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THE GREEK DILEMMA

THE GREEK:
DILEMMA

War and
Aftermath

William Hardy McNeill |

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY |

| PHILADELPHIA AND NEW YORK I

i |

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COPYRIGHT, 1947, BY
WILHAM HARDY MCNEILL

PRINTED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FIRST EDITION

To my wife, Elizabeth

Preface

-HE history of Greece during
the past six years reveals a bitter struggle for power between
a Left, dominated and led by the Communist Party, and
a Right, which has rallied around the figure of King
George II. The struggle between these two extremes has been
powerfully and decisively influenced by foreign intervention.
The Russians have supported the Left morally; the British
have supported the Right by arms, and, in conjunction with
the United States, economically as well.

The story, I believe, is interesting in itself. It takes a larger
interest from the light which events in Greece can throw on
the pattern of world politics which seems so rapidly to be
dividing all the nations of the world into two great rival
camps. Greece has become a bone of contention between
Russia and Great Britain. The struggle between Left and
Right which is now going on within the country reflects, and
adds its part to, the forces which divide Russia from the
West. Consequently, the fate of Greece is inextricably tangled
with world politics. It is even possible that the fate of the
world may take a decisive turn from future events in Greece,
for the conflict is more naked and direct there than in almost
any other country.

This book arises from twenty months' residence in Greece,
between November 1944 and June 1946. During that time
I was able to travel through all parts of the country, and was
witness to many of the scenes here described. The project of
writing this book formed itself in my mind while I was still in

,7

& PREFACE

Greece, and I was able to interview most of the men who
have played a leading part in the recent shaping of the coun-
try's history.

All opinions and judgments expressed in the book are, of
course, my own.

W. H. M.
15 October 1946

Contents

i

I. GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 13

II. WAR AND OCCUPATION 36

III. RESISTANCE 61

IV. THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 91
V. THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 113

VI. EFFORTS AT UNITY 131

VII. CmLWAR 161

VIII. REACTION 191

IX. ELECTIONS 220

X. FOREIGN RELATIONS 248

XL CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 270

APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 282

INDEX 286

THE GREEK DILEMMA

Glossary

EAM

*

EDES

Athens EDES
EKKA

ELAS

Ipejthinos

Kapetanios

KKE

Liberal Party
PAO

PEEA

Popular Party

ELAN

Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon National Liberation
Front. Leftist political resistance organization.

Ellinikos Dimikratikos Ethnikos tfytwteymos Greek Demo-
cratic National League. Conservative guerilla army in western
Greece.

Conservative political resistance organization in Athens;
started EDES guerillas, but later broke with them.

Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosis National and Social
Liberation. Socialist resistance group to which a small guerilla
band attached itself.

Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos. "National People's
Liberation Army. By far the largest guerilla force in Greece,
organized by EAM.

The Responsible. Chief EAM local official.
Political commissar with ELAS.

Kommunistikon Komma Ettados Communist Party of Greece.
The most influential component of EAM.

Phileleftheron Komma. The party of Venizelos. Conservative
republican.

Panellinios Apeleftherotiki Organ&sis Panhellenjc Liberating
Organization. Conservative guerilla organization in Salonika
area.

Politiki Epitropi Ethntkis Apeleftherosis Political Committee
of National Liberation. The Provisional Government of the
Mountains set up by EAM in 1944.

Laikon Komma. Principal royalist party.

Rumeli-Avalona-Nisi, that is, a province of southern Bulgaria,
Valona and Nish. A conservative irridentist organization.

Chi, a letter of the Greek alphabet. Anti-Communist secret
society? with, an affiliated political party of the same name.
12

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z

Greek Society and Politics

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IREECE is today a small
country, an unwilling pawn of Great Power politics, dis-
tressed by poverty and distracted by internal strife that verges
on chronic civil war. As all Greeks are vividly aware, their
nation occupied no such subordinate position in times past.
The ancient Greeks put a stamp on Western civilization that
has never been erased, and for centuries after the fall of
Rome, the Greek Empire of Byzantium was perhaps the most
powerful, and certainly the most civilized, state of Europe.
The fact that their place in the contemporary world cannot
compare with past greatness weighs constantly upon the
national pride of the Greeks. They like to dream of rising
again to a leading place in the world, and for long hoped to
rebuild the vanished Empire of Byzantium and make the
Imperial City of Constantinople once more the capital of the
Greek state.

Ever since Greece became independent of the Turks
(1830), this hope has run through Greek political life like a
will-o'-the-wisp. But the little kingdom of Greece was weak
by itself, and speedily fell into bitter quarrels with neighbor-
ing Christian peoples of the Balkans, so that the coveted
capital and the hope of territorial expansion at the expense
of the Turks both remained unattainable. However, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, events of the Balkan
Wars and of World War I, coupled with the appearance of
a catalytic new political personality Eleftherios Venizelos

13

14 THE GREEK DILEMMA

breathed new life into the old ambition and brought about
an entirely new political balance inside Greece itself.

Venizelos first distinguished himself in 1908 as a leader of
a revolt against the Turkish rulers of his native island, Crete.
His fiery eloquence, ardent nationalism, and extraordinary
personal magnetism won him many followers and admirers,
so that when a military league staged a successful coup d'etat
against the Government in Athens, the officers who had led
the conspiracy fixed upon the young Venizelos as an appro-
priate leader for their cause. Accordingly, although legally
a Turkish subject, Venizelos was asked to come to Athens in
1910, and within a few months he became Prime Minister
of Greece.

The new Prime Minister was above all else a Greek na-
tionalist. He took the dream of a Greater Greece with deadly
seriousness, and was able to win the support of most Greeks
for his plans. In 1911 Turkey became embroiled in a war
with Italy over the province of Tunisia. The time to strike
against the hereditary enemy seemed ripe. Venizelos hastened
to join in a league with Bulgaria and Serbia for the purpose
of attacking the Turks and partitioning the European prov-
inces of the Ottoman Empire. No definite agreement was
made as to where the new Greek boundaries should run;
and in fact there were basic conflicts between the territorial
ambitions of the three Christian nations.

Without settling these conflicts by any definite advance
agreement, the governments of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia
agreed to co5perate in a war against the Turks. Accordingly,
in the fall of 1912, the three armies were mobilized, attacked
the Turks simultaneously, and won immediate success on all
fronts. The Bulgars defeated a Turkish army in Thrace and
drove forward toward Constantinople. The Serbs met an-
other Turkish army in Macedonia and utterly defeated it,
capturing all the northern part of that province. The Greeks
pushed northward toward Salonika and captured it in

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 15

October. A second Greek force traversed the wilds of Epirus,
where it besieged and eventually captured the capital,
Jannina.

The great successes of the three allies were soon dimmed
by quarrels over the division of the spoils. Austria and Italy
were alarmed by Serbia's unexpected victory. They hastened
to blunt its effect in the Adriatic by diplomatic intervention,
and succeeded in setting up Albania as an independent state.
By this means Serbia was shut off from the sea, and the
Straits of Otranto were secured against any possible penetra-
tion by Serbia's friends, the Triple Entente. Serbia thereupon
demanded compensation for her losses in the West; but the
Bulgars (and the Greeks) were unwilling to concede any of
their newly won territory. At the same time, the Bulgars
demanded Salonika, claiming that their greater effort in the
war entitled them to the lion's share of the spoils. Prolonged
and acrimonious negotiations ensued which were only broken
off when the Bulgars made" an unannounced attack on the
Greek and Serbian armies.

The Bulgar attack on their former allies did not prosper.
The Turks promptly renewed hostilities in Thrace; and the
Rumanians too joined in the fray against Bulgaria. Such an
encirclement was too much for Bulgar armies. They suffered
a number of defeats, and in July 1913 the Bulgarian Govern-
ment was compelled to make peace. In the settlement which
followed, Greece annexed Crete, the principal Aegean islands,
Southern Epirus and the southern half of Macedonia. Serbia
acquired the northern part of Macedonia and the Sanjak
which had previously separated her from the sister state of
Montenegro. Bulgaria, although she had borne the main
brunt of the fighting against the Turks, was forced to content
herself with the provinces of Western Thrace and Pirim.
The Bulgars were bitterly disappointed and cherished a burn-
ing animosity against both Serbia and Greece for wresting
from them so much of the fruit of victory.

16 THE GREEK DILEMMA

The next three years were a tangled and disastrous time
for Greece. Crown Prince Constantine had personally led the
Greek Army which captured Salonika, and had been able to
take command o the troops besieging Jannina in time for
the final assault. King George I was assassinated during the
war, and Constantine became King while serving in the field.
He reaped a great popularity from his military successes, and
formed around himself a group of ardent admirers. Venizelos,
the other great Greek protagonist of the Balkan Wars, rivaled
the King's popularity. The two men did not like one another
personally. Each felt the other claimed more than his share
of credit for the Greek victories. Furthermore, there were
differences in the social background of the men who sup-
ported the two rivals, and this lent edge to their personal
dislike.

But what brought all these points of friction into full play
was a question of high policy raised by the outbreak of World
War I. King Constantine wanted Greece to cling to neutrality
and husband her strength against unforeseen contingencies.
Venizelos, on the contrary, advocated joining the Allied side
of the conflict. King Constantine had family connections with
the German Kaiser, and he had a soldier's respect for' the
might of German arms. Venizelos was influenced above all
by one consideration: Turkey was belligerent against the
Allies, and if Greece should join the Allied side she could
hope to gain Constantinople and make the Aegean a Greek
lake, in the event of an Allied victory. It was a gamble, of
course; the Allies might be defeated. But Venizelos was a
born political gambler and gladly risked what he had already
won, in hope of winning more.

A moral issue was also involved, for Greece had been in
alliance with Serbia, and, depending on how one construed
the words of the treaty, she was or was not obliged to come
to Serbia's assistance when the Serbs were attacked by Austria.
Diplomatic intrigue flourished in Athens as French, Russians,

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 17

British, Germans, and Austrians did all in their power to
advance the fortunes of the party favorable to their respective
interests. It was a situation in which honest and patriotic
Greeks could feel sincere doubt, but the uncertainties of both
arguments seemed merely to make the two sides more fanatic.
All Greece came to be torn between the contending factions.

Bulgarian entry into the war (1916) on the German side
strengthened the Venizelist party, for victory over Bulgaria
and Turkey could now open the road to Constantinople,
which had previously been blocked by a neutral Bulgaria.
An election in 1916 gave the Venizelists a small majority,
but Constantine refused to re-appoint Venizelos as Prime
Minister. The fiery Cretan thereupon decided on insurrec-
tion. He withdrew from Athens and established a Govern-
ment in Salonika in open defiance of the King. A French and
British expeditionary force landed in Macedonia in support
of the Venizelist Government where it opened the Salonika
front against the Bulgars. This could plausibly be construed
as treason; but the King countered in kind, for he sent secret
instructions to the Greek garrison of Eastern Macedonia to
allow the Bulgars to pass without opposition, thinking that
Venizelos would be taken unexpectedly on the flank and
overthrown by the Bulgar armies. This stratagem failed, and
Allied diplomacy backed up by Allied guns (warships bom-
barded the Royal Palace briefly) compelled the Government
in Athens to come to terms with Venizelos early in 1917. It
was a victory for the revolutionaries, for Venizelos became
Prime Minister again, and Constantine was forced to re-
linquish his throne to his second son, Alexander. Alexander
was a less stubborn man than his father or his elder brother,
George, so that the intensity of the struggle between royalists
and Venizelists died down for a few years.

The Venizelist Government in Salonika had begun to
build a volunteer army. After the reconciliation, the regular
Greek Army was sent to the Salonika front where it combined

18 THE GREEK DILEMMA

with the Venizelist troops and fought creditably under
Allied command for the next year. After the Bulgarian sur-
render and the Turkish collapse (early fall, 1918), Greek
troops in conjunction with French and British occupied
Thrace and bivouacked within sight of the long-dreamed-of
capital, Constantinople. It was a time of high elation for the
Greeks. Venizelos hastened away to the Peace Conference at
Paris where he became one of the dominant figures of that
international gathering. He won great concessions for Greece
in Asia Minor, but failed to gain the keystone city of Con-
stantinople.

Greek disappointment over this failure was severe. Simul-
taneously, the untimely death of King Alexander reopened
the scarce-healed controversy of the early war years, and a
corrupt Government at home sullied Venizelos' popularity.
In 1920 new elections were held and Venizelos was defeated.
King Constantine returned in triumph, and a group of the
King's personal friends and supporters took over the Govern-
ment.

The royalists faced a difficult problem in Asia Minor.
Greek troops had taken up garrison duties in the area assigned
to Greece by the peace treaty, but the Turkish insurrection-
ary Government headed by Mustapha Kemal had refused to
accept any partition of Asia Minor and defied the Greek
claims to part of the peninsula. Faced with Turkish in-
transigence, King Constantine and his followers decided to
overbid Venizelos' patriotic appeal which had won him such
great political successes in the past. Accordingly, they under-
took an offensive against the Turks, fondly hoping to annex
most or all of Asia Minor. Unfortunately for their ambitions,
imperial interests in Syria persuaded the French to lend sup-
port to Mustapha Kemal, and Great Britain was unwilling to
back the Greeks to the bitter end. Using French surplus war
stocks, the Turks built up an army whose strength became
superior to that of the Greek forces, and in the spring of 1922

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 19

the Turks were able to inflict a serious defeat on the Greeks.
Retreat soon turned into a desperate rout. The Greeks were
unable to hold the Turks anywhere on the mainland, and
what remained of the beaten Army made its way to safety in
the islands off the coast or took ship directly to Athens. As
the Turks advanced they systematically uprooted all the
Greeks and other Christians who were native to Asia Minor.
Many thousands were killed, especially at Smyrna when a
great massacre of the large Greek community signalized the
final victory of the Turks. Despite the thousands who were
slaughtered, over a million Greeks and Armenians succeeded
in escaping by sea to Greece.

After this disaster the Greeks had no choice but to negotiate
a peace with Turkey whereby they gave up all their claims in
Asia Minor. A systematic exchange of populations between
the two countries was agreed upon. The treaty with Bulgaria,
concluded some years before, had also provided for a popu-
lation exchange. Consequently, during the following three
years, all persons who opted for Turkish or Bulgarian citizen-
ship were expelled from Greek territory; and about half a
million more Greeks came to swell the total of refugees who
had come from Asia Minor in 1922. (One exception was
made: it was agreed that the Greek population of Constan-
tinople should not be displaced; and in return the Turkish
population of Western Thrace was allowed to remain un-
disturbed.)

During the following years the Greeks' dream of a recon-
stituted Byzantine Empire faded. Nearly all the Greek popu-
lation which had formerly been scattered over the Balkans
and Asia Minor, had either been absorbed into the rising
nationalities or forcibly transferred within the new boun-
daries of Greece. Turkey had emerged from the war as a
compact national state, able and willing to protect Con-
stantinople against attack. It followed, after the bitterness of
war and defeat, that Greek relations with Turkey grew

20 THE GREEK DILEMMA

steadily more friendly until in 1931 a treaty of amity was
concluded between the two ancient enemies.

Part of the reason for this rapprochement was the fact that
Greece found herself faced with the implacable enmity of
Bulgaria. The Bulgars never gave up hope of recovering the
provinces of Thrace and Macedonia, The Greeks, for their
part, nourished a deep grievance against the Bulgars who had
twice fought against them, and who so openly coveted the new
provinces which Greece had won.

The negotiation of peace with Turkey did not bring in-
ternal pacification to Greece. The quarrel between King
Constantine and Eleftherios Venizelos arose, in part, as we
have seen, from personal incompatibility between the two
men. It quickly took on a wider significance, however, when
rival and hostile political parties formed around the two
leaders. From 1916, when Venizelos embarked upon his
Salonika adventure, he became the leader of a sort of dis-
guised revolution. New men, representing a new class, rose
to power in his wake and rudely shouldered aside the mem-
bers of the semi-aristocratic families who had previously
exercised a near monopoly of political leadership.

During the nineteenth century the little kingdom of Greece
had been organized on almost patriarchal lines. The over-
whelming majority of the population was peasant, and took
almost no active part in the political rivalries of the capital.
In the villages the peasant way of life was well consolidated.
The peasants generally owned the land they cultivated, and
were able by hard work and frugal living to feed and clothe
themselves and their families. Lack of education and lack
of any active discontent united to restrain them from any
important part in the political quarrels and maneuvers of the
Athens Governments.

Many, but not all, villages had traditional associations with
a particular aristocratic family. Originally, these great
families had been large landowners, or leaders in the Greek

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 21

War of Independence, but during the nineteenth century
their estates were nearly all broken up by sale to the peasants,
and the former landowners moved to Athens, where they
dabbled in politics. The peasants were generally willing to
vote for their patron at election time; and in return they
expected and received his personal intervention on their be-
half whenever his help was needed in dealing with the Gov-
ernment.

In the capital, political faction was chronic and sometimes
embittered, but it arose solely from personal rivalries and
jealousies, exacerbated from time to time by foreign en-
couragement of one or another party. There were no social
differences between the various political groups, and political
maneuvers often had the appearance more of a parlor game
than of anything more serious. By degrees, the widespread
devastation of the War of Independence was repaired; new
land was steadily brought under cultivation; and public im-
provements, such as railroad construction, were carried
through with the help of foreign loans.

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, this form of
social organization began to develop new strains. The basic
cause was a growing overpopulation. Greek peasant society
produced a large surplus of children. Marriages normally
were made at an early age, and large families were both ex-
pected and desired. In consequence, arable land which had
been left waste after the War of Independence was rapidly
repeopled, and fifty years later a surplus rural population
began to appear. Younger sons could no longer find enough
unoccupied land on which to make a living, and were forced
to look outside the village community for means .of liveli-
hood.

Two solutions were found for this problem. By far the
more important was emigration. A swarm of peasant boys
began to leave for America (and other parts of the world),
there to seek their fortune. Very often the emigrant was

22 THE GREEK DILEMMA

chosen in family conclave as the most likely to succeed in the
strange outside world, and his passage was financed by the
pooled resources of the whole family or by a relative who had
already established himself in America, The Greek peasants
when they came to America still maintained strong social
roots in their ancestral villages. Their purpose was to make
money as quickly as possible in order to send much-needed
cash back to relatives in Greece. Consequently, despite their
peasant origin, Greek immigrants seldom if ever took up
land, but rather sought work in the cities, and faithfully sent
surplus earnings home to Greece.

But the journey overseas was long and expensive. Many
Greeks were loath to separate themselves so far from their
families or were unable to pay the cost of passage. Migration
to the towns of Greece itself offered hope of livelihood for
such persons; and the easy availability of a cheap, hard-
working labor force, recruited from the surplus peasant popu-
lation of the villages, helped to make possible a notable
development of light industry in Greece after 1900. Textile
manufacture far outstripped other industries. Factory pro-
duction remained on a relatively small scale, however; and
before World War I proletarian industrial laborers num-
bered only a few thousand in all of Greece. Other thousands
of peasants who could find no land in their villages were
able to contrive a living in the towns of Greece by pursuing
various service occupations or by becoming artisans and
small traders. A few of the more ambitious and intelligent
men were able to acquire professional training at the Uni-
versity of Athens but very often discovered that their hard-
won education failed to assure them an adequate income
due to serious overcrowding of all the professions.

The growth of towns meant the development of a group
in the Greek population which fell outside the traditional
social organization. To be sure, old attitudes and loyalties
persisted strongly among the peasants who came to the towns,

GREEK SOCIETY AND Pooncs 23

and the townsmen were not numerous enough to challenge,
by themselves, the traditional political and social leadership
of the great families, even if they had clearly wished to do
so. They remained a marginal group. But the social problem
of Greece in the early years of this century was more than
the restlessness of the growing group of impoverished towns-
people, for the great mass of the peasantry was less well
content than before due to the ever-increasing land shortage.
Village custom failed to adjust population to the land, and
the traditional political leaders of Greece proved almost un-
aware of, and totally unable to cope with, the population
problem.

This was roughly the social situation in Greece when the
dynamic figure of Eleftherios Venizelos arrived from Crete.
He proclaimed a fiery nationalism; and his program of terri-
torial expansion easily appealed to the land hunger of the
Greek peasantry. More than this, he channelled the restless-
ness of the townsmen toward a new political expression.
From the beginning, the marginal group in the towns was the
most ardent and prominent of Venizelos' supporters. Hun-
dreds of ambitious and impecunious lawyers, many of whom
were peasants' sons, flocked to the political party which
formed around him. The new party was called Phileleftheron
Komma, that is, Friends of Liberty Party, or, as the name is
usually translated, the Liberal Party.

Very few of the old families cared to associate with the
new political group, finding its members as a rule, poor,
coarse and uncultured. But Venizelos* great successes in the
Balkan Wars, and the palpable force of his personality,
quickly made his party a real power in the land. Thus, for
the first time since Greece had achieved liberation from the
Turks, the political and social leadership of the old families
was seriously questioned. They met the challenge by rec-
onciling the petty differences that had previously divided
them. By and large, the old families rallied round the King,

24 THE GREEK DILEMMA

forming what came to be known as the Laikon Komma, that
is, the People's, or Popular, Party. King Constantine became
in fact, though not in name, the party leader.

The annexation of Macedonia and Thrace, and the influx
of a million and a half refugees after 1922, worked a funda-
mental change in the balance of forces in Greek politics. The
new citizens of the Greek state were generally loyal to
Venizelos and opposed to the Popular Party and the King.
In the north, where large numbers of refugees had settled on
the half-vacant land of Macedonia and Thrace, the popula-
tion became almost solidly Venizelist; and in the larger towns,
where other thousands of the refugees found habitation,
Venizelist influence almost eclipsed that of the Popular
Party. Only in southern Greece, and especially in the Pelo-
ponnese, did the conservatives retain their old-time leader-
ship. In the country as a whole, preponderance passed to the
Venizelists.

Thus, during World War I, the struggle between political
parties assumed what was for Greece a new character. Instead
of mere personal rivalries, the quarrels of the politicians
came to reflect social cleavages and the bitterness of political
strife increased correspondingly. After 1922 the struggle took
on a constitutional form: royalist versus republican. This
development of the controversy arose in large part as a result
of the personal characters and acts of King Constantine and of
his son, King George II. Venizelos began his public career as
an advocate of constitutional monarchy, and perhaps never
espoused theoretical republicanism with complete enthusi-
asm. But when King Constantine became the chief of Veni-
zelos' political opponents, he forfeited the neutrality which
best becomes a king. It became impossible for the Venizelists
to feel any real loyalty to a king whom they knew to be
exerting every effort against them. While Alexander was
King (1917-20) the Liberals got along well enough under
the monarchy; but after Alexander's untimely death and

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 25

Constantine's restoration, the Venizelists were driven toward
republicanism, willy-nilly.

After the defeat in Asia Minor (1922), King Constantine
fled from Greece, and his son, George II, succeeded to the
throne. George was entirely unable to stem the popular re-
vulsion which arose against the Government that had led
Greece to such a disaster. Reflecting popular feeling, a tri-
umvirate of Venizelist officers proclaimed a revolution against
the royal Government. They met with little resistance. The
leaders of the revolt, Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Plastiras,
Lieutenant Colonel Stylianos Gonatas and Admiral Hadji-
kyriakos seized control of the Government, and invited King
George to leave the country. At the end of 1923, new elections
were held. The royalists abstained, so that the new Chamber
of Deputies and Cabinet were solidly against King George,
and, in the absence of any other candidate for the throne,
came to favor the establishment of a republican Government.
Accordingly, in March 1924, George was formally dethroned
and Greece officially became a republic.

By this act, the Liberals and associated parties became in-
delibly stamped as republican; while their major rival for
political power, the Popular Party, by virtue of its origin and
composition, favored monarchy. Thus the constitutional
issue was created which has distracted Greek politics ever
since.

After 1922 the republicans enjoyed a secure majority. For
the five years immediately following the end of hostilities
with the Turks (1923-28), Greece was governed by a
series of short-lived republican Administrations. A new Con-
stitution was drawn up and adopted after long discussion, but
constitutional procedures were by no means always followed.
Threats of violence were chronic, and in 1926 General
Theodore Pangalos established a dictatorship, which, how-
ever, was overthrown a few months later by a palace coup
d'&at. Gradually the most pressing problems created by the

26 THE GREEK DILEMMA

war faded away, and more stable government was established.
In 1928 Venizelos became Prime Minister again, and was
able to remain continuously in office until 1933. This un-
wontedly long Administration was able to accomplish much
for Greece, but proved unable to relieve the suffering and
discontent brought to Greece by the world depression of the
early thirties.

During the postwar period, the principal line of division
in Greek politics remained royalist versus republican. The
two main groups were in turn extensively subdivided into a
large number of small parties. These splinter parties usually
formed around the figure of some prominent politician, and
in many cases consisted only of a coterie of personal hangers-
on. The small parties thrown off by the Liberals were in gen-
eral rather to the left of the main stem, as for example, the
Progressive (Proodevtikon) Party led by George Kafandaris
or the Democratic Socialist (Dimokratikon Koinonikon)
Party of George Papandreou. These parties remained small,
and in parliamentary maneuvers usually joined forces with
the larger Liberal group.

A similar development took place among the conserva-
tives. After 1924 the main stem of the Popular Party officially
accepted republicanism, although many of its members never
gave up hoping for the return of the good old days, repre-
sented for them by the vision of the King once more secure
on his throne. Moderate and royalist wings developed within
the Popular Party, and an open split between the two seemed
sometimes to be imminent. No breach ever took place, how-
ever, and public advocacy of the King's return was left to
small parties. Of these the only significant one was the party
of Free Opinion (Eleftherof rones) led by General John
Metaxas. Metaxas was a brilliant military organizer and
tactician, a personal friend of King Constantine and a bitter
enemy of republicans and republicanism. His party, how-
ever, was very small.

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 27

During these years, Greek political life differed from that
of other European countries in two respects. No powerful
peasant party arose to dominate the scene as was the case in
Bulgaria, Rumania and Croatia. It is difficult to understand
why an effective agrarian party did not develop in Greece,
since peasants always constituted the majority of the popula-
tion. Self-styled peasant parties enjoyed a paper existence
after 1908, but, perhaps because of the distraction of the con-
stitutional issue, the main mass of the peasantry was never
won away from adherence to the Liberal and Popular Parties
which remained distinctly bourgeois in leadership and
orientation. Socialism, such as was familiar in Central and
Western Europe, found equally small success in Greece. A
Socialist Party was founded in 1908, but its members were
predominantly intellectuals. Their ideas won little support
even among the laboring classes of the cities, which, despite
their changed circumstances, still generally clung to the
attitudes of their peasant ancestors.

During the period of republican predominance (1922-33),
the country made considerable economic progress. Factories
grew in number and size; roads and other communications
were improved, and new areas of land were made fit for culti-
vation by the execution of large-scale drainage and irrigation
projects. As long as world prosperity was general, the Greeks
were able to make out satisfactorily enough. After 1924, free
immigration to America was stopped. The stream was par-
tially diverted elsewhere, notably to Australia and South
Africa, while the rising rate of industrial development in
Greece itself helped to absorb what was left over of the sur-
plus rural population.

The Greek economy was, however, exceedingly vulnerable.
Even after the annexation of the relatively fertile and exten-
sive fields of Macedonia and Thrace, the country did no't
raise enough food to feed its population. As much as forty
per cent of the wheat consumed by the Greek people had to

28 THE GREEK DILEMMA

be imported from abroad. In addition, essential and expen-
sive manufactured goods could not be produced locally, and
had to come from more developed industrial areas.

The imports of Greece were necessities. They were largely
paid for by the exports of luxuries: tobacco, olives and olive
oil, currants, briar and liquorice roots, etc. As long as trade
was relatively free and other countries prosperous, this was
an advantage for Greece. Greek tobacco, by far the largest
export, commanded a high price on the market, being of a
peculiar type and fineness which could not be produced else-
where in the world. (The so-called Turkish tobacco in our
cigarettes is in large part Greek.) Fields devoted to tobacco
would pay for five to ten times the amount of wheat that
could have been grown on the same land. Greece enjoyed a
similar but slighter advantage from raising her other spe-
cialized agricultural crops.

But when the depression of the early thirties came to the
world, the Greek economy was exposed to serious dislocation.
Other countries could afford to do without fine tobacco or,
olive oil; Greece could not afford to do without bread. Con-
sequently, prices for Greek luxury products fell far more than
did the price of bread, and it. became more and more difficult
for Greece to buy enough wheat to satisfy the needs of her
population. Serious hardship resulted, and some land was
shifted from the raising of specialized crops back to wheat
growing.

On the political scene, the onset of the depression
sharpened once more the bitterness of party controversy.
The Popular Party grew in strength; and in 1933, when
elections were held, the Liberals lost their majority. This
outcome was a surprise to the republican political leaders.
A small group of Army officers, believing that a Government
directed by the Popular Party would surely oust them from
their positions, tried to organize a coup d'tat. The revolt
was led by Nicholas Plastiras (now a general), but it did not

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 29

gain the support of the more moderate republican leaders,
and was speedily put down. Plastiras fled to France, as did
his chief followers. The net effect of the revolt was to dis-
credit the republicans and weaken their influence in the
Army.

Sentiment favoring the return of King George undoubtedly
increased, but the country was by no means of one mind, and
the cautious leader of the Popular Party declined to bring
the King back suddenly, or without a plebiscite. Prolonged
and futile parliamentary maneuvers resulted. The new Gov-
ernment failed to come to grips with the economic crisis
which afflicted the country, and popular sentiment tended to
harden toward extremes. On the one hand, a small Commu-
nist Party won new support; on the other, a good many Greeks
began to think that the return of the King would be a good
thing and relieve the prevailing political instability. But it
was neither of these groups which precipitated renewed
violence. In February 1935 several hundred republican Army
officers attempted a coup d'tat against the Popular Party
Government. This revolt was better organized and on a much
larger scale than the revolt of 1933. Venizelos was persuaded
to give the movement his reluctant blessing, but he himself
took little or no part in it. After a few days of fighting, the
revolt was put down in Athens, and an army marched north-
ward to Macedonia where the republicans had gained con-
trol. Determined action by the royalist military leaders, and
the failure of the coup d'etat in the south persuaded the
republican generals in the north to give up the game after
only a few skirmishes. The leaders of the uprising fled to
safety abroad. Venizelos was among the refugees. He died
in exile the next year.

The revolt of 1935 provoked a reorganization of the Gov-
ernment. Out-and-out royalists came to power and set about
preparing the way for the return of King George II to the
Greek throne. General John Metaxas was appointed Minister

30 THE GREEK DILEMMA

of War and purged the Army and police of all republican
officers who were suspected of complicity in, or sympathy
with, the revolt. When the Army and police had been purged,
an election was arranged. The republican parties boycotted
the election, and consequently an overwhelmingly royalist
Chamber of Deputies was returned. The new Government
hastened to organize a plebiscite for the return of King
George, and, in November, a ninety-seven per cent vote in
favor of his restoration was announced. The plebiscite was
extensively falsified and in no sense represented accurately
the opinions of the electorate. Nevertheless, King George re-
turned to his throne, arriving in Athens late in November
1935.

The King came back with the hope and intention of ruling
as a constitutional monarch, more or less on the British pat-
tern. He declared a general amnesty for all political offenders,
and insisted that new and honest elections be held. Accord-
ingly, another election took place in June 1936. All parties
participated, and there was no systematic falsification of the
result. The Chamber of Deputies which was so chosen, di-
vided almost equally between republican and royalist parties.
The largest single party was the Liberal, with 127 seats. With
other splinter groups, the total strength of the republican
bloc amounted to 142. The Popular Party gained only 69
seats; but other royalist groups swelled the total to 143. Thus
the two were almost exactly balanced and neither could com-
mand a majority in the Chamber.

Such a deadlock was hardly new in Greek politics. What
was new was the fact that fifteen deputies representing the
Communist Party of Greece held the balance of power be-
tween royalist and republican blocs. This fact seemed to
promise great influence for the Communists in any Govern-
ment based on the Chamber of Deputies. It marks the arrival
of a new force on the Greek political scene; a force which has

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 31

played a most important part in the subsequent history of the
country.

The Communist Party of Greece (Kommunistikon Komma
ElladoSj or as often abbreviated, KKE) was not a new organi-
zation in 1936. It had been founded in 1918 by a group of
intellectuals and labor leaders. It was first called the Socialist-
Labor Party, but changed its name in 1924 when it became
formally affiliated with the Third International.

During the years of prosperity the Communists made little
headway in Greece. The landowning peasants found nothing
to attract them in Marxist doctrine, and the workingmen of
the towns were generally too close to their village origins
easily to abandon the traditional peasant frame of mind. The
party did make a number of converts among students and pro-
fessional classes. Marxist ideas appealed strongly to the numer-
ous professionally trained men who were unable to earn a
satisfactory living, since it explained their personal failure on
"scientific" grounds, and proved it to be not their own fault.
Another group in the Greek population was likewise touched
by Communist propaganda, namely the refugees in the larger
towns. Many of these had enjoyed relatively spacious living
in Asia Minor, where they had been merchants and artisans.
In Greece, few were ever able to rise again to the same stand*
ard of living they had known in their old homes; and most of
them were reduced to penurious day labor. Among these
refugees, especially of the younger generation, the doctrines
of the Communist Party met with considerable success. Ac-
cordingly, many tobacco workers of Kavalla and other towns
of northern Greece, and a substantial number of the refugee
laborers in Athens and Pireus became Communists before
the war.

The Communist Party differed from other Greek parties
in its stronger discipline and centralized control. The party
was directed by a Political Bureau, headed by a Secretary

32 THE GREEK DILEMMA

General. He appointed subordinate officials to direct the
party's activity in all the towns and districts of Greece. In
theory, the Political Bureau represented a Central Commit-
tee, elected by the members of the party at periodic con-
gresses; but, in fact, the membership of the Central Com-
mittee and of the Political Bureau was determined by cabals
among the top leaders of the party, and only a single slate of
candidates was presented for election at the congresses.

During its early years, the Greek Communist Party was not
thoroughly subordinated to the Comintern; but in 1931,
when the party split wide open on a relatively minor question
of tactics, the Third International intervened, and settled the
dispute, bringing the Greek Communists thoroughly into
line. An entirely new Political Bureau was sent to Greece
from Russia in that year, and all of the former leaders were
demoted. Nicholas Zachariades became the head of the Greek
Communist Party; and, despite his youth (he was only twenty-
nine years of age) , he was quickly able to restore discipline
among the Greek Communists.

In the next five years KKE won many new adherents. Its
propaganda was powerfully aided by the hardships of the
depression and the apparent inability of the established
political parties to cope with the worsening economic situa-
tion. The Communists gained steadily in the elections, but
the party remained small, and in 1936 was represented by
only fifteen deputies. But, as we have seen, the deadlock
between royalists and republicans gave the handful of Com-
munist deputies an importance out of all proportion to their
numbers. It seemed that any party Government would be at
the mercy of the Communist bloc unless a coalition between
the royalist and republican groups could be arranged.

By a remarkable coincidence, the Prime Minister and the
Deputy Prime Minister both died before the Chamber of
Deputies convened, and General Metaxas, as the senior Cabi-
net Minister and leader of the tiny Party of Free Opinion

GREEK SOCIETY ANB POLITICS 33

(seven seats), found himself In control of the Government
when the Chamber opened Its session in April 1936. By
agreement of both republicans and royalists, the Chamber
was immediately prorogued for a period of five months, and
Metaxas was empowered to govern in the interim. The reason
for this extraordinary decision was that neither the republican
nor the royalist party wished to see itself at the mercy of the
Communist deputies; but neither group could yet bring it-
self to unite with the other in support of a coalition Gov-
ernment.

While the Chamber was prorogued, negotiations between
the various political parties were carried on, and some sort of
understanding between the Liberals and Populists was in
fact arranged during the course of the summer. But Metaxas
had little faith in the words of professional politicians. More-
over, he liked the taste of power which the coincidence of the
deaths of his seniors and the paralysis of the Chamber had
given him. The Communists, meanwhile, had been active in
their turn, attempting to negotiate with the republicans and
persuade them to form a Popular Front on the pattern of
France. The Communists were rebuffed, however, and rumors
that they were about to organize a general strike began to
circulate in Athens. On the strength of these rumors Metaxas
was able to persuade King George that extraconstitutional
steps were necessary. Accordingly, on 4 August, the King
signed a decree conferring dictatorial powers on Prime Min-
ister John Metaxas. The Chamber was dissolved sine die, and
the Constitution suspended. Thus fortified, Metaxas called
out the Army and was easily able to quell all opposition.

The dictatorial Government proceeded to try to bring
order, discipline and prosperity to the Greek people. It soon
proved itself vigorous, and far more effective in carrying out
policies than any of its predecessors had been, distracted as
they were by parliamentary insecurity and uncertainty.
Metaxas modeled his regime more or less consciously on the

34 THE GREEK DILEMMA

pattern of the Fascist and Nazi dictators, introducing a uni-
formed youth movement, emphasizing things military, and
repressing free speech. Politicians of all parties, including the
Populists, were silenced; and if individuals showed signs of
refusing to accept the new order, they were exiled to one or
another of the islands of the Aegean. A far-reaching system
of secret police was set up to spy on "subversive" elements in
the population, and incautious conversation in public places
was likely to land a man in jail or at least bring him up for
warning from a local police official.

One of the main aims of Metaxas' rule was to build up
the Greek Army. The whole economy was organized to
serve this end. Special subsidies and protective tariffs were
set up to foster the development of industries which might
contribute to the military power of the country. A small but
surprisingly efficient munitions industry was built by such
methods. Trade was carried on largely through barter agree-
ments with other countries, and Germany took an ever larger
proportion of Greek exports, sending in return mostly muni-
tions and machinery of war. Trade unions were "coordina-
ted" and made into administrative branches of the central
Government. At the same time, Metaxas put into effect laws
protecting the workmen from certain abuses, providing un-
employment insurance, etc. The Government collected taxes
from the industrialists and other men of means with an
efficiency equalled by no previous Greek Government. Using
these devices, Metaxas brought about a substantial economic
recovery; but it is also true that the diversion of the national
wealth to military and other nonproductive expenditures
made the cost of living rise steadily. Wages were not adjusted
to rising prices, and real wages decreased slightly.

A particular target of the regime was the Communist Party.
Most of the Communist leaders were clapped into jail at the
very beginning of Metaxas' rule, but KK.E was able to pre-
serve at least a skeleton of its organization. The number of

GREEK SOCIETY AND POLITICS 35

its sympathizers increased during the period of dictatorship
even though, for the time, no open propaganda or coordi-
nated action could be undertaken. Other political parties,
unable or unwilling to go underground after the example of
the Communists, practically disappeared. Of course, the body
of former sympathizers remained, and only a few leaders were
ever exiled or jailed. But the organization and morale of the
traditional parties almost completely disintegrated under
governmental repression.

The dictatorship was never popular. In free elections,
Metaxas had attracted only a small number of voters, and
after his accession to undisputed control of the state machine,
his popularity did not increase. He relied upon the Army and
the police to maintain himself in power. Both these organiza-
tions were expanded and pampered as against other branches
of public service. Army officers and the police consequently
were generally well content with the Government and ac-
corded it their passive or active support. Among the popula-
tion at large, dissatisfaction was almost universal, but there
was no organization capable of consolidating and leading the
general discontent to open expression.

Such a Government, in so small and poor a country, must
have seemed easy prey to Benito Mussolini when he cast
his eye around for new glories to win and fresh worlds to
conquer. Occasion for quarrel was easy to manufacture. Ac-
cordingly, in 1940, the Italian Government delivered an ulti-
matum to Metaxas, and without waiting for his reply, invaded
Greece in the early, morning hours of 28 October.

jtiutiiiiiiiiiHiHininitiiuiHittiiiitiiuiitiHiiiiiiiniiiiuitifUiiiiuitiiiiiniiiiuiiriit-iHiiiiuiuiuiaiiiiniiiiiiiuiiiKuiiii

II

War and Occupation

DELATIONS between
Greece and Italy had never been especially cordial; and from
the time of Mussolini's accession to power, Greece figured in
the Italian landscape chiefly as a candidate for admission to
the Roman Empire about to be reborn. In 1923 relations
were severely strained when Mussolini sent warships to bom-
bard the Greek island of Corfu, but the matter was settled
peaceably by the League of Nations. Following the collapse
of Austria in 1918, Italy had taken over sort of unofficial pro-
tectorate of the little backward state of Albania. In 1938
Italian control became official. Soldiers were sent from Italy
and met with little or no resistance as they marched inland
to "pacify" the wild Albanian mountains. In general the
Albanians were well enough content with their new rulers.
A normal amount of brigandage and sheepstealing continued
within the country and across the borders into Greece and
Yugoslavia. Such disorders were age old, and were taken
into small account until one day in 1940 an Albanian brigand
was killed a few miles inside the Greek border. The Italians
chose to make his death an international incident.

The threat which Italian military occupation of Albania
offered to Greece was certainly not lost on so shrewd a soldier
as General John Metaxas. He bent every effort to strengthen
the Greek Army and Navy, and in particular rushed to com-
pletion the road that now connects Epirus with Thessaly. In
the spring of 1940 the Greeks had an additional warning of

36

WAR AND OCCUPATION 37

Italian intentions, if one were needed. The light cruiser
Helle, one of the proudest ships of the Greek Navy, lay at
anchor off the island of Tinos where it had been sent to con-
vey a sacred icon to Athens for the Easter celebrations. While,
anchored there, it was sunk without warning by a torpedo.
Pieces of the torpedo were later recovered and proved to be of
Italian manufacture. Overt acts were supplemented by a
systematic barrage of propaganda against the Greek Gov-
ernment's policy toward the small Albanian minority of
Epirus.

Italy's aggression against Greece was connected with events
on the larger European scene. When World War II broke
out in September 1939, Italy at first remained nonbelligerent.
In the spring of 1940, however, just as France was reeling to
collapse under the bombs of German Stukas and the grinding
tread of German tanks, Mussolini saw fit to enter the fray. In
North Africa, small British forces succeeded in containing the
more numerous Italian armies of Libya. Under the circum-
stances, the Italian Government needed a success to parade
before the public; furthermore, possession of Greece and
Crete would provide an easier and more secure supply line to
the Italian armies of the North African desert, and would
bring the Fascists one step nearer to the realization of their
ambition of rebuilding the ancient Empire of Rome. To gain
these ends, Mussolini decided to occupy part or all of Greece.

Accordingly, on the evening of 27 October 1940, the
Fascist Government delivered an ultimatum to the Greeks
demanding the protective occupation of unspecified zones of
Greek territory, monetary compensation for the death of the
Albanian brigand and a number of other concessions. The
ultimatum had six hours to run. Even before the six hours
expired, the first Italian troops marched across the Greek
border in Epirus. Metaxas, for his part, after anxious con-
sultations, boldly refused the Italian demands.

It would appear that Italian intelligence reports had grossly

38 THE GREEK DILEMMA

miscalculated both Greek strength and Greek morale. Mus-
solini expected to meet with little resistance. He planned to
be in Salonika within a couple of weeks, and to reach Athens
a fortnight later. For the first day or two the Italians advanced
without much trouble. Greek border guards fell back before
the attackers, but were able to delay the Italian troops by
repeated skirmishes. Geography narrowly defined the course
of the invading army* One column tried to penetrate south-
ward, toward Jannina; while a second set out eastward for
the plateau of Western Macedonia, Kozani and Salonika.
The first of these columns succeeded in moving some twenty
to thirty miles across the Greek frontier during the first two
weeks of the war, but its rate of progress was much slower
than expected; and, as the Greeks retreated, their resistance
steadily intensified. The other column had to climb a moun-
tain ridge from Koritsa before it could reach the Macedonian
plateau. This the invading army never succeeded in doing;
the Greeks were able to stop the Italians at the foothills of the
mountain only three or four miles inside their border.

The Greek Army had been partially mobilized when the
Italian ultimatum came, but it was deployed along the entire
northern frontier. Immediately following the outbreak of
war, a great wheeling movement was begun. The Bulgarian
and Yugoslav frontier was stripped of most of its forces.
Reservists streamed to call-up centers in obedience to the
proclamations of the Government. In the course of the next
seven months a total of twenty-two divisions and over 300,000
men were mobilized. Equipment was poor, for the Greeks had
little but infantry weapons with which to oppose Italian tanks
and airplanes. Ammunition and food both became seriously
short at the front, and for days on end Greek troops lived
without warm food or any fire, on snowy mountain slopes in
the dead of winter. Only a transcendent morale made such
endurance possible.

By mid-November the Italian advance had been stopped. A

WAR AND OCCUPATION 39

few days later the Greek counter-attack began. A whole divi-
sion succeeded in crossing the Pindus Mountains north of the
Metsovon road and was able to fall upon the undefended
flank of the Italian column which had pressed southward
toward Jannina. The Italians were unprepared for the attack.
(The Greeks left transport and supply behind them when
they scaled the mountain range, save for what small trickle of
food and ammunition mules were able to bring up after
them.) To cover themselves, the Italians retreated; but the
retreat turned into a rout as the morale of the Fascist soldiers
cracked. Precipitous retreat carried them across the border
into Albania, and victorious Greek troops, coming north from
Jannina, west over the Pindus Mountains, and plunging
down from the Fiorina pass were able to capture Koritsa
(November) and Argyrokastron (December).

The Greek advance came to a grinding halt some thirty
miles inside the Albanian border. Greek endurance and sup-
ply lines were strained to the limit, and while the force of
their attack weakened, the Italians steadily picked up rein-
forcements and fresh supplies as they drew back, until they
were at length able to halt the Greeks and recover something
of their shaken morale. During the balance of the winter the
battlefront shifted very little. Both Italians and Greeks en-
dured great hardships from the severe winter weather. Lack
of sufficiently warm clothing caused thousands of rf Greek sol-
diers to lose their hands and feet by freezing. To this day,
wheel chairs carrying legless men, whose limbs were frozen at
the Albanian front and had to be amputated, are a common
sight in Athens.

In February the Greeks tried to resume their advance, and
they were able to straighten out the battle line in the center
by conquering a few square miles. But the attack was costly
and failed to break through. In the spring, the Italians in
their turn prepared an assault on the Greek lines, attempting
to drive southward in the direction of Koritsa. The Greeks

40 THE GREEK DILEMMA

were able to stem the attack, but had to expend almost their
last reserves to do so. The Albanian front had seemingly
settled down to a stalemate.

The unprovoked Italian aggression created a remarkable
and seldom-paralleled surge of self-abnegating patriotism that
ran through the whole Greek nation. All the psychological
energy of the Greeks, which normally was frittered away in
striving against one another, suddenly turned against the in-
vader. The nation united as never before. Fashionable ladies
of Athens, who had never worked in their lives, volunteered
as nurses, travelled through the remote and barbarous moun-
tains of Epirus and did their best to organize hospitals in the
mountains. Men too old to fight served as muleteers, making
their way over the precipitous mountain paths. Others helped
to bring up supplies over the few roads by car or wagon.
Peasants of the near-by villages gave their labor gladly to clear
the rdads of snow in order that the precious stream of supplies
could continue to flow toward the front. The transport system
of the Greek Army would have amazed an American soldier.
Civilian vehicles of all descriptions battered themselves to
pieces on the rough and narrow roads. Wagons and mules
carried loads where motor vehicles could not go; and not a
few supplies were carried on human backs often by local
peasant women.

In the fervor of the moment, Metaxas found it safe to grant
pardon to many political offenders. Not all his prisoners were
released; and in particular he kept the main figures of the
Communist Party under lock and key. Nevertheless, in the
early days of the war, the Communist leader, Nicholas Za-
chariades, wrote a letter from his prison cell in Corfu, in-
structing all good Communists to join in the fight against
Fascist aggression and loyally to cooperate with the hated
Metaxas regime. The general political spirit was well typified
by the action of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who shortly be-
fore the establishment of dictatorship had organized a party

WAR AND OCCUPATION 41

of National Unity (Ethnikon Enotikon Komma) and been
exiled from Athens for his pains. Upon release from deten-
tion, he volunteered to serve as a private in the Army and
went to the front in that humble position.

The enthusiasm of civilians was reflected to the full in the
ranks of the Greek Army. The original repulse of the Italian
forces had been possible only through an almost reckless
daring which risked being cut off from all adequate supplies
in order to attack on an exposed flank. When the Italian re-
treat began, a wave of high confidence ran through the entire
Greek Army. Individual soldiers performed almost incredible
feats of daring and endurance, marching long miles and at-
tacking with dash and persistence. The story is told how on
one occasion a Greek detachment found itself without am-
munition in the face of an Italian outpost. Nevertheless, the
Greeks attacked the panicky Italian soldiers with only rocks
and empty rifles in their hands, drove them from their
trenches, and captured enough ammunition to continue their
advance* Even if the story be not exactly true, it was widely
circulated among the Greek troops and was generally be-
lieved, as it is still. The spirit of the troops was such that they
might well have been capable of such heroic rashness.

It seems probable that the Greek success was due more to
the amazing morale of the Army than to well-prepared plans
or skillful generalship. The perennial individualism of the
Greek showed itself on more than one occasion by dis-
obedience to orders; and when their officers failed to lead
satisfactorily, the troops let their displeasure be known, and
in a few instances took matters into their own hands and shot
the offending officers. The whole advance must have been
chaotic and confused. Small units moved forward until they
met opposition, attacked and overcame it if they could; if not,
waited until more Greek troops came up and a stronger at-
tack could be launched. Much of the Greek supply came from
captured Italian stores. At no time was the supply of am-

42 THE GREEK DILEMMA

munition and food from the rear adequate to sustain a heavy
offensive.

The coming of spring did not dampen civilian ardor for
the war, but at the front many men must have realized that
no repetition of the first days of success was possible. The
Greeks had deployed almost their last reserves to stop the
Italian offensive of March, and there were no replacements
for the men who fell sick or suffered wounds. Food was in-
adequate, ammunition scarce; and the Italians were superior
in numbers, supply and equipment A small trickle of mili-
tary supplies from the British and the effective help of a
squadron of RAF fighters, could not counterbalance the
Italian superiority. Under the circumstances, no great vic-
tories could be hoped for by the Greeks; and indeed, had the
Germans not intervened, it seems probable that Mussolini's
legions would have been able to hold their line and probably
even to advance against the Greeks during the summer of
1941.

But it was not destined that the Greek effort should gutter
out in slow defeat. The Epic of Albania, as the Greeks habit-
ually now call their war against the Italians, had an epic end-
ing; the ponderous weight of the German Army came to the
rescue of Italian arms in April 1941, easily and swiftly crush-
ing the resistance that stood in its way.

During the autumn and winter of the Albanian War,
events had moved rapidly on the European scene. In the fall
of 1940 Germany toyed with and then abandoned the idea of
an invasion of England. In North Africa, British troops were
able to drive back the Italians in Libya, sweeping as far west-
ward as Bengasi. To counter this success, the Germans had
begun to organize the Afrika Korps which was to reverse the
balance and drive the British almost to the gates of Alex-
andria. But the main attention of the German High Com-
mand- had shifted from west to east. The German generals
were busy, in secret, preparing plans for the invasion of

WAR AND OCCUPATION 43

Russia. To secure the southern flank of the armies in Russia,
the Germans found it necessary to bring the entire Balkan
Peninsula within their sphere of influence. To win Bulgaria
was no problem, for the Bulgars gladly seized what seemed a
chance to regain territory lost to Greece and Yugoslavia, and
opened their frontiers secretly to German troops. Rumania
yielded to force majeure, giving up Transylvania to Hungary
and admitting the German Army.

But in Greece and Yugoslavia, the Germans had a more
difficult problem. Both countries had been traditionally as-
sociated with the French and British, and a strong current of
antipathy to the Germans and their Nazi Government ran
through the people of both nations. Through the winter of
1940 the Greek public was so engrossed in the war with Italy
as to spare little attention to the threatening developments to
the north. The Greek Government was at least partially in-
formed of German troop movements in Bulgaria, but was
unable to spare any large number of soldiers from the
Albanian front to safeguard the Bulgarian frontier. Diploma-
tic maneuver was equally shut to the Greeks. Since they were
engaged in a bitter war with Italy, the ally of Germany, the
Greeks could. scarcely expect to come to satisfactory terms
with the German end of the Axis without having to yield to
the utterly unacceptable demands of the Italians. Willy-nilly,
Metaxas was forced to rely upon the British. He must have
realized how weak was the British power in the Eastern
Mediterranean, how inadequate to protect Greece against the
might of German armies. Nevertheless, Britain was the only
ally to whom Greece could turn, as Greece was the only ally
which Britain could find on the whole continent of Europe.

A few months before the outbreak of World War II, the
British Government had "guaranteed" the territorial in-
tegrity of Greece. Accordingly in the first months of 1941,
when the threat from the north loomed unmistakably, the
Greek Government asked Great Britain to honor this guar-

44 THE GREEK DILEMMA

antee by despatching an expeditionary force to help stave off
the German and Bulgarian danger. Churchill, despite disas-
trous experiences in France and Norway, was still an optimist.
He felt the importance of demonstrating before the world
that Britain still kept her promises even in time of extreme
emergency. Furthermore, he perhaps welcomed a land front
in Europe against the Germans, thinking that the rugged
mountains of Greece might stop German armor, and later
serve as a convenient bridgehead from which a British attack
on German-held Europe could be launched. Whatever
ChurchilFs thoughts, he decided to respond to the Greek
appeal. The victorious British Army of the Nile was broken
up, and a total of about sixty thousand men, including the
best of the British North African divisions, were sent into
Greece under the command of General Sir Henry Maitland
Wilson.

The first British troops arrived in Athens, 4 March 1941
and were received by a wildly enthusiastic populace. They
were rumored to be but the advance guard of a mighty host,
and extravagant hopes based upon these rumors no doubt
helped to bring about the popular revolution that took place
in Yugoslavia in April when the Government which had
come to terms with Hitler was overthrown, and another, com-
mitted to resist the Germans, put in its place.

The Germans were not unprepared for the Brtish landing
in Greece, A German army had secretly been concentrated in
southwest Bulgaria against just such an emergency, and by
the beginning of April it was ready to advance. Accordingly,
on 6 April, Germany declared war on both Yugoslavia and
Greece.

The lines of the German attack on Greece followed geo-
graphically determined routes. Starting from western Bul-
garia the main column cut through the southeast corner of
Yugoslavia and moved down the rolling plains of the Axios
Valley toward Salonika. Within three days of the opening of

WAR AND OCCUPATION 45

hostilities the Germans entered Salonika and cut off the
Greek garrison in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. A second
and smaller column swung wide through Yugoslav Mace-
donia, captured Skoplje, and crossed the Greek frontier at the
Monastir Gap. Travelling south through open, rolling plateau
country, this force was able to penetrate to the Aliakmon
River (Kozani) by 14 April. Meanwhile the Greeks had put
up a brave but brief battle along the Bulgarian frontier
(notably in the Kula Pass), but when cut off from the rest of
Greece by the capture of Salonika, the garrison of Eastern
Macedonia and Thrace surrendered.

The British had landed their first troops in Greece a scant
month before the German attack, and by the beginning of
April had not succeeded in bringing more than a small part
of their total force into northern Greece. No serious effort
was made to hold the Germans north of the Aliakmon River.
Small British and Greek detachments beyond this line with-
drew as best they could before the advancing German
columns. The first battles were fought when the Germans
reached the precipitous valley of the Aliakmon, with its sea-
buttress, Mt. Olympus. Together these two geographical
features formed the so-called Olympus Line. To this day
shattered tanks can be seen in the Vale of Tempe and along
the Aliakmon gorge where the two armies fought. But Ger-
man strength in tanks, airplanes and manpower was far su-
perior to that of the defenders, and the Germans were able
to break through the British-Greek line after three or four
days of hard fighting (17 April).

