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s antt &ntiqtutirs 



A HANDBOOK 



GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



MACAU MAN AND CO., LIMITKO 

LONDON ' j'.OMBAY CALCUTTA 
MKMIOI.IRNE 

TIIK MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NKW VOltK - HUSTON ' CIUCAt.'O 
li.U.LAS SAN JKKANCISCO 

TUli MAOMJLhAN CO. OL 1 CANADA, LTD. 

TOHON'J'O 



A HANDBOOK 
GREEK 

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTOBY 



A. PL J. -aEEEKLDGE, M.A. 

LATE lECTURER AND 1'KLLOW OK ItEfiTlrtmb (JOLLfitiK, A.ND 
crURER IN ANCIENT IIIbTORY AT BRAhKNUblil (JOLLLGU, OAKOIlD 



MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED 

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON 

1914 



COPV RIGHT 



Edition 1896 
1902, 1911. 1914 



TO 

MY FA THEE 



PEEFAGE 

THIS little book Is meant to be of assistance to those who find 
difficulty in mastering what I have often found regarded as the 
least attractive, probably because it is the least understood, 
portion of Greek history. The merest glance at its pages will 
be sufficient to show how little it attempts to compete with 
such standard works on Greek Political Antiquities as some of 
those mentioned in the brief bibliography which I have given on 
page xv. My debt to the works of Hermann, Schomann, Gilbert, 
and to the scholars who have written in Handbooks or in 
Dictionaries of Antiquities, is very great indeed \ for no one 
can move a step in Greek Constitutional Law without consult- 
ing authorities as remarkable for the fulness as for the accuracy 
of their detail. But, apart from the obviously smaller compass 
of this treatise, my object has been somewhat different from 
that of most of these writers. Completeness of detail could 
not be aimed at in a work of this size ; such an attempt would 
have changed what professes to be a History into a too con- 
cise, and therefore almost unintelligible, Manual of Political 
Antiquities. My purpose has been to give in a brief narrative 
form the main lines of development of Greek Public Law, to 
represent the different types of states in the order of their 
development, and to pay more attention to the working than 
to the mere structure of constitutions. I have attempted, in 
the introductory chapter of this work, to offer some considera- 



viii OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

tions which justify a separate study of Greek political institu- 
tions, so rarely attempted in this country ; consequently it is 
needless to anticipate at this point the reasons for a procedure 
which, perhaps, does not need defence. 

Throughout the work I have cited the original passages 
from ancient authors on which every fact or assertion of any 
degree of importance is based. Considerations of space forbade 
more ample quotations from the texts of the original authorities 
or a fuller discussion of passages which have given rise to 
differences of interpretation. In citing inscriptions references 
have been given to the Handbooks which I believed to be most 
easily accessible to students. In no case have I referred to 
the Corpus Inscriptiomm Graecarum or the Corpus Inscriptionum 
AUkarwn where I knew that the inscription was to be found 
in the Manuals of Hicks, Dittenberger, and Cauer. 

My thanks are due to my wife for valuable suggestions in 
the correction of the proofs, for a great share of the labour in 
preparing the Index, and for the map which accompanies this 

voln e - A. R J. G. 

OXFOTID, June 1896. 



CONTENTS 

(The references are to the pages) 
CHAPTER I 

INTRODUCTORY 

SECT. 

The constitutional aspect of Greek History, 1. Primary political COP 
captions, 4 ; the State and the Constitution, 4 ; political office, 6 ; the 
Citizen, 7 ; the Law, 8 ; public and piivate law, 9 ; authoritative 
character of law, 10. 

CHAPTER II 

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OP THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 

THROUGH MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, AND TYRANNY 

TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 

Origin of the city-state ; the tribe and the clan, 12. Origin of Greek 
monarchy, 14 ; character of the heroic monarchy, 15 ; downfall of this 
monarchy, 17. Transfer of government to the clans, 19 ; nature of the 
clan, 20, The early aristocracies, 21 ; tendency to oligarchic govern- 
ment, 22. Impulse to colonisation, 24. Early Greek tyranny, 25 ; its 
origin, 25 ; the tyrants, 27 ; character of their government, 30 ; how far 
was it constitutional, 31 ; political and social consequences of their rule, 
32 ; downfall of tyranny, 33. Rise of constitutional government, 34, 

CHAPTER III 

COLONISATION INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COLONISATION 

1. Causes of colonisation as affecting the form of the colony, 36. Settle, 
ments due to the migrations ; characteristics of the Asiatic colonies, 37, 



X OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

I (T. 

Colonies due to political and commercial causes, 38. Military colonies. 
39. Cleruchies, 40, The act of colonisation and colonial charters, 40. 
Relations between the colony and the mother city, 42. Political history 
of the colonies ; characteristics of the Western settlements, 44. 

INTERNATIONAL LAW 

2, The unity of Hellas, 45. International obligations based on religion, 46, 
The amphictyonies and games, 48. Tribal amphictyonies, 49. Inter- 
tribal or interpohtical unions, 50. The amphictyony of Delphi, 51. 
Secular relations between Greek states, 53 ; interchange of civic rights, 
54. Commercial relations, 54. Arbitration, 55. Treaties, 55. 



OHAPTEB IV 

CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS OLIGARCHY 

THE DIFFERENT FoRm OP GOVERNMENT 

1. Principles of classification, 56. Tendencies of development and causes 

of variation in constitutions, 57. Classification of constitutions with 
reference to their form, 58. States in Greece that were not cities, 59. 
The three main forms of constitution, 60. 

OLIGARCHY 

2. Conception of oligarchy, 60. Instability of this form of government, 62. 

The more permanent types of oligarchy, 62. The cities of Thessaly, 62. 
The Maliaus, 64. The Opuntian Locrians, 65. The Ozolian Locrians, 
66. Thebes, CG. Mqgara, 68. Sicyon and Corinth, 70. Ricyon, 71. 
Corinth, 71. Causes of our ignorance of tho details of oligarchic govern- 
ments ; probable .simplicity of the typo, 73. 

CHAPTER V 

MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 

Meaning of mixed constitution, 74. Characteristics of governments of 
this typo, 76. 

SPARTA THE C 'LASSES, THE CITIZENS, AND THIS LAND 

1. Sparta's position in Laconia, 78. Origin of the Perioed, 78. Ethnic ele- 
ments in Sparta, 79. Condition of tho Perioeci and their relations to thfi 
ruling city, 80. Tho Helots, 83. Tho Neodnmodeis, 86. Tho Mothaces, 
86. The Spartiatae, 87; "peers" and "inferiors," 87. The common 
meals, 88. Nobles and commons at Sparta, 80. Tenure of land at Sparta 
90. Economic evils of the constitution, 91. 



CONTENTS xi 

SECT. 

THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION 

2. Meaning of rhetra, 92. Constitution of Lycurgus, 93. Rbetra of 

Lycuigus, 94. The obes aud the tribes, 94. Character of the early con- 
stitution, 96. The later constitution, 97. The Kings, 97. The Council 
of Elders, 100. The Ephors, 102. Character of the developed con- 
stitution, 106. 

THE PELOPONNESIAN CONFEDERACY 

3. Origin of the confederacy, 108 ; its legal basis, 108. Means by which 

Spartan influence was secured, 109. Kelations of the states to one 
another, HO; their relations to Sparta, 111. The Council of the Con- 
federacy, 112. Elements of weakness in Sparta's hegemony, 113 ; her 
imperial system, 114. Decline of the Spartan state, 114. 

THE CITIES OF CRETE 

4. Origin of the Cretan constitutions, 115. Kelations of the Cretan cities to one 

another, 116. The classes in the states, 117. Social institutions, 118. 
Political constitution, 118. General character of this constitution, 120. 
Change to democracy, 120. 

CHAPTER YI 

DEMOOEACY 

Evolution of the power of the people ; the principle of democracy, 122. 
Degrees in this principle ; modified forms of democracy determined by 
intention or accident, 123. 

ATHENS THE CLASSES AND THE STATE-DIVISIONS 

1 . Elements in the population of Attica, 124. Early political condition of 

Attica, 125. The owouwpfc of Theseus, 126. The four Ionic tribes, 
127. The clans, 128. The phratries, 129. The Eupatrids, 129. Citizen- 
ship at Athens, 131. The slaves, 132. The resident aliens, 133. The 
trittyes and the naucraries, 134. 

TBE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ATHENS THE MAGISTRACY AND 
THE COUNCIL 

2. Decline of the monarchy and early history of the archonship, 135. "The 

Arcnon" as the president of the state, 136 ; Damasias, 137. Decline of 
the power of the archonship, 137. Early modes of appointment to office, 
138 ; modified use of the lot, 138. Meaning of appointment by lot, 139. 
Justification of this mode of appointment, 140. Qualification for office, 
141. The original council at Athens, 142. The Ephetae, 143. The 
Areiopagus ; history of this council, 145 ; downfall of this council, 147. 
Powerlessness of the original elements in the constitution, 148. 



xii OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

SECT. 

EPOCHS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AT ATHENS 

3. Early movements towards reform ; the constitution of Draco, 149. Re 
forms of Solon : social, 150; political, 151. Institution of the heliaea ; 
democratic tendency of this reform, 153. General view of the Solonian 
constitution, 155. Dangers which threatened this constitution, 156. 
Informs of Cleisthenes, 157. General estimate of the work of Cleisthenes, 
1G2. Reforms effected by Pericles and his successors, 1G2. 

Tun WORKING OF THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 

<I. The council of five hundred ; its structure and powers, 1GG. The ecelesia, 
169 ; limitations on its powers, 170. The safeguards of the constitution, 
170. Legislation at Athens, 172. Administrative powers of the ecclosia, 
173. The heliaea : its organisation, 175 ; its powers, character, and 
place in the constitution, 176. Administrative offices held by in- 
dividuals, 178. Great power of individuals at Athens, 179. Offices 
which furnished a basis for such power : the slr.itegia, ISO ; position and 
powers of the strategi, ISO ; finance offices, 183 ; administration of 
finance in the fifth century, 183 ; the great finance offices of the fourth 
century ; 6 irl ry Stot^/ira and 6 M rb de&piKbv, 185. Unofficial influence 
exercised by individuals ; the TrpoorrctT^s TOV Sfaov, 187. 

THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE 

5. Origin of the Athenian Empire, 189. Tlin confederacy of Delos, 100 , 

change in the character of the confederacy, 100. The Empire, 192. 
The autonomous allies, 193. Legal basis of the Empire, 193; charters 
of Erythrao and (Jhalcis, 194. Duties of tho allies to Athens, 19G. 
History of the tribute, 196. Modes of assessment of tribute, 197; the 
tribute-lists, 198. Imperial jurisdiction, 199. Chnrador of the im- 
perial administration of Athens, 200. The eJeruchies, 201. Theories of 
imperial government, 202. Religions unity of the Empire, 202. Political 
unity of the Empire as a great democratic alliance, 203 ; its influence on 
the constitutional history of the Knst. 

THE ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY 

6. Origin of the second Athenian confederacy, 204. Conditions of tha 

league 1 ; relations of the states to Athens, 205. Relation of the aynedrion 
to the Athenian ecclesia, 206. Dissolution of the confederacy, 207. 

JJlSTVRBANQBti IN THE ATHENIAN CONSTITUTIONTHE CLOSING &CEN1S 

7. Opposition to the democracy ; the moderates and the oligarchs, 208. 

Motives of oligarchic reaction, 209. The political clubs, 201) ; their 
character at tho close of tho Poloprmncsian war, 210. Tho Four Hundred, 
Sill. The Mvo Thousand, 211. Proposed reform in archonsliip of 



CONTENTS xiii 

SECT. 

Eueluides, 212. Athens a timooraey after the Lam lau \vur, 21 '2. Athene 
under Roman mle, 212. 

OTHER DEMOCRACIES ELIS, ARGOS, SYRACUSE, HUODES 
8. Ehs, 213. Argos, 214. Syracuse, 216. Rhodes, 218. 

CHAPTEE YI1 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 

What constitutes a federal government} 220. Federations of cities and 
of cantons, 221. Types of federal government, 222. Thessaly : the 
monarchy and the early federal constitution, 222 ; the tageia and the 
second federation, 223 ; federal system under Macedonian and Roman 
rule. Boeotia : the religious league, 224 ; the oligarchic federation, 225 , 
the democratic federation, 226. Acarnania : early international union 
and later federation, 227. Olynthus : attempt at federal government, 
228. Arcadia : early religious union and later federation j the federal 
system of Arcadia, 229. Federalism becomes the normal type of polity, 
231. Aetolia : early cantonal union ; extension of the federal system, 
232 ; constitution of the Aetolian league, 233. . Achaea : early federal 
union ; dissolution, revival, and extension of the league, 236. Con- 
stitution of the Achaean league, 237. Lycian league, 241 ; peculiarities 
of the Lycian federal system, 242. E-epresentation in Greek federal 
governments, 243. 

CHAPTER VIII 

HELLENISM AND THE PATE OF THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 

Meaning of Hellenism, 244. Modes in which Greek political civilisation 
was extended to the barbarian world, 245. Hellenism beyond the limits 
of the Roman Empire, 246 ; in the Parthian Empire ; in Asia Minor and 
the Asiatic provinces of Rome, 247. The Roman province of Achaea, 
248. Greek political civilisation in Macedonia and Thrace, 249. Latin 
political civilisation replaces Greek in Southern Italy aud Sicily, 250 ; in 
Africa, Spain, and Gaul, 251. The Latin West and the Greek East, 251. 
Greek constitutions preserved under the Roman Republic, 251 ; destroyed 
under the Empire by the centralised system of government and the 
application of Roman administrative law, 252. 



APPENDIX 
The President of the College of Strategi, 253. 



XIV OUTLINES OF GKEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

INDEX 

PAGE 
(i) of subjects .....,., 257 

(ii) of Greek words ....... 266 

(iii) of passages from ancient authors referred to in the text , . 271 

MAP 
POLITICAL MAP OF GREECE, erne. 430 B.C, . . , Frontispiece 



SELECT BIBLIOGEAPHY 

1. GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND LAW 

BUSOLT, G. "Die griechischen Staats- tind Rechtsaltertumer," 2te, Aufl, 

(Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wisscnschaft, herausg. von dr, 

Iwan von Muller, Bd. iv.) Munchen, 1892. 
GILBERT, G.ffawdbuck der griechmhen StacttsaUerthuincr> 2 Bde. Leipzig, 

1881-85. 
HEIIMANN, C. F. A Manital of tJie Political Antiquities of Greece, historically 

considered. Oxford, 1836. 
JEVONS, F. "B.Constitutional and legal Antiquities (Book vi. of A Manual 

of Greek Antiquities, by Gardner and Jevons). London, 1895. 
SCHOEMANN, G. F. Antiquitates Jwrispublici Qmeoomn. 1S38, 

Griechische Atterthumer, dte. Aufl. neu bearbeitet von 

J. H. Lipsius, Bd. I., "das Staatswesen." Berlin, 1897. 

TJie Antiquities of Greece; translated from the German 

by E G. Hardy and J. S, Mann. London, 1880. 
THUEMSER, Y.Lehrluch der grieclvisclm Staatscdtcrttimer, 6te. vermehrte 

und veibesserte Aufl. (K. F. Hermann's Lehr'buch der griechischen 

Antiquitaten, Bd. i.) Freiburg, 1889. 

2, CONSTITUTIONS OF SPARTA AND ATHENS 

GILBERT, G. The constitutional Acuities ofSpctrta and Athens ; translated 
by E. J. Brooks and T. Nicklin, with an introductory note by J. E. 
Sandys. London and Few York, 1895. 

3. CONSTITUTION OF SPARTA 

ARNOLD'S Thucydides, vol. i. App. 2, "On the Constitution of Sparta" (re- 
viewed by Sir G. 0. Lewis in the Philological Museum, vol. ii. p. 39). 

GILBERT, G.Studienzuraltspartanischen Geschichte. Go*ttingen, 1872. 

HERMANN, C. Y.~AnMquitafym Laconicarum libelli quatuor. Marburg, 
1841. 

MUELLER (C. 0.), Die Dorier. Breslau, 1824, 

translated into English by Henry Tufnell and 
G.C.Lewis. 2vols. Oxford, 1830. 



xvi OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

KorsTADT, A. De rerum LacoMcaruiu constitttiioiiis Lycttrycae origine et 
iiidole dissertatiu. 1849. 



4. CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS 

BELOCH, J.- Die attiselw Politik seit Pericles. Leipzig, 1884. 

GILBERT, G.Beitntge zur inncrn GescJuchte Athens im ZeUaltcr dcs Pelopon- 

msischen KriegAs. Leipzig, 1877. 
HBADLAM, J. W. Election by lot at Athens. Odmbridgo University Press, 

1891 
WIIIBLEY, L. Political Parties in Athens during tJie Peloponnesian War 

Cambridge University Press, 1889. 

Popular Assemblies. 
SOHOEMANN, G, F Do comtiiis Athetiiensium libri trcs. 1819, 

Jurisdiction. 

FIIAKNKKL, M.Dic attischcn Gfeschworenengeritihtc: tin Beitrmj sum attlstken 

Staatsrccht. Burliii, 1877. 
MMIKH(H. E.) uud Schumann (G. F.) Dcr attische Prows*; neu bcarbcitot 

von J. H. Lipsms. Berlin, 1883. 

Public Economy. 

BOECKII, A.- Die jStaatshausJMltuMj tier Athener; 3te. Auil. hcrausg. und mit 
Anmcrkungon boglcitct von Max Fraiikul ; 2 Bdu. IJurlin, 18S(>. 

TIui public Economy of Athens; translated from the German. 
London, 1828. 

5. HOMERIC TIMKS 

FANTA, A.. Dcr Staat indcrlliaswul Odyssec; ein Beitmyzur Beurtheilumj 
d&r honwrischcn Jferfassuntj. Iniisbruuk, 1882. 

G. TYllANNIJOS 

PLASK, H. G. Die Tyrwmis in ihren btiden Pcriotien btid&i, alien (friec/tfiiij 
2 Tlieile. Bremen, 1852. 



7. OLIQAUCHIEfcJ 
WHIBLISY, L. Greek Oligarchies. London, 1806. 



SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY xvii 

8. FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 

FIIEEMVN, E. A. -History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy; 

edited by J. B. Bury. London, 1893. 
DUBOIS, M. Les Hyues dohcnne et achecnne. Paiis, 1885, 

9. PROPERTY AND LAND TENURES 

COULAXGES, F. de "Becherches sur le droit de propriety chez lesGrecs," 
in Nowllta Rechenhcs snr quclqites problemcs d'hisfoire, Paris, 1891. 

GUIUAUD, P. La propritte fonciere en Grece jusqu'b la conqiitte romamc. 
Paiis, 1893, 

10, DICTIONARIES OF ANTIQUITIES CONTAINING ARTICLES 
ON GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 

DAHEMBEUG-SAGLIO, Dictionnaire de$ antiquitfa grccques et romaines (A to 

Med). 1875-1902. 
PAULY, ^.Red-Encydopadie der dassischen AUerthumswissc'nschaft ; in 

6 Bde. Stuttgart, 1839. 
FAULT- WISSOWA, Real'Encyclopu.die, etc. (new edition of the above, A to 

Di), 1893-1902. 
SMITH, Dictionary of Greek and Eoman Antiquities (third edition, edited by 

W. Smith, W, Wayte, and G. E. Marindin). London, 1890. 

II. GENERAL HISTORIES OF GREECE 

ABBOTT, E, A History of Greece. London, 1888-1900. 
BUSOLT, G Griechische GescMcMe. Gotlia, 1893-1897. 
CURTIUS, Jb.Qri(chi8cfo Gesehichte, 6te. Aufl,, 3 Bde. Berlin, 1S87-1S89. 
The History of Greece, translated by A. W. Waid, 5 vols. 

London, 1868-1873, 
DUNOKEU, M. 'History of Greece; translated by S. F. Alleyne and E. 

Abbott. Vols. i, and ii, (containing the history of the earliest period). 

London, 1883. 

QUOTE, &Hi$tory of Greece, 10 vols. London (Aberdeen), 1888, 8vo, 
HOLM, A. History of Greece. London, 1894-98 



CHAPTER 1 

INTRODUCTORY 

THE central idea and what may be called the spirit of Greek 
history is its constitutionalism. "The constitution," says 
IsocrateSj "is the soul of the state"; "the constitution," says 
Aristotle, " is the state." 1 Here at any rate we get a coinci- 
dence between the common-sense and the philosophic view 
which ought to be decisive. But this is far from being the 
impression left on our minds by the Greek historians. It 
cannot be denied that Greek history is rendered incoherent, 
sometimes almost grotesque, by the brilliant personalities that 
stalk across the stage and blot out the constitution. They are 
stage characters without a setting, and the fault of such 
representations is to be found, not in the characteristics of 
Greek history, but in the mental attitude of those who have 
handed Greek history down to us. The student of con- 
stitutional history is glad to be freed from these oppressive 
personalities that seem so completely to overshadow their own 
creations. For in Greece, as everywhere in the civilised world, 
the creation was greater than the creator. The tyranny of law 
in history was at least as great as the tyranny of abstract 
ideas in philosophy ; but the former can be severed from 
personality even more easily than the latter, and the rule of 
law can be fully appreciated only if we abstract the " material " 
from the "form." 

A further danger to the student is one threatened by Greek 
philosophy. To regard the political speculations of Plato and 
Aristotle as fully representing the tone of political thought in 

1 Isocr. Areop. 14 ; Arist. PoL in. 3, 
S> B 



2 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHA?. 

Greece is like regarding the odes of Pindar as a fair expression 
of the waves of emotion that swayed the mixed rabble at 
the Olympian and Isthmian games. Such speculations are the 
highest expression of political thought, and for this reason they 
are not the truest for the historian of constitutional law. The 
most difficult of his tasks is the careful analysis of these 
political speculations the attempt to distinguish history from 
theory, the opinions of the writer from the opinions of the 
average Greek, of which they are an exaggerated development. 
The humbler the source the better the information. A 
political view of Isocrates is worth more for our purpose than 
one of Aristotle, a judgment of Xenophon is more valuable 
than a page of Plato. 

How much is gained or lost by such procedure is a question 
that will be answered differently by different minds ; but the 
chances are that to the genuine student of legal history the 
unrivalled beauty of the Greek constitutions will never appeal 
so forcibly as when released from the trammels both of science 
and of personality. They then appear as symmetrical creations, 
delicate and often fragile in their artistic completeness. But 
the completeness was given them by nations rather than by 
lawgivers, and their symmetry is not rendered more perfect 
by the airy castles raised on them by Greek scientific thinkers. 
The lawgiver as a creator is himself to a large extent a fiction 
of the philosophers; and perhaps the most striking fact in 
Greek political development is that real logical coherence was 
obtained by growth s that development led to a real system of 
law, not to a system of political conventions which, as in 
Rome or in England, patch up the rents made by adding 
new cloth to old garments. This fact alone is sufficient to 
establish the truth that constitutional law can be found in no 
more perfect form than in the states of the old Greek world. 
It is also the key to the strange fact noticed above that Greek 
historians, sometimes more by their silence than by their state- 
ments, have given at least an inadequate, if not a false picture 
of the great political movements in Greece. Symmetry is a 
dangerous thing in politics, more especially if it be due to the 
genius of a nation and not of a man, and one of its dangers is 
the lack of attention it induces in those who are accustomed to 
such a system. Thucydides tells us that Pericles was monarch 
of Athens, but gives no hint as to the basis on which his power 



i INTRODUCTORY 3 

rested ; he speaks of the <%os without specifying which of the 
opposite poles of the constitution he means, the executive body 
called the "ecclesia," or the supreme court and legislative 
sovereign called the " heliaea " j he has written the history of 
the Athenian Empire and told us almost nothing of its organisa- 
tion. And this lack of attention was, it must be admitted, 
accompanied by a corresponding lack of reverence. In few 
Greek states was there an unbroken chain of political tradition 
the citizen of the democracy could not look back with pleasure 
or with pride to the age of oligarchies or of tyrannies. And 
the changes had been so rapid in the past that none could tell 
what might be in store for the future. From a state of bond- 
age worse than the feudal system of mediaeval Europe, Athens 
under Solon had stepped forth into the full blaze of democracy, 
and the people were not blinded. The new regime seemed as 
natural as the old. But in a country where such miracles as 
this could happen the unexpected did not exist. Hence the 
restlessness and the fever of Greek political life. It was not 
always a low political ambition which made the great traitors 
of Greece, whose brilliance almost redeems their treason. It 
was their imagination the restless desire to plunge into the 
unknown in politics as in science which led Aristotle to regard 
as the greatest potential criminal, not the footpad or the 
housebreaker, but the refined young man of boundless energy 
and leisure. 1 

The even flow of Greek constitutionalism was thus ruffled 
by many a storm ; it was not often that the storm took the 
violent and extreme form of the rupawk. Sometimes it was 
due to waves of sentiment, which would lead in modern states 
to a change of government, which led in Greece to a change 
of constitution. Such changes, often prompted from without, 
might disturb our view as to the continuity of Greek political 
life, did we not see that they are merely temporary, that there 
are tendencies stronger than those of a changing sentimentality 
and the will of the few strong men who are capable of availing 
themselves of it, and that underneath these fluctuations there 
runs a coherence which developed types of states both normal 
and abnormal. 

The normal type of the free Greek state attracts us on 
account of the universality which it was destined to attain. 
1 Arist. Pol. ii. 7. 



4 OUTLINES OF GKEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

The more abnormal type attracts us from its very singularity. 
Political work strangely wrought out meets us at every turn, 
and sometimes the constitution is the only valuable product of 
a country. The glories of Athens rest but partly on her 
constitution, which must have been singularly uninteresting 
when compared with those of other communities of which we 
catch but glimpses; and we are at times almost forced to regret 
the fate which has handed down so many petty details about 
the typical democracy, and has told us so little of the singular 
forms which political life took in Sparta and in Crete, and the 
still more fantastic shapes which it assumed in some of the 
western colonies. To the historian of constitutions the part 
which a state has played in the history of the world matters 
little, except in so far as this accidentally determines the 
amount which is known about its history. If the constitutions 
about which most is known are treated at disproportionate 
length in these pages, it must be remembered that this is the 
result of accident, not of design. 

Before entering on an historical sketch of Greek political 
development it will be necessary to give some idea of the 
fundamental political conceptions which we shall express by 
the words "state," "constitution," "citizen," and "law." This 
order is necessary if we would express the logical sequence of 
the terms. A political is often the reverse of an historical series ; 
and, whatever may be our view as to the origin of law and 
government, from the standpoint of a developed society where 
alone constitutional law can exist, man is only a citizen through 
the state and its constitution, while law itself although an in- 
variable is not a strictly necessary complement of the ideas 
either of state or citizenship. 

With respect to the first two terms, " state " and " constitu- 
tion," it will be observed that where we possess two abstract 
or semi-abstract terms the Greeks had only one. This is not 
an accidental difference. To us the " state " is an abstraction 
which should, when used in its strict sense, express the whole 
of the national life, the " constitution " expressing but a part 
of it. To the Greek the constitution (rro^n^} is the city itself 
(fl-oAt?) from an abstract point of view ; it professes, therefore, 
to express the whole of the national life. This idea, which 
underlies the constructive theories of Plato and Aristotle, and 
which has given rise in modern times to the strange notion that 



I INTRODUCTORY 5 

Greek society " subordinated the individual to the state," is only 
a fiction in the sense that it was a theory which did not always 
square with the facts of political life. As a genuine theory, 
the realisation of which was consistently pursued by philosophers 
if not by legislators, it runs through the whole of Greek political 
thought. It is the ground for Aristotle's statement that the 
constitution is the " form of the state " (eftSos -n)s roAeo)?), and 
of his seeming paradox that the identity of a state is the 
identity of its constitution. 1 The justification for this paradox 
is found in his definition of a ^roA-treta, which, unlike some of 
the other definitions of political terms found in his Politics, 
is only a formal expression of the current Greek view. The 
constitution he defines as an ordered arrangement (rafts) which 
specifies three things (1) the ethical end of the city, which is 
itself the means by which the state has decided to attain good 
life, (2) the distribution of offices, and (3) the sovereign 
body of the state, by what individual or class of individuals 
supreme office is to be held. 2 It is this third element (the 
most obvious from the point of view of practical politics) 
which is dwelt on in another definition, where the constitution 
is said to be a rais of magistracies in general, and especially 
of the sovereign one, and where it is finally identified with the 
governing body of a state (TroAtre^a 8e lo-ni/ 17 iroA.iT'a). 8 An 
important aspect of this definition is the question it raises as 
to the connection between the sovereign body (rb Kvpiov) and the 
laws in Greek communities. This we shall consider later ; but 
the reason for the identification may at once be seen if we take 
yet another statement of Aristotle's, to the effect that the 
constitution is " a life " of the state. 4 It is an expression of 
some particular life that the state has elected to live, some 
particular theory of existence which it has determined to put 
into force. But different theories of life are represented in- 
variably by different classes of society, and thus, when a new 
theory is adopted, it means that a new class his risen to the 
top in political affairs. This class will be. rb 7roA.6Teu/x,a, the 
privileged class for the time being ; and hence the question 
" What is the TroAtre/a ? " will be answered when we can reply 
to the question " What is the TTO Amv^a ? " The second problem 
is the simpler -, when it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, 

1 Pol iff. 3. a ib. m. 6. 

2 ib. iv. l=p. 1289 a. * tf. iv. ll=p. 1295 b. 



6 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

to give a direct answer to this latter question, one has the 
puzzling phenomenon of a " mixed constitution " (JUKTT) TroA-ira'a), 
a state in a permanent condition of suspended revolution. 

Tro/Weta, therefore, meant to the Greek something more than 
"constitution" or "government" means to us. It was not 
merely a convenient form of organisation under which men 
lived. Aristotle, as an historian, realised, as perhaps only a 
Greek could realise, that with every change of constitution the 
balance of power was entirely shifted. Classes of individuals 
which had been kept in the background now came forward and 
showed themselves sovereign ; the beliefs and interests of one 
class had given place to the beliefs and interests of another ; a 
change of constitution was a change of creed, and the sovereign 
class could force its subjects to bow down to the political creed 
of the day. In most Greek states there was little or nothing 
of the compromise, the principle of mutual political concession, 
which is such a striking feature in Roman history and in that 
of our own country. When the balance of power had swung 
over, everything went with it, and the change was thorough 
and radical. Thus Greece has given us no code of laws, arid 
but few examples of gradual political development. She sub- 
stituted the lawgiver for the code, and the lawgiver was the 
creature of the revolution. It is a significant recognition of 
this truth that the constitution is the governing class, that 
Aristotle, in place of a full discussion of the modes in which 
constitutions may alter in obedience to social changes, has, in 
a book of his Politics, given us a treatise on the art of 
avoiding revolutions. 

From the conception of the constitution we naturally pass 
to the Greek idea of political office. The assertion that the 
constitution has to deal with the assignment of magistracies in 
the city implies that the state is a distributer. The conception 
of distributive justice, so fully worked out by Aristotle, is 
contained in glhii in the most inchoate political society. Every 
association distributes burdens and rewards ; but it is only with 
the former, in the shape of political offices, that we are here 
concerned. The state assigns provinces of rule (d/j^yai) to its 
members, and by tipx'l Aristotle understands every possible 
kind of administrative activity : we can hardly add legislative 
activity, for this, as we shall see, was not contemplated as a 
regular function of government in Greek states. He includes 



INTRODUCTORY ? 

tinder the term the duties of a member of a senate or popular 
assembly 3 or even those of a juryman. 1 Here he confessedly 
goes beyond the limits of current terminology, for the Greeks 
tended to confine the word dpxty like our "office," to the 
individual magistracies of a state. But Aristotle is justified in 
employing a common term to express a common conception. 
When the primitive notion of the magistracy as a unity of 
power, which was derived from the prehistoric kingship and 
was never lost at Rome, had been broken down in Greece, no 
fundamental distinction existed between the branches of the 
executive that were shared amongst the people. The distinction 
that continued to exist was merely one based on the con- 
veniences of the state. It was held that some functions could 
better be exercised collectively by bodies of men, while others 
could be better performed by individuals. It is true that the 
tendency was to subordinate individual to collective control, 
but even this subordination did not imply the de jure sovereignty 
of popular bodies. At Athens the assembly, the law-courts, 
the generals, the archons, and other individual officials are all 
alike branches of the executive, carrying out the law which 
is not the mandate of any one of these bodies or of all of them 
collectively. 

These executive functions are distributed amongst some or all 
of the members of the community. As the TroAmia is the basis 
of distribution, we should naturally conclude that the recipients 
of these functions were the only TroAtrtu. It is the logical 
conclusion to which Aristotle is led when he defines a citizen 
as " one who is capable of ruling and being ruled in turn." 2 
But this was not a conclusion accepted by the average Greek 
mind, and Aristotle himself feels that it does not fit the facts of 
Greek history. It was an ideal of citizenship pitched far too 
high for many a Greek state wrestling with poverty and seeking 
only for protection. It is a definition true only of democracy, 3 
the ideal Tro'Ats with all the corollaries whicii* accompany the 
attainment of its ideal end leisure, universal education, and the 
possession of a large slave class. Since the inevitable tendency 
of nearly all Greek states was towards democracy, and most 
succeed, at some period of their history, in at least a temporary 
attainment of the ideal goal, the definition has some historical 

1 Pol. ii. 12 ; iii. 1. 2 ib. i. 2 ; vii. H=rp. 1332 b. 

8 & iii. 1 ; vi. 2=p. 1317 b. 



