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THE    GUARDIANS    OF 
THE    GATE 


2071 


Oxford  University  Press 

London       Edinburgh        Glasgow       New  Tork 

Toronto   Melbourne    Cape  Town    Bombay 

Humphrey  Milford  Publisher  to  the  University 


GUARDIANS 
ur    THE   GATE 

HISTORICAL  LECTURES 
ON  THE  SERBS 

BY 

R.  G.  D.    LAFFAN,    C.F. 

FELLOW   OF   queens'   COLLEGE,   CAMBRIDGE 

WITH  A  FOREWORD 

BY 

VICE-ADMIRAL  E.  T.  TROUBRIDGE 
C.B.,  C.M.G. 


OXFORD 

AT    THE   CLARENDON    PRESS 

1918 


<*> 


FOREWORD 

The  Serbians  are  a  people  but  little  kno\vn  in  Great 
Britain.  This  extremely  interesting  book  by  the  Rev. 
R.  G.  D,  Laffan,  C.F.  will,  I  am  confident,  help  our  nation 
to  understand  them  better,  and,  in  understanding,  to 
appreciate  the  sterling  qualities  that  underlie  their  national 
character. 

I  have  lived  among  the  Serbians  during  the  past  three 
years,  in  days,  and  under  circumstances,  which  encourage 
the  revelation  of  every  human  attribute  :  in  the  days  imme- 
diately following  their  first  success,  when  they  triumphantly 
flung  out  of  Serbia  the  '  Punitive  expedition  '  of  their  power- 
ful neighbour  and  relentless  enemy  :  in  long  and  weary  days 
of  tenacious  defence  :  in  the  days  of  overwhelming  and 
treacherous  attack  upon  them,  with  hope  of  succour  growing 
less  and  less  :  in  days  of  terrible  marches  in  a  fighting  retreat 
through  their  beloved  country  under  moral  and  physical 
conditions  surely  never  paralleled  in  the  history  of  any 
nation  :  in  the  days  of  regeneration  of  all  that  was  left  of 
them  :  and  finally  in  days  of  eager  and  reckless  fighting 
to  regain  that  which  they  had  lost.  The  qualities  which 
they  have  displayed  throughout  these  fateful  years  should 
especially  appeal  to  the  inhabitants  of  our  Empire. 

A  love  of  freedom  and  country  as  deeply  implanted  as  our 
own.  A  loyalty  to  friends  that  does  not  falter  under  the 
greatest  temptation,  and  a  chivalry  so  innate  that  hundreds 


2  Foreword 

of  our  countrywomen  could  walk  hundreds  of  miles  through 
a  great  army  in  a  harassed  retreat,  through  a  fleeing  peasantry 
in  a  disorganized  and  strange  land,  and  yet  fear  no  evil. 

'From  sych  experiences  a  judgement  can  be  formed;  I 
permit  myself,  with  the  Serbians,  to  believe  in  a  Serbia 
great  and  flourishing  in  the  future,  pursuing  her  national 
development  and  ideals  in  peace  and  quietness,  bound  to 
Great  Britain  in  the  closest  ties  of  friendship,  and  once 
more — as  for  centuries  past — holding  the  gate  of  freedom 
of  life,  of  freedom  of  thought,  against  the  sinister  forces 
of  moral  enslavement. 

Serbia  has  indeed  well  and  bravely  answered  the  great 
question  He  asked  :  'What  shall  it  profit  a  man  if  he  gain 
the  whole  world  and  lose  his  own  soul  ?  ' 

E.  T.  T. 


PREFACE 

To  pass  away  the  winter  evenings  in  the  early  months  of 
1917  I  gave  a  series  of  lectures  on  modern  Serbian  history 
to  the  scattered  companies  of  the  A.S.C.  (M.T.),  who  are 
attached  to  the  Serbian  Army.  Many  of  the  men  of  the 
companies  showed  great  interest  in  the  subject,  and,  as  we 
approached  the  end  of  the  course,  a  number  of  them  asked 
me  to  publish  the  lectures.  So  I  have  written  the  following 
chapters  from  the  lecture-notes,  intending  them  primarily 
as  a  souvenir  for  those  who  are  now  with  the  Serbs,  but  also 
in  the  hope  that  they  may  serve  to  spread  sympathy  for  our 
heroic  but  little-known  allies. 

The  title,  '  the  Guardians  of  the  Gate ',  is  borrowed  from 
a  phrase  applied  to  the  Serbs  by  several  speakers,  in  particular 
by  Mr.  Lloyd  George  in  his  speech  on  August  8.  It  is  a 
summary  of  the  services  which  the  Serbs  have  always  done 
their  best  to  render  to  Christendom  :  for  their  country  is, 
indeed,  one  of  the  gateways  of  civilized  Europe.  Despite 
their  unhappy  divisions  and  their  weakness  in  numbers  they 
have  never  ceased  to  struggle  against  the  barbarisms  of 
Turkestan  and  Berlin,  which  at  different  times  have 
threatened  to  overflow  the  Western  nations  and  the  Medi- 
terranean lands. 

The  lectures  did  not  attempt  a  detailed  survey  of  even 
recent  years,  and  their  publication  may  seem  superfluous 
in  view  of  the  number  of  books  lately  produced  on  Balkan 


4     .  Preface 

topics.  Yet  attention  in  England  has  been  so  largely  and 
naturally  directed  to  the  west  of  Europe  and  to  Russia  that 
it  is  still  possible  to  encounter  the  most  complete  ignorance 
of  the  Eastern  Question.  There  are  many  who  have  a 
working  knowledge  of  the  great  nations  of  Europe  who  still 
could  scarcely  distinguish  between  a  Sandjak  and  a  Dardanelle, 
or  say  off-hand  whether  the  Balkan  peoples  were  Christians 
or  worshippers  of  Mumbo  Jumbo.  And  the  history  of  south- 
eastern Europe  in  the  present  century  is  so  obscure  in  its 
details  that  there  is  much  excuse  for  those  who  could  not 
be  bothered  to  understand  it.  Yet  the  vital  interests  of 
the  British  Empire  are  so  bound  up  with  the  Near  East 
that  every  effort  should  be  made  to  present  British  readers 
with  facts  on  which  an  opinion  may  be  based.  Not  that 
it  is  yet  possible  to  write  the  history  of  such  recent  years 
or  of  so  complicated  a  subject  with  the  scientific  and 
impartial  accuracy  of  the  true  historian.  For  that  we  must 
wait  until  the  dust  of  conflict  has  cleared  and  the  passions 
of  the  moment  have  subsided.  Meanwhile,  these  lectures 
are  offered  as  a  provisional  and  tentative  examination  of  the 
triumphs,  disasters,  and  ambitions  of  the  Serbs. 

The  chief  difficulty  in  the  way  of  gathering  historical 
material  during  a  campaign  in  the  uplands  of  Macedonia  con- 
sists in  the  lack  of  books.  Especially  has  this  been  true  of  books 
giving  the  views  of  our  enemies.  However,  I  have  read 
everything  upon  which  I  could  lay  my  hands,  and  the  lack 
of  printed  matter  has  been  perhaps,  to  some  extent,  balanced 
by  the  advantage  of  meeting  with  and  questioning  numerous 
Serbian  officers  ard  others  who  know  the  Balkans  well. 


Preface  5 

As  regards  spelling,  in  a  work  for  students  it  would  be 
necessary  to  use  the  '  Latinitza '.  But  for  non-expert 
readers  experience  here  seems  to  show  that  the  Croatian 
alphabet  with  its  accented  consonants  is  only  a  degree  less 
difficult  than  the  Serbian  letters  themselves.  So  I  have 
transliterated  Southern  Slav  names  and  quotations  from  the 
Serbian  into  the  corresponding  English  sounds.  The  follow- 
ing very  simple  rules  will  be  easily  remembered. 

a    pronounced  as  the  a    in  father. 


e 

5J 

J> 

a 

„  ate. 

i 

>J 

J3 

ee 

,,  meet. 

u 

>5 

5> 

00 

,,  moon. 

zh 

?> 

31 

z 

,,  azure. 

In  all  the  Southern  Slav  territories  I  have  used  the  Slavonic 
place-names,  with  the  exception  of  a  few  very  farai^ir  names 
such  as  Belgrade,  Monastir,  Scutari,  and  the  Danube. 
When  referring  to  Southern  Slav  authors,  whose  books  are 
quoted,  I  have  thought  it  best  to  leave  their  names  as  they 
appear  on  the  title-pages  of  the  books  in  question. 

I  wish  to  take  this  opportunity  of  imitating  many  genera 
tions  of  Oxford  men  in  expressing  my  gratitude  for  the  un- 
failing sympathy  and  help  of  which  Mr.  C.  R.  L.  Fletcher,  of 
Magdalen,  is  so  prodigal ;  and  in  particular  for  his  kindness  on 
this  occasion  in  undertaking  to  see  my  MS.  through  the  press. 

It  is  also  my  pleasant  duty  to  thank  Privates  Tillett  and 
Thomson  for  drafting  the  maps  ;  as  also  Corporals  Taylor 
and  Hughes,  and  Privates  Biggs,  Lorenzelli,  and  Dixon  for 
typing  the  MS.  in  triplicate,  a  precaution  rendered  necessary 
by  the  enemy's  submarines.     Also,  lastly,  Lt.-Col.  W.  L. 


6  Preface 

Sorel,  D.S.O.,  and  the  Officers  commanding  the  companies, 
and  Lt.-Col.  A.  E.  Kidd,  R.A.M.C,  commanding  Stationary 
Hospital,  who  gave  me  every  facility  for  delivering  the 
lectures. 

R.  G.  D.  LAFFAN. 


Head-quarters, 

M.T.  Units  with  Royal  Serbian  Army, 
British  Salonika  Force. 
September  19,   191 7. 


I 


CONTENTS 


Publications  consulted 
Introduction  to  the  Lectures 

1.  The  Past 

2.  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

3.  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

4.  Yugoslavia     . 

5.  The  Turkish  War 

6.  The  Bulgarian  War 

7.  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

8.  The  Austrian  War 

9.  The  Downfall 
ID.  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 
II,  To-day:      The     Serbian     People     and     their 

Aspirations         ..... 
Appendix  :    Statistical  Table  of  Various  Reckon 
ings  of  the  macedonian  population 

INDEX       


PAGE 
9 

39 

70 

86 
"3 

134 
159 

188 

205 

229 

246 

283 
285 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 


King  i'eter      ........ 

Macedonian  Peasants  dancing  .... 

A  Macedonian  Peasant  Family 

Aftovtzi  in  Hcrtzegovina  1917.    How  Austria-Hungary 

retains  the  loyalty  of  the  Yugoslavs     . 
Monastir  from  the  Air       ..... 

Sarajevo  {Photograph — Central  News) 

Corfu      ........ 

Corfu — Infantry  of   Vardar  Division  re-equipped  an 

reconstituted    ...  ... 

Embarking  at  Corfu  for  Salonika 

In  the  Moglena  Mountains  .... 

The  Tserna  Valley  ...... 

A  Billet  behind  the  Line,  Macedonia 

Lonely  Serbian  Graves      ..... 

The  First  Day  of  the  Offensive  in  September.     From 

left    to    right,   General  Vasitch,   General    Sarrail, 

General  Boyovitch   .  .  .  .  . 

.^t  H.-Q.  M.T.  Units.     The  Bishop  of  Buckingham  on 

left.     The  Author  second  from  right   . 
Kaymakchalan         ....... 

Bulgarian  Trenches  on  Kaymakchalan 

The  First  Prayer  on  Serbian  soil  191 6 

Reading  out  orders  ...... 

The   Crown    Prince    Alexander   and    General    Sarrail 

entering  Monastir     ...... 

Corfu.    The  Kaiser's  Villa,  used  as  a  Serbian  hospital 
Skoplye  (Uskub)      ....... 


Frontispiece 

to  face  page       64 

„  64 

„  104 

128 

„  160 

224 

228 
„  229 

»  232 

»  232 

233 
233 


236 

236 

237 
237 
240 

240 

241 

260 
280 


MAPS 


The  Balkans  in  1900 
The  Balkans  in  1914 
The  Macedonian  Campaign  of  191 6 


PAGE 

16 

112 

230 


PUBLICATIONS  CONSULTED 

[Works  of  peculiar  interest  are  marked  with  an  asterisk.] 

Printed  Documents 

Collected  diplomatic  documents  relating  to  the  outbreak  of  the  European  War. 

London, 1915. 
Le  Livre  bleu  Serb e.    Ed.  Berger-Levrault.    Paris,  1914. 
Deuxieme  Lime  bleu  serbe.    Ed.  Berger-Levrault.    Paris,  1916. 
Nashi  u  Austro-Ugarskoy.     Issued  by  Serbian  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 

Salonika,  1917. 

Historical,  Political,  and  Economic  Works 
*E.  Denis.    La  Grande  Serbie.    (Serbophil.)    Paris,  1915. 
*H.  W.  V.  Temperley.    History  of  Serbia.    London,  1917. 
*'A  Diplomatist.'     Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East.      Oxford, 

1915. 
*A.  Stead  (edited  by).    Servia  by  the  Servians.    (A  survey  of  the  national 

life  by  leaders  in' various  departments.)    London,  1909. 
*N.  Forbes.     Parts  I  and  II  of  The  Balkans.     A  History.     (Impartial 

between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria.)    Oxford,  191 5. 
G.  Yakschitch.     V Europe    et    la    resurrection  de  la   Serbie    (1804-34). 

Paris,  1907. 
*M.  Newbigin.    Geographical  aspects  of  Balkan  problems.    London,  1915. 
P.  de  Lanux.    La  Tougoslavic.    Paris,  191 6. 
R.  P.  Guerin-Songeon.    Histoirc  de  la  Bulgarie.    (Pro-Bulgarian.)    Paris, 

1913- 
*H.  Wickham  Steed.     The  Hapsburg  Monarchy,  3rd  edition.     London, 

1914. 

*R.  W.  Seton-Watson.    The  Southern  Slav  question.    London,  191 1. 

W.  M.  Petrovitch.    Serbia.    London,  1915. 

W.  M.  Sloane.    The  Balkans.    New  York,  1914. 

*V.  Berard.    La  Serbie.    (A  lecture.)    Paris,  191 6. 


10  Publications  consulted 

M.  Militchevitch.    Pomenik  znanienitih  lyudi  i  Srpskog  naroda.    Belgrade, 


J.  Cvijic  (Tsviyitch).    Protnatranya  o  etnografiyi  Makedonskih  Slovena. 

Belgrade,  1906. 
*H.  N.  Brailsford.    Macedonia.    London,  1906. 
*I.  E.  Gueshoff.    The  Balkan  League.    (The  Bulgarian  case,  by  the  former 

Bulgarian  Prime  Minister.)    London,  1915. 
*'  Balcanicus.'    La  Bulgarie.    (The  Serbian  case,  by  a  Serbian  Minister. 

Paris,  1915. 
K.  Stojanovitch.    Etat  economique  de  la  Serbie.    Belgrade,  1909. 
A.  Muzet.    Le  Monde  balkaniqiie.    Paris,  1917. 
J.  Pelissier.    Dix  inois  de  guerre  dans  les  Balkans.    Paris,  1914. 
A.  Cheradame.  Doiize  aits  depropagande  enfaveur  des  peuples  balkaniques. 

Paris,  19 13. 
W.  H.  Crawfurd  Price.    The  Balkan  Cockpit.    London,  1915. 
General  Niox.    Les  Pays  balkaniques.    Paris,  1915. 
S.  P.  Phocas  Cosmetatos.    Au  lendemain  des  guerres  balkaniques.     (An 

economic  study.)    Paris,  1915. 
*P.  V.  Savii.    The  Reconstruction  oj South-Eastern  Europe.   London,  1917. 
R.  A.  Reiss,  Austro-Hungarian  Atrocities.    Report.    London,  1916. 
N.  and  C.  R.  Buxton.    The  War  and  the  Balkans.    London,  1915. 
R.  W.  Seton-Watson.    Chapters  IV  and  VII  in  The  War  and  Democracy. 

London,  1914. 
*R.  W.  Seton-Watson.     The  Balkans,  Italy  and  the  Adriatic.     London, 

1916. 
*A.  Cheradame.     The  Pangerman  Plot  Unmasked.    London,  1917. 
V.  Kuhne.   Ceiix  dont  on  ignore  le  martyre.    (Yugoslavs.)    Geneva,  1917. 
W.  H.  Crawfurd  Price.     Venizelos  and  the  War.    London,  19 17. 
H.  Hinkovic.    The  Jugoslavs  in  Future  Europe.    London,  1916. 
Anon.    Austro-Magyar  Judicial  Crimes.     (1908-16.)    London,  1916. 
*M.  Dunan.    L' Invasion  de  la  Serbie  et  la  retraite  d'Albanie.    (Based  on 

information  supplied  by  the  Serbian  General  Staff.)    Salonika,  1917. 


Travel,  Reminiscences 

M.  E.  Durham.    The  Burden  oj  the  Balkans.   Ed.  Nelson,  is.   (Macedonia, 

Albania  in  1904.)    London,  n.  d. 
A.  Upward.    The  East  End  oJ Europe.    London,  1908. 


Publications  consulted  ii 

H.  Vivian.     The  Serbian  Tragedy.     (Appreciation  of  King  Alexander.) 

London,  1904. 
H.  Barby.    Les  Victoires  serbes.    Paris,  1913- 
A.  Fraccaroli.    La  Serbia  nella  sua  terza  giierra.    Milan,  1915. 
C.  Sturzenegger.    La  Serbie  en  guerre.    1914-16.    Neuchatel,  1916. 
H.  Angel!.     Le  Soldat  serbe.     (Translated  from  the  Norwegian.)     Paris, 

1916. 
J.  Berry.    The  Story  of  a  Red  Cross  Unit  in  Serbia.    London,  1916. 
*G.  Gordon  Smith.    Through  the  Serbian  Campaign.    London,  1916. 
R.  Labry.    AvecVarmee  serbe  en  retraite.    Paris,  1916. 
St.  C.  Stobart.  The  Flaming  Szvord  in  Serbia  and  elsewhere.  London,  1917. 
A.  and  C.  Askew.    The  Stricken  Land.    London,  19 16. 
Ferri-Pisani.    Le  Drame  serbe.    Paris,  1916. 

F.  Sandes.    An  English  Woman-sergeant  in  the  Serbian  Army.    London, 

1916. 

Miscellaneous 

Fr.  N.  Velimirovid.    Serbia  in  Light  and  Darkness.    London,  1916. 
L.  d'Orfer.    Chants  de  guerre  de  la  Serbie.    Paris,  1916. 
Yugoslavia.    An  Anthology  in  Serbian.    Salonika,  1917. 
M.  A.  Miigge.    Serbian  Folk-Songs,  Fairy  Tales,  and  Proverbs.    London, 
1916. 

Pamphlets 

Fr.  N.  Velimiroviif.    Religion  and  Nationality  in  Serbia.    London,  19 15. 
P.  Popovic.    Serbian  Macedonia.    London,  1916. 
The  Southern  Slav  Library.    London,  1916. 

1.  The  Southern  Slav  Programme. 

2.  The  Southern  Slavs  :  Land  and  People. 

3.  A  sketch  of  Southern  Slav  History. 

4.  Southern  Slav  Culture. 

5.  Idea  of  Southern  Slav  Unity. 

6.  Political  and  Social  Conditions  in  Slovene  Lands. 

*J.  W.  Headlam.    Belgium  and  Greece.    London,  1917. 

G.  Lazarevitch.    Sa  Srpskog  fronta.    Salonika,  19 16. 


I 


INTRODUCTION   TO   THE   LECTURES 

AS  DELIVERED 

"When  we  arrived  at  Salonika  last  summer,  most  of  us 
were  entirely  ignorant  of  the  Balkan  peninsula.  Since  then 
we  have  lived  and  worked  in  Macedonia,  and  I  believe  that 
you  have  formed  no  very  high  opinion  of  the  country  ; 
•which  is  not  surprising  when  we  remember  that  it  has  been 
the  most  troubled  and  insecure  part  of  the  Balkans  for  the 
last  forty  years.  We  are  still  more  than  vague  about  the 
inhabitants,  the  states,  the  economic  condition  and  the 
history  of  the  peninsula.  But  one  thing  we  have  all  learned. 
We  have  been  in  close  touch  with  the  Serbian  soldier,  and 
we  admire  and  love  him.  He  has  been  a  revelation  to  us  of 
the  charm  of  a  people  very  unlike  ourselves. 

In  the  past  most  Englishmen,  who  have  spoken  to  me 
about  the  Balkans,  have  expressed  very  decided  views. 
Nine  out  of  ten  have  said  that  all  the  Balkan  nations  were  as 
bad  as  each  other  ;  that,  as  between  Turks  and  Christians, 
it  was  six  of  one  and  half-a-dozen  of  the  other ;  that  all  were 
savages  and  cut-throats  and  past  praying  for.  The  tenth 
man  has  usually  been  a  philanthropic  crank,  who  would  only 
see  good  points  in  his  own  pet  Balkan  nation,  and  who 
wished  to  make  it  by  industrialization  and  party  politics 
into  an  imitation  of  Great  Britain. 


14  Introduction  to  the  Lectures 

Now,  when  we  return  to  England,  we  shall,  at  any  rate, 
be  in  a  position  to  declare  that  we  found  one  Balkan  race, 
the  Serbs,  to  consist  of  the  best  of  fellows.  Our  companies 
have  had  Serbs  attached  to  them,  as  guards  or  drivers, 
and  very  sorry  we  were  when  they  were  withdrawn.  Though 
most  of  us  could  not  say  anything  to  them  except  '  Dobro  ' 
(good),  we  managed  to  understand  them,  and  to  make 
ourselves  understood.  They  were  always  cheerful,  kindly, 
helpful,  with  a  skill  in  many  handicrafts  that  made  camp-life 
more  comfortable  for  themselves  and  us.  And  I  think  we 
may  flatter  ourselves  that  they  liked  us  and  our  ways,  and 
found  the  British  character  sympathetic  with  their  own. 

But,  though  first-hand  acquaintance  with  some  Serbs 
is  essential  to  any  knowledge  of  the  people,  I  believe  that 
you  would  like  also  to  understand  something  of  the  nation's 
past  and  of  the  mental  background  from  which  the  Serbs 
view  the  world.  It  is  for  that  reason  that  I  have  undertaken 
to  deliver  these  lectures.  They  will  deal  with  the  history 
of  the  Serbs  in  recent  times ;  because  it  is  impossible  to 
understand  the  characteristics  and  point  of  view  of  a  people, 
especially  a  people  so  nationalist  and  traditionalist  as  the 
Serbs,  apart  from  their  history. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  do  not  propose  to  go  into  the 
mediaeval  glories  of  the  Serbian  emperors,  the  self-sacrificing 
educational  work  of  St.  Sava,  the  conquests  of  Stephen 
Dushan,  or  the  exploits  of  Kralyevitch  Marko  and  other 
heroes  of  the  race.  It  would  take  too  long,  and  I  do  not  think 
it  would  greatly  interest  you.  But  it  will  be  necessary 
throughout  to  remember  that  the  Serbs  look  back  with  pride 
to  the  great  days  of  their  independence  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
and  to  their  empire  which  once  embraced  the  whole  Balkan 
peninsula,   except  southern   Greece  and   the  coast-towns. 


Introduction  to  the  Lectures  15 

They  were  a  great  people  six  hundred  years  ago.  Never 
have  they  been  more  glorious  than  in  their  present  humilia- 
tion, exile,  and  disruption.  But,  please  God,  that  spiritual 
glory  which  encircles  them  to-day  will  soon  be  expressed 
in  the  '  outward  and  visible  signs '  of  material  greatness, 
and  they  will  again  take  their  place  among  the  mighty 
nations  of  the  earth." 


J 


I 
The  Past 

Iz  mrachnoga  sinu  groba 

Srpske  krune  novi  siai. 

'  Out  of  the  darkness  of  the  tomb  j  ^' 

Shines  the  new  lustre  of  the  Serbian  crown.' 

Serbian  National  Anthem. 

It  is  best  to  begin  with  geography.  Several  permanent 
elements  in  Serbian  history  become  apparent  as  soon  as 
we  study  the  map.  The  first  point  that  strikes  us  is  the 
mountainous  nature  of  the  country,  only  relieved  by  a  few 
plains,  as  in  the  Matchva  to  the  north-west,  the  plain  of 
Kossovo,  the  valley  of  the  Morava,  or  the  Monastir  plain. 
The  whole  trend  of  the  country  north  of  Skoplye  (Uskub) 
is  a  well-wooded  and  irregular  slope  down  towards  the 
Danube  and  the  Save,  into  which  flow  the  rivers  of  Serbia, 
familiar  to  the  M.T.  companies  from  the  names  of  the 
military  divisions — the  Timok,  the  Drina,  and  the  Morava, 
with  its  two  branches  and  its  tributary,  the  Ibar.  South  of 
Skoplye  the  country  consists  of  a  tangle  of  uplands  to  the 
west,  and  the  Vardar  valley  to  the  east,  leading  down 
towards  the  great  Greek  harbour  of  Salonika. 

There  are  three  distinguishable  parts  of  Serbia,  to  which 
I  shall  refer  under  the  following  names — '  Serbia  proper ', 
'Old  Serbia',  and  'Serbian  Macedonia'.  By  'Serbia 
proper  '  I  mean  the  roughly  triangular  little  State  which 
we  knew  as  Serbia  before  191 2,  bounded  on  the  north  by 
the  Danube,  on  the  east  by  the  Timok  and  the  Balkan 
Mountains,  and  on  the  west  and  south  by  the  Drina  and  the 
old  Turkish  frontier  running  north  of  Mitrovitza  and  south 

2071  B 


i8  The  Past 

of  Vranya.  By  '  Old  Serbia  '  I  mean  the  central  belt  round 
Skoplyc,  Kumanovo,  and  the  Kossovo  plain,  including  the 
old  Sandjak  of  Novi  Pazar,  which  ran  up  to  the  Bosnian 
frontier.  Here  are  the  towns  and  sacred  places  of  mediaeval 
Serbia  ;  Skoplye,  where  Stephen  Dushan  was  crowned 
emperor  ;  Fetch  (Ipck),i  the  ancient  see  of  the  Serbian 
patriarchs  ;  Detchani,  the  famous  monastery  and  home  of 
Serbian  traditions ;  Kossovo,  where  the  Serbian  power 
went  down  before  the  Turks.  By  '  Serbian  Macedonia  ' 
I  mean  the  middle  Vardar  valley  below  Veles  and  the  hilly 
country  which  lies  between  that  and  the  lake  of  Ohrida. 

Three  further  general  remarks  about  the  geography  of 
Serbia  ought  to  be  made  at  this  point.  First,  the  great 
importance  of  the  position  which  the  country  occupies. 
The  Balkan  peninsula  consists  largely  of  barren  uplands  and 
mountain  ranges  producing  little  in  the  way  of  valuable 
merchandise.  But  across  it  run  at  least  two  great  trade- 
routes,  from  Belgrade  to  Salonika  and  from  Belgrade  to 
Constantinople,  connecting  Central  Europe  with  the  Aegean 
Sea  and  the  East.  There  have  been  other  routes,  but  to-day 
the  peninsula  is  traversed  by  only  two  main  railway  lines 
which  follow  the  two  routes  I  have  mentioned.  These  two 
corridors  open  the  way  through  the  inhospitable  country 
and  connect  the  rich  plains  of  Hungary  with  the  Levantine 
world.  They  are  also  the  lines  along  which  invasion  has 
poured  from  East  to  West  or  from  West  to  East  many  times 
in  the  course  of  history.  And  the  Balkan  peninsula  is 
peculiarly  open  to  invasion.  Spain  and  Italy  are  shut  off 
and  protected  from  their  northern  neighbours  by  great 
mountain  barriers,  while  on  every  other  side  they  are  washed 
by  the  waters  of  broad  seas.  The  northern  frontiers  of 
^  Fetch  was  included  in  Montenegro  in  1913. 


The  Past  19 

Bosnia,  Serbia,  and  Bulgaria  consist  only  of  rivers,  mainly 
running  through  low-lying  country,  while  to  the  south-east 
the  narrow  straits  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles 
have  not  constituted  a  formidable  obstacle  to  an  enemy 
possessed  of  the  Asian  shore.  The  gates  of  the  peninsula, 
therefore,  have  not  been  closed  to  the  hostile  foreigner,  and 
the  corridors  which  penetrate  it  have  aroused  his  cupidity. 
Foreign  Powers,  Roman,  Frank  and  Ottoman,  Austrian, 
Russian,  and  German,  have  desired  and  determined  to 
control  the  overland  routes  of  the  Balkan  countries. 

Now,  athwart  those  lines  of  communication  and  com- 
manding the  north-western  portions  of  both,  lies  Serbia. 
Invading  armies  m.oving  west  from  Asia  or  east  from  Central 
Europe  must  pass  over  Serbian  territory.  The  little  country 
stands  in  a  position  of  world  importance.  She  holds  a  gate- 
way between  the  mountain  walls,  and  therefore  she  is  in 
a  situation  of  the  utmost  danger.  Her  stormy  history,  the 
long  centuries  of  her  subjection  to  foreign  rule,  and  her 
present  disastrous  condition  show  how  her  more  powerful 
neighbours  have  coveted  the  passage-ways  which  she 
commands. 

Secondly,  alone  with  Switzerland  amongst  European 
states,  Serbia  has  no  outlet  to  the  sea.  Naturally  this  has 
been  an  overwhelming  commercial  disadvantage,  and  has 
terribly  handicapped  Serbia  as  compared  with  Roumania 
or  Bulgaria,  not  to  mention  Greece,  which  is  really  a  mari- 
time state,  with  a  population  living  on  or  around  the 
Aegean. 

The  full  effect  of  this  disadvantage  was  felt  by  Serbia 
when  she  began  to  develop  her  natural  resources  towards 
the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Apart  from  Bulgaria 
and  Turkey,  neither  of  whom  was  rich  or  civilized,  she  had 

B  2 


20 


The  Past 


I  no    customer    for    lier    exports    except    Austria-Hungary. 

iSurrounding  Serbia  from  the  Carpathians  to  the  Sandjak 
of  Novi  Pazar,  Austria-Hungary  received  almost  the  whole 
of  Serbia's  trade  and  consequently  tended  to  assume  the 
part  of  dictator  to  the  little  state,  which  she  was  able  to 
threaten  with  commercial  starvation  should  her  wishes  not 
be  docilely  obeyed.  Serbia  in  fact  was  for  many  years  in 
the  Austrian  grip. 

Thirdly,  let  us  remember  throughout  that  only  a  part  of 
the  Serbian  race  lives  in  Serbia.  Bosnia  and  Hertzegovina 
are  Serbian  lands.  Out  of  less  than  1,900,000  inhabitants, 
over  1,820,000  are  Serbo-Croats.^  Almost  the  whole 
population  of  the  Austrian  province  of  Dalmatia  is  Serbo- 
Croat,  while  the  Slovenes  of  the  country  round  Lyublyana 
(Laibach),  though  devotedly  Roman  Catholic  and  so  divided 
from  the  Serbs  on  religious  grounds,  are  Slavs  and  use  a 
language  closely  akin  to  Serbian.  Hungary,  too,  has  its 
large  percentage  of  the  same  race.  In  the  Banat,  Batchka, 
and  Syrmia  is  a  pure  Serbian  population,  at  one  with  the 
Serbs  in  language  and  religion  and  numbering  over  a  million. 
Also  in  Croatia  and  Slavonia  there  are  the  Croats,  Roman 
Catholic  in  religion,  but  using  the  Serbian  language, 
though  written  in  the  Latin  or  western  characters,  not  in 
the  Cyrillic  alphabet  of  Serbia.  Lastly,  the  little  state  of 
Montenegro  differs  on  no  test  of  race,  language,  or  r3ligion 
from  Serbia,  and  its  inhabitants  are  but  an  independent 
and  allied  portion  of  the  Serbian  nation. 

Consequently,  of  recent  years  when  Serbia  showed  signs 
of  growing  strength  and  vitality,  not  unnaturally  many  of 
her  friends  expected  her  to  play  a  great  role  in  the  future 
and  to  be  the  nucleus  round  which  a  state  should  grow  up, 

^  The  New  Europe,  No.  21,  p.  256,  March  8,  1917. 


The  Past  21 

embracing  all  the  Slav  peoples  of  southern  Austria-Hungary,  'p;etLw/>^^ 
as  well  as  the  Serbian  portions  of  the  old  Turkish  Empire.  9y(J\}<^ 
There  have  been  many  obstacles  to  the  fulfilment  of  such 
a  hope.  Quite  apart  from  the  present  catastrophe  that  has 
overtaken  our  Serbian  friends,  the  religious  difficulty  still 
exists,  though  similarity  of  race  and  speech  have  drawn 
Catholics  and  Orthodox  into  the  common  movement.  Also 
the  Slavs  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  Croatia  have  felt  them- 
selves the  superiors  of  the  Serbs  in  civilization,  and  have 
been  unready  whole-heartedly  to  seek  national  salvation  at 
Belgrade.  But  the  tyranny  of  the  Hungarian  Government, 
which  has  done  so  much  to  draw  the  Southern  Slavs  together, 
has  nearly  succeeded  in  removing  all  the  moral  barriers  to 
what  is  called  Yugoslav  solidarity.^  It  was  the  remarkable 
growth  of  pro-Serbian  feeling  among  the  Slavs  of  Austria- /^///-^S./^*! 
Hungary  after  the  Serbian  victories  in  the  Balkan  wars 
that  roused  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  its  determination  to 
crush  Serbia  out  of  existence. 

Now  let  us  turn  to  the  history.  Serbia  was  conquered  by 
the  Turks  about  five  hundred  years  ago.  Although  the 
Serbs  suffered  a  crushing  defeat  on  the  plain  of  Kossovo 
in  1389,  they  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  brought  definitely 
under  Turkish  rule  for  the  next  seventy  years.  Various 
leaders  maintained  the  unequal  struggle  against  the  invader, 
and  with  efficient  help  from  the  Christian  nations  they 
might  have  succeeded  in  stemming  the  Asiatic  flood,  but 
with  the  fall  of  Smederevo  in  1459,  Serbian  independence 
came  to  an  end.  The  fortress  of  Belgrade,  the  last  Christian 
stronghold  in  the  Balkans,  fell  in  1521,  and  the  task  of 
defending  Christendom  against  the  Mohammedan  hordes 
fell  to  the  races  of  Central  Europe. 

^  '  Yug  '  in  Serbian  means  '  south  '. 


2  2  The  Past 

Then  the  Serbs  sank  into  a  deep  sleep  of  four  hundred 
years.  The  gross  darkness  of  Turkish  rule  covered  the  land. 
From  having  been  an  independent  and  conquering  people 
they  became  the  working  class  of  a  Turkish  pashalik  or  pro- 
vince. As  against  their  Moslem  lords,  who  took  possession 
of  the  land  and  for  whom  they  laboured,  they  had  few  rights 
and  little  chance  of  successful  appeal  to  the  distant  govern- 
ment of  the  Sultan. 

There  has  been  and  is  now  a  tendency  in  England  to  regard 
the  Turks  as  a  race  of  honourable  gentlemen,  clean  fighters, 
and  even,  when  left  to  themselves,  very  tolerable  governors. 
The  nations  whom  they  have  ruled  have  thought  very 
differently.  TJi^know  what  it  has  meant  to  be  defenceless 
before  the  Turk,  to  see  their  sons  carried  off  to  be  educated 
as  Moslems  and  to  form  the  corps  of  Janizaries,  to  be 
unable  to  protect  their  daughters  from  entering  the  harems 
of  the  dominant  race  or  the  fruits  of  their  labour  from  the 
landlords.  It  seems  as  though  the  Turk  had  retained  the 
chivalry  of  caste  coloured  by  Mohammedan  contempt  for 
'  infidels '.  To  his  equal  in  wealth  or  military  prowess  the 
Turk  has  usually  appeared  as  a  gentleman,  with  the  qualities 
of  the  gallant  fighter,  but  woe  to  those  whom  Allah  has  made 
weak  and  delivered  into  his  hand,  should  they  not  submit 
to  all  his  wishes ! 

In  this  long  period  of  extinction  two  forces  were  mainly 
responsible  for  keeping  alive  the  national  spirit  of  the  Serbs. 
One  was  their  church,  part  of  the  Holy  Orthodox  Church 
of  the  East.  True  to  the  precepts  of  Mohammed,  the  Turks 
did  not  force  their  religion  on  the  peoples  whom  they 
conquered.  They  offered  the  three-fold  choice  of  Islam, 
the  sword,  or  tribute.  Should  a  subject-race  reject  the 
Mohammedan  faith  and  also  not  wish  to  be  exterminated. 


The  Past  23 

it  was  spared  on  condition  of  paying  tribute.  So  it 
came  about  that,  at  a  time  when  Western  Europe  thought  it 
the  first  duty  of  a  government  to  impose  what  it  considered 
the  true  religion  on  its  subjects,  the  Sultan  of  Turkey  drew 
his  revenues  from  subjects  who  were  allowed  to  abhor  the 
faith  of  their  ruler.  Separate  nationalities  have  never  been 
allowed  in  the  Turkish  Empire.  Religion  is  for  the  Turk 
the  mark  of  distinction  between  men,  and  the  people  who 
would  retain  a  united  social  life  must  find  it  in  ecclesiastical 
organization.  This  the  Serbs  possessed  in  their  national 
church  with  its  patriarchate  of  Fetch  ;  and  thus  it  was  their 
church,  the  one  institution  left  to  them,  that  embodied  the 
traditions,  the  hopes,  and  the  unity  of  the  people. 

The  second  influence  that  preserved  the  national  spirit 
was  that  of  the  folk-songs  and  ballads  {fesme).  In  these 
the  lays  of  the  saints  and  heroes  of  the  glorious  past  were 
gathered,  and  they  formed  the  whole  sum  of  learning  and 
culture  to  the  greater  portion  of  the  people.  The  singing 
of  these  mournful  and  haunting  ballads,  which  may  often  be 
heard  from  the  lips  of  Serb  soldiers,  was  the  special  business 
of  the  blind  musicians  who  accompanied  themselves  on  their 
one-stringed  gousle,  but  every  Serb  would  know  several  by 
heart  and,  his  memory  not  being  weakened  by  the  arts  of 
reading  and  writing,  the  words  would  remain  indelibly 
printed  on  his  mind.  Thus  the  fesme  would  be  handed  on 
from  generation  to  generation  without  ever  being  committed 
to  paper  ;  and  though  many  have  been  collected  and  edited 
during  the  last  century,  there  must  be  many  that  have  never 
been  written.  In  the  long  winter  evenings,  when  the  Serbian 
farmers  could  not  work,  they  would  gather  round  the  fire 
and  sing  together  of  past  heroes  and  the  golden  age.  Thus 
the  Serbian  soldier  of  to-day  has  a  rich  store  of  national 


24  The  Past 

history  in  his  songs  and  knows  far  more  of  the  tradition,  the 
triumphs,  and  the  struggles  of  his  own  people  than  does  his 
English  brother-in-arms.  The  great  figures  of  English 
history  are  to  most  of  our  countrymen  nothing  but  names 
in  history  books.  To  the  Serbs  the  old  heroes  are  familiar 
characters,  some  of  whom,  like  St.  Sava  and  Kralyevitch 
Marko,  will  appear  in  moments  of  national  crisis  to  lead 
their  people  to  victory. 

In  the  hour  of  disaster  and  trial,  too,  these  chants  are  the 
solace  of  the  long-martyred  race.  A  French  doctor,  who 
went  through  the  terrible  retreat  in  1915,  describes  how  the 
last  act  of  some  Serbian  soldiers,  before  retiring  from 
Kralyevo  towards  exile  and  probable  death,  was  to  gather 
round  a  blind  gousla-^\zyer  and  to  listen  once  more  to  the 
national  epic.-^ 

Nor  are  all  the  -pesme  by  any  means  ancient.  The  Serbs 
have  sung  the  story  of  this  war,  of  their  retreat,  of  Corfu,  and 
of  the  present  campaign.  Unsophisticated,  primitive  folk  find 
it  natural  to  express  themselves  in  poetry.  Lieut.  Krstitch  ^ 
tells  me  that  during  campaigns  many  of  his  soldiers  used  to 
write  home  to  their  wives  or  parents  in  song  and  describe 
the  details  of  their  lives  in  verse. 

Thus,  in  words  composed  by  a  host  of  nameless  bards,  the 
songs  of  Serbia  carry  on  the  nation's  story,  and  every  Serb 
feels  himself  an  actor  in  a  great  drama  that  is  beng  played 
out  across  the  centuries.  He  continues  the  work  of  his 
forefathers.  He  avenges  their  sufferings.  But  he  also  works 
for  the  future.  He  builds  the  framework  of  an  aee  to 
come.    He  is  a  living  link  in  one  great  chain  that  stretches 

^  Labry,  p.  208. 

"  The  Serbian  liaison  officer  whom  Head-quarters  M.T.  Units  are  so 
fortunate  as  to  have  with  them. 


The  Past  25 

backward  far  into   the   past    and   reaches  forward   to   the 
generations  who  shall  see  Serbia  great  and  free. 

To  these  two  influences  making  for  continuity  we  ought 
to  add  a  third — the  uninterrupted  existence  of  small  groups 
of  the  Serbian  race  who  never  lost  their  liberty.     Perched 
on  the  inhospitable  crags  of  the  mountains  round  Tsetinye 
(Cetinje)  and  ruled  by  their  bishops  of  the  house  of  Nyegush, 
a  remnant  of  the  people  hurled  defiance  at  the  Moslem,  till 
in    modern    times   they  formed    the   principality   (recently 
kingdom)   of  Montenegro.     Meanwhile,  in   the   north,   in 
the   wooded   hills   of    Shumadia,    though   lacking   political 
organization,   other  mountaineers  led   the  life  of  outlaws 
and    maintained    ceaseless    guerrilla    warfare    against    the 
invader.     But  it  was  on  the  Adriatic  coast  in  the  sturdy 
republic  of  Dubrovnik  (Ragusa)  that  the  tradition  of  Serbian 
culture  was  maintained.     Dubrovnik,  which  succeeded  in 
upholding  her  independence  amid  the  rivalries  of  the  Turks, 
the  Venetians  and  the  house  of  Austria,  was  one  of  the  princi- 
pal trade-centres  of  the  Levant.    Her  merchants  had  their 
factories  along  the  trade-routes  of  the  Balkans,  at  Sarajevo, 
Novi  Pazar,  Skoplye,  Belgrade,  Constantinople,  and  beyond. 
They  brought  with  them  amongst  the  conquered  Serbs  the 
atmosphere  of  their  own  free  institutions  and  their  wider 
outlook.    But  Dubrovnik  was  even  more  remarkable  for  her 
tradition  of  literary  and  scientific  achievement.     The  poets 
Ivan  Gundulitch,  Palmotitch  and  Kaltchitch,  the  librarian 
of    the    Vatican,   Stephen    Graditch,   and    the   astronomer 
Boshkovitch,  are  amongst  the  names  of  those  who  adorned 
the  annals    of    their   city-state,   whose    independence    was 
only    brought    to    an    end    by    the    far-reaching    arm    of 
Napoleon. 
There  were  also  portions  of  the  Serbian  race  who,  though 


26  The  Past 

not  iiulependent,  lived  under  a  less  barbarous  regime  than 
that  of  the  Porte,  The  Serbs  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  were 
brought  into  touch  with  the  West  through  their  Venetian 
masters ;  while  from  the  time  of  Matthias  Corvinus,  king 
of  Hungary,  the  southern  districts  of  that  kingdom  were 
w'idely  colonized  by  Serbs  who  had  fled  before  the  armies  of 
the  Sultan. 

At  the  opening  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  position 
of  the  Serbs  appeared  hopeless.  They  were  but  one  of 
many  races  submerged  in  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The 
Turks  were  by  then  masters  of  the  whole  Balkan  peninsula, 
except  the  Dalmatian  littoral  and  the  remote  mountain 
retreats  of  the  Serbian  outlaws.  Beyond  the  Danube  they 
had  conquered  the  whole  plain  of  Hungary  and  of  Roumania. 
The  Black  Sea  was  a  Turkish  lake  and  the  Moslem  hordes 
again  and  again  threatened  Vienna  and  the  centre  of  Europe. 
But  then  began  the  long  Turkish  decline.  The  Turk  has 
been  in  history  a  soldier  and  nothing  else.  In  the  Balkans 
he  has  been  a  parasite  living  on  the  industry  of  Slav  or  Greek 
peasants.  In  Constantinople  to-day  you  may  see  how  all  the 
commerce,  the  enterprise  and  the  art  are  the  monopoly  of 
the  Christian  races.  The  Turk  is  still  the  governor,  the 
soldier,  or  the  groom,  but  he  is  nothing  more.  And  so  when 
the  Turks  ceased  to  be  a  dominant  military  Power,  threaten- 
ing the  most  powerful  states  of  Christendom,  the  decline 
steadily  continued.  The  trend  of  aggression  ceased  to  be 
westward  and  turned  to  the  East.  On  the  heels  of  the 
retreating  Turks  the  rising  power  of  Austria  pressed  on 
towards  the  Levant.  The  imperial  rule  was  established  in 
Hungary  and  Croatia,  and  finally,  after  1815,  in  Dalmatia 
also.  For  a  short  period  of  twenty-one  years  (1718-39) 
northern  Serbia  also  was  Austrian.     Thus  a  large  portion 


The  Past  27 

of  the  Serb  race  came  permanently  under  the  government  of 
the  Habsburg  emperors. 

Further,  in  1690,  after  the  failure  of  an  Austrian  invasion 
of  the  Balkans,  the  Serbian  patriarch,  Arsen,  greatly  com- 
promised in  the  eyes  of  the  Porte  by  his  support  of  the  im- 
perial cause,  led  an  exodus  of  his  people  across  the  Danube 
into  Syrmia,  Batchka,  and  the  Banat.  The  Emperor  Leopold 
granted  these  immigrants  considerable  privileges  in  return 
for  their  invaluable  services  as  guardians  of  the  frontier. 
The  patriarch  was  established  at  Karlovtzi  (Karlowitz)  with 
the  same  jurisdiction  over  his  co-religionists  that  he  had 
nominally  enjoyed  under  the  Turk,  and  although  the  full 
liberties  promised  were  never  put  in  force,  the  Serbs  of 
southern  Hungary  enjoyed  a  measure  of  national  life.  ^ 

Thus  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  Serbs  found  themselves  ^  J       ^ 
divided    between   the  Austrian  and   the  Turkish  imperial  *V^y   '"^ 
systems.     Under  both  governments  they  were  suspect  and  (^v^**- 
their  aspirations  quenched.     In    1766  the  patriarchate  of  "i  n<*-ri  *- 
Fetch  was  abolished  by  Turkey.     In  ijjS  the  Hofdeputationy 
a  commission  appointed  for  the  defence  of  Serbian  ecclesiasti- 
cal interests  in  Hungary,  was  likewise  suppressed  by  Austria. 
The  Serbs,  however,  continued  to  negotiate  with  Vienna, 
which  was  only  propitious  when   there  was  any  frontier 
fighting  to  be  done  or  when  it  seemed  necessary  to  control 
the  Magyars  by  support  of  their  neighbours.     Some  of  the 
Serbs,    despairing   of    liberty   under    the    Habsburgs,  had 
begun  a  further  exodus  to  Russia,  whither  also  an  increasing 
number  of  young  Serbs  went  for  their  education. 

But  the  age  of  revolution  was  at  hand.  The  nineteenth 
century  opened  amid  the  conflagration  that  had  been  lit 
in  France.  Underlying  the  French  revolution  were  the  two 
great  ideas,  or  systems  of  ideas,  that  we  will  call '  The  Rights 


28  The  Past 

of  Man  '  and  '  Nationality  '.  These  ideas  were  trumpet- 
calls  that  sounded  throughout  Europe  and  even  awoke  an 
echo  in  the  distant  Balkans.  But  for  such  an  appeal  to  meet 
with  a  response  some  measure  of  previous  education  is  neces- 
\  sary.  A  wholly  illiterate  and  ignorant  peasantry  cannot  be 
'•y  :  roused  by  appeals  to  general  principles.  Therefore  I  will 
stop  to  say  a  few  words  about  a  Serbian  man  of  letters,  whom 
we  will  take  as  the  most  conspicuous  of  those  who  gave  them- 
selves at  this  time  to  the  task  of  reviving  national  sentiment 
and  a  national  literature  among  their  fellow-countrymen. 

Dositey  Obradovitch  was  a  native  of  the  Banat,  and  at 
the  age  of  fifteen  entered  the  monastery  of  Hopovo  in  the 
Frushka  Gora.  Though  a  monk  he  did  not  feel  himself 
called  to  the  contemplative  life.  His  career  is  a  record  of 
wanderings  in  search  of  knowledge,  from  Smyrna  to  France 
and  from  Russia  to  Italy.  He  studied  also  in  Germany  and 
spent  six  months  in  London.  But,  though  his  mind  was 
open  to  the  literature  and  ideas  of  every  nation,  he  was  a  true 
Serb  in  his  devotion  to  the  church  and  to  the  pesme,  many 
of  which  he  collected  and  published.  But  he  longed  also 
to  see  the  best  of  western  civilization  and  science  introduced 
among  his  people,  as  Peter  the  Great  had  done  in  Russia. 
Dositey  Obradovitch  lived  to  see  a  great  enthusiasm  among 
Serbs  for  his  works.  I  am  told  that  they  used  to  be  sold  for 
their  equivalent  weight  in  gold.  He  first  attempted  to 
break  from  the  old  Slavonic  tradition  and  to  write  in  the 
speech  of  modern  life.  His  appeal  reached  indirectly  beyond 
his  readers  to  those  who  could  not  themselves  read.  He 
called  to  all  who  spoke  the  Serbian  tongue  to  remember 
their  common  past  and  to  labour  together  for  a  future 
unity.  Even  in  the  pashalik  of  Belgrade  he  awoke  a  response. 
After  living  in  the  opening  years  of  the  nineteenth  century 


The  Past  29 

at  Trieste,  where  a  public  subscription  was  raised  to  relieve 
him  of  the  perpetual  worries  of  poverty,  he  was  invited  by 
the  Serbian  leader,  Kara-George,  to  begin  the  organization 
of  Serbian  education.  He  accordingly  settled  in  Belgrade 
in  1807  and  founded  the  school  out  of  which  has  ultimately 
grown  the  present  university.  He  refused  to  leave  the  country 
even  during  the  Turkish  massacres  in  1 809,  and  died  in  the 
midst  of  the  struggle  for  liberation. 

The  intellectual  revival,  of  which  Dositey  Obradovitch  was 
at  once  a  symptom  and  a  cause,  was  naturally  more  in  evi- 
dence amongst  the  Serbs  of  the  Austrian  provinces,  where 
material  civilization  made  educational  work  possible.  Secon- 
dary schools  were  founded  in  1791  and  the  seminary  of 
Karlovtzi  in  1794.  ^  Slavo-Serbian  printing  press  was 
established  at  Vienna,  and  two  Serbian  newspapers  appeared, 
7he  Serbian  Gazette  and  The  Slavo-Serbian  Journal  (1791- 
4).  But  the  Serbs  learned  by  bitter  experience  that  the 
civilized  power  of  Austria  would  be  a  more  thorough  , 
opponent  of  their  national  life  than  the  barbarous  but  easy- 
going government  of  the  Sultan.  '  They  hate  Austria 
more  than  Turkey,  because  Turkey  only  scourged  their 
bodies,  while  Austria  has  stifled  their  souls.'  ^  North  of  the 
Danube  the  Serbs  found  that  they  could  receive  the  elements 
of  education,  only  to  be  baidked  of  the  freedom  which 
that  education  made  them  desire.  The  scene  of  the  Serbian 
struggle  therefore  shifted  once  more  to  Turkey,  where  the  Jt/^«t  '-^^i-^ 
peasant  leaders  hoped  to  secure  a  form  of  provincial  autonomy 
with  the  help  of  the  Russian  Empire,  which  had  been  recog- 
nized by  the  Treaty  of  Kutchuk-Kainardji  (1774)  as  the 
protector  of  the  Orthodox  subjects  of  the  Porte. 

The  appeal  of  the  Serbs  met  with  a  favourable  response 

^  Berry,  p.  124. 


30  The  Past 

from  the  Sultan  Selim  III,  who  granted  them  a  limited  form 
of  self-government,  religious  liberty,  and  commercial  freedom. 
Their  princes  (knezt)  were  to  be  elected  in  democratic 
assemblies,  their  financial  obligations  were  fixed  and  reduced 
to  imperial  taxation  only  ;  while  the  Janizaries,  the  real 
oppressors  of  the  unfortunate  peasants,  were  forbidden  to 
enter  or  inhabit  the  pashalik  of  Belgrade  (1793).  But  the 
Sultan  was  far  away.  The  Janizaries  were  on  the  spot  and 
in  no  temper  to  allow  their  victims  to  escape  from  thraldom. 
Defying  their  distant  master,  they  carried  devastation  and 
slaughter  far  and  wide  amongst  all  who  resisted  their  will. 
In  1 801  they  assassinated  the  pasha  of  Belgrade,  and  the 
country  was  completely  given  over  to  anarchy  under  the 
nominal  rule  of  four  Turkish  rebel  chiefs. 

Life  was  insupportable  for  the  Serbs.  Once  more  they 
appealed  to  Constantinople.  Their  leaders  met  together 
and  addressed  a  petition  to  the  Sultan.  '  We  are  attacked ', 
they  said,  '  in  respect  of  life,  religion,  honour.  There  is 
not  a  husband  who  can  be  sure  of  protecting  his  wife ; 
nor  a  father  his  daughter,  nor  a  brother  his  sister. 
Monasteries,  churches,  monks,  priests,  nothing  is  safe  from 
outrage.'^ 

Western  nations,  largely  misled  by  the  exaggerations  and 
misrepresentations  of  the  Austrian  press,  have  often  expressed 
contempt  for  the  barbarous,  turbulent,  and  unprogressive 
Serbs.  Our  soldiers  have  noticed  the  miserable  poverty, 
squalor,  and  primitive  conditions  of  life  in  Macedonia.  What 
has  made  Macedonia  a  desolation  has  been  the  feeble  and 
corrupt  Turkish  government,  which  allowed  free  play  to  all 
the  elements  of  disorder  and  terrorism.  That  Turkish 
domination  brought  misery  to  all  the  Balkan  peoples,  and 

^  Quoted  in  Denis,  p.  48. 


The  Past  31 

when  we  read  a  cry  of  despair  like  that  which  I  have  just 
quoted,  we  cease  to  be  struck  by  the  hatred  of  the  Serbs  for 
the  Turks  or  by  their  undeveloped  civilization.  Rather  we 
are  amazed  that  a  people  who  only  emerged  from  Turkish 
misgovernment  less  than  a  century  ago  should  be  so  tolerant 
and  open-minded  and  so  progressive  as  the  Serbs  in  recent 
years  have  shown  themselves  to  be.-*- 

In  answer  to  this  last  appeal  the  Sultan  ordered  the  dis- 
turbers of  the  peace  to  respect  the  rights  of  the  Christian 
peasants  and  threatened  them  with  punishment.  The  only 
result  of  this  was  that  the  Moslems  of  the  pashalik  carried 
out  a  savage  massacre  of  the  most  conspicuous  Serbian 
leaders.  One  hundied  and  fifty  were  killed  in  January  1804, 
and  seventy-two  heads  were  exposed  on  pikes  at  Belgrade. 
The  Serbs  saw  that  the  hour  had  come  when  they  must 
effect  their  own  salvation.  It  was  useless  to  go  on  hoping 
against  hope  for  succour  from  distant  protectors.  They 
succeeded  in  temporarily  sinking  their  internal  dissensions, 
and  resolved  to  unite  in  a  furious  revolt  which  should  bring 
either  liberty  or  annihilation. 

Thus  the  Serbs  were  the  first  of  the  Balkan  peoples  to  raise  <f  I'^Sl 
the  standard   of  rebellion  in  a  war  of  national  liberation. 
They,  too,  in  a  peculiar  degree,  achieved  their  own  indepen- 
dence.   The  Greeks  fought  for  themselves ;  but  without  the 
intervention  of  the  Powers,  at  the  critical  moment  when 

^  Miss  Durham  describes  how  she  helped  an  unfortunate  wretch  to 
escape  from  Macedonia  and  cross  the  frontier  into  Serbia.  She  received 
a  pathetically  grateful  letter  from  Belgrade.  *  He  had  never  before 
known,  he  said,  what  it  was  to  be  in  a  free  and  civihzed  land.  There  are 
people  in  England  who  believe  that  Serbia  is  a  wild  and  dangerous  place. 
They  are  those  who  do  not  understand  what  it  is  to  be  a  subject  of  the 
Svikan.'    Durham,  p.  86, 


fxh.C^»~ 


32  The  Past 


o 


Ibrahim  Pasha  had  virtually  stamped  out  the  insurrection, 
the  Greek  kingdom  could  not  have  been  created.  The 
Bulgars  owe  their  liberation  to  Russia.  To  Russia's  wars  with 
Turkey  the  Serbs  also  owe  the  military  embarrassment  of  the 
Sultan,  who  was  unable  to  overwhelm  the  rebels  of  the  Shu- 
madia.  Still  the  hard  and  continuous  years  of  fighting  were 
the  work  of  the  Serbs  themselves,  unassisted  by  any  sympathy 
or  material  help  from  Western  Europe  and  only  supported  by 
[  a  very  small  Russian  force,  which  was  withdrawn  when  Napo- 
1  Icon  invaded  Russia  itself.  Serbia  does  not  forget  so  proud 
a  national  tradition,  and  round  the  cross  on  her  coat  of  arms 
are  four  S's  (in  Serbian,  C's)  which  I  have  heard  interpreted, 
'  Sama  Srbiya  sebe  spasela ' — '  Serbia  alone  delivered  herself.'  ^ 
The  leader  who  came  forward  at  this  crisis  was  George 
Petrovitch,  better  known  by  his  Turkish  name  of  ICara-George 
(Black  George),  the  grandfather  of  King  Peter.  An  illiterate 
peasant  of  the  Shumadia,  he  had  seen  something  of  war  as  a 
volunteer  in  the  Austrian  army,  and  had  made  a  little  money 
by  dealing  in  pigs.  He  owed  such  command  as  he  had  over 
the  loyalty  of  his  fellow-Serbs  to  his  huge  physical.strength, 
his  courage,  his  violent  temper,  and  his  undeniable  genius  for 
irregular  warfare. 

So  thorough  was  his  success  that  by  1807  northern  Serbia 
from  the  Drina  to  the  Timok  had  been  freed  from  the  Turks, 
who  were  even  driven  from  their  garrison  towns.  The 
Serbians  then  settled  down — like  any  newly-emancipated 
people — to  quarrel  among  themselves.  But  the  time  soon 
came  when  Turkey  was  able  to  collect  her  scattered  forces 
to  deal  thoroughly  with  the  Serbian  insurrection.  In  181 2 
the  little  Russian  auxiliary  force  was  withdrawn.     At  their 

^  The-correct  meaning,  I  understand,  Is  Samo  shga  Srbina  spasava — 
'  Only  in  the  union  of  Serbs  is  salvation.' 


i^,^0«^ 


The  Past  33 

departure  a  '  pope  '  celebrated  the  Holy  Eucharist  and  read 
for  the  Gospel  the  passage,  '  Let  not  your  heart  be  troubled. 
Ye  believe  in  God;  believe  also  in  me  . .  .'  Kara-George  and  ,  , 
his  lieutenants  took  an  oath  of  eternal  fidelity  to  Russia,  but 
their  hearts  must  have  been  heavy  with  foreboding  as  they  saw 
the  few  supporters  they  had  had  march  away  and  leave  them 
alone.  By  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  (18 12)  the  Russians  had 
indeed  extorted  from  the  Sultan  a  promise  that  the  Serbs 
should  have  the  administration  of  their  own  affairs,  but  the 
Turkish  troops  were  to  come  back  to  the  fortresses  and  that 
meant  the  return  of  the  old  order. 

In  the  following  year  the  blow  fell.  A  large  Turkish  army 
invaded  Serbia.  Weakened  by  the  long  years  of  struggle,  in 
which  many  of  the  stoutest  hearts  had  perished,  and  depressed 
by  their  isolation,  the  Serbs  were  in  no  condition  to  resist. 
Kara-George  himself  fled  into  Hungary  and  was  promptly 
imprisoned  by  the  Austrian  police.  Those  who  remained  in 
Serbia  were  the  victims  of  the  exasperated  Turkish  army. 
The  victors  exploited  their  success  with  ferocious  stupidity 
and  spoke  of  exterminating  the  rebellious  race.  In  the 
neighbourhood  of  Krushevatz  only  one  man  in  every  six  was 
said  to  have  survived.  On  either  side  of  the  road  at  the 
entrance  to  Belgrade  some  sixty  prominent  Serbs  were  im- 
paled, amongst  whom  were  priests  and  monks,  their  bodies 
being  eaten  by  the  dogs. 

Thus  in  18 13  the  only  result  of  ten  years'  hard  fighting  was 
the  scrap  of  paper  on  which  the  Sultan  had  accorded  to  the 
Serbs  the  internal  government  of  their  province.  Yet  out  of 
that  Article  VIII  of  the  treaty  of  Bucharest  has  grown  the 
independent  kingdom.  For  the  Turkish  government,  looking 
around  for  some  satisfactory  method  of  making  its  authority 
felt  so  far  from  Constantinople,  decided  to  recognize  one  of 

2071  P 


34  The  Past 

the  Serbian  leddcrs  as  the  responsible  head  of  the  people.  The 
man  who  accepted  this  difficult  and  dangerous  position  was 
the  second  liberator  of  Serbia,  Milosh  Obrenovitch.  Some- 
thing more  than  the  courage  and  strength  of  Kara-George 
was  needed.  Milosh  brought  to  his  task  the  additional  advan- 
tages of  oriental  cunning  and  a  complete  lack  of  scruple. 
Though  undoubtedly  a  brave  fighter,  he  preferred  to  gain 
his  ends  by  diplomacy  rather  than  war.  Yet,  successful  as 
Milosh  was,  Kara-George  has  always  been  the  hero  of  the 
wars  of  independence.  To  Milosh  clings  the  taint  of  having 
deliberately  continued  those  habits  of  cruelty,  fraud,  and 
narrow-minded  egoism  which  are  the  curse  of  a  long  op- 
pressed people,  and  which  it  was  Serbia's  highest  interest  to 
eradicate. 

By  alternately  using  the  weapons  of  bribery,  rebellion,  and 
the  threat  of  Russian  intervention  after  the  final  fall  of 
Napoleon  in  1815,  Milosh  succeeded  in  getting  himself  recog- 
nized as  autonomous  knez.  of  Serbia.  His  position,  however, 
was  precarious  for  the  next  fifteen  years  until  the  Russians, 
by  the  treaty  of  Adrianople  (1829),  extorted  from  the  Sultan 
the  edict  of  1830,  which  is  the  charter  of  Serbia's  indepen- 
dence. Milosh  was  accepted  as  hereditary  prince ;  the 
Sultan  resigned  all  pretension  to  interfere  in  Serbian  internal 
affairs  or  the  administration  of  justice  ;  Mohammedans  were 
forbidden  to  reside  in  the  country,  except  in  those  towns 
where  the  Ottoman  government  continued  for  nearly  forty 
years  to  maintain  its  garrisons. 

Thus  modern  Serbia  was  launched.  A  tiny  peasant  state, 
consisting  only  of  the  northern  territories  between  the  Drina 
and  the  Timok,  and  the  valleys  of  the  Western  Morava  and 
Ibar.  The  hand  of  the  Turk  was  removed,  but  the  evil 
results  of  his  rule  could  not  be  abolished  in  a  day.     Every- 


The  Past  35 

thing  remained  to  be  done  in  the  way  of  educating  the  people 
in  industry  and  citizenship,  and  a  rough  schoolmaster  they 
had  in  Milosh  Obrenovitch.  The  Prince  of  Serbia  did 
not  afFect  the  style  of  any  modern  European  royalty.  His 
favourite  residence  at  Kraguyevatz,  close  to  the  mountains 
of  Rudnik,  into  which  he  could  retreat  when  necessary,  was 
a  simple  Turkish  house,  displaying  the  crescent  over  the  door. 
His  office  of  state  was  a  little  room  furnished  with  maps  and 
captured  Turkish  flags.  Unable  to  read  or  write,  he  had 
a  secretary  who  gave  him  the  news  and  interpreted  some  of 
the  legal  codes  of  Western  Europe.  Seated  on  cushions 
on  the  floor,  with  a  turban  on  his  head,  he  gave  audience  to 
his  visitors  exactly  in  the  fashion  of  his  Turkish  predecessors. 

Not  only  in  the  outward  details  of  his  manner  of  life/'^^^*^    > 
but  in  character  also  Milosh  was  a  barbarian — the  product  of   h/rf^^\^. 
anarchy.     His  temper  was  often  ungovernable,  and  he  met     iH^ 
the  slightest  resistance  to  his  wishes  with  summary  imprison- 
ment.    His  opponents,  who  naturally  were  not  few,  he 
removed   by   force   or   assassination.     When    Kara-George 
ventured  back  into  Serbia  in  1817  to  renew  the  fight  for 
independence  Milosh  had  him  murdered  in  his  sleep,  and 
sent  his  head  to  the  Sultan,  accompanying  this  pledge  of  good 
faith  by  demands  in  the  interests  of  the  Serbian  people.    The 
Archbishop  Nikshitch  was  assassinated  in  his  palace.    By  such 
means  Milosh  succeeded  in  imposing  his  authority  on  his 
turbulent  subjects. 

He  had  also  other  methods  of  building  up  his  power.  He 
was  responsible  for  the  tribute  payable  to  the  Turkish 
government.  This  he  forced  the  Serbs  to  pay  in  Austrian 
money,  while  he  himself  forwarded  it  in  the  less  valuable 
Turkish  currency  and  kept  the  difference.  He  reserved  for 
himself  the  monopoly  of  dealing  in  certain  articles,  and  for- 

c  2 


36  The  Past 

bade  the  development  of  the  salt-mines  in  Serbia,  lest  they 
should  reduce  his  profits  from  similar  enterprises  in  Rouma- 
nia.  For  years  he  never  called  together  the  Skupshtina  or 
national  assembly. 

His  wife,  the  Princess  Liubitza,  was  a  fitting  companion  for 
such  a  monarch.  She  had  fought  in  the  ranks  of  the  insur- 
gents and  kept  their  courage  alive  in  the  darkest  hours.  As 
princess  she  cooked  her  husband's  meals  and  waited  at  table 
on  the  male  members  of  the  household.  Her  only  knowledge 
of  civiHzed  Eurqpe  was  derived  through  her  daughter,  who 
had  married  a  shop-keeper  in  Zimun,  opposite  Belgrade.  She 
imitated  her  husband's  methods  of  dealing  with  rivals.  When 
Milosh,  who  in  so  many  ways  continued  the  Mohammedan 
tradition,  was  captivated  by  other  ladies,  his  wife  would 
finish  them  off  with  a  gun  and  then  retire  into  the  mountains 
until  her  lord's  anger  had  evaporated. 

Nevertheless,  this  barbarian  had  a  very  shrewd  idea  of 
what  his  country  needed.  The  alternative  to  his  autocracy 
was  an  anarchy  of  quarrelling  chiefs,  and  he  used  his  power 
for  many  beneficent  ends.  He  first  gave  Serbia  roads  and 
schools ;  he  encouraged  the  press ;  he  laid  the  foundations 
of  the  army  and  civil  service  ;  he  freed  the  national  Church 
from  the  control  of  the  Greek  Patriarchate  in  183 1,  since 
when  it  has  been  autonomous  with  a  Serbian  Metropolitan 
at  Belgrade.  Above  all,  in  1833  the  old  Turkish  system  of 
land-tenure  was  abolished  and  the  peasants  became  the  owners 
of  the  soil,  a  reform  so  successful  that  Serbia  may  be  said  in 
modern  times  to  have  had  no  agrarian  problem. 

Milosh,  however,  had  made  many  enemies  amongst  those 
who  wished  to  share  in  the  government  of  the  country  and 
those  who  objected  to  his  western  innovations.  He  might 
have  succe^ssfully  resisted  all  efforts  to  deprive  him  of  power 


The  Past  37 

but  for  the  existence  of  a  rival  dynasty.  The  malcontents 
could  appeal  to  the  memory  of  the  dead  hero,  Kara-George, 
and  claim  the  princely  throne  for  his  son.  So  in  1839  Milosh 
was  at  last  driven  from  Serbia,  after  abdicating  in  favour  of 
his  sons.  The  elder  son,  Milan,  died  almost  at  once,  and  his 
brother  Michael  succeeded  him  at  the  age  of  16,  only  to  follov^f 
his  father  into  exile  in  1842,  when  a  series  of  faction  fights 
ended  by  placing  on  the  throne  the  representative  of  the 
rival  house,  Alexander  Karageorgevitch. 

Throughout    his    reign    Prince  Alexander  was   troubled  ^iuiJ  ^^•*** 
with  Obrenovitch  plots.    By  his  refusal  to  take  part  in  the 
Crimean  War  against  the  Turks  he  incurred  great  unpopu-         ij  ^ 
larity,  although  in  1856  he  gained  the  collective  guarantee  ^^{(o 

of  the  Powers  for  Serbian  liberties.  The  result  was  that 
in  1858  he  too  followed  the  example  of  his  predecessors  and 
went  into  exile  with  his  young  son  Peter,  of  whom,  we  shall 
hear  more  in  after  years. 

The  veteran  Prince  Milosh  returned  to  the  throne  and 
lived  for  two  years,  being  again  succeeded  by  his  son  Michael 
in  i860.  This  prince,  who  proved  the  ablest  ruler  modern 
Serbia  has  had,  destroyed  the  last  visible  sign  of  Turkish  rule 
in  his  country.  After  a  disturbance  in  the  streets  of  Belgrade 
in  1862  the  Turkish  commandant  opened  fire  on  the  town. 
Russiajindj£arice^_Serbk  demanded  the 

removal  of  the  garrisons,  but  Great  Britain  and  Austria 
supported  Turkey,  the  former  from  fear  of  Russian  influence, 
the  latter  because  she  wished  to  see  no  diminution  of  Turkish 
authority  except  in  her  own  favour.  Austrian  statesmen 
clung  to  Metternich's  pronouncement  that  Serbia  must  be 
either  Turkish  or  Austrian,  and  they  preferred  the  suzerainty 
oTthe  Turk  (whom  the  Emperor  Francis  II  called  '  the  most 


3S  The  Past 

comfortable    of    neighbours ')    to    a    wholly    independent 
Serbia. 

In  1S67  the  situation  was  different.    Austria  had  just  been 
soundlv  thrashed  bv  Prussia  and  was  eneaeed  in  satisfvin? 
Hungary's    demands   for   Home    Rule.      The   Turks    were 
^^'  occupied  with  one  of  the  many  risings  in  Crete.    Michael 

n^'  aeain  demanded  the  removal  of  the  earrisons,  and  this  time 
gained  his  point.  Thus  at  last,  after  more  than  400  years,  the 
soU  of  Serbia  was  purged  of  the  Asiatic  conqueror.  The 
suzerainty  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  remained  for  a  few  years, 
but  the  night  was  over.  The  morning  had  dawned  and  the 
li?ht  of  a  new  dav  had  come,  a  new  dav  in  which  the  Serbian 
people  should  labour  at  the  fulfilment  of  their  destiny  and 
enter  again  the  stream  of  European  ciiiTlization. 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

In  this  lecture  I  wish  to  deal  with  a  short  period,  and 
shall  only  reach  1878,  because,  in  that  year,  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  re-fashioned  the  Balkan  peninsula  on  a  system  which, 
with  minor  alterations,  remained  in  force  until  five  years  ago. 

The  duty  that  lay  before  Prince  Michael  and  his  ministers 
was  that  of  introducing  among  their  liberated  countrymen 
the  best  fruits  of  Western  civilization.  It  was  not  an  easy 
task.  It  meant  heavy  burdens  of  taxation  and  much  hard 
work  along  new  lines.  The  Serbs  have  shown  themselves  to 
be  capable  of  supreme  heroism  and  complete  devotion  to 
noble  ideals  in  moments  of  crisis.  The  virtues  of  plodding, 
continuous  labour  and  constructive  thought  they  have  found 
less  congenial.  The  Bulgars  have  a  saying  to  express  this 
view.  '  The  Serbs ',  they  say, '  are  a  people  of  warriors ;  but 
we  are  a  military  nation.'  Although  the  Serbs  have  in  recent 
years  proved  that  they  too  are  capable  of  national  organiza- 
tion, and  so  have  given  the  lie  to  this  judgement  by  their 
neighbours,  in  the  nineteenth  century  they  appeared  un- 
progressive  and  more  devoted  to  their  glorious  past  than 
anxious  to  lay  the  foundations  of  their  country's  future. 
Amongst  the  ruling  class  faction  and  intrigue  were  a  continual 
hindrance  to  the  government ;  while  the  peasants  had  been 
too  long  under  the  blight  of  Turkish  misrule  to  accommodate 
themselves  quickly  to  modern  methods  of  working  the  land. 

Yet  slowly,  but  surely,  Serbia  was  emerging  from  bar- 
barism. To  cross  the  Save  from  Hungary  to  Belgrade  was 
still  to  leave  Europe  for  the  East.    The  Serbian  capital  was 


40  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

a  true  oriental  town  in  its  squalor  and  shapeless  confusion. 
But  through  it  already  ran  a  European  main  street  with  solid 
modern  houses  and  shops  where  Viennese  goods  could  be  pro- 
cured. In  1 862,  by  the  generosity  of  a  patriotic  citizen,  a  fine 
building  was  opened  for  the  High  School  or  College,  which 
numbered  twenty  professors  and  several  hundred  students. 

Meanwhile  the  countryside  remained  in  a  torpor  of  con- 
tented conservatism.  Agriculture  was  still  in  a  rudimentary 
stage.  Manures  were  little  used,  and  the  primitive  wooden 
plough  only  scratched  the  surface  of  the  soil,  from  which  a 
meagre  crop  was  gathered,  sufficient  for  the  peasants'  modest 
needs.  It  was  not  a  country  to  attract  the  foreign  traveller, 
for  inns  were  few  and  far  from  comfortable,  though  the 
presence  of  chairs  to  sit  upon,  and  knives  and  forks  to  use  at 
table,  contrasted  favourably  with  anything  to  be  found  on 
the  Turkish  side  of  the  frontier. 

One  sign  of  change,  much  lamented  by  many  as  an  indica- 
tion that  '  the  country  was  going  to  the  dogs ',  was  the 
weakening  of  the  institution  known  as  the  zadruga. 

The  zadruga  is  the  family  community,  consisting  of  any- 
thing up  to  thirty  or  forty  persons,  living  together,  owning 
and  working  the  land  together.  There  is  no  inheritance  or 
partition  of  the  family  property.  When  the  head  of  the 
house  dies,  the  estate  is  not  divided,  nor  does  it  pass  to  any 
one  member,  for  the  whole  body,  which  is  the  collective 
owner,  continues  in  possession.  The  father  or  the  eldest 
brother  will  be  the  representative  of  the  zadruga.  He  has  a 
moral  authority  over  the  rest  based  on  his  age  and  experience, 
but  he  cannot  sell  the  property  of  the  family  without  their 
consent.  On  marriage  the  husband  normally  takes  his  bride 
into  his  home  circle,  and,  if  there  is  no  room  under  the  family 
roof,  another  small  house  will  be  built  near  by  for  the  young 


4 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  41 

couple,  who  nevertheless  will  join  the  others  at  meals,  at 
work,  and  in  their  leisure. 

Such  an  arrangement  has  its  great  advantages.  It  keeps  the 
people  on  the  land,  it  gives  them  solidarity  and  assures  to 
them  their  livehhood,  while  it  checks  self-seeking  and  en- 
courages loyal  co-operation.  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  its 
drawbacks,  which  account  for  its  decay.  Individual  ini- 
tiative was  paralysed  by  the  control  of  the  large  group,  some 
members  of  which  would  always  be  found  to  oppose  new 
and  improved  methods  of  industry.  Consequently  the  code 
of  1 844  had  permitted  the  individual  to  demand  his  share  of 
the  estate  as  a  separate  property  and  to  dispose  of  it  in  his 
will.  The  resultingjchange  from  collective  to  private  owner- M^*^"*" 
ship  was  naturally  accompanied  by  troubles  and  difficulties,  cuS"^^ 
which  caused  grave  misgivings  in  the  hearts  of  those  to  whom 
the  old  order  w^as  dear. 

At  this  time,  when  Serbia  was  halting  uncertainly  between 
the  old  world  and  the  new,  the  nation  was  fortunate  in  the 
possession  of  so  able  a  prince  as  Michael.  Sixteen  years  of 
exile  had  taught  him  courage  and  prudence,  and  given  him 
a  wide  acquaintance  with  Europe.  He  spoke  and  wrote 
French  and  German,  and  understood  Russian.  A  Serbian 
writer  -^  says  that  he  '  highly  esteemed  the  English  as  a  people 
who  loved  liberty  and  respected  lawful  rights,  but  regretted 
the  great  fault  of  their  policy,  their  support  of  the  Turks '. 
Under  his  rule  material  prosperity  began  to  develop. 
Schools  of  agriculture  taught  the  peasants  new  and  more 
productive  methods,  the  breeding  of  live  stock  was  improved, 
the  wasteful  destruction  of  timber  was  checked  and  afforesta- 
tion begun.  The  charter  of  1861  set  the  Serbian  democracy 
on  a  firm  basis,  by  substituting  regular  elections  for  mass 

^  Militchevitch,  p.  485. 


42  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

meetings  with  their  tumultuous  procedure.  A  French  officer, 
Col.  Mondain,  was  Secretary  for  War,  and  could  provide  in 
case  of  necessity  an  army  of  150,000  men  with  seven  batteries 
of  artillery,  drawing  munitions  from  the  arsenal  at  Kraguye- 
vatz. 

Hopes  for  the  stability  and  progress  of  the  country  rose 
high.  The  old  dynastic  feuds  seemed  to  have  been  composed. 
Two  princesses  of  the  House  of  Karageorgevitch  were  present 
when,  on  the  feast  of  the  Holy  Trinity  in  1865,  Michael  cele- 
brated the  jubilee  of  Serbian  independence  amidst  general 
rejoicings. 

But  many  looked  to  the  Prince  of  Serbia  to  do  greater 
things.  It  was  hoped  that  he  would  be  the  emancipator  of 
the  Southern  Slav  peoples ;  that,  as  united  Italy  had  grown  up 
round  the  little  state  of  Piedmont,  so  all  the  Slav  subjects  of 
Turkey  would  be  gathered  together  into  a  single  nation  and 
the  principality  of  Serbia  expand  into  a  great  Balkan  kingdom, 
stretching  from  the  Black  Sea  to  the  Adriatic.  In  Michael's 
day  such  an  ambition  was  not  so  extravagant  as  it  has  since 
become.  It  was  a  time  of  change,  when  new  nations  were 
being  formed.  Italy  had  just  been  united.  The  Roumanians 
had  shaken  off  Turkish  control  and  elected  a  prince  of  their 
own.  The  eyes  of  the  Slavs  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  naturally 
turned  to  that  corner  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  where  indepen- 
dence had  been  won.  The  peasants  of  Bosnia  and  Hertze- 
govina  longed  to  break  the  yoke  of  their  landlords  and 
enjoy  the  liberties  of  their  fellow  Serbs  across  the  Drina. 
The  same  was  true  of  the  Serbs  of  Old  Serbia.  Also  there 
was  then  no  Bulgaria  ;  Western  Europe  was  unaware  of  the 
existence  of  a  Bulgarian  people.  The  Bulgars,  who  were  as 
yet  only  the  labouring  class  of  the  eastern  half  of  the  Balkans, 
were  indeed  just  beginning  to  awake  to  the  idea  of  nationality. 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  43 

Their  religion  was  the  same  as  that  of  the  Serbs.  Their 
leaders,  who  plotted  and  planned  for  a  revolution  against  the 
Turkish  government,  were  often  welcome  guests  at  Belgrade. 
A  little  luck,  some  years  of  strenuous  work,  and  it  seemed 
probable  that  the  Bulgars  and  Serbs  would  merge  into  one 
people  under  the  firm  and  wise  government  of  Prince  Mi- 
chael. There  was  even  a  treaty  in  1867  between  him  and  the 
Bulgarian  revolutionary  committee  by  which  it  was  arranged 
that  he  was  to  be  sovereign  of  the  two  united  nations. 

Further,  the  literary  movement  of  the  middle  of  the 
century  had  given  to  all  the  Southern  Slavs  an  increased  con- 
sciousness of  their  common  inheritance  of  race  and  language. 
The  Croatian  poet  Gai  had  called  on  them  to  realize  within 
the  Austrian  Empire  the  union  which  they  had  known  during 
the  short  period  of  Napoleon's  possession  of  Illyria.  The 
great-hearted  Roman  Catholic  bishop  Strossmayer  was  work- 
ing for  their  education  and  unity.  The  most  conspicuous  figure 
amongst  Serbian  writers  of  that  age  was  Vuk  Karadjitch,  the 
second  founder  of  Serbian  literature.  A  self-educated  man, 
he  laboured  all  his  life  to  give  a  literary  form  to  the  common 
speech  of  the  people  and  to  complete  that  departure  from  the 
antiquated  Slavonic  which  Dositey  Obradovitch  had  begun. 
He  chose  as  his  medium  of  expression  the  beautiful  speech 
of  his  native  Hertzegovina,  which  has  become  the  language 
of  Serbian  culture.  It  was  in  that  cultivated  tongue  that 
the  Archimandrite  Joachim  Byedov,  who  is  chaplain  at 
General  Vasitch's  head-quarters,  made  us  a  speech  on  the 
Orthodox  Christmas  Day,  and  very  majestic  and  musical  it 
sounded. 