The disorganized Allied troops fell back on Mount Oeta
and the historic pass of Thermopylae, but here too the Ger-
man superiority quickly told- (24 April) and the British de-
cided to evacuate the country. Weary troops embarked from
Pireus and Nauplion, leaving all their heavy equipment be-
hind them. German airplanes harried the retreat, and many
ships were sunk in the harbors and in the narrow waters off

46 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the Greek coast, yet more than half of the British expedition-
ary force escaped.

In Albania, meanwhile, the Greek Army had been cut off.
A fast-moving German column crossed the mountains from
Thessaly and captured Jannina (23 April). The main body of
the Greek Army had begun to retreat within a day or two of
the German attack, but the men were utterly weary and
dispirited, and equipment and supplies were even shorter
than usual, so that no effective defense was established in the
rear against the advancing Germans. On the same day that
the Germans took Jannina, General George Tsolakoglu, com-
manding the Greek Army of Epirus, surrendered all the
forces under his command. With this surrender the main
body of the Greek Army acknowledged defeat. Tsolakoglu
had no authority from the Greek Government in Athens for
his capitulation. He proceeded on his own initiative in the
face of a desperate situation.

On 26 April German parachutists landed on the isthmus of
Corinth and cut off British stragglers. The next day, advance
columns entered Athens from the north, and the Nazi swas-
tika was raised high over the Acropolis.

Less than a month later the indefatigable Germans
launched their famous airborne invasion of Crete. The island
was ill defended. Some of the disorganized British troops
after their evacuation from the mainland had been landed in
Crete; and there were a few Greek soldiers on the island also.
The German attack came as a surprise, and after severe losses
(particularly at sea, where ships of the British Navy braved
the dangers of the Luftwaffe to destroy convoys of German
troops attempting to cross into Crete) the Germans were able
to win control of Malame airdrome near Khania, land their
airborne infantry, and overpower the defenders. The first
parachutists landed in Crete, 20 May; by 2 June organized
resistance to the invaders had ceased. It was a novel campaign,
very costly to the Germans, but assured them of a valuable

WAR AND OCCUPATION 47

air base for raids on shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and also gave them a new and shorter route of supply for
the Afrika Korps in Libya.

The dictator, Metaxas, died at the end of January 1941,
and so did not live to see the conquest of his country. He was
succeeded by the King's nominee, Alexander Koryzis, a
former Governor of the Bank of Greece. Koryzis headed the
Greek Government through the disastrous days of the Ger-
man attack, but when defeat appeared certain, he committed
suicide (19 April). In the emergency, King George him-
self assumed the prime ministership for a few days. Mean-
while, he cast about for a liberal politician who might prove
able to reassure the public and willing to take over. Several
leading republican figures refused the post, but Emmanuel
Tsouderos, an ex-Venizelist Minister and another former
Governor of the Bank of Greece, was prevailed upon to
accept the appointment, 22 April 1941.

Tsouderos refused to sanction General Tsolakoglu's sur-
render, and the new Government decided, without trying to
make terms with the German conquerors, to go to Crete,
hoping there to set up a free Greece against some future and
better day. The King and a handful of Ministers and other
high officials were all who fled from Athens. They had no
more than established themselves in Crete when the German
attack began, and the refugee Government fled a scond time,
to Cairo.

In Greece itself the conquerors embarked upon a policy of
conciliation. Greek soldiers were not held as prisoners of war
but were allowed freely to return to their homes, and the
entire Greek Army was demobilized. The Germans were
anxious to reconcile the Greeks to their place in the New
Order of Europe. They had no wish to keep more than a
skeleton force of German soldiers in occupation, since all
available Germans were needed for the great attack on
Russia which was about to begin. The Germans decided that

50 THE GREEK DILEMMA

It was necessary to keep their troops at a few key strategic
points. The rest of the country they handed over to their
allies, the Italians and Bulgars. Accordingly, Crete remained
in German hands, as did some of the other Aegean Islands.
German troops occupied a strip of territory facing on the
Turkish border in Thrace, and German garrisons were sta-
tioned in Athens and Salonika. The Bulgars were permitted
to annex Eastern Macedonia and Thrace; elsewhere the
Italians were entrusted with responsibility for controlling the
country.

General Tsolakoglu, after surrendering the Army of
Epirus, travelled down to Athens, and on 30 April, just a
week after his surrender, he was installed by the German
commander as Prime Minister of Greece. (The area of East
Macedonia and Thrace entrusted to the Bulgars was no
longer counted as a part of Greece, and the power of the
Greek administration did not extend there.) Tsolakoglu had
little difficulty in finding men to obey him. In general the gov-
ernmental machine which had functioned under Metaxas and
Koryzis continued to operate. The gendarmery remained
responsible for ordinary day-to-day police work, and few of
its members deserted or refused to accept the orders of the
new Government. The same was true of other branches of the
state service. The one great difference lay in this, that there
was no longer any Greek Army. Instead Italian and German
troops provided the ultimate support for the regime. But
control of the armed force meant practical control of the Gov-
ernment. From the beginning, Tsolakoglu's Administration
had no independence, but obeyed the orders of German and
Italian military commanders in all things. Nevertheless, for
the first months of occupation, in ordinary day-to-day adminis-
tration, the Greek Government functioned much as it had
done under the dictatorship of Metaxas. Axis control was dis-
guised, operating only behind the scenes on the level of high
policy.

WAR AND OCCUPATION 51

In spite of these precautions, the quisling Government was
never able to win the support of any considerable number of
the Greeks. The Greek people hated and feared the Germans
and Bulgars; remembering the glories of the Albanian cam-
paign, they despised the Italians who now strutted as con-
querors in the streets. Nevertheless, during the first year of
occupation the spirit of resistance found little expression in
Greece. The people must have been rather stunned by the
suddenness of their disaster. From the dizzy excitement in-
spired by their success against the Italians, they found them-
selves reduced to what seemed hopeless subjugation. Nearly
all Greeks turned despairingly to the immediate task of keep-
ing alive.

During the ensuing months this was no simple task. Famine
came to sit at the table. Thousands of Greeks died from lack
of food or from disease brought on by undernourishment,
Greece had not been able to raise enough food to feed its
population before the war, and the Germans were not willing
to send any surplus grain from their own storehouses to the
relief of the conquered country. The physical ravages of war
had not been overly severe in Greece; but some fields had not
been planted due to the fact that peasant sons were away in
the army fighting against the Italians, and the harvest was
mediocre. Serious shortage of transport and steady deteriora-
tion of the roads further exacerbated food shortages by mak-
ing distribution more difficult. It is impossible to estimate
with any exactitude how many Greeks died during the winter
O f 1941-1942 as a result of the famine. The number runs into
the thousands, and perhaps into the hundred thousands; but
it is easy to exaggerate, since reports came chiefly from the
cities, especially from Athens, where the shortage of food was
most severe.

Reports of starvation in Greece quickly spread through the
world, and a variety of Greek organizations, Including the
Exile Government, bent every effort to relieve the suffering.

52 THE GREEK DILEMMA

A remarkable agreement was concluded between the prin-
cipal belligerent and neutral countries of the world to permit
famine relief in Greece. Under this agreement an Inter-
national Red Gross administration was set up in Greece,
staffed by Swiss and Swedes, which distributed Canadian and
American wheat, shipped into Greece with safe passage
guaranteed by all belligerents. Relief brought in by the Red
Gross under this agreement helped to end the famine; and
after mid-summer 1942, the food supply became, at least com-
paratively, adequate.

With the new year (1942) there came a partial but none the
less real economic recovery. In the confusion of defeat nearly
all economic activity had come to a halt, but gradually fac-
tories resumed operation, and production increased. The
Germans seized relatively little from the industrial plant of
Greece, although they did dismantle a part of the munitions
factories and ship them away to the north. Other machinery-
was too antiquated or inefficient to justify the trouble of re-
moving it. Furthermore, the Germans and Italians employed
large numbers of Greeks as auxiliaries to their armies. Men
were put to work building defenses against Allied landing;
others were hired to repair railroads and bridges which had
been destroyed in the course of the war. The occupying
armies and the Greek Government paid all these workmen by
the simple device of printing paper currency. Inflation was
the natural and inevitable result; but not until late in 1943
did the depreciation of the currency assume runaway propor-
tions. Before that, times were relatively good for the Greek
workmen and businessmen. The shortage of goods which be-
came so pronounced in 1944 had not yet shown itself seriously.
Jobs were abundant and profits easy to take. It would be false
to suppose that the Greeks were as well off economically in
1942 as they had been before the war; the economic recovery
existed only by contrast with what preceded and what fol-
lowed. The Greeks have always been poor, and real and wide-

WAR AND OCCUPATION 53

spread deprivation undoubtedly continued through the peak
of occupation prosperity. The fact remains that for most of
the population times were better in 1942 than they had been
before or were soon to be again.

Despite the economic recovery, the summer of 1942 saw the
beginning of effective resistance to the Axis occupiers in
Greece. Small bands appeared in the hills, performed various
acts of sabotage, and attacked isolated Italian and German
soldiers. As time went on the guerilla forces steadily waxed
in power and numbers, and the prestige and authority of the
quisling Government waned in proportion. By degrees many
of the ordinary state services in the countryside disappeared.
Schools went first, for the schoolmasters were as a group gen-
erally sympathetic to the resistance bands. Police power
weakened more slowly; but by mid-1943 the gendarmery of
the Greek Government dared not travel over large areas of the
land, and its members remained in relatively large concentra-
tions near the towns and along main roads.

While the provincial administration of the Greek Govern-
ment thus weakened, an enormous and unhealthy growth
took place in the capital. Vast numbers of persons were added
to the civil service lists, many of them possessing no qualifica-
tion except a crying need for some ready cash or a close rela-
tive in a position of power. As the strength and prestige of the
resistance groups grew in the land, the quisling Government
faced a growing moral crisis. Many of its functionaries felt
secret sympathy with the guerillas in the hills, and some few
of them gave up the security and comfort of town living to
join one or another of the bands. As inflation began to show
its force, the salaries of civil servants became inadequate to
sustain life, so that state officials were driven to all sorts of
devices in order to secure the wherewithal to live. Corruption
flourished, and whatever efficiency the Greek Government
had had under Metaxas gradually withered.

It became increasingly common, as the certainty of German

54 THE GREEK DILEMMA

victory lessened and eventually disappeared, for officials of
the Greek Government to come into relation with British or
Allied secret services. Many a man liked to have a foot in
both camps, so that no matter who might win the war, he
would be able to put a bold front forward and claim to have
been a loyal supporter of the victor from the beginning. An
amazing and incredibly complicated maze of espionage and
counterespionage developed from this situation. British
"agents" were everywhere; and the same man was often both
a British and a German agent, telling each what he thought it
well for them to know, and often inventing or embroidering
the truth of his reports almost past recognition.

It would slander the Greek nation, however, not to em-
phasize that the Allies generally got the best of the bargain.
Nearly all Greeks sincerely hoped for an Allied victory and
were willing to do what they could to bring the victory about.
Their reports to the Germans must usually have been system-
atically falsified; while reports to Allied authorities were for
the most part innocently, though effectively, exaggerated.
Very few Allied nationals were ever betrayed by Greeks to
the German police, even though dozens of Greeks knew the
whereabouts of each British or American officer in the coun-
try. Many Greeks underwent personal danger to shelter
Allied personnel, and hundreds of aviators were able to es-
cape after losing their planes, thanks to the faithful help of
Greek peasants. In truth, the company of Greek traitors to
the Allied cause was very small. Most of the persons who be-
came collaborators did so reluctantly, driven to it either by
cupidity, fear or hatred of the Communists in the resistance
movement.

There is no need to follow in detail the vicissitudes of the
quisling Government. General Tsolakoglu continued to hold
the post of Prime Minister until December 1942 when he was
Replaced by Konstantine Logothetopoulos, a distinguished
doctor and former Rector of the University of Athens. He in

WAR ANB OCCUPATION 55

his turn resigned in April 1943 and was succeeded by John
Rallis, a professional politician who had held several Cabinet
posts as a member of the Popular Party. Rallis remained as
Prime Minister until October 1944 when the Germans finally
abandoned Athens and their puppet Government dissolved
of its own accord.

During the period of occupation, an inoffensive, law-abid-
ing citizen found Greece a hard place in which to live. From
1943 onward there were two separate and contradictory laws
in the land; the law of the Government in Athens, and the
law upheld by the guerillas of the mountains. The conflict
between the two was bitter and irreconcilable. Many helpless
villagers found themselves exposed to the retaliation of one
or both sides for acts committed under duress. Increasing
numbers began to flock into the larger towns where security
was greater. An additional attraction in the towns was the
easier access to the relief supplies brought in by the Red
Cross. Difficulties of transport steadily increased as the years
of occupation passed, and the Red Cross became unable to
make deliveries of the relief shipments to the remote regions
of the country. Peasants whose houses had been burnt or
whose animals had been carried off and other property stolen,
were all the more ready to come into the towns, knowing that
food would be available for them there through the Red
Cross. In consequence, few houses, once destroyed, were re-
built, and the damage to the country was increased by the
progressive pauperization of a part of the population.

When guerilla activity began to show itself in Greece dur-
ing the summer of 1942, the occupying forces at first took
little notice. Efforts were made to apprehend the persons who
committed acts of sabotage or who dared to kill Axis soldiers.
Even in these early days, when no culprits could be found,
exemplary punishment was sometimes meted out to a whole
village. As the scale of guerilla activity increased, the German
and Italian occupiers began to take systematic counteraction.

56 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Their effort to win the loyalty of the Greek people was clearly
a failure. The Greeks had repaid the German overtures by
supporting the guerillas, passively if not actively. Conse-
quently the Germans decided to control by terror. Wholesale
retaliation became a settled policy. In August 1943 the Ger-
mans officially announced that for every German soldier
killed in Greece no less than fifty Greeks would be executed.
The theory behind such a policy was that fear of the con-
sequences would lead "peasants and townsmen to refuse
cooperation with the guerillas. In fact, the policy operated to
ingrain hatred of the Germans into almost every Greek heart.
Moderate men found themselves torn between two despera-
tions; they could not easily approve of the guerillas whose
action against the Germans resulted in wholesale executions;
and they certainly could not bring themselves to sympathize
with the Germans who so cruelly were destroying innocent
lives. The impossibility of such a choice between hammer and
anvil practically destroyed all middle-of-the-road opinion in
Greece. Some few extremists chose rather to accept support
from the Germans than to allow the Communist-led guerillas
to gain undisputed control of the country. But most men who
could not bring themselves to join the guerillas in the hills,
saw no comfort in coming under the German mantle. They
were confused, disorganized and afraid, and grew ever more
so until the German withdrawal in 1944.

German methods in making reprisals were ruthless. On
more than one occasion in the town of Athens a German pa-
trol was sent out to the scene of the death of a German soldier,
and there arrested the first fifty persons who happened to
walk down the street, lined them against a wall and shot them
out of hand. In the country retaliation was more sweeping
still. If the guerillas had ambushed a German patrol, blown
a bridge or committed some other act of sabotage, the Ger-
mans made it a practice to go to the nearest village and there
burn down some or all of the houses. In extreme cases, where

WAR AND OCCUPATION 57

the offense had been more serious, the Germans made sys-
tematic attempts to kill all the inhabitants and burn their
houses to the ground,

One of the most famous instances of this indiscriminate
cruelty is the destruction o Kalavryta, a town of sentimental
interest to every Greek, for there began the War of In-t
dependence in 1821. In the spring of 1944 a German column
was waylaid in a gorge some miles to the north of the town,
and a few prisoners were taken. The captives were brought to
Kalavryta, kept for a few days and then taken into the hills
and executed. When news of these happenings came to the
German Command, an entire battalion was despatched to
punish the townspeople. When first the German troops ar-
rived in Kalavryta most of the inhabitants had fled; but the
Germans remained for several days, professing the intention
only of punishing the individuals who had harmed German
soldiers. Believing these assurances, most of the villagers
filtered back to their homes. Then one morning, the German
officer in command ordered all the people of the town to re-
port to the square. When they had all congregated, the men
were separated from the rest, marched out into a near-by
field and there mowed down by hidden machine guns. The
women and children, meanwhile, had been penned into the
church, and the building set on fire. The rear door of the
church was opened (in disobedience of orders) by one of the
German soldiers, and most of the women were able to escape
with their children; but of the men, only a few who success-
fully shammed death in the field ever lived to tell the tale.
Before departing from Kalavryta, the Germans scattered a
special inflammatory powder through all the peasant homes
and set them alight. It was by such massacres that the Ger-
mans hoped to keep the Greeks down.

It would be false to say that the systematic retaliation and
terror did not have an effect. It did. Many Greeks became
almost frantic, seeking a nonexistent peace, hating the Ger-

58 THE GREEK DILEMMA

mans and hoping that the guerillas would cease to provoke
them. Others reacted by joining all the more strenuously in
the resistance movement, doing what they could to revenge
themselves on the Germans, and recking nought of the addi-
tional cost their acts might have for fellow Greeks. It is doubt-
ful whether the German policy of deliberate terror and whole-
sale retaliation reduced the power or scale of the resistance
movement; but it is certain that it produced a bitter resent-
ment against the guerillas in the minds of many who suffered
unjustly for their acts. Further, the economic cost to Greece
was heavy. Almost a fourth of all the buildings in Greece
were damaged in some degree; thousands of Greeks were
killed; and regular cultivation of considerable areas of land
was interrupted.

Most of the systematic destruction was wreaked during the
last year and a half of occupation. While the Italians were in
control of Greece, terror was largely confined to individual
arrest and execution, though cases of mass punishment were
not unknown. It was not until after the collapse of the Italian
armies in Greece (Sept.-Nov. 1943), when the Germans were
compelled to take over responsibility for peace and order in
the whole country at a time when they needed troops desper-
ately on the Eastern and Italian fronts, that German wrath
against the guerillas and anger at the people who sheltered
them reached such a peak that massacres such as I have
described were regularly resorted to.

After the Italian collapse, the Germans were seriously
pressed for men to hold even the main lines of communica-
tion through Greece. Many large but relatively remote dis-
tricts were never reconquered by the Germans, but remained
from 1943 onward under guerilla control. After the fall of
1943 the German shortage of men was so great that they or-
ganized Greeks into the so-called Security (or Police) Bat-
talions. These battalions were commanded by regular Greek
Army officers, but each unit had attached to it a German

WAR AND OCCUPATION 59

liaison officer who in practice acted as the battalion com-
mander. They were recruited on a semivoluntary basis. Most
of the battalions originated as volunteer bands eager to fight
against the Communists. After they had been officially recog-
nized and equipped by the Germans, the quisling Govern-
ment made halfhearted attempts to conscript Greek civilians
into the battalions. But it was always easy for a man to hide
himself from government officials, if necessary by joining the
guerillas in the mountains, so that in practice few if any men
joined the battalions save of their own will.

The Security Battalions were not organized over all Greece.
They centered chiefly in the southern part of the country,
where a predominantly conservative peasantry was easily per-
suaded that Communist guerillas were worse even than
German tools. In Athens and Salonika, battalions were also
raised, for in the last year of occupation the guerillas extended
the sphere of their operation into the principal cities, where
they quickly grew too strong for ordinary police to handle.
Elsewhere in Greece it was difficult or impossible to find per-
sonnel who were willing to serve under the Germans, and
Security Battalions were never successfully brought into
operation. The total force was not large, numbering about
five thousand men.

The Security Battalions were organized to fight against the
guerillas. The combat sometimes took the form of direct en-
gagement between the rival forces, but usually the weaker
side was content to retreat without standing pitched battle.
Instead, it was the villagers who bore the brunt. Peasants were
penalized for assisting the guerillas, and the Security Bat-
talions no less than the Germans themselves were guilty of
wholesale acts of retaliation against helpless populations. The
guerillas, for their part, undertook to punish anyone who
ventured to assist the Security Battalions. It followed that the
net effect of the formation of these battalions was to spread
still wider the rapine and destruction that had already

50 THE GREEK DILEMMA

blighted Greece, and to intensify the internal discord which
had begun to paralyze the whole country and jeopardize its
future.

Three and a half years of occupation, then, brought un-
mitigated disaster to Greece. The quisling Government de-
cayed steadily, losing power and efficiency until it became
entirely helpless by 1944. Economically, a sort of false pros-
perity followed the famine of 1941, but after mid-1943 un-
checked inflation began, prices rose astronomically, and in
the end the currency became worthless so that economic ex-
change reverted to a barter, basis. Losses from retaliatory de-
struction were heavy and grew ever more serious. But perhaps
the most irreparable damage of all was the hurt done to the
Greek spirit. The country became hopelessly divided against
itself. In the mountains one community lived and fought
under the dominant control of the Communist Party, In the
towns and villages, moderate men knew not where to turn,
and came to fix their hopes blindly on an Allied liberation
which they fondly believed would cure the ills which beset
their country. On the extreme Right a small number of per-
sons threw in their lot with the Germans, and lived in fear of
violent retaliation from the guerillas after the expected de-
parture of their protectors. It was not an easy thing to be a
Greek during the years of occupation, nor could any wise man
see clearly what way his duty lay. What alone was clear in the
confused situation was that more trouble lay ahead after the
so-much-hoped-for liberation.

III

Resistance

IIIMIHIIIinilllHillllliUIHIIIlHlllIHlllinillilW

.FTER the sudden over-
throw o the Greek state and the precipitous evacuation of
British troops from Greece, it must have seemed to most
Greeks that the Germans had every chance of winning the
war. A sort of stunned paralysis descended on the population.
There seemed nothing to do to restore the independence of
the country or win back the severed provinces of Thrace and
Eastern Macedonia. Within a few months of their defeat, the
problem of finding enough food distracted attention from
all other questions, and men began to dispute mournfully in
the caf s as to which had lost the most weight. Under the cir-
cumstances there seemed little a man could do save blindly
wish, hope and hate.

Despite this initial lethargy Greece was not a country easily
cowed by a hated and despised conqueror. An age-old tradi-
tion of guerilla action against the Turkish oppressors was in-
grained deeply in the sentiments of every Greek. Old ballads,
familiar to everyone, told of the deeds of daring performed
by robber klefti of olden time; and the Greek War of In-
dependence, as all Greeks knew, had been fought out in large
part by just such irregular bands. Furthermore, the Greeks
had guns. When the Greek Army retreated in defeat before
the German invader, many soldiers foresaw the end of or-
ganized resistance and started on foot for their homes, carry-
ing their rifles with them. Apart from these weapons, many

61

62 THE I^REEK UILEMMA

Greek peasants treasured antique firearms, taking an almost
childlike joy in their possession.

The country, too, is by nature well suited to guerilla ac-
tion. All of Greece, one may say, is mountainous. Plains are
the exception, and are cut off from one another by ranges of
almost barren hills. The principal mountain mass of Greece
is the Pindus, a broad, broken range, nowhere more than nine
thousand feet high, intersected by valleys in which isolated
villages cluster. Roads and other means of communication
are few and primitive. Great areas of Greece, particularly in
the Pindus, can be reached only by foot or on mule back. A
large proportion of the villages lies away from any road along
which motor vehicles can pass. Such terrain makes it difficult
to police the country in times of peace. In a time when the
Government was almost universally unpopular, the task be-
came well-nigh impossible.

A further fact which made the development of guerilla
bands inevitable was that the Germans saw fit to hand over
nearly all of Greece to Italian control. Practically every able-
bodied Greek had taken part in the Albanian War and had
learned thoroughly to despise the Italian soldiery. Now that
the self-same Italians strutted through the streets of the towns
and took up posts along the principal roads, lording it over
the Greeks as though they had been victors, no Greek could
but remember what had happened in Epirus and Albania
when they in their handfuls had put hundreds of Italians to
flight. It was easy to believe that the same could happen again;
that a national army could form in the mountains and bring
discomfiture once more to the haughty Italians.

By the summer of 1942 dozens of little bands began to form
in the hills. At first there was no common organization. A
leader, distinguished for his military experience, courage or
daring, could easily recruit a few restless young men from
a village, treat them to some patriotic speeches, and take them

RESISTANCE 63

out on a few adventures: cutting telephone wire, threatening
Greek collaborators, or perhaps assaulting an isolated Italian
soldier. Most of these bands were of no permanent impor-
tance, and many of them enjoyed only an intermittent exist-
ence, their members going out for a few nights of raiding,
and returning to peaceful pursuits during the day,

A few more desperate characters found it wise to remain
permanently in the hills. These were mostly men who were
wanted by the Government for one reason or another, but in-
cluded from the very beginning a few who had been sent as
emissaries of political organizations for the purpose of form-
ing permanent guerilla units. Two such men, Napoleon
Zervas and Ares Velouhiotis, succeeded in forming small
bands early in the summer of 1942, which were destined to
play a large part in the subsequent history of Greece. The
two men had much in common. Both were bold, skillful
guerilla leaders and cherished vaulting personal ambition.
But the differences between them were also great Ares
Velouhiotis was a Communist and a sadist; Zervas, a re-
publican and an adventurer.

The Communist guerilla leader was universally known as
Ares, a name borrowed from the classic Greek god of war.
Details of his life are uncertain and his real name is disputed.
According to the version most current in Greece, his name
was Athanasios Klaras, and he was born into a middle class
family of Athens. He was well educated, specializing in agri-
cultural studies. As a young man he is supposed to have
entered the civil service as an agricultural extension agent.
While working for the Government he became attracted by
the Communist movement and joined the party. There are
reports that he went to Russia for training and that he was
in Spain in 1936-1938. In any event, he was jailed by Metaxas
on criminal charges and remained imprisoned until 1941,
when, in the general confusion of the German invasion, he

64 THE GREEK DILEMMA

escaped. Once free, he fell in with the Communist leaders,
and in 1942 was commissioned by them to form a band of
guerillas in the central Pindus Mountains.

Ares* character was an extraordinary one. He could exert
great charm and suavity when he so wished; at other times he
exhibited the most bestial cruelty, and took such apparent
delight in torturing and killing his victims as to repel even
his own followers. He proved himself a capable guerilla
leader, possessing both courage and resource in sudden
emergency, and was able to spur his men on by personal ex-
ample to deeds from which they would otherwise have
shrunk. When he first formed his band, Ares was between
thirty and thirty-five years of age, of stalwart build with
fierce sparkling eyes. As a guerilla, he let his black beard grow
long, wore a black uniform and a black lambskin cap adorned
with white skull and crossbones. Around himself he collected
a special bodyguard of desperadoes who were similarly uni-
formed. The band gained a reputation for boundless cruelty
and daring. It often served as a special execution squad which
tortured and killed men condemned by the "People's Courts."

Napoleon Zervas 1 career is better known. He was born in
western Greece near the town of Arta about 1890. He entered
the military cadet school in Athens, but dropped out after
two years, being too lazy and undisciplined to study. He
thereupon joined the Army as a career non-commissioned
officer. When Venizelos set up his revolutionary Government
in Salonika (1916) Zervas' hastened to join the new Army, in
which he was speedily commissioned. He won his way close
to the center of power in the Venizelist Army, being aide-de-
camp to one of the chief republican generals, and by 1920
had risen to the rank of major. In 1922 he joined with
Plastiras in his revolt against the royal Government; in 1925
he assisted General Pangalos to seize power, and became, joint
commander of the dictator's personal bodyguard. The fol-
lowing year he fell in with the plots against the dictator, and

RESISTANCE 65

used his position as commander of the bodyguard to oust
Pangalos from power.

This act did not win Zervas a very savory reputation. As
a consequence he was forced to retire from the Army, and
for the next fifteen years lived as a private citizen. During
this time he established himself as a son of gambling king of
Athens. He took no part in the Albanian War, but under the
occupation he became interested in an association of re-
publican politicians which formed in Athens in the fall of
1941, under the name of the Greek Democratic National
League or EDES (Ellinikos Dimokratikos Ethnihos Syndes-
mos). Zervas had more military experience than most of the
members of this association, and he was selected as the man
to lead a guerilla band that, it was hoped, would be able to
forward the political program of the organization. Accord-
ingly, in June 1942, Zervas left Athens for his native district
in western Greece, and there was quickly able to form around
himself a small group of EDES guerillas.

Both EDES and the Communist political organization had
made contact with British agents in the course of 1941. When
British Headquarters in Cairo decided to try to interrupt the
German line of supply that ran through Greece to North
Africa, it was known to them that the two bands led by Ares
and Zervas were in existence. Consequently when British
saboteurs were dropped by parachute into Greece in the sum-
mer of 1942, they had instructions to come into contact with
both bands and try to gain their assistance. The British plan
was to blow up the Gorgopotamos Bridge which carried the
railroad line, connecting Greece with the rest of Europe,
over a deep gorge in the mountains south of Lamia. The
operation was timed to coincide with the British offensive at
El Alamein. It had a considerable importance, for much if
not most of the German supplies for Rommel's army were
being delivered through Greece via Crete. If the British could
interrupt the railroad for two or three weeks, German sup-

66 THE GREEK DILEMMA

plies could not be delivered, and the hoped-for victory would
be made the easier.

The three British officers assigned this hazardous mission
were Lieutenant Colonel Tom Barnes, a New Zealander and
the man who actually was to place the charges that destroyed
the bridge; Lieutenant Colonel Chris Woodhouse, a clever
young Englishman with high social connections; and Colonel
Edward Myers, a regular officer of the British Army. With
them were several sergeants, specially trained in demoli-
tion. The little group was successfully dropped in the wilds
of the Pindus Mountains with the necessary radio sets, and
paraphernalia for blowing up the bridge. During the follow
ing weeks they were able to make contact with both Zervaj
and Ares. The two guerilla leaders agreed to assist in de
stroying the bridge, and a total force of some hundred mer
set out cross country in the early fall. The bridge was guarded
by Italian soldiers; and the two Greek bands were assignee
the task of engaging the guards (one to each end of the bridge
while the British detachment placed the charges and blew i
up. All went well for the saboteurs, and on 24 Novembei
1942 the bridge was destroyed. It was not repaired until abou
three weeks had passed, and during that time the flow o
supplies from Europe to the German armies in North Afria
was interrupted.

In fact, the saboteurs were late. Three weeks before the 1 ;
blew the Gorgopotamos Bridge, Montgomery had won th<
battle of El Alamein. Nevertheless, the secret feat of thi
handful of British soldiers and Greek guerillas was of grea
value to the Allied cause, for it helped compel the Germans ii
Africa to draw back westward until they could reach fresl
supplies coming through Italy. By the time the bridge ha<
been repaired, Rommel's army had retreated so faf into Liby;
that Greece no longer served the Axis as a useful line o
supply. Thereafter the necessity of garrisoning the countr

RESISTANCE 67

became nothing but a drain on much-needed manpower,
from which the Germans could reap no military return.

As soon as the bridge was destroyed, the Greeks and
British fled for the fastnesses of the Pindus. They were harried
by pursuing Italian soldiers; and the British officers, at any
rate, were pushed to the limit of their endurance to keep
ahead of the pursuit. The original intention of British Head-
quarters in Cairo had been to carry out this one operation
and then withdraw the mission. A submarine was supposed to
pick up the British soldiers in a remote cove off the west
coast of Greece; and on Christmas Day 1942 the weary group
arrived at the shore to wait for the submarine. For several
days it did not show up; and at length a radio signal from
Cairo came telling the Britishers that they had done well,
and would remain in Greece to carry out further operations
as directed. Their disappointment was severe; but they had
no choice in the matter and made the best of it.

When the British Mission first found Zervas in the fall of

1942, he had with him no more than fourteen men; Ares had
a few more, about thirty. From these minute beginnings two
armies developed during the next year, until by the end of

1943, Ares* organization numbered perhaps twenty thousand
men, while Zervas commanded about five thousand. This
enormous growth was made possible by the development of
the political organizations which supported the guerillas.
We must now examine them more closely.

The Greek Communist Party had succeeded in keeping
its organization alive throughout the dictatorship of Metaxas.
Communists fought bravely in the Albanian War, obedient
to the instructions of a letter written by their imprisoned
leader, Nicholas Zachariades. In January 1941, however, after
the Greek troops had crossed into Albania, Zachariades wrote
a second letter denouncing the Greek invasion as a war of
Fascist aggression, and ordered his followers to desert and
sabotage the war effort as far as lay within their power. This

68 THE GREEK DILEMMA

second letter did not gain the same wide circulation as had
the first, and only a handful of "professional" Communists
obeyed. Consequently the patriotic reputation of the Com-
munist Party was not seriously damaged, and after the oc-
cupation had begun, when Communist leaders began to call
for a common front against the invaders, many patriotic and
moderate-minded men were inclined to lend a willing ear to
their words.

In the general confusion that followed immediately upon
the Greek defeat, most of the jails of the country were opened
and their inmates allowed to escape. By this means nearly
all the Communist leaders regained their freedom and were
able to add their efforts to those of the few who had been
able to evade imprisonment. Leadership of KKE passed to
George Siantos, for the prewar head of the party, Nicholas
Zachariades, had not been able to escape from prison. He
fell into German hands and was sent to the Dachau concen-
tration camp where he remained throughout the war.

Since both Zachariades and Siantos have played central
rdles in the recent history of Greece, it is worth while to look
at their personal careers for a moment. Nicholas Zachariades
was born in 1902 in Asia Minor. As a child, his family took
him to Skoplje (then still part of Turkey), but after the Serbs
acquired sovereignty over that town (1912) the family moved
again to Adrianople (Turkey), where the young Zachariades
attended a Greek school. At the time of the Russian Revo-
lution he was just fifteen years old, and for some years there-
after he worked as a sailor on the Black Sea. He was intel-
lectually gifted, and perhaps resented the hard life of a Greek
sailor. In 1921 or 1922 he skipped ship in some Russian port,
and succeeded in winning admittance to a school of Marxist
studies. He made a brilliant record, and in 1923 was sent by
the Comintern to Greece where he quickly took a leading
place in the Communist youth movement. By 1926 Zacha-
riades had graduated to the party itself, and spent a short

RESISTANCE 69

time in Salonika where he was arrested by the dictatorial
Government of General Pangalos. He escaped, went to
Athens, and after Pangalos 1 fall, became a member of the
Athens Regional Committee of the Communist Party. In
1929 he was again arrested, this time on the charge that he
had killed a political opponent in a knife fight. His enemy
was an "Archivo-Marxist," that is, a member of an obscure
and miniscule Trotskyite group. With the help of his fellow
Communists, Zachariades again succeeded in escaping from
jail, and was shipped to Russia a second time for safety and
further study. He is believed to have followed a course at
the School of Eastern Studies in Moscow, and is reputed to
have made the best academic record that had ever been made
in that school.

He certainly made a favorable impression on high officials
of the Third International, for, as we have seen, when a split
developed in the Communist Party in Greece (1931), the
young Zachariades was chosen to take over the leadership of
the party. He was notably successful in uniting the fractured
party and led the Greek Communists to greater influence
than they had previously known. During the next few years
Zachariades' prestige rose with his party's successes. In 1935
he was appointed to the Executive Committee of the Comin-
tern and became Secretary of the Balkan Communist Bureau.
As such he was head of all the Balkan Communist organiza-
tions, directly subordinate to the Comintern chief, George
Dimitroff. When Metaxas came to power, Zachariades was
jailed, and he remained a prisoner until the invading Ger-
mans removed him to Dachau.

If Zachariades represents the professional internationalist
revolutionary, George Siantos may be taken as typical of a
more distinctly national type of Communist. He is an older
man than Zachariades, having been born in 1890. He came
of a poor family in Thessaly, and at the age of thirteen began
work in a tobacco factory. Siantos was an intelligent youth

70 THE GREEK DILEMMA

of dominating character. He became prominent in the
Tobacco Workers' Federation of Greece even before the
Balkan Wars. From 1911 to 1920 he served in the Greek
Army, rising to the grade of technical sergeant. During this
time he is said to have been strongly impressed by the progress
of the Russian Revolution. Upon his discharge from military
service, he became a member of the newly formed Socialist-
Labor Party.

He soon rose to be one of the leading figures of that party.
In 1922 he helped to organize certain small agrarian disturb-
ances that took place in Thessaly and led to the breakup of a
few large estates which had previously existed there. Siantos
advocated and helped to bring about the affiliation of the So-
cialist-Labor Party with the Thicd International, and became
a charter member of the Political Bureau of the new Greek
Communist Party. In 1925 he became Secretary General of
the Central Committee, a post which involved practical con-
trol of the Greek Communists.

In 1928 he made his first visit to Russia, attending the Sixth
Congress of the Comintern as representative of the Greek
party. He resumed the post of Secretary General upon his re-
turn, and entered official political life as a member of the
Chamber of Deputies in 1930. His career met a sudden ob-
stacle in the next year when a discontented faction of the
party broke away from his leadership and began to accuse
him of deviations from true Marxist-Leninist principles. He
was ousted from power and departed for Russia where he
remained for two years, studying in the same School of East-
ern Studies from which Zachariades had graduated so bril-
liantly. In 1933 Siantos returned to Greece and took over
direction of the Communist organization in Pireus, Within
three years he was again a member of the Political Bureau,
with an influence in the party second only to that of
Zachariades.

In 1937 Metaxas arrested Siantos and interned him oil a

RESISTANCE 71

desolate little island in the Aegean. He escaped the following
year and took over the direction of the Communist Party in
the absence of Zachariades who remained securely in prison.
He was arrested again in 1939, and fell into Italian custody
after the occupation of Greece. He escaped from them in
1941 and once more took over the leadership of KKE. In
due course he became the most influential single individual
in the Communist-inspired resistance movement.

The contrast in the careers and characters of these two men
is interesting and instructive for the light it throws on the
management and control of the Greek Communist Party.
Siantos was energetic, clever in conference rooms, and shrewd
in his estimate of other men. He was not much of a doctrin-
aire, and cared more for the preservation of the party as an
administrative machine and instrument of power than for
doctrinal purity or consistency. He was not an effective public
speaker and rather shunned the limelight; yet in private con-
versation he showed himself thoroughly self-assured, sar-
donically humorous, ironically amused by the permutations
of the human puppet show. His life has been wholly Greek,
and it is rumored that he has not always accepted the direc-
tions of the Comintern with complete enthusiasm.

Zachariades was a totally different sort of character. He was
a virtuoso in abstract intellectual discussion, could make an
effective public speech, and has written large numbers of
articles, two small books (including one on literary criticism)
and translated several Marxist classics into Greek. He was
highly educated, narrowly doctrinaire, totally humorless and
liked to take a prominent place in the public eye. He was
Greek by accident of language, having come to the country
as a grown man, an emissary of the Communist International
His whole point of view differed from that of Siantos. Siantos
exhibited a sort of peasant shrewdness and soil-rootedness;
Zachariades was an international urban revolutionary.

In appearance the two were in striking contrast. Siantoi

72 THE GREEK DILEMMA

was short, balding, and stooped. His nose was long, great
pouches hung under his eyes, and a moustache straggled
across his upper lip. Zachariades was rather handsome, clean-
shaven, with stocky but athletic build. In a social gathering
he tended to lecture rather than to converse, and there was
always some sense of strain, as though he were not thoroughly
at his ease, and, anticipating attack, went out to meet it with
aggressive and eloquent words.

The organization which Siantos found under his direction
when he escaped from jail in the spring of 1941 was relatively
small, but boasted a firm discipline and commanded a deep
enthusiasm among its members. A core of professional revo-
lutionaries, of whom a small number (perhaps fifty in all) had
been specially trained in Russia, headed a mixed following
of students, professional men and workers. The greatest weak-
ness of the organization was the lack of any real following
among the peasants. Its greatest strength lay in the fact that
the Communists were already familiar with repression and
persecution, and had learned to be adept in undercover
activity during the Metaxas regime. All in all, the Greek
Communist Party was in a strategic position. No other Greek
political organization was ready on the ground; and among
most politicians a spirit of defeatism prevented any serious
efforts to revive the party organizations which had ^been
crushed by Metaxas. Yet despite the supine behavior of their
old political leaders, nearly the whole Greek people was
united in its dislike of the invaders. The Communists were
quickly able to capitalize on this fact and win wide support
by establishing a new organization, the National Liberation
Front, or as it became universally known from it initials,
EAM (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon).

EAM was founded 27 September 1941. Its original con-
stituents were the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party of
Gavrielides, the United Socialist Party, the Republican Party,
the Union of Popular Democracy and the Socialist Party.

RESISTANCE

73

Besides these organizations, some of which were of very
slender influence, many individuals from the old Liberal
Party were attracted into the new organization, and played
relatively important rdles in the early days. EAM was di-
rected by a committee, drawing one representative from each
of the constituent parties. On the surface, this arrangement
would seem to relegate the Communist Party to a minority
place in directing the policies of the Front; but in fact it was
otherwise. Of the six groups that united to form EAM, four
were indistinguishable in all but name from the Communist
Party. Only the Union of Popular Democracy headed by the
Socialist intellectual, Elias Tsirimokos, and the Socialist
Party, which drew its strength from the rather chaotic labor
unions of Greece, were truly independent of the Communists.
The others were headed by Communists and followed the
wishes of the Political Bureau of KKE in all things.

Despite this fact, Communist control of EAM was incon-
spicuous during its early days. The movement succeeded in
attracting great numbers of non-Communists, and generated
such enthusiasm among them that for a while it seemed pos-
sible that the Communists would be submerged by the
greater numbers of the others and lose control of the move-
ment. But, as we shall see, the disciplined energy of the Com-
munists resulted in their coming into ultimate control of the
whole EAM organization.

The influence of the Communist Party was deliberately
camouflaged at the beginning. KKE members were not
allowed to hold the most conspicuous posts. Thus the first
Secretary General of the National Liberation Front was an
eminently respectable Socialist named George Economou. A
similar policy was followed in filling all subordinate posi-
tions; wherever possible men of general respect and good
repute were installed.

The purposes of EAM as originally announced were such
as would appeal to almost every patriotic Greek. The

74 THE GREEK DILEMMA

organization set out to unite all factions against the invader;
to resist the efforts of the quisling Government by strikes and
by armed force; and to raise and maintain the morale of the
people against the day of liberation. Preaching this doctrine,
organizers were sent out to the villages of Greece during the
fall and winter of 1941-1942. By this means, KKE's great
weakness lack of peasant support was largely overcome.
In nearly every village of Greece an EAM cell came to be
established. Propaganda was intense and well organized.
Young boys and students did much of the evangelistic work,
and not all of them were Communist by any means. Under
the circumstances, the movement spread rapidly and took a
firm hold on the loyalties of large numbers of the peasants
of Greece.

In the towns, EAM's success was equally great. A few
months after its foundation nearly all the laboring men had
joined the movement, and a number of singularly successful
strikes were carried out by EAM during the ensuing three
years as warnings and demonstrations against unpopular Gov-
ernment action. It was in part due to the propaganda and
demonstrations organized by EAM that Greek laborers were
never conscripted by the quisling Government for work in
German factories, and that the number of men who volun-
teered for work in Germany was small.

EAM drew much of its force from the fact that it appealed
to the youth and women of Greece. The movement was able
to reach the boys and girls of the nation, and inspire them
with a vivid sense of their OTpi value and importance. Boys of
fourteen were numerous among the guerillas, while veritable
children were regularly employed as messengers, being less
likely to suspicion and search. Traditionally, in Greek society 3
the father had unchallenged control over the members of his
family, and the place of women was (and is) far lower than in
the countries of Western Europe. EAM, however, established
special groups for women, and many a Greek housewife found

RESISTANCE 75

herself called upon for the first time in her life to act, in
obedience to the directions of the organization, independ-
ently of her husband's control. Such emancipation attracted
many women, and they became among the most fanatic EAM
supporters. In general, one may say that the development of
EAM broke down the peasant family system of values and
discipline which had previously been dominant among the
working classes of the towns. In the country nothing of the
sort took place: the families continued to exist as before with
the father in supreme control, and the EAM movement was
largely limited to the menfolk of the villages. For this among
other reasons, the power of the movement was far less in the
country than in the towns. In a sense this aspect of EAM's
activity only continued an emancipation begun under the
Metaxas regime, through the agency of youth and women's
groups.

By the spring of 1942, EAM had set up local leaders and
organizations over the whole of central Greece. Only after
this had been achieved was an effort made to form the armed
force, the guerilla army which was to resist the occupation
troops. On 10 April EAM made proclamation of its plan to
form a guerilla army. It was called ELAS, a pun on the
Greeks' name for their country, Ellas. The letters are the
initials of the National People's Liberation Army (Ethnikos
Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos). The new army did not
spring suddenly into existence but formed around a few
guerilla chieftains, of whom Ares was by far the most famous
and important. At first the bands operated independently,
and not until the winter of 1942-1943 did any semblance of
effective central control begin to bind the separate bands into
what could properly be called a guerilla army.

Thousands of eager young men offered themselves as re-
cruits for ELAS. To be accepted, a volunteer had to be recom-
mended by the EAM leader (Ipefthinos) of the village or the
district of the town in which he lived. With a certificate of

76 THE GREEK DILEMMA

good character from the Ipef thinos, the would-be recruit pre-
sented himself to the nearest band, and if weapons were avail-
able, he would be duly sworn in as a soldier of the ELAS.
Normal military law was enforced. A soldier once enrolled
could not depart without formal permission from his com-
manding officer; and disobedience to orders was punishable
by death if circumstances seemed to warrant. Special military
courts were established to enforce discipline, and they also
extended their jurisdiction to the trial of civilians who were
accused of hindering or harming the activities of ELAS.

The army was commanded by a system of triplices. Instead
of a single commander, every unit and headquarters was di-
rected by a committee of three. The three were a military
commander (usually but not always a former officer or ser-
geant of the Greek Army); a Kapetanios, who was charged
with carrying on propaganda and enlightenment in the unit;
and a political representative of EAM. The political repre-
sentative was supposed to direct relations between the unit
and the civilian population and organizations, e.g., he would
make billeting arrangements or requisition food from a vil-
lage. Any important decision had to be agreed to by all three
men in command. But in general, the military commander
turned out to be the least important of the three, being en-
trusted only with narrowly military decisions such as the dis-
position of troops for an attack. Other matters, such as
deciding who should be attacked and when, were usually
attended to by the Kapetanios and the political representative
together. The system assured civilian control over the army;
more than that, it was so manipulated as to assure Communist
control, for as time went on, more and more of the political
representatives and Kapetanoi were chosen from the ranks
of the Communist Party.

Such a systematic description as the above oversimplifies
and makes too orderly what was actually a gradual and in part
an unforeseen development from the original collection of

RESISTANCE 77

small isolated bands. Much of the early development of ELAS
took place through the incorporation of bands which had
formed independently of EAM. Many such bands were will-
ing to join forces with the larger organization peaceably;
especially when, as was often the case, their chieftains were
promised a larger command within the framework of ELAS.
It was by this method that its two most prominent military
figures were persuaded to join the National People's Libera-
tion Army.

Colonel Stephen Sarafis was a Regular Army officer who
had attached himself closely to the fortunes of the republican
faction in the Army. After the 1935 revolution he was dis-
missed from active service and exiled to the island of Milos.
In 1941 he returned to Athens where he spent some months
in jail as a prisoner of the Italians, but was released early in
1943. He thereupon went to his native district in Thessaly
and was able to organize a small independent band of gueril-
las. In May 1943 his band was one day surrounded by ELAS
troops, and Sarafis was offered the choice of surrendering to
ELAS or suffering their attack. He chose to surrender, and
was taken as a prisoner to ELAS General Headquarters where
he was first condemned to death, and then, after some days,
suddenly emerged as the Commander in Chief of all the
ELAS forces.

This surprising denouement can be understood if one
bears in mind two things: first, that Sarafis was a high ranking
Army officer (full colonel) with considerable prestige among
republican officers, and presumed experience and capacity in
military tactics; and second, that as Commander in Chief he
was checked by a Kapetanios (Ares) and a political representa-
tive (George Siantos), so that his opportunity of independent
action was nil. From the point of view of the men who held
effective power over ELAS, Sarafis could do them no harm;
and by giving military advice and serving as a respectable
front, he could do the movement useful service.

78 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Colonel Evripidis Bakirdjis was recruited to the ranks of
ELAS in almost the same manner. When the war broke out,
he was in exile, where he had fled after the failure of the 1935
revolt. In 1942 he presented himself to the Greek Government
in Cairo and was appointed to active duty. He quickly became
immersed in the intrigues that were then running through
the Greek forces in the Middle East. In order to rid them-
selves of his troublesome presence, the Greeks suggested that
Colonel Bakirdjis might be a useful man to head a resistance
group in the north of Greece, where an organization known
as EKKA, closely under British protection, was trying to start
active military operations against the Germans. The British
accepted him, and Bakirdjis was transported into Macedonia
(spring, 1943), and he was soon able to form a small band of
guerillas. But again ELAS insisted on a monopoly of re-
sistance, and brought its forces into a threatening position so
that Bakirdjis was persuaded to surrender to them. In due
course, he became the top ELAS commander in Macedonia,
and was for some months the president of the Provisional
Government of the Mountains when it was organized in the
spring of 1944.

Commanders such as Sarafis and Bakirdjis were rare in the
ranks of ELAS. Regular Army officers were generally an
object of suspicion to the leftists, and officers reciprocated the
distrust. Most ELAS units were commanded militarily by
former sergeants or very junior Reserve officers of the Greek
Army. The Kapetanoi and political representatives were re-
cruited from the ranks of the Communist and associated
parties. Some of these were capable and educated men-
lawyers and university students or the like; but others were
simple workmen or peasants whose only formal education was
what they had gained from the propaganda lectures of EAM
and the Communist Party.

British policy did much to forward the growth of the power
of ELAS. When the three original members of the British

RESISTANCE 79

Mission received the order to remain in Greece, they dis-
persed. Lieutenant Colonel Woodhouse joined Ares in the
mountains of Thessaly; Lieutenant Colonel Barnes stayed
with Zervas in western Greece; and Colonel Myers set up an
independent headquarters of his own from which he hoped
to coordinate the activities of both bands. It was roughly
agreed that Zervas would act in the west, leaving the area
east of the Pindus Mountains to Ares. This division was orig-
inally made simply because Zervas in western Greece was on
ground familiar from his childhood; but the facts of geog-
raphy put him at a grave disadvantage as against Ares and the
ELAS bands. The western part of Greece is isolated from the
main centers of population and lines of communication by
wild and desolate mountains, and an organization centering
itself around the town of Arta was inevitably far removed
from the fulcrum of power.

Nevertheless, the British and Greeks worked on the basis of
such a delimitation of spheres. Ares* band became the core of
the National People's Liberation Army, and, as its numbers
grew by recruitment and absorption of other bands, subordi-
nate units, grandiloquently named divisions, regiments and
battalions were organized. The British sent in some supplies
and weapons by air; more important, they sent large sums of
gold which were used to buy food and other necessities for
the guerilla soldiers. During the first year the British treated
ELAS and Zervas equally; although the fact that ELAS
quickly outstripped all rivals meant that in practice the
British delivered larger quantities of supplies to them.

British policy was aimed to secure the maximum possible
military pressure on the Italian and German troops that oc-
cupied Greece. As a first step toward this end it seemed neces-
sary to unite all the various guerilla bands into a single force.
In central Greece, Ares and his friends became the chosen in-
strument. They had been first on the ground, and Ares deeply
impressed Colonel Woodhouse with his capacities as a guerilla

80 THE GREEK DILEMMA

leader. The sadistic side of Ares' character was probably kept
hidden from the Britisher; and in any case, a little Balkan
barbarism probably seemed inevitable and even wholesome
to the cultivated young Englishman.

Consequently, as ELAS stretched out its power into new
areas, its demand for monopoly of armed resistance was in
general supported by the British liaison officers who began to
come into Greece in ever-increasing numbers. On the BBC,
nightly broadcasts urged all guerilla factions in Greece to
unite in harmony in order to resist the invaders. In practice
over most of Greece this came to mean union with ELAS.

The guerilla troops were chronically short of clothes and
ammunition. Nevertheless, life in ELAS was not of itself very
onerous, for the guerillas stayed in remote mountain villages
most of the time and lived a life of semi-indolence. Occasional
periods of sudden and extreme exertion varied the monotony;
and every so often came a whiff of danger which confirmed
the soldiers in their conviction that they were national heroes.
In the winter, life was harder; but the men seldom had to live
in the open for more than a few days at a time since it was
the universal practice to requisition lodging (and sometimes
food as well) from the local peasants. Food often ran short in
the early days; but by midsummer 1943 EAM had succeeded
in establishing a remarkably efficient system of requisition
and purchase, and had been able to accumulate substantial
ration stores which were distributed with fair regularity.

In actual fact, a soldier in ELAS lived a good deaf better
than did the ordinary peasant of Greece, and did not have to
work with the same drudging toil. He further had the psycho-
logical exhilaration of believing himself a hero and the true
descendant of the robber klefti who had fought in the War of
Independence and were enshrined in the Greek national tra-
dition. Under the circumstances, many a peasant's son found
himself irresistibly attracted to the guerilla life; and an over-
abundant peasant population made recruitment easy. Fewer

RESISTANCE 81

came from the towns; life was relatively, comfortable there,
and EAM had other work for townsmen, organizing strikes
and serving as propagandists among the more illiterate
peasants.

From the very beginning the chief factor that limited the
numbers of the guerillas was lack of weapons. Their original
armament had been in the country at the beginning, coming
mostly from the soldiers who had kept their guns after the
Albanian War. Additional weapons came by capture from the
Italians and Germans; and a small trickle, but important be-
cause it was tHe best source of automatic weapons, came by air
from the British in Cairo. Drawing guns from these sources,
ELAS was able to build its strength up to about twenty thou-
% sand by the end of the summer of 1943.

Although ELAS became by far the most formidable force
among the resistance organizations, it was not without rivals.
The most important of these was the EDES led by Napoleon
Zervas. EDES shared all the early advantages of ELAS save
two: it began operations in what was essentially a backwater
of the country and could never reach into the main parts of
Greece without coming into collision with ELAS which, hold-
ing the Pindus Mountains, blocked the way to the main
centers of population; and secondly, the political organization
that backed the EDES guerilla force was less efficient and less
energetic than EAM. It was this second weakness that was de-
cisive. Had Zervas been supported by an organization as
vigorous as EAM, he could undoubtedly have overcome the
opposition of ELAS and built up his army in other parts of
Greece despite the Communists. As it was, many isolated
bands, not wishing to join forces with ELAS, tried to associate
themselves with Zervas and EDES; but lack of easy communi-
cation or effective support from a political machine compara-
ble to EAM made all such attempts failures, and permitted
ELAS to pick off the dissident bands one by one, after the
fashion of their dealing with Colonels Sarafis and Bakirdjis.

82 THE GREEK DILEMMA

After Greece had been conquered by the Germans, the es-
tablished leaders of the Liberal and other republican parties
declined to take any active interest in organizing resistance.
Most of them were old men (the leader of the Liberal Party,
Themistocles Sofoulis, was seventy-nine years old) and unac-
customed to the conspiratorial methods that had to be used.
Many of the younger and more impatient Liberals con-
sequently joined forces with EAM when it was founded.
Others preferred to organize separately. The Greek National
Democratic League (Athens EDES) was the result. This new
organization fixed upon General Nicholas Plastiras as its
nominal head. It will be recalled that Plastiras had been the
military leader of the revolution against King Constantine's
Government in 1922, and had led a second revolt, but with-
out success, in 1933. Thereafter he lived in exile, but kept up
connections in Greece with former confederates. A few of
Plastiras' friends were among the original founders of the
Democratic League, and through their influence he came to
be recognized as the nominal leader of the organization.

