GUNS AND CAVALRY
BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOX STRANGWAYS.
GUNS AND CAVALRY
THEIR PERFORMANCES IN THE PAST
AND THEIR PROSPECTS IN THE FUTURE
BY
MAJOR E. S. MAY, R.A.
AUTHOR OF "ACHIEVEMENTS OF FIELD ARTILLERY :
WITH PLANS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
BOSTON
ROBERTS BROTHERS
1896
U-
/6J
M,
LONDON :
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.
PREFACE.
MUCH of what the following pages contain has been
said before by me in lectures or articles which I have
written within the last few years. It has been sug-
gested to me that they might interest more than the
comparatively narrow circle of officers for which they
were originally intended, and accordingly I have here
thrown my ideas into a more connected and less fugitive
form.
To a book which is neither written wholly for
professional soldiers, nor yet in a style which appeals
to popular taste alone, some few words by way of
preface seem demanded. To one class of readers I
must often appear to dwell on matters which are
already obvious and need no explanation, while I may
occasionally weary another with details and considera-
tions which are too technical to be attractive. Yet all
viii PREFACE.
soldiers are not students, and many laborious civilians
in their hours of relaxation are very capable soldiers
indeed. I take the opportunity, therefore, of offering
my apologies to both the parties whose indulgence I
may have trespassed upon from opposite directions,
and plead as my excuse that it is a difficult task to
satisfy everybody.
.That some words on the action of guns and cavalry
may rjot, however, just now be . superfluous, when the
problem of their.' application .is far more complicated
than it was before scientific ingenuity had invaded
successfully the realm of the gun-constructor, is shown
by the interest the subject has within the last' year or
two aroused above and beyond the. special attraction
which for certain minds it has always possessed.
No branch of the art of war is more difficult; none
calls for .the -exhibition of more soldierlike qualities,
physical as well as. mental, on the part -"of a leader,
and in none are so many /noble chances offered.^
The .story of cavalry and . of artillery -co-operating-
with. It . .is', a record studded - with the - -names - of-
quick,, resolute men, -low.. down in- the- scale of pre-
cedence according to -rank or -age, -who climbed- to
PREFACE.
fame by such deeds as have ever delighted soldiers.
Men vigorous, and energetic in body, and with some
touch of that indefinite quality which may most fitly
be expressed as military instinct, but which merges
or develops imperceptibly into what without inflation
of language we may term genius for war. Many
of them never rose to high dignities ; many were
killed or died when comparatively young: Norman
Ramsay was but a brevet major when he fell at
Waterloo ; Brandling and Von Woldersdorf were
captains when they acutely influenced the fate of
a serious combat ; Lasalle was thirty-four when he
lost his life at Wagram ; Murat was only four years
his senior ; and Kellerman, when he, " inspired by a
happy and sudden resolve, threw himself on the
Austrian column," and won Marengo for Buonaparte,
was no more than thirty. The unexpected, sudden,
and fleeting opportunities offered by the circumstances
under which cavalry and guns engage, are indeed the
very ones in which he who is something more than
mediocre and painstaking may win his spurs. It is
because of this that there is a greater halo of romance
round these arms than any others, and that on them
b
PREFACE.
so much of the admiration and attention of the general
public is centred.
I can only hope that the interest of such a subject
may atone for and to some extent hide any deficiencies
of execution of which I may have been guilty.
E. S. MAY.
IlTGJIFTELD, WOOLWICH.
March Wi, 1896.
CONTENTS.
THE MOBILITY OF GUNS ....
II.— THE ACTION OF GUNS AND CAVALRY TOGETHER
III.— EXAMPLES OF CO-OPERATION WHEN ACTING AS
AN INDEPENDENT FORCE .
IV. OPPORTUNITIES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD
V. — SUBSIDIARY ROLES
PAGE
i
24
73
106
146
Vi —SOME REMARKS AS TO THE INFLUENCE OF QUICK-
FIRING, MACHINE GUNS, AND MOUNTED
INFANTRY . ..... .181
INDEX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND
PLANS.
PAGE
BRIGADIER-GENERAL Fox STRANGWAYS' . Frontispiece
HORSE ARTILLERY IN MOVEMENT .... 9
OLIVER CROMWELL 25
FREDERICK THE GREAT 30
GENERAL VON ZIETHEN 39
FIELD MARSHAL SIR HEW D. Ross, G.C.B. . . 41
SERGEANT-MAJOR JAMES WIGHTMAN, R.H.A. . . 59
GENERAL SIR JAMES SCARLETT, K.C.B. ... 77
COLONEL SIR AUGUSTUS FRAZER, K.C.B. ... 80
HORSE ARTILLERY IN ACTION 83
LlEUT.-COLONEL J. J. BRANDLING, R.A., C.B. . . 89
PLAN OF BATTLE OF BALACLAVA . To face page 93
MAJOR NORMAN RAMSAY, R.H.A 116
PLAN OF BATTLE OF ALBUERA . . To face page 123
GENERAL SIR E. C. WHINYATES, K.C.B. . . . 126
PLAN OF BATTLE OF WAGRAM 131
PLAN OF BATTLE OF LOIGNY-POUPRY. . . .143
SAVING THE GUNS AT MAI WAND (reproduced by kind
permission of Messrs. Borgen &> Turner, Carlton
Gallery, Pall Mall, S.W.} 165
MURAT, KING OF NAPLES 171
NOTE.— The Author has to thank the Committees of the
R.A. Mess and R.A. Institution, Woolwich, for permission
to reproduce several of the above pictures.
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
CHAPTER I.
THE MOBILITY OF GUNS.
THE whole question of the efficiency of guns acting
with cavalry hinges on the mobility with which they
are endowed ; and since the number of animals which
can be made to work together to the best advantage
and the powers of each individual horse are limited, it
will not be unprofitable to devote our opening chapter
to a discussion of the value which mobility is to Field
Artillery in general. Horse Artillery, the arm usually
employed with horsemen, simply differs from ordinary
Field Artillery in the fact that its gunners ride, while
the others either walk, and retard rapid progress,
because they can do so no faster than other foot-
soldiers, or sit on the carriages and add burthens to
the team, which tell as surely on a march as does the
weight-cloth on a racecourse,
B
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
When a field battery moves lightly past the
General at a review on a level sward with an ease
apparently equal to that displayed by one in yellow-
laced jackets, people are apt to forget that the extra
weight has as yet had no time to tell ; that the guns
have been dragged perhaps not a mile from the com-
fortable stables where the horses have been fed a few
hours previously, and whither they will return again
in a comparatively brief period to well-filled mangers.
Field and Horse batteries both appear to manoeuvre
with equal elegance and freedom, and as regards
mobility there does not seem to be a very vast
difference between them even to the generality of
officers.
. The delusion is perhaps further increased by the
fact that in respect to fire effect they really are very
much on the same footing.
This is so because the demands of modern tactics
and the power of the most recent Horse Artillery
guns are such that batteries cannot be allowed to
stand idle during a great battle, and therefore our
Horse Artillery batteries of to-day, whatever may
have been necessary in the past, must be trained and
utilised in precisely the same manner as are field
batteries ; and they constitute in fact simply mobile
Field Artillery. If expense and forage considerations
THE LESSONS OF THE PAST.
were of no moment it would indeed be better to have
all gunners, both of Horse and Field Artillery,*
mounted, and thus ease the horses. Mobility is the
most vital characteristic which artillery should possess,
and, leaving its use with the cavalry division altogether
out of sight for a moment, it is in this respect that
Horse Artillery is always valuable.
I need scarcely now enlarge on what is but a well-
worn commonplace, that has been illustrated in the
last great European wars just as in the old days, when
its truth was more generally recognised, but I will
remind my readers once more that at Dresden Napo-
leon had to double the teams which could not draw
his guns by taking horses from the commissariat
waggons ; that at La Rothiere the artillery of Sacken's
Corps could not be got forward, and that one-half had
to be left on the ridge of Trannes, while all the horses
took on the other half, and came back for the re-
mainder ; that after Montmirail the Russian artillery
could only be got off the field by harnessing fifty
Hussars with long ropes to each gun ; and that at
Vauchamps, when Grouchy got across Blucher's line of
retreat with his cuirassiers, all the accounts tell us that
* It has this year been suggested by the Camp Commandant
at Okehampton that with a Field battery two gunners should in
future be mounted on the off horses of the gun teams.
B 2
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
not a man would have escaped had not the two Horse
Artillery batteries which formed part of his division
been delayed by the execrable state of the roads too
far behind to be of service.
And — to come down to more recent times — in the
discussion following a lecture I gave a year ago on
Cavalry and Horse Artillery, Lieut-General Sir
William Stirling, K.C.B., gave the following account
of his experiences with " C " Troop, R.H.A., during the
Crimean war, which I shall myself refer to later on.
After a reference to its armament and the events of
the 25th of October, 1854, he said :—
"Again, at the Tchernaya, on the i6th of August,
1855, 'C' Troop was with the British cavalry and Horse
Artillery in reserve. After the fall of Sebastopol on
the 8th of September, 1855, a cavalry division of forty
squadrons, to which three Horse Artillery batteries
were attached, was formed at Eupatoria to the north
of Sebastopol to threaten the Russian communication.
There was a Turkish Horse Artillery battery with
comparatively light pieces and only four horses in the
team, I think ; there was a French Horse Artillery
battery with six horses in the team, armed with the
piece that had been an 8-pr. and was now bored up
to throw a 12-pr. projectile, and considered to be
good up to a mile ; and then there was ' C ' Troop,
CRIMEAN EXPERIENCES. 5
R.H.A., with its 9-prs. of 39 and 40 cwt., with eight
horses in the team and ten mounted men in the
detachments.
" During the five weeks in October and November,
1855, that this force remained at Eupatoria there were
three reconnaissances in which the whole cavalry took
part, supported by a strong Franco-Turkish infantry
division. There were also several smaller reconnais-
sances made by portions of the forces. The country
was quite perfect for cavalry and Horse Artillery to
work over, an undulating grassy steppe, but water was
scarce and very bad, and the force could not on this
account remain out beyond the third day on either
occasion.
" The experience gained by ' C ' Troop, even
working over this very favourable ground, and with
excellent horses in good condition, was that the
weight behind the teams was quite excessive, and
that both the extra pair of horses in the team and
the great weight of the equipment would effect-
ually bar co-operation with cavalry under normal
circumstances.
" Gentlemen, we do not want guns that can just be
rolled up into position and there stand and blaze
away at long ranges ; we want to come to short
ranges and to be able to keep up with the cavalry ;
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
and I think, Sir,* that the whole question of the co-
operation of guns with cavalry turns upon the weight
that we put behind the teams."
Yet fourteen years ago in spite of these experiences,
and of a hundred similar ones, our Horse Artillery
batteries were again found deficient in mobility on
active service, and we would do well, in this age of
science and theory, to bear in mind that mobility is
the first essential to artillery, that we do not make war
on grassy lawns, or only in summer weather, that horses
lose their strength when underfed and over- worked.
Why the lessons of campaigning, and such facts as
I have just quoted, should have been forgotten, I know
not, unless it be that we live not only in an age much
given to study and theory, but distinguished for in-
ventive genius also. Every impulse which science
imparts to manufacture improves the material means
of destruction, and as firearms become more perfect,
there is a tendency for men to dwell rather on what
may be done with them when soldiers are actually
shooting on one another, than on the manoeuvres
which bring about their judicious application.
Musketry and gunnery being exact sciences, are,
therefore, to the majority of thoughtful minds more
* General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C , G.C.B., G.C.M.G., was in
the chair.
THE INFLUENCE OF FIREARMS,
attractive than tactics, and there is sometimes a cold-
ness where there should be sympathy between two
schools of thought. The effect of fire can be measured
on a target, while that of a charge or rapid march
requires actual hostilities to give illustration of its
value. We have target practice with us every day,
but war experiences come but at wide intervals of
time, or to some perhaps never, and so we lack
object lessons to guide us in one direction, and that
too a most important one.
It is a curious thing, however, that as cavalry, the
most mobile arm, lost in importance as musketry
advanced, and even sacrificed its dash to the improved
art of shooting, it was in mobility that artillery made
way under the new conditions. The matter came
about in this way.
Seeing the vast benefit which infantry derived from
the growing power of firearms, cavalry men in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were tempted to
discard the tactics on which they had hitherto relied,
and which were their special characteristic, and sought
aid also from powder and ball. Thus it was that the
greatest of German soldiers found his regiments when
he came to the throne halting to fire a volley ere
they delivered their charge, and it required all the
strength of character of a man exceptionally strong-
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
willed to stamp the heresy out. But although
Frederick appreciated, as every military genius has
done before his time and since, the fact that mobility
is essential to success in war, he found he could not
dispense with fire effect even with his cavalry, and
thus, curiously enough, it was that guns in Europe,
in order to supplement the efforts of the horseman,
became endowed as it were with a new life, and they
were no longer content to be classified as " train," and
to plod wearily along with the heavy baggage driven
by waggoners on foot.
From the new powers of movement that were now
given them a whole series of results, each foreshadow-
ing some modern development of their tactics, was
produced. Guns that could move could be combined
together, could be brought rapidly forward to deal a
decisive blow, or could be carried from one part of the
field of battle to another. It was activity in fact,
rather than improved shooting powers, which first
raised artillery from the position it once occupied as a
mere appendage to the infantry, into the status and
position of an arm capable (although it is not in-
tended to and does not desire to use its powers) of
independent action.
Thus it was that artillery officers, remembering,
perhaps, how much their arm had been indebted to
A SINE QUA NON.
mobility in the past, came twenty years ago to over-
estimate its importance, or rather to underrate that of
fire. Then the inevitable reaction set in. We were
taught that the whole duty of artillery was to hit, hit,
hit. And not long ago we have been reminded very
forcibly that we must concentrate, concentrate, con-
centrate. Till we have practical demonstration of the
effect of modern shrapnel, I feel diffident in making
any assertions, but I will nevertheless venture to add
a corollary to both these postulates, to the effect that
guns must be able to move freely also, otherwise they
may find themselves in a position from which, perhaps,
their hitting, if they survive long enough to find the
range, may be of little avail, and their concentration
will be that of an unwieldy mass.
Accuracy without concentration is, in fact, of no
value : concentration of fire means combination of
batteries, and combination demands mobility. In
other words, tactical considerations must form the
foundations for technical excellence.
Napoleon, who destroyed his earlier opponents
chiefly by the rapidity of his movements, in his later
campaigns relied much on his artillery. He valued
fire effect so greatly that some of his maxims in
war might almost appear to be the utterances of an
enthusiastic musketry or gunnery instructor of our
12 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
own times. " Fire effect is everything, all the rest is
nothing." " Victory will be his who understands how to
bring a great mass of guns into action unexpectedly."
Are not these but paraphrases of the very precepts we
hear round us in the mouths of many to-day ?
A combination of mobility and of fire effect might
be looked for from artillery at the commencement
of the century. The most essential characteristics
of Napoleon's tactics were, therefore, to be found
united in one arm, and, if we study what was his
greatest artillery battle, we shall find a splendid
illustration of how he turned to account the arm in
which he himself received his first education as a
soldier, and all the powers of which he had done so
much to develop. Nor need we hesitate to discuss
the action of batteries armed with weapons which
are contemptible in the eyes of the gunners of to-day.
While human nature exists the same fundamental
principles must govern the course of all battles.
What occurred at Wagram or Bautzen may very
likely happen in the " next great war." Indeed,
there was a battle fought in 1870 some incidents
of which bear, it seems to me, in certain respects
so close an analogy to the great struggle on the
Marchfeld, that I propose to deal with these two
actions together in a later chapter, and to let two
RAPID MARCHES. 13
engagements, separated by a gap of sixty years,
measured by progress of time, and by whole centuries
as regards progress of science, stand together to corro-
borate one another, and bear witness to the necessity
for an adequate mobility on the part of batteries.
And in the phrase mobility I would include not only
those qualifications which enable the guns and horses
to travel fast, but the personal attributes of the com-
mander who sets them in motion.
Before, however, I go further into this portion of
the subject, it is right that I should remind you that
war does not mean a rapid succession of engage-
ments. " Victory," as Frederick said, " lies in the
legs," and there are many more days of marching
than of fighting during a campaign.
Before ever a foe is seen quickness of movement in
getting over long distances will be urgently required.
Rapid marches will have to be undertaken, not only
for a mile or two, but for distances that it will take
hours, or even days, to traverse. No doubt such great
demands on the mobility of artillery can to some
extent be avoided by assigning to it a very forward
place on the line of march, and good arrangements
here may render the necessity for a great strain of the
powers of men and horses a matter no longer of very
frequent occurrence,
14 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
But however many text-book examples of the
correct order of march for a division or a corps be
studied, such expedients will after all only partially
meet the case. When one considers the great length
of road that must be taken up by an Army Corps on
the line of march, it will be seen that, even with the
best arrangements compatible with prudence, and
.even supposing no unforeseen mistakes or mishaps to
occur, the Corps Artillery must still be several miles
behind the head of the advanced guard, and must
move up at a trot over those miles if it is to be in
position within a reasonable time after it is sent for.
An hour or two might be considered a reasonable
time enough ; but an hour, now that the intensity
of musketry fire has become so much increased, will
be a long time in the life of a battle. It will at any
rate be extremely difficult to make up for what want
of sufficient artillery for even an hour's time may
bring about. An impression will be made more
quickly than in former days, while the value of a first
success or a good beginning will be as important as
ever. Here, therefore, we shall still require as much
mobility as before, and we should be all the better ofif
for a higher standard still.
Nor can artillery with a due regard to safety be
placed in a more forward position on the line of
THE FIRST OF SEPTEMBER, 1870.
march than that already assigned to it by our regula-
tions, nor will it be possible for forces in bivouac to
bring their artillery masses nearer to the enemy than
has hitherto been the custom, for as Prince Kraft has
told us, in bivouacs, especially at night, artillery is
defenceless and must be left in rear.
Whichever way we look at it we must be forced to
the conclusion that long marches at a trot will have
to be undertaken on certain occasions in any future
campaign, and the experience of actual warfare will
only bring the fact more clearly before us.
It scarcely seems necessary in the light of all that
has been written on the subject, to bring forward
examples to prove what will sound to students a
truism. I have already referred to the experiences of
the smoothbore days, but let not anyone imagine that
they are belied by those of a more scientific period.
Far from it. But facts apparently obvious are often
lost sight of in practice, and it will do no one any
harm to be reminded that the Corps Artillery of the
German Guard marched nine miles on the road from
Carignan to Villiers-Cernay at a gentle trot in one
spell on that 1st of September which gave so great
a triumph to the artillery of the victors. That long-
continued trot helped to render complete the great
girdle of batteries which encircled the French several
1 6 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
hours earlier than would otherwise have been the
case, and the time gained was valuable in allowing a
methodical reconnaissance, the selection of a good
position, and that calmness in the occupying of it
which goes far to promote an effective fire.
Neither let us forget Von Dresky with the Corps
Artillery of the 3rd Corps at Spicheren. He had
marched his batteries thirteen miles up and down hill
in the early part of the day on that 6th of August,
and, imagining his day's work was over, had settled
down in his bivouac at Ottweiler for the night, when
he was called upon at 3 o'clock to hurry to Saarbruck.
In half-an-hour his horses were hooked in and he
was on the road with fifteen miles of an undulating
country in front of him. Those batteries had to hurry
along so fast that they grudged even the time neces-
sary to put on a drag-shoe. At 6.30 o'clock the
Horse Artillery were on the battle-field, and were
able to assist their friends. The effort was, however,
somewhat beyond the powers of the Field Batteries,
and when these appeared, at 8 o'clock, they were too
late to be of service.
The performances of these same batteries during
the campaign of 1870, led by the gallant Von Dresky,
might, indeed, serve to illustrate almost all the varied
phases of artillery tactics ; now, however, that we are
BE A UNE-LA -ROLANDE. 1 7
dealing with mobility alone, I will only touch on one
more of their achievements, that, namely, when at
Beaune-la-Rolande, on the 28th November, they were
ordered up to the assistance of the loth Corps
engaged on the north-east of Beaune.
Again, the superior mobility of the Horse Artillery
enabled them to be on the scene of action when
required, and they were able to render opportune aid,
having accomplished a march of 31^ miles success-
fully ; but, on the other hand, the Field Batteries, who
could not get along so fast, failed as before to furnish
timely assistance.
But it is not only for long and rapid marches such
as these that mobility will always be essential to
artillery. On the field of battle itself occasions will
still occur when prompt assistance and support can
alone be rendered by very rapid movement, and when,
if batteries are to cordially co-operate and work with
the other arms, they must be prepared to quickly
respond to the call of their companions.
The inter-dependence of the three arms cannot be
too often insisted upon.
Artillery cannot cope single-handed with the
enemy's skirmishers when established within effective
rifle range of the guns, or, at any rate, can do so
but with difficulty. For help in such situations it
c
i8 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
must look to an adequate force of riflemen on its
own side, so posted as to prevent the creeping sharp-
shooter from attaining a dangerous proximity to it.
All this is now universally recognised and understood.
On the other hand, after the preparatory artillery
action is over, and the infantry has moved forward,
the artillery must also be ready to conform to its
movements and advance, if necessary, more or less
with it. We must now be prepared for more than long
hours of collar work, since such an advance will often
have to be very rapid and cannot always be confined
to roads or paths. Rough or highly cultivated ground
may have to be crossed, and the detachments, in the
case of Field Batteries, will almost always have to
be mounted on the carriages. Again, the configura-
tion of the ground will very seldom allow of guns
remaining in action behind advancing infantry, nor,
in spite of much that has lately been said to the
contrary, do I believe that such tactics would be
desirable, if its safety and staunchness are not to
be compromised. For men have a nervous dread of
shells flying over their heads from behind.
The guns, therefore, will have to keep pace with
the tide of advance. But besides this general, and
more or less deliberate, forward movement, occasions
and opportunities may arise in future warfare as they
GUNS IN CLOSE SUPPORT. 19
have in the past, when artillery must be prepared to
make short desperate rushes, and, forgetting alike
its vulnerability and its long range, stand shoulder
to shoulder with its brethren of the infantry. The
war of 1870 shows us many such instances, and
nothing in it was more conspicuous than the devotion
with which the German Artillery again and again
moved up right into the thick of musketry fire when
urgent necessity existed for the sacrifice almost
always involved. However perfect a weapon the
modern rifle may become, if both sides are equally,
or almost equally, well armed, the attack will in-
evitably be brought to a standstill at certain points as
before, and then without the intervention of some
new power it may be found impossible to push for-
ward. There are also critical moments during all
engagements at which not to be able to press on is
tantamount to a repulse, when a check to an hitherto
almost continuous advance may alter the whole aspect
of affairs, or even herald the advent of defeat.
On such occasions it will be always necessary to
bring artillery rapidly into action at decisive points to
give support and confidence to a wavering infantry,
or shake a stubborn foe. I need hardly remind my
readers that it will also be necessary after a successful
attack by the other arms to send artillery forward to
C 2
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
secure the ground gained, to destroy obstacles to
further progress, or harass the flying enemy.
And in the event of a disaster artillery must be no
less alert to cover the retreat. It must, in fact, never
forget that its chief value is as an auxiliary, and that
it is with the infantry that it must stand or fall.
Thus, on the 6th of August, 1870, at that same battle
of Spicheren, we find Colonel von Rex, commanding
the 32nd Brigade, particularly begging for the sup-
port of artillery to give more decisive effect to the
successes already gained on the Spicheren plateau by
the infantry, who, half exhausted, were with difficulty
clinging to the ground they had captured. In re-
sponse to his cry for aid, General von Billow ordered
up the 3rd Light and 3rd Heavy Batteries of the Qth
Brigade to the heights. The road by which these
batteries endeavoured to advance was at all times a
difficult one, but now ploughed up as it was by shells,
and narrowed by some cavalry who had preceded
them and halted there, had become almost impassable.
The leading gun of the Light Battery was alone
able at first to reach the heights, and its anxiously
waited for appearance was greeted, we are told, by a
loud cheer from the well-nigh exhausted infantry.
Soon after the rest of the Light Battery was got up,
but only one division of the Heavy Battery was able
SP1CHEREN.
to gain the spot they strove for. Although these
eight guns lost nearly half their gunners, fighting
as they were within 800 paces of a line of French
skirmishers in shelter trenches, the effect of their
shells compelled the enemy by degrees to abandon
the field, and the remaining four guns of the Heavy
Battery were able to come into action also.
The timely advance of these guns and the glorious
struggle maintained by them had a most decisive
effect, and had it not been for their opportune ap-
pearance the Rotherberg might have been lost to the
Prussians. Few better examples of how lightness and
activity may serve us at a pinch could, I think, be
quoted. The Light Battery, it will have been noticed,
was able to ascend a height at a critical moment
which was impracticable to the heavier guns, and
which it was of vital importance to occupy quickly
with artillery.
Not only, however, was the great necessity of
mobility conspicuously displayed here, but the dis-
advantage of a field piece with much recoil in certain
situations was also exemplified. We are told that the
configuration of the ground, sloping as it did to the
rear, brought about such ah amount of recoil in the
heavy guns as to interfere very seriously with their
service. This fact, though only casually mentioned,
22 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
is not without a certain bearing on the subject, and I
feel I need not apologise for alluding to it here.
To return to some incidents in the war of 1870.
At the battle of Vionville — Mars-la-Tour, when
the Prussian infantiy had to evacuate the Tronville
copses between three and five o'clock, its retreat was
covered with much bravery by the guns, which had
a very difficult role to play, till they were reinforced
at a critical moment by the 3rd Horse Artillery
Battery of the loth Corps, temporarily withdrawn
from another position, and sent round the south of
Vionville at a gallop to support the other guns *
already in action.
From the battle of Gravelotte incidents of the same
description might be freely culled. The splendid
recklessness or devotion, call it what you will, which
sent Basse's and Gniigge's batteries across the ravine
opposite the French left, the gallant advance of Von
Prittwitz and the 3rd Light Battery of the Guard
Corps Artillery have furnished a theme for many a
sympathetic writer. We need not multiply examples
of this kind, and moreover they savour somewhat of a
" rough and tumble " kind of tactics, and of magnificent
courage, and soldier-like qualities, falsely utilised by
deficient leadership.
* The batteries of the 6th Infantry Division.
THE CRY FOR GUNS.
It may possibly be that the same scenes may once
more be re-enacted in the future, for the very precision
and intensity of modern musketry may, one is almost
tempted to say must, bring about a deadlock between
the two lines of opposing riflemen. On such occasions
the cry for artillery has invariably gone up in the past
from infantry. He will be somewhat bold who will
deny the possibility of its being heard again, and, if it
is, then, without the intervention of guns willing and
able to move, infantry will be prevented from making
progress.
24 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
CHAPTER II.
THE ACTION OF GUNS AND CAVALRY TOGETHER.
HAVING thus discussed the value or rather necessity
which mobility is to Field Artillery, we may turn to
show what an Artillery endowed with due mobility
may become to Cavalry.
As I have said already, even during the I7th
century firearms were the rage of the day, and the
Cavalry soldiers of those days were carried away by
the new fetish to the detriment of their efficiency.
Tilly formed his squadrons in ten ranks, Wallenstein
in eight, while they moved but slowly, and confided
much in their firearms. Even Gustavus Adolphus,
whose genius placed him far in front of his age in
many respects, and who was the first to introduce into
modern Europe the true principles of Cavalry tactics,
could do with no less than three, and even he did not
aspire to dispense altogether with a volley. His men
were taught to ride boldly up to the enemy's line,
when the front rank were to fire a single volley with
their pistols, ere they drew their swords. Then they
CENTURY TACTICS.
dashed in amongst their opponents, while the ranks
behind them usually reserved their fire, to be used
when the enemy's line was broken.
The Ironsides, too, of Cromwell, whom I regard
as the best cavalry leader these islands have ever
produced, could not shake off entirely the evil fashion
of the day, but when they engaged an enemy ^were
26 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
usually drawn up five deep. The front rank fired
its two pistols and filed away to the rear to reload,
then the second rank did likewise, and similarly in
due course the third rank replaced it. When the
word was given to charge the men steadied them-
selves ere they delivered their onset, fired their pistols,
and then fell to with their swords, supplementing their
rush, it is said, by flinging their empty firearms in the.
faces of their opponents ! I believe Cromwell latterly
understood more fully the true application of cavalry,*
and discountenanced firing previous to a charge ; but
certainly the usual tendency of cavalry tactics during
the seventeenth century was a false one.