8 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

justification. But by all cities in the early stages of develop- 
ment, and by many who at a later period still lagged behind, 
other criteria had to be accepted. There were two definitions 
of citizenship current in the Greek world which Aristotle set 
aside as incomplete. These were "the protection of private 
rights " and " descent from original citizens." The possession 
of neither of these alone would have been sufficient to make a 
man a TroXn-^s, but both together would probably have furnished 
a satisfactory claim to the position in an oligarchy like that of 
Corinth, where political privileges were not distributed beyond 
a narrow circle, but where political duties such as military 
service equally demanded a clear definition of citizenship. The 
first of these factors is insufficient, as Aristotle remarks, because 
in some Greek states the resident alien (/^rot/cos) could enforce 
his private rights in his own name; 1 the second is rather a 
test than a definition, but in practical politics traditional tests 
are of considerable importance, especially when they are con- 
nected with the two most powerful bonds of union, the family 
and religion. Hence what we may call the " phratric " con- 
ception of citizenship, its dependence on birth and consequently 
on membership of the "phratry" or the clan, completely 
overshadowed all others in the eyes of Greece. We shall have 
occasion to discuss the conception in connection with the history 
of Athens, where the conditions of citizenship are best known 
to us ; and so we need not dwell on it here. We need only 
notice its importance as the connecting link between the family 
and the state, as one of the many signs that in the Greek world 
the claims of the family, in politics as well as in religion, 
continued to control the activity of its own great offspring, 
which had grown great enough to absorb its parent, but not 
strong or wilful enough to neglect its claims. 

Lastly, we must consider the Greek conception of law, its 
relation to the constitution and to the governing class. Law is 
not regarded as a primary factor in Greek political life it is 
but secondary to the constitution, the support of the structure. 
As the constitution is tho whole expression of the life of the 

1 Pol. iii. 1. Tliis was pruhably welcomed. In such states the usual 

the case iu groat commercial oligarchies, requirement of representation liy a irpo- 

sueh as Corinth, whero tho uleal of ffrdrrjs wouhlnot have been insisted on. 

citizenship was low, xriportxycu were Such metopeH would liave resembled 

cultivated, and foreigners consequently the dees sine nuffrayw of Home. 



INTRODUCTORY 9 

state, there is no adequate ground for a distinction between 
public and private law ; and, in fact, this distinction does not 
exist in its pure form, in spite of the marked differences between 
public and private procedure which we shall have to trace at 
Athens and elsewhere in Greece. Yet it was felt that some 
laws were universal, while others were peculiar to particular 
societies. Hence the distinction between Kotybs vo/to? and t'Stos 
vo/ios, 1 and amongst the iStcu vo/wn would certainly fall the laws 
protecting the structure of the state. The further distinction 
within these between ordinances protecting society and those 
which protect the government could hardly be drawn in states 
where, as for instance in Sparta and in the cities of Crete, a 
peculiar structure of society was so closely interwoven with 
government that the two could not be separated even in thought. 
Law, in its relation to the constitution, has clearly a protective 
character, and this agrees with the common Greek notion, so 
different from that which we gather from the philosophers, that 
law is prohibitive rather than positive. 2 The general idea of 
(keek political organisation is that of a structure framed on a 
certain principle of life, with rules ordained to protect it and 
to prevent its being destroyed. The constitution has the force 
of the community on its side, and this must be used by the 
magistrates to carry out the laws. 

While, therefore, by "public law" we generally mean the 
actual constitutional arrangements of a country, the Greek 
would have understood by it the protective measures by which 
the permanence of these arrangements is secured, and the Greek 
yo/jotfer^s is a creator before he is a legislator. The necessity of 
law to a constitution depends entirely on the idea of the 
imperfection of human nature and on the probability of re- 
sistance by certain individuals or classes to the ideal set up by 
the state. But the " state " and the " law " are both mere 
abstractions : how, it may be asked, can one impersonal entity 
support another? In facing this question the Greek showed 
more courage and consistency than his modern successors have 
done. He did not fall back on the theory of a personal 
sovereign; to him laws are enforced by, but are in no sense 

1 Arist. Rhet. i. 10, 3 v&fJLOs 5' l<rrlv, 2 Lycurg. c. Lcocr. 4 6 [v yap 

6 fj.kv ffiios, 6 5 KQivfc. Xyw 8k tStov v6ju.os vtyviee irpo'Xeya] & jj,q Sit 

ptv K0.6 1 fo yeypawfrov rroXiretfoj/rai rpdrrew: cf. Aesch. c. TwutrUt. 

Kowbv 8t 6'cra &ypa0a wapb Trariv 6/io 13. 
\oyetcrdaL 8oKet 



JJf OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OHAI-. 

the product of a government ; he only faintly appealed to the 
gods, and, while giving law a divine character, rarely in the 
historical period gave it a directly divine origin. 

The charge that Greek law lacked an authoritative character 
is therefore not unnatural ; but it is wrongly stated when it is 
implied that the Greek looked on his state as an "oracle of 
spiritual truth," as a " parochial Sinai," as a Pope who could 
not be " ecumenical." 1 It is true that spiritual life based on 
divine authority is not an idea wholly unknown to the Greeks. 
We find the idea in acts such as the purification of Athens by 
Epimenides, in ceremonies such as the Eleusinian mysteries, 
celebrated by a privileged race which has received its authority 
from God. The laws of Minos have a divine origin ; all those 
of Sparta are EvfloxpqcrToi VO/JMM. But nowhere is the state the 
sanction ; to the Greek mind generally the only authority on 
which a revelation rests is the authority of nature and reason. 
Plato embodies this doctrine when he would have his laws 
couched in a persuasive form, not merely command or 
threaten. 2 In a sense every state was regarded by its citizens 
as " ecumenical" that is, as teaching and enforcing a doctrine 
which ought to be valid for all the world. This will become 
more apparent if we cull some definitions of law from two very 
different sources. Law has a divine origin as the " discovery 
and gift of the gods " ; it expresses human reason, and is a 
"covenant" between man and man. 3 It is order, the passion- 
less reason, the rule of God and of reason, and derives its force 
from habit. 4 Law is, therefore, a covenant between men 
dictated by the divine reason ; it is the fixing of the best custom 
or habit in a generalised form ; it comprises those rules of life 
which ought to have absolute validity ; and, as comprising them, 
it may be, and ought to be, itself sovereign. It was not 
supposed that all that was understood by law would find its 
way into the statute-book. There were unwritten laws, more 
important and powerful than the written laws of a land. fi 
Amongst them was a body of rules directly supporting the 
structure of the state in the mixed governments of Greece, such 
as we now call the "custom of tho constitution." Their 

1 Nownuui jfVtfiY0/.lml(iltivol. i. 4 A list. PuL ii. 8; iii. 16; vii. 4 

pp. 81, 82. =p. 1320 a. 

a Plato Lam p. 859 a. ib. iii. 16. 
8 [Dem.] c. Arista(/. i. 16. 



i INTRODUCTORY 

sanction was simply the consciousness that the state would-, 
become unworkable, and a revolution result, if they were 
violated. 

Yet, in spite of the universal character of law, It is equally 
true that with every revolution that part of the 18101 VO/JLOL 
which directly supports the constitution, and which we should 
call " public law," must necessarily change. The legislator 
will have to find those rules of reason which defend the 
interests of the class which has entrusted him with the task of 
reconstruction. If he is an arbitrator, like Solon, he may seek 
the interest of more than one, and, like Solon again, he may 
not aim at finality. If his work is an advance in the direction 
of the unknown, he may believe himself one step nearer an 
indefinitely distant goal, or he may hark back again, like the 
Athenian reactionaries of 411 B.C., to a supposed bright period 
in the history of the past. But in either case, so far as his 
work does not merely appeal to the interest of a class, so far 
as it wins general acceptance from the community, its validity 
rests on its reasonableness alone, on its peculiar suitability to 
the moral and social conditions of the nation and of the time. 

When the work has been done, the privileged class, armed 
with its code, proceeds to enforce it and to defend it with all 
its might. As long as there is a code there is a constitution ; 
where there is none, as in the great upheaval caused by 
tyranny, there no constitution exists. It is in this modified 
sense that we must interpret the two apparently conflicting 
maxims of Aristotle that the " constitution is the governing 
class," and that "where the laws do not rule there is no 
constitution." l 

1 Pol. in. 6; iv. 4= p. 1292 a. 



CHAPTER II 

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS THROUGH 
MONARCHY, ARISTOCRACY, AND TYRANNY TO CONSTITU- 
TIONAL GOVERNMENT. 

THE city-state was a late development of common life in 
Greece, and sprang from the looser aggregate of the tribe 
(c/njA?/). 1 Although contemporary literary records are not 
lacking of political units lower than the TroAts, a description of 
Greece in these tribal days can be based only on the guesses 
of writers who, like Thucydides arid Aristotle, try to get 
behind the history of the city-state. Their accounts, though 
mainly reconstructions, can yet be shown to contain a large 
element of truth. 

Thucydides 2 argues from survivals of this tribal life, and 
from such survivals attempts to depict the primitive condition 
of the whole Greek world. Hellas, he thinks, was not 
originally inhabited by any fixed population. There were 
frequent movements of races and no settled life or freedom of 
intercourse, Greece was occupied by a number of small 
communities seeking little more than the provision of their 
daily wants. Traces of such communities were found in his 
own time in Ozolian Locris 3 and in Aotolia. 4 A treaty of 
alliance between Elis and the Heraeans of Arcadia of the 
middle of the sixth century speaks of both these communities 
as "districts" (S?y/jtot), fi while portions of Arcadia, even in the 

1 <l>v\'i), according to Dicatjaiv.hus, 2 Time. i. 2. 

a contemporary of Aristotle, meant :i ib. iii. 101, 102. 

originally a union of individuals into a 4 ib. iii. 94 /card KU/JWLS 

community or .state, not a unity within orous. 
the state (Btcph. Byxant. s.v. war pa). {l Hicks n. 8. 



CHAP, ii EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 13 

fifth century, had not risen above such tribal associations. 
The unit of political life in such societies is described as the 
Kcop? or village community ; whether this was ever the highest 
unit we cannot say, but the belief that it was at least an in- 
dependent unit underlies Aristotle's sketch of the origin of the 
TToAts. 1 He builds up the state from two constituent elements, 
the village community, and behind this the household (oiiua) 
and traces an ascending scale of development. Since he regards 
the village community as identical with the yevos, he bases the 
earliest forms of association on family life and on this widest 
of family units, the clan. 

This is not the mere abstract speculation of a philosopher : 
it is a view based on survivals ; for, although it is true that the 
household and the clan are nowhere found in history as entirely 
independent organisations, yet the notion of ultimate family 
connection in the larger units which made up the irdA.ts is en- 
grained in Greek life. The clan continues to play an important 
part in the inner life of the state, and even furnishes the type 
for later modes of union ; for the symbol of relationship, the 
eponymous ancestor, is borrowed from the clan to be applied 
to purely artificial forms of association such as the "deme" 
and the " tribe." Its influence on the religious life of the state 
is yet more strongly marked, and we shall find that the public 
worship of a community is often but a recognition of the 
private " cultus " of the clan. 2 It has left its trace on political 
institutions in the use of the word ye/oovre? or elders, which is 
applied in the Homeric poems to the councillors of the king. 3 
As the Latin word patres applied to the Eoman Senate was 
probably derived from patm-familias, so yepovres may mean 
"heads of families," the elders of the tribe. The councillors of 
Sparta preserved this name into historic times, and it can be 
proved that the ye/oowta of that state ever continued to represent 
the noble clans of the community. 

Although the influence of the clans may be thus clearly 
demonstrated, what their precise relation was to the early 

1 Pol. L 2. Gelo became Ipo^avrat ruv x#mW 

2 See the article " Genos " in 9euv on the foundation of the city of 
Smith's Diet, of Greek and Roman Ge3a, because an ancestor Telmes had 
Antiquities (3rded.) A curious instance brought the Ipd of these goddesses 
of the claim to a public priesthood with him. 

basing itself on descent is to be found 3 II. ii. 404 ; iv. 344. 

in Herodotus vii. 153. The family of 



14 OUTLINES OF GEEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OHAP. 



tribal unions cannot be determined. The fyvXri may have been 
sometimes an' extended family, sometimes an aggregate of 
families. In any case it is the most primitive form of associa- 
tion known to us, and the TroAts grew up with the union of 
various tribes just as at a later stage still the central city, such 
as Athens or Elis, grew up with the " housing together" (o-uv- 
otKto-ts) of various smaller 3roA.ets. And the district or the city, 
when first known to us, is under the rule of a king. 

The accounts of the kingly power given by the philosophers, 
and particularly by Aristotle, are attempts to solve what was 
to the Greeks of historic times a very difficult problem the 
origin of monarchy, an institution alien both to their experience 
and to their sympathies. At one time Aristotle suggests that 
the earliest monarchy was patriarchal, that it was the rule of 
the eldest agnate of the family, and that the " common hearth " 
was the source of the kingly honour. 1 Elsewhere he gives a 
different explanation. The first chiefs, he thinks, must have 
been benefactors of the people in arts or in war. 2 He explains 
their position by the fact that they were the fittest, and he is 
doubtless right in saying that the monarchy of the heroic times 
originated with the settlement of a community or the acquisition 
of territory. The monarchy of the heroic times, like most 
others, originated with conquest; and, if the earliest Greek 
kingship was patriarchal, this peaceful and paternal monarch 
must have been superseded, when the time for movement and 
action aime, by the one strong man who could win territory 
for his people, protect their persons, and avenge their death. 
The very etymology of the word ftaariXek has been thought to 
show a military power, 3 and the kingly titles which were 
preserved in historic Greece toll the same tale. At Sparta they 
were leaders (ftayoC) and rulers of the people (dpxay&at), and one 
of the titles borne by the king of Thcssaly is the military one of 
rayos. Vague as are the descriptions found in the Kpos of the 
relations between the king and his nobles or people, yet even 

1 Pol i. 2 ; ef. vi. 8 = p. 1322 b d?rd 8 /3a<rt\et'/s in derived by U. Curtius 

""jjs KOIVIJS tcrrlas fyowrt r^v rip^v" from the root /3a and Xei> ( -= Xao, of, 

/caXoOtrt 5' ol fjv &PXOVTOLS rotfrous 61 dt Acuri^^s). Ft would thus 1m cqui- 

jSatnAeis ol $t irpvT&i>t$. Oluirou of valent to iho German "Hory.otf," and 

Larnpsacus ciVr47QB.c. gave to his not disminilar to tho Latin jtrttttHt 

treatise on the Spartan kings the title (prae-itor), one of Ihu original upju'Ila- 

A.p%ovT* Kal irpVTfoeis AQ,K8o,ijj,ovlwv t tiona of the king of Itotiu- and tha titlo 

8 ib. lii. 14. of tho earlier 



ii EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 15 

here we find traces of a military past. The notion of fealty to 
the chief is very strongly marked ; the duty of the kralpoi to 
the pariXtvs is the duty of a retinue, a cohors amicorum to 
its general. 1 On the other hand, the king owes duties to his 
nobles and to his people ; he is bound to protect them and to 
avenge their death. The monarchy at this early period was, 
to use Maine's expression, rather a matter of status than of 
contract \ but where the monarchy was preserved in later times 
we find that, in some cases, the tacit had become an expressed 
covenant. At Sparta a monthly oath was interchanged between 
the king and the ephors. The king swore on his own behalf 
that he would rule in accordance with the existing ordinances 
of the state, and they on behalf of the city that as long as he 
kept his oath his monarchy should remain unimpaired. A 
similar custom is recorded of the Molossians. After a sacrifice 
to Zeus Areius the king swears to rule in accordance with the 
laws, and the people to preserve his kingly power. 2 

These evidences point rather to the selection of a king 
as a leader in war, and to a mutual understanding between 
king and people for their own protection, than to a monarchy 
based merely on right of birth. Perhaps, as in the Germanic 
kingdoms, personal fitness and descent were both recognised; 
perhaps the military power, when long established, tended to 
be transmitted within a certain clan. In any case, this chief- 
tainship developed into the stereotyped monarchy of the Epos, 
which is described by Aristotle as hereditary and legal. 3 The 
idea of heredity, which we now meet for the first time, is a 
characteristic Greek conception. It exercised an influence even 
in the most democratic states, and its importance is fully re- 
cognised by the philosophers. 4 It is based on the notion of 
an actual transmission of excellence (apcro?) from father to son, 
and also on the idea that the acquisition of this excellence 
is dependent on the fact of being born in" a certain station. 6 
In the time of the monarchies, and of the aristocracies which 



1 J7. iv. 266, 267 'Ar/jeffy, fid\a. yAv iror IK /3acriX<?ws |8a<rtXefls Kal e| 
roi ey&v ^pfypos ertupos fo<rojj,ai, ws ayadov ayados Kal K /caXoO KaX6?, 
rb irp&Tov i)TciffTT\v Kal Karfrevira. Kal rfiXXa iravra ofr'rws, eKocrrov 
Of. II. xvi. 269 ff. y&ovs %Tepov TOIOVTOV gKyovov, av fity 

2 Xen. Rfisp. Lac. 15, 7; Pint. rfyas ytywyrai. 

Pyrrk. 5. 8 Aristotle (PoL v. l=p. 1301 b) 

3 Pol. in. 4 ; cf. Thuc. i. 13 tnl defines afy&eta as 7rpoy6i>w dperTj Kal 
^TOIS ytpaet irarpiKal /SacriXetcu TrXoOros. Cf. iv. 8, p. 1294 a i) y&p 

4 Plato Craf. p. 394 A ftrrai yap etyM gerw apery Kal TrXoOros dp^atos. 



16 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

succeeded them, aper?; is equivalent to good birth, and the 
word d/HortvoV, meaning " by right of birth," becomes almost 
a technical legal term. 1 In the Epos it is the kingly race which 
is thus chiefly honoured the race within which the royal 
sceptre must descend. We find also the idea that the kingly 
honour (np]) springs from Zeus, but a divine right to pre- 
eminence, if not to rule, is shared by others than the king; 
the other princes (/3ao-tXefc) are under the protection of the 
gods from whom they draw their race ; they too are " heaven- 
born " and " heaven-reared." The growing power of the nobles 
is, in fact, very apparent. The monarchy described in the 
Epos, probably of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., is by no 
means a great power, and unfortunately we have no record of 
the strongest period of kingly rule in Greece. If we could 
regard the discoveries at Tiryns, Mycenae, and on the east 
coast of Greece generally as representing a purely Hellenic 
civilisation, we should indeed have evidence of a period of 
despotism, of a difference of life between king and subjects, 
and of a command over their persons and manual labour which 
find their counterparts only in the East. But the differences 
between the civilisation of Mycenae and that portrayed in the 
epic poems are more fundamental than the resemblances. We 
can see in the former only the traces of an immigrant oriental 
despotism, and for the Greek /SaertAeus- we must turn to the 
Homeric poems, which show us a power approaching dissolu- 
tion. This weakening of his position may be best exemplified 
by a rapid review of his powers. As we should expect, his 
military authority in the field is of all his prerogatives the least 
impaired. He has the supreme command, with the power of 
life and death. Besides being general the king is priest, and 
in a certain sense priest of the community. The Homeric king 
sacrifices to all or any of the gods, and he may have sacrificed 
for the 6%ios as the house-father sacrifices for the family ; but 
he is priest chiefly as the representative of the greatest family 
in the state, and therefore the maintainer of its hereditary 
worship and sacrifices. 2 For this very reason his priesthood 
is limited. Aristotle says that he was " lord of the sacrifices 

1 As in one of Draco's laws (Hicks n. meansthreelmndred Eupatrids (>SW. 12). 

59). By the r/)ta\'6criot fyiffrbfaiv 5i/cd- 2 As in Agamemnon's ottering to 

OJTCS who tried those guilty ofllio death Xous (11. ii. 402 IF.), and Alcinous' to 

of the Cylonian conspirators Plutarch Poseidon (Od, xiii. 181). 



ii EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 17 

so far as they did not belong to .special priests." 1 There were, 
therefore, other tepcm/cat 0wu which belonged to representa- 
tives of other families who held the hereditary priesthoods of 
their clan. Thus we find that, when the monarchy comes to 
an end, the various cults of the state are in the hands of a 
close corporation of nobles, whose position is strengthened by 
their being the sole depositaries of religion. 

Again, the king is judge, as the keeper of the ordinances 
of Zeus, the interpreter of the unwritten law of the community. 
The sceptre and the ordinances go together. 2 But he is not 
the only judge. Even in the oldest parts of the Iliad more 
than one judge is mentioned, and there are many StKocrTroAoi 
in a single %AOS. S Thus others of the nobles have the 
0e/uoTs from Zeus, and even when the king judges, the 
nobles are there to aid him with their knowledge of &'/?, 
which expressed the customary law. 4 

Laws as yet are only ^to-res, "institutions" or single ad- 
judications. Justice itself appears in a semi-abstract form as 
StKty " straightness " or " Tightness "; but if language be a test 
of thought, there was as yet no notion of customary law (VO/AOS), 
for there was no name for it, although we must believe with 
Plato that its presence was felt in the heroic period, and that 
it was believed to regulate the ordinances of the king. 5 The 
idea of v6po$ grew up, no doubt, in the time of the succeeding 
aristocracies, which become the depositaries and expounders of 
traditional law, and it became fixed in the codifications effected 
by the great lawgivers of the seventh century Zaleucus, 
Charondas, and Draco. 

The pictures we possess of the heroic monarchy point, 
therefore, to a power approaching decline ; and this is natural 
enough if these pictures date from the ninth and eighth 
centuries B.C., for about the middle of the eighth century the 
monarchies fell throughout the Greek world. In Athens, in 
752, the rule of the Melanthidae was limited to a ten years' 
presidency. The same tendencies are found in Asia Minor; 

1 Pol. iii. 14 Ktpios T&V 6v<riu)j> probably the judge, i.e. the king, 
Saw, pAi lepartKd. who, after taking advice of the ypw- 

2 H. ii. 206. r, pronounced the sentence (Panta der 

3 SiKaffTT&Xoi o't re 0e/uoras irp&s Aids Stoat in d. Jlias u. Odyssee pp. 82 ff. ) 
eJptfarat, IL i. 238. c Plato Laws ni. p. 680 A d\V Ctfeu: 

4 In the trial scene on the shield of Kal TO?S Xeyoju&'ois irarpioLs v6/u.oi$ 
Achilles (72. xviii. 497), the ftrrwp is Mpfvot 



18 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

monarchy grave place to aristocracy in Ephesus, Cyme, and 
Lesbos. In Corinth, at about the same period, the monarchical 
rule of the Bacchiadae was replaced by a oWaoreta of the same 
family. The movement spread through Peloponnese. In 
Messenia, soon after 750, the monarchy was weakened. We 
have many general references to an early state of anarchy in 
this district, and from these it is evident that the kings of 
Messenia tried to maintain their royal prerogative, but without 
success. 1 In Argos, though the monarchy was preserved and 
is found as late as 480, 2 the influences of the time were shown 
in the abandonment of the hereditary principle. The power 
was taken from the Heracleidae and given to another house 
that of Aegon. In Sparta the monarchy had been saved by the 
readjustment of the constitution at the end of the ninth century. 
Order was restored, but at the expense of the kingly power. 

So little is known about the details of this startling change 
that historians, in their attempts to account for it, have been 
reduced mainly to conjecture. The movement was so widely 
spread that it is safe to assert that very general causes must 
have been at work, and these are more easily discovered than 
the details of each particular revolution. The storm of the 
great migrations, during which the guidance of an able king 
had been invaluable, had left behind it a period of com- 
parative calm, and there was less need for the continuance of 
a great military leader. The nobles possessed definite power, 
their council-board (yepowta) was organised, and they could 
easily take over the duties that the monarch had once fulfilled. 
In the states affected by the migrations conquest had meant an 
increase of material power to the nobility. Many of the noblo 
families had shared in the fruits of victory, and had received 
allotments (TC/^I/?;) in the conquered territory, comparable to 
those of the early kings. 3 They had grown to wealth and 
power, and were placed in a position almost independent of the 
reigning house. It has also been thought that the very isola- 
tion of the nobles in the conquered provinces, in face of the 

1 Plato (Laws iii. p. 691 is) says that 2 Her. vii. 1 19. 

the kings of Argos and Messenia ruined 3 It is possible that the rights of the 

themselves and Greek power by not king and nobles extended beyond their 

knowing that the half was better than private re^vr), and that they lind the 

the whole. Plutarch (Lye. 7) speaks power of collecting dues from tho small 

of the St'ifjiuv Kal pauriXfav crrticras Kal settlcis on the common land. 



II EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 19 

subdued populations and of their own turbulent otyws, made 
them more ready to trust to their own mutual assistance, less 
willing to trust in a king appointed from their midst. We are 
told that the Dorians of Messenia quarrelled with their leader, 
Cresphontes, on account of the privileges which he gave to 
the conquered race ; l and tradition says that it was a revolt of 
the Dorian nobles against their own &}yuos and the native 
"perioeci" which brought about the foundation of historic 
Sparta. 2 If we add to these considerations the fact that, as 
the result of conquest, new cities had been formed, that the 
bonds of civic life had everywhere been drawn closer, and that 
the Greek TroAis, with its restricted area and public life, was 
eminently unsuited to a kingly form of government, the dignity 
of which requires for its support a certain degree of seclusion, 
we shall have ample reasons of a general kind for the almost 
simultaneous downfall of the monarchies of Greece. 

The consequence of the downfall of the monarchies, in 
Greece and in Asia Minor, was the transfer of government to 
the clans. This transfer might assume either of two forms. 
In some cases the government lapsed from the royal clan to the 
many noble clans of a community. At other times it was kept 
within the ruling clan, but, instead of being reserved for one 
individual, was vested in the members generally. The govern- 
ment of a union of clans is perhaps exemplified by that of the 
Eupatridae at Athens, for although the title "Eupatrid" in 
historical times designated only a very small section of the 
community, it was probably applied originally to all the noble 
families. 8 Of the second form of clan government a great 
many instances were preserved even in historic times. The 
great Thessalian clans, the Aleuadae of Larisa, the Scopadae of 
Cranon (both claiming, like the Spartan Idngs 3 descent from 
Heracles), and the Creondae of Pharsalus, still continued to rule 
their respective cities. The Bacchiadae, also of the conquering 
race of the Heracleidae, who formed a close corporation, 
marrying only within the clan, 4 took over the government of 
Corinth. The Penthelidae are found in Mitylene, and some- 

1 Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 361. things sacred and profane, (ii.) they 

2 ib. p. 364. were the expounders of the laws and sc 

3 The Eupatridae, as described by possessed all jurisdiction, and (in.) they 
Plutarch (Thes. 25), (i.) had the know- filled the offices of state. 

ledge of sacred things and were the 4 Her. v. 92 ISloocav KO! jfyovro 
instructors of the other citizens in e dX\9?Aow. 



20 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

times in Asia Minor the name of the clan reflects its royal 
origin. Thus the Basileidiio held sway in Ephesus 1 and 
Erythrae. 2 An inscription found at Arkcsinc, in the island of 
Amorgus, bears the tribe-name IWtAeiTui. 3 

An appreciation of the character of this government can 
be formed only by some knowledge of the nature of the clan. 
The yei/os was a close corporation, the individual members of 
which believed themselves to be ultimately connected by blood \ 
and it was a corporation that for this reason always remained 
inexpansive. It might be recruited by adoption, but by no 
other means. The most democratic legislator in the most 
democratic state could not increase its numbers : Cleisthenes 
of Athens created new citizens ; he enrolled them in the tribes 
and phra tries ; but he could not add them to the clan. The 
members of this body, the yei/i'i/rat, recognised in common 
some mythical ancestor, who was generally suggested by the 
patronymic ending of the clan-name, which expressed the belief 
of the members in their ultimate relationship. They possessed 
a common worship, which was closely dependent on their 
common ancestry, and was the only living evidence of it, the 
clan -name borne by the individual, which was preserved in 
Rome, having been early lost in Greece. 4 The ancestor who 
gave his name to the clan might be a god himself, or some hero 
whose descent connected it with a god. 6 Thus the Spartan 
kings were priests of Zeus, under his two titles AaKeoatfutw and 
Qvpdvios. They were the link by which the whole state was 

Bound by gold chains about the foot of Gwl ; 

and this was partly the secret of the maintenance of their 
power. The statement of Hecataens that his sixteenth 
ancestor was a god 7 is probably not an exaggerated expression 
of the current Greek belief in the possibility of divine descent.. 

1 Stmbo p. G3. Iliad by Hie epithets oior/)Cf/>/;s ami 

8 Ami. /W. v. 6. owywi'is, which tire applied, not only 

3 Gilbert tiltnttsatt. ii. p. 273. In the pa<Tt\cfo or kiu& but also to the 

4 Herodotus (v. 60), Hpwiking of /ktriXew or princes (II. i. 387 ; xi. 
Isagoras, the opponent of Ulcisthews, 82;}, etc.) See Fanta o)>. cit. p. .'J3 ; cf. 
says of him Mip JA& t&v doKij^ov wrap (hi, iv. 63 76*0? Storpffitw [1a.fft\-fj(t)v. 
T& wtK&Ocy O'UK #x w fipdfftti' OfiovffL tt Cf. the atory of thu restoration of 
<W ol ffvyycvtes arJroD Ate Kapttp. (loin- I'lfistoaimx (Time. v. 16). TJus nrada 
pare with this the Hiinjihsr Komau test, bids the Spartans, uinI<T j)cnalti<jH, to 

wtoi Mint <jiu men nnminc restore 1 "the Heed of the demigod HOIJ 
tetlantur (Oiiujius ap. Pt!.st. p. S)4), ol'Xi-UH." 
This is the idea expressed in thu 7 Her. ii. Htf. 



ri EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 21 

Often, however, a family traced its origin, not directly to a 
god, but to some seer or priest intrusted with his worship \ and 
in such families a hereditary craft or gift was not infrequently 
associated with the hereditary cult. The Talthybiadae at 
Sparta owed their position as state -heralds to their being 
descendants of Talthybius, 1 and it was by this right that the 
great prophetic families of Elis, the Tellidae and lamidae, 
exercised their hereditary gift. 2 Sometimes a peculiarity in 
worship was thought to mark a radical difference of race. 
Thus in Attica the Eumolpidae were considered, probably on 
grounds of ritual alone, to be of Thracian origin ; the Gephyraei, 
whom Herodotus considers to be Phoenician, had their separate 
shrines and worship, in which the rest of the people had no 
share, and were in turn excluded from certain religious festivals 
of the Athenians. 3 

We may now form some idea of the power of this nobility 
of birth. In most cases its members had won their territory 
by the right of conquest, and were the large landowners in 
the states ; their special claims to honour were the exclusive 
possession of the sacrifices and higher religious rites of the state, 
the exclusive knowledge of its laws, and the sole possession of that 
citizen aperf which resulted from higher birth and from inherited 
wealth and culture. This was the rule of the best (a/Morot), 
and for a time these governments may well have been the 
truest aristocracies that the Greek world ever saw. It was not 
merely the position, it was still more the qualities which made 
these men at once priests, judges, and soldiers that seemed un- 
attainable by the common herd. Their rule had a divine sanction, 
but the theocratic element was not oppressively present ; it was 
less obvious than at Rome, for the clan-worship, exclusive as it 
was, was less baneful than the inscrutable knowledge of the 
priestly colleges of the Eoman Patriciate, which created a 
strong tie of interest between all the families of the privileged 
class, and professed to give rules for all things human and 
divine. In Greece the lay functions overshadowed the priestly 
character, and that status and merit were thought to be 
coincident is shown by the growth of a characteristic Greek 
conception, which in after days was barely eradicated from the 
most democratic states. This was the idea of 



Her. vii. 134. 2 to. v. 44 ; ix. 33, 37. 3 to. v. 57. 



22 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

primarily a military conception, 1 dependent for its origin on 
the obvious fact that certain modes of life and the exercise of 
certain trades disqualify from prowess in the field. The artist 
and the artisan are equally exposed to the charge ; agriculture 
is comparatively exempt ; for, even when the master works on 
his own field, the life is one of greater leisure and of healthy 
influences. Even in these early days the word may also 
have implied the absence of leisure for the higher arts of peace, 
ritual, and law, and thus have formed the basis for the complex 
philosophic notion of a life that debars from all pursuit of the 
higher arts, politics and philosophy, 2 by its continuous drudgery, 
its fixed boundaries, and the professionalism which drags the 
mind along a single narrow groove. 