EDES, as the organization was always called, differed from
EAM in many respects. It never achieved any wide popular
base but remained little more than a cabal of ambitious poli-
ticians or would-be politicians in Athens. Active leaders were
mostly professors and well-to-do businessmen who made little
progress toward building up a rank-and-file membership in
Athens. Elsewhere in the country no real organization was
ever established. The leading figure of EDES in Athens was
General Stylianos Gonatas, Plastiras' colleague in the revolu-
tion of 1922. As we have seen, Napoleon Zervas became the
military leader of the movement; but after leaving for the
west (June 1942) he maintained only very tenuous ties with
the parent organization in Athens, and owed little to its sup-
port. Some few recruits came to Zervas' forces through the
Athens organization; otherwise nothing.

In western Greece, Zervas was able to expand his guerilla

RESISTANCE , 83

force by much the same methods as were used by ELAS in
sther parts of Greece. A political committee was organized
3.t his headquarters which sent men round the villages to
spread Zervas' fame. They urged young men who had rifles to
join him, and selected local representatives in each village
who became responsible for providing such supplies and
quarters as the EDES guerillas required. But the political
propaganda of EDES never had the drive and enthusiasm
which was so abundantly possessed by EAM; and the political
organization of the villages never reached a level comparable
to that achieved by the rival group.

Despite these weaknesses, Zervas was able to expand his
force rapidly, and in his case too, it was a lack of weapons that
held down the number of his guerillas. Approximately five
thousand men had come under his command by the summer
of 1943. Their organization followed orthodox military lines.
Zervas, himself a former army officer, was able to attract into
his forces a greater number of professional soldiers than was
the case with ELAS. Military commanders were given full
control of their units. Zervas was universally accepted as the
Commander in Chief; and his relation to subordinates was a
personal one. Among the EDES troops he was known as
"Papa Zervas/' and his squat figure, distinguished by an
enormous black beard, was known by sight to nearly all his
followers.

In addition to the two principal resistance organizations,
there grew up in Greece an enormous and bewildering num-
ber of others, mostly known by a set of initials, one much re-
sembling another. Out of this welter only three organizations
actually succeeded in creating an armed force, or in rising to
any practical importance. These were known as PAO, EKKA,
andX.

The Panhellenic Liberating Organization, or PAO (Panel
linios Apeleftherotiki Organosis) developed its principal
power in Salonika. The core of its membership was regular

84 THE GREEK DILEMMA

and reserve army officers, but some civilians also joined in its
councils. In December 1942, at a time when ELAS had not yet
appeared in Macedonia, the organization succeeded in com-
ing into contact with Greek and British authorities in the
Middle East, and received five thousand gold pounds (roughly
1 100,000 purchasing power ir^ Greece) on the understanding
that PAO would form an armed force which would be obe-
dient to the commands of the British Headquarters in Cairo.

There was, however, a serious misunderstanding between
the British and PAO leaders. The British hoped for the
speedy formation of guerilla bands; the leaders of PAO in-
tended rather to re-create the Greek Army in secret, planning
to form on paper an organization which would rise to make
a sudden blow against the occupiers on the day of, or slightly
, before, an Allied landing in Greece. Working on these lines,
the organization had no trouble in finding officers, but there
was notable shortage of privates, since more hoped to give
orders than to take them. As long as the army remained
wholly a scheme on paper, free scope was given for quarrels
over precedence. Fruitless bickering was only broken off
when British Headquarters made clear that it looked for more
concrete results. Consequently PAO guerilla bands were not
organized until March 1943; and at the peak of their strength
they probably mustered something like one thousand men
divided among a dozen bands.

By the time the PAO bands were formed, ELAS already
existed in the mountains that border the Salonika plain to
the west. Quarrels broke out immediately. ELAS accused its
rival of collaboration with the enemy, and called them Fas-
cists; PAO reciprocated, accusing ELAS of a secret league
with the Bulgarians, and calling them Communists. Words
soon led to action, and small-scale running fights broke out
repeatedly. In June, a British officer travelled north from the
ELAS General Headquarters, assigned as liaison officer with
the ELAS bands of the region. Discovering the bad relations

RESISTANCE , 85

between ELAS and PAO, he tried to bring about an agree-
ment for cooperation; but the effort failed, since the leaders
on the spot said the matter would have to be referred to
higher headquarters. In pursuit of such an agreement, the
British officer returned to ELAS Headquarters in the Pindus
Mountains, and after the lapse of some weeks, summoned
representatives of the PAO Central Committee to come and
negotiate an agreement between their organization and
ELAS. Meanwhile the fighting between the two organizations
continued, neither side winning conspicuous success. Even
after a draft agreement had been signed between PAO and
ELAS in the Pindus Headquarters, further fighting broke
out, and mutual recriminations came thick and fast.

The British Mission (headed after midsummer 1943 by
Colonel Woodhouse), in pursuit of its general policy of trying
to unify all guerilla organizations and bring them under the
command of Allied Force Headquarters (Algiers), had spent
the summer of 1943 trying to negotiate formal written agree-
ments between the principal guerilla forces which had come
into being in the hills of Greece. The PAO-ELAS draft agree-
ment was only one of several similar peacemaking efforts. A
formal agreement was finally drawn up in July, comprising
terms of cooperation between all the guerilla groups and
establishing their military subordination to Allied Force
Headquarters. But after all the negotiation, ELAS refused to
sign. They justified this refusal by accusing PAO of having
violated the draft agreement that had been made some weeks
earlier, and asserted roundly that no agreement with such a
band of Fascist collaborators could ever be made. ELAS did,
at this time, however, formally acknowledge its military
subordination to AFHQ.

The effort at peacemaking thus collapsed, and during the
next six months ELAS was able to pick off the PAO bands
one by one, and take over control of all Central Macedonia
and the Chalcidice as well. In December 1943 the last surviv-

86 THE GREEK DILEMMA

ing remnant of PAO guerillas boarded a caique off the shore
of the Chalcidice and succeeded in making its way to the
Middle East. The organization itself continued to exist as a
conspiracy between a few Army officers and others in the city
of Salonika, but after the fall of 1943 it had lost all practical
importance.

A single anti-Communist band survived ELAS attacks in
northern Greece. Some of its members had belonged to PAO,
but the band itself had not been a part of that organization. It
was led by Anton Filiates, or as he was universally known, by
Anton Tsaous, that is, Anton, the Sergeant. (Tsaous is a Hel-
lenized rendering of the Turkish word for sergeant.) This
band operated in Eastern Macedonia, in Bulgar-held terri-
tory. ELAS power failed to penetrate the area until the fall
of 1944. Prior to that time, Anton Tsaous moved through the
mountains on the border between Bulgaria and Greece, or
occasionally crossed into the rugged mountain mass of Pan-
geion near the coast. At first he played a sort of Robin Hood
role, protecting the Greeks against the Bulgars; later as the
power of ELAS grew and its threat to his band increased,
Anton Tsaous and his followers became more anti-Com-
munist than anything else, and devoted most of their energies
to preventing political or military penetration of their area
by EAM-ELAS. ELAS accused Anton Tsaous of collaboration
with the Bulgarian occupiers. Perhaps, during the last months
of the occupation, he and his band did enter upon friendly
relations with the Bulgars. But the matter is open to doubt.
Accusations of collaboration against rivals were the stock in
trade of all the Greek resistance organizations, and ELAS too
has been darkly and repeatedly accused of collaboration with
the Bulgarians in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. In this
quarrel it seems impossible to assess blame or try to sift the
flatly contradictory evidence advanced by the rival sides.

Another resistance organization which achieved a place in
the bickerings and civil wars that beset the Greek guerilla

RESISTANCE 87

groups was the so-called National and Social Liberation, or
EKKA (Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apdeftherosis). EKKA came
late on the scene, forming at the beginning of 1943 around
the lively personality of George Kartalis. He came of a rich
and prominent family, and his uncle had achieved some
prominence in the Popular Party. A bright young man,
George Kartalis before the war had been a confirmed dilet-
tante in politics no less than in art. He became attracted ta
Socialist ideas, and in a moment of enthusiasm found himself
editing a clandestine newspaper in Athens and heading an
organization of intellectuals and political dabblers that called
itself EKKA, In Athens the activities of this group were largely
propagandist, directed principally toward the middle and
upper classes. They supplied many spies for the British in-
telligence network, and in later times the group came to be
dubbed the Golden Resistance as a derogatory reminder of
the quantities of gold its members had received from Cairo.
EKKA's military organization was never of central im-
portance in the group's activities and came about almost
fortuitously. A certain Colonel Dimitrios Psarros had been
among the many individuals who formed small independent
guerilla bands in the summer of 1942. Colonel Psarros was a
man of high character and reputation, an old-line Venizelist
but no revolutionary. His personal prestige was sufficient to
attract considerable numbers of men to his leadership, and
his band grew to be larger than most, with perhaps two to
three hundred members. When ELAS expansion began to
reach into the villages on the slopes of Mount Parnassos where
Colonel Psarros had established himself, he looked around
for support, and found it in EKKA. An agreement was made
between the guerilla leader and the politicians of EKKA
whereby the band became subordinated to the commands of
the EKKA Committee. This arrangement secured additional
recruits for Colonel Psarros' band from among some of the
young men of Athens who found stimulus in the political

88 THE GREEK DILEMMA

ideas of the Kartalis organization: more important, it gave
his band political support and associated it closely with the
British services that supplied EKKA so liberally with money.

It followed that when ELAS units attempted to force Colo-
nel Psarros to join them, he was able to refer the question to
the EKKA committee, and negotiations between ELAS Head-
quarters and EKKA ensued. In midsummer 1943 an agree-
ment was drawn up providing for the cooperation of the two
organizations; and it was incorporated in the general guerilla
charter of July. But, as we have seen, difficulties arose over
the final ratification of this document. ELAS found PAO un-
acceptable as an ally, and raised objections to signing an
agreement to which it was a party. The ELAS-EKKA agree-
ment was, however, considered binding, by the British at
least. Despite the agreement, mutual suspicions made effec-
tive cooperation between the ELAS and EKKA impossible.
Colonel Psarros was not able to expand his organization over
any new area, as he wished to do, since he was hemmed in by
hostile EAM organizations in all the surrounding villages,
able and anxious to prevent any other organization from
taking root if necessary by betraying the leaders of the rival
group to the Italians.

In the fall of 1943 ELAS began a large-scale effort to eradi-
cate the remaining independent guerilla bands. As a part of
this effort, Psarros was surrounded and compelled to give up
most of his weapons. His band, however, did not totally break
up. Most of its members, being deprived of weapons, returned
to their homes; but a small number remained on the slopes
of Mount Parnassos. In April 1944, ELAS renewed its attacks,
and after a series of skirmishes succeeded in breaking up what
remained. Colonel Psarros himself was captured and killed,
with some twenty of his officers. Most of the rank and
file were compelled or persuaded, to join ELAS. So ended the
military career of EKKA. Its short-lived effort in Macedonia,

RESISTANCE 89

under Colonel Bakirdjis, had, as we have seen, come to
nothing some months before.

The history of X is quite different This organization began
as an association among the former officers of the II (Athens)
Division. Lieutenant Colonel George Grivas had been Chief
of Staff of the Division during the Albanian War, and within
a few months of the organization's foundation he became its
undisputed head. In its early days, X aspired to recreate the
II Division underground, and on a given signal call it into
active operation against the German and Italian occupation
army. Such a rising was imagined as the concomitant of an
Allied landing in Greece. But from the beginning, X had a
strong conservative political color. Grivas was an ardent
royalist, and his organization came to stand for the King. As
the shadow of ELAS spread over the land, X came by degrees
to fear more the power of the Communists than the oppres-
sion of the Germans. In 1943 membership was extended to
include former non-commissioned officers of the II Division;
and a few months later privates and even men who had never
served in the Division were admitted.

X found arms difficult to come by. The British, already be-
deviled by rival and quarrelling resistance groups, declined
to add X to their payroll or to supply it with weapons. The
only other easy supply of arms was from the German and
Italian armies. It is not certain that Grivas ever came into
direct contact with the occupying authorities; more likely he
dealt indirectly through the Greek quisling Government in
whose ranks not a few former Army officers and Metaxas of-
ficials were to be found who would easily lend a sympathetic
ear to a man of Grivas' position and political ideas. In any
case, X was able to possess itself of arms from German and
Italian sources. With the weapons so secured, gangs of bravos
were equipped, who made it their habit to traverse the streets
of Athens by night and seek out leading EAM organizers to

90 THE GREEK DILEMMA

shoot or beat up. X never became very large during the occu-
pation, numbering perhaps five to six hundred armed men
at its greatest strength. It became the chief target of ELAS in
the city of Athens, and running gun fights became almost
nightly occurrences between the rival organizations during
the first months of 1944.

From this brief survey, it is clear that none of the armed
organizations that set themselves up in rivalry to ELAS suc-
ceeded in challenging its power in Greece as a whole. The
preeminent reason for their failure was lack of a political
backing such as EAM was able to provide for ELAS. The
energy and enthusiasm mobilized by EAM was tremendous.
Most of its members were inspired by honest and lofty mo-
tives and most profoundly believed in the righteousness of
their cause. Yet despite their good intentions EAM began to
undergo a complicated transformation and degeneration in
the months after the summer of 1943. Patriotism and self-
sacrifice, high enthusiasm and warm social idealism, all came
to serve an intolerant, ruthless and power-hungry political
machine which, by its excesses, helped to create an irreconcil-
able opposition to itself and to bring on the miseries of civil
war.

IF
The Beginning of Civil War

ITS name implies, EAM,
the National Liberation Front, claimed to represent the
whole Greek nation in its resistance to the occupying armies
and quisling Government, When first organized, EAM at-
tracted well-meaning individuals from many walks of life;
persons often energetic and idealistic, and of various political
affiliations. Yet from the beginning there were many Greeks
who did not join EAM. In the early days there was relatively
little active hostility to the new movement, and the fact that
the more conservatively minded Greeks did not join the
Front was as much due to inertia as to any distrust of the
movement's leadership.

In most of the Greek villages, during the first years of oc-
cupation, there was no other political organization which
could compete with EAM for the loyalties of the peasants,
and only indifference or personal rivalries among the villagers
prevented everyone from joining in the movement. In the
towns, the situation was more complicated. EAM found its
first foothold chiefly among the workers and intellectual radi-
cals; and other groups in the population, generally speaking,
declined to associate themselves with a movement of such
social composition. Some individuals no doubt cried "Com-
munist" from the very first; but most of the upper and middle
classes, I believe, remained aloof merely because they were
unaccustomed to associate with refugees, impecunious law-

91

92 THE GREEK DILEMMA

yers and hot-headed students such as filled the ranks of the
new movement.

Just as the political leaders of the conservative and center
parties steered clear of any association with EAM, so the
upper and most of the middle class of the towns were content
to let others undertake the crusade and risk the dangers of
resistance to the unpopular Government and the hated con-
querors, EAM thus became a movement of the dispossessed
and the underprivileged; and from a nation-wide beginning
gradually became a revolutionary class movement. This
transformation was undoubtedly helped and deliberately
hastened by the propaganda and actions of the Communist
Party; but it was made possible by the initial abdication of
the old ruling classes from leadership of the resistance; an
abdication which was seldom deliberate and more often arose
from a supine preference for the safer, easier path.

EAM's early propaganda was designed to attract as many as
possible to its banners, and could have alienated only the
few out-and-out collaborators. In September 1942 a pamphlet
was secretly published, entitled "What Is EAM and What
Are Its Aims?" It had a wide circulation, and may be taken as
an official statement of the purposes of the organization. The
pamphlet listed them as follows:

1. The protection of the people against hunger, illness
and want.

2. Passive and active resistance against the occupying
forces and those collaborating with them. The raising of the
people's morale. Opposition to all forms of collaboration.

3. Daily paralyzing of the occupying forces to ensure that
their war aims are not served by Greek labor or Greek
materials.

4. Active resistance to force, answering force by force,
armed struggle and a final armed rising.

5. When the occupying forces have been expelled:

a. The formation of a Government from the leaders
of the National Liberation Struggle, from the

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 93

parties and bands which will have guided the
struggle during the fight and during the victory.

b. The immediate reestablishment of all popular liber-
ties, of press, of speech and of assembly. A general
amnesty.

c. The immediate calling of elections for a National
Constituent Assembly, where the form of popular
government of the country will be drawn up.

Surely only black reactionaries could object to such a pro-
gram! So at least it seemed to most members of EAM. They
came to feel that whoever did not join the movement was an
enemy of the people and should be treated accordingly. This
conviction, and. unquestioning acceptance of facile accusa-
tions of collaboration made against all rivals, permitted ELAS
to attack all independent guerilla bands without qualm,
whereas most of the other bands were seriously embarrassed
by finding themselves in battle with fellow Greeks, and re-
peatedly fumbled opportunities to gain military advantage
by attempting peace negotiations. In the face of the fervor
and conviction of most EAM followers, and the hard calcula-
tion of their leaders, no real or enduring understanding with
any other independent organization was possible. There came
to be no middle ground: whoever was not for, was against,
and therefore an enemy of the people.

From the neutral, patriotic beginnings of 1941 and 1942,
EAM propaganda gradually took on a definite antiroyalist
tone. King George II was portrayed as a man who had come
to Greece in 1935 unbidden, who had imposed a dictatorship
on the people by subterfuge, and who had cowardly fled the
country when the real struggle began. The Greek defeat was
attributed to the treason of regular officers who were accused
of being pro-German and Fascist (as indeed some of them
were). The Government-in-Exile fell under deep suspicion.
It was descended from the Metaxas dictatorship without any
constitutional break, recognized King George as its sovereign,
and constituted a potential rival to EAM for postwar control

94 THE GREEK DILEMMA

of Greece. Prior to 1944, however, the Government-in-Exile
was not assailed directly but merely by innuendo. Desire to
maintain British support may have influenced this caution.

In attacking the King, EAM was in full accord with the
dominant sentiment of the Greek people. Dislike of the
Metaxas dictatorship and dislike of the King became identi-
fied; furthermore, many Greeks felt that their King had
deserted them in the hour of need, forfeiting whatever right
he had to rule, by his flight. In March 1942 representatives of
nearly all the old-time politicians of Athens signed a petition,
the so-called Protocol of 31 March, in which it was stated that
King George should not return to Greece before a plebiscite
had been held to determine whether the people wanted him
or not. This resolution was in due course forwarded to Cairo,
where it became the subject of much quarrelling and debate.

By the summer of 1943 the formative period of guerilla de-
velopment was past. At that time ELAS was indisputably the
most powerful organization among the Greeks, with perhaps
twenty thousand armed men in its ranks. The character of
this force varied. Through the peripheral districts of Greece
(except Epirus and part of Aetolia-Arkarnania where Zervas
held sole sway) scattered ELAS bands roamed the country,
living by requisition off the peasants of the more remote vil-
lages, engaging in an occasional brush with the Italian troops
that guarded the principal lines of communication, and,
rather more often, descending upon some hapless Greek who
had exposed himself to the charge of collaboration, punishing
him with death or confiscation of all his possessions.

The character of these bands varied markedly from region
to region, and also with the individual who happened to be in
command. In the Peloponnese, where the peasants were tra-
ditionally conservative, EAM was never able to gain undis-
puted hold on the loyalty of the population, and ELAS bands
were consequently comparatively insecure. They reacted by
exercising a terrorism more severe than in other parts of the

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 95

country. By contrast, in most of Macedonia, almost the whole
Greek population was won over to EAM, and the guerilla
bands had almost the character of a national army. Com-
munists controlled ELAS in the north as surely as they did
elsewhere in the country, but their control was not challenged
after the breakup of PAO, and the bands found no occasion
to resort to acts of violence such as disfigured their record in
the south.

In Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, EAM influence re-
mained weak. The Bulgajs treated the territory they had
been given by the Germans as an integral part of Bulgaria,
bringing in thousands of Bulgarian settlers, and driving other
thousands of Greeks from the land. This weakened the Greek
element. Still more, those Greeks who remained were more
fearful of offending the. occupation force than was the case
in the rest of Greece. Bulgar vengeance was swifter and surer
than the Italian, and was animated by the bitterness of a na-
tional quarrel. Another reason for EAM's weakness in this
region was its remoteness. As we have seen, EAM's power did
not come to Central Macedonia until the summer of 1943,
and during the following year only feeble tentacles were ex-
tended eastward.

Conservative Greeks today explain that EAM did not try
to organize in Bulgar-occupied lands because the Greek
Communist Party had an agreement with the Bulgarian Com-
munists by which the Greek leftists agreed to limit their ac-
tivities to the districts west of the Strymon River. It is said that
John loannides, one of the senior members of the Greek
Communist Party and an old internationalist revolutionary,
negotiated this agreement in 1941, long before the power of
EAM and the Greek Communists extended into any part of
Macedonia. Texts purporting to be the terms of the agree-
ment have been published. The accusation, of course, is
heatedly denied by EAM and the Communists. It seems im-
possible to judge the question without free access to the

96 THE GREEK DILEMMA

secret files of the Greek or Bulgarian Communist Parties. All
that need be noted here is that, whatever the reason, EAM
and ELAS were relatively weak through the parts of Greece
occupied by the Bulgars.

Another area in which EAM had made no impression in
1943 was the extreme northwest comer of Western Mace-
donia. There, lived a small but compact population of Slavic
peasants who took no part in Greek political movements, and
in fact had generally been won to the support of the Axis by
Bulgarian and Italian propaganda.

In the islands, EAM generally had undisputed control and
did not find it necessary to form armed bands. Crete was an
exception. In that island, ELAS units operated side by side
with independent guerilla bands and never absorbed or even
attacked them. Relations were reasonably smooth between
all the bands, even when the majority of the non-Communist
groups formed a loose federation known as the National
Organization of Cretan Guerillas or EOKA (Ethniki Or-
ganosis Kritikon Andarton). The unwonted harmony in
Crete may have been due to the fact that ELAS was in a
minority, mustering not more than one third of the total
armed guerillas of the island.

The main center of EAM-ELAS power was in the Pindus
Mountains west of the plain of Thessaly. By mid- 1943 a
veritable state had been there set up, guarded by ELAS
soldiers, policed by a special corps known as Politofylaki,
and governed by the EAM Central Committee. The area had
fluctuating boundaries. At no time were the guerillas able to
prevent a column of Italian or German troops from moving
at will over the country; nor did they often attempt to do so.
Rather the guerilla forces melted away before the advancing
enemy, and villagers in their path were warned to flee before
their approach so that the Axis troops would generally find
nothing tangible to oppose them. The guerilla power was
none the less real. Taxes were collected in kind to support

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 97

ELAS; justice was administered by a system of People's
Courts; travel was controlled by internal passports; educa-
tion, of a narrowly propagandist sort, was carried on by
itinerant EAM organizers and evangelists.

The principal agent of the EAM Government in each vil-
lage was an official called the Ipefthinos (literally, the Re-
sponsible). He was appointed by the central authority from
among the local villagers, and if an incumbent proved un-
satisfactory or showed any signs of lagging in enthusiastic
enforcement of the demands made on the villagers, he was
promptly replaced by a more efficient tool. The Ipefthinos
was often assisted by a special representative of the EAM
Central Committee. These were usually young men, full of
crusading ardor for the cause, and in many villages tended to
edge the native-bom Ipefthinos from real control. The tax
burden on the peasants was heavy, but perhaps not in excess
of the exactions formerly made by the Greek Government. If
there was active discontent, it was easily repressed; for any
man who ventured to speak against EAM marked himself as
an enemy of the people and was promptly and ruthlessly
dealt with by the People's Courts.

When one considers the difficulties of transport and com-
munication under which the EAM machine operated, the
control it came to exercise appears as a truly remarkable
achievement. What made it possible was the enormous en-
thusiasm of the individual agents in the villages: men of
energy, who were content to live poorly themselves in the
conviction that they were aiding the cause of liberation and
freedom. It is not at all clear how many of the subordinate
officials of the EAM regime were Communists. Many of them
were members of the party, but most of them probably were
not, and took the democratic and disinterested slogans of
EAM more or less at face value, looking forward to a social
and political regeneration of Greece under their own leader-
ship after the war.

98 THE GREEK DILEMMA

But freedom and democracy in their mouths tended to
assume what seems to a man brought up in the American
tradition, a peculiar meaning. Toleration of persons who dis-
agreed with EAM' was never conceived, since they were all
lumped together as Fascist reactionaries. Democracy seemed
simply to mean the establishment of EAM in political power;
but only by a peculiar distortion of the word could the or-
ganization of EAM be termed democratic. The Central Com-
mittee of EAM represented the constituent political parties;
but, as we have seen, four out of six of these parties were
Communist organizations. Subordinate officials were ap-
pointed by the Central Committee and were subject to dis-
missal or transfer without notice. Usually in each village or
town there was also an elected advisory committee that as-
sisted the Ipefthinos and the political representative in carry-
ing out their duties, and doubtless the committee often
exercised effective restraint against the enthusiasm of the
village EAM leaders. But the committees had no mandatory
power, and on disputed issues a committee was usually divided
against itself, and could not act as an effective check on the
power of the appointed officials.

The whole system of government was makeshift. It was
sustained by a high enthusiasm and never-ceasing propaganda.
If one tries to imagine what the evolution of such a system
would have been had EAM succeeded in winning control of
postwar Greece, one can only think that as enthusiasm faded
the autocratic elements in the Government would have come
to the fore. There is a fine line between village labor
voluntarily contributed to carry supplies over the mountains
and forced labor conscripted by fear for the uses of the state.
As has subsequently happened in Yugoslavia, I believe that
the EAM Government would have evolved rapidly into an
undisguised Communist dictatorship had it persisted in
Greece after the withdrawal of the Germans. The elements
for such an evolution were all present in the regime of the

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 99

mountains, including a secret police (designed originally to
ferret out and punish collaborators), a spirit of intolerance,
and the principle of appointment from above. Undoubtedly
other, truly democratic elements were also present in EAM:
elected local committees and a preponderant number of per-
sons who had no liking for the devious methods of the Com-
munists. But only blind optimism or an act of faith can
convince an observer that these elements would in the long
run have predominated over the centralized authoritarianism
of the Communist Party.

Within the area controlled by EAM, the Greek quisling
Government had little or no power. Gendarmes dared not
travel there save in large groups, and were even then liable
to sudden attack. Taxes could not be collected; justice and
schools disappeared. Of all the public institutions that had
existed before the war, only the Church survived. EAM never
became anticlerical. In fact, many priests and a few bishops
joined the movement. ELAS had chaplains to minister to the
soldiers, and most of its peasant members retained their
reverence for the Christian religion. The central administra-
tion of the Greek Church in Athens likewise distinguished
itself during the occupation by a steadfast and successful
neutrality as between EAM and its rivals.

The success of the Greek Church in the difficult times of
the occupation was partly due to old tradition. In the time of
the Turks the Church had been the sole bulwark of
Hellenism, and for centuries had survived under, but inde-
pendent of, the Turkish administration. The quisling Gov-
ernment bore this same relation to the head of the Greek
Church, Archbishop Damaskinos, and his subordinate prel-
ates. They were under, but not of, the Government. A
second reason for the Church's good standing with the Left
was that the Greek Church has no endowment of land or
money. In Greece the parish priests are chosen from among
the peasants of the village and share the attitudes and ideas

100 THE GREEK DILEMMA

of their parishioners to the full. Most priests own a patch of
land in their own right and till it like any other peasant. They
are distinguished from their fellows chiefly by a peculiar dress,
and by the semimagical power, conferred by the bishop's
ordination, to conduct services, baptisms, marriages and
funerals. The priests are little educated, and some of them are
only partially literate. Under such circumstances there was
no rift between clergy and peasants; and the priests divided
as did their parishioners, some favoring, some opposing EAM.

In the cities of Greece, EAM had little military power in
1943. In them were concentrated the garrisons of the oc-
cupying armies, and there concentrated also those Greeks
who for one reason or another found themselves openly
opposed to the leftist movement. In Athens, the city police
remained in existence until the time of liberation; in the
other towns, gendarme detachments were able to keep more
or less effective police power. Taxes were collected rather
haphazardly from the townspeople, and the Metaxas law
cotirts continued to function.

The situation in western Greece, where Zervas held sway,
was less well organized. Openly EAM had no local repre-
sentatives in Zervas' territory, although, as events later proved,
there were secret adherents of EAM planted in a good many
of the towns and some of the villages of western Greece.
Zervas depended far less on the political cooperation of the
villagers. He bought a large proportion of the food he needed
to feed his soldiers, although some of it came by requisition.
No system of regular assessment and collection of "taxes" was
ever put into effect. Compulsory labor for the benefit of the
EDES guerillas similarly remained on a haphazard basis,
being called for only as the need arose.

The economic foundations of Zervas' army were similar to
those of ELAS. Representatives of EDES were appointed in
most of the villages, and billeting, forced labor, or contribu-
tions in kind were arranged through them when needed. But

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 101

the pitch of enthusiasm for EDES among the villagers was
far less. They supported and sympathized with the guerillas,
and seldom or never betrayed them to the Italians. They must
often have wished, however, to be left alone and relieved of
the trouble and expense which supporting EDES meant for
them. No all-seeing police or high-crusading enthusiasm pre-
vented the expression of such sentiments; in other words, the
EDES organization was less efficient, and more tolerant, than
was its counterpart in ELAS territory.

During the first six months of 1943 guerilla activity against
the occupying armies was minimal. The effort of the British
Mission and of the two principal guerilla armies was in the
direction of extending and perfecting their organization,
rather than day-to-day fighting against the Italians and Ger-
mans. About midsummer, however, the British had done
what they could to bring all the guerilla bands into har-
monious cooperation and considered all was ready for a re-
sumption of operations. At that time the order came from
Cairo to open a general attack on the Italians and Germans,
and specific plans for particular acts of sabotage were pre-
pared.

The strategy behind this order was as follows: the German
Afrika Korps was just on the point of its final defeat in North
Africa, and preparations for the invasion of Italy were al-
ready under way. It was hoped that a campaign of rumors and
an outbreak of sabotage would convince the Germans that the
point of Allied landing would be in Greece, and that they
would divert reinforcements from Italy to the Balkan Pe-
ninsula in such expectation. Accordingly, British and Greek
agents spread the rumor that liberation was rapidly approach-
ing, and it gained almost universal credence among the Greek
people. The leaders of ELAS believed it too, and hastened
their preparations against an early Allied landing.

The political aims of ELAS leaders first became obvious to
the British at this iuncture. What happened is this: when

102 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the order to embark on a campaign of sabotage came through,
the leaders of ELAS found excuse after excuse to postpone
action. They withdrew the best-organized units of their army
into the high Pindus with the announced purpose of there
forming a ' 'regular' ' national army that would be able to
combat the Italians on equal terms. The peripheral ELAS
bands were not always so refractory. Under the pressure of
British liaison officers, and with equipment supplied spe-
cifically for particular operations, they blew up a number of
bridges, attacked trains, cut telephone wires and otherwise
made life uncomfortable for the Italian and German garri-
sons. But it was the universal impression of the members of
the British Mission that ELAS did not exert its maximum
strength. Most of them put this down to cowardice on the pan
of the Greeks; and indeed many of the complaints that equip-
ment was insufficient or the enemy too strong seemed to smack
of fear. But the British discovered an odd fact: many times
the subordinate commander and the men in his unit them-
selves would agree gladly to a proposed act of sabotage and
make no complaint of inadequate equipment or enemy
strength; and this after the higher headquarters had decided
$iat the proposal was impracticable until more equipment
could be sent from Cairo. So common was this phenomenon
that British officers adopted the policy of taking up a pro-
posed operation directly with the unit that they thought best
able to carry it out, by-passing the ELAS General Head-
quarters. Using this irregular method, the British and ELAS
were able to produce a real wave of sabotage in Greece; and
this, coupled with the common talk of an approaching Allied
landing in the country persuaded the Germans to send addi-
tional divisions to Greece in the fall of 1943. These divisions
were thereby lost to the Germans for the Italian campaign;
and it may even be thought that the absence of these troops
made the difference between the success and failure of the

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR ' 103

Allied landings in Italy. Though it cost Greece dear, the
British ruse was a success.

The events of the late summer of 1943 naturally estranged
the British Mission from ELAS Headquarters. The British
had freely flouted the ELAS chain of command; and ELAS
General Headquarters had shown what the British came to
regard as disobedience to the orders of the Allied High Com-
mand. It seemed as though ELAS Headquarters were trying
to keep its armed force intact; and the suspicion that it was
to be preserved in order to serve as the instrument for estab-
lishing a new regime in postwar Greece'became deeply seated
in the minds of the British Mission. The same conviction
spread among most Greeks who had not joined EAM. In view
of the subsequent behavior of ELAS, the suspicion seems to
have been well founded.

Zervas for his part had fallen in with British wishes and
instructions, and had carried out a number of successful at-
tacks, often commanding in person. Nevertheless, Zervas and
his army came under a shadow of suspicion about this time.
The EDES organization in Athens viewed with alarm the rise
of ELAS and EAM throughout Greece, and some of the mem-
bers of the organization began to advocate combat of the
Communists by any means, even going so far as to approve the
organization of the Security Battalions by the Germans and
quisling Government. In particular, General Gonatas, who
had been the most prominent figure in the Athens EDES
organization, won the peculiar enmity of EAM by advising
young regular officers to obey the summons of the quisling
Government and take service with the Security Battalions.
Most of the members of EDES in Athens were too wary them-
selves in person to enter into active collaboration; but they
did lend moral support to others who did, and the reputation
of the organization suffered accordingly.

This behavior put Zervas in an embarrassing position.

104 THE GREEK. DILEMMA

Accusations of collaboration had already been made against
him freely by members of EAM, and now they had fresh
reason and more plausibility for their reproaches. To escape
such accusations, Zervas decided to break relations with his
parent organization. He did so publicly in January 1944 and
renamed his army National Units of Greek Guerillas, or
EOEA (Ethniki Organosis Ellinikon Andarton). The
change made little practical difference in his position. Re-
cruits no longer came to him through the Athens organiza-
tion, but that had never been an important element in
Zervas' strength. He could easily raise more men than he
could equip from the villages of western Greece alone. Nor
did the action ward off accusations of collaboration. It did
perhaps weaken their force and hurt the ELAS case against
him. If so, that was its only effect. In popular speech his
forces still were called EDES, and the original name stuck
until their final disbandment.

Events in Greece moved rapidly in the fall of 1943. The
expected Allied landing failed to materialize, but a greater
surprise came when the Italian surrender was announced, 9
September. General confusion prevailed, for most of the
country was still garrisoned by Italian units, and their com-
manders knew not what orders to accept or what line of
action to pursue. The British sent agents to the principal
Italian headquarters ordering them to come into the moun-
tains and join in the war against the Germans. At the same
time, German troops moved rapidly and were able in many
instances to persuade the Italian commanders to remain
loyal to the Axis. Many smaller Italian units simply disin-
tegrated, their members deserting, selling their weapons
(usually to representatives of the guerillas) and taking up a
vagabond life. These men were later rounded up for the most
part and formed into labor battalions by the Germans. But
some of the Italian units followed the orders circulated by

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 105

British representatives and moved into the mountains where
they expected, or at least hoped, to be received as allies.

The principal unit which followed this course was the
division that had garrisoned the plain of Thessaly. In Novem-
ber 1943 the whole division, complete with artillery and
transport, took the road westward toward the Pindus Moun-
tains, marching into the central stronghold of ELAS. The
plans of the British Mission were not clear. They had no
means of feeding so many men, much less of supplying them
with all the thousands of items required to keep a force in
fighting trim. Plans were under consideration for partially
disarming the Italians, dividing their equipment between
ELAS and Zervas, and using the Italians as service and labor
troops. But the Greeks had other ideas. The Italians were
their bitter enemies, over whom they had triumphed in
Albania and before whom they had humbled themselves in
the streets of Athens. Such persons would never be allies if
the Greeks had anything to do with it

And the Greeks did, for they were in possession of the
ground. As the column feached the higher hills, it was stopped
by soldiers of ELAS, surrounded, and ordered to lay down all
arms. After vain protest, and in a state of general bewilder-
ment, the Italian soldiers did as they were bid. ELAS came
into possession of some ten thousand rifles at one step. It also
acquired a few pieces of mountain artillery, mortars, machine
guns, mules and a number of motor vehicles. By guerilla
standards, it was an enormous booty. Supplemented by the
smaller hauls from other parts of the country, the Italian
collapse approximately doubled the amount of small arms in
ELAS possession, and strengthened the guerilla army, too, by
the acquisition of light supporting arms such as they had
never had before. As for the Italian soldiers, they were made
prisoner and dragged out a wretched existence in the barren
mountains until the liberation of Greece in 1944 finally freed
those who remained alive.

106 THE GREEK DILEMMA

With such a windfall, the strength of ELAS rose enor-
mously. Its leaders had no intention of letting any of their
new-found power escape from them; and British remon-
strances, urging division of the booty with Zervas, went un-
heeded. Zervas had gathered a small harvest of arms himself,
but he controlled a relatively small part of the country and no
large Italian garrisons surrendered to him. It followed that
ELAS was greatly strengthened as compared to Zervas, and its
leaders proceeded in due time to exploit their new advantage.

After the Italian surrender, the leaders of ELAS believed
that they would be able to gain complete and undisputed
control of Greece upon German withdrawal. Their relations
with the British Mission had become strained during the
summer of 1943; now they elected to throw caution to the
winds and defy the British from further meddling in Greek
affairs. They refused to give up any of the armament they
had acquired from the Italians when the British Mission
ordered them to do so. From that time the break was open.
British liaison officers remained with ELAS units, but they
no longer were accorded the freedom of movement or the
deference they had previously enjoyed. Indeed some British
officers found themselves in a sort of semi-imprisonment. At
ELAS General Headquarters, the British Mission had a
similar experience. Their words no longer counted for much,
and they became reduced to a status of mere intelligence
agents.

In the summer of 1943 American officers had come to
Greece for the first time. They never played a r61e comparable
to that of the British, being far fewer in numbers and having
more limited supplies and cash resources at their command.
A few American sabotage teams operated in Greece with con-
siderable effect, but most of the American effort was confined
to intelligence reporting, in which endeavor they operated
successfully and independently.

British reaction to the changed state of affairs in Greece

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 107

was prompt. Further supply to ELAS was cut off in the hope
that its leaders would change their ways. When this proved
unavailing, the British undertook to build up Zervas*
strength as a makeweight against ELAS. They sent equipment
for fifteen thousand men and provided gold to pay the EDES
soldiers regularly. But while Zervas' strength grew, ELAS
was able to expand even more rapidly, using the Italian arms
to equip new recruits. Consequently, Zervas' strength never
approached that of ELAS.

Within a month of the Italian surrender, and before the
British had finished building up Zervas' strength, ELAS at-
tempted to eliminate the EDES army completely* The leftists
accused Zervas of having violated the guerilla charter which
had been signed during the summer and proceeded to attack
him. Open civil war resulted.

Strengthened by the captured ammunition and weapons,
ELAS was able to drive Zervas back toward the sea; but the
fighting was hard, and Zervas showed himself to be a crafty
and daring commander. In early January Zervas began to run
out of ammunition, and his troops were compelled to with-
draw into a small valley some twenty miles from the sea. For
two days the whole fate of the EDES guerillas hung in the
balance. Ammunition was expected from Cairo, but the
weather was bad and long hours of waiting and watching
brought no result. Finally, just as the morale of the retreating
force was reaching rock bottom, an airplane appeared, flying
low under broken clouds. While the guerillas cheered wildly,
the plane dropped several hundred thousand rounds of small
arms ammunition. With this, Zervas was able to stand off the
attacks of ELAS. About a week later ELAS in its turn began
to run short of ammunition. Zervas started to advance, and
ten days of furious marching followed: ELAS retreating as
fast as human legs could go, and Zervas pursuing. The rout
crossed over the peaks of the Pindus in the dead of winter-
no mean feat of endurance for the often ill-clad and always

108 THE GREEK DILEMMA

ill-fed guerillas and the victorious forces of Zervas pursued
toward the plains of Thessaly. But once over the crest of the
mountains, ELAS was within easy reach of ammunition and
other stores that had been painstakingly accumulated, so that
the tables once more were turned. Zervas and his men had to
withdraw, but their retreat was comparatively slow, involving
repeated rearguard actions.

By February Zervas was back within the old boundaries of
his power. ELAS for its part had expended far more of its
precious ammunition and other supplies than had originally
been planned, and saw no immediate possibility of finishing
off the rival army which could always count on the support
of the British. Furthermore, the outbreak of large-scale civil
war in Greece had become known round the world, and
there was strong pressure from public opinion within and
outside of the country against the continuation of such
fratricidal strife.

Accordingly, on 12 February 1944, representatives from
ELAS Headquarters, from the British and American Mis-
sions, and from Zervas, met at the Plaka Bridge over the
Arakthos River. An agreement was there drawn up exactly
delimiting the zones in which ELAS and Zervas would
operate against the Germans. It was solemnly agreed that
neither side would infringe upon the other's territory, and
that both would turn all their effort against the Germans.
The Plaka Bridge Agreement failed to inspire any deep con-
fidence in either side. From that time onward Zervas kept
his two best "divisions" on his landward frontier as guard
against a second ELAS attack; and ELAS reciprocated, sta-
tioning strong detachments in border villages.

The transformation of EAM-ELAS into a ruthless and
unscrupulous instrument of power was signalized to all
Greeks by the events of this civil war. It was clear to all that
ELAS had been the aggressor, and had preferred the arbitra-
ment of force to negotiation as a means of settling the differ-

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 109

ences which inevitably arose between independent (and more
or less lawless) guerilla forces. The effect of this development
upon Greek civilians who stood outside the EAM movement
was to create an active dislike and fear of the Left; and many
began to revise their attitudes toward the quisling Govern-
ment, thinking of it as a protection against sudden seizure of
power by EAM. Some few Greeks, as we have seen, even em-
barked upon active collaboration with the Germans, hoping
to form military organizations X and the Security Battalions
that could stand against ELAS in the post-occupation
struggle for power. The experience of civil war transformed
Zervas* force from radical republican into conservative na-
tionalist, and EDES guerillas even came to wear the King's
crown on their caps. The dominating sentiment among them
became a hatred of communism, which in practice meant a
hatred of ELAS. On the other side, ELAS steadily portrayed
Zervas as a Fascist and collaborator who was perfidiously in
the pay of both the British and the Germans. The stage
clearly was set for future troubles.

For the High Command of ELAS and EAM the civil war
with Zervas was only one item in tfieir agenda. As we have
seen, the only other important independent guerilla band-
that led by Colonel Psarros was partly disarmed in the fall of
1943 and totally eliminated the following spring. But the
major attention of the leaders of ELAS was directed to still
other ends.

One of these was the creation of a powerful ELAS Reserve
in the towns of Greece. Prior to the fall of 1943, EAM had
existed in the towns as an unarmed secret organization. It
now began to build up extensive arms depots, and to create
a reserve army from among its sympathizers. This Reserve
was organized territorially. Each city block had its platoon
or company, with designated commanders and an arms depot.
In some cases the arms were entrusted to the individual mem-
bers of the Reserve, but more usually the rifles were dis-

110 THE GREEK DILEMMA

tributed in caches where it was easier to control and safe-
guard them. Many of the weapons acquired from the Italians
were used to equip the Reserve, and some were sent from
villages where it was calculated they would not be needed.
Units of the Reserve drilled by night. Patrols were frequently
sent through the streets after dark, especially in Athens,
where gangs of X-ites had begun to threaten the security of
prominent EAM citizens.

During the course of 1944 the ELAS Reserve became a
large organization, and by the time of liberation it probably
outnumbered the regular, troops of ELAS. In Athens and
Pireus its strength was between ten and fifteen thousand men
equipped with rifles, sub-machine guns and pistols. Else-
where its numbers were smaller, but the total probably ran
between thirty and forty thousand for the whole country.

When rumors of the creation of the ELAS Reserve began
to circulate, the anti-Communist Greeks jumped to the con-
clusion that this was the instrument designed to secure the
revolution after liberation. Leftists answered that it was de-
signed to bring about the liberation; that on a given day the
Reserve would rise against the occupiers and drive them from
their strongholds in the cities. Doubtless both motives were
operative among the men who planned and carried out the
creation of the Reserve, mixed in different proportions ac-
cording 'to their personal political ideals. The Reserve was no
more purely Communist than was the ELAS in the moun-
tains; but as in its active counterpart, Communists generally
held key positions in its organization. As the future was to
demonstrate, the Communists were able to bring the Reserve
to obey their will. For the immediate time, the new organiza-
tion assured the extension of ELAS power to those portions of
the country into which it had previously been unable to
penetrate due to the presence of the Germans. With the firm
establishment of the ELAS Reserve in the towns, no corner
of the country, save Zervas' small district in the west and

THE BEGINNING OF CIVIL WAR 111

certain vague areas in Bulgarian territory, was not actually
or potentially in the hands o ELAS. As soon as the Germans
retreated (and by 1944 it was obvious that they soon would
have to do so) the country would be theirs.

The second major enterprise undertaken by the leftists
after the Italian collapse was the organization of a provisional
Government in the mountains. The complexion of the Gov-
ernment-in-Exile was far from satisfactory to EAM. It was
solidly conservative, and in the event of its return to Greece
it could not be expected to accept with good grace the new
order of things which EAM hoped and expected to bring
about. In particular, EAM was resolved to prevent the return
of King George II to Greece. Accordingly, in March 1944,
EAM set up a provisional Government of its own, known as
the Political Committee for National Liberation, or PEEA
(Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis Apeleftherosis). The first Presi-
dent of the Committee was Colonel Evripidis Bakirdjis, suc-
ceeded in April by Professor Alexander Svolos. They were no
more than figureheads. Real power was concentrated in the
hands of a few Communist leaders, chief among them George
Siantos, the Secretary of the Interior in the "Cabinet."

It is worth while to dwell for a minute on the career of
Siantos during the years of resistance. As Secretary General of
the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, Siantos became
the most influential single individual in determining the de-
velopment of EAM and ELAS. Despite his power, he re-
mained effectively in the background, and it was not until
after the Germans had left Greece that he emerged as the
dominant figure of the leftist resistance movement. He held
no post in EAM, but assigned the task of representing the
Communist Party on the EAM Central Committee to an-
other man, Demetrios Partsalides. Siantos did, however,
occupy an official position in ELAS, acting as political rep-
resentative in the General Headquarters. Ares, also a mem-
ber of the Communist Party, played the r61e of Kapetanios in

112 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the Headquarters, and Colonel (now usually called General)
Sarafis was the military member of the triumvirate. It is not
difficult to imagine what counsels prevailed among these
three men. Sarafis, save for narrowly military matters, was a
nullity; Ares devoted himself to serving as contact man vis-a-
vis the British and American Missions, and also carried out
a number of special "sticky" jobs personally, such as the
liquidation of Psarros. High policy lay with Siantos, and he
was able skillfully to confound the British and build up an
instrument of power far more efficient than any other in all
Greece, save for the German Army itself.

When Siantos and his councillors decided to establish the
Provisional Government they took a step of great significance.
By implication the authority of the Government-in-Exile was
denied, and British governance of Greek affairs, which had
been exercised in the name of the Cairo Government, re-
jected. No change in the system of internal administration
resulted from the establishment of PEEA, but a new symbol
was created toward which the loyalties of the members of
EAM and ELAS could be directed. The repercussions in
Cairo were greater than in Greece itself. There a mutiny in
the Greek Army was stirred up by agents of EAM and Prime
Minister Tsouderos was overthrown.

By the establishment of this Committee the divergence be-
tween the resistance movement and the emigre Government
was written clear for all to see, and the problems which Ger-
man withdrawal would bring as to the postwar government
of the country became obvious to everyone in Greece, and to
those outside who took an interest in 'Greek affairs. The
obvious step was to try to bring about some sort of recon-
ciliation between the two Governments. Before tracing the
efforts that were made in this direction, however, it will be
necessary to describe the history of the Greek Government-
in-Exile.

V

The Governm%nt-in-Exile

T

JLHE small group of men that

fled with King George from Crete ahead of the advancing
German Army could be called a Government only by courtesy
coupled with an act of faith. They had no country to govern,
and were deeply divided against themselves. The Prime
Minister, Emmanuel Tsouderos, immediately before assum-
ing office, had been under house arrest, in the keeping of
none other than his Minister for Interior, Constantine
Maniadakis. As can be easily imagined, there was little love
lost between the two men. Standing uneasily over the dis-
cordant groups in the Cabinet was the King, a descendant of
Danish princes, George Gliicksburg by name. Such a refugee
Government must have presented a forlorn appearance in-
deed when its members debarked in Alexandria, Egypt, and
proceeded to take up their residence in Cairo.

Cairo itself in the summer of 1941 was full of confusion
and alarm. Rommel's armies defeated the British in the
Western Desert and drove forward, it seemed irresistibly.
Semipanic spread through Cairo and Alexandria. It was de-
cided that the Greek Government should move again beyond
the reach of the Germans. Consequently, in July, King
George and his Cabinet fled to Capetown, South Africa. After
some months in that remote city, the King and a group of
high officials, travelled to the United States, and were officially
received. The seat of the Greek Government in the mean-
while was removed to London, where it established itself in

113

114 THE GREEK DILEMMA

September, 194L In London, the Greek exiles were close
to the seat of power but far from their own country and the
Greek armed forces which had meanwhile been created in the
Middle East. When disorders broke out in the Greek Middle
East forces, it seemed wise for the Government to move closer
to the scene, and accordingly, in May 1943, the King, Tsou-
deros, and a small company of officials moved back to Cairo.
There the Government remained until the eve of the libera-
tion of Greece.

The wanderings of the Greek Government during its first
two years of exile had important consequences. By travelling
to far corners of the world, the Government necessarily lost
contact with affairs inside Greece. The Exile Government,
even after its return to Cairo, never fully regained touch with
the Greek people. Despite the Axis occupation, communica-
tion between Greece and the Middle East was not entirely
interrupted. Persons who wished to pass into or out of Greece
could often cross the Turkish frontier in Thrace; and a multi-
tude of small vessels regularly plied the Aegean, and could
put into Turkish ports and there take on or drop off pas-
sengers. Such travel was secret, of course. The Italians and
Germans did their best to intercept persons trying to leave
or enter the country from British areas. Despite their efforts,
a sort of "underground railroad" came into existence. It be-
came possible for a man to travel between Egypt and Greece
with a reasonable amount of security, though not without
great discomfort, expense and long delays.

By the time the Greek Government took up regular resi-
dence in Cairo, the Middle East end of this traffic had been
gathered under British military control. During the years
that followed, the British never relinquished their control.
It followed that all communications between the Greek Gov-
ernment and persons in Greece were thenceforth subject to
British censorship. The Greeks of Cairo were allowed almost
no say in the dealings between British Headquarters and the

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 115

guerillas. This situation frequently galled the Greeks, but
British officers felt small respect for the opinions of Greek civ-
ilians when they opposed their own. Efforts of the Greek Gov-
ernment to come directly into contact with resistance organiza-
tions outside British military channels were strenuously and
effectively frowned upon. This was certainly high-handed
treatment of a "sovereign" allied government, but when one
considers the miscellaneous gathering of adventurers and
heroes, patriots and crooks that by degrees collected around
the Greek Government in Cairo, it is hard to criticize the
British authorities for their insistence on the power of cen-
sorship and monopoly of military relations with the guerillas.

A second result of the extended travels of the Greek Gov-
ernment was that the Greek Army of the Middle East passed
away from the control of the Greek Cabinet. Operationally
there was never any question: Greek troops fought as a part
of the Allied forces, and were subject to the orders of Allied
commanders. Administratively, however, and especially in
the matter of appointment of particular individuals to par-
ticular posts, the Greek Army became a strange sort of hybrid.
No single authority had jurisdiction; rival cliques among the
officers developed into rival secret leagues which, in turn,
fomented mutiny, and repeatedly were able to compel
changes in the Cabinet. Mutinies, of course, were nothing
new -in Greek military tradition, but it was the initial re-
laxation of the government's power, due to its absence from
the scene during the first years of exile, that provided con-
ditions in which sedition was free to spread among the
soldiers.

The Government, when it first came to the Middle East,
was the legal continuation of the Metaxas regime. Most of the
members of the Cabinet were holdovers from the dictator's
Government. At the very beginning, a bitter struggle de-
veloped between Prime Minister Tsouderos axid the Minister
for Interior, Maniadakis. As chief of the Metaxas police,

116 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Maniadakis had come to represent all the most hated
aspects of the dictatorship; and Tsouderos had a personal
grudge against Maniadakis for the arrest to which he had been
condemned. King George, however, was a man of strong per-
sonal loyalties. The King felt that Maniadakis had been a
faithful servant and loyal supporter of the state, and at first
refused to entertain the suggestion that he be dismissed. But
dictatorships were scarcely reputable with the Allies; at least,
when vocal opposition to them existed. The King could with
difficulty defend dictatorial principle^ and a few days after
the Government arrived in Cairo, he yielded. Maniadakis was
dismissed from the Cabinet along with some of his Metaxist
colleagues, and the reorganized Cabinet became little more
than a group of personal friends of the Prime Minister. It re-
mained so until the return to Cairo in 1943.

From the point of view of the British, who provided the
chief financial and political support of the Exile Government
during its first years, King George and his Cabinet had two
uses. They embodied the legal government of Greece, and
had a symbolic value for propaganda during the occupation
and still more for the time of liberation, when, presumably,
the Exile Government would return to resume its just and
proper powers. For the immediate present, the Government
was in a position to raise troops from among the Greek com-
munities scattered through the Middle East.

One of the first acts of the government was to declare a
mobilization of all Greek citizens in Egypt and neighboring
countries. The Greek community of Egypt was relatively
large and prosperous. Under the Capitulation laws, nearly
all Greeks had retained their nationality even though long
resident in Egypt, and therefore came under the jurisdiction
of the Greek Government. Nearly all of the Egyptian Greeks
were engaged in commerce, accustomed to relatively easy
living, and madfe poor soldiers as compared with Greeks from
Greece. Some of the ever-recurrent troubles of the Greek Army

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 117

in the Middle East arose from this fact. Egyptian-born Greeks
did not accept gladly the orders of officers who had gathered
from odd corners of the world, or who escaped from Greece
after the occupation. Greek officers were accustomed to deal-
ing with a peasant soldiery, and habitually presumed upon
their privileges and power in a way that seemed tyrannical to
the city-born-and-bred Greeks of the Middle East.

As the months passed, a steady trickle of Greek refugees
came to Egypt. Those of military age swelled the ranks of the
Greek Army. Most of these came from the parts of Greece
close to Turkey, for it was easier for them to escape than for
the rest. But officers, and men who were well to do, were able
to pay the cost of passage from other parts of Greece. Further-
more, officers had perhaps more reason to wish to escape than
others. They were in greater or less degree marked men, and
suspicious acts on their part were more seriously regarded
by the occupation armies. Consequently the Greek Army in
the Middle East was embarrassed by a great surplus of officers.
From their idleness and jealousy arose much of the intrigue
that came to honeycomb it.