Such indeed was the prestige then attaching to
powder and ball, that, though few can have fallen
by them under such conditions, the whole spirit and
dash of horsemen were sacrificed in their favour.
Prince Rupert, however, whose name has become
a synonym for fiery valour, appreciated the mischief
of the tendency, and may be credited with at any
rate an endeavour to make cavalry rely only on inertia
and swift movement in their first onset. According to
Bulstrode Whitlock's Memoirs, quoted in Gardiner's
" History of the Civil War," f the following instructions
* Vide Major Baldock's interesting articles which have lately
appeared in the " United Service Magazine."
t Vol. ii. p. 146.
THE CIVIL WAR. 27
were issued before the battle of Edge Hill. ' He says :
"Just before we began our march Prince Rupert
passed from one wing to the other, giving positive
orders to the Horse to march as close as possible,
keeping their ranks with sword in hand, to receive
the enemy's shot, without firing either carbine or pistol
until we broke in among the enemy, and then to make
use of our firearms as need should require, which
was punctually observed."
At the battle of Auldearn, fought on the Qth of
May, 1645, we read that " Lord Gordon " (who com-
manded Montrose's horse) " by this time charges the
left wing, and that with a new form of fight, for he dis-
charges all shooting of pistols, and carbines, only with
their swords to charge quite through their enemies." *
Montrose had probably profited by Cromwell's ex-
ample, but the generality of cavalry soldiers did not.
Indeed, it is astounding how even up to our own
times the same fond desire to avail themselves of
fire has often distinguished Cavalry. A few examples
occur at once to the mind.
The French Cavalry, perhaps the best of that
period, halted to receive our charge with pistol fire
at the affair of Aroya-Molinos in 181 i.f
* Gardiner's " History of the Civil War," vol. ii. p. 226.
t October 28th, vide " The History of the King's German
Legion," vol. ii. p. 23.
28 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
In 1854* the massive Russian squadrons did
exactly the same thing when Scarlett's resolute
squadrons faced them and advanced to ride on what
seemed certain destruction.
The Austrian horsemen, thirty years ago, were re-
garded by competent judges as perhaps the most
admirable in the whole of Europe, and yet a study of
the campaign of 1866 will show them more than once
exhibiting the same fatal error at a critical moment,t
while there is another example even more astonishing
still.
We all know how splendidly the French cavalry
fought on occasions in 1870, and what devotion and
courage they displayed when assailing infantry in
particular, yet had they so little of the true cavalry
spirit, that, when that gallant and celebrated charge
was delivered by Margueritte's division on the Illy
plateau at Sedan it was preceded by volleys of carbine
fire. So much was this the case — so much smoke
and explosion of firearms was there — that an eye-
witness has told us that the German 5th Corps at first
supposed that they had infantry in front of them.J
* At Balaclava.
t Vide Official Account of the War of 1866, pp. 95 and 344.
J I found this statement in a series of " Lectures on the Three
Arms," by Baron Seddeler of the Russian General Staff, pub-
lished in the " Militar-Wochenblatt " in the year 1873.
A STERN REFORMER. 29
British cavalry have never been prone to such a
fault — if they have erred at all, they have done so
on the side of a too headlong valour; but, never-
theless, these chance examples remind us once more
of the need which cavalry feels for the support
of fire, and of the truth of Napoleon's dictum,
" Cavalry has more need of artillery than infantry,
because it cannot reply to fire, but can fight only
with the steel." And, I repeat, that it was this
keenly felt necessity which gave birth to Horse Artil-
lery as a special arm, and linked guns and cavalry
together as part and parcel of the same unit on the
battle-field.
For when Frederick the Great set himself to perfect
his army, and turn it into the magnificent fighting
machine it ultimately became, one of the first reforms
he had to introduce was with reference to the employ-
ment of his cavalry. Fire worship was still the
religion of cavalry soldiers, and he found his squadrons
still following the fashion of the previous century, and
waiting to receive an attack in position, and then,
having poured in a volley, charging to take advantage
of its effect. All the dash and enterprise which
should distinguish the most mobile arm were there-
fore gone, and the dragoon, or even the cuirassier,
had become a bad trooper and a worse musqueteer.
30 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
The genius of the Soldier King saw that such tactics
took away all the characteristics that made cavalry
valuable, and he set himself to work energetically
FREDERICK THE GREAT.
to destroy the hideous error that was sapping the
efficiency of his regiments.
I may here make a digression for a moment to
HIS TEACHING. 31
remind my readers that we see an example in our
own times of history repeating itself, in the manner in
which the fire action of cavalry has been accentuated
in the Russian army, where they have armed the
dragoons once more with rifle and bayonet, and that
this new departure is regarded by many with the same
dislike as it was by the Prussian King.
His measures to improve matters were somewhat
more decisive than we are used to nowadays. There
is no uncertain sound about the order he issued to his
squadrons, " Nimmer zu halten, nimmer zu stocken,
aber immer stets zu attackiren," that is to say, they
were always to attack, and, further, he declared that
any officer who waited in the old way to receive the
enemy should be tried by Court-martial.
His cavalry, trained and splendidly led by Seydlitz
and Ziethen, two of the most capable cavalry leaders
that ever lived, were soon renowned for the precision
and rapidity of their swoop, and have probably never
been surpassed.
But having developed the " shock " powers of his
cavalry at the expense of its fire effect, he had to
make the latter good in some other way.
Cavalry is essentially an offensive arm : it cannot
defend itself except by counter attack, and in certain
situations it is at the mercy of a few well-placed
32 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
marksmen. Batteries of artillery lightly equipped,
and with their detachments mounted like troopers,
were therefore organised by Frederick to move and
act with cavalry, and supply it with the powers he
had shorn it of. He is said to have taken the greatest
possible interest in the new arm and to have superin-
tended its drill and instruction himself. So valuable
was the new acquisition found to be that the number
of Horse Artillery in the Prussian service had risen to
twenty in 1806, and the co-operation of the two arms
was, and has since been, found to work out in another
way, to the benefit of both, because, while guns
loosened compact formations for the horsemen, the
cavalry forced the scattered troopers to draw together,
and thus present an easier target to the guns.
Of Seydlitz it is impossible to speak without enthu-
siasm. His regiment was said to be a model to the
whole universe, and he combined prudence, energy,
and boldness to an extraordinary degree. As a boy
he was noted for his mad pranks. At seven years old
he was sufficiently master of the animal he bestrode
to gallop between the sails of a windmill in full action.
At twenty-three he was a Major, in nine years more a
Colonel-Commandant of a cuirassier regiment, and
three years later became a Lieutenant-General, and
Commander-in- Chief of the Prussian cavalry. Ross-
th«
-
:•
SEYDLITZ AND ZIETHEN. 33
bach was perhaps his finest battle, and there artillery
materially aided his attack, although it has not always
received credit for it.
Ziethen was another born cavalry soldier, and
equally combined wisdom with courage. He is said
to have "conceived his plans with the progressive-
ness of the rising storm, and executed them with
the rapidity of the thunderbolt." The famous Ziethen
or " Death's Head " Hussars were commanded by
him, and a world-wide reputation still clings round his
old regiment. Coup d'ceil was his special gift, and the
secret of his success, and he once told his Royal
Master that he no sooner saw his enemy than his
dispositions were already made.
It is with these two memorable names that the
extraordinary successes of Frederick's cavalry will
always be identified.
Napoleon, who appreciated the value of fire more
than any man of his time, and also reaped immense
esults from a skilful use of cavalry, recognised the
lue of a mobile artillery too, and attached guns to
his regiments to work with and support them. Under
his great example its use became general, and galloper
guns, as they were at first termed, attained a recognised
status both in Europe and in India.
Napoleon, too, more than any other general before
34 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
or since, taught his cavalry to act with boldness in
reconnaissance work ahead of his armies, and it was
by means of the information as to his enemy's plans
and position, which an abundant and energetic cavalry
placed at his disposal, that many of his most cele-
brated strokes were rendered possible. Thus, during
his advance to Russia in 1812, Murat, with the ad-
vanced cavalry, was often fifty miles ahead of his
army. So it was that not only did cavalry in his day
come into collision with the enemy on the field of
battle to an extent such as we shall perhaps never
see again, but cavalry raids and combats took place
ere the main forces came in contact at all. A power-
ful cavalry meant a vigorous pursuit. Other nations,
to meet his horsemen, had to adopt similar tactics,
and thus great opportunities for the action of cavalry
and its complement, Horse Artillery, were given in the
long wars that marked the end of the last and the com-
mencement of the present century. And by no batteries
were opportunities more worthily turned to account,
let me add, than by our own brilliant troops in India,
in the Penjnsula, and in Belgium a few years later.
During the long period of peace — the lull after the
storm — however that succeeded Waterloo, many of
the lessons of the great battle-fields were forgotten ;
and when in 1870 the Prussians sent the ubiquitous
DEARTH OF EXAMPLES FROM 1870. 35
Uhlans roaming through France, men stared in amaze-
ment as though a new epoch in the art of war had
opened. Yet they were doing but that which Napo-
leon had shown to be essential to the safety of an
army seventy years before, and did not do it either
nearly so well as he had done.
But the French had not profited by the study of
military history as their opponents had, and their
squadrons, brave and eager as they proved themselves
more than once in the actual fight, were held aimlessly
in hand, tied to the same road on which moved the
other troops. No cavalry was sent scouting far away
in front or on the flanks, and even in retreat they
rarely or never attempted to prevent the inquisitive
inroads of the pursuers. It takes two, we all know, to
make a quarrel, and a cavalry combat is no exception
to the general rule. There were few in 1870 because
the German troopers had it, to use a familiar expres-
sion, "all their own way." Consequently, the horse
artillery and cavalry had no need to support one
another, and there were in 1870 only a few examples
of their co-operation in the most important role they
can be called upon to adopt.
Such, briefly, is the explanation, and it applies also
largely to 1866, of the fact that we find richer ground
for research if we retrace our steps to the earlier
D 2
36 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
periods. And it is very necessary that we should
understand this, because it is as certain as anything in
this world can be that, if we have another great war
on the Continent in the near future, we shall again see
the two arms we are dealing with working together,
to an extent and upon a scale which even Napoleon
never dreamt of. All nations have studied and pro-
fited by the lessons of 1870, and on all sides we see
signs that tell us that vast swarms of cavalry will
shroud and protect the advance of modern armies.
When both sides adopt these same tactics, their
cavalry will surely come into collision, and we shall
see squadrons supported by horse artillery taking part
in contests which will materially affect the progress of
subsequent events.
In 1870, when the cavalry divisions of the Germans
were thrust forward alone, horse artillery always ac-
companied them, although when the battle took place
we find them employed apart from the horsemen in
the general line of battle ; for guns, be they horse or
field, must never be allowed to stand by idle when
their fire may be utilised.
But, besides being essential to one another in this
most important work, cavalry and horse artillery will
find opportunity and need to work harmoniously
together in other emergencies.
FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES. 37
These arms will form part of the immediate ad-
vanced guard of every considerable force, will have to
reconnoitre the enemy's strength and position, delay
his onset, or check his retreat, until the main body
arrives.
They will also, perhaps, find their most useful and
most honourable role in covering a retreat of their
own side, and it is to their skill, readiness, and, if need
be, self-sacrifice, that their comrades look for salvation
in the most trying circumstances in which soldiers can
be placed.
Horse artillery and cavalry may also be employed
on the field of battle itself to make a flanking move-
ment, or, by their mobility, forestall the enemy at
some important point.
And finally, they may act together with advantage
in the pursuit of a beaten foe.
But although we may have opportunities as great
or greater than those of Napoleon, our difficulties
may also be greater too. In the old days of round
shot and case a good Horse Artillery range was four
hundred yards. Two hundred was even a better.
The Horse Artillery guns were comparatively useless
unless they galloped right into the fight, and their
whole energies were concentrated on getting to close
quarters as soon as possible. Even on the battle-field
38 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
itself they might gallop up to within a few hundred
yards of a mass of infantry, unlimber and come into
action without excessive loss, and then a pitiless storm
of case was often more than a match for the musketry
fire which clumsy flint-locks could bring to bear.
But now the weapon of a Horse Artillery battery
can hit pretty hard at 3000 yards, and therefore
nowadays we are especially tempted to try and com-
bine and fuse together two great principles of tactics
which are more or less antagonistic the one to the
other. We endeavour to make what for the time
being is one unit act by both fire and shock at the
same moment, yet can never thus hope to reap the
fullest effects from both such methods of application.
Nay more, we desire at one phase of the action to see
men forgetful of the advantages with which modern
science has endowed them, and fight as in the days of
flint-locks, and at another earlier stage we may
require them to utilise almost to the utmost all the
powers of the scientific weapons with which they are
equipped.
And our difficulties are further complicated by the
fact that in the decisive combat the potency of one
part of our unit, although undoubtedly it has made
much progress especially in mobility, has not altered
very materially during the last hundred-and-twenty
DIFFICULTIES OF THE PRESENT DAY.
39
years, while that of the other portion has grown out
of all recognition.
The lance and sword ! what are they but the
weapons of chivalry ? the arms of Coeur de Lion
ZIETHEN.
and of Saladin, and yet are they not those on which a
cavalry soldier still relies when he flings down the
gauntlet to his foe ?
They are no more deadly now than they ever were,
nor are the men who wield them presumably more
40 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
powerful or skilful in handling them than were those
that Seydlitz or Ziethen led.
It is a very different matter, however, where fire-
arms are concerned. Here magazine rifles have re-
placed flint-locks, ranges have increased tenfold, while
rapidity and accuracy of fire have equally advanced.
If Byng's or Maitland's Guards — the men who
fought at Waterloo — could be called upon to face
the battalions which are their successors to-day in
London, we know to a certainty that a mere mas-
sacre would ensue. If Ross's* troop of 1815, that
one which gained undying fame during the Peninsular
war, were to engage its successor, "the Chestnut
troop " of our own times, we have no doubt that it
would be swept away before it could get near enough
to put in a round at all. We could prove all this to
demonstration, but here certainty ends ; and, although
our squadrons give unmistakable evidence of the
attention which has been bestowed upon them of late,
and, although many of us believe, or at any rate I
* Field Marshal Sir Hew D. Ross, G.C.B., K.T.S., etc., etc.,
who is here referred to, was one of the most distinguished
officers which the Artillery has produced. He commanded the
present A battery Royal Horse Artillery, then A troop, during
the Peninsular war and at Waterloo, and was dangerously
wounded at the siege of Badajoz. He was the first artilleryman
who was made a Field Marshal, and died as Lt.-Governor of
Chelsea Hospital in 1868, aged ninety.
UNEVEN PROGRESS.
believe, that our cavalry are now, regiment for regi-
ment, at least as good as any in Europe, I cannot
help thinking that if the Union Brigade, composed
FIELD MARSHAL SIR HEW D. ROSS, G.C.B.
of the Scots Greys, the Royals, and the Inniskillings,
which swept down on D'Erlon's Corps on a certain
1 8th of June eighty years ago, had to charge the three
42 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
magnificent regiments which we see in England at the
present time, the result would be by no means the
same foregone conclusion as in the other cases which
I have cited.
Indeed, I may go further, and say that I myself
often doubt (and I know I am supported by opinion
in Germany) whether the highly trained squadrons of
Seydlitz, "jammed," as he loved to see them "boot
to boot," would not be, as regards a charge at any
rate, a fair match for any cavalry which modern
Europe can show.
The principles which govern shock tactics have in
fact not altered since before the days of gunpowder,
and yet in close alliance with them we have to utilise
weapons which would astonish such comparatively
modern Generals as Lord Raglan or Lee.
But if artillery is indeed to be the right arm, as it
has been termed, of cavalry, it must be trained weekly
or even daily with it, and the two should, if possible,
learn to understand one another, not from the per-
functory study of one another's text-books, but from
that personal familiarity which is acquired to some
extent at field days, but is fostered and developed in
a far larger degree, by life together in camp and
barracks. And I dwell particularly on this point
because, owing to the changes in the armament of
TWO R6LES OF HORSE ARTILLER Y. 43
artillery which I have alluded to, there is an especial
danger that Horse Artillery may nowadays receive a
one-sided education only.
Yet, so far as we can read the future, it seems
probable that harder and more varied work than ever
will be asked for from Horse Artillery. Because, as
I have said, it has at the present day to fulfil two
roles : one as Horse Artillery with the cavalry, some-
times acting quite independently, and the other a
more frequent one, perhaps, when it takes its place
with the rest of the Field Artillery in line of battle,
what in fact for want of a better term we may call its
role as " Corps Artillery."
With the advanced cavalry, when merely feeling for
the enemy, it will not usually have to engage in
decisive actions, since its duty will be to furnish just
enough force to rend the hostile veil. It can utilise
its range often here, for a shrapnel shell will often
tell you more of an enemy than can the best of
patrols or scouts, yet it will, nevertheless, have to
do a lot of hard work in moving rapidly over long
distances. On certain occasions severe fighting too
may fall to its share even with the advanced cavalry,
for it may be sent to seize some important strategic
point, as after Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, or as when the
5th German Cavalry division (Rheinhaben's) went
44 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
ahead to seize the passage across the Moselle in
1870; to make a raid on the line of hostile com-
munications, as when the Horse Artillery and Cavalry
of the ist army — Prince Frederick Charles's — dashed
on and cut the line of rail at Lundenberg ; * or to
fasten on and hold fast an enemy endeavouring to
escape, as at Vionville. Such deeds as these may
have to be accomplished before the opposing bodies
of infantry and Field Artillery see one another at all,
and, when a pitched battle is joined, the labours of
the Cavalry and Horse Artillery will be by no means
lessened. For these two must work together then
with the other arms, and must watch eagerly for
every chance which may enable them to operate for
the common good. And while awaiting an oppor-
tunity the Horse Artillery, be it remembered, will
probably take the same share in the action as do the
other guns.
In many of these roles which I have specified the
tactics are almost a matter of common sense, and
depend altogether on the exigencies of the moment.
During a pursuit we need scarcely urge Horse
Artillery men or Cavalry to hurry on and hammer
pitilessly the retreating foe, still less need we adjure
the former to stand to their guns and sacrifice them-
* July 1 5th, 1866.
OPPORTUNE INTERVENTION. 45
selves stubbornly when covering the retreat of a
shattered army, or when defending some detached
post or defile on the impregnability of which depends
the safety of their brethren of the other arms.
There are only two main roles after all which we
need discuss closely here : one when Cavalry and
Horse Artillery are called upon to throw their weight
suddenly into the scale at some crisis in a pitched
battle, and the other when a cavalry brigade or
division, for the time being independent, engages a
similar hostile body in a decisive combat.
The latter is the kind of fight that will most
fascinate cavalry soldiers, and there is certainly more
room in it for the display of those peculiar qualities
with which a leader of Horse should be endowed ; but
the opportunities afforded on the battle-field itself,
come, perhaps, more frequently, and it is in them that
cavalry and guns may show themselves especially
useful. We will all willingly do homage to the
tivalrous impatience which urges a fiery Hotspur
single out and attack his natural foe irrespective of
surrounding circumstances, but we will esteem him
lore if he intervenes only when the interests of the
st of the army call forth his skill or courage.
And I may preface my brief remarks on this point
by explaining that, according to the latest regulations,
46 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
a cavalry division would, in our Service, usually be ;
composed of two brigades, or six regiments of cavalry,
two sections of cavalry with four machine-guns, two
or, as some think, better still, three batteries of Horse
Artillery, and a battalion of mounted infantry, to
which likewise two machine-guns would be attached.
In both France and Germany I understand that lately
opinion has been rather more in favour of two than
three batteries with a division of six regiments, and
one authority has expressed a preference for three
4-gun batteries over two of 6-guns. With that view
I entirely dissent, and regard a 4-gun battery as a
distinctly feeble unit in regard to fire effect.
I need not here distract the attention of my non-
professional readers by entering into the question of
how these latter-day adjuncts to the cavalry division
are to be employed. The Germans carried infantry in
carts on more than one occasion during the war of
1870, and our Mounted Infantry may show themselves
useful in advance of the main body under certain
circumstances again ; the question, until we have some
experiences of recent war to go upon, must, however,
be a theoretical, perhaps a controversial, one ; but,
since the question of an escort to guns has ever been
a difficult one, the new additions in this respect
probably prove a welcome assistance and support.
v
•
NO TIME FOR DELIBERATION. 47
Such being the means in hand, let us consider how
best they may be turned to account, how most'
profitably utilised in a purely artillery and cavalry
combat.
But before I go any further into this the most
difficult and important portion of the subject, I want
to put it to you with all the cogency I can command,
that now Horse Artillery and Cavalry leaders alike
must forget some of the lessons they have acquired
when studying the Corps Artillery side of Horse
Artillery training. There is no time now for delibera-
tion, every shot must tell ; the artillery leader will
often have to act on his own responsibility ; there
must be the most complete and thorough under-
standing between the two arms. Owing to the
natural wish to get the most out of their armament, I
believe we have trained our Horse Artillery batteries
too much lately with a view only to the Corps Artil-
lery side of their usefulness. On the other hand,
they have done so well at Okehampton that cavalry
soldiers are fascinated by the accounts of their
destructive powers at comparatively long ranges. I
venture to think that matters want clearing up a little ;
and, therefore, before I say any more I will be bold
nough to lay down one or two propositions which I
regard as vital.
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
When guns and cavalry are engaging one another
in decisive combats —
(a) Ranges should be decisive. That is to say, of
not more than 1500 yards, if possible, and
on an emergency considerably less.
(b) Speaking generally, but recognising the prin-
ciple that the arm at the moment most
dangerous is the one to attack, the objective
of both cavalry and guns is the hostile
cavalry.
(c) Changes of position are to be avoided, and as
a rule one decisive position only is to be
taken up until the cavalry combat has been
decided.
(d) The officer commanding the artillery is on
occasions to take the initiative, should he be
separated from the cavalry leader, and is
never to hang back waiting for orders.
It may sound startling to some ears to hear a
doctrine as to ranges advanced which sacrifices so
completely the powers of the gun. For a short time
other views held the field, but now I think the pendu-
lum is tending to swing the other way, and almost
all authorities recognise the fact that decisive ranges
must be sought, otherwise at a critical moment the
EVERY ROUND MUSI TELL. 49
fire of the guns may be masked, their moral effect
will not be so great as it otherwise might be, and the
two arms will not work so completely together as
they ought. Moreover, the cavalry fight develops
with such rapidity that we want every round to be
effective ; and, finally, considerations as to the supply
of ammunition make us chary of wasting even one.
Under such circumstances, and when we do not intend
to enter into a protracted contest with guns at all,
cover is to be left out of our calculation, and we should
think only of so placing ourselves that we may have
the best chance of quickly injuring our opponents,
and may move off again rapidly if necessary.* It is
for these reasons that the limbers are put close behind
the guns, and that we place them so without mis-
givings, in the face of all we know, as to the deadliness
of the modern shrapnel shell.
Changes of position are to be avoided because they
waste precious moments.
* A note from the Diary of Lieutenant Swabey in the Penin-
sula throws an interesting light on this subject, and reveals the
minor tactics of a period when Horse Artillery was at its very
best.
"Apropos of Captain Lefebure, remember in coming into
action, when cavalry is likely to come up unperceived, not to
let the limbers of the guns turn, or drive farther from the trail
than to admit of the gun being worked without the hand-
spike." See R.A.I. " Proceedings,", p. 93, vol. xxii.
50 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
Let us now see how matters are likely to work out
a little in detail.
Two divisions or brigades each accompanied in the
former case by two or three batteries, and in the
latter by one, are in contact and mean to fight. The
country is one suitable for the working of the arms,
and for the moment infantry may be left out of our
calculations. What is the first thing that will occur
after the news that the enemy is close by has been
received ? The cavalry will be formed in a formation
preparatory to attack. How long will it be before
the division is ready to move forward ? Obviously
this will depend largely on the nature of the country
through which it is moving, and the previous march
formation, but I suppose perhaps sometimes several
minutes might be thus occupied. Now during that
time it may well happen that the hostile batteries will
come into action, and will try and cannonade the
squadrons while more or less stationary. I have
already said that Horse Artillery are to go to decisive
ranges, and, therefore, now, strictly speaking, they
should not come into action. But the hostile cavalry
are probably not in sight, as yet we are only in a
preliminary stage of the combat, and the guns must
cover the deployment of their friends if it is interfered
with by fire. Therefore they will occasionally now
-
WHICH IS THE PROTECTED FLANK1 51
have to engage the enemy's artillery. But we must
remember that they are not to do so in the same
spirit in which they act when they are working in their
" Corps " capacity. They are to be prepared to move
off rapidly again when their friends are ready, and are
never to be drawn into a protracted artillery duel.
And the same rule, it may be as well to point out,
applies to any other occasions during the earlier part
of the action when collisions between advanced or
rear-guards — little squalls that skim before the storm
— may draw fire from the guns.
By the time the three lines are formed the hostile
cavalry will probably be in view, our leader will move
forward to reconnoitre, the officer commanding the
artillery will accompany him, and the guns will be
left on the protected flank, moving a little in rear of
the first line, or, better still, in front of the centre of it
when circumstances allow of their doing so.
To keep the guns on the protected flank has always
been regarded as the orthodox arrangement, and
hen one flank is, owing to natural features or other
circumstances, obviously not open to assault, no doubt
it is a good one. But who shall say which flank is
protected and which not, if you are manoeuvring in
quite an open country against an active and enter-
prising opponent ? At one stage of the combat he
E 2
52 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
may threaten you on one side, at another from an
opposite direction, and you will be safest with your
guns in the centre of your horsemen, ready to move
wherever a sudden call may take them.
All the guns should be usually held together in one
mass. They will thus accomplish most by their fire,
and will interfere least with the free movement of the
cavalry. And it may be added here that on the line
of march also it will be best to keep all the batteries
together with the main body, and not as a rule detach
any with the advanced guard, if for no other reason
than that they may open fire prematurely, and without
a due knowledge of the cavalry commander's intentions,
and so force an engagement upon him inopportunely,
or under conditions which are not in his favour.
We must bear in mind that at this stage of the
action events are rushing on with bewildering variation
and rapidity. The two hostile bodies are closing on
one another as active cavalry only in an open country
can move. There is not much time to think, and
none for alteration of plans. Our leader will quickly
form his decision, choose the position for the guns
(aided in his choice by the artillery commander), and
will send the latter to take command of his arm
either at once, or, at any rate, when the trails touch
the ground.
11.
*
THE SHORTEST ROAD THE BEST. 53
In very many cases the position selected will -be
the rising ground from which the reconnaissance is
made, but often it may be a favourable site con-
siderably nearer to the foe. Care should be taken
that a position good merely from the topographical
point of view be not selected, such an one may only
be valuable if the fight comes off in a place to fit in
with it, and, in a cavalry combat, things often turn out
very differently from what is anticipated. The posi-
tion therefore should not be chosen too soon, for the
guns must take their stand where they are sure of
commanding the scene of conflict.
I have heard the question as to whether the guns
should advance straight forward or move slightly to.
a flank hotly argued. It is but little profitable to
waste time over such contentions or pedantries. In
nine cases out of ten on the actual field there is
only one place which is obviously the best for
artillery, and the guns will go to that place whether
it be a little on the flank or not ; nay, it may even
granted that a position two or three hundred
yards on the flank is the safest for a mediocre com-
mander, who fears lest he may hamper his own
cavalry. But the ideal move for them is, nevertheless,
straight to the front, because thus they will get to
work quickest ; and never forget that in combats such
54 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
as we are now discussing the artillery have at first
to make a race of it to forestall that of the enemy,
and everything depends on its getting to its position
at the right moment.
Again, however, I must add a saving clause such
as all rules in war demand. The cavalry is the
principal arm, the predominant partner in the union
of which I am now speaking, and the artillery must
not forget that it is purely an auxiliary. Therefore
the worst fault a gunner could commit would be to
interfere with the free movement of the squadrons,
or hamper their effective action. If circumstances
demand that the cavalry go straight to the front,
then the guns must get out of their way to a flank,
and they must always be careful that by no chance
should they incline towards the cavalry during their
advance. The bias, if any, should be in the other
direction.
Moreover, another reason for guns going straight
ahead is that nothing decisive is ever accomplished in
a cavalry action except by flank attacks.
The squadrons work away from the guns therefore
to gain the enemy's flank. He changes front to face
them, and in doing so not only offers a chance of
enfilade fire to our batteries, but at the same time
masks his own.