The purely aristocratic character of these governments was, 
it is true, tempered by the accompaniment, perhaps in some 
cases by the introduction, of the oligarchic element of wealth. 
For wealth must from an early time have had an important 
influence in determining the character of the government, 
chiefly as supplying the means for the military equipment 
in vogue. Aristotle lays special stress on this element as 
determining the form of an oligarchy. He states tfiat, after 
the time of the monarchies, the earliest privileged class (77 
irpwrrj TroXireia) was chosen from the warriors, and at first 
from the " charioteers " or " knights " (wnrcts). It was only 
later, as cities grew larger and the hoplite formed the main 
strength of the army, that governments became more liberal. 3 
A type of this first form of aristocracy, which was dependent on 
wealth, is furnished by the rule of the anrofiarai of Chalcis, on 
whose lands the Athenians established a cleruchy in 507. It 
is described by Strabo as an aristocratic government based on a 
property qualification. 4 In governments of this type the 

1 Herodotus (u. 167) rightly assigns rule of oTrXircu Thucydides and 
it this origin, and remarks on its An.stotle ic^ard as that of a liberal 
presence in tho most warlike of the oligarchy, since the oirXtrai are 
barbarian nations, He adds that in CI'/'TTO/XH (Thuc. vni. 07 ; Arlst Pol. iv. 
Greece the commercial town of 13 = p. 1297 b). Extreme democracy 
Corinth showed the least contempt for consists in the a.l mission of the \l/froL 
Xip<yrtx vat ' anf l ^ ne v&vrtKtis oxXos to government, 

2 Aiist. Pul. vii. 2 = p. 1324 a. 4 Slrabop. 4l7d7ron/x^arwv&^5/)cs 

3 ib. iv. 5 = i>. 12021). It must, d/iiirroK/xiTtKajs &PXOVT&* Herodotius 
have depended entirely on tin- chtir- (v. 77) calls them oi Traces. A similar 
acter of the country whether in-Trek form of government existed in Eretna 
meant charioteers or horsemen. The ( Arist. Pol. iv. 3 = p. 1289 b). 



ii EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF QEEEK CONSTITUTIONS 23 

poorer members of the noble clans must have been excluded 
from all share in power ; but as a rule, especially in countries 
such as Attica, where wealth depended almost wholly on 
landed possessions, the aristocracy of wealth and birth must 
generally have coincided. Such, however, could not have been 
the case in the maritime states of Asia Minor which were 
given up to trade, and yet it is here that the aristocracies of 
the " knights " are especially prominent. Such governments 
were found at Magnesia on the Maeander, at Colophon, and at 
Cyme. Another kind of government that hovers between an 
aristocratic and an oligarchic character deserves some mention 
here; for, although it belongs to a later stage of political 
development, some instances of it are as old as the eighth cen- 
tury. It is the aristocracy of the colonies, where the original 
possession of landed property has created a status which may 
in some cases have become fixed enough to exist without its 
original support. The privileged class is formed by the yapopoi 
or yew/iopoi, round which the later S-Jj/tos gathers. Instances of 
such governments are found at Samos, and at Leontini and 
Syracuse in Sicily. 

The last stage is marked by more artificial forms of oligarchy, 
where the aristocratic element is thrust still further into the 
background. Such governments are mentioned here because, 
although they are found chiefly in the western colonies, they 
may in certain cases be a reflection of an earlier state of things 
in Greece. Even, however, if they be regarded as pure 
political experiments, such as are found earliest in colonial 
settlements, the work of the legislator who created them is but 
an expression of the tentative spirit which at the close of this 
epoch was seeking to find some other basis for power than that 
of birth. Sometimes these governments depend on a fixed 
property -qualification, sometimes they admit only a certain 
number of citizens to power. 1 The government of " the thou- 
sand " (ol X&WH) is so widely spread in Italy that it may well 
have owed its origin to some master-mind. At Locri 2 it was 
probably the work of Zaleucus, and to this influence its presence 
at Croton 3 and Rhegium 4 may also have been due. 

1 If we are to believe the Ath. Pol. this is probably an anachronism, 

(c. 4), a constitution of the first kind 2 Polyb. xii. 16. 

was found at Athens by Draco when he 3 Jarabl. Fit. Pijthcuj. 35, 260. 

began his work of organisation ; but 4 Heracleid Fta<jm. 25. 



24 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

The precise forms assumed by the early aristocracies of the 
Greek world can very rarely be determined. They depended 
on the supremacy of caste or of wealth combined with caste, 
and they may rightly be termed " constitutions," in so far as 
the power of these governments, like that of the monarchies 
which had preceded them, was supposed to he limited by the 
observance of traditional law. There is only ono extreme form, 
which, if it is rightly interpreted by Aristotle, hardly deserves 
the name of constitution. This is the Bwaxrreia or hereditary 
oligarchy, in which " son succeeds father, and personality and 
not the law is the governing force." 1 The government of the 
Thessalian clans in later times furnishes instances of at least 
the relics of such a system ; but the best example of such a 
" dynasty " which we possess is the rule of the Bacchiadae of 
Corinth, where the caste system was more marked, and the 
government apparently more tyrannical, than elsewhere in the 
states of Greece. 

The administrative character of these aristocracies is as 
obscure as their form, and the little that we know about the 
nature of their rule is confined to the period of their decline. 
If we fix our attention on the primitive states of Greece proper, 
and neglect for the moment the later colonial developments on 
which we have touched, the chief characteristics which we find 
noted may be summed up in two points : their almost universal 
oppression of the lower classes, and the extraordinary impulse 
which they consequently gave to colonisation. The varied and 
sometimes minute causes which led to the planting of colonies 
belong to the general history of Greece and not to the history 
of her institutions ; it is sufficient to remark here that, after 
the period of the migrations, the latter part of the eighth and 
the first part of the seventh century were the great periods of 
the expansion of Hellas; and for this fact certain general 
causes can be assigned. One, it is true, was purely physical : 
the movement set on foot by the migrations was not yet over, 
and Greece possessed teeming populations with no room to settle 
on the mainland. But a groat political cause is to be found in 
the discontent of the S]/AOS at home under oligarchical govern- 
ment; for that this was the chief stimulus to emigration is 
proved by the fact that with the rise of democracy and settled 
government colonisation on a great scale ceases. Proximate 
1 Arfet. jPuZ.lv. 5 = p. 12921). 



n EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 25 

causes were often furnished by quarrels in the ruling houses. 
Young and noble adventurers, whom crime or revolution had 
driven from home, went with bands of retainers to seek new 
settlements. Such were Archias, the Heracleid founder of 
Syracuse, 1 and the Spartan Partheniae, founders of Tarentum. 2 
In later times some of the wiser despots, and later still some 
of the constitutional ministers of Greece, revived colonisation as 
a political measure. They often succeeded in their immediate 
objects, but were never able to give colonisation a history such 
as it had in this age. This was to a greater degree than others 
the age of chivalry and enterprise in Greece ; for it was the 
age of discontent, which is the basis of enterprise. And the 
dissatisfaction with the existing order of things which produced 
colonisation was soon destined to give birth to a product 
whose influence was to be as great on the political development 
of Greece. This was tyranny. 

The cities of Greece ever showed a remarkable tendency to 
accept personal rule, for universal subjection was at least one 
of the modes in which true democratic equality might be 
secured. We shall find that from the close of the fourth 
century, at a time when almost every political experiment had 
been tried and had seemed to fail in turn, tyranny, which at 
that time usually meant the protection of Macedon or of 
Persia, was again resorted to and became almost the normal 
type of government. But, in the earlier period that we are 
considering, the phenomenon is not complicated by external 
influences. It was a spontaneous development, and but a 
passing symptom of the growth of some new and powerful 
organ. Fortunately the new factors which created it and 
determined its character can be discovered with some success. 

The origin of Greek tyranny was in the main commercial, 
and Thucydides is only reflecting this truth when he makes 
the somewhat enigmatic statement that it was due to the 
growing wealth of Hellas. 8 It is true that tyrannies some- 
times arose in states, such as Athens, which had no claims to 
commercial greatness ; wherever there was a discontented class 
whether this were formed of merchants or peasants there 
was a latent possibility of its growth. But the earliest, 
strongest, and most permanent despotisms certainly sprang 

1 Time. vi. 3 ; Pint. Ainat. Narr. ii. 2 Pans. x. 10, 6 ; Strafco p. 426. 
p. 944 Didot. Thuc. i. 13. 



26 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

from a sudden assertion of their claims by the rich and un- 
privileged classes the commercial folk who were outside the 
pale, and who were not only excluded from all share in the 
government, but found their properties exposed to the plunder 
of the dynasties which ruled the towns. These were the 
conditions which gave birth to the tyrant in Corinth, the rich 
manufacturing and shipping town which commanded the trade 
of the Isthmus, 1 and in Sicyon, renowned only next to Corinth 
for its commercial enterprise. 2 Both were ripe for revolution. 
In the former city a violent reaction against the Bacchiadae, 
who had grossly abused their power and appropriated to their 
own use the profits of the commercial class, 3 upset the dynastic 
government ; in the latter the social movement was complicated 
by an ethnic question. At Sicyon both the tyrant and his 
supporters belonged to the weaker Ionian element in the state 
the tribe of the Aegialeis and the revolution took the form 
of a reaction against an oppressive Dorian nationality 4 and the 
assertion of the freedom of the state from Argive influence. 
Perhaps in this respect Sicyon did not stand alone. The effect 
of the Dorian migration had been to make social coincide with 
national distinctions, and tyranny may elsewhere have been 
the assertion of external freedom for the state as well as of 
internal liberty for the masses. More than a century later we 
find the same social causes that had affected Corinth at work in 
the western colonies. The tyrannies that sprang up during 
the close of the sixth century in Sicily and Southern Italy, at 
Leontini, Gela, and Rhegium, developed out of oligarchies, 5 and 
were probably due to the same assertion of their claims by tho 
rich and unprivileged classes. In other states, where a com- 
mercial had not yet replaced u wholly agricultural civilisation, 
it was the championship of the poorest class on which the 
despot based his claim to power. It was thus that Peisistratus 
of Athens led the poor hill-men of the uplands of Attica, the 
Diacrii, against the rich men of the plain. 6 

Throughout Greece the difficulties, whether national or 
social, that called for settlement, could admit of but one 
solution a personal ascendency of some kind that could load 

1 K6/>u'0os i] ttMfiLw, Her. iii. 52. J Ilisv. v. f>8. 

i;< Stral>o p. 382. '' A risl. 7W. v. 1^-- p. 1,'Miin. 

3 Ael. Var. Hist. i. 19; Strubo p. (i IJcr. i. CD; Aribl. /W. v. &--p 

325. 1305 a. 



ir EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 27 

to the readjustment of the conflicting claims of the rival parties 
in the state and the framing of a constitution. But the nature 
of this personal ascendency varied. In some rare cases it took 
the form of a constitutional dictatorship. At times the con- 
tending factions were fortunate or reasonable enough to come 
to an arrangement, and to agree in appointing an individual for 
a settlement of their difficulties who bore the title of cuW 
j&i/j/Tifs. Such an office was held by Pittacus in Mitylene, by 
Zaleucus in Locri, and we may even say by Solon in Athens, 
for, although nominally sole archon, he was practically dictator. 
It was the only constitutional form of despotism in the Greek 
world, and is described by Aristotle as an " elective tyranny," 
and as combining the characteristics of monarchy and tyrannis. 1 
The aesymnete was given a body-guard of sufficient force to 
enable him to carry out his work of organisation, 2 and, with 
respect to the length of his tenure of power, three forms of the 
office are described. 3 It was held either for life, or for a fixed 
term of years, or until certain duties had been performed. 4 But 
in most cities faction was too intense to admit the recognition 
of such a temporary and legitimised despotism. More frequently 
the reins of government were seized by a man who constituted 
himself champion of a section of the community, and by its help 
rose to be tyrant. 

Normal and inevitable as we have seen the development of 
tyranny to be, it is yet possible that even in its earliest forms 
it was to some extent a conscious imitation of oriental despotism. 
At least the word rvpawos, which cannot be explained as Greek, 
seems to have come from Lydia and Phrygia, where it is found 
frequently on inscriptions, both as a title and as a proper name. 6 
The meaning conveyed by the word to the Greek mind of a 
later age was that of a man who wielded an absolute authority, 
which was not sanctioned by the ordinances of the state in 

1 Arist. Pol in. 14; iv. 10 = p. out m Greece ; and there is an instance, 
1295 a. " They are royal in so far as in a later period, of an aesymnete, 
the monarch rules according to law Iphiades of Abydos, who made himself 
and over willing subjects; but they despot (Arist. Pol. v. 6= p. 1306 a), 
are tyrannical in so far as he is des- In some states, such as Teos, Cyme, 
potic and rules according to his own Naxos, and Mcgara, the title is found 
fancy " (Jo\vett), as that of a standing olfice. 

2 ft), iii. 15. c See Bockh's comment on O.LQ. 

3 ib. in. 14. n. 3438, where the title is applied to 

4 The aesymnesia, though it belongs Zeus (KO.T &nTwfip rov Kvpiov rvpdvvov 
particularly to this period, never died Aids Mcur^aXaT^oO K.r.X.) 



28 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP 

which it was exercised. Absolutism and irresponsibility are 
the chief connotations of the word. To the citizen of a later 
age the tyrant was an outlaw in a threefold sense. He had 
placed himself outside the pale of positive law ; for this reason 
he seemed exempt from all moral control, and, as an equally 
necessary consequence, was outside the protection of the law. 
It was this idea of "irresponsibility," of being above the 
ordinances of the state, which above all shocked Greek senti- 
ment, and gave rise to the gloomy generalisations as to the 
character and conduct befitting such a position with which the 
readers of Herodotus are familiar. 1 We need only note in 
passing the gratuitous addition to this conception developed by 
the later philosophic thought of Greece, viz. that the rule of 
the tyrant was exercised not in the interest of the subject, but 
in that of the ruler. It forms the chief ground for Aristotle's 
distinction between monarchy and tyranny, 2 and was a natural 
consequence of the idea that the latter government was outside 
the pale of law ; but it was a deduction not always justified by 
the facts. Historians must judge by results arid not by motives; 
and few governments in Greece betrayed such a keen interest 
in the welfare of their cities as these unauthorised monarchs. 3 

Tho portraits of these pretenders who rose to power in the 
seventh and sixth centuries are drawn invariably in the same 
broad outlines. 4 They were demagogues who united military 
prowess, and sometimes, like Peisistratus, a past record for good 
service in the field, with a zeal, real or pretended, for the 
popular welfare. They were men who, in later Greece, would 
have been constitutional " champions of the people " 



1 Her. iii. 80 /cws o' a,v ei'i? XPW M 3 The treatment of the vigorous 

Ka.TypTijfj.tvoi' fiompxiT], rp t'e<m a.v- external policy of the tyrants, which 

cvOtivy irodfiv TO, fioOXcrat ; Here wo raised their cities to a greater height of 

get the key-note to the Greek prejudice power than was ever attained in their 

against tyrannis. Tho internal state former, and sometimes in their subsc- 

of the despot soon became the subject qnent history, and of the magnificence 

of debate in the philosophic schools ; of their courts the natural result of 

and this speculation, assisted perhaps peace and prosperity which is so 

by the experience of the inferior tyrants .strangely misconstrued by Aristotle 

of the fourth century, fonnwl the basis (Pol. v. 1 1 p. 1313 b), does not belong 

for the ideal pictures nf Plato and to constitutional history. I have 

Xenophon (Plat ft<'j>. p. f>80 ; Xen. attempted a Hlcetch of these points in 

Hi'0ro t y(Wiiai) 9 Mu\ ibrsuchamonslrou.s the art. "Tyrannun" in Smith's Jtict. 

creation as the Penander of Herodotus t>f Oreck and Human A-ntiq. (3rd ed.) 
(v. 92). 4 Plato Rep. viii. p. 565 D ; Arist. Pol 

a Arist. Rth. viii. 10, 2 ; Pol iii. 7, 5. v. 10 = p. 1310 b ; Dionys. vi. 60, 



ji EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 29 



TOV SrjfjLov) j but they lived at a time when the sword was a keener 
weapon than the tongue, and when there was no organised 
assembly of the people to be swayed by their eloquence, but 
only a rabble to be led to the acropolis. The best -known 
types for this early period are Orthagoras of Sicyon, Cypselus 
of Corinth, Theagenes of Megara, and Peisistratus of Athens. 
But this type was very constant, and perpetuated itself even in 
the fourth century. At a time when there was no further 
political principle left to be fought for, we find Dionysius reach- 
ing the throne in Syracuse by a championship of social in 
default of political rights, and he is cited as one of the great 
historical instances of the demagogue despot. 1 It was naturally 
in the earlier tyrannies that this phenomenon was of most import- 
ance, for, as Aristotle was the first of Greeks to see, their holders 
were everywhere the precursors of a new phase of political life. 
The immediate effect of their rule may be summed up by saying 
that everywhere they found distraction in their cities, and 
everywhere they left something approaching unity. We extract 
from Herodotus, 2 an unwilling witness, the fact that at Athens 
the rule of the Peisistratidae first created a national spirit. It 
is after their overthrow that the SVJJJ.QS emerges as a united 
whole, by alliance with -which Cleisthenes created the democracy. 
As unifiers of their cities they were the precursors of popular 
government, which requires a collective will. It is true that a 
democratic form of government did not everywhere follow their 
overthrow ; but even in these cases a constitution of any kind 
was an improvement on the old dynastic rule. Corinth, the 
city most grievously chastened, and perhaps the most improved 
by tyranny, still remained an oligarchy, but an oligarchy of a 
constitutional type, which rested on, if it did not express, the 
popular will. 

The social position of the individual demagogues who made 
their way to the throne is of some importance for constitutional 
history, since sometimes it shows a connecting link between the 
new regime and the old. In some cases, it is true, the tyrants 
sprang from the oppressed classes which they championed; 
Orthagoras, for instance, the founder of the dynasty of Sicyon, 
belonged to the weaker Ionian element of the state, and is said 
to have been a cook. 3 But more frequently they illustrate the 
truth that the best democrats spring from the ranks of the 
1 Aiist. Pol. v. 5=p. 1305 a. 2 v. 66. 3 Diodor. viii. 24. 



30 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

nobility. They were often members of the oligarchies they 
overthrew, and sometimes even executive officials of these 
governments, who made the great powers which they possessed 
as magistrates a stepping-stone to the crown. According to 
one account, 1 Cypselus of Corinth was enabled to found his 
dynasty by the mode in which he exercised the office of 
" polemarch," or chief military commander of the city. It was 
by the straining of the powers of a magistracy that Phalaris 
rose to be tyrant of Agrigentum, 2 while at Miletus a tyranny 
arose out of the office of president (n-pvTavis) of the state. 3 
Peisistratus of Athens was of the royal family of Codrus, 4 and 
Lygdamis, whom he established in Naxos, belonged to the old 
nobility. 6 In cases where a magistracy had been held the 
transition to power was easier : a fragment of the constitution 
still remained, and the chief change was that popular now 
replaced dynastic support. At times this popular support was 
sufficient to maintain the government which it had established. 
Thus we are told that Cypselus remained a popular hero, and 
during the whole period of his rule at Corinth never required 
a body-guard. 6 But as a rule the despot could not hold his 
position by popular support alone. It was perhaps not so 
much a distrust of the loyalty of the masses as of their efficiency 
to protect their leaders against the attacks of the hostile clans, 
that led to the almost universal employment of bands of 
mercenaries, for the support of which the subjects were taxed. 7 
This unfortunate accompaniment of their rule deepened, if it 
did not in some cases create, the idea of its unconstitutional 
character. The maintenance of the tyrant's rule was often 
typical of its beginning ; for the throne that was supported by 
force had been in many cases won by violence. A coup tfttat 
was the necessary supplement to popular favour in the case of 
Peisistratus ; in other cases it seems to have been a substitute 
for popular support. It was thus that Poly crates gained the 
throne in Samos, 8 that Aristodemus made himself despot of 

1 That of Nicolaus of Damascus, p. 58. 7 ib. iii. 14; v. 10 = p. 1311 a. 

2 Arist. Pol. v. 10 = p. 1310 b. Herodotus (i. 61) speaks of the Argive 

3 it), v. 5=sp. 1305 a. mercenaries of Peisistratus. 

4 Her. v. 65. 8 Yet, if it is true that he seized the 
ff Arist. Pol. v. G= p. 1305 b. acropolis with only fifteen hoplites 
6 ft v. 12 = p. 1315 b. The (Her. iii. 120), he must have relied on 

Corinthians whom he slew, robbed, the discontent of the <%cos, and be- 
and banished (Her, v, 92), must have lieved that it would accept the result 
been members of the hostile oligarchy. of the coup d'etat. 



II EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTION'S 31 

Cumae in Italy, 1 and that Cylon attempted to occupy the same 
position at Athens. 2 

The first exercise of the tyrant's power was naturally a 
work of clearance. The most powerful members of the clans, 
which it was their declared object to resist, had to be disposed 
of ; and we are not surprised to find that the Bacchiadae were 
expelled from Corinth by Cypselus, 3 and that even Peisistratus, 
in spite of the mildness of his rule, found it necessary to banish 
some of the nobles. 4 But by the wiser despots no violent 
change seems to have been made in the machinery of govern- 
ment where such machinery existed. The Peisistratidae, we 
are told, ruled in accordance with the Kupevoi vd//ot, only taking 
the precaution of having the great offices of state filled by 
members of their own family. 5 The Greek mind, it is true, 
would eliminate tyranny altogether from constitutional history ; 
but the position of the Peisistratidae suggests the question 
whether the early Greek tyrannies were so unconstitutional 
either in theory or in practice as they are generally represented 
to have been. Unfortunately the case which we know best can 
scarcely be taken as typical, for despotism at Athens was a 
comparatively late development, and followed a thorough 
reconstruction of the state by Solon. There was a machinery 
to hand which the new ruler might use, and Peisistratus, while 
as absolute as the Roman princeps, posed like him as an 
executive authority and as a part of the constitution. In the 
earlier tyrannies this chance was hardly offered, for with the 
overthrow of the dynasty the whole machinery of government 
went with it. Yet in those cases where the exercise of a 
magistracy was made a stepping-stone to tyranny, some shadow 
of legality might have been preserved by the maintenance of 
this office. The case of Gelo of Syracuse proves how even the 
greater tyrants craved legal recognition, 6 and how sometimes 

1 Dionys. vii. 2-11. VIKUS, and his reign was called the age 

2 Her. v. 71 ; Time. i. 126. His of Cronus. For liis observance of con- 
failure was largely due to the fatal &titutional forms see Arist. Pol. v. 12 
mistake he made in relying on foreign, =p. 1315 b. 

in this case Megarian, aid. See W. The rulers of Sicily are exempted 
Fowler The Oity State p. 127. "by Thucydides (i. 17) from his general 

3 Dionys. iii. 46 ; cf. Her. v. 92. condemnation of the pettiness of the 

4 t&. vi. 103. tyrant's aims. In Herodotus (vii. 163 ; 
6 ft i. 59 ; Thuc. vi. 54. In the cf. 157) Gelo is despot, not of Syracuse 

Ath. Pol. (c. 16) Peisistratus is said to but of Sicily, 
have ruled /iaXXop iroXim'ws $ rvpav- 



32 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

this might be won. The lofty ambition of Gelo more than 
redeems his tyranny \ it was nothing less than the defence of 
western civilisation against its deadly foe the Semite, by a 
union of the Sicilian Greeks to resist the Carthaginians. The 
union was effected, and by the battle of Himera in 480 the 
victory was won. Then it was that Gelo was acclaimed by the 
Syracusans as their saviour, their benefactor, and their king. 1 

The true evil of tyrannis was supposed to be most clearly 
shown by the necessities of its internal administration. To 
create a slavish feeling in the subjects, to sow mistrust amongst 
them, to allow no prominent men in the state, to encourage 
fLatterers, parasites, and espionage, are said to be the character- 
istics of the despots; 2 elsewhere stress is laid on the blood- 
stained character of their rule. 3 It is impossible to say whether 
these criticisms are really applicable to the earlier tyrannies, 
and they are largely due to the later Greek sentiment that 
irresponsible must mean evil rule. We hear nothing of general 
oppression of the citizens ; if we may judge from the case of 
the Peisistraticlae, taxation seems to have been light : they 
collected only one-twentieth of the products of the soil ; * and 
there are many typical stories which show that it was to the 
interest of the tyrants to keep the lower classes contented and 
employed. 5 

More important are the social changes with which they are 
credited. The scattered notices of these deserve examination 
since, whether consciously pursued with this motive or not, 
these reforms had a decidedly political tendency. An inevitable 
object of their policy was to raise the depressed portion of the 
population at the expense of the dominant section. This 
change, probably universal, was most marked where the 
distinction between classes was a national one. Hence the 
fame of Clcisthenos's reforms at Sicyon. His hatred of the 
memory of Adrastus, the Dorian hero, his suppression of the 
Homeric recitals, arid his alteration of the tribe-names, 6 were 



J Diodor. xi. 2G euepysrw, <rwrJjp a Arist. Pol. v. 11 =p. 1313 b. 
Ko.1 /fcwiXflfe. See Freeman Jlht. of s Her. iii. 80 ; v. 92. 
Nieily ii. p. 501. Kven before thin 4 Time. vi. 54. The Ath. Pol. (c. 

Athenian envoys arc represented as 1C), probably wrongly, makes Peisis- 

addressing him ns & /SacriXeO SJv/w?- trutus himself exact a tithe. 
Koduv (Her. vii. 161), This was a Ath. PoL 16 ; Ael. Var. Hiat. ix, 

courtesy title, ami in fact the only 25. 
mode of addiuss possible to a tyrant Her. v. 67, 68. 
from envoys of a friendly state. 



n EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 33 

all meant to elevate the Ionian element in the state at the 
expense of the Dorian. National unity was to the interest of 
the tyrant, since his power was equally threatened by clan 
feuds and by local factions. For this purpose religious festivals 
were instituted, and Peisistratus's establishment of the greater 
Panathenaea l is typical of the mode in which pageantry might 
be employed in the interest of order. A third element in their 
reforms was, characteristically for this period of Greek history, 
also religious. It can hardly be an accident that the names of 
Periander, Cleisthenes, and Peisistratus are all associated with the 
cultivation of the Dionysiac worship ; 2 for by the encourage- 
ment given to these festivals they were substituting universal 
and popular cults for the aristocratic and exclusive worship of 
the nobles. The Dionysiac-Orphic ritual is of great importance 
in the history of the democracy. It is not a primitive cult in 
Greece ; even at Eleusis it replaced an older native worship of 
Poseidon. With its advent from Thrace two popular movements 
began the drama and the mysteries. The mysteries were above 
all anti-aristocratic ; they were part of a spiritual cult, to which 
any one might be admitted ; they had, it is true, their special 
priests, such as the Eumolpidae and Ceryces at Athens, but 
noble and commoner were on a level amongst the initiated. In 
all the states the Dionysiac worship was a new thing, connected 
with no traditional ancestry, appealing to no particular clan. 
Its tendency was thus unifying and levelling, and for this reason 
it was encouraged by the tyrants. 

It was not in the nature of tyranny to last long, however 
powerful the individual ruler might make himself. We do 
indeed meet with despotisms of a duration which rivalled that 
of the ordinary constitutional governments in Greece : the Ortha- 
goridae ruled at Sicyon for a hundred years, the Cypselidae at 
Corinth for seventy-three years, the Peisistratidae at Athens, 
exclusive of the period during which Peisistratus was banished, 
for thirty-five ; but these periods were exceptional. The tyrants 
were, as a rule, ministers of the people irregularly appointed to 
perform a special work, and when the work was done and there 
was no further reason for their continuance, they fell. Their 
government was brought to an end sometimes through the 

1 Schol. Aristeidis p. 323. dence, though more abundant, is less 

2 Periander (Her. i. 23), Cleisthenes direct. It is collected and examined "by 
(Her. v. 67) ; for Peisistratus the evi- Dyer The Gods in Greece pp. 125, 126. 

D 



34 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY ciur. 

degeneracy of the successors to the original usurper, as in the 
case of the Peisistratidae ; sometimes through conspiracies 
inspired by private motives a cause of ruin which Aristotle 
illustrates by the downfall of the earlier and later despotisms at 
Syracuse. 1 But not infrequently their overthrow was effected by 
external force, and the earliest crusades undertaken in support 
of a political idea were the expeditions made by certain cities 
for the destruction of tyranny in others. In early times Sparta 
gained the greatest name as a liberator, and is said to have put 
down most of the tyrannies in Greece. 2 The other great 
instance is that of a city which had itself suffered : Syracuse, 
after the death of Thrasybulus, and after that of the younger 
Dionysius, vigorously undertook the liberation of the other 
Sicilian states. 3 

Such in the main are the faint glimpses we get of early 
Greek tyranny through the haze of false tradition and real 
fear. For it was fear that moulded the later Greek conception 
of this rule, The law-abiding Greek of the fifth and fourth 
centuries had ever in his mind the haunting fear of a possible 
despotism such as seemed threatened by men of the type of 
Alcibiades of Athens men unwilling to submit to the equality 
of a democratic constitution, whose chief characteristic was a 
covetous ambition (7rA.eovei'a), and whose rise to power meant 
the negation of all political principle. It was difficult for him, 
with such a vision before his eyes, to look back to a time when 
tyranny had represented a principle, and when it had helped to 
secure rights for the common folk. 

With the close of Greek tyranny the ancient history of 
Greece is left behind us. The rest is modern, in the sense now 
so familiar to us of history that is modern in its characteristics. 
If, as has been said, the history of civilisation is the passa,ge 
from Mus to contract, 4 we may say that status in Greece 
had now been left behind, and that the basis of the contract 
on which society rests was to be examined and criticised. The 
most definite answers to the question appear in the various 
forms of constitution which were now to spring up. Conscious 
political thought soon followed these creations, with varying 
results. One day the respective merits of these forms was to be 

1 Pol v. 10=p. 1312 b. 3 Arist. Its. ; Bind. xi. 68; xvi. 

a Time. i. 18 ; of. Arist. l.c., Her. 82. 
v. 92. 4 Maine Aiwient LMO c. 5. 



n EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 35 

settled by an appeal to the sword in the great political struggle 
of the Peloponnesian War ; and meanwhile the more peaceful 
discussion of these claims, which appears already in Herodotus 
and grows more subtle in Thucydides, had been handed down 
to the still colder judgment of philosophy, to find at length 
its grandest exposition in Aristotle's Politics. It was Greek 
tyranny which, by breaking down all artificial barriers, pre- 
pared the way for the "bazaar of constitutions" exhibited 
there. 



OHAPTEIi III 

COLONISATION INTERNATIONAL LAW - 

THE differences of political development which followed the 
downfall of tyranny arc too great to allow us to treat -Greek 
history collectively from this point onwards. Henceforth we 
shall have to examine distinct types of development ; but, before 
entering on this more minute phase of the work, it will be 
convenient to touch here on two political factors which are 
common more or less to the whole Greek world, to that Hellas 
which is the name not of a territory, but of a people. These 
are colonisation and the tendencies which led to such unification 
as Hellas as a whole attained. 

1 Colonisation 

Wo have already noticed that the period of the aristocracies 
was the great epoch of the expansion of Greece, and we have 
seen the general political tendencies to which this movement 
was due. The particular causes which led to the planting of 
colonies at this or at any other time are of importance for con- 
stitutional history only in so far as the motive for the foundation 
of the new state may have affected its form or its relation to 
the mother city. The differences of the periods in which 
colonies were founded must have been equally important in 
both these respects ; but of these we can say but little. It is 
difficult, in a comprehensive treatment of colonisation, to 
separate the old from the new, the later deliberate organisation 
which we know HO well from the earlier and more spontaneous 
movement of which we hear BO little. 

The causes may be summed up generally as being migration 



CHAP, in COLONISATION 37 

and the movement of peoples, political faction, agricultural and 
commercial enterprise, and, lastly, the motives of military and 
agrarian settlement in the interest of the colonising state. 
Settlements due to the migrations such as were, according to 
current Greek opinion, the Aeolian, Ionian, and Doric cities on the 
coast of Asia Minor, which some have thought to have had an 
independent origin and to be as old, at least in germ, as the 
cities of Greece proper itself are, if the story of their settlement 
or reinforcement by the migrations be accepted, rather the 
result of spontaneous national movement than of conscious 
colonial enterprise. 1 It is possible that the movements of 
these emigrants may have been to some extent guided by 
prominent cities on the mainland of Greece ; but later historical 
reflection, which strove to connect the traditions of East and 
"West, and to attach them to the great working hypothesis of the 
Dorian migration, was of itself sufficient to float such a theory 
as that which represents certain of these Ionian cities as having 
taken their sacred fire from the court-house of the Athenians. 2 
The theory was assisted by, and made the excuse for later 
political connections; it established a claim on Athenian 
protection, 3 and formed the basis of the counter claim which 
Athens made, in the period of her Empire, that she was only 
ruling over her natural dependencies. Otherwise its political 
importance is slight, and the peculiarities of the political history 
of the Greeks in Asia are due to other causes. The antiquity 
of these settlements led to their pursuing the normal lines of 
Greek constitutional development, with the exception that the 
element of wealth seems to have been more strongly marked in 
their period of aristocratic development. 4 Some, such as 
Miletus, developed tyrannies of the spontaneous type ; 5 but 
their political growth was soon arrested by foreign conquest. 
Herodotus 6 mentions a crop of so-called "tyrants" of the 
Greek cities of Asia Minor of the sixth and fifth centuries, such 
as Daphnis of Abydos, Aeaces of Samos, Aristagoras of Cyme, 

1 Later settlements were due to a Chalcedonians, after the Ionic revolt, 

similar cause movement caused by the fled from the Persians and settled at 

pressure of enemies. To this was due Mesembria on the Euxine (ib. vi. 33). 
the emigration of the Phocaeans, under 2 Her. i. 146. 
pressure from the Persians, to Velia in 3 ifi. xi. 106 ; Time. i. 95. 
Italy and Aloha in Corsica (Her. i. 4 See p. 23, 

167), and of the Teians to ALclcra (ib 5 See p. 30. 

i. 168). Similarly the Byzantines and c iv. 138. 