Recruitment to the Army continued after the Government
abandoned Cairo for South Africa and London. Altogether
two brigades were formed (totaling perhaps eight thousand
men). An equal or greater number of soldiers was distributed
among various training centers and replacement depots. The
First Brigade was organized and equipped by mid- 1942 and
took part in the battle of El Alamein, where it fought credit-
ably. The Brigade joined in the pursuit of the Germans, and
was not withdrawn until Tunis had been reached. It did not,
however, take part in any serious fighting after Alamein. An-
other unit, the Sacred Squadron, composed exclusively of
officers, went to the front in Tunis and fought under the
command of the Free French almost until the time of German
surrender in Tunisia.

This is virtually the sum of the combat service of the

118 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Greek forces in the Middle East during the first three years
of the war. Interminable training courses and long spells of
guard duty filled in the rest of the time. Part of the reason
for this fact was that British divisional and army commanders
were reluctant to accept Greek troops under their command
for active operations. Difficulties of language made effective
coordination sometimes difficult. Moreover, most British
commanders had an ingrained distrust of Greek units and
tended to regard them as "native" troops. This 'bitterly
offended Greek pride and was indeed quite unjustified by the
performance of the Greeks in battle. But the fact of dis-
crimination remained, and did nothing to improve the
morale of the Greek troops.

The first of a long series of troubles broke out in the ranks
of the Greek Middle East Army in March 1942. The quarrel
was largely personal, and arose among a small number of
senior officers. A few officers, who had served under Metaxas
and taken part in the Albanian War, had made their way to
Cairo in the first days of occupation and had taken over the
chief commands of the newly formed Army. During the suc-
ceeding months, a number of others, mostly republican
officers who had been exiled from Greece since the failure of
the 1935 revolt, gravitated to Cairo; and some of them
succeeded in regaining their commissions. Each group was
deeply suspicious of the other. In March this suspicion broke
out in bitter mutual recriminations and open insubordina-
tion. Prime Minister Tsouderos hastily came from London
to settle the dispute. After listening to the accusations of both
sides he compromised by removing a few of the top com-
manders and replacing them with men who were more or
less neutral between the rival cliques.

This move restored peace for the time being. It did not,
however, end the rivalry and distrust between the Metaxist
and republican officers, but rather drove their intrigues
underground. Secret military leagues were formed by both

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 119

groups, but, of the two, the Republican was the more active
and became the more powerful. The handful of republicans
was a small minority in the Greek officer corps of the Middle
East. The leaders of the Republican League, therefore, de-
cided to open it to soldiers of all ranks. The organization
quickly became a league of privates and non-commissioned
officers, led by a handful of senior officers. It had all the at-
traction to the Greek soldier of an association directed against
the men who were in command over him. It had an addi-
tional source of strength in the discontent of the Egyptian-
born Greeks, who generally felt themselves superior to the
Greek officers who commanded them. During the year that
followed, Greek troops were for the most part kept in routine
garrison duty; and the Republican League grew apace, nour-
ished by the dissatisfaction and idleness of the soldiers.

In the spring of 1943 the League felt itself strong enough
to act. Mutiny broke out in nearly all the Greek Army units
(the Sacred Squadron was a notable exception). The muti-
neers demanded that the Army be purged of Fascists, I. e., of
Metaxist officers. The Government had no power to resist
the soldiers, and most of the objectionable officers were re-
moved. A new administration came to power in the Army,
headed by the senior officers who had organized the Republi-
can League; and a new War Minister, sympathetic to the
republican cause, was added to the Cabinet

Following this success, the leaders of the Republican
League tended to relax their activities. They had now satis-
fied their personal ambition by winning control of the Greek
Army. Consequently they began to take less interest in the
soldiers' organization which had made their rise possible. A
natural development ensued. Without formally repudiating
the leadership of the senior republican officers, the members
of the League began to come under the influence of EAM;
and a new cadre of leaders, sympathetic to the Left, formed

120 THE GREEK DILEMMA

under tHe republicans without displacing them from nominal
leadership.

EAM in Greece was naturally concerned that the Govern-
ment-in-Exile should not some day return to wreck their
achievement. After mid- 1943, EAM and EL AS were pretty
well able to control the flow of persons to and from Greece
at their end, just as the British did in the Middle East. Con-
sequently, new recruits to the Greek Army were usually
vetted by EAM before they were allowed to leave Greece.
From 1943 onward EA]VT propagandists and organizers were
systematically sent to the Middle East as recruits for the
Army. They became privates for the most part, but were
from that fact in a better position to talk with their fellow
soldiers and win their confidence. They found the framework
of the Republican League already established in the ranks,
and speedily made use of it, joining and climbing, by their
energy and skill, to positions of influence.

Thus it came about that in the spring of 1944 both old-line
republicans and EAM-ites believed that they controlled the
Republican League in the Army. The republicans knew of
the EAM propagandists, but thought it wise to "use" them
to gain their own ends. Exactly the same reasoning was used
by the EAM representatives. In point of fact, there was much
in common between the aims of the two groups. Each wanted
to overthrow the King and establish a republic in Greece
after the war. Thus the issue, King versus Republic, which
had long distracted Greece, was revived and tore apart the
Greek Middle East Army*! It became at the same time the
major question of emigr politics.

In Greece itself, it will be recalled, the King had become a
generally unpopular figure. In March 1942 most of the lead-
ing prewar politicians had signed a manifesto suggesting that
the King refrain frorft returning until after a plebiscite had
been held. This suggestion was not welcome to King George.
He had been born to rule, being the eldest son of Constantine,

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 121

and educated more or less in the German tradition. He had
grown up in Greece when it still had a predominantly
patriarchal type of government. As a youth he had trained
for a year with the Prussian Foot Guards, where he acquired a
lifelong interest In military matters and a liking, too, for
military discipline. When his father, King Constantine, came
Into collision with the fiery genius of Venizelos, young George
warmly espoused his father's side of the dispute. He was not
a man of high intellectual abilities, and probably never was
able to understand why his subjects turned from -the tradi-
tional and proper loyalty which he felt they owed to him,
their rightful sovereign. He tended to blame the whole re-
publican movement on a handful of "bad" men who had
succeeded in misleading the Greeks.

When he returned to the throne in 1935, he hoped that
the corrupting influence of the republican leaders had been
dissipated and that all would be right again. He fondly
dreamed of an obedient people, willing subjects of a benevo-
lent and constitutional monarch. When such proved not to be
the case, he fell back on one of his father's old friends, a mili-
tary man, General Metaxas; and found in his militarized
government and discipline a sort of substitute for the
patriarchal relation he had hoped to have toward his people.
In. exile again after 1941, King George felt that his right to
rule was undiminished. Stubbornly, he did his best to close
his ears to the voices that began to question his return.

Despite the fact that his Prime Minister, Tsouderos, was an
old republican, the King's relations with him were relatively
smooth and easy. The King formally announced the end of
dictatorship in February 1942. He hoped to embark on an-
other constitutional experiment such as the one of 1935, and
believed that in Tsouderos he had found a prime minister
With whom he could work harmoniously. The Protocol of
31 March, by which the leading politicians of Athens asked
that he not return as a matter of right, must have come as a

122 THE GREEK DILEMMA

rude blow to the King's hopes. It roused a streak of stub-
bornness in his nature, and he determined to do all in his
power to resist so ungrateful an effort to unseat him.

As long as the prospect of liberation was distant, the ques-
tion of the King's position was not pressing. Nevertheless,
republican sentiment among the Greek emigr6 colony
steadily mounted. A group of Liberal politicians, headed by
Sophocles Venizelos, son of the illustrious founder of the
party, collected in Cairo, and came into contact with the
officers who headed the Republican League in the Army.
They easily imagined a triumphant re-entry into Athens,
with themselves at the head of the Government, A little
plotting to displace Tsouderos and seat themselves in his
place seemed all that was necessary to achieve this result.
Under the circumstances, intrigue proliferated wildly.

By the fall of 1943 preponderance of republicanism both in
and outside of Greece was unmistakable. In August delegates
from the three principal guerilla organizations of Greece had
come to Cairo, and put forward in the strongest terms their
demand that King George not return before a plebiscite was
held. The delegates received no immediate satisfaction, and
returned, disgruntled, to Greece.

Soon after this visit, Prime Minister Tsouderos discreetly
raised the question with King George, and in November the
King wrote a letter in which he promised to * 'examine anew
the question of my return to Greece/' This letter was written
in response to pressure from British officials who hoped to
promote unity among the Greeks by putting off into an indef-
inite future a final decision on the question of the King's
right to rule.

One of the forces which the King most heavily counted
upon to guarantee his return to Greece was the support of the
British Government. To assure this support, he decided to
make a trip to England and there try to mend his political
fences in person. Accordingly, in March 1944, he left Cairo

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 123

and the Greek Government behind him and went to London.
In the British capital, King George found sympathetic ears.
The British Government, in the person of Mr. Churchill at
least, had a sentimental regard for the institution of kingship,
and liked to imagine Greece in the postwar world, a firm
friend and grateful ally of Great Britain, securely ruled by a
constitutional monarch. Furthermore, King George had
nominally headed the Greek Government at the time when
Greece came into the war as Britain's only European ally,
and Churchill no doubt felt an obligation to forward the
King's cause in return for the help he had given in the dark
days of 1940.

At lower levels, however, British official opinion was con-
fused. To maintain their power in the Mediterranean, the
British were anxious that postwar Greece should be friendly
to Great Britain; but how best to guarantee such friendship
was difficult for them to decide. Some British officials were
convinced that only a republican government could be
truly strong and popular. But EAM was the sole republican
group that was in a position to take over the reins of power;
and, after 1943, British observers became increasingly doubt-
ful as to whether a Government established by EAM would
in fact be friendly. Russian armies were already edging into
the Balkans, and EAM's affection for Russia could easily turn
into a cool, or even positively unfriendly attitude toward the
British. Against such an eventuality the return of King
George to his throne would be a guarantee; but there seemed
small possibility that he would be able to return peacefully
in view of EAM's bitter opposition and armed strength. In
general, British officials in Cairo were more dubious of the
King's political position than was the Foreign Office in
London, and, as a result, British policy was lacking in clarity,
and fluctuated between lukewarm support of the Greek
King and an uneasy neutrality in the question.

The more sympathetic attitude of officials in London

j24 THE GREEK DILEMMA

encouraged King George to make no further concessions to re-
publican pressure from Cairo and Greece. He took up resi-
dence in the British capital, and a coterie of Greek royalists
quickly formed round him. Many of these men were clever,
ambitious and unscrupulous. Either by intention or perhaps
without realizing it, they cut the King off from accurate in-
formation as to the progress of affairs in Greece. He came to
live in a sort of ivory tower, ignorant of what his opponents
were doing and isolated from whatever elements in Greek
life might have supported his claims.

The republican movement continued to gain momentum
in the King's absence. In December 1943, Prime Minister
Tsouderos sent a representative into Greece with the mission
of sounding out political leaders within the country as to
their opinions on the question of the postwar regime. What
particularly he wanted was their reaction to the proposal that
a regent be nominated secretly by the King in order to exer-
cise the royal powers for an interim period immediately after
liberation. The original suggestion for the establishment of a
regency in Greece had come from individuals in the British
Embassy near the Government of Greece which had been set
up in Cairo in 1943. Tsouderos favored the idea of a regency,
and the Athenian politicians, with whom his representatives
discussed the matter, likewise approved of the proposal. All
groups that were consulted, including the Communists,
agreed that Darnaskinos, Metropolitan of Athens and Arch-
bishop of^All Greece, should be the Regent. Throughout the
occupation, Daniaskinos had succeeded in keeping above
party strife and was almost the only man in prominent posi-
tion who could command the respect and confidence of both
Left and Right.

When news of the favorable reaction of Greek political
figures to the proposed regency reached the Prime Minister,
he, wrote a letter to King George urging him to sign a decree
in secret, nominating Damaskinos as his temporary represent-

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 125

ative in Greece. The King refused to consider the proposal.
From that time on, he began to regard Tsouderos with suspi-
cion, seeing him as no more than the agent of a republican
conspiracy against him.

The reaction to the King's refusal was not long delayed.
EAM became convinced that strong measures would be neces-
sary to prevent the King's return, and proceeded to set up the
Provisional Government in the mountains in deliberate de-
fiance of the royal emigr Government, At the same time, the
Republican League in the Army redoubled its activities. Both
EAM sympathizers and the Venizelist republicans took the
King's refusal to appoint a regent as a gage of battle.

In March, the First Brigade of the Greek Middle East
Army prepared to take ship for Italy where it was expected to
take part in the fighting. To the antiroyalist conspirators, the
departure of the Brigade meant a hitch in their plans; a
mutiny in Egypt, which did not include the First Brigade in
Italy, would fail to deprive the King of all his military sup-
port; and a mutiny in the front line would have been hard to
start and harder still to justify in the eyes of the world. Con-
sequently, on 1 April, only a few days before the Brigade was
scheduled to embark, the Republican League gave orders to
mutiny. Insubordination first broke out aboard the ships of
the Greek Navy which were tied up in Alexandria Harbor.
Within a week the mutiny spread to nearly all units of the
Greek Army. As before, the Sacred Squadron was the only
combat unit that remained obedient to the Cairo Govern-
ment.

The mutiny was carried out with admirable efficiency.
Groups of soldiers rose in the night, seized headquarters
buildings and took prisoner those of their officers who pro-
tested. There was almost no bloodshed, although in some of
the units a few shots were fired. Committees, drawn from the
members of the Republican League, took command of each
mutinous unit. Some of the leaders were officers, but many

126 THE GREEK DILEMMA

were privates. The First Brigade, where the disorder caine
to be most widespread and lasted longest, fell under the com-
mand of a slight, intense private soldier, assisted by a pair of
majors. In effect, EAM came into control. The old-line re-
publican officers, who nominally headed the League, had
agreed to, but had not actually organized the revolt, nor did
they control it once it had begun.

The mutineers demanded that the Greek Government
recognize the Political Committee which EAM had estab-
lished in Greece, as the legitimate representative of the Greek
people, and accept some or all of its members into the
Cabinet. They further demanded the purge of Fascists from
the Army and Navy, and an unequivocal statement that the
King would not return without a plebiscite.

The mutiny came as a complete surprise to the British
liaison officers who were attached to the various units of the
Greek Army, and was equally unexpected by British Head-
quarters. Knowing little or nothing of the political struggles
that lay behind the action, the British officer who was de-
tailed to handle the situation in the First Brigade saw nothing
but mutiny against duly constituted military authority. Ac-
cordingly, he declared the First Greek Brigade to be rebel-
lious, and ordered all the soldiers to parade out from the
camp where they were stationed and surrender their arms.
This was a psychological mistake. During the first few days of
the mutiny, only a minority of the soldiers had actively sided
with the insurrection. There was a general state of confusion
and uncertainty in the ranks. But when the order came to
lay down their arms, it struck close to the Greek pride. Al-
most to a man the soldiers refused, and by that act associated
themselves with the mutineers. In some of the other Greek
camps less maladroit methods were used, and the mutinies
died one by one. The Navy and First Brigade, however, re-
mained adamant.

The Greek Navy, at the time when the mutiny broke out,

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

was in almost undisputed command of Alexandria Harbor,
There was wild talk to the effect that, if the Greek Govern-
ment and British military authorities did not yield to the
rebel demands, the guns of the Greek fleet would be turned
on the city. Nothing of the sort occurred, however. Within a
few days British destroyers were brought into the harbor, and
for over two weeks the two forces glowered at one another*
Finally on 22 April, the Greek Admiralty organized board-
ing parties and took over the Greek ships one by one. On
some of the ships there were gun fights and about half a
dozen men were killed. The man who organized the boarding
parties and brought the Navy back to obedience was Admiral
Petros Voulgaris, newly appointed Commander in Chief, The
reputation he gained by this action became the basis of his
subsequent political career.

The First Brigade, meanwhile, had been surrounded by
British troops. The siege lasted for eighteen days. When news
of the surrender in the Navy reached the camp, the British
sent an ultimatum threatening full-scale attack if the muti-
neers did not lay down their arms. No answer came to the
ultimatum, and in the darkness of night, 23 April, British
troops moved forward. They met with almost no resistance.
The Greek soldiers surrendered three hours after the advance
began, and next morning marched out from their camp with-
out arms.

In Greek political circles in Cairo, the mutiny had drastic
repercussions. Tsouderos resigned when the news came, and
the republican coterie, under the leadership of Sophocles
Venizelos, succeeded to power. To their surprise, however,
the republican politicians found that the mutiny they had
helped to start did not die down, even when the new Prime
Minister ordered the rebels to desist. When it came to action,
the few republican senior officers who had headed the Re-
publican League found that they had no control over their
followers. The EAM-ites who had climbed up from the ranks

128 THE GREEK DILEMMA .

directed the movement instead* It was a surprise to the re-
publican Army officers to find themselves so powerless; and
when Venizelos failed by his words to quell the trouble,
despite his known connection with its fomentation, his pres-
tige dropped almost to zero. The British Embassy began to
look around for another prime minister. They found him in
George Papandreou, leader of the Social Democratic Party.

Before we turn to Papandreou's career, and the efforts to
find a satisfactory modus vivendi between the Government-
in-Exile and the resistance organizations in Greece, it is con-
venient to recount the further development of the Greek
Army in the Middle East.

When the last mutineers had been forced to yield, the
whole organization of the Greek Army was in ruins. Hardly
a single commanding officer had been able to maintain any
hold on the troops under his command, and except for the
Sacred Squadron, no unit was without its percentage of revo-
lutionaries. At the time of the surrender, an effort was made
to separate the soldiers into those who had taken active part
in the mutiny and those who had not. In the case of the First
Brigade, this wa^ done simply by individual option: the men
who agreed with the mutineers were ordered to fall out into
one column and were thereupon marched off to a detention
camp in the desert, while the remnant was taken to a different
camp. By similar methods, the other units of the Greek Army
were sifted, and altogether nearly ten thousand mutineers
(about half of the total strength of the Greek forces in the
Middle East) were segregated and interned. From the men
who had not taken active part in the mutiny a new brigade
was formed. It was named the Third Brigade, although there
was of course no longer any First or Second in existence.

A few weeks after the mutiny, the general administration
of the Greek Army was entrusted to Major General Constan-
tine Vendiris. General Vendiris was a man of remarkable his-
trionic gifts and possessed resolute will and great ambition. He

THE GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE 129

had a turbulent career behind him when he took command*
As a young regular officer he had joined the Venizelist In-
surrectionary Government in Salonika, and distinguished
himself for his personal bravery in action. Through the peace
he was generally considered an extreme republican. He took
active part in the 1935 revolution and as a result was dismissed
from the } Army. Metaxas cherished a personal animosity
against him, and refused his melodramatic offer to serve as a
private in the ranks at the time of the Albanian War. During
the occupation, Vendiris became head of a secret organization
known as RAN. This was an irridentist group, taking its
name from three geographical place names which were desired
as the future frontiers of an enlarged Greece Rumeli-Ava-
lona-Nisi. The plan cherished by this organization was to
equip secretly a force of patriotic Greeks who would leap to
arms as the Germans withdrew, and follow behind, taking
over border areas from Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.
This scheme never got past the paper stage; but a number
of influential Army officers and prominent civilians set them-
selves up as a sort of headquarters for the nonexistent army,
and under General Vendiris' direction devoted themselves to
making propaganda for a Greater Greece.

From his experience in Greece, General Vendiris had be-
come bitterly anti-Communist. He believed Communists to
be enemies of the nation, and looked upon the mutiny in the
Middle East as a crowning blow struck against the glory of
Greek arms. With the backing of British military authorities,
he set about reconstituting the Greek Army. He was guided
by two desires. He wanted to create an armed force that
would be thoroughly proof against Communist infiltration,
and he wanted to restore the Army quickly in order that some
of its units might take part in the fighting in Italy and redeem
the tarnished Greek military reputation.

To achieve these purposes, Vendiris combed out the Greek
officer corps and retained on active duty only those men

130 THE GREEK DILEMMA

whom he or his subordinates felt sure were anti-Communist.
This meant in practice that he appointed royalist officers to
command positions. Since a somewhat similar, though less
careful selection of the common soldiers had taken place, the
new units of the Greek Army became predominantly royalist,
and uniformly anti-Communist.

By June 1944 the Third Brigade was organized. After a
couple of months* strenuous training in the mountains of
Lebanon, it was transported to Italy. There the Brigade
joined the Eighth Army and after a week of brisk fighting
succeeded in capturing the Italian town of Rimini. From
this victory, it was afterward frequently known as the Rimini
Brigade.

As for the soldiers who had elected to join the mutineers,
they remained in detention camps until after the liberation
of Greece. Some of them were formed into guard battalions,
and others served in labor units, but many remained in a
sort of imprisonment until finally transported to Greece in
the spring of 1945. Twenty of the ringleaders of the mutiny
were tried by court-martial. Some of them were sentenced to
death, others to varying terms of imprisonment. The sen-
tences, however, were suspended by the Greek Government
from political considerations, and no one suffered execution
as a result of his part in the mutiny.

itfi!If!lJlt$ttlit!finifiIBI!!B!iI!ilH

VI

Efforts at Unity

JLN 1944 the German armies

were everywhere on the defensive. To the hopeful eyes of the
Greeks, their power waned almost from day to day. In early
spring the Greek people generally expected an Allied landing
in force, but from month to month it failed to come. As the
summer wore on it began to look as though the German
garrison in Greece would either have to withdraw or allow it-
self to be cut off by the Russians, who were driving through
the northern Balkans. Every German movement came to be
rumored as withdrawal; but by late August it was unmis-
takable: units of the German garrison were moving north-
ward. Through September the certainty grew. A steady stream
of German soldiers passed from the islands to the mainland,
until whole islands were abandoned. By degrees garrison
posts in the southern part of the country were likewise given
up, and all Greeks knew that the day of liberation was at
hand.

Liberation was longed for by all the population save for
a handful of out-and-out collaborators. Almost every Greek
was animated by a deep hatred of the Germans who had ruled
so harshly, killed so many innocent persons, and burnt so many
of the villages. But this hatred was almost the only feeling
common to all Greeks. The men of the Left looked forward
confidently to the day of liberation as a time when Greece
would enter on a new era and, under the political leader-
ship of the resistance movement, slough off all that was evil

131

132 THE GREEK DILEMMA

and unjust In the prewar social order. There was a tre-
mendous buoyancy and faith in the EAM movement. Its
members had no doubt that they were in the right and would
be able to make all things new. They were, however, vague
as to the exact steps that would be taken to realize the reforms
they expected. They were definite only in two things: the
King would not be allowed to come back and impose another
Fascist dictatorship; and they, the members of EAM, would
be the men and women who would take control of the country
and direct it into democratic paths* What they meant by
democratic it is hard to say; indeed it seems to me that the
word had lost all independent meaning and had become
equivalent in their mouths to their program of no King, and
EAM in power. With governmental power in their hands,
the members of EAM looked forward to elections, a new
constitution and a new economic order. They had complete
faith that in their hands the future of Greece would be safe;
that they, being the people, could do no wrong and commit
no folly. The whole movement had an element of religious
crusade in it; one might carp and criticize from the outside,
but once within the ranks all doubts faded and the world
and its future seemed bright. In international matters, EAM
advocated friendship with Greece's northern neighbors, and
some of its members spoke of an eventual Balkan federal
union that would include Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia.

By the time of liberation, EAM numbered about two
million members, out of a total population of over seven
million. They were incomparably superior to all rivals in
their organization and enthusiasm, and had every reason to
suppose that once the Germans were out of the way, they
would be able to take over undisputed control. There seemed
to be nothing that could hope to stand against them.

EAM was not, however, the sole political organization
among the Greeks, nor did it represent the only strains ol

EFFORTS AT UNITY 133

political feeling. The traditional political parties were all in
a state of suspended animation. A few politicians lived quietly
in Athens, and had from time to time expressed an opinion
or desire to the Govemment-in-Exile. But they were without
any organization that could lend their words weight, and for
the time being they enjoyed only a sort of traditional prestige
which attached to their names. Other than that they had no
power.

The enormous growth of EAM, and its intolerant attitude
toward all who failed to join the National Liberation Front,
aroused deep fears among many of the Greeks who refused to
accept its leadership. In most of the country, opposition to
EAM found no formulation. Anyone who spoke against the
movement was effectively punished by fine, imprisonment or,
in more serious cases, by death. In Athens and some of the
other large towns, however, Right wing sentiment was free
to develop.

The conservatives were caught in an embarrassing position.
They did not like the Germans, and yet they could not hope
by themselves to challenge the military power of ELAS. Most
conservatives found this dilemma insoluble, and during the
last months of occupation lived in high anxiety, hating the
Germans and fearing EAM and ELAS. Personally, the major-
ity refused active collaboration, but they began to condone
and even to approve of the few who took active part against
the Communists in German-sponsored organizations. Thus
many of the politicians of the Liberal and Populist Parties
looked with complacency on the formation of the Security
Battalions in the fall of 1943, hoping that they would be able
to counterbalance the power of ELAS in the period after lib-
eration. Conservatives looked upon X in much the same way:
a valuable counterweight to the ELAS Reserve of Athens,
even though its manners were sometimes crude, and its meth-
ods of getting and using weapons best left in the dark.

The few who actually took the plunge and entered into

134 THE GREEK DILEMMA

open military collaboration with the Germans against ELAS
came from no one class or district. In later times, a casual
observer could not have distinguished an ELAS Reservist
from a member of X simply by looking at him or listening to
his accent. Accident seems to have played a part in determin-
ing the political affiliation of many individuals. The death
of a close relative at the hands of ELAS was enough to make
many a peasant or townsman join the other side. In the
Peloponnese, where traditions of private justice and blood
feud remain strong, this probably accounted for most of the
men who joined the Security Battalions. In the great cities,
like Athens or Salonika, some men doubtless joined simply
to make a living. Economic conditions grew rapidly worse
from 1943 onward, and many must have found the prospect
of food and clothing, mixed with the opportunities for plun-
der that came the way of a Security battalioneer, a strong
attraction. The rank and file of both X and the Security Bat-
talions came from the same social groups as did the ELAS-
Ites. The only difference lay in the leaders. X was commanded
for the most part by former army officers; ELAS by a mixed
group of students, workmen and professional revolutionaries.
During 1944 there was a perceptible hardening of Right
wing sentiment in Athens. Propaganda against EAM was
assiduously spread by word of mouth and through illegal
newspapers as well. The accusations against the Left were
many, but, of all, the most effective and most widely believed
was that EAM sought to betray the Greek nation. "They call
the Bulgars brothers" came to be a favorite damnation of the
Left. Partly in reaction against the Left and partly for the
inherent attraction of expansion, the Right began to revive
the old dream of a Greater Greece. Territorial claims against
Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were formulated on an
extravagant scale, and, as we have seen, the proposal was seri-
ously made that Greece should occupy the border lands as
the Germans withdrew, thus giving the Greeks practical

EFFORTS AT UNITY 135

possession of disputed areas when the time for making peace
treaties came around. By degrees, the one effective relying
cry of the Right became "Greater Greece/* On other questions
they were divided among themselves between republicans
and royalists, and could find no course to steer between the
"democracy" of the Left and the tyranny of the German
occupiers.

The striking fact of the Greek political scene on the eve
of liberation was the lack of anything that could be called
a Center. There were many persons who disliked both the
intolerance of the Left and the reaction of the Right; but
they had neither an organization nor a program, and in
practical politics counted for next to nothing. The Liberal
politicians aspired to lead this confused mass, but they were
themselves confused. After 1943 the leader of the Liberal
Party, octogenarian Themistocles Sofoulis, turned strongly
against EAM. But he had no liking for the royalists of the
extreme Right and remained almost solitary, quite unable
to stay, or even seriously to influence the course of events.

George Papandreou, younger and more vigorous than
Sofoulis, was likewise a politician of the Center and was,
like his elder, without a party. Nevertheless, in the spring
of 1944, British political observers came to pin their hopes
on him. Papandreou had been one of the bright young men
who congregated around the great Venizelos, and had held a
number of Cabinet posts in the time of the republic. In
1928 he broke off from the Liberals to found his own Social
Democratic Party. The new party never became large. In
1935 it won twenty-four seats in the Chamber of Deputies.
This made it the largest of the republican splinter groups,
but no more than that. During the occupation, Papandreou,
like other politicians, took no active r61e. He flirted for a
while with EAM but never joined it, and was among the
signers of the Protocol of 31 March 1942 asking that the
King's return be put off until after the plebiscite. In sue-

136 THE GREEK DILEMMA

ceeding months, he never broke so openly with EAM as did
Sofoulis, perhaps foreseeing some such mediating rdle as
in fact came his way in 1944.

Papandreou's chief eminence was as a rhetorician. His
speeches were eloquent, plausible and, by Western standards,
interminable. He also had a keen sensitivity to the currents
of public opinion; but careful attention to the public mood
of the moment earned for him a reputation as an extraordi-
nary twister and fence sitter. His public announcements of
policy were always cloudy, capable of more than one inter-
pretation, and enveloped in such a multitude of words that
one could read into them almost any opinion. Papandreou
was something more than this, however. He was a great ego-
ist, and in the early months of 1944 convinced himself that
he had been, as it were, supernaturally commissioned to
bring order out of chaos and lead Greece through the diffi-
culties of the liberation period. This sense of mission may
partly have been assumed for the benefit of the public, but
probably Papandreou himself sincerely believed that he was
a chosen instrument, the only man in Greece who could
bring reconciliation to the warring factions that divided the
country. He had been in touch with British agents from
time to time during the occupation, and early in 1944 he
convinced some of them that he could join Left and Right
in a National Union that would tide over the period of
liberation.

Accordingly, when the mutiny broke out in Egypt, the
British decided to send for Papandreou. Soon after his ar-
rival in Cairo, the Liberal coterie that had taken over the
Government after Tsouderos* resignation, was persuaded to
resign in its turn. On April 23 Papandreou succeeded
Sophocles Venizelos as Prime Minister of the Exile Govern-
ment. He came to power with the program of uniting all
parties and resistance organizations in support of a coalition
Government. This idea had been current in Cairo before

EFFORTS AT UNITY 137

his arrival, and the Venizelos Government had issued formal
invitations to the parties and organizations in Greece to
come to a conference in the Middle East. Such a conference,
it was hoped by both British and Greeks, would be able to
resolve the quarrels that threatened to break out into blood-
shed upon the Germans* departure.

It took some weeks for all the delegates to be transported
safely to the Middle East. Finally, on May 17, the conference
met near Beirut in the Lebanon. Altogether twenty-five dele-
gates were present, representing the politicians of Cairo, and
nearly all the parties and resistance organizations of Greece.
EAM was represented by six men, of whom only one was a
Communist. The head of the EAM delegation was Alexander
Svolos, formerly Professor of Constitutional Law in the Uni-
versity of Athens. Svolos had only recently made public his
membership in EAM, leaving Athens for the mountains in
April 1944. He was a figure of considerable distinction, with
a high reputation in intellectual and legal circles. He was
quickly appointed to the presidency of the Provisional Gov-
ernment, replacing Colonel Bakirdjis, who went north and
took command of ELAS in Macedonia and Thrace. Svolos
was a theoretical Marxist of the Socialist persuasion, and a
man of unquestioned good will. He came to the Lebanon
Conference with sincere hope of making a workable coalition
Government.

His relation to the Communists of EAM is difficult to
comprehend. They probably accepted him as a useful "front
man*' for the movement; he, however, took seriously the
democratic professions of EAM, and conceived of democracy
more along Western lines than was the case with other EAM-
ites. He was willing to admit other points of view and did
not automatically condemn all dissent as traitorous. At the
same time, he was convinced that EAM did represent the
overwhelming proportion of the Greek people, and expected
to win for it a preponderance in the Government of National

138 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Unity. The other members of the EAM delegation were like-
wise moderates, and the Communist representative, Miltiades
Porfyrogennis, did not stand out irreconcilably against their
attitude of compromise.

It is interesting to speculate as to why EAM sent such a
delegation to the Lebanon Conference. By its very composi-
tion, some sort of agreement on a Government of National
Union was assured, and such must have been the intention
of the Central Committee that selected the delegates. It
seems probable, from the shape of subsequent events, that
the Communist leaders of EAM decided that their power
needed the cover of formal legality, and shied away from
an open and irreparable break with the Government-in-Exile,
Probably they calculated that a Government of National
Unity could at any time be bent to their will by the superior
force of ELAS which, in the last analysis, would hold the
power in Greece after the liberation. Another factor that
may have governed the Communists* policy was the threat
of British intervention. If no Government of National Unity
emerged from the Lebanon Conference, there seemed a
lively possibility that the British would land troops in Greece
and restore the Government-in-Exile, even though it were
without any representatives of the Left. Such an event would
put the leftists in a difficult position. They would have either
to fight against the liberating British Army or else knuckle
under to a hostile Government. With such a possibility
hanging over them, it must have seemed prudent to join
the Government-in-Exile and hope to bend it toward the
Left. The overwhelming preponderance which EAM had
achieved in the country could reasonably be expected to
make possible alterations in the Cabinet that would assure
leftist control; and the British would have small excuse to
intervene in the internal affairs of the Government once it
had been safely reestablished on Greek soil.

Such I believe to have been the sort of thinking that

EFFORTS AT UNITY 139

guided the Communist leaders in their decisions. That they
had suffered a sudden change of heart and sincerely wel-
comed EAM's cooperation with the Right wing and Center,
or renounced EAM's claim to exclusive representation of
the Greek people, seems entirely improbable. The move
was rather in the nature o a tactical retreat. The ultimate
goal, to establish an EAM Government and through it, a
Communist regime, remained unaltered. At the same time,
it must be recognized that a large element in EAM was not
Communist and did not share the Communist ideals. To
them participation in an ecumenical Government seemed a
natural step. It proved RAM's good faith, and seemed to
hold promise of future peace and quiet for the country. This
was the group in EAM which Svolos and his Socialist col-
leagues represented, and there is no reason to doubt their
sincerity.

The Right wing was sparsely represented at Lebanon.
The Popular Party had a single delegate from Greece, and
General .Vendiris was present as representative of RAN. For
them there was small question. A Government in which they
were represented was better than the most probable alterna-
tive: a solidly leftist, revolutionary regime in Greece, made
desperate by the threat of forcible intervention by the British.
Perhaps even at the time of the Conference, some of the
rightists counted on British support once the Government
of National Unity had established itself in Greece. Whether
they saw so far into the future or not, a coalition seemed the
best possible arrangement they could make, and no difficul-
ties arose from the Right.

The British Ambassador to the Greek Government-in-
Exile, Reginald Leeper, played an important role in the
deliberations. He did not actually attend the sessions of the
Conference, but he did come up from Cairo to be close to
the scene of action, and he was in constant touch with the
chief delegates. He urged conciliation and agreement on all

140 THE GREEK DILEMMA

parties, and strove by all means in his power to make the
Conference a success. In view of the British position vis-i-vis
the Greek Government, his advice carried much weight; so
much so that the agreement which emerged from the Con-
ference generally reflected the British view.

The major quarrel in the Conference was between the
representatives of the Liberal politicians of Cairo and Prime
Minister Papandreou. The Liberals felt that Papandreou
represented nobody but himself, and that they, as represent-
atives of the great traditional party of the Center, should
hold the largest bloc of seats in the Cabinet. Papandreou, on
the other hand, was anxious to consolidate his own personal
position as chief of the Government and wanted to put as
many of his friends into the Cabinet as he could.

After some days of discussion, general agreement was
reached among all the delegates. Papandreou was confirmed
as Prime Minister of a Government of National Unity. EAM
was accorded a quarter of the seats in the Cabinet (five); the
Liberals were assigned an equal number; the Popular Party
got three; and the balance was divided between small parties
and groups, many of them personal friends of Papandreou.

The basis of the new Government was the so-called Leba-
non Charter. This document comprised eight resolutions
that were to guide the policy of the new Government. They
may be summarized as follows:

1. Reorganization and disciplining of the Greek forces of
the Middle East.

2. Unification of guerilla forces and the eventual formation
of a national army free from any party influence.

3. End of terrorism in Greece, and the insurance of full
political liberties after the German withdrawal.

4. Shipment of food and medicines to Greece.

5. Insurance of order and liberty in Greece at the time of
liberation in order that the people might freely decide on
the political and social regime to prevail in postwar
Greece and install a Government of their choice.

EFFORTS AT UNITY 141

6. Severe punishment of all traitors and exploiters of the
people's misery.

7. Immediate satisfaction of the material needs of the
people.

8. Full satisfaction of national territorial claims.

This was obviously a compromise document, and some of
its provisions were subject to a wide variety of interpreta-
tions. The third clause was aimed at ELAS; the sixth at the
extreme Right; but the crucial and most controversial was
the fifth. It was phrased to cover the question of the King's
return but failed to commit the Government to anything
definite. EAM regarded this clause as a guarantee that it
would be able to take power after liberation. The other po-
litical groups, however, interpreted "order and liberty" to
mean the cessation of most of EAM's activities in order that
their own partisans might organize and be able to install a
Government of their choice. With such wide variations in
interpretation, the Lebanon Charter was a frail basis upon
which to form a truly united Government. It was the best
that could be produced under the circumstances, however,
and did serve as the foundation of government during the
following six months.

After the conclusion of the Conference, the Government
returned to Cairo and representatives of the Liberal and
other parties were duly inducted into the Cabinet. The EAM
delegation, however, returned to Greece in order to secure
ratification of its decisions, so that for the time being no
representatives of the Left joined the Government of Na-
tional Unity.

The course of the new Government was not smooth. A
sense of overwhelming urgency dominated the times, for
the day of liberation was obviously approaching fast. But
internal quarrels, and the embarrassing absence of the repre-
sentatives of what was, after all, the most powerful group
in the country, made it almost impossible for the Govern-

142 THE GREEK DILEMMA

ment to prepare serious plans for the postwar settlement
and administration of Greece. Only one item in the agenda
of the Lebanon Charter proceeded smoothly; the reorgani-
zation of the Army in the Middle East, and that was carried
on more or less independently of the Government, in defiance
of the wishes of the Liberal members of the Cabinet, who
saw their friends among the Army officers unceremoniously
cashiered for having taken part in the mutiny. Even so un-
controversial a matter as the organization of relief for the
liberated country was hampered by jurisdictional quarrels
between the Greek Government and UNRRA officials. The
Greeks wanted. to have full control over relief distribution;
UNRRA insisted on guarantees that relief supplies would
not be used as a political weapon to favor one party against
another, and proposed that perfect neutrality be assured by
their taking over responsibility for the internal distribution.
A deadlock resulted which was not resolved until several
months after the liberation.

Actually, the Cabinet's attention was devoted principally
to its own internal quarrels. The largest question was EAM:
would or would not the leftist representatives join the Cabi-
net and participate in the Government? When Svolos and
his fellow delegates returned to Greece from Lebanon, some
at least of the leaders of EAM felt that they had come away
with a bad bargain. EAM was far stronger in Greece than
was the Liberal Party, yet the two had equal representation
in Papandreou's Cabinet. Such a distribution of seats must
have seemed little short of absurd to the leaders of EAM.
They could, however, scarcely reopen the bargaining and
ask for greater representation. Moreover, Svolos and his
fellow delegates argued that the Cabinet would be re-organ-
ized soon after the Government's return to Greece (fifth
resolution of the Lebanon Charter), and held out great hopes
of redressing the balance in favor of EAM at that time.

During the following month, Papandreou's actions in

EFFORTS AT UNITY 143

Cairo began to cause the EAM leaders to doubt his willing-
ness to fall in with their plans. Papandreou exhibited almost
complete subservience to British suggestions and wishes, and
showed unmistakably that he believed himself uniquely
suited to lead Greece through the difficult time ahead of her.
EAM leaders felt equally that they alone were ordained to
the leadership and resented British influence. Accordingly,
on 29 July 1944, EAM sent a telegram to Papandreou demand-
ing that he resign before their representatives would join the
Government. After discussion with the Cabinet, Papandreou
returned a soft answer, saying that his person would never
stand in the way of national unity. Simultaneously, the Lib-
eral members of the Government sent a telegram to EAM
in which they recommended that no insistence be made that
Papandreou resign at the moment. They told, however, of a
plan they cherished for substituting their own leader, The-
mistocles Sofoulis, as Prime Minister as soon as the Govern-
ment arrived in Greece. This reassured EAM, for with Lib-
eral support they believed they would have no difficulty in
forcing a reorganization of the Cabinet that would give the
Left a larger share in the Government.

But before the EAM Ministers came to Cairo, a second
point was raised. The new Government had not clearly com-
mitted itself on the question of the Security Battalions, and
EAM now demanded a categorical denunciation of these
organizations as traitorous. The conservatives in the Cabinet
believed that the Security Battalions were a valuable and
necessary makeweight to the armed power of ELAS, and
hoped that they would survive the liberation to lend the
Government military support in the event of trouble with
the Left. But Papandreou and most of the Center could not
approve of organizations which had committed so many atroc-
ities against Greek villages and had served as willing tools
of the Germans. The Right was overruled, and the Govern-
ment agreed to denounce them. Accordingly on 7 September

144 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the Security Battalions were formally and publicly declared
traitorous. The German evacuation of Greece had already
begun, and the members of the Security Battalions, hearing
that the new Government would consider them as enemies,
began to drift off to their homes. By the time the liberation
was accomplished only small remnants of the original force
continued to exist and ELAS easily destroyed them all.

With these two questions out of the way, EAM became
reconciled to joining the Government in Cairo. Accordingly,
five men were chosen as ministers, two of them Communists
and the others drawn from the Socialist wing of the move-
ment. They arrived in Cairo 1 September and were sworn
in the next day. A few days later the Provisional Government
of the Mountains was formally dissolved.

Meanwhile, the Liberals in the Cabinet had quarrelled
with Prime Minister Papandreou and, on the eve of the
arrival of the EAM representatives in Cairo, had resigned
from the Government (31 August). It seems certain that the
Liberals expected to come into contact with the members of
the EAM delegation upon their arrival from Greece and, in
conjunction with them, compel an immediate change in the
person of the Prime Minister. But when they arrived, the
EAM leaders did not fall in with the plans of Sophocles
Venizelos and his fellow politicians. Instead of balking at
the behavior of Papandreou, the Leftists entered the Cabinet
without delay, leaving the Liberal politicians in the lurch*

According to Alexander Svolos, who had been appointed
as one of the Ministers to represent EAM in Papandreou's-
Cabinet, the reason for this action was that his two Com-
munist colleagues went to the Russian Legation in Cairo
and were there advised to join the Cabinet without further
bargaining. There is no reason to doubt Svolos' word, or
that he was in a position to know of the action of his fellow
Ministers. It raises the interesting question of the general

EFFORTS AT UNITY 145

relation between the EAM movement and the Russian Gov-
ernment.

Until Russian troops had driven the Germans from the
Black Sea coast, direct communication between Russia and
Greece seems to have been practically impossible. There is
no evidence that EAM or the Greek Communist Party re-
ceived any instructions from Russia during the first years
of the war. As we have seen, the EAM movement was domi-
nated by Communists; and in the Greek Communist Party
there was a small group of professional revolutionaries who
had received special training in Russia before the war. Their
number was very small, but their influence in EAM was pro-
found. It seems probable that the remarkable parallel be-
tween events in Greece and Yugoslavia may be accounted
for by the fact that the Partisan movement, too, was directed
by Russian-trained revolutionaries, and both movements fol-
lowed the textbook directions of the Russian teachers. This
seems to have been the limit of Russian control over EAM.
Except for the intervention in Cairo, there is no evidence of
Russian advice affecting the day-to-day policy of the Greek
resistance movement,

In August 1944 a small group of Russian Army officers
dropped by parachute into ELAS Headquarters. Their sud-
den arrival came as a complete and unwelcome surprise to
the British. The Russians actually came from Tito's Head-
quarters, not from Russia directly; and so far as could be
observed, took no active part in directing ELAS policy dur-
ing the ensuing months. The members of this military mis-
sion remained in Greece after the liberation, acting as an
intelligence team and evacuating Russian prisoners of war.
They stayed in Athens throughout the civil war, living in
British army billets, and made no gesture to assist the Greek
Communists by word or deed.

Though the Russians seem to have exercised no direct

146 THE GREEK DILEMMA

control over the movement, EAM certainly held Russia in
high esteem, and in propaganda always emphasized the Red
Army's preponderant part in the war against Germany. It
seems certain that if it had ultimately gained control, EAM
would have brought Greece into the Russian sphere, as the
Partisans have done in Yugoslavia. In such an event, British
and American influence would have been largely excluded
from the country.

But in the summer of 1944 such issues lay still buried in
the future. The immediate problem was to make prepara-
tions for the imminent liberation of Greece. The United
States declined to take an equal share in the expedition that
would liberate Greece, and American military participation
was limited to a share in relief administration. The military
undertaking thus became almost wholly a British responsi-
bility. No serious effort to attack the German garrison or
to cut off its retreat was contemplated. Troops for an attack
were not easily available in the Mediterranean area, and a
landing in force would bring no great advantage since the
Germans were already leaving of their own ^accord. Conse-
quently AFHQ assigned only a token force of approximately
four thousand men for the landing in Greece.

It was obviously necessary to concert plans with the Greek
Government, but British military authorities were very re-
luctant to confide in the Cabinet, for some of the Ministers
were incurable chatterboxes, and regularly discussed state
secrets with members of the Greek community in Cairo over
their afternoon coffee on the porch of Shepheard's Hotel.
Consequently in mid-August Prime Minister Papandreou
agreed to feign illness, and was declared to be unable to see
visitors. Actually he went secretly to Italy where he met
Churchill and discussed plans for the liberation of Greece
with the British Prime Minister. It was this circumvention
of the Greek Cabinet that precipitated the resignation of
the Liberal Ministers on 31 August.

EFFORTS AT UNITY 147

J* 1
Exactly what passed between Papandreou and Churchill

at their secret meeting in Italy has never been fully divulged.
Upon his return to Cairo, Papandreou let it be known that
they had agreed that King George II should not return to
Greece immediately upon the liberation of the country but
should wait in London until a plebiscite had been held;
that the Government should be reorganized upon arriving
in Greece; and that it should immediately transfer its seat
from Cairo to Italy as a preparatory move for re-entering
Greece. It is sure that military plans for the landing were
discussed and agreed upon by the Greek and British Prime
Ministers. In addition, the Liberals and EAM accused Pa-
pandreou of having agreed to more than this, saying that
he promised to favor the King's return and prevent the Left
from coming into undisputed power. Whether these sus-
picions were well founded only Papandreou and Churchill
can say, and neither of the two men has found it fitting to
tell more than was announced at the time.

Early in September the Greek Government transferred its
seat to Salerno, Italy, where it was effectually divorced from
the talkative Greek colony of Cairo and subject to no outside
pressures save that of British military advice. The great
task was to get ready for liberation. Members of the Cabinet
were detailed to go to various outlying parts of the country
that had already been freed of the Germans. The main body
of the Cabinet, however, with Prime Minister Papandreou
and the EAM Ministers, remained in Italy and travelled to
Athens by sea.

Toward the end of September an agreement was made
between the British and Greeks to regulate the military as-
pects of the liberation. General Sarafis, Commander in Chief
of ELAS, General Zervas, Chief of the EDES guerillas, Prime
Minister Papandreou and two British generals, Sir Henry
Maitland Wilson and Ronald Scobie were present at the
Conference which drew up what was afterward called the

148 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Caserta Agreement. By this Agreement the guerilla forces in
Greece acknowledged the headship of Papandreou's Govern-
ment, and that Government in turn put all the Greek forces
at its disposal under the command of General Scobie, as repre-
sentative of the Allied High Command in Greece. It was
further agreed that the guerilla forces would not make any
attempt to seize power at the time of liberation, but would
form a national union between themselves through which to
coordinate their activities against the enemy. It was expressly
stated that the Security Battalions were not a part of the
forces under the Greek Government but were enemy forma-
tions.

Supplementary to the Agreement was a series of opera-
tional orders issued by General Scobie. In these Scobie stated
his aim: to help to reconstruct Greece under the guidance of
the Greek Government In the original draft of his order,
General Scobie said he aimed to restore law and order. This
met with an objection from Sarafis, who insisted that law
and order were an internal matter which concerned only
the Greek Government. General Scobie accepted the objec-
tion and changed the wording of his order accordingly. Ad-
ditional provisions of the operational order made the guerilla
commanders responsible for the observance of good order
in Greece immediately after liberation and marked out the
operational boundaries between ELAS and EDES along the
same line as that fixed by the Plaka Agreement. One im-
portant territorial change was introduced. Athens and the
district around it were exempted from ELAS control, and
put under the command of General Panagiotis Spiliotopoulos
instead. Spiliotopoulos was a friend and former subordinate
of General Vendiris who was at this time the Commander
in Chief of the Greek Middle East Army. In effect, then, this
provision handed the capital over to the military control o
Vendiris, and the conservative, nationalist political opinion
he represented.

EFFORTS AT UNITY 149

One may say In general that the Caserta Agreement was
drawn up at a time when the future political control o
Greece was in the forefront of everyone's mind. The British
were determined not to let the Government pass into the sole
control of the Left; ELAS and EAM were equally determined
to gain complete control of the country. Both sides in a sense
were playing for time. EAM leaders expected that once the
liberation had been accomplished their monopoly of political
organization in the country and the widespread popular
support they commanded would compel the Government to
move more and more to the Left. The conservatives and the
British felt that no break with the Left could be risked at
the moment and were content to establish a Government in
which EAM held only a minority position and let events
guide their action afterward.

Such then was the political situation when the Germans
at last abandoned Athens, and the Greek Government was
able to return to its long-lost capital city. There had been no
real meeting of minds between the extremes, nor any suc-
cessful effort toward honest compromise. Within the coun-
try the two sides, EAM and the enemies of EAM, were as
deeply estranged as ever. The Government of National Unity
was a frail fabric, barely disguising the chasms which yawned
between the constituent factions of the Cabinet. No one
but a blind man or a foolish optimist could have expected
the future to run smoothly.

The Government arrived in Athens on 18 October 1944.
British troops had landed in Greece three weeks earlier, com-
ing ashore on the mainland first at Patras. Several small
skirmishes took place between the advance guard of the
British force and the tail of the German column. Zervas har-
assed the German retreat through Epirus and assaulted
Jannina before the last Germans had time to escape. ELAS
likewise harried the retreating Germans, but devoted most
of its power to destroying the remnants of the Security Bat-

150 THE GREEK DILEMMA

talions. As the Germans withdrew, the guerillas came down
from the hills to the towns and enjoyed the sweets of a more
civilized life than they had known in the remote villages of
the back country. In some places there was a little bloodshed,
notably at Kalamata in the southern Peloponnese where
ELAS executed about thirty persons; but through most of
Greece the guerillas obeyed the order of General Scobie that
there .should be no wholesale punishment of collaborators.
EAM governments were set up in all the towns of the ELAS
area; a special corps of ELAS took over town police duties;
taxes were assessed on those who were suspected of having
profited during the occupation, and collected by force if
necessary. In the city of Athens there were frequent shots by
night; but the majority of them were fired into the air and
only expressed the high spirits of the guerilla who pressed
the trigger. Peace and order were on the whole remarkably
well maintained.

General Scobie sent a brigade of paratroopers northward
on the heels of the Germans. By 30 October the German
evacuation was complete, and all Greece was finally free.
British troops visited the main centers of Greece as far as
Salonika, "showing the flag." Everywhere they met with
warm welcome as liberators, and joint ELAS-British parades
were organized in several towns. The general spirit of the
people was one of rejoicing, and for the first few days of the
liberation there was little thought of the morrow or the prob-
lems it would bring. Everyone believed that better times lay
ahead, and forgot the bitter quarrels that divided them
against each other.

In late October two brigades of the Fourth Indian Division
came to Greece after hard service on the Italian front. The
plan was that Greece should serve a sort of rest area for British
troops. It was intended to keep about one division in the
country as a garrison force and insurance against trouble with
ELAS. Upon the arrival of the Indian brigades, the para-

EFFORTS AT UNITY 151

troopers and raiding forces, which had first landed in the
country, were concentrated in Athens and Patras for reship-
ment to Italy. Raiding forces actually left the country in
November; but the paratroopers were retained at the last
minute when threatening political tension developed be-
tween ELAS and the British-supported Government. They
were destined to take the leading part in the Battle of Athens.

After the first days of rejoicing, political tension was not
slow to manifest itself. Papandreou's Government faced truly
colossal difficulties, and could not forget its bitter internal
quarrels. A week after reaching Athens, the Cabinet was re-
shuffled; but contrary to the hopes of the Left, no significant
change in the political balance of the Government took place.
Papandreou remained as Prime Minister, and EAM was ac-
corded only six seats in the Cabinet. Four representatives of
the Populist Party came into the reorganized Government,
but the Liberal Party remained aloof. Representing an almost
nonexisting Center, the Liberal politicians found themselves
in a difficult position. Themistocles Sofoulis, leader of the
Liberal Party, refused to accept the plan of the Left (and of
some of his own followers) whereby he would become Prime
Minister in a Cabinet dominated by EAM; but at the same
time, he declined to come into a Government headed by his
old-time subordinate, Papandreou. He decided instead to
wait and see.

The reorganized Government faced a country in economic
ruin; a people whose moral habits had been corrupted; a na-
tion divided against itself politically, in which the govern-
mental administrative machine had almost totally collapsed.
Such difficulties might well have staggered a strong govern-
ment. The divided Cabinet over which Papandreou presided
proved itself quite unable to meet any of the difficulties that
now confronted it.

In economic matters, the immediate problem was currency.
A wild inflation had taken place during the last months of the

152 THE GREEK DILEMMA

occupation, and by November one hundred billion drachma
notes had become worthless and could be seen blowing in
the wind across the sidewalks of Athens. Economic exchange
had reverted to barter, although for large transactions, the
gdld pounds, which had been supplied so copiously to various
resistance organizations, provided a medium of exchange.
Alexander Svolos, the Minister of Finance, declared the old
currency no longer legal tender, and redeemed it with a new
issue supplied from England at the rate of two hundred
billion drachma to one. To start factories and restore com-
munication and transport was far more difficult. In this di-
rection the Papandreou Government accomplished prac-
tically nothing. Some emergency road repair was done by the
British Army units so that the main roads became passable to
wheeled vehicles. Otherwise nothing.

The political problem was equally beyond settlement. In
the country, except for the area controlled by Zervas, there
was only one vocal party. EAM was in control and it per-
mitted no opposition. In Athens, however, the Right wing
took courage, founded newspapers, and became more out-
spoken every day. EAM for its part staged a series of large
demonstrations in the heart of the city. The demonstrations
had various themes. One demanded an immediate purge of
collaborators from the Government; another celebrated the
twenty-sixth anniversary of the Communist Party; and a third
paraded the corpses of some EAM followers who had been
slain in a brawl.

Perhaps the deepest and most difficult of all the problems
that beset Greece was the general breakdown of habit and
morals that the war and occupation had brought about. When
men had existed for years at a stretch under constant fear of
sudden and unprovoked attack, normal living became almost
impossible. Under a Government so unpopular as the quis-
ling, sabotage and malingering became twisted into a patriotic
duty and grew to be a fixed habit of mind and action among

EFFORTS AT UNITY 153

large sections of the population. In factories, honest work be-
came the rare exception. An attitude of distrust and defiance
of authority spread to all parts of the city population. Large
numbers of families had lived on the charity of the Red Cross
through the last years of the war^ and, lacking the oppor-
tunity, had lost the will to work. Stealing had become pa-
triotic, when it was done from the Germans; and many of
the Greeks retained the habit after the Germans had gone.
These attitudes combined to make Greek society grossly in-
efficient. Much-needed work, such as the unloading of relief
ships in Pireus or the repair of roads, could be organized
only with the greatest difficulty, required far greater numbers
of men than normally would have been the case, and without
constant and minute supervision, theft and idling on the job
kept results to a minimum.

