more easily entered undis-
covered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And |
making a stand in their arms in the market-place, did not
(as they that gave them entrance would have had them) fall
presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adver-
saries, but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation,
and to induce the cities to composition and friendship. And
the herald proclaimed, * that if any man, according to the
' ancient custom of all the Boeotians, would enter into the
' same league of war with them, he should come and bring his
* arms to theirs :' supposing the city by this means would ea-
sily be drawn to their side.j The Plataeans, when they per-
ceived that the Thebans were already entered, and had sur-
prised the city, through fear and opinion that more were en-
tered than indeed were,- (for they could not see them in the
night) came to composition, and accepting the condition,
rested quiet ', and the rather for that (hey had yet done no
man harm. But whilst that these things were treating, they
observed that the Thebans were not many, and thought that if
they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory.
For the Plataean commons were not willing to have revolted
from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to under-
take the matter; and they united themselves, by digging
through the common walls between house and house, that
they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They
also pla<;ed carts in the streets (without the cattle that drew
them) to serve them instead of a wall j and every other thing
' f The AtbeHtaiis ben^an tlieir years about the summer solstice.
f BoioraB^t/trii . There were eleven of them in all, aud had the al>$ulute com-
mand of the Baotians iu tiieir wars in turns.
;{: Qifntoi ru tirKtt,
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. ff
they put in readiness, as they severally seemed necessary for
the present enterprise. When all things, according to their
means, were ready, they marched from their houses, towards
their enemies ; taking their time whilst it was yet night, and
a little before break of day ; because they would not have to
charge them, when they should be emboldened by the light,
and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified,
and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city.
So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly up to
hand-strokes.' And the Thebans seeing this, and finding they
' were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure, and beat
them back in that part where the assault was made ; and twice
or thrice they repulsed them. But at last, when both the
Plataeans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and
their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the
houses, and withal threw stones and tiles amongst them ; the
night having been also very wet, they were afraid and turned
their backs, and fled here and there about the city ; ignorant
for the most part, in the dark and dirt, of the ways out, by
which they should have been saved (for this accident fell out
upon the change of the moon) and pursued by such as were
well acquainted with the ways to keep them in, insomuch as
the greatest part of them perished. The gate by which they
entered, and which only was left open, a certain Plataean shut
up again with the head of a javelin, which he thrust into the
staple instead of a bolt : so that this way also their passage was
stopped. As they were chased up and down the city, some
climbed the walls and cast themselves out, and for the most
part died ; some came to a desart gate of the city, and with a
hatchet given them by a woman, cut the staple, and got forth
unseen : but these were not many, for the thing was soon dis-
covered : others again were slain, dispersed in several parts of the
city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast
themselves before into a ring, happened into a great edifice
adjoining to the wall, the doors whereof being open, they
thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been
a direct way through to the other side. The Platseans seeing
them now penned up, consulted whether they should burn them
as they were, by firing of the house, or else resolve of some
other punishment. At length, both these and all the rest of
the Thebans that were straggling in the city, agreed to yield
themselves and their arms to the Plataeans, at discretion. And
this success had they that entered into Plataea.
But the rest of the Thebans that should with their whole
power have been there before day, for fear the surprise should
not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their
aid, that they heard the news of what was done by the way.
Now Plata?a is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched
6
/
78 THE HISTORY book ir.
the slowHer for the rain which had fallen the same night. For
the river Asopus was swolen so high, that it was not easily pass-
able ; so that what by the foulness of the way, and what by
the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till their
men were already some slain, and some taken prisoners. When
the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait
for such of the Platgeans as were without : (for there were abroad
in the vilUages both men and household-stuff, as was not un-
likely, the evil happening unexpectedly, and in time of peace ;)
desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them for
exchange for those of theirs within, which (if any were so)
were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the
Plataeans, whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some
such thing would be done, and fearing their case without, sent
a herald unto the Thebans, whom they commanded to say,
* I'hat what they had already done, attempting to surprise their
' city in time of peace, was done wickedly,' and to forbid them
' to do any injury to those without, and that otherwise they
* would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive ; which,
' if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they
* would again restore unto them.' Thus the Thebans say, and
that the Plataeans did swear it. But the Plataeans confess not
that they promised to deliver them presently, but upon treaty, if
they should agree, and deny that they swore it. Upon this the
Thebans went out of their territory, and the Plataeans, when
they had speedily taken in whatsoever they had in tiie country,
immediately slew their prisoners. They that were taken were
one hundred and eighty, and Eurymachus, with whom the trai-
tors had practised, was one., When they had done, they sent a
messenger to Athens, and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch
away the bodies of their dead, and ordered the city as was
thought convenient for the present occasion.
The news of what was done, coming straight-way to Athens,
they instantly laid hands on all the Boeotians then in Attica,
and sent an officer to Plataea to forbid their further proceeding
with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should
have advised of the matter : for they were not yet advertised
of their putting to death. For the first messenger was sent
away when the Thebans first entered the town ; and the se-
cond when they were overcome and taken prisoners. But of
what followed after, they knew nothing. So that the Athe-
nians when they sent, knew not what was done, and the of-
ficer arriving, found that the men were already slain. After
this, the Athenians sending an army to Plattea, victualled it,
and left a garrison in it, and took thence both the women and
children, and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.
. This action falling out at Plataea, and the peace now clearly
dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also
HOOK ij, OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 79
did the Lacedemonians and their confederates ; intending on
either part to send ambassadors to the king *, and to other
Barbarians wheresoever they had hope of succours, and con-
tracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own
command. The Lacedemonians f, besides those gallies which
they had in Italy and Sicily of the cities that took part with
them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the
greatness of their several cities, so many more, as the whole
number might amount to five hundred sail ; and to provide
a sum of money assessed, and in other things not to stir far-
ther, but to receive the Athenians, coming but with one gaily
at once, till such time as the same should be ready. The
Athenians, on the other side, surveyed their present confede-
rates, and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Pe-
loponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephalonia, Acarnania, and Zacynthus,
knowing that as long as these were their friends they might
with the more security make war round about upon the coast
of Peloponnesus.
Neither side conceived small matters, but put their whole
strength to the war. And not without reason : for all men in
the beginnings of enterprises are the most eager. Besides, there
were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in
Athens, who for want of experience, not unwillingly undertook
the war. And not only the rest of Greece stood at gaze, to
behold the two principal states in combat, but many prophe-
cies X were told, and many sung § by the priests of the oracles,
both in the cities about to war, and in others.
There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos,
which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before ; and
was interpreted for, and seemed to be a sign of what was to
come afterwards to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced
of the same nature, it was all sure to be enquired after. But
men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedemo-
nians ; and the rather, for that they gave out, they would re-
cover the Grecians' liberty. And every man, both private and
public person, endeavoured as much as in them lay, both in
word and deed to assist them, and thought the business so much
hindered, as himself was not present at it. In such passion
were most men against the Athenians, some for desire to be
delivered from under their government, and others for fear of
falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections
brought unto the war.
• Of Persia.
■f The Lacedeiiiouian league, or Lacedemoniun party, nut particularly that
slate.
J \oyiK. Pr.ipliocics in prose.
^ H?»», Siin». For those prooliecips whic'i th*; Oracles delivered by their
priests, were in verse, and were tot called i\iyi», but X^fttt.
//
80 THE HISTORY book ii.
But the confederates of either party, which they had when
they began it, were these : the Lacedemonians had all Pelo-
ponnesus within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achaeans;
(for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at
first, only of all Achaia, took their part ; but afterwards all the
rest did so likewise) and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans,
Locrians, Boeotians, Phocaeans, Ambraciots, Leucadians, and
Anactorians. Of which the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians,
Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians found shipping.
The Boeotians, Phocaeans, and Locrians, horsemen ; and the rest
of the cities, footmen. And these were the confederates of the
Lacedemonians. The Athenian confederates were these : the
Chians, Lesbians, Plataeans, the Messenians in Naupactus, most
of the Acarnanians, the Corcyraeans, Zacynthians, and other
cities their tributaries amongst those nations. Also that part
of Caria which is on the sea coast, and the Doreans adjoining
to them, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace, all
the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the
rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these the
Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyraeans found gallics, the rest foot-
men and money. These were their confederates, and the pre-
paration for the war on both sides.
The Lacedemonians, after the business of Plataea, sent mes-
sengers presently up and down Peloponnesus, and to their con-
federates without, to have in readiness their forces, and such
things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as in-
tending the invasion of Attica. And when they were all ready,
they came to the rendezvous in the Isthmus, at a day appointed,
two thirds of the forces of every city. When the whole army
was gotten together, Archidamus king of the Lacedemonians,
general of the expedition; called together the commanders of
the several cities, and such as were in authority, and most
worthy to be present, and spake unto them as foUoweth :
The Oration of Archidamus.
* Men of Peloponnesus, and confederates, not only our fa-
* thers have had many wars both within and without Peloponne-
' sus, but we ourselves also, such as are any thing in years,
* have been sufficiently acquainted therewith ; yet did we ne-
* ver before set forth with so great a preparation as at this pre-
* sent. And now, not only we are a numerous and puissant
* army that invade, but the state also is puissant that is invaded
* by us. We have reason therefore to shew ourselves, neither
* worse than our fathers, nor short of the opinion conceived of
* ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion observing
* us : and through their hatred to the Athenians, do wish that
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 81
^ we may accomplisli whatsoever we intend. And therefore
* though we seem to invade them with a great army, and to
* have much assurance that they will not come out against us
* to battle, yet we ought not for this, to march the less care-
' fully prepared, but of ever\' city, as well the captain as the
* soldier, to expect always some danger or other, in that part
* wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents of war are
' uncertain ; and for the most part the onset begins from the
* lesser number, and upon passion. And oftentimes tiie lesser
* number, being afraid, hath beaten back the greater with the
' more ease, for that through contempt they have gone unpre-
* pared. And in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers
* ought alvvays to have bold hearts, yet for the action they ought
* to make their preparations, as if they were afraid. For that
' will give them both more courage to go upon the enemy,
' and more safety in fighting with him. But we invade not
' now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city everj' way well
* appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be
* fought withal, though not now, because we be not yet there,
* yet hereafter, when they shall see us in their country wasting
* and destroying their possessions : for all men when in their
* own sight, and on a sudden, they receive any extraordinary
* hurt, fall presently into choler; and the less they consider,
' with the more stomach they assault. And this is likely to
* hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in otliers; for
' they think themselves worthy to have the command of others,
* and to invade and waste the territory of their neighbours, rather
* than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore as being
' to war against a great city, and to procure both to your ances-
* tors and yourselves, a great fame, cither good or bad, as shall
' be the event ; follow your leaders in such sort, as above all
* things you esteem of order and watchfulness : for there is
' nothing in the world more comely nor more safe, than when
* many men are seen to observe one and the same order.*
Archidamus having thus spoken and dismissed the council,
/ -first sent Melesippus the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to
Athens to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their jour-
ney, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But
the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor presented
him to the state : for the opinion of Pericles had already taken
place, not to receive from the Lacedemonians neither herald
nor ambassador, as long as their army was abroad. Therefore
they sent him back without audience, with commandment to
be out of their borders the self-same day ; and that hereafter if
they would any thing with them, they should return every one
to his home, and send their ambassadors from thence. They
sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the
G
82 THE HISTORY book ii.
country, to the end that no man should confer with him : who
when he came to the limits, and was to be dismissed, uttered
these words ; * this day is the beginning of much evil unto the
* Grecians :' and so departed.
When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that
they would not relent, dislodged, and marched on with his army
into their territory. The Boeotians with their appointed part,
and with horsemen, aided the Peloponnesians ; but with the rest
of their forces, went and wasted the territory of Plataea.
/ h Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the Isth-
/^mus, and when they were on their march, before they brake
into Attica ; Pericles the son of Xantippus, (who with nine
others was general of the Athenians) wlien he saw they were
about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either of pri-
vate courtesy, or by the command of the Lacedemonians, to
bring him into jealousy (as they had before for his sake com-
manded the excommunication) might oftentimes leave his lands
untouched, told the Athenians before-hand in an assembly,
* that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill
* to the state, and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his
* lands and houses, as well as the rest, that then he gave them
* to the common-wealth.' And therefore desired, * that for
* this he might not be suspected.' Also he advised them con-
cerning the business in hand, the same things he had done be-
fore, * That they should make preparation for the war, and re-
' ceive their goods into the city ; that they should not go out to
' battle, but come into the city, and guard it. That they should
' also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and
* hold a careful hand over their confederates,' telling them, ' hovv
* that in the money that came from these, lay their strength,
' and that the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and
* store of money. Further,' he bad them be confident, ' in
* that there was yearly coming in to the state from the confe-
' derates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents *,
* and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents f of
' silver coin ;' (for the greatest sum there had been, was ten
thousand talents X^ wanting three hundred, out of which was
taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses of
the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of
Potidsa.) ' Besides the uncoined gold and silver of private
' and public offerings \ and all the dedicated vessels belonging
(. to the shews and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and
* Six liuiidred laUnts of oiii- nioiiey, uboiit one liundred tind twelve tliousaad
five liiiiKlrtd pounds.
\ Six tlioiisand talents of our iiioiiey, about one million, one hundred, and
twpnty-five thousand pounds.
\ Nine thousand seven hundred talents, one million, eight hundred, and eighteen
thun^uad seven imndred and fifty pounds sterling.
BOOK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 83
^ other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five
* hundred talents*.' He added further, ' that much money
' mit'ht be had out of other temples without the city, which
* they might use. And if they were barred the use of all these,
* they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess f
* herself; and said that the image had about it the weight of
' forty talents t of most pure gold, and which might all be takea
< off; but having made use of it for their safety,' he said, ' they
' were to make restitution of the like quantity again.' Thus
he encouraged them touching matter of money. ' Men of
* arms,' he said, * they had thirteen thousand, besides the sixteen
* thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and
' upon the walls ;' (for so many at the first kept watch at the
coming in of the enemy, young and old together, and strangers
that dwelt amongst them, as many as could bear arms.) For
the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumfe-
rence of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty-five
furlongs ; and that part of the circumference which was guard-
ed (for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely the part
between the Long Walls and the Phalerian) was forty-three
furlongs ; and the length of the Long Walls down to Piraeus,
(of which there was a watch only on the outmost) was forty
furlongs ; and the whole compass of Piraeus, tog;ether with.
Munychia, was sixty furlongs, (whereof that part that was
watched, was but half.) He said futher, * they had of horse-
* men, accounting archers on horse-back, one thousand two
^ hundred, and one thousand six hundred archers, and of gallics
' fit for the sea three hundred.' All this and no less had the
Athenians when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first
in hand, and when the war began. These and other words
spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they
were likely to out-last this war.
/ ^ When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his
words, and fetched into the city their wives and children, and
the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of
the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over
into Euboea, and into the islands over against them. Never-
theless this removal, in respect they had most of them been
accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.
Jy This custom was from great antiquity, more familiar with
the Athenians than any other of the rest of Greece. For in the
time of Cecrops, and the first kings down to Theseus, the in-
habitants of Attica had their several bourghs§, and therein
Five hundred talents, ninety-three tliousand, sereii hundred, and fifty pounds.
+ Minerva.
X The weight of forty talents in gold, at three pound an ounce, conies to uiue
thousand pounds.
84 THE HISTORY book ii.
their common-halls*, and their governors; and unless they
were in fear of some danger, went not together to the king for
advice, but every city administered their own affairs, and deli-
berated by themselves. And some of them had also their par-
ticular wars, as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus
against Erectheusf. But after Theseus came to the kingdom,
one who besides his wisdom, was also a man of very great
power; he not only set good order in the country in other re-
spects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the
rest of the towns ; and assigning them all one hall, and one
council-house, brought them all to cohabit in the city that now
is, and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use J
this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their
duties to it) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to
posterity. And from that time to this day the Athenians keep
a holiday at the public charge to the goddess §, and call it Sy-
naecia ||. That which is now the citadel, and the part which is
to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An
argument whereof is this, that the temples of the gods are all
set either in the citadel itself; or, if without, yet in that quar-
ter. As that of Jupiter Olympius, and of Apollo Pythius, and
of Tellus, and of Bacchus in Lymnae, (in honour of whom, the
old Bacchanals ^ were celebrated on the twelfth day of the
month of Anthesterion**, according as the lonians, who are
derived from Athens, do still observe them) besides other an-
cient temples situate in the same part. Moreover they served
themselves with water for the best uses, of the fountain, which
now the Nine- Pipes, built so by the tyrants, was formerly, when
the springs were open, called Calliroe, and was near. And
from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites, they
ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel,
from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still
called the city.
The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by
* Xl^uruyiix. Giiild-lialls, jilacos wiiere those that administered the state did
meet : where also some, for honours cause and service, were allowed diet, and
wlierein Vesta was worshipped, and a ligiit continually burned ; so that some
thence derive the name, mukinu^ ^^urantToy quasi v$fioi ra/nTi*.
■[ King^ of the Athenians.
;J; Not that thej' must needs dwell in it ; but make it the seat of the grovcrn-
ment, and |)ay their duties to it. This caused the city to grow both populous
and potent, because now the whole nation united into one city, made use of the
sea, which divided, they could not have done.
^ Minerva.
11 Cohabitation.
^ There were in Athens three Bacchancls, whereof this Bacchus in I.ymnffi
[tliat is in the Marshes] was principal ; another were the rural Bacchanals, and
the third the city Bacchanals.
*• This month fell about our January, and was the second of their winter
quarter.
BOOK II, OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 85
laws of their own in the country towns ; and after they were
brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which
most had, as well of the ancient time, as since, till the Persian
war, to live in the country with their whole families ; and also
especially, for that since the Persian War, they had already re-
paired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It
pressed them likewise, and was heavily taken, besides their
houses, to leave the things that pertained to their religion*,
(which since their old form of government, were become par-
trial,) and to change their manner of life, and to be no better
than banished every man his city. After they came into
Athens, there was habitation for a few, and place of retire, with
some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated them-
selves in the empty places of the city, and in temples, and in
all the chapels of the heroes f, (sa\'ing in such as were in the
citadel, and the Eleusinium :|:, and other places strongly shut
up.) The Pelasgicum § also, under the citadel, though it
were a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end
of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words ;— * Best is the
* Pelasgicon empty ;' was nevertheless for the present necessity
inhabited. And in my opinion this prophecy now fell out con-
trary to what was looked for ; for the unlawful dwelling there,
caused not the calamities that befel the city, but the war
caused the necessity of dwelling tliere : which war the oracle
not naming, foretold only, that it should one day be inhabited
unfortunately. Many also furnished the turrets of the walls, and
whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when
they were come in, the city had not place for them all : but
afterwards they had the Long Walls divided amongst them, and
inhabited there, and in most parts of Piraeus. Withal they
applied themselves to the business of the war, \ev\iog their
confederates, and making readv a hundred gallies to send about
Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.
The army of the Peloponnesians marching fonvard, came first
to Oenoe a town of Attica, the place where they intended to
break in ; and encamping before it, prepared with engines, and
by other means, to assault the wall. For Oenoe Ivin? on the
confines between Attica and Boeotia, was walled 'about, and
the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country,
when at any time there should be war. For which cause they
made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much
time about it otherwise.
• Altars, chapels, houshold-gods.
.1.2 "^f" !"PP«f 'J ^ be gotten between a deity and a morUl, or such as exceed
the rest of lueii by many decrees in magnanimity.
I tleusiBium, a temple in Athens, used with grcnt religion.
^ felasgicnm, a place by the citadel where the Pelas-iaiis ance fortified them
^ THE HISTORY book ii.
Arid Archidamus for this was not a little taxed, as thought
to have been slow in gathering together the forces of the war,
and also to have favoured the Athenians, in that he encouraged
not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likevvise,
his Stay in the Isthmus, and his slowness in the whole journey
was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Oenoe : for
in this time the Athenians retired into the city, whereas it was
thought that the Peloponnesians marching speedily, might
but for his delay, iiave taken them all without : so passionate
was the army of Archidamus, for his stay before Oenoe. But
expecting that the Athenians, wliilst their territory was yet
unhurt, would relent, and not endure to see it wasted, for that
cause (as it is reported) he held his hand. But after, when
l^ey had assaulted Oenoe, and tried all means, but could not
take it, and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them, then
at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that
which happened to the Thebans that entered Plataea, the sum-
mer and corn being now at the highest, they fell into Attica ;
led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacede-
monians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to
wasting of the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the
plain of Thriasia, and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen
at the brooks called Rheiti. After this, leaving the iKgaleon
on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia till they came
unto Acharnas, which is the greatest town in all Attica, of
those that are called Demoi * ; and pitching there, both forti-
fied their camp, and staid a great while wasting the country
thereabout.
Archidamus was said to have staid so long at Acharnas^
with his army in battle array, and not to have come down all
the time of his invasion into the champagne with this inten-
tion : he hoped that the Athenians flourishing in number of
young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were
before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not
endured to see their fields cut down and wasted ; and therefore
seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if
they would come out against him lying now at AcharnaSi
Besides, the place seemed unto him commodious for the army
to lie in ; and it was thought also that the Acharnans being
a great piece of the tity (for they were three thousand men of
arms) would not have suffered the spoiling of their lands, but
rather have urged all the rest to go out and fight. And if they
came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter
more boldly both waste the champagne country, and come
down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnans, after
they should have lost their own,~would not be so forward to
* Horoujjlis.
BOOK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 97
hazard themselves for the goods of other men; but there
would be thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the
city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay
at Acharnas.
The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about
Eleusis and the fields of Thrius, and as long as they had any
hope it would come on no further, (remembering that also
Plistoanax the son of Pausanias king of Lacedemon, when
fourteen years before this war, he entered Attica with an
army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia,
retired again, and came no further ; for which he was also
banished Sparta, as thought to have gone back for money) they
stirred not. But when they saw the army now at Acharnas,
but sixty furlongs from the city, then they thought it no longer
to be endured ; and when their fields were wasted (as it was
likely) in their sight, (which the younger sort had never seen
before, nor the elder but in the Persian war) it was taken for a
horrible matter, and thought fit by all, especially by the youth,
to go out, and not to endure it any longer. And holding coun-
cils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some
to make a sally, and some to hinder it. And the priests of the
oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, every one made the
interpretation according to the sway of his own affection. But
the Acharnans conceiving themselves to be no small part of
the Athenians, were they that whilst their own lands were
wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the
city was every way in tumult, and in choler against Pericles,
remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished
them ; but reviled him, for that being their general he refused
to lead them into the field, and imputing unto him the cause
of all their evil : but Pericles seeing them in passion for their
present loss, and ill advised, and being confident he was in the
right touching not sallying, assembled tl>em not, nor called any
council, for fear lest being together, they might upon passion
rather than judgment commit some error; but looked to the
guarding of the city, and as much as he could, to keep it in quiet.
Nevertiieless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the
scouts of the army from entering upon, and doing hurt to the
fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygii a small
skirmish between one troop of horse of the Athenians (with
whom were also the Thessalians) and the horse-men of the
Boeotians ; wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the
worse, till such time as the Boeotians were aided by the com-
ing in of their men of arms, and then they were put to flight,
and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain ; whose bo-
dies notwithstanding they fetched off the same day, without
leave of the enemy j and the Peloponnesians the next day
88 OF THE GRECIAN WAR, book ii.
erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an
ancient league with the Athenians, and consisted of Larissseans,
Pharsalians, Parasians, Cranonians, Peirasians, Gyrtonians,
Pherteans. The leaders of the Larissaeans were Polymedes and
Aristonus, men of contrary factions in their city. Of the Phar-
salians, Aleno. And of the rest, out of the several cities seve-
ral commanders.
The Peloponnesians seeing the Athenians would not come
out to fight, dislodging from Acharnas, wasted certain other
villages between the hills Parnethus and Brelissus.
Whilst these were in Attica the Athenians sent the one hun-
dred gallies which they had provided, and in them a thousand
men of arms, and four hundred archers about Peloponnesus,
the commanders whereof were Charcinus the sonof Xenotimus,
Proteus the son of Epicles, and Socrates the son of Antigenes,
who thus furnished, weighed anchor, and went their way.
The Peloponnesians, when they had staid in Attica as long
as their provision lasted, went home through Boeotia, not the
way they came in ; but passing by Oropus, wasted the country
called Peiraice, which is of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects
to the people of Athens ; and when they were come back into
Peloponnesus, they disbanded, and went every man to his own
city.
When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both
by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the
war. And made a decree to take out a thousand talents of the
money in the citadel, and set it by, so as it might not be spent,
but the ckarges of the war be borne out of other monies ; and
made it capital for any man to move, or give his vote for the
stirring of this money for any other use, but only (if the enemy
should come with an army by sea to invade the city) for neces-
sity of that defence. Together with this money, they likewise
set apart one hundred gallies, and those to be every year the
best ; and captains to be appointed over them, which were to
be employed for no other use than the money was, and for
the same danger, if need should require.
The Athenians that were with the one hundred gallies about
Peloponnesus, and with them the Corcyraeans with the aid of
fifty sail more, and certain others of the confederates there-
about, amongst other places which they infested in their course,
landed at Methone, a town of Laconia, and assaulted it, as be-
ing but weak and few men within. But it chanced that Brasidas
the son of Tellis a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts, and
hearing of it, succoured those of the town with one hundred
men of arms; wherewith running through the Athenian ar-
my, dispersed in the fields directly towards the town, he put
himself into Methone ; and with the loss of few of his men in
BOOK II, OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 89
the passage, he saved the place, and for this adventure, was the
first that was praised at Sparta in this war. The Athenians put-
ing off from thence, sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia
of Elis, where they spent two days in wasting the country, and
in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the lower
Elis, together with other Eleans thereabouts that came forth to
defend it. But the wind arising, and their gallies being tossed by
the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked,
and sailed about the promontory called Icthys, into the haven
of Pheia. But the Messenians and certain others that could not
get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it :
and when they had done, the gallies that now were come about
took tliem in, and leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again : by
w liich time a great army of Eleans was come to succour it, but
the Athenians were now gone away, and wasting some other
territory.
About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty gal-
lies about Locris *, which were to serve also for a watch about
Euboea. Of these Cleopompus the son of Clinias had the con-
duct, and, landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some
places of the sea coast, and won the town of Thronium, of
which he took the hostages ; and overcame in fight at Alope
the Locrians that came out to aid it.
The same summer the Athenians put the iEginetae, man,
woman, and child out of iEgina, laying to their charge, that
they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was
also thought the safer course to hold JEgina, being adjacent to
Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long
after they sent inhabitants into the same. When the ^-Eginetae
were thus banished, the Lacedemonians gave them Thyraea to
dwell in, and the occupation of the lands belonging unto it to
live on ; both upon hatred to the Athenians, and for the bene-
fits received at the hands of the ^-Eginetae in the time of the
earthquake and insurrection of their Helots. Tiiis territory of
ThvTtea is in the border between Argolica and Laconica, and
reacheth to the sea side. So some of them were placed there,
and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece.
Also the same summer, on the first day * of the month, ac-
cording to the moon, (at which time it seems only possible) in
the afternoon, happened an eclipse of the sun ; which after it
had appeared in the form as a crescent, and withal some stars had
been discerned, came afterwards again to the former brightness.
The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus the
• That Locris whose chief city is Opus, not that where the Locri Ozols dwelt.
■f- Stuftnim xsrot rtXtunt. The first day of the month, according- to the moon ;
in distinction of the month civil ; for their year was lunar, yet was it so exact, as
that the uioon chaiiijcd often on the first dav.
90 THE HISTORY book h.
son of Pythos of the city of Abdera, (whose sister was married
to Sitalces, and that was of great power with him) their host *,
though before they took him for an enemy and sent for him to
Athens, hoping by this means to bring Sitalces the son of Te-
res king of Thrace into their league. This Teres, the father of
Sitalces, was the first that advanced tlie kingdom of the Odry-
sians above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of
Thrace consisteth of free states ; and Tereus f that took td
wife (out of Athens) Procne the daughter of Pandion was no
kin to this Teres, nor of the same part of Thrace. But that
Tereus was of the city of Daulia, in the country now called
Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. (And the fact of the
women concerning Itys was done there; and by the poets,
where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called
Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his
daughter witii this man for vicinity and mutual succour, than
with the other, that was so many days journey otf, as to Odry-
S£B.) And Teres, which is also another name, was the first that
seized on the kingdom of Odrysee. Now Sitalces, this man's
son, the Athenians got into their league, that they might have
the towns lying on Thrace, and Perdiccas X to be of their par-
ty. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league
between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus the son of Si-
talces to be made free of Athens, and also undertook to end the
war in Thrace §. For he would persuade Sitalces to send unto
the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targettiers. He
likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured
of him the restitution of Therme. And Perdiccas presently
aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chal-
cideans. Thus Were Sitalces the son of Teres kind of Thrace,
and Perdiccas the son of -Alexander king of Macedonia, made
confederates with the Athenians.
The Athenians being yet with their hundred gallies about
Peloponnesius, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Co-
rinthians, and put the Palirenses only of all the Acarnanians,
into the possession both of the town and territory : having
also by force taken Astacus from the tyrant Euarchus, they
drove him thence, and joined the place to their league : from
thence they sailed to Cephalonia, and subdued it without battle.
This Cephalonia is an island lying over against Acarnania and
Leucas, and hath in it these four cities, the Pallenses, Craniij
Samei, and Prontei. And not long after returned with the fleet
to Athens.
• That is the man at whose liousc, niul by vvlunii any public prrsoii was to be
eiitprlaiiiPfl that came from Athens to Abdera.
t Set- llie fable df Tereus and i'rdgiic in Ovid's Metani.
t King- of Miicedon.
^ 'i he war iiboiit I'lilidn,;!.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 91
About the end of the autumn of this summer, the Athenians,
both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them,
with the whole power of the city, under the conduct of Pericles
the son of Xantippus, in\-aded the territory of Megara. And
those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred gallies
about Peloponnesus, in their return (being now at .Egina) hear-
ing that the whole power of the city was gone into Megaris *,
went and joined with them. And this was the greatest army
that ever the Athenians had together in one place before ; the
city being now in strength, and the plague not yet amongst
them ; for the Athenians of themselves were no less than ten
thousand men of arms, (besides the three thousand at Potidea)
and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, and accompanied
them in this invasion, were no fewer than three thousand men
of arms more, besides other great numbers of light-armed sol-
diers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the
country, they went back to Athens. And after\^'ards, year after
year, during this war, the Athenians often invaded Megaris,
sometimes with their horsemen, and sometimes with their
whole array, until such time as they had won Nisaea f.
Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalante, an
island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then, for a
garrison against thieves, vvhich passing over from Opus, and
other parts of Locris, might annoy Euboea. These were the
things done this summer, after the retreat of the Peloponne-
sians out of Attica.
The winter following, Euarchus of Acamania, desirous to re-
turn to Astacus, prevaileth with the Corinthians to go thither
with forty gallies, and one thousand five hundred men of arms
to re-establish him ; to which he hired also certain other mer-
cenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army
were Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus, Timoxenes the son
of Timocrates, and Eumachus the son of Chrysis. When they
had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party
some other places on the sea coast of Acamania, but missing
their purpose, they set sail homeward. As they passed by the
coast of Cephalonia, they disbarked in the territory of the Cra-
nii, where, under colour of composition, they were deceived,
and lost some part of their forces. For the assault made upon
them by the Cranii, being unexpected, they got off with much
ado, and went home.
The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient
custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war,
in this manner : having set up a tent, they put into it the
* The territory of Megara.
+ The ursuaal of Mr^ara.
92 THE HISTORY
BOOK 11,
bones * of the dead, three days before the funeral, and every one
bringeth f whatsoever he thinks good to his own %. When
the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress
coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which
are the bones of the men of every tribe by themselves. There
is likewise born an empty hearse covered over, for such as ap-
pear not, nor were found amongst the rest when they were taken
up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citi-
zen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at
the burial, lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into
a public monument, which standeth in the fairest suburbs § of
the city (in which place they have ever interred all that died in
the wars, except those that were slain in the fields of Marathon;
who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were there-
fore buried there-right) and when the earth is thrown over them,
some one, thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity,
chosen by the city, maketh an oration, wherein he giveth them
such praises as are fit ; which done, the company depart. And
this is the form of that burial ; and for the whole time of the
war II, whensoever there was occasion, they observed the same.
For these first, the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles
the son of Xantippus, who when the time served, going out of
the place of burial into a high pulpit, to be heard the farther
oflFby the multitude about him, spake unto them in this man-
ner :
The Funeral Oration made hy Pericles.
* Though most that have spoken formerly in this place have
' commended the man that added this oration to the law, as
* honorable for tliose that die in the wars ; yet to me it seemetii
* sufficient, that they who have shewed their valour by action,
* should also by an action have their honour, as now you see
' they have, in this their sepulture performed by the state ; and
< not to have the virtue of many hazarded on one, to be be-
* lieved as that one shall make a good or bad oration. For, to
* speak of men in a just measure, is a hard matter; and though
' one do so, yet he shall hardly get the truth firmly believed.
* The favourable hearer, and he that knows what was done, will
^ perhaps think what is spoken, short of what he would have it,
' and what it wks ; and he that is ignorant will find somewhat
• The ciislom w.is wlien a w»h died fo l>uni liirn, and llie buiial afler was only
of lii.-i hiiiHS, or (the powdcj- of thciii) his aslics.
\ Offfiring's, incense, and rites of burial.
\ To his own friends slain.
kj The Cerainicuin.
II By (he first slain in the war, is understood either the first every year in the
same war; or else the several actions of this fjreut war are counted as several
wars, and so the first slain in any of ihcni had the hoiiuiir of this biiria).
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 93
' on the other side, whicli he will think too much extolled ;
' especially if he hear ought above the pitch of his own nature.
' For to hear another man praised, finds patience so long only
' as each man shall think he could himself have done somewhat
* of that he hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer
' presently through envy thinks it false. But since our an-
* cestors have so thought good, I also, following the same ordi-
' nance, must endeavour to be answerable to the desires and
' opinions of every one of you, as far forth as I can. I will be-
* gin at our ancestors, being a thing both just and honest, that
' to them first be given the honour of remembrance in this
* kind : for ihey, having been always the inhabitants of this re-
* gion, by their valour have delivered the same to succession of
* posterity hitherto, in the state of liberty, for which they de-
* serve commendation : but our fathers desen'e yet more, for
* that besides what descended on them, not without great labour
* of their own, they have purchased this our present dominion,
* and delivered the same over to us that now are. Which in a
* great part also, we ourselves that are'yet in the strength of our
' age here present, have enlarged ; and so furnished the city
' with every thing, both for peace and war, as it is now all-suf-
' ficient in itself. The actions of war, whereby all this was
* attained, and the deeds of arms, both of ourselves and our fa-
' thers, in valiant opposition to the Barbarians, or Grecians, in
' their wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted
'with the sum, to avoid prolixity, I will pass over. But by
* what institutions we arrived at this, by what form of govem-
' ment, and by what means we have advanced the state to this
* greatness, when I shall have laid open this, I will then descend
' to these men's praises. For I think they are things both fit for
' the purpose in hand, and profitable to the whole company, both
* of citizens and strangers, to hear related. We have a form of go-
' vernment, not fetched by imitation of the laws of our neighbour-
* ing states, (nay, we are rather a pattern to others than they
* to us) which, because in the administration, it hath respect,
* not to a few, but to the multitude, is called a democracy.
' Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all men in
* point of law for their private controversies, yet in conferring
* of dignities one man is preferred before another to public
'charge; and that according to the reputation, not of his
' house *, but of his virtue, and is not put back through poverty,
' for the obscurity of his person, as long as he can do good ser-
' vice to the common- wealth. And we live not only free in
' the administration of the state, but also one with another,
* Mtjaj, a part. But here he means a part or family in the common-wealth j
carping; secretly at the Lacedemonians, that had none come to the supreme office,
but the Heracleides.
94 ' THE HISTORY book u.
' void of jealousy, touching each others daily course of life; not
* offended at any man for following his own humour, nor cast-
* ing on any man censorious looks *, which though they he no
* punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one with
* another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in
* fear to transgress against the public, and are obedient always
* to those that govern, and to the laws, and principally to such
* laws as are written for protection against injury, and such un-
* written, as bring undeniable shame to the transgressors. We
* have also found out many ways to yive our minds recreation
* from labour, by public institution of games and sacrifices for
* all the days of the year, with a decent pomp and furniture of
* the same by private men ; by the daily delight whereof, we
* expel sadness. We have this further, by the greatness of our
* city, that all things, from all parts of the earth are imported
* hither ; whereby we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities
* of all other nations than our own. Then in the studies of
* war, we excel our enemies in this ; we leave our city open to
* all men, nor was it ever seen, that by banishing of strangers f,
' we denied them the learning or siglit of any of those things,
' which if not hidden, an enemy might reap advantage by,
* not relying on secret preparation and deceit, but upon our
* own courage in the action. They in their discipline hunt
* after valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise,
* and yet we that live remissly undertake as great dangers as
* they. For example, the Lacedemonians invade not our do-
* minion by themselves alone, but with the aid of all the rest.
* But when we invade our neighbours, though we fight in hos-
* tile ground, against such as in their own ground fight in de-
' fence of their own substance, yet for the most part we get the
* victory. Never enemy yet fell into the hands of our whole
* forces at once, both because we apply ourselves much to na-
* vigation, and by land also send many of our men into divers
* countries abroad. But when fighting with a part of it, they
* chance to get the better, they boast they have beaten the
' whole ; and when they get the worse, they are beaten by the
* whole. And yet when from ease, rather than studious labour,
^ and upon natural rather than doctrinal valour, we come to
* undertake any danger, we have this odds by it, that we shall
* not faint before- hand with the meditation of future trouble,
* and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they
* that are ever toiling, procuring admiration to our city, as well
• Ho g-lanceth agti'in at the Lacedemonians, because tlioy ever looked sourly on
loft and loojte belmviour.
f This is spoken with envy tov^ards the Laccdeinonians, that prohibited stran-
gei» to dwell aniong-st^theui.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 95
in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves
to bravery, and yet with thrift ; and to philosophy, and yet
without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather
for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation : and
hold it not a shame to confess poverty, but not to have
avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men a care, both
of tlieir own, and of the public affairs, and a sufficient know-
ledge* of state- matters, even in those that labour with their
hands. For we only think one that is utterly ignorant therein,
to be a man not that meddles with nothing, but that is good
for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake, and ap-
prehend it perfectly in our minds ; not accounting words for
a hindrance of action, but that it is rather a hindrance to ac-
tion, to come to it without instruction of words before. For
also in this we excel others ; daring to undertake as much as
any, and yet examining what we undertake ; whereas with
other men, ignorance makes them dare, and consideration
dastards ; and they are most rightly reputed valiant, who
though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous, and
what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adven-
turing. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of
bounty ; for we purchase our friends, not by receiving, but
by bestowing benefits. And he that bestoweth a good turn,
is ever the most constant friend, because he will not lose the
thanks due unto him, from him whom he bestowed it on.
Whereas the friendship of him that oweth a benefit is dull
and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour,
but for a debt : so that we only do good to others, not upon
computation of profit, but freeness of trust. In sum, it may
be said, both that the city is in general a school of the Gre-
cians, and that the men here have every one in particular his
person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with
grace and decency. And that this is not now rather a bravery
of words upon the occasion, than real truth, this power of the
city, which by these institutions we have obtained, maketh
evident. For it is the only power now, found greater in proof
than fame ; and the only power that neither grieveth the in-
vader when he miscarries with the quality of those he was
hurt by, nor givetii cause to the subjected states to murmur,
as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with
present and future ages we shall be in admiration for a
power, not without testimony, but made evident by great
arguments, and which needeth not either a Homer to praise,
or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present
• In Athens no man so poor but was a statesman. So St. Luke, Acts xrii. 21.
• All the Athenians spend their time in nothing^ but hearinj and teliiD|^ of news.'
The true character of politicians without employment.
9fi THE HISTORY
BOOK n.
' bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opi-
' nion conceived of the actions. For we have opened unto us
' by our courage, all seas and lands, and set up eternal monu-
* ments on all sides, both of the evil we have done to our ene-
* mies, and the good we have done to our friends. Such is
* the city for which these men (thinking it no reason to lose
' it) valiantly fighting, have died. And it is fit that every
' man of you that be left, should be like-minded, to undergo
* any travel for the same. And I have therefore spoken so
' much concerning the city in general, as well to shew you
* that the stakes between us and them, whose city is not such^
^ are not equal ; as also to make known by effects the worth of
* these men I am to speak of, the greatest part of their praises
* being therein already delivered. For what I have spoken of
' the city, hath by these and such as these been achieved : nei-
* ther would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent
' in many other of the Grecians, as they do in these ; the
* present revolution of these men's lives seeming unto me an
* argument of their virtues, noted in the first act thereof, and
' in the last confirmed. For even such of them as were worse
* than the rest, do nevertheless deserve that for their valour
* shewn in the wars for defence of their country, they should
* be preferred before the rest. For having by their good ac-
' tions abolished the memory of their evil, they have profited
* the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their private
' behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the
* further fruition of his wealth, was thereby grown cowardly,
' or that for hope to overcome his poverty at length, and to at-
* tain to riches, did for that cause withdraw himself from the
' danger. For their principal desire was not wealth, but re-
* venge on their enemies, which esteeming the most honour-
' able cause of danger, they made account through it both to
* accomplish their revenge, and to purchase wealth withal ;
' putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their
* hope; but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon
* themselves in the action ; and therein choosing rather to
* fight and die, than to shrink and be saved. They fled from
' shame, but with their bodies they stood out the battle; and
' so in a moment, whilst fortune inclineth neither way, left
* lives not in fear, but in opinion of victory. Such were these
' men, worthy of their country ; and for you that remain, you
' may pray for a safer fortune ; but you ought not to be less
* venturously minded against the enemy ; not weighing the
* profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may re-
* count, to you that know as well as he, the many commodities
* that arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies, but con-
* templating the power of the city in the actions of the same
BOOK u. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 97
from day to day performed, and thereby becoming enamoured
of it. And when this power of the city shall seem great to
you, consider then that the same was purchased by valiant
men, and by men that knew their duty, and by men that
were sensible of dishonour when they were in fight ; and by
such men, as though they failed of their attempt, yet would
not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made unto
it a most honourable contribution. For having every one gi-
ven his body to the common-wealth, they receive in place
thereof an undecaying commendation, and a most remarkable
sepulchre, not wherein they are buried so mucli, as wherein
their glory is laid up upon all occasions, both of speech and
action, to be remembered for ever. For to famous men, all
the earth is a sepulchre ; and their virtues shall be testified,
not only by the inscription in stone at home, but by an un-
written record of the mind, which more than of any monu-
ment, will remain with every one for ever. In imitation
therefore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and
liberty in valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war.
For the miserable and desperate men, are not they that have
the most reason to be prodigal of their lives ; but rather
such men, as if they live, may expect a change of fortune,
and whose losses are greatest if they miscarry in ought. For
to a man of any spirit, death, wiiich is without sense, ar-
riving whilst he is in vigour, and common hope, is nothing
so bitter, as after a tender life to be brought into misery.
Wherefore 1 will not so much bewail as comfort you the pa-
rents that are present of these men. For you know that
whilst they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calami-
ties, whereas whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that
die honourably, as these have done ; and to whom it hath
been granted, not only to live in prosperity, but to die in it.
Though it be a hard matter to dissuade you from sorrow for
the loss of that, which the happiness * of others, wherein you
also when time was rejoiced yourselves, shall so often bring
into your remembrance (for sorrow is not for the want of
a gooid never tasted, but for the privation of a good we have
been used to) yet such of you as are of the age to have chil-
dren, may bear the loss of these, in the hope of more. For
the latter children will both draw on with some the oblivion
of those that are slain, and also doubly conduce to the good
of the city, by population and strength. For it is not likely
that they should equally give good counsel to the state, that
have not children to be equally exposed to danger in it. As
for you that are past having of children, you are to put the
• CLildreu.
H
98 THE HISTORY book n,
former and greater part of your life, to the account of your
gain, and supposing the remainder of it will be but short, you
shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same.
For the love of honour never groweth old, nor doth that un-
profitable part of our life take delight (as some have said)
in gathering of w^ealth, so much as it doth in being honoured.
As for you that are the children or brethren of these men, I
see you shall have a difficult task of emulation. For every
every man useth to praise the dead, so that v^'ith odds of vir-
tue, you will hardly get an equal reputation, but still be
thought a little short. For men envy their competitors in
glory, while they live, but to stand out of their way, is a thing
honoured with an affection free from opposition. And since
1 must say somewhat also of feminine virtue, for you that are
now widows : I shall express it all in this short admonition. It
will be much for your honour, not to recede from your sex,
and to give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men,
whether of good or evil, as ye can. Thus also have I, ac-
cording to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was
expedient ; and those that are here interred, have in fact been
already honoured ; and further, their children shall be main-
tained till they be at man's estate, at the charge of the city,
which hath therein propounded both to these, and them that
live, a profitable garland in their matches of valour. For
where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the wor-
thiest men. So now having lamented every one his own,
you may be gone.'
Such was the funeral made this winter, which ending, ended
the first year of the war.
YEAR II.
In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and
their confederates, with two thirds of their forces as before, in-
vaded Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus the son of
Zeuxidamus king of Lacedemon, and after they had encamped
themselves, wasted the country about them.
They had not been many days in Attica when the plague
first began among the Athenians, said also to have seized for-
merly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos, and elsewhere ;
but so great a plague and mortality of men was never remem-
bered to have happened in any place before. For at first, nei-
ther were the physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of
what it was, but died fastest themselves, as being tlie men that
most approached the sick, nor any other art of man availed
whatsoever. All supplications to the gods, and enquiries of
oracles, and whatsoever other means they used of that kind,
proved all unprofitable, insomuch as subdued with the greatness
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 99
of the evil, they gave them all over. It began (by report) first,
in that part of .Ethiopia that lieth upon ALgypt, and thence
fell down into -Egypt, and Afric, and into the greatest part of
the territories of the king*. It invaded Athens on a sudden,
and touched first upon those that dwelt in Piraeus ; insomuch
as they reported the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their
wells, for springs there were not any in that place. But after-
wards it came up into the high city, and then they died a great
deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concern-
ing the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what
causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak
according to his own knowledge ; for my own part, I will de-
liver but the manner of it, and lay open only such things as
one may take his mark by, to discover the same if it come
again, having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick
of the same. This year, by confession of all men, was of all
other for other diseases most free and healthful. If any man
were sick before, his disease turned to this ; if not, yet sud-
denly, without any apparent cause preceding, and being in per-
fect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache in their
heads, redness and inflamation of the eyes ; and then inwardly
their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their
breath noisome and unsavory. Upon this followed sneezing
and hoarseness, and not long after, the pain, together with a
mighty cough came down into the breast : and when once it
was settled in the stomach f, it caused vomit, and with great
torment came up all manner of bilious purgation, that phy-
sicians ever named. Most of them had all the hickeyexe,
which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased
quickly, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bo-
dies outwardly to the touch were neither very hot nor pale, but
reddish livid, and beflowered with little pimples and whelks ;
but so burned inwardly, as not to endure the lightest cloths or
linen garment to be upon them, nor any thing but mere na-
kedness; but rather most willingly to have cast themselves
into the cold water. And many of them that were not looked
to, possessed with insatiate thirst, run unto the wells, and to
drink much or little was indifferent, being still from ease, and
power to sleep, as far as ever. As long as the disease was at
the height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment
beyond all expectation, insomuch, as the most of them either
died of their Inward burning, in nine or seven days, whilst they
had yet strength, or if they had escaped that, then the disease
falling down into their bellies, and causing there great exulce^
• Of Persia.
f K«(3i«, here laken for iLe stomach .
100 THE HISTORY book ii.
rations and Immoderate looseness, they died many of them af-
terwards tlirough weakness. For the disease (which took first
the head) began above and came down, and passed through the
whole body; and he that overcame the worst of it was yet
marked witli the loss of his extreme parts j for breaking out
both at their privy-members, and at their fingers and toes,
many with the loss of these escaped. There were also some
that lost their eyes, and many that presently upon their reco-
very, were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever,
as they neither knew themselves, nor their acquaintance. For
this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expres-
sion of words, and both exceeded human nature, in the cruelty
wherewith it handled each one, and appeared also otherwise to
be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that
especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that use to
feed on human flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied,
either came not at them, or tasting perished. An argument
whereof as touching the birds, is the manifest defect of such
fowl, which were not then seen, neither about the carcasses, or
any where else : but by the dogs, because they are familiar with
men, this effect was seen much clearer. So that this disease
(to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that
some had differently from others) was in general such as I have
shewn, and for other usual sicknesses, at that time no man was
troubled with any. Now they died some for want of atten-
dance, and some again with all the care and physic that could
be used. Nor was there any to say certain medicine, that ap-
plied must have helped them ; for if it did good to one, it did
harm to another ; nor any difference of body, for strength or
weakness, that was able to resist it ; but it carried all away,
what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery
of all was, the dejection of mind, in such as found them-
selves beginning to be sick (for they grew presently des-
perate, and gave themselves over without making any resis-
tance) as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mu-
tual visitation, for the greatest mortality proceeded that way.
For if men forbore to visit them, for fear; then they died for-
lorn, whereby many families became empty, for want of such
as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they
died themselves, and principally the honestest men. For out
of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto
their friends, especially after it was come to this pass, that even
their domestics wearied with the lamentations of them that
died, and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no
longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered, had
much compassion both on them that died, and on them that
lay sick, as having both known the misery themselves, and now
BOOK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 101
no more subject to the danger. For this disease never took
any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men
were both by others counted happy, and they also themselves,
through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope
never to die of any other sickness hereafter. Besides the pre-
sent affliction, the reception of the country people and of their
substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more
the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses,
but dwelling at that time of the year in stifling booths, the
mortality was now without all form ; and dpng men lay tum-
bling one upon another in the streets, and men half dead about
every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where
they dwelt in tents, were all full of the dead that died within
them ; for oppressed with violence of the calamity, and not
knowing what to do, men grew careless both of holy and pro-
fane things alike. And the laws which they formerly used
touching funerals, were all now broken ; every one burying
where he could find room. And many for want of things ne-
cessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become im-
pudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made
a funeral pile *, another getting before him, would throw on his
dead and give it fire. And when one was burning, another
would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go
his way again. And the great licentiousness, which also in
other kinds was used in the city, began at first from this disease.
For that which a man before would dissemble, and not ac-
knowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely,
seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying,
and men worth nothing inheriting their estates; insomuch
as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods even for
their pleasure, as men that thought they held their lives but
by the day. As for pains, no man was forward in any action of
honour to take any, because they thought it uncertain whether
they should die or not, before they achieved it. But what any
man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure, that
was made both profitable and honourable. Neither the fear of
the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man. Not the former,
because, they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship,
from seeing that alike they all perished : nor the latter, because
no man expected his fife would last, till he received punishment
of his crimes by judgment. But they thought there was now
over their heads, some far greater judgment decreed against
them ; before which fell they thought to enjoy some little part
of their lives. Such was the misery into which the Athenians
being fallen, were much oppressed j having not only their men
* A pile of wood, wliich wheo they laid the corps on it, they fired, and mf-
terwards buried tlie buucs.
102 THE HISTORY
BOOK II.
killed by the disease within, but the enemy also laying waste
their fields and villages without. In this sickness also, (as it
was not unlikely they would) they called to mind this verse,
said also of the elder sort to have been uttered of old :
A Dorick war shall fall,
And a great plague* withal.
Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it
was not Ao<ju.oj, (i. e. the Plague) that was by the ancients men-
tioned in that verse, but A«jaoc, (i. e. Famine.) But upon the
present occasion the word Aoi[/,og deservedly obtained. For as
men suffered, so they made the verse to say. And I think, if
after this, there shall ever come another Dorick war, and with
it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There
was also reported by such as knew, a certain answer given by
the oracle to the Lacedemonians, when they enquired whether
they should make this war, or not, * that if they warred with
' all their power, they should have the victory, and that the
* god t himself would take their parts :' and thereupon they
thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy.
The' Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, but the
sickness presently began, and never came into Peloponnesus, to
speak of, but reigned principally in Athens, and in such other
places afterwards as were most populous. And thus much of
this disease.
After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champagne country,
they fell upon the territory called Paralos J, as far as to the
mountain Laurius, where the Athenians had silver mines, and
first wasted that part of it which looketh towards Peloponnesus,
and then that also which lieth toward Andros and Euboea : and
Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind
he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not
to go out against them to battle.
Whilst they were yet in the plain, and before they entered
into the maritime country, he furnished an hundred gallies to
go about Peloponnesus, and as soon as they were ready, put to
sea. In these gallies he had four thousand men of arms, and
in vessels, then purposely first made to carry horses, three hun-
dred horsenicn. i he Chians and Lesbians joined likewise with
him with fifty gallies. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set
fort)-., left the Peloponnesians still in Paralia, and coming be-
fore Epidaurus a city of Peloponnesus, they wasted much of
the country thereabout, and assaultiniij the city, had hope to
take it, though it succeeded not. Leaving Epidaurus, they
• Aiifii;.
f A|>olli>, to whom the licatlirns attributed the iinmissioii of all epidemic or
ordinary diiieascs.
I IJy llif sea coast.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 10
wasted the territories about, of Traezene, Halias, and Hermione,
places all on the sea coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from
hence they came to Prasiae, a small maritime city of Laconica,
and both wasted the territory about it, and took and razed the
town itself: and having done tliis, came home and found the
Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.
All tiie while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the
Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sick-
ness both in the army and city, destroyed many, insomuch as
it was said, that the Peloponnesians fearing the sickness (which
they knew to be in the city, both by the fugitives, and by see-
ing the Athenians burying their dead) went the sooner away
out of the country. And yet they staid there longer in this in-
vasion, than they had done any time before, and wasted even
the whole territory : for they continued in Attica, almost forty
days.
The same summer Agnon the son of Nicias, and Cleopom-
pus the son of Clinias, who were joint commanders with Pericles,
with the army which he had employed before, went presently
and made war upon the Chalcideans of Thrace, and against
PotidcP.a, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently ap-
plied engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but nei-
ther the taking of the city, nor any thing else succeeded worthy
so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them,
afliicted them mightily indeed, and even devoured the army.
And the Athenian soldiers which were there before, and in
health, catched the sickness from those that came with Agnon.
As for Phormio and his one thousand six hundred, they were
not now amongst the Chalcideans ; and Agnon therefore came
back with his fleet, having of four thousand men in less than
forty days, lost one thousand and fifty of tlie plague. But the
soldiers that were there before, staid upon the place, and conti-
nued the siege of Potidaea.
After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athe-
nians (having their fields now the second time wasted, and both
the sickness and war faUing upon them at once) changed their
minds, and accused Pericles, as if by his means they had been
brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to com-
pound with the Lacedemonians, to whom also they sent cer-
tain ambassadors, but they returned without effect. And being
then at their wits end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he-
seeing tliem vexed with their present calamity, and doing all
those things which he had before expected, called an assembly
(for he was yet general) with intention to put them again into
heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a
more calm and less dismayed temper ; and standing forth he
spake unto them in thb manner.
104 THE HISTORY book ii.
The Oration of Pericles.
* Your anger towards me, cometh not unlooked for^ (for the
* causes of it I know) and I have called this assembly therefore,
* to remember you, and reprehend you for those things wherein
' you have either been angry with me, or given way to your ad-
* versity, without reason, for I am of this opinion, that the pub-
* lie prosperity of the city, is better for private men, than if the
' private men themselves were in prosperity, and the public
* wealth in decay. For a private man, though in good estate, if
* his country come to ruin, must of necessity be ruined with it;
' whereas he that miscarrieth in a flourishing common -wealth,
* shall much more easily be preserved. Since then the com-
' mon-wealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and
* every one cannot support the calamities of the common-wealth,
* why should not every one strive to defend it ? and not (as you
* now, astonished with domestic misfortune) forsake the com-
' mon safety, and fall a censuring both me that counselled the
* war, and yourselves that decreed the same as well as I.
' And it is 1 you are angry withal, one, as I think myself in-
* ferior to none, either in knowing what is requisite, or
* in expressing what I know, and a lover of my country,
' and superior to money. For he that hath good thoughts,
' and cannot clearly express them, were as good to have
* thought nothing at all. He that can do both, and is ill
' affected to his country, will likewise not give it faithful coun-
' sel. And he that will do that too, yet if he be superable by
' money, will for that alone set all the rest to sale. Now if you
' followed my advice in making this war, as esteeming these vir-
* tues to be in me, somewhat above the rest, there is sure no
' reason I should how be accused of doing you wrong. For
* though to such as have it in their own election (being other-
' wise in good estate) it were madness to make choice of war;
' yet when we must of necessity, either give way, and so with-
' out more ado be subject to our neighbours, or else save our-
* selves from it by danger, he is more to be condemned that
* declineth the danger, than he that standeth to it. For mine
' own part, I am the man I was, and of the mind I was, but
' you are changed, won to tiie war, when you were entire, but
' repenting it upon the damage, and condemning my counsel, in
* the counsel, in the weakness of your own judgment. The rea-
< son of this is, because you feel already every one in par-
* ticular, that which afflicts you, but the evidence of the profit
* to accrew to the city in general, you see not yet. And your
' minds dejected with the great and sudden alteration, cannot
* constantly maintain what you have before resolved. For that
' which is sudden and unexpected, and coatrary to what one
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 105
' hath deliberated, enslaveth the spirit ; which by this disease
* principally, in the neck of the other incooDmodities, is now
' come to pass in you. But you that are born in a great city,
* and with education suitable ; how great soever the affliction
' be, ought not to shrink at it, and eclipse your reputation
* (for men do no less condemn those that through cowardice
' lose the glory they have, than hate those that through impu-
' dence, arrogate glory they have not) but to set aside the
' grief of your private losses, and lay your hands to the common
' safety. As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be
* long, and we in the end never the nearer to the victon.',
' though that may suffice which I have demonstrated at other
' times, touching your causeless suspicion that way ; yet this
' I will tell you moreover, touching the greatness of your means
* for dominion which neither you yourselves seem to have ever
* thought on, nor I touched in my former orations, nor would I
* also have spoken it now, but that I see your minds dejected
* more than there is cause for. That though you take your
' dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that
* of the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and
* the sea, you are of the one of them, entire masters, both of
* as much of it as you make use of, and also of as much more
* as you shall think fit yourselves. Neither is there any king or
* nation whatsoever, of those that now are, that can impeach
' your navigation, with the fleet and strength you now go. So
' that you must not put the use of houses and lands (wherein
* you now think yourselves deprived of a mighty matter) into
* the balance with such a power as this, nor take the loss of
* these things heavily in respect of it ; but rather set little by
* them, as but a little ornament and embellishment of wealth,
* and think that our liberty, as long as we hold fast that, will
* easily recover unto us these things again ; whereas subjected
* once to others, even that which we possess besides will be di-
< minished. Siiew not yourselves both ways inferior to your
' ancestors, who not only held this (gotten by their own la-
^ hours, not left them) but have also preserved and delivered the
* same unto us, (for it is more dishonour to lose what one pos-
* sesseth, than to miscarry in the acquisition of it) and encoun-
* ter the enemy not only with magnanimity, but also with dis-
* dain : for a coward may have a high mind upon a prosperous
* ignorance, but he that is confident upon judgment to be su-
* perior to his enemy, doth also disdain him, which is now our
* case. And courage (in equal fortune) is the safer for our dis-
* dain of the enemy, where a man knows what he doth. For
* he trusteth less to hope, which is of force only in uncertain -
* ties, and more to judgment upon certainties, wherein there is
* a more sure foresight. You have reason besides to maintain
106 THE HISTORY book u.
the dignity the city hath gotten for her dominion, (in which
you all triumph) and either not decline the pains, or not also
pursue the honour. And you must not think the question is
now of your liberty and servitude only ; besides the loss of
your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have
contracted, by offence given in the administration of it. Nor
can you now give it over (if any, fearing at this present that
that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention
of not to meddle hereafter) for already your government is in
the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up,
and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could
persuade others to it, or lived in a free city by themselves,
would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be
preserved, if it be not ranged with the active life ; nor is it a
life conducible to a city that reigneth, but to a subject city,
that it may safely serve. Be not therefore seduced by this
sort of men, nor angry with me, together with whom your-
selves did decree this war, because the enemy invading you
hath done what was likely he would, if you obeyed him not.
And as for the sickness (the only thing that exceeded the im-
agination of all men) it was unlooked for, and I know you
hate me somewhat the more for that, but unjustly, unless
when any thing falleth out above your expectation fortunate,
you will also dedicate unto me that. Evils that come from
heaven you must bear necessarily, and such as proceed from
your enemies, valiantly; for so it hath been the custom of
this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your
part to reverse : knowing that tliis city hatli a great name
amongst all people, for not yielding to adversity, and for
the mighty power it yet hath, after the expence of so many
lives, and so much labour in the war ; the memory whereof,
though we should now at length miscarry (for all things are
made with this law, to decay again) will remain with poste-
rity for ever. How that being Grecians, most of the Gre-
cians were our subjects 5 that we have abidden the greatest
wars against them, both universally and singly, and have in-
habited the greatest and wealthiest city : now this, he with
the quiet life will condemn, the active man will emulate, and
they that have not attained to the like, will envy. But to be
hated, and to displease, is a tiling that happeneth for the
time to whosoever he be that hatli the command of others;
and he does well that undergoeth hatred, for matters of great
consequence. For the hatred lastcth not, and is recom-
penced both with a present splendour, and an immortal glory
hereafter. Seeing then you foresee both what is honourable
for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure
both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no
BOOK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 107
* more heralds to the Lacedemonians, nor let them know that
' the evil present does any way afflict you : for they whose
' minds least feel, and whose actions most oppose a calamity,
* both amongst states and private persons, are the best.'
In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of
the Athenians towards himself, and withal to withdraw their
thoughts from the present affliction ; but they, though for the
state in general, they were won, and sent to the Lacedemonians
no more, but rather inclined to the war, yet they were every
one in particular grieved for their several losses ; the poor, be-
cause entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the
rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with good-
ly houses, and costly furniture in them, in the country ; but
the greatest matter of all was, that they had war instead of
peace. And also altogether, they deposed not their anger, till
they had first fined him in a sum of money. Nevertheless, not
long after, (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him
general again, and committed the whole state to his adminis-
tration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled,
and for the need of the common- wealth, they prized him more
than any other whatsoever. For as long as he was in authori-
ty in the city, in time of peace, he governed the same with
moderation, and was a faithful watch of it, and in his time it
was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is ma-
nifest that he therein also fore-saw what it could do. He lived
after the war began, two years and six months. And his fore-
sight in the war was best known after his death *. For he
told them, that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy,
and during this war, seek no further dominion, nor hazard the
city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they
did contrary in all, and in such other things besides, as seemed
not to concern the war, managed the state, according to their
private ambition and covetousness, preniciously both for them-
selves, and their confederates. What succeeded well, the ho-
nour and profit of it came most to private men; and what
miscarried, was to the cities detriment in the war. The rea-
son whereof was this, that being a man of great power, both
for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most
incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude, and was not so
much led by them, as he led them. Because (having gotten
his power by no evil arts) he would not humour them in his
speeches, but out of his authority, durst anger them with con-
tradiction. Therefore whensoever he saw them out of season
insolently bold, he would with his orations put them into a fear:
and again when they were afraid without reason, he would like-
* Plutarch says, he died of the plague.
108 THE HISTORY book ii.
wise erect their spirits, and embolden them. It was in name a
state democratical, but in fact, a government of the principal
man. But they that came after, being more equal amongst
themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied
themselves to the people, and let go the care of the common-
wealth. From whence, amongst many other errors, as was like-
ly in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage into
Sicily, which was not so much upon mistaking those whom
they went against, as for want of knowledge in the senders, of
what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For
through private quarrels about, who should bear the greatest
sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army,
and then also first troubled the state at home with division.
Being overthrown in Sicily, and having lost, besides other am-
munition, the greatest part of their navy, and the city being
then in sedition, yet they held out three years, both against
their first enemies, and the Sicilians with them, and against
most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards
against Cyrus the king's son, who took part with, and sent mo-
ney to the Peloponnesians, to maintain their fleet j and never
shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dis-
sensions. So much was in Pericles above other men at that
time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easi-
ly have out-lasted the Pelopponesians in this war.
The Lacedemonians and their confederates, made war the
same summer with one hundred galhes, against Zacynthus*, an
island lying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were
a colony of the Archaeans of Peloponnesus, but confederates of
the people of Athens. There went in this fleet, one thou-
sand men of arms, and Cnemus a Spartan for admiral, who
landing wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they
of the island not yielding, they put off again, and went home.
In the end of the same summer, Aristaeus of Corinth, and
Anaristus, Nicolans, Pratodemus, and Timagoras of Tegea,
ambassadors of the Lacedemonians, and Polls of Argos, a pri-
vate man, as they were travelling into Asia to the king, to get
money of him, and to draw him into their league, took Thrace
in their way, and came unto Sitalces the son of Teres, with a de-
sire to get him also, if they could, to forsake the league with
Athens, and to send his forces to Potidaea, which the Athenian
army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer:
and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other
side of Hellespont, to go, as they intended, to Pliarnabazus,
the son of Pharnaces, wiio would convoy them to the king ;
but the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus, the son of Callima-
* Zaiitc.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 109
chus, and Ameiniades the son of Philemon, then resident with
Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus the son of Sitalces, who was now
a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they
might not go to the king, and do hurt to the city, whereof he
himself was now a member. Whereunto condescending, as they
journeyed through Thrace, to take ship to cross the Hellespont,
he apprehended * them before they got to the ship, by such
others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameiniades, with
command to deliver them into their hands ; and they, when
they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came
thither, the Athenians fearing Aristaeus, lest escaping he should
do them further mischief, (for he was manifestly the author of
the business of Potidaea, and about Thrace) the same day put
them all to death, unjudged, and desirous to have spoken ; and
threw them into the pits, thinking it but just to take revenge
of the Lacedemonians that began it, and had slain and thrown
into pits, the merchants of the Athenians and their confede-
rates, whom they took sailing in merchants' ships f, about the
coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the
Lacedemonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea,
whether confederates of the Athenians, or neutral, all alike.
About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambra-
ciots, both they themselves, and divers Barbarian nations by
them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia, and
against the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them
and the Argives arose first from hence. This Argos and the
rest of Amphilochia, was planted by Ampliilocus the son of
Amphiraus, after the Trojan war; who at his return, misliking
then the state of Argos, built this city in the gulf of Ambracia,
and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it
was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of
all Amphilocia. But many generations after, being fallen into
misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciots,
bordering upon Amphilochia. And then they first learned
the Greek language now used, from the Ambraciots that lived
among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were Barba-
rians. Now the Ambraciots in process of time drove out the
Argives, and held the city by themselves : whereupon the Am-
philochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both
together called in the Athenians, who sent thirty gallies
to their aid, and Phormio for general. Phormio being arrived,
took Argos by assault, and making slaves of the Ambraciots,
put the town into the joint possessions of the Amphilochians
• A vile act of Sadocus to gratify the Athenians, because they had made him
free of their city.
■f- 0A.»aSi(, Ships of the round form of building- ; for the use of merchants, not
for the use of war, as were gallies, aad other vessels of the long form of building.
ne THE HISTORY
BOOK II
and Acarnanlans; and this was the beginning of the league
between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots there-
fore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their cap-
tivity, came in with an army partly of their own, and partly
TtAteA amongst the Chaonians, and other neighbouring Barba-
rians now in this war. And coming to Argos, were masters
of the field ; but when they could not take the city by assault,
they returned, and disbanding, went every nation to his own.
These were the acts of the summer.
In the beginning of winter the Athenians sent twenty gal-
lies about Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio, who
coming to lie at Naupactus *, guarded the passage that none
might go in or out from Corinth and the Crissaean gulf. And
other six gallies, under the conduct of Melesander, they sent
into Caria and Lycia, as well to gather tribute in those parts, as
also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates, lying on those coasts,
from molesting the navigation of such merchant f ships as
they expected to con)e to them from Phaselis, Phoenicia, and
that part of the continent. But Melesander landing in Lycia
with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he
had aboard, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of
a part of his army.
The same winter the Potidaeans unable any longer to endure
the siege, seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesian s
could not make them rise, and seeing their victual failed, and
that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by
them, for necessity of food, to eat one another, propounded at
length to Xenophon the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus the son
of Aristoclidas, and Phjenomachus the son of Callimachus, the
Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the
same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army
was already afflicted by lying in that cold place, and that the
state had already spent two thousand talents X upon the siege,
accepted of it. The conditions agreed on, were these ; ' To
* depart, they and their wives and children, and their auxiliar
* soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes, and every woman
* with two ; and to take with them every one a certain sum of
* money for his charges by the way.' Hereupon a truce was
granted them to depart, and they went, some to the Chalci-
deans, and others to other places, as tliey could get to. But tiie
people of Athens called the commanders in question for com-
pounding without them, conceiving that they might liave got-
ten the city to discretion j and sent afterwards a colony to Po-
tidiea of their own citizens. These were the things done in
• Lepanto. t "OXsaSi*.
^ Three hundred nod seveuty<fivc thousand pounds sterling.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR, 1 1 1
this winter. And so ended the second year of this war, writ-
ten by Thucydides.
YEAR III.
The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates
came not into Attica, but turned their arms against Plataea,
led by Archidamus the son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacede-
monians, who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the
territory thereof. But the Plataeans sent ambassadors pre-
sently unto him, with words to this effect : ' Archidamus, and
* you Lacedemonians, yoo do neither justly, nor worthy your-
* selves and ancestors, in making war upon Plataea. For
* Pausanias of Lacedemon, the son of Cleombrotus, having (to-
* gether with such Grecians as were content to undergo the
' danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory) de-
' livered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he
* offered sacrifice in the market-place of Plataea to Jupiter the
* deliverer, called together all the confederates, and granted to
' the Plataeans this privilege ; that their city and territory
* should be free : that none should make unjust war against
* them, nor go about to subject them ; and if any did, the
* confederates then present, should do their utmost ability, to
* revenge their quarrel. These privileges your fathers granted
* us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you
* the clean contrary, for you join with our greatest enemies,
* the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling
* to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your
' and our countr}', we require you, that you do no damage to
* the territory of Plataea, nor violate those oaths; but that you
* suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us
* by Pausanias.'
The Plataeans having thus said, Archidamus replied, and said
thus: ' Men of Plataea, if you would do as ye say, you say what
* IS just. For as Pausanias hath granted to you, so also be you
* free ; and help to set free the rest, who having been par-
* takers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in
' the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjec-
* tion by the Athenians. And this so great preparatian and
* war is only for the deliverance of them, and others : of
* which if you will especially participate, keep your oaths,
* at least (as we have also advised you formerly) be quiet, and
* enjoy your own, in neutrality, receiving both sides in the way
* of friendship, neither side in the way of faction.' Thus said
Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they
heard him, returned to the city; and having communicated
his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus,
112 THE HISTORY book ii.
' That what he had advised, was impossible for them to per-
' form, without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were
' their wives and children ; and that they feared also for the
* whole city, lest when the Lacedemonians were gone, the
' Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their
* hands; or that the Thebans comprehended in the oath ofre-
* ceiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it.' But
Archidamus to encourage them, made this answer : ' Deliver
* you unto us Lacedemonians your city and your houses, shew
* us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees, by tale, and
' whatsoever else can be numbered, and depart yourselves whi-
* ther you shall think good, as long as tlie war lasteth : and
* when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again :
' in the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will
* cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as
' shall suffice for your maintenance/
Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and
having consulted with the people, made answer : ' That they
' would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would
' consent, they would then accept the condition : till then they
' desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory
' wasted.' Upon this he granted them so many days truce as
was requisite for their return, and for so long forbore to waste
their territory. When the Platsean ambassadors were arrived
at Atliens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians,
they returned to the city with tliis answer : the Athenians say
thus : ' That neither in former times, since we were tlieir con-
' federates, did they ever abandon us to the injury of any, nor
' will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance.
* And they conjure us by the oatli of our fathers, not to make
* any alienation touching the league.'
When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans
resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians, but ra-
ther to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory be-
fore their eyes, and to suffer whatsoever misery could befal
them ; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make
this answer ; * That it was impossible for them to do as the
* Lacedemonians had required.' When they had answered so,
Archidamus the king first made a protestation to the gods and
heroes of the country, saying thus : ' All ye gods and heroes,
* protectors of Plateeis, be witnesses that we neither invade this
* territory, wherein our fathers, after their vows unto you, over-
' came the Medes, and which you made propitious for the
' Grecians to fight in, unjustly now in the beginning; because
* they have first broken the league tliey had sworn : nor what
' we shall further do will be any injury, because though we
' have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet
BOOK rr. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 113
' been all refused. Assent yet also to the punishment of the
* beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear law-
' ful arms.'
Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready
his army for the war. And first having felled trees, he there-
with made a palisado about the town that none might go out.
That done, he raised a mount against the wall, hoping with so
great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken in.
And having cut down wood in the hill Cithseron, they built a
frame of timber, and vvatled it about on either side, to serve
instead of wall, to keep the earth from falling too much away,
and cast into it stones, and earth, and wliatsoever else would
serve to fill ii up. Seventy days and nights continually they
poured on, dividing the work between them for rest in such
manner, as some might be carrying, whilst others took their
sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lace-
demonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several ci-
ties, and had the charge of the work. The Plataeans seeing
the mount to rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which
having placed on the wall of the city, in the place where the
mount touched, they built it within full of bricks, taken from
the adjoining houses, for that purpose demolished; the tim-
ber serving to bind them together, that the building might not
be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with
hides and quilts, both to keep the timber from shot of wildfire,
and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of
the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast
on the other. The Platjeans used also this device; they brake
a hole in their own wall, where the mount joined, and drew the
earth from it unto the city. But the Peloponnesians, when
they found it out, took clay, and therewith daubing hurdles of
reeds, cast the same into the chink, which mouldering not, as
did the earth, they could not draw it away. The Plataeans ex-
cluded here, gave over that plot, and digging a secret mine,
which they canied under the mount from within the city by
conjecture, fetched away the earth again, and were a long time
undiscovered ; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less,
the earth being drawn away below, and settling over the part
where it was voided. The Platteans nevertheless, fearing that
they should not be able even thus to hold out, being few against
many, devised this further : they gave over working at the high
wall against the mount, and beginning at both ends of it, where
the wall was low, built another wall in form of a crescent, inward
to the city, that if the great wall were taken, this might resist,
and put the enemy to make another mount; and by coming
further in, to be at double pains, and withal more encompass-
able with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the raising
114 THE HISTORY book ir.
of the mount, brought to the city their engines of battery ;
one of which, by help of the mount, they applied to the high
wall, wherewith they much shook it, and put the Plataeans into
great fear ; and others to other parts of the wall, which the Pla-
taeans partly turned aside, by casting ropes about them, and
partly with great beams, which being hung in long iron chains
lay either end upon two other great beams jetting over, and in-
clining from above the wall like to horns, they drew up to them
athwart, and where the engine was about to hght, slacking
the chains, and letting their hands go, they let fall with vio-
lence, to break the beak of it. After this, the'Peloponnesians
seeing their engines availed not, and thinking it hard to take
the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege
it. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no
great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn
it. For there was no way they did not think on, to have gained
it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought
faggots, they cast them from the mount, into the space be-
tween it and their new wall, which by so many hands was
quickly filled ; and then into as much of the rest of the city as
at that distance they could reach : and throwing amongst them
fire, togetlier with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and
raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before, made by
the hand of man. For as for the woods in the mountains, the
trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attri-
tion, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire
was a great one, and the Platasans that had escaped other mis-
chiefs, wanted little of being consumed by this. For near the
wall they could not get by a great way : and if the wind liad
been with it (as the enemy hoped it might) they could never
have escaped. It is also reported, that there fell much rain
then, with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished,
and the danger ceased by that. The Peloponnesians, when
they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army, and
dismissing the rest, enclosed the city about with a wall, divid-
ing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several ci-
ties. There vas a ditch both within and without it, out of
which they made their bricks ; and after it was finished, wliich
was about the rising of Arcturus *, they left a guard for one half
of the wall, (for the other was guarded by the Boeotians) and
departed with the rest of their army, and were dissolved according
to their cities. The Plataeans had before this, sent their wives
and children, and all their unserviceable men to Athens. The
rest were besieged, being in number, of the Plataeans tliem-
selves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and one hundred wo-
•♦ In the bnginiiiiij of September.
«ooK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. UC*
men to dress their meat. These were all when the siege was
first laid, and not more, neither free nor bond in the city. In
this manner was the city besieged.
The same summer, at the same time that this journey was
made against Plataea, the Athenians with two thousand men of
arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made war
upon the Chalcideans of Thrace, and the Bottiseans, when the
corn was at tlie highest, under the conduct of Xenophon tlie
son of Eur}'pides, and two others. These coming before Spar-
tolus in Bottiaea, destroyed the corn, and expected that the
town should have been rendered by tlie practice of some within.
But such as would not have it so, having sent for aid to Olyn-
thus before, there came into the city for safeguard therefore, a
supply both of men of arms, and other soldiers from thence.
And tiiese issuing forth of Spartolus, the Athenians put them-
selves in order of battle under the town itself. The men of
arms of the Chalcideans, and certain auxiliaries with them,
were overcome by tlie Athenians, and retired within Spartolus.
And the horsemen of the Chalcideans, and their light-armed
soldiers, overcame the horsemen, and light-armed of the Athe-
nians ; but they had some few targetiers besides, of the territory
called Chrusis. When the battle was now begun, came a sup-
ply of other targetiers from Olyntlius, which tlie light-armed
soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this ad-
dition of strength, and also as having had the better before, with
the Chalcidean horse, and this new supply, charged the Athe-
nians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two compa-
nies they had left with the carriages ; and as oft as the Athe-
nians charged, the Chalcideans retired ; and when the Athe-
nians retired, the Chalcideans charged them with their shot.
Especially the Chalcidean horsemen rode up, and charging them
where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme atfright,
to turn their backs, and chased them a great way. The Athe-
nians fled to Potidaea, and having aftenvards fetched away the
bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder
of their army, to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they
lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalci-
deans and Bottiaeans, when they had set up a trophy, and
taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went every one to his
city.
Not long after this, the same summer, the Ambraciotes and
Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania, and to make it
revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedemonians to
make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to send
one thousand men of arms into Acarnania ; saying, that if they
aided them both with a fleet, and a land army at once, the Acar-
nanians of the sea-coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest,
having easily gained Acarnania, they might be masters after-
116 THE HISTORY book n.
ward both of Zacynthus and Ceplialonia, and the Athenians
hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus ;
and that there was a hope besides to take Naupactus. The
Peloponnesians assenting, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet
admiral, with his men of arms, in a few gallics immediately ;
and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their gal-
lies were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas, Now the
Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciotes,
as being their own colony. And the gallies which were to go
from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now
making ready ; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and
Ambraciotes, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their
coming. Cnemus and his one thousand men of arms when
they had crossed the sea undescried of Phormio, who com-
manded the twenty Athenian gallies that kept watch at Nau-
pactus *, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in
his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciotes, Leucadians, Anactorians,
and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him ; and of
Barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, but were
led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families
eligible had now the annual government. With the Chaonians
came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king. The
Molossians, and Antitanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector
of Tharups their king, who was yet in minority. The Para-
veans were led by their king Oraedus; and under Oraedus,
served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king a thou-
sand Orestians. Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the
Athenians, a thousand Macedonians ; but these last were not
yet arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march, without
staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argia,
they destroyed Limnaea, a town unwalled. From thence they
marched towards Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania ; con-
ceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come
easily in. The Acarnanians seeing a great army by land was
entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by
sea, joined not to succour Stratus, but guarded every one his
own, and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them,
that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he
could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Pelopon-
nesians and their confederates, with their army divided into
three, marched on towards the city of the Stratians, to the end
that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley,
they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the
Chaonians and other Barbarians in the middle ; the Leuca-
dians, and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on
the right hand; and Cnemus, with the Peloponnesians and
Ambraciotes on the left ; each army at great distance, and some-
* Lepanto.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 117
times out of sight one of another. The Grecians in their march
kept their order, and went warily on, till they had gotten a con-
venient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians confident of
themselves, and by the inhabitants of tiiat continent accounted
roost warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for
a camp, but carried furiously on, together witli the rest of the
Barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour,
and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they
of Stratus, aware of this, whilst they were yet in their way, and
imagining, if they could overcome these, thus divided from the
other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less for-
ward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city,
and when the enemies approached, fell upon them, both from
the city, and from the ambushes at once, and putting them into
afinght, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place. And
the rest of the Barbarians seeing these to shrink, staid no lon-
ger, but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had
knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far be-
fore, to choose (as they then thought) a commodious place to
pitch in. But when the Barbarians came back upon them
running, they received them, and joining both camps together,
stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them
not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians, but used
their slings against them, and troubled them much that way.
For without their men of arms, there was no stirring for them.
And in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent.
When night came, Cnenius withdrew liis army to the river
Anapus, from Stratus eighty furlongs, and fetched oflf the dead
bodies u{X)n truce the next day. And whereas the city Oeniades
.was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither, before the
Acarnanians should assemble with their succours ; and from
thence went every one home. And the Stratians set up a tro-
phy of the skirmish against the Barbarians.
in tlie mean time the fleet of Corinth, and the other confe-
derates, that was to set out from the Crissaean gulf, and to join
with Cnemus to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the
upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with
Phormio, and tliose twenty Athenian gallies that kept watch at
Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stra-
tus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on
them till they were out of the streight, intending to set upon
them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confe-
derates went not as to tight by sea, but furnished rather for the
land service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athe-
nians with their twenty gallies, durst fight with theirs, that were
seven and forty. Nevertheless when they saw that the Athe-
nians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them
118 THE HISTORY book ii.
on the other, and that now when they went off from Patrae in
Achaia, to go over to Acarnania in the opposite continent, the
Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Eue-
nus, and also knew that they had come to anchor there the
night before, tliey found they were then to fight of necessity,
directly against the mouth of the streight. The commanders
of the fleet were such as the cities that set it forth had severally
appointed; but of the Corinthians these, Machon, Isocrates,
and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet in
such manner, as they made thereof a circle as great as, without
leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through,
they were possibly able ; with the stems of their gallies out-
ward, and sterns inward, and into the midst thereof, received
such small vessels as came with them ; and also five of their
swiftest gallies, the which were at narrow passages to come
forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge.
But the Athenians with their gallies ordered one after one in
file, went round them, and shrunk them up together, by wip-
ing them ever as they passed, and putting them in expecta-
tion of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them
to fight, till he had given them the signal. For he hoped that
this order of theirs would not last long, as in an array on land,
but that the gallies would fall foul of one another, and be trou-
bled also with the smaller vessels in the midst. And if the
wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof
he so went round them, and which usually * blew there every
morning, he made account they would then instantly be dis-
ordered. As for giving tlie onset, because his gallies were more
agile than the gallies of the enemy, he tliought it was his own
election, and \vould be most opportune on that occasion.
When this wind was up, and the gallies of the Peloponnesians
being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways
troubled by the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels
that incumbered tliem ; and when one gaily fell foul of another,
and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles,
and through the noise they made, keeping off, and reviling
each other, heard nothing, neither of their charge, nor of the
gallies direction ; and for want of skill, unable to keep up their
oars in a troubled sea, rendered the gaily untractable to him
that sate at the helm, then, and with this opportunity he gave
the signal. And the Athenians charging, drowned first one of
the admiral gallics, and divers others after it, in the several parts
they assaulted ; and brought them to that pass at length, that
not one applying himself to the fight, they fled all towards
* A set wind which blew every )iiorniiig^ there from ihc cast, caused, as il
sccnielb, i>y tlie a}»proach i>f tho suu.
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 110
Patr« and Dyme, cities of Achaia. The Athenians, after they
had chased them, and taken twelve gallies, and slain most of
the men that were in them, fell off, and went to Molychrium ;
and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one
gaily to Ne])tune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus.
The Peloponnesians with the remainder of their fleet, went
presently along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans ;
and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cncmus from
Leucas, and with him those gallies that were there, and with
which this other fleet should have been joined.
After this, the Lacedemonians sent unto Cneraus to the fleet,
Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron to be of his council, with
command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer
a few gallies to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they
thought tliis accident (especially being their first proof by sea)
very much against reason ; and that it was not so much a de-
fect of the fleet, as of their courage : never comparing the long
practice of the Athenians, with their own short study in these
businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in pas-
sion : who being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities
about to provide their gallies, and caused those they had before,
to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make
known both the enemies preparation, and his own former vic-
tory j and withal to will them to send speedily unto him, as
many gallies as they could make ready ; because they were
every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent
him twenty gallies, but commanded him that had the charge of
them to go first into Crete.
^ For Niclas a Cretan of Gortys, the public host of the Athe-
nians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, tell-
ing them they might take it in, being now their enemy.
Which he did, to gratify the Polychnits, that bordered upon
the Cydonians. Therefore with ' these gallies he sailed into
Crete, and together with the Polychnitae, wasted the territory
of the Cydonians ; where also, by reason of the winds, and
weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.
In the mean time, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound
in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of
battle sailed along the coast to Panormus of 'Achaia, to which
also were their land forces to come to aid them. Phormio like-
wise sailed by tlie shore to Rhium Molychricum, and anchored
without it, with twenty gallies, the same he had used in the
former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side,
and the Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on tiie opposite shore^
distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea ; and these
two make the mouth of the Crissaean gulf. The Peloponne-
sians therefore came to an anchor at Rhium of Achaia, with
120 THE HISTORY book ii.
seventy-seven gallies, not far from Panormus, where they left
their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain
six or seven days one against the other, meditating and provid-
ing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off
without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had
suffered by it before ; nor the other to enter the streight, be-
cause to tight within, they thought to be the enemies' advan-
tage. At last, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other comman-
ders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily before a
new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers toge-
ther, and seeing the most of them to be fearful through their
former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them
first with words to this effect.
The Oration of Cnemus.
* Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle
* at hand, for the success of the battle past, his fear is without
* ground. For you know we were inferior to them then in pre-
* paration, and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to
' an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in
* many things, and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness,
* so as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice. Nor is
* it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but
* have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should
' be dejected for the calamity of the event. But we must
^ think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a
' valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cow-
* ardice in any thing, by pretending want of skill, and yet be
* truly valiant. And yet you are not so much short of their
' skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this know-
* ledge of theirs which you so much fear, joined with courage,
' will not be without a memory also, to put what they know in
' execution, yet without courage no act in the world is of any
' force in the time of danger. For fear confoundeth the me-
* mory, and skill without courage availeth nothing. To their
* odds therefore of skill, oppose your odds of valour; and to
* the fear caused by your overthrow, oppose your being then
* unprovided. You have further now, a greater fleet, and to
' fight on your own shore, with your aids at hand of men of
' arms : and for the most part, the greatest number, and best
* provided, get the victory. So that we can neither see any
* one cause in particular, why we should miscarry; and what-
* soever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this,
* will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore,
* both masters and mariners follow every man in his order, not
* forsaking the place assigned him. And for us, we shall
BOOK 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 121
* order the battle as well as the former commanders ; and
* leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any
* will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment,
* and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit.'
Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians.
And Phormio, he likewise doubting that his soldiers were
but faint-hearted, and observing they had consultations apart,
and were afraid of tlie multitude of the enemies galHes, thought
good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish
them upon the present occasion. For though he had always
before told them, and predisposed their minds to an opinion
that there was no number of gallies so great, which setting
upon them, they ought not to undertake ; and also most of
the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves,
that being Athenians, they ought not to decline any number of
gallies whatsoever of the Peloponnesians ; yet when he saw
that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he
thought fit to revive their courage, and having assembled the
Athenians, said thus :
The Oration of Phormio.
* Soldiers, having obser\ed your fear of the enemies num-
' ber, 1 have called you together, not enduring to see you ter-
* rifled with things that are not terrible. For first they have
* prepared this great number and odds of gallies, for that they
* were overcome before, and because they are even in their own
* opinions too weak for us. And next, their present boldness
* proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in con-
* fidence whereof (as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them)
* they are now come up ; wherein having the most part
* prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea. But
* in reason the odds must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs
* in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not,
* and as toucliing the advantage of either side, we may better
* be bold now than they. And the Lacedemonians, who are
* the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight, for the
* greatest part (in respect of the opinion they have of us)
* against their wills ; for else they would never have undertaken
* a new battle after they were once so clearly overthrown.
* Fear not therefore any great boldness on their part. But the
* fear which they have of you is far both greater and more cer-
* tain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but
' also for this, that they would never believe you would go
* about to resist, unless you had some notable thing to put in
* practice upon them. For when the enemy is the greater
122 THE HISTORY book n.
* number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confi-
' dence of their strength. But they that are much the fewer
* must have some great and sure design when they dare fight
* unconstrained. Wherewith these men now amazed, fear us
* more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were
' more proportionable. Besides, many great armies have
•^ been both overcome by the lesser through unskilfulness, and
' some also by timorousness, both which we ourselves are free
* from. As for the battle, I will not willingly fight in the
' gulf; nor go in thither; seeing that to a few gallies with
' nimbleness and art, against many without art, streightness of
* room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the
' beak of the gaily as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy
* afar off, or if he be himself over-pressed, again get clear.
* Nor is there any getting through them, or turning to and fro
* at ones pleasure, which are all the works of such gallies as
' have their advantage in agility ; but the sea fight would of
' necessity be the same with a battle by land, wherein the
* greater number must have the better. But of this, I shall
' myself take the best care I am able. In the mean time keep
' yon your order well in the gallies, and every man receive his
' charge readily, and the rather because the enemy is at anchor
* so near us. In the fight, have in great estimation, order and
* silence, as things of great force in most military actions, es-
' pecially in a fight by sea, and charge these your enemies ac-
' cording to the worth of your former acts. You are to fight
* for a great wager, either to destroy the hope of the Pelopon-
* nesian navies, or to bring the fear of the sea nearer home to
' the Athenians. Again, let me tell you, you have beaten
' them once already ; and men once overcome, will not come
* again to the danger so well resolved as before.*
Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers.
The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would
enter the gulf and streight, desiring to draw them in against
their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having
arranged their gallies by four and four in a rank, sailed along
their own coast, within the gulf, leading the way, in the same
order as they had lain at anchor with their right-wing. In
this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest gallies, to
the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus,
should for safeguard of the town, sail along his own coast like-
wise, within the streight, the Athenians might not be able to
get beyond that wing of theirs and avoid the impression, but
be enclosed by their gallies on both sides. Phormio fearing
(as they expected) what might become of the town now with-
out guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR 123
will, and in extreme haste went aboard, and sailed along the
shore with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to
aid him. The Peloponnesians when they saw them sail in one
long file, gaily after gaily, and that they were now in the gulf,
and by the shore, (which they most desired) upon one sign
given, turned suddenly, every one as fast as he could upon the
Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every gaily. But
of those, the eleven foremost avoiding that wing, and the turn
made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea. The
rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, sunk
them.
The men, as many as swam not out, they slew, and tlie gal-
lies some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty,
and one with the men and all in her they had already taken.
But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with
their arms, got aboard of some of them, and fighting from the
decks, recovered them again, after they were already towing
away. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory,
and overcame the gallies of the Athenians. Now the twenty
gallies that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven
Athenian gallies, which had avoided them when they turned,
and were gotten into the open sea. These flying toward Nau-
pactus, arrived there before the enemies all save one, and when
they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak-heads,
and put themselves into readiness for defence, in case the ene-
my should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians
as they came after, were paeanizing *, as if they had already
the victory ; and one gaily, which was of Leucas, being far
before the rest, gave chase to one Athenian gaily that was be-
hind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay
out into the sea a certain ship at anchor, to which the Athenian
gaily first coming, fetched a compass about her, and came
back full butt against the Leucadian gaily that gave her chase,
and sunk her. Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident
they began to fear, and having also followed the chase, as
being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into
the water and hitidered the way of their gallies (a matter of
very ill consequence, seeing the enemy was so near) and staid
for more company. And some of them through ignorance of
the coast, ran upon the shelves. The Athenians seeing this,
took heart again, and together with one clamour set upon
them ; who resisted not long, because of their present errors
committed, and their disarray ; but turned and fled to Panor-
mus, from whence at first tliey set forth. The Athenians
followed, and took from them six gallies, that were hindmost,
• Singing the hyuin of victory.
124 THE HISTORY book h.
and recovered their own which the Peloponneslans had sunk
by the shore, and tied a stern of theirs. Of the men, some
they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian
gaily that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates a Lacedemo-
nian, who when the gaily was lost, run himself through with
his sword, and his body drove into the haven of Naupactus.
The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from
whence they set forth to this victory, and took up their dead,
and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave
truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also
set up a trophy, as if they also had had the victory, in respect
of the flight of those gallies which they sunk by the shore ;
and the gaily which they had taken they consecrated to Nep-
tune in Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this,
fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed
by night into the Crissaean gulf, and to Corinth, all but the
Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty gallies out of
Crete that should have been with Phormio before the battle,
not long after the going away of the gallies of Peloponnesus,
arrived at Naupactus ; and the summer ended.
But before the fleet gone into the Crisssean gulf and to Co-
rinth, was dispersed, Cnemus, and Brasidas, and the rest of
the commanders of the Peloponnesians, in the beginning of
winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make
an attempt upon Piraeus, the haven of the Athenians. Now
it was without guard or bar, and that upon very good cause,
considering how much they exceeded others in the power of
their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his
oar *, his cushion, and one thong f for his oar to turn in, should
take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea, that lieth
to Athens, and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty
gallies out of Nisaa, the arsenal of the Megareans which then
were there, and sail presently into Piraeus. For at that time,
there neither stood any gallies for a watch before it, nor was
there any imagination, that the enemies would on such a sud-
den come upon them. For they durst not have attempted it
openly, though with leisure ; nor if they had had any such in-
tention, could it but have been discovered. As soon as it was
resolved on, they set presently forward, and arriving by night,
launched the said gallies of Nissea, and set sail, not now towards
Piraeus, as they intended, fearing the danger: and a wind
was also said to have risen that hindered them, but toward a
promontory of Samalis, lying out towards Megara.
* It nitty he licnce gntliercd, that in flic jjallits of old, tlicrn was but otie man
to OOP oar.
f 'Tfca-oT^f, n piece of leullit'r ulineiii llitir oar is liinitil.
B06K 11. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 125
Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea,
lav three gallies that kept watch, to hinder the importation
and exportation of any thing:, to or from the Megareans. This
fort they assaulted, and the gallies they towed empty away
after them. And being come upon the Salaminians unawares,
wasted also other parts of the island.
By this time the fires signifying * the coming of ene-
mies, were lifted up towards Athens, and affrighted them
more than any thing that had happened in all this war :
for thev in the city thought the enemies had been already
in Pirsus ; and they in Piraeus thought the city of the Sa-
laminians had been already taken, and that the enemy
would instantly come into Pirjeus : which had they not
been afraid, nor been liindered by the wind, they might
also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was
day, came with the whole strength of the city into Piraeus,
and launched their gallies, and embarking in haste and tumult,
set sail toward Salamis, leaving for the guard of Piraeus, an
army of foot. The Peloponnesians upon notice of those suc-
cours, having now over- run most of Salamis, and taken many
prisoners, and much other booty, besides the three gallies from
the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisaea. And
somewhat they feared the more, for that their gallies had lain
long in the water, and were subject to leaking. And when
they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by
land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the ene-
my at Salamis, went home ; and from that time forward look-
ed better to Piraeus, both for the shutting of the ports, and for
their diligence otherwise.
About the same time, in the beginning of the same winter,
Sytalces an Odrysian, the son of Teres king of Thrace, made
war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander king of Macedonia,
and upon the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace, upon two pro-
mises ; one of which he required to be performed to him, and
the other he was to perforin himself. For Perdiccas had pro-
mised somewhat unto him for reconciling him to the Athe-
nians, who had formerly oppressed him with war, and for not
restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, which was his
enemy, which he never paid him, and Sytalces himself had cove-
nanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them,
that he would end the war which they had against the Chalci-
deans of Thrace. For these causes therefore he made this ex-
pedition, and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip,
Fins lifted up, if tLcy were stili, si^uiSeJ fiiends coining, if waved, eucmies.
Scholiastes.
126 THE HISTORY nooK n.
(with purpose to make him king of Macedonia) and also the
Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and
Agnon the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought
also to have joined with him against the Chalcideans, both
with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.
Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those
Thracians that inhabit on this side tlie mountains .-Emus and
Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the
shore of the Euxine sea, and the Hellespont. Then beyond
i^ilmus he levied the Getes, and all the nations between Ister
and the Euxine sea. The Getes, and people of those parts,
are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scy-
thians are, archers on horseback. He also drew forth many
of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains, and are free
states, all sword-men, and are called Dii, the greatest part of
which are on the mountain Rhodope ; wliereof some he hired,
and some went as volunteers. He levied also the Agrians and
Leaeans, and all other the nations of Pajonia, in his own domi-
nion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extend-
ing to the Graeans and Leseans, nations of Paeonia, and to the
river Strymon ; which rising out of the mountain Scomius,
passeth through the territories of the Groans and Leaeans, who
make the bounds of his kingdom toward Paeonia, and are sub-
ject only to their own laws. But on the part that lieth to the
Triballians, who are also a free people, the Trercs make the
bound of his dominion, and the Tilataeans. These dwell on the
north side of the mountain Scomus, and reach westward as far
as to the siver Oseius, which cometh out of tlie same hill Nes-
tus and Hebras doth, a great and desert hill adjoining to Rho-
dope.
The dimension of the dominion of tlie Odrysians by the sea
side, is from the city of the Abderites, to the mouth of Ister in
the Euxine sea; and is the nearest way, four days and as
many nights sail for a round ship *, with a continual fore-
wind. By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city
Abdera to the mouth of Ister eleven days journey for an expe-
dite footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea.
Now for the continent ; from Byzantium to the Leaeans,
and to the river Strymon (for it reacheth this way farthest into
the main land) it is for the like footman, thirteen days journey.
The tribute they received from all the Barbarian nations, and
from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned
* A ship that usptli only sails, of tiip round form of bulliliag', and sprvintf for
burthen, in distinction to gullies, and all other vessels of the long- form of build,
ing, serving for the wars.