A BOLD ADVANCE NOT RASH. 55
"That is all very well," some critic may object,
" but what are the enemy about all this time ? " Cer-
tainly I am only spinning a pretty theory. Never-
theless such is the consummation we hope to reach
by our manoeuvre, and all we can ever do in war is to
try and act correctly ourselves and trust that our foe
will make more errors than we will. It is only a
question of who makes the most numerous and gross
blunders after all, and in seeking perfection for our-
selves we need not seek it for the foe also.
When the guns do move into the decisive position
they are to go at their best pace.
If more than one battery is engaged it will be best
to place the batteries in echelon, the one furthest from
the fight being in advance. Each battery can thus
change front on a central gun easily, and fire be
turned quickly in the different directions which a
moving target may necessitate.
How far to the front can they go without undue
rashness ?
The general rule says that they should advance
one-third of the distance which separates the opposing
forces. They ought, however, almost always to have a
small escort, and then they are safe enough as long as
they keep nearer to their friends than to their foes.
The exact distance they should go forward must
56 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
indeed be left largely to circumstances, but Von
Schell, a high authority, agrees with the estimate I
have just made. Another distinguished officer has
recommended the artillery commander to watch care-
fully the opposing lines ; calculate as far as possible
the spot on which the two front lines of squadrons
will come in contact, and strive to get into position
three hundred yards short of, and the same distance
on the flank of, the point of first conflict. We may
note how much judgment, how much boldness, how
much decision is therefore required on the part of him
who leads the guns, and how immediately associated
their action, to be effective, must be with that of the
other arm.
Some one will, perhaps, object that it is dangerous
to send guns thus boldly forward. Why ? If the
hostile squadrons fall upon them they will do the very
thing they should not, and will be playing our game.
For if the cavalry and guns are really working together
as they ought to be, when the enemy turns on a
battery they will expose their own flank to assault,
and, in any case, they can after all injure the artillery
but to a very small extent. What may appear
temerity is, therefore, the surest bid for success.
Moreover, the guns are always the spoil of the
victors. From selfish considerations alone, therefore,
THE OBJECTIVE OF THE GUNS. 57
artillery should play its last card freely to secure the
success of its cavalry, because its own safety must
depend entirely on that success.
The guns will probably most often be on the flank,
and their outer flank may need protection. A half
squadron would usually be detailed for that duty, and
might have to dismount some of its files in certain
cases to call in the aid of fire.
It is obviously a mistake, however, thus to weaken
the cavalry, for they will need every sabre in the
coming melee, and therefore it is possible that a sphere
of usefulness may be opened up here for the mounted
infantry and machine-guns, in which they may on
occasions display their special characteristics with
success.
The point to be specially noted is the very short
time there will be for the guns to produce an effect,
and that against a varying target also. For the
artillery officer will have to exercise quick decision as
regards the choice of his objective. Is he to fire at
the enemy's guns, or at their squadrons ? The answer
is that the arm at the moment the most dangerous
must be attacked, and circumstances must influence
him here ; but, as I have already said, the general
rule is that he fire on the hostile cavalry.
It is for these reasons that extreme quickness, or
58 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
what we call smartness, has been looked for, both
from officers and men who wear the jacket.* It was
* Sergeant Wightman, whose portrait is -here given, was a
remarkably fine specimen of the Horse Artilleryman of the
Peninsular epoch, and had a very adventurous career. He
entered the Royal Horse Artillery in March, 1797, served as a
non-commissioned officer in "F" troop during the Peninsular
war, 1811-1814, receiving the medal with seven clasps for Ciudad
Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Vittoria, Nive, Nivelle, St.
Sebastian, while he was present at many other minor affairs.
He was wounded at St. Jean de Luz, and was specially men-
tioned in despatches for his gallantry on that occasion. At
Waterloo, as sergeant-major, he lost his right arm by a cannon-
shot. He afterwards became brigade sergeant-major, Royal
Horse Artillery, and was presented with a sword of honour by
Lieut.- Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer, K.C.B. In 1825 he was
promoted to be a lieutenant of invalid artillery, and accompaDied
the expedition to Portugal in 1827 as quarter-master, Royal
Artillery. He was appointed a Military Knight of Windsor in
1848, and died the same year. The portrait, which is here
reproduced by kind permission of the committee, represents him
on the horse he rode at Waterloo, and was presented to the
Royal Artillery Institution in 1891 by his son, the late Major
Wightman, nth Hussars. There is no doubt that it was he
who laid the gun which wounded Marshal Marmont at Sala-
manca, and caused the loss of his arm. The Marshal, in his
Mdmoires, vol. vii. p. 116 (Paris. Perrotin), thus describes the
two interviews he had with him in after years : — " At Ghent, in
1815, previous to Waterloo, they presented to me the quarter-
master (mareschal de logis) who, on the 23rd of July, 1812, had
laid the gun whose discharge had broken my arm an hour
before the battle of Salamanca. There could be no mistake ;
this fatal wound had been caused by a single gun-shot fired at a
certain time at a known spot. I gave this under officer a good
reception. Since then I saw the same man at Woolwich, where
he was a storekeeper (really an officer of invalids having certain
duties in the store department), when I was there in 1820 to
SERGEANT-MAJOR JAMES WIGHTMAN, R.H.A.
SMARTNESS NECESSARY. 61
not through mere bravado, or to please the gallery,
therefore, that the old troops took pride in getting off
a round quickly, but because, since it was necessary to
get to a short range in order to have a chance against
their rapidly moving target, none of the fleeting
moments might be wasted. Even in these days of
high-power guns in combats between cavalry such as
we are describing, which will herald the approach
of struggles on a larger scale, distances and oppor-
tunities will still be short as ever, and the same
qualities, both physical and mental, will be needed
in the Horse Artilleryman if he is to do his duty
properly.
The gunners, too, were, and are, men selected for
their physique, because, in order to leap on a limber
or mount a horse with facility, something more than
the average stature of the soldier is required. The
labour of running guns up after their recoil during
rapid firing is also immense, and calls for an exertion
of considerable physical strength on the part of the
detachment.
We may find an illustration of the severe labour
that is sometimes thrown on gunners in this respect
visit that magnificent arsenal. There, however, he had but one
arm, having lost the other at Waterloo. In condoling with him,
I said, ' My good fellow, each has his turn ! ' "
62 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
from the records of the Egyptian campaign of
1882.
In the very first action of the war two guns were
sent forward from Ismalia to gain possession of a dam
across the Sweet Water Canal at Magfar. They
were in action for several hours in heavy sand, and
the detachments became so exhausted by the labour
involved in working them that they found themselves
completely unable, in several cases, to carry out their
duties. The drivers had to be called upon to take
their turn at the wheels, and subsequently the aid of
the marine artillerymen, who were in action close by,
had also to be invoked.
It used to be a question as to what projectile the
guns were to use, but now there is no doubt that
shrapnel is the only one. It may be impossible, in
the short time at disposal, to set fuzes, but there is a
system known now as " magazine fire," which obviates
the necessity for doing so, and gives excellent results.
As it has only been adopted by us during the last
few years, it will be well perhaps if I give a description
of how it is carried out for the benefit of my non-
professional readers. When cavalry come within
1000 yards of a battery, the ground lying between that
distance and case range may be swept completely if
the following arrangements are adopted : —
MAGAZINE FIRE." 63
On guns finding themselves in a position where they
may be attacked by cavalry, that is to say always in
the case of Horse Artillery in a purely cavalry combat,
the word " Prepare for cavalry " is given. The gun-
layer then sets his left sight at 500 yards and replaces
it in the gun, taking care to clamp it firmly so that
the concussion of discharge may not cause it to slip
down again. The numbers at the limber or waggon
fill a portable magazine with three rounds of shrapnel
with the fuzes set and clamped at 2 (the division
corresponding to about 500 yards). This is taken
up to the gun and marked, so that ammunition
from it may not be taken by mistake during ordinary
fire.
If subsequently during the course of the action a
rush upon the guns be attempted, when the hostile
cavalry come to within 1000 yards or thereabouts, the
battery commander gives the caution, " Cavalry in
front " (or as the case may be), " magazine fire."
The three rounds of shrapnel in the " Cavalry "
magazine are thereupon fired as rapidly as possible
with the elevation for 500 yards.* As the sights and
fuzes are already set there should be no delay ; the
safety pins only have to be pulled out ; the sights need
Since these pages were written it has been laid down that
" two fingers " may suffice for elevation.
6 4 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
not be removed between the rounds, and the No. I
(as the gun captain is termed) will have previously
examined the fuzes, and need not again inspect them.
Any rounds already in the guns are of course first
fired off at the cavalry with the elevation given by the
left sight. Should the enemy succeed in getting
within 500 yards of the battery, its commander gives
the word " Case." That projectile then resorted to, the
first round being fired at " two fingers," the second at
"one finger," and the third "point blank."
So far as we can judge from the experiences of
practice this system gives excellent results, and should
render guns capable of dealing successfully with any
of the sudden crises which may confront them on the
battle-field.
As soon as the two front lines of horsemen have
met in conflict, the guns may turn their attention to
the second line and reserves, and ward off any flank
attack.
In the event of success or failure being distinctly
pronounced, the role of the guns would be obvious
and need not be dwelt on ; but occasionally it may be
a knotty point for the leader of the batteries to decide
whether he should remain in action or whether he
should retire to some position in rear. He must leave
selfish considerations out of sight. But which will be
A KNOTTY POINT. 65
best for his friends ? Probably to stay unlimbered,
for it is during a repulse that guns may be of most
assistance, and it is often the last round of case that
turns the scale. Yet to stay behind too long may
cause the cavalry losses in a desperate attempt to
extricate them. The artillery leader in this position
has need both of pluck and judgment, and his state
may be likened to that of a man watching his friend
battling with a wild torrent, and uncertain whether to
leap in at once and make an all but hopeless effort to
save him, or stay for a moment to launch a boat.
But now, after the first collision, there comes a
phase of the fight when I think the guns most often
in actual war have found their opportunity.
When we read the story of cavalry combats we find
that they have often ended in but " a lame and impo-
tent conclusion." The first lines meet, there is some
cutting and hacking, one side begins to yield, then the
second lines come up, the fight sways back again, and
so on, until what Lord Anglesey, in one of his letters,
calls a " see-saw " supervenes, and finally perhaps both
sides end by finding themselves very much in the same
positions from which they started. What give really
decisive results are flank attacks, or artillery fire into
squadrons which are attempting to rally.
It is therefore to shatter a foe finally who other-
F
66 GUNS AND CAVALR\.
wise might recover himself that guns must strive, and
it is by doing so that they will frequently be of great
service. They did good work thus at Benevente in
1808, and again, as I shall presently show, in 1854.
Therefore during the combat of the cavalry the officer
commanding the artillery should keep a watchful eye
on the course of events, and be ready to send his
guns, or, if he has three batteries in hand, a portion of
them, galloping boldly on after the enemy's squadrons,
to give them that knock-down blow that will prevent
their showing a front again that day. If the success
be a very pronounced one he will also go rapidly on
with all his force, to pursue with fire the flying enemy.
In the event of a defeat he must act as circum-
stances dictate, but it will almost always be best to
remain doggedly in position, and fight his guns to
the very last. To limber up and try and get away
before a pursuing cavalry is, I believe, a hopeless
effort. I have read an account by a foreign officer
who says no one who has never had actual experience
can realise what a panic is apt to seize men then, how
quickly the avenging horsemen seem to gain upon
you, and how helpless you feel with your back turned
to them.
On the other hand a determined attitude has often
been rewarded with success in the old days, and, as
NEVER WAIT FOR THE GUNS. 67
an example from modern war, there is the story of
how a Prussian battery breasted the torrent, and turned
it by its fire, in the fight at Rossbrunn during the
campaign in Western Germany in 1866.
And, as a concluding word on tactics, I want further
to lay it down as a general principle that, though the
Horse Artillery is to assist in every way the cavalry,
still the latter is to attack when that one golden
moment, which occurs once only in a fight, and once
lost is never perhaps regained, offers an opportunity,
whether the guns have prepared the way or not.
Here, in fact, the relations between guns and cavalry
differ absolutely from those between them and
infantry. I have heard, I am sorry to say, bigoted
artillerymen propound other views, and assert that the
cavalry must wait for the batteries to produce their
effect. Never ! If the guns can act, all the better,
but never miss a chance through any pedantic scruple
as to waiting for them to do so.
There remains one possible phase of a fight to be
considered.
The most difficult problem of all for the artillery
officer would occur when a mingled mass of friends
and foes came surging back upon the guns. It would
be a very knotty point to decide whether the guns
should, under such circumstances, remain in action or
F 2
68 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
limber up, in the hope of getting a clear front of fire
further to the rear, and the exigencies of the moment
must be allowed to settle the problem. As a general
rule, however, it will be the best to remain in position.
It is in crises such as these that the support of guns
may be sufficient to turn the scale, and to withdraw
would, in the majority of cases, be a risky proceeding.
Von Schell suggests the heroic remedy of firing
indiscriminately into the confused mass, thus dis-
entangling it, and forcing the enemy to loosen his
grip. There are no instances from war, as far as I
am aware, of such drastic methods having been
deliberately adopted ; but it is scarcely likely that,
even if any officer had had the hardihood to try
their effect, a record of his proceedings would be
preserved in the Official Account.
There was an occasion during the Crimean war,
however, when something of this kind did occur. Dr.
W. H. Russell, then correspondent to the Times,
wrote as follows concerning the action of the Russian
artillery after our Light Brigade had made their
celebrated charge at Balaclava : " At the very moment
when they were about to retreat, an enormous mass
of lancers was hurled on their flank. Colonel Shewell,
of the 8th Hussars, saw the danger and rode his few
men straight at them, cutting his way through with
A DRASTIC REMEDY. 69
fearful loss. The other regiments turned and engaged
in a desperate encounter. With courage too great
almost for credence, they were breaking their way
through the columns which enveloped them, when
there took place an act of atrocity without parallel in
the modern warfare of civilised nations. The Russian
gunners, when the storm of cavalry passed, returned
to their guns. They saw their own cavalry mingled
with the troopers who had just ridden over them, and,
to the eternal disgrace of the Russian name, the mis-
creants poured a murderous volley of grape and
canister on the mass of struggling men and horses,
mingling friend and foe in one common ruin."
It is to be noted, however, that the action of the
Russian artillery was unjustifiable in this case, and was
not in accordance with the spirit of Von Schell's re-
commendations, because our cavalry were not bearing
down victoriously on their enemy's position at the
moment, but were leaving it. The statements of eye-
witnesses, whom I have consulted, likewise throw
considerable doubt on the account as given by Dr.
Russell ; and it is very probable that the Russian
gunners acted less deliberately, or even altogether
accidentally, and that their friends suffered less at
their hands than we are led to believe by him. Should
tillery officer, however, ever be placed in so
70 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
trying and painful a situation that, in order to save
the bulk of the force he was acting with from destruc-
tion, he felt bound to run the risk of sacrificing the
lives of some of his friends, his motive would be a
commendable one, and should not expose him to
censure, far less to execration.
With reference to the value of the assistance some
riflemen may be to Horse Artillery in certain situa-
tions, and the allusion which has been made to the
employment of mounted infantry in this manner, we
have, as far as I am aware, no experience in war sub-
sequent to the Crimean era. During the affair of the
Bulganak, however, the day before the battle of the
Alma was fought, the need for an escort of infantry
was felt by our Horse Artillery, and the want was
made good in an impromptu manner, which appears
to foreshadow what may be done in the future more
easily and effectively through our modern organisation.
The Russian cavalry and Horse Artillery were
supported by three or four battalions of infantry, and,
as these advanced, our two troops of Horse Artillery
(I and C), under Brigadier-General Fox Strangways,
galloped forward from where they already were in
action against the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, their
fire from their new position being effective. The
Black battery of the Light Division was also soon in
THE ACTION OF GUNS AND CAVALRY TOGETHER. 71
action. The Russian cavalry, feeling the effect of the
artillery fire, quickly retired out of range, and " C "
troop, as Lord Raglan did not wish a general engage-
ment brought on, moved back to the ground about 300
yards in advance of where it had at first come into
action, and fronted the Russian infantry and guns,
both of which had now been reinforced. Sir George
Brown had by this time got the Light Division up,
and extended in line, but just out of sight behind the
ridge, and he, or Lord Raglan, desired that some men
of the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade might be taken on
the guns of " C " troop to act as sharpshooters, in the
event of another advance into action. " This battalion
had practised with the Minie rifle at Canterbury in
1853. The Light Division regiments had all, or
nearly all, been at Chobham Camp in 1853.
" The riflemen were accordingly placed on each
axletree box, one on each trail, and three on the
limber boxes ; the limber gunners themselves stood
on the trail handles, and held on by the limber boxes.
This was done with the concurrence of General
Strangways, and Sir George Brown was afterwards
pleased to call the troop his ' Rifle troop ' ; however,
there was no further attempt on the part of the
Russians to renew the fighting, and this ended the
1 affair of the Bulganak.' "
72 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
It does not seem unreasonable to assume that, had
Lord Raglan had at his disposal the resources which
one of our leaders of to-day will possess, he would
gladly have utilised their services on this occasion ;
and the incident is interesting as an example of the
unforeseen demands which the exigencies of the
battle-field occasionally impose upon us.
( 73 )
CHAPTER III.
EXAMPLES OF CO-OPERATION WHEN ACTING AS AN
INDEPENDENT FORCE.
HAVING devoted the previous chapter to a theoretical
discussion of the tactics which should govern the
employment of cavalry and guns when acting in-
dependently, we will now turn to Military History
for an illustration of how matters may work out in
practice.
Our first example shall be from the Crimean war.
It is by no means an ideal picture of what we would
wish to occur ; it is indeed far otherwise ; but there
are valuable lessons to be learnt from what happened
during the Heavy Brigade charge at Balaclava, and
from the part which was then taken by the Troop of
Horse which was engaged with it.
It will even be profitable to consider what might
have occurred had arrangements and equipment been
more suitable to the task in hand, and therefore I
dwell upon it.
Earlier in the day " I " troop had done splendid
service too, and had co-operated with the cavalry divi-
74 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
sion under Lord Lucan in a manner which left nothing
to be desired. Its leader, Captain Maude, an officer
of the highest reputation, was seriously wounded early
in the action, and both horses and men suffered
severely under the overpowering fire of a far superior
force of Russian Artillery, and bore themselves with
a fine courage under the trial.
It is however of " C " that I would now speak, not
that I think its deeds more praiseworthy, but because
I believe they are fuller of instructive experiences
in some directions for us.
And as regards the cavalry also I desire at the
outset to make my intention perfectly clear. I do
not write to glorify my own arm, nor to compose a
glowing epitaph for a man whom I never saw, and
who died indeed, poor fellow, a few years after the
Crimean war was over.* The glory of the heavy
charge at Balaclava belongs to our cavalry alone.
Although the great mass may have been struck by
the fire of Barker's Field battery which was posted
near the gorge of Kadikoi, I hardly think that any
shot or shell, fired by any of our guns, can be said to
have materially assisted in bringing about the Russian
defeat ; our foes were simply taken aback by the
* Captain Brandling, then Lieut.-Colonel and C.B. for his
services in the Crimea, died of consumption at Leeds, i6th
April, 1860.
THE HE A VY CA VALR Y CHARGE A T BALA CLA VA. 75
promptness of Scarlett, were beaten by shock tactics
pure and simple, by the pluck and dash of our
Dragoons, and by nothing else, and I in no sense
wish to claim any share of one of the most brilliant
feats of history for the Horse Artillerymen. But
after the foe was first turned back, they did some
good service too, and we can learn something from
their conduct.
Now I will briefly tell so much of the story of the
day as concerns us here.
It is very far indeed from being an ideal cavalry
and artillery battle, planned and fought out according
as theory directs, and with odds on both sides equal.
It is by no means an easy task to find such.
There is nearly always something abnormal which
spoils the symmetry of the fight. One side or other
is supported by infantry, or fights with smooth-bored
cannon against rifled ones, or there are no guns
present, or one party declines the combat just at the
interesting moment. However, I believe there is
more than one lesson in the story I am going to tell,
and so I will ask my readers to bear with me even
if I relate a drama played out, as in war is nearly
always the case, scarcely in a way to satisfy rigid
and exacting critics.
Seeing the Turks giving way in the gorge of
76 GUNS AND ~ CAVALRY.
Kadikoi, Lord Raglan sent eight squadrons of our
heavy brigade to their assistance. General Scarlett
was in the act of executing this mission and had
with him the 5th Dragoon Guards, the Scots Greys,
and the Inniskilling Dragoons, in all six squadrons,
while two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards were
following him, and two of the Royals joined him
later. The six squadrons in front had got into two
columns, owing to an obstruction in their path, and
of these the right-hand column was led by the ist
squadron of the Inniskillings and closed by the two
squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards, and the one
on the left hand by the 2nd squadron of the
Inniskillings and closed by two squadrons of the
Greys.
No patrols or scouts covered the march of these
troops. Suddenly the head of an immense Russian
column of cavalry, composed of probably not less
than 2000 men, is seen crowning the causeway
heights on our left flank not more than seven or
eight hundred yards away. Scarlett, on the left flank
of our left column, determined at once to attack them,
and wheeled the three squadrons beside him into
line to the left ; the other three, forming the right-
hand column, were wheeled to face the enemy too,
and constituted what was practically a second line.
\
GENERAL SIR JAMES SCARLETT, K.C.B.
THE HE A VY CA VA LR Y CHA RGE AT BALA CLA VA. 79
The ist squadron of the Inniskillings had gained on
the others during the march, and was formed there-
fore to their right rear.
The three squadrons in front numbered some 300
men, those in rear not quite as many more. The
two squadrons of the 4th Dragoon Guards and of
the Royal Dragoons were meanwhile moving on to
support. Now there is nothing more gallant, or
more creditable in the whole of military history, than
the manner in which this handful of men behind
Scarlett dauntlessly faced and attacked an enemy
immensely superior to them in numbers, and moving
against them with all the advantage of the ground
in their favour. But we cannot pause to dwell on
the details even of so glorious a feat. We want to
look into the artillery side of the action, and a battery,
which should now have been on the spot, was mean-
while straining every nerve to try and find a place
in the impending combat.
" C " troop had been quartered with and attached
to the light division, and had that morning been called
from its camp, five-and-a-half miles away. Why, it
will be asked, was not the troop with the cavalry ?
Why indeed ! Except that during the Peninsular
war Ross's troop — The Chestnut troop — whose
name has become historical, had worked and made its
8o
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
reputation, not with cavalry, but with Craufurd's
celebrated light division. So the precedent supplied
COLONEL SIR AUGUSTUS FKAZER, K.C.B.
by the employment of the " Chestnut troop " in the
early days was once more followed.
Moreover, Lieut.-Colonel Sir Augustus Frazer,
K.C.B., who is remembered as one of our most distin-
PENINSULAR ' TRADITIONS. 8 1
guished officers,* who saw much service in the
Peninsula, and who commanded our Horse Artillery in
the campaign of 1815, had gained great kudos because
he, recognising the weight of metal likely to be
brought against him in Belgium, had insisted on some
of the Horse Artillery batteries being armed with
9-pounders, and carried his point, in spite of the oppo-
sition at first of the Duke of Wellington. It is to
be remembered, however, that our Horse Artillery
batteries at Waterloo were utilised in line with the
other guns throughout the day, in the fashion in
which we now use them as "corps artillery," and that
had any manoeuvring taken place a deficiency in
mobility would have been observable. Indeed Sir
Robert Gardiner, whose troop, " E," did such good
service with the cavalry during the retreat from Quatre
Bras to Waterloo, wrote that had his guns been other
than the 6-pounders they were, they would have fallen
into the hands of the enemy.
When the Crimean war broke out we had not
(been at war as a nation for forty years, and were
governed altogether by the traditions of the mighty
struggle in the Peninsula. The few grey-haired
* An interesting series of letters by Sir Augustus Frazer from
the Peninsula and Netherlands was published in 1859. He died
when Director of the Royal Laboratory at Woolwich in 1835.
G
82 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
officers still serving, who had taken part in the
great war with France, based their military ideas,
naturally enough, on their experiences during the time
when last they had taken the field. The armament
of our batteries, and their equipment generally, varied
but slightly from what they had been in the Great
Duke's prime, and I have even heard it stated
that there were guns still employed in the service
which had been in use with our troops in Spain and
Belgium at the commencement of the century. There
were only two troops of Horse Artillery in the Crimea,
" I " and " C " ; of these, " I " had been allotted to
the cavalry, and was now with the light brigade, and
" C," as I have said, was with the light division.
Far better had it been had another and wiser
Peninsular precedent been followed ; for that distin-
guished cavalry leader, the Marquess of Anglesey, or
Lord Paget, as he then was, had command of a cavalry
division of five regiments and two Horse Artillery
batteries during Sir John Moore's campaign in 1808.*
But the fault of not keeping the Horse Artillery
with the cavalry was in 1854 further aggravated, in
spite of what previous experience had taught, by arming
" C " troop with four Q-prs. and two 24~pr. howitzers —
* The 7th, loth, and i8th Hussars, the I5th Light Dragoons,
and the 3rd Light Dragoons of the K.G.L., with " B " and " C "
troops, R.H.A.
A TOO WEIGHTY EQUIPMENT. 85
an equipment too heavy for Horse Artillery.* A
rough road and an unwieldy equipment destroyed
the chance the guns had of effectively co-operating.
As an eye-witness tells us, the horses " reeled and
trembled," when they halted after the excessive
strain, and, after all, the troop arrived a few minutes
too late.
As it came down from the upland past the Col, the
troop was met by a staff officer with a message from
Brigadier-General Fox Strangwaysf (a fine soldier
* The 9-pr. equipment armament of " C " troop in 1854,
weighed — gun, 38 cwt. 29 qrs. ; waggon (without spare wheel),
34cwt. i qr. 17 Ibs.
6-pr. equipment armament of " I " troop, 28 cwt. 23 Ibs. ;
waggon, 33 cwt. 3 qrs. 8 Ibs.
24-pr. Howitzers for 9~pr. equipment, 39 cwt. I qr. 1 1 Ibs. ;
waggon, 35 cwt. I qr. 20 Ibs.
12-pr. Howitzers for 6-pr. equipment, 29 cwt. 17 Ibs. ; waggon,
31 cwt. 2 qrs. 1 3 Ibs.
No men on limbers or elsewhere have been included in these
weights, which have been kindly obtained for me by Col. F. A.
Whinyates.
The weight of the 12 pr. B. L. and limber is 39 cwt. 3 qrs. 9 Ibs.
" with personal equipment and detachment."
t He served with the 2nd Rocket troop which was sent to
Germany in 1813, and was present at the battles of Goerde
and Leipzig, where the Rocket troop especially distinguished
itself. For his services there he received the order of St. Anne
of Russia, and the Swedish Order of the Sword. With the
same troop he took part in the triumph of Waterloo, and was
there so dangerously wounded that his recovery was regarded
as miraculous. He commanded our artillery during the Crimean
expedition, fought with it at the Alma, and at Inkerman was
killed by the bursting of a shell.
86 Gf/JVS AND CAVALRY.
whose portrait forms the frontispiece of this volume,
and whose name should be remembered by every
artilleryman *), calling it to a certain spot on the left
of the heavies. Now " C " troop was at this time
commanded by Captain John Brandling, a man who
seems to me, from what I have heard of his behaviour
on this day, to have had a readiness, resolution, and
coolness in action such as mark him out as a man
endowed with something akin to genius for war. I
do not want to spatter him with indiscriminate praise,
as one wise after the event might possibly do.
Some of my readers, who study art, will remember
how when Turner was informed of the subtleties and
meanings, which most people failed to appreciate, that
Ruskin had discovered in his pictures, he laughed and
said, " Ruskin sees a good deal more in them than
ever I put there ! "
Brandling similarly may have acted as much by
good luck as good guidance ; but it is fair at any rate
to give him credit for the latter. And he saw that
since the order for him had been given the situation
had materially altered. The Russian column was now
moving on and seconds were precious. He grasped
the fact at once that he could not possibly reach the
* When struck at Inkerman he asked to be taken to the
Siege Train Camp, and almost his last words were, " Take me
to the gunners, let me die amongst the gunners."
CAPTAIN BRANDLING AND " C" TROOP. 87
position suggested in time to be of any use, and that
from it his fire must quickly be masked. Therefore,
without any hesitation or delay, he shouted, " No,
I cannot get there in time," or words to that effect,
and he drove straight on by the rear of the Dragoons.
Now I say he acted then with the independence
that a Horse Artilleryman should show, and he
decided moreover most judiciously.