In brief, the machine which EAM had perfected for
sabotage of the occupation regime continued to operate after
the liberation. Perhaps had EAM succeeded in taking over
the Government many of these inefficiencies would have been
reduced. Insofar as it was organized deliberately, the sabotage
would of course have stopped; but much was not organized.
It had become an ingrained habit which only intensive
propaganda and changed conditions of living could over-
come. Neither came to Greece; and the country continued to
suffer from a tremendous and crippling social inefficiency.
Economic privation accentuated all these moral difficulties;
But in turn, inefficiency accentuated economic privation. It
became a sort of vicious circle from which it was hard to see
any easy escape.

Such matters lay far beyond the scope of the Government
when it first returned to Greece. The immediate problem to
which the Cabinet addressed itself was the establishment of
a governmental machine that would be able to exercise power
in the provinces. In particular, plans were proposed for the
organization of an armed force that would be able to guard

154 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the public peace. In this, the Government ran headlong into
opposition from EAM. Almost every man suggested for a gov-
ernmental post by one side was automatically found un-
acceptable by the other. The net result was that only a few
top administrative posts in the provinces were filled, and
then only by colorless weaklings who usually proved to be no
match for the EAM administrators already on the ground.

Much quarreling arose over the question of collaboration.
The Left pressed for prompt and dire punishment, and
wanted to organize special courts with special abbreviated
rules of procedure to try persons accused. The Right was re-
luctant. It feared that such courts would accept EAM's def-
inition of collaboration by which most of the conservative
political leaders and many of their prospective followers
would be classed as collaborators. Such courts, set up over all
Greece, could easily be made into an effective weapon against
anyone who dared to criticize EAM, for plausible charges
could be drawn against almost every man in Greece unless
the definition of collaboration were made clear and narrow.
With such a division in the Cabinet, judicial progress against
collaborators was slow, and no one was actually condemned
in the time during which Papandreou held power. This fact
infuriated many honest Greeks, and became one of the prin-
cipal items in leftist propaganda against the Government.

An equally stubborn controversy developed over the ques-
tion of the organization of a police force. The gendarmery
which had served under Metaxas and the quisling Govern-
ments had largely broken up, and was in any case totally un-
acceptable to EAM. The Government decided to concentrate
its remaining members in Athens and there screen them,
accepting for continued service only those whose record
could be proven blameless. In the meanwhile, a special Na-
tional Guard was to be raised by calling to active service one
of the prewar classes of the Army Reserve. The problem of
finding officers for this organization who would be acceptable

EFFORTS AT UNITY 155

to both Left and Right proved very difficult. By the time the
Guard was called to service (24 November) only about a
third of the necessary officers had been appointed. For this
and other reasons, it never actually took over police work
until much later, when the whole balance of power in Greece
had been changed by civil war.

Before any makeshift police force had been organized, an-
other problem arose which quickly obscured all others. ELAS
and EDES had originally been formed to resist the Germans.
Rightists in the Cabinet and outside it now argued that since
the Germans had gone, ELAS and the other guerilla forces
had accomplished their purpose, and should disband. They
further stated that it was intolerable for a private army to
exist within a sovereign state, and that, before the Govern-
ment could consider any of the questions of reconstruction,
the threat which the existence of ELAS constantly held over
the head of any who ventured to disagree with the Left, must
be lifted. EAM accepted this reasoning, agreed that ELAS
had accomplished its task, but insisted that all armed
organizations of the Right should be disbanded simulta-
neously.

This argument was aimed at the Third (or Rimini) Brigade
which had come from Italy to Athens, arriving 9 November.
In leftist circles it was rumored that the Brigade had come
from the battle in Italy in order to put down EAM and bring
the King back by force. As we have seen, the Third Brigade
was predominantly composed of royalists, and its members
were inspired by a deep hatred of EAM and the Communists.
That the Brigade would have been able to bring the King
back by force seems, however, highly doubtful. King George
was living in London, and he would scarcely have been able
to leave without the knowledge and permission of the British
Government. And the British, though they tended to favor
the King's cause, would certainly not have allowed him to be
installed on his throne by force of arms. It is, however, per-

156 THE GREEK DILEMMA

fectly true that a Government, supported militarily by the
Third Brigade, would have been able to put into effect meas-
ures favoring the King's return. It is even conceivable, though
hardly probable, that a plebiscite could have been so
administered within two or three months as to nullify EAM's
popular strength and bring a majority in favor of the King.
There seems small doubt that the King commanded only a
minority of actively loyal subjects in Greece at the time o
the liberation. The royalists lackedjany sort of organized fol-
lowing in the provinces, and without a strong political
machine, the most royalist of Governments could hardly
have manipulated the ballots successfully. Furthermore,
Papandreou's Government was far from royalist. The largest
single bloc in the Government EAM was fanatically op-
posed to any restoration of the King, and it is difficult to see
how fake elections could have been carried through as long
as EAM Ministers remained in the Cabinet.

Such speculation is hardly to the point, for EAM was in no
mood to accept what the rightists and the British wanted.
They refused to agree to the retention of the Third Brigade
as a cadre for the new Army, and to the total dissolution of
all guerilla groups. It is easy to sympathize with EAM's
position. They had risen to supremacy in Greece during the
years of occupation through hard work, danger and suffering.
They saw no reason why they should of their own will re-
linquish the power which they had won, and give to the Right
a chance to organize itself in the countryside and challenge
their supremacy in the land.

The Right claimed that EAM's power was based on terror,
which in some part it was. Few dissidents dared to raise their
voices in the villages and provincial towns in the fall of 1944;
and because so few dared, overt acts of terrorism were also
few, so that the outward seeming of the country was surpris-
ingly peaceful and calm. Nevertheless, government officials
and emissaries of the conservative political organizations were

EFFORTS AT UNITY 157

not allowed to travel out from Athens, being turned back by
ELAS guards who were posted along the highways. Under
such constraints, the Right justifiably claimed that there was
no freedom in Greece, and that they could not conduct their
activities nor organize their supporters until ELAS had been
dissolved.

The leftists rebutted such arguments by observing that
their opponents were rotten through and through with col-
laboration, and should not be granted the right to propa-
gandize their errors and break down the unity of the people.
Passionately they claimed, and most of them believed, that
they were the people. They believed that they, the people,
had risen in righteous wrath against the men who for so long
had betrayed and swindled them; boldly they asserted that the
people would never again permit Fascist collaborators and
economic tyrants to rule over them.

The institutions and practices of liberal democracy of the
Western style do not work in such a climate of opinion. There
was no meeting place, no common ground between the Left
and Right. Counting of heads or of ballots cannot resolve
such antagonisms. The losing side will not accept the verdict,
but will challenge the honesty of the election and sabotage
the resulting Government by every means in its power, using
whatever violence it can command. Under such circum-
stances, force is the only arbiter. Certainly, it was force that
prevailed in Greece.

Events moved quickly toward their climax when once the
issue of disarmament of ELAS had come up. Details of the
proposals and counterproposals that ensued are much dis-
puted, for in the negotiations that preceded the outbreak o
war, each side sought to fix the blame on the other. Contra-
dictory and variant accounts of happenings during the last
two weeks of November have been published. What follows
here can only claim to be an effort to sift the truth.

On 22 November Prime Minister Papandreou declared

158 THE GREEK DILEMMA

that he favored the demobilization of all volunteer units.
The Left understood that the phrase "volunteer units"
included the Third Brigade, and Papandreou probably
intended to include the royalist brigade in the phrase. But
it was ambiguous, for one could argue that the Third Brigade
was not volunteer, but the conscript Army of the Government
o Greece, which in part it was. All Papandreou's skill in
vague phraseology could not bridge the gap between the
insistence of the Right (backed powerfully by the British
Ambassador and General Scobie), that the Third Mountain
Brigade be retained in service; and the equally definite
insistence from the Left that the Brigade be disbanded.

A compromise was suggested after some days, and seems
for a brief while to have been agreed to by all factions in the
Cabinet. The proposal was this: that ELAS disband and dis-
arm, save for a number of men equal to the combined
strength of the Third Mountain Brigade, Sacred Squadron
and a corps, of undetermined size, from the EDES guerillas.
This arrangement, while seeming to give ELAS an equal ad-
vantage in the struggle for power, actually would have greatly
weakened the position of the leftists, for ELAS was not equal
man for man to the well-trained and equipped troops that had
come from the Middle East. Voluntary demobilization of
their greatly superior numbers would merely deprive the
party for which ELAS stood of its peculiar advantage in the
political scramble. Perhaps not realizing these military facts,
the EAM Ministers in the Cabinet at first agreed to the pro-
posal of partial disarmament of ELAS; then withdrew their
assent two days later (29 November).

Tired of the endless bickering and indecision of the Greek
Cabinet, General Scobie thereupon ordered Sarafis and
Zervas to disband their forces by 10 December. In issuing this
order, Scobie was acting in his capacity as Commander in
Chief of all Allied Forces in Greece. He was certainly stretch-
ing the powers he had been accorded by the Caserta Agree-

EFFORTS AT UNITY 159

ment when he thus ordered the dlsbandment of a part of the
forces that had been put under his control.

Zervas promptly professed willingness to obey, but Sarafis
refused point blank to disband ELAS, saying that any such
order would have to come from the Greek Government.
Scobie countered this defiance with a proclamation addressed
to the rank and file of ELAS, ordering disbandment on 10
December "in accord with the Greek Government's instruc-
tion/*

It is far from clear whether the Greek Government had in
fact ever ordered the disbandment of the guerilla forces. A
reasonable guess is that General Scobie chose to consider the
leftists* initial acceptance of the proposal to disarm (save for
a corps equal in numerical strength to Right wing armed
units) as an official decision of the Greek Government. For a
space of two days, it appears that the proposal had been con-
curred in by all members of the Cabinet. Even so, legal
formalities had not been complied with, for no decision of
the Greek Government becomes official until published in the
government Gazette, and no order for the disarmament of
the guerillas had been so published. Actually, General Scobie
probably took small account of such technicalities. As he saw
it, the leftists had agreed to disarm and then had violated
their word. He was determined to finish the dispute and keep
to the schedule that had been set up, which called for the
National Guard to begin police work on 1 December and
ELAS to demobilize ten days later.

EAM looked at the situation very differently. To them, the
interference of a British general in Greek internal politics
was intolerable. He had no right, they felt, to disregard their
Ministers' change of mind; still less to make proclamations to
their troops in the name of the Greek Government. Accord-
ingly, when news of General Scobie's proclamation reached
them, the EAM Ministers resigned from the Government, in
the small hours of the morning, 2 December.

160 THE GREEK DILEMMA

As Siantos himself said later, this resignation did not arise
solely from the controversy over the disarmament of ELAS.
That question was merely the occasion for bringing into the
open a split which irreconcilably divided the Greek Cabinet
and paralyzed all important decision. Governmental inaction
was as intolerable to EAM as to everyone else concerned*
Papandreou had proved himself little more than a weather-
cock, yielding to the Left, only to contradict himself later by
yielding to the Right. Between the two, he had in the end,
after repeated vacillations, always come over into the con-
servative camp. Papandreou made it his habit to consult the
British Ambassador, Mr. Reginald Leeper, on every issue.
Leeper was no novice in Greek affairs, having followed the
tortuous path of Greek politics in Cairo since 1943. He was
a clever man, rather austere and forbidding in manner, and
sometimes offended the Greeks by an air of haughtiness.
Papandreou's dependence on the British Ambassador con-
firmed all EAM's suspicions against the Prime Minister, and
after six weeks' trial, they resolved to overthrow his Govern-
ment. The disarmament question was only the stimulus for
an open collision of what had long been irreconcilable wills.

By the maneuver of resignation, EAM expected to provoke
a Government crisis and bring about the overthrow of
Papandreou and Ms Cabinet. The leftists were, perhaps, a bit
surprised at the boldness and scale of British intervention in
Greek affairs, but believed that a show of resolution and the
discreet threat of force would compel General Scobie and
Ambassador Leeper to yield. In the immediate crisis, they
hoped to be able to win the support of the Liberal politicians,
who had stood on the sidelines of the controversy. EAM
leaders expected to be able to form a new Cabinet, consisting
largely of Liberals and leftists, with the aged politician,
Themistocles Sofoulis, as Prime Minister. But the event was
to betray their expectations. Within a week, Athens was
plunged into civil war.

VII

Civil War

.UBLIC excitement mounted
steadily in Athens through the last weeks of November.
Alarmist rumors were in the air. Left and Right freely ac-
cused each other of plotting a coup d'tat, o terrorism, of
collaboration. There was almost no crime which was not
attributed by each side to the other. By this time the original
joy of liberation had worn off and most persons, looking
around them, found life no better than under the Germans,
their clothes still rags, food scarce, and medicines almost un-
obtainable. Military relief had been organized long before
the liberation, but difficulties of unloading from ships, of
transport, and of distribution made actual delivery of sup-
plies lag far behind the eager expectation of the Greeks.
There was a feeling of disillusionment among many Athen-
ians. The great day, the long-looked-for liberation had come
and gone, leaving them with almost the same problems and
discomforts as before.

Political partisanship fed on this spirit. The Right blamed
EAM and EAM blamed the Right for obstructing true and
complete liberation. The principal accusation made against
the Right was that it sought to bring the King back by force,
establish a new dictatorship, and protect collaborationists
from just punishment. The Left was accused of betraying
Greece to the Bulgars, of exercising terrorism in the prov-
inces, and of planning to establish a Communist dictatorship
by guile or, if necessary, by force. None of these accusations

161

162 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Is exactly true; but all had enough color of truth to confirm
the suspicions and increase the fear and hatred of each side
for the other.

The British, I believe, would have liked to see a liberal
society and government emerge from this welter. Their first
and principal concern was that the Government of Greece
should always be friendly toward them; and the men who
shaped British policy for Greece were by this time firmly
convinced that an EAM Government would not be friendly.
Exactly what "friendly" meant was not clear. Probably it
meant in part the reestablishment of economic concessions
to British-owned public utility and other companies; but in
last analysis and far more important, it meant a Government
in Greece that would side with Great Britain in case of an-
other war. To assure a friendly Government, the British on
the whole liked the idea of restoring King George. He might
be personally grateful; certainly would be no friend of the
Left which had attacked him so virulently. But there were
important reservations in the British support of the King.
Particularly among the officials of the Embassy in Athens,
there was doubt as to whether King George could win enough
popular support to be able to retain his throne except by
strongarm methods of government. This the British would
have been reluctant to see. Furthermore, the King's return
threatened to drive the Liberal Party and many middle-of-the
road Greeks into the arms of the extreme Left. This would
have been a disaster from the point of view of the British
Embassy, and they were not willing to back the King's return
if it seemed to mean such an outcome. On the other hand,
the British saw small hope of a peaceful and secure republic
rising from the bitter party factionalism that prevailed in
Greece. With serious doubts of the King and even deeper dis-
trust of a republic, the British policy in practice was little
more than one of wait and see, meanwhile keeping the Left
from exclusive power.

CIVIL WAR 163

The resignation of the EAM Ministers on the night of 1-2
December sent a tremor of excitement through all Athens.
The issue between Left and Right had been joined at last*
The Government would have to move decisively either one
way or the other. The leaders of EAM were confident that it
would move in their direction. The resignations had taken
place Friday night. The next morning EAM asked and was
granted permission to hold a demonstration in the center of
Athens at Constitution Square on Sunday, 3 December.
Large-scale preparations were immediately begun. Bands of
young men went through all the streets of the city shouting
orders and threats through megaphones, instructing all mem-
bers of EAM to come to the demonstration, and warning all
who stayed away that they would be considered enemies of
the people. Large numbers of posters were prepared, calling
for punishment of collaborators and the overthrow of Papan-
dreou. Trucks were sent into the country round about to
bring EAM members from the villages near the capital. The
demonstration was intended to show the popular support
EAM could command and convince the British and the Right
that no Government without representatives of the Left
could possibly rule Greece.

EAM made still other and more ominous preparations. A
special committee was established to take command of ELAS
forces in and around Athens. The members of the Committee
were "General" Emmanuel Mandakas, George Siantos and
a retired general, Michael Hadjimachalis. Both Mandakas
and Siantos were Communists; Hadjimachalis represented
the "Left Liberals." The Committee was established on
Saturday, 2 December, and on the same day it ordered the
Athens and Pireus ELAS Reserve to mobilize. As word was
passed round, the members of the Reserve proceeded to
uncache their weapons and concentrate themselves at pre-
arranged spots, mostly in school buildings and the like.

A general strike was declared for Monday, 4 December.

164 THE GREEK DILEMMA

In fact, the call-up of the ELAS Reserve, and EAM's use of
manpower for other preparations, cut deeply into the work-
ing force of many plants and factories even before the strike
officially began. There was no doubt that when it was called,
the general strike would be effective.

The Papandreou Government was in a state of near panic.
It could in its own right command no military or police sup-
port except for the thinned ranks of the Athens police. This
force was almost unchanged from the time of occupation. It
had not been deeply implicated with the Germans, and had
on many occasions tipped off Greeks who were about to be
arrested, thereby giving them a chance to hide away in time.
Because of this, and the lack of any alternative corps to direct
traffic and keep order, the Athens police had been allowed to
continue its duties. It was badly demoralized, however, and
numbered only a few hundred men. Yet this police force was
the only support on which the Government could count, ex-
cept for the troops under General Scobie's command. Under
these circumstances, when the threat of violence and revolu-
tion against the Government was unmistakable, Papandreou
and his Ministers became wholly dependent on the decisions
of the man who controlled the only force that could hope to
stand against ELAS. >,

That man was Lieutenant General Ronald Scobie. General
Scobie was a professional soldier, an officer and a gentleman
of the peculiarly narrow British military tradition. His
manner was suave, his appearance handsome; and he was
thoroughly at ease in a polite drawing room. His military
career had been neither brilliant nor the reverse, but as a
senior officer he had filled chiefly staff and administrative
positions so that he had little experience as a field com-
mander. Despite the prominence which his name came to
have in connection with the civil war in Athens, he actually
played only a small part in the events. British policy was
decided by the Ambassador, Mr. Leeper and Churchill

CIVIL WAR 165

while Scobie contended himself with doing what he conceived
to be his duty as a soldier, implementing the decisions handed
down to him. When it came to open fighting, operational
command of most of the British troops was taken from him,
and another, more experienced field commander, General
Hawkesworthy, came from Italy to direct the battle. Scobie
of course remained as Commander in Chief, and all negotia-
tions between the leftists, the Greek Government and the
British Ambassador were conducted through his office. In
actual fact, however, he was always more a symbol than a
prime mover in the tangled skein of Greek affairs.

On Saturday evening, as the scope and magnitude of EAM
preparation became evident, the British took alarm, fearing
that if the demonstration came off as scheduled it might gen-
erate intense excitement and get far out of hand. When
general tension in the city was so great, it seemed wise to try
to prevent any demonstration from taking place. Accordingly,
in the evening of 2 December after consultation with the
British, the Greek Government informed the leaders of EAM
that permission to hold their demonstration had been with-
drawn. The leftists were indignant, and replied that their
preparations had already gone so far that it was not possible
for them to notify their followers in the remote parts of the
city and cancel the demonstration. The leftist contention was
undoubtedly true. They could not have called their demon-
stration off even had they wished to. But they did not wish
to do so, and to the last minute worked feverishly to make it
as large and impressive a show of their popular support
against the Right as lay within their power.

On the morning of 3 December crowds of EAM demon-
strators began to gather in all the suburbs of Athens. They
raised their flags and banners and set off marching toward
the middle of the town. Some of the columns came for miles
on foot. A few marched in from Pireus. Others arrived in
the outskirts of the city by truck, formed their columns, and

166 THE GREEK DILEMMA

started walking while the trucks went back for more. The
mood of the crowds was angry. They were convinced that
dark plots were afoot among the Fascist reactionaries. They
believed that the people's liberty was endangered. Yet there
was also a spirit of holiday excitement, rapid talk, violent
gesticulation, craning necks, and much singing of spirited
marching songs as the mass of people moved onward toward
Constitution Square. Women and children predominated in
the crowds for the able-bodied men had been called to duty
with the ELAS Reserve.

The Athens police were afraid. They had been ordered to
prevent the demonstrators from getting to the Square. Cor-
dons, two and three men deep, had been thrown across all the
streets leading into the Square. The police carried arms:
Italian carbines. Their magazines were loaded with blank
rounds, and orders were to fire the blanks if it became neces-
sary in order to break up the crowds and turn them back.
Some of the police had small confidence in blank ammuni-
tion, A few, or perhaps only one man, substituted live rounds
for the blanks that had been issued. The act was to have wide
repercussions.

The demonstration was scheduled to begin at 11 o'clock.
The first columns began to arrive in the center of the city
about 10:30 and were surprised and angry at finding their
path blocked. Some of the columns stopped and retreated or
milled around in confusion when they met the police barrier.
But as more and more demonstrators accumulated, the pres-
sure and excitement mounted in the streets, and attempts
were made to break through the police lines. Scuffling ensued,
and some persons had their heads cracked. Several wounded
policemen were brought into Police Headquarters building
adjoining Constitution Square. The sight of their wounded
fellow policemen instilled a spirit of intense fear into the
handful of men that guarded the front of Police Head-
quarters. They easily believed that the demonstrators were

168 THE GREEK DILEMMA

out to lynch them. For better protection, the group moved
across the street, taking shelter behind a breast-high stone
wall that faced out onto the Square.

About 10:45 one group of demonstrators broke through
the police cordon that had tried to block Syngrou Boulevard,
leading up from PIreus. (See map.) A triumphant and excited
crowd started to move across the Square heading directly
toward Police Headquarters. The crowd was unarmed, and
probably intended no more than a highly emotional demon-
stration against collaborators and the Papandreou Govern-
ment. It numbered perhaps six hundred persons, close
packed, and nearly all women and youngsters. They were an
angry mass of human beings, and certainly had no respect or
liking for the police. To the fifteen or twenty policemen who
stood behind the wall in front of the Headquarters building,
the advancing crowd was terrifying. When it had approached
to within one hundred feet of where they stood, panic ran
down the single line of grey-clad police. At this moment a
man dressed in military uniform, but not in the grey of the
police, suddenly ran out from the Headquarters building,
shouted "Shoot the bastards/' crouched on one knee beyond
the end of the wall, and began to fire his gun. The noise of
gunshots and his example decided the wavering police. They
too unslung their carbines, leveled them at the advancing
crowd, and fired a veritable fusillade into the mass in front of
them.

The crowd was taken completely by surprise. Their
banners fell like grain before a sickle as they threw themselves
onto the pavement. Some ran for refuge .to the sides of the
Square where walls and trees offered shelter. After a few
minutes the police stopped firing, probably only because their
ammunition had run out. When this lull came, the crowd
hastily ran from the road where they had thrown themselves
down. They left their banners behind them; left also some
twelve to fifteen bodies prone on the pavement. Of these some

CIVIL WAR 169

were only wounded, but at least seven were killed. That so
few were hurt can only be explained by supposing that most
of the policemen fired blanks. Perhaps only one man per-
haps the man who had run out at the last minute and started
the shootingfired to kill. A single carbine could easily have
done all the execution of that morning. If all of the police
had fired live rounds, not fifteen but at least a hundred would
have been hit, for the crowd was close and entirely unpro-
tected.

When the smoke had cleared, a few brave individuals
from the crowd returned to succor the wounded and remove
the dead. They dragged them from the Square and carried
the limp bodies away. The police continued to fire occasional
rounds across the Square, whenever a cluster of people
formed. The crowd remained scattered on either side of the
street, dazed and angry.

Meanwhile the police cordon across Kifissla Boulevard,
about two blocks away, had been attacked by a similar EAM
crowd, and had resorted to gunfire to drive the people back.
Hundreds of shots were fired, but when It was all over, there
were no casualties. In this instance, there is no doubt that the
police used blanks.

The deadlock in Constitution Square was broken by the
arrival of another crowd of demonstrators. Coming from the
west, up Hermes Street, this crowd had, like the first, broken
through the police cordon and arrived triumphant a few
minutes after 11 o'clock. The unnerved policemen in front
of the Headquarters building did not fire a second time. They
withdrew inside the gates and locked themselves in. During
the next half-hour the remaining police cordons disinte-
grated. Most of the policemen took refuge in private homes;
some few made their way in safety to the Headquarters; but
others were caught by the indignant crowd and in a few
cases were killed and torn literally limb from limb.

When the new arrivals discovered what had happened to

170 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the first group of demonstrators in Constitution Square, their
anger and excitement rose to a paroxysm. With the collapse
o the police cordons, great numbers flowed into the Square,
and within a few minutes it became densely packed. Still
other masses filled the neighboring streets, struggling to get
into the center of things. For the next three hours the crowd
milled round the Square, waving banners; shouting slogans,
and hurling imprecations against the cowering policemen
who hid within the walls of the Headquarters building*
Around the spots on the pavement where their fellows had
been slaughtered, little borders of flowers and twigs were
erected, and hundreds of persons bent down to dip their
handkerchiefs in the blood which lay fresh on the pavement.
These were made into banners, which were paraded through
the crowd while their bearers exhorted all around them to
touch the blood-stained rag and swear vengeance against the
men who had made the slaughter.

It was the greatest demonstration that Athens had ever
seen. Perhaps sixty thousand persons jammed the Square, and
other thousands stood outside. The excitement was inde-
scribable and the anger which exuded from the crowd
seemed almost palpable. A tiny wizened woman, dressed in
widow's weeds, came up in front of the Police Headquarters,
a wooden stick in her hand, and remained there for half an
hour, the very image of wrath. She hurled threats and spat out
curses, gesticulating with her whole body. She must have
struck a chord of fear in the heart of any policemen who
heard or saw her. Young girls, scarcely more than fourteen
years old, paraded with the hems of their skirts dipped in
blood from the pools on the street. Some boys raised an
American Army officer, who had tried to walk through the
crowd, up on their shoulders and carried him more than forty
yards before he kicked his way free. The crowd made a def-
inite effort to distinguish between the American and British
policy. They shouted "Roosevelt, Roosevelt," constantly, aftd

CIVIL WAR 171

carried vast numbers of American flags. There were also
many Greek flags, a few Russian, but no British. Banners in
English exhorted British soldiers not to interfere in Greek
affairs, and reproached General Scobie and Ambassador
Leeper for what they had done.

Somewhat after two o'clock in the afternoon a company
of British paratroopers arrived on the scene. They dis-
mounted from trucks and quickly formed a cordon, one
man deep, across the Square. The crowd showed no hostility
toward them, and with remarkable good humor obeyed the
soldiers* gestures that forbade walking through their line.
The cordon moved slowly across the Square, herding the
demonstrators in front of it. By this time the demonstration
had pretty well worn itself out in any case. The EAM-ites
must have been tired from the physical exertions and from
the emotional intensity of the morning. They moved off,
singing, down the main streets leading away from the Square,
and filtered back to their homes. Within twenty minutes of
the arrival of the British troops, the Square was empty, and
a strange silence descended upon its pavements.

The violent events of Sunday, 3 December, were a prelude
to civil war. When news of the action of the police reached
the ELAS Committee, the order was sent out to attack all
police stations. Beleaguermetit began the same night. One
by one the peripheral police stations were captured by ELAS
and their inmates executed. When news of this action reached
British Headquarters, relief parties of British troops were
organized and sent to those of the police stations that still
held out. ELAS made no active resistance to these columns,
and more than half of the Athens police force was rescued.

On December 4 the corpses of the people who had been
killed in the demonstration the day before were paraded
through the central streets of Athens. A great crowd of
mourners followed their biers, and the occasion turned into
a second, though smaller, EAM demonstration. This time.

172 THE : GREEK DILEMMA

British tanks and armored cars were stationed at the street
corners near the center of the city, and no further violence
occurred, although the crowd showed a more hostile attitude
toward the British soldiers than before.

The same day, ELAS began to attack the stronghold of the
X organization in the Theseon area of Athens. A small-scale
battle developed. Several buildings were set on fire. The lurid
color of flame was reflected from low hanging clouds, and
illumined Athens at night. Electric power had been cut
off by the general strike, and the red glow of the flames
seemed appropriate illumination for the fateful time. The
X organization was not numerous, and after a day of stubborn
fighting, in the course of which ELAS used mortars for the
first time, the rightists began to get the worst of it. They were
saved from extermination by a British relief party, which, as
in the case of the police rescues, was not resisted by ELAS,
although stray shots were fired near, if not at, British vehicles.

Meanwhile, the political scene had suffered violent fluctua-
tions. Papandreou was alarmed at the action of the Athens
police and still more by the reaction of EAM and its army,
ELAS, On Monday, 4 December, he offered his resignation.
Negotiations between various politicians in Athens were
begun with the purpose of forming another Cabinet over
which Themistocles Sofoulis would, by general consent, pre-
side. By Monday afternoon fairly definite arrangements had
been made for Sofoulis to take over, although the all-impor-
tant question of the share EAM would have in the new
Cabinet was not settled. But Athens did not have the only or
ultimate say in the matter. King George was in London, and
by constitutional procedure, only he could accept a Prime
Minister's resignation or authorize another man to form a
new Cabinet.

Telegrams were consequently sent 'off to King George ask-
ing his approval for the proposed change in Prime Ministers.
Other telegrams were sent to the British Foreign Office de^

CIVIL WAR 173

scribing the situation which had developed in Athens and the
steps which had been proposed to meet it. The question was
brought to Churchill. He was adamant against any concession
to EAM, and declared that Papandreou must stay. Accord-
ingly, a telegram was despatched to the British Ambassador
instructing him to urge Papandreou to withdraw his resigna-
tion. The substance of this communication was delivered to
Papandreou, who quickly enough agreed not to resign, and
thereby saved King George from the embarrassment of
making a decision. Sofoulis was informed that his services
would not after all be required. He took the information
without comment, but refused to lend his support to Papan-
dreou^ Government, declaring that it was nothing more than
a disguised dictatorship.

Churchill certainly could not have known the difficult de-
tails of the situation in Greece when he made this fateful
decision. He was probably influenced by the favorable im-
pression he had gained from his interview with the Greek
Prime Minister in August, Likewise, to allow Sofoulis to take
over the Government would mean an end of any chance of
restoring King George to his throne. Churchill had fewer
doubts about the Greek King than did his Ambassador in
Athens. He was relatively ignorant of the opposition that the
King aroused among his subjects, and indeed it seems prob-
able that Churchill scarcely conceived how different was the
institution of kingship in Greece from its counterpart in
Great Britain. A third consideration, and perhaps the most
compelling, was Churchill's estimate that any change in
Prime Ministers would mean concession to EAM. He prob-
ably believed that any concession would mean a complete
leftist victory, if not immediately, then in the early future;
and, as we have seen, the whole policy of the British Govern-
ment was directed toward preventing EAM from taking over
control of the Government of Greece. Churchill no doubt
thought that a show of resolution would bring the leftists- to

174 THE GREEK DILEMMA

heel. Probably it scarcely crossed his mind that British troops
might find themselves embroiled in a civil war as a result of
his decision.

When Papandreou withdrew his resignation, EAM found
itself in a critical position. The whole tactical plan had gone
askew. If they were to gain their end, and change the Govern-
ment, then obviously more strenuous efforts and greater
violence were required. Their problem was made no easier
by an order which General Scobie issued in the name of the
Greek Government early in the morning of 4 December. By
this order he commanded all ELAS units to withdraw from
Athens and Pireus within seventy-two hours, and ordered
them to desist from attacking police stations. As Allied Com-
mander in Chief and duly commissioned deputy of the Greek
Government, General Scobie unquestionably had the legal
power to issue such orders. To defy them would mean an
open break with British military power. ELAS was not yet
willing to risk battle with the British, and returned a tem-
porizing answer suggesting that the wishes of the Papandreou
Government should no longer be considered as the expres-
sion of the will of the Greek people, and expressing the hope
that the British would "remain neutral in the fight waged by
the Greek people for the safeguarding of their liberties."

The counsels of EAM were seriously divided. The Com-
munists were strongly in favor of continuing the battle, if
necessary even against British soldiers. They calculated that
the superior numbers of ELAS were sufficient to overcome
not only the Right-wing Greeks, but the British as well. The
Socialist element in EAM was reluctant to resort to unlimited
violence. They were still looking for a compromise, and
wished to reopen negotiations with Papandreou and the
British. The 'argument between the two groups was heated
but did not spread to the rank and file of the movement, for
the differences of the leaders were kept within closed doors.

CIVIL WAR 175

After hours of uncertainty, a sort of compromise was readied.
It was agreed that ELAS would not obey General Scobie's
ultimatum to evacuate the town; but, leaving British troops
scrupulously alone, would launch an attack on the main
governmental buildings in the center of Athens. The leftist
plan seems to have been to present General Scobie with a
fait accompli. On the morning of 6 December, when the ulti-
matum for withdrawal would expire, they hoped to be able to
say to the British General: "We are now the Greek Govern-
ment. We hold all Greece and all Athens, including the gov-
ernment buildings. Consequently you will no longer pay
attention to the wishes of the former Prime Minister, Mr.
Papandreou/*

In the grey light of dawn on the sixth of December ELAS'
made its attack. Men clad in civilian clothes and equipped
only with rifles, made their way through the Royal Gardens,
climbed the iron fence and started across Kifissia Boulevard,
a broad avenue along which lay the Foreign Office, the Minis-
try of War and other key government buildings. The attack
failed. One reason was that it was delivered halfheartedly,
and by relatively few men. A more important reason was that
when the attackers arrived near their goal they were thrown
into confusion by the unexpected presence of British soldiers.
Perhaps General Scobie had knowledge of the leftist's inten-
tions. Whether he did or not, a few hours before the attack
was started, British sentries were posted in front of all the
principal government buildings. ELAS had no instructions to
attack the British, and many of its members had no wish to
do so. Consequently, when in the early morning light they
saw the figure of a lone British soldier in front of each build-
ing, they did not know what to do. Some of the more reck-
less spirits pressed on, regardless; others hung back. The at-
tack was consequently weak and easily repulsed by the police
detachments which had been assigned to guard the buildings.

176 THE GREEK DILEMMA

The British sentries joined in the battle. Thus for the first
time ELAS and British soldiers fired at one another,^ and
began open warfare.

When the battle began, it was to the surprise and despite
the intention of both parties. The British were not prepared.
Small detachments of soldiers were scattered all through
Athens, quartered in various public buildings, guarding sup-
ply depots, and the like. Most of the British soldiers were
not combat troops, being headquarters personnel, supply
men, etc. There were, however, three combat units in Athens
under Scobie's command: the paratroop brigade which had
made the original landing in Greece, an armored brigade,
and the Third Greek Brigade. Their total fighting strength
was less than six thousand men. Of course in emergency this
number could be increased by using the services of non-
combat troops. Counting these, General Scobie had about
ten thousand men available in Athens and Pireus. He had
some twenty-four tanks and two squadrons of armored cars.
As air force, a Spitfire squadron was stationed near by at
Hassani airfield.

ELAS for its part was almost equally unprepared for any
prolonged battle. The main concentration of seasoned ELAS
troops was in Thessaly, where they had come down from the
Pindus after the liberation. Near the capital were two divi-
sions, totalling perhaps eight thousand men. Within the city
the ELAS Reserve numbered between ten and fifteen thou-
sand, but its members were unused to battle and the organi-
zation was necessarily imperfect. The Reserve had never
before been mobilized, and most of its members knew only
their immediate superior in the chain of command. In the
confusion of battle, such a system is likely to break down, one
man not knowing who is in authority or whom he should
obey.

The ELAS Committee in Athens had sent out an order
for reinforcements sometime prior to 5 December. A single

CIVIL WAR 177

brigade (about 2,000 men) from the Peloponnese, under the
command of the redoubtable Ares, arrived In Athens on the
5 or 6 December. Other reinforcements began to come from
Thessaly on the fifth. Unfortunately for the revolutionists'
plans, it required about eleven days of marching for troops
to come from Thessaly to Athens. Once the battk had been
joined, British airplanes patrolled the roads by day and shot
up anything that looked like ELAS troops on the march. In
consequence, the ELAS reinforcements from the north could
move only at night, and in fact did not arrive in time to take
any part in the fighting.

Not all of ELAS strength was devoted to the battle in
Athens. Large concentrations surrounded the British garri-
sons in Salonika and Patras, where a precarious armed truce
lasted throughout the period of hostilities in the capital.
Furthermore, ELAS chose this time to attack Zervas again.
EDES troops had infringed on the territory assigned to ELAS
by the Plaka Bridge and Caserta Agreements during the last
days of November. This ELAS took as a challenge to battle,
and the High Command decided to eliminate the threat to
their rear which the existence of Zervas* forces constantly of-
fered. Hostilities began 19 December. Three ELAS divisions
marched over the Pindus into Epirus, one of them going
through Albania in order to turn EDES* flank. The attack
was powerful and well executed. Within ten days of its open-
ing, Zervas was driven to the sea. About half of his force es-
caped to the island of Corfu, thanks to the British Navy,
which evacuated the EDES soldiers. By this victory, ELAS
gained control of all of Greece, save for a patch of land in the
center of Athens, another stretch along the Bay of Phaleron,
and two small zones in Salonika and Patras. Success in Athens
would have sealed their victory.

In Athens, confusion reigned on both sides after the attack
of 6 December had been repulsed. EAM was still reluctant
to fight against the British, and, for the next three days, tried

178 THE GREEK DILEMMA

by proclamation to keep the British neutral. General Scobie
for his part held that ELAS had disregarded his orders, and
as he had threatened, proceeded to treat the armed leftists as
rebels and enemies. Early in the morning of 6 December he
ordered British airplanes to strafe Ardettos Hill, a park which
overlooks the center of Athens on which ELAS had concen-
trated some troops. Other open areas held by ELAS were at-
tacked from the air during the course of the day. It is impos-
sible to be perfectly accurate with air attack, and some civilian
houses were hit and civilian lives lost by this strafing. The re-
action among the leftists of Athens was strong, and it is
probable that the deaths from British airplanes did much to
harden the feelings of the moderate elements in EAM and
make them willing to accept the Communist revolutionary
lead.

At this stage of the battle, British military circles seriously
underestimated the resistance they had to deal with. Armored
cars and tanks were able to move freely through the streets,
and no systematic resistance was made to British troops. Most
Britishers thought that the leftists would yield after a few
days, when they had seen British strength and determination.
The first disillusionment came when the Greek Third Bri-
gade was ordered to clear the southeast suburbs and capture
Ardettos Hill. The Greek soldiers met with heavy sniping,
especially in the Communist suburb of Kaiseriani, and were
unable to reach Ardettos Hill save with a few mortar shells.
This the British wrote down to Greek inefficiency. The real
disillusionment did not come until 10 December when Brit-
ish troops, supported by armored cars and tanks, moved
northward and occupied the Army Cadet College. This ad-
vance was made only after overcoming some sharp resistance.
A small garrison was left in the cadet school. Next morning
to their dismay the British found that the garrison was cut off.
ELAS had laid mines in the streets leading to the school, and
had lined the houses along the way with snipers. Only after

CIVIL WAR 179

losing several tanks and armored cars by mines did the Brit-
ish succeed in fighting their way to the school and rescuing
the garrison. It was promptly evacuated. From this time on-
ward the British soldiers seldom went beyond their lines.

On the other side, ELAS faced serious problems at the be-
ginning of hostilities. Even after 6 December, the leftists were
not united on the question of fighting the British. The Com-
munists, as before, argued for an all-out effort, but the Social-
ists held back. The moderates had no practicable alternative
to offer, however, and in the end, after long and heated de-
bates, the Communists won the upper hand. By 10 December
EAM had definitely determined that, if no political settle-
ment could be reached, they would fight not only the Right-
wing Greeks but the British as well.

Leaders of the moderate wing of EAM never fully made
up their minds in the emergency. Alexander Svolos, EAM's
leading intellectual Socialist, decided on 5 December that
he would not support an open revolution; but he did not
announce his decision nor make a public break with the ex-
treme leaders of the movement. Instead he retired to his home
and waited to see how events would turn out. A similar dis-
quiet troubled many in the rank and file who were Socialists
or merely republicans. They felt somehow that they had be-
come cat's-paws of the Communists, but saw no clear path by
which they could escape from the dilemma in which they
found themselves. They could not join the Right, and they
dared not stand by themselves, against both Communists and
conservatives. Their reluctance undoubtedly weakened the
force of the ELAS attack and reduced the Left's chance of
success.

Until about the 12 or 13 December EAM leaders still
hoped for a diplomatic settlement. Terms of agreement were
discussed between Siantos and Scobie on one of these two
days. The Communist leader was relatively conciliatory but
General Scobie insisted on the full measure of his original

180 THE GREEK DILEMMA

demands: evacuation of Athens and the disarmament of
ELAS throughout the country as had been ordered. Such
terms were not acceptable to Siantos and the interview
broke off without accomplishing anything,

On the military front, ELAS was also beset with difficulties.
The Reserve was an unreliable military instrument. It was
organized on a territorial basis. When its members were de-
fending their own home district, they sometimes fought very
bravely and effectively. When called to another part of the
city, however, their discipline was untrustworthy. Individuals
were likely to slip away to their homes from time to time in
order to make sure that all was well with their families. Pri-
vates tended to question their commanders* decisions, doubt-
ing their superior military skill and experience. In these and
other respects they showed an independence incompatible
with full military effectiveness. The ELAS regulars were
much better disciplined and more experienced in fighting.
After the first few days it was they who bore the real brunt of
the battle against the British and Greek rightist forces. The
Reserve did little but snipe; this, although troublesome at
times, never amounted to more than a serious nuisance to
the British.

Since the ELAS Reserve wore no sort of uniform, its mem-
bers could convert themselves from innocent civilian to hid-
den sniper with the greatest of ease. All that was necessary
was to take a gun from its hiding place and poke the muzzle
out of the window. This made sniping difficult for the Brit-
ish to deal with. Even in the heart of the city, where British
troops were concentrated, sniping was incessant during the
early days. Many times careful search of a building in which
a sniper had been seen revealed nothing. The sniper need
simply hide his gun and assume an innocent expression when
the search party came through; or perhaps invent a story
about a man whom he had seen running off over the roof tops
in this or that direction. The British met the sniping nuisance

CIVIL WAR 181

in two ways. They arrested large numbers of persons on sus-
picion, and when it became impossible to keep them in
Athens, they were transported to a vacated army camp in
North Africa. The other and more effective step was the ex-
pansion of a Greek National Guard.

The National Guard, which had been formed in November
from one class of the Army Reserve, had almost entirely dis-
integrated when ELAS attacked the government. In Athens,
some few men remained. When the British began to feel
the need for help against snipers, they determined to reestab-
lish and expand the National Guard, by calling up and equip-
ping additional reservists. Obedient to the British suggestion,
Papandreou and his Cabinet issued a decree calling into active
service Army Reserve classes from 1934 to 1940. As these men
reported, they were given rifles and uniforms and formed into
National Guard battalions. When uniforms gave out, arm
bands were used, so that by the end of the battle it was a
common sight to see bedraggled men in civilian clothing
carrying rifles over their shoulders with only a blue and white
armband to distinguish them from the ELAS reservists.

Inasmuch as the writ of the Papandreou Government ran
only where British arms prevailed, recruits to the National
Guard came at first only from a small district in the
center of Athens. With confusion so great, the "conscription"
amounted to little more than a legal framework for the for-
mation of volunteer units. Nobody looked too closely at the
men who offered themselves for service. That they should be
strictly within the age limits, nobody cared; nor did anyone
examine the past record of the recruits. This inevitable haste
and carelessness resulted in difficulties later. Many rough-
necks and criminals hastened to join the new National Guard.
Veterans of the Security Battalions did the same. The gen-
darmes, who had been brought to Athens to be screened, were
incorporated into the National Guard in a body without any
pretense at checking their individual records for collabora-

182 THE GREEK DILEMMA

tlon. As the original pressure for men relaxed, more care was
taken to enroll only those who legally belonged to the Guard.
The battalions formed during the latter part of December
were thus generally better disciplined and less extreme In
their political partisanship than was the case with those
formed earliest. Nevertheless, all the battalions that were
raised during the fighting in Athens were rowdy and strongly
anti-Communist. They came later to be known over most of
Greece as the "Athens Battalions" and their reputation was
no better than one would expect from the method of their
formation.

Recruits for the National Guard battalions came in fast
even in the earliest days. By the end of December, thirty-six
battalions had been formed and equipped, with a total
strength of more than nineteen thousand men. They were
used chiefly to police the rear areas. By dint of numbers, they
were able to check ELAS infiltration behind the lines and
pretty well stopped the sniping which had so bothered the
British during the early days.

From 8 to 12 December the scale of ELAS operations
steadily increased. The Reserve was gradually whipped into
shape > supplies of mines were brought into the city and
strewn in the principal streets, and the ELAS Regulars came
from the hills and took up positions as close to British troops
as they could. During this time various isolated British units
were withdrawn into the center, and some valuable supply
dumps were abandoned in Pireus and elsewhere. Consider-
able stores of food thus became available to ELAS, and much
of the rations which the ELAS soldiers ate while fighting in
Athens came from these abandoned British dumps.

One detachment, RAF Headquarters, was not withdrawn.
It was located in Kifissia, a suburb of Athens, and the RAF
commander pooh-poohed General Scobie's suggestion that his
men be brought inside the British perimeter. On 18 Decem-
ber ELAS attacked the buildings in which the RAF was

CIVIL WAK 183

billeted, and, after a two-day fight, captured them, taking
several hundred prisoners. This was perhaps the greatest
success ELAS won against the British. It was certainly the
largest single haul of prisoners they made.

The Greek Third Brigade was quartered outside Athens
when the fighting began, and remained there until near the
end. It was surrounded by ELAS troops, bombarded by
mortars, and subject to constant small arms fire. No attack
was launched on the barracks, however. After the unpleasant
experiences of the first days, when the Brigade had failed to
take Ardettos Hill, it remained on the defensive. Some con-
siderable difficulty was experienced in maintaining com-
munication with the British-held center of Athens. Special
convoys carried food and other supplies out to the Greek
troops at night, but they were subject to constant harassment
by ELAS, and until the last days of the battle, the Brigade's
supply situation remained precarious.

The British forces were divided between three separate
areas. A small number of men retreated to the tip of the
peninsula in Pireus where they were cut off from all com-
munication except by sea. Another slightly larger garrison
occupied the airfield at Hassani and the shore toward
Phaleron Bay. But the main body of British troops was lo-
cated in central Athens. When the lines finally became more
or less definitely fixed, about 12 December, the area held by
the British was small indeed. It was about two miles long, and
five or six blocks wide, extending from the barracks where
the armored brigade was stationed on the east to the British
Military Headquarters building on the west. The area em-
braced Constitution Square, the main government buildings
and part of the central business district. All the rest of the
city lay in the hands of ELAS.

Such a distribution of forces was ill suited for either de-
fense or attack. The main difficulty that troubled the British
commander was an imminent shortage of supplies. Much had

184 THE GREEK DILEMMA

been abandoned during the early days o the fighting and it
was difficult to distribute what remained to the three pockets
of troops. At one time, the British in central Athens had
only a single day's ration of food on hand, and their supplies
of gasoline were likewise nearly exhausted. Rumor had it that
General Scobie at one time considered evacuating Athens,
but decided against it because he had not enough trucks to
carry out the withdrawal speedily and in (comparative)
safety.

On 1 1 December Field Marshal Alexander, who had taken
command of the Mediterranean Theater, flew to Athens to
make a personal reconnaissance of the situation. He quickly
decided that reinforcements were necessary. Within two days
the first troops arrived by air from Italy, and during the next
two weeks a total of two complete British divisions came to
the Athens area, as well as a brigade of the Fourth Indian Di-
vision and several miscellaneous battalions. These reinforce-
ments were grouped under General Hawkesworthy's com-
mand. They took up a defense position along Phaleron Bay,
and proceeded to relieve the beleaguered British force in
Pireus after some hard fighting.

When the prospect of diplomatic settlement had vanished
(about 13 December), ELAS prepared for an all-out attack on
the British position in central Athens. British reinforcements
were already beginning to arrive, and the ELAS Committee
realized that they must strike immediately or lose all chance
of success. Their own reinforcements had not arrived from
Thessaly, and political difficulties within their ranks had not
been fully overcome. Nevertheless, it was decided to make a
concerted attack in the hope of compelling the British to
retreat entirely from Athens. The plan of attack called for a
simultaneous assault on the British lines from three direc-
tions. Unfortunately for the attackers, their synchronization
broke down. When on the night of 15-16 December, the at-
tacks were launched, they did not come exactly at the same

Civil, WAR 185

time. As a result, British armored cars and tanks were able to
rush from one front to another, to support the infantry line.
In this way, each assault was repulsed in turn. Only on the
east flank of the British position did ELAS succeed in break-
ing through. The leftists entered the barracks where the
armored brigade was quartered, burnt most o the gasoline
which was stored there, and captured and destroyed the mili-
tary switchboard, killing the civilian operators. Before they
were able to advance farther, however, the tanks arrived, and
were able to drive the invaders back. The failure of this
attack marked the turning point of the battle. Thereafter,
British strength grew steadily as the reinforcements arrived in
increasing numbers, and ELAS power gradually decreased
as individuals gave up the struggle and returned to their
homes.

The British did not attack at once with their newfound
superiority. Political considerations held them back. The
repercussions of the outbreak of fighting between British and
Greek troops in Athens had been world-wide. Newspaper
correspondents generally reported the events in Athens in a
tone highly critical of the British action. A storm of popular
disapproval resulted in both the United States and Great
Britain. Churchill was severely criticized for his imperialist
policy by members of Parliament and by the press. He him-
self was probably surprised by the turn affairs had taken, and
decided to make an effort to bring a political settlement of
the dispute. Accordingly, on Christmas Day he and his
Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, flew to Athens.

Upon his arrival, Churchill called a meeting of the most
prominent politicians of Athens. Arrangements were made
for the safe-conduct of EAM leaders to the conference, and
all the other traditional parties and leading political figures
were present. Churchill hoped that some sort of agreement
could be reached that would end the fighting immediately.
He hoped for something like a new Lebanon Agreement; and

jgg THE GREEK DILEMMA

as candidate for the headship of a new Government, the
British had fixed upon General Nicholas Plastiras.

Plastiras had been persuaded to come from his exile in
France some days previously. British political advisers pinned
great hopes on his return, for they thought him to be the one
man who might bring peace between Left and Right. Plas-
tiras had a political record that fitted him admirably for such
a mediating role. He had begun his career as a professional
soldier, joined the Venizelist insurrectionary movement in
Salonika in 1916, and later, in 1922, led the revolt against
King Constantine which forced him into exile. Plastiras was
personally popular among the refugee population which
formed the principal support of the EAM movement in
Athens. He was an uncompromising republican, and could by
no stretch of the imagination be accused of wanting to im-
pose a royal Government on an unwilling people. He would
thus, as head of the Government, be able to win the con-
fidence of many of the supporters of EAM. At the same time,
he was a conservative, and disapproved of the Communists
and their methods in the most emphatic manner. He would
never willingly see established a Communist Government in
Greece, nor permit Greece to move into the Russian orbit. A
man combining such qualities seemed to the British an ideal
choice to head a new coalition Government, and pacify the
Left.

But the political atmosphere in Athens did not favor agree-
ment. The royalists and men of the Right were delighted to
see British soldiers fighting their battles for them. They were
anxious that the Communists be utterly overthrown before
peace should come, and were consequently in no mood to
compromise. The Left too could not bring itself to yield. The
British terms remained unchanged that ELAS should agree
to disarmament and evacuate the Athens area but Siantos
and his fellow Communists were not willing to give up the
struggle or admit military defeat. Up to the time of the con-

CIVIL WAR 187

Eerence, the British had made no serious offensive move, and
it is possible that the leftists were ignorant of the scale of
British reinforcement.

A notable fact at the conference was the firmness with
which the old-line republican leaders turned their backs on
the Left. Social revolution played no part in the political
ideas of Sofoulis or the other Liberal leaders; and a close
look at revolution as practiced by ELAS soldiers made them
react against it violently. In this they reflected a revulsion that
spread over much of the population of Athens. ELAS had in-
dulged in atrocities to which the people of Athens were
scarcely inured. People's courts were established in various
suburbs to try persons accused of treason or collaboration.
Their procedure was summary and punishment severe. After
peace had come, several hundred bodies were exhumed from
a cemetery in the suburb of Peristeri, where most of the ex-
ecutions had taken place. Corpses showed unmistakable signs
of torture and mutilation that were horrible to see.

Still another psychological mistake was made by the leftists
when they decided to take hostages. Horror stories circulated
among the members of EAM retailing the brutalities of Brit-
ish and Greek soldiers against the captured ELAS-ites, and
on 16 December the ELAS Committee officially decided to
take an equal number of hostages from the part of Athens
they controlled. Fifteen thousand hostages were seized. When
the ELAS retreat began, the hostages were driven northward
on foot, despite inadequate clothing and bitter winter
weather. Laggards were frequently shot out of hand, and in
all, about tour thousand perished. The cruel treatment to
which the hostages were subjected, and the injustice of the
whole procedure, turned many former sympathizers against
EAM and the Communists who ordered such deeds.

When the political representatives gathered together foi
conference (25-26 December), they agreed only on one point,
All parties thought it wise that a regent should be appointed

188 THE GREEK DILEMMA

to exercise the powers of the King until such time as a plebis-
cite could be held to decide whether King George should re-
turn. On everything else, agreement proved impossible.
Siantos demanded, as the conditions on which he would desist
from battle, that EAM be given forty to fifty per cent of the
seats in a new Cabinet; that collaborationists be purged from
the state machinery; and that the gendarmes and Third
Brigade be disbanded. Only when this had been done would
ELAS agree to surrender its arms to the Government. Plastiras
refused even to consider these terms. The representatives of
the Popular Party walked out, exclaiming that such action
would mean communizing the country.

Churchill had waited impatiently in Athens for the conclu-
sion of the conference. He was nettled by the failure of the
Greek leaders to come to any sort of understanding, and de-
parted immediately for London. In leaving he made some
rather ill-tempered remarks belittling Greek political capa-
city, and threatened that if the Greeks did not succeed "in
laying democratic foundations which are satisfactory and
inspire confidence, it will probably be necessary that you be
placed temporarily under international trusteeship of some
form."

His experience in Athens had nevertheless convinced
Churchill of two things. He decided that King George was
hopelessly unpopular, at least for the time being, and de-
termined to bring all the pressure he could command to per-
suade the Greek King to agree to the appointment of a
regent. Secondly, he concluded that the leftists would have to
be crushed by superior weight of arms before they would
accept terms satisfactory either to the British or to the other
political leaders of Greece. Accordingly he ordered the Brit-
ish generals in Greece to begin a full-scale offensive as soon as
possible.

The offensive began on the very next day, 27 December.
British troops moved northward from their Phaleron base,

CIVIL WAR 189

and the Greek Third Brigade attacked southward from their
barracks. ELAS had no strength to stand against the superior
numbers, equipment and discipline of the attacking troops.
Within three days the whole southern half of the city was
cleared of ELAS soldiers, and much of Pireus had been cap-
tured from the leftists as well. Following this success, the
British stopped their advance for a couple of days, regrouping
and resting their forces. On 3 January the attack was resumed
on the northern part of the town and the advance continued,
though in the face of stout resistance. By this time the ELAS
Committee realized that their forces could no longer hope to
hold Athens. On the night of 4-5 January a general with-
drawal was ordered, and ELAS began to evacuate the city.