BOOK II. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 127
after Sitalces, and made the most of it) was In gold and sil-
ver, by estimation, four Imndred talents * by year. And pre-
sents of gold and silver came to as mucli more : besides ves-
tures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not
only to him, but also to all the men of authority and Odrysian
nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was
general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Per-
sia, to receive rather tiian to give : and it was there a greater
shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and go without. Ne-
vertheless they held this custom long, by reason of their power:
for without gifts, there was nothing to be gotten done amongst
them ; so that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power :
for of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian f
gulf and the Euxene X sea, it was for the revenue of money,
and other wealth, the mightiest ; though indeed for strength of
an army and multitudes of soldiers the same be far short of the
Scythians : for there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but
neither of Asia, that are comparable to this, or that as long as
they agree, are able one nation to one, to stand against the
Scythians ; and yet in matter of counsel and wisdom in the
present occasions of life, they are not like to other men.
Sitalces therefore, king of tliis great country, prepared liis
army, and when all was ready, set forward, and marched to-
wards Macedonia. First through his Own dominion, then over
Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the PcEO-
Bians, over which he marched the same way himself had for-
merly made with timber, when he made war against the Paonians.
Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrvsians, they
had on their right-hand tiie Psonians, and on the left the Sin-
tians and Medes, and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus
iu Paonia. His array as he marched diminished not any way,
except by sickness, but increased by the accession of many free
nations of Thrace that came in uncalled, in hope of booty.
Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no
less than one hundred and fifty thousand men, whereof the
most were foot, the horse being" a third part, or tiiereabouts ;
and of the horse the greatest part were the Odrysians them-
selves, and the next most the Getes : and of the foot, those
sword-men, a free nation, that came down to him out of the
mountain Rhodopc, were most warlike. The rest of the pro-
miscuous multitude, were formidable only for their number.
Being all together at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from
the hills' side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Per-
diccas : for there are in Macedonia and Lyncestians and Heli-
* Fifty-seren thousand pounds sterling-. f The Adriatic sea.
X Mar Magrgiore.
128 THE HISTORY book u.
miots, and other highland nations, who though they be confe-
derates, and in subjection to the other, yet have their several
kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now Mace-
donia which lieth toward the sea, Alexander the father of this
Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidffi, who came out of
Argos, were the first possessors, and reigned in the same ;
having first driven out of Piera the Pierians, (which afterwards
seated themselves in Phagres and other towns beyond Stry-
mon, at the foot of Pangeum ; from which cause that country
is called the gulf Pieria to this day, which lieth at the foot of
Pangeum, and bendeth towards the sea) and out of that which
is called Bottia, the Bottiaeans, that now border upon the Chal-
cideans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of
Paeonia, near unto the river of Axius, reaching from above
down to Pella, and to the sea. Beyond Axius, they possess
the country called Mygdonia, as f'^r as to Strymon, from
whence they have driven out the Eidonians. Furthermore,
they drove the Eordians out of the territory, now called Eorda,
(of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of
them yet about Physca) and the Almopians out of Almopia.
The same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold
them yet, as Anthemus, Grestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great
part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called
Macedonia, and was the kingdom of Perdiccas the son of Alex-
ander, when Sitalces came to invade it. The Macedonians
unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired
all within their strong holds, and walled towns, as many as the
country afforded ; which were not many then, but were built
afterwards by Archelaus the son of Perdiccas, when he came to
the kingdom, who then also laid out the high-ways straight,
and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms, and
for other provision, better than all the eight kings that were
before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, in-
vaded that territority first, which had been the principality of
Philip, and took Eidomene by force ; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and
some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyn-
tas the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also
assaulted Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on
further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the right hand
of Pella and Cyrrhus ; but within these, into Bottiaea and
Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Grestonia, and
Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention
to make head against them with their foot, but sending out
their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the
higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Tluracian army in such
places, where few against many, they thought they might do
it with most convenience ; and where they charged, none was
BOOK H. OP THE GRECIAN WAR. 129
able to resist them, being both good horsemen, and well-armed
with breast-plates ; but enclosed by the multitude of the ene-
mies, they fought against manifold odds of number : so that in
the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to
hazard battle against so many.
After this, Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas
touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athe-
nians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not
that Sitalces would have made the journey) but had sent am-
bassadors to him with presents, he sent a part of his army
against the Chalcideans and Bottiaeans, wherewith having com-
pelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and de-
stroyed their territority. Whilst he staid in these parts, the
Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians and the rest
of the nations subject to the Thessalians, and all the Gre-
cians as far as to Thermopylae, were afraid he would have turned
his forces upon them, and stood upon their guard. And north-
ward those Thraciuns that inhabit the campagne country be-
yond Strymon, namely the Panaeans, Odomantians, Droans, and
Dersasans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He
gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army
against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians,
as called in by them to that purpose, by virtue of their league.
But whilst he staid, he wasted the Chalcidean, Bottiaean, and
Macedonian territories ; and when he could not effect what he
came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted
with the coldness of the season ; Seuthes the son of Spardocus
his cousin german, and of the greatest authority next himself,
persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt
secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage,
and money with her: and Sitalces at the persuasion of him after
the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight in Chalcidea,
retired with his army with all speed into his own kingdom.
And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Strato-
nica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the is^ue of
this expedition of Sitalces.
The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dis-
solved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus, under the con-
duct of Phormio, sailed along the coast of Astacus, and dis-
barking, marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had
in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with
him in his gallies, and four hundred more Messenians. With
these he put out of Stratus, Corontte, and other places, all
those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had
restored Cynes the son of Theolytus to Corontae, they returned
again to their gallies. For they thought they should not be
able to make war against the Oeniades, (who only of all Acar-
K
130 THE HISTORY &c. book h.
nania are the Athenians' enemies) in respeet of the winter. For
the river Achelous, springing out of the mountain Pindus, and
running through Dolopia, and through the territorities of the
Agrseans. and the Amphiloehians, and through most part of the
campagne of Acarnania, passing ahove the city of Stratus, and
falling into the sea by the city of the Oeniades, which also it
moatetli about with fens, by the abundance of water, raaketh
it hard lying there for an army in the time of winter. Also
most of tlie islands Echinades lie just over against Oenia, hard
by the mouth of Achelous. And the river being a great one,
continually heapeth together the gravel ; insomuch that some
of those islands are become continent already, and the like in
a short time is expected by the rest. For not only the stream
of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous, but also the islands
themselves stand thick, and because the gravel cannot pass, are
joined one to another, lying in and out, not in a direct line,
nor so much as to give the water his course directly forward
into the sea. These islands are all desert and but small ones.
It is reported that Apollo by his oracle did assign this place for
an habitation to Alcmaeon the son of Amphiraus, at such time
as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother ;
telling him, ' tliat he should never be free from the terrors that
* haunted him till he had found out, and seated himself in such
* a land, as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen,
' nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted by
' him.' Hereupon being at a non-plus, as they say, with much
ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelous,
and thought there was enough cast up to serve his turn alrea-
dy, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which
it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. There-
fore seating himself in the places about the Oeniades, he
reigned there, and named the country after the name of his
son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it con-
cerning Alcmaion. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving
Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus in the very beginning
of the spring, came back to Athens, and brought with them such
gallies as they had taken, and the freemen tliey had taken pri-
soners, in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by
exchange of man for man. So ended that winter Bod the third
year of the war written by Thucydides.
THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.
TSE
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK III.
CONTEXTS.
Silica invaded by the Peloponnesians. The Mitylmmns revolt, and
are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league.
The Athenians send Padies to Mitylene to besiege it. Part of
the besieged Platteans escape through the forti^ations of the
enemy. The commons of Mitylene armed by the nobility for a
$aUy on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians. The re-
mime cf the Plat^eans yield to the besiegers, and are put to the
mp0rd. Tlie proceeding upon the Mitylenians, and their punish-
ment. The sedition in Corcyra, Laches is sent by the Athenians
into Sicily. And Nicias into Melos. Demosthenes fighteth
against the Miolians unfortunately, and afterwards against the
Ambraciotes fortunately. Pythadorus is sent into Sicily to receive
the fleet from Laches. This in other three years of this war.
YEAR IV.
J HE summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confe-
derates at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with
their army into Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus the
son of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedemonians, and there set
them down, and wasted the territory about. And the Athe-
nian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where
they thought fit, and kept back the multitude of light-armed
soldiers, from going out before the men of arms, and infesting
132 THE HISTORY book in.
the places near the city. And when they had staid as long as
their victual lasted, they returned, and were dissolved according
to their cities.
After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos imme-
diately all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians ; which
though they would have done before the war, and the Lacede-
monians would not then receive them, yet even now they were
forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For
they staid to have first straightened the mouth of their haven
with dams of earth, to have finished their walls, and their gal-
lies then in building, and to have gotten in all that Was to come
out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, whatsoever else they had
sent for.
But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the
Methymnians, and of the Mitylenians themselves, certain par-
ticular men, upon faction, being hosts of the Athenians, made
known unto them, that the Lesbians were forced to go all into
Mitylene ; that by the help of the Lacedemonians, and their
kindred the Boeotians, they hastened all manner of provision
necessary for a revolt, and that unless it were presently pre-
vented, all Lesbos would be lost.
The Athenians (afflicted with the disease, and with the war
now on foot, and at the hottest) thought it a dangerous mat-
ter that Lesbos, which had a navy, and was of strength entire,
should thus be added to the rest of their enemies ; and at first
received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather
feigned, because they would not have had them true.
But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mitylene, and
could not persuade them to dissolve themselves, and undo their
preparation, they then feared the worst, and would have pre-
vented them. And to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty
gallics made ready for Peloponnesus, with Cleippedes and two
other commanders. For they had been advertised that there
was a holiday of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city,
and that to the celebration thereof, the Mitylenians were accus-
tomed to come all out of the town ; and they hoped making
haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt suc-
ceeded, it was well ; if not, they might command the Mityle-
nians to deliver up their gallies, and to demolish their walls j
or they might make war against them if they refused. So these
gallies went their way. And ten gallies of Mitylene which
then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league to aid
them, the Athenians staid, and cast into prison the men that
were in them. In the mean time a certain man went from
Athens into Euboea by sea, and then by land to Geraestus, and
finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favour-
able, arrived in Mitylene three days after he set forth from
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 133
Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet.
Hereupontheynotonly went not out to Maloeis, as was expect-
ed, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where
they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.
When the Athenians not long after arrived, and saw this,
the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mitylenians what
they had in charge, which not hearkened unto, they presently
fell to the war. The Mitylenians unprovided, and compelled
to a war on such a sudden, put out some few gallies before the
haven to fight : but being driven in again by the gallies of
Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parly ; de-
siring, if they could, upon reasonable conditions, to get the
gallies for the present sent away.
And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he
also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the
whole island.
When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mitylenians
amongst others, sent to Athens one of those that had given in-
telligence there of their design, and had repented him after of
the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their
fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Withal
they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedemon, un-
discovered of the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at
anchor in Malea *, to the north of the city; being without any
confidence of their success at Athens. And these men after
an ill voyage through the wide sea, arri\ang at Lacedemon,
negociated the sending of aid from thence. But when their
ambassadors were come back from Athens without efflsct, the
Mitylenians, and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for
these together with the Lnbrians, Lemnians, and some few
other their confederates, aided the Athenians) prepared them-
selves for the war. And the Mitylenians, with the whole
strength of the city, made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and
came to a battle ; wherein though the Mitylenians had not the
worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst
trust to their strength, but retiring into the town, lay quiet
there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such
forces as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus.
For there were now come into the city, one Meleas a Laconian,
and Hermiondas a Theban, who having been sent out before
the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athe-
nian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle, entered the ha-
ven in a gaily, and persuaded them to send anotlier gaily along
♦ This Malea seemelh not to be the promontory of Malea, accordiug- to the
scholiast, which lieth to the south of Mitjleno, bnt sonic other Hearer place, and
on the north side of the city.
134 THE HISTORY book in.
with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta ; which they did.
But the Athenians, much confirmed by this the Mitylenians*
cessation, called in their confederates, who because they saw
no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner
in than it was thought they would have done ; and riding at
anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either
side one, and brought their gallies before both the ports, and
so quite excluded the Mitylenians from the use of the sea. As
for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their
camps, which was not much : and the Mitylenians and other
Lesbians, that were now come to aid them, were masters of
the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only
for their gallies, and to keep their market in. And thus pro-
ceeded the war before Mitylene.
About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians
sent likewise thirty gallies into Peloponnesus, under the con-
duct ot Asopius the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians
had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio for
general into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the
maritime country of Laconia, and then, sending back the
greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself with twelve
gallies went on to Naupactus *. And afterwards having raised
the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Oeniades,
and both entered with his gallies into the river of Achelous,
and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the
Oeniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and
sailed with gallies to Leucas, and landed his soldiers on the ter-
ritory of Neritum ; but in going off, was, by those of the coun-
try that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison
soldiers there, both himself and part of his company slain. And
having upon truce received from the Leucadians their dead bo-
dies, they went their ways.
Now the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that went out in
the first gaily, having been referred by the Lacedemonians to
the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end
they might determine of them, together with the rest of the
confederates, went to Olympia accordingly. It was that Olym-
piade f wherein Dorieus of Rhodes was the second time victor.
And when after the solemnity, they were set in council, the
ambassadors spake unto them in this manner.
The Oration of the Ambassadors of Mitylene.
* Men of Lacedemon and confederates, we know the received
* custom of the Grecians : for they that take into league such
• Lepante. f Olympiad righty-eig'liti
BOOK in. OF THE GRECIAN WAR 135
* as revolt in the wars, and relinquish a former league, though
* they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet
* accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they
' esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say
* the truth, this judgment is not without good reason, when
* they that revolt, and they from whom t!ie revolt is made,
* are mutually like-minded and affected, and equal in provision
* and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But
* now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any
* man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by
* them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of dan-
' ger. For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek
' to come into league with you, shall be to make good the jus-
* tice and honesty of our revolt. For we know there can be
* neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any com-
* munion between city and city to any purjjose whatsoever,
* without a mutual opinion of each other's honesty, and also a
* similitude of customs ptherways : for in the difference of
* minds- is grounded the diversity of actions. As for our league
* with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the
* the Medan war, and they remained to prosecute the relics
* of that business : yet we entered not such a league, as to be
* their helpers in bringing the Grecims into the senitude of the
* Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of
* the Medes. And as long as they led us as equals, we fol-
* lowed them with much zeal ; but when we saw they remitted
' their enmity against the Medes, and led us to the subjuga-
' tion of the confederates^ we could not then but be afraid.
* And the confederates througli the multitude of distinct coun-
* cils, unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell all but
* ourselves and the Chians into their subjection ; and we having
* still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed
* them to the wars ; but so, as by the examples of their former
* actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For
* it was not probable when they had subdued those, whom to-
* gether with us they took into league, but that, when they
* should be able, they would do the like also by the rest. It is
' true, that if we were now in liberty all, we niight be the bel-
* ter assured that they would forbear to innovate ; but since
* they have under them the greatest part already, in all likeli-
' hood they will take it ill to deal on equal terms with us alone ;
' and the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals :
* especially when by how much they are become stronger by
' the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are
' we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear, is the
' only band of faith in leagues ; for he that hath the will to
* transgress, j-et when he liath not the odds of strength, will
136 THE HISTORY book hi:
abstain from coming in. Now the reason why they have
left us ye^ free, is no other, but that they may have a fair co-
lour to lay upon their domination over the rest; and be-
cause it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us
in by policy than by force. For therein they made use of us
for an argument, that having equal vote with them, we
would never have followed them to the wars, if those against
whom they led us had not done the injury. And thereby
also they brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserv-
ing the strongest to the last, made them the weaker, by re-
moving the rest. Whereas if they had begun with us, when
the confederates had had both their own strength, and a side
to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Like-
wise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added
to yours, or to any other, it might have created them some
danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance toward
their commons and most eminent men from time to time.
But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering
the examples they have shewed us in the rest, if this war
should not have fallen out. What friendship then or as-
surance of liberty was this, when we received eacli other with
alienated aifections? when whilst they had wars, they for fear
courted us, and when they had peace, we for fear courted
them ? And whereas in others, good will assureth loyalty, in
us it was the effect of fear : so it was more for fear than love
that we remained their confederates ; and whomsoever secu-
rity should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or
other to break the league. Now if any man think we did
unjustly to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended,
without staying to be certain, whether they would do it or not,
he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able
to contrive evil against them, and again to defer it, as they
can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at
their discretion ? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at
pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate. Upon these
pretensions therefore, and causes, men of Lacedemon and
confederates, we have revolted ; the whicli are both clear
enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for
it, and weighty enough to affright and compel us to take some
course for our own safety ; which we would have done before,
when before the war we sent ambassadors to you about our
revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us
into your league. And now when the Boeotians invited us to
it, we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a
double revolt, one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them
mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free ;
and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 137
staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of
ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were pro-
vided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so
much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the
speedier aid, thereby the better at once both to defend those
you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof
there was never better opportunity than at this present : for
the Athenians being both with the sickness, and their great
expences consumed, and their navy divided, part upon your
own coasts, and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have
many gallies to spare, in case you again this summer invade
them both by sea and land ; but that they should either be
unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or be forced to come
off from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive
that you shall herein, at your own danger, defend the terri-
tory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the pro-
fit of it will be near you. For the war will not be, as a man
would think, in Attica, but there from whence cometh the
profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from
their confederates, which if they subdue us, will still be
greater. For neither will any other revolt, and all that i*
oiurs will accrue unto them ; and we shall be worse handlec
besides, than those that were under them before. But aiding
us with diligence you shall both add to your league a city tha
hath a great navy, (the thing you most stand in need of) an(
also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of thei
confederates ; because every one will then be more confident
to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting
such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endea-
vour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be
much the more confirmed. In reverence therefore of the
hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the
presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here, we are
in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mitylenians into
league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who (though, as
to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own) shal
bring a common profit to all Greece, if we prosper, and a
more common detriment to all the Grecians if through your
inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men, such as
the Grecians esteem you, and our fears require you to be.*
In this mariner spake the Mitylenians,
And the Lacedemonians and their confederates, when they
had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league
with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into
Attica. And to that purpose the Lacedemonians appointed
A*^^
138 THE HISTORY book in.
their confederates there present, to make as much speed as
they could with two parts of their forces into the Isthmus : and
they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the
Isthmus for the drawing up of gallies, with intention to carry
the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lieth towards
Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And
these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confede-
rates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in
of their fruits, and weary of warfare.
The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made,
upon an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see
they were deceived, as being able without stirring the fleet at
Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against
them out of Peloponnesus, manned out one hundred gallies,
and embarked therein generally, both citizens (except those of
degree of Pentacosiomedimni *, and horsemen f) and also
strangers that dwelt amongst them : and sailing to the Isth-
mus, made a shew of their strength, and landed their soldiers
in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the
Lacedemonians saw things so contrary to their expectation,
they thought it false, which was spoken by the Lesbian am-
bassadors ; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their con-
federates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the
wasting of the territory near their city, by the thirty gallies
formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went
home again ; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos,
and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty gallies, and
appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them for admi-
ral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians
gone, went likewise home with their hundred gallies.
About the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the
most gallies in action (besides the beauty of them) that ever
they had at once. But in the beginning of the war, they had
as good gallies, and also more in number. For one hundred
attended the guard of Attica, Euboea, and Salamis, and an-
other hundred were about Peloponnesus, besides those that were
at Potidsea, and in other places : so that in one summer they
had in all two hundred and fifty sail. And this, together with
Potidsea, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the
men I of arms that besieged the city, had each of them two
drachms a day, one for himself, and another for his man, and
were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first,
* A Aegree estimated by tlirir wealth, as if onr should say, men that had five
hundred chaldrons revenne, as they reckon in Scotland.
f Hofsemen, such as kept a horse to serve the state, and were valued at three
))undi-ed chaldrons.
I 'o^'irai,'a man of arms had double poy, <<>r hinisetf and for a serrant.
BOOK in. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 139
and remained to the end of the siege ; besides one thousand
six handred more, that went with Phormio, and came away
before the town was won. And the gallies had all the same
pav. In this manner was their money consumed, and so many
gallies employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned
at once.
About the same time that the Lacedemonians were in the
Isthmus, the Mitylenians marched by land, both they and their
auxiliaries, against JVfethymne, in hope to have had it betrayed
unto them ; and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded
not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antyssa,
Pyrrha, and Eressos ; and after they had settled the affairs of
those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily
home. When these were gone, the Mithymneans likewise
made war upon Antissa, but beaten by the Antissians, and
some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to
Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the
Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the
Mitylenians were masters of the land, and that their own sol-
diers there, were not enough to keep them in, sent thither,
about the beginning of autumn, Paches the son of Epicurus,
with one thousand men of arms of their own city, who supply-
ing the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mitylene, and
ingirt it with a single wall. Save that in some places, stronger
by nature than the rest, they only built turrets, and placed
guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly be-
sieged both by sea and land ; and the winter began.
The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both
contributed themselves, and sent thither two hundred talents *
of this their first contribution, and also dispatched Lysicles and
four others, with forty-two gallies, to levy money amongst the
confederates. But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro, and
gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from
Myus through the plains of Meander in Caria, as far as to the
hill Sandius, was set upon there by the Carians and Anaetians,
and himself with a great part of his soldiers slain.
The same winter the PlaUeans (for they were yet besieged
by the Peloponnesians) and Boeotians pressed now with want
of victual, and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other
means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the
Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out,
and if they could pass over the wall of the enemy by force.
The authors of this attempt, were Theaenetus the son of Timi-
das a sooth-sayer, and Eupolpidas the son of Daemachus, one
of their commanders. But half of them afterwards, by one
* Thirty.tMeii thousand fire hanJred pouach sterling-.
140 THE HISTORY book iiu
means or other, for the greatn^s of the danger, shrunk from it
again. But two hundred and twenty, or thereabouts, volunta-
rily persisted to go out, in this manner : they made them lad-
ders, fit for the height of the enemies wall ; the wall they mea-
sured by the lays of brick, on the part toward the town, where
it was not plaistered over ; and divers men at once numbered
the lays of brick, whereof though some missed, yet the greatest
part took the reckoning just.: especially, numbering them often,
and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the
part to which their ladders were to be applied ; and so by guess
of the thickness of one brick took the measure of their ladders.
As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built:
it consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea, and another
outward, in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls
were distant one from the other about sixteen feet ; and that
sixteen feet of space was between them, was disposed and built
into cabines for the watchmen, which were so joined and con-
tinued one to another, that tlie whole appeared to be one thick
wall, with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements
stood a great tower of a just breadth to comprehend both walls,
and reach from the utmost to the inmost front of the whole, so
that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but through
the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm
of rain, they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to
watch under the towers, as being not far asunder, and covered
beside overhead. Such was the form of the wall wherein the
Peloponnesians kept their watch. The Plataeans, after they were
ready, and had attended a tempestuous night, and withal moon-
less, went out of the city, and were conducted by the same men
that were with the authors of the attempt. And tirst they passed
the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to
the wall of the enemy, who because it was dark, could not see
them coming; and the noise they made as they went could not
be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on be-
sides at a good distance one from the other, that they might
not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms ; and were but
lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot, for the more
steadiness in the wet. They came thus to the battlements in
one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there
was now no watch kept there. And first came they that car-
ried the ladders, and placed them to the wall ; then twelve
lightly armed, only with a dagger and a breast-plate, went up,
led by Ammeas the son of Coraebus, who was the first that
mounted ; and they that followed him, went up into either
tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that car-
ried the darts, for whom they that came after carried targets at
their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 141
which targets they were to deliver to them when they came to
the enemv. At length, when most of them were ascended, they
were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers; for one
of the Plataeans taking hold of the battlements threw down a
tile, which made a noise in the fall, and presently there was an
alarm ; and the army run to the wall, for in the dark and stormy
night, they knew not wiiat the danger was. And the Plat<eans
that were left in the city, came forth withal, and assaulted the
wall of the Pcloponnesians on the opposite part to that where
their men went over. So that though they were all in a tumult
in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst
stir to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had
happened. But those three hundred * that were appointed to
assist the watch upon all occ-asions of need, went without the
wall, and made towards the place of the clamour. They also
held up the fires by which they used to make known the ap-
proach of enemies, towards Thebes. But then the Plataeans
likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city,
which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the
fires of the enemy insignificant ; and that the Thebans appre-
hending the matter otherwise than it was, might forbear to send
help, till their men were over, and had recovered some place of
safety.
In the mean time those Plataeans, which having scaled the
wall first, and slain the watch, were now masters of both the
towers, not only guarded his passages, by standing themselves
in the entries, but also applying ladders from the wall to the
towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies
off with shot, both from above and below. In the mean space
the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many lad-
ders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite
over between the towers, and ever as any of them got to the
other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without,
and with arrow and darts kept off those that came by the out-
side of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest
were over, then last of all, and with much ado, came thev also
down to the ditch which was in the two towers. And by this
time the three hundred that were to assist the watch, came and
set upon them, and had lights with them ; by which means the
Platseans that were on the further brink of the ditch, discerned,
them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows
and darts at their most disarmed parts. For, standing in the
dark, the light of the enemy made the Plataeans the less dis-
cernable. Insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though
* There is no mentioo of these tiiree hnndred i«bere tbc author relateth the
lajing of siege ; but it must be understood.
142 THE HISTORY
BOOK IIT.
with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over,
though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the
wind is at east, rather than at north : and the snow which fell
that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had very
much increased the water, which they waded through with
scarce their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm
was the principal means of their escape.
From the ditch the Plat&eans in troop took the way towards
Thebes, leaving on the left hand the Temple of Juno, built
by Androcrates, both for that they supposed they would least
suspect the way that led to their enemies ; and also because they
saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way,
which by mount Cithseron, and the Oakheads, led to Athens.
The Platteans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs,
forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards
the mountain to Erythrae and Hysiae, and having gotten the
hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve
persons of a greater number : for some of them returned into
the city before the rest went over ; and one of their archers was
taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave
over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Platseans
that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and
those that turned back having told them, that not a man
escaped, as soon as it was day, sent a herald to entreat a truce
for the taking up of their dead bodies ; but when they knew the
truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Platsea passed
through the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.
About the end of the same winter, Salaethus a Lacedaemonian,
was sent in a gaily to Mitylene, and coming first to Pyrrha,
and thence going to Mitylene by land, entered the city by the
dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through
the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And he told the
magistrates that Attica should again be invaded, and that the
forty gallies which were to aid them, were coming ; and that
himself was sent before, both to let them know it, and withal
to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mityle-
nians grew confident, aud hearkened less to composition with the
Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this
war written by Thucydides.
YEAR V.
In the beginning of the summer, after they had sent Alcidas
away with the forty-two gallies *, whereof he was admiral, unto
Mitylene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica ; to
the end that the Athenians troubled on both sides, might the
• It should be fori v.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 143
less send supply against the fleet, now gone to Mitylene. In
this expedition Cleomenes was general instead of Pausanias
the son of Plistoanax, who being king, was yet in minority,
and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now
cut down, both what they had before wasted and began to grow
again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted.
And this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second.
For whilst they staid to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos,
which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they
went abroad, and destroyed most part of the countr}'. But
when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing
their corn failed, they retired again, and were dissolved ac-
cording to their cities.
The Mitylenians in the mean time, seeing the fleet came
not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their vic-
tuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with
the Athenians, upon this occasion. Salsethus, when he also
expected these gallies no longer, armed the commons of the
city, who were before unarmed, with intention to have made a
saUy upon the Athenians ; but they, as soon as tliey had got-
ten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates, but holding as-
semblies by themselves, required the rich men either to bring
their corn to light, and divide it amongst them all, or else they
said they would make their composition by delivering up the
city to the Athenians.
Those that managed the state perceiving this, and unable to
binder it, knowing also their own danger, in case they were
excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to
yield the city to Paches and his army, with these conditions,
. * to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of
* Athens : and to receive the army into the city, and that the
* Mitylenians should send ambassadors to Athens about their
* own business : and that Paches till their return, should nei-
' ther put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mitylenian.'
This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mi-
tylenians as had principally practised with the Lacedemonians,
being afraid of themselves, when the army entered the city, durst
not trust to the conditions sigreed on, but took sanctuary at
the altars. But Paches having raised them upon promise to do
them no injury, sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there
till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do.
After this, he sent some gallies to Antissa, and took in that
town, and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought con-
venient.
In the mean time, those forty gallies of Peloponnesus which
should have made all possible haste, trifled away the time about
Pebponnesus, and making small speed in the rest of their
144 THE HISTORY book ut.
navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at
Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconum, they
got first intelligence of the loss of Mitylene. But to know the
truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus in J3ry-
thraea. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mi-
tylene, that they arrived at Embatus, where understanding the
certainty, they went to counsel about what they were to do
upon the present occasion, and Teutiaplus an Elean delivered
his opinion to this effect.
, ' Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Pelopon-
* nesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go
' to Mitylene, as we are, before advice be given of our arrival.
' (For in all probability, we shall find the city, in respect they
* have but lately won it, very weakly guarded) and to the sea,
* (where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong)
' not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers
' are dispersed, some in one house, and some in another, care-
* lessly as victors. Therefore if we fall upon them suddenly,
' and by night, I think, with the help of those within (if any
* be left there that will take our part) we may be able to possess
* ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger, if
' we but think this, that all stratagems of war whatsoever are
' no more, but such occasions as this, which if a commander
' avoid in himself, and take the advantage of them in tiie enemy,
' he shall for the most part have good success.' Thus said lie,
but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of
Ionia, and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet,
gave him counsel, ' that seeing he feared the danger of this,
* he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume in iEolia, that
* having some town for the seat of the war,^hey might from
' thence force Ionia to revolt, whereof there was hope, because
' the lonians would not be unwilling to see him there. And if
' they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great re-
' venue, and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them,
* it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said
' besides, that they thought they should be able to get Pissuth-
' nes, to join with them in the war.'
But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to
this opinion, that since they were come too late to Mitylene,
they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus. Where-
upon putting ofl^ from Embatus, he sailed by the shore of My-
onnesus of the Talans, and there slew most of the prisoners he
had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus, and
thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anfea,
and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Gre-
cians at liberty, to kill such as had not lift up their hands
against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians,
BOOK III. OF TilL CtRECIAN WAR. I-I5
but confederates to the Athenians by constraint. And that
unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the
enemies his friends ; but many now friends, to become his ene-
mies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors, he set
tlie Chians, and some others, all that he had left ali\e, at li-
berty. For when men saw their fleet, they never flew from it,
but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the
Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst
have put over to Ionia.
From Ephesus, Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled ; for
he had been descried by the Salaminia *, and the Paralus (which
by chance were then in their course for Athens,) whilst he lay
at anchor about Chu-os, and fearing to be chased kept the wide
sea, meaning by liis good will to touch no land, till he came
into Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches
fi-om divers places, especially from Erythraea : for the cities of
Ionia being unwalled, were afraid extremely, lest the Pelopon-
nesians sailing by, without intention to stay, should have pil-
laged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralus
having seen him at Claros, brought the news themselves. And
Paches thereupon made great haste after, and followed him as
far as Latmos f the island : but when he saw he could not
reach him, he came back again, and thought he had a good
turn, seeing he could not overtake those gallics upon the wide
sea, that the same were not compelled, by being taken in some
place near land, to fortify themselves, and so to give him occa-
sion with guards and galHes, to attend them.
As he came by, in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of
the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and in-
habited, after the town above J, through their own sedition,
was taken by Itamanes and the Barbarians. This town was
taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by
the Peloponnesians. They then that came down, and dwelt in
Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having pro-
cured some forces, Arcadians and Barbarians of Pissuthnes,
kept them in a j)art of the town which they had severed from the
rest with a wall ; and there, with such of the Colophonians
of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered
with them, they governed the city at their pleasure : and
the other part which went out from these, and were the fu-
gitives, brought in Paches. He, when he had c.illed out
Hippias, captain of the Arcadians that were within the said
• The uame of two gillies of Athens.
t In disijnctioii to Latmus the mountain. But I can find no mention of this
Lalnius the island in any of the geographer*.
I The city of Colophoa, two miles higher into (be land.
146 THE HISTORY book hi.
wall, with promise, if they should not agree, to set him safe
and sound within the wall again ; and Hippias was thereupon
come to him, committed him to custody, but without bonds ;
and withal assaulting the wall on a sudden when they ex-
pected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and
Barbarians as were within. And when he had done, brought
Hippias in again, according as he had promised. But after
he had him there, laid hold on him, and caused him to be
shot to death ; and restored Notium to the Colophonians,
excluding only such as had medized. Afterwards the Athe-
nians, sent governors to Notium of their own, and having ga-
thered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever,
seated them there under the law of the Athenians.
Paches, when he came back to Mitylene, took in Pyrrha
and Eressus ; and having found Salaethus the Lacedemonian
hidden in Mitylene, apprehended him, and sent him, together
with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whom-
soever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He
likewise sent away the greatest part of his army, and with the
rest staid and settled the state of Mitylene, and the rest of
Lesbos, as he thought convenient.
These men, and Salaethus with them, being arrived at Athens,
the Athenians slew Salaethus presently, though he made tiiem
many offers, and amongst other, to get the army of the Pelo-
ponnesians to rise from before Plataea, (for it was yet besieged)
but upon the rest they went to council, and in tlieir passion de-
creed to put thein to death ; not only those men there present,
but also all the men of Mitylene that were of age, and to make
slaves of the women and children : laying to their charge the
revolt itself, in ,that they revolted not, being in subjection as
others were : and withal the Peloponnesian fleet, which durst
enter into Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that
commotion. For by tiiat it seemed that the revolt was not
made without much premeditation. They tiierefore sent a
gaily to inform Paciies of their decree, with command to put
tlie Mitylenians presently to death. But the next day they
felt a kind of repentance in themselves, and began to con-
sider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the
authors only, but tlie whole city should be destroyed. Which
when the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that were there
present, and such Athenians as favoured them understood, they
wrought with those tiiat bare office to bring the matter again
into debate ; wherein they easily prevailed, for as much as to
them also it was well known, that the most of the city were
desirous to have means to consult of the same anew. The as-
sembly being presently met, amongst the opinions of divers
others, Cleon also, the son of Cleaenetus, who in the former assem-
BOOK III. OF THK GRECIAN WAR. 147
Wy had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most
violent, and with the people at that time far the most powerful,
stood forth, and said in this manner :
The Oration ofCleon.
* I have often on other occeisions thought a democracy inca-
pable of dominion over others ; but most of all now, for this
your repentance concerning the Mitylenians. For through
your own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same
also in your confederates, and consider not, that when at their
persuasion you commit an error, or relent upon compassion, you
are softened thus, to the danger of the commonwealth, not to
the winning of the aftections of your confederates. Nor do you
consider, that your government is a t\Tanny, and those that
be subject to it, are against their wills so, and plotting conti-
nually against you, and obey you not for any good turn, which
to your own detriment you shall do them, but only for that you
exceed them in strength, and for no good will. But the worst
mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree shall stand firm,
and that we will not know, that a city with the worse laws,
if immoveable, is better than one with good laws, when they be
not binding ; and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty,
is more profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance ;
and that the more ignorant sort of men do for the most part
better regulate a commonwealth, than they that are wiser.
For these love to appear wiser than the laws, and in all public
debatings to carry the victory, as the worthiest things wherein to
shew their wisdom ; from whence most commonly proceedeth
the ruin of the states they live in. Whereas the other sort,
mistrusting their own wits, are content to be esteemed not so
wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is well spoken
by another 5 and so making themselves equal judges, rather
than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part
well. We therefore should do the like, and not be carried
away with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such coun-
sel to your multitude, as in our own judgments we think not
good. For my own part I am of the opinion I was before ;
and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of
the Mitylenians in question again, and thereby cause delay,
which is the advantage only of them that do the injury. For
the sufferer by this means comes upon the doer with his anger
dulled ; whereas revenge, the opposite of injury, is then great-
est, when it follows presently. 1 do wonder also what he is
that shall stand up now to contradict me, and shall think to
prove that the injuries done us by the Mitylenians, are good
for us, or that our calamities are any damage to our confede-
rates. For certainly he must either trust in his eloquence, to
make you believe that that which was decreed was not decreed ;
/
148 THE HISTORY book hi,
* or, moved with lucre, must with some elaborate speech endea-
* vour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence]
^ as these, the city giveth the prizes to others, but the danger
' that thence proceedeth, she herself sustaineth. And of all this
' you yourselves are the cause, by the evil institution of these
* matches, in that you use to be spectators of words, and hear-
' ers of actions, beholding future actions in the words of them
* that speak well, as possible to come to pass ; and actions al-
' ready past, in the orations of such as make the most of them,
' and that with such assurance, as if what you saw with your eyes,
* were not more certain than what you hear related. You are
' excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain,
' but backward to follow any tried advice : slaves to strange
' things, contemners of things usual. You would every one
' chiefly give the best advice, but if you cannot, then you will
^ contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come
' after with your opinion ; but rather if any thing be acutely
' spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready apprehenders of
' what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the
^ sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, some-
* what else than what our life is conversant in ; and yet you
' sufficiently understand not that that is before your eyes. And to
* speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are
^ rather like unto spectators, sitting to hear the contentions of
' sophisters, tlian to men that deliberate the state of a common-
* wealth. To put you out of this humour, I say unto you, that
* the Mitylenians have done us more injury, than ever did any
' one city. For those that have revolted through the over-hard
' pressure of our government, or that have been compelled to
* it by the enemy, I pardon them ; but they that were islanders,
' and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our ene-
* mies, but only by sea ; in which case also they were armed
' for them with sufficient provision of gallies ; and they that
* were permitted to have their own laws, and whom we princi-
' pally honoured, and yet have done thus ; what have they
* done but conspired against us, and rather warred upon us,
* than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffi^T
* violence) and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us ?
' This is far worse than if they had warred against us for in-
* creasing of their own power. But these men would neither take
' example by their neighbours calamity, who are, all that re-
* volted, already subdued by us, nor could their own present
* felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery. But
* being bold against future events, and aiming at matters above
* their strength, though below their desires, have taken arms
* against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner
' they thought they might get the victory, but immediately,
BOOR 111. OF THE GRLCIAN WAR. 149
though without injury against them, they rose against us. But
with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity, it is
usual to turn insolent. Whereas most commonly that pros-
perity whicii is attained according to the course of reason, is
more' firm than that which cometh imhoped for. And such
cities, as one may say, do more easily keep off* an adverse, than
maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly
have done any honour, more to the Mitylenians, than to the
rest of our confederates ; for then tliey had never come to this
degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to contemn
those that observe them, and to have in admiration such as
will not give them way. Now therefore let them be punished
according to their wicked dealing ; and let not the fault be
laid upon a few, and the people be absolved ; for they have
all alike taken arms against us. And the commons, if they
had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have
recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming
it the safer adventure, to join with the few, are alike with
them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration, your
confederates; and if you inflict the same punishment on them
that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on
them that revolt of their own accord : who think you will not
revolt, though on light pretence ; seeing that speeding they
win their liberty, and failing, their case is not incurable? Be-
sides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard both
of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success,
we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that, wherein our
strength lieth, the revenue of it ; but miscarrying, we add
these enemies to our former ; and must spend that time in
warring against our own confederates, which we needed to
employ against the enemies we have already. We must not
therefore give our confederates hope of pardon, either impe-
trable by words, or purchasable by money, as if their errors
were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For
these didusnotaninjurv- unwillingly, but wittingly, conspired
against us ; whereas it ought to be involuntary, whatsoever
is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I
maintain, that you ought n t to alter your former decree, nor
to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things
to empire, pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As
for pity, it is just to shew it on them that are like to us, and
will have pity again ; but not upon such as not only would
not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been
our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that de-
light you with their orations, let them play their prizes in mat-
ters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little
pleasure, must suffer a great damage, but they for their well
150 THE HISTORY book ur.
* speaking, must well have *. Lastly for lenity, it is to be used
* towards tiiose that will be our friends hereafter, rather than
* towards such, as being suffered to live, will still be as they
' are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum I say only this,
* that if you follow my advice, you shall do that, which is both
* just in respect of the Mitylenians, and profitable for your-
* selves; whereas if you decree otherwise, you do not gra-
* tify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have just-
* ly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over
' them. Nay, though your dominion be against reason, yet
' if you resolve to liold it, you must also, as a matter con-
^ ducing thereunto, against reason punish them ; or else you
* must give your dominion over, that you may be good without
* danger. But if you consider what was likely they would have
* done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them
* worthy the same punishment ; nor be less sensible you that
' have escaped^ than they that have conspired ; especially they
' having done the injury first. For such as do an injury with-
' out precedent cause, persecute most, and even to the death,
* him they have done it to ; as jealous of the danger his remain-
* ing enemy may create him. For he that is wronged without
* cause, and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel, than if it
' were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not there-
' fore betray ourselves, but in contemplation of what you are
' near suffering, and how you once prized above all things else,
* to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be
* not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the
' danger that hung over our own heads so lately : give not only
' unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest
* of our confederates a clear example, that death is their sen-
* tence, whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know,
' you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies,
' and fight against your own confederates.'
To this purpose spake Clean.
After him, Diodotus the son of Eucrates, who also in the
former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mitylenians
to death, stood forth, and spake as followeth.
The Oration of Diodotus.
* I will neither blame those who have propounded the business
' of the Mitylenians, to be again debated, nor commend those
* that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great import-
* Meauiiig- tlint tlie orators ure bribed and hired to give counsel to the com-
monwealtli, accordinf' to the desire of other klatcs.
BOOK HI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 15 T
' ance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good
* counsel as these two, haste and anger : whereof the one is ever
* accompanied with madness, and the other with want of judg-
' ment. And whosoever maintaineth, that words are not in-
* structors to deeds, either he is not wise, or doth it upon some
* private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that fu-
* ture and not apparent things, may be demonstrated otherwise
' than by words : interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter,
* and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he
* go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calum-
* niation. But they, of all others, are most intolerable, that
* when men give public advice, will accuse them also of briber}'.
* For if they charge a man with no more but ignorance, when
* he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion
* of a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his coun-
* sel take place, he is still suspected, and if it do not take
* place, he shall be lield not only a fool, but also void of ho-
* nesty. The common-wealth gets no good by such courses ;
' for through fear hereof it will want counsellors, and the state
* would do their business for the most part well, if this kind of
* citizens were they that had the least ability in speaking ; for
' they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For
^ a good statesman should not go about to terrify those that
' contradict him, but rather to make good his counsel upon li-
' berty of speech. And a wise state ought not, either to add
* unto, or on the other side, to derogate from the honour of
* him that giveth good advice ; nor yet punish, nay nor dis-
* grace the man whose counsel they receive not. And then nei-
* ther would he that lighteth on g(K)d advice, deliver any thing
* against his own conscience, out of ambition of further ho-
* nour, and to please the auditory ; nor he that doth not, covet
* thereupon by gratifying the people some way or other, that he
* also may eadear them. But we do here the contrary, and be-
* sides if any nwn be siRpected of corruption, though he give
* the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy, {ot this
* uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the
* common-wealth. And our custom is to hold good counsel
* given suddenly no less suspected, than bad. By which means,
* as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must get the
' same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound
* advice, is forced by Iving to get himself believed. So that the
* eommon-wealth is it alone, which by reason of these suspici-
* ous imaginations, no man can possibly benefit, by the plain
' and open way, without artifice. For if any man shall do a
' manifest good unto the common-wealth, he shall presently be
* suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular. We
' therefore, that in the most important affairs, and amidst these
152 THE HISTORY book in.
' jealousies, do give you advice, have need to foresee farther
' than you that look not far ; and the rather because we stand
* accountable for our counsel, and you are to render no account
' of your hearing it. For If the persuader and the persuaded
' had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges.
' But now, according to the passion tliat takes you, when at
' any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that
' one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of
* your own, that were in fault as well as his. For my own
* part, I stood not forth with any purpose of contradiction, in
' the business of the MItylenians, nor to accuse any man. For
' we contend not now. If we be wise, about the injury done by
* them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how
^ great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have
* them put to death, unless it be for our profit ; nor yet would
* I pardon them, though they were pardonable, unless it be
* good for the common-wealth. And In my opinion, our de-
' liberation now is of the future, rather than of the present.
* And whereas Cleon contendeth, that it will be profitable for
' the future, to put them to death, in that it will keep the rest
' from rebelling, 1 contending likewise for the future, affirm the
' contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit of my
' advice, for the fair pretexts of his, which agreeing more with
* your present anger against the MItylenians, may quickly per-
* haps win your consent. We plead not judicially vvlth the Mi-
' tylenians, so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult
* of them, which way we may serve ourselves of tliem to our
'■ most advantage hereafter. ' I say therefore, that death hath
* been In states ordained for a punishment of many offences,
^ and those not, so great, but far less than this. Yet encou-
) _ * raged by hope, men hazard themselves. Nor did any man
y? ^ ' ever yet enter into a practice, which he knew he could not go
* through with. And a city when it revolteth, supposeth it-
* self to be better furnished either of themselves, or by their
* confederates, than It Is, or else it would never take the enter-
* prise in hand. Thay have it by nature, both men and cities
* to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it.
'^ For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augment-
* ing them still. In hope to be less annoyed by malefactors ;
* and It Is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old,
* even upon the most heinous crimes ; but that in tract of time,
* men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards
* to the taking away of life ; and yet they still transgress. And
' therefore either some greater terror than death must be dc-
^ vised, or death will not be enough for coertion. For poverty
* will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetous-
* ness to pride and contempt. And the other (middle) fortunes.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 153
' they also through human passion, according as they are se-
' ver'ally subject" to some insuperable one or other, impel
' men to danger. But hope and desire work this effect in all
' estates. And this as the leader, that as the companion ; this
* contriving the enterprise, that suggesting the success ; are the
' cause of most crimes that are committed : and being least dis-
* cerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides
' these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as any
* thing else : for presenting herself sometimes unlooked for, she
* provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they
* ought for the purpose : and especially cities, because they
' venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion
' over others ; and amongst a generality, every one, though
* witiiout reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in par-
' ticular. In a word, it is a thing impossible, and of great sim-
* plicity to believe, when human nature is earnestly bent to do
' a thing:, that by force of law, or any other danger, it can be_
* diverted. We must not therefore, relying on the security of
' capital punishment, decree the worst against them, nor make
' them desperate, as if there were no place to repent, and as
* soon as they can to cancel their offence. For observe, if a
* city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would
' now compound, whilst it were able both to pay us our charges
* for the present, and our tribute for the time to come. But
* the way that Cleon prescribeth, what city, think you, would
* not provide itself better than this did, and endure the siege to
' the very last, if to compound late and soon be all one ? And
* how can it be but detriment to us, to be at the charge of long
* sieges, through their obstinacy, and when we have taken a
* city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the
* future ? And this revenue is the only strength we have against
' our enemies. We are not tiien to be exact judges in the pu-
* nition of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate
^ punishment we may have our confederate cities, such as they
* may be able to pay us tribute ; and not think to keep them
* in awe by the rigor of laws, but by the providence of our own
' actions. But we to the contrary, when we recover a city,
' which having been free, and held under our obedience by
* force, hath revolted justly, think now, that we ought to inflict
* some cruel punishment upon them ; whereas we ought rather,
* not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to
* look to it before it revolt, and to prevent the intention of itj
* but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as
' few as we can. Consider also, if you follow the advice of
* Cleon, how much you shall offond likewise in this other point.
' For in all your cities, the commonality are now your friends,
* and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to
' it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that cause
154 THE HISTORY
BOOK in.
' the revolt ; whereby when you go to war, you have the com-
* mons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall de-
* stroy the commonality of the Mitylenians, which did neither
' partake of tlie revolt, and as soon as they were armed, pre-
* sently delivered the city into your hands, you shall first do
* unjustly to kill such as have done you service, and you shall
' eftect a work besides, which the great men do every where
' most desire. For when they have made a city to revolt, they
* shall have the people presently on their side; you having fore-
* shewn them by the example, tliat both the guilty and not
* guilty must undergo the same punishment.
' Whereas indeed, though they were guilty, yet we ought
' to dissemble it, to the end that the only party (now our
' friend) may not become our enemy. And for the assur-
' ing of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily
* to put up with an injury, than justly to destroy such as we
^ should not. And that same, both justice and profit of re-
* venge alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together
* in the same thing.
' You therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course,
* not upon compassion, or lenity, (for neither would 1 have you
' won by that) but upon consideration of what hath been ad-
' vised, be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own
* leisure, against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty,
' and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both
* good for the future, and also of present terror to the enemy.
' For he that consulteth wisely, is a sorer enemy than he that
' assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.'
Thus spoke Diodotus.
After these two opinions were delivered, the one most oppo-
site to the other, the Athenians were at contention which they
should decree ; and at the holding up of hands, they Mere both
sides almost equal : but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed.
Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another gaily,
lest not arriving before the former, they should find the city
already destroyed. The first gaily set forth before the second
a day and a night. But the Mitylenian ambassadors having
furnished tliis latter with wine and barley-cakes, and promised
them great rewards, if they overtook the other gaily ; they
rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their
oars, and taking their refection of the said barley-cakes steeped
in wine and oil : and by turns part of them slept, and the other
part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against
them ; and the former gaily making no great haste, as going
on so sad an errand, whereas the latter proceeded in the man-
ner before mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much,
as Paches had read the sentence, and prepared to execute what
they had decreed. But presently after came in the other gaily,
BOOK in. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 155
and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the
Mitylenians to the danger.
But those whom Paches had sent home, as most culpable of
the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death ;
being in number somewhat above a thousand.
They also razed the walls of Mitylene, and took from them
all their gallies. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no
more tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the
Methvmneans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of
those parts, of the choisest land, they consecrated to tiie gods.
And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to
possess it, of whom the Lesbians at the rent of two mins * of
silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by
themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns also as the
Mitylenians were masters of in the continent, which were af-
terwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended
the business touching Lesbos.
The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athe-
nians under the conduct of Nicias the son of Niceratus, made
war on Minoa, an island adjacent to Megara. For the Mega-
reans had built a tower in it, and served themselves of the
island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the
Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara in that island,
as being nearer, and no more at Budorus and Salamis ; to the
end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with
their gallies undescried, nor send out pirates as they had for-
merly done, and to prohibit the importation of all things to the
Megareans by sea. Wherefore when he had first taken two
towers that stood out from Nisaea, with engines applied from
the sea, and so made a free entrance for his gallies between the
island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the
continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge
over the marishes, for it was not far distant from the main
land. And that being in few days finished, he built a fort in
the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, carried the rest
of his army back.
It happened also about the same time of this summer, that
the Platseans having s|)ent their victual, and being unable
longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Pe-
loponnesians. The Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but
they within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Liacedemo-
nian commander perceiving their wccikness would not take
the place by force, (for he had command to that purpose from
Lacedemon, to the end that if they should ever make peace
\\ith the Athenians, with conditions of mutual restitution of such
* Six pound* ive shillings sterliDg.
156 THE HISTORY
BOOK III.
cities as on either side had been taken by war, Platfea^ as liavinj^
come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable,)
but sent a herald to them, who demanded, whether or no they
would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lace-
demonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish
the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the he-
rald : and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up
the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Plata?ans
food for certain days, till the judges, wiiich were five, should
arrive from Lacedcmon. And when they were come, no accu-
sation was exhibited, but calling them man by man, they asked
of every one only tliis question : ' wliether they had done to
* the Lacedemonians and their confederates in this war, any
* good service ?' But the Plata^ans having sued to make their
answer more at large, and having appointed Astymachus the
son of Asopolaus, and Lacon the son of Adimnestus (who had
been heretofore the host of the Lacedemonians) for their
speakers, said as folio weth :
The Oration of the Plutccans.
' Men of Lacedemon, relying upon you, we yielded up our
' city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal
* manner of proceeding, and we agreed not to stand to the
* judgment of others, (as now we do) but of yourselves only;
' conceiving we should so obtain tlie better justice. But now
* we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason
' to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you the judges
* partial. Gathering so much, both from that, that there hath
' not been presented any accusation to which we might answer,
* and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such
' as if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against our-
* selves ; and*be easily convinced, if we lie. But since we are
' on all hands in a straight, we are forced (and it seems our
' safest way,) to try what we can obtain by pleading. For, for
* men in our case, thq speech not spoken may give occasion to
^ some to think, that spoken, it had preserved us. But besides
* other inconveniences, the means also of persuasion go ill on
' our side : for if we had not known one another, we might
* have helped ourselves by producing testimony in things you
' knew not. Whereas now all that we shall say, will be before
* men that know already what it is. And we fear not that you
' mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves, to
* make that a crime, but lest you bring us to a judgment al-
' ready judged, to gratify some body else. Nevertheless we
* will produce our reasons of equity against the quarrel of the
* Thebans, and withal make mention of our services done, both
BOOK. III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 157
* to you and to the rest of Greece, and make trial, if by any
* means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory,
* whether we have any way done good in this present war to
* the Lacedemonians and their confederates or not ? if you ask
* us as enemies, we say, that if we have done them no good,
* we have also done them no wrong. If you ask us as friends,
* then we say, that they rather have done us the injury, in that
* they made war upon us. But in the time of the peace, and
* in the war against the Medes, we behaved ourselves well ; for
' the one we brake not first, and in the other, we were the only
* Boeotians that joined with you for the delivery of Greece.
* For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by sea at
* Arteniisium, and in the battle fought in this our own terri-
* tory we were with you; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians
* in those times underwent, we were partakers of all, even be-
* yond our strength. And unto you Lacedemonians in parti-
* cular, when Sparta was in greatest affright after the earth-
' quake, upon the rebelhon of the Helots, and seizing of
* Ithome, we sent the third part of our power to assist you,
* which you have no reason to forget. Such then we shewed
* ourselves in those ancient and most important affairs. It is
' true, we have been your enemies since, but for that you are
* to blame yourselves : for when oppressed by the Thebans we
* sought league of you, you rejected us, and bade us go to the
' Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off:
* nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor were to have
^ suffered at our hands any thing that misbecame us. And if
' we denied to revolt from the Athenians, when you bade us,
' we did you no injury in it : for they both aided us against the
* Thebans, when you shrunk from us ; and it was now no more
* any honesty to betray tl)em : especially having been well used
* by them, and we ourselves, having sought their league, and
' been made denizens also of their city. Nay, we ought ra-
* ther to have followed them in all their commands with ala-
* crity. When you, or the Athenians have the leading of the
* confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpa-
' ble, but you that lead to the evil. The Thebans have done
^ us many other injuries; but this last, which is the cause of
* what we now suffer, you yourselves know what it was. For
* we avenged us but justly of tiiose that in time of peace, and
* upon the day of our Novilunial Sacrifice, had surprised our
* city ; and by tlie law of all nations it is lawful to repel an as-
* sailing enemy ; and therefore there is no reason you should
' punish us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by
* your and their present benefit in the war, it will manifestly^
* appear, that you are not judges of the truth, but respecters
* only of your profit. And yet if the Thebans seem profitable
168 THE HISTORY
BOOK HI,
to you now, we and the rest of the Grecians were more pro-
fitable to you then, when you were in greater danger. For
though the Thebans are now on your side when you invade
others, yet at that time when the Barbarian came in to im-
pose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that
with our present offence (if we have committed any) to com-
pare our forwardness then ; which you will find both greater
than our fault, and augmented also by the circumstance of
such a season, when it was rare to find any Grecian that
durst oppose his valour to Xerxes' power ; and when they
were most commended, not that with safety helped to further
his invasion, but that adventured to do what was most honest,
though with danger. But we being of that number, and ho-
noured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall
be now a cause for our destruction, as having chosen rather
to follow the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But you
should ever have the same opinion, in the same case ; and
think this only to be profitable, that doing what is useful for
the present occasion, you reserve withal a constant acknow-
ledgment of the virtue of your good confederates. Consider
also that you are an example of honest dealing * to the most
of the Grecians. Now if you shall decree otherwise than is
just, (for this judgment of yours is conspicuous) you that be
praised against us that be not blamed, take heed that they do
not dislike that good men should undergo an unjust sentence,
though at the hands of better men ; or that the spoil of us
that have done the Grecians service, should be dedicated in
their temples. For it will be thought a horrible matter that
Platasa should be destroyed by the Lacedemonians, and that
you, whereas your fathers in honour of our valour, inscribed
the name of our city on the Tripode at Delphi, should now
blot it out of all Greece to gratify the Thebans. For we have
proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes had
prevailed, we must have perished then ; and now the Thebans
have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest
friends, and have put us to two great hazards, one before of
famishing if we yielded not, and another of a capital sentence.
And we Plataeans, who even beyond our strength have been
zealous in the defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned,
and left unrelieved by them all. But we beseech you for those
gods' sakes, in whose names once we made a mutual league,
and for our valour's sake shewn in the behalf of the Grecians,
to be moved towards us, and (if at the persuasion of the The-
* It dotli not appear by any thing' iii the time of tliis war, that the Lacedemo-
nians deserved any reputation for justice, but contrarily they appear by thiii and
divers oilier actions, not to have esteemed of justice at all when it crossed their
own interest or passion.
BOOK ni. OF THE GRECIAN WAR 159
* bans, you have determined ought against us,) to change your
* minds, and reciprocally to require at the hands of the The-
^ bans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare, they would
* be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest benefit in
' recompence of a wicked one, and not to bestow pleasure upon
* others, and receive wickedness upon yourselves in exchange.
* For though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done,
* yet to make the infamy of it cease, will be work enough.
* For being none of your enemies, but well-willers, and such
* as have entered into the war upon constraint, you cannot put
' us to death with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncor-
* ruptly, you ought to secure our persons, and to remember
* that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and
* with hands upheld (and it is the law among Grecians not to
* put such to death,) besides that, we have from time to time
* been beneficial to you : for look upon the sepulchres of your
* fatiiers, whom slain by the Medes, and buried in this territory
* of ours, we have yearly honoured at the public charge, both
* with vestments and other rites ; and of such things as our
* land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits
' of it all, as friends in amicable land, and confederates use to
* do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms.
* But now by a wrong sentence, you shall do the contrary of
' this. For consider this : Pausanias, as he thought, interred
* these men in amicable ground, and amongst their friends :
* but you, if you slay us, and of Plataeis make Thebais, what do
* you but leave your fathers and kindred deprived of the ho-
* nours they now have, in an hostile territory, and amongst the
* very men that slew them ? And moreover put into servitude
* that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty ; and
* make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they
* prevailed against the Medes : and destroy the patrial sacri-
' fices which were instituted by the builders and founders of
* the same.
* These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedemon,
* nor to violate the common institutions of Greece, and wrong
* your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you ser-
* vice, for the hatred of another, when you have received no in-
* jury from us yourselves. But to spare our lives, to relent, to
* have a moderate compassion, in contemplation not only of
* the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that
* sufTer, and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and
* that undeservedly ; which we (as becometh us, and our need
* compelleth us to do) cry aloud unto the common gods
' of Greece to persuade you unto; producing the oath sworn
* by your fathers, to put you in mind ; and also we become
' here, sanctuary men, at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying
160 THE HISTORY book m.
* out upon the dead, not to suffer themselves to be in the
* power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be
* betrayed into the liands of their greatest enemies ; remem-
' bering them of that day, upon which, tliough we have done
' glorious acts in iheir company, yet we are in danger at this
' day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of
* speaking (which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in
' our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon af-
* ter,) for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans
* that we rendered our city (for we would rather have died of
' famine, the most base perdition of all other) but we came
^ out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot
* persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were
' in, and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also
' we require you, men of Lacedemon, not only to deliver us
' Plataeans who have been most zealous in the service of the
' Grecians, especially being sanctuary men, out of your own
* hands, and your own trust, into the hands of our most mortal
* enemies the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not
* to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Gre-
* cians.'
T/ius spake the Platcsans.
But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedemonians might re-
lent at their oration, stood forth and said, * That since the Pla-
* tjeans had had the liberty of a longer speech (which they thought
' they should not) than for answer to the question was neccs-
' sary, they also desired to speak :' and being commanded to
say on, spake to this effect :
The Oratio7i of the Thebans.
* If these men had answered briefly to the question, and
' not both turned against us with an accusation, and also
* out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged,
' made much apology and commendation of themselves iu
* things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak ; but
* as it is, we are to the one point to answer, and to confute the
* other, that neither the faults of us, nor their own reputation
* may do them good, but your sentence may be guided, by
' hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and
' them arose first from this ; that when we had built Platfea
* last of all the cities of Boeotia, together with some other
* places, which, having driven out the promiscuous nations, we
* had then in our dominion, they would not (as was ordained at
* first) allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of
* all the Boeotians that transgressed the common ordinance of
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 161
the country, when they should have been compelled to their
dutv, they turned unto the Athenians, and together with them
did as many evils, for which they likewise suffered as many
from us. But when the Barbarians invaded Greece, then
(say they) that they, of all the Boeotians only also medized
not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most
themselves and most detract from us. Now we confess they
medized not, because also the Athenians did not. Neverthe-
less when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the
Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Boeotians they only
atticized. But take now into your consideration withal, what
form of government we were in, both the one and the other,
when we did this. For then had we our city governed, nei-
ther by an oligarchy, with laws common to all, nor by a
democracy, but the state was managed by a few with autho-
rity absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to
laws, and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny.
And these few, hoping yet further, if the Medes prevailed,'
to increase their own power, kept the people under, and
furthered the coming of the Barbarian. And so did the
whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it
deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no
laws, [but were at the will of others.] But when the Medes
were gone, and our city had laws, consider now, Avhen the
Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory
of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had got-
ten many places already, whether by giving them battle at
Coronea and defeating them, we delivered not Boeotia from
servitude then, and do not also now with much zeal assist
you in the asserting of the rest and find not more horses, and
more provision of war, than any of the confederates besides.
And so much be spoken by way of apology to our raedizing.
And we will endeavour to prove now, that the Grecians have been
rather wronged by you, and that you are more worthy of all'
manner of punishment. You became, (you say) confede-
rates and denizens of Athens, for to be righted against us ;
against us then only the Athenians should have come with
you, and not you with them have gone to the invasion of the
rest; especially when if the Athenians would have led you
whither you would not, you had the league of the Lacedemo-
nians made with you against the Medes (which you so often
objected) to have resorted unto; which was sufficient not
only to have protected you from us, but which is the main
matter, to have secured you to take what course you had
pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you rather
chose to follow the Athenians. And you say it had been a
dishonest thing to have betrayed your benefactors : but it is
M
162 THE HISTORY book in.
^ more dishonest, and more unjust by far, to betray the Gre-
j cians universally, to whom you have sworn, than to betray
J the Athenians alone ; especially when these go about to de-
liver Greece from subjection, and the other to subdue it.
* Besides, the requital you make the Athenians, is not propor-
' tionable, nor free from dishonesty ; for you (as you say your-
* selves) brought in the Athenians to right you against inju-
* ries, and you co-operate with them in injuring others. And
* howsoever, it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited,
* as to make such a requital, as though justly due, cannot be
' justly done. But you have made it apparent, that even then
* it was not for the Grecians' sake, that you alone of all the
* Boeotians, medized not, but because the Athenians did not ;
' yet now, you that would do as the Athenians did, and con-
* trary to what the Grecians did, claim favour of these, for what
' you did for the others' sake. But there is no reason for that ;
* but as you have chosen the Athenians, so let them help you
* in this trial. And produce not the oath of the former league,
* as if that should save you now ; for you have relinquished it,
* and contrary to the same, have rather helped the Athenians to
* subdue the iEginetje, and others, than hindered them from it.
* And this you not only did voluntarily, and having laws, the
* same you have now, and none forcing you to it, as there did
* us, but also rejected our last invitation, (a little before the
* shutting up of your city) to quietness and neutrality. Who
' can therefore more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in ge-
* neral than you, that pretend honesty to tiieir rutn ? And
* those acts wherein formerly (as you say) you have been bene-
* ficial to the Grecians, you have now made apparent to be
* none of yours, and made true proof of what your own nature
* inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in
* the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open
* touching our involuntary medizing, and your voluntary atti-
* cizing.
' And for this last injury you charge us with, namely the un-
* lawful invading of your city in time of peace, and of your
* New Moon Sacrifice, we do not think, no not in this action, that
* we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we
* had done unjustly if we had assaulted your city, or wasted
' your territory as enemies, of our own accord ; yet when the
* prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility,
* willing to discharge you of foreign league, and conform you
< to the common institutions of all Boeotia, did of their own
« accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then ? For they
* that lead transgress, rather than they that follow. But as we
' conceive, neither tliey nor we have transgressed at all. But
* being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard.
BOOK ni. O]^ THE GRECIAN WAR. 163
they opened their own gates, and took us into the city as
friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill-aflected
from being worse, and to do right to the good : taking upon
them to be moderators of your councils, and not to deprive
the city of your persons ; but to reduce you into one body
with the rest of your kindred ; and not to engage you in hos-
tility witli any, but to settle you in peace with all-
' And for an argument that we did not this as enemies, we
did harm to no man ; but proclaimed, that if any man were
willing to have the city governed after the common form of
all Boeotia, he should come to us. And you came willingly
at first, and were quiet ; but afterwards when you knew we
were but few, (though we might seem to have done some-
what more then was fit to do, without the consent of your mul-
titude) you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate no-
thing in fact, and then with words persuade us to go forth
again, but contrary to the compisitioo, assaulted us. And
for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much
(for they suffered by a kind of law) but to kill those that held
up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive, you afterwards
had promised to spare, was not this a horrid cruelty ? You
committed in this business three crimes, one in the neck of
another : first the breach of the composition, then the death
that followed of our men, and thirdly the falsifying of your pro-
mise, to save them if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in
the fields. And yet you say that we are the transgressors,
and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judg-
ment. But it is otherwise. And if these men judge aright,
you shall be punished now for all your crimes at once. We
have herein, men of Lacedemon, been thus large, both for
your sakes and ours. For yours, to let you see, that if you
condemn them, it will be no injustice; for ours, that the equity
of our revenge may the better appear. Be not moved with
the recital of their virtues of old (if any they had) which
though they ought to help the wronged, should double the
punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their of-
fence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the
better for their lamentation or your compassion, when they
cry out upon your fathers' sepulchres, and their own want of
friends. For we on the other side affirm, that the youth of
our city suffered harder measure from them and their fathers,
partly slain at Corouea, in bringing BcEotia to your confede-
ration, and partly alive and now old, and deprived of their
children, make far juster supplication to you tor revenge.
And pity belongeth to such as suffer undeservedly, but on the
contrary, when men are worthily punished, (as these are) it
is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want, of friends,
164 THE HISTORY book m..
* they may thank themselves : for of their own accord they re-
* jected the better confederates. And the law hath been broken
* by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they con-
* demned our men spitefully, rather than judicially ; in which
* point we shall now come short of requiting them; for they
* shall suffer legally, and not, as they say they do, with hands
* upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon
* trial by consent.
' Maintain therefore (ye Lacedemonians) the law of the
* Grecians against these men that have transgressed ; and give
* unto us that have suffered contrary to the law, the just re-
* compence of our alacrity in your service. And let not the
* words of these, give us a repulse from you : but set up an ex-
* ample to the Grecians, by presenting unto these men a trial,
* not of words, but of facts ; which if they be good, a short
* narration of them will serve the turn ; if ill, compt orations
* do but veil them. But if such as have the authority, as you
* have now, would collect the matter to a head, and according
' as any man should make answer thereunto, so proceed to sen-
' tence, men would be less in the search of fair speeches, where-
* with to excuse the foulness of their actions.'
T/ius spake the Thehans.
And the Lacedemonian judges conceiving their interrogatory
to stand well, namely, ' whether they had received any benefit by
* them or not, in this present war,* (for they had indeed entreated
them both at other times, according to the ancient league of
Pausanias after the Medan war, to stand neutral ; and also a
little before the siege, tlie Plataeans had rejected their propo-
sition of being" common friend to both sides, according to the
same league) taking themselves in respect of these their just
offers, to be now discharged of the league, and to have received
evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought
forth, and having asked them again the same question, * whe-
* ther they had any way benefited the Lacedemonians, and
* their confederates in this present war, or not ?' As they an-
swered, ' not,* led them aside and slew them, not exempting
any. Of the Plataeans themselves they slew no less than two
hundred. Of Athenians, who were besieged with them,
twenty-five. The women they made slaves ; and the Thebans
assigned the city for a year, or thereabouts, for an habitation to
such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own,
and to all those Plataeans, which living, were of the Theban
faction. But afterwards, pulling it all down to the very foun-
dation, they built an hospital in the place, neiu: the temple
of Juno, of two hundred feet diameter, with chambers on
every side in circle, both above and below j using therein the
J
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 165
roofs and doors of the Platseans' buildings. And of the rest of
the stuff that was in the city wall, as brass, and iron, they
made bedsteads, and dedicated them to Juno, to whom also they
built a stone chapel of one hundred feet over. The land they
confiscated, and set it to farm aftenvards for ten years to the
Thebans, So far were the Lacedemonians alienated from the
Plataeans, especially, or rather altogether for the Thebans' sake,
whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot.
So ended the business at Plataea, in the fourscore and thirteenth
year after their league made with the Athenians.
The forty gallies of Peloponnesians, which- having been sent
to aid the Lesbians, fled, as hath been related, through the
wide sea, chased by the Athenians and tossed by storms on the
coast of Crete, came thence dispersed, into Peloponnesus, and
found thirteen gallies, Leucadians and Ambraciotes, in the ha-
ven of Cyllene, with Brasidas the son of Tellis, come thither to
be of council with Alcidas, For the Lacedemonians, seeing
they failed of Lesbos, determined with their fleet augmented
to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition, (there being but
twelve Athenian gallies about Naupactus) to the end they
might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come
from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves
in that.
The sedition in CorcvTa began upon the coming home of
those captives which were taken in the battles by sea at Epi-
damnus, and released afterwards by the Corinthians at the ran-
some, as was voiced, of eighty talents, for which they had given
security to their hosts ; but in fict, for they had persuaded the
Corinthians that they would put CorcNTa' into their power.
These men going from man to man, solicited the city to revolt
from the Athenians. And two gallies being now come in, one of
Athens another of Corinth, with ambassadors from both those
states ; the Corcyraeans, upon audience of them both, decreed
to hold the Athenians for their confederates, on articles agreed
on : but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they
had formerly been. There was one Pithias, voluntary host of
the Athenians, and that had been principal magistrate of the
people. Him, these men called into judgment, and laid to his
charge a practice to bring the city into the servitude of the
Athenians. He again, being acquit, called in question five of
the wealthiest of the same men, saying they had cut certain
stakes * in the ground belonging to the temples both of Ju-
piter and of Alcinus, upon every one of which, there lay a penalty
Xc(«caif, stakes, either for vine prop*, which are particnlarlj called ;(^c^<Mir^
or for ottitT profaae use^
166 THE HISTORY book ni.
of a stater*. And the caufie going against them, they took
sanctuary in the temples, to the end, the sum being great, they
might pay it by portions, as they should be taxed. But Pi-
thias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law
should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the se-
nate, and understanding that Pithias, as long as he was a se-
nator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes, the
same tliat were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest,
and armed with daggers, suddenly brake into the senate house,
and slew both Pithias and others, as well private men as se-
nators, to the number of about sixty persons ; only a few of
those of Pithias his faction escaped into the Athenian gaily that
lay yet in the harbour. When they had done this, and called
the Corcyrffians to an assembly, they told them, that what they
had done, was for the best, and that they should not be now
in bondage to the Athenians. And for the future they advised
them to be in quiet, and to receive neither party with more
than one gaily at once ; and to take them for enemies if they
were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree
it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to
Athens, both to shew that it was fit for them to do what they
had done, and also to dissuade such Corcyraeans as were fled
thither of the other faction, from doing any thing to their pre-
judice, for fear the matter should fall into a relapse.
When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the
ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those
Gorcyreeans whom they had there prevailed with ; and sent
them to custody in .-Egina. In the mean time, upon the com-
ing in of a gaily of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedemon,
those that managed the state assailed the commons, and over-
came them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled
into the citadel, and the higher parts of the city, where they
rallied themselves, and encamped, and made themselves mas-
ters of the haven called the Hillaic haven. But the nobility
seized on the market-place (where also the most of them dwelt,)
and on the haven on the side toward the continent.
The next day they skirmished a little with shot f, and both
parts sent abroad into the villages to solicit the slaves with pro-
mise of liberty, to take their parts. And the greatest part of
the slaves took part with the commons, and the other side had
an aid of eight hundred men from the continent.
The next day but one they fought again, and the people had
the victory, having the odds both in strength of places, and in
number of men. And the women also manfully assisted them,
* Of our money about fifteen shillings seven pence balf-penny.
■f Arrows, darts, stones, and the like missile weapons.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 167
throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult, even
beyond the condition of their sex. The few began to fly
about twilight, and fearing lest the people should even with
their shout take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to
tlje sword, to stop their passage, set fire on the houses in circle
about the market-place, and upon others near it. Much goods
of merchants were hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind
had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger
to have been destroyed. When the people liad gotten the vie •
tory, the Corinthian gaily stole away, and most of the auxilia-
ries got over privily into the continent.
Tlie next day Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, an Athe-
nian commander, came in with twelve gallies and five hundred
Messenian men of arms from Naupactus, and both negociated
a reconciliation, and induced them (to the end they might
i^ree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition
(who presently fled) and to let the rest alone, with articles both
between themselves and with the Athenians, to esteem friends
and enemies the same as the Athenians did. When he had done
this, he would ha*e been gone, but the people persuaded him
before he went to leave behind him five of his gallies, the bet-
ter to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as
many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyrfleans, and
send with him. To this he agreed, and they made a list of
those that should embark, consisting altogether of their ene-
mies. But these fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary
m the temple of Castor and Pollux ; but Nicostratus endea-
voured to raise them, and spake to them, to put them into cou-
rage : but when he could not prevail, the people (arming them>-
selves on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Ni-
costratus proceeded from some evil intention) took away their
arms out of their houses, and would also have killed some of
them, such as ihey chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hin-
dered them.
Others also, when they saw this, took sanctuary in the texx*-
ple of Juno, and they were in all above four hundred. But the
people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise,
and conveying them into the island that lieth over against the
temple of Juno, sent them their necessaries thither.
The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth day
after the putting over of these men into the isli\nd, arrived the
Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their vo\-age of
Ionia, they had lain at anchor, to tiie number of three and fifty
sail. Alcidas had the commaDd of these, as before, and Bra-
sidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in
at Sybota, a liaven of the continent, they came on the next
morning by break of day toward Corcynu
\68 THE HISTORY book hi.
The Corcyrseans being in a great tumult and fear, both of
the seditious within, and of the invasion without, made ready
threescore gallies, and still as any of them were manned, sent
them out against the enemy ; whereas the Athenians had ad-
vised them to give leave to them to go forth first, and then the
Corcyreeans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When
their gallies came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned
to the enemy, and in others, they that were aboard, were toge-
ther by the ears among themselves, and nothing was done in
due order. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, op-
posed themselves to the Corcyraeans with twenty gallies only,
the rest they set in array against the twelve gallies of Athens,
whereof the Salaminia and the Paralus were two.
The Corcyraeans having come disorderly up, and by few at
once, were on their part, in much distress; but the Athenians,
fearing the enemies number, and doubting to be environed,
would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood
thick, nor would set upon the gallies that were placed in the
midst, but charged one end of them, and drowned one of their
gallies : and when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their
fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it,
endeavouring to put them into disorder ; which they that were
fighting against the Corcyraeans perceiving, and fearing such
another chance as befel them formerly at Naupactus, went to
their aid, and uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all
together.
But they retiring rowed a stern, that the Corcyraeans should
take that time to escape in ; they themselves in the mean time
going as leisurely back as was possible, and keeping the
enemy still a head. Such was this battle, and it ended about
sun-set.
The Corcyraeans fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their
victory, should have come directly against the city, or take
aboard the men wliich they had put over into the island, or do
them some other mischief, fetched back the men into the temple
of Juno again, and guarded the city.
But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, yet
durst not invade the city, but having taken thirteen of the
Corcyraean gallies, went back into the continent from whence
they had set forth. The next day they came not unto the city,
no more than before, although it was in great tumult and af-
fright : and though also Brasidas (as it is reported) advised
Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority : but only landed
soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna, and wasted their ter-
ritory.
In the mean time the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely
lest those gallies should come against the city, not only cou-
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 169
ferred with those in sanctuary, and with the rest, about how
the citv might be preserved, but also induced some of them to
go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition, they manned
thirty gallies, in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should
have' entered. But the Peloponnesians having been wasting
of their fields till it was about noon, went their ways again.
Within night the Corcyraeans had notice by fires of threescore
Athenian gallies coming toward them from Leucas, which the
Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition, and of the fleet to
go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them, under the
conduct of Eurvmedon the son of Thucles.
The Peloponnesians therefore, as soon as night came, sailed
speedily home, keeping still the shore, and causing their gal-
lies to be carried over at the Isthmus of Leucas, that they
might not come in sight, as tiiey went about. But the people
of Corcyra hearing of the Attic gallies coming in, and the
going off of the Peloponnesians, brought into the city those
Messenians*, which before were without, and appointing
the gallies which they had furnished, to come about into the
Hilliac haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all
the contrary faction they could lay hands on ; and also after-
wards threw overboard out of the same gallies, all those they
had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence. And
coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those
that had taken sanctuary, to refer themselves to a legal trial ;
all which they condemned to die. But the most of the sanc-
tuary men, that is, all those that were not induced to stand to
trial by law, when they saw what was done, killed one another
there-right in the temple : some hanged themselves on trees ;
every one as he had means, made himself away. And for se-
ven days together that Eurymedon staid there with his three-
score gallies, the Corc\Taeans did notliing but kill such of their
city as they took to be their enemies, laying to their 'charge a
practice to have averted the popular government.
V Amongst whom, some were slain upon private hatred,
and some by their debtors, for the money which they had
lent them. All forms of death were then seen, and (as in
such cases it usually falls out) whatsoever had happened
at any time, happened also then, and more. For the fa-
ther slew his son, men were dragged out of the temples, and
then slain hard by; and some immured in the temple of Bac-
chus, died within it. So cruel was this sedition, and seemed
so the more, because it was of these the first. For afterwards
all Greece, as a man may say, was in commotion; and quarrels
arose every where between the patrons of the commoDS, that
* That came with Nicostratus.
J 70 THE HISTORY book hi.
sought to bring In the Athenians, and the few, that desired to
bring in the Lacedemonians. Now in time of peace tliey could
have no pretence, nor would have been so forward to call them
in ; but being war, and confederates to be had for either party,
both to hurt their enemies, and strengthen themselves, such as
desired alteration easily got them to come in. And many hei-
nous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which
though they have been before, and shall be ever, as long as
human nature is the same, yet they are more calm, and of dif-
ferent kinds, according to the several* conjunctures. For in peace
and prosperity, as wdl cities as private men, are better minded,
because they be not plunged into necessity of doing any thing
against their will ; but war taking away the affluence of daily
necessaries, is a most violent master, and conformeth most
men's passions to the present occasion. The cities therefore
being now in sedition, and those that fell into it later, having
heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the
same in^newness of conceit, botli for the art of assailing, and
for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of
names imposed for signification of things, was changed into
arbitrary : for inconsiderate boldness, was counted true-hearted
manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty,
the cloak of cowardice ; to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in
every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of va-
lour. To re-advise for the better security, was held for a fair
pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce, was always
trusty ; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected. He
that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man ; but he that could
not smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he : but
he that had been so provident as not to need to do one or the
other, was said to be a dissolver of society, and one that stood
in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could out-strip an-
other in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade anotlier
thereto, that never meant it, was commended. To be kin to
another, was not to be so near as to be of his society, because
these were ready to undertake any thing, and not to dispute it.
For these societies f were not made upon prescribed laws of
profit, but for rapine, contrary to the laws established. And as
for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much
by divine law X, as by the communication of guilt. And what
was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye
to their actions, to see whether they were too strong for them
* MtviScKat rat ^ufcrvxii^*, cliaiipcs of tlip ttale of tliinjifS.
f The uniting- of companies under certain laws, for the more profitable ma-
naging of tlicir trades and arts, sccnieth to have been in use then, as now.
I By oath.
ROOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 171
or not, and not ingenuously. To be revenged was in more re-
quest, than nev^er to have received injur}-. And for oaths (when
any were) of reconcilement, being administered in the present
for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power :
but upon opportunity, he that first durst, thought his revenge
sweeter by the trust, than if he had taken the open way. For
they did not only put to account the safeness of that course,
but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to
themselves withal, a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest
men for the most part are sooner called able, than simple men
honest. i\nd men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride
in the other. The cause of this is desire of rule, out of avarice
and ambition, and the zeal of contention * from those two pro-
ceeding. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of
the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles,
one the political equality of the multitude ; the other the mo-
derate aristocracy, though in words they seemed to be servants
of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their con-
tention. And striving by whatsoever means to overcome,
both ventured on most horrible outrages, and prosecuted their
revenges still further, without any regard of justice, or the
public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own ap-
petite : and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence, or with
their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their
spite. So that neither side made account to have any thing
the sooner done by religion [of an oath,] but he was most
commended, that could pass a business against the hair with a
fair oration. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both
fections ; partly because they would not side with them, and
partly for envy that they should so escape.
Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind, throughput all
Greece, by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof
there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down. And
it was far the best course, to stand diffidently against each other,
with their thoughts in battle-array, which no speech was so
powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all
of them, the more they considered, the more desperate of as-
surance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief, than
were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part,
such as had the least wit, had the best success ; for both their
own defect, and the subtiity of their adversaries, putting them
in a great fear to be overcome in words, or at least in pre-insi-
diation, by their enemies great craft, they therefore went
roundly to work with them, with deeds. Whereas the other,
• *(X«ti«;«, properly that spife wLich reignetb in tv*o adversaries whilil tbey
contesd, or eageTOeti in ttriviug.
172 THE HISTORY book hi,
not caring though they were perceived, and thinking they
needed not to take by force, what they might do by plot, were
thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain.
In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed
first; and so were all other, which either such men as have
been governed with pride, rather than modesty, by those on
whom they take revenge, were like to commit in taking it; or
which such men as stand upon their delivery from long po-
verty, out of covetousness (chiefly to have their neighbours
goods) would contrary to justice give their voices to : or which
men, not for covetousness, but assailing each other on equal
terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger, would
cruelly and inexorably execute.
And the common course of life being at that time confound-
ed in the city ; the nature of man, which is wont even against
law to do evil, gotten now above the law, shewed itself with
delight, to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, an
enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred
revenge before innocence, nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it
was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for
the laws common to all men in such cases, (which, as long as
they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury) men de-
sire not to leave them standing, against the need a man in
danger may have of them, but by their revenges on others, to
be beforehand in subverting them. Such were the passions of
the Corcyrseans first of all other Grecians, towards one another
in the city. And Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with
their gallics.
Afterwards such of the Corcyrseans as had fled (for there
escaped about fi,ve hundred of them) having seized on the forts
in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own terri-
tory on the other side, and from thence came over and robbed
the islanders, and did them much hurt ; and there grew a great
famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lace-
demon and Corinth, concerning their reduction ; and when
they could get nothing done, having gotten boats, and some
auxiliary soldiers, they passed a while after to the number of
about six hundred into the island. Where when they had set
their hosts on fire that they might trust to nothing but to make
themselves masters of the field, they went up into the hill
Istone, and having there fortified themselves with a wall, in-
fested those within, and were masters of the territory.
In the end of the same summer the Athenians sent twenty
gallies into Sicily under the command of Laches the son of
Melanopus, and Chariadas the son of Euphiletus : for the Sy-
racusians and the Leontines were now warring against each
other. The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric
cities, (except the Camarinaeans) which also in the beginning
BOOK m. OF THE GRECIAN WAR 173
of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedemonians,
but had not yet aided them in the war. The confederates of
the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, together with Ca-
marina. And in Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusians ;
but the Khegians, according to their consanguinity, took part
with the Leontines. Now the confederates of the Leontines,
in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also
for that they were lonians, obtained of the Athenians to send
them gallies, for that the Leontines were deprived by the Sy-
racusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the
people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity,
but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from
thence into Peloponnesus, and also to taste the possibility of
taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving
at Rhegium in Italy, joined with the confederates, and began
the war : and so ended this summer.
The next winter the sickness fell upon the Athenians again
(having indeed never totally left the city, though there was
some intermission,) and continued above a year after. But the
former lasted two years ; insomuch as nothing aflBicted the
Athenians, or impaired their strength more than it : for the
number that died of it, of men of arms enrolled, were no less
than four thousand four hundred, and horsemen three hundred,
of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at
the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and in
Euboea, and also amongst the Boeotians; and in Boeotia,
chiefly at Orchomenus.
The Athenians and Khegians that were now in Sicily, made
war the same winter on the islands called the islands of ^Bolus,
with thirty gallies. For in summer it was impossible to war
upon them for the shallowness of the water. These islands
are inhabited by the Lipareans, who are a colony of the Cni-
dians, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called
Lipara, and thence they go forth, and husband the rest, which
are Dydime, Strongile, and Hiera. The inhabitants of those
places have an opinion, that in Hiera, Vulcan eserciseth the
craft of a smith : for it is seen to send forth abundance of fire
in the day-time, and of smoke in the night. These islands are
adjacent to the territory of the Siculi * and Messanians, but
were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians
had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come in, they
put off again, and went to Rhegium. And so ended this win-
ter, and the fifth year of this war, written by Thucydides.
* XiXiXM. There are in Tbucrdides mentioned S/«Xm and 2i«iX/»r<u, whereof
this latter is the name of the inhabitants of Sicily in general ; the former, are
only those that were of that name anciently in Italy, and coming over into Sicily,
gave that name to the island.
1/4 THE HISTORY book ni.
YEAR VI.
The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates
came as far as the Isthmus, under the conduct of Agis the son
of Archidamus, intending to have invaded Attica ; but by rea-
son of the many earthquakes that then happened, they turned
back, and the invasion proceeded not.
About the same time, (Eubcea being then troubled with
earthquakes) the sea came in at Orobiae, on the part which
then was land, and being impetuous withal, overflowed most
part of the city, whereof part it covered, and part it washed
down, and made lower in the return ; so that it is now sea, which
before was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent
it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another
inundation like unto this, happened in the ilse of Atalanta, on
the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of
the Athenians' fort there ; and of two gallies that lay on dry
land, it brake one in pieces.
Also there happened at Peparethus a certain rising of the
water, hut it brake not in. And a part of the wall, the town-
house *, and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the
earthquakes. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I
take to be this ; that the earthquake where it was very great,
did there send off the sea, and the sea returning on a sudden,
caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it
seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake, such an acci-
dent could never happen.
The same summer, divers others, as they had several occa-
sions, made war in Sicily. So also did the Sicilians f, amongst
themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I
will make mention only of such most memorable things as were
done either by the confederates there with the Athenians or
against the Athenians by the enemy.
Charaeades the Athenian general being slain by the Syrncu-
sians. Laches, wlio was now the sole commander of the fleet,
together with the confederates, made war on Mylae, a towrj be-
longing to Messana. There were in Mylae two companies of
Messanians in garrison, the which also laid a certain ambush
for those that came up from the fleet. But the Athenians and
their confederates, both put to flight those that were in am-
bush, with the slaughter of most of them ; and also assaulting
their fortification, forced them on composition both to ren-
der the citadel, and to go along with them against Messana.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 175
After this, upon the approach of the Athenians and their con-
federates, the Messanians compounded likewise, and gave them
hostages, and such other security as was requisite.
The same summer the Athenians sent thirty gallies about
Peloponnesus, under the command of Demosthenes the son of
Antisthenes, and Proclus the son of Theodorus ; and sixty gal-
lies more, with two thousand men of arms, commanded by Ni-
cias the son of Niceratus, into Afelos. For the Athenians, in
respect that the Melians * were islanders, and yet would nei-
ther be their subjects, nor of their league, intending to subdue
them. But when upon the wasting of their fields they stood
out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus, in the op-
posite continent.
Being there arrived within night, the men of arms left the
gallies, and marched presently by land to Tanagra in Bceotia.
To which place, u}X)n a sign given, the Athenians that were in
the city of Athens, came also forth with their whole forces,
led by Hipponicus the son of Callias, and Eurymedon the
son of Thucles, and joined with them ; and pitching their
camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and
lay tuere the night following.
The next day they defeated in battle such of the Tanagrians
as came out against them, and also certain succours sent them
from Thebes ; and when they had taken up the arms of those that
were slain, and erected a trophy, they returned back, the one
part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias with his
sixty gallies, having first sailed along the coast of Locris and
wasted it, came home likewise.
About the same time the Pelo{x>nne3ians erected a colony of
Heraclea in Trachinia, with this intention : the Melians f in
the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, Hierans, and
Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians being afflicted with war
from the Oeteans their borderers, thought at first to have joined
themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not
be faithful unto them, they sent to Lacedemon, choosing for
their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the
mother nation to the Lacedemonians, sent their ambassadors
likewise with him, with the same requests. For they also
were infested with war from the same Oeteans.
Upon audience of tiiese ambassadors, the Lacedemonians
concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation
of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians;
and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very commo-
* MnXin. The Melians mentioned a little after this, are not islanders, noj
termed Mx'Xw*, but MuX/m;.
t MnXuJf, «L people of The«»aly, n^^r the MeHaq gulf.
17G THE HISTORY book hi.
diously, for their war with the Athenians ; inasmuch as they
might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but
short, against Euboea ; and it would much further their con-
veyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind
wholly bent to the building of the place.
First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi ;
and the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants
thither, both of their own people, and of the neighbours about
them, and gave leave also to any that would go thither out of
the rest of Greece, save only to the lonians, Achaians, and
some few other nations.
The conductors of the colony were three Lacedemonians ;
Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon : who, taking it in hand, built
the city, which is now called Heraclea, from the very founda-
tion ; being distant from Thermopylae forty furlongs, and from
the sea twenty. Also they made houses for gallies to lie under,
beginning close to Thermopylae, against the very streight, to
the end to have them the more defensible.
The Athenians, when this city was peopled, were at first
afraid, and thought it to be set up especially against Euboea ;
because from thence to Ceneum, a promontory of Euboea, the
passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than
they imagined, for they had no great harm by it. The reason
whereof was this : that the Thessalians who had the towns of
those parts in their power, and upon whose ground it was
built, afflicted these new planters with a continual war, till they
had worn them out, though they were many indeed in the be-
ginning, (for being the foundation of the Lacedemonians, every
one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one)
and chiefly the governors themselves, sent thither from Lacede-
mon, undid the business, and dispeopled the city by frighting most
men away, for that they governed severely, and sometimes also
unjustly, by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed
against them.
The same summer, and about the same time- that the Athe-
nians staid in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the
thirty gallies about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garrison sol-
diers in EUomenus, a place of Leucadia, by ambushment. But
afterwards with a greater fleet, and with the whole power of
the Acarnanians (who followed the army, all (but the Ocniades)
that could bear arms) and with the Zacyntiiians and Cephalo-
nianSj and fifteen gallies of the Corcyraeans, made war against
the city itself of Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw
the territory wasted by them, both without the Isthmus, and
within, (where the city of Leucas slandeth, and the temple of
Apollo) yet they durst not stir, because the number of the ene-
my was so great. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthe-
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR J77
nes the Atlienian general to wall them up, conceiving that they
might easily be expunged by a siege, and desiring to be rid of
a city their continual enemy. But Demostlienes was persuad-
ed at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so great
au army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade
the ^tolians, principally, as being enemies to Naupactus ; and
that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts
would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they al-
leged, that though the nation of the iEolians were great and
warhke, yet their habitations was in villages unwalled, and those
at great distances ; and were but light-armed, and might there-
fore with no great difficulty be all subdued before they could
unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take
in hand first the Apodotians, next the Ophionians, and after
them the Eurjtanians, which are the greatest part of ^-Etoha,
of a most strange language, and that are reported to eat raw
flesh; for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow.
But he, induced by the Messenians whom lie favoured, but
especially because he thought, without the forces of the people
of Athens, with the confederates only of the continent, and
with the .Etolians, to invade Boeotia by land : going first through
the Locri Ozolae, and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Pernassus
on the right-hand, till the descent thereof into the territory of
the Phocaeans, (which people, for the friendship they ever bore
to the Atlienians, would, he thought, be willing to follow his
army, and if not might be forced) and upon the Phocceans bor-
dereth Bceotia. Putting oft' therefore with his whole army,
against the minds of the Acarnanians, from Leucas, he sailed
unto Solium by the shore, and there having communicated his
conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of
it, because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with
the rest of his army, Cephalonians, Zac) nthians, and three hun-
dred Athenians, the soldiers of his own fleet, (for the fifteen
gallies of CorcjTa were now gone away) warred on the ^^tolians,
having Oeneon a city of Locris, for the seat of his war. Now
these Locrians called Ozolje, were confederates of the Athenians,
and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of
the country. For being confiners on the .ttolians, and using
the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be a matter
of great utility in the war, to have them in their army ; for that
they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the
country. Having lain the night with his whole army in the
temple* of Jupiter Nemeius, (wherein the poet Hesiodus is
reported by them that dwell thereabout toliave died, foretold by
* "'-I"» *l>e Hbole conscQrated grouud whcreia the temple stood; not the
cLurcb oiilv.
17« THE HISTORY book in.
an oracle, that he should die in Nemea) in the morning be-
times he dislodged and marched into ^tolia.
The first day he took Potidania, the second day Crocylium,
the third Tichium. There he staid, and sent the booty he had
gotten to Eupolium in Locris. For he purposed, when he had
subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards, (if they
submitted not) in his return to Naupactus.
But the ^tolians knew of this preparation when it was first
resolved on ; and afterwards when the army was entered, they
were united into a mighty army to make head. Insomuch as
that the farthest off of the Ophionians, that reach out to the
Melian gulf, the Bomians and Callians came in with their aids.
The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes that
they had done before; and alleging that the conquest of the
iEtolians would be but easy, willed him to march with all speed
against them, village after village, and not to stay while they
were all united, and in order of battle against him, but to at-
tempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded
by them, and confident of his fortune because nothing had
crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that
should have come in with their aids (for his greatest want was
of darters light armed) marched to iEgitium, which approaching,
he won by force, the men having fled secretly out, and encamp-
ed themselves on the hills above it : for it stood in a moun-
tainous place, and about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the
^tolians, (for by this time they were come with their forces
to i5]gitium) charged the Athenians and their confederates
and running down upon them, some one way some another,
from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the
army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired ; and when it
retired, they assaulted. So that the fight for a good while, was
nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians
had the worst in both.
Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows and were
able to use them, (for the .-Etolians, by reason they were not
armed, were put back still with the shot) they held out. But
when upon the death of their captain, the archers were dis-
persed, and the rest were also wearied, having a long time con-
tinued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the ^^to-
lians continually afflicting them with their darts, they were for-
ced at length to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue,
and into places they were not acquainted withal, were destroyed.
For Chromon a Messenian, who was tlieir guide for the
ways, was slain. And the yEtolians pursuing them still with
darts, slew many of them quickly, whilst they fled, being swift
of foot, and without armour. But the most of them missing
their way, and entering into a wood which had no passage
through, the ^Etolians set it on fire, and burnt it about them.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 179
All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction were
that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained,
with much ado got to tiie sea, and to Oeneon, a city of Locris,
from whence they first set forth.
There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred
and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their num-
ber, and all of them able men. These men of the very best
died in this war : Procles also was there slain, one of the gene-
rals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from
the ^Etolians under truce, and were gotten again to Naupactus,
they returned with the fleet to Athens. But they left Demos-
thenes about Naupactus, and those parts, because he was afraid
of the Athenian people, for the loss that had happened.
About the same time the Athenians that were on the coast of
Sicily, sailed unto Locris, and landing, overcame such as made
head ; and took in Peripolium, situate on the river Halex.
The same summer the j^tolians having sent their ambassa-
dors, Telephas an Ophionian, Boryades an Eurytanian, and
Tisander an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedemon, persuaded
them to send an army against Naupactus, for that it harboured
the Athenians against them. And the Lacedemonians towards
the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms, of
their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heraclea,
the new-built city of Trachinia. The general of the army was
Eurylochus a Spartan, with whom Massarius * and Menedatu*
went also along, Spartans likewise.
When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eur}lochus sent a
herald to the Locrians of Ozolte, both because their way lay
through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to
make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians the
Amphissians co-operated with him most, as standing most in
fear for the enmity of the Phocaeans. And they first giving
hostages, induced others (who likewise were afraid of the com-
ing in of the army) to do the like : the Myonians first, being
their neighbours, (for this way is Locris of most difiBcult ac-
cess) then the Iphnaeans, Messapians, Trit«ans, Challceans,
Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Oeantheans. All these went
with them to the war. The Olpffians gave them hostages ; but
followed not the army. But the Hyeans would give them no
hostages till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis-
When every thing was ready, and he had sent the hostages
away to Citinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards
Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And a»
he inarched he took Oeneon, a town of theirs, and Eapolium,
because they refused to yield unto him.
• TIicsc arc afterwards called Macuriu* *nd MeBfiUin*.
180 THE HISTORY book hi.
When they were come into the territory of Naupactus, the
iEtolians being there already to join with them, they wasted the
fields about, and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified.
Then they went to Molychrium, a colony of the Corinthians,
but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now De-
mosthenes the Athenian, (for ever since the ^tolian business,
he abode about Naupactus) having been pre-advertised of this
army, and being afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acar-
nanians, and with much ado, because of his departure from be-
fore Leucas, persuaded them to relieve Naupactus, and they
sent along with him in his gallies one thousand men of arms,
which entering were the preservation of the city ; for there was
danger, the walls being of a great compass, and the defendants
few, that else they should not have been able to make them
good. Eurylochus, and those that were with him, when they
perceived that those forces were entered, and that it was impos-
sible to take the city by assault, departed thence, not into Pelo-
ponnesus, but to AioMs, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron,
and to other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in iEto-
lia. For the Ambraciots coming to them, persuaded them to
undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against Ar-
gos and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, saying withal,
that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent
would enter into the league of the Lacedemonians. Whereunto
Eurylochus assented, and dismissing the iEtolians, lay quiet in
those parts with his army, till such time as the Ambraciots be-
ing come with their forces before Argos, he should have need
to aid them. And so this summer ended.
The Athenians that were in Sicily in the beginning of winter,
together with the Grecians of tlieir league, and as many of the
Siculi * as having obeyed the Syracusians by force, or being
their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly
against Nessa f a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the
hands of the Syracusians ; and they assaulted the same, but when
they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat the Syracu-
sians that were in the citadel sallied out upon the confederates
that retired later than the Athenians, and charging, put a part
of the army to flight, and killed not a few.
