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S.  Hrg.  103-774 

GUN  VIOLENCE:  DO  STOLEN  MIUTARY  PARTS 

PUY  A  ROLE? 


4.  G  74/9;  S.  HRG.  103-774 

jR  Violence:  Do  Stoles  Hilitarji  Pa.. 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON 
GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


NOVEMBER  18,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 


i\ 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
74--127CC  WASHINGTON  :  1994 


For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  t)C  20402 
ISBN  0-16-046015-8 


S.  Hrg.  103-774 

GUN  VIOLENCE:  DO  STOLEN  MIUTARY  PARTS 

PLAY  A  ROLE? 


LG  74/9;  B.  HRG.  103-774 

Violence:  Do  Stolen  ttilitars  Pa.. 


HEARING 

BEFORE  THE 

COMMITTEE  ON 
GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 
UNITED  STATES  SENATE 

ONE  HUNDRED  THIRD  CONGRESS 

FIRST  SESSION 


NOVEMBER  18,  1993 


Printed  for  the  use  of  the  Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs 


^^013  . 


U.S.  GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
74-427  cc  WASHINGTON  :  1994 


For  sale  by  the  U.S.  Government  Printing  Office 
Superintendent  of  Documents,  Congressional  Sales  Office,  Washington,  DC  20402 
ISBN  0-16-046015-8 


COMMITTEE  ON  GOVERNMENTAL  AFFAIRS 

JOHN  GLE>fN,  Ohio,  Chairman 

SAM  NUNN,  Georgia  WILLIAM  V.  ROTH,  Jr.,  Delaware 

CARL  LEVIN,  Michigan  TED  STEVENS,  Alaska 

JIM  SASSER,  Tennessee  WILLIAM  S.  COHEN,  Maine 

DAVID  PRYOR,  Arkansas  THAD  COCHRAN,  Mississippi 

JOSEPH  I.  LIEBERMAN,  Connecticut  JOHN  McCAIN,  Arizona 

DANIEL  K.  AKAKA,  Hawaii  ROBERT  F.  BENNETT,  Utah 
BYRON  L.  DORGAN,  North  Dakota 

Leonard  Weiss,  Staff  Director 

Betty  Ann  Soiefer,  Counsel 

Franklin  G.  Polk,  Minority  Staff  Director  and  Chief  Counsel 

Michal  Sue  Prosser,  Chief  Clerk 


(II) 


CONTENTS 


Opening  statements:  Page 

Senator  Glenn  1 

Senator  Lieberman  4 

Prepared  statement: 

Senator  Cohen  16 

WITNESSES 

Thursday,  November  18,  1993 

Donna  M.  Heivilin,  Director,  Defense  Management  and  NASA  Issues,  General 
Accounting  Office;  accompanied  by  Joan  Hawkins,  Assistant  Director,  and 
Donald  Wheeler,  Deputy  Director,  Office  of  Special  Investigations,  General 
Accounting  Office  5 

Mark  S.  Carter,  former  Michigan  National  Guard  member  21 

Detective  Michael  V.  Vaughn,  Gang  Supervisor,  Los  Angeles  Police  Depart- 
ment          23 

Lieutenant  General  Leon  E.  Salomon,  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Logistics,  De- 
partment of  the  Army  33 

Alphabetical  List  of  Witnesses 

Carter,  Mark  S.: 

Testimony  21 

Heivilin,  Donna  M.: 

Testimony  5 

Salomon,  Leon  E.: 

Testimony  33 

Vaughn,  Michael  V.: 

Testimony  23 


(III) 


GUN  VIOLENCE:  DO  STOLEN  MILITARY  PARTS 

PLAY  A  ROLE? 


THURSDAY,  NOVEMBER  18,  1993 

U.S.  Senate, 
Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs, 

Washington,  DC. 
The  Committee  met,  pursuant  to  notice,  at  10:00  a.m.,  in  room 
342,  Dirksen  Senate  Office  Building,  Hon.  John  Glenn,  Chairman 
of  the  Committee,  presiding. 

Present:  Senators  Glenn,  Levin,  Lieberman,  Akaka,  Stevens, 
Cohen,  and  Bennett. 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  CHAIRMAN  GLENN 

Chairman  Glenn.  The  hearing  will  be  in  order.  I  am  sorry  for 
the  delay  this  morning,  but  we  had  a  vote  on  the  floor. 

Nearly  70  percent  of  the  murders  in  the  U.S.  in  1992  were  due 
to  guns.  Fifteen-thousand-three-hundred-and-seventy-seven  people 
were  killed  by  gunfire  in  1992,  451  in  the  District  of  Colimibia 
alone,  many  of  those  within  just  a  few  blocks  of  where  we  are  right 
now. 

We  in  the  Congress  have  spent  the  past  several  weeks  debating 
the  causes  of  such  appalling  statistics,  trying  to  fashion  measures 
which  would  help  reduce  them.  We  have  agreed  to  add  money  to 
put  more  police  on  the  street.  We  have  debated  tougher  sentences, 
more  Federal  crimes,  additional  housing  or  prisons  for  prisoners, 
and  many  other  ideas. 

As  we  consider  these  measures,  the  entire  Nation  is  grappling 
with  the  grave  problem  of  an  increasing  violence  in  society,  and  our 
constituencies  have  told  us  that  crime  is  their  biggest  single  worry 
today. 

It  is  obvious  that  the  easy  availability  of  weapons  to  those  with 
criminal  motive  is  a  factor  in  the  increase  of  violent  crime.  Keeping 
sophisticated  weapons  out  of  the  hands  of  criminals  should  be  a  top 
priority.  That  means,  among  other  things,  that  the  largest  holder 
of  sophisticated  weapons,  the  military,  must  carry  out  its  special 
responsibility  to  keep  such  weapons  and  their  spare  parts  secure. 

GAO  has  found  that  stolen  military  weapons  parts  are  readily 
availaJDle  at  gun  shows  across  the  country.  The  presence  of  these 
parts  in  open  markets  may  be  contributing  to  the  bloodshed  which 
has  gripped  our  citizens  with  fear. 

We  are  going  to  hear  today  from  a  Los  Angeles  police  detective 
who  has  seen  this  first  hand,  military  weapons,  even  artillery,  in 
the  hands  of  criminals  on  the  streets  of  Los  Angeles. 

(1) 


I  have  here  before  me  just  some  of  the  parts  that  were  picked 
up  by  GAO  at  some  of  the  gun  shows  here,  parts  that  will  let  a 
semi-automatic  AR-15  go  into  fiill  automatic  fire,  just  with  this  lit- 
tle kit  of  parts  here  that  I  hold  in  my  hand,  so  that  you  have  a 
more  lethal  weapon,  you  have  something  that  is  highly  prized  by 
some  of  the  gangs,  and  these  are  military  parts  that  have  gotten 
out  of  the  military  system  and  are  out  there  now  to  be  used  to 
make  an  AR-15  into  a  fiiUy  automatic  weapon. 

The  presence  of  these  parts  in  open  markets  may  be  contributing 
to  the  bloodshed  that  has  gripped  our  citizens  with  fear.  You  can 
see  that  these  parts  aren't  very  large.  In  fact,  you  can  hold  all  of 
them  in  one  hand  without  any  problem. 

Past  investigations  have  found  that  the  military  wasn't  doing  a 
very  good  job  of  keeping  track  of  its  equipment,  but  today  we  are 
not  discussing  the  problem  of  just  engines  rusting  in  a  field  at  an 
Army  depot.  We  had  a  hearing  on  that  not  too  long  ago.  The  inven- 
tory problem  we  are  looking  at  today  has  more  far-reaching  and 
dangerous  implications  for  the  American  public,  especially  those 
people  who  live  in  everyday  fear  of  gun  violence. 

The  small  weapons  parts  that  I  just  showed  you  here  could  add 
a  dangerous  new  wrinkle  to  the  out-of-control  problem  of  automatic 
weapons  on  the  street.  I  would  hate  to  think  Uncle  Sam  has  be- 
come a  contributor  instead  of  the  solution  to  this  problem. 

For  example,  as  the  GAO  reports,  parts  similar  to  these  were  sto- 
len off  a  military  base  in  Michigan  and  sold  to  a  national  gun  deal- 
er. As  it  turns  out,  this  gun  dealer  has  also  been  linked  to  the  sale 
of  small  arms  parts  to  the  Branch  Davidian  religious  cult  in  Waco, 
Texas.  Could  it  be  possible  that  David  Koresh's  arsenal  was 
strengthened  by  stolen  U.S.  military  parts?  It  could  be.  I  don't  have 
the  answer  to  that  question,  but  you  can  see  that  there  are  fright- 
ening consequences  to  small  arms  parts  theft. 

At  past  hearings,  this  Committee  has  received  numerous  prom- 
ises that  the  Army  would  resolve  its  inventory  problem.  We  have 
been  hearing  this  for  3  years  now,  with  a  whole  series  of  GAO  re- 
ports. These  promises  that  the  problems  are  going  to  be  solved  are 
beginning  to  have  a  very  hollow  sound. 

The  report  we  are  releasing  today  is  the  latest  in  a  long  series 
of  GAO  reports  on  the  same  subject.  They  have  given  us  such  re- 
ports practically  every  6  months,  in  May  1990,  November  1990,  Au- 
gust 1991,  and  March  1992.  So  what  is  being  done?  Why  isn't 
something  being  done?  Why  haven't  we  corrected  this  particular 
problem?  I  certainly  hope  the  threat  of  military  hardware  our  Na- 
tion's streets  changes  this  all  talk  and  no  action  policy. 

Today  we  will  be  examining  the  issue  of  the  theft  of  small  arms 
parts  at  several  military  bases.  Several  General  Accounting  Office 
reports  issued  in  the  past  3  years  have  explored  the  problem  of 
theft  of  small  arms  at  military  bases  across  the  country.  Following 
up  on  these  reports,  I  asked  the  GAO  to  look  at  the  steps  taken 
by  the  Army  to  prevent  thefts  of  small  arms  parts  and  evaluate 
their  effectiveness. 

Today's  hearing  focuses  on  the  most  recent  GAO  report,  which 
found  that  internal  controls  were  deficient  at  the  military  sites 
they  visited.  Lax  controls  at  military  storage  facilities  have  re- 
sulted in  thefts  of  parts  by  both  military  personnel  and  civilians. 


These  lax  controls  also  raise  another  important  question.  If  these 
sensitive  gun  parts  are  leaving  military  bases,  what  about  other 
military  supplies?  We  will  hear  about  everything  from  batteries  to 
rocket  launchers  being  stolen.  This  is  indicative  of  a  major  problem 
with  security  and  with  taxpayer  funds  just  being  wasted. 

Yesterday  we  approved  the  Department  of  Defense  authorization 
bill.  How  much  of  that  money  is  going  to  be  used  to  put  oil  or  gas 
in  the  cars  of  non-military  personnel?  Not  only  is  this  shocking  be- 
cause of  the  loss  of  taxpayer  dollars  due  to  theft,  but  also  because 
the  GAO  found  that  some  of  the  parts  stolen  are  those  that  are 
used  to  convert  semi-automatic  rifles  into  automatic  machine  guns. 
Those  are  the  same  automatic  machine  guns  which  we  have  passed 
laws  to  prohibit. 

A  recent  poll  by  the  DeHere  Foundation  taken  between  October 
21  and  24  of  this  year  found  that  92  percent  of  those  surveyed  sup- 
ported a  complete  ban  on  semi-automatic  weapons.  We  have  just 
passed  an  amendment  to  the  crime  bill  which  prohibits  possession 
even  of  those  same  semi-automatic  rifles,  which  will  be  discussed 
here. 

The  GAO  report  issued  today  is  quite  definite  in  its  assessment 
of  the  military's  security  systems.  It  does  not  say  that  security  sys- 
tems could  be  tightened.  Rather,  the  report  concludes  in  strong  lan- 
guage that  the  inventory  control,  computer  tracking  systems,  and 
physical  security  of  small  arms  parts  are  so  weak  that  the  system 
appears  to  be  out  of  control.  Army  inattention  to  parts  control  has 
led  to  increased  availability  of  potentially  dangerous  parts  and  ma- 
terial with  dire  consequences. 

We  address  today  the  findings  of  the  GAO  and  what  the  Army 
intends  to  do  to  call  a  halt  to  future  theft.  Our  first  panel  today 
is  from  the  GAO.  We  look  forward  to  hearing  fi"om  Ms.  Donna 
Heivilin  of  the  GAO  about  the  important  conclusions  contained  in 
the  report. 

We  will  hear  from  Mr.  Carter,  formerly  of  the  Michigan  Guard, 
who  will  discuss  his  personal  knowledge  of  and  involvement  with 
the  weaknesses  of  the  supply  system  at  the  base  in  which  he 
worked.  It  is  ironic  that  at  the  same  time  the  District  of  Columbia 
is  attempting  to  call  upon  the  National  Guard  to  help  stem  the  vio- 
lence in  the  streets,  the  Guard  may  well  have  contributed  to  the 
problem  itself. 

We  also  have  with  us  Detective  Michael  Vaughn  of  the  Los  Ange- 
les Police  Department,  as  I  mentioned,  who  has  personal  experi- 
ence in  dealing  with  the  effect  of  military  weapons  which  hit  the 
streets  of  L.A. 

Finally,  we  will  hear  from  Lieutenant  General  Leon  Salomon 
with  the  Armys  response  to  the  GAO  report. 

This  report  today  is  very  narrowly  focused.  It  is  a  GAO  report 
we  requested  looking  into  gun  parts,  which  we  have  had  previous 
reports  on,  following  on  whether  the  situation  had  been  corrected 
or  not. 

But  I  do  not  want  anyone  to  think  that  we  are  focusing  exclu- 
sively on  gun  parts  here  today  because  it  is  part  of  a  much  broader 
problem.  There  are  larger  weapons  other  than  those  going  from  a 
semi-automatic  to  an  automatic  weapon  that  may  well  be  entering 


the  black  market,  being  sold  in  the  country,  and  being  given  to 
gangs  or  being  acquired  by  gsings. 

Even  that  becomes  a  smaller  problem  when  you  think  beyond  se- 
curity items  like  gun  parts,  to  other  items  like  shoes,  clothing,  food, 
computers,  typewriters  and  everything  else  that  may  be  going  out 
the  door,  too.  If  we  are  having  that  kind  of  a  problem  with  some- 
thing supposedly  as  secure  as  gun  parts,  then  what  is  going  on 
with  all  the  other  things  that  are  on  bases  that  people  also  can  be 
stealing  out? 

I  also  want  to  find  out  more  from  General  Salomon  since  this  is 
our  fourth  report  in  just  about  3  years,  and  yet  we  seem  to  be  just 
repeating  the  same  chapter  and  verse.  You  almost  could  just 
change  the  date-time  stamp  on  the  report  and  repeat  the  same  one. 

We  have  had  a  number  of  reports,  and  this  Committee  has 
looked  into  a  number  of  the  areas  of  waste  and  abuse  and  mis- 
handling of  government  equipment.  We  have  seen  programs  like 
"20/20"  and  "60  Minutes"  go  into  some  of  the  warehouses  and  ask 
some  very  embarrassing  questions. 

This  morning  we  are  looking  beyond  gun  parts,  to  the  much  big- 
ger issue  of  what  is  going  on  with  other  material  and  why  we  are 
not  in  a  position  to  really  correct  this. 

With  that.  Senator  Lieberman,  do  you  have  any  comments? 

OPENING  STATEMENT  OF  SENATOR  LIEBERMAN 

Senator  LlEBERMAN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  want,  very  briefly,  just  to  thank  you  and  your  staff  for  the  ex- 
traordinary work  that  has  been  done  in  bringing  this  hearing  to- 
gether and  to  thank  the  folks  at  GAG  for  their  characteristically 
high  level  of  investigation  and  analysis. 

This  hearing  brings  together  in  a  way  that  is  hard  to  com- 
prehend, really,  two  of  our  main  concerns  here  in  Congress  this 
year,  which  are  to  ferret  out  waste  in  government  and  to  make  gov- 
ernment function  more  efficiently  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  to  fight  this  outrageous  wave  of  violent  crime  that  is 
sweeping  our  country. 

The  thought  that  our  ineffectiveness  at  managing  assets  of  the 
Federal  Government,  in  this  case  military  assets,  is  contributing  to 
the  outbreak  of  violent  crime  which  threatens  our  security  is  mind- 
boggling. 

A  lot  of  us  have  been  saying  in  the  debate  on  the  crime  bill, 
which  hopefully  will  come  to  an  end  on  the  Senate  floor  today,  that 
the  American  people  face  threats  to  their  freedom  and  security 
today  from  criminals  at  home  more  than  any  that  we  face  from  for- 
eign enemies  abroad. 

It  is  really  disconcerting  and  a  shame  to  think  that  inadequacy 
in  overseeing  some  of  these  assets,  these  gun  parts  and  other 
equipment,  which  are  really  the  possession  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  is  contributing  to  our  violent  crime  problem.  It  is  the 
taxpayers  who  bought  this  equipment,  it  is  those  who  work  in  gov- 
ernment who  just  manage  or  oversee  their  use,  who  are  in  that 
sense  trustees  for  what  is  owned  by  others.  The  thought  that  the 
inadequacy  of  management  systems  on  the  part  of  the  military  is 
contributing  to  a  loss  of  security  here  at  home  is  very  troubling  in- 
deed. 


There  are  some  allegations  in  the  GAO  report  about  security 
problems  of  the  Connecticut  National  Guard  in  Hartford  and  Wind- 
sor Locks.  I  do  want  to  say  for  the  record  that  we  have  already  had 
one  outcry  from  the  IoceJ  authorities  saying  that  there  is  another 
side  to  the  story,  and  I  will  be  glad  to  hear  their  case  explained 
in  more  detail. 

In  hearings  before  this  Committee,  the  Army  has  received  the 
highest  compliments,  particularly  from  the  GAO  and  Comptroller 
General  Bowsher,  in  terms  of  its  management  overall.  That  makes 
it  doubly  troubling  to  hear  the  very  serious  direct  allegations  made 
in  the  GAO  report. 

I  hope  that  this  confrontation,  such  as  it  is,  will  lead  to  changes 
in  behavior  that  will  both  save  the  taxpayers  money  and  protect 
our  citizenry  from  crime. 

I  look  forward  to  the  testimony,  and  again,  Mr.  Chairman,  I 
thank  you  for  your  leadership  here. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much.  Senator  Lieberman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Our  first  witness  this  morning  is  Donna 
Heivilin,  Director,  Defense  Management  and  NASA  Issues,  General 
Accounting  Office,  and  with  her  are  Joan  Hawkins,  Assistant  Di- 
rector, and  Donald  Wheeler,  Deputy  Director,  Office  of  Special  In- 
vestigations. 

Ms.  Heivilin,  we  look  for  your  testimony.  Thank  you  for  being 
here. 

TESTIMONY  OF  DONNA  M.  HEIVILIN,  DIRECTOR,  DEFENSE 
MANAGEMENT  AND  NASA  ISSUES,  GENERAL  ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE;  ACCOMPANIED  BY  JOAN  HAWKINS,  ASSISTANT  DI- 
RECTOR, AND  DONALD  WHEELER,  DEPUTY  DIRECTOR,  OF- 
FICE OF  SPECIAL  INVESTIGATIONS 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the  Committee,  I  am 
pleased  to  be  here  today  to  discuss  our  review  of  the  Army's  protec- 
tion of  small  arms  parts  in  active  units  and  the  National  Guard. 
We  are  releasing  the  report  today,  and  I  am  going  to  touch  on  some 
of  the  highlights  in  my  statement. 

We  have  issued  numerous  reports,  as  you  have  pointed  out,  in 
the  past  on  various  problems  in  protecting  DOD's  inventory.  We 
have  reported  that  many  thefts  and  attempted  thefts  of  small  arms 
parts  from  the  military  supply  system,  including  those  for  the  mili- 
tary M16  rifle,  have  been  (Hscovered.  The  common  thread  in  all  of 
these  thefts  is  that  military  personnel  have  been  involved  and  the 
discovery  of  the  thefts  was  accidental. 