The retreat was carried out in reasonably good order. Rear
guard detachments systematically dynamited buildings along
the road of retreat and used the rubble as barricades from
which to stand off the advancing British troops. By January 6
the last ELAS units had left Athens. Many of the Reserve
betook themselves to their homes, and for the most part it was
only the Regular ELAS troops that withdrew from the city.
They were not closely pursued. The British wanted first to
search the newly won areas to prevent any outbreak of sniping
in their rear. By 8 January pursuit was organized, and, in the
following week, advance British units penetrated as far north
as Lamia and as far south as Corinth.

ELAS had been beaten. On 11 January delegates from
ELAS Headquarters came to General Scobie and arranged an
armistice. The leftists agreed to evacuate all troops from
Attica, Beotia and a part of Phocia, and to abandon an area
within a twenty-mile radius of Salonika. It was provided that
ELAS troops should return to the part of the country to
which they were native, thus preventing any concentration of
strength in the north of Greece for a future resumption of the
struggle. Release of all prisoners was prescribed, and arrange-
ments for relief parties to come to the succor of the hostages

190 THE GREEK DILEMMA

were also included in the terms of truce. It was further pro-
vided that terms of surrender were to be negotiated between
ELAS and the Greek Government at the earliest possible date.
On 15 January hostilities came to an end as agreed by the
truce. The power of ELAS had been broken; the revolution
had failed; all the enthusiasm and ardor of the EAM move-
ment had come to disaster. Many former followers had be-
come bitterly disillusioned, and the leaders of the Left were
compelled to admit defeat. It remained for a new political
balance to be struck, and a start made toward reconstruction
of the war-torn country.

VIII
Reaction

BEFORE the final military
overthrow of ELAS, two steps of the greatest importance had
been taken toward the political pacification of Greece. On
New Year's Day, 1945, His Beatitude, Damaskinos, Metro-
politan of Athens and Archbishop of All Greece, became
Regent. Three days later, General Nicholas Plastiras was ap-
pointed Prime Minister. This change in regime undoubtedly
attracted many of the EAM moderates away from their Com-
munist leaders, and made possible the early end of the civil
war. From the point of view of the British, who had in large
part engineered the transfer of power, the move was therefore
a success.

When Churchill returned from his Christmas visit to
Athens, he promptly interviewed King George II. The Greek
King still cherished a stubborn determination not to yield
one jot or tittle of his rightful powers; but brief and forceful
argument changed his mind. Churchill insisted, and the King
unwillingly agreed to authorize Archbishop Damaskinos to
become Regent. A telegram was despatched to Athens an-
nouncing King George's decision. Accordingly a hasty cere-
mony was arranged in an upper room of the Foreign Office,
at which the Archbishop-Regent took an oath to exercise the
royal power in accordance with the Constitution.

The new Regent was a striking figure of a man. He stood
well over six feet, and was broad in proportion. The flowing
robes and high mitre, which he wore by virtue of his episcopal

191

192 THE GREEK DILEMMA

office, exaggerated his height, and assured that his mere
physical presence dominated any ordinary gathering of men.
His face was coarse featured but majestic. His nose, which had
been broken and thickened at the root, served as visible re-
minder that Damaskinos' early career and first fame came as a
wrestler where his extraordinary size and strength served him
well.

While still a young man Damaskinos gave up the wrestling
ring and became a monk, which, in the Orthodox Church, is
the normal prelude to a prelate's career. His imposing
physical appearance, keen intelligence and general good sense
assured him of preferment. In 1922 he was appointed Bishop
of Corinth. Five years later, a great earthquake devastated the
town, and Damaskinos undertook a trip to the United States
to raise money from the Greeks of America for the rebuilding
of the destroyed city. He was very successful, gathering several
million dollars, which helped to rebuild Corinth on a new
site some three miles from the old town.

Damaskinos rapidly rose to a leading place in the Greek
Church. In 1936 he again travelled to America, this time on a
political mission in connection with the election to the pa-
triarchate of Constantinople which occurred in that year. He
went to drum up support among the Orthodox Church lead-
ers of the United States for the candidate favored by the
Greek bishops. In the same year, the incumbent Archbishop
of All Greece died, and the council of bishops assembled to
elect a successor. There were two candidates: Damaskinos and
another bishop named Chrysanthos. The election was closely
contested, but Damaskinos was finally elected by the margin
of a single vote.

This outcome displeased Dictator John Metaxas. Damas-
kinos was generally known to be republican. He was no great
friend or supporter of the King, and openly disapproved of
the reactionary and extra-legal acts of the dictatorial Govern-

REACTION 193

ment. Consequently, on the ground that one of the partici-
pating bishops had been unqualified to vote, the Government
declared the election invalid. The bishops met again, and a
new vote gave a majority for Chrysanthos. To remove a
troublesome personality from the public eye, Metaxas there-
upon sent Damaskinos into retirement in a provincial
monastery.

He remained there until after the Germans had occupied
Athens. Thinking to gain a grateful supporter, the quisling
Government in 1941 annulled the election of Chrysanthos
and declared Damaskinos to be the rightful head of the
Church. Chrysanthos in his turn retired, taking up private
residence in Athens; and Damaskinos came to the capital and
assumed the robes of office. Despite the circumstances of his
accession to power, Archbishop Damaskinos never truckled to
the quisling Governments. He busied himself with organizing
relief for the people of Athens, and gathered around himself
a group of earnest young men who conducted summer camps,
helped suspects escape to the Middle East, carried blankets
and other supplies to freshly burnt villages, and in other ways
tried to reduce the hardships of the occupation for the people.
During most of 1944 he was kept under house arrest by the
Germans, but was not molested otherwise.

Damaskinos was able to remain almost entirely above the
strife of factions which tore Greece apart during the later
years of occupation. He never denounced EAM, although
strong pressure was brought to bear upon him to do so. EAM
reciprocated by refraining from denouncing him, and indeed
the majesty of his robes and sacred office held a strong power
over the imaginations of most of the rank and file of the move-
ment. Despite this, conservatives never accused the Arch-
bishop of being a leftist, although some of them thought he
was overly inclined to sympathize with republicanism. He
was thus in a thoroughly unique position among prominent
Greeks, and it was for this reason that he had been fixed upon

194 THE GREEK. DILEMMA

by common consent as far back as 1943 as candidate for the
office of Regent.

The personal character of Damaskinos was kindly. He is
said to have been ambitious and scheming as a young man;
but, having arrived at so high a place, ambition no longer
goaded him. His education, save in theology, was not exten-
sive; but experience and native good sense have made him
wise in the ways of men, a capable administrator and a prac-
tical politician. Such a man was surely well chosen to preside
over the destiny of Greece in troubled times.

As soon as the Regent had been sworn in, Papandreou sub-
mitted his resignation. It was accepted and the Regent com-
missioned General Plastiras to form a new Cabinet. By 3
January Plastiras had selected a Cabinet, and took office. For
the most part he relied on old friends of 1922 and 1933, who
were all associated with the Liberal Party, but he gave his
Cabinet a flavor of coalition by including two representatives
from the republican wing of the Popular Party. The Govern-
ment was thus solidly anti-royalist. It was also anti-Com-
munist and was committed to carry on the struggle against
ELAS.

When the truce between ELAS and General Scobie was
signed, the most pressing problem before the Government
became the negotiation of a definitive settlement with the
leftists, who remained in control of more than half the coun-
try. At the time, many persons in Athens expected a resump-
tion of hostilities. From grossly underestimating the power of
ELAS, the pendulum had swung to the extreme of overesti-
mation. In actual fact, the Communists had shot their bolt.
Within the ranks of ELAS, strong criticism was raised against
the way their leaders had conducted the revolution. As late
as 14 December, ELAS guerillas coming to join the fight in
Athens were told that they were to fight against Greek Fas-
cists, and when they found themselves opposing British
troops, they were grievously surprised, and some few deserted

REACTION 195

or allowed themselves unnecessarily to be taken prisoner.
After the truce, Siantos and his colleagues no longer could
have ordered their men to resume the fight, had they so
wished.

Despite this fact, peace negotiations were long drawn out.
There was bickering about the representatives, the Govern-
ment insisting that members of the Communist Party be sent,
while EAM* preferred to accredit men who were not Com-
munists. At length the Government had its way, and, at the
beginning of February, a three-man delegation, headed by
Siantos, arrived in Athens to negotiate peace. After a week's
bargaining, agreement was reached on 12 February. From the
name of the village near which the meeting took place, it was
called the Varkiza Agreement. By its terms ELAS agreed to
surrender all arms, and quotas for the various types of
weapons were established as a means of assuring that actual
disarmament took place. With the exception of a few small
guard detachments, disbandment of ELAS was to be com-
pleted within two weeks. Weapons were to be concentrated at
specified points, and handed over to British officers appointed
by General Scobie to collect them.

In return for this concession, the Government agreed to
maintain and uphold civil liberties and to publish an amnesty
which would cover all "political" crimes committed during
the civil war. The Government further promised to purge the
state bureaucracy by means of special boards, but the criteria
on which judgment was to be based were only vaguely re-
corded. The Army was to be recruited by age groups, but it
was expressly provided that professional soldiers and reserv-
ists specially trained in modern weapons could be retained in
service. This in practice meant that the Third Brigade and
Sacred Squadron would remain to form the core of a new
Greek Army. The final provision was as follows:

At the earliest possible date, and in any case within the cur-
rent year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and

196 THE GREEK DILEMMA

with every care for its genuineness, a plebiscite, which shall
finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being
submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall
follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent As-
sembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the
country. The representatives of both sides agree that for the
verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popu-
lar will, the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send
observers.

The elections, promised by this clause, were to become one
of the main issues of Greek politics during the following
year. In view of the later changes, it is interesting to note that
the leftists pressed for an early election date at this time. They
evidently still believed themselves to command a safe ma-
jority in the country, and hoped through fair elections to
resume some or all of the power they had lost. Six months
later they had lost their confidence, and, fearing defeat, used
all the devices at their command to postpone the holding of
elections. This striking change in tactics was brought about
by a widespread popular reaction against the Left which
began to show itself as soon as the military power of ELAS
had been dissipated. We must now follow the manifestations
of that reaction.

Despite some misgivings among British officers and Greek
conservatives, ELAS punctually and faithfully carried out
most of the military prescriptions of the Varkiza Agreement.
Arms were duly collected into dumps, and the soldiers of
ELAS were sent home with formal discharge certificates. A
few ELAS-ites, however, either feared or disliked the prospect
of returning to their native villages. One small band of ir-
reconcilables under the leadership of Ares took to the familiar
mountains of the Pindus, and defied both the Greek Govern-
ment and the orders of the Communist Party. Three months
later the band was hunted down by detachments of the Na-
tional Guard. After a brisk battle, the rebels were over-
powered. Most of them were killed on the spot, and only

REACTION 197

three or four succeeded in escaping. Ares was among the
dead. His head was cut off and brought to the town of Trik-
kala where it was barbarously displayed in the market place
for all to see. Others from the ranks of ELAS, numbering per-
haps three or four thousand in all, crossed the border into
Yugoslavia where they found refuge from the vindictiveness
of the Greek Right, and lived to stir up future trouble in
Greek Macedonia.

The British originally planned to occupy ELAS territory
slowly, but the unexpected completeness of the disarmament,
and the outbreak of disorders in some of the remote areas of
the country, persuaded them to accelerate their movements.
By 1 April detachments of British troops had penetrated to
all the principal towns of Greece, and had quieted most of
the incipient disorder. The first care of the British was to
take over the arms dumps where ELAS had concentrated its
weapons. By the Varkiza Agreement, 41,500 rifles and a pro-
portionate number of other weapons had been set as the
minimum to be turned over by ELAS. Actually ELAS sur-
rendered more of every weapon than had been required.
Despite this surplus, not all the leftists* arms were given up,
as had been stipulated in the peace terms. Some of their best
weapons were secreted in caches and singly. During the next
six months, British and Greek troops searched out as many of
these hidden arms as they could. The total actually discovered
and reported amounted to about four thousand additional
small arms. Many more were actually found by the Greek
troops and never reported, being used to equip civilian
sympathizers of the Right.

The National Guard, which had been formed so hastily in
Athens during the battle, was the organization to which fell
the task of policing the newly occupied areas. The Greek
units followed behind the British more slowly, and it was not
until May 15 that National Guardsmen had spread the power
of the Greek Government to all parts of the country. As the

198 THE GREEK DILEMMA

guard advanced, new battalions were raised from the local
inhabitants by the call up of a single class of the Army Re-
serve. The Athens Battalions served as a sort of advance party,
occupying new areas progressively, moving on only after local
battalions had been formed. Consequently, it was the Athens
Battalions that came first to each part of die territory that had
been occupied by ELAS. These battalions contained many
disreputable characters. Their officers and soldiers were
fanatically opposed to communism, and were generally ig-
norant of the law. As a result, they freely disregarded the civil
liberties which had been promised by the Varkiza Agreement.
In point of fact, the machinery for legal arrest and trial did
not exist in the provinces, and the only alternatives were
either complete inaction or infraction of the niceties of law.
Nevertheless, the Athens Battalions indulged in unnecessary
and provocative acts against the Left, and, partly as a result,
frequently became engaged in local affrays and public brawls.
When a National Guard detachment first arrived in a vil-
lage or town which had previously been under leftist control,
the Guardsmen first conducted a search for hidden weapons,
and regularly found a goodly number. Their methods were
rough. Most of the caches which they found were discovered
by confessions wrung from local leaders of the Left by beat-
ings and other strong-arm methods. Sometimes the weapons
were turned in to the British, but a proportion they regularly
kept out and gave to their political friends, that is, to men of
the Right. As soon as the Left had been thus disarmed, a
swarm of informers descended on the Guard commander, ac-
cusing the local leftists of all sorts of crimes. Most of these
accusations were never acted upon, but a proportion of them
resulted in arrests. Jails were primitive and soon became ter-
ribly overcrowded. Since judges were few and legal procedure
incredibly dilatory, many persons languished in prison for
months on end without coming up for trial. After some
months, the Government was compelled to pass a series of

REACTION 199

amnesty laws which cleared the prisons of most of the persons
who had been incarcerated. By this, innocent and guilty alike
were freed, and in parts of Greece private vengeance was
thereupon brought into play to remedy the undeniable de-
fects of legal justice.

Despite the handicaps under which they labored once the
National Guard had come to town, EAM and Communist
newspapers generally continued to appear as before. A favo-
rite pastime of some of the National Guardsmen came to be
breaking up the leftist printing shops. On many occasions,
a group of soldiers in their off-duty hours invaded the prem-
ises where the printing was done, scattered the type fonts and
smashed as much as they could of the presses. The editors, if
caught, were beaten.

Not all battalions indulged in such rowdyism. Their con-
duct varied according to the officers who led them. Much, too,
depended on how close the unit found itself to British troops,
who uniformly exercised a moderating influence. On several
occasions British officers made prison inspections and com-
pelled improvements in what were truly appalling conditions.
The British looked with the strongest disapproval on the
practice of arming civilians with the weapons seized from
leftists, so that in the larger towns where British troops were
also stationed, this practice was a good deal less open than
elsewhere.

As the National Guard spread out through the countryside
of Greece, a sort of miniature counter-revolution followed in
its wake. The rightists of each village and town came into the
open, and proceeded to do all in their power to turn the
tables, and silence their opponents. A rash of self-styled Na-
tionalist organizations grew up within a matter of weeks.
Many of them were nothing but an ambitious letterhead or a
cabal of a few would-be politicians. As time went on, the
local organizations tended to affiliate themselves with nation-
wide societies, chief among which was X. By fall, Colonel

200 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Grivas, the leader of the X organization, claimed a member-
ship of two hundred thousand. In actual fact, however, much
of the membership was nominal. The rightist organizations
never succeeded in mobilizing the same enthusiastic energy
as had the Left, nor did they ever coine to dominate the daily
life of the population with speeches, demonstrations, lectures,
etc., to the same extent as the Left had done. Furthermore,
the Government was officially committed to an advocacy of
civil liberties. EAM had been trammelled by no such com-
punctions and had permitted no dissident newspapers to ap-
pear, nor any rival political organizations to form under its
regime.

It followed that the relative inefficiency of the Right in its
organization and propaganda, supplemented by an official
policy of toleration, made political life freer in 1945 than it
had been under the Left a year before. In most villages, save
for the northern parts of Greece, EAM organization and ac-
tivities pretty well ceased. In the larger towns, great numbers
of EAM followers deserted the movement, but the organiza-
tional core remained, and was able to continue propaganda,
organize strikes, and even hold public demonstrations. Dur-
ing the first months after the disarmament of ELAS, the Com-
munist party line was pacific. By a careful obedience to the
law, the party leaders hoped to make possible an early election
which would, they believed, return a majority for EAM. But
in calculating thus, the Communists underestimated the re-
action against them.

In March the two leading figures of the Socialist movement,
Elias Tsirimokos and Professor Alexander Svolos, announced
their withdrawal from EAM, and by degrees drew all So-
cialist groups into a new United Socialist Party. In breaking
off they spoke harsh words against the Communists, accusing
them of having dominated and perverted the whole EAM
movement. How many of the EAM rank and file followed the
Socialist leaders, it is impossible to say. Socialism has always

REACTION 201

been a comparatively weak movement in Greece, and the
actual number of persons who deserted EAM with Svolos and
Tsirimokos may have been small. Nevertheless, their action
had a certain importance since it made the Communists the
sole supporters of EAM. Its pretensions to be a National
Front representing the whole Greek people from this time on
lacked all plausibility.

Marked regional variations in the political pattern of the
Greek countryside developed in the course of the first year of
rule by the Athens Government. In the south generally, and
especially in the Peloponnese, the Right gained almost un-
challenged control. Leftists were severely persecuted, and
many were hunted down and killed by armed rightists. Re-
venge for murders committed by leftists during the preceding
years probably constituted the principal motive in most such
killings, for in the Peloponnese it is still counted a family
duty to kill the murderer of a close relative. In central Greece
and Thessaly, the Left remained much stronger. Most villages
passed under rightist domination, but the towns became di-
vided between rival political organizations, and small-scale
disorders were not uncommon between the extremes.

In Epirus, Zervas' followers, demobilized after 1 January
in Corfu, returned to the mainland and dominated both town
and country. On the ground that Albanians persecuted
Greeks on the other side of the border, Zervas' bravos harried
about fifteen thousand Albanian peasants from their ancestral
villages and compelled them to flee from Greece to Albania.
The fact that the Chams, as these Albanians were called, had
cooperated with the Germans during the occupation and had
used their favored position to abuse their Greek neighbors,
partly accounts for this vengeful act.

Western and Central Macedonia, on the other hand, re-
mained strongly influenced by the Left. Many villagers met
the new National Guard with hostile sullenness; and the
rightists among them never achieved an unchallenged su-

202 THE GREEK DILEMMA

premacy such, as was general In the south. The major reason
for this difference was probably the relatively good record
EAM and ELAS had made in the north. The EAM movement
there had won general support from the population, and con-
sequently the leftists did .not find it necessary to use violent or
terroristic methods. Conversely, the Right, finding less sup-
port than elsewhere, committed more outrages in Macedonia
than in the other parts of Greece during the first days of its
new-found power.

In Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, provinces which had
been occupied by the Bulgars during the war, the state of
public feeling and balance of political organization was quite
different from that of the neighboring sections of Macedonia.
The EAM movement had penetrated that area late (hardly
before 1944) and never consolidated its hold on the popula-
tion so firmly as elsewhere. Remnants of Anton Tsaous' band
came down from hiding in the hills after ELAS had laid down
its arms, and, for a brief while, more or less took over control
of towns such as Drama and Serres. Even after regular units
of the National Guard had arrived on the scene, Tsaous'
guerillas continued to carry arms for several weeks; and the
band became the framework for a sort of local nationalist
political machine. The influence of Tsaous' band was made
possible by the state of political feeling among the people at
large, which turned strongly against the Left, identifying the
Communists with a policy of conciliation toward the hated
Bulgars. Even towns such as Kavalla, the chief center of
tobacco manipulation in Greece, which had been a strong-
hold of communism before the war, showed a much more
conservative spirit than was the case in industrial towns in
other parts of the country.

The greater cities of Greece that is, Athens, Pireus, Sa-
lonika, Patras, and Volos differed from the country that la^
around them in that political antagonism there had a real base
in social class distinctions. A proletariat, largely unemployed

REACTION 203

and existing chiefly on the goods supplied by relief agencies,
remained generally loyal to the Communist leaders. Against
them, merchants, capitalists, as well as a host of small entre-
preneurs, were almost solidly arrayed as members of one or
another of the "nationalist" parties. Intellectuals and profes-
sional men divided between the two extremes.

By slow degrees the civil administration of the central Gov-
ernment was reestablished in the provinces. Governors and
prefects were appointed and despatched to their posts, but
after they had arrived they found themselves faced with in-
numerable difficulties. There was an almost total lack of sup-
plies and transport. Even the simplest items such as paper to
write on or the pencil wherewith to write were unobtainable,
or could only be acquired after days of effort. No sort of civil
service existed, of course; and the local officials were seldom
empowered to make any but the most petty expenditures
without special authority from Athens. In practice, the top
administrators spent most of their time in the capital, trying
to force decisions from the central Government, and perforce
neglected the day-to-day management of the provinces as-
signed to their care.

As soon as possible, the gendarmery was reorganized and
despatched to the provinces to relieve the National Guard of
police duty. The gendarmes who had served during the occu-
pation formed the core of the new force. Only a few hundred
were refused reinstatement because of collaboration with the
Germans; but all were put through an abbreviated training
course organized by a British Police Mission, were reequipped
with uniforms and carbines, and hurried out to the provinces.
By 15 May the gendarmes had taken over police responsibility
everywhere, although they were not numerous enough to re-
lieve the National Guard in the more remote areas until some
months later. After the gendarmery had arrived in the prov-
inces, the National Guard became merely a frontier police,
with the exception of a dozen battalions which remained in

204 THE GREEK DILEMMA

the Interior as a sort of reserve in case of disorders too great
for the gendarmery to cope with.

In general the reorganized gendarmery made a better
record than the National Guard had done. The force was
definitely rightist. No known or suspected Communists were
admitted to its ranks, and many gendarmes were closely as-
sociated with, or even became members of, extreme rightist
organizations such as X. Despite this bias, the processes of
law were better observed by the gendarmery, and they com-
mitted fewer illegal acts of violence against the Left than the
National Guard had done.

The central Government itself suffered from many of the
same difficulties that plagued its local representatives. The
plethora of civil servants who had been given jobs during the
occupation nearly all remained on the Government's payroll,
although many, perhaps even most of them, were half idle or
performed useless tasks. Frequent changes in Cabinet Minis-
ters, and corresponding shifts in the top administrators,
seriously interfered with the smooth functioning of most gov-
ernment offices. Graft and favoritism were scarcely checked,
especially when a new inflation began to develop and the civil
servants' salaries became entirely inadequate to sustain life.

Two agencies almost independent of the Government
began to take over mariy of the functions which normally
would have fallen to the central administration. In economic
matters, UNRRA guided and largely controlled Greek Gov-
ernment officials; in military matters, the Greek General
Staff, supported by a British Military Mission, achieved a
marked degree of independence.

Civilian relief was under military control for the first six
months of liberation. A special organization known as
Military Liaison, Greece, headed by an American brigadier
general, Percy L. Sadler, assumed initial responsibility for
relief distribution. Tfre Athens fighting delayed operations
for about two months, but during the reduced time, about

REACTION 205

ninety per cent of the amount of supplies originally scheduled
was brought into the country. The chief item was food, for
Greece was even less able than before the war to feed its
population.

UNRRA took over the responsibility for relief in April
1945, with the expectation of administering a two-year pro-
gram ending 1 January 1947. The scale of its operation was
very large. A foreign staff of over seven hundred persons,
nearly all American and British, was supplemented by sev-
eral thousand Greeks. The controversy which had begun in
Cairo was ended in April when UNRRA at length signed an
agreement with the Greek Government, by which it took re-
sponsibility only for discharging supplies on the docks.
Officials of the Government were to supervise delivery and
distribution. UNRRA, however, was accorded the right of
inspection to make sure that flagrant abuses did not develop.
In practice this right of inspection came to be greatly ex-
panded, and in many instances, the Greek governmental
officials became almost wholly dependent on UNRRA's "ad-
vice/*

Most of UNRRA deliveries to Greece during 1945 were
designed for relief rather than rehabilitation. Its purchases
for Greece during the second-half of 1945 were as follows:

Food $100,000,000

Seed and agricultural equipment 14,000,000

Clothing 21,000,000

Industrial rehabilitation 26,000,000

Hygiene 10,000,000

Total $171,000,000

During the first full year's operation no less than 1,400,000
tons of food were imported by UNRRA into Greece, in addi-
tion to which Military Liaison brought 387,000 tons to the
country. This amounted to about four hundred pounds for
every single person in Greece, more than a pound per day.

206 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Such a quantity of food prevented any real starvation, but
many persons were undernourished, especially since it be-
came common practice for poor families to sell a part of their
UNRRA ration on the black market to provide themselves
with ready cash.

During 1946, the emphasis of the UNRRA program shifted
from immediate relief toward longer range reconstruction.
Consequently, food and clothing shipments were reduced and
a larger amount of machinery and industrial raw material was
fed into thd> Greek economy. The results were perceptible.
Agriculture, the great economic base of the country, re-
covered most promptly and, thanks to an unusually favorable
growing season, the wheat crop of 1946 was almost equal to
average prewar production.

Industrial recovery was much slower. Financial and labor
difficulties powerfully abetted damaged and worn-out ma-
chinery to keep production at a small fraction of prewar
figures. Industry, however, had never been of central im-
portance in the over-all picture of Greek economy. A more
serious and crippling problem was the difficulty of transporta-
tion. UNRRA brought about six thousand trucks to distrib-
ute relief supplies, but was unable to help much with the
repair of the railroads, which, it is estimated, will take two
years from 1 January 1946 under the most favorable cir-
cumstances. During 1946 the narrow gauge railroad in the
Peloponnese was repaired and the important link between
Salonika and Constantinople was reopened. Some stretches
of the main line from Athens to Salonika were likewise re-
built, but UNRRA could not supply the materials necessary
for the repair of some difficult tunnels and bridges between
Thessaly and Botia. Equally, if not more, important was
the shortage of sea transport, which had carried much of the
freight in prewar Greece. About eighty per cent of the small
coasting vessels had been sunk during the war, and wood to
build new ones was very scarce and expensive. Lack of

REACTION 207

adequate transportation put a steady drag on the functioning
of the Greek economy, increased local food shortages, and
hindered all forms of industrial activity.

UNRRA was an international organization, and as such
was properly independent of the Greek Government. The
Greek General Staff, on the other hand, was of course
nominally subject to the control of the Government through
the Ministry of War. In practice, however, it was able to
assert a great deal of independence and gained a control over
Army administration and policies almost apart from the wishes
of the Government. The major reason for this was a British-
directed effort to make the Greek Army free from "politics."
British Police and Military Missions were established during
the early months of 1945, having been requested by the
Papandreou Government at the time of the civil war to assist
in reorganizing the police and army. The Police Mission was
accorded mandatory powers, so that its chief was able to veto
promotions and transfers proposed by the Minister "of In-
terior if they seemed to him deleterious to the service. The
Military Mission, however, had only advisory powers; but its
advice proved to have nearly the force of command.

In the new Greek Army, men trained in the Middle East
and already familiar with the British methods and organiza-
tion were in a key position. Veterans of the Third Brigade
constituted the principal cadres for new units, and their con-
servative spirit came to dominate the Army completely.
Plastiras, as an old soldier and veteran of two military revo-
lutions, had an especial interest in the Army. He appointed
his personal friends and former republican confederates to
the top commands; but despite the fact that the generals
were nearly all republican, tHe Army itself became strongly
royalist. General Constantine Vendiris, who was appointed
Assistant Chief of the General Staff, became the key figure
of the Greek Army in this anomalous situation. He was in
the confidence of the British advisers, and was able to sur-

208 THE GREEK DILEMMA

round himself with a personal following of relatively senior
officers. These officers were fanatically anti-Communist, and
looked on King George II as the best stay against the Red
menace. Vendiris and his friends gained authority to make
appointments in the whole Army, and by that power, came to
control it.

This development in the Army was profoundly disturbing
to Prime Minister Plastiras. With a royalist Army holding the
ultimate power in the state, he saw small chance of establish-
ing the republic which he hoped for. He tried to interfere,
but only came into collision with the British Mission which
accused him of playing politics with the Army, In this con-
tention, the British officers of the Mission were undoubtedly
sincere. They did not fully realize the political bias of the
Army they were helping to create, and regarded any inter-
ference with their work as mere political meddling. The
British Military Mission was able to enlist the support of the
British Ambassador and General Scobie. And its desires in
general prevailed, even against the will of the Prime Minister.

At the same time, in the country at large, royalism gained
steadily at the expense of republicanism. Generally, anyone
who disliked the Communists and their methods came also to
distrust republican government. The royalists harped steadily
on the theme that Greece's only effective safeguard against the
Left was the return of the King; and few Greeks could believe
that a liberal republican Government would be able to sur-
vive the machinations of the Communists. The Liberal party
limped along under the direction of a few old men. Themisto-
cles Sofoulis, now eighty-three years old, remained as head of
the party, and his following consisted mostly of men whose
political ideas had been fixed at the time of the bitter quarrel
between Constantine and Venizelos, during the First World
War. They cherished an unquenchable dislike for the royal
house and for the person of George II, but equally abhorred
the new ideas and violent methods of the Left. The younger

REACTION 209

generation of Liberals had deserted, drifting either to Left
or Right. All the dynamism which had once driven the Lib-
eral Party to power and palace revolution was departed. The
patriotic appeal of "Greater Greece" had been inherited by
royalists of the Right; and Liberal social reformism had been
transmuted into the revolutionary aspirations of EAM.

Plastiras, as an old republican and stout conservative,
found himself in an uncomfortable position. As the royalists
spread their organization over the country and gained popular
support, they began vociferously to accuse him of using his
position as Prime Minister to forward party ends. In the
Army too, the royalists had control, and Plastiras' efforts to
unseat them were thwarted by the British Mission and the
Greek General Staff. Thus he found himself without any
important following.

In March, royalist circles began to agitate for the establish-
ment of a "service'* Government. By this they meant a
Government of men who had no traditional or clear-cut asso-
ciations with any political party. They argued that only such
a Government could prepare the way with perfect fairness for
the election which would at last set up a normal Government
in Greece. Plastiras did not take kindly to the suggestion that
he surrender the reins of office. Accordingly, at the beginning
of April a royalist newspaper published a letter that he had
written in 1941 in which he declared that further resistance to
the Germans was useless. Royalists proclaimed this loudly
as proof of collaboration. (The Germans had tried to bring
Plastiras back to Greece and install him as head of the quisling
Government, but after some hesitation, he refused.) This
embarrassment, in combination with his quarrels with the
British and his lack of success in making secure a republican
Government, persuaded Plastiras to resign, 7 April.

Plastiras was succeeded by a "service" Government, headed
by Admiral Petros Voulgaris. His Ministers were largely
Army and Navy officers, relieved by a sprinkling of university

210 THE GREEK DILEMMA

professors. Voulgaris himself was a former republican. He
had taken part in the 1935 revolt and had been put into re-
tirement as a result. During the next years, he worked as a
plant manager for one of the great industrialists of Greece,
Bodossakis Athanassiades, generally known simply by his first
name.

Bodossakis was an extraordinary individual, and his career
illustrates something of the part private capitalists have been
able to play in Greek political affairs. Native to Asia Minor,
he came of a poor family and boasted almost no formal educa-
tion. He was, however, shrewd and utterly unscrupulous, and
devoted his talents to making money. The foundation of his
fortune came from selling supplies to the Greek and Turkish
armies during the war of 1920-1922. Forced to flee with the
rest of the Greeks, he lost most of his gains, but salvaged
enough to begin industrial operations in Pireus. From small
beginnings, he succeeded in building up an industrial em-
pire. By 1940 he controlled the munitions industry of Greece,
from which he made a fortune during the Spanish civil war
and in the Albanian War. In addition he dominated Greek
shipbuilding, the wine and spirits industry, owned the only
artificial silk factory in Greece, and developed other business
interests outside the country.

Once he had become rich, Bodossakis' ambition turned
from the simple accumulation of money to the exercise of
power. He had the temperament that delights in secrecy; his
favorite pastime was to watch the human puppets dance on
the political stage of Greece while secretly pulling some at
least of the strings by which they moved. It is perhaps a fallacy
to overestimate his power. He is reputed to have had connec-
tions with every political party, thanks to his generous con-
tributions of money. An elaborate private intelligence system
gave him access to a great many of the government's official
secrets, and in fact most of his wealth probably came from
competitive advantages he enjoyed by virtue of governmental

REACTION 211

favors. In the Middle East, he was implicated in the April
mutiny of 1944, but no proof was ever found of his role.
Though the Left-Liberal group failed to take power, when he
reappeared on the scene in Greece in 1945, he was firmly
ensconced in the good graces of the royalists. Yet at the same
time he continued to make contributions to the Communist
Party, perhaps as insurance against some future day.

Boddssakis was a tremendous gambler in business deals.
Against a rival he was ruthless, and all men he treated as
instruments. He learned to play upon them with a masterly
touch. He exercised a strange fascination on his associates,
and was able to gather to himself some of the most capable
technicians of Greece, who, though they distrusted his
honesty, admired his sinuous, daring character. Bodossakis*
influence and power had played a real part in the history of
Greece during the past twenty-five years. It did not diminish
when his protege, Admiral Voulgaris, became Prime Minister.

By comparison, Voulgaris was a small man. He had won
prominence by organizing the boarding parties which brought
the mutiny in the Greek Navy to an end in April 1944.
Thereafter he had been Commander in Chief of the Navy,
and, like Vendiris, had carried through a purge of all who
sympathized with the mutineers. After the purge, the Navy
became predominantly royalist, although on the whole its
partisanship was less than the Army's. Like so many other
former republicans, Voulgaris had reacted strongly against
communism, and he found himself, though perhaps without
warm conviction, in the royalist camp. The Government
which he headed shared his views. It became in fact, though
not in name, a Government of the reaction.

One of the most pressing problems which confronted the
Government was the unhappy state of the Greek economy.
Despite the ever-increasing flow of relief supplies from
UNRRA, recovery was painfully slow. There were material
difficulties. Sometimes the lack of a single small part would

212 THE GREEK DILEMMA

stop a complicated piece of machinery. Since most of the
machinery in Greece had come from Germany, spares were
hard to get, and the local machine shops were themselves
short of steel and other necessities for effective improvisation.
Lack of transport multiplied all these difficulties. The major
hindrance to recovery, however, was social disorganization.
Strikes broke out at frequent intervals, and few workmen re-
gained prewar habits of industrious labor. They were exposed
to a steady bombardment of propaganda from EAM urging
them not to work for the bosses and to demand a living wage.
The propaganda was the more effective because inflation
early began to cut into Government-fixed wages. The Govern-
ment spent approximately twice what it took in from taxes,
and financed the deficit by printing paper. With continuing
scarcity of goods, inflation was rapid. The new drachma when
first introduced in November 1944 was assigned an exchange
value of 149 to the dollar. In June 1945, the official rate was
changed to 500 to 1; but the black-market rate continued to
rise, and after six months (January 1946) a new exchange was
set at 5,000 to L Wages and salaries inevitably lagged behind
prices, and the gap inflicted real and severe hardship on all
workmen and salaried persons.

Inflation and political insecurity had a further disastrous
consequence. What capital individual Greeks possessed, they
hid. Most of their surplus cash was converted to gold or other
tangible stocks. In consequence, the price of gold in Greece
rose far above the world market, and such items as continued
to be produced, steadily disappeared from the market into
private warehouses where they were hoarded as a form of in-
vestment for surplus capital. Constructive investment was at
a minimum. Men simply were afraid to risk their resources
for fear of losing all they had. Consequently, some factories
which could have been reopened if the owners had been
willing to make expenditures, were kept closed, and new con-
struction was at a minimum.

REACTION 213

UNRRA, for all its bounty, had a curiously blighting effect
on governmental economic policy. In the hope that UNRRA
might supply all needs gratis, foreign exchange for the pur-
chase of many items, which private persons were anxious to
import, was refused. For this reason much-needed hospital
supplies, railroad equipment, and other such items were de-
layed in reaching Greece.

Unemployment continued high, and uneconomic self-em-
ployment became absurdly widespread. Little stands display-
ing half a dozen eggs or a few shoe laces, etc., were set up by
the thousand all through Athens and other towns, competing
one against the other and providing only a miserable half-
living for their proprietors. Yet in the midst of all the poverty,
luxury existed. If one had enough money, one could buy
anything in Athens. No sort of rationing was in force and
lavish meals could be had for extremely high prices in the
restaurants.

To improve this unsatisfactory economic situation, the
Voulgaris Government tried to introduce rationing and price
control. Kyriakos Varvaressos, a former Governor of the Bank
of Greece, was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Min-
ister of Supply, and it was he who planned and directed the
attempt. Varvaressos' intention was to stop inflation by bring-
ing the state budget nearly into balance through direct tax-
ation on real estate, and at the same time to assure a more
even distribution of food and other consumer goods by
rationing the whole population and fixing prices. Govern-
ment boards were set up to determine just prices, and a
market police was organized to enforce the price-maximums.
After a couple of months of seeming success, the effort failed,
Varvaressos resigned, and the measures were withdrawn. A
strange combination defeated the program. A few large mer-
chants and industrialists objected to paying direct taxes and
selling at fixed prices, and organized a sort of selling strike,
hoarding their stocks. The Communists, perhaps fearing a

214 THE GREEK DILEMMA

genuine economic settlement, took the occasion to organize
a widespread series of strikes, demanding a one hundred per
cent increase in wages and the inclusion of EAM in the Gov-
ernment. As a result, food almost disappeared from the
Athens market for several days. Newspapers of all political
shades laid the blame on Varvaressos, and he at length re-
signed in bitter anger.

Even apart from the maneuvers that overthrew the scheme,
it is questionable whether the plan could have been a success.
The Government did not have the personnel to administer
and enforce price ceilings, and serious injustices were done
by the Government boards which assessed the taxes and set
the maximum prices. The scheme was too ambitious, and
was bound to collapse from the lack of flexibility and honest
enforcement.

The failure of Voulgaris' economic program was a great
blow to the Government's prestige. Liberal and leftist criti-
cism mounted steadily. Furthermore, with the victory of the
Labor Party in Great Britain (end of July), it was generally
assumed that there would be a sharp change in British policy
toward Greece. These considerations led Admiral Voulgaris
to resign in the early days of August. For some days negotia-
tions were carried on between the Liberal and Popular
parties in an effort to form a coalition Government between
the two. The Populists, however, were well content with the
way things were going under Voulgaris. They stubbornly re-
fused to enter into any sort of coalition with the republicans
of the Liberal Party, and extolled the virtues of "nonparti-
san" government. After a week's uncertainty, the Regent
prevailed upon Voulgaris to resume office. There were some
changes in the Cabinet, designed to bring into it a stronger
republican influence, but the new Ministers proved unable
to change the drift toward royalism and reaction, and in fact
made small difference in the policies of the Government.

The principal purpose for which the Voulgaris "service"

REACTION 215

Government had taken office was to organize elections. In
June, the Government had ordered a revision of the election
registers which had last been used in 1936. It was decreed
that voters must register in their prewar place of residence.
This decision was taken partly in the hope of inducing some
of the refugees who had flooded into Athens and other large
cities to return to their former homes. A more important
reason was the administrative impossibility of completely re-
compiling the registers. It had the effect, however, of dis-
franchising a large number of potential voters. Registration
was rather difficult in the cities, for voters had to present
certificates of birth and residence, and pay a small fee before
being put on the lists. In the villages it was simpler, for there
a committee, consisting of the priest, a villager and a repre-
sentative of the government Civil Service inscribed the names
of the voters without any individual application.

The Varkiza Agreement had provided that an Allied
mission be invited to observe the elections. Voulgaris accord-
ingly sent invitations to Britain, France, the United States
and Russia. Probably fearing that a precedent might be set for
elections in her own satellite countries, Russia declined the
invitation on the ground that such a mission was an unjusti-
fiable intervention in the domestic affairs of an independent
country. The other three Allied nations, however, agreed to
send observers, and undertook to bear the expense of the
mission themselves.

The . Varkiza Agreement had likewise provided that a
plebiscite to determine the constitutional issue would precede
elections for a constitutive assembly. The changed political
balance in Greece, however, coupled with a change in British
policy, resulted in a transposition: it was decided to hold
elections first, and postpone the plebiscite until after a Gov-
ernment based on an elected Chamber of Deputies had come
to power.

By the early fall of 1945 the Left was convinced that it

216 THE GREEK DILEMMA

could not any longer command a majority of the voters, and
so ceased to urge a speedy plebiscite. The conservatives and
royalists, on the contrary, believed that they would be able
to win, and called loudly for an immediate vote. When
Churchill's Government suffered defeat in Great Britain and
the Labor Party came to power, all Greeks wondered what
would be the effect on British policy in their country, and, at
the beginning of September, the Regent, Archbishop Damas-
kinos, undertook a trip to London for the purpose of sound-
ing out the new British Government, In particular, he
discussed the problem of organizing elections in Greece.

Unlike Mr. Churchill, the Laborites were generally un-
sympathetic to King George of Greece, believing that his
partisans were reactionaries and unworthy of their support.
But equally, they disliked the Greek Communists who seemed
to be the only serious contender for political power in
Greece. In such a dilemma, the British advisers decided that
a prolonged cooling-off period was desirable. If the constitu-
tional question could be postponed until some measure of
economic recovery could be brought to Greece, and a strong
Center have time to build itself up, then, they believed, a
"sounder" expression of the people's will could be had, and
the question of the King's return settled once and for all.
Meanwhile, Greece obviously needed a Government that was
based directly on the popular franchise, for the Cabinets that
had governed Greece since the time of Metaxas could by no
stretch of the imagination be regarded as democratically
chosen.

The British, then, advised Archbishop Damaskinos that
the plebiscite should be postponed, and recommended 1947
or 1948 as a good time for it to be held. The Greek Regent,
realizing the power of the Right in Greece and its anxiety to
hold a plebiscite at the earliest possible moment, was re-
luctant to announce such a drastic change in schedule, saying
that he would lay himself open to charges of trying to prolong

REACTION 217

his own tenure of power. Consequently, the British took the
matter up with the American and French Foreign Ministers
(who were conveniently gathered in London at a meeting of
the Big Four) and persuaded them to join in making a procla-
mation to the world which ran in part as follows:

The three Governments [of Great Britain, the United
States and France] hold the firm opinion that elections for a
revisionary assembly should be held as soon as possible. . . .
Thus a government would be formed which would be based
on the wishes of the people and Parliament. The formation
of such a Government would facilitate the restoration of
conditions of stable tranquillity in Greece. Only when these
conditions are, in due course, firmly established will it be-
come possible to hold a free and genuine plebiscite to decide
on the future regime in Greece.

This statement was received submissively enough in
Greece, although the royalists protested briefly. They were
confident of winning either election or plebiscite, and if the
Great Allies wanted the election first, they were willing to
yield. The Left, for its part, largely neglected the question,
but welcomed what was obviously a cooling of British affec-
tion for the cause of King George.

When it became evident that Britain and the United States
were pressing for early elections, a vigorous controversy
arose in Greek political circles. The royalists warmly agreed
that elections should be hastened; the Liberals and the Left,
on the contrary, realized their weakness, and insisted that the
state of public disorder and terrorism in the country was such
that honest elections could not be held. For some weeks,
Voulgaris hesitated between the two pressures. At length, at
the beginning of October, he announced elections for 2C
January 1946. Within a day, EAM and the Liberal Part}
both proclaimed that they would refuse to participate ir
elections held under prevailing conditions. It became ap
parent that only the royalists would vote. Such a situatior

218 THE GREEK DILEMMA

would make the elections a farce, and, having come to such
an impasse, Voulgaris resigned.

A month of crisis followed. For nearly three weeks Greece
had no Cabinet. The deadlock was the same as in August.
The royalists refused to join in any coalition with the Lib-
erals; and the Regent, recognizing the power of the Right and
distrusting the Left, refused to agree to a Cabinet drawn only
from the Liberal Party. A coalition of leftists and Liberals was
never considered. The Liberals, although republican, liked
the Communists no better than did the royalists, and refused
even to entertain such a possibility.

The lack of any titular head to the Government created a
feeling of public nervousness in Greece. For some days there
were rumors of an impending coup d^tat from the Right,
and in fact it seems to be true that some rightists considered
such action. Its vehicle would have been the X organization,
which by this time claimed wide membership and support.
Success, however, could only be assured by the cooperation
of the Greek Army. The hotheads of the X organization
counted on the assistance of General Vendiris, and of a secret
military league which he headed. This league had been
formed in the Middle East after the mutiny of April 1944,
and was designed to serve as a sort of extraordinary chain of
command which would be called into operation only in the
event of a second Communist mutiny. In the present instance,
there was no immediate danger of a Communist uprising.
The Communists were relatively weak, and were careful to
make no provocative move. Consequently, Vendiris refused
to support a coup from the extreme fringe of the Right, and
the plot petered out into a demonstration on Constitution
Square, held despite an emergency decree forbidding public
assemblage.

At length, on 17 October, the Regent himself took over
the office of Prime Minister as a stop-gap measure. The Minis-
ters who had served with Voulgaris were asked to remain at

REACTION 219

their posts to give an appearance of solidity to the adminis-
tration. Public apprehension was in some degree quieted
thereby. For two weeks this extraordinary Government en-
dured. The Regent replaced it on 1 November by a Govern-
ment of University professors and disabled politicians, who
were brought together by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos.

This Government had perhaps the ablest collection of
brains of any of the postwar Governments of Greece. But it
lacked any vestige of political support. Kanellopoulos "was
neither flesh nor fowl; neither definitely a royalist nor defi-
nitely a republican. He preferred a republic on theoretical
grounds, but was not convinced that republican government
was well suited to Greece under the extraordinary difficulties
of the time. He asserted that he would become either one or
the other, obedient to the verdict of people. Such an avoid-
ance of the key issue in Greek politics won him no political
friends. Both republicans and royalists declined to support
his Government, so that good intentions and a high-minded
program came to nothing.

Throughout the month of October, inflation advanced by
leaps and bounds. Prices on the Athens market almost
doubled within the single month, and the black-market ex-
change rate of the drachma sank to about three thousand to
the dollar. Heroic remedies for the economic and political
crisis were needed. In the emergency, the Greeks turned to
Great Britain, and the Labor Government was forced to take
another and closer look into Greek affairs. The resultant
British intervention set the mould for Greek politics during
the following four months and finally brought about the
long promised postwar elections. To the intricacies of the
election question we must now turn.

/x

Elections

tlHIllllilllllllltlUIUlllIUIltlllltllUlltlUIltltllUIIIIUIUIUMIIIIilUIIIIItlttlltlitltllUi

T

JLHE situation of Greece, when

it came so urgently to the attention of the Labor Government,
was an embarrassing one for the British. A year of liberation
had not sufficed to establish anything that could reasonably
be considered recovery. Uncertainty and distress still plagued
the country. The Government held power only by a sort of
constitutional fiction, being based neither on elections nor on
any theory of dictatorship.

Hector McNeil, Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign
Affairs, was assigned the task of trying to set things to rights.
He arrived in Athens, 13 November, and after some days of
discussion with Greek politicians and officials of the British
Embassy, he formulated a definite plan. First of all, he wanted
a reorganization of the Cabinet to make it representative of
a coalition of political parties. To assist such a Government,
he proposed the appointment of British or Allied committees
to advise in matters of economic administration and policy.
In return, he held out hope of a substantial loan from Great
Britain with which the Greek currency could perhaps be
stabilized.

When it came to putting this program into. effect, the Brit-
ish emissary found the Popular Party as unwilling as ever to
take any part in a coalition Government. After some vain
negotiation, he decided that a coalition of center parties was
a practicable alternative. Accordingly, the Liberal leader,
Sofoulis, prepared a Cabinet composed only of republican

220

ELECTIONS 221

politicians. The Regent distrusted such a solution, believing
that the royalists were the strongest political group in the
country and should be represented in any real or effective
coalition. When McNeil insisted, Archbishop Damaskinos
felt his dignity and authority had been disregarded, and in a
tumultuous all-night scene, he resigned from his post as
Regent. Only after heated argument did he agree to swear in
the new Sofoulis Government; and it was three days before
the advice of the American Ambassador, Lincoln MacVeagh,
persuaded the Archbishop to resume his regency.

Such high-handed intervention in the affairs of the "sov-
ereign" state of Greece was reminiscent of the methods
Churchill had used in dealing with Papandreou. In Decem-
ber 1944 the British Government had been severely criticized
for its intervention, and during the following months the
British made an effort to keep their hands off Greek politics.
Obedient to this policy, the British Ambassador had rebuffed
frequent appeals from the Regent during the prolonged crisis
of October. On a lower level, British influence had of course
been uninterrupted. The Military Mission and the Police
Mission exercised continuous and decisive influence in de-
termining military policy, and, as we have seen, operated in
fact to assist the royalist faction, while trying, according to the
lights of the British officers who staffed the missions, to make
the armed forces nonpolitical. By this dichotomy, the Brit-
ish effort at nonintervention on the narrowly political plane
was effectively annulled. British influence remained pre-
eminent in Greece, and inaction by the Ambassador in time
of political crisis merely intensified the state of indecision.

The basis of British influence in Greece is not far to seek.
Most Greeks had reacted strongly against communism as
practiced by EAM, but they saw themselves faced with a
constant menace from the Communists within their own
country, and still more by the solidly Communist countries
north of them. Fear of Communist-Slavic inundation became

222 THE GREEK DILEMMA

widespread and deep-seated. It seemed clear to all anti-Com-
munist Greeks that only the power and prestige of Great
Britain could. stave off the danger which threatened their
country. British troops had originally come to Greece as a
liberating force. Within three months they were formed into
a sort of extraordinary police force which took over control
of the country where EAM had ruled. In May 1945 British
troops withdrew from active policing, leaving it to the Greek
gendarmery. Thereafter the British forces were concentrated
in or near the principal centers of population, and confined
their activities to training their own replacements, and lend-
ing aid to the training of the Greek Army. But British troops
remained in Greece. Their function had imperceptibly
changed from that of an internal police force to a guard
against foreign invasion. The Greeks who controlled the Gov-
ernment, and the British Cabinet likewise, calculated that the
mere presence of British troops would forestall any Com-
munist intervention from Yugoslavia or Bulgaria on behalf
of fellow leftists in Greece.

Thus the Greek internal struggle became involved in the
larger international rivalry between Russia and Great Britain.
Whether they liked it or not, and the Greek rightists did not
always like the British attitude of superiority toward them-
selves, the anti-Communists of Greece felt that they needed
British protection against the danger that threatened them.
They felt they must please the British, and it followed that
British advice came to have almost mandatory force, not only
in military but in all other matters.

The British were often embarrassed by the responsibilities
which such a relation thrust upon them; but such half-
hearted efforts as they made to escape from active interven-
tion in Greek affairs proved unavailing against the growing
shadow of international distrust between Russia and the
West. Unless they decided to abandon Greece and the Eastern
Mediterranean to the Russians, the British were compelled to

ELECTIONS 223

maintain a "friendly" Government in Greece; and a friendly
Government asked, indeed pleaded, for British troops as a
physical and moral protection against the Slavic threat to its
power. 'Thus the little cockpit of Greek internal politics
during 1945 came to be inseparably mixed into the world
struggle of the Great Powers; and by the same token, the
British became inextricably tangled in the quicksands of
Greek political strife. The development had been foreseen
neither by Greeks nor British at the time of liberation. It
made of Greece a client-state, quite apart from the deliberate
intention of either the British government or the Greek
Right, and effectively limited (one might almost say ter-
minated) the sovereignty of the Greek Government.

When news of the British intervention in favor of Sofoulis
and the Center reached the royalists, they became furious. A
few hotheads spoke of making a coup d'etat, but calmer lead-
ers realized that such an act would alienate the support of the
British which they felt they desperately needed. Consequently
all organized violence was repressed. The royalists instead
concentrated all their strength to press for an early election.
They were confident that a vote would give them the undi-
vided power over the Greek Government which they sought.
Events were to prove them correct.

Throughout the next four months, Sofoulis and the British
were hopeful that a Center Government would be able to
gather together the shattered strength of the center parties.
Their hopes were vain. Conservative republicanism had no
appeal for the Greek people, for nearly all conservatives had
come to believe that a republican Government would prove
only the first step toward communism.

The Left had at first been pleased by the British interven-
tion on behalf of Sofoulis. EAM and the Communist Party
announced that they would accord the new government
moral support, and began to press for release of prisoners,
purge of Army and police, and the inclusion of EAM in the

224 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Government. By this time, the Communist Party had re-
covered much of its lost morale, and the strength of the Left
was rising once more. In October a General Congress of the
Communist Party took place in Athens. At this congress, a
new Political Committee was elected, and the lines of a new
and aggressive policy were laid down, Zachariades had re-
turned from Dachau in May, and immediately took over con-
trol of the party despite the fact that he had no official posi-
tion. At the Congress this defect was remedied; he was elected
Secretary General of the Political Bureau in place of Siantos,
and his personal supporters gained control of the whole Com-
munist organization. Siantos remained a member of the
Political Bureau, but his influence was much reduced. It be-
came fashionable in Communist circles to decry his wisdom,
and accuse him of having muffed the chance of seizing power
at the time of liberation.

Absurd misunderstanding was common among all Greeks
as to the nature of the Labor Party in Great Britain. With its
victory in July, Greek leftists assumed that the workers of
Great Britain would now come to their succor and put them
in power. The tardy intervention in November was regarded
as a half-step in this direction, and was accepted as such by
many Gjeek Communists. It speedily appeared, however, that
Sofoulis was no Communist, and that his efforts to republi-
canize the Army and police were still being thwarted by the
British Mission. When this state of affairs became clear to the
leaders of the Left, they embarked on a bitter campaign
against the British. Quite correctly, they estimated that the
presence of British troops in Greece was the major factor
obstructing their rise to power in the land. Accordingly, a
propaganda campaign, more calumnious and intense than
any the Left had launched since the defeat of January 1945,
was unleashed against the British occupation. The campaign
began in December 1945, and was echoed by the Russian de-
mand for British retirement from Greece, made at the first

ELECTIONS 225

meeting of the United Nations Security Council in February.

The Sofoulis Cabinet faced two pressing problems when it
came to power. Economic dislocation, consequent upon a
snowballing inflation, threatened serious disaster; and elec-
tions, so long promised, had to be organized before the Greek
Government could be plausibly counted democratic, or find
itself securely based on the popular will.