After this. Laches and the Athenians landed sometime at Lo-
cris, and overcame in battle, by the river Caicinus, about 300
Locrians, who with Proxenus the son of Capiton, came out to
make resistance ; and when they had stripped them of their arms,
departed.
. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos,
t Nes«8, rather luetsa. The inhabitants he calteth Ineattti, lib. 6.
BOOK III. OF THE GRFXIAN WAR. 181
by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus
also the tvrant hallowed the same before, not all, but only so
much as was within the prospect of the temple. But now they
hallowed it all over in this manner : they took away all sepul-
chres whatsoever, of such as had died there before : and for the
future made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor
any woman to bring forth child in the island ; but when they
were near their time, either of the one or the other, they should
be carried over into Rhenea.
This Rhenea is so little away distant from Delos, that Poly-
crates the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea,
and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rhenea,
dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it unto Delos with
a chain. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians in-
stituted the keeping every fifth year of the Delian games.
There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos,
both of lonians and of the islanders round about. For they
then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as
the lonians do now the games at Ephesus.
There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise, and of
music ; and the cities did severally set forth dances Which
things to have been so, is principally declared by Homer, in
these verses of his hymn to Apollo, v. 146.
But thou, Apollo, lakestmost delight
In Delos. There assemble in ihy siglit,
The long-coat Ions, with their children dear,
And venerable bedfellows ; aad there.
In matches set, of buffets, song, and dance.
Both shew thee pastime, and thy name advance.
Tliat there were also matches of music, and that men resort-
ed thither to contend therein, he again maketh manifest in
these verses of the same hymn. For after he hath spoken of
the Delian dance of the women, he endeth their praise with
these verses, wherein also he maketh mention of himself
V. 165. *
But well : let Phoebus and Diana be
Propitious ; and farewell you each one;
But yet remember me when I am gone :
And if of earthly men you chance to see
Any loil'd pilgrim, that shall ask you. Who,
O damsels, is the man that living here.
Was sweet'st in song and that most had your ear ?
Then all, with ajoint murmur, thereunto
Make answer thus ; A man deprived of seeing :
In th' isle of Sandie Chios is his being.
So much hath Homer witnessed touching the great meeting,
and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the
islanders, and Athenians, since that time, hiave contiaued still to
I«3 THE HISTORY book hi.
send dancers along with their saerificers, but the games and
things of that kind were Morn out, as is likely, by adversity,
till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added,
the horse race, which was not before.
The same winter the Ambraciots (according to their promise
made to Eurylochus) when they retained his army, made war up-
on Argos in Amphilochia, with three thousand men of arms, and
invading Argia, they took Olpae, a strong fort on a hill by the
sea side which the Acarnanians had fortified, and used for the place
of their common meetings for matters of justice, and is distant
from the city of Argos, which stands also on the sea side, about
twenty-five furlongs. The Acarnanians with part of their forces
came to relieve Argos, and with the rest they encamped in that
part of Amphilochia which is called Crenae, to watch the Pelo-
ponnesians that were with Eurylochus, that they might not pass
through to the Ambraciots without their knowledge ; and sent
to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the
expedition against the ^tolians, to come to them and be their
general.
They sent also to the twenty Athenian gallies that chanced
to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of
Aristoteles the son of Timocrates, and Jerophon the son of An-
timnestus. In like manner the Ambr iciots that were at Olpae,
sent a messenger to the city of Ambracia, wilUng them to come
to their aid with their whole power; as fearing that those with
Eurylochus would not be able to pa s by the Acarnanians, and
so they should be either forced to fight alone, or else have
an unsafe retreat.
But the Peloponnesians that were with Eurylochus, as soon
as they understood that the Ambraciots were come to Olpae,
dislodging from Proschion, went with all speed to assist them.
And passing over the river Achelous, marched through Acar-
nania, (which by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now dis-
furnished) on their-right hand they had the city of Stratus, and
that garrison ; on their left, the rest of Acarnania. Having
passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phy-
tia, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon, then through
Limnaea, then they went into the territory of the Agraeans,
which are out of Acarnania, and their friends ; and getting to
the hill Thiamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it,
and came down into Argia, when it was now night; and passing
between tiie city of the Argives, and the Acarnans that kept
watch at the wells, came unseen, and joined with the Ambra-
ciots at Olpie.
When they were all together, they sat down about break of
day, at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And
the Athenians not long after with their 20 gallies, arrived in the
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. IBS
Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives. To whom also came
Demosthenes with 200 Messenian men of arms, and threescore
Athenian archers. The gallies lay at sea, before the hill upon
which the fort of Olpae standeth. But the Acarnanians, and
those few Amphilochians (for the greatest part of them the Am -
braciots kept back by force) that were come already together at
Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle, and chose
Demosthenes, with their own commanders, for general of the
whole league. He, when he had brought them up near unto
Olpae, there encamped. There was between them a great hol-
low, and for five days together they stirred not ; but the sixth
day both sides put themselves into array for the battle. The
army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the
other, for indeed it was much greater; but Demostiienes, fear-
ing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow
way, and fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers,
in all to the number of 400, w hich in that part where the number
of the enemies over-reached, should in the heat of the battle rise
out of ambush, and charge them on their backs. When
the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows.
Demosthenes with the Messenians, and those few Athenians
that were there, stood in the right wing : and the Acarnanians
(as they could one after another be put in order and those Am-
philochian darters which were present, made up the other.
The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were ranged promiscuous-
ly, except only the Mantineans, who stood together, most of
them in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it, for Eu-
rylochus and those that were with him, made the extremity of
the left wing against Demosthenes and the Messenians.
When they were in fight, and that the Peloponnesians with
that wing over-reached, and had encircled the right wing of
their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming at
their backs, charged them, and put them to flight in such sort
as they endured not the first brunt ; and besides, caused the
greatest part of the army through affright to run away. For
when they saw that part of it defeated which was with Eurjlo-
chus, which was the best of their army, they were a great deal
the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part
of the arflay with Demostiienes pursuing them, dispatched the
greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciots that were
in the right vving, on that part, had the victorj', and chased the
enemy unto the city of Argos ; but in their retreat, when they
saw that the greatest part of the army was vanquished, the rest
of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to
recover Olpae in safety ; and many of them were slain, w hilst
they ran into it out of array, and in disorder : save only the
Mattineans ; for these made a more orderly retreat than any
184 THE HISTORY book hi.
part of the army. A nd so this battle ended, having lasted till
the evening.
The next day, Menedaius* (Eurylochus and Macarlus* being
now slain) taking the command upon him, and not finding
how, if he staid, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein
he should both be shut up by land, and also with those Attic
gallies by sea ; or if he should depart, how he might do it safe-
ly, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains,
both about a truce for his departure, and for the receiving of the
bodies of the slain. And they delivered unto them their dead;
and having erected atrophy, took up their own dead, which were
about three hundred; but for their departure they would make
no truce openly, nor to all : but secretly Demosthenes with bis
Acarnanian fellow commanders, made a truce with the Manti-
neans and with Menedaius, and the rest of the Peloponnesian
captains, and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they
could ; with purpose to disguard the Ambraciots, and multi-
tude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means
to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of
those parts, as men that had treacherously advanced their par-
ticular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead and bu-
ried them as fast as they could ; and such as had leave, con -
suited secretly touching how to be gone.
Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that
the Ambraciots, from the city of Ambracia, according to the
message sent to them before from Olpae, (which was, that they
should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their
aid) were already on their march, (ignorant of what passed
here) to join with those at Olpfje. And hereupon he sent a part
of his army presently forth to beset the ways with ambushment,
and to preoccupate all places of strength, and prepared withal,
to encounter with the rest of his army.
In the mean time the Mantineans, and such as had part in
the truce, going out on pretence to gather pot-herbs and fire-
wood, stole away by small numbers, and as they went, did in-
deed gather suclv things as they pretended to go forth for; but
when they were gotten far from Olpae, they went faster away.
But the Ambraciots and others that came forth in the same
manner, but in greater troops, seeing the others to go quite
away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran out-right, as de-
siring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarna-
nians at first thought they had gone all without truce a like,
and pursued the Peloponnesians, and threw darts at their own
captains for forbidden them, and for saying that they went
away under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last
• C«l]pd Wfore Merirtlatus and Massariiii.
BOOK III. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 185
thev let go the Mantineans and Peloponnesians, and slew the
Ambraciots only. And there was much contention and igno-
rance of which was an Ainbraciot, and which a Peloponne-
sian. So they slew about two hundred of them, and the rest
escaped into Agraeis, a bordering territory, where Salynthius
king of the Agraeans, and their friend received them.
The Ambraciots out of the city of Ambracia, were come as
far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills, to the greater
whereof came first undiscovered that night they whom Demos-
thenes had sent before from the camp, and seized it. But
the Ambraciots got first to the lesser, and there encamped the
same night. Demosthenes after supper, in the twilight, marched
forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof himself took
with him for the assault of the camp, and the ether half he sent
about through the mountains of Amphilochia.
And the next morning before day, he invaded the Ambraciots
whilst they were yet in their lodgings, and knew not what was
the matter, but thought rather, that they had been some of
their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messe-
nians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them
to speak unto them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to
make the sentinels secure ; especially seeing their faces could
not be discerned, for it was yet night. Wherefore they put the
army of the Ambraciots to flight at the first onset, and slew
many upon the place. The rest fled as fast as they could to-
wards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Am-
philochians being well acquainted with their own territories,
and armed but lightly against men in armour, unacquainted,
and utterly ignorant which way to take, they light into hollow
ways, and to the places forelaid with ambushes and perished.
And having been put to all manner of shift for their lives, some
fled towards the sea, and when they saw the gallies of Athens
sailing by the shore, (this accident concurring with their defeat)
swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear to be
killed of those in the gallies, than by the Barbarians, and their
most mortal enemies the Amphilochians. The Ambraciots
with this loss came home a few of many in safety to their city.
And the Acarnanians having taken the spoil of the dead, and
erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.
The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciots
which fled from Olpae into Agraeis, to demand leave to carry
away the bodies of those dead which were slain after the first
battle, when without truce they went away together with the
Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the he-
rald saw the armours of those Ambraciots that came from the
city, he wondered at the number. For he knew nothing of
tliis last blow, but thought they had been the armours of those
186 I'HE HISTORY book iii.
with them. Then one asked him, ^ what he wondered at, and
* how many he thouglit there was slain ? ' For he that asked
him the question thouglit on the other side that he had been an
herald sent from those at Idomene : and he answered, ' about
' two hundred.' Then he that asked, replied and said, ' then these
* are not the armours of them, but of above a thousand. Then
* (said he again) they belong not to them that were in the bat-
' tie with us.' The other answered, ' Yes, if you fought yes-
* terday in Idomene.' ' But we fought not yesterday at all,
* but the other day in our retreat.' ' But we yet fought yester-
' day with those Ambraciots that came from the city to aid
' the rest/ When the herald heard that, and knew that the
aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into, ah mees ;
and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith
went his way without his errand, and required the dead bodies
no further. For tliis loss was greater than in the like number
of days happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I
have not written the number of the slain, because it was said
to be such, as is incredible, for the quantity of the city. But
this 1 know, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilochians, as
Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would
have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the
shout of their voices ; but they feared now that if the Athenians
possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours
unto them than the other.
After this, having bestowed tlie third part of the spoils upon
the Athenians, they distributed the other two part according to
the cities. The Athenians' part was lost by sea. For those
three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the
temples in Attica, were pricked out for Demosthenes himself,
and he brought them away with him. His return was withal
the safer for this action, after his defeat in .'l^^tolia. And the
Athenians that were in the twenty gallies returned to Naupac-
tus.
The Acarnanians and Amphilochians, when the Athenians
and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the
Oeniades to those Ambraciots and Peloponnesians that were
fled to Salynthius, and the Agraeans to retire, the Oeniades
being gone over to Salynthius, and the Agraeans likewise.
And for the future the Acarnanians and Amphilochians made a
league with the Ambraciots for a hundred years, upon these con-
ditions.
* That neither the Ambraciots with the Acarnanians should
make war against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians
with the Ambraciots against the Athenians. That they should
give mutual aid to one another's country. That the Ambra-
ciots should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields they
BOOK in. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 187
held of the Amphilochians ; and that they should at no time aid
Anactorium, which was in liostilily with the Acarnanians.' And
upon this composition the war ended.
After this the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hun-
dred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the con-
duct of Xenoclides the son of Euthycles ; who with much
difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus
passed the business in Ambraciae.
The same winter the Athenians that were in Sicily, invaded
Himertea by sea, aided by the Sicilians* that invaded the skirts
of the same by land. They sailed also to the islands of .i^olus.
Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus
the son of Isolochus, with certain gallies come to receive charge
of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates
had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them
with a greater fleet. For though the S}Tacusians were masters
by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few gallies from
the liberty of the sea, they made preparation, and were gathering
together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athe-
nians furnished out forty gallies to send into Sicily, conceiving
that the war there would the sooner be at an end, and desiring
withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pytho-
dorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a
few of those gallies, and intended to send Sophocles the son of
Sostratides, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles, with the great-
est number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the com-
mand of Laches's fleet, sailed in the end of winter unto a cer-
tain garrison of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken
and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.
The same spring there issued a great stream f of fire out of
the mountain /Etna, as it had also done in former times, and
burned part of the territorj' of the Cataneans that dwell at the
foot of iEtna, which is the highest mountain of all Sicily,
From the last time that the fire brake out before, to this time
it is said to be fifty years. And it hath now broken out thrice
in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were
the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the
sixth year of this war, written by Thucydides.
SoiXiJtci.
■f *Pvc| «-•» 9V4«.', :i stream of fire ; aud wus a kind of melted stone, <rii&biBf
oat uf the sides ui' tiie lauunluiu.
THE END OF THE THIRD BOOK.
THB
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK IV.
CONTENTS.
The Athenians take and fortify Pylus in Laconia. The Lacedemo-
nians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into
the island Sphacteria : tchom the Athenians, having overcome the
Lacedemonian feet, do there besiege. The Athenians and Syra-
cusians fght in the streight of Messana. Cleon engageth himself
rashly to take or kill the Lacedemonians in Sphacteria within
twenty days, and by good fortune performeth it. The sedition
ceaseth in Corcyra. Nicias invadeth Peloponnesus. The Sici-
lians agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretence of sailing
upon that coast with their fleet. The Athenians take Nisaa, but
fail of Megara. The overthrow of the Athenians at Delium.
The cities on the confines of Thrace, upon the coming of Brasidas,
revolt to the Lacedemonians. Truce fur a year. And this in
three years more of the same war.
YEAR VII.
1 HE spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten
gallies of Syracuse, and as many of Locris, went to Messena in
Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it ; and
Messena revolted from the Athenians. This was done by the
practice chiefly of the Syracusians, that saw the place to be
commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians
some time or other hereafter, making it the seat of their war
190 THE HISTORY book iv.
might come with greater forces into Sicily, and invade them
from thence 5 but partly also of the Locrians, as being in hosti-
lity with the Rhegians, and desirous to make war upon them
on both sides. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of
the Rhegians with their whole power ; both because they would
hinder them from assisting the Messenians, and because they
were solicited thereunto by the banished men of Rhegium, that
were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedi-
tion, and were unable for the present to give them battle, for
which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after
they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their land
forces, but their gallies lay still at the guard of Messena, and
more were setting forth to lie in the same harbour, to make the
war on that side. •
About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at
full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under
the conduct of Agis the son of Archidamus, king of the Lace-
demonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the coun-
try about.
And the, Athenians sent forty gallies into Sicily, the same
which they had provided before for that purpose, and with
them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For
Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived
in Sicily before. To these they gave commandment also, to
take order as they went by, for the state of those Corcyraeans
that were in the city, and were pillaged by the out-laws in the
mountain ; and threescore gallies of the Peloponnesians were
gone out to take part with those in the mountain ; who because
there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easi-
ly be masters of the state. To Demosthenes also (who ever
since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately) they gave
authority, at his own request, to make use of the same gallies,
if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.
As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence
that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Euryme-
don and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra ; but Demosthenes willed
them to put in first at Pylus, and when they had done what
was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But
whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylus by a
tempest that then arose by chance : and presently Demosthenes
required them to fortify the place, alleging that he came with
tliem for no other ])urpose, and shewing how there was great
store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally
strong, and desert, botli it, and a great deal of the country
about. For it lieth from Sparta about four hundred furlongs,
in the territory that belonging once to the Messenians, is
called by the Lacedemonians, Coryphasion. But they answered
I
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 191
him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus,
if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them
in. But there appeared unto Demosthenes a great difference
between this place and other places; because there was here an
haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof,
speaking the same language the Lacedemonians did, wnoH
both be able to annoy them much by excursions thence, and be
also faithful guardians of the place.
Wlien he could not prevail, neither with the generals nor
with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to
the captains of companies, he gave it over, till at last, the wea-
ther not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying
idle, a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of
their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they
performed it, not with iron tools to hew stone, but picked out
such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them
as they would severally fit. And for mortar, where it needed,
for want of vessels, they carried it on their backs, with their
bodies inclining forward, so as it might best lie, and their hands
clasped behind to stay it from falling : making all possible haste
to prevent the Lacedemonians, and to finish the most assailable
parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of
the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.
The Lacedemonians were that day celebrating a certain holi-
day, and when they heard the news, did set lightly by it ; con-
ceiving, that whensoever it should please them to go thither,
they should find them either already gone, or easily take the
place by force. Somewhat also they were retarded by rea-
son that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in
six days finished the wall to the land, and in the places where
was most need, left Demosthenes with five gallies to defend it,
and with the rest, hastened on in their course for Corcyra and
Sicily.
The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were ad-
vertised of the taking of Pylus, returned speedily home. For
the Lacedemonians and Agis their king, took this accident of
Pylus to concern their own particular. And the invasion was
withal so early, (corn being yet green) that the most of them
were scanted with victual ; the army was also much troubled
with the weather, which was colder than for the season ; so as
for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now
than at other times they had done; and this invasion was
the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen
days.
About the same time Sin>onides an Athenian commander,
having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons,
and a number o( the confederates of those parts, took the citv
193 THE HISTORY book iv.
of Eion in Thrace, a colony of the Mendaeans, that was their ene-
my, by treason ; but was presently again driven out by the
Chalcideans and Bottiaeans that came to succour it, and lost
many of his soldiers.
When the Pelponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of
the city of Sparta, and of other the next neighbouring towns,
went presently to the aid of Pylus ; but the rest of the Lacede-
monians came slowlier on, as being newly come from the for-
mer expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of
Peloponnesus, to require their assistance with all speed at Pylus;
and also to their threescore gallies that were at Corcyra.
Which, transported over the Istiimus of Leucas, arrived at Py-
lus unseen of the Athenian gallies lying at Zacynthus. And
by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the
Peloponnesian gallies were coming toward Pylus, Demosthenes
sent two gallies secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet
at Zacynthus in all haste, to tell them that they must come
presently to him, for as much as the place was in danger to be
lost. And, according as Demosthenes his message imported,
so the fleet made haste. The Lacedemonians in the mean
time prepared themselves to assault the fort both by sea and
land ; hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste, and
not many men within it. And because they expected the com-
ing of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose,
if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the har-
bour. For the island called Sphacteria, lying just before,
and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the
entries straight ; one of them, nearest to Pylus,and to the Athe-
nian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two gal-
lies in front ; and the other which lieth against the other part
of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island by
being desert, was all wood, and untrodden, in bigness about fif-
teen furlongs over. Therefore they determined with their gal-
lies thick set, and with the beak-heads outward, to stop up
the entries of the haven. And because they feared the island,
lest the Athenians putting men into it, should make war upon
them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same,
and placed other likewise along the shore of the continent.
For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find
in the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the con-
tinent. For the coast of Pylus itself, without these two entries,
being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from
whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows. And they, in
all probability, might by siege, without battle by sea, or other
danger, win tlie place, seeing there was no provision of victual
within it, and that the enemy took it but on siiort preparation.
Having thus resolved, they put over into the isla,nd their men
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 193
of anns, out of every band by lot, some also had been sent
over bv turns ; but they which went over now last, and were
left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots
that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas the son
of Molobrus.
Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedemonians bent to as-
sault him, both from their gallies, and with their army by
land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had
drawn up his gallies, all that were left him, unto the land, he
placed them athwart the fort, and armed the mariners that be-
longed to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the
greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert
place to provide themselves of arms. Those they l^id they
took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars, and a light-horseman *
of the Messenians which came by chance. And the men of
arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use
of amongst the rest. The greatest part therefore, both of armed
and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the
land which were of most strength, and commanded them to
make good the place against the land fcn-ces, if they assaulted
it ; and he himself with sixty men of arms, chosen out of the
whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort to the
sea-side, in that part where he most expected their landinsr.
Which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay to
the wide sea. But because their wall was there the weakest,
he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For
neither did the Athenians think they should ever have Been
mastered with gallies, which caused them to make the place
to the sea-ward the less strong ; and if the Peloponnesians
should by force come to land, they made no other account but
the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the
very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms, and en-
couraged them with words to this effect :
The Oration of Demosthenes to his Soldiers,
' You that participate with me in the present danger, let not
* any of you in this extremity, go about to seem wise, and
* reckon every peril that now besetteth us ; but let him rather
' come up to the enemy uith little circumspection, and much
* hope, and look for his safety by that. For things that are
* come once to a pinch, as these are, admit not debate, but a
' speedy hazard. And yet if we stand it out, and betray not our
' advantages with fear of the number of the enemy, I see weU
' enough that most things are with us. For I make account
O
194 THE HISTORY book iv.
' the difficulty of their landing makes for us : wliich, as long
^ as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though
' the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them,
' they will land well enough. For whilst they are in their
* gallics, they are most easy to be fought withal, and in their
* disbarking being but on equal terms, their number is not
' greatly to be feared ; for though they be many, yet they must
* fight but by few, for want of room to fight in. And for an
* army to have odds by land, is another matter than when
* they are to fight from gallics, where they stand in need of so
' many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that
^ 1 think their great difficulties do but set them even with
« our small number. And for you, that be Athenians, and by
« experience of disbarking against others, knpw, that if a man
' stand it out, and do not fear of the sousing of a wave, or the
* menacing approach of a gaily, give back of himself, he can
* never be put back by violence ; I expect that you should
* keep your ground, and by fighting it out upon the very edge
' of the water, preserve both yourselves and the fort.*
Upon this exhortation of Demosthenes, the Athenians took
better heart, and went down, and arranged themselves close by
the sea. And the Lacedemonians came and assaulted the fort,
both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting
of three and forty gallies, in which was admiral, Thrasymelidas
the son of Cratesiclcs, a Spartan ; and he made his approach
where Demosthenes had before expected him. So the Athe-
nians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and land.
The Peloponnesians dividing their gallies into small num-
bers, because they could not come near with many at once,
and resting between, assailed them by turns ; using all possible
valour and mutual encouragement, to put the Athenians back,
and gain the fort.
Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas : for having the
command of a gaily, and seeing other captains of gallies and
steersmen (the place being hard of access) when there appeared
sometimes possibility of putting ashore to be afraid, and tender
of breaking their gallies, he would cry out unto them, saying,
* They did not well for sparing of wood, to let the enemy for-
' tify in their country.'
And to the Lacedemonians he gave advice, to force landing
with the breaking of their gallies ; and prayed the confederates,
* that in requital of many benefits, they would not stick to
* bestow their gallies at this time upon the Lacedemonians,
' and running them a shore, to use any means whatsoever to
* land, and to get into their hands both the men in the isle,
* and the fort.*
Thus he urged others ; and having compelled the steersman
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 195
of his own gaily to run her ashore, he came to the ladders *, but
attempting to get down, was by the Athenians put back, and
after he had received many wounds, swooned, and falling upon
the ledges t of his gaily, his buckler tumbled over into
the sea, which brought to land the Athenians took up, and used
afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault.
Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come on land ;
but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budg-
ing, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came
so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, La-
conic land, against Lacedemonians in gallics; ;:nd the La-
cedemonians from their gallies fought against the Athenians,
to get landing in tiieir own now hostile territory. For at that
there was an opinion far spread, that these were rather land
men, and expert in a battle of foot; and that in maritime and
naval actions the other excelled.
This day then and a part of the next, they made sundry as-
saults, and after that gave over. And the third day tiiey sent
out some gallies to Asine for timber wherewith to make en-
gines, hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that
looketh into the haven ; which, though it were higher, yet the
landing to it was easier.
In the mean time arrive the forty Athenian gallies from Za-
cynthus ; for there were joined with them certain gallies of the
garrison of Xaupactus, and four of Chios. And when they
saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms, and
that the gallies that were in tiie haven would not come forth,
not knowing where to cast anchor, they sailed for the present
to the isle Prote, being near, and desert, and there lay for that
night.
The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they
put to sea again, w ith purpose to offer them battle, if the other
would come forth into the wide sea against them, if not, to en-
ter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither
came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the
haven, as they had before determined, but lying still on the
shore, manned out their gallies, and prepared to fight, if any
entered, in the haven itself, which was no small one. The
Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them, at
both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedemonian
gallies, which were already set out, and opposed them, they
charged, and put to flight. And in following the chase, which
was but short, they brake many of them, and took five, where-
* 'AfPuJaSaa, ladders or planks to disbark by.
t ntoi5si»!ir.«, fori. The place on the ontside of the gaily for soldiers to Stand
and fight ou, between the rowers and ilie water.
19G THE HISTORY book iv,
of one with all her men in her ; and they fell in also with them
that fled to the shore ; and the gallies which were but in man-
ning out, were torn and rent, before they could put off from the
land. Others they tied to their own gallies, and towed them
away empty. Which the Lacedemonians perceiving, and ex-
tremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby
intercepted in the island, came in with their aid from the land,
and entering armed into the sea, took hold of the gallies with
their hands, to have pulled them back again ; every one con-
ceiving the business to proceed the worse, wherein himself was
not present. So there arose a great affray about the gallies,
and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For
the Lacedemonians out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as
one may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land ;
and the Athenians, who had the victory, and desired to extend
their present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from
their gallies. But at length, having wearied and wounded each
other, they fell asunder ; and the Lacedemonians recovered all
their gallies, save only those which were taken at the first on-
set. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the
Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead,
and possessed the wreck, and immediately went round the
island with their gallies, keeping watch upon it, as having in-
tercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians in the mean
time, that were in the continent, and were by this time assem-
bled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus,
remained upon the place at Pylus.
As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta,
they thought fit, in respect the loss was great, to send the ma-
gistrates down to the camp, to determine, upon view of the
state of their present affairs there, what they thought requi-
site to be done. These, when they saw there was no possibility
to relieve their men, and were not willing to put them to the
danger either of suffering by famine, or of being forced by mul-
titude, concluded amongst themselves, to take truce with the
Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of
Pylus, if they also would be content, and to send ambassadors
to Athens, about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their
men as soon as they could. Tlie Athenian commanders
accepting their proposition, the truce was made, in this man-
ner.
The Articles of the Truce.
' That the Lacedemonians should deliver up, not only
' those gallies wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylus,
* and put into the Athenians' hands, whatsoever vessels of
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 197
* the long * form of building were any where else in La-
* conia.
^ That they should not make any assault upon the fort, nei-
' ther by sea nor land. That the Athenians should permit the
' Lacedemonians that were in the continent, to send over to
* those in the island, a portion of ground corn, agreed on, to
* wit, to every one two Attic Choenickes f of meal, and two Co-
' tyles X of wine, and a piece of flesh : and to every of their ser-
* vants half that quantity.
' That they should send tliis, the Athenians looking on, and
' not send over any vessel by stealth.
* That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding
' the island, provided that they landed not in it ; and should
* not invade the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.
* That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the
* truce was then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold
* good till the return of the Lacedemonian ambassadors from
* Athens.
* That the Athenians should convoy them in a gaily unto
* Athens, and back. That at their return the truce should end,
* and the Athenians should restore them their gallics, in as good
* estate as they had received them.'
Thus was the truce made, and the gallics were delivered to
the Athenians, to the number of about threescore : and the
ambassadors were sent away, who arriving at Athens, said as
foUoweth :
The Oration of the Lacedemonian Ambassadors.
' Men of Athens, the Lacedemonians have sent us hither
* concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade
* you to sucli a course, as being most profitable for you, may in
* this misfortune, be the most honourable for us, that our pre-
' sent condition is capable of. We will not be longer in dis-
' course than standeth with our custom, being the fashion §
' with us, where few words suffice, there indeed not to use
* many ; but yet to use more, when the occasion requireth that
* by words we should make plain that which is to be done in
' actions of importance. But the words we shall use, we pray
' you to receive, not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we
* Out of tliis and other placrs it appears, that the shippiog of those tioies was
of two forms, long and round. The long, uliich principally used the oar, served
for the wars, the ronnd, which used only the sail, served for inercliants uses and
traosportittioa of provision . Of the tirst sort were all gallies, whether of one,
two, or three, or more tire of oars ; of the latter were the ships called "OA.**}*;.
-f- A CLcenix, a measure of about three pints of oura.
\ K»T-jX.n., 9. quarter of a Choenix.
^ Brevity of speech was »o cu^toBiary aud luUaral to tbe Laconians, that k
jfrew to a proverb.
198 THE HISTORY book iv.
went about to instruct you, as men ignorant, but for a re-
membrance to you, of what you know, that you may delibe-
rate wisely therein. It is now in your power to assure your
present good fortune with reputation, lidding what you have,
with the addition of honour and glory besides ; and to avoid
that which befallcth men upon extraordinary success, who
through hope aspire to greater fortune, because the fortune
they have already came unhoped for. Whereas they that have
felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most
suspicious of the good. So ought your city, and ours espe-
cially, upon experience in all reason to be. Know it, by
seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who being of
greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that
which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give.
And yet we are not brought to this through weakness, nor
through insolence upon additition of strength, but because it
succeeded not with the power we had, as we thought it should,
which may as well happen to any others as to ourselves. So
that you have no reason to conceive, that for your power, and
purchases, fortune also must be therefore always yours. Such
wise men as falsely reckon their prosperity in the account of
things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves to-
wards adversity ; and not think that war will so far follow,
and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in
hand ; but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also
seldom miscarrying, because they be not puft up with the
confidence of success, choose then principally to give over,
when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be
good for you, men of Athens, to do with us ; and not, if re-
jecting our advice, you chance to miscarry (as many ways
you may) to have it thought hereafter that all your present
successes were but mere fortune.
^ Whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands without dan-
ger to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and
wisdom. The Lacedemonians call you to a peace, and end
of the war, giving you peace, and alliance, and much other
friendship and mutual familiarity, requiring for the same,
only those their men that are in the island; though also
we think it better for both sides, not to try the chance of
war, whether it fallout that by some occasion of safety offered,
they escape by force, or being expunged by siege, they should
be more in your power than they be. For we are of this
mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one that
having beaten his enemyj and gotten much the better in the
war, brings him through necessity to take an oath, and to
make peace on unequal terms; but when having it in his
power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him like-
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 199
' wise in goodness, and contrary to what lie expects be recon-
* died to him on moderate conditions. For in this case, his
* enemy, being obliged not to seek revenge as one that had
* been forced, but to requit his goodness, will (for shame) be
* the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And na-
* turally, to those that relent of their own accord, men give
* way reciprocally, with content ; but against the arrogant they
* will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too
' weak. > But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is
* surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident
* be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled besides the
' common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred, and you be
* deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be re-
' conciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have
* gained reputation, and our friendship, and we not suffered
* dishonour, and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only
* ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation
' of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will ac-
' knowledge it rather from you tlian us. For they make war,
' not knowing whether side began ; but if an end be made,
* (which is now for the most part in your hands) the thanks
* will be yours.
* And by decreeing the peace you may make the Lacedemo-
' nians your sure friends, inasmuch as they call you to it, and
f are therein not enforced, but gratified. Wherein consider
' how many commodities are like to ensue ; for if we and you
* go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to
* us, will honour * us in the highest degree.*
Thus spake the Lacedemonians, thinking that in times
past the Athenians had coveted peace, and been hindered of it
by them, and that being now offered, they would gladly accept
of it.
But they, having these men intercepted in the island,
thought they might compound at pleasure, and aspired to
greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by
Cleon the son of Cleaenetus, a popular man at that time, and of
the greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to
give tiiis answer :
* That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms,
' and come themselves to Athens, and wiien they should
* be there, if the Lacedemonians would make restitution of
* Ta fiiyifa riftivu. Will gire lis higJiest honour. Conveying' to tlie under-
standing of tlie wiser sort of the liearcrs, the consideration of tyrannizing the rest
of Greece, for by the highest honour lie means tyranny, but avoiding the envy
of the word ; because if he had said it plainly, the confederates would see that
tliey which termed themselves, The ilelirerers of Greece, would now out of private
iulerest, be content to join with the Athenians to tyrannise it.
200 THE HISTORY book iv.
' Nisaea, and Pegae, and Trsezen, and Achaia/ (the which they
had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when
the Athenians, being in distress, and at that time in more need
of peace than now,, yielded them up into their hands) * then
' they should have their men again, and peace should be made
' for as long as they botli should think good.'
To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that com-
missioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alter-
nate speaking and hearing, might quietly make such an agree-
ment as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon
came mightily upon them, saying, he knew before that they
had no honest purpose, and that the same was now manifest,
in that they refused to speak before the people, but sought to
sit in consultation only with a few ; and willed them if they
had ought to say that was real, to speak it before them all.
But the Lacedemonians finding, that although they had a
mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity,
yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest
speaking and not obtaining, they should incur calumny * with
their confederates, and seeing withal that the Athenians would
not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they
went back again without effect.
Upon their return, presently the truce at Pylus was at end,
and the Lacedemonians, according to agreement, demanded
restitution of their gallics. But the Athenians laying to their
charge an assault made upon the fort, contrary to the articles,
and other matters of no great importance, refused to render
them ; standing upon this, that it was said that the accord
should be void, upon whatsoever the least transgression of the
same. But the Lacedemonians denying it, and protesting this
detention of their gallies for an injury, went their ways and be-
took themselves to the war. So the war at Pylus was on both
sides renewed with all their power.
The Athenians went every day about the island with two
gallies, one going one way, another another way, and lay at
anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on
tliat part which lieth to the open sea, and that only w hen it
was windy. From Athens also there came a supply of thirty
gallics more to guard the island, so that they were in the whole
three score and ten. And the Lacedemonians made assaults
upon the fort, and watched every opportunity that should pre-
sent itself to save their men in tlie island.
• Viz. For biiyingfiieace at the cost of tlie confedfralrs stibjoction ; for llin thing'
they (hirst not |)ro|)ouiid before tho people was this, th;it hy the amity of these
two great states, the rest of Greece uoiihl be forced to serve them, which they
touched also but obscurely in the last words of their oration, as I have noted be-
fore. . " ■
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 201
Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confe-
derates in Sicily adding to those gallies that lay in garrison at
Messana the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made
war out of JMessana, instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians,
as enemies to the Rliegians, (whose territory they had also in-
vaded with their whole forces by land) and seeing the Athe-
nians had but a few gallies present, and hearing that the greater
number which were to come to them, were employed in the
siege of the island *, desired to try with them a battle by sea ;
for if they could get the better with tlieir navy, they hoped,
lying before Rhegium, both with their land forces on the field
side, and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their
hands, and thereby strengthert their affairs. For Rhegium a
promontory f of Italy, and Messana in Sicily lying near toge-
ther they might both hinder the Athenians from lying there at an-
chor against them, and make themselves masters of the streight.
This streight is the sea between Rhegium and Messana, where
Sicily is nearest to the continent, and is that which is called
Charybdis J, where Ulysses is said to have passed through ;
which for that it is very narrow, and because the sea falleth in
there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is
rough, hath therefore not without good cause been esteemed
dangerous.
In this streight then, the Svracusians and their confederates,
with somewhat more than thirty gallies, were constrained in
the latter end of the day to come to a sea-fight, having been
drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake
sixteen gallies of Athens, and eight of Rhegium, and being
overcome by the Athenians fell off with the Toss of one gaily,
and went speedily each side to tlieir own camp at Messana and
Rhegium, and the night overtook them in the action. After
this the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians;
and the fleet of tiie Syracusians and their confederates came to-
gether to an anchor at Peloris §, and had their land forces by
them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them, and
finding their gallies empty of men, fell in amongst them, and
by means of a grapnel || cast into one of their gallies, they lost
that gaily, but the men swam out. Upon this the Syracusians
went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the sliore to-
* Sphacteria.
t Rbegium being- a promontorT, au^ derived from 'P>iy»»A", wliicli sigpaifie*
to break, makes it probable that Sicily was oace a part of iuily, and there broken
off by some earthquake, but yet Scylla is iifarer to Sicily thaa Rhegium is.
X Charybdis, here taken fur the name of the whole streig-ht, is bnl a part near
to flleiisana, between it and Pelorus, subject to extraordinary agitation in stormy
weather, but nothings to that it was, or was feigned to be of old.
§ A promontory of Sicily, hard by Mes»ana.
II Cast in by the soldiers uu shore.
202 THE HISTORY book iv.
wards Messana, the Athenians came up to them again, and the
Syracusians opening themselves, charged first, and sunk ano-
ther of their gallies ; ro the Syracusians passed on to the port
of Messana, having had the better in their passage by the shore,
and in the sea-fight^ which were both together in such manner
as is declared.
The Athenians upon news that Chamerina should by Archias
and his accomplices be betrayed to tlie Syracusians, went thi-
ther. In the mean time the Messanians with their whole
power by land, and also with tlieir fleet, warred on Naxus a
Chalcidic* city, and their borderer. The first day having forced
the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their
fields ; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river
Acesine, which spoiled the country as it went up the river, and
M^th their land forces assaulted the city. In the mean time
many of the Siculi, mountaineers, came down to their assistance
against the Messanians ; which when they of Naxus perceived,
they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion
that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their confe-
derates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the
city, and charged upon the Messanians, and put them to flight,
with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, the rest
hardly escaping home. For the Barbarians fell upon them,
and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the
gallies that lay at Messana not long after divided themselves,
and went to their several homes f.
Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together
with the Athenians, marched presently against Messana, as
being now weakened, and assaulted it, the Athenians with
their fleet by the haven, and their land forces at the wall to the
field. But the Messanians and certain Locrians with Demo-
teles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing
forth, and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the
Leontines' army to flight, and slew many ; but the Athenians
seeing that, disbarked and relieved them : and coming upon
the Messanians now in disorder, chased them again into the
city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium.
After this the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another,
without the Athenians.
All tliis while the Athenians at Pylus besieged the Lacede-
monians in the island ; and the army of the Peloponnesians in
the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of
watch was exceeding painful to the Athenians, in respect of
the want they had both of corn and water ; for there was no
well but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylus, and no
* Of those whicli were founded by the Chalcidcaiis of Grccct;.
•(• Syracusa and Lociis.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 203
great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel,
and drunk such water as they were like to find there*. They
were also scanted of room for their camp; and tlieir gallies not
having place to ride in, they were forced by turns, some to stay
a shore, and others to take their victual, and lie off at anchor.
But their greatest discouragement was, the time which they
had staid there longer than they had thought to have done ; for
they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being
in a desert island, and having nothing to drink but salt water.
The cause wh.ereof were the Lacedemonians, who had pro-
claimed t that any man that would, should carry in meal, wine,
cheese, and all other esculents necessar}' for a siege into the
island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver : and if
an Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty.
Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual : but es-
pecially the Helots, who putting off from all parts of Pelopon-
nesus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of
the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above
all, to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind.
For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of
the gallies easily; for they could not then lie round about the
island at anchor. And the Helots were nothing tender in put-
ting a-shore, for they ran their gallies on ground, valued at a
price in money, and the men of arms also watched at all the
landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt
when the weather was calm, were intercepted. There were
also such as could dive that swam over into the island tiirough
the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled with
P<^PPy If tempered with honey and pounded linseed ; whereof
some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched.
So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to
send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.
The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their
army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported
into the island, knew not what they should do to it, and feared
lest winter should overtake them in their siege ; fearing not
only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and
in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible, but also
that they should be unable to send forth so many things as
were requisite, though it were summer; and again, that^ the
parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no
place to lie at anchor in against them, but that the watoh there
The water which is found by digging' in the sea sanJs is commonly fresh,
beingr strained and so purged of tiie sallness in the pas&ag^e of the water tbrouvh
the sand, but not so orood as farther off from the sra.
+ To the people of the country about.
X A medicine for hunger and thirst, not meat. Scboliastct.
204 THE HISTORY book iv.
ceasing of Itself, the men would by that means escape, or in
some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that
brought them meat. But that which tliey feared most, was
that the Lacedemonians seemed to have some assurance of
them already, because they sent no more to negociate about
them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of
the peace. But Cleon knowing himself to be the man sus-
pected for hindering the agreement, said, that they who brought
the news, reported not the truth. Whereupon they that came
thence, advising them, if they would not believe it, to send to
view the state of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by
the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of
force either say as they said, whom he before calumniated, or
saying the contrary be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians,
seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater
forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit
to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by de-
lay, but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should
make a voyage against those men, and glanced at Nicias the
son of Niceratus, then general *, upon malice, and with lan-
guage of reproach. Saying it was easy, if the leaders were
men, to go and take them there in the island. And that him-
self, if he had the command, would do it. But Nicias, seeing
the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that
when he thought it so easy a matter, he did not presently put
it in practice, and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him
to take what strength he would, that they could give him, and
undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this
leave but in words, was ready to accept it ; but when he knew
he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he
shrunk back, and said, that not he, but Nicias was general :
being now indeed afraid, and hoping that he durst not have
given over the office to him. But then, Nicias again bade him
do it, and gave over his command to him, for so much as con-
cerned Pylus, and called the Athenians to witness it. They (as
is the fashion of the multitude) the more Cleon declined the
voyage, and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much
the more to resign his power f to him, and cried out upon
Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage
himself of his word, he undertook the voyage, and stood forth,
saying, that he feared not the Lacedemonians, and that he
would not carry any man with him out of the city, but only the
Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those tar-
♦ SrjaTnyaj, the magistrate to whose authority wa» committed the levyiaj
and nnistoiiDg; of soldiers,
f His power to levy soldiers-
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 205
getlers that were come to them from .'Enus, and four hundred
archers out of other places ; and with these he said, added to
the soldiers that were at Pylus already, he would within twenty
days, either fetch away the Lacedemonians alive ; or kill them
upon the place.
This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laugh-
ter, and was heard with great content of the wiser sort. For
of two benefits, the one must needs fall out ; either to be rid of
Cleon, (which was their greatest hope) or if they were deceived
in that, then to get those Lacedemonians into their hands.
Now when he had dispatched with the assembly, and the
Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined
unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylus,
and presently put to sea. He made choice of Demosthenes
for his companion, because he heard that he also of himself had
a purpose to set his soldiers on land in the isle. For the army
having suffered much by the straightness of the place, and
being rather the besieged, than the besieger, had a great desire
to put the matter to the hazard of a battle : confirmed therein
the more, for that the island had been burnt. For having been
for the most part wood, and (by reason it had lien ever desert)
without path, they were before the more afraid, and thought it
the advantage of the enemy ; for assaulting them out of sight,
they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come
on land. For their errors, being in the wood, and their pre-
paration could not so well have been discerned : whereas all
the faults of their own army should have been in sight. So
that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly, in what
part soever they had pleased, because the onset had been in
their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to
fight witli the Lacedemonians at hand in the thick woods, the
fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought would be too hard for
the many and unskilful. Besides their own army being great,
it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, be-
cause they could not see where it was needful to relieve one
another.
These things came into his head, especially from the loss
he received in i^'tolia ; which in part also happened by occa-
sion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room,' having
been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their
dinners, with a watch before them, and one of them having set
fire on the wood, it burnt on by little and little ; and the wind
afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were
aware. By this accident, Demosthenes the better discerning
that the Lacedemonians were more than he had imagined,
having before, by victual sent unto them, thought them not so
many, did now prepare himself for the enterprise, as a matter
206 THE HISTORY took iv.
deserving the Athenians utmost care, and as having better
commodity of landing in the island, than before he had ; and
both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and
put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who
had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came him-
self also with those forces which he had required, unto Pylus.
When they were ooth together, first tliey sent a herald to the
camp in the continent, to know if they would command those
in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without
battle, to be held with easy imprisonment, till some agreement
were made touching the main war. Which when they refused,
the Athenians for one day held their hands ; but the next day,
having put aboard upon a few gallics all their men of arms,
they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both
sides of the island, both from the main, and from the haven, to
the number of about eight hundred men of arms, and marched
upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island.
For thus the Lacedemonians lay quartered. In the foremost
watch were about thirty men of arms. The midst and evenest
part of the island, and about the water, was ke])t by Epitadas
their captain, with the greatest part of the whole number.
And another part of them, which were not many, kept the last
guard towards Pylus, which place to the sea-ward was on a
cliff, and least assailable by land. For there was also a certain
fort which was old and made of chosen, not of hewn stones,
which they thought would stand them instead in case of violent
retreat. Thus they were quartered. Now the Athenians pre-
sently killed those of the foremost guard, (which they so ran to)
in their cabins, and as they were taking arms. For they knew
not of their landing, but thought those gallics had come thi-
ther to anchor in the night according to custon), as they hid
been wont to do. As soon as it was morning the rest * of the
army also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy gallics,
every one with such arms as he had ; being all that rowed (ex-
cept only the Thalamiif) eight hundred archers, targetiers as
many, all the Messanians that came to aid them, and as many
of them besides, as held any place about Pylus, except only the
garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposing his
army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less,
at certain distances, seized on all the higher grounds, to the
end that the enemies compassed about on every side, might the
* Viz. the lig^Iit-nrnied.
•f Thalaiiiii. There were three ranks of rowers ainoiinst the Athenians, the
uppermost called TlirauitiE, the second Zygitie, and tlie last Tlialaniilie, or Tlia-
laniii. In the gaily called Birenie, there were no Zeiif;ita>, in a Trireme were all
three ranks, in a Qiiadrirenie and ii|)ward9, all the middle ranks were Zeugite :
only the upptrmost were Thranitcc, and the ucthcrniost Tlialauiita.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 20/
less know what to do ; or against what part to set themselves
in battle, and be subject to the shot of the multitude from
every part ; and when they should make head against those
that fronted them, be charged behind ; and when they should
turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at
once both behind and before. And which way soever they
marched, the liglit-armed, and such as were meanliest provided
of arms, followed them at the back, with arrows, darts, stones
and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and could not
be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the ene-
mies wlien they should retire. With this design Demosthenes
both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his
forces accordingly in the action. Those that were about Epi-
tadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when
they saw that the foremost guard was slain, and that the army
marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went to-
wards the men of arms of the Athenians, with an intent to
charge them ; for these were opposed to them in front, and
the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs.
But they could neither come to join with them, nor any
way make use of their skill * : for both the ligh*-armed
soldiers kept them off" with shot from either side, and the
men of arms advanced not. Where the light-armed sol-
diers approached nearest, they were driven back, but return-
ing, they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and
that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the
ground being uneasy and rough, by having been formerly de-
sert ; so that the Lacedemonians in their armour could not
follow them. Thus for a little while they skirmished one
against another afar off. But when the Lacedemonians were
no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these
light-armed soldiers seeing them less earnest in chasing them,
and taking courage chiefly from their sight, as being many
times their number, and having also been used to them so much,
as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for
that they had not received so much hurt at their hands, as their
subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacede-
monians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them,
and witli a great cr\' ran all at once u^wn them, casting
stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand.
Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not ac-
customed to such kind of fight ; and withal a great dust of the
"Woods lately burnt, mounted Into the air, so that by reason of
the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from
Tbc skill of fiThtina; a standing fight, was thought a peculiar Tirtne of the
LaccdcEionians, as the tea fight was tiiaught of the Atbeuiaiis.
208 THE HISTORY book iv.
such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them.
Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedemonians side, for their
jacks * now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were
thrown stuck broken in them, so as they could not handle
themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any di-
rection given them, for the greater noise of the enemy; but
(danger being on all sides) were hopeless to save themselves
upon any side by fighting. In the end, many of them being
now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they
made their retreat in close order, to the last guard of the island,
and to the watch that was tliere. When they once gave
ground, then were the light-armed soldiers much more confi-
dent than before, and pressed upon them with a mighty noise.
And as many of the Lacedemonians as they could intercept in
their retreat they slew ; but the most of them recovered the fort,
and together with the watch of the same, put tliemselves in or-
der to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The
Athenians following could not now encompass and hem them
in, for the strong situation of the place, but assaulting them in
the face, thought only how to put them from the wall. And
thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, ei-
ther side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the
sun, one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the
other to keep their ground. And the Lacedemonians defended
themselves easier now than before, because they were not now
encompassed upon their flanks. When there was no end of
the business, the captain of the Messenians said unto Cleon
and Demosthenes that they spent their labour in vain, and that
if they w^ould deliver unto him a part of the archers, and light-
armed soldiers, to get up by such a way as he himself should
find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the en-
trance might be forced. And having received the forces he
asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lace-
demonians, that he might not be discovered ; making his ap-
proach under the clilfs of the island, where they were continual ;
in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they
kept no watch, and with much labour, and hardly unseen, came
behind them ; and appearing suddenly from above at their backs,
both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected
not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what
they expected. And the Lacedemonians being now charged
with their shot both before and beiiind, were in the same case
(to compare small matters with great) that they were in at
Thermopylae f. For then they were slain by the Persians
* U'tXti, a kind of qtiillcil armour, or of stiiH' closp bciilPii like felt.
t Five litiiidred Lncedciiioiiians under their king- LcuniUas in tiic streight of
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 209
shut up on both sides in a harrow path. And these now being-
charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer,
but fighting few against many, and being weak withal for want
of food, were at last forced to give ground, and the Athenians
by this time were also masters of all the entrances.
But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more thev
gave back, the faster they would be killed by their army, staid
the fight, and held in the soldiers, with desire to carry them
alive to Athens, in case their spirits were so much broken,
and their courage abated by tiiis misery, as upon proclamation
made, they would be content to deliver up their arms. So
they proclaimed, tliat they should deliver up their arms and
themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them
should seem good.
Upon hearing hereof the most of them threw down their
bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads, signifying
their acceptation of what vvas proclaimed. Whereupon a
truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demos-
thenes of one side, and Styphon the son of Pharax, on the
other side. For of them that had command there, Epitadas,
who was the first, was slain ; and Hippagretes, who was cho-
sen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive ;
and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the
law *, in case the others should miscarrv'. Styphon and those
that were with him, said that they would send over to the La-
cedemonians in the continent, to know what they there would
advise them to ; but the Athenians letting none go thence,
called for heralds out of the continent ; and the question hav-
ing been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedemonians
that came over from the continent brought them this answer :
' The Lacedemonians bid you take advice touching yourselves
' such as you shall think good, provided you do nothing disho-
' nourably.' Whereufwu having consulted, they yielded up
themselves and their arms ; and the Athenians attended them
that day and the night following with a watch. But the next
day after they had set up their tropliy in the island, they pre-
pared to be gone, and committed the prisoners to the custodv
of the captains of the gallies. And the Lacedemonians sent
over a herald, and took up the bodies of their dead. The num-
ber of them that were slain and taken alive in the island, was
thus. There went over into the island in all, four hundred and
twenty men of arras ; of these were sent awav alive, three
hundred wanting eight, and the rest were slain. Of those that
Tiiermopylse, withstood t'sree hundred thousand P,>r»ians, till torj were Cirenoi-
Tented, aiid charged hotli before and behind, and so all stain. Herod, lib. 7.
-♦ This manner of sabordr.i.iino^ dirers commauders to be chief io auec
was in those times much used.
P
210 THE HISTORY book iv,
lived, that were of the city itself of Sparta, one hundred and
twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was no
standing fight.
The whole time of the siege of these men in the island from
the fight of the gallies to the fight in the island was seventy-
two days ; of which for twenty days victual was allowed to be
carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassa-
dors were away that went about the peace ; in the rest they
were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth, and yet there
was both corn and other food left in the island. For their
captain Epltadas had distributed it more sparingly than he
needed to have done. So the Athenians and Peloponnesians
departed from Pylus, and went home both of them with their
armies. And the promise of Cleon, as senseless as it was, took
effect : for within twenty days he brought home the men, as he
had undertaken.
Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most
contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected
that the Lacedemonians should never, neither by famine, nor
whatsoever necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their
arms, but having died with them in their hands, fighting as
long as they had been able ; and would not believe that those
that yielded, were like to those that were slain : and when one
afterwards, of the Athenian confederates, asked one of the pri-
soners by way of insulting, if they which were slain were va-
liant men ; he answered that a spindle (meaning an arrow) de-
served to be valued at a higher rate, if it could know who was
a good man ; signifying that the slain were such as the stones
and arrows chanced to light on.
After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they
should be kept in bonds till there should be made some agree-
ment ; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their
territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took
order also in the same assembly, for the settling of the garrison
at Pylus. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thi-
ther such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as
to their native country, (for Pylus is in that country which be-
longed once to the Messenians) infested Laconia with rob-
beries, and did them much other mischief, as being of the
same language.
The Lacedemonians, not having in times passed been ac-
quainted with robberies, and such war as that, and because their
Helots ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater inno-
vation in the country, took the matter much to heart ; and
though they would not be known of it to the Athenians, yet
they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution
of the fort of Pylus and of their men. But the Athenians as-
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 211
pired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they
came often about it, yet were always sent away without effect.
These were the proceedings at Pylus.
Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians with
eighty gallies, two thousand men of arms of their own city,
and two hundred horse, in boats built for transportation of
horses, made war upon the territory of Corinth. There went
also with them, Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians of their
confederates. The general of the whole army was Nicias, the
son of Niceratus, with two others in commission with him.
Betimes in a morning they put in at a place between Cherso-
nesus and Rheitus on that shore, above which standeth the
hill Solygius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down, to
make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were
then iEolians, and upon which there standeth now a village,
called also Solygia. From the shore where the gallies came in,
this village is distant twenty furlongs, and the city of Corinth
sixty, and the Isthmus twenty. The Corinthians having long
before from Argos had intelligence, that an army of the Athe-
nians was coming against them, came all of them with their
forces to the Isthmus, (save only such as dwelt without the
Isthmus, and five hundred garrison soldiers, absent in Am-
bracia and Leucadia) all the rest of military age came forth,
to attend the Athenians, where they should put in. But
when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen, and
that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up
into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchrea,
lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and with the
other half made haste to meet them. Battus, one of their com-
manders, (for there were two of them present at the battle)
with one squadron, went toward the village of Solygia, being
an open one, to defend it ; and Lycophron with the rest
charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the
right-wing of the Athenians, which was but newly landed
before Chersonesus, and afterwards they charged likewise
the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and at hand-
strokes : and the right-wing of the Athenians and Ca-
rystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sus-
tained the charge of the Corinthians, and with much ado
drove them back. But as they retired, they came up, (for the
place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence,
being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them ; and
having sung the Paean *, came again close to them ; whom
when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at hand-
strokes. But a certain band of Corinthians, that came in to
• A hymn accustomed to be smig, one before battle, another after Tlctory.
212^ TME HISTORY
BOOK. IV.
the aid of their own left-wing, put the right-wing of the Athe-
nians to flight, and chased them to tiie sea-side. But then
from their galHes they turned head again, both the Athenians
and the Carystians. The other part of their army continued
fighting on both sides, especially the right-wing of the Corin-
thians ; where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the
Athenians : for they expected that the Athenians would at-
tempt to go to Solygia; so tiiey held each other to it a long
time, neither side giving ground. But in the end (for
that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them great
service, seeing the other had none) the Corinthians were
put to flight, and retired to the hill, where they laid down their
arms, and descended no more but tliere rested. In this retreat,
the greatest part of their right-wing was slain, and amongst
others, Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the
army being in this manner, neither much urged, nor retiring
in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat
up the hill, and there sat down. The Athenians seeing tliem
come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the
enemy, and took up their own, and presently erected a trophy
on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cen-
chrea, to watcli the Athenians, that they went not against
Crommyon, saw not this battle, for the hill Oneius j but when
they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went
presently to their aid : so did also the old men of Corinth *
from the city, when they understood how the matter had suc-
ceeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon
them together, imagining them to have been the succours of
the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their
gallies ; carrying with them the booty, and the bodies of their
dead all save two, which not finding they left. Being aboard,
they crossed over to the islands on the other side, and from
thence sent a herald f, and fetched away those two dead bo-
dies which they left behind. There were slain in this battle,
Corinthians two hundred and twelve, and Athenians somewhat
under fifty.
The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same
day to Crommyon, in the territory of Corinth, distant from the
city a hundred and twenty furlongs : where anchoring, they
wasted the fields, and staid ail that night. The next day they
sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, where-
into they made some little incursion from their gallies, and
* It was said before that all tlie Coiiiitliiaiis of military ajje were come forth.
-f- To fetch ofi" lhe<lead liy ;i herald, was a confession of being- the weaker;
but yet Nicias chooseth rather to renounce the reputation of victory, than omit an
act of piety. Besides, the peo|)le took uiarvclloiisly ill the neglect of tlie dead
bodies, as mhy appear by their senteuce on the captains after the battle Arg-iuusw.
1
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. )NI
then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Troezen, and
there took in the Isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and
placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the
territories of Troezen, HaHas, and Epidaurus ; and when they
had fortified this place, they returned with their fleet.
About the same time that these things were in doing, Eury-
medon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylus with
the Athenian fleet, towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined
with those of the city, and made war upon those Corcyraeans
which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which after the
sedition had come over ; and both made themselves masters of
the field, and much annoyed the city : and having assaulted
their fortification, took it. But the men all in one troop,
escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their com-
position, which was this ; * that they should deliver up the stran-
' gers that aided them ; and that they themselves, having ren-
* dered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people
* of Athens,' Hereupon the generals granted them truce,
and transported them to the island of Ptychia, to be there in
custody till the Athenians should send for them ; with this con-
dition, * that if any one of them should be taken running away,
* then the truce to be broken for tliem all.'
But the patrons of the commons of CorcjTa, fearing lest the
Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise
against them this plot. To some few of those in the island
they secretly send their friends, and instruct them to say, as if
forsooth, it were for good will, that it was their best course with
all speed to get away, (and withal to offer to provide them of a
boat) for that the Athenian coinraanders intended verily to de-
liver them to the Corcyreean ])eopIe.
When they were persuaded to do so, and that a boat was
treacherously prepared, as they rowed away, they were taken,
and the truce being noAv broken, were all given up into the
hands of the Corc\T8eans. It did much further this plot, that
to make the pretext seem more serious, and the agents in it
less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out, that they were
nothing pleased that the men should be carried home by others,
whilst they themselves were to go into Sicily, and the honour
of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Cor-
cyraeans having received them into their hands, imprisoned
them in a certain edifice, from whence afterwards they took
them out by twenty at a time, and made them pass through a
lane of men of arms, bound together, and receinng strokes and
thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied
his enemy. And to hasten the space of those that went slow-
liest on, others were set to follo.v them with whips.
They had taken out of the room in this manner, and slain.
2M THE HISTORY book iv.
to the number of threescore, before they that remained knew it,
who thought they were but removed, and carried to some other
place. But when they knew the truth, some or other having
told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and said, that
if they would themselves kill them, they should do it, and re-
fused any more to go out of the room, nor would suffer they
said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But nei-
ther had the Corcyreeans any purpose to force entrance by the
door, but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered tiie
roof, and threw tiles, and shot arrows at them. They in prison
defended themselves as well as they could, but many also slew
themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting
them into their throats, and strangling themselves with the
cords of certain beds that were in the room, and with ropes
made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having con-
tinued most part of the night, (for night overtook them in the
action) partly strangling themselves by all such means as they
found, and partly shot at from above, they all perished. When
day came, the Corcyrseans laid them one across another * in
carts, and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as
many as were taken in the fortification, they made bond-women.
In this manner were the Corcyraeans that kept the hillf,
brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this
far-spread sedition, for so much as concerned this present war :
for other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation.
And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at
first bound, prosecuted the war there, together with the rest of
their confederates of those parts.
In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Nau-
pactus, went forth with an army and took the city of Anacto-
rium;}:, belonging to the Corinthians, and lying at the mouth of
the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth
the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent
thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this sum-
mer ended.
The next winter, Aristides the son of Archippus, one of the
commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to ga-
ther tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes
a Persian, in the town of Eion, upon the river Strimon, going
from the king to Lacedemon. When he was brought to
Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assy-
* <lfe^ftti2of, significlh properly, after the manner that mats, or hurdles nre platted.
■\- Istoiie.
;f This city belonged to the Corcyra'aiis and Corinthians in common, Imt a
little before this war, tlic Corinthians carried away captives tlie men that were in
it, and possessed it alone : and those Corcyraeans wrought the sedition before r«w
lated.
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 215
rian language into Greek, and read them ; wherein, amongst them
other things that were written to the Lacedemonians, the prin-
cipal was this, * That he knew not what they meant, for many
* ambassadors came, but they spake not the same things. If
* therefore they had any thing to say certain, they should send
* somebody to him, with this Persian.' But Artaphernes they
send afterwards away in a gaily, with ambassadors of their own,
to Ephesus. And there encountering the news, that king Ar-
taxerxes, the son of Xerxes was lately dead, (for about that time
he died) they returned home.
The same winter also the Chians demolished their new wall,
by command of the Athenians, upon suspicion that they in-
tended some innovation, notwithstanding they had given the
Athenians their faith, and the best security they could, to the
intent they should let them be as they were. Thus ended this
winter, and the seventh year of this war, written byThucydides.
YEAR VIII.
The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change of the
moon the sun was eclipsed in part ; and in the beginning
of the same month happened an earthquake.
At this time the Mitylenian and other Lesbian outlaws, most
of them residing in the continent, with mercenarj' forces out of
Peloponnesus, and some which they levied where they were,
seize on Rhoetium, and for two thousand Phocean staters ren-
der it again, without doing them other harm. After this they
came with their forces to Antander, and took that city also by
treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the
cities called Act»ae *, whidi were in the occupation formerly of
the Mitylenians, but subject to the Athenians : but above all
the rest, Antander, which when they had once gotten, (for there
they might easily build gallies, because there was store of tim-
ber; and mount Ida was above their heads) they might issue
from thence with other their preparation, and infest Lesbos
which was near, and bring into their power the iEolic towns
in the continent. And this were those men preparing.
The Athenians the same summer with sixty gallies, two
thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking also with
them the Milesians, and some other of their confederates, made
war upon Cythera, under the conduct of Nicias the son of Ni-
ceratus, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes, and Antocles the son
of Tolmseus. This Cythera f is an island upon the coast of
Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants be Lacedemo-
nians, of the same that dwell about them.
♦ Littorales, chits situate on the sea shore. f Now Cerigo.
215 THE HISTORY book ly.
And every year there goeth over unto them from Sparta a
magistrate called Cytherodices *. They likewise sent over men
of arms from time to time, to lie in garrison there, and took
much care of the place. For it was the place where their ships f
used to put in from 4^gypt and Lybia, and by which Laconia
was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way
only subject to that mischief. For the island lieth wholly out,
into the Sicilian and Cretic seas : the Athenians arriving with
their army, with ten of their gallies, and two thousand men of
arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to the sea, called
Scandea, and with the rest of their forces having landed in the
parts of the island towards Malea, marched into tl)e city itself
of the Cythereans, lying likewise to the sea. The Cythereans
they found standing all in arms prepared for them ; and after the
battle began, the Cythereans for a little while made resist-
ance ; but soon after turned their backs and fled into the high-
er part of the city; and afterwards compounded with Nicias
and his fellow-commanders, ' That the Athenians | should de-
' termine of them whatsoever they thought good, but death.'
Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cythereans
before, which was also a cause that those things which concerned
the accord both now and afterwards, were both the sooner,
and with the more favour dispatched. For the Athenians did
but remove the Cythereans, and that also because they were
Lacedemonians, and because the island lay in that manner upon
the coast of Laconia. After this composition, having as they went
by, received Scandea, a town lying upon the haven, and put a
guard upon the Cythereans, they sailed to Asine and most of
the towns upon the sea side. And going sometimes on land,
and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about
seven days together. The Lacedemonians, though they saw
the Athenians had Cythera, and expected withal that they
would come to land, in the same manner in their own territory,
yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them ; but
distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their
territory to guard it wheresoever there was need, and were other-
wise also exceeding watchful, fearing lest some innovation
should happen in the state ; as having received a very great
and unexpected loss in the island §, and the Athenians having
gotten Pylus and Cythera, and as being on all sides encom-
passed with a busy and unavoidable war; insomuch that con-
trary to their custom they ordained four hundred horsemen ||,
• The judge of Cytjiero.
t "OX»«Sif, ships of the roiiiid form of building, meicbants ships.
j The Athenian people.
^ Spliacteria, where their men were taken and carried to Athens.
II The Lacedemonians relied only on their armed footmen, or men of onus, in
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN W.\R. 217
and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of
war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own
way, to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians who
thought they lost whatsoever they attempted not. Withal their
so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary
to their own expectation, exceedingly aflfrighted them. And
fearing lest some such calamity should again happen as they
had received in the island, they dur:jt the less to hazard battle ;
and thought that whatsoever they should go about would mis-
carry, because their minds not used formerly to losses, could
now warrant them nothing. As the Athenians therefore
wasted the maritime parts of the countr}% and disbarked near
any garrison, those of tlie garrison for the most part stirred not,
both as knowing themselves singly to be too small a number,
and as being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought
about Cortyta and Aphrodisia,and frighted in the straggling rab-
ble of liglit-armed soldiers ; but when the men of arms had re-
ceived them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whom they
also rifled of their arms. And the Athenians, after they had
erected a tropliy, put off again and went to Cythera. From
thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera*, and hav-
ing wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which
is of the territory called Cynuria, but is nevertheless the mid-
dle border between Argia and Laconia. The Lacedemonians
possessing this city, gave the same for an habitation to the
i£ginetae after they were driven out of .^^gina, both for the
benefit they had received from them about the tjme of the
earthquake, and of the insurrection of the Helots, and also for
that being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone
ever the same way with the Lacedemonians, When the Athe-
nians were coming towards them, the ^i-^ginetae left the wall
which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side,
and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which
was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with
them one of those garrisons which the Lacedemonians had dis-
tributed into the several parts of the countrj'j and these
though they Iielped them to build the fort below, yet would not
now enler with them into the town, (though the ^Egineta; en-
treated them) a|:prehending danger in being cooped up withip
the walls ; and therefore retiring into the highest ground, lay
still therCj as finding themselves too weak to give them battle.
In the mean time the Athenians came in, and marching up pre-
sently with their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and
wbose Tatour an^l skill in fight, they gloried mucli, as a peculiar virtue, and as
for horsetnen and light-armed soldiers, they made less reckoning, and only used
s;icb of them as were brought in by their confederates.
* So called from xifusfy a faa^en, because it is fall of havens.
318 THE HISTORY book iv.
destroyed wlialsoever was in it. The ^ginetae, as many as
were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens ;
amongst whom Tantalus also the son of Patroclus, captain of
such Lacedemonians as were amongst them, was wounded and
taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men
of Cythera, whom for safeties sake they thought good to re-
move into some other place. * These therefore, the Athenians
* decreed, should be placed in the islands *. And the rest of
* the Cythereans, at the tribute of four talents, should inhabit
* their own territory. That the JEginetie, as many as they
' had taken, (out of former inveterate hatred) should be put to
* death. And that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst
* those Lacedemonians that were taken in the island f.*
In Sicily the same summer was concluded a cessation of
arms, first between the Camarinaeans and the Geloans. But
afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling by their ambas-
sadors out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst
themselves, for making of a peace : wherein, after many opi-
nions delivered by men disagreeing, and requiring satisfaction
every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates the
son of Hermon a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the
most, spake unto the assembly to this effect :
T/te Oration of Hermocrates Jbr Peace.
' Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city, nor of the
* most afflicted with war, that am now to speak and to deliver
* the opinion which I take to conduce most to tjie common
' benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous a thing
* it is, to what end should a man, particularizing the evils there-
* of, make a long speech before men that already know it ? For
* neither doth the not knowing of them necessitate any man to
* enter into war, nor the fear of them divert any man from it,
* when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it so
* falls out, that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger ;
' and the other prefers danger before present loss. But lest
* they should, both the one and the other, do it unseasonably,
' exhortations unto peace are profitable, and will be very much
* worth to us if we will follow them, at this present. For it was
' out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that
' we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now,
* by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which
* if it succeed not so well, that we may depart satisfied every
* man with reason, we will be at wars again. Nevertheless,
* you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to
• Cycladi's. t Splmcttria.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 219
be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how
to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least
in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think
that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders of the peace
than any words of mine ; who having, of all the Grecians, the
greatest power, lie here with a few gallics to observe our
errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accom-
modate their natural hostility to their best advantage. For if
we enter into a war, and call in these men, who are apt enough
to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at
our own charges, and withal cut out for them the dominion
here, it is likely when they shall see us spent, they will some
time hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet, and attempt
to bring all these states into their subjection. Now, if we
were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates, and under-
go dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours,
then for the impairing of what we already have ; and to believe,
that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition ; and that
Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the
Athenians, as one body, is nevertheless city against city in
sedition within itself. In contemplation whereof, we ought, man
with man, and city with city, to return again into amity, and with
one consent, to endeavour the safety of all Sicily ; and not to
have tliis conceit, that though the Dorians * be the Athenians
enemies, yet the Chalcideans f are safe, as being of the race of
the lonians. For they invade not these divided races upon
hatred of a side, but upon a covetous desire of those necessities
which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved them-
selves, in their coming hither to aid the Chalcideans. For
though they never received any aid by virtue of their league
from the Chalcideans, yet have they on their part been more
forward to help them than by the league they were bound unto.
Indeed the Athenians that covet and meditate these things are
to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign,
but those that are most willing to be subject. For it is the
nature of man, every where to command such as give way,
and to be shy of such as assail. We are to blame that know
this, and do not provide accordingly, and make it our first
care of all, to take good order against the common fear. Of
which we should soon be delivered, if we would agree amongst
ourselves. For the Athenians come not against us out of their
own country, but from theirs here that have called them in.
* The Dorians and lonians are two nations, out of which almost all the people
of Greece were descended.
f The Chalcideans and Athenians were lonians, and the Lacedemonians and
most of Peloponnesus were Dorians. Hence it is that the Chalcideans might be
thought safe, though the Atheuians invaded Sicily, but the Dorians auU
220 ■'-^V.»rHE HISTORY
BOOK IV.
And so not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be €nded
by peace without trouble. A nd those that have been called in,
as they came with fair pretence to injure us, so shall they
with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.
x\nd thus much for the profit that will be found by advising
wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confes-
sed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not
make it also in respect of ourselves ? Or do you think perhaps,
if any of you possess a good thing, or be pressed with an evil,
that peace is not better then war, to remove the latter, or pre-
serve the former, to both ? or that it hath not honours, and
eminence more free from danger ? or whatsoever else one
might discourse at large concerning war ? Wiiich things con-
sidered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather
make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now
if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some
design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed
that he fail not, so much the more to his grief, as it is contra-
ry to his hope; knowing that many men ere now, hunting
after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others
trusting by some strength they have had, to take away ano-
ther's right, have the first sort, instead of being revenged been
destroyed, and the other instead of winning from others, left
behind them what they had of their own. For revenge suc-
ceeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath
been done, it should therefore prosper ; nor is strength there-
fore sure, because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune
that is most predominant in things to come, which though it
be the most deccivable of all things yet appears to be most
profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed
against each other with the greater providence. Now there-
fore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncer-
tainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present,
and taking these for hindrances sufficient to have made us
come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us
send away our enemies that hover over us, and make an eter-
nal peace amongst ourselves, or if not that, then a truce at least,
for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some
other time. In sum, let us know this, that following my
counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free, whereby be-
ing masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate ac-
cording to their merit, such as do us good or harm. Where-
as rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our con-
tention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best,
if it be, we must be forced to beconie friends to our greatest
enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not. For my part,
I said in the beginning I bring to this the greatest city, and
-BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 221
' Which is rather an assailant than assailed : ind yet foreseeing
* these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreeiDcnt, and not so
* to hurt our enemies,a5 to hurt ourselves more. Xor yet through
* foolish* spite will I look to be followed as absolute in my will,
' and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but will also
' give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do
* as well as I ; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the
' enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of
* kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcideaa
* of another of his own race ; or in sum, any one by another of
* us, being neighbours, and cohabiters of the same region, en-
* compassed by the sea, and all called by one name Sicilians.
' Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again
' by common conferences make peace, by our own selves.
' But when foreigners invade us, we shall (if wise) unite all of
' us to encounter them, inasmuch as being weakened singly, we
* are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never
* hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain
* these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians, and of domes-
' tic war for the present, and to be inhabited by ourselves with
* liberty, and less insidiated by others for the time to come.*
Hcrmocrates hanng thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his
advice, and agreed amongst themselves, * That the war should
* cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed.
* And that the Camariuccans should have Morgantina, panngfor
* the same unto the Syracusians, a certain sum of money then
' assessed.'
They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling
5uch of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them
that they also were willing to compound, and be comprehended
in the same peace ; and the Athenians approving it, thev did
so ; and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicilv. The
people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two,
namely Pythadorus, and Sophocles ; and laid a fine upon the
third, which was Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued
the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to returnf. So great
was their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could
cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy, and
hard enterprises with great and slender forces alike. The cause
whereof, was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their de-
signs, subministering strength unto their hope.
The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara,
* 4>(j.«>i«/e.
■f Nothing was more frequent in the Athenian assemblies at this time, than
when things went amiss, to accuse one another of bribery : for it was a sure way
to win farour with the people, who thought that nothings was able to resist their
power.
222 THE HISTORY book iv.
pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their
territory, with their whole forces, every year twice, and by their
own outlaws from Pegae, who in a sedition driven out by the
commons, grievously afflicted them with robberies, began to talk
one to another, how it was fit to call them home again, and not
to let their city by both those means be ruined. The friends of
those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly
now than before, required to have it brought to counsel. But
the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the com-
mons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be
able to carry it against the other side, made an offer to Hippo-
crates the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes the son of Alcis-
thenes, commander of the Athenian army, to deliver them the
city, as esteeming that course the less dangerous for themselves,
than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out.
And they agreed, that first, the Athenians should possess them-
selves of the Longwalls, (these were about eight furlongs in
length, and reached from the city to Nissea, their haven) there-
by to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians, in Nisaea, in which
(the better to assure Megara to the side) there lay no other
soldiers in garrison, but they. And then afterwards, that these
men would attempt to deliver them the city above, which would
the more easily succeed, if that were effected first. The Athe-
nians therefore, after all was done, and said on both sides, and
every thing ready, sailed away by night to Minoa*, an island
of the Megareans with six hundred men of arms led by Hippo-
crates, and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had
been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they
that were with the other commander Demosthenes, light-armed
Plataeans, and others called Peripoli, lay in ambush at the tem-
ple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city
perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care
to know the passages of this same night. When it was almost
day, the Megarean traitors did thus. They had been accustomed
long, as men that went out for booty f, with leave of the magis-
trates, of whom they had obtained by good offices, the open-
ing of the gates|, to carry out a little boat§, such as wherein the
watermen used an oar in either hand, and to convey it by night,
down the ditch to the sea side in a cart ; and in a cart to bring
it back again, and set it within the gates ; to the end that the
• This island lying before tlie liaven Nisapa, made the port, and the Athenians
kept in it an ordinary irnrrison ever since they took it first, and could see all the
liaven and what vessels lay in it, but could not enter.
f To get booty from the Athenians.
I Not the jrates of Megara, but the gates in the long walls near unto Nisira,as
appears by the narration.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 223
Athenians which lay in Minoa, might not know where to watch
for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time
was that cart at the gates, which was opened according to cus-
tom, as for the boat *. And the Athenians, seeing it (for so
it was agreed on) arose from their ambush, and ran with all
speed, to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be
there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open.
And first those Plataeans, and Peripoli, that were with Demos-
thenes, ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now ex-
tant; and fighting presently within the gates (for those Pelo-
ponnesians that were nearest f heard the stir) the Platteans over-
came those that resisted, and made good the gates for the
Athenian men of arms, that were coming after.
After this, the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up
every one to the wall, and a few of the Peloponnesians that
were of the garrison, made head at first and fought, and were
some of them slain, but the most of them took their heels :
fearing in the night, both the enemy that charged them, and
also the traitors of the Megareaes that fought against them,
apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed
them. It chanced also that the Athenian herald, of his own
discretion, made proclamation, that if any Megarean would
take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his
arms. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they staid no lon-
ger, but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them
fled into Nisaea. As soon as it was day, the walls being now
taken, and the Megareans being in a tumult \\-ithin the city,
they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them, the
rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates
opened, and to go out and give tiie enemy battle. Now it was
agreed on between them, that when the gates % were open, the
Athenians should rush in. And that themselves would be ea-
sily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm
done them, for that they would besmear themselves with some
ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their
greater safety. For the four thousand men of arms of Athens,
and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appoint-
ment were to come to them, having marched all night,
were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves,
and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy
discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These join-
ing their strength, came all together to the gates, denying that
it was fit to go out to fight j (for that neither in former times
• To take it in, for it waa almost morning.
■f Those that watched in that part of Xisara, which was nearest to this gate of
the long' walls.
I Of the city itself of Megura.
224 THE HISTORY
BOOK IV.
when they were stronger than now, durst they do so) or to put
the city in so manifest a danger. And said, that if they would
not be satisfied, the battle should be there right. Yet tliey
discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as hav-
ing given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they staid
at the gates, insomuch as the traitors could not perform what
they intended. The Athenian commanders, knowing some
cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the
city by assault, fell to enclosing Nissea with a wall, which
if they could take before aid came, tliey thougiit Megara
would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them
from Athens, and masons, and whatsoever else was necessary.
And beginning at the wall * they had won, when they had
built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they
drew it on to the sea on either side Nissea, and having distri
buted the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch,
they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs,
and having felled trees, and timber, they supplied what was de-
fective, with a strong palisado ; the houses also themselves of
the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served for a
fortification. All that day they wrought, the next day about
evening they had within a very little finished. But then, they
that were in Nisaea, seeing themselves to want victual, (for
they had none but what came day by day from the city above)
and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come
to relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their
enemies, compounded with the Athenians on these terms, ' To
be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money ; to deliver
up their arms ; and the Lacedemonians, both the captain, and
whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athe-
nians.' Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians,
when they had broken f off the Longwalls from the city of Me-
gara, and taken in Nisaea, prepared for what was further to be
done. Brasidas the son of Tellis, a Lacedemonian, happened at
this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army
to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the
Longwalls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians
in Nisfea, and lest Megara should be won, sent unto the Boeo-
tians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at
Tripodiscus (a village of Megaris, so called, at the foot of the
hill Geranea) and marched presently himself with two tiiousand
seven hundred men of arms of Corinth, four hundred of Phlius,
six hundred of Sicyon, and those of his own, all that he had
• Viz. that part of the long- wall which they seized.
t Not iJiilled them down qnite, but only so far, as not to be a defence to any
part of the city itself, nor to join to the walls of the city.
Booit IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 22*
yet kvied ; thinking to have found Nisaa yet untaken. When
he heard the contrary (for he set first towards Tripodiscus in the
night) with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army,
before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the
Athenians that lay by the sea side, to the city of Megara, pre-
tending in word, and intending also in good earnest, if he could
have done it, to attempt upon Nistea ; but desiring to get into
Megara to confirm it, and required to be let in, for that he was,
he said, in hope to recover Nissea. But the Megarean factions
being afraid, one *, lest he should bring in the outlaws, and
cast out them ; the other f, lest the commons, out of this very
fear, should assault them, whereby the city (being at battle
within itself, and the Athenians lying in wait so near) would be
lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still,
and attend the success. For both the one faction and the other
expected, that the Athenians, and these that came to succour
the city, would join battle, and then they might with more
safety, such as were the favoured side, turn unto them that had
the victor}'. And Brasidas not prevailing, went back to the rest
of the army J. Betimes in the morning, arrived the Boeotians,
having also intended to come to the aid of Megara, before Bra-
sidas sent, as esteeming the danger to concern themselves, and
were then with their whole forces come forward as far as Pla-
tsea. But when they had received also this message, they were
a great deal the more encouraged ; and sent two thousand two
hundred men of arms, and two hundred horse, to Brasidas, but
went back with the greater part of their army. The whole army
being now together of no less than six thousand men of arms.
And the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order, about
Nisiea, and the sea side, but the light-armed straggling in the
plains, the Boeotian horsemen came unexpected upon the
light-armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea. For in
all this time till now, there had come no aid at all to the Mega-
reans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went
likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a
battle between the horsemen of either side, that held long,
wherein both sides claimed tiie victory. For the Athenians slew
the general of the Boeotian horse, and some few others, and
rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to
Nisaea. And having these dead bodies in their power, they re-
stored them upon truce, and erected a trophy. Nevertheless,
in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assur-
ance, but parting asunder, the Boeotians went to the army, and
the Athenians to Nisiea.
• The patrons of the commons. f The aobitiljr.
J At Tri|)odiscu^
226 THE HISTORY book ir.
After this, Brasidas, with his army, came down nearer to the
sea, and to the city of Megara ; and having seized on a place
of advantage, set his army in battle array, and stood still. For
they thought the Athenians would be the assailants, and knew
the Megareans stood observing whether side should have the
victory ; and that it must needs fall out well for them both
ways ; first, because they should not be the assailant, and vo-
luntarily begin the battle and danger; since having shewed
themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly * be at-
tributed to them without f their labour. And next it must fall
out well in respect of the Megareans. For if they should not have
come in sight, the matter had not been any longer in the power
of fortune, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived
of the city, as men conquered. Whereas now, if haply, the
Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what
they came for without stroke stricken. Which also indeed
came to pass. For the Megareans ;):, when the Athenians went
out and ordered their army without the long walls, but yet (be-
cause the enemy charged not) stood also still, (their comman-
ders likewise, considering that if they should begin the battle,
against a number greater than their own, after the greatest
part of their enterprise was already achieved, the danger would
be unequal ; for if they should overcome, they could win but
Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part
of their men of arms : whereas the enemy, who out of the
whole power and number that was present in the field, did ad-
venture but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to
the hazard,) and so for a while affronted each other, and nei-
ther doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first into
Nisjea, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from
whence they had set forth ; then, I say, the Megareans (such
as were the friends of the outlaws) taking heart, because they
saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates
to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the se-
veral cities : and when they were in, (those that had practised
with the Athenians, being all the while in a great fear) they
went to council. Afterwards Brasidas having dismissed his con-
federates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth, in pur-
suit of his former purpose of levying an army for Thrace. Now
the Megareans that were in the city, (when the Athenians also
* Brasidas if lie saved the town from the Allieiiians had his end. Therefore hy
shfwinn' himself ready if tlic Athenians would not (ij;ht, he gained this, that he
(iioulH be let into the town, whicli was all he came for, and theretore luig-ht just-
ly he connted victor.
f 'Ajt«y/r/, withont dust.
i The period is somethinir luDg^, and seems to be one of them that gave occasion
to Dionysiua Ilalicaniasieus, to censure the author"! elocutioa.
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 227
were gone home) all that had chief hand in the practice with the
Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipped
away ; but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends
of the outlaws, recalled them from PegcE, upon great oaths ad-
ministered unto them, no more to remember former quarrels,
but to give the city their best advice.
These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms,
and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city,
picked out of their enemies, and of those that seemed most
to have co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about
an hundred persons ; and having constrained the people to give
their sentence upon them openly *, when they were con-
demned, slew them ; and established in the city, the estate al-
most of an oligarchy. And this change of government, made
by a few, upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long
time after.
The same summer, when Antandrus was to be furnished by
the Mitylenians as they intended, Demodicus and Aristides,
captains of certain gallies set forth by the Athenians to fetch in
tribute, being then about Hellespont (for Lamachus that was
the third in that commission, was gone with ten gallies into
Pontus) having notice of the preparation made in that place ;
and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there, as
it had done in Anaea over againsi Samos, in which the Samian
outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in
matters of the sea, by sending them steersmen ; and both bred
trouble within the city, and entertained such as fled out of it,
levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched to it,
and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antan-
drus against them, recovered the place again. And not long
after, Lamachus, that was gone into Pontus, as he lay at an-
chor in the river Calex, in the territory of Heraclea, much rain
having fallen above in the country, and the stream of a land
flood coming suddenly down, lost all his gallies, and came him-
self and his army through the territory of the Bithinians (who
areThracians dwelling in Asia, on the other side) to Chalcedon,
a colony of the Megareans in the mouth of Pontus Euxinus,
by land.
The same summer likewise, Demosthenes, general of the
Athenians, with forty gallies, presently after his departure out
of Megaris, sailed to Naupactus. For certain men in the ci-
ties thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Boeotian
government, and to turn it into a democracy, according to
• Because they sliould not dare but to condemn them, which thejr wosid not
hare done, if their seutcnce had passed by secret lufiVa^es.
I
228 THE HISTORY book iv.
the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates,
to betray unto him the estates of Boeotia : induced thereunto
principally by Ptoeodorus a Theban outlaw. And they ordered
the design thus : some had undertaken to deliver up Siphae,
(Siphffi is a city of the territory Thespiae, standing upon the
sea side, in the Crissaean gulf) and Chseronea (which was a
town that paid duties to Orchomenus, called heretofore Or-
chomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Boeotia) some
others of Orchomenus, were to surrender into their hands, and
the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this, and
were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This
Chaeronea is the utmost town of Boeotia towards Phanocis in
the country of Phocis, and some Phocians also dwelt in it. On
the other side, the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a
place consecrated to Apollo, in the territory of Tanagra, on the
part toward Euboea. All this ought to have been done toge-
ther upon a day appointed, to the end that the Boeotians
might not oppose them with their forces united, but might be
troubled every one to defend his own. And if the attempt suc-
ceeded, and that they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped,
though no change followed in the state of the Boeotians for
the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that
means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because
there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that It
could not stand long at a stay ; but that the Athenians joining
with such of them as rebelled, and the Boeotians not having
their forces united, they might in time order the state to their
own liking. Thus was the plot laid.
And Hippocrates himself with the forces of the city, was
ready when time should serve to march * ', but sent Demos-
thenes before with forty gallies to Naupactus, to the end that
he should levy an army of Acarnanians, and other their confe-
derates in these quarters, and sail to Siphae to receive it by
treason. And a day was set down between them, on which
these things should have been done together.
Demosthenes, when he arrived and found the Cenlades by
compulsion of the rest of Acarnania, entered into the Athenian
confederation, and had himself raised all the confederates there-
abouts, made war, first upon Salynthlus and the Agraeans, and
having taken In other places thereabouts, stood ready when the
time should require, to go to Siphae.
About the same time of this summer, Brasidas marching to-
wards the cities upon Thrace, with fifteen hundred men of
arms, when he came to Heraclea in Trachinia, sent a jnessen-
♦ Towards Delium.
BOOK IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 229
ger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to
be guides unto him, and to his army. And when there were
come unto him, Panaerus, and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and
Torylaus, and Strophacus, (who was the public host of the
Chalcidaeans) all which met him at Melitia, a town of Achaia,
he marched on. There were other of the Thessalians also that
convoyed him ; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Niconi-
das a friend of Perdiccas. For it had been hard to pass Thes-
saly without a guide howsoever, but especially with an army.
And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave, is a
thing that all Grecians alike are jealous of. Besides, that the
people of Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athe-
nians. Insomuch, as if by custom, tlie government of that
country had not been lordly* rather than a commonwealth t>
he could never have gone on. For also now as he marched
fon\'ard, there met him at the river Enipeus, others of a con-
trary mind to the former, that forbad him, and told him that
he did unjustly to go on witliout the common consent of all.
But those that convoyed him answered, that they would not
bring him through against their wills ; but that coming to them
on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas
himself said, he came thither a friend, both to the country and
to them ; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against
the Athenians their enemies. And that he never knew of any
enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedemonians, whereby
they might not use one another's ground ; and that even now
he would not go on without their consent ; for neither could
he, but only entreated them not to stop him. When they
heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of
his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder
him, marched on with all possible speed, staying no where by
the way j and the same day he set forth from Melitia, he
reached Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus.
From thence he went to Phacium ; from thence into Pertebia.
The Persebians, though subject to the Thessalonians, set him
at Dion, in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Ma-
cedonians, situated at the foot of Olympus, on the side toward
Thessaly. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly be-
fore any there could put in readiness to stop him ; and came
into the territory of the Chalcidaeans, and to Perdiccas. For
Perdiccas and the Chalcidaeans, all that had revolted from the
Athenians, when they saw the afl&irs of the Athenians prosper,
* Aurarxs, absolute g^ovcrnment under one part,
"t 'l#-»»«/*i«, equality of privilege in the whole.
230 THE HISTORY book it.
had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear : the Chal-
cideans because they thought the Athenians would make war
on them first, as having been also incited thereto, by those ci-
ties amongst them that had not revolted ; and Perdiccas, not that
he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians
for ancient quarrels ; but principally because he desired to sub-
due Arrhibgeus king of the Lyncesteans. And the ill success
which the Lacedemonians in these times had, was a cause that
they obtained an army from them the more easily.
For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their particular
territory * Laconia most of all, they thought the best way to
divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the
Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because
Perdiccas and the Chalcideans were content to maintain the
army, having called it thither to help the Chalcideans in their
revolt. And because also they desired a pretence to send away
part of their Helots f, for fear they should take the opportunity
of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in
Pylus to innovate. For they did also this further : fearing the
youth, and multitude of their Helots, (for the Lacedemonians
had ever many ordinances cancerning how to look to themselves
against the Helots,) they caused proclamation to be made, that
as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the
Lacedemonians best service in their wars should be made free ;
feeling them in this manner, and conceiving, that as they
should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first
made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And
when they had thus preferred about two thousand, which also
with crowns on their heads went in procession about the tem-
ples, as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them
away, and no man knew how they perished. And now at this
time with all their hearts they sent away seven hundred men of
arms more of the same men, along with Brasidas. The rest of
the army were mercenaries hired by Brasidas, out of Pelopon-
nesus. But Brasidas himself the Lacedemonians sent out,
chiefly, because it was his own desire. Notwithstanding the
Chalcideans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in
Sparta, every way an active man. And when he was out, he
did the Lacedemonians very great service. For by shewing
himself at that present just, and moderate towards the cities,
he caused tiie most of them to revolt, and some of them he
also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass, that if
' • By incursions and foraging the country from Pylus uud tlie isIuuU Cythcra.
•}- Their servants.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 231
the Lacedemonians pleased to come to composition (as also
they did) they might have towns to render and receive reci-
procally.
And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and
wisdom which Brasidas shewed now, to some known by expe-
rience, by others believed upon from report, was the principal
cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lace-
demonians : for being the first * that went out, and esteemed
in all points for a worthy man, he left behind him an assured
hope, that the rest also were like him.
Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians upon notice
thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, as imputing to him this
expedition, and reinforced the garrisons in the parts there-
abouts.
Perdiccas with Brasidas and his army, together with his own
forces, marched presently against Arrhibjeus the son of Bro-
merus king of the Lyncestheans, a people of Macedonia, con-
fining on Perdiccas his dominion, both for a quarrel they had
against him, and also as desiring to subdue him.
When he came with his army, and Brasidas with him, to
the place where they were to have fallen in, Brasidas told him
that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibaeus by
parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedemonians. For
Arrhibicus had also made some proffer by a herald, to commit
the matter to Brasidas's arbitrement. And the Chalcidean
ambassadors being present, gave him likewise advice, not to
thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, to the end
they might have him more prompt in their own affairs. Be-
sides, the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacede-
mon, had spoken there, as if they had meant to bring as many
of the places about him as they could, into the Lacedemonian
league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibfeus, for the public
good of their own state. But Perdiccas said that he brought
net Brasidas thither, to be a judge of his controversies, but to
destroy those enemies which he should shew him. And that
it will be an injury, seeing he pays the half of his army, for
Brasidas to parley with Arrhibaeus. Nevertheless, Brasidas,
whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel,
had conference with Arrhibaeus, by whom also he was induced
to withdraw his army. But from tiiat time forward, Perdiccas
• The first that went abroad for gorcrnor iuto olber stnte» since ibi« war. F«r
fifty years before this war, Paiisiinin.-i having the g-overnmrnt of the Grecian con-
federates at Bizantium, behaved himself insolently, and then Ciinon an Athenian
by the virtues now praised in Brasidas, g^t tlie confedcra'es to leave the Lao«>
demonians and affect the Athenians.
293 THE HISTORY book iv.
instead of half, paid but a third part of his army, conceiving
himself to have been injured.
The same summer, a little before the vintage, Brasidas hav-
ing joined to his own, the forces of the Chalcideans, marched
to Acanthus, a colony of the Andrians. And there arose se-
dition about receiving him, between such as had joined with
the Chalcideans in calling him thither, and the common peo-
ple. Nevertheless, for fear of their fruits which were not yet
gotten in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter
alone, and then (after he had said his mind) to advise, what to
do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the
multitude, (for he was not uneloquent, tliough a Lacedemonian,)
lie spake to this effect.
The Or-ation of Brasidas.
^ Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedemonians have
* sent me, and this army abroad, is to make good what we
' gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against
* the Athenians, which was, that we meant to make a war for
* the liberty of Greece. But if we be come late, as deceived
' by the war there, in the opinion we had, that we ourselves
' should soon have pulled the Athenians down, without any
* danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us.
^ For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your
' help will do our best, to bring them under. But I wonder
' why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not wel-
* come. For we Lacedemonians have undergone this great
* danger, of passing many days journey through the territory of
' strangers, and shewed all possible zeal, because we imagined
* that we went to such confederates, as before we came, had us
* present in their hearts, and were desirous of our coming. And
* therefore it were hard, that you should now be otherwise
* minded, and withstand your own, and the rest of the Grecians'
' liberty ; not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because
* others whom I go to, will be the less willing to come in ;
' making difficulty, because you to whom I came first, having a
* flourishing city, and being esteemed wise, have refused us:
* for which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must
' be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to
' come weak, and without power to maintain you against the
' Athenians. And yet against this same army 1 now have,
* when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisaea, though
' more in number, they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely
* that the Athenians will send forth so great number against
' you, as they had in their fleet there at Nisoea. I come not
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 233
hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians, and I have the
Lacedemonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths,
that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at
least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws. And that we
shall not hold you as confederates to us, brought in either by
force, or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to you,
that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore
I claim not only that you be not jealous of me, especially
having given you so good assurance, or think me unable to de-
fend you, but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me.
And if any man be unwilling so to do, through fear of some
particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into
the handg of a few, let him cast away that fear; for I came
not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured li-
berty, if neglecting the ancient use here, I should enthral, ei-
ther the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude.
For to be governed so, were worse than the domination of a
foreigner. And there would result from it to us Lacedemo-
nians, not thanks for our labours, but instead of honour and
glory, an imputation of those crimes * for which we make war
amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in
us than in them, that never pretended the virtue f. For it is
more dishonourable, at least, to men in dignity, to amplify
their estate by specious fraud, than by open violence. For
the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by
fortune, but the other, with the treachery of a wicked con-
science.
* But besides the oath which they have sworn already, the
greatest further assurance you can have, is this, that our ac-
tions weighed with our words, you must needs believe, that
it is to our profit to do, as I have' told you. But if after these
promises of mine, you shall say, you 'cannot, and yet for as
much as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for re-
jecting us ; or shall say that this liberty I offer you seems to
be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to
offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any ;
then will I call to witness the gods, and heroes I of this
place, that my counsel which you refuse, was for your good,
and will endeavour by wasting of your territory to compel
you to it. Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong ;
but have reason for it from two necessities, one of the Lace-
Ambition and desire to siibdoe other states.
+ The desire to assert other states.
X Semi-gods feigned by the peels to have been gotten between a eod and a
mortal. "
234 THE HISTORY book iv.
' demonians, lest whilst they have your affections, and not your
* society, tliey should receive hurt from your contribution of
' money to the Athenians ; another, of the Grecians, lest they
* should be hindered of their liberty by your example ; for
'otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we
* Lacedemonians to set any at liberty against their wills, if it
' were not for some common good. We covet not dominion
' over you, but seeing we haste to make others lay down the
' same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing li-
* berty to the other states in general, we should tolerate you to
* cross us. Deliberate well of these things, strive to be the
* beginners of liberty in Greece, to get yourselves eternal glory,
* to preserve every man his private estate from damage ; and to
* invest the whole city with a most honourable title *.' Thus
spake Brasidas.
The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for
that which Brasidas had effectually spoken, and partly for fear
of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from
the Athenians, having given their votes in secret. And when
they had made him take the same oath, which the Lacedemo-
nian magistrates took, when they sent him out; namely, that
what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedemonians
should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the
city. And not long after revolted Stagyrus, another colony of
the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.
In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Boeo-
tian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and De-
mosthenes, generals of the Athenians, and that Demosthenes
should have gone to Siphae, and Hippocrates to Delium, hav-
ing mistaken the days, on which they should have both set for-
ward, Demosthenes went to Siphfe first f, and having with
him the Acarnans, and many confederates of those parts in his
fleet, yet lost his labour. For the treason was detected by one
Nicomachus a Phocean, of the town of Phanotis, who told it
unto the Lacedemonians, and they again unto the Boeotians.
Whereby the Boeotians concurring universally to relieve those
places, (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in
their own several territories) pre-occupied both Siphae, and
Chaeronea. And the conspirators knovk^ing the error, attempted
in those cities no further.
But Hippocrates having raised the whole power of the city
of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them,
* The title of a free city.
t Before Hippocrates went to Delium, whereas it onght to have been at the
■ame time.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 235
and all strangers, that were then there, arrived afterwards * at
Delium, when the Boeotians were now returned from Siphae,
and there staid, and took in Delium a temple of Apollo with a
wall, in this manner. Round about the temple, and the whole
consecrated ground, they drew a ditch, and out of the ditch,
instead of a wall, they cast up the earth, and having driven
down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the
vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they cut
down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined build-
ings. And by all means heightened the fortification, and in
such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood upon
the same. There was no edifice of the temple standing, for
the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the
work the third day after they set forth from Athens, and
wrought all the same day, and all the fourth and fifth day, till
dinner. And then being most part of it finished, the camp
came back from Delium, about ten furlongs homewards. And
the light-armed soldiers went most of them presently away,
but the men of arms laid down their arms there, and rested.