Because in combats such as this, in order to get the
fullest effect, both from fire and shock, it is best to
let your onset strike the hostile cavalry on the flank
furthest from the guns. The enemy, if he then faces
your onset, exposes a flank to the artillery, which is
able to fire upon him not only up to the very moment
of collision, but, should he be overthrown, can pursue
him with shells as he retreats.
Now there were two squadrons of the Royals and
two of the 4th Dragoon Guards which might fall on
the Russian right, and thus constitute an auxiliary
flank attack. Therefore, when Brandling went where
he did, he seized a position from whence his fire was
not likely to be masked, from whence he might hope
to assail most effectively his objective during the
combat, and from whence he might pursue it most
vigorously with fire should it fall back towards its base.
But above all, and that was the consideration we
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
may be sure which most influenced him, he went
where he could most quickly get into action.
So he drove along with his left shoulder turned to
the backs of our Dragoons, but all the time watching
closely the state of the situation.
When in rear of our line he saw the huge column
rolling on down the slope, and he noted what to him
might have looked something like hesitation and delay
in our first line, for the 1st squadron of the Greys was
advancing alone to the attack. At that moment the
fight appeared a hopelessly uneven one, and it seemed
to him that, in all probability, the mere inertia of the
Russian mass would bear our men back. He deter-
mined therefore to go somewhat to the rear, in order
to cover their retreat. So he called out, " Sub-divisions
right wheel," but he himself remained where he was,
with his eyes turned on the impending collision.
Thus he saw the devoted charge of the 1st squadron,
and the rest of the 300 moving off too, and their
inroad into the enemy's ranks. He noted too, from
the way the Russians bore themselves at that supreme
moment, that they were not going to ride us down,
and then he determined to throw his lot in decisively,
not to avert defeat, but to achieve victory.
He shouted, "Sub-divisions left wheel," and brought
his troop up on the right rear of our squadrons.
LIEUT.-COLONEL J. J. BRANDLING, R.A., C.B.
CAPTAIA BRANDLING AND "C" TROOP. 9'
But ere he could get in a round, his front was
masked by the first squadron of the Inniskillings,
which now crossed him to dash in on the Russian left.
On the other flank the 4th Dragoon Guards and the
Royals were now no less vigorously pressing, while
the 5th Dragoon Guards were storming in to the left
rear of the Greys. What takes some time to tell was
in reality but a matter of minutes ; and soon the
monstrous column was more or less disintegrated,
and, baffled in its enterprise, retired up the slope.
It was now that Brandling at last got his chance.
The moment he saw which way the tide of battle
was setting he sprang forward, and even while a few
red-coats were still tinging with colour the dull grey
mass, he was at work. The column was so large and
solid that its very weight held it together, and its rear
and left rear could not be reached by our swordsmen.
It was not therefore completely scattered, but rather
rolled itself sullenly back ; and on the high ground
behind, the Russian officers were soon seen holding up
their swords and rallying their men. I have been in
correspondence with three men, happily still living,
who acted as " Nos. I " to three of these guns that
day, and their account of the number of rounds fired
varies so considerably that I will only say that, what-
ever may have been the precise total, their fire was
92 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
undoubtedly most effective, not only morally so, but
physically. General Godman, who was adjutant to the
5th Dragoon Guards on that day, has written : " I well
remember the troop of Horse Artillery firing into the
retreating mass almost before some of the red-coats
were clear of them, and going over the ground next
day I saw they did good work."
And from a Russian source testimony as to the effect
of the shells has also reached me through the kindness
of Colonel F. A. Whinyates, who has devoted so much
time and trouble to the history of the troop which he
commanded for ten years with such marked distinction.
The artillery fire effectually put an end to any
chance of rallying which the Russians may have ever
had, and they now quickly retired. A Russian driver
and a pair of horses were found killed by the explosion
of a shell fired from one of the subsequent positions
which the troop took up, and this has possibly given
rise to the notion that there may have been some
guns in action with our opponents. The driver may
however have belonged to something else than a gun,
and certainly no artillery came into action with the
cavalry on the Russian side during the first conflict
with our Heavies, although their advance was pre-
ceded by Horse Artillery, who did not however fire
upon our cavalry.
CAPTAIN BRANDLING AND "C" TROOP. 93
The troop now limbered up, went ahead again,
then changed front to the right, and came under fire
from some guns near No. 2 Redoubt. It subsequently
advanced by echelon of half batteries in the direction
of some Russian squadrons which were pushed out
towards it in a manner that menaced a second attack.
The left half troop came' into action against these,
and its fire was most effective, visibly so indeed, and
compelled them quickly to withdraw. The heavy
brigade were covering the troop in more or less
close proximity to it during this time. We need
not here follow Brandling's movements further, and
his work with the heavy brigade now practically
came to an end ; but I hope I have said enough to
show that he acted in a way in which we would wish
gunners to act when assisting cavalry, that he utilised
all the chances he got, that he showed himself quick,
resolute, knowledgeable and bold, that, in one word,
he bore himself like a good soldier.*
* With reference to my remarks as to the good service done
by Brandling's battery, I think the following letter which I
received from the late Lieut.-General Sir Charles Craufurd
«-r, K.C.B., last year, shortly after I had given a lecture on
Horse Artillery, will be of interest : —
Cavalry Club, London,
22nd March, 1895.
SIK, Hiid the opportunity occurred of my cnteiin;.; into
discussion after your lecture, I should have supported your
account of the good work done by the Royal Horse Artillery at
94 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
And what lessons can we draw from this, as far as
artillery is concerned, comparatively imperfect action ?
Balaclava, by quoting the following words from a letter that I
received, at the time of the reduction of the Horse Artillery,
from Colonel Frank Forster, who took part in the successful
charge of the heavy cavalry as a captain in the 4th R.I.
Dragoon Guards : — " If there are any officers alive who were
in John Brandling's troop of Horse Artillery at Balaclava, they
would tell you how his opportune arrival with his guns after the
heavy brigade charge saved them from a fresh attack from a
very strong force of Russian cavalry. If your Horse Artillery
is reduced, your cavalry becomes more feeble than ever."
Further on, March i8th, 1895, he writes : — "John Brandling's
troop was not attached to the heavy brigade, and was sent
down from the front (on the hill opposite Sebastopol) to assist
the cavalry when it was seen that an engagement with the
Russians was imminent.
The distance he had to come was about six miles — he did it
as fast as he could go — and only arrived in time to open fire on
a supporting force of Russian cavalry.
He told me that the horses in his troop were so beat from
the pace he had come, he could not have got them much further.
They had been worked hard and badly fed ever since they
had landed in the Crimea.
I see they are going to increase the Royal Horse Artillery
again : what a triumph to you and the others who opposed their
reduction."
Yours faithfully,
CHARLES CRAUFURD FRASER,
To Lieut.-General.
MAJOR E. S. MAY, R.A.
Colonel F. A. Whinyates has also kindly sent me the follow-
ing reminiscences of Captain John Brandling, supplied by one
who served with him in " C " troop during the Crimean war. I
give them in his own words : —
" At the Alma the first retirement was at a rapid pace, and
LESSONS. 95
We have, in the first place, an illustration of cavalry
acting wisely in not waiting for the guns, for it was
Brandling, who remained well behind next the Russians, swore
lustily, ' D n it ! where are you leading to, keep this shoulder
up, the other shoulder up, etc., etc.' At the second retirement the
troop had lost a man, and Colonel Lake his horse, and Baddeley,
who had surrendered his to the Colonel, was running about with
a saddle in his arms, Brandling joking him, though things
looked very warm. Just before wheeling about again to advance,
Captain Strange came down, and asked Brandling where he
was to take the waggons to. Brandling roared out at the top of
his voice, smiling all the while, ' Wherever you like, Captain
Strange,' repeating it three times ; he then ordered the
trumpeter to sound 'About' and 'Gallop,' looking as happy
as if he were going in at football. There was many a laugh
over this afterwards, and— together with the swearing at the
previous retirement, and his remaining in the open under fire
after putting all he could under cover at the river side — gave the
men a great opinion of his coolness in battle ; but there was a
strong feeling with all ranks that, as the troop was actually in
the field before the enemy, the command, as the fortune of war,
ought to have been allowed to devolve on the senior Lieutenant
(the late Major- General E. J. Michell), who was a highly
efficient officer, instead of handing it over to one who was not a
bond fide Horse Artilleryman. (Brandling had been transferred
from the siege train.)
" Brandling was a North countryman, and, after explaining
things frequently, used the expression 'You know.' On the
morning of quitting the Alma he called the Nos. I to the front
and told them to impress on the men not to get out of the way
of the shot when in action, or to use the words * look-out ' to
each other when the shot were coming at them adding, in his
own style and with a touch of drollery in his eye, ' if a shot is
coming to take your head off, you know, it is not a d d bit
of use trying to get out of its way, you know ; now I saw that the
other day, and I don't want to see it again.' This sort of thing
96 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
Scarlett's bold and prompt conduct in at once facing and
charging his huge antagonist that gave us the victory.
went down with the men and helped to enliven them in their
subsequent hardships. It had reference to the Bulganak, when
the mounted detachments received their Bapteme de feu as
cavalry, and found how trying it is to sit still in one long rank
and be shot at by artillery ; there was a little easing off and
opening of the files, and thus many shots passed through harm-
lessly. At the Alma the shots were far too numerous to admit
of being seen.
"At page 138 ' History of " C " Troop,' mention is made of a
shot coming close over his shoulder ; his back was toward the
Russians at the moment, and the guns were in the act of wheel-
ing towards him in column of sub-divisions. A N.-C. officer
called, ' Look out, sir,' as the shot seemed to be coming fair
for his back, but he did not take the slightest notice, and
merely remarked afterwards to the N.-C. officer, ' I believe I
had a narrow shave that time.'
" In October, at the Right Attack, when great vigilance was
necessary, he addressed the men thus : ' Oh, good G-d ! if we
are going to let the Russians catch us asleep we had a d d
sight better have remained in England, you know ; ' and he
warned us that, if he caught any night sentry not actively on
the alert, he would have him tried by Court-martial. A night
or two afterwards he did confine a sentry for not challenging
him, though the twilight was barely passed, notwithstanding the
man was alert, walking up and down by the horses, and knew
the Captain was present, but thought it unnecessarily early to
challenge. The man was, however, tried by Court-martial and
suffered corporal punishment. Brandling, though hard in many
respects, never spared himself — with pick and spade and
blistered hands he worked well with the men when they tried to
hut themselves on the plateau in November, but he had not the
sustaining power of Captain Fraser, and he used to say to him,
' David, I don't know how the devil you manage to get over the
ground.' He kept cheery and light-hearted under the most
LESSONS. 97
I say we learn next that guns should always be
quartered or encamped with the brigade or division
of cavalry with which they are to act in the field.
We learn that burthens which may not appear
excessive for horses in peace time, or when the guns
are acting with infantry, are too great when the
strain of rapid work with cavalry on active service is
encountered.
I say too that the guns and cavalry must be within
easy reach of one another when the crisis of the fight
arrives, that the artillery leader must have his eye
on the combat, and his finger on its pulse, and must
act decisively and rapidly on his own responsibility,
according as circumstances dictate.
I believe, after all said and done, that it is often in
the actions we are discussing largely a matter of this.
Even with the best of leaders and the most highly
trained troops, in the excitement and hurry of a
cavalry fight, who would leave his guns to seek instruc-
adverse circumstances, and with his merry laugh was often
heard from the tent at night chaffing the other officers.
'' Sir George Brown did not care much for the mounted arms or
gay dress, but he began to take a great pride and interest in the
troop, and he seemed to think there was no one like Brandling.
A kindly recollection of Captain Brandling as Commanding
Officer at a memorable time has prompted these remarks.
After the war he changed much in character and became a
serious and devout man."
H
98 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
tions, or what cavalry general with his whole atten-
tion absorbed, and rightly absorbed, in the skilful
manoeuvring of his squadrons is likely to make a new
scheme to send to his guns, should circumstances
alter? A general scheme may be arranged rapidly
beforehand ; but even in the last minute or two some
unforeseen chance may swim up from unseen depths
to our eyes, when the plan of attack ought to be
altered, and must be altered, if the commander be not
an incapable pedant.
Over and over again I feel certain that the leader of
the guns must be prepared to measure facts, and play,
not by the book, but to the score.
And now let us turn from the days when round
shot was still to be found in our limber boxes
to a more modern period. As I have already said,
there is not much as to the action of Horse Artillery
and cavalry working independently to be learnt from
the campaign of 1870. There was, however, an affair
at Buzancy on the 2/th of August, during MacMahon's
celebrated flank march to Sedan, which is not un-
worthy of our attention.
The Saxon cavalry division covering the front of
the 1 2th Corps, which was to cross the Meuse at Dun,
had assembled its 2$rd Brigade at Landres during
the forenoon. The 24th Brigade was sent forward to
BUZANCY. 99
the north to reconnoitre, the i8th Lancers working
towards the Buzancy-Stenay road, while the. 3rd
Cavalry with a battery of Horse Artillery, had reached
Remonville, and pushed forward an advanced guard,
consisting of one troop of the ist and two troops of
the 5th squadron, towards Buzancy. At about eleven
o'clock this advanced guard reported that there was a
regiment of French cavalry in front of it, and that the
town was occupied by the enemy.
Now, the troops observed were the cavalry of the
5th Corps of the French, which was so disastrously
defeated at Beaumont three days later, and which
was now formed up at Bar, Brahaut's cavalry division
being pushed ahead of it as far as Buzancy. Two
squadrons of the I2th Chasseurs were on the south of
that town, the issues of which were held by dis-
mounted troopers, but the bulk of the cavalry were
still on the north of it.
Meanwhile, on the German side, the i8th Lancers
had concluded their reconnaissance, and had moved
to Remonville. The leader of the 24th Brigade
(General Senfft von Pilsach), having now united his
brigade again, ordered it to move forward through
Bayonville. He then rode on to the advanced guard,
and, seeing the weakness of the opposition, ordered
it to charge the Chasseurs. This was done, and with
H 2
GUNS AND CAVALKY.
such good effect that the hostile squadrons were
driven back to Buzancy, and, in spite of the carbine
fire with which they were received, the Germans
succeeded in pressing into the town after them. There
a hand-to-hand metee ensued, and the French, coming
on in superior numbers, gradually forced their op-
ponents from the houses and pursued them for some
distance beyond.
But the captain of the 1st squadron (Von Wolders-
dorf) had taken up a position on the east of the
Remonville road, from which, in the event of the weak
advanced guard being forced backward (which was
what actually occurred), he might fall on the flank of
the pursuing French and take them in a most vital
point in the midst of their career of triumph.
Now it seems to me that this same Von Woldersdorf
(I do not know if he afterwards rose to distinction or
not) was also a man imbued by nature with a special
aptitude for war. Many of us can be wise after the
fight is over, and there are plenty of men who can
show how Napoleon ought to have won Waterloo, or
Moltke have lost Gravelotte. But this man was wise
before the event, and displayed judgment and deci-
sion at a critical juncture during the fleeting moments
of a cavalry combat. Ninety-nine officers in a hundred
moving in support of that advanced guard would have
BUZANCY. 101
manoeuvred somewhere in rear of it ; but he, with an
instinct which did riot lead him astray, carried his
command boldly to a position from which the greatest
results were bound to follow on its swoop. He appre-
ciated the situation, and recognised the decisive point.
Like the other captain whom I have just praised, this
man too acted like a born soldier.
The event proved the correctness of his judgment ;
his attack on the left flank of the Chasseurs enabled
the flying Germans to rally and face their foes, and
the Chasseurs, assailed both in front and flank, were
driven back once more within the shelter of the
houses.
But now the weakness of cavalry is forcibly
exemplified to us.
The carbine fire from the village denied further
progress to the Saxons, who, under punishment from
it, fell back to a distance of some hundreds of yards
from it, while the remainder of the brigade moved up
to Sivry.
It was now that the guns made their influence felt,
and effectively supplemented the efforts of the horse-
men. The German battery of Horse Artillery was
brought into action on some heights close to, and
directed a well-aimed fire on the Chasseurs, who,
supported by the musketry fire, were again advanc-
102 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
ing. So effective was the fire of these guns, so decisive
was their intervention, that, as the Official Account
tells us, the French " withdrew in such haste that a
squadron of the Lancers (it had not yet been engaged),
which was now likewise advancing, was unable to reach
them."
At one o'clock the skirmish had come to an end.
The two German squadrons who were engaged had
lost thirty-two men and twenty-seven horses ; both the
captains were wounded. Twelve French Chasseurs
and Lieutenant-Colonel de la Porte, who was wounded
in'several places, were made prisoners. Subsequently
the French squadrons fell back from Buzancy, the
Saxon Cavalry Division continued its work un-
molested, and was sent to reconnoitre towards Nouart
late in the afternoon, working towards Nouart, Barri-
court, and Villiers-devant-Dieu.
The affair is only regarded as a little skirmish in
the German Official Account, and but few paragraphs
are devoted to a description of it, yet it is, nevertheless,
interesting and remarkable as being, perhaps, the most
characteristic, or even the only, purely horse artillery
and cavalry action in the whole war. It seems to me
also that it is full of instruction for us, and certainly
it brings out also the value of artillery well, as the
French, although in superior strength both within,
ACTION AT BUZANCY
27™AUGUST 1870.
a. 2 Squadrons Chasseurs.
ft. Copt, v Vlfolderdorf'j S<fuadrcnj.
c Advanced $nar&
Gtrman> cavalry
Jratch
tfws
t'LAN OF ACTION OF BUZANCY.
RESULTS OF FRENCH INACTION. 105
and on the other side of, Buzancy, are stated to have
declined the combat owing to their having no guns
to support them.
And what was the result of such a want of enter-
prise on the part of the French cavalry, or so great a
deficiency in the organisation of that cavalry division ?
Briefly this :
Three days later, the men of the 5th Corps were
round their cooking pots at Beaumont getting their
dinners ready — just as I shall presently describe how
their brethren of Forton's Cavalry had been busied
with their breakfasts on the eventful August 16 — when
German shells came tumbling into their camp and
startled them from their repose. Their cavalry had
not secured their safety ; in consequence of that they
did not know of the foes that were closing in upon
them, and the surprise of Beaumont foreshadowed
and led up to the disaster of Sedan.
io6 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
CHAPTER IV.
OPPORTUNITIES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD.
HAVING thus discussed the most difficult and charac-
teristic role of guns and cavalry, we will turn to study
some examples of how they may turn opportunity to
account on the battle-field itself.
Of modern instances of such co-operation there are
not many; the cavalry and artillery work in 1866
was not quite satisfactory, and in 1870 the French
squadrons were admittedly mismanaged. There was
a great cavalry combat certainly on the i6th of
August, 1870, at Ville-sur-Yron to the north-west of
Mars-la-Tour, but before it took place the German
Horse Artillery had been absorbed in the general
fight, and no guns supported Barby's charges.
Nor do we find them in the other brilliant charges
which occurred on that day, that of the Brigade
Redern, or of Bredow's Brigade, the hero of Tobit-
schau, that one I mean which the Germans call the
" Todten-Ritt " ; nor yet was the gallant rush made
by the 1st Dragoons of the Guard to stem the French
OPPORTUNITIES ON THE BATTLEFIELD. 107
advance, and extricate the guns on the east of Mars-
la- Lour supported directly by artillery. The principle
the Germans acted upon is sound, and when once
battle is joined cavalry may be utilised independently
of guns, because they are then employed in com-
bination with and supported by the other arms, and
never assail infantry unless the latter are already
demoralised by fire, or taken by surprise.
It has been suggested by some that it would be
better that Horse Artillery batteries should form an
inseparable, inalienable portion of a cavalry brigade or
division, and should not be placed in line with the
other guns during a pitched battle. I have heard
these very facts about the battle of Vionville, which
I have just referred to, quoted as an example of the
evil of not preserving Horse Artillery batteries thus
exclusively for cavalry work. No general, however,
would, I believe, ever hold a number of guns idle on
the battle-field, which were capable of inflicting injury
on his infantry and artillery opponents, on the chance
that they might be needed with his squadrons later on.
Certainly no English general could afford to do so, for
even according to our latest organisation, which is
to add three field batteries to our corps artillery, an
English corps d'armte will still have to face a foreign
corps with only 108 guns against 120.
io8 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
At Vionville every gun on the German side was
needed to hold back the French, who, when they
recovered from their first surprise, advanced in
superior numbers to sweep away their foe, and it
would have been sheer madness to have kept bat-
teries aloof from a battle in which after the first
brilliant commencement the Germans had to fight
for hours on the defensive, and were forced to make
every effort to preserve the ground that they had
gained.
I would, however, even go further than this and say
that in a general engagement it is better that the
cavalry should study the chances of the moment and
rely on the character of the fighting in their vicinity,
and the situation of the moment for support. It seeks
on such an occasion only to act in combination with
the other arms, and may, therefore, dispense with
the special support which it requires when acting
independently.
True, there may be opportunities when cavalry and
Horse Artillery moving rapidly, even during the
progress of a great battle, may anticipate the foe at
some decisive point, and may make or prevent a
telling flank movement.
But for such special occasions, special arrangements
could, no doubt, be made as the exigencies of the
OPPORTUNITIES ON THE BATTLE-FIELD. 109
moment might dictate, and we need not legislate for
them beforehand.
There is indeed a very good and instructive lesson
as to what Horse Artillery and cavalry can do in this
respect, even on the battle-field itself, to be found in
the story of the battle of Loigny-Poupry, and on a
smaller scale there are some valuable examples to be
drawn from the closing days of the campaign of 1 870.
It is usually but futile to discuss the " what might
have been," and in war success or failure are facts with
which it is more than ever unprofitable to wrestle with
or attempt to explain away. Perhaps, however, when
we are seeking instruction, it may be permitted us to
speculate a little on possibilities, and it would seem that
at Gravelotte an opportunity was missed, and that had
the mass of the French cavalry, in place of being held
aimlessly and helplessly in the rear, been placed in
front of the right of the French position, where the
ground was favourable to the arm, they might have
checked their enemy's advance, and prevented his
reaching that wing till the close of the day.
It was on this very right wing that the decisive
blow of the day was struck, and had the French not
been defeated there, the task of the Germans would
have been immensely more difficult than it was ; for on
the left their success was by no means established.
no GUNS AND CAVALRY.
Indeed, by a bold and judicious employment of
cavalry and Horse Artillery the French right might
have taken the offensive, and, with the Guard Corps
thrown in to its support, such a movement must have
been an exceedingly dangerous one to their opponents.
To return, however, to our discussion of actual
incidents in warfare, and to go a very long way back
indeed. The action of cavalry supported by artillery
on the head of a column, to prevent a turning move-
ment, was never more brilliantly illustrated than at
Rossbach, where Seydlitz made his decisive charge,
and the guns on the Janusberg so efficiently co-ope-
rated with him. This, however, is scarcely a modern
instance, and we must forego enlarging on it.
There are also examples of how guns and horsemen
worked together, sometimes on a very large scale as at
Hanau, to be found in the history of the wars of the
early century.
Marengo supplies almost the first, and nothing more
decisive or brilliant has ever been accomplished in war
than the stroke of Kellerman with his 400 sabres.
The story is so well known that it is enough to say
here that the Austrians thought they had won the
battle, and so sure of his victory was their leader, the
veteran Melas, that he left the field at 2 o'clock, and
wearied out sought rest. The arrival of Desaix's
MARENGO.
corps, however, gave new hope to the French, and
stayed their retreating columns. That gallant soldier
told Napoleon that, though one battle had been lost,
there was still time to gain another, and asked for
some guns to aid him. Some eighteen, collected by
Marmont, were soon brought into action, and for a
time the strides of the Austrian triumph were again
checked.
But for a time only.
The brave Desaix was struck down, and the French
again began to give way before the masses of their
opponents. Marmont's guns, however, caught the
victors in flank with a few rounds of grape as they
pressed on, and suddenly just in front of them " little
Kellerman " swept past with his 400 troopers well in
hand. One quick word of command brought the
divisions into line by a rapid wheel to the left, and
in less time than it takes to write these lines the
Austrians were in the most hopeless disorder.
Such was the effect of that opportune blow that
General Zach and 2000 imperial soldiers — or 3000
according to Marmont — laid down their arms at once,
while four guns and six colours were captured.
Eventually the whole Austrian army was not only
beaten, but their power was annihilated. Marmont
says it was the volley of case from the guns and the
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
charge coming together just at the right moment that
did the deed. " If the charge had been made three
minutes later, our guns would have been taken, or
they (the Austrians) would have retired, and perhaps,
having got over its surprise at the sudden volley, the
Austrian infantry might have faced the cavalry. It
would have been the same if the charge had preceded
the storm of case."
Here we have a salient example of guns and
squadrons working together ; but our own experiences,
which are always of greater interest than any others,
supply us with an equally good one.
It would be difficult to find a better instance on a
small scale of Horse Artillery and cavalry making a
flank attack during the progress of a general engage-
ment than a feat accomplished during the Indian
Mutiny by Tombs's troop of the Bengal Horse
Artillery, and eulogised by Kaye in his " Sepoy War."
When on May 30, 1857, Wilson's force reached
Ghazee-ood-deen Nuggur, near the river Hindun, it
was evident that there would be a struggle. The
mountaineers, flushed with victory and filled with
confidence, had boldly left their stronghold, and had
pressed on to attack the Meerut brigade before it
could join hands with the force from Umballa. Some
heavy guns were posted on a ridge to the right of
GHAZEE-OOD-DEEN NUGGUR. 113
their position, and these opened fire upon our people.
We had some i8-pounders too, however, which
vigorously replied to this fire, and under the protec-
tion of their heavy projectiles our riflemen moved out
along the causeway, and came to close quarters with
the enemy. The conflict was waged stubbornly on
both sides, and the fight was at a standstill till a new
force was brought suddenly into play.
The Horse Artillery under Henry Tombs (a name
still fondly cherished by the Royal Artillery), sup-
ported by the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers),
swiftly dashed away to the right, crossed the river
Hindun, undeterred either by its rugged bank or
dangerous bed, and successfully turned the left flank
of the enemy.
Kaye tells us how "under the galling fire then
poured in upon them, the mutineers reeled and
staggered, and presently broke. Some took refuge in
a village, whence they were driven by our riflemen,
and soon the whole body of the enemy were in
ignominious flight towards the walls of Delhi."
From India in fact may be gleaned splendid illustra-
tions of the value of Horse Artillery and cavalry, of
their powers in covering long distances, or carrying
through gallant enterprises. India moreover, as I
may remind you, has even a claim to be regarded as
I
114 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
the birthplace of the former arm. However that may
be, for it is a matter of controversy, it is at any rate
certain that we cannot anywhere find mention of
brighter exploits than those of which our Indian
Horse Artillery can boast, and when future historians
may undertake to collect the names which have shed
most lustre on Horse Artillery and cavalry, it is to
the muster-rolls of the Bengal Artillery, and of the
regiments who co-operated with them, that they will
frequently have to turn.
But in the far East we have not had to fight
European foe with our Horse Artillery, and therefore
and because also our Horse Artillery was at its very
best during that period, I resort to one of the great
battles of the Peninsular War for an illustration.
There no doubt have been deeds accomplished on a
larger scale, such as may be gleaned from 1814, but
nowhere was the danger more imminent, or the crisis
sharper than at the battle of Albuera.
Tactical skill is usually only acquired by immense
practical experience, and the protracted wars at the
commencement of the century taught men to use the
materials at their disposal to better advantage than
perhaps they have ever done since.
That is why I ask my readers to come back with
me all the way to 1811.
NORMAN RA MSA Y. 1 1 j
When mentioning Horse Artillery in connection with
the Peninsular War, it is impossible however to avoid
a reference to Major Norman Ramsay. No feat of
arms is more celebrated perhaps than that when he
charged and broke through the French cavalry at
Fuentes d'Onor, and it has secured undying fame,
sparling for ever in the glow eloquence of Napier's.
But brilliant as it was, that triumph of audacity is
scarcely within the pale of legitimate tactics, and
Norman Ramsay's real reputation rests on something
more solid and exemplary. He was respected by his
comrades as a capable and zealous officer, and beloved
as a charming companion and a sincere friend. When
he fell at Waterloo no one was more genuinely
mourned ; there was a universal feeling that the
regiment had lost a man difficult or even impossible to
replace ; and that feeling has endured to this very day.
Beneath his picture in the mess at Woolwich hang
relics and trinkets which belonged to him and which
are cherished with something like affection by his
brother officers of the present time. The photograph
of his grave hangs there too, and copies of it are to be
found in many an artillery officer's house or quarter.