No  less  than  forty-nine  books  stand  to  Vuk  Karadjitch's 
credit  in  a  dictionary  of  eminent  Serbs.  He  encountered 
such  opposition  from  old-fashioned  circles  in   Serbia,  on 


44  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

account  of  his  break  with  the  old  alphabet  and  the  old  lan- 
guage, that  his  books  were  for  many  years  forbidden  in  the 
principality,  but  they  were  published  in  Vienna,  Buda-Pesth, 
Leipzig,  and  other  places,  and  not  only  gave  the  scattered 
Southern  Slavs  a  common  literature  but  introduced  them  to 
the  notice  of  Europe  at  large.  His  greatest  work  was  his 
monumental  Serbian  dictionary,  published  in  i8i8.  He  lived 
on  till  1864  and  continued  to  pour  out  works,  including  four 
large  volumes  of  collected  songs  and  ballads. 

At  the  same  time  Croatian  literature  was  being  standardized 
on  the  model  of  the  poets  of  Dubrovnik,  and  the  Serbs  of 
Serbia  were  producing  their  share  of  the  national  output 
of  science  and  letters.  Since  1847  the  Srpska  Slovesnost, 
a  literary  society  of  Belgrade,  had  published  annually  the 
volumes  of  its  Glasnik  (Reporter),  to  which  many  articles  of 
high  value  were  contributed.  Belgrade  was,  in  fact,  begin- 
ning to  take  its  place  with  Zagreb,  Novi  Sad,  and  other 
Southern  Slav  towns  as  a  centre  of  intellectual  light  and 
leading.  Throughout  the  Serbo-Croat  lands  the  dawn  of  a 
new  day  seemed  to  be  spreading,  and  a  manifesto  issued  at 
Vienna  in  1850  could  proudly  declare  that  all  the  Southern 
Slavs,  of  whatever  state  or  church,  whether  they  used  the 
Latin  or  the  Cyrillic  alphabet,  were  one  people  and  used  one 
language.  This  union  of  culture  could  not  but  express  itself 
in  aspirations  after  political  emancipation  from  the  two 
empires  which  divided  the  Serbian  race.  Everywhere  arose 
the  prayer, '  Lord,  declare  to  us  that  Thine  anger  is  appeased 
and  that  Thou  hast  pardoned  our  faults.  Lord,  set  an  end  to 
the  punishment  of  the  sons  of  Lazar,  the  martyr  of  Kossovo. 
Lord,  grant  us  our  place  in  the  midst  of  the  nations  and 
deliver  us  from  the  Turk  and  the  German.'  ^ 

^  Denis,  p.  92. 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  45 

But  the  task  of  creating  a  '  greater  Serbia  '  was  beyond  the 
means  which  Prince  Michael  had  at  his  disposal.  The  little 
principality  could  not  hope  to  make  any  headway  against 
either  Austria  or  Turkey  without  allies  ;  and  allies  were  hard 
to  find.  Russia  was  then  occupied  with  her  own  affairs.  She 
was  engaged  in  liberating  her  serfs,  and  had  not  as  much 
attention  as  usual  to  give  to  Balkan  affairs.  France,  under 
Napoleon  III,  gave  little  sympathy  or  support  to  Serbia. 
Great  Britain  was  the  friend  of  the  Turk.  Of  nearer  neigh- 
bours, Roumania  was  but  newly  established  and  herself  most 
insecure  and  distrustful  of  Slavs.  Greece  was  feeble  and 
divided,  and,  despite  a  Serbo-Greek  alliance  in  1867,  would 
also  resent  the  establishment  of  a  powerful  Slav  state  barring 
the  way  to  her  north-eastward  expansion. 

The  one  ally  on  whom  Michael  could  depend  was  the  other 
Serb  state  of  Montenegro.  Montenegro  is  a  wild  tangle  of 
barren  hills  with  very  few  fertile  valleys,  a  country  that  owed 
its  liberty  to  the  harshness  of  its  physical  features.  In  fact,  a 
popular  story  has  it  that  when  God  was  creating  the  world  He 
brought  the  mountains  along  in  a  sack.  By  some  accident  the 
sack  burst,  and  the  mountains  poured  out  higgledy-piggledy 
on  to  Montenegro.  The  state  had  been  ruled  by  bishops  for 
150  years,  the  succession  passing  from  uncle  to  nephew,  since 
bishops  of  the  Eastern  Orthodox  Church  do  not  marry,  when 
Bishop  Danilo  (1851-60)  declared  himself  'Prince',  married 
a  wife,  and  became  an  ordinary  secular  ruler.  His  nephew, 
Nicholas,  who  succeeded  him,  and  who  is  the  present  King 
of  Montenegro  (though  actually,  as  is  well  known,  an  exile  in 
France),  has  had  a  long  and,  until  this  war,  a  most  successful 
reign.  Basing  his  policy  on  a  continuous  alliance  with  the  (H*iofe/?juyo 
Russian  Empire,  from  which  he  received  great  financial  assis-  ,j^  /Ziu/ 
tance,  he  was  ever  ready  to  lead  his  hardy  mountaineers  to 


46  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

battle  to  Increase  his  territory  or  to  gain  a  port  on  the  Adriatic. 
Amid  the  prosaic  dullness  of  the  modern  world,  King  Nicholas 
has  been  a  striking  figure  of  romance,  master  of  guerilla 
warfare,  paternal  despot  of  his  people,  to  whom  he  used  to 
administer  justice  seated  under  a  tree  in  his  garden,  un- 
troubled by  scruples,  uncivilized  even  by  his  intimate  know- 
ledge of  Europe. 

During  his  reign  Montenegro  made  some  advance  in 
material  development,  so  that  if  I  give  a  few  details  of  life 
there,  as  they  struck  me  when  I  visited  Tsetinye  in  1910,  we 
may  estimate  what  sort  of  an  ally  the  little  state  would  have 
been  to  Prince  Michael  fifty  years  ago. 

I  landed  at  Cattaro,  an  Austrian  port,  and  drove  up  the 
magnificent  Austrian  road  which  leads  to  the  Montenegrin 
capital,  and  is  the  only  way  by  which  carriages  can  enter  the 
kingdom.     Up  and  up  the  road  zigzagged  across  the  face  of 
the  precipitous  cliffs  that  rise  from  the  water's  edge.    When 
we  had  left  all  signs  of  verdure  behind  us  and  were  among  the 
bare  rocks,  we  crossed  the  frontier.  A  six  hours'  drive  through 
the  wildest  country  brought  us  to  Tsetinye.    It  was  about  the 
size  of  a  good  big  English  village,  with  a  population  of  less 
than  2,000  inhabitants.    The  royal  palace  was  a  plain  v/hite- 
washed  house  of  two  stories  and  looked  like  a  substantial 
English  country  inn.    The  Bank  of  Montenegro  was  an  im- 
pressive building  about  the  size  of  a  labourer's  cottage.    There 
was  an  exhibition  of  Italian  goods  going  on  at  the  time,  and 
I  went  in  and  watched  the  interest  with  which  the  Monte- 
negrins examined  the  most  commonplace  articles  of  house- 
hold furniture,  regarding  them  evidently  as  great  novelties. 
At  the  post  office  I  asked  for  a  stamp  of  the  value  of  2\d.  in 
order  to  send  a  letter  to  England.    I  was  told  that  they  were 
unfortunately  out  of  stamps  of  the  values  of  \d.,  id.,  and  2\d., 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  47 

but  that  there  was  no  need  to  worry  as  there  would  be  a  new 
issue  in  about  a  fortnight  !  The  men  are  not  partial  to  any 
form  of  work,  except  war,  so  that  material  progress  of  any 
considerable  kind  is  impossible.  Even  if  they  did  help  their 
womenfolk  to  cultivate  the  land,  they  could  make  but  little 
of  the  unproductive  soil.  The  national  industry  of  war, 
however,  can  always  be  practised  with  the  neighbouring 
Albanian  tribes,  who  are  also  usually  spoiling  for  a  fight 
and  loathe  the  Montenegrins.  Finally,  Montenegro,  which 
to-day  appears  only  a  spot  on  the  map  of  Europe,  was  fifty 
years  ago  considerably  smaller,  having  a  diameter  of  about 
22  miles. 

From  such  an  ally,  however  loyal,  Serbia  could  not  expect 
much  assistance  in  the  task  of  liberating  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
Indeed,  before  anything  had  been  openly  attempted  towards 
that  object,  Serbia  suffered  the  terrible  misfortune  of  losing 
her  prince.  Michael  was  assassinated  on  June  10,  1868,  while  vJ-^O-^t^ 
walking  in  his  park  at  Topshider,  near  Belgrade,  with  the  girl  ^ 

to  whom  he  was  engaged.  The  murder  has  always  been  a 
mystery.  Michael's  success  as  ruler  may  have  exasperated  the 
supporters  of  the  Karageorgevitch  family  into  doing  this 
dastardly  act,  so  fatal  to  the  best  interests  of  their  country,  or 
it  may  merely  have  been  the  work  of  anarchists,  who  would 
murder  any  royalty  on  principle,  for  the  sake  of  removing  a 
head  that  bore  a  crown.  Others  again,  asking  the  pertinent 
question  '  Cui  bono  F  '  '  Who  profited  by  the  murder  ?  ',  have 
suspected  Austria  of  being  behind  the  fatal  daggers. 

If  the  removal  of  Michael  was  a  godsend  for  Austrian 
policy,  it  was  for  Serbia  an  irreparable  loss.  Had  he  survived, 
it  was  not  at  that  time  a  wild  dream  to  look  forward  to  the 
establishment  of  a  united  Slav  state,  including  Bosnia, 
Hertzegovina,  Serbia,  Macedonia,  and  Bulgaria.    Not  even 


48  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

the  successes  of  the  Serbian  army  in  191 2  could  make  up  for 
this  disaster,  for  in  the  meanwhile  the  follies  and  crimes  of 
Michael's  two  successors,  together  with  the  disintegrating 
policy  of  the  great  Powers,  destroyed  all  such  ambitious  pro- 
jects. The  history  of  the  next  thirty-five  years  may  in  fact 
be  described  as  '  the  dechne  and  fall  of  the  Obrenovitch 
dynasty  '. 

Prince  Milan,  who  now  succeeded  his  cousin,  jvas  only 
fourteen.  Four  years  later,  in  1872,  he  came  of  age  and  soon 
showed  his  character  and  intentions.  He  had  much  to  re- 
commend him  ;  the  royal  gift  (so  striking  a  possession  of  our 
King  Edward)  of  never  forgetting  a  face  ;  a  genial  manner 
with  all  classes  which  endeared  his  memory  to  many  of  his 
people  and  has  made  'Milan 'so  common  a  Christian  nam.e 
in  Serbia  ;  the  charm  of  a  good  conversationalist,  quick  and 
witty  ;  great  intellectual  ability,  ready  eloquence,  and  a  keen 
critical  faculty  which  made  him  a  dominant  figure  among 
his  ministers  and  party-leaders.  Those  who  have  collected 
stamps  or  coins  will  remember  the  handsome  boyish  face 
with  its  rounded  cheeks  and  its  almost  feminine  appear- 
ance. He  had  all  the  attractiveness,  too,  of  the  ideal 
'  knut ',  knowing  exactly  what  clothes  to  wear  and  taking 
life  easily. 

But  he  came  from  Paris,  where  he  had  succeeded  in 
thoroughly  misspending  his  boyhood.  His  education  had 
lacked  method.  He  had  grown  up  without  disciphne  or 
affection.  The  poison  of  scepticism,  just  then  so  strong  in 
French  hfe  and  thought,  had  eaten  into  his  mind  and  soul,  j 
and  he  was  wholly  without  faith  in  God  or  humanity,  religion, 
patriotism,  honour,  or  justice.  His  one  fixed  intention  was  1 
to  have  a  good  time  and  to  exploit  his  position  in  accordance 
with  his  baser  instincts.    Such  was  the  prince  who  now  came 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  49 

to  direct  the  lives  and  fortunes  of  a  people  who  are  nothing 

lif  not  enthusiastic,  idealistic,  mystical,  and  devoted  to  the 

,  traditions  of  their  church  and  nation.     Such  a  prince  and 

jsuch  a  people  could  never  be  in  true  harmony.    Milan  hated 

jthe  business  of  government.    He  despised  the  intriguing  and 

!  factious  poHticians  of  the  Skupshtina  (Parliament)  and  the 

Court.    He  regarded  existence  in  Belgrade  as  an  intolerable 

exile  from  the  gay  life  of  Paris,  Vienna,  Biarritz,  and  the 

I  other  centres  of  Society,  where  he  spent  much  of  his  time. 

'The  generous  emotions  and  ardent  enthusiasms  of  the  Serbs 

jonly  aroused  his  sarcasm,  and  he  ended  by  hating  his  own 

1  people.     '  For  the  love  of  God,'  he  wrote  to  Queen  Natalie 

about  their  son  Alexander,  '  and  in  the  name  of  your  child, 

do  not  trust  the  Serbs.'     The  Queen's  reply  was  the  right 

commentary  on  such  a  message  :   '  A  King ',  she  answered, 

'  is  not  crowned  to  distrust  his  people  and  to  exploit  them, 

but  to  live  and  to  die  with  them.'  ^ 

Nine-tenths  of  the  people  wished  to  see  their  government  QcJUcdX  ♦-^^ 
following  a  Radical  policy.     The  programme  was  simple —  f(2ui5,.e^  } 
strict   economy,   extensive  powers   for  local   authorities,   a 
■  Russian  alliance,  and  a  Slav  foreign  policy.  But  Milan  wanted 
i  money,  and  the  line  of  least  resistance  was  to  receive  it  from 
Austria-Hungary,  in  whose  sphere  of  influence  Serbia  was 
now  recognized  to  be.    Rather  than  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  his  people  in  resistance  to  the  Austrian  menace  and  call  on  ^^         • 
Russia  for  support,  which  might  not  be  forthcoming,  Milan 
preferred  to   accept   the  credits  which  were  always  at  his    f^^kfic*'^ 
disposal  in  the  banks  of  Vienna.     But  if  Austria-Hungary 
paid  the  piper,  she  naturally  called  the  tune.    Serbia  became 
a  happy  hunting-ground  for  Austrian  contractors.     They 
received  special  privileges  to  the  detriment  of  the  natives. 

^  Denis,  p.  96. 
2071  p 


50  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

The  country  became  deeply  involved  in  debt.  To  carry 
through  this  policy  of  subservience  to  his  paymaster  and  to 
govern  against  the  wishes  of  the  Radicals,  Milan  was  obliged 
to  have  recourse  to  violence  and  deceit.  The  constitution  was 
violated,  elections  falsified,  the  Skupshtina  summoned,  pro- 
rogued, dissolved,  justice  perverted,  plots  engineered  by  the 
police,  politicians  cynically  bought  or  ruined,  public  officials 
dismissed  if  they  did  not  carry  out  the  king's  illegal  orders. 
In  this  riot  of  despotism  it  is  small  wonder  that  the  tone  of 
public  life  was  debased.  Particularly  did  this  corruption 
invade  the  army.  In  an  army  such  as  the  Serbian  where 
service  with  the  colours  is  short,  and  where  there  is  but  a 
small  backbone  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers,  it  is 
essential  to  maintain  a  high  sense  of  duty  and  public  spirit. 
More  especially  is  this  so  in  a  country  surrounded  by  poten- 
tial enemies,  and  looking  forward  to  the  possibility  of  war  to 
assure  its  expansion  and  free  development.  It  was  therefore 
disastrous  that  Milan  should  have  brought  officers  into  the 
intrigues  of  political  life,  bought  their  assistance  with  pro- 
motions, distinctions,  or  money,  and  filled  the  higher  ranks 
with  men  remarkable  for  success  at  Court  rather  than  for 
military  efficiency. 

When  Milan  finally  abdicated  his  throne  and  quitted  the 
country,  he  left  behind  him  a  debt  of  400,000,000  francs. 
The  Serbs  would  have  forgiven  him  that,  but  they  could  not 
forget  that  he  demoralized  their  public  life,  and  that  (as  we 
shaU  see  later)  he  alienated  the  Bulgars ;  above  all,  that  he 
sold  them  into  the  hands  of  Austria. 

Now  let  us  look  at  his  Balkan  policy  and  the  attempts  which 
he  made  to  fulfil  Serbia's  dreams  of  expansion.  In  1875  an 
insurrection  broke  out  in  Hcrtzegovina  and  rapidly  spread 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  51 

through  Bosnia.  The  unfortunate  peasants  of  those  pro- 
vinces suffered  the  worst  evils  of  Turkish  rule.  The  triple 
exactions  of  their  Mohammedan  landlords,  of  the  imperial 
exchequer,  and  of  the  farmers  of  the  revenue,  weighed  heavily 
on  the  impoverished  country.  Across  the  Drina  they  saw 
their  fellow  Serbs  at  least  free  from  the  Turk  and  masters  of 
the  soil.  Unable  •  to  endure  their  position  any  longer,  they 
rose  everywhere  in  revolt. 

Here  was  Austria-Hungary's  chance.  If  she  could  march 
her  armies  into  the  two  provinces  and  restore  order,  she  could 
then  turn  to  Europe,  point  out  the  eminent  service  she  had 
rendered  to  civilization,  and  insist  that  she  had  better  remain 
to  administer  the  country  in  the  interests  of  the  inhabitants. 
Prince  Metternich  had  long  before  laid  down  that  Serbia 
must  be  either  Turkish  or  Austrian.  But  Austria  in  those  days 
was  pre-eminently  the  European  Power  which  stood  for 
legitimism,  that  is,  for  the  public  recognition  of  rights  con- 
ferred by  treaties  or  hereditary"  descent.  She  could  hardly, 
therefore,  march  into  Serbia  and  annex  it.  Her  aim  was 
rather  to  surround  and  penetrate  the  little  principality  until 
the  day  when  Serbia  should  be  unable  to  resist  peaceful 
annexation.  Such  a  policy  was  cheaper  and  less  provocative 
than  more  violent  and  dashing  methods.  In  the  occupation 
qf^Bpsnia-Hertzegovina  the  Austro-Hungarian  government 
saw  a  grand  opportunity  to  cut  off  Serbia  from  all  hope 
of  westward  expansion  and  to  carry  its  power  far  on  the 
way  to  Salonika,  already  a  constant  object  of  Viennese 
policy. 

But  if  the  revolt  was  Austria-Hungary's  opportunity,  much 
more  so  was  it  Serbia's.  'Bosnia-Hertzegovina ',  says  M.  Tsvi- 
jitch,  the  celebrated  Serbian  geographer, '  is  not  merely  for  us 
what  the  Trentino  and  Trieste  are  for  Italy.  .  .  .  They  have 

D  2 


52  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

for  Serbia  the  same  importance  that  the  environs  of  Moscow 
have  for  Russia,  or  the  most  vital  parts  of  Germany  and 
France  have  for  the  Germans  and  the  French.'  The  two 
provinces  were  the  home  of  the  purest  Serb  traditions,  and 
their  dialect  had  been  accepted  as  the  literary  expression  of 
the  Southern  Slavs.  That  was  the  sentimental  and  racial 
reason  for  their  supreme  importance  to  Serbia.  There  was 
also  the  economic  and  strategic  danger  threatened  to  Serbia, 
should  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  not  be  recovered  but  come 
under  Habsburg  control.  Serbia  would  then  find  the 
Austro-Hungarian  army  on  her  western  as  well  as  her 
northern  frontier,  and  all  hope  of  penetrating  to  the 
Adriatic  Sea  would  be  indefinitely  postponed,  if  not  entirely 
quenched. 

Ristitch,  Milan's  minister,  saw  all  the  dangers  that  would 
have  to  be  faced  should  Serbia  embark  on  a  policy  of  adven- 
ture. The  Turkish  army,  always  a  formidable  fighting  force, 
would  overwhelm  the  Serbs,  if  it  could  be  wholly  massed 
against  them.  A  Serbian  invasion  of  the  rebellious  provinces 
would  also,  if  successful,  mean  a  conflict  with  Austria- 
Hungary,  in  which  Russia  would  probably  not  interfere, 
while  France  was  then  in  no  condition  to  support  other 
nations'  crusades.  On  the  other  hand,  Old  Serbia  too  broke 
into  rebellion,  and  this  was  followed  by  a  similar  movement 
in  Bulgaria.  If  Serbia  could  only  act  quickly  and  establish 
herself  in  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  and  Old  Serbia,  it  would  take 
time  to  dislodge  her,  and  meanwhile  the  example  of  insurrec- 
tion would  probably  spread  far  and  wide  over  the  whole  of 
Turkey  in  Europe.  Also  Balkan  statesmen  have  been  taught 
by  long  experience  that  with  the  Powers  nothing  succeeds  like 
self-help.  Possession  is  nine  points  of  the  law.  If  they  could 
maintain  a  positionj  however  precarious,  in  the  '  unredeemed ' 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  53 

Serbian  lands,  the  Serbs  could  look  forward  with  confidence 
to  being  ultimately  supported  by  Russia.  Ristitch  therefore 
decided  to  act,  and  all  Serbia  was  behind  him. 

The  essence  of  his  plans  was  quick  and  decisive  action,  the 
immediate  occupation  of  Bosnia  by  the  Serbian  army.  And 
here  whatever  chance  of  success  there  had  been  was  ruined  by 
the  hesitations  and  delays  of  Prince  Milan.  When  at  last,  in 
June  1876,  the  prince  brought  himself,  under  the  pressure  of 
his  subjects'  opinion,  to  declare  war,  it  was  too  late.  The 
Turks  had  by  then  quenched  the  feeble  fires  of  the  Bul- 
garian rising  with  the  blood  of  the  slaughtered  peasants, 
and  having  had  the  necessary  time  were  ready  to  turn  their 
whole  force  on  to  the  Serbs.  Worse  still,  in  July  1876  the 
Emperors  of  Austria  and  Russia  met  at  Reichstadt  and  k<^\\r\(^  \Ut 
came  to  an  informal  agreement  by  which  they  arranged  a^{xJ/rf*^' 
that  Russia  should  limit  her  sphere  of  action  in  the  Balkans  y^lL 

to  the  East,  leaving  the  West  (that  is  to  say,  the  Serbs)  to 
Austria-Hungary. 

Deprived  of  the  chance  of  ultimate  Russian  support,  the 
position  of  Serbia  was  hopeless.  Her  soldiers  fought  bravely 
and  well,  and  had  the  assistance  of  many  Russian  volunteers. 
But  the  army  had  not  been  thoroughly  organized  for  war, 
and  soon  the  Turks  began  to  invade  Serbian  territory.  The 
Serbs  were  only  saved  from  disaster  by  the  intervention  of 
Russia,  v/hich  in  October  1876  imposed  an  armistice  on  the 
Turks.  A  conference  then  met  at  Constantinople,  which 
arranged  for  reforms  to  protect  Turkey's  Christian  subjects, 
and  the  armistice  was  converted  into  a  peace.  But  the 
promised  reforms  were  not  put  in  force,  and  in  1877  Russia, 
supported  by  Roumania,  declared  war  on  Turkey.  Not 
content  with  her  beating  of  the  previous  year,  Serbia  joined 
in  the  attack  on  the  common  enemy,  this  time  with  success. 


54  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

'The  Turkish  army  had  its  hands  full  elsewhere,  and  the  Serbs 
triumphantly  conquered  and  occupied  Nish  and  the  valleys 
of  the  Nishava  and  Southern  Morava, 

But  Russia  had  entered  on  this  war  for  love  of  the  un- 
fortunate Bulgars,  not  for  the  Serbs  whom  she  had  agreed  to 
consider  as  Austria-Hungary's  affair.  As  the  existence  of  the 
Bulgarian  State  dates  from  the  end  of  this  campaign,  and 
since  it  is  impossible  to  follow  further  Serbian  history  without 
some  knowledge  of  the  Bulgars,  let  me  now  pause  to  consider 
that  people,  who  are  to-day  our  immediate  opponents  in 
Macedonia. 


The  first  point  to  grasp  about  the  Bulgars  is  that,  unlike 
the  Serbs  and  Russians,  they  were  originally  not  Slavs  at 
all.  Their  early  history  is  wrapped  in  considerable  mystery, 
but  we  may  say  roughly  that  they  entered  the  Balkan 
peninsula  in  the  seventh  century,  as  a  Mongolian  central- 
Asiatic  race,  akin  to  the  Huns  and  Turks.  Of  recent  years, 
since  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  have  become  usually  hostile  and 
always  suspicious  towards  each  other,  many  Bulgarian 
writers  have  rejoiced  to  emphasize  their  people's  Tartaric 
origin.  Pure  Tartars,  however,  they  certainly  are  not.  Once 
settled  south  of  the  Danube  they  accepted  the  language 
and  customs  of  the  Slavs  amongst  whom  they  found  them- 
selves. The  old  Bulgarian  language  disappeared  and  their 
present  speech  is  pure  Slavonic.  They  were  converted  to  the 
Slav  form  of  Christianity  and  they  intermarried  with  the 
Slav  race,  so  that  in  the  west  of  Bulgaria,  where  the  survival 
of  the  Slavs  was  most  widespread,  there  is  little  difference 
between  the  Bulgar  and  his  Serbian  neighbour  over  the 
frontier.    In  fact,  in  1878,  when  the  principality  of  Bulgaria 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  55 

was  being  created,  many  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  western 
districts  asked  to  be  incorporated  in  Serbia. 

The  history  of  the  Bulgars,  the  long  centuries  during 
which  they  made  no  attempt  to  challenge  their  Turkish 
masters,  and  their  final  liberation  by  arms  other  than  their 
own,  might  point  to  a  lack  of  initiative  and  some  natural 
docility  to  authority.  Certainly  of  late  years  their  present 
king  and  his  court  have  seemed  able  to  drive  the  Bulgars 
along  any  line  of  policy.  But  there  is  no  doubt  about  the 
energy,  the  discipline,  and  the  persistent  industry  which  have 
enabled  the  people  to  develop  their  country's  resources  very 
rapidly  in  the  last  forty  years.  Still  less  is  there  any  question 
about  their  capacity  for  war.  When  Serbia  was  attacked  by 
Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and  Bulgaria  in  1915,  a  pre- 
valent feeling  amongst  the  Serbs  was  that,  given  anything 
like  equal  conditions,  their  most  dangerous  opponents 
would  be  the  Bulgars.  General  Vasitch,  I  am  told,  said  that 
he  would  rather  have  to  deal  with  two  divisions  of  Germans 
than  one  of  Bulgars. 

Lying  farther  to  the  east  than  the  Serbs,  the  Bulgars  were 
naturally  conquered  first.  They  then  settled  down  as 
drudges,  without  an  educated  class,  without  traditions, 
without  hope.  When  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  achieved 
their  independence  the  Bulgars  made  no  sign  of  life.  To 
Western  Europe  of  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century 
the  Bulgarian  race  was  unknown.  But  then  began  an 
intellectual  awakening  and  the  birth  of  nationalism,  largely 
helped  by  the  Serbian  government,  which  printed 
Bulgarian  books,  opened  Bulgarian  schools,  and  generally 
encouraged  the  movement.  Now  the  Turk,  as  we  said 
before,  professes  to  know  nothing  of  separate  nationalities 
under    his   rule.     The  only   line   of    demarcation    that  he 


56  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

recognizes  is  religious.  Therefore  the  first  step  taken  by  the 
Bulgars  was  their  demand  in  1856  for  a  separate  church 
with  an  organization  independent  of  the  Greek  Patriarch 
of  Constantinople,  who  had  hitherto  placed  Greeks  in 
all  the  bishoprics  and  higher  ecclesiastical  posts  in  Bulgaria. 
The  Ottoman  government,  seeing  nothing  in  this  pro- 
posal but  a  Russian  intrigue,  made  promises  which  it  did 
not  fulfil.  A  party  of  the  Bulgars  thereupon  turned  to 
France  with  a  view  to  embracing  Roman  Catholicism. 
The  Emperor  Napoleon  III  entered  into  negotiations  with 
the  party-leader,  Dragan  Tsankov,  and  the  result  was  the 
dispatch  from  Rome  of  a  bishop  to  organize  a  Bulgarian 
Uniate  Church  (i.  e.  a  national  church  with  peculiar 
privileges,  but  under  obedience  to  the  see  of  Rome).  This 
bishop  landed  at  Salonika  in  1861  and  a  week  later  dis- 
appeared, and  with  him  collapsed  the  idea  of  a  national 
conversion,  though  the  little  Uniate  body  still  exists  and  has 
been  used  by  Bulgaria  as  a  weapon  against  Greeks  and 
Moslems. 

Meanwhile,  the  mass  of  the  Bulgars  had  taken  the  decided 
step  of  refusing  further  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the 
Patriarch.  In  1870  the  Ottoman  government,  thinking  that 
the  Bulgars  might  prove  a  useful  counterpoise  to  the  Serbs 
and  Greeks,  decided  to  grant  their  request,  and  to  establish 
a  Bulgarian  Exarchate,  or  separate  church,  under  an  exarch 
who  should  reside  at  Constantinople  and  represent  his 
co-relioionists  in  their  relations  with  the  Sultan. 

o 

One  point  in  the  Sultan's  firman  (edict)  establishing  the 
Exarchate  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  negotiations  had 
been  carried  on  between  four  parties — the  Turkish  govern- 
ment, the  Greek  Patriarch,  the  Bulgar  leaders,  and  their 
friend    and     supporter,    the    Russian    ambassador,  General 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  57 

Ignatieff.  Tlie  plan  which  liad  been  generally  approved 
left  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate  still  united  to  the  Patriarchate, 
though  self-governing,  and  defined  its  geographical  limits. 
Behind  the  backs  of  the  Russian  ambassador  and  the  Patri- 
arch, the  Turks  agreed  to  grant  the  Bulgars  virtual  inde- 
pendence and  to  leave  their  boundaries  undecided.  The 
result  of  the  first  alteration  in  the  firman  was  that  the 
Patriarch  excommunicated  the  Exarchate,  and  the  Bulgars 
since  that  time  have  remained  the  one  Balkan  people  who 
are  not  united  to  the  others  and  to  Russia  by  ecclesiastical 
communion.  The  second  alteration  was  embodied  in  the 
tenth  clause  of  the  firman  and  ran  as  follows :  '  if  all  or 
two-thirds  at  least  of  the  Orthodox  inhabitants  of  districts, 
other  than  those  enumerated  above,  wish  to  submit  to  the 
Bulgarian  Exarchate  in  spiritual  matters,  and  if  this  is  stated 
and  proved,  they  shall  be  authorized  so  to  do  .  .  .  .'  ^  This 
looks  like  a  harmless  and  thoughtful  provision  for  the  future. 
Actually  it  has  been  used  by  the  Bulgars  in  a  most  sinister 
manner  for  the  extension  of  their  influence.  In  this  they 
had  the  great  advantage  that  they  were  looked  upon  with 
considerable  favour  by  the  Turkish  government  and 
encouraged  at  first  against  the  Greeks  and  also  the  Serbs, 
who  now  put  in  a  claim  to  the  old  Serbian  bishoprics  of 
Skoplye  and  Petch.  To  the  results  of  that  tenth  clause  we 
shall  come  presently. 

Six  years  after  the  foundation  of  the  Exarchate,  the  Bul- 
garian insurrection  broke  out.  It  was  no  more  than  a  feeble 
and  local  affair,  and  was  stamped  out  with  brutality  by 
Turkish  irregular  troops.  But  the  '  Bulgarian  atrocities ' 
of  the  Turks  roused  public  indignation  in  Europe.  Mr. 
Gladstone  poured  out  speeches  denouncing  the  assassins, 
^  Text  of  Firman  in  Balcanicus,  pp.  286-90. 


58  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

but  failed  to  move  Mr.  Disraeli's  government  from  its 
attitude  of  benevolence  towards  the  Sultan.  Russia,  on 
the  contrary,  took  up  arms.  Her  armies  crossed  Roumania 
in  1877,  and  after  breaking  the  long  and  desperate  resistance 
of  the  Turks  marched  to  the  walls  of  Constantinople. 
Turkey  was  obliged  to  give  in  and  agree  to  the  treaty  of 
San  Stefano,  by  which  Russia  provided  for  a  great  Bulgarian 
principality,  including  what  have  since  been  known  as 
Bulgaria  and  Eastern  Roumelia,  all  Macedonia,  and  the 
Aegean  coast  to  the  east  of  Salonika.  Had  this  treaty  been 
carried  into  effect  Bulgaria  would  have  been  by  far  the 
largest  state  in  the  Balkans,  stretching  from  the  Danube  to 
the  Aegean  Sea,  and  from  the  Black  Sea  to  Albania,  thus 
breaking  European  Turkey  into  two  parts  and  separating 
Greece  and  Serbia. 

But  the  treaty  was  not  allowed  to  stand.  Austria-Hungary 
would  not  tolerate  the  intrusion  of  a  new  state  between  her- 
self and  her  coveted  goal  of  Salonika.  Both  Austria-Hungary 
and  Great  Britain  suspected  that  the  new  principality  would 
be  guided  and  dominated  by  Russia.  Consequently  a 
European  congress  was  held  at  Berlin  to  revise  the  Balkan 
situation.  Three  statesmen.  Prince  Bismarck,  the  German 
Chancellor,  Count  Andrassy,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Chan- 
cellor, and  Mr.  Disraeli,  acting  together,  so  altered  the 
provisions  of  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  as  to  establish  a  small 
principality  of  Bulgaria,  stretching  from  the  Timok  to  the 
Black  Sea  between  the  Danube  and  the  Balkan  Mountains. 
Southern  Bulgaria,  called  Eastern  Roumeha,  was  to  be 
governed  by  a  Christian  official  appointed  by  the  Porte  ; 
while  Turkey,  promising  to  introduce  reforms  favourable 
to  the  Christian  population,  was  confirmed  in  the  rest  of 
her  European  possessions,  with  the  exception  of  concessions 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  59 

on  her  frontiers  to  Austria-Hungary,  Serbia,  Roumania,  and 
Montenegro. 

The  Bulgars  had  thus  seen  Macedonia  given  to  them,  only 
to  see  it  at  once  withdrawn.  Their  appetite  was  whetted. 
They  foresaw  the  coming  collapse  of  the  Turkish  empire 
in  Europe,  and  were  determined  that  when  the  day  for 
dividing  Turkey's  estate  came,  they  should  have  the  lion's 
share.  Macedonia  must  be  shown  to  be  Bulgarian  in  race, 
language,  and  sympathy.  Thus  Bulgaria  would  in  time 
become  the  predominant  state  of  the  Balkans,  holding  the 
central  strategic  position  and  controlling  both  the  main 
trade-routes.  The  story  of  the  Bulgarian  attempt  to  do 
this  has  been  called  '  the  folk-war  ',  which  made  a  hell  of 
Macedonia  during  the  thirty  years  before  the  Balkan  War 
of  1912. 

Macedonia  is  not  a  province  with  exact  limits.  At  the 
present  moment  it  is  nominally  divided  between  Serbia 
and  Greece.  It  is  rather  the  name  vaguely  given  to  all  that 
debatable  block  of  country  where  the  Greeks,  the  Serbs, 
the  Bulgars,  and  the  Albanians  meet  and  mingle.  The 
confusion  of  races  is  rendered  yet  more  perplexing  by  the 
presence  of  a  number  of  Turks,  and  of  Kutzo-Vlachs, 
supposed  to  be  the  descendants  of  the  original  Romano- 
Illyrian  stock  who  were  in  the  peninsula  before  the  Slavs 
came.-^  Each  of  the  Balkan  States  has  cast  covetous  eyes  on 
Macedonia  and  tried  to  prove  part  or  the  whole  of  it  to  be 
by  nature  hers ;    while  the  Albanians  vigorously  resent  any 

^  Batachin,  where  one  of  our  A.S.C.  (M.T.)  companies  was  billeted  in 
October  19 16,  is  a  Kutzo-Vlach  village.  The  people  speak  a  dialect 
similar  to  Roumanian.  Their  houses  were  built  by  the  Roumanian 
government,  and  a  school  provided  from  the  same  source  was  being  con- 
structed when  the  war  broke  out. 


6o  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

attempt  to  deprive  them  of  the  anarchy  and  tribal  indepen- 
dence which  they  have  enjoyed  for  centuries. 

In  the  work  of  staking  out  a  claim  Bulgaria  set  the  pace. 
She  had  many  advantages.  Unlike  Serbia,  she  had  free 
access  to  the  sea.  Unlike  Greece,  she  had  a  fine  and  fertile 
soil.  She  possessed  an  invaluable  asset  in  the  steady,  sober, 
and  industrious  character  of  her  people,  less  given  to  gusts 
of  emotion  and  passion  than  either  of  her  neighbours. 
While  Greece  was  unable  to  settle  down  to  peaceful  develop- 
ment for  thinking  how  she  might  extend  the  narrow  limits 
of  her  rocky  kingdom,  while  Serbia  was  fast  in  the  economic 
toils  of  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  increased  rapidly  in 
riches  and  material  power.  Alternately  courted  by  Russia 
and  Austria-Hungary,  she  could  usually  count  on  financial 
support  from  Russia  ;  and  when  the  Powers  combined  to 
maintain  gendarmerie  officers  in  Macedonia,  the  Russian 
representatives  acted  as  though  they  had  been  appointed 
at  Sofia.  Further,  to  the  Turks,  the  Greeks  and  Serbs  had 
always  had  the  character  of  revolutionaries  and  implacable 
enemies.  The  Bulgars  had  been  less  intractable  and  owed 
their  first  step  towards  nationality  to  the  Turkish  plan  of 
using  them  against  the  other  Christian  peoples.  Thus  there 
occurred  the  extraordinary  situation  of  the  Bulgars  terrorizing 
parts  of  the  Macedonian  country-side  with  the  connivance  and 
even  sometimes  the  support  of  the  Turkish  governing  officials. 

Starting  from  their  legal  basis  in  the  tenth  clause  of  the 
Sultan's  ^n«^«  of  1870,  the  Bulgars  have  conducted  a  con- 
tinuous campaign  by  fair  means  or  foul  to  prove  that  the 
inhabitants  of  Macedonia  are  Bulgars.  The  people  them- 
selves did  not  know  what  they  were.  They  only  knew  that 
they  lived  in  a  turmoil  of  warring  interests  and  corrupt 
administration,  and  longed  for  a  firm  and  equitable  govern- 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  6i 

ment.  Amongst  these  people  came  the  agents  of  the 
Bulgarian  Exarchate  and  a  revolutionary  committee  called 
the  '  Internal  Organization '.  The  fairest  means  which 
they  adopted  was  that  of  building  schools  and  churches, 
a  game  at  which  the  Greeks  were  their  equal,  while  the 
Serbs  did  their  best  to  emulate  them  in  northern  Macedonia, 
and  even  the  Roumanians  took  a  hand.  The  foulest  means 
was  the  simple  terrorization  by  murder,  arson  and  pillage, 
of  those  who  would  not  declare  themselves  Bulgars,  or  rather 
'  Exarchists '.  The  old  race-feud  of  Bulgar  and  Greek 
broke  out  again,  bringing  with  it  more  misery  and  uncer- 
tainty of  life  than  ever  the  Turk  had  caused.  The  Bulgarian 
bands  descended  from  the  mountains,  secretly  supported 
from  Sofia,  with  the  twofold  object  of  extending  their 
national  influence,  and,  by  throwing  the  blame  for  their 
atrocities  on  the  Turks,  of  provoking  European  intervention 
and  the  cession  of  Macedonia  to  Bulgaria.  On  the  body  of 
the  Bulgarian  '  comitadji '  chief,  Sfetkoff,  who  was  killed 
in  1905,  was  found  a  document  ordering  that  '  any  Christian 
who  refuses  assistance  must  be  killed  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  blame  may  be  thrown  upon  the  forest  guard, 
Imam  or  Dere  Bey,  and  two  witnesses  must  be  forthcoming 
who  will  persuade  the  court  that  the  murder  has  been 
committed  by  some  such  tyrant  \^  Thus  many  an  act  of 
brutal  violence,  which  stirred  up  European  wrath  against 
the  Turk,  was  really  the  work  of  the  Bulgar  at  the  expense 
of  his  fellow  Christian. 

The  wretched  peasant  was  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma.    If 

he  agreed  that  he  was  a  Bulgar,  the  '  comitadji '  band  would 

point  out  that  it  was  his  privilege  and  duty  to  assist  them  in 

their   noble   crusade.     They   would   therefore  live   at   his 

^  Crawfurd  Price,  The  Balkan  Cockpit,  p.  347. 


62  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

expense    and    trouble    him    for    financial   support.      If   he 
obstinately  denied   that  he  was  a   Bulgar,  he  might  look 
forward  with  some  certainty  to  attempts  on  his  life,  the 
burning  of  his  crops  or  the  destruction  of  his  home.    Even 
the  educational  propaganda  of  schools  and  churches,  which 
looks  such  an  innocent  method  of  peaceful  penetration,  was 
pushed  by  similar  means.    Let  me  quote  a  single  case  which 
will  serve  as  an  example  of  Bulgarian  methods  of  conversion 
to  the  Exarchate.     It  is  the  evidence  of  Kostadin  George- 
vitch,   parish   priest   of    Konyska,   near   Gyevgyeli,   in    the 
Vardar  valley.     '  Up  till  1898  or  1899,  I  don't  remember 
exactly,  we  were  all  under  the  authority  of  the  Patriarchate 
(Greek)  or,  as  we  say  here,  we  were  Grecomaniacs.    Then 
came  the  Bulgarian  '  voivoda  '  John,  a  native  of  Karasula, 
who  ordered  me  to  give  up  the  Greek  school  and  to  become 
a  Bulgarian  schoolmaster.     If  I  refused,  I  should  be  killed. 
He  further  ordered  me  to  inform  all  the  peasants  that  they 
were  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  the  Exarchate.    If  they 
didn't,  they  likewise  would  be  all  massacred.     Our  only 
course,  in  accordance  with  his  order,  was  to  draw  up  two 
petitions,  one  addressed  to  the  Exarch  at  Constantinople, 
the  other  to  the   Kaimakam  at  Gyevgyeli,  asking  them  to 
attach  us  to  the  Exarchate,  since  we  were  Bulgars.     We 
obeyed  the  order  given  to  us.     Some  time  later  there  came 
from  Gyevgyeli  a  Turkish  police  official,  who  assembled  us 
and  put  some  questions  to  us.     When,  under  the  threats  of 
the  '  voivoda  '  John,  the  terrified  people  endorsed  the  terms 
of  their  petition,  we  were  made  into  Bulgars ! '  ^ 

It  is  hardly  surprising  that,  seeing  such  methods  at  work  in 
Macedonia,  the  Serbs  and  Greeks  should  have  also  fitted  out 

1  Balcanicus,  p.  277.     Quoted  without  reference  to  any  authority. 
But  for  Bulgarian  propaganda  see  Durham  and  Upward,  &c.,  passim. 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  63 

and  encouraged  '  comitadji '  bands  to  protect  their  kindred 
and  to  prevent  the  further  spread  of  Bulgarization,  till  the 
whole  of  Macedonia  reeled  with  propaganda.  The  Bulgars 
have  had  undoubtedly  the  best  of  the  competition.  They  have 
shown  themselves  by  far  the  best  publicity-agents  in  plead- 
ing their  cause  before  Europe.  They  have  had  the  greatest 
measure  of  success  in  converting  the  natives  of  Macedonia. 

Some  writers,  therefore,  argue  that  the  Bulgars  have 
established  their  claim  to  those  parts  of  the  country  in  which 
the  people  have  expressed  their  desire  to  be  Bulgarian.  To 
the  Serbian  and  Greek  contention  that  this  result  has  been 
produced  by  liberal  expenditure  on  schools,  churches,  and 
revolutionary  bands,  they  reply  that  the  fact  remains  that 
it  has  been  produced.  But  that  is  not  the  end  of  the  matter. 
The  effect  has  been  largely  accomplished  by  sheer  intimida- 
tion. From  which  I  draw  two  conclusions ;  first,  that  Bulgaria 
must  not  enjoy  the  possession  of  lands  which  she  has  used 
such  foul  means  to  obtain,  and  secondly,  that  there  has  been 
no  real  test  of  Macedonian  feeling. 

I  cannot  pretend  to  speak  with  any  authority  about  the 
true  affinities  of  the  Macedonian  population.  They  differ 
from  village  to  village.  The  people  of  Ekshisu  fired  on  the 
Serbian  troops  in  August  last.  The  people  of  other  villages 
have  welcomed  them.  Lescovatz  village,  near  Fiorina,  is 
Turkish.  Batachin  is  Vlach.  If  you  study  books  on  the 
population  you  will  nearly  always  find  that  the  author  has 
some  strong  bias.  There  is  no  other  explanation  of  the 
extraordinarily  different  figures  and  arguments  produced.^ 

^  See  Appendix.  Despite  the  varied  estimates  there  given  there  seems 
to  be  a  general  agreement  among  the  Bulgarian,  Serbian,  and  German 
writers  to  put  the  Greeks  at  about  200,000  and  the  Slavs  at  something 
over  a  million. 


64  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

The  people  whom  one  author  classes  as  Serbs  another  counts 
as  Bulgars,  while  there  is  no  unanimity  even  about  the 
total  population  ;  one  cannot  argue  from  names,  for  a  man 
will  change  his  name  according  to  the  Power  which  he  is 
seeking  to  propitiate.  Serbian  parents  named  Markovitch 
may  have  children  calling  themselves  Markov  and  temporarily 
sound  Bulgars  ;  and  vice  versa.  Language  does  not  settle 
the  question,  for  the  Macedonian  Slavs  speak  a  dialect 
that  is  about  equally  akin  to  Serbian  and  Bulgarian,  while 
there  is  a  Slav-speaking  population  who  have  been  for 
centuries  under  the  Greek  Patriarchate  and  are  now  forced 
to  talk  Greek.  The  true  Greeks  are  distinguishable  from 
the  Slavs  by  language  and  physical  traits,  but  they  are  only 
to  be  found  along  the  coast,  where  they  predominate  in 
the  towns,  and  in  the  extreme  south  of  Macedonia.  The 
normal  Macedonian  village  is  Slav,  since  the  Turkish 
minority  tends  to  decrease.  And  those  Slavs  would,  I  believe, 
be  quite  content  in  time  to  be  either  Serbs  or  Bulgars,  if 
they  could  be  assured  of  a  stable  government.  If  historical 
arguments  count  for  anything,  Serbia  has  the  better  claim, 
for  the  mediaeval  Serbian  empire  has  left  many  traces  in 
Macedonia  in  the  way  of  architecture  and  writings,  while 
the  short-lived  Bulgarian  empires  covered  the  country 
only  it!  the  dark  ages.  The  district  round  Prilep,  in  fact,  is 
the  country  of  Kralyevitch  Marko,  the  Serbian  hero,  and 
is  filled  with  his  churches  and  monasteries.  One  interesting 
bit  of  evidence  from  local  customs  is  that  the  Slavs  of  Mace- 
donia keep  up  the  habit  of  celebrating  their  '  Slavas ',  or 
feasts  of  their  family  patron  saints,  a  habit  peculiar  to  the 
Serbian  race,  not  found  amongst  the  other  Slavs  and  actually 
prohibited  before  now  by  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate  as 
contrary  to  the  Orthodox  religion. 


MACEDONIAN  PEASANTS  DANCING 


A  MACEDONIAN  PEASANT  FAMILY 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  65 

One  argument  remains  to  be  stated,  namely  the  economic. 
The  abrupt  mountain  barriers  of  the  Balkan  peninsula  make 
communication  difficult  ;  but  there  are  natural  lines  between 
the  hills  along  which  commercial  activity  can  flow.  Now 
Macedonia,  for  the  most  part,  looks  towards  Salonika  as  its 
one  outlet  to  the  sea.  From  Salonika  runs  the  corridor  of 
the  Vardar  valley  joining  Serbia  and  the  Mediterranean 
world.  Northern  and  western  Macedonia  are  necessary 
to  Serbia,  of  which  they  are  a  continuation.  They  could 
only  have  economic  affinities  with  Bulgaria,  if  that  Power 
held,  or  had  special  rights  in,  Salonika.  Eastern  Macedonia  is 
different.  To  the  country  round  Kavalla  and  Seres  Serbia 
makes  no  claim  ;  and  lying  round  the  Struma  river,  it  would 
seem  to  provide  the  natural  commercial  route  between 
Sofia  and  the  Aegean, 

•  •  •  •  •'•  •  •  • 

I  hope  that  the  above  short  description  of  the  incessant 
and  bloodthirsty  irregular  war  that  has  so  long  devastated 
Macedonia  will  have  explained  certain  features  of  the 
population.  Many  visitors  have  expressed  surprise  at  the 
poverty-stricken,  unprogressive,  unintelligent  appearance 
of  the  people,  and  the  poor  use  made  of  the  land.  But  is 
this  not  to  be  expected,  when  for  years  the  peasants  have 
lived  in  a  state  of  uncertainty  and  haunting  terror  ?  One 
feature  of  the  landscape  bears  eloquent  witness  to  the 
age-long  spirit  of  fear  that  has  lain  like  a  cloud  over  Mace- 
donia ;  the  villages  avoid  the  main  roads.  All  the  way 
from  Salonika  to  Banitza,  a  distance  of  some  140  kilometres, 
one  only  passes  through  the  two  towns  of  Yenidje-Vardar 
and  Vodena,  and  no  villages,  though  the  road  skirts  along 
the  edge  of  Vladovo.  The  peasants  have  preferred  to  keep 
out  of  the  publicity  of  the  few  thoroughfares.     Nor  is  it 

2071  £ 


66  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

strange  that  the  peasant  is  reluctant  to  say  what  is  his 
nationality.  Ask  one  of  these  Macedonians  what  he  is.  He 
will,  of  course,  not  tell  a  soldier  of  the  Allies  that  he  is 
a  Bulgar.  Nor  will  he  be  likely  to  say  that  he  is  Serbian  or 
Greek.  He  does  not  know  who  may  overhear  him,  or  what 
might  come  of  such  a  declaration,  should  the  Bulgars  come 
back.  He  will  probably  smile  and  say  that  he  is  Makedonski, 
which  is  a  wise  answer  and  one  that  has  not  yet  been  improved 
upon  by  the  professors  and  journalists  who  have  studied  the 
question.  The  Macedonian  child  must  have  gone  through 
a  bewildering  education  in  Serbian  Macedonia.  Starting 
perhaps  with  being  educated  as  a  Greek  in  a  Patriarchist 
school,  he  then  discovered,  after  the  *  conversion  '  of  his 
father  and  schoolmaster,  that  he  was  a  Bulgar.  Then  came 
the  Serbian  army  and  annexed  the  country,  whereupon  our  lad 
found  that  he  was  a  Serb.  Since  191 5,  no  doubt,  his  village 
has  changed  its  tune  again  and  he  is  a  Bulgar  once  more. 

With  these  sudden  changes,  with  all  the  uncertainty  of 
life  and  property  to  which  he  was  subjected  by  his  Turkish 
masters  and  by  the  Bulgarian,  Serbian,  and  Greek  *  comitadji ' 
bands  before  the  recent  wars,  with  the  futile,  lazy,  and 
corrupt  government  of  the  Turkish  days  and  its  legacy  of 
stagnation,  the  Macedonian  peasant  has  never  had  a  chance. 
The  villages  behind  our  lines  are  now  enjoying  such  a  peace 
as  they  have  not  known  for  years,  though,  of  course,  commerce 
on  an  ambitious  scale  is  impossible  with  the  railway  monopo- 
lized by  the  armies  and  the  sea  threatened  by  submarines. 
We  will  not,  therefore,  dismiss  Macedonia  as  hopeless.  We 
will  rather  look  upon  it  as  a  most  unfortunate  land,  which 
it  is  a  part  of  our  mission  to  endow  with  peace  and  good 
government  when  the  end  of  the  war  shall  bring  a  new  and 
reasonable  arrangement  of  the  Balkan  States. 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  67 

Let  me  conclude  this  survey  by  stating  the  nature  of  the  . 
settlement  made  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  in  1878.    All  the 
trouble  of  the  years  1875-8  began  with  the  rising  in  Bosnia-  ©^^-j     |& 
Hertzegovina.     The  question  of  those  two  provinces  was 
settled  by  handing  them  over  to  Austro-Hungarian  adminis-    r^^ 
tration.     This   was   done  in   spite  of   the   protests   of   the 
Turkish  government,  whose  continued  suzerainty  was,  never- 
theless, guaranteed.     Austria-Hungary  further  acquired  the 
right  to  maintain   troops  and  to  patrol  the  roads  in  the 
Sandjak  of  Novi-Pazar,    The  population  of  Bosnia-Hertze- 
govina    bitterly    resented    this    change    of    masters.      The 
Mohammedans   regretted   the   departure   of   their  Turkish 
co-religionists.     The    Serbs   loathed    the   idea   of   Austro- 
Hungarian    domination,    and    maintained    an    attitude    of 
defiance  sometimes  breaking  out  into  open  rebellion.    The 
only  element  that  welcomed  the  new  regime  was  the  Roman 
Catholic  minority.    But  Count  Andrassy  could  congratulate        .    ^S- 
himself  on  having  successfully  taken  a  long  stride  towards  ^  .  - 

the  coveted  Salonika,  by  thrusting  the  Austro-Hungarian -fw  b^<*^ 
armies  between  Serbia  and  Montenegro,  and  firmly  estab- 
lishing the  imperial  influence  in  the  western  half  of  the 
Balkans ;  Prince  Bismarck  was  glad  to  see  Austria-Hungary 
forgetting  her  exclusion  from  Germany  and  setting  her 
face  towards  the  East,  where  she  would  be  a  useful  agent 
for  German  plans  and  German  kultur ;  while  Mr.  Disraeli 
saw  in  the  Austrian  advance  a  substantial  check  to  Russian 
aggression. 

Lord  Salisbury  afterwards  said  that  at  the  Congress  of 
Berlin  we  had  '  backed  the  wrong  horse  '.  Yet  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  else  we  could  have  shaped  the  broad  lines  of  our 
policy.  Russia  was  an  aggressive  Power,  apparently  bent 
on  challenging  our  Asiatic  interests.    Neither  Germany  nor 

E  2 


68  To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 

Austria-Hungary  had  yet  disclosed  their  later  ambitions 
of  expansion.  It  was  natural  to  curb  Russia  by  means  of 
Austria-Hungary.  The  alternative  was  the  division  of 
European  Turkey  between  the  Balkan  peoples,  but  Bulgaria 
was  an  unknown  quantity  and  suspect  of  being  entirely 
under  Russian  influence.  Neither  Greece,  nor  Serbia  under 
King  Milan,  commanded  the  respect  of  Europe.  Conse- 
quently the  Turk  remained  in  Macedonia,  Albania,  and 
Thrace,  The  one  thing  that  might  have  been  done  at 
Berlin  was  the  provision  of  means  for  enforcing  those  reforms 
in  Macedonia  which  the  Sultan  promised  but  never  carried 
out.  Macedonia  remained  Turkish  and  suffered  all  the 
unrest  and  misery  described  above  for  thirty-four  years. 

Bulgaria  was  reduced  to  the  country  between  the  Danube 
and  the  Balkan  mountains,  including  a  Serbian  population 
in  its  north-western  corner,  and  was  given  a  German  prince, 
Alexander  of  Battenberg,  as  ruler  under  the  suzerainty  of 
Turkey.  The  world  had  not  yet  perceived  the  possible 
dangers  of  flooding  the  Balkans  with  royalties,  chosen  from 
the  inexhaustible  supply  of  German  princely  and  ducal 
families. 

Roumania  received  a  stretch  of  territory  between  the 
Danube  and  the  Black  Sea,  but  without  the  strategic  frontier 
to  the  south,  which  she  demanded  and  for  the  sake  of  which 
she  entered  the  war  against  Bulgaria  in  191 3. 

Montenegro  was  nearly  doubled  in  size  (though  that  is 
not  saying  much),  and  received  a  tiny  strip  of  coast,  but 
without  a  respectable  harbour. 

Lastly,  Count  Andrassy  and  the  diplomatists  granted  to 
Serbia  complete  independence  from  Turkey,  and  the  dis- 
tricts of  Nish,  Pirot,  Lescovatz,  and  Vranya,  which  her 
army  had  occupied.     Serbia  thus  redeemed  a  portion  of 


To  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  69 

her  race  and  injcreased  her  territory  by  50  per  cent.  I  have 
heard  King  Milan  praised  on  this  account  by  Serbs  and 
extolled  as  a  conqueror,  building  the  edifice  of  Serbian 
expansion  and  liberation.  But,  without  prejudice  to  Milan, 
who  was  in  a  most  difficult  position,  we  may  say  that  the 
net  result  of  the  treaty  of  Berlin  was  to  thrust  Serbia  further 
into  the  toils  of  Austrian  hegemony.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  were  now  on  the  Serbian  frontier  from  Roumania 
all  the  way  round  to  Mitrovitza  in  the  Sandjak.  Serbia  saw 
herself  cut  off  from  her  sister  territory  of  Bosnia  and  the 
path^tojhe, Adriatic  in  a  fair  way  to  be  closed  for  ever.  She 
was  later  to  find  her  other  neighbours  Bulgaria  and  Turkey 
sold  to  Vienna.  Serbia  was  in  an  Austro-Hungarian  prison, 
and,  if  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  enlarged  the  area  of  that  prison, 
it  also  strengthened  the  prison-walls,  while  the  exits  were 
bolted  and  barred. 


3 

The  Change  of  Dynasty 

.  .  .  sa  dinastiyom  Karageorgevttcha,  koya  ye  dala  dokaza  da  se  c  ideyama 
i  ocechayinia  ne  dvoyi  od  naroda.  .  .  .    Corfu  Manifesto,  July  29,  1917. 

.  .  .  with  the  dynasty  of  Karageorgevitch,  which  has  shown  that  it 
identifies  itself  with  the  thoughts  and  sentiments  of  the  people  .  .  . 

Since  the  war  began  our  newspapers  have  made  us  famihar 
with  the  phrase  Drang  nach  OsUn,  which  means  the  '  East- 
ward pressure '  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  This 
policy  of  extending  their  influence  across  the  Balkans  and  the 
Turkish  dominions  has  been  of  late  years  the  main  thread  in 
the  complicated  policy  of  the  Central  Empires.  The  Treaty 
of  Berlin  had  brought  Austria-Hungary  well  within  Turkish 
territory,  and  in  the  next  year  she  formed  that  close  alliance 
with  Germany  which  soon  became  the  Triple  Alliance  with 
Italy  as  the  third  partner,  and  which  has  been  the  source  of 
so  much  alarm  and  trouble  in  modern  Europe.  Firmly  based 
on  the  German  alliance,  Austria-Hungary  proceeded  to  work 
her  way  across  the  peninsula  towards  Salonika  and  the 
Aegean  Sea. 

Serbian  patriots  saw  with  despair  that  King  Milan  had  no 
intention  of  opposing  the  Austrian  flood.  He  himself  pro- 
fessed a  5£!^£5L_PP^^^^°^  ^s  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Russia.  He  saw  that  a  struggle  between  these  two  Great 
Powers  must  come  sooner  or  later.  '  In  the  coming  conflict 
between  Germanism  and  Slavism,'  he  said,  in  the  course  of  a 
speech  at  a  'Slava'  on  St.  Nicholas  Day,  1887,  'my  intention 
and  wish  is  that  Serbia  should  be  neutral.'    But  in  view  of 


•|iM   f> 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  yi 

the  continued  aggression  and  intrigue  of  both  her  powerful 
neighbours  this  was  precisely  what  Serbia  could  not  be.  In 
fact,  she  became  the  vassal  of  Austria-Hungary.  In  1881 
Milan  concluded  a  secret  agreement  with  Austria-Hungary, 
by  which  he  renounced  all  pretensions  to  Bosnia-Hertze- 
govina  and  undertook  that  Serbia  should  make  no  treaties 
with  foreign  States  without  Austrian  approval.  In  return  for 
placing  his  country  in  her  enemy's  power  he  received  a 
promise  that  his  dynasty  should  be  maintained  on  the  Serbian 
throne.  The  existence  of  this  private  arrangement,  which  /-  f^ 
was  not  generally  known  till  1893,  explains  the  ultra- Austrian 
attitude  of  King  Milan — he  declared  himself  king  in  1882 — 
during  the  rest  of  his  reign.  When  the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  rose 
in  rebellion  in  1882  the  Serbian  government  made  no  move 
to  support  them,  though  many  individual  Serbs  crossed  the 
frontier  to  help  their  brothers  in  their  desperate  bid  for 
freedom  from  the  Austrians. 

Austria-Hungary  for  the  next  twenty-three  years  treated 
Serbia  as  a  protectorate  of  her  own.  She  spoke  in  Serbia's  ^ 
name  at  international  tariff  conferences ;  she  hindered  the  ^ 
construction  of  the  railway  between  Serbia  and  Salonika  so 
as  to  direct  almost  the  whole  of  Serbia's  trade  to  her  own 
territories ;  she  re-exported  Serbian  goods  in  her  own  name 
so  that  the  origin  of  Serbia's  few  products  was  unknown  to 
Europe  ;  she  imposed  customs  on  Serbian  commerce  at  the 
Iron  Gates  of  the  Danube,  although  one  bank  of  the  river  is 
there  Serbian  ;  while  communication  between  Serbia  and 
Bosnia  was  methodically  and  meticulously  suppressed.  Serbia 
had  only  escaped  from  the  Turkish  economic  system  to  be 
swallowed  in  the  Austrian,  and  the  exchange  was  not  even 
commercially  beneficial.  From  1864  to  1884  Serbia's 
commerce  grew  in   aggregate  from   33,000,000  francs   to 


72  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

90,000,000  francs.  In  the  next  twenty  years,  1884  to  1904, 
which  we  may  take  as  roughly  the  period  of  subjection  to 
Austria-Hungary,  her  commerce  only  rose  from  90,000,000 
francs  to  127,000,000  francs.-^ 

King  Milan  even  allowed  himself  to  be  pushed  into  war 
with  Bulgaria  by  his  Austrian  masters,  thus  thoroughly 
alienating  the  sympathy  of  the  Bulgars  from  his  own  king- 
dom. In  1885  the  inhabitants  of  Eastern  Roumelia,  which 
was  still  a  Turkish  province,  suddenly  proclaimed  themselves 
Bulgarian  subjects,  and  their  adherence  was  accepted  by 
Prince  Alexander.  Milan  thereupon  denounced  the  Bul- 
garian government  for  tearing  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  He 
then  inaugurated  what  has  lately  been  the  common  Balka 
practice  of  demanding  territorial  compensations ;  and  before 
we  condemn  him  for  foolish  jealousy,  we  should  remember 
that  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  had  cruelly  limited  the  boundaries 
of  Serbia,  excluding  from  her  the  Serbs  both  of  Old  Serbia 
and  of  western  Bulgaria.  What  we  may  fairly  condemn  was 
the  foolhardiness  of  entering  on  a  military  adventure  with  an 
incompetently-led  and  unprepared  army. 

On  November  13  Milan  declared  war,  and  next  day  the 
Serbian  army  advanced  along  the  direct  route  to  Sofia.  The 
Bulgars  found  themselves  in  a  most  embarrassing  situation. 
Their  troops  were  for  the  most  part  along  the  Roumelian 
frontier  prepared  to  meet  a  Turkish  attack.  They  had  to  be 
hurried  across  to  the  defence  of  the  capital.  But  all  the 
senior  officers  of  the  newly  formed  Bulgarian  army  had  been 
lent  by  Russia,  and  the  Emperor  xAlexander,  resenting  Bul- 
garia's independence  in  absorbing  Eastern  Roumelia,  now 
withdrew  them  all.  Bulgaria  was  left  without  an  officer 
above  the  rank  of  captain.     The  army,  however,  was  ably 

^  Stojanovitch,  p.  139. 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  73 

prepared  for  action  by  the  junior  officers  and  sergeants,  met 
the  Serbs  on  November  i8  at  Slivnitza,  and  was  completely 
victorious.  Pressing  their  advantage  the  Bulgars  advanced 
into  Serbia,  and  on  November  26  appeared  before  Pirot  which 
they  occupied  next  day.  Milan  asked  for  an  armistice,  which 
was  refused,  and  the  Bulgars  were  marching  on  Nish  when 
Baron  Khevenhuller,  the  Austro-Hungarian  minister,  who 
had  urged  Milan  to  make  war,  hastily  arrived  at  Pirot,  and  in 
the  name  of  his  government  insisted  on  the  conclusion  of  an 
armistice  preparatory  to  peace.  Bulgaria  had  no  choice  but 
to  agree,  and  a  peace  was  made  in  the  following  March  which 
left  the  two  States  as  they  had  been.  The  peacemaker, 
Khevenhuller,  however,  discovered  that  he  had  been  pre- 
mature ;  Austria-Hungary  would  in  fact  have  had  no  ob- 
jection to  sending  troops  into  Serbia — nominally  to  support 
her,  but  actually  to  become  her  permanent  protector — and 
the  Baron  was  for  a  long  while  disgraced  as  a  result  of  his 
too  speedy  intervention. 

Serbia  had  received  a  nasty  blow.  Her  military  reputation 
sank  very  low  and  her  debt  mounted  high.  Yet  it  is  not  fair 
to  lay  this  failure  to  the  account  of  the  people.  They  had 
had  little  enthusiasm  for  the  war,  and  no  confidence  in  their 
leaders,  who  were  rather  the  king's  political  supporters  than 
military  experts.  During  the  armistice  Milan  himself  spoke 
of  abdicating,  a  suggestion  which  was  generally  welcomed 
by  public  opinion  ;  but  the  solace  which  he  received  from 
Austria-Hungary  soon  restored  his  self-confidence,  and  he 
would  have  reopened  hostilities  had  not  the  Skupshtina 
insisted  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

Although  the  constitution  which  Milan  gave  to  Serbia  in 
1888  was  a  great  advance  in  democracy,  and  made  the  minis- 
ters for  the  first  time  really  responsible  to  the  Skupshtina, 


74  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

the  last  years  of  his  reign  were  a  record  of  futility  and 
folly.  His  wife,  the  beautiful  Queen  Natalie,  was  Russian, 
and  naturally  opposed  to  her  husband's  Austrian  connexion. 

fShe  also  very  naturally  resented  the  continual  intrigues  and 
scandals  that  destroyed  the  family  life  of  the  palace.  This 
domestic  discord  had  its  evil  effect  in  the  country  and  dis- 
credited the  nation  abroad.  Serbia  was  a  remote  and  undis- 
covered corner  of  the  Balkans.  All  that  the  ordinary  west 
European  public  knew  of  her  was  the  unsavoury  character  of 
her  ruler,  who  dragged  his  country's  good  name  through  the 
dirt  of  fashionable  watering-places  and  the  doubtful  quarters 
of  the  European  capitals.  So  that,  when  in  1889  Milan 
really  did  abdicate,  his  departure  was  greeted  with  a  sigh  of 
relief,  despite  the  lingering  affection  of  some  of  his  subjects 
for  their  genial  monarch. 

His  son,  Alexander,  succeeded  to  the  throne  at  the  age  of 
thirteen.  It  was  a  difficult  position  for  the  unfortunate  boy. 
The  only  son  of  his  father,  without  near  relatives,  he  was  the 
last  hope  of  the  house  of  Obrenovitch.  His  childhood  had 
been  spent  amongst  the  storms  of  domestic  and  political  strife. 
His  boyhood  was  now  devoted  to  excessive  study  under  the 
guidance  of  M.  Ristitch  and  other  counsellors.  The  pressure 
of  over-work,  combined  with  the  gloomy  atmosphere  of 
suspicion  and  intrigue  with  which  he  was  surrounded,  pro- 
bably retarded  his  mental  development  and  narrowed  his 
sympathies.  Alexander  grew  up  heavy,  silent,  melancholy, 
without  friends,  a  lonely  and  very  pitiful  figure.  Suspecting 
plots  on  all  sides  and  seeing  nothing  but  selfish  factions  in  the 
new  democratic  regime^  he  naturally  turned  for  protection  to 
his  parents.  Milan  and  Natalie  had  separated,  but  neither 
had  completely  severed  their  connexion  with  Serbia,  where 
Milan  was  still  nominally  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 


The  Change  of  Dynasty 


75 


\b^l 


army.  They  used  to  visit  Belgrade  alternately  for  some  years 
until  they  both  agreed  to  leave  the  country  and  allow  their 
son  to  work  out  his  own  destiny. 

The  young  prince  began  by  declaring  himself  of  age  in 
1893  and  arresting  his  ministers  one  night  when  they  were  j. 

dining  with  him.  He  followed  this  up  by  annulling  the  new  ^"^ 
constitution  and  entering  on  a  royalist  and  Austnan  course 
of  policy.  In  1897  King  Milan  returned  to  Serbia  and  added 
his  disturbing  presence  to  the  many  warring  elements  already 
there.  Into  such  confusion  had  the  affairs  of  the  country 
drifted  that  the  Serbs  even  tolerated  the  very  imprudent  step 
which  Alexander  took  in  1900.  Having  gone  to  see  his 
mother  at  Biarritz,  he  fell  madly  in  love  with  Draga  Mashin, 
one  of  the  late  queen's  ladies-in-waiting.  The  fact  that 
Madame  Mashin  was  the  divorced  wife  of  a  Serbian  officer 
by  no  means  exhausted  the  seamier  side  of  her  past  life. 
Also  she  was  considerably  older  than  the  king.  A  marriage 
with  a  person  of  such  character  was  vigorously  opposed  by 
Alexander's  parents,  his  ministers,  and  his  friends,  who 
declared  further  that  Draga  was  incapable  of  bearing  a  child, 
a  vital  necessity  to  the  Obrenovitch  dynasty.  Such  opposi- 
tion only  strengthened  Alexander's  determination,  and  at 
first  the  marriage  had  the  happy  result  that  the  new  queen 
absolutely  forbade  her  husband's  father  to  re-enter  Serbia. 
But  Draga  was  soon  seen  to  be  no  saviour  of  her  country. 
She  irritated  the  army  by  the  favours  she  procured  for  her 
two  young  brothers,  the  country  by  the  Austrian  intrigues 
in  which  she  took  part.  The  strict  censorship  of  the  press, 
the  reactionary  policy  of  the  government,  the  serious  con- 
dition of  the  national  finances  combined  to  disgust  the  Serbs 
with  their  king.  The  students  of  Belgrade  rioted  and 
demonstrated  ;    but  there  was  no  movement  of  a  national 


\]^ 


76  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

character.  The  crash  came  suddenly  in  June  1903  when  the 
famous  double  murder  of  Alexander  and  Draga  by  a  clique 
of  officers  ended  the  dishonoured  and  unpopular  dynasty. 

The  story  of  that  night  of  the  loth  of  June  is  a  sickening  bit 
of  mediaeval  barbarity.  The  gang  of  officers  secured  control 
of  the  palace  and  proceeded  to  search  for  the  doomed  couple. 
The  darkness,  their  own  drunken  excitement,  and  the  efforts 
of  one  or  two  loyal  officers  prolonged  the  hunt.  Finally  the 
.j^jP  king  and  queen  were  discovered  in  a  little  dressing-room  with 
\  \*r  ^  hidden  door.  They  were  retiring  for  the  night  when  their 
enemies  burst  in  on  them.  Alexander  threw  himself  before 
his  wife  and  was  riddled  with  bullets.  The  conspirators  then 
murdered  Draga  and  proceeded  to  mutilate  the  bodies.  The 
queen's  two  brothers  were  also  killed,  and  some  of  the  court 
officials  who  were  committed  to  the  cause  of  the  late  king. 

All  had  happened  suddenly  and  the  nation  was  faced  with 
a  fait  accompli.    In  the  Balkans  violent  and  brutal  methods 
.  do  not  outrage  public  opinion  to  the  same  extent  as  they 

i!r  would  do  in  Western  Europe,    The  Serbs  felt  that  what  had 

been  done  had  been  done,  and,  however  it  had  happened, 
they  were  well  rid  of  the  Obrenovitch.  Events  also  continued 
to  move  rapidly.  Eight  days  after  the  murder  Prince  Peter 
Karageorgevitch,  son  of  Prince  Alexander  (1842-58),  had 
been  fetched  from  his  retirement  at  Geneva.  Already  on 
June  15  he  was  proclaimed  king  by  the  unanimous  vote  of 
the  national  assembly.  Before  an  awkward  crisis  had  time  to 
develop,  or  Austria-Hungary  could  see  an  opportunity  to 
intervene,  King  Peter  was  installed,  to  the  great  relief  of  the 
nation.  It  was  felt  that  the  period  of  vassalage  to  Vienna  was 
finished.  It  was  hoped  that  the  bad  days  of  faction,  intrigue, 
and  personal  monarchy  had  also  come  to  an  end.  Miss 
Durham  passed  through  Serbia  in  the  following  December 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  77 

and  records  how  a  peasant  in  the  train  said  to  her,  *  Now  we 
have  a  king  who  is  as  good  as  yours,  and  Serbia  will  have  her 
own  again  \^ 

The  new  king  had  had  more  than  his  share  of  exile.    Forty-    ^t-^Uf^ 
five  years  before  he  had  left  Serbia  after  the  revolution  which    *^  *        j 
had  dethroned  his  father.    Unlike  the  previous  princely  exiles     rrcWA 
he  had  found  a  home  and  a  career  in  France,  and  with  him    .  .  >^  ^^^^^ 
French   influence   and    culture    entered    Serbia.      He    had 
followed  the  profession  of  arms,  passed  through  the  military 
school  of  St.  Cyr,  and  fought  as  a  lieutenant  of  the  French 
army  through  the  Franco-Prussian  War  in  which  he  was 
wounded  and  decorated.    He  had  also  fought  for  the  national 
cause  in  the  Bosnian  insurrection  of  1876.    Though  a  soldier 
by  training  and  inclination  he  had  also  used  his  time  to  study 
the  thought  and  institutions  of  Europe,  and  was  the  author 
of  a  Serbian  translation  of  Mill's  '  Treatise  on  Liberty  '. 

He  was  now  over  sixty  years  of  age,  and  before  him  lay  a 
task  which  might  well  have  given  pause  to  a  man  in  the  prime 
of  life.  On  the  one  hand,  Serbia  needed  a  firm  yet  liberal 
government,  which  should  raise  her  from  the  degradation 
into  which  she  had  fallen  and  restore  her  self-confidence.  On 
the  other,  all  this  must  be  done  without  giving  any  provoca- 
tion, real  or  imaginary,  to  Austria-Hungary,  who  would 
certainly  view  with  disfavour  a  Serbian  resurrection. 

The  difficulties  of  his  position  as  a  reformer  were  numerous 
and  formidable.  In  the  first  place,  the  finances  of  the  kingdom 
were  in  a  desperate  condition.  From  his  predecessor,  Peter  ^^l^ 
inherited  a  debt  of  450,000,000  francs.  The  interest  on  the 
debt  alone  swallowed  a  quarter  of  the  annual  budget.  The 
currency  had  been  depreciated  by  25  per  cent.  Also  the  public 
services  were  disorganized  and  corrupt,  owing  to  the  system 

*  Durham,  p.  in. 


vN- 


78  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

^^"'^      of  court  favour  which  had  obtained  for  the  past  tliirty  years. 
\  Some  of  the  best  servants  of  the  State  had  retired  from  public 

life  in  disgust  at  the  crime  by  which  the  revolution  had  been 
eifected.  The  partisans  of  the  late  dynasty,  though  without 
any  pretender  to  whom  they  could  offer  their  support, 
naturally  looked  with  disfavour  on  the  present  occupant  of 
the  throne.  More  serious  still  were  the  conflicts  between  the 
parliamentary  leaders,  who  were  the  lawful  government  of 
j^  the  country,  and  the  military  clique,  who  had  brought  back 
^  King  Peter  and  to  whom  he  was  to  some  unknown  extent 
committed.  Thirdly,  the  new  reign  opened  under  the  cloud 
of  European  disapprobation.  The  follies  of  Milan  had 
earned  contempt  for  Serbia  on  all  sides,  a  feeling  which 
changed  to  horror,  as  the  Austro-Hungarian  press  exploited 
the  murder  to  discredit  the  whole  nation.  It  must  at  that 
time  have  taken  some  courage  to  confess  oneself  a  Serb  in 
foreign  countries.  The  officers  of  the  Italian  army  returned 
their  Serbian  decorations.  Great  Britain  withdrew  her 
minister  and  insisted,  as  a  preliminary  to  reopening  relations, 
that  all  the  officers  concerned  in  the  regicide  plot  should  be 
cashiered.  This  was  done  in  time,  though  the  king  had  to 
provide  the  officers  in  question  with  other  posts,  until  the  call 
of  active  service  brought  them  back  to  the  army  again.  That 
nothing  should  be  lacking  to  the  general  display  of  outraged 
morality,  even  the  Sultan  Abdul  Hamid,  his  hands  red  with 
the  blood  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Armenians  and  other 
victims,  even  he  lectured  the  Serbs  in  exalted  phrases  on  the 
undesirability  of  assassination. 

If  the  spectacle  of  the  last  autocrat  of  Turkey  playing  the 
part  of  moral  preceptor  rouses  our  sense  of  the  ridiculous,  and 
although  it  is  easy  for  the  Serbs  to  retaliate  on  Europe  by 
pointing  out  the  violent  ends  which  many  rulers  have  met  in 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  79 

western  countries,  we  cannot  fail  to  endorse  the  general  and 
emphatic  condemnation  of  the  crime  of  June  10.  Western 
Europe  does  not  hold  up  its  mediaeval  past  as  offering 
models  of  how  changes  of  government  should  be  made.  On 
behalf  of  Serbia  it  should  be  remembered  that  she  is  but  now 
emerging  from  that  mediaeval  condition  in  which  murder 
sometimes  seemed  theonly  way  out  of  an  impossible  situation. 
The  virtues  of  homely  kindliness,  geniality,  generosity,  and 
heroic  courage  in  adversity  display  another  side  of  the  primi- 
tive character  of  the  Serbs,  who,  as  a  whole,  knew  nothing  of 
the  murder  till  it  was  accomplished.  Nevertheless,  though  we 
admit  that  our  own  annals  are  stained  with  gory  pages,  and 
though  we  may  make  every  allowance  for  a  younger  people, 
we  must,  for  their  own  sakes,  earnestly  hope  that  in  the  future 
any  individuals  or  parties  amongst  the  Serbs  who  seek  to  gain 
power  by  the  methods  of  the  assassin  will  be  punished  with 
extreme  severity.  Serbia  has  won  the  hearts  of  all  the  Allies 
(and  even  of  some  of  her  enemies)  ^  by  her  gallantry.  In  the 
years  after  the  war  her  best  asset  will  be  the  assurance  that 
the  firm  government  of  King  Peter  and  the  present  prince- 
regent  have  established  the  tradition  in  Serbian  public 
life  that  private  interest  shall  not  poison  the  wells  of 
loyalty  and  patriotism  upon  which  the  health  of  the  nation 
depends. 

To  return  to  King  Peter's  difficulties.  Under  the  mani- 
fold shortcomings  of  their  late  government  the  Serbs  had 
seemed  like  a  nation  asleep.     Industrial  development  had 

^  e.g.  extract  from  the  Vossische  Zeiiung,  January  5,  1916,  2^  Livre 
bleu  serbe,  p.  22  :  '  They  [the  Serbian  peasants]  are  naturally  good  men, 
untempted  by  any  evil  thought.  We  must  abandon  the  stupid  yarns 
which  in  our  country  depict  Serbia  as  a  land  of  highwaymen,  assassins, 
bugs,  and  fleas  .  . . ' 


8o  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

hardly  begun  and  was  in  the  hands  of  foreigners.  The 
German  economist,  Fischer,  writing  in  1893,  despaired  of 
Serbian  agriculture,  which  was  still  in  a  rudimentary  state, 
while  the  peasants  devoted  a  quarter  of  their  time  to  singing, 
dancing,  and  church  festivals.  Only  one-seventh  of  the  land 
was  under  cultivation,  and  the  growth  of  small  properties  from 
which  the  zadruga  had  disappeared  had  resulted  in  placing 
many  of  the  farmers  in  the  hands  of  money-lenders.  With  a 
dull  indifference  the  people  saw  lands  which  were  historically 
theirs  invaded  by  alien  races.  Supported  by  Austrian  en- 
couragement the  Albanians  were  increasing  in  Old  Serbia  ; 
the  Bulgars  dominated  the  Macedonian  country-side  ;  the 
Magyars  and  Germans  exploited  the  Serbs  of  Bosnia  and 
southern  Hungary.  Despised  abroad  and  without  a  vigorous 
life  at  home  Serbia  seemed  unfitted  to  survive.  To  Austria- 
Hungary,  at  any  rate,  she  appeared  like  a  ripe  apple  about  to 
drop  into  the  hands  that  were  waiting  to  receive  her.  A  more 
than  usually  violent  disturbance  at  Belgrade,  an  insult,  real 
or  pretended,  offered  to  an  Austro-Hungarian  minister, 
and  the  imperial  and  royal  army  would  cross  the  frontier 
to  bring  Serbia  the  benefits  of  the  civilization  which  it  had 
established  already  in  Bosnia. 