38 OUTLINES 0? GKEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

and others. But these cannot be classed with the despots of the 
early period in Greece proper, Italy, and Sicily, for they were 
merely native princes who governed the Greek dependencies of 
Persia, and who were kept in their position by Persian support. 
Subsequently the Persian government learnt that democracy 
was a better basis for loyalty than tyranny ; 1 but henceforth 
these Greeks of Asia have scarcely any independent political 
history : they are the slaves of Athenian, Spartan, and Persian 
caprice ; whatever form of government they possess is imposed, 
or at least tolerated, by a foreign power; yet they perform 
their function in the world's history none the worse for this. 
It was to be the Hellenism of the East, the beginning of which 
may be traced in the uniform system of the Athenian Empire, 
while the end is to be found in the municipal administration 
of the eastern half of the Roman Empire. 

Political faction, as a ground for colonisation, 2 is in no sense 
a determinant as regards either the nature of the colony or its 
relation to the parent state. The autonomy enjoyed by such 
settlements is simply a result of the normal theory of colonisa- 
tion, not of the special circumstances of their departure. Such 
a colony is not a chance aggregate moving off in anger from 
the mother city. It parts with it in a friendly spirit ; the 
parent, though relieved at the departure, gives the blessing and 
authorisation necessary to make the offspring a colony; and 
the ties of sentimental allegiance between the two are at least 
as close as those consequent on other motives. 

When, on the other hand, we turn to the commercial 
motive, we find many points that demand attention. That it 
was the most constant of the inspiring causes is shown by the 
" Greek fringe woven round the coast of the barbarian," noticed 
by Cicero ; 3 but the stability of Greek political institutions is 
largely due to the fact that the Greek settlement was rarely, 
like the Phoenician, a mere factory. The agricultural element, 
so prominent in the cities of Sicily and the eighty Milesian 
colonies on the Black Sea, was almost invariably present ; and 
agriculture implies a permanent settlement and attachment to 
the soil. Sometimes, indeed, trade might be the only motive ; 
a Greek " emporium," to which rights had been granted by the 
people with whom it traded, might grow into a city. It was 

1 Her. vi. 43. 2 See p. 24. ayris quasi attcxta gwedam videtw 

8 de Rep. ii. 4, 9 ita larbarorum or& esse (Jraedae. 



in COLONISATION 3S 

thus that Amasis of Egypt recognised the existence of Naucratis, 
composed of a society of Greeks of various cities who had 
long been trading at the Canobic mouth of the Nile. It 
remained a thoroughly Greek settlement \ its manners and laws 
were Hellenic, and its constitution appears to have been 
modelled on that of one of the founding states. 1 Yet it was 
hardly a colony (airoiKia) in the ordinary Greek sense, for it 
lacked the two characteristics of a mother city and a founder 
(otKicmjs). But Naucratis is probably an exceptional case. 
Many of the early commercial settlements may have had a 
similarly unconscious growth ; the TroAts may have been a late 
development from the factory, yet there is every reason to 
believe that when it became an organised community it 
received a sanction from a founding state, and became in the 
strict sense a colony, but with no further political connection 
with the mother city than that contained in treaties which 
were the result of community of commercial interest. The tie 
was sometimes closer when, in place of this unconscious growth, 
a powerful commercial city founded settlements along its own 
trade-routes. Corinth attempted a direct control of her western 
colonies on the coasts of Illyria, Epirus, and Acarnania, and we 
have a passing reference to the presence of certain Corinthian 
officials called eTiSrjfuovpyoi in Potidaea. 2 

The political connection was necessarily closer still between 
colonies founded to serve a military purpose and the states 
which sent them out. Such settlements were artificial creations 
of a later age, merely attempts to hold distant dependencies 
or to create a sphere of military influence near an enemy's 
territory. They are peculiarly interesting to the student of 
constitutional history, since the two colonial charters which 
have been preserved that of the Periclean colony sent to Brea 
in Thrace, and that regulating the settlement of Naupactus by 
the Opuntian Locrians 3 are concerned with foundations the 
main object, at least, of which was military. From the nature 
of the case the dependence of such a colony on the mother city 
is very close, and hence the relations between the two are far 



are magistrates of Nan- of Trade (irpoffT&rai TOV 

cratis as of Teos. The other founding Her. ii. 178. 

states-were Chios, Phocaea,Clazomenae 2 Time. i. 56. 

(Ionian) ; Rhodes, Cnidns, Halicar- 3 Hicks nn. 29, 63. The respective 

nassus, Phaselis (Dorian) ; and Mitylene dates of these foundations are approxi- 

(Aeolian). These appointed the Board raately 440 and 460. 



40 OUTLINES OT? GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

from typical. Amphipolis and the other Periclean colonies in 
Thrace, which may be taken as types of such settlements, were 
founded within the empire of Athens, and therefore within the 
sphere of her direct military influence. The Spartan colony of 
Heraclea in Trachis, 1 a bold enterprise undertaken during the 
Peloponnesian War for the purpose of commanding the 
northern dependencies of Athens, was a mere military outpost 
under the immediate command of Spartan governors. 

One step further in history and we find the central control 
becoming still more definite. The K^povx^, ^ e ^ ast sta g e i n 
the development of the colonial theory in Greece, is merely an 
outlying fragment of the central TroXts with some municipal 
organisation of its own. Technically it belongs rather to the 
history of agrarian legislation than to that of colonisation, 
although military might he combined with social objects in 
its creation. The cleruchies are known to us almost entirely 
as one of the modes in which Athens employed her control 
of subject territory to further the interests of her own state, 2 
and their treatment consequently belongs more properly to that 
division of our work which deals with the Athenian system of 
imperial administration. 

The questions wo have touched on have already illustrated 
the fact that colonisation was always regarded as a public act 
in Greece ; no settlement was regarded as quite legitimate 
unless this act of state had been performed by some city, which 
was then regarded as the metropolis, and might afterwards 
become the grandmother of the offshoots of its own colony, 
since ancient custom directed that the latter, in founding a 
fresh settlement, should seek a leader (oi/acrr/js) from its own 
parent state. 3 The act of colonisation was preceded by certain 
formalities. A religious sanction was obtained by the con- 
sultation of an oracle, 4 generally that of Delphi, which appears 
to have had the fullest information of the places best suited 
for settlement. Next came the charter of incorporation (ra 

1 Founded in 426 (Time. iii. 92). Qraetia coloniam mistt in Aeoliam, 

2 The cleruchitis were not, however, Ionian, Asiam, Siciliam, Italiam sine 
confined to Athens. Some of the Pythio aut JJodonaeo aut ffammonio 
Milesian settlements on the islands nraculu 9 The tendency to consult the 
(Strain) p. 035), e.ff. at Lores, seem to Pythian oracle gave rise to the worship, 
have lieen of this nature. so frequent in the colonies, of Apollc 

* Time. i. 24. Arehegetes. 

4 Oic. de JDiv. i. 1, 3 quam v&ro 



in COLONISATION 41 

diroiiaa) given by the government of the founding state. This 
charter set forth the conditions under which the colony was to 
be founded, and sometimes the relations, whether religious or 
political, which were to be maintained between it and the 
parent state. The fortunate preservation of the decree 
establishing the colony of Brea gives us a vivid insight into 
the contents of such documents. This decree (1) specifies 
the social condition of the intending colonists : they were 
to be chosen from the "Zeugitae" and the "Thetes," the two 
lower classes in the Solonian census. Such a clause, though 
characteristic of the state-directed colonies of the Periclean 
age, must have been extremely unusual, if not unknown, at 
an earlier period : since emigration, though directed by the 
state, was as a rule a voluntary act and a matter of private 
enterprise. (2) It appoints a certain Democleides to be the 
oecist, the guide and leader, of the new enterprise, and gives 
him the fullest power over the details of the " establishment " 
of the colony. 1 We can hardly understand by this a free 
permission to frame constitutional details at his pleasure, 
although at an earlier period the influence of the oecist on the 
structure of the new constitution must have been immense. 
(3) Here follows a clause which is the most remarkable 
instance we possess of the recognition of absolute religious 
obligations by constitutional law. It enacts that the religious 
enclosures (re^vrf) in the territory destined for the settlement 
should be left as they are and no others be enclosed. 2 This 
can only be an injunction to worship the native gods, 3 a 
provision of Greek international custom to maintain the 
religious observances of a conquered district, which here finds 
expression in the public law of Athens. It is probable that 
universal legal recognition accompanied a sentiment which we 
know to be typically Greek, and which widened the native 
Pantheon by the absorption of the cults of Asia Minor and 
of Thrace, and even of the strange worships left by Sicel or 
Sican in the West. 4 (4) Next comes the mention of the 

1 Hicks n. 29, A 1. 8 Ai7jUo/eXeJ&p> it was but a fresh recognition of an 
KaraffTTJcrai atTotcpdropa. influence early felt by Greek religion. 

2 1. 9 ra 5t re^vy r& lg/7/c&a &v More remarkable is the assumption by 
KaQ&irep <m Kai #AAct /*) re^vL^iv. Greek settlers of such wholly non- 

3 Gilbert StaatsaU. ii. p. 400. Hellenic worships as those of Hadranus 

4 The absorption of oriental worships and the Palici in Sicily. See Freeman 
by colonists is not so striking, since History of Sicily vol. i. pp. 517 ft'. 



42 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTOEY CHAP. 

supply of money granted by the state to set the colony on 
its way (<o8wv) ; this was generally accompanied by the 
equally necessary provision of a supply of arms. 1 (5) 
Land -commissioners (yewvo'/zot) are appointed to divide the 
territory into allotments. The lots would probably be equal, 
and the recipients would form the "Gamori," who would 
remain the chiefly, and in some cases the solely, privileged 
aristocracy as the settlement grew with the influx of new 
residents. 2 So fully was it recognised by this class that the 
maintenance of its privileges depended on its remaining a 
landed aristocracy that sometimes, as in Locri, 3 laws appear 
to have been made to prevent alienation of the lots. (6) 
Finally, provision is made for sacred offerings, symbols of a 
religious allegiance, to be sent to the festivals of the mother 
state. In some cases the latter sent sacred envoys to 
colonial festivals, where special honours were accorded them. 4 
Another generally observed custom, not mentioned here, was 
the taking of the sacred fire from the prytaneium of the 
founding state. 

Some of the clauses in colonial charters may have been 
dictated by circumstances and have varied from time to time ; 
but most of them the appointment of the oecist, the injunc- 
tions as to religious duties, and perhaps the l<ooW, if asked 
for were, like the consultation of the oracle, "customary ob- 
servances," the neglect of which was likely to entail disaster on 
the settlement. 6 Tho whole procedure is an expression of the 
Greek sentiment which pictured the act as that of a mother 
who sends her child out into the world. 6 

The relation between a colony and its mother city was as a 
rule merely sentimental and religious, and was emphasised by 
the worship of the personal founder as a hero after his death. 7 
Sometimes, indeed, it was difficult to preserve even this senti- 
mental relationship. Although directed by a single city, colonies 
were sometimes composed of very mixed elements, and in this 
case little attachment to the founders was to be looked for. It 

1 ArgL to Demosthenes On the Herodotus (v. 52). Here lie relates the 
CJiersonese Kal ^\&^o.vov TTG^TT^VOL dreadful fate which overtook Dorieus 
$Tr\a IK rov 7}/ji,offlou Kal ty&faa. the Spartan for not obeying these 

2 See p. 23. customary rules. 

3 Arist. Pol. ii. 7, 6. c of. Plato Lam p. 754. 

4 Time. i. 25. 7 For the worship of the ofaumjs see 
6 rii, vofuftjj.ei'a. they are called hy Her. vi. 38, Time. v. 11. 



in COLONISATION 43 

was an aggregate of races of this kind, planted by the Athenians 
at Thurii in 443, that declined to worship a founder of more 
limited nationality than Apollo Avchegetes himself. 1 But 
community of commercial and politic t \l interests often bound 
the two states closely together, and sometimes this community 
found expression in a fixed agreement included in the charter. 
A clause such as that in the charter given by the Locrians to 
Naupactus about 460 that the colonists should swear not to quit 
alliance with the mother city, and that thirty years later each 
state might call on the other to renew the oath 2 was, in spite 
of the late date of this document, probably not unusual. We 
have noticed the actual attempt at government of her colonies 
made by Corinth. Elsewhere we find tokens of dependence 
given by the colony, but on reasonable grounds. Cotyora, 
Trapezus, and Cerasus, colonies of Sinope, had to pay to the 
mother state a yearly tribute. It was merely, however, a sign 
of the precarious tenure of their soil, for these colonies had been 
founded on land which Sinope had taken from the barbarians. 3 
But dependence of any kind was rare; and although the 
slight bonds of Greek international law were here reinforced by 
the tie of sentiment, and it was considered impious to bear 
arms against the mother state, 4 the general feeling in Greece 
seems to have been that all political interference on the part of 
the latter was sufficient to dissolve the bonds of sentimental 
allegiance. 5 The chief reason for this independence of the 
colony is no doubt to be sought simply in the idea of the 
autonomy of the TroAis, the foundation of Greek political life. 
Modern practice takes a different view of these relations 
because modern colonisation is based on the theory of territorial 
sovereignty, which implies that any territory settled on and 
claimed by members of a state is by right of occupation a part 
of that community an easy conception when the basis of 
civilisation is ethnic, but impossible where, as in Greece, the 
city was regarded as the highest political unit. But there were 
practical reasons which rendered colonial dependence impossible. 
The distance of some of these settlements from the colonising 
state, as of Massilia from Phocaea, would have prevented close 
supervision. The mixture of population a characteristic even 

1 Died. xii. 10. Xen. Ana&. v. 5, 10. 

2 Hicks n. 63 i. A. * Her. iii. 19 ; viii. 22. 

8 Time. i. 34, 



44 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of tlie early colonies, 1 and still more strongly marked in the 

joint settlements which were in vogue in the fifth century 2 

combined with a difference in the conditions of life that could 
evolve "gay Tarentum " from sombre Sparta, resulted frequently 
in a complete difference of civilisation. Lastly, colonies often 
became more powerful than their mother cities; and it was 
fortunate that no such fiction existed as that which would have 
asserted a supremacy of Corinth over Syracuse, or of Megara 
over Byzantium. 

The rigorous theory of the independence of the colony would, 
if strictly carried out, have led to a dissolution of all family ties 
and to an abandonment of all legal family claims between the 
members of the respective states. But this was not in accord- 
ance with Greek sentiment, and is provided against by certain 
clauses in the charter of Naupactus. Provision is there made 
for the next of kin in the mother state claiming intestate 
succession to a colonist, for a Naupactian taking his share of 
his deceased brother's property in Locris, and for a colonist who 
leaves a father behind him being entitled to his share at his 
father's death. 3 Easy conditions are even made for the resump- 
tion of citizenship in the mother city; 4 and, though the 
document that contains these clauses is of late date, still there 
is every reason to believe that here, as elsewhere in Greece, the 
family and religion created ties that even the dissolution of 
those of the city could not break. 

The political history of the colonies was marked by a rapidity 
of development and a comprehensive grasp of social problems 
which found no parallel in the states of Greece proper, at least 
until the beginning of the sixth century. The arrested develop- 
ment of the East furnishes few examples of their political pro- 
gress. In the West it was different. Here ingenious political 
experiments were tried, such as the timocracies, which sprang 
up in Locri, fthegium, Crotori, and probably in Sybaris. The 
struggle between classes assumed a new and interesting phase, 

1 .</. of the Ionian cities <>f Asia ailult sou or brother in his place, lie may 
(Her. i. 140) and of Cyreno (ib. iv. bo enrolled in the E. Locrian registers 
161); the Milesian colonies on the without en trance -sacrifice." The 
Black St'a must also have been mixed conditions are almost precisely the 
BuUleiuiiiits. amo as those which regulated the 

2 J)tod. x'u, 30 (Tliuni); Time. Hi. jus ejssulandi at Rome, between nocii 
9'2 (1 [craBloa) ; cf. i. 27. ami Mini and between Lalini and 

:! Hicks 11. 68, A, f, and H. Roman citizens. 

4 " If a colonist returns, leaving an 



in INTERNATIONAL LAW 45 

and revolution, the product of material rather than of artificial 
distinctions, began earlier than in the older states of Greece. 
The first clear glimpse which we catch of the history of 
Syracuse shows us the Gamori exiled by their own demos and 
the serf population. 1 The tyrannies which we have already 
noticed in other Sicilian states came later indeed in time than 
those of the mother country, but earlier in the political history 
of the cities they affected. The same tendencies are visible in 
Magna Graecia; in Khegium the aristocratic government was 
overthrown by Anaxilas; and Telys of Sybaris is called in- 
differently demagogue and tyrant. 2 The application of scientific 
thought to practical life finds ample illustration in these 
western civilisations. In 532 the school of the Pythagoreans 
with its aristocratic tendencies sprang up at Croton, only to be 
driven out by a democracy whose wants were more powerful 
than the theories of its opponents. More than a century 
earlier legislation, the product of mixed populations, who are 
as susceptible to new laws as to new impressions, 3 had begun. 
Zaleucus of Locri (662) must have been more than a codifier, 
for he created a type of constitution and fixed the penalties of 
the criminal law, which had hitherto rested on the discretion of 
the judge. 4 The legislation of Charondas of Catana (drc. 650) 
must have been less political than that of his predecessor, and 
of a very universal type, since it was extended to the other 
Chalcidian cities of Sicily and Italy. We know nothing of the 
tenor of his laws ; but that its chief characteristic was accuracy 
of expression (fapipeta) 5 is a sign of a new spirit in Greece a 
spirit that would accept nothing that it could not explain, and 
would realise only what it believed it understood. 



2 International Law 

The tendency to disintegration, which had been born with the 
tribal unions of the Greeks, had been still further increased by 
the expansion effected by the period of colonisation. Yet it was 
always possible to say where Hellas was, and the tests that could 
be applied to discover its existence are summed up by Herodotus 

1 Her. vii. 155. Plato Laws p. 708. 

2 Diod. xii. 9 dwayayds : Her. v. 4 Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 260. 
44 rtipavvos or jScwnXeik. 5 Arist. Pol. ii. 12. 



46 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

as community of blood, language, religion, and manners. 1 
Ultimate community in the first two factors the Greeks did 
riot care to trace, and community of race had little meaning for 
them apart from an obvious resemblance in language, tradition, 
and type of political civilisation. In reality language and religion 
are the most tangible symbols of unity to an early people, for 
they mean a tendency to community of worship (which is the 
basis of such international law as they possess), common 
literature and art, and to a large extent community even in the 
forces of morality and social life. From the earliest time these 
last are inextricably interwoven with religion, although the 
power of a common language is even here not to be ignored. 
We have in modern times to a large extent outgrown the 
tyranny of words ; but to the Greek the common word was 
the common thing. Expressions such as Stay, VO/AOS, evos, 
which appealed in the same way to every Greek, were binding 
as terms long before they became valid as concepts. 

Externally, at least, religion was the most important influence 
in effecting the unity of Greece; for so far as there was 
community of worship there was a common international law. 
It was, it is true, rather a negative than a positive law a 
mild protest of religion against the entire absence of order. 
For Greek society practically assumed a wholesale denial of 
international relations other than those based on interest or 
convenience, and carried out with the utmost strictness the 
theory that there aro no rights of man other than those con- 
ferred by membership of the city-state. It never evolved a 
secular basis for international law such as the jits gentmm or the 
lex naturae ; but there was just a minimum of common morality 
which a common religion enjoined on all Greeks alike, and it 
was this which formed the basis of the " law common to the 
Greeks." This law often appears unsupported by any institu- 
tion that could enforce it, but its validity is not impaired by 
its purely impersonal sanction. One form it assumed was the 
duty of hospitality to the stranger (evta) 9 which developed on 
the one hand into the institution of 7r/>oevia, the representa- 
tion of the interests of one state by a citizen resident in another, 
who undertook this duty cither voluntarily or by commission ; 2 
on the other hand, into the rules regulating the status of a 
stranger in any community. An alien from a foreign city had 
1 viii. 1-14. a Hence the dihtiuction between irpb^vos and 0c\07rp6i-ci>os. 



m INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 

as a rule 1 no legal personality, and could, therefore, exercise 
his rights as a resident alien (/xerotKos) only through a duly 
qualified citizen whom he took as patron (TrpocrraT^s), Hence in 
some states 2 the principle was observed that a stranger could 
not reside more than thirty days in the city without enrolling 
himself as a metoec and attaching himself to a patron. It was 
only thus that the alien could cease to be an enemy and become 
a guest. But even as an enemy religion invested him with 
certain rights, and it was in the sphere of war that its influence 
was most clearly seen. The herald was sacrosanct for the state 
to which he journeyed, if not for the states through which he 
passed; 3 and this sanctity spread beyond the sphere of in- 
fluence of the Greek gods to invest even the herald of the 
barbarian. 4 Duties were owed to the bodies of the slain in 
battle; they might not be mutilated, 5 and the victors were 
bound to give them up for burial. Shrines and temples in 
conquered countries were to be preserved, and the religious 
ceremonial continued ; c and rules were even framed to modify 
that most repulsive aspect of Greek civilisation, the treatment 
of prisoners of war. According to Greek ideas prisoners passed 
wholly into the hands of the conqueror ; they might be kept or 
sold as slaves, or put to death. But three modifying principles 
came finally to prevail. A fixed ransom of two minae might be 
offered for a captive soldier, although it is doubtful whether, 
in the time of the citizen armies at least, there was any obligation 
on the victor to accept it ; 7 it was claimed that unconditional 
but voluntary surrender should carry with it the preservation 
of life, 8 while in conditional surrender the condition must be 

1 The rule was not quite universal ; , the primary meaning of which is "rude," 
see p. 8. " strange," and which was applied to 

2 This principle is found in a nations of the highest degree of civilisa- 
commercial treaty concluded between tion, has come here, and in other 
Oeanthia and Chaleion, two towns on passages of Herodotus and Thucydides, 
the Corinthian Gulf. Hicks n. 31. 1. 8 ; to mean " unworthy of a Greek." 

of. Hicks n. 63 Z. 6 For these last two duties see the 

8 The execution of Aristeus, a curious discussion between the Athenians 

Corinthian envoy to the Persians, by and Boeotians after the battle of 

the Athenians (Thuc. ii. 67) makes it Delium iu 424 (Time. iv. 98). 

doubtful whether the herald was 7 For this ransom see Her. v. 77 ; 

sacrosanct for the whole Greek world. vi. 79. Aristotle (Ethics v. 7, 1) 

4 cf. the story of the wrath of makes it a universal rule; but then he is 
Talthybius in Her. vii. 134 ff. writing in the time of mercenary armies. 

5 Mutilation is conduct worthy only of 8 It is a ?6/ws ro?s "EXXij<rt (Thuc. 
a pdppapos (Her. ix. 79), This word, iii. 58). 



48 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP 

observed, but only if it had been ratified by an oath. The oath 
might create a wholly new series of international relations, 
temporary or permanent, between two states; but the most 
solemn form of promise, unaccompanied by a religious formula, 
had no binding force. 1 It is not surprising that this belief 
sometimes made the literal performance of an oath override the 
fulfilment of the spirit of an agreement. 2 

The sanction of such rules is that their violator exposes 
himself to the vengeance of the common gods of Greece, or, in 
the case of a covenant, of his native gods by whom he has 
sworn. But sometimes these rules rested partly on a human 
institution that of the " amphictyonies " of Greece partly 
on the sworn compact on which these organisations themselves 
reposed ; and the divine and human sanction were here closely 
interwoven. The amphictyony was a body of representatives of 
different tribes or cities meeting at stated intervals round some 
common religious centre. 3 The object of their meeting was, 
primarily, to preserve the temple and its worship and to 
defend the territory of the god against aggression ; secondarily, 
to mitigate excess of rancour in wars between the states of this 
religious league, and to preserve that minimum of international 
morality which a common religion enjoined. 4 Often the 
principles they professed to maintain were formulated and 
ratified by oath, but many questions appear to have been 
discussed at these meetings the answers to which were not 
contained in any written code. 5 These religious meetings were 
identical in origin with the great games, which through their 
more popular character eventually overshadowed them. Friendly 
contests of various kinds (clywyes) are mentioned in connection 
with all the chief amphictyonies. They are found at Onchestus 
in Boeotia, 6 in Deles, 7 at Mycale, 8 and at Triopium 9 ; and 
down to tlio latest times one of the four great games, the Pythian, 
was never a festival of all Greece, but was confined to the 

1 Time. ii. 5. citizens of Dclos in 345 or 344 for 

a ib. ni. JJ4. Jruedom from llio Athenian hegemony, 

s dfjt,(fjiKTloi'$=TrptKT[ovs "dwellers which was referred to the amphictyony 

around " (so used m Her. vu. 148). of Delphi, had no connection with the 

The form afufmcriiovcs is found also in ordinary functions of this hody. 

inscriptions. Horn. JJi/mn. in Ap. I'yth. 52 ft". 

4 Dionyn. iv. 'J5 yi/tous /carcumj- 7 Time. iii. 104. 

(rdpevos $ta r&v ISlav, 8>v IKCUFTII 8 Her. i. 148. 

7T<SX eT^c, robs Kowobs airaorip. 9 ib. i. 144. 

6 e.g. the requunt wacto by the 



in INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 

members of the amphictyony of Delphi. The sacred truce 
(Upal a-TTovSai or e/cfx 64 / 5 "*) is common to both; but these 
associations, originally the same, branched off into two distinct 
lines of development. Sometimes the games outgrew the 
amphictyony as at Olympia, where there had originally been a 
meeting of the Pisatans, and afterwards of the Aetolians of 
Elis, for the worship of Zeus and Here. The Nemean games 
were similarly a festival of Cleonae, which afterwards fell under 
the direction of Argos, and the Isthmian were at first a 
Corinthian festival in honour of Melcarth. When this was the 
tendency of the meeting the chief direction of the festival came 
again to be vested in the hands of a single state, and the 
council of the league tended to disappear. In other cases the 
association itself continued to be of chief importance. Then it 
remained an amphictyony, in which any individual city ceased 
to have an undue preponderance. It is at least an association 
of the cities of a tribe, but more usually it is an association of 
tribes or of different cities of different tribes. 

The tendency of these societies was to change from being a 
union of one tribe into becoming a union of many, but in some 
this development was arrested, and amphictyonies may con- 
sequently be divided into two classes those that remained 
tribal and strictly national associations, and those that were 
unions of many different nationalities. 

Amongst tribal unions that of Delos, re-established by 
Athens in 42 6, 1 was of high antiquity. It was an ancient 
association of "lonians and neighbouring islanders," who 
celebrated contests, gymnastic and musical, in honour of Apollo. 
An inscription of the early part of the fourth century (377-374) 
shows that it was still composed of lonians of the islands under 
the presidency of Athens, 2 and that the Athenian presidents of 
the temple are still called 'A/*<iKTvoj/e?, and share this office 
with members from the other states. 3 The chief historic 
interest of this society is its revival by Athens for the purpose 
of effecting the religious unity of her empire. Two national 
amphictyonies were formed by the Greeks of Asia Minor : the 
one Ionian, which met at the Panionium on the promontory of 
Mycale for the worship of Poseidon, 4 and for one moment, 

1 Thuc. iii. 104. 3 Thus 'A^i/cruoyes from Andros 

2 Hicks n. 82. are found. Q.LA. ii. n. 814. 

4 Her. i. 148. 



50 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAf\ 

during the heat of the Ionic revolt against Persia, became 
almost a federal government; 1 the other a gathering of the six 
Dorian cities of the South, which worshipped Apollo at the 
promontory of Triopium. 2 In Argolis we find a religious 
association, also strictly national, but of a slightly different 
character. For Argos had once possessed a political hegemony 
over the members of the league, the surrounding cities of the 
Argolid, founded as she claimed by herself, which met to 
worship Apollo Pythaeus on her own acropolis. Traces of her 
political hegemony survive into historic times, 3 but at the close 
of the fifth century her coercive power seems to have been 
confined exclusively to religious matters. 4 At the extreme 
west of Peloponnese the Triphylian townships kept the memory 
of their Minyan nationality alive by a gathering at the pro- 
montory of Samicum for the worship of Poseidon Samios ; 5 but 
any political importance which it possessed must have been 
lost in the early part of the fifth century on the conquest of the 
country by the Eleans. 6 

Onco tit least in Greek history an association of this kind 
seems to have paved the way for real national unity. The 
gathering of the Boeotian cities at Onchestus probably dates 
back to a time before the hegemony of Thebes was fully 
established, and when the union of Boeotia was mainly religious. 7 
The cities met in the territory of Haliarlus to worship at the 
temple of Poseidon. The junphictyouy doubtless prepared the 
way for the federal government, for the archon of Onchestus 
is identical with the archon of united Boeotia, 8 and even in 
tho third century B.C. this district is still the centre of the 
Boeotian alliance. 

Amongst amphiotyonies which were composed of a number 
of cities of different nationality, the most prominent in early 
times must have been that which met in the island of Calauria, 
whoro seven cities gathered to sacrifice in tho temple of 
Poseidon. These cities were Hennione, Epidaurus, Aegina, 
Athens, Prasiae, Niiuplia, and Orchomonus in Boeotia. 9 Later 
the place of Nauplia was taken by Argos, and that of Prasiae 

1 HUP. vi. 7. " ift. I H-1. 7 8lr,il>o }>, 412. 

3 ib. vi. !>a. >l Time. v. 5JJ. K Jn inscriptions Ike formula 6/>- 

5 Strabo 1 1, (J 1H. Xoi'ros iv 'OyxfiffTtp appears side by side 

For tlio Minynn iiiiUoiiulity of Uiu with llio formula &PXOVTOS Botwrots, 

Tripliyliiius and llu-ir fomjuoHt by tho Huo (Silbcrt filttakalt. ii. p. 53 n. 3, 

sec Hur. iv. 148. u Htralx) p. 874. 



m INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 

by Lacedaemon. Commerce was probably a leading motive 
for this powerful association, before the relations of the 
chief trading states became disturbed and Athens and Aegina 
drifted apart. Its religious influence must have paled before 
that of the amphictyony of Delphi, which, owing to the 
repute gained by its oracle, was ever growing into greater 
importance. 

The accident of the tragic part played by this Delphian 
association in the downfall of Greek liberty before Macedon has 
raised it into greater prominence than it deserves. Historically 
it is of little importance , it played a feeble part in the great 
struggle with the Persian, and it sat passively by to watch the 
horrors of the Peloponnesian War. To the student of ethnology 
it is interesting, because its advance from Thermopylae to 
Delphi seems to keep pace with the spread of Dorian influence 
and of the Hellenic name ; but to the student of institutions it 
is invaluable, for it tells of a time when the Greeks possessed a 
common religious organisation before they dwelt in cities, and 
it displays institutions which must have suggested federal unity 
to any race less blind to such an allurement than the Greeks. 
Its great antiquity ^is proved by the fact that it was a union, 
not of cities, but of' twelve tribes or nationalities (etfyr?), 1 and 
also by the names of some of the tribes included in the list. 
The Perrhaebi, Magnetes, and Phthiotian Achaean s, all in historic 
times subject to the Thessalians, appear by the side of the 
lonians and Dorians a fact which shows that its date precedes 
the time when Thessaly was conquered from Epirus. The 
association included all the colonies of these tribes ; 2 but though 
sometimes called the common assemblage of the Greeks (TO 
Koivbv 'EAX^j/wj/ crw&pLov), it was really not representative of 
the whole of Hellas, the Aetolians, Arcadians, Dryopians, and 
(apparently) the Achaeans of Peloponnese being excluded. 

The object of the association was the twofold purpose 
characteristic of all amphictyonies, and was clearly expressed in 
the oath which forbade the members to cut off water from any 
amphictyonic city or to raze it to the ground, enjoined them 
all to defend to the utmost the territory of the Delphian god, 
and bound them to march against the transgressors and destroy 

1 Thessalians. Boeotians, Dorians, Phocians, and Dolopes. 
lunians, Perrliaebi, Magiietes, Locrians, " Aeschmes de Falsa Legatione 
Oeteans, Plitliiotian Achaeans, Malians, 115. 



52 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

their city. 1 Its practice was even wider than the professions of 
this oath, for the history of the league in the latter half of the 
fourth century shows that, with skilful manipulation, almost 
any charge of a violation of international right in religious 
matters might be brought before the body, to be enforced only 
when political enmity or interest prompted aggression against 
the offender. The two sacred wars in which it engaged (596- 
586 and 355-346) were both undertaken professedly in defence 
of its narrower object of defending the privileges of Delphi. 2 

The council met twice a year, at Delphi in the autumn and 
at Thermopylae in the spring. There were twenty-four votes 
in all, each of the tribes (Wvrj) possessing two, and all the votes 
being of equal value. It is clear that these tribal votes must 
have been in some way taken over by cities, although how this 
was effected can only be a matter of conjecture. In some cases 
a single woAt? may have been chosen as the permanent repre- 
sentative of a nation, in others cities may have undertaken the 
duty in rotation. An inscription of Eoman times shows us 
that when at this period an 20i/os was divided into two regions, 
each took a single vote. Thus the vote of the Dorians was 
divided between those of the metropolis and of Peloponnese, that 
of the lonians between those of Attica and Euboea ; but there 
is no authority for transferring this arrangement to an earlier 
period, and it does not solve the dilliculty of election by cities. 