Hippocrates staid yet behind, and took order about the garri-
son, and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.
The Boeotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra ;
and when all the forces were come in, that from every city
were expected, and when they understood that the Athe-
nians drew homewards though the rest of the Boeotian f
commanders, which were eleven, approved not giving battle,
because they were not now in Boeotia (for the Athenians, when
they laid down their arms, were in the confines of Oropia) yet
Pagondas the son of Aioladas, being the Boeotian X commander
for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army,
was, together with Arianthidas the son of Lysimachidas, of
opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune
of a battle ; wherefore calling them unto him every company
by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he
exhorted the Boeotians to march against the Athenians, and
to hazard battle, speaking in this manner.
The Oration of Pagondas to his Soldiers.
* Men of Boeotia, it ought never to have so much as entered
* into the thought of any of us the commanders, that because
' we find not the Athenians now in Boeotia, it should there-
• After Demosthenes had been at Sipljae, which was too late, he fortificth
Delium.
-f- 'B»iuTx^)(jiiTts, eleven in number.
X It seems that the several states of B<Botia being free of fbemselvCT, and hold-
ings altogether, were united under governors sent from ihem severally, at least in
tlie wars, and then they had the leading of the common forces by tarns.
236 THE HISTORY book it.
fore be unfit to give them battle. For they, out of a border-
ing country have entered Boeotia, and fortified in it, with in-
tent to waste it, and are indeed enemies in whatsoever ground
we find them, or whencesoever they come, doing the acts of
hostility. But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him
henceforth be of another opinion. For providence in them
that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning
their own, as may be used by them, who retaining their own,
out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily invade the estate of an-
other. And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a
foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him, both on
your own, and on your neighbours ground alike ; but much
more you ought to do it, against the Athenians, when they be
borderers. For liberty* with all men, is nothing else but
to be a match for the cities that are their neighbours. With
these then that attempt the subjugation, not only of their
neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not
try the utmost of our fortune ? We have for example, the es-
tate that the Euboeans over against us, and also the greatest
part of the rest of Greece do live in under them. And you
must know, that though others fight with their neighbours,
about the bounds of their territories, we, if we be vanquished,
shall have but one bound amongst us all ; so that we shall no
more quarrel about limits. For if they enter, they will take
all our several states into their own possession by force. So
much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians,
than of other people. And such as upon confidence in their
strength invade their neighbours, (as the Athenians now do)
use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending
themselves only in their own territories ; whereas they be less
urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their
own limits, or also to begin the war when opportunity serveth.
We have experience hereof in these same men ; for after we
had overcome them at Coronea, at what time through our
own sedition, they held our country in subjection, we esta-
blished a great security in Boeotia, which lasted till this pre-
sent. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to
imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are
the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to dis-
grace the virtue of their houses ; but rather with confi-
dence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlaw-
fully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him
appearing fair, to march against them, and let them see, that
* So that so soon as a state hath a neighbour strong enough to subdue it, it
is no more to be thought a free state.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. Uf
* though they may gain what they covet, when they invade
' such as will not fight, yet men that have tlie generosity to
* hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state
* of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfoughten.'
Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Boeotians to
march against the Athenians, and making them rise *, led them
speedily on, for it was drawing towards night, and when he was
near to their army, in a place, from whence by the interposi-
tion of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand, he put
his army into order, and prepared to give battle. When it
was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Boeo-
tians were marching after them, he sends presently to the
army, commanding them to be put 'm array, and not long after
he came himself, having left some three hundred horse about
Delium, both for a guard to the place, if it should be assaulted,
and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Boeotians
when they were in fight. But for these, the Boeotians ap-
pointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all
was as it should be, they shewed themselves from the top of
the hill. Where they sat down with their arms, in the same
order they were to fight in ; being about seven thousand men
of arms, of light-armed soldiers above ten thousand, a thou-
sand horsemen, and five hundred targetiers. Their right wing
consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers ; in the middle
battle were the Haliartians, Coronaeans, Copteans, and the rest
that dwell about the lake f ; in the left were the Thespians,
Tanagraeans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen, and lig-ht-
armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans
were ordered by twenty-five in file, but the rest, every one as
it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Boeo-
tians.
The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the
enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout. Their horse
they placed on either wing; but for light-armed soldiers,
armed as was fit, there were none, nor was there anv in the
city. Those that went out, followed the camp, for the most
part without arms, as being a general expedition both of citi-
zens and strangers ; and after they once began to make home-
ward, there staid few behind. When they were now in their
order, and ready to join battle, Hippocrates the general came
into the army of the Athenians, and encouraged them, speak-
ing to this effect.
* It was tlie fushiou in tliose times for the soldiers to sit down Hith their arnra
by them, when they staid any where ia the field,
"f The laks Cojiuis.
238 THE HISTORY book iv.
The Oration of Hippocrates to his Soldiers.
' Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with
* valiant men it hath as much force as a longer, and is for a re-
* membrance rather than a command. Let no man think, be-
' cause it is in the territory of another, that we therefore preci-
* pitate ourselves into a great danger tliat did not concern us,
* For in the territory of these men you fight for your own : if
* we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our
* territories again, for want of the Boeotian horsemen : so that
* in one battle you shall both gain this territory, and free your
* own. Therefore march pn against the enemy, every one as
' becometh the dignity both of his natural city, (which he glo-
' rieth to be chief of all Greece) and of his ancestors, who
' having overcome these men at Oenophyta, under the conduct
* of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Boeotia.'
Whilst Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had
gone with it over half the army, but could proceed no further,
the Boeotians (for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhor-
tation, and had there sung the Paean) came down upon them
from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to
meet them, so fast, that they met together running. The ut-
most parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both
by one and the same cause, for certain currents of water kept
them asunder. But the rest made sharp battle, standing close
and striving to put by each others bucklers. The left wing of
the Boeotians to the very middle of the army was overthrown
by the Athenians, who in this part had to deal amongst others
principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were
placed within the same wing, gave back, and were circled in
by the Athenians in a narrow compass, those Thespians that
were slain, were hewed down in the very fight. Some also of
the Athenians themselves, troubled with enclosing them,
through ignorance slew one another. So that the Boeotians
were overthrown in this part and fled to the other part, where
they were yet in fight. But the right wing wherein the The-
bans stood, had the better of the Athenians, and by little and
little, forced them to give ground, and followed upon them
from tiie very first. It happened also that Pagondas, whilst the
left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of
horse secretly about the hill, whereby that wing of the Athe-
nians, which was victorious, apprehending upon their sudden
appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put into a
fright, and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly ter-
rified by this accident, and by the Thebans that continually
BOOR IT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 2S9
won ground, and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight;
some fled toward Delium and the sea, and some towards Oro-
pus ; others toward the mountain Parnethus, and others other
ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Boeotians, es-
pecially their horse, and those Locrians that came in, after the
enemy was already defeated, followed, killing them. But
night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the
easier saved. The next day, those that were gotten to Oropus
and Delium, went thence by sea to Athens, having left a gar-
rison in Delium, which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they
yet retained. The Boeotians, when they had erected their tro-
phv, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy,
and they left a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra,
and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made
upon Delium. In the mean time a herald sent from the Athe-
nians to require the bodies, met with a herald by the way, sent
by the Boeotians, which turned him back, by telling him he
could get nothing done, till himself was returned from the
Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians,
delivered unto them wliat the Boeotians had given him in
charge; namely,
* That they had done unjustly to transgress the universal law of
* the Grecians ; being a constitution received by them all, that
* the invader of another's country shall abstain from all holy places
* in the same. That the Athenians had fortified Delium, and
* dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places
* profane, and had drawn that water to the common use, which
* was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash
* their hands for the sacrifice. That therefore the Boeotians,
* both in the behalf of the god, and of themselves, invoking A-
* polio, and all the interested spirits* did warn them to be gone,
* and to remove their stuff out of the temple.*
After the herald had said thus, the Athenians sent a herald
of their own to the Boeotians : denying, * that either they had
* done any wrong to the holy place already, or would willingly
' do any hurt to it hereafter. For neither did they at first enter
' into it to such intent; but to requit the greater injuries which
* had been done unto them. As for the law which the Grecians
* have, it is no other, but that they which have the dominion of any
* territory great or small, have ever the temples also, and besides
* the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can.
* For also the Boeotians and most men else, all that having dri-
' ven out another nation possess their territory, did at first in-
* vade the temples of others, and make them their own. That
240 THE HISTORY book iv.
' therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they
' would keep it ; and for the part they were now in, they were
' in it with a good will, and would not out of it, as being their
' own. That for the water, they meddled with it upon neces-
* sity, which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this,
' that fighting against the Boeotians that had invaded their ter-
* ritory first, they were forced to use it. For whatsoever is
* forced by war, or danger, hath in reason, a kind of pardon even
* with the God himself. For the altars, in cases of involuntary
' offences, are a refuge ; and they are said to violate laws, that
* are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon
* occasion of distress. That the Boeotians themselves, who re-
' quire restitution of the holy places, for a redemption of the
* dead, are more irreligious by far, than they, who rather than
' let their temples go, are content to go without that which
' were fit for them to receive.*
And they bad him say plainly, * that they would not depart
* out of the Boeotians* territory, for that they were not now in
< it, but in a territory which they had made their own by the
< sword * ; and nevertheless required truce according to the or-
* dinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead.*
To this the Boeotians answered, * that if the dead were in
' Bo^otia, they should quit the ground, and take with them
* whatsoever was theirs. But if the dead were in their own ter-
' ritory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do.*
For they thought, that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay,
(for the battle was fought in the border between Attica and Boeo-
tia) by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not
fetch them off by force ; and for truce, that the Athenians might
come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none, but
conceived it was a handsome answer, to say, ' that if they would
* quit the ground, they should obtain whatsoever they required.'
Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way with-
out effect. The Boeotians presently sent for darters and slin-
gers from the towns on the Melian gulf, and with these, and
with two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and with the Pe-
loponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisaa, and with the Me-
gareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith
to Delium, and assaulted the wall; and when they had attempted
the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an en-
gine, wherewith they also took it, made in this manner : hav-
ing slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides,
and curiously set them together again in form of a pipe.
At the end of it in chains they hung a caldron, and into the
* A*(4, by tlie spear.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 241
caldron from the end of the mast they conveyed a snout of iron,
having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the
wood. They carried it to the wall (being far off) in carts, to
that part where it was most made up, with the matter of the vi-
neyard, and with wood. And when it was to, they applied a
pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew.
The blast passing narrowly through into the caldron, in which
were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding
great flame, and set the wall on fire ; so that no man being
able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same, and
betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means
taken.
Of the defendants some were slain, and two hundred taken
prisoners. The rest of the number recovered their gallies, and
got home. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the
battle, and the herald, which not long after was sent again about
the fetching away the dead, not knowing it, the Boeotians let
him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done.
In the battle there died Boeotians few less than five hundred; Athe-
nians few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates the general ;
but of light-armed soldiers, and such as carried the provisions
of the army, a great number.
Not long after this battle, Demosthenes that had been with
his army at Siphee, seeing the treason succeeded not, having
aboard his gallies his army of Acarnanians, and Agraeans, and
four hundred men of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before
all his gallies came on shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to
defend their territorj', put to flight such as were already landed,
and chased them back to their gallies ; having also slain some,
and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they
gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead.
About the time that these things past at Delium, died Sital-
ces king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition
against the Triballians, and Seuthes the son of Spardocus his
brother's son succeeded him in the kingdom both of the Odry-
sians and of the rest of Thrace, as much as was before subject
to Sitalces.
The same winter Brasidas with the confederates in Thrace,
made war upon Amphipolis, a colony of the Athenians, situated
on the river Strymon. The place whereon the city now standeth,
Aristagoras of Miletus had formerly attempted to inhabit when
he fled from king Darius, but was beaten away by theEdonians.
Two and thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same,
and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as
many as would go. And these were destroyed all by the Thra-
cians at Drabescus.
242 THE HISTORY nooK iv.
In the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon the son
of NiciaSj the Athenians came again, and having driven out the
Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the
Nine ways. This army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by
the sea-side, subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the
Strymon ; five and twenty furlongs from the city; Agnon
named this city Amphipolis, because it was surrounded by the
river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken
it in, with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants
into the place, being conspicuous round about, both to the sea
and land.
Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging
from Arnse in Chalcidea. Being about twilight come as far as
Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe entereth into the
sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by
night. The weatl er was foul, and a little it snowed, which also
made him to march tlie rather, as desiring that none of Amphi-
polis, but only tlie traitors, should be aware of his coming. For
there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city, (now
Argilus is a colony of the Andrians) and others, that contrived
this induced thereunto, some by Perdiccas, and some by the
Chalcidaeans. But above all, the Argilians being of a city near
unto it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies
to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered, and Brasidas
arrived, (who had also long before dealt underhand with as many
of them as dwelt in Amphipolis, to betray it) both received him
into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought
the army forward the same night, as far as to the bridge of the
river. The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a
fort at the bridge then, as there is now, but they kept it only
with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard,
both in respect of the treason, and of the weather and of his own
unexpected approach, he passed the bridge, and was presently
master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had, that dwelt with-
out. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of
those without being slain, and some fled into the city, the Am-
phipolitans were in very great confusion at it, and the rather,
because they were jealous one of another. And it is said, that
if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had
marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it
then. But so it was, that he ])itched there, and fell upon those
without, and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still
upon the])lace. But the contrary faction to the traitors, being
superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened pre-
sently, both they and Eucles the general, who was then there
for the Athenians, to keep the town, sent unto the other ge-
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 243
neral, Thucydides the son of Olorus, the writer of this history,
who had charge in Thrace, and was now about Thasus (which
is an island, and a colony of the Parians, distant from Amphi-
polis, about half a day's sail) requiring him to come and relieve
them.
When he heard the news, he went thitlien.\ards in all haste,
with seven gallies which chanced to be with him at that time.
His purpose principally was, to prev^jnt the yielding up of Am-
phipolis, but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of
Eion, before Brasidas's coming.
i* Brasidas in the mean time fearing the aid of the gallies, to
come from Thasus, and having also been informed that Tliu-
cydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace there-
abouts, and was thereby of ahiility amongst the principal men of
the continent, hasted by all means to get AmphipoHs, before
he should arrive ; lest otherwise at his coming, the commons
of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates, both
from the sea side, and in Thrace, and relieve them, should
thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end, oftered them a
moderate composition, causing to be proclaimed, ^ that what-
' soever Amphipolitan, or Athenian would, might continue to
* dwell there, and enjoy his own, with equal and like form of
* government. And that he that would not, should have five
' days respite to be gone, and carry away his goods.' :l
VVhcn the commons heard this, their minds were turned ;
and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but
few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kins-
men of those that were taken without, flocked together within,
and in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation
reasonable. The Athenians thought it so, because they were
willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be
greater than that of the rest, and withal, not expecting aid in
haste ; and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both de-
livered of the danger, and withal to retain their citv, with the
equal form of government. Insomuch, that they which con-
spired with Brasidas, now openly justified the offer to be rea-
sonable, and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned
and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian
general, they compounded, and upon the conditions proclaimed,
received him. Thus did these men deliver up the citv.
Tiiucydides with his gallies, arrived in the evening of the-
same day at Eion. Brasidas had already goiten Amphipolis,'
and wanted but a night of taking Eion also, for if these gallies
had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had
been had.
After this, Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe,
244 THE HISTORY
BOOK IV
both for the present, tliough Brasidas should assault it, and for
the future ; and took into it, such as according to the procla-
mation made, came down from Amphipolis. Brasidas, with
many boats came suddenly down the river to Eion, and at-
tempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the
wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the ri-
vers he assayed also the same, at the same time by land, and
was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all
things necessary.
Then revolted to him Myrciuns, a city of the Edonians, (Pit-
tacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Go-
axis, and by Braure his own wife.) And not long after, Gap-
selus also, and Oesyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas
also, after the taking of these places, came to him, and helped
him in assaulting of the same. After Amphipolis was taken,
the Athenians Avere brought into great fear ; especially, for that
it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber
which is sent them for the building of gallies, and in revenue
of money ; and because also, though the Lacedemonians hadapas-
sage open to come against their confederates (the Thessalians
convoying them) as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not got-
ten that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen,
and towards Eion, well guarded with their gallies, they could
have gone no further, which now they thought they might ea-
sily do ; and therefore feared lest their confederates should re-
volt. For Brasidas both shewed himself otherwise very mode-
rate, and also gave out in speech, that he was sent forth to re-
cover the liberty of Greece. And the cities, which were subject
to the Atiienians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what
assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides,
were extremely desirous of innovation; and sent messengers
])rivily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should
first revolt. For tliey thought they might do it boldly, falsely
estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards
it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to blind
wilfulness, rather than safe forecast. It being the fashion of
men, what they wish to be true to admit, even upon an un-
grounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral * kind
of arguing to reject. Withal, because the Athenians had late-
ly received a blow from the Boeotians, and because Brasidas had
said, not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them, that
when he was at Nisaea, the Athenians durst not fight with those
forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed
not that any man would come against them. But the greatest
BOOK IV. OF TH-i: GRECIAN WAR. 245
caase of all was, that for the delight they took at this time to
innovate, and for that they were to make trial of the L/acedemo-
nians, not till now angr\', they were content by any means to put
it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent
garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as tlie shortness of
the time, and the season of winter would permit. And Brasi-
das sent unto Lacedemon, to demand greater forces ; and in the
mean time prepared to build gallies on the river of Strymon.
But the Lacedemonians, partly through envy of the principal
men, and partly, because they more affected the redemption of
their men taken in the island*, and the ending of the war, re-
fused to furnished him.
The same winter, the Megareans having recovered their long
walls, holden by the Athenians, rased them to the very ground.
Brasidas after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the
confederates, marched with his army into the territory called
Acte. This Acte is that prominent territory, which is disjoined
from the continent, by a ditch, made by the king f. And Athos
a high mountain in the same, determineth at the ^-Egean sea.
Of the cities it hath, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by
the side of the said ditch, on the part which looketh to the sea,
towards Euboea ; the rest are Thyssus, Cleonae, Acrothoi, Olo-
phixus, and Dion, and are inhabited by promiscuous Barba-
rians of two languages X j some few there are also of the Chal-
cidaean nation, but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene
nations that once inhabited Athens, and Lemnos; and of the
Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians ; and dwell
in small cities, the most of which yielded to Brasidas. But
Sane, and Dion held out ; for which cause he staid with his
army and wasted their territory. But seeing they would not
hearken unto him, he led his ^my presently against Torone of
Chalcidea, held by the Athenians. He was called in by the few,
who were ready withal to deliver him the city, and arriving there
a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the
temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from
the city So that to the rest of the city, and to the
Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the
traitors knowing he was to come, (some few of them being also
privily gone to him) attended his approach, and when they per-
ceived he was come, they took in unto them seven men, armed
only with daggers, (for of twenty appointed at first to that ser-
vice, seven only had the courage to go in, and were led by Ly-
sistratus of Olynthus) which getting over the wall towards the
• Spliacteria. f Xerxes when he invaded Greece,
X The Greek, and their o\»a Barbarian.
246 THE HISTORY book iv.
main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's
side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and
having slain the watchmen, brake open the postern gate towards
Canastraia. Brasidas this while, with the rest of his army, lay
still, and then coming a little forward, sent one hundred targe-
tiers before, who when the gates should be opened, and a sign
agreed on be set up, should run in first. These men expecting
long, and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at
length come up close to the city. Those Toronae-ans within,
which helped the men that entered to perform the enterprise,
when the. postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading
to the market-j)lace opened likewise, by cutting asunder the bar,
went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the
end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew
not the matter, both behind and on either side ; and then they
put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the
rest of the targetiers by the gate that leadeth to the market-
place.
Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and
with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those
within, entered into the city running. Some went directly in by
the gate, and some by certain squared timber trees, which lay at the
wall (which iiaving been lately down, was now again in building)
for the drawing up of stone. Brasidas therefore, with the
greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the
city, to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places
of advantage.
But the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there, with-
out difference. When the town was taken, the most of the
Toronaeans were much troubled, because they were not acquain-
ted with the matter, but the conspirators, and such as were
pleased with it, joined themselves presently with those that en-
tered. The Athenians (of which there were about fifty men of
arms asleep in the market place) when they knew what had
happened, fled all, except some few that were slain upon the
place, some by land, some by water in two gallies that kept
watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus ; which was a
fort which they themselves held, cut off from the rest of the
city to the sea-ward, in a narrow Isthmus. And thither also
fled all such Toronfeans as were affected to them. Being now day,
the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to
be made, that those Toronaeans which were fled with the Athe-
nians, might come back, as many as would, to their own, and
inhabit there in security. To the Athenians he sent a herald,
bidding them depart out of Lecytjms, under truce, with all they
had, as a place that belonged to the Chalcideans. The Athe-
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 247
nians denied to quit the place, but the truce they desired for
one day, for the taking up of their dead. And Brasidas granted
it for two. In which two days, he fortified tiie buildings near,
and so also did the Athenians theirs. He also called an assem-
bly of the Torona^ans, and spake unto them, as he had done be-
fore to the Acanthians, adding, * that there was no just cause,
* why either they that had practised to put the city into his
' hands, should be the w^orse thought of, or accounted traitors
' for it, seeing that they did it, with no intent to bring the city
* into servitude, nor were hired thereunto with money, but for
* the benefit and liberty of the city ; or that they which were
' not made acquainted with it, should think, that themselves
* were not to reap as much good by it as the others. For he
* came not to destroy either city or man. But had therefore
' made that proclamation touching those that fled with the
' Athenians, because he thought them never the worse for that
' friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the
' Lacedemonians, they would shew as much good will also unto
* them, or rather more, inasmuch as they would behave them-
* selves with more equity ; and that their present fear, was only
* upon want of trial. Withal, he wished them to prepare them-
* selves to be true confederates for the future, and from hence-
* forward, to look to have their faults imputed. For, for what
* was past he thought they had not done any wrong, but suf-
* fered it ratiier from other men that were too strong for them,
' and therefore were to be pardoned, if they had in ought been
* against him.'
When he had thus said, and put them again into heart, the
truce being expired, he made divers assaults upon Lecythus.
The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a
bad one, and from the houses such as had battlements, and for
the first day kept them off. But the next day, when the ene-
mies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they
intended to cast fire upon their wooden fences, and that the ar-
my was now coming up to the place where they thought they
might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be as-
saulted : the Athenians, having upon the top of the building
erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of wa-
ter, and many men being also gone up into it, the building
overcharged with weight, fell suddenly to the ground, and
that with so huge a noise, that though those which were
near and saw it, were grieved more than afraid, yet such as
stood further off, especially the. farthest of all, supposing the
place to be in that part already taken, fled as fast as they
could towards the sea, and went aboard their gallies.
Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements to be abandoned.
248 THE HISTORY book iv.
and saw what had happened, came on with his army, and pre-
sently got the fort, and slew all that he found within. But the
^rest of the Athenians, which before abandoned the place, with
their boats and gallies, put themselves into Pallene.
There was in Lecythus a temple of Minerva.
And when Brasidas was about to give the assault, he had
made proclamation, that whosoever first scaled the wall, should
have thirty* Minte of silver, for a reward. Brasidas now con-
ceiving that the place was won by means not human, gave
thirty Minse to the goddess, to the use of the temple. And
then pulling down Lecythus, he built it anew, and consecrated
unto her the whole place. The rest of this winter, he spent in
assuring the places he had already gotten, and in contriving the
conquest of more. Which winter ended, ended the eighth year
of this war.
YEAR IX.
The Lacedemonians, and Athenians, in the spring of the
summer following, made a cessation of arms, presently for a
year, having reputed with themselves ; the Athenians, that
JBrasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to
revolt, but that by this leisure, they might prepare to secure
them ; and that if this suspension liked them, they might af-
terwards make some agreement for a longer time ; the Lacede-
monians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would
upon the taste of this intermission of their miseries, and weary
life, be the willinger to compound, and with the restitution of
their men, to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they
would fain have recovered their men, whilst Brasidas his good
fortune continued, and whilst if they could not recover them, they
might yet (Brasidas prospering, and setting them equal with
the Athenians) try it out upon even terms, and get the victo-
ry. Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, com-
prehending both themselves and their confederates, in these
words :
* Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, it
' seemeth good unto us, that whosoever will, may without fraud,
' and without fear, ask counsel thereat, according to the laws of
* his country. The same also seemeth good to the Lacedemo-
* nians and their confederates here present, and they promise
* moreover, to send ambassadors to the Boeotians and Phoceans,
* and do their best to persuade them to the same.
' That concerning the treasure belonging to the god, we shall
• Niuty-tlirce pounds, fifteen shilling's stcrlin^f.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 249
* take care to find out those that have offended therein, both we
* and you proceeding with right and equity, according to the laws
' of our several states. And that whosoever else will, may do
* the same, every one according to the law of his own coun-
* try.
' If the Athenians will accord that each side shall keep with-
* in their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the La-
* cedemonians and the rest of the confederates, touching the
* same, think good thus ;
* That the Lacedemonians in Corjphasium, stay within the
* mountains of Buphras and Tomeus, and the Athenians in Cy-
* thera, without joining together in any league, either we with
' them, or they with us.
* That those in Nisiea and Minoa pass not the highway, which
' from the gate of Megara, near the temple of Nisus, leadeth to
* the temple of Xeptune, and so straight fon\ard to the bridge
* that lies over into Minoa. That the Megareans pass not the
* same highway, nor into the island which the Athenians have
* taken ; neither having commerce with other.
* That the Megareans keep what they now possess in Troezen,
* and what they had before by agreement with the Athenians,
* and have free navigation both upon the coasts of their own
* territories and their confederates.
* That the Lacedemonians and their confederates shall pass
* the seas, not in a long ship *, but in any other boat rowed with
' oars, of burthen not exceeding five hundred talents. That
* the heralds and ambassadors that shall pass between both sides
* for the ending of the war, or for trials of judgment, may go
' and come without impeachment, with as many followers as
* they shall think good, both by sea and land.
* That during the time of truce, neither we nor you receive
* one another's fugitives, free nor bond.
* That you to us, and we to you shall afford law according to
* the use of our several states, to the end our controversies may
* be decided judicially without war.
* This is thought good by the Lacedemonians and their con-
* federates. But if you shall conceive any other articles more
* fair, or of more equity than these, then shall you go and de-
* clare the same at Lacedemon. For neither shall the Lacede-
* monians, nor their confederates refuse any thing that you
' shall make appear to be just. But let those that go, go with
* full authority, even as you do now require it of us. That this
* truce shall be for a year.
The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the
* Long ships vrere of use for the wnr, ami therefore Lere excluded, yet tliry
had le»Tc to use vessels (bat went with the oar, so tbcy were of aoothcr form.
250 THE HISTORY
aooK IV.
assembly *, Phsenippus the scribe f, Niciades overseer J, and
Laches pronounced these words : ' With good fortune to the
' people of Athens, a suspension of arms is concluded, accord-
* ing as the Lacedemonians and their confederates have agreed ;
' and they consented before the people, that the suspension
* should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the
* fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion §. In which time the
* ambassadors and heralds going from one side to the other,
* should treat about a final end of the wars. And that the com-
* manders of the army, and the presidents of the city calling an
* assembly, the Athenians should hold a council touching the
* manner of ambassage, for ending of the war first. And the am-
' bassadors there present should now immediately swear in this
* truce for a year.' The same articles the Lacedemonians pro-
pounded, and the confederates agreed unto, with the Athenians
and their confederates in Lacedemon, on the twelfth day of the
Geraslion.
The men that agreed upon these articles and sacrificed ||,
were these, viz. Of the Lacedemonians, Taurus the son of Eche-
timidas, Athenteus the son of Pericleidas, and Philocharidas
the son of Eryxidaedas. Of the Corinthians, >^ncas the son of
Ocytes, and Euphamidas the son of Aristonymus. Of the
Sicyonians, Damotimas the son of Naucrates, and Onesimus
the son of Megacles. Of the Megareans, Nicasus the son of
Cenalus, and Menecrates the son of Amphidorus. Of the Epi-
daurians, Amphias the son of Eupseidas. Of the Athenians,
the generals themselves, Nicostratus the son of Diotrephes,
Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Autocles the son of Tolmaeus.
This was the truce, and during the same, they were continu-
ally in treaty about a longer peace.
About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro,
Scione a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasi-
das. The Scioneans say that they be Pellenians descended
of those of Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors passing the
seas from Troy were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the
Achffians up and down, and planted themselves in the place
they now dwell in. Brasidas upon revolt, went over into Scione
by night, and though he had a gaily with him that went before,
yet he himself followed aloof in a light-horseman. His reason
was this, that if his light-horseman should be assaulted by some
greater vessel, the gaily would defend it ; but if he met with a
* 'E^rgoTavsvi.
t "Ef.trraTii. 'Er/arar);;, \>as the name of an officer lliat kept the citadel,
whieli offioo wus bill for u (kiy, and lie that had it, was one of n^iiTtnih.
k, Fcln-narv.
II 'EirdPivJo/ra, ihey sacrificed at tlic making of all accords between cities.
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 251
gaily equal to his own, he made account that such a one would
not assault his boat, but rather the gaily, whereby he might in
the mean time go through in safety. When he was over, and
called the Scionians to assemble, he spake unto them as he had
done before to them of Acanthus and Torone, adding, * that
* they of all the rest were most worthy to be commended inas-
* much as Pallene, being cut ofFin the Isthmus by the Athenians
* that possess Potidtea, and being no other than islanders, did yet
' of their own accord come forth to meet their liberty, and staid
' not through cowardliness, till tliey must of necessity have
* been compelled to their own manifest good. Which was an
' argument that they would valiantly undergo any other great
* matter to have their state ordered to their minds. And that
* he would verily hold them for most faithful friends to the
* Lacedemonians, and also othervsise do them honour/ The
Scioneans were erected with these words of his ; and now every
one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done,
as those that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo
the war ; and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and
crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as
the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him
with garlands, and came to him, as they use to do to a cham-
pion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small gar-
rison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over
a greater army, with design by the help of those of Scione, to
make an attempt upon Menda and Potidyea. For he thought
the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island,
and desired to prevent them. Withal he had in hand a practice
with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he at-
tended ready to undertake that enterprise.
But in the mean time came unto him in a gaily Aristonymus
for the Athenians, and Athenteus for the Lacedemonians, that
carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent awav hb
army again to Torone. And these men related unto Arasidas
the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lace-
demonians in Thrace approved of what was done, and Aristo-
nymus had in all other things satisfaction ; but for the Scio-
neans, whose revolt by computation of the days, he had found
to be after the making of the truce, he deniai that thev were
comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction
of thisj and that the city revolted before the truce, and re-
fused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to
Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were
ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The La-
cedemonians in the mean time sent ambassadors to the Athe
nians to tell them, that they could not send an army against it
without breach of truce ; and upon Brasidas's word, challenged
252 THE HISTORY book iv.
the city to belong unto them, offering themselves to the deci-
sion of the law. But the Athenians would by no means put
the matter to judgment ; but meant, with all speed they could
make, to send an army against it ; being angry at the heart
that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst re-
volt, and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the
Lacedemonians by land. Besides touching the time of the re-
volt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves
alleged. For the revolt of the Scionaeans was after the truce
two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a
<iecree to take them by force, and to put them all to the sword.
And forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves
only for that.
In the mean time revolted also Menda in Pallene a colony of
the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection,
holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time
of truce. And somewhat there was also, which he charged the
Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause
the Mendaeans had also been the bolder, as sure * of the inten-
tion of Brasidas, which they might guess at by Scione, inas-
much as he could not be gotten to deliver it. Withal, tl^e few
were they which had practised the revolt, who being once about
it, would by no means give it over, but fearing lest they should
be discovered, forced the multitude, contrary to their own incli-
nation to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently ad-
vertised, and much more angry now than before, made prepa-
ration to war upon both, and Brasidas expecting that they would
send a fleet against them, received the women and children of
the Scioneans and Mendaeans into Olynthus in Chalcidea, and
sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms, and
three hundred Chalcidsean targetiers, and for commander of
them all, Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and
Menda, joined in the administration of their affairs, as expect-
ing to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.
In the mean time Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces,
march into Lyncus against Arrhibaeus the second time. Per-
diccas led with him the power of the Macedonians his subjects,
and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasi-
das, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him
the Chalcideans, iVcanthians, and the rest, according to the forces
they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian
men of arms were about three thousand. The horsemen, both
Macedonians and Chalcidseans, somewhat less than one thou-
sand, but the other rabble of Barbarians was great. Being en-
tered the territory of Arrhibaeus, and finding the Lyncesteans
• Sure he would not rrjcct them.
BOOK ir. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 253
encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their
camp. And the foot of each side, being lodged upon a hill,
and a plain lying between them both, the horsemen ran down
into the same, and a skirmish, followed first between the horse
only of them both ; but afterwards the men of arms of the Lyn-
cesteans coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and of-
fering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army
likewise, and charging, put the Lyncesteans to flight, many of
which being slain, the rest retired to the hill top, and lay still.
After this they erected a trophy, and staid two or three days
expecting the Illyrians, who were coming to Perdiccas upon
hire, and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have 'gone on against
the villages of Arrhibaeus one after another, and to have sitten
still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on
Menda, lest, if the Athenians came thither before his return, it
should receive some blow ; seeing withal that the Illyrians came
not, had no liking to do so, but rather to retire. Whilst they
thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed
Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arrhibaeus. So that now
it was thought good to retire, by them both, for fear of these
who were a warlike people, but yet for the time when to march,
there was nothing concluded by reason of their variance. The
next night the Macedonians, and multitude of Barbarians (as
it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown)
being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many
more in number than they were, and even now upon them, be-
took themselves to present flight, and went home. And Per-
diccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he
knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their camps being
far asunder) to be gone also. Brasidas betimes in the morning,
when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away
without him, and that the Illvrians and Arrhibaeans were com-
ing upon him, putting his men of arms into a square form, and
receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the midst, in-
tended to retire likewise. The voungest men of his soldiers, he
appointed to run out upon the enemy, when they charged the
army any where with shot ; and he himself with three hundred
chosen men, marching in the rear, intended, as he retired, to
sustain the foremost of the enemy fighting, if they came close
up. But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his sol-
diers, as the shortness of the time gave him leave, with words to
this effect:
The Oration of Brasidas to his Soldiers.
* Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect you
\
254 THE HISTORY
BOOK IV
^ are thus abandoned by the Macedonians, and that the Barba-
' rians which come upon you, are many, that you were afraid, I
* should not at this time instruct you, and encourage you as I do.
* But now against tliis desertion of your companions, and the mul-
' titude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruc-
* tion and hortative, to give you encouragement to the full.
* For, to be good soldiers, is unto you natural, not by the pre-
' sence of any confederates, but by your own valour ; and not
* to fear others for number, seeing you are not come from a city
* where the many bear rule over the few, but the few over many,
* and have gotten this for power by no other means than by over-
* coming in fight. And as to these Barbarians, whom through
' ignorance you fear, you may take notice both by the former
* battles fought by us against them before, in favour of the Ma-
* cedonians, and also by what I myself conjecture, and have
* heard by others, that they have no great danger in them. For
' when any enemy whatsoever maketh shevv of strengtli, being
* indeed weak, the truth once known doth rather serve to embol-
^ den the other side, wliereas against such as have valour indeed,
' a man will be the boldest, when he knoweth the least. These
* m.en here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible
* offers ; for the sight of their number is fearful; the greatness
* of their cry intolerable ; and the vain shaking of their weapons
* on high, is not without signification of menacing. But they
' are not answerable to this when with such as stand them, they
' come to blows. For fighting without order, they will quit
' the place without shame, if they be once pressed, and seeing it
' is with them honourable alike to fight, or run away, their
* valours are never called in question. And a battle wherein
* every one may do as he lists, afifbrds tliem a more handsome
* excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather in their
* standing out of danger, and terrifying us afar off, than in
* coming to hands with us, for else they would rather have
* taken that course than this. And you see manifestly, that
* all that was before terrible in them, is in effect little ; and
* serves only to urge you to be going, with their shew and
* noise. Which if you sustain at their first coming on, and
* again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have leisure, in
* your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner to
* a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter, that
' such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first
* charge, do but make a flourish of valour, with tl\reats from
* afar, before the battle ; but to such as give them ground, ihcy
' are eager enough to seem courageous, where they may do '*-
' safely.'
When Brasidas had made his exhortation, he led dis^ n's
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 2^5
army. And the Barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with
great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. But seeing that
those who were appointed to run out upon them, did so, and
met them, which way soever they came on : and that Brasidas
himself with his cliosen band sustained them where they charged
close, and endured the first brunt, beyond their expectation ;
and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged,
the other received them and fought, and when they ceased, the
other retired, then at length the greatest part of the Barbarians
forbore the Grecians, that with Brasidas was in the open field;
and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with
all speed after the Macedonians which were fled, of whom, as
many as they overtook, they slew ; and withal, prepossessed the
passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving en-
trance into the country of Arrhibaeus, knowing thatthere was
no other passage, by which Brasidas could get away. And when
he was come to the very streight, they were going about him, to
have him cut ofl\ He, when he saw this, commanded the three
hundred that were with him, to run every man as fast as he
could to one of the tops, which of them they could easiliest get
up to, and try if they could drive down those Barbarians that
were now going up to the same, before any greater number was
above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with, and
overcame those Barbarians upon the hill," and thereby the rest
of the army marched the more easily to the top. For this beat-
ing them from the vantage of the hill, made the Barbarians also
afraid, so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal,
that they were now at the confines, and already escaped through.
Brasidas, having now gotten the iiills, and marching with more
safety, came first the same day to Arnissa, of the dominion of
Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves being anjjry with
the Macedonians, for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of
oxen, or fardles fallen from any man (as was likelv to happen
in a retreat, made in fear, and in the night) they lighted on by
the way, the oxen they cut in pieces, and took the fardles to
themselves. And from this time did Perdiccas first esteem Bra-
sidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated tlie Peloiwnnesians,
not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake ; but bein<' ut-
terly fallen out with him, about his own particular interest,
sought means as soon as he could, to compound with these,
and to be disleagued from the other.
Brasidiis at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found
that the Athenians had already taken Menda, and therefore
staying there (for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pal-
lene, and to recover Menda) he kept good watch upon Torone.
For about the time that these things passed amongst the Lyn-
256 THE HISTORY book iv.
cesteans, the Athenians, after all was in a readiness, set sail for
Menda and Scione, with fifty gallies, whereof ten wereofChius,
and one thousand men of arms of their own city, six hundred
archers, one thousand Thracian mercenaries, and other targe-
tiers of their own confederates thereabouts, under the conduct
of Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Nicostratus the son of Dio-
trephes. These launching from Potidasa with their gallies, and
putting in at the temple of Neptune, marched presently against
the Mendeeans. The Mendaeans with their own forces, three
hundred of Scione that came to aid them, and the aids of the Pe-
loponnesians, in all seven hundred men of arms, and Polydami-
das their commander, were encamped upon a strong hill with-
out the city. Nicias with one hundred and twenty light-armed
soldiers of Methone, and sixty chosen men of arms of Athens,
and all his archers attempting to get up by a path that was in
the hills side, was wounded in the attempt, and could not make
his way by force. And Nicostratus, with all the rest of the army,
going another way farther about, as he cUmbed the hill being
hard of access, was quite disordered, and the whole army wanted
little of being utterly discomfited. So for this day, seeing the
the Mendaeans and their confederates stood to it, the Athenians
retired, and pitched their camp. And at night the Mendeeans
retired into the city. The next day the Athenians sailing about
unto that part of the city which is towards Scione, seized on
the suburbs, and all that day wasted their fields, no man com-
ing forth to oppose them ; for there was also sedition in the city,
and the three hundred Scionseans, the night following went
home again. The next day, Nicias with the one half of the
army marched to the confines, and wasted the territory of the
Scionjeans, and Nicostratus at the same time with the other
half, sat down against the city, before the higher gates towards
Potidsea. Polydamidas (for it fell out that the Mendteans, and
their aids had their arms lying within the wall, in this part) set
his men in order for the battle, and encouraged the Mendaeans
to make a sally. But when one of the faction of the commons
in sedition, said to the contrary, that they would not go out,
and that it was not necessary to fight, and was upon this con-
tradiction by Polydamidas pulled and molested, the commons
in passion presently took up their arms, and made towards tiie
Peloponnesians, and such other with them as were of the con-
trary faction, and falling upon them, put them to flight, partly
with the suddenness of the charge, and partly through the fear
they were in of the Athenians, to whom the gates were at that
time opened. For they imagined that this insurrection was by
some appointment made between them. So tiiey fled into the
citadel, as niany as were not presently shiiu, which was also in
BOOK IV. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 257
their own hands before. But the Athenians (for now was Ni-
cias also come back, and at the town side) rushed into the city,
with the whole army, and rifled it, not as opened unto them by
agreement, but as taken by force. And the captains had much
ado to keep them, that tliey also killed not the men. After
this, they bid the Aleudaeans use the same form of government
they had done before, and to give judgment upon those they
thought the principal authors of the revolt, amongst themselves.
Those that were in tlie citadel, they shut up with a wall reach-
ing on both sides to the sea, and left a guard to defend it ; and
having thus gotten Menda, they left their army against Scione.
The Scionaeans, and the Peloponnesians coming out against
them, possessed themselves of a strong hill before the city, which
if the enemy did not win, he should not be able to enclose the
city with a wall. The Athenians having strongly charged them
with shot, and beaten the defendants from it, encamped upon
the hill, and after tliey had set up their trophy, prepared to build
their wall about the city. Not long after, whilst the Athenians
were at work about this, those aids that were besieged in the
citadel of Menda, forcing the watch by the sea side, came by
night, and escaping most of them through the camp before
Scione, put themselves into that city.
As they were enclosing Scione, Perdiccas sent a herald to the
Athenian commanders, and concluded a peace with the Athe-
nians, upon hatred to Brasidas, about the retreat made out of
Lyncus, having then immediately begun to treat of the same.
For it happened also at this time, that Ischagoras a Lacedemo-
nian was leading an army on foot unto Brasidas. And Perdic-
cas, partly because Nicias advised him, seeing the peace was
made, to give some clear token that he would be firm, and
partly because he himself desired not that the Peloponnesians
siiould come any more into his territories, wrought with his hosts
in Thessaly, having in that kind ever used the prime men, and
so stopped the army and munition, as they would not so much
as try the Thessalians, whether they would let them pass or not.
Nevertheless Ischagoras and Ameinias, and AristiEUs them-
selves went on to Brasidas, as sent by the Lacedemonians to
view the state of affairs there. And also took with them from
Sparta, contrary to the law, such men as were but in the
beginning of their youth to make them governors of cities,
rather than to commit the cities to the care of such as were
there before. And Clearidas the son of Cleonymus they made
governor of Amphipolis, and Epitelidas the son of Hegesander,
governor of Torone.
The same summer, the Thebans demolished the walls of the
Thespians, laying atticism to their charge. And though they.
258 THE HISTORY, &c. book iv.
had ever meant to do it, yet now it was easier, because the flower
of their youth was slain in the battle against the Athenians.
The temple of Juno in Argos, was also burnt down the same
summer, by the negligence of Chrysis the priest, who having
set a burning torch by the garlands, fell asleep, insomuch as all
was on fire, and flamed out before she knew. Chrysis the same
night, for fear of the Argives, fled presently to Phlius, and they,
according to the law formerly used, chose another priest in her
room, called Phaeinis. Now when Chrysis fled, was the eighth
year of this war ended, and half of the ninth.
Scione in the very end of this summer was quite enclosed,
and the Athenians having left a guard there, went home with
the rest of their army.
The winter following, nothing was done between the Athe-
nians and the Lacedemonians because of the truce. But the
Mantineans, and the Tegeates, with the confederates of both,
fought a battle at Laodicea, in the territory of Orestis, wherein
the victory was doubtful, for either side put to flight one of their
enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent off their
spoils unto Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either
side, and equal battle, which ended by the coming of the night,
the Tegeatse lodged all night in the place, and erected their
trophy then presently, whereas the Mantineans turned to Bu-
colion, and set up their trophy afterward.
The same winter ending, and the spring now approaching,
Brasidas made an attempt upon Potidsea ; for coming by night,
he applied his ladders, and was thitherto undiscerned. He
took the time to apply his ladders, when the bell passed by,
and before he that carried it to the next returned. Neverthe-
less, being discovered, he scaled not the wall, but presently
again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day.
So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by
Thucvdides.
THE END OF THE FOURTH BOOK.
THB
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK V.
CONTEXTS.
The former year's truce ended, Cleon xcarreth on the Chalcidic cities,
and recovereth Torone. Phteax is sent by the Athenians to move
a tear amongst the Sicilians. Cleon and Brasidas, who tcere on
both sides the principal maintainers of the rear, are both slain at
Amphipolis. Presently after their death a peace is concluded,
and after that again a league between the Lacedemonians and the
Athenians. Divers of the Lacedemonian confederates hereat dis-
contented, seek the confederacy of the Argives. These make
league, first with the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, then
with the Lacedemonians ; and then again (hy the artifice of Al-
cibiadesj with the Athenians. After this the Argives make war
upon the Epidaurians ; and the Lacedemonians upon the Argives.
The Athenian captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue,
touching the yielding of Melos, which the Athenians afterwards
besiege and win. These are the acts almost of six years more
of the same war.
± HE summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last
till the Pythian * holidays, expired. During this truce, the
Athenians removed the Delians out of Delos ; because though
• Exercises dedicated to Apollo, and celebrated at Delphi aboat the twelth of
the month ElaphoboUain, as may be gathered by the begining of the truce oa
that day.
260 THE HISTORY book v.
they were consecrated, yet for a certain crime committed of
old, they esteemed them polluted persons; because also they
thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purgation
of the island ; in the purging whereof, as I declared before *,
they thought tliey did well to take up the sepulchres of the
dead. These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every one
as he came, in Adramyttium in Asia, a town given unto them
by Pharnaces.
After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed with the Athe-
nians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon
Thrace. He had with him of Athenians twelve hundred men
of arms, and three hundred horsemen ; of confederates more,
and thirty gallies. And first arriving at Scione, which was yet
besieged, he took aboard some men of arms, of those that kept
the siege, and sailed into the haven of the Colophonians, not
far distant from the city of Torone. And there having heard
by fugitives, that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor those within
sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his army to the
city, and sent ten of his gallies about into the haven f. And
first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about
the city to take in the suburbs, making a breach in the old wall
that the whole might be one city. And Pasitelidas, a Lacede-
monian captain of the town, with the garrison there present,
came to the defence, and fought with the Athenians that as-
saulted it. But being oppressed, (and the gallies which were
before sent about, being by this time come into the haven)
Pasitelidas was afraid, lest those gallies should take the town
unfurnished of defendants before he could get back, and that
the Athenians on the other side should win the wall, and he
be intercepted between bothj and thereupon abandoned the
wall, and ran back into the city. But the Athenians that were
in the gallies having taken the town before he came, and the
land army following in after him without resistance, and en-
tering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the
Peloponnesians and Toroneans on the place ; and some others,
amongst whom was the captain Pasitelidas, they took alive.
Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone, but ad-
vertised by the way that it was already lost, went back again,
being about forty furlongs short of preventing it. Cleon and
the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another
at the wall.
The women and children of the Toroneans they made slaves,
but the men ofTorone, andthe Peloponnesians, and such Chal-
cideans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred,
* Lib. iii. p. 180. t '"!<> t''f l"»v<'" ofTorone.
i
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 261
they sent away prisoners to Athens. The Peloponnesians
were afterward at the making of the peace dismissed, the rest
were redeemed by the Olynthians, by exchange of man for
man.
About the same time the Bceotians took Panactum, a fort of
the Athenians standing in their confines, by treason.
Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in Torone, went
thence by sea about tlie mountain Athos, to make war against
Amphipolis.
About the same time Phseax the son of Erasistratus, who
with two others was sent ambassador into Italy and Sicily, de-
parted from Athens, with two gallies. For the Leon tines, af-
ter the Athenians, upon the making of the peace, were gone out
of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of their
city, and the commons had a purpose also to have made divi-
sion of the land. But the great men perceiving it, called in
the Syracusians, and drove the commons out. And they wan-
dered up and down every one as he chanced, and the great
men, upon conditions agreed on with the Syracusians, aban-
doning and deserting that city, went to dwell with the privi-
lege of free citizens in Syracusa. After this again, some of
them upon dislike relinquished Syracusa, and seized on Phoceae,
a certain place, part of the city of the Leontines, and uj)on Bri-
cinniffi a castle in the Leontine territorj'; thither also came
unto them most of the commons, that had before been driven
out, and settling themselves, made war from those places of
strength. Upon intelligence hereof, the Athenians sent Phaeax
thither to persuade their confederates there, and, if they could,
all the Sicilians jointly, to make war upon the Syracusians
that were now beginning to grow great, to try if they might
thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phaax
arriving, prevailed with the Camarinaeans and the Agrigen-
tines : but the business finding a stop at Gelas, he went unto
no more, as conceiving he should not be able to persuade them.
So he returned through the cities of the Siculi unto Catana,
having been at Bricinniie by the way, and there encouraged
them to hold out ; and from Catana he set sail, and departed.
In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he
went by with sundry cities also of Italy, to enter into friend-
ship with the Athenians.
He also lighted on those Locrians, which having dwelt once
in Messana, were afterwards driven out again ; being tiie same
men which after the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Mes-
sana, wherein one of the factious called in the Locrians, had
been then sent to inhabit there, and now were sent away again :
for the Locrians held Messana for a while. Phaeax therefore
262 THE HISTORY book v.
chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own
city, did them no hurt, because the Ix)crians had been in speech
with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when
the Sicihans made a general peace, these only of all the con-
federates refused to make any peace at all with tlie Athenians.
Nor indeed would they have done it now, but that they were
constrained thereunto by the war they had with the Itonians
and Melaans, their own colonies and borderers. And Phaeax
after this returned to Athens.
Cleon who was now gone from Torone, and come about to
Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted the
city of Stagirus *, a colony of the Andrians, but could not take
it ; but Gampselus, a colony of the Thracians, he took by as-
sault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas to will him
to come with his forces, according to the league ; and other
ambassadors into Thrace unto Polles king of the Odomantians,
to take up as many mercenary Thracians as he could, he lay
still in Eion to expect their coming. Brasidas, upon notice
hereof, sat down over against him at Cerdylium. This is a
place belonging to the Argilians, standing high, and beyond
the river, not far from Amphipolis, and from whence he might
discern all that was about him. So that Cleon could not but
be seen, if he should rise with his army to go against Amphi-
polis, which he expected he would do ; and that, in contempt
of his small number, he would go up with the forces he had
then present. Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hun-
dred mercenary Thracians, and took unto him all his Edonians,
both horsemen and targetiers. He had also of Myrcinians
and Chalcideans, one thousand targetiers, besides them in Am-
phipolis. But for men of arms, his whole number was at the
most two thousand ; and of Grecian horsemen three hundred.
With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas and sat down at
Cerdylium, the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas their
captain within Amphipolis. Cleon for a while lay still, but
was afterwards forced to do as was expected by Brasidas. For
the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting
with themselves what a command his would be, and with what
ignorance and cowardice, against what skill and boldness of
the other, and how they came forth with him against their
wills, he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling to of-
fend them with so long a stay in one place, dislodged, and led
them forward. And he took the same course there, which hav-
ing succeeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to think
himself to have some judgment. For he thought not that any
* Stagirut the city where Aristotle was l>orn.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 263
body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out, he
went up principally to see the place : and staid for greater
forces ; not to secure him in case he should be compelled to
fight, but that he might therewith environ tlie city on all sides
at once, and in that manner take it by force. So he went up,
and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis,
standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon, and the
situation of the city towards Thrace ; and thought he could
have retired again at his pleasure without battle. For neither
did any man appear upon the walls, nor come out of the gates
which were all fast shut ; insomuch as he thought he had com-
mitted an error in coming without engines, because he thought
he might by such means have won the city, as being without
defendants. Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians re-
move, came down also from Cerdylium, and put himself into
Amphipolis. He would not suffer them to make any sally, nor
to face the Athenians in order of battle, mistrusting his own
forces, which he thought inferior, not in number (for they were
in a manner equal) but in worth (for such Athenians as were
there, were pure, and the Lemnians and Imbrians which were
amongst them, were of the very ablest) but prepared to set
upon them by a wile. For if he should have shewed to the
enemy both his number and their armour, such as for the pre-
sent they were forced to use, he thought that thereby he should
not so soon get the victory, as by keeping them out of sight,
and out of their contempt, till the very point. Wherefore
choosing to himself one hundred and fifty men of arms, and com-
mitting the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set
suddenly upon them before they should retire ; as not expecting
to take them so alone another time, if their succours chanced
to arrive. And when he had called his soldiers together to en-
courage them and to make known unto them his design, he
said as foUoweth :
The Oration of Brasidas to his Soldiers.
' Men of Peloponnesus, as for your countr)', how by valour
' it hath ever retained her liberty; and that being Dorians, you
^ are now to fight against lonians, of whom you were ever wont
' to get the victory, let it suffice tiiat I have touched it thus
* briefly. But in what manner I intend to charge, that I am
* now to inform you of; lest the venturing by few at once, and
' not altogether, should seem to proceed from weakness, and
' so dishearten you. I do conjecture that it was in contempt
* of us, and as not expecting to be fought withal, that the enemy
* both came up to this place, and that they have now betakea
* themselves carelessly, and out of order to view the country.
264 THE HISTORY book v
' But he that best observing such errors in his enemies, shall
* also to his strength, give the onset, not always openly, and in
* ranged battle, but as is best for his present advantage, shall for
' the most part attain his purpose. And these wiles carry with
* them the greatest glory of all, by which deceiving most the ene-
* my, a man doth most benefit his friends. Therefore whilst they
' are secure without preparation, and intend, for ought I see, to
* steal away, rather than to stay, I say, in this their looseness
' of resolution, and before they put their minds in order, I, for
* my part, with those I have chosen, will if I can, before they
' get away, fall in upon the midst of their army, running. And
' you Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to have
* charged and (as it is probable) to have put them into a fright,
' take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans, and all the
' rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates, run out
* upon them, and with all possible speed come up to stroke of
' hand, (for there is great hope this way to terrify them, seeing
' they which come after, are ever of more terror to the enemy
' than those that are already present, and in fight.). And be
' valiant, as is likely that you should that are a Spartan ; and
' you confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the parts
' of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and obedience
* to his leaders ; and that this day you shall either gain your-
* selves liberty by your valour, and so be called confederates of
* the Lacedemonians, or else not only to serve the Athenians
* yourselves, and at the best, if you be not led captives, nor
* put to death, to be in greater servitude than before, but also to
* be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians.
' But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at
* stake : and I for my part will make it appear that I am not
* more ready to persuade another^ than to put myself into ac-
' tion.'
When Brasidas had thus said, he both prepared to go out
himself, and also placed the rest that were with Clearidas be-
fore the gates called the Thracian gates, to issue forth after-
wards, as was appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight
when he came down from Cerdyliurn, and again when he sa-
crificed in the city by the temple of Pallas, which place might
be seen from without, it was told Cleon whilst Brasidas was
ordering of his men, (for he was at this time gone off a
little to look about him) that the whole army of the enemies
was plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet
of many men and horses, ready to come forth, might be dis-
cerned from under the gate. Hearing this, he came to the
place, and when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight,
until his aids arrived, and yet making no other account but
that his retreat would be discovered, he commanded at once to
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 265
give the signal of retreat ; and that as they went, the left wing
should march foremost, which was the only means they had to
withdraw towards Eion. But when he thought they were
long about it, causing the right wing to wheel about, and lay
open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he led away the army
himself. Brasidas at tlie same time, having spied his oppor-
tunity, and that the army of the Athenians removed, said to
those' about him, and the rest, ' these men stay not for us, it is
* apparent by the wagging of their spears, and of their heads.
* For where such motion is, they use not to stay for the charge
* of the enemy : therefore open me some body the gates ap-
* pointed, and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them.'
Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and
which was the first gate of the Long wall, which then was
standing, and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as
one passeth by the strongest part of the town, there standeth
now a trophy. And charging upon the midst of the Athenian
army, which was terrified both with their own disarray, and the
valour of the men, forced them to fly. And Clearidas, (as was
appointed) having issued out by the Thracian gates, was withal
coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians by this
unexpected and sudden attempt, were on both sides in confu-
sion ; and the left wing which was next to Eion, and which in-
deed was marching away before, was immediately broken off
from the rest of the army, and fled. When that was gone,
Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there wounded.
The Athenians saw not when he fell, and they that were near
took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer
to it, and though Cleon himself presently fled, (as at first he
intended not to stay) and was intercepted by a MjTcinian tar-
getier, and slain, yet his men of arms casting themselves
into a circle on the top of a little hill, twice or thrice resisted
the charge of Clearidas, and shrunk not at all, till begirt with
the Myrcinian and Chalcidean horse, and with the targetiers,
they were put to flight by their darts. Thus the whole army
of the Athenians getting away with much ado over the hills,
and by several ways : all that were not slain upon the place, or
by the Chalcidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion. The
other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and, having so
long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city.
And he knew that his side had gotten the victor}*, but expired
shortly after. When Clearidas with the rest of the army were
returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled those that were
slain, and erected a trophy.
After this the confederates following the corps of Brasidas,
all of them in their arms, buried him in the city at the public
266 THE HISTORY book v.
charge, in the entrance of that which is now the market-place.
And the Amp]iipolitans afterwards having taken in his monu-
ment with a wall, killed * unto him, as to a hero f, honoured
him with games and anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their
colony unto him, as to the founder; pulling down the edifices
of Agnon X^ and defacing whatsoever monument might main-
tain the memory of his foundation. This they did, both for
that they esteemed Brasidas for their preserver, and also be-
cause at this time, through fear of the Athenians, they courted
the Lacedemonians for a league. As for Agnon, because of
their hostility with the Athenians_, they thought it neither ex-
pedient for them to give him honours, nor that they would be
acceptable unto him if they did. The dead bodies they ren-
dered to the Athenians; of whom there was slain about six
hundred, and but seven of the other side, by reason that it was
no set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and precedent
affright. After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went
home by sea, and Clearidas and those with him staid to settle
the estate of Amphipolis.
About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias,
Antocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedemonians, were leading a
supply towards the parts upon Thrace, of nine hundred men of
arms, and when they were come to Heraclea in Trachinia,
they staid there to amend such things as they thought amiss.
Whilst they staid, this battle was fought; and the summer
ended.
The next winter they that were with Ramphias went pre-
sently forward, as far as the hill Pierium in Thessaly. But the
Thessalians forbidding them to go on, and Brasidas to whom
they were carrying this army being dead, they returned home-
wards; conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both
because the Athenians were upon this overthrow gone away,
and for that they themselves were unable to perform any of those
designs, which the other had intended. But the principal
cause of their return was this, that they knew at their coming
forth that the Lacedemonians had their minds more set upon a
peace than war.
Presently after the battle of Amphipolis, and return of Ram-
phias out of Thessaly, it fell out, that neither side did any act
of war, but were inclined rather to a peace ; the Athenians for
the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little
after at Amphipolis; and because tliey had no longer that
confident hope in their strength, on which they relied,
• Killed sacrifices iinfo liim. f Or scmi-fod.
J Wlio was their true founder.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 267
when formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived
on their present success, that they should have had the upper-
hand.
Also tliey stood in fear of their own confederates, lest, em-
boldened by these losses of theirs, they should more and more
revolt, and repented that they made not the peace after their
happy success at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have
done it honourably. And the Lacedemonians on the other
side did desire peace, because the war had not proceeded as
they expected : for they had thought they should in a few
years have warred down the power of Athens, by wasting their
territory ; and because they were fallen into that calamity in
the island, the like whereof had never happened unto Sparta
before : because also their country was continually ravaged by
those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helots continually fled
to the enemy ; and because they feared lest those that remained,
trusting in them that were run away, should in this estate of
theirs, raise some innovation, as at other times before they had
done. Withal it happened that the thirty * years peace with
the Argives was now upon the point of expiring, and the Ar-
gives would not renew it without restitution made tliem of
Cynuria ; so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians
both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that
some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives,
as indeed it came afterwards to pass. These things considered,
it was by both parts thought good to conclude a peace ; but
especially hy the Lacedemonians, for the desire they had to re-
cover their men taken in the island; for the Spartans that
were amongst them were both of the prime men of the city,
and their kinsmen. And therefore they began to treat pre-
sently after they were taken.
But the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not
lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their
defeat at Delium, the Lacedemonians, knowing they would be
apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which
they were to meet, and consult about a longer time. But when
also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Ara-
phipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain (the
which on either side were most opposite to the peace ; the one
for that he had good success and honour in the war ; the other,
because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear, and
his calumniations be the less believed) those two that in the
Arapelidns and LIchas were sent to .Argos to renew tlie peace, bnt the Ar-
rives, holding the I^cederaoaians to be n;i dangerous enemies without the Athe-
nians, refuse it.
268 THE HISTORY book v.
two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax tlie son of
Pausanias, and Nicias tlie son of Niceratus, who in military
charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of
all others desire to have the peace go forward; Nicias, because
he was desirous (having hitlierto never been overthrown) to
carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and
the city rest from their troubles for the present ; and for the
future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made
the common-wealth miscarry : which he thought might be
done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little
as he might into the hands of fortune : and to stand' out of
danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had the same de-
sire, because of the imputation laid upon him, about his return
from exile, by his enemies, that suggested unto the Lacedemo-
nians upon every loss they received, that the same befel
them, for having contrary to the law repealed his banish-
ment. For they charged him further, that he and his brotlier
Aristocles, had suborned the prophetess of Delphi, to answer
the deputies * of the Lacedemonians when they came thither,
most commonly with this, ' that they should bring back the
* seed of the Semigod f, the son of Jupiter, out of a strange coun-
* try into his own : and that if they did not, they should plough
^ their land with a silver plough :' and so at length to have
made the Lacedemonians, nineteen years after, witli such
dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of La-
cedemon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their
kings, to fetch him home again, who lived in the mean time in
exile in the mountain Lycaeum, in a house whereof the one
half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lacede-
monians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw
his army out of Attica.
Being troubled with these imputations, and considering with
liimself, there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace,
and the Lacedemonians thereby recovering their men, that he
also should cease to be obnoxious to the calumniations of his
enemies ; whereas in war such as had charge, could not but be
quarrelled upon their losses, he was therefore forward to have
the peace concluded.
And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacede-
monians braved them with a preparation already making against
the spring, sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if
they meant to fortify in Attica, to the end that the Athenians
might give them the better ear. When after many meetings,
* Oiaaoi, ainhassatlois to tlip oraclos were so ciilled.
t ileiciiles, from \yI)odi Pleistoanax was descended.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 269
and many demands on either side, it w'as at last agreed, that
peace should be concluded, each part rendering what they had
taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisaea,
(for when they likewise demanded Plataea, and the Thebans an-
swered, that it was neither taken by force, nor by treason, but
rendered voluntarily ; the Athenians said that they also had Ni-
saea in the same manner.) The Lacedemonians called together
their confederates, and all but the Boeotians, Corinthians,
Eleans, and Megareans, (for these disliked it) giving their rotes
for the ending of the war, they concluded the peace, and con-
firmed it to the Athenians with sacrifices, and swore it, and the
Athenians again unto them, upon these articles.
The Articles of the Peace between the Athenians aod the
Lacedemonians.
The Athenians, and Lacedemonians, and their confederates,
have made peace, and sworn it city by city, as foUoweth :
' Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whom-
* soever will, to sacrifice in them, and to have access unto them,
* and to ask counsel of the oracles in the same, and to send
* their deputies * unto them, according to the custom of bis
* country, securely both by sea and land.
* The whole place consecrate, and temple of Apollo in Del-
' phi, and Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law,
* taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges,
* both city and territory, according to the institution of the
* place.
* The peace shall endure between the Athenians, with their
* confederates, and the Lacedemonians with their confederates,
' for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud, and with-
* out harm doing.
* It shall not be lawful to bear arms, with intention of hurt,
* neither for the Lacedemonians and their confederates, against
* the Athenians, nor for the Athenians and their confederates,
* against the Lacedemonians, by any art or machination what-
' soever.
* If any controversy shall arise between them, the same shall
' be decided by law, and by oath, in such manner as they shall
' agree on.
* Ambassadors about matters of religion.
270 THE HISTORY r.ooK v.
* The Lacedemonians and their confederates shall render
* Amphipolis to the Athenians.
* The inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedemonians
shall render unto the Athenians, shall be at liberty to go forth
whither they will, with bag and baggage.
* Those cities which paid the tribute, taxed in the time * of
Aristides, continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own
laws, and now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlaw-
ful for the Athenians, or their confederates, to bear arms
against them, or to do them any hurt, as long as they shall
pay the said tribute. The cities are these, Argilus, Stagirus,
Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. And they shall be
confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedemonians,
nor of the Athenians. But if the Athenians can persuade
these cities unto it, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians
to have them for their confederates, having gotten their con-
sent.
* The Mecybernians, Sanseans, and Singsans, shall inhabit
their own cities, on the same conditions, with the Olynthians
and Acanthians.
* The Lacedemonians, and their confederates, shall render
Panactum unto the Athenians. And the Athenians shall ren-
der to the Lacedemonians, Coryphasium f, Cythera, Methone,
Pteleum, and Atalante.
* They shall likewise deliver whatsoever Lacedemonians are
in the prison of Athens, or in any prison of what place soever,
in the Athenian dominion ; and dismiss all the Peloponne-
sians, besieged in Scione, and all that Brasidas did there put
in, and whatsoever confederates of the Lacedemonians are in
prison, either at Athens, or in the Athenian state. And the
Lacedemonians and their confederates shall deliver whomso-
ever they have in their hands of the Athenians, or their con-
federates, in the same manner.
' Touching the Scioneans, Toronaeans, and Sermylians, and
whatsoever other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athe-
nians shall do with them what they think fit.
* The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedemonians
and their confederates, city by city ; and that oath shall be
the greatest that in each city is in use ; the thing that they
', shall swear, shall be this. 1 stand to these articics, and to
* Wliicli was tlio first time tliat the Athenians began to command the rest of
Greece, for when in tlie end of tlie Mcdaii war the Lacedemonians left tfiat coui-
iiiaud, tlic Athenians undertook it, and taxed the several cities with tribute to-
wnrils tlie war. The war ended, the tribute ended not.
f 'J he |irunionlury wherein I'jlus stood, jiut here for Pylus.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 2/1
* this peace tndy and sincerely. And the Lacedemonians and
* their confederates, shall take the same oath to the Athenians.
* This oath they shall on both sides every year renew, and shall
' erect pillars, [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia *,
'and in the Isthmus; at Athens, within the citadel; and at
* JLacedemon, in the Amyclaeum f.
' And if any thing be on either side forgotten, or shall be
* thought fit upon good deliberation to be changed ; it shall be
' lawful for them to do it, in such manner X as the Lacedemo-
* nians and Athenians shall think fit, jointly.
* This peace shall take beginning from the twenty-fourth of
' the month Artemisium, Pleistolas being Ephore at Sparta,
* and the fifteenth of Elaphebolium § after the account of
^ Atliens, Alcjeus being Archon.
* They that look the oath and sacrificed, were these ; of the
* Lacedemonians, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes,
* Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, An-
' thippus, Tellis, Alcenidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of
* the Athenians these, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches,
' Euthidemus, Procles, Pythadorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasy-
* cles, Theagenes, Aristoccetes, lolcius, Timocrates, Leon, La-
* machus, Demosthenes.'
This peace was made in the very end || of winter, and the
spring then beginning, presently after the city Bacchanals, and
full ten years, and some few days over, after the first invasion of
Attica, and the beginning of this war. But now for the cer-
tainty hereof, let a man consider the times themselves, and not
trust to the account of names of such as in the several places
bare chief offices, or for some honour to themselves, had their
names ascribed, for marks to the actions foregoing. For it is
not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or
who in the midst, or how he was, when any thing fell out.
But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according
as they are written, he shall find by the two half years, which
make the whole, that this first war was of ten summers, and as
many winters continuance.
The Lacedemonians (for it fell unto them by lot to begin
the restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they
had then in thehr hands, and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras,
* By Delphi where the Pythian games were kept,
t Ainycla;um, a temple of A|>onii.
X This article displeased the confederates of Lacedemon, because the articles
might by this be changed without them,
§ February.
II It appears here that the month Elaphebolion amongst th« Atheuians was
the last month of their winter quarter.
272 THE HISTORY
BOOK V.
Menas, and Philocharidas into the parts upon Thrace, with
command to Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athe-
nians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to ac-
cept of the peace in such manner as was for every of them ac-
corded. But they would not do it, because they thouglit it
was not for their advantage. And Clearidas also, to gratify the
Chalcideans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could
not do it whether they would or not. And coming away soon
after with .those ambassadors to Lacedemon, both to purge
himself, if he should be accused by those with Ischagoras for
disobeying the states command, and to also try if the peace
might by any means be shaken : when he found it firm, he
himself being sent back by the Lacedemonians, with command
principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that,
then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians that were in it, im-
mediately took his journey. But the confederates chanced to be
present themselves in Lacedemon, and the Lacedemonians re-
quired such of them as formerly refused, that they would ac-
cept the peace : but they, upon the same pretence on which
they had rejected it before, said, that unless it were more rea-
sonable, they would not accept it. And the Lacedemonians
seeing they refused, dismissed them, and by themselves entered
with the Athenians into a league ; because they imagined that
the Argives would not renew their peace (because they had re-
fused it before, when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos,)
and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athe-
nians : and also conceived, that by this means the rest of Pelo-
ponnesus would not stir ; for if they could, they would turn to
the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being
then present, and conference had, they agreed, and the oath
and league was concluded on, in the terms following.
The Articles of the League between the Lacedemonians and
the Athenians.
' The Lacedemonians shall be confederates with the Athe-
* nians for fifty years.
' If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedemonians,
' and do the Lacedemonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid
* the Lacedemonians against them in the strongest manner
' tliey can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled
* the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held
' as enemy both to the Lacedemonians and to the Athenians,
* and shall be warred upon by them both ; and both cities shall
* again lay down the war jointly. And this to be done justly,
* readily, and sincerely.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 273
* And if any enemy shall invade the territories of Athenians,
* and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedemonians
* shall aid the Athenians against them in the strongest manner
* they can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled
* the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held
* for enemy both to the Lacedemonians and to the Athenians,
* and shall be warred upon by both, and both the cities shall
* again lay down the war together. And this to be done justly,
* readily, and sincerely.
^ If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the
* Lacedemonians with all their strengtii possible.
* These things shall be sworn unto by the same men on ei-
* ther side that swore the peace, and shall be every year re-
* newed by the Lacedemonians at their coming to the Baccha-
* nals * at Athens j and by the Athenians at their going to the
* Hyacinthian feast at Lacedemon ; and either side shall erect
* a pillar [inscribed with this league] one at Lacedemon, near
* unto Apollo in the Amycelum, another at Athens near Mi-
* nena in the citadel.
* If it shall seem good to the Lacedemonians and Athenians
' to add or take away any thing touching the league, it shall be
* lawful for them to do it jointly.
* Of the Lacedemonians took the oath, these, Pleistoanax,
' Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus,
' Daidus, Ischagoras, Phi loch aridas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Al-
* cinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athe-
* nians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus,
* Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasycles, Thea-
* genes, Aristocrates, lolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus,
* and Demosthenes.*
This league was made not long after the peace. And the
Athenians delivered to the Lacedemonians the men they had
taken in tlie island ; and by this time began the summer of the
eleventh year. And hitherto hath been written these ten years
which this first war continued, without intermission.
YEAR XL
After the peace and league made between the Lacedemo-
nians and Athenians, after the ten years war, Pleistolas being
ephore at Lacedemon, and Alcseus archon of Athens; though
there w'ere peace to those that had accepted it; yet the Corin-
thians and some cities of Peloponnesus endeavoured to over-
* Baccban&lia Urt>ica, which were celebrated yearly, not ranch before ftis
time.
274 THE HISTORY book v.
throw what was done, and presently arose another stir, by the
confederates, against Lacedemon. And the Lacedemonians
also after a while became suspect unto the Athenians, for
not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. And
for six years and ten months, they abstained from entering into
each other's territories with their arms : but, the peace being
but weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could ;
and in the end, were forced to dissolve the peace, made after
those ten years, and fell again into open war. This also hath
the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by
summers and winters, as every thing came to pass, until such
time as the Lacedemonians, and their confederates, had made
an end of the Athenian dominion, and had taken their Long-
walls, and Peiraeus. To which time from the beginning of the
war, it is in all twenty-seven years. As for the composition
between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted with
the war, he shall think amiss. For let him look into the ac-
tions that passed as they are distinctly set down, and he shall
find, that, that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in which
they neither rendered all, nor accepted all, according to the ar-
ticles. Besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and
in other actions, it was on both sides infringed. Moreover,
the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in hostility
as before ; and the Boeotians had but a truce from one ten
days to another. So that with the first ten years war, and
with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed after it,
a man shall find, counting by the times, that it came to just
so many years, and some few days ; and that those who built
upon the prediction of the oracles, have this number only to
agree. And I remember yet, that from the very beginning o(
this war, and so on, till the end, it was uttered by many, that it
should be of thrice nine years continuance. And for the time
thereof I lived in my strength, and applied my mind to gain an
accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was
banished my country for twenty years, after my charge at Am-
phipolis ; whereby being present at the affairs of both, and es-
pecially of the Lacedemonians, by reason of my exile, I could
at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The
quarrels therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those
ten years, and tliat which followed, according as from time to
time the war was carried, I will now pursue.
After the concluding of the fifty years peace, and the league
which followed, and when those ambassadors which were sent
for, out of the rest of Peloponnesus, to accept the said peace,
were departed from Lacedemon, the Corinthians (the rest going
all to their own cities) turning first to Argos, entered into
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 275
treaty with some of the Argive magistrates, to this purpose,
that the Lacedemonians had made a peace and league with the
Athenians, their heretofore mortal enemies tending not to the
benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoving
them to consider of a course, for the safety of the same, and to
make a decree, that any city of the Grecians that would, and
were a free city, and admitted the like, and equal trials of judg-
ment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives, for
the one mutually to aid the other, and to assign them a few
men, with absolute authority from the state, to treat with ;
and that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end,
that if the multitude would not agree to it, it might be un-
known that ever they had made such a motion ; affirming that
many would come into this confederacy upon hatred to the La-
cedemonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this
overture, went home. These men of Argos, having heanl
them, and reported their proposition, both to the magistrates,
and to the people, the Argives ordered the same accordingly,
and elected twelve men, with whom it should be lawful for any
Grecian to make the league that would, except the Lacedemo-
nians, and the Athenians, with neither of which they were to
eater into any league, without the consent of the Argive people.
And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well for
that they saw the Lacedemonians would make war upon them,
(for the truce between them was now upon expiring) as also
because they hoped to have the principality of Peloponnesus.
For about this time Lacedemon had but a bad report, and was
in contempt for the losses it had received. And the Argives
in all points were in good estate, as not having concurred in
the Attic war, but rather been in peace with both, and thereby
gotten in their revenue. Thus the Argives received into
league all such Grecians as came unto them.
First of all therefore, came in the Mantineans, and their
confederates; whicii they did for fear of the Lacedemonians.
For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come
under the obedience of the Mantineans, over which they
thought, the Lacedemonians, now they were at rest, would not
permit them any longer to command. And therefore they
willingly joined with the Argives, as being they thought a great
city, ever enemy to the Lacedemonians, and governed as their
own by democracy. When the Mantineans had revolted, the
rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter amongst themselves,
that it was fit for them to do the like ; conceiving that there
was somewhat in it, more than they knew, that made the Maa-
tmeans to turn ; and were also angry with the Lacedemonians,
amongst many other causes, for that it was written in the ar-
276 THE HISTORY book v.
tides of the Attic peace, ' Tliat it should be lawful to add
' unto, or take away from the same, whatsoever should seem
' good to the two cities of the Lacedemonians and the Athe-
* nians/ For this was the article that the most troubled the
Peloponnesians, and put them into a jealousy, that the Lace-
demonians might have a purpose joining with the Athenians, to
bring them into subjection. For in justice the power of
changing the articles, ought to have been ascribed to all the
confederates in general. Whereupon many fearing such an
intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one seve-
rally striving to come into their league.
The Lacedemonians perceiving this stir to begin in Pelopon-
nesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it,
and entered themselves also into the league with Argos, sent
ambassadors unto Corinth with intention to prevent the sequel
of it, and accused them, both for the whole design, and for
their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make
from them, to the league of the Argives; saying that they
should therein infringe their oath, and that they had already done
unjustly, to refuse the peace made with the Athenians ; for as
much as it is an article of their league*, that what the major
part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hin-
dered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But
the Corinthians (those confederates which had refused the
peace as well as they, being now at Corinth ; for they had sent
for them before) in their answer to the Lacedemonians, did not
openly allege the wrongs they had received ; as that the Athe-
nians had not restored Solium nor Anactorium, nor any thing
else they had in this war lost ; but pretended not to betray
those of Thrace, for that they had in particular taken an oath
unto them, both when (together with Potideea) they first re-
volted, and also another afterwards. And therefore they did
not break the oath of their league, by rejecting the peace with
Athens. For having sworn unto them by the gods, they
should in betraying them, offend the gods. And whereas it is
said, unless some god'or hero /ii7ider it, this appeareth to be a
divine hindrance. Tlius they answered for their old oath.
Then for their league with the Argives, they gave this an-
swer : ' that when they had advised with their friends, they
' would do afterwards what should be just.' And so the ambas-
sadors of Lacedemon went home. At the same time were
present also in Corinth, the ambassadors of Argos, to invite
the Corinthians to their league, and that without delay. But
* The Pelopounesian Iragnr against Atlicnc.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 277
the Corinthians appointed them to come again at tlieir next
sitting.
Presently after this, came unto them an ambassage also
from the Eleans. And first, they made a league with the Co-
rinthians ; and going thence to Argos, made a league with the
Argives, according to the declaration * before mentioned. The
Eleans had a quarrel with the Lacedemonians concerning Le-
preum. For the Lepreates, having heretofore warred on cer-
tain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleans into
their confederacy, with condition to give them the moiety of the
land to be won from them, when the war was ended, the
Eleans gave unto the Lepreates, the whole land to be enjoyed
by themselves, witli an imposition thereon of a talent f to be
paid to Jupiter Olympian, which they continued to pay, till the
beginning of the Athenian war. But afterwards, upon pre-
tence of that war, giving over the payment, the Eleans would
have forced them to it again. The Lepreates for help, having
recourse to the Lacedemonians, and the cause being referred to
their decision, the Eleans afterv^ards, upon suspicion that the
Lacedemonians would not do them right, renounced the re-
ference, and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lace-
demonians, nevertheless gave sentence, 'that the Lepreates
' should be at liberty to pay it, or not, and that the Eleans did
'the injury;' and because the Eleans had not stood to the
reference, the Lacedemonians put into Lepreum, a garrison
of men of arms. The Eleans taking this, as if the Lacedemo-
nians had received their revolted city, and producing the ar-
ticle of their league, ' that what every one possessed, when they
* entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess when
* they gave it over,' revolted to the Argives, as wronged, and
entered league with them, as is before related.
After these came presently into the Argive league, the Co-
rinthians and the Chalcideans upon Thrace. The Boeotians also,
and Megareans threatened as much, but because they thought
the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them,
who were governed according to the government of the Lacede-
monians by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.
About the same time of this summer, the Athenians expunged
Scione, slew all that were in it at man's estate, made slaves of
the women and children, and gave their territory to the Pla-
taeans.
They also replanted the Delians in Deles, both in consider-
* '''I'^^ecree of the Argives that any Grecian that weiild niig^ht make a league
w»th them, treatiof with the tx**Ue commissioners br them chosen to that pur-
pose. ' "^
t One hundred and eighty pounds Un sbillings sterliog.
278 THE HISTORY book v
ation of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and
also because the oracle at Delphi had commanded it.
The Phoceans and Locrians also began a war at that time
against each other.
And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went
to Tegea, to cause it to revolt from the Lacedemonians ; con-
ceiving it to be an important piece of Peloponnesus, and mak-
ing account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily
obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become
enemies to the Lacedemonians, the Corinthians, who till then
had been very forward, grew less violent, and were afraid, that
no more of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they went to
the Boeotians, and solicited them to enter into league with
them, and the Argives, and to do as they did. And the Co-
rinthians further desired the Boeotians to go along with them
to Athens, and to procure for them the like ten days truce, to
that which was made between the Athenians and Boeotians,
presently after the making of the fifty years peace, on the same
terms that the Boeotians had it ; if thfe Athenians refused, then
to renounce theirs, and to make no more truces hereafter
without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this
request, the Boeotians willed them touching the league with
the Argives to stay a while longer, and went with them to
Athens, but obtained not the ten days truce, the Athenians an-
swering, that if the Corinthians were confederates with the La-
cedemonians, they had a peace already. Nevertheless, the
Boeotians would not relinquish their ten days truce, though
the Corinthians both required the same, and affirmed that it
was so before agreed on. Yet the Athenians granted the
Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratifica-
tion *.
The same summer the Lacedemonians with their whole
power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias,
king of the Lacedemonians, made war upon the Parrhasians of
Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans, partly as called in, by oc-
casion of sedition, and partly because they intended, if they
could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had
built, and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in the territory
of the Parrhasians, towards Sciritis of Laconia. The Lace-
demonians therefore wasted the territory of the Parrha-
sians. And the Mantineans leaving their own city to the
custody of the Argives, came forth to aid the Parrha-
sians their confederates. But being unable to defend botii the
fort of Cypsela, and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went
home again j and the Lacedemonians, when they had set the
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 729
Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortification, went
home likewise.
The same summer, when those soldiers which went out with
Brasidas, and of which Clearidas, after the making of the
peace, had the charge, were returned from the parts upon
Thrace, the Lacedemonians made a decree, that those Helotes
which had fought under Brasidas, should receive their liberty,
and inhabit where they thought good; but not long after, they
placed them, together with such others as had been newly
enfranchised, in Lepreum, a city standing in the confines be-
tween Laconia, and the Eleans, with wliom they were now at
variance.
Fearing also lest those citizens of their own, which had been
taken in the island *, and had delivered up their arms to the
Athenians, should upon apprehension of disgrace for that ca-
lamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some in-
novation in the state, they disabled them, though some of
them were in office already ; and their disablement was this,
* that they should neither bear office, nor be capable to buy and
* sell,' yet in time they were again restored to their former ho-
nours.
The same summer also, the Dictideans took Thyssus, a towir
in mount Athos, and confederate of the Athenians.
This whole summer there was continual commerce between
the Athenians and the Peloponnesians ; nevertheless they be-
gan, both the Athenians, and the Lacedemonians, to have each
other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in respect of the
places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedemonians,
to whose lot it fell to make restitution first, had not rendered
Amphipolis, and the other cities, nor had caused the peace tc
be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Boeo-
tians, nor Corinthians, though they had ever professed, that
in case they refused, they would join with the Athenians, to
bring them to it by force, and had prefixed a time (though not
by wTiting) within the which, such as entered not into this
peace, were to be held as enemies unto both. The Athenians
therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, sus-
pected that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon refused
to render Pylus, when they required it ; nay, they repented that
they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island;
and detained the rest of the towns they then held, till the La-
cedemonians should have performed the conditions on their part
also. The Lacedemonians, to this, alleged, 'that they had
' done what they were able to do. For they had delivered the
* Sphacteria orer againct Pylus.
280 THE HISTORY book v.
' Athenian prisoners that were in their hands, and had with-
* drawn their soldiers from the parts upon Thrace, and whatso-
* ever else was in their own power to perform. But Amphipo-
* lis, they said, was not in their power to surrender. That they
' would endeavour to bring the Boeotians and Corinthians, to
' accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the
' Athenian prisoners in Boeotia to be sent home.* And there-
fore desired them ' to make restitution of Pylus, or if not so,
' at least to draw out of it, the Messenians and Helotes (as
* they for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns
* upon Thrace) and, if they thought good, to keep it with a
*■ garrison of Athenians.' After divers, and long conferences
had this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians, at
the last, as they drew thence, all the Messenians, and Helotes,
and all other Laconian fugitives, and placed them in Cranii, a
city of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace and
free passage from one to another.
In the beginning of the winter, (for now there were other
ephores in office ; not those in whose time the peace was
made, but some of them that opposed it) ambassadors being
come from the confederates ; and the Athenian, Boeotian, and
Corinthian ambassadors being already there, and having had
much conference together, but concluded nothing, Cleobulus
and Xenares, ephores that most desired the dissolution of the
peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, en-
tered into private conference with the Boeotians and Corin-
thians, exhorting them to run both the same course ; and ad-
vised the Boeotians to endeavour first to make a league
themselves with the Argives, and then to get the Argives toge-
ther with themselves, into a league with the Lacedemonians.
For that they might by this means avoid the necessity of ac-
cepting the peace with Athens. For the Lacedemonians
would more regard the friendship and league of the Argives,
than the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athe-
nians. For he knew the Lacedemonians had ever desired to
have Argos their friend upon any reasonable conditions, because
they knew that their war without Peloponnesus, would thereby
be a great deal the easier. Wherefore they entreated the Boeo-
tians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedemonians,
to the end that if they could get Pylus for it in exchange,
they might make war against the Athenians the more commo-
diously.
The Boeotians and Corinthians being dismissed by Xenares
and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedemonians of that faction,
with these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went
to their several cities. And two men of Argos, of principal
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 281
authority in that city, having waited for, and met with them by
the way, entered into a treaty with them about a league be-
tween the Argives and the Boeotians, as there was between them
and the Corinthians, and the Eleans, and Mantineans already.
For they thought, if it succeeded, they might the more easily
have either war or peace, (forasmuch as the cause would now
be common) either with the Lacedemonians, or whomsoever
else it should be needful.
When the Boeotian ambassadors heard this, they were wdl
pleased. For as it chanced, the Argives requested the same
things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedemon had
been sent to procure of the Argives. These men therefore of
Argos, when they saw that the Boeotians accepted of the mo-
tion, promised to send ambassadors to the Boeotians about it,
and so departed.
When the Boeotians were come home, they related there
what they had heard, both Lacedemon, and by the way, from
the Argives. The governors of Boeotia were glad thereof, and
much more forward in it now than formerly they had been,
seeing that not only their friends in Lacedemon desired, but
the Argives themselves hastened to have done the self-same
thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from
Argos, to solicit the dispatch of the business before propounded,
but the governors of Boeotia commended only the proposition,
and dismissed them, with promise to send ambassadors about
the league to Argos. In the mean time the governors of Boeo-
tia thought fit that an oath should first be taken by themselves,
and by the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the con-
federates upon Thrace, to give mutual assistance upon any oc-
casion to them that should require it, and neither to make war
nor peace without the common consent. And next that the
Boeotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same course)
should make a league with the Argives. But before this oath
was to be taken, the governors of Boeotia communicated the
business to the four Boeotian councils, in the which the whole
authority of the state consisteth ; and withal presented their
advice, ' that any city that would might join with them in the
* like oath for mutual assistance.' But they that were of these
councils approved not the proposition, because they feared to
offend the Lacedemonians in being sworn to the Corinthians
that had revolted from their confederacy. For the governors of
Boeotia had not reported unto them what had past at Lacede-
mon, how Cleobulus and Xenares the epbores and their friends
there, had advised them to enter first into a league with the
Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards to make the same
league with the Lacedemonians. For they thought that the
282 THE HISTORY, book v.
councils, though this had never been told them, would have
decreed it no otherwise than they upon premeditation should
advise. So the business was checked, and the ambassadors
from Corinth, and from the cities upon Thrace, departed with-
out effect. And the governors of Bceotia that were before
minded, if they had gotten this done, to have leagued them-
selves also with the Argives, made no mention of the Argives
in the councils at all, nor sent the ambassadors to Argos, as
they had before promised, but a kind of carelessness and delay
possessed the whole business.
The same winter the Olynthians took Mecybern, held with a
garrison of the Athenians by assault.
After this the Lacedemonians (for the conferences between
the Athenians and the Lacedemonians about restitution reci-
procal continued still) hoping that if the Athenians should ob-
tain from the Boeotians Panactum, that then they also should
recover Pylus, sent ambassadors to the Boeotians, with request
that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners might be put into
the hands of the Lacedemonians, that they might get Pylus
restored in exchange. But the Boeotians answered, ' that un-
* less the Lacedemonians would make a particular league with
* them, as they had done with the Athenians, they would not
* do it.' The Lacedemonians, though they knew they
should therein wrong the Athenians, for that it was said in the
articles that neither party should make either league or war,
without the other's consent, yet such was their desire to get Pa-
nactum, to exchange it for Pylus, and withal, they that longed
to break the peace with Athens, were so eager in it, that at
last they concluded a league with the Boeotians, winter, then
ending, and the spring approaching. And Panactum was
presently pulled down to the ground. So ended the eleventh
year of this war.
YEAR XIL
In the spring following the Argives, when they saw that the
ambassadors, which the Boeotians had promised to send unto
them came not, and that Panactum was razed, and that also
there was a private league made between the Boeotians and the
Lacedemonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be
abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the La-
cedemonians. For they apprehended that the Boeotians had
been induced both to raze Panactum, and also to enter into the
Athenian peace by the Lacedemonians; and that the Athe-
nians were privy to the same. So that now they had no means
to make league with the Athenians neither j whereas before
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 283
they made account that if their truce with the Lacedemonians
continued not, they might upon these differences have joined
themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at
a stand and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedemo-
nians, Tegeats, Boeotians, and Athenians, as having formerly
refused the truce with the Lacedemonians, and imagined
to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they
sent ambassadors with as much speed as miglit be, Eu-
strophus and JEson, persons, as they thought most accept-
able unto them, with this cogitation, that by compounding
with the L ;cedemonians, as well as for their present estate they
might, howsoever the world went, they should live at least
at quiet. When these ambassadors were there, they fell to
treat of the articles upon which the agreement should be made.
And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred ei-
ther to some private man or to some city, concerning the ter-
ritory of Cynuria, about which they have always differed, as
lying on the borders of them both (it containeth the cities of
Thyrea and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedemonians.)
But afterwards the Lacedemonians not suffering mention to be
made of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it
did before, they might; the Argive ambassadors got them to
yield to this, ' that for the present an accord should be made
* for fifty years, but withal, that it should be lawful nevertheless
* (if one challenged the other thereunto) both for Lacedenioa
* and Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, so that
* there were in neither city the plague or a war to excuse them ;'
(as once before they had done, when as both sides thought they
had the victor}.) ' And that it should not be lawful for one
* part to follow the chase of the other, further than to the
* bounds either of Lacedemon or Argos.'
And though this seemed to the Lacedemonians at first to
be but a foolish proposition, yet aftenvards (because thev de-
sired by all means to have friendship with the Argives) they
agreed unto it, and put into writing what they required. How-
soever, before the Lacedemonians would make any full conclu-
sion of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos, and
to make the people acquainted with it ; and then if it were ac-
cepted, to return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these
departed.
Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedemo-
nian ambassadors, Andromenes, and Phaedimus, and Antimeni-
das, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prison-
ers from the Boeotians to render them to the Athenians, found
that Panactum was demolished, and that their pretext was this,
that there had been anciently an oath by occasion of difference
284 THE HISTORY book v.
between the Athenians and them, that neither part should
inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. But for the Athenian
prisoners, as many as the Boeotians had, they that were with
Andromenes received, convoyed and delivered them unto the
Athenians, and withal told them of the razing of Panactum,
alleging it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens should
dwell in it hereafter.
But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a hei-
nous matter, for that they conceived that the Lacedemonians
had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panactum which
was pulled down, and should have been rendered standing ; and
because also they had heard of the private league made with the
Boeotians, whereas they had promised to join with the Athe-
nians in compelling such to accept of the peace, as had refused
it J withal they weighed whatsoever other points the Lacede-
monians had been short in, touching the performance of the
articles, and thought themselves abused ; so that they an-
swered the Lacedemonian ambassadors roughly, and dismissed
them.
This difference arising between the Lacedemonians and the
Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens
as desired to have the peace dissolved.
Amongst the rest was Alcibiades the son of Clinias, a man
though young in years, yet in the dignity of his ancestors ho-
noured as much as any man of what city soever : who was of
opinion, that it was better to join with the Argives ; not only
for the matter itself, but also out of stomach, labouring to cross
the Lacedemonians, because they had made the peace by the means
of Nicias and Laches without him : whom for his youth they had
neglected and not honoured, as for the ancient hospitality between
his house and them, had been requisite, which his father had
indeed renounced, but he himself by good offices done to those
prisoners which were brought from the island, had a purpose to
have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged,
he both opposed the peace at first, alleging that the Lacede-
monians would not be constant ; and that they had made the
peace, only to get the Argives by that means away from
them, and afterwards to invade the Athenians again, when they
should be destitute of their friends ; and also as soon as this
difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself,
willing them with all speed to come to Athens, as being there-
unto invited, and to bring with them the Eleans and Manti-
neans, to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportu-
nity now serving ; and promising that he would help them all
he could.
The Argives having heard the message, and knowing that
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. MS
the Athenians had made no league with the Boeotians, and that
thev were at great quarrel with the Lacedemonians, neglected
the ambassadors they had then in Lacedemon, (whom they had
sent about the truce) and applied themselves to the Athenians
with this thought, that if they should hare war, they should
by this means be backed with a city that had been their ancient
friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest
power by sea. Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors
to Athens to make a league ; and together with theirs, went
also the ambassadors of the Eleans, and Mantineans. Thither
also with all speed came the Lacedemonian ambassadors, Phi-
locharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious
with the Athenians, for fear, lest in their passion, they should
make a league with the Argives ; and withal to require the
restitution of Pylus for Panactum and to excuse themselves
concerning their league with the Boeotians, as not made for
any harm intended to the Athenians.
Now speaking of these things before the council, and how
that they were come thither with full power to make agreement
concerning all controversies between them, they put Alcibiades
into fear, Test, if they should say the same before the people,
the multitude would be drawn unto their side, and so the Ar-
give league fall off. But Alcibiades deviseth against them this
plot. He persuadeth the Lacedemonians not to confess their
plenary power before the people, and giveth them his faith, that
then Pylus should be rendered, (for he said he would persuade
the Athenians to it, as much as he now opposed it) and tiiat
the rest of their differences should be compounded. This he
did to alienate them from Nicias, and that by accusing them
before the people, as men that had no true meaning, nor ever
spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league
with the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans. And it came to pass
accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to
the question, whether they had full power of concluding, (con-
trarj to what they had said in council) answered no, the Athenians
would no longer endure them, but gave ear to Alcibiades, that
exclaimed against the Lacedemonians far more now than ever,
and were ready then presently to have the Argives, and those
others with them brought in, and to make the league. But an
earthquake happening, before any thing was concluded, the as-
sembly was adjourned. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though
tlie Lacedemonians had been abused, and he himself also de-
ceived, touching their coming with full power to conclude, yet
he persisted to affirm, that it was their best course to be friends
with the Lacedemonians, and to defer the Argives' business, till
they had sent to the Lacedemonians again to be assured of their
286 THE HISTORY book v.
intention; saying, that it was honour upon themselves, and
dishonour to the Lacedemonians to have the war put off. For,
for themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was best to pre-
serve their good fortune, as long as they might ; whereas to the
other side, who were in evil estate, it should be in place of gain
to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he per-
suaded them to send ambassadors, whereof himself was one, to
require the Lacedemonians, (if they meant sincerely) to render
Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis : and if the Boeotians
would not accept of the peace, then to undo their league with
them, according to the article, that the one should not make
league with any, without the consent of the other. They willed
him to say further ; * that they themselves also, if they had had
* the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Ar-
' gives, who were present then at Athens, for the same purpose.'
And whatsoever they had to accuse the Lacedemonians of be-
sides, they instructed Nicias in it, and sent him and the other,
his fellow ambassadors away. When they were arrived, and had
delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all, * that
* the Athenians would make league with the Argives, unless the
' Lacedemonians would renounce their league with the Boeotians,'
if the Boeotians accepted not the peace, the Lacedemonians
denied to renounce their league with the Boeotians, (for Xena-
res the ephore, and the rest of that faction carried it) but at the
request of Nicias, they renewed their former oath. For Nicias
was afraid he should return with nothing done, and be carped at
(as after also it fell out) as author * of the Lacedemonian peace.
At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing
was effected at Lacedemon, they grew presently into choler, and
apprehending injury (the Argives, and their confederates being
there present, brought in by Alcibiades) they made a peace, and
league with them, in these words.
The Articles of the League between the Athenians and the
Argives.
* The Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans,
* for themselves, and for the confederates commanded by every
* of them, have an accord for one hundred years without fraud
* or damage, both by sea and land.
^ It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleans, nor Man-
' tineans, nor their confederates to bear arms against the Athe-
* Nicias was tlie author of tlic peace between the Alhoniiiiis and the I.accde-
monians, and that peace was therefore called Nicia.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 287
' nians, or the confederates * under the command of the Athe-
^ nians, or their confederates, by any fraud or machination
* whatsoever. And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans,
* have made league with each other for one hundred years on
* these terms.
* If any enemy shall invade the territor}' of the Athenians,
' then the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans shall go unto
* Athens, to assist them according as the Athenians shall send
* them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But
* if the enemy after he have spoiled the territory shall be gone
* back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives,
* Eleans, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made
' against it, by all those cities. And it shall not be lawful for
* any of those cities to give over the war, without the consent
* of all the rest.
* And if an enemy shall invade the territorj', either of the
* Argives, or of the Eleans, or of the Mantineans, then the
' Athenians shall come unto Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, to as-
* sist them, in such sort as those cities shall send them word to
* do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy
* after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back, then
* their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians, and
' also to the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, and war shall
* be made against it, by all those cities ; and it shall not be
' lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city,
* without the consent of all the rest.
* There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the
* dominions either of themselves, or of any the confederates un-
* der their several commands to make war in any place whatso-
' ever, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos,
* Elis, and Mantinea, their passage be allowed.
* To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city
* which sendeth them shall give maintenance for thirty days after
' they shall arrive in the city that sent for them ; and the like
' at their going away. But if they will use the army for a
* longer time, then the city that sent for tiiem, shall find them
* maintenance at the rate of three oboles of ^Egina a day for a
* man of arms, and of a drachma of .Egina for a horseman.