The  review  I  am  discussing  today  is  the  third  we  have  conducted 
in  a  series  on  the  protection  of  small  arms  parts.  In  1990,  we 
looked  at  the  New  York  National  Guard  and  we  found  that  its  in- 
ternal controls  and  physical  security  over  small  arms  parts  was  in- 
adequate to  prevent  theft. 

In  July  1991,  we  reported  on  an  examination  of  the  small  arms 
parts  at  four  Army  supply  depots.  We  found  large  and  consistent 
losses  at  the  Red  River  Depot.  At  three  of  the  four  depots,  we  re- 
ported that  the  security  was  generally  targeted  toward  theft  by 
outsiders  and  not  targeted  toward  employee  theft. 

During  this  most  recent  review,  we  helped  uncover  previously 
undetected  thefts  of  smgdl  arms  parts  by  National  Guardsmen  at 


the  Michigan  Army  National  Guard,  one  of  the  six  active  Army  and 
Army  National  Guard  sites  that  we  examined. 

The  Guardsman,  who  you  will  hear  from  later  this  morning,  had 
been  previously  assigned  to  the  repair  parts  section  of  the  ware- 
house and  admitted  to  us  that  he  had  stolen  small  arms  parts  for 
at  least  5  years.  After  stealing  the  parts,  he  sold  them  to  a  national 
gun  dealer  who  has  been  connected  to  the  sale  of  small  arms  parts 
to  the  Branch  Davidian  religious  sect  in  Waco,  Texas. 

The  thefts  had  gone  undetected  for  years  because  of  inattentive 
management  and  the  lack  of  basic  checks  on  the  ordering  and  han- 
dling of  parts,  that  is,  internal  controls.  The  lack  of  controls  at  all 
six  sites  we  examined  invite  theft. 

As  an  indicator  of  the  pervasiveness  of  these  thefts  is  that  mili- 
tary small  arms  parts  are  readily  available  to  the  public  at  gun 
shows  across  the  U.S.  Neither  the  manufacturers  nor  the  govern- 
ment sells  these  parts  to  the  public.  Consequently,  it  is  likely  they 
were  stolen  from  the  military  supply  system  or  the  manufacturer. 

We  visited  gun  shows  in  six  States  to  determine  the  availability 
of  military  small  arms  parts.  In  all  six  States,  we  purchased  small 
arms  parts,  some  in  government  packaging,  including  the  magazine 
clip  in  the  picture  that  you  have  before  you,  and  in  five  States  we 
were  able  to  buy  some  or  all  of  the  six  smgdl  arms  parts  necessary 
to  convert  a  semi-automatic  civiligm  rifle,  the  AR15,  to  the  equiva- 
lent of  a  fully  automatic  military  M16.  These  parts  are  shown  in 
a  picture  that  we  are  going  to  put  up  here  in  a  minute.  They  in- 
clude the  bolt  carrier,  the  hammer,  the  trigger,  the  sear,  the  selec- 
tor, and  the  disconnector. 

We  bought  military  small  arms  parts  at  13  of  15  gun  shows  that 
we  attended.  We  brought  some  of  the  parts  with  us  today  so  you 
can  see  them,  and  Senator  Glenn,  you  have  some  parts.  Maybe  we 
can  make  other  parts  available  to  Senator  Lieberman. 

I  also  want  to  point  out  that  we  brought  with  us  a  round  for  the 
M16  today.  It  is  a  round  that  is  armor-piercing.  We  bought  this  at 
one  of  the  gun  shows.  We  had  a  lot  of  trouble  getting  just  one  or 
two  rounds.  The  gun  dealer  wanted  to  sell  a  thousand  or  thousands 
of  rounds.  They  didn't  want  to  sell  one  or  two.  When  our  GAG 
auditor  was  persistent  and  bought  some  of  these  other  parts,  then 
the  gun  dealer  finally  said,  well,  I  will  sell  you  one  or  two.  I  am 
going  to  pass  this,  too.  You  can  tell  that  it  is  armor-piercing  be- 
cause of  the  green  tip. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Was  this  ammunition  still  in  government  con- 
tainers? This  wasn't  manufactured 

Ms.  Heivilin.  It  was  in  the  green  U.S.  Army  box  with  the  NSN 
marking  on  it.  We  didn't  buy  a  whole  box,  so  we  don't  have  that 
to  show  you.  We  were  told  that  it  was  from  the  Saudi  theater,  fresh 
from  the  Saudi  theater. 

Also  one  of  the  things  that  I  should  comment  to  you  on  is  that 
in  buying  that  round,  the  display  at  the  table  had  a  metal  plate 
there  that  showed  that  the  round  would  cut  cleanly  through  the 
metal  plate,  whereas  the  regular  type  of  round  would  just  damage 
the  plate  but  it  would  not  cut  cleanly  through.  The  plate  was  clear- 
ly there  on  display  showing  what  this  armor-piercing  round  would 
do. 


Considering  that  there  are  thousands  of  nationwide  gun  shows 
annually,  the  ready  availability  of  these  parts  is  alarming.  One  of 
the  other  things  I  brought  for  you  to  look  at  is  copies  of  "Shotgun 
News".  These  are  November  issues.  You  can  see  just  how  many 
shows  there  are,  how  many  people  there  are  that  sell,  and  the 
parts  that  we  bought  are  advertised  in  some  of  the  advertisements. 
I  think  I  have  clipped  the  pages  with  those  advertisements  so  you 
can  see  that  they  are  still  readily  available. 

I  would  like  to  turn  now  to  the  particular  theft  that  we  discov- 
ered at  the  Michigan  National  Guard.  The  thefts  were  discovered 
because  we  asked  site  officials  to  review  requisitions  for  small  arms 
parts.  The  site  officials  then  became  aware  that  some  shops  were 
ordering  small  arms  parts  that  they  were  not  authorized  to  use. 
Further  investigation  pointed  to  a  Guardsman,  who  later  admitted 
the  theft.  He  recently  plead  guilty  to  charges  of  stealing  govern- 
ment property.  A  second  Michigan  Guardsman  who  worked  in  the 
repair  shop  has  also  admitted  to  stealing  small  arms  parts. 

We  have  here  a  chart  showing  how  the  general  flow  of  repair 
parts  in  DOD  is  set  up.  The  supply  depots  that  you  see  there  are 
the  depots  such  as  Red  River  Depot,  which  was  the  system  that  we 
reported  on  in  1991.  The  first  Guardsman  was  assigned  to  the 
warehouse  at  an  installation  and  the  second  was  assigned  to  the 
repair  shop. 

At  Fort  Campbell,  Kentucky,  one  of  the  other  sites  in  our  study, 
the  theft  of  about  $80,000  in  government  property,  including  small 
arms  parts,  was  discovered  only  because  the  vehicle  carrying  the 
stolen  property  from  Fort  Campbell  was  stopped  for  a  minor  traffic 
violation  by  off-base  police. 

At  all  six  sites  we  visited,  basic  checks  to  protect  military  small 
arms  parts  from  theft  were  deficient  in  some  form.  For  example, 
the  thefts  by  the  Michigan  National  Guardsmen  remained  hidden 
in  part  because  key  supply  and  repair  duties  were  not  separated, 
physical  security  was  lax,  and  the  computer  system  could  be  easily 
used  to  hide  the  theft. 

In  addition,  management  officials  at  this  and  other  sites  had  not 
monitored  supply  and  repedr  operations  as  they  should  have.  They 
had  not  reviewed  requisitions  on  a  regular  basis,  and  they  did  not 
ensure  that  the  inventory  was  accounted  for. 

None  of  these  problems  were  cited  as  material  weaknesses  in  the 
Financial  Integrity  Act  reports  that  we  reviewed.  At  the  Georgia 
Army  National  Guard,  we  found  that  the  Financial  Integrity  Act 
reports  lacked  supporting  review  or  check  analysis.  The  fact  that 
the  Michigan  Guardsmen  could  steal  parts  for  over  5  years  without 
detection  also  raises  questions  about  the  validity  of  these  reports. 

One  of  the  major  problems  we  found  at  five  of  the  sites  we  exam- 
ined was  that  key  duties  are  not  separated.  The  Michigan  Guards- 
men who  stole  small  arms  parts  had  access  to  the  computer  system 
that  was  used  to  order  and  track  repair  parts  and  physical  access 
to  the  parts  in  the  warehouse.  As  a  result,  he  could  initiate  orders 
for  parts  in  the  computer  and  take  the  actual  parts  fi'om  the  ware- 
house with  ease. 

Similarly,  at  the  Georgia  and  Michigan  guards,  supply  personnel 
assigned  to  the  maintenance  supply  office  had  both  record  keeping 
and  parts  handling  responsibilities. 


8 

Finally,  at  repair  shops  at  Fort  Benning,  Campbell,  and  Sill,  the 
same  person  who  was  inspecting  weapons  for  needed  repairs  deter- 
mined the  parts  that  were  needed  and  repsdred  the  weapons.  These 
situations  invite  theft. 

Another  problem  we  identified  at  five  of  the  sites  was  that  the 
reviews  of  requisitions  for  repair  parts  were  lax  and  sometimes 
nonexistent.  We  could  not  tell  about  reviews  at  the  sixth  site,  Fort 
Benning,  because  data  wasn't  available  there. 

Requisitions  for  small  arms  parts  are  not  routinely  reviewed  to 
determine  if  the  orders  are  authorized.  We  found  that  lower-level 
repair  shops  requisitioned  small  arms  parts  for  repairs  that  they 
were  not  authorized  to  do. 

At  five  sites  where  the  data  was  available,  some  requisition  for 
eight  of  the  ten  small  arms  parts  that  we  tested  were  unauthor- 
ized. This  indicates  that  parts  are  probably  being  stolen  at  all  the 
sites  we  examined,  since  the  Michigan  Guardsman  used  this  weak- 
ness to  cover  up  his  thefts.  Some  of  the  unauthorized  requisitions 
were  for  three  of  the  six  parts  needed  to  m£ike  a  fully  automatic 
weapon. 

At  all  six  sites,  we  found  inventory  controls  were  inadequate  and 
sometimes  nonexistent.  In  our  review,  we  fi-equently  found  repair 
parts  which  were  unaccounted  for  and  inventory  documentation 
that  was  incomplete.  We  found  small  arms  parts  in  repair  shops 
that  were  not  authorized  or  on  any  parts  list. 

As  a  result  of  our  visit,  personnel  at  Fort  Sill  turned  in  as  excess 
over  $37,000  in  sensitive  and  high-dollar-value  small  arms  parts 
that  were  not  on  any  authorized  parts  list. 

At  the  Connecticut  Army  National  Guard,  we  found  46  machine 
gun  barrels  worth  over  $38,000  that  were  not  on  any  inventory 
records  and  had  been  stored  for  over  9  months. 

Inventory  documentation  was  incomplete  at  three  sites.  Inven- 
tory adjustments  at  the  Michigan  Guard  were  made  without  any 
review  or  approval  at  a  higher  level.  The  Georgia  Guard  could  not 
find  the  inventory  adjustment  form  for  us,  and  the  Connecticut 
Guard  adjusted  its  inventory  records  before  the  higher-level  review 
and  approval  took  place. 

Throughout  our  review,  we  found  that  physical  security  at  the 
supply  and  repair  operations  we  visited  was,  for  the  most  part,  in- 
adequate to  protect  small  arms  parts  and  other  government  prop- 
erty. Deficiencies  included  poor  controls  over  access  to  the  facilities 
and  improper  security  of  small  arms  parts. 

For  example,  employees  at  several  sites  were  allowed  to  park 
their  automobiles  near  open  bay  doors,  fences  had  holes  large 
enough  for  a  person  to  crawl  through,  guards  were  not  assigned  to 
gates,  and  warehouse  doors  were  usually  left  open  and  unattended. 
We  have  a  picture  showing  a  gap  in  the  perimeter  fence  gate  at 
the  Michigan  National  Guard.  One  night  in  early  1992,  security 
personnel  caught  three  people  entering  the  site  through  the  gap 
under  this  gate. 

In  addition,  sensitive  and  pilferable  items  were  frequently  stored 
with  other  items  or  not  properly  secured.  At  Fort  Campbell,  for  ex- 
ample, nine  squad  assault  weapon  barrels  were  outside  the  locked 
caged  area  where  they  should  have  been  stored.  At  Fort  Benning, 


9 

rifle  barrels  were  stacked  under  an  open  window  where  they  could 
be  stolen  by  anyone  walking  outside  the  building. 

We  have  a  picture  here  that  shows  the  maintenance  supply  area 
at  the  Michigan  Guard  where  sensitive  small  arms  parts  are  stored 
on  the  second  floor  behind  a  locked  door.  However,  as  our  picture 
shows  and  I  saw  a  couple  of  weeks  ago,  part  of  this  area  is  open 
and  can  be  reached  by  climbing  on  cabinets. 

Finally,  I  want  to  discuss  the  fact  that  the  Army's  automated 
systems  can  be  used  to  hide  theft.  There  are  serious  vulnerabilities 
in  the  computer  system  used  by  the  Michigan  National  Guard 
which  enabled  the  Guardsman  to  steal  parts.  For  example,  he  had 
complete  access  to  the  system  and  could  issue  sensitive  commands 
reserved  for  the  warehouse  systems  manager. 

In  addition,  a  flawed  batch  entry  process  at  the  site  and  inad- 
equate system  controls  aided  him  in  manipulating  small  arms 
parts  orders.  For  example,  he  was  able  to  order  and  receive  parts 
and  erase  the  record  of  this  transaction  in  the  computer.  There 
were  many  other  ways  he  could  use  the  computer  system  to  steal 
small  arms  parts.  Officials  at  the  Michigan  Guard  believe  that  such 
system  vulnerabilities  could  lead  to  theft  in  any  Army  organization 
using  this  system. 

In  our  report,  we  make  recommendations  to  the  Secretary  of  De- 
fense and  the  Secretary  of  the  Army.  Basically,  they  cover  changes 
needed  in  the  computer  system  plus  the  need  to  enforce  their  regu- 
lations dealing  with  the  financial  integrity  act,  physical  security, 
and  internal  checks  and  controls. 

I  would  also  like  to  emphasize  the  need  for  attention  to  the  atti- 
tude. Even  though  the  costs  of  the  parts  we  are  discussing  today 
is  not  high,  they  can  be  used  to  create  dangerous  weapons.  The 
people  in  these  military  organizations  need  to  understand  that  this 
inventory  is  theirs  to  protect,  not  to  take. 

Before  I  conclude,  I  would  like  to  thank  the  U.S.  Attorney's  Of- 
fice of  the  Western  District  of  Michigan  and  the  FBI  in  the  Detroit 
Division  for  their  cooperation  with  our  Office  of  Special  Investiga- 
tion agents  and  our  evaluators.  They  made  this  work  possible. 

Also,  I  want  to  point  out  that  locally,  the  Army  and  the  Army 
National  Guard  units  we  examined  have  taken  actions  on  some  of 
the  physical  security  problems  that  we  found. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  concludes  my  statement.  I  welcome  any  ques- 
tions you  or  members  of  the  Committee  may  have. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much.  We  appreciate  your  tes- 
timony. 

I  would  like  to  ask  first,  how  did  you  select  these  sites?  Were 
there  some  indications  of  problems  at  these  sites,  or  were  these 
sites  selected  at  random? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  had  a  hypothesis  going  in  that  if  there  were 
high  support  costs  for  the  amount  of  weapons  that  were  at  a  site, 
that  if  that  was  the  case  and  there  were  other  vulnerabilities,  then 
there  was  opportunity  for  theft.  However,  we  didn't  select  just  sites 
that  looked  like  that.  We  tried  to  select  sites  based  on  a  geographi- 
cal dispersion.  We  actually  selected  some  sites  where  there  were 
low  support  costs  to  make  sure  that  there  wasn't  a  difference,  and 
we  selected  Army  units  that  had  different  missions.  We  selected 


10 

Fort  Sill  because  it  was  artillery,  Fort  Benning  because  of  training, 
and  Fort  Campbell  because  it  was  infantry  support. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Some  of  the  bases  were  regular  Army  bases 
and  some  were  National  Guard  or  reserve  bases,  right? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Right,  three  of  each,  regular  Army  and  National 
Guard. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Was  there  a  major  difference  between  those 
that  were  regular  active  duty  bases  as  opposed  to  National  Guard? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  No,  there  wasn't.  We  found  the  same 
vulnerabilities  in  all  of  the  sites  we  looked  at.  There  is  some  vari- 
ation among  every  site,  but  we  saw  enough  vulnerabilities  to  make 
us  very  concerned  every  place  we  went. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Your  investigation  was  strictly  limited  to  gun 
parts?  Some  of  the  testimony  later  will  show  a  huge  rise  in  order- 
ing of  C  and  D  cell  batteries,  for  instance,  just  before  the  holidays, 
with  testimony  that  many  of  these  batteries  wind  up  in  kids'  toys 
during  the  holiday  season.  That  could  be  what  the  testimony  will 
be  a  little  bit  later  on. 

Did  you  look  into  things  like  that? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  No,  we  didn't.  This  kind  of  investigation  takes  a 
lot  of  time  on  the  part  of  auditors.  It  is  a  very  labor-intensive  in- 
vestigation. We  selected  the  small  arms  parts  that  you  could  use 
to  convert  to  automatic  weapons  because  we  thought  if  there  was 
anything  you  would  want  to  protect  and  control,  those  kinds  of 
parts  are  the  ones  that  you  would  want  to  make  sure  weren't  out 
on  the  street. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  agree  with  that,  and  I  would  think  these 
would  be  among  the  things  that  would  be  more  protected.  I  think 
the  other  things,  I  don't  know  what  kind  of  loss  of  materiel  we  can 
expect  when  we  get  into  these  other  areas,  but  it  must  be  enor- 
mous if  the  security  areas  like  weapons  parts  are  stolen  as  they  ap- 
parently are. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  have  looked  before  this  particular  study  on  the 
overall  opportunity  for  theft,  and  we  do  think  overall  there  are 
weaknesses  and  opportunity  for  theft  of  all  the  property. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  have  had  hearings  on  that  before  here, 
too,  and  we  got  into  all  sorts  of  things.  Over  the  past,  I  suppose, 
3  years  or  so,  I  must  have  personally  conducted  35  or  40  hearings 
on  different  things  in  the  military,  not  all  Army,  but  different  mili- 
tary areas  of  waste. 

I  think  sometimes  maybe  our  people  over  in  the  Pentagon  turn 
over  too  rapidly.  I  used  to  think  that  was  not  the  case.  I  used  to 
think  we  ought  to  rotate  as  many  people  through  so  we  got  some 
experience  over  there,  but  I  sometimes  think  now  they  are  not 
there  long  enough. 

Here  we  are  with  four  reports  in  3  years  and  very  little,  if  any- 
thing, having  been  done  about  it.  You  are  just  hitting  the  tip  of  the 
iceberg  here,  on  gun  parts,  and  I  am  sure  we  are  going  to  want  to 
look  into  some  of  these  other  areas  a  little  bit  later  on.  People 
sometimes  come  in  over  there  and  they  put  in  their  time  there  and 
they  can  say:  "It  didn't  happen  on  their  watch". 

Somebody  new  comes  in  and  they  are  not  as  cognizant  of  what 
the  testimony  over  here  has  been  or  what  has  been  found  before. 


11 

so  it  sort  of  passes  from  one  person  to  another  without  the  situa- 
tion really  being  corrected.  I  don't  know  what  we  do  about  that,  but 
I  think  that  is  one  of  our  problems. 