The duties of representation wore performed by two classes 
of officers, the te/>o/Ai/?J/xovs and the TruXayfyai. The evidence 
on their respective functions is vague arid conflicting, but it is 
generally believed now that the hicromnemones were the official 
representatives of the tribes, who therefore formed a council of 
twenty-four members, and wore the authoritative assembly, tho 
pylagorae being the informal representatives of the various 
cities. It is possible that we have here an instance of the 
double system of representation, which we shall find to be 
characteristic of tho Greek federal system. The votes of a 
tribe which could never be more than two were probably 
determined by the hieromnomones and the pylagorae of that 

1 AuKchineB <te Full. Ley. 100. Dcjlphiant-t, and the Athenians after 

* With the tepos vtikciws of 448 their departure restored it to the 

(Time. i. 112) the amphictyoiis had PhoeLms ; hut tho council remained 

nothing to do. Th( Lacedaemonians passive spectators of tins transference, 
put tho temple into tho hands of the 



Ill 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 



tribe acting together, the former being more permanent officials 
meant to represent the minimum of voting power that must be 
present, the latter being an indefinite number of added repre- 
sentatives whose presence was advisable but not necessary. 1 
Besides these two bodies, the general mass of votaries and 
worshippers present formed a kind of ecclesia or assembly, 2 
which was only summoned on special occasions. From Aeschines 
we should gather that debate was allowed in this body, but 
that it could pass no formal or binding resolution. This could 
come only from the two official boards, and it is unlikely that 
they were in any way bound by the decisions of the assembly. 

A council that represents nations and cities naturally assumes 
something of a federal character. But the resemblance fades 
away entirely when we glance from the bare outlines of the 
organisation to the -motives of the league, the duties with which 
the members were entrusted, and even to the character of their 
constituencies. The amphictyony of Delphi was a purely 
religious body, composed of laymen invested for a time with a 
sacred character, who may have performed their functions as 
curators of the temple efficiently, but who failed in enforcing 
even the minimum of international law which it was their duty 
to enjoin. It did not represent the whole Greek world, and 
the absurd distribution of votes would have rendered its political 
activity ineffective even for that portion which it did include. 
Its ineffectiveness unfortunately did not render it harmless, and 
its cumbrous machinery proved an engine of destruction in the 
hands of an able man like Philip. It is characteristic of Greek 
political sentiment that no reform in its organisation was ever 
contemplated which might have made it a possible means of 
salvation. 

Principles so vague and so inefficiently enforced as the early 
international customs of the Greeks could not long remain the 
only ties between developed societies. We find, therefore, a 
series of relations springing up, the real basis of which was the 



1 That the iepofjLv^/jLoves were the other hand, "resolved by tliePylagorae" 

authoritative assembly seems shown by occurs in the decree in Dem. de GOT. 

Aesch. c. Otes. 124 T&OS 5 faffiov- 197. Harpocration makes loth the 

rcu ijxeiv rois lepofJLvtfuovas 'tyovTO,* Hieromnemones and Pylagorae repre- 

d&yfj.a KT\. From -which it appears sentatives of cities (s. w. 

that they drew up the resolutions. It and TriJXcu). 

is these officers, too, who mark out the 2 Aeschines Lc. 
iepd, X 6p* (0.1.0. n. 1171). On the 



54 OUTLINES OF CHEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CIIAK 

secular motive of interest or convenience, although the religious 
element still remains in so far as they were specified in agree- 
ments ratified by oath. 1 International courtesy, springing from 
political or commercial interests, sometimes prompted an exten- 
sion, which was usually accompanied by an interchange, of 
certain civic rights, either by the decree of one of the states or, 
in the more usual case of the conferment being reciprocal, by a 
sworn treaty concluded between the two. The relation thus 
established usually assumed the form of a mutual interchange 
of the private rights of citizenship (tVoTroAtreta). The chief of 
these rights were that of intermarriage between the citizens of 
the two states (eVtya/jua) and that of holding landed property 
(y?Js Kal otKias cjKrrjoris) in their respective domains and these 
rights might be conferred or interchanged either separately or 
in combination. 2 Much rarer is the institution of o-v/wroAtTeta, 
or the reciprocal conferment of full political rights. It did not 
imply a complete amalgamation of the two states which entered 
into this relation, nor a diminution of the civic independence of 
either; it was only a voluntary contract, capable of dissolution, 
which gave each of the members of these communities a double 
citizenship. 3 

Commerce also created a series of new relations, and treaties 
(o-vpfioXa) were drawn up which regulated the manner in which 
suits should be tried which were brought by individual citizens 
of different states against one another, by an individual against 
a foreign state, or by a foreign state against an individual. The 
general principle regulating these Sweat cwrb o-vpftoXw seems to 
have been that the case should be tried in the court of the 
defendant. 4 This was at times, however, only a court of first 
instance, and the plaint/ill' was allowed an appeal to the courts 
of a third city (CKK-X^TOS TroAts). Where no commercial treaty 
existed between two states and a contract had been violated, 
the party wronged was entitled by an act of justifiable piracy 
(hence called o-vAp) to seize as a pledge the person or property 



1 It appears also iu the occasional " Hicks n. 176 1. 35 if. Here 
sanction of the pajnient of a Hue to a tlic people of Magnesia arc made lull 
temple by the party who breaks the citizens of Smyrna. 

treaty (Hicks n. 8). 4 The forum rti of Roman law, 

2 Ganur n. 119 (treaty between But the practice of the Athenian 
llierapytna and Priansus in Crete) Empire seems to show that sometimes 
7}(j.tv ira.p dXXdXoiS iffairokirclav kal U\Q forum contractus the place where 
ftrtya/u'a; Kal WKTIJITIV Kal /jLtrvxav Kal the contract was concluded was 
Gduv Kal dvQpuirljHM irwrw. adopted. 



in INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 

of the wrong-doer, either before or after a judicial decision in 
his own court, and by means of this security, if justified by the 
verdict, to gain satisfaction for his wrong. 

Arbitration was as fully recognised, if not as frequently 
resorted to, in matters of international dispute as in private 
commercial relations between two cities. A state or individual 
was appointed by consent of the parties \ to this the contending 
cities sent their advocates, and bound themselves to accept the 
decision of the commissioners. 1 

The attitude of latent hostility which, according to Greek 
notions, was the juristic condition of independent states towards 
one another, was frequently turned into one of temporary 
toleration by military alliances, offensive and defensive. In 
the treaties which contain these alliances are found detailed 
specifications of the casus belli which was to call the partners 
to action, and often minute regulations as to the amount of 
assistance to be rendered and as to the furnishing of support 
for the contingents supplied. 2 Their religious sanction was an 
oath, their temporal an immediate dissolution of the alliance on 
the breach of its conditions. Minor questions in dispute were 
sometimes, by the terms of the treaty, referred to arbitration. 3 

Some of these alliances were concluded in the hopeful spirit 
that they would be perpetual ; 4 but as a rule peace was only 
concluded for a term of years thirty, fifty, or a hundred, as 
the case might be. 5 With the close of this period there is a 
resumption of the state of war the normal state de jure, and 
too often de facto, of the independent cities of Greece. 

1 Offers of arbitration, Time. i. 28 ; tween Athens and Thessaly) els rbv 
v. 41. The Spartans arbitrate between ad xpbvov. By the charter given to 
Athens and Megara for the possession Naupactus by the Opimtian Locrians 
of Salamis (Plut. Sol. 10). (Hicks n. 63) each state might call on 

2 Thuc. v. 47. the other to renew the oath after an 
8 ib. v. 79. interval of thirty years. 

4 Dittenberger n. 85 (TV^CL^ (be- 5 Thuc. 1 115 ; v. 18 ; iii. 114. 



CHAPTEK IV 

CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS OLIGARCHY 

1 The different Forms of Government 

HITHERTO we have been content to trace in parallel lines the 
political growth of some of the more important types of the city- 
state in Greece a treatment to some extent justified by the 
paucity of our materials for the history of this earlier period. 
But this treatment will no longer suffice. Information now 
becomes more ample, and political creation more complex, and 
the difficult question arises, "On what principle are we to 
classify the myriad forms of constitution which now sprang up 
in Greece ? 3J It is obvious that in a work of this compass any 
attempt to grasp the details of these varied forms would be 
idle and fruitless ; even in works of a larger scope the reproduc- 
tion of the scanty details which have been preserved about 
most of the Greek constitutions present but scattered bones 
of skeletons, which the historian can clothe with flesh and 
blood only by analogy with the structure of those organisms 
whose life is known from history. It is to these better known 
types that we shall in the main confine ourselves ; but still 
the question remains, " On what principle shall the types be 
classified ? " 

The leading principle is presented to us by the continuity 
which Aristotle was fortunate enough to be able to trace in the 
history of the Greek constitutions amidst their manifold forms 
of development. Although like most Greek thinkers he some- 
times inclines to the theory of the omnipotence of the legislator, 
he recognises fully that this creator is limited by the material 



CHAP, iv CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS 57 

with which he has to deal, 1 and he sees that there has been a 
historical development in Greece which no legislator can be 
said definitely to have controlled. 2 The rule of the one able 
man a single rule, because such men are a rare product of a 
primitive age was followed by a stage when many of equal 
merit arose, sought a "commune" (KOWOV TL), and set up a 
constitution. Then these governments began to enrich them- 
selves at the expense of the state, and degenerated intc 
oligarchies. The narrowness of the oligarchies and their abuse 
of power strengthened the people; they were followed by 
tyrannies, and then by democracies, and in the final stage of 
the history of the Greek city the inevitable tendency was towards 
democracy. Here, therefore, he recognised a tendency which 
was almost beyond control, and, accepting the lesson, we shall 
proceed immediately to discuss those oligarchies which survived 
the shock of tyranny, and reserve to the last the democratic as 
the culminating type of Greek city life. Beyond the city and 
the Hellene Aristotle did not care to pass; but the Greek 
genius went further both in its creative power and in its 
influence. We shall have to consider the history of federal 
governments (really a stage in the history of democracy), and 
to touch on Hellenism, the political legacy which the Greek 
left to the barbarian. 

We must bear in mind, however, that a general tendency, 
though it may be a good guide to discussion, is never a sufficient 
explanation of particular cases. The government of a people 
may be profoundly influenced by an event which is so far out 
of the reach of human control that it may be called an accident. 3 
Aristotle recognised that the battle of Salamis hurried on the 
democracy at Athens, 4 that at Argos it was not merely Spartan 
intervention, but the distinction gained by the young nobles at 
Mantineia which led to the overthrow of the democracy in 418, 
and that it was the victory over the Athenians which changed 
the government of Syracuse from a moderate to an extreme 
democracy. 5 Social conditions, which depend on geographical 
and other data, are still more powerful in moulding the form 

1 Pol. iv. 11 = p. 1295 a. 3 ib. ii. 12 0afrerc $' ot> Kara 

2 ib. in. 15. It ran parallel with rip So'Xwfos yevtcrdai TOVTO {the demo- 
a corresponding development in educa- cracy) irpoa,lpe(rLv, dXXa p.a\\oj> ecTrd 
tion and cnlture (i&. vhi. 6 = p. 1341 a). 0-v/Mrrcfyiaros. 

The military aspects of this evolution 4 I.e. 

are also traced (ib. iv. 13= p. 1297 b). c ib. v. 4= p. 1304 a. 



68 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of a nation's life ; and it is on these, as well as on its ethical 
characteristics, that a constitution is based. 1 The state is 
composed of households and based on professions, and it is the 
different combinations of classes and lives that give us the 
different forms of the state, as it is the variation in the com- 
bination of organs which gives us the different forms of animal 
life. 2 Political science was aiming high, and yet reflecting an 
obvious truth, when it asserted that the same form of maritime 
democracy (one only among many forms) was not suited to the 
fishermen of Tarentum and Byzantium, the crews of the 
triremes at Athens, the merchant sailors of Aegina and Chios, 
and the ferrymen of Tenedos. 3 Closely allied to these 
determinants are what we vaguely call national characteristics 
the genius and the needs of peoples, such as their relative 
capacity to produce a dominant race or a mass of citizens 
endowed with the sense of legal rule, 4 tendencies which might 
be explained by such a knowledge of their history as we rarely 
possess, but which are not readily analysable into distinct social 
conditions. But such factors, powerful as they were, led 
rather to the acceptance than to the existence of a constitution 
in the developed Greek states. There are no blind forces at 
work, except occasionally that of strong external pressure from 
a neighbouring state. The multiplicity of changes almost 
conceals the strong undercurrent of public opinion, without the 
support of which, Aristotle suggests, no government in Greece 
stood a chance of permanence. The ethical spirit which deter- 
mined it might bo represented only by a class, but it must bo 
one accepted by the masses, whoso power in the last resort 
decided the fate of the constitution. 5 

It has been necessary to give this brief summary of the 
possible causes social, ethnic, and even geographical of the 
various forms of constitution, because, except in those rare 
cases where our authorities enable us to trace a continuity of 
development, we cannot use any or all of them as a basis for 
classifying forms of government. As a rule we know too little 
of the social distinctions between one state and another to make 

1 Arist. Pol iv. 13 = p. 1289 b. to the constitution, and by Ins recogni- 

2 il>. iv. 4= p. 1200 b. lion of the force of customary law ; cf. 

3 'U>. iv. 4 = p. 1291 b. Pol. iv. 12 = p. 1290 b Set yip Kp&T- 

4 id iii. 7. rov tfvat rb {$Q\iKbfi,wQv t^pos TTJS 
Thw may be illiwlrated by Avis- irfXcws rou ju-ij jSouXoju^ou jw^vew rty 

totlo's appeal to education as a biipport iro\tTtav t t 



IV CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONS 59 

these our guide. Ethnic distinctions aro too little luiiAed in 
Greece to Ic a sufficient ground for classification, and geo- 
oraphical circumstances avo not a sufficiently powerful deter- 
minant. An arrangement of the constitutions of Greek states 
by nationalities or districts is therefore somewhat meaningless^ 
The difficulty which besets the alternative which we shall adopt 

the consideration of states with reference to the form which 

their constitutions assumed is that this form is not unalterable. 
There may be a strong tendency in one direction, bub there is 
an ebb as well as a flow in Greek political life, and what seems 
like reaction often sets in to impede apparent progress. But 
these changes need not prevent us from assuming what a 
study of the particular state is in most cases sufficient to prove 
that there is as a rule one final or at least most permanent 
form which a city's life assumes, and that all its deflections 
from this type may be looked on as aberrations. 

It is true that at times we shall not be treating the sroAis 
simply. The constitutional history of Athens leads us on to 
empire, that of Sparta to a military league; arid both the 
league and the empire are (in spite of the protests of Plato arid 
Aristotle) of the essence of the city-state. It is in Greece 
proper that the highest forms of political life were in the main 
attained; 1 and the TroXts as a wholly independent political unit 
in this portion of Hellas is something of a fiction. If we take 
the middle of the fifth century B.C. as representing the acme 
of Greek political civilisation, and think of the distribution of 
races and cities during that period, we find no less than live 
systems of federal or tribal government in existence, in Thessaly, 
Boeotia, Achaea, Acarnania, and Aetolin,; one compact nation 
composed of many cities, that of this East Locrians ; and soino 
smaller Wvr), such as the Malians and Oeteans. Sparta exorcises 
a so-called " hegemony " over most of the cities of the Pclo- 
ponnese, which means that she controls the politics of the 
stronger ones by diplomacy, of the weaker ones by force of 
arms ; while Argos hovers between an attempt to govern and an 
effort to destroy the cities of her own domain. Athens, Sparta, 
Corinth, Argos, and perhaps Elis these are the really inde- 
pendent city-states of the period;- the rest are merged in 

1 The one great exception is the con- Doris was under Spartun pMi doral!" ; 
stitiition of the Dorian cities in Crate; but in the .small predatory ctminmws of 
they have a very close parallel in Sparta. West Loci-is independence was the, 

2 Phocis piobably formed a league ; result of a low degree of civilisation. 



60 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

larger units or dwell in an indefinable region somewhere 
between nominal sovereignty and municipal self-government. 
To treat Athens without her empire would be to ignore the 
power which gave democracy to the Eastern world ; to describe 
Sparta apart from her confederacy would be to shut our eyes 
to the only moral and material force that was able to stem the 
tide of democracy in Greece. 

The classification of forms of government for historical 
purposes is simple. It is better to avail ourselves of the limited 
phraseology adopted by the average Greek, and which has 
survived through all time, than to adopt the subtle refinements 
of Aristotle. The average Greek divided ordinary forms of 
government into oligarchy and democracy ; he regarded aristoc- 
racy as a form of the one, " polity " or moderate democracy as 
a form of the other. 1 He was equally conscious that there 
were some forms of constitution which would not fit these 
simple types, for they seemed in a manner to combine the 
elements both of democracy and of oligarchy. These he called 
mixed governments. Later on we may have to resort to 
minuter differentiation; but for the present oligarchy, mixed 
government, and democracy give us a classification of govern- 
ments sufficiently comprehensive for practical purposes, now 
that monarchy, the early aristocracy of status, and tyranny 
have been left behind. 



2 Oligarchy 

Oligarchy is described both as the rule of the few and as the 
rule of the rich. As the two classes invariably coincided in 
Greek states, we need not pause to discuss with Aristotle the 
question whether the qualitative or the quantitative element 
be of more importance in the definition of the term. 2 To the 
average Greek mind they were inseparably associated ; but there 
is historical justification for the belief that wealth was conceived 
to be the main " principle " (o/ios) of such a constitution the 
chief, though not the only, claim of the few to rule. It was 
natural that this should be so ; for it is material goods which on 
a shallow analysis of the needs of government must seem to 
contribute most directly to the preservation of the state, and it 

' Arisl. Pd. iv. 3= p. 1290 a. 2 &. iv. 4 = p. 1291 b, 



IV OLIGAEOHY 61 

is on the obvious ground of the possession and use of such 
goods that the demand for recompense, in the shape of political 
influence and honour, can most readily be made. We have 
already seen the aristocracies of birth admitting the principle 
of wealth in early Greek societies \ l the theory that the rule 
of the few was the rule of the richer class was made still more 
apparent in the brilliant commercial life of the colonies, and 
was finally stamped for ever on Greek thought by the great 
social struggle of the Peloponnesian War, which was everywhere 
a contest between the rich and the poor the only two classes 
which can never overlap in the same community. 2 The rude 
and shallow claim of the oligarch for a superiority of political 
power in virtue of his " stake in the country " may even have 
originated the theory of distributive justice, of men receiving 
from the state in proportion to their desert ; for wealth is the 
primary symbol of this joint-stock conception of political life. 
But it would be a mistake to suppose that this is the only claim 
of oligarchy, and that the pride of the oligarch rested on his 
money-bags alone. To him the rule is aristocratic, at least in 
a single, possibly in a twofold sense, The possession of wealth 
was taken to mean respectability, as implying education and 
freedom from temptation to crime. 3 Hence such names as KoAot 
KayaOoi and yvvpipoi, which were usurped by the wealthier 
classes even in democratic states, and the contemptuous irovypoi, 
which they applied to the masses. And the claim of birth was 
never extinguished that " good birth " (cuyeveta) which, as we 
saw, was defined in terms of inherited wealth and culture. 4 

But general acceptance is necessary for the stablishing of 
shadowy claims like these; and this general acceptance was 
rarely forthcoming. To the average consciousness the oligarch 
was a covetous man (TTA.OVKTT/S), who had more than his fair 
share of the goods of the state already, and whose iniquity was 
aggravated by his impudence in demanding more. To the 
ordinary Greek the claim of wealth overrode all others, and 
oligarchy therefore appealed to him as the straining of the 
narrowest of political principles to its utmost limits. It might be 
tolerable in certain commercial states such as Corinth or Sicyon, 
for there the wealthiest men ought to be the " directors"; in cities 
with wider views of life and nobler aims it was intolerable. 

1 p. 22. 3 *&. iv. 8= p. 1293 1> ; cf. iii. 13. 

2 Arist. Pol. iv. 4=p. 1291 b. 4 p. 16. 



62 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

The later oligarchies of Greece are in fact, like the earlier 
ones whose structure we have discussed, transitional forms of 
government. It was seldom that they could stand alone un- 
aided by some foreign power. The oligarchies in Peloponnese 
were largely due to Spartan influence ; and at a later period, 
from the close of tho fourth century onwards, we find Macedon 
adopting the same device to hold nations such as Thessaly and 
Achaea in subjection. Sometimes, indeed, they spring up, 
like the Four Hundred at Athens in 411, in reaction against 
democratic excesses, but as a rule only to disappear again if 
the state be isolated. 

Oligarchy was unstable because it rested or appeared to 
rest on a single principle which was in itself little justification 
for good government, and which, except under unusual cir- 
cumstances, was not likely to win the tacit support of the 
masses, without which no government could continue to exist. 
In Greece the best chance for the permanence of such a con- 
stitution was its admission of some alien principle which 
changed it into a mixed form of government ; and it is, there- 
fore, not surprising that tho state which was the real centre of 
oligarchic influence in Greece was itself not an oligarchy. In 
dealing with the Peloponnesian league we shall be treating of a 
crop of oligarchic governments whose main support was Sparta, 
itself a harmonious balance of opposing principles. The main- 
spring was perfectly adjusted, and was sufficient to keep intact 
the outer works of tho machine, which, without this regulation, 
would have hopelessly collapsed. The consideration of this 
influence will come later ; meanwhile we shall confine ourselves 
to the few clear instances of oligarchies proper which were ablo 
to exist for a time unsupported, or only partially supported, 
by external influence. 

Northern Greece presents us with some curious instances of 
oligarchies of an aristocratic type. In some of these districts 
commerce had not flourished, and the course of years had 
brought little change in their primitive agricultural societies. 
It had given thorn a TroAtTaa and a fixed conception of 
citizenship, but the claim to rule was based, as in early Greece, 
on birth, landed possessions, or military service. The states of 
TuflSSAiiY furnish instances of aristocracies of the ancient type. 
The history of the whole district hardly prepares us for this, 
for it is one of monarchy, followed in the course of the fifth 



tv OLIGARCHY 63 

century by a kind of democratic federation. But the character 
of the government of the towns is dynastic in the extreme, and 
a comparison of the condition of the towns with the tendencies 
of the central government makes it difficult to believe that the 
influence of the noble Thessalian clans was everywhere, or even 
in the majority of cases, recognised by law. Many of the cities 
may have been de facto rather than de jure oligarchies : they may 
have possessed a professedly liberal constitution and yet have had 
their chief offices, and especially the military leadership of the 
state, monopolised by the noble clans ; in other states, perhaps, 
the dynastic influence enjoyed a fuller legal recognition. In 
spite of the existence of the federal council, which succeeded the 
monarchy perhaps as early as the middle of the fifth century, 1 
the different states seem largely independent of one another ; 
and though the foreign policy of the whole country was to 
some extent directed by the central government, the details even 
of this were entirely under the control of the separate hereditary 
oligarchies. Thus we find that, when Thessaly sent help to 
Athens in 431 at the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, 
each of the cities appointed its own commander. Larisa 
appears to have had the misfortune to possess two great 
families instead of one, and consequently its forces were led by 
two generals, each chosen from a separate clan or faction in the 
city. 2 Sometimes we find the nobles arming their retainers, the 
Penestae, and taking an independent part in the wars of foreign 
nations. 3 Occasionally the states encroached on one another's 
liberties the powerful city of Pharsalus, for example, extended 
its rule over some of its smaller neighbours; 4 but the larger states 
seem to have been practically independent, or were connected only 
through the ramifications of the great family of the Aleuadae of 
Larisa, which established dynasties in many towns. 5 Other clans 
who controlled their respective cities were the Creondae of Phar- 
salus and the Scopadae of Cranon. These families were enabled 
to maintain their ascendency largely through the preponderance 
of cavalry amongst the Thessalians ; the character of the country 

1 See ch. vii., where Thessaly is fl Find. Pyth. 10 ad fin. tv 5' 
treated as a federal government. dyaOoi<ri fceerat Trarpcft'ac Kwvai iro\luv 

2 &ITQ TTJS <rr&(r(i)$ esdrepos (Time. Kvpepvdffics. 

ii. 22). b On these families see Her. vi. 127, 

J As Menon of Pharsalus in 364 B.C. vii. 6, ix. 58 ; Diod. xv. 61, xvi. 14 ; 

(Dem. c. Aristocr. 238). Scliol. in Theocr. xvi. 34. 
* Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 8. 



64 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

and the numbers of their retainers enabled the nobles to support 
large bands of horsemen, while the hoplite force, the backbone 
of constitutional government, was comparatively unimportant. 1 
The cities of Thessaly, where we find almost the sole survival 
of the old feudal nobility, are, with short intervals of unity and 
peace, a scene of political confusion unparalleled in the Greek 
world down to the time of their conquest by Philip of Macedon 
in 344. The democracy aimed at centralisation, the nobles at 
isolation, whilst in the individual states the struggle of faction 
raged, sometimes between the members of the clans, sometimes 
between the clans and the popular party. In some cities a com- 
promise was for a time effected ; at Larisa a mediator (apx^ 
ptcriSios) was called in to allay the feuds of the ruling clan, 
while magistrates of a popular character (7ro\tTo<t>vXaKes and 
Srjpiovpyoi) were set up as a concession to democratic claims. 2 
At last the B^ios threw off the rule of the clan in the most 
effective, and perhaps the only possible way. In 404 a 
tyranny was established at Pherae, which for a time became a 
constitutional government of the whole of Thessaly. This in 
turn led to a federal system, the fortunes of which we shall 
follow elsewhere. 

As we go south from Thessaly we pass from the most 
violent type of oligarchy to its mildest form. The little 
people of the MALIANS possessed a constitution such as 
Aristotle calls a " politeia " or constitutional government, but 
which more closely resembled a moderate oligarchy than a 
modified democracy. The privileged class (TroAm-vjua) was 
composed of those citizens who had served as hoplites, the 
magistrates being chosen from those actually on service. 3 The 
latter provision seems to show that the whole organisation of 
the state was military j but as the hoplite was in Greek society 
equivalent to the middle -class citizen, and as it was in the 
JLWO-OS iroXiTrys that truo political virtue was supposed by certain 
Greek theorists to reside, it is curious to find a backward Greek 
tribe realising so easily a political ideal which Athens tried in 
vain to attain, 4 and which many great thinkers regarded as the 
best practical form of government for any state. 

1 ArfatPtf.lv. 3=p. 1289b;Thnc. 3 Arist. Pol. iv. 13=p.l297b. The 
u. 22 ; Her. v. C3 ; Dem. cortf.ra irdKirda. was composed Ac rQv c&TrXtreu- 
Anstocr. 238. K&TWV : the magistrates were chosen in 

2 Arist. Pol. v. 6 ss p. 1305 b; in. 2 ; r&v a-rparevo^v^v. 
Etym. M, s.v. toifuovfryte. 4 Bee oh. vi. 7. 



iv OLIGARCHY 65 

A tribal oligarchy of narrower type, and one that seems 
clearly to be a persistent survival of the early aristocracies of 
Greece, is found in the wider territory of the EAST or OPUNTIAN 
LoCRiANS. This people did not form a city but a nation. 
From the fifth century onwards the independence of the 
separate towns seems to have been lost, and Opus became the 
capital of the tribe. The Locrians might perhaps have de- 
scribed the central government as a " commune " (KQWOV) of 
the various cities 1 an expression which is generally used in 
Greece to denote federal association, but which in this case 
seems to express something more akin to a common national 
life. There are traces of something like community of citizen- 
ship and of a common taxation, but on the other hand of a 
variation in the local laws, 2 which seem to point to an extensive 
municipal autonomy enjoyed by the several cities that had 
resigned their sovereign independence. The government was 
an oligarchy of a thousand men, 3 chosen, as has been con- 
jectured with much probability, from the hundred most 
prominent and richest clans of the Locrians, which we know 
were singled out in some special way from amongst the families 
scattered through the territory. 4 It was a landed aristocracy, 
and that every effort was made to preserve its numbers intact 
may be concluded from a law which forbade the possessors to 
alienate their land except on proof of stringent necessity. 6 It 
is a form of government that so far finds its parallels in the 
early aristocracy of Thebes, in the landed interest that we 
shall find Sparta supporting at Mantineia, and perhaps in the 
narrow oligarchy of a hundred and eighty which ruled in Epi- 
daurus ; for although these were members of the city, and were 
distinguished from the country (%tos, 6 they probably represented 
the noble clans who were the large landed proprietors in the 
district. But the commune of the Eastern Locrians differs from 
all these in being something wider than a city, and presents us, 
in the selection of the round number of a hundred families 



1 After the Roman conquest we continues rarfras d' elvcu rds 
meet with the KOIVOV TWI> AoKp&v TUP oida.$ TO.S irpoKpi&eicras bird rQv 
'Eotw. irpijf % T^V faoiidav e|eX0p. The 

2 Hicks n. 63. words IIWAJ mean only " singled out 
8 ft*, n. 63 6 8 ri KCL ^ 8oKfy for the purpose of the colony." 

'Qirovriuv re -xi\iuv r\-/)6g.. 5 Arist. Pol. ii. 7, 6 (if this passage 

4 Polybms (xii. 5), in treating of does not refer only to the Locrians of 

the Epizephyrian Locriaus, speaks of Italy ; see p. 42). 

etyevets from the eraroV otWcu, and 6 Pint, fytaest. Graec. 1, 



66 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

from the surrounding cantons, with a more striking instance 
than we elsewhere possess of the boldness with which a purely 
natural association like the clan might be manipulated for the 
purposes of political representation. No such union appears to 
be found amongst their less civilised kinsmen of WEST or 
OZOLIAN Looms. The independence of their petty states was 
perhaps more suited to the freebooting habits of the people, 
although commercial treaties sometimes restrained their tend- 
encies to mutual plunder. One of these treaties, concluded 
between Oeanthia and Chaleion, furnishes some slight evidence 
that the government of these towns was of an aristocratic 
character. 1 

In some of the more developed societies of Southern Greece, 
whose wealth or position entitled them to be ranked amongst 
the great powers of the political world, we sometimes find an 
astonishing persistence of oligarchic government, the reasons 
for which, so far as they were social, are almost entirely hidden 
from our view, but which can sometimes be explained by the 
external relations of these communities with other powers. 
Degrees of permanence of oligarchic rule may be illustrated 
by the histories of Thebes, Megara, and Corinth, with the last 
of which the neighbouring town of Sicyon may be associated. 

THEBES is the only city in Greece which seems to have no 
fixed political characteristics at all. Its transitions from a 
narrow to a liberal form of government and back again are 
violent without being rapid; it runs a successful course of 
oligarchy during the Peloponnesian War, to pursue a still more 
successful democratic career during the period of that ascendency 
in Greece which it secured in the year 379, and it is successively 
at the head of an oligarchic and a democratic league. These 
changes cannot be explained as an illustration of the normal 
development in Greek states, for the two parties within the 
city seem at all times to be fairly evenly balanced, and the 
tendency in either direction is determined by considerations 
of foreign policy and by the city's one paramount object of 
ambition the maintenance of her position as head of the 
Boeotian league. In the earlier part of her history sho had 
to face the rampant democracy of Athens, which was sowing 

1 Hicks n. 31. 1. 15 5a/w/>y(bs tipurrivdw means "by right of birth." 
&6mu roi>s 6pKju6ras ApurrivSav. See p. 16. 
Tlio Domiurgi are the magistrates, arid 



IV OLIGARCHY 67 

disaffection amongst her cities, in the later she was meeting 
the oligarchic hostility of Sparta. Thebes is a remarkable 
instance of the sacrifice of political proclivities to one great 
national object, and her polity is but a means of securing her 
hegemony. The nature of her popular government, both 
earlier and later, is unknown ; probably in its developed form 
it resembled that of the typical democratic state, Athens, with 
the modifications necessary to suit it to a federal system ; but 
of the oligarchic phases of her constitution some traces have 
been preserved, which show that they exhibited at different 
periods three separate forms, two of which are easily re- 
cognisable. 