That a man who died when only a brevet major more
than eighty years ago should haue aroused such long-
enduring enthusiasm, stamps him as a soldier of more
I 2
n6
GUNS AND CAVALRY.
than common mould. He furnishes, I believe, an
almost if not quite unique instance in the annals of our
army, and a book on guns and cavalry would hardly
be complete without some slight tribute to his name.
MAJOR NORMAN RAMSAY, H.A.
But to proceed. Some may despise, as a shred of
ancient history, the example I am going to give, but I
believe it is the spirit rather than the letter which we
EXAMPLES FROM 1814. 117
should dwell upon with reference to the particular
part of the subject in our immediate view, and that
the old wars may still be studied with advantage.
The special characteristics of cavalry and the mode
of its application have not altered at all since the
stirring times when the century was young, and guns
must co-operate in the future and utilise their mobility
just as they did in the past. Indeed I say further
that if anyone wants to read of Horse Artillery and
cavalry at their very best, he must refer to what those
arms did in that wonderful campaign of 1814 in
France, when Napoleon showed the world what genius
may accomplish against appalling odds. At Rheims,*
to give one instance out of many, he turned the left
flank of the Russians, under St. Priest, with 8000
cavalry and 30 Horse Artillery guns. But the Allies
retaliated in the most brilliant manner at the second
battle of Fere Champenoise,f when 20,000 of their
horsemen with 128 guns utterly defeated the corps of
Marmont and Mortier, 22,000 strong, of whom 17,000
were infantry, and with 84 guns. I think this is per-
haps the most astonishing achievement of guns and
cavalry which history records, for not a musket was
fired on the Allied side, and gunners and troopers
worked entirely alone.
* March i5th, 1814. t March 24th, 1814.
u8 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
It will be impossible I fear to analyse Albuera very
closely as regards cavalry and Horse Artillery, for the
records on the subject are singularly bad. They
did not publish Official Accounts in those days ; there
were no war correspondents ; the great authority,
Napier, was an infantry soldier, and I think he has
sometimes failed to do full justice to the cavalry and
artillery. We know from the glowing pages, which
tell the story of " the fatal hill," " with what a strength
and majesty the British soldier fights." "That
astonishing infantry " surely deserved every word he
said of them and more, but it is disappointing never-
theless to find the equally gallant efforts of the 3rd
and 4th Dragoon Guards, who with four guns of " D "
troop held our right flank against the efforts of the
powerful French cavalry, but comparatively briefly
referred to.
Let us stay for a moment to see what they did ;
though I will only speak very generally of the
operations except in so far as they affected the cavalry
and Horse Artillery.
Beresford on the i6th of May had taken up a posi-
tion at Albuera to receive Soult who was marching
to the relief of Badajoz. The Spaniards were on his
right, the English in the centre, the Portuguese on his
left. The cavalry and Horse Artillery were extended
BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 119
along his front, their left appuyed on the village of
Albuera. On the high ground above the village the
four guns of" D " troop,* R.H.A., under the command
of Captain Lefebure were in action.
The whole force under Beresford amounted to about
27,000 infantry, of whom only about 7500 however
were British, 2000 cavalry and 38 guns. Against
these Soult brought some 20,000 veteran infantry,
4500 cavalry, and 52 guns — authorities differ as to the
exact numbers, but these are near the mark. Beres-
ford had neglected to occupy a wooded hill on his
right front between the Ferdia and Albuera rivers.
Behind this hill Soult accordingly massed his heavy
cavalry under Latour Maubourg, and his 5th Corps,
while he made a feint of attacking the bridge leading
across the stream to Albuera with the remainder.
Between eight and nine o'clock Alten's Light Infantry
Brigade of the King's German Legion, which was
holding the village and bridge of Albuera, was assailed,
and a sharp contest ensued. But it was soon evident
that the real attack was to be on our right, for two-
thirds of the French infantry was seen to counter-
march to its left, while their light cavalry wheeled
about too, and galloped rapidly up the left bank of
* Two guns had been left behind at Lisbon, and had not yet
joined.
120 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
the Albuera to join the remainder of their horse in an
attempt to outflank and overwhelm our right.
The Spaniards were ordered to change front to the
right, the second division was moved to their support,
while the Portuguese were carried to the centre, with
the exception of one brigade which was sent to sup-
port Alten. The I3th Light Dragoons were left
above the bridge, but Lumley's heavy brigade, con-
sisting of the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Guards and the
Horse Artillery battery, was hurried as fast as possible
to the extreme right to cover our flank, which was
much exposed, and was being threatened by heavy
masses of French cavalry and artillery.
The Spanish General was both obstinate and in-
capable, his troops failed to carry out the orders they
had received as promptly as they should have done,
and the French were upon them ere they had com-
pleted the necessary movements. In half-an-hour
Beresford's position was a desperate one, and defeat
or victory hung in the balance till the very end of the
battle. The complete story of that fight must be
studied elsewhere. It is enough to say now that the
duties which were thrust on the cavalry and guns on
the right, where some very hard fighting took place,
were as arduous as perhaps fell to the lot of any of
the troops. Again and again did Soult throw squadron
BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 121
after squadron upon them, and often were they all but
overwhelmed. " D " troop was ridden through several
times by the enemy's horsemen and for a short period
they gained possession of one of its guns. It was
however soon recovered, and Lumley was able to hold
the inundation back until Hardinge's inspiration saved
the day, and the celebrated charge of the Fusiliers
pushed Soult's columns down " the fatal hill." *
But before that crowning stroke, let me remind my
readers that the fate of the day had already been
* Sir Evelyn Wood last year did me the honour to preside at
a lecture in which I mentioned Albuera, and afterwards told the
following anecdote as to the influence which Hardinge had on
the fortunes of the fight : — " I will tell you a story which may
interest you, which occurred to me after having seen the synopsis
of the lecture as regards Albuera. Napier tells the story, and tells
it very well — that Colonel Hardinge sent back those troops which
had retired from there, i.e., the bridge (pointing to the map} and
ordered up the Fusilier brigade. I asked Arthur Hardinge (I was
there in 1888, going thence straight to Gibraltar) 'is that true ?'
' Oh, no,' he said, ' not a bit of it, my father often talked to me
about it. But he was trying to persuade Beresford to hold on.'
Beresford was a very brave man, and I should not tell you the
story except that it is very well known ; but he had been greatly
' hustled ' ; a Polish lancer had got behind him and he very
nearly got his spear into the general, who caught the lance and
turned it away. There were three or four others trying to kill
him at the moment, and Beresford, seeing so many men down,
had his head inclined backwards, when Hardinge rode up to
him and said, ' I think, Sir, I ought to tell you that you have a
peerage in one hand and a Court-martial in the other.' Beres-
ford waited a moment or two and then turned round and said,
' I will go for the peerage.' That is really what occurred ! "
122 GUNS AND CAVALKY.
snatched out of the fire by Lumley's promptness,
and the courage and devotion of four of his heavy
squadrons, who fell on the French Hussars and Polish
Lancers in the moment of their triumph.
But for him even that irresistible charge of the
Fusiliers might have been impossible, and at the most
it could only have mitigated a serious defeat.
Four of these regiments had suddenly caught Col-
borne's Brigade and Cleeve's and Hawker's guns at
a disadvantage in the rain and mist, had taken them
in flank and rear, had slain or captured two-thirds of
the brigade and six of the guns, and had penetrated
to almost every part of our position. Beresford him-
self, caught in the torrent, had a hand-to-hand en-
counter with a Polish Lancer, and owed his life to his
great personal strength and courage.
One of Colborne's battalions, however, stood firmly
on the heights, and our Cavalry were at hand in the
hour of need. Never in fact did the three arms more
loyally co-operate than at this crisis. There have
been bigger battles, but none I think more glorious
to our soldiers.
I wish I could give closer details of such a fight,
but I have found that to try and find particulars of
some of these glorious actions of the great wars is
a most hopeless and disappointing task. At the time
•
BATTLE OF ALBUERA. 123
perhaps men were too occupied in the constant
fighting to write of what they had seen and done, but
this hardly explains the apathy shown, subsequently,
towards collecting any adequate accounts of the great
deeds of our regiments being preserved. The official
regimental histories of the 3rd and 4th Dragoon
Guards dismiss achievements that should be cherished
by every man in their ranks in a few niggardly lines.
The Artillery despatch was unfortunately lost, and
we have only certain private letters from some of the
officers engaged to go upon. But the good service
done by the Cavalry and guns is recognised hand-
somely, if too briefly for the student's needs, by every-
one who has written of that day. Marshal Beresford's
despatch was most flattering to the Artillery, and
was that of General Lumley, while Brigadier-
General Long * who commanded our Light Cavalry
writes in a private letter : — " The dispersion of our
Cavalry scarely left us 400 or 500 British at any
point, and these with two regiments of Spaniards,
were all we had to offer by way of resistance to their
numerous and overwhelming columns. The ground
however favoured us, and the Horse Artillery did its
duty with brilliant effect. The enemy lost a great
* Extract from a letter of Brigadier-General R. B. Long,
from " Bivouac near Vicente," dated the 26th June, 1811.
I24 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
number of men, and from 400 to 500 horses by the
operation of this arm alone." Consider what a loss of
400 or 500 horses means to a Cavalry division on
active service ! I think everyone will agree with me
that to inflict such a loss as that under the circum-
stances argues well for the coolness and courage of
the gunners.
And now is there no lesson to be drawn from this
ancient history ? May not guns and Cavalry be called
upon in the future to play just the same part in which
their predecessors distinguished themselves in those
far-off days ? Can we ensure genius on the part of
our generals now any more than we could then, and
under similar conditions of leadership and atmosphere
might not precisely the same incidents once more
recur ? A dull man and a rainy day ! Is the com-
bination an absolutely remote contingency even in
this nineteenth century ? If not, then I say, a weak
flank may once more have to be protected against the
inroad of an overbearing foe, British infantry and guns
may again be surprised and ridden over by an active
Cavalry, and the vigilance and readiness of the same
arm on our own side may again be indispensable if
disaster is to be retrieved.
Nine days afterwards there was a brilliant little
cavalry fight at Usagre when Lumley with his two
ACTION AT USAGRE. 125
fine regiments, Madden's Portuguese, and " D " troop,
was attacked by Latour Maubourg with the whole of
his Cavalry division and some guns. As we are discuss-
ing Albuera it is a pity not to mention it here.
The French were driven off with a loss of 200 men for,
as a letter from an officer engaged says cheerfully, " the
instant our jolly fellows came near them, they turned
and were sabred in good style." That fight, however,
strictly speaking, hardly comes under the category of
those we are now dealing with, nor does Ribera, where
the services of " D " troop were again especially
brilliant, and probably no man ever received a higher
tribute than did Captain E. C. Whinyates who was its
second captain. But I may just mention that during
a communication after the action under a flag of truce
the French leader, General Lallemand, made particular
inquiries for the name of the officer who had com-
manded the guns near the river, and on learning it
sent the following message to Captain Whinyates.*
* Sir E. C. Whinyates, K.C.B. and K.H., had a most dis-
tinguished career in the Artillery. He joined in 1798, and a
year later accompanied the expedition to the Helder under
Abercromby. He afterwards took part in the campaign in
North Holland under the Duke of York, and served at the
capture of Madeira in 1801. In 1807 he was appointed adjutant
to the artillery of the army under Lord Cathcart, and was
employed in the attack on Copenhagen, where he commanded
one of the principal batteries during the siege. In 1810 he went
to the Peninsula as second captain of " D," Lefebure's, troop of
126
GUNS AND CAVALRY,
" Tell that brave man that if it had not been for him
I should have beaten your cavalry, but that meeting
GENERAL SIR E. C. WHINYATES. K.C.B.
Royal Horse Artillery, remained there for three years, and saw
much fighting. At Waterloo he had three horses shot under
him, was struck by a round shot in the leg, and severely
wounded in the left arm towards the close of the battle. He
died at Cheltenham, 1865.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE FOE. 127
me in every movement with his fire, he never would
allow me to form for attack. Say that I shall mention
his name in my orders as having been the cause of
our defeat, and not your cavalry. Be sure you tell
him this. Promise to give him my message."
Such instances as I have just dealt with may, how-
ever, be regarded as the minor incidents of a fight, of
a character, viewed relatively to the great places of
the whole struggle, such as are borne by the personal
acts of bravery performed by individuals in a melee.
For great strokes conceived and carried out on a large
scale, mobility and co-operation are nevertheless even
more essential.
Guns may be combined for various objects during
an engagement. To make or repel a flank attack, to
fill a gap in one's own, or to force an entry into an
opponent's, -line. A capable leader, who understands
the arm, has a full control over it, and can rely on
its rising to his expectations, has often in the history
of war turned it on such occasions nobly to account.
I*i the two battles we will now deal with we shall find
mobility -enabling it to meet the demands of every
one of the eventualities I have alluded to.
Let us look at Wagram first, and as we do so I
must presume that my readers are acquainted with
the story of the campaign of 1809 up to the morning
128 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
of July 6, the day following that on which Napoleon
had gained the left bank of the Danube with his whole
army.
When the Archduke's attack on his right, in the
early dawn of the 6th of July, took Napoleon by sur-
prise, he had to hurry to support Davout with his
guard and its artillery from Raasdorf, where they
had bivouacked the previous evening, to Glinzendorf
where the Austrian left was pressing on. The distance,
as the crow flies, is some three-and-a-half miles.
There are no roads even now to compare with those
we are accustomed to in England, and the fields on
either side of the unmetalled tracks were then green
with corn and cultivation. When I walked over the
ground, four years ago, it was winter, and at every
step one sank ankle deep into the soft alluvial soil of
those level plains. But the crops must have made
movement even more difficult in summer, and these
batteries I speak of had to cover a lot of ground
that day.
For when the threatened inroad of the Austrians
at Glinzendorf had been forced back, a new danger
awaited Napoleon in his centre near Aderklaa. There,
too, the Austrians were coming on with triumphant
strides, and the same batteries that had stemmed
their raid on the French right flank at one end of the
•JO
I
BATTLE OF WAGRAM. 129
battle, were now needed at the other to restore the
fight, and fill the gap in their dangerously weakened
centre. Napoleon, at the head of the cavalry and
Horse Artillery, galloped himself to the new point of
danger. The remaining batteries of his Guard, that
is to say six Field, followed him with all the speed
they could command, and their rapid flank march lay
once again over the cultivated fields.
I have often wondered how that wonderful change
of position was made. The distance, as the crow flies,
is some four miles and a half, and, as I have said, the
ground traversed is a level, highly cultivated plain.
There had been a deluge of rain, too, on the night
but one before, the ground must have been soft and
soppy, and the long stalks of corn and herbage must
ave become entwined with the wheels of the carnages,
o carry a mass of sixty guns such a distance at a
crisis in the course of a battle seems to me a great
performance, and it argues immense manoeuvring
power and skill both on the part of the batteries and
of those that led them.
When they gained the angle of the French line
near Aderklaa they closed the breach the Austrians
had made, and subsequently, after Davout had carried
he heights above Neusiedel, and was driving the
Austrian left before rjim, these same guns and forty
K
130 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
more were thrown into the fight under Lauriston to
clear the way for Macdonald's celebrated column, and
trotted out ahead to come to close quarters with the
enemy. The deeds of the vast mass of artillery so
formed are a leading illustration in all tactical works,
and have become one of the common-places of military
history. But the display of mobility made by them
has been hardly so much recognised, yet it seems to
me a no less striking feature of their performance.
In a brief survey it is impossible to give a clear
picture of all the incidents in a very complicated
battle, and truly the incidents of Wagram succeed one
another with the swiftness and variety of a kaleido-
scope. While the French were winning at one end of
the field they were at times being beaten at another,
and the balance swayed for a long time in uncertainty
ere the fortunes of the Austrians kicked the beam.
Artillery was called upon more than once to throw its
weight into the scales, and while its tremendous fire,
exemplified in Lauriston's huge battery, won the day,
its mobility was also indispensable to the victors.
Now let us turn to Loigny-Poupry, a great artillery
fight of sixty years later. There also we are be-
wildered by the numerous and changeful features of
the fighting. There also we see the mobility of
artillery utilised both to make and repel an attack,
BATTLE OF WAGRAM
6™ JULY 1809.
BATTLE OF WAGRAM.
K 2
BATTLE OF LOlGNY-POUPRY. 133
this time on a flank. There, too, it was the fire of
artillery which went far to win the day for the
Germans. In a word, the mobility and combined
handling of certain batteries were displayed to such
an advantage on the battle-field itself that, of all the
great fights of 1870, this one has called forth the
special admiration of the German General Staff.
I will try and give a brief summary of what occurred.
On December 2, 1870, Von der Tann, with the ist
Bavarian Corps, was facing south-west at La Mala-
derie. About eight o'clock the French i6th Corps,
advanced from Terminiers, Villepion, and Nonneville
towards Loigny and Lumeau. Von der Tann had
received orders to join hands with the German forces
to the eastward, and to take up a position with his
left resting on Chateau Goury. The 4th Cavalry
Division he was told would cover his right, while the
1 7th Division was moving on Lumeau, and the 22nd
on Baigneux to his assistance. But when, in accord-
ance with these instructions, he took ground to his
left, the French advance threatened his movement,
and the 2nd Division was deployed in action about
9.30 o'clock between Beauvilliers Farm and Chateau
Goury. Here six batteries much distinguished them-
selves and formed a solid framework for their infantry,
hard pressed by a superior foe, to rally on.
134 GVNS AMD CAVALRY.
Since we are especially considering the mobility
displayed by guns on this day, we will not pause to
describe the closely contested struggle which ensued.
The French at first pressed on triumphantly. Then a
brilliant counter-attack by the 3rd Bavarian Brigade
achieved a temporary success, and forced their op-
ponents in some disorder back as far as Loigny.
But the whole French i6th Corps now advanced on
the line Nonneville-Neuvilliers, and the brigade had
to fall back with heavy loss. The batteries nobly
stemmed the rush of the attack, and faced the hostile
skirmishers while their comrades rallied behind them.
They had, however, to give way also, and were com-
pelled to fall back to a second position where they
were reinforced by two batteries from the Reserve
Artillery, and a chance was given to the infantry to
rally and recover themselves.
Some little time previously, however, two Horse
Artillery Batteries, with an escort of cavalry, from the
1 7th Division, had appeared to the south of Chateau
Goury, and their fire, taking the enemy's advance as
it did in flank, was of immense service in bringing it
to a standstill.
Meanwhile the 4th Cavalry Division and the
Bavarian Cuirassier Brigade had commenced a turn-
ing movement against the French left. La Maladerie
BATTLE OF LOlGNV-POUPRY. 135
and Orgeres were evacuated as they approached, and
soon the two Horse Artillery Batteries and that
belonging to the Bavarian Cuirassier Brigade were in
action at La Frileuse.
It will be as well to make one story of the per-
formances of these batteries as it is on the mobility
which they displayed in making this flank attack that
I desire to dwell.
At two o'clock, therefore, an even bolder attack was
determined on by Prince Albrecht, who commanded
them.
The gth Cavalry Brigade (two Uhlan Regiments)
and the 5th Cuirassier Regiment were to go forward
on the line Gommiers-Terminiers to cut the enemy's
line of retreat, while the Bavarian Cuirassier Brigade
was to sweep round still further on the German right.
The loth Cavalry Brigade (two regiments) was to
be held in reserve.
The batteries to accompany the cavalry.
While the movement was in progress, however,
French guns opened fire from Faverolles and Gom-
miers, and the Cavalry Division fell back to Chauveux
Farm, one Horse Artillery Battery came into action on
the north-west of Nonneville against a French battery
on the north of Villepion, and two Bavarian Horse
Artillery Batteries also hurried up across country at a
136 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
rapid trot from where they had been in action at La
Maladerie and supported it from the south-west of
Nonneville. When the hostile guns had been silenced
this battery again moved forward and unlimbered on
the right of the Bavarian batteries. The three soon
drove the French guns at Faverolles off the field, and
then commenced to shell the village and the infantry
posted there.
About three o'clock several regiments of French
cavalry attempted to advance from the west of Guillon-
ville, but as soon as they appeared the Horse Artillery
Battery, which was waiting at Chauveux Farm trotted
out to meet them, and its fire was so effective that
the French horsemen turned and left the field. Its
fellow battery also joined in the fight with the cavalry
at a range of 1200 metres. A second attempt which
the cavalry made to advance from the other side of
the village was similarly foiled by the fire of these
two batteries, and we read that the French squadrons
retreated so precipitately that the three Cuirassier
regiments sent out from Chauveux Farm to attack
them, could never catch them up. .
Now the mobility displayed in these different
movements by the German batteries is most praise-
worthy. The performances of the Bavarian ones are
especially remarkable, and they covered distances of
BATTLE OF LOlGNV-POUPRY. 137
5000 metres (more than three miles) over the fields at
a rapid pace, and showed the greatest quickness and
readiness also in the various minor changes of posi-
tion. From La Maladerie to Faverolles is more than
four miles, and from Nonneville to La Frileuse two,
distances being measured in each case as the crow
flies.
The ground was fairly level, as is the plain of the
Marchfeld. It should be noted, however, that there
was a sharp frost, and that the surface of the fields
was hard and favourable therefore to the guns. Yet
the movements just described are, nevertheless, a
remarkable display of mobility, and General Chanzy
has admitted that the bold flank attack was of the
greatest effect, and that Admiral Jaureguiberry, wbo
commanded the ist French Division, was led to
imagine by it that his left was about to be assailed
by overpowering hostile forces.
We must leave the main battle now, and glance at
another striking example of mobility on the part of
batteries at the other side of the arena.
I have shown with what readiness the Horse
Artillery guns of the i/th Division hurried forward to
assail the other flank of the French. The remaining
batteries followed their example no less satisfactorily,
but I would pass over their achievements, since we have
138 GUNS AND CAVALkY.
no space to devote to a detailed account of them, to
call attention to the action of those of the 22nd Divi-
sion. This division had assembled on the morning of
the battle on the east of Tivernon, and at nine o'clock
set out to march by Santilly on Baigneux.
When it arrived at Baigneux (about six miles as
the crow flies) between 1 1 and 1 1.30 o'clock, its leader,
General von Wittich, learnt news of the fighting
before him and sent forward his six batteries some
two miles further to attack the enemy who were
assailing Lumeau. It is not my purpose here to enter
into a minute description of how this mass of guns
acted ; of how its component parts prepared the way
for and supported the attack of the infantry to which
it was attached ; or to tell, in the words of the official
narrative, how it forced its way onward at " trot and
gallop," and, finally, how it poured its concentrated
fire at the "most effective ranges," from south-west of
Anneux, into the flank of the French attack.
Nor shall I ask you to consider the no less work-
manlike manner in which the guns of the I7th Division
were handled on the west of Lumeau.
For what is more relevant to the special subject we
are considering is another brilliant illustration of
activity which the six Field Batteries of the 22nd
Division were to give when news reached its com-
BATTLE OF L01GNY-POUPRY. 139
mander that the I5th French Corps had advanced
past Artenay on the road to Paris, and that its 3rd
Division had fallen on the 3rd German Brigade of
Cavalry near Dambron and driven it back. The foe
had then turned towards Poupry, perceiving that the
22nd Division were fighting as has been described.
Von Wittich promptly wheeled his division round
on its left to face the new danger, and we are told that
his Artillery Commander, Colonel von Bronikowski,
personally led three Field Batteries, in line at full
interval, at a trot across country to the south of Poupry,
where he brought them into action. The other three
batteries followed no less rapidly in the same forma-
tion, and were soon unlimbered in line with the others
on their right flank.
Thus these batteries, like those of the Guard at
Wagram, were snatched out of one battle and hurried
across country to interpose with most effective energy
in another widely distant from the first, and, having
just carried out a flank attack, now turned their
energies to repel one. The exact distance traversed
by these batteries in this last change of position is a
little more than two miles. The stretch of ground
covered does not strike one as enormous, nevertheless
I think every artillery officer will admit that for Field
Batteries, and two of them were Heavy Field Batteries,
140 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
to advance in line at a trot across a cultivated plain,
such as lay between Loigny and Poupry, after all they
had done that day, was a performance of which any
artillery might feel proud.
And their labours were by no means over when
they reached their latest position, for they had to
sustain an obstinate struggle against seven French
batteries and a superior force of infantry until darkness
set in and the fight died out. Two of them had,
moreover, again to utilise their mobility during this
last fight, for one was called from the south of
Poupry to the northern edge of the copses on the
north of the village, and in doing so had to make a
march of some two miles and a half, while another
moved from the south to the immediate north of the
village, and covered in two moves about a mile of
ground.
Mobility is the most marked characteristic of the
performances of the German batteries, but in respect
to another point in their handling on this day they
are also to be commended.
They were everywhere used in concentrated masses,
and combined their fire on one target. Such a method
of working batteries is now almost universally recog-
nised as the only true one for artillery to adopt.
Occasionally one hears a plausible suggestion put
CONCENTRATION OF BATTERIES. 141
forward as to concentrating fire, but dispersing batteries.
On paper the idea appears to have much to recom-
mend it, but in practice it is found to be a fallacious
one, because you cannot obtain unity of direction, in
other words, .concentration of fire, if it be adopted.
For one man to direct the fire of five or six batteries,
even if they be all formed up in line together, is an
exceedingly difficult task, but if the mass be split up
into several portions, the intervals between which are
taken up by other troops, it is probably not an ex-
aggeration to describe it as impossible.
And we should note also that not only is concentra-
tion one of the essentials to the successful action of
artillery, but that the concentration of batteries should
be accompanied also with their simultaneous and
sudden appearance.
Now, where large masses of guns are concerned, to
effect a great concentration of guns in the last stages
of the fight, either to force a way for the assaulting
columns after the Napoleonic fashion, or for some
other purpose, means that batteries may possibly have
to be withdrawn rapidly from another part of the field,
and brought into action again against the point selected
• for attack. Formerly a reserve of artillery was held
in hand for this purpose, but nowadays when guns
are endowed with immense range they all may be
142 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
utilised from the first, and to keep any idle would be
a waste of opportunity. Concentration in a modern
battle may, therefore, largely depend on mobility.
But a simultaneous and abrupt attack by artillery
implies also great precision of movement, and precision
means an unstrained effort. Batteries must, to use a
sporting phrase, "go well within themselves," and
respond readily to every call from him who guides
them, turn to his hand as does the well-built vessel to
her pilot, if they are to burst with any suddenness on
the astonished foe. If it is by a great effort that
batteries can reach a position they will either lose
their chance by being too slow if they wait for one
another, or will straggle up at intervals or even piece-
meal by single guns, and in place of surprising their
opponent may be themselves wiped out in detail.
When, therefore, the German General Staff hold up
the mobility and concentration of their batteries at
Loigny-Poupry to admiration, they remind us, though
not intentionally, that these two features in the per-
formance were complementary to one another, and
that those six batteries of the 22nd Division could not
have been rapidly and decisively carried out of one
battle into another, had they not been held well in
hand by a capable leader with a firm grasp of his com-
mand. Neitherjcould the two Bavarian Horse Artillery
GETTING INTO POSlffOA.
Batteries have made the brilliant march they did and
have joined themselves on to the other three to form
that mass of guns to the south of Nonneville, had they
not been possessed of the other quality to which con-
centration in the other instance gave its opportunity.
So that we ought to remember that although artillery
is the arm which acts by fire alone, to reach complete
efficiency it must study something more than questions
of gunnery although they must be always its first care.
Position and the getting into position is a factor in
success, the value of which it would be difficult to
exaggerate. Combination, and that, too, in its widest
term — combination of its various component parts,
and combination with the other arms — must form a
no less important subject of attention.
146 GUNS AND CA VALRY.
CHAPTER V.
SUBSIDIARY ROLES.
HAVING discussed the action of guns and cavalry
when serious fighting in a more or less " set " manner
has to be undertaken, we may in this chapter examine
their behaviour in the various subsidiary roles which
they may be called upon to assume.
Almost, or perhaps quite, the most important of
these is that one when squadrons, supported and
stiffened by an addition of artillery, are sent to
reconnoitre in front or on the flanks of an army. In
such reconnaissance work decisive combats would never
or very rarely indeed be undertaken, but nevertheless
it is in them that guns may be especially useful, and
such work, it is almost needless to say, forms a part
of Horse Artillery and cavalry activity which more
repays study and practice than any other. The sense
of insecurity produced by the continual appearance of
even a few hostile scouts, who elude pursuit, and hang
as a constant menace and evil omen on the path of an
army, is most demoralising, Unless cavalry on our side
RECONNAISSANCE WORK. 147
can drive them away, and penetrate into the mystery
which lies beyond them, we can but grope in the dark,
the prey of surprises or of terrors that may be purely
imaginary, but are none the less disturbing because of
that.