But  the  world's  history  is  a  record  of  the  unexpected. 
To  the  surprise  of  all  observers,  Serbia,  under  King  Peter, 
made  a  wonderful  recovery.  The  government  was  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  Radical  party,  and  the  sovereign  strictly 
adhered  to  his  role  of  constitutional  ruler.  By  degrees  the 
chaos  of  interests  that  at  first  surrounded  the  throne  was 
reduced  to  order.  Sound  finance  and  the  expanding 
economic  life  of  the  nation  enabled  the  State  to  have 
30,000,000  francs  in  hand  by  1909.  The  reform  of  the  army 
and  of  the  state  monopolies  was    begun.      The  country's 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  8i 

mineral  wealth  began  to  attract  foreign  capital.  And  the 
high  school  of  Belgrade,  with  its  406  students  in  1900,  had 
become  by  191 1  a  university  with  1,100  members. 

The  critical  moment,  when  a  new  departure  in  national  , 

policy  was  made,  occurred  in  1905.    In  order  to  break  the    fTftM'-  t^''' 
barriers  of  Austro-Hungarian  control  the  Serbian  govern-  A'"^ 

ment  in  that  year  opened  negotiations  with  Bulgaria  with  '-^^ 

a  view  to  a  commercial  treaty,  by  which  the  tariff  duties 
between  the  two  States  should  be  abolished.  Serbia  and 
Bulgaria  would  thus  form  a  single  extended  market,  to  the 
great  benefit  of  merchants  and  importers  in  both  countries. 
But  Austria-Hungary  looked  with  disfavour  on  any  approach 
to  co-operation  amongst  the  Balkan  States.  It  was  her 
policy  to  keep  them  apart,  and  she  had  no  intention  of  allow- 
ing Serbia  to  develop  an  independent  economic  life.  As  her 
commercial  treaty  with  Serbia  was  drawing  to  a  close,  she 
threatened  not  to  continue  it  unless  the  proposed  agreement 
with  Bulgaria  were  cancelled.  Soon  after  she  also  insisted 
that  the  order  for  guns,  which  the  Serbian  government  had 
placed  with  the  French  arsenal  of  Creusot,  should  also  be 
cancelled,  and  the  contracts  for  artillery  and  railway  material 
given  to  Austrian  firms.  The  situation  was  a  serious  one  for 
the  Serbian  cabinet.  The  Austro-Hungarian  commercial 
treaty  was  the  foundation  of  Serbia's  foreign  trade.  Nearly 
90  per  cenj:.  of  her  exports  went  to  the  Dual  Monarchy.  If 
it  were  not  continued  and  if  the  frontier  were  closed  to  Serbian 
products,  ruin  might  follow.  But  the  Serbian  government 
were  determined  to  make  a  bid  for  freedom.  Despite  the 
presence  of  troops  massed  along  the  frontier,  it  refused  to 
agree  to  Austria-Hungary's  demands.  Then  between  the 
great  Central  Empire  and  her  little  neighbour  began  the 
strenuous  tariff  struggle  called  the  '  Pig-War  ',  after  Serbia's 

2071  p 


82  The  Change  of  Dy^iasty 

chief   article   of   export.      For   more   than   two   years   the 
^'^  frontier  was  closed,  and,  seeing  that  the  Bulgarian  Treaty 

had  fallen  through,  Austria-Hungary  was  at  first  confident 
that  her  presumptuous  opponent  would  be  obliged  to  sue 
for  terms.    But  the  Serbian  Minister  of  Commerce,M.  Sto- 
janovitch,  supported  by  his  colleagues,  by  the  Skupshtina, 
and  by  the  whole  people,  who  showed  a  rare  practical  intelli- 
gence, was  able  to  defeat  these  hopes  by  deflecting  Serbian  , 
exports  into  new  channels.     The  cereals  were  sent  down 
the  Danube,  the  live  stock  and  meat  by  the  railway  through 
Turkey   to   Salonika.     Reductions   in   the   railway-freights 
enabled  Serbian  commerce  to  reach  new  markets  in  Germany, 
Belgium,  Italy,  France,  and  Egypt.     At  the  close  of  1906 
;^.s*"  the  revenue  from  customs  had  hardly  fallen,  and  Serbia  had 
-^^^''"^         found  customers  who  offered  better  terms  than  she  had  ever 
^  enjoyed  before. 

Meanwhile,  the  French  guns  were  ordered  and  French 
''     ^       companies    undertook    the    Serbian    railway    construction. 
The  only  persons  who  had  been  badly  hit  by  the  '  Pig-War  ' 
were  the  consumers  of  Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth,  no  longer 
able  to  purchase  their  Serbian  bacon.     Though  the  Hun- 
garian  agriculturists  were  not  sorry  to  see  a  redoubtable 
competitor  excluded  from  their  country,  the  general  public 
of  the  empire  did  not  hide  its  resentment.     In  the  end  it 
J    sV      was  Austria-Hungary  who  asked  for  economic  peace,  and 
,  ^  in  1910,  for  the  first  time,  she  signed  a  treaty  of  commerce 

with  Serbia  on  terms  of  equality. 

Serbia  had  achieved  a  notable  triumph.  Whereas  a  few 
years  before  she  had  seemed  on  the  point  of  dissolution, 
she  had  now  carried  a  struggle  against  overwhelming  odds 
to  a  successful  issue.  But  her  statesmen  knew  that  her 
position  was  none  too  sure,  none  too  satisfactory.     The 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  83 

exports  that  followed  the  line  of  the  Danube  had  to  perform 
a  long  journey  to  reach  the  markets  of  North-Western  Europe. 
The  live  stock  on  its  southern  journey  had  to  pass  through 
a  country  of  insanitary  conditions  and  '  comitadji '  activity, 
to  be  embarked  at  Salonika,  a  port  unsuited  to  such  traffic, 
and  then  to  voyage  round  Greece  to  its  final  destinations. 
The  Italo-Turkish  War  of  191 1  had  the  effect  of  stopping 
almost  completely  the  Serbian  sea-borne  trade.  Meanvi^hile, 
Austria-Hungary  was  using  every  means  to  prevent  the 
opening  of  a  railway  between  the  Danube  and  the  Adriatic 
(the  compensation  promised  to  Serbia  at  the  time  of  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  in  1908),  and  vigorously 
pursuing  her  policy  of  isolating  Serbia  from  possible  allies. 
Despite  increasing  prosperity  and  restored  national  confi- 
dence Serbian  statesmen  were  obliged  to  turn  their  thoughts 
to  some  permanent  method  of  assuring  national  indepen- 
dence and  security  from  the  attack  that  was  ever  threatening 
on  the  northern  frontier.  Above  all,  their  desire  was  for  p^.^^ 
a  strip  of  sea-coast,  that '  window  looking  on  to  the  Adriatic  '  f?^u-w#^ 
which  should  throw  the  world  open  to  their  countrymen  ;  (j 

and  also  for  the  increase  of  their  resources  in  wealth  and 
population  by  the  dehverance  of  the  Serbs  who  still  remained 
in  Turkey.  For  these  ends  they  were  glad  soon  after  to 
enter  the  league  of  the  Balkan  States. 

But  besides  turning  their  eyes  longingly  to  possible  future    '^Un'<r^ 
expansion,  the  patriots  of  Serbia  set  themselves  to  the  work  -' 

iof  national  regeneration  within.  The  lack  of  internal 
history  between  1903  and  1913  is  a  proof  of  the  steady  and 
quiet  work  that  was  being  achieved.  The  king  himself, 
by  his  tact,  modesty,  and  unimpeachably  constitutional 
behaviour,  set  the  example  of  withdrawing  Serbia  from  the 
painful  publicity  of  the  European  limelight  in  which'  she 

F  2 


84  The  Change  of  Dynasty 

had  previously  figured  to  her  own  discredit.  The  need  for 
national  unity,  preparedness,  and  education  called  into 
existence  a  society  named  the  '  Narodna  Odbrana  '  (National 
Defence),  which  was  but  the  most  conspicuous  of  several 
patriotic  associations  aiming  by  instruction,  sports,  and 
gymnastic  exercises  at  the  general  improvement  of  the  people. 
The  '  Narodna  Odbrana  '  had,  as  its  special  objects,  the 
equipping  and  training  of  volunteers  for  military  service  in 
support  of  the  regular  army,  and  the  awakening  of  national 
consciousness  by  any  available  means.  It  is  pretty  certain  that 
the  society  carried  on  propaganda  among  the  Serbs  beyond 
the  Bosnian  frontier,  an  activity  which  was  brought  to  an  end 
officially  by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  to  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Empire.  Serbia  saw  at  the  time  of  that 
crisis  that  she  could  not  hope  to  fight  on  behalf  of  the 
annexed  provinces  with  any  chance  of  success.  She  promised, 
therefore,  so  to  direct  her  policy  as  to  live  on  terms  of  friend- 
ship with  Austria-Hungary.  The  '  Narodna  Odbrana  ' 
came  to  an  end,  but  was  succeeded  by  another  society  called 
'  The  New  Narodna  Odbrana  ',  whose  task  was  to  co- 
ordinate the  existing  associations  on  a  wholly  private  and 
unofficial  basis.  The  new  society  avowedly  aimed  at 
preparing  the  Serbs  to  resist  a  second  blow  like  the  annexa- 
tion of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  such  as  an  Austrian  advance 
into  Macedonia  or  Old  Serbia.  A  pamphlet  describing  the 
society's  work  contained  the  following  passage  :  '  It  is  an 
error  to  assert  that  Kossovo  is  past  and  gone.  We  find 
ourselves  in  the  midst  of  Kossovo.  Our  Kossovo  of  to-day 
is  the  gloom  and  ignorance  in  which  our  people  live.  The 
other  causes  of  the  new  Kossovo  live  on  the  frontiers  to  the 
North  and  West :  the  Germans,  Austrians,  and  "  Schwabas ", 
with  their  onward  pressure  against  our  Serbian  and  Slavonic 


The  Change  of  Dynasty  85 

South.'  ^  The  New  Narodna  Odbrana  was  not  a  secret  society, 
nor  was  it  an  official  organization  enjoying  State  assistance 
or  recognition.  It  did  not  aim  at  offensive  action  over  the 
frontier,  though  doubtless  some  of  its  members  carried  on 
anti-Austrian  intrigues  with  the  Serbs  of  the  empire.  Its 
purpose  was  defensive,  to  prepare  the  people  for  a  combat 
which  seemed  certain  to  be  thrust  upon  them. 

The  reason  why  such  a  clash  appeared  inevitable  was  that 
Serbia  had  begun  to  assume  a  second  aspect  besides  that  of 
internal  recovery.  The  rising  prestige  of  the  kingdom, 
combined  with  the  disaffection  among  the  Southern  Slavs 
of  Austria-Hungary,  caused  her  to  become  the  natural 
centre  and  focus  of  Slav  national  feeling  in  all  the  neigh- 
bouring provinces.  What  Piedmont  had  been  to  Italy, 
it  was  hoped  that  Serbia  would  be  to  a  future  Yugoslavia. 
We  must,  therefore,  leave  the  course  of  events  in  Serbia 
to  consider  the  growth  of  a  wider  m.ovement  beyond  her 
frontiers,  a  movement  in  which  she  had  at  first  little  or  no 
part,  but  into  which  she  drifted  by  reason  of  her  character 
as  the  home  of  independence  in  the  midst  of  the  divided  and 
helpless  portions  of  the  Southern  Slav  race. 

1  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  478,  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book, 
Appendix  2. 


Yugoslavia 

Bcz  slogc  neina  slobode. 

'  Without  union  there  is  no  liberty.' 

During  the  first  decade  of  the  twentieth  century  it  became 
clear  that  the  various  sections  of  the  Southern  Slav  race 
in  the  Habsburg  Empire  had  begun  once  more  to  aspire  to 
that  unity  which  they  had  never  possessed,  but  for  which 
they  had  made  occasional  efforts.  Napoleon  united  a  large 
portion  of  the  race  in  his  short-lived  Illyria.  Towards  the 
middle  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  language-reforms 
of  the  Serb  Karadjitch,  the  Croat  Gai,  and  the  Slovene  Vraz, 
drew  the  three  families  of  Slavs  into  a  common  intellectual 
and  spiritual  life.  Bishop  Strossmayer,  by  his  nobility  of 
character,  his  brilliant  intellectual  gifts,  his  wide  sympathies, 
and  his  powerful  influence,  towered  above  the  differences 
that  kept  the  Southern  Slavs  apart.  His  foundation  of  the 
Yugoslav  Academy  at  Zagreb  in  1867  and  of  Zagreb  Univer- 
sity in  1874  provided  a  centre  for  the  dissemination  of 
unionist  ideas,  even  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy  becoming 
champions  of  co-operation  with  the  Orthodox  Serbs. 

In  1848,  when  the  Hungarians  rose  in  rebellion  against 
the  Austrian  emperor,  the  Southern  Slavs  threw  in  their 
lot  with  the  Habsburg  monarchy,  to  which  they  trusted 
for  deliverance  from  Buda-Pesth.  The  Croats  and  the  Serbs 
of  southern  Hungary  fought  together  for  a  common  Slavonic 
ideal,  and  it  was  the  Orthodox  Patriarch  of  Karlovtzi  who 


Yugoslavia  87 

solemnly  installed  the  Ban  of  Croatia  and  embraced  him 
before  the  enthusiastic  multitude.  In  all  this  there  was  no 
serious  thought  of  separation  from  Austria.  Centuries 
of  war  against  the  Moslems  in  the  service  of  the  emperor 
had  bred  a  traditional  devotion  to  the  House  of  Habsburg 
amongst  the  Southern  Slavs.  It  was  against  the  Magyar 
upstarts  that  their  resentment  was  kindled.  What  they 
hoped  for  was  freedom  and  union  under  the  emperor.  But 
the  reign  of  Franz  Joseph  brought  them  nothing  but 
disappointment  and  betrayal.  No  sooner  had  the  monarchy 
crushed  the  Magyars  with  the  help  of  the  Serbo-Croats  than 
reaction  to  a  centralized  bureaucratic  system  followed. 
The  special  privileges  of  the  triune  kingdom  of  Croatia, 
Slavpnia,  and  Dalmatia  were  abolished  in  1850.  Worse 
followed  in  1867,  when  the  monarchy  took  its  modern  dual 
form  of  Austria-Hungary.  The  Southern  Slavs  were  now 
divided,  the  Dalmatians  and  the  Slovenes  forming  Austria's 
share  and  the  rest  going  to  Hungary.  Croatia  and  Slavonia 
received  Home  Rule  with  a  parliament  of  their  own,  subor- 
dinate to  that  of  Buda-Pesth,  but  the  Ban  or  governor  is 
appointed  by  the  Hungarian  government,  and  Riyeka 
(Fiume),  the  great  Croatian  port,  has  been  formed  into 
a  separate  unit  under  another  official  of  the  Magyars.  The 
last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  witnessed  a  certain 
reaction  against  Southern  Slav  unity.  In  Dalmatia  the 
Slavs  received  better  treatment  after  Austria  had  lost  her 
Italian  possessions.  Serbia  was  disunited  and  discredited, 
while  in  the  centre  of  '  Yugoslavia  '  Bosnia  and  Hertzegovina 
lay  prostrate  under  the  draconian  rule  of  their  governor, 
Kalay. 

It  was  the  Hungarian  treatment  of  Croatia  that  chiefly 
caused  the  revival  of  the  Southern  Slav  movement.    While 


88  Ytigoslavia 

the  aristocratic  caste  that  governs  Hungary  continued  to 
pose  before  Europe  as  the  champions  of  national  liberty, 
it  proceeded  systematically  to  violate  the  privileges  of  the 
Croats  by  imposing  the  Magyar  language  upon  them 
wherever  possible.  The  system  of  Hungarian  railways  was 
so  arranged  as  completely  to  cut  off  direct  communication 
between  Dalmatia  or  Bosnia  and  Croatia,  Dalmatia,  in 
this  respect,  is  indeed  worse  oE  than  in  the  Middle  Ages, 
for  the  old  trade-routes  have  long  fallen  into  disuse  and  no 
others  have  taken  their  places.  Freights  were  juggled  so 
as  to  make  it  cheaper  to  transport  goods  from  Buda-Pesth  to 
Riyeka  than  from  Croatian  towns  to  the  same  port.  In 
general  the  policy  of  successive  Hungarian  governments  has 
been  to  aim  at  the  suppression  of  Croat  and  Serbian,  as  well 
as  Roumanian  and  Slovak,  nationality,  and  artificially  to 
create  a  single  unitary  Magyar  state  and  people. 

It  is  remarkable  that  in  their  struggle  against  Buda-Pesth 
the  Southern  Slavs  should  not  have  received  any  support 
from  the  emperor,  whose  throne  they  had  helped  to  save  in 
1848  and  to  whose  army  they  have  for  centuries  contributed 
some  of  the  bravest  and  most  trustworthy  troops.  But  Franz 
Joseph,  the  incarnation  of  the  Habsburg  tradition,  lived  in 
y  a  closed  circle  of  ideas,  out  of  which  nothing  but  dire  neces- 
*  sity  could  draw  him.  Amongst  these  ideas  three  principal 
I  traditions  stand  out  prominently.  First,  the  imperial  family 
tradition,  implying  the  divine  right  of  the  Habsburgs  to 
the  most  exalted  secular  position  on  earth,  their  feudal  rela- 
tions with  the  noble  houses  of  the  empire,  and  their  absolute 
authority  over  those  plebeians,  like  the  Serbs,  who  have  no 
aristocracy.  The  weakness  of  Austria  after  1 866,  the  strength 
of  the  Magyar  magnates  and  their  understanding  with  Prussia, 
were  the  motive  causes  that  forced  the  emperor  to  agree  to 


Yugoslavia  89 

Hungarian  self-government.  But  he  merely  yielded  to 
necessity  when  it  was  evident  that  only  by  such  means  could 
the  Habsburg  inheritance  be  strengthened  to  resist  further 
shocks.  The  less  powerful  Slav  peoples,  who  could  not 
seriously  threaten,  and  could  only  put  forward  claims  on 
the  gratitude  of,  the  dynasty,  were  treated  as  pariahs  in  their 
own  country,  where  they  had  lived  for  more  than  ten 
centuries. 

A  second  tradition  of  the  past  to  which  Franz  Joseph 
was  heir  was  that  of  the  crusade  of  Western  Christendom 
against  the  barbarous,  non-Christian,  or  at  any  rate  non- 
Catholic,  East.  The  original  meaning  of  the  word  '  Austria  ' 
is  the  '  East  kingdom  ',  the  eastern  bulwark  of  Western 
Europe.  Nobly  the  House  of  Habsburg  and  its  subject 
peoples  have  discharged  their  function  of  holding  back  the 
Turk  from  the  heart  of  Europe.  And  while  they  presented 
an  unconquerable  front  to  Islam,  the  emperors  also  success- 
fully set  themselves  to  stamp  out  heresy  in  their  own 
dominions.  When  the  tide  of  invasion  turned  and  the  Aus- 
trian state  spread  eastward  to  the  Carpathians,  the  emperors 
found  themselves  confronted  with  Orthodox  Christian 
subjects,  whom  they  tolerated  indeed,  but  whom  they 
considered  themselves  bound  to  lead  into  the  true  fold  of 
Rome.  With  the  Serbs,  who  were  not  merely  a  crowd 
of  vulgar  peasants,  but  also  schismatic  from  the  Western 
Church,  Franz  Joseph  could  have  no  sympathy.  And  the 
Croats,  although  devotedly  Roman  Catholic,  were  suspect 
on  account  of  their  racial  affinity  to  the  Orthodox  Serbs. 

But  if  Franz  Joseph  was  the  chief  surviving  exponent  of 
mediaeval  and  feudal  monarchy  and  the  hereditary  secular 
champion  of  the  pope,  he  was  also  thirdly  a  German  prince. 
He  began  his  reign  as  the  leading  and  presiding  sovereign 


Qo  Yugoslavia 

of  the  Germanic  Confederation.     Even  after   1866,  when 
Prussia  brusquely  ordered  Austria  out  of  Germany  and  her- 
self assumed  the  guidance  of  the  new  confederation,  Franz 
Joseph  did  not  forget  that  he  was  a  German,  nor  at  first 
abandon  the  hope  of  recovering  the  position  which  he  had 
lost.    After  the  formation  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  when  he 
buried    the   past   and   entered   into   close   friendship   with 
Prussia,  he  continued  to  champion  the  cause  of  Germanism 
in    the   East.      Austria    had    been   the   eastern   outpost   of 
Catholicism  ;     but    she    had    been    also    the    vanguard    of 
Germany  conquering  the  Magyars,  Poles,  Ruthenes,  Czechs, 
Roumanians,  and  Southern  Slavs,  and  extending  to  them 
the  benefits  of  German  civilization.    After  1867  the  German 
character  of  the  empire  was  compromised  by  the  elevation 
of  the  Magyars  to  equality  of  power.    But  the  compromise 
was   extended   no   further   than   was   absolutely   necessary. 
The  Magyars  were  admitted  to  the  German  fold  and  became 
a  privileged  nation.     But  the  millions  of  Slavs  and  Latins, 
who  lay  like  a  ring  round  the  outskirts  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
and  who  formed  the  majority  of  its  population,  were  still 
regarded  as  semi-civilized  savages  whose  natural  lot  was  to 
subserve  the  interests  of  the  German  race. 

Oppressed  by  the  Magyars  and  unable  to  awaken  the 
sympathy  of  Vienna,  the  Southern  Slavs  at  last  began  once 
more  to  draw  together  and  to  demand  the  recognition 
of  their  united  nationality.  The  decisive  date  that  marks  the 
re-birth  of  the  movement  is  1903.  In  that  year  King  Peter 
Karageorgevitch  inaugurated  the  revival  of  Serbia  and  the 
end  of  Serbian  dependence  on  Austria-Hungary.  In  Bosnia 
the  year  was  marked  by  the  death  of  Kalay,  who  had  governed 
with  a  rod  of  iron  since  the  rebellion  of  1882.  In  Croatia 
the  obnoxious  Ban   Khuen-Hodervary,  who  had  carefully 


Yugoslavia  91 

fomented  rivalry  between  Croats  and  Serbs,  was  removed 
from  his  office.  On  every  side  the  influences  that  had 
stifled  Southern  Slav  life  seemed  to  be  withdrawn.  The 
divided  portions  of  the  race  approached  each  other,  realizing 
that  in  union  was  their  only  hope  of  successful  resistance 
to  the  foreigner.  On  October  2,  1905,  forty  Croatian 
deputies  of  the  parliaments  of  Croatia,  Dalmatia,  and 
Istria  met  at  Riyeka  to  discuss  their  policy.  The  result  of 
their  conference  was  that,  while  accepting  the  union  of 
Croatia  with  Hungary,  they  determined  to  agitate  for 
real  autonomy  and  civil  freedom,  and  the  restoration  of  the 
united  triune  kingdom.  But  they  went  further  and  extended 
the  right  hand  of  fellowship  to  the  Serbian  political  parties, 
calling  on  them  to  join  in  the  national  unity.  The  Serbs 
were  not  slow  to  respond.  On  October  16  twenty-six 
Serbian  deputies  met  at  Zadar  (Zara)  and  endorsed  the  policy 
of  their  Croatian  brothers.  The  outcome  of  these  meetings  <^,^y^ 
was  the  Serbo-Croat  coalition,  which  now  entered  on  an 
unequal   struggle  with    the    governments    of   Vienna    and  .^^ 

Buda-Pesth. 

The  new  united  party,  the  centre  of  whose  activities  was 
the  Parliament  of  Zagreb,  determined  to  make  common 
cause  with  the  Hungarian  Opposition  at  Buda-Pesth.  Their 
overtures  were  accepted  effusively.  '  We  greet  our  Croatian 
and  Dalmatian  brothers,'  said  Francis  Kossuth,  the  Magyar 
Opposition  leader,  '  and  remind  the  Croats  that  we  have 
always  shared  with  them  the  rights  which  we  had  won  for 
ourselves.'  ^  Sixteen  months  later,  in  the  spring  of  1907, 
the  leaders  of  the  Hungarian  Opposition  were  in  office, 
and  the  time  had  come  for  them  to  redeem  their  pledge  to  • 
the  Southern  Slavs.  But  the  unreal  and  factious  character 
^  Seton-Watson,  Southern  Slav  Question,  p.  148. 


92  Yugoslavia 

of  that  Opposition  now  became  evident.  They  showed  them- 
selves to  be  Magyar  persecutors  when  in  power,  and  apostles 
of  liberty  only  so  long  as  they  were  called  upon  to  talk  and  not 
to  act.  Kossuth  himself  brought  in  a  railway  Bill  enforcing 
the  use  of  the  Magyar  language  on  all  the  Croatian  railways. 
The  Serbo-Croat  coalition  did  its  utmost  by  obstruction  in 
the  Hungarian  Parliament  to  save  the  official  use  of  their 
language  in  their  own  country,  but  the  hateful  measure  was 
forced  through  by  their  late  friends  and  allies. 

The  Serbo-Croats  then  settled  down  to  open  war  with 
Buda-Pesth.  Their  deputies  left  the  Hungarian  Parliament 
and  the  coalition  government  at  Zagreb  resigned.  The 
answer  to  this  challenge  was  the  appointment  of  Baron  Ranch 
to  be  Ban  of  Croatia  in  December  1907.  The  new  Ban  came 
expressly  charged  with  the  task  of  breaking  the  Serbo-Croat 
coalition.  The  contest  began  from  the  moment  of  his  arrival 
in  Zagreb.  Parliament  being  dissolved  a  general  election 
was  necessary,  and  was  held  at  the  end  of  February  1908 
Croatia  enjoys  the  narrowest  franchise  in  Europe.  In  addi- 
tion to  that.  Baron  Rauch  brought  all  the  influence  of  the 
State  to  bear  on  the  electors.  Officials  were  forbidden  to 
vote  for  the  Opposition  candidates.  Force  and  fraud  were 
employed  to  secure  returns  satisfactory  to  the  government. 
Despite  every  disadvantage,  however,  the  coalition  won 
fifty-seven  seats  in  a  House  of  eighty-eight.  This  triumph 
of  the  Southern  Slavs  was  intolerable  to  their  Magyar 
masters.  Hardly  had  the  new  Parliament  been  elected  when 
on  March  14  it  was  indefinitely  prorogued.  A  violent  press 
campaign  was  everywhere  opened,  denouncing  the  Serbo- 
Croats  as  disloyal  and  separatist,  unfit  for  equal  rights  with 
the  Germans  and  Magyars.  Hitherto  there  had  been  no 
question  of  disloyalty  to  the  empire.    The  Southern  Slavs 


Yugoslavia  93 

had  only  been  asking  for  those  rights  of  union  and  self- 
government  that  had  historically  been  secured  to  them  under 
the  Habsburg  crown.  But  the  increasing  bitterness  of  the 
struggle  for  those  privileges  did  now  indeed  force  them  to 
look  more  towards  the  land  of  Southern  Slav  indepen- 
dence. Austro-Magyar  oppression  began  to  drive  Zagreb  and 
Belgrade  into  each  other's  arms.  r^ 

This  process  was  hastened  and  completed  by  the  bullying 
and  the  blunders  of  the  new  director  of  Austro-Hungarian 
foreign  policy.  Count  Goluchowski,  a  statesman  of  the 
milder  and  more  liberal  Austrian  type,  had  been  succeeded 
in  October  1906  by  Baron  von  Aerenthal.  Aerenthal  might 
be  described  by  that  odious  word  '  hustler  '.  Unhampered 
by  any  considerations  of  morality  in  public  affairs,  he  was  the 
determined  exponent  of  that  Realpolitik,  or  policy  of  brute 
force,  which  German  statesmen  have  held  up  to  the  admira- 
tion of  an  unthinking  world.  He  set  out  to  do  for  Austria- 
Hungary  what  Bismarck  had  done  for  Prussia.  Like  his  exem- 
plar, he  would  restore  the  dimmed  prestige  of  his  country  and 
make  her  a  leading  Power  in  the  world  by  a  judicious  blend  of 
military  aggression  and  calculated  falsehood.  The  condition 
of  Europe  seemed  propitious.  None  knew  better  than 
Aerenthal  the  exhausted  state  of  the  Russian  Empire  after 
the  war  with  Japan.  He  had  himself  been  for  many  years 
ambassador  at  Petrograd,  and  in  that  capacity  had  helped  to 
push  Russia  into  the  disastrous  campaign  in  Manchuria. 
Russia  would  for  some  years  be  in  no  condition  to  oppose  the 
eastward  advance  of  Austria-Hungary,  For  France  and 
Great  Britain  the  new  minister  entertained  only  dislike  and 
contempt.  As  an  orthodox  German  he  believed  France  to  be 
decadent  and  unable  to  play  a  leading  part  in  Europe,  while 
we  can  imagine  the  lofty  disdain  which,  as  a  member  of  a 


\» 


94  Yugoslavia 

military  nobility,  he  must  have  felt  for  the  commercial  and 
industrial  democracy  of  Britain.  Under  his  guidance  Austria- 
Hungary  was  no  longer  to  be  a  '  brilliant  second '  to  Germany, 
as  the  Kaiser  William  had  somewhat  contemptuously  called 
her.  She  would  herself  take  the  initiative  and  display  the 
vitality  that  was  still  in  her. 

If  the  Habsburg  monarchy  was  to  embark  on  a  policy  of 
expansion  its  obvious  route  lay  to  the  south-east.  An 
aggressive  move  in  that  direction  would  be  a  suitable  reply  to 
the  Anglo-Russian  entente  of  1907.  Further,  it  would  perhaps 
rouse  Serbia  to  some  act  of  folly,  and  Aerenthal  would 
seize  the  opportunity  to  crush  the  troublesome  little  State 
which  barred  the  way  to  Salonika.  The  definitive  annexation 
of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  which  Austria-Hungary  had  ad- 
ministered 'on  behalf  of  the  Sultan'  since  1878,  would 
achieve  Aerenthal's  object ;  and  the  Young  Turk  revolution 
of  1908  decided  him  not  to  delay  his  coup.  There  was  the  ;V/ 
danger  that  the  administered  provinces  would  insist  on  their/  / 
right  to  participate  in  the  new  Turkish  constitution.  On  the 
other  hand  it  would  be  well,  by  conferring  separate  con- 
stitutional privileges  on  them,  to  show  the  world  that  the 
'  Bosniaks '  were  as  well  off  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  ;  and  to  keep  them  in  order  under  their  new  institu- 
tions it  would  be  necessary  for  the  Habsburgs  to  be  un- 
disputed masters.     Hence  the  annexation. 

The  measure  was  carried  out  in  evident  collusion  with 
Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria.  On  October  5  the  independent 
kingdom  of  Bulgaria  was  proclaimed,  followed  two  days  later 
by  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  to  the  Habsburg 
Empire.  Both  declarations  violated  the  Treaty  of  Berlin, 
and  protests  were  not  lacking.  The  Young  Turks  had  hardly 
found  themselves  in  power  when  their  promises  of  a  renewed 


Yugoslavia  95 

and  powerful  Turkey  were  heavily  discounted  by  the  loss 
of  suzerainty  over  two  countries  of  six  milhon  inhabitants. 
But  the  Turkish  government  could  no  nothing.  It  was 
in  no  position  to  make  war.  The  Powers  well  knew  that, 
despite  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  Bulgarian  independence  and 
Austro-Hungarian  possession  of  Bosnia  were  really  long- 
established  facts.  None  of  them  were  anxious  to  fight  over 
clauses  which  had  been,  with  the  full  approval  of  Europe,  a 
dead  letter  for  thirty  years.  Also  the  Young  Turks  were  as 
much  under  German  tutelage  as  Abdul  Hamid  had  been. 
So  they  eventually  pocketed  their  pride  and  a  financial 
indemnity. 

The  matter  did  not  end  there.  The  annexation  touched 
Serbia  very  much  more  closely  than  it  touched  Turkey. 
The  government  of  Constantinople  lost  two  distant  pro- 
vinces, v/ith  which  it  had  long  ceased  to  have  any  dealings, 
and  a  population  which  was  alien  in  race  and  mostly  ahen 
in  sympathy.  But  Serbia  saw  the  very  centre  of  the  Yugo- 
slav peoples,  which  she  had  always  hoped  against  hope  to 
Hberate,  finally  handed  over  to  the  rule  of  the  Austro-Magyars, 
who  had  already  done  their  best  to  denationalize  the  in- 
habitants. It  is  no  wonder  that,  just  as  Aerenthal  expected, 
the  Serbs  were  indignant  and  clamoured  for  war.  Who  was 
the  emperor  and  what  was  his  precious  empire  that  neigh- 
bouring peoples  must  be  carved  up  and  divided  for  his  ambi- 
tious purposes  ?  Had  not  his  armies  been  defeated  every 
time  that  they  had  engaged  in  war  ?  As  Spain  to  England  in 
the  days  of  Elizabeth,  Austria-Hungary  appeared  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Serbian  mihtary  enthusiasts  to  be  no  more  than  '  a 
colossus  stuffed  with  clouts '.  The  new  Serbian  army,  the 
product  of  King  Peter's  fostering  care,  would  roll  this 
colossus  in  the  dust  and  make  him  relinquish  his  hold  on  the 


96  Yugoslavia 

Serbian  lands.     So  shouted  the  wilder  spirits  of  Belgrade. 
But  prudent  counsels  prevailed.    A  private  quarrel  between 
Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  could  only  result  in  the  latter's 
humiliation,  perhaps  in  her  loss  of  independence.    The  cir- 
cumstances  of   the   annexation   pointed   to   an   agreement 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria,  which  would  bring 
down  an  enemy  on  Serbia's  rear  in  the  event  of  war.    And 
Serbia  could  find  no  outside  support.     Great  Britain  and 
Russia  both  protested  against  the  annexation,  and  had  Russia 
been  willing  to  fight  over  it,  the  resentment  of  Turkey  and 
Italy  might  possibly  have  brought  those  two  countries  to 
Serbia's  side.     But  the  threat  of  German  intervention  was 
too  much  for  Russia.    When  the  German  emperor  stepped 
forward  and  informed  the  Tsar  that  in  case  of  war  he  would 
stand  by  Austria-Hungary  as  '  a  friend  in  shining  armour  ', 
Russia  withdrew  her  protest  and  strongly  advised  Serbia  to 
submit  to  the  inevitable.     Great  Britain  could  hardly  take 
the  Slav  cause  upon  herself,  and  therefore  proffered  the  same 
advice.    On  March  31,  1909,  Serbia  swallowed  the  bitter  pill 
and  addressed  a  Note  to  Austria-Hungary  in  which  she 
declared  that '  Serbia  recognizes  that  the  fait  accompli  regard- 
ing Bosnia  has  not  affected  her  rights ' ;  and  that '  in  deference 
to  the  advice  of  the  Great  Pov/ers,  Serbia  undertakes  to 
renounce  from  now  onwards  the  attitude  of  protest  and 
opposition  which  she  has  adopted  with  regard  to  the  annexa- 
tion since  last  autumn.'  ^ 

The  crisis  of  October  1908  to  March  1909  thus  ended  in 
a  triumph  for  Aerenthal,  He  had  shown  that  there  was  still 
life  in  the  old  empire  which  he  served.  In  the  trial  of 
strength  the  Central  Empires  had  forced  the  Anglo-Franco- 
Russian  Entente  to  eat  humble  pie.  Still  the  Entente  had 
^  Diplomatic  Documents^  p.  4,  British  Correspondence,  No.  4. 


Yugoslavia  97 

stood  together.  Though  unwilling  to  plunge  Europe  into 
a  general  war  over  a  matter  of  form,  they  had  shown  that 
their  interests  were  united.  They  had  even  had  a  modicum 
of  support  from  Italy,  who  had  insisted  that  Austria-Hungary 
should  now  withdraw  from  the  Sandjak  of  Novi  Pazar.  They 
had  submitted,  but  it  was  doubtful  if  they  would  take  another 
aggressive  move  so  complacently.  If  the  Germanic  Powers 
proved  content  with  their  victory,  and  did  not  attempt  any 
further  Balkan  coups,  all  would  be  well.  But  of  that  many 
competent  judges  had  little  hope.  A  Viennese  newspaper, 
a  month  after  the  annexation,  had  announced  '  We  have 
missed  an  excellent  opportunity.  When  our  monitors  were 
near  the  Serbian  capital,  we  ought  to  have  seized  the  town. 
.  .  .  The  conflict  with  Serbia  and  Montenegro  is  inevitable. 
The  longer  we  postpone  it,  the  dearer  it  will  cost  us.'  ■"• 
Prophetic  words  !  Serbia  too  thought  the  struggle  inevitable 
in  view  of  Austria-Hungary's  ambitions.  She  saw  herself 
threatened  with  a  continual  menace  and  unsupported  by  any 
allies  prepared  for  war.  Taking  counsel  of  her  courage,  she 
made  ready  for  '  the  day  ',  resolved  at  least  to  die  honourably 
and  to  perish  rather  than  surrender  the  liberty  achieved  at 
the  cost  of  so  much  blood  and  effort. 

As  for  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  the  continued  protest  of  the 
inhabitants  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  occupation  was 
maintained  with  even  greater  vigour  and  unity  than  before 
the  annexation.  The  government  ever  since  1878  has  done 
its  utmost  to  foster  internal  discord  and  to  set  the  three  reli- 
gious bodies — Roman  Catholic  Croats,  Orthodox  Serbs,  and 
Mohammedans — against  each  other.  The  country  was  not 
allowed  to  develop.  So  wretched  has  the  poverty  been  that 
in  some  parts  the  peasant  families  have  been  obliged  to  drag 

^  Quoted  in  Denis,  p.  204. 
2071  Q 


98  Yugoslavia 

the  plough  themselves  for  lack  of  oxen.  The  miserable 
Turkish  land-system  was  kept  in  force  to  propitiate  the 
Mussulmans  (rightly  considered  less  dangerous  enemies  than 
the  Serbs),  although  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin  it  had  been 
arranged  that  the  settlement  of  the  agrarian  question  should 
be  the  first  duty  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  government, 
acting  on  behalf  of  Europe.  Hoping  for  the  fulfilment  of 
this  reform,  the  600,000  kmeti,  or  serfs,  who  work  the  land 
for  the  benefit  of  some  40,000  Mohammedan  agas,  looked 
forward  to  freeing  themselves  by  purchasing  their  farms,  and 
consequently  they  were  careful  not  to  make  the  soil  produce 
too  much  lest  the  selling-price  should  rise.  Thus  from  year 
to  year  the  vicious  circle  was  followed.  The  land  did  not 
produce  her  fruits  because  the  peasants  always  anticipated 
economic  freedom,  and  the  government  complained  of  the 
ungrateful  obstinacy  of  the  people  in  not  taking  advantage 
of  the  benefits  of  civilization.  The  railways,  instead  of  being 
made  to  encourage  commerce,  were  built  primarily  for 
strategic  purposes,  and  have  been  of  little  value  to  the  agri- 
cultural producers.  Public  instruction  was  grossly  neglected 
or  given  in  an  unknown  tongue.  The  result  has  been  that  the 
illiterates  in  Bosnia  number  90  per  cent,  of  the  population, 
one  of  the  highest  figures  in  Europe.  This  does  not  trouble 
the  Mohammedans,  who  are  for  the  most  part  indifferent 
to  education  ;  but  the  Serbian  community  struggled  to  main- 
tain schools  by  private  subscriptions,  many  of  which  were 
suppressed  by  the  government.  Any  dealings  with  Serbia 
were  so  penalized  that  exports  to  that  country,  which  in  1884 
totalled  388,046  francs,  and  represented  a  large  decrease  from 
the  figures  for  1879,  ^^^  fallen  by  1900  to  40,888  francs.^ 
The  two  provinces  were,  in  fact,  treated  as  a  savage  colony 

*  Stojanovitch,  p.  176. 


Yugoslavia  99 

in  whose  welfare  the  government  had  no  interest,  and  which 
was  only  useful  as  part  of  a  strategical  advance  towards  the 
south-east. 

The  grant  of  a  constitution  did  not  alter  this  condition  of 
affairs.  The  new  Sabor,  or  Parliament,  whose  constituencies 
were  so  based  on  religious  differences  as  to  give  the  Croats  an 
unfair  advantage,  had  few  of  the  powers  of  a  true  legislative 
assembly.  Its  president,  appointed  by  the  emperor,  has 
almost  absolute  authority  in  the  sessions.  It  cannot  concern 
itself  with  the  tariff  or  with  military  burdens.  It  cannot 
pass  any  laws  without  the  sanction  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Dual  government.  It  cannot  exercise  any  check  on  the 
governor  of  the  provinces.  Indeed  the  poHtical  system  is 
more  autocratic  thin  before  1908,  for  the  office  of  civil 
assistant  to  the  military  governor  has  been  suppressed  and 
the  supreme  authority  is  that  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
The  Sabor  has  protested  against  its  own  powerlessness  but 
without  effect,  for  the  revision  of  the  constitution  is  placed 
beyond  its  competence.  After  resisting  for  two  years  the 
Sabor's  demand  for  land-purchase  on  behalf  of  the  peasants, 
the  government  sanctioned  a  scheme  of  purchase  to  be  applied 
only  when  there  was  agreement  between  the  Jga  and  his 
kmeti.  Obviously  this  would  not  help  on  matters  much. 
Also  a  Viennese  professor  calculated  that  under  the  scheme 
in  question  the  last  of  the  Bosnian  kmeti  could  not  be  eman- 
cipated till  the  year  2025. 

The  visitor  in  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  is  not  made  aware  of 
the  sympathies  of  the  population.  He  sees  the  well-kept 
streets  of  Sarajevo  ;  he  enjoys  the  unexpected  comfort  and 
cleanliness  of  the  hotels  which  have  been  built  for  him ;  he 
is  aware  of  the  good  order  maintained  by  the  numerous 
police  and  military.    But  underneath  this  fair  exterior,  and 

G  2 


100  Yugoslavia 

not  mentioned  to  the  stranger  from  motives  of  prudence,  is 
the  unceasing  resentment  of  a  people  who  know  themselves 
to  be  exploited  by  their  foreign  masters.  The  murder  at 
Sarajevo,  on  June  28,  1914,  was  but  the  climax  of  many  acts 
of  protest  illustrating  the  aspirations  of  the  people  and  their 
helplessness. 

Aerenthal  had  set  himself  to  break  down  the  Southern  Slav 
barrier  that  offered  its  passive  resistance  to  the  aggression  of 
Austro-Magyar  imperialism.  The  coup  of  the  annexation 
had  been  brilliantly  successful  and  had  done  its  work  of 
humiliating  Serbia  and  convincing  many  observers  that 
Southern  Slav  unity  could  only  be  achieved  under  the 
apparently  irresistible  power  of  the  empire.  But  his  plans  .  I 
went  further.  To  serve  as  a  pretext  for  the  annexation  it 
must  be  shown  that  the  lawful  authority  of  Austria-Hungary, 
based  on  European  treaties,  had  been  in  danger  from  the 
intrigues  of  Serbia.  Aerenthal  wished  to  be  able  to  hold  up 
Serbia  to  the  obloquy  of  the  world  as  the  disturber  of  the 
peace  and  the  author  of  sedition  and  conspiracy  in  all  the 
Southern  Slav  lands.  With  that  character  fixed  upon  the 
government  of  Serbia,  it  would  be  his  pleasant  task  to  up- 
root Yugoslav  agitation  in  the  empire  by  persecution,  and 
finally  to  suppress  Serbian  independence.  The  open  violence 
of  the  annexation  was,  therefore,  only  an  incident  in  a 
campaign  of  cunning  intrigue. 

The  first  Serbian  '  iniquity  '  exposed  is  known  as  '  the 
Tsetinye  plot '.  It  is  of  interest  on  account  of  the  exposer 
*  )  rather  than  in  itself ;  for  the  accusations  could  not  be  proved, 
and  depended  for  their  efiicacy  on  the  persistent  survival  of 
scandal,  however  ill  founded.  In  November  1907  a  person 
of  the  suitable  name  of  Nastitch,  whom  even  Professor 
Fried] ung,  the  advocate  of  official  imperial  views,  described 


Yugoslavia  loi 

as  a  man  whom  one  could  only  touch  with  tongs,  gave 
evidence  at  Tsetinye  of  a  supposed  Serbian  plot  to  blow  up 
Prince  Nicholas's  palace.  Nastitch's  character  is  illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  he  had  been  prosecuted  for  stealing  opera- 
glasses  in  a  Viennese  theatre,  and  was  afterwards  shown  to  be 
in  the  pay  of  the  police  of  Sarajevo.  It  had  also  been  observed 
that  on  one  occasion  he  had  started  the  cry  '  Long  live 
King  Peter  ! '  in  a  crowded  street.  For  this  offence  he  had 
been  fined  200  crowns,  which  he  never  paid,  whereas  others 
who  had  followed  his  lead  were  imprisoned.  This  pleasing 
individual  now  asserted  that  the  plot  which  he  was  exposing 
was  the  work  of  Prince  George  of  Serbia,  and  had  the 
approval  of  King  Peter,  Prince  Nicholas's  son-in-law. 
Amongst  other  details  it  appeared  that  the  young  prince  had 
chosen  for  the  explosion  a  date  when  his  only  sister  was 
staying  in  the  palace  with  her  grandparents. 

Despite  the  absurdity  of  the  charge,  the  Tsetinye  plot 
attained  its  object.  The  suspicions  of  the  old  Prince  of 
Montenegro,  whose  relations  with  his  son-in-law  had  been 
far  from  cordial,  were  roused,  and  for  some  time  the  two 
Serbian  States  were  completely  estranged.  But  besides  this 
a  vague  suspicion  of  foul  play  rested  on  the  Serbian  dynasty 
in  the  minds  of  the  European  public.  The  murder  of 
Alexander  and  Draga  was  recalled  ;  and  Serbia's  enemies 
could  rhetorically  demand  '  of  what  barbarism  might  not 
these  Serbs  be  capable  ?  ' 

Nastitch  was  again  the  purveyor  of  the  next '  exposure  '  of 
Serbian  intrigues.^  In  July  1908,  as  a  preparation  for  the 
annexation  of  Bosnia,  he  published  a  pamphlet  entitled 
'  Finale  ',  in  which  he  gave  numerous  names  and  details  ' 
connected  with  a  widespread  revolutionary  movement  in  the 
^  For  the  details  that  follow  see  Seton-Watson,  Southern  Slav  Question. 


102  Yugoslavia 

Southern  Slav  lands.  The  whole  conspiracy,  it  appeared,  was 
being  engineered  by  a  political  club  of  Belgrade,  the  Slovenski 
Tug  (Slavonic  South),  with  the  support  of  King  Peter  and  his 
government. 

Af  once  numerous  arrests  were  made  amongst  the  Serbs 
of  Croatia.  Finally,  fifty-three  persons  were  kept  in  custody, 
without  examination  or  even  information  as  to  the  nature  of 
their  offence.  As  was  anticipated,  this  procedure  aroused 
furious  indignation  in  Serbia,  which  was  further  inflamed  by 
the  annexation.  Had  the  Serbs  gone  to  war  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  the  unfortunate  prisoners,  as  well  as  many 
other  w^ell-known  Serbs,  would  have  remained  in  prison  or 
been  executed.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to  disprove 
Nastitch's  fabricated  evidence,  and  the  truth  would  never 
have  come  to  light.  Our  know-ledge  of  what  happened  in 
1908-^  must  make  us  fear  that  Austria-Hungary  achieved  to 
the  full  in  1914-15  the  judicial  crimes  and  gross  injustices 
which  she  failed  to  carry  out  six  years  before. 

The  proceedings  eventually  started  in  March  1909,  pre- 
sumably because  it  then  became  clear  that  war  with  Serbia 
could  not  be  forced  on  by  the  continued  imprisonment  of 
the  accused.  The  court  at  Zagreb  was  presided  over  by 
an  obscure  lawyer  whose  name,  Tarabocchia,  corresponded 
admirably  with  his  notoriously  convivial  habits.  The  only 
evidence  produced  of  the  seditious  relations  of  the  prisoners 
with  Serbia  was  Nastitch's  pamphlet.  But  that  did  not 
matter.  The  slightest  hint  of  sympathy  with  things  Serbian 
was  good  enough  evidence  for  this  extraordinary  court.  The 
use  of  the  Cyrillic  alphabet  was  guaranteed  to  the  Serbs  of  the 
Hungarian  kingdom,  and  was  obligatory  in  the  schools  of  those 
districts  where  there  was  a  Serbian  majority  among  the  in- 
habitants.   Nevertheless,  it  was  now  held  to  be  highly  sus- 


Yugoslavia  103 

picious  and  indicative  of  sympathy  with  Pan-Serb  propa- 
ganda. If  the  prisoners  had  spoken  of  themselves  or  their 
fellow  nationals  as  '  Serbs '  or  their  church  as  '  Serb  Ortho- 
dox ',  that  too  raised  a  presumption  of  guilt,  although  these 
names  had  been  sanctioned  by  two  centuries  of  official  use. 
The  defendants  were  even  held  responsible  for  anti-annexa- 
tionist  articles  which  had  appeared  in  the  Serbo-Croat  press 
of  America  long  after  their  imprisonment,  on  the  ground 
that  the  newspapers  in  question  were  the  outcome  of  societies 
and  clubs  to  which  the  defendants  belonged.  But  many  of 
the  accusations  were  even  more  fantastic.  A  villager  was 
charged  with  having  asserted  that  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary 
was  a  Serb.  A  shopkeeper  was  condemned  for  having  in  his 
possession  a  supply  of  dynamite,  though  he  was  able  to  show 
that  he  had  official  permission  to  use  it  for  blasting  in  a 
country  district.  The  possession  of  the  King  of  Serbia's 
portrait  was,  of  course,  a  clear  proof  of  guilt.  A  certain 
Krizhnyak  was  represented  as  declaring  that  he  had  seen 
'  Long  live  Peter  Karageorgevitch  '  written  up  in  the  house 
of  a  man  called  Gayitch.  Yet  it  appeared  that  Krizhnyak 
could  neither  read  nor  write.  The  following  dialogue,  too, 
is  sufficiently  laughable.  President  of  the  court  :  '  You  trod 
on  a  dog's  tail,  and  when  the  dog  howled  you  said,  "  How 
that  Croat  whines  !  "  '  Accused  :  '  In  the  first  place,  the  dog 
had  no  tail.  Secondly,  it  is  untrue  that  I  called  the  dog  a 
Croat.'  President  :  '  But  the  witnesses  all  say  you  did.' 
Accused  :  '  I  only  asked  "  Is  the  dog  a  Croat,  I  wonder,  as 
you  make  out  there  are  only  Croats  in  Croatia  ?  "  The 
question  was  a  joke.'  ^ 

But  there  were  darker  features  about  the  trial.    Proofs  were 
submitted  in  the  Croatian  Parliament,  and  never  denied,  that 

^  Seton- Watson,  p.  189. 


104  Yugoslavia 

Nastitch,  the  principal  witness,  had  been  paid  for  his  evidence 
by  the  Prefect  of  Police  at  Zagreb,  and  that  on  the  eve  of 
his  examination  he  had  been  instructed  by  the  magistrates 
how  he  should  reply  to  certain  questions  which  would  be  put 
to  him.  Further,  counsel  for  the  defence  suffered  the  most 
intolerable  treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  police.  Two  of 
them,  M.  Hinkovitch  and  M.  Budisavlyevitch,  visited  Bel- 
grade in  the  course  of  the  proceedings  in  order  to  obtain 
information  with  which  to  support  their  case.  They  called 
at  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  and  were  assured  that  the 
authorities  had  no  objection  to  their  activities.  Their  mission 
fulfilled,  they  returned.  M.  Hinkovitch,  who  was  the  first 
to  leave  Serbia,  had  no  sooner  arrived  in  Hungary  than  he 
found  his  valise  had  been  stolen.  Some  months  later  it  was 
returned  to  him  with  the  lock  forced.  But  the  thieves  had 
not  secured  what  they  evidently  sought,  for  M.  Hinkovitch 
had  confided  the  notes  and  memoranda  made  in  Belgrade  to 
a  friend  who  had  carried  them  across  the  frontier  in  safety. 
M.  Budisavlyevitch  was  not  so  fortunate.  On  his  arrival  at 
Zimun  he  was  arrested  and  searched.  His  notes  were  found 
on  him  and  confiscated.  Soon  after  these  notes  were  trium- 
phantly produced  in  court  by  the  prosecution.  Most  of  the 
subject-matter,  which  was  entirely  favourable  to  the  prisoners, 
had  been  suppressed,  and  the  remainder  carefully  edited  and 
twisted  into  a  form  prejudicial  to  the  defence. 
-TfiU*^'  The  Zagreb  trial  dragged  wearily  on  during  seven  months, 
and  only  came  to  an  end  in  October  1909,  A  judgement  of 
startling  severity,  though  not  out  of  keeping  with  the  illegali- 
ties of  the  trial,  followed.  Thirty-one  of  the  prisoners  were 
found  guilty  of  high  treason,  and  condemned  to  penal  servi- 
tude for  periods  varying  from  five  to  twelve  years.  An  appeal 
was  thereupon  lodged  against  the  decision,  and  M.  Hinkovitch 


Yugoslavia  105 

published  his  denunciation  of  the  methods  of  the  court, 
which  he  accused  of  the  falsification  of  documents,  the  dis- 
tortion or  suppression  of  evidence,  and  indifference  to  all 
extenuating  circumstances.  The  court  of  appeal  quashed  the 
sentence  on  the  ground  of  *  considerable  doubts  as  to  the 
truth  of  the  facts  on  which  the  judgement  had  been  based. 
Legally  the  case  ought  now  to  have  been  re-opened  or 
definitely  dismissed.  Yet  neither  course  was  followed. 
Month  succeeded  to  month  while  the  unfortunate  prisoners 
remained  in  custody,  until  suddenly,  in  September  1910,  the 
whole  case  was  set  aside  by  royal  decree. 

The  reason  for  this  extraordinary  procedure,  which 
neither  condemned  nor  exonerated  the  accused,  is  to  be 
found  in  another  trial  which  had  taken  place  meanwhile. 
On  March  25,  1909,  the  very  day  on  which  it  became  known 
that  Russia  had  accepted  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Hertze- 
govina,  there  appeared  in  the  Neue  Freie  Presse  a  sensational 
article  called  '  Austria-Hungary  and  Serbia  ',  written  by  an 
eminent  historian,  Professor  Friedjung.  The  burden  of  the 
learned  doctor's  argument  was  that  Serbia  was  showing  herself 
an  impossible  neighbour  by  her  active  intrigues  against  the 
Dual  Monarchy.  He  stated  and  amplified  all  Nastitch's  case, 
and  accused  the  Serbo-Croat  coalition  party  of  having  been 
bought  by  the  Serbian  government  for  the  purpose  of  stirring 
up  rebellion  in  the  Southern  Slav  provinces.  The  article,  in 
fact,  reproduced  all  the  recrimination  which  was  then  being 
rebutted  in  the  Zagreb  trial,  and  added  information  about 
a  Serbian  project  for  the  erection  of  a  league  of  Yugoslav 
republics  (a  plan  that  seems  strangely  out  of  keeping  with 
King  Peter's  supposed  complicity  in  the  plot).  What  made 
at  serious  wa«  the  high  reputation  of  Dr.  Friedjung  as  a 
man  of  honoBj  and  sound  learning,  and  his  assertion  that  he 


1 06  Yugoslavia 

could  produce  irrefutable  documentary  evidence  of  the  facts, 
figures,  and  names  mentioned  in  his  article.  Consequentlv 
the  accusations  could  not  be  allowed  to  pass  unchallenged, 
and  the  deputies  of  the  Serbo-Croat  coalition  collectively 
brought  an  action  for  libel  against  the  author.  Aerenthal, 
for  reasons  which  we  shall  readily  appreciate,  was  by  now 
tired  of  the  whole  subject,  and  tried  to  get  the  matter  settled 
out  of  court.  But  the  deputies  had  reached  the  limit  of  their 
patience,  while  Dr.  Friedjung  was  convinced  of  the  truth  of 
his  assertions  and  of  the  patriotic  nature  of  the  services 
which  he  was  performing  in  exposing  a  dangerous  conspiracy. 
Both  parties  therefore  insisted  on  a  public  decision  of  the 
issue. 

The  case  came  before  the  court  in  Vienna  in  December 
1909,  and  the  professor  produced  his  documents,  which  it 
appeared  were  photographs  of  papers  stolen  from  the  Serbian 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  the  club  Slovenski  Tug.  They 
consisted  of  the  minutes  of  the  club,  written  by  a  certain 
Milan  Stepanovitch  (whose  identity  was  a  mystery,  for  no  one 
answering  to  his  description  could  be  discovered),  and  of  a 
few  official  papers,  amongst  which  was  a  report  addressed  by 
the  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Spalaykovitch, 
to  his  chief,  describing  a  political  mission  in  Hungary  and 
negotiations  with  certain  members  of  the  coalition.  Dr. 
Friedjung  explained  that  the  original  papers  had  been  photo- 
graphed in  Belgrade  and  secretly  restored  to  their  owners, 
which  explained  the  fact  that  they  had  never  been  missed. 
He  insisted  that  they  must  be  genuine,  since  he  had  received 
them  from  a  quarter  so  exalted  as  to  preclude  all  suspicion 
(a  statement  which  was  recognized  as  referring  to  Aerenthal 
and  the  heir  to  the  throne  himself,  the  Archduke  Franz 
Ferdinand).     But  he  had  also  examined  them  carefully  and 


Yugoslavia  107 

was  willing  to  stake  his  reputation  as  a  scientific  historian  on 
their  authenticity. 

Yet  when  these  precious  documents  were  submitted  for 
inspection  by  those  who  could  read  Serbian  and  knew  any- 
thing of  Serbian  affairs,  they  only  provoked  outbursts  of  in- 
extinguishable laughter.  The  egregious  professor  could  not 
read  a  word  of  Serbian.  Consequently  he  was  unaware  that 
the  authors  of  the  documents  could  not  write  that  language. 
The  papers  consisted  of  clumsy  renderings  into  Serbian,  with 
German  and  Polish  idioms  literally  translated.  M.  Spalayko- 
vitch  appeared  in  person  and  denied  the  authorship  of  the 
report  attributed  to  him,  pointing  out  in  addition  that 
the  document  referred  to  a  loan  which  the  Skupshtina  was 
shortly  to  vote.  The  loan  in  question  had  been  raised  a  year 
before,  largely  through  the  work  of  M.  Spalaykovitch  him- 
self. Two  experts,  who  were  thereupon  appointed  to  examine 
the  report,  confirmed  the  minister's  evidence  by  declaring 
that  the  writer  was  undoubtedly  ignorant  of  Serbian.  The 
supposed  minutes  of  the  Slovenski  Tug  were  guilty  also  of  the 
oddest  anachronism.  The  record  of  the  meeting  held  on 
March  10,  1908,  mentioned  a  vote  of  6,000  dinars  for  use  in 
'  the  impending  elections '  in  Croatia.  The  said  elections 
had  taken  place  less  than  a  fortnight  previously,  at  the  end 
of  February. 

Professor  Bozho  Markovitch,  the  president  of  the  Slovenski 
Tug,  declared  that  the  '  minutes  '  were  a  pure  fabrication. 
Especially  he  pointed  out  that  they  represented  him  as 
presiding  over  a  meeting  on  October  21,  1908,  a  date  when 
he  had  actually  been  in  Berlin.  The  court  could  satisfy 
themselves  of  the  truth  of  his  statement  by  addressing 
inquiries  to  the  police  of  that  city,  and  to  the  hotels  at 
Vienna  and  Buda-Pesth  in  which  he  had  stayed  on  the 


io8  Yugoslavia 

journey.  When,  in  addition  to  all  the  other  exposures 
of  the  documents,  there  arrived  from  Berlin  the  German 
official  confirmation  of  Professor  Markovitch's  alibi,  the 
defence  broke  down.  The  government  determined  to  prevent 
further  discussion,  and  appealed  to  the  Serbo-Croat  deputies 
on  grounds  of  patriotism  and  the  prestige  of  the  Monarchy 
not  to  press  their  suit  any  further.  Dr.  Fried jung  read 
a  public  declaration  apologizing  for  his  mistake,  and  the 
prosecution  was  dropped.  The  anxiety  of  the  government 
to  reach  an  amicable  settlement  shows  that  they  feared 
a  decided  verdict  for  the  plaintiffs.  If  we  are  ready  to  recog- 
nize the  impartiality  of  the  Austrian  court  before  which 
the  case  was  tried,  what  are  we  to  think  of  those  exalted 
individuals  who  provided  Dr.  Friedjung  with  these  ridiculous 
documents  and  then  interfered  with  the  course  of  justice 
to  hush  up  a  scandal  ? 

The  whole  affair  was  still  wrapped  in  mystery,  and  might 
never  have  been  cleared  up  had  not  one  of  the  hidden  actors 
in  the  drama  entered  the  limelight  in  the  autumn  of  1910. 
This  was  a  journalist  named  Vasitch,  who  had  then  just  been 
arrested  by  the  police  of  Belgrade  for  espionage.  During 
his  trial  it  appeared  that  he  had  been  the  unknown  Milan 
Stepanovitch,  who  had  drawn  up  Dr.  Friedjung's  '  minutes  '. 
Then  the  whole  truth  came  out.  Vasitch  had  been  engaged 
by  M.  Svientochowski,  Secretary  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Legation  in  Belgrade,  as  tutor  for  his  children.  While  so 
employed  he  had  been  asked  if  he  would  like  to  earn  much 
money  for  little  work.  He  had  then  been  given  the  originals 
of  Dr.  Friedjung's  documents,  written  in  Latin  characters 
and  in  execrable  Serbian.  His  job  was  to  Serbicize  them  all, 
copy  them  out  in  the  Cyrillic  script,  and  forge  the  signatures 
of  several  persons.     This  he  had  done,  though  taking  care 


Yugoslavia  109 

that  his  own  version  should  no  more  be  in  accurate  Serbian 
than  that  of  his  employers.  The  completed  texts  were  then 
photographed  ;  the  originals  which  had  been  concocted 
in  the  legation  were  burned  ;  and  the  photographs  were 
forwarded  to  the  Foreign  Office  in  Vienna.  Vasitch,  evi- 
dently a  cunning  blackguard,  had  however  succeeded  in 
saving  one  or  two  of  the  originals  from  destruction  and, 
after  having  used  them  for  purposes  of  blackmail,  he  was 
now  able  to  produce  them  in  support  of  his  statements. 
Professor  Masaryk,  the  eminent  Bohemian  writer  and 
politician  (now  in  safety  in  England),  took  up  the  matter  in 
the  Imperial  Delegations  and  added  to  the  damning  effect 
of  Vasitch's  confession.  He  showed  that  the  originals  were 
written  on  huge  sheets  of  paper  nearly  a  metre  in  length. 
Obviously  no  society  carrying  on  delicate  and  criminal 
negotiations  would  commit  their  minutes  to  sheets  of  this 
size,  even  if  they  had  the  folly  to  keep  any  written  record 
of  their  activities.  On  the  other  hand,  paper  of  that  size 
would  be  most  convenient  with  a  view  to  obtaining  clear 
photographic  negatives.  There  was  also  a  telegram,  supposed 
to  have  been  sent  from  Loznitza,  and  used  in  support  of 
Dr.  Friedjung's  case.  Professor  Masaryk  was  able  to  prove 
that  this  telegram  was  written  not  on  the  paper  used  for 
delivery  by  the  Serbian  postal  service,  but  on  the  paper 
provided  in  post  offices  for  the  use  of  the  public  ! 

Vasitch  was  sentenced  to  five  years'  penal  servitude. 
But  the  whole  interest  of  his  case  was  that  he  had  explained 
the  mystery  of  the  Friedjung  trial.  Baron  Forgach,  Austro- 
Hungarian  minister  at  Belgrade,  was  shown  to  have  been 
employed  in  the  fabrication  of  documents  intended  to  incul- 
pate the  government  to  which  he  was  accredited.  Society 
at  Belgrade  did  not  know  whether  to  be  indignant  at  the 


no  Yugoslavia 

foulness  of  the  plot  or  to  dissolve  into  laughter  at  the  com- 
plete discomfiture  of  the  inexpert  forger.  In  Austria- 
Hungary  there  was  an  explosion  of  wrath  from  all  unfettered 
public  opinion  at  the  abominable  iniquity  of  the  government 
and  its  incredible  clumsiness,  which  had  made  the  empire 
the  laughing-stock  of  Europe.  But  the  Court  and  the 
government  were  unrepentant.  Baron  Forgach  was  held 
to  have  discharged  his  functions  badly,  but  his  whole  crime 
consisted  in  having  been  found  out.  He  was  removed  to 
be  minister  at  Dresden,  but  shortly  afterwards  was  recalled 
to  Vienna  to  be  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs.  As  it 
was  in  this  capacity  that  he  helped  to  draft  the  ultimatum 
to  Serbia  of  July  23,  1914,  Europe  may  be  pardoned  for 
disbelieving  the  reahty  of  the  grievances  put  forward  in  that 
document,  until  it  be  proved  by  the  impartial  tribunal  of 
future  historians. 

Thus  Aerenthal's  endeavours  to  discredit  Serbia  and  to 
fix  the  guilt  of  sedition  on  the  Serbo-Croat  coalition  had 
ended  in  a  complete  fiasco.  Instead  of  scotchino-  the 
Yugoslav  movement,  he  had  enormously  strengthened  it. 
The  attempt  to  drive  a  wedge  between  the  Croats  and  the 
Serbs,  and  to  persuade  the  Croats  that  they  were  being 
betrayed  by  their  Serbian  friends  into  a  treasonable  support 
of  Serbia  against  the  monarchy,  only  succeeded  in  show- 
,  ing  to  both  parties  alike  that  there  was  justice  for  none 
but  Germans  or  Magyars  in  Austria-Hungary.  Croatian 
barristers  had  defended  the  Serbian  prisoners  at  Zagreb. 
Croatian  politicians  and  organizations  supported  their  cause. 
When  the  Zagreb  trial  showed  the  futility  of  the  govern- 
ment's efforts,  the  whole  Serbo-Croat  coalition  had  endured 
the  official  wrath  together.  From  that  time  the  Yugoslav 
ideal  was  firmly  estabHshed  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  Serbs 


Yugoslavia  i  ii 

and  Croats  alike.  Yugoslav  unity  made  rapid  strides  in 
the  domain  of  art,  letters,  and  science,  and  resulted  in  the 
formation  of  many  Serbo-Croato-Slovene  societies.  The 
van  was  led  by  the  young  Serbo-Croat  progressive  party, 
which  held  its  first  conference  at  Split  (Spalato)  in  August 
191 1,  and  defined  as  its  object  '  the  liberation  and  unifica- 
tion of  all  Southern  Slavs  into  one  single  independent 
state '.  Thus  the  persecution  of  pretended  revolutionaries 
had  produced  real  ones.  But  the  hope  that  Yugoslav  unity 
could  be  achieved  under  Serbia's  leadership  and  apart  from 
Austria-Hungary  was  even  then  not  generally  entertained. 
Serbia  had  still  her  reputation  to  make.  The  wars  of  191 2-1 3 
showed  her  in  a  new  light.  Her  victories  roused  all  the 
Southern  Slavs  to  the  height  of  enthusiasm.  If  there  were 
still  many  who  distrusted  her  and  put  their  hope  in  '  Trial- 
ism  '  after  191 3,  the  events  of  1914  have  effected  the  moral 
unification  of  the  Yugoslavs.  In  the  present  war  Serbia 
is  the  champion  and  spokesman  of  the  Southern  Slav  race. 


5 
The  Turkish  War 

Osvecheno  Kossovo. 
'  Kossovo  avenged.' 

Consider  the  position  in  which  Serbia  stood  in  the  early- 
months  of  191 2.  She  was  waiting  for  the  blow  which  was 
certain  to  come  from  Austria-Hungary.  If  possible,  it  was 
clearly  her  policy  to  strengthen  herself  by  reaching  the  sea, 
expanding  her  territory,  and  redeeming  the  Serbs  in  Turkey. 
For  any  such  enterprise  the  co-operation  of  the  other 
Balkan  States  would  be  necessary.  A  secret  convention  had 
indeed  been  signed  between  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  as  far  back 
as  1909,  but,  despite  this,  most  competent  judges  thought 
a  Balkan  League  to  be  impossible.  In  191 1  the  Grand  Vizier 
had  told  an  American  writer  that  his  time  was  too  precious 
to  waste  in  the  discussion  of  such  absurdities,  and  Hussein 
Hilmi  Pasha,  who  knew  Balkan  politics  if  any  one  did,  was 
certain  that  the  Greeks  and  Bulgars  could  never  march 
together.  All  the  Christian  states  wished  to  deliver  Mace- 
donia from  the  Turk,  but  there  their  unanimity  ended. 
Each  wished  for  a  larger  share  of  the  coveted  province  than 
the  others  would  allow.  Th£  Turkish  government  counted  '^^  uuKu^ 
on  these  rivalries  to  keep  its  enemies  divided  and  mutually  /-\V^'^ 
hostile.  ^ 

But  what  seemed  impossible  was  made  possible  by 
Turkey  herself.  Abdul  Hamid  was  no  longer  Sultan.  The 
threads  of  policy  at  Constantinople  were  in  less  cunning 

3071  jj 


114  ^  1^'^  Turkish  War 

hands.  The  Young  Turks,  who  had  been  established  in 
power  since  1909,  had  introduced  a  new  element  into  the 
government  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  No  less  arbitrary 
and  corrupt  than  their  autocratic  predecessor,  they  could 
\,^  not  make  his  appeal  to  religious  sentiment.     The  Moham- 

medan inhabitants  of  the  empire  saw  the  central  power  no 
longer  in  the  hands  of  a  single  God-appointed  ruler,  but 
put  into  commission  among  a  set  of  westernized  atheists 
and  crypto-Jews.  The  Young  Turks  indeed  took  their 
stand  on  nationality  rather  than  on  religion  as  a  bond 
of  union.  Announcing  that  religious  liberty  should  be 
accorded  to  every  creed,  they  called  upon  all  races  in  the 
empire  to  be  good  Ottomans.  But  the  old  Turkish  bureau- 
cracy could  not  change  its  skin,  nor  the  Mussulman  his 
spots.  When  the  Macedonian  population  were  disarmed 
in  1910,  there  were  numerous  cases  of  the  Turks  not  only 
not  being  relieved  of  their  weapons,  but  even  being  supplied 
with  rifles  taken  from  the  Christians.  Race  intolerance  was 
but  a  new  name  for  the  old  evil.  The  Turkish  government 
looked  with  complaisance  on  the  exodus  of  thousands  of 
the  healthiest  elements  of  the  Christian  population  of 
European  Turkey,  who  preferred  emigration  to  the  new 
privilege  of  serving  in  the  Turkish  army.  Their  places  would 
be  taken  by  Mussulmans  from  Bosnia,  who  were  welcomed, 
though  confessedly  dirty  and  lazy  and  unfamiliar  with  the 
Turkish  language.  Massacre  was  no  more  palatable  to 
those  who  endured  it  because  it  was  carried  out  in  the 
name  of  national  unity  than  it  had  been  as  the  result  of 
religious  fanaticism.  The  unfortunate  Armenians  discovered 
in  1909  that  the  Young  Turks  could  keep  up  Abdul  Hamid's 
tradition  in  this  respect.  In  19 10  followed  a  severe  persecu- 
tion of  Greeks  in   the  neighbourhood  of  Smyrna.     This 


The  Turkish  War  ii5 

acted  as  a  spur  to  the  government  of  Greece,  which  at  this 
time,  after  a  period  of  revolution  and  unrest,  was  under  the 
capable  guidance  of  M.  Venizelos.  That  striking  statesman 
had  been  summoned  from  his  native  Crete  to  be  the  saviour 
of  the  mother  country.  On  his  own  island  he  had  been 
a  leader  of  guerrilla  warfare,  and  had  caused  the  withdrawal 
of  Prince  George  of  Greece  from  the  post  of  High  Com- 
missioner. The  differences  of  view  between  the  Cretan 
statesman  and  the  Greek  Royal  Family  have  presumably 
never  been  forgotten,  and  account  to  a  large  extent  for  the 
condition  of  affairs  in  the  kingdom  to-day.  Yet  in  two  years 
M.  Venizelos  worked  a  miraculous  change  in  the  country 
of  his  adoption.  In  19 12  Greece  was  not  only  united  and 
internally  peaceful,  prosperous,  and  self-confident,  but  for 
the  first  time  she  had  an  army  which  made  her  a  desirable 
ally,  as  well  as  a  fleet  that  could  control  the  Turkish  coasts. 
M.  Venizelos  went  further  and  succeeded  in  persuading 
his  countrymen  to  join  forces  with  their  traditional  enemy, 
Bulgaria. 

Tsar  Ferdinand  of  Bulgaria,    who    may  be  regarded  as 
the  chief  director  of  the  Balkan  League,  was  anxious  to  use 
the  Serbs  and  Greeks  in  his  plans  for  ousting  the  Turk  from 
Europe  and  assuming  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkan  peninsula. 
The  increased  vigour  which  the  Young  Turks  were  attempt- 
ing to  infuse  into  the  failing  system  of  the  Ottoman  Empire   -,    . 
was  disquieting  to  one  who  looked  upon  himself  as  the  heir 
of  that  dying  organism.  He  therefore  approached  the  Serbian    (   ^ 
government,  which  was  willing  to  make  some  abatements  of    ' 
its  Macedonian  claims  in  view  of  the  opportunity  to  strike 
quickly  before  the  Austro-Hungarian  blow  should  fall.     A 
conveniently- timed  massacre  of  Macedonian  Slavs  near  Shtip, 
which  the  Bulgars  are  strongly  suspected  of  having  provoked, 

H  2 


ii6  The  Turkish  War 

roused  public  opinion  in  Sofia  to  demonstrate  in  favour  of 
war  for  the  liberation  of  Macedonia. 

The  moment  was  good.  Turkey,  though  still  a  formidable 
military  Power,  with  German  officers  in  charge  of  her  army, 
was  known  to  be  divided  in  counsel  and  corrupt  in  adminis- 
tration. The  Arabs  and  Albanians  were  in  a  state  of  chronic 
discontent.  In  fact  it  was  an  Albanian  rising  that  upset 
the  Government  in  July  and  caused  the  temporary  return 
to  power  of  a  moderate  cabinet  under  Kiamil  Pasha.  The 
irreligion  of  the  Young  Turks  and  the  presence  of  Christians 
in  the  ranks  had  destroyed  the  old  religious  unity  of  the 
troops.  Above  all,  Turkey  was  still  engaged  in  her  difficult 
task  of  fighting  Italy  in  Tripoli  across  a  sea  patrolled  by  the 
Italian  fleet. 

The  spring  and  summer  of  191 2  were  therefore  spent  in 
drawing  up  the  necessary  treaties  between  the  Balkan  Allies 
and  in  securing  the  goodwill  "of  the  Powers.  In  April 
M.  Venizelos  saw  the  German  emperor  at  his  villa  in  Corfu, 
and  the  admirers  of  the  Greek  minister  account  it  one  of 
his  great  triumphs  that  he  won  the  Kaiser's  approval  of 
the  Balkan  League.  Whether  the  Emperor  William  expected 
the  Balkan  Allies  to  attack  Turkey  and  to  be  victorious 
is  another  matter.  Very  probably  he  was  convinced  that 
the  Turkish  army  was  easily  able  to  settle  accounts  with 
the  Christian  states.  That  was  undoubtedly  the  view  of 
Austria-Hungary.  Count  Berchtold  had  taken  Aerenthal's 
place  in  the  direction  of  policy  at  Vienna,  and  was  likely 
to  prefer  diplomacy  to  war  in  the  task  of  ruining  Serbia. 
If  Serbia  joined  the  crusade  for  Macedonia  she  would 
inevitably  be  crushed,  when  it  would  be  Austria-Hungary's 
pleasant  duty  to  step  in  and  protect  the  Serbs  from  the 
results  of  their  own  folly.    Once  in  Serbia,  Austria-Hungary 


The  Turkish  War  117 

would  not  be  dislodged,  and  her  valuable  civilizing  powers 
might  be  extended  to  Albania,  Macedonia,  and  ultimately 
to  Salonika. 

With  Russia  there  was  no  difficulty.  M.  Hartwig,  the 
Russian  minister  at  Belgrade,  had  been  working  for  some 
time  to  secure  Serbo-Bulgarian  co-operation,  and  any  sign 
of  Slav  solidarity  in  the  Balkans  was  bound  to  be  welcome  p^t/A^ 
to  his  government.  The  Tsar,  indeed,  was  invited  to  be  ^^ 
guide,  philosopher  and  friend  to  the  two  States,  who  agreed 
that  he  should  be  their  arbiter  in  case  of  disagreement. 
France  and  Great  Britain  were  remote,  not  keenly  interested, 
and  unmilitary.  The  Balkan  League  could  therefore  count 
on  liberty  of  action. 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  main  points  of  the  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  alliance,  let  us  examine  the  gist  of  some  of  the 
clauses  in  the  treaties  of  1912,  as  published  in  La  Bulgarie  by 
a  Serb  calling  himself  '  Balcanicus  '.^  The  first  treaty  was 
signed  on  March  13,  191 2.  Of  this,  the  first  clause  bound 
either  State  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  other,  should 
that  other  be  attacked  by  one  or  more  enemies.  The  second 
clause  bound  either  State  to  support  the  other  should  that 
other's  interests  be  affected  by  the  invasion  of  Turkish 
territory  by  any  outside  Power.  The  third  clause  established 
that  neither  State  in  the  event  of  hostilities  would  make 
a  separate  peace. 

To  this  treaty  was  added  a  secret  annexe,  the  first  clause 
of  which  enabled  either  State  to  announce  when  the  moment 
for  action  had  come.  In  case  of  a  difference  of  opinion, 
the  matter  was  to  be  settled  by  reference  to  Russian  arbitra- 
tion. The  second  clause  was  the  vital  one  dealing  with  the 
territories  which  it  was  hoped  would  be  the  spoils  of  victory. 
^  Given  also  in  Gueshoff,  Appendix,  pp.  1 12-33. 


ii8  The  Turkish  War 

They  consisted  of  Macedonia,  witli  fringes  of  adjacent 
territory,  such  as  Old  Serbia,  the  Sandjak,  northern  Albania, 
and  western  Thrace.  Bulgaria  had  been  in  favour  of  an 
autonomous  Macedonia,  which  she  could  ultimately  annex 
at  a  favourable  opportunity.  Consequently  Serbia  insisted 
on  a  partition,  which  plan  was  adopted  in  this  clause^ 
During  the  war  the  occupied  territory  was  to  be  the  joint 
property  of  the  two  allies,  but  within  three  months  of  the 
restoration  of  peace  it  was  to  be  divided  on  the  following 
lines.  All  the  country  to  the  east  and  south  of  the  Struma 
river  and  the  Rhodope  mountains  was  guaranteed  to 
Bulgaria.  Similarly  everything  north  and  west  of  the  Shar 
Planina  range  was  to  be  as  unquestionably  Serbian.  This 
left  the  great  main  block  of  Macedonia  in  the  centre.  Acros:. 
this,  a  provisional  frontier  line  was  drawn  from  just  north 
of  Egri-Palanka  in  a  south-westerly  direction  to  Lake  Ohrida. 
This  line  crossed  the  Vardar  slightly  above  Veles  and  gave 
Bulgaria  also  the  towns  of  Ohrida,  Monastir,  and  Prilep. 
This  settlement,  however,  was  subject  to  revision  by  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  whose  decision  was  to  be  final  not  only  in 
this  respect  but  also  on  any  dispute  arising  out  of  the  treaty, 
the  annexe,  or  the  military  convention  which  followed.  We 
may  remark,  in  passing,  that  the  uncertainty  as  to  this 
division  of  territory  was  due  to  the  fact  that  while  Serbia 
claimed  nothing  south-east  of  the  line,  Bulgaria  did  not 
bind  herself  in  the  same  way  as  regards  the  north-western 
side.  Thus  there  remained  a  narrow  strip  of  country 
including  Skoplye,  whose  ultimate  fate  was  not  decided. 

This  treaty  was  followed  by  a  military  convention  signed 
on  July  I.  The  interesting  point  of  the  convention  is  that 
it  mentions  definite  details  as  to  numbers  of  troops  and 
possible  enemies.     Bulgaria,  as  the  leading  partner  in  the 


The  Turkish  War  119 

alliance,  was  to  provide  200,000  men,  Serbia  150,000.  In 
the  event  of  a  Roumanian  or  a  Turkish  attack  on  Bulgaria, 
Serbia  was  to  direct  a  force  of  not  less  than  100,000  men 
against  the  aggressor.  On  the  other  hand  Bulgaria  promised 
to  support  the  Serbs  with  200,000  men,  should  Austria- 
Hungary  attack  them  or  send  troops  into  the  Sandjak. 
Also,  should  Turkey  attack  Serbia,  Bulgaria  would  detach 
100,000  men  to  co-operate  with  her  ally  in  the  Macedonian 
theatre  of  war. 