In  your  testimony,  you  mention  the  incomplete  inventory  docu- 
mentation you  found  at  all  six  sites.  I  would  think  that  would  be 
key,  because  unless  you  have  an  inventory  showing  what  is  sup- 
posed to  be  there,  what  the  need  is,  what  the  inventory  is,  you 
have  difficulty  in  tracking  down  what  is  missing,  is  that  correct? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  think  that  it  does  a  number  of  things.  It  invites 
theft  because  the  people  working  with  the  inventory  know  that  no 
one  knows  exactly  how  much  they  have  and  so  it  won't  be  missed. 
Also,  if  you  have  a  lot  of  inventory  but  you  don't  know  you  have 
a  lot  of  inventory,  you  are  likely  to  order  more  inventory,  which 
creates  some  of  the  excesses  that  we  have  different  places. 

Also,  one  of  the  things  we  have  seen  is  that  when  policemen  stop 
people  that  have  stolen  inventory  at  their  cars,  then  they  have 
trouble  documenting  that  back  in  the  base  from  which  the  inven- 
tory was  stolen.  The  policemen  might  go  back  to  the  base  and  say, 
hey,  we  have  apprehended  this  person  and  they  had  property  that 
looks  like  its  yours,  and  then  the  particular  base  can't  verify  that 
it  was  theirs  because  their  inventory  records  aren't  very  good. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  have  personally  been  involved,  I  believe, 
with  several  of  these  investigations  in  the  past  over  several  years, 
is  that  correct? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Yes,  I  have.  I  have  been  involved  in  all  of  the  ones 
that  we  have  talked  about  today,  the  New  York  National  Guard, 
the  one  in  which  we  looked  at  the  wholesale  system  and  our  job 
on  overall  theft. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Going  back  to  1990,  or  before  that? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Right. 

Chairman  GLENN.  Nineteen-ninety? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Right. 

Chairman  Glenn.  In  what  you  have  seen  recently,  have  you  seen 
any  improvement  in  inventory  control  or  security  of  equipment,  or 
has  it  gone  along  just  about  the  same  as  what  you  ran  into  3  years 
ago? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  can't  say  I  haven't  seen  any  improvements. 
Where  we  have  pointed  out  particular  physical  security 
vulnerabilities  at  a  particular  site,  usually  the  commander  will 
then  fix  that  particular  thing  that  we  point  out.  But  that  makes 
me  kind  of  worried,  because  we  can't  be  everyplace  and  we  can't 
be  pointing  out  everything. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  have  just  one  other  thing,  too.  You  didn't  ad- 
dress foreign  sedes.  Some  of  these  gun  parts  or  guns  of  a  type  like 
this,  M16s  and  so  on,  we  have  sold  literally  millions  of  all  over  the 
world.  Is  there  any  indication  that  some  of  these  parts  are  coming 
back  in  from  non-U. S.  sources? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  have  not  seen  any  indication  of  that.  That 
doesn't  mean  it  is  not  happening,  but  we  are  not  aware  that  that 
is  what  is  happening. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  weren't  specifically  looking  for  stolen  am- 
munition or  following  that  lead  up  on  this,  were  you?  You  were 
looking  mainly  at  gun  parts? 


12 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  were  looking  mainly  at  gun  parts.  It  was  just 
that  our  GAO  auditor  saw  so  much  ammunition  and  saw  ammuni- 
tion for  the  M16  in  government  wrappings  and  government  con- 
tainers and  decided  to  buy  some  of  it. 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  they  wanted  to  sell  you 

Ms.  Heivilin.  He  said  that  it  was  at  many  of  the  tables,  and 
there  were  thousands  of  rounds. 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  they  wanted  to  sell  you  cases  of  ammuni- 
tion instead  of  singles? 
Ms.  Heivilin.  Right. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you.  My  time  is  up  on  this  round. 
Senator  Lieberman? 

Senator  Lieberman.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 
Ms.  HeiviHn,  most  of  the  cases  of  theft  that  you  describe  involve 
Army  or  National  Guard  personnel  as  opposed  to  civilians.  I  want 
to  clarify  whether  you  see  this  as  largely  an  internal  problem  of 
theft  or  whether  there  is  also  a  problem  because  of  some  of  the 
carelessness  that  the  report  portrays  of  civihans  coming  on  base  to 
steal  parts. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  think  there  are  both  civilians  and  military  per- 
sonnel involved.  In  the  cases  that  we  know  about,  both  are  in- 
volved. But  it  is  a  threat,  in  our  eyes,  of  internal  security  because 
the  thefts  are  employees. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  In  other  words,  even  the  civilians  are  em- 
ployees? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Right.  They  aren't  from  outside  of  the  base.  Some- 
times a  person  who  is  a  civilian  employee  from  another  part  of  the 
base  might  get  involved  with  someone  who  is  working  in  the  supply 
system,  but  they  are  employees  of  the  base  in  the  cases  we  have 
seen. 

Senator  Lieberman.  So  it  is  the  rare  case,  at  least  in  your  inves- 
tigation, where  thieves  totally  unassociated  with  the  military  facil- 
ity break  in  and  steal  parts  because  of  the  laxity  of  security  there. 
Ms.  Heivilin.  That  is  right.  We  don't  see  much  of  that.  It  does 
happen  and  there  are  some  incidences,  but  we  think  the  major  vul- 
nerability is  inside. 

Senator  Lieberman.  OK.  There  is  a  suggestion  here,  and  one  of 
the  later  witnesses  may  be  in  a  position  to  answer  it,  but  I  am  curi- 
ous about  your  response  to  it.  We  are  confronting  in  street  crime 
today  this  extraordinary  spread  and  organization  of  gangs  operat- 
ing like  the  classic  organized  crime  families,  even  worse  in  many 
ways. 

My  question  is  whether  you  find  any  indication  of  either  gang 
members  working  at  military  facilities,  either  in  uniform  or  as  ci- 
vilians, or  of  gangs  attempting  to  create  contacts  with  military  or 
civilian  employees  of  the  government  in  pursuit  of  acquiring  gun 
parts  or  other  weapons. 
Ms.  Heivilin.  We  haven't  seen  any  evidence  of  that. 
Senator  Lieberman.  You  describe  a  National  Guard  study  which 
concluded  that  there  was  no  widespread  problem  with  theft  of 
parts.  Did  you  ascertain  the  basis  for  that  conclusion? 

Ms.  Hawkins.  That  was  just  a  study  where  when  the  theft  in 
Michigan  was  identified,  they  sent  a  memo  around  to  their  Na- 
tional Guard  sites  and  said  we  would  like  you  to  look  at  this  and 


13 

see  if  there  is  a  problem.  The  answer  came  back,  we  don't  have  any 
problem.  But  it  was  not  a  detailed  study,  it  was  responses  to  a 
memo. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  I  see.  Maybe  you  can  clarify  the  reference, 
then,  on  page  37  of  the  report  about  the  National  Guard  bureau 
destro3dng  some  documents  that  were  part  of  a  review.  I  am  not 
clear. 

Ms.  Hawkins.  That  was  when  they  got  the  responses  to  this 
memo  that  they  sent.  When  the  responses  came  back  after  they 
looked  at  it  and  said  there  is  no  problem,  they  threw  away  the  re- 
sponses. 

Senator  Lieberman.  So  you  were  not  concerned  about  that  docu- 
ment destruction? 

Ms.  Hawkins.  We  would  have  liked  to  have  seen  those  docu- 
ments. However,  once  they  were  destroyed,  there  wasn't  much  we 
could  do  about  it. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Right. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  would  have  liked  to  have  seen  the  actual  re- 
sponses from  the  various  Guards,  but  they  didn't  have  them. 

Senator  Lieberman.  But  you  didn't  conclude  that  there  was  any 
reason  to  suspect  the  report,  or  were  you  not  in  a  position  to  con- 
clude either  way? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  are  not  in  a  position  to  conclude  either  way. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Generally,  you  have  described  a  kind  of  cli- 
mate that — and  I  don't  mean  to  put  words  into  your  mouth  or  into 
the  report,  but  my  reading  of  it  suggests  that  there  is  failure  at  the 
leadership  level  here  to  create  an  environment  that  is  intolerant  of 
theft. 

Is  that  a  fair  description,  and  could  you  just  talk  about  it  a  little 
bit  more? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  think  it  is  more  that  they  don't  believe  that  they 
have  much  theft,  or  in  the  past  they  have  not  believed  that  there 
was  much  theft. 

Senator  Lieberman.  That  the  Army  and  National  Guard  leader- 
ship doesn't  believe  there  is  a  serious  problem? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  And  when  I  say  that,  I  am  talking  DOD-wide. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Right. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  When  we  have  published  reports  on  theft,  the  re- 
sponses that  we  have  gotten  back  from  DOD  is  that  GAO  has  over- 
stated the  problem,  that  we  don't  understand,  that  the  theft  is  real- 
ly very  small,  it  is  not  significant,  it  is  not  a  problem  worth  the 
kind  of  effort  that  we  are  suggesting  that  they  should  apply  to  it. 

Senator  Lieberman.  Clearly,  you  would  say  that  your  findings 
generally — I  must  say  that  I  am  impressed  by  the  fact  that  at  each 
one  of  the  gun  shows  you  went  to  you  found  what  you  took  to  be 
real  U.S.  military  parts.  I  take  it  the  shows  that  you  went  to  were 
randomly  selected,  there  was  no  particular  reason  why  they  should 
have  been  more  likely 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  simply  selected  them  because  they  were  avail- 
able during  the  time  frame  that  we  were  going  to  gun  shows.  We 
tried  to  go  to  gun  shows  geographically  across  the  United  States. 

We  also  had  the  Army's  experts  at  Rock  Island,  Illinois,  look  at 
the  parts  that  we  bought.  Some  of  the  parts  we  bought  weren't 
military,  but  most  of  what  we  bought,  we  thought  were  military  or 


74-427    0-94 


14 

was  represented  to  us  as  military,  and  the  expert  at  Rock  Island 
Arsenal  said  yes,  they  were  military.  To  verify  the  parts  as  mili- 
tary, he  looked  at  the  markings  and  he  looked  at  the  particular 
parts. 

Senator  Lieberman.  To  just  echo  the  Chsdrman,  it  does  seem  to 
me  that  this  report  really  cries  out  for  some  response  from  the  Pen- 
tagon. If,  in  fact,  as  you  describe  it,  there  is  a  sincere,  but  accord- 
ing to  your  own  conclusions,  misinformed  opinion  that  theft  of  mili- 
tary parts  is  not  a  problem,  it  seems  to  me  after  your  report  the 
burden  is  certainly  on  the  Pentagon  to  justify  that  conclusion,  or 
their  conclusion  that  it  is  not  a  problem,  or  to  take  aggressive  ac- 
tion to  stop  the  problem. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Can  I  take  a  minute  and  point  out,  one  of  the 
problems  in  trying  to  stop  this  kind  of  theft  is  because  there  are 
thousands  of  places  it  can  occur.  The  Army  has  the  kind  of  units 
that  we  are  talking  about  at  thousands  of  locations  across  the 
world  and  across  the  United  States.  Also,  often  the  stolen  amounts 
are  small,  and  the  value,  the  absolute  value,  is  very,  very  small. 
The  DOD  has  just  a  finite  number  of  investigators,  and  when 
they  respond  to  us  about  this  theft  they  say  it  isn't  a  major  prob- 
lem because  the  losses  that  are  documented  in  criminal  investiga- 
tions are  relatively  small.  Well,  they  are  small  because  these  things 
don't  cost  much.  They  are  also  small  because  it  is  usually  a  small 
amount  taken  over  a  long  period  of  time,  not  like  the  huge  amount 
that  you  would  get  if  you  had  contract  fraud  or  procurement  fraud. 
So  it  takes  a  lot  more  effort  to  find  and  it  is  a  lot  harder  to  docu- 
ment and  a  lot  harder  to  prosecute. 

Senator  LiEBERMAN.  That  is  a  good  point,  but  obviously  it  all 
adds  up  cumulatively,  and  even  if  it  doesn't  add  up  cumulatively, 
if  this  theft  is  ending  up  in  the  hands  of  street  criminals,  then  it 
is  having  a  disastrous  effect  on  people. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  think  that  is  all  the  more  reason  that  you  need 
to  work  on  the  attitudes,  since  it  is  very  hard  to  prevent  all  of  the 
stealing  that  could  take  place  in  so  many  places,  then  the  attitude 
towards  it  is  probably  your  first  line  of  defense. 
Senator  LiEBERMAN.  Thank  you. 
Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 
Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Bennett? 
Senator  BENNETT.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 
I  don't  have  any  earth-shattering  questions  for  the  witness.  I  am 
impressed  by  her  testimony.  I  do  have  an  observation  coming  out 
of  my  background  in  the  business  world.  If  you  were  in  retailing, 
we  would  call  this  shrinkage,  and  virtually  every  retailer  knows 
that  shrinkage  is  a  problem  and  that  more  shopUfting  occurs  from 
employees  than  it  does  from  customers. 

So  every  retailer  sets  about  to  put  into  place  some  kind  of  con- 
trols to  prevent  it,  not  because  the  amount  of  money  is  that  large, 
although  in  some  circumstances  it  can  be,  but  because  of  the  corro- 
sive culture  that  it  creates  among  the  employees  if  this  is  allowed 
to  go  on. 

I  think  in  response  to  your  question  to  Senator  Lieberman,  the 
Pentagon  should  be  made  to  understand  that  this  corrosive  culture 
is  worth  a  lot  of  money,  not  just  in  this  circumstance  but  all  across 
the  board,  in  the  way  employees  of  the  Pentagon,  employees  of  the 


15 

defense  establishment  respond  to  their  jobs  and  their  responsibil- 
ities. 

If  you  get  into  this  kind  of  a  culture,  this  means  you  go  home 
a  half-hour  early  every  day,  and  then  pretty  soon  you  are  taking 
45  minutes  extra  for  lunch.  Nobody  cares.  It  is  not  a  big  amount 
of  money.  The  overall  impact  of  this  on  the  efficiency  and  effective- 
ness of  an  organization  is  very  serious,  and  every  management  ex- 
pert who  has  ever  studied  it  knows  that. 

That  is  why  retailers  go  to  such  effort  to  stop  shrinkage,  regard- 
less of  the  amount  of  money  involved  in  the  sweater  that  is  taken 
home  or  the  bra  that  is  stolen  or  the  pair  of  kids'  shoes  that  dis- 
appear. It  is  the  other  thing  that  is  far  more  important  than  the 
value  of  the  goods. 

So  I  would  hope  out  of  this  hearing  we  could  send  a  very  strong 
message  that  says  we  are  not  interested  in  a  clear  dollar  and  cent 
accounting  of  the  monetary  value  of  this  part  or  that  part,  but  we 
are  very  interested  in  the  corrosive  nature  of  the  culture  that  says 
you  can  steal  at  random. 

This  is  a  pervasive  problem.  It  exists  every  place  where  people 
are  employed.  I  once  worked  for  Howard  Hughes  in  the  days  when 
he  owned  the  casinos,  and  there  our  inventory  was  cash.  You  can 
understand  that  we  took  shrinkage  very  seriously  in  dealing  with 
gambling  casinos.  And  once  again,  it  was  not  just  the  cash,  it  was 
the  mindset  of  our  employees  that  said,  when  you  work  here,  you 
don't  steal.  You  don't  steal  time,  you  don't  steal  cash,  you  don't 
steal  any  kind  of  thing,  except  in  the  hotels  we  did  encourage  the 
customers  to  steal  the  ash  trays  because  they  were  advertising  and 
they  would  take  them  home  and  show  them  off  to  their  friends. 

But  we  are  not  talking  about  ash  trays  here.  We  are  talking 
about  assault  weapons  that  could  get  on  the  street,  and  I  simply 
wanted  to  make  this  statement,  Mr.  Chairman,  so  that  no  one  in 
the  Pentagon  would  misunderstand  if  they  are  addressing  the  issue 
of  the  value  of  the  things  in  the  way  you  described.  We  are  talking 
about  a  culture  that  is  very  important,  and  every  other  manage- 
ment organization  in  the  country  in  business  understands  the  link 
between  this  kind  of  theft  and  the  culture,  and  the  Pentagon  ought 
to  understand  it,  too. 

Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much. 

Senator  Akaka? 

Senator  Akaka.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  am  delighted  to  hear  my  colleague,  Senator  Bennett,  talk  about 
the  corrosive  culture  that  is  so  important  and  basic  to  this  issue. 
By  your  testimony,  Ms.  Heivilin,  you  have  indicated  that  lax  con- 
trol, laxity  in  property  inventory,  and  the  lack  of  basic  checks  con- 
tributes to  this.  Also,  you  know  that  parts  are  missing  and  you 
know  that  it  is  an  inside  job. 

Knowing  all  of  this,  you  have  come  across  with  some  rec- 
ommendations. What  has  happened  to  these  recommendations? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  For  the  recommendations  for  the  current  report, 
DOD  hasn't  had  time  to  do  anything  yet  except  at  the  particular 
units  we  were  at,  when  we  pointed  out  physical  security  things  or 
we  pointed  out  parts  that  weren't  under  control,  those  things  were 
taken  care  of  usually. 


16 

The  Pentagon  has  started,  though,  to  look  at  the  computer  sys- 
tem. They  have  sent  some  of  their  people  over  to  talk  to  our  com- 
puter expert  and  that  conversation  will  continue  to  evolve.  We  are 
committed  to  helping  them.  We  have  also  offered,  and  they  have 
said  they  are  going  to  take  us  up  on,  having  our  auditors  sit  down 
and  talk  to  them  about  everything  we  saw.  Obviously,  we  don't  get 
everything  into  a  report.  We  have  stacks  and  stacks  of  work  papers 
that  have  a  lot  more  detail  than  what  we  put  in  the  report. 

But  going  back  to  the  report  we  did  on  the  New  York  National 
Guard,  there  we  made  some  recommendations  in  1990.  There  are 
changes  that  still  have  not  come  out  but  are  supposed  to  come  out 
next  month  in  a  regulation.  It  seems  to  take  an  awful  long  time 
for  that  kind  of  thing  to  happen.  Also,  they  aren't  changing  every- 
thing exactly  the  way  we  think  they  should.  They  are  putting  more 
strength  in  separating  duties,  but  they  talk  about  separation  of  du- 
ties between  repair  and  supply.  They  are  not  separating  duties 
within  supply  and  within  repair,  which  is  where  we  saw  the  prob- 
lem and  where  we  saw  the  stealing  going  on  at  the  Michigan  Na- 
tional Guard. 

Also,  the  implementation  problem  just  continues.  There  are  thou- 
sands of  units,  and  you  have  to  make  sure  that  they  all  know  about 
it  and  they  all  do  it.  That  is  a  big  management  situation  and  a  big 
management  problem.  It  is  going  to  take  a  lot  of  time  and  atten- 
tion. 

Senator  Akaka.  I  think  you  put  the  finger  on  it.  What  I  was 
going  to  ask,  and  you  probably  are  doing  it,  is  for  the  military  and 
for  the  Army  to  put  emphasis  on  a  program  to  prevent  pilfering  so 
that  employees  or  people  that  belong  understand  that  this  is  not 
what  is  accepted. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  It  is  their  responsibility  to  protect  it. 

Senator  Akaka.  Maybe  that  might  help  the  cause.  You  have  cer- 
tainly done  well  in  identifying  the  problem  and  even  recommending 
what  should  be  done.  I  just  hope  that  you  can  move  swiftly  on  this 
with  a  good  program  to  prevent  pilfering. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you. 

Senator  Cohen? 

Senator  COHEN.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

I  have  an  opening  statement  I  would  like  to  submit  for  the 
record. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Without  objection,  it  will  be  included  in  the 

record  in  its  entirety. 

Prepared  Statement  of  Senator  Cohen 

Mr.  Chairman,  I  commend  you  for  holding  this  hearing  on  the  very  serious  prob- 
lem of  the  susceptibility  of  the  Department  of  Defense  inventory,  and  specifically 
gun  parts,  to  theft.  As  the  Chairman  well  knows,  this  is  not  a  new  issue.  For  years 
the  Department  of  Defense  has  had  systemic  problems  in  the  security  of  its  inven- 
tories. The  General  Accounting  Office  (GAO)  has  issued  a  number  of  reports  uncov- 
ering thefts  and  attempted  thefts  of  small  arms  parts  from  the  military  supply  sys- 
tem. Everything  from  gun  parts  to  batteries  has  been  stolen  for  monetary  gain  and 
Srivate  use.  As  a  result,  government  property  has  turned  up  in  the  hands  of  our 
fation's  criminals  and  in  the  Christmas  toys  of  the  children  of  the  unscrupulous 
individuals  who  stole  these  supplies. 