At his accession to power, Sofoulis had been given to un-
derstand that a British loan would be promptly forthcoming
by means of which the inflation of the currency could be
checked. In fact, hitches developed in the negotiations. The
British government sent an Economic Mission to look over
the ground in Greece, and what they found was not en-
couraging. Government waste and inefficiency had scarcely
been reduced from the time of the quisling Governments.
Thousands of useless civil servants burdened the budget; and
the two largest single items in the Government's expenses, up-
keep of the armed forces (30%) and pensions (15%), were
economically unproductive. Taxation was nearly all indirect
and dishonestly administered. As inflation advanced, the gov-
ernment's expenditures mounted steadily. Salaries o civil
servants were raised to compensate for the debasement of the
currency, and other costs increased proportionately. Tax in-
come, however, failed to keep pace, and by January, the Gov-
ernment was spending over three times its receipts. Without
a thorough housecleaning, it seemed to the British economists
that a loan would simply pour money down the drain, post-
poning, but not solving, the economic problems that be-
deviled the country.

Consequently, prolonged discussions were entered upon
as to the steps which could be taken to reduce expenditures
of the Government and improve revenues. Two of the leading
ministers of the Cabinet went to London to conduct the
negotiations, and not until 25 January was an agreement
finally reached. By the terms of this agreement, the British

226 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Government relaxed restrictions that had been placed during
the war on Greek funds deposited in London, and granted
a loan of ten million pounds to the Greek Government. Gold,
which had in practice become the basis of prices, was le-
galized, and 500,000 sovereigns were imported from Britain.
The Bank of Greece fixed the price of sovereigns and under-
took to sell them to the public. By this means, devaluation
of the paper currency was halted for the time, although not
before the drachma had depreciated to an exchange value of
about six thousand to one dollar. But the agreement also
provided for the establishment of a British Economic Mission
with wide powers. Furthermore, the issuance of currency was
subjected to the veto of an Anglo-American financial com-
mission. Such an agreement was not received with any great
enthusiasm by the Greeks. The terms were less generous than
they had expected, and the establishment of foreign economic
and financial advisors seemed to threaten Greece with a
semicolonial status. The Left attacked the agreement bitterly;
while the Right felt Greece's dignity had suffered damage.
Nevertheless, it worked: prices ceased to rise. This was a
substantial success for the Sofoulis Government, and unques-
tionably helped it to survive.

Progress toward elections was slower. Sofoulis believed that
a necessary preliminary to elections was a purge of royalist
leaders from the Army and police. Sweeping changes in the
top commands were suggested by the Minister of War, but as
before, such measures were strenuously opposed by the Brit-
ish Military and Police Missions. The controversy came to
settle around the figure of General Vendiris, Assistant Chief
of Staff. He was accused by republicans, both conservative
and leftist, of being the leader of the royalist clique in the
Army. In December, the Minister of War "removed" Vendiris
from his post, but the General remained at his desk during
the next few weeks until a sort of compromise was arranged.
Instead of being dismissed outright, Vendiris was posted to a

ELECTIONS 227

provincial command. With the exception of this single vic-
tory, the Liberal effort to purge the Army was successfully
parried by the Greek General Staff, acting with the British
Military Mission.

The failure to transform the Army from royalist to re-
publican disturbed the Liberals. They could not bring them-
selves to believe the protestations of the Greek officers and of
the British Mission that the Army had become divorced from
politics. Among themselves they accused the British of duplic-
ity, seeking to restore the King while professing neutrality on
the constitutional issue.

The rights and wrongs of the quarrel over the Army are not
simple. The republican officers were nearly all old men, who,
like Sofoulis himself, had fixed their political conceptions
thirty years before. They had been out of military service,
since 1935, and were, as a whole, comparatively inefficient and
antipathetic to new ideas and British advice. They tended
to look upon the Army as an instrument of political power
within the state, and were at less pains to hide their attitude
than were the royalists, who verbally at least, fell in en-
thusiastically a with the British program for a nonpolitical
Army. An Army with officers chosen purely on the basis of
professional competence automatically favored the royalists,
since most of the competent officers were also supporters of
the King. Thus the British Mission had a real justification for
its strong stand against republican tampering with military
appointments.

In effect, one may say that the failure of the republicans to
gain control of the Army was another manifestation of the
collapse of the Center in Greek life. Young conservative re-
publicans, whether in the Army or out of it, scarcely existed.
The only competent republican officers were veterans of
ELA$, and neither Sofoulis nor the royalists contemplated
incorporating them into the Regular Army. ELAS officers
were driven into the arms of the Communists by this policy,

228 THE GREEK DILEMMA

and many individuals, who in January 1945 had been dis-
gusted with their Communist leaders, began to gravitate back
toward the party, seeing in it their only chance of a career.
The Communist Party was substantially strengthened by this
fact.

The Sofoulis Government also insisted that a necessary
preliminary to elections was the establishment of peace and
order in the countryside. The economic hardships of the
inflation, the impatience of royalist extremists, and the policy
of the Communist Party all combined to increase the public
disorders in Greece during the fall and winter months. In the
Peloponnese and in parts of Thessaly, royalist bands began
to form. They devoted themselves to attacking leftists, and
lived as outlaws in the tradition of the Greek klefti. In
January a royalist band entered Kalamata in the southern
Peloponnese, and took over the town for a couple of days.
They released some of their fellows who had been jailed on
criminal charges, and took the occasion to settle scores with
a number of local leftists. The Government promptly declared
martial law and sent a detachment of the Army to the district;
but the bandits easily escaped, especially since neither the
local gendarmes nor the Army officers wanted to arrest them.

Simultaneously, the Communists, feeling themselves
stronger, adopted an aggressive policy. So-called "self-defense
groups*' were formed in the principal cities, and began to
prowl the streets at night where they engaged in riots and
small-scale battles with rival rightist gangs. In Macedonia two
or three leftist bands came into permanent existence in the
mountains. They made a practice of visiting remote villages,
threatening their political opponents with the imminence of
a "third round" when the Left would revenge itself for the
defeat of January 1945. Isolated gendarme posts were
attacked on several occasions, and a few prominent national-
ist civilians assassinated.

Such conditions could plausibly be advanced as evidence

ELECTIONS 229

that free elections could not be held in Greece. Unfortunately,
there seemed no likelihood that these disorders would quickly
come to an end, or that the level of public peace would soon
improve. It seemed possible that a popularly elected govern-
ment might to able to reduce in some degree the prevalence
of violence. In any action against illegal armed bands an
elected Government would at least have the sanction of
popular support, such as no appointed Government could
claim. Consequently, when the advance party of the Allied
Mission for Observing Greek Elections (AMFOGE) arrived
in Greece at the end of November, its numbers were not
impressed by Prime Minister Sofoulis' arguments against
holding elections at an early date. After considerable pressure
had been brought to bear by the leaders of the Mission,
Sofoulis reluctantly set the election date for 31 March, and
the Mission proceeded to lay plans on that basis.

For many months thereafter, rumors that the elections
would be postponed again were in the air. The Liberals did
not want them held, since they realized their weakness. The
Left, too, was reluctant, and after some uncertainty, declared
that it would refuse participation, on the ground that the
state of terrorism was such that the result could not be any-
thing but a travesty. In making this decision, two considera-
tions probably guided the Communists. For one thing,
persecution of leftists in most of Greece was real, and under
the prevailing conditions, the Communists could not expect
to bring the full number of their supporters and sympathizers
to the polls. All the penumbra of the leftist movement, the
lukewarm sympathizers and fellow-travellers, would shy away
from exposing themselves to rightist retaliation. In addition
to this, the leaders of the Left did not wish to reveal the fact
that they had only a minority following. Abstaining from the
election, they could claim not only their own adherents, but
also all the persons who failed to vote for other reasons: the
sick, indifferent and dead.

230 THE GREEK DILEMMA

The state of the Greek election registers was such that
many persons long deceased appeared as eligible voters. The
Voulgaris Government had ordered a revision of the lists, but
the order had been imperfectly obeyed. In many communi-
ties, names of men who had come of age since 1936 were
added, but names of those who had died were not erased.
The reason for this was largely sloth and inefficiency, but
there was another factor which contributed to the distortion
of the lists. According to the election law, a man voted in the
community where he had been resident in 1940. Many per-
sons had moved their domiciles during the years of occupa-
tion, and many such refugees had died. But in their original
communities, sure information was often lacking, and to cut
a name off the list on the presumption that the man had died
was of course illegal.

Still another important factor that kept the election regis-
ters swollen was the fact that politicians of the Right thought
they might be able to cast ballots for the absent ones. As we
shall see, the activities of the Election Mission were on such
a scale as to reduce falsification to a minimum, but in the
days before the Mission arrived on the scene, many politicians
anticipated the possibility that they might be able to rig the
election, as had so often been done before in Greek history.
In some election districts, false names were deliberately in-
serted on the lists under the Voulgaris Administration. Con-
sequently, Sofoulis reopened the registration lists, and many
of these irregularities were removed. Thereafter, the efforts
of the Election Mission and of the Government prevented any
large-scale systematic falsification. The names of many dead
and displaced persons remained on the rolls, however, and in
due course were claimed by EAM as supporters of the Left.

Prolonged dispute next arose over the question of repre-
sentation. The royalists, being stronger, advocated the major-
ity system such as is used in Great Britain or the United States.
The weaker parties wanted a proportional system whereby the

ELECTIONS 231

minority votes of each district would also be given representa-
tion in the elected Chamber. After some weeks of debate,
Sofoulis declared that the proportional system would be
followed.

By February it was clear that elections would in fact be
held, despite the obvious reluctance of the Government to
face the polls. The Allied Mission for Observing Greek
Elections arrived on the scene in force. It comprised over
twelve hundred persons, of whom almost half were Ameri-
cans. The observer teams were all headed by Army and Navy
officers who were generally quite ignorant of Greek affairs.
They depended entirely on a hastily gathered staff of inter-
preters, and it is probable that in some cases the observers
allowed themselves to be hoodwinked, and failed to discover
the true state of affairs due to their interpreters' distortion
of question and answer. All arrangements had perforce to be
made in haste, and sufficient allowance for the peculiarities of
the Greek national character and political scene was not
always made.

Despite these handicaps and shortcomings, the Mission
made a serious effort to check the accuracy of the registration
lists and the regularity of the procedure. Two hundred and
forty field teams were organized. They visited over half of all
the polling places in the country, sampled the registration
lists, observed the physical preparations of polling booths,
and on the day of election itself watched the proceedings at
as many of the polling places as possible. The scope and
sincerity of the effort impressed the Greeks, and undoubtedly
made the election better, more honest and freer than it
would otherwise have been.

The proportional system of counting election results made
party coalitions meaningless. There was no need for joint
slates, when the votes for each minority candidate were
counted also, and given a proportionate share of representa-
tion in the Chamber. Consequently the parties separated,

232 THE GREEK DILEMMA

and each conducted its own independent campaign. Nine
major parties took part in the election, of which four were
royalist, two republican and three declared that they would
accept either a kingdom or a republic, according to the de-
cision of the plebiscite. The chief royalist party was the
Popular, headed by a three-man Committee. The others
were the Reformist Party of Apostolis Alexandris, the Na-
tional Liberal Party led by Stylianos Gonatas (outgrowth of
the Athens EDES), and the National Party of Greece which
Napoleon Zervas had founded on the basis of his guerilla
force. Out-and-out republican parties were limited to the
Liberal Party led by Themistocles Sofoulis, and the Agrarian
Party of Alexander Mylonas. In between, the personal fol-
lowings of the former Prime Ministers, George Papandreou,
Sophocles Venizelos (who had broken away from the Liberal
Party in January), and Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, formed
three more parties. These three politicians shared a senti-
mental inclination toward republicanism, but announced that
they would abide by the outcome of the plebiscite, and be-
come royalist or republican according to the verdict of the
people.

Campaigning followed patterns familiar in the United
States. Election posters, bearing the photographs of candi-
dates, decorated the walls of Athens and the chief provincial
towns. Candidates embarked on a flurry of speechmaking, and
promised all things to all men. The leading politicians under-
took tours through the provinces to drum up support, en-
dorse local candidates, and jack up their political machines.
Strangely enough, the Left was in the forefront of the
electioneering, urging all and sundry to abstain from voting.

On the eve of election, Constitution Square in Athens
presented an extraordinary sight. Three rival political rallies
took place simultaneously. From one building, former Prime
Minister Papandreou promised his followers a Greater
Greece; across the Square, royalists promised the return of

ELECTIONS 233

King George II; and diagonally, Siantos and other speakers
for EAM instructed all democrats to abstain. Cordons of
unarmed policemen separated the three crowds, permitting
the passage of individuals from one group to the other, but
deflecting mass movements. The meetings broke up without
rioting. In all Athens only one murder occurred on election
eve.

So far as the Allied observers saw, there was little overt
terrorism used by either side to influence the result of the
election. Acts of physical violence were few, although in parts
of the country it proved difficult or impossible for the minor-
ity parties to make an open campaign. In Epirus, Zervas and
his former guerillas prevented all rivals from circulating
freely in the countryside for electioneering purposes by set-
ting up check posts on the roads; and in the Peloponnese, the
Popular Party was able to treat republican propagandists
almost the same way. As a general rule, and over most of
Greece, however, threats of future retaliation took the place
of actual physical restraints. In the areas of the country where
the extremes were strongest, threats certainly carried con-
siderable weight in the minds of ordinary citizens who, as
always, chiefly desired to keep out of trouble. In certain
districts of Athens and Pireus where EAM was firmly en-
trenched, anyone who went to the polls on election day be-
came a marked man. In such districts as much as eighty-five
per cent abstention took place. In parts of Macedonia the
same conditions existed, and abstention ran above fifty per
cent. Conversely, in the Peloponnese and Epirus, pressure to
vote was strong, and only men who were already known as
EAM-ites dared to stay away. Nevertheless, nothing could
prevent a man from casting a blank ballot if he wished to ab-
stain, so that the psychological pressure of the Right was less
efficacious than that of the Left in distorting the result of
the election.

When election day came round, it passed off fairly peace-

234 THE GREEK DILEMMA

fully. In a single village in Macedonia the voting was inter-
rupted when a band of leftists descended from the hills,
attacked the gendarme station and broke up the election
booth. In some of the other provincial towns disturbances
took place, but not on a scale to interrupt the voting. In
Athens the royalists persuaded the Military Governor to keep
polls open past the legal time for closure in some districts.
Their purpose was to allow certain persons to vote who feared
to approach the polling places during daylight, when they
could easily be seen and identified by Communists of their
neighborhood.

Despite these irregularities most Greeks felt that their
election had been as free and honest as circumstances would
permit. Illegal and plural voting was at a minimum. Errors
in the registration lists were estimated at no more than two
per cent of the voters by AMFOGE. There was a spirit of
quiet exultation among the people of Athens. A peaceful
election reminded many of prewar times, and they fondly
hoped that Greece at last was returning to normal and peace-
ful political life. Such an election, they felt, raised Greece
above her neighbors, where Communist democracy had uni-
formly and almost unanimously endorsed the monolithic
state. A free election seemed to put Greece on a plane with
Great Britain or the United States, and stood a proof of the
democratic, Western spirit of the people.

Final results of the elections were not known for several
days, but it speedily became evident that the royalists had
won. When the count was finally in, they emerged with an
overwhelming majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Out of
a total of 354 seats, the royalists won 231 places. The Popular
Party constituted by far the largest proportion of this total;
but it is impossible to give an exact figure, due to the fact
that once the election was over, all the royalist groups, with
the exception of Zervas' party, merged into a single bloc, and
particular party affiliation of individual royalist deputies

ELECTIONS 235

became lost. Against this crushing majority, out-and-out re-
publicans numbered only 51, divided between the Liberals'
48 seats and the Agrarian Party's 3. The three parties which
had straddled the constitutional issue won a total of 67 places
in the Chamber. In addition, there were three independents.

The Left did what it could to discredit the election result.
Only forty-nine per cent of the persons whose names appeared
on the registration lists had voted, and the Left jubilantly
claimed the balance, fifty-one per cent, as its followers. The
leftists derided their opponents, saying that they represented
only a minority of the people, and declared the assumption
of power by the royalists to be illegal. The logical force of
this propaganda was hurt by the fact that, before the election,
the Left had loudly proclaimed the falsity of the election
lists.

It is difficult to discover how great was the actual following
of the Left. The AMFOGE report on the election estimated
that only 9.3 per cent of the electorate abstained for political
reasons; but this figure was received with general incredulity
in Greece, and exposed the Election Mission to the charge of
partisanship and deliberate falsification against the Left.
The percentage had been arrived at by sampling public
opinion just before election. Every precaution was taken to
make the sampling statistically correct, but unfortunately for
the reputation of the Allied Mission, proper account of the
peculiarities of the Greek psychology was not taken. The
sampling was done by interview of persons selected at sci-
entific random from the registration lists. The interviews
were made by American, British and French Army officers,
It seems almost certain that some of the people whom they
questioned answered, as is the wont of the Greeks, not ac-
cording to what they felt, but as they believed their inter-
locutor to desire. Consequently it is safe to assume that a
good number of persons, who in their hearts intended to
abstain, told the interviewers that they would vote. The

236 THE GREEK DILEMMA

actual number of EAM and Communist followers can only
be estimated. As a guess, one may set the correct figure at
about twenty per cent of the voters.

When the royalist victory became certain, Sofoulis re-
signed. A coalition Government took over for a few days until
the count had been completed, when the newly elected leader
of the Popular Party, Constantine Tsaldaris, became Prime
Minister. The new Prime Minister was a nephew of Panagiotis
Tsaldaris, prewar leader of the Popular Party. He was an
undistinguished man and his political fortunes depended on
his name and on the fact that his mediocrity had made him
fewer enemies than was the case with rivals for the party
leadership. His Cabinet was drawn largely from the ranks of
his own party, but included representatives of all other
royalist groups with the exception of Zervas' party.

The Popular Party which had won the election was ill
consolidated. In January 1945 it had existed only as a few
dozen professional politicians in Athens. A year later, it was
able to nominate candidates in almost every electoral district
of Greece, and to win a majority of the seats in the Chamber
of Deputies. This rapid growth was not based upon any solid,
disciplined organization. When EAM had ruled the country,
the leftist political machine had been able to repress all
dissent and opposition, even after a reaction against it had
begun to set in. Partly for this reason, when finally unleashed
by military events, the reaction went further than it would
otherwise have done. Thus the Right in a sense profited from
the thoroughness of the Left. But the royalists lacked a politi-
cal machine that could equal what EAM's had been. To be
sure, there were widespread royalist societies, such as X,
which aspired to a totalitarian control over the people at
large; but these societies were never wholly coordinated with
the Popular Party (Colonel GrivaS, leader of X, had split with
the Populists just before the election), and they lacked both

ELECTIONS 237

funds and evangelistic enthusiasm with which to achieve a
totalitarian reactionary state.

The power of the Popular Party was consequently less
firmly based than EAM's had been. Even parliamentary
discipline among the royalist deputies was imperfect. A
group of young men tended to form a clique which demanded
quick and drastic action. They frequently criticized the gov-
ernmental leaders for too great caution and dependence on
British advice. Being extremists, in their fanatic bitterness
against the Communists they often advocated measures that
could plausibly be called Fascist. As against the republicans,
this group of young proto-Fascists of course supported the
Government; but the republican bloc was so small that their
votes were not needed to assure a royalist majority, and on
many issues the extremists acted almost like an Opposition of
the Right, showing scant respect for the wisdom or wishes of
the older men who headed the Popular Party.

The existence of such a group in the Chamber of Deputies
was, in a sense, made possible by the absention of the extreme
Left from the election. Had the Left voted, and won some
twenty per cent of the seats in the Chamber, then the royalist
majority would have been smaller, and it would seldom have
been possible for the extreme wing to break away from the
Government. A stricter parliamentary discipline would have
been enforced on the royalist deputies in order to keep safe
their superiority as against the republican and leftist groups.

It strains the imagination, however, to picture royalists
and Communists sitting in the same Chamber. Were the two
extremes brought so close together, it would be almost certain
that the intensity of their mutual hate would have made
peaceful proceedings utterly impossible, and parliamentary
procedure would have been reduced to brawls and fisticuffs.
The institutions of Western democracy hardly fitted the
social and political situation in which Greece found itself;

238 THE GREEK DILEMMA

and, at any close look, it appeared that the parliamentary
cloak was ill fitted to the Greek body politic, though it might
camouflage its true bones and joints upon occasion.

Despite the weaknesses of the Popular Party and of the
Chamber of Deputies, the new Government was far stronger
than those which had preceded it. It had come to power
through a relatively free and honest election and was firmly
supported by both police and Army. The British accepted
the new Government with some reservation. British officials
were anxious to improve administration and moderate the
Government's narrow partisanship, but nevertheless ap-
proved the general policy and political orientation of the
new Cabinet.

The Chamber of Deputies met for the first time on 13
May. It was the first assemblage of a legislature since the brief
and fruitless session of 1936. The occasion was not without
dignity. The deputies filled the hall, seating themselves ac-
cording to their party affiliation. More than half of the space
was occupied by the deputies of the Popular Party. Not all
of them were well dressed, and many bore on their persons
marks of provincial origin. In front of them sat the Ministers
in full and formal array. Toward the center of the hall, Zervas
and his deputies took their place. The guerilla leader looked
strangely different with shaved face and civilian clothes; his
followers, nearly all from the wilds of Epirus, presented a
rough-and-ready appearance. Other well known faces were
present. Former Prime Ministers Papandreou, Venizelos and
Kanellopoulos sat on the left, each with his group of deputies
clustered around him. On the extreme left the aged but still
vigorous Liberal leader, Sofoulis, appeared in the front row,
and a few rows behind him sat two Cretan deputies, clad in
the old peasant costume of their island: baggy trousers and
little flat cap. The majestic figure of the Regent strode into
the hall to open the session. He read a brief speech from the

ELECTIONS 239

Throne which had been prepared for him by the Cabinet,
after which the meeting was adjourned.

The following day, Prime Minister Tsaldaris outlined the
Government's program, and announced that the plebiscite
would be held on 1 September. This date had been set as the
earliest by which the election registers could be thoroughly
revised. The British still wanted to postpone the plebiscite
until 1947 or 1948, but the newly elected Government would
not brook such a delay, and for the first time since 1941, a
Greek Government was able to resist the wishes of the British
successfully. Such independence reflected the firmer base
elections had given the new Government. The British could
not very well gainsay its right to decide on the date of the
plebiscite, and in fact accepted Tsaldaris' decision with good
grace.

The program Tsaldaris expounded to the deputies put
major emphasis on the restoration of the King. Everything
else was subordinated to this issue. In foreign affairs he
promised strenuous efforts to secure the annexation of new
territory to Greece from Albania and Bulgaria. Economic
recovery he passed over lightly, falling back more on pious
hopes than on specific proposals. A fourth topic which he
greatly stressed was the restoration of law and order in the
provinces, for which he promised quick and effective action
against the armed bands which were principally responsible
for disturbing the peace.

Of all the problems which faced the new Government,
economic recovery was probably the most important. Yet
the Government was on the whole little interested in eco-
nomic matters. Their attitude was one of laissez faire, with
politic attention to the wishes of their friends who could
profit from a complacent government policy in matters of
taxation and contracts. To make the system work, they
counted on loans from Britain and America. Such an ap-

240 THE GREEK DILEMMA

proach to economics did not correspond well with the ideas
and wishes of the British Economic Mission. This Mission
had scarcely begun to function under Sofoulis, and it soon
found itself facing the passive resistance of the Greek Govern-
ment and administration. The Greeks suspected the British
advisers of trying to bring Greece under their economic con-
trol, and did not welcome the prospect. They resented British
suggestions for economy and limitation of government ex-
penditures, but found that they could not easily resist the
advice showered upon them.

A state budget was drawn up and presented to the Chamber
in June. The largest single item in this estimate was for the
maintenance and equipment of the Army. With the cost of
the police, Navy and Air force, the total for military and
security expenditures amounted to fifty per cent of the
total budget. Estimates for other expenditures were reduced
to a minimum; and in particular, the amount allotted to
reconstruction was pitifully small. Taxation policy was not
clarified, and the estimates of government receipts, by which
the budget was almost brought to balance, seemed to be
rather hopes than calculations.

Such a budget could not excite wholehearted approval.
Yet the desperate economic plight of the country made it
difficult to conceive of anything much better. The Govern-
ment promised to introduce genuine budgetary control of
.expenditure, as its predecessors had never done. It seemed
highly doubtful, however, whether in fact the estimates
would prove enforceable, or inflation could permanently be
stopped. In general, the Government counted on foreign
loans for reconstruction. The budget was drawn up partly
with the purpose of inducing British and American officials to
approve loans, which, if the budget could be adhered to,
would be devoted principally to economically productive
expenditure. In July a vast plan for reconstruction was hastily
drawn up for presentation to the United States and Britain

ELECTIONS 241

as a basis for loan making. Negotiations dragged, however,
and were not concluded at the end of September.

To establish satisfactory public peace called for strong
action. In the southern parts of Greece, rightist bands con-
tinued to harass leftists, frequently resorting to violence and
murder. Their acts sometimes embarrassed the Government
and regularly brought grist to the Communist propaganda
mill. Nevertheless the leaders of the Government and mem-
bers of the gendarmery generally sympathized with these
bands, and secretly considered such to be the only effective
way of dealing with the Left. Gestures toward the arrest and
punishment of these rightist bands were made, but no more.

In northern Greece, however, the Government viewed the
situation with some alarm. Leftist bands had been abroad in
the fastnesses of Mount Olympus and near-by areas since the
summer of 1945. After the royalist victory in the election, the
Communists increased their effort to create additional bands,
hoping to reestablish a guerilla force such as ELAS had been.
What most alarmed the Government was that some of these
bands received help and supplies from Yugoslavia. Their
existence seemed a standing threat not only to local rightists
but to the security of the Greek state itself. Strong measures
were accordingly taken to disperse them. The Minister of
Public Order organized special gendarme detachments to
hunt down the bands. They were equipped with automatic
weapons and instructed to take no prisoners. Operations
began in July, and met with some success. The gendarmes
were not able to eliminate the bands completely, but did
succeed in restricting the scale and scope of their activities.

In September the scale of leftist band activity increased
again. The Communist leaders in Athens openly acknowl-
edged their connection with these bands, and claimed that
ten thousand men had again taken to the hills of Greece,
forming a new ELAS which would combat the monarcho-
Fascist government of Greece. Units of the Greek Army were

242 THE GREEK DILEMMA

called into action against the new ELAS, and a number of
skirmishes ensued in which altogether several hundred men
were killed. British troops, although they remained in Greece,
took no part in these operations*

Despite some pressure from extremists, the Communist
Party was not declared illegal. However, its activities were
somewhat hampered by the enactment of laws designed to
impede Communist organizers. Security Committees were
established in a number of provincial towns with the legal
power of banishing objectionable characters who were not
native residents. Since it was standard Communist practice to
assign their organizers to particular towns and districts,
usually under false names, where they were not native born,
this law made it possible for local leading citizens to compel
Communist organizers to move on. The initial use of this
power was very cautious, for the Government feared that
British and American public opinion would consider such
action a violation of civil liberties. New and stricter libel
laws were also passed, which, if literally enforced, would
severely restrict the traditional scope of almost every Greek
newspaper. This law too was sparingly invoked, and the
Communist press remained free to publish bitter denuncia-
tions of the government "Fascists."

To cope with economic problems and Communist in-
transigence was, in the Government's view, a necessary task;
the restoration of George II, King of the Hellenes, a joyous
duty. The clique of younger deputies advocated an im-
mediate recall of the King, arguing that he was the rightful
sovereign of Greece and required no plebiscite to justify
his power. The official leaders of the Popular Party, however,
had committed themselves to a plebiscite in December 1944,
and saw no reason to risk public and world opprobrium at this
juncture by declining to take a vote which they knew they
could win. In order to give the plebiscite the sanction of the
Western Powers, Tsaldaris decided to invite the Allies to

ELECTIONS 243

send a second mission to observe the preparations for the
plebiscite. Invitations were issued in April, and accepted by
Britain and the United States. France declined on the ground
of expense, although the pressure of French Communists in
the Chamber of Deputies probably had more to do with the
decision.

The original Election Mission had recommended that a
thorough revision of the Greek electoral registers precede
any new vote. This the Government undertook to do prior
to 1 September, when the plebiscite was scheduled to take
place. Renewed instructions were sent out to the local gov-
ernment officials, ordering a careful check of all names on
tlie elections registers. As a result of this order, a few new
names were inscribed, but the major change was the elimina-
tion of several hundred thousand names of persons who had
died since 1936, when the registers had last been brought
fully up to date. Revision began in June, and was observed
and verified by the British and American Mission that came
to supervise the process. The second election mission was
much smaller than had been its predecessor, and only twenty-
five teams were sent into the country to check on the pro-
cedure in the provinces. These teams managed to visit six
hundred registration polls, and concluded, when the revision
had been completed (mid : August), that the Greek election
lists had been brought to "a degree of fairness and accuracy
which justifies their use in seeking the opinion of the Greek
people in matters, of national import." By sampling cross-
sections of the population and checking the result against
the registration lists, the Mission estimated that over eighty
per cent of the persons of voting age had registered, and that
errors and false registrations were reduced to minimum.

The Greek Government requested the Allied Mission to
remain and observe the actual voting in the plebiscite, but
the British and American Governments declined to undertake
the task, arguing that the Mission was too small to be able

244 THE GREEK DILEMMA

adequately to cover the whole of Greece, and consequently
would not be able to make any authoritative report. Indi-
vidual members of the mission nevertheless remained in
Greece until after 1 September, and were able to watch the
actual voting process.

The Greek Government was most anxious to carry out the
plebiscite in a fashion that would win the approval of the
Western Powers, and *give the leftists no plausible basis of
criticism. The royalists were sure that they could win a
majority for the King, and consequently were not much
tempted to falsify the result, or to resort to illegal means of
persuasion. In point of fact, the Greek Communists played
into the royalists' hands, for the increased scale of leftist
banditry lent power to the Government's argument that
only the King could establish a stable Government, capable
of opposing the violent attack of the Communists. Systematic
publicity was given to the armed clashes between gendarmes
and Communist bands; and for the first time it was publicly
announced that the leftists were receiving weapons and other
supplies from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This roused the old
and deep-seated Greek fear of Slavic invasion of their north-
ern provinces, and seemed to prove that the Communists were
indeed enemies of the Greek nation, in league with the hated
Bulgars. More and more, the threatening foreign situation
weighed on the public mind, and the Government was able
to distract attention from the internal problems of the
country.

There is no doubt that the aggressive Communist policy
alienated many former followers. In August KKE proclaimed
a general strike to last only two hours as a demonstration
against the Government. It was not successful; and the royal-
ists construed the failure as proof that the workingmen no
longer adhered wholeheartedly to the leadership of the Com-
munist Party. But at the same time, the more aggressive
policy had the effect of binding those who remained with the

ELECTIONS 245

Communists more firmly to their cause. Thus the net effec-
tiveness of the Communist Party as an instrument of power
scarcely suffered decline.

The republican arguments against the King were often
scurrilous and bitterly personal. The principal charge was
that King George had wantonly established dictatorship in
Greece in 1936, and would do so again if he should return.
The words and behavior of some of the extreme royalists
lent a certain amount of plausibility to this charge, despite
the Government's official rebuttal that the King was now
firmly committed to democratic principles.

Some weeks before the plebiscite, the three former Prime
Ministers, George Papandreou, Sophocles Venizelos and
Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, whose parties had tended to cluster
together in the Chamber of Deputies in a sort of informal
Opposition bloc, came out definitely for a republic. They all
professed willingness to abide loyally by the result of the
plebiscite; but, perhaps anticipating a future popular re-
vulsion against royalism and the Popular Party, took the
occasion to declare against the King's return.

Just prior to the plebiscite, apprehension lest the Com-
munists should mobilize to create riots and break up electipn
booths was general in Athens. To discourage such an attempt,
the Greek Army was alerted. Guard detachments of soldiers
were scattered through Athens and other large towns. The
reduced British garrison, however, was confined to barracks
during the time of voting, and took no part in the proceed-
ings.

Despite the fears, there was little disorder on 1 September.
In the provinces a number of brawls took place and several
people were killed; in Athens the plebiscite was carried out
with decorum. Almost all the registered voters cast ballots,
for no party urged its followers to abstain, and the republican
groups were anxious to make as impressive a show of their
strength as possible. According to the figures of the Ministry

246 THE GREEK DILEMMA

of the Interior, from a registered total of about 1,700,000,
more than 1,673,000 votes were cast: sixty-nine per cent in
favor of the King and thirty-one per cent against his return.
This amounted to a slightly larger royalist vote than had
been polled in the election of March, when the various royal-
ist parties combined to gain sixty-five per cent of the total.

When the result of the plebiscite was known, Prime Minis-
ter Constantine Tsaldaris (who was in Paris at the Peace
Conference) went to London and formally invited his sov-
ereign, George II, King of the Hellenes, to return to Greece
and resume his throne. Tsaldaris returned to Paris briefly,
but went on to Athens, where he busied himself with prepara-
tions for the royal arrival. On 27 September, King George
alighted from an airplane and set foot on Greek soil for the
first time since 194L He immediately embarked in a Greek
destroyer, and made his formal entry into Athens the next
day, coming ashore at Phaleron Bay, and progressing up
Syngrou Boulevard to the Cathedral. There the former
Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, officiated at a Te Deum,
after which the King made a public appearance in Constitu-
tion Square, where he laid a wreath on the tomb of the Un-
known Soldier. Later in the day, he held a reception for
leading politicians, government officials and foreign diplo-
mats. The Russian and Yugoslav diplomatic representatives
were both ominously absent.

The city was decorated for the occasion with thousands of
Greek and Allied flags. Large crowds watched the King's
progress into .the city, and were restrained with difficulty from
blocking the streets, by long lines of police. JLoud cheers
greeted the King as he made his way slowly toward the center
of Athens, and some of the people in the crowd made highly
emotional displays of their affection for the returned mon-
arch. Yet there was an overtone of sombreness. The crowd,
though large and enthusiastic, was not so large nor so stirred-
up as some EAM crowds had been. Officials feared that some

ELECTIONS 247

V

attempt at assassination might be made, and a special police
edict forbade the throwing of flowers, lest a bomb be mixed
with the bouquets. The celebration was ostentatiously boy-
cotted by all leftists. The Communist newspaper of Athens in
reporting it remarked that George Gliicksburg, a foreigner,
had returned and would begin to rule over the Greeks. The
King could not cease from being a symbol of party strife even
for one day, and the ceremonies were in fact a party and not
a national demonstration.

Despite the welcome of the royalist crowds and the pro-
testations of loyalty which the politicians of the Popular and
associated parties showered upon King George, it must have
been with some sadness that he saw the evidences of poverty
and sensed the antagonism that divided his subjects against
one another and turned a part of them so bitterly against his
own person. By himself, the King could hope to do little to
relieve the troubles and anxieties of his kingdom. The fa-
miliar problems economic dislocation, internal strife, and
international ill will still were as pressing as ever. The
solution of each seemed to require the solution of the others
first, making an endless circle from which only great wisdom, '
hard work and good fortune could rescue the country. The
greatest test of the royal Government clearly still lay ahead.

X

Foreign Relations

tlliillllliaiilillllllllltlHIHlIllUllllUlilllHUIHIIIlHIUIIIIUIIIfUIUlIllllliilUini

u

/NDER the occupation,
Greece had become an unwilling part o the New Order, and
had lost all the reality and most of the pretenses of national
sovereignty. The quisling Government did what it was told,
though sometimes with reluctance. Greek provinces had been
ceded to the Bulgars. A fierce hatred for the old enemy flared
in nearly every Greek heart, but resentment could find no
open or official expression for the time.

EAM, at its inception, paid little attention to international
problems. As time passed, the power of EAM extended into
the border regions of Greece. This inevitably raised problems
of relations with guerilla forces of neighboring countries. In
general, EAM followers believed that the hostilities which
had divided the Balkan countries against one another in the
past would be overcome by their revolutionary movement,
working in conjunction with the parallel movements of
Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria. No very clear blueprints
for the future were ever drawn up. Some members of the
movement talked of a Balkan confederation; but a strong
streak of unregenerate nationalism ran through much of the
EAM rank and file, and projects for such a submergence of
Greek sovereignty were never officially promulgated.

In practical matters, relations between the Communist
guerillas of the Balkan countries were generally amicable. A
sort of passport system existed whereby a man could get a
slip of paper from designated authorities near the frontier,

24S

FOREIGN RELATIONS 249

which, upon presentation to the guerilla officials across the
border, assured recognition as a friend. With such a passport,
travel was possible between all the Balkan countries. Difficul-
ties of transport were of course severe, yet Tito and ELAS did
exchange liaison officers in 1943 and communication was ir-
regularly maintained between Partisan and ELAS Head-
quarters thereafter. The Albanian guerilla movement, when
it began to form under Enver Hodja, was in practice little
more than an extension of Tito's power into a new area. EAM
was friendly, and, as we have seen, an ELAS division could
march through Albania in December 1944 (in order to
attack Zervas) and meet with no opposition or even protest.

The relation of the EAM movement with Bulgaria is less
clear. It seems probable that some communication with Bul-
garian Communists occurred during the occupation; and, as
we have seen, there were rumors that the Greek Communists
made an agreement assigning East Macedonia and Thrace
to the Bulgar sphere of revolutionary operations.

During tEe six months of EAM rule in northern Greece,
relations with the northern neighbors remained on the whole
friendly. There were certain quarrels with the Yugoslavs, and
one small battle took place between ELAS and a detachment
of Yugoslav Partisans when the latter tried to remove some
railroad freight cars from Greek territory. However, these
incidents were smoothed over by an evangelistic spirit,
preaching the brotherhood of all Balkan nations. In 1944, a
more serious issue between Greeks and Yugoslavs began to
develop in Western Macedonia, but that is best described
separately as a pan of the evolution of the Macedonian
question.

The international frontiers were lightly guarded, and
passage to and fro was relatively free. Certain grain shipments
from Greece into Albania took place in the spring of 1945,
when ELAS power was about to come to an end, and the
leftists saw no reason to give up their food stores to an un-

250 THE GREEK DILEMMA

sympathetic central Government. Shortage of surplus prod-
ucts and lack of transport reduced other economic inter-
change to a minimum.

The victory of the Greek Right in the fighting in Athens
brought an end to these relatively harmonious international
relations. Toward the end of the occupation, at a time when
the Right was generally disorganized and divided between
collaboration and refusal of collaboration, the one clear issue
on which conservative Greeks had been able to unite was ad-
vocacy of the ideal of Greater Greece. After liberation,
propaganda for annexation of neighboring territories grew
stronger. Nearly all Greeks carne to believe that the sacrifices
and sufferings they had undergone could only be com-
pensated by the addition of new territories to their country
at the expense of the neighboring nations to the north. The
old hope of restoring the Byzantine Empire was revived in
this shrunken form. It was easy for the Greeks to convince
themselves of their right to the territories they coveted, re-
membering the extent of Byzantine boundaries. It is probably
also true that calculating politicians chose to fan the flame as
a means of distracting attention from hardships at home. The
conviction took deep emotional hold. The national claims
were warmly applauded by all parties of the Right and
Center. The Left, in deference to the strength of popular
feeling, advanced claims of its own, against Turkey and
Great Britain (Cyprus), and even accorded vaguely phrased
support to territorial claims to the north.

Basically, the Greek feeling was one of moral indignation.
They believed that the Bulgars should be made to pay for
their annexation of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace during
the war. But retribution did not seem an adequate argument
to justify annexation of Bulgar soil. Consequently an aux-
iliary argument, the need for military security, was developed
and expanded until the vast majority of the people of Greece
came to believe that only by the addition of a strip of land

FOREIGN RELATIONS 251

some thirty to fifty miles in width across the whole length of
their northern frontier could Greece become militarily safe
from her neighbors. The fact that Yugoslavia had been an
Allied state and could hardly be asked to yield up part of her
territory to the Greeks, was simply glossed over in most public
utterances. Emotional emphasis was directed against the
Bulgars and the Albanians; mention was scarcely made of the
Yugoslavs, but maps of the new "Greater Greece" showed a
generous slice of Yugoslav territory included in the new
Greek boundaries.

Ethnological arguments were advanced to justify the de-
sired annexations, but except for the case of southern Albania
(or, as the Greeks insist on calling it, Northern Epirus) the
grounds for the Greek claims were ridiculously slight. Albania
presents a more difficult case. The Albanian state came into
existence only as a result of the intrigues of the Austrian and
Italian Governments in 1912. At that time, Albanian na-
tionalism was in a formative stage. In the province of North-
ern Epirus the educated and articulate Christians spoke and
considered themselves Greek. There was also a peasant
Christian population which spoke Albanian, and had prac-
tically no sense of nationality. After World War I, Greece
laid claim to this province, but Italian influence again pre-
vented any cession of the southern part of Albania to Greece.
During the following years of Albanian national independ-
ence, the feeling of nationalism was successfully implanted
in most of the Albanian-speaking peasants, whether Moslem
or Christian. Persons who actively expressed loyalty to Greece
not unnaturally were persecuted in greater or less degree, and
many individuals found it politic to lose their Greekness and
assume an Albanian nationality, in outward things at least.
The result was a steady weakening of the Greek element in
the border regions, until today it is certain that the number
of active Greek nationalists in Northern Epirus is a small
minority.

252 THE GREEK. DILEMMA

After the overthrow of ELAS in Greece, the national an-
tagonism became entangled with ideological struggles. Al-
bania came under a Communist Government in 1944. When
a conservative Government took power in Greece, Albanian
conservatives, in the southern part of the country at least,
began to look to Greece for liberation from their rulers. At
the same time, Albanian authorities began to take precau-
tionary measures against the opposition, jailing many, execut-
ing some, and putting others into forced-labor battalions.
This the Greek Government has interpreted as persecution of
the pro-Greek minority, as indeed it has become.

Greek territorial claims against her three northern neigh-
bors naturally did nothing to improve Balkan international
relations. An initial strain existed in the ideological opposi-
tion, for Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania all lay within the
Russian sphere of influence and came under Communist
Governments. The Greek border was closed to all normal
traffic from 1945 onward. In March 1946, when UNRRA
tried to organize the delivery of relief supplies to southern
Yugoslavia through Salonika, quarrels between the Yugoslav
and Greek local officials prevented all but a single shipment
from crossing the border.

Mutual distrust led inevitably to a series of border inci-
dents. Most of these were entirely insignificant, consisting of
sheepstealing raids or smuggling by civilians across the fron-
tier. Others, however, developed into small-scale battles
between the rival frontier posts, in which prisoners were
sometimes, taken and casualties suffered. It is unprofitable to
try to assess the fault for these affrays. They arose over minor
misunderstandings, fed by the general atmosphere of hos-
tility.

The Greeks had laid claims of $700,000,000 in reparations
from Bulgaria for damages wrought in the zone of their oc-
cupation. The Bulgars countered with lists of the capital
improvements they had made in the area, and refused to

FOREIGN RELATIONS 253

accept Greek accounting of damages. A single small repara-
tions payment was made. Eighty railway freight cars and two
locomotives were surrendered to the Greeks in March 1946
but most of them were so worn as to be almost useless. At the
Paris Peace Conference (October 1946) Greece was tentatively
awarded reparations payments from Bulgaria amounting to
$62,500,000, but time and means of payment remained un-
certain.

During the early months of 1946 it became clear that
Greek territorial claims against Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had
small chance of satisfaction. The Bulgars not only announced
that no cession of any territory to Greece would be con-
sidered, but went further and countered Greek claims by de-
manding an outlet to the Aegean for themselves. Such
''impudence" startled the Greeks; but helped to make clear
that few concessions could be expected from Bulgaria, es-
pecially since Bulgar claims seemed to have the tacit support
of the Russians.

Disappointment in Bulgaria made Greek territorial aspira-
tions turn the more strongly toward Albania, where their
case was a better one. Memoranda were prepared for the
principal Allied Powers; and Greek historical, military and
ethnological rights to possession of Northern Epirus were
presented before the Peace Conference in Paris (July 1946)
by the Prime Minister himself. The Greek claims did not
come up for hearing until the last days of August. Russia
proved unalterably opposed to any territorial changes at the
expense of her protectorate, Albania; and maneuvered mat-
ters so that when Greek accusations against Albania came up
in Paris, Ukrainian accusations against Greece were simul-
taneously being aired at Lake Success before the Security
Council of the United Nations. The Western Allies were
unprepared to back the Greek claims strenuously in the face
of Russian opposition; but Greek hopes rose when the ques-
tion of Bulgarian boundary adjustment was referred, by a

254 THE GREEK DILEMMA

quirk of Conference procedure, back to the Council of
Foreign Ministers without any specific recommendation from
the Peace Conference.

Greek relations with her Mediterranean neighbors were
not much happier. From Italy, Greece claimed the Dodeca-
nese Islands in the southeast Aegean. These islands were in-
habited by a Greek population, but had been under Italian
rule since 1911. They had considerable importance as mili-
tary bases for control of the Eastern Mediterranean. The
island of Leros boasted a fine harbor, and the Italians had
there constructed a naval base and several military airfields-
Perhaps for this reason, the Russians at first raised objection
to the transfer of these islands to Greek sovereignty, but at a
Conference of the "Big Four" in Paris, May 1946, it was
finally agreed that Greece should have the Dodecanese. Actual
assertion of Greek sovereignty, however, was delayed until
after the conclusion of the final peace treaty with Italy,

A second point at issue between Greece and Italy was
reparations. The Greeks calculated the costs of the Albanian
War and the Italian occupation in rough and ready fashion,
and arrived at the astronomical figure of $2,677,000,000. This
claim was referred to the Peace Conference (July-October
1946) for settlement, and the amount was at length scaled
do^rn to $100,000,000, less than four per cent of the original
claim. In the course of the Peace Conference, Greece and
Italy showed signs of coming into more harmonious relations
with one another. Despite the prominent part Italy had
played in the war against Greece, public resentment against
the Italians did not rise to a high level in post-liberation
Greece. Relatively little attention was paid to the past crimes
of the Italians, perhaps because the full force of public resent-
ment was so effectively channeled against the Bulgars. This
fact, plus the possession of common friends (Great Britain
and the United States) and common opponents (Yugoslavia

FOREIGN RELATIONS 255

and Russia) made rapprochement between the former ene-
mies a relatively easy matter.

Relations with Greece's other neighbor and old-time
enemy, Turkey, were generally amicable but scarcely inti-
mate. During World War II, the Turks had assessed heavy
and unjust taxes against the Greek community in Constanti-
nople, and many prominent Greek families had been ruined.
This raised an echo of the old antagonism, which only slowly
died down in Greece, and rather reduced the warmth of of-
ficial relations. Early In 1945 the Greek leftists advanced a
claim on Eastern Thrace, arguing that the province by old
historic right belonged to Greece. They furthermore hinted
that if Greece would see the light and join the Communist
bloc, a grateful Russia would gladly give Greece all or most
of that province, after having wrested Constantinople and the
Straits from Turkish control. As can be imagined, such a
propaganda did not help to cement relations between Greece
and Turkey. In general, the Turks considered the Greeks so
weak and divided that they would not make worthwhile allies
against the Russian and Communist danger, which threat-
ened both governments alike. Consequently even the posses-
sion of a common enemy did not bring about any important
rapprochement between the two countries. Trade and com-
munication with Turkey were relatively free. A railroad
connection between Salonika and Constantinople existed
after June 1945, and boat service ran between Pireus and the
chief Turkish ports. With the exception of Egypt, Turkey
was the only country to which an ordinary civilian could
travel from Greece. Other frontiers and countries were
closed, either by government policy or by Insuperable trans-
port and exchange difficulties.

Greece thus found herself in an unenviable position. She
was surrounded by enemies or lukewarm friends and sup-
ported only by the distant power of Great Britain, and, less

256 THE GREEK DILEMMA

directly, die United States. Even relations with Britain were
not perfectly smooth. Greek claims to Cyprus constituted a
long-standing irritant. That island is inhabited by a mixed
Greek and Turkish population, and during recent years the
Cypriote Greeks have become ardent nationalists. The Greek
Right, feeling the need of British support, never raised the
question of Cyprus directly. Rightist politicians repeatedly
stated that Great Britain and Greece would be able to settle
the question amicably, implying that the British would, from
the generosity of their hearts, surrender the island to Greek
sovereignty. These hints the British studiously disregarded.
The Left, however, fixed upon Cyprus as a legitimate national
claim, and demanded it loudly and emphatically. Most
Greeks wanted Cyprus, but were not prepared to risk British
displeasure by pressing for its immediate annexation. The
question, consequently, remained more or less in the back-
ground.

Another factor which made relations between Greece and
Great Britain something less than idyllic was the feeling cur-
rent among many Greeks that the British were trying to
exploit their country economically. Most of the prewar con-
cessions to British capital were reestablished with the return
of the Exile Government. Such enterprises as the Athens
streetcars and the electric power company were British owned
and directed. It was generally feared that the Economic Mis-
sion, which had been set up in conformance with the agree-
ment of 25 January 1946, would operate to the advantage of
Great Britain and tie Greece to the sterling area in all finan-
cial and commercial dealings. The Greek Left made much of
thf se misgivings, but, in fact, they were shared by many
other Greeks who accepted economic bondage as the neces-
sary though unwelcome price of political and military sup-
port against the Communists within, and still more outside,
the country.

A further irritant to Greek-British relations was the casual

FOREIGN RELATIONS 257

way in which British officials and troops constantly assumed
an air of superiority. Many Greek Army officers came bitterly
to resent the patronizing attitude Britishers adopted in dis-
cussing military matters with them; and in other walks of life,
where Greeks and British came closely into contact, similar
disharmony tended to arise. Nevertheless, on a purely per-
sonal and social plane, relations were often very friendly.
Most Greeks appreciated the difference between British and
German or Italian methods, and infinitely preferred British
superciliousness to the harsh subjection they anticipated if
ever they should come under Russian domination.

Relations between the United States and Greece were
much happier. In general, the American Embassy, headed by
Ambassador Lincoln MacVeagh, took no active part or in-
dependent lead in Greek affairs. During the civil war in
Athens, the handful of American troops on the scene main-
tained an official neutrality between the British and ELAS.
This enabled the United States to escape the full bitterness
of partisan attack; and during subsequent months, despite the
fact that in most things American policy tacitly supported the
British, the United States never became a prime target of
leftist criticism. Americans took a leading part in the first
Election Mission, for the American contingent of observers
was the largest and best equipped of the three national dele-
gations.

From the time of liberation (and even before) the United
States government, and private societies in America such as
the Greek War Relief and the Near East Foundation, played
a major part in organizing relief and rehabilitation for
Greece. The American contingent in the UNRRA Greece
Mission was larger than any other, and the head of the Mis-
sion was an American, Buell Maben. In the summer of 1945
a 125,000,000 loan was granted to Greece by the United States
Government for reconstruction purchases, and the Greeks en-
tertained lively hopes of securing additional and larger loans

258 THE GREEK DILEMMA

in the future. The prominence which the United States
achieved in relief activities strengthened the gratitude and af-
fection which nearly all Greeks felt toward America. For
many thousands, emigration to the United States seemed the
brightest hope for the future, and the American consulates
were constantly besieged by eager applicants for immigration
permits. A small and inelastic quota prevented all but a very
few from achieving what they so much desired.

As tension developed on the larger international scene be-
tween Russia and the West, the United States began to take
a rather more positive part in Greek affairs. Ceremonial visits
by American warships were generally accepted by the Greeks
as proof that the United States was interested in and solicitous
for the welfare of Greece and her protection against Com-
munist invasion from the north. In December 1945 the USS
Providence visited Pireus briefly. In April of the next year the
USS Missouri put in at Phaleron after its visit to Constanti-
nople; and six months later, the aircraft carrier, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, repeated the call. The visit was climaxed by a
demonstration flight over the capital city of Athens.

The large Greek-American community in the United States
created a special sentimental tie between the two countries.
Many Greeks felt a sort of vicarious partnership in the United
States: if their relatives could so easily become Americans,
they too could feel a vague kinship to the great, rich and
powerful nation across the ocean. The United States was thus
in a unique position, and enjoyed high esteem in the eyes of
nearly every Greek.

The third Great Ally, Russia, occupied first place in the
affections of the Left, but was profoundly feared by the Right.
Official relations after the rightist victory of January 1945
were consequently cool. For many months the Russians sent
no ambassador to Athens, and were represented only by a
military mission. (The same that had been dropped into
ELAS Headquarters by parachute.) This embarrassing gap in

FOREIGN RELATIONS 259

the diplomatic corps was filled only after Sofoulis became
Prime Minister; and when Admiral Gonstantine Rodianov
presented his credentials they proved to be addressed not to
King George but to the Regent.

The Russian press and radio regularly reproduced the
propaganda of EAM, and did not hesitate to call the Greek
government Fascist. In March 1946 the Russian Ambassador
suggested that Greece should cede one of the Dodecanese
islands to Russia as a base for shipping, so that supplies of
grain could be sent from Russia to the Greeks. This idea was
firmly refused by the Greek Government, and the Russians
dropped the matter without further discussion. Implied
Russian support for Bulgarian claims to an outlet on the
Aegean shocked and terrified the Greeks. Official relations
became the more frigid and correct.

In July 1946 the Peace Conference assembled at Paris, and
Prime Minister Tsaldaris attended in person, hoping to
emulate the successes of his predecessor, Eleftherios Veni-
zelos, and win for Greece new territories. It soon became
evident, however, that the Russians were strongly opposed to
the Greek claims, and that the United States and Great
Britain were at best lukewarm to the Greek hopes of ter-
ritorial changes. It was a shattering discovery for most of the
Greeks. They had so completely convinced themselves of
their rights to enlarged boundaries, that they generally felt
that they had been ungratefully betrayed and their heroic
part in the war shamelessly forgotten. The award of much-
whittled-down reparations seemed a caricature of justice; and
the Left took the occasion to proclaim the folly of a Govern-
ment which depended on such ungrateful nations as the
Anglo-Saxon Powers.

Tsaldaris' unsuccessful demands against Albania and
Bulgaria at the Peace Conference did not help to improve
relations with Russia. Toward the end of August, the Russian
and Yugoslav Ambassadors both went home on 'leave." and

260 THE GREEK DILEMMA

their prolonged absence was generally interpreted as a sign
of displeasure at the policies of the Greek Government. A few
days later, August 23, Dimitri Manuilisky, Foreign Minister
of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, asked the United
Nations to consider the threat to world peace which the
policies of the Greek Government offered. He specifically ac-
cused Greece of fomenting border incidents, of seeking to
take over by force the southern part of Albania, and of per-
secuting minorities; and requested the Security Council of
the United Nations to consider and concert steps to deal with
the threat to peace which these acts had created in the Balkans.

The Ukrainian charge was accordingly put on the agenda
of the Security Council meeting but only after bitter words
had been exchanged between the British and Ukrainian rep-
resentatives. The debate turned into fruitless discussion of
border quarrels between Greek and Albanian frontier guards
over stolen cattle, the painting of frontier markers, etc. Repre-
sentatives of various Russian satellite nations accused the
Greeks of aggressive intentions, and dwelt on the malicious
influence exerted by the presence of British troops, which,
they charged, encouraged Greek collaborators and reaction-
aries to stir up trouble in the Balkans. The Greek representa-
tive, Ambassador Vassili Dendramis, heatedly denied the
charges, and was supported by the British delegate to the UN.
Despite its heat, the debate generated little light, and con-
cluded with a vote whereby a majority of the nations declared
that Greece had not been proven an aggressive nation, nor a
danger to the precarious Balkan peace.