The  Bulgarian  engagement  to  fight  Austria-Hungary 
in  case  of  necessity  is  peculiarly  interesting  in  view  of  a  later 
statement  by  M.  Daneff  in  the  course  of  a  speech  in  the 
Bulgarian  Sobranje  (Parliament)  on  May  18,  1914.  The 
speaker,  who  was  a  minister  at  the  time  of  the  treaties,  said 
that  the  military  convention  had  not  been  fully  known  to 
him,  but  that  no  statesman  in  Bulgaria  had  ever  supposed 
that  their  country  would  dream  of  making  war  on  Austria- 
Hungary,  The  clause  in  question,  he  asserted,  had  been  „ 
introduced  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  world  at  large  Hj-^  'a^ 
the  solidarity  of  the  two  allies,  neither  of  whom  expected  t  jjdUi, 
Bulgaria  actually  to  keep  the  letter  of  her  undertaking. 
Yet  later  on  Serbia  did  expect  assistance  from  Bulgaria 
against  Austria-Hungary  over  the  Serbian  conquest  of  the 
Adriatic  coast,  and  complained  that  she  did  not  receive  it.^ 
On  this  point  Bulgaria  proved  herself  to  be  an  ally  of  very 
doubtful  value. 

Meanwhile,  Greece  also  made  her  treaty  with  Bulgaria,/!^  r^{-. 
followed  by  a  military  convention  on  the  eve  of  war,  by^ 
which  she  promised  a  force  of  120,000  men  and  the  invalu-  lw.v\(,Y(fi 
able  services  of  her  fleet.     The  question  of  possible  Greek       ^^, 

^  M.  Daneff's  speech  and  M.  Gueshoff's  telegram  of  January  17,  191 3. 
Balcanicus,  pp.  107-10. 


120  The  Turkish  Way 

and  Bulgarian  accessions  of  territory  was,  however,  not 
settled.  By  clause  5  each  of  the  two  States  undertook  to 
make  no  armistice  of  more  than  24  hours  without  the  con- 
sent of  her  ally. 

One  more  treaty.  On  September  28  the  final  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  military  convention  laid  down  the  plan  of 
attack.  The  original  plan  had  been  that  the  Serbian  army, 
advancing  up  the  line  of  the  Morava,  should  be  supported 
at  the  head  of  the  Vardar  valley  by  three  Bulgarian  divisions 
coming  from  Kustendil.  This  was  now  altered.  The 
Bulgarian  army  as  a  whole  was  to  be  thrown  on  the  Maritza 
front  to  strike  at  Adrianople  and  Thrace.  One  division 
only  was  to  remain  at  Kustendil  and  co-operate  with  one 
Serbian  division  to  form  the  allied  left  vvdng  in  Macedonia. 

Meanwhile,  the  Greek  army  w^as  to  advance  northwards 
from  Thessaly  and  take  the  Turkish  Macedonian  army  in  the 
rear,  while  the  Montenegrins  made  a  diversion  in  northern 
Albania  and  the  Serbian  secondary  armies  occupied  the 
Sandjak.  The  Greek  fleet,  though  on  paper  much  weaker 
than  the  Turkish,  was  rightly  trusted  to  command  the 
Aegean  Sea  and  prevent  reinforcements  or  supplies  from 
reaching  Salonika. 

The  Montenegrins,  always  spoiling  for  a  fight  with  the 
Turk,  made  the  first  hostile  move,  and  crossed  the  frontier 
on  October  8,  intent  on  the  capture  of  Scutari,  a  far  bigger 
town  than  any  in  their  own  little  kingdom  and  one  which 
they  had  long  coveted.  The  other  three  Balkan  States  were 
then  still  considering  the  note  addressed  to  them  by  the 
Powers,  in  which  they  were  informed  that  they  could  not 
possibly  hope  to  gain  such  good  terms  for  the  Christians 
of  Macedonia  as  the  Powers  undertook  to  obtain.  The 
Powers,  therefore,  urged  them  not  to  make  war,  and  warned 


The  Turkish  War  121 

them  that  even  if  successful  they  would  not  be  allowed  to 

alter  the  map  of  the  Balkans.    The  Balkan  States  eventually  yi^Ar(<  ^^ 

replied  on  October  13,  that  they  were  much  obHged  for  the    ;^>r-' 

kind   interest    taken    by   the   Powers   in    the   Macedonian 

Christians,  but  thought  that  this  time  they  would  deal  with 

the    Sultan's   government    themselves.      They   accordingly 

sent  an  ultimatum  to  Constantinople  demanding  autonomy 

for  Turkey's  Christian  subjects  in  Europe,  together  with 

a  whole  system  of  supervision  by  officials  representing  the 

Powers  and  the  Balkan  States.     As  they  expected,  Turkey 

could  not  stand  this  insolence  from  her  former  vassals  and 

declared  war  on  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  on  October  17.    Greece 

was  omitted  from  the  declaration  of  war,  for  the  Turks 

thought  that  she  could  be  bought  out  ;    but  she  replied  by 

declaring  war  herself  on  October  18.    The  unexpected  had 

come  to    pass.     The  four  Christian  states  stood  shoulder 

to  shoulder  against  their  old  enemy. 

The  attempt  of  the  Powers  to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  I 
hostilities  is  a  little  odd  in  view  of  the  encouragement 
previously  given  to  the  Balkan  League.  It  seems  clear  that 
Russia  had  not  contemplated  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  allies  ^j^fl^, 
entering  into  a  war  with  Turkey,  who  was  generally  con- 
sidered strong  enough  to  crush  them.  The  Western  Powers 
were  anxious  only  to  prevent  hostilities  which  might  have 
far-reaching  effects  and  upset  the  general  peace  of  Europe. 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  gladly  foresaw  the  defeat 
of  the  Balkan  League,  but  joined  in  the  warning  that  no 
territorial  changes  would  be  allowed,  probably  in  order  that 
the  victorious  Turks  should  not  be  able  to  regain  any  of  their 
lost  empire.  Anyhow,  the  diplomats  of  Europe  were  accus- 
tomed to  dealing  very  slowly,  cautiously,  and  ineffectively 
with  the  Eastern  Question,  and  were  amazed  at  the  audacity 


122  The  Turkish  War 

of  the  Allies  in  taking  the  initiative  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
Powers.  No  one  knew  what  complications  might  not  follow 
if  Balkan  difficulties  were  tackled  in  this  summary  fashion. 
Issues  would  not  be  lacking  over  which  a  European  war  might 
break  out.  But  the  Balkan  Leaguers  were  not  going  to  be 
stopped.  They  had  seen  the  results  of  thirty  years  of  talk 
about  Macedonia.  They  had  now  got  the  bit  between  their 
teeth  and  they  bolted  straight  for  the  Turkish  fence. 

Now  what  was  the  position  of  the  Serbs  when  they  entered 
the  war  on  October  17  ?  Against  them  they  had  a  still  re- 
doubtable enemy.  The  Italian  complication  was  at  once  re- 
moved, for  the  Turks  made  peace  with  Italy  in  order  to  devote 
their  full  attention  to  the  war  in  Europe.  The  best  troops 
which  the  Turks  had  been  able  to  collect  they  had  sent  to 
Macedonia  under  the  command  of  Zeki  Pasha.  The  mobiliza- 
tion had  worked  with  unexpected  smoothness  and  accuracy 
under  the  direction  of  German  officers.  The  Serbs'  own  army 
had  been  untried  for  nearly  thirty  years  and  did  not  enjoy 
a  high  reputation.  Their  allies  of  Greece  and  Bulgaria  could 
hardly  be  counted  as  whole-hearted  and  devoted  friends.  On 
their  flank  were  the  hostile  Albanians.  And  in  their  rear  was 
the  constant  menace  of  Austria-Hungary  ready  to  cross  the 
Serbian  frontier  should  the  Serbs  be  defeated.  To  these, 
then,  victory  was  essential,  and  all  ranks  knew  it. 

In  Serbia  military  service  is  universal,  and  required  from 
the  age  of  twenty-one  to  that  of  forty-six :  two  years  with  the 
colours,  nine  in  the  reserve,  eight  in  the  second  ban,  and  six 
in  the  third  ban.  Lads  from  seventeen  to  twenty  and  men 
from  forty-six  to  fifty  can  be  called  out  for  home  defence  in 
time  of  war.  There  was  a  small  core  of  permanent  officers  and 
N.C.O.s,  and  the  first  ban  was  admirably  equipped,  but  the 


The  Turkish  War  123 

general  appearance  of  the  army  was  not  professional.  The  men 
of  the  second  and  third  bans  brought  their  own  ponies,  horses, 
carts,  and  equipment.  The  transport  service  consisted  mainly 
of  the  peasants'  ox- wagons.  The  country  was  poor  and  could 
not  afford  more  elaborate  arrangements.  But  out  of  a 
population  of  less  than  three  millions  she  furnished  an  army 
of  over  400,000  men — nearly  100,000  more  than  had  been 
expected — an  army  soon  to  be  recognized  as  the  equal  of  any 
fighters  in  the  world. 

There  were  two  deficiencies  in  the  war  material  of  the  army 
which,  while  not  affecting  the  issue  of  the  military  operations, 
caused  the  Serbs  severe  losses.  Had  they  possessed  aeroplanes 
they  would  have  known  the  exact  disposition  of  the  Turkish 
troops  in  the  battles  at  Kumanovo  and  Prilep  ;  and  their 
poverty  in  mountain  artillery  was  responsible  for  the  check 
they  received  before  the  strong  positions  at  the  Babuna 
Pass  and  at  Oblakovo  near  Monastir.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Serbs  alone  of  the  Allies  had  foreseen  the  supreme  value 
of  heavy  artillery  in  modern  war.  Their  guns  were  French 
and  excellent,  and  later  on  were  borrowed  by  the  Bulgars  Cfh^^ 
to  batter  down  the  defences  of  Adrianople,  where  the 
dominance  of  heavy  pieces  over  permanent  works  was  first 
demonstrated  in  European  warfare. 

The  old  days  of  courtier-generals  were  gone.  The  Serbs 
now  had  generals  whom  they  trusted  to  lead  them  with 
vigour  and  scientific  skill.  General  Putnik,  an  old  hero  of 
the  wars  of  1876-8,  was  placed  in  supreme  command,  and 
for  him  King  Peter  revived  the  ancient  title  of  '  Voivoda ', 
which  corresponds  literally  to  the  mediaeval  English  title  of 
'  duke  '  and  to  the  modern  military  rank  of  '  Field-Marshal '. 
The  Chief-of-Staif  was  Colonel  Mishitch  (now  '  Voivoda  ' 
and  commanding  the  First  Serbian  Army),  the  ablest  living 


frof^ 


124  The  Turkish  War 

master  of  the  art  of  war  in  the  difficult  Balkan  country.  In 
charge  of  theSerbo-Bulgarian  force  advancing  from  Kustendil 
was  General  Stepan  Stepanovitch  (now  also  '  Voivoda  ',  and 
commanding  the  Second  Army),  a  retiring  personality,  hardly 
known  except  as  a  devotee  of  his  profession. 

But  above  all  other  advantages  the  Serbian  army  possessed 
the  strength  that  comes  from  complete  unity  between  all| 
ranks  and  a  common  determination  to  conquer  or  die,  but 
neither  to  return  defeated  nor  to  halt  before  they  had  driven  j 
the  Turk  from  their  own  ancestral  lands.     The  soldiers  had, ' 
too,  the  moral  force — peculiar  to  a  mystical  and  traditionalist 
people — that  comes  from  visions  of  past  saints  and  heroes. 
They  saw  the  victors  of  their  faith  and  nation  once  more 
leading  the  way  to  victory. 

A  French  journalist  gives  us  an  example  of  the  spirit  that 
animated  them.  The  attack  on  the  Babuna  Pass  was  en- 
trusted to  the  Morava  division.  The  Turks  held  a  string  of 
positions  admirably  fortified  on  heights  of  more  than  4,000  ft. 
When  the  Fifth  regiment,  after  clambering  up  the  precipi- 
tous slopes  where  no  artillery  support  was  possible,  had  estab- 
lished itself  in  the  captured  Turkish  lines,  all  its  officers  and 
two-thirds  of  the  men  were  dead.  A  wounded  soldier  re- 
counted the  attack  to  M.  Barby,  a  war  correspondent :  '  We 
were  advancing  up  a  sort  of  funnel.  The  Turks  overwhelmed 
us  with  a  hail  of  bullets  and  shrapnel.  We  fell,  but  we  still 
advanced.  Suddenly  .  .  .  everything  spun  round  me  and 
I  lost  consciousness.  Yet  still  I  heard  the  voice  of  my 
lieutenant,  "  Forward,  my  brothers.  See,  the  tower  of 
Kralyevitch  Marko  !  " '  ^ 

In  a  cavern  in  those  hills,  so  says  the  Serbian  legend,  is 
Marko  sleeping.    His  sword  is  driven  into  the  rock.    Beside 

^  Barby,  p.  1 14. 


The  Turkish  War  125 

him  is  his  horse,  Sharatz,  nibbling  the  moss.  Some  day  the 
sword  will  fall  with  a  clatter  on  the  stony  floor  of  the  cave  ; 
Marko  will  wake,  and  mounting  Sharatz  will  call  his  country- 
men to  the  last  victorious  onslaught  against  the  Moslem. 
Many  a  Serb  saw  Marko  in  those  days  of  November  1912  and 
charged  under  his  leadership  '  za  krst  chasni  i  slobodu  zlatnu  ' 
— '  for  the  holy  cross  and  golden  liberty  '. 

Mr.  Crawfurd  Price  recounts  how  he  discussed  the  battle 
of  Kumanovo  with  a  schoolmaster  who  was  serving  as  a 
private  in  the  Serbian  army.  '  What  gave  you ',  he  asked, 
*  such  tremendous  Man  after  the  severe  gruelling  you  received 
during  the  first  day's  fight  ?  '  '  Well,'  the  Serb  replied 
quietly,  *  during  the  combat  we  all  saw  St.  Sava,  robed  in 
white,  and  seated  in  a  white  chariot  drawn  by  white  horses, 
leading  us  on  to  victory.'  ^ 

Let  us  now  follow  the  outlines  of  the  campaign.  The 
Turkish  General  Staff,  who  were  confident  of  success  against 
opponents  whom  they  despised,  had  prepared  a  plan  which, 
if  successful,  bid  fair  to  end  the  war  with  great  rapidity. 
While  a  small  force  held  back  the  Greeks  in  the  mountains 
to  the  south,  the  main  Turkish  army  was  to  advance  from 
Skoplye,  defeat  the  Serbs  in  one  crucial  battle  at  Kumanovo, 
and  then  march  straight  on  Sofia,  annihilating  General 
Stepanovitch's  force  on  the  way.  The  Bulgarian  army  in 
Thrace  would  then  be  between  two  fires  and  would  offer  but 
little  resistance.  Kumanovo,  therefore,  was  the  decisive 
point  of  the  whole  war,  and  Turkish  staflF  officers  referred  to 
it  as  the  '  great  battle '  that  was  to  give  them  the  victory. 

With  this  object  Zeki  Pasha's  troops  attacked  the  Crown 
Prince  Alexander's  main  Serbian  army  on  October  23,  before 
^  Crawfurd  Price,  Balkan  Cockpit,  p.  154. 


126  The  Turkish  War 

the  Serbian  concentration  was  complete.  All  day  they  were  | 
held  by  the  Serbian  infantry,  who,  however,  had  to  fall  back 
inch  by  inch,  till  in  the  nick  of  time  the  guns  and  reinforce- 
ments reached  them.  As  the  day  closed  the  Turks  made  a  last 
supreme  effort.  The  two  races  were  locked  in  a  desperate 
struggle.  Bit  by  bit  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet  the  Serbs 
pressed  their  opponents  back  and  drove  them  once  more  into 
their  positions. 

Next  day  it  was  the  Serbs'  turn  to  take  the  offensive. 
Supported  by  the  fire  of  their  gunners,  they  broke  the 
Turkish  line  and  hurled  the  enemy  in  headlong  rout.  As 
soon  as  the  retreat  sounded,  Zeki  Pasha's  army  became  a 
flying  rabble.  Efforts  were  made  to  re-form  them  at  Skoplye, 
but  they  fled  on  southwards,  and  the  Serbs  entered  the  ancient 
capital  of  their  nation  without  a  blow.  Nor  did  the  Turks 
halt  at  Veles,  their  next  line  of  defence,  but  turning  to  the 
south-west  took  up  the  almost  impregnable  position  on  the 
Babuna  mountains,  of  which  we  have  already  spoken.  For 
three  days  desperate  lighting  ensued,  until  at  last  the  Serbs 
won  through  on  November  4  and  descended  into  the  Mona- 
stir  plain  to  occupy  Prilep.  The  Serbs  say  that  the  struggle 
for  the  Babuna  Pass  was  the  hardest  of  all  the  campaign,  and 
it  cost  them  dear,  but  they  had  driven  the  Turks  to  their  last 
defences  at  Monastir.  Old  Serbia  was  theirs  and  they  awaited 
the  final  act  of  the  drama  in  supreme  spiritual  exaltation. 

They  paused  at  Prilep  to  recover  from  the  slaughter  at  the 
pass,  and  this  delay  enabled  their  enemy  to  put  the  final 
touches  to  the  trenches  on  the  hills  round  Monastir.  The 
Turks  were  still  formidable.  They  have  always  been  magni- 
ficent in  defence.  Their  commander,  Djavid  Pasha,  had  just 
put  heart  into  them  by  the  oneTurkish  success  recorded  in  the 
Macedonian  campaign.    The  fifth  division  of  the  Greek  army, 


The  Turkish  War  127 

incautiously  pushing  northwards  from  Sorovitch,  had  come 
up  into  the  Monastir  plain  and  occupied  Banitza  on  Novem- 
ber I.  Djavid,  who  had  been  luring  them  on,  fell  upon  the 
Greeks  the  next  day  and  drove  them  back  over  the  hills, 
attacked  them  again  on  the  5th  and  scattered  them  towards 
the  south.    Then  he  returned  to  face  the  Serbs. 

We  have  discovered  in  the  present  war  what  a  strong  posi- 
tion Monastir  is.  For  months  now  the  allied  armies,  though 
possessed  of  the  town,  have  been  unable  to  move  the  Ger- 
mano-Bulgarian  forces  from  the  hills  that  dominate  it.  To 
the  north  and  west  the  mountains  present  every  opportunity 
for  defence.  To  the  east  and  south  stretches  the  bare  plain, 
offering  no  cover  for  an  attacking  army.  In  addition  to  this 
the  early  winter  of  191 2  was  unusually  gloomy  and  wet,  and 
when  the  Serbian  troops  moved  forward  on  November  13 
they  found  that  the  Tserna  had  overflowed  its  bank  and  con- 
verted itself  into  a  vast  lake. 

With  the  mountains  on  one  side  and  the  wide  marshes  and 
floods  on  the  other  the  Serbs  had  to  contend  with  terrible 
obstacles.  For  five  days  the  battle  raged  with  varying 
fortunes.  On  the  fifth  (November  19)  the  Turks  were  finally 
dislodged  from  Oblakovo  (to  the  north-west  of  Monastir)  and 
their  retreat  to  Albania  thus  threatened.  Meanwhile  the 
Danube  division  had  crossed  the  mile-and-a-half  of  Tserna 
water  that  lay  to  the  east.  Holding  hands  to  avoid  being 
swept  away  in  the  rapid  and  ice-cold  currents,  those  superb 
soldiers  moved  slowly  onward  under  the  hail  of  Turkish  fire, 
gained  the  dry  land,  fixed  their  bayonets,  and  rushed  upon  the 
batteries  that  had  been  playing  upon  them.  The  attack  was 
now  closing  in  on  all  sides,  and  the  Turkish  commander 
decided  to  retire  with  the  remains  of  his  army  while  there 
was  yet  time.    Leaving  behind  10,000  prisoners  and  a  vast 


128  The  Turkish  War 

quantity  of  war  material,  Djavid  Pasha  and  all  that  was  left 
of  the  Turkish  army  of  Macedonia  moved  off  to  Ohrida  and 
thence  to  Albania,  where  his  troops  passed  the  winter,  return- 
ing to  Constantinople  by  sea  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

In  less  than  a  month  the  Serbs  had  cleared  all  northern 
and  central  Macedonia  of  the  power  which  for  more  than  five 
centuries  had  held  the  whole  country  in  its  grip.  Nor  had 
they  employed  all  their  forces.  After  Kumanovo  two  divi- 
sions had  been  detached  and  sent  off  to  Thrace  to  support 
the  Bulgars  in  front  of  Adrianople.  As  for  a  Bulgarian  force 
which  had  been  attached  to  the  extreme  left  of  the  Serbian 
army,  after  three  days'  fighting  its  commanding  officer  in- 
formed his  Serbian  chief  that  he  had  news  of  a  Turkish  con- 
centration at  Radovishte  and  that  he  proposed  to  move  south 
and  engage  the  enemy.  Though  the  information,  whether 
actually  received  or  not,  was  untrue,  the  Bulgars  did  not 
return,  but  pushed  on  towards  Salonika  in  a  desperate  hurry 
to  reach  that  coveted  city  before  their  Greek  allies. 

While  Macedonia  was  thus  summarily  cleared  of  the 
Turkish  armies,  the  other  Serbian  forces  were  hastening  to 
occupy  the  territory  which  according  to  treaty  was  to  be 
incontestably  annexed  to  their  country.  General  Yanko- 
vitch's  troops  came  through  the  mountains  on  to  the  historic 
plain  of  Kossovo  where  their  ancestors  had  fallen  before  the 
Turkish  conqueror.  Without  an  order  the  Serbian  soldiers 
saluted  the  hallowed  ground  ;  and  a  curious  legend  had  a 
quaint  fulfilment.  The  plain  is  covered  in  parts  with  white 
pebbles  said  to  have  been  the  bread  of  the  Christian  host  at 
the  great  battle.  By  a  miracle  these  had  been  turned  into 
stones,  on  which  the  hungry  Turks  only  broke  their  teeth. 
For  five  centuries  the  Serbs  awaited  the  day  when  they  should 
return  and  eat  the  bread  of  Kossovo.    Now,  in  October  1912, 


The  Turkish  War  129 

General  Yankovitch's  soldiers  arrived  at  Mitrovitza  weary 
and  famished,  and  there  in  the  station  were  eight  abandoned 
wagons  of  ration  biscuits.  The  bread  of  Kossovo  !  The 
old  debt  was  paid. 

During  the  nineteenth  century  the  Serbian  population  of 
the  plain  had  been  diminishing  before  the  influx  of  Albanians, 
and  the  land  was  being  increasingly  left  untilled.  To  avoid 
persecution  and  massacre  the  Serbs  had  taken  to  the  Albanian 
dress  and  language,  at  any  jate  in  public.  '  Brothers,'  said 
one  old  Serb  as  he  led  a  crowd  of  these  unfortunate  people  to 
greet  the  invading  army,  '  Brothers,  it  was  time  you  came  ; 
we  have  waited  live  hundred  years  for  you  ;  but  in  a  few 
years  you  would  have  found  no  one  left.' 

The  Albanians,  who  had  assured  the  Turkish  General  Staff 
that  they  could  deal  with  the  Serbian  army,  showed  them- 
selves useless  in  modern  warfare  and  put  up  but  the  feeblest 
resistance.  The  Serbs  occupied  the  Sandjak  and  pressed  on 
through  the  mountains  to  help  their  Montenegrin  comrades 
to  besiege  Scutari.  That  march,  through  the  inhospitable 
wilds  of  northern  Albania,  was  in  itself  one  of  the  great  feats 
of  the  war.  A  difficult  matter  at  any  time,  it  was  rendered 
a  tremendous  effort  of  endurance  by  the  severity  of  the  winter 
weather.  At  last  they  came  to  the  ports  of  Medua  and 
Durazzo.  When  from  the  last  lines  of  hills  the  soldiers  saw 
the  sea,  all  recognized  the  solemnity  of  the  moment  in  the  fi^Ji/f^^ 
history  of  their  race.  The  door  of  national  freedom  lay  open 
to  them.  There  was  the  open  sea  across  which  Serbia  could 
join  without  hindrance  in  the  commerce  and  the  civilization 
of  the  world.  In  perfect  order  they  marched  to  the  beach  at 
Durazzo.  The  Serbian  tricolour  was  planted  in  the  water, 
and  as  the  red,  blue,  and  white  fluttered  out  on  the  breeze  a 
threefold  shout  was  raised  of  '  Zhivelo  Serbsko  more  '  ('  Three 

2071  I 


130  The  Turkish  War 

cheers  for  the  Serbian  sea  ').  That  evening  the  doctors 
attended  to  a  hundred  and  forty-seven  men  whose  feet  were 
frozen,  but  who  had  been  determined  with  the  help  of  their 
comrades  to  reach  the  shore  and  take  their  part  in  saluting 
the  Serbian  sea. 

•  ••••••"• 

From  the  south  the  Greek  army  had  done  its  share.  If 
it  did  not  face  a  very  serious  enemy,  at  any  rate  it  proceeded 
to  crumple  him  up  with  the  utmost  dispatch.  Passing 
through  Verria  the  Crown  Prince  Constantine  engaged  the 
Turks  at  Yenidje-Vardar,  and  drove  them  like  sheep  back  on 
to  Salonika,  which  he  entered  as  conqueror  on  November  9. 
The  Greeks  had  at  once  set  about  the  organization  of  govern- 
ment in  the  great  prize  that  had  fallen  to  them,  when  next 
day  to  their  surprise  and  disgust  a  Bulgarian  force  arrived, 
claiming  to  have  fought  their  way  at  great  sacrifice  to 
Salonika.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Turks  made  no  organized 
resistance  in  the  country  immediately  north  of  the  town,  and 
the  Bulgars  appear  to  have  described  as  a  great  battle  their 
own  very  questionable  act  of  firing  on  the  Turkish  rabble 
who  had  already  surrendered  to  the  Greeks.  The  Bulgars, 
deeply  chagrined  to  find  themselves  a  day  too  late,  asked  that 
at  any  rate  two  battalions  should  be  allowed  to  occupy 
quarters  in  Salonika.  On  receiving  permission  for  that 
number  of  troops,  they  promptly  marched  in  ten  battalions 
with  cavalry  and  guns.  And  so  began  the  curious  dual  occu- 
pation of  Salonika  and  its  environs  which  provoked  many 
quarrels  and  outbreaks,  and  continued  until  the  following 
July,  when  the  second  Balkan  war  ended  an  impossible 
situation. 

So  in  December  191 2  the  Serbs  were  masters  of  more  terri- 
tory than  they  had  ever  expected  to  conquer.    The  Greeks 


The  Turkish  War  131 

had  far  exceeded  their  own  wildest  expectations.  The  Monte- 
negrins, though  not  in  Scutari,  were  certain  of  expansion. 
All  were  ready  for  peace.  But  Bulgaria's  success  had  not  been 
equal  to  her  ambitions.  Until  she  was  assured  not  only  of 
Macedonia  but  also  of  Thrace,  that  is  to  say  by  far  the  greater 
part  of  the  whole  allied  conquests,  she  had  no  intention  of 
laying  down  her  arms.  I  think  it  is  easy  to  see  the  Bulgarian 
view  of  the  situation  and  to  sympathize  with  the  Bulgars. 
Theirs  was  the  largest  and  most  powerful  of  the  allied  armies. 
Their  first  overwhelming  successes  had  been  trumpeted 
abroad  as  the  really  decisive  victories  of  the  war,  till  they 
themselves  believed  that  they  had  borne  the  whole  burden  of 
the  serious  fighting.  By  mid- November  they  had  driven  back 
the  Turks  to  the  fortified  line  of  Chataldja  and  settled  dowoi 
to  the  siege  of  Adrianople.  Macedonia  had  been  their  real 
objective,  though  the  plan  of  campaign  demanded  that  they 
should  fight  in  Thrace.  But  they  had  been  carried  forward 
by  their  own  impetus,  and  Tsar  Ferdinand  was  now  deter- 
mined to  instal  himself  in  Constantinople,  the  ancient  capital 
of  the  Eastern  Emperors.  Kiamil  Pasha  offered  to  negotiate 
for  peace,  but  Bulgaria  was  still  on  the  flood-tide  of  success 
and  the  order  was  given  for  the  attack  on  Chataldja.  For 
three  days  (November  17-19)  her  troops  hurled  themselves 
against  the  fortifications.  But  the  Turks  had  pulled  them- 
selves together  and  finally  succeeded  in  repelling  their  enemy. 
This  check,  which  had  all  the  appearance  of  being  perma- 
nent, combined  with  the  sickness  and  fatigue  from  which  the 
Bulgars  were  suffering,  caused  Ferdinand  to  incline  towards 
an  armistice.  The  Greeks,  seeing  the  opportunity  the  Turks 
would  thus  obtain  for  hurrying  up  fresh  troops  and  trans- 
porting them  to  Thrace,  objected  to  the  suggestion,  and 
offered  to  force  the  Dardanelles  by  a  combined  military  and 

I  2 


132  The  Turkish  War 

naval  offensive.  Bulgaria,  w^ho  evidently  did  not  want  her 
allies  interfering  in  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  did  not  deign  to 
reply  to  this  proposal.  On  the  contrary  on  December  3 
Bulgaria,  speaking  in  the  name  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro, 
made  an  armistice  with  the  Turks,  in  violation,  it  will  be 
remembered,  of  clause  5  of  the  Bulgaro-Greek  military 
convention.  Greece,  who  held  the  sea,  refused  to  abandon 
hostilities,  and  continued  her  blockade,  thereby  being  of  the 
utmost  assistance  to  the  Bulgars  as  she  prevented  Turkey 
from  pouring  troops  into  Dedeagatch  and  falling  on  the 
Bulgarian  flank. 

Despite  this  difference  among  the  Allies,  all  five  Balkan 
States  agreed  to  send  their  delegates  to  London  to  discuss 
terms  of  peace  under  the  chairmanship  of  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
While  the  conference  continued  the  Greek  fleet  controlled 
the  Aegean,  and  the  three  surviving  Turkish  fortresses  of 
Scutari,  Yannina,  and  Adrianople  were  not  to  be  re-victualled 
or  supplied  in  any  way. 

The  Turks  had  received  a  terrible  blow  to  their  self- 
respect.  If  they  had  been  nothing  else,  they  had  always  been 
esteemed  by  friends  and  enemies  to  be  mighty  warriors.  Yet 
in  less  than  a  month  they  had  been  driven  from  almost  the 
whole  of  their  European  possessions.  To  many  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Macedonia  the  sudden  collapse  of  the  age-long 
Turkish  domination  seemed  incredible.  The  Turks  had  often 
been  defeated  by  Austria  and  Russia,  but  it  had  never  seemed 
to  make  much  difference.  The  Empire  of  the  East  had  re- 
mained theirs.-^ 

^  In  October  1916,  one  Company  A.S.C.  (M.T.)  were  billeted  in  the 
little  mountain  village  of  Batachin,  near  Ostrovo.  The  \411agers  were 
convinced  that  the  Turks  had  come  back.  It  was  only  when  the  Company 
paid  for  their  billets  that  the  people  saw  their  mistake. 


The  Turkish  War  i33 

The  Turks  were  certain  now  by  diplomacy  and  delay  to 
attempt  the  recovery  of  what  had  been  lost  on  the  field  of 
battle.  Still,  Kiamil  Pasha's  government  was  moderate  and 
had  not  to  live  up  to  the  nationalist  reputation  of  the  Young 
Turks.  It  was  therefore  hoped  that  the  end  of  the  year  would 
see  peace  restored. 


The  Bulgarian  War 

Neka  dodje  na  nyega  pogibao  nenadna,  i  mrezha  koyu  ye  namyestio  neka 
iilovi  nyega,  neka  on  u  nyu  padne  na  pogibao.    Psalm  xxxv.  8. 

In  December  191 2  the  Allies  had  possessed  themselves 
of  all  the  territory  for  which  they  had  entered  the  war. 
Serbia  had  overrun  her  portion — the  Sandjak,  Old  Serbia, 
and  northern  Albania — and  her  troops  were  in  occupation 
of  all  northern  Macedonia.  But  now  the  sinister  figure  of 
Austria-Hungary  began  to  appear  upon  the  scene.  It  was 
immediately  after  M.  Daneff,  the  Bulgarian  minister,  had 
paid  a  visit  to  Buda-Pesth  that  Austria-Hungary  first 
indicated  that  the  Serbs  would  not  be  left  in  possession  of 
the  strip  of  Adriatic  coast  to  w^hich  they  had  penetrated. 
Ever  since  the  first  Serbian  victories  the  cabinets  of  Vienna 
and  Buda-Pesth  had  shown  their  irritation  at  the  failure  of 
Turkey  to  crush  their  southern  neighbour.  Assuming  the 
championship  of  the  Albanian  '  nation  ',  they  adopted 
a  threatening  tone  towards  Serbia.  200,000  troops,  the 
units  being  of  German  and  Magyar  race,  were  massed  along 
the  frontier.  The  Save  and  the  Danube  were  carefully 
mined.  Officers  crossed  the  rivers  to  photograph  the 
Serbian  bank.  Monitors  flashed  their  searchlights  on  the 
royal  palace  and  amused  themselves  by  rushing  past  the 
wharves  of  Belgrade,  upsetting  the  boats  moored  along 
the  shore.  A  few  kilometres  from  the  city  shells  fell  close 
to  a  number  of  customs  officials.  A  monstrous  agitation 
was  raised  against  Serbia  by  the  war-party  at  Vienna  over 


The  Bulgarian  War  135 

what  was  known  as  the  Prochaska  affair.  It  was  roundly 
asserted  that  M.  Prochaska,  Austro-Hungarian  consul  at 
Prizren,  had  been  brutally  insulted  and  even  mutilated  by 
the  Serbs  in  their  advance  southwards.  For  a  month  every 
means  was  used  to  persuade  the  old  emperor  and  his  govern- 
ment that  the  monarchy  had  been  outraged  and  that  war 
was  an  absolute  necessity.  At  the  end  of  that  time  the 
investigations  of  an  Austrian  consular  official  at  Prizren 
proved  that  the  whole  story  was  an  infamous  fabrication 
of  those  who  were  determined  to  fix  a  quarrel  upon  Serbia. 

But  the  Serbs  were  not  to  be  provoked  into  any  ill-timed 
act  of  resentment.  Their  main  desire  now  was  to  conclude 
peace  with  the  Turks  as  soon  as  possible,  lest  these  Austro- 
Hungarian  demonstrations  should  develop  into  something 
more  serious.  But  the  Bulgars  would  have  no  peace  which 
did  not  give  them  Adrianople.  While  the  discussions  and 
disputes  on  that  point  were  still  proceeding,  a  coup  d'etat 
in  Constantinople  suddenly  changed  the  Turkish  govern- 
ment and  restored  the  state  of  war  in  the  Balkans. 

If  what  one  reads  of  that  revolution  at  the  time  is  true, 
it  makes  a  rather  curious  tragi-comedy.  In  January  191 3 
Enver  Bey  (now  Pasha)  and  a  group  of  the  Young  Turk 
leaders  decided  to  make  another  bid  for  power.  They 
understood  that  the  Cabinet  had  actually  come  to  terms 
with  the  Allies  and  agreed  to  surrender  Adrianople.  Here 
was  an  admirable  means  of  overthrowing  Kiamil's  govern- 
ment. They  would  appeal  to  Turkish  opinion  against 
the  traitors  who  were  handing  over  the  fortress  and  holy 
city  to  the  infidels.  At  the  same  time  they  would  not  be 
under  the  dire  necessity  of  continuing  the  desperate  struggle 
of  war,  for  they  would  hold  themselves  obliged  to  stand  by 
the  plighted  word  of  the  late  ministers,  on  whom  the  odium 


136  The  Bulgarian  War 

of  the  loss  of  Adrianoplc  would  fall.  So  on  January  23  Enver 
and  his  associates  entered  the  building  where  the  Cabinet 
was  assembled.  Nazim  Pasha,  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
was  in  the  corridor.  Enver  shot  him,  and  then  proceeded 
to  arrest  the  other  ministers.  The  Young  Turks  assumed 
the  reins  of  power  and  formed  a  new  government.  But  in 
the  late  ministry  had  been  an  astute  Armenian,  Nourred- 
dungian  EfTendi,  who  had  had  his  suspicions  that  some 
trouble  was  brewing  and  had  consequently  delayed  a  final 
decision  on  the  question  of  Adrianople.  Thus  the  Young 
Turks  found  the  matter  still  unsettled  and  themselves  in 
the  same  dilemma  as  their  predecessors.  They  had  to 
choose  between  surrendering  the  coveted  city  or  continuing 
the  apparently  hopeless  attempt  to  expel  the  Bulgars  from 
Thrace.  Urged  thereto  by  their  German  counsellors,  they 
decided  to  re-open  hostilities. 

On  January  29,  therefore,  the  conference  at  London 
dissolved,  though  not  before  the  Bulgars  had  claimed  the 
future  possession  of  Dibra.  Observe  where  Dibra  lies.  It 
is  well  to  the  north-western  or  Serbian  side  of  the  pre- 
arranged partition  line,  and  the  claim  showed  that  the 
Bulgars  had  no  intention  of  being  bound  by  that  division, 
which  had  assigned  to  them  all  the  most  valuable  portion 
of  Macedonia.  They  clearly  wished  to  drive  a  thick  wedge 
of  Bulgarian  territory — at  its  narrowest  the  whole  distance 
from  Dibra  to  Ohrida — between  Serbia  and  Greece.  Thus 
Serbia,  now  expelled  from  the  Adriatic  coast,  would  find 
herself  hemmed  in  more  completely  than  before  her  vic- 
torious campaign.  Instead  of  easy-going  Turkey  to  the 
south  she  would  now  have  Bulgaria  and  the  new  Albania, 
both  States  in  the  Austrian  service. 

The   war    now    resolved    itself  into    a    struggle  for  the 


The  Bulgarian  War  137 

capture  of  the  three  Turkish  fortresses.  Yannina  fell  to 
the  Greeks  on  March  4.  But  Adrianople  continued  to  defy 
its  besiegers.  To  reduce  it  the  Bulgars  were  obliged  to 
borrow  the  Serbian  heavy  artillery,  which  now  joined  the 
two  divisions  already  sent  to  the  Thracian  front.  I  suppose 
we  should  be  right  in  saying  that  the  power  of  heavy  guns 
to  batter  down  any  permanent  fortifications  was  first 
demonstrated  in  European  warfare,  not  at  Liege  and  Namur, 
but  at  Adrianople.  Anyhow  the  Serbian  gunners  caused  the 
surrender  of  Ekmetchikei  and  the  adjacent  high  ground  on 
March  25.  This  sealed  the  fate  of  the  city,  which  capitulated 
the  next  day.  To  prevent  his  Allies  from  receiving  the 
credit  of  their  success.  General  Savoff,  the  Bulgarian 
Commander-in-Chief,  ordered  General  Ivanoff,  commanding 
before  Adrianople,  on  no  account  to  allow  Shukri  Pasha  to 
surrender  to  the  Serbs.  Unfortunately  for  that  plan 
Shukri  Pasha  had  already  done  so  when  the  order  arrived. 

With  the  fall  of  Adrianople  Bulgaria's  war  with  Turkey 
practically  ceased.  The  situation  in  Thrace  was  one  of 
stale-mate.  The  Turks  were  beaten  back  to  their  last  line 
of  defence,  but  that  last  line  could  not  be  forced.  Bulgaria 
began  to  turn  her  thoughts  to  the  division  of  the  conquered 
territories  and  to  very  probable  trouble  with  her  Allies. 
Troops  began  to  move  across  towards  the  Serbian  and  Greek 
provisional  frontiers.  An  attempt  was  made  to  retain  the 
two  divisions  and  the  guns  lent  by  the  Serbian  army,  but,  as 
these  began  to  march  away  homewards,  transport  was  at  last 
placed  at  their  disposal,  though  they  were  hurried  through 
Sofia  to  avoid  any  demonstrations  of  enthusiasm  by  the 
people  for  the  conquerors  of  Adrianople. 

While  they  treated  privately  for  an  armistice  with  the 
Turks   (contrary   again   to   the   treaties   with   Greece   and 


I     138  <—   The  Bulgarian  War 

Serbia)  the  Bulgars  were  preparing  to  gather  in  for  them- 
selves the  entire  fruits  of  victory.  The  more  moderate 
among  them  did  riot  aim  at  anything  less  than  the  big 
Bulgaria  of  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  reduced  by  the 
minimum  of  concessions  to  Serbia,  and  increased  by  the 
territory  of  Adrianople.  M.  Gueshoff,  the  Prime  Minister 
and  leader  of  this  '  moderate  '  party,  proposed  to  secure 
the  frontiers  laid  down  at  San  Stefano,  with  the  cession, 
however,  of  Salonika  to  Greece.  The  more  grasping  policy, 
which  ultimately  prevailed,  would  have  made  Salonika 
a  Bulgarian  port  and  pushed  the  Greeks  south  of  the  Vis- 
tritza  river.  To  support  these  aspirations  the  Bulgarian 
army  began  to  take  up  its  position  along  the  provisional 
frontier  in  eastern  and  central  Macedonia. 

Whilst  the  Allies  were  thus  moving  slowly  towards  a 
second  struggle,  a  far  more  overwhelming  war-cloud  was 
arising  in  Albania.  The  one  remaining  Turkish  fortress  of 
Scutari  had  long  proved  too  strong  for  the  Montenegrins 
and  the  Serbian  force  that  had  crossed  the  mountains  to 
their  assistance.  Essad  Pasha,  one  of  the  very  few  men  who 
have  in  recent  times  exercised  a  widespread  authority  in 
Albania,  had  supplanted  his  chief  in  the  command  of  the 
garrison  and  was  conducting  a  spirited  resistance.  The 
Montenegrins,  however,  were  determined  to  have  Scutari, 
a  far  larger  town  than  any  in  their  own  little  kingdom,  and 
one  which  they  hoped  to  make  their  capital.  At  last  on 
April  23  the  place  surrendered  and  King  Nicholas  entered 
it  in  triumph,  after  a  costly  siege  of  nearly  seven  months. 
\y  Then  the  blow  fell.  Austria-Hungary,  intent  on  the 
/|  erection  of  an  Albanian  State  which  should  shut  out  the 
Serbs  from  the  sea,  very  naturally  pointed  out  that  Scutari 
was  an  Albanian  town  and  refused  to  tolerate  the  continued 


The  Bulgarian  War  139 

presence  there  of  the  Montenegrin  army.    For  a  time  King 
Nicholas  refused  to  budge.     As  over  the  Serbian  conquest 
of  the  coast,  so  now  over  the  Montenegrin  occupation  of 
Scutari,  it  seemed  more  than  likely  that  Europe  would  be 
unable  to  avoid  a  general  conflagration.    Every  preparation  rs 
was   made  along  Austria's   eastern  frontier  for  war  with    wt^S"*- 
Russia.     But  the  situation  was  saved  just  in  time.     King  (f^t^uwC/ 
Nicholas  abandoned  the  coveted  town  and  handed  it  over    i?   \\^j^ 
to  an  international  force  representing  the  Great  Powers. 
He  is  said  to  have  made  a  very  good  thing  out  of  the  inter- 
national crisis  by  speculating  on  the  Viennese  Bourse,  whose 
movements  he  was  in  a  position  to  control. 

There  were  a  couple  of  excellent  cartoons  at  this  time  in 
the  ever-apposite  pages  of  Punch.  The  first  represented 
the  six  Powers  driving  in  a  motor-car  along  a  narrow 
Albanian  road  and  about  to  cross  a  small  bridge,  which  was 
just  broad  enough  to  permit  of  their  passage.  Standing 
in  the  middle  of  the  bridge  was  a  cock,  defying  the  oncoming 
car  and  refusing  to  make  way.  In  the  second  the  Montenegrin 
cock  had  leapt  on  to  the  parapet  of  the  bridge  and  was 
calling  after  the  car  as  it  sailed  safely  past,  '  Ha  !  Ha  !  Gave 
you  a  nasty  scare  that  time.  And  your  troubles  aren't  over 
yet.    You'll  find  that  old  bird  Essad  farther  down  the  road.'  ^ 

The  spectre  of  European  war  had  been  exorcised,  but  the 
expulsion  of  the  Serbs  and  Montenegrins  from  their  con- 
quests by  no  means  meant  the  end  of  trouble  in  Albania. 
In  the  Conference  of  London,  renewed  after  the  fall  of 
Adrianople,  the  Powers  set  themselves  to  elaborate  a  possible 
solution  for  that  most  thorny  subject.  Since  the  Balkan 
Allies  had  entered  the  war  on  behalf  of  the  principle  of  f^ijX^^^ 
nationality,  it  seemed  only  reasonable  that  the  Albanians 
^  Punch,  May  7  and  May  14,  1913. 


140  The  Bulgarian  War 

should  be  placed  under  a  government  of  their  own.  The 
objection  to  that  course,  however,  is  that  alone  of  European 
peoples  the  Albanians  seem  to  dislike  all  idea  of  government. 
Of  some  peoples  we  say  that  they  are  corrupt,  or  uncivilized, 
or  as  yet  incapable  of  managing  their  own  affairs.  But 
nowhere  else  in  Europe  do  the  inhabitants  of  a  country 
object  to  orderly  government  as  such.  '  Albania  for  the 
Albanians  '  was  a  programme  which  was  certain  to  sooth 
the  Liberal  democracies  of  Europe.  Also  there  was  the 
impossibility  of  placing  the  country  under  any  other  State. 
Serbia  only  wanted  northern  Albania  because  the  Serbian 
coast  of  Dalmatia  was  closed  to  her.  If  she  were  expelled 
to  make  room  for  Austria-Hungary,  Italy  would  have  some- 
thing to  say  at  such  a  challenge  to  her  Adriatic  interests. 
Italy  also  would  object  to  the  north-westward  expansion 
of  Greece  for  the  same  reasons. 

So  when  peace  came  on  May  30  and  Turkey  surrendered 

all  her  European  possessions  west  of  the  Enos-Midia  line  to 

q,  the  united  Balkan  League,  an  exception  was  made  in  favour 

'"    of  Albania,  which  was  placed  under  the  Powers  pending 

.^'^  .  its  erection  into  an  independent  principality.    This  solution 

>;*■       was    virtually    the    triumph    of    Austria-Hungary,    for    an 

™  autonomous,  and  therefore  anarchic,  Albania  would  offer 

abundant  opportunities  for  Austrian  interference.  A 
German  prince  ascended  the  throne  of  the  new  State,  and, 
above  all,  Serbia  was  driven  back  from  the  sea  and  ringed 
round  once  more  by  her  enemies.  Serbia  was,  however, 
promised  a  railway  through  the  gap  in  the  hills  from  Liesh 
to  Prizren,  along  the  course  of  the  old  Roman  road  from 
the  Adriatic  to  the  Danube,  a  project  which  never 
materialized. 


The  Bulgarian  War  141 

Turkey  being  at  last  eliminated,  it  now  remained  for 
the  Allies  to  divide  the  spoils  of  war.  The  only  agreement 
between  them  was  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  treaty  partitioning 
Macedonia.  But  that  treaty  had  been  concluded  on  several 
assumptions.  One  of  these  was  that  only  Macedonia,  and 
fringes  of  country  west  and  north  and  east  of  it,  would  be 
the  objects  of  annexation.  Another  was  that  northern 
Albania  would  form  part  of  the  territorial  dividend.  But 
both  these  assumptions  were  now  falsified.  Bulgaria  had 
effected  conquests  in  Thrace,  while  Serbia  had  been  ejected 
from  Albania.  After  conquering  Old  Serbia,  northern 
Albania,  and  the  greater  part  of  Macedonia,  the  Serbs 
found  themselves  expected  to  be  content  with  Old  Serbia 
only,  and  even  there  the  Bulgars  had  pretensions  to  Skoplye. 
The  Serbian  government,  therefore,  began  to  demand  a 
revision  of  the  partition  treaty.  They  asked  for  that  portion 
of  Macedonia  of  which  their  armies  were  actually  in  occupa- 
tion. This  meant  that  Monastir,  Ohrida,  Prilep,  and  Veles 
would  become  Serbian,  while  the  Bulgarian  frontier  would 
follow  the  River  Zletovska  and  a  line  from  Shtip  to  Doiran. 
Should  this  arrangement  not  meet  vAth.  Bulgarian  approval — 
as  it  was  certain  not  to  do — the  Serbs  pointed  out  that  the 
original  treaty  provided  for  Russian  arbitration  in  all  cases 
of  dispute,  and  professed  their  willingness  to  refer  the 
issue  to  the  Tsar.  M.  Gueshoff  was  in  favour  of  such 
a  pacific  solution,  being  confident  doubtless  that  the 
Russian  emperor  would  grant  his  country  more  than  the 
Serbian  proposal  had  allowed  her.  His  desire  for  peace  was, 
however,  rendered  futile  by  the  rising  determination  of 
the  real  directors  of  policy  at  Sofia  to  crush  any  Allied  State 
that  opposed  Bulgarian  hegemony  in  the  Balkans ;  so  that, 
while  the  Bulgarian  government  was  preparing  for  arbitra- 


142  The  Bulgarian  War 

tion,  the  Bulgarian    army    was   being  secretly   massed   for 
,an  attack  on  the  Greeks  and  Serbs. 

Neither  the  Bulgarian  nor  the  Serbian  people  had  any 
enthusiasm  for  war  against  the  other.    The  Bulgars,  satisfied 
with  their  defeat  of  Turkey,  were  anxious  to  go  home  and 
had   begun   to   desert.     General  Savoff,  in   a    dispatch  of 
June  1 8  which  he  wrote  to  M.  Daneff,  admitted  the  diffi- 
culty he  found  in  keeping  his  army  together  :   '  It  is  my 
duty  to  inform  you  that  I  am  not  in  a  position  to  guarantee 
that  in  ten  days'  time  I  shall  be  able  to  keep  our    men 
with  the  colours.'  ^     He  further  thought  it  necessary  the 
next  day  to  circularize  his  army  commanders  on  the  subject 
of  discontent  in  the  army  and  to  urge  them  to  combat  it 
with  energy.    On  the  other  hand  the  Serbs  also  were  anxious 
to  avoid  fighting  their  Allies,  with  whom  they  were  on 
excellent   terms.     They  knew  that   their  most   dangerous 
enemy  was  not  before  them  but  behind,  across  the  Save  and 
the  Danube.     They  had  no  wish  further  to  deplete  their 
supplies  of  men  and  munitions  in  view  of  the  ever-threatening 
Austro-Hungarian   menace.      How   abundantly   right   they 
were  in  their  fears  at  this  time  was  revealed  by  M.  Giolitti, 
the  Italian  statesman,  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  at  Rome 
on  December  5,  1914.    He  stated  that  on  August  9,  1913, 
he  heard  from  the  Italian  Foreign  Minister  that  '  Austria 
has  communicated  to  us  and  to  Germany  her  intention 
of  taking  action  against  Servia,  and  defines  such  action  as 
defensive,  hoping  to  bring  into  operation  the  casus  foederis 
of  the  Triple  Alliance  .  .  .'  -     Italy  refused  to  allow  that 
any  such  action  against  Serbia  could  be  described  as  defensive, 
since  no  one  thought  of  attacking  Austria-Hungary,  and 

^  Balcanicus,  p.  70. 

2  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  401.    Appendix  to  Serbian  Blue  Book. 


The  Bulgarian  War  143 

Italy's  argument  was  evidently  accepted,  for  her  alliance 
with  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  was  in  no  way  disturbed. 
M.  Take  Jonescu,  the  Roumanian  leader,  has  also  declared 
that  in  May  191 3,  before  Serbia  and  Bulgaria  had  come  to 
blows,  Austria-Hungary  approached  his  government  with 
a  view  to  united  action  against  Serbia.^  The  Austro-Hun- 
garian  government  has  denied  this  revelation  so  categorically 
that  we  are  obliged  to  suspend  judgement  on  the  point.  But 
M.  Giolitti's  statement  is  sufficient  indication  of  the  danger 
with  which  Serbia  was  threatened  in  the  summer  of  1913. 

Despite  Bulgaria's  pretence  of  adhering  to  Russian 
arbitration,  she  was  rapidly  drifting  towards  war  with 
Serbia.  The  argument  as  to  which  of  the  two  countries 
is  to  blame  for  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  is  endless.  The 
Bulgarian  case  seems  to  me  simple  and  intelligible.  They  ^ 
had  their  treaty  with  Serbia  and  they  insisted  on  its  being  pj^[C!{<Xi 
put  into  force.     If  the  Serbs  had  occupied  Monastir  and  J 

the  Vardar  valley,  that  was  merely  because  the  common*  ^;^i|-s  ft -^ 
Allied  strategy  had  placed  the  Bulgarian  army  in  Thrace  ^ 

(which  the  Bulgars  now  represented  as  the  all-important 
theatre  of  operations).  Moreover,  the  Serbs  had  already 
broken  the  treaty  by  a  secret  agreement  with  Greece,  and 
as  early  as  September  1912,  before  the  war  began,  had  been 
claiming  and  intriguing  to  obtain  some  districts  south-east 
of  the  line  of  partition.^ 

As  far  back  as  December  19 12  the  Greeks,  fearing  with 
good  reason  a  Bulgarian  attempt  on  Salonika,  had  approached 
the  Serbs  with  a  view  to  mutual  guarantees  against  their 
ally  and  possible  foe.  The  negotiations  were  unofficial,  for 
M.  Venizelos  placed  his  hopes  in  a  continued  Balkan  Alliance, 
while  M.  Pashitch  strongly  supported  a  close  understanding 
^  Le  Livre  bleu  serbe,  p.  jj.  -  Gueshoff,  p.  62. 


144  The  Bulgarian  War 

with  Bulgaria.     But  as  the  probability    of  war  increased 
the  proposals  took  a  more  definite  form,  and  the  two  States 
entered  into  a  treaty,  preceded  on  June  i   by  a  military 
convention,  by  which  they  agreed  to  support  each  other  in 
possession  of  Monastir  and  Salonika  respectively.     Serbia 
offered  Bulgaria  the  districts  of  the  Bregalnitza  and  Stru- 
mitza,  but   claimed  the  Vardar   down   to  Gyevgyei,  after 
which  point  that  river  was  to  become  Greek.     The  Greeks 
left  Doiran  and  Kilkitch  to  the  Bulgars,  but  insisted  on  their 
right  to  the  coastland.    Thus  the  Bulgars  were  left  a  con- 
siderable stretch  of  Macedonia  to  the  east  of  the  Vardar. 
V       V  Should  they  attempt  to  invade  the  territory  claimed  by 
,  ^ji*'^    either  Serbia  or  Greece  the  two  States  agreed  to  act  together 
I  .V  against  the   aggressors.      This  is  the  famous  Serbo-Greek 

agreement  of  which  we  have  heard  so  much  in  the  present 
war  and  which  we  shall  have  to  consider  again  later. 

Against  this  Bulgarian  accusation  of  bad  faith  and  a 
broken  word  the  Serbs  had  an  excellent  case  ;  they  put 
forward  many  reasons  for  demanding  a  revision  of  the 
partition  treaty.  First,  then,  the  original  military  conven- 
tion had  provided  for  an  army  of  100,000  Bulgars  to  support 
the  Serbs  in  Macedonia.  It  is  true  that  the  later  convention 
of  September  28  reduced  that  force  to  a  division.  But  that 
division  had  been  transferred  to  the  Thracian  front  almost 
immediately.  As  for  a  small  Bulgarian  force  on  the  extreme 
left  of  the  Serbs,  after  some  three  days'  fighting,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  Bulgarian  commander  informed  his  Serbian  chief 
that  he  had  news  of  a  strong  Turkish  concentration  at  Rado- 
vishte  and  that  he  proposed  to  attack  the  enemy  at  that  point, 
asking  the  Serbs  to  remain  at  Kotchana  pending  the  result 
of  the  battle.  Yet  on  discovering  the  falsity  of  the  informa- 
tion the  Bulgarian  column  did  not  return  to  their  Allies  as 


The  Bulgarian  War  145 

was  their  plain  duty,  but  hurried  on  to  share  in  the  disputed 
.  occupation  of  Salonika.  So  far  from  Bulgaria  assisting  Serbia, 
the  reverse  had  been  the  truth.  Serbia  had  sent  50,000 
troops  and  her  heavy  artillery  to  Adrianople.  After  she  had 
made  good  her  conquests  she  had  remained  at  war  and  kept 
her  army  with  the  colours  for  six  months,  while  Bulgaria 
alone  was  profiting  by  the  prolongation  of  hostilities. 

Secondly,  Bulgaria  had  come  out  of  the  war  possessed  of 
Thracian  territory  of  which  the  Allies  had  not  originally 
meditated  the  conquest.  The  Serbian  contention,  in  fact, 
is  that  Bulgaria  used  her  allies  to  secure  Macedonia,  which 
all  wished  to  liberate,  while  she  herself  annexed  another  pro- 
vince, with  the  full  intention  of  subsequently  ejecting  those 
allies  from  the  country  for  which  primarily  all  were  fighting. 

Thirdly,  and  most  important  of  all,  Serbia  was  not  in  the 
same  position  in  191 3  as  she  had  been  before  the  war  in 
respect  of  Albania.  Having  been  summarily  turned  out  of 
Albania  by  Austria-Hungary  she  saw  all  her  efforts  thrown 
away.  If  she  were  to  have  Albania  on  her  western,  and 
Bulgaria  on  her  southern,  frontier  she  would  be  completely 
hemmed  in  by  Austria-Hungary  and  her  vassals.  If  Serbia 
was  not  to  have  an  outlook  on  the  Adriatic,  then  she  must 
make  sure  of  a  common  frontier  with  her  friend  Greece  and 
arrange  for  commercial  rights  at  Salonika.  The  fact  that  ~^  VIaaL- 
Bulgaria  had  not  been  willing  to  support  Serbia  against 
Austria-Hungary  in  the  Albanian  affair  was  contrary  to  the 
very  treaty  on  whose  enforcement  Bulgaria  was  now  insisting. 

Fourthly,  the  treaty  had  carefully  made  provision  for  the 
reconciliation  of  differences  over  the  exact  partition  of  Mace- 
donia. The  Serbs  were  following  the  letter  of  the  treaty  in 
demanding  Russian  arbitration  to  settle  the  point  of  dispute. 

Further,  the  Serbo-Greek  alliance,  which  was  purely  defen- 

2071  jj 


146  The  Bulgarian  War 

sive,  was  not  even  mooted,  much  less  concluded,  till  after 
Bulgaria  had  privately  offered  Greece  the  possession  of 
Salonika  if  she  would  join  in  a  combined  attack  on  Serbia. 

For  these  reasons  Serbia  had  abundant  justification  for  de- 
manding some  extension  in  Macedonia,  Yet  had  she  attacked 
Bulgaria,  or  had  she  merely  taken  up  a  posture  of  defence  and 
refused  to  listen  to  any  proposal  of  concessions  to  Bulgaria, 
it  would  be  impossible  to  acquit  her  of  responsibility  for  the 
second  Balkan  war.  The  great  fact  which  exonerates  her  from 
blame  is  that,  unlike  her  opponent,  she  never  refused  to  sub- 
mit her  case  to  judgement.  As  in  July  1914,  so  in  June  191 3 
she  appealed  to  her  adversary  to  reject  the  temptation  of  war 
and  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  an  impartial  tribunal.  That 
many  Serbs  suspected  the  impartiality  of  the  Russian  govern- 
ment, and  doubted  to  the  last  the  wisdom  of  submitting  to 
it,  makes  their  adherence  to  the  proposal  for  arbitration  all 
the  more  admirable.  A  considerable  body  of  opinion  in 
Serbia  was  inclined  not  to  submit  to  the  Russian  aAvard,  The 
Serbs  knew  Russia's  traditional  weakness  for  Bulgaria  and 
how  her  officers  had  encouraged  the  Bulgarian  propaganda  in 
Macedonia  before  the  war.  Russia  had  not  supported  them 
over  Durazzo.  She  might  now  fail  to  support  them  over 
Monastir,  An  army  so  completely  successful  as  the  Serbian 
then  was  is  apt  to  suffer  from  swelled  head  and  pugnacity, 
especially  when  it  sees  some  of  the  fruits  of  its  victory  in 
danger  of  being  given  away  by  diplomats  across  a  table. 
Fortunately  M.  Pashitch  was  firm  in  his  pacificism  and  able  to 
carry  the  army  and  the  country  with  him.  Serbia  was  still 
waiting,  though  with  misgivings,  for  the  conference  and  deci- 
sion at  Petrograd,  when  she  was  suddenly  attacked  by  her  ally.-^ 

^  M.  Gueshoflt's  contention  is  that  Serbia  would  not  agree  to  arbitration 
on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  March  13,  1912,  while  Bulgaria  at  the  last 


w 


The  Bulgarian  War  147 

But  before  entering  on  the  description  of  the  war  which 
followed,  let  us  consider  the  state  of  Bulgaria  in  the  two 
months  before  the  alliance  was  broken .  During  May  M.  Gues- 
hoff  was  nominally  directing  the  country's  policy.  It  is 
probable  that  he  was  sincerely  desirous  of  peace.  But  decisive 
power  was  really  in  the  hands  of  King  Ferdinand,  the  German-/V5/i^^ 
trained  officers  of  the  general  staff,  and  the  revolutionary^  "^  '  ^}- 
committees  whose  business  it  had  long  been  to  claim  Mace- 
donia for  the  Bulgarian  nation.  The  officers  of  the  army 
were  intoxicated  with  success  and  had  a  profound  contempt 
for  both  Serbs  and  Greeks.  On  the  eve  of  his  meeting  with 
M.  Pashitch  at  Tzaribrod  to  discuss  the  situation  M.  Gues- 
holf,  knowing  that  he  had  not  his  sovereign's  confidence, 
offered  his  resignation.  On  June  i  he  interviewed  the  Serbian 
Prime  IVIinister  and,  despite  the  knowledge  that  in  a  few  days 
he  w^ould  resign  the  direction  of  Bulgarian  policy  to  some  less 
tractable  successor,  he  agreed  to  a  conference  of  the  four 
allied  states  at  Salonika.  On  June  6  his  resignation  was 
accepted  and  M.  Daneff,  the  representative  of  more  extended 
Bulgarian  claims,  became  Premier. 

Seeing  the  imminent  danger  of  the  dissolution  of  the 
Balkan  League  in  a  bitter  internal  conflict,  the  Russian 
government  did  everything  in  its  power  to  keep  the  Slav 
States  to  the  arbitration  which  they  had  promised  to  respect. 
On  June  8  the  Tsar  addressed  a  dispatch  to  the  Kings  of 
Serbia  and  Bulgaria  which  closed  with  the  words  :  '  I  declare 
that  the  state  which  first  engages  in  hostilities  will  have  to 

moment  submitted  to  the  Russian  tribunal  unconditionally.  (Gueshoff, 
p.  81.)  The  answer  is  that,  at  the  moment  when  the  Balkan  States  were 
preparing  for  a  conference  on  the  subject,  Bulgaria  sprang  her  surprise 
attack.  Also  M.  Daneff  subsequently  declared  that  M.  Pashitch  had  just 
accepted  arbitration.     See  Nationalism  and  War  in  the  Near  East,  p.  269. 

K  2 


Wi« 


148  The  Bulgarian  War 

answer  for  it  before  the  Slav  world.'  Up  to  the  very  day  on 
which  the  fighting  began  M.  Hartwig,  the  Russian  minister 
at  Belgrade,  was  convinced  that  war  would  be  avoided.  He 
had  succeeded  in  pursuading  the  Serbs  to  submit  to  Russia's 
decision  and  did  not  know  the  contrary  determination  which 
prevailed  in  high  quarters  at  Sofia. 

Those  who  effectively  controlled  the  destinies  of  Bulgaria 
received  encouragement  from  Austria-Hungary  in  their 
preparation  for  war.  A  second  Balkan  war  would  weaken  all 
the  participants.  As  an  official  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
^■*  Foreign  Office  said  at  the  time,  '  We  will  allow  these  dogs 
to  devour  each  other.  Afterwards  we  shall  dominate  the 
Balkans.''-  If,  however,  as  seemed  more  likely,  the  war  were 
short  and  sweet  in  Bulgaria's  favour,  a  big  Bulgaria  suited  the 
policy  of  Vienna  very  well.  Failing  her  own  possession  of 
Salonika,  Austria-Hungary  saw  the  best  means  of  securing 
herself  against  Serbia  in  the  detachment  of  Bulgaria  from 
Russia.  She  was  therefore  willing  to  support  the  most 
extreme  Bulgarian  pretensions,  to  Salonika,  to  the  whole  of 
Macedonia,  even  to  southern  Albania.  Although  the  Turks, 
with  their  lack  of  organization  and  corrupt  supply  services, 
had  been  unable  to  defeat  the  Serbs,  the  admirable  army  of 
Bulgaria  would  surely  make  short  work  of  the  hated  kingdom. 
So  opinion  in  Sofia  was  carefully  and  systematically  roused 
against  Russian  arbitration,  which  was  represented  as  already 
committed  to  the  Serbian  view. 

On  June  19  Count  Tisza,  the  Hungarian  Prime  Minister, 
made  a  speech  in  the  Parliament  of  Buda-Pesth,  which  seems 
to  me  a  model  of  provocative  utterance  masquerading  as 
perfect  innocence.  '  Our  interests ',  he  said,  '  demand  the 
completest  independence  of  the  Balkan  States.    That  is  the 

^  Pelissier,  p.  321. 


The  Bulgarian  War  149 

Alpha  and  Omega  of  the  policy  we  shall  pursue  in  regard  to 
the  solution  of  Balkan  problems.  .  .  .  Into  this  situation 
(Serbo-Bulgarian  disagreement)  has  come  the  separate 
action  of  Russia  towards  Serbia  and  Bulgaria.  Our  starting- 
point  is  naturally  that  here  also  the  Balkan  States  are  inde- 
pendent and  that  they  are  consequently  free  to  choose  their 
own  method  of  settling  their  differences.  They  may  choose 
war  or  they  may  choose  mediation  or  a  tribunal  of  arbitra- 
tion. .  ,  .  Nor  can  we  allow  any  other  state  to  acquire  prero- 
gatives detrimental  to  our  fundamental  principle  of  Balkan 
independence.'  ^  The  profession  of  solicitude  for  Balkan 
independence  looked  well  and  was  calculated  to  touch  the 
hearts  of  all  who  were  not  familiar  with  Hungarian  policy. 
But  the  mention  of  war,  not  as  a  horrible  danger  to  be  avoided, 
but  as  a  right  of  which  the  Balkan  States  could  avail  them- 
selves, was  a  most  admirably  subtle  provocation.  Also  reading 
Count  Tisza's  words  one  would  suppose  that  Russia  had 
aggressively  thrust  herself  upon  the  Balkan  kingdoms  and 
arrogated  to  herself  the  disposal  of  their  affairs.  One  would 
never  guess  that  these  States  had  agreed  a  year  before  to 
submit  possible  differences  to  Russia  and  that  only  moral 
force  bound  them  to  fulfil  their  word  in  this  respect.  The 
result  of  such  language  on  the  part  of  so  eminent  a  man  as 
the  virtual  dictator  of  Hungary  could  be  nothing  else  but  to 
inflame  Bulgarian  opinion  against  Russia  and  in  favour  of  war. 
'  Pride  goes  before  a  fall '  seems  to  be  a  formula  almost  in- 
variably applicable  to  Balkan  campaigns.  The  Turks  had 
been  so  certain  of  victory  in  October  191 2  that  Fethi  Pasha 
had  remarked  how  delicate  would  be  his  position  on  entering 
victoriously  into  Belgrade,  where  for  six  years  he  had  been 

^  Quoted  In  Savic,  p.  i86.     The  quotation  has  been    curtailed,  but 
nothing  affecting  the  sense  of  the  passage  has  been  omitted. 


150  The  Btilgavian  War 

Ottoman  minister  and  had  made  many  friends.  In  the 
present  war  there  have  been  striking  instances  in  which  the 
favourite,  certain  of  success,  has  gone  down  before  a  despised 
outsider.  One  or  two  quotations  will  illustrate  the  frame  of 
mind  in  which  Bulgaria's  rulers  broke  the  peace  and  attacked 
their  allies. 

The  first  is  General  Savoff's  dispatch  to  M.  Gueshoff  of 
May  19,  urging  on  the  reluctant  statesman  the  necessity  of 
war.  '  Any  concession  made  to  our  enfeebled  allies  would 
provoke  lively  discontent  in  the  ranks  of  the  army.  .  .  .  The 
question  is  who  is  to  have  the  hegemony  of  the  Balkan  penin- 
sula. ...  A  victorious  war  will  decisively  settle  that  question 
of  hegemony  in  our  favour.  In  one  or  two  years  from  now  it 
will  be  too  late  ;  Europe  \\\\\  oppose  it.  That  is  why  I  think 
we  ought  to  use  every  trick  and  means  in  our  power,  whilst 
declining  responsibility  for  the  war,  to  provoke  an  armed 
conflict,  with  our  allies.  When  we  have  inflicted  on  them  a 
decisive  defeat,  we  shall  remove  from  our  enemies  all  possi- 
bilities of  creating  obstacles  to  the  realization  of  our  national 
ideal.  .  .  .  According  to  the  information  which  I  possess  about 
our  future  operations  the  Greeks  after  four  days  at  the  most 
will  be  under  the  necessity  of  breaking  with  the  Serbs  and 
will  ask  us  for  a  separate  peace  to  avoid  disaster.  Then  our 
whole  effort  can  be  directed  against  Serbia.  The  Serbian 
army  will  at  no  point  be  able  to  resist  the  impetuous  attack 
of  our  mighty  columns.'  ^ 

Consider  the  characteristic  notes  of  this  pronouncement. 
War  for  hegemony,  the  solution  of  possible  future  difficulties 
by  immediate  armed  conflict,  deliberate  provocation  of  allies 
in  order  to  make  them  appear  the  aggressors,  complete  con- 

^  Balcanicus,  p.  37.  Quoted  from  the  Dnevnik  (General  Savoff's  organ) 
of  June  15,  1914. 


The  Bulgarian  War  151 

tempt  for  opponents.  It  is  surely  clear  in  what  school  these 
methods  and  ideals  of  conduct  were  learned.  From  the  time 
that  Bismarck  tricked  his  Austrian  allies  into  the  war  of  1866 
up  to  the  present  day  they  have  been  the  marks  of  the  Prussian 
beast.  From  Prussia  the  poison  has  spread  and  been  absorbed 
by  those  States  whom  she  has  drawn  into  her  system. 

The  next  quotation  is  from  General  Kovatcheff's  '  order 
of  the  day  ',  addressed  to  the  Fourth  Bulgarian  Army  on 
June  17.  His  army  had  moved  through  Macedonia  to  take 
up  a  position  round  Shtip  in  front  of  the  Serbs  who  held  a 
line  of  heights  immediately  to  the  west.  The  concentration 
of  the  Bulgarian  forces  was  so  obviously  threatening  that  the 
Serbs  might  well  have  fallen  upon  them  as  they  passed  across 
their  front.  The  Serbs  made  no  movement,  because  they 
hoped  still  to  avoid  a  rupture.  General  Kovatcheff  either 
could  not  or  would  not  understand  such  self-restraint.  '  At 
the  approach  of  our  first  detachments  the  moral  of  the  Serbian 
army  began  to  give  way.  To-day  it  is  reduced  to  nothing. 
The  fact  that  the  concentration  of  our  army  has  been  accom- 
plished before  the  Serbian  front  without  the  slightest  hin- 
drance shows  clearly  the  moral  condition  of  the  Serbian  army. 
It  is  unable  to  master  its  alarm,  and  its  attitude  has  confirmed 
the  rumours  that  the  Serbian  army  had  not  the  courage  to 
enter  into  a  struggle  with  us.  Were  it  otherwise,  would  the 
Serbs  have  allowed  us  quietly  to  complete  our  concentration  ? 
That  would  be  an  example  without  precedent  in  history.'  ■"■ 
Because  the  Serbs  wished  to  avoid  a  fight,  the  general  repre- 
sented them  as  afraid  to  fight. 

My  third  quotation  consists  of  M.  Daneff's  remarks  to  the 
Roumanian  minister  at  Sofia  on  July  I,  after  the  outbreak  of 
war,  when  Roumania  was  threatening  intervention.     '  You 

1  Bakanicus,  p.  69. 


152  The  Bulgarian  War 

want  to  frighten  me,  M.  Ghika,  by  saying  that  you  will  enter 
Bulgarian  territory.  Very  well,  come,  and  what  will  you  do 
there  ?  You  will  take  the  Tutrakan-Baltchik  line.  That  is 
what  you  want.  You  will  enter  the  Dobrudja.  That  will  be 
yours  too.  But  you  will  not  be  able  to  go  further,  for  you 
cannot  mobilize  your  army  in  so  short  a  time,  and  in  ten  days 
I  will  have  finished  with  the  Serbs.' ^ 

There  was  the  pride.    Now  let  us  record  the  fall. 

The  Bulgarian  strategy  was  dictated  not  so  much  by  the 
desire  to  inflict  a  complete  defeat  on  the  Serbs  and  Greeks, 
which  would  have  taken  time,  as  by  the  intention  of  rapidly 
driving  the  allies  out  of  Macedonia  and  so  relieving  the 
Russian  Emperor  of  his  invidious  task  of  arbitration.  Conse- 
quently, instead  of  a  vigorous  attack  at  the  heart  of  Serbia  by 
Tzaribrod  and  Pirot,  only  a  small  force  was  placed  on  that 
section  of  the  frontier  to  protect  Sofia.  The  main  concentra- 
tion took  the  form  of  an  angle  with  its  apex  at  Shtip  and  its 
sides  running  back  to  Radovishte  and  along  the  Zletovska 
river,  while  the  Bulgarian  Second  Army  took  up  its  position 
in  eastern  Macedonia  with  orders  to  capture  Salonika  as  soon 
as  the  moment  for  hostilities  came. 

By  July  22,  when  Tsar  Ferdinand  called  a  special  council 
of  state  at  his  chateau  at  Vrana,  the  preparations  were  made. 
A  delay  of  seven  days,  however,  was  agreed  upon  to  allow 
Russia  to  declare  her  willingness  to  arbitrate  on  the  basis  of 
the  partition  in  the  treaty  of  March  13,  191 2.  If  she  failed 
to  do  so  within  the  week,  a  surprise  attack  without  declara- 
tion of  war  was  to  be  made  all  along  the  line.  So  we  come 
to  the  night  of  June  29.  The  Serbian  and  Bulgarian  armies 
were  fraternizing  round  Shtip.  The  outposts  passed  the 
monotonous  hours  of  waiting  in  mutual  visits  and  games  of 

^  Balcanicus,  p.  94. 


The  Bulgarian  War  153 

cards.  That  evening  some  Serbian  officers  were  asked  to 
dine  in  the  Bulgarian  lines.  Hosts  and  guests  made  merry 
and  were  photographed  together.  At  about  ten  o'clock  the 
Bulgars  intimated  that  it  was  time  for  bed  and  saw  the  Serbs 
back  to  their  camp.  At  three  o'clock  in  the  morning  the  Bul- 
gars advanced,  overpowered  the  Serbian  guards, and  murdered 
their  guests  of  the  previous  evening  in  their  sleep.  In  this 
manner,  which  seems  more  in  keeping  with  a  tale  of  adven- 
ture among  Red  Indians  or  African  cannibals  than  with 
European  warfare,  began  the  Serbo-Bulgarian  war.  The 
Bulgars  added  a  final  touch  by  denouncing  in  the  European 
press  of  July  i  the  treachery  of  the  Serbs  in  attacking  them. 

The  first  shock  of  the  attack  fell  on  the  Drina  Division  of 
General  Yankovitch's  army.  The  first  lines  were  rushed 
before  the  Serbs  could  recover  from  their  surprise  and 
organize  their  resistance.  Farther  south  the  enemy  crossed 
the  Vardar  and  occupied  Gyevgyei.  At  Gradsko  the  Serbs 
were  also  driven  across  to  the  right  bank.  But  by  the  end  of 
the  day  Voivoda  Putnik  had  a  thorough  grasp  of  the  situation 
and  issued  orders  to  his  army  commanders  to  assume  the 
offensive  on  July  i. 

Then  followed  a  short  but  desperate  struggle.  Serbian 
officers  tell  me  that  the  Turkish  war  was  nothing  to  it.  Day 
and  night  for  slightly  over  a  week  the  two  armies  fought, 
mostly  hand-to-hand  with  the  bayonet.  They  were  roughly 
equal  in  numbers.  The  Bulgars  had  the  initial  advantage  of 
surprise  and,  had  they  not  been  stolidly  resisted  on  June  30, 
they  might  then  have  dealt  the  decisive  blow.  But  they  were 
exhausted  with  their  march  across  Bulgaria  in  the  height  of 
the  Balkan  summer.  They  had  not  the  same  enthusiasm  for 
this  war  as  for  fighting  the  Turks.  The  shock-tactics  and 
mass-formations  in  which  they  had  assaulted  the  Turkish  lines 


154  The  Bulgarian  War 

had  caused  heavy  losses.    On  the  other  hand,  the  Serbs  had 
been  resting  since  the  previous  autumn  and  were  in  fine 
condition.     Gradually  they  pressed  the  Bulgars  back.     On 
July  5  Kotchana  was  taken.     By  the  9th  the  Serbs  were  in 
Radovishte.     With  the  Bulgars  driven  out  of  the  Vardar 
valley  the  Serbian  army  stopped  and  made  no  attempt  to 
pursue  their  advantage,  partly  perhaps  in  the  hopes  of  renew- 
ing the  Bulgarian  alliance,  partly  to  preserve  their  forces  to 
fight  again  another  day  against  the  enemy  across  the  Danube. 
Meanwhile  with  dramatic  rapidity  Bulgaria  was  attacked 
from  all  sides,  and  her  plans  of  hegemony  vanished  in  the 
complete  collapse  of  her  armed  forces.    The  eastern  frontier 
had  been  denuded  of  troops,  with  the  result  that  the  Turks 
could   not   resist   the   temptation   of   quickly   re-occupying 
Adrianople.    The  city  and  fortress,  which  it  had  taken  five 
months  and  a  train  of  siege  artillery  to  reduce,  was  retaken  by 
a  patrol  of  cavalry.    Roumania,  thinking  it  a  pity  not  to  be 
in  any  general  division  of  territory,  sent  her  army  into  Bul- 
garia, where  it  advanced  unopposed  to  within  a  day's  march 
of  Sofia.     But  the  Bulgars'  great  surprise  came  from  the 
Greeks,  whom  they  had  been  certain  of  defeating  with  ease. 
Just  before  the  sudden  attack  on  the  Allies,  General  Hassap- 
djieff  is  said  to  have  interviewed  the  officers  of  the  Bulgarian 
force  at  Salonika  and  offered  them  permission  to  leave  the 
town.      At  the  same  time  he  promised  them  that  the  Bul- 
garian army  would  be  in  Salonika  on  July  2.     The  officers 
accordingly  decided  to  stay  where  they  were  and  await  the 
triumphal  entry  of  their  fellow  countrymen.      The  general 
left  Salonika  on  June  30,  and  the  same  day,  hostilities  having 
already  begun,  the  Greek  commandant,  resisting  the  tempta- 
tion   to   demand   the   surrender   of   the    Bulgarian    troops, 
ordered  them  to  quit  Greek  territory.    The  Bulgars  showed 


The  Bulgarian  War  155 

that  they  had  no  intention  of  moving,  and  street-fighting 
began,  the  traces  of  which  may  still  be  seen  in  the  many 
bullet-spattered  houses  of  the  Boulevard  Hamidie  (the 
broad  street  running  inland  from  the  White  Tower).  The 
Bulgars  stood  to  their  posts  very  gallantly.  In  the  church  of 
St.  Sophia,  amongst  other  places,  they  put  up  a  desperate 
resistance.  But  machine  guns  played  on  them  from  above 
and  the  Cretan  gendarmerie  attacked  them  from  below  till 
they  were  overpowered,  and  Salonika  passed  into  the  un- 
disputed possession  of  the  Greeks, 

Meanwhile,  far  from  marching  gaily  to  the  sea,  General 
Ivanoff's  army  was  soundly  defeated  by  the  despised  Greek 
forces,  who  secured  their  position  along  the  coast  and  then 
pushing  northwards  joined  hands  with  the  Serbs  and  flung 
back  the  Bulgarian  invasion. 

Exactly  a  month  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  Bulgaria 
gave  in  and  an  armistice  was  signed  at  Bucharest.  In  the 
discussions  that  followed  Russia  attempted  to  secure  Adria- 
nople  and  Kavalla  for  Bulgaria.  But  the  Turks  were  not 
going  to  relinquish  the  city  which  by  a  godsend  they  had 
recovered.  And  the  Greeks  were  in  no  humour  to  conciliate 
the  Bulgars  any  more.  By  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  (August  10) 
Bulgaria  accordingly  lost  territory  in  every  direction.  The 
Turks  kept  Adrianople  and  so  controlled  the  railway  leading 
southwards  to  Dedeagatch  down  the  Maritza  valley.  The  p^jjo^^^ 
Roumanians  received  their  slice  of  the  Dobrudja.    The  Bui-  kj    1^ 

garian  claims  to  Macedonia  were  set  aside  and  that  country     (fJJi^^^ 
divided  between  the  Serbs  and  Greeks.  \k\h 

We  may  admit  that  this  was  severe  treatment  for  the 
Bulgars.  Their  share  of  the  conquered  Turkish  territory 
was  thus  reduced  to  the  comparatively  valueless  coast- 
district  between  Kavalla  and  Dedeagatch,  and  the  valley  of 


\ 


156  The  Bulgarian  War  » 

the  upper  Struma.  Only  two  natural  passages  lead  down 
from  Central  Bulgaria  to  the  Aegean  Sea,  the  Struma  and 
the  Maritza  valleys.  The  former  now  passed  into  Greek 
possession  ;  the  latter  was  cut  by  the  Turks  at  Adrianoplc. 
But  severe  treatment  is  not  always  wrong.  Nations,  like 
individuals,  cannot  expect  to  have  all  their  claims  considered, 
when  by  their  behaviour  they  have  put  themselves  beyond 
the  pale  of  civilized  intercourse.  There  is  such  a  thing  as 
moral  responsibility  in  national  politics.  The  Bulgars  at 
Bucharest  paid  a  fitting  penalty  for  their  cynical  display  of 
treachery  and  greed.  In  a  recent  newspaper  controversy  a 
writer  made  this  assertion  :  '  In  what  respect  he  [Tsar  Fer- 
dinand of  Bulgaria]  has  played  the  traitor,  or  to  whom, 
those  who  persistently  miscall  him  would  be  hard  put  to  it 
to  prove.'  ^  The  proof  does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  very 
difficult.  It  was  on  July  30,  191 3,  when  the  Bulgarian  army, 
by  order  of  their  king,  suddenly  fell  upon  their  allies,  that 
Ferdinand  won  his  undying  title  of  traitor. 