I  am  very  concerned  by  the  fact  that  we  have  heard  before  about  a  number  of 
the  very  same  problems  we  are  going  to  discuss  today.  In  fact,  the  Army's  failure 
to  address  the  problems  outlined  in  earlier  reports  have  contributed  to  the  ease  by 
which  these  subsequent  thefts  were  committed.  Time  and  time  again  the  Army  has 


17 

not  taken  the  necessary  steps  to  put  an  end  to  this  abuse.  In  view  of  GAO's  earlier 
findings,  I  find  it  inexcusable  that  the  former  member  of  the  Michigan  Army  Na- 
tional Guard  who  will  be  testifying  today  was  able  to  steal  fi*om  the  Federal  Govern- 
ment for  some  5  years  before  the  thefts  were  detected.  This  individual  stole  parts 
fi"om  the  Federal  Government  and  sold  them  to  a  national  gun  dealer  in  Illinois  who 
has  been  connected  to  the  sale  of  small  arms  parts  to  the  Branch  Davidian  religious 
sect  in  Wado,  Texas.  It  is  particularly  disturbing  to  think  that  the  very  weapons 
used  to  kill  Federal  agents  may  have  been  supplied  by  the  government  itself. 

We  will  hear  today  how  these  parts  are  ending  up  in  the  hands  of  our  Nation's 
criminals.  For  nearly  a  month,  the  Congress  has  been  working  to  address  our  Na- 
tion's very  serious  crime  problem;  yet,  lax  military  controls  are  already  at  work  un- 
dermining this  important  legislation. 

Military  small  arms  parts  are  being  sold  at  gun  shows  across  the  Nation.  In  five 
of  six  States  GAO  visited,  GAO  was  able  to  buy  some  or  all  of  the  parts  necessary 
to  convert  a  semiautomatic  civilian  rifle  to  the  equivalent  of  a  fully  automatic  mili- 
tary M16.  DOD's  regulation  on  the  disposal  of  property  states  that  "small  arms, 
weapons  and  parts  are  not  authorized  for  sale  to  the  general  public  except  as  scrap 
after  necessary  demilitarization  is  completed."  Yet,  these  parts  are  readily  available 
to  the  public  at  gun  shows  throughout  the  country.  In  some  cases  these  parts  were 
still  in  government  packaging  which  included  their  stock  number. 

The  GAO  report  being  released  today  certainly  paints  a  disturbing  picture:  one 
in  which  Army  facilities  have  lax  physical  security,  inadequate  internal  controls,  in- 
effective inventory  accounting  mechanisms,  poor  supervision  of  employees,  and  a 
lack  of  basic  checks  on  the  ordering  and  handling  of  parts — a  situation  which  invites 
theft  of  government  property  for  personal  gain.  Although  GAO's  report  looks  only 
at  a  number  of  Army  installations,  I  remain  very  concerned  about  the  degree  to 
which  similar  situations  may  be  occurring  at  other  Army  facilities  throughout  the 
country  and  within  other  branches  of  the  military. 

Earlier  this  week,  I  participated  in  a  hearing  on  the  growing  problem  of  criminal 
aliens  in  this  country.  Large  numbers  of  criminal  aliens  do  not  have  their  deporta- 
tion proceedings  completed  before  they  complete  their  prison  sentence  and  as  a  re- 
sult, are  released  back  into  our  society.  Once  out  on  the  street,  these  criminals  are 
often  notified  by  mail  that  they  are  going  to  be  deported  and  they  are  given  72 
hours  to  report  to  the  INS  for  deportation.  I  am  sure  it  comes  as  no  surprise  to  any- 
one in  this  room  that  large  numbers  of  these  individuals  don't  show  up  for  their 
deportation.  In  short,  the  INS  is  running  an  honor  system  policy  for  convicted  crimi- 
nal aliens — a  policy  which  invites  abuse.  These  criminal  aliens  are  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  run  and  we  should  not  be  surprised  that  they  often  take  it. 

The  situation  being  described  today  by  GAO  and  the  former  member  of  the  Michi- 
gan Army  National  Guard  presents  a  similar  situation.  The  physical  security  at 
many  of  these  facilities  is  inadequate  to  prevent  theft.  Fences  with  holes  large 
enough  for  a  person  to  crawl  through,  unguarded  gates,  and  warehouse  doors  that 
are  often  left  open  and  unattended  are  just  a  few  of  the  security  breaches  GAO  dis- 
covered. At  Fort  Benning,  for  example,  rifle  barrels  were  stacked  under  an  open 
window  inviting  anyone  walking  by  to  steal  them.  Here  again,  we  seem  to  be  creat- 
ing a  situation  which  invites  abuse  and,  in  this  case,  theft.  Employees  are  presented 
with  opportunities  to  steal  and,  as  we  have  seen,  they  are  taking  it.  In  addition, 
there  do  not  appear  to  be  adequate  controls  or  safeguards  to  prevent  these  thefts 
from  occurring.  In  a  situation  at  Fort  Campbell,  Kentucky,  about  $80,000  worth  of 
government  property,  including  small  arms  parts,  was  discovered  as  it  was  being 
stolen  only  because  the  vehicle  was  stopped  for  a  minor  traffic  violation  by  oflF-base 
police. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  specific  problems  at  the  Army  installations  and  the  ways  that 
employees  have  been  stealing  government  property  are  too  numerous  to  go  into  fur- 
ther in  this  opening  statement.  Let  me  just  say  that  the  Federal  Government  has 
a  responsibility  to  do  better  and  it  must  do  better.  We  must  prevent  theft  of  govern- 
ment property  and  the  use  of  military  weapons  to  commit  crimes.  While  I  am  aware 
that  the  Army  has  made  some  changes  in  an  eff"ort  to  begin  to  correct  this  situation, 
it  is  clear  that  it  has  not  done  enough.  If  the  Army  is  unwilling  or  unable  to  address 
these  very  serious  problems,  then  I  stand  ready  to  assist  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  in  im- 
plementing changes  so  that  we  are  not  called  back  here  in  anther  2  or  3  years  to 
hear  stories  similar  to  the  ones  we  are  going  to  hear  today. 

Senator  Cohen.  I  will  offer  a  couple  of  comments  and  questions. 

I  take  it  very  little  follow  up  has  been  done  since  the  initial  GAO 
report  and  its  recommendations  were  issued  back  in  1990.  We  have 
basically  the  same  situation  today  that  we  had  in  1990? 


18 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Yes,  we  do. 

Senator  COHEN.  I  think  you  expressed  it  in  terms  of  an  attitu- 
dinal  problem. 

Mr.  Chairman,  this  is  more  than  a  few  thousand  bullets  or  a  few 
thousand  batteries  making  their  way  out  into  the  civilian  circula- 
tion. As  Senator  Bennett  has  said,  we  are  talking  about  parts  for 
assault  weapons  as  well.  It  has  to  do  with  more  than  simply  leak- 
age or  shrinkage,  it  has  to  do  now  with  national  security,  because, 
I  expect,  this  is  not  confined  to  the  National  Guard  alone. 

Do  individuals  have  a  different  mindset  within  the  National 
Guard  as  opposed  to  being  in  the  military  full  time.  We  have  civil- 
ians moving  from  civilian  life  into  soldiering  and  back  out  into  ci- 
vilian life  again. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  didn't  see  any  difference. 

Senator  Cohen.  You  saw  no  difference?  The  reason  I  ask  this 
question  is  I  noticed  in  today's  Washington  Post,  page  A3,  a  very 
significant  headline,  "Justice  Department  Urges  Pentagon  Not  to 
Purchase  Cop-Killer  Bullets".  We  have  the  Attorney  General  of  the 
United  States  calling  upon  the  Secretary  of  Defense  not  to  pur- 
chase armor-purchasing  bullets  for  nine-millimeter  handguns  be- 
cause of  the  fear  that  these  particular  armor-piercing  bullets  will 
be  used  to  kill  policemen  who  are  wearing  armor-protective  vests. 

This  is  more  than  just  a  few  thousand  bullets  getting  out  into  the 
mainstream  of  commercial  life.  We  are  talking  now  about  civilian 
agencies  asking  the  defense  agencies  not  to  purchase  the  kind  of 
weaponry  or  ammunition  that  may  be  necessary  to  save  our  sol- 
diers' lives.  We  are  setting  up  a  dynamic,  or  a  conflict,  between  the 
needs  for  a  national  security  protecting  our  soldiers'  lives — and  pro- 
tecting our  civilian  lives. 

This  is  not  something  that  can  be  easily  dismissed.  It  is  very  se- 
rious. The  fear  is  we  have  lost  control. 

Earlier  this  week,  I  participated  in  a  set  of  hearings  dealing  with 
the  Immigration  and  Naturalization  Service.  We  have,  as  I  recall, 
something  like  450,000  criminal  aliens  in  the  country,  and  we  don't 
know  where  they  are.  We  don't  even  know  who  they  are.  We  have 
a  situation  in  which  those  who  are  illegally  in  this  country  have 
committed  crimes,  been  sent  to  prison  to  complete  their  sentences, 
are  released,  and  they  are  often  given  a  notice  by  mail  that  they 
have  72  hours  to  get  their  affairs  in  order  before  they  are  deported. 

Does  it  come  as  any  surprise  that  most  of  them  never  show  up? 
Last  year  in  New  York  alone,  87.7  percent  of  those  ordered  to  be 
deported  did  not  show  up  for  their  deportation.  We  don't  know  who 
they  are  as  they  use  aliases  or  different  social  security  numbers. 
We  lack  the  technology,  the  internal  controls  and  the  personnel  to 
locate  them.  The  problem  is  not  identical  to  what  we  have  here,  but 
both  represent  dysfunctional  systems. 

Now  it  may  be  that  the  Army  personnel  who  have  come  to  testify 
will  dispute  the  GAO's  findings.  It  may  be  that  the  situation  is 
being  magnified  beyond  the  nature  of  the  problem.  I  think  you 
would  agree  that  we  can  expect  some  leakage  or  shrinkage  no  mat- 
ter how  many  controls  are  put  into  effect.  That  is  the  nature  of 
human  beings  There  will  be  some  pilfering. 

But  the  question  is,  can  we  hold  it  down  to  a  bare  minimum,  and 
what  changes  are  necessary,  £ind  at  what  expense,  to  prevent  the 


19 

kind  of  hemorrhaging  that  appears  to  be  the  case  here.  Or,  at  a 
minimum,  how  can  we  Hmit  the  opportunity  for  hemorrhaging. 
When  I  look  at  some  of  the  photographs  or  read  the  testimony  of 
how  easy  it  is  to  steal  certain  items,  it  calls  into  question  whether 
or  not  we  have  to  have  a  change  in  attitude. 

It  is  not  a  matter  of  small  change  or  small  potatoes.  It  is  not  just 
a  few  thousand  bullets  floating  around  ending  up  in  Waco,  Texas. 
I  believe  it  is  far  more  serious,  because  now  it  has  extended  to  our 
Justice  Department  calling  upon  the  Defense  Department  not  to 
purchase  a  type  of  bullet  that  can,  in  fact,  save  the  lives  of  our 
servicemen  and  women  but  also  kill  our  police  officers  on  the 
streets.  That  is  how  serious  the  problem  has  become. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you.  You  raise  a  good  point.  I  hadn't 
seen  that  report  in  the  paper  this  morning.  Senator  Cohen,  but 
that  is  very  interesting.  Apparently  they  either  don't  want  them  to 
be  manufactured  at  all  or  they  feel  there  is  going  to  be  so  much 
leakage  of  ammunition  out  of  the  Defense  Department  that  it  is 
going  to  be  a  factor  in  our  national  crime.  It  is  a  tragedy  when  we 
get  to  that  point. 

I  have  just  a  couple  of  additional  questions.  First,  where  in  the 
system  is  the  main  loss?  Is  it  the  warehouse,  the  depot,  or  the  local 
repair  shop  where  the  weapons  are  actusdly  being  repaired? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  can't  tell  that,  because  it  isn't  possible  to  do 
the  kind  of  job  that  would  identify  that.  You  would  have  to 

Chairman  Glenn.  Are  the  records  complete  enough  that  you 
could  even  do  that? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Probably  not.  We  certainly  do  know  how  m£iny  ad- 
justments there  are  in  inventory,  and  in  the  past,  when  we  have 
looked  at  something  in  a  particular  maintenance  depot,  for  in- 
stance, we  have  seen  up  to  18  percent  inventory  unaccounted  for. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Eighteen  percent? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Yes. 

Chairman  Glenn.  In  gun  parts? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  No,  I  am  talking  about  all  inventory. 

Chairman  Glenn.  All  inventory,  18  percent. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Yes.  But  we  don't  know  the  answer  to  your  ques- 
tion. 

Chairman  Glenn.  All  right.  I  gather  you  have  not  tried  to  ex- 
trapolate the  results  of  this  investigation  and  multiply  it  by  the 
number  of  centers  and  repair  places  all  over  the  country.  You 
didn't  try  to  do  that,  did  you? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  don't  know  how  to  do  that.  This  isn't  the  kind 
of  study  for  which  you  can  draw  a  statistical  sample  and  general- 
ize. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Is  it  your  opinion  that  the  same  or  greater  lev- 
els of  theft  probably  occur  with  regard  to  other  items,  for  anything 
that  is  useful  or  saleable,  such  as  the  batteries  that  we  will  have 
testimony  on  later?  I  was  impressed  with  that.  I  think  the  state- 
ment in  one  of  the  copies  of  advance  testimony  received  said  some- 
thing about  $25,000  worth  of  C  and  D  batteries  just  happened  to 
be  ordered  in  November  just  to  meet  the  Christmas  holiday  season 
when  all  the  kids'  toys  need  batteries  and  so  on. 

I  don't  know  whether  that  is  a  valid  assumption  or  not,  but 


20 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  would  guess  that  the  same  amount  of  theft  is 
going  on  in  every  area. 

Chairman  Glenn.  OK.  Do  you  happen  to  know  whether  any  of 
these  bases  use  a  gate  check  procedure?  When  I  was  in  the  mih- 
tary,  and  I  was  in  for  quite  a  while  in  the  Marine  Corps,  23  years, 
occasionally  they  would  have  gate  checks  back  in  those  days.  You 
just  took  at  random,  you  took  every  third  or  fifth  car  and  pulled 
it  over  when  people  were  leaving  the  base.  That  car  got  a  good 
going  over.  If  there  was  anything  that  was  government  equipment 
in  that  car,  you  were  in  deep  trouble.  That  seemed  to  keep  things 
pretty  well  under  control,  because  people  who  had  things  in  the 
trunk  or  in  the  car  were  dealt  with  very  harshly. 

Did  any  of  these  bases  have  that  kind  of  a  check  procedure,  so 
far  as  you  know? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  None  of  them  had  what  you  are  talking  about, 
where  they  would  stop  random  cars  and  they  would  open  up  the 
trunks  and  look  at  them.  Generally,  that  doesn't  happen  on  most 
of  the  bases.  I  know  it  does  happen  on  some  of  the  bases.  When 
we  examined  Red  River  and  we  saw  all  of  the  problems  there,  they 
weren't  doing  gate  checks  at  that  time.  When  we  asked  them  about 
it  they  said  that  it  would  be  difficult,  it  would  be  hard  on  the  em- 
ployee morale.  We  pointed  out  that  they  could  pull  the  cars  over 
and  not  cause  a  line  to  form,  and  they  did  start  doing  that. 
Chairman  GLENN.  Employee  morale,  my  foot. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  That  is  the  answer  we  also  get  about 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  wouldn't  worry  necessarily  about  employee 
morale.  I  am  trying  to  worry  about  the  taxpayers  here,  too. 

Ms.  Heivilin.  We  get  the  same  answer  when  we  point  out  that 
cars  shouldn't  be  parked  up  against  the  warehouses.  They  say  it 
would  cause  employee  morale  problems  if  employees  had  to  walk 
several  blocks. 

Chairman  Glenn.  In  these  random  searches,  I  have  been  pulled 
over  at  the  main  gate  and  my  car  gone  through  just  like  everybody 
else.  It  hurt  my  morale,  too,  but  it  also  helped  cut  down  on  waste 
coming  out  of  the  base— not  that  I  had  any  in  my  car,  understand. 
[Laughter.] 

Ms.  Heivilin.  I  do  know  that  it  happens  at  some  bases,  but  it 
didn't  at  the  ones  that  we  were  looking  at. 
Chairman  Glenn.  OK,  thank  you. 
Senator  Cohen,  do  you  have  any  other  questions? 
Senator  COHEN.  Is  that  part  of  your  recommendations,  that  we 
include  that? 

Ms.  Heivilin.  Part  of  our  recommendations  is  that  they  make 
sure  that  their  security  regulations  are  implemented,  and  the  secu- 
rity regulations  say  that  there  should  be  spot  checks  at  the  gate. 
Senator  COHEN.  Thank  you. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much.  I  appreciate  it.  We  may 
have  additional  questions  for  you.  We  would  appreciate  a  prompt 
response  to  any  additional  questions  so  we  can  include  them  in  the 
record. 

Again,  we  appreciate  your  being  here.  I  am  sorry  that  we  are  re- 
visiting this  for  the  fourth  time  now  in  just  your  own  reporting  on 
this  particular  issue. 


21 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  have  two  people  on  our  second  panel, 
Mark  Carter,  a  former  Michigan  National  Guard  member,  and  De- 
tective Michael  Vaughn,  Gang  Supervisor,  Los  Angeles  Police  De- 
partment. 

Mr.  Carter,  if  you  would  lead  off,  we  would  appreciate  it.  Please 
give  us  your  experience  as  a  Michigan  National  Guard  member. 
You  were  involved  with  this  yourself,  I  believe,  and  were  appre- 
hended doing  some  of  the  things  that  GAO  found.  You  are  awaiting 
sentencing  now,  I  believe,  so  you  have  had  some  personal  experi- 
ence with  this. 

TESTIMONY  OF  MARK  S.  CARTER,  FORMER  MICfflGAN 
NATIONAL  GUARD  MEMBER 

Mr.  Carter.  Yes  sir.  Mr.  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Commit- 
tee, thank  you  for  inviting  me  here  today  to  testify  about  the  secu- 
rity of  small  arms  parts  in  the  Michigan  National  Guard. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Pull  those  mikes  up  real  close  if  you  can  so 
everybody  can  hear,  or  speak  a  little  more  loudly  there  if  you 
would,  please. 

Mr.  Carter.  I  was  a  member  of  the  Michig£ui  National  Guard 
from  August  1982  until  April  1992,  for  almost  10  years.  I  spent 
many  of  those  years  as  stock  control  supervisor  for  class  nine  re- 
pair parts.  Those  are  the  parts  used  to  repair  vehicles,  weapons, 
and  aircraft,  such  as  bolts,  barrels,  and  batteries. 

I  was  responsible  for  the  input  and  output  of  the  computer  sys- 
tem which  kept  track  of  all  inventory  in  the  warehouse  of  those 
parts,  and  I  reconciled  the  records  of  the  two  computer  systems  to 
each  other.  I  kept  the  data  flowing  dnd  supervised  the  office  staff 
which  processed  all  requisition  orders  for  those  parts.  This  included 
handling  of  all  requisitions  for  126  Guard  units  in  the  State. 

There  were  ten  employees  in  the  chain  of  command,  including 
the  chief  warrant  officer,  who  was  our  OIC,  officer  in  charge.  There 
were  approximately  four  people  who  worked  under  me. 