French officers who were engaged in 1870 have
given us most vivid and realistic pictures of the ever-
lasting anxiety caused by the hated presence of the
enemy's cavalry. Their line of march became the
object of continual inspection from hostile scouts, who
galloped round them keeping just beyond range,
seeking to find the head of the columns, estimate their
strength, and then withdraw to report to those who
sent them.
After Woerth, even if the pursuit was not such an
one as Napoleon would have launched, the utmost
uneasiness was spread throughout the French ranks
by the everlasting appearance, disappearance, and
reappearance of the ubiquitous German trooper.
Men settling down to snatch a few hours' brief
repose were suddenly ordered to march again for no
other reason than that the dreaded horsemen had
again come in sight.
The French were made to feel that they were
within the meshes of a net, and yet no man on their
side was found bold enough to try and break it.
L 2
H8 GUNS AND CAVALRV.
Yet on the very first page of De Brack's " Light
Cavalry Outposts," a work republished only a year
before the Franco-German war, it is written, in
answer to the question, "What is the object of Light
Cavalry in a campaign ? "
" By preceding our columns, feeling on the flanks,
surrounding and covering all by a vigilant and fearless
curtain ; following the enemy step by step, tormenting
him, engendering uneasiness, discovering his projects,
wearing out his forces in detail, and compelling him
in short to waste in defence that offensive power from
which he would otherwise have been able to derive the
greatest advantages."
That was the teaching of De Brack, and he, let us
remember, was the pupil of Lasalle and Montbrun
and Pajol, and handed down the traditions of the wars
of the First Empire.
And the same service should be rendered by cavalry
not only in advance of the main bodies, but on the
battle-field when they are deployed for combat
Then the cavalry should be posted on the wings,
which it must strive to protect during the progress of
the fighting. The army looks to it, then, for timely
notice as to any turning movements which may be
threatening it, and for information also as to what is
occurring in the enemy's rear. And in order to explore
RECONNAISSANCES IN FORCE. 149
to any purpose, either then or when away in front,
some exercise of force may be required, and to give
that force the cavalry leader needs guns. A few
shells well directed will even at a long range often
reveal much. Their battering power against walls,
houses, villages, bridges, would often be invaluable.
A railway station or a train would be especially
vulnerable to them, and without their aid a few
riflemen might easily enough compel cavalry to keep
at such a distance that they might be unable to gain
the knowledge which was essential to the side they
were working for. The presence of guns will make
cavalry advance more confidently, and they will
certainly, as we saw at Buzancy, materially hamper or
debar an enemy's progress.
But cavalry and guns may often need to press
forward with a sterner object in view than only to
gain information. They may be sent on to make
a reconnaissance in force, and then guns are quite
indispensable.
As an instance of the employment of Horse
Artillery in an advanced guard action partaking of
the nature of such a reconnaissance in force, the most
brilliant example in recent times that we can mention
is the battle of Vionville, because the consequences of
the bold intervention of these two arms on that occa-
ISO GUNS AND CAVALRY.
sion were immense and far-reaching, and because the
audacity with which they fastened on the immensely
superior French forces is unrivalled in the annals of
war.
Bazaine was endeavouring to make good his retreat
westwards from Metz, while the Germans were sweep-
ing round his flank in order to throw him back on
that fortress. To hold the enemy fast till reinforce-
ments might have time to come up was, therefore, of
vital importance.
The 5th Cavalry Division, at nine o'clock on
August 1 6, surprised the bivouacs of Forton's cavalry
at Vionville, and at once the four Horse Artillery
batteries that were with it began shelling the French
camp from the Tronville heights.
A German officer has lately published a pamphlet,
as a supplement to the well-known "Militar-Wochen-
blatt," dealing with the performances of this 5th
Cavalry Division at the battle we are considering.
This is how he describes the wonderful scene that the
Germans saw when they first mounted -the heights
east of Tronville : —
"Just as our advanced patrols had informed us, a
large French cavalry bivouac is found on the west of
Vionville. Some squadrons are busy watering their
horses, some are cooking, not a charger is saddled !
VIONVILLE AND BEAUMONT, 151
Truly a picture of the most peaceful, easy-going
existence found haply amid the turmoil of war, and
this, too, in the closest and most dangerous proximity
to 4000 hostile troopers only waiting impatiently for
the order to attack !
" In a moment Schirmer's battery unlimbers on the
height which commands the enemy's position, and
suddenly pours down upon it a perfectly unexpected
and most withering fire, which falls especially on the
Brigade Murat and the squadrons which are busy
watering. Major Korber's battery quickly joins the
one already in action, and the Hussar regiments
extend themselves on either side to cover the flanks of
the guns. The very first shells which fall screaming
and crashing into the camp throw everything into a
state of the wildest panic, and the French cavalry in a
few moments fall into a confusion which is simply
indescribable."
The French in fact had made no use of their
cavalry to patrol or reconnoitre towards the enemy ;
the German shells startled them at breakfast, as I have
already shown they disturbed their dinners at Beau-
mont, and they were absolutely unprepared for this
attack. This is what the Official Account says : " At
the very first round of shell the hostile cavalry fell into
wild confusion. A French squadron, indeed, attempted
152 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
to advance to the north of the village of Vionville, and
a battery to the north-west of it, but both were unable
to hold their ground against the fire of the Prussian
guns ; they speedily followed the rest of the cavalry,
which abandoned the camp in the greatest confusion,
and disappeared in an easterly direction." Then the
German Horse Artillery galloped further ahead and
began cannonading the infantry camp about Rezonville,
which the flying horsemen also threw into great con-
fusion. The Horse Artillery, too, of the 6th Cavalry
Division now pressed forward and came into action
alongside their comrades in front, their fire being also
most demoralising.
Now here we have a very excellent example of the
manner in which mobility, which is the distinguishing
feature of a cavalry and Horse Artillery force, may
be turned to account ; and remember that the cavalry,
although they might have startled the French momen-
tarily, could have effected nothing substantial without
the fire with which the guns endowed them. A few
dismounted troopers might have checked them till the
others could get under arms, and the infantry would
soon have advanced and driven them away.
As it was, this latter did rally in a short time and
advanced in superior numbers against the batteries.
The position of the guns was, in consequence, soon most
CAVALRY A TTA CKING G UNS. 1 5 3
critical, but Von Alvensleben, who commanded the
3rd Corps, fully appreciated the necessity for fastening
his grip immovably on the French flank, and battery
after battery was therefore hurried on to the front,
and in course of time a long line of artillery was built
up which defied all the efforts of the Frenchmen,
and formed a solid framework on which the infantry
divisions deployed by degrees.
I cannot go into the details of the great fight, which
was a very glorious one for the artillery, but its open-
ing phases are especially valuable from our point of
view, and it may be confidently asserted that had the
German cavalry and Horse Artillery not thrown them-
selves with such decision on the foe immediately he
was found, Bazaine's army, whatever might have been
its ultimate fate, would never have been defeated at
Gravelotte, or surrendered in Metz.
And now I may say a word as to the attack of
guns by cavalry.
I admit frankly that squadrons can often charge
batteries in action successfully. There are plenty of
such instances, and plenty too showing a different
result for the matter of that. But deliberately to
gallop at guns when they see you coming is not, I
believe, the best way to set to work. The game is
rarely then worth the candle. You will certainly los,e
154 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
heavily, and unless you are supported strongly, even
if you get among the guns, you will not be able to do
sufficient harm to compensate for the crippled state
your squadrons will be in.
Cavalry too, even when they get amongst guns,
are often comparatively helpless. Although a very
brilliant feat, the permanent capture of the eighteen
guns at Tobitschau remains almost, if not quite, an
unique experience. Von Bredow could carry off or
disable none of the French pieces through which he
rode at Vionville, and neither could our light cavalry
do so at Balaclava. Horses not accustomed to the sight
shy away from guns that have just been fired, and it
is often not easy to make them go up close to them.
I have seen it stated that in 1849 the drivers of a
Prussian battery drove off the Danish Dragoons who
had got into the battery with their whips ! *
In an interesting account too of a " Prussian
gunner's adventure in 1815" published some four
years ago, and from which I gave extracts in an
article I wrote some years ago for the United Service
Magazine, Lieutenant Von Reuter in describing his
grandfather's exploits gives a curious example of how
little may disconcert cavalry amongst guns.
At the battle of Ligny the flank of the Prussian
* Militar-Wochenblatt 61 of 1866.
AN OPPORTUNE BLOW. 155
battle in question was surprised and taken in rear by
fifty French horsemen under a staff officer. " As these
rushed upon us the officer shouted to me in German "
(says Von Reuter's grandfather), " Surrender, gunners,
for you are all prisoners ! " with these words he charged
down with his men on the flank gun on my left, and
dealt a vicious cut at my wheel driver, Borchardt, who
dodged it, however, by flinging himself over on his
dead horse. The blow was delivered with such good-
will that the sabre cut deep into the saddle, and stuck
there fast. Gunner Sieberg however, availing himself
of the chance the momentary delay afforded, snatched
up the handspike of one of the 12-pounders, and with
the words " I'll soon show him how to take prisoners,"
dealt the officer such a blow on his bearskin that he
rolled with a broken skull from the back of his
grey charger, which galloped away into the line of
skirmishers in our front. The fifty horsemen, unable
to control their horses, which bounded after their com-
panion, followed his lead in a moment, rode over the
prostrate marksmen, and carried the utmost confusion
into the enemy's ranks. I seized the opportunity to
limber up all my guns except the unfortunate one on
my left, and to retire on two of our cavalry regiments,
etc., etc."
If in extended order on a very wide front, and all
156 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
the men in the ranks ride home like heroes, and if
there is no escort to the artillery, I daresay some men
will always get into the batteries ; but escorts ought
always to be with guns at all open to a rush, and I
cannot help thinking that men will riot keep extended
if their flanks are threatened even by comparatively
weak bodies. Moreover to turn enough cavalry to do
real mischief on to the guns is to commit a tactical
error, for it is a first principle in war that you cannot
be too strong at the decisive point, and that point in a
cavalry combat is where the main bodies meet. If
you win there you will eventually have the guns too.
If you are beaten there you will have to relinquish the
batteries even if you capture them.
But favoured by ground, especially if artillery is
made to co-operate with it, cavalry can take artillery
or infantry by surprise, and can then accomplish much
at but little expense, just as those French regiments
did at Albuera, or Von Bredow did at Vionville, and
I will only sum up the latter story by saying that on
that day with but six squadrons that brilliant cavalry
leader succeeded in wrecking six batteries and four
battalions, and in the actual attack on them lost com-
paratively few of his men, for it was after they had
passed their immediate objective, and had got out
of hand, that they were so cut up, But the aim of
THE "DEATH-RIDE" AT VIdNVILLE. i$7
the French batteries was disturbed by the German
artillery near Vionville, which as Bredow advanced
poured a sudden and rapid storm of shell on the guns
he was about to charge.
The story of how Von Bredow was called upon to
assail the French cavalry and infantry in order to gain
breathing time for the hard-pressed Germans is most
dramatic, and there is nothing finer than the spirit
displayed by his men. Von Alvensleben's order
concluded with the words, "Vielleicht hangt das
Schicksal der Schlacht von Ihrer Attacke ab." The
fate of the day depended perhaps on him ! Two
squadrons were sent towards the Tronville copses to
cover his left front. It was thought that French
infantry were in them ; if so, the horsemen would
probably be decimated ere they moved on to the
attack ; therefore, Von Bredow made his squadrons
draw lots for the murderous station, and with serious,
pitiful faces, we are told, the remainder saw their
doomed comrades ride away — one squadron of
cuirassiers and one of lancers.
And yet after all it was Lehmann's detachment that
was in the copses, and those two squadrons were the
ones that suffered least of all, and formed the nucleus
round which eventually the others were reformed.
Without a word and very calm, "es war bewun-
158 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
dernswerth," says Von Kreitschmann in the regimental
history, "wie der General, ohne ein Wort, die Brigade
in Bewegung setzte," Von Bredow set the remaining
six squadrons, about 800 men, in motion, and then
Major Korber, of whose achievements in the morning
we have already heard, in the most skilful manner
prepared the way for him. So well was the situation
turned to account, that a whole salvo was sent into the
French guns just to one side of Bredow's column as it
moved onward down the dip, and so effectually did
this sudden outburst of artillery activity absorb the
attention of the French gunners, that although Von
Bredow had to cross a stretch of 1 500 metres ere he
reached them, he succeeded in completely taking them
by surprise, and lost hardly at all in the advance.
Only two guns indeed were turned upon them at
all, and these fired over their heads. But the squadrons
rushing wildly on had ignored infantry behind them
in their left rear, a gallop for 3000 metres tired their
horses too, and finally they were assailed by fresh
French cavalry both in front and flank.
The 7th Cuirassiers (Seydlitz's regiment) lost
7 officers, 198 men, and 261 horses ; the 1 6th Uhlans,
9 officers, 222 men, and 224 horses. An appalling
loss ; but the sacrifice was justified, and the day was
saved.
TOBITSCHAU. 159
Then there is the example of Tobitschau, and every
cavalry soldier should remember it. It was an
action, as all my military readers will know, fought
on the I5th'of July, 1866, when the Austrians were in
retreat from Olmiitz, and it gives us a very valuable
example of cavalry attacking artillery, and there too
guns co-operated with the squadrons. We find a
lesson even in the terse curt phrases of the official
account. When that same Von Bredow, of whom we
have just been speaking, stole away suddenly to his
left, to make a dash at the Austrian batteries, which
he had noted were exposed without an escort, the two
Horse Artillery batteries with the cavalry division to
which he belonged, were turned swiftly on to the
hostile guns, and occupied their attention in front
while he was making for their flank.
There is a whole lecture, I think, in one little word
in the paragraphs that speak of it, that little word is
" guessing." " Guessing his motive, General Hartman
planted the two Horse Artillery batteries on the bank
of the Blatta southward of Klopotowitz from whence
they could engage the enemy, draw his attention from
the Cuirassiers, and assist their attack."
Bredow only lost 10 privates and 6 horses wounded
and 12 horses killed in this enterprise, and captured
1 8 guns, 15 limbers, 7 ammunition waggons, 2 officers
160 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
and 168 gunners, 230 men of other corps, and 157
horses. Truly a noble prize for 3 squadrons ! and
gained, let us remember, by guns being made to
co-operate sympathetically with the cavalry.
It is to make feints on, or to surprise guns, how-
ever, that our cavalry should seek. No doubt if your
squadrons are suffering under artillery fire, a feint with
a portion of your force of cavalry may draw away some
of the annoying shells. I believe that in Germany
assaults on lines of guns by large forces of cavalry are
regarded as feasible enterprises, and are practised at
manoeuvres. The first lines widely extended, the second
less widely, there also being echelons on the flanks, and
reserves behind. Very likely such tactics may occa-
sionally be successful, and may be considered practical
by a power with such forces of cavalry at its command
as has Germany. But fn all our campaigns, ancient
and modern, we have suffered from a want of cavalry.
With us squadrons are held too valuable to be
squandered in so prodigal a fashion, and I do not
believe that in the future any British General will feel
justified in launching his precious horsemen on so
costly and hazardous an undertaking. It will be
better policy for us to set about our task in a less
rough-and-ready way, and to endeavour to make skill
in manoeuvring replace numbers.
REAR GUARD ACTION. 161
Having thus considered the action of Horse Artillery
and cavalry previous to and during a battle, let us turn
to examine a role which perhaps offers greater oppor-
tunity than any other for the exhibition of the special
characteristics of these two arms. It is during the
retreat after an army has met with grave disaster, as at
Koniggratz, or during the retrograde movement before
superior forces when it seeks to escape to some securer
position in rear, as after Quatre Bras, that a force has
to rely for its safety on the efficiency of its cavalry
and Horse Artillery, and it is on these occasions that
their assistance is simply invaluable. The Prince de
Ligne once said that he could not conceive how an
army ever succeeded in retreating. The explanation
is that it could never make anything like an orderly
retreat before an enterprising foe were its movement
not covered with skill and self-sacrifice by the two
arms we are dealing with here. There is no finer
example of the two arms working together than the
retreat, on the i/th of June, 1815, from Quatre Bras
to the Waterloo position. Wellington had to draw off
far inferior forces in the face of Napoleon himself at
the head of an army flushed with the victory of the
previous day over the Prussians, and looking forward
with confident anticipation to a coming triumph over
the English, separated as they thought they were
M
162 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
from their allies. A series of cavalry and horse
artillery engagements was fought that day all along
the Charleroi road, and we read in Siborne's interesting
letters at the end of Lord Anglesey's account, " Thus
ended the prettiest field day of cavalry and horse
artillery I ever saw in my life."
This is a typical example of rear guard actions, for
in these the object is rather to delay the enemy than
enter into a serious engagement with him, and Horse
Artillery which can move rapidly to successive positions
in the rear, fire a few rounds, compel the enemy to
deploy, then limber up and gallop off again, is specially
suited to such. It should thus form a continual
menace to the enemy, most irritating, most impalp-
able, never allowing him the chance of a direct blow
at it, but ever avoiding his onset and slipping from
his grasp.
Occasionally, however, when it is necessary to avert
total ruin, guns must be sacrificed, and, forgetting
their mobility, stand rooted across the path of their
foe, blocking his way without thought of yielding.
The French in 1 870 did not make use of their cavalry
and Horse Artillery either to cover the advance or the
retreat ; for this reason, and from the nature of the
German victories, which we shall deal with later on,
we must go back to the war of 1866 to find cavalry
KONIGGRATZ. 163
and Horse Artillery sacrificing themselves to secure
the safety of the other arms.
One could not desire a better example of such
devoted conduct on the part of cavalry and artillery
than the manner in which the Austrian cavalry and
artillery staved off complete ruin from their comrades
after the great battle of Koniggratz. It is true that
these guns which so highly distinguished themselves
were not all belonging to Horse Artillery ; but horse
and field artillery alike covered the retreat in the
manner in which we hope usually to see Horse
Artillery acting, and nobly seconded the efforts of the
cavalry as though they were all linked to them in the
orthodox way. Especially did eight batteries of the
Reserve Artillery distinguish themselves when they
were brought into action to oppose the advance of the
2nd Army under the Crown Prince, and subsequently
when they took successive positions to the rear to
hold back the triumphant flood of Prussian success.
But for the unflinching front shown by these guns up
to the last moment the disaster would have been
immeasurably greater. Yet, covered by their fire and
the brave Austrian cavalry, Benedek succeeded in
drawing off his troops, still in formation, across the
Elbe, and nothing like a rout supervened on the
defeat. These eight batteries lost 9 officers, 139 men,
M 2
164 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
259 horses, and 32 guns. Let it not, however, be
imagined that the loss of guns was a dishonour to
them. That idea, I hope, has for ever been exploded,
and it may form their proudest boast that they
sacrificed their guns to save the army.
And on this occasion the action of the Austrian
cavalry masses was also worthy of the highest praise.
They advanced boldly against the squadrons which
the victors sent out in pursuit of their disorganised
infantry, and it was due to them that the shattered
battalions were able to escape. Prince Kraft, who
was an eye-witness of their deeds, says that had the
Austrian cavalry masses not been employed as they
were, or had they been absent, the whole Austrian
army had been lost, and that had the Prussian horse-
men, on the other hand, not been on the field to
oppose the hostile squadrons, the result of the day
might have been very different, and a victory been
converted into a defeat.
Before leaving this part of the subject I cannot
forbear to notice how, after the terrible reverse we
experienced at Maiwand, the heaviest blow our pre-
stige has received in the East since the Afghan War
of 1841-42,* four guns of our Horse Artillery were
* It is notable that at, and during the disastrous retreat
om,|Cabul in 1841-42, it was also a Horse Artillery battery,
Bl
SUBSIDIARY R6LES. 167
mainly instrumental in enabling what was left of our
shattered and demoralised force to escape. Their
leader was justly rewarded ; everyone spoke of the
splendid behaviour of the battery, and some of the
men belonging to it were decorated with the Victoria
Cross. But what was the reward of the gallant
battery itself of which we were all so proud ? Like
the other fine battery I spoke of in Egypt, and like
" D " troop * which fought so well at Albuera and
which pre-eminently distinguished itself. It was of the conduct
of the ist troop ist Brigade Bengal Horse Artillery that Akbar
Khan the Afghan leader said: — "Had all the British troops
fought like the ' Redmen ' " (an allusion to the flowing red manes
then worn on the helmets of the Bengal Horse Artillery), "they
would never have been driven from Cabul."
* The case of " D " troop is a particularly hard one. It was
formed in November, 1793, and was therefore one of the oldest
of our troops. It took part with much distinction in the battles
of Albuera, Vittoria, Orthes, Toulouse, and Waterloo ; and in
the actions of Usagre, Fuentes Guinaldo, Aldea-de-Ponte,
Ribera, San Munos, Ford of the Yeltes, Salmanca (May 22,
1813), Pyrenees, Aire, and capture of Paris in 1815. It was
besides engaged in many other affairs during the Peninsular
War, being always with advanced or rear guards. At Waterloo
it suffered very heavily. Its commanding officer, Major Beane,
seven men, and thirty-six horses were killed ; and its second
Captain, W. Webber, and a subaltern, W. Cromie, the latter
mortally so, were wounded amongst many others.
Nevertheless, when after the war was over, our army was
reduced in 1816, it was selected by the Duke of Wellington for
reduction, although it had seen more service than any other
of our troops, except "A" and " I."
1 It has been said that the reason of this was that it was at
T68 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
in the Peninsula generally and at Waterloo, it was
broken up. And yet we are taught that to foster esprit
de corps and increase the self-respect of the soldier
has ever been the first study of great leaders of men.
Indeed, this destruction of noble traditions has gone
on so uniformly in the artillery that I think it is
enormously to the credit of the regiment to which I
have the honour to belong that it still preserves its
fame untarnished.
I once stood with an officer who has now, alas ! left
us, in the old dining-hall at Woolwich. One of the
mottoes on the wall emblazoned in old English letters
caught our eyes. He read it. " Unlasting yet unresting
work." " Surely," I said, "you are making a mistake,
it is unhasting" " Is it ? " he said. " I have remem-
bered it as unlasting all my life, and it seemed such a
that time commanded by Captain Mercer, who when in com-
mand of " G " troop at Waterloo, had incurred the Duke's dis-
pleasure because he did not retire his gunners into the infantry
squares alongside him during the great cavalry attacks on our
right centre, according to instructions. These squares were
composed of Brunswick troops, and Mercer contended that
had he not disregarded orders and set them a good example
by standing to his guns they would have broken. It was a
serious thing to incur the Great Duke's wrath, and not only
did Mercer lose a brevet on this occasion, but the troop he
commanded was punished also. It may have been hard on
Mercer, but it was doubly so, and, indeed, absolutely unjust, to
visit the fault of an individual on a fine body of men who had
done much distinguished service.
THE PURSUIT OF A BEATEN FOE. 169
good motto for a gunner, for it told me that I must do
my best, and work hard, and then my battery perhaps
would be disbanded." He did not speak cynically.
The grey-haired veteran, one of the best officers we
ever possessed, had bowed his head all his life to the
inevitable, and had never slackened one atom of his
zeal or disregarded his duty for one moment, although
he knew, and probably had experienced, the reward
which has not infrequently followed such efforts in
our regiment. But his remark filled me with greater
admiration for him than ever, and I know I may say
with confidence that we have many more like him,
whose spirit and energy remain unbroken, even though
the batteries they served with and were proud of may
have disappeared.
There remains for me now to discuss the duties
which fall to cavalry and Horse Artillery during the
pursuit of a beaten enemy. A mere victory will effect
comparatively little, if the vanquished are not so
harassed and demoralised by the victors following
rapidly upon them that they shall have no time, as it
were, to recover breath. Napoleon blamed his cavalry,
after Wagram, for their want of enterprise in this
respect, and exclaimed, "This day will be without
results ! " since neither guns nor prisoners fell into his
hands to give tangible evidence of his success. Sala-
1 70 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
manca, similarly, might have been ten times more
telling a triumph than it was had a pursuit, swift and
inexorable, been launched after the French, or had the
Spaniards not broken their pledges with regard to the
Castle of Alba. Vittoria, Jena, and Waterloo are
examples, on the other hand, of victories converted
into routs, although at Waterloo the cavalry might
have done more than they did.
Lord Lake too, who had learnt his profession in the
wars of the Great Frederick while still a boy, carried
through a splendid enterprise when on the celebrated
march in chase of Holkar in 1804, with a force
composed of six regiments of cavalry and a battalion
of native infantry, accompanied by Captain Brown's
troop of the Bengal Horse Artillery. Lake, on
reaching Aliganj on the morning of November 16,
determined to catch up his enemy before he should
have an opportunity of destroying Fatehgarh, and
accordingly the Horse Artillery and cavalry were
ordered to move on again in the evening. In the
early hours of the following day Holkar was alarmed
by a gun. He was told and believed that it was the
morning gun at Fatehgarh, and the more readily so
that he knew his scouts had left Lake late in the
previous afternoon quite thirty miles away. But with
the first grey dawn of morning the noise of cannon
LAKE IN CHASE OF HOLKAR.
and showers of grape shot startled his men, who
were lying in their blankets asleep, and they awoke to
find our dragoons amongst them with the 8th Royal
MURAT.
Irish leading the van. The discomfited host suffered
heavily and fled, and was pursued in different direc-
tions for ten miles more
172 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
Lake accomplished 252 miles in 13 successive days,
while in the last dash forward his men covered 54
miles in 30 hours. Denison* puts the figures differently,
and says that 350 miles were accomplished in about
15 days ; but I think he has over-estimated distances.
Instances of ideal pursuits are however rare : amongst
others that conducted by Murat after Jena is the most
striking of all, and may serve as a model for all time
to soldiers. Such was the vigour and pertinacity of
that leader, ably seconded by Grouchy and Lasalle,
that the whole Prussian military system was absolutely
destroyed. Cannons were captured by hundreds,
thousands of prisoners were cut off, and the fortress
of Stettin, with 160 guns and a garrison of 6000
men, was captured by Lasalle without a shot being
fired.
It is curious how all the best examples, too, are
to be found amongst the annals of the early wars of
the century.
This is variously to be accounted for. Darkness
closing in at the end of a hard-fought day often
prevents effective pursuit, and the victors are often
too weary and sore for it.
Von Moltke had told us how difficult it often is
to pursue, and of how stern a fibre a general must be
* " History of Cavalry."
THE VICTORIES OF 1870. 173
made who can brace himself to subject his men to the
fatigue and hardship usually involved, and that too
when they may haye just earned a much disputed
victory.
It is at any rate certain that only the very best and
most energetic generals of history have understood
how to follow up a beaten foe.
Our force of cavalry was too weak to enable us to
harry our foes after the Alma, or rather it was sup-
posed to be too weak, for it is useless to deny that a
glorious opportunity was then thrown away. The
circumstances which surround the greatest victories of
1870 were so remarkable that they rendered pursuit un-
necessary. There was, in fact, nothing left to chase,
for the entire French army was surrounded, hemmed
in, or captured in these triumphs. After Woerth,
however, the cavalry on the German side was not suffi-
ciently boldly handled, and touch with MacMahon was
lost, owing to its not having been thrown fearlessly to
the front upon his line of retreat. To quote all the
examples which Military History would yield of
successful pursuits by cavalry and guns would occupy
a little volume of itself, so I will now content myself
with touching on the principles which should guide
us in the future. But let it not be supposed from any-
thing that may have been said by me, that there will
174 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
not be ample scope and opportunity for the mobile arms
in future campaigns to shine in this most essential role.
Masses of cavalry should be concentrated on the
line of retreat, where the main body of the enemy is
most likely to be met with. As many batteries of
Horse Artillery should be sent on with the cavalry as
possible, for otherwise a few riflemen or guns may
hold the squadrons back by their fire, and it will be
advantageous for them not to fight on foot, for every
sabre will be needed in the work before them. A
German authority,* Captain Cardinal von Widdern,
in his " Handbuch fur Truppenfiihrung und Befehls-
abfassung," recommends that some companies of
infantry, well supplied with cartridges, should therefore
be sent with them, carried on carnages. The Germans
are, as the majority of my readers will know, no be-
lievers in mounted infantry as we organise it, although
they clearly recognise the value of a mobile rifleman ;
otherwise, no doubt, we should have seen mounted
infantry proper referred to. The battalion of mounted
infantry with our cavalry division will come in most
opportunely here, and, we trust, may find a sphere of
usefulness before it some day on such an occasion as a
British victory. Strong patrols, formed by regiments
or squadrons, as circumstances may dictate, would
* Quoted in Trench's " Cavalry in Modern War."