We  may  ask  how  it  was  that  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany, 
who  had  encouraged  Bulgaria  to  enter  on  this  second  war, 
stood  by  and  let  their  catspaw  be  crushed.  We  have  already 
seen  that  Austria-Hungary  had  thoughts  of  striking  at  Serbia 
from  behind.  She  did  not  interfere,  perhaps  because  of 
Italy's  firm  refusal  to  countenance  such  a  policy,  perhaps 
because  her  own  military  arrangements  were  not  completed, 
but  probably  most  of  all  because  Germany  was  not  yet  quite 
ready  for  the  general  European  war  which  would  doubtless 
have  followed.  There  was  the  further  consideration  that  if 
the  Bulgars  were  forced  to  disgorge  territory  on  every  side  ' 
they  would  feel  a  lasting  resentment  and  hatred  for  the  other 
Balkan  States  and  be  prepared,  when  the  time  came,  to  strike 
^  The  Near  East,  May  4,  1917. 


The  Bulgarian  War  157 

on  the  side  of  the  Central  Empires  for  the  recovery  of  all  and 
more  than  all  that  they  had  lost  at  Bucharest.  The  Central 
Empires  began  their  work  of  indemnifying  Bulgaria  when 
they  persuaded  the  Turks  to  hand  over  the  Adrianople- 
Dedeagatch  railway  to  her.  They  completed  it  when  they 
gave  her  the  opportunity  of  seizing  half  Serbia  in  191 5  and 
Kavalla  and  the  Dobrudja  last  year. 

What  then  were  the  results  for  Serbia  of  the  Balkan  wars  ?  .<  u. 
Consider  the  cost  of  her  effort  first.     Besides  the  loss  of  men,  f^*"^"'^ 
the  expenses  of  the  wars  amounted  to  530,600,000  francs.     Ca^t^  ■ 
An  immediate  capital  sum  of  70,000,000  francs  would  be 
needed  for  the  newly-acquired  territories.     Serbia's  share, 
17  per  cent.,  of  the  Ottoman  debt  represented  a  capital  of 
40  more  millions.     All  this  meant  that  the  national  debt 
would  be  doubled.     And  against  this  accumulation  could 
be  set  no  sum  received  from  their  vanquished  enemy,  for 
it  had  been  German  policy  at  the  conference  in  London  to 
prevent  the  payment  of  any  indemnity  by  Turkey. 

On  the  other  hand,  Serbia  was  nearly  tvnce  as  large  as 
before.  Her  population  was  increased  by  1,500,000,  which 
placed  her  on  a  rough  equality  with  Bulgaria  and  Greece. 
All  the  historic  shrines  of  the  race  in  Old  Serbia  had  been 
recovered.  No  Austrian  arm  was  now  thrust  out  between 
Serbia  and  Montenegro,  the  two  Serbian  States  having  at 
last  joined  hands  across  the  former  Sandjak.  The  whole 
basin  of  the  middle  Vardar  was  Serbian,  as  well  as  the  rich 
plains  of  Kossovo  and  Monastir.  The  new  territory  con- 
tained many  flourishing  towns  considerably  larger  than 
any  in  Serbia  except  Belgrade  :  Monastir,  Skoplye,  Ohrida, 
Prishtina,  Veles,  Prilep.  There  were  also  large  forests 
unexploited.     The  new  territories  also  provided  just  those 


158  The  Bulgarian  War 

products  that  were  needed  to  complement  the  output  of 
the  northern  districts.  The  vilayet  of  Kossovo,  almost  the 
whole  of  which  went  to  Serbia,  had  produced  in  191 1 
5,000,000  kilos  of  tobacco.  In  addition  grapes,  rice, 
pepper,  hides,  which  the  Serbs  had  had  to  import,  were 
now  procurable  in  the  kingdom,  while  the  Vardar  rail- 
way now  freely  carried  many  articles  which  before  the  wars 
had  paid  duty  at  the  Turkish  frontier.  Then  there  were 
the  riches  of  the  subsoil.  The  silver  mines  of  Kopaonik 
and  Kratovo  had  been  worked  in  the  Middle  Ages  and  only 
awaited  capital  and  enterprise.  There  was  gold  and  copper 
and  manganese,  and  it  has  been  said  that  there  is  enough 
.1     iron  in  Serbia  to  suffice  for  the  needs  of  the  whole  of  Europe. 

pftfi^       Above  all,   Serbia  had   definitely   broken   out  of  Austria- 
Af^      Hungary's  economic  web.     An  agreement  with  their  Greek 

^'       ■'      ally  gave  the  Serbs_free  access  to  the  sea  aj^Salon^. 

It  is  true  that  the  presence  in  the  new  territories  of  a  con- 
siderable number  of  Albanians  and  of  Macedonian  Slavs,  who 
had  been  for  thirty  years  taught  to  look  to  Bulgaria  as  their 
spiritual  home,  constituted  a  difficulty  for  Serbian  adminis- 
tration. The  Serbs,  however,  felt  equal  to  the  task  of 
conciliating  and  assimilating  the  bulk  of  the  heterogeneous 
population.  What  they  now  needed  was  twenty  years  of 
peace,  in  which  industry  and  frugality  would  enable  them  to 
make  use  of  the  opportunities  with  which  they  were  pre- 

^S-    aV'''  \  sented.     But  peace  was  precisely  what  Austria-Hungary,  who 

r    Vi'^    .       had  instigated  two  wars  against  them  without  success,  had 

^v\^         no  intention  of  permitting. 


7 
The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

For  the  Serbs  the  Balkan  wars  had  been  a  period  of 
mixed  triumph  and  anxiety.  By  August  191 3  they  had 
1  achieved  complete  success.  The  statesmen,  Serbian,  Greek, 
and  Montenegrin,  who  had  concluded  the  treaty  of  Bucharest 
were  greeted  with  enthusiasm  as  they  arrived  by  water 
and  stepped  ashore  at  Belgrade.  But  the  entry  of  the  troops 
roused  the  capital  to  yet  wilder  expressions  of  delirious  joy. 
Arches  bearing  the  inscription  '  Za  Kossovo — Kumanovo. 
Za  Slivnitzu,  Bregalnitzu  '  (For  Kossovo,  Kumanovo. 
For  Slivnitza,  Bregalnitza)  spanned  the  road.  Amidst  the 
shouts  of  the  crowd  and  a  rain  of  flowers  the  Danube 
division  marched  into  the  city.  Foot,  horse,  and  then  the 
all-conquering  guns,  all  decorated  with  bouquets.  In  front 
came  a  cavalcade,  the  General  Staff  of  the  Serbian  army, 
and  ahead  rode  a  single  officer  in  plain  service  uniform,  the 
Crown  Prince  Alexander.  Slowly  the  great  procession  made 
its  way  to  the  palace  and  defiled  before  the  windows  where 
stood  the  three  veterans  who  had  guided  Serbia  to  this 
hour  of  triumph — King  Peter,  M.  Pashitch,  and  Voivoda 
Putnik.  As  a  monument  to  Kara-George  was  inaugurated 
the  guns  boomed  out  announcing  their  message  of  victory 
and  peace.  It  was  the  greatest  moment  of  Serbia's  history. 
But  such  moments  pass ;  and  the  Serbs  settled  down  to 
the  task  of  putting  their  house  in  order.  Many  problems 
awaited  solution.  An  Albanian  insurrection  kept  a  large 
part  of  the  army  still  in  action.  Many  of  our  Serbian  friends 
have  been  continuously  mobilized  since  September   191 2. 


i6o  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

Lieut.  Krstitch  tells  mc  that  he  has  never  been  home  for 
more  than  twenty  days  on  end  since  the  Turkish  war  began. 
Then  there  was  the  religious  problem.  The  adherents  of  the 
Greek  Patriarchate  and  the  Bulgarian  Exarchate  were 
transferred  to  the  obedience  of  the  Archbishop  of  Belgrade, 
the  Greeks  being  allowed  to  keep  their  schools.  The 
Mohammedans  were  less  tractable  and  regretted  the  passing 
of  the  temporal  power  of  their  faith.  The  free  exercise  of 
their  religion  was,  however,  secured  to  them,  and  the  Turks, 
at  any  rate,  have  accommodated  themselves  to  the  new 
situation.  The  Roman  Catholic  Albanians,  who  had  long 
been  used  as  pawns  in  the  political  game  by  Austria -Hun- 
gary, were  removed  from  her  influence  by  a  Concordat  with 
the  Pope  which  placed  them  directly  under  the  Roman 
Catholic  bishop  of  Belgrade. 

For  some  time  after  the  proclamation  of  peace  the  new 
territories  were  under  strict  military  government.  The 
administration  had  to  deal  with  hostile  elements  which  had 
long  been  accustomed  to  the  practice  of  pillage  and  murder, 
and  with  the  agents  of  the  Bulgarian  propaganda.  It 
cannot  be  pretended  that  the  work  of  introducing  order 
amongst  the  population  of  Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia  was 
unaccompanied  by  acts  of  violence,  mistakes,  excesses.  It 
would  have  been  remarkable  had  it  not  been  so.  Time  was 
needed  to  soften  the  harshness  of  excessive  nationalism  and 
to  reconcile  the  population,  accustomed  to  the  easy-going 
laxity  of  the  Turks,  to  the  more  vigorous  methods  of  the 
Serbs.  Remember  Serbia  had  only  had  her  new  territories 
for  less  than  a  year  when  the  present  war  broke  out.  Yet 
in  that  time  the  government,  urged  on  by  the  parliamentary 
opposition,  had  organized  a  civil  police,  set  up  ordinary 
tribunals  of  justice,  and  disarmed  most  of  the  population. 


o 
> 

I— ^ 

< 

< 
(J) 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  i6i 

For  general  security  and  prosperity  it  was  necessary  to 
settle  the  question  of  the  land.  Under  the  Turks  the 
peasants  had  been  tenants  paying  a  large  portion  of  the 
fruits  of  their  labour  to  Turkish  or  Albanian  landlords. 
The  government  determined  to  introduce  the  Serbian 
system  of  peasant  proprietorship  and  to  facilitate  the 
division  of  the  large  estates  into  small  farms.  As  Mace- 
donia was  very  thinly  populated  there  was  much  available 
land  which  was  not  under  cultivation.  In  Turkish  times 
it  had  not  been  worth  while  to  plough  it.  By  opening  a 
prospect  of  agricultural  property  in  the  new  territories  the 
government  attracted  immigrants  who  would  otherwise  have 
flocked  to  America.  But  the  rights  of  the  original  inhabi- 
tants were  carefully  guarded.  To  them  in  the  first  instance 
was  accorded  the  right  to  take  up  land ;  after  them  to 
Serbs  of  Serbia,  and  thirdly  to  Serbs  or  Slavs  from  other 
countries.  No  estate  of  less  than  five  hectares  was  granted, 
and  two  further  hectares  were  added  for  every  male  member 
of  the  family  over  sixteen  years  of  age.  Immigrants  could 
have  themselves,  their  animals  and  their  implements,  trans- 
ported free  of  charge.  For  the  first  three  years  they  were 
also  to  be  free  of  all  taxes,  except  an  education  rate.  They 
could  not  alienate  their  property  for  the  first  fifteen  years ; 
after  which  period  they  were  to  enter  into  full  ownership. 
By  these  means  Serbia  offered  a  home  to  many  of  her 
children  who  would  otherwise  have  been  absorbed  in  foreign 
lands,  and  set  herself  towards  the  reconciliation  of  her 
pro-Bulgarian  subjects. 

Lastly,  there  was  the  question  of  communication,  Serbia 
had  had  the  beginnings  of  an  adequate  railway  system  before 
191 2,  but  the  new  territories  were  very  poorly  provided. 
Besides  the  central  Vardar  railway  from  Skoplye  to  Salonika, 

2071  L 


1 62  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

there  were  only  the  branch  line  to  Mitrovitza  and  the 
Monastir  line  which  leaves  Serbian  soil  after  a  distance  of 
twelve  miles.  A  whole  network  of  new  railways  was  now 
planned,  radiating  in  every  direction,  to  assist  the  develop- 
ment of  every  corner  whose  fertility  promised  adequate 
results.  The  cost  was  estimated  at  300,000,000  francs, 
while  five  more  millions  were  devoted  to  an  object  with 
which  any  traveller  in  the  Balkans  will  sympathize  ;  I  mean 
the  construction  of  roads  in  Serbian  Macedonia. 

Despite  the  heavy  financial  burdens  with  which  Serbia 
was  loading  herself,  we  can  readily  understand  the  general 
feeling  of  well-being,  made  up  of  martial  triumph  and 
economic  enterprise,  with  which  the  Serbs  nov/  set  them- 
selves to  the  various  tasks  that  were  to  make  their  country 
prosperous  and  strong.  But  over  their  heads  hung  the 
menace  of  new  troubles.  All  who  knew  South-Eastern 
Europe  were  very  dubious  about  the  stability  of  the  Treaty 
of  Bucharest.  Austria-Hungary  had  twice  seen  her  Balkan 
plans  upset  by  the  unexpected  chance  of  war.  She  was 
determined  that  Serbia  should  not  for  ever  stand  between 
her  and  the  Aegean  Sea.  And  behind  her  was  the  far  more 
sinister  and  powerful  figure  of  the  German  Empire. 

To  understand  the  relation  of  Serbia  to  German  policy 
we  must  stop  a  m.oment  and  consider  the  map  of  the  world. 
Germany,  disunited  till  1871  and  absorbed  in  European 
affairs  till  1882,  had  entered  very  late  into  the  competition 
of  the  Powers  for  colonies.  But  for  the  last  thirty  years  she 
had  grown  continuously  more  eager  for  the  addition  to  her 
Empire  of  new  countries.  She  was  determined  to  be  a 
world-power,  with  a  decisive  voice  in  international  questions 
and  the  control  of  remote  continents.  Her  writers  made  no 
secret  of  the  national  ambition.     An  admirable  and  ever- 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  163 

increasing    fleet    proclaimed    her    intention    of    ultimately 
challenging  the  British  navy. 

Foiled  in  the  hope  of  using  the  Boers  to  establish  German 
power  in  South  Africa,  German  statesmen  turned  their 
attention  to  the  Far  East.  Unable,  owing  to  the  common 
action  of  the  Powers  and  the  rise  of  Japan,  to  convert  their 
territory  of  Kiao-Chau  into  an  eastern  empire,  they  then 
entered  on  their  struggle  with  France  for  Morocco  and  the 
north-west  coast  of  Africa.  The  solid  resistance  of  France 
and  Great  Britain  to  German  expansion  in  that  quarter 
caused  the  Pan-Germans  to  put  their  faith  in  another 
plan  to  which  no  one  was  prepared  to  take  exception.  This 
great  plan  is  best  known  under  the  short  title  of  '  Berlin- 
Baghdad  '.  The  main  idea  was  the  erection  of  a  system  or 
chain  of  allied  States  under  the  hegemony  of  Germany,  and 
stretching  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Berlin 
had  long  been  joined  to  Constantinople  by  excellent  railways, 
and  German  engineers  were  busy  with  the  completion  of 
a  further  line  which  should  stretch  across  the  900  miles 
of  Turkey  in  Asia  to  Baghdad  and  Basra  and  link  itself  up 
with  the  railway  running  south  from  Damascus  to  Mecca.  '^(,\\^^. 
This  railway  was  to  develop  and  complete  Germany's  ^  niiA^ 
economic  and  military  control  of  the  Ottoman  Empire.  The  ^~^\ 
great  untapped  riches  of  Asia  Minor  should  flow  westwards 
to  Germany,  and  German  ofl^icers  would  be  found  in  control 
of  everything  as  far  as  the  Persian  mountains  and  the 
deserts  of  Arabia. 

The  plan  was  admirably  feasible,  and  has  been  put  in 
force  almost  completely  in  the  course  of  this  war  (not  quite, 
for  our  troops  are  solidly  established  on  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
hold  Baghdad,  while  the  Russians  have  penetrated  far  into 
Armenia).      If   '  Berlin-Baghdad  '   were   achieved,    a   huge 

L  2 


1 64  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

block  of  territory  producing  every  kind  of  economic  wealth 
and  unassailable  by  sea-power  would  be  united  under 
German  authority.  Russia  would  be  cut  off  by  this  barrier 
from  her  western  friends,  Great  Britain  and  France.  Ger- 
man and  Turkish  armies  would  be  w^ithin  easy  striking 
distance  of  our  Egyptian  interests,  and  from  the  Persian 
Gulf  our  Indian  Empire  would  be  threatened.  The  port  of 
Alexandretta  and  the  control  of  the  Dardanelles  would  soon 
give  Germany  enormous  naval  power  in  the  Mediterranean. 

A  glance  at  the  map  of  the  world  will  show  how  the  chain 
of  States  stretched  from  Berlin  to  Baghdad.  The  German 
Empire,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  Bulgaria,  Turkey. 
One  little  strip  of  territory  alone  blocked  the  way  and  pre- 
vented the  two  ends  of  the  chain  from  being  linked  together. 
That  little  strip  was  Serbia.  Serbia  stood  small  but  defiant 
between  Germany  and  the  great  ports  of  Constantinople 
and  Salonika,  holding  the  gate  of  the  East.  Little  though 
we  knew  or  cared  in  England,  Serbia  was  really  the  first  line 
of  defence  of  our  eastern  possessions.  If  she  were  crushed 
or  enticed  into  the  '  Berlin-Baghdad  '  system,  then  our  vast 
but  slightly  defended  empire  would  soon  have  felt  the 
shock  of  Germany's  eastward  thrust. 

To  Germany,  therefore,  Serbia  was  an  intolerable  nuisance. 
Serbia  would  not  be  cajoled  into  the  family  of  Germany's 
vassal-states.  Therefore,  Serbia  must  be  crushed.  The 
Serbs  knew  well  that  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest  was  not  the 
end  of  war  in  the  Balkans.  As  soon  as  the  German  military 
preparations  were  completed,  an  excuse  would  not  be  want- 
ing, and  then  the  Serbs  might  look  to  themselves,  for  the 
last  and  most  terrible  of  their  wars  would  burst  upon  them. 

During  the  year  that  followed  the  Balkan  wars,  South- 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  165 

Eastern  Europe  was  in  a  ferment  of  expectation.     The  old 

racial  and  national  antagonisms  were  more  embittered  than 

before.    An  explosion  was  expected  from  day  to  day.    The 

presence  of  Prince  William  of  Wied  with  a  crown  and  a 

council  of  ministers  and  all  the  apparatus  of  a  modern  ruler 

did  not  mean  that  Albania  was  any  quieter  than  she  had  ever 

been.     It  was   not  Austria-Hungary's  intention   that  she 

should   be.     As   long  as   the   Albanians   respected   neither 

the  authority  of  their  own  sovereign  nor  the  rights  of  other 

States,  there  would  always  be  an  excuse  for  the  Austio- 

Hungarian  armies  to  advance  in  the  name  of  law  and  order.  T/v  fi^OO-'^^ 

In   the   autumn   of    191 3    the   Albanians   invaded    Serbian 

territory,  and  to  control  the  unruly  tribesmen  the   Serbs 

occupied  several  strategic  positions  on  the  Albanian  side  of   Cw(^,'6^  O 

the  frontier.     They  were  at  once  ordered  out  by  Austria-    /       /L^  t^ 

Hungary,  and  had  to  submit  to  Albanian  attacks  without  '  o 

the  possibility  of  checking  them  by  retaliation. 

Bosnia-Hertzegovina  had  never  been  resigned  to  Austrian 
rule,  and  since  the  Serbian  victories  the  two  provinces  were 
simmering  with  discontent.  When  the  country  was  annexed 
in  1908  a  constitution  had  been  promised,  but  the  parlia- 
ment that  was  set  up  found  itself  forbidden  to  control 
the  executive,  while  the  laws  it  passed  had  to  be  sanctioned 
by  the  central  government.  Serbian  societies  or  '  sokols ' 
everywhere  kept  alive  the  national  spirit,  and  encouraged 
the  people  to  resist  the  germanization  or  magyarization  of 
their  land.  Although  the  Serbian  government  did  not 
take  part  in  Pan-Serbian  agitation  over  the  frontier,  many 
Serbs  of  Serbia  undoubtedly  joined  with  their  brothers 
of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  to  spread  the  enthusiasm  for 
'  Greater  Serbia  '.  Unfortunately,  the  general  excitement 
and  the  repressive  attitude  of  the  government  resulted  in 


1 66  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

frequent  attempts  at  assassination.  A  people  helpless  before 
the  overwhelming  force  of  an  alien  invader  will  always 
be  tempted  to  rid  themselves  of  obnoxious  rulers  by  the  re- 
volver and  the  bomb.  But  we  must  hope  that,  whatever  the 
future  may  bring  forth,  the  Serbs  of  every  country  will  not 
again  have  recourse  to  such  useless  methods,  which  alienate 
from  them  the  sympathies  of  those  who  do  not  deny  their 
grievances.    The  result  of  the  general  unrest  was  that  in 

191 2  the  provinces  were  placed  under  military  rule,  and  in 

191 3  a  state  of  siege  was  proclaimed. 

Much  the  same  was  the  condition  of  Croatia.  The  old 
mutual  distrust  of  Croats  and  Serbs  had  been  steadily 
disappearing  with  the  growth  of  the  Serbo-Croat  coalition. 
Her  victories  showed  Serbia  to  be  a  worthy  leader  of  the 
Southern  Slav  crusade,  and  enthusiasm  for  Serbia  rose  high. 
Here,  too,  there  were  repeated  attempts  at  assassination, 
with  the  result  that  the  constitution  was  suspended,  and 
in  191 3  the  state  of  siege  followed.  The  blame  for  these 
continual  disturbances  was  laid  by  the  Magyars  to  the 
account  of  the  Serbian  government.  But  in  fact  official 
Serbia  was  but  a  passive  actor  in  the  drama.  It  had  been 
her  successful  revival  that  turned  the  hearts  of  her  ftUow 
Slavs  towards  her.  No  movement  for  liberation  from 
Austria-Hungary  would  have  begun  but  for  the  tyrannous 
nationahsm  of  the  Magyars.  The  blame  for  the  Croatian 
troubles  lies  really  with  Count  Tisza  and  the  Hungarian 
government,  which  has  been  unable  to  tolerate  Slav 
nationality  alongside  its  own. 

The  same  disturbance  and  insecurity  existed  in  Austria. 
In  1914  the  Bohemian  constitution  was  suspended.  Trieste 
was  in  rebellion  against  her  governor.  A  bad  budget  and 
the  prevailing  high  cost  of  living  added  to  the  general  unrest. 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  167 

But  Austria  is  accustomed  to  crises  of  all  kinds.  Her 
existence  has  for  long  been  a  juggling  performance  of  no 
little  skill.  The  government  is  always  engaged  in  playing 
off  one  national  interest  against  another  or  in  devising 
compromises  which  will  tide  over  immediate  difficulties. 
As  a  German  professor  once  said  to  me,  Austria  is  like  the 
old  house  in  Grimm's  Fairy  Tales  which  was  so  rotten 
that  it  was  on  the  point  of  falling  down  ;  but  as  it  could  not 
make  up  its  mind  which  way  to  fall,  it  continued  to  stand. 
Austria  has  weathered  many  storms,  and  left  to  herself  she 
would  doubtless  have  found  some  means  of  quieting  her 
disturbed  provinces  and  continuing  her  existence  as  the 
Central  European  Babel  where  all  the  races  somehow  pull 
together. 

But  the  gamblers  of  the  Central  Empires  were  determined 
to  chance  the  risks  of  a  world-war.  All  the  struggles  and  the 
rivalries  of  South-Eastern  Europe  were  to  be  submerged 
in  the  sea  of  German  expansion.  The  Germans  of  Austria, 
ardent  supporters  of  Pan-Germanism,  saw  that  success  would 
further  secure  their  predominance  in  their  own  country, 
while  failure  would  only  mean  their  relapse  into  the  German 
Empire.  Behind  and  controlling  the  whole  plan  were  the 
Emperor  William  and  the  German  government,  powerfully 
seconded  by  the  strong  man  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  Count  Tisza.  Our  papers  have  seldom  ceased 
during  the  war  to  represent  Hungary  as  a  most  uneasy 
partner  in  the  Central  European  firm,  only  too  anxious  to 
make  a  separate  peace  should  the  opportunity  occur.  No 
greater  mistake  could  be  made.  The  Magyars  are  a  minority 
in  their  own  country,  and  in  order  to  continue  their  domina- 
tion over  Slavs  and  Roumanians  they  have  sought  Prussian 
support  and   bound   themselves   to   the  Prussian    alliance. 


1 68  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 


/ 


Hungary,  which  is  ruled  by  an  hereditary  aristocracy,  sees 
its  whole  interest  closely  tied  to  Germany's  success  and  to 
Germany's  political  ideas.     It  was  Count  Tisza  and  the 
Magyars  as  much  as  any  one  who  brought  the  war  upon  us. 
At  Vienna  the  direction  'of  Austro-Hungarian  policy  was 
nominally  in  the  hands  of  Count  Berchtold,  a  gentleman,  as 
are  most  Austrians  of  high  birth,  but  casual  and  dilettante, 
more  interested  in  Society,  sport,  and  country  life  than  in 
the  drudgery  of  a  difficult  position.     Guiding  him  where 
they   wished   were   abler   men.      Count    Forgach,    Under- 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  was  our  old  friend  of  the 
Friedjung   forgeries,  a    bitter    enemy   of   the    Serbs,  with 
a  reputation  to  recover  by  proving  that  the  Serbs  were 
really  an  intolerable  menace  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  State. 
Working    in    close    touch   with   him    and    Tisza    was    also 
Count  von  Tschirschky,  the  German  ambassador,  '  the  old 
spider  of  the  Metternichgasse ',  an  inveterate  foe  of  Russia 
and  all  Slavs.     The  old  emperor  was  past  taking  an  active 
share  in  the  direction  of  policy,  but  the  heir  to  the  throne, 
the  Archduke   Franz   Ferdinand,   who   was   most   popular 
in  the  army,  was  known  to  be  in  favour  of  suppressing 
Serbia  once  for  all  by  military  force.     He  had  rattled  the 
Austrian  sabre  in  1908-9,  and  again  over  Durazzo  and  Scutari 
during  the  Turkish  war,  and  was  regarded  by  the  Serbs  with 
profound  distrust  as  being  their  irreconcilable  enemy. 

These  men  were  preparing  Austria-Hungary  for  the 
outbreak  of  war  with  Serbia.  But  across  this  simple  thread 
in  the  plot  runs  another  which  it  is  not  easy  to  unravel  ; 
and  that  is  the  unpopularity  of  the  archduke  in  various  high 
quarters.  The  emperor,  who  was  more  the  representative 
of  the  Habsburg  family  tradition  than  an  individual  per- 
sonahty,  always  resented  the  marriage  of  his  heir  with  the 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  169 

Countess  Chotek,  who  was  not  of  sufficiently  exalted  rank 
to  enable  her  to  be  the  wife  and  mother  of  emperors.  He 
loathed  the  thought  of  being  succeeded  by  Franz  Ferdinand, 
and  he  had  secured  the  subsequent  succession  to  the  young 
Archduke  Karl  Franz  Joseph  (now  emperor).  But  Franz 
Ferdinand  seems  also  to  have  been  suspect  in  the  eyes  of 
the  Hungarian  government.  Why  this  was  so  it  is  hard  to 
say  unless  it  was  that  the  archduke  was  connected  with  the 
policy  known  as  '  Trialism  '.  The  trialist  proposal  was  to 
counteract  the  Southern  Slav  agitation  by  creating  a  third 
and  Yugoslav  State,  in  addition  to  Austria  and  Hungary, 
within  the  empire.  Such  a  third  State  would  have  contained 
a  large  part  of  Hungarian  territory  and  completely  shut 
Hungary  off  from  the  sea. 

Several  conferences  took  place  in  the  spring  of  19 14.  The 
two  emperors  met.  The  Austrian  and  German  General 
Staffs  conferred.  In  June  the  German  Emperor,  accompanied 
by  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  visited  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdi- 
nand at  Konopisht  in  Bohemia.  What  they  said  to  each  other 
we  cannot  tell,  but  it  has  been  conjectured  that  the  attack 
on  Serbia  was  arranged  and  the  creation  of  a  Magyar- 
Yugoslav  State  which  would  provide  a  crown  for  one  of 
Franz  Ferdinand's  sons. 

Immediately  after  this  the  archduke  went  south  to  attend 
the  grand  manoeuvres  in  Bosnia.  It  was  courting  danger  for 
the  Austrian  heir-apparent  to  visit  any  province  of  Serbian 
nationality  at  a  time  when  feeling  was  running  high,  and 
the  Serbs  connected  his  presence  with  the  Austrian  policy 
of  stimulating  the  Albanian  tribes  to  activity.  But  it  was 
yet  further  dangerous  for  him  to  enter  Sarajevo,  as  he  did, 
on  '  Vidovdan '  (St.  Vitus's  Day,  June  28),  this  being  the 
anniversary   of    the  battle  of   Kossovo,   which   the   Serbs, 


170  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

strangely  enough,  always  celebrate  as  a  national  festival. 
The  hero  of  '  Vidovdan  '  is  Milosh  Obelitch,  who  killed  the 
Sultan  Murad  in  his  tent  on  the  day  of  the  battle,  and  there 
would  have  been  nothing  astonishing  if  some  young  Bosnian 
Serb  of  unstable  mind  had  taken  it  into  his  head  to  emulate 
that  feat  by  putting  an  end  to  a  representative  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  monarchy.  The  Serbs  of  Bosnia,  devoted  to  the 
common  Serbian  cause,  saw  in  the  archduke  the  enemy  who 
encouraged  Roman  Catholic  propaganda  at  their  expense, 
who  had  instigated  Dr.  Friedjung  and  provided  him  with 
forged  papers,  who  had  kept  Serbia  from  the  sea,  and  stirred 
up  Bulgaria  to  the  fratricidal  war  that  had  destroyed  the 
Balkan  League.  Attempts  at  political  assassination  had  been 
so  frequent  in  recent  years  in  the  Southern  Slav  lands  that 
on  the  occasion  of  the  old  emperor's  visit  to  Sarajevo  some 
years  before  his  safety  had  been  ensured  by  1,000  police,  and 
probably  by  an  army  of  secret  agents.  It  was  to  be  expected, 
therefore,  that  every  precautioji  would  be  taken  to  protect 
the  heir  to  the  throne,  above  all  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
M.  Pashitch  warned  the  government  on  June  21  that  he  had 
reason  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  conspiracy  in  Bosnia. 
The  Serbian  authorities  also  communicated  their  suspicions 
of  a  man  called  Chabrinovitch,  a  young  anarchist  who  had 
lately  been  in  Belgrade  where  the  police  would  have  arrested 
him  but  for  assurances  from  Austria-Hungary. 

Despite  all  these  indications  of  the  hidden  dangers  of  the 
Bosnian  capital,  the  arrangements  for  the  archduke's  visit 
seem  to  have  been  conceived  in  a  spirit  of  real  or  assumed 
confidence  in  the  people  who  thronged  the  streets.  Con- 
trary to  the  usual  custom,  the  police  of  Sarajevo  were  ordered 
to  hand  over  the  task  of  protecting  the  archduke  and  his  wife 
to  the  military.    As  a  matter  of  fact  the  exalted  pair  drove 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  171 

through  the  streets  with  General  Potiorek,  the  military 
governor,  followed  by  a  second  motor  containing  some  of 
their  suite,  but  unaccompanied  by  any  body-guard  whatever. 
As  they  passed  along  Chabrinovitch  flung  a  couple  of  bombs 
at  the  leading  car.  One  bomb  appears  actually  to  have  fallen 
on  the  archduke,  who  with  great  presence  of  mind  flung  it 
clear.  In  exploding,  it  wounded  one  or  two  occupants 
of  the  second  motor.  The  archduke  was  not  unnaturally 
incensed  at  his  unpleasant  experience,  and  said  as  much  to 
the  mayor  who  met  him  with  an  address  of  welcome  at  the 
town  hall.  After  the  official  lunch  he  proposed  a  visit  to 
the  hospital  to  which  the  victims  of  the  morning's  outrage 
had  been  taken.  Several  people  wisely  urged  him  not  to  take 
any  more  risks.  As  he  hesitated.  General  Potiorek  struck  in, 
'  I  know  my  Bosniaks.  There  are  never  two  attempts  on  the 
same  day.  You  would  miss  a  splendid  ovation.'  ^  The  arch- 
duke was  persuaded,  and  started  on  a  second  drive  through 
the  streets.  As  the  car  slowed  down  to  take  a  corner,  a  young 
man  called  Prinzip  stepped  off  the  pavement  and  with  his 
revolver  shot  both  the  archduke  and  his  wife. 

The  news  of  the  double  murder  came  as  a  terrible  shock 
to  all  in  Europe  who  followed  the  outlines  of  international 
politics.  In  England  singularly  little  interest  was  shown. 
Not  many  people  were  quite  clear  as  to  who  the  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  was.  All  agreed  that  a  dastardly  action  had 
been  committed,  that  something  would  and  ought  to  be  done 
about  it,  but  that  the  whole  affair  was  very  far  away  and 
would  soon  be  forgotten.  Following  the  reports  that  came 
from  Austria,  nearly  all  our  newspapers  assumed  that  the 
outrage  was  the  work  of  Serbian  revolutionaries  from  the 
kingdom,  that  Austria-Hungary  was  entitled  to  demand  some 

^  Denis,  p.  278. 


172  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

form  of  compensation  and  guarantees  for  the  future  and  that 
then  all  would  be  calm  again. 

But  those  who  knew  something  of  South-Eastern  Europe 
saw  with  the  gravest  misgivings  that  here  was  the  very  oppor- 
tunity for  which  Austria-Hungary  had  been  looking  in  order 
to  put  out  her  strength  and  strangle  the  rising  Serbian 
kingdom.      Here  surely  was  the  moral  justification  for  Dr. 
Fried]  ung,  even  for  Forgach  and  his  forgers.     If  what  the 
Austrian  newspapers  said  was  true,  and  the  murderers  had 
been  sent  from  Serbia  to  accomplish  their  errand  of  death, 
then  surely  Europe  would  be  obliged  to.  stand  by  while 
condign  punishment  was  meted  out.    Yet  for  nearly  a  month 
nothing  happened.    M.  Pashitch,  in  the  name  of  his  country, 
hastened  to  offer  his  condolences  to  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government.     He  asserted  that  the  crime  of  Sarajevo  was 
most  severely  reprobated  by  all  classes  of  society  in  Serbia, 
and  that  his  government  would  co-operate  loyally  in  bringing     \ 
to  justice  any  Serbian  subjects  suspected  of  complicity  in  the 
murder.    On  July  3  the  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna  was  able 
to  report  to  his  chief  at  Belgrade  that  he  had  had  an  inter- 
view   with    Baron   Macchio,  Under-Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  and  that  the  Baron  had  said,  '  Nobody  accuses  the 
Kingdom  of  Serbia  nor  its  Government  nor  the  whole  Ser- 
bian nation  '.^    This  sounded  promising.     But  opinion  inj 
the  Dual  Monarchy  was  being  inflamed  by  the  press,  and  th& 
government  did  little  to  control  the  demonstrations  hostil^/ 
to  Serbia.    There  were  riots  at  Sarajevo,  where  the  Serbian 
quarter  was  burned,  as  well  as  in  the  bigger  towns  of  Austria 
and  Hungary.     The  newspapers  persistently  referred  to  the 
authors  of  the  outrage  as  '  Serbs  ',  in  order  to  give  the  im- 
pression that  they  v/ere  subjects  of  King  Peter,  since  the 
1  Diplomatic  Docu7nents,  p.  375  ;   Serbian  Blue  Book,  No.  12. 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  173 

Serbs  of  Bosnia  had  long  been  officially  designated  as  '  Bos- 
niaks '.  They  also  published  wholly  fictitious  accounts  of  the 
assassination  of  several  Hungarian  journalists  in  Serbia,  and 
of  a  demonstration  against  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister 
at  the  funeral  of  M.  Hartwig.  Considering  that  M.  Hartwig 
had  been  beloved  by  all  Serbs  as  a  true  and  powerful  friend 
of  their  nation  and  that  his  sudden  death  while  drinking 
coffee  in  the  Austro-Hungarian  Legation  was  ascribed  by 
Serbian  public  opinion  to  poison,  it  would  not  have  been 
surprising  if  the  immense  crowd  that  followed  the  Russian 
diplomat's  coffin  to  the  grave  had  expressed  its  indignation 
against  the  supposed  murderer.  As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  clear 
that  these  newspaper  stories  had  no  foundation  ;  for  not 
only  were  they  officially  denied  by  M.  Pashitch,^  but  Freiherr 
von  Giesl,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Minister,  in  his  reports  on 
events  at  Belgrade  prior  to  July  21,  made  no  more  serious 
complaint  than  that  great  bitterness  was  generally  expressed 
against  Austria-Hungary  both  in  the  press  and  in  Society." 
The  Serbian  press  was  indeed  violent  in  tone  ;  but,  as  the 
Prime  Minister  pointed  out,  complete  liberty  of  the  press 
existed  in  that  country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  same  excuse 
could  hardly  be  made  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  journals. 
Nor  was  opinion  in  Serbia  calmed  by  learning  that  the  Crown 
Prince  Alexander  was  receiving  almost  daily  from  Austria- 
Hungary  letters  threatening  him  with  death. ^ 

Meanwhile  the  inquiry  into  the  facts  of  the  murder  pro- 
ceeded at  Sarajevo  in  secret.  At  first  this  did  not  prevent  the 
Hungarian  papers  from  publishing  certain  '  confessions  '  of 
the  prisoners  incriminating  various  persons  in  Serbia,  espe- 

^  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  380;  Serbian  Blue  Book,  No.  21. 
-  Ibid.,  p.  451  ;   Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  6. 
^  Ibid.,  p.  378  ;    Serbian  Blue  Book,  No.  18. 


174  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

cially  General  Yankovitch,  the  president  of  the  '  Narodna 
Odbrana  '.  Suddenly,  in  the  middle  of  July,  these  reports 
and  revelations  ceased  in  obedience  to  the  government's 
orders,  and  the  press  began  to  represent  the  whole  affair  not 
as  a  trial  of  individuals  but  as  an  international  affair  which 
must  ultimately  be  settled  by  war.  It  is  surely  not  an  un- 
natural surmise  to  suppose  that  this  change  of  policy  was 
dictated  by  the  course  of  the  trial.  At  first  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  authorities  expected  no  doubt  to  discover  proofs 
of  Serbian  official  complicity  in  a  great  plot.  As  they  found 
themselves  unable  to  trace  the  murder  to  the  quarters 
required,  they  turned  the  attention  of  the  public  from  the 
facts  concerned  with  the  murders  towards  incitement  of  a 
general  kind  against  Serbia  as  a  perpetual  menace  to  Austria- 
Hungary. 

Nevertheless  no  very  serious  consequences  were  expected. 
The  Serbian  Minister  at  Vienna  thought  on  July  15  that 
Austria-Hungary  was  preparing  a  note  to  Serbia  in  which 
that  nation  would  be  ordered  to  give  guarantees  of  neigh- 
bourly behaviour,  and  also  a  circular  note  to  the  Great 
Powers  asking  for  their  support  to  this  end.-^  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  was  so  reassuring  that  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  Vienna  left  his  post  to  go  on  leave,  the 
President  of  the  French  Republic  with  his  Foreign  Minister 
paid  a  visit '  to  Petrograd,  while  M.  Pashitch  and  other 
Serbian  ministers  left  Belgrade  for  the  interior  in  connexion 
with  the  approaching  elections.  It  was  at  this  moment  that 
the  blow  fell  from  Vienna,  like  thunder  out  of  a  clear  sky.  On 
July  23  the  famous  ultimatum  was  handed  to  M.  Pashitch's 
substitute  at  Belgrade.  This  document  accused  Serbia  of 
having  tolerated  and  even  encouraged  anti-Austrian  propa- 
^  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  383  ;  Serbian  Blue  Book,  No.  25. 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  175 

t^anda  for  the  previous  five  years,  of  retaining  in  her  service  /f—Zr 
officers  who  had  engineered  the  murder  at  Sarajevo,  and  rJ^'^Alu 
of  having  supphed  the  conspirators  with  weapons  from  the 
State  arsenal  at  Kraguyevatz.  The  note  contained  demands 
formulated  in  ten  clauses  asking  for  the  suppression  of 
notoriously  anti-Austrian  societies  in  Serbia,  the  dismissal 
from  the  State  service  of  officials  guilty  of  anti-Austrian 
proceedings,  the  arrest  of  two  indivitfuals,  the  suppression 
:  of  illicit  traffic  in  arms  over  the  frontier,  apologies  for  certain 
hostile  utterances  of  public  men  since  June  28,  and  the 
admission  of  Austro-Hungarian  representatives  to  assist  in 
the  suppression  of  propagandist  societies  and  in  the  trial  of 
persons  suspected  of  complicity  in  the  murder.  The  Serbian 
government  was  called  upon  to  accept  the  note  in  its  entirety 
within  the  space  of  forty-eight  hours  from  6.0  p.m.  on  July  23, 
failing  which  the  acting  Serbian  Prime  Minister  was  informed 
that  diplomatic  relations  would  be  suspended. 

Before  considering  the  Serbian  reply  to  these  proposals, 
let  us  return  and  examine  some  of  the  details  concerning  the 
murder  itself.  Who  killed  Franz  Ferdinand  ?  Or  rather,  on 
whom  does  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  his  death  rest  ? 
The  Austro-Hungarian  official  case  is  that  the  murder  was 
perpetrated  by  Serbs — Bosnian  Serbs,  it  is  true,  but  recently 
resident  in  Serbia — and  that  the  authors  of  the  two  attempts 
used  bombs  emanating  from  Kraguyevatz  and  Browning 
pistols  given  to  them  in  Serbia.  The  case  certainly  looks 
black  at  first  sight  and  points  to  Serbian  complicity,  though 
the  evidence  after  all  had  only  been  produced  in  the  course 
of  a  secret  trial  whose  proceedings  have  never  been  published. 

On  the  other  hand,  let  us  apply  a  test  which  is  much  to  the 
point.  To  whose  interest  were  the  results  brought  about 
by  the  crime  ?    Manifestly  not  to  the  interest  of  the  Serbian 


176  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

kingdom,  which  had  just  emerged  impoverished  and  ex- 
hausted from  two  wars.  Nothing  could  have  been  more 
disastrous  for  Serbia  at  such  a  time  than  to  provoke  a  conflict 
with  a  neighbouring  Great  Power,  particularly  under  circum- 
stances that  would  alienate  the  opinion  of  every  civilized 
State.  For  the  Central  Empires,  however,  the  violent  death 
of  the  archduke  provided  just  the  needful  excuse  for  the 
suppression  of  independent  Serbia.  The  change  in  the. 
succession  to  the  Habsburg  crown  from  Franz  Ferdinand  to 
the  young  Karl  Franz  Joseph  was  known  by  all  to  be  most 
gratifying  to  the  old  emperor,  wliile  the  murder  of  the 
advocate  of  Trialism  could  not  but  be  acceptable  to  Hun- 
garian nationalists,  who  had  been  infuriated  by  the  late 
archduke's  plans  for  a  Southern  Slav  monarchy.  Considera- 
tions of  policy  therefore  would  show  that  Serbia  had  no 
interest  in  the  crime,  while  powerful  forces  in  Central 
Europe  would  have  been  inclined  to  welcome  and  profit  by  it. 
Of  course  an  enlightened  view  of  national  interests  cannot  be 
expected  from  all  Serbian  individuals.  But  what  we  may 
consider  ourselves  entitled  to  assume  is  that  the  Serbian 
government  would  view  the  situation  calmly  and  be  unlikely 
to  permit  its  subordinates  to  draw  down  well-merited 
punishment  on  their  country. 

But  there  are  details  to  consider,  and  though  we  cannot 
pretend  to  penetrate  the  obscurity  in  which  the  whole  affair 
is  wrapped,  the  examination  of  some  of  the  facts  may  help  us 
to  form  a  provisional  estimate  of  the  guilty  parties,  pending 
the  publication  of  decisive  proofs. 

First  of  all,  then,  why  were  no  precautions  taken  to  protect 
the  life  of  the  archduke  in  so  dangerous  a  spot  as  Sarajevo  ? 
Why  was  Chabrinovitch  not  arrested  when  denounced  by  the 
Serbian  government  as  a  dangerous  character  ?    or  at  least, 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  177 

why  was  not  some  check  placed  on  his  freedom  of  movement  ? 
Why  were  no  escort  and  no  police  provided  to  guard  the 
archduke  on  his  drive  through  the  streets  ?  After  the  crime 
the  president  of  the  Bosnian  Diet  made  the  most  extra- 
ordinary revelations.  There  were,  it  appears,  two  bombs 
under  the  table  of  the  dining-room,  and  a  third  in  the 
chimney.-'-  It  is  hardly  possible  to  imagine  that  any  police 
force  would  overlook  the  presence  of  little  things  like  that 
stuck  about  a  dining-room  that  was  to  receive  royalty.  The 
presence  of  the  bombs,  to  my  mind,  points  to  an  attempt, 
made  either  before  or  after  the  murder,  to  prove  the  existence 
of  a  widespread  conspiracy. 

There  are  other  suspicious  points  in  the  attitude  of  the 
Austro-Hnngarian  authorities.  General  Potiorek  was  the 
man  who  innocently  or  deliberately  sent  the  archduke  to  his 
death.  Why  was  not  the  general  broken,  or  placed  on  the 
retired  list  ?  Why  does  he  appear  soon  afterwards  at  the  head 
of  the  great  army  that  invaded  Serbia  in  November  ? 

Again,  a  Serbian  officer  tells  me  that  he  saw  a  postcard 
sent  from  Sarajevo  a  few  days  before  the  fatal  Sunday  to  a 
brother  officer  in  Serbia.  On  the  card  was  a  message  to  the 
effect  that  '  Vidovdan  '  was  approaching  and  that  then  it 
would  be  known  who  was  true  and  who  was  not.  On  it  was 
also  drawn  a  little  plan  of  the  streets  of  Sarajevo,  with  dots 
at  the  very  points  where  the  attempts  took  place.  Now  there 
was  the  strictest  censorship  on  the  Serbo-Bosnian  frontier. 
So  carefully  had  the  frontier  been  guarded  that  the  Serbs 
declared  that  the  birds  could  not  fly  over  it.  Who  would  be 
fool  enough  to  post  so  incriminating  a  document,  knowing 
that  it  would  have  to  run  the  gauntlet  of  a  searching  examina- 
tion ?     Yet  bombs,  pistols,  and  conspirators'  correspondence 

1  Denis,  p.  279. 
2071  j^ 


y 


178  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

^  crossed  that  frontier  quite  easily.  Once  more,  it  looks  as 
though  the  Austro-Hungarian  police  had  been  allowing 
\y  criminal  preparations  to  go  on,  and  even  adding  a  touch  or 
two  to  the  evidence. 

As  recently  as  last  April  the  Echo  de  Paris  published  an 
article  which  throws  a  weight  of  suspicion  on  the  Hungarian 
government.^  According  to  the  writer  the  Commissaire 
central  of  Zagreb  a.  month  before  the  murder  received  two 
warnings  of  a  plot,  with  names.  The  Croatian  government 
proceeded  at  once  to  advise  the  government  at  Buda-Pesth. 
A  third  warning  from  Dr.  M^arco  Gagliardi,  a  well-known 
Serbophil  of  Zagreb,  was  also  transmitted  to  the  Hungarian 
capital.  Yet  nothing  was  done.  The  blame  for  this  in- 
activity ascends  to  the  highest  quarters  and  must  rest  on  the 
Premier,  Count  Tisza.  Either  he  did  not  know  of  the  warn- 
ings, in  which  case  it  is  odd  that  he  did  not  censure  his 
subordinates  when  the  facts  became  public,  or  else  he 
knew  and  deliberately  let  events  follow  their  course. 

M.  Hinkovitch,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  Zagreb  conspiracy 
trial,  adds  to  our  suspicion  of  the  Hungarian  government. 
In  a  pamphlet  published  in  London,  he  declares  that  the 
priest  Locali,  leader  of  the  Transylvanian  Roumanian  party, 
promised  in  December  1915  to  publish  documentary  proof 
that  Count  Tisza  and  certain  other  officials  were  responsible 
for  the  crime.^ 

The  fact  that  tells  most  heavily  against  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  official  case  is^he  secrecy  in  which  the  trial  of  the 
culprits  has  from  the  beginning  been  wrapped.  Why  has  that 
damning  evidence,  on  which  the  ultimatum  purported  to  be 
based,  never  been  given  to  the  world  ?    And  how  curious  it 

^  Echo  de  Paris.,  April  13,  1917. 
^  Hinkovic,  p.  18. 


\\ 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  179 

as  that,  as  the  trial  proceeded  and  the  evidence  no  doubt 
came  to  light,  the  newspapers  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  were 
forbidden  to  publish  the  '  confessions '  of  the  prisoners,  as 
they  had  at  iirst  been  allowed  to  do  ! 

One  last  point.  The  antipathy  of  the  emperor  and  the 
imperial  family  for  the  late  archduke  and  his  wife  was 
conspicuously  shown  in  the  circumstances  of  their  funeral. 
Xo  wreaths  were  sent.  The  ceremony  had  nothing  of  the 
character  of  a  public  event,  and  would  have  been  almost 
unattended  but  for  the  unexpected  presence  of  the  present 
emperor  and  a  number  of  young  members  of  the  noble 
families  of  Austria,  who  resented  '  the  burial  of  the  dog  ' 
accorded  to  their  late  Commander-in-Chief  and  Crown- 
Prince.  The  emperor's  master  of  the  ceremonies  forgot 
nothine  that  could  show  indifference  to  the  fate  of  the 
deceased.  Beside  the  coffin  of  the  murdered  princess  lay 
only  a  fan  and  a  pair  of  white  gloves,  the  insignia  of  her 
'  true  '  station  in  life,  that  of  a  lady-in-waiting. 

In  all  this  there  is  no  positive  proof.  The  mystery  has 
points  that  baffle  the  most  cock-sure.  But  on  the  strength 
of  the  arguments  here  put  forward  I  think  an  opinion  can 
be  based.  It  is  that  the  murder  was  the  work  of  one  or  two 
fanatics  of  Serbian  race,  but  of  Austro-Hungarian  allegiance, 
who  were  roused  to  fury  by  the  unsympathetic  treatment  of 
the  Orthodox  inhabitants  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina ;  that  these 
Serbs  or  Bosniaks  were  probably  in  touch  with  '  comitadjis ' 
of  Serbia,  who  were  ignorant  of  Europe  and  did  not  realize 
with  what  inflammable  material  they  were  playing,  that 
the  Serbian  government  and  public  services  in  general  did 
not  know  what  was  being  prepared  ;  but  that  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  government  did  know  and  used  the  plot  as 
a  Heaven-sent   means    to   remove    an   undesirable   heir  to 

M  2 


i8o  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

the   throne   and   to  incriminate  Serbia  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world. 

Having  decided  on  the  course  to  be  followed,  the  statesmen 
of  Vienna  brought  about  the  rupture  with  overwhelming  sud- 
denness and  rapidity.  On  the  very  day  that  the  ultimatum 
was  presented  Baron  Macchio  had  an  interview  with  the 
French  ambassador,  and  never  dropped  the  slightest  hint  of 
what  was  to  be  done  that  afternoon  at  Belgrade.  Serbia — 
and  with  her  also  the  Powers  friendly  to  her — had  only  forty- 
eight  hours  in  which  to  consider  and  accept  a  note  of  con- 
siderable length  and  many  points.  It  is  worth  noticing  that 
even  if  Serbia  accepted  the  whole  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
ultimatum,  she  was  still  to  be  called  upon  to  pay  for  the 
Austro-Hungarian  mobilization.  In  the  same  way  might  a 
bully  demand  an  apology  for  an  imaginary  insult,  and,  on 
receiving  it,  insist  that  the  victim  should  pay  for  the  stick 
with  which  the  necessary  intimidation  had  been  performed. 

To  the  ultimatum  was  annexed  a  series  of  findings  of  the 
criminal  court  at  Sarajevo.  If  all  the  charges  there  put 
forward  are  true,  the  greater  part  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
demands  are  but  reasonable  measures  of  self-protection. 
But  the  whole  document  was  the  product  of  the  Foreign 
Office  of  Vienna,  assisted  by  von  Tschirschky  and  Tisza.  It 
w^as  surely  too  much  to  ask  of  the  governments  of  Europe 
that  they  should  accept  in  two  days,  that  is  to  say,  after  the 
most  cursory  examination,  accusations  brought  forward  by 
the  most  notorious  forger  of  recent  years,  Count  Forgach. 
Austria-Hungary  indeed  took  up  the  attitude  that  the  matter 
only  concerned  herself  and  Serbia.  But  she  laid  her  grievances 
before  all  the  Powers,  and  in  any  case  Serbia  herself  had  the 
right  to  ask  that  the  charges  should  be  substantiated.    The 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  i8i 

Russian  Foreign  Minister  pointed  out  the  futility  of  sub- 
mitting the  case  against  Serbia  to  his  government  after  the 
ultimatum  had  been  dispatched.  To  which  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  ambassador  replied  that  the  results  attained  by 
the  investigation  at  Sarajevo  '  were  quite  sufficient  for  our 
procedure  in  this  matter  '/  and  that  the  information  had  only 
been  laid  before  the  Powers  for  Austria-Hungary's  public 
justification.  Thus,  while  loudly  protesting  her  innocence 
and  parading  her  grievances,  Austria-Hungary  gave  neither  \  j 
Serbia  nor  Europe  an  opportunity  of  judging  the  truth  of  her  V 
statements. 

Yet,  despite  the  bullying  tone  of  the  ultimatum  and  its  /^/X/fit*^ 
unsupported  charges,  Serbia  acted  on  the  advice  of  her  more  i  ^  >^ 
powerful  friends  and  returned  an  unexpectedly  humble  and  ^'^'^ 
accommodating  reply.  Out  of  the  ten  demands  eight  were  in 
substance  accepted,  though  with  a  number  of  verbal  altera- 
tions which  Austria-Hungary  used  to  support  her  case.  The 
'  Narodna  Odbrana  '  was  to  be  dissolved  ;  all  anti-Habsburg 
propaganda  shown  by  Austria-Hungary  to  exist  in  Serbian 
schools  and  colleges  was  to  be  suppressed  ;  any  military 
officers  denounced  for  the  same  offence  would  be  tried  and, 
if  guilty,  cashiered ;  one  of  the  individuals  named  had 
already  been  arrested  ;  the  other,  an  Austro-Hungarian 
subject,  the  government  had  not  been  able  to  arrest ;  the 
proofs  of  their  guilt  were  asked  with  a  view  to  their  trial ; 
energetic  measures  were  promised  against  any  illicit  traffic 
in  arms  across  the  frontier  ;  explanations  would  be  given  of 
any  anti-Habsburg  utterances  of  Serbian  public  officials. 
What  then  did  Serbia  refuse  ?  Clauses  5  and  6  of  the  ulti- 
matum had  insisted  on  the  admission  of  Austro-Hungarian 
delegates  to  assist  in  the  suppression  of  hostile  propaganda 
^  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  458  ;  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  14. 


1 82  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

and  in  the  trial  of  persons  suspected  of  complicity  in  the 
murder.  Here  were  demands  that  could  not  be  granted 
without  the  sacrifice  of  Serbia's  national  independence.  As 
M.  Sazonov  said,  Serbia  would  no  longer  be  master  in  her 
own  house  if  she  submitted  to  such  control.  '  You  will 
always  be  wanting  to  intervene  again,'  he  said  to  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  ambassador,  '  and  what  a  life  you  will  lead 
Europe.'  ^  Yet  even  so,  the  Serbian  refusal  of  these  two 
clauses  was  studiously  non-provocative.  The  Serbian 
government  agreed  to  '  such  collaboration  as  agrees  with  the 
principle  of  international  law,  with  criminal  procedure  and 
with  good  neighbourly  relations ',  and,  while  refusing  the 
services  of  Austro-Hungarian  delegates  in  the  murder  trials, 
.agreed  to  try  any  persons  accused  by  Austria-Hungary  and 
to  inform  her  of  the  results  of  the  investigations.  Finally, 
should  this  almost  abject  reply  not  be  acceptable  to  Vienna, 
Serbia  suggested  that  the  matter  should  be  referred  to  the 
Hague  Tribunal  or  to  the  Great  Powers  who  had  ended  the 
crisis  of  1909  by  drawing  up  the  declaration  then  made  by  the 
Serbian  government.  Three  days  later  the  charge  d'affaires 
at  Rome  even  told  our  ambassador  that  Serbia  would  pro- 
bably accept  the  whole  of  the  ultimatum  if  she  were  informed 
exactly  as  to  what  powers  were  claimed  for  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian delegates  in  the  investigations  on  Serbian  territory. 

But  the  ultimatum  had  been  sent  in  order  that  it  might 
be  rejected.  No  other  explanation  of  the  treatment  of 
Serbia's  reply  is  possible.  M.  Pashitch  handed  his  answer 
to  Freiherr  von  Giesl  at  5.45  p.m.  on  Saturday,  July  25. 
We  have  already  seen  that  it  was  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
deserve  the  most  careful  consideration  from  any  government 
desirous  of  keeping  the  peace.  Yet  on  returning  to  his 
^  Diplo7iiaiic  Documents,  p.  458;  Austro-Hungarian  Red  Book,  No.  14. 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  183 

office  M,  Pashitch  received  a  note  from  the  Austro-Hun- 
gaiian  Minister  informing  him  that  the  Serbian  reply  was  not 
satisfactory  and  that  diplomatic  relations  were  accordingly 
broken  off.  The  Minister,  with  the  entire  staff  of  the 
Legation,  quitted  Serbian  territory  by  special  train  the  same 
evening,  showing  thereby  that  every  preparation  had  been 
made  on  the  assumption  that  war  would  be  forced  upon 
Serbia.  On  July  28  Count  Berchtold  sent  the  Serbian 
<:overnment  a  formal  declaration  of  war. 

In  England  we  could  hardly  believe  the  seiiousness  of 
the  situation.  There  had  been  so  many  Balkan  crises 
engineered  from  Vienna.  Surely  this  one  would  subside 
like  the  others.  But  our  Foreign  Secretary  was  alarmed 
at  the  rapidity  with  which  events  had  developed.  He  had 
done  his  utmost  to  induce  Germany  and  xA.ustria-Hungary 
to  agree  to  a  conference  of  the  Powers  to  discuss  the  ulti- 
matum. He  now  said  that  he  had  hoped  that  the  Serbian 
reply  would  furnish  a  basis  for  discussion  and  agreement. 
To  this  Count  Berchtold  answered  that  Serbia  had  ordered 
her  mobilization  on  July  25.  '  Up  to  then  we  had  made  no 
military  preparations,  but  by  the  Serbian  mobilization  we 
were  compelled  to  do  so.'  ^  So  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  to 
understand  that  Austria-Hungary,  with  all  her  immense 
forces  ready  on  the  Bosnian  frontier,  was  afraid  that  Serbia 
would  invade  her  territories ! 

On  July  28,  after  informing  the  ambassador  at  Petrograd 
that  war  had  been  declared  that  day,  Count  Berchtold 
went  on  to  say  that  this  step  had  been  rendered  necessary 
by  the  enemy's  attack  on  the  Hungarian  frontier.  Yet 
it  is  curious  to  observe  that  in  his  declaration  of  war  Count 

1  Ibid.,  p.  517,  No.  39. 


184  The  Mtirder  at  Sarajevo 

Berchtold  said  nothing  about  any  Serbian  acts  of  hostility, 
and  confined  himself  to  the  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the 
reply  to  the  ultimatum.^ 

The  fact  was  that  Austria-Hungary  felt  her  golden  op- 
portunity had  come.  While  the  memory  of  the  murdered 
archduke  was  still  fresh  she  must  hustle  Serbia  into  wai. 
If  there  was  any  delay  the  Serbs  might  be  able  to  prove 
their  innocence,  or  at  least  the  Powers  would  discover 
a  compromise  and  so  preserve  the  independence  and  integ- 
rity of  the  Serbian  State.  That  was  what  Austria-Hungary 
had  no  intention  of  allowing.  Serbia  was  not  merely  to 
become  a  vassal  of  Vienna  as  in  the  days  of  King  Milan. 
She  was  now  to  be  stripped  of  territory  and  rendered  help- 
less. The  Italian  government  was  informed  on  July  30  that 
Austria-Hungary  could  not  promise  to  respect  the  territorial 
integrity  of  Serbia.-  Thus,  while  the  cabinets  of  Great 
Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia  were  striving  to  prevent 
a  general  conflagration  and  sending  notes  in  every  direction, 
the  Austro-Hungarian  guns  were  already  bombarding  the 
defenceless  streets  and  houses  of  Belgrade. 

As  the  Hungarian  newspaper,  Pesti  Hirlaf,  acknowledged 
in  its  issue  of  June  28,  1916,  the  war  was  thrust  upon  Serbia 
by  Austria-Hungary.  'To-day',  ran  the  article,  'we  can 
frankly  say  that  the  cause  of  this  war  was  not  the  tragedy 
of  Sarajevo  .  .  .  but  we  saw  that  we  were  obliged  to  finish 
once  for  all  with  the  Serbian  agitation,  which  after  the 
Balkan  wars  had  become  insupportable  .  .  .'  ^    That  was  part 

1  Diplotnattc  Documents,  pp.  515  and  518;  Austro-Hungarian  Red 
Book,  Nos.  37  and  40. 

-  Denis,  p.  289.  Quoted  from  a  speech  by  Signor  Salandra,  June  2, 
1915.  Itwas  on  this  issue,  the  intention  of  Austria-Hungary  to  violate 
the  territorial  settlement  of  the  Balkans,  that  Italy  drew  away  from 
the  Triple  Alliance.  3  Quoted  in  Kuhne,  p.  279. 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  185 

of  the  issue.  Austria-Hungary  saw  in  Serbia  the  potential 
deliverer  of  the  Southern  Slavs.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  there  was  much  Southern  Slav  agitation  in  which 
some  Serbs  of  Serbia  were  taking  part.  But  Austria-Hun- 
gary's remedy  was  not  necessarily  war.  By  Trialism,  or  any 
other  federal  form  of  government  that  would  have  allowed 
justice  and  liberty  to  the  Serbo-Croats  of  the  Empire,  the 
Serbian  danger  might  have  been  avoided.  Austria-Hungary, 
however,  had  further  ambitions.  She  now  felt  herself  strong 
enough  to  break  down  the  Serbian  barrier  that  stood  between 
herself  and  the  East.  If  we  can  feel  some  sympathy  for  an/  (f^'^  .  t 
antiquated  imperial  system,  beset  by  rising  national  forces,}  A-^^^ 
we  can  have  none  for  an  aggressive  and  disingenuous  govern- 
ment which  seeks  to  destroy  a  neighbouring  State  for  the 
offence  of  being  situated  across  an  advantageous  trade-route. 
But  if  we  lay  the  blame  for  the  first  hostilities  upon 
Austria-Hungary,  the  main  responsibility  for  the  spread 
of  the  war  to  all  the  Great  Powers  of  the  world  lies  elsewhere. 
It  became  clear  at  once  to  the  diplomats  of  Vienna  that 
they  had  not  only  to  reckon  with  Serbia.  As  soon  as  he 
received  the  ^news  that  war  was  declared,  the  Serbian 
Minister  at  Petrograd  addressed  on  July  28  an  appeal  for 
help  to  Russia.  '  In  bringing  to  your  notice ',  he  wrote  to 
M.  Sazonov,  '  the  act  that  a  Great  Power  has  had  the  sorry 
courage  to  commit  against  a  little  Slav  country  which  has 
scarcely  emerged  from  a  long  series  of  heroic  and  exhausting 
struggles,  I  take  the  liberty,  in  circumstances  of  such  gravity 
for  my  country,  of  expressing  the  hope  that  this  act,  which 
breaks  the  peace  and  outrages  the  conscience  of  Europe, 
will  be  condemned  by  the  whole  civilized  world  and  severely 
punished  by  Russia,  Serbia's  protector.'  ^  The  Russian 
1  Le  Livre  bleu  serbe,  No.  47,  p.  64. 


1 86  The  Murder  at  Sarajevo 

reply  was  an  assurance  that  Serbia  would  not  be  left  to  her 
fate.  That  meant  a  certainty  of  European  war,  and  Austria- 
Hungary  appears  to  have  wished  to  draw  back  before  the 
prospect  of  such  a  cataclysm.  On  July  31  our  Foreign 
Office  learned  with  relief  that  Vienna  and  Petrograd  had 
resumed  their  abandoned  negotiations,  and  that  the  former 
was  prepared  to  guarantee  the  independence  and  integrity 
of  Serbia.  Despite  the  contrary  declaration  at  Rome,  to 
which  we  have  referred,  it  is  possible  to  believe  that  Austria- 
Hungary  was  in  earnest,  and  wished  at  the  last  moment 
to  avoid  the  overwhelming  consequence  of  her  late  action  by 
a  dignified  withdrawal.  Too  late !  Germany  had  arranged 
a  European  war  and  was  not  to  be  baulked  by  the  discretion 
of  her  ally.  Although  not  herself  a  party  to  the  quarrel,  she 
stepped  in  and  declared  war  upon  Russia  on  August  i.  In 
the  last  resort  it  was  the  firm  will  and  inhuman  policy  of 
Berlin  that  drove  Austria-Hungary  to  the  logical  issue  of 
her  Pan-German  policy.  Instead  of  sending  what  she  had 
called  '  a  punitive  expedition  '  to  give  the  naughty  boys 
of  Serbia  a  sound  thrashing,  Austria-Hungary  found  that 
she  had  created  a  world-war. 

Our  generation  will  not  forget  the  crowded  emotions  of 
those  first  days  of  August  19 14.  When  Germany  challenged 
Russia,  France  declared  her  faithfulness  to  her  ally.  Italy 
showed  the  hollowness  of  the  German  claim  to  be  on  the 
defensive  by  refusing  to  support  the  Central  Empires. 
Everywhere  was  feverish  haste  to  be  prepared  for  the  first 
shock.  Amongst  ourselves  the  rising  indignation  at  German 
aggression  was  still  checked  by  the  passionate  desire  even 
at  the  last  moment  to  deliver  the  world  from  the  tidal  wave 
of  horror  that  was  about  to  burst.  Military  enthusiasm  was 
to  most  of  us  a  distant  virtue  of  past  history.     We  breathed 


The  Murder  at  Sarajevo  187 

an  atmosphere  of  'live  and  let  live',  and  were  strangers 
to  the  irreconcilable  conflicts  of  the  continental  races. 
Yet  it  was  impossible  to  stand  by  and  see  France  crushed, 
as  German  writers  had  announced  that  she  must  inevitably 
be.  As  we  halted  between  a  generous  longing  to  plunge 
into  the  common  struggle  against  the  disturber  of  Europe 
and  the  peaceful  traditions  of  four  generations,  there  came 
the  news  of  Belgium  violated.  Here  was  the  crime  which 
we  had  said  we  would  not  tolerate.  The  tension  of  un- 
certainty was  over,  and  the  nation  as  a  whole,  with  many 
regrets,  but  with  the  fervour  of  crusaders,  applauded  its 
rulers'  decision  to  enter  the  lists  and  to  forge  again  the  sword 
of  Britain  for  the  cause  of  European  liberties  and  inter- 
national justice. 


8 

The  Austrian  War 

Znatte,  moyi  druzi  boyni ; 

'  Shvaba  '  nama  yamu  kopa, 

AV  che  u  nyu  pasti  glupo, — 

Ta,  c  nama  ye  sva  Emopa  !    (Vlada  Popovitch,  1914.) 

'  Kbow,  my  comrades  in  arms, 
The  German  is  digging  our  grave  5 
But  on  him  shall  his  folly  fall, — • 
All  Europe  stands  by  our  side.' 

Serbia  had  tried  to  avoid  war  by  abasing  herself  before 
her  enemy,  for  her  government  knew  how  unready  the 
country  was  for  another  struggle  after  the  losses  of  the  pre- 
vious two  years.  They  appreciated  the  dangers  by  which 
Serbia  was  surrounded.  Roumania  under  a  Hohenzollern 
king  and  largely  pro-German  ;  Bulgaria  waiting  eagerly  for 
the  moment  of  revenge  for  the  Treaty  of  Bucharest ;  the 
Albanian  tribes  in  the  pay  of  Austria-Hungary  and  ready  to 
raid  the  southern  Serbian  districts ;  Greece  the  ally,  with 
a  government  loyal  to  its  agreements,  but  with  a  court- 
party  tied  to  Germany  and  large  sections  of  public  opinion 
only  anxious  at  any  cost  to  avoid  further  war. 

Still  more  immediately  serious  were  the  deficiencies  in 
the  army.  The  new  divisions,  which  were  being  raised  from 
Old  Serbia  and  Macedonia,  as  yet  existed  only  on  paper, 
and  could  not  take  the  places  of  the  men  who  had  fallen 
in  the  Balkan  wars.  The  stock  of  munitions  was  depleted, 
and  it  was  impossible  to  get  an  adequate  supply  at  such 


The  Austrian  War  189 

a  moment,  when  other  nations  had  none  to  spare.  In  the 
fighting  that  followed  Serbian  regiments  frequently  went 
into  the  firing-line  with  only  one  rifle  for  every  two  men. 

It  was  a  moral  certainty  that  any  resistance  which  Serbia 
might  offer  would  be  crushed  by  superior  numbers.  There 
could  hardly  be  any  doubt  about  this.  In  the  days  just 
before  the  outbreak  of  war  the  diplomatists  of  the  Entente 
tried  to  induce  Austria-Hungary  to  place  a  territorial  limit 
beyond  which  her  '  punitive  expedition  '  should  not  go. 
Herr  von  Zimmermann,  the  German  Under-Secretary  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  said  that  had  Russia  not  entered  the  war, 
Austria-Hungary  could  have  contented  herself  with  occupy- 
ing Belgrade  and  would  then  have  reopened  negotiations,^ 
As  it  was,  Serbia  did  not  have  to  face  her  enemy  alone. 
Still  Austria-Hungary  dispatched  large  forces  against  her, 
and  the  European  nations,  if  they  gave  any  thought  to  the 
Serbs  in  those  first  crowded  days  of  the  war,  expected  to 
see  them  slowly  driven  backwards  through  their  own 
country  and  forced  to  retire  to  the  south  or  to  capitulate. 

Instead  of  that  Serbia  offered  a  resistance  that  astonished 
the  world.  Three  times  the  enemy's  armies  crossed  her 
frontier  and  penetrated  into  the  interior.  Each  effort  ended 
in  failure  and  retirement,  Austria-Hungary  had  to  wait 
four  months  for  her  occupation  of  Belgrade,  and  then  she 
was  driven  from  the  town  after  holding  it  for  only  thirteen 
days.  By  the  close  of  the  year  there  was  not  an  Austrian 
soldier  on  Serbian  soil — or,  as  Voivoda  Putnik,  who  loved 
accuracy,  more  correctly  said,  there  was  not  an  Austrian 
soldier  at  liberty.  There  were  in  Serbia  some  70,000 
Austrian  prisoners. 

^  Diplomatic  Documents,  p.  394  j   Serbian  Blue  Book,  No.  51. 


1 90  The  Austrian  War 

After  llic  precipitate  haste  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
government  in  declaring  war  the  general  staff  appear  to 
have  followed  their  traditional  dilatory  methods.  The 
bombardment  of  Belgrade,  an  open  town,  began  on  July  30. 
In  the  words  of  a  poem  in  the  J  nthology  of  Humorous  Verse: 
'  An  Austrian  army  awfully  arrayed 
Boldly  by  battery  besieged  Belgrade,' 

and  so  opened  the  long  series  of  violations  of  international 
law  which  we  have  witnessed  in  the  past  three  years.  But 
for  some  days  no  large  military  movement  was  made.  The 
Serbian  ministry  had  left  the  capital  on  the  night  of  July  25, 
accompanied  by  the  diplomatic  corps  and  a  host  of  officials 
and  others.  Nish  became  the  seat  of  government  and  centre 
of  the  nation's  life.  The  army  stood  on  the  defensive, 
choosing  its  ground  and  prepared  if  necessary  to  allow  the 
enemy  to  cross  the  frontier  that  he  might  be  the  more 
decisively  beaten.  Yet,  despite  the  weak  forces  that  defended 
Belgrade,  the  Austro-Hungarian  attempts  to  cross  the  rivers 
in  that  region  were  repulsed  with  heavy  losses.  The  enemy 
then  made  their  main  advance  against  the  Matchva,  the 
district  in  the  extreme  north-west  of  Serbia,  lying  in  the 
angle  between  the  Save  and  the  Drina.  On  August  12  they 
crossed  the  frontier  from  Hungary  and  Bosnia,  and  advanced 
on  a  sixty-kilometre  front  between  Krupanj  and  Shabatz. 
The  Serbs,  who  were  heavily  outnumbered,  fell  back  and 
abandoned  most  of  the  Matchva.  Already  by  August  14 
the  victories  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  were  being 
celebrated  in  Vienna.  Their  flanks  protected  by  the  two 
rivers,  the  enemy  moved  confidently  forward,  expecting  to 
end  the  campaign  in  a  few  weeks.  The  campaign  ended 
even  sooner  than  they  had  anticipated.  The  Serbs  gave 
battle  on  August  17,  hurled  themselves  with  irresistible  dash 


The  Austrian  War  191 

at  the  Austro-Hungarian  centre,  and  occupied  the  ridge 
of  the  Tser  mountains.  A  week  of  desperate  fighting 
ensued,  and  then  the  Serbs  drove  the  divided  halves  of  the 
invading  army  westward  down  the  Yadar  river  and  northward 
to  the  Save.  By  August  24  the  country  had  been  cleared 
of  the  enemy.  Serbia,  the  despised  little  Balkan  State,  had 
registered  the  first  successful  blow  at  the  Central  Empires. 
The  fruits  of  victory  were  represented,  according  to  the 
lowest  estimate,  by  50  guns,  4,000  prisoners,  and  a  large 
supply  of  war  material  of  all  kinds  abandoned  by  the 
enemy  in  his  flight.  The  Austro-Hungarian  government 
was  humorous  enough  to  announce  that  the  imperial  and 
royal  army,  having  made  a  successful  incursion  into  Serbian 
territory,  had  achieved  its  object  and  had  thereupon  retired 
from  the  country. 

But  as  the  Serbian  army  re-entered  the  villages  of  the 
Matchva  they  were  horrified  to  find  that  atrocities  of  the 
most  savage  and  barbarous  kind  had  been  inflicted  upon  the 
unfortunate  inhabitants.  The  Serbs  had  recently  fought 
Turks,  Bulgars,  and  Albanians.  They  were  accustomed 
to  the  horrors  of  war.  But  in  the  Matchva  they  found  the 
evidence  not  merely  of  war  but  of  systematic  and  organized 
crime.  They  had  for  years  been  denounced  and  despised 
as  savages  by  the  prophets  of  German-Magyar  civilization. 
They  had  expected  a  scrupulous  consideration  for  harmless 
non-combatants  from  the  soldiers  of  a  State  which  assumed 
this  tone  of  lofty  superiority.  Instead  they  found  that 
Austria-Hungary  had  made  war  upon  women  and  children 
and  aged  men,  upon  private  property  and  upon  whole 
villages,  without  distinction  of  innocent  from  guilty. 

We,  too,  in  England  had  not  expected  to  hear  of  indis- 
criminate brutality  committed  by  Austro-Hungarian  troops. 


192  The  Austrian  War 

A  very  real  regard  for  those  races  of  the  Dual  Monarchy 
known  to  us,  and  especially  for  the  officers  of  the  army,  was 
widespread  amongst  us.  When  the  first  horrible  rumours 
of  German  doings  in  Belgium  and  France  reached  us  we 
did  not  believe  them.  When  they  grew  into  certainties, 
as  the  official  commissions  gave  their  evidence,  and  we 
heard  stories  at  first-hand  from  the  men  who  were  at  Mons, 
we  thought  some  madness  must  have  overtaken  the  rulers 
of  Germany.  We  were  sure  that  they  must  be  unique  : 
that  an  Austro-Hungarian  army  would  not  behave  with 
such  barbarity.  But  Dr.  Reiss,  of  Lausanne,  has  published 
a  book,  now  translated  into  English,  containing  the  evidence 
which  he  collected  on  the  spot  after  the  retreat  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarians.  Though  we  may  comfort  ourselves  v/ith  the 
reflection  that  many  officers  and  men  probably  hated  the 
tasks  which  they  were  called  upon  to  perform,  we  cannot 
but  profoundly  regret  that  an  army  which  we  had  always 
considered  a  school  for  gentlemen  should  have  been  thus 
disgraced  in  its  corporate  capacity. 

The  troops  had  for  many  years  past  been  taught  that  the 
Serbs  were  a  race  of  barbarous  savages,  animated  by  vindic- 
tive greed  and  unrestrained  by  any  moral  or  humane 
considerations.  The  name  of  the  '  Zimun  tradition '  had 
been  given  to  the  consistent  picture  of  Serbian  arrogance 
and  brutality  disseminated  by  the  Austro-Hungarian 
journalists,  whose  business  it  was  to  pick  up  or  invent 
scandal  in  Belgrade  and  then  to  cross  the  river  and  dispatch 
their  tit-bits  from  Zimun  in  Hungary.  In  the  army  the 
officers  had  instructed  their  men  on  the  same  lines,  and 
possibly  the  majority  of  all  ranks  entirely  believed  the 
legend  so  assiduously  preached.  An  Austrian  lieutenant 
told  Dr.  Reiss  that  when  he  saw  himself  unable  to  escape 


The  Austrian  War  193 

capture  he  had  determined  to  shoot  himself.  But  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  had  prevailed,  and  he  had  sur- 
rendered, fully  expecting  the  most  barbarous  treatment. 
'  To-day ',  he  said,  '  I  am  glad  that  I  did  not  do  it  (i.  e. 
commit  suicide),  because  Col.  Hitch  is  like  a  father  to  us.'  ^ 
Other  officers  also  declared  that  they  were  extremely  well 
treated.  At  Nish,  which  was  a  sort  of  prisoners'  general 
head-quarters,  the  offi.cers  inhabited  a  large  barrack  situated 
in  a  park,  and  were  provided  with  books,  pianos,  a  canteen, 
and  a  field  for  outdoor  sports.^  Those  who  were  in  Serbia 
in  191 5  with  the  various  British  medical  missions  tell  us 
the  same  story. 

It  was  not  always  possible  to  treat  captured  Austro- 
Hungarian  officers  with  the  deference  that  some  of  them 
appear  to  have  expected.  A  certain  captain  was  highly 
indignant  at  not  being  at  once  conveyed  to  Serbian  general 
head-quarters.  If  the  Serbs  had  the  honour  to  capture  an 
imperial  and  royal  officer,  the  least  they  could  do  should 
be  to  send  him  at  once  by  motor-car  to  their  General 
Staff.  It  had  to  be  gently  explained  to  him  that  while 
motors  were  scarce  among  the  Serbs,  Austro-Hungarian 
officer  prisoners  were  numerous.  This,  however,  did  not 
reconcile  the  captain  to  such  a  humiliating  mode  of  transport 
as  the  Serbian  bullock-wagons.  . 

Of  course,  Serbia  was  poor  and  her  peasants  are  accustomed 
to  rougher  fare  than  satisfies  the  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary. 
Consequently,  many  of  the  men  among  the  prisoners 
suffered  considerable  hardship.  But  they  were  treated  a?  well 
as  circumstances  would  allow.  They  received,  even  in  the 
early  days  of  the  great  retreat,  the  same  food  as  the  Serbian 
soldiers  themselves.    As  far  as  possible  they  were  given  not 

1  Reiss,  p.  174.  ^  Sturzenegger,  p.  75. 

2071  U 


194  The  Austrian  War 

uncongenial  employment.  Many  served  as  orderlies  in 
the  various  hospitals  and  realized  how  much  better  off  they 
were  than  in  the  army  of  the  Monarchy.  At  Skoplye  in 
the  officers'  club  there  was  an  orchestra  of  prisoners  who 
received  higher  pay  than  that  of  the  Serbian  army. 