' The city wiiich sendeth for the aids shall have the leading
' and command of them, whilst the war is in their own territory :
* but if it shall seem good unto these cities to make a war in
* common, then all the cities shall equally participate of the
* command.
olh
call
• Confederates were of two sorts, sncli as on equal terms entered Ifag-ue with
her, and such as sr rvcd other in the war by conipiilhion, or as subjects, both
Med in the Greek ^Cftftm^tt properly, hnt not properly confederates.
THE HISTORY book v.
* The Athenians shall swear unto the articles both for them-
* selves, and for their confederates; and the Argives, Eleans,
' Mantineans, and the confederates of these shall every one swear
' unto them city by city, and their oath shall be the greatest
* that by custom of the several cities is used, and with most
' perfect hosts *, and in these words :'
/ luill stand to this league accordi?ig to the articles thereof^
justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same hy
any art or machination 'whatsoever.
' This oath shall be taken at Athens, by the senate, and the
* officers of the commons, and administred by the Prytaneis. At
' Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty,
* and by the Artynae, and administered by the council of eighty :
* at Mantinea it shall be taken by the procurators of the people,
' and by the senate, and by the rest of the magistrates, and
' administered by the Theori, and by the Tribunes of the soldiers.
* At Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and
* by the officers of the treasury, and by the council of six hun-
* dred, and administered by the procurators of the people, and by
* the keepers of the law.
* This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go
* to Elis, and to Mantinea, and to Argos thirty day before the
* Olympian games ; and by the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans,
* who shall come to Athens ten days before the Panathensean
' holy days.
' The articles of this league and peace and the oath, shall be
' inscribed in a pillar of stone ; by the Athenians in the citadel ;
' by the Argives in their market place within the precinct of the
' temple of Apollo; and by the Mantineans in their market place,
* within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. And at the Olym-
« pian games now at hand, there shall be erected jointly by them
' all, a brazen pillar in Olympia. [with the same inscription.]
^ If it shall seem good to these cities to add any thing to these
* articles, whatsoever shall be determined by them all in com-
* men council, the same shall stand good.*
Thus was the league and the peace concluded, and that which
was made before between the Lacedemonians and the Athe-
nians, was notwithstanding, by neither side renounced.
But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of
the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league; nay,
though there were made a league before this, between them and
* Beasts ofTerrd in sacrifice.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 289
the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, that where one, there all
should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it ; but
said that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were
bound to defend each other, but not to take part one with ano-
ther in invading. So the Corinthians fell oft' from their confe-
derates, and incHned again to the Lacedemonians.
This summer were celebrated the Olympian games, in which
Androsthenes an Arcadian was the first time victor in the ex-
ercise called Pancratium *. And the Lacedemonians were by
the Eleans prohibited the temple there ; so as they might nei-
ther sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes, amongst the rest ; for
that they had not paid the fine set upon them (according to an
Olympic law) by the Eleans, that laid to their charge that they
had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum in
the time of the Olympic truce.
The fine amounted to two thousand Minse f, which was two
Minae X for every man of arms, according to the law. But the
Lacedemonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither,
made answer ' that they had been unjustly condemned, alleg-
* ing that the truce was not published in Lacedemon, when their
* soldiers were sent out.'
To this the Eleans said again, * that the truce was already
' begun amongst themselves, who used to publish it first in their
* own dominion ; and thereupon, whilst they lay still, and
' expected no sucli matter as in time of truce, the Lacedemo-
' nians did them the injury at unawares.*
The Lacedemonians hereunto replied, * that it was not ne-
* cessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lace-
* demon at all^ if they thought themselves WTonged already ; but
* rather, if they thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do
* it by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them
* afterwards.'
The Eleans stood stiffly in their first argument ; ' that they
* would never be persuaded but injury had been done them;
' but were nevertheless contented, if they would render Lepreum,
* both to remit their own part of the money, and also to pay
* that part for them which was due unto the god.'
When this would not be agreed unto, they required this, not
that they should render Lepreum unless they would, but that
then they should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, seeing
they desired to have free use of the temple, and there before the
Grecians take an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter. But
when the Lacedemonians refused that also, they were excluded
♦ Pancratium coDsistetl of wrestling' and fighting with fists.
■f Six handred and twenty-five pounds sterling.
J Six pounds five shillings sterling.
U
290 THE HISTORY book v.
the temple, the sacrifices, and the games, and sacrificed at
home ; but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were
all admitted to be spectators. Nevertheless, the Eleans fear-
ing lest they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a
guard there of their youngest men in arms, to whom were added
Argives and Mantineans of either city one thousand, and cer-
tain Athenian horsemen who were then at Argos waiting the
celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the as-
sembly, lest the Lacedemonians should come upon them with
an army ; and the rather because Lichas the son of Arcesilaus
a Lacedemonian, had been whipped by the Serjeants upon the
race, for that when his chariot had gotten the prize, after pro-
clamation made that the chariot of the Boeotian state had
won it (because he himself was not admitted to run) he came
forth into the race, and crowned his charioteer to make known
that the chariot was his own. This added much to their fear,
and they verily expected some accident to follow. Nevertheless,
the Lacedemonians stirred not, and the feast passed over.
After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confede-
rates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians into their league,
and the Lacedemonian ambassadors chanced to be there also;
and after much conference and nothing concluded, upon occa-
sion of an earthquake, they brake off the conference, and returned
every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.
The next winter the men of Heraclea in Traehinia fought a
battle against the .-Enians, Dolopians, Melians, and certain
Thessalians. For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city,
as built to the prejudice only of them, and both opposed the same
from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could,
and also in this battle overcame them, and slew Xenares a La-
cedemonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots.
Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.
YEAR XIIL
In the very beginning of the next summer the Boeotians took
Heraclea miserably afflicted, into their own hands, and put He-
gesippidus a Lacedemonian out of it, for his evil government.
They took it, because they feared lest whilst the Lacedemonians
were troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in
by the Athenians. Nevertheless, the Lacedemonians were of-
fended with them for doing it.
The same summer Alcibiades the son of Clinias, being ge-
neral of the Athenians, by the practice of the Argives, and
their confederates went into Peloponnesus, and having with
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 291
him a few men of arms, and archers of Athens, and some of
the confederates which he took up there as he passed through
the country with his army, both ordered such affairs by the way
concerning the league, as was fit ; and coming to the Pa-
traeans, persuaded them to build their walls down to the sea
side, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards Rhium
in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others
as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and hindered
him.
The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians
and the Argives ; the pretext thereof was about a beast for sa-
crifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in considera-
tion of their pastures, to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it ;
the x-Vrgives being the principal owners of the temple. But
Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined to take in the
city, though without pretence at all, both that the Corinthians
might not stir, and also that they might bring the Athenian
succours from JEgina. into those parts a nearer way than by com-
passing the promontory of Scyllgeum. And therefore the Ar-
gives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by inva-
sion.
About the same time also the Lacedemonians with their
whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of
their own territory towards Lycseum, under the conduct of
Agis the son of Archidamus their king. No man knew against
what place they intended the war ; no, not the cities them-
selves out of which they were levied. But when in the sacri-
fices which they made for their passage, the tokens observed
were unlucky, they went home again, and sent word about to
their confederates (being now the month Carneius *) to pre-
pare themselves after the next f feast of the new moon (kept
by the Dorians) to be again upon their march. The Argives,
who set forth the twenty-sixth day of the month before Car-
neius J, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time
they continued invading and wasting Epidauria. And the Epi-
daurians called in their confederates to help them, whereof
some excused themselves upon the quality of the month, and
others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and there staid.
Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the ambassadors of di-
vers cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Manti-
nea, where in a conference amongst them, Ephamidas of Co-
rinth said, ' that their actions agreed not with their words, for
* as much as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace,
* Their holy month ; ia which they kept a feast to Apollo,
t 'U»*/tnria.
292 THE HISTORY book v.
' the Epidaurians, with tlieir confederates and the Argives, stood
' armed in the mean time against each other in order of battle.
* That it was tlierefore fit that some body should go first unto
* the armies from either side, and dissolve them, and then come
* again and dispute of peace.'
This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the
Argives from Epidauria ; and meeting afterwards again in the
same place, they could not for all that agree ; and the Argives
again invaded and wasted E])idauria.
The Lacedemonians also drew forth their army against Ca-
ryjfi, but then again their sacrifice for passage being not to their
mind, they returned. And the Argives, when they had spoiled
about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They
had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and
Alcibiades their commander ; but these hearing that the Lace-
demonians were in the field, and seeing now there was no
longer need of them, departed ; and so passed this summer.
The next winter the Lacedemonians, unknown to the Athe-
nians, put three hundred garrison soldiers under the command
of Agesippidas into Ej^idaurus by sea. For which cause the
Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians, that where-
as it was written in the articles of the league, that no enemy
should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions,
yet had they suffered the Lacedemonians to pass by sea*; and
said they had wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the
Messenians and Helots into Pylus against the Lacedemonians.
Hereupon the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote
upon the Laconian pillar f [under the inscription of the peace]
that the Lacedemonians had violated their oath, and they drew
the Helots out of Cranii J, and put them again into Pylus, to
infest the territory with driving of booties, but did no more.
All this winter, though there was war between the Argives
and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle, but only ambushes
and skirmishes, wherein was slain on both sides, such as it
chanced.
But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the
Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by
reason of the war, thinking to have won it by assault, but re-
turned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter,
and the thirteenth year of this war.
• Tbe Argives acknowlcdgr tlie sea on tlieir own coast to be of the dominion
of Athens.
f Which was erected for tlie aiticles of the peace to be written in.
j III Ccphalonia: where they had before placed them.
BOOK V. THE GRECIAN WAR. 293
YEAR XIV.
In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedemonians seeing
that the Epidaurians their confederates were tired, and that the
rest of the cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted,
and others were but in evil terms, and apprehending that if they
prevented it not, the mischief would spread still farther, put them-
selves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves
and their Helots, to make war against Argos, under the con-
duct of Agis the son of Archidamus their king. The Tegeates
went also with them, and the rest of Arcadia, all that were in
the Lacedemonian league. But the rest of their confederates,
both within Peloponnesus and without, were to meet together
at Phlius. That is to say, of the Boeotians five thousand men
of arms, and as many light-armed, five hundred horse, and to
every horseman * another man on foot, which holding the horses
maue, ran by with equal speed. Of Corinthians, two thousand men
of arms, and of the rest more or less, as they were. But the Phlia-
sians, because the army was assembled in their own territorv, put
forth their whole power. The Argives having had notice both
formerly of the preparation of the Lacedemonians, and afterward
of their marching on to join with the rest at Phlius, brought
their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids
of the Mantineans and their confederates, and three thousand
men of arms of the Eleans ; and marching forward, met the Lace-
demonians f at Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seiz-
ing on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the
Lacedemonians, whilst they were single. But Agis dislodging
his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the con-
federates, unseen. Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives be-
times in the morning retired first to Argos, and afterwards to
the forest of Nemea, by which they thought the Lacedemonians
and their confederates would fall in. But Agis came not the
way which they expected, but with the Lacedemonians, Ar-
cadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his pur-
pose, took another more difficult way to pass, and came down
into the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pellenians,
and Phliasians, marched another troublesome way; only the
Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, were appointed to come
down by the way of the forest of Nemea, in which the Argives
• 'Ana-Til.
t The Lacedemonians, Tegeates, and some Arcadiaas, not the whole leajtie,
which was not vet united.
294 THE HISTORY book v.
were encamped ; to the end that if the Arglves should turn
head against the Lacedemonians, these might set upon them at
the back with their liorse.
Thus ordered, Agis entered into the plains, and spoiled Sa-
minthus and some other towns thereabouts. Which when the
Argives understood, they came out of the forest somewhat after
break of day to oppose them, and lighting among the Plilia-
§ians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had
more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many.
The Boeotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians marched forward
toward Nemea, and found that the Argives were departed. For
when they came down and saw their country wasted, they put
themselves into order of battle ; and the Lacedemonians on the
other side did the same ; and the Argives stood intercepted in
the midst of their enemies. For in the plain between them
and the city, stood the Lacedemonians and those with them ;
and above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pelle-
nians; and towards Nemea were the Boeotians, Sicyonians,
and Megareans. And horsemen they had none, for the Athe-
nians alone of all their confederates, were not yet come. Now
the generality of the armyof the Argives, and their confederates,
did not think the danger present so great, as indeed it was, but
rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own, and
that the Lacedemonians were intercepted, not only in the Ar-
gives' territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of
Argos, Thrasyllus one of the five commanders of tlie army, Al-
ciphron, entertainer * of the Lacedemonians, when the armies
were even ready to join, went unto Agis, and dealt with him
to have the battle put off, for as much as the Argives were con-
tent and ready, both to propound and accept of equal. arbitrators
in whatsoever the Lacedemonians should charge them withal,
and in the mean time, to have peace with them solemnly con-
firmed.
This these Argives said of themselves, without the command
of the generality, and Agis of himself likewise accepting their
proposition, witliout deliberation had with the major part, and
having communicated it only to some one more of those that
had charge in the army, made truce with them for four months ;
in which space tliey were to perform the things agreed upon be-
tween them. And then presently he withdrew his army, with-
out giving account to any of the rest of the league why he did
so. The Lacedemonians and the confederates followed Agis,
according to the law, he being tlieir general, but amongst them-
selves taxed him exceedingly, for that having a very fair occa-
* Tl(i^tv»s, he that lodged the Lacedemonians when any of thcin cnnic to Argot.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 295
sion of battle, the Argives being enclosed on all sides, both by
their horse and foot, he yet went his way, doing nothing worthy
the great preparation they had made. For this was in very
truth the fairest army that ever the Grecians had in the fieli
unto this day; but it was most to be seen when they were al-
together * in the forest of Nemea. Where the Lacedemonians
were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Boeotians,
Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans;
and these all chosen men of their several cities, and such as
were thought a match not only for the league of the Argives,
but for such another added to it. The army thus offended with
Agis, departed, and were dissolved, every man to his home. The
Argives were much more offended with those of their city,
which without the consent of the multitude, had made the
truce, they also supposing that the Lacedemonians had escaped
their hands in such an advantage, as they never had the like
before ; in that the battle was to have been fought under their
city walls, and with the assistance of many and good confede-
rates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at
the Charadrum (the place where the soldiers before they enter
into the city from warfare, use to have their military causes
heard) but he flying to the altar saved himself, nevertheless
they confiscated his goods.
After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one
thousand men of arms, and three hundred horse, under the
conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were
afraid for all this, to break the truce with the Lacedemonians)
willed them to be gone again ; and when they desired to treat,
would not present them to the people till such time as the Man-
tineans and Eleans (who were not yet gone) forced them unto
it by their importunity. Then the Athenians, in the presence
of Alcibiades, that was ambassador there, spake unto the Ar-
gives and their confederates, saying, < that the truce was un-
* duly made, without the assent of the rest of their confederates,
* and that now (for they were come time enough) they ought
* to fall again to the war,' and did by their words so prevail with
the confederates, that they all, save the Argives, presently
marched against Orchomenus f, of iVrcadia.
And these though satisfied, staid behind at first, but after-
wards they went; and sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly
besieged, and assaulted the same ; desiring to take it in ; as
well for other causes, as chiefly for that the hostages which the
Arcadians had given to the Lacedemonians, were there in cus-
* That is going borne, for tiH then they were never altogether ia Nemefc
t 1 iiere was another Orchomenns in Baotia.
29f. THE HISTORY book v.
tody. The Orchomenians fearing the weakness of their walls,
and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish be-
fore any relief arrived, yielded up the town on conditions : * to
* be received into the league ; to give hostages for themselves ;
' and to surrender the hostages held there by the Lacedemo-
* nians, into the hands of the Mantineans.'
The confederates after this, having gotten Orchoraenus, sat
in council about what town they should proceed against next.
The Eleans gave advice to go against Lepreum *, but the Man-
tineans against Tegea. And the Argives and Athenians con-
curred in opinion with the Mantineans. But the ' Eleans
taking it in evil part, that they did not decree to go against
Lepreum, went home ; but the rest prepared themselves at
Mantinea to go against Tegea, which also some within had a
purpose to put into their hands.
The Lacedemonians, after their return from Argos with
their four months truce, severely questioned Agis, for that upon
so fair an opportunity, as they never had before, he subdued
not Argos to the state ; for so many and so good confederates
would hardly be gotten together again at one time. But when
also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was
their indignation much greater, and they presently resolved
(contrary to their own custom) in their passion to raze his
house, and fine him in tlie sum of ten tiiousand drachmas f.
But lie besought them that they would do neither of these
things yet, and promised that leading out the army again, he
would by some valiant action cancel those accusations ; or if
not, they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatsoever
they thought good. So they forbore both the fine and the
razing of his house ; but made a decree for that present, such
as had never been before, that ten Spartans should be elected
and joined with him as counsellors, without whom it should
not be lawful for him to lead the army into the field.
In the mean time came news from their side in Tegea, that
unless they came presently, with ai<l, the Tegeans would re-
volt to the Argives, and their confederates; and that they
wanted little of being revolted already.
Upon this the Lacedemonians with speed levied all their
forces, both of themselves and their Helots, in such number as
they had never done before, and marched unto Orestium in
Maenalia, and appointed the Arcadians, such as were of their
league, to assemble and follow them at the heels to Tegea.
The Lacedemonians being come entire to Orestium, from
• As beinw in particular hostility with it.
*}- Three hundred and twelve pounds ten shillings sterling.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 297
thence sent back the sixth part of their army (in which they
put both the youngest and the eldest sort) fur the custody of
the city, and with the rest marched on to Tegea ; and not long
after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia.
They sent also to Corinth, and to the Boeotians, Phoceans,
and Locrians, to come with their aids with all speed to Manti-
nea. But these had too short a warning, nor was it easy for
them, unless they came altogether, and staid for one another,
to come through the enemies country, which lay between, and
barred them of passage. Nevertlieless, they made what haste
they could. And the Lacedemonians taking with them their
Arcadian confederates present, entered into the territory of
Mantinea, and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules,
wasted the territory about.
The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in
sight, seized on a certain place fortified by nature, and of hard
access, and put themselves into battle array. And the Lacede-
monians marched presently towards them, and came up witliln
a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the ancient men of
the army cried out unto Agis, seeing liim to go on against a
place of that strength, that he went about to amend one fault
with another; signifying that he intended to make amends for
his former retreat from Argos, which he was questioned for,
with iiis now unseasonable for%vardness. But he, whether it
were upon that increpation, or some other sudden apprehen-
sion of his own, presently withdrew his army before the fight
began, and marching unto the territory of Tegea, turned the
course of the water into the territory of Mantinea ; touching
which water, (because into what part soever it had its course,
it did much harm to the country) the Mantineans and Tegeates
were at war. Novv his drift wjis, by the turning of that water,
to provoke those Argives and their confederates which kept
the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose
them, that so they might fight with tliem in the plain. And
by that time he had staid about the water a day, he had di-
verted the stream. The Argives and their confederates were
at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them,
and knew not what to make of it. But when after the retreat
they returned no more in sight, and that they themselves lying
still on the place, did not pursue them, then began they anew
to accuse the commanders : both for suffering the Lacedemo-
nians to depart formerly, when they had them enclosed at so
fair an advantage before Argos ; and now again for not pursuing
them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save them-
selves, and betraying the army. The commanders for the pre-
sent were much troubled hereat, but aftenvards they drew
298 THE HISTORY book v.
down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain,
encamped as to go against the enemy. The next day the Ar-
gives and their confederates put themselves in such order as (if
occasion served) they meant to fight in, and the Lacedemo-
nians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, the
same place where they had formerly encamped, perceived the
enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come
down already from the hill. Certainly the Lacedemonians
were more affrighted at this time, than ever they had been to
their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare
themselves was exceeding short, and such was their diligence
that every man fell immediately into his own rank, Agis the
king commanding all according to the law. For whilst the
king hath the army in the field, all things are commanded by
him, and he signifieth what is to be done, to the Polemarchi *,
they to the Lochagi, these to the Pentecontateres, and these
again to the Enomatarchi, who lastly make it known every one
to his own Enomatia. In this manner when they would have
any thing to be done, their commands pass through the army,
and are quickly executed. For almost all the Lacedemonian
army, save a very few, are captains of captains, and the care of
what is to be put in execution, lieth upon many. Now
their left wing consisted of the Sicritee f, which amongst the
Lacedemonians have ever alone that place. Next to these
were placed the Brasidian soldiers lately come out of Thrace ;
and v^'ith them those X that had been newly made free. After
them in order, the rest of the Lacedemonians, band after band ;
and by them Arcadians, first the Herseans, after these the Mae-
nalians. In the right wing were the Tegeates, and a few Lace-
demonians in the point of the same wing. And u[X)n the out-
side of either wing, the horsemen. So stood the Lacedemo-
nians. Opposite to them in the right wing stood the Manti-
neans, because it was upon their own territory, and with them
such Arcadians as were of their league. Then the one thou-
sand chosen Argives which the city had for a long time caused
to be trained for the war at the public cliarge ; and next to
them the rest of the Argives. After these the Cleonaeans and
Orneates, their confederates. And lastly, the Athenians with
the horsemen (which were also theirs) had the left wing. This
was the order and preparation of botli the armies.
• Polemarchi, niartials of the field. Tlic commanders of regiments, colonels.
Pentecontateres, captains of companies. Enomatarchi, captains of the fourth
part of a company. An Enomatia was in this army thirty two soldiers.
t A band of the I^cedeinonians so.called, perhaps from Scicus, a town in La-
conia.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 299
The army of the Lacedemonians appeared to be the greater.
But what the number was, either of the particulars of either
side, or in general, I could not exactly write. For the number
of the Lacedemonians, agreeable to the secresy of that state,
was unknown ; and of the other side, for the ostentation usual
with all men, touching the number of themselves was unbe-
lieved. Nevertheless the number of the Lacedemonians may
be attained by computing thus. Besides the Sicritfe, which
were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments*, in
every regiment were four companies tj in each company were
four enomatiae |, and of every enomatia, there stood in front
four; but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the cap-
tains of bands thought it necessary. But the army in general
was so ordered, as to be eight men in depth, and the first rank
of the whole, besides the Sicritae, consisted of four hundred and
forty-eight soldiers.
Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made
their hortatives, every one to those that were under his com-
mand. To the Mantineans it was said, *that they were to
' fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and ser-
' vitude, that the former might not be taken from them, and
' that they mitrht not again taste of the latter.' The Argives
were admonished, 'that whereas anciently they had the lead-
* ing of Peloponnesus, and in it an equal share, they should
* not now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; and
* that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a
* city, their neighbour and enemy.' To the Athenians it was
remembered, * how honourable a thing it would be for them,
* in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior
* to none of them ; and that if they had once vanquished the
* Lacedemonians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would
' become both the more assured, and the larger by it, and that
* no other would invade their territorj' hereafter.' Thus much
was said to the Argives and their confederates. But the La-
cedemonians encouraged one another, both of themselves, and
* A«;^«, less than the ordinary regiment nith us, more than ordioarr com-
panies.
■f- Companies of fifty, but more or less in them as occasion served.
'I Enomatia, the fourth part of a Pentecostre. By this account every Enoma-
tia had thirty-tfTO, every hand or A<;^m five hundred and twelve, the whole amy
besides the Sicritie three thousand five hundred and eighty-four, and with the
SicritsE, which are six hundred, four tlioiisand one hundred and eighty-four,
'which number riselh also thus, four hundred and forty-eight in rank, eight in
file, make three thousand five hundred and eighty-four, and then the six hun-
dred Sicritje, as before, make four thousand one hundred and eighty-four. Light-
armed soldiers, which usually far exceeded the number of men of arras are not
reckoned.
300 THE HISTORY book v.
also by the manner* of their discipline in the wars ; taking en-
couragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what
they already knew, as being well acquainted, that a long actual
experience, conferred more to their safety than any short verbal
exhortation, though never so well delivered. After this followed
the battle.
The Arglves and their confederates marched to the charge
with great violence and fury. But the Lacedemonians, slowh',
and w^ith many flutes, according to their military discipline, not
as a point of religion, but that marching evenly, and by
measure, their ranks might not be distracted, as the greatest
armies, when they march in the face of the enemy, use to be.
Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis the king thought
of this course. All armies do thus ; in the conflict they extend
their right wing, so as it cometh in upon the flank of the left wing
of the enemy ; and this happeneth for that every one through
fear seeketh all he can to cover his unarmed side with the shield
of him that standeth next him on his right hand, conceiving,
that to be so locked together is their best defence. The be-
ginning hereof is in the leader of the first file on the right hand,
who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy,
the rest upon like fear follow after. And at this time, the
Mantlneans in the right wing had far encompassed the Si-
critae : and the Lacedemonians on the other side, and the Te-
geates were come in, yet farther upon the flank of the Athenians,
by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis fear-
ing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and supposing
the Mantlneans to be come in far, signified unto the Slcritje
and Brasidians, to draw out part of their bands, and therewith
to equalize their left wing to the right wing of the Mantlneans,
and into the void space, he commanded to come up Hipponoi-
das and Arlstocles, two colonels with their bands out of their
right wing, and to fall in there, and make up the breach : con-
ceiving that more than enough would be still remaining in their
right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantlneans
would be the stronger. But it happened (for he commanded it
in the very onset, and on the sudden) both that Arlstocles and
Hipponoldas refused to go to the place commanded (for which
they were afterwards banished Sparta, as thought to have dis-
obeyed out of cowardice) and that the enemy had in the mean
time also charged. And when those which he commanded to
go to the place of the Sicritfe, went not, they could no more
reunite themselves, nor close again the empty space. But the
* They used before battle to sing songs, containing encouragement to die for
their country.
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 301
Lacedemonians, though they had the worst at this time in
every point, for skill, yet in valour they manifestly shewed
themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, not-
withstanding that tlie right wing of the Mantineans did put to
flight the Sicritae and Brasidians, and that the Mantineans to-
gether with their confederates, and tiiose one thousand chosen
men of Argos, falling upon them in flank, by the breach not
yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedemonians, and put to
flight, and chased them to their carriages, slaying also certain
of the elder sort left there for a guard, so as in this part the
Lacedemonians were overcome. But with the rest of the ar-
my, and especially the middle battle, where Agis was himself,
and those which are called the three hundred horsemen about
him, they charged upon the eldest of the Argives, and upon
those which are named the five cohorts, and upon the Cleo-
naeans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst
them, and put them all to flight. In such sort as many of them
never struck a stroke, but as soon as the Lacedemonians
charged, gave ground presently, and some for fear to be over-
taken, were trodden under foot. As soon as the army of the
Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground,
they began also to break on either side. The right wing of the
Lacedemonians and Tegeates had now with their surplusage of
number hemmed the Athenians in, so as they had the danger
on all hands, being within the circle, penned up; and without
it, already vanquished. And they had been the most distressed
part of all the army, had not their horsemen come in to help
them. Withal it fell out that Agis when he perceived the left
wing of his own army to labour, namely, that which was op-
posed to the Mantineans, and to those thousand Argives, com-
manded the whole army to go and relieve the part overcome.
By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as to-
gether with them were overlaid whilst tiie army passed by and
declined them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Manti-
neans with their confederates, and those chosen Argives, had
no more mind now of pressing upon their enemies, but seeing
their side was overcome, and the Lacedemonians approaching
them, presently turned their backs. Of the Mantineans the
greatest part were slain, but of those chosen Argives, the most
were saved, by reason the flight and going off" was neither hasty
nor long. For the Lacedemonians fight long and constantly,
till they have made the enemy to turn his back, but that done,
they follow him not far.
Thus or near thus went the battle, the greatest that had
been for a long time between Grecians and Grecians, and of
two the most famous cities. The Lacedemonians lavine to-
302 THE HISTORY book v.
gether the arms of their slain enemies, presently erected a tro-
phy, and rifled their dead bodies. Their own dead they took
up, and carried them to Tegea, where they were also buried,
and delivered to the enemy theirs, under truce. Of the Ar-
gives, and Orneates, and Cleoneans were slain seven hundred,
of the Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians with the
iEginetffi, likewise two hundred, and both the captains. The
confederates of the Lacedemonians were never pressed, and
therefore their loss was not worth mentioning. And of the
Lacedemonians themselves it is hard to know the certainty,
but it is said that there were slain three hundred.
When it was certain they would fight, Pleistoanax the other
king of the Lacedemonians, and with him both old and young,
came out of the city to have aided the army, and came forth
as far as Tegea ; but being advertised of the victory, they re-
turned. And the Lacedemonians sent out to turn back also
those confederates of theirs which were coming to them from
Corinth, and from without the Isthmus. And then they also
went home themselves, and having dismissed their confederates
(for now were the Carneian holidays) celebrated that feast.
Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the
Grecians ; for they had been taxed both with cowardice, for the
blow they received in the island, and with imprudence and
slackness in other occasions. But after this, their miscarriage
was imputed to fortune, and for their minds, they were es-
teemed to have been ever the same they had been.
The day before this battle, it chanced also that the Epi-
daurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos,
as being emptied much of men ; and whilst the Argives were
abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend
it.
Also three thousand men of Elis, and a thousand Athenians,
besides those which had been sent before, being come after the
battle to aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epi-
daurus, and lay before it all the while the Lacedemonians were
celebrating the Carneian holidays : and assigning to every one
his part, began to take in the city with a wall, but the rest
gave over ; only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification,
(which was their task) wherein stood the temple of Juno. In
it, amongst them all they left a garrison, and went home every
one to his own city. And so this summer ended.
In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedemo-
nians, presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew
out their army into the field, and being come to Tegea, sent
certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There
were before this time many citizens in Argos well affected to
BOOK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 303
the Lacedemonians, and that desired the deposing of the Ar-
give people, and now after the battle, they were better able by
much to persuade the people to composition, than they for-
merly were. And their design was first to get a peace made
with the Lacedemonians, and after that a league, and then at
last to set upon the commons.
There went thither, Lichas the son of Archesilaus, enter-
tainer of the Argives in Lacedemon, and brought to Argos two
propositions ; one of war, if the war were to proceed ; another
of peace, if they would have peace. And after much contra-
diction, (for Alcibiades was also there) the Lacedemonian fac-
tion, that boldly now discovered themselves, prevailed with the
Argives to accept the proposition of peace, which was this :
THE ARTICLES.
* It seemeth good to the council of the Lacedemonians to
* accord with the Argives on these articles :
* The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchomenians their
* children *, and unto the Maenalians their men f, and unto the
* Lacedemonians those men X that are at Mantinea.
' They shall withdraw their soldiers from Epidaurus, and
* raze the fortification there. And if the Athenians depart not
* from Epidaurus likewise, they shall be held as enemies both
* to the Arrives and to the Lacedemonians, and also to the con-
* federates of them both.
' If the Lacedemonians have any men of theirs in custody,
* they shall deliver them every one to his own city.
* And for so much as concemeth the god§, the.Vrgives shall
* accept composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath ||
* which they shall swear, touching that controversy, and the Ar-
* gives shall give the form of that oath.
* All the cities of Peloponnesus both small and great, shall
* be free, according to their patrial laws.
* If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm,
* the Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort
* Hoslag-es which they took of the Orchomenians.
•f" Hosfag'es of the Msnalians,
J Hostaofes rf the Arcbadians given to the Lacedemonians, and by them kept
in Orcbomenus, and at the taking of Orchomenus by the Argive league, carried
away to Mantinea.
^ Apollo, to whom the Epidanrians shonld have sent a beast for sacrifice, in
name of their pastures, but not doing- it, the Argires went abont to force them to
it.
II An oath to send the beast for sacrifice hereafter.
304 THE HISTORY rook v.
* as In a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be
' thought reasonable.
^ The confederates of the Lacedemonians without Pelopon-
* nesus, shall have the same conditions which the confederates
' of the Argives and of the Lacedemonians have, every one
* holding his own.
* This composition is to hold from the time that they shall
' both parts have shewed the same to their confederates, and
* obtained their consent.
' And if it shall seem good to either part to add or alter any
* tiling, their confederates shall be sent unto, and acquainted
* therewith.'
These propositions the Argives accepted at first, and the
army of the Lacedemonians returned from Tegea to their own
city. But shortly after, when they had commerced together,
the same * men went further, and so wrought, that the Ar-
gives renouncing their league with the Mantineans, Eleans,
and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedemo-
nians, in this form :
The League between the Argives and Lacedemonians.
* It seemetli good to the Lacedemonians and Argives to
' make league and alliance for fifty years, on these articles :
' That either side shall allow unto the other, equal and like
' trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.
' That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and
* alliance comprehending also them) shall be free *, both from
* the laws and payments of any other city than their own, hold-
* ing what they have, and atfording equal and like trials of
* judgment, according to the form used in their several cities.
' That every of the cities confederate with the Lacedemo-
' nians without Peloponnesus, shall be in tlie same condition
' with the Lacedemonians, and the confederates of the Argives
' in the same with the Argives, every one holding his own.
' That if at any lime there shall need an expedition to be
' undertaken in common, the Lacedemonians and the Argives
' shall consult thereof, and decree as shall stand most with
' equity towards the confederates ; and that if any controversy
* arise between any of the cities, either within or without Pe-
' loponnesus, about the limits or other matter, they also shall
' decide It.
* Tlif [.acrdpiHoiiiiiii fncliun. + Klriti/xn k*,) KiTtxiXnt.
rooK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 305
* That if any confederate.city be at contention with another,
' it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think
* most indifferent; but the particular men of any one city
' shall be judged according to the law of the same/
Thus was the peace and league concluded, and whatsoever
one had taken from the other in the war, or whatsoever one had
against another otherwise, was all acquitted.
Now when they were together settling their business, they or-
dered that the Argives should neither admit herald or ambas-
sage from t!>e Athenians, till they were gone out of Pelopon-
nesus, and had quit the fortification ; nor should make peace
or war with any, without consent of the rest.
And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they
sent ambassadors from both their cities, to the towns lying
upon Thrace, and unto Perdiccas, whom they also persuaded to
swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from
the Athenians presently, but intended it ; because he saw the
Argives had done so ; and was himself also anciently descended
out of Argos. They likewise renewed their old oath with the
Chalcideans, and took another besides it.
The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring
them to abandon the fortification they had made against Epi-
daurus. And the Athenians considering that the soldiers thev
had in it were but few, in respect of the many other that were
with them in the same, sent Demosthenes thither to fetch
them away. He when he was come, and had exhibited for a
pretence, a certain exercise of naked men without the fort,
when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made
fast the gates, and afterwards having renewed the league with
the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into
tlieir hands.
After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Manti-
neans also, though they withstood it at first, yet being too weak
without the Argives, made their peace with the Lacedemo-
nians, and laid down their command over the other cities *.
And the Lacedemonians and Argives, with a thousand men cf
either city, having joined their arms, the Lacedemonians first,
with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to
a smaller number, and then they both together dissolved the
democracy at Argos.
And the oligarchy was established conformable to the state
of Lacedemon. These things passed in the end of the winter,
and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this
war.
• Which Ihey had the Irading of in Arcadia.
X
306 THE HISTORY book v.
YEAR XV.
The next summer the Dictidians seated in mount Athos, re-
volted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans.
And the Lacedemonians ordered the state of Achaia after
tlieir own form, which before was otherwise. But the Argives,
after they had by little and little assembled themselves and re-
covered heart, taking their time when the Lacedemonians were
celebrating then* exercises of the naked youth, assaulted the
few, and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had
the victory, and some they slew, others they drove into exile.
The Lacedemonians, though those of their faction in Argos
sent for them, went not a long time after, yet at last they ad-
journed the exercises, and came forth with intention to give
them aid, but hearing by the way of Tegea, that the few were
overcome, they could not be entreated by such as had escaped
thence, to go on, but returning, went on with the celebration
of their exercises. But afterwards when there came ambassa-
dors unto them, both from the Argives in the city, and from
them that were driven out, there being present also their con-
federates, and much alleged on either side, they concluded at
last that those in the city had done the wrong, and decreed to
go against Argos with their army ; but many delays passed,
and much time was spent between. In the mean time the
common people of Argos, fearing tiie Lacedemonians, and re-
gaining the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would
turn to their very great advantage, raise long walls from their
city down to the sea-shore ; to the end that if they were shut
up by land, they might yet, with the help of the Athenians,
bring things necessary into the city by sea. And with this
their building, some other cities of Peloponnesus were also ac-
quainted. And the Argives, universally themselves, and wives,
and servants, wrought at the wall ; and had workmen and
hewers of stone from Athens. So this summer ended.
The next winter the Lacedemonians understanding that they
were fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their
confederates, all but the Corinthians, and some practice they
bad beside, within the city itself of Argos. The army was
commanded by Agis the son of Archidamus king of the Lace-
demonians. But those things whicii were practising in Argos,
and supposed to have been already mature, did not then suc-
ceed. Nevertheless, they took the walls that were then in
building, and razed them to the ground ; and then after they
had taken Hysiw, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all
«ooK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 307
the freemen in it, they went home, and were dissolved every
one to his own city.
After this, the Argives went with an army into Phliasia,
which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it
because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws ; for there
the greatest part of them dwelt.
The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Mace-
donia from the use of tlie sea, objecting that he had sworn the
league of the Argives and Lacedemonians, and that when they
had prepared an army under the conduct of Nicias the son of
Niceratus, to go against the Chalcideans upon Thrace, and
against Amphipolis, ho had broken the league made between
them and him ; and by his departure was the principal cause of
the dissolution of that army, and was therefore an enemy.
And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.
YEAR XVI.
The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with twenty
gallles, and took thence the suspected Argives, and such as
seemed to favour of the Lacedemonian faction, to the number
of three hundred, and put them into the nearest of the islands
subject to the Athenian state.
The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos with
thirty gallics of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos.
Wherein were of their own one thousand two hundred men of
arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback,
and of their confederates and islanders about one thousand five
hundred men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lace-
demonians, and therefore refused to be subject, as the rest of
the islands were, unto the Athenians ; but rested at the first
neutral, and afterwards when the Athenians put them to it, by
wasting of their land, they entered into open war.
Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomenes the son of Ly-
comedes, and Licias the son of Lysimachus, being encamped
upon their land with these forces, before they would hurt the
same, sent ambassadors to deul with them first by way of con-
ference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring be-
fore the multitude, but commanded them to deliver their mes-
sage before the magistrates and the few, and they accordingly
said as folio weth.
A Dialogue between the Athenians and Melians.
ATH. * Since we may not speak to the multitude, for few:
* lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable argu-
3US THE HISTORY book v.
' ments, all at once in a continued oration, they should chance
' to be subdued, (for we know that this is the scope of your
' bringing us to audience before the few) make surer yet that
' point, you that sit here, answer you also to every particular,
' not in a set speech, but presently interrupting us, whensoever
' any thing shall be said by us which shall seem unto you to be
' otherwise. And first answer us, whether you like this mo-
* tion or not?'
Whereunto the council of the Melians answered :
MEL. ' Tlie equity of a leisurely debate is not to- be found
' fault withal ; but this preparation of war, not future, but al-
^ ready here present, seemeth not to agree with the same.
^ For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference ;
* and that the issue of it, if we be superior in agreement,
' and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us warj and if we
* yield, servitude.'
ATH. * Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions
' of what may be, or to any other purpose, than to take advice
* upon what is present, and before your eyes how to save your
' city from destruction, let us give over. But if this be the
' point, let us speak to it.'
MEL. ' ft is reason and pardonable for men in our cases, to
' turn both their words and thoughts upon divers things : how-
' soever, tliis consultation being held only upon the point of
' our safety, we are content, if you think good to go on with
' the course you have propounded.'
ATH. ' As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pre-
' tences, (as that having defeated the Medes, our reign is there-
* fore lawful, or that we come against you for injury done)
' make a long discourse without being believed; so would we
' iiave you also not expect to prevail, by saying, either, that
* you took not our parts, because you were a colony not of the
* Lacedemonians ; or, that you have done us no injury ; but out
' of those things which we liolh of us do really think, let us go
* through with that whicli is feasible ; both you and we know-
' ing, that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on,
' when the necessity is equal. Whereas they that have odds of
* power, exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such
* conditions as they can get.'
MEL. ' Well then, (seeing you put the point of profit in tiie
* place of that of justice) we hold it profitable for ourselves, not
* to overthrow a general profit to all men, which is this, that
' men in danger, if they plead reason and equity, nay, though
' somewhat without the strict compass of justice, yet it ought
* ever to do them good. And the same most of all concerncth
RoiK V. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 309
' you, for as much as you shall else give an example unto others
* of the greatest revenge that can be taken, if you chance to
' miscarry.'
AT II. 'As for us, though our dominion should cease, yet we
' fear not the sequel. For not they that command, as do the
* Lacedemonians, are cruel to those that are vanquished by
< them, (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedemonians,)
' but such as having been in subjection, have assaulted those that
' commanded them, and gotten tiie victory. But let the danger
* of that be to ourselves. In the mean time we tell you this,
* that we are here now, both to enlarge our own dominion,
* and also to confer about the saving of your city. For we would
* have dominion over you, without oppressing you, and preserve
* you, to the profit of us both.'
MEL. ' But how can it be profitable for us to serve, though
* it be so for you to command ?'
ATH. ' Because you by obeying shall save yourselves from
* extremity ; and we not destroying you, shall reap profit by
* you.'
MEL. ' But will you not accept that we remain quiet, and
* be your friends, (whereas before we were your enemies) and
' take part with neither?'
ATH. ' No, for your enmity doth not so much hurt us, as
* your friendship will be an argument of our weakness ; and your
* hatred, of our power, amongst those whom we bear rule over.'
MEL. ' Why ? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to
' put those that never had to do with you, and themselves,
' who for the most part have been your own colonies, and
* some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same
* consideration?'
ATH. ' Why not? For they think they have reason on their
' side, both the one sort and the other ; and that such as are
' subdued, are subdued by force, and such as are forborn are so
' through our fear. So that by subduing you, besides the extend-
' ing of our dominion over so many more subjects, we shall also
' assure it the more over those we had before, especially being
' masters of the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (ex.cept
* you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued
f already.'
MEL ' Do you think then that there is no assurance in that
' which we propounded ? For here again (since driving us from
' the plea of equity, you persuade us to submit to your profit)
' when we have shewed you what is good for us, we must en-
* deavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it shall be
' good for you also. As many therefore as now are neutral,
' what do you but make them your enemies, when beholding
310 THE HISTORY book y,
these your proceedings, they look that hereafter you will also
turn your arms upon them ? And what is this, but to make
greater the enemies you have already, and to make others
your enemies even against their wills, that would not else
have been so ?'
ATH. * We do not think that they shall be ever the more our
enemies, who inhabiting any where in the continent, will be
long ere they so much as keep guard upon their liberty
against us. But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders of-
fended with the necessity of subjection which they are already
in, these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both himself
and us into apparent danger.'
MEL. * If you then to retain your command, and your vas-
sals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost of dan-
ger, would it not in us that be already free, be great base-
ness and cowardice if we should not encounter any thing
whatsoever, rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into
bondage ?'
ATH. * No, if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand
a match of valour upon equal terms, wherein to forfeit your
honour ; but rather a consultation upon your safety, tliat you
resist not such as be so far your over matches.'
MEL. ' But we know that in matter of war the event is
sometimes otherwise than according to the difference of the
number in sides. And that if we yield presently, all our hope
is lost ; whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep
ourselves up.'
ATH. * Hope ! the comfort of danger, when such use it as
have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not.
But to such as set their rest upon it, (for it is a thing by na-
ture prodigal) it at once by failing maketh itself known ; and
known, leaveth no place for future caution. Which let it not
be your own case, you that are but weak, and have no more but
this one stake- Nor be you like unto many men, who though
they may presently save themselves by human means, will
yet when (upon pressure of the enemy) their most apparent
hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones, as divina-
tion, oracles, and other such things, which with hopes destroy
men.'
MEL. * We think it (you well know) a hard matter for us to
combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on
equal terms. Nevertheless we believe, that for fortune we
shall be nothing inferior, as having the gods on our side, be-
cause we stand innocent, against men unjust. And for
power, what is wanting in us, will be supplied by our league with
the Lacedemonians, who arc of necessity obliged, if for no other
BOOK T. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 311
cause, yet for consanguinities sake, ami for their own honour
to defend us. So tliat we are confident, not altogether so
much without reason, as you think.'
ATH. ' As for the favour of the gods, we expect to have it
as well as you, for we neither do, nor require any thing con-
trary to what mankind hath decreed, either concerning the
worship of the gods, or concerning themselves. For of the
gods we think, according to the common opinion ; and of
men that for certain by necessity of nature, they will every
where reign over such as they be too strong for. Neither
did we make this law, nor are we the first that use it made,
but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so
also we use it. Knowing that you likewise, and others that
should have the same power which we have, "Would do the
same. So that for as much as toucheth the favour of tlie
gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as
for the opinion \x>u have of the Lacedemonians, in that you
believe they will help you for their own honour, we bless
your innocent minds, but aflfect not your folly. For the La-
cedemoninas, though in respect of themselves and the con-
stitutions of their own country, they are wont for the most
part to be generous ; \-et in respect of others, though much
might be alleged, jTt the shortest way one might say it all
thus, that most apjiarently of all men, they hold for honour-
able that which pleaseth, and for just tiiat which profiteth.
And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd
means of safety.'
MEL. ' Nay, for this same opinion of theirs we now the rather
believe that they will not l)etray their own colony, the
Melians ; and thereby become perfidious to such of the
Grecians as be their friends, and beneficial to such as be their
enemies.'
ATH. ' You think not then that what is profitable must be
also safe, and that which is just and honourable must be per-
formed with danger, which commonly the Lacedemonians are
least willing of all men to undergo for others.'
MBL. * But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us
rather than for any other ; and that they think that we will be
more assured unto them, than unto any other; because for
action we lie near to Peloponnesus, and for affection are more
faithful than others for our nearness of kin.'
ATH. ' The security of such as are at wars, consisteth not in
the good will of those that arc called to their aid, but in the
power of those means they excel in. And this the Lacede-
monians themselves use to consider more than any; and
therefore out of diffidence in their own forces, they take
312 THE HISTORY rook v.
many of their confederates with them, though to an expedition
but against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not hkely, we
being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an
island/
MEL. ' Yea, but they have others to send ; and the Cretic
sea is wide ; wherein to take another, is harder for him that
is master of it, than it is for him that will steal by to save
himself. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms
against your own territory, or those of your confederates
not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trou-
ble yourselves no more about a territory that you have no-
thing to do withal, but about your own and your confede-
rates.'
ATH. ^ Let them take which course of these they will, that
you also may find by experience, and not be ignorant that
the Athenians never yet gave over siege, for fear of any di-
version upon others. But we observe, that whereas you said
you would consult of your own safety, you have not yet in all
this discourse said any thing, which a man relying on, could
hope to be preserved by. The strongest arguments you use,
are but future hopes, and your present power is too short to
defend you against the forces already arranged against you.
You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless ex-
cluding us, you make amongst yourselves, some more discreet
conclusion. For when you are by yourselves, you will no
more set your thoughts upon shame, which when dishonour
and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undo-
eth them. For many when they have foreseen into what
dangers they are entering, have nevertheless been so overcome
by that forcible word dishonour, that that which is but called
dishonour, hath caused them to fall willingly into imme-
dicable calamities, and so to draw upon themselves really by
their own madness, a greater dishonour than could have be-
fallen them by fortune. Which you, if you deliberate wisely,
will take heed of, and not think shame to submit to a most
potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions, as of
league, and of enjoying your own, under tribute. And see-
ing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of pee-
vishness take the worse. For such do take the best course,
who though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly ac-
commodate to their superiors, and towards their inferiors use
moderation. Consider of it therefore, whilst we stand off, and
have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country,
which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one consul-
tation.'
So the Athenians went aside from the conference ; and the
THE GRECIAN WAR. 313
Melians, after they had decreed the very same things which
before they had spoken, made answer unto them in this man-
ner.
MEL. ' Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what
' you have heard before ; nor will we in a small portion of time,
* overthrow that liberty in which our city hath remained for
* the space of seven hundred years since it was first founded.
' But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have pre-
' served it hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is, of the
' Lacedemonians, we will do our best to maintain the same.
* But this we oiFer; To be your Jiieiuis ; aieniLs to neither
' side ; and you to depart out of our land after agreement, such
' as tiv shall both think fit.''
Thus the Melians answered ; to which the Athenians, the
conference being already broken off, replied thus :
ATH. ' You are the only men, (as it seemeth to us bv this
* consultation) that think future things more certain than
' things seen, and behold things doubtful, through desire to
* have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As
* you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedemonians,
' and to fortune, and hopes ; so will you be the most deceived.'
Thus said, the Athenian ambassadors departed to their
camp, and the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out,
fell presently to the war, and dividing the work among the se-
veral cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall.
The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own, and of
their confederates, for a guard, both by sea and land, and with
tiie greatest part of their army went home. The rest that were
left, besieged the place.
About the same time the Argivcs making a road into
Phliasia, lost about eighty of their men by ambush laid for
them by the men of Phlius, and the outlaws of their own city.
And the Athenians that lay in Pylus, fetched in thither a
great booty from the Laceden'ionians'; notwithstanding which
the Lacedemonians did not war upon them, as renouncing the
peace, but gave leave by edict only, to any of their people" that
would, to take booties reciprocally in the territory of the Athe-
nians.
The Corinthians also made war upon the Athenians, but it
was for certain controversies of their own, and the rest of Pe-
loponnesus stirred not.
The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians
by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market-
place, and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into
the town both corn and other provision whatsoever they could buy
for money, and so returned and lay still. And the Athenians
314 THE HISTORY &c. nooK y.
from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer
ended.
The winter following, the Lacedemonians being about to
enter with their army into the territory of the Argives, when
they perceived that the sacrifices which they made on the bor-
der for tlieir passage, were not acceptable, returned. And the
Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion, in regard
of this design of the Lacedemonians, apprehended some of
them, and some escaped.
About the same time the Melians took another part of the
wall of the Athenians, they that kept the siege being then not
many. But this done, there came afterwards fresh forces from
Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates the son of Demeas.
And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also
within some that practised to have it given up, they yielded
themselves to the discretion of the Athenians, who slew all
the men of military age, made slaves of the women and chil-
dren, and inhabited the place with a colony sent thither after-
Wards, of five hundred men of their own.
THE END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.
THE
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK VI.
CONTENTS.
Sicily described. The causes and pretences of the Sicilian icar, with
the consultation and preparation for the same, jllcibiades, one
of the generals of the army accused of defacing the images of Mer-
cury, is suffered for that present to depart with the army. The
.Athenian army cometh to Rhegium, thence to Catana. From
thence Alcibiades is sent for home, to make answer to his accusa-
tions, and by tlie way escaping, goeth to Lacedemon. Nicias en-
campelh near Syracuse, and hating overcome the army of the Sy-
racusians in battle, returneth to Catana. The Syracusians pro-
cure aids amongst the rest of the Sicilians. Alcibiades instigateth
and instructeth the Lacedemonians against his country. Nicias
returneth from Catana to Syracuse, and encamping in Epipoler,
besiegeth the city, and heginneth to enclose themwith a double wall,
which was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the
eighteenth year of this war.
J. HE same winter the Athenians with greater forces than they
had before sent out with Laches and Eur)medon, resolved to
go again into Sicily, and if they could wholly to subdue it. Being
for the most part ignorant both of the greatness of the island,
and of the multitude of people, as well Greeks as Barbarians
that inhabited the same ; and that they undertook a war not
much less than the war against the Peloponnesians.
316 THE HISTORY book vr.
For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days sail for
a ship, and though so great, is yet divided with no more then
twenty furlongs *, sea measure from the continent.
It was inhabited in old time, thus ; and these were the na-
tions that ,held it. The most ancient inhabitants in a part
thereof, are said to have been the Cyclopes and Leestrigones, of
whose stock, and whence they came, or to what place they re-
moved, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice wiiich the poets
have spoken, and which every particular man hath learned of
them.
After them, the first that appear to have dwelt therein, are
the Sicanians, as they say themselves ; nay, before the other, as
being the natural f breed of the island. But the trutli is, they
were Iberians, and driven away by the Ligyans from the banks
of Sicanus, a river on which they were seated in Iberia. And
the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was be-
fore Trinacria. And these tvvo inhabit yet in the western parts
of Sicily.
After the taking of Ilium, certain Trojans escaping the hands
of the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily, and having
})lanted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both the
nations in one were called Elymi, and their cities were Eryx
and Egesta.
Hard by these came and dvvelled also certain Phoceans, who
coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Afric, and
thence into Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy (for
there they inhabited) flying from the Opici, having, as is most
likely and as it is reported, observed the straight, and with a
forewind gotten over in boats wiiich they made suddenly on the
occasion, or perhaps by some other means.
There is at this day a people in Italy, called Siculi. And Italy
itself got that name after the same manner, from a king of Ar-
cadia, called Italus. Of these a great army crossing over into
Sicily, overthrew the Sicanians in battle, and drove them into
the south and west parts of the same ; and instead of Sicania,
caused the island to be called Sicilia, and held and inhabited the
best of the land for near three liundred years after their going
over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. And till
now they possess the midland, and north parts of the island.
Also the Phoenicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides,
having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands
adjacent, for trades sake with the Sicilians. But after that
many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phoenicians abandoned
most of their former habitations, and uniting themselves, dwelt
* "OXaxi. -J- AiT»\;9«»!f.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 317
in Motya, and Solcecis, and Panormus, upon the borders of the
Elvmi ; as relying upon their league with the Elymi, and be-
cause also from thence lay the shortest cut over unto Carthage.
These were the Barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.
Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcideans, under Thu-
cles their conductor, going from EubcEa, built Naxus, and the
altar of Apollo Archegetes *, now standing without the city,
upon which the f ambassadors employed to the oracles, as of-
ten as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first
sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the Herculean fa-
mily, carried a colony from Corinth, and became founder of Sy-
racuse, where first he drove the Siculi out of that island J, in
which the inner part of the city now standeth, not now envi-
roned wholly with the sea as it was then. And in process of
time, when tiie city also that is without was taken in with a
wall, it became a populous city.
In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and
the Chalcideans, going from Naxus built Leontium, expelling
thence the Siculi, and after that Catana, but they that went to
Catana, chose Euarchus for their founder. About the same
time arrived in Sicily also Lamis, witii a colony from Megara,
and first built a certain town called Trotilus upon the river Pan-
tacius, where for a while after he governed the estate of his co-
lony in common with the Chalcideans of Leontium. But af-
terwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had built Thap-
sus, he died ; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the con-
duct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called Me-
gara-Hyblea. And after they had there inhabited two hundred
and forty-five years, they were by Gelon a tvTant of SjTacuse,
put out both of the city and territory. But before they were
driven thence, namely one hundred years after they had built it,
they sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus. This
Pammilus came to them from Megara, tlieir own metropolitan
city, and so togetiier with them founded Selinus. Gela was
built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, that
brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Eutymus that did the
like out of Crete, jointly.
This city was named after the name of the river Gela, and the
place where now the city standeth, and which at first they walled
in, was called Lindii. And the luws which they established, were
the Doric. About one hundred and eight years after their
own foundation, they of Gela built the city of Acragante, call-
ing the city after the name of the river, and for their conductors
* Id est, chief guide. f ©iaijti.
X Nasius, Ortj-gia, an island pari of ;he city of Syracuse.
318 THE HISTORY book vi.
chose Aristonous and Pythilus, and gave unto them the laws
of Gela. Zancle was first built by Pirates, that came from
Cumae, a Chalcidean city in Opicia; but afterwards there came
a multitude, and helped to people it out of Chalcis, and the rest
of Euboea ; and their conductors were Prieres and Crataemenes,
one of Cuma?, the other of Chalcis. And the name of the city
was at first Zancle, so named by the Sicilians because it hath
the form of a side, and the Sicilians call a side Zanclon. But
these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence by the Samians
and other people of Ionia, that in their flight from the Medes,
fell upon Sicily.
After this, Anaxilus tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Sa-
mians, and peopling the city with a mixed people of them and
his own, instead of Zancle, called the place by the name of his
own country from whence he vvas anciently descended, Mes-
sana. After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, Simus,
and Sacon ; the most of which colony were Chalcideans : but
there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the
vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidae. Their lan-
guage grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric ;
but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed. Acra? and Chasmenae,
were built by the Syracusians ; Acrae twenty years after Syracuse,
and Chasmenae almost twenty after Acrae. Camarina was at
first built by the Syracusians, very near the one hundred and
thirty-fifth year of their own city, Dascon and Menecolus being
the conductors. But the Camarineans having been by the Sy-
racusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates
tyrant of Gela, in process of time taking of the Syracusians
that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became
their founder, and placed them in Camarina again.
After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they
were planted the third time in the same city. These were the
nations, Greeks and Barbarians that inhabited Sicily.
And though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very
much to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all
under subjection (which was the true motive) but as having
withal this fair pretext of aiding their kindred and new confede-
rates. But principally they were instigated to it by the ambas-
sadors of Egesta who were at Athens, and earnestly pressed them
tjiereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians,
they had begun a war about certain things concerning marriage,
and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them.
And the Selinuntians having leagued themselves witii the Syra-
cusians, infested them with war both by sea and by land. In-
somuch as the Egestaeans putting the Athenians in mind of
their former league with the Leontines, made by Laches, prayed
»ooK Yi. OF THE GUFXTAX WAR. Z19
them to send a fleet thither in their aid ; alleging amongst many
other tilings, this as principal, that if the Syracusians who had
driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without re-
venge taken on them, and so proceed by consuming the rest of
the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of
Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerons, lest hereafter,
some time or other, being Doreans, they should with great
forces aid the Doreans for affinity, and being a colony of the
Peloponnesians, join with the Peloponnesians that sent them
out to pull down the Athenian empire. That it were wisdom
therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head
against the Syracusians ; and the rather because for the defray-
ing of the war, the Egestseans would furnish money sufficient
of themselves. Which things when the Athenians had often
heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Egestsean am-
bassadors, and of their advocates and patrons, they decreed to
send ambassadors to Egesta to see first, whether there were in
their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there
was, and to bring word in what terms the war stood between
that city and tlie Selinuntians : and ambassadors were sent
into Sicily accordingly.
The same winter the Lacedemonians and their confederates,
all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the
territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields, and
carried away certain cart loads of their corn. Thence they went
to Orne:e, and having placed there the Argive outlaws, left with
them a few others of the rest of the army, and then making a
composition for a certain time, that they of Orneae and those
Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their army
home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty
gallies and six hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came
also forth with their whole power, and joining with them, sat
down betimes in the morning before Orneie. But when at
night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled
out, and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneae
to the ground and went home ; and so also did the Athenians
not long after with their gallies.
Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part
of their own and part Macedonian fugitives that lived with them,
into Methone, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the
Lacedemonians sent unto the Chalcideans upon Thrace, who
held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, ap-
pointing them to aid Perdiccas. But they refused. And so
ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this wTir, written by
Thucydides.
320 THE HISTORY
BOOK VI.
YEAR XVII.
The next summer, early in the spring, the Atlienians ambas-
sadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta
with them, and brought in silver uncoined, sixty talents, for a
month's pay of sixty gallies, which they would intreat the Athe-
nians to send thither. And the Athenians having called an as-
sembly, and heard both from the Egestaean and their own am-
bassadors, amongst other persuasive, but untrue allegations touch-
ing their money, how they had great store ready, both in their
treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty gallies into
Sicily, and Alcibiades the son of Clinias, Nicias the son of Ni-
ceratus, and Lamaehus, the son of Xenophanes, for comman-
ders, with authority absolute, the which were to aid the people
of Egesta against the Selinuntians; and withal, if they had
time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew in their citv, and to
order all other the affairs of Sicily, as they should think most
for the profit of the Athenians.
Five days after this, the people assembled again, to consult
of the means how most speedily to put this armada in readi-
ness, and to decree such things as the generals should further
require for the expedition. But Nicias having heard that him-
self was chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the
state had not well resolved, but affected the conquest of all Sici-
ly a great matter upon small and superficial pretences, stood
forth desiring to have altered this the Athenians' purpose, and
spake as followeth :
The Gralion of Nicias.
'■ Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our pre-
^ paration, and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sici-
' ly 5 y^t to me it seemeth that we ought rather once again to
* consult, whether it be not better, not to send it at all, than
* upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair, and uj)on
* the credit of strangers, to draw upon ourselves an impertinent
* war. For my own part, I have honour by it ; and for the
» danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men ; not but
^ that I ,think him a good member of the commonwealth, that
* iiath regard also to his own person and estate : for such
« a man especially will desire the public to prosper, for
* his own sake. But as I have never spoken heretofore, so
* nor now will I speak any thing that is against my con-
' science, for gain ng to myself a pre-eminence of honour,
' but that only which I apj)rehend for the best. And al-
' though I am sure, that if I go about to persuade you to preserve
* what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 321
uncertaiu and future, my words will be too weak to prevail
against your humour; yet this I must needs let you know,
that neither your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to
be achieved. For I say, that going thither you leave many
enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw
hither. You perhaps think that tlie league will be firm that
you have made with the Lacedemonians, which though as
long as you stir not, may continue a league in name, (for so
some have made it of our own side) yet if any considerable
forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew
the war, as having made the peace, constrained by calamities,
and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than our-
selves. Besides in the league itself, we have many things con-
troverted ; and some there be that refuse utterly to accept it,
and they none of the weakest, whereof some *, are now in
open war against us, and others f, because the Lacedemonians
stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten davs,
and so are contented yet to hold their hands. But peradven-
ture when they shall hear that our power is distracted (which
is the thing we now hasten to do) they will be glad to join in
the war with the Sicilians against us, the confederacy of whom
they would heretofore have valued above many other. It be-
hoveth us therefore to consider of these things, and not to run
into new dangers, when the state of our own city, hangeth
unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that
wliich we already have. For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after
so many years revolt, are yet unreduced : and from others in
divers parts of the continent, we have but doubtful obedience.
But the Egestaeans, being forsooth our confederates, and
\^Tonged, they in all haste must be aided ; though to right us
on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged,
that we defer. And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans
into subjection, we could easily also keep them so. But
the Sicilians, though we vanquisii them, yet being manv, and
far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience.
Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering, you
cannot keep ; and failing, should lose the means for ever alfter
to attempt the same again. As for the Sicilians, it seemeth
unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less
danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the S\Tacusians,
than they are now. x\nd yet this is that the Egestaeans would
most affright us with j for now the states of Sicily in several,
may perhaps be induced in favour of the Lacedemonians, to
take part against us : whereas then, being reduced into one, it
• The Corinthians. f The Boeotians.
322 THE HISTORY rooK vi.
* it is not likely they would hazard with us state against state.
^ For by the same means that they, joining with the Pelopon-
' nesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would
* be likely that the Peloponnesians would subvert theirs. The
* Grecians there will fear us most, if we go not at all ; next, if
* we but shew our forces, and come quickly away. But if any
* misfortune befal us, they will presently despise us, and join
* with the Grecians here to invade us. For we all know that
* those things are most admired which are farthest off, and
* which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of
' them. And this (Athenians) is your own case now with the
* Lacedemonians and their confederates, whom because beyond
' your hope you have overcome, in those things for which you
* at first feared them, you now in contempt of them turn your
* arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puft up upon the
* misfortunes of our enemies, but to be confident then only,
* when we have mastered their designs. Nor ought we to tiiink
* that the Lacedemonians set their minds on any thing else,
* but how they may yet for the late disgrace, repair their repu-
' tation if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather because
' they have so much, and so long laboured to win an opinion in
* the world of their valour. The question with us therefore (if
' we be well advised) will not be of the Egestaeans in Sicily,
* but how we may speedily defend our city against the insidia-
* tion of them that favour the oligarchy. We must remem.ber
* also that we have had now some short recreation from a late
* great plague, and great war, and thereby are improved both
* in men and money ; which it is most meet we should spend
' here upon ourselves, and not upon these outlaws which seek
* for aid. Seeing it maketh for them to tell us a specious lie ;
^ who contributing only words, whilst their friends bear all the
' danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if ill,
' undo their friends for company. Now if there be any man *
^ here that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general,
* especially being yet too young to have charge in chief, shall
* advise the expedition, to the end he may have admiration for
* his expense upon horses, and help from his place to defray
' that expense, suffer him not to purchase his private humour
' and splendor with the danger of the public fortune. Believe
* rather that such men, though they rob the public, do never-
' theless consume also their private wealth. Besides, the matter
* itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young
' man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand. And
I seeing those now that sit by and abet the same man, am fear-
* lie jlancplli at Alcibiadei.
X
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 323
* ful of them, and do on the other side exhort the elder sort (if
* anv of them sit near those other) not to be ashamed to deliver
* their minds freely ; as fearing, that if they give their voice
* against the war, they should be esteemed cowards ; nor to
* dote (as they do) upon things absent, knowing that by pas-
* sion the fewest actions, and by reason the most do prosper ;
* but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast
* into greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands
* on the other side, and decree, that the Sicilians within the li-
* raits they now enjoy, not misliked by you, and with liberty to
* sail by the shore, in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the
* Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound their dif-
* ferences with themselves. And for the Egestaeans, to answer
* them in particular, thus ; that as without the Athenians they
' had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should
' without them likewise end it. And, that we shall no more
* hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our con-
* federates, as when they shall do injury, we must maintain it,
' and when we require their assistance, cannot have it. And
' you the president (if you think it your office to take care of
* the commonwealth, apd to desire to be a good member of the
' same) put these things once more to the question, and let the
* Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to in-
* fringe the orders of the assembly) that before so many wit-
^ nesses it will not be made a crime, but that you shall be ra-
* ther thought a physician of your country, that hath swallowed
* down evil counsel. And he truly dischargeth the duty of a
* president, who laboureth to do his country the most good,
* or at least will not willingly do it hurt.' Thus spake Nicias.
But the most of the Atlienians that spake after him, were of
opinion that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree already
made not to be reversed. Yet some there were that said to the
contrar)'. But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alci-
biades the son of Clinias, both out of desire he had to cross Ni-
cias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state,
and also for that he had glanced at him invidiously in his ora-
tion, but principally for that he affected to have charge, hoping
that himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Car-
thage, to the state of Athens, and withal, if it succeeded to in-
crease his own private wealth and glory. For being in great
estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for
the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of horses and
other his expenses, was meet. Which proved afterwards none
of the least causes of the subversion of the Athenian common-
wealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in
things that concerned his person and form of life, and for the
324 THE HISTORY
BOOK VI.
greatness of his spirit, in every particular action he undertook,
as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy.
And although for the public, he excellently managed the war, yet
every man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the
charge of the wars to others, and thereby not long after, over-
threw the state ; Alcibiades at this time stood forth, and spake
to this effect.
The Oration of Alcibiades.
' Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto me, more than to
any other, to have this charge ; and withal, I think myself (for
I must needs begin with this, as having been touched by Ni-
cias) to be wortiiy of the same. For those things for which
1 am so much spoken of, do indeed purchase glory to my pro-
genitors, and myself, but to the commonwealth, they confer
both glory and profit. For the Grecians have thought our city
a mighty one, even above the truth, by reason of my brave
appearance at the Olympian games; whereas before they
thought easily to have warred it down. For I brought thither
seven chariots, and not only won the first, second, and fourth
prize, but carried also in all other things a magnificence wor-
thy the honour of the victory. And in such things as these,
as there is honour to be supposed, according to the law ; so is
there also a power conceived, upon sight of the thing done.
As for my expenses * in the city, upon setting forth of shows,
or whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it
procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an
argument of our greatness. Now it is no unprofitable course
of life, when a man shall at his private cost, not only benefit
himself, but also the commonwealth. Nor doth he that bear-
eth himself high upon his own worth, and refuseth to make
himself fellow with the rest, wrong the rest ; for if he were in
distress, he should not find any man that would share with him
in his calamity. Therefore as we are not so much as saluted
when we be in misery, so let tliem likewise be content to be
contemned of us when we flourish ; or if they require equality,
let them also give it. I know that such men, or any man else,
that excelleth in the glory of any thing whatsoever, shall as long
as he liveth be envied, principally of his equals, and then also of
others amongst whom he converseth j but with posterity they
shall have kindred claimed of them, though there be none j
and his country will boast of liim, not as a stranger, or one
that had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen, and
one that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. This being
• Xe^nylii, the oxiiibition of masAS, jfaim^s, or oth«*r (Vstival spectacles.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 325
the thing I aim at, and for which I am renowned, consider
now wliether I administer the public the worse for it or not.
For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Pe-
loponnesus without much, either danger or cost, I compelled
the Lacedemonians to stake all that ever they had, upon the
fortune of one day of Mantinea.
* And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been
very madness, with familiar and fit words, wTought upon the
power of the Peloponnesians; and shewing reason for my pas-
sion, made my madness now no longer to be feared. But as
long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate,
make you use of both our services. And abrogate not your
decree touching the voyage into Sicily, as though the power
were great you are to encounter withal. For the number
wherewith their cities are populous, is but of promiscuous na-
tions, easily shifting, and easily admitting new comers ; and
consequently not sufficiently armed any of them for the defence
of their bodies, nor furnished as the custom of the place ap-
pointeth, to fight for their country. But what any of them
thinks he may get by fair speech, or snatch from the public by
sedition, that only he looks after, with purpose if he fail, to
ruin the country. And it is not likely that such a rabble should
either with one consent give ear to what is told them, or unite
themselves for the administration of their affairs in common ;
but if they hear of fair offers, they will one after one be easily
induced to come in ; especially if there be seditions amongst
them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are nei-
ther so many men of arms as they boast of ; nor doth it appear
that there are so many Grecians there in all, as the several
cities have every one reckoned for their own number. Nay,
even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce suffici-
ently armed in all this war past. So that the business there,
for all that I can by fame understand, is even as I have told you,
and will yet be easier. For we sliall have many of the Barba-
rians, upon hatred of the S}Tacusians, to take our parts against
them there, and if we consider the case aright, there will be
nothing to hinder us at home. For our ancestors, having the
same enemies which they say we leave behind us now in our
voyage to Sicily, and the Persian besides, did nevertheless erect
the empire we now have, by our onlv odds of strength at sea.
* And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us, was never less
than now it is, though their power were also as great as ever j
for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not
into Sicily ; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go,
for we shall leave a navy sufficient to oppose theirs behind us.
What tlierefore can we allege with aoy probability for our
326 THE HISTORY nooK vi,
backwardness ? Or what can we pretend unto our confederates,
for denying them assistance ? Whom we ou^ht to defend, were
it but because we have sworn it to tiiem ; without objecting
that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them
not into league, that they should come hither with their aids,
but that by troubling our enemies there, they might hinder
them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby
we, and whosoever else hath dominion, hath gotten it, hath
ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that re-
quired it, whether they were Greeks or Barbarians. For if we
should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were fit to
be assisted and which not, we should have little under our go-
vernment of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our
own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use
not only to defend themselves, against him when he shall in-
vade, but to anticipate him that he invade not at all. Nor is
it in our power to be our own carvers, how much we will have
subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as ne-
cessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our
dominion, as to keep so those that are: lest if others be not
subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected unto them.
Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that otliers
do, unless also the institution of this state were like unto that
of other states. Let us rather make reckoning by enterprizing
abroad ; to increase our power at home, and proceed in our
voyage ; that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the
Peloponnesians, and shew them the contempt and slight ac-
count we make of our present ease, by undertaking this our
expedition into Sicily. Whereby either conquering those states,
we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracu-
sians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And
for our security to stay ; (if any city shall come to our side)
or to come away (if otherwise) our gallics will afford it. For
in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians
together were against it. Let not the speech of Nicias, tend-
ing only to laziness, and to the stirring of debate between the
young men and the old, avert you from it; but with the same
decency wherewith your ancestors consulting young and old
together, have brought our dominion to the present height
endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not
that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but
that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactcst judgments
tempered together, is it that doth the greatest good ; and that
a state, as well as any other thing, will, if it rest, wear out of
itself, and all men's knowledge decay ; whereas by the exercise
of war experience will continually increase, and the city will
«ooK vr. OF TIIE GRECIAN WAR. 327
* get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words^but action.
* In sum this is my opinion, that a state accustomed to be active
* if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change ;
* and that they of all men are most surely planted, that with
* most unity observe the present laws and customs, though not
« always of the best/
Thus spake Alcibiades.
The Athenians, when they had heard him, together with the
Egestaeans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present, en-
treated and (objecting to them their oath) begged their help in
form of suppliants, were far more earnestly bent upon the
journey than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he
could not alter their resolution with his oration, but thought he
might perhaps put them from it by the greatness of the provi-
sion, if he should require it with the most, stood forth again,
and said in this manner :
The Oiation of Nicias.
' Men of Athens, for as much as I see you violently bent to this
expedition, such effect may it take, as is desired. Neverthe-
less I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet
standeth. As far as we understand by report, we set out against
great cities, not subject to one another, nor needing innova-
tion, whereby they should be glad out of hard serxntude to ad-
mit of easier masters ; nor such as are likely to prefer our go-
vernment before their own liberty ; but many, (as for one island)
and those Greek cities. For besides Naxus and Catana,
(which two 1 hope will join with us, for their affinity with the
Leontines,) there are other seven, furnished in all respects after
the manner of our own army, and especially those two against
which we bend our forces most, Selinus and Syracuse. For
there are in them many men of arms, many archers, many
darters, besides many gallies and a multitude of men to man
them. They have also store of money, both amongst private
men, and in their temples. This have the Selinuntians. The
SjTracusians have tribute beside coming in from some of the
Barbarians. But that wherein they exceed us most, is this,
that they abound in horses, and have corn of their own, not
fetched in from other places. Against such a power we shall
therefore need, not a fleet only, and with it a small army, but
there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean
to do any thing worthy our design, and not to be kept by their
many horsemen from landing ; especially if the cities there
terrified by us, should now hold all together, and none but the
Egestaeans prove our friends, and furnish us with a cavalry to
328 THE HISTORY book vi.
* resist them. And it would be a shame either to come back
' with a repulse, or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if
* we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore
* we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that
' we go far from home, and are to make war in a place of dis-
' advantage, and not as when we went as confederates, to aid
' some of our subjects here at home, where we had easy bring-
* ing in of necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends.
* But we go far off, and into a country of none but strangers,
' and from whence in winter there can hardly come a messen-
* ger unto us in so little as four months. Wherefore I am of
^ opinion that we ought to take with us many men of arms, of
' our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects, and also
' out of Peloponnesus as many as W^e can get either for love or
' money; and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist
* their cavalry ; and much spare shipping, for the more easy
* bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean wheat and
' barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships * ;
' and bakers from the mills, hired and made to work by turns,
* that the army, if it chance to be weather-bound, may not
* be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for
* every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must
* as much as we can, provide them ourselves, and not rely on
* others.
* Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can ;
* for as for that which is said to be ready at Egesta, think it ready
' in words, but not in deed : for although we go thither with an
' army not only equal unto theirs, but also (expecting their men
' of arms for battle) in every thing exceeding it, yet so shall we
' scarce be able both to overcome them, and withal to preserve
' our own. We must also make account that we go to inhabit
' some city in that foreign and hostile country, and either the
' first day we come thither to be presently masters of the field,
' or failing, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Wliich
* fearing, and knowing that the business requires much good
* advice, and more good fortune (wliich is a hard matter, being
' we are but men) 1 would so set forth, as to commit myself to
* fortune as little as I may, and take with me an army, that in
* likelihood should be secure. And this I conceive to be both
* the surest course for the city in general, and the safest for us
* that go the voyage. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I re-
' sign him my place.'
Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would,
upon the multitude of the things required, abandon the en-
• "OXiceciif, ships hf the round building', going only with sails, without oari
after the fecshion of our ships. In distinction from gillies.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 329
terprise : or if he were forced to go, he might go thus with the
more security.
But the Athenians gave not over the desire they had of the
vovage for the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more
inflamed thereby to have it proceed ; and the contrar}' fell out
of that which he before expected. For they approved his coun-
sel, and thought now there would be no danger at all, and
every one alike fell in love with the enterprise. The old
men, upon hope to subdue the place they went to, or tliat at
least so great a power could not miscarry; and the young men,
upon desire to see a foreign country, and to gaze, making little
doubt but to return with safety.
As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account
to gain by it not only their wages for the time, but also so to
amplify the state in power, as that their stif)end should endure
for ever. So that through the vehement desire thereunto, of
the most, they also that liked it not, for fear (if they held up
their hands against it) to be thought evil affected to the state,
were content to let it f>ass.
And in the end a certain Athenian stood up, and calling upon
Nicias, said, he ouglit not to shift off, nor delay the business
any longer, but to declare there before them all, what forces he
would have the Athenians decree him. To which unwillingly
he answered and said, he would to consider of it first with his
fellow commanders ; nevertheless for so much as he could judge
upon the sudden, he said, there would need no less than one
hundred gallies ; whereof for transporting of men of arms, so
many of the Athenians own, as they themselves should think
meet, and the r^st to be sent for to their confederates. And
that of men of arms, in all, of their own and of their confede-
rates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand, but
rather more if they could be gotten, and other provision pro-
portionable. As for archers both from hence and from Crete,
and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they
would provide it tiiemselves, and take it with them.
When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed
that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching
the greatness of the ireparation, and the whole voyage, to do
therein as should seem best unto them for the commonwealth.
And after this they went in hand with the preparations accord-
ingly, and both sent unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers
at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the
sid^ness, and from their continuui wars, both in number of men
fit for the wars, grown up after the ceasing of tiie plague, and
in store of money gathered togetlier by means of the peace,
whereby they made their provisions with much ease. And thus
were li>ey emploj'ed in preparation for tWe \oyage.
830 THE HISTORY book vi.
In the mean time the Mercuries of stone throughout the
whole city of Athens, (now there were many of these of square
stone, set up by the law of the place, and many in the porches
of private houses, and in the temples) had in one night most of
them their faces pared, and no man knew who had done it.
And yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded
to the discoverers ; and a decree made that if any man knew of
any other profanation, he might boldly declare the same, were
he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact ex-
ceedingly to heart, as ominous to the expedition, and done
withal upon conspiracy for alteration of thestate^ and dissolution
of the democracy.
Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the city, and certain
serving-men revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but
of the paring of the statues of some other of the gods, com-
mitted formerly through wantonness and too much wine by
young men, and withal, how they had in private houses acted
the mysteries of their religion in mockery ; amongst whom
they also accused Alcibiades. This, they that most envied Al-
cibiades, because he stood in their way, that they could not con-
stantly bear chief sway with the people, making account to have
the primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of, and ex-
ceedingly aggravated, exclaiming, that both the mockery of the
mysteries, and the paring of the Mercuries tended to the depos-
ing of the people ; and that nothing therein was done without
him, alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary
course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate. He at
that present made his apology, and was there ready, if he had
done any such thing, to answer it before he went the voyage,
(for by this time all their preparation was in readiness) and to
suffer justice if he were guilty, and if absolved, to resume his
charge. Protesting against all accusations to be brought against
him in his absence, and pressing to be put to death then pre-
sently, if he had offended ; and saying, that it would not be dis-
creetly done to send away a man accused of so great crimes,
with the charge of such an army, before his trial. But his
enemies fearing lest if he came then to his trial, he should have
had the favour of his army ; and lest the people which loved him,
because the Argives and some of the Mantineans served them
in this war, only for his sake, should have been mollified, put
the matter off, and hastened his going out, by setting on other
orators to advise that for the present he should go, and that the
setting forward of the fleet should not be retarded, and that at
his return he should have a day assigned him for his trial. Their
purpose being upon further accusation, which they might easily
contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his
answer. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 331.
After this, the summer bein^ now half spent, they put to sea
for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates and the ships
that carried tiieir corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of
the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet
upon a day set, at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the
Ionian gulf to the promontory of Japygia. But the Athenians
themselves, and as many of their confederates as were at Athens
upon the day appointed, betimes in the morning came down into
Peiraeus, and went aboard to take sea. With them came down
in a manner the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants
as strangers: the inhabitants, to follow after such as belonged
unto them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some
their children : filled both with hope and lamentations ; hope
of conquering what they went for, and lamentation as being in
doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, con-
sidering what a way they were to go from their own territory.
And now when they were to leave one another to danger, they
apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done
before, when they decreed the expedition. Nevertheless their
present strength, by the abundance of every thing before their
eyes prepared for the journey, gave them heart again in behold-
ing it. But the strangers and other multitude came only to
see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible design. For this
preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went out
of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the
most glorious of all that ever had been set forth before it, to that
day. Nevertheless for number of gallics and men of arms, that
which went out with Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Ag-
non carried with him to Potidiea, was not inferior to it. For
there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse,
and one hundred gallies out of Athens itself; and out of Les-
bos and Chios fifty gallies, besides many confederates that ac-
companied him in the voyage. But they went not far, and were
but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet as being to stay long
abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them
soever it should have occasion to be employed both with ship-
ping and land soldiers.
For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost,
both of the captains of gallies, and of the city. For the state
allowed a drachma a day to every mariner : the empty* gallies
which they sent forth, being of nimble ones sixty, and of such
as carried their men of arms forty more. And the captains of
gallies both put into them the most able servants, and besides
the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called
♦ Eiiipiy ill respect of those that carried provision.
332 THE HISTORY book vi,
the] Thranitae *, and to the servants, gave somewhat of their
own ; and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon his
own gaily, both in the badges f and other rigging, each one
striving to the utmost to have his gaily, both in some ornament,
and also in swiftness to exceed the rest.
And for the land forces, they were levied with exceeding great
choice, and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the
bravery of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person.
Insomuch as amongst themselves it begat quarrel about prece-
dency, but amongst other Grecians a conceit that it was an os-
tentation rather of their power and riches, than a preparation
against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the ex-
pence as well of the public as of private men that went the
voyage, namely, of the public, what was spent already in the
business, and what was to be given to the commanders to carry
with them ; and of private men, what every one had bestowed
upon his person, and every captain on his gaily, beside what
every one was likely, over and above his allowance from the
state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what the
merchant carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum
carried out of the city, to amount to a great many talents. And
the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was
to go, for the strange boldness of the attempt, and gloriousness
of the shew, than it was for the excessive report of their num-
ber, for the length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken
with so vast future hopes, in respect of their present power.
After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they
meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the
trumpet ; and after the wine had been carried about to the whole
army, and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk J
a health to the voyage, they made their prayers, such as by the
law were 'appointed for before their taking sea ; not in every
gaily apart, but all together, the herald prenouncing them : and
the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else
wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had
sung the Paean, and ended the health, they put forth to sea. And
having at first gone out in a long file, gaily after gaily, they
Q^avirai. There being three banks of oars one abope another, the npper-
1 were called Tliranita-, the middlemost Zeug-itae, and the lowest 'I'halnmita,
leof the lliraniiit niaiiag-iMl the longest oar, and therefore in respect of their
greater labour mij|;lit deserve a -greater pay.
■]■ 'Stifiiia. The iniag-es which being set on tlie fore-part of the gaily, did give
it the name for the most pait.
I "XfrinlotTif. It was a form amongst the Grecians, and other nations tlien,
both befoie grent enterprises to wish good fortune ; and at the making of league
and peace, to ratify what they did, by drinking one to another.
most
wlif I
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 333
after went a vie by ^'Egina. Thus hasted these to be at Corcyra;
to which place also the other array of the confederates were as-
sembling.
At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voyage from di-
vers places ; nevertheless it was long ere any thing would be
believed. Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were
made, such as follow, on both parts, as well by them that be-
lieved the report touching the Athenian army to be true, as by
others that affirmed the contrary. And Hermocrates the son of
Hermon, as one that thought he knew the certainty, stood forth,
aud spake to this effect :
The Oration of Hermocrates.
' Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I
' shall be thought as well as other men, to deliver a thing incre-
* dible ; and though I know that such as be either the authors
* orrelaters of matter incredible, shall not only not persuade, but
' be also accounted fools ; nevertheless I will not for fear thereof
* hold ray tongue, as long as the coramonvvealth is in danger;
* being confident that I know the truth hereof somewhat more
* certainly then others do. The Athenians are bent to come,
* even against us, (which you verily wonder at) and that with
' great forces both for the sea and land, with pretence indeed to
' aid their confederates the Egestaeans, and to replant the Leon-
* tines, but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and
* especially of this city of ours ; which obtained, they make ac-
* count to get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will pre-
* sently be upon us, advise with your present means, how you
* may with most honour make head against them, that you may
* not be taken unprovided tlirough contempt, nor be careless
* through incredulity ; and that such as believe it, may not be
* dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they are not
* more able to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them, neither
* indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage
* unto us. Nay, it will be much the better for us, in respect of
* the rest of the Sicilians ; for being terrified by thera, they will
* the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish or re-
* pulse them without obtaining what they come for (for I fear
* not at all the effecting of their purpose) verily it will be a
' great honour to us, and in my opinion not unlikely to come
* to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whe-
* ther of Grecians or Barbarians, sent far from home, thcrt; have
* not prospered ill. Neither are these that come against us
* more in number than ourselves, and the neighbouring cities,
' for singly we shall all hold together upon fear. And if for
334 THE HISTORY book vi,
* want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to mis-
* carry, the honour of it will be left to us against whom they
* bend their counsels, though the greatest cause of their over-
* throw should consist in their own errors, which was also the
* case of these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the
* misfortune of the Medes, (though it happened for the most
* part contrary to reason) because in name they went only
* against the Athenians. And that the same shall now happen
* unto us, is not without probability.
* Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our own
' forces, let us send to the Siculi, to confirm those we have,
* and to make peace and league with others ; and let us send
* ambassadors to the rest of Sicily, to shew them that it is a
* common danger ; and into Italy to get them into our league,
* or at least that they receive not the Athenians. And in my
* judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage, for
* even they are not without expectation of the same danger.
* Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will
' bring the war upon them also, even to their city. So that
' upon apprehension, that if they neglect us the trouble will
* come home to their own door, they will perhaps either secretly
' or openly, or som.e way assist us. And of all that now are,
' they are the best able to do it, if they please, for they have
* the most gold and silver, by which both the wars and all
' things else are the best expedited. Let us also send to La-
' cedemon and to Corinth, praying them not only to send
' their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot the
' war there. But that which I think the best course of all,
* tliough through an habit of sitting still, you will hardly be
* brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you that what it is.
* If the Sicilians all together, or if not all, yet if we, and most
* of the rest would draw together our whole navy, and with two
' months provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum,
* and the promontory of Japygia, and let them see that they
* must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf, before they
' fight for Sicily, it would both terrify them the most, and also
' put them into a consideration, that we, as the watchmen of
* our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory,
* (for we shall be received at Tarentum) whereas they them-
' selves have a great deal of sea to pass with all their prepara-
* tions, and cannot keep themselves in their order for the length
* of the voyage. And that for us, it will be an easy matter to
* assail them, coming up as they do, slowly and thin. Again,
' if lightning their gallies, they shall come up to us more nim-
' bly and more close together, we shall charge upon them al-
* ready wearied, or we may if we please, retire again unto Ta-
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 333
* rentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of
' their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want
* of victuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there
* besieged, or attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest
* of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the ci-
* ties, whether they will receive them or not.
* I am therefore of opinion, that dismayed with this reckon-
* ing, they will either not put over at all from Corc\Ta, or whilst
* they spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to ex-
* plore how many, and in what place we are, the season will
* be lost, and winter come ; or deterred with our unlooked for
* opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather,
* for that (as I hear) the man of most experience amongst
' their commanders, hath the charge against his will, and would
* take a light occasion to return, if he saw any considerable
* stop made by us in the way. And I am very sure we should
* be voiced amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports
* are, so are men's minds ; and they fear more such as they
* hear will begin with them, than such as give out, that they
* will go no more but defend themselves. Because then they
* think the danger equal. Which would he now the case of
* the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion
' that we will not fight ; deservedly contemning us, because we
' joined not with the Lacedemonians to pull them down. But
' if they should see us once bolder than they looked for,
' they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness, than
* with the truth of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore
* principally to dare to do this ; or if not this, yet speedily to
' make yourselves otherwise ready for the war ; and every man
' to remember, that though to shew contempt of the enemy
' be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the
* surest, that are made with fear and opinion of danger. As
« for the Athenians, they come, and I am sure are already in
* the way, and want only that they are not now here.'
Thus spake Ilermocraies.
But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst
themselves, some contending that the Athenians would bv no
means come, and that the reports were not true ; and others,
that if they came, they would do more harm than they were
likely again to receive. Some contemned and laughed' at the
matter : but some few there were that believed Hermocrates,
and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was chief ma-
gistrate of the people, and at that time most powerful with the
commons, spake as foUoweth :
336 THE HISTORY book vr.
The Oration of Athenagoras.
* He is either a coward, or not well affected to the state,
' whosoever lie be that wisheth the Athenians not so mad, as
* coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that re-
' port such things as these, and put you into fear, though I
* wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they
* think their ends not seen. For they that are afraid of any
* thing themselves, will put the city into a fright, that they
* may shadow their own with the common fear. And this
' may the reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but
* framed on purpose, by such as always trouble the state. But
* if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reckoning
< by the reports of these men, but by that which wise men,
* and men of great experiences, (such as I hold the Athenians
^ to be) are likely to do. For it is not probable, that leaving
' the Peloponnesians and the war there not yet surely ended,
' they should willingly come hither to a new war, no less than
* the former ; seeing in my opinion, they may be glad that we
' invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are.
' And if indeed they come, (as these men say they will,) I
* think Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than Pelopon-
* nesus, as being in all respects better furnished : and that this
* our own city is much stronger than the army which they say
' is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For
* I know they neither bring horses with them, nor can get any
' here, save only a few from the Egestaans, nor liave men of
* arms, so many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea.
* For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though
' they carried no men of arms in their gallics at all, if they carry
* with them all other their necessaries ; which cannot be small
* against so great a city. So that I am so far from the opinion
* of these others, that I tliink the Athenians, though they had
* here another city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it,
' and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able
' to. escape from being destroyed every man of them ; much less
' now, when all Sicily is their enemy. For in their camp,
* fenced with their gallics, they shall be cooped up ; and from
* their tents and forced munition, never be able to stir far
* abroad without being cut off with our liorsemen. In short, I
' think they shall never be able to get landing ; so much above
* theirs do I value our own forces. But these things, as I said
' before, the Athenians considering, I am very sure, will look
* unto their own ; and our men talk here of things that neither
' are, nor ever will be j who I know have desired, not only now
BOOK ti. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 337
* but ever, by such reports as these or by worse, or by their ac-
* tions to put the multitude in fear, that they themselves might
* rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it often,
* they may one day effect it. And for us, we are too poor-
' spirited either to foresee it ere it be done, or foreseeing to
* prevent it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but sub-
'ject to sedition, and contention, not so much against the
* enemy as within itself ; and sometimes also to tyranny and
* usurpation. Which I will endeavour (if you will second me)
* so to prevent hereafter, as nothing more of this kind shall
* befall you. Which must be done, first by gaining you the
< multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots,
* not only when I find them in the action, (for it vriW be hard
' to take them so) but also for those things which they would,
* and cannot do. For one must not only take revenge upon an
* enemy for what he hath already done, but strike him first for
* his evil purpose : for if a man strike not first, he shall first be
* strucken. And as for the few, I shall in somewhat reprove
' them, in somewhat have an eye to them, and in somewhat
' advise them. For this I think will be the best course to avert
' them from their bad intentions. Tell me forsooth, (I have
* asked this question often) you that are the younger sort,
* what would you have ? Would you now bear office ? the law
' allows it not. And the law was made, because ye are not
* now sufficient for government, not to disgrace you when you
* shall be sufficient. But forsooth, you would not be ranked
* with the multitude. But what justice is it, that the same
* men should not have the same privileges ? Some will say,
* that the democracy is neither a well-governed, nor a just
* state, and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best
* government. But I answer first, democracy is a name of
* the whole, oligarchy but of a part. Next, though the rich
' are indeed fittest to keep the treasure, yet the wise are the
* best counsellors, and the multitude, upon hearing, the best
' judge. Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and se-
' verally participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy,
* they allow indeed to the multitude a participation of all dan-
* gers ; but in matters of profit, they not only encroach upon
* the multitude, but take from them, and keep the whole.
* Which is the thing that you the rich and the younger sort af-
* feet ; but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet,
* O ye, the most unwise of all men, unless you know what you
* affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most ig-
* norant of all the Grecians I know ; or ye most wicked of all
* men, if knowing it, you dare do this : yet I say, inform your-
* selves better, or change your purpose, and help to amplify the
338 THE HISTORY book vi.
' common good of the city, making account tliat the good
* amongst you shall not only have an equal but a greater share
' therein than the rest of the multitude. Whereas if you will
* needs have all, you shall run the hazard of losing all. Away
* therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not allowed.
* For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to de-
* fend itself with honour. And we have generals to look to
* that matter. And if they come not, (which I rather believe)
' it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of
* you for commanders, and cast itself into voluntary servitude.
' But taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words
* virtually as facts, and will not upon words let go her present
* liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the
* same actually to your discretion.'
Thus spake Athenagoras.
Then one of their generals rising up, forbad any other to
stand forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand, to this
effect :
The Speech of one of the Syracusian Generals.
* It is no wisdom neither for the speakers to utter such ca-
* lumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive
* them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports,
^ how we may in the best manner, both every one in particu-
* lar and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when
* they come. And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city
' with horses and arms, and other habiliments of war can do us
* no hurt. As for the care hereof, and the musters, we will
' look to it, and will send men abroad, both to the cities and
' for spials, and do whatsoever else is requisite. Somewhat we
* have done already, and what more we shall hereafter find
* meet, we will from time to time report unto you.'
Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved
the assembly.
The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their
confederates. And first the generals took a view of the whole
army, and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor,
and make their naval camp, and having divided them into three
squadrons, to each squadron they assigned a captain by lot, to
the end that being at sea, they might not come into want of water,
or harbours, or any other necessaries, where they chanced to
stay ; and that they might otherwise be the more easy to be
governed, when every squadron had liis proper commander.
I
EooK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 33?
After this they sent before them three gallies, into Italy and
Sicilv, to bring them word what cities in those parts would re-
ceive them, whom they appointed to come back and meet
them, that they might know whether they might be received or
not before they put in. This done, the Athenians with all
tl)eir provisions put out from Corcyra towards Sicily, having witU
them in all one hundred and thirty-four gallies, and two Rho-
dian long-boats of fifty oars apiece. Of these a hundred v,'ere
of Athens itself, whereof sixty were expedite, the other forty
for transportation of soldiers. The rest of the navy belonged
to the Chians, and other the confederates. Of men of arms they
had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these there were of
the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred enrolled, and seven
hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, hired for
defence of the gallies. The rest were of their confederates,
some of them being their subjects. Of Argives there were
five hundred. Of Mantineans and mercenaries two hundred
and fifty. Their archers in all four hundred and eighty, of
which eighty were Cretans. Rhodian slingers they had seven
hundred. Of light-armed Megarean fugitives one hundred and
twenty, and in one vessel made for transportation of horses,
thirty horsemen. These were the forces that went over to the
war at first. With these went also thirty ships carrying ne-
cessaries, wherein went also the bakers and masons, and car-
penters, and ail tools of use in fortification. And with
these thirty ships went one hundred boats by constraint,
and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed
the army for trade, which then passed altogether from Cor-
cyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come
to tlie promontop,' of Japygia and to Tarentum, and such other
j)laces as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of
Italy, neither received of the states there into any city, nor al-
lowed any market, having only the liberty of anchorage and
water, (and tiiat also at Tarentum and Locri denied them) till
they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again,
and settled their camp in the temple of Diana, (for neither there
were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the
Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn
their gallies to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt w ith
the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to aid the Leontines,
Chalcideans likewise. To which was answered, that they
would take part with neither, but what the rest of the Italians
should conclude, that also tliey would do. So the Athenians
lay still, meditating on theu: Sicilian business, how they might
carry it the best ; and withal expected the return from Egesta
of the three gallics which they had sent before them, desiring
t
340 THE HISTORY book vi.
to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported
by their messengers at Athens.
The Syracusians in the mean time from divers parts, and
also from their spies, had certain intelligence that the fleet was
now at Rhegium, and therefore made their preparations with
all diligence ; and were no longer incredulous ; but sent unto
the Siculi, to some cities, men to keep them from revolting; to
others, ambassadors ; and into such places as lay upon the sea,
garrisons ; and examined the forces of their own city by a view
taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or
not, and ordered all things as for a war at hand, and not only
already present.
The three gallies sent before to Egesta, returned to the
Athenians at Rliegium, and brought word, that for the rest of
the money promised there was none, only there appeared thirty
talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged, both
because this first hope was crossed, and because also the Rhe-
glans, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league,
and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being
of kin to the Leontines, and always heretofore favourable to the
Athenian state, now refused. And though to Nicias, this news
from the Egestseans was no more than he expected, yet to the
other two it was extreme strange. But the Egestaeans, when
the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their treasure,
had thus deceived them. They brought them into the temple
of Venus in Eyrx *, and shewed them the holy treasure, gob-
lets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity,
which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above
their true value in money. Then they feasted such as came
with them in their private houses, and at those feastings exhi-
bited all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, ei-
ther in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow in other, as well
Phoenician as Grecian cities, for their own. So all of them in
a manner making use of the same plate; and much appearing
in every of those houses, it put those which came with the
ambassadors into a very great admiration, insomuch as at their
return to Athens, they strove who should first proclaim what
Ayealth they had seen. These men having both been abused
themselves, and having abused others, when it was told that
there was no such wealth in Egesta, were much taxed by the
soldiers. But the generals went to council upon the business
in hand.
Nicias was of this opinion, that it was best to go presently
• Eijx wnt n ciry near Egrsta, and subject to it.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 341
with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly
set forth ; and if the Egestaeans would furnlsli them with mo-
ney for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon the
occasion ; if not, tlien to require maintenance for the sixty
gnllies set fortii at their own request, and staying with them, by
force or composition, to bring the Selinuntians and them to a
peace. And then passing along by other of those cities, to
make a shew of the power of the Athenian state, and of their
readiness to help their friends and confederates, and so to go
home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought of
means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the
other cities to their own league, and not to put the common-
wealth in danger at her own charges.
Alcibiades said it would do well to have come out from
Athens, with so great a power, and then dishonourably without
effect to go home again: but rather to send heralds to every city
but Selinus and Syracuse, and assay to make the Siculi to re-
volt from the Syracusians ; and others to enter league with the
Athenians, that they might aid them with men and victual.
And first to deal with the Messenians, as being seated in the
passage, and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in ;
and having a port and harbour sufficient for their fleet ; and
when they had regained those cities, and knew what help they
were to have in the war, then to take in hand SjTacuse and
Selinus : unless these would agree with the Egestaeans, and the
other suffer the Leontines to be replanted.