EFFE CT OF ARTTLLER Y. 175
scour the other roads, and smaller detachments would
penetrate wherever they could make their way. In
all cases the additions of some guns will be extremely
useful, for the mere appearance of artillery always
produces an immense effect on an enemy in full
retreat. The pictures that historians and correspon-
dents have often painted of the disorganised crowds
of soldiers jostling one another like sheep in the road-
way, the long, slowly-moving ammunition and supply
columns blocking up the path, all describe a tempting
target to the pursuing batteries, and a few shells may
be enough to cause whole miles of vehicles to be
abandoned. The defensive power which fire lends to
cavalry also gives it greater audacity, and likewise
enables it, as we have said, to brush aside resistance
which might otherwise prove serious ; and, finally, the
sound of the guns may aid their side, for, in the event
of the enemy being able to assemble in sufficient
numbers to bring on an engagement, it will call rein-
forcements in the direction where they are needed.
The manner in which our cavalry took up the pursuit
after Tel-el-Kebir, although rather in the nature of a
cavalry raid, is a splendid example from the most
modern times, but the undue weight of their equip-
ment prevented the Horse Artillery batteries from
accompanying the horsemen the following day from
176 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
Belbeis to Cairo, as Sir Drury Lowe was most anxious
they should have done, for, in the event of any resist-
ance being met with in that brilliant and audacious
coup, their presence would have been most valuable.
The mention of this latter feat, for, as we have said,
it was more in the nature of a raid than a pursuit,
leads us to the last role which guns and cavalry may
assume in common. I mean in those raids which
were a famous feature of the American war, and have
ever supplied a field for the energy and capacity of
a genuine leader of cavalry. Such rapid enterprises
may be undertaken for the sake of gaining informa-
tion, cutting an enemy's communications, or capturing
supplies and stores.
It is an old world tale now, but there is something
peculiarly audacious about that partisan raid of
General Haddick on Berlin on October 17, 1857. He
took with him only 4000 men and 4 guns ; but
rumour soon exaggerated the strength of his force,
and by concealing his movements as much as possible,
he did not allow his enemies to see much of his
columns. Rapid marching enabled him to make the
most of a good start, and he attacked the Silesian gate
of Berlin with so much effrontery that the command-
ant, although he had a force capable of defeating the
Austrians, hurriedly retreated to Spandau with the
CAVALRY RAIDS. 177
royal family, and left the capital to its fate. Haddick's
terms were finally arranged at £27,000 sterling, and
after a halt of only twelve hours, that astute leader
made off again, skilfully evading all attempts to cut
him off, and finally effecting a secure retreat behind
the river Spree.
No cavalry have indeed ever been more efficient in
reconnoitring and advanced post work than the light
troops which covered the Austrian armies during the
Seven Years' War. The Pandours, Croats, and Hun-
garians often mystified and worried Frederick, and he
was sometimes much perplexed and exasperated
owing to them.
The attack and capture of a Prussian convoy on its
march from Troppau to Olmutz on June 30, 1758, is
another instance of their efficiency. Loudon and
Ziskowitz were on that occasion more than a match
for even Ziethen, and obliged him to draw off his
force, leaving 250 waggons as a spoil to the victors.
And the cordon of outposts placed by Loudon to
prevent information reaching the king did its work so
well, that he only heard of the loss he had sustained
the day after it had occurred.
We find another excellent example of such an
operation in our own times in the reconnaissance or
raid effected by General Gourko across the Balkans in
N
178 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
July, 1877, when in eight days he carried dismay into
the heart of Turkey, destroyed parts of the railroad and
telegraph on the principal lines, and gained a great
deal of information as to the Turkish movements. On
that occasion he had a mixed force with him, but
there can be little doubt that had he had mounted
infantry at his disposal, as the leader of one of our
cavalry divisions will in the future have, he would
have availed himself of their services in place of
that of their slower-moving brethren. In such rapid
operations there is clearly a wide field too for the co-
operation of guns, that are possessed of due mobility,
and cavalry.
During the American war of Secession such raids
were freely undertaken, and the exploits of Stuart,
Forrest, and Morgan are justly celebrated instances.
But these leaders conducted their operations rather
after the manner of irregular than regular warfare.
Their principal object was to elude observation, not to
fight, and, therefore, extreme mobility was desirable.
Consequently guns played only a minor role, and
there was a latterly a tendency to dispense with their
services altogether.
A salient instance of this nature of fighting may
be found in General J. E. Stuart's raid in front of
Richmond in 1862, when with 1200 men and two
STUARFS RAID IN 1862. 179
guns he unexpectedly burst into the Federal lines,
and gained a quantity of information that was of the
greatest value in the subsequent operations. With
impudent audacity he swept completely round the
rear of his opponents, cut their communications,
burnt and destroyed a vast amount of stores and
property of various description. He returned in forty-
eight hours with the loss of only one man, having
captured 165 prisoners and 200 horses and mules.
The dashing cavalry leader will probably again in the
future thus turn the mobility of his arm to account,
and the value of a force capable both of fire effect and
rapidity of movement will again be exemplified.
With this last reference to a sphere in which
the usefulness of a combination of cavalry and
artillery will certainly find employment I must close
my remarks. I have only taken opportunity to touch
very briefly on the various aspects of the tactics we
have been discussing, but I trust I may have said
enough to show that in the future as much as in the
past, or perhaps even more, will be expected from the
arms of the Service we have dealt with. On the battle-
field itself, we can hardly hope to see cavalry, as in
the days of Ziethen and Seydlitz, deciding battles by
its action, although we may note in passing that the
most modern battle, that of Placilla, in the Chilian
N 2
1 8e G UNS A ND CA VALR V.
war of a few years ago, was won in this way ; but
before great forces are locked in a decisive struggle,
there must be many opportunities for the arm still.
When Frederick said that for every day of fighting
there were twenty of marching, he stated a truth that
is as real now as it was during the Seven Years' War.
Therefore cavalry and Horse Artillery should be
regarded and welded together as one and the same
unit, for the arm that can move and strike also can
never be at a discount, and the side well served by it
will reap far-reaching benefits and advantages that
will materially influence the progress of its operations.
CHAPTER VI.
SOME REMARKS AS TO THE INFLUENCE OF QUICK-
FIRING, MACHINE GUNS, AND MOUNTED IN-
FANTRY.
IT has been suggested to me that I should add to what
I have already said some words as to how the improve-
ments recently effected in quick-firing and machine
guns may influence the tactics of artillery and cavalry.
And, indeed, since the very name of a Maxim has of
late become almost a synonym for destruction, it may
be well to drop a special hint or two with reference to
the influence of these new arms on tactics in general,
and more particularly on those of artillery. In war we
shall largely rely on men who now are citizens first and
soldiers afterwards, and some of them may well have
caught the contagion of the enthusiasm which just
at present has dangerously excited popular imagina-
tion, and in certain quarters there is a kind of vague
impression afloat, and such dreams have often before
deluded men, that victory may be made certain
through cunning surpris.es as regards armament
1 82 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
It is, however, a pernicious, perilous, and de-
moralising creed which teaches men that there is any
substitute for skill and courage in warfare. They
should go into battle determined to win by their own
resolution and braveiy, relying on their knowledge of
the weapons they bear, on the goodness of their
cause, on what discipline has taught them, on their
confidence in the general at their head. On every-
thing in fact which goes to make a good soldier, or
an efficient army ; on" anything rather than on the
merits of a mechanical contrivance which is to make
the road to victory an easy one. Therefore, let it not
be forgotten that admirable as some inventions may
be in certain situations, we must not pin our faith
slavishly upon them, and that the anticipations formed
in peace time on inadequate data are often falsified by
the test of war on a large scale.
A modern cavalry division, however, will not only
be accompanied by machine guns, but also comprises
a battalion of mounted infantry, and, therefore, I have
thought it as well to add something with regard to the
employment of that adjunct.
For the benefit of any non-professional readers
whom I may attract I should perhaps start by a
further preface and explanation, namely, that the
term " quick-firing " is used to denote a gun which is
QUICK-FIRING GUNS. 183
" fed " by hand, and is rendered capable of more rapid
discharge than in the case of an ordinary field-piece
because its ammunition is "fixed." That is to say
the projectile and powder are done up together in
one cartridge, with a cap at the base, as is the
ammunition of a rifle. The process of loading is
therefore greatly expedited, and, if there be no recoil,
rapidity in laying is also gained. In the case of a
machine gun, on the other hand, the loading and
firing takes place more or less automatically, and in
the Maxim systems entirely so. Quick-firing guns,
moreover, can be constructed to fire very heavy pro-
jectiles, and they are often utilised as shell guns,
while the machine gun in general use for land service
is of rifle calibre only.
It will be obvious that to derive full benefit from
a quick-firing system there must be complete absence
of recoil. Otherwise the man laying would be
knocked over by the piece after its discharge if he
did not get out of its path, while, if he moved away
between each round, rapidity of fire would naturally
suffer very considerably.
In the navy guns of this kind can be fixed on
immovable stands on deck, and a man can keep his
eye to the sights and fire the piece almost as he might
a rifle. It is for this reason that quick-firers are so
1 84 GUNS AND CAVALRV.
valuable on board ship, and that they can be turned
to such good account in warding off an attack by
torpedo-boats. But even on board ship the tendency
to recoil thus violently arrested strains and shakes the
structure of the vessel considerably.
That a quick-firing gun might be a suitable arma-
ment for Horse Artillery batteries is by no means
denied, and many officers of the arm look for im-
portant advantages to be derived from the use of
fixed ammunition. It will not, however, be always
desirable for field service to unite projectile and
powder charge in one metal case, and it will probably
be found more convenient that they be separate as
they are now. To enter into a full consideration of
the whole question would involve us in a highly
technical discussion, out of place in a work of this
kind, but it may be stated briefly that the question
of recoil lies at the root of all objections to the inno-
vations suggested. If by any means a manufacturer
can produce a wheeled-carriage, which will form a
secure platform for the gun when it is fired, which can
be rapidly brought into action, and limbered up again,
and which yet will not recoil between the rounds
discharged from it, he will benefit Horse Artillery
batteries enormously, and a squadron will be received
with the same storm of shells which pelts a torpedo-
QUICK-FIRING GUNS. 185
boat rushing to assail a man-of-war. The production
of such a carriage has not as yet, however, been
accomplished, and we may, therefore, leave the ques-
tion of a re-armament of Horse Artillery at rest until
a most difficult problem is solved.
A gun which recoils cannot in fact be termed a
"quick-firer" at all. It may be a quick-loader, but
the advantage then gained is only small, because it is
the running up of a field gun and the relaying of it that
consumes time and makes fire slow. Moreover, the
great length of a projectile and cartridge fixed together
renders such ammunition as quick-firers now use
unsuitable for packing in limber boxes, and the advan-
tages gained in the direction of the case being gas-
tight, and the better preservation of ammunition, are
over-balanced by this inconvenience and by the
increased weight in the shape of metal cartridge-cases
which would have to be carried about.
Experiments are, however, being carried out, I
believe, in the hope of finding a field gun-carriage
which will possess the advantages and none of the
defects which I have referred to, and then we may see a
weapon introduced which will materially aid our Horse
Artillery batteries in cavalry action. Up to the present,
however, although a carriage with a spade arrange-
ment on the trail has been made which will not run
1 86 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
back, it shows the effect of recoil in another way, that
is to say, by a "jump," brought about by the tendency
of the gun-carriage when checked in its backward
progress to rotate round the point of the trail, which
most inimically affects the accuracy of the shooting.
To do away with recoil in field-carriages, and at the
same time produce no "jump," is at present one
of the toughest problems which gun designers have
to face.
It may, however, be pointed out that just now
opinion on the Continent is drifting away from the
idea of arming field artillery with light pieces capable
of a great rapidity of discharge, and that the field gun
of the future, so far as we can read the signs of the
times, will not belong to this class. If it is to be
a quick-firer it must be one of a calibre capable of
firing a shell as heavy as our present one.
The position of the machine gun as regards cavalry
is, perhaps, less clearly understood. There is no
doubt that the extreme mobility and efficiency of the
Maxim machine gun, which with 4000 rounds of
ammunition weighs only n^ cwt. in draught, has a
great fascination for many soldiers, and I have heard
cavalry officers of experience, who have probably wit-
nessed with disgust our unwieldy 12-pounders en-
deavouring to keep pace with their squadrons, assert
MACHINE GUNS, 187
that a battery of machine guns would supply all the
support which cavalry need from fire.
I do not think this idea is shared by many, and it
appears to be based on two cardinal misconceptions.
We must remember that the occasions on which
Horse Artillery is perhaps most valuable, if not abso-
lutely indispensable, to cavalry is during reconnaissance
work, and that on certain occasions in warfare there
is no scout or patrol more effectual than a few rounds
of shell fire. From a perfectly safe distance such pro-
jectiles can force the enemy to disclose something
more of his strength than we could otherwise discover ;
they can by commanding the outlet of a defile or
village street, or the bend of a road, compel him to
deploy, and perhaps bring guns into action which he
would prefer to keep concealed ; they can deny roads
and beaten paths to him, and delay his progress while
he is picking his way in extended order across
country ; while a shell or two thrown into it will
soon settle the question as to whether a hamlet or
wood be occupied or not. It is not indeed until
cavalry embark in this work ahead of armies that
the immense assistance which far ranging guns may
prove is realised, and that their support is fully
appreciated.
Moreover, the destructive power of a comparatively
1 88 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
heavy shell asserts itself unmistakably when villages
or buildings have to be assailed, and squadrons could
hardly hope to carry such posts without the aid of
shell fire.
The second difficulty which those who have not
had much experience of Field Artillery work are apt
to overlook is the difficulty there is in accurately
determining the range by any other means than by
trial shots. And, lest it should be supposed that I
wish to impugn either the skill of an expert or the
efficiency of a machine, I may add, that when we seek
to make a shot fall on a certain spot, it is not enough
to know how far lineally that spot is distant from us
(because it may be quite likely that our range-finder
will tell us that with correctness), but how much we
must elevate or depress the piece to gain our object.
The reason of this is the state of the atmosphere,
the elevation above the sea-level at which we stand, the
incorrect weighing of the powder charge, the quality of
the ammunition, or the time it has been in store, are
all factors in the problem which assert their influence.
A gun laid absolutely correctly, with precisely the
same elevation, and firing exactly the same nature of
ammunition, will very likely not throw its projectile
as far on one day as on another ; and, indeed, until
we try an experiment we cannot be sure wha.t eleva-
DIFFICULTIES VF RANGING. 189
tion we are to use in order to send our projectile a
given distance. The range-finder usually acts as a
rough guide only, and it is the burst of a shell which
shows us our error, and assists us in our corrections,
until we arrived at a correct result.
This unknown quantity, which at first hampers our
efforts, is recognised amongst artillerymen as "the
error of the day."
Now, with machine guns we are unable to determine
how much that error is, because at anything but a very
short range indeed, at not more in fact, than about
600 yards, we cannot see the result of our shots upon
the ground unless we are firing on a sandy waste, or
over water. While, therefore, we are firing away with
great rapidity, a huge waste of ammunition only may
be taking place. It is in this direction that the weak-
ness of a machine gun lies, and that is why we are
prevented from getting the most out of it at ranges
at which, if we could be sure of correctly gauging the
error of our trial shots, it would undoubtedly be
capable of destructive effect.
Some years ago there used to be considerable con-
troversy as to the calibre which was most suitable for
these weapons. So many varieties, each enthusias-
tically supported, have appeared from time to time,
that it would need a special book on the subject to
190 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
deal with all of them. It is the Automatic Maxim
gun of rifle calibre, however, which has fascinated
popular imagination most, and, undoubtedly, it is the
most valuable of all the various inventions which have
from time to time attempted to substitute mechanical
contrivances for a given number of rifles carried by
soldiers. It is, therefore, of this weapon that I will
chiefly speak. It is probably as nearly perfect as such
a mechanical contrivance can be, it has undoubtedly
proved itself a most valuable adjunct to the armament
of our army, and it has, besides gaining a verdict of
popular acclamation, received official and scientific
approbation in a higher degree than any of its com-
petitors.
The novelty and speciality of the system consists in
this, that the force of recoil, which is such a source of
trouble in field artillery matters, and has militated
against the efficiency of other patterns of machine guns,
is utilised and turned to good account for the eminently
practical purpose of loading and firing the piece. The
wasteful and destructive violence of a great force is
in it chained up and compelled to work for our benefit,
just as is the power of steam in a boiler, or that of the
rushing torrent which is made to turn a mill-wheel.
The mechanism becomes therefore entirely automatic,
and a dangerous energy, which had to be kept subdued
THE MAXIM GUN. 191
by means of brakes and other costly and complicated
contrivances, is absorbed and set to useful employ-
ment, like a burglar in a convict prison.
The idea bears the stamp of genius ; it is so simple
and so complete. What baffled other men became in
Mr. Maxim's hands the principal element of success.
That this was so is apparent from the following
considerations. The "jamming," which was the most
fatal defect of previous designs, often occurred, owing
to the cartridge being damp and hanging fire, while
the crank or lever was being rapidly worked. It was
therefore, perhaps, partially withdrawn while in the
very act of exploding, the forward end of the case was
driven firmly into the chamber, and the mechanism
thrown out of gear. Or, again, the crank, by which
other natures of machine guns are worked, may well,
in the heat and excitement of action, be moved so
rapidly that the cartridges, which fall into position in
the older systems by their own weight, cannot attain
their allotted position in due time. They are therefore
crushed whilst they are descending, and the gun
becomes jammed, and for the time being is as much
out of action as though it were a field gun " spiked."
This is, at any rate, one explanation why machine
guns have so often become useless at the supreme
moment when they are most needed to show their
192 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
prowess, and when, perhaps, the lives of their detach-
ments, or even the defeat or victory of the force they
are acting with, are at stake. It is these very serious
risks and defects which the ingenuity of Mr. Maxim
has especially succeeded in overcoming.
In the automatic gun which bears his name, the
first cartridge is exploded by simply pressing a button,
much in the same way as one rings an electric bell.
The recoil engendered by the explosion opens the
breech, throws out the empty case, and inserts a
fresh round. This one, in its turn, causes the same
movements to be automatically repeated, and so ad
infinitnin.
The supply is kept up and the gun is " fed " from a
revolving belt, which can be quickly replaced, when
emptied, by a full one.
There is only one barrel, and that, as we shall see,
is encased in water.
It will be understood that as the explosion of each
cartridge is entirely dependent on the recoil caused
by that of its predecessor, a "jam," owing to a cart-
ridge hanging, or missing fire in the manner first
described, is altogether impossible. All that would
happen, did such a thing occur, would be that the gun
would cease firing, and the mechanism would be as
little injured or out of gear as is a fowling-piece when
THE MAXIM GUN. 193
a similar contretemps overtakes us out shooting. A
few seconds might suffice for a man to remove the
cause of mischief, and the bullets would very soon
again be flying on their errands. A miss-fire may be
an awkward mishap, of course, at a critical moment,
whether in action, or when shooting big game, but the
consequences of one are not, it is obvious, nearly so
serious in the case of Maxims as in that of other
machine guns.
The automatic arrangement is also advantageous,
because no external force need be brought to bear to
fire the gun. A fruitful cause of inaccuracy, even in
rifle-shooting, is quite obviated therefore, and once
correctly laid and it is claimed that set in motion on a
perfectly rigid platform a Maxim gun would go on
firing, and putting bullet after bullet on the same
spot without any interference or relaying being
required.
Since, however, we c!o not find perfectly rigid plat-
forms supplied to us on battle-fields, we need not
over-estimate this point in the automatic gun's favour.
That so rapid a rate of firing as it can develop will
quickly heat the barrel everyone with any knowledge
of firearms at all will understand. To counteract this
difficulty, it is surrounded by a jacket full of water in
such a way that the water has not only to be heated
O
194 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
but evaporated. But then, as Jameson's men are said
to have found the other day, to their hurt, water is not
always obtainable, and the utility of the Maxim gun
depends on an adequate supply.
This weapon has, however, great merits to recom-
mend it, and it is the one which has been selected to
form part of our recognised organisations. As I
do not propose to compare rival systems with it, or
to discuss purely technical matters as to the best
dimensions of the calibre for such weapons, I will,
in speaking of machine guns, take it as a type of all
the others.
I may, however, add that with regard to the pre-
dictions that have been made as to what the larger
natures which some experts have promised us for
land service may accomplish, it is to be remarked
that the resources of science are not open to one
arm only, and that it is not improbable that the
future may see artillery also, turning to its account
those advantages with which in the long run perse-
verance never fails to reward attention and skill.
Whatever coming years may have in store for us,
however, be it quick-firing guns or high explosive
shells fired from howitzers, it is more profitable now
to deal with matters as they are, and to consider
how far artillery must to-day modify its tactics, so as
RHETORICAL PRAISE. 195
best to make use of or neutralise the most recent
acquisitions our armed strength has received.
The extent of the influence of these innovations is
not at present easy to determine, for all we have to
go upon are some more or less unreliable reports
from the practice ground, and a few isolated instances
from active service ; while in the case of machine
guns we have to discount the confident assertions
of enthusiasts or inventors. Controversy as regards
mounted infantry has not run quite so high, but
experts differ considerably as to their value.
It is to be regretted that in the case of machine guns
language has frequently become rhetorical and inflated.
We used to be told that the mechanic has superseded
the soldier, that their introduction will effect such a
revolution in warfare as has not been witnessed since
the appearance of the breechloading rifle, and that the
nation that does not utilise them courts defeat. Yet
the most practical soldiers on earth, and the nation
which has ever been first to develop fire effect, from
the days of Frederick's iron ramrods to those of the
needle gun, remain sceptical.
The expressions I have referred to ominously
reproduce the acclamations that heralded the advent
of the mitrailleuse. A foreign enthusiast has even
declared that " La mitrailleuse constitue un tireur
O 2
196 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
ideal, puis qu'elle n'a point de nerfs, et ne connait pas
la fatigue." *
But some admirers have not contented themselves
with claiming for the new inventions great efficiency in
certain situations, and suggesting them as a possible
substitute for Horse Artillery guns, but the whole
status of Field Artillery in general has been threatened
by them.
It has been more than once contended that artillery
will not be able to live even at ranges of from 2000 to
3000 yards under the "stream of lead " which the new
arm is to pour upon it.f The exploits of the small-
bore rifle likewise aroused similar expectations, which,
however, will all demand an almost perfect system of
range-finding ere they can be realised. Artillery, with
the advantage of seeing the results of its shots, has had
considerable experience of the difficulties of picking
up the range even at the shorter distance specified
* "L'Emploi des Mitrailleurs et Canons a. tir rapide." By
Gustaf Roos.
tin opposition to these views it has, however, been argued
that the improvements in small arms, such as the magazine
rifle, and the introduction of a smokeless powder, will increase
the relative importance of Artillery fire. It is contended that
modern infantry fire will be so destructive that the attack will
be altogether unable to make headway unless supported by a
powerful Artillery, and will call more loudly than ever for the
guns to shake and demoralise its opponents when it finds itself
checked.
KOUROPATXINE ON RANGES. 197
above, and will know how to discount over-confidence
here, but there does seem a danger that the idea
may gain ground that future battles will see long
intervals separating the opposing lines, and that the
development of fire may again bring about the
tendency to hold the guns back which has before
characterised advances in this respect. There is more
to be feared from such notions than from the bullets
of the enemy, but as regards the earlier stages of the
fight, they are invested with a certain truth. So much
may be admitted ; nevertheless, to gain decisive effect,
to give the knock-down blow that establishes victory,
the two parties in the struggle must ultimately come
into collision, and moreover the losses that may be
anticipated from long range fire will make them seek
to do so as quickly as they may,
The Russian General Kouropatkine has said that
the fire from an intrenched position did not increase
in intensity as the attack advanced. . On the contrary,
its effect seemed greater at 2000 than at 600 metres,
because, as the assailants approached, the defenders
lost their heads, the more cowardly ceased to fire
altogether, and the great majority let off their rifles in
the air. The Germans, with a unique experience of
modern war, have little confidence in long ranges, and
" long range fire on artillery is discountenanced as a
198 GVNS AND CAVALRY.
rule." The new Drill Regulations for artillery, of
our own and foreign armies, drawn up with a full
knowledge of the powers of the best machine guns,
are full of rules that seem almost to ignore them.
We find that artillery should not, at decisive moments,
avoid even the very heaviest fire from either rifles or
machine guns, and certainly it is advisable in order to
assist the infantry attack, to cause its advance when
the fire of the guns is masked, to be accompanied by
single batteries if possible up to the very closest and
most effective range. The strengthening, especially
in moral, which the attack will experience from such
an accompaniment will fully outweigh the consequent
losses of the artillery.
I am convinced that it is unnecessary to rush so
intrinsically valuable a weapon as the machine gun
into popularity after the fashion I have referred to.
It has attained a recognised status, and is able to
stand on its own merits in its own sphere.
Lest, being an artilleryman myself, it may be
imagined that the artillery service is specially pre-
judiced against machine guns, I would further point
out that the advocates of the rifle, on the other hand,
claim that their especial weapon, with its modern
developments, will in the long run prove the more
valuable arm.
EXPERIENCES AT ALEXANDRIA. 199
Major Mecham, District Inspector of Musketry, for
example, stated before the Aldershot Military Society*
that he thought the money spent on machine guns
would be more usefully expended in giving an in-
creased supply of ammunition to the men, while on
the same occasion Major Hutton gave some striking
instances from his experiences on service at Alexan-
dria in 1882, and from the results of practice, to show
how easily a vast waste of ammunition may take place
when using these weapons without the error being dis-
covered. I must, however, point out that Maxim guns
were not those on this occasion referred to, and that
their performances might have been more satisfactory.
Before 1 870 the most extravagant hopes with regard
to the value of the mitrailleuse were indulged in, and
equally high-coloured pictures of the effects to be pro-
duced by the Gatling gun were drawn by its admirers
before it was adopted and tested on the battle-field.
In neither case was expectation borne out by the
event, while even at the present day the machine gun
has not made any decided impression on tactics.
* Proceedings of Aldershot Military Society, July, 1888. The
cause of the bad shooting was due, it is said, to the wheels not
being on the same level. This may be so, and can doubtless
be obviated, but it is essential to notice that those with the
guns, even at 1120 yards range, were quite satisfied with their
performance, and had no idea of how wide of the mark their
shots were going.
200 GUNS AND CAYAL&Y.
The French, of course, did not understand the true
application of their favourite, and committed the initial
blunder of substituting a battery armed with it for
one of the batteries of their divisional artillery, but
the fact must not be overlooked that the Germans had
so poor an opinion of its powers that they never
utilised any of the numbers (about 600) they captured
against their opponents. In no case, however, can it
be admitted that the issue of battle is simply a ques-
tion of weapons. As \ write these lines the papers
are full of the disaster which has just overtaken the
gallant Italians in Abyssinia, who have learnt to their
cost that the most modern equipment will not secure
victory to an army which is not handled in action
with skill and judgment. The result of a fight still
depends, as it always has and will, on the number,
discipline, and bravery of the combatants, and on the
capacity of their leaders, and victory will never be
snatched by the possession of a mechanical contrivance,
however perfect it may be shown to be theoreticaliy.
Moreover, even if the powers of the machine gun
are as great as their advocates assert, artillery fire can
be shown to be quite as destructive, at any rate, on
the practice-ground, which is at present the only
arena wherein they can measure their strength.
What modern guns may do on the battle-field itself,
RVSSO-TURKlSH WAR.
however, is evidenced in the Turkish losses at Aladja
Dagh, when, according to Lieut. Greene, " the greater
part of their losses were caused by the admirable
employment of the Russian artillery with shrapnel." *
The late Major-General C. B. Brackenbury has
likewise quoted this battle to show how hard good
artillery can hit, and has stated that on that occasion
50 per cent, of the Turkish losses were caused by
artillery fire, f
The machine gun cannot therefore lay claim to a
monopoly of deadliness, nor can it, it is believed,
owing to its want of power, ever prove a substitute for
artillery except under exceptional circumstances.