Yet  all  this  was  after  those  first  terrible  days  of  the  war 
in  which  the  Austro-Hungarian  troops  had  loosed  upon 
the  Matchva  the  same  terror  that  was  then  sweeping  over 
Belgium.  Into  the  details  of  what  was  done  it  is  unnecessary 
to  enter.  They  may  be  read  in  Dr.  Reiss's  book.  The 
important  thing  is  to  fix  the  blame,  as  far  as  we  can. 

Austria-Hungary's  first  line  of  defence,  after  she  admitted 
the  general  truth  that  great  severity  had  been  shown  in 
the  Matchva,  was  that  such  a  course  was  rendered  neces- 
sary by  the  active  hostility  of  the  civil  population.  But, 
granted  the  truth  of  this  assertion,  it  would  then  follow 
that  those  guilty  of  hostile  acts  should  alone  be  executed. 
Yet  Dr.  Reiss  was  able  to  trace  the  evidence  for  the  execution 
of  306  women.  If  it  be  replied  that  women  are  often  as 
capable  as  men  of  becoming  francs-tireurs  and  firing  from 
houses  and  behind  hedges,  is  the  same  claimed  for  old  people 
over  eighty  years  of  age  or  for  children  of  under  five  ?  The 
list  of  victims  covers  every  age  from  one  to  ninety-five. 

Again,  should  any  civilians  be  proved  guilty  of  hostile  acts, 
their  punishment  is  universally  recognized  by  civilized 
nations.  They  should  be  shot.  What  are  we  to  make  of  a 
list  of  victims  half  of  whom  were  clubbed  to  death,  hanged, 
burned,  or  mutilated.  Sixty-eight  persons  with  eyes  put  out 
and  thirty-four  with  noses  cut  off  take  some  explanation. 

The  next  Austro-Hungarian  justification  is  that  a  few  of 
the  worst  elements  of  the  army  got  out  of  hand  and  gave 
free  rein  to  their  passions.    This  is  what  might  happen  in  any 


The  Austrian  War  195 

army  and  probably  occurred  to  some  slight  extent  in  this  case. 
But  it  is  not,  I  think,  difficult  to  show  that  the  real  responsi- 
bility lies  elsewhere.  The  Austro-Hungarian  soldiers  were 
provided  with  tins  of  an  inflammable  liquid  with  which  they 
sprinkled  houses  before  setting  fire  to  them.-"^  That  is  not  the 
act  of  a  few  unruly  hooligans.  With  the  invading  army  were 
brought  a  number  of  Mohammedan  and  Croatian  civilians 
of  the  lowest  class  who  set  the  example  of  indiscriminate 
pillage  and  whose  lead  could  hardly  fail  to  be  followed  by  the 
troops.  The  High  Command  ordered  that  hostages  should  be 
taken  in  the  occupied  districts  and  executed  if  a  single  shot 
were  fired  at  the  troops  in  that  locality  ;  also  that  any  persons 
encountered  on  the  country-side  were  to  be  considered 
suspect  and  shot  at  once  if  they  showed  any  sign  of  hostility 
to  the  invaders.  The  General  Officer  Commanding  the 
Ninth  Corps  ordered  that  all  non-uniformed  but  armed  men 
should  be  shot  at  sight. ^  This  bore  hardly  on  an  army  like  the 
Serbian,  in  which  the  second  and  third  lines  had  no  uniforms 
at  any  time  and  in  which  the  recruits  raised  for  this  war  could 
only  be  supplied  with  cartridges  and  old  battered  rifles. 

Then  there  is  the  evidence  of  Austro-Hungarian  soldiers 
themselves.  For  instance.  Dr.  Reiss  describes  how  a  soldier 
of  the  Ninety-seventh  Regiment  of  the  line  informed  him 
that  in  the  fiirst  invasion  of  August  1914  their  orders  were  to 
burn  and  kill  in  every  direction  and  without  distinction. 
When  they  again  entered  Serbia,  later  on,  they  were  only 
permitted  to  loot.^ 

An  Italian  journalist,  who  was  acting  as  war-correspondent 
with  the  Austro-Hungarian  army  on  the  Galician  front  in  the 
first  few  weeks  of  the  war,  tells  how  an  officer  arrived  there 

*  Reiss,'p.  22.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  182  and  183. 

'  Ibid.,  p.  177. 

N  2 


19^  T^he  Austrian  War 

transferred  from  the  army  that  had  invaded  Serbia.  This 
officer  was  indignant  at  the  manner  in  which  the  High 
Command  had  ordered  the  systematic  wasting  of  Serbia. 
He  said,  '  Our  orders  were  to  kill  and  destroy  every  one  and 
everything.    That  is  not  humanity.    They  are  brigands.'  ^ 

The  army  could  hardly  fail  in  some  measure  to  earn  this 
denunciation  considering  the  incitements  to  brutaHty  issued 
by  the  High  Command.  The  attitude  and  intentions  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  military  chiefs  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
words  of  the  order  issued  by  the  commander  of  the  Ninth 
Corps  :  '  In  dealing  with  a  population  of  this  kind  (i.  e.  the 
Serbs)  all  humanity  and  kindness  of  heart  are  out  of  place, 
they  are  even  harmful. ...  I  therefore  give  orders  that,  during 
the  entire  course  of  the  war,  an  attitude  of  extreme  severity, 
extreme  harshness,  and  extreme  distrust  is  to  be  observed 
towards  everybody.'  ^  Imagine  any  such  order  being  issued 
by  one  of  our  own  generals.  The  commanders  of  invading 
armies  are  called  upon  to  show  solicitude  for  the  civil 
population  concerned  and  to  protect  them  against  the 
rougher  elements  amongst  their  own  troops.  Here  was  a  high 
command  only  anxious  lest  its  army  should  prove  civilized 
and  humane,  and  urging  the  men  to  steel  their  hearts  against 
the  promptings  of  mercy.  It  was  not  the  wildness  of  a  few 
baser  natures,  but  deliberate  policy  of  their  chiefs  that  was 
responsible  for  the  cruelties  inflicted  by  the  troops  in  the 
Matchva.  The  Austro-Hungarian  army  was  dispatched  for 
more  than  the  vaunted  '  punitive  expedition  '.  During  that 
short  fortnight  it  was  engaged  in  a  veritable  war  of  extermi- 
nation. This  art  of  war  had  been  learned  in  Berlin.  Superb 
contempt  of  neighbouring  peoples,  war  upon  women  and 
children,  wholesale  destruction  of  property,  these  are  the 
^  Fraccaroli,  p.  126.  2  Reiss,  p.  181. 


The  Austrian  War  197 

precepts  of  that  new  school  of  warriors  who  have  done  their 
best  to  destroy  the  traditions  of  Christendom  and  to  exclude 
all  moral  considerations  from  the  conflicts  of  nations. 

•  *••••••• 

On  the  heels  of  the  retreating  Austro-Hungarians  the 
Serbs  crossed  the  rivers  and  entered  Bosnia  and  southern 
Hungary,  while  the  Montenegrins  pressed  northwards  into 
Hertzegovina.  It  was  an  intoxicating  moment.  Not  only 
had  the  Serbs  defended  the  soil  of  free  Serbia,  but  now  they 
had  swept  out  into  the  empire  of  their  powerful  adversary 
and  appeared  as  deliverers  amongst  their  subject  brethren  of 
the  '  Greater  Serbia  '  that  was  to  be.  Iji  many  districts  they 
found  themselves  in  the  midst  of  a  pure  Serbian  and  Ortho- 
dox population,  which  received  them  with  demonstrations  of 
welcome.  Many  were  the  sentences  of  death,  imprisonment, 
or  confiscation  of  property  afterwards  pronounced  by  various 
courts  of  the  monarchy  on  its  Serbian  subjects  for  their 
reception  of  King  Peter's  army.  But  at  the  moment  fortune 
seemed  to  smile  on  the  Allied  cause  in  eastern  Europe. 
Though  on  the  distant  western  front  the  German  rush  was 
not  yet  definitely  repulsed  from  the  heart  of  France,  in 
the  east  the  Russians  were  unexpectedly  successful  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  offensive  in  Poland  had  become  a  struggle 
for  the  defence  of  Galicia.  In  Bosnia  the  Serbs  pressed  on  till 
they  were  encamped  on  the  hills  round  Sarajevo,  and  feasted 
their  eyes  on  the  beautiful  city  which  they  hoped  soon  to 
make  their  own. 

But  the  Habsburg  monarchy  was  too  powerful  an  adver- 
sary to  be  lightly  attacked.  Despite  the  Russian  offensive 
Austro-Hungarian  military  pride  could  not  submit  to  defeat 
at  the  hands  of  the  despised  '  barbarians  '  of  the  Balkans.  A 
second  advance  on  Serbia  was  undertaken  in  September,  and 


igS  The  Austrian  War 

the  Serbian  army  had  to  fall  back  and  offer  battle  on  its 
own  ground.  With  them  went  a  large  number  of  Serbian 
families  from  Syrmia  and  Bosnia  to  avoid  the  natural 
penalties  for  having  fraternized  with  their  late  invaders. 
These  refugees,  whose  destitution  was  relieved  by  public 
subscriptions  through  the  newspapers,  constituted  a  serious 
drain  on  the  slender  resources  of  the  country. 

Yet  the  Austro-Hungarians  were  at  first  held  on  the 
western  frontier  of  Serbia  and  were  unable  to  advance  far 
from  the  river  banks  where  they  were  covered  by  the  guns  of 
their  own  monitors.  At  one  point  only  did  the  new  offensive 
seem  likely  to  achieve  success.  Round  Loznitza  the  Serbs 
had  but  a  small  force.  Throwing  their  troops  on  this  gap  in 
the  defence  the  Austro-Hungarians  steadily  advanced  during 
the  middle  of  September.  Suffering  terrible  losses  owing  to 
their  attacks  in  close  formation,  but  constantly  replenishing 
their  ranks  with  fresh  troops,  they  pushed  on  towards 
Valyevo,  which  their  general  ha^  promised  to  enter  on 
September  20.  A  moment  of  suspense  ensued  while  the  fate 
of  central  Serbia,  and  therefore  of  Belgrade,  still  heroically 
defying  all  assaults,  hung  in  the  balance.  Then  a  desperate 
fight  at  Rozhan  turned  the  tide  of  invasion  and  the  Austro- 
Hungarians  were  obliged  to  fall  back  on  the  Guchevo  hills. 
Protected  there  by  big  guns  on  the  Bosnian  side  of  the  Drina, 
they  were  able  to  beat  off  the  Serbian  attacks,  and  prepare 
for  yet  another  effort. 

During  October  there  was  desultory  fighting  along  the 
frontiers.  The  Serbs  attempted  an  invasion  of  Bosnia  in 
order  to  compel  their  enemy  to  retire  from  Serbian  soil. 
But  the  difficulties  of  supply  and  transport  in  that  wild 
country  were  too  formidable  and  the  Serbian  army  too  small 
to  run  the  risk  of  detaching  forces  adequate  to  the  task. 


The  Austrian  War  199 

Meanwhile  the  Serbian  retirement  from  Syrmia  enabled 
the  Austro-Hungarians  to  continue  their  bombardment  of 
Belgrade,  which  seemed  likely  to  become  completely  wrecked. 

In  November  the  enemy  launched  their  third  and  greatest 
invasion.  General  Potiorek,  at  the  head  of  five  army  corps 
and  two  supplementary  divisions,  resumed  the  attack  from 
the  north-west.  The  situation  was  again  critical.  The 
Serbian  troops  were  in  the  marshy  plains  between  the  Drina 
and  the  Save.  The  roads  on  which  they  depended  for  supplies 
had  been  broken  up  and  rendered  almost  impassable  by 
three  months  of  war.  The  supply  of  ammunition  was  steadily 
dwindling.  A  withdrawal  of  the  whole  line  was  clearly  neces- 
sary, despite  the  depressing  effect  of  such  strategy  upon  the 
army  and  the  civil  population.  It  was  necessary  to  give  the 
Austro-Hungarians  a  taste  of  the  difficulties  of  the  country. 
'  All  my  strategy ',  said  Voivoda  Putnik  in  reference  to  this 
campaign,  'consisted  in  placing  between  the  enemy's  fighting- 
line  and  their  impedimenta  the  Serbian  national  mud.'  ^ 

The  decision  was  amply  justified.  Many  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  suffered  terribly  from  hunger  owing  to 
the  partial  breakdown  of  their  commissariat.  Yet  despite 
the  geographical  obstacles  they  continued  to  advance  into 
Shumadia,  supported  by  their  numerous  and  powerful 
artillery.  Driven  from  Rozhan,  the  Serbs  abandoned 
Valyevo  and  retired  to  the  hills  that  separate  the  valleys  of 
the  Kolubara  and  the  Morava.  The  news  of  the  fall  of 
Valyevo  was  greeted  with  enthusiasm  in  Vienna,  where  it  was 
supposed  to  indicate  the  collapse  of  the  Serbian  resistance. 
General  Potiorek  was  decorated  with  a  new  order  specially 
inaugurated  in  honour  of  his  triumph. 

1  Petrovitch,  p.  208. 


200  The  Austrian  War 

But  the  Serbian  army  was  still  intact,  though  the  dangers 
of  the  situation  caused  the  General  Staff  to  order  the  evacua- 
tion of  Belgrade  and  a  concentration  to  the  south  along  the 
Rudnik  range  of  mountains.  At  the  beginning  of  December 
Serbia  seemed  to  be  at  her  last  gasp.  The  Austro-Hungarians 
made  their  long-expected  triumphal  entry  into  Belgrade. 
Kraguyevatz  seemed  certain  to  fall.  The  enemy  moved  large 
reinforcements  into  the  lower  Morava  valley  to  make  certain 
of  Nish  and  so  to  cut  off  the  Serbian  retreat  along  the  line 
of  the  railway.  Worse  still,  the  munitions  were  known  to  be 
almost  exhausted ;  whole  batteries  were  reduced  to  six  rounds 
per  gun.  Worst  of  aU  was  the  moral  effect  of  continued 
retreat.  The  Serbian  peasant-soldier,  seeing  his  familiar 
country-side  in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  began  in  many 
cases  to  lose  confidence  in  superiors  who  would  not  offer 
battle.  A  little  nation  that  had  risen  to  renewed  life  after 
400  years  of  death,  and  had  struggled  through  endless  diffi- 
culties towards  liberty  and  unity,  seemed  on  the  brink  of 
destruction.  A  more  powerful  and  organized  foe  than  any 
she  had  yet  encountered  had  her  by  the  throat.  The  nations 
of  the  West,  still  unprepared  for  war  on  the  necessary  scale, 
were  unable  to  send  forces  to  her  support,  nor  could  they 
have  arrived  in  time  had  they  been  available.  Serbia's  doom 
was  surely  sealed.  All  her  efforts  were  to  end  in  submission 
to  the  empire  which  already  misgoverned  her  co-nationals. 
All  that  the  friends  of  Serbia  could  do  was  to  avert  their  eyes 
in  sorrow  of  heart  while  the  death-blow  was  administered. 

But  at  the  moment  when  all  seemed  lost,  relief  came,  and 
the  Serbian  army  gathered  itself  together  for  a  supreme 
effort.  The  news  that  supplies  of  ammunition  were  coming 
to  the  Serbs  from  her  western  allies  must  have  leaked  out. 
For  a  Bulgarian  band  descended  from  Strumitza  one  night 


The  Austrian  War  201 

at  the  end  of  November  and  succeeded  in  blowing  up  the 
railway  bridge  at  the  point  where  the  frontier  ran  dangerously 
near  the  line.  Fortunately  they  were  too  late.  The  muni- 
tions had  already  passed  on  their  way  northwards,  and  the 
Serbian  High  Command  were  preparing  for  their  great  stroke. 
The  aged  king  now  appeared  among  his  soldiers  on  the 
heights  of  Rudnik.  The  faint-hearted  he  invited  to  return 
to  their  homes.  They  should  not  be  made  to  pay  for  their 
desertion  should  the  coming  fight  be  won.  But  the  house  of 
Karageorgevitch  would  conquer  or  die. 

It  was  on  December  3  that  the  Serbs  suddenly  turned  upon 
their  enemy.  General  Mishitch,  who  had  taken  command  of 
the  First  Army,  now  reported  that  he  was  confident  of  being 

!  able  to  break  the  opposing  line.  Moving  forward  even  before 
he  had  received  permission  from  Head-quarters,  he  flung  his 

'■  force  upon  the  astonished  Austro-Hungarians.    The  Serbian 

I  gunners,  masters  of  their  science,  poured  such  a  pitiless  rain  of 

II  shells  upon  them  that  they  believed  the  Serbs  to  have  been 
in  some  wonderful  way  vastly  reinforced.  From  every 
direction  the  Serbian  infantry  closed  in  on  them,  creeping 
over  the  hills  and  appearing  suddenly  from  unHkely  quarters. 
In  the  first  three  days  of  the  fighting  the  Serbs  took  over 
5,000  prisoners  and  the  hill-sides  were  strewn  with  the  dead 
and  wounded.  The  Austro-Hungarians  fell  back,  hoping  to 
re-form  their  shattered  units.  But  they  were  given  no  respite. 
While  they  were  continually  attacked  in  front,  a  division  under 
Colonel  Angelkovitch  moved  rapidly  through  the  mountains 
and  planted  itself  between  them  and  Valyevo.  By  this 
manoeuvre  the  Fifteenth  Corps  and  part  of  the  Sixteenth 
were  cut  off  from  their  line  of  communication  and  had  to 
make  the  best  of  their  way  by  tracks  and  footpaths  towards 
the  Drina.     Their  retreat  became  a  rout.      Then  the  Serbs 


2  02  The  Austrian  War 

moved  forward  all  along  the  line.  Valyevo  was  recaptured 
after  two  hours'  resistance,  and  the  remaining  Austro- 
Hungarian  armies  were  driven  northwards.  As  the  disorder 
and  confusion  increased  among  the  retreating  enemy  the 
fighting  became  a  mere  pursuit.  In  their  haste  to  overtake 
the  flying  Austro-Hungarians  the  Serbs  could  not  deal  with 
the  numerous  prisoners  who  had  surrendered.  Convoys  of 
several  hundred  were  sent  off  into  the  interior  v\dth  single 
guides  to  lead  them.  Finally  no  m.en  could  be  spared,  and 
the  astonishing  spectacle  might  be  seen  of  long  columns  of 
prisoners  marching  across  Serbia  with  no  accompanying 
guard  whatever.  '  Follow  the  telegraph-Vv^ires  and  you'll 
come  to  Lazarevatz,'  they  were  told.^  To  many  towns  of 
the  interior  the  first  news  of  victory  was  brought  by  these 
strange  companies  of  unguarded  prisoners. 

On  December  15,  thirteen  days  after  they  had  left  it,  the 
Serbs  were  back  in  Belgrade.  The  soil  of  the  mother  country 
was  again  free  from  the  invader.  Seldom,  since  the  time 
when  Sennacherib's  host  melted  away  from  the  walls  of 
Jerusalem,  has  there  been  so  sudden  and  dramatic  a  change 
of  fortune.  In  a  fortnight  the  Serbs  had  been  roused  from 
despair  by  the  iron  will  and  swift  decision  of  their  leaders, 
and  had  hurled  their  opponents  in  headlong  flight  across  the 
frontiers.  Bravely  had  Serbia  done  her  share  of  the  common 
task  of  the  AlHes.  Successive  Austro-Hungarian  armies  had 
been  shattered,  and  forces  equal  to  the  whole  of  Serbia's 
strength  had  been  put  out  of  action.  When  the  Serbs  came 
to  count  their  spoils  they  found  that  they  had  captured  close 
on  70,000  prisoners,  192  guns,  90,000  rifles,  491  cartloads  of 
ammunition  and  large  supplies  of  other  material  of  war,^ ; 
Truly  the  modern  Serbian  heroes  had  surpassed  all  the  deeds  |  ^ 
^  Fraccaroli,  p.  58.  ^  Savic,  p.  130.  |j 


The  Austrian  War  203 

of  their  forefathers.  No  enemy  would  again  lightly  attack 
the  peasant-army  that  had  rolled  the  pride  of  the  Habsburg 
empire  in  the  dust. 

Great  were  the  rejoicings  in  Nish  and  Belgrade  that 
Christmastide — the  last  that  manv  thousands  of  Serbs  were  to 
spend  in  their  own  country.  Well  might  they  imagine  that 
for  the  present  their  troubles  were  over  and  that  their  sorely 
tried  nation  was  now  to  have  a  breathing-space  of  peace  and 
quietness.  Permanent  peace  they  would  not  buy  at  the 
cost  of  abandoning  France,  Britain,  and  Russia  ;  although 
Austria-Hungary  now  offered  excellent  terms,  the  Serbs  felt 
themselves  morally  bound  to  the  Allies,  who  had  entered 
the  war  directly  or  indirectly  on  their  account,  despite  the 
fact  that  the  Powers  of  the  Entente  had  not  made  (nor 
have  yet  made)  any  treaty  with  the  Serbian  government. 
Peace  did  indeed  reign  in  Serbia  for  many  months ; 
but  peace  took  her  toll  of  suffering  and  death  no  less  than  war. 
By  an  irony  of  fate  the  very  completeness  of  Serbia's  victory 
brought  upon  her  new  and  terrible  misfortunes.  Amongst 
the  quantity  of  prisoners  for  whom  at  first  adequate  provision 
could  not  be  made,  were  large  numbers  who  had  succumbed 
to  disease  amid  the  hardships  of  war.  Scattered  among  the 
towns  and  villages  of  Serbia  they  soon  began  to  spread  the 
dreaded  scourges  of  typhus  and  cholera.  The  trouble  began 
in  the  west,  in  the  districts  of  Uzhitze  and  Valyevo,  where 
the  line  of  the  enemy's  flight  had  remained  littered  with  the 
dead  bodies  of  men  and  animals.  But  the  contagion  spread 
rapidly  across  the  country,  and  there  were  few  means  of 
arresting  its  progress.  Since  the  outbreak  of  war  Serbia  had 
suffered  from  a  shortage  of  doctors.  Her  medical  students 
were  accustomed  to  study  at  Vienna  and  other  foreign 
universities,  and  in  the  summer  120  doctors  and  medical 


2  04  The  Austrian  War 

students,  though  non-combatants  and  therefore  protected 
by  international  law,  had  been  interned  in  Austria-Hungary. 
Besides,  strictness  over  hygiene  is  the  result  of  a  very  de- 
veloped material  civilization  and  the  Serbian  peasantry  had  no 
idea  of  the  measures  necessary  to  combat  the  danger  in  their 
midst.  In  her  agony  Serbia  sent  an  appeal  to  her  allies,  and 
soon  medical  units — British,  French,  Russian,  American — 
were  hurried  out  and  set  themselves  with  vigour  to  conquer 
the  diseases.  For  four  months  they  laboured,  many  of  the 
doctors,  nurses,  and  orderlies  falling  victims  to  their  devotion, 
and  then  they  triumphed.  By  July  191 5  the  typhus  and 
the  cholera  were  overcome,  and  Serbia  was  herself  again,  but 
with  the  loss  of  thousands  of  lives  which  she  could  ill  spare. 
Many  Serbs  thought  that  now  at  last  had  come  a  tim.e  of 
rest  and  relaxation.  They  would  not  be  attacked,  and  they 
would  need  time  for  much  reorganization  before  they  could 
think  themselves  of  assuming  the  offensive.  Young  Serbian 
officers  married  in  that  summer  of  191 5  in  the  firm  con- 
viction that  a  long  period  of  peace  lay  before  them.  But 
there  were  others  who  more  correctly  appreciated  the  Euro- 
pean situation.  While  Serbia  was  fighting  her  way  back  to 
physical  health,  the  whole  aspect  of  the  eastern  front  had 
changed.  Instead  of  advancing  to  the  siege  of  Cracow  and 
the  invasion  of  Silesia,  the  Russians  were  in  full  retreat, 
driven  along  by  Mackensen's  overwhelming  artillery.  Farther 
and  farther  the  German  armies  advanced.  When  they  had 
finally  driven  back  the  Russians  into  their  own  country, 
disheartened  and  disorganized,  what  would  be  the  fate  of 
Serbia,  unsupported  by  her  natural  protector  ? 


9 

The  Downfall 

Bolye  ye  umreti  u  lepoti,  nego  zhiveti  pod  sraviotom. 
'  It  is  better  to  die  in  beauty  than  to  live  under  disgrace.' 

M.  Pashitch. 

Consider  the  position  of  the  Central  Empires  in  the  late 
summer  of  191 5.  Mackensen's  offensive  had  been  marvel- 
lously successful  and  had  restored  the  confidence  of  the  Ger- 
man nation  in  their  own  invincibility  and  ultimate  triumph. 
But  the  Russian  army  had  not  been  destroyed.  The  great 
encircling  ring  of  trenches  still  shut  in  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  on  both  sides.  In  the  West  the  continuous  line 
ran  from  the  North  Sea  to  the  Adriatic,  broken  only  by  the 
strictly  neutral  territory  of  Switzerland.  In  the  East  the 
Russian-Serbian-Montenegrin  line  similarly  stretched  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Adriatic,  interrupted  only  by  Roumania, 
who  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  had  shown  herself  ready 
to  defend  her  frontiers  against  aggression  and  was  drifting 
steadily  towards  alliance  with  the  Entente,  Outside  this 
circle  and  cut  off  from  direct  communication  with  her  allies 
was  Turkey,  whose  all-important  fortress  of  the  Dardanelles 
was  being  assailed  by  Britain  and  France.  Without  supplies 
of  ammunition  from  Central  Europe  the  Turks  might  col- 
lapse. Constantinople  and  the  passage  to  the  Black  Sea  would 
soon  lie  open.  Then  the  Western  Powers  would  be  able  to 
pour  into  Russia  all  those  munitions  of  war,,  the  lack  of  which 
had  made  the  German  triumph  in  Poland  possible.    Without 


2o6  The  Downfall 

Turkey  and  with  their  enemies  linked  together  by  easy  lines 
of  communication  the  Central  Empires  could  have  been 
made  to  feel  the  strangling  grip  of  the  Grand  Alliance.  It 
was  therefore  of  vital  importance  to  them  to  break  their  way 
through  to  the  support  of  the  Turks. 

The  obvious  route,  the  shortest  and  the  most  practicable, 
between  Constantinople  and  Hungary  is  that  of  the  railway- 
line  along  which  used  to  run  the  Orient  Express,  through 
Belgrade,  Nish,  Sofia,  and  Adrianople.  Two  small  states, 
Serbia  and  Bulgaria,  held  the  passage  across  the  Balkan 
peninsula.  Both  would  have  to  be  dealt  with  in  such  a  way 
as  to  secure  German  control  of  the  whole  route  to  the  East. 
With  Serbia  no  terms  were  possible.  She  would  have  to  be 
conquered.  But  Bulgaria  could  be  v^^on  with  territory  and 
gold.  Tsar  Ferdinand  was  ardently  Austro-Hungarian  in 
sympathy.  His  ministers  shared  his  point  of  view.  The 
whole  nation  desired  revenge  upon  Serbia  and  the  acquisition 
of  Macedonia.  If  Bulgaria  fell  upon  Serbia  from  behind, 
that  devoted  little  country  could  not  fail  to  be  crushed, 
provided  the  suspicions  of  the  Allies  were  not  aroused  too 
soon.  Bulgaria  had  to  see  that  the  game  was  not  given  away 
beforehand. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  summer,  therefore,  large  forces 
were  concentrated  in  southern  Hungary,  while  Bulgaria  con- 
tinued to  profess  her  intention  of  remaining  strictly  neutral. 
The  Serbs  knew  through  the  reports  of  their  French  aviators 
that  an  army  was  being  collected  for  a  fourth  invasion  of  their 
country.  They  could  not  tell  the  numbers  with  which  they 
would  have  to  deal,  but  they  were  confident  that  after  so 
many  reverses  the  enemy  would  not  advance  except  in 
overwhelming  force.  Of  another  point  also  they  were  sure 
from  the  beginning,  and  that  was  that  Bulgaria  would  strike 


The  Downfall  207 

as  soon  as  a  powerful  offensive  should  divert  Serbia's  attention 
to  the  northern  frontier. 

Seeing  that  they  were  faced  with  a  more  desperate  situa- 
tion even  than  in  19 14,  the  Serbian  government  appealed  to 
its  allies  for  250,000  troops.  Serbia  could  still  put  into  the 
field  another  250,000  ;  and  with  half  a  million  men  it  would 
be  possible  to  inflict  on  the  German  invasion  the  same  fate  as 
its  predecessors  had  undergone.  To  this  appeal  the  Allies 
returned  the  remarkable  reply  that  they  would  arrange  with 
the  Bulgars  to  supply  the  number  of  men  required.  So  the 
Allies  entered  into  negotiations  with  M.  Radoslavoff's 
ministry,  no  doubt  to  the  latter's  vast  amusement.  The 
Bulgars  represented  themselves  as  willing  to  join  the  Entente 
if  their  national  aspirations  were  satisfied.  The  Allies 
accordingly  offered  to  obtain  for  them  that  part  of  the 
■  Dobrudja  which  Roumania  had  acquired  in  191 3,  a  large 
portion  of  Serbian  Macedonia,  and  from  Greece  Kavalla  and 
the  territory  immediately  behind  it.  The  Allies,  in  fact, 
with  open-handed  generosity  bartered  away  other  people's 
property.  The  effect  was  disastrous.  Greek  opinion  was 
infuriated  at  the  calm  manner  in  which  the  Allies  proposed 
to  hand  over  to  Greece's  secular  enemy  territory  which  she 
had  won  upon  the  battle-field.  Serbia  and  Roumania  were 
no  less  astonished  and  outraged  at  the  disregard  of  their 
interests.  And  all  the  while  every  one  in  the  Balkans  was 
certain  that  Bulgaria  would  never  march  with  the  Allies. 

Despite  his  preparations  for  war,  M.  Radoslavoff  con- 
tinued to  protest  that  his  country  would  remain  neutral. 
As  late  as  September  25,  two  days  after  the  Bulgarian 
mobilization  had  begun,  he  informed  the  Greek  minister 
at  Sofia  that  Bulgaria  did  not  intend  to  attack  either  Greece 
or  Serbia.    Even  at  the  last  moment  before  plunging  into 


2o8  TJic  Downfall 

war  he  assured  the  British  and  Russian  ministers  that  the 
Bulgarian  mobilization  was  not  directed  against  Serbia, 
but  was  a  precautionary  measure  in  case  Germany  should 
press  on  across  Serbia  and  violate  Bulgarian  territory. 

The  Balkan  statesmen  knew  better.  As  early  as  September  i 
the  Greek  minister  at  Vienna  warned  his  government  that 
Bulgaria  would  attack  Serbia  on  October  15.  Mr.  Gordon 
Smith,  the  Scottish  journalist,  had  an  interview  with 
M.  Venizelos  in  September,  on  his  way  through  Athens  to 
Salonika.  '  We  are  completely  at  a  loss ',  said  the  Greek 
premier,  '  to  understand  the  aberration  of  the  Allies.  They 
drag  on  negotiations  with  our  worst  enemies,  when  a  child 
could  see  that  they  are  being  fooled  by  the  wily  Bulgarian 
premier,  who  is  acting  under  orders  from  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  He  is  dragging  out  the  pretended  negotiations 
in  order  to  give  the  Central  Powers  time  to  concentrate 
their  armies  against  Serbia,'  ^ 

Looking  back  after  the  event,  we  find  it  hard  to  under- 
stand how  any  one  could  have  believed  in  the  possibility 
of  drawing  Bulgaria  into  the  Entente.  It  was  a  common 
opinion  in  England  that  she  would  never  fight  against 
Russia,  though  she  was  governed  at  the  time  by  a  Russo- 
phobe ministry.  Further,  during  191 5  Bulgaria  had  come 
to  an  agreement  with  Turkey  by  which  she  acquired  the 
railway-line  leading  down  the  Maritza  valley  to  Dedeagatch, 
and  had  received  a  loan  of  250,000,000  francs  from  Vienna 
and  Berlin,  These  little  items  would  not  have  been  furnished 
by  our  enemies  in  return  for  nothing.  And  there  was 
another  fact  that  gave  food  for  thought.  Bulgaria  had  i 
suffered  very  extensive  losses  in  guns  and  ammunition 
during  the  second  Balkan  war.     Since  then  she  had  drawn  no 

^  Gordon  Smith,  p.  15. 


The  Downfall        •  209 

supplies  from  France  or  Great  Britain.  Yet  now  she  was 
completely  equipped  for  war.  Her  wants  had  clearly  been 
supplied  by  the  Central  Empires.  In  April,  too,  an  incident 
occurred  which  gave  an  indication  of  Bulgarian  feeling  and 
formed  a  presage  of  future  events ;  a  Bulgarian  band 
descended  once  more  on  the  Vardar  valley  and  succeeded 
in  cutting  the  railway,  Serbia's  only  line  of  communication 
with  the  outer  world. 

But  apart  from  all  these  occurrences,  if  Bulgaria  abandoned 
her  neutrality,  her  aspirations  would  naturally  draw  her 
to  the  Central  Empires  rather  than  to  ourselves.  English 
and  French  writers  were  never  tired  at  the  time  of  pointing 
out  that  only  by  the  victory  of  the  Entente  could  a  Balkan 
settlement  on   the  basis  of  nationality  be  made  possible. 

i  If  the  Allies  prevailed,  Roumania,  Serbia,  and  Bulgaria 
could  be  extended  to  include  all  their  '  unredeemed  '  co- 
nationals,  while  Greece  could  be  made  to  include  a  large 
portion  of  the  Hellenic  population  in  Asia  Minor.     These 

I  writers  were  absolutely  correct  thus  far.  What  we  did  not 
realize  was  that  a  settlement  on  the  basis  of  nationality 
does  not  suit  Bulgaria,  She  aspires  to  the  hegemony  of 
the  Balkan  peninsula.  Her  statesmen  and  soldiers  glory  in 
the  title  of  '  the  Prussians  of  the  Balkans  ',  and  hope  to 
deal  with  Serbia  and  Greece  as  Prussia  dealt  with 
Hanover  and  Bavaria  in  1866.  Greece  might  be  a  sub- 
ordinate state,  but  Serbia  must  disappear,  be  absorbed, 
crushed.  Not  a  federation  of  free  and  equal  states,  such  as 
M.  Venizelos  had  hoped  to  see,  but  a  Bulgarian  empire  was 
Sofia's  programme.  As  to  Constantinople,  it  was  clear 
that  no  Balkan  state  was  yet  strong  enough  to  grasp  that 
prize.  But  Bulgaria's  policy  was  determined  with  regard 
to  that  too.     Russia  must,  if  possible,  be  prevented  from 

2071  O 


21  o  The  Downfall 

extending  across  the  sea  and  planting  herself  upon  the 
Golden  Horn  and  the  Dardanelles.  As  long  as  the  Turk 
continued  his  feeble  rule  at  Constantinople,  Bulgaria  could 
hope  one  day  to  enter  the  imperial  city,  which  would  then 
become  again  the  capital  of  a  Balkan  empire.  But  a  Great 
Power  settled  on  the  Bosphorus  would  close  the  eastward 
path  of  Bulgarian  expansion. 

The  Central  Empires  offered  the  partition  of  Serbia 
and  the  continued  Turkish  possession  of  Constantinople. 
Although  this  meant  also  the  German  control  of  both 
Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  Tsar  Ferdinand  and  his  ministers 
were  hardly  likely  to  reject  such  a  prospect  in  favour  of  the 
Powers  who  wished  to  support  Serbia  and  to  bring  Russia 
to  the  Aegean  Sea.  Bulgaria's  mind  was  made  up.  She 
threw  in  her  lot  with  Germany,  though  she  lulled  the 
Allies'  suspicions  by  demands  and  promises  till  the  very 
moment  of  her  participation  in  the  war. 

It  was  on  September  23  that  the  Bulgarian  government 
ordered  a  general  mobilization.  The  Serbs  were  under  no- 
illusions  as  to  what  that  meant.  The  German-Austrian 
bombardment  of  the  Serbian  front  along  the  Save  and  the 
Danube  had  begun  four  days  earlier.  Everything  was  j 
ready  for  the  Bulgars. 

Serbia  was  now  in  a  death-trap.  On  her  northern  frontier 
was  a  far  more  formidable  army  than  any  that  had  yet  been 
sent  against  her.  Germany  was  determined  that  there 
should  be  no  mistake  this  time.  More  than  two-thirds 
of  the  troops  were  German,  and  at  their  head  was  Germany's 
master-strategist,  Mackensen,  with  his  able  lieutenant, 
Gallwitz.  To  the  east  of  Belgrade  Gallwitz  commanded 
nine  German  divisions  and  an  Austro-Hungarian  brigade. 
Opposite    Belgrade   and   along   the    Save   were   the    22nd 


The  Downfall  211 

German  army  corps  and  the  i6th  and  19th  Austro-Hun- 
garian  corps,  while  on  the  Drina  were  three  more  Austro- 
Hungarian  brigades.  In  all  there  were  about  164  battalions. 
But  it  was  not  on  infantry,  however  numerous,  that  the 
Germans  depended  for  victory.  Each  of  their  divisions 
was  supported  by  two  regiments  of  artillery,  and  they  had 
collected  an  overwhelming  number  of  very  heavy  guns. 

Against  this  display  of  force  the  Serbs  were,  of  course, 
unable  to  oppose  their  whole  army.  Except  along  the 
common  frontier  with  Greece,  they  had  to  guard  against 
enemies  from  every  side  on  a  front  of  more  than  1,000 
kilometres.  Five  of  their  best  divisions,  with  the  cavalry 
division  and  some  small  detachments,  guarded  the  Bulgarian 
frontier,  under  the  command  of  Voivoda  Stepanovitch 
(Second  Army)  and  General  Goikovitch.  Opposed  to  the 
Austro-Germans  were  the  First  Army  (Voivoda  Mishitch) 
along  the  Save,  the  Third  Army  (General  Yurishitch)  along 
the  Danube,  and  in  the  centre  round  Belgrade  a  force  of 
six  regiments,  three  being  of  the  third  ban,  under  General 
Zhivkovitch.  Altogether  on  the  northern  front  the  Serbs 
could  muster  about  116  battalions,  of  which  number  forty 
were  drawn  from  the  third  ban.  The  enemy  were  therefore 
stronger  in  infantry  in  the  proportion  of  three  to  two, 
while  their  preponderance  in  artillery  was  far  greater.  On 
the  eastern  front  the  enemy's  numerical  superiority  was 
even  more  pronounced  (being  more  than  two  to  one), 
though  the  Serbian  Second  Army  contained  three  divisions 
of  the  first  ban,  as  good  troops  as  any  in  Europe.  Roughly 
we  may  say  that  250,000  Serbs  (a  liberal  estimate  and  one 
that  includes  many  hundreds  of  men  not  yet  fully  recovered 
from  typhus)  had  to  make  headway  against  300,000  Austro- 
Germans  and  more  than  that  number  of  Bulgars. 

o  2 


212  The  Downfall 

One  course  only  had  seemed  to  promise  rapid  and  possibly 
decisive  success.  The  Serbs  at  first  determined  to  take 
advantage  of  their  own  preparedness  to  attack  the  Bulgars 
before  these  had  completed  their  mobilization.  Such  an 
offensive  could  not  have  led  to  the  complete  defeat  of 
Bulgaria,  but  the  Serbian  General  Staff  judged  that  they 
could  thereby  safeguard  the  Salonika  railway  and,  by 
occupying  several  important  centres,  throw  Bulgaria's  plans 
into  considerable  confusion  and  cripple  her  army.  In  that 
case  Serbia  could  have  afforded  to  wait  patiently  for  the 
support  which  the  Allies  had  promised  to  send  by  way  of 
Salonika  and  Skoplye.  But  the  Allies  had  been  to  the  last 
duped  by  Radoslavoff.  Convinced  that  the  Bulgars  would 
never  break  with  the  Entente,  they  had  assured  the  Serbs 
that  the  Bulgarian  mobilization  was  not  directed  against 
them,  and  had  vetoed  any  attack  by  Serbia.  In  obedience 
to  their  wishes  the  Serbs  therefore  had  withdrawn  their 
troops  to  a  short  distance  from  the  Bulgarian  frontier  and 
now  awaited  the  avalanche  that  was  to  descend  upon  them. 

It  was,  however,  not  yet  certain  how  much  help  Serbia 
was  to  receive.  An  Anglo-French  force  was  coming  to 
Salonika.  But  what  did  Greece  propose  to  do  .?  By  the 
treaty  of' 191 3  Serbia  and  Greece  were  bound  to  come  to 
each  other's  assistance  if  either  were  attacked  by  Bulgaria. 
In  such  a  combined  campaign  Serbia  was  to  provide  at 
least  150,000  men  to  co-operate  with  the  Greeks  in  Mace- 
donia. But  the  Serbs  had  no  troops  to  spare.  Accordingly 
M.  Venizelos  had  asked  the  Allies  whether  they  could 
dispatch  the  necessary  150,000  in  the  event  of  a  Bulgarian 
attack  on  Serbia.  The  Allies  had  replied  that  they  would 
do  so,  and,  becoming  at  last  suspicious  of  Bulgaria's  inten- 
tions, they  proceeded  at  once  to  land  their  first  contingent 


The  Downfall  213 

at  Salonika.  Hearing  of  this  on  October  2,  the  Greek 
government  felt  bound  to  protest  against  this  violation  of  its 
neutral  territory,  since  Bulgaria  had  not  yet  entered  the  war. 
But,  despite  the  formal  protest,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
M.  Venizelos  and  the  majority  of  his  countrymen,  knowing 
the  imminence  of  Bulgaria's  intervention,  were  delighted 
at  the  arrival  of  the  Anglo-French  troops.  On  the  next 
day  the  Russian  government  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Bulgaria 
which  was  disregarded.  Bulgaria  was  now  clearly  showing 
her  intention  to  fight.  But  what  of  the  threat  of  Greek 
intervention  ?  During  the  Austro-Hungarian  offensives 
of  1914  this  menace  had  been  sufficient  to  restrain  Bulgaria 
from  stabbing  Serbia  in  the  back.  Now  it  had  lost  its 
terrors.  The  truth  is  tolerably  clear  that  there  had  already 
been  treachery  at  Athens  and  that  Bulgaria  had  been 
assured  that  Greece  would  not  make  common  cause  with  the 
Allies.  On  October  4  M.  Venizelos  delivered  a  memorable 
speech,  declaring  that  Greece  would  loyally  stand  by  her 
treaty  obligations  and  make  common  cause  with  Serbia. 
He  was  supported  on  a  division  by  a  substantial  majority 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  Next  day  King  Constantine 
sent  for  his  Prime  Minister  and  declared  that  he  could  not 
follow  the  policy  indicated.  M.  Venizelos  resigned  his 
office,  and  with  his  retirement  disappeared  all  hope  of 
Greek  help  for  Serbia.  A  neutralist  cabinet  without 
a  parliamentary  majority  assumed  the  government  and 
informed  M.  Pashitch  that  Greece  did  not  hold  herself 
bound  to  abandon  her  neutrality.  Of  the  many  excuses 
brought  forward  in  support  of  this  betrayal  of  an  ally  two 
only  seemed  to  merit  attention.  One  was  that  the  treaty 
spoke  only  of  an  attack  by  Bulgaria  and  not  of  a  united 
assault   on    Serbia   by   Bulgaria   and   other  Powers.     This 


214  The  Downfall 

was  the  first  hint  of  such  a  curious  interpretation  of  the 
treaty,  and  had  not  been  previously  put  forward  by  any  Greek 
government.  The  other  argument  was  that  Serbia  could 
not  provide  150,000  men  for  the  common  resistance  to 
Bulgaria.  This  was  no  more  than  a  debating  point.  Voivoda 
Stepanovitch  had  over  100,000  men  opposed  to  the  Bulgars 
in  Serbia,  while  the  Allies  had  already  at  the  beginning  of 
October  22,000  at  Salonika  and  more  were  to  follow  shortly.    | 

Anyhow,  with  justification  or  without,  the  new  Greek 
government  had   no   intention   of   coming   to   the   rescue. 
Serbia  had  been  betrayed,  not  by  Greece,  but  by  a  Greek   j 
faction.    The  only  help  to  be  expected  was  from  the  Anglo-    ' 
French   troops   gathering   at    Salonika,      Unable   to    move    1 
their  expeditionary  force  rapidly  up  from  the  coast,  the   ; 
Allies  bade  the  Serbs  retire  slowly  before  the  enemy,  avoidinq;    ' 
any  general  engagement,  until  a  junction  should  be  effected 
with  the  Anglo-French  contingent.    This  advice,  absolutely 
necessary  under  the  circumstances,  made  cruel  demands 
on  the  steadfastness  of  an  army  of  peasants,  with  whom 
patriotism  primarily  takes  the  form  of  a  passionate  adoration 
for  their  home,  their  village,  their  district.     They  would 
be  obliged  to  see  their  country  overrun  by  troops,  most 
of  whom  they  had  soundly  defeated  before  and  were  now 
confident  of  defeating  again.    The  Serbs  have  encountered 
the  almost  incredible  criticism  that  in  the  campaign  which 
followed  they  did  not  '  put  up  a  fight  '.■*■     Rather  might 
they  be  criticized  in  the  opposite  sense,  for  having  put  up 
too  much  of  a  fight.     Had  they  not  offered  a  desperate 
resistance  which  held  back  their  enemies  for  the  first  three. j 
weeks,  it  seems  probable  that  they  could  have  made  certain 

^  A.  and  C.  Askew,  p.  214.    The  authors  encountered  a  British  officer 
who  made  the  statement  quoted  above. 


The  Downfall  215 

of  joining  hands  with  the  Allies.  It  would  have  meant 
a  deliberate  sacrifice  of  nearly  all  the  northern  half  of  Serbia, 
the  real  Serbia,  and  a  retirement  into  the  new  territories. 
But  it  would  have  been  better  to  sacrifice  the  land  and 
preserve  the  army.  Had  such  a  strategic  retreat  been  success- 
ful, there  would  never  have  been  the  horrors  of  Albania, 
nor  would  the  civil  population  of  Serbia  have  found 
itself  caught  in  a  trap  from  which  there  was  no  escape. 
Even  had  the  enemy  not  been  brought  to  a  halt  to  the  north 
and  east  of  Skoplye,  still  the  route  to  Salonika  would  have 
been  open. 

The   Austro-Germans    began    with    an   intense   artillery 
preparation.     Fifty  thousand  shells  are  said  to  have  fallen 
upon  the  stricken  city  of  Belgrade  in  two  days.    Then  on 
October  6  the  enemy  began  the  passage  of  the  rivers.    Their 
main  objectives  were  the  Morava  valley  and  the  capital. 
Their  guns   pounded   and   wrecked  the  Serbian  positions. 
Their  infantry  came  on  in  dense  masses.   The  British,  French, 
and  Russian  heavy  artillery  defending  Belgrade  were  silenced 
almost  at  once.     Yet  the  Serbs  clung  to  the  river  banks  and 
destroyed  the  successive  waves  of  infantry  which  succeeded 
in  effecting  a  foothold  on  Serbian  territory.     So  the  fight 
raged  for  a  week.     Then  the  enemy's  numbers  and  guns 
could  no  longer  be  denied.    Smederevo  fell  on  the  nth  and 
was  followed  by  the  loss  of  Belgrade  on  the  1 5th.    Mackensen 
had  thus  accomplished  the  first  two  steps  of  his  plan  of 
campaign.     He  had  secured  the  rail-head  of  the  coveted 
line  to  Constantinople  and  established  his  hold  on  the  lower 
Morava.     On  October  17  Voivoda  Mishitch's  army,  which 
had  succeeded   in   repelling  all  attacks  from   the  Austro- 
Hungarians  on   the   Save,  was  obliged   by   these  disasters 


21 6  The  Downfall 

to  fall  back  to  the  south-cast  in  order  to  maintain  its  com- 
munications with  the  Serbian  centre. 

All  this  time  the  Serbs  were  confidently  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  the  allied  troops.  Britain  and  France  were 
Great  Powers  with  vast  resources,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  promised  that  Serbia  should  not  be  left  to  fight  alone. 
Besides,  apart  from  the  loyalty  of  their  allies,  in  which  they 
had  complete  confidence,  the  Serbs  knew  the  supreme 
importance  of  their  country  in  the  world-war.  Once  let 
the  Austro-Germans  batter  their  way  through  Serbia  and 
the  '  Berlin-Baghdad '  plan  would  be  accomplished.  In 
her  own  interests  Britain  must  prevent  the  collapse  of 
Serbia.  Also  she  had  sworn  to  support  her.  So  the  streets 
of  Nish  were  gaily  decorated  with  the  flags  of  the  Entente 
to  v.'elcome  the  Anglo-French  soldiers.  Every  day  rumours 
went  round  the  town  that  the  Allies  were  to  arrive  next 
day  from  Salonika.  Then,  as  their  army  was  slowly  pressed 
back  by  sheer  weight  of  men  and  artillery,  and  no  sign  of 
help  came  from  the  south,  the  bitter  truth  was  borne  in 
on  the  Serbs.  Despite  their  goodwill,  despite  the  best 
of  intentions,  the  Allies  had  failed  to  grasp  the  situation. 
Once  more  they  were  too  late.  Quietly  the  decorations  were 
removed  from  the  houses  in  Nish.  There  was  very  little 
display  of  rancour  against  the  Great  Powers  that  were 
abandoning  their  little  comrade  to  a  hopeless  struggle. 
With  the  doggedness  of  despair  th'  Serbs  settled  down  to 
sell  their  lives  and  their  country  as  dearly  as  they  could. 

On  October  12  the  Bulgars  at  last  threw  off  the  mask. 
Without  any  declaration  of  war  they  attacked  the  Serbian 
advanced  posts,  and  on  the  night  of  the  13th  moved  forward 
along  the  whole  eastern  front.  Their  line  stretching  from 
the  Danube  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Radovishte  contained 


The  Downfall  217 

177  battalions.  The  pressure  on  the  northern  front  had 
forced  the  Serbs  to  transfer  their  cavalry  division  and 
that  of  Shumadia  (first  ban)  from  the  Second  Army  to  the 
lower  Morava.  To  oppose  the  Bulgars,  therefore,  the 
Serbs  had  only  78  battalions.  Nevertheless,  the  enemy 
encountered  a  desperate,  and  at  mos-t  points  completely 
successful,  resistance.  Despite  their  small  numbers  the 
Serbs  felt  that  they  had  beaten  the  Bulgars  but  two  years 
before  and  could  do  so  again.  For  ten  days  all  the  attacks 
in  the  Timok  and  Nishava  districts  were  repulsed.  Not  till 
October  25  did  the  enemy  succeed  in  reaching  Kniayevatz, 
some  twenty  kilometres  from  the  frontier.  On  the  same 
day  to  the  north  of  Pirot  the  Bulgars  sustained  a  severe  and 
costly  defeat.  In  spite  of  their  success,  however,  the  Serbian 
eastern  army  began  to  find  themselves  in  a  position  of  the 
utmost  danger.  The  Austro-German  advance  on  Kraguye- 
vatz  was  already  threatening  Nish  and  the  junction  of  the 
two  Moravas.  The  Serbs  could  not  maintain  themselves 
against  the  heavy  guns.  They  bitterly  complained  that 
they  never  saw  the  Germans  with  v.hom  they  were  longing 
to  get  to  grips.  Mackensen,  indeed,  now  used  his  infantry, 
which  was  of  poor  quality,  as  little  as  possible,  while  he 
blasted  his  way  across  Serbia  with  the  devastating  fire  of 
his  artillery.  The  Second  Army  and  the  troops  along  the 
Timok  accordingly  were  obliged  to  retire,  to  avoid  being 
taken  in  the  rear.  The  government  left  Nish  for  Kralyevo 
and  by  the  beginning  of  November  the  First,  Second,  and 
Third  Armies,  and  the  intermediate  detachments,  had  all 
concentrated  in  the  angle  between  the  two  Moravas. 
Kralyevo  and  Krushevatz  were  further  crowded  with  the 
civil  population  of  the  north  and  east,  thousands  of  whom 
fled  with  the  army,  urging  their  slow-moving  ox-wagons 


2i8  The  Downfall 

along  the  congested  and  impossible  roads.  Hope  was  not 
yet  dead.  Many  of  the  Serbs  still  believed  that  there  were 
no  limits  to  what  their  army  could  do  amongst  their  own 
mountains.  Occasionally  accidental  causes  maintained  even 
a  desperate  gaiety.  Mr.  Gordon  Smith  tells  how  he  arrived 
at  Krushevatz  to  find  the  town  apparently  en  fete  and  the 
inhabitants  singing  and  dancing,  despite  the  distant  booming 
of  the  German  cannon.  At  a  loss  at  first  to  understand  this 
unexpected  revelry,  he  soon  discovered  its  origin.  The 
government  had  been  destroying  their  stores  or  distributing 
them  to  the  public.  Amongst  the  goods  in  Krushevatz 
station  had  been  found  20,000  bottles  of  champagne.  The 
population  had  determined  not  to  abandon  this  treasure- 
trove,  and,  as  it  could  only  conveniently  be  carried  internally, 
they  had  proceeded  at  once  to  absorb  it.-^ 

But  the  news  from  the  south  was  of  the  worst  possible. 
The  Serbs  had  been  obliged  to  fall  back  on  the  southern 
Morava  to  the  north  of  Vranya.  The  Vardar  valley  was  only 
held  by  the  new  Macedonian  divisions,  which  were  far  below 
strength  and  poorly  supplied  with  guns  of  all  calibres.  Here 
the  Bulgars  proceeded  at  once  to  cut  the  railway-line  near 
Strumitza,  thus  placing  themselves  between  the  Serbs  and 
any  possible  relief  from  Salonika.  Serbia  was  now  encircled. 
Her  only  railway  communication  with  the  outer  world  was 
gone,  except  for  the  few  miles  from  Monastir  to  the  Greek 
frontier.  And  the  roads  to  Monastir  might  be  closed  any 
day.  By  October  22  the  Bulgars  had  advanced  to  Skoplye, 
where  they  captured  Lady  Paget  and  her  English  hospital, 
and  pressed  on  towards  Katchanik. 

Although  the  Anglo-French  force  had  now  moved  up 
the  Vardar  as  far  as  Gradsko,  it  was  clear  that  it  could  do 

•^  Gordon  Smith,  p.  92. 


1 


The  Downfall  219 

nothing  to  enable  the  main  body  of  the  Serbian  army  to 
hold  its  ground  on  the  Morava.  The  Serbs,  therefore,  had 
no  choice  but  to  fall  back  on  the  plain  of  Kossovo  and  from 
there  to  force  their  way  through  the  Bulgars  and  join  their 
allies.  Thus  in  the  second  week  of  November  the  Serbs 
set  out  on  their  way  of  sorrows.  People  and  army,  mixed 
together  in  continuous  streams  of  human  misery,  flowed 
southwards  along  the  narrow  roads  through  the  mountains. 
The  rain  fell  pitilessly  upon  the  fugitives.  The  wheels 
of  the  ox- wagons  churned  the  mud  into  deep  morasses. 
Only  three  routes  were  possible.  The  First  Army  followed 
the  course  of  the  Ibar  past  Rashka  to  Mitrovitza.  The 
Third  Army  and  the  garrison  of  Belgrade  had  to  make  use 
of  the  one  track  that  led  over  the  hills  from  Kurshumlia 
to  Prepolatz  and  Prishtina.  The  Second  Army's  line  of 
retirement  from  Lescovatz  towards  the  same  point  was 
threatened  by  the  Bulgar  advance  from  the  south.  At  one 
moment  indeed,  on  November  10,  their  retreat  was  cut 
off,  and  they  only  re-established  their  communications 
after  a  fierce  fight.  The  transport  of  the  Second  and  Third 
Armies  and  of  the  garrison  of  Belgrade  managed  to  pass 
through  Kurshumlia  just  in  time.  The  Bulgars  \\ere  only 
some  ten  miles  to  the  east ;  the  Austro-Hungarians  were 
already  at  Rashka  on  the  west ;  close  behind  were  the 
Germans,  being  kept  back  by  the  Third  Army.  And  at 
Kurshumlia  there  could  be  no  resting  for  the  troops.  Their 
enemies  were  closing  in  relentlessly  on  three  sides.  Another 
race  lay  before  them,  to  reach  Prishtina  before  they  were 
surrounded. 

With  the  army  went  the '  recruits ',  young  men  who  would 
soon  have  been  old  enough  to  be  taken  for  military  service. 
For  them  there  was   no  provision  ;   no  imiforms,  no  arms, 


220  The  Downfall 

no  food,  no  transport.  The  sufferings  of  those  unfortunate 
lads  is  one  of  the  most  heartrending  features  of  the  national 
martyrdom.  Then  in  many  places  the  food-supply  began 
to  give  out.  Rations  could  not  be  supplied  to  all  the  troops. 
The  soldiers  presumed  that  the  civilians  would  have  brought 
supplies  with  them.  The  civilians  hoped  that  at  any  rate 
they  would  be  able  to  beg  some  food  from  the  army.  Both 
received  the  same  answer,  '  Nema  '  (There  is  none).  Very 
little  could  be  procured  in  the  villages.  Seeing  their  hated 
masters  in  distress,  the  Albanians  of  Kossovo  and  the  Sandjak 
demanded  exorbitant  prices.  They  began  to  refuse  paper 
money,  and  raised  the  price  of  a  loaf  of  bread,  which  nor- 
mally cost  25  paras,  to  5  dinars  (francs).  And  this  was 
only  the  beginning  of  the  retreat.  Later  on  at  Fetch  the 
loaf  rose  to  10  dinars,  and  Mr.  Askew  speaks  of  an  officer 
paying  28  dinars  for  a  quarter  of  a  loaf.^  The  cold  was 
becoming  bitter.  The  continuous  rain  began  to  turn  to 
snow.  The  troops  suffered  the  misery  of  vermin.  Overhead 
were  the  enemy's  aeroplanes.  Stragglers  met  with  little 
mercy  at  the  hands  of  Turks  and  Albanians.  Yet  in  spite 
of  everything  the  retirement  to  Kossovo  was  carried  out 
swiftly  and  skilfully,  and  the  enemy  succeeded  in  making 
no  captures  either  of  artillery  or  supplies. 

By  November  15  the  whole  Serbian  army  was  collected  in 
and  round  the  plain  of  Kossovo,  the  chief  concentration 
being  at  Prishtina,  while  the  First  Army  held  off  the  Austro- 
Hungarians  to  the  north  of  Mitrovitza.  The  Serbs  v/ere 
now  at  their  last  gasp.  Surrender  they  would  not,  though 
all  that  was  left  to  them  of  their  country  was  the  barren 
little  corner  in  which  they  were  encamped.  Beyond  lay 
only  the  forbidding  mountain  walls  of  Albania  and  Monte- 

^  Askew,  p.  293. 


The  Downfall  221 

negro.  They  gathered  themselves  for  one  supreme  effort. 
Between  Prishtina  and  Skoplye  lie  the  ranges  of  Shar  Planina 
and  Kara  Dagh,  separated  by  the  pass  of  Katchanik.  On 
November  17  five  divisions  of  infantry  and  two  mixed 
detachments  advanced  in  the  forlorn  hope  of  piercing  the 
Bulgarian  line  across  the  pass  and  opening  a  way  of  escape 
to  the  south.  Gallantly  the  weary  and  starving  troops  hurled 
themselves  on  the  enemy.  At  first  they  were  successful  and 
pushed  steadily  forward.  An  intercepted  dispatch  showed 
that  the  Bulgars  considered  the  position  critical.  But  speed 
was  essential  to  the  Serbs.  The  Austro-German  advance 
menaced  them  from  behind.  On  November  20  the  Germans 
crossed  the  old  Serbo-Turkish  frontier  at  Prepolatz  and 
pushed  on  to  within  twelve  kilometres  of  Prishtina.  It  was 
clear  that  the  exhausted  men  at  Katchanik  would  not  be 
able  to  force  the  passage  into  the  Vardar  valley  in  time. 
Also  the  news  came  through  from  the  south  that  the  Allies^ 
whose  advance  had  been  used  to  buoy  up  the  spirits  of  the 
troops,  were  falling  back  towards  Salonika.  On  November  21, 
the  troops  received  the  order  to  fall  back  and  rejoin  the 
rest  of  the  army,  which  was  now  withdrawn  to  the  left  flank 
of  the  Sitnitza. 

It  was  the  end.  The  Serbs  could  do  no  more.  They  had 
been  attacked  by  three  Powers,  betrayed  by  the  Greek 
government,  unsupported  by  their  western  allies.  They 
had  done  all,  and  more  than  all,  that  could  be  required  of 
any  army.  They  now  stood  on  the  farthest  limit  of  their 
country,  on  that  sacred  plain  of  sorrowful  memories,  where 
Tsar  Lazar  and  the  Serbian  empire  had  perished.  Again, 
the  Serbian  nation,  restored  to  life  at  the  cost  of  so  much 
blood  and  sacrifice,  was  dying.  Would  it  move  us  to 
surprise  or  criticism  if  Serbia  had  made  her  peace  with  the 


222  The  Downfall 

victors,  if  she  had  lost  all  faith  in  those  friends  who  had 
been  powerless  to  help  her,  and  had  submitted  to  the  yoke 
in  patient  expectation  of  one  day  liberating  herself  again  ? 
Remember  that  the  soldiers  had  left  wives  and  parents 
and  children  in  the  enemy's  power.  Even  the  civil  popula- 
tion that  had  fled  was  now  ordered  to  return  home  and  face 
slavery  rather  than  the  almost  certain  death  that  awaited 
them  beyond  the  frontier.  Yet  death  was  waiting  for  them 
also  on  their  return  across  Old  Serbia.  The  enemy  had 
armed  the  Moslem  Albanians  and  placed  the  policing  of 
the  countryside  in  their  hands.  The  Arnauts  did  not  need 
German  encouragement  in  order  to  begin  at  once  a  pitiless 
hunt  for  Serbian  victims.-^  It  is  no  matter  for  wonder 
that  many  of  the  soldiers  could  not  bear  their  position  any 
longer  and  deserted.  They  did  not  understand  this  never- 
ending  retreat.  They  demanded  to  be  led  against  the 
enemy,  whose  vast  numbers  they  did  not  realize,  and  to 
fight  their  way  home.  But  when  their  chiefs  only  gave 
the  order  for  further  retreat  they  lost  all  heart  and  slipped 
away,  making  for  the  home  which  they  had  hardly  seen  for 
three  long  years. 

Yet,  if  the  resolution  of  individuals  broke  down,  the' 
steadfastness  of  the  army  as  a  whole  was  marvellous.  The 
enemy  never  succeeded  in  taking  prisoners  a  whole  unit. 
And  now  the  Serbian  General  Staff  called  on  the  army  to 
leave  the  fatherland  and  face  starvation  and  exile  rather  than 
make  terms  with  the  invaders.  The  cup  of  bitterness  must 
be  drunk  to  the  dregs.  There  were  no  illusions  as  to  what 
a  retreat 'through  Albania  would  mean.  It  would  be  a 
disaster.    The  precious  guns,  the  motor  vehicles,  the  greater 

^  Sturzenegger,  p.  154;    confirmed  by  Ganghofer  in  the  Neue  Freie 
Presse  of  January  5,  191 6  ;  2*  Livre  bleu  serbe,  No.  4,  p.  21. 


The  Downfall  223 

part  of  the  wagons  and  even  of  the  oxen  and  horses  might 
be  regarded  as  doomed  to  certain  destruction.  Of  the  men 
themselves  many  would  probably  succumb  to  cold  and 
starvation  before  they  could  win  through  to  Scutari,  where 
the  Allies  promised  to  await  them  with  food  and  supplies. 
With  the  army  still  went  the  '  recruits  ',  and  the  prisoners. 
It  was  not  the  fault  of  the  Serbs  if  these  unfortunate  Austro- 
Hungarians,  Germans,  and  Bulgars  had  to  undergo  atrocious 
hardships  and  died  by  thousands  on  the  road.  The  Serbian 
government  had  offered*  to  exchange  them,  but,  receiving 
no  answer,  had  no  choice  but  to  order  the  prisoners  to  share 
in  the  retreat.  22,000  of  them  eventually  succeeded  in 
reaching  the  Adriatic. 

The  country  over  which  the  retreat  had  to  be  made 
consists  of  the  Albanian  Alps,  the  most  savage  and  inhospit- 
able region  of  Europe.  Across  the  barren  and  precipitous 
mountains  run  no  roads,  only  inferior  mule-tracks,  along 
which  it  is  impossible  to  move  wagons  of  any  size.  One 
good  road  existed  in  Montenegro  leading  from  Andrea vitza 
to  Podgoritza,  but  to  reach  it  the  Serbs  had  to  cross  moun- 
tains of  over  5,000  ft.  in  the  intense  cold  of  a  Montenegrin 
December,  The  scanty  inhabitants  of  the  valleys  were 
either  Roman  Catholic  Albanians,  whose  only  profession 
for  centuries  has  been  pillage  and  war,  or  the  more  remote 
Montenegrins,  who  did  not  see  why  alliance  with  Serbia 
should  prevent  them  from  charging  monstrous  prices  for 
the  miserable  fare  which  they  had  to  offer. 

The  plan  of  the  General  Staff  was  to  hurry  the  army  across 
the  mountains  to  Scutari  as  quickly  as  possible,  and  then, 
with  an  impassable  country  between  them  and  the  enemy, 
to  reorganize  the  exhausted  troops  with  the  help  of  the 
British  and  French  Adriatic  Missions.     For  this  purpose  as 


224  The  Downfall 

many  routes  had  to  be  used  as  possible.  The  bulk  of  the 
army  retired  by  Fetch  and  so  to  the  road  from  Andreavitza. 
The  troops  of  the  new  territories  followed  the  shortest,  but 
most  difficult,  passage,  by  Lium-Kula  and  Spash  along  the 
Drin.  With  them  went  the  aged  king,  often  on  foot,  despite 
his  seventy-six  years,  sharing  the  misery  and  sufferings  of  his 
men.  At  the  head  of  the  column,  too,  was  Voivoda  Putnik. 
The  old  chief  of  the  army  was  a  martyr  to  asthma,  and  for 
two  years  had  hardly  quitted  his  room,  which  had  been  kept 
at  a  temperature  of  86  Fahr.  But  the  Voivoda  could  not 
be  left  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy.  So,  carried  in  a 
sedan-chair  by  four  soldiers,  he  led  the  way  through  the  snows 
of  Albania.  But  he  had  fought  his  last  campaign.  His  health 
could  not  recover  from  the  retreat.  When  the  army  again 
took  the  field  in  1916  he  had  to  be  left  in  Corfu,  and  on 
May  19,  1917,  he  passed  away  at  Nice. 

Lastly,  the  cavalry  division  and  several  other  formations 
went  south  with  orders  to  make  their  way  along  the  Black 
Drin  through  Dibra  to  Monastir  and  there  to  join  the  troops 
which  still  held  out  in  Macedonia,  and  the  French  detach- 
ment on  the  river  Tserna.  On  December  2  the  leading 
columns  reached  Dibra.  But  the  next  day  the  Bulgars  entered 
Monastir  and  pressed  on  to  drive  the  slender  Serbian  detach- 
ment from  their  last  foothold  in  Macedonia.  The  line  of 
march  was  therefore  changed  and  the  troops  moved  west- 
ward towards  Elbasan  in  central  Albania. 

The  first  fortnight  cf  December  saw  the  First,  Second, 
and  Third  Armies  crossing  south-eastern  Montenegro,  the 
First  Army  always  covering  the  retreat  and  holding  off  the 
Albanian  tribes.  As  the  men  reached  the  limits  of  human 
endurance,  all  order  (but  not  self-discipline)  began  to  break 
down.    The  army  became  a  confused  herd  of  famished  and 


I 


■n 


^-^T^^: 


■ID 


The  Downfall  225 

despairing  fugitives.  Blindly  they  staggered  on  through  mud 
and  snow.  The  path  was  littered  with  the  bodies  of  the 
fallen  and  the  carcasses  of  animals,  on  to  which  the  soldiers 
flung  themselves  gnawing  the  raw  flesh.  The  rags,  which 
were  all  that  was  left  of  their  uniforms,  they  bartered  for 
bread  and  rakia  in  the  miserable  villages  through  which  they 
passed..  A  Serbian  officer  has  told  me  how  he  was  forced  to 
part  with  his  trousers  to  buy  half  a  kilo  of  flour,  and  had  to 
tramp  all  the  way  from  the  Drin  valley  to  Valona  before  he 
could  reclothe  himself.  The  men  ate  their  boots  and  trudged 
on  with  naked  and  bleeding  feet.  Dysentery  added  its  horrors 
to  the  march.  Around  could  be  heard  the  wolves  waiting 
for  those  that  fell  by  the  wayside.  Now  and  then  a  hostile 
aeroplane  wheeled  and  circled  overhead.  But  still  they 
struggled  on,  for  at  Andreavitza  there  would  be  food  and  rest. 
At  last  they  reached  the  town  of  promise.  There  was  nothing. 
The  organization  at  Scutari  and  the  coast  had  not  been  able 
to  deal  with  the  difficulties  of  the  situation,  and  there  was  no 
means  of  transport  into  the  interior.  On  the  troops  had  to 
go,  on  to  Podgoritza  and  Scutari,  a  phantom  army  of  dying 
men. 

But  neither  at  Scutari  nor  on  the  coast  itself  did  the  tale 
of  misery  end.  The  Adriatic  was  infested  with  Austro- 
Hungarian  submarines.  The  wretched  little  port  of  San 
Giovanni  di  Medua,  through  which  supplies  were  to  have 
come  and  from  which  the  civilians  who  had  accompanied  the 
army  hoped  to  sail  to  some  friendly  shore,  was  blocked  with 
the  wreckage  of  shipping  and  wholly  unable  to  sustain  the 
role  designed  for  it.  Consequently  the  British  Adriatic 
Mission,  which  met  the  Serbian  army  at  Scutari,  was  unable 
properly  to  carry  out  the  promises  made  to  the  General  Staff. 
Whatever  food  came  through  was  at  once  dealt  out  to  the 

2071  -n 


2  26  The  Downfall 

hungry  multitudes,  but  there  was  never  enough.     The  Serbs 
continued  to  die  of  starvation  at  Scutari  and  Liesh. 

The  plan  of  reconstituting  the  army  at  Scutari  behind  the 
barrier  of  the  mountains  had  to  be  abandoned.  That  plan 
had  rested  on  the  assumption  that  Italy,  the  nearest  ally, 
with  British  and  French  assistance,  would  keep  open  the 
communication  by  sea  from  Brindisi  to  the  Albanian  coast. 
This  Italy  declared  herself  unable  to  do.  Indeed,  on  Decem- 
ber 9  an  Austrian  squadron  sailed  into  Durazzo  harbour  and 
then  into  Medua  and  sank  all  the  shipping  in  both  ports, 
without  being  so  much  as  challenged.  And,  apart  from  the 
dangers  of  the  sea,  a  further  stay  in  Scutari  was  made  im- 
possible by  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  Mount  Lovchen,  the 
supposedly  impregnable  fortress  of  the  Montenegrins  above 
Cattaro,  fell  to  the  Austro-Hungarians.  The  road  to 
Tsetinye  and  Podgoritza  lay  open  and  defenceless.  At  the 
same  time  the  Bulgarians  were  pressing  in  from  the  east  and 
threatening  Elbasan.  The  Serbian  army  clearly  could  not 
stay  where  it  was.  But  where  could  it  find  the  haven  of  refuge 
for  which  it  longed  .?  Corsica  and  Tunis  were  suggested. 
The  civilians  were  shipped  off  for  Corsica,  and  a  first  detach- 
ment of  some  10,000  troops  was  dispatched  to  Bizerta.  But 
the  sea  journey  in  both  cases  was  considered  too  long,  and 
Africa  would  have  been  too  torrid  a  climate  for  the  Serbs 
accustomed  to  their  mountains  and  exhausted  by  their 
privations.  It  was  finally  decided  to  transport  the  army 
from  Valona  to  Corfu.  Corfu  indeed  was  Greek  territorv. 
But  the  Powers,  on  whose  guarantee  rested  the  inde- 
pendence of  Greece  as  a  constitutional  state,  considered 
themselves  justified  in  forcing  that  kingdom  to  extend 
some  hospitality  to  the  ally  whom  she  had  been  obliged  by 
a  faithless  autocrat  to  abandon.     On  Corfu  there  would  at 


The  Downfall  227 

last  be  rest  for  the  weary  feet  and  peace  for  the  tortured 
souls. 

The  roads  southward  from  Scutari  lay  through  a  country 
that  was  at  any  rate  nominally  friendly.  Here  the  influence 
of  Essad  Pasha,  the  one  central  authority  left  in  Albania 
whose  name  commanded  any  widespread  respect,  was 
exercised  on  behalf  of  the  AlHes.  But  this  did  not  prevent 
the  inhabitants  of  the  plain  from  following  the  example  of 
the  Albanians  of  the  mountains  in  regard  to  the  extortion  of 
money.  At  the  ferries  they  demanded  gold,  and  those  who 
could  not  pay  might  remain  where  they  were  and  die.  Those 
who  went  through  the  whole  retreat  say  that  the  last  stages 
through  the  marshes  and  mud  of  central  Albania  were  the 
worst  of  all.  Hope  deferred,  the  continued  starvation  and 
the  heart-breaking  nature  of  the  country  broke  down  the 
resistance  of  the  strongest.  The  whole  retreat  from  the 
banks  of  the  Morava  to  the  harbour  at  Valona  was  one 
crescendo  of  sorrow  and  calamity.  When  at  last  Valona  was 
reached  thousands  still  died  neglected  before  they  could  be 
taken  off  by  the  French  and  British  ships.  The  Serbs  were 
even  required  to  march  on  to  Santi  Quaranta,but  the  General 
Staff  refused  to  demand  anything  more  of  their  men,  who  had 
patiently  borne  so  many  disappointments.  From  Valona  the 
army,  150,000  strong,  finally  left  Albania  and  crossed  over  to 
Corfu.  Only  the  astonishing  endurance  of  the  Serbs  made 
possible  the  miraculous  escape  of  so  large  a  number.  Through 
the  encircling  lines  of  the  enemy,  through  mud  and  snow, 
over  mountains  and  marshes,  despite  famine  and  cold,  these 
amazing  patriots  had  forced  their  way  out  to  the  freedom 
that  would  enable  them  once  more  to  return  to  the  struggle. 

In  England  we  did  not  then  know  what  had  been  happening. 
Our  newspapers  were  unable  to  tell  us  what  was  being  done 

P  2 


228  The  Downfall 

inside  that  ring  of  fire  that  encircled  Serbia.  We  trembled 
for  our  little  hero-ally,  as  day  after  day  passed  and  still  no 
word  reached  us.  For  two  months  the  darkness  of  Golgotha 
enshrouded  the  Balkan  mountains.  When  at  last  the  curtain 
was  raised,  the  western  peoples  saw  uplifted  before  them 
against  the  red  glow  of  carnage  and  slaughter  the  spectre  of 
a  cross  on  which  was  crucified  a  living  nation.  Serbia  might 
have  yielded  to  the  powers  of  darkness.  She  might  have  sold 
her  honour  and  sunk  down  among  the  subject  races  of  'Mit- 
teleuropa '.  But  she  had  preferred  loyalty  to  life.  She  was 
dying.  But  her  spirit  was  alive.  In  the  army  at  Corfu  that 
immortal  spirit  was  even  then  passing  over  the  dry  bones, 
clothing  them  with  sinew  and  muscle,  and  filling  them  with 
the  breath  of  resurrection. 


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10 

The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

Ar  za  to  opet  pevani 

'  Zhivela  Serbiya  !  ' 
'  Nevertheless  will  I  sing 

"Long  live  Serbia!'" 

(Song  of  Exile  on  Corfu.) 

Although  on  their  arrival  at  Corfu  the  Serbs  were  greeted 
with  several  weeks  of  continuous  rain,  the  island  presently 
lived  up  to  its  reputation  as  an  earthly  paradise.  There  the 
battered  and  broken  remnants  of  the  once  invincible  army 
nursed  themselves  back  to  life.  At  first  there  were  difficulties 
with  the  food  which  the  Allies  provided.  The  Serbian 
soldier  knew  nothing  of  Australian  frozen  meat.  He  put  it 
straight  into  the  pot  and  was  alarmed  to  find  that  it  emerged 
in  a  state  closely  resembling  rubber.  '  Bully  beef  ',  too, 
became  suspect  on  account  of  one  or  two  tins  that  proved  to 
be  bad,  owing  perhaps  to  a  stray  nail  having  penetrated  the 
tins.  In  any  case  the  shrunken  stomachs  of  starving  men 
could  not  assimilate  such  unaccustomed  fare.  Bread  was 
what  they  wanted,  and  after  a  few  days  they  got  it.  Two  field 
bakeries  of  thirty-two  ovens  each,  as  soon  as  they  were  con- 
structed and  the  wood  for  fires  had  been  collected,  provided 
all  the  bread  that  was  needed.  But  the  work  of  reconstruc- 
tion was  necessarily  slow.  The  army  was  destitute  of  nearly 
everything  in  the  way  of  equipment.  Hundreds  still  died 
every  day,  either  because  they  were  already  too  far  gone  for 
recovery  or  from  exposure  to  the  continuous  rain.    Daily  the 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  231 

boats  put  out  with  their  tragic  freight  of  dead,  who  had 
reached  safety  too  late.  But  nothing  could  kill  the  great 
majority.  Gradually  their  strength  came  back  to  them. 
They  received  their  new  British  and  French  uniforms,  their 
American  boots,  and  their  French  rifles.  The  recruits  were 
trained  and  the  whole  army  reconstituted  into  new  forma- 
tions. It  speaks  highly  for  all  ranks  that  by  April  there  were 
already  a  number  of  units  ready  to  leave  the  island  for 
Salonika  and  to  resume  their  endless  task  of  war  once  again. 
The  mention  of  Salonika  brings  us  back  to  the  Greek 
question.  The  Allies  had  sent  their  troops  to  Salonika, 
immediately  after  M.  Venizelos's  inquiry  about  assistance  in 
case  of  a  Greco-Bulgarian  conflict,  in  virtue  of  the  position  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  as  the  guarantors  of  the 
Greek  constitution  and  in  gentle  vindication  of  the  Serbo- 
Greek  alliance.  But  King  Constantine  looked  upon  the 
expedition  with  extreme  disfavour.  General  Sarrail's  force 
seemed  hardly  sufficient  to  prevent  the  Germano-Bulgarian 
advance  on  Salonika,  anyhow  quite  inadequate  to  check  an 
attack  southwards  on  Greece  should  that  country  decide  to 
join  the  Allies.  She  would  then  suffer  the  fate  of  Belgium 
and  Serbia.  Besides,  the  king  and  his  party  at  Athens  were 
convinced  not  so  much  that  Germany  would  win  the  war  as 
that  she  had  already  done  so.  Greek  neutrality  was  gradually 
changed  into  secret  support  of  the  enemy,  and  in  March  the 
Bulgars  were  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier  and  occupy  useful 
strategic  positions  in  the  mountains.  When  the  Greek 
government  were  asked  to  permit  the  transport  of  the  Serbian 
army  to  Salonika  by  railway  to  avoid  the  enemy's  submarines, 
they  put  forward  many  objections  and  ended  by  refusing. 
The  Serbs  passed  round  Greece  by  sea  without  mishap.  But 
the  most  serious  service  which  the  Greeks  rendered  to  our 


232  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

enemies  occurred  at  the  end  of  May,  when  their  commandant 
handed  over  the  fort  of  Rupel  to  the  Bulgars.  This  fort  had 
been  specially  planned  by  the  Greek  government  to  defend 
the  Struma  valley  against  Bulgarian  attacks,  and  occupied 
a  position  of  extreme  strength.  Drama,  Seres,  and  Kavalla, 
which  M.  Venizelos  had  obtained  for  his  country  after  the 
victories  of  the  second  Balkan  war,  were  thus  exposed  to  the 
certainty  of  Bulgarian  aggression  as  soon  as  hostilities  began 
once  more.  The  answer  of  the  Allies  to  this  act  of  treachery  || 
was  to  blockade  the  Greek  ports  and  demand  constitutional 
government  based  on  real  and  free  elections  for  the  Greek 
Chamber  ;  while  General  Sarrail  proclaimed  martial  law  at 
Salonika  and  virtually  assumed  the  government  of  that  town. 
The  Zaimis  cabinet  at  Athens  accepted  the  Allies'  terms  and 
preparations  were  made  for  holding  the  Greek  elections  in 
September. 

Such  was  the  political  situation  when  the  Serbs  arrived  at 
Mikra  Bay  close  to  Salonika,  with  a  view  to  becoming  the 
left  wing  of  the  Allied  armies  in  the  coming  offensive  of  the 
autumn.  In  front  of  them  would  be  the  Bulgars  holding 
immensely  strong  positions  on  the  crests  of  the  mountain- 
ranges  that  form  the  Serbo-Greek  frontier.  Behind  them 
they  would  have  the  doubtful  factor  of  Greece,  who  was 
temporarily  on  her  good  behaviour  owing  to  the  Allied 
warships,  but  who  might  appear  as  an  enemy,  should  the 
campaign  in  Macedonia  go  in  favour  of  the  Bulgarians. 