Around  1987,  I  started  to  experience  severe  financial  difficulty. 
My  house  was  foreclosed  on.  Around  that  same  time,  I  decided  I 
wanted  to  build  a  rifle  for  my  own  use,  but  I  didn't  have  all  the 
parts.  I  happened  to  go  to  a  gun  show  and  I  didn't  have  the  money 
to  buy  the  parts  I  needed,  but  I  had  extra  parts  at  home  which  I 
had  taken  from  the  National  Guard.  I  took  those  extra  parts  to  the 
show  and  sold  them  to  purchase  the  parts  I  needed  to  put  my  rifle 
together. 

Once  my  rifle  was  done,  I  realized  I  could  sell  the  rifle  and  make 
a  profit  or  I  could  sell  the  parts  I  was  t£iking  from  the  base.  I  start- 
ed to  do  both  of  these  things. 

I  got  the  parts  very  easily.  I  had  complete  access  to  the  computer 
system  and  there  was  no  one  checking  on  what  I  did  or  what  our 
actual  inventory  or  invoices  were.  So  I  created  false  requisitions, 
filled  them,  and  took  the  parts.  The  requisitions  and  inventory 
were  only  reconciled  quarterly.  On  a  monthly  basis,  there  was  sup- 
posed to  be  a  reconciliation  by  sending  a  statement  to  the  cus- 
tomer, that  is  the  individual  unit,  yet  the  customers  were  not  re- 
quired to  respond  and  a  request  on  one  statement  would  not  ap- 
pear on  the  next  statement.  So  if  the  customer  didn't  keep  the 


22 

records,  match  them  to  their  request,  and  notify  us,  they  would 
never  know  if  there  was  a  discrepancy. 

I  also  was  able  to  get  parts  from  turn-ins  by  direct  support  units. 
Those  units  would  turn  over  overstocked  small  arms  parts  £ind  not 
request  any  receipt.  I  could  then  just  walk  away  with  them  or  I 
could  give  them  a  receipt  and  throw  the  original  in  the  trash. 

There  were  also  times  when  the  depot  sent  more  items  than  were 
ordered.  For  example,  the  depot  might  send  120  bolts  where  only 
100  were  ordered.  Since  there  was  no  reconciliation  between  our  of- 
fice and  the  depot,  I  could  just  take  the  difference  and  change  our 
record.  I  could  also  indicate  the  shipment  was  short  when  it  wasn't 
and  take  the  difference. 

The  even  easier  part  was  taking  the  parts  home.  Physical  secu- 
rity on  the  base  was  a  joke.  They  knew  me,  so  I  was  never  stopped. 
There  were  never  any  kinds  of  checks  on  us.  I  just  drove  home  with 
whatever  I  wanted. 

At  this  point,  I  want  to  say  something  about  the  atmosphere  at 
the  base  with  regard  to  security.  I  am  not  saying  this  to  excuse  my- 
self, because  what  I  did  was  wrong,  but  I  think  it  is  important  for 
you  to  know  that  everyone  there  was  either  taking  supplies  or 
knew  about  it.  I  don't  just  mean  small  arms  parts,  although  there 
was  a  tremendous  amount  of  theft  there,  but  also  any  parts  that 
could  be  used  privately. 

For  example,  we  shipped  $25,000  worth  of  C  and  D  cell  batteries 
in  1  year,  with  the  bulk  going  in  November  and  December.  I  know 
of  a  lot  of  kids  whose  Christmas  toys  had  military  batteries  run- 
ning them. 

There  were  also  some  guys  I  know  of  who  started  a  race  car  team 
with  Army  supphes.  They  got  their  tires,  windshield  wiper  fluid, 
and  oil  courtesy  of  the  government.  It  was  just  not  unusual  for  peo- 
ple to  do  stuff  like  that.  The  attitude  was  like  kids  in  a  candy  store 
who  could  get  anything  they  wanted. 

I  also  know  of  one  guy  who  wrote  a  computer  software  program 
that  would  allow  him  to  send  us  a  diskette  and  listing  where  the 
total  number  of  requests  on  the  diskette  would  match  but  the  re- 
quests on  the  diskettes  were  different  in  stock  number  and  in 
quantity  from  the  listing.  When  the  diskette  was  processed,  it  was 
erased,  wiped  clean,  destroying  the  evidence. 

We  were  audited  two  times  in  the  10  years  I  was  in  the  Guard. 
The  first  time  was  around  1984.  It  was  an  in-house  auditor,  and 
we  all  covered  for  each  other  and  got  a  clean  bill  of  health. 

The  second  time  was  more  recently,  in  1991  or  1992,  and  the 
auditor  was  from  the  Guard  Bureau.  He  came  in,  chatted,  and 
asked  for  a  list  of  items  to  look  at,  so  we  gave  him  a  list  and  he 
checked  our  paper  against  the  inventory  in  the  warehouse,  and  of 
course  it  matched. 

In  my  10  years  with  the  Michigan  National  Guard,  there  was 
never  any  serious  attempt  to  look  at  our  accounting  system  or  our 
records.  When  GAO  came  in,  that  was  the  first  time  anyone  really 
looked  at  what  we  were  doing. 

You  might  want  to  know  what  was  happening  to  the  parts  that 
were  stolen  by  people  like  me.  There  is  a  black  market  network 


23 

across  the  country  which  buys  stolen  small  arms  parts  from  dif- 
ferent National  Guard  units,  then  they  sell  the  stolen  parts  at  gun 
shows  and  through  gun  magazines  and  newspapers. 

That  concludes  my  prepared  statement.  Again,  thank  you.  Sen- 
ator Glenn,  for  the  opportunity  to  testify.  I  want  to  apologize  to  you 
and  to  the  Michigan  National  Guard  for  my  illegal  activities.  I  hope 
that  my  testimony  here  today  will  be  of  some  help  to  you  in  stop- 
ping other  people  from  being  able  to  do  what  I  did.  I  would  be 
happy  to  answer  Einy  questions  you  might  have. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much,  Mr.  Carter.  I  appre- 
ciate your  testimony. 

Before  we  get  to  questions,  we  will  hear  from  Detective  Michael 
Vaughn,  who  is  in  the  gang  supervision  or  investigation  depart- 
ment, I  guess,  gang  supervisor  might  not  be  quite  the  right  title. 
Is  that  your  title? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Pretty  close,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  are  a  gang  investigation  supervisor,  from 
the  Los  Angeles  Police  Department. 

Detective  Vaughn,  we  are  glad  to  have  you  with  us  and  look  for- 
ward to  your  testimony. 

TESTIMONY  OF  DETECTIVE  MICHAEL  V.  VAUGHN,  GANG 
SUPERVISOR,  LOS  ANGELES  POLICE  DEPARTMENT 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Thank  you,  sir.  Mr.  Chairman,  members  of  the 
Committee,  it  is  a  pleasure  to  be  here  today  to  discuss  the  issue 
of  parts  stolen  from  active  and  reserve  military  instEdlations. 

I  have  been  a  Los  Angeles  police  officer  for  over  25  years.  I  began 
investigating  street  gangs  in  1971.  In  1978,  I  accepted  the  addi- 
tional assignment  of  investigating  outlaw  motorcycle  gangs,  and  in 
1983,  another  additional  assignment  of  investigating  prison  gangs. 

Currently,  I  am  a  detective  supervisor  in  the  g£ing  information 
section.  I  am  currently  the  department's  expert  on  prison,  street 
gangs,  and  outlaw  motorcycle  gangs.  I  have  qualified  in  Federal, 
superior,  municipal,  and  civil  courts  as  an  expert  and  have  given 
expert  testimony  to  Federal  and  county  grand  juries  in  Los  Ange- 
les. 

I  have  written  a  department  training  pamphlet  and  co-written 
manuals  for  other  agencies,  and  I  have  read  training  manuals  for 
foreign.  Federal,  State,  and  local  law  enforcement  agencies  relating 
to  gang  investigations. 

I  am  the  principal  trainer  for  the  department  and  have  trained 
numerous  foreign,  State,  Federal,  and  local  law  enforcement  offi- 
cers, as  well  as  being  instructor  for  the  Los  Angeles  Police  Acad- 
emy, the  Los  Angeles  County  Sheriff's  Academy,  State  and  commu- 
nity colleges,  and  other  training  seminars. 

Being  a  member  of  five  investigative  associations,  I  am  regarded 
as  an  authority  amongst  my  peers. 

Additionally,  having  over  26  years  of  service  with  the  Army  Na- 
tional Guard,  I  retired  in  1990  at  the  rank  of  Command  Sergeant 
Major.  Being  a  Vietnam  veteran,  I  have  served  in  a  variety  of  as- 
signments, including  the  scouts,  military  police,  as  well  as  the 
mechanized  infantry.  My  last  assignment  was  the  post  command 
sergeant  major  at  the  Armed  Forces  Reserve  Center  in  Los 
Alamitos,  California. 


24 

My  testimony  this  morning  evolves  around  military  weapons,  ex- 
plosives, ammunition,  and  parts  that  make  their  way  from  military 
installations  into  the  hands  of  the  criminals  on  the  streets  of  our 
cities. 

There  are  no  hard  statistics  readily  available  to  me  to  present  to 
you  this  morning.  However,  I  can  say  that  law  enforcement  encoun- 
ters with  military  munitions  and  weaponry  are  all  too  frequent  and 
routinely  included  in  our  training  programs. 

The  past  22  years  investigating  gangs  has  produced  thousands  of 
investigations,  countless  arrests,  and  an  innumerable  amount  of 
hours  on  surveillance.  I  have  authored  in  excess  of  100  search  war- 
rants and  participated  in,  planned,  and  served  many  others. 

My  investigations  have  led  to  the  recovery  of  military  weapons, 
explosives  and  ammunition,  and  spare  parts  as  well  as  other  mili- 
tary hardware.  Heavy  machine  guns,  rocket  launchers,  automatic 
rifles,  semi-automatic  pistols,  grenades,  detonation  cord,  plastic  ex- 
plosives, land  mines.  Claymore  mines,  ammunition,  and  spare 
parts  are  just  a  few  examples  of  what  has  been  recovered  in  our 
cities  at  the  hands  of  the  criminal  elements  of  our  society. 

It  has  been  my  experience  that  the  military  hardware  on  our 
streets  is  used  as  a  commodity.  These  weapons  or  parts  are  traded 
for  narcotics,  which  are  in  turn  sold  on  the  streets  at  a  profit.  In 
other  cases,  the  theft  and  sale  of  these  items  is  an  industry  into 
itself,  with  criminals  who  specialize  in  military  hardware.  In  still 
other  cases,  they  become  available  at  a  premium  price  to  gang 
members  for  use  in  their  criminal  endeavors,  rival  gang  warfare, 
or  in  some  cases  against  police  and  government  agencies. 

All  too  often,  white  supremacists,  survivalists,  organized  criminal 
organizations,  subversive  groups,  and  gang  members  have  stock- 
piled military  hardware  that  surpasses  anything  available  to  local, 
State,  and  Federal  law  enforcement  agencies.  We  recover  grenades, 
explosive,  and  booby  traps  that  are  in  themselves  a  danger  by  their 
mere  existence.  Automatic  weapons  and  heavy  machine  guns  either 
have  no  history  or  have  been  reported  destroyed  by  the  mihtary 
have  also  been  discovered. 

Military  explosives,  heavy  weapons,  grenades,  rocket  launchers, 
mortars,  and  automatic  weapons  have  no  legitimate  use  in  our  soci- 
ety and  pose  a  threat  to  law  enforcement  and  citizens  alike. 

We  recently  monitored  a  gun  show  where  enough  parts  can  be 
purchased  to  assemble  the  M16  automatic  rifle  and  the  Colt 
M1911-.45  caliber  semi-automatic  pistol,  as  well  as  bombs  and 
booby  traps.  Many  of  these  parts  are  still  packaged  in  military 
crates,  their  original  Cosmoline  packaging,  and  available  in  unbe- 
lievable quantities.  Virtually  truck  loads  of  parts  are  readily  avail- 
able for  purchase.  Training  ammunition  is  sometimes  unavailable 
to  troops  but  can  be  purchased  by  civilians  in  any  amount.  Case 
upon  case  of  this  clearly-marked  military  ammunition  sits  stacked 
on  the  floor,  available  to  cash  customers. 

One  has  to  ask  the  question  of  why  this  military  hardware 
makes  its  way  onto  our  streets.  Greed  is  the  most  obvious  answer. 
There  is  a  ready  market  that  pays  in  hard  cash  for  military  hard- 
ware. Gang  members  and  other  criminal  elements  are  members  of 
the  regular  military  services  as  well  as  reserve  and  National  Guard 
units.  Many  are  recruited  into  the  military  by  personnel  who  are 


25 

under  pressure  to  produce  numbers  and  less  likely  to  adequately 
check  personal  backgrounds. 

Many  are  lured  into  drug-related  crimes  as  well  as  gang-related 
criminal  activities  after  being  introduced  in  the  military  service, 
and  there  is  also  the  unscrupulous  individual  trying  to  make  a  fast 
buck. 

I  have  had  gang  members  and  other  criminal  elements  in  my 
own  units,  as  well  as  having  arrested  and  investigated  many  mem- 
bers of  the  military.  I  routinely  liaison  with  many  military  inves- 
tigators who  share  their  frustration  with  me  at  having  gang  mem- 
bers and  criminals  in  their  installations.  Narcotics  and  gang  vio- 
lence are  no  longer  strangers  to  life  on  military  posts  throughout 
the  world. 

This,  however,  does  not  answer  the  question  of  how  these  weap- 
ons make  their  way  from  military  reservations  onto  the  streets.  It 
has  been  my  personal  experience  while  in  the  military  in  a  variety 
of  assignments  that  the  military  lacks  adequate  controls  to  prevent 
theft.  Internal  and  external  security  at  military  installations  is 
sorely  deficient  and  unable  to  prevent  these  losses.  It  was  not  un- 
common to  see  weapons  reported  lost  or  missing,  written  off  as 
damaged  or  surveyed  for  spare  parts.  There  is  little  or  no  audit 
trail  on  spare  parts,  as  they  have  no  identifiable  numbers  and  have 
no  part-for-part  exchange  rate. 

When  theft  or  loss  is  discovered,  reserve  and  National  Guard 
units  have  ineffective  or  no  investigative  resources  available  to 
them.  There  is  little  follow-up  investigation  on  thefts,  missing,  or 
reportedly  destroyed  weapons. 

As  an  example,  we  recovered  two  fully  operational  M60  machine 
guns  in  a  narcotics  deal.  Both  of  these  weapons  had  been  reported 
destroyed  by  the  Marine  Corps  several  years  prior,  but  there  was 
no  supporting  documentation  to  tell  us  who  and  where. 

Military  reservations  and  installations  have  poor  internal  and  ex- 
ternal security.  I  have  seen  inadequate  perimeter  and  building  se- 
curity as  well  as  storage  security.  Private  security  companies  are 
routinely  hired  to  provide  security  at  reserve  instedlations  and  lack 
adequate  training.  Military  police  at  installations  all  too  often  lack 
adequate  police  training  and  search  techniques  to  prevent  theft. 

In  short,  there  are  not  enough  controls  exercised  by  the  military 
and  inadequate  records  to  trace^  recovered  military  weapons,  explo- 
sives, and  spare  parts. 

Having  both  a  long  military  and  police  background,  I  feel  quali- 
fied to  state  that  the  military  lacks  introspection.  They  are  under- 
standably concerned  with  readiness  and  training.  Defense  of  this 
Nation  by  a  well-trsiined,  well-armed  military  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. It  is,  however,  important  that  they  be  reminded  that  they 
exist,  live,  and  train  in  a  country  that  is  not  at  war  and  in  a  society 
that  is,  in  general,  not  hostile. 

The  same  people  they  have  sworn  to  protect  are  in  many  cases 
victimized  by  their  failure  to  control  the  weapons  of  war.  This  lack 
of  concern  is  all  too  often  measured  in  a  loss  of  human  life  in  a  so- 
ciety that  is  already  burdened  with  uncontrolled  violence. 

Thank  you,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much. 


26 

Mr.  Vaughn.  I  welcome  any  questions  from  you,  Mr.  Chairman, 
or  members  of  the  Committee. 
Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much.  I  appreciate  it. 
Mr.  Carter,  where  do  you  think  most  of  the  losses  are  occurring, 
in  the  repair  shop  where  the  actual  repairs  are  being  made,  or  de- 
pots, warehouses,  where  in  the  system  are  the  greatest  losses,  or 
is  it  all  of  the  above? 

Mr.  Carter.  All  of  the  above,  sir.  They  filter  out  from  every  place 
they  touch. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Are  these  the  kinds  of  parts,  like  those  I  have 
here,  that  you  were  taking  out  and  selling? 

Mr.  Carter.  Or  similar,  sir.  A  lot  of  those  smaller  parts  aren't 
really  worth  a  great  deal  of  money,  no  incentive.  The  large  part, 
the  bolt  carrier  on  the  right,  your  left  there,  is  worth  approximately 
$20,  $25  cash. 

Chairman  Glenn.  What  was  the  value  of  material  you  took  out 
and  sold?  Do  you  have  any  estimate  of  that? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  have  no  exact  figure.  I  am  guessing  between 
$5,000  and  $10,000.  The  GAO  figure  is  between  $20,000  and 
$30,000. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  mentioned  that  "everyone  is  doing  it",  in 
sort  of  a  general  reference,  referring  not  just  to  gun  parts  them- 
selves, but  to  looking  as  though  government  equipment  or  GFE  is 
their  property  to  be  taken  if  they  can  get  away  with  it,  is  that 
right? 

Mr.  Carter.  In  the  10  years  that  I  worked  there,  I  did  a  running 
figure  in  my  head  of  the  value  of  stuff  that  went  out  the  door,  not 
necessarily  myself  but  just  stuff  that  I  saw  leave  that  didn't  go 
where  it  was  supposed  to,  and  the  figure  is  somewhere  between 
$300,000  and  $500,000. 
Chairman  Glenn.  Just  off  this  one  base? 
Mr.  Carter.  Just  off  the  area  I  worked. 
Chairman  Glenn.  And  that  would  be  what,  all  kinds  of  gun 

parts 

Mr.  Carter.  Repair  parts. 

Chairman  Glenn.  The  batteries  you  talked  about. 
Mr.  Carter.  If  you  are  looking  at,  say,  just  strictly  C  and  D  cell 
batteries,  $25,000  a  year,  10  years,  $250,000  right  there.  Auto- 
mobile batteries,  tires,  alternators,  generators,  starters,  carbu- 
retors, rope,  nuts  and  bolts,  light  bulbs,  windshield  wipers,  on  and 
on  and  on,  anything  you  could  use  at  home  or  anywhere  else. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Was  there  ever  any  check  made  at  the  gate  or 
any  attempt  made  to  stop  such  pilfering.  Was  it  not  known  that 
such  pilfering  was  going  on? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  can't  imagine  that  it  wasn't  known  because  of  the 
great  number  of  people  involved  in  it.  Everybody  helped  themselves 
in  one  way  or  another  to  something. 

As  far  as  being  stopped  at  the  gate,  the  gate  was  just  open  all 
day.  You  could  drive  in  and  out.  There  was  no  gate  guard.  You 
could  come  into  work  before  anyone  else  got  there  or  you  could  stay 
after  everyone  else  left,  and  at  lunchtime  there  usually  wasn't  any- 
one around  anyway.  Most  of  the  things  that  I  took  out  the  door 
were  done  during  working  hours  because  I  didn't  want  to  come  in 


27 

on  the  weekend  if  I  didn't  have  to.  This  was  all  during  business 
hours. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  said  there  were  only  two  audits  in  10 
years. 