The downfall of the monarchy was followed by the type of 
oligarchy with which we are now familiar that of a privileged 
class who were the owners of the land. The " laws of adoption " 
(vofjiot fariKoi) of the legislator Philolaus at the end of the 
eighth century, by regulating the adjustment of the lots (K\rjpoi) 
with reference to population, 1 attempted to secure the perman- 
ence of this government; whilst its exclusiveness is exhibited 
by an enactment, perhaps due to the same legislator, which 
prohibited any one from sharing in political privileges who had 
not retired from trade for ten years. 2 This landed aristocracy, 
which excluded the class actually engaged in trade, and was 
therefore not quite a pure oligarchy, had by the year 480 
dwindled into a very narrow Swacrreta. 3 The unpatriotic part 
played by this family clique during the Persian wars 
strengthened the hands of the anti-Medising or popular party 
after Plataea ; and doubtless a more liberal form of government 
followed the expulsion of the Mede. It is impossible, however, 
to say when Thebes became an actual democracy, whether 
before or after the battle of Oenophyta (456), which asserted 
the Athenian influence in Boeotia. The only certain fact is 
that the Athenian protection thus secured gave to the infant 
democracy a security which led to its degeneration and its fall. 4 
The 'oligarchic was now the patriotic party, and a reaction set 
in which reached its height when the battle of Coroneia (447) 
freed Boeotia from the Athenians. The reaction was justified 
by its results; the supremacy of Thebes over the states of 

1 They are laws irepl TTJS iraiSoTodtis, s Thuc. iii. 62 dwacrrela, d\Lyuv 
Arist. Pol. ii, 12. avSpw &% r& irp&yjmra.. 

2 Arist. Pol. iii. 5. 4 Arist. Pol. v. 3=p. 13021). 



68 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

Boeotia was secured, and an oligarchic type of federal govern- 
ment established, the details of which we shall examine else- 
where. The government of the states was necessarily modelled 
on that of the central city, the municipal organisation of which, 
as distinct from its share in the federal constitution, is almost 
wholly unknown. The peace of Antalcidas in 387, by robbing 
Thebes of her hegemony and strengthening the oligarchic 
governments, which she herself had encouraged, of the now 
liberated cities of Boeotia, prepared the way for the subsequent 
reaction; 1 and this was rendered inevitable by an occurrence 
which for a time seemed to strengthen the oligarchic influence 
in the city. The seizure of the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes, 
by the Spartans in 383 showed that democracy was the only 
chance of securing freedom from foreign control and a renewed 
ascendency over Boeotia. In 379 the Spartans were driven 
out, and the re-establishment of the democracy was followed by 
a campaign against the oligarchic cities of Boeotia. The federal 
association was revived, but now on a democratic basis; and 
this condition continued until 338, when Chaeroneia gave the 
Thebans a Macedonian garrison and an oligarchic government, 
and robbed them of their hegemony. Thebes is not a great 
nation politically, for its politics were swayed too much by 
those of the neighbouring powers ; but we must remember the 
prize that it had at stake, and its glorious inconsistencies the 
product of a rare self-restraint are due to a nobler motive 
than the selfish interests of classes or individuals which led to 
revolution in other states. 

The political history of MEGARA is in some respects a 
parallel, in others a contrast, to that of Thebes. Both experi- 
ence alternations of democracy and oligarchy ; but the changes 
in Megara, though not unassisted by external influences, seem 
to be the direct outcome of social revolution; her democratic 
fervour awoke earlier and burnt more fiercely than that ever 
kindled in Thebes, or perhaps in any Greek city before the time 
of the Poloponnosiau War, while the period of her oligarchic 
repose was for a long time undisturbed by questions of political 
expediency. Here the struggle of classes which gave rise to 
tyranny was not ended by the rule of the tyrant, and the social 
question awaited another and a more violent settlement. It is 



1 Xcn. Hell. v. 4, 46 (378 B.O. } iv KaOeiffT^Kearav ttffirep & 9i}j8cus. 
irdms 7&p rats ir^Xceri Swcwrmcu 



IV OLIGARCHY 69 

true that the close of the rule of Theagenes was at first marked 
by a compromise. Probably it was the relief of all parties at 
being rid of despotism that led to the temporary establishment 
of a moderate constitution, 1 of the details of which we are wholly 
uninformed, but which was probably some kind of timocracy or 
liberal oligarchy. This was followed by a democracy of the 
most reckless type. The people, led on by demagogues of 
communistic views, 2 proceeded to insult and plunder the 
wealthier classes, to call back interest, and finally to banish the 
.notables and to confiscate their goods. This promising begin- 
ning was checked by the return of an army of banished nobles, 
who were successful in getting possession of the state. 3 In the 
new oligarchy that was established exile was taken as the test 
of political orthodoxy, and offices were held by the fartigrfa 
alone. 4 So far Megara had been left to its own devices ; now 
external influences come into play, and the little state becomes 
the shuttle-cock of Athens and Sparta, but changes its con- 
stitution as often in reaction against as in obedience to the 
claims of these two cities. The democracy which we find during 
the earlier part of the Peloponnesian War \vas probably the 
result of the alliance concluded with Athens in 455 ; but the 
independence of the state was the guarantee of the permanence 
of the democracy. The Megarians preferred the loss of their 
individual rights to the loss of their national autonomy, and an 
attempt made by a section of the demos in 424 to betray the 
liberties of the state to Athens, led to an oligarchic reaction 
and the establishment of a very narrow and singularly perma- 
nent form of government. Thucydides remarks with wonder 
that a change effected by such a small party should have been 
so lasting. 5 Whether the new government won the confidence 
of the people, or whether the national fear that prompted the 
revolution continued to secure the permanence of its results, 
we do not know; but the oligarchy continued down to the 
fourth century. Perhaps it was the fear of Spartan hegemony 
that in its turn prompted the state to become again a democ- 
racy. It appears as such in 375, a year marked by an attempt 

1 Pint. Quaest. Graec. 18 Meyapeis ^$3aXXojf iro\\oi>s r&v yvupl^wp KT\. 
Qeayfrr) rbv rtipavvov ^/c/SaXozres, J Hut., Arist., II. cc. 

6\iyov "xp'ww cr(d<pp&vri<ra,v /caret rty * Arist. Pol. iv. 15 = p. 1300 a. 
iro\tTetav. 5 Time. iv. 74 Kal ir\affTov 5r? 

2 Arist. Pol. v. 5 = p. 1304 b ol y&p xp^ vov a ^ T7 7 &* 



70 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of the oligarchs on the constitution which resulted in complete 
failure. 1 Democracy seems to have flourished in Megara from 
that time to the close of its existence as an independent state. 
Such scanty details of its civic organisation as have been pre- 
served refer, unfortunately, entirely to this period of democratic 
rule, and tell us nothing of the earlier oligarchic organisation. 2 
It is a relief to turn from these changing governments to the 
more stable oligarchies of Corinth and Sicyon. There were no 
cities in Greece where the duration of tyranny was longer and 
its work more complete ; and perhaps this purification of the 
state may have assisted the stability of any government 
subsequently established; but another reason for the per- 
manence of these constitutions is to be sought in their freedom 
from any foreign influences of a democratic kind. Both were at 
an early period members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, and 
therefore within the sphere of Sparta's influence. Corinth was 
too strong and too isolated in her naval and commercial 
supremacy ever to be touched by Athenian influence, which her 
rival interests alone would have urged her to repel; while 
Sicyon had early shaken off the hegemony of Argos, and thus 
obtained security from the democratic propaganda which that 
state spread through Peloponnese. The absence of disturbing 
causes explains not only the preservation but to some extent the 
existence of these oligarchies, which, certainly at Sicyon and 
probably at Corinth, were of a liberal type. For at the time 
when they were founded hardly any other form of government 
was possible, especially in cities that remained mainly Dorian 
and had the Dorian tenacity for old customs and ancient forms. 
The commercial character of both these states, while it may 
have assisted the permanence of these governments, is also a 
striking testimony to their justice. There are no blanks in 
Greek history that are more to be regretted than the absence 
of information on the social conditions and the political structure 
of these two commercial oligarchies. Neither, as will be seen, 
ended its days in peace; but both had a tenure of power 
remarkable for any government in Greece, and one which 
proves thai, they were valuable creations, a knowledge 

1 Diod. xv. 40. that the " aesyraiietes " who introduce 

<J Gilbert gfaulitalt. ii. p. 71. Oar- business (Caucr l.c.) may be a modified 

ing the democracy the inevitable /SouXdt survival of some oligarchic ofiice, 

KQ.I fla/tos (Cauer H. 108) appear at Sec p. 27. 

the head of the state. It is possible 



1V . OLIGAECHY 71 

of whose details would have added in no mean degree to 
the political wisdom of the world. Unhappily a few lines are 
sufficient to sum up so much of the constitutional history of these 
states as has been handed down to us. At SICYON the ethnic 
changes introduced by the tyrant Cleisthenes l continued in 
force for sixty years after his death ; then the state was united 
by a friendly agreement, a sign of which was the reversion to 
the old Dorian tribe-names. 2 The constitution which followed 
was an oligarchy which Plutarch regards as a type of the pure 
Dorian aristocracy, 3 and which must have been of a moderate 
kind, for the Spartans, in the panic caused by the democratic 
reaction in Peloponnese which led up to the battle of Mantineia, 
found it necessary in 41 8 4 to narrow the circle of qualified 
citizens. Whether this change was permanent is not known ; but 
that the government during its later stages must have been to 
some extent dependent on foreign support seems proved by the 
fact that the date of its overthrow by Euphron, 5 369, is 
coincident with the decline of Spartan power in the Peloponnese, 
Democracy during the lifetime of Euphron meant little more 
than the personal ascendency of its creator; but the work 
seems to have survived its author, and a popular form of 
government to have prevailed in Sicyon during the short 
interval which elapsed between his death and the Macedonian 
supremacy. Then a succession of tyrants of the later dependent 
type sprang up, and Sicyon only regained a constitution by a 
partial surrender of its autonomy when Aratus united it to the 
Achaean league. 

CORINTH possesses a still less varied history. The consistency 
of its foreign relations was based on the stability of its govern- 
ment, and the narrowness of both is remarkable. The tenacity 
of purpose with which this city pursued its definite commercial 
objects at any cost, even at the risk of affronting Sparta, the 
acknowledged leader of its foreign policy up to the close of the 
Peloponnesian War, shows oligarchy at its best in Greece, and 
exhibits the truth that the narrower and more permanent the 
executive of a state, the greater is the gain in consistency and 
concentration of purpose, and tho greater the power of carrying 
this purpose into effect, if other circumstances favour a com- 

1 P- 32. AW/MKTJS djOtffTOArpan'as &ffirep ctpjotopJas 

8 Her. v. 68. <wyxv0<r^<? xr\. 4 Thuc. v. 81. 

3 Hut. Arat. 2 & rfy fapdrov KO! Xen. Udl. vii. 1, 4-1 ; vii. 3, 4. 



72 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

munity of interest between the ruler and the ruled. Of the 
executive which guided Corinth all that we know is that it 
consisted of a council of unknown numbers, at the head of 
which stood eight irpdpovXoi. 1 In the scope of its powers this 
council probably preserved the characteristics of the old 
yepowta; 2 but its constitution could not have depended on 
birth, since a passing remark of Herodotus shows us that every 
trace of the aristocratic conception of ftavava-ua had been 
eliminated from this commercial state. 3 Probably admission 
depended on a high franchise, but on one attainable by all. 
Merit, as it is understood in commercial life, must have been 
the road to office and was reflected in the exercise of rule. 
Rights were rigorously protected, the material advantages of 
all the citizens consistently pursued, 4 and, like the "refined 
aristocracy " of Tarentum, 6 the rulers of Corinth seem to have 
learnt the lesson that " the poor have no passions, only wants," 
and to have checked the growth of ambition by satisfying the 
demands of necessity. Where the masses were prosperous 
there was little chance of a social revolution, which would have 
meant democracy and possibly tyranny, the fear of which, as a 
menace to life and property, seems to have been ardently 
fostered by the oligarchic rulers. External causes may also 
have contributed in a less degree to the permanence of this 
government. Corinth, though really isolated through the 
greater part of her history, was yet in such violent antagonism 
to the rivnl commercial power of Athens that she naturally 
favoured the coalition headed by Sparta, which represented a 
political principle hostile to democracy. From the time of the 
downfall of the Cypsclidac to the beginning of the fourth 
century her oligarchic constitution remained unshaken. When 
the change came it was in one of those subtle forms of foreign 
aggression which meet us everywhere in Greece. In 392 Argos 
supported a rising of the democrats and the oligarchy fell. 7 
But with it the state fell too. It is not often that a social 

1 Nicol. DaiiiiiNe. Ifytg. GO. ( ' See the speech of Sosicles the 

u Diodorus (xvi. G, r ) speaks of a Corinthian against the revStoration of 

yepovtrla with criminal jurisdiction the Peisistratidae in Her. v. 92 ; cf. iii. 

whiuh must have been identical with 18. It was from Corinth that the 

tht' council. % stories of the cruelties of its tyrants, 

:< I lei. li. IB7 iJKtcrru, ot KopbfOioi Cypselus and Pemnder, came. See 

6vwTCLL roi'/y Xdfiorlx 1 ' ''*' Nee p. 252. p. 28. 

4 I'ind. VI. KJ, G II 1 . 7 ]>i<xl. xiv, 92. Xeii. lldl iv. 4, 

8 ArLst. /W. vi, 5 -p. 1320 b. 6 ; v. 1, 36. 



IV 



OLIGARCHY 73 



movement is powerful enough to annihilate a nation ; but, like 
most extreme tendencies in politics, even this is illustrated in 
Greek history by the union of Corinth and Argos from 392 to 
387. Strictly speaking Corinth, from the age of the tyrants, 
ever remained an oligarchy ; for the restoration of this govern- 
ment in 387 meant the renewed independence of the state. 
When democracy did come it was in the modified form which 
admission to the Achaean league necessitated. 

If these few instances of the more or less permanent rule of 
the few give us most of the information on oligarchic rule with 
which we are acquainted, we are tempted to ask why most of 
the details of this form of government have been suppressed, 
and why so little of the constitutional arrangements of oligarchies 
appears, not only in philosophical writings, but in inscriptions. 
The transitoriness of these governments may account for much, 
the secrecy of their administration for more; but the main 
reason for this silence seems to be the comparative simplicity 
of the type. The forms were few, the details of organisation 
limited. It is true that this limitation is not inherent in 
oligarchy: there is as ample room for variety here as in govern- 
ments of the most democratic kind, for both the growth and the 
combination of the necessary elements of government are as 
possible in the narrowest as in the widest sphere. Proofs of 
this are found in the early constitutional arrangements of 
Athens, in the permanence of monarchy at Argos, in the 
survival of a double council in the democracy of Elis, in the 
antiquity of the lot as a mode of appointment to office. But 
we may believe that in the most permanent oligarchies, even 
where the constitution was a survival, variations of this kind 
tended to be swept away ; that a unity of administration, such 
as the combination of judicial and executive power which we 
observe in the council of Corinth, was generally possessed by 
the deliberative assembly \ and that all individual magistracies 
proceeded from and were directly responsible to this body. 
Here there could be none of the distribution and of the conflict 
of authority which arrest attention and lead to investigation of 
the exact structure and working of a government. Political 
research quitted the simple forms, after briefly noticing the 
variety of principles on which they rested, to concentrate its 
attention on the truly abnormal phenomenon of constitutions of 
the mixed type. 



CHAPTER V 

MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 

IT lias often been denied that such a thing as a " mixed constitu- 
tion " is possible. This denial is based on the two assumptions 
that the character of the constitution of a state is determined 
by the nature of its sovereign, and that the sovereign is always 
an individual or a determinate number of individuals. From 
these assumptions it inevitably follows that but three types of 
state are possible which we call monarchy, oligarchy or aristoc- 
racy, and democracy respectively, according as the supreme 
power is held by the one, the few, or the many. As the holders 
of the supreme power are always determinate, the constitutions 
which they define must be always simple ; and the " mixed 
constitution," to which Greek thinkers devoted such minute 
attention, is but the product of a shallow and superficial analysis, 
a confusion of the semblance with the reality of the thing, a con- 
fession of incapacity to pierce beneath the apparent working of 
a constitution to the one central fact of sovereignty. 

If this position were tenable, the conclusions of political 
science might indeed be accurate, but could hardly be considered 
valuable. If we enumerate a sufficient number of elements in 
a state, we can generally discover (although, it must be admitted, 
with considerable difficulty) something approaching to a deter- 
minate sovereign that is, we can generally find an aggregate 
of individuals who, taken collectively, seem to hold the supreme 
power in the state. But a discovery, though true, may be of 
very limited value, and such a discovery as this tells us exactly 
what we do not desire to know. What we really wish to 
discover is not what men or bodies of men hold power in the 
state, but how the supreme power is distributed between such 



CHAP, v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 75 

individuals or bodies ; for it is this that constitutes the nature 
and the working of a constitution. It may, indeed, be denied 
that the supreme power can be distributed, for by the "supreme" 
is usually meant the legislative power, and the unity of the 
legislative sovereign is a postulate of modern political thought. 
As a matter of fact it can easily be shown that there have been 
states, such as Eome or England, where through the accidents 
of growth even legislative functions have been divided, and 
where the only supreme or regulative power has been the tacit 
recognition of customary law. But, apart from these instances, 
the objection of the impossibility of the division of legislative 
authority, which appeals with such force to the modern inquirer, 
did not appeal at all to the Greek, for the simple reason that, 
as we have shown, 1 he did not recognise a legislative sovereign. 
His sovereign (TO Kvpiov) was merely vested with executive 
functions ; and as it is far easier to conceive the distribution of 
executive than of legislative power, the idea of a /UKTIJ TroAtreta 
was a far more natural conception to a Greek than that of a 
" mixed constitution " can ever be to us. Theoretically it seems 
that, from this point of view, even a purely quantitative analysis 
of governments, if classes rather than mere aggregates be taken 
into account, might justify the use of the term. But its main 
justification is to be found in that qualitative analysis of con- 
stitutions which, to Aristotle's view, far outweighed in scientific 
as in practical importance any mere appeal to quantitative 
distinctions. 2 In regarding the basis of government as qualita- 
tive we assume certain simple forms of constitution to be 
dependent on certain simple principles e.g. democracy to be 
based on the idea of numerical equality, oligarchy or timocracy 
on the idea of what Aristotle calls "proportional" equality 
regulated by wealth, aristocracy on the same idea regulated by 
aperi}. When these principles, as represented by the power 
given to certain corresponding classes in the state, are found 
not singly, but in combination, then the government may be 
called a "mixed government." Such a government is, in the 
first instance, a balance of principles. But principles are mere 
abstractions of which practical politics can take no account 
unless they are embodied in classes of the population and from 

1 p. 10. But the numbers of the sovereign are 

2 Pol. iv. 12 = p, 1296 TJ e'ort dl 7ra<ra mere accidents (ffvfip^Kdra) ; the 

fir re TOU TrotoO Kai iroffou. quality is the true determinant. 



76 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

this second point of view a mixed constitution implies a balance 
of power between classes, which may be vaguely or accurately 
defined according to the social conditions of the country. For 
the " normal " state (the opOrj iroXtTcia of Aristotle) this might be 
a sufficient account ; in such a state several distinct classes, on 
which political power has been conferred, embody principles, 
each of which can be proved to tend in some way to the interest 
of the community. But we must also consider the peculiar 
interests of the classes themselves ; for it requires a very super- 
ficial acquaintance with Greek history to convince us that 
bodies of men who strive for power are seeking their, own as 
well as the common good ; and, from this third point of view, a 
mixed constitution secures a balance of interests. What, it 
may be asked, was gained by this harmony or balance of 
principle, class -power, and interest? The Greek thinker 
answered " permanence " ; but his experience taught him that 
it was a permanence secured by growth, and no thinker seems 
seriously to have believed that a successful mixed government 
could bo the work of conscious creation. It is, indeed, too 
delicate a mechanism to be other than a product of nature, and, 
us in the case of other abnormal products, its existence is its 
justification ; for so strange a growth must be the fittest 
expression of the wants and capacities of the nation which 
gives it birth. History has shown that such forms of 
government are suited to a common-sense non-idealistic people : 
the Phoenicians of Carthage, the Dorians of Greece, Eomans, 
and Englishmen have all developed this type of polity. It is 
one which shows a lack of political genius, which is a genius 
for " revolution " in the sense of " radical change " (/xera/SoA?5) ; 
and, though the permanence of such governments is often 
secured by the crudity of minds which decline to seek symmetry 
in politics as in art, yet they have their own attendant dangers. 
The paradox of Tacitus 1 that a mixed constitution " can rarely 
be realised, and, if realised, cannot be lasting/' contains more 
than one element of truth. Besides the acknowledged difficulty 
of the creation of such ;i system, besides the friction necessarily 
entailed by the war of jarring elements, so amply illustrated 
by the histories of Sparta, Rome, and England a friction 



1 Ann. iv. 3iJ nnm cunetas - c.tmwcwta rei inillicae forma, laudari 
titnws ct ii-flcx jwn/w/s' <mt ywhnnres facilitis quam evenwe, vel si evenit t 
aut sinyiili, rctjimt : ddcda ex iis et 7w,u.d diuturna essc potcst. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 77 

which sometimes paralyses action, and always retards reform 
there is the element of revolution, which, though infrequently 
displayed amongst such peoples, assumes a curiously easy 
because a legal form in this type of government. A peculiarity 
of such states is that the central power comes often to be vested 
in the hands of some body not contemplated in the strict theory 
of the constitution. The Ephors at Sparta, the Senate of 
Eome, to a less extent the Cabinet in England, furnish familiar 
illustrations of this tendency. Its result is not infrequently a 
questioning of the righis of the actually controlling power by 
a sudden assertion of the claims of some part of the de jure 
sovereign which has long been slumbering. It is to the credit 
of these types in Greece that they show no parallel to the com- 
plete overthrowal of the Eoman constitution by the struggle 
between senate and people. The nearest approaches which can 
be shown are the conflicts between kings and ephors at Sparta, 
culminating in the suppression of the social revolution which 
Agis IV. sought to effect in the third century; probably the 
Cretan 0*007*10, 1 the temporary abolition by the nobles of the 
supreme judicial power ; and the later democratising tendency 
which we shall trace in the cities of this island, which perhaps 
belonged to the same class of revolutions. But the historian 
has to face what to him is a more serious consequence of the 
non-correspondence of the theoretical with the actual sovereign. 
The working of the constitution is hopelessly obscured, and he 
has in the main to reconstruct it from his knowledge of the 
powers possessed by the different elements in the state. We 
shall try to illustrate the working of a mixed constitution in 
Greece from the histories of Sparta and the cities of Crete, the 
Dorian states which developed this form - of polity \ but the 
product can be understood only by some acquaintance with 
the social conditions and the early history of these states. 
Fortunately the evidence for these primary factors in national 
life is more abundant for these countries than for any which 
we have hitherto discussed. 

1 Sparta, the Classes, the Citizens, and the Land 

Conquest and amalgamation were the means by which large 
states were founded in Greece ; it was of the first of these two 

. ii. 7. 



78 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

movements that Sparta was a product, although, as we shall 
see, the phenomenon of the <rwoiKicrju,os was even here not quite 
unknown. In the historic period Sparta represents the district 
of Laconia; it is the "city of the Lacedaemonians" (^ TW 
Aa/c<5cu/AovtW TroXis) a title which is somewhat misleading, for 
the word " Lacedaemonians " is used indiscriminately to describe 
the Spartiatae and the non-Spartan perioeci, and the latter were, 
as we shall see, not strictly members of the Spartan state. 
There was, however, almost certainly a time when Sparta no 
more represented Laconia than Borne originally represented 
Latiurn a time, that is, succeeding the Dorian migration, when 
she was only one out of many cities holding a dominant 
position in the district. This truth underlies both the accounts 
which we possess of the effects of the original Dorian conquest 
of Laconia and of the origin of the subject race of the perioeci 
accounts which are in other respects perplexing, for they differ 
both in the causes which they assign for the subjection of this 
people, and in the statement as to its original nationality. 
Ephorus * says that they were the original Achaean inhabitants 
of the country which the Dorians had invaded, that during the 
first generation after the invasion they not only remained 
possessed of all private rights, but shared in the political 
franchise of the invaders, but that in the next generation 
these political privileges were taken from them, they were 
reduced to a condition of subjection, and even made to pay 
tribute to the dominant Dorians. The story told by Isocrates 2 
differs considerably from that of his pupil Ephorus. He draws 
no such distinction of race between the Spartans and the 
periooci ; on the contrary, he represents the latter as having 
been originally the demos of the Spartan state, which, expelled 
after a period of faction, was reduced to the grade of a subject 
population by the victorious oligarchy and scattered through 
the many small townships of Laconia. The chief point of 
agreement in these accounts is that they both represent the 
political condition of the perioeci as having been originally 
better than it was in historic times \ but the guesses as to the 
nationality of this people are valuable, because they exhibit 
the important fact that in historic times there was no recognis- 
able difference between the nationality of the perioeci and that 
of the Spartans themselves. Both together are Aa/ceSai/ioi/iot : 
1 ap. Sirab. vii. p. 364. * Panath. p. 270. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 79 

the word STraprtarat conveys the ideci of a higher political status 
more distinctly than the idea of a different race. Yet it is 
certain that the perioecic population was to a large degree 
tinged with the old Achaean element; and a theory which 
takes account of all these facts and guesses must, like that 
stated by Curtius and others, 1 recognise two distinct stages 
in the Dorian occupation of Laconia. The first stage was 
marked, as in the contemporary histories of Messenia 2 and 
Elis, 3 by amalgamation with the native inhabitants, the 
original circle of dominant states established in Laconia 
not being peculiarly Dorian. 4 The second stage is marked, 
as in Messenia, by a reaction against this intermixture. 
The scattered Dorian elements are collected at a single central 
point by the influence of the noble clans, amongst which 
the two families which afterwards gave Sparta her kings 
must have been prominent. This central point was Sparta, 
which was naturally chosen as having been originally the 
nucleus for the spread of Dorian influence in Laconia, as 
Stenyclerus was in Messenia. It is for this reason that the 
Achaeo-Dorian towns of Amyclae, Pharis, and Goronthrae are 
called her colonies ; these so-called colonies wore conquered 
about 800 B.C. by the mother state, 6 when she had assumed the 
form of that historic Sparta with whose history we are 
concerned. 

The foundation of the city was, therefore, partly the effect 
of conquest, partly of amalgamation ; and it seems that in this 
amalgamation certain non-Dorian elements must have crept into 
this mainly Dorian state. One of the royal houses, the Agidae, 
claimed Achaean descent \ G of the nationality of the other royal 
house, the Eurypontidae, we know nothing. It was possibly 
Dorian; although if the tradition that the kings were the 
descendants of the twin sons of Aristodemus was the official 
Spartan legend, there can be no doubt that this Dorian com- 
munity was professedly governed by two Achaean kings. A 
third element is represented by the "great tribe" of the 

1 E. Curtius Hist, of Greece Blc. ii. states may have been Amyclae, Iliads, 

ch. i. ; Guirard La PropriMS fonciere and Geronthrae (.said to have been 

efrQrtceipp. 43, 160. colonies Irom Sparta), Oemis, Uowie 

* Ephorus ap. Strab. vii. p. 361. (the latter said to have Iwen founded 

* Strabo viii. p. 354. by a Heracleid chief), and Sparta itself. 
4 Curtius speaks of an original 5 Pans. Ui. 2, C. 

"hexapolis." The six most prominent 6 Her. v. 72. 



80 OUTLINES OF GEEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

Aegeidae. 1 The importance of this tribe is better established 
than its origin ; it is connected traditionally with the wander- 
ing race of the Minyans, 2 and legend says that it came from 
Boeotia, where was the great Minyan town of Orchemenus. 3 
The Achaean element in Sparta is probably something of a 
fiction, meant to connect their ruling houses with the ancient 
name of the Atreidae, and the Aegeidae were probably later 
comers who swelled the Spartan demos. This crwoifctopfc, 
which must have occurred not long before the year 800, did 
little to modify the purely Dorian character of the state. 

The nationality of the perioeci, on the other hand, was much 
more decidedly mixed. They might be described roughly as 
an Achaeo-Dorian race, to which other elements were subse- 
quently added, such as the lonians of Oynuria and the Sciritae, 
the inhabitants of the wolds of South Arcadia. But Dorism must 
here, as in Argos, 4 have imprinted its stamp on the mixed 
nationality, and the ethnic difference between Spartans and 
perioeci came to be but a slight one. Politically, however, by 
the close of the ninth century at latest, the distinction was 
firmly established between the rulers and subjects and we may 
now proceed to consider what the relations created between 
them were. 

After the reduction of the perioeci we are told that they 
were forced to pay tribute to Sparta. 5 Two views have been 
entertained as to the nature of this tax. We are told of 
property - taxes (da-fapaC) which existed for the whole of 
Laconia, including the Spartan territory, but which in course of 
time came not to be paid by the Spartiatae; 6 and it has been 
thought that the tax paid by the perioeci was of this nature a 
land-tax to the state, understood to affect the Spartans as well, 
but evaded by them, 7 and riot a tribute paid in token of sub- 
jection. The more probable view is that it was n tax based 
on the theory of territorial sovereignty, tho land being supposed 



1 Hor. iv. H9 0u\fy /Jxy&Xy <> 4 Herodotus (viii. 7JJ) says of tho 
Sflrdprfl. It is possible that <j>v\ r f) hero Cynumn.s <?K<563a>/>tewT<u 5 fab re 
may not he used m the sense of one of 'Apydw upxtifAwoi Kal rou xpovov* 
the political subdivisions of the state ; 6 (rvvrcXav ry 'Zira.pT'Q, Ephorus ap. 
but that it means more than a yivos nr Strab. p. 36-1. 

(f>pa,Tpla, (Stein in loc.} seems shown by (> A list. 7W. ri. 9 SI.CL yap rb rQv 

Pindar Pi/th. v. 101. STa/marw*' efrcu T\V ic\dffTyv yqv oiw 

2 Her. iv. 148. t&rafrvfftj' aX\rj\tav ras flatfiOpfa. 

8 Strab. pp. 346, 401. 7 Grote Hist, of Greece pt. ii. li. vL 



V MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 81 

to belong to the Spartans by right of conquest, and the perioeci 
paying a revenue to them for the right of possession. 1 Other 
tokens of dependence were the absence of all civic privileges 
which, if Isocrates is right in saying that the ephors could put 
the perioeci to death without trial, 2 was pushed to the extreme 
of denying them all rights of protection against the state and 
the absence of the right of intermarriage with Spartans. But, 
in spite of these disabilities, the perioeci do not appear to have 
been an oppressed people, and show little discontent with their 
position. In the great revolt of the helots in 464 only two 
perioecic townships joined the insurgents, 3 and it is not until 
the time of the conspiracy of Cinadon in 398 that we find any 
traces of general disaffection amongst them. 4 Their loyalty 
was believed in, for we find them serving as hoplites in the 
Spartan army, 5 and their nobles (fcaAot KayaOoi) voluntarily 
enlisting in the Spartan service. 6 We occasionally find a 
perioecus in very high command both in the diplomatic 7 
and in the naval 8 service, although, as we should expect, 
never in a position which subordinates a Spartan to his 
control. 

In her relations with this people Sparta, like Rome, adopted 
the principle of division as the basis of her rule ; for it is clear 
that all national life was stamped out of the inhabitants of 
Laconia, and from the vague accounts of our authorities there 
is room for conjecture that there was in some cases even a 
transfer of inhabitants for the purpose of weakening national 
ties. Isocrates 9 states that the Spartans intentionally weakened 
the other Laconians by dispersing them over a great number of 
hamlets (piKpol TOTHH), which they called cities (TroAets), and 
which were situated in the most unproductive parts of the 
district, the best land of which they reserved for themselves. 
This last statement reminds us of the land- distribution of 
Laconia which Plutarch attributes toLycurgus 10 the assignment 
of thirty thousand allotments to the perioeci, of nine thousand 

1 Sir G. 0. Lewis in the Philological s Thyrea and Aetliaea (Thuc i. 101) 
Museum vol. ii. p. 54 ; Guirard (La 4 Xen. Hell ill. 3, 6. 6 Her.ix 11 
Propr.fonciere p. 164) leaves it an open 6 Xen. Hell. v. 3, 9. 

question whether it was a capitation or 7 Thuc viii. 6. 

a land-tax ; he regards it as being the <&. viii. 22, as vafaf>x* of an 

same as the jScunXi/cds 0<5/>o? (Plato allied fleet from Chios in 412. 

4k*&- 18). 9 ranath. p. 270. 

2 Panath. 181. 10 Plut LyCt 8> 



82 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

equal lots to the Spartans. Both assignments have been 
thought with justice to be equally mythical. 1 But Isocrates 3 
statement points to the fact that there was a distinction 
between the land of the Spartans and that of the perioeci ; the 
former (the TroAmK^ xV a ) 2 was * n tne 1n. plain of the 
interior, the latter on the coast and on the rugged territory 
round this plain. 

But the perioeci did not tend naturally to an agricultural 
life, and there were many compensations in their position. 
They were not subjected to the rigorous discipline of the 
Spartans, and the trade and manufactures of the country were 
exclusively in their hands. They occupied the maritime towns 
of Laconia, many, if not most, of the hundred cities (AaKtSaifjuav 
/caro/j,7ToAts) lying on the coast; and the whole coast-line is 
sometimes called 17 *rc/Mows. 8 One of these towns was 
Gytheium, the port of Sparta itself; and Cythera, the 
nucleus of Lacedaemonian maritime trade, was also a perioecic 
settlement. 4 It, is strange to reflect on the singularity of 
the position of the grim bands of Spartan warriors amidst 
the wealth and comfort of this subject people; in this case 
the dogs seem to have really guarded and not to have worried 
the sheep. 

"YVe have already noticed that the perioeci had none of tho 
civic privileges of the central state no voice, therefore, in the 
Spartan assembly. It is natural, however, to suppose that 
they enjoyed full civil rights in the communities to which thoy 
belonged ; otherwise thoy would hardly have been called TroActs. 
But, whatever degree of autonomy these cities possessed, we 
must remember that, when wo are considering Sparta as a state, 
we must take no account of the perioeci at all; they are in 
public law members of distinct cities, not unprivileged members of 
a single city. The affairs of the perioecic cities seem to have been 
to some extent controlled by direct government from Sparta. 
We find a reference to twenty Spartan apfuxrrai, and epigraph ic 
evidence seems to have verified the conjecture t.hat these 
harmosts were governors of perioecic districts. 5 To Cythora wo 
know that a magistrate was sent who bore the title KvOijpo- 

1 Groie Hist, of Greece pt. li. ch. vi. describing tho fftcvrdXy received by the 

2 Polyb. vi. 45. harmoslB, says fow 8t d/j/iooral Aeufe- 

3 Time. iii. 16. datfMvlw tfKo<ru>. On an inscription 

4 ib. iv. 53 ; vii. 57. from Cytlicra wo find Mtvavdpos ap/to- 
8 The scholiast to PimL 01 vi. 154, in orfy> TtfapWai|>] (Cauer n. 2K). 



MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 83 

In any case it is probable that, if governors were 
appointed from Sparta, they were governors not of the 
separate TroAets, but of districts, amongst which these cities 
were distributed for administrative purposes. The internal ad- 
ministration of each separate -n-oAts might quite well have been 
in the hands of its perioecic inhabitants themselves. This status, 
once created, was applied by the Spartans to the organisation 
of their later conquests in Peloponnese. It has been noticed 
that some of the towns mentioned by Strabo as belonging to 
the Lacedaemonian eKaropTroXis were in Messenia, 2 and cannot, 
therefore, have been settled until after the conquest of that 
territory about the year 631 ; and later still the district of 
Cynuria, which was wrested from Argos about the middle of 
the sixth century, was organised as perioecic territory. 

While the comparatively ample details which have been 
handed down about the Spartan perioeci give us a fair idea 
of the condition of the class of subject freemen, which is found 
as a result of conquest also in Elis and perhaps in some of the 
colonial settlements, 5 in the class that stands below them at 
Sparta, the Helots, we have a picture of predial slavery, also 
the result of conquest, of which the most striking parallels are 
found in the Penestae of Thcssaly arid in the Mariandynic in- 
habitants of the Pontic Heraclea. The origin of this servile 
class at Sparta is wholly uncertain. Modern inquirers favour 
the derivation which gives the word e/'Acores the neutral sense 
of "captives," and thus a signification which throws no light 
upon the origin of the class ; whik, to explain the distinction 
in status between the perioeci and the helots, it has sometimes 
been supposed that the latter were a race which the Dorians 
found already a subject population when they invaded the 
Peloponnese. But there is no evidence to support this view, 
and Greek traditions know of no earlier slavery to the soil 
than that originating with the conquests which followed the 
migrations. In the condition of the helots we seem to find 
traces of a compact made between the Spartans and a con- 

1 Time. iv. 53. such as Leucadia and Anactormm 

2 Schomann Antiq. Juris pull. (Time. ii. 81, Arnold's note) ; "but the 
Graec. iv. 1 5. word ireptoiKQi, as used, for instance, to 

3 The perioeci of Elis (Thue. ii. describe the native populations siir- 
25) perhaps resembled the Spartan, rounding Greek colonies like Cyrcnu 
and traces of a subject people are (Her. iv. 159), may not be coincident 
found in later Dorian foundations, with the status here described. 



84 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

quered power ; and, on the analogy of the Pcnestae, the 
inhabitants of Thessaly first subdued by the Thesprotians, it 
seems as though this condition may have originated in some 
community which submitted on terms, and may have been after- 
wards extended to peoples subsequently conquered, such as the 
Dorians of Messenia. The evidences for this origin are to be 
found in the status itself. The helots were in a certain sense 
public slaves, used by private individuals, but under the 
dominium of the state. The state assigned them certain 
localities for residence, and attached them to private in- 
dividuals. 1 They could not be freed by their masters but 
only by the government, and they could not be sold out of 
the country. 2 The state too employed them for military 
service as light -armed troops, as rowers for the fleet, and 
even occasionally as hoplites. Again, they were under the 
protection of the state, or rather of the state religion; for, 
although they cultivated the lands of private individuals, they 
had to pay only a fixed proportion of the produce, which could 
not be increased under penalty of a curse. 3 Such a status 
could hardly have originated otherwise than in a compact 
which closed a war; the religious sanction is but the oath 
of the treaty perpetuated; and it does not seem impossible 
that a truth may be reflected in the traditional derivations 
which made them citizens of Helos, a town near the mouth 
of the Eurotas, or dwellers in the marshes (eXos) or fens 
about that river. Neither of these etymologies may be correct, 
but it is probable that we have in e/'Awres a local designation 
which eventually became a class designation. The localities 
in which the helots arc found in historical times throw no 
light upon their origin; they were settled as cultivators on 
the land owned by the Spartans, and Messenia, a later conquest, 
was for the most part helotised. In fact, most of the helots 
of Sparta were in historical times bclioved to be the conquered 
Mossenians. 4 

1 Ephorus ap. Strob. p. 365 rplnrov Politic Hcraclca (Poseidon ap. Athen. 

ydp nva 577/A00-/OVS SotfXous elxov ol p. 263d). 

AaKeSatfA&VLOL roiJrow, KaroiKlas rivfa 3 Pint. Inst. Lctc. 41 tirdparov ft* fy 

aiJrots aTrodeLi-wres ml XeLrovpylas ir\eLovfa TWO, fttaO&ffat. KT\. 
iSias. Cf. Pans, iiu 20, 6. 4 Time. i. 101 ; ho adds J Kal Me<r- 

9 A precisely similar agreement that trfynot tK^Oycrajr ol irdvTes. Thus the 

they should not be sold out of the revolt of the helots in 4C4 B.C. is 

country was made by the native sometimes spoken of as the Third 

Mariaudyni with the citizens of the. Messenian War. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 85 

Our authorities often notice the difficulties which the Spartans 
experienced in controlling this large serf population. Aristotle 1 
says that "the helots have often risen against the Lacedae- 
monians, for whose misfortunes they are always lying in wait " ; 
and we have the still stronger expression of Thucydides 2 which, 
even when applied to the military organisation of Sparta, seems 
exaggerated that "most of the institutions of Lacedaemon 
were framed to guard against insurrections of the helots." One 
institution, at least, is recorded of which this was the specific 
object. This was the KpvTrreia or system of secret police, con- 
ducted by the ephors and entrusted to a select band of Spartan 
youths. Their object was to investigate and report, and, a 
credible tradition adds, to carry out the results of their in- 
vestigations by a secret assassination of suspected helots. The 
state secrecy for which Sparta was so famed 3 might have 
concealed this last- mentioned element, as it has no doubt 
concealed many other ugly points in her administration, were 
it not revealed by the awkward religious scruple which made 
the ephors, after coming into office, declare war on the helots, 
that their death might be justified by religious law. 4 Externally 
the crypteia might seem simply a good police-training, incul- 
cating hardihood and vigour on the young, and as such it is 
treated by Plato. 5 But the darkest of its ulterior objects seems 
demonstrated by the account given by Thucydides of how two 
thousand of the helots, of approved courage, disappeared (no 
one knew how) in the seventh year of the Peloponnesian War. 
We may well believe with Plutarch that organised assassination 
was not one of the original institutions of Sparta, but only 
originated after the great panic caused by the revolt of the 
helots in 464. 

The two classes that we have considered, of perioeci and 
helots, however powerful their influence was in forming and 
perpetuating the military organisation of Sparta, and to this 
extent in determining the character of her political life, yet 
stood, strictly speaking, outside the state. Of the two the 
helot was more a part of it than the perioecus, for, besides 
being what Aristotle calls a " necessary condition " of the body 
politic, he was potentially at least a partial citizen, and might 

1 Pol. ii. 9. 2 iv. 80. * 6Vws tiayts y rb &pe\ew t Plut, 

8 TTJS iroXirdas rb KpvirT6v t Time. v. Lye. 28. 
88. 8 La m i. p. 633. 



86 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

aspire to a position which the perioecus, the member of another 
city, could never fill. We will now consider two further 
classes which yet remain in this state of many grades. These 
are the veoSa/^wSeis and the /zo'fla/ces, classes which to some 
extent form a connecting link between the dependants and 
their rulers. Their existence shows a more liberal policy in 
the conferment of citizenship than that exhibited by many 
Greek cities, and, as admission in either case depended on aper//, 
is an assertion of the profoundly aristocratic character of the 
admitting state. 

The neodamodeis are briefly described by late authorities 
as "new citizens" and "emancipated helots." 1 But there is 
ground for thinking that this word signifies a second and not 
the first stage attained by a helot on enfranchisement. There 
is a stage of emancipation hinted at in some passages of 
Thucydides 2 which seems to precede the attainment of the 
position of the neodamodeis. The difference of status is unknown, 
but the conjecture 3 that the neodamodeis were enfranchised 
helots possibly of the second generation is rendered probable 
by the astonishing rapidity with which the class grows up 
during the later years of the Peloponnesian War. There is 
evidence that emancipation on a large scale went on from the 
beginning of this period, and this would explain the large 
numbers of this class that are found serving on foreign ex- 
peditions at its close. 4 Some of the rights of an emancipated 
helot we know to have been freedom from personal service 
and free choice of residence. In what the superiority of the 
rieodumodeis consisted we do not know; but it is unlikely 
that they ever won active political rights, and it is probable 
thai they merely enjoyed the passive rights of citizenship. 

Of the fwOitKes or /z,o#</>vs Phylarchus, a writer of the close 
of the third century B.C., supplies us with a fairly complete 
definition. He says that they were freemen, but not Lace- 
daemonians, that they shared in the full Spartan training ; and 
he implies that they might attain to full Spartan citizenship 
through merit. 5 Xenophon also describes a class of youths 



uK (fla/uti&tms ~ fypbrat) ; 3 Muller Dctrier li. p. 45, 

Pollux iii. 83. Little can be wade 4 One thousand arc found serving in 

of the definition purhaps a glass Awa with Thimbrcm (Xcn. Jfdl. iii. 1, 

in Thiic. vii. 58 SiWrtu 5 rb veo- 4), and two thousand with Agcnilaua 

5a.fj.u8K tXetiOepov rfdy etvai. (ib. 111. 4, 2). 

a v. 34, 67. B Phylareh. ap. Atheu. i. p. 271 e. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS S7 

admitted to the Spartan culture 1 which was composed partly 
of foreigners (gevoi), partly of illegitimate sons of Spartan 
fathers (voOot), the mothers being, we may suspect, usually 
helot women. That it was possible for molha'kes to become 
full citizens is proved by the great historic instances of 
Lysander, Callicratidas, and Gylippus : they were probably all 
of the mixed blood- 2 but it may have been equally possible 
for foreigners, such as the son whom Phocion sent to be 
educated at Sparta, 3 to graduate as well. We are not told the 
precise conditions requisite for admission to civic rights; but 
the evidence seems to show that the inotluikes were half- 
burgesses who were permitted to share in the Lycurgcan 
discipline, and then, if they showed a possession of ihe true 
Spartan d/oert}, might be created citizens. If this was the ea.se, 
it considerably modifies the view as to the exclusivcncss of the 
Spartan state which we gather from Aristotle. 4 Even Athens, 
as a rule, insisted on free descent on both sides. It is, how- 
ever, characteristic of the Spartan spirit that, if admission to 
the citizenship was to be made at all, it should be made only 
through a rigid observance of the Spartan ayon/vj. 

When we have ascended through these grades and reached 
the ruling class itself, the privileged circle of the true 
Spartiatae, we might expect such distinctions to disappear; 
but at the outset we are confronted with a twofoM division 
within this circle the result partly of a principle which 
insisted that other standards should join with free birth in 
being a necessary qualification for citizenship, partly of u, 
conservatism which perpetuated some of the privileges of the 
original noble clans. 

The first distinction is that between "peers" (o/*ow>i) and 
" inferiors " (wo/Aoves). All that we know for certain about 
the "peers" is that those only answered to the designation 
who had been brought up in the characteristic Spartan 
training; 5 but it is implied that another condition for this 
status was the continuance of the contribution which all 
citizens owed to the support of the public meals. Aristotle, 
at least, tells us that "the common meals were meant to be a 

1 Xen. Hell, v. 3, 9. 3 Pint. /%w. 20. 

2 Phylarch. Lc. Ael. Vnr. Hist. 12, 4 Pol. ii. 9, 17. 

43. Lysander's father is said to have fl Xen. liej). JMC. 10, 7; An<d>. iv. 
been a Heracleid (Plut. Lys. 2). 6, 1 4. 



88 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them 
is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take 
part in them ; and, according to ancient custom, those who can- 
not contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizen- 
ship." l We may conclude, therefore, that those Spartans were 
o/KHot who satisfied both of two conditions, the obedience to 
all the regulations of the Spartan training, and the continuance 
of the contribution to the public meals that the word was, in 
fact, a designation of all the full citizens of Sparta. 2 The 
u7ro//aoi/es, as a class distinct from the " peers," would be most 
naturally taken to be those who had not fulfilled either one or 
both of these conditions who had, therefore, lost their political 
while still probably retaining their private rights as citizens. 

It was very characteristic of Spartan institutions to designate 
all the Spartiatae, nobles and demos alike, as " peers " ; for the 
reduction of the life of all the citizens to one level was a real 
basis of equality in the state. It was the Spartans, Thucydides 
tells us, 3 that first set the example of this equality in Greece, 
by their uniform simplicity in dress and enforced moderation 
in life. Their equality was the essential one of a common rule 
of manners ; and, from this point of view, Sparta reminds us 
of those enlarged oligarchies of which Aristotle speaks, 4 in 
which the members of the privileged class formed, as it were, 
a democracy amongst themselves. 

The most constant suggestion of this equality was contained 
in the membership of the common meals (owo-ma) to which 
we have referred. Originally, perhaps, mere barrack-room 
messes for soldiers who had to be ever on their guard against 
the revolt of a subject district, they attained in time a more 
refined organisation which gave them a close resemblance to 
the ITGU/KMU or unofficial clubs, half political, half social, of the 
rest of the Greek world. The syssitia were small dining clubs, 
consisting of about fifteen members each. 5 Admission was 
dependent on ballot and required the unanimous consent of the 



1 PoL ii. 9 (Jowett). Jtyapop erweioVfcu ical cZXwt Kal v<=o- 

2 A final proof of this is famished Sap&defft /cai rots biro(jLdQ<ri Kal rots 
by the accounts of the conspiracy of ircpwtKots. The only clashes left to 
Cinadon in 398. Aristotle says' (Pol. be attacked were the 6/j.otot and the 
v. 7= p. 1306 b) that he conspired ftri STra/marcu. They would apparently, 
robs Sra/mdras. Xenophon says therefore, have been identical. 

(Hell. HI 3, 5) that Cinadon himself i. 6. 

was not one of the 0/Aoiot. As to the 4 Pol. v. 8= p. 1308 a. 

conspirators ( 6), afoot ^vrot, TT&O-LV 5 Plut. Lye. 12. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 89 

already elected members - } no doubt the exclusion of a qualified 
citizen from all these societies was an impossible contingency, 
and no guarantee of admission was, therefore, needed from the 
state. A restricted public opinion, such as was encouraged by 
these clubs, though it gains strength from its very narrowness, 
and may promote bravery in the field and honour in private 
life, is not a happy thing to foster in a state, for it creates a 
character exclusive, proud, and cruel. Private debate in these 
societies, on the conclusions of which the utmost secrecy was 
enjoined, was some compensation for the lack of freedom of 
speech in the assembly; but it fostered the tendency of the 
Spartans to secrecy and intrigue, and gave them a penchant to 
the oligarchical club and a belief in the efficiency of narrow 
corporations which proved the ruin of the empire which they 
wrested from Athens in the Peloponnesian War. The principle 
of co-optation recognised in these clubs must have tended to 
emphasise such class distinctions as did exist in the state ; but, 
since membership was certainly attainable by every one who 
had the means to pay his quota, an appearance of social 
equality between all the citizens was secured. 

But, in spite of this apparent equality, we do find a dis- 
tinction within the O/*OH between the nobles (/caA.ol KfyaOoi) 
and the commons (SoJ/^os). It was, apparently, a distinction 
between the members of the ancient clans and those who were 
not members, between the old and the new burgesses \ and this 
distinction was of political importance, for apparently only the 
nobles were chosen for the yc/xnxrfo. How it came that a class 
which could be called the demos grew up at Sparta is not 
known. From the first there may have been a Dorian popula- 
tion outside the noble clans, but it was probably recruited by 
later accessions of inhabitants to the community. Legends of 
such later accessions are not wanting, and Aristotle tells us that 
" there was a tradition that, in the days of their ancient kings, 
the Spartans were in the habit of giving the rights of citizen- 
ship to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no 
lack of population was experienced by them," 1 and thai at 
one time Sparta was said to have numbered ten thousand 
citizens. The Aegeidae, the non-Dorian tribe whose presence 
we have already noticed, may be the greatest of the instances 
of such later additions to the state. 
1 Pol ii. 9. 



90 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

We have already touched on a qualification for citizenship, 
which had such important results that it must now be considered 
more in detail. The mention of membership of the syssitia as 
a preliminary to the enjoyment of civic rights lias prepared us 
for the fact that property and citizenship were indissolubly 
connected at Sparta. Aristotle : tells us that the decrease in 
the number of citizens was owing to the accumulation of 
property in a few hands a statement which implies that the 
loss of property meant the loss of civic rights ; and this fact 
has an important bearing on the much-disputed question of 
the tenure of land by the Spartans. Since all the wealth of 
the Spartiatae rested on Iand 3 trade being forbidden, and the 
contribution to the public meal was the basis of citizenship, we 
should expect to find some provision made for securing land- 
allotments to the citizens arid for preserving this distribution. 
Some of our authorities assert that an equal allotment of all 
the available land was made 2 a statement which cannot be 
accepted as literally correct, since evidences are found for a 
very early inequality of wealth amongst the Spartans, and 
this inequality of wealth must necessarily have meant 
inequality of landed possessions. But, as has often been 
pointed out, 3 this by no means shows the tradition of the 
distribution of equal K\rjpoi amongst the citizens to havo been 
a fiction. From the earliest times a distinction must have 
existed between the landed possessions of the nobility and of 
the demos. The nobility possessed large tracts of land, like 
the rcfxvj) of the Spartan kings, in the conquered territory, 
while the members of the demos had their separate K^PUL 
allotted them, which were originally certainly inalienable and 
probably equal ; for it by no means follows that, because some 
members of a state can be proved to lie large proprietors, the 
others do not possess a minimum of lunrl such a minimum as 
was assigned to poorer citizens by Athens and Uomo and other 
conquering states of the ancient world. The tenures of the 
ordinary land and of the minimum assigned by the state might 
naturally be different ; and this seems to have been the case at 
Sparta, for a clear distinction was drawn between the ordinary 
landed possessions which an individual might acquire and the 
" ancient division " (dp^ua, /MH/XX) or /eA.7//>o$ which had been 



1 Pol. ii. 9. 3 Sue especially Gilbert StantsaU. L 

2 Plut. Lye. 8 ; Polyb. vi. 45. p. 13 ; Guirard La Propr.fon. p. 41 ff. 



V MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 91 

assigned. It was the latter alone that could riot be alienated ; l 
and iii the case of the extinction of the family this heritable 
and inalienable allotment must have lapsed to the state. The 
division was undertaken for political motives, and was gradual 
in the sense that it kept pace with conquest and the consequent 
acquisition of common land. Land once assigned was not 
thereafter touched by the state ; for neither in Sparta nor in 
any community of early Greece is there any sign of collectivism 
or of periodical redistribution. The change in the tenure of 
land came with the law of the ephor Epitadeus, of unknown 
date, but which may with probability be placed soon after the 
Peloponnesian War, 2 the close of which marks the beginning of 
the social revolution in Sparta. This law permitted to every 
one free gift and free bequest of his house and land. 3 Even 
now sale was not permitted, and in later times it was still con- 
sidered disgraceful, though not illegal, to sell one's property 4 
the last relic of the previous inalienability of land and a proof 
of the grounds on which it had been based. 

This assignment of equal lots of land to the citizens, besides 
being the necessary completion of the Lycurgean system, was 
also more possible at Sparta than in any other state of the 
Greek world ; for as long as she continued to be a conquering 
state there could be no difficulty in finding surplus land for 
distribution. When the period of conquest was closed the 
theory was still maintained that civic rights should be dependent 
on the possession of land, and no remedies could be adopted to 
make an impossible theory effective. So far from any check 
being placed on the increase of the citizens, the state had 
encouraged it by pronouncing the father of three sons exempt 
from garrison duty, the father of four free from all state 
burdens; 5 and the inconsistency noticed by Aristotle was 
committed, of attempting to limit the possession of land without 
regulating population. He thinks that a possible solution 
would have been to make the syssitia, as in Crete, depend on 
public land worked by public slaves; and perhaps it would 
have been better had Sparta pushed her theory of communism 
this one step further. The principle which was adhered to that 

1 Heracleides Ponticus 2, 7 iruXeiv 2 Contangos NouvelksItecfLerclies p. 60. 

8e yfy Aa/ceocujiopfois atVxpor i>ev6- 3 Pint. Ay is 5. 

Ttjs d dp^a/as /to/pa? oti8 4 Arist. Pol. ii. 9. 

Of. Pint. Inst. Lao. 22. 6 l,c. 



92 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of the inalienability of the land only increased the difficulty of 
the situation; for the minute subdivision of an allotment amongst 
many sons must often have meant that all of them were 
prevented from continuing the public training or contributing 
to the public meals. But the removal of this restriction had 
an unexpected result. Nearly two-fifths of the land came 
eventually, through inheritance, through dowry, and probably 
through voluntary transfer, to be possessed by the women l 
a consequence which can only be explained by the exemption 
of women from the Lycurgean rules of trade 3 which prompted 
the Spartan to gain through his female relatives a use and 
enjoyment of capital from which he himself was debarred by 
law. As the land centred in fewer hands the population did 
not decrease, for the oAtyai/0/>owna from which Sparta suffered 
was one of privileged citizens. Even at the beginning of the 
fourth century the number of the vTrofJAioves had enormously 
increased, as is shown by the conspiracy of Cinadon. This 
discontented element had thrown in its lot with the subject 
peoples, and Sparta was becoming a narrower oligarchy exposed 
to graver dangers. 

2 The Political Constitution 

Sparta had no code of written laws, and the whole consti- 
tution was based on a few /;?/T/>cu. 2 A rhetra was, according to 
Plutarch, an ordinance with a religious sanction. Another 
definition makes it a " contract." 3 But these two notions are 
not exclusive of one another : a rhetra is both an ordinance and 
a covenant. It was not, however, so much a covenant mado 
between God and man as a compact between man and man 
dictated by a god, the ultimate sanction of which was an oath. 
Thus Xenophon 4 speaks of the covenant between the king and 
the people of Sparta instituted by Lycurgus, and this idea 
comes out very clearly in his account of the monthly oath inter- 
changed between the king and the ephors. 5 The belief that 
compacts of this kind were dictated by a god was never lost, 

1 Arist. Pol. ii. 9. meant a contract, as in lex dicta, lex 

2 Plut. Lye. 13. data. A law was a covenant between 
8 Hcsychius /tyr/wr <rvv01jKCLi $L& nuigistrato and people, as "rhetra" 

X6y&>. * Jlesp. Lac,. 15, 1. here is a compact between king and 

ib. 7. cf. p. 15. So lex at Rome people. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 93 

and even the rhetrae subsequent to Lycurgus were supposed to 
have had a divine origin. 1 

To the Greeks the constitution of Sparta seemed, almost in 
its entirety, to be the work of a master -mind, of the nature 
"half human, half divine" 2 of Lycurgus. Eut the legislator 
is only in a very limited sense a creator ; he is at the mercy of 
circumstances, and the utmost that he can do is to codify the 
best tendencies of his time. The peculiarities of the Spartan 
constitution, in so far as they are exemplified by its communism 
and the mixed character of its institutions, may be explained 
as a normal development from certain primitive Dorian tend- 
encies, which assumed a somewhat similar form in the cities of 
Crete, and, as realised there, furnished a parallel which appealed 
as strongly to the Spartans of Herodotus's day 3 as to Plato and 
Aristotle in later times. In so far as these peculiarities were 
exemplified in the purely military ideal and the strict military 
discipline of the state, they were the natural consequence of 
the environment of the Spartans, and the results of rules of 
life necessarily adopted by a handful of Dorian nobles set in 
the midst of a conquered and hostile territory. The attention 
of practical statesmen and philosophers was directed to Sparta, 
not because it was unique, but because it was the typical 
example of what the city-state should be. The statesman saw 
in it the realisation of his ideal of permanence, which it attained 
through the even balance of its different elements \ the philo- 
sopher saw his dream of state-control fulfilled in the most 
perfect form perfect because the control was not felt to be an 
infringement of individual liberty, since the ideal of the state 
and of the individual was the same. Yet, although the tend- 
encies which led to this result may be explained by natural causes, 
the work associated with the name of Lycurgus seems to have 
been more comprehensive than that performed by any legislator 
of the ancient world. It bears, in fact, more resemblance to the 
constitution of a new state than to the reconstruction of tin old. 
The tendency of modern inquiry is, as we saw, to bring the 
foundation of historic Sparta down to a comparatively Lite 
epoch, and it is possible that the political history of this Sparta 
begins with the constitution of Lycurgus. There was no doubt 
a Dorian settlement there from the date of the migration, but 
this was not the state created by the new conquest and amalga- 

1 Pint. Lye. 6. a Plato Lmos p. G92. * Her. i. 65. 



94 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

niation. The reforms attributed to Lycurgus seem on examina 
tion to be the work of an ot'facmjs. In the account of him 
given by Herodotus he constitutes everything ; 1 and the rhetra 
attributed to him, undoubtedly a genuine and probably an 
ancient document, contains the reconstruction of Sparta on a 
new basis. It is, in appearance, a charter of incorporation, and 
a detailed examination of its clauses will be our best guide to 
the primitive institutions of the state. 2 

The first ordinance has reference to worship, and enjoins the 
religious unity of the new state. A shrine is to be established 
to Zeus Hellanius and Athene Hellania. Zeus is recognised 
since he is the guardian god of the two Spartan kings ; it is 
less certain why Athene appears ; but their epithets "Hellanius" 3 
and " Hellania " are easily understood when we remember the 
claim of the Dorians to be a branch of the original Hellenes of 
Thessaly and their close connection with the amphictyony of 
Delphi that sacred union which, by accompanying their 
conquests southward, probably spread the name "Hellenic" 
over the whole of Greece. 4 

The people assembled in their ecclesia or aireAAa are to meet 
within certain local boundaries, which are called respectively 
Babyce and Cnacion. The nature of these limits is not 
exactly known, but Criacion is said to have been a river and 
Babyce a bridge, 5 and the boundaries hero specified are doubt- 
less the limits of the plain of Sparta itself, within which the 
four villages of Pitane, Limnae, Messoa, and Cynosura, that 
composed the commune, were situated. The meetings are to 
take place monthly; they are to bo called "from full-moon 
to full-moon." 

The people are to be divided into state-divisions called <l>v\ui 
and wj&u', and the latter are to be thirty in number. Those 
thirty obes appear to be identical with certain subdivisions of 
the people which Herodotus attributes to Lycurgus and calls 



1 Her. i. 65 /tCT&rTtyflre r& vtiiup.* ^al KraKtwvoj, otfrws dcrfi/pew rf K<d 

ir&vra. u,<f>l<rra,(rQaL' SdfJitf 8t rat* Kvptav fyw 

tt The text of the rlietra is given by teal Kfiaros. 

Plutarch (Lye.. 6) OH follows: Aids >A SeXXdnos (for the unmeaning 

SeXXaptou ml 'Mctvfa SeXXew/as lepbv SwXXdwos of tlio MSB.) i clearly 

ISpvedjiwov, #iA&s <pu\d%avra Kal equivalent to 'EXX^eos. 

tfySis tZ>/3aaj'Ta TptdKovra, 'ytpovffla.v * See, p. 51, 

crfo Apxayfrats tfaraoTTjeraj'ra, $/>as D lint. Lye, 0. (jilliert thinks tlmf 

# &pas fac\\6fai> pera^ Uapi'iias re tlio Oonua and tlio Tiaaa are meant, 



MIXED CONSTITUTION'S 95 



This word rpuiKas means apparently a division of 
thirty, and was at Athens applied to the clans (yen?), thirty of 
which went to form a phratry. Here too it probably denotes 
a similar division of a larger unit, in this case the whole state, 
between thirty clans; and consequently the obes, if identical 
with them, would appear as family divisions. Now it is 
certain that the obes of Sparta were local divisions, 1 and 
consequently we have, on this theory, to admit that the smaller 
local units were based on the clan. 

A twofold character of a somewhat similar kind is found in 
the larger division of the tribe (<t>vX.rj). The tribes at Sparta 
were the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and Dymanes, with the separate 
"tribe" of the Aegeidae (if this was a <vA.7J in the sense of 
being a state-division). The first three are the tribe-names 
which appear in many, perhaps in most, states settled under 
Dorian influence. We find these names at Sicyon with the 
additional tribe- name of the Aegialeis, at Argos with the 
Hyrnathiae attached, and at Megara, where they continued up 
to Eoman times, although other tribes were added. It is 
strange that, while the " tribe " of the Aegeidae is so distinct at 
Sparta, there should be no tribe-name recording an Achaean 
element in the population, the only trace of which was pro- 
fessedly represented by the royal house of the Agidae. The 
"Pamphyli," from its etymology, no doubt included the 
mixture of elements found in a Dorian state created by 
conquest, and possibly the Dorian tribe-names were imposed 
at a time when any small Achaean element that may have 
crept in was absorbed into the mass of Dorians. The Aegeidae 
are represented as having been a somewhat later accession, and 
it may have been for this reason that they preserved their 
tribe-name intact. 

These tribe -names must originally have marked ethnic 
divisions of the people; but we have evidence which seems 
to show that the tribes, just like the obes, were local. 2 
This combination of the ethnic and local nucleus is not an 
uncommon phenomenon in the Greek world. That the yevjj at 
Athens, for instance, which were family, and sometimes ethnic 
divisions, were also to some extent local is proved by the fact that 



1 Hesych. s.v. c&jSat rbroi jucyaXo- lv Sn-</JTfl. Hesychius can hardly 
tepeft. moan that the tribe and the locality 

2 Hesych, s.v. Aityw? ^vXfy Kal r6iros were distinct. 



96 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAI. 

in Cleisthenes' reforms the name of the clan not infrequently 
became the name of the deme. The combination does not imply 
that the ethnic or family and the local limits were identical, 
that the clan or the tribe sat circumscribed within certain local 
boundaries, but that the clan or tribe did tend to gather round 
a certain nucleus, the centre of the religious worship that bound 
its members together ; and to this extent the ethnic or family 
divisions, the <u\cu and w/3at, were localised. 

The tribes must have included all the citizens of Sparta the 
obes, if we believe their " gentile " character to be established, 
must have consisted of close corporations of nobles, to each of 
which other citizens were possibly attached for religious purposes. 
That they were composed primarily of nobles seems shown by 
the analogy of other Greek clans, but chiefly by the corre- 
spondence of their number, thirty, with the thirty -yepovres or 
members of the council, for there is evidence that election to 
the yepQ-vu-ia. was based on the clan. 1 We should naturally 
expect the yepovres to represent the clans, for they are the 
survival of the clan influence of the old Homeric council. The 
reform mentioned in this rhetra consists in making them 
represent thirty clans and no more. Two of these clans were 
the Agidae and Eurypontidae, represented by the kings in the 
council; and according to this theory these royal clans must 
themselves have been two of the thirty obes. 2 

The charter concludes by enacting that the people (8a/*os) 
gathered in the Apella should have the " ratifying authority " 
that is, that it should give its assent or dissent to proposals 
brought before it from the ys/xwcn'a, and that this decision of 
the Apella should be final. 

There seems at first sight nothing very striking and very 
little that is "mixed" in this original constitution. It is the 
old Homeric regime of king, council, and people, rendered more 
determinate by a greater fixity of character being given to 
the council and more definite powers to the assembly. The 
precise powers of kings and council are not known to us until 
a later stage of Spartan history, when the growth of the 
ephoralty had impaired the importance of both ; but the 
review of their functions on which we shall soon enter gives 

1 See p. 101. is an isolated mention of an institution, 

2 In Athonaeus (p. 141 f) we honr of neither the <late nor the significance of 
twenty-seven phratries at Sparta. This which is known. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 97 

us an index to the unimpaired powers possessed by these 
bodies at an earlier period. The authority of the two kings 
was hardly less perhaps than that of the early consuls at 
Rome. They were generals and priests, and had the civil 
jurisdiction in their hands. They were also the centre of the 
administration, for it must have been they alone who presided 
at the meetings of council and people. The council possessed, 
with the king, the criminal jurisdiction, and it exercised all 
administrative authority subject to the limitation of asking the 
consent of the people to all important matters such as peace, 
war, or alliance. Of legislative power there was none, for no 
change was contemplated in the constitution. 

Even now this constitution is a balance, but one chiefly 
between kings and nobles, although in governments of this 
kind it is unsafe to ignore even the nominal existence of a third 
element, such as the ratifying power of the Apella. For, even 
when subject to control, the moral force of such an authority 
in the background is immense ; it creates an uneasiness in the 
de facto sovereign, a necessity for shaping his views for other 
eyes, which is in itself a limitation of his power. How the 
structure of the state was changed by the introduction of a 
more definitely democratic element can best be seen by 
examining the powers of its different bodies as they existed in 
historical times. 