The  Serbian  army  numbered  over  120,000  men,  the  whole 
fighting  force  remaining  after  the  hardships  of  the  retreat 
and  the  ravages  of  disease,  except  for  a  draft  of  some  three 
hundred  officers  and  N.C.O.s  who  went  to  Russia  under  the 
command  of  General  Zhivkovitch  to  lead  the  Austro- 
Hungarian    Serbs    who   had    entered    the    Russian    service. 


IN  THE  MOGLENA  MOUNTAINS 


-^ 


THE  TSERNA  VALLEY 


A  BILLET  BEHIND  THE  LINE,   MACEDONIA 


LONELY  SERBIAN  GRAVES 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  233 

Voivoda  Putnik  was  no  longer  with  them,  for  the  old  and 
trusted  leader  had  been  unable  to  recover  from  the  trials  of 
the  winter  and  had  to  be  left  behind  to  pass  the  last  months 
of  his  life  far  from  the  scene  of  war.  His  work  as  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  was  placed  in  the  capable  hands  of  General 
Boyovitch.  The  other  heroes  of  previous  campaigns, 
Mishitch,  Stepanovitch,  Yurishitch,  were  still  with  the  army. 

The  equipment  of  the  force  was  undertaken  by  France 
and  Great  Britain.  The  guns,  rifles,  machine-guns,  &c., 
came  from  France,  while  the  two  western  Powers  pro- 
vided equal  shares  of  the  rations,  uniforms,  ammunition, 
and  animals.  The  same  equal  division  was  observed  with 
regard  to  medical  aid  and  transport.  Each  nation  undertook 
to  supply  accommodation  for  7,000  patients,  Britain  sending 
complete  hospitals  for  the  Serbian  sick  and  wounded,  France 
guaranteeing  to  the  Serbs  the  use  of  the  stipulated  number 
of  beds  in  her  own  hospitals.  With  regard  to  mechanical 
transport,  each  nation  promised  to  carry  600  tons  daily. 
The  carrying  of  that  amount  has  been  the  share  of  our 
M.T.  companies  in  the  Great  War  for  the  past  year. 

The  country  in  which  the  Serbs  were  to  operate  presented 
the  most  formidable  obstacles.  Their  share  of  the  Allied  line 
ran  along  the  frontier  from  the  east  of  Lake  Prespa  across  the 
Monastir  plain  and  along  the  Moglena  mountains.  On  the 
summit  of  the  precipitous  wall  from  Starkov  Grob  to  Kozhuk 
the  Bulgars  were  firmly  established,  while  across  the  Monastir 
plain  lay  the  strong  defensive  works  of  Kenali,  prepared  under 
the  supervision  of  von  Mackensen  himself.  The  means  of 
communication  with  this  front  were  most  unsatisfactory. 
Running  from  Salonika  to  Monastir  by  the  most  direct  route 
possible  were  the  remains  of  what  had  once  been  a  great 
Roman  road,  the  Via  Egnatia,  which  crosses  the  Vardar  plain, 


234  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

pierces  the  mountains  at  Vodena,  climbs  the  Gornichevo  pass 
to  Banitza,  and  then  runs  level  to  Monastir.  It  is  to-day  a 
very  practicable  highway,  at  certain  places  even  capable  of 
satisfying  the  most  critical  motorist,  and  only  very  occa- 
sionally looking  like  the  bed  of  a  rocky  stream.  But  in 
August  1 91 6,  when  the  campaign  began,  it  presented  a  very 
different  appearance.  In  the  Vardar  vaUey  it  was  in  a  shocking 
state  of  disrepair  with  most  of  the  bridges  gone.  In  the  hills 
beyond  Vodena  it  could  not  aspire  to  any  title  more  dignified 
than  that  of  track.  The  railway  had  carried  the  traffic  of  the 
countryside  before  the  war,  and  the  so-called  road  had  de- 
generated into  a  revolting  mixture  of  mud  and  rocks,  uneven 
enough  to  ruin  any  ordinary  motor-vehicles  in  a  short  time. 
The  only  other  road  then  in  existence  was  the  one  which 
parts  from  the  Via  Egnatia  at  an  inn  east  of  Yenidje  Vardar 
and  runs  through  Verria  and  along  the  Vistritza  valley  to 
Kozani,  where  it  joins  the  road  that  goes  north  to  Sorovitch, 
and  joins  the  Via  Egnatia  again  close  to  Banitza. 

The  importance  of  this  second  route  was  that  through 
Kozani  communication  could  be  opened  up  between  Mona- 
stir and  Thessaly,  in  other  words  between  the  Germano- 
Bulgarians  and  Old  Greece,  which  would  turn  the  left  flank 
of  the  Salonika  armies.  Up  the  valley  of  the  Moglenitza  there 
was  also  a  very  rough  track,  which  dispensed  with  bridges 
and  plunged  across  the  beds  of  any  streams  in  its  path.  Among 
the  mountains  there  were  bridle-paths  of  the  most  forbidding 
kind  which  led  over  the  crest  to  the  Tserna  valley.  Finally 
there  was  the  railway.  It  is  a  single-line  affair,  skirting  along 
the  edge  of  the  Vardar  plain  to  Vertekop  and  then  climbing 
the  mountains  to  Ostrovo  by  very  steep  gradients,  through 
tunnels  and  over  viaducts.  At  Vertekop,  where  the  rise 
begins,  the  trains  used  often  to  stick  and  sometimes  to  move 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  235 

backwards  while  the  wheels  still  revolved  furiously  forwards. 
Even  with  three  engines  on  the  train  frequent  halts  had  to  be 
called  to  get  up  steam.  Owing  to  these  difficulties  and  the 
congestion  of  the  line  railway  transport  was  extremely  slow. 
In  19 16  the  ninety  miles  from  Salonika  to  Ostrovo  were 
seldom  accomplished  in  less  than  twenty-four  hours,  and, 
although  things  are  far  better  now,  it  is  not  many  months 
since  it  took  some  of  our  men  three  days  to  reach  Banitza. 
After  Ostrovo  the  railway  parts  from  the  road  and  runs 
beside  the  lake  to  Sorovitch,  making  a  detour  by  Ekshisu 
and  then  turning  north  to  Banitza  and  Fiorina. 

The  country  itself  contains  extreme  varieties  of  fertility 
and  temperature.  The  Moglenitza  valley  is  a  green  oasis  of 
millet,  maize,  and  cotton,  surrounded  by  frowning  masses  of 
bare  rock.  At  V'ertekop  the  summer  heat  is  overwhelming, 
while  a  few  kilometres  away  on  its  ledge  Vodena  rejoices  in 
gushing  waterfalls  and  abundance  of  trees  and  vineyards. 
Similarly  the  fertile  flats  close  to  Ostrovo  and  Fiorina  are  in 
strong  contrast  with  the  barren  uplands  beside  them. 

The  same  variety  applies  to  the  inhabitants.  In  the  Vardar 
valley  the  agriculturists  seem  to  be  chiefly  Turkish  and  Greek, 
while  beyond  Vodena  the  Slavs  preponderate.  Greeks  are 
always  to  be  found  in  the  towns,  as  are  Turks.  But  the  con- 
fusion of  races,  languages,  and  sympathies  over  the  whole 
country-side  is  most  intricate.  Slavs,  Greeks,  Turks,  Kutzo- 
Vlachs,  Jews,  Gipsies,  Albanians,  Bulgarian  and  Serbian 
partisans — they  are  all  to  be  found,  mixed  in  the  towns  or 
separated  into  their  respective  villages.  In  such  a  veritable 
macedoine  there  were  certain  to  be  many  spies  and  agents  of 
the  enemy,  men  who  had  been  secretly  employed  by  Bulgaria 
before  the  Balkan  wars  or  were  now  bought  by  the  Germans. 
But  the  general  feeling  of  the  people  seemed  to  be  one  of 


236  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

indifference  to  the  issues  of  the  war,  thankfulness  that  the 
presence  of  the  Allies  meant  security  and  good  roads,  and 
irritation  at  the  prevailing  high  prices.  The  chief  impression 
which  the  peasants  everywhere  gave  was  that  of  great  poverty 
and  lack  of  enterprise.  Macedonia  was  not  able  to  con 
tribute  much  to  the  sources  of  supply  of  the  Serbs  and  their 
allies. 

When  the  first  two  British  General  Hospitals  (36th  and 
37th)  arrived  and  moved  up  to  Vertekop  at  the  beginning 
of  July,  they  were  in  a  most  exposed  position.  French  troops 
lay  to  the  north  in  the  Moglenitza  valley  and  small  detach- 
ments were  scattered  along  the  railway-line  as  far  as  Fiorina. 
But  there  was  little  to  stop  a  Bulgarian  advance,  had  the 
enemy  then  wished  to  leave  Serbian  territory.  At  the  end 
of  July  the  Serbs  began  to  move  up  westwards  and  resume 
once  more  the  fight  for  their  fatherland. 

The  First  Army  was  placed  in  reserve  under  General 
Vasitch,  who  took  up  his  head-quarters  at  Verria.  The 
Second  Army,  under  Voivoda  Stepanovitch,  occupied  the 
Moglenitza  valley  and  pushed  up  to  the  lower  slopes  of 
the  mountains.  They  had  probably  the  most  difficult 
natural  obstacles  to  face  of  any  of  the  Serbian  troops,  and 
after  their  early  success  in  gaining  a  foothold  on  the  hills,  I 
they  remained  for  many  months  unable  to  advance  any 
farther.  The  Third  Army,  with  General  Yurishitch's  head- 
quarters at  Ostrovo,  was  spread  out  between  that  village  and 
Fiorina.  Their  outposts  were  thrown  forward  at  Vrbeni  and 
Zhivonia,  and  their  line  ran  across  the  mountains  to  the  north- 
east of  Gornichevo.  It  was  too  weak  a  force  to  try  conclusions 
with  the  Bulgars,  but  the  Allied  strategy  seems  to  have  been 
based  on  the  assumption  that  the  enemy  would  not  attack  in 
force  from  Monastir.     For  the  moment  the  Third  Army's 


THE  FIRST' DAY  OF  THE  OFFENSIVE  IN  SEPTEMBER 
From  left  to  ri-ht  General  Vasitch,  General  Sarrail,  General  Boyovitch 


^>3»^ 


AT  HO.     M.T.  UNITS 
The  Bishop  of  Buckingham  on  left.     The  Author  second  from  right 


KAYMAKCHALAiN 


-  -'^  u 


BULGARIAN  TRENCHES  OX  KAYMAKCHAI.AN 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  237 

only  task  was  to  hold  the  line  and  prepare  for  the  coming 
offensive. 

But  the  unexpected  happened.  The  Germano-Bulgars 
decided  to  attack  on  the  extreme  wings  of  the  Allied  position, 
on  the  west  from  Monastir  towards  Kozani,  on  the  east  from 
Fort  Rupel  along  the  Struma  to  the  sea.  If  the  former  move- 
ment were  successful  it  would  open  the  way  to  Old  Greece 
and  enable  King  Constantine  to  join  forces  with  his  brother- 
in-law.  The  latter  would  give  the  Bulgars  the  coveted  port 
of  Kavalla  and  the  rich  districts  of  Drama  and  Seres.  On 
August  17  accordingly  the  enemy  suddenly  moved  forward 
in  strength  from  the  Kenali  line.  General  Yurishitch  knew 
that  he  could  not  maintain  his  position  on  the  Monastir 
plain,  arjd  the  Third  Army  therefore  fell  back  as  rapidly  as 
possible  into  the  hills.  The  Bulgars  occupied  Banitza  and 
Gornichevo  and  came  down  to  Lake  Ostrovo  at  the 
Sorovitch  end.  Thus  the  campaign  opened  with  a  rebuif. 
The  Bulgars  by  a  quick  decisive  movement,  and  owing  to 
the  Serbian  numerical  weakness,  had  achieved  their  object 
of  opening  the  way  to  Kozani.  Had  they  also  been  able  to 
capture  Ostrovo,  which  was  now  subjected  to  daily  bombard- 
ment, they  would  presumably  have  pushed  on  down  the 
valley  and  blown  up  several  of  the  numerous  viaducts,  thus 
preventing  a  Serbian  advance  for  several  months.  But  rein- 
forcements were  hurried  up.  General  Vasitch  took  over 
the  Third  Army,  which  was  joined  by  the  First  Army,  now 
commanded  by  Voivoda  Mishitch.  A  French  division,  with 
the  Serbian  cavalry  and  some  volunteers,  came  into  the  line 
on  the  eastern  side  of  the  lake,  and  preparations  were  made 
for  a  counter-attack. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  our  companies  were  moved  up  to 
carry  the  supplies  and  ammunition  for  the  offensive.     Two 


238  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

companies  had  already  since  the  end  of  July  been  working 
behind  the  Second  Army  and  a  detachment  came  up  on 
August  1 8  to  Ostrovo,  where  they  had  an  unpleasantly 
exciting  time  and  did  very  useful  work  in  feeding  the  guns 
that  checked  the  Bulgarian  advance.  In  the  second  week  of 
September  a  company  also  arrived  at  Ostrovo  and  worked 
through  Katranitza  behind  the  left  wing.  Another  company, 
which  had  been  at  Verria  behind  the  French  troops  that  were 
moving  round  by  Kozani,  arrived  at  Ekshisu  on  September  17 
and  two  days  later  moved  round  to  Ostrovo  to  support  the 
attack  on  Starkov  Grob.  It  was  during  this  movement  that 
a  number  of  their  vans  lost  their  way  in  the  dark  and,  pro- 
ceeding up  the  Monastir  road,  stopped  just  in  time  to  avoid 
entering  the  Bulgarian  lines.  From  Ostrovo  they  had  a  spell 
of  most  exacting  work  carrying  ammunition  past  Gornichevo 
and  on  up  the  hills  to  the  gun-positions.  A  company  reached 
Ostrovo  in  two  detachments  on  September  24  and  October  8, 
by  which  time  the  whole  of  one  company  were  helping  in 
the  service  of  the  Third  Army,  and  another  with  their  heavy 
lorries  were  at  Sorovitch,  from  which,  as  the  Serbs  advanced, 
they  executed  an  ever-lengthening  run  into  the  Monastir 
plain. 

The  attack  began  with  the  triumphant  rush  of  the  Serbs 
up  the  pass  to  Gornichevo.  They  laboured  under  most  diffi- 
cult conditions.  The  artillery  support  was  inadequate  and 
only  able  to  break  up  the  wire  entanglements  in  a  few  places. 
The  advance  had  to  be  made  across  rough  open  ground, 
affording  very  little  cover  and  too  rocky  to  allow  of  digging  in. 

The  Serbian  '  trenches  ',  which  could  be  seen  all  over  that 
part  of  the  country  for  a  long  while  after,  consisted  of  little 
semi-circular  piles  of  stones,  each  affording  cover  for  one  or 
two  men.     Gornichevo  village  and  ridge,  however,  were 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  239 

carried  on  September  12,  and  while  part  of  the  Serbs  began 
the  attack  on  the  Starkov  Grob  position,  the  rest  followed  the 
Bulgars  down  the  road  and  captured  Banitza. 

With  the  Serbian  advance  over  the  hills  the  Bulgarian 
forces  round  Sorovitch  found  themselves  in  danger  of  being 
cut  off  from  the  Monastir  plain,  and  they  accordingly  fell 
back  with  rapidity,  blowing  up  the  railway  viaduct  near 
EkshisUjwhich  station  had  therefore  to  be  the  Allied  rail-head 
for  the  next  two  months.  They  were  followed  by  the  French 
and  a  brigade  of  Russians,  who  fought  their  way  steadily 
towards  Fiorina.  After  being  taken  and  re-taken  the  town 
was  finally  occupied  on  September  18  and  the  Bulgars,  after 
their  one  month's  expedition  into  Greece,  retired  again  to 
their  Kenali  line. 

The  Serbs  meanwhile  stormed  Starkov  Grob,  which  was 
carried  a  few  days  after  the  capture  of  Fiorina,  and  prepared 
themselves  for  the  culminating  struggle  for  Kaymakchalan, 
the  mountain  that  towers  up  8,000  feet  high  and  forms  the 
summit  of  the  complex  between  the  Tserna  and  the  Nisia 
Voda.  During  the  last  fortnight  of  September  the  Third 
Army  fought  a  battle  of  giants  for  the  heights.  It  now  seems 
marvellous  that  any  force  of  men  could  have  captured  posi- 
tions of  such  strength,  unless  supported  by  overwhelming  artil- 
lery superiority,  and  even  then  it  would  have  been  long  odds 
on  the  defence.  As  things  were,  it  was  a  matter  of  the  utmost 
difficulty  to  maintain  the  supply  of  ammunition  and  victual- 
ling, our  Ford  vans  struggling  night  and  day  up  the  winding 
track  that  climbs  the  face  of  the  mountain  from  Batachin,  and 
handing  over  their  loads  to  be  taken  on  by  carts  or  on  mules 
and  donkeys.  But  the  Serbs  were  determined  to  climb  the 
wall  that  shut  them  out  from  their  own  country.  On  the 
bare  expanse  of  rock  that  surrounds  the  summit  the  toll  of 


240  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

casualties  was  very  heavy.  Day  and  night  the  Serbs  and 
Bulgars  fought  in  the  labyrinth  of  trenches  that  crowned 
the  mountain-top,  which  was  taken  and  retaken  by  the 
desperate  attacks  of  both  sides.  Many  of  the  Serbian 
officers  fell,  the  most  conspicuous  loss  being  the  popular 
hero,  '  Voivoda'  Vuk  Popovitch,  the  *comitadji '  and  leader 
of  the  volunteer  regiment,  who  had  borne  a  charmed  life 
through  all  the  hottest  corners  of  the  previous  campaigns. 
By  the  end  of  the  month,  terribly  reduced  in  numbers  but  I 
triumphant,  the  Serbs  drove  the  Bulgars  from  Kaymakchalan 
and  down  the  steep  slopes  to  the  north.  The  achievement 
was  superb  and  showed  the  Serbs'  complete  mastery  over  the 
difficult  art  of  mountain-warfare. 

Thus  in  October  the  Allied  line  ran  from  Kaymakchalan 
down  towards  Zhivonia  and  then  westwards  in  front  of 
Vrbeni  and  Fiorina.  Two  of  our  companies  were  now 
working  across  the  Monastir  plain  behind  the  First  Army, 
and  one  company  sent  up  a  detachment  to  Banitza  to  be 
behind  the  left  flank  of  the  Third  Army.  It  was  decided  to 
make  a  general  advance  of  the  French,  Serbian,  and  Russian 
forces.  While  the  Serbs  continued  to  make  progress  towards 
the  Tserna,  the  French  delivered  a  frontal  assault  on  the  Kenali 
line  that  blocked  the  way  to  Monastir.  General  Sarrail  him- 
self came  up  to  supervise  the  operations,  and  on  October  14, 
after  forty-eight  hours  of  artillery  preparation,  the  French  I 
infantry  flung  themselves  against  the  enemy's  position.  They 
succeeded  in  entering  a  small  portion  of  the  front  line,  but 
the  trenches  were  too  well  laid  out.  From  the  redoubts  and 
forts  the  enemy  were  able  to  pour  too  murderous  a  fire  upon 
the  assailants.  The  French  were  obliged  to  fall  back.  Again 
the  guns  played  on  the  enemy's  trenches  for  several  days,  but 
were  not  powerful  enough  to  destroy  them.    A  second  assault 


"^•^tjfc 


■-CwVcv 


THE  FIRST  PRAYER  ON  SERBIAN  SOIL  1916 


READING  OUT  ORDERS 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  241 

met  with  no  greater  success  than  the  first.    The  Kenali  line 
defied  attack. 

But  what  could  not  be  done  by  direct  method  was 
unexpectedly  and  brilliantly  achieved  by  the  Serbs  among  the 
liills  on  the  right  wing.    On  October  17  the  First  Army  made 


a 


sudden  forward  thrust.  Down  the  steep  descent  to  the 
Tserna  they  came,  across  the  river  and  up  the  frowning 
hills  on  the  northern  side.  Nothing  could  stop  their  rush. 
They  captured  Brod,  and  pushing  on  after  the  defeated 
Bulgars  reached  as  far  as  Polog.  This  rapid  advance  brought 
them  to  a  point  north  of  the  Kenali  line,  and  it  was  clear 
that,  if  they  could  threaten  that  alinement  on  its  left,  the 
fight  for  Monastir  would  be  won.  So  Voivoda  Mishitch's 
army  was  reinforced  with  French  infantry  and  guns,  and  on 
November  10  once  more  resumed  the  attack.  Swinging 
round  to  westwards  they  fought  a  savage  battle  for  four  days, 
in  which  they  captured  over  3,000  prisoners  and  some 
thirty  guns.  That  decided  the  fate  of  the  Kenali  line. 
The  redoubtable  position  became  untenable  with  the  Serbs 
advancing  on  a  point  behind  it.  The  Germano-Bulgarians 
were  forced  to  retire  to  their  second  line,  four  miles  from 
Monastir.  But  that  too  was  turned  by  the  continued  advance 
of  the  Serbs  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Tserna.  Hill  12 12 
was  captured  and  held  despite  a  desperate  attempt  to 
retake  it,  and  on  November  18  the  Serbs  also  established 
themselves  on  Hill  1378,  The  road  to  Prilep,  along  which 
alone  the  Bulgars  could  retire  with  safety,  was  now  in 
danger.  Monastir  had  to  be  sacrificed,  and  that  at  once. 
The  enemy  accordingly  retired  hastily  to  the  north  of 
the  town,  which  thus  returned  to  Serbia  after  just  under 
a  year  of  Bulgarian  occupation.  The  French  cavalry 
entered  from  the  south   at  9  o'clock  on  the  morning  of 

2U71  Q 


242  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

Sunday,  November  19,  and  a  Serbian  patrol,  after  swim- 
ming the  flooded  Tserna,  rode  in  from  the  east.  The 
German  troops  that  were  hurried  up  to  save  the  situa- 
tion arrived  too  late  and  found  Monastir  in  the  hands  of 
the  Allies. 

It  was  unfortunate  that  the  Allied  Army  was  not  able 
immediately  to  follow  up  its  advantage  and  continue  the 
pursuit  of  the  enemy.  The  Bulgars  had  time  to  recover 
themselves  and  advanced  once  more  to  strong  positions  in 
the  hills  above  Monastir  from  which  they  could  shell  the 
town.  A  few  days  later  they  began  the  bombardment,  and 
they  have  continued  to  batter  the  unfortunate  town  on  and 
off  ever  since.  On  November  22,  when  I  went  in  to  see  it, 
Monastir  was  radiant  and,  except  for  the  unkempt  state  of 
those  buildings  which  had  been  hurriedly  evacuated  by 
the  enemy,  it  showed  no  signs  of  having  been  through 
a  campaign.    To-day  it  is  a  desolate  mass  of  ruins. 

One  further  success,  however,  was  achieved  by  the  Serbs. 
With  the  help  of  the  French  Zouaves  the  Morava  division 
captured  Hill  1050.  This  was  the  last  spurt  of  the  autumn 
offensive.  Although  more  and  more  troops,  one  Italian 
and  two  French  divisions,  as  well  as  two  Russian  brigades, 
wtxe  added  to  the  Allied  force  on  this  front,  no  large 
advance  could  be  made.  Both  sides  settled  down  to  a  pro- 
longed pause  which  lasted  through  the  winter.  The  time 
was  used  by  the  Serbs  in  building  a  number  of  excellent 
roads  across  the  plain  and  up  to  Petalino,  where  previously 
there  had  only  been  bridle-paths,  and  in  reconstituting 
their  organization  into  two  armies  of  three  divisions  apiece. 
Our  companies  were  all  up  in  the  Monastir  plain  by  this 
time  (with  the  exception  of  one,  which  w^as  working  for  the 
Second  Army  on  the  other  side  of  the  Moglena  mountains), 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  243 

ii  and  '  carried  on  '  quietly,  the  only  excitement  being  the  snow 
r  and  the  visits  of  hostile  air-craft,  though  another  had  the 
I  dangerous  task  of  running  supplies  into  the  stricken  town 
of  Monastir  and  for  their  excellent  work  were  corporately 
decorated  with  the   Croix  de  guerre.     On  Christmas  Day 
i  General  Vasitch   delighted   the   three   companies   working 
for  his  army  by  demanding  a  holiday  for  them  and  addressing 
to  each  of  them  short  speeches  in  the  most  excellent  English. 
Another  British  unit  also  had  appeared  early  in  November 
— the  33rd  Stationary  Hospital,  which  pitched  its  camp  at 
Sorovitch,  hoping  shortly  to  move  to  Monastir.     Unfor- 
tunately the  bombardment  of  the  town  made  this  impossible, 
and  the  hospital  has  had  to  be  stationary  ever  since  its  arrival. 
In  the  spring  of  191 7,  then,  the  Allied  position  was  roughly 
as  follows :  the  French  troops  lay  on  either  side  of  Monastir 
from  Lake  Prespa  to  the  Tserna.    On  the  left  bank  of  the  river 
the  Italians  continued  the  line  till  they  joined  hands  with 
some  Russians  and  the  French  Seventeenth  Colonial  Division. 
On  the  eastern  side  of  the  Tserna  loop  were  the  remainder 
of  the  Russians  and  the  First  Serbian  Army  perched  on  the 
rocks  amid  the  snow  and  the  pine-woods  and  linked  up  with 
the  Second  Army  on  the  far  side  of  the  high  mountains. 
At  various  places  the  trenches  of  either  side   approached 
each  other  nearly  enough  for  witticisms  to  be  exchanged 
and  for  occasional  parties  of  Bulgars  to  desert  to  the  Serbs. 

Despite  slight  advances  and  interchange  of  position  among 
the  Allied  troops,  that  is  stiU  the  situation,  though  a  new 
factor  has  appeared  with  the  Greek  participation  in  the 
war.  It  was  the  Bulgarian  seizure  in  August  1916  of  all 
Macedonia  east  of  the  Struma  that  precipitated  matters. 
The  disaster  was  made  worse  by  the  fact  that  the  4th  Greek 
Army  Corps  at   Kavalla   was   deliberately   surrendered   to 

Q  2 


2  44  The  Return  of  the  Exiles 

the  enemy.    This  was  more  than  Greek  patriots  could  stand. 
A  revolution  was  carried  out  at  Salonika  at  the  end  of  the 
month.    The  royalist  troops  were  besieged  in  their  barracks 
and   eventually  surrendered   to  General   Sarrail,  who  had 
intervened  to  prevent  further  bloodshed.    Three  days  later 
a  local  committee  had  established  itself  as  the  provisional 
government  of   Macedonian    Greece.     This  foundation  of 
a  nationalist  Greek  state  soon  afterwards  received  immense 
additional  strength  by  the  adhesion  of  M.  Venizelos.     The 
cx-premier,  unable  any  longer  to  bear  the  royal  betrayal 
of  Greek  interests,  had  arrived  in  Salonika  on  October  9 
and  joined  with  Admiral  Condouriotis  and  General  Danglis 
in    organizing    the    government    of    Macedonia.    '  Greek 
patriots    from    all    quarters,    especially    from    the    islands, 
joined  the  movement,  and  by  the  end  of  May  the  Venizelist 
volunteers  co-operating  with  the  Allies  reached  the  number 
of  61,543  officers  and  men.     The  collapse  of  Roumania, 
however,  by  awakening  the  fears  of  the  population  of  Old 
Greece,  strengthened   King  Constantine  and  his  General 
Staff  in   their  anti-Ententist  attitude.     During  the  early 
months  of  191 7  Allied  troops  had  to  be  sent  into  Thessaly 
to  protect  the  rear  of  the  Salonika  armies.    At  one  moment 
it  seemed  likely  that  the  Allies  would  have  to  fight  on  two 
fronts.     But  at  last  in  June  the  Entente  decided  to  give 
M.  Venizelos  a  free  hand  that  he  might  prove  the  truth  of 
his  assurances  that  the  bulk  of  Greek  opinion  was  with  him. 
On  June  12  King  Constantine  abdicated  in  favour  of  his 
son,  and  on  June  27  M,  Venizelos  returned  to  Athens  as 
Prime   Minister   to   restore   constitutional   government  to 
his  country.    Greece  is  now  once  more  ranged  on  the  side 
of  Serbia,  her  ally  of  the  Balkan  wars  and  her  natural  friend. 
The  danger  from  the  rear  has  disappeared,  and  the  Allied 


The  Return  of  the  Exiles  245 

forces  will  in  future  have  the  double  advantage  of  secure 
communications  and  the  co-operation  of  the  Greek  army. 

Thus  far  the  only  considerable  successes  of  the  campaign 
conducted  from  Salonika  have  been  the  work  of  the  Serbs. 
Our  own  troops  in  eastern  Macedonia  have  been  confronted 
with  terrible  natural  obstacles  and  have,  so  far,  been  unable 
to  dislodge  the  Bulgar  from  his  mountain  fastnesses.  The 
French  have  succeeded  in  advancing  at  several  points. 
But  it  was  the  mountain  fighting  round  the  Tserna  river 
Which  sealed  the  fate  of  Monastir.  The  Serbs  have  shown 
that,  despite  adversitj^  and  homelessness,  their  spirit  remains 
itmconquerable.  They  are  but  a  fragment  of  the  victorious 
army  that  triumphed  over  Turks,  Bulgars,  and  Austrians 
a  few  years  ago.  They  have  now  to  depend  on  the  prowess 
bf  their  friends.  Their  enemies  will  never  willingly  restore 
to  them  their  fatherland.  But  the  Entente  cannot  cease 
from  war  till  that  heroic  little  band  of  exiles  return  as  free 
men  to  their  own  country  and  that  country  is  enlarged  into 
the  Yugoslavia  of  their  dreams. 


II 

To-dav  :    The  Serbian  People  and  their 
Aspirations 

Kralyevinu  Srpskii  brant 
Petvekovne  borbe  plod. 
'  Guard  the  Serbian  kingdom, 
Fruit  of  five  centuries  of  strife.' 

(National  Anthem.) 

The  present  is  an  unsatisfactory  point  at  which  to  conclude 
our  survey  of  the  career  of  the  Serbian  nation.  Unfortu- 
nately we  cannot  write  future  history.  We  long  with  all  our 
hearts  to  see  the  drama  brought  to  its  fit  and  happy  ending. 
Not  that  the  ending  can  be  '  happy  '  for  the  many  Serbs 
who  have  lost  wife  or  husband,  parents  or  children  in  these 
red  years  of  war.  But  the  villain  of  the  piece  can  be  chastised. 
He  can  be  driven  from  the  home  over  which  he  has  for 
two  years  cast  the  shadow  of  his  hateful  presence.  The 
'  evil  neighbour  '  of  Bulgaria  can  be  sent  back  to  his  own 
house,  there  to  meditate  on  the  error  of  his  ways  and  to 
amend  them.  That  is  what  we  hope  for.  So  let  us  close  by 
taking  stock  of  the  present  fate  of  our  Serbian  friends  and 
looking  into  their  future  as  we  trust  it  will  shape  itself  after 
the  final  victory  of  the  Entente. 

The  Serbian  nation  to-day  is  broken  up  and  scattered  over 
the  face  of  Europe.  Roughly  we  may  divide  it  into  four 
groups  :  those  who  are  still  on  their  native  soil  under  the 
rule  either  of  Austria-Hungary  or  Bulgaria  ;  those  who  have 
been  deported  into  slavery  in  these  two  countries  or  in  Asia 


To-day  :    The  Serbian  People  247 

'Minor  (if  deportation  to  Asia  Minor  be  not  a  euphemism 
for  extermination)  ;  those  who  are  free,  but  exiled  in 
Switzerland,  Italy,  France,  or  Great  Britain  ;  and  lastly, 
the  army  and  the  refugees  in  Macedonia  and  Corfu.  Let 
us  take  them  in  that  order. 

Serbia  has  been  divided  by  her  conquerors,  the  lion's 
share  falling  to  Bulgaria.  The  lower  Morava  forms  part  of 
the  new  frontier,  which  leaves  the  river  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Nish  and  runs  north-west  of  Prishtina  and  Prizren. 
Austria-Hungary  can  put  forward  no  claim  to  her  share 
except  conquest,  strategic  necessity,  the  rights  of  superior 
civilization,  punishment  for  the  alleged  Serbian  conspiracies, 
and  so  forth.  But  Bulgaria  has  seized  all  Serbian  Macedonia, 
the  greater  part  of  Old  Serbia,  and  nearly  the  half  of  '  Serbia 
proper  ',  in  the  name  of  that  very  principle  of  nationality 
which  the  Allies  have  adopted  as  their  battle-cry.  Had  it 
been  only  Macedonia  the  Bulgarian  contention  would 
have  had  some  show  of  justification.  Bulgaria  has  trumpeted 
her  right  to  that  unhappy  district  for  thirty  years.  But  she 
has  now  discovered  that  the  Serbs  of  the  Morava  valley  are 
her  children  and  therefore  presumably  have  long  cherished 
the  hope  of  reunion  under  the  Bulgarian  crown.  How 
passionate  is  this  '  love  '  of  their  Bulgarian  '  fatherland  '  the 
Serbs  showed  last  spring  by  their  desperate  revolt  against 
their  new  governors.  The  movement  began  around  Nish, 
Lescovatz,  and  Prokuplye  in  December  1916.  The  Bulgars 
thereupon  issued  a  new  order  interning  all  the  male  popula- 
tion over  the  age  of  seventeen  and  conscribing  all  capable  of 
bearing  arms.  The  Serbs,  in  fact,  were  called  upon  to  serve 
in  the  army  of  Bulgaria  against  their  own  exiled  country- 
men. The  result  was  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion  at 
Prokuplye   in   March.     The   insurgents,   according   to    the 


248  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

reports  of  Bulgarian  prisoners,  seem  to  have  numbered  about 
20,000  men,  and  were  armed  not  only  with  rifles  but  also 
with  machine-guns,  which  speaks  well  for  the  organizing 
powers  of  their  leaders.  They  even  had  the  assistance  of 
some  of  the  21st  Bulgarian  Infantry  Regiment,  who  had 
mutinied  and  deserted.  Two  Bulgarian  divisions  (including 
the  1st  Sofia)  and  artillery  were  sent  to  deal  with  the  situa- 
tion. During  a  fortnight  of  fighting  both  sides  sustained 
many  casualties ;  but  when  a  third  division  was  brought 
into  the  field  the  Serbs  were  too  heavily  outnumbered  and 
the  insurrection  gradually  collapsed.  It  had  been  a  gallant 
effort,  but  foredoomed  to  failure,  so  long  as  the  Allied  armies 
did  not  advance  from  Salonika.  Some  6,000  of  the  insurgents 
were  captured,  of  whom  2,000  were  summarily  executed, 
being  shot  down  in  groups  with  machine-guns  and  flung 
into  trenches ;  the  remainder  were  deported  to  Asia  Minor, 
After  the  savage  massacres  with  which  the  suppression  of  the 
rebellion  was  celebrated,  the  rural  inhabitants  of  the  dis- 
tricts principally  affected  were  removed  en  masse  to  Bulgaria. 
There  they  were  divided,  the  able-bodied  men  being  kept 
to  provide  labour,  and  the  remainder  handed  over  to  the 
Turks  for  deportation  to  Asia  Minor  (that  sinister  phrase). 
Meanwhile,  the  conscription  for  the  army  of  all  male  Serbs 
over  the  age  of  seventeen  was  continued. 

Of  the  condition  of  affairs  in  Serbia  during  the  last  year 
and  a  half,  in  which  the  rebellion  was  but  a  short  incident, 
it  is  not  easy  to  speak.  News  has  not  been  plentiful,  especially 
from  the  Bulgarian  part,  which  is  cut  off  from  postal 
communication  even  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  districts. 
A  letter  cannot  cross  the  lower  Morava,  except  secretly 
and  with  great  difficulty.  Thus  my  unfortunate  friend, 
the  Prota   Steitch,   who  is  chaplain   at   the   36th  General 


and  their  Aspirations  249 

Hospital,  has  never  been  able  to  discover  if  his  wife,  whom 
he  left  at  Kumanovo,  is  still  alive,  or  whether  she  has  re- 
ceived the  many  sums  of  money  which  he  has  sent  to  her 
through  neutral  consulates.  But  the  conquerors  in  their 
proclamations  and  their  newspapers  have  given  us  con- 
siderable information  about  the  fate  of  the  Serbian  popula- 
tion, and  this  is  supplemented  by  the  reports  of  those  who 
have  escaped  and  of  a  few  neutral  subjects. 

It  is  a  fundamental  principle  of  modern  warfare  that  the 
struggle  is  carried  on  between  states,  and  that,  therefore, 
one  state  cannot  hold  the  subjects  of  its  opponent  responsible 
for  their  acts,  unless  those  acts  are  contrary  to  the  rules 
of  war  or  endanger  the  safety  of  the  state's  administrative 
or  armed  forces.  Nevertheless  the  Austro-Hungarian 
military  governor  of  Serbia,  the  Archduke  Frederick,  on 
June  28,  1916,  issued  an  ordinance  announcing  the  confisca- 
tion of  the  property  of  all  persons  held  guilty  of  having 
assisted  in  provoking  the  present  war  against  the  Dual 
Monarchy.^  The  wording  of  the  document  is  so  vague 
that  it  would  be  perfectly  possible  on  the  strength  of  it  to 
pronounce  an  adverse  sentence  upon  most  of  the  population. 
Further,  by  the  Hague  Convention  of  October  1907,  an 
invading  army  is  bound  to  respect  private  property  and  to 
maintain  the  laws  of  the  country  of  which  it  is  in  occupation. 
In  this  case  both  principles  have  been  violated,  for  the 
Serbian  constitution  expressly  forbids  the  seizure  of  the 
means  of  livelihood  of  any  Serb.  The  Austro-Hungarian 
courts  also  are  empowered  by  this  ordinance  to  try  individuals 
for  acts  performed  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  in  no 
way  concerned  with  the  safety  of  the  military  occupation 
of  Serbia.  Thus  Colonel  Radakovitch,  then  a  prisoner  of 
^  2^  Lime  bleu  serbe,  p.  13,  No.  i. 


250  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

war  at  Groding  in  Austria,  was  brought  up  for  trial  before 
the  military  tribunal  at  Sarajevo  on  the  ground  that  the 
Serbian  archives  captured  at  Nish  proved  his  complicity  in 
the  murder  of  the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand.  Even  if 
the  Serbs  were  the  knaves  that  the  Austro-Hungarians  make 
out,  they  are  not  such  fools  as  to  commit  to  paper  incrimi- 
nating evidence  connecting  them  with  the  assassination  of 
a  foreign  prince.  But  granted  that  the  story  were  true  and 
the  evidence  existed,  still  the  invader  has  no  right  thus  to 
arrogate  to  himself  the  position  of  judge  in  non-military 
affairs. 

With  such  principles  enunciated  by  the  head  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  administration,  it  is  not  surprising  to 
find  a  mass  of  detailed  iniquity  in  the  treatment  of  the 
conquered  people.  In  violence  against  persons  the  Bulgarians 
appear  to  have  been  the  great  offenders.  On  their  entry 
into  Monastir,  says  a  Greek  writer  in  the  Nea  Himera, 
they  gave  orders  that  all  Serbs  were  to  be  transported  to 
Sofia.  The  Bulgars  themselves  used  to  smile  at  the  use  of 
the  expression  '  send  to  Sofia  ',  and  openly  said  that  it  meant 
death. ^  Six  hundred  women  were  carried  off  one  day  from 
Monastir  in  wagons,  and  their  subsequent  fate  is  unknown.  At 
Kumanovo  the  Bulgars  tied  together  eighty  Serbs,  killed  them 
with  knives,  and  flung  their  bodies  into  the  river.  They  were 
evidently  determined  to  purge  Macedonia  of  its  undoubtedly 
Serbian  element.  The  rest  of  the  Macedonian  male  popula- 
tion between  the  ages  of  i8  and  50  were  either  calmly 
incorporated  in  the  Bulgarian  army  or  registered  for  military 
duty  in  case  of  necessity. 

When  Cardinal  Mercier  was  imprisoned  in  his  own  palace 
by  the  German  authorities  in  Belgium,  there  was  a  natural 
^  2*  Livrebleu  serbe,  p.  24,  No.  12. 


and  their  Aspirations  251 

and  justified  outcry  in  Europe  and  the  revered  prelate  was 
set  at  liberty  again.  The  Serbian  bishops  are  far  from 
Western  Europe  and  have  no  international  Papacy  to  inter- 
vene on  their  behalf.  Thus  it  is  not  widely  known  that  the 
bishop  of  Nish  was  carried  off  in  November  191 5,  and  in- 
terned near  Sofia,  or  that  the  bishop  of  Skoplye  was  removed 
to  Prizren,  his  sufferings  being  embittered  by  crowds  of 
Bulgars  and  Albanians  who  spat  on  him  and  tore  his 
beard. 

The  second  Serbian  Blue  Book  contains  accounts  of  many 
other  outrages.  A  doctor,  a  neutral  subject,  gives  evidence 
on  the  Bulgarian  and  German  violations  of  women  in  the 
district  of  Skoplye.  Another  neutral  describes  how  the 
Austro-Hungarian  officers  carried  off  a  number  of  young 
women  of  Belgrade  to  a  large  house  adjoining  the  Hotel 
Moscow,  violated  them,  and  then  passed  them  on  to  their 
soldiers.  According  to  the  '  Dnevnik  '  (of  Sofia)  the  Bul- 
garian government  proceeded  to  confiscate  and  sell  all 
'  ownerless  '  property  in  the  Morava  valley.  At  Belgrade 
all  the  furniture  was  stolen  from  the  royal  palace,  while 
houses  and  shops  were  for  a  fortnight  unmercifully  pillaged 
by  the  Germans,  whether  the  owners  were  present  or  not. 
Ironical  receipts  were  sometimes  given  for  requisitions,  such 
as  '  King  Peter  will  pay  on  his  return  ' ;  '  To  the  account 
of  M.  Nichola  Pashitch  ' ;  '  To  be  placed  to  the  credit  of 
Voivoda  Putnik  '.  The  Austro-Hungarians  are  accused  of 
extorting  receipts  acknowledging  payment  for  articles  which 
they  had  seized.  Houses  were  turned  into  stables  by  the 
Germans,  who  did  not  boggle  at  using  the  cathedral  at 
Nish  for  the  same  purpose.  The  Dnevnik,  Narodni  Prava, 
and- other  Bulgarian  newspapers  frequently  published  the 
news  of  the  arrival  at  Sofia  of  train-loads  of  stolen  goods 


252  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

and  the  appropriation  of  the  property  of  refugees  who  had 
fled  from  Serbia.-^  All  the  harvest  for  1916  was  confiscated 
in  advance,  and  severe  punishments  announced  for  the 
evasion  of  this  order.  The  attacks  on  property  were  extended 
to  literature  and  churches.  In  their  new  provinces  the 
Bulgars  seized  all  Serbian  books,  most  of  which  were  either 
destroyed  or  forwarded  to  Sofia  to  be  used  as  raw  material 
for  the  manufacture  of  paper.  The  National  and  University 
Libraries  of  Belgrade  were  also  appropriated  and  sent  to 
the  Bulgarian  capital.  There  was  a  lively  discussion  between 
the  three  partners,  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Bulgaria,  as  to 
who  should  be  entitled  to  rifle  the  treasures  of  the  famous 
Serbian  monastery  of  Detchani.  A  member  of  the  Bulgarian 
commission  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  stealing  literary  and 
artistic  treasures  finally  announced  in  the  Narodni  Prava 
of  July  31,  1916,  that  everything  of  the  slightest  value  had 
been  removed  from  Detchani  to  Bulgaria.^  A  few  days 
before  the  same  newspaper  had  announced  that  the  Bul- 
garian Exarchate  was  to  replace  the  Serbian  Church  in  the 
newly-acquired  provinces,  despite  all  Hague  Conventions 
about  respect  for  the  religious  convictions  of  the  inhabitants 
of  occupied  territory.  Indeed,  already  by  May  nearly  three 
hundred  Bulgarian  priests  had  been  sent  to  Serbia  to  replace 
the  native  parochial  clergy.  A  thorough  attempt  to  dena- 
tionalize the  Serbs  is  being  carried  out  in  a  number  of  de- 
tailed ways.  Serbian  names,  which  end  in  -itch,  are  forbidden 
by  the  Bulgars,  and  their  owners  are  ordered  to  change 
the  termination  to  -off.  The  Cyrillic  alphabet  and  the 
Orthodox  calendar  have  both  been  suppressed  by  the  Austro- 
Hungarians,   who   made  first   the   German   and   then   the 

^  Kuhne,  pp.  240-2. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  279  ;  2"  Livre  bleu  serbe,  p.  123,  No.  165. 


and  their  Aspirations  253 

Magyar  language  compulsory  in  the  schools,  while  the 
children  across  the  Morava  are,  of  course,  being  educated 
entirely  as  little  Bulgars.  Peculiarly  pathetic  is  an  extract 
from  a  report  of  the  inspection  of  Bulgarian  schools  at 
Alexinatz,  given  in  the  Outro  (of  Sofia).  When  the  Minister 
of  Education,  M.  Peshev,  '  questioned  some  of  the  children 
about  their  names  and  families,  they  replied  in  pure  Bul- 
garian.   They  were  only  at  fault  in  the  accent.' 

By  introducing  German  in  all  the  courts  of  law  the 
Austro-Hungarians  have  violated  the  judicial  system  of 
the  country,  as  by  placing  their  creatures  at  the  head  of  the 
municipal  councils  they  have  superseded  the  local  adminis- 
tration. They  have  also  emulated  their  Bulgarian  friends 
by  deporting  a  large  number  of  Serbian  families  into 
Hungary.  It  goes  without  saying  that  the  conquerors  are 
exploiting  the  economic  wealth  of  the  country  for  their 
own  profit,  levying  taxation  and  extracting  forced  loans 
from  the  population.  The  Bulgars  have  also  declared  the 
Serbian  paper  money  worthless  and  called  in  all  the  silver 
currency  at  50  per  cent,  of  its  value.  The  unfortunate 
people  are  thus  impoverished  and  disheartened,  and  the 
Bulgarian  government  has  acquired  a  large  amount  of  silver 
at  a  low  price. 

The  scattered  items  of  news  that  have  reached  the  Allies 
about  conditions  in  Serbia  do  not  on  the  whole  give  a  picture 
of  unbridled  savagery  or  indiscriminate  brutality.  The 
personal  behaviour  of  the  conquerors  has  often  been  exem- 
plary. Monastir  was  quite  satisfied  with  the  conduct  of 
the  German  troops,  who  paid  for  everything  they  took 
during  their  occupation  of  the  town.  The  real  charge 
against  both  Bulgars  and  Austro-Hungarians  is  that  they 
have  refused   to  recognize   the  existence  of   Serbia   as  an 


254  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

independent  and  sovereign  state.  The  inhabitants  have 
been  treated  as  though  they  were  rebels  against  the  lawful 
authority  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  Tsar  Ferdinand.  Thus 
all  the  rules  of  civilized  warfare  safeguarding  the  material 
and  spiritual  welfare  of  conquered  peoples  have  been  swept 
aside.  One  incident  will  illustrate  the  attitude  of  our 
enemies.  The  Austro-Hungarian  and  Bulgarian  Red  Cross 
Societies  informed  the  international  bureau  of  the  Society 
at  Geneva  that  they  could  not  recognize  the  Serbian  Red 
Cross,  because  in  fact  the  Serbian  state  had  ceased  to  exist 
and  had  been  partitioned  between  themselves.  When  the  Ser- 
bian Red  Cross,  through  Geneva,  addressed  some  questions 
about  prisoners  and  civilians  to  the  sister  Society  of  Bulgaria, 
the  Bulgars  replied  that  they  knew  nothing  of  any  Serbian 
Red  Cross  and  that  the  inhabitants  of  Serbia  were  their  own 
countrymen,  of  whose  interests  they  themselves  would  take 
care.-*-  And  all  the  time  the  Serbian  Red  Cross,  in  accordance 
with  international  convention,  has  continued  its  humane 
task  of  collecting  information  about  all  prisoners  of  war 
in  Serbian  hands  and  informing  their  families  of  their 
condition.  The  meaning  of  this  denial  of  national  rights  is 
that  the  conquerors  have  acted  in  Serbia  as  though  they 
were  the  legal  civil  government  of  the  country,  and  that 
the  Serbs  are  subjected  to  a  grinding  economic  and  social 
tyranny,  none  the  less  galling  for  being  orderly  and  not 
melodramatic. 

Of  Serbian  prisoners  of  war  in  Bulgaria  I  believe  nothing 
is  known,  which  leads  one  to  suspect  that  there  may  be  none. 
In  Austria-Hungary  good  fortune  has  brought  to  a  few  of 
the  prisoners  a  very  easy  fate.    I  have  heard  of  one  or  two 

^  Kuhne,  p.  281.    Quotation  from  5rt/^<2M5^rt  Po5^/«,  of  September  20, 
1916. 


and  their  Aspirations  255 

who  have  been  taken  into  the  employment  of  old  friends 
or  relatives  in  Hungary  and  who  enjoy  a  very  large  liberty 
of  movement.  But  the  great  majority  have  naturally  been 
placed  in  concentration  camps.  According  to  a  pamphlet  ■"• 
issued  by  the  Serbian  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  the  prisoners, 
both  military  and  civilian,  were  relieved  of  all  their  money, 
while  sums  remitted  to  them  from  home  were  placed  on 
deposit,  from  which  they  were  only  allowed  to  draw  small 
amounts  for  obvious  necessities.  Any  good  clothing  they 
might  have  had  was  confiscated  for  the  use  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops.  Peculiarly  odious  conditions  seem  to 
have  reigned  among  the  Serbian  prisoners  at  Mauthausen. 
An  Italian,  Aristide  Sartorio,  who  returned  from  that  camp, 
gave  the  following  description  of  it  to  the  Giornale  d'' Italia. 
'  The  Serbian  Golgotha  is,  perhaps,  worse  than  that  of  the 
Serbs  who  are  left  in  Serbia.  As  you  know,  the  Serbs  were 
at  Mauthausen  before  the  Italians  were  sent  to  occupy 
the  barracks — the  same  barracks  in  which  8,000  Serbs  died 
of  typhus  and  tuberculosis — so  we  feared  that  these  epidemics 
would  again  appear.  All  the  same,  the  number  of  Serbian 
casualties  certainly  increased,  and  the  development  of  dis- 
eases was  greatly  increased  by  the  behaviour  of  the  Austrians 
inspired  by  hatred  of  the  Serbs.  .  .  .  We  had  not  yet  received 
any  parcels  from  Italy,  so  we  threw  them  (the  Serbs)  some 
money  as  they  passed.  Later,  even  this  kind  of  help  was 
prohibited.  And  when  we  came  to  Mauthausen  the 
Austrians  gave  us  very  good  coats,  and  where  do  you  think 
these  coats  came  from  ?  They  had  been  sent  by  Serbian 
ladies  to  the  Austrian  command  for  the  use  of  the  Serbs. 
Many  of  them  had  been  made  in  Italy.  Colonel  Riveri  asked 
us  not  to  wear  them,  and  the  greater  number  of  them  were 
1  Nasht  u  Austro-Ugarskoy. 


256  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

handed  back  to  the  Austrians,  except  some  which  were  kept 
for  those  who  wanted  to  escape.'  ^  The  Serbian  pamphlet 
puts  the  number  of  deaths  from  typhus,  &c,,  at  Mauthausen 
at  16,000,  and  attributes  this  terrible  mortality  to  the  deser- 
tion of  the  sick  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  doctors. 

The  following  incident  was  presumably  an  attempt  to 
sap  the  moral  of  the  Serbs.  A  cemetery  was  provided  for 
them  at  Mauthausen  with  an  Orthodox  chapel,  and  on  the 
chapel  was  placed  the  inscription,  '  Serbian  soldiers,  died 
of  wounds  received  in  the  Austro-Hungarian-Serbian  war, 
which  was  provoked  by  Serbia.' 

The  most  disquieting  feature  of  the  prisoners'  lot  is  the 
terrible  number  who  have  gone  mad.  An  Austrian  doctor 
told  the  Serbian  government's  investigator  that  in  an 
asylum  near  Zagreb  he  had  seen  over  3,000  Serbian  soldiers 
and  interned  civilians  who  had  gone  out  of  their  minds. 
No  doubt  conditions  varied  in  different  camps,  and  the 
Serbian  pamphlet  pays  a  tribute  to  the  commandant  at 
Braunau,  but  in  some  centres  at  any  rate  the  Serbs  seem  to 
be  undergoing  a  terrible  martyrdom. 

A  third  portion  of  the  Serbian  nation  consists  of  all 
those  who  have  found  safety  in  France  or  her  colonies,  in 
Switzerland,  Great  Britain,  or  Italy.  The  Bulgarian 
advance  into  the  Vardar  valley  in  October  191 5  prevented 
any  migration  on  a  national  scale.  Those  who  escaped 
either  made  their  way  to  Salonika  while  there  was  yet  time, 
or  joined  the  army  in  the  terrible  retreat  through  Albania. 
The  refugees  at  Salonika  consisted  largely  of  minor  govern- 
ment officials,  schoolmasters,  and  other  educated  men  with 
their  families,  who  had  settled  in  Macedonia  after  the 
Balkan  wars.  Their  evacuation  was  a  comparatively  easy 
^  The  New  Europe^  vol.  iii,  No.  39,  p.  414. 


and  their  Aspirations  257 


task.  The  others,  who  had  no  road  open  to  them  but  the 
Albanian  mountains,  came  chiefly  from  '  Serbia  proper ' 
land  the  plain  of  Kossovo.  Here  there  was  even  less  of  a  mass 
movement,  the  women  fugitives  being  barely  a  tenth  of 
the  whole  body.  Numbers  of  young  men  went  with  the 
army  as  '  recruits '  or  in  order  to  avoid  internment,  many  of 
them  students  anxious  to  complete  their  education  in  an 
Allied  country.  Some  hundreds  of  small  boys  marched  away 
with  their  fathers  or  brothers  in  the  ranks,  as  well  as  many 
isolated  individuals  both  of  the  educated  and  peasant  class, 
who  had  left  their  homes  expecting  shortly  to  return. 

The  Serbian  Relief  Fund  did  invaluable  work  in  facilitating 
the  removal  of  both  contingents  of  refugees.  The  coloniza- 
tion of  Sicily,  Cyprus,  or  some  other  Mediterranean  island 
was  suggested  as  provision  for  the  exiles.  But  eventually 
the  French  government  offered  its  hospitality  to  them  all. 
Some  went  to  Algeria,  some  to  the  south  of  France,  but  the 
majority  to  Corsica.  The  Serbian  Relief  Fund  offered  to 
meet  the  financial  responsibilities  of  the  settlement  in  Cor- 
sica, but  the  French  government  generously  undertook  the 
board  and  lodging  of  its  guests,  leaving  to  the  Fund  the  task 
of  clothing  them  and  providing  for  their  medical  care.  On  the 
island  the  Serbs  have  found  scope  for  their  industry  and  have 
been  able  to  build  up  their  social  life  in  the  midst  of  strangers. 

France  has  sent  many  of  the  Serbian  boys  to  her  lycees, 
where  they  have  received  the  best  education  that  the  State 
affords.  Some  have  gone  further  afield  and  are  at  school  in 
England,  where,  too,  a  small  number  of  theological  students 
are  being  trained  for  the  Serbian  priesthood.  These  young- 
sters have  the  future  of  their  nation  entrusted  to  them. 
While  their  elders  are  either  dead  or  forgetting  the  arts  of 
peace  during  successive  years  of  active  service  with  the  army, 


2071  ^ 


258  To-day  :    TJie  Serbian  People 

they  are  called  to  lay  the  foundations  of  that  knowledge  and 
character  which  Serbia  will  some  day  sorely  need.  In  the 
pages  of  their  monthly  review,  La  Patrie  serhe^  a  Serbian^ 
journalist,  M.  Bozovitch,  describes  their  duty.  After  saying 
that  their  nation  was  called  to  a  first  mobilization  in  1914 
and  again  to  a  second  among  the  oliveyards  of  Corfu,  he 
proceeds  :  '  And  to-day  we  must  carry  out  another,  a  third 
mobilization.  How,  and  why  .^  ...  It  is  the  mobilization  of 
our  young  students,  of  the  new  young  Serbia  of  to-morrow 
And  that  mobilization  is  made  in  view  of  the  coming  v.ar— 
the  war  for  progress  and  civilization  :  the  struggle  with 
ignorance,  drink,  tuberculosis,  disease,  and  crime  ;  the  war 
against  waste,  the  poverty  of  the  countryside,  against  all  that 
is  evil  in  the  moral,  social,  and  economic  life  of  a  people.  For 
this  war,  my  young  friends,  you  must  without  truce  prepare 
and  arm  yourselves.  .  .  .  Scattered  amongst  the  schools  and 
universities  of  the  allied  nations,  you  are  in  countries  which 
possess  a  glorious  past,  a  civilized  present,  and  a  brilliant 
future.  ...  Be  ever  on  the  alert.  Keep  the  eye  of  your  mind 
always  open.  Let  everything  around  you  move  you  to 
thought  and  action.  In  everything  find  a  subject  for  com- 
parison with  your  own  country.'  ^ 

We  need  not  be  blind  admirers  of  western  European 
civilization  to  hope  that  the  younger  generation  of  Serbs  w  ill 
indeed  carry  back  with  them  to  their  fatherland  moral  and 
technical  learning  that  will  help  to  create  real  progress  in 
the  years  to  come.  Meanwhile,  despite  the  most  kindly 
hospitality  that  can  be  offered  to  them  in  France  or  Great 
Britain,  they  are  exiles.  In  the  first  year  after  the  retreat 
they  were  buoyed  up  by  the  confident  expectation  that  their 
army  and  its  allies  were  about  to  advance  triumphantly  into 
^  La  Patrie  seibe,  No.  3,  p.  108. 


and  their  Aspirations  259 

Serbia.  But  with  the  fall  of  Monastir  the  army  came  to 
a  halt.  And  now  month  after  month  has  gone  by  and  the 
restoration  of  Serbia  is  still  apparently  distant.  Many  of 
the  students  have  now  rejoined  their  countrymen  on  active 
service.  For  the  remainder  the  long  months  of  waiting 
and  deferred  hope  must  be  a  searching  test  of  their  patriotism 
and  their  strength  of  will. 

Lastly,  there  is  the  army  and  the  government,  and  the 
Serbs  in  one  way  or  another  attached  to  these.  Corfu,  where 
the  government  installed  itself  after  the  retreat,  has  in 
certain  quarters  the  aspect  of  a  Serbian  town.  Serbian 
officers  and  soldiers,  some  sick,  some  engaged  on  government 
work,  crowd  the  streets.  In  the  neighbourhood  of  the 
ministries  and  the  hotels  one  constantly  hears  Serbian  in  the 
streets.  There  M.  Pashitch  and  his  colleagues  carry  on  their 
task  of  governing  a  nation  with  no  territory,  except  the  little 
strip  along  the  frontier  close  to  A'lonastir. 

The  army  is  now  among  the  mountains  between  the  Tserna 
and  the  Moglenitza  rivers.  With  most  of  our  soldiers  in 
Macedonia,  knowledge  of  the  Serbs  is  confined  to  this  last 
group  of  the  nation.  Here  they  can  speak  of  what  they  have 
themselves  experienced.  Let  me  try  and  gather  together 
some  of  the  impressions  which  our  allies  have  made  upon 
their  British  comrades. 

The  first  characteristic  that  strikes  a  stranger  among  the 
Serbs  is  their  geniality.  In  Western  Europe  it  has  been  usual 
to  think  of  the  Balkans  only  as  a  land  of  battle,  murder,  and 
sudden  death.  The  Serbs  were  vaguely  supposed  to  be  like 
the  Albanians,  fierce  and  savage  of  aspect,  uncouth  and 
alarming.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  Expan- 
sive and  jovial,  with  the  simplicity  of  a  light-hearted  and 
primitive  people,  untroubled  by  self-consciousness  or  reserve. 

R  2 


26 o  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

the  Serbs  are  always  ready  to  take  us  for  granted  as  friends 
and  good  companions.  There  are  no  two  opinions  amongst 
the  British  troops  about  the  Serbian  peasant-soldier.  He  has 
the  heart  of  a  child  with  the  strength  and  technical  skill  of  a 
man — the  very  qualities  of  which  our  pessimists  lament  the 
loss  in  richer  and  more  powerful  countries.  From  the  con- 
templation of  him  we  can  understand  why  Serbia  before  the 
war  was  so  often  described  as  a  poor  man's  Paradise.  For  the 
Serbs  are  a  family.  In  their  country  there  were  but  few  out- 
standing fortunes  and  no  poor.  They  have  had  practically 
no  proletariat,  for  those  who  guided  the  nation's  destiny  took 
care  not  to  convert  the  peasantry  into  an  industrial  popula- 
tion. Serbia  was  a  country  of  large  villages  and  95  per  cent, 
of  the  land  was  owned  by  300,000  families  having  each  less 
than  20  hectares.  As  a  veteran  politician  of  Radical  views 
once  said,  '  Fortunately  we  have  only  two  coal-mines,  no 
waterfalls,  very  few  factories  .  .  .  but  plenty  of  land,  enough 
for  years  to  come.'  ■"■ 

There  is  amongst  them  an  equality  which  can  hardly 
obtain  in  our  own  more  complex  civilization.  After  all,  the 
Serbs  are  all  the  grandsons  or  great-grandsons  of  peasants. 
They  have  no  titles  or  hereditary  distinctions,  apart  from  the 
royal  family.  And  King  Peter  himself  is  the  grandson  of  a 
swineherd.  This  equality  is  conspicuous  in  the  army,  though 
veiled  by  a  discipline  of  the  very  strictest  kind.  Prompt  and 
exact  obedience  is  given  to  the  orders  of  an  officer.  The 
dignity  of  the  commissioned  ranks  is  severely  maintained  on 
duty  ;  but  off  duty  officers  and  men  are  members  of  a  social 
system  that  knows  no  impassable  gulfs.  If  officers  occasionally 
punish  their  subordinates  with  a  physical  violence  that  we 
should  not  tolerate,  they  will  also  sit  down  to  table  with  them 

^  Angell,  p.  42. 


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and  their  Aspirations  261 

on  terms  of  intimacy  and  without  embarrassment  on  either 
side.  Indeed,  the  army  resembles  a  mediaeval  host,  equipped 
with  modern  science  and  modern  weapons.  The  mutual  rela- 
tions of  soldier  and  officer  resemble  those  of  the  clansman  and 
his  chief.  There  is  no  thought  about  equality  or  inequality. 
The  officer  is  the  leader,  the  more  skilled  warrior,  whose  life 
is  precious  and  whose  will  is  to  be  obeyed.  The  soldier  is  the 
follower,  whose  powers  are  all  at  the  other's  disposal  without 
reserve  and  without  complaint.  But  it  is  only  so,  I  imagine, 
because  the  soldier's  place  in  the  national  life  is  assured — he 
is  an  indispensable  and  free  citizen  in  time  of  peace,  taking 
his  share  in  the  government  of  his  commune.  He  corresponds 
to  the  yeoman  of  England  who  followed  the  chivalry  of 
Edward  III  or  the  Black  Prince  to  our  wars  in  France,  The 
personal  touch,  the  underlying  equality  of  men  that  charac- 
terized the  Middle  Ages,  has  not  been  destroyed  by  the 
impersonal  conditions  that  have  followed  industrialization. 
Hence  the  paternal  non-official  attitude  of  the  Serbian 
officers  to  their  men,  as  regards  both  severity  and  intimacy. 
Hence  also  the  simple  filial  devotion  of  the  men  to  their 
officers.  I  remember  a  Serbian  orderly  at  the  36th  General 
Hospital  who  insisted  on  being  at  his  officer's  side  during  the 
Litter's  operation,  and  refused  to  be  ejected,  since  he  felt 
that  he  could  entrust  the  patient  to  no  hands  but  his  own. 
Another  Serbian  officer,  who  was  severely  wounded  and  had 
to  be  transported  down  the  line  in  great  pain,  was  comforted 
by  a  soldier  who  assured  him  that  he  would  take  as  much  care 
of  him  as  of  his  own  calf.  In  the  British  army  tradition 
assumes  that  the  private  soldier  is  incapable  of  looking  after 
himself  and  must  be  watched  over  and  guided  in  a  thousand 
details  regarding  his  health  and  well-being  by  his  officer, 
Amongst  the  Serbs  the  emphasis  seems  rather  to  be  placed  on 


2  62  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

the  opposite  side.  The  soldier,  being  accustomed  to  the  open 
air  and  a  hard  life,  is  well  able  to  take  care  of  himself  and  also 
gladly  attends  to  any  needs  of  his  leader.  The  whole  atmo- 
sphere is  not  democratic,  as  we  understand  the  word  to-day. 
At  a  meeting  in  Paris  M.  Vesnitch,  the  Serbian  Minister  in 
Paris,  said, '  Every  Serb  considers  himself  a  gentleman,  which 
means  that  he  recognizes  no  human  being  as  socially  or  legally 
superior  to  himself.'  ^  This  might  give  rather  a  false  im- 
pression, which  the  speaker  did  not  intend  to  convey.  The 
equality  of  the  Serbs  has  nothing  in  common  with  the  aggres- 
sive self-assertion  of  the  modern  leveller  who  considers  him- 
self '  as  good  as '  any  one  else.  The  Serbian  peasant  pays  an 
undoubted  deference  to  the  social  superiority  of  the  educated 
man,  though  legally  and  politically  they  may  be  equals.  He 
is  a  gentleman  in  the  true  sense  of  possessing  a  profound 
self-respect  and  extending  courtesy  to  all  as  being  at  least 
his  peers.  All  are  treated  as  men  and  not  as  '  hands '  or 
machines.  The  whole  atmosphere,  in  fact,  is  mediaeval.  It 
is  made  possible  by  that  underlying  groundwork  of  dogma 
that  made  the  Middle  Ages  believe  and  act  upon  both  the 
fundamental  equality  of  men  as  sons  of  God,  and  their 
diversity  of  function  and  authority. 

Another  trait  in  the  character  of  the  Serbs  appears  to  be 
their  normally  high  spirits  and  facile  emotions.  The  great 
majority  of  the  troops  have  heard  no  word  from  home  since 
they  left  their  country  nearly  two  years  ago.  Amidst  the 
hardships  of  war  they  cannot  solace  themselves  with  thoughts 
of  '  those  at  home  '  safe  and  prosperous  and  wanting  for 
nothing  except  their  own  return.  Even  if  they  could  get 
it,  leave  would  have  no  attractions ;  for  where  would  they 
go  ^.    Their  houses  may  still  exist ;  their  families  may  indeed 

^  La  Pairie  serbe,  No.  4,  p.  190. 


and  their  Aspirations  263 

be  unvisited  even  by  want  or  suffering,  but  they  cannot  tell. 
Meanwhile  they  are  part  of  an  ever-dwindling  army  with  no 
other  certain  home  than  the  log-hut  or  the  bivouac-tent 
which  they  have  erected  among  the  pine-trees  and  rocks  of 
the  mountains.  Yet  it  is  always  a  tonic  and  an  antidote  to 
dullness  to  be  with  the  Serbs.  They  possess  the  irresponsible 
^'aiety  that  we  traditionally  connect  with  the  Irish,  with  whom 
they  have  often  been  compared.  Other  less  convenient  sides 
of  the  Irish  character  are  also  typical  of  the  Serbs,  such  as  a 
certain  cheerful  contempt  for  punctuality  in  daily  life  and 
a  ready  willingness,  arising  clearly  from  politeness  and  good 
nature,  to  make  promises  that  are  not  always  fulfilled.  But 
perhaps  the  most  pronounced  of  these  similarities  is  to  be 
found  in  the  songs  of  Serbia  and  Ireland.  With  both  peoples 
the  historic  songs  about  the  past  are  songs  of  sorrow,  of  noble 
struggles  against  overwhelming  odds,  of  failure  redeemed  by 
unconquerable  resolve.  There  is  nothing  strange  in  this 
combination  of  laughing  gaiety  and  profound  melancholy. 
It  is  often  only  those  who  are  truly  capable  of  the  one 
emotion  who  also  have  the  faculty  for  the  other.  And 
emotional  moderation,  stiffness,  and  reserve  are  not  charac- 
teristic of  mystical  and  simple  peoples  attached  to  the  soil 
and  bound  together  by  bonds  of  family  and  tradition. 

'More  virile  in  appearance  than  the  Greeks  and  less  heavy 
than  the  Bulgars,  the  Serbs  are  physically  the  '  thorough- 
breds '  of  the  Balkans.  The  easy  grace  and  masculine  strength 
of  the  typical  Serbian  officer,  well  set  off  by  the  smartness  of 
his  uniform,  make  him  an  attractive  and  striking  figure  in  any 
assembly.  They  were  decidedly  the  most  picturesque  feature 
in  the  kaleidoscopic  crowds  of  many  armies  who  thronged 
the  quay  and  the  cafes  of  Salonika  in  the  evenings  of  last 
summer.    Many  are  strikingly  handsome,  tall  and  lithe,  with 


264  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

that  dashing  air  which  has  made  the  Balkans  so  popular  a 
scene  for  musical  comedies  and  novels  of  romance.  The 
soldiers  are  equally  magnificent  specimens  of  humanity. 
Slim  and  supple  in  youth,  they  develop  immense  strength  in 
full  manhood.  The  French  papers  have  sometimes  affec- 
tionately spoken  of  '  le  petit  soldat  serbe  '.  But  the  Serbian 
soldier  is  most  unlike  the  \\Xt\c  pioupiou  of  Latin  armies.  He 
stands  well  above  the  average  European  height,  a  man  of  the 
open  air,  of  the  mountains  or  the  farm.  It  is  his  clean  and 
strong  physique  that  has  made  him  so  unconquerable  a 
fighter.  In  the  Balkan  wars  various  Serbian  units  performed 
prodigies  of  endurance  on  the  march.  The  14th  regiment, 
on  one  occasion,  marched  64  kilometres  between  midday 
and  the  next  morning  in  order  to  arrive  on  the  battlefield 
and  to  take  part  at  once  in  an  engagement.  A  battalion  of 
the  third  ban,  that  is  to  say  of  men  getting  on  in  years,  went 
from  Struga  to  Monastir,  a  distance  of  74  kilometres  as  the 
crow  flies,  in  just  over  twenty-four  hours  and  without  a  single 
casualty.  The  constitutional  soundness  of  the  Serbs  also 
makes  them  excellent  patients  in  hospital,  so  long  as  they  do 
not  give  way  to  depression.  One  of  our  doctors  at  Vertekop, 
cominq;  one  mornino-  to  examine  a  man  on  whose  interior  he 
had  the  previous  day  performed  an  operation  which  it  was 
expected  would  keep  the  patient  in  bed  for  a  considerable 
time,  found  him  walking  up  and  down  outside  enjoying  a 
cigarette. 

The  enemy  have  paid  their  tribute  to  the  manly  qualities 
of  the  Serbs.  '  Two  factors,  in  my  opinion,  have  been  of 
supreme  importance  in  the  victories  of  the  Serbian  army,' 
writes  a  correspondent  of  the  Frankfurter  Zeittmg,  '  the 
universal  patriotic  enthusiasm  and  the  physical  soundness  of 
the  Serbian  soldiers.    As  to  the  patriotic  enthusiasm,  of  that 


and  their  Aspirations  265 

there  is  the  witness  of  so  many  models  of  self-sacrifice,  who 
liave  given  their  families  and  all  their  possessions  and  placed 
themselves  at  the  disposal  of  their  fatherland,'  ^  No  proof 
is  needed  of  the  patriotism  and  devotion  of  an  army  that 
has  been  through  what  the  Serbs  have  endured.  But  let 
me  add  the  following  illustration  of  the  spirit  that  animates 
the  country's  women.  It  must  have  been  a  Spartan  mother 
and  the  daughter  of  a  heroic  race  who  wrote  thus  to  her 
peasant  son,  a  prisoner  in  Austria,  '  I  suppose  that  if  they 
took  you  prisoner,  it  was  because  you  were  wounded  and  not 
able  to  defend  yourself.  But  if  you  surrendered  without 
being  wounded,  my  son,  never  return  home.  You  would 
defile  the  village  which  has  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  our 
Fatherland  83  heroes  out  of  the  120  who  were  called  up. 
Your  brother  Milan  fell  at  Rudnik.  He  must  have  been 
happy  to  see  his  old  king  firing  a  rifle  in  the  front  line.'  ^ 

The  Serbs  have  the  utmost  confidence  in  their  ability  to 
emulate  the  achievements  of  the  most  powerful  nations  of 
the  world.  It  may  be  true  that,  before  their  recent  catastrophe 
and  their  terrible  losses,  some  amongst  them  underestimated 
the  advance  which  they  had  still  to  make  in  order  to  become 
a  '  great  modern  nation  '.  But,  if  wider  experience  and  their 
reduced  numbers  have  made  them  view  the  future  more 
soberly,  they  have  in  no  degree  abated  their  national  aspira- 
tions. Knowing  that,  as  in  the  past,  they  will  have  for  some 
time  after  the  restoration  of  peace  to  rely  on  the  support  of 
their  allies,  they  yet  look  forward  to  the  day  when  they  will 
be  politically  and  financially  independent.  The  main  lines 
of  the  'Greater  Serbia'  or  'Yugoslavia'  that  is  to  be  born  of 
this  war  have  just  been  laid  down  in  a  joint  manifesto  of  the 

^  Quoted  in  Tugoslavia,  p.  123.  ^  La  Patrie  serbe,  No.  5,  p.  216. 


266  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

Serbian  Government  and  the  Yugoslav  Committee.  The 
programme,  which  is  signed  by  M.  Pashitch  and  M.  Trum- 
bitch,  the  President  of  the  Southern  Slav  Committee,  con- 
tains thirteen  clauses  and  asserts  the  following  aims  :  ^ 

1 .  The  state  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes,  also  known 
under  the  name  of  Southern  Slavs  or  Yugoslavs,  will  be  a  free 
and  independent  kingdom  of  united  territory  and  unity  of 
citizenship.  It  will  be  a  constitutional,  democratic,  and 
parliamentary  monarchy  under  the  leadership  of  the  Kara- 
georgevitch  dynasty,  which  has  shown  that  it  shares  the 
ideas  and  sentiments  of  the  people  and  places  the  nation's 
freedom  and  the  nation's  will  before  all  else. 

2.  This  state  will  be  known  as '  The  kingdom  of  the  Serbs, 
Croats,  and  Slovenes ',  and  its  ruler  as  '  The  king  of  the 
Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes '. 

5.  All  three  names,  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes,  shall  enjoy 
absolutely  equal  rights  in  the  whole  territory  of  the  kingdom, 
and  each  may  be  freely  used  on  all  public  occasions.  .  .  . 

6.  Both  alphabets,  the  Cyrillic  and  the  Latin,  shall  simi- 
larly be  absolutely  equal  and  either  may  be  freely  used  in  the 
whole  territory  of  the  kingdom.  Every  central  and  local 
authority  shall  be  bound  to  use  either  alphabet  in  accordance 
with  the  wishes  of  the  inhabitants. 

7.  All  recognized  religions  shall  be  freely  and  publicly 
exercised.  The  Pravoslav  (Orthodox),  Roman  Catholic,  and 
Mohammedan  creeds,  which  are  numerically  strongest 
amongst  our  people,  shall  have  the  same  rights  in  relation  to 
the  state.  .  .  . 

8.  The  calendar  shall  be  unified  as  soon  as  possible. 

^  Pravda  (of  Salonika),  July  16/29,  '9'7-  ^^^  two  clauses  omitted 
deal  with  the  national  flag,  coat  of  arms,  and  crown,  and  permission  for 
the  use  of  special  local  emblems. 


and  their  Aspirations  267 

9.  The  territory  of  the  kingdom  of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes  will  contain  all  that  territory  inhabited  by  our 
three-fold  people  in  a  compact  and  continuous  body,  and 
cannot  be  mutilated  without  injury  to  the  vital  interests  of 
the  whole.  Our  people  demands  nothing  belonging  to  others. 
It  asks  for  what  is  its  own  and  desires  freedom  and  unity.  .  .  . 
Our  people  puts  forward  as  one  indivisible  whole  the  problem 
of  their  deliverance  from  Austria-Hungary  and  their  union 
with  Serbia  and  Montenegro  in  one  state.  .  .  . 

10.  In  the  interests  of  the  freedom  and  equal  rights  of 
all  peoples,  the  Adriatic  Sea  shall  be  free  and  open  to  all. 

11.  All  citizens  throughout  the  whole  territory  shall  be 
equal  and  enjoy  the  same  rights  towards  the  state, and  before 
the  law. 

12.  The  franchise  for  the  election  of  deputies  to  the 
National  Parliament,  as  for  the  communes  and  other  ad- 
ministrative assemblies,  shall  be  equal  and  universal  and  shall 
be  effected  through  direct  and  secret  ballot  by  communes. 

13.  The  constitution,  to  be  drawn  up  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  by  a  constituent  assembly,  elected  by  universal 
suffrage,  will  be  the  basis  of  the  state's  life.  .  .  .  The  nation 
of  the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes,  thus  united,  would  form 
a  state  of  about  12  million  citizens,  and  prove  ...  a  powerful 
bulwark  against  German  aggression  and  the  inseparable  ally 
of  all  those  civilized  peoples  and  states  who  have  upheld  the 
principles  of  law,  national  independence,  and  international 
justice,  as  well  as  a  worthy  member  of  a  new  international 
federation. 

Such  is  the  future  for  which  the  Serbs  are  fighting.  The 
mere  restoration  of  Serbia  at  the  close  of  the  war  to  her  old 
boundaries  would  constitute  a  failure  on  the  part  of  the  Allies. 
Neither  Serbia  nor  her  supporters  entered  on  war  intent  on 


2  68  To-day:    The  Serbian  People 

the  rearrangement  of  the  map  of  Europe.  But  since  it  was 
thrust  upon  them,  their  object  now  is  so  to  rectify  that  map 
as  to  remove  from  Europe  that  most  prolific  source  of  trouble, 
divided  nationalities.  British  statesmen  for  some  time  pre- 
served a  discreet  silence  on  the  subject  of  Yugoslav  aspira- 
tions. But  in  their  reply  of  January  lo  to  President  Wilson's 
note  the  Allies  declared  themselves  to  be  fighting  for  '  the 
liberation  of  the  Italians,  as  also  of  the  Slavs,  Roumanians, 
and  Czecho-Slovaks,from  foreign  domination'.  In  his  speech 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  July  24,  Lord  Robert  Cecil, 
alluding  to  the  territorial  claims  of  our  allies,  laid  especial 
emphasis  on  those  of  Serbia.  The  same  minister  allowed  no 
ambiguity  to  mar  the  expression  of  his  sympathy  with  the 
Serbian  cause  at  the  luncheon  given  to  M.  Pashitch  on 
August  8,  when  he  said  that  the  settlement  after  the  war 
must  recognize  the  national  and  racial  aspirations  of  the 
Slavs.  On  the  same  occasion  Mr.  Lloyd  George  achieved 
one  of  his  masterpieces  of  eloquence,  summing  up  our  feelings 
for  Serbia  with  the  words, '  Come  weal,  come  woe,  w'e  are  not 
merely  allies,  but  friends  and  partners,  and  we  will  go  through 
the  world  together.'  The  war  has  revealed  to  the  British 
public  the  hidden  problems  of  South-Eastern  Europe.  It  is  to- 
day clear  that  the  twin  causes  of  Serbian  freedom  and  Yugo- 
slav unity  rightly  claim  our  traditional  support  of  the  small 
nationalities,  and  also  are  bound  up  with  British  interests. 
A  united  and  self-dependent  Southern  Slav  state  would  be 
not  only  a  guarantee  of  future  peace  in  the  Balkans,  but  also 
a  barrier  against  German  aggression,  defending  the  gateways 
of  the  Mediterranean  and  of  the  East. 

What  then  are  the  territories  which  the  Serbs  hope  to 
unite  in  the  Yugoslav  state  ?  The  manifesto  of  Corfu  does 
not  say,  and  naturally  there  is  some  difference  of  opinion 


and  their  Aspirations  269 

amongst  Serbs.  It  is  possible  to  meet  an  occasional  extremist 
who  claims  Trieste  on  the  ground  that  the  city  has  a  con- 
siderable Slav  population  and  would  be  ruined  if  separated 
from  its  hinterland,  which  is  pure  Slovene.  I  have  even 
heard  a  Slovene  from  that  neighbourhood  put  forward  a 
claim  to  the  Yugoslav  population  across  the  Italian  frontier 
!i  Friuli.  But  such  pretensions  are  most  exceptional. 
Although  the  Southern  Slav  Programme,  published  by 
the  Yugoslav  Committee,  claims  Trieste,  the  great  majority 
of  Serbs  are  more  moderate.  Without  contesting  Italy's 
right  to  Trieste  they  content  themselves  with  the  eminently 
reasonable  suggestion  that  the  city  should  become  an  open 
port,  and  so  continue  to  act  as  the  economic  outlet  of  the 
Slovene,  German,  and  Czech  lands  to  the  north.  Similarly 
the  Yugoslav  kingdom,  if  in  possession  of  Riyeka,  might  well 
make  that  an  open  port  for  the  benefit  of  the  great  Hungarian 
plain  from  which  it  is  the  natural  exit  to  the  sea.  The  defi- 
nite claim  to  the  territories  inhabited  by  Serbs,  Croats,  and 
Slovenes  we  may  take  roughly  to  comprise  the  whole  of 
Serbia,  Montenegro,  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  Dalmatia,  and 
Croatia-Slavonia,  and  the  Slav  portions  of  Istria,  Gorizia, 
Carinthia,  Carniola,  Styria,  Batchka,  and  the  Banat.  All 
these  lands  form  an  ethnical  unit,  with  a  population  over- 
whelmingly Yugoslav,  from  end  to  end  of  which  the  same 
language  is  spoken.  They  make  a  compact  block  of  territory, 
the  different  parts  of  which  cannot  be  separated  without 
violence  to  their  economic  interests. 