Those books on tactics which have appeared both
in this country and abroad, since it has forced itself
prominently on public attention, agree in regarding its
fire as a species of musketry, and its tactics are rightly
therefore to be considered in combination with those of
mounted infantry. The one is a mounted rifle, the
other a mounted rifleman. It is for this reason,
doubtless, that some authorities consider that cavalry
alone should accompany Horse Artillery, but it would
appear that the mobility of mounted infantry and
* Greene's " Russo-Turkish War."
t Lecture before the Aldershot Military Society, on "The
Use and Abuse of Field Artillery."
202 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
machine guns may render them an efficient escort,
capable of going almost anywhere that artillery could
penetrate.
We have the high authority of the late Sir Edward
Hamley for recommending the former for this duty,
and, if it is to be made use of, its effect should
naturally be supplemented and enhanced by the
addition of a few of the latter.
Again, however, it is right that I should tell my
readers that the late General Keith Fraser, Inspector-
General of our Cavalry, did not consider that machine
guns should accompany Horse Artillery. In his
report on the cavalry manoeuvres of last year he
says : —
" Machine guns. — There were only two Maxim guns
with the division, and these being both in charge of
the same regiment, were not considered available
during the operations of brigade versus brigade. I
recommend that each cavalry regiment should be
supplied with a Maxim gun, to be carried in a bucket
on the off side behind the rider's leg, the tripod being
similarly carried on the near side. I consider that
machine guns are quite out of place if attached to and
working with Horse Artillery."
There was no mounted infantry present at these
manoeuvres, so that there was no opportunity of learning
MACHINE GUNS AWING ARTILLERY. 203
anything as to their employment with the cavalry
division.
The drift of the previous remarks may appear to
show an inclination to unduly depreciate the value of
machine guns. Such is not their intention. Viewed
as an addition to the fire action of cavalry in certain
situations they have a high value, and a unique claim
to consideration for a certain class of foe. They will
also doubtless inflict heavy losses on artillery, but
none the less must artillery be taught to brave such
risks, and, however hazardous the attempt, it must
still endeavour to approach to the most decisive ranges.
On the other hand, machine guns will often aid
artillery in their role, but will not replace them.
I feel tempted here for a moment to stray away
from the subject immediately in view, and to speak of
artillery in general, and not of the guns only, that will
accompany our squadrons, because it is conceivable
that machine guns may on the most modern battle-
field, and in the very hottest part of it too, be of
special service.
It is during the last stages of the attack that the
importance of a close co-operation and support between
artillery and infantry has always been recognised.
The necessity for the artillery to perform these func-
tions was plainly evidenced by Napoleon's attaching
204 GtSNS AND CAVALRY.
two guns to each regiment, or to three battalions of
infantry,* and this at the very time and occasion when
he developed the power of artillery in masses to an
extent that never previously had been attempted.
Further on it will be shown how this idea may be
carried out at present by substituting machine guns
for the field-pieces Napoleon provided. Machine guns
will here be able to save artillery from the destructive
losses it would incur if pressing forward directly with
the later stages of the attack, and, being better pro-
tected (by shields), will perhaps suffer less. It must,
however, be remembered that in the face of shrapnel
fire a shield may prove but a shell trap, and explode
a projectile which might otherwise bury itself com-
paratively harmlessly in the ground. Colonel Home
anticipated such tactics, and says that the Germans in
their more recent books acknowledged the power of
the mitrailleuse, more especially in the last portion of
the attack, when its effect on infantry is very great.
With regard to the plan adopted by Napoleon, and
referred to above,f he asks : " May not this be the
true place of the mitrailleuse, to support infantry
when closely pressed, to be kept back until the
advance of the hostile infantry to a certain extent
masks its artillery, and then to be used on the ad-
* Home's " Modern Tactics." f Ibid.
SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MACHINE GUNS. 205
vancing infantry ? " Similar tactics may be employed
in the attack, it being remembered that modern
machine guns are protected from infantry by steel
shields, and that one man can serve them therefore
under cover. Their great mobility would likewise
allow them to be moved forward, even when severe
losses had been sustained, whatever be the means of
transport which may be ultimately adopted for them.
To revert again to their use with cavalry. To
every brigade of cavalry in the field there will in
future be attached a cavalry section with two machine
guns. What has already been said as to the capacity
of these guns has rather referred to an idea which
some hold, although I do not believe that it is pre-
valent amongst officers who have at all studied the
subject, that Horse Artillery might be superseded by
batteries composed of these lightly-moving weapons.
There will be many occasions in warfare in which
a rapid concentration of fire, such as they may be
depended on to supply, will be almost invaluable.
To defend a defile, a village street, to guard or
force a bridge, protect a ford, or defend an advanced
post, are directions in which it is obvious that their
assistance will be eagerly sought, and probably no
one will deny their efficiency in such situations. It is
possible that in the hands of a skilful officer, and
206 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
availing themselves to the fullest extent of their
powers of rapid movement, and the smallness of their
size, they may elude observation on the very battle-
field itself, and do useful work even when acting
quite independently. Their success in such a role
would however depend entirely on the qualifications
for such service which the officer in charge of them
possessed. Three years ago we saw a machine gun
well handled at the manoeuvres in this very fashion,
and no doubt with the right man in charge of it a
Maxim will be able to make its influence felt on
occasions during future warfare. The danger to be
guarded against is that it should be turned into the
plaything of a faddist, and be treated with the short-
lived enthusiasm which surrounds the acquisition of a
new toy. In judiciously selected hands and within its
own sphere, however, it will doubtless assert its worth,
aud probably no men will more freely avail them-
selves of its services than will those of the artillery.
Of mounted infantry with cavalry it is more difficult
to speak with any degree of confidence. Hardly any
of our cavalry soldiers have given any public utter-
ances which would enlighten us as to what they would
do with the battalion which is attached on service to
our cavalry division. Whether on active service that
battalion could move with such a freedom as to be
MOUNTED INFANTRY. 207
always at hand when needed, is also a point on which
I believe there exists considerable difference of opinion,
which nothing short of ocular demonstration in war
will completely allay. Presumably, however, our new
arm will be able to keep up with our squadrons in
their reconnaissance work far away to the front — to
start on any other supposition would, it seems to me, be
a mere begging of the question — and in reconnaissance
work, when it is necessary either to gain information,
or to prevent the foe's doing so, the assistance which
a force of mobile riflemen may yield to their side will
be immense. I have already touched upon the nature
of the minor operations of an independent nature
which will always give them an opportunity, and they
may be useful with an advanced guard to hold a
position until the infantry proper arrive, but even when
two armies have become locked together in a decisive
struggle on a large scale, it is very possible that we
may also turn the newest adjuncts to our military
resources to considerable account.
By almost all writers on artillery, and by many
soldiers who have studied war on the battle-field,
notably by such men as Prince Kraft and Von Dresky,
great stress has been laid on the capability of artillery
to defend itself from assault. Such remarks, however,
apply more especially to a good artillery position and
2o8 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
a frontal attack. To meet an enveloping or flanking
movement will sometimes severely try the powers of
batteries, and, moreover, will divert their aim from the
true objective. During movement, moreover, artillery
is absolutely helpless, and must be intimately sup-
ported by the other arms, and, if this is the case in
the ordinary combat, it becomes an even more press-
ing necessity when artillery is more or less isolated
to the front or on the flanks.
To tell off a permanent escort of infantry appears a
mistake, as it will not be able to follow the guns in
their quick movements, and will probably be behind-
hand at the very moment it is wanted. To attach a
body of cavalry would be of little advantage, as the
action of this arm is very restricted on the modern
battle-field, and it would be itself unable to hold its
ground in the presence of aimed infantry fire. If,
therefore, we can find an arm capable of quick move-
ment, and at the same time possessed of powerful fire
action, we will have the very article most suitable for
escort purposes. In mounted infantry and machine
guns we have to hand the exact thing we are in need
of, and in this respect a wide sphere of action is open
to them. After their work with the advanced guard
is over therefore, and while the army forms up into
line of battle, a proportion of the machine guns and
RdLE OF MACHINE GUNS ON BATTLE-FIELD. 209
mounted infantry should be told off to form an escort
to the artillery throughout the day.
But guns will have to do more than stand stolidly
firing at long ranges. Without a more genial support
than this the infantry will never get forward, and,
therefore, in order to heighten the effect of their fire,
and bring matters to an issue as soon as possible, the
guns must soon push forward to a more decisive range.
Such an advance on their part might be covered by
a heavy fire from the machine guns forming their
escort, which should by this time, by utilising the
experiences of the artillery, have accurately arrived
at the range of the enemy's guns, and should be able
to pour a very intense and rapid fire on them while
their artillery are limbered up and advancing.
After one or more of these advances the artillery
will have reached the decisive artillery position, which
would be from 2000 to 1500 yards from the enemy's
line, according to circumstances. Here the duty of
the machine guns will be to protect them from any
counter-attack that may be attempted by the enemy's
reserves. They should now engage the guns of the
defence, and thus permit their own artillery to devote
their whole energy and attention to hammering and
shaking the hostile infantry. As soon as the order is
given for the infantry to advance to the assault, the
P
2io GUNS AND CAVALRY.
fire of all the guns (some may previously have been
obliged to reply to the enemy's artillery), without
change of position and regardless of any of the
enemy's batteries still remaining in action, is at once
directed on the points of the position to be assaulted ,
and upon any of the enemy's troops that can take
the infantry in flank. " Artillery on the offensive
should make it their principal object to play on the
infantry of the enemy. An attack can only be thought
of when this has been weakened." At this moment
the machine guns may be of the greatest service to
the batteries, and they may at this time very effectively
fire on and annoy the artillery of the defence.
In the event of their infantry requiring further
support and assistance the guns may have to seek
even closer quarters, and, as has been shown, must not
fear to advance to the most decisive ranges.
The introduction of machine guns may, however,
render such movements unnecessary for the future. -
As we have indicated previously, after the manner
adopted by Napoleon in the case of field guns, these
should be able to press forward with the infantry
close up to the position. They are protected by
shields, and should, therefore, be able to face modern
musketry with more chance of success than guns could -
do, while their effect at ranges considerably unjer
IN SUPPORT 'Of TH£ AT7ACK. 2it
looo yards must be tremendous. They should now
therefore to able to save artillery from the heavy losses,
especially amongst the horses, they would have to
undergo in pressing forward in the last stages of the
attack. If circumstances demand it, it is true they
will have to be prepared to face destruction. But
with machine guns circumstances should not often
demand the sacrifice.
If the attack be successful, the position of the
attacking infantry is for the moment one of great
danger, and it is all important to crown the captured
position with artillery and ensure its possession.
A proportion of guns would be sent forward for
this purpose, and here machine guns might accompany
and protect them from a counter-attack with great
advantage. If the enemy be in retreat, and is to be
pursued, an efficient escort to the artillery would
again be formed by a detachment of mounted in-
fantry with machine guns, and its presence and close
co-operation would enable the guns to advance fear-
lessly and with greater confidence to such ranges, as
it would compel the columns of the retreating enemy
to quit the roads and seek safety in a disorderly
rout.
Such are some of the considerations that must
guide us in making any modifications in the tactics of
212 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
artillery in attack due to the new auxiliaries that
have lately been called into existence. But they are
some only, and anyone who has had an opportunity
of witnessing in the field during practical work the
difficulties which are involved and which continually
crop up in unexpected ways, will, I think, admit that,
until the test of actual war has been applied to them,
no deductions drawn from theory or even from peace
manoeuvres can be really trustworthy, and must be
accepted with considerable caution.
It is in savage warfare, however, that the best
opportunity of machine guns has so far arrived, and
at the comparatively short ranges at which actions
are fought in such campaigns, they have undoubtedly
earned a well-deserved reputation. It was during
the Matabele war in the autumn of 1893 that they
perhaps gained their brightest laurels.
The accounts which appeared in the newspapers
from the various war correspondents who accompanied
the expedition vie with one another in praising the
courage and hardihood of our brave opponents, and
the hopelessness of their attempts to face the fire of
the machine guns which were turned upon them.
Relying on their spears alone, they rushed on with a
recklessness such as no European troops would have
displayed, but only to certain destruction. The cor-
EXPERIENCES IN SOUTH' AFRICA. 213
respondent of the Daily News wrote in one of his
letters : " The Matabele presented a wide front, and
they were struck down by scores as they got well
within range. But they did not falter until they
had reached the nearest waggons. Then the havoc
wrought by every Maxim that could be brought to
bear proved too much for their valour. They wavered
and then fell back, but not in disorder. Before they
could be followed the regiments had turned and
delivered a second assault. One tried to find a weak
point in the laager. All advanced gallantly, and all
who were not mown down by the concentrated fire of
the Maxims turned and fled before it Yet a third
attack was made ; but the Matabele ardour had
become cool. Spears had reached the laager in the
first and in the second assault. In the third the
enemy broke and fled at the first taste of the Maxims,
impelled by a wild desire to find cover from the
destroying hail." And so on the dreary tale of the
enforced destruction of brave men fighting in their
ignorance against a force of absolutely overwhelming
power is continued with only trifling variation.
In the Chitral campaign also these guns asserted
their influence on occasions unmistakably, and an
acknowledgment of their good service appears in the
despatches of Sir R. C. Low. No one will, in fact,
214 GUNS AND CAVALRY.
question their value in their proper sphere, and we
need search no further for recognition of what they
have done. At the same time it is as well that
officers and the general public, which nowadays has its
own notions on all subjects, should discriminate in
their admiration, and not imagine that there is any
talismanic attribute or virtue about a weapon, the
characteristics of which must be carefully understood
and opportunely applied, if the good results are to be
obtained from it which it will undoubtedly yield when
utilised with judgment and discretion.
INDEX.
ABYSSINIA, Italians in, 200
Aderklaa, Napoleon at, 128, 129
Adolphus, Gustavus, principles of
cavalry tactics, 24, 25
Akbar Khan, 167 n.
Albuera, tattle of, 114, 118-124,
167
Alexandria, machine guns used in
1882.. 199
Alma, battle of the, 94-96
American War of Secession, cavalry
raids in the, 176, 178, 179
Anglesey, Lord, 65, 82, 162
Aroya-Molinos, French cavalry at
the affair of, 27
Artillery, new drill regulations for,
198; machine guns aiding, 202-
206 : see Field Artillery, Horse
Artillery, Guns, etc.
Auldearn, battle of, 27
Austrian campaign of 1866.. 28,
35, 44, 159, 160, 162-164
Austrians, at the battle of Marengo,
. 110-112; at the battle of Wa-
: gram, 127-133 ; the Seven Years'
War, 177, 1 80
Automatic Maxim gun, 190-195
BALACLAVA, charge of Scarlett's
squadrons at, 28 ; incident at,
recorded by Dr. W, H. Russell,
68, 69 ; the Heavy Brigade
charge at, 73-75 ; Captain
Brandling's " C " Troop at, 82-
97
Balkans, General Gouiko in the,
177, 178
Bautzen, artillery at, 12
Bazaine, retreat of, from Metz,
ISO
Beaumont, the surprise at, 105, 151
Beane, Major, 167 n.
Benedek, at the battle of Konig-
gratz, 163, 164
Benevente, 66
Bengd Horse Artillery, at Ghazee-
ood-deen Nuggur, 112, 113; the
retreat from Cabul in 1841-2..
167 n. ; in pursuit of Holkar,
170-172
Beresford, Marshal, at battle of
Albuera. 118-124
Brackenbury, Major-General,
Brahaut's cavalry division at
Buzancy, 99
Brandling, Captain John, ix., 74 n. ;
experiences with "C" Troop in
the Crimea, 82-97
216
INDEX.
Bredow, Von, at Vionville, 154,
156-158 ; at Tobitschau, 159, 160
Brown, Sir George, 71* 97 n»
Bulganak, the affair of the, 70-72,
96 n.
Billow, General von, 20, 21
Buzancy, action of, 98-105
Byng's Guards at Waterloo, 40
" C " TROOP, R.H.A., experiences
of, in the Crimea, 4-6, 79, 80,
82-97
Cabul, retreat from, in 1841-2..
164 «., 167 n.
Cavalry, mobility of, 7, 8 ; action
of — and guns together, 24-73 >
tactics of, in the seventeenth
century, 24-26 ; reform of
Frederick the Great, 29-33
Cavalry attacking guns, 153-169
Cavalry raids, 176-180
" Chestnut Troop," the, 40, 79, 80
Chitral campaign, the, 213
Concentration of batteries, 140-142
" Corps Artillery," 43, 47
Crimean War, Lieutenant-General
Sir William Stirling's exptriencts
with " C " Troop, R.H.A., 4-6 ;
charge of Scarlett's squadrons at
Balaclava, 28 ; incident at Bala-
clava recorded by Dr. W. H.
Russell, 68, 69 ; the affair of the
Bulganak, 70-72 ; the Heavy
Brigade charge at Balaclava, 73-
80 ; Captain Bi and ling and " C "
Troop in the, 82-97
Cromwell, Oliver, and his Iron-
sides, 25> 26
"D" TROOP, H.A., at Albuera,
119-125, 167 n.
Davout, at battle of Wogram, 128-
130
"Death's Head " Hussars, 33
De Brack's " Light Cavalry Out-
posts," 148
D'Erlon's corps at Waterloo, 41, 42
Desaix, at battle of Marengo, no,.
in
Dragoon Guards at Balaclava, 92-
97
Dresden, Napoleon's artillery at, 3
Dresky, Von, at Spicheren, 1 6 ;
and artillery, 207
EDGE HILL, battle of, 27
Egyptian campaign of 1882 . . 62
Eupatoria, cavalry force at, 4, 5
FERE CHAMPENOISE, second battle
of, 117
Field Artillery, difference from Horse
Artillery, 1-3 ; machine guns a
substitute for, 196, 197 : see also
Guns
Fiieaims, influence of, 7
Forrest, raids of, in American War,
178
Forsler, Colonel Frank, 94 n.
Franco-German War, the, 15-17,
19, 28, 35, 36, 147, 162, 173,
200; the action of Buzancy, 98-
105 ; battle of Vionville, 107-
109, 149-158 ; battle of Loigny-
Poupry, 109, HO, 133-145-
Fraser, Lieutenant - General Sir
Charles Craufuid, letter re Cap-
tain Brandling's " C " Troop in
the Crimea, 93 «., 94 «.
Fraser, Captain, 96 n.
Fraser, General Keith, 202.
Frazer, Colonel Sir Augustus, 80, 8j
INDEX.
217
Frederick the Great, and mobility
of guns, 8 ; and rapid marches,
13 ; reforms with reference to the
employment of cavalry, 29-33 5
the Seven Years' War, 177, 1 80
French cavalry at the affair of
Aroya-Molinos, 27 ; at Sedan, 28
French troops in the Peninsular
War, 114-125
Fuentes d'Onor, Major Ramsay at,
GARDINER, Sir Robert, 81
Gatling gun, the, 199
Germans, the, and long range fire,
197, 198
Germany, war with France, 1870..
15-17, 19, 28, 35, 36, 46,147, 162,
173, 200 ; the action of Buzancy,
98-105 ; battle of Vionville, 107-
109, 149-158 ; battle of Loigny-
Poupry, 109, no, 133-145
Ghazee-ood-deen Nuggur, Tombs's
troop of Bengal H.A. at, 112,
"3
Godman, General, 92
Gordon, Lord, of Montrose's Horse,
at the battle of Auldearn, 27
Gourko, General, 177, 178
Gravelotte, battle of, 22
Greene, Lieutenant, on the Russo-
Turkish War, 201
Grouchy at Vauchamps, 3, 4
Gun-carriages, 185, 186
Guns, the mobility of, 1-23 ; the
action of guns and cavalry to-
gether, 24-73 : see also Horse
Artillery, Machine guns, etc.
HADDICK, General, 176, 177
Hamley, Sir E., 202
Hanau, no
Hardinge, Colonel, at Albuera,
121-123
Hartman, General, 159
Holkar, capture of, in 1804.. 170-
172
Home, Colonel, and the mitrailleuse,
204, 205
Horse Artillery ; difference from
Field Artillery, 1-3 ; experiences
of "C " Troop in the Crimea, 4-6,
82-97 > deficient in mobility on
active service, 6 ; defenceless in
bivouacs, 15 ; the mobility of,
6-23 ; origin of, as a special arm,
29 ; united action with cavalry in
1*70.. 36; in the future, 37-39;
two rdles of, 43-47 ; weighty
equipment for, 85 and n. ; India
regarded as the birthplace of, 113,
114; machine guns a substitute
for, 196, 197 : see alsn Guns.
Hutton, Major, 199
"I" TROOP, R.H.A., in the
Crimea, 82
India, British troops in, 34
India, the birthplace of Horse
Artillery, 113, 114
Indian Mutiny ; Tombs's troop of
the Bengal Horse Artillery in the,
112, 113.
Infantry, firearms of, 7
Infantry, mounted, 46, 201, 206-
209.
Ironsides, the, of Oliver Cromwell,
25, 26
Italians in Abyssinia, 200
JAMESON'S raid, and the Maxim
gun, 194
Q
218
INDEX.
"Jamming" of machine guns, 191,
192
Jena, battle of, 170, 172
KADIKOI, the gorge of, 74-76
Kaye's " Sepoy War," reference to
Tombs's Troop, H.A., 1 12, 113
Kellerman, ix. ; at the battle of
Marengo, 110-112
Koniggratz, battle of, 161, 163, 164
Kouropatkine, General, on ranges,
197, 198
Kraft, Prince, 15, 164, 207
LAKE, Colonel, 95 n.
Lake, Lord, pursuit of Holkar in
1804.. 170-172
Lallemand, General, message to
Captain E. C. Whinyates, 125-127
La Rothiere, artillery of Sacken's
corps at, 3
Lasalle, ix. ; capture of Stettin, 172
Lee, General, 42
Lefebure, Captain, 49 n. ; at Al-
buera, 119
Light Cavalry, object of, in a cam-
paign, 148
Ligny, the battle of, 154, 155
Loigny-Poupry, battle of, 109, 1 10,
130, 133-145
Long, Brigadier- General, at Albuera,
123, 124
Low, Sir R. C., 213
Lowe, Sir Drury, 176
Lucan, Lord, 74
Lumley, General, heavy brigade at
Albuera, 120-124; action at
Usagre, 124, 125
MACHINE GUNS, 182, 186-195,
198 ; experiences of, in recent
wars and their use in the futur~,
199-214
MacMahon's flank march to Sedan,
98-10;, 173
" Magazine fire," 62-64
Magfar, action near, in 1 882.. 62
Maitland's Guards at Waterloo, 40
Maiwand, 164-168
Marches, rapid, 13
Marengo, battle of, ix., 110-112
Marmont, Marshal, 58 n. ; at battle
of Marengo, ill; corps of, de-
feated at Fere Champenoise, 117
Mars-la-Tour, 22, 106, 107
Matabele War, use of Maxim guns
in the, 212, 213
Maude, Captain, 74
Maxim guns, 181, 186-195, 199,
206 ; used in the last Matabele
War, 212, 213 ; and in the Chitral
campaign, 213
Mecham, Major, 199
Melas, at battle of Marengo, no,
in
Mercer, Captain, l68«.
Michell, Major-General E. J., 95 //.
Mitrailleuse, the, 195, 196, 199,
200 ; the Germans and the power
of, 204
Mobility of guns, the, 1-23
Moltke, Von, and the pursuit of a
beaten foe, 172, 173
Monlmirail, Russian artillery at, 3
Montrose's Horse, at the battle of
Auldearn, 27
Morgan, raids of, in American War,
178
M order, corps of, defeated at Fere
Champenoise, 117
Mounted infantry, 46, 2OI, 206-
209
INDEX.
219
Murat, ix., 171; advance to Russia
in 1812.. 34; at Jena, 172
NAPIER, on the Peninsular War,
115, 118, 121
Napoleon, his artillery at Dresden, !
3 ; in later campaigns relied much
on his artillery, 11-13, 33> 2O4j
210 ; cavalry has more need of !
artillery than infantry, 29 ; use of '
cavalry, 35 ; campaign of 1814, use
of Horse Artillery and cavalry at,
117; the battle of Wagram, 127-
131, 169
' j
( )KEHAMPTON, camp at, 3 n., 47
j
PAGET, Lord, 82
Peninsular War, British troops in, |
34 ; Ross's Troop in, 40 ; Sergeant
Wightman in, 58 n. ; the battle
of Albuera, 114-124; action at
Usagre, 124, 125; "D" Troop
in, 167 n. ; battle of Salamanca,
169, 170
Pilsach, General S. von, 99
Placilla, battle of, in Chili, 179, 180
Pursuit of a beaten foe, 169-176
QUICK-FIRING GUNS, 182-186
RAGLAN, Lord, 42, 71, 72, 76
Ramsay, Norman, ix. ; in the Penin-
sular War, 115, 116
Ranges, General Kouropatkine on,
197, 198
Rapid marches, 13
Rear-guard actions, 162
Reconnaissance work, 147-149
Renter, Lieutenant von, 154, 155
Rex, Colonel von, at Spicheren,
20, 21
Rheims, battle of, 117
Ribera, fight at, 125
Richmond, General Stuart's raid in
front of, in 1862.. 178, 179
Ross, Field-Marshal Sir Hew D.,
40, 41, 79
Rossbach, battle of, 32, 33, 1 10
Rossbrunn, fight at, 67
Rupert, Prince, and cavalry at the
battle of Edge Hill, 26, 27
Russell, Dr. W. H., incident at
Balaclava recorded by, 68, 69
Russia, Murat's advance in 1 812..
34 : see also Crimea
Russian army, fire action of cavalry
in, 31
Russo-Turkish War, 201
SAARBRUCK, 16
Salamanca, battle of, 58 «., 169,
170
Scarlett, General Sir James, charge
of his squadrons at Balaclava, 28,
75-79, 96
Sedan, French cavalry at, 28; the
action of Buzancy, 98-105
Seddeler, Baron, 28 n.
Seydlitz, noted cavalry leader, 31-
33, 40, 42, 1 10, 179
Shewell, Colonel, 68
Shrapnel projectiles, 62, 63
Sieberg, Gunner, at the battle of
Ligny* 155
Soult, Marshal, at Albuera, Il8-
124
Spain : see Peninsular War
Spicheren, Von Dresky at, 1 6 ;
artillery at, 20, 21
Stettin, capture of, by Lasalle, 172
220
INDEX.
Stirling, Lieutenant - General Sir
Wm., experiences with "C"
Troop, R. H. A. , in the Crimea, 4-6
Strange, Captain, 95 n.
Strangways, Brigadier-General Fox,
70, 71, 85
Stuart, General J. E., raid in front
of Richmond, 1862 . . 178, 179
Swabey, Lieutenant, diary of, in
the Peninsula, 49 n.
TACTICS, in the seventeenth century,
24-26
Tactics governing the employment
of cavalry and guns acting to-
gether, 37-72
Tactics, books on, and machine
guns, 201
Tel-el- Kebir, 43, 175, 176
Tilly, cavalry squadrons of, 24
Tobitschau, 154, 159, 160
"Todten-Ritt," the, 106
Tombs's troop of Bengal II. A. at
Ghazee-ood-deen Nuggur, 112,
113
Turkish losses at Aladja Dagh, 201
UHLANS, the, in France, 35
Union Brigade, the, at Waterloo,
41,42
Usagre, cavalry fight at, 124, 125
VAUCHAMPS, Grouchy at, 3, 4
Ville-sur-Yron, cavalry combat at,
106, 107
Vionville, the battle of, 22, 44, 107-
109, 149-153 ; the "death ride"
at Vionville, 156-158
Vittoria, 170
Von Schell, 56, 68, 69
WAGRAM, battle of, 127-131, 169;
artillery at, 12
Wallenstein, cavalry squadron of,
24
Waterloo, battle of, 40, 41, 161,
162, 170; Sir E. C. Whinyates
at, 126 «.; "D"Troopat, 167 «.,
i68«.
Wellington, Duke of, at Waterloo,
161, 162
Whinyates, Sir E. C., 125-127
Whinyates, Colonel F. A., 85 «.,
92 ; reminiscences of Captain
Brandling, 94 ^.-97 n.
Widdern, Captain C. von, 174, 175
Wightman, Sergeant-Major J., 58-
61
Wittich, General von, 138, 139
Woerth, 173
Woldersdorf, Captain von, ix. ; at
Buzancy, 100-102.
Wood, Sir Evelyn, on battle of
Albuera, 121 n.
ZACH, General, at ba'tleof Marengo,
ill
Ziethen, noted cavalry leader, 31,
33» 39, 40, 177, 179
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