Mr.  Carter.  Yes  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  they  didn't  mean  anj^hing,  obviously, 
from  what  your  testimony  indicated.  Is  that  customary  at  most 
bases  now,  that  you  wouldn't  have  a  supply  inventory  except  a  cou- 
ple of  times  in  10  years? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  am  not  sure  how  it  is  in  other  bases.  I  know  in 
our  area  and  the  areas  I  looked  at,  there  are  organizations  we  sup- 
ported that  never  saw  any  type  of  activity  like  that,  never  had  an 
audit  at  all  in  the  10  years  that  I  was  there.  Our  activity  was  a 
little  more  high-profile,  and  the  reason,  I  guess,  that  we  didn't  have 
more  audits  was  because  there  are  so  few  people  out  there  that 
knew  how  to  do  it  in  our  area. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Mr.  Vaughn,  you  have  had  experience  on  both 
sides  of  this.  You  have  been  in  the  military,  you  have  seen  some 
of  this  theft  happening.  You  said  you  actugdly  have  arrested  people 
in  the  military  for  some  of  these  same  things  in  addition  to  having 
police  experience  outside. 

What  is  the  best  way  to  stop  this,  gate  checks?  That  is  not  the 
only  answer  to  this,  I  am  sure,  but  what  else  can  we  do? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  That  is  an  excellent  question,  Senator.  I  think  se- 
curity, especially  in  the  military,  does  tend  to  lead  towards  prob- 
lems in  our  society.  I  think  there  is  a  general  attitude  that  if  we 
don't  have  enough,  we  can  order  more,  and  I  think  there  is  a  gen- 
eral lack  of  consciousness  of  the  danger  and  how  a  military  person 
or  the  military  itself  would  look  at  routine  tools  of  the  trade. 

They  lack  the  understanding  of  v.'hat  happens  to  those  things 
when  they  reach  the  street  in  the  hands  of  individuals  involved  in 
criminal  activity.  The  thought  of  driving  down  the  street  in  a  black- 
and-white  police  vehicle  and  facing  a  rocket  or  a  heavy  machine 
gun  is  something  that  keeps  me  awake  at  night.  I  don't  think  they 
have  that  thought  process. 

Chairman  Glenn.  As  I  indicated  in  my  opening  statement,  I  am 
concerned,  obviously,  about  the  gun  parts  that  we  have  displayed 
right  here  that  may  add  to  greater  danger  for  police  and  for  law 
enforcement  officers,  wherever  they  may  be.  But  I  am  also  con- 
cerned that  this  may  be  indicative  of  much  wider  stealing  or  pilfer- 
ing from  the  government,  as  Mr.  Carter  indicates,  whether  it  is 
batteries  or  rope  or  windshield  wipers  or  fluid  or  whatever. 

I  would  like  your  view  of  that.  You  were  in  the  military  also.  Do 
you  think  that  it  is  as  prevalent  as  Mr.  Carter  indicates? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  I  think  in  general  it  is.  You  gentlemen  probably 
have  a  better  understand  in  recent  articles  of  what  has  been  miss- 
ing from  the  government,  overstocked  or  straight  waste.  When  you 
go  to  these  gun  shows  or  you  travel  to  swap  meets,  you  can  vir- 
tually see  just  about  any  military  hardware  available.  Criminal  or- 
ganizations have  been  reported  to  have  a  variety  of  different  types 
of  weapons.  Some  even  claim  that  they  can  produce  armored  mili- 
tary vehicles  for  the  right  amount  of  cash. 


28 

Chairman  Glenn.  Is  this  organized  enough  that  you  can  go  to 
any  of  these  gun  shows  and  order  what  you  want  and  they  will  get 
it  for  you? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  My  personal  experience  doesn't  go  in  that  area  so 
much.  I  have  talked  to  investigators  with  the  Bureau  of  Alcohol, 
Tobacco,  and  Firearms  on  a  weekly  basis,  and  I  have  been  to  many 
intelligence  briefings.  I  think  if  you  have  the  money,  you  can  find 
the  contact  to  buy  virtually  just  about  anything  you  want,  if  you 
have  the  cash  to  pay  for  it. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Mr.  Carter,  do  you  think  it  is  that  organized 
that  you  can  just  order  what  you  want? 

Mr.  Carter.  Yes  sir.  There  are  shows  that  I  have  been  to  where 
that  is  the  case.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  one  gentleman  that 
I  was  working  with  that  basically  gave  me  a  shopping  list  and  said, 
this  is  what  I  need,  how  soon  can  you  get  it?  They  were  very  spe- 
cific about  what  they  wanted  to  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  market. 
If  you  went  to  the  right  person  there  at  the  show  and  put  in  a  re- 
quest for  something  in  particular,  it  would  just  be  a  short  matter 
of  time  before  that  was  carried  out. 
Chairman  Glenn.  My  time  is  up. 
Senator  Cohen? 

Senator  Cohen.  Mr.  Carter,  did  you  see  a  theft  of  grenades  and 
Claymore  mines? 
Mr.  Carter.  Negative. 
Senator  Cohen.  Plastic  explosives? 

Mr.  Carter.  No,  we  worked  strictly  with  repair  parts  in  our 
area.  There  was  stuff  Hke  that  that  filtered  out  from  the  Guard 
units,  but  as  a  rule,  it  was  usually  ammunition  and  other  types  of 
pyrotechnic  devices.  Most  of  those  were  taken  for  amusement  pur- 
poses for  the  people  involved. 

Senator  Cohen.  Was  there  a  sense  that  because  you  were  a 
Guard  unit  as  opposed  to  a  part  of  the  uniformed  services,  full-time 
that  there  was  greater  laxity?  Were  there  less  strict  standards  im- 
posed upon  you  as  a  civilian? 

Mr.  Carter.  Actually,  I  was  fiill-time  with  the  National  Guard 
and  I  have  been  full-time  with  the  Army  as  well.  This  is  part  of 
13  years  of  active  duty.  The  attitudes  weren't  that  much  different, 
from  what  I  have  observed.  The  National  Guard  unit  I  was  in  was 
a  bit  more  relaxed.  Most  of  the  units  I  worked  with  were  fairly  well 
relEixed,  some  to  the  point  of  unconsciousness.  I  don't  know  that  it 
would  be  any  different  on  an  active  Army  post. 

Senator  COHEN.  Now  you  don't  strike  me  as  being  a  master 
criminal  type.  Senator  Glenn  and  I  have  sat  through  many  hear- 
ings on  this  Committee.  We  have  had  chop-shop  criminals  come  in 
and  teach  law  enforcement  officials  how  they  get  into  cars  in  a 
matter  of  seconds  and  take  them  out  and  chop  them  up  within  just 
a  few  minutes  as  a  means  of  educating  the  police  and  the  manufac- 
turers, as  to  how  to  deter  this  type  of  activity. 

I  assume  that  you  could  give  some  pretty  easy  recommendations 
to  prevent  the  kind  of  small-time,  if  you  will,  pilfering  that  takes 
place  or  took  place  with  you.  There  are  a  lot  of  very  creative  people 
and  minds  in  the  military  as  there  are  elsewhere.  Is  it  your  judg- 
ment that  as  soon  as  we  put  a  computerized  system  in  place  as 


29 

GAO  has  recommended,  there  would  be  those  who  would  find  cre- 
ative ways  to  evade  that? 

Mr.  Carter.  Quite  possibly.  If  you  run  a  computer  supply  system 
or  any  kind  of  computer  system  with  the  military,  you  want  cre- 
ative people  around  you.  It  makes  your  job  a  lot  easier.  You  want 
honest  creative  people. 

As  far  as  the  computer  progrsims  that  would  help  account  for 
where  stuff  went,  like  a  history  record,  some  type  of  transaction 
history  on  computer  that  would  let  you  know  what  happened  and 
when  it  happened  and  who  did  it,  that  would  definitely  make  a  big 
difference.  Better  physical  security  would  have  stopped  99  percent 
of  everything  that  I  did.  If  you  can't  get  it  out  the  gate,  there  is 
no  point  in  taking  it. 

But  the  mindset  on  a  lot  of  the  leadership  in  the  Guard  where 
I  was  at  was  basically  look  the  other  way,  it  doesn't  really  hap- 
pen- 


Senator  COHEN.  There  has  been  some  reference  made  to  morale. 
What  if  you  had  a  situation  where  you  had  the  base  commander 
held  strictly  accountable?  For  example,  if  you  had  an  investigative 
SWAT  team  come  in  periodically  to  various  facilities  and  run 
through  a  check  to  determine  the  strength  or  laxity  of  the  security 
requirements  and  hold  the  base  commander  accountable.  Would 
that  improve  morgile? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  am  not  sure  what  the  effect  was.  If  I 

Senator  Cohen.  It  would  improve  security,  never  mind  morale, 
it  would  improve  security. 

Mr.  Carter.  It  couldn't  hurt.  The  first  thing  they  would  attempt 
to  do  would  be  to  cover  it  all  up.  As  a  matter  of  fact 

Senator  Cohen.  Cover  it  up  how? 

Mr.  Carter.  In  whatever  way,  shape,  or  form  they  could. 

Senator  Cohen.  I  am  talking  about  having  a  real  investigative 
SWAT  team  go  in  unannounced  and  make  periodic  "sweeps"  to  find 
out  what  kind  of  regulations  are  in  effect  and  what  security  meas- 
ures have  been  taken  or  not  taken. 

Mr.  Carter.  That  would  probably  work. 

Senator  Cohen.  How  are  they  going  to  cover  that  up? 

Mr.  Carter.  No,  I  guess  I  misunderstood  your  question.  A  little 
bit  of  that  would  go  a  long  way  toward  creating  the  right  mindset 
to  make  sure  that  things  are  complied  with,  most  definitely. 

Senator  Cohen.  Mr.  Vaughn,  as  I  listened  to  you,  I  jotted  down 
"Miami  Vice".  We  are  always  talking  about  television  and  the  im- 
pact of  television.  Is  art  imitating  life  or  is  life  imitating  art.  I  used 
to  watch  some  of  these  programs,  still  do  occasionally,  and  have 
thought  what  a  preposterous  caricature  of  life,  the  notion  that 
somehow  somebody  can  order  a  truck  full  of  anti — TOW  missiles  or 
Claymore  mines.  It  seems  preposterous,  just  Hollywood  or  the  net- 
works trying  to  promote  something  that  is  not,  in  fact,  true. 

Then  I  listen  to  you,  and  there  is  a  lot  of  credibility  that  one  can 
attach  now  to  these  various  programs.  In  fact,  it  seems  easy  for 
those  of  a  corrupt  mind  to  indeed  sell  these  small  arms  parts  for 
substantial  profits. 

I  will  take  a  second  look  at  the  programs  to  find  out  whether 
there  is  any  basis  of  truth,  but  you  make  it  sound  awfully  easy  that 
these  parts  are  getting  out  into  the  civilian  marketplace. 


30 

The  question  I  have  is  should  we  prohibit  the  sale  of  miUtary 
weaponry  at  a  commercial  level?  I  know  I  am  going  to  get  a  lot  of 
mail  on  this,  but  the  question  is,  is  that  a  policy  this  country 
should  adopt? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  I  don't  know  if  I  should  answer  that  and  still  be 
able  to  go  back  to  work. 

I  think,  first  of  all,  that  I  should  clarify  that  the  violence  and  the 
weaponry,  that  the  routine,  everyday  street  gang  member  has. 
Military  weaponry  plays  a  small,  a  very  small  part  in  what  is 
available.  They  can  purchase  much  better  weaponry  on  the  street 
at  a  much  cheaper  price  than  looking  for  the  military  hardware. 

The  thing  I  do  want  to  make  clear  is  that  it  is  all  available.  It 
is  all  out  there,  it  is  all  being  used  and  being  seen. 

Senator  Cohen.  Can  you  purchase  Claymore  mines  out  on  the 
street? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Not  on  a  routine  basis,  but  you  can  find  the  indi- 
vidual that  will  supply  you  with  military  explosives  of  a  variety  of 
kinds.  The  average  street  g£uig  member  wouldn't  be  trained  in  that 
and  how  to  use  it,  but  we  do  recover  them  occasionally  in  our 
search  warrants  and  various  raids.  Mostly  being  used  and  stock- 
piled by  your  non-traditional  type  organized  crime,  motorcycle 
gangs  and  other  groups,  for  inter-gang  warfare  as  opposed  to  used 
against  the  police  department.  But  those  items  in  themselves  are 
inherently  dangerous.  They  have  a  history  of  bad  things  happening 
when  you  play  with  them. 

As  far  as  the 

Senator  Cohen.  I  just  want  to  clarify  the  point.  Is  it  a  substan- 
tial problem  that  large  amounts  of  military  hardware  is,  in  fact, 
ending  up  in  the  hands  of  gang  members,  or  is  it  a  small  fraction? 
Which  is  it? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  It  is  available.  Large  amounts  of  military  hardware 
are  available.  They  are  not  available  on  the  street  comer  to  the  av- 
erage individual  criminal.  You  get  into  your  more  sophisticated  or- 
ganized groups,  yes.  Some  of  your  survivalists  and  those  type  of  or- 
ganizations have  a  tremendous  amount  of  the  military  hardware 
available.  But  it  is  not  sold  on  the  street  comer  per  se  to  the  aver- 
age gang  member.  Some  of  it — and  a  lot  of  it  does  wind  up  in  their 
hands  through  thefts  or  through  sales  at  gun  shows  by  people  that 
don't  really  realize  what  they  are  doing. 

Senator  Cohen.  I  guess  the  question  I  really  have,  and  I  will  end 
here,  Mr.  Chairman,  but  if  you  have,  for  example,  a  legitimate  gun 
dealer,  and  you  have  indicated  before  that  sometimes  you  find  he 
or  she  would  have  a  military  weapon  still  in  the  package,  un- 
opened  

Mr.  Vaughn.  That  in  itself  would  be  illegal. 

Senator  Cohen.  OK. 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Those  are  the  types  of  things — you  are  not  going 
to  go  to  a  gun  show  and  see  a  LAW  rocket  for  sale  or  an  M16  rifle, 
because  they  are  illegal  to  possess,  those  particular  items. 

Senator  COHEN.  OK. 

Mr.  Vaughn.  You  can  buy  the  parts  to  assemble  one,  if  you 
would  like,  or  to  convert  an  automatic  weapon,  or  the  ammunition. 
You  can  buy  machine  gun  parts  at  these  shows.  But  on  the  other 


31 

hand,  there  are  dealers  out  there  that  do  deal  in  military  hard- 
ware, the  weapons  themselves. 

Senator  COHEN.  But  that  is  illegal  under  existing  law,  is  it  not? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Correct. 

Senator  COHEN.  That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you. 

The  attractiveness  of  military  weapons,  it  seems  to  me  we  have 
some  200  million  handguns  in  the  country  now,  so  they  are  readily 
available,  as  you  say.  Is  the  attractiveness  of  military  weapons,  is 
it  a  prestige  matter  among  gang  members,  and  going  from  a  semi- 
automatic to  an  automatic  weapon,  is  that  more  prestige  than  it  is 
actual  combat  requirement  on  the  streets  or  what? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  There  is  some  of  that  Rambo  mentality  out  there, 
but  I  think  in  general  these  individuals  buy  what  is  available, 
whatever  is  presented  to  them.  What  they  don't  buy,  they  steal.  So 
they  are  going  to  take  what  is  readily  available. 

Senator  Cohen.  Are  there  any  stolen  Humvees  out  there? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Not  that  I  am  aware  of. 

Chairman  Glenn.  But  there  will  be  one  of  these  days. 

Mr.  Vaughn.  There  could  be. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Just  one  other  question.  Mr.  Carter,  in  your 
testimony  you  say,  "a  black  market  network  that  is  across  the 
country  which  buys  stolen  small  arms  parts  from  different  National 
Guard  units". 

Could  you  elaborate  on  that  a  little?  Is  this  an  organized  net- 
work, or  are  you  referring  just  to  a  general  sales  pattern  across 
country?  Is  this  really  an  organized  effort  run  by  somebody  who 
runs  a  network  who  does  this  on  an  organized  basis,  or  were  you 
talking  more  in  general  terms? 

Mr.  Carter.  When  it  came  to  wholesale  selling  of  repair  parts, 
weapons  parts,  I  dealt  with  three  companies  in  three  separate 
States,  California,  New  Jersey,  and  Illinois.  The  organization  in  Il- 
linois supplies  an  incredible  area  of  our  country.  Actually,  all  three 
of  those  businesses  supply,  I  don't  know,  50  or  60  percent  of  the 
country  when  it  comes  to  those  parts  specifically. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Does  organized  crime  get  into  this?  Is  there  an 
organized  crime  network  of  weapons  parts? 

Mr.  Carter.  I  don't  know  if  the  person  I  dealt  with  was  involved 
with  organized  crime.  That  is  something  that  would  have  to  be 
checked  out  by  someone  else.  He  paid  cash.  He  would  pay  you  in 
any  way  you  wanted  it.  He  would  have  it  sent  einywhere  you  want- 
ed it.  You  send  him  the  parts  UPS.  He  would  meet  you  anywhere 
to  buy  them,  any  State. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Did  you  have  any  knowledge  of  his  other  con- 
tacts? Were  there  other  people  within  your  National  Guard  unit 
that  he  worked  with  also?  Were  you  aware  of  any  other  contacts? 

Mr.  Carter.  Not  through  him,  not  through  him,  but  other  associ- 
ates in  the  Guard  and  people  that  I  have  done  business  in  the  past, 
it  was  common  knowledge  of  who  this  guy  was  and  who  other  peo- 
ple were  in  the  business,  so  to  speak.  It  was  well  known. 
Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you. 
Do  you  have  anything  else,  Senator  Cohen? 
Senator  Cohen.  One  final  point.  Mr.  Vaughn,  you  indicated  that 
gang  members  are  actually  recruited  to  go  into  the  military,  either 


32 

the  Guard  or  active  duty,  because  of  pressure  to  fill  quotas.  My  un- 
derstanding was  we  are  tr5ring  to  "downsize"  the  military  and  have 
a  smaller  fighting  force,  so  where  is  the  pressure  to  allow  gang 
members  to  slip  in  under  the  net? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Having  retired  in  1990,  the  downsizing  is  a  new 
thing,  I  think,  for  a  lot  of  people.  But  when  I  was  in  the  Guard, 
I  had  people  enrolled  in  my  unit  that  didn't  exist.  They  virtually 
did  not  exist.  They  were  taken  out  of  a  phone  book  or  created.  I 
had  criminals  in  my  organizations,  in  my  Guard  units,  narcotics  or- 
ganization, and  gang  members. 

I  always  asked  myself,  how  do  these  people  get  recruited?  How 
do  they  get  in  there?  During  those  days,  there  was  a  tremendous 
amount  of  pressure  put  on  recruiters  to  produce  numbers,  bodies 
as  opposed  to  qusdified  folks. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  have  been  members  of  the  military  that 
have  become  involved  in  gang  activity.  In  the  last  four  or  5  years, 
and  of  course  now  that  some  of  these  bases  are  going  to  be  gone 
out  of  my  area  and  it  won't  be  my  problem  anymore,  but  we  had 
50  or  60  members  of  a  motorcycle  gang  that  were  active  members 
of  the  military  living  on  one  post  together  that  we  had  problems 
with. 

Senator  COHEN.  Kind  of  a  symbiotic  relationship  between  the 
gang  members  influencing  the  military  and  the  military  influencing 
the  gang  members? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  Exactly.  My  apologies  to  Mr.  Carter.  I  didn't  mean 
my  statement  to  be  pointed  at  him,  but  there  are  people  whose  sole 
purpose  is  to  use  the  military  as  a  shopping  network  as  opposed 
to  those  folks  who  don't  really  realize  some  of  the  things  that  they 
do  when  they  sell  a  boxload  of  small  parts.  It  may  be  insignificant 
to  them  but  a  lot  more  significant  to  folks  like  me  that  see  them 
on  the  street  in  the  hands  of  people  that  shouldn't  have  them. 

Senator  COHEN.  Thank  you  very  much. 

That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  say  you  had  fake  people  on  the  roster, 
people  that  didn't  exist?  Did  I  hear  you  correctly? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  That  is  correct,  sir. 