The Security Council debate of August-September 1946
dramatized the ill-feeling that permeated the Balkans, and the
tensions which had arisen during the preceding two years
between Greece and her neighbors. In actual fact, Greece
found herself in the front line, at the juncture of British and
Russian spheres of influence. Such an advanced position in-

FOREIGN RELATIONS 261

evitably exposed Greece to severe buffets and a constant
inquietude.

Potential enemies were near and powerful in comparison
with the limited resources of the Greek nation. Potential
allies were far away, separated from Greece by long stretches
of sea. The delicate Greek international position was made
still more acute by a revival, in altered form, of the Macedoni-
an question which had for so long plagued the Balkans. Since
the future history of the Greek state and people may depend
in large part on the development of the ^Macedonian issue, it
deserves a careful examination.

Before the Balkan Wars (1912-13) the Turkish province of
Macedonia was inhabited by a peasantry predominantly
Slavic, mixed with a population, mostly urban, of Turks,
Greeks and Jews. The Slavic peasants spoke a language dis-
tinct from other Balkan tongues, but more nearly related, to
Bulgarian than to any other. Helped by this affinity, the
Bulgars on the whole had more success in winning the
allegiance of the peasants in the struggle for Macedonia
(1876-1912) than had any other nation.

After World War I, when the Bulgars were excluded from
nearly all of Macedonia, Greek influence became overwhelm-
ingly predominant in the part of that province which had
come within the boundaries of Greece. Exchange of popula-
tions with Bulgaria resulted in the uprooting of nearly all of
the Slav-speaking peasants, and Greek refugees were settled
in their place. Much new land was brought under cultivation,
and the total population increased rapidly. No exchange of
populations with Yugoslavia toolc place, however, and in the
remote northwest corner of Greece a substantial colony of
Slavic peasants remained on their ancestral lands. Their ac-
tual number is much disputed, but probably lies between
sixty and a hundred thousand today.

The Slavic peasants of Western Macedonia had been less

262 THE GREEK. DILEMMA

affected by nationalism than their fellows of less remote dis-
tricts, and were generally content to accept the new Greek
sovereignty calmly enough. The Greek Government for its
part was distracted by other problems, and paid very little
attention to the Slavic community that had been incorporated
inside the national boundaries. Greek schools were set up
throughout the district and substantial numbers of Greek
settlers came to occupy land that had fallen vacant as a result
of the prolonged disorders which had affected all Macedonia.
Under these circumstances, Greek influence became firmly
established in the region, and, through the schools, the
younger generation among the Slavs generally began to learn
a little Greek.

This process of peaceful assimilation was checked by a
series of laws passed in the time of the Metaxas dictatorship.
In an effort to hasten assimilation, it was made a legal offense
to speak Slavic in public, and other legal handicaps were put
upon the Slavs. Under such repression, the Macedonian
peasants became acutely conscious of their difference from
the Greeks. The old half-dormant conviction that the land
belonged by right to them and their kind gained a new hold
over their minds. Population had grown rapidly, and the land
which had been half empty in 1912, was, by 1936, insufficient
to provide a living for all the peasants' sons. Greek and Slavic
peasants were driven to compete against each other for the
very means of their livelihood, and the latent national antip-
athies throve as a result.

Throughout the early years of occupation, the Italians were
responsible for policing Western Macedonia, The occupying
army quickly hit upon the idea of using the antagonism
which had developed between Slavs and Greeks for their own
advantage. Bulgarian agents were allowed free scope to spread
propaganda among the Slavic villagers, and persuaded many
to opt for Bulgarian nationality. Thereby the Slavs gained spe-
cial legal and ration privileges, and were able to lord it over

FOREIGN RELATIONS 263

their Greek neighbors as the Greeks had previously lorded it
over them. The Italians organized a special Slavic gendarmery
force from among the peasants of Western Macedonia and
used it for ordinary police work of the area. As was usual with
Axis police forces, it indulged in punitive raids against Greek
villages in retaliation for acts of sabotage carried out by the
guerillas. Naturally enough, the Greeks of Western Mace-
donia came to hate their Slavic neighbors for such traitorous
behavior, but were relatively helpless for the time.

The Italian surrender in 1943 brought a temporary in-
crease in Bulgarian influence, for Western Macedonia was
nominally added to the Bulgar zone of occupation. Actually,
Bulgar troops never came to the area in force, and practical
control of all but the main roads passed into the hands of
EL AS. The indigestible Slavic population of Western Mace-
donia presented the leaders of ELAS with a difficult problem.
International Communist policy for Macedonia in the years
before the war had been far from clear. There had, however,
been considerable talk in Communist circles of a Macedonian
republic to be organized within a Balkan federation of revo-
lutionary states. Within each of the three countries concerned
Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia the national Communist
parties had had an "autonomist" wing which advocated
creation of the new state. But there was no Macedonian Com-
munist Party as such, and individual Macedonians who fell
under the influence of Communist doctrine joined one or
another of the three established national parties. Among
Greek Communists, Andreas Dzimas had become the recog-
nized leader of the Macedonian autonomy movement. He was
a native of Kastoria in northern Greece, a Slav by ancestry,
but educated as a Greek,

In the summer of 1943 a conference was held between
representatives of the Albanian, Yugoslav and Greek guerilla
armies in a village of Western Macedonia. The question how
to counteract reactionary Bulgar influence among the Slavic

254 THE GREEK, DILEMMA

peasants of Greek Macedonia came up at this meeting. The
Yugoslav representative suggested that Tito's Macedonian
Partisans could best succeed in establishing Communist vil-
lage organization and in raising guerilla bands among the
Slavs, of Greece. But the Greek representative refused to fall
in with this suggestion. It was finally agreed that the guerilla
groups would restrict their organizations to the old national
boundaries, and ELAS undertook to organize the Slavs as an
integral part of EAM and ELAS. To establish liaison and
assure smooth cooperation, Dzimas was sent to Tito's head-
quarters shortly after this conference (fall of 1943) as chief
representative of ELAS. In that position he undoubtedly did
what he could to forward the cause of Macedonian autonomy.

As a result of the conference, in the fall of 1943 ELAS
formed a Slavic Communist band under the command of a
man named Gotsi (or Gotseff). Gotsi was a native of Fiorina,
a town just south of the Yugoslav border; himself a Slav and
a baker by trade. The band was considered to be a part of
ELAS and came under the command of ELAS Macedonian
Headquarters. From its inception, however, the band had a
strong autonomist coloring, and Gotsi followed a relatively
independent propaganda policy, openly advocating the es-
tablishment of an independent Macedonian state under Com-
munist auspices. His band found recruits easily enough, and
he was able to draw at least some of the necessary weapons
from ELAS stocks.

It seems probable that from the beginning Gotsi had ac-
cepted ELAS control only with reservations. Matters came to
a crisis about May 1944 when the remnant of the Slavic
gendarmery joined forces with Gotsi. From the point of view
of ELAS Headquarters, this was an enemy formation which
had surrendered to Gotsi. It followed that the gendarmes'
guns were captured enemy property, and, as such, subject to
the disposition of ELAS Headquarters. Gotsi, however,
looked on the matter quite differently. He considered that,

FOREIGN RELATIONS 265

to advance their common aim the better, the two forces had
united to work for the establishment of an independent
Macedonia.

When ELAS Headquarters ordered Gotsi to turn over most
of his newly acquired weapons, he refused to do so. Prolonged
negotiations followed in the course of which Gotsi did yield
some few guns, which were however mostly useless castoffs
and failed to satisfy ELAS. Such intransigence seemed in-
tolerable to the Greek leaders of ELAS, and at length they
decided to break with the Slavic band. In October 1944 su-
perior ELAS forces were brought up, and Gotsi was com-
pelled to cross the border into Yugoslavia.

In Yugoslavia Gotsi found refuge but no warm welcome.
The Partisan movement in Macedonia had a strong tinge of
autonomism, and was Communist chiefly for convenience.
When the power of Tito's central Government began to make
itself felt in Yugoslav Macedonia (spring 1945), considerable
friction developed as a result of the Macedonian expectation
of a real autonomy in the new federated Yugoslav state. The
whole Macedonian autonomist movement consequently fell
under Tito's displeasure. Serbian and Montenegrin troops
were sent into Yugoslav Macedonia and purely Macedonian
units were transferred elsewhere. Simultaneously, the govern-
ment at Skoplje was overhauled and brought fully into line
with Tito's central Government. Gotsi's band fell under sus-
picion with the rest of the autonomists, and it was put into
semi-internment for several months. Groups of ELAS refu-
gees, which came from Greece in March, were similarly
treated.

After Gotsi's expulsion from Greece, ELAS and EAM
ruled the Slavic villages of Western Macedonia for the next
six months. By and large EAM distrusted the Slavs. No sys-
tematic persecutions were carried 'through, however, and ef-
forts to spread Communist organization to them continued
and met with fair success. When the National Guard and

266 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Greek gendarmery came to Western Macedonia in April and
May 1945 the ill-feeling, which had accumulated during the
occupation and had been more or less repressed by EAM,
boiled to the surface. Greeks came to the authorities bearing
all manner of accusations against the Slavs. It became cus-
tomary in local rightist circles to call all the Slavs Communist.
The National Guard, for its part, was ardently nationalistic,
and prone to accept any accusations against a Slav at face
value. Repeated acts of violence and official discrimination
against the Slavic peasants resulted. Many were beaten and
robbed of some or all of their goods, but relatively few were
killed. Such deeds were usually justified as repayment for
acts committed by the victims against Greeks during the oc-
cupation; and in some instances undoubtedly such was the
case. On other occasions, innocent individuals suffered; but
the Greeks tended to regard the Slavs as collectively guilty
for the acts of a few, and threatened to evict the entire popu-
lation from Greek soil in punishment for their treason during
the war.

Thus it came about that in the spring of 1945 the Slavs of
Western Macedonia were like sheep without a shepherd.
Greek Communists distrusted them; Greek nationalists hated
them; and the autonomist movement seemed to have under-
gone an eclipse in Tito's Yugoslavia. In many Slavic villages
of Greece fear and apprehension was intense, and villagers
slept away from their houses to avoid sudden surprise by
night. Reports of this situation easily reached Yugoslavia.
Communist authorities across the border saw a great op-
portunity and did not hesitate to take it. Selected men from
Gotsi's followers and from, among the ELAS refugees were
allowed to form small armed bands and cross over into
Greece. These bands appeared first in June 1945. They de-
voted most of their attention to spreading propaganda among
the Slavic villages, promising an early liberation from the
Greek rule. A "third round" was darkly hinted at when the

FOREIGN RELATIONS 267

Communists would return triumphantly to power, and in-
corporate Greek Macedonia into Tito's Macedonian re-
public.

The bands were never numerous perhaps five hundred
men in all, divided into fifteen or twenty groups. They em-
phasized their propaganda by waylaying a few National
Guardsmen and gendarmes, and by assassinating a few leading
Greek nationalists in the villages. On one occasion, a band
attacked a British truck and killed one of its passengers.
Strenuous British and Greek countermeasures, the approach
of cold weather, and perhaps difficulty in getting ammunition
and other supplies from Yugoslavia, persuaded the bands to
withdraw in the fall of 1945.

They had however brought a new hope to the Slavs of
Greece. It seems clear that these bands persuaded the great
majority of the Slavic villagers to pin their hopes on the
Macedonian People's Republic to the north, and attach their
political loyalties to Tito and his brand of communism.

This new development proved an acute embarrassment to
the Greek Communist Party. Most Greek Communists
strongly objected to any cession of Greek territory; and
should it become recognized that the party officially backed
cession of all or part of Macedonia to a Slav state, the Greek
Communist movement would lose much of its influence over-
night. To avoid such a debacle, Greek Communist leaders
became extremely anxious to reach an understanding with
Tito on the question of Macedonia. In January 1946 Zacha-
riades made a secret trip to the north of Greece, accompanied,
significantly, by Dzimas. In the course of his travels, Zacha-
riades had a conference with high-ranking members of the
Bulgarian and Yugoslav Communist parties, and probably
discussed the Macedonian question with them.

What was decided at this meeting can only be surmised
from subsequent events. During the following months, par-
allel Communist organizations were set up through most of

268 THE GREEK DILEMMA

Western Macedonia: a Greek organization designed to attract
and appeal to Greeks; and a Macedonian organization, di-
rected from Skoplje, which was designed to win the support
of the Slavic population. Local Greek and Macedonian or-
ganizers were instructed to cooperate with each other closely.
It is impossible to say whether Zachariades and his fellow
conferees made any decision as to the ultimate disposition of
Macedonia. The Greek Communist Party did all in its power
to gloss over the issue and distract public attention from it;
and in Yugoslavia spokesmen refrained from making any
public statements which might seem to threaten the integrity
of Greek Macedonia.

Since the summer of 1945 the activities of the Macedonian
Communist Party inside Greece have been constant and ef-
fective. They won the support of most of the Slays; and con-
tinued to instigate murders and assassinations of Greek na-
tionalists and officials of the Government. In the summer of
1946 armed bands reappeared in the hills, supplied and sup-
ported as before partly from Yugoslavia. The Greek Govern-
ment was seriously alarmed by the presence of these bands,
and as we have seen made strenuous efforts to suppress them.

Chiefly as a result of the success of the Macedonian Com-
munist organization in Western Macedonia, the Greek Com-
munist organization lost much of its former influence in that
area. Communism for the local Greeks came to mean an anti-
national movement. In reaction, the Right grew stronger than
anywhere else in Macedonia. In other words, ideological and
national antagonisms aligned themselves; Greek reactionary
against Slav revolutionary.

It is an explosive mixture, and may provide Tito at any
moment he desires with a convenient and plausible excuse for
diplomatic or even military intervention in Greece. The
Slavic peasants have a long tradition of guerilla action, live in
a remote and mountainous land, and have bred hundreds of
young men who have no land of their own, and find them-

FOREIGN RELATIONS 269

selves strongly attracted toward the heroic life of banditry,
colored and condoned by political principles and national
antagonism. At almost any time it may desire, the Mace-
donian Government in Skoplje will be able to create serious
disorders in northwestern Greece; disorders adequate, should
the Yugoslavs ever wish it, to justify intervention to protect
"oppressed Slav brothers of Aegean Macedonia."

The Macedonian question is like a lighted match. It may
go out with the passage of time; but it may also provide the
occasion for widespread conflagration. As we have seen, Greek
international relations are difficult. The country faces hostile
neighbors, and finds itself on the razor's edge dividing East
from West, Russia from Great Britain and the United States.
The internal struggle of Left and Right is inextricably mixed
with the international struggle between Russian communism
and Anglo-American capitalism. In such a chiaroscuro, an
open flame like the Macedonia issue may prove fateful
indeed.

XI

Conclusion and Prospect

iitjnaiisfiininiriiiiiiiaiiiniiiininiiiBiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiniiitnansiiiiiiiiiiiiiiBiiiniiiiiiiniHBiniiaiiwisiii!)

war did not come to
an end In Greece when the Varkiza Agreement was signed. A
bitter war of words has continued without cessation, and spo-
radic sparks of violence illumine, as it were, two armies en-
camped over against each other, dividing and disputing
Greece between them. Neither side thinks the time quite
propitious for all-out battle. Skirmishes take place from time
to time, and only tactical calculation, not any spirit of com-
promise and commonweal, prevents hostilities from breaking
out between Left and Right on a much larger scale.

Real democratic government is impossible under such cir-
cumstances. No one supposes that battles can be settled by
asking rival armies to vote for the candidates of their choice.
Democratic government of the sort familiar to American or
British tradition can only exist when an overwhelming pro-
portion of the people agree in all important matters as to
how things should be done. When such a happy unanimity
exists, parties may divide over minor issues, take their dif-
ferences to the polls, and accept the result with good grace.
In case of defeat, the minority can contentedly wait and hope
for a future redress of the balance which will bring them to
power. These conditions obviously do not exist in Greece.
The issues and memories which divide Left from Right are
too deeply fraught with emotion to permit either side ever to
admit defeat until physically crushed by superior force.

It is conceivable that democratic organization and control

270

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 271

should prevail within the ranks of one or the other or both
sides. But no stretch of the word will bridge the gap between
them. Furthermore, the strain of battle operates to reduce or
eliminate the democratic elements within the contending
parties. To fight well, whether with guns or with words, re-
quires unquestioning subordination to a unified command.
Much of the peculiar strength of the Communist Party comes
from its firm recognition of this principle. The Greek Com-
munist Party, to be sure, holds elections within its ranks; but
the elections are all rigged in advance so that only the men
already chosen by the leaders of the party come to office. In
case of serious quarrel between the leaders, higher Commu-
nist authority intervened in the past, and there is no reason
to suppose it would not do so again. For, though the Comin-
tern has been officially declared dead, there are in Greece
unmistakable signs of its lively life after death.

The strain toward military subordination and unified con-
trol has asserted itself among the rightists also. Their organ-
ization and discipline are far less developed, and the rival am-
bitions of individual politicians have prevented any single
party organization from achieving unquestioned leadership
of the Right. The lack of strong party machines has been
partly compensated for by the use of the governmental ad-
ministrative bureaucracy as a substitute. But up to date, the
British and American Ambassadors have exercised an effec-
tive restraining hand on the extremists of the Right, who
would like to deny all civil liberties to their Communist
enemies, and use the police and Army to destroy the power
of the Left.

If the strength of the Communists should increase until
they seemed seriously to challenge the present power of the
Right, a notable consolidation of rightist ranks would prob-
ably take place. In real or imagined emergency, rather than
go under to the Communists, the men of the Right would
try to establish a dictatorship such as the one Metaxas wielded

272 THE GREEK DILEMMA

before the war; and would employ the full power of the po-
lice and Army to repress the threat from the Left. Such an
event would prove highly embarrassing to the British and
American Governments. Both have preferred a Center which
does not exist; but between extremes have chosen to support
the Right within certain limits. Should the Right, facing
emergency, set up authoritarian government, the Western
Powers would find themselves faced with the problem
whether to support what would practically be a Fascist
state. Only if communism fades away and becomes what it
was before the war, an irritant but not a threat, will the
probability of a dictatorship from the Right disappear.

What then will bring a weakening of the extremes and the
strengthening of moderate opinion? Moral education can
perhaps do something, but apostles of the golden mean are
hard to find in Greece today, and their influence does not
promise to be great until their numbers and conviction in-
crease. If economic conditions could be so improved that
every Greek was able to live as well as he had been brought
up to expect, it seems probable that the excessive concern and
fanaticism which the people now manifest for political par-*
ties and programs would diminish. Circumstances might then
become propitious for the gradual emergence of a community
of ideas that would embrace almost the whole population,
and permit genuine democratic government to be established.
Economic prosperity could not guarantee stable and popular
government, but it would certainly make its achievement
more probable.

Unfortunately for Greece, the country's economic life is
deeply distressed, and will almost surely remain so for years
to come. The fundamental problem is overpopulation. For
generations, the Greek peasant family has produced a large
surplus of children. In the past, periodic outbreaks of disease,
war and famine kept the population down. Greece after the
War of Independence, and Macedonia after the Balkan Wars,

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 273

had both been half depopulated by these means, and a genera-
tion or more was required to restore full occupancy of the
land.

Today the land of Greece is fully occupied. Greece is one
of the most densely inhabited countries of Europe in propor-
tion to the extent of arable soil. Only Belgium and Great
Britain have a greater concentration of population per cul-
tivated acre, and they depend on a highly developed industry
to support their people. In Greece, the land is generally poor.
Most hill slopes are denuded of soil so that they can be used
only as pasture for sheep and goats. Every patch of tillable
earth is exploited. Many peasant families wring a hard living
from holdings of only three or four acres, and depend on the
high value of specialized crops such as tobacco or currants to
buy the food they require. Any interruption of export trade
brings immediate disaster to them, unless charity such as has
been provided by the Red Cross or UNRRA becomes avail-
able.

Substantial improvements in agricultural techniques are
possible, especially through the more abundant use of fer-
tilizers. But improvements generally require capital which
most peasants do not have. A stubborn conservatism among
them hinders innovation of any kind, especially when recom-
mended to them by city-trained (and therefore suspect) agri-
cultural agents. For these reasons, only small increases in
agricultural production can be expected in Greece during
coming years.

After 1900, when Greece faced a similar population crisis,
the pressure was relieved by emigration, expansion into
Macedonia and industrial development at home. Today
emigration is almost closed except to men of considerable
wealth who can satisfy the requirements for admission to
South American countries, South Africa, etc. The United
States, which absorbed most of the earlier emigration, has al-
most closed its doors. The quota for Greece is only a little

274 THE GREEK DILEMMA

over three hundred per year* Applications for more than ten
years to come are on file at the American Embassy.

If Americans seriously want to help Greece, the simplest
and most effective way to do so would be to enlarge this small
quota. Greeks have proved themselves good Americans, and
the United States could easily absorb several thousand immi-
grants from Greece each year. Thereby, the population pres-
sure in Greece would be partially relieved, and the United
States would acquire useful, energetic citizens. Such a policy
would be better and cheaper than millions of dollars in loans.
It would bring gain to both nations, loss to neither.

Other means for bringing a satisfactory living to the sur-
plus population are not very hopeful. Any important ter-
ritorial expansion of the Greek state seems hardly probable.
Greek territorial demands are extensive and unabashed, but
met with almost no success at the Peace Conference. Further-
more, with the exception of parts of European Turkey, the
land which adjoins Greece is already thickly populated with
Bulgars, Macedonians, and Albanians. There is no longer any
half-empty land into which Greece might expand as was the
case after World War I.

The only peaceful alternative is absorption of the surplus
population by a vast development of industry. Greek indus-
try, however, labors under heavy handicaps. The country has
no abundant source of power, and many factories now depend
on imported coal. This means higher costs. In the past the
disadvantage was counterbalanced by tariff protection and
near-starvation wages. Greece has never had any important
industrial exports. There seems small likelihood of any being
soon created. Raw materials are not abundant, and, save for
some bauxite deposits, no important mineral resources exist
in the country. Other countries have equally good bauxite,
and Greece lacks the power with which to refine aluminum
from the ore economically. Some cotton is raised which pro-
vides a part of the raw materials for the textile factories of

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 275

Greece. Save for that, almost everything has to be bought
abroad and brought into the country for manufacture. This
inevitably means production costs above those of more
favored parts of the world, and implies small chance for
Greek industry ever to compete on the world market.

It is conceivable that enormous expenditures of capital
could nevertheless create a substantial industrial plant in
Greece able to supply almost all the industrial products re-
quired by the country itself. This would absorb some, but by
no means all of the surplus population. A network of dams
could be constructed, which would permit flood control, help
irrigation, and produce electric power. But the flow of all
streams is markedly seasonal, and all but a few dry up com-
pletely in the summer. Power production would consequently
have to follow the seasonal fluctuation, or else run at a very
low level the year round using water impounded by the dams
to tide over the dry months. The great initial cost of the dams
would make electricity expensive, and it would almost cer-
tainly be uneconomic in competition with other countries.
Although such a program would undoubtedly bring great im-
provement to Greece, it would fall short of solving the basic
population question. There are, nevertheless, a few sites,
especially in western Greece, where valuable and econom-
ically practicable dams could be constructed to the great
advantage of the country.

Physical difficulties are only a part of the industrial im-
passe which confronts Greece. The whole social pattern in
the cities is disjointed, and there is no efficiency in it. The
war, and the impact of EAM, largely succeeded in breaking
down the peasant attitudes of mind which had persisted
among most of the industrial workers of Greece prior to the
war. Up to the present, the effect has been wholly negative.
Old habits of work have been lost, but new ones have not
been developed to take their place. Under the occupation,
the Left succeeded in building up a magnificent machine for

276 THE GREEK DILEMMA

industrial sabotage; it continues to operate under the royalist
Government with almost equal success. In consequence, ef-
ficient and honest work in the factories is almost unheard of,
and labor costs are doubled or sometimes trebled as com-
pared with prewar times.

Equally, capitalists are afraid to risk anything in the un-
settled times, and many individuals have sabotaged govern-
mental efforts to improve industrial production by hoarding
raw materials and refusing to make expenditures that are re-
quired to reopen factories.

There is little if any sense of commonweal. Workmen re-
gard their employers as natural enemies; employers look upon
their workmen as unruly, dishonest, greedy. The political
paralysis of the country extends to its industrial relations.
Labor unions are mostly controlled by Communists, and
many workmen sympathize with the Left. Employers are stout
conservatives almost to a man, and regard any concession to
their workmen as a concession to communism. Peace and
goodwill are obviously not to be found under such circum-
stances; even intelligent cooperation for the improvement
of production hardly exists.

Before the war, Greek industrial efficiency was relatively
good. Capitalists were daring and adventurous; workmen la-
bored hard and long. Their miserable wages scarcely sufficed
to buy more than the food they needed; but the smallness of
their wages contributed to the cheapness of the product.
Today, this efficiency seems irretrievably gone. By May 1946
industrial production in Athens and Pireus amounted to less
than half the 1939 total, even with the advantage of free im-
port of raw materials by UNRRA, which were issued to the
factories at less than market cost.

The Greek foreign exchange balance was always precarious
in prewar years. Remittances from emigrants to their families
back home, and income from the merchant marine, almost,
but not quite, covered the trade deficit. Remittances will in-

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 277

evitably decrease as the generation of emigrants passes from
the scene, and this source of foreign exchange will gradually
dry up unless large-scale fresh emigration becomes possible.
About eighty per cent of the Greek merchant marine was
sunk in the war, and reparations will only replace a small
proportion of the lost tonnage. Furthermore, it seems prob-
able that the low wages which made possible Greek success in
international competition before the war, will lead to para-
lyzing labor troubles on Greek ships. If such in fact proves to
be the case, it will be difficult indeed for Greece to build up
again the merchant marine she had before the war.

To this accumulation of problems must be added the
disaster of physical destruction during the war, which greatly
reduced the capacity of the internal transport system, and
cut into the industrial plant.

Most Greeks consider their only escape from the economic
dilemma to be foreign loans. The United States and Britain
have already made loans to Greece, although relatively small.
Enormous sums would be necessary to build a self-sufficient
economy in the country, and there seems almost no possibility
that such sums could ever be repaid. Both America and
Britain are prepared to subsidize the Greek economy to some
extent in order to keep peace in the country, but it is doubtful
whether their willingness will extend to large sums delivered
over long years. Especially will this be true if strong-arm
dictatorial government comes to be established in Greece.

It seems clear, then, that all Greeks must expect a lowered
standard of living during the next few years. But many Greeks
existed on the thin edge of starvation even before the war,
and it is difficult to see how any great lowering of their in-
come can take place without widespread social disturbance.
There is no spirit of willingness to share the inevitable suf-
fering. Each man is out for himself, and many Greeks are
quite prepared to disregard laws designed to equalize the
economic burden among all classes. Evasion of taxation is

278 THE GREEK DILEMMA

common practice among the well-to-do; bribery of underpaid
government officials is a normal way to secure special favors.

With such an economic base, Greek politics seems certain
to continue embittered, and democratic government will
scarcely prove viable. The strategic place Greece holds on the
international scene adds still more to the difficulties that lie
before the country. Tension between Russia and the Anglo-
American Powers almost guarantees continuance of the Com-
munist-Rightist struggle within Greece. Each of the domestic
factions looks abroad for moral and physical support. Each
promises eventual victory to its adherents on the strength of
foreign help.

Greece has involuntarily come to the forefront in the
postwar jockeying of the Great Powers for position in Europe.
The northern frontier of Greece has come to be a part of the
line separating Russia from the West; and it is crystal clear
that the Russians would be glad to increase their zone of in-
fluence and bring Greece among the number of their client
states. In the struggle for Greece, geography gives Russia an
advantage, while history helps the Western Powers. The geo-
graphic advantage of proximity and a long land frontier needs
no elaboration. Against it must be set the traditional affilia-
tion of Greece with France and England, and the general
Greek fear of Slavic inundation. The existence of the Com-
munist threat, we have seen, forces Greece into dependence
on Great Britain. Equally, the Russian danger drives the
British to seek to maintain their power and influence in
Greece.

In the world-wide strategic picture, this barren little coun-
try cannot of itself be considered highly important. Its value
lies in its position. Communist success in Greece would bring
Russian power and influence into the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, and go a long way toward assuring the Russians of
predominance in all of that troubled area. Neither the United
States nor Great Britain is willing to accede passively to such

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 279

an increase in Russian power. It is for this reason that the
British so high-handedly supported Papandreou in December
1944 and used their troops to combat EAM. It is largely for
the same reason that Britain and the United States have
hoped for economic and political stabilization in Greece, and
have sent such large amounts of relief supplies to that coun-
try.

The task of stabilization is not yet accomplished, nor is the
Communist threat dissolved. I have already said that support
of the enemies of the Communists in Greece may possibly
turn into support of dictatorial and violent government. If
this should come to pass, the British and American Govern-
ments will find themselves in a difficult dilemma, unwilling
to withdraw, and hand Greece over to the Communists and
the Russians, yet unable with good conscience to support what
will to all intents and purposes be a Fascist state. The
Western Powers will undoubtedly bend every effort to prevent
such a situation from arising. The British and American Am-
bassadors will do all they can to assure the maintenance of
democratic and parliamentary forms even though the sub-
stance of government by consent will almost surely be unat-
tainable. Diplomatic pressure supported by economic subven-
tion on a sufficient scale would probably suffice to stave off
dictatorship. The question is whether we will prove willing to
pay the cost of our scruples; or, refusing to make uneconomic
loans, and insisting on the sacred liberties of Western
democracy, find that economic distress and organized Com-
munist effort have made Greece ripe for Russia to pluck.

In Communist hands, Greece would suffer from most of
the economic ills that beset the country today. Perhaps the
energy and efficiency of the Communist organization would
succeed in checking some of the sabotage that today comes
from workmen and capitalists, and be able to put Greek
factories more efficiently to work. But Russia is in no position
to send much help to Greece, at least for the present; and

280 THE GREEK DILEMMA

without foreign food, coal and manufactures, Greece would
starve. The Greek economy is not like that of Bulgaria or
Yugoslavia, self-sufficient within itself for the necessities of
life. Greece depends on imports to live. For political reasons
Russia might be willing to send wheat to Greece. Needing it
for her own people, she might also let the Greeks starve, or
solve the problem of surplus population by forming forced
labor gangs for work in Russia.

In the world contest for power, the good or ill of a small
state like Greece counts for little. Neither Great Britain nor
Russia directs its policy toward the benefit of the Greeks. If
Greece benefits, it is only incidentally; if Greece suffers,
equally it is incidental. Yet the fate of Greece in very large
part has come inescapably to depend on the remorseless ac-
tion of the Russian millstone grinding heavily against the
Anglo-American. It is a sad and anguishing position for a
proud people.

The difficulties that face Greece may seem almost over-
whelming. One does well to remember that Greeks have suf-
fered many tribulations in the past and have survived them
all. Poverty is no new thing among them, nor is internal dis-
sension. The people are energetic, ingenious and clever, ac-
customed to living by their wits in a difficult world. After
World War I, a million and a half refugees flooded the coun-
try, most of them bereft of all material possessions; yet, by a
combination of foreign philanthropy and their own address,
most of these refugees succeeded in making a living, and
some even rose to easy circumstances. The surplus popula-
tion that now throngs the towns and villages of Greece is
much as was that refugee mass twenty-five years ago. There
is no land in Macedonia today for them to settle, but perhaps
they will nevertheless be able to contrive the means to live,
and find a way to contribute their part to the productivity
of the nation.

Even should the townsmen fail, and war and rapine be

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 281

called in to solve the population problem, the Greek peas-
antry remains. The peasants are hardy and industrious, able
to survive the cataclysms of famine, war and pestilence. In
the past, town life in Greece has often been nearly wiped out.
One hundred and thirty years ago, Pireus was an empty
harbor without even a single house by its shores, and Athens
was only a small village of perhaps a thousand souls. Today
the two cities number over a million inhabitants between
them. Though they may again be brought low, the survival
of the Greek people on the land will not thereby be pre-
vented. The land and its tillers survive while cities rise and
fall. If overpopulation is not relieved by emigration and
peaceful economic development, it will bring its own solu-
tion by precipitating death-dealing violence, as has happened
in the past. Yet the peasant community will still survive, and
with it, something of the turbulent, proud, and civilizing
Greek spirit.

Appendix:
Chronological Table

1453 Turks capture Constantinople. End of the Byzantine

Empire.

1821-29 Greek War of Independence.

1835 Otto of Bavaria appointed King of the Hellenes.

1863 George I became King of the Hellenes.

1870 Bulgarian Church separated from the Greek Church.

Great impetus to the rising spirit of Bulgar national-
ism.

1878 Treaty of San Stefano created a Big Bulgaria, putting

nearly the whole of Macedonia within the boundaries
of the new state. It was modified in the same year at
the Congress of Berlin, and Macedonia returned to
Turkish sovereignty.

1881 District of Arta and part of Thessaly added to Greece.

1897 Greco-Turkish war. Inconclusive.

1899-1910 Chronic disturbances in Macedonia, with rival gue-
rilla bands and organized propaganda striving to
advance the cause of Greek, Bulgar and Serbian
nationalism among the local inhabitants.

1908 Young Turk Revolution promised longer life to
Turkey than the Christian states of the Balkans had
hoped. Venizelos distinguished himself in Cretan
insurrection.

1909 Military league made coup d'etat in Athens, invited
Venizelos to come to Greece.

1910 Venizelos became Prime Minister for first time.

1912 First Balkan War. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria at-
tacked Turkey and drove Turks almost entirely out
of Europe.

1913 King George I assassinated. His son Constantine suc-
ceeded to Greek throne. Outbreak of Second Balkan

282

APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 283

War, Bulgaria fighting against Greece and Serbia
over the division of the spoils in Macedonia.
1914 Outbreak of World War I. Great Britain annexed

Cyprus. Bitter quarrel between King Constantine
and Venizelos over Greek foreign policy.

1916 New elections returned slight Venizelos majority, but
King Constantine refused to accept Venizelos as
Prime Minister. Venizelos set up insurrectionary Gov-
ernment in Salonika.

1917 Venizelos returned to Athens. King Constantine
forced into exile, succeeded by his second son Alex-
ander.

1918 Armistice. Greek troops bivouacked within sight of
Constantinople.

1919 Peace Conference at Paris. Venizelos won great con-
cessions for Greece, including strip of Asia Minor
along the Aegean, and Western Thrace. Treaty of
Neuilly fixed Bulgarian peace terms, provided for a
population exchange between Greece and Bulgaria
and guaranteed Bulgaria an economic outlet on the
Aegean.

1920 Mustapha Kemal refused to accept peace terms dic-
tated by Allies for Turkey. King Alexander died and
King Constantine recalled by popular acclaim.

1921 Greek offensive in Asia Minor.

1922 Turks threw back Greek armies in Asia Minor. Mas-
sacre in Smyrna. King Constantine abdicated and his
elder son George II became King. Plastiras, Gonatas
and Hadjikyriakos led revolt against royalist Govern-
ment.

1923 Treaty of Lausanne made peace between Greece and
Turkey. Greece gave up all claims to territory in
Asia Minor, and exchange of populations prescribed.
Corfu incident.

1924 Greece became a republic.

1925 General Pangalos established a dictatorship.

1926 Pangalos overthrown, republic restored.
1928-33 Venizelos Prime Minister again.

1933 Election gave majority to Popular Party (royalist).

Plastiras attempted coup d'tat without success. Went
into exile in France.

284 THE GREEK DILEMMA

1935 Second republican coup d'tat put down after some
days o fighting in Athens and Macedonia. Extensive
purge of Greek Army, favoring royalists. King George
called back by extensively falsified plebiscite.

1936 New elections resulted in almost even balance be-
tween royalists and republicans in Chamber of Depu-
ties. General John Metaxas acting Prime Minister,
while Chamber of Deputies was prorogued. Metaxas
persuaded King George to entrust him with dicta-
torial powers.

1939 Outbreak of World War II.

1940 Italy declared war on Greece, but after initial suc-
cesses Italian troops were driven back inside Albanian
border.

1941 British troops land in Greece but were too weak to
oppose German invasion. Greek Army of Epirus sur-
rendered, General Tsolakoglu became quisling
Prime Minister while King George and Cabinet,
headed by Tsouderos, fled to Cairo. Famine in Greece,
winter 1941-1942.

1942 Resistance organizations began to form in Greece, the
chief being EAM and its army, ELAS; EDES less
powerful, centered in western Greece under Napoleon
Zervas' leadership. Destruction of Gorgopotamos
Bridge marked arrival of British sabotage teams in
Greece, first important act of resistance.

1943 Rapid growth of guerilla armies. British worked to
unite all guerilla forces. General guerilla charter,
July, established subordination of Greek guerillas
to Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean. Italian
surrender strengthened ELAS. Outbreak of large-
scale civil war between ELAS and EDES. Estrange-
ment of British from ELAS.

1944 Plaka Bridge agreement ended civil war between
guerillas (February). Establishment of ELAS Re-
serve in towns. Provisional Government of the Moun-
tains challenged the Exile Government's legality.
Mutiny in Middle East (April). Efforts at unity.
Lebanon Conference (May). Papandreou, Prime
Minister; EAM agreed to join the Exile Government
(August). Government transferred to Italy (Septem-

APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 285

ber). Caserta Agreement. Government returned to
Athens (October). Quarrels between Left and Right.
EAM ministers resigned (2 December) . Demonstra-
tion led to bloodshed (3 December). Outbreak of
civil war, with British supporting the Right.
Churchill flew to Athens in effort to end fighting.

1945 Archbishop Damaskinos appointed Regent (1 Janu-
ary). Plastiras became Prime Minister. ELAS signed
truce. Varkiza Agreement ended civil war (February).
Dissolution o ELAS. National Guard took over con-
trol of provinces. Plastiras resigned (April), suc-
ceeded by Voulgaris, who resigned in October. Im-
passe. Regent Prime Minister for few days, succeeded
by Kanellopoulos (October), and Sofoulis (Novem-
ber). Preparations for elections.

1946 Elections March 31 returned royalist majority. Tsal-
daris became Prime Minister. Revision of election
registers. Plebiscite (1 September) resulted in recall
of King George. King returned to Athens (28 Sep-
tember).

HIlIlllfllltllDlUIIilttlltlUIIIllllllltllltlttllllltlllllllllllllillUlUIIIIIlI

IIHIIilitlliliilUlillKfUllft

Indei

UltlllllllltllltlUIUIUIUIUItllUlllllllllIMIIIIHIlllUllllUIIIIflllllHlllll

IHIIlllIlillHill

"Aegean Macedonia," 269
AFHQ, Algiers, 85; Caserta, 146
Agrarian Party, 27, 232, 235
Albania, 15, 36, 37, 129, 134, 177,

201, 239, 248, 251-54, 259, 263
Albanian War, 37-42, 254
Alexander, Field Marshal Harold, 184
Alexander, King of the Hellenes, 17,

24

Alexandras, Apostolis, 232
American Army Mission in Greece,

106, 108, 112

AMFOGE (Allied Mission for Ob-
serving Greek Elections), 217, 229,
231, 234, 235, 257
Anton Tsaous, 86, 202
Ares (Velouhiotis), 63, 66, 77, 79,

111, 177, 196-97
Armoured Brigade (British) , 176, 183,

185

Army, British, see Great Britain
Army, Greek, in Albanian War, 38-
42, 44-46; in the Middle East, 114-
120, 125-130, 142; reorganization of,
195, 207, 208, 226-27; after libera-
tion, 209, 227, 238, 240, 245, 257;
see also Third Mountain Brigade,
Sacred Squadron
Asia Minor Campaign, 18ff.
Athens EDES, 82, 103-104, 232
Autonomism, Macedonian, 263-65

Bakirdjis, Col. Evripides, 78, 81, 89,

111, 137

Balkan Wars, 13ff., 261
Barnes, Lt. Col. Tom, 66, 79
Bodossakis, 210-11
Border incidents, 36, 37, 252, 260
British Economic Mission, 226, 240,

256
British Embassy to Greece, 124, 128,

162, 220; see also Great Britain

287

British Headquarters, Cairo, 65, 67,
84, 107, 114-15; Greece, 171, 183

British Military Mission, 207-209, 221,
224, 226-27

British Mission with the Greek gue-
rillas, 66, 67, 78-80, 85, 101-108, 112

British Police Mission, 203, 207, 221,
224, 226

Bulgaria, 86, 129, 134, 259, 261-63,
280; in Balkan Wars, 15; in World
War I, 17; irridentism, 20, 253, 259;
in World War II, 43, 50, 95, 248;
Greek attitude toward, 202, 222,
239, 248, 250-51, 254; relation to
guerillas in Greece, 95, 244; repara-
tions, 252-53

Caserta Agreement, 147-49, 158, 177

Chamber of Deputies, 30, 32-33, 215,
217, 234, 235, 237, 239, 245

Chrysanthos, Archbishop, 192-93

Church, Greek Orthodox, 99-100, 192-
93

Churchill, Winston, 44, 123, 146-47,
164, 173-74, 185, 188, 191, 216, 221

Collaboration, 50-51, 53-54, 84, 104,
109, 133-34, 154, 157, 161, 163, 188

Communist Party, Greek, 29, 67, 195,
196, 211, 213-14, 218, 237, 252; early
history, 30-32, 34; and resistance,
68, 72-73, 76, 97-99, 110; relation to
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, 95,
248-50; policy toward Govt. of Na-
tional Unity, 138-39; relation to
Russia, 145, 259; and civil war in
Athens, 174-75, 179, 186-87; power
and morale of, 194, 200, 224-25,
227-28, 241-42, 244-45, 271, 276;
newspapers, 199, 242, 247; fear of,
221-22, 242, 245, 278; and elections,
223, 228, 229, 234, 235; and Mace-
donian question, 263-69.

288

INDEX

Constantine, King of the Hellenes, 16-

18, 24, 186, 208
Constantinople, 13, 14, 18, 19, 206,

255, 258
Constitution Square, 163, 166-71, 183,

218, 232, 246
Corfu, 36, 177, 201
Corinth, 189, 192
Crete, 46, 86, 238
Cyprus, 250, 256

Damaskinos, Archbishop and Regent,

99, 124, 214, 216, 218-19, 221, 238,

246, 259; career and character, 191-

94

Dictatorship, 25, 33-35, 98-99, 132, 161,

245, 270-72, 279
Dimitroff , George, 69
Dodecanese Islands, 254, 259
Dzimas, Andreas, 263-64, 267

EAM (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon
Metopon) , establishment of, 72;
aims, 73, 92-94, 98, 108-109, 132, 149,
212; growth, 74-75, 132; morale, 90,
93, 157, 174-75, 178, 190; social com-
position, 91-92; regional strength,
94-97, 100, 201-203; local govern-
ment by, 97,236; and the Church,99-
100; and Greek Army in the Middle
East, 119-20, 126-28; opposition to,
133; and Govt. of National Unity,
137-39, 141-44, 154-57, 159-60, 163;
relation to Albania, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia, 95, 248-50; demonstra-
tions, 152, 163, 165-71; preparation
for civil war, 163, 165-71; policy
during civil war, 174-75, 179; news-
papers, 192, 242; loss of influence,
199-201, 215-16; and elections, 215-
17, 223, 229, 233, 235-36; and
Russia, 144-46, 235-36, 259; and
Macedonian question, 263-65

EDES, guerillas (Ellinikos Dimokrat-
ikos Ethnikos Syndesmos), 65, 81,
158, 232-33; organization of, 83,
100-101, 106; relations with British
Mission, 102-103, 107; split with
Athens EDES, 103-104; attacked by
ELAS, 107, 177; transformation of,
109

EKKA (Ethniki kai Koinoniki Apelef-
therosis), 78, 83, 87-88

ELAS (Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherot-
ikos Stratos), establishment and

growth, 75-81; relations with other
guerillas, 85, 88, 89, 107, 177;
strength, 94, 105-106; relations with
British Mission, 78-80, 102, 103, 106,
107; transformation of, 108-109; and
liberation, 149-50; question of its
disbandment, 155-59; in Athens
civil war, 176-77, 180, 182, 184, 188-
89, 194-95; disarmament and dis-
bandment of, 196, 227-28; reap-
pearance of, 241-42; and Yugoslavia,
249; and Macedonian question, 263-
65

ELAS Reserve, establishment and
growth, 109-10; social composition,
134; and fighting in Athens, 163,
171, 175-76, 180, 182, 184, 188-89

Elections, 17, 18, 25, 28, 30, 196, 215,
217-18, 226-36

Election Mission, see AMFOGE

EOEA (Ethniki Organosis Ellinikon
Andarton), 104

EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kritikon
Andarton), 96

Epirus, 15, 37, 46, 62, 94, 149, 177,
201, 233, 238, 251

Famine, 51

Filiates, Anton, see Anton Tsaous

Financial Commission, 226

First Brigade, Greek, 117, 125-28

Fiorina, 264

France, 186, 215, 217, 235, 278

Gendarmery, 50, 154, 181, 203-204,
222, 228, 265, 267

General Staff, 207, 209, 227; see also
Army, Greek

George II, King of the Hellenes, 24,
161, 172, 188, 217, 232, 259; acces-
sion and exile, 25; return to throne,
30, 242, 246; and Government-in-
Exile, 47, 113, 116; character and
education, 120-22; question of his
return, 122, 141, 147, 155-56; visits
United States, 113; and regency,
124-25, 188, 191; opposition to, 93,
156, 188, 245; British support for,
122, 125, 162, 173-74, 216-17;

rwth of popularity, 208, 239, 244-

Germany, 42, 44, 50, 104, 131, 149,

150

"Golden Resistance," 87
Gonatas, Stylianos, 25, 103, 232

INDEX

289

Gorgopotamos bridge, 65, 66

Gotsi, 264-65

Government-in-Exile, 111-16, 138, 147

Great Britain, and Greek Campaign,
1941, 43-45; policy towards restora-
tion of King George, 123-24, 162,
227; policy toward EAM, 149, 162;
and outbreak of civil war in
Athens, 162, 165, 172-74; army in
Greece, 43-45, 149-51, 176, 184,
188-89, 197, 242, 245, 260, 267;
opinion about Greece, 185, 242; in-
fluence in Greece, 185-88, 221-23,
239, 255, 260-61, 278-80; and Greek
elections, 215-17, 235, 238, 243;
loans to Greece, 220, 226, 239-41,
277; see also British Mission to the
Guerillas, British Headquarters,
British Embassy

"Greater Greece," 14, 134-35, 209, 232,
239, 250-52, 259

Greece, social organization of, 20-24,
27-28, 275-76; ,* establishment of re-
public, 25; Metaxas dictatorship,
33-35; Albanian war, 37-42, 46; war
with Germany, 44-47; economy, 27-
28, 52-53, 134, 151-52, 204-207, 212-
14, 225-26, 239-41, 256, 272-81; psy-
chology, 38, 40-41, 51, 54, 60, 131-35,
152-53, 161, 235, 270-72, 275-78;
governmental administration, 53-
55, 203-204; relations with Italy, 36-
37,254

Greek War Relief Association, 257

Grivas, Lt. Col. George, 89, 200, 236

Guerilla bands, 53, 55, 61ff., 228,
241-42, 244, 245, 267; see ELAS,
EDES, PAO, EKKA

Guerilla charter, 85, 88

Hadjimihalis, Gen. Michael, 163
Hawkesworthy, Gen., 165, 184
Hodja, Enver, 248
Hostages, 187, 189

Immigration, 258, 273, 274
Inflation, 52, 151-52, 212, 219, 226,

240

loannides, John, 95
Ipefthinos, 75, 97
Italy, 15, 35, 36-42, 50, 62, 104-105,

251, 253-54, 262

Jannina, 15, 38, 39, 46, 149

Kafandaris, George, 26

Kalamata, 150, 228

Kalavryta, 57

Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis, 40* 219,

232, 238, 245
Kapetanios, 76-78
Kartalis, George, 87
Klaras, Athanasios, see Area
Koritsa, 38, 39
Koryzis, Alexander, 47
Kozani, 38, 45

Labour Party (British), 214, 216, 219,

220, 224
Lamia, 65, 189

Lebanon Agreement, 140-41, 185
Lebanon Conference, 136-41
Leeper, Sir Reginald, 139, 10, 164,

171
Liberal Party, 23, 73, 82, 133, 135,

140, 142, 143, 151, 160, 194, 208-209,

214, 217-18, 232, 235
Loans, 226, 239-41, 257, 277
Logothetopoulos, Konstantine, 54

Maben, Buell, 257

Macedonia, 15, 20, 24, 45, 78, 84, 88,
95, 228, 233-34, 260-69, 280; Central
85, 201-202; Eastern, 95, 202, 249,
250; Western, 96, 201-202, 249

Macedonian Communist Party, 263,
268

Macedonian Question, 249, 261-69

MacVeagh, Ambassador Lincoln, 221,
257

Mandakas, Gen, Emmanuel, 163

Maniadakis, Constantine, 113, 115-16

McNeil, Hector, 220-21

Metaxas, Gen. John, 26, 29, 32, 33, 40,
47, 63, 121, 129, 192, 262, 271

Military Liaison, 204-205

Minorities in Greece, 260; Albanian,

37, 201; Slavic, 96, 261-69
Myers, Col. Edward, 66, 79
Mylonas, Alexander, 232

National Guard, 154, 181-82, 197-99,

203-204, 265-67
National Unity, Government of, 137-

38, 140-47, 151-60, 164

Navy, Greek, 125, 126-27, 211, 240
Near East Foundation, 257

Pangalos, Gen. Theodore, 25, 64, 65,
69

290

INDEX

PAO (Panellinios Apeleftherotiki

Organosis), 83-86

Papandreou, George, 26, 128, 160,
175, 181, 221, 232, 238, 245, 279;
career and character, 135-36; as
Prime Minister, 135-36, 140, 143,
146-47, 172-73, 194
Paratroop Brigade (British), 150-51,

171, 176
Parliament, Greek, see Chamber of

Deputies

Partsalides, Dimitrios, 111
Peace Conference (Paris 1946), 246,

253-54, 259, 274
PEEA (Politiki Epitropi Ethnikis

Apelftherosis), 78, 111, 125
Peloponnese, 94, 134, 177, 201, 206,

228, 233
Phaleron, Bay of, 177, 183, 184, 188,

246,258
Pindus mountains, 39, 64, 66, 67, 81,

85, 96, 102, 105, 107, 177, 196
Pireus, 31, 45, 70, 153, 168, 174, 176,
182, 183, 184, 189, 202, 233, 255, 276,
281
Plaka Bridge Agreement, 108, 148,

177

Plastiras, Gen, Nicholas, 25, 28, 64, 82,

188; career and character, 186; as

Prime Minister, 191, 194, 207, 209

Plebiscite, 30, 196, 215, 239, 242-46

Plebiscite Mission, 243-44

Police, 164, 166-71, see also Gen-

darmery

Popular Party, 24, 133, 139, 140, 151,

188, 194, 214, 220, 232, 233, 234,

236, 242, 245; organization of, 236-

38

Population, 19, 24, 262, 272-74, 280-

81
Protocol of 31 March, 94, 120, 121,

135

Provisional Government in the Moun-
tains, see PEEA
Psarros, Col. Dimitri, 87-88, 109, 112

Quisling government, 50, 53, 54-55,
209, 248

RAF, in Albanian War, 42; in Athens

civil war, 176-78, 182-83
Railroads, 206-207
Rallis, John, 55

RAN (Rumeli-Avalona-Nisi), 129
Red Cross, 52, 55, 153

Refugees from Asia Minor, 19, 24,

31, 186, 280

Regency, 124-25, 187-88, 191
Regent, see Damaskinos
Reparations, 252, 253, 259
Rimini Brigade, see Third Mountain

Brigade

Rodianov, Adm. Constantine, 259
Roosevelt, Pres., Franklin D., 170
Royalists, 18, 23-24, 26, 29-30, 186,

208-209, 211, 214, 216, 217, 218, 223,

227, 228, 230, 232, 234, 235, 236,

244, 24?
Russia, 144-46, 215, 222, 224, 246, 252-

60, 269, 278-80

Sacred Squadron, 117, 125, 128, 158,
195

Salonika, 15, 38, 44, 45, 59, 64, 69, 83,
129, 134, 150, 177, 189, 202, 206,
252, 255

Sarafis, Col. Stephen, 77, 81, 112, 147,
148, 158

Scobie, Lt, Gen. Ronald, 147, 150,
171, 195, 208; operational orders
for liberation, 148; disbandment of
guerillas, 158-59; career and char-
acter, 164-65; and civil war in
Athens, 174, 178, 179, 182, 184, 189

Security Battalions, 58, 59, 103, 109,
133, 134, 143-44, 148, 149, 182

Security Committees, 242

"Service" government, 209, 214-15

Siantos, George, 68, 77, 160, 224, 232;
early career and character, 69-71;
position in EAM and ELAS, 111-12,
163; in Athens civil war, 163, 179,
186, 188, 195

Skoplje, 45, 68, 265, 268, 269

Slavic population of Greece, 96, 261-
69

Socialists, 72-73, 174, 179, 200-201

Sofoulis, Themistocles, 82, 135, 143 3
151, 160, 172, 173, 187, 208, 238,
259; as Prime Minister, 220-21, 223,
224, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236

Spiliotopoulos, Lt. Gen. Panagiotis,
148

Svolos, Professor Alexander, 111, 137,
142, 144, 152, 179, 200-201

Terror, 56-58, 56-57, 199, 228, 233-34,

266
Thessaly, 70, 96, 105, 108, 176-77, 184,

206, 228

INDEX

291

Third Mountain Brigade, 158, 195,
207; formation of, 128, 130; fight-
ing in Italy, 130; arrives in Athens,
155; in Civil War, 176, 178, 183, 189

Tito, 145, 249, 264, 265, 267

Tsaldaris, Constantine, 236, 239, 242,
245, 259

Tsiriraokos, Elias, 73, 200-201

Tsolakoglu, Gen. George, 46, 50

Tsouderos, Emmanuel, 47, 113, 115,
118, 121, 122, 124, 127,

Turkey, 14ff., 18-19, 250, 255

Ukraine, 253, 260

United Nations, 253, 260

United States, 146, 185, 192, 204, 226,
239-41, 242, 254, 256, 257-58, 259,
269, 277, 278, 279; and Greek elec-
tions, 215, 217, 231, 235, 243; Navy,
258; Army, 106, 108, 112, 257

UNRRA, 142, 204-207, 211, 213, 252,
257, 276

Varkiza Agreement, 195-98, 215, 270
Varvaressos, Kyriakos, 213-14
Vendiris, Maj. Gen, Constantine, 139,

148, 207, 218, 226; early career and

character, 128-29

Venizelos, Eleftherios, 13ff., 17, 18, 26,

29, 64, 135, 208, 259
Venizelos, Sophocles, 122, 127, 136,

144, 232, 238, 245
Voulgaris, Admiral Petros, 127, 209-

10, 211, 214,217-18,230

Wilson, Gen. Sir Henry Maitland, 44,

147

Woodhouse, Lt. Col. Chris, 66, 79, 85
World War I, 16, 261, 280

X (Chi), 83, 109, 110, 133, 236; estab-
lishment of, 89-90; relations with
ELAS, 89, 134, 172; growth, 199-
200, 204; threatens coup d'etat, 218

Yugoslavia, 43, 98, 129, 134, 145, 197,
222, 244, 246, 248, 251, 252, 254,
259, 261, 263-66, 280

Zachariades, Nicholas, 32, 40, 224,
267, 268; early career and character,
68-69, 71

Zervas, Napoleon, 63, 66, 67, 79, 81,
83, 94, 103, 106, 107, 147, 149, 152,
158, 177, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238,
249; early career and character, 64-
65

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