But Lamachus was of opinion that it was best to go directly
to Syracuse, and to fight with them as soon as they could at
their city, whilst they were yet unfurnished, and their fear at the
greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first ; but
if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits
and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if it
come upon them suddenly, while they expect it with fear, it
would the more easily get the victory, and every thing would
affright them ; as the sight of it (for then they would appear
most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but
especially the danger of a present battle. And that it was
likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without,
as not believing that they would come ; and though they should
be already gotten in, yet the army being master of the field,
and sitting down before the city, would want no money, and
the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguing with the Sy-
racusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off
and spying who should have the better. And for a place to
retire unto and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit, being
desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.
34-2 THE HISTORY hook vi.
I/amachus said this, but came afterwards to the opinion of Al-
cibiades.
After this, Alcibiades with his own gaily having passed over
to Messana, and propounded to them a league and not pre-
vailed, they answering, that they would not let the army in,
but allow them only a market without the walls, returned back
to Rhegium. And presently the generals, having out of the
whole fleet manned three score gallies, and taken provision
aboard, went along the shore to Naxus, having left the rest of
the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians
having received them into the city, they went on by' the coast
to Catana.
But the Cataneans receiving them not, (for there were some
within that favoured the Syracusians) they entered the river of
Terias, and having staid there all that night, went the next day
towards i^yracuse, leisurely with the rest of their gallies ; but
ten they sent before into the great haven, not to stay, but
to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to pro-
claim from their gallies, that the Athenians were come to re-
plant the Leontines on their own, according to league and af-
finity ; and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syra-
cuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians, as to their
friends and benefactors.
And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the
cit}'^, and the havens, and the region where they were to seat
themselves for the war, they returned to Catana.
An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to re-
ceive the army, they admitted the generals, and willed them to
speak their minds. And whilst Alicibiades was in his oration,
and the citizens at the assembly, the soldiers having secretly
pulled down a little gate which was but weakly built, entered the
city, and were walking up and down in the market. And the
Cataneans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army
witiiin, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not
many. The rest concluded the league with the Athenians,
and willed them to fetch in the rest of the army from Rhe-
gium. After this the Athenians went back to Rhegium, and
rising from thence came to Catana with their whole army to-
gether.
Now they had news from Camarina, that if they would come
thither, the Camarinaeans would join with them, and that the
Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the
whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse, where
not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina.
And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto
them ; but the Camarinaeans would not receive the army, al-
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 343
leging that they had taken an oath, not to receive the Athe-
nians with more than one gaily, unless they should have sent
for more, of their own accord. Having lost their labour they
departed, and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and
had ffotten some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming
out a"nd killing some stragglers of the light-armed, they returned
again to Catana.
Here they find the gaily called Salaminia, come thither from
Athens, both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come
home, to purge himself of such things as were laid to his
charge by the state, and also for other soldiers that were with
him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the myste-
ries, and some also for the Mercuries. For the Athenians after,
the fleet was put to sea, proceeded nevertheless in the searcli
of those that were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and
the Mercuries. And making no enquin." into the persons of the
informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, upon the
report of evil men, apprehended very good citizens, and cast
them into prison. Choosing rather to examine the fact and'
find tlie truth by torments, than that any man, how good
soever in estimation, being once accused, should escape un-
questioned.
For the people having by fame understood that the tyranny
of Pisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end ; and
withal, that neither themselves, nor Harmodius, but the Lace-
demonians overthrew it, were ever fearful, and apprehended
every thing suspiciously.
For the fact of Aristogiton and Harmodius was undertaken
upon an accident of love, which unfolding at large, 1 shall
make appear that neither any other, nor the Athenians them-
selves report any certainty, either of their own tyrants, or of
the fact. For the old Pisistratus dying in the tvTanny, not
Hipparchus, (as the most think) but Hippias, who was the
eldest son, succeeded in the government. Now Harmodius, a
man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was in the
power of one Aristogiton, a citizen of a middle condition, that
was his lover. This Harmodius having been solicited by
Hipparcims the son of Pisistratus, and not yielding, discovered
the same unto Aristogiton. He apprehending it (as lovers
use) with a great deal of anguish, and fearing the power of
Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by force, fell pre-
sently as much as his condition would permit, to a contriving
how to pull down the tyranny. In the mean time Hippar-
chus ha\ing again attempted Harmodius, and not prevailed,
intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as if
forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some disgrace.
344 THE HISTORY book vi.
For neither \ras the government otherwise heavy till then, but car-
ried without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants
held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long time ; and
taking of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues,
adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their
religion worthily. In other points they were governed by the
laws formerly established, save that these took a care ever to
prefer to the magistracy, men of their own adherence. And
amongst many that had the annual office of archon, Pisistratus
also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his
grandfather, who also when he was archon, dedicated the altar
of the twelve gods in the market-place, and that other in the
temple of Apollo Pythius. And though the people of Athens,
amplifying afterwards that altar which was in the market-place,
thereby defaced the inscription, yet that upon the altar that is
in the temple of Apollo Pythius, is to be seen still, though in
letters somewhat obscure, in these words.
Pisistratus the son of Hippias
Erected this to stand
In th' temple of Apollo Pythius,
Witness of his 6oniniand.
And that Hippias being the elder brother, had the govern-
ment, I can affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than
other men. And it may be known also by this: it appears
that of all the legitimate brethren, this only had children, as is
both signified by the altar, and also by that pillar which^ for a
testimony of the injustice of the tyrants, was erected in the
Athenian citadel. In which there is no mention of any son of
Thessalus, or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias which
lie had by Myrrhine the daughter of Callias the son of Hypero-
chidas. For it is probable that the eldest was first married,
and in the forepart of the pillar, his name after his fathers, was
the first ; not without reason, as being both next him in age,
and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed could Hip-
pias have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if
his brother had died, seized of the tyranny, and he been the
same day to settle it on himself. Whereas he retained the
same with abundant security both for the customary fear in the
people, and diligence in the guard ; and was not to seek, like
a younger brother, to whom the government had not continually
been familiar. But Hipparchus came to be named for his mis-
fortune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards, that he was
also tyrant.
This Harmodius therefore that had denied his suit, he dis-
graced, as he before intended. For when some had warned a
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 34i
sister of his, a virgin, to be present, to carry a little basket in a
procession, they rejected her again when she canrie, and said that
thev had never warned her at all, as holding her unworthy the
honour. This was taken heavily by Harmodius ; but Aristogi-
ton for his sake, was far more exasperated tlian he. Where-
upon with the rest of the conspirators he made all things ready
for the execution of the design. Only, they were to stay the
time of the holiday, called the great Panathenaea, upon which
day only, such citizens as lead the procession, might without
suspicion be armed in good number. And they were to begin
the fact themselves, but the rest were to help them against the
halberdiers *.
Now the conspirators for their security, were not many ; for
they hoped that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it
once undertaken, being upon this occasion armed, would assist
in the recovery of their own liberty. When this holiday was
come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the place called
Ceramicum, with his guard of halberdiers, and was ordering the
procession, how it was to go. And Harmodius and Aristogiton,
with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the fact. But when
they saw one of the conspiratorsfamiharly talking with Hippias,
(for Hippias was very aftable to all men) they were afraid, and
believed that they were discovered, and must presently have
been apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible)
to be revenged first upon him that had done them the
wrong, and for whose sake they had undergone all this dan-
ger ; and furnished as they were, ran furiously into the city, and
finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium, without all re-
gard of themselves, fell upon him, and with all the anger in the
world, one upon jealousy, the other upon disgrace, struck and
slew him. Aristogiton, for the present, by means of the great
confluence of people, escaped through the guard, but taken
afterwards, was ungently handled ; but Harmodius was slain
upon the place.
The news being brought to Hippias in the Ceramicum f, he
went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but
presently unto those that were armed for the solemnity of the
shows, and were far off, that he might be with them before they
heard of it, and, composing his countenance as well as he could
to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place, and com-
manded them to repair thither without their arms. Which
they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them
• The g;uard of Hippias the tyrant. ....
t A street w ithout the walls of Athens, where they used to bury their slain in
the wai-s, lib. i. so named from K'.»ccf*tvs, a potter, or as Paus. from one Ceramns.
346 THE HISTORY book vi.
somewhat. But having commanded his guard to take those
arms away, he then fell presently to picking out of such as he
meant to question, and whosoever else was found amongst them
with a dagger : for with shields and spears to be in the head
of the procession, was of custom.
Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon quarrel of
love, and then upon a sudden fear, followed this unadvised ad-
venture of Harmodius and Aristoglton. And after this time
the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been before.
And Hippias standing more in fear, not only put many of the citi-
zens to death, but also east his eye on the states abroad, to see if
lie might get any security fron) them, in this alteration at home.
He therefore afterwards (though * an Athenian, and to a Lamp-
sacen) gave his daughter Archedice unto .-Eantidas the son of
Hippocles tyrant of Lampsacus, knowing that the Lampsacens
were in great favour with king Darius. And her sepulchre is
yet to be seen with this inscription :
Arcliedice, the cJatig-hler of kinj Flippias,
who in his time,
Of all the potentates of Greece was prime,
this dust doth liide.
Daiig-hter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was,
yet free from pride.
And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens,
and was in the fourth deposed by the Lacedemonians, and the
exiled Alcmaeonides f, went under truce to Sigeum, and to
./Eantidas at Lampsacus, and thence to king Darius, from whence
twenty years after in his old age, he came to Marathon with the
Medan army.
The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering
all that they had heard concerning them, were extremely bitter,
and full of jealousyl towards those that had been accused of the
mysterise,and thought all to have been done upon some oligarchial
or tyrannical conspiracy. And whilst they were passionate upon
this surmise, many worthy men had already been cast in prison,
and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily more
savage, and sought to apprehend more still. Whilst they were
at this pass, a prisoner that seemed most to be guilty, was per-
suaded by one of his fellpw prisoners to accuse some body whe-
ther it were true or not true, (for it is but conjectural on both
• A woman of Athens, a city flourishing' for letters aiid civility, to a man of
Lampsacus, a city infamous for barbarity and effeminacy.
-f- A family descended from a noble citizen of Athens named Alcmaeon, who be-
ing in exile, solicited the Lacedemonians to depose the tyrants of Athens.
J The jealousy and passionate fury of the people, in inquiring after the authors
of the offence*, touching the mysteries and Mercuries.
BOOK Yi. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. ap-
sides, nor was there ever then or after, any man that could say
certainly who it was that did the deed) who brought him to it
by telling him that though lie had done it, yet he might be sure
to save his own life, and should deliver the city from the present
suspicion. And that he should be more certain of his own safety,
by a free confession, than by coming to his trial if he denied it.
Hereupon he accused both himself and others for the Mercuries.
The people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they
thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before, to
think that the conspirators should never * perhaps be discovered
to their multitude, presently set at liberty the accuser, and the
rest with him, whom he had not appeached, but for those that
were accused, they appointed judges, and all they apprehended
they executed. And having condemned to die such as fled, they
ordained a sum of money to be given to those that should slay
them. And though it were all this while uncertain, whether
they suffered justly or unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a
manifest ease for the present. But touching xMcibiades, the
Athenians took it extreme ill, through the instigation of his
enemies, the same that had opposed him before he went. And
seeing it was certain (as they thought) for the Mercuries, the
other crime also concerning the mysteries whereof he had been
accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed
by him upon the same reason, and conspiracy against the peo-
ple.
For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about
this, that an army of the Lacedemonians was come as far as the
Isthmus, upon some design against the Boeotians.
These therefore they thought were come thither, not against
the Boeotians, but by appointment of him, and that if they had
not first apprehended the persons appeached, the city had been
betrayed. And one night they watched all night long in their
arms in the temple of Theseus within the city. And the friends
of Alcibiades in Argos, were at the same time suspected of a
purpose, to set upon the people there ; whereupon the Athe-
nians also delivered unto the Argive people those hostages t
which they held of theirs in the islands, to be slain. And there
were presumptions against Alcibiades on all sides ; insomuch as
purposing bylaw to put him to death, they sent, as 1 have said,
the gaily called Salaminia into Sicily, both for him and the rest
with him that had been accused; but gave command to those
that went, not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them, to
make his purgation 3 because they had a care, not to give ocea-
• But only to some few of the great men.
f Three huniired in number, lib. v.
348 THE HISTORY book vi.
sion of stir, either amongst their own or tlie enemies soldiers;
but especially because they desired that the Mantlneans and the
Argives, who they thought followed the war by his persuasion,
might not depart from the army. So he and the rest accused
with him in his own gaily, in company of the Salaminia, left
Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thuria they fol-
lowed no further, but left the gaily, and were no more to be
found ; fearing indeed to appear to the accusation. They of the
Salaminia made search for Alcibiades, and those that were with
him for a while, but not finding him, followed on their course
for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in
a small boat from Thuria into Peloponnesus, and the Athenians
proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned
both him and them to death.
After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily,
having divided the army into two, and taken each his part by
lot, went with the whole towards Selinus and Egesta, with in-
tention both to see if the Egestseans, would pay them the money,
and withal to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians,
and learn the state of their controversy with the Egestseans.
And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand
on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to
Himera, the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily : which
not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyc-
cara, a little town of the Sicanians, enemy to the Egestfeans
and a sea town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, deli-
vered the town to the Egestaeans, whose horse forces were there
with them.
Thence the Athenians with their land men returned through
the territory of the Siculi to Catana; and the gallies went
about with the captives. Nicias, going with the fleet presently
from Hyccara to Egesta, when he had dispatched with them his
other business, and received thirty talents of money, returned to
the army. The captives they ransomed, of which they made
one hundred and twenty talents more. Then they sailed about
to their confederates of the Siculi, appointing them to send
their forces ; and with the half of their own they came before
Hybla in the territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it not,
and so ended this summer.
The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make prepa-
ration for their journey against Syracuse. And the Syracusians
on the other side prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing
the Athenians had not presently upon the first fear, and expecta-
tion of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day more
and more heart. And because they went far from them into
those other parts of Sicily, and assaulting Hybla, could not take
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 345
it, they contemned them more than ever : and prayed their com-
manders, (as is the manner of the multitude when they be in
courage) seeing the Atlienians came not upon them, to conduct
them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, which. were
ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athe-
nians, amongst other scorns, asked them whether they came
not rather to dwell in the land of another, than to restore the
Leontines to their own ?
The Athenian generals having observed this, and being desir-
ous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might
be from the city, to be able in ihe mean time, without impeach-
ment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some con-
venient place to encamp in ; for they knew they should not be
able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if
they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian
horsemen being many, would greatly annoy the light-armed, and
other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there;
whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place where the
horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of, (now the
Syracusian outlaws that were with them, had told them of a
place near the temple of Olympicum, which also they seized) I
say, the Athenian generals to bring this their purpose to effect,
contrived the matter thus : they send a man of whose fidelity
they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian
commanders, no less a friend of theirs.
This man was a Catanaean, and said he came from Catana,
from such and such whose names they knew, and knew to be
the remnant of their well-willers in that city. He told thera
that the Atlienians lay every night within the town, and far from
their arms, and that if with the whole power of their city, at a
day appointed, betimes in the morning, they would come to their
camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians
in, and set fire on their gallies, by which means the Syracusians
assaulting the palisado, might easily win the camp. And that
the Cataneeans that were to help them herein were many, and
those he came from, already prepared for it.
The Syracusian commanders, having been also otherwise en-
couraged, and having intended a preparation to go against Ca-
tana, though this messenger had not come, did so much the'
more unadvisedly believe the man, and straightways being agreed
of the day on which they were to be there, sent him away.
These commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians, and some
other their confederates were come in) appointed the Syracu-
sians universally to set forwards by a day. And when all their
necessaries were in readiness, and the day at hand in wiiich they
were to be there, they set forwards toward Catana, and encamped
350 THE HISTORY
BOOK YI.
the night following upon the banks of the river Simethus, in
the territory of the Leontines. The Athenians upon advertise-
ment that they were set forth, rising with their whole army,
both themselves, and such of the Siculi, and others as went with
them, and going aboard their gaUies and boats in the beginning
of the night, set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes, the
Atheniansdisbarked over againstOlympicum, to make theircamp.
And tlie Syracusian horsemen, who were at Catana before the
rest, finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told
them. Whereupon they went altogether back to the aid of the
city. In the mean time, the way the Syraeusians had to go
being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in
a place of advantage, wherein it was in their own power to
begin battle when they list, and where, both in and before the
battle, the Syracusian horsemen could least annoy them. For
on one side there were walls, and houses, and trees, and a lake
that kept them off; on the other side steep rocks; and having
felled trees hard by, and brought them to the sea side, they made
a palisado both before their gallies, and toward Dascon. And
on that part that was most accessible to the enemy they made
a fort with stone, (the best they could find, but un wrought) and
with wood, and withal pulled down the bridge of the river Ana-
pus.
Whilst this was doing, there came none to impeach them
from the city. The first that came against them were the Sy-
racusian horsemen, and by and by after, all the foot together.
And though at first they came up near unto the camp of the
Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against
tiiem, they retired again, and crossing to the other side of the
Helorine highway, staid there that night.
The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared
to fight, and were ordered thus : the Argives and the Rlanti-
neans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle,
and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half
of the army which stood foremost was ordered by eight in file ;
the other half towards their tents, ordered likewise by eights,
was cast into the form of a long square, and commanded to
observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress,
and to make specially thither. And in the midst of these so
arranged, were received such as carried the weapons and tools
of the army.
The Syraeusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syra-
eusians of all conditions, and as many of their confederates as
were present, by sixteen in file. They that came to aid them
were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the
Geloans, about two hundred ; and of the Camiurina^ans about
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 351
twenty horsemen, and fifty archers. The cavalry they placed
in the right point of the battle, being in all no less than a thou-
sand two hundred, and with them the darters. But the Athe-
nians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down
the army, from one nation to another, and to all in general, he
spake to this effect.
The Oration of Nicias to his Army,
' What need I (sirs) to make a long exhortation, when the
' battle is the thing for which we all came hither ? For in my
* opinion the present preparation is more able to give you en-
* courageraent, than any oration, how well soever, made, if with
* a weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Manti-
* neans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we
* choose, amongst so many and good confederates, but conceive
* great hope of the victory ? especially against tag and rag, and
* not chosen men as we are ourselves, and against Sicilians, who
* though they contemn us, cannot stand against us; their skill
' not being answerable to their courage. It must be remem-
* bered also, that we be far from our own, and not near to any
* amicable lerritor)-, but such as we shall acquire by the sword.
* My exhortation to you (I am certain) is contrary to that of the
* enemy. For they say to theirs, you are to fight for your
* country, I say to you, you are to tight out of your countrv,
^ where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away.
* For many horsemen will be upon us. Remember therefore
* every man his own worth, and charge valiantly, and think the
* present necessity and streight we are io^ to be more formida-
* ble than the enemy.*
Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the
charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that
instant, and the city being near, some of them were gone away ;
and some for haste came in running; and though late, yet every
one, as he came, put himself in, where was the greatest number.
For they wanted neither willingness, nor courage either in this
or any other battle, being no less valiant, so far forth as they
had experience, than the Athenians. But the want of this
made them even against their wills, to abate also somewhat of
their courage.
Nevertheless, though they thought not the Athenians would
have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight on
a sudden, yet they resumed their arms, and came presently for-
ward to the encounter.
And first, the casters of stones, and slingers, and archers of
either side, skirmished in the midst between the armies, mu-
352 THE HISTORY book yi.
tually chasing each other, as amongst the h'ght-armed was not
unlikely.
After this, tlie soothsayers brought forth their sacrifices ac-
cording to the law of the place, and the trumpets instigated the
men of arms to the battle. And they came on to fight, the Sy-
racusians for their country, and their lives for the present, and
for their liberty in the future. On the other side, the Athe-
nians to win the country of another, and make it their own,
and not to weaken their own by being vanquished. The Ar-
gives and other free confederates to help tlie Athenians to con-
quer the country they came against, and to return to their own
with victory. And their subject-confederates came also on with
great courage, principally for their better safety, as desperate if
they overcame not, and withal upon the by, that by helping the
Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjec-
tion might be the easier.
After they were come to handstrokes, they fought long on
both sides. But in the mean time there happened some claps
of thunder and flashes of lightning, together with a great shower
of rain ; insomuch as it added to tlie fear of the Syracusians
that were now fighting their first battle, and not familiar with
the wars ; whereas to the other side that had more experience,
the season of the year seemed to expound that accident ; and
their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of their
enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When
the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians to
give ground, and after them the Athenians also had done the
like to those that were arranged against them, then the rest of
thejSyracusian army was presently broken and put to flight.
But the Athenians pursued them not far, (because the Syracu-
sian horsemen being many, and unvanquished, whensoever any
men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged
upon them, and still drove them in again) but having followed
as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again,
and erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied them-
selves in the Helorine way, and recovered their order as well as
they could for that time, sent a guard into Olympicum, lest
the Athenians should take the treasure there, and returned with
the rest of the army into the city. The Athenians went not to
assault the temple, but gathering together their dead, laid them
upon the funeral fire, and staid that night upon the place. The
next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their
dead (of whom and of their confederates were slain about two
hundred and sixty) and gathered up the bones of their own.
Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty.
And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 353
returned to Catana. For it was now winter, and to make war
there they thought it yet impossible, before they had sent for
horsemen to Athens, and levied other amongst their confede-
rates there in Sicily ; to the end they might not be altogether
over-mastered in horse, and before they had also both levied mo-
ney there and received more from Athens, and made league with
certain cities which they hoped after this battle would the more
easily hearicen thereunto ; and before they had likewise pro-
vided themselves of victuals and other things necessary, as in-
tending the next spring to undertake SjTacuse again. With this
mind they went to winter at Naxus and Catana.
The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an
assembly, and Hermocrates tiie son of Hermon, a man not
otherwise second to any in wisdom and in war, both able for
his experience, and eminent for his valour, standing forth, gave
them encouragement, and would not suffer them to be dis-
mayed with that wliich had happened.
' Their courage,' he said, ' was not overcome, though their want
' of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not
* so far inferior, as it was likely they would have been. Espe-
* cially being (as one may say) home bred artificers against the
* most experienced in the war of all the Grecians. That they
' had also lieen hurt by the number of their generals and com-
* manders, (for there were tiftecn that commanded in chief)
* and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command
* at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful
* leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it,
* to incTease as much as might be, the number of their men of
* arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of
* discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the
* enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order,
* would be learnt by practice ; and both of these would still
* grow greater; skill, by practising with danger: and their
* courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of
* skill. And for their generals they ought to choose them few
' and absolute, and to take an oath unto them, to let them
* lead the army whithersoever they thought best. For by this
* means, both the things that require secrecy would the better
* be concealed, and all things would be put in readiness with
* order, and less tergiversation.'
The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that
he advised, and elected three generals, him, Heraclides the
son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Exegestus. They
sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedemon, as well to
obtain a league with them, as also to persuade the Lacedemo-
nians to make a hotter war against the Athenians^ and to declare
A a
354 THE HISTORY book vi.
themselves in the quarrel of the Syracusians, thereby either to
withdraw them from Sicily, or to make them the less able to
send supply to their army which was there already.
The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messana to
receive it by treason of some within, but the plot came not to
effect. For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge,
being resolved to fly, and knowing what was to be done, dis-
covered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messana,
who with those of their faction slew such as were accused ; and
being armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to have
the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians after thirteen
days stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also
failing, and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxus ; and
having fortified their camp with a palisado, they wintered there,
and dispatched a gaily to Athens for money, and horsemen to
be with them early in the spring.
The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city,
all the length of the side towards Epipola?, including Te-
menitis * ; to the end, if they chanced to be beaten, they
might not be so easily enclosed, as when they were in a nar-
rower compass. And they put a guard into Megara, and an-
other into Olympium, and made palisadoes on the sea-side, at
all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians
wintered at Naxus, they marched with all the power of the city
unto Catana, and after they had wasted the territory and burnt
the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before,
returned home.
And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors
to Camarina, according to a league made before in the time of
Laches, to try if they could win them to their side, they also
sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the
Camarinaeans had sent those succours in the former battle with
no great good will, and that now they would take part with
them no longer, seeing the Athenians had the better of the
day, but would rather join with the Athenians upon the former
league. Hermocrates therefore and others being come to Ca-
marina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from
the Athenians, when the assembly was met, Hermocrates de-
siring to increase their envy to the Athenians, spake unto them
to this effect :
The Oration of Hermocrates.
' Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that the
* forces of the Athenians here present may affright you, but lest
• The jiound belonging to the ti-uiple of Apollo.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 355
their speeches which they are about to make, may seduce you,
before you have also heard what may be said by us. They
are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed which you hear
given out, but with that intention which vve all suspect. And
to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leon-
tines, but rather our supplantation : for surely it holdeth not
in reason, that they who subvert the cities yonder, should
come to plant any city here ; nor that they should have such
a care of the Leontines, because Chalcideans, for kindred's
sake, wlien thev keep in servitude the Chalcideans themselves
of Euboea, of whom these here are but the colonies. But
they both hold the cities there, and attempt those that are
here in one and the same kind. For wlien the lonians, and
the rest of the confederates, their own colonies, had willingly
made them their leaders in the war, to avenge them on the
Medes, the Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, to
some the not sending of their forces, to some their war among
themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable crimina-
tions they could get, subdued them all to their obedience.
And it was not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men,
nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head
against the Medes ; but the Athenians did it to make them
serve, not the Medes, but them ; and the Grecians to change
their master as they did, not for one less wise, but for one
worse wise. But in truth we come not to accuse the Athe-
nian state (though it obnoxious enough) before you that know
sufficiently the injuries "they have done; but rather to accuse
ourselves, who tiiough we have examples before our eyes^of
the Grecians there, brought into servitude for want of defend-
ing themselves ; and though we see them now with the same
sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred, and
aiding of their confederates the Egestaeans, prepare to do the
like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better cou-
rage make them to know that we be not lonians, nor Helles-
pontines, nor Islanders, that changing serve always the Mede
or some other master ; but that we are Doriens and free-men
come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free
country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city ?
When we know, that that only way we are conquerable,
and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing
some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to
wear each other out with war, upon hope of their confe-
deracy, and winning others by other fit language, they may
have the power to do us hurt. But we think, though one of
the same island perish, yet if he dwell far off, the danger will
not come to us ; and before it arrive, we count unhappy only
356 THE HISTORY book vi.
him that suffereth before us. If any therefore be of this
opinion that it is not he, but the Syracusian tliat is the Athe-
nians' enemy, and thinketh it a hard matter, that he should
endanger himself for the territory that is mine, I would have
him to consider, that he is to fight not chiefly for mine, but
equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety, for
that 1 am not destroyed before, and he thereby destitute of
my help, but stand with him in the battle. Let him also
consider, that the Athenians come not hither to punish the
Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me,
to make himself the stronger by your friendship. If any man
here envieth, or also fearelh us, (for the strongest are still
liable unto both) and would therefore wish that the Syracu-
sians might be weakened, to make them more modest, but
not vanquished for their own safeties sake, that man hath
conceived a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not
reasonable, that the same man should be the disposer both of
his desires and of his fortune. And if his aim should fail him,
he might, deploring his own misery, perad venture wish to en-
joy my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to
him that shall abandon me, and not undertake the same dan-
gers, though not in title, yet in effect the same that I do.
For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your
own safety you shall defend. And you men of Camarina
that are our borderers, and likely to have the second place of
danger, you should most of all have foreseen this, and not
have aided us so dully. You should rather have come to us,
and that which, if the Athenians had come first against Ca-
marina, you should in your need have implored at our hands,
the same you should now also have been seen equally to
hearten us withal, to keep us from yielding. But as yet nei-
ther you, nor any of the rest have been so forward. Perhaps
upon fear you mean to deal evenly between us both, and
allege your league with the Athenians. You made no
league against your friends, but against your enemies, in case
any should invade you : and by it you are also tied to aid the
Athenians when others wrong them, but not when (as now)
they wrong their neighbours. For even the Rhegians who
are Chalcideans, refuse to help them in replanting the Leon-
tines, though these also be Chalcideans. And then it were a
hard case, if they suspecting a bad action under a fair justifi-
cation, are wise without a reason, and you, upon pretence of
reason, should aid your natural enemies, and help them that
most hate you, to destroy your more natural kindred.
* But this is no justice ; tu fight with them is justice, and not
to stand in fear of their preparation. Which if we hdd to-
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 35
' gather is not terrible, but is, if contrdrily (which they endea-
^ vour) we be disunited. For neither when they came against
* us being none but ourselves, and had the upper-hand in bat-
^ tie, could they yet effect their purpose, but quickly went
' their ways. There is no reason therefore we should be afraid
* when we are all together, but that we should have the better
' will to unite ourselves in a league. And the rather, because
' we are to have aid from Peloponnesus, who every way excel
' these men in military sufficiency. Nor should you think that
* your purpose to aid neither, as being in league with both, is
* either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves. For it is
* not so just in substance, as it is in the pretence. For if
' through want of your aid the assailed perish, and the assailant
' become victor, what do you by your neutrality but leave the
* safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil ?
* Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the
* wTonged, and with your kindred, both to defend the common
* good of Sicily, and keep the Athenians as your friends, from
' an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that to
* demonstrate plainly to you, or to any other, the thing you al-
' ready know, is no hard matter ; but we pray you, and withal,
^ if you reject our words, we protest, that whereas the lonians,
' who have ever been our enemies, do take counsel against us,
* you that are Doriens as well as we, betray us. And if they
* subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet
* they only shall have the honour of it. And for the prize of
* their victor)-, they will have none other but even the authors
' of their victory. But if the victorv' fall unto us, even you
* also, the cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty.
* Consider therefore now, and take your choice, whether you
' will have servitude without the present danger, or saving
'yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a
' master, and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be
' lasting.'
TJiiis spake Hermocrates.
After him, Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians,
spake thus :
The Oration of Euphemus.
' Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet
* seeing we are touched by the Syracusian, it will be necessary
' we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And
* the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself givein, in
* that he said the lonians were ever enemies to the Doriens;
35S THE HISTORY book vi.
* And it is true. For being lonians, we have endeavoured to
* find out some means or other how best to free ourselves from
* subjection to the Peloponnesians, that are Doriens, more in
* number than we, and dwelling near us. After the Medan
* war, having gotten us a navy, we were delivered thereby from
' the command and leading of the Lacedemonians ; there being
' no cause why they should rather be leaders of us than we of
* them, save only that they were then the stronger. And when
' we were made commanders of those Grecians which before
* lived under the king, we took upon us the government of
' them, because we thought, that having power in our hands to
' defend ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the
' Peloponnesians. And to say truth, we subjected the lonians
* and Islanders, (whom the Syracusians say we brought into
* bondage being our kindred) not without just cause : for they
* came with the Medes against ours their mother city, and for
* fear of losing their wealth, durst not revolt as we did, that
* abandoned our very city. But as they were content to serve,
^ so they would have imposed the same condition upon us. For
< these causes we took upon us our dominion over them, both
* as worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet
' and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians :
* whereas they with the like promptness in favour of the Medes,
* did us hurt : and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a
' strength against the Peloponnesians. And follow any other
* we will not, seeing we alone have pulled down the Barbarian,
* (and therefore have right to command) or at least have put
* ourselves into danger more for the liberty of the Peloponne-
* sians, than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides.
* Now to seek means for ones own preservation is a thing un-
* blameable. And as it is for our own safeties cause that we
* are now liere, so also we find that the same will be profitable
* for you. Which we will make plain, from those very things
* which they accuse, and you as most formidable suspect us of;
' being assured that such as suspect with vehement fear, though
' they may be won for the ])resent with the sweetness of an
* oration, yet wlien the matter comes to performance, will then
* do as shall be most for their turn. We have told you that
' we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; and that upon the
* same cause we come hither now by the lielp of our friends, to
* assure the cities here, and not to bring you into subjection,
* but rather to keep you from it.
* And let no man object that we be solicitous for those that
* are nothing to us. For as long as you be preserved, and able
* to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less
* annoyed by their sending of forces to the Peloponnesians.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 359
And in this point yoii are very much unto us. For the same
reason it is meet also that we replant the Leontines, not
to subject them, as their kindred in Euboea, but to make
them puissant as we can ; that being near, they may from
their own territory weaken the Syracusians in our behalf. For
as for our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies
without their help. And the Chalcidean, (whom having
made a slave yonder, the Syracusian said, we absurdly pretend
to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there
without arms, paying money only ; but the Leontines, and
other our friends here, are the most profitable to us, when they
are most in liberty.
* Now to a tyrant, or city that reigneth, nothing can be
thought absurd, if profitable, nor any man a friend that may
not be trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, according to
the several occasions. But here it is for our benefit not to
weaken our friends, but by our friends' strength to weaken our
enemies. This you must needs believe, in as much as yon«-
der also, we so command over our confederates, as every of
them may be most useful to us. The Chians and Methym-
naeans redeem their liberty with providing us some galUes :
the most of the rest with a tribute of money, somewhat more
pressing. Some again of our confederates are absolutely
free, notwithstanding that they be islanders, and easy to be
subdued. The reason whereof is this, they are situate in
places commodious about Peloponnesus. It it probable there-
fore that here also we will so order our affairs, as shall be
most for our own turn, and most according to our fear
(as we told you) of the Syracusians. For they affect a domi-
nion over you ; and having by advantage of your suspicion of
us, drawn you to their side, will themselves by force, or, (if
we go home without effect) by your want of friends, have the
sole command of Sicily, which, if you join with them, must
of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy for us
to bring so great forces again together, nor will the S\Tacu-
sians want strength to subdue you if we be absent. Him
that thinketh otherwise, the thing itself convinceth : for when
you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you pre-
tended was only this, that if we neglected you, the Syracu-
sians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of
the danger. And it were unjust that the argument, you
would needs have to prevail then with us, should now have
no effect on yourselves; or that you should be jealous
of the much strength we bring against the power of the
SjTacusiaqs, when much rather you should give the less
360 THE HISTORY book vi.
* ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here with-
' out you ; and if becoming perfidious, we should subdue
* these states, yet we are unable to hold them ; both in
' respect of the length of the voyage, and for want of means of
' guarding them, because they be great, and provided after the
* manner of the continent. Whereas they, not lodged near
* you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater
* power than this of ours, will be always watching their advan-
' tages against you : and when an opportunity shall be offered
* against any of your cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they
* have already made to appear, both in their proceedings against
* the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the
' face to move you against us that hinder this, and that have
* hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we on
* the other side, invite you to a far more real safety, and pray
' you not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from
^ one another at this present, but to consider that they by their
* own number have way to you always, though without confe-
* derates, whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again
* to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to
* go away without effect ; or if it miscarry, you will hereafter
* wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can
* no more do you good. But (Camarinseans) be neither you
* nor others, moved with their calumnies. We have told you
* the very truth why we are suspected ; and summarily we will
* tell it you again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We
' say we command yonder, lest else we should obey, and we as-
' sert into liberty the cities here, lest else we should be harmed
* by them. Many things we are forced to be doing, because
' many things we have to bevvare of. And both now and be-
* fore we came not uncalled, but called as confederates to such
' of you as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of what
* we do, nor go about as censors (which were now hard to do)
' to divert us ; but as far as this busy humour and fashion
' of ours may be for your own service, so far take and
* use it. And think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that
' the greatest part of the Grecians have good by it. For in all
* places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that looketh
* to be wronged, and he that contriveth to do wrong, by the
* obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid, and of
* the fear that the other hath of their own danger if we should
* come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against
< his will, the other into safety, without his trouble. Re-
* fuse not therefore the security now present, common both to
* us that require it, and to yourselves. But do as others use to
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 361
' do ; come with us, and instead of defending yourselves always
* against tbe Svracusians, take your turn once, and put them to
* their guard as they have done you.'
Thus spake Euphemus.
The Camarineeans stood thus affected : they bare good will
to the Athenians, save that they thought to subjugate Sicily;
and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders.
Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians that were
near them might as well get the victory as the other, they had
both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved
for the future to help the Syracusians, but underhand, and as
sparingly as was possible ; and withal that they might no less
seem to favour the Athenians than the SjTacusians, especially
after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal
answer unto both. So after deliberation had they answered
thus, ' that for as much as they that warred v, ere both of them
* their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their
* oath, for the present to give aid to neither.' And so the
ambassadors of both sides went their ways : and the Syracu-
sians made preparation for the war by themselves.
The Athenians being encamped at Naxus, treated with the
Siculi, to procure as many of them as they might to their side.
Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the
Syracusians, for the most part held off ; but they tiiat dwelt in
the most inland parts of the island, being a free people, and ever
before dwelling in villages, presently agreed with the Athenians,
and brought corn into the array, and some of them also money.
To those that held off, the Athenians went with their army, and
some they forced to come in, and others they hindered from
receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians. And hav-
ing brought their fleet from Naxus, where it had been all tbe
winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Cataua, and
re- erected their camp formerly burnt by the Syracusians.
They sent a gaily to Carthage to procure amity, and what
help they could from thence : and into Hetruria, because some
cities there had of their own accord promised to take their
parts. They sent likewise to tlie Siculi about them, and to
Egesta, appointing them to send in all the horse they could, and
made ready bricks and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary
for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as intending to
fall in hand with the war early the next spring.
The ambassadors of Syracuse, which were sent to Corinth
and Lacedemon, as they sailed by, endeavoured also to move
the Italians to a regard of this action of the Athenians. Being
come to Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid
3G2 THE HISTORY book vi.
upon the title * of consanguinity. The Corinthians having
forthwith for their own part decreed cheerfully to aid them,
sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these toLacede-
mon, to help them to persuade the Lacedemonians both to make a
more open war against the Athenians at home, and to send
some forces also into Sicily.
At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedemon
from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow fugi-
tives ; who presently upon their escape, passed over from Thu-
ria first to Cyllene the haven of the Eleans in a ship, and after-
wards went thence to Lacedemon, sent for by the Lacedemo-
nians themselves under public security : for he feared them for
his doings about Mantinea. And it fell out, that in the as-
sembly of the Lacedemonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians,
and Alcibiades, made all of them the same request. Now the
Ephores and magistrates, though intending to send ambassa-
dors to Syracuse, to hinder them from compounding with the
Athenians, being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades
stood forth and sharpened the Lacedemonians, inciting them
with words to this effect :
The Orniion of Alcibiades.
^ It will be necessary that I say something first concerning
' mine own accusation, lest through jealousy of me you bring
* a prejudicate ear to the common business. My ancestors
* having on a certain quarrel renounced the office f of receiving
* you, I was the man that restored the same again, and shewed
* you all possible respect, both otherwise, and in the matter %
' of your loss at Pylus. Whilst I persisted in my good will to
* you, being to make a peace at Athens, by treating the same
' with my adversaries, you invested them with authority, and
* me with disgrace. For which cause, if in applying myself
* afterwards to the Mantinaeans and Argives, or in' any thing
' else 1 did hurt you, I did it justly. And if any man here
* were causelessly angry with me then when he suffered, him
* be now content again, when he knows the true cause of the
' same. Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to
* the people, let him acknowledge that therein also he is of-
* fended without a cause. For we have been always enemies
* to tyrants, and what is contrary to a tyrant, is called the peo-
* Corinth was tlio niollipr city of Syracuse.
■f- nj»5«v/a». The Lacedeiiioiiiaii ambassadors that came at any time to Athens,
were entertained hy his ancestors: this was the office whicli they after upon
a f|uarrel renounced, and Alcibiades sought to repair.
j He favoured their prisoners taken there, and imprisoned at Athens.
ooK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 3G3
pie ; and from thence hath continued our adherence' to
the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it
was necessary in most things to follow the present course ;
nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than
suiteth with the now headstrong humour of the people. But
others there have been both formerly and now, that have in-
cited the common people to worse tilings than I, and they are
those that have also driven out me. But as for us, when we
had the charge of the whole, we thought it reason, by
what form it was grown most great and most free, and in
which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though
such of us as have judgment, do know well enough what the
democracy is, and I no less than another, (insomuch as I
could inveigh against it, but of confessed madness nothing
can be said that is new) yet we thought it not safe to change
it, when you our enemies were so near us. Thus stands the
matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what
we are to consult of both vou and I, if I know anv thing which
yourselves do not, hear it now. We made this voyage into
Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians ; after them,
the Italians; after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage,
and Carthage itself. If these, or most of these enterprises suc-
ceeded, then next we would have undertaken Peloponnesus,
with the accession both of the Greek forces there, and with
many mercenary Barbarians, Iberians, and others of those parts,
confessed to be the most warlike of the Barbarians that are
now. We should also have built many gallies, besides these
which we have already, (there being plenty of timber in Italy)
with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also tak-
ing the cities thereof with our land forces, upon such oc-
casions as should arise from the land, some by assault, and
some by siege, we hoped easily to have debellcd it, and after-
wards to have gotten the dominion of all Greece. As for
money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we
should have conquered there, besides what here we should
have found, would sufficiently have furnished us.
* Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have
heard what is the design of the fleet now gone, and which
the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in exe-
cution.
* Understand next, that unless you aid them, they yonder
cannot possibly holdout. For the Sicilians, though inexpert,
if many of them unite, may well subsist ; but that the Syra-
cusians alone, with their whole power already beaten, and
withal kept from the use of the sea, should withstand the
forces of the Athenians already there, is a thing impossible.
364 THE HISTORY book vi.
And if their city should be taken, all Sicily Is had, and soon
after Italy also, and the danger from thence, which I fore-
told you, would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no
man therefore think that lie now consulteth of Sicily only, but
also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed. Let the
army you send be of such, as being aboard, may row,
and landing, presently be armed. And (which I think more
profitable than the army itself) send a Spartan for com-
mander, both to train the soldiers already there, and to com-
pel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends
be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful, come to
you with the more assurance. It were also good to make
war more openly upon them here, that the Syracusians see-
ing your care, may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be
less able to send supply to their army. You ought like-
wise to fortify Decelea in the territory of Athens, a thing
which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for
the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war. And
the way to hurt an enemy most, is to know certainly what
he most feareth, and to bring the same upon him. For
in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most, as having
the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for
the commodities which yourselves shall reap, and deprive the
enemy of by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you
up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished
withal, will come most of it unto you, partly taken, and
partly of its own accord. The revenue of the silver mines in
Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they have from their
land, or from their courts of justice *, will presently be lost.
And which is worst, their confederates will be remiss in
bringing in their revenue, and will care little for the Athe-
nians, if they believe once that you follow the war to the ut-
most.
* That any of these things be put in act speedily and ear-
nestly, (men of Lacedemon) it resteth only on yourselves :
for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things
are possible to be done. Now I must crave this, that I be
neither the worse esteemed, for that having once been
thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the
greatest enemies of the same, against it; nor yet mis-
trusted as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive.
For though I fly from the malice of them that drove me out,
I shall not (if you take my counsel) fly your profit. Nor
* As fees and fiiie.«, wliicli wonlii erase in the towns abroad, the enemy con-
tinually lying' upon them, or not be able to be conveyed to the cily.
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 3S6
* are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies,
* as they are that have made enemies of friends. I love not my
* countnr', as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it,
* Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine,
' but that I far rather seek to recover the country 1 have not.
* And he is truly a lover of his country, not that refuseth to in-
* vade the country he hath wrongfully lost, but that desires so
' much to be in it, as by any means he can, he will attempt to
^ recover it. 1 desire you therefore, (Lacedemonians) to make
* use of my service, in whatsoever danger or labour, con6dently,
* seeing you know, (according to the common saying) if I did
* hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much
' when I am your friend. And so much the more, in that I know
* the state of Athens, and but conjectured at yours. And con-
* sidering you are now in deliberation upon a matter of so ex-
* treme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army
< both into Sicily and Attica, as well to preserve the great mat-
* ters that are there, with the presence of a small part of your
* force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians, both
« present and to come; and afterwards to dwell in safety your-
* selves, and to have the leading of all Greece; not forced,
« but voluntary, and with their good affection.'
Thus spake Alcibiades.
And the Lacedemonians, though before this they had a pur-
pose of their own accord, to send an army against Athens, but
had delayed and neglected it, yet when these particulars were
delivered by him, they were a great deal the more confirmed in
the same, conceiving that wliat they had heard, was from one
that evidently knew it. Insomuch as they had set their minds
already upon the fortifying at Decelea, and upon the sending of
some succours into Sicily for the present. And having assigned
Gylippus the son of Cleandridas unto the Syracusian ambassa-
dors for ckief commander, they willed him to consider both with
them and the Corinthians, how best (for their present means)
and with greatest speed, some help might be conveyed unto them
in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him
two gallies presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant
to send, and to have them ready to sail wlien occasion should
serve. This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedemon.
In the mean time the gaily arrived at Athens, which the ge-
nerals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians
upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and horsemen to
the army. So the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of
this war, v^Titten by Thucydides.
366 THE HISTORY book vi.
YEAR XVIII.
In the very beginning of the next spring, the Athenians in
Sicily departed from Cutana, and sailed by the coast to Megara
of Sicily. The inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant
Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out,
and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here they
wasted the fields, and having assaulted a certain small fortress of
the Syracusians, not taking it, they went presently back part by
land, and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And landing
again in the plain fields, wasted the same and burnt up their
corn ; and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew
some of them ; and having set up a trophy, went all again aboard
their gallies. Thence they returned to Catana, and took in
victual. Then with their whole army they went to Centoripa,
a small city of the Siculi, which yielding on composition, they
departed, and in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessseans
and the Hyblyeans. Being come again to Catana, they
find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens
without horses, though not without the furniture, supposing to
have horses there; and thirty archers on horseback, and three
hundred talents of silver.
The same spring the Lacedemonians led forth their army
against Argos, and went as far as to Cleona? ; but an earthquake
happening, they went home again. But the Argives invaded the
territory of Thynea, confining on their own, and took a great
booty from the Lacedemonians, which they sold for no less than
twenty-five talents *.
Not long after, the commons of Thespiae set upon tliem that
had t])e government ; but not prevailing, they were part appre-
hended, and part escaped to Athens, the Athenians liaving also
aided them.
The Syracusians the same summer, when they lieard that
the Athenians had horsemen sent to them from Athens, and
that they were ready now to come against them, conceiving that
if the Athenians got not Epipolae, a rocky ground, and lying just
against the city, they would not be able, though masters of the
field, to take in the city with a wall ; intended therefore, lest
the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by
which there was access unto it, with a guard. For the rest of
the place is to the outside high and steep, falling to the city by
degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the eye. And it
is called by the Syracusians, Epipolje, because it lieth above
* Four thousand seven liundrcd and seventeen pounds ten shillings stcrliDg-.
EooK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 367
the level of the rest. The Syracusians coming out of the city
with their whole power into a meadow by the side of the river
Anapus, betimes in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fel-
low commanders had already received their charge) were there
taking a view of their arms ; but first they had set apart seven
hundred men of arms, under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw
of Andros, both to guard Epipolae, and to be ready together
quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of
their service. The Athenians the day following, having been
already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces,
and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon (six or seven
furlongs from Epipolae) unperceived, and laid their navy at an-
chor under Thapsus. Thapsus is almost an island, lying out
into the sea, and joined to the land with a narrow isthmus, not
far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces
of the Athenians, having made a palisade across the said isth-
mus, lay there quiet. But the land soldiers marched at high
speed toward Epipolae, and got up by Euxyalus before the Sy-
racusians could come to them from out of the meadow where
they were mustering. Nevertheless they came on, every one
with what speed he could, not only Diomilus with his seven
hundred, but the rest also. They had no less to go from the
meadow than twenty-five furlongs, before they could reach the
enemy : the Syracusians therefore coming up in this manner,
and thereby defeated in battle at Epipolae, withdrew themselves
into the city. But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the
rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and delivered to
the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce, and came
down the next day to the city. But when none came out to
give them battle, they retired again, and built a fort upon Lab-
dalum, in the very brink of the precipices of Epipolae, on the
side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to keep their
utensils and money in when they went out either to tight or
to work.
Not long after there came unto them from Egesta, three
hundred horsemen : and from the Siculi, namely the Naxians
and some others, about one hundred : and the Athenians had
of their own two hundred and fifty : for which they had horses,
part from the Egestaeans and Catanfeans, and part they bought.
So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty
horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians
went dovvn to Syca*, and raised there a wall in circle very
quickly, so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with
the celerity of the work. Who therefore coming forth, intended
t Tyca, or Tjcha. It was a temple of fortune, part of the city of Syracnsc.
368 THE HISTORY book vi.
to have given them battle, and no longer to have neglected the
matter. But when the armies were one set against the other,
the Syracusian generals perceiving their own to be in disarray,
and not easily to be imbattled, led them again into the city,
save only a certain part of their horsemen, which staying, kept
the Athenians from carrying of stone, and straggling far abroad
from their camp. But the Athenians with one squadron of
men of arms, together with their whole number of horse,
charged the horsemen of the Syracusians, and put them to flight.
Of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle
of horse.
The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall, to
the north side of their circular wall, some building, and some
fetching stone and timber, which they still laid down toward the
place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come,
with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea.
The Syracusians by the persuasion of their generals, and prin-
cipally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with
their whole power against the Athenians any more, but thought
fit rather in the way where the Athenians were to bring their
wall, to raise a counter wall, which if they could but do, before
the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their fur-
ther building. And if the Athenians should set upon them as
they were doing it, they might send part of the army to defend
it, and preoccupate the accesses to it with a palisado. And if they
would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must
they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore
they came out, and beginning at tlieir own city, drew a cross wall
beneath the circular fortification of the Athenians, and set wooden
turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the
ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not
yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Sy-
racusians were masters of the places near the sea ; and the Athe-
nians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.
The Syracusians, when they thouglit both their palisado and
wall sufficient, and considering that the Athenians came not to
impeach them in the work, as they that lieared to divide their
army, and to be tliereby the more easy to be fought withal, and
that also hasted to make an end of their own wall, wherewith
to encompass the city, left one squadron for a guard of their
works, and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athe-
nians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water
to drink was conveyed under ground into the towns.
And having observed also, that about noon the Syracusians kept
within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into
the city, and that such as were remaining at the palisado kept
BOOK VI. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 369
but negligent watch, they commanded three hundred chosen
men of arms, and certain others picked out and armed from
amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly to that counter-wall of
the S\Tacusians. The rest of the army divided in two, went
one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which
might be sent from the city ; and tlie other with the other general
to the palisado, next to the gate of the counter-wall. The three
hundred assaulted and took the palisado ; the guard whereof for-
saking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground, and with
them entered also their pursuers, but after they were in were
beaten out again by the Syracusians, and some slain both of
the Argives and Atheniins, but not many. Then the whole
army went back together, and pulled down the wall, and
plucked up the palisado, the pales whereof they carried with
them to their camp, and erected a trophy. The next day the
Athenians beginning at their circular wall, built onwards to
that crag over the marishes, which on that part of Epipolte,
looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the
haven for their wall to come through the plain and marish
\vas the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came
out again, and made another palisado, beginning at the
city, through the middle of the marish, and a ditch at the
side of it to exclude the Athenians from bringing their wall
to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their
work, as far as to the crag, assaulted the palis-do and trench of
the Syracusians again. And having commanded their gallics to
be brought about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syra-
cirsa, about break of day, went straight down into the plain ;
and passing through the marish, where the ground was clay,
and firmest, and partly upon boards and planks, won both the
trench and palisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morn-
ing, and the rest not long after. And here also they fought, and
the victory fell to the Athenians. The Syracusians, those of
the right wing, fled to the city; and they of the left, to the river.
The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their
passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge * ; but the
Syracusians fearing to be prevented (for most of the horsemen
were in this number) set upon these three hundred, and putting
them to flight, drove them upon the right wing of the Athe-
nians, and following, affrighted also the foremost guard of the
wing. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them with a few
archers from the left wing of their own, and with all the xArgives ;
and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was
deserted and slain, with some six or seven more. These the
• Thp bridf e of the river Anapui.
Bb
370 THE HISTORY book vii.
Syracusians hastily snatched up, and carried into a place of
safety beyond the river. And when they saw the rest of the
Athenian army coming towards them, they departed. In the
mean time they that fled at first to the city, seeing how things
went, took heart again, and reimbattled themselves against the
same Athenians that stood ranged against them before, and withal
sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortifi-
cation of the Athenians upon Epipolae; supposing to find it
without defendants, and so to take it. And they took and de-
molished the outwork ten plethers * in length ; but the circle
itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it
for infirmity. For he commanded his servants to set fire on all
the engines, and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall,
knowing there was no otlver possible means to save themselves,
want of men. And it fell out accordingly. For by reason
of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athe-
nians having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were
coming up to relieve the circle; and their gaUies withal (as is
before mentioned) were going about from Thapsus into the
great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away,
they, and the whole army of the Syracusians into the city ; with
opinion that they could no longer hinder them with the strength
they now had from bringing their wall through into the sea.
After this the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered to the
Syracusians their dead, under truce ; and they on the other side
delivered to the Athenians the body of Lamachus, and of the
rest slain with him. And their whole army, both land and sea
forces being now together, they began to enclose the Syracu-
sians with a double vvall, from Epipolie and the rocks, unto the
sea side. The necessaries of the army were supplied from all
parts of Italy : and many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof
to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athe-
nians, to whom came also tiiree penteconteri [long-boats of
fifty oars apiece] from Hetruria; and divers other ways their
hopes were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when there
came no help from Peloponnesus, made no longer account to
subsist by war, but conferred, both amongst themselves and
with Nicias, of composition ; for Lamachus being dead, the
sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing
were concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men per-
plexed, and now more straightly besieged than before) were
propounded unto Nicias, and more amongst themselves. And
the present ill success had also bred some jealousy amongst
them, one of another. And they discliargcd the generals under
• Ten plethers, six hundred and eighty cubits, a plether conlaiuing, according
to Suidat, sixty-eight cubits.
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 37]
whose conduct this happened, as if their harm had come, ei-
ther from their unluckiness, or from their perfidiousness, and
chose HeracHdes, Eucles, and Tellias in their places.
Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedemon, and the Corin-
thian gallies were ready at Leucas, purposing with all speed to
go over into Sicily. But when terrible reports came unto them
from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that Syracuse was al-
ready quite enclosed, Gylippus had hope of Sicily no longer,
but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen a Corinthian, with
two Laconic and two Corinthian gallies, with all speed crossed
the Ionic sea to Tarentum. And the Corinthians were to man
ten gallies of their own, two of Leucas, and three of Ambracia,
and come after. Gylippus went first from Tarentum to Thuria,
as ambassador, by his father's right, who was free of the city
of Tarentum ; but not winning them to his side, he put cut
again and sailed along the coast of Italy. Passing by the Te-
rinaean gulf, he was put from the shore (by a wind which in that
quarter bloweth strongly against the north) and driven into the
main sea ; and after another extreme tempest, brought in
again into Tarentum, where he drew up such of his gal-
lies as had been hurt by the weather, and repaired them.
Nicias hearing that he came, contemned the small number
of his gallies, as also the Thurians had before, supposing them
furnished as for piracy, and appointed no watch for them
yet.
About the same time of this summer the Lacedemonians in-
vaded the territory of Argos, they and their confederates, and
wasted a great part of their land. And the Athenians aided
the Argives with thirty gallies, which most apparently broke
the peace between them and the Lacedemonians. For before,
they went out from Pylus with the Argives and Mantineans,
but in the nature of free-booters ; and that also not into Laco-
nia, but other parts of Peloponnesus. Nay, when the Argives
have often entreated them but only to land with their arms in
Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their territory to
return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Py-
thodorus, Laespodius, and Demaratus, they landed in the terri-
tory of Epidaurus Limera, and in Prasia, and there and in other
places wasted the country, and gave unto the Lacedemonians a
most justifiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After
this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their gal-
lies, and the Lacedemonians gone likewise home, the Argives
invaded Phliasia, and when they had wasted part of their ter-
ritory, and killed some of their mea, returned.
THE END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.
THE
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK VII.
CONTENTS.
Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse, checheth the fortune of the AthenianSy
and cutteth off tJieir works with a countertcall. The Lacedemo-
nians invade Attica, and fortify Decelea. The confederates of
each side are solicited for supplies to be sent to Syracuse. Two
battles fought in the great haven ; in the first of which the Syra-
cusiatis are beaten, in the second superior ; Demosthenes arriveth
with a new army, and attempting the works of the enemy in Epi-
poltE by night, is repulsed with great slaughter of his men. They
fight the third time, and the Syracusians having the victory block
up the hat en with boats. A catalogue of the confederates on
each side. They fight again at the bars of the haven, where the
Athenians losing their galli(s, prepare to inarch away by land.
In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally subdued by
the Syracusians ; the death of Nicias and Demosthenes, and mi-
sery of the captives in the quarry ; which happened in the nine-
teenth year of this war.
Gylippus and Pythen having repaired their gallies, from Ta-
rentum went along the coast to Loeri Epizephyrii. And upon
certain intelligence now, that Syracuse was not wholly en-
closed, but that coming with an arniy, there was entrance still by
Epipoloe, they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily
.oij their right hand, and adventure into the town by sea ; or on
374 THE HISTORY book vn.
the left, and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along
both them and as many other as they could get to their side,
to go into it by land. And it was resolved to goto Himera; the
rather because the four Attic gallies wliich Nicias (though he
contemned them before) had now, when he heard they were at
Locri, sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Khegium.
Having prevented this guard, they crossed the streight, and
touching at Rhegium andMessana by the way, came to Himera.
Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himerseans, that
they not only followed them to the war themselves, butalso fur-
nished with armour, such of Gylippus and Pythen's mariners
as wanted. For at Himera they had drawn their gallies to land.
They likewise sent to the Selinuntians to meet them at a place
assigned with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other of
the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many; being
much the willinger to come to the side, both for that Archoni-
das was lately dead, who reigning over some of the Siculi in
those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to
the Athenians, and also for that Gylippus seemed to come
from Lacedemon with a good will to the business. Gylippus
taking with him of his own mariners and sea soldiers, for whom
he had gotten arms, at the most seven hundred, and Hime-
rseans with armour, and without, in the whole one thousand, and
one hundred horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians, with
some few horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi in all, about
one thousand, marched witli these towards Syracuse.
In the mean time the Corinthians, v^ith the rest of their gal-
lies, putting to sea from Leucas, made after as they were, every
one with what speed he could, and Gongylus one of the Corin-
thian commanders, though the last that set forth, arrived first
at Syracuse with one gaily, and but a little before the coming of
Gylippus. And finding them ready to call an assembly about an
end of the war, he hindered them from it, and put them into lieart,
relating both how the rest of the gallies were corning, and also
Gylippus the son of Cleandridas for general, sent unto them by
the Lacedemonians. With this the Syracusians were recon-
firmed, and went presently out with their whole army to meet
him ; for they understood now that he was near. He having
taken Jegas, a fort in his way as he passed through the territory
of the Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolae, and
getting up by Euryalus, where also the Athenians had gotten up
before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall
of the Athenians. At the time when lie arrived, the Athenians
had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards
the great haven, save only a little next the sea, whicli they were
yet at work on. And on the other side of their circle towards
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 375
Trogilus, and the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid
ready upon the place, and the work was left in some places lialf,
and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger that Sy- ^
racuse was now brought into. -^
The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though
somewhat troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive
him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a he-
rald to them, saying, that if they would abandon Sicily withia
five days with bag and baggage, he was content to give them
truce. Which the Athenians comteroniug, sent him away
without any answer. After this they were putting themselves
into order of battle one against another; but Gylippus finding
the SjTacusians troubled, and not easily falling into their ranks,
led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the
Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification.
And Gylippus seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into
the top called Temenites, w here he lodged all night. The next
day he drew out the greatest part of his army, and embattled
them before the fortification of the Athenians, that they might
not send succour to any other place, but a part idso they sent
to the fort of Labilalum, and took it, and slew all those they
found within it. For the place was out of sight to the Athe-
nians. The same day the SvTacusians took also an Athenian
gaily as it was entered into the great haven.
After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a '
wall through Epipola?, from the city towards the single cross
wall upwards ; that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it,
might be excluded from bringing their own wall any further on.
And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their
wall to the sea, were come up again ; and Gylippus (for some
part of their wall was but weak) rising with his army by night,
went to assault it ; but the Athenians also knowing it (for they
lodged all night without the wall) went presently to relieve it ;
which Gylippus perceiving, again retired. And the Athenians
when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part them-
selves, and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their
confederates. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the
place called Plemmyrium, (it is a promontory over against the
city, which shooting into the entrance of the great haven,
streighteneth the mouth of the same) which fortified he thought
would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For
by this means their gallies might ride nearer to the haven * of
the SvTacusians, and not upon every motion of the navy of the
enemies to be to come out against them, as they were before
• Viz. Uic lesser haren.
/
/.
376 THE HISTORY book vii.
from the bottom of the [great] haven. And he had his mind
set chiefly now upon the war by sea, seeing his hopes by land
diminished, since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore
drawn his army and gallies to that place, he built about it three
fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage, and where now also
lay at road both his great vessels of carriage, and the nimblest
of his gallies. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion
of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water,
and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out to fetch in
wood, they were continually intercepted by the Syracusian
horsemen that were masters of the field. For the third part of
the Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a little town called
Olympicum *, to keep those in Plemmyrium from going abroad
to spoil the country.
Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of
the Corinthian gallies, and sent out a guard of twenty gallies,
with order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium, and
the passage there into Sicily.
Gylippus in the mean time went on with the wall through
Epipolcfi, using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians,
and withal drew out the Syracusians and there confederates be-
yond the point of the same, and ever as he brought them
forth, put them into their order ; and the Athenians on the
other side embattled themselves against them. Gylippus when
he saw his time, began the battle ; and being come to hands,
they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the
Syracusians and their confederates had no use at all of their
horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being over-
come, and the Athenians having given them truce to take up
their dead, and erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army,
and told tliem, ' that this was not theirs, but his own fault, who
* by pitching the battle so far within the fortifications, had de-
' prived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters ; and
* that therefore he meant to bring them on again ; and wished
* them to consider, that for forces they were nothing infe-
* rior to the enemy : and for courage, it were a thing not
* to be endured, that being Peloponnesians and Doriens, they
* should not master, and drive out of the country lonians,
* Islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.'
After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought on the
army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it neces-
sary, if not to begin the battle, yet by no means to set light by
the wall in hand (for by this time it wanted little of passing the
point of theirs, and proceeding, would give the enemy advan-
t The temple there aud nltole town was conseciatiMl to Jtipiter Oluniiius.
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECi.'tN WAR. 377
tage both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless
he listed) did therefore also set forth to meet the Syracu-
sians.
Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms farther with-
out the walls than he had done before, gave the onset. His
horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athe-
nians, in ground enough, to which neither of their walls ex-
tended. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charg-
ing upon the left-wing of the Athenians next them, put them
to flight ; by which means the rest of the army was by the Sy-
racusians overcome likewise, and driven headlong within their
fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians brought
up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so as they
could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly unable,
though masters of the field, to enclose the city.
After tiiis, the other twelve gallies of the Corinthians, Ara-
braciots, and Leucadians, undescried of the Athenian gallies
that lay in wait for them, entered the haven, under the com-
mand of Erasinedes a Corinthian, and helped the Syracusians
to finish what remained to the cross wall.
Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily raising forces both
for sea and land, and soliciting to his side all such cities as for-
merly either had not been forward, or had wholly abstained
from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracu-
sians and Corinthians were sent to Lacedemon and Corinth to
procure new forces to be transported either in ships or boats, or
how they could, because the Athenians had also sent to Athens
for the like. In the mean time the Syracusians both manned
their navy, and made trial of themselves, as intending to take
in hand that part also; and were otherwise exceedingly en-
couraged .
Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy,
and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messen-
gers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occa-
sion of every action that passed ; and now es})ecially, as finding
himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those
away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them,
there was no hope of safety : and fearing lest such as he sent,
through want of utterance or judgment, or through desire to
please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they
were, he wrote unto them a letter. Conceiving that thus the
Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could
now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter
into deliberation upon true grounds.
With these letters and other their instructions, the messen-
gers took their journey ; and Nicias in the mean time, having
3/8 THE HISTORY
BOOK VII.
a care to the well guarding of his camp, was weary of entering
^ into any voluntary dangers.
y ^ In the end of this summer, Euetion, general for the Athe-
nians, with Perdiccas, together with many Thracians, warring
against Amphipolis, took not the city; but bringing his gallies
about into Strymon, besieged it from the river lying at Ime-
raeum : and so this summer ended.
J^ The next winter the messengers arrived at Athens; and hav-
ing spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such
questions as they were asked, they presented the letter, which
the clerk of the city standing forth read unto the Athenians,
containing as followeth :
The Letter ofNicias to the People of Athens.
' Athenians, you know by many other my letters, what hath
' passed formerly : nor is it less needful for you to be informed
* of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it at this
' present. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracu-
' sians, against whom we are sent, and had built the walls
' within which we now lie, came Gylippus a Lacedemonian,
* with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of
* the cities of Sicily ; and in the first battle was overcome by
^ us ; but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and
' darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving
* over the walling up of the city, for tlie multitude of our ene-
* mies, we now sit still. Nor can we indeed have the use of
* our whole army, because some part of the men of arms are
* employed to defend our walls. And they have built a single
' wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to enclose
' it, except one should come with a great army and win that
* cross wall of theirs by assault. And so it is, that we who
' seemed to besiege others, are besieged ourselves, for so much
* as concernetli the land. For we cannot go far abroad by
' reason of their cavalry. : They have also sent ambassadors for
* another army into Peloponnesus; and Gylippus is gone amongst
' the cities of Sicily, both to solicit such to join with him in the
' war, as have not yet stirred ; and of others to get (if he can)
* both more land soldiers, and more munitition for their navy.
' For they intend (as I have been informed) both to assault our
* wall by land with their army, and to make trial what they are
* able to do with their navy by sea. For though our fleet
' (which they also have heard) were vigorous at first, both for
' soundness of the gallies, and entireness of the men ; yet our
' gallies are now soaked with lying so long in the water, and
' our men consumed. For we want the means to hale on land
BOOK vu. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 379
our gallies, and trim them, because the gallies of the enemy, as
good as ours, and more in number, do keep us in a continual
expectation of assault, which they manifestly endeavour. And
seeing it is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have there-
fore liberty to dry their gallies at their pleasure.; For they He not,
as we, in attendance upon others. Nay, we could hardly do it,
though we had many gallies to spare, and were not constrained,
as now, to keep watch upon them with our whole number.
For should we abate, though but a little, of our observance,
we should want provision, which as we are, being to pass
so near their city, is brought in with difficulty ; and hence it
is that our mariners both formerly have been, and are now
wasted. For our mariners fetching wood and water, and for-
raging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen ; and our slaves,
now we are on equal terms, run over to the enemy. As for
strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint,
return presently to the cities; and others, having been
levied at first with great wages, and thinking they came to
enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see the enemy
make so strong resistance, both othenvise beyond their ex-
pectation, and especially with their navy, partly take pretext
to be gone, that they may serve the enemy, and partly (Sicily
being large) shift themselves away everyone as he can. Some
there are also, who having brought here Hyccarian slaves *,
have gotten the captains of gallies to accept of them in the
room of themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our
naval strength, i To you I write, who know how small a
time any fleet continueth in the height of vigour, and how
few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course
of a gaily, and how to contain the oar. But of all, my
greatest trouble is this, that being general, I can neither make
them do better, (for your natures are hard to be governed) nor
get mariners in any other place, (which the enemy can do
from many places) but must of necessity have them from
whence we brought those we have, and those we have lost.
For our own confederate cities, Naxus and Catana, are not
able to supply us. Had the enemy but this one thing more,
that the towns of Italy that now send us provision, seeing
what estate we are in, and you not help us, would turn to
them, the war were at an end, and we expunged without
another stroke. I could have written to you otber things
more pleasing than these, but not more profitable, seeing it is
necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here, when
♦ These were they which Nicias upon the taking of Hyccara, made sale of
himself.
S80 THE HISTORY nooK vn.
* you go to council upon them : withal, (because I know your
^ natures to he sucli, as though you love to hear the best, yet
* afterwards when things fall not out accordingly, you will call
* in question tliem that wrote it) I thought best to write the
;- * truth for my own safeties sake. \ And now think thus, that
' though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers,
* in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably; yet
* since all Sicily is united against us, and another army ex-
' pectcd out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we
* have here are not enough for the enemies present forces) either
* to send for tliese away, or to send hither another army both of
* land and sea soldiers, no less than the former, and money not
* a little ; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no
* longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone in the kid-
' ney. I must crave your pardon. I have done you many
* good services in the conducts of your armies when 1 had my
* health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of
' spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have fur-
^ nished himself of his Sicilian aids ; and though those from
* Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look not to it, they will
* get hither partly unseen, as before, and partly by preventing
' you with speed.*
/.
These were the contents of the Letter of Nicias.
The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they
released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present till such
time as others chosen to be in commission might arrive, they
joined with him two of those that were already in the army,
Menander and Euthydemon, to the end that he might not
sustain the whole burthen alone in his sickness. They con-
cluded likewise to send another army, as well as for the sea as the
land, both of Athenians enrolled, and of their confederates.
And for fellow generals with Nicias they elected Demosthenes
the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles.
Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily, about the time
of the winter solstice, with ten gallies and twenty talents of
silver, to tell them there that aid was coming, and that there
was care taken of them.i But Demosthenes staying, made pre-
paration for the voyage, to set out early the next spring ; and
sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should
provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and
gallies, and men of arms.
The Athenians sent also twenty gallies about Peloponnesus,
to watch that none should go over into Sicily, from Corinth or
Peloponnesus. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 381
were come to tbem, and had brought news of the amendment
of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that they had sent
thither those other gallies before ; but now they were encou-
raged a great deal more, and prepared men of arms to be
transported into Sicily in ships, and the Lacedemonians did
the like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians manned
five and twenty gallies to present battle to the fleet that kept
watch at Naupactus, that the ships with the men of arms,
whilst the Athenians attended these gallies so embattled against
them, might pass by unhindered.
The Lacedemonians, as they intended before, and being also
instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon ad-
vertisement now of the Athenians new supply for Sicily, pre-
pared likewise to invade Attica, thereby to divert them. And
Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Decelea,
and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedemonians
were heartened thereunto principally because they thought the
Athenians hasang in hand a double war, one against them, and
another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled down ;
and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in
themselves ; for in the former war the injury proceeded from
their own side, in that the Thebans had entered Plata;a in time
of peace ; and because also whereas it was inserted in the for-
mer articles, that arms should not be carried against such as
would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial
when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their
misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause ; re-
membering amongst others the calamity at Pylus. But when
the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail had spoiled part of the
territory of Epidaurus and of Prasiae, and other places, and
their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in
the country about : and seeing that as often as there arose any
controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the
Lacedemonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it;
then indeed the Lacedemonians conceiving the Athenians to be
in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook
themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter they sent
about unto their confederates, to make ready iron, and all in-
struments of fortification. And for the aid they were to trans-
port in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision
amongst themselves, and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to
do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of
the war, written by Thucydides.
382 THE HISTORY book vii.
YEAR XIX.
The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever be ■
fore, the Lacedemonians and their confederates entered with
their army into Attica, under the command of Agis the son of
Archidamus their king. And first they wasted the champagne
country, and then vvent in hand with the wall at Decelea, di-
viding the work amongst the army according to their cities.
This Decelea is from the city of Athens, at the most but a hun-
dred and twenty furlongs, and about as much, or a little more
from Boeotia. This fort they made in the plain, and' in the
most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and
in sight of the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confe-
derates in Attica went on with their fortification.
They in Peloponnesus sent away their ships with the men of
arms about the same time into Sicily. Of which, the Lacede-
monians, out of the best of their Helots, and men made newly
free, sent in the whole six hundred, and Eccritus a Spartan for
commander. And the Boeotians three hundred, under the con-
duct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegessander a Thes-
pian. And these set forth first, and put to sea at Taenaris in La-
conia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hun-
dred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, aqd part merce-
nary Arcadians, and Alexarchus a Corinthian for captain.
The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went
from Corinth, and Sargeus a Sicyonian for captain. Now
the twenty-five Corinthian gallics that were manned in winter,
lay opposite to the twenty gallics of Athens which were at Nau-
pactus, till such time as the men of arms in the ships from
Peloponnesus might get away ; for which purpose they were
also set out at first, that the Athenians might not have tlieir
minds upon these ships, so much as upon the gallies.
In the mean time also the Athenians, whilst Decelea was
fortifying, in the beginning of the spring, sent twenty gallies
about Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles the son
of Apollodorus, with order when he came to Argos to take
aboard the men of arms which the Argives were to send them
according to league ; and sent away Demosthenes (as they in-
tended before) into Sicily, with three score gallies of Athens,
and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred men of arms
of the roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they could
get, provided by their subject confederates of all other neces-
saries for the war : but he had order to join first with Chari-
cles, and help him to make war first upon Laconia. So De-
mosthenes went to yEgina, and staid there both for the rem-
nant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Ciiari-
cles till he had taken aboard the Argives.
liooK vii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 383
^ I In Sicily about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also
returned to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had
dealt withal, as great forces as severally he could get from them.
And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they
ought to man as many gallies as they could, and make trial of
a battle by sea, and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat
to the benefit of the war, which should be worthy the dan-
ger. Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting
them to undertake the Athenians with their navy, who told
them, ' that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea heredi-
* tary, or from everlasting, but were more inland men than the
' Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the Medes :
' and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are
* most formidable that are as daring against them. For where-
' with they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the
' advantage of power, but coldness of enterprising, with the
' same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies.
*■ He knew it,' he said, ' certainly that the Syracusians by
* their unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy,
* would get more advantage in respect of the fear it would
* cause, than the Athenians should endamage them by their
' odds of skill.' He bade them therefore, ' to make trial of
* their navy, and to be afraid no longer.' The Syracusians on
these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others, if
any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea, and
presently manned their gallies.
Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power
of land soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself
and assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium. Withal the
gallies of the Syracusians by appointment, thirty-five of them
came up towards it out of the great haven, and forty-five more
came about out of the little haven, where also was their arse-
nal with purpose to join with those within, and to go together
to Plemmyrium, that the Athenians might be troubled on both
sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty gallies
to oppose them, with twenty-five of them they fought with the
thirty-five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the
rest went to meet those tliat came about from the little haven.
And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven,
and held each other to it for a long time ; one side endeavour-
ing to force, the other to defend the entrance. ' In the mean
time Gylippus (the Athenians in Plemmvrium being now come
down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the
fight of the gaUies) betimes in the morning, and on a sudden
assaulted the fortifications before they could come back again to
defend them ; and possessed first the greatest, and afterwards
384 THE HISTORY
BOOK VII.
the two lesser : for they that watched in these, when they saw
the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that
fled upon the losing of the first wall, and put themselves into
boats, and into a certain ship, got hardly into the camp ;
for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the
better in the fight upon the water, they gave them chase
with one nimble gaily. But by that time the other two
walls were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were
overcome, and the Athenians which fled from those two walls,
got to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian gal-
lies that fought before the havens mouth, having beaten back
the Athenian, entered in disorder, and falling foul one on an-
other, gave away tlie victory unto the Athenians, who put to
flight not only them, but also those other by whom they had
before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven gallies
of the Syracusians, and slew most of the men aboard them,
save only the men of three gallies, whom they took alive. Of
their own gallies tliey lost only three.
When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian
gallies, and erected a trophy in the little island over against
o jL Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp. \ The Syracusians,
*'*^ • though such were their success in the battle by sea, yet they
won the fortification in Plemmyrium, and set up three trophies,
for every wall one. One of the two walls last taken, they de-
molished, but two they repaired and kept with a garrison.
At the taking of these walls many men were slain, and many
taken alive, and their goods, which all together was a great mat-
ter, were all taken. For the Athenians using these works for
their store-house, there was in them much wealth and victual
belonging unto merchants, and much unto captains of gallies :
for there were sails within it for forty gallies, besides other fur-
niture, and three gallies drawn to land. And this loss of
Plemmyrium was it that most and principally impaired the
Athenians army. For the entrance of their provision was now
no longer safe, (for the Syracusians lying against them there
with their gallies, kept them out) and nothing could be brought
in unto them but by fight, and the army besides was thereby
, otherwise terrified and dejected. .;
^C After this the Syracusians sent out twelve gallics under the
command of Agatharchus a Syracusian. Of which one carried
ambassadors into Pelopormesus to declare what hope they had
now of their business, and to instigate them to a sharper war
in Attica. The other eleven went into Italy, upon intelligence
of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athe-
nians army : which also they met with, and destroyed most of
them ; and the timber which for building of gallies the Athe-
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 385
nians had ready framed, tliey bunied in the territory of Cau-
lonia.
After this they went to Locri, and riding here, there came
unto them one of the ships that carried the men of arms of the
Thespians; whom the Syracusians took aboard, and went
homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them
^ith twenty gallies at Megara, took one of them, and the men
that were in her, but could not take the rest : so that they es-
caped througli to Syracuse.
There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse,
about the piles which the SjTacusians had driven down before
their old harbour, to the end that the gallies might ride within,
and the Athenians not annoy them by assault. The Athenians
having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness, fortified
with wooden turrets, and covered against fire, caused certain
men with little boats to go and fasten cords unto the pile, and
so broke them up with craning. Some also the divers did cut
up with saws. In the mean time the Syracusians from the
harbour, and they from the great ship shot at each other, till in
the end the greatest part of the piles were by the Athenians
gotten up. But the greatest difficulty was to get up those
piles which lay hidden ; for some of them tiiey had so driven
in, as that they came not above the water. So that he that
should come near was in danger to be thrown upon them as
upon a rock. But these also for reward the dixers went down
and sawed asunder. Bnt the Syracusians continually drove
down other in their stead. Other devices they had against
each otlicr, (as was not unlikely between armies so near op-
posed) and many light skirmishes passed, and attempts of all
- kinds were put in execution.
The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corin-
thians, some Ambraciots, and some Lacedemonians, unto the
cities about them, to let them know that they had won Plem-
myrium, and that in the battle by sea, they were not overcome
by the strength of the enemy, but by their own disorder; and
also to shew w hat hope they were in, in other respects, and to
entreat their aid both of sea and land forces, for so much as
the Athenians expecting another army, if they would send aid
before it came, whereby to overthrow that which they hud now
there, the war would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of
Sicily.
' Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to
the succour of those in Sicily were gotten together, put to sea
from iEgina, and sailing into Peloponnesus, joined with Cha-
ricles and the thirty gallies that were with him. And having
taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, came to Laco-
c c
^v
386 THE HISTORY book vii.
nia, and first wasted part of tlie territory of Epidaurus Limera.
From thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against
the island Cythera, (where is a temple of Apollo) they wasted
a part of the country, and fortified an Isthmus there, both that
the Helots might have a refuge in it, running away from the
Lacedemonians, and that free-booters from thence, as from
Pylus, might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining. As
soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on
to Corcyra to take up tlie confederates there, with intent to go
thence speedily into Sicily. And Charicles having staid to
finish, and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards
with his thirty gallies to Athens, and the Argives also went
home.
The same winter also came to Athens a thousand and three
hundred targetiers, of those called Machserophori, of the race of
them that are called Dii, and were to have gone with Demos-
thenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians re-
solved to send them back again into Thrace, as being too
chargeable a matter to entertain them only for the war in De-
celea ; for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the
day. For Decelea being this summer fortified, first by the
whole army, and then by the several cities maintained with a
garrison by turns, much endamaged the Athenians, and weak-
ened their estate, both by destroying their commodities and
consuming of their men, so as nothing more. For the former
invasions having been short, hindered them not from reaping
the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time ; but now, the
enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with greater
forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison mak-
ing incursions, and fetching in booties, Agis the king of Lace-
demon being always there in person, and diligently prosecuting
the war, the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted :
for they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also
above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy,
whereof the greatest part were artificers.
Besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. And by the con-
tinual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to
Decelea, and defending the country, their horses became partly
lamed through incessant labour in rugged ground, and partly
wounded by the enemy. * And their provision which formerly
they used to bring in from Euboea by Oropus, the siiortest way,
through Decelea by land, they were now forced to fetch in by
sea, at great cost, about the promontory of Sunium. And
whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without,
it now wanted, and instead of a city was become as it were a
fort. And the Athenians watching on the battlements of the
BOOK VII.- OF THE GRECMN WAR. 387
wall in the day time by turns, but in the night both winter and
summer all at once, (except the horsemen) part at the walls,
and part at the arms, were quite tired. But that which pressed
them most, was that they had two wars at once. And yet their
obstinacy was so great as no man would have believed, till now
they saw it. For being besieged at home, from the fortification
of the Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined, that they
should not only not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but
have also besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than
Athens, and therein so mucii to have exceeded the expectation
of the rest of the Grecians, both in power and courage, (who
in the beginning of this war conceived, if the Peloponncsiems
invaded their territory, some of them that they might hold out
two years, others three, no man more) as that in the seven-
teenth year after they were first invaded, they should have un-
dertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being every way weak-
ened already by the former war, have undergone anotlier, not
inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians.
Now their treasure being by these wars and by the detriment
sustained from Decelea, and other great expences that came
upon them, at a very low ebb, about this time they imposed on
such as were under their dominion, a twentieth part of all goods
passing by sea, for a tribute, by this means to improve their
comings in. For their expences were not now as before, but
so much greater, by how much the war was greater, and their
revenue besides cut off.
. The Thracians therefore, that came too late to go with De-
mosthenes, they presently sent back, as being unwilling to
lay out money in such a scarcity ; and gave the charge of car-
rying them back to Diotrephes, with command as he went
along those coasts, (for his way was through the Euripus *) if
occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy. He ac-
cordingly landed them by Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some
small booty. Then going over the Euripus from Chalcis ii\
Euboea, he disbarked again in Bceotia, and led his soldiers to-
wards Mycakssus, and lay all night at the temple of Mercury
undiscovered, which is distant from Mycalessus about sixteen
furlongs. The next day he cometh to the city, being a very
great one, and taketh it. For they kept no watch, nor ex-
pected that any man would have come in and assaulted them
so far from the sea. Their walls also were but weak, in some
places fallen down, and in others low built, and their gates
open through security. The Thracians entering into Mycalessus,
spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people without
' The strri^ht bet'.vecu Eii'jcpa nii'l Bicotia.
388 THE HISTORY book vii.
mercy on old or young, but killed all they could light on, both
women and children, yea, and the labouring cattle, and what-
soever other living thing they saw. For the nation of the
Thracians, wliere they dare, are extreme bloody, equal to any
of the Barbarians. Insomucli as there was put in practice at
this time, besides other disorder, all forms of slaughter that
could be imagined. They likewise fell upon the school-house
(which was in the city a great one, and the children newly en-
tered into it) and killed them every one. And the calamity of
the whole city, as it was as gi-eat as ever befel any, so also was
it more unexpected, and more bitter.'- The Thebans hearing
► of it, came out to help them ; and overtaking the Thracians
before they were gone far, both recovered the booty, and chased
them to the Euripus, and to the sea, where the gallics lay that
brought them. Some of them they killed, of tliose most in
their going aboard. For swim they could not ; and such as were
in tlie small boats, when they saw how things went on land,
had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus. In
the rest of the retreat, the Thracians beliaved themselves not
unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they
were charged first ; but running out, and again rallying them-
selves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, de-
fended themselves well, and lost but few men in that action.
But some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they staid be-
hind for pillage. But in the whole, of thirteen hundred there
were slain only two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and
others that came out to help the city, there were slain, horse-
men and men of arms one with another, about twenty ; and
amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of
Boeotia. And of the Mycalessians there perished a part. Thus
went the matter at Mycalessus, the loss which it received be-
ing for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any
that happened in the whole war.
f ■*• Demosthenes going from Corcyra, after his fortifying in La-
conla, found a ship lying at Phia of Elis, and in her certain
men of arms of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. The ship he
sunk, but the men escaped, and afterwards getting another
ship, went on in their voyage.
After this, Demosthenes being about Zaeynthus and Cephal-
lenia, took aboard their men of arms, and sent to Naupactus
for the Messenians. From thence he crossed over to the con-
tinent of Acarnania, to Alyzea, and Anactorium, which be-
longed to the Athenians. While he was in these parts, he met
with Eurymedon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter
unto the army with commodities, wlio told him amongst other
things, how he had heard by the way after he was at sea, that
BOOK vii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 339
the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium. Codod also the
captain of Naupactus came to them, and related that the
twenty-five gallies of Corinth that lay before Naupactus would
not give over war, and yet delayed to fight ; and therefore de-
sired to have some gallies sent him, as being unable with his
eighteen to give battle to twenty-five of the enemy. Where-
upon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent twenty gallies more
to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Ci>-
non himself; and went themselves about furnishing of wl^at
belonged to the army. Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra,
and having appointed them there to man fifteen gallies, levied
men of arms ; for now giving over his course to Athens, he
joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him, in
the charge of general ; and Demosthenes took up slingers and
darters in the parts about Acarnania.
^ . The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which after the taking
of Plemmyrium had been sent unto the cities about, having
now obtained, and levied an army amongst them, were con-
ducting the same to Syracuse. But Nicias upon intelligence
thereof, sent unto such cities of the Siculi as had the passages
and were their confederates, the Ceatoripines, Halicycaeans,
and others, not to suffer the enemy to go by, but to unite
themselves and stop them ; for that they would not so mucii
as offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had al-
ready denied them. When the Sicilians* were marching, the
Siculi t, as the Athenians had desired them, put themselves
in ambush in three several places, and setting upon them un-
awares, and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them,
and all the ambassadors, save only one, a Corinthian, wliich
conducted the rest that escaped, being about fifteen hundred,
to Syracuse.
I About the same time came unto them also the aid of the
Camarinseans, five hundred men of arms, three hundred dart-
ers, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them
men for five gallies, besides four hundred darters, and two
hundred liorseinea. For now all Sicily (except the Agrigen-
tines, who were neutral) but all the rest, who before stood
looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against the Athe-
nians. Nevertheless, the Syracusians after this blow received
amongst the Siculi, held their hands, and assaulted not the
Athenians for a while.
Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army now ready,
crossed over from Corcyra and the continent J with the whoAe
I The continent about Acarnaniu, for there was DcniOitbenes ; and at CorCyta
was Eurvmedou.
i
t L
390 THE HISTORY book vn.
army to the promontory of lapygia. From thence they went to
the Chterades, islands of liipygia, and here took in certain
lapygian darters, to the number of two hundred and fifty, of
the Messapian nation. And having renewed a certain ancient
alliance with Artas, who reigned there, and granted them those
darters, they went thence to Metapontium, a city of Italy.
There by virtue of a league they got two gallies, and two
hundred darters, which taken aboard, they kept along the
shore till they came to the territory of Thuria. Here they
found the adverse faction to the Athenians to have been lately
driven out into a sedition. And because they desired to mus-
ter their army here, that they might see if any were left behind,
and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war,
(and as things stood) to have for friends and enemies the same
that were so to the Athenians, they staid about that in the ter-
ritory of the Thurians.
^ r ' The Peloponnesians and the rest, who were at the same time
in the twenty-five gallies that, for safeguard of the ships, lay
opposite to the gallies before Naupactus, having prepared them-
selves for battle, and with more gallies, so as they were little
inferior in number to those of the Athenians, went to an an-
chor under Erineus of Achaia in Rhypica. The place where
they rid, was in form like a half-moon, and their land forces
they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians
and other their confederates of those parts, embattled upon
the points of the promontory, and their gallies made up the
space between, under the command of Polyanthes a Corinthian.
Against these tiie Athenians came up with thirty-three gallics
from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians
at first lay still, but afterwards when they saw their time, and
the signal given, they charged the Athenians, and the fight be-
gun. Th^y held each other to it long. The Athenians sunk
three gallies of the Corinthians. And though none of their
own were sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which hav-
ing encountered the Corinthian gallies a head, were torn on
both sides between the beak and the oars, by the beaks of the
Corinthian gallies, made stronger for the same purpose. After
they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides chal-
lenged the victory, (though yet the Athenians were masters of the
wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the
Corinthians came not out to renew the fight) they at length
parted. There was no chasing of men that fled, nor a pri-
soner taken on either side, because the Peloponnesians and Co-
rinthians fighting near the land, easily escaped, nor was there
any gaily of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians
were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians presently set up
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 391
a trophy as victors, in regard that more of the Athenian gal-
lies were made unserviceable than of theirs ; and thought them-
selves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the
others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the
Corinthians think they have the better, when they have not
much the worse; and the Athenians think they have the worse,
when they have not much the better. And when the Pelo-
ponnesians were gone, and their army by land dissolved, the
Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia as if the victory had
been theirs, distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians
rid, about twenty furlongs. This was the success of that battle
by sea.
^ Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put
in readiness to go with them seven hundred men of arms and
three hundred darters, commanded their gallies to go along the
coast to Croton, and conducted their land soldiers, having first
taken a muster of them all upon the side of the river Sycaris,
through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river
Hylias, upon word sent them from the men of Croton, that if
the army went through their territory, it should be against their
will, they marched down to the sea side, and to the mouth of
the river Hylias, where they staid all that night, and were met
by their gallies.
The next day embarking, they kept along the shore, and
touched at every town saving Locri till they arrived at Petra,
in the territory of Rhegium.
The Syracusians in the mean time, upon intelligence of their
coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their
navy, and with their new supply of landmen, which they had
gotten together on purpose, to fight with the Athenians before
Demosthenes and Eurymedon should arrive. And they fur-
nished their navy both otherwise, according to the advantages
they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the
heads of their gallies, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to
them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with
rafters fastened to the sides of the gallies, botii within and with-
out, of six cubits long, in such manner as the Corinthians had
armed their gallies ahead to fight with those before Naupactus.
For the Syracusians made account that against the Athenian
gallies not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to
meet the enemy ahead, as upon the side, by fetching a compass,
they could not but have the better ; and that to fight in the
great haven many gallies in not much room, was an advantage
to them, for that using to direct encounter, they should break
with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts
of the gallies of their enemies ; and that the Athenians in tliat
3D2 THE HISTORY book vii.
narrow room, would want means both to go about, and to go
through them, which was the point of art they most relied on.
For as for their passing through, they would hinder it them-
selves as much as they could, and for fetching compass, the
streightness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting
ahead, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters
[to do otherwise,] was it they would now principally make use
of; for in this would be their principal advantage. For the
Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land,
which was but a little way off, and little in compass, near their
own camp, and of the rest of the haven themselves should be
masters, and the enemy being prest, could not choose, thronging
together into a little room, and all into one and the same place,
but disorder one another, which was indeed the thing that in all
their battles by sea, did the Athenians the greatest hurt, (hav-
ing not as the Syracusians had the liberty of the whole iiaven to
retire unto) and to go about into a place of more room, they
having it in their power to set upon them from the main sea,
and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able ;
especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth
not being large. The Syracusians having devised thus mucli
over and above their former skill and strength, and far more
confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them
both with their army and with their navy at once. The land-
men from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and brought
them to t'.ie wall of the Athenian camp, upon the side towards
the city ; and from Olympicum, the men of arms, all that were
there, and the horsemen and light-armed of the Syracusians,
came up to the wall on the other side. And by and by after
came sailing forth also the gallies of the Syracusians and their
confederates. The Athenians that thought at first they would
have made the attempt only with their land men, seeing also
the gallies on a sudden coming towards them, were in con-
fusion, and some of them put themselves in order upon and be-
fore the walls, against those that came from the city, and others
went out to meet the horsemen and darters, that were coming
in great numbers and with speed from Olympicum, and the parts
without. Others again went aboard, and withal came to aid
those ashore ; but when the gallies were manned, they put off,
being seventy-five in number, and those of Syracuse about
eighty. \ Having sjient much of the day in charging and retir-
' ing, and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the
mentioning, save that the Syracusians sunk a gaily or two of
the Athenians, they parted again, and the land soldiers retired
at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The
next day the Syracusians lay still, witliout shewing any sign of
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 893
what they meant to do. Yet Nicias seeing tliat the battle by
sea was with equality, and imagining that they would fight
atrain, made the captains to repair their gaUies, such as had been
torn, and two great ships to be moored, without those piles which
he had driven into the sea before his gallies, to be instead of a
haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres breadth
asunder, to the end of any gaily chanced to be pressed, it might
safely run in, and again go safely out at leisure. In perfonning
of this, the Athenians spent a whole day from morning until
night.
The next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again
with the same forces both by sea and land, that they had done
before, but begun earlier in the morning, and being opposed
fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day now
again, as before, in attempting upon each other without effect.
Till at last Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus a Corinthian, the
most expert master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, per-
suaded the commanders of the navy to send to such in the city
as it belonged to, and command that the market should be
speedily kept at the sea side, and to compel every man to bring
thither whatsoever he had fit for meat, and there to sell it, that
the mariners disbarking might presently dine by the gallies
sides, and quickly again unlocked for, assault the Athenians
afresh the same day.
/J , This advice being liked, tiiey sent a messenger, and the
market was furnished. And the Syracusians suddenly rowed
astern towards the city, and disbarking dined there right on the
shore. The Athenians supposing they had retired towards the
city as vanquished, landed at leisure, and amongst other busi-
ness, went about the dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to
have fought again the same day. But the Syracusians sud-
denly going aboard, came towards them again. And the Athe-
nians in great tumult, and for the most part undined, embark-
ing disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them.
For a while they held their liands on both sides, and but ob-
served each other : but anon after the Athenians thought not
fit by longer dallying to overcome themselves with their own
labour, but rather to fight as soon as they could ; and there-
upon at once with a joint shout, charged the enemy, and the
fight began. The Syracusians received and resisted their charge ;
and fighting as they had before determined, with their gallies
head to head with those of the Atlienians, and provided with
beaks for the purpose, brake the gallies of the Athenians verj-
much, between the heads of the gaUies and the oars. The
Athenians were also annoyed much by the darters from the
decks, but much more by tjiose Syracusians, who going about
394 THIi HISTORY book vii.
in small boats, passed under the rows of the oars of the ene-
mies gallies, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts
at the mariners from thence.
«- The Syracusians having fought in this manner with the ut-
most of their strength, in the end got the victory, and the Athe-
nians between the two ships escaped into their harbour. The
Syracusian gallies chased them as far as to those ships, but the
dolphins hanging from the masts over the entrance of the har-
bour, forbad them to follow any further. Yet there were two
gallies, which upon a jollity after victory approached them,
but were both lost, of which one with her men and all was
taken. The Syracusians after they had sunk seven gallies of
the Athenians, and torn many more, and of the men had taken
some alive, and killed others, retired, and for both the battles
erected trophies, and had already an assured hope, of being far
superior by sea, and also made account to subdue the army by
land. And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.
In the mean time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with
the Athenian supply, being about seventy-three gallies, and men
of arms of their own and of their confederates about five thou-
sand. Besides darters, as well Barbarians as Greeks, not a few,
and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For
the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their con-
federates to see no end of their danger, and that not withstand-
ing the fortifying in Decelea, another army should come now,
equal and like unto their former, and that their power should
be so great in every kind. And on the other side it was a kind
of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was
there before. Demosthenes when he saw how things stood, and
thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into Nicias's case, (for Ni-
cias who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not
presently upon Syracuse, but wintered at Catana, both grew into
contempt, and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus
thither with an army out of Peloponnesus. The which, if Ni-
cias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much
as sent for. For supposing themselves to have been strong
enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak
and the city been enclosed with a wall, whereby, though they
had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did. De-
mosthenes I say considering this,) and that he also even at the
present, and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, in-
tended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of
the army. And having observed that the cross wall of the Sy-
racusians wherewith they hindered tlie Athenians from enclosing
the city, was but single, and that if they could be masti.'rs of
the ascent to Epipolae, and again of the camp there, the same
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 895
might easily be taken, (for none would have stood against them)
hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the
dispatching of the war. For either he should have success he
thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away tlie army,
and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians
there with him, and the whole stat€. The Athenians therefore
went out, and first wasted the territory of the SvTacusians about
the river Anapus, and were the stronger as at first, both by sea
and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against
them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olym-
picum.
After this Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which
the Athenians had built to enclose the city withal, with en-
gines; but seeing the engines were burnt by the defendants
fighting from the wall, and that having assaulted it in divers
parts with the rest of his army, he was notwithstanding put
back, he resolved to spend the time no longer, but (having
gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest in commission there-
unto) to put in execution his design for Epipolae, as was be-
fore intended. By day it was thought impossible not to be
discovered, either in their approach, or in their ascent. Hav-
ing therefore first commanded to take five days provision of
victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of cast-
ing weapons, and whatsoever they might need if they overcame,
for fortification, he and Eur}'medon, and Menander, with the
whole army, marched about midnight to Epipolee, leaving
Nicias in the camp. Being come to Epipol* at Euryalus
(where also the army went up before) they were not only not
discovered by the Syracusians that kept the watch, but ascend-
ing took a certain fortification of the Syracusians there, and
killed part of them that kept it. But the greatest number es-
caping, ran presently to the camps, of which there were in
Epipolie three walled about without the city, one of Syracu-
sians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates, and car-
ried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six hun-
dred Syracusians that kept this part of Epipolae at the first,
who presently went forth to meet them. But Demosthenes
and the Athenians lighting on them, though they fought va-
liantly, put them to flight, and presently marched on, making
use of the present heat of the army to finisli what he came for,
before it were too late. And others going on, in their first
course took the cross wall of the Syracusians, they flying that
kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The
Syracusians and their confederates, and Gylippus and those
with him, came out to meet them from their camps : but be-
cause the attempt was unexpected, and an the night, they
43
396 THE HISTORY book vii.
charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced
to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order,
chiefly as having already gotten the victory, but desiring also
quickly to pass through all that remained yet unfoughten with,
(lest through their remissness in following, they might again
rally themselves) the Boeotians withstood them first, and charg-
ing, forced them to turn their backs. \ And here the Athenians
were mightily in disorder and perplexed, so tiiat it hath been
very hard to be informed of any side, in what manner each
thing passed. For if in the day time, when things are better
seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go,
save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto him-
self: how then in a battle by night, (the only one that hap-
pened between great armies in all this war) can a man know
any thing for certain ? For though the moon shined bright, yet
they saw not one another no otherwise than (as by moon-light
was likely) so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were
a friend, or not. And the men of arms on both sides being
not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the
Athenians, some were already overcome, others went on in
their first way. Also a great part of the rest of the army was
already part gotten up, and part ascending, and knew not
which way to march ; for that the Athenians once turned their
backs, all before them was in confusion ; and it was hard to
distinguish of any thing for the noise. For the Syracusians
and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each other, and
received the assailants with exceeding great shouts, (for they
had no other means in the night to express themselves.) And
the Athenians sought each other, and took for enemies all be-
fore them, though friends, and of the number of those that fled.