The Spartan kings were called officially d^xayerat and 
jSayot, the former word, which is found in the rhetra of 
Lycurgus, being apparently the strict official title and perhaps 
denoting mainly their civil authority, while /3ayot (" leaders ") 
lays more stress on their military powers. The traditional 
honour (rip?) 1 of the two colleagues was not exactly equal. 
The Eurypontids were regarded as the "inferior house," and 
the Agids honoured more " in virtue of their older lineage " 2 
a preference that naturally attached to the house believed to be 
Achaean, which probably connected its traditions with those of 
the original rulers of the territory. The traditional and religious 
reverence for the kings was very great, and they were honoured 
more like heroes than like men ; 3 their institution was greeted 
with choric dances and sacrifice, 4 their death received with an 
oriental excess of lamentation. 5 Their domains, which stretched 

1 For this idea cf. p. 16. 3 Xe n. Rasp. Lac. 15, 9. 

2 Kmh, irpefffivywelyv, Her. vi. 61. 4 Thuc. v. 16. fi Her. vi. 69. 



98 OUTLINES OF GKEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

through many of the perioecic cities, 1 were of vast extent, and 
made them the richest individuals in the Greek world. 2 The 
monarchy was hereditary, but in a singular way, for the king 
was succeeded not by his eldest son, but by the eldest son born 
after his accession to the throne. 3 In the case of there being 
no direct heir the eldest agnate succeeded, and this relative 
acted as guardian (irp68tKo$) to the infant king. 

The military functions of the kings were so preponderant in 
historic times that Aristotle describes the Spartan monarchy as 
being merely an absolute and perpetual generalship. 4 Herodotus 
asserts that they had the power to " carry war " 5 against any 
country they pleased, and that no one could hinder the exercise 
of this power a statement which may be true of the early 
Spartan monarchy, but was apparently not true of the monarchy 
of Herodotus's own day. 6 Against it we must place the distinct 
statement of Xenophon, 7 who only credits the king with the 
power of "leading an army whithersoever the city sends it 
out." By " the city " is meant the Ephors and the Apella. Yet 
passages have been pointed out where the monarch, even in 
later times, seems to make war at his own discretion. 8 But it 
is to be observed that in all these cases war had already 
commenced, and the power of the king here hardly exceeds 
that of a general of Rome on a foreign campaign. There the 
senate and people could alone declare war, but the imperator 
might use his armies in attacking a nation which had violated 
its neutrality by assisting the people with whom he was engaged. 
In later times we find two of the Ephors accompanying the 
king to the field, 9 not however to share the command in this 
he is avTOKpdrtop but for the purpose of assisting in negotiations 
after a victory or defeat. In the year 418 a commission of ten 
crvppovXoi, was appointed by the state to control the king's 
actions in diplomatic matters ; 10 but this was apparently merely 
a temporary measure. After the year 510 the Spartan armies 
were divided between the two kings, and the command became 
still more absolute. Each had the power of life and death, 11 

1 Xen. op. tit. 15, 3. 7 Resp. Lac. 15, 2. 

2 Plato Aleib. p. 123. 8 Thuo. viii. 5 : Xen. Hell. ii. 2, 7 ; 

3 Her. vii. 3. 4 Pol iii. 14. iv. 7, 1 ; v. 1, 34 : Gilbert StmtMlt. 
8 ir6\fJLQv K<j>petj>, Her. vi 56. i. p. 49, note 2. 

8 The expedition to Plataea, de- fl Xen. Hell ii. 4, 3G (403 B.O.). 
scribed in Her. ix. 9 ff. seems to be 10 Thno. v. 63. 
controlled by the Ephors. n Aral. Pul iii. 14, 4. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 99 

and was hampered in his actions only by the advisability of 
referring important matters to bis council, which was in the 
fourth century composed of thirty commissioners (crv/x/fouXot) 
selected by the king himself. 1 

In treating of the civil powers of the kings we are dealing 
with a mere relic of a once very extensive administrative and 
judicial control ; for it is clear that all the civil powers which 
they retained 2 sprang from the religious presidency which they 
never lost. Thus they had the appointment of fly>o<n/ot, a duty 
connected with the old religious obligation of hospitality, the 
nomination of the Ilu&ot, the yearly envoys to Delphi, and, 
with the Pythii, the custody of the oracles an important pre- 
rogative in a state swayed beyond all others by fear of the 
gods. 3 Their judicial functions were as closely connected with 
their religious character. The most important of these were 
the awarding of heiresses in marriage and jurisdiction in cases 
of adoption. Both these duties were connected with the pre- 
servation of the household, the continuity of the sacred rights 
of the clan, and at Sparta no doubt with the transmission of 
the inalienable allotments. The maintenance and the trans- 
mission of the family and of family worship were always sacred 
obligations in Greece and Eome, and in the exercise of these 
powers the Spartan king appears as the head of the religion of 
the state, as the rex was the head of the Roman religion. 
Herodotus adds to these a third judicial function jurisdiction 
"about the public roads." This can only mean the settlement 
of disputes about the respective limits of public and private 
property : which may also be considered a function springing 
from the religious presidency of the king ; for in the ancient 
world the boundary -stone (opos) was sacred, and questions 
about the demarcation of property would depend largely on 
religious tradition. 

Such was the archaic survival left by the encroaching power 
of the Ephors. But the actual influence of the kings, even 
within the city, cannot be estimated by these legal prerogatives. 
The words of men invested with a sanctity as great as that 

1 Xen. Hell. iii. 4, 2. In almost a For the importance attached to 
every particular the position of the oracles at Sparta see Her. v. 90, Thuc, 
Spartan king in the field bears a v. 16. Even at Athens a collection of 
striking resemblance to that of the oracles had a political value. Her. 
Roman wip&rator. vii. 6. Of. Aristoph. fiq. 1003 if. 

2 Enumerated in Her. vi. 57. 



100 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

which has ever encompassed a crowned head must have been of 
mighty force at the council-board. Deeds were a still surer 
ground of influence, and a king of military ability who was 
leading the Spartan armies on a successful career of conquest 
was certainly the most powerful man in the state, and might 
practically be its head. 

The Council of Elders (yepovo-ia) was composed of the two 
kings and of twenty-eight members, probably chosen, as we 
have seen, from certain selected families of the state. The 
evidence of Aristotle and Polybius proves conclusively that only 
members of the nobility were eligible. 1 The other qualification 
was one of age : the ykpwrts at Sparta were Elders in fact as 
well as in name, for no one under sixty years old might be 
chosen. But this limited qualification was accompanied by free 
election in the Apella. The aged candidates were led through 
the assembly one by one, and, as each passed, the people 
shouted. Judges locked up in a room near by listened to the 
cries, and the candidate who was welcomed with the loudest 
shout won the vacant seat. 2 This is the mode of election 
which Aristotle describes as "childish," 3 but which was a 
sufficiently natural mode in an assembly that voted only by 
acclamation. 4 

The functions of the council were in the main twofold. In 
the first place it was a deliberative and administrative assembly, 
in the second a court of justice. In its deliberative capacity it 
was, at least in all important matters, merely a probouleulic 
assembly, deciding on every question before it went to the 
people. It appears as such in the rhetra of Lycurgus, and is 
found fulfilling this function in the later days of Spartan 
history. 6 In the" last resort it might be partly a legislative 
assembly; for, although the introduction of new rhetrae was 
probably not contemplated in the constitution, and a rhetra 
was, as we saw, supposed to require the sanction of the gods, 
yet, if the constitution did require modification, the change 
rested in the first instance with the Elders. Those functions 
wei'e apparently extended, the powers of the Gerousia increased, 

1 ArLst. Pol ii. ; only KaXol Kaya- 2 Pint. lye. 20. 

Got were elected. Of v. 6 = }>. ISOtia; 8 I'd. 11 9. 

In Polyt). vi. 10 they are KG.T &K\oyfy 4 /3o# Ka.1 oft ^7/</y, Thuc. i. 87. 

Apto-rtvS^v KCKpifdvot.. For dpiffTivSyv b Pint, Agfa 11. 

see p. 16. tf ib. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 101 

and those of the Apella correspondingly diminished by the rhefcra, 
of the kings Polydorus and Theopompus (743-724), which 
enacted that "if the people decided crookedly, the Elders and 
kings might reverse their decision." 1 The result of this change 
was possibly the procedure described by Aristotle, 2 by which 
a negative decision of the people is final, a positive not final. 
The motive for this reaction is unknown; for the reason 
assigned by Plutarch the reckless mode in which the assembly 
curtailed or amended bills sent down from the upper house 
assumes a freedom of debate which probably never existed in 
the Apella. The change does not seem to have been permanent, 
since in the debate which decided the outbreak of the Pelo- 
ponnesian War the Apella seems to have the final ratifying 
authority. 3 The growth of the ephoralty probably restored to 
the assembly the powers curtailed by Theopompus. 

We have treated the Gerousia here as a probouleutic 
assembly \ but undoubtedly most matters of routine administra- 
tion were within its entire competence, partly in its own right, 
partly as the council-board of the Ephors. In its own right it 
seems to have exercised a censorial authority for the maintenance 
of the Lycurgean discipline, 4 although the actual enforcement 
of the alien acts (^i/TyAacncu) which made Sparta so unpopular 
was in the hands of the Ephors. 5 

The council as a court of justice was concerned with criminal 
jurisdiction a survival from the Homeric times, in which 
the heads of the clan, the yepoi/res, meet for this purpose. In 
this sphere its control was absolute, and, as there was no 
written law at Sparta, its decisions were necessarily arbitrary, 
mere "dooms" or "ordinances" (tfe/uirres); but judgments 
pronounced by so large and experienced a body would doubt- 
less be strictly modelled on the customary law. No office could 
have exempted from its jurisdiction, for the king or regent 
himself must appear before its tribunal/ 1 and it could inflict the 
extremest penalties such as death and disfrunchisement. 7 

This combination of functions made the Gerousia very 
powerful, and we are not surprised to find that to the super- 
ficial observer it seemed the central government of the Spartan 
state. According to Isocrates it " presided over everything " ; 

1 Plut. Lye. 6. 2 Pol. iv. H=p. 1298 b. Time, i, 87. 

4 Gellius xviii. 3. He refers to Aeschinus iw bis authority 

6 Her. iii. 148. Paus, iii. 5, 2. * Xen. '/^. Luc. 10, 2, 



102 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

according to Dionysius it had the whole control of the com- 
munity. 1 Aristotle 2 is more concerned with noticing its many 
defects, the " childish " mode of election, the committal of the 
most important judicial functions to old men holding office for 
life. He objects to their irresponsibility, and says that many of 
the Elders are known to have taken bribes. 

The question of its general efficiency is answered by Spartan 
history ; the question of its actual power depends to a large 
extent on our view of its procedure. How was it summoned, 
and .who were its presidents ? Originally, no doubt, it was 
summoned by the kings, and Schomann thinks that the 
presidency may have continued to belong to each king alter- 
nately. 3 But it has been noticed that Herodotus does not 
make the presidency of the council one of the privileges of the 
kings : they merely " sit as members " ; 4 and the only theory 
that can explain the working of the Spartan constitution is to 
suppose that the Ephors who, we know, for certain purposes 
sat with the council 5 also summoned and presided over it. It 
is at least necessary that there should have been a very close 
connection between the deliberative and administrative body 
on the one hand and the executive body on the other. The 
Ephors were the only officials capable of laying quesstions of 
foreign administration and information on foreign politics 
before this body. The Gerousia is thus the great deliberative, 
judicial, and administrative body of the state. But the power 
of a deliberative assembly is clearly limited by its dependence 
on some other authority for meeting, or at least for the trans- 
action of its most important business. The council may, for 
certain purposes, have had stated times for meeting ; but if it 
could only transact the usual official business on the summons 
of the Ephors, this fact largely explains the power of the latter 
body. 

There is a conflict of evidence about the origin of these 
officials. Herodotus makes them a creation of Lycurgus; but 

1 Isocr. Panath. 154; Dionys. Leon concluded that the kings voted 
ii 14. Polybius (vi. 4.5) is more lost. This may have been so, but 
accurate, ol yfyovres 81' &v /cai would not prove them to have been 
/w0* &v ir&vra, xeiplfercu TO, Kara rtyv the presidents. At Rome the presiding 
TTo\iTelw. magistrate did not vote at all. 

2 Pol ii. 9. 4 vaptfeuf, Her. vi. 57. 

3 Antiquities i. p. 213. From Thuc. 8 "When assembled as a criminal 
i. 20 (fug, i/"#0<f> rpoo'TiOeffOcu') it has court, Paus. in. 5, 2. 



MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 103 

constitutional anomalies are not as a rule created, and the 
slightest knowledge of comparative politics would alone be 
sufficient to convince us that they were of later growth. The 
more credible account is that of Aristotle and Plutarch, who 
refer their origin to the reign of Theopompus. 1 Plato, too, 
speaks of the " third saviour " of the Spartan state who estab- 
lished the ephoralty ; 2 and a final proof of this view is found in 
Pausanias' assertion that the state-seal used by all official boards 
bore on it the effigy of Polydorus, the colleague of this king. 3 
The epoch of their institution must have been looked back on 
as the origin of the liberties of the city, for the Ephors are 
essentially city magistrates, as opposed to the kings and Elders 
who represent the nobility. In the oath of office interchanged 
between the king and the Ephors the king swears "on behalf 
of himself," the Ephors " on behalf of the city." 4 Even their 
number, five, has been thought to have a close connection with 
the local divisions of the city the four villages and the central 
fort, the ToAts or aKpoiroXis. 5 



The name itself (tyopoi) has been variously explained. It 
means " inspectors," " overseers," and some have supposed it to 
mean " inspectors of the market." Whether this be so or not, 
that they were from the first judicial magistrates seems shown 
by the fact that to the last almost their only independent 
function is that of civil jurisdiction. This gives a strong 
appearance of truth to the legend that the Ephors were originally 
representatives of the kings, nominated by them during the 
Messenian wars for the trial of judicial suits while the kings 
were absent in the field. Thus they would have been from 
the first magistrates of the demos which had been growing up 
by the side of the old nobility. Their career bears a shadowy 
resemblance to that of the tribunes of the plebs at Rome, with 
whom they have often been compared. Like them, they grew 
from being the representatives of a part of the state to being 
the representatives of the whole state. We may compare the 
general guardianship of the laws which the Ephors had, as 
expressed in the oath which we havo cited, with the similar 

1 Arist. Pol. v. 11 = p. 1313 a ; Plut. nature who instituted the ycpovria, i.e. 
Cleom. 10. Lycurgus. 

2 Laws p. 692. The first saviour : > Faun. iii. Id, 8. 4 See p. If*. 
was the god who gave the Spartans 5 PhUuluc/. Aluwitm ii. i>p. 50 ff 
two kings j the second the half-divine fl Plut. Clcom. 10. 



Uft/ OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

* 

functions of the tribunes, and both have an extraordinary 
power of enforcing their decrees (coercitio). But their origin 
was more modest than that of the tribunes, the growth of their 
powers greater, their final position even more important. 
Aristotle 1 admits that this representation of the demos may 
have been due to chance, and by " chance " he means that the 
final position of these officials in the state was not that con- 
templated at their institution. 

The Ephors were probably at first little more than delegates 
of the kings, and hence they must have been nominated by the 
kings. Later on there was no doubt popular election to the 
office. Aristotle describes the election to the ephoralty, like 
that to the Gerousia, as " childish " ; hence the mode of appoint- 
nent to the two offices was probably the same. The essential 
liflerence lay in the qualification; to the ephoralty any 
Spartan was eligible, and hence it is regarded as the democratic 
dement in the Spartan constitution. 2 

We do not know the successive steps by which the functions 
>f the ephoralty were extended, but wo are told that this 
'extension was gradual. An epoch in its history is said to have 
been marked by the ephoralty of a certain Asteropus " many 
generations after" the institution of the office. 3 What the 
change here noticed consisted in can only be a matter of con- 
jecture. Some think it refers to the transference of the 
appointment of the Ephors from the king to the people ; others 
fthink Iffeat the powers thus gained were the right of summoning 
.and presiding over the meetings of the popular assembly and 
jbhe right of sitting at the council. That both these changes 
<fcook place there is no doubt, but their epochs cannot be 
determined. The final result was that these popular magis- 
trates came to supplant the kings as the executive of the state. 
The dual monarchy rendered united action on the part of 
the kings impossible, while the board of Elders was too 
large and perhaps too aged to be an active executive. Hence 

1 Pol. ii. 9. he by no means implies that the Ephors 

' Tho JKphors are ^| fardprw, IK roO were not elected by the people. 

5i}/xoy, and ol rvxfirres (Arist. Pol. 8 Pint. I.e. The name of Chiton 

ii. fl). When A.ristotlo says (Pol. iv. (dmt 550) seems also to be associated 

9= p. 12J)4b) that one of the demo- with some change (Diog. Laert. 1, 3, 

cratie elements ia tho constitution is 68), though what this was cannot be 

that the people *' appoint to tho made out. 
Gerousia and .share in the ephoralty," 



MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 

Ithe new power of the Ephors, which was so unlimited as to b<? 
'described as a " tyrannis." 1 But it appears that, absolute as 
their authority might be while in power, they might yet be 
called to account when they had quitted office, and Aristotle 
seems to imply that this scrutiny was exercised by their 
successors. 2 One of the Ephors gave his name to the year, for 
the tenure of office was annual. The five formed a college, in 
which the ITTWI/VJU-OS had probably an honorary precedence. But 
they decided all questions by a majority of votes. 3 How 
important these questions were may be seen by a rapid 
summary of their developed powers. 

(1) They summon, and are apparently the only officials that 
can summon, the Apella, and they conduct the business in this 



(2) They sit with the council, 5 and either preside over, or 
at least bring all important business before it. As members of 
this body they also share in its criminal jurisdiction. 6 Almost 
their chief function, however, in connection with the Gerousia, 
must have been that of carrying out its decrees. It is this 
merely executive function which accounts for many of the 
apparently exceptional powers which the Ephors possess. 
When, for instance, we are tojd that they could summon the 
king before them on a charge of treason, and even imprison 
him, the reference is simply to a duty which they perform as 
officers of a criminal court. 7 

(3) Independently of other bodies they have the control of 
civil jurisdiction. Aristotle 8 says that " they determine suits 
about contracts, which they distribute amongst themselves." 
They act, therefore, in this respect not as a college, but 
individually. 

(4) It may possibly have been amongst their duties to call 
all magistrates to account after their teim of office had expired. 
In this they must have acted only as a court of first instance, 
for final jurisdiction belonged to the Gerousia. 

But (5) their most important power was no doubt that of 
being the executive magistrates for foreign affairs of being, 

1 Plato Laws p. 692. 3 Xen. Hell. n. 3, 34. 

2 Anst. Pol. n. 9 56&G 8' ft? ?? 4 Time. i. 87. 3 Her. v. 40. 
TWV tydpuv apx^ irfoas etOfoeiv ras 6 Pans. iii. f>, 2. 

d/>x<is. But the words may refer only 7 Time. i. 131 ; cf. Her. vi. 82. 
to their vwo<f)v\a,Kla,. 8 Put. iii. ] . 



106 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

in fact, the foreign ministry of Sparta. They doubtless had 
the execution of the decrees of the Apella and the Gerousia, 
and from this power are no doubt often credited with actions 
the initiative in which belonged to these two assemblies l the 
decision as to war and peace, for instance, which belonged un- 
doubtedly to the Apella, 2 and the true formula for which ran : 
"It seemed good to the Ephors and the assembly." 3 But the 
Apella could not act without the Ephors, and hence in their 
hands lay the initiation as well as the final execution of the 
decree. Thus they received foreign envoys, negotiated with 
foreign states, and sent out the expedition when the Apella 
had declared for war. 4 Their executive relations with the 
council and the assembly may conveniently be summed up 
under three heads : (i) They received the first information on 
foreign matters and brought it before the Gerousia. (ii) They 
brought the irpofiovXmiia of the Elders before the Apella. 
(iii) They executed the degrees both of the Gerousia and of 
the Apella. Their influence in determining the course of Spartan 
policy was therefore strongly marked j 5 but it was too wholly 
a personal influence, ancl the annual change of Ephors some- 
times produced a change in foreign relations which was not 
advantageous to the state. 

The Ephors, as the chiefs of the foreign executive at Sparta, 
were necessarily also to a great extent the guiding spirits of 
the Peloponnesian confederacy. How this was the case may 
best bo seen by anticipating one of the points in the procedure 
of the council of this league which we shall soon discuss. In 
the final debate on any matter before this council Sparta is 
the mover, and it undoubtedly rests with her either to make 
a proposition or not to do so. But by Sparta in this instance 
we moan the Ephors, who bring the matter before the Apella, 
which is largely under their control, The guidance of the 
confederacy was, in fact, the culminating point in the growth 
of the power of 1,he college of Ephors. 

Hero we take leaves of the last element in this complex 
state; for tho Apclla, or popular assembly composed of all the 
o/xoiw,, does not require separate discussion, since incidentally 
wo have touched on all its powers and on its relation to other 

1 Gilbert Rtoatecdt. i. p. 50. 3 Xwi. //#. iv. 6, 3. 

9 As early as 480 the Apulia, cle- 4 Her. ix. 7,0; Time. iv. 50. 
eidwl about treaties, Her. vii. 149. 5 Time v 36. * t&. iv. 50. 



MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 107 

bodies. What kind of state is it that we have described 1 
Historically Sparta is a balance of the three numerical elements 
of sovereignty : the nobles limit the king, and the demos the 
nobility, and all three are found finally together in a condition 
of stable equilibrium. But analytically we should be inclined 
to recognise only two elements, and to pronounce the constitu- 
tion a dynastic oligarchy of a mild type modified by a strong 
democratic element. The dynastic element is obvious; it is 
the power of the Gerousia. Its mildness consists in the fact 
that the members of this body were elected by the people. The 
democratic element is threefold: the social equality to some 
extent enforced by the state ; in a higher degree the popular 
choice of the Elders and Ephors, and the popular ratification or 
refusal of the council's acts; in the highest degree the vast 
powers exercised by the freely-chosen magistrates of the city. 
It is true that the refinements of the Greek intellect would 
not have been satisfied with this analysis. In election as here 
displayed the Greeks would have seen an "aristocratic" element, 
and to Plato the Ephors are " tyrannical " ; again, there was the 
shadow of the monarchy to be taken into account. But the 
real power is a balance between the city and the nobility, and 
from this point of view Sparta was a mixture of democratic 
with dynastic elements. 

If we ask " Why did not Sparta go on in the course which 
she had begun, and become still more democratic 1 " the chief 
answer is again to be sought in the Peloponnesian confederacy. 
We shall find that one of the surest means which Sparta 
adopted for maintaining a union of political interests in the 
league was the support of governments in the various cities 
of a conservative, stable, and, on the whole, oligarchic type. 
This policy must necessarily have exercised a reactionary 
influence on the leading state. The continuity of her hegemony 
necessitated the permanence of her political institutions. How- 
ever variable the policy of the Ephors might be in detail, they 
remained consistent in the application of this one principle of 
stability a natural consistency, since the maintenance of this 
principle made them practically the heads of the greatest 
power in the Greek world. For this reason the Spartan 
constitution, which had grown and expanded for so many 
generations, suddenly crystallised and remained fixed and 
unchanged for centuries. 



108 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

3 The Peloponnesian Confederacy 

We have given a sketch of the main factors of the Spartan 
constitution considered from an internal point of view, with 
a hint, however, that this internal point of view is by itself 
insufficient. Her institutions are closely connected with her 
career as a conquering state, and we have already treated her 
as the mistress of Laconia, Messenia, and Cynuria. Her 
western conquests were early consolidated, her eastern limit 
reached about the middle of the sixth century. In the early 
part of the seventh century her design seems to have been to 
conquer the whole of Peloponnese ; but a great defeat inflicted 
by Argos at Hysiac, and the subsequent rise to power of that 
state, checked her progress and turned her thoughts into other 
channels. She now sought to make herself the centre of a 
powerful confederacy, the stages in the growth of which are 
unknown, but which is found existing in full vigour in the 
year 510. This confederacy was brought together by conquest 
as well as by alliance, and a vigorous display of force was 
sometimes required to maintain it ; l but on the whole a 
common interest seems to have kept together this largest and 
most stable of the voluntary unions of the Greek world. In 
extent it was a union of all the Peloponnesian states with the 
exception of Argos and the district of Achaea, 2 which were 
divided from Sparta as much on political as on national 
grounds. The permanent hegemony of Sparta, in fact, did 
not extent boyond the limits of the Isthmus, Mogara on the 
north-east being her most distant ally. It is true that in the 
Persian Wars it roso to be a hegemony of nearly all Greece for a 
special purpose, and that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian 
War Sparta claims a kind of indefinite leadership over Dorian 
states outside the Peloponnese, and requests contingents from 
the Dorian cities of Italy and Sicily; 3 but those are only 
instances of temporary union for a professed object, and the 
union disappeared when tho object was attained. 

We know little or nothing about the legal basis of the 

1 Two great attempts were irmdo to a Time. ii. 9 ; Paus. vii. 0, 3. 

shake off IIIT hegemony between the Puusamas (I.e.) says of the Achaeans 

Persian ami the Pelopoimetrion Wars : 5i4 rb fyyov rd ?r/)6s T/ooJcw Aa/feScu- 

the first by Tegca supported by Argos, /xoj^ous Awptets farqlow ff<f>tvtv 

tlio flceoml by all the Arcadians except crOai. 

the Mautiutians (Her. ix. 85). Jl Time. ii. 7 ; ef. iii. 80*. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 109 

confederacy, but it seems probable that the supremacy of 
Sparta and the existence of the alliance were secured by a 
system of separate treaties with the separate states. It is 
difficult to imagine any other basis when we consider the 
different periods at which Sparta was brought into relation 
with the different communities. The relations between herself 
and Elis, for instance, had existed from the earliest times, but 
it was only in the middle of the sixth century that she 
concluded the unequal alliance which made Tegea her subject 
ally. 1 The confederacy was probably brought together in two 
ways by the conquest of states to which she left autonomy, 
and which she reduced to the condition of subject allies, and by 
defensive treaties concluded with more powerful communities, 
such as Elis, Corinth, and Sicyon, which naturally gravitated to 
her as the most powerful state in Peloponnese. The league, 
therefore, included cities of very different degrees of power, 
but Sparta was wise enough to raise or reduce all to the same 
level. Every state possessed autonomy and an equal vote in 
the council, and hence there were but few discontented elements 
among them. But an absence of discontent does not necessarily 
imply active loyalty, and Sparta had a more effective means 
for securing allegiance. This was by maintaining oligarchies 
friendly to her own interests in the states which were within 
the sphere of her influence. 2 In early times she had posed as 
the opponent of tyrannis, as the liberating city which had 
resisted the individual despot, as she was afterwards to resist 
the tyrant state of Athens. But in crushing tyranny she also 
opposed the revolutionary force which tended towards demo- 
cracy, she established the existing oligarchies, and she was every- 
where regarded as the supporter of stable government and 
conservative institutions. Her working on the inner life of 
states was subtle and indirect : before the fall of Tegea in 
550, there was a "laconising" party within the town; 3 and in 
most of the cities of the league she contented herself with 
this indirect influence. But sometimes she had more difficult 
material to deal with, and then she resorted to measures more 
stringent than diplomacy. The influence which strengthened 
the oligarchy at Sicyon in 418, after the battle of Mantinea, 
was backed by force ; 4 the one attempt at democratic reaction 

1 Her. i. 66. 3 Plat. Quaest. Graecae 5. 

2 Thuc. i. 19, 76, 144. * Thuc. v. 81. 



110 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

made by Phlius was sternly repressed; 1 and Mantineia, the 
discontented and ambitious town of Arcadia, was more than 
once the victim of armed interference. Arcadia was the 
northern neighbour of Sparta, and this dangerous proximity 
may account in some measure for the harsh manner in which 
her towns were treated. Sparta seems to have been unwilling 
that these communities should be walled cities at all; the 
:roXi9 was more defensible, and city life tended towards demo- 
cracy. Hence she preferred that they should keep their old 
tribal and village organisation, and, when she felt herself 
strong enough, enforced this preference as in 385, when she 
compelled the Mantineians to pull down their wall, and divided 
the city into its four original villages. 2 Thus, when indirect 
influence was not sufficient to keep up a government favourable 
to her interests, Sparta was very willing, where she could, to 
bring direct pressure to bear upon the states. Her methods 
varied with circumstances, and wisdom dictated that they 
should be, as a rule, pacific. Had Sparta's hegemony in 
Peloponnese rested, like Eome's in Italy, everywhere on 
conquest, the league might have developed into a protectorate, 
and the protectorate into an empire. But Sparta, incapable 
of incorporating even her immediate dependencies of Laconia, 
had powerful rivals in Elis and Corinth, even within the states 
of her confederacy. Hence the league retained its original 
character, and since its independence never sank under the 
weight of a too powerful leader, its organisation continued 
uniform. 

The relations of the states to one another were clearly, 
though not minutely, defined. It was a condition of the league 
that they should be all independent, small and great alike ; 3 it 
was consequently the duty of Sparta to interfere if one state 
conquered another, as she did interfere when Mantineia reduced 
the Parrhasians of Arcadia to subjection and attempted to 
establish a small d/>x?/ during the Peloponnesian War. 4 The 
states also bound themselves by a defensive alliance to repel 

1 Xeu. lldl v. 2, 8 ami 3, 10. aibw6Xe. 

8 ib. v. 2, 7. Xcno|lioii goes * ib. v. 29, 33. It was also ilia 

on to say that this dwelling Kwrb, ground of interference with Elis (ib. 

K&/IO.S was much more favourable to v. 31) ; yet this city had pursued a 

aristocracy, the owners of the soil successful career of conquest in Tri- 

having local In II nonce in the villages. phylia during tlio iifth century (Her. 

a Thue. v. 77 ; ef. 79 Mvopot raZ iv. 148). 



110 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

made by Phlius was sternly repressed; 1 and Mantineia, the 
discontented and ambitious town of Arcadia, was more than 
once the victim of armed interference. Arcadia was the 
northern neighbour of Sparta, and this dangerous proximity 
may account in some measure for the harsh manner in which 
her towns were treated. Sparta seems to have been unwilling 
that these communities should be walled cities at all; the 
TroAis was more defensible, and city life tended towards demo- 
cracy. Hence she preferred that they should keep their old 
tribal and village organisation, and, when she felt herself 
strong enough, enforced this preference as in 385, when she 
compelled the Mantineians to pull down their wall, and divided 
the city into its four original villages. 2 Thus, when indirect 
influence was not sufficient to keep up a government favourable 
to her interests, Sparta was very willing, where she could, to 
bring direct pressure to bear upon the states. Her methods 
varied with circumstances, and wisdom dictated that they 
should be, as a rule, pacific. Had Sparta's hegemony in 
Peloponnese rested, like Eome's in Italy, everywhere on 
conquest, the league might have developed into a protectorate, 
and the protectorate into an empire. But Sparta, incapable 
of incorporating even her immediate dependencies of Laconia, 
had powerful rivals in Elis and Corinth, even within the states 
of her confederacy. Hence the league retained its original 
character, and since its independence never sank under the 
weight of a too powerful leader, i(.s organisation continued 
uniform. 

The relations of the states to one another were clearly, 
though not minutely, defined. It was a condition of the league 
that they should be all independent, small and great alike ; 3 it 
was consequently the duty of Sparta to interfere if one state 
conquered another, as she did interfere when Mantineia reduced 
the Parrhasians of Arcadia to subjection and attempted to 
establish a small d/>x?/ during the Peloponnesian War. 4 The 
states also bound themselves by a defensive alliance to repel 



1 Xeii. Udl v. 2, 8 ami 3, 10. 

8 ib. v. 2, 7. Xcnojihoii goes * Hi. v. 29, 33. It was also the 

ou to say that this dwelling tfarA, ground of interference with Elis (il. 

K&fias was much more favourable to v. 31) ; yet this city had pursued a 

aristocracy, the owners of the soil wiccessful career of conquest in Tri- 

liaving local influence in the villages. phylia during the iifth century (Her. 

a Thuc. v. 77 j uf. 79 Mvopoi Ka.1 iv. 148). 



112 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

we find the states allowed to send money instead of men. To 
Sparta was given the power of fining states that did not furnish 
contingents or their equivalent. 1 The allies paid no fixed 
tribute to the league or to Sparta, 2 but merely had to furnish 
the expenses of their own contingents, the amount of the 
supplies necessary depending entirely on the nature of the 
expedition. This liberal system, though often criticised and 
sometimes a source of weakness, possessed many advantages. 
It preserved an appearance of liberty in the cities, it prevented 
the influx of money into Sparta, and it was supposed to re- 
present an elastic principle more effective than that of regular 
contribution in times of pressing need. 3 

Although Sparta was certainly something more than the 
mere executive head of this association, yet all important 
decisions appeared to be arrived at by the council composed of 
delegates from the states. The council had to be summoned 
for the purpose of declaring war, or of accepting a peace or an 
armistice, and the formal sovereignty of the states composing it 
was asserted by their swearing separately to a treaty concluded 
with a foreign power. 4 There was perfect equality of votes 
amongst the cities, irrespective of their size; the decision 
of the majority was binding upon all ; 5 and the allies claimed 
and exercised the right of refusing to follow Sparta to a war 
which had not been decided on by the majority of the council. 6 
But a glance at the procedure of this assembly shows that 
Sparta had a very decided power of influencing its resolutions. 
Sometimes the first proposal for joint action came from Sparta 
herself; then she summoned the allies and laid her measure 
before thorn. 7 But the first suggestion might come from any 
quarter. The accounts of three meetings have been preserved, 