ChairmEin  GLENN.  You  mean  they  just  put  a  name  on  the  roster? 
What  happened  when  you  had  drill  days  and  so  on? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  They  were  counted  AWOL  for  up  to  2  years,  never 
showed  up  for  their  basic  induction  training,  but  we  had  to  keep 
them  on  the  books  to  show  that  we  had  a  fiill-size  military  unit. 
We  fought  that  for  years  and  years  and  years. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Did  somebody  get  their  pay,  or  what 

Mr.  Vaughn.  There  was  no  pay  because  they  never  showed  up. 
They  were  inducted  into  the  military,  they  had  a  name,  a  social  se- 
curity number,  but  they  never  showed  up  for  basic  training,  and  we 
carried  them  AWOL.  I  reported  them  AWOL  every  month.  I 
couldn't  find  them  in  the  State  system,  I  couldn't  find  them  in  the 
computer  system,  no  address,  no  home  phone  number.  Eventually 
we  ended  up  discharging  them  after  approximately  2  years,  but  it 
kept  our  military  strength  reporting  up.  We  had  a  full-size  unit  on 
the  books.  We  went  through  that  for  years. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Have  you  ever  seen  that,  Mr.  Carter? 


33 

Mr.  Carter.  I  have  seen  things  Hke  that.  It  was  fairly  common. 
There  is  a  lot  of  pressure  on  commanders  to  have  the  numbers 
where  they  should  be  as  far  as  people. 

Chairman  GLENN.  Did  you  find  fake  names  on  there  where  bod- 
ies didn't  exist  to  match  those  names? 

Mr.  Carter.  They  would  have  addresses  and  phone  numbers 
that  were  a  comer  somewhere  in  Detroit,  a  phone  booth,  that  was 
the  address  and  their  phone  number,  and  they  would  show  up  long 
enough  to  get  issued  a  full  set  of  gear,  which  they  would  promptly 
take  down  to  the  pawn  shop  and  sell,  and  that  was  the  last  you 
ever  heard  of  this  person. 

Senator  COHEN.  Mr.  Chairman,  we  have  had  stealth  fighters  but 
now  we  have  phantom  soldiers.  It  is  quite  revealing.  I  am  sure  in 
your  Subcommittee  on  Armed  Services  you  will  want  to  examine 
end  strength  numbers. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  do,  indeed.  We  both  are  on  the  Armed 
Services  Committee,  and  until  just  this  year  I  was  chairman  of  the 
Personnel  Subcommittee  in  which  we  worked  very,  very  hard  to  try 
and  get  the  Guard  and  reserve  in  the  proper  roles  and  missions 
and  so  on.  It  is  very  disturbing  to  hear  this.  This  is  something  new. 
We  had  occasional  cases,  but  you  are  indicating  that  this  was  not 
uncommon  at  all,  I  gather,  is  that  correct? 

Mr.  Vaughn.  It  was  not  uncommon  for  at  least  the  California 
National  Guard  system,  but  I  think  the  key,  as  the  Senator  ex- 
plained, is  that  with  the  downsizing,  I  think  there  can  now  prob- 
ably be  an  emphasis  on  quality  as  opposed  to  quantity,  and  I  think 
that  that  will  probably  eliminate  the  pressure  to  recruit  to  full 
strength. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  can  hardly  measure  the  quality  if  the 
quantity  is  zero.  We  may  want  to  follow  up  with  you  later  on  and 
follow  up  on  this  particular  issue. 

We  are  going  to  have  to  move  along  here.  Thank  you.  We  may 
have  other  questions  for  you.  We  would  appreciate  a  response  so 
that  we  can  include  it  in  the  record. 

Chairman  Glenn.  The  next  witness  is  General  Leon  Salomon, 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff,  Logistics,  Department  of  the  Army. 

General  Salomon,  we  welcome  you  this  morning. 

General  Salomon.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  You  have  heard  our  testimony  this  morning. 
I  am  sure  you  find  it  disturbing,  as  we  do. 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  look  forward  to  your  testimony.  Thank  you 
for  being  here  this  morning. 

TESTIMONY  OF  LIEUTENANT  GENERAL  LEON  E.  SALOMON, 
DEPUTY  CfflEF  OF  STAFF,  LOGISTICS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE 
ARMY 

General  Salomon.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  Lieutenant  General  Leon 
Salomon,  the  Army's  Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  for  Logistics.  Thank  you 
very  much  for  the  opportunity  to  appear  here  today  to  address  the 
General  Accounting  Office's  report  on  internal  controls  over  small 
arms. 

With  your  permission,  I  have  a  written  statement  I  would  like 
to  submit  for  the  record.  I  will  summarize  its  key  points. 


34 

Chairman  Glenn.  It  will  be  included  in  its  entirety. 

General  Salomon.  As  the  GAO  testified  earlier,  they  conducted 
a  review  of  small  arms  parts  control  at  six  Army  locations,  three 
active  and  three  National  Guard,  between  November  1991  and  Jan- 
uary 1993.  For  reasons  which  I  both  understand  and  agree  with, 
I  have  not  been  provided  a  copy  of  the  report  we  are  discussing 
today.  We  got  that  as  the  meeting  started.  However,  my  staff  has 
been  briefed  on  its  content. 

Simply  put,  the  GAO  found  problems.  Our  internal  controls  need 
strengthening,  management  was  inattentive,  physical  security 
lapses  were  noted,  and  the  automated  supply  system  that  was 
operational  at  the  sites  GAO  visited  was  vulnerable  to  abuse.  Sir, 
not  good  news. 

At  the  outset,  let  me  say  that  my  top  and  bottom  lines  are  the 
same.  The  GAO's  findings,  especially  those  that  indicate  an  oppor- 
tunity for  criminal  activity,  deeply  concern  me  both  as  a  soldier 
and  as  a  citizen  of  this  great  country.  The  Army  needs  to  improve. 
GAO's  recommendations  have  my  full  attention,  and  corrective  ac- 
tion will  be  taken. 

Small  arms,  such  as  light  machine  guns,  pistols,  rifles,  and  shot- 
guns are  authorized  in  £dmost  every  Army  unit  around  the  world. 
In  fact,  we  now  have  over  four  million  small  arms  in  our  inventory. 
Most  are  entrusted  to  commanders  of  approximately  19,000  com- 
pany-size units. 

These  weapons  are  made  up  of  many  individual  parts  and  assem- 
bles, such  as  barrels,  bolts,  buttstocks,  hand  guards,  firing  pins, 
and  sear  springs.  Millions  of  parts  must  be  readily  available  for  the 
repair  of  these  weapons  across  the  entire  spectrum  of  the  Army, 
and  that  includes  the  battlefield,  so  that  our  soldiers'  weapons  are 
ready  when  needed. 

Mr.  Chairman,  for  example,  the  M16A2  rifle  alone  has  109  dif- 
ferent repair  parts. 

Our  logistics  system,  especially  at  the  troop  level,  must  be  able 
to  support  power  projection  and  the  rapid  deployment  of  forces  to 
and  from  any  place  in  the  world.  For  example,  we  sent  additional 
troops  to  Somalia  last  month.  The  first  increment  was  an  imme- 
diate reaction  company  from  the  24th  Division  at  Fort  Stewart.  We 
alerted  them  on  Saturday,  and  by  Tuesday  they  are  on  the  ground 
in  Mogadishu  with  14  Bradley  fighting  vehicles,  four  Abrams 
tanks,  210  soldiers,  along  with  their  equipment,  ammunition,  small 
arms,  small  arms  parts,  and  computers. 

Today's  military  mission  presents  us  with  the  challenge  of  strik- 
ing a  balance  between  control  and  the  ready  availability  of  needed 
items.  On  any  given  day,  in  addition  to  our  forward  deployed 
troops,  there  are  over  20,000  soldiers  deployed  throughout  the 
world. 

This  Committee  knows  better  than  most  that  America's  Army  is 
going  through  a  period  of  massive  change,  reshaping,  and  reduc- 
tion. Between  1989  and  30  September  of  this  year,  208,000  active 
and  91,000  reserve  soldiers  have  left  the  Army.  We  have  reduced 
our  troop  strength  in  Europe  by  50  percent. 

Sir,  despite  these  challenges,  you  should  not  be  tolerant  of  our 
mistakes  or  relax  the  standards.  I  make  this  point  because  as 


35 

America's  Army  is  rapidly  changing,  we  welcome  another  set  of 
eyes.  The  GAO  provides  those  eyes. 

The  GAO  report  signals  that  we  have  improvements  to  make  in 
internal  controls,  automated  systems,  and  physical  security.  By 
strengthening  internal  controls,  we  can  improve  our  inventory 
management,  ensure  tighter  accountability,  and  reduce  the  risk  of 
theft  by  those  few — I  repeat,  those  few  in  our  force  with  criminal 
intent. 

Current  Army  policy  includes  many  provisions  designed  to  re- 
duce the  risk  of  loss  and  theft.  For  example,  regulations  restrict  ac- 
cess to  specific  parts,  limit  on-hand  quantities,  require  periodic  in- 
ventories, and  mandate  command  review  of  stockage  levels.  Army 
regulations  gdso  require  physical  security  inspection  of  all  arms 
rooms  at  least  every  18  months. 

If  an  inventory  or  physical  security  inspection  reveals  a  loss  and 
negligence  is  suspected  or  the  loss  involves  a  sensitive  item,  the 
commander  must  appoint  an  officer  to  conduct  a  complete  inves- 
tigation. When  criminal  activity  is  suspected,  the  investigation  is 
referred  to  the  appropriate  law  enforcement  agency. 

I  am  particularly  concerned  by  GAO's  findings  and  believe  that 
the  Army's  retail  supply  system,  which  is  called  SARSS-1  interim, 
is  vulnerable  to  abuse.  Corrections  to  many  of  the  deficiencies 
noted  by  the  GAO  are  incorporated  into  an  enhanced  version  of  the 
system  we  are  currently  fielding.  I  will  closely  study  this  aspect  of 
the  report  to  learn  how  we  can  improve. 

Since  the  GAO  visit  to  the  six  sites  discussed  in  the  report,  the 
Army  has  taken  corrective  actions  concerning  the  deficiencies.  The 
Army  is  implementing  a  policy  that  separates  the  duties  of  the  in- 
dividuEils  who  inspect  and  repair  the  arms  from  those  who  main- 
tain the  shop  stock  records. 

At  Fort  Benning,  a  separate  security  cage  has  been  built  for  the 
storage  of  small  arms  parts.  The  801st  Maintenance  Battalion  at 
Fort  Campbell  will  move  by  February  1994  to  a  facility  with  a 
vault  for  sensitive  and  pilferable  small  arms  parts. 

The  National  Guard  has  been  conducting  unannounced  audits  of 
small  arms  parts  control  since  last  year.  This  has  also  been  a  key 
area  of  attention  during  the  Guard's  recent  logistics  review. 

The  Army  has  been  focusing  £ind  will  continue  to  focus  the  need 
on  compliance  and  internal  controls.  The  Secretary  of  the  Army  in 
August  1992  and  again  in  October  of  this  year  emphasized  the  im- 
portance of  internal  controls  to  ensure  effective  management,  mis- 
sion accomplishment,  and  stewardship  of  public  resources.  Addi- 
tionally, internal  management  control  checklists  as  well  as  com- 
mand supply  discipline  program  checklists  require  inspection  of 
these  critical  areas. 

Over  the  past  IV2  years,  I  have  spoken  to  every  major  Army  com- 
mand commander,  every  corps  commander,  every  division  com- 
mander, every  brigade  commander  and  battalion  commander  on 
this  subject  of  internal  controls.  I  will  continue  to  emphasize  to 
commanders  and  supervisors  up  and  down  the  chain  the  impor- 
tance of  complying  with  existing  policy,  focusing  on  their  lawfiil  re- 
sponsibility to  reduce  the  risk  of  mismanagement  and  criminal  ac- 
tivity and  taking  appropriate  and  expeditious  action. 


36 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  GAO  review  shows  America's  Army  must  im- 
prove. We  can,  and  we  will. 

The  Army  has  recognized  these  problems  in  its  annual  assurance 
statement  prepared  under  the  Federal  Managers'  Integrity  Act  and 
is  taking  action  to  correct  them.  We  have  been  reporting  a  material 
weakness  on  our  problem  with  small  arms  parts  in  the  National 
Guard  since  1991.  Based  on  my  understanding  of  this  report  that 
we  are  discussing  today,  I  have  expanded  this  material  weakness 
to  address  the  issue  on  an  Army-wide  basis. 

The  Army  has  also  been  carrying  property  accountability  as  a  de- 
partmental weakness  since  1989.  Our  corrective  actions  increased 
departmental  oversights  of  property  accountability  trends. 

I  have  directed  my  command  logistics  review  team  to  focus  on 
the  management  of  small  arms  parts  at  every  location  they  visit 
this  year.  The  Army  Inspector  General  will  also  be  conducting  a 
special  review  of  small  arms  parts  this  year.  Our  commanders  will 
be  directed  to  place  additionsd  emphasis  on  this  in  their  command 
inspection  programs. 

I  will  use  the  GAO's  vulnerability  analysis  of  the  Army's  interim 
supply  system  to  identify  potential  enhancements  to  that  system 
and  explore  the  cost  effectiveness  of  further  improvements  to  our 
objective  system.  The  objective  system  is  a  real-time  system  that 
would  have  prevented  many  of  the  noted  security  breaches. 

Members  of  the  Committee,  as  you  know,  the  purpose  of  our  lo- 
gistics system  is  to  be  agile,  supportive,  and  responsive  to  our  com- 
bat force.  We  continually  strive  to  find  the  proper  balance  between 
responsiveness  and  control.  This  report  will  assist  us  in  realigning 
that  balance. 

Sir,  our  policies  must  make  sense  at  the  soldier  level.  In  making 
policies  that  balance  responsiveness  and  control,  I  have  always 
been  guided  by  General  Eisenhower's  observation  that  farming 
takes  on  a  whole  different  meaning  when  a  pencil  is  your  plow  and 
you  are  a  thousand  miles  from  the  field. 

Sir,  you  have  my  commitment  that  the  issues  surfaced  today  will 
be  resolved.  Thanks  for  the  opportunity  to  appear.  I  welcome  your 
questions. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you.  General.  Thank  you  very  much. 

My  first  question  will  be:  I  think  this  is  fourth  report  on  this  spe- 
cific subject  over  3y2  years,  and  we  have  had  the  same  assurances 
every  time  we  have  come  out  with  another  report.  "We  have  talked 
to  our  commanders,  we  have  done  this,  we  have  done  that,  we  have 
done  something  else,"  and  yet  it  continues. 

I  accepted  at  face  value  previous  assurances  of  people  who  sat 
right  where  you  are  sitting  and  said  they  are  going  to  fix  it  up,  yet 
it  seems  to  me  that  what  we  are  dealing  with  here  is  not  new  com- 
mand structure,  is  not  new  organizations  or  whatever.  It  is  some- 
thing that  instills  in  people  honesty,  number  one,  and  a  way  to  find 
out  if  honesty  is  not  their  major  trait,  some  way  to  find  out  that 
they  are  stealing,  and  that  occurs  right  at  the  local  level.  That  oc- 
curs when  somebody  walks  out  of  the  warehouse  and  gets  in  their 
car  to  go  home  at  night. 

How  do  you  address  it  at  that  level?  Is  that  part  of  what  your 
commanders  are  going  to  address?  Are  we  going  to  have  gate 
checks?  I  hate  to  keep  bring  up  gate  checks,  because  maybe  that's 


37 

so  old  hat  you  don't  do  that  anjrmore  for  whatever  reason,  but  it 
used  to  work.  Is  anybody  instituting  such  a  commonplace  item  as 
that  these  days? 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  in  my  previous  life,  I  was  a  post  com- 
mander. We  did  not  use  gate  checks  all  the  time,  only  when  we  had 
indicators  through  our  internal  controls  program  that  problems 
were  going  on.  So  it  was  a  periodic  check  that  we  used.  Sir,  that 
is  something  we're  going  to  have  to  look  into  some  more. 

Chairman  Glenn,  ^e  your  internal  controls  good  enough  to 
know  when  this  is  going  on?  I  think  that  was  the  point  that  Mr. 
Carter  made,  that  nobody  knew  anything  about  what  was  going  on. 
They  had  only  been  audited  twice  in  10  years.  Nobody  knows  what 
is  going  on,  and  with  the  lists  of  what  material  he  got,  he  could 
fake  that  on  the  computers  and  nobody  knew  the  difference.  So 
how  are  you  going  to  know  when  things  are  being  stolen? 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  with  respect  to  the  computer  aspect  of  it, 
that  is  probably  one  of  the  most  vexing  problems  we  have  in  that 
we  have  designed  our  logistics  system  so  our  direct  support  units, 
the  ones  that  have  these  kinds  of  parts,  can  provide  them  to  a  mul- 
titude of  customers. 

So  what  happens  is  that  if  you  were  in  any  area  and  the  unit 
was  going  through  it  and  needed  a  particular  part  because  of  a 
weapon,  we  are  allowed  to  have  what  is  called  a  post-post  trans- 
action. We  issue  the  item  and  update  the  computer  later. 

We  would  have  to  change  our  doctrine  to  get  at  that  kind  of  situ- 
ation, and  that  is  why  I  say  that  is  one  of  our  most  vexing  prob- 
lems that  we  have. 

I  have  a  command  logistics  review  team.  Last  year,  we  went  to 
about  52  different  areas  and  inspected  physical  security  areas  and 
small  arms  rooms.  Our  results  were  not  as  bad  as  what  we  have 
found  on  the  GAO  report.  I  have  to  go  see  if  I  am  checking  the 
right  thing.  I  will  be  up  front,  sir.  We  were  not  specifically  looking 
at  these  six  parts  that  you  have  seen  here. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  don't  want  to  overblow  these  into  this  being 
the  be  all  and  end  all  of  the  problem.  It  is  not.  These  six  parts  are 
used  as  an  example  of  what  is  going  on,  an  example  that  we  are 
very  concerned  about.  But  I  am  also  concerned,  as  I  indicated, 
about  the  bigger  picture  of  everjrthing  that  is  going  out  the  front 
gate. 

You  made  a  major  point  out  of  the  fact  that  we  have  to  be  re- 
sponsive for  emergencies  and  you  are  going  to  Somalia  and  all  of 
that.  That  is  true,  but  responsiveness  doesn't  automatically  mean 
no  accountability,  and  I  am  sure  you  would  agree  with  that  state- 
ment. 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir,  absolutely. 

Chairman  Glenn.  And  accountability  goes  right  along  with  re- 
sponsiveness, just  as  much  overseas  as  it  does  here.  I  know  there 
are  going  to  be  losses  as  you  transfer  equipment  around,  and  that 
is  expected.  I  am  very  much  aware  of  that,  but  I  think  accountabil- 
ity has  to  be  built  into  this  system  wherever  we  are,  in  or  out  of 
the  country.  That  is  just  as  much  true  in  Somalia  as  it  is  right 
here. 


38 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  I  didn't  mean  to  imply  that.  If  I  did,  I 
apologize.  I  am  trying  to  talk  to  what  the  balance  is  between  the 
responsibility  and  the  control. 

Chairman  Glenn.  After  these  previous  reports  that  we  had  here, 
what  was  actually  done?  How  long  have  you  been  in  your  job? 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  I  have  been  in  the  job  about  a  year-and- 
a-half,  a  little  over  a  year. 