And by often asking the word, there being no other means of
distinction, all asking at once, they both made a great deal of
stir amongst themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy.
But they did not in like manner know the word of the Syracu-
sians, because these being victorious and undistracted, knew
one another better. So that when they lighted on any num-
ber of the enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the
enemy escaped, as knowing the watch-word ; but they, when
they could not answer, were slain. But that which hurt them
most was the tunc of the Pu?an *, which being in both armies
the same, drove them to their wits end. For the Argives and
Corcyrteans, and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians
part, when they sounded the Paean, terrified the Athenians on
♦ A liyiTiu with IninipcU or other loud music, hoth before arul after battle.
BOOK VII. OF THE GRFXIAN WAR. 397
one side, and the enemy terrified them with the like on the
other side. Wherefore at the last falling one upon another in
divers parts of the army, friends against friends, and country-
men against countrymen, they not only terrified each other,
but came to hand-strokes, and could hardly again be parted.
As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from
Epipolae, by which they were to go back, being but streight,
many of them threw themselves down from the rocks and died
so ; and of the rest that got down safely into the plain, though
the greatest part, and all that were of the old army, by tlieir
knowledge of the country, escaped into the camp, yet of these
that came last, some lost their way, and straying in the fields,
when the day came on, were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen
tjiat ranged the country about.
The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies, one in
Epipolffi at the ascent, and another where the first check was
given by the Boeotians. The Athenians received their dead
under truce ; and many there were that died, both of them-
selves and of their confederates. But the arms taken, were
more than for the number of the slain : for of such as were
forced to quit their bucklers, and leap down from the rocks,
though some perished, yet some there also were that es-
caped.
After this, the Syracusians having by such unlocked few
prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with
fifteen gallies to Agrigentum being in sedition, to bring that
city if they could to their obedience. And Gylippus went
again to the Sicilian cities by land, to raise yet another army,
as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by assault,
considering how the matter had gone in Epipolae.
In the mean time the Athenian generals went to council
upon their late overthrow, and present general weakness of the
array. For they saw, not only that their designs prospered not,
but that the soldiers ako were weary of staying. For they
v>^ere troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause ;
this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and
the place where they lay moorish and noisome. And all tilings
else appeared desperate.
Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer ; and since the
execution of his design at Epipolae had failed, delivered his
opinion ' for going out of the haven whilst the seas were open,
* and whilst, at least with this addition of gallies, they were
* stronger than the army of the enemy. For it was better,' he
said, * for the city to make war upon those which fortify
* against them at home, than against the Syracusians, seeing
' they cannot now be easily overcome ; and there was no rea-
398 ■ THE HISTORY
TOOK vir.
' son why they should spend much money in lying before the
* city.' This was the opinion of Demosthenes.
i Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was un-
willing to have their weakness discovered, and by decreeing of
their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known
the same to the enemy. For if at any time they had a mind
to be gone, tliey should then be less able to do it secretly. Be-
sides, the estate of the enemy, in as much as he understood it
better than the rest, put him into some iiope that it might yet
grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege,
especially being already masters of the sea far and near with
their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athe-
nians in Syracuse that desired to betray the state into their
hands, and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered him
not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he
were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did not yet
consider; nevertheless openly in his speech, he was against the
withdrawing the army, and said, * that he was sure the people
* of Athens would take it ill, if he went thence without their
* order : for that they were not to have such judges as should
* give sentence upon their own sight of things done, rather than
' upon the report of calumniators, but such as would believe what-
' soever some fine speaker should accuse tiiem of. That many,
' nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their mi-
* sery, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals
' have betrayed the state, and come away for a bribe. That he
' would not therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so
* well, choose to be put to death, unjustly, and charged with a
* dishonorable crime by the Athenians, rather than if he must
' needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by
' his own adventure. And yet he said the state of the Sy-
' racusians was still inferior to their own : for paying much
* money to strangers, and laying out much more on forts with-
' out and about the city, having also had a great navy a year
* already in pay, they must needs want money at last, and all
' these things fail them. For they have spent already two
* thousand talents, and are much in debt besides. And whenso-
* ever they sliall give over this course, and make pay no longer,
' their strength is gone, as being auxiliary, and not constrained
* to follow the war, as the Athenians are. Therefore it was fit,'
he said, ' to stay close in the city, and not to go away, as if
* they were too weak in money, wherein they were much supe-
* rior.'
Nicias, whenhe spake thus, assured them of it, as knowing the
state of Syracuse precisely, and their M-ant of money ; and tliat
there were some that desired to betray the city to the Atho-
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 3911
nians, and sent him word not to go. Withal he had now con-
fidence in the fleet, which as being before overcome, he had
not. As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no
means hear of it. But if the army might not be carried away
without order from the Athenians, but must needs stay in Sicily,
then he said they might go to Thapsus, or Catana, from whence
by their land-men they might invade and turn much of the
country to them, and wasting the fields of the enemies, weaken
the Syracusians, and be to fight with their gallies in the main sea,
and not in a narrow (which is the advantage of the enemy) but
in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs, and
where they should not be forced in charging and retiring, to
come up, and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In
sum, he said he by no means liked to stay where they were, but
with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be
gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless
upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth
and procrastination in the business, and a suspicion withal, that
the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he
knew above the rest, and thereupon the xA^thenians deferred their
going thence, and staid upon the place.
In the mean time Gylippus and Sycanus returned unto S\Ta-
cuse. Sycanus without his purpose at Agrigentum (for whilst
he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the
behalf of the Syracusians, was turned into friendship ;) but Gy-
lippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the
men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships
the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out
of Afric. For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyre-
neans having given them two gallies with pilots, in passing by
the shore they aided the Euesperits besieged by the Africans ;
and having overcome the Africans, they went on to Neapolis, a
town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians, where the
passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's
sail over. And from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus.
As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently
prepared to set upon the Athenians both by sea and land. The
Athenian generals seeing them have another army, and their
own not bettering, but growing every day worse than other, but
especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers,
repented now that they removed not before; and Nicias being
now no longer against it as he was, but desirous only that it
, might not be concluded openly, gave order unto all, as secretly
as was possible, to put forth of the harbour, and to be ready
when the sign should be given.
But when they were about it, and every thing was ready, the
400 THE HISTORY hook vn.
moon happened to be eclipsed ; for it was full moon : and not
only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the generals
to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and
observations of that kind somewhat too much) said, that it should
come no more into debate, whether they should go or not, till
the three times nine days be past, which the soothsayers appoint
in that behalf. And the Athenians, though going, staid still for
this reason.
4^ / The Syracusians also having intelligence of this, were encou-
raged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more, for
that they confessed themselves already too weak for them both
by sea and land ; for else they would never have sought to have
run away.
Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other
part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on ; but had
rather there-right, and in a place most for their advantage com-
pel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their
gallies, and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when
they saw their time, tlie first day they assaulted the Athenians'
camp, and some small number of men of arms and horsemen of
the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates, and the
Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them
back into the camp. But the entrance being streight, there
were seventy of the horsemen lost, and men of arms some, but
not many.
^'^ The next day they came out with their gallies, seventy-six m
number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eighty-
six; and being come together they fought. Eurymedon had
charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring to en-
compass the gallies of the enemies, drew forth his own gallies
in length more toward the shore ; and was cut off by the Syra-
cusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athe-
nians from the rest in the bottom and inmost part of the haven ;
and both slain himself, and the gallies that were with him lost.
And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased
^ and driven ashore.
y w Gylippus when he saw the navy of the enemy A'anquishcd,
and carried past the piles, and their own harbour, came with a
part of his army to the peer to kill such as landed, and to cause
that the Syracusians might the easilier pull the enemies gallies
from the shore, whereof themselves were masters. But the
Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians, seeing
them coming that way in disorder, made head, and charging
these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimelia. But
when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and tiieir
confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians to help
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR, 401
the Tuscans, and for fear to lose their gallics, fought witli them,
and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew
many of their men of arms, but also saved the most of their
gallies, and brought tliem back into the harbour. Nevertheless
the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the men taken in them.
And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which
blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and
brands set on fire to burn them. The Athenians on the other
side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire,
and having quenched the flame, and kept the ship from coming
^, • near, escaped that danger.
** ^ After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the bat-
tie by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted
above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And
the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of
those footmen which the Tuscans drove into the marsh, and for
those which they themselves put to fliglit with the rest of the
^^ When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their
fleet (for they feared at first the supply of gallies that came with
Demosthenes) the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out
of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they
repented more of the voyage.
For having come against these cities, the only ones that were
for institution like unto their own, and governed by the people as
well as themselves; and which had a navy, and horses, and
greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them
about change of government, to win them that way, nor could
subdue it with tlie greatness of their forces, when they were far
the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they
were then at their wits end. But now, when they were also
vanquished by sea (which they would never have thought) they
,' were much more dejected than ever.
" ' » The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear,
and meditated how to shut up the same, that the Athenians
might not steal away without their knowledge, though they
would. For now they studied not only how to save themselves,
but how^ to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Svra-
cusians conceived (not untruly) that their own strength was at
this present the greater, and that if they could vanquish the
Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it
would be a mastery of great honour to them, amongst the rest
of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part
freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter.
For it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remain-
der of their strength, to sustain the v.ar that would be made
D d
i
402 • THE HISTORY book vii.
upon them afterwards ; and they being reputed the authors of
it, sliould be had in admiration, not only with all men now living,
but also with posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy
mastery, both for tlie causes shewn, and also for that they be-
came victors not of the Athenians only, but many others their
confederates ; nor again they themselves alone, but their con-
federates also having been in joint command with the Corin-
thians and Lacedemonians, and both exposed their city to the
first hazard, and of tlie business by sea performed the greatest
part themselves.
The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of
Ihose which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedemon, were
4''; together at this one city.\ And this number on both sides
against Sicily, and for it, some to help win, and some to help
save it, came to the war at Syi:acuse, not on any pretence of
right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit^or necessity
severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians being Io-
nic went against the Syracusians that be Doric, voluntarily.
With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and
Imbrians, and the iEginetae that dwelt in iEgina then, all of
the same language and institutions with themselves.
Also the Hestiaeans of Euboea. Of the rest, some went with
them as their subjects, and some as their free confederates, and
some also hired. Subjects and tributaries, as the Eretrians,
Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Euboea. Ceians,
Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands. Milesians, Samians,
and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them
as free, not as tributaries of money but of gallies. And these
were almost all of them lonians, descended from the Athenians,
except only the Carystians that are of the nation of the Dryopes.
And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet
they were lonians against Dorians. Besides these, there went
with them jEolians, namely the Methymneeans, subjects to
Athens, not tributaries of money, but of gallies, and the Te-
nedians and iEnians tributaries. Now here Cohans were
constrained to fight against j^Eolians, namely against their
founders the Boeotians, that took part with the Syracusians.
But the Platasans, and only they being Boeotians, fought against
Boeotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cytherians
Doric both, by constraint, bore arms ; one of them, namely the
Cytherians a colony of the Lacedemonians, with the Athenians
against the Lacedemonians that were with Gylippus ; and the
other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives,
not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but
against their own colony the Gelans, which took j^art with the
Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there
BOOK vir. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 4fl&
went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but
that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe
as islanders, by the Athenians who were masters of the sea.
And the Corc}Taeans, being not only Doric but Corinthians,
fought openly against botli Corinthians and SvTacusians, though
a colony of the one, and of kin to the other: which they did
necessarily (to make the best of it) but indeed no less willingly,
in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messe-
nians now so called in Naupactus, were taken along to this war,
and the Messenians at Pylus then holden by the Athenians.
Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advan-
tage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Seli-
nuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of
their army was rather voluntary. The Argives not so much for
the league as for their enmity with the Lacedemonians and their
present particular spleen, followed the Athenians to the war
though Ionic, against Dorians. And the Mantineans and other
Arcadian mercenaries went with him, as men accustomed ever to
invade the enemy shewed them, and now for gain, had for ene-
mies as much as any those other Arcadians which went thither
with the Corinthians. The Cretans and iEtolians were all
mercenar)', and it fell out that the Cretans, who together with
the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part
with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire.
And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain, but most
of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes, and for
good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the
bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians fallen into the same
necessity of seditious times, there went with them to this war,
theThurians, and Metapontians. Of Greek Sicilians, the Nax-
ians and Catanaeans. Of Barbarian, the Egestaeans, who also drew
with them the most of those Greek Sicilians. Without Sicily,
there went with them some Thuscans, upon quarrels between
them and the Syracusians, and some Jiipygian mercenaries.
These were the nations that followed the army of the Athe-
nians.
On the other side, there opposed them, on the part of the Sy-
racusians, the Camarinaeans their borderers. And beyond them
again the Geloans. And then (the Agrrigentines not stir-
ring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians.
These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric.
Then the Himeraans on the side that lieth to the Tyrrhene sea,
where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided
them. These were their confederates of the Greek nation, within
Sicily ; all Doreans and free states. Then of the Barbarians
404 THE HISTORY took vii.
there, they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athe-
nians. For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedemonians sent
them a Spartan commander, with some Helots, and the rest
freed* men. Then aided them both with gallies and with land
men the Corinthians only ; and for kindred's sake, the Leuca-
dians and Ambraciots. Out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent
by the Corinthians. And Sicyonians on constraint. And from
without Peloponnesus, the Boeotians. To the foreign aids, the
Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every
kind than as much again ; for they got together men of arms,
gallies and horses, great store, and other number in abundance.
And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I
may say, above as much more, in respect of the greatness both
of their city and of their danger.
Jf^^l > These were the succours assembled on either part, which
' were then all there, and after them came no more neither to the
one side nor the other. No marvel then, if the Syracusians
thought it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already got-
ten, they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so
great as it was, and hinder their escape both by sea and
land.
Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the
mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide,
with gallies laid cross, and lighters and boats upon their anchors,
and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary, in case the
Athenians would hazard another battle, meditating on no small
*^atters in any thing.
^'"' The Athenians seeing the shutting up of the haven, and the
rest of the enemies' designs, thought good to go to counsel upon
it ; and the generals and commanders of regiments having met,
and considered their present wants, both otherwise, and in this,
that they neither had provision for the present, (for upon their
resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the
sending in of any more) nor were likely to have for the future,
unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon
their camp above, and to take in some place, no greater than
needs they must, near unto their gallies with a wall, and leaving
some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to
man every gaily that they had, serviceable and less serviceable,
and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out,
if they got the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their
retreat in order of battle, by land (having iirst set fire on their
* Atola/icilus, newly made free, Corinthians, Leucadians, Ambraciots, Area-
dinii mercenaries, Sicyonians.
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 405
navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either Barba-
rian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto be-
fore the enemy. As they had concluded, so they did ; for they
both came down to the shore from their camp above, and also
manned every gaily they had, and compelled to go on board
every man of age, of any ability whatsoever. So the whole
navy was manned, to the number of one hundred and ten gal-
lies, upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acar-
nanians and other strangers, and all things else provided accord-
ing to their means and purpose. And Nicias, when almost
every thing was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected
for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and
yet in respect of the scarcity of victual, desirous as soon as could
be to fight, called them together, and encouraged them then
the f.rst time, with words to this effect :
The Oration of Nkias.
' Soldiers, Athenians, and other our confederates, though the
' trial at hand will be common to all alike, and will concern the
* safety and country, no less of each of us, than of the enemy :
* (for if our gallies get the victor.', we may every one see his
* native city again) yet ought we not to be discouraged, like men
* of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever
' after carry a fear suitable to their misfortunes. But you Athe-
* nians here present, having had experience already of many
* wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along
* with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out
' otherwise in war than one would think ; and in hope that
* fortune will once also be of our side, prepare yourselves to fight
* again, in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see
* yourselves to be.V What we thought would be helps in the
'^ narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of gallies, as
* will be there, and against the provision of the enemy upon
* their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with
' the masters now considered them all, and as well as our prc-
* sent means will permit, made them ready. For many arcliers
' and darters shall go aboard, and that multitude, which if we
* had been to fight in the main sea, we would not liave used,
* because by slugging the gallies, it would take away the use of
* skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to
' make a land fight from our gallies. We have also devised,
* instead of what should have been provided for in the building of
* our gallies against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which
* did most hurt us, to lash their gallies unto ours with iron
* grapnels, whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we may
406
THE HtSTORY
BOOK VII,
keep the galHes which once come close up, from falling back
again. For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a
land fight upon the water ; and it will be the best for us nei-
ther to fall back ourselves, nor suffer the enemy to do so. Es-
pecially, when except what our men on land shall make good,
the shore is altogether hostile^ Which you remembering, must
therefore fight it out to tiie utmost, and not suffer yourselves
to be beaten back unto the shore. But when gaily to gaily shall
once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make
you part, unless you have first beaten off the men of arms of
the enemy from their decks. And this I speak to you rather
that are men of arms, than to the mariners, in as much as that
part belongeth ratlier unto you that fight above ; and in you it
lieth, even yet to achieve the victory, for the most part with
the land men. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal
beseech tliem not to be too much daunted with the losses past,
having now both a greater number ofgallies, and greater forces
upon the decks. Think it a pleasure worth preserving, that
being taken, by your knowledge of the language, and imitation
of our fashions for Athenians, (though you be not so) you
are not only admired for it througli all Greece, but also
partake of our dominion in matter of profit no less than our-
selves ; and for avvfulness to the nations subject, and protection
from injury, more. You therefore that alone participate freely
of our dominion, cannot with any justice betray the same. In
despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often
vanquished ; and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was
at the best, durst never so much as stand us, repel them, and
make it appear, that your knowledge even with weakness and
less, is better than the strength of another with fortune. | Again,
to such of you as are Athenians I must remember this, that you
have no more such fleets in your harbours, nor such able men
of arms ; and that if ought happen to you but victory, your
enemies here will presently be upon you at home ; and those
at home will be unable to defend themselves, both against
those that shall go hence, and against the enemy that lieth
there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of
the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what
intent you came hitlier, and the other part which is at home
shall fall into the hands of the Lacedemonians. Being therefore
in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them j be
therefore valiant now if ever, and bear in mind every one of
you, that you that go now aboard are the land forces, the sea
forces, the whole estate, and great name of Athens. For
which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can never
BOOK VII.
OF THE GRECIAN WAR.
407
' shew it more opportunely than now, wlien he may both help
^ himself with it, and the whole.'
Niclas having thus encouraged them, commanded presently
to go aboard.
Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the
Athenians meant to fight, by seeing their preparation. Besides
they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels
into their galUes. And as for every thing else, so also for that
they had made provision. For they covered the fore-part of
their gallies, and also the decks for a great way with hides that
the grapnels cast in might slip, and not be able to take hold.
When all was ready, Gylippus likewise, and other the comman-
ders used unto the soldiers this hortative.
The Oration of Gylippus, and the Sj/racusiun
Generals.
* That not only our former acts have been honourable, but
* that we are to fight now also for honour, (men of Syracuse,
' and confederates) the most of you seem to know already (for
' else you never would so valiantly have undergone it.) xAnd if
* there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we
* will make it appear unto him better. For wiiereas the Athenians
* came into this country with design first to enslave Sicily, and
* then if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece.
' And whereas already tliey had the greatest dominion of any
* Grecians wliatsoever, either present or past, you, the first that
* ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were every where
* masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall
* in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are
* cut short where they thought themselves to exceed, become af-
* terwards further out of opinion with themselves than they
* would have been if they had never thought so. And when they
* come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come
* short also in courage of the true strength of their forces. And
* this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians.) Whereas
' with us it falleth out, that our former courage wherewith, though
* unexperienced, we durst stand them, being now confirmed,
* and an opinion added of being the stronger, giveth to every
' one of us a double hope. And in all enterprises, the greatest
' hope conferreth for the most part the greatest courage. As
* for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are ac-
' quainted withal, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided
* for them. But they when they shall have many men of arms
' upon their decks, (being not used to it) and many (as I may
408
THE HISTORY
BOOK VII.
term them) land-darters *, botli Acarnanians and others, who
would not be able to direct their darts, though they should sit,
how can they choose but put the gallies into danger, and be
all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion f not
their own ? As for the number of their gallies it will help them
nothing (if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against
odds in number,) for many in little room are so much the slower
to do what they desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our mu-
nition. But the very truth you shall now understand by
these things, whereof we suppose we have most, certain
intelligence.
' Overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties
which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate, not
trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the
decision of fortune as vvell as they may, that so they may
either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward
by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the
worse.
' Against such confusion therefore, and against the fortune
of our greatest enemies, now betraying itself into our hands, let
us fight with anger, and with an opinion not only that it is most
lawful to fulfill our hearts' desire upon these our enemies that
justified their coming hither, as a righting of themselves against
an assailant ; but also that to be revenged on an enemy is both
most natural, and as is most commonly said^ the sweetest thing
in the world. And that they^are our enemies, and our great-
est enemies, you all well enough know, seeing they come hi-
ther into our dominion to bring us into servitude. Wherein if
they had sped, they had put the men to the greatest tortures,
the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and the
whole city to the most ignominious name X in the world. In
regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so tender
as to think it gain, if they go away without putting you to
further danger, for so they mean to do though they get the
victory : but effecting (as it is likely we shall) what we intend,
both to be revenged of these, and to deliver unto all Sicily
their liberty which they enjoyed before, but now is more as-
sured. Honourable is that combat, and rare are thore hazards
wherein the failing bringeth little loss, and the success a great
deal of profit.'
When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians
• 'AKitTdrrai p^t^ffulei. Sucli ns bciiiij upon land, conid nse tlirir tiarls, hut not
tottering- upon tlie water.
t That is, accordiiin^^ to tlie motion of tlie gall.Vj not stedfastly ns upon land.
X 'Hie name of siil)ji»ct.
BOOK vn. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 40^
had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they present-
ly put their men aboard, perceiving the Athenians to do the
same.
Nicias perplexed with this present estate, and seeing how
great and how near the danger was, being now on the point to
put forth from the harbour, and doubting (as in great battles it
falleth out) that somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and
that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him
again all the captains of gallies, and spake unto them every one
by their fathers, their tribes, and their proper names, and en-
treated every one of them that had reputation in any kind, not
to betray the same ; and those whose ancestors were eminent,
not to deface their hereditary virtues ; remembering them of
* their country's liberty, and the uncontrolled power of all men
* to live as they pleased ; ' and saying whatsoever else in such
a pinch men are accustomed, not out of their store to utter *
things stale, and in all occasions the same, touching their wives,
children, and patrial gods, but such things as being thought by
them available in the present discouragement, they use to cry
into their ears. And when he thought he had admonished
them not enough, but as much as the time would permit, he
went his way and drew out those forces that were to serve on
land on the sea side, and embattled them so, as they might
take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby
so much the more to confirm the courage of them that were
aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus, (for
those of the Athenian commanders went aboard) putting forth
of the harbour, went immediately to the lock of the haven, and
to the passage that was left open, with intention to force their
way out./ But the Syracusians and their confederates, being
out already with the same number of gallies, they had before
disposed part of them to the guard of the open passage, and
the rest in circle about the haven, to the end they might fall
upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land
forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the gal-
lies touched. In the Syracusian navy, commanded Sicanus
and Agatharchus, each of them over a wing, and Pythen with
the Corinthians had the middle battle. After the Athenians
were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they
overcame the gallies placed there to guard it, and endeavoured
to break open the bars thereof. But when aften\ards the Sy-
racusians and confederates came upon them from every side.
• 'A{;^«/«X»j'irr. To speak old or stale sentences.
410 THE HISTORY book vii.
they fought not at the lock only, but also in the haven itself.
And the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before
been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on
both sides brought up their gallies to any part they were bid-
den, was very great, and great was the plotting and counter-
plotting, and contention one against another of the masters.
Also the soldiers when the gallies boarded each other, did their
utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could
be used from the decks, and every man in the place as-
signed him, put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many
gallies fallen close together in a narrow compass (for they were
the most gallies that in any battle they had used, and fought
in the least room, being little fewer on the one side and the
other than two hundred) they ran against each other but sel-
dom^ because there was no means of retiring, nor of passing
by ; but made assaults upon each other oftener, as gaily with
gaily, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul. And as
long as a gaily was making up, they that stood on the decks
used their darts and arrows, and stones in abundance, but be-
ing once come close, the soldiers at hand-strokes attempted to
board each other. And in many places it so fell out through
want of room, that they which ran upon a gaily on one side,
were run upon themselves on the other; and that two gallies,
or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of one, and that
the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place
only, but in many together, how to defend on the one side,
and how to offend on the other. And the great noise of many
gallics fallen foul of one another, both amazed them and took
away their hearing of what their directors * directed ; for they
directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art required,
but out of their present eagerness ; the Athenians crying out to
theirs to force the passage, and now if ever, valiantly to lay
hold upon their safe return to their country ; and the Syracu-
sians and their confederates to theirs ; how honourable a thing
to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape, and by
this victory to improve every man the honour of his own coun-
try. Moreover the commanders of either side, where they saw
any man without necessity to row a stern, would call unto the
captain of the gaily by his name, and ask him, the Athenians,
whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to
be more their friend than the sea, which they had so long been
masters of? The Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew
that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to fly, they
» Kiktvf7»i.
BOOK VII. OF THE eRECIAN WAR. 411
would nevertheless fly from the fliers 3 whilst the conflict was
upon the water, the land men had a conflict, and sided with
them in their affections. They of the place contending for
increase of the honours they had already gotten, and the in-
vaders fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For
the Athenians who had their whole fortune at stake in their
gallies, were in such a fear of the event, as they had never been
in the like ; and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight
upon the water with very different passions. For the sight
being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same
part, he that saw their own side prevail, took heart and fell to
calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their
safety ; and they that saw them have the worse, not only la-
mented, but shrieked outright, and had their minds more sub-
dued by the sight of what was done, than they that were pre-
sent in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part
where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so,
as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on
every occasion, agreeable to their expectation, passed the time
in a miserable perplexity. For they were ever within a little
either of escaping, or of perishing. And one might hear in one
and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was
indifferent, at one and tlie same time, lamentations, shouts, that
they won, that they lost, and whatsoever else a great army in
great danger is forced differently to utter. They also that were
aboard suffered the same, till at last the Syracusians and their
confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them
to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them with great cla-
mour and encouragement of their own, to the shore. And the
sea forces making to the shore, some one way and some another,
except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped into
the harbour. And the army that was upon the land, no longer
now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence, all
with shrieks and sighs, unable to sustain what befel, ran part to
save the gallies, part to the defence of the camp ; and the resi-
due, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consi-
der every one of the best way to save himself. And this was
the time wherein of all others they stood in greatest fear, and
they suffered now the like to what they had made others to
suffer before at Pylus. For the Lacedemonians then, besides
the loss of their fleet, lost the men which they had set over into
the island, and the Athenians now (without some accident not
to be expected) were out of all hope to save themselves by land.
After this cruel battle, and many gallies and men on either
side consumed, the Syracusians and their confederates having
the victory took up the \^ reck, and bodies of their dead, and
412 THE HISTORY
BOOK VII.
returning into the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians,
in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought
upon asking leave to take up their dead or wreck, but fell im-
mediately to consultation how to be gone the same night.
And Demosthenes coming unto Nicias, delivered his opinion
for going once again aboard, and forcing the passage if it were
possible betimes the next morning; saying that their gallics
which were yet remaining, and serviceable, were more than
those of the enemy, (for the Athenians had yet left them about
sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty.) But when Nicias ap-
proved the advice, and would have manned out the gallics, the
mariners refused to go aboard, as being not only dejected with
• their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upper
hand any more. Whereupon they now resolved all to make
w « their retreat by land. \ But Hermocrates of Syracuse suspect-
/ *-* ing their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous,
that so great an army going away by land, sitting down in some
part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired
unto the magistrates, and admonished them that it was not fit
through negligence to suffer the enemy in the night time to go
their ways, (alleging what he thought best to the purpose) but
that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out
and fortify in their way, and prepossess all the narrow passages
with a guard. Now they were all of them of the same opinion,
no less than himself, and thought it fit to be done, but they
conceived withal that the soldier now joyful, and taking his
ease after a sore battle, being also holiday, (for it was their day
of sacrifice to Hercules) would not easily be brought to obey.
For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of
them, being holiday, be drinking, and look for any thing, ra-
ther than to be persuaded at tliis time to take arms again and
go out. But seeing the magistrates upon this consideration
thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates not prevailing, of his
own head contrived this. Fearing lest the Athenians should
pass the worst of their way in the night, and so at ease out-go
them, as soon as it grew dark, he sent certain of his friends, and
with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp, who ap-
proaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them
to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians (for
Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence) and
bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night, for that
the Syracusians had beset the ways, but that the next day, having
7JJ had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away .4
^ Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had
been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not pre-
sently, they thought good to stay there that day also ; to the end
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 41S
that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commo-
diouslv as they could, and be gone, leaving all things else behind
them, save what was necessary for their bodies. But Gylippus
and the Svracusians with their land forces went out before them,
and not only stopped up the ways in the country about, by
which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard at
the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to re-
ceive and stop their army in such places as they thought con-
venient. And with their gallies they rowed to the harbour of
the Athenians, and towed their gallies away from the shore ;
some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves
meant to have done : but the rest at their leisure, as any of
them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards
haled into the city.| After this, when every thing seemed unto
Nicias and Demosthenes, sufficiently prepared, they dislodged,
being now the third day from their fight by sea.
It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as
that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and
that instead of their great hopes, they had endangered both
themselves and the state, but also for the dolorous objects
which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of
them in particular in the leaving of their camp. For the
dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the
ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. But
the living that were sick or wounded, both grieved them more
than the dead, and were more miserable. For with entrea-
ties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading
to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fol-
lowers or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their com-
rades, and following as far as they were able. And when the
strength of their bodies failed that they could go no further,
with ah mees, and imprecations were there left. Insomuch as
the whole army filled with tears, and irresolute, could hardly
get away, though the place were hostile, and they had suifered
already, and feared to suffer in the future more than with
tears could be expressed, but hung down their heads and ge-
nerally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else,
but even the people of some great city expunged by siege,
and making their escape. For the whole number that marched
were no less one with another than forty thousand men.
Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he
thought he should have occasion to use, but also the men of
arms and horsemen contrary to their custom, carried their
victuals under their arms, partly for want, and partly for dis-
trust of their servants, who from time to time ran over to
the enemy ; but at this time went the greatest number :
71
414 THE HISTORY book vfi.
and yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn.
For not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp.
Neither were the sufferings of others and that equal division
of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it, in that
we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light
in itself. And the rather, because they considered from
what splendor and glory which they enjoyed before, into how
low an estate they were now fallen : for never Grecian army so
differed from itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to
enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves
themselves, and instead of prayers and hymns, with wiiich they
put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledic-
tions : and whereas they came out seamen, they departed land-
men, and relied not upon their naval forces, but upon their
men of arms. Nevertheless in respect of the great danger yet
hanging over them, these miseries seemed all but tolerable.f
Nicias perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change
that was in it, came up to the ranks, and encouraged and
comforted them, as far as for the present means he was able.
And as be went from part to part, lie exalted his voice more
than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation, and
because also he desired that the benefit of his words might
reach as far as might be.
The Oralion of Nicias to Ids afflicted Army.
^ Athenians and confederates, we must hope still even in our
' present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater
' dangers than these are. Nor ought you too much to accuse
* yourselves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved mi-
*■ series we are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage
' of none of you in strength of body, (you see how I am in my
* sickness,) nor am thought inferior to any of you for prosperity
* past, either in respect of my own private person or otherwise,
* am nevertheless now in as much danger as the meanest of
' you. And yet I have worshipped the gods frequently according
« to the law, and lived justly and unblamably towards men. For
« which cause, my liope is still confident of the future, though
' these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our
^ desert, do indeed make me fear. But they may perhaps
' cease. For both the enemies have already had sulhcient for-
* tune, and the gods, if any of them have been already dis-
' jjleased with our voyage, liave already sufficiently punished
' us. Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we; and
* as their offence, whicii proceeded of human infirmity, so their
' punishment also hath been tolerable. And vvc have reason
y?
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 415
now both to hope for more favour from the gods, (for our
case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred) and also
not to despair of ourselves, seeing how good and how many
men of arms you are, marching together in order of battle.
Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit
down, there presently of yourselves you are a city, such as not
any other in Sicily can either easily sustain if you assault, or re-
move if you be once seated. Now for your march, that it
may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves, making no
other account any of you, but what place soever he shall be
forced to fight in, the same if he win it, must be his country
and his walls. March you must with diligence, both night
and day alike, for our victual is short ; and if we can but reach
some amicable territory of the Siculi, (for these are still firm
to us for fear of the S\Tacusians) then you may think your-
selves secure. Let us therefore send before to them, and bid
them meet us, and bring us forth some supplies of victual.
In sum, soldiers, let me tell you, it is necessary that you be
valiant ; for there is no place near, where being cowards, you
can possibly behaved. Whereas if you escape through the
enemies at this time, you may every one see again whatso-
ever any where he most desires, and the Athenians may re-
erect the great power of their city, how low soever fallen.
For the men, not the walls, nor the empty gallics are the
city.'
Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal about the
army, and where he saw any man straggle and not march in
rank, he brought him about and set him in his place. De-
mosthenes having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as
much to those soldiers under him ; and they marched forward,
those with Nicias in a square battalion, and then tiiose with
Demosthenes in the rear. And the men of arms received
those that carried the baggage, and the other multitude, within
them.
When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they
there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates
embattled against them on tiie bank, but these they put to
flight, and having won the passage, marched forward. But the
Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light-armed
plied them with their darts in the flank. This day they
marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a
certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, they
marched forwards, about twenty furlongs, and descending into
a certain champagne ground, encamped there with intent both
to get victual at the houses, (for the place was inhabited) and
to carry water with them thence j for before them, in the way
;
416 THE HISTORY book vii.
they were to pass for many furlongs together, there was little to
be had. But the Syracusians in the mean time got before
them, and cut off their passage with a wall. This was at a steep
hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with
steep and rocky banks, and it is called Acraeum Lepas. The
next day the Athenians went on. And the horsemen and
darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great
number of both, pressed them so with their horses and darts,
that the Athenians after long fight, were compelled to retire
again into the same camp : but now with less victual than be-
fore, because the horsemen would suffer them no more to
straggle abroad. In the morning betimes they dislodged, and
put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to
the hill which the enemy had fortified, where they found be-
fore them the Syracusian foot embattled in great length above
the fortification, on the hill's side (for the place itself was but
narrow.) The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall, but
the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of
the hill (for they could easily cast home from above) making
them unable to take it, they retired again and rested. There
happened withal some claps of thunder and a shower of rain,
as usually falleth out at this time of the year, being now
near autumn, which further disheartened the Athenians,
who thought that also this did tend to their destruction.
Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part
of their army to raise a wall at their backs in the way they
had to come, but this the Athenians hindered by sending
against them part of theirs. After this the Athenians re-
tiring with their whole army into a more champagne ground,
lodged there that night, and the next day went forward again.
And the Syracusians with their darts from every part round
about, wounded many of them ; and when the Athenians
charged they retired, and when they retired, the Syracusians
charged; and that especially, upon the hindmost, that by
putting to flight a few, they might terrify the whole army. And
for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them ;
and afterwards being gotten five or six furlongs forward, they
rested in the plain ; and the Syracusians went from tliem to
their own camp.
This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes,
seeing the miserable estate of their army, and the want already
of all necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults
of the enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as
they possibly could, not the way they purposed before, but to-
ward the sea, which was the contrary way to that which the Syra-
cusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not
BOOKvn. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 417
towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, Cama-
rina and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as Barbarian,
that way. When they had made many fires accordingly, they
marched in the night, and (as usually it falleth out in all ar-
mies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to aflxight
and terror, especially marching by night, and in hostile ground,
and the enemy near) were in confusion. The army of Nicias
leading the way, kept together and got far before ; but that of
Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed
from the rest, and marched more disorderly. Nevertheless by
the morning betimes they got to the sea-side, and entering into
the Helorine way, they went on towards the river Cacyparis,
to the end when they came thither to march upwards along
the river side, through the heart of the country. For they
hoped that this way, the Siculi to whom they had sent, would
meet them. When they came to the river, here also they found
a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a
wall and with piles. When they had quickly forced this guard
they passed the river, and again marched on to anotiier river
called Erineus, for that was the way which the guides directed
^> I themi In the mean time the Syracusians and their confede-
rates, as soon as day appeared, and that they knew the Athe-
nians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus, as if he
had let them go with his consent, followed them witii speed the
same way, wiiich they easily understood they were gone, and
about dinner time overtook them. When they were come
up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost,
and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other
part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night,
they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horse-
men hemmed them in, and forced them up into a narrow
compass, the more easily now, because they were divided
from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was gone by this
time one hundred and fifty furlongs further on. For he led
away the faster, because he thought not that their safety con-
sisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a speedy
retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose.
But Demosthenes was both in greater and in more continual toil,
in respect that he marched in the rear, and consequently was
pressed by the enemy. And seeing the Syracusians pursuing
him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight, till by
his stay he was encompassed and reduced, he and the Athenians
with him into great disorder. For being shut up within a
place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had
a way open amongst abundance of olive trees, they were charged
from all sides at ojjce with the enemies shot. For the Syracu-
E e
418 THE HISTORY book vir.
sians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon
very good reason. For to hazard battle against men desperate,
was not so much for theirs, as for the Athenians advantage.
Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves
somewhat, because they were loth to wear themselves out be-
fore the end of the business, and thought by this kind of fight,
•v" J_ to subdue and take them alive!. Whereupon after they had
plied the Athenians and their confederates, all day long from
every side with shot, and saw that with their wounds and other
annoyance, they were already tired ; Gylippus and the Syracu-
sians and their confederates, first made proclamation that if any
of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at li-
berty ; and the men of some few cities went over. And by
and by after they made agreement with all the rest that were
with Demosthenes, * that they should deliver up their arms,
^ and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by
' bonds, nor by want of the necessities of life.' And they all
yielded, to the number of six thousand men, and the silver they
had they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets,
and filled with the same four targets. And these men they
carried presently into the city,
Nicias and those that were with him attained the same day
, to the river Erineus, which passing, he caused his army to sit
^ s^ down upon a certain ground, more elevate than the rest j where
\he Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those
witli Demosthenes had yielded themselves, and willed him to
do the like. But he, not believing it, took truce for a horse-
man to enquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and
word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and
the Syracusians, saying, that he was content to compound on
the part of the Athenians, to repay whatsoever money the Sy-
racusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to
depart. And that till payment of the money were made, he
would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated at
a talent. But Gylippus and the Syracusians refusing the con-
dition, charged them, and having hemmed them in, plied them
with shot, as they had done the other army, from every side,
till evening. This part of the army was also pinched with the
want both of victual and other necessaries. Nevertheless ob-
serving the quiet of the night, they were about to march : but
no sooner took they their arms up, than the Syracusians per-
ceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians finding
themselves discovered, sat down again, all but tiiree hundred,
who breaking by force through the guards, marched as far as
f^ , , they could tliat night. And Nicias when it was day led his
^ ' • army forward, the Syracusians and their confederates still press-
BOOK VII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 4t9
ing them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them
from every side. The Athenians hasted to get the river
Asinarus, not only because they were urged on every side
by the assault of the many horsemen, and other multitude, and
thought to be more at ease when they were over the river, but
out of weariness also, and desire to drink. When they were
come unto the river, they rushed in without any order, every
man striving who should first get over. But the pressing of
the enemy made the passage now more difficult : for being
forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and trampled
one another under their feet ; and falling amongst the spears
and utensils of the army, some perished presently, and others
catching hold of one another, were carried away together down
the stream. And not only the Syracusians standing along the
farther bank being a steep one, killed the Athenians with their
shot from above, as they were many of them greedily drinking,
and troubling one another in the hollow of the river, but the
Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their
swords, and those especially that were in the river. And sud-
denly the water was corrupted. Nevertheless they drunk it,
^ foul as it was with blood and mire, and many also fought for
it. f In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and
the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if
any got away) by the horsemen, Nicias yielding himself unto
Gylippus, (having more confidence in him than in the Syracu-
sians) ' to be for his own person at the discretion of him and
' the Lacedemonians, and no further slaughter to be made of
* the soldiers.* Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take
prisoners. So the residue, except such as were hidden from
them (whidi were many) they carried alive into the city. They
sent also to pursue the three hundred which broke through
their guards in the night, and took them. That whicii was
left together of this army to the public, was not much ; but
they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many : and
all Sicily, was filled with them, because they were not taken
as those with Demosthenes were, by composition. Besides, a
great part of these were slain ; for the slaughter at this time
was exceeding great, none greater in all the Sicilian war.
They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in
their march. Nevertheless many also escaped, some then pre-
sently, and some by running away after servitude, the rendez-
vous of whom was Catana.
The Syracusians and their confederates being come together,,
returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the
spoil, into the city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athe-
nians and their confederates, they put themselves into the quar*
4Sai THE HISTORY book vii
ries*, as the safest custody. But Nicias and Demosthenes
they killed against Gylippus's will. For Gylippus thought the
the victory would be very honourable, if, over and above all his
other success, he could carry home both the generals of the
enemy to Lacedemon. And it fell out that the one of them,
Demosthenes was their greatest enemy, for the things he had
done in the island f, and at Pylus ; and the other, upon the
same occasion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly
laboured to have those prisoners which were taken in the
island to be set at liberty by persuading the Athenians to the
peace. For which cause the Lacedemonians were inclined to
love him. And it was principally in confidence of that, that
he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians (as
it is reported) some of them for fear (because they had been
tampering with him) lest being put to the torture, he might
bring them into trouble, whereas they were now well enough ;
and others (especially the Corinthians) fearing he might get
away by corruption of one or other, (being wealthy) and work
them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confede-
rates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes near
unto these, was he put to death; being the man that of
all the Grecians of my time, had least deserved to be brought
to so great a degree of misery. t As for those in the quarries,
' the Syracusians handled them at first but ungently : for in this
hollow place, first the sun and suffocating air (being without
roof) annoyed them one way; and on the other side, the
nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, put them
(by reason of the alteration) into strange diseases. Especially
doing all things for want of room, in one and the same place ;
and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds, or change of
air, or other like accident, lying together there on heaps. Also
the smell was intolerable, besides that they were afflicted with
hunger and thirst. For for eight months together they allowed
them no more but to every man a cotyle J of water by the day,
and two cotyles of corn. And whatsoever misery is probable
that men in such a place may suiFer, they suffered. Some se-
venty days they lived thus thronged. Afterwards retaining the
Athenians and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the army
with them, they sold the rest. How many were taken in all,
it is hard to say exactly ; but they were seven thousand at the
fewest. And this was the greatest action that happened in all
this war, or at all, that we have heard of, amongst the Grecians,
being to the victors most glorious, and most calamitous to the
* \iBeTefiiai. f Sphacterie.
^ A tniali laeasnrs about half our pint.
BOOK vn. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 421
vanquished. For being wholly overcome in every kind, and
receiving small loss in nothing, their army and fleet, and all
that ever they had perished (as they used to say) with an uni-
versal destruction. Few of many returned home. And thus
passed the business concerning Sicily.
THE END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.
THB
HISTORY
GRECIAN WAR.
BOOK VIII.
CONTEXTS.
The revolt of the Athenian confederates, and the offers made by Tis-
saphemes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the lower
Asia, draw the Lacedemonians to the tear in Ionia cmd Helle-
spont. First in Ionia and the provinces of Tissaphemes, icho by
the counsel of Alcibiades and connivance of Jstyochus, hindereth
their proceedings. Alcibiades in the mean xchile to make way for
his return into his country, giveth occasion of sedition about the
government, whence ensued the authority of the four hundred,
tinder the pretext of five thousand ; the recalling of Alcibiades by
the army ; and at length by his countenance the deposing again
of the four hundred, and end of the sedition. But in the mean
time they lose Eubcea. Mindarus, successor of Astyochus, finding
himself abused by Tissaphemes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus
into Hellespont, and there presently loseth the battle to the Athe-
nians before Abydus, being then summer, and the twenty-first year
of the war.
When the news was told at Athens, they believed not a long
time, though it were plainly related, and by those very soldiers
that escaped from the defeat itself, that all was so utterly lost,
as it was. When they knew it, they were mightily offended
with the orators that furthered the voyage, as if they themselves
424 THE HISTORY rook vm.
had never decreed it. They were angry also with those that
gave out prophecies, and with the soothsayers, and with who-
sover else had at first by any divination put them into hope
that Sicily should be subdued. Every thing from every place
grieved them ; and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever
they were in, beset them round. For they were not only
grieved for the loss which both every man in particular, and
the whole city sustained, of so many men of arms, horsemen
and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw Was not left ;
but seeing they had neither gallies in their haven, nor money
in their treasury, nor furniture in their gallies, were even des-
perate at that present of their safety, and thought the enemy
out of Sicily would come forthwith with their fleet into Peirseus
(especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy) and that
the enemy here, would surely now, with double preparation in
every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land, and
be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless,
as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to
stand it out, and getting materials and money where they could
have it, to make ready a navy, and to make sure of their con-
federates, especially those of Euboea; and to introduce a
greater frugality in the city, and to erect a magistracy of the
elder sort, as occasion should be oflfered, to pre-consult of the
business that passed. And they were ready, in respect of their
present fear, (as is the peoples' fashion) to order every thing
aright. And as they resolved this, so they did it. And the
summer ended.
The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the
Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against
them. Those who before were confederates of neither side,
thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the
war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord, as hav-
ing not only every one severally this thought, that had the
Athenians prospered in Sicily, they would afterwards have come
upon them also; but imagined withal, that the rest of the
war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to par-
ticipate. And such of them as were confederates of the Lace-
demonians, longed now more than ever, to be freed as soon as
might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject
to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to re-
volt, as they that judged according to their passion, without
admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they
were to remain with victory. But the Lacedemonians them-
selves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally
from that, that their confederates in Sicily, with great power,
having another navy now necessarily added to their own, would
BOOK vm. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 42§
in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring.
And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without de-
lay to fall close to the war ; making account if this were well
ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers
as the Athenians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put
them into, and also having pulled them down, to have the prin-
cipality of all Greece, now secure unto themselves.
Whereupon Agis their king went out with a part of his army
the same winter from Decelea, and levied money amongst the
confederates for the building of a navy. And turning into the
Melian gulf upon an old grudge, took a great booty from the
Oetaans, which he made money of, and forced those of Pthiotis
being Achaians, and others in those parts, subjects to the Thes-
salians, (the Thessalians complaining, and unwilling) to give
him hostages and money. The hostages he put into Corinth,
and endeavoured to draw them into the league.
And the Lacedemonians imposed upon the states confederate
the charge of building one hundred gallies, [that is to say]
on their own state, and on the Boeotians, each twenty -five ; on
the Phoceans and Locrians fifteen ; on the Corinthians fif-
teen ; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians ten ; and on
the Megareans, Troezenians, and Hermonians ten, and put all
things else in readiness, presently with the spring to begin the war.
The Athenians also made their preparations, as they had de-
signed, having gotten timber and built their navy this same
winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium, that their
corn-boats might come about in safety. Also they abandoned
the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they passed by for
Sicily. And generally where there appeared expence upon
any thing unuseful, they contracted the charge.
Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, there came unto
Agis, about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassa-
dors of the Euboeans. Accepting the motion, he sent for
Alcamenes the son of Stheneleidas, and for Melanthon, from
Lacedemon, to go commanders into Euboea. Whom, when
he was come to him with about three liundred freed men,
he was now about to send over. But in the mean time came
the Lesbians, they also desiring to revolt, and by the means of
the Boeotians, Agis changed his former resolution, and prepared
for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Euboea, and assigned
them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Euboea,
for their governor. And the Boeotians promised them ten gal-
lies, and Agis other ten. Now this was done without ac-
quainting therewith the state of Lacedemon. For Agis, as
long as he was about Decelea with the power he had, had the
law in his own hands, to send what army, and whither he listed,
426 THE HISTORY book mu.
and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this
time the confederates of him (as I may call them) did better obey
him, than the confederates of the Lacedemonians did them at
home. For having the power in his own hands, he was terri-
ble wheresoever he came. And he was now for the Lesbians.
But the Chians and Erythreeans, they also desiring to revolt,
went not to Agis, but to the Lacedemonians in the city, and
with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieu-
tenant to king Darius in the low countries of Asia. For Tis-
saphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians, and promised to
pay their fleet. For he had lately begged of the king the tri-
bute accruing in his own province, for which he was in arrear-
age, because he could receive nothing out of any of the Greek
cities, by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought
by weakening the Athenians to receive the tribute the better,
and withal to draw the Lacedemonians into a league with the
king, and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill, or take
alive Amorges, Pissuthnes his bastard son, who was in rebel-
lion against him about Caria. The Chians therefore and Tis-
saphernes followed this business jointly.
Caligetus the son of Laophon a Megarean, and Timagoras
the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own
cities, and abiding with Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces
came also about the same time to Lacedemon, sent by Phar-
nabazus to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he also, if he
could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt
for his tribute's sake, and be the first to draw the Lacedemo-
nians into a league with the king. Just the same things that
were desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus and
Tissaphernes treating apart, there was great canvassing at La-
cedemon, between the one side that persuaded to send to Ionia
and Chios, and the other, that would have the army and fleet
go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedemonians indeed
approved best by much of the business of the Chians and of
Tissaphernes. For with these co-operated Alcibiades, heredi-
tary guest and friend of Endius, the ephore of that year, in the
highest degree ; insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, Al-
cibiades's family received a Laconic name. For Endius was
called Endius Alcibiadis*. Nevertheless the Lacedemonians
sent first one Phrynis (a man of those parts) to Chios to see if
the gallies they had were so many as they reported, and whe-
ther the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be.
* The name of Endiiis's father was Alcibiades, to whom Clinias beiny
guest, for thai cause g-avc the name of Alcibiades to his sou, this Alcibiades
Clinis.
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 427
And when the messenger brought back word that all that had
been said was true, they received both the Chians and the Ery-
thrgeans presently into their league, and decreed to send them
forty gallies, there being at Chios from such places as the
Chians named, no less than sixty already. And of these at
first they were about to send out ten with Melancridas for ad-
miral ; but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for
Melancridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten gallies,
they went about the making ready of five only in Laconia. So
the' winter ended, and nineteenth year of this war, written by
Thucydides.
YEAR XX.
In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians
pressed to have the gallies sent away, and fearing lest the Athe-
nians should get notice what they were doing (for all their
ambassadors went out by stealth) the Lacedemonians send away
to Corinth three Spartans, to will them with all speed to tran-
sport their gallies over the Isthmus to the other sea towards
Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had
made ready to go to Lesbos, as the rest. The number of the
gallies of the league, which were then there, being forty waoto
ing one.
But Calligetus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus,
would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios, nor would
deliver the money, twenty-five talents*, which they had brought
with them to pay for their setting forth, but made account to
go out with another fleet afterwards by themselves.
When Agis saw that the Lacedemonians meant to send first
to Chios, he resolved not of any other course himself, but the
confederates assembling at Corinth, went to counsel upon the
matter, and concluded thus, that they should go first to Chios,
under the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the
five gallies in Laconia : and then to Lesbos under the charge of
Alcamenes, intended also to be sent thither by Agis ; and lastly
into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus
the son of Ramphias should have the command ; and concluded
to carry over the Isthmus, first the one half of their gallies, and
that those should presently put to sea, that the Athenians might
have their minds more upon those, than on the other half to be
transported afterwards. For they determined to pass that sea
openly, contemning the weakness of the Athenians in respect
they had not any navy of importance yet appearing. As they re-
* Four tboatand six hundred and eiphtr-seTcn pounds ten shillings sterling'.
428 THE HISTORY
BOOK vin.
solved, so presently they carried over one and twenty gallies.
But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corintliians were
unwilling to go along, before they should have ended the cele-
bration of the Isthmian holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis
was content that they for their part should observe the Isth-
mian truce ; and he therefore to take the fleet upon himself as
his own.
But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time pas-
sing away, the Athenians got intelligence the easilier of the
practice of the Chians, and sent thither Aristocrates, one of
their generals to accuse them of it. The Chians denying the
matter, he commanded them, for their better credit, to send
along with him some gallies for their aid, due by the league ;
and they sent seven. The cause why they sent these gallies,
was the many not acquainted with the practice, and the few
and conscious not willing to undergo the enmity of the multi-
tude, without having strength first, and their not expecting
any longer the coming of the Lacedemonians, because they
had so long delayed them.
In the mean time the Isthmian games were celebrating, and
the Athenians (for they had word sent them of it) came and
saw ; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. After
they went thence, they took order presently that the fleet might
not pass from Cenchreae undiscovered. And after the holydays
were over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chius, under the con-
duct of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first with equal
number came up to them, and endeavoured to draw them out
into the main sea. But seeing the Peloponnesians followed not
far, but turned another way, the Athenians went also from them.
For the seven gallies at Chios, which were part of this number,
they durst not trust. But afterwards having manned thirty-
seven others, they gave chase to the enemy by the shore, and
drove them into Peiraeus in the territory of Corinth, (this Peiraeus
is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the confines of Epidau-
ria.) One gaily that was far from land the Peloponnesians lost,
the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athe-
nians charging them by sea with their gallies, and withal set-
ting their men on land, mightily troubled and disordered them,
brake their gallies upon shore, and slew Alcamenes their com-
mander ; and some they lost of their own.
The fight being ended, they assigned a suflicient number of
gallies to lie opposite to those of the enemy, and the rest to lie
under a little island not far off, in which they also encamped,
and sent to Athens for supply. For the Peloponnesians had with
them for aid of their gallies, the Corinthians the next day, and
not long after divers others of the inhabitants tliereabouts. But
BOOK vui. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 429
when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place
would be painful, they knew not what course to take, and once
they thought to have set the gallics on fire ; but it was conclud-
ed afterwards to draw them to tiie land, and guard them with
their land men till some good occasion should be offered for
their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent
unto them Thermon, a Spartan.
The Lacedemonians having been advertised of the departure
of these gallies from the Isthmus, (for the ephores had com-
manded Alcamenes which he put to sea to send him word by a
horseman) were minded presently to have sent away the five
gallies also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the comman-
der of them, and with him Alclbiades ; but after\vards as they
were ready to go out, came the news of the gallies chased into
Peiraeus : which so much discouraged them, in respect they
stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they pur-
posed now, not only not to send away those gallies of their own,
but also to call back again some of those that were already at
sea.
When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with Endius and the rest
of the ephores again not to fear the voyage, alleging that they
would make haste and be there before the Chians should have
heard of the misfortune of the fleet. And that as soon as he
should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities
there to revolt, by declaring unto them the' weakness of the
Athenians, and the diligence of the Lacedemonians, wherein
he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other.
Moreover to Endius he said, that it would be an honour in par-
ticular to him that Ionia should revolt, and the king be made
confederates to the Lacedemonians by his own means, and not
to have it the mastery of Agis, for' he was at difference with
Agis. So having prevailed witli Endius and the other ephores,
he took sea with five gallies, together with Chalcideus a Lace-
demon, and made haste.
About the same time, came back horn Sicily those sixteen
gallies of the Peloponnesians, which having aided Gvlippus in
that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia, and evil
entreated by twenty-seven gallies of Athens, that watched there-
abouts under the command of Hippocles the son of Menippus,
for such gallies as should return out of Sicily. For all the rest,
savang one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Corinth
before.
Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every
man they met with by the way, to the end that notice might
not be given of their passage, and touching first at Corvcus in
the continent, where they also dismissed thpse whom they had
430 THE HISTORY
BOOK VIII.
apprehended, after conference there with some of the conspira-
tors of the Chians that advised them to go to the city, without
sending them word before they came upon the Chians suddenly
and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and
astonishment, but the few had so ordered the matter before hand,
that an assembly chanced to be holden at the same time. And
when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same, and
told them that many gallies were coming to them, but
not that those other gallies were besieged in Peirseus the Chians
first, and afterwards the Erythraeans, revolted from the Athe-
nians.
After this, they went with three gallies to Clazomena;, and
made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently
crossed over to the continent, and there fortified Polichna, lest
they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein
they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortify-
ing and making of preparation for the war.
This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians,
who conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evi-
dent danger, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so
great a city to revolt, would be no longer quiet in this their
present fear, decreed that those one thousand talents *, which
through all this war they had affected to keep untouched, forth-
with abrogating the punishment ordained for such, as spake or
gave their suffrages to stir it, should now be used, and there-
with gallies, not a few manned. They decreed also to send
thither out of hand, under the command of Strombichides the
son of Diotimus eight gallies, of the number of those that be-
sieged the enemy at Peirfeus ; the which having forsaking their
charge to give chase to the gallies that went with Chalcideus,
and not able to overtake them, were now returned, and shortly
after also to send Thrasicles to help them with twelve gallies
more, which also had departed from the same guard upon the
enemy. And those seven gallies of Chios, M'hich likewise kept
watch at Peiraeus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and
gave the bond-men tliat served in them their liberty, and the
chains to those that were free. And instead of all those gallies
that kept guard upon the gallies of the Peloponnesians, they
made ready other with all speed in their places, besides thirty
more which they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great
was their diligence, and nothing was of light importance that
they went about for the recovery of Chios.
Strombichides in the mean time arrived at Samos, and taking
into his company one Samian gaily, went thence to Teas, and
* One Iitiudrfed t^^lity-scvcu ihousniiil (ivc liiindrrd pounds iterlin;j.
BOOK viii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 431
entreated them not to stir. But towards Teus was Chalcldeus
also coming with twenty-three gallies from Chios, and with
him also the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythrseans,
whereof Strombichides having been advertised, he put forth
again before his arrival, and standing off at sea, when he saw
the many gallies that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos,
they following him. The land forces the Teans would not at
the first admit, but after this flight of the Athenians they
brought them in. And these for the most part held their hands
for a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from the chase ;
but when he staid somewhat long, they fell of themselves to
the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teus by the
Athenians towards the continent; wherein they were also
helped by some few Barbarians that came down thither, under
the leading of Tages, deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.
Chalcideus and Alcibiades when they had chased Strombi-
chides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the gallies
of Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios ; instead of whom they
manned mariners of Chios, both those, and twenty gallies more,
and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it
to revolt. For the intention of Alcibiades that was acquainted
with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was
to come from Peloponnesus, and to turn these cities first, that
the honour of it might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to
Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) to Endius that set them
out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt, with the
forces of the Chians only, and of those gallies that came with
Chalcideus. So these for the greatest part of their way undis-
covered, and arriving, not much sooner than Strombichides
and Thrasicles (who now chancing to be present with those
twelve gallies from Athens, followed them with Strombichides)
caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them
at the heels with nineteen gallies, being shut out by the Mile-
sians, lay at anchor at Lada, an island over against the city.
Presently upon the revolt of Miletus w-as made the' first
league between the King and the Lacedemonians by Tissapher-
nes and Chalcideus, as foUoweth :
League between Tissaphbrnes and the Lacedemonians.
* The Lacedemonians and their confederates have made a
* league with the King and Tissaphernes, on these articles,
* Whatsoever territory or cities the King possesseth, and his
* ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the King's.
' Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athe-
432 THE HISTORY rook vhi.
* nians from their cities, the King and the Lacedemonians are
* jointly to hinder, so as the Athenians may receive nothing
' from thence, neither money nor other thing.
' The King and the Lacedemonians, and their confederates,
* are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without
' consent of both parts, it shall not be lawful to lay down the
* war against the Athenians, neither for the King, nor for the
* Lacedemonians and their confederates.
* If any shall revolt from the King, they shall be enemies
* to the Lacedemonians and their confederates. And if any
* shall revolt from the Lacedemonians and their confederates,
' they shall in like manner be enemies to the King.'
This was the league.
Presently after this, the Chians set out ten gallies more, and
went to Aneea, both to hearken what became of the business at
Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But
word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that
Amorges was at hand with his army, they went thence to the
temple of Jupiter. Being there they descried sixteen gallies
more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the
charge of Diomedon, after the putting to sea of those with
Thrasycles, upon sight of whom they fled, one gaily to Ephe-
sus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took,
but empty, the men being gotten on shore ; the rest escaped
into the city of Teos. And the Athenians went away again to-
wards Samos.
The Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of their
fleet, and with the land forces, caused first Lebedus to revolt,
and then Erae. And afterwards returned both with tiieir fleet
and land men, every one to his own.
About the same time the twenty gallies of Peloponnesus,
which the Athenians had formerly chased into Peirieus, and
against whom they now lay with a like number, suddenly
forced their passage, and having the victory in fight, took four
of the Athenian gallies, and going to Cenchreee, prepared
afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time
there came also unto them from Lacedemon, for commander,
Astyochus, who was now admiral of the whole navy.
When the land men were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes
himself came thither with his forces, and he also demolished
the wall, as much as was left standing, and went his way
again.
Not long after the going away of him, came thither Diome-
don with ten gallies of Athens, and having made a truce witli
the Teians that he might also be received, he put to sea again,
noOK viiT. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 433
and kept the shore to Erffi, and assatilted it; but falling to take
it, departed.
It fell out about the same time that the commons of Sainos,
together with the Athenians who were there with three gallies,
made an insurrection against Uie great men, and slew of them
in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred
more, and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses,
(the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed
them their liberty) they administered the affairs of the city from
that time forward by themselves, no more communicating with
the Geomori *, nor permitting any of the common people to
marry with them.
After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun,
persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt,
even without the Lacedemonians, with their single forces, and
desiring to make as many fellows of their danger as they were
able, made war by themselves with thirteen gallies against Lesbos
(which was according to what was concluded by the Lacede-
monians, namely to go thither in the second place, and thence
into the Hellespont.) And withal, the land forces both of such
Peloponnesians as were present, and of their confederates there-
abouts, went along by them to Clazomen;i? and Syme. These
under the command of Eualas a Spartan, and the gallies of
Deiniadas a man of the parts thereabouts. The gallies putting
in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first f.********
Now Astyochus the Lacedemonian admiral, having set forth
as he intended from Cenchret^, arrived at Chios. The third day
after his coming thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Les-
bos with twenty-five gallies of Athens; for Leon came with
a supply of ten gallies more from Athens afterwards. Astyochus
in the evening of the same day, taking with him one gaily more
of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos to help it what he could,
and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressus. Here he
heard that Mitylene was taken by the Athenians, even with the
shout of their voices. For the Athenians coming unexpected,
entered the haven, and having beaten the gallies of tiie Chians,
disbarked, and overcame those that made head against them,
and won the city. When Astyochus heard this, both from the
Eresslans, and from those Chian gallies that came from Me-
thymna with Eubulus, (which having been left there before, as
soon as Mitylene was lost, fled, and three of them chanced ta
meet with him, for one was taken by the Athenians) he conti-
• The nability of Sanios, so called) for tiiat riiey dinired the land amongst them.
t It seeuieth that somethino; is here wantiDg, and supiHied thus by Fran. Pur-
ta. Then tlie Chians leaving four srillies here for g^nard of the place, went to
Mffrleiie mth ffn? rest, and canicd tliaf city alio to rctoit.
Ff
431 THE HISTORY book viii.
nued his course for Mitylene no longer, but having caused
Eressus to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, made
them to march toward Antissa and Methymna by land, under
the conduct of Eteonicus, and he himself with his own gallies,
and those three of Chios, rowed thither along the shore, hoping
that the Methymnaeans upon sight of his forces would take heart,
and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things
went against him, he reimbarked his army, and returned to
Chios. And tlie landmen that were aboard and should have
gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this,
came to them six gallies to Chios of those of the confederate
fleet at Cenchrew. The Athenians, when they had re-estab-
lished the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna,
which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent, and
brought them all back again into the city which is in the is-
land, save only the authors of the revolt, (for these got away
to Daphnus) and Clazomense returned to the obedience of the
Athenians.
The same summer those Athenians that with twenty gallies
lay in the isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of
Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalcideus the Lacedemonian com-
mander, that came out against him but with a few 5 and set up a
trophy, and the third day after departed. But the Milesians
pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were
not masters.
Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian gallies that were at
Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea, from the isles called
Oenussse, which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum
(forts they held in Erythraea) and from Lesbos. They that
were aboard, were men of arms of the roll, compelled to serve
in the fleet. With these they landed at Cardamyle ; and hav-
ing overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at
Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the
enemy all the places of that quarter. And again they over-
came them in another battle at Phanae, and in a third at Leu-
conium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight j
by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory,
excellently well furnished. For except it were the Lacedemo-
nians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of, that
joined advisedness to prosperity, and the more their city in-
creased, had carried tiie more respect in the administration
thereof to assure it. Nor ventured they now to revolt (lest any
man should think, that in this act at least they regarded not
what was the safest) till they had many and strong confederates,
with whose help to try their fortune ; nor till such time as they
perceived the people of Athens (as themselves could not deny)
to have their estate, after the defeat in Sicily, reduced to ex-
treme weakness.
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 435
And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in
ought, they erred with manv others, who in like manner had an
opinion, that the state of the Athenians would quickly have
been overthrown.
Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands
spoiled, some within undertook to make the city return unto
the Athenians. Which though the magistrates perceived, yet
they themselves stirred not, but having received Astyochus into
the city with four gallies that were with him from Erythrse,
they took advice together, how by taking hostages, or some
other gentle way to make them give over the conspiracy. Thus
stood the business of the Chians.
In the end of this summer a thousand five hundred men of
arms of Athens, and a thousand of Argos (for the Athenians
had put armour upon five hundred light-armed Argives) and of
other confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight gallies,
reckoning those wliich were for transportation of soldiers, un-
der the conduct of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironidas,
came into Samos, and crossing over to Miletus, encamped be-
fore it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred
men at arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came
with Chalcideus, and someauxiliar strangers withTissaphernes,
(Tissaphernes himself being there also with his cavalr)') and
fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Ar-
gives who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the
rest, and in some disorder in contempt of the enemy, as being
lonians, and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Mi-
lesians overcome, and lost no less than three hundred of their
men. But the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the
Peloponnesians, and then beaten back the Barbarians and other
multitude, and not fought with the Milesians at all, (for they,
after they were come from the chase of the Argives, and saw
their other wing defeated, went into the town) sat down with
their arms, as being now masters of the field, close under the
wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that on both sides
the Ionics had the better of the Dorics. For the Athenians
overcame the opposite Peloponnesians, and the Milesians the
Argives. The Athenians after they had erected their trophy,
the place being an Isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a
wall ; supposing, if they got Miletus, the other cities would
easily come in. In the mean time it was told them about twi-
light, that the fifty-five gallies from Peloponnesus and Sicily
were hard by, and only not already come. For there came into
Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates
to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state,
twenty gallies of Syracuse, and two of Selinus. And the gal-
436 THE HISTORY bqox yiii.
lies that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also
ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the
charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus
the admiral. And they put in first at Eleus, an island over
against Miletus, and being advertised there, that the Athenians
lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of la-
sus, to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibia-
des coming a horseback to Teichiussa, of the territory of Mile-
tus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian ga3.1ies lay at
anchor, they were informed by him of the battle ; for Alcibi^-
des was with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes present in it.
And he exhorted them (unless they meant to lose what they
had in Ionia, and the whole business) to succour Miletus with
all speed, and not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall. Ac-
cording to this they concluded to go the next morning and re-
lieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus of
the arrival of those gallies, his colleagues advising to stay and
fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it
himself, nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he
could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter,
when they should know against how many gallics of the enemy,
and with what addition to their own, sufficiently, and at leisure
made ready, they might do it ; he would never, he said, for
fear of being upbraided with baseness (for it was no baseness
for the Athenians to let their navy give way upon occasion j
but by what means soever it should fallout, it would be a
great baseness to be beaten) be swayed to hazard battle
against reason, and not only to dishonour the state, but also to
cast it into extreme danger. Seeing that since their late losses
it hath scarce been fit, with their strongest preparation, will-
ingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity to undertake, how
then without constraint to seek out voluntary dangers? There-
fore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those
that were wounded, and their landmen, and whatsoever uten-
sils they brought with them, but to leave behind whatsoever
they had taken in the territory of the enemy, to the en4 that
their gallies might be the lighter, and to put off for Samps, and
thence when they had ^^^ their fleet together to make out
against the enemy, as occtfsion should be offered.
As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it iq ej^ecution, and
was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards ; nor
in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of.
Thus the Ather^ians presently in the evefling, v/i\\\ their vip-
tpry imperfect, dislodged from before Miletus, FrPHi Sq-
mw, tlie Argiv^s ir^ hjv^te an^, in anger fof their pvertl^rpyv
W^n^ hp|flp>
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 437
The Peloponftesians setting forth betimes in the mornifig
from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus and staid there one day.
The next day they took with them those gallies of Chios,
which had formerly been chased together with Chalcideus, and
meant to ha\'e returned to Teichiussa, to take aboard such ne-
cessaries as tliey had left on shore. But as they were ^oing,
Tissaphernes came to them with his land-men, and persuaded
them to set upon lasus, where Amorges the king's enemy then
lay. Whereupon tliey assaulted lasus upon a sudden, and
(they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of i\\e
Athenians) took it. The greatest praise in this action was
given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard
son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians
delivered him to Tissaphernes to carry liim, if he wouW, to the
king, as he had order to do. The city they pilkiged, wherein,
as being a place of ancient riciies, the army got a very consi-
derable quantity of money. The auxiliary soldiers of Amorges
they received without doing them hurt into the army, being
for the most part Pdoponnesians. The town itself they deli-
vered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners as well free as
bond, upon composition with him at a daric stater by the poll.
And so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent
Paedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedemonians had sent
hither to be go\'ernor of Chios, to ErNtlu-jE, amd with him the
bands that had aided Amorges by land, and made Philip go-
vernor there, in Miletus. And so this summer ended.
The next winter Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrisoa
into lasus, came to Miletus, and for one month's pay, (as was
promised on his part at Lacedemon) he gave unto the soldiers
through the whole fleet after an attic drachma * a man by tlie
day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but three
oboles t, till he had asked the king's pleasure ; and if the king
commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma.
Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermocrates general of
the Syracusians (for Theramenes Was but slack in exacting
pay, as not being general, but only to deliver the gallies that
came with him, to Astyochus.) It was agreed that but for the
five gallies X that were over and above, thev should have more
than three oboles a man. For to fifty-five gallies he allowed tliree
• SSeTen pence liaff- penny of our money.
t Three pence half-pesmy farthing. This diminution of their stipend^ pro-
ceeded from the counsel which Alcibiades gave to TissafvTienies, as is hereafter
declared.
I If they had been five galMes less, that is, but fifty, as they were fifty-five,
their pay had been four oboles a man, at three talents to the fifiy gallies fur'a
Kuath. Qu. How many men pattfiu a gatly? ft seemetfi bnt eijhteea.
438 THE HISTORY book viii.
talents a month, and to as many as should be more than that
number, after the same proportion.
The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos, (for
there were now come in thirty-five gallies more from home,
with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon their com-
manders) having gathered together their gallies, as well those
that had been at Chios, as all the rest, concluded, distributing
to every one his charge by lot, to go lie before Miletus with a
fleet ; but against Chios to send out both a fleet and an army of
land-men. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles,
and Euctemon with thirty gallies and part of those one thou-
sand men of arms that went to Miletus, which they carried
along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers ac-
cording to their lot, went to Chios, and the rest remaining at
Samos with seventy-four gallies, were masters of the sea, and
went to Miletus.
Astyochus, who was now in Chios, requiring hostages in re-
spect of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come
with Theramenes, and that the articles of the league with Tis-
saphernes Mere mended, gave over that business ; and with ten
gallies of Peloponnesus, and ten of Chios, went thence and as-
saulted Pteleum, but not being able to take it, he kept by the
shore to Clazomenae. There he summoned those within to
yield, with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians,
that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus. And Tamos
the deputy lieutenant of Ionia, off^ered them the same. But
they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault upon the
city unwalhd, but when he could not take it, he put to sea
again, and with a mighty wind was carried to Phocca and
Syme, but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and
Drimyssa, islands that lie over against Clazomenae. After they
had staid there eight days in regard of the winds, spoiling and
destroying, and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the
Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocasa
and Syme to Astyochus. While Astyochus was tiiere, the am-
bassadors of the Lesbians came unto him, desiring to revolt
from the Atiienians, and as for him, they prevailed with him,
but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were
willing, in respect of their former ill success there, he put to
sea for Chios. Whither after a great tempest, his gallies, some
from one place and some from another, at length arrived all.
After this, Padaritus who was now at Erythrani, whither he
was come from Miletus by land, came over with his forces into
Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had
the soldiers which were of the five gallies that carae thither
HOOK vin. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. AMU
with Chalcideus, and were left there to the number of five hun-
dred, and armour to arm them.
Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Asty-
ochus communicated the matter with Paedaritus and the Chians,
alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make
Lesbos to revolt, for that they should either get more confede-
rates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians.
But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian gailies, Paeda-
ritus told him plainly he should have none of them. Wliere-
upon Astyochus taking upon him five gallics of Corinth, a
sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Lacouia, which
he brought with him, went towards Miletus, to his charge;
mightily threatening the Chians in case they should need him,
not to help them.
Wlicn he was come to Corycus in Erytliraea, he staid there ;
and the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the
point, the one not knowing that the other was so near. As-
tyochus, upon a letter sent him from Pjedaritus, signifying
that there were come certain Er\thraean captives dismissed
from Samos, with design to betray Erythrai, vveut presently
back to Erythrae, so little he missed of falling into the hands
of the Athenians. Paedaritus also went over to iiim, and hav-
ing narrowly inquired touching these seeming traitors, and
found that the whole matter was but pretence, which the men
had used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them and
departed, one to Chios, the other as he was going before, to-
wards Miletus.
In the mean time the army of the Athenians being come
about by sea from Corycus to Argenum, lighted on three long
boats of Chios, which when they saw, they presently chased.
But there arose a great tempest, and the long boats of Chios
with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the Athuniai)
gallics, especially such as followed him furthest, there perished
three, driven ashore at tlie city of Chios ; and the men that
were aboard them were part taken, and part slain ; the rest of
the fleet escaped into a haven called Phoenicus, under the hill
Mimas, from whence they got. afterwards to Lesbos, and there
fortified.
The same winter Hippocrates setting out from Peloponne-
sus with ten gailies of Thurium, commanded by Doreius the
son of Diagoras, with two others, and with one gaily of Laeo-
nia, and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidus. This city was now
revolted from Tissaphernes : and the Peloponnesians that lay
at Miletus hearing of it, commanded that (the one half of tiieir
gailies remaining for the guard of Cnidus,) the other half
should go about Triopium, and help to bring in the ships which
440 THE HISTORY book yiii,
were to cotne from Mgypt. This Triopium is, a promontory
of the territory of Cnidus, lying out into the sea, and conse-
crated to Apollo. The Athenians, upon advertisement hereof,
setting fortii from Samos, tcok those gallies that kept guard at
Triopium, but the men that were in them escaped to land.
After this they went to Cnidus, which they assaulted, aud had
almost taken, being without wall ; and the next day they as-
saulted it again ; but being less able to hurt it now than be-
fore, because they had fenced it better this night, and the
men also were gotten into it that fled from their gallies under
Triopium, they invaded and vvasted the Cnidian territory, and
so went back to Samos.
About the same time Astyochus being come to the navy at
Miletus, the Peloponnesians had plenty of all things for the
army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers
had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of lasus. Aud
the Milesians underwent the war with a good will. Neverthe-
less the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with
Tissaphernes seemed defective, and not so advantageous to
them as to him. Whereupon they agreed, to ijew ones in the
presence of Theramenes, which were these :
The second League between tlie Lacedemonians and the king
of Persia.
* The agreement of the Lacedemonians and their confe-
' derates, with king Darius and his children, and with Tissa-
' phernes, for league and amity, according to the articles fol-
' lowing.
* Whatsoever territories or cities do belong unto king Darius,
* or were his fathers, or his ancestors, against those shall nei-
' ther the Lacedemonians go to make war, nor any way to an-
* noy them. Neither shall the Lacedemonians, nor their con-
* federates, exact tribute of any of those cities. Neither shall
* king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon, or
* any way annoy the Lacedemonians, or any of the Lacedemo-
* nian confederates.
' If the Lacedemonians, or their confederates, shall need any
* thing of the king, or the king of the Lacedemonians, or of
' their confederates, what they sliall persuade each other to do,
* that if they do it, shall be good.
* They shall, both of them make war jointly against the
* Athenians and their confederates ; and when they shall give
' over the war, they shall also do it jointly.
* Whatsoever army shall be in the king's country, sent for
* by the king, the king shall defray.
* If aoy of the cities comprehended in the league maile with
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 4*1
* the king, shall invade the king's territories, the rest shall op-
^ pose them, and defend the king to the utmost of their power,
' If any city of the king's, or under his dominion, shall invade
* the Lacedemonians, or their confederates, tl>e king shall make
' opposition, and defend them to the utmost of his power/
After this accord made, Theramenes defirered his gallies
iato the hands of Astyochus, and putting to sea in alight-horse
man, is no more seen.
The Athenians that were now come with their army from
Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of tlie field and of the sea,
fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the land- ward, and
that had also a harbour for shipping, and was not far from the
city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been disheartened
in divers former battles, and otherwise, not only not mutually
well affected, but jealous one of another ; (for Tydeus and his
complices had been put to death by Psedaritus for atticism, and
the rest of the city was kept in awe, but by force, and for a
time) stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned,
not conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength, nor
with the help of those that Paedaritus had with him, sufficient
to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid fromi
Ast)'ochus. Which when he had denied them, Piedaritus sent
letters to Lacedemon, complaining of the wrong. Thus pro-
ceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. Also their fleet
at Samos went often out against the fleet of the enemy at Mi-
letus ; but when theirs would never come out of the harbour t0
encounter them, tliey returned to Samos, and lay still.
The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Pelopon-
nesus towards Ionia, those twenty-seven gallies, which at the
procurement of Calligetus of Megara, and Timagoras of Cyzi-
cus, were made ready by the Lacedemonians for Pharnabazus.
The commander of them was Antisthenes a Spartan, with whom
the Lacedemonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council
with Astyochus, whereof Lichas the son of Arceailaus was one.
These had commission, that when they should be arrived at Mi-
letus, besides their general care to order every tiling to the best,
they should send away these gallies, either tiie same, or more^
or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they so thought
fit, and to appoint Clearchus the son of Ramphias, that went
iilong in them, for commander. And that the same eleven, if
they thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his charge,
and ordain Antisthenes in his place : for tijey liad him in sus-
picion for the Ifetters of Paedaritus,
These gallies holding their course from Malea througli the
maitL sea, and" arrrv'ing at Mdo^ lighted on tea of the galUeik
442 THE HISTORY book vm.
of the Athenians, whereof three they took, but without the men,
and fired them.
After this, because they feared lest those Atlienian gallies
that escaped from Melos, should give notice of their coming to
those in Samos (as also it fell out) they changed tlieir course,
and went towards Crete, and having made their voyage the
longer, that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus in
Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they
sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.
The Chians and Paedaritus, about the same time, notwith-
standing their former repulse, and that Astyochus was still
backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with
his whole fleet to help them being besieged, and not to suffer
the greatest of their confederates' cities in all Ionia, to be thus
shut up by sea, and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians
having many slaves, more than any one state, except that
of the Lacedemonians, whom for their offences they the more
urgently punished because of their number, many of them, as
soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifica-
tions, ran over presently to them, and were they, that knowing
the territory so well, did it the greates* spoil. Therefore the
Chians said he must help them ; whilst there was hope and
possibility to do it. Delphinium being still in fortifying, and
unfurnished, and greater fences being in making both about
their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not be-
fore, because he would have made good his threats, yet when
he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to have re-
lieved them.
But in the meantime came the messenger from the twenty-
seven gallies, and from the Lacedemonian counsellors that were
come to Caunus. Astyochus therefore esteeming the wafting in of
those gallies, whereby they might the more freely command tlie
sea, and the safe coming in of those Lacedemonians, who were
to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred
before all others, presently gave over his journey for Chios, and
went towards Caunus.
As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being
unwalled and thrown down by an earthquake which had hap-
pened there, the greatest verily in man's memory, and rifled it,
the inhabitants being fled into the mountains ; and overrunning
their country, made booty of all that came in his way, saving
the free-men, and those he dismissed. From Cos he went by
night to Cnidus : but found it necessary, by the advice of
the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow as he
was after those twenty gallies of Athens, wherewith Charminus,
one of the Athenian genwals gone out from Samos, stood
watching for those twenty-seven gallies that \\ere come from
BOOK viii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 443
Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus himself was going to
convoy in. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Mi-
letus of their coming, and Charminus u-as IWng for them about
Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia : for by this time
he knew that they were at Caunus. Astyochus therefore desir-
ing to out-go the report of his coming, went as he was to Syme,
hoping to find those gallies out from the shore. But a shower
of rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his gallies
to miss their course in the dark, and disordered them.
The next morning the fleet being scattered, the left wing
was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wan-
dered yet about the island : and thereupon Charminus and the
Athenians put forth against them with twenty gallies, sup-
posing they had been the same gallies they were watching for
from Caunus. And presently charging, sunk tlu-ee of them,
and hurt others, and were superior in the fight, till such time
as (contrary to their expectation) the greater part of their fleet
came in sight, and enclosed them about. Then they betook
themselves to flight, and with the loss of six gallies, the rest
escaped into the island of Teuglussa, and from thence to Ha-
licarnassus.
After this, the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidus, and
joining with tiiose seven and twenty gallies that came from
Caunus, went altogether to Syme, and, having there erected
a trophy, returned again and lay at Cnidus.
The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in
this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme.
But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidus, nor the
navy tiiere against them. Whereupon they took up the furni-
ture of their gallies at Syme, and assaulted Lorj'ma, a town in
the continent, and so returned to Samos.
The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being at Cnidus, was
now in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it
wanted j and withal those eleven Lacedemonians conferred with
Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching such things as
they disliked in the articles before agreed on, and concerning
the war, liow it might be carried for the future, in the best and
most advantageous manner for them both. But Lychas was
he that considered the business most nearly, and said, that nei-
ther the first league, nor yet the latter made by Theramenes,
was made as it ought to have been. And that it would be a
very hard condition, that whatsoever territories the king and
his ancestors possessed before, he should possess the same now ;
for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands and
the sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Boeotia ; and the
Lacedemonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty.
4i4 THE HISTORY book vnr.
sftould put them into subjection to the rule of the Mtdei^,
Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and
not to stand to these. As for pay, in the new articles the^
would require none. But Tissaphernes chafing at this, Vvent
his way in choler, and nothing was done.
The Pieloponnesians solicited by messengers fi'orti the ^riScrt
men of Rhodes, resolved to go thither, because they hoped it
teould not prove impossible witli their niimber of seamen, and
army of land soldiers to bririg that island into their power ; and
withal supposed themselves able, with theii* present confede-
rates to maintain their fleet without asking money any more
of Tissaphernes. Presently therefore the same winter, they
put forth from Cnidus, and arriving in the territory of Rhode's
at Cameirus, first frighted the commons out of it, that kneW
not of tbe business ; and they fled. Then the Lacedemonians'
called together both these, and the Rhodians * of the two cities
Lihdus and lelysus, and persuaded them to revolt from the?
Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Pelepohnesiansv The
Athenians at the same time hearing of their desigh, put forth
witli tlieir fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before
them, and were seen in the main sea too late, though not much.
For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to
Sttmos, but afterwards they came forth with their gallies divers
tiVnes^, and made war against Rhodes from Chalce, Cos and
Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rho-
dians but levy money amongst them, to the sum of thirty-two
talents f, and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there,
having their gallies haled ashore, they meddled^ not.
In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians
to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow.
Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus, and battle at Mi-
letus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians ; and Astyochus
having received letters from them from Lacedemon, to put him
tD death, (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not
well trusted) retired to Tissaphernes, first for fear, and after-
wartls to his power hindered the affairs of the Peloponnesians.
And being in every thing his instructor, he not only cut shorter
their pay, insomuch as from a drachma | he brought it to three
oboles §, and those also not continually paid ; advising Tissa-
phernes to tell them, how that the Athenians, men of a long
continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to their
own, not so much for want of money, but lest the marinn^,
some of them growing insolent by superfluity, should disable
* Tlie city of R]io(]es-\vai> ih,1 then built. f Six thoiisaixl poiiiidx iiterliii{>'.
J' Sc^tn pence lialf penny; § Tlue^ jj'Cfire bnlfix^wftV fsH-thlfifc".
BOOK Till. OF THE GBECIAN WAR. 4C
their bodies by spendLog their money on such things as would
weaken them, and others should quit the gallies with the ar-
rear of their pay in tlieir captains' hands for a pawn ; but also
gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of
the gallies, and to the generals of the several cities (save only
those of Syracuse) to give way unto it. For Hermocrates the
general of the Syracusians, was the only man that in the name
of tlie whole league stood against it. And for the cities that
came to require money, he would put them back himself,
and answer them in Tissaphemes's name, and sav, namely to
the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of
the Grecian states, and preserved by strangers, to expect ne-
vertheless, that others for tlieir liberty should not only venture
their persons, but maintain them with their purses. And to
other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their mo-
ney befcH-e they revolted, that they might serve the Athenians,
not to bestow as much or more now upon themselves. And
told them that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own
charges, had reason to be sparing; but when money should
come down from the king, he would then give them their full
pay, and assist the cities as should be fit. Moreover he ad-
vised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the
war, nor to fetch in the Phoenician fleet which was making
ready; nor take more men into pay; whereby to put the
whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one : but
to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king,
when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other.
Whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he
will want, by whom to pull down tliose that hold it, unless
with great danger and cost, he should come and try it out
himself. But thus the danger would be less chargeable (he
being but a small part of the^cost) and he should wear out the
Grecians one against another, and himself in the noean time
remain in safety.
He said further, that the Athenians were fitter to partake
dominion witli him than the other, for that they were less am-
bitious of power by land ; and that their speeches and actions
tended more to the king's purpose : for that they would join
with hirn to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves,
as touching the dominion by sea; and for the king, as touch-
ing the Grecians in the king's territories. Whereas the Lace-
demonians on the contran', were come to set them free. And
it was not likely but tliat they that were come to deliver the
Grecians from the Grecians, will (if they overcome the Athe-
nians) deliver them also from the Barbarians.
He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both, and
446 THE HISTORY book viii.
then when they had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of
the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his coun-
try. And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly, as far
as by his actions can be conjectured : for hereupon he gave
himself to believe Alcibiades as his best counsellor in these af-
fairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages, nor
would suffer them to fight by sea, but pretending the coming of
the Phoenician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with
odds, he overthrew their proceedings, and abated the vigour of
their navy, before very puissant, and was in all things else
more backward than he could possibly dissemble.
Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes about
this, whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the
same to be indeed the best course ; but partly also to make
way for his own return into his country : knowing that if he
destroyed it not, the time would one day come, that he might
persuade the Athenians to recal him. And the best way to
persuade them to it he thought was this, to make it appear unto
them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also
came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw
what power he had with him, the captains of gallies and princi-
pal men there, partly upon Alcibiades's own motion, who had
sent to the greatest amongst them, that they should remem-
ber him to the best sort, and say that he desired to come home,
so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil
persons, nor yet of the multitude that cast him out ; and that
he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, and to war on
their side ; but chiefly of their own accords had their minds in-
clined to the deposing of the popular government.
This business was set on foot first in the camp, and from
thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain per-
sons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos, and had confer-
ence with him. And when he had undertaken to bring to
their friendship, first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in case
the government were taken from the people, (for then he said
the king might the better rely upon them) they that were of
most power in the city, who also were the most toiled out, en-
tered into great hope, both to have the ordering of the state at
home themselves, and victory also over the enemy. And when
they came back to Samos they drew all such as were for their
purpose into an oatli of conspiracy with themselves, and to the
multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades might be re-
called, and the people put from the government, the king
would turn their friend, and furnish them with money. Though
the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the pre-
sent, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay, they
stirred not.
BOOK vni. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 4(17
But they that viere setting up the oligarchy, when they^ had
communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration
anew, and with more of their complices, of the things spoken
by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy, and wor-
thy to be believed : but Pl»r)nicus, who yet was general of the
army, liked it not, but thought (as the truth was) that Alcibia-
des cared no more for the oligarchy thantthe democracy, nor
had any other aim in it, but only by altering the government
that then was, to be called home by his associates. And said,' they
* were especially to look to this, that they did not mutiny for the
' king, who could not very easily be induced (the Peloponne-
* sians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and
* having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the
' Athenians, whom he trusted not, and to trouble himself when
' he might have the friendship of tlie Peloponnesians, that ne-
* ver did him hurt.*
* As for the confederate cities, to whom they promise oligar-
' chy, in that they themselves do put down the democracy,' he
said, ' he knew full well, that neither those which were already
* revolted, would the sooner return to, nor those that remained,
* be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby. For
* they would never be so willing to be in subjection, either to
* the few, or the people, as they would be to have their liberty,
* which side soever it were that should give it them. But would
' think that even those which are termed the good men *, if
* they had the government, would give them as much to do as
* the people, being contrivers and authors to the people, of do-
* ing those mischiefs against them, out of which they make
* most profit unto themselves. And that if the few had the
* rule, then they should be put to death unheard, and more
* violently than by the former, whereas the people is their re-
* fuge, and moderator of the others insolence. This,' he said,
* he was certain that the cities thought, in that they had
* learned the same by the actions themselves. x\nd that there-
* fore what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no means
* approved.'
But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only ap-
proved the present proposition, but also made preparation to
send Pisander and others ambassadors to Athens, to negociate
concerning the reduction of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the
democracy, and the procuring unto the Athenians the friend-
ship of Tissaphernes.
* KiLXu x£yaB»i. The best men, or aiisforracr, a diiTermce from the oligrar-
chy, which was of the richest sort only. For the good men who in the demo,
cracy are the people^s minions, and put the people opoit all they do, \vill do the
tame thino^K tlieniiflves, when they have the soTpreijnty in their hands.
448 THE HISTORY book vin.
Now Hirynichiis knowing that an overture was to be made
at Athens for the restoring of Aleibiades, and that the Athe-
nians would embrace it; and fearing lest being recalled he
should do him a mischief (in regard he had spoken against it)
as one that would have hindered the same, betook himself to this
coarse. He sends secret letters to Astyochus the Lacedemonian
general, who was yet about Miletus, and advertised him that
Alcibiades undid their affairs, and was procuring the friendship
of Tissaphernes for the Athenians, writing in plain terms the
whole business, and desiring to be excused if he rendered evil
to his enemy, with some advantage to his country. Astyochus
had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibia-
des, especially when he was not in his own hands. And going
to him to Magnesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them what
advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself
the appeachcr. For he adhered (as was said) to Tissaphernes
for his ])rivate lucre both in this, and in divers other matters,
which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the
abatement was made, he was not so stout in opposing it as he
ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sendeth letters pre-
sently to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phryni-
chus of what he had done, and requiring to have him put to
death. Phrynichus perplexed with this discovery, and brought
into danger indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what
was past as not well concealed, and promised now to be ready
to deliver unto him the whole army at Samos, to be destroyed ;
writing from point to point (Samos being unwalled) in what
manner he would do it; and saying, that since his life was
brought in danger, they could not blame him, though he did
this or any other thing, rather than be destroyed by his most
deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed unto Alcibiades.
But Phryniclnis having had notice betimes how he abused
him, and that letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner
come, he anticipates the news himself, and tells the army, that
whereas Samos was unwalled, and the gallies rid not all witliin,
the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour ; that he had
sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all
speed to raise a wall about the city, and put garrisons into other
places thereabouts. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and
it was in his ovv-n power to see it done. They then fell to wall-
ing, whereby Samos (which they meant toliave done howsoever)
was so much the sooner walled in. Not long after came let-
ters from Alcibiades, that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus,
and that the enemy purposed to invade the harbour where they
lay. But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be be-
lieved, but rather that having foreseen the design of the enemy,
BOOK vni. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 449
be went about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynicbus, as
conscious of it likewise. So that be did bim no burt by telling
it, but bare witness ratber of tbat wbicb Phrynicbus had told
them of before.
After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade
Tissapbernes to the friendship of the Athenians; for though
Tissapbernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet
was greater than that of the Athenians, yet if be bad been able,
he had a good will to have been persuaded by him ; especially
in his anger against the Peloponnesians, after the dissension at
Cnidus, about the league made by Theraraenes, (for they were
already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in
Rhodes) wherein that which bad been before spoken by Alci-
biades, bow that the coming of the Lacedemonians was to re-
store all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Licbas,
in that he said, it was an article not to be suffered, that the
king should hold those cities which he and his ancestors then
or before bad holden. Alcibiades therefore, as one that laboured
for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to Tissapbernes.
The Athenian ambassadors sent from Saraos with Pisander,
being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the
people. And related unto them summarily the points of their
business, and principally this; * That if they would call home
* Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the
* hands of the people, in such manner as it did, they might have
* the king for their confederate, and get the victorv of the Pe-
* loponnesians.' Now when many opposed that point, toucli-
ing the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured
withal, that it would be a horrible thing he should return by
forcing the government, when the Eumolpidae * and Ceryces f
bare witness against him concerning the mysteries for which
he fled, and prohibited his return under their curse. Pisander,
at this great opposition and querimony, stood out, and going
amongst them, took out one by one those that were against it,
and asked them, ' Whether, now that the Peloponnesians had
* as many gallies at sea to oppose them as they themselves had,
* and confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with
* money by the king and Tissapbernes, the Athenians being with-
* out, they had any other hope to save the state, but by persuad-
* ing the king to come about to their side ? And they that
• Eomolpidap, a family descended from Euinolpas, tbe author at Athens of the
mysteries of Ceres. This fainiljr bad the chief aotbority iu matters that concerned
those rites.
t Ceryces, heralds in war, ambassadors in peace. Suidas. They prononnced
all formal words in the ceremonies of their relig^ion, and were a family descended
from Ceryx, the son of Mercury.
450 THE HISTORY book viii.
were asked having nothing to answer; then in plain terms he
said unto them, * this you cannot now obtain, except we admi-
' nister the state with more moderation, and bring the power
* into the hands of a few, that the king may rely upon us.
' And we deliberate at this time, not so much about/ the form
^ as about the preservation of the state ; for if you mislike the
* form, you may change it again hereafter. And let us rccal
* Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring this to pass.'
The people hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously
at first : but when Pisander had proved evidently, that there
was no other way of safety ; in the end, partly for fear, and
partly because they hoped again to change the government, they
yielded thereunto. So they ordered, that Pisander and ten
others should go and treat both with Tissaphernes and^ with
Alcibiades, as to them should seem best. Withal, upon the
accusation of Pisander against Phrynichus, they discharged both
Phrynichus and Scironidas his fellow-commmissioner of their
command, and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet
in their places.
Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and said
he had betrayed liisus and Amorges, was only this, he thought
him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades.
Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations
(which were in the city before, for obtaining of places of judi-
cature and command) exhorting them to stand together, and
advise about deposing the democracy ; and when he had dis-
patched the rest of his business, so as there should be no more
cause for him to stay there, took sea with those other ten, to go
to Tissaphernes.
Leon and Diomedon arriving the same winter at the Athe-
nian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes, and finding there the
Peloponncsian gallies drawn up to land, disbarked and overcame
in battle such of the Rhodians as made head j and then put to
sea again, and went to Chalce. After this they made sharper
war upon them from Cos. For from thence they could better
observe the Peloponncsian navy when it should putvOfFfrom the
land.
In this while there arrived at Rhodes, Xenophontidas a La-
conian, sent out of Chios from Paedaritus, to advertise them
that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished,
and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole
fleet, the state of Ciiios must utterly be lost. And it was re-
solved to relieve them. But Ptedaritus in the mean time, v. ith
the whole power both of his own auxiliar forces, and of the
Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athe-
nians had made about tiieir navy, part whereof he won, and
BOOK Till. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 451
had gotten some gallies that were drawn on land. But the
Athenians issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians,
and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pasdaritus,
and slew Paedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians pri-
soners, and much armour. After this, the Chians were be-
sieged both by sea and land more narrowly, and great famine
was in the city.
Pisander and the other Athenian ambassadors that went
with him when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer
about the agreement. But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of
Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear too much of the Pe-
loponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as Alcibiades himself
had taught him, to weaken both sides yet more) betook him-
self to this shift ; that Tissaphernes should break off the treat}^,
by making to the Athenians exhorbitant demands. And it
seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing ;
Tissaphernes for fear, and Alcibiades for that when he saw Tis-
sapliernes not desirous to agree, though the offers were never so
great, he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could
not persuade him to it, but rather that he was already persuaded
and willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with suf-
ficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for
Tissaphernes, though he were also present, made unto them
such excessive demands, that though the Athenians should have
yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been at-
tributed to them, that the treaty went not on. For they de-
manded first, ' that all Ionia sliould be rendered.' Then again,
' The adjacent islands and other things, which the Athenians
* stood not against.' In fine, at the third meeting, when he
feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word,
he required, ' That they should suffer the king to build a navy,
' and sail up and down by their coast, wheresoever, and with
' what number soever of gallies he himself should think good.'
Upon this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming
the conditions intolerable, and that Alcibiades had abused
them ; and so went away in a chafe to Samos.
Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to
Caunus with intent both to bring the Peloponnesians back to
Miletus, and also (as soon as lie should have agreed unto new
articles such as he could get) to give the fleet their pay j and
not to fall directly out with them, for fear lest so many gallies
wanting maintenance, should either be forced by the Athe-
nians to fight, and so be overcome, or emptied of men, the bu-
siness might succeed with the Athenians according to their own
desire wiUiout him. Besides he was afraid, lest looking out
452 THE HISTORY »ook vni.
for maintenance, they should make spoil in the continent. In
consideration and foresight of all which things, he desired to
counterpoise the Grecians. And sending for the Peloponne-
sians, he gave them their pay, and now made the third league,
as followeth.
The third League betiveen Tissaphernes and the
Peloponnesians.
' In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas
' being ephore in Lacedemon, agreement was made in the
* plain of Maeander, between the Lacedemonians and their con-
* federates on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes, and
* the sons of Pharnaces on the other part ; concerning the af-
* fairs of the king, and of the Lacedemonians and their con-
' federates.
* That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king,
' shall be the king's still. And that concerning his own coun-
* tries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he
' shall think meet.
* That the Lacedemonians and their confederates shall not
* invade any of the territories of the king, to harm them ; nor
* the king the territories of the Lacedemonians or their confe-
* derates.