The  next  question  to  be  asked  is  whether  the  parties  who 
promulgated  the  manifesto  of  Corfu  are  truly  representative 
of  the  peoples  in  whose  name  they  speak.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  the  Serbian  government  has  only  proclaimed  what 
has  long  been  the  hope  of  the  Serbian  nation,  at  least  ever 


270  To-day:    The  Serbian  People 

since  the  reign  of  Prince  Michael,  fifty  years  ago.  But  what 
of  the  Yugoslav  Committee  ?  Committees  of  refugees  are 
so  apt  to  consist  of  irresponsible  journalists,  intellectual  prigs 
out  of  touch  with  their  fellow  countrymen,  cranks,  and  so 
forth.  Who  compose  this  Committee  and  what  claims  has 
it  to  represent  the  Southern  Slavs  of  Austria-Hungary }  It 
is  a  question  well  worth  examining. 

The  president  is  Dr.  Trumbitch,  President  of  the  Croat 
National  Party  in  the  provincial  Parliament  of  Dalmatia, 
sometime  Mayor  of  Split,  and  Member  for  Zadar  in  the 
Austrian  Imperial  Parliament.  He  is,  that  is  to  say,  about 
as  representative  of  Dalmatian  public  opinion  according  to 
electoral  tests  as  one  could  wish.  The  other  sixteen  gentle- 
men who  form  the  committee  ^  are  drawn  from  all  three 
Yugoslav  peoples  and  all  quarters  of  the  Yugoslav  territory, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Banat  and  Batchka,  which  are 
probably  the  most  unitedly  Serbophil  of  all.  Of  the  four 
who  represent  Dalmatia,  two  are  town  councillors  of  Dubrov- 
nik  and  one  of  Shebenik.  Of  the  four  who  represent  Croatia, 
one  is  the  well-known  Dr.  Hinkovitch,  Member  of  the 
Croatian  Parliament  and  Croatian  delegate  to  the  Parliament 
of  Buda-Pesth.  Two  of  his  colleagues  share  these  qualifica- 
tions to  speak  for  Croatian  opinion.  On  behalf  of  the  three 
who  come  from  Slovene  lands,  and  of  the  three  who  are  resi- 
dents in  the  United  States,  it  is  not  possible  to  bring  forward 
the  same  argument,  though  they  are  clearly  men  of  influence 
and  ability  from  the  positions  they  hold  or  held,  two  being 
university  professors,  and  three  being  either  presidents  or 
secretaries  of  Yugoslav  organizations.  Finally,  there  is  a 
member  of  the  Bosnian  Diet  and  a  Vice-President  of  the 
Serb  National  Union  of  Bosnia.    These  men  are  clearly  not 

^  See  list  in  The  Southern  Slav  Programme,  p.  14. 


I 


and  their  Aspirations  271 

of  the  type  who  represent  nobody  and  put  forward  views 
held  by  few  but  themselves. 

But  the  views  of  the  Yugoslavs  can  be  examined  by  another 
and  much  more  conclusive  test,  namely  the  attitude  adopted 
by  Austria-Hungary  towards  her  own  Southern  Slav  popula- 
tion from  the  moment  that  war  broke  out  with  Serbia,  and 
the  punishments  which  she  has  felt  it  necessary  to  inflict  on 
her  subjects  for  sympathy  with  the  enemy.  Before  the 
opening  of  the  war  Austria-Hungary's  accusation  against 
Serbia  was  that  she  was  intriguing  and  stirring  up  trouble 
amongst  the  Yugoslavs,  the  majority  of  whom  were  well 
content  to  remain  under  the  existing  regime.  But  how  did 
the  Dual  Monarchy  show  its  confidence  in  the  loyalty  of  the 
Yugoslavs?  The  news  of  the  ultimatum  to  Serbia  was  not 
allowed  to  become  known  in  Dalmatia  till  twelve  hours  after 
its  expiration,  and  those  twelve  hours  were  used  to  round  up 
the  young  men  and  to  prevent  any  attempts  at  escape  from 
the  country.  Public  opinion  was  given  no  opportunity  to 
express  itself.  All  the  town  councils  of  Dalmatia  were  sup- 
pressed with  the  exception  of  Zadar,  where  there  is  an  Italian 
majority.  The  whole  press,  as  well  as  all  nationalist  societies 
and  literary  clubs,  were  suppressed.  The  Diet,  like  all  the 
other  provincial  Diets  of  Austria,  was  not  allowed  to  meet. 

Elsewhere  all  the  Serbo-Croat  leaders  were  either  arrested, 
and  in  some  cases  used  as  hostages  for  the  good  behaviour  of 
the  people,  or  placed  under  observation.  Almost  a  clean 
sweep  was  made  of  the  student  class.  Dr.  Kuhne  states  that 
nearly  10,000  persons  were  thus  imprisoned  on  the  eve  of,  or 
immediately  after,  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  He  was  also 
informed  by  an  Austro-Hungarian  doctor  that  in  one  town 
of  Hungary  in  the  first  fortnight  of  the  war  ten  or  twelve 
Serbs  were  daily  condemned  to  be  shot  or  hung.    The  warmth 


272  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

of  the  welcome  accorded  by  the  population  to  the  Serbian 
srmy  when  it  entered  Slavonia  and  Bosnia  is  attested  by 
the  enormous  number  of  persons  subsequently  punished  for 
treason.  The  value  of  Serbian  property  at  Zimun  confiscated 
for  high  treason  amounted,  according  to  the  semi-ofhcial 
Hrvatski  Dyievnik  of  January  22,  1916,  to  550  millions  of 
crowns.  As  for  Bosnia,  the  Bosnische  Post,  between  March  20 
and  27,  191 5,  announced  5,510  cases  of  confiscation  in  accor- 
dance with  a  decree  of  the  previous  October.  Thousands  of 
families — old  men,  women  and  children,  for  the  younger  men 
were  all  with  the  colours,  in  prison,  or  in  the  Serbian  army — 
were  pitilessly  evicted  from  all  the  Serbian  provinces  and 
driven  over  the  frontier  into  Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  em- 
barrass those  hard-pressed  states.  Then  followed  the  trials 
of  large  numbers  of  Serbs  of  Bosnia  on  the  model  of  the 
Zagreb  conspiracy  case  of  1909.  We  are  not  concerned  with 
the  justice  administered,  though,  after  the  exposure  of 
previous  Austro-Hungarian  judicial  methods,  we  may  enter- 
tain doubts  about  the  prisoners'  guilt  of  the  crimes  attributed 
to  them.  The  point  is  rather  the  v^idespread  disaffection 
with  which  the  government  felt  itself  to  be  contending,  and 
the  revolutionary  and  separatist  meaning  which  the  courts 
found  in  all  the  many  societies  or  institutions  intended  to 
encourage  Yugoslav  national  feeling.  If  the  most  ridiculous 
charges  had  to  serve  as  the  ground  for  conviction,  if  the  prose- 
cution could  not  lay  their  hands  on  anything  definitely 
treasonable  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  still  the  govern- 
ment was  right  in  its  estimate  of  the  abhorrence  in  which  it 
was  held  by  the  mass  of  the  people.  In  three  trials  in  191 5, 
directed  against  the  youth  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  131 
schoolboys  were  condemned,  one  to  be  hanged  and  the  rest 
to  terms  of  imprisonment  varying  from  a  month  to  sixteen 


and  their  Aspirations  273 

\-ears.  Then  followed  the  monster  trial  of  Banyaluka  in 
November  191 5  when  98  persons  were  condemned,  16  to 
death  and  the  remainder  to  periods  of  imprisonment  varying 
from  two  to  twenty  years  and  to  a  collective  fine  of  over 
fourteen  million  crowns.  The  fact  that  the  bench  appa- 
rently had  to  be  packed  with  Germans  and  the  prosecution 
ntrusted  to  Germans  leads  to  the  natural  conclusion  that 
Croats  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  deal  severely  with  the 
accused.  In  the  trials  of  students,  too,  it  is  noticeable  that 
Roman  Catholics  (Croats)  and  Mohammedans  figure  together 
with  Serbs  amongst  the  prisoners. 

Nor  have  these  judicial  proceedings  been  confined  to  the 
Serbs  of  Bosnia-Hertzegovina.  The  Banyaluka  trial  was  but 
the  most  conspicuous  of  an  interminable  series  of  prosecutions 
to  which  the  population  of  all  the  Yugoslav  provinces  have 
been  subjected.  The  Croatian  and  Slovene  papers  quoted 
frequent  sentences  of  imprisonment,  hard  labour,  or  confisca- 
tion of  property  inflicted  by  the  courts  at  Zagreb,  Trieste, 
and  elsewhere.  In  the  summer  of  1916  article  19  of  the 
Hungarian  Constitution  guaranteeing  the  equality  of  the 
nations  in  Hungary  was  suspended.  The  Croatian  Parlia- 
ment has  been  permitted  to  meet,  it  is  true,  but  several 
members  of  the  Serbo-Croat  block,  including  the  president 
of  the  assembly,  were  interned  or  underwent  sentences  of 
various  kinds.  When  the  Yugoslav  Committee,  in  May  191 5, 
issued  their  appeal  to  the  British  nation  on  behalf  of  Yugo- 
slav unity  and  independence,  Count  Tisza  completely  failed 
in  his  efforts  to  secure  its  public  repudiation  by  the  Croatian 
deputies.  On  the  contrary,  the  vice-president,  amid  cheers 
from  the  whole  House,  proclaimed  '  the  nation's  constant 
desire  for  unification  in  a  single  and  independent  body  \^ 

^  The  New  Europe,  No.  12,  p.  362. 
2071  g 


274  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

The  three  Croatian  opposition  parties  absolutely  refused  the 
invitation  to  be  present  at  the  coronation  of  the  King  of 
Hungary  on  the  ground  that  '  Hungary  is  the  cruellest 
oppressor  of  small  nationalities '. 

Meanwhile  the  voice  of  the  Yugoslavs  in  Austria-Hungary, 
though  it  cannot  be  silenced,  grows  fainter  and  fainter.  Not 
only  are  so  many  of  their  leaders  imprisoned,  outlawed,  or 
with  the  Serbian  army,  but  their  manhood  has  been  terribly 
reduced.  The  conscription  of  the  Slavs  has  been  more 
rigorously  enforced  than  that  of  the  Germans,  and  of  the 
Yugoslav  troops,  who  were  systematically  given  the  most 
dangerous  tasks,  60  per  cent,  were  killed  or  wounded  in  the 
first  year  of  the  war. 

In  this  account  of  Austria-Hungary's  treatment  of  her 
Yugoslavs  my  object  is  not  to  criticize  the  government  for 
the  measures  which  it  has  seen  fit  to  take  for  the  preservation 
of  the  Habsburg  empire,  but  simply  to  point  out  that  the 
government  knows  that  the  great  majority  of  the  Yugoslavs 
pray  for  the  day  when  they  shall  escape  from  their  present 
condition  and  become  united  with  Serbia  in  the  kingdom  of 
the  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes.  For  these  three  peoples  the 
decisive  victory  of  the  Allies  will  be  the  only  tolerable  result 
of  the  war.  Anything  short  of  that  will  not  release  the  Yugo- 
slavs of  the  Dual  Monarchy  from  foreign  domination  ;  while 
nothing  else  will  enable  Serbia  to  regain  her  lost  territories. 
A  peace  '  without  annexations '  has  been  discussed  through- 
out Europe  for  the  past  six  months.  Whatever  annexations 
the  Central  Empires  might  be  willing  to  forgo — and  they 
do  not  appear  to  be  many — Serbia  will  not  be  among  them. 
At  all  costs  Germany  is  determined  to  secure  the  route  to  the 
East  by  Belgrade,  Nish,  and  Pirot.  Should  our  enemies 
consent  to  the  restoration  of  Serbia,  that  would  mean  a 


and  their  Aspirations  2.y$ 

Serbia  shorn  of  her  north-eastern  districts  as  well  as  of 
Macedonia,  i.  e.  a  microscopic  mountain  principality  depen- 
dent utterly  on  Austria-Hungary.  The  Central  Empires  by 
the  destruction  of  Serbia  have  supplied  the  missing  link  in 
their  chain  between  the  North  Sea  and  Asia  Minor.  They 
realize  that  a  strong  and  independent  Serbia  is  as  vital  to 
British  security  in  the  East  as  Belgium  is  in  the  West.  The 
j  Bulgarian  official  view  seems  to  be  even  more  drastic,  and 
'  lends  no  support  to  those  who,  even  after  the  events  of  the  last 
two  years,  still  talk  of  buying  out  Bulgaria.  It  is  possible, 
though  improbable,  that  we  might  bribe  her  by  offering  to 
secure  her  possession  of  the  territories  to  which  she  lays 
claim.  Such  a  course  would  be  cheaper  than  that  of  con- 
tinuing to  fight  her.  It  is  always  in  the  first  instance  cheaper 
to  sell  your  friends  than  to  fight  your  enemies.  And  Bulgaria 
could  only  be  bought  out  by  the  complete  betrayal  of  Serbia, 
and  for  that  matter  of  Roumania  as  well.  Bulgarian  ministers 
have  made  it  abundantly  clear  that  they  do  not  want  a  settle- 
ment of  the  Balkans  on  national  lines.  They  insist  on  a 
common  frontier  with  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  the  annihila- 
tion of  Serbia,  The  Narodni  Prava  of  May  19,  19 16,  ex- 
pressed their  view  :  '  The  existence  of  Serbia,  no  matter 
under  what  form,  would  be  a  perpetual  menace  to  the  peace 
of  the  Balkans.  .  .  .  This  state,  which  since  its  independence 
has  been  a  nest  of  intrigues  and  of  quarrels,  must  cease  to 
exist.' 

Serbia's  hopes,  therefore,  must  rest  entirely  on  the  decisive 
victory  of  the  Allies.  But  even  in  that  event  she  will  still  find 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  full  satisfaction  of  her  aspirations. 
That  these  difficulties  are  capable  of  adj  ustment  is  the  opinion 
of  many  responsible  Allied  statesmen,  as  it  must  be  the  fer- 
vent hope  of  all  who  have  the  principles  of  the  Allies  at  heart. 

s  2 


276  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

The  least  troublesome  questions  are  concerned  with  Serbia's 
allies,  Roumania  and  Montenegro.  The  Banat  has  its  con- 
siderable Roumanian  population  and  is  divided  by  no  obvious 
line  suitable  for  a  frontier.  But,  as  in  the  past,  so  now,  Rou- 
manian and  Serbian  interests  do  not  clash,  and  it  is  in  the  last 
degree  unlikely  that  the  two  friendly  states  would  quarrel  over 
the  allocation  of  a  few  villages  in  the  Banat  when  their  main 
attention  in  each  case  wiU  be  directed  to  more  important 
issues  elsewhere.  As  for  Montenegro,  the  only  source  of 
friction  appears  to  be  the  dynastic  ambition  of  the  old  king, 
Nicholas,  who  against  the  wishes  of  his  people  and  the  advice 
of  successive  ministries  has  refused  to  accept  the  principle  of 
Montenegro's  ultimate  absorption  in  the  Southern  Slav 
state  under  the  house  of  Karageorgevitch. 

But  the  relation  of  Italy  to  the  Yugoslav  question  is  one 
of  the  thorny  problems  of  the  Entente's  diplomacy.  We  shall 
all  be  agreed  on  the  justice  of  Italy's  ambition  to  complete  her 
national  unity  by  gathering  into  the  kingdom  the  population 
of  the  Adriatic  coast,  wherever  it  is  predominantly  Italian. 
Similarly  Italy  is  but  reasonable  in  demanding  security  for 
her  indefensible  eastern  coast.  But  thirdly,  it  is  equally 
necessary  to  keep  in  view  the  paramount  importance  of  a 
friendly  accord  between  Italy  and  the  future  Yugoslav  state. 
If  they  are  to  start  their  mutual  relations  on  a  basis  of  dis- 
trust and  antagonism  the  way  wall  be  open  for  Germany  and 
Austria  to  profit  by  the  quarrels  of  our  allies  and  to  work  their 
way  down  once  more  to  the  Adriatic  and  the  Mediterranean. 
As  the  war  proceeds  we  shall  certainly  see  an  Austro-German 
attempt  to  erect  a  Yugoslav  state  under  the  Habsburg  crown 
in  antagonism  to  both  Italy  and  Serbia.  The  union  of  Italian 
and  Slav  must  form  a  barrier  through  which  German  force 
and  German  intrigue  will  be  unable  to  break.    It  is  a  vital 


and  their  Aspirations  277 

interest  of  Italy  that  a  new  state  should  arise  to  the  south  of 
Austria  and  Hungary  strong  enough  to  resist  the  restoration 
of  the  Dual  Monarchy  to  its  present  control  of  the  Adriatic. 
And  it  is  equally  essential  to  the  Slavs  to  have  beside  them  a 
friendly  Italy  to  support  their  independence  against  all  efforts 
to  reimpose  the  Habsburg  authority. 

Yiovf  then  do  Italian  and  Slav  claims  conflict  ?  There  is  in 
Italy  a  crypto-Austrophil  minority  who  have  tried  to  sow 
distrust  between  Serbs  and  Croats  with  a  view  to  ruining 
Yugoslav  unity.  But  we  are  only  concerned  with  the  claims 
that  are  put  forward  by  the  government  and  public  opinion 
of  Italy  on  the  basis  of  goodwill  towards  the  Yugoslavs  as 
to  all  the  rest  of  the  Grand  Alliance.  The  difficulty  lies  in 
the  fact  that  Italy  can  put  forward  a  case,  based  either  on 
nationality  or  on  history,  or  on  strategic  grounds,  for  annex- 
ing the  whole  of  the  Adriatic  littoral  from  her  own  frontier 
down  to  Corfu.  That  is  an  extreme  demand  which  I  believe 
no  section  of  Italian  opinion  supports.  But  the  principles 
underlying  Italy's  claim  to  various  parts  of  the  littoral  might 
be  applied  to  the  whole.  Now  as  regards  the  nationality  of 
the  inhabitants,  no  one  will  dispute  that  Trieste  is  mainly  an 
Italian  town.  It  has  not  historically  been  under  Italian 
government,  for  the  house  of  Habsburg  has  ruled  it  for  more 
than  500  years.  But  to-day  the  Italians  are  well  over  half  the 
population,  and,  as  ever,  the  city  is  a  centre  of  Italian  culture. 
The  province  of  Gorizia  is  sharply  divided  between  the 
Italians  (30  per  cent.)  to  the  west  and  along  the  coast,  and 
the1§lovenes  (51  per  cent.)  to  the  north  and  east  of  Gorizia 
town.  In  Istria,  too,  the  separation  is  sufficiently  clearly 
marked.  The  west  coast  is  Italian,  while  the  eastern  shore 
and  the  inland  districts  are  purely  Slav,  as  the  most  casual 
tourist  can  see.    Riyeka,  I  believe,  the  Italians  do  not  claim. 


278  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

It  is  entirely  bound  up  with  Croatia  and  Hungary,  for  which 
countries  it  has  long  been  the  only  outlet  to  the  sea,  and  will 
be- for  some  years  after  the  war  the  only  convenient  port  of 
the  Yugoslav  lands.  It  is  true  that  the  extreme  Italian 
nationalists  wish  the  Yugoslavs  to  find  their  commercial 
outlet  through  the  south  of  Dalmatia,  by  Dubrovnik  and 
Kotor  (Cattaro),  where  they  can  have  their  '  window  on  the 
Adriatic  '.  But  for  the  purpose  of  entering  or  leaving  a  house 
a  door  is  a  more  convenient  aperture  than  a  window.  In 
Riyeka  the  Yugoslavs  see  the  door  through  which,  though 
under  various  disabilities,  their  trade  has  already  gone  out 
to  foreign  lands.  They  will  not  consent  to  exchange  it  for 
a  window,  the  approach  to  which  necessitates  the  gymnastic 
feat  of  scaling  the  Dinaric  Alps. 

So  far  matters  are  comparatively  simple.  The  coast  of  the 
Adriatic  from  the  Isonzo  round  to  the  southern  point  of  Istria 
should  be  Italian.  The  hinterland  with  Riyeka,  as  rightly, 
should  be  Yugoslav.  But  it  is  over  Dalmatia  that  contro- 
versy still  rages.  The  Italian  claim  to  the  province,  or 
half  of  it,  rests  primarily  on  historical  arguments,  on  the 
ancient  Latin  character  of  the  coast-land,  and  in  more  modern 
times  on  the  Venetian  supremacy  over  the  ports,  where  the 
architecture  bears  witness  to  the  artistic  genius  of  Venice, 
The  reason  for  the  decline  of  Itahan  nationahty  in  the  last 
century,  so  the  argument  runs,  is  due  to  the  Austrian  policy 
of  trusting  the  Slavs  rather  than  the  Italians,  whom  the 
government  sought  to  denationalize.  To  this  the  Slavs  can 
reply  that  the  overwhelming  mass  of  the  Dalmatian  j^ople 
is  Slav  and  has  been  so  for  more  than  a  thousand  years.  Split 
was  once  the  capital  of  the  Croatian  kingdom,  where  Zvono- 
mir  received  his  crown  from  a  papal  legate.  Farther  south 
Dubrovnik  maintained  its  independent  Slavonic  existence. 


and  their  Aspirations  279 

defying  both  Turk  and  Venetian,  till  the  opening  of  the 
nineteenth  century.     If  Venice  imposed  her  government 
along  the  coast,' her  real  power  was  confined  to  the  cities 
which  she  used  as  naval  bases  for  war  with  the  Turks  and 
the  protection  of  her  trade.     If  it  is  true  that  Austria  en- 
couraged the  Slav  element  at  the  expense  of  the  Italian, 
after  the  loss  of  Lombardy  and  Venetia  had  removed  most 
of  the  empire's  Italian  interests,  still  it  cannot  be  contested 
that  of   recent  years  it  has  been  the  Yugoslavs  who  have 
borne  the  burden  of  official  persecution,  while  the  govern- 
ment encouraged  the  mutual  suspicion  of  the  two  subject 
races.    When  the  present  war  broke  out  all  the  Slav  munici- 
palities were  at  once  dissolved.  The  one  Italian  municipality, 
that  of  Zadar,  was  still  left  to  exercise  its  powers  after  Italy 
joined  the  Entente.    What  has  happened  in  Dalmatia  is  that 
the  small   bourgeois  oligarchies  of   the   towns,  which  were 
Italian  either  in  race  or  feeling,  have  been  ousted  from  power 
by  the  rising  tide  of  the  democracy,  which  is  Slav.    At  no 
time  in  the  last  century  have  the  Italians  numbered  more 
than  about  5  per  cent,  of  the  population.    This  minuteness 
of   the    Italian   percentage   in    Dalmatia   is   not   generally 
realized.     M.  Bonavia,  writing  in  The  Near  East  in  July  last, 
argued  that  the  Austrian  statistics  had  falsified  the  number 
of  Italians,  which  should  be  two-thirds  as  great  again  as  in 
the  official  figures.    M.  Bonavia  did  not  mention  what  those 
figures  were,  and  possibly  trusted  that  English  readers  would 
not  know.     As  a  matter  of  fact  they  place  the  Italians  at 
3  per  cent.    The  addition  of  two-thirds  of  that  would  bring 
their  number  up  to  5  per  cent.,  no  very  impressive  proportion 
on  which  to  base  any  ethnical  claim  to  Dalmatia. 

Economically  there  is  no  comparison  between  the  value  of 
Dalmatia  to  Italy  and  Yugoslavia  respectively.    To  Italy  it 


28o  To-day  :    The  Serbian  People 

would  be  but  a  narrow  strip  of  barren  soil  between  the  sea 
and  the  mountain-frontier,  as  it  has  been  under  Austria.  To 
Yugoslavia  it  would  be  the  natural  maritime  complement  to 
Bosnia  and  Serbia,  Shebenik  and  Split,  when  they  become 
termini  of  adequate  railway-lines  piercing  the  coastal  moun- 
tains, will  become  flourishing  trade  centres,  but  they  can  be 
so  only  if  they  are  united  to  the  inl^d  provinces  in  one  and 
the  same  state. 

There  is  another  issue  to  be  considered.  Italy's  eastern 
coast  lies  open  to  the  attacks  of  any  Power  whose  fleet  has 
the  freedom  of  the  Adriatic.  When  this  war  has  seen  the 
destruction  of  Austro-Hungarian  sea-power,  the  Italians 
do  not  wish  to  set  up  another  state  which  may  threaten 
them  from  the  harbours  and  islands  of  Dalmatia.  If  it  is 
argued  that  the  Yugoslavs  will  be  poor  and  at  the  outside 
will  not  number  more  than  twelve  millions,  the  Italians 
cautiously  reply  that  it  is  impossible  to  predict  the  future 
and  that  Yugoslavia  might  develop  into  an  aggressive  naval 
Power.  Let  Italy  then  assure  her  safety  against  such 
hypothetical  dangers  by  retaining  the  naval  bases  necessary 
for  her  purpose.  Trieste,  Pola,  and  Valona  will  undoubtedly 
be  hers,  if  the  Allies  achieve  complete  victory.  Should 
she  also  demand  such  a  strategic  advantage  as  the  possession 
of  two  or  three  of  the  outer  Dalmatian  islands,  the  Yugoslavs 
should  give  their  consent  to  such  an  arrangement  in  the 
interests  of  peace.  But  all  who  love  Italy — and  nowhere 
has  she  more  friends  than  in  Great  Britain — will  hope  that 
she  will  yet  refrain  from  laying  hands  on  the  mainland  or 
the  inner  islands.  The  annexation  of  part  of  Dalmatia  to 
Italy  would  only  remove  the  population  of  that  district 
from  one  foreign  master  to  hand  them  over  to  another, 
while   it    would    raise    a    permanent    irredentist    agitation 


I 


and  their  Aspirations  281 

amongst  the  Slavs.  Italy's  true  ideal  has  been  well  put  by 
Professor  Slavenini :  '  The  Adriatic  .  .  .  ought  to  be  neither 
a  lake  more  Austrian  than  Italian  as  it  is  now,  nor  an  Italian 
lake  from  which  the  other  peoples  on  its  shores  would  be 
practically  excluded,  but  a  sea  on  which  Italy,  secured  against 
every  danger,  could  exercise  her  activity  both  economic 
and  civilizing,  in  full  harmony  with  all  the  populations  of 
the  eastern  shore.'  ^  If  that  is  the  temper  that  will  ulti- 
mately prevail  in  Italy's  dealings  with  the  Yugoslavs,  we 
shall  see  on  the  Adriatic  a  union  of  age  and  youth,  of  the 
ancient  yet  vigorous  Latin  civilization  and  the  fresh  energy 
of  the  Southern  Slav.  The  beloved  land  from  which 
Western  Europe  received  her  laws,  her  religion,  and  most 
of  her  speech,  will  take  up  her  age-long  task  again,  not  as 
an  imperial  conqueror  but  as  a  cultured  friend,  and  lead  the 
Serbs  into  the  art  and  commerce,  the  science  and  industry 
of  the  modern  world,  out  of  which  we  hope  the  Serbs  will 
know  to  refuse  the  evil  and  choose  the  good. 

One  last  question.  Is  it  possible  for  the  Serbs  ever  to 
recover  from  the  desolation  that  has  swept  over  them  ? 
Thousands  upon  thousands  of  the  little  nation,  of  both 
sexes,  have  perished.  Of  their  manhood  but  a  pitiful 
fragment  remains  at  liberty,  and  of  those  in  bondage  the 
spirit  of  many  may  be  broken  before  the  hour  of  release  is 
sounded.  It  will  be  difficult  no  doubt  to  build  up  once  more 
the  national  life.  Those  war-weary  heroes  who  have  been 
through  every  vicissitude  of  fortune,  living  like  ascetics 
through  the  long  years  of  uncertainty,  triumph,  and  disaster, 
will  they  be  able  to  resume  the  almost  forgotten  arts  of 
peace  .''  Those  who  know  the  Serbian  peasant,  who  is  the 
backbone  of  the  nation,  do  not  doubt  his  ability  to  restore 

^  Hinkovitch,  p.  54. 


282     The  Serbian  People  and  their  Aspirations 

'  the  years  that  the  locust  hath  eaten  '.  And  the  spirit  of 
the  educated  class  that  led  the  Serbian  revival  of  the  decade 
before  the  war  is  not  dead.  '  He  who  has  snatched  his  life 
from  death ',  writes  M.  Prodanovitch,  '  is  bound  to  spend 
it  in  labour.  For  long  years  Serbia  must  have  no  useless 
men,  no  squandered  days.'  ^  That,  I  believe,  will  be  the 
spirit  of  the  Serb.  If  ever  a  nation  bought  its  union  and  its 
liberty  with  blood  and  tears,  the  Serbs  have  paid  that  price. 
For  five  hundred  years  they  have  never  been  content  to 
submit  to  slavery,  but  have  unceasingly  struggled  towards 
the  light.  To  extend  to  them  our  pity  would  be  an  insult. 
They  have  kept  faith  with  us  to  the  utmost  and  accepted 
the  loss  of  all  as  better  than  surrender.  Let  us  rather  ask 
ourselves  how  it  was  that  they  came  to  be  abandoned  to 
their  fate,  and  resolve  that  never  now  for  lack  of  Great 
Britain's  sympathy  and  help  shall  they  fail  in  the  achievement 
of  their  national  liberty. 

^  La  Patrie  serbe,  No.  3,  p.  102. 


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INDEX 


Abdul  Hamid,  Sultan,  78,  95,  113, 

114. 
Adrlanople,    120,    123,    128,    136, 
138,  I4S>  155,206. 
restored  to  Turkey  (1913),  155. 
siege  and  fall  of  (1912-13),  131, 
132,  137,  139  ;    reoccupied  by 
the  Turks,  154,  156. 
Treaty  of  (1829),  34. 
Adriatic  Sea,  25,  42,  52,  69,  83, 
119,    136,   140,    145,   205,   223, 
225,  267,  276-S,  280,  281. 
Aegean  Sea,   18,  58,  65,  70,   120, 

132,  156,  162,  210. 
Aerenthal,  Baron  von,  93-6,  100, 

106,  no,  116. 
Albania,  58,  117,  120,  257. 

and    Austria-Hungary,    138-40, 

145,  148,  160,  165,  169,  188. 
and  the  two  Balkan  wars  (1912- 
13),  122,  127-9,  134,  136,  1385 
i39-4i>  145,  I59>  165. 
and  Bulgaria,  148. 
and  the  Great  War,   215,  220, 

222-4,  226,  227. 
and  Serbia,  T22,  140,  141,   145, 

159,  165. 
and  Turkey,  68,  116. 
Albanian  Alps,  223,  257. 
Albanians,  59,  80,  158,  160,  165. 

turbulence  of,  47,  116,  140. 
Alessio,  140. 
Alexander     I,     King     of     Serbia 

(1889-1903),  74-6,  lOI. 
Alexander  III,  Tsar  of  Russia,  72. 
Alexander,  Crown  Prince  of  Serbia, 

125,  159,  ^7^- 
Alexander   of  Battenberg,  Prince 

of  Bulgaria  (1879-85),  68,  72. 
Alexander  Karageorgevitch,  Prince 

of  Serbia  (1843-58),  37,  76. 


Alexandretta,  164. 
Algiers,  Serbian  refugees  in,  257. 
Andrassy,  Count,  58,  6j,  68. 
Andreavitza,  223,  224,  225. 
Angelkovitch,  General,  201. 
Anglo-Franco-Russian  entente,  94, 

96. 
Arabia,  163. 
Armenia,  163. 
Armenian  massacres,  78. 
Arnauts  :    see  Albanians. 
Arsen,  Serbian  patriarch,  27. 
Asia  Minor,  163,  209,  247,  248,  275. 
Athens,  213,  231,  232. 
Austria,  insecurity  of,  166,  167. 

legitimist  policy  of,  51. 

rise  to  power  of,  26,  27. 
Austria-Hungary : 

and  Albania,  138-40,  145,  148, 
160,  165,  169,  188. 

and  the  Balkans,  27,  70,  81, 
116,  148,  149,  162,  184  M. 

and  the  Balkan  wars  :  the  first 
(1912-13),  116,  119,  121,  122, 
134-,    the  second  (1913),   156, 

157- 
and  Bosnia,  80,  87,  90,  95,  96. 
and    Bosnia-Hertzegovina,    51, 

^7^  71,  83,  84,  94-102,  165,  166. 
and  Bulgaria,  119,  148. 
and  Germany,  70,  90,  92-4,  96. 
and  the  Great  War,  167,  180-6, 

188-21 1,  215-23,  225-56. 
and  Hertzegovina,  87. 
and  Italy,  87,  96,  97,  278,  279. 
and  Montenegro,  97. 
and  Prussia,  90,  151. 
and  Roumania,  88. 
and  Russia,  93,  96,  105,  139. 
and  the  Sarajevo  crime,  170-S5, 

250. 


286 


Index 


Austria-Hungary  {continued) : 
and  Serbia,  20,  27,  29,  37,  38, 

43>  45^  47>  49-55^  60,  69-73, 
76-8,  S0-5,  88,  90,  91,  94-7, 
105-13,  116,  134-6,  142-5, 
157,  158,  162,  165,  168,  176, 
246,  247,  249-56,  267,  271,  272, 
275  ;  ultimatum  to  Serbia 
(1914),.  1 10,  174-5,  181-271  : 
war  with  Serbia,  182-6,  188- 
204,  213. 

and  the  Southern  Slavs,  21, 
86-93,  271-4. 

and   the  Treaty  of   Berb'n,    58, 

(>7-7°-,  945  95- 
and  Turkey,  89,  94,  95. 
Austro-Hungarian  army,  outrages 
by,  191-2,  194-7,  251. 
Red  Cross  Society,  254. 
Serbs,  232. 

Babuna  Pass,  123,  124,  126. 
Baghdad,  163,  164,  215,  216. 
Balkan  League,  83,   113,   1 15-17, 
121,    122,    134,    139,    140,    143, 
147,  170. 
Balkan  peninsula  : 

and    Austria-Hungary,    27,    67, 
70,  81,  116, 148, 149,  162,  184  w. 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  67-9. 
and   the   Treaty   of   Bucharest. 

164. 
attempts  towards  unity,  47,  48. 
hegemony   of,    Bulgarian    plans 

for,  115,  141,  150,  154,275. 
passage  across  the,  206. 
peoples  of  the,  6,  13,  263,  264. 
railway  lines,  18. 
settlement  problems,  209,  210. 
trade-routes,  18,  19,  25. 
Turkish  oppression  in,  51. 
Balkan  States,  13,  59,  66,  113,  120, 

121,  132,  147-9,  156- 
Balkan  wars  :    the  first  (1912-13), 
113-45,      149;       the      second 
(1913),  146-59,  208,  232. 
Baltic  Sea,  205. 


Banatjthe,  20,  27,  28,  269,  270,276. 
Banitza,   65,    127,   234,   235,  237, 

240. 
Banyaluka,  trial  of,  273. 
Barby,  M.,  124. 
Basra,  163. 
Batachin,  59  «.,  63. 
Batchka,  20,  27,  239,  269,  270. 
Belgium,  187,  192,  194,  196,  231, 

250,  275. 
Belgrade,    18,   25,   28-31,   33,   37, 

39^  43,  47)  49)  75)  80,  93,  108, 
109,  134,  149,  157,  159,  170, 
172-4,  180,  192,  206,  210,  211, 
219,251,  274. 

Archbishop  of,  36,  i6o. 

besieged  and  occupied  by  the 
Austrians  (1914-15),  189,  190, 
198-200 ;  retaken  by  the 
Serbs,  202,  203 ;  again  be- 
sieged, and  occupied  by  Austro- 
Germans,  215. 

captured  by  the  Turks  (1521),  21. 
-♦High  School,  or  College,  at,  40, 
81. 

National  and  University  Li- 
braries of,  plundered  by  the 
Bulgars,  252. 

Slovenski  Tug  club,  102,  106, 
107. 

Srpska  Slovesnost  at,  44. 
Berchtold,  Count,    116,    168,   183, 

184. 
Berhn,    107,    108,    163,    164,    186, 
196,  208. 

Congress  of  (1878),  39,  58,  67, 
68,  98. 

Treaty  of  (1878),  67,  68,  70,  94, 

95- 

Berlin   to   Baghdad   scheme,    163, 

164,  215,  216. 
Bismarck,  Prince,  58,  67,  93,  151. 
Bizerta,  226. 
Black  Drin,  the,  224. 
Black  Sea,  26,  42,  58,  68,  205. 
Bonavia,  M.,  279. 
Boshkovitch,  25. 


Index 


287 


Bosnia,  42,  47,  88,  114,  169,  190, 

197,  272,  280. 
and    Austria-Hungary,    80,    87, 

90,  95,  96. 
and  the  Great  War,  197,  198. 
and  the  Serbs,  20,  69,  169,  170, 

171,  i73>  175- 
and  Turkey,  51,  67. 
frontiers  of,  19. 

insurrections    in,    (1875)    51-3, 
,  (1882)  71. 

Serb  National  Union  of,  270. 
;  Bosnia-Hertzegovina  : 
'       and    Austria-Hungary,    51,    67, 

7h  83,  84,  94-102,  165,  i66. 
I       and  the  Serbs,  51-3,  165-6,  179, 
269,  272,  273. 
annexation     of,     by     Austria- 
Hungary  (1908),   83,  84,  94-7, 
100,    lOI. 
commerce,  98,  99. 
education,  98. 
insurrection  in  (1875),  ^7* 
land  system,  98,  ^9. 
political  system,  98,  99. 
poverty,  97. 
railways,  98. 
religion,  99. 

Sabor,  or  Parliament,  99. 
Bosniaks,  94,  171,  173,  179. 
Bosnian  Diet,  177. 
Bosphorus,  the,  19,  210. 
Boyavitch,  General,  233. 
Bozovitch,  M.,  258. 
Braunau,  256. 
Bregalnitza,  the,  144. 
Brindisi,  226. 

British  Adriatic  Mission,  223,  225. 

British     medical     missions     and 

hospitals  in   Serbia,    193,   204, 

218,  233,  236,  243. 

Brod,  capture  of,  241. 

Bucharest,  Treaty  of  :    (1812)  33  ; 

(1913)155-7,159)162,164,188. 

Buda-Pesth,  86-8,  91,  92,  107,  134, 

148,  270. 
Budisavlyevitch,  M.,  104. 


Bulgaria  : 

and  Albania,  148. 

and  Austria-Hungary,  119,  148. 

and  the  Balkan  wars  :  the  first 
(1912-13),  1 15-21,  123,  128, 
130-2,  136-8,  141,  142,  144, 
145  :  the  second  (1913),  146- 
58,  208. 

and  the  Central  Powers,  206-10. 

and  the  Entente  Powers,  207-9. 

and  Germany,  210. 

and  the  Great  War,  188,  200, 
206-14,  216-28,  231-3,  236-48, 
250-6. 

and  Greece,  55,  56,  61,  113,  130, 
143,  231,  232;  treaty  and 
military  convention  between 
(1912),  117-20,  132,  137. 

and  Macedonia,  58-66,  115,  136, 
141-7,  152,  155,  160,  243,  247, 
250. 

and  Russia,  32,  54,  60,  72,  141, 

143,  145-95  152,  155,  213. 

and  Serbia,  50,  54,  55,  81,  113, 
117,  141-4 ;  treaty  between, 
137-8,  141,  143-6:  war  be- 
tween, (1885)  72,  73,  (1913) 
146-59,  (191 5-)  55,  206-48, 
250-4,  256,  275. 

and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  58,  59, 
68,  72,  94-6. 

and   the   Treaty   of  Bucharest, 

155-7- 
and  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano, 

138. 
and  Turkey,  42,  43,  52,  53,  55- 

61,   68;    war  between,   (1876) 

57,   (1912-13)    113-38. 
early  history  of,  54,  55. 
education  in,  55. 
frontiers  of,  19. 
independence  of,  94,  95. 
material  progress,  60. 
national  feeling,  55. 
principality  of,  creation  of,  54, 

58. 
rehgion,  43,  54,  56,  57. 


288 


Index 


Bulgaria  {continued) : 

resources  of,  55. 
Bulgarian  aspirations  in  the  Bal- 
kans, 209,  210. 

Exarchate,   56,   57,   61,  62,   64, 
160,  252. 

language,  54. 

race,  54,  55. 

Red  Cross  Society,  254. 

Uniate  Church,  56. 
Bulgars,  brutal  outrages  by,  250, 

251- 
character  of,  55,  60. 

population  of,in  Macedonia,  283. 

Byedov,  Archimandrite  Joachim, 

43- 

Carinthia,  269. 

Carniola,  269. 

Carpathians,  the,  2C,  89. 

Cattaro  (Kotor),  46,  226,  278. 

Cecil,  Lord  Robert,  268. 

Central     Empires  :      see    Austro- 

Hungary,  Germany. 
Cetinje  :   see  Tsetinye. 
Chabrinovitch,  an  anarchist,  and 

the  crime  at  Sarajevo,  170,  171, 

176. 
Chotek,  Countess,  169. 
Christians,   13,  26,  114,   116,   120, 

121,  128. 
'  Comitadji '  bands,  61,  63,  66,  179, 

240. 
Constantine,  King  of  Greece,  130, 

213,  237  ;   abdication  of,  244. 
Constantinople,  18,  25,  30,  53,  58, 

95,113,  121,  128,  131,  135,  163, 
164,  205,  206,  209,  210,  215. 

Christian  races  in,  26. 
Greek  Patriarch  of,  56,  57. 
Corfu,  277. 

Serbian  army  reconstituted  at, 

224,  226-31,  247,  258,  277. 
Serbian    government    removed 

to,  259. 
Yugoslav  manifesto  issued  from, 

266,  26S,  269. 


Corsica,  Serbian  refugees  in,  226, 

257. 
Cracow,  204. 

Cretan  gendarmerie,    155. 
Crete,  115. 
Crimean  war,  37. 
Croat  National  Party,  270. 
Croatia,  166,  178,  270,  278. 

Austrian  rule  in,  26. 

Ban  of,  87. 

Hungarian  treatment  of,  87,  88, 

.  9O)  9}-,  92,  935  I02)  1035  105- 
inhabitants  of,  20,  21. 

Croatian  literature,  43,  44. 

Parliament,  270,  273. 
Croatia-Slavonia,  269. 
Croats,  86,  87,  88,  91,  92,  97,  99, 
102,   103,   105,   106,   107,   108, 
no,  III,   195,  266,   267,    269, 
273 >  277. 
and  Serbs,  20,  86,  166. 
Cyprus,  257. 

CyriUic  alphabet,  20,  44,  102,  108, 
252,  266. 

Dalmatia,  87,  88,  91.  140,  269-71, 
278-80. 
Serbo-Croat  population  of,  20. 
Dalmatian  coast,  Serbs  of  the,  26. 
Damascus,  163. 
Daneff,  M.,   119,     134,    142,    147, 

Danilo,  Bishop,  45. 

Danube,  the,   17,  26,  27,  29,   58, 

68,  71,  82,  83,   134,   140,   142, 

154,  210,  211,  216. 
Dardanelles,  the,  19,  131,  164,  210. 

attack  on  (1915),  205. 
Dedeagatch,  132,  155,  208. 
Detchani,  monastery  of,  18  ;  rifled 

by  Bulgars,  252. 
Dibra,  136,  224. 
Dinaric  Alps,  278. 
Disraeli,  Benjamin,  58,  67. 
Djavid  Pasha,  126,  127,  128. 
Dobrudja,  the,  152.  155,  157,  207. 
Doiran,  141,  144. 


Index 


289 


Draga   Mashin,   Queen-consort  of 
Serbia,  75;  murder  of,  76,  loi. 

Drama,  232,  237. 

Drin,  Black,  river,  224. 
valley,  225. 

Drina,  the,  17,  32,  34,  42,  51,  190, 
198,  199,  201,  211. 

Dubrovnik  CRagusa),  21;,  44,  270, 
278. 

Durazzo,  129,  146,  168,  226. 

Durham,  Miss  M.  E.,  31  «.,  76,  jj. 

Dushan,  Stephen,  14. 


Eastern    Church :     see    Orthodox 

Church. 
Egri-Palanka,  118. 
Egypt,  i64._ 

Ekmetchikei,  fall  of  (1913),  137. 
Ekshisu,  63,  235,  238,  239. 
Elbasan,  224. 
Enos-Midia  line,  140. 
Enver  Pasha,  135,  136. 
Essad  Pasha,  139,  227. 
Exarchate,  Bulgarian,  56,  57,  61, 

62,  64,  160,  252. 


Ferdinand,  Prince  and  Tsar  of 
Bulgaria  (1886-),  95,  115,  131, 
147,  156,  206,  210,  254. 

Fethi  Pasha,  149. 

Fiume  :    see  Riyeka. 

Fiorina,  235,  236,  239,  240. 

Forgach,  Baron  and  Count,  109, 
no,  168,  172,  180. 

France,  93. 

and  the  first  Balkan  war  (1912- 

13),   "7- 
and  the  Great  War,    184,    186, 

187,    192,    197,    205,    213-16, 

218,  219,  221,  226,  227,  231-3, 

236-45. 
and  Morocco,  163. 
and    Serbia,    37,    45,    81,    82; 

Serbian  refugees  in,  247,  256-8. 
Francis  II,  Emperor,  38. 

2071 


Franz  Ferdinand,  Archduke  of 
Austria,  106,  168,  169;  assas- 
sination of,  with  his  wife,  at 
Sarajevo,  171-85,  250. 

Franz  Joseph  II,  Emperor  of 
Austria,  87,  89,  90,  170,  179. 

Frederick,  Archduke    of    Austria, 

French  Adriatic  Mission,  223. 

hospitals  in  Serbia,  233. 
French  Revolution    and  its  influ- 
ence on  nationality,  27,  28. 
Friedjung,    Professor,     100,     105, 

106,  108,  109,  168,  170,  172. 
Friuli,  269. 
Frushka  Gora,  the,  28. 

Gai,  Croatian  poet,  43,  86. 
Galicia,   197. 
Gallwitz,  General,  210. 
Geneva  and  the  Red  Cross,  254. 
George,  Prince  of  Greece,  115. 
George,  Prince  of  Serbia,  loi. 
George,  D.  Lloyd,  5,  268. 
Georgevitch,  Kostadin,  62. 
German  army,  brutal  outrages  by, 

192,  196,  251. 
Germanic  Confederation,  90. 
Germany  : 

and  Austria-Hungary,  70,  90, 
92-4,  96. 

and  the  Balkan  wars  (1912-13), 
121,  156,  157. 

and  the  Berlin-Baghdad  scheme, 

163,  164,  215,  216. 
and  Bulgaria,  210. 

and  the  Eastern  Question  (1878), 

67. 
and  the  route  to  the  East,  163, 

164,  206,  268,  274. 
and  the  Far  East,   163. 

and  the  Great  War,  167,  182, 
186,  188,  197,  204-11,  215-23, 
231,234,237,250,251. 

and  Morocco,  163. 

and  Serbia,  55,  162-4,252,  253, 
267,  268,  277. 


290 


Index 


Germany  {continued)  : 

and  Turkey,  95,   116,   122,  136, 
163,  210. 

colonial  ambitions  of,  162,  163. 
Ghika,  M.,  152. 
Giesl,  Freiherr  von,  173,  182. 
Giolitti,  142,  143. 
Gladstone,  W.  E.,  57. 
Goikovitch,  Voivoda,  211. 
Golden  Horn,  210. 
Goluchowski,  Count,  93. 
Gorizia,  269,  277. 
Gornichevo  Pass,  234,  237,  238. 
Graditch,  Stephen,  25. 
Gradsko,  153,  218. 
Great  Britain,  93,  94. 

and  the  annexation  of  Bosnia- 
Hertzegovina  (1909),  96. 

and  the  first  Balkan  war  (1912- 

13)5  "7- 
and  the  Eastern  Question  (1878), 

58,67. 
and  German  designs  in  Africa, 

163. 
and  the   Great  War,    184,    186, 

187,  205, 213-16, 218,  219, 221, 

226,  227,  231-4,  236-45. 
and  Russia,  58,  67,  94. 
and  the    Sarajevo    crime,    171, 

,83. 
and  Serbia,  37,  41,  45,  78,  268, 

275,  282  ;    Serbian  refugees  in, 

247,  256-8. 
Greece : 

and  the  Balkan  League,  113. 
and  the  Balkan  wars  :    the  first 

(1912-13),  1 19-21,  125-8,  130- 

2,    136-8  ;     the  second   (1913), 

154-8,  232. 
and  Bulgaria,   55,   56,  61,    113, 

130.5  143,  231,  232  ;   treaty  and 

military    convention     between 

(1912),  119-20,  132,  137. 
and    the   Central   Powers,    231, 

23i. 
and  the  Entente  Powers,   212, 
213,  244. 


Greece  (continued) : 

and  the  Great  War,  188,  207, 
209, 211-13,  221,  226, 231,  232, 

237-9) 243,  244. 

and  Macedonia,  59,  61,  63-6, 
155,  212,  244. 

and  Serbia,  45,  145,  150,  212, 
213,221,231,244;  treaty  and 
military  convention  between 
(1913)5  143,  144,  212-14. 

and   the   Treaty   of   Bucharest, 

154-7,  159- 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  68. 
and  Turkey,  60,  114,  115  ;    war 
between  (1912-13),  113-38. 
Greek  army,  115. 

ecclesiastics  in  Bulgaria,  56. 
fleet,  115,  120,  132. 
Patriarchate,  56,  57,  62,  64,  160. 
population  in  Macedonia,  283. 
ports  blockaded  by  the  Entente 

Powers,  232. 
royal  family,  115. 

war  of  independence,  31.  sj 

Grey,     Sir     Edward     (afterwards    f| 

Viscount),  132,  183,  216. 
Guchevo  hills,  198. 
Gueshoff,  M.,  117  «.,  119  ?z.,   138, 

141,.  147,  15°- 
Gundulitch,  Ivan,  25. 

Gyevgyei,  62,  144,  153.  j| 

Habsburg  dynasty,  86-9,   93,  94, 

168,  176,  197,  276,  277.  j 

Hague  Conventions,  violations  of, 

249,  252.  I 

Hague  Tribunal,  182. 
Hartwig,  M.,  148,  173. 
Hassapdjiefl,  General,  154. 
Hertzegovina  : 

and  Austria-Hungary,  87. 

and  the  Great  War,  197. 

insurrection  in  (1875),  50-3,  67. 

language  of,  43. 

Serbian  race  in,  20,  42,  48. 
Hinkovitch,  Dr.  H.,  104,  178,  270. 
H  of  deputation,  27. 


Index 


291 


Hopovo,  monastery  of,  28. 
Hungarian  Parliament,  92. 
Hungary  : 

and  the  Balkans,  148,  149. 

and  the  Croatian  troubles,  166, 
271-4. 

and  the  Prussian  alliance,  167-9. 

and  the  Sarajevo  crime,  178. 

and  Serbia,  190,  192,  197,  206. 
255,  271. 

and  the  Serbo-Croats,  20,  86-93, 
102. 

Austrian  rule  in,  26. 

deportation  of  Serbs  to,  253. 

equality  of  nations  in,  273. 

plains  of,  18,  26. 

railways  of,  88. 
Hussein  Hiimi  Pasha,  113. 

Ibar  river,  17. 

valley,  34. 
Ibrahim  Pasha,  32. 
Ignatieff,  General,  57. 
Hitch,  Colonel,  193. 
Illyria,  43,  86. 
Indian  Empire,  164. 
Ipek  :   see  Petch. 
Istria,  91,  269,  277,  278. 
Italy  : 

and  the  Adriatic,  140. 

and    Austria-Hungary,    87,    96, 

97- 
and  the  second  Balkan  war,  156. 

and  the  Great  War,    184,  226, 

242,  243. 
and    Serbia,    78,    269,    276-81  ; 

Serbian  refugees  in,  247,  256. 
and  the  Triple  Alliance,  70,  142, 

143,  184  n. 
and     the     Yugoslav     question, 

276-81. 
war  with  Turkey  (1911-12),  83, 

116,  122. 
Ivanoff,  General,  137,  155. 

Japan,  163. 
Jonescu,  Take,  143. 


Kalay,  governor  of  Bosnia-Hertze- 

govina,  87,  90. 
Kaltchitch,  25. 
Kara  Dagh  range,  221. 
Karadjitch,  Vuk,  43,  86. 
Kara-George  (Petrovitch),  29,  32- 

5,  37)  159- 
Karageorgevitch    family,    42,    47, 

201,  276.    .9£'e  Alexander  Kara- 
georgevitch. 

Karl   Franz   Joseph,   Emperor  of 
Austria,  169,  176. 

Karlovtzi     (Karlowitz),     Patriar- 
chate at,  27,  86,  87. 
seminary  of,  29. 

Katchanik,  218,  221. 

Katranitza,  238. 

Kavalla,   65,   155,   157,  207,  232, 

237- 

surrender  of  Greek  Army  Corps 
at  (1916),  243. 
Kaymakchalan,  239,  240. 
Kenali,  233,  237,  239-41. 
Khevenhuller,  Baron,  73. 
Khuen-Hodervary,  Ban,  90,  91. 
Kiamil  Pasha,  116, 131,  133,  135. 
Kiao-Chau,  163. 
Kilkitch,  144. 
Kniayevatz,  217. 
Kolubara  valley,  199. 
Konopisht,  169. 
Kopaonik,  158. 
Kossovo,  18, 44,  84,  158,  220. 

battle  of  (1389),  18,  21,  169. 

bread  of,  128-9. 

plain,  17,  18,128,  157,  219,  257. 
Kossuth,  Francis,  91,  92. 
Kotchana,  besieged  and  captured 

by  the  Serbs  (1912),  144,  154. 
Kotor :  see  Cattaro. 
Kovatcheff,  General,   151, 
Kozani,  234,  237,  238. 
Kozhuk,  233. 

Kraguyevatz  35,  42,  175,  200,  217. 
Kralyevitch    Marko,    14,   24,    64 ; 

legend  of,  124-5. 
Kralyevo,  24,  217. 


T2 


292 


Index 


Kratovo,  158. 
Krstitch,  Lieut.,  24,  160. 
Krupanj,  190. 
Krushevatz,  33,  217,  218. 
Kuhne,  Dr.,  271. 
Kumanovo,  18,  249,  250. 

battle  of  (1912),  123,  125,  126, 
128. 
Kurshumlia,  219. 
Kustendil,  120,  124. 
Kutchuk-Kainardji,      Treaty     of 
(1774),  29. 

Lalbach  :   see  Lyublyana. 

Lazar,  Tsar,  221. 

Lazarevatz,  202. 

Leopold  II,  Emperor  of  Austria, 

27. 
Lescovatz,  63,  68,  219,  247. 
Levant,  the,  18,  25. 
Liesh  (Alessio),  226. 
Liubitza,  Princess,  36. 
Lium-Kula,  224. 
London  Peace  Conference  (1913), 

132,  136,  139.  157- 
Lovchen,  Mount,  226. 
Loznitza,  109,  198. 
Lyublyana  (Laibach),  20. 

Macchio,  Baron,  172,  180. 
Macedonia,  48,  188. 

and  Austria-Hungary,  117,  188. 
and  Bulgaria,  58-66,   115,   136, 

141-7,  152,  155,  160,  243,  247, 

250. 
and  the  Gr^t  War,   218,  224, 

232,  235,  216,  244. 
and  Greece,  59,  61,   63-6,   155, 

212,  244. 
and  the  Powers,  60,  61. 
and  Russia,  60. 
and  Serbia,  59,  61,  63,  64,  66, 

115,  116,  141-6,  155,  160,  161, 

212,  247,  250,  256,  275. 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  68. 
and  Turkey,  30,  31,  60.  64.  66, 

68,  113,  115. 


Macedonia  (continued) : 

character  of  the  people,  13,  65, 

66. 
Christians  of,  120,  121. 
'  comitadji  '  bands,  61,  63,  66. 
communications,  65,   161,   162. 
economic  conditions,  65. 
immigrants,  161. 
'  Internal  Organization  '  revolu- 
tionary committee,  61. 
language,  64,  235. 
mixture  of  races  in,  59,  63,  64, 

235-. 
partition    of,    59,    136,     141 -8, 

152,  155,  160,  206,  207. 
peasant  proprietorship,  161. 
population  statistics,  283. 
railways,  162. 
road  construction,  162. 
schools  and  churches,  61-3. 
war    for    liberation    (1912-13), 
1 1 6-40. 
Macedonian  Greece,  244. 
question,  59-66. 
Slavs,  115. 
Mackensen,  General  von,  204,  205, 

210,  215,217,233. 
Magyar  language,  88,  92. 
Magyars,  the,  27,  80,  87,  88,  90-5, 

no,  134,  166-8. 
Maritza  valley,  120,  155,  156,  208. 
Marko,  Kralyevltch  :  see   Kralye- 

vitch  Marko. 
Markovitch,  Professor  Bozho,  107, 

108. 
Marmora,  Sea  of,  132. 
Masaryk,  Professor,  109. 
Matchva,  the,   17,   190,   191,    194, 

196. 
Matthias  Corvinus,  King  of  Hun- 
gary, 26. 
Mauthausen,  prisoners  at,  255,  256. 
Mecca,  163. 
Medical  missions  In    Serbia,    193, 

204,218,233. 
Mediterranean,  the,  164,  276. 
Medua,  San  Giovanni  dl,  129,  226. 


Index 


293 


Mercler,  Cardinal,  250. 
Metternich,  Prince,  37,  51. 
Michael   Obrenovitch   III,   Prince 
of     Serbia     (1840-2,     1860-8), 

37-9>  41-35  45-8,  270. 
Mikra  Bay,  232. 
Milan   Obrenovitch   II,   Prince   of 

Serbia  (1839),  37- 
Milan  Obrenovitch  IV,  Prince  and 

King     of     Serbia     (1868-89), 

48-50,  52,  S3,  68-75,  184. 
Milosh   Obrenovitch  I,  Prince    of 

Serbia      (1817-39,       1858-60), 

34-7- 
Mishitch,  Voivoda,  123,  201,  211, 

215,  233,  237,  241. 

Mitrovitza,  17,  69,  129,  162,  219, 
220. 

Moglena  mountains,  233,  242. 

Moglenitza  river,  259. 
valley,  234-6. 

Mohammedans,  21,  22,  34,  36,  51, 
67,  97,  98,  "4,  160,  195,  266. 

Monastir,  118,  123,  141,  162,  218, 
224,  233,  234,  253,_  259,  264  ; 
occupied  bythe  Serbians  (1912), 
126,  127,  143,  144,  146,  157; 
taken  by  the  Bulgars  (191 5), 
224,  250 ;  attacked  and  re- 
captured by  the  Allies  (19 16), 
236-42,  245. 
plain,  17,  126,  127,  157,  233, 
2385  239,  242. 

Mondain,  Colonel,  42. 

Montenegro  : 

and     the     two     Balkan     wars 
(1912-13),  120,  129,  131,   132, 

138,  139,  159- 
and  the  Great  War,  197,  220-1, 

223,  226. 
and  Serbia,  25,  45-7,  loi,  157, 

267,  276. 
and  the   Treaty   of  Berlin,    67, 

68. 
inhabitants  of,  20,  269. 
internal  conditions,  46,  47. 
physical  features,  45,  46. 


Morava,    river,    17,    120,  217-19, 

227,  248, 253. 
valley,  17,  34,  54,  199,  200,  215, 

247,  251. 
Morocco,  German  designs  on,  163. 
Moslems,  22,  25,  26,  31,56, 87,  222. 
Murad,  Sultan,  170. 
Mussulmans,  98,  114,  160. 

population    of,    in    Macedonia, 

285. 

Napoleon  I,  25,  32,  34,  43,  86. 
Napoleon  III,  45,  56. 
'Narodna  Odbrana',  84,  181. 
Nastitch,  100,  loi,  102,  104,  105. 
Natalie,  Queen-consort  of  Serbia, 

49,  74- 
Nazim  Pasha,  136. 

Nice,  224. 

Nicholas   I,   Prince   and   King   of 

Montenegro    (i860-),    45,    46, 

loi,  138,  139,  276. 
Nicholas    II,    the    late    Tsar    of 

Russia,  117,  118,  141,  147,  152. 
Nikshitch,  Archbishop,  35. 
Nish,  54,  68,  73,  190,  193,  200,  203, 

206,  216,  217,  247, 274. 
bishop  of,  251. 
Nishava  river,  217. 

valley,  54. 
Nisia  Voda,  239.  ' 

North  Sea,  163,  205,  275. 
Nourreddungian  Eflendi,  136. 
Novi  Pazar,  Sandjak  of,  18,  20,  25, 

67,  97,  118-20,  129,  134,  157, 

220. 
Novi  Sad,  44. 
Nyegush,  house  of,  25. 

Obelitch,  Milosh,  170. 
Oblakovo,  123,  127. 
Obradovitch,     Dositey,    and    the 

intellectual  revival  of  the  Serbs, 

28,  29,  43. 
Obrenovitch    dynasty,    48,    74-6. 

See  Michael,  Milan,  and  Milosh 

Obrenovitch. 


294 


Index 


Ohrida,  ii8,  128,  136,  141,  157. 

Lake  of,  18,  118. 
Old  Serbia  (northern  Macedonia), 

17,  18,42,  52,  72,  84,  118,  126, 

134,  141,  160,  188,  222,  247. 
Orthodox     calendar,     suppression 

of,  252. 
Orthodox  Church,  21,  22,  29,  45, 

57)  64,  89,  179,  197,  266. 
Ostrovo,  234,  235,  238. 

Lake,  237. 
Ottoman  Empire  :   see  Turkey. 

Paget,  Lady,  218. 
Palmotitch,  25. 

Pashitch,  M.,  143,  146,  147,  159, 
170,  172-4,  182,  183,  205,  213, 

259,  266,  268. 
Persian  Gulf,  163,  164. 
Petalino,  242. 

Petch  (Ipek),  18,  220,  224. 
Patriarchate  of,  23,  27. 

Peter  I,  King  of  Serbia  (1903-), 
32,  37,  76-80,  83,  90, 95, 101-3, 
105.    123,    159,    172,    197,   201, 

260,  265. 

Petrograd,  93,  146,  183,  185,  186. 

Petrovitch,  George  :  see  Kara- 
George. 

Pirot,  68,  73,  152,  217,  274. 
'  Podgoritza,  223,  225,  226. 

Pola,  280. 

Poland,  197,  204,  205. 

Polog,  241. 

Popovitch,  Voivoda  Vuk,  240. 

Potiorek,  General,  171,  177,  199. 

Prepolatz,  219,  221. 

Prespa,  Lake,  233,  243. 

Price,  W.  H.  Crawfurd,  125. 

Prilep,  64,  118,  126,  141,  157,  241. 
battle  of  (1912),  123. 

Prinzip,  an  anarchist,  assassinates 
the  Archduke  Franz  Ferdinand 
and  his  wife  at  Sarajevo,  171. 

Prishtina,  157,  219-21. 

Prizren,  135,  140. 

Prochaska  aflair,  the,  135. 


Prodanovitch,  M.,  282. 

Prokuplye,  247. 

Provoslav  Church  :    see  Orthodox 

Church. 
Prussia  and  Austria-Hungary,  90, 

Putnik,   Voivoda,    123,    153,    159, 
189,  199,  233  ;    death  of,  224. 

Radakovitch,  Colonel,  249,  250. 

Radoslavofl,  M.,  207,  208,  212. 

Radovishte,  128,  144,  152,  154. 

Ragusa  :   see  Dubrovnik. 

Rashka,  219. 

Rauch,  Baron,  92. 

Reiss,  Dr.  R.  A.,  192-6. 

Rhodope  mountains,  118. 

Ristitch,  M.,  52,  53. 

Riveri,  Colonel,  255. 

Riyeka  (Fiume),  87,  88,  91,  269, 

277,278. 
Roman  Catholics,  20,  21,  56,  67,  86, 

89,  90,  97,  i60j  170,  223,  266. 
Rome,  182,  186. 
Roumania  : 

and  Austria-Hungary,  88,  167, 

and    the    second    Balkan    war 
(1913),  68,  151,  152,  154,  155. 

and  the   Great  War,    188,  205, 
207,  209,  244,  275. 

and  Serbia,  276. 

and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878), 
68. 

conquered  by  the  Turks,  26. 

independence  of,  42. 

insecurity  of,  45. 

war    with    Turkey    (1877),     53, 
58. 
Roumelia,  Eastern,  58,  72. 
Rozhan,  battle  at  (1914),  198,  199. 
Rudnik,  265. 

range,  200,  201. 
Rupel,  Fort,  232,  237. 
Russia  : 

and  Asia  Minor,  163,  164. 

and    Austria-Hungary,    93,    96, 
105,  139. 


Index 


295 


Russia  {continued) : 

and  the  Balkan  wars  (1912-13), 
117,  118,  121,  141,  143-6,  152, 

155- 
and  Bulgaria,  32,  54,  60,  72,  141, 

143,  145-9)  152,  155;  213. 
and  the  Central  Empires,  70. 
and  Great  Britain,  67,  68. 
and  the  Great  War,  184-6,  189, 

197,204,205,208-10,215,232, 

239,  240,  242,  243. 
and  Macedonia,  60. 
and  Montenegro,  45. 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878), 

67,  68. 
and    Serbia,    29,    32-4,    37,   45, 

49)  53)  54)  60,  141,  143,  145-9, 

152,  181,  185,  186. 
wars  with  Turkey,  32  ;  (i  877-8), 

53,  58- 

Salisbury,  Lord,  67. 

Salonika,  13,  17,  18,  51,  56,  58,  65, 
6?)  7°i7h  82,  83,  94,  117,  120, 
128,  130,  138,  143-5,  152)  154) 
161,  164,  212,215,233,  263. 
Anglo-French  army  at,  212,  213, 
214,  216,  218,  221,  231,  232-5, 

244)  245)  248. 
passes    into    possession    of    the 

Greeks  (1913),  155. 
Serbian  refugees  at,  256. 
Sandjak,  the  :  see  Novi  Pazar. 
San  Giovanni  di  Medua,  225. 
San  Stefano,  Treaty  of  (1878).  58, 

138. 
Santi  Quaranta,  227. 
Sarajevo,  99,  loi,  197. 

the  murder  of  June   28,    1914, 

100,  170-85,  250. 
trade-centre,  25. 
Sarrail,  General,  231,  232,  24P,  244. 
Sartorio,  Aristide,  255. 
Sava,  St.,  14,  24,  125. 
Save,  the,   17,  39,   134,   142,   190, 

191,  199,  210,  211,  215. 
SavofI,  General,  137,  142,  150. 


Sazonov,  M.,  182,  185. 

Scutari,   120,   129,   131,    132,   138, 

139,  168,  223,  225-7. 
Selim  III,  Sultan,  30,  31,  33-5. 
Serbia  : 

and  Albania,  140,  141,  145,  159, 

165. 
and    Austria-Hungary,    20,    27, 

29)  37)  38,  43)  45)  47)  49-55) 
60,  69-73,  76-8,  80-5,  88,  90, 

91,  94-7,  105-13,  116,  134-6, 
142-5,  157,  158,  162,  165,  168, 
176,  246,  247,  249-56,  267, 
271,  272,  275. 
and  the  Balkan  wars  :  the  first 
(1912-13),  III,  115-19,  121-30, 

I32r.  134-9,  144,  145;  the 
second  (1913),  146-59. 

and  Bosnia,  69,  169,  170. 

and  Bosnia-Hertzegovina,  51-3, 
95,  96,  loi,  102,  165-6. 

and  Bulgaria,  50,  54,  55,  81, 
113,  117,  141-4 ;  treaty  be- 
tween (1912),  117-20,  137-8, 
141,  143-65  war  between, 
(1885)  72,  73,  (1913)  146-59, 
(191 5-)  55)  206-48,  250-4,  256, 
275. 

and  the  Entente  Powers,  212, 
214,  216,  218,  221,  223,  226, 
227,  229,  231-3,  236,  247, 
275-82. 

and  Germany,  55,  162-4,  252, 
253,  267,  268,  277. 

and  the  Great  War  :  Austria's 
ultimatum  (1914),  no,  174-5, 
180-1,  271  ;  Serbia's  reply, 
1 8 1-2  ;  war  with  Austria, 
182-6,  188-204,  213  j  the 
German-Austrian  invasion  and 
entry  of  Bulgaria,  205-19  ;  the 
retreat  across  the  mountains, 
219-28  5  recuperation  at  Cor- 
fu. 229-31  ;  return  to  active 
warfare,  232-47. 

and  Great  Britain,  78,  268,  275, 
282. 


296 


Index 


Serbia  {continued)  : 

and  Greece,  45,  145,  150,  212, 
213,  221,  231,  244;  Serbo- 
Greek  alliance  (1867),  45  ; 
treaty  between  (1913),  143-4, 
212-14. 

and  Italy,  269,  276-81. 

and  Macedonia,  59,  61,  63,  64, 
66,  115,  116,  141-6,  155,  160, 
161,  212,  247,  250,  256,  275. 

and  Montenegro,  25,  45-7,  loi, 

157,  267,  276. 
and  Roumania,  276. 

and  Russia,  29,  32,  33,  34,  37, 
4S>  495  53>  54,  60,   141,    143, 

145-9,  ^52;  181,  185,  186. 
and    the    Sarajevo    crime,    100, 

170-85,  250. 
and  the  Southern  Slavs,  86-iii. 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878), 

67-9)72,  159- 
and    the    Treaty    of    Bucharest 

(1913),  155-7- ' 
and  Turkey,  18,  21,  22,  26,  27, 

29-3S,  45',  52,  68,  78,  83,  248  ; 
war  between,  (1813)  33,  (1876- 

7)53,54,  (1912)  113-38- 
absence  of  outlet  to  the  sea,  19, 
60,  69,  83,  129,  130,  138,  140, 

158,  170,  267,  269. 

agrarian  system,  36,  40. 

agriculture,  40,  41,  80,  82. 

commerce,  19,  20,  71,  72,  81-3. 

commercial  treaties  :  with  Aus- 
tria, 82  ;  proposed  treaty  with 
Bulgaria,  81,  82. 

divisions,  17,  18. 

economic  bondage  of,  60,  71,  72, 

81,  158. 
financial  burdens,  jj,  80,   157, 

162. 
frontiers  of,  19. 
gateway  to  the  East,  5,  19,  164, 

185,  206,  268. 
geography  of,  17-20. 
heroes  of,  23-5. 
industries,  79,  80. 


Serbia  {continued)  : 

laws  as  to  inheritance,  40,  41. 
live-stock  trade,  82,  83. 
mediaeval  towns,  18. 
military  divisions,  17. 
mineral  wealth,    158. 
'  Narodna   Odbrana  '    (National 

Defence  Society),  84,  181. 
national  debt,  157. 
national    independence    of,    34, 
42,55,182. 
national  rights  denied  to,  253, 

254- 
natural   resources,    19. 
'  New  Narodna   Odbrana  ',   84, 

85. 
'Pig- War',  81,  82. 
population,  20. 
products,  158. 
public  services,  jj,  78,  80. 
railway  construction,  71,  81,  82, 

rehgion,  20,  21,  27,  43,  89,  266. 

roads,  36. 

sacred  places,  18. 

salt-mines,  36. 

schools,  36,  81. 

science,  44. 

self-government,  30. 

'  Skupshtina  '  (National  Assem- 
bly), 36,  49,  5.0,  73,  82,  107. 

strength  and  vitahty  of,  20,  21. 

tariff  duties,  81,  82. 

treatment  of  prisoners  by,  192-4. 

'  zadruga ',  or  family  community, 
40,  41. 
Serbian  alphabets,  266. 

army,  36,  42,  48,  50,  75,  76,  78, 
80,  95,  122-5,  260-2. 

aspirations,  265-82. 

books,  appropriated  by  Bulgars, 
252. 

calendar,  266. 

church,  18,  23,  36,  89,  252. 

civil  service,  36. 

'  comitadjis  ',  179,  240. 

constitution,  y^- 


Index 


297 


Serbian  {continued)  : 

education,  29,  36,  81. 

folk-songs  and  ballads,  23-5, 263. 

language,  20,  21,  43,  44,  86. 

literature,  28,  43,  44. 

Ministry  of  the  Interior,  255. 

motto,  32. 

nation,  20. 

press,  36. 

prisoners  of  war,  254-6. 

race,  20,  21,  25,  26. 

Red  Cross,  254. 

refugees,  246-8,  256-9. 

Relief  Fund,  257. 

women,  heroic  spirit  of,  265. 
Serbo-Croat  unity,  44. 
Serbo-Croats,    20,    86-8,    91,    92, 

102,   103,   105-8,   no,   III,    166, 

269-71,  273,  277. 
Serbs,  character  of,  13-15,  39,  40, 
49,   79,    80,   89,   259-65,   281, 
282. 
Austro-Hungarian,  232. 
distribution  of,  25,  26. 
in    Macedonia,    population    of, 

283. 
in  Russia,  27. 
national  spirit  of,  22-5. 
Orthodox,  86,  89,  97,  103. 
Seres,  65,  232,  237. 
Sfetkoff,  '  comitadji '  chief,  61. 
Shabatz,  190. 

Shar  Planina  range,  118,  221. 
Shebenik,  270,  280. 
Shtip,4i,  115,  151,  152. 
Shukri  Pasha,  137. 
Shumadia,  25,  32,  199. 
Sicily,  257. 
Silesia,  204. 
Sitnitza,  the,  221. 
Skoplye  (Uskub),  17,  18,  118,  125, 
126,    141,    157,    161,    194,   212, 
215,  218,  221,  251. 
bishop  of,  251. 
Slavenini,  Professor,  281. 
Slavonia,  20,  87,  272. 
Slavo-Serbian  printing  press,  29. 


Slavs,  the,  20,  21,  61,  167,  276-81. 

hopes  of  the,  42-5. 

population    of,    in    Macedonia, 
283. 

Southern :  see  Yugoslavs. 
Slivnitza,  battle  of,  73. 
Slovenes,  the,  20,  87,  266,  267,  269, 

270,  273)  ^77- 
Smederevo,    fall    of    (1459),    21  ; 

(1915),   215. 

Smith,  G.  Gordon,  208,  218. 

Smyrna,  1 14. 

Sofia,  60,  61,  65,  72,  152.  206,  207, 

209,  250,  251. 
^Sorovitch,  234,  235,  237. 

Southern    Slav    Committee,    pro- 
gramme of,  266-7. 

Southern  Slavs  :   see  Yugoslavs. 

Spalato  :   see  Split. 

Spalaykovitch,  M.,  106,  107. 

Spash,  224. 

Split  (Spalato),  in,  270,  280. 

Starkov  Grob,  attacked  and  cap- 
tured by  the  Serbs,  233,  238, 

239- 
Steitch,  Prota,  248. 

Stepanovitch,  Milan,  106. 

Stepanovitch,  Voivoda  Stepan, 

124,  125,  211,  214,  233,  236. 
Stephen     Dushan,     Emperor     of 

Serbia,  18. 
Stojanovitch,  M.,  82, 
Strossmayer,  Bishop,  43,  86. 
Struga,  264. 
Struma  river,  65,  118,  237,  243. 

valley,  156,  232. 
Strumitza,  144,  218. 
Styria,  269. 

Svientochowski,  M.,  108. 
Switzerland,  205  ;  Serbian  refugees 

in,  247)  256. 
Syrmia,  20,  27,  198,  199. 

Tartars,  54. 

Thessaly,  120,  234,  244. 

Thrace,  68,  118,  120,  128,  131,  136, 

137) 143-5- 


298 


Index 


Timok,  the,  17,  32,  34,  58,  217. 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  169. 

Tisza,  Count.  148,  149,  166-8,  178, 

180,  273. 
Topshider,  47. 

Trade-routes  of  the  Balkans,  18. 
'  Trialism ',  169,  176,  185. 
Trieste,  29,  166,  269,  280. 
Triple  Alliance,  the,  70,  90,   142, 

143,  184  w. 
Trumbitch,  Dr.,  266,  270. 
Tsankov,  Dragan,  56. 
Tschirschky,  Count  von,  168,  180. 
Tser  mountains,  191. 
Tserna    river,    127,    224,    239-43,' 

245)  259- 
valley,  234. 

Tsetinye    (Cetinje),    25,   46,    226 ; 

plot,  100,  lOI. 
Tsvijitch,  M.,  51. 
Tunis,  226. 
Turkey  : 

and  Albania,  1 16. 

and  Austria-Hungary,  89,  94,  95. 

and  the  Balkan  wars  :    the  first 

(1912-13),  113-35,  i4o-2>  i44j 

I49>    '57  5    the  second  (1913), 

154,  I55-. 
and    Bosnia-Hertzegovina,     50, 

51,  67. 
and  Bulgaria,  52,  53,  55-61,  68  ; 

war  between,  (1876)  57,  (1912- 

13)  113-38- 
and    Germany,    116,    122,    136, 

163,  210. 
and   the  Great  War,   205,   206, 

208,  220. 
and  Greece,  60,  114,  115;    war 

between  (1912-13),  113-38. 
and  Macedonia,  60,  64,  66,  68, 

113)  "S; 
and  Serbia,   18,  21,  22,  26,  27, 

29-38,  45)  52,  68,  78,  83,  248  ; 
war  between,  (1813)  33,  (1876- 

7)  53,  54)  (1912)  113-38- 
and  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (1878), 
67-9. 


Turkey  {continued)  : 
decline  of,  26. 
land  system  of,  98. 
payment  of  tribute  to,  22,  23,    ' 

35). 51- 
religion  of,  22,  23. 

revolution  in  (1913),  135-6. 

Serbian  portions  of,  21. 

war   with    Italy    (1911-12),    83, 

1 16,  122. 
wars  with  Russia,  32  ;   (1877-8), 

53,  58. 
Turkey  in  Asia,  163. 
Turkish  administration,   116,  160, 
161. 
army,  114,  1 16. 
fleet,  120. 
janizaries,  22,  30. 
Turks,  character  of  the,  13,  22,  26. 
masters  of  the  Balkan  peninsula. 

26. 
Young  Turks,  94,  95,  113,  115, 
1.16,  133,  135,  136. 
Tzaribrod.  147,  152. 

Uskub  :   see  Skoplye. 
Uzhitze,  203. 

Valona,  225-7,  280. 
V^alyevo,      203  ;       besieged      and 
captured     by     the     Austrians 
(1914),    198,    199 ;     recaptured 
by  the  Serbs,  201,  202. 
Vardar  plain,  233,  234. 
railway,  161. 
river,  118,  144,  153,  157. 
valley,  17,  18,  65,  120,  143,  154, 
209,  218,  221,  235,  256. 
Vasitch,  General,  43,  55,  236,  237, 

243- 
Vasitch.  a  journalist,  108,  109. 

Veles,  18,  118,  126,  141,  157. 

Venice,  278,  279. 

Venizelist  volunteer  army,  244. 

Venizelos,  E.,  115,  116,  143,  208, 

209,  212,  213,  231,  232,244. 


Index 


299 


Verrla,  130,  234,  236,  238. 

Vertekop,  234-6,  264. 

Vesnitch,  M.,  262. 

Via  Egnatia,  the,  233,  234. 

*  Vidovdan ',      Serbian      national 

festival,  169,  170,  177. 
Vienna,  26,  27,  29,  49.  91,  106-8, 

116,    134,    168,   172,    174,    180, 

182-6,  190,  199,  203. 
Vistritza  river,  138. 

valley,  234. 
Vladovo,  65. 
Vodena,  65,  235. 
Vrana,  152. 
Vranya,  18,  68,  218. 
Vraz,  86. 
Vrbeni,  236,  240. 


William  II,  German  Emperor,  94, 

96,  116,  167,  169. 
William  of  Wied,  Prince,  165. 
Wilson,  President,  268. 


Yada  river,  191. 

Yankovitch,    General,     128,     129, 

15.3,  174- 
Yannina,  blockaded  by  the  Greeks 


(1912),    132;     fall    of    (1913), 

Yenidje-Vardar,  65,  234 ;  Turks 
defeated  at,  by  the  Greeks 
(1912),  130. 

Young  Turks  :    5^*?  Turks. 

Yugoslav  Academy,  86. 

Yugoslav  Committee,  programme 
of,  266-7,  269-70,273. 

Yugoslavs,  Yugoslavia  (Southern 
Slavs),  21,  52,  85-1 1 1,  166, 
170,  176,  185,  245,  266-81. 

Yurishitch,  General,  211,  233,  236, 

237- 

Zadar  (Zara),  91,  270,  271,  279. 
Zagreb,  44,  86,  91-3,  178,  256. 
political     conspiracy     trial     at 
(1909),  102-1 1,  272. 
Zaimis;  M.,  232. 
Zeki  Pasha,  122,  125,  126. 
Zhivkovitch,    General,    211,    232, 

236. 
Zhivonia,  240. 

Zimmermann,  Herr  von,  189. 
Zimun,  36,  104,  192,  272. 
*  Zimun  tradition  ',  192. 
Zletovska,  river,  141,  152. 
Zvonomir,  278. 


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