Chairman  Glenn.  So  some  of  this  occurred  before  you  were  on 
the  job.  Do  you  have  a  run-down  you  can  give  us  on  what  occurred 
starting  along  back  in  about  1990  when  the  first  report  came  out? 
We  thought  automatically  these  things  were  going  to  be  checked 
and  that  they  would  all  be  corrected.  Now  here  we  are  three  more 
reports  later  and  the  same  situation  exists. 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  Red  River  came  up  several  times  during 
the  testimony.  The  information  that  I  have  been  provided,  I  think 
there  were  39  or  so  major  deficiencies.  We  are  right  now,  the  last 
check  I  made,  35  of  those  39  deficiencies  have  been  corrected  and 
we  are  going  into  audit  to  see  if  the  last  four 

Chairman  Glenn.  How  about  the  other  bases,  though?  Have  they 
been  alerted  and  the  same  thing  has  been  taken  care  of  at  other 
bases  also,  not  just  the  ones  that  were  inspected?  These  were  just 
indicators  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  whole  system. 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir,  to  put  that  out — as  you  know,  some 
of  the  other  testimony  we  had  has  been  involved  with  inventory 
management  and  the  excess,  and  that  has  come  down  dramatically, 
the  excess  at  both,  which  is  part  of  this  problem,  because  the  more 
excess  you  have,  then  these  are  the  kinds  of  things  that  have  hap- 
pened. The  dollar  value  of  that  has  gone  down  dramatically  at  both 
what  we  say  the  retail  level  and  in  the  wholesale  level  in  the  Army 
Materiel  Command. 

Chairman  Glenn.  That  has  been  a  good  move,  I  might  add.  We 
pushed  that  on  the  Armed  Services  Committee  where  all  three  of 
us  serve.  Only  replace  the  65  percent  rule,  with  which  I  am  sure 
you  are  familiar. 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  We  only  replace  65  percent  until  we  draw  our 
stocks  down  to  about  a  level  where  they  should  be  instead  of  some 
of  the  excesses  we  have. 

General  Salomon.  One  of  the  areas,  and  this  is  not  meant  in  any 
way  as  an  excuse,  right  now  we  are  in  a  process  at  Anderson  Army 
Depot  demilling  over  one  million  small  arms  weapons. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Good  job. 

General  Salomon.  The  magnitude  of  what  we  have  in  front  of  us 
to  get  this  accomplished,  it  is  awesome  when  you  look  at  those 
numbers  and  then  you  add  up  the  parts  that  are  involved  that 
must  also  be  demilled  and  must  also  be  shredded. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  think  the  local  commanders  out  there  have 
to  get  on  something  like  this  of  all  kinds  of  pilfering.  I  don't  know 
whether  gate  checks  or  other  things,  or  barracks  searches,  or  what- 
ever are  the  answer.  If  it  offends  somebody,  well,  that  is  too  bad. 
I  was  offended  when  I  used  to  get  pulled  over  once  in  a  while,  too. 
But  it  seemed  to  me  that  we  didn't  have  the  same  kind  of  problem 


39 

we  have  now,  and  maybe  you  have  to  take  some  pretty  common- 
place actions  hke  that  and  deal  very,  very  harshly  with  people  that 
have  government  property  in  their  car  going  off  base. 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Cohen? 

Senator  Cohen.  General,  you  indicated  you  made  a  sweep  of  a 
number  of  bases  and  you  didn't  find  as  poor  a  result  as  GAO  did. 
What  kind  of  investigation  were  you  making? 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  as  the  desk  log,  I  have  what  is  called  a 
command  logistics  review  team  and  this  year,  they  will  go  out  to 
about  14  different  installations.  What  I  base  that  on  is  the  material 
weaknesses  that  we  have  submitted  in  the  Chief  Financial  Officers 
Act,  and  one  of  the  areas  we  wanted  to  look  at  was  property  ac- 
countability and  physical  security  in  arms  rooms.  We  aJso  have 
checkhsts  that  have  been  published  for  each  one  of  the  units  to  do 
that.  So  we  scoped  in  on  this  physical  security  point  of  view. 

Now  I  would  be  the  first  to  say  this  is  another  set  of  eyes  for  us. 
We  weren't  looking  into  these  parts  specifically,  but  we  were  look- 
ing into  the  physical  security  aspects  of  that.  To  try  and  get  at  that 
some  more,  as  Senator  Glenn  was  mentioning,  this  is  the  first  year 
we  will  have  the  IG  looking  at  this. 

Senator  COHEN.  What  happened  when  you  found  deficiencies? 
What  did  you  do? 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  the  system  is — this  is  an  assistance  pro- 
gram— a  good  question.  What  we  do,  I  provide  that  to  the  local 
commander.  That  is  our  policy.  And  it  is  up  to  the  local  commander 
to  take  the  appropriate  action.  What  I  have  done  personally,  be- 
cause I  know  most  all  these  corps  commanders,  I  then  sit  down  and 
write  them  a  letter  to  make  sure  that  this  has  been  brought  aware 
and  is  not  down  inside  the  staff  and  the  information  does  not  get 
up  to  them. 

Senator  COHEN.  Now  what  happens  at  this  point?  Suppose  you 
have  found  particular  deficiencies  and  have  written  a  letter  saying. 
Commander,  this  is  the  problem  we  have.  Do  you  go  back  again  to 
find  out  whether  or  not  he 

General  Salomon.  Presently  we  do  not,  sir. 

Senator  Cohen.  Don't  you  think  that,  at  a  minimum,  what  you 
have  to  do  is  set  the  standards  and  then  insist  that  the  base  com- 
manders be  responsible? 

General  SALOMON.  Yes  sir. 

Senator  Cohen,  I  mentioned  before  the  possibility  of  going  in  on 
a  sweep  and  making  a  real  investigation  and  then  holding  the  base 
commander.  Should  that  be  done? 

General  Salomon,  Sir,  that  is  one  thing  that  we  are  going  to 
have  to  reconsider,  because  in  the  past,  we  have  empowered  the 
commanders  to  do  that,  to  take  those  appropriate  actions.  Now  we 
have  some  additional  information  that  we  have  got  to  go  back  and 
look  to  see  if  we  need  to  change  that  policy. 

Senator  Cohen.  Do  you  intend  to  implement  some,  or  all,  of  the 
GAO  recommendations? 

General  Salomon,  Sir,  naturally  after  we  go  through  the  review 
and  if  there  are  some  points  of  differences,  we  will  go  through  that, 
and  there  is  a  process  for  doing  that  through  the  Army  and  the 
DOD  IG. 


40 

Senator  COHEN.  Were  you  stunned  by  the  testimony  of  Mr. 
Vaughn  that  they  have  phantom  Guardsmen? 

General  SALOMON.  Yes  sir. 

Senator  Cohen.  Is  that  a  problem  that  you  have  ever  been  aware 
of? 

General  Salomon.  Not  in  my  career,  and  that  is  one  of  the  rea- 
sons I  came  here  to  sit  through  it  all,  because  this  is  a — I  think 
you  had  indicated,  and  Senator  Glenn,  it  is  very  helpful  to  get 
these  various  types  of  information,  because  when  you  are  making 
these  policies,  all  the  input  that  you  can  get  is  very,  very  helpful. 
But  the  answer  to  your  question  is  yes,  I  was  stunned. 

Senator  COHEN.  General,  I  will  just  conclude  by  saying  I  think 
we  all  recognize  there  has  been  an  attitude  problem.  If  you  don't 
set  the  standards  at  the  top,  if  you  don't  really  insist  upon  the 
proper  attitude  at  the  top,  then  those  at  the  bottom  are  going  to 
take  advantage  of  the  system  and  exploit  it.  I  would  seriously  rec- 
ommend that  you  institute  some  kind  of  a  system  whereby  you  will 
go  in  without  notice  periodically  and  conduct  a  base  check. 

If  you  find  deficiencies,  you  should  hold  that  base  commander  ac- 
countable. He  or  she  should  have  known  about  the  deficiencies  and 
there  should  be  consequences,  real  consequences,  for  failing  to 
measure  up  to  the  standards  that  will  be  set. 

That  is  all  I  have,  Mr.  Chairman. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Senator  Levin? 

Senator  Levin.  Thank  you,  Mr.  Chairman. 

First,  let  me  commend  you  again,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  your  leader- 
ship. This  is  a  very,  very  disturbing  area,  and  our  Chairman  has 
performed  an  important  role  here,  and  an  important  function  by  in- 
sisting that  this  problem  be  solved  once  and  for  all.  It  is  awfully 
frustrating  for  him  and  for  us  on  the  Committee  to  come  back 
again,  for  I  don't  know  how  many  times,  and  basically  hear  the 
same  story  from  the  GAO  and  the  same  commitment  from  the  per- 
son sitting  in  that  chair. 

Are  you  going  to  take  personal  responsibility  to  cure  this  matter? 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Senator  Levin.  Do  you  have  any  idea  how  many  people  have 
been  arrested  for  theft  of  small  arms  and  small  arms  parts? 

General  Salomon.  No  sir,  I  will  submit  that  for  the  record. 

Senator  Levin.  Would  you  do  that? 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Senator  Levin.  And  would  you  also  tell  us  what  has  happened 
to  them? 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir. 

Senator  Levin.  If  you  have  had  100  people  arrested  and  50  peo- 
ple tried  and  18  people  convicted  and  what  their  sentences  were, 
would  you  be  specific  about  that? 

General  Salomon.  Yes  sir.  We  tried  to  anticipate  that,  but  you 
have  to  go  out  to  each  individual  installation  and  go  back  and  look 
at  the 

Senator  Levin.  That  may  be  one  way  of  sending  a  signal  to  each 
installation  as  to  what  we  are  about  here,  because  obviously  this 
is  not  going  to  be  tolerated. 

General  SALOMON.  Yes  sir. 


41 

Senator  Levin.  You  know,  this  small  arms  theft  problem  reminds 
me  a  little  bit  of  the  Energizer  bunny.  It  just  keeps  going  and  going 
and  going.  We  think  we  finally  get  someone  truly  energized  to  end 
it  and  it  just  keeps  going  on. 

The  ramifications  here  are  both  fiscal  but  also  physical.  The 
parts  that  get  out,  as  the  Chairmein  has  demonstrated,  threaten 
our  law  enforcement  people,  threaten  our  innocent  citizens  out  on 
the  street.  Our  own  Army  product  is  out  there  killing  our  people, 
not  the  bad  guys,  our  good  guys. 

The  other  part  of  it  is  fiscal.  I  just  came  from  a  meeting  of  the 
Armed  Services  Committee  on  the  nomination  of  the  new  Secretary 
of  the  Army,  and  people  are  talking  about  the  lack  of  resources.  We 
had  a  whole  bunch  of  folks  yesterday  voting  against  the  defense 
budget  who  are  very  strong  on  defense  as  a  protest  against  the  cut 
in  the  size  of  the  defense  budget. 

When  we  waste  resources,  as  we  are  wasting  them  with  this  kind 
of  a  situation,  we  are  jeopardizing  our  very  security  in  terms  of 
what  we  need  to  be  doing  with  our  defense  dollars.  In  addition,  as 
the  Chairman  has  pointed  out,  we  end  up  threatening  our  own  peo- 
ple by  the  pilferage  of  parts  and  equipment  which  end  up  upgrad- 
ing a  semi-automatic  to  an  automatic,  for  instance,  or  a  machine 
gun. 

The  Chairman  and  others  on  this  Committee,  I  know,  are  seri- 
ous. I  don't  know  what  more  can  be  done,  other  than  to  impress 
upon  you  that  seriousness  and  to  require  that  you  get  back  to  the 
Committee  with  your  response  to  the  GAO  report.  I  don't  know 
that  that  has  been  specifically  requested  of  you,  but  I  am  sure  that 
£dl  of  us  would  want  to  know. 

You  said  you  are  going  to  sit  down  with  the  GAO  and  go  through 
their  recommendations.  It  is  your  intent  to  implement  all  of  them, 
but  we,  I  am  sure,  would  like  to  know  what  specifically  you  are 
going  to  do  to  implement  each  one  of  those.  If  the  Chairman  hasn't 
already  asked,  I  am  sure  that  he  would  not  have  any  problem  with 
the  request  that  you  get  back  to  us  with  that. 

Chairman  Glenn.  That  is  fine. 

Senator  Levin.  The  key  to  me  is  responsibility,  yours  and  the 
commanders  on  the  scene.  Something  is  going  to  give  here.  It  is 
pretty  obvious  that  something  is  going  to  happen  that  will  shake 
up  this  system  dramatically  from  on  high  rather  than  from  below, 
unless  you  folks  can  figure  it  out  for  yourself.  The  right  way  to  do 
it  is  for  you  to  figure  it  out  and  do  it.  But  if  you  don't,  you  are 
going  to  find  some  Congressionsd  rearrangement  of  the  whole  oper- 
ation. 

We  in  Congress  shouldn't  be  micro-mginaging.  Lord  knows,  but 
what  are  our  options  when  year  after  year  after  year  the  GAO 
comes  back  and  tells  us  almost  in  the  same  words  as  they  did  pre- 
viously what  the  problem  is. 

I  mean,  you  could  almost  take  this  GAO  report,  when  you  go 
through  it,  and  see  it  is  the  same  problem:  large  and  consistent 
problems  of  small  arms  parts;  number  of  reported  incidences  of 
theft;  significant  circumstantial  evidence  that  they  are  not  isolated 
cases;  that  the  Army  has  assigned  a  low  priority  to  depot  missions, 
including  control  and  security  of  inventory  items;  the  Army  has 
failed  to  conduct  oversight  and  monitoring  activities.  I  mean,  I 


BOSTON  PUBLIC  LIBRARY 


42  3  9999  05982  924  0 

think  if  you  compared  the  report  that  we  got  today  with  the  one 
a  year  or  two  ago,  it  is  almost  word  for  word  the  same  problem. 

General  I  don't  want  to  beat  up  on  you  too  much  because  I  know 
you  are  trying  the  best  you  can,  but  you  have  to  do  better. 

General  Salomon.  I  agree,  sir. 

Senator  Levin.  And  finally,  I  just  want  to  raise  one  quick  point 
with  you.  You  very  carefully  stated  relative  to  excess  inventory 
that  the  dollar  value  has  gone  down,  most  of  that  through  reevalu- 
ation.  In  other  words,  most  of  the  dollar  value  reduction  in  inven- 
tory has  come  just  because  it  has  been  revalued  rather  than  that 
the  physical  amount  of  the  inventory  has  been  reduced,  and  that 
is  an  area  that  my  Subcommittee  has  gotten  into  particularly.  The 
full  Committee  has  as  well,  and  we  will  be  proceeding  to  make  in- 
quiry about  the  excess  inventory  issue. 

General  SALOMON.  Yes,  I  think,  sir,  I  will  be  over  there  talking 
to  you  on  this  also. 

Senator  Levin.  I  just  want  to  let  you  know  that  we  are  pressing 
forward  with  that  and  that  everyone  should  realize  that  there  is  a 
big  difference  between  the  dollar  value  of  excess  inventory  going 
down  and  whether  the  physical  inventory  has  gone  down.  We  are 
going  to  press  that  latter  issue  with  you,  and  thank  you  very  much. 

General  Salomon.  Sir,  if  I  could  give  one  response,  and  please, 
I  don't  mean  this  to  be  as  if  I  am  trying  to  dilute  the  report,  but 
one  thing  we  have  to  work  with  the  GAO  on  this,  we  have  a  dif- 
ferent opinion  on  if  all  of  these  pgirts  have  come  from  a  military 
weapons  room.  Some  of  our  research  preliminarily  indicates  that 
these  are  also  readily  available  and  sold  commercially,  so  we  have 
to  see  how  much  of  that  came  from 

Senator  Levin.  That  is  fair  enough. 

General  SALOMON.  Sir,  we  have  to  work  with  the  GAO  on  that. 

Senator  Levin.  If  you  reach  a  different  conclusion,  just  let  us 
know. 

Chairman  GLENN.  Good.  That  is  fine,  and  I  welcome  that.  I  don't 
like  sending  GAO  in  once  a  year  or  once  every  6  months  as  a 
watchdog  here.  They  make  their  report  and  then  they  are  off  in  a 
vacuum  someplace  here.  I  think  you  should  be  working  together 
with  GAO  and  making  suggestions  regarding  their  findings.  That 
can  help  you  and  vice  versa.  I  don't  have  any  problem  at  all  with 
you  working  together  on  this. 

Let  me  follow  up  a  little  bit,  though,  on  what  Senator  Levin  was 
talking  about.  We  went  back  a  bit  in  the  record.  In  1986,  we  had 
a  Senate  task  force  on  inventory  management  chaired  by  then-Sen- 
ator, now  Governor  of  California  Pete  Wilson.  The  report  came  out 
that  the  Army  had  incomplete  documentation  of  its  inventory  and 
inadequate  physical  security. 

Here  we  are  7  years  later,  and  every  time  we  try  and  get  into 
an  investigation  like  this,  we  are  told  we  are  trying  to  micro-man- 
age again.  "Why  don't  we  get  out  of  everybody's  hair  over  there  and 
let  them  run  their  shop?" 

Yet  here  we  sire  7  years  later  and  I  personally  have  been  through 
four  GAO  reports  and  I  don't  want  to  chair  a  fifth. 

General  Salomon.  Yes.  Right. 


43 

Chairman  Glenn.  That  is  my  bottom  hne  on  it.  I  hope  you  can 
straighten  this  out.  I  think  we  need  to  commit  right  now  to  a  hear- 
ing on  this  sometime  next  summer  or  sometime  7  or  8  months  from 
now  so  that  we  can  see  what  progress  is  being  made. 

Another  comment  was  made  also  by  Senator  Levin  about  our  ac- 
counts here.  These  accounts  in  the  Armed  Service  Committee  are 
very  serious.  I  chair  the  Readiness  Subcommittee  and  that  has  all 
the  operations  and  maintenance  accounts  (O&M).  I  had  to  take  a 
$2  billion  hit  on  that  and  I  fought  that  tooth  and  toenail. 

General  SALOMON.  I  know,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  That  is  cutting  into  the  readiness  of  this  Na- 
tion's military  forces,  and  I  didn't  want  to  do  that.  We  had  to  do 
that  because  the  O&M  accounts  are  the  fast-spending  accounts,  so 
they  do  more  to  balance  the  budget  this  year  than  anything  else. 
That  is  the  traditional  way.  You  hit  and  then  you  ask  the  Pentagon 
to  request  reprogrsunming  from  us  so  we  can  still  even  keep  operat- 
ing. Right  now,  we  are  on  a  $2  billion  deficit  in  those  O&M  ac- 
counts and  can't  get  the  equipment  we  need. 

At  the  same  time,  we  see  waste  like  this  going  on  out  the  door 
that  neither  you  nor  I,  nor  GAO  have  the  foggiest  idea  have  an 
idea  of  exactly  how  much  is  involved. 

But  while  we  use  the  parts  here  as  an  example  this  morning, 
what  may  be  going  off  the  base  in  100  different  areas,  whether  it 
is  rope,  or  hydraulic  fluid,  or  brakes,  or  tires,  or  everything  else. 
Somehow  we  have  to  stop  this  and  return  to  an  attitude  where  sol- 
diers don't  look  at  government  property  as  their  own  shopping 
place  without  having  to  pay  the  bill. 

The  National  Guard  issue  disturbed  me.  I  hadn't  heard  that  one 
before  and  I  want  to  look  into  that  one.  I  am  sure  you  will  carry 
that  word  back  to  the  Pentagon  to  look  into  that  also. 

We  want  to  work  with  you  on  this,  but  we  are  going  to  have  £ui- 
other  hearing  on  this.  I  will  commit  to  that  right  now.  We  will 
want  to  get  a  status  report  on  what  you  are  doing  about  this  GAO 
report.  We  will  probably  have  that  sometime  next  summer. 

General  I  appreciate  your  being  here  this  morning. 

Greneral  Salomon.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  I  know  it  is  not  pleasant.  We  appreciate  your 
candor  on  this  and  look  forward  to  working  with  you  to  solve  what 
is  a  very  important  problem. 

General  Salomon.  Thank  you,  sir. 

Chairman  Glenn.  Thank  you  very  much. 

The  hearing  will  stand  in  recess,  subject  to  the  call  of  the  Chair. 

[Whereupon,  at  12:17  p.m.,  the  hearing  was  adjourned,  subject  to 
the  call  of  the  Chair.] 

o 


74-427    (48) 


ISBN  0-16-046015-8 


9  7801 


60  460159 


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