* If any of the Lacedemonians or their confederates shall in-
* vade the king's country to do it hurt, the Lacedemonians and
' their confederates shall oppose it. And if any of the king's
*^ country shall invade the Lacedemonians, or their confederates
* to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.
' That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on,
' maintain the present fleet, till the king's fleet arrive.
* That when the king's navy shall be come, the Lacedemo-
' nians and their confederates shall maintain their own navy
* themselves, if they please ; or if they will have Tissaphernes
* to maintain it, he shall do it : and that the Lacedemonians
* and their confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissa-
* phernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him.
' When the king's gallies shall be arrived, both they and the
' gallies of the Lacedemonians and their confederates shall
* make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the
' Lacedemonians, and their confederates shall seem good.
* And if they will give over the war against the Athenians, they
' shall give it over in the same manner.'
Such were the articles.
After this, Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the
BOOK. vm. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 453
Phoenician fleet, accorjiing to the agreement, and to do whatso-
ever else he had undertaken, desiring to have it seen at least
that he went about it.
In the end of this winter the Boeotians took Oropus by trea-
son. It had in it a garrison of Athenians. They that plotted
it were certain Eretrians, and some of Oropus itself, who were
then contriving the revolt of Eubata. For the place being
built to keep Eretria in subjection, it was impossible, as long
as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both
Eretria, and the rest of Euboea. Having Oropus in their
hands already, they came to Rhodes to call the Peloponnesians
into Euboea. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclina-
tion to relieve Chios now distressed ; and putting to sea, de-
parted out of Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were
come about Tropium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the
main sea, going from Chalce. And neither side assaulting
other, they put in, the one fleet atSamos, the other at Miletus.
For the Peloponnesians saw that they could not pass to relieve
Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter, and the twen-
tieth year of this war, written by Thucydides.
YEAR XXI.
The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercyli-
dus a Spartan, was sent by land into Hellespont with a small
army to work the revolt of Abydus, a colony of the Milesians.
And the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at a
stand how to help them, were compelled by the pressiu-e of the
siege to hazard a battle by sea.
Now whilst Astyochus lay in Rhodes, they had received into
the city of Chios, after the death of Paedaritus one Leon a
Spartan, that came along with Antisthenes as a private soldier,
and with him twelve gallics that lay at the guard of Miletus,
whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Ansa,
one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians
issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a cer-
tain place of strength, and put forth thirty-six gallies against
thirty-two of the Athenians, and fought. After a sharp
fight wherein the Chians and their associates had not the
worst ; and when it began to be dark, they retired again into
the city.
Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived now in Helles-
pont from Miletus by land, Abydus revolted to him and
to Pharnabazus. And two days after, revolted also Lamp-
sacus.
Strombichides having intelligence of this, made kasteihi-
454 THE HISTORY book vm.
ther from Chios, with four and twenty sail of Athenians,
(those being also of that number which transported his men of
arms.) And when he had overcome the Lampsacens, that
came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an open
town, at the first shout of their voices, and made prize of all
the goods they found, and of the slaves, he placed the freemen
there again, and went against Abydus. But when that city nei-
ther yielded, nor could be taken by assault, he crossed over
from Abydus to the opposite shore, and in Sestus a city of
Chersonesus, (possessed heretofore by the Medes) he placed a
garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.
In the mean time, not only the Chians had the sea at more
command, but Astyochus also ; and the army at Miletus hav-
ing been advertised what past in the fight by sea, and that
Strombichides and those gallies with him were gone away, took
heart. And Astyochus going to Chios with two gallies,
fetched away the gallies that were there, and with the whole
fleet now together, went against Samos. But seeing they of
Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came
not against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it
was about this time, that the democracy was put down at
Athens.
For after that Pisander and his fellow ambassadors that
had been with Tissaphernes, were come to Samos, they both
assured their affairs yet better in the army, and also pro-
voked the principal men of the Samians to attempt with them
the erecting of the oligarchy ; though there were then an in-
surrection amongst them against the oligarchy.
And withal the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst
themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let
him alone; (for indeed they thought him no fit man to come
into an oligarchy) but for themselves seeing they were already
engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business
from a relapse, and withal to sustain the war, and to contribute
money, and whatsoever else was needful, with alacrity out of
their private estates, and no more to toil for other than them-
selves. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the
ambassadors presently home to follow the business there, with
command to set up the oligarchy in all cities they were to
touch at by the way ; the other half they sent about, some to
one part of the state, and some to another. And they sent
away Diotrcphes to his charge, who was now about Chios, cho-
sen to go governor of the cities upon Tiirace.
He, when he came to Thasus, deposed the people. And
within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians
fortified their city, as needing no longer an aristocracy with the
ROOK. VIII. OF THE GRECIA>r WAR. 455
Athenians, but expecting liberty every day by the help of the
Lacedemonians. For there were also certain of them with the
Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athenians ; and these prac-
tised with §uch in the city as were for their purpose, to receive
gallies into it, and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for
them just as they would have it, that that estate of theirs was
set up without their danger, and that the people was deposed
that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasus it fell
out contrary to what those Athenians thought which erected
the oligarchy; and so in my opinion it did in many other
places of their dominion. For the cities now grown wise, and
withal resolute in their proceeding, sought a direct libertv, and
preferred not before it that outside of a well ordered government
introduced by the Athenians.
They vvitii Pisander, according to the order given them, en-
tering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democra-
cies, and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of
arms, they came to Athens, and found the business for the
greatest part dispatched to their hands by their complices be-
fore their coming. For certain young men combining them-
selves, had not only murdered Androcles privih-, a principal
patron of the popular government, and one that had his hand
the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades ; whom they slew
for two causes, for the sway he bare amongst the people, and to
gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return, and get
them the friendship of Tissaphernes ; but had also made away
divers men unfit for their design, in the same manner. They
had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in pub-
lic, wherein they said < that there ought none to receive wages
* but such as had served in the wars, nor to participate of
' the government more than five thousand ; and those such
* as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the
' commonwealth.*
And this with the most carried a good shew, because they
that would set forward the alteration of the state, were to have
the managing of the same. Yet the people and the council *
of tiie bean met still, but debated nothinc:, save what the con-
spirators thought fit. Nay, all that spake were of that num-
ber, and had considered before what they were to say. Nor
would any of the rest speak against them' for fear, and because
they saw the combination was great ; and if any man did, he
was quickly made away by one convenient means or other, and
no enquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted.
against any that was suspected.
HP sriiate or couicil of five hundred.
466 THE HISTORY kook viii.
But the people were so quiet, and so afraid, tliat every man
thought it gain to escape violence, though he said never a
word. Their hearts failed them because they thought the con-
spirators more than indeed they were; and to learn their num-
ber, in respect of the greatness of the city, and for that they
knew not one another, they were unable.
For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that
was angry at it, to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged
on them that conspired. For he must have told his mind, ei-
ther to one he knew not, or to one he knew and trusted not.
For the populars approached other^ every one with jealousy, as
if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such
amongst them as no man would have thought would ever have
turned to the oligarchy ; and those were they that caused in
the many that diffidence, and by strengthening the jealousy of
the populars one against another, conferred most to the security
of the few. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that
were with him coming in, fell in hand presently with the re-
mainder of the business. And first they assembled the people,
and delivered their opinion for ten men to be chosen with
power absolute, to make a draught of laws, and (having drawn
them) to deliver their opinion at a day appointed, before the
people, touching the best form of government for the city.
Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the as-
sembly to Colonus (which is a place consecrated to Neptune,
without the city about two furlongs off.) And they that were
appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this, ^that
* it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever
* opinion they pleased,' imposing of great punishments upon
whosoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating
the laws, or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was
in plain terms propounded, * that not any magistracy of the
* form before used, might any longer be in force, nor any fee
' belong unto it, but that five prytanes might be elected, and
* these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred
* take unto him three others. And these four hundred entering
' into the council-house, might have absohite authority to go-
* vern the state as they thought best, and to summon the five
' thousand as oft as to them should seem good.' He that de-
livered this opinion was Pisander, who was also otherwise
openly the forwardest to put down the democracy. But he
that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass,
and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon, a man for virtue
not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any
man, both to devise well, and also to express well what he had
BOOK vin. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 457
devised. And though he came not into the assemblies of the
people, nor willingly to any other debatings ; because the mul-
titude had him in jealousy for the opinion they had of the
power of his eloquence, yet when any man that had occasion of
suit, either in the courts of justice, or in the assembly of the
people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to
help him most. The same man, when afterwards the govern-
ment of the four hundred went down, and was vexed of the
people, was heard to plead for himself when his life was in ques-
tion for that business, the best of any man to this day.
Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oli-
garchy, and that more eminently than any other, because he
feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted with all his
practices at Samos with Astyochus ; and thought in all proba-
bility, that he would never return, to live under the govern-
ment of the few. And this man, in any matter of weight, ap-
peared the most sufficient to be relied on.
Also Theramenes the son of Agnon, an able man both for
elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of
those that overthrew the democracy. So that it is no mar\el
if the business took effect, being by many and wise men con-
ducted, though it were a hard one. For it went sore with the
Athenian people, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of
the tyrants, to be now deprived of their liberty, having not only not
been subject to any, but also for the half of this time, been in-
ured to dominion over others.
When the assembly (after it had passed these things
no man contradicting) was dissolved, then afterwards they
brought the four hundred into the council-house in this
manner. The Athenians were evermore partly on the walls,
and partly at their arms in the camp, in regard of the enemy
that lay at Decelea. Therefore on the day appointed, they
suffered such as knew not their intent to go forth as they
were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy, they
quietly gave order, not to go to the camp itself, but to'lag be-
hind at a certain distance, and if any man should oppose what
was in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They to whom
this charge was given, were the Andrians, Tenians, three hun-
dred Carystians, and such of the colony of iEgina which the
Athenians had sent thither to inhabit, as came on purpose to
this action with their own arms. These things thus ordered,
the four hundred, with every man a secret dagger, accompanied
with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece (whom
they used for occasions of shedding blood) came in upon the
459 THE HISTORY
BOOK VIII.
counsellors * of the bean, as they sat in the council-house,
and commanded them to take their salary, and be gone, which
also they brought ready with them for the whole time they
were behind, and paid it to them as they went out. And the
rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet.
The four hundred being now entered into the council-house,
created prytanes f amongst themselves by lot, and made their
prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at
the entrance upon the government. And afterwards, receding
far from that course, which in the administration of the state
was used by the people, saving that for Alcibiades' sake, they
recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the
commonwealth imperiously. And not only slew some, though
not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and im-
prisoned some, and confined others to places abroad, but also
sent heralds to Agis king of the Lacedemonians, who was at
Decelea, signifying tliat they would come to composition with
bim, and that now he might better treat with them, than he
might before with the inconstant people.
But he not imagining that the city was yet in quiet, nor
willing so soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather
that if they saw him approach with great forces, they would be
in tumult ; not yet believing fully, but that some stir or other
would arise amongst them, gave no answer at all to those that
came from the four hundred, touching the composition ; but
having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus,
came down himself not long after, both with the army at De-
celea, and those new comers, to the Athenian walls. Hoping
that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at
least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at the
very first shout of their voices ; in respect of the tumult that
in all likelihood was to happen both within and without the
city. For, as the Long walls, in regard of the few defendants
likely to be found upon them he thought he could not fail to
take them. But when he came near, and the Athenians were
without any the least alteration within, and had with their
horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men of
arms, and of tiieir light-armed, and of their archers, overthrown
some of his men that approached too near, and gotten some
• Tl)c senate or council of five hundred, made by lot, in whicii lot tlicy tised
bcniis, wliite and black.
t These were presidents in the council of the five hundred, in nuuihcrtcn,and in
turns niodernted, and put the qucstiou in that council, and also in the assemblies
of the people.
B60K vni. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 459
arms and bodies of the slain ; rectified thus, he withdrew his
army again, and himself and such as were with him before
stayed in their place at Decelea ; but, as for those that came
last, after they had staid awhile in the country, he sent them
home again. After this, the four hundred, notwithstanding
their former repulse, sent ambassadors unto Agis anew, and he
now received them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors
also to Lacedemon about an agreement, being desirous of
peace.
They likewise sent ten men to Samos to satisfy the army,
and to tell them, ' that the oligarchy was not set up to any pre-
* judice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole
* state. And that they which had their hands in it were five
* thousand, and not four hundred only. Notwithstanding that
* the Athenians, by reason of warfare and employment abroad,
* never assembled, of how great consequence soever was the
* matter to be handled, so frequent as to be five thousand there
* at once.' And having in other things instructed them how
to make the best of the matter, they sent them away imme-
diately after the government was changed, fearing (as also it
fell out) lest the seafaring multitude would not only not con-
tinue in this oligarchical form themselves, but (the mischief
beginning there) would depose them also.
For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy
already. And this that foUoweth happened about the same
that the four hundred were set up in Athens. Those Samians
that had risen against the nobility and were of the peoples' side,
turning when Pisander came thither, at the persuasion of him and
of those Athenians in Samos that were his complices, conspired
together to the number of three hundred, and were to have as-
saulted the rest as populars ; and one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow,
who not for any fear of his power, or for any dignity, but for
wickedness of life, and dishonour he did the city, had been
banished by ostracism, they slew ; abetted therein both by
Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that
were amongst them, who had given them their faith ; and toge-
ther with these they committed other facts of the same kind,
and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side, but
they having gotten notice thereof, made known the design both
to the generals Leon and Diomedon, (for these bein^ honoured
by the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly) and also
to Thrasibulus and Thrasillus, whereof one was captain of a gaily,
and the other captain of a band of men of arms, and to such
others continually as they thought stood in greatest opposition to
the conspirators ; and required of them, that they would not see
460 THE HISTORY book viii.
them destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians, by
the only means of which their dominion had till this time kept
itself in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to the soldiers,
and exhorted them one by one, not to suffer it, especially to the
Paralians (who were all Athenians and free-men come thither
in the gaily called Paralus, and had always before been enemies
to the oligarchy." And Leon, and Diomedon, whensoever they
went forth any whither, left them certain gallies for their guard.)
So that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of
the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Para-
lians, had the upper hand, and of the three hundred slew thirty.
Three of the chief authors they banished, and burying in obli-
vion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time for-
ward as a democracy.
The Paralus, and in it Chaereas the son of Archestratus a man
of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this
change, the Samians and the soldiers dispatched presently away
to Athens, to advertise them of what was done ; for they knew
not yet that the government was in the hands of the four hun-
dred. When they arrived, the four hundred cast some two or
three of these of the Paralus into prison; the rest after they had
taken the gaily from them, and put aboard another military gaily,
they commanded to keep guard about Euboea. But Chaereas
by some means or other, getting presently away, seeing how
things went, came back to Samos, and related to the army all
that the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost;
^ As that they punished every man with stripes, to the end that
' none should contradict the doings of those that bore rule ; and
' that their wives and children at home were abused ; and that
* they had an intention farther to take and imprison all that were
* of kin to any of the army which was not of their faction, to the
* intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their
* authority.' And many other things he told them, adding lies
of his own.
When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen
upon the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such of the rest
as were partakers of it. Yet afterwards, being hindered by such
as came between, and advised them not to overthrow the state,
the enemy lying so near with their gallies to assault them, they
gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus the son of Lycas, and
Thrasyllus (for these were the principal authors of the change)
determined now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a de-
mocracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligar-
chicals, the greatest they could devise, both * that they should
* be subject to the democracy, and agree together, and also that
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 461
* they should zealously prosecute the Peloponnesians, and withal
* be enemies to the four hundred, and not have to do with them
* by ambassadors.' The oath was taken by all the Samians that
were of age, and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them
their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of
their dangers. For whom and for themselves they made ac-
count there was no refuge of safety, but that if either the four
hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must
needs perish.
So there was a contention at this time, one side compelling
the city to a democracy, the other, the army to an ohgarchy.
And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called,
wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such cap-
tains of gallies as they had in suspicion of their charge, and
chose others, both captains of gallies and commanders in their
places, of which Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And
they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise and
with this, ^ That they had no cause to be dejected for the cities
* revolting from them ; for they at Athens being the lesser
* part, had forsaken them, who were not only the greater part,
* but also every way better provided. For they ha\ing the
' whole navy could compel the rest of the cities subject unto
* them, to pay in their money as well now as if they were to set
* out from Athens itself. And that they also had a citv,
* namely Samos, no weak one, but even such a one, as when
* they were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion of
* the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of the war was
' the same as it was before; and that they should be better able
' to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy,
* than they should be that were at home in the city. And that
* they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiraeus both
* formerly by the favour of them at Samos, and that now also,
* unless they restore them the government, they shall be again
' brought to that pass, that those at Samos shall be better able
* to bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be to bar it
* them of Samos. That it was a trifle, and worth nothing which
* was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city,
' and a small matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had nei-
* ther any more silver to send them, (for the soldiers shifted for
* themselves) nor yet good direction, which is the the thing for
' which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that
* in this point they erred which were at Athens, in that they
* had abrogated the laws of their country, whereas they at Sa-
' mos did both observe the same themselves, and endeavour to
* constrain the other to do so likewise. So that such of them
462 THE HISTORY book vim.
' in the camp as should give good counsel, were as good as they
' in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his
' security and his return, would with all his heart procure the
* king to be their confederate. And that, which is the main
' thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet
* they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they
* might find both city and territory.'
When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly, and
encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times,
whatsoever was necessary for the war. And the ten ambassa-
dors which were sent to Samos from the four hundred, hearing
of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already,
staid still there.
About the same time also the soldiers of the Peloponnesian
fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves, that Astyochus
and Tissaphernes, overthrew the state of their affairs. Astyo-
chus in refusing to fight, before, when their own fleet was
stronger, and that of the Athenians but small, and also now,
whilst they were said to be in sedition, and their fleet divided ;
and in expecting the Phosnician fleet in fame not in fact to come
from Tissaphernes; and Tissaphernes, in that he not only
brought not in that fleet of his, but also impaired theirs, by not
giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually j and that
they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard
battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.
Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the mur-
mur, and had in council resolved to fight, especially after they
were informed that Samos was in a tumult, putting forth with
theirwholefleet,tothenumberofonehundredandtwenty-onesail,
with order given to the Milesians to march by land to the same
place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians being come out
from Samos with their fleet of eighty-two gallies, and riding
now at Glauce of the territory of Mycale (for in this part
of Mycale, Samos is but a little way from the continent)
when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against
them, put in again to Samos, as not esteeming themselves
a sufficient number to hazard their whole fortune on the
battle. Besides, they staid for the coming of Strombi-
chides from Hellespont to their aid, (for they saw that they
of Miletus had a desire to figlit) with tiiose gallies that went
from Chios against Abydus; for they had sent unto him before.
So these retired into Samos. And the Peloponnesians, putting
in at Mycale, there encamped, as also did the land forces of the
Milesians, and others of the country thereabout. The next day,
when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 463
news that Strombichides with his gallies was arrived out of Hel-
lespont, and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the
Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these gallies,
went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, intend-
ing to fight : but when no body came out against them, they
likewise went back to Samos.
Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians,
who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding them-
selves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and
were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of
so great a number of gallies, sent Clearchus the son of Rham-
phias with forty gallies (according to the order at first from Pe-
loponnesus) to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus him-
self had sent for, and promised to pay them, but they were ad-
vertised besides, by ambassadors, that Byzantium had a pur-
pose to revolt. Hereupon these Peloponnesian gallies having
put out into the main sea, to the end that they might not be
seen as they passed by, and tossed with tempests, part of them
(which were the greatest number) and Clearchus with them got
into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again : (but Cle-
archus went thence again into the Hellespont by land, and
had the command there,) and part under the charge of Elixus a
Magarean (which were ten sail) went safely through into the
Hellespont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this,
when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain gallies into
Hellespont to oppose them, and to be a guard to the cities
thereabouts ; and there followed a small fight between them, of
eight gallies to eight, before Byzantium.
In the mean time, they that were in authority at Samos, and es-
pecially Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed,
was still of the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in an
assembly persuaded the soldiers to the same. And when they
had decreed for Alcibiades, both his return and his security, he
went to Tissaphernes, and fetched Alcibiades to Samos, account-
ing it their only means of safety to win Tissaphernes from
the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called,
Alcibiades complained of and lamented the calamity of his own
exile, and speaking much of the business of the state, gave
them no small hopes of the future time hyperboHcally mag-
nifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to the end that both
they which held the oligarchy at home, might the more fear
him, and so the conspiracies dissolve, and also those at Samos
the more honour him, and take better heart unto themselves :
and withal that the enemy might object the same to the utter-
most to Tissaphernes, and fall from their present hopes. Alcibia-
des therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that
Tissaphernes had undertaken to him,aslongthat as he had any thing
464 THE HISTORY book vni.
left, if he might but trust the Athenians, they should never want
maintenance, no though he should be constrained to make money
of his own bed ; and that he would fetch the Phoenician fleet
now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians, but to the Athe-
nians. And that then only he would rely upon the Athenians
when Alcibiades called home, should undertake for them.
Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently for ge-
neral, together with those that were before, and committed unto
them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was
not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of sub-
sisting themselves, and being revenged of the four hundred, for
any good in the world ; and were ready even then, upon those
words of his, contemning the enemy there present, to set sail
for Peiraeus. But he, though many pressed it, by all means for-
bad their going against Peiraeus, being to leave their enemies so
near; but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said,
to go to Tissaphernes first, and to dispatch such business with
him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake
up, he took his journey accordingly, to the end that he might
seem to communicate every thing with him, and for that he de-
sired also to be in more honour with him, and to shew that he
was general, and a man capable to do him good or hurt. And
it liappened to Alcibiades that he awed the Athenians with Tis-
saphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.
When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus heard that
Alcibiades was gone home, whereas they mistrusted Tissapher-
nes before, now they much more accused him. For it fell out,
that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before
Miletus, they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became
thereby a great deal slacker in his payment, and besides that he
was hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake, the soldiers
now meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another
tlie same matters which they had noted before ; and some also
men of value, and not the common soldier alone, recounted this
withal, how they had never had their full stipend, that the al-
lowance was but small, and yet not continually paid ; and that
unless they either fought, or went to some other place where they
might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet, and
that the cause of all this was in Astyochus, who for private lucre
gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes. Whilst tJiesc were
upon this consideration, there happened also a certain tumult
about Astyochus. For the mariners of the Syracusians and
Thurians, by how much they were a multitude that had greater
liberty then the rest, with so much stouter importunity tiiey
demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat
an insolent answer, but also threatened Doricus, tliat amongst
the rest spake for the soldiers under himself, and lift up his. staff
BOOK viii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 465
against him. When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry
liJce seamen indeed all at once, and were running upon Astyo-
chus to have strucken him. But foreseeing it, he fled to an al-
tar, and was not stricken, but they were parted again.
The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by
Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it, and cast out the gar-
rison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the
confederates, and especially by the Syracusians well approved
of, but Lichas liked them not ; saying it behoved the Milesians,
and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, to have
obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and, till such time
as the war should have been well dispatched, to have courted
him. And the Milesians, for this and other things of this kind,
were offended with Lichas, and afterwards when he died of
sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place,
where the Lacedemonians then present would have had him.
Whilst they were quarrelling about their business with As-
tyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus cometh in from Lacede-
mon, to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet. And as
soon as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus de-
parted. But with him Tissaphernes sent a Carian, named
Cauleites, one that spake both the languages *, both to accuse
the Milesians about the fort, and also to make an apology for
himself. Knowing that the Milesians went principally to ex-
claim upon him, and that Hermocrates went with them, and
would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Pe-
loponnesians, with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For
he was continually at enmity with him, about the payment of
the soldiers wage*; and in the end, when Hermocrates was
banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the SjTacu-
sian fleet, namely, Potamis, Miscon, and Demarchus, were ar-
rived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him, being
an outlaw then before, and accused him amongst other things,
that he had asked him money, and because he coiUd not have
it, became his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates and
the Milesians went their way to Lacedemon.
Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes,
to Samos. And those ambassadors of the four hundred, which
had been sent out before to mollify and to inform those of
Samos, came from Delos, now, whilst Alcibiades was present.
An assembly being called, they were offering to speak, but
the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out to have
them put to death, for that they had deposed the people ; yet
afterwards with much ado they were calmed, and gave them
* Both (ireck a ml Persian.
hU
466 THE HISTORY book vm.
hearing. They declared, ^ that the change had been made for
* the preservation of the city, not to destroy it, nor to deliver it
' to the enemy ; for they could have done that before noM',
' when the enemy during their government, assaulted it. That
* every one of the five thousand was to participate of the go-
* vernment in their turns. And their friends were not (as
' Chereas had laid to their charge) abused, nor had any wrong
* at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own.*
Though they delivered this, and much more, yet the soldiers
believed them not, but raged still, and declared their opinions,
some in one place, some in another, most agreeing in this, to
go against Peiraeus. And now Alcibiades appeared the first and
principal man in doing service to the commonwealth. For
when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade
themselves, (in which case most manifestly the enemy had
presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont) it was
thought that he was the man that kept them from it. Nor
was there any man at that time able to have held in the multi-
tude but himself. He both made them to desist from the
voyage, and rated oft' from the ambassadors, those that were in
their own particular incensed against them ; whom also he sent
away, giving them their answer himself: ' That he opposed not
' the government of the five thousand, but willed them to remove
* the four hundred, and to establish the council that was before
' of five hundred. That if they had frugally cut off" any ex-
* pence, so that such as were employed in the wars might be the
' better maintained, he did much commend them for it.' And
withal he exhorted them ' to stand out, and give no ground to
* their enemies ; for that as long as the city held out, there
* was great hope for them to compound ; but if either part mis-
* carry once, either this at Samos, or the other at Athens,
* there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal.'
There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Ar-
gives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos,
to assist them. "^Pliese Alcibiades commended, and appointed
to be ready when they sliould be called for, and so dismissed
them. These Arglves came in with those of the Paralus that
had been bestowed formerly in the military gaily by the four
hundred, to go about Euboea, and to convoy Lcspodias, Aris-
tophon, and Milesias, ambassadors from the four hundred to
Lacedemon. These, as they sailed by Argos, seized on the
ambassadors, and delivered them as principal men in deposing
of the people to the Argives, and returned no more to Athens,
but came with the gaily they then were in to Samos, and
brought with them these ambassadors from tiie Argives.
The same summer Tissaphernes at the time that the Pelo-
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 467
ponnesians were offended with him most, both for tlie going
home of Alcibiades, and divers other things, as now atticizing,
with purpose (as indeed it seemed) to clear himself to them
concerning his accusations, made ready his journey to Aspendus
for the Phoenician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with
him ; saying, that he would substitute Tamos his deputy lieu-
tenant over the army, to pay the fleet whilst himself was ab-
sent.
This matter is diversely reported, and it is hard to know
with what purpose he went to Aspendus, and yet brought not
the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hun-
dred and forty- seven sail of the Phoenicians were come
forward as far as Aspendus, but why th^y came not through,
the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design
(as he formerly intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces,
(for which cause also Tamos, who liad thai charge, made no
better but rather worse payment than himself.) Others, that
having brought the Phoenicians as far as Aspendus, he might
dismiss them for money ; (for he never meant to use their ser-
vice.) Some said it was because they exclaimed so against it
at Lacedemon, and that it might not be said he abased them,
but that he went openly to a fleet really set out.
For ray own part, I think it most clear, that it was to the
end to consume and to balance the Grecians, that he brought
not those gallies in. Consuming them, in that he went thither
and delayed the time ; and equalizing them, in that bringing
them to neither, he made neither party the stronger. For if
he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have
been sure to have done it. For if he had brought them to the
Lacedemonians, in all reason he had given them the victory,
who had a navy already, rather equal than inferior to that of
their enemies.
But that which hurt them most was the pretence he alleged
for not bringing the fleet in, for he said they were not so many
sail as the king had ordained to be gotten together. But sure
he might have ingratiated himself more in this business, by dis-
patching it with less of the king's money, than by spending
more. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to
Aspendus, and was with the Phcenicians, and by his own ap-
pointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip a Lacedemonian with
him with two gallies, as to take charge of the fleet.
Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to
Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen gallies, promising to
those at Samos, a safe and great benefit, which was, that he
would either bring those Phoenician gallies to the service of the
Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponne-
Am THli HISTORY book viii.
sians ; knowing, as is likely, tlie mind of Tissaphernes by long
acquaintance, that he meant not to bring them on, and desir-
ing, as much as he could, to procure* him the ill will of the
Peloponnesians, for the friendship shewn to himself and to the
Athenians^ that he might thereby the better engage him to take
their part. So he presently put to sea, holding his course for
Phaselis and Caunus upwards.
The ambassadors of the four hundred being returned from
Samos to Athens, and having related what they had in charge
from Alcibiades, how that he exhorted them to hold out, and
not give ground to the enemy, and that he had great hopes to
reconcile them to the army, and to overcome the Peloponne-
sians ; whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were for-
merly discontented, and would gladly, if they could have done
it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a great deal
more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their
meetings apart, and did cast their aspersions on the govern-
ment, and had for their ring-leaders some of the heads of the
oligarchicals, and such as bare office amongst them, as Thera-
menes the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates the son of Sicelias,
and others, who though they were partakers with the foremost
in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and
the army at Samos ; and joined in the sending ambassadors to
Laccdemon, because they were loth by singling themselves from
the greater number, to hurt the state : not that they dismissed
the state into the hands of a very few; but said that the five
thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only,
and the government to be reduced to a greater equality. And
this was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hun-
dred. But the most of them through private ambition fell upon
that, by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly
overthrown. For at once they claimed every one, not to be
equal, but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when
election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals,
he can better brook it. But the great ])ower of Alcibiades at
Samos, and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not like
to last, was it that most evidently encouraged them ; and there-
upon they every one contended, who should most eminently
become th.e patron of the people.
But tliose of the four hundred that were most opposite to
sucii a form of government, and the principal of thera, both
Phrynichus (who had been general at Samos, and was ever since
at difference with Alcibiades) and Aristarchus, a man that had
been an adversary to the people, both in the greatest manner,
and for the longest time; and Pisander and Antiphon, and
others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they
BOOK. VIII. OF '4ME GRECIAN WAl^ 469
entered into authority, and afterward when tlie state at Samos
revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to Lacedemon, and
bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and built a wall in the
place called Eetioneia; but much more afterwards, when their
ambassadors were come from Samos, and tliat they saw not only
the populars, but also some others of their own party, tliou«'ht
trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedemon they sent
Antiphon and Phrynichus, with ten others, with all possible
speed, as fearing their adversaries both at home and at Samos,
with commission to make a peace with the Lacedemonians on
any tolerable conditions whatsoever, or howsoever, and in this
time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia with
greater diligence than before. The scope thev had in this wail,
as it was given out by Theramenes the son of Agnon, was not
so much to keep out those of Samos, in case they should at-
tempt by force to enter into Peiraeus, as at their pleasure to be
able to let in both the gallies, and land forces of the enemies.
For this Eetioneia is the peer of the Peiraeus, close unto which
is the mouth of the haven ; and therefore they built this wall^
so to another wall, that was built before to the continerrt, that
a few men lying within it, might command the entrance. For
the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the very
mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the conti-
nent, as of the new which was built within it to the water.
They built also an open ground gallery *, an exceeding great
one, and close to their new wall within Peirffius, and were mas-
ters of it, and constrained all men, as well to bring thither
their corn, which they had already come in, as to unload there
whatsoever should come in afterward, and to take and sell it
from thence.
These things Theramenes murmured at long before, and
when the ambassadors returned to Lacedemon, without com-
pounding for them all in general, he gave out, that this wall
would endanger the city. For at this very instant there hap-
pened to be riding on the coast of Laconia forty-two gallies
(amongst whicli were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some
Italians, and some Sicilians) set out from Peloponnesus, at the
instance of the Euboeans, bound for Euboea, and commanded
by Hegesandridas, the son of Hegesander a Spartan. And these
Theramenes said were coming, not so much towards Euboea,
as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia,. and that if they
were not looked to, they would surprise the city. Now some
matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were
accused, so that it was not a mere slander. For their principal
design was to retain the oligarchy, with dominion over tlieir
470 THE HISTORY nooK viii.
confederates; but If they failed of that, yet being masters of the
gallies and of the fortification, to have subsisted free them-
selves ; if barred that, then, rather than to be the only men to
suffer death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy,
and without either navy or fortification to have let what would
have become of the city, and to have compounded for the safety
of their own persons.
Therefore they went diligentlyon with the fortification,wherein
were wickets and entries, and back-ways for the enemy, and
desired to have it finished in time. And though these things
were spoken but amongst a few before, and in secret, yet when
Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedemonian ambassage,
was by a certain watchman wounded treacherously in the market-
place, when it was full, as he went from the council-house, and
not far from it, fell instantly dead, and the murtherer gone ;
and that one of his complices, an Argive, taken by the four
hundred, and put to the torture, would confess no man of those
named to him, nor any thing else, saving this, that many men
used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch, and
at the other houses ; then at length, because this accident bred
no alteration, Therames and Aristocrates, and as many other,
eitiier of the four hundred, or out of that number, as were of the
same faction, proceeded more boldly to assault the government.
For now also the fleet being come about Laconia, and lying
upon the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon /I^gina.
AndTheramenes thereupon alleged, that it was improbable that
those gallies holding their course for Euboea, would have put in
at iEgina, and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus,
unless they had been sent for by such men as he had ever ac-
cused of the same ; and that therefore there was no reason any
longer to sit still. And In the end, after many seditious and
suspicious speeches, they fell upon the state In good earnest.
For the soldiers that were in Peiraeus, employed in fortifying
Eetioneia (amongst whom was also Aristocrates captain of a
band of men, and his band with him) seized on Alexlcles, prin-
cipal commander of the soldiers under the four hundred, an
eminent man of the other side, and carrying him into a house,
kept him In hold. As soon as the news hereof was brought
unto the four hundred, (who chanced at the same time to be
sitting In the council-house) they were ready all of them pre-
sently to have taken arms, threatening Theramenes and his fac-
tion.
He, to purge himself, was ready to go with them, and to lielp
to rescue Alexlcles, and taking with liim one of the commanders,
who was also of ins faction, went down into Peintus. To help
lilm went also Arlstarchus and certain horsemen of the younger
sort.
looK vm. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 4/1
Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they
thought Peirffius was already taken, and him that was laid in
hold, slain. And in Peirasus they expected every hour the power
of the city to come upon them. At last the ancient men stop-
ping them that ran up and down tlie city to arm themselves,
and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the cities' host *, being then there,
going boldly and close up to every one he met, and crying out
unto them not to destroy their country, when the enemy lay so
near waiting for an advantage, with much ado quieted them,
and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes
coming into Peiraeus, for he also had command over the soldiers,
made a shew by his exclaiming, of being angry with them ;
but Aristarchus and those that were of the contrary side, were
extremely angry in good earnest. Nevertheless, the soldiers
went on with their business, and repented not a jot of what they
had done. Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought this
fortification were made to any good end, and whether it were not
better to have it demolished. And he answered, tliat if they
thought good to demolish it, he thought the same. At wjiich
word they presenlly got up, both the soldiers, and also many
others of Peirasus, and fell to the digging down of the wall.
Now the provocation that they used to the multitude, was in
these words : * that whosoever desired that the sovereignty should
' be in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, ought also
* to set himself to the work in hand.' For notwithstanding all
this, they thought fit as yet to vail the democracy with the
name of tlie five thousand, and not to say plainly, ' whosoever
* will have the sovereignty in the people,' lest the five thousand
should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to
some or other of them, might do hurt to the business, through
ignorance. And for this cause it was, that the four hundred
would neither let tiie five thousand be extant, nor yet let it be
known that they were not. For to make so many participant
of the affairs of state, they thought was a direct democracy,
but to have it doubtful, would make them afraid of one an-
other. The next day, the four hundred, though out of order,
yet met together in the council-house, and the soldiers in Pei-
rteus having enlarged Alexicles, whom they had before impri-
soned, and quite razed the fortification, came into the theatre
of Bacchus near to Mynichia, and there sat down with their
arms, and presently according as they had resolved in an as-
sembly then holden, marched into the city, and there sat down
again in the temple of Castor and Pollux. To this place came
• Xlfi^ttts- He tliat lodged tUe Athenians when any of llicra came to Phar-
sulus.
472 THE HISTORY rook viii.
unto them certain men elected by the four hundred, and man to
man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of the
mildest temper, both to be quiet themselves, and to restrain
the rest ; saying, that not only the 5000 should be made known
who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in
turns, to be of the four hundred, as the five thousand should think
good ; and entreating them by all means that they would not
in the mean time overthrow the city, and force it into the hand
of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men of
arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew calmer,
and feared most the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed
between them, that an assembly should be held for making of
accord, in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned.
When they came to the temple of Bacchus, and wanted but
a little of a full assembly, came news that Hegesandriadas with
his forty-two gallics, came from Megara, along the coast to-
wards Salamis. And now there was not a soldier but thought
it the very same thing that Theramenes and his party had before
told them, ' that those gallics were come to the fortification,
* and that it was now demolished to good purpose.' But He-
gesandriadas perhaps upon appointment hovered upon the coast
of Epidaurus, and thereabouts j but it is likely that in respect
of the sedition of the Athenians, he staid in those parts, with
hope to take hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was,
the Athenians, as soon as it was told them, ran presently with
all the power of the city, down to Peirseus ; less esteeming
their domestic war, than that of the common enemy, which was
not now far off, but even in the haven. And some went aboard
the gallics that were then ready, some launched the rest, and
others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.
But the Peloponnesian gallics being now gone by, and got-
ten about the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between
Thoricus and Prasise, and put in afterwards at Oropus. The
Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumul-
tuary forces, such as a city in time of sedition could afford,
and desirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake
(for Euboea, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they
had) sent a fleet under the command of Timocharis to Eretria.
Which arriving with those gallics that were in Euboea before,
made up the number of thirty-six sail; and they were presently
constrained to hazard battle. For Hegesandriadas brought out
his gallics from Oropus, when he had first there dined.
Now Oropus is from Eretria about three score furlongs at sea.
Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards
them, began to embark, supposing that their soldiers had been
somewliere near unto the gallics ; but it fell out that they were
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 473
gone abroad to get their dinner, not in the market (for by set
purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall
upon the Athenians, that embarked slowly, before they were
ready, and force them to come out and fight, nothing was there
to be sold) but in the outmost houses of the city. There was
beside a sign set up at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus at
what time to set forward.
The Athenians drawn out by this device, and fighting before
the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for a while,
but afterwards turned their backs and were chased ashore. Such
as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend,
were handled most cruelly, and slaughtered by them of the
town ; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the
Athenians, saved themselves : and so did so many of their gal-
lies as got to Chalcis.
The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twelve Athenian
gallies with the men, whereof some they slew, and some they
took prisoners, erected a trophy ; and not long after, having
caused all Eubcea to revolt, save only Oreus (which tiie Athe-
nians held with their own forces) they settled the rest of their
business there.
When the news of that which had happened in Euboea was
brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest as-
tonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did
their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other
at any time so much affright them, as this. For now when
the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more
gallies nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition
amongst themselves, and in continual expectation of falling to-
gether by the ears, then in the neck of all, arrived this great ca-
lamity; wherein they not only lost their gallies, but also,
which was worst of all, Euboea, by which they had received
more commodity than by Attica. How then could they choose
but be dejected ? But most of all they were troubled, and that
for the nearness, with a fear, lest upon this victory, the enemy
should take courage, and come immediately into Peiraeus, now
empty of shipping, of which they thought nothing wanting,
but that they were not there already. And had they been any
thing adventurous, they might easily have done it, and then
had they staid there and besieged them, they had not only in-
creased the sedition, but also compelled the fleet to come away
from Ionia, to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city,
though enemies to the oligarchy ; and in the mean time gotten
the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands and all places even to Eubcea,
and, as one may say, the whole iVthenian empire into their
power. But the Lacedemonians not only in this, but in many
474 THE HISTORY
BOOK VIII.
other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians
to war ^yithal. For being of most different humours, the one
swift, the other slow, the one adventurous, the other timorous,
the Lacedemonians gave tliem great advantage, especially when
their greatness was by sea. This was evident in th6 Syracu-
sians, who being in condition like unto them, warred best
against them.
The Athenians upon this news made ready notwithstanding
twenty gallies, and called an assembly, one then presently in
the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at
other times, in which having deposed the four hundred, they de-
creed the sovereignty to the five thousand, of which number
were all such to be as were charged witii arms; and from that
time forward to salariate no man for magistracy, with a penalty
on the magistrate receiving the salary to be held for an execra-
ble person. There were also divers other assemblies held af-
terwards, wherein they elected law-makers, and enacted other
things concerning the government. And now first, (at least
in my time) the Athenians seemed to have ordered their state
aright : which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the
few and of the many. And this was the first thing that,
after so many misfortunes past, made the city again to raise
her head.
They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, and those that
were in exile with him ; and sending to him, and to the
army at Samos, willed them to fall in hand with their
business.
In this c])ange, Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were
with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy,
immediately withdrew themselves to Decelea. Only Aristar-
chus (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers) took
with him certain archers of the most barbarous, and went with
all speed to Oenoe. This was a fort of the Athenians in the
confines of Boeotia, and (for the loss that the Corinthians had
received by the garrison of Oenoe) was by voluntary Corinthians,
and by some Boeotians by them called in to aid them, now be-
sieged. Aristarchus therefore having treated with these de-
ceived those in Oenoe, and told them, that the city of Athens
had compounded with the Lacedemonians, and that they were
to render up the place to the Boeotians, for that it was so con-
ditioned in the agreement. Whereupon believing him, as one
that had authority over the soldiery, and knowing nothing be-
cause besieged, upon security for their pass, they gave up the fort.
So the Boeotians received Oenoe ; and the oligarchy and sedi-
tion at Athens ceased.
About the sam« time of this summer, when none of
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 475
those whom Tissaphernes at his going to Aspendus, had sub-
stituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus, did it ;
and seeing neither the PhcEnieian fleet nor Tissaphernes came to
them ; and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and also
another, one Hippocrates, a Spartan, that was lying in Phasales,
had written to Mindarus the general, that the fleet was not to
come at all, ^nd in every thing Tissaphernes abused them ;
seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was will-
ing upon the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also,
as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within
his own province to revolt from the Athenians. Then at length
Mindarus hoping for benefit by him, with good order and sud-
den warning, that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware
of their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventy-
three gallics, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone
into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part of Chersonesus.
But tossed with the winds, he was forced to put in at Icarus,
and after he had staid there, through ill weather, some five or
six days, he arrived at Chios.
Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from
Miletus, he also puts to sea at Samos, with five and fifty sail,
hastening to be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing
that he was in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there,
he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos, and in the continent over
against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove with-
out his knowledge; and he himself going to Methymna, com-
manded provision to be made of meal, and other necessaries,
intending if they staid there long to go from Lesbos, and in-
vade them in Chios.
Withal, because Eressus was revolted from I^esbos, he pur-
posed to go thither with his fleet, if he could, to take it in.
For the most potent of the Methymnsean exiles had gotten into
their society about fifty men of arms out of Syme, and hired
others out of the continent, and with their whole number, in all
three hundred, having for their leader Anaxarchus, a Theban,
chosen in respect of their descent from the Thebans, first as-
saulted Methymna, but beaten in the attempt by the Athenian
garrison that came against them from Mitylene, and again in
a skirmish without the city driven quite away, they passed by
the way of the mountain to Eressus, and caused it to revolt.
Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his gallics,
and to assault it. At his coming, he found Thrasybulus there
also before him, with five gallies from Samos : for he had been
advertised of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to pre-
vent them, he went to Eressus, and lay before it at anchor.
Hither also came two gallies of Methymna, that were going
476 THE HISIORY
BOOK VIII.
home from the Hellespont ; so that they were in all threescore
and seven sail, out of which they made an army, intending
with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eressus
by assault.
In the mean time Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet that
was at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their
gallics, and had received of the Chians, three Chian * Tessara-
costes a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios ;
and kept far from the shore, that they might not fall amongst
the gallies at Eressus. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand,
went to the continent side, and putting in at a haven in Crate-
rei, belonging to the territory of Phoca3a, and there dining,
passed along the territory of Syme, and came to Arginusae in
the continent over against Mitylene, where they supped. From
thence they put forth late in the night, and came to Hermatus,
a place in the continent over against Methymna, and after din-
ner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Harmaxitus, and
other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to Rhae-
tium ; this now is in Hellespont. But some of his gallies put
in at Sigeum and other places thereabouts.
The Athenians that lay with eighteen gallies at Sestus, knew
that the Peloponnesians were entering into the Hellespont by the
fires, both those which their own watchmen put up, and by the
many which appeared on the enemies' shore, and therefore the
same night, in all haste, as they were, kept the shore of Cher-
sonesus towards Elaeus, desiring to get out into the wide sea,
and to decline the fleet of the enemy j and went out unseen of
those sixteen gallies that lay at Abydus (though these had warn-
ing before from the fleet of their friends that came on to watch
them narrowly that they went not out) but in the morning
being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus, and chased by him,
they could not all escape, but the most of them got to the con-
tinent, and into Lemnos ; only four of the hindmost were ta-
ken near Elasus ; whereof the Peloponnesians took one with
the men in her that had run herself on ground at the temple of
Protesilaus, and two other without the men, and set tire on a
fourth abandoned upon the shore of Imbrus.
After this, they besieged Eltcus the same day with those gal-
lies of Abydus which were with them, and with the rest, being
now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not
yield, they went away to Abydus.
The Athenians who had been deceived by their spies, and
not imai^ining that the enemies fleet could have gone by with-
out their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of
♦ A TcMarncokte scrinctli to Iiavc hrcn a Koin amonfsl tlie Cliions, iind the
rortifth |>art of some o(bcr girater coin.
BOOK viii. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. A17
Eressus, when now they knew they were gone, immediately
left Eressus; and hasted to the defence of Hellespont. By the
way they took two gallies of the Peloponnesians, that having
ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy
than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the
Athenians.
The next day they came to Elseus and staid, and thither from
Imbrus came unto them those other gallies that had escaped
from the enemy. Here they spent five days in preparation for
a battle. After this, they fought in tliis manner. The Athe-
nians went by the shore, ordering their gallies one by one to-
wards Sestus. The Peloponnesians also, when they saw this,
brought out their fleet against them from Abydus.
Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the
Athenians along the shore of Chersonesus, beginning at Idacus,
and reaching as far as Arrhianae, threescore and six gallies. And
the Peloponnesians from Abydus to Dardanus, fourscore and
six gallies. In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the
Syracusians, in the other Mindarus himself, and those gallies
that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had
the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right, and the rest of the
commanders every one the place assigned him.
Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset, and
with their left wing to over-reach the right wing of the Athe-
nians, and keep them from going out, and to drive those in the
middle to the shore which was near. The Athenians, who per-
ceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their way out,
put forth the same way that they did, and out went them.
The left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this
time, beyond the point called Cynos-sema * , by means whereof
that part of the fleet which was in the midst, became both weak
and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet ; and the
sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos-sema took
away the sight of what passed there, from those that were on
the other side.
The Peloponnesians therefore charging this middle part, both
drove their gallies to the dry land, and being far superior in
fight, went out after them, and assaulted them upon the shore.
And to help them, neither was Thrasybulus able, who was in
the right wing, for the multitude of the enemies that pressed
him ; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could
not see what was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema, and
because also he was kept from it by the Syracusians and others
lying upon his hands, no i'ewer in number than themselves. Till
• The tepulchre of llecnba. Ciirip.
478 THE HISTORY
BOOK VIII.
at last the Peloponnesians bold upon their victory, chasing some
one gaily, some another, fell into some disorder, in a part of
their army. And then those about Thrasybulus having observed
that the opposite gallies sought now no more to go beyond tliem,
turned upon them, and fighting, put them presently to flight.
And having also cut off from the rest of the fleet, such gallies
of the Peloponnesians of that part that had the victory, as were
scattered abroad, some they assaulted, but the greatest number
they put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians also, whom
those about Thrasyllus had already caused to shrink, when they
saw the rest fly, fled outright.
This defeat being given, and the Peloponnesians having for
the most part escaped, first to the river Pydius, and afterwards
to Abydus; though the Athenians took but few of their gallies
(for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a
short retreat) yet the victory was the most seasonable to them
that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the
Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received
by little and little, and also for the great loss in Sicily, they now
ceased eitiier to accuse themselves, or to think highly any
longer of the naval power of their enemies. The gallies they
took were these ; eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia
two, of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one apiece. Of
their own they lost fifteen.
When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynos-
sema, and taken up the wrecks, and given truce to the enemies
to fetch away the bodies of their dead, they presently sent away
a gaily with a messenger to carry news of the victory to Athens.
The Athenians, upon the coming in of this gaily, hearing of their
unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss
in Euboea, and after their sedition, and conceived that their
estate might yet keep up, if they plied the business coura-
giously.
The fourth day after this battle, tlie Athenians that were in
Sestus, having hastily prepared their fleet, went to Cyzicus
which was revolted ; and espying as they passed by, the eight
gallies come from Byzantium, riding under Harpagium and
Priapus, set upon them, and having also overcome those that
came to their aid from the land, took them. Then coming to
Cyzicus, being an open town, they brought it again to their
own power, and levied a sum of money amongst them.
The Peloponnesians in the mean time going from Abydus to
Ela^us, recovered as many of their gallics formerly taken, as
remained whole. The rest the Eleusians had burnt. They
also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Euboea, to fetch away
the fleet that was there.
BOOK VIII. OF THE GRECIAN WAR. 479
x\bout the same time also, returned Alcibiades to Samos with
his thirteen gallies from Caunusand Phaselis, reporting, that he
had diverted the Plicenician fleet from coming to the Pelopon-
nesians, and that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friend-
ship of the Athenians, more than he was before. Thence man-
ning out nine gallies more, he exacted a great sum of money
of the Halicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. Being now almost
autumn, he returned to Samos.
The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antan-
drians (who are rEolians) received into the city men of arms
from Abydus by land tlirough mount Ida, upon injury that had
been done them by Arsaces, a deputy lieutenant of Tissapher-
nes. This Arsaces having feigned a certain war, not declared
against whom had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians
(the which in hallowing of Delos by the Athenians were turned
out, and had planted themselves in Adramittium) to go with him
to this war. And when under colour of amity and confederacy
he had drawn them out, he obser\ed a time when they were at
dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers mur-
dered them with darts. And therefore for this act's sake, fear-
ing lest he might do some unlawful prank against them also,
and for that he had otherwise done them injur}', they cast his
garrison out of their citadel.
Tissaphernes hearing of this, (being the act of the Pelopon-
nesians, as well as that at Miletus, or that at Cnidus : for in
those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same man-
ner) and conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, and
fearing lest they should do him some other hurt ; and withal
not enduring that Pharnabazus should receive them, and with
less time and cost speed better against the Athenians then he
had done, resolved to make a journey to them in the Hellespont,
both to complain of what was done at Antandrus, and to clear
himself of his accusations, the best he could, as well concern-
ing the Phoenician fleet, as other matters. And first he put
in at Ephesus, and offered sacrifice to Diana.
When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the
one and twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.
FINIS.
THB
TABLE.
Abdera, 126.
Abydus revolteth from the A-
tlienians, 187.
Acantlius revolteth from the
Athenians, 234.
Acarnanians, why so called,
130. Thieves, 3. Their
league with Athens, 110.
Good slingers, 117.
Acesine, a river of Sicily, 202.
Achaia, oligarchised, 30C.
Acharnas, a great part of the
Athenian city, 86.
Achelous, 130.
Acheron, 25.
Acherusia, ibid.
Acrae, when, and by whom
built, 318.
Acragante,when, and by whom
built, 317.
Acte, 245.
Actium, 17.
iEginetae, they incense the La-
cedemonians against the A-
thenians, 33.
JEgina, yielded to the Athe-
nians, 53. They are re-
ceived by the Lacedemo-
nians into Th}Tea, 89. and
taken by the Athenians, are
put to death, 218.
^gitium, 178.
^Egypt. The Athenians in
^gypt defeated, 54.
^mus, 126.
iEnus, 205.
JEoWan islands, 173.
iEtna, burneth, 187.
^tolia, 178.
Agamemnon, his power, 5.
Agis withdraweth his army
from Argos, and why, 294.
he levieth money in Thessa-
]y, 423. his power when he
was at Decelea, ibid.
Agraei, 130.
Agraeis, 182.
Agrians, 126.
Alcamenes slain, 429.
Alcibiades, how he crossetli
Nicias, and deceiving the
Lacedemonian ambassadors,
procureth a league between
the Athenians and Argives,
284. et seq. he goeth with
charge into Peloponnesus,
290. presseth the Sicilian ex-
pedition, and why, 323. is
accused for defacing of the
Mercuries, 330. his opinion
touching the managing of
the Sicilian war, 166. is call-
ed home to his trial, 343. he
unbetrayeth Messana, 354.
I 1
TABLE.
his advice to the Lacedemo-
nians, to fortify Decelea,
364. He flieth to Tissa-
phernes, 444. he counselleth
Tissaphernes against the La-
cedemonians, 445. seeketh
to return to Athens, ibid,
he deludetli the Athenians,
in demand of intolerable
conditions, and why, 451.
his return propounded at A-
thens, 449. He is made
general of the Athenian ar-
my at Samos, 464. his re-
turn decreed at Athens, 4/4.
he hindereth the army of the
Athenians from invading the
city of Athens, 466. he go-
eth after Tissaphernes to
Aspendus, and why, 467.
Alcidas sent to relieve Mity-
lene, 142. his behaviour in
that voyage, 1 i4. his return
with his fleet into Pelopon-
nesus, 165. his charge a-
gainst Corcyra at Sybota,
168.
Alcmaeon, 130.
Almopia, 128.
A lope, 89.
Alyzea, 388.
Ambracian gulf, I/.
Ambraciots war against the
Acarnanians, 115. are de-
feated at Idomenffi, 185.
Amorges, a rebel against the
king of Persia, 437.
Amphipolis, called the Nine-
ways, 49. taken by Brasidas,
243. refuseth to be rendered
to the Athenians, 272.
Anactorium, 16, 18/, 2H,
888.
Ana^a, a city over against Sa-
mos, 227. the Auffians were
Samians, H4.
Anapus, a river in Acarnania,
117. a river near Syracuse,
350,- 367.
Androsthenes, victor in the O-
lympic games, 289.
Antander, taken by the out-
laws of Mitylene, 215.
Anthemus, 128.
Anthesterion, 84.
Antitanes, 116.
Aphrodisia, 217-
Apidanus, 229.
Apodoti, 177-
Apollo Maloeis, 132.
Arcadians, borrowed ships for
the Trojan war, 6.
Archedice, daughter of Hip-
pias, her epitaph, 346.
Archidamus, king of Lacede-
mon, general of the Pelo-
ponnesians, SO. blamed for
his delay at Oenoe, 86. pur-
pose in staying at A char nee,
ibid, his protestation against
Plataea, 112.
Archon. The nine archontes,
61.
Arcturus, 1 14.
An Argilian betrayeth Pausa-
nias, 65.
Argenum, 439.
Argives. They refuse to re-
new the truce with Sparta,
and why, 267. they treat of
league against the Lacede-
monians, with the rest of
the Grecians, 275. they seek
peace with Sparta, 283. they
make league with Athens,
286. their army intercept-
ed between the armies of
their enemies, 294. they re-
nounce their league with
the Mantineans, 304.
Argos, 6. Argos Amphilochi-
um, 109. invaded bv the
'fABLE.
Ambraciots, 182. Argos oli-
garchised, again relapseth
into a democracy, 305.
Aristaeus, 16, 30, 31.
Aristogiton, 11. his fact a-
gainst the tyrants, 343. et
sequentia.
Ariston, his stratagem, 393.
Armies, a property of all ar-
mies in fight ; wliat it is,
300. greatness of the Athe-
nian army set forth for Si-
cily, 339.
Armour ordinarily worn, 4.
laid by first by the Athe-
nians, 4.
Artaphernes, ambassador from
the king of Persia, to Sparta,
taken by the Athenians, and
his letters read, 214.
Artaxerxes, 67.his death, 215.
Artynae, a magistracy in Ar-
gos, 288.
Asine, 216.
Asopius, the son of Phormio,
134.
Astacus, 90, 129.
Astyochus, general of the Pe-
loponnesians, 432. his dan-
ger, 439. he discloseth the
treason of Phrynichus to
Alcibiades, 448. in danger
to be slain by mutiny, 465.
discharged of his command,
ibid.
Atalante, 91, 174.
Athenians, the first of the Gre-
cians that grew civil, 4. they
wore the grasshopper in
their hair, ibid, their man-
ner of governing their con-
federates, 1 1 . their disposi-
tion, 35. they break the
league by aiding the Corcy-
reeans, 27. they wall their
city, 44. their wtory at the
river Eurymedon, 49. their
reputation for mural assaults,
ibid, how they got the lead-
ing of Greece, 47. the Gre-
cians hate them in the be-
ginning of this war, 73. they
refuse to hear the messenger
from Archidamus, 81. their
custom of living in the coun-
try towns, S3, their revenue
and treasure, 82. their forces,
83. they loved to hear and
tell news, 95. they seek
peace with the Lacedemo-
nians, 103. they question
their commanders for com-
pounding with Potidaea, 1 1 0.
they desire to conquer Sici-
ly, 172. they banish their
commanders for returning
out of Sicily, 22 J . they with-
hold the gallies of the Pelo-
ponnesians at Pylus, upon a
cavil, 86. they refuse to ren-
der Pylus, and why, 279.
they war on Macedonia,
371. they break the peace
with Lacedemon, 319. their
miserable rising from Syra-
cuse, and their final defeat,
413. et seq. they were fitter
to be friends of the Persians,
than were the Lacedemo-
nians, and why, 446. et
seq.
Athens, made great by The-
seus, 18. greatest in the
time of Pericles, 1 07.
Athos, 245. by what nations
inhabited, ibid.
Atreus, 5.
Attica, sterile ground, 2. how
it became populous, ibid,
invaded, 55. 86. 98. 131.
142. 190, 382.
Axius, 128.
TABLE.
B
Bacchanal holidays, city Bac-
chanals celebrated in the end
of winter, 84.
Battles, by sea between the
"Corcyreans and Corinthians,
16^ 24. between the Athe-
nians and .-Eginetffi, 116.
between the Athenians and
Peloponnesians at Cecry-
phaleia, ibid, at Halias, ibid,
between the Athenians and
the Samians, 56. between
the Athenians and Phoeni-
cians, &c. 53. between
Phormio and the Pelopon-
nesians, 117. again, 122.
between the Peloponnesians
and Corcyrffians, IfiS. be-
tween the Lacedemonians
and Athenians at Pylus, 196.
between the Syracusians and
Athenians in the streight of
Messana, 202. between tlie
Syracusians and Athenians,
in the great haven, 383.
again, 125. again, 278.
again, 409. between the
Athenians and Corinthians,
51. between the Athenians
and Peloponnesians at Ere-
tria, 472. at Cynos-sema,
478. by land, between the
Athenians and Corinthians
at Potidjea, 3 1 . between the
Athenians and Poloponne-
Ifans in Megaris, 52. at
Tanagra, ibid, between the
Athenians and Boeotians at
Coroncn, 54. "b(;tween the
Ambraciots and Acarna-
nians, 183. between the
Athenians and Corinthians
at Solygia, 211. between
the Atlienians and Boeotians
at Delium, 238. between the
Lacedemonians and Ar-
gives, 300. between the Sy-
racusians and Athenians,
35 1 . between the same by
night, 396. between the
Athenians and Peloponne-
sians at Miletus, 435.
Berrhaea, 30.
Bell (a) used in going the
round, 258.
Best (the) man, 42.
Birds died of the pestilence,
100.
Bisaltia, 128.
Bithynians, are Thracians on
Asia side of the Bosphorus,
227.
Boeotarchontes, 235.
Boeotia, fertile ground, 2. call-
ed formerly Cadmeis, 8. the
Boeotians came from Arne
in Thessaly, ibid, are over-
come in battle at Oenophy-
ta, 53. overcome at Coro-
nea, 55. they take Heraclea
into protection, 290.
Boium, 52.
Bolbe, the lake, 30.
Bolissus, 43 I.
Bomians, 178.
Bottiffiis revolteth from the
Athenians, 32. the Athe-
nians and Boeotians fight,
115.
Bottia, 128.
Brasidas saves Methone, and
is publicly praised at Sparta,
88. joined as a counsellor
with Cnemus, 16/. swoon-
cth of his wounds at Pylus,
195. he passeth througii
Thessaly, 229. refuseth to
aid Perdiccas, 231. taketh
Acanthus, 232. is praised
by the author, 230. is en-
TABLE.
vied at Sparta, 245. he
taketh Torone, 246. and
Lecythus, 247- is lionoured
by the Sionaeans, 251. he
receiveth Menda that re-
volteth from the Athenians,
252. his retreat out of Lyn-
cus, 255. he attempteth
Potidaa by night, 258. liis
stratagem against Cleon at
Amphipolis, 262. his deatli,
burial and honours, 265 et
seq.
Bucoh'orv, 258.
Budorus, 125.
Buphras, 249.
Burial. How the Carians
were buried, 5.
Ca?adas, 66.
Callians, l/S.
Callias general of the Athe-
nians at Potidfiea, 30, 32,
Callirrhoe, a fountain, or the
nine-pipes, 84.
Calydon, 180.
Camarina, when and by whom
built, 318. refuseth to re-
ceive the Athenians, 342.
Cardamylae, 434.
Carians, inhabited the Cycla-
des, 3. addicted to robbery,
5. expelled the Cyclades by
Minos, 3. known by their
form of burial, 5.
Carneius, a month kept holy
by the Dweans, 291. Car-
neian holidays, 302.
Caryae, 292.
Carystus, 48.
Catalogue of the confederates
of both sides at Syracuse,
402. Catalogue of the con-
federates of the Lacedema-
nians and Athenians, 79-
et seq.
Catana surprised by the Athe-
nians, 342. when and by
whom built, 317.
Caulonia, 385.
Cause of the Peloponnesian
war, 13, 44.
Cenchrcae, 4 8.
Cephallenia, 90, 91.
CerdyUum, 262.
Cestrine, 25.
Cercine, 12/.
Chaeronaea, 54. taken by the
Athenians, ibid, the Boeo-
tian outlaws seek to betray
it, 228. subject to the city
of Orchomenus, 229.
Chalcideans, tliey revolt from
the Athenians, 29. they re-
tire to Olynthus, ibid, they
procure an army out of Pe-
loponnesus, and why, 237-
they league with the Ar-
gives, 276.
Chalcfdeus slain, 434.
Chalcis, 53. 118.
Challeeans, 179.
Chaonians, 115, 11<5. defend-
ed bv the men of Stratus,
1J7.'
Cheimerium, 24.
Chians not deprived of liberty
by the Athenians, and why,
135. forced to raze their
city wall, 214. desire to be
protected by the Lacedemo-
nians, 426.' revolt from the
Athenians, 430. kept by the
Athenians, from the use of
the sea, 435.
Clirusis, a territorv', fis. .
Chrysis, woman priest of Juno
at Argos, slept whilst the
twnple was fired, 258.
TABLE.
Cimon, 50. taketh Eion, 48.
warreth on Cyprus, 54. dieth
before Citium, ibid.
Cithaeron, 113.
Claros the city, 145.
Clazomente, 438.
Clearidas endeavoureth to dis-
solve the peace, 272.
Cleobulus, 280.
Cleon hindereth the peace
with the Lacedemonians,
204. undertaketh the ex-
punging of Sphacteria, ibid,
his boast, ibid, he warreth
on Amphipolis, 261. is in
contempt with his army,
ibid, winneth Torone, 262.
is slain at Amphipolis, 265.
Cleonae, 245.
Cnemus overcome at sea by
Phormio, 123.
Colon se, 64.
Colophon, 145. haven of the
Colophonians, near Torone,
261.
Combinations for offices, 450.
Corcyra metropolitan of Epi-
damnus, 13. strong in ship-
ping, 14. called of old
Phaeacia, ibid, conveniently
situated for passage into
Sicily, 24. Corcyrseans not
accustomed to league with
others, 18, 21. masters of
the sea, IS. divers of them
taken by the Corinthians in
Anactorium, 28, 33. their
sedition beginneth, 165. the
great men take sanctuary,
] 67. they encamp on Istone,
172.
Corinthians protect Epidam-
nus, 15. their expostulation
with tiie Athenians, 2/.
Corinthia, invaded by the
Athenians, 123. Corinth
how far from the sea that
looketh towards Athens,
211. Corinthians fall off
from the Lacedemonians to
the Argives, and why, 274,
275. they fall off again from
the Argives, and why, 288,
289. they resolve to aid the
Syracusians, 36 1 .
Coronea, 55.
Corontae, 129.
Cortyta, 217.
Corycus, 439.
Coryphasion, 190.
Cos, 442.
Council of the Bean, 455.
Cranii, 90, 91, 280.
Crissaean gulf, 52, 117, 124.
Crocylium, 178.
Customs (in) as in arts, the
newest prevail, 35. Custom
of the Lacedemonians not
hastily to condemn a Spar-
tan, 64. Custom of the
Thracians touching gifts,
127.
Cyclades governed by the sons
of Minos, 3.
Cydonia, 119.
Cyllene, 17, 119.
Cylon, 61.
Cynos-sema, 477-
Cynuria, 217, 283.
Cyreneans, 399.
Cyrrhus, 128.
Cythera, ojjposite to Malea,
215, 216. taken by the
Athenians, ibid. Cythero-
dices, 216. Cytherseans re-
moved into the Cyclades,
318.
Cytinium, 52.
Cyzicus recovered by the
Athenians, 478.
TABLE.
D
Daphnus, 438.
Dascon, 350.
Daulia, 90.
Decelea. The incommodi-
ties arising to the Athenians
bv the fortification there,
386.
Delphi, 16.
Delos consecrated, 260. no
man might be born or suf-
fered to die in Delos, 181.
Delian games, ibid. Delians
driven out of Delos, are re-
ceived into Adramyttium,
260. replanted in Delos,
277.
Delium, in the territory of
Tanagra, 228. taken by the
Athenians, 235. battle at
Delium, 238.
Democracy. Democracy con-
spired against Athens, 52.
Democracy dissolved at Ar-
gos, .S05.
Democracy, what it is, 363.
Demosthenes invadeth .iltolia,
177' is defeated, 178. fear-
eth to return to Athens, ibid,
he maketh peace with the
Peloponnesians shut up in
Olpffi, and why, 178. his
acts in Acarnania, 182. et
seq. he attempteth Siphae
in BoEotia, 235. he taketh
in Pylus, 190. he putteth
the fort before Epidaurus
into the hands of the Epi-
daurians, and how, 305, he
arriveth at Syracuse, 394.
his attempt at Epipolae, ibid,
adviseth to rise from before
Syracuse, 398. is taken pri-
soner, 418.
Dercieaus, 129.
Derdas brother to Perdiccas,
29.
Dialogue between the Athe-
nians and Melians, 307-
Dii, 126.
Diomilus, a fugitive of Andros,
367. slain at Epipolae, ibid.
Dion in INIacedonie, 229.
Dion in mount Athos, 245.
Doberus, 127.
Dolopia, 130.
Dorieus of Rhodes, victor in
the Olympian games, 134.
Doris, metropolitan of the
Lacedemonians, 52.
Drabescus, 49.
Droans, 129.
Drimvssa, 438.
Dyme, 119.
E
Earthquake attributed to the
violation of religion, 62.
Earthquake at Delos, 73'
Earthquake hindereth the
Lacedemonians from invad-
ing Attica, 173. Earth-
quakes, 215. 173. 174.th(eir
natural cause, ibid.
Echinades, 130.
Eclipse of the sun, 89, 215.
of the moon, 400. it keepeth
Nicias from removing from
before Syracuse, ibid.
Eetioneia fortified, by whom,
and why, 469.
Egesta^an ambassadors at
Athens, 319. the Egestacans
deceive the Athenians, and
how, 310.
Eidomeue, 128.
Eidonia, 128. Eidonians, 49.-
Eion, 48. 214.
TABLE.
ElapheboHon, 271-
Eleans, their league with
Corinth, 277. their quarrel
with the Lepreates, ibid,
and with the Lacedemo-
nians, ibid, they leave the
Argive army, and why, 296.
they refuse to be compre-
hended in the peace between
the Lacedemonians and
Athenians, 268.
Eleatis, 25.
Eleus, an island adjacent to
Miletus, 436.
Enipeus, 229.
Eorda, 128.
Ephesus, 67.
Ephori, their power to impri-
son their king, 64.
Ephyre, 24.
Epidamnus, 14. Epidamnians
implore the aid of the Cor-
cyraeans, ibid, they put
themselves into the protec-
tion of the Corinthians, ibid.
Epidaurus taken by the Cor-
cyraeans, 16. Epidaurus,
102. Epidaurian war, 291.
Epidaurus besieged by the
Athenians, 302. Epidaurus
Limera, 217-
Epidemiurgi, magistrates, 29.
Epipolae, 367.
Erae revolteth from the Athe-
nians, 432.
Eressus, 146. revolteth, 434.
Eretrians betray the Athe-
nians, 473.
Erineus, 52.
Erythree, 142. 145.
Euarchus, tyrant of Astachus,
91.
Eubosa revolteth from the
Athenians, 55. recovered by
Pericles, ibid. Euboea, 132.
Euboeans send to Agis for
protection, 425.
Euenus, 118.
Eusperitffi, 309.
Eupolium, 179,
Euristheus, 6.
Europus, 1 28.
Euryalus, 367, 374.
Eurymedon slain, 400.
Eurytanians, 177.
Euxine sea, 126.
Exaction, cause of revolt, 49.
Fable of Alcmaeon, 130.
Factions of the Grecians, 10.
Fattest soils most subject to
change of inhabitants, 2.
Fear the cause of faith in lea-
gues, 135.
Fear of injury to come, cause
of war, 136.
Fire. A great fire in Platsea,
114. Fires significant, 125.
169- Fire breaketh out of
iEtna, 187.
Fleet of Athenians at Salamis,
how great, 37. the fleet for
Sicily, 334. how great, 339.
not received by the cities of
Sicily, ibid.
Fort before Epidaurus, 302.
the fortifications of the Pe-
loponnesians about Platfea,
140.
Funeral at Athens for the first
slain in the war, 9 1 .
G
Games Olympian, 4.
Gapselus, 244. 262.
Garments of the Lacedemo-
nian nobility, 4.
table:
Gela, when, and by whom
built, 317.
Geomori, 433.
Geraestus, 132.
Geranea, 52. 225. 51.
Getes, 127.
Gifts, the custom of the Thra-
cians to take gifts, 127-
Gigonus, 31.
Gongylus keepeth the Syracu-
sians from yielding to the
Athenians, 375.
Gortynia, 1 28.
Grasshoppers worn by the
Athenians, 4.
Greece divided into leagues,
10.
Grestonia, 1 28.
Gylippus, general of the Pe-
loponnesians at Syracuse,
366. arriveth at Syracuse,
374. his message to the
Athenians, ibid.
H
Halias, 51. 103.
Harmodius, 1 1 . solicited to
love by Hipparchus, 343.
Hellanicus the historiographer,
48.
Hellas, whence so called, 2.
Hellen, the son of Deucalion,
3.
Helorine way, 350.
Helots, 65. why called Mes-
senians, ibid, the plots of
the Lacedemonians to keep
them weak, 230.
Heraclea, when, and by whom
built, 175. infested by the
Thessalians, 1 JG- commo-
diously seated for the war
against Athens, ibid. He-
raclea, 228. weakened by
the Dolopians, 290.
Heracleides, 8.
Hermione, 103.
Hermocrates banished, 465.
Hestiaeans put out of Euboea
by the Athenians, 55.
Hirea, Vulcan's shop, 173.
Himera, when and by whom
built, 318. invaded by the
Athenians, 186. it aideth
Gylippus, 373.
Hipparchus, brother to Hip-
pias the tyrant of Athens,
slain by Harmodius and
Aristogiton, 11. soliciteth
Harmodius for love, and is
denied, 343. disgraceth Har-
modius, 34. l. how slain, ibid,
why thouglit afterwards to
have been the tyrant, ibid.
Hippias, tyrant of Athens, 1 1 .
344. eldest son of Pisistra-
tus, ibid, driven out of A-
thens by the Lacedemo-
nians, returneth with the
Persians to Marathon, 346.
Hippias, an Arcadian, slain by
Paches, contrary to faith,
146.
Hippocrates taketh Delium,
215.
Holy war, 54.
Holiday (some) or other at A-
thens continually, 05.
Homer, 3.
Hope, 310.
Horsemen, 361. horsemen or-
dained by the Lacedemo-
nians, 216.
Horsemen, a degree in estate
at Athens, 1 38.
Hyccara, 348.
Hyperbolus, 459.
Hysiae of Attica, 142.
TABLE.
Hysiae of Argia, taken by the
Lacedemonians, 306.
I
lasus taken by the Pelopon-
nesians, 437-
Icthys, promontory, 89.
Ida, 215.
Idomenae, 185.
legas, 374.
lUyrians betray Perdiccas, 253.
Images of Mercury at Athens
defaced, 3S0.
Imbrians, 133.
Inarus, a rebel crucified, 53.
Inessa, 180. Inessseans, 366.
Inscription on the tripode by
Pausanias, 64. by the Lace-
monians, ibid.
Inundation at Orobiae, 1/4.
at Atalanta, ibid.
Ionia planted with Athenians,
8.
Isthmi, taken by the building
of cities, 5. Isthmus of Pal-
lene, 31.
Istone, 172.
Italy, whence so named, 316.
Ithome, 50. yielded up, ibid.
Itonians, 261.
Juno's temple at Argos burnt,
258.
K
King of Lacedemon had but
one vote in council, 12.
Kingdoms with honours li-
mited, 11.
Lacedemonians. Lacedemo-
nian noblemen, plain in
their garments, 4. Lacede-
monians pulled down the
tyrants of Greece, 10. how
they governed their confe-
derates, 1 1 . slow to war
without necessity, 57* pre-
tend the liberty of Greece,
1 1 . they would have no
walled cities without Pelo-
ponnesus, and why, 44.
they are hindered from the
invasion of Attica, by an
earthquake, 174. their go-
vernment always severe, not
always just, 176. four hun-
dred Lacedemonians put
into the isle Sphacteria, 192.
they desire to treat for their
men at Pylus, with a pri-
vate committee, 200. their
men taken in Sphacteria,
put in bonds, 210. they seek
peace secretly, ibid, their
policy in destroying their
Helots, 230. theyseek peace,
and why, 266. their men
taken in Pylus, delivered,
273. league with the Ar-
gives, and why, 280. their
ambassadors roughly used
at Athens, 284. they make
league privately with the
Boeotians, 282. they war
on Argos, 293. their army
at Leuctra, 291. are ex-
cluded from the Olympian
games, 89, 90. and fined
in a sum of money, ibid,
their discipline in charging
the enemy, 300. they fight
long for a victory, but fol-
low the enemy not far, 301.
they make ready one hun-
dred galiies for the Ionian
war, 433. commodious ene-
mies for the Athenians, 474.
Labdalum, 367.
TABLE.
Laestrigones, 316.
Lamachus, his opinion touch-
ing the conduction of the
Sicilian war, 341. slain,
369.
Lampsacus, 68. revolteth from
the Athenians, 453. reco-
vered again, ibid.
Laodicea, 258.
Larissa, 229.
Latmos, the island, 145.
Leaeans, 126.
League, two great leagues in
Greece, 10. league defen-
sive between the Athenians
and Corcyraeans, 24. league
between the Ambraciots
and Acarnanians, 186. be-
tween the Athenians and
Lacedemonians, 272. be-
tween the Argives and E-
leans, &c. 277- between
the Argives and Lacedemo-
nians, 304. between the
Lacedemonians and Tissa-
phernes, 431. again, 440.
again, 452.
Lebedus revolteth from the
Athenians, 432.
Lecythus, 246, 247.
Lemnos, 55. 133. 204.
Leocorium, 1 1 .
Leontines aided by the Athe-
nians, 172. Leontine com-
mons driven out by the
few, 261. Leontine nobility
go to dwell at Syracuse,
ibid, they seize on certain
places of their own terri-
tory, ibid. Leontium, 317.
Leotychides, general at My-
cale, 4t.
Lepreates quarrel with the
Eleans, 277-
Lesbos, 133. received into the
league of the Peloponne-
sians, 138. revolteth from
the Athenians, 157-
Letter. Letter of Nicias to
the Athenian people, 378.
of Xerxes to Pausanias, 63.
Leucas, I7. 25. 113. 177.
Leucimna, 1 7. 25.
Leuconium, 434.
Leuctra of Arcadia, 251.
Lichas, a Lacedemonian whip-
ped, 250. sent with autho-
rity into Ionia, 441. hated
by the Milesians, 465.
Limnaea, 116.
Lipara, 173.
Lochagi, 298.
Locri Ozolae. Thieves, 4.
Locris in Italy, confederate
with Syracuse, 173. Locri-
ans make peace with the
Athenians, 262.
Lycaum, 268. 291.
Lynchestians, 126. 230, 231.
M
Macedonia. The beginning
of the reign of the Teme-
nidae, 128. the description
of that kingdom, ibid.
Maedi, 1 27.
Maenalia, 296.
Magistracy. A new magis-
tracy erected at Athens, 432.
Epidemiurgi magistrates at
Potidaea, 29. Cytherodices,
a magistracy, 216.
Magnesia of Asia, 68.
Magnesians, 129.
Malea, 133.
Maloeis Apollo, 132.
Mantineans and Tegeates fight,
258. their league with the
TABLE.
Arglves, 275. their league
with the Lacedemonians,
276.
Marathusa, 438.
Mecybern taken from the
Athenians, 282.
Medeon, 182.
Megareans forbidden com-
merce in Attica, 33. they
revolt from the Corinthians,
50. they revolt from the
Athenians, 55. they expect
the event of battle between
Brasidas and the Athenians,
225. Megarean outlaws re-
called, 226. set up the oli-
garchy, 227. they refuse to
be comprehended in the
peace between the Athe-
nians and Lacedemonians,
269. Megara invaded by
the Athenians, 91. Megara
attempted by the Athenians,
222. treason in Megara
discovered, 223.
Megara Hyblea, 366. when
and by whom built, 317.
Malieis, 175. their dialogue
with the Athenians, 307.
Malietia, 229.
Melos, 80. 175. besieged by
the Athenians, ibid, talien
and sacked, 3 1 4.
Menda revolteth from the
Athenians, 252.
Messana, 174. revolteth from
the Athenians, 189. Messa-
nians invade Naxus, 202.
Messana, wl)y called Zan-
cle, 318.
Mcssapians, 179.
Methone, 88. 219. 319.
Methymnc, 133. revolteth from
the rest of Lesbos, 132.
Methymneans war on An-
tissa, 139.
Methydrium, 293.
Miletus revolteth from the
Athenians, 4S2.
Mindarus, general of the Pe-
loponnesians, 465. goeth
into Hellespont, 475.
Minoa, 222. taken by Nicias,
155.
Minos first that liad a great
navy, 3. 5. freed the sea of
pirates, ibid, master of the
sea, 3.
Mitylenians, 132. why no|;
deprived of liberty, 136^
Mitylenian commons yield
the city to the Athenians,
143. sentence at Athens
against Mitylene, 146. one
thousand Mitylenians put
to death, 155. Mitylenian
outlaws lose Antandras, 226.
Molossians, 116.
Molychrium, 119- 180.
Month. Elapheboliom, 250.
271. Gerastion, 250. Arte-
misium, 27 1 • Carneius, 29 1 .
Mount raised againt Plateea,
113.
Mycale, 44.
Mycalessus, 387.
Mycenae, 6".
Mygdonia, 30. 128.
Mylae, 174.
Myonnesus, 144.
Myrcinus, 244.
Myronides, 51.
Myus, 68. 13S^.
N
Navy first built by Minos, 3.
the navies of old time in
Greece, 9. the navy of the
TABLE.
Athenians at the greatest
when, 138.
Naupactus, 50. 110. defended
by Demosthenes, 180.
Naxus, the island, first of the
Athenian confederates that
was brought into servitude,
48.
Naxus of Sicily, 202. when
and by whom built, 3 1 /•
Xeapolis of Afric, 31)9.
Nemea the forest, 295.
Neritum, 134.
Nicias goeth with an army to
Melas, 1 /S.giveth his power
to levy soldiers to Cleon,
204. winneth Cythera, 216.
goeth ambassador to Lace-
demon, 286. chosen gene-
ral for the Sicilian voyage,
320. itis opinion touching
the managing of that war,
340. his stratagem to get
landing at Syracuse, 348. is
assaulted in iiis camp, 3/0.
why unwilling to rise from
before Syracuse, 39S. he
yieldeth himself to Gylip-
pus, 419. his death 420.
Nicias of Crete, 119.
Nis£ea besieged by the Athe-
nians, 51. rendered, 224.
Notium, i45, 146.
Number of the Lacedemonian
army against the Argives,
how computed, 299.
Nymphodorus of Abdera, 89,
'90.
O
Oar. One man to one oar
in a trireme, 124.
Oath. Form of the oath at
the making of the peace
Between the Lacedemonians
and the Athenians, 270.
Odomantians, 129. 262.
Odrysai, 90.
Oeantheans, 179.
Oeneon, ibid.
Oenias, 54. 117- compelled
by the Acarnanians into the
Athenian league, 228.
Oenoe, 85. betrayed to the
Bcxotians, 474.
Oenophyta, 53.
Oenussae, 434.
Oezyme, 244.
Oligarchy, of the four hundred
at Athens, 456. et seq.
they enter the senate house,
457. they begin to decline,
46^. are assaulted by the
populars, 470.
Olophyxus, 245.
Olpae, 182. taken by the Am
braciots, 183.
Olympia, 18.
Olympian games, 4. 289.
Olympiade, eighty • eighth, 134.
Olympiseura, 349, 350. 354.
Olympus, 229.
Olynthus, 29. 3i. 252.
Oneius, 212.
Ophionians, 177> 17^«
Opus, 53.
Oracle. The Corcyrjeans re-
fer their cause to the oracle
at Delphi, 16. oracle at
Delphi consulted by the
Epidamnians, 14. oracle at
Delphi encourageth theLa-
demonians, 57- 102.
Oradus king of the Paravae-
ans, 1 1 6.
Oration of the Corinthians at
Athens, 21. at Sparta 57. of
the Corcyrseans at Athens,
TABLE.
18. of the Athenians at La-
cedemon, 33. of Archida-
mus, 40. of Sthenelaidus,
43. of Pericles at Athens,
69. of Archidamus to his
army, 80. of Pericles at the
funeral, 92. of Pericles to
the incensed people, 104. of
Phormio to his soldiers, 121.
of Cnemus to his soldiers,
120. of the Mitylenians at
Olympia, 134. of Cleon
against the Mitylenians,
147. of Diodotus for them,
150. of the Plataeans, 156.
of the Thebans, 160. of
Demosthenes to his soldiers,
193. of the Lacedemonians
at Athens, 197- of Hermo-
crates to the Sicilians at
Gela, 218. of Pagondas to
his soldiers, 235. of Hip-
pocrates, to his soldiers,
238. of Brasidas to the A-
canthians, 232. to the
Sionaeans, 251. to the To-
ronseans, 247. to his sol-
diers in Lyncus, 253. to his
soldiers in Amphipolis, 263.
of Nicias against the Sici-
lian voyage, 320. again, 327.
to his soldiers, 351. to his
soldiers about to fight in
the great haven, 398. to his
soldiers when he rose from
before Syracuse, 414. of Al-
cibiades for the Sicilian voy-
age, 324. against the Athe-
nians at Lacedemon, ii62.
of Hermocrates in Syracuse,
333. at Camarina, 354. of
Athenagoras, 336. of a Sy-
racusian general, 338. of
Euphemus at Camarina,
.^^57.
Orchomenus seized by the
Boeotian outlaws, 54.
Orchomenus of Arcadia be-
sieged by the Argives, and
taken, 295, 296.
Orestes king of Thessaly, 54.
Orestis of Epirus, 258.
Orestium, 296.
Orneae pulled down, 319.
Orobiae, 174.
Oropus, 88. taken by the
Athenians by treason, 453.
Paches killeth Hippias cap-
tain of the Arcadians in
Notium, by fraud, 146.
Psedaritus slain, 45 1 .
Paeonia, 128.
Paeonians, ibid.
Pallas Chalciceca, 62. 66.
Pallene, 29. 32.
Pan actum taken by the Boeo-
tians, 261. pulled down,
and why, 283, 284.
Panathenoea, 1 2. 288.
Pancratium, 289.
Pallenses, 90.
Palirenses, ibid.
PangJEum, 128.
Panormus of Achaia, 119. of
Milesia, 434.
Paralia, 102.
Paralians, 175.
Paralus, the name of a gaily,
145.
Patrae, U8, 119. 291.
Pausanias hated by the confe-
derates, 48. winneth most
of Cyprus, 47- his insolent
behaviour, ibid, sent for
home, ibid, his pride, 63.
TABLE.
driven out of Byzantium,
he goeth to Colonae, 64. his
inscription on the Tripode,
ibid, his letter to Xerxes,
63. he conspireth with the
Helots, 65. is betrayed by
an Argilian, ibid, taketh
sanctuary, 66. his death,
ibid.
Peace between the Lacedemo-
nians and Athenians for
thirty years, 55. peace in
Sicily, made by Hermo-
crates, 221. peace between
the Lacedemonians and A-
thenians for fifty years, 269.
not liked by the confede-
rates, 272. why desired by
the Lacedemonians, 267.
crossed by the ephores, 280.
the peace made after the
first ten years war, no
peace, 275. broken in the
Mantinean and Epidaurus
war, ibid.
Pegae, 52.
Peiraice, 88.
Pelasgicum, 85.
Pella, 128.
Pelopides, 6.
Peloponnesus, whence so call-
ed, 5. inhabited by the Do-
reans, 8. Peloponnesian war,
after the Persian, fifty years,
51.
Peloponnesus invaded by the
Athenians, 88. 103.
Peloris, 201.
Pelops, 5.
Pentacosiomedimni, 138.
Peparethus, 174.
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia
revolteth from the Athe-
nians, 31. procureth an ar-
my out of Peloponnesus,
229, 230. declared by the
Athenians for their enemy,
231. betrayed by the lUy-
rians, 253. flieth out of
Lyncus, and deserteth Bra-
sidas, ibid, maketh peace
with the Athenians, 257.
stoppeth the passage of
the Lacedemonians through
Thessaly, ibid, is barred
the use of the sea by
the Athenians, and why,
SO7.
Pericles warreth on Samos, 56.
besiegeth Oenia, 54. de-
scended of a stock that was
under the curse for violation
of sanctuary, 62. enemy to
the Lacedemonians, ibid,
blamed by the Athenians
as author of the war, 87.
gives his land to the state,
in case it were spared by
the enemy, 82. his death
and praise, 104. et seq.
Peripolium, 179.
Perseides, 6.
Pestilence at Athens, 99.
Phacium, 229.
Phseax sent into Sicily, 261.
moveth war against Syra-
cuse, ibid.
Phaeinis, priest of Juno, 258.
Phagres, 128.
Phaleron, 52.
Phanocis, 228.
Pharsalus, 54.
Phaselis, 110.
Pheia, 89.
Philip brother to Perdiccas,
29.
Phliasia wasted by the Ar-
gives, 307.
Phlius, 293.
Phoceae, 261.
Phocaea, 438.
Phoenicians, addicted to rob-
TABLE.
bery, 5. their cities in Si-
cily, 316. Phoenicia, 110.
Phanieus, a haven, fiJO.
Phormio wasteth Chalcidea,
32. sent to Potidjea, ibid,
sent to Naupactus, 110.
fighteth with the Corin-
thians, 118. with Cnemus,
1 24. putteth suspected per-
sons out of Stratus and Co-
rontae, 129
Phrygii, a place in Corinthia,
87.
Phrynichus refuseth battle,
and why, 436. his art to
elude the accusation of Al-
cibiades,448. his death,470.
Phthiotis, 3.
Physca, 128.
Phytia, 182.
Pieria, 128.
Piraeus, better to the Atheni-
ans than their city, 47.
when walled in, ibid, at-
tempted by the Peloponne-
sians, 124. Piraeus of Co-
rinthia, 428.
Pisander laboureth the recall-
ing of Alcibiades,and depos-
ing of the people, 449. ac-
cuseth Phrynichus, 450. is a
principal man in the setting
up of the four hundred
Athens, 456.
Pisistratus, the son of Hippias
the tyrant, 343.
Pitanate, 12.
Pits. Men thrown into pits,
109.
Plague, vide Pestilence.
Plataea surprised, 76. victual-
led by the Athenians, 78.
attempted by fire, 114. by
engines, ibid, besieged, 115.
yielded, 155. Platsans, 142.
Platfta demolished, 164.
Plataeis invaded by the Lace-
demonians, 111.
Pleistoanax banished, 87. de-
vsireth peace, and why, 268.
Plemmyrium fortified by Ni-
cias, 375. taken by the Sy-
racusians, 383.
Pleuron, 180.
Polis Argivis, 108.
Poppy tempered with honey
sent over into Sphacteria,
203.
Potidania, 178.
Potidaca, 29. revolteth, ibid.
is besieged. 30. the Poti-
daeans eat one another, 1 10.
they yield, ibid.
Prasise, 103.
Priene, 55.
Pronsei, 90.
Prophecies rise before great
wars, 79.
Proschion, 180, 182.
Prote, 195.
Prytanes, 458.
Pteleum, 270, 434.
Pydna, 30,
P'ylus, 190. fortified by the
Athenians, ibid, kept by
Messenians, 210.
Pyrrha, 146.
Q
Quarrel about Epidamnus, 1 4 .
Quarries, a prison at Syracuse,
419, 420.
Question, how put in the as-
sembly at Sparta, 43.
Question to be answered by
the Plataeans, 156.
R
Religion neglected in the time
TABLE.
of the pestilence, 101. the
opinion of the Athenians,
touching the gods, 311.
Revolt. Causes of revolts, 49.
Rhegium, 17^-
Rheiti, 86.
Rheitus, 211.
Rhenea tied to Delos with a
chain, 181.
Rhium Molychrium, 119.
Rhium Achaicum, 119.
Rhodes, 444.
Rhodope, 126, 127.
Rhoetium, 215.
Robbing had in honour, 3.
Sabylinthus king of the Agrse-
ans, 116.
Sadocus made free of the city
of Athens, 90. betrayeth
the Lacedemonian ambas-
sadors, 108.
Salethus entereth secretly into
Mitylene, and conBrmeth
it against the Athenians,
142. is taken, 146. and put
to death at Athens, ibid.
Salami nia, the name of a tri-
reme, 145.
Salamis over-run by the Pelo-
ponnesians, IJ5.
Samos besieged, 55. yielded,
56.
Samos in sedition, 459.
Sane, 245.
Sanctuary, 14, 62.
Scione, 250. besieged by the
Athenians, 258. expunged
and given to the Platasans,
277.
Sciritae, 229.
S com us, 126.
Scylleum, 291.
SCNTOS, 48.
Scytale, 64.
Scythians, their power, 127-
Sea. The Argives acknowledge
the dominion of the sea up-
on their own coast, to be-
long to the Athenians, 283.
Seditions, most incident to
fertile countries, 2. Sedition
in Corcyra, 102. Manners
of the seditious described,
169. et seq. the nobUity in
the sedition of Corcyra, now
destroyed, 214-
Selinus, 31/. when built, ibid.
Sentence. The cruel sentence
of the Athenians against the
Mityleuians, 146.
Sermyla, 32.
Shipping of Greece, what it
was before the Peloponne-
sian war, 9.
Sicani, 3 1 6.
Sicily described, 316. et seq.
Sicilians make peace a-
raongst themselves at Gela,
319. the Sicilian voyage re-
solved on at Athens, 320.
Siculi, 317.
Sidussa, 445.
Sintians, 127.
Siphse, 234.
Sitalces king of Thrace leagues
with the Athenians, 90. war-
reth on Macedonia, 125.
retireth thence, 129.
''Solium, 90.
Solygia, 211.
Spartans taken in Sphacteria,
267.
Spartolus, 1 15.
Sphacteria, how situate, 192.
Stagyrus, revolteth, 234. as-
saulted by Cleon, ibid.
Standard in battle, 25.
Sthenelaidas, 43.
Kk
TABLE.
Stratagem of Ariston, 393.
Stratus. The Chaonians over-
thrown by ambush at Stra-
tus, 117, 126.
Strymon, 49, 126, 244, 263.
Sybota, the islands, 25. 28.
Sybota, the haven, 26. 167.
Syca, 367.
Syme, 443.
Synaecia, why, and by whom
instituted, 84.
Syracuse, when, and by whom
built, 317- the Syracusians
displace their generals, and
why, S70. Syracuse how
near to being taken by the
Athenians, 375. the Syra-
cusians begin to treat with
Nicias, 370. they shut up
the mouth of the great
haven, 404.
Tages, deputy lieutenant to
Tissaphernes, 431.
Talent. A talent, pay for a
month, to a gaily, 320. a
ship of five hundred talents
burthen, 249.
Taenarus. Temple of Nep-
tune at Tsenarus, 62.
Tanagra, 53. 175. 228.
Tantalus a Lacedemonian, ta-
ken, and added to the pri-
soners taken at Pylus, 318.
Tegea, 296. 302. 278. Te-
geans and Mantineans fight
at Orestium, 258. Tegeans
refuse the Argive league,
278.
Temple of Juno built in the
ruins of Plattea, 165.
A tenth of the land in Lesbos
consecrated, 155.
Tereas, S66.
Teres, 90.
Tereus, ibid.
Teuglussa, 443.
Tens revolteth, 431.
Thalamii, 206
Thapsus, when, and by whom
built, 317. Thapsus, 367.
Tharups, king of the Molossi-
ans and Antitanes, 1 1 6.
Thasus revolteth from the A-
thenians, 49. is subdued, ib.
Oligarchized by the Athe-
nians, revolteth from them,
454.
Thebes, seat of the war, made
by Xerxes, 45. distant from
l-'lataea seventy furlongs, 77*
Thebans attempting to sur-
prise Platsea, taken prison-
soners, 79- slain, ibid.
Themistocles, 9. 37. adviseth
to wall in the city of A-
thens, 45. deludeth the La-
cedemonians, ibid, addicted
to the affairs by sea, 40.
author to the Athenians to
take upon them the domi-
nion of the sea, ibid, his
letter to Artaxerxes, 67- his
praise, 68. his death and
burial, ibid.
Theramenes, a Lacedemonian,
cast away at sea, 44 1 .
Theramenes the Athenian,
469.
Therme, 30, 90.
Thermopylae, 129, 176.
Theseus reduceth the Atheni-
ans to one city, 84.
Thespiae, 228. the walls of
ThespisB razed. 257' Thes-
pian commons assault the
few, 366.
TABLE.
Thesprotis, 17, 23.
Thessalians, 129. they infest
Heraclea, 176'
Thiamus, 182.
Thrace described, 126. Thra-
cian custom in receiving
gifts, 127. the Thracian ar-
my in Macedonia, 126.
Thracians sack Mycales-
sus, 387.
Thriasian fields, 86.
Thronium, 89.
Thucydides, his diligence in
writing this history, 1 2. is
sick of the pestilence, 98.
he defendeth Eion, 243. is
banished for twenty years,
and when, 274. lived
throughout the whole war,
ibid.
Thyraea, 89, 217, 283.
Thyssus, 245.
Tichiuni, 173.
Timocrates, 124.
Tissaphernes seeketh the La-
cedemonian league, 426. is
well affected to the Athe-
nians, 446. why he brought
not the Phoenician fleet
from A spend us, 467.
Tolophians, 179.
Tomeus. 249.
Torone, 245.
Trachinians, 175.
Tribute, when first assessed by
the Athenians, 48.
Trinacria, 316.
Triopium, 439.
Tripodiscus, 224.
Tritaeans, 179.
Troezen, 103.
Trogilus, 340.
The Trojan war, first joint
action of the Grecians, 3.
the Trojan fleet, "J.
Trotilus, when, and by whom
built, 317.
Truce for five years between
the Peloponnesians and A-
thenians, 54. Truce at Py-
lus, 196. Truce for a year
between the Lacedemonians
and the Athenians, 248.
ended, 259. Truce between
the Lacedemonian and Ar-
give armies, 294.
Tyrants, 10. Tyranny of the
Pisistratides easy, 344. Ty-
ranny opposite to Demo-
cracy, 363.
W
Walling of towns when it be-
gan in Greece, 5. the walls
of Athens built in haste, 46.
the wall about Peiraeus, ibid,
the long v;alls of Athens
begun, 52. finished, ibid,
inhabited, 85. the long walls
of Megara built by the
Athenians, 50, 51. Long
walls at Argos, 85. razed,
ibid. Long w-alls from Pa-
trae to Rhium, 291. the
walls of Tanagra razed, 53.
a new wall before Syracuse,
367. the walls of the Athe-
nians to enclose Syracuse,
367. Wall of the Syracu-
sians to cut off the walls of
the Athenians, 375, 377-
War. The wars of old time,
9. between the Chalcideans
and Eretrians, ibid. War
against Sparta decreed at
Athens, 44 the holy war,
54. War of the Athenians
against Samos, 55. war of
TABLE.
the Athenians in ^gypt
ended, 55. beginning of
the Peloponnesian war, 75.
the children of such as died
in the war, kept by the
Athenian people till they
Avere at men's estate, 98.
Watch-word, 396.
Wind. A set wind every
morning blowing from the
mouth of the Crissaean bay,
118.
Woods. The advantage of
woods in fight, 205. the
woods in Sphacteria set on
fire, and burnt up by acci-
dent, ibid.
X
Xenares, ephore of Lacede-
mon seeketh to dissolve the
peace, 280, 286.
Xerxes, his fleet, 10. his letter
to Pausanias, 65,
Peloponnesian war, 75. the
second, 98. the third year,
111. the fourth, 131. the
fifth, 142. the sixth, 174.
the seventh, 189. the eighth,
215. the ninth, 248. the
tenth, 259. the eleventh,
273. the twelfth, 282. the
thirteenth, 290. the four-
teenth, 293. the fifteenth,
306. the sixteenth, 307.
the seventeenth, 320. the
eighteenth, 366. the nine-
teenth, 382. the twentieth
427. the one and twentieth,
453. the number of years
that the whole war lasted,
274. how the years of the
war ought to be reckoned,
271.
Young men for want of expe-
rience love war, 120. Young
men made governors of
cities contrary to the laws,
257.
Z
Year. The first year of the
Zacynthus, 108.
Zancle, 3 1 8.
THE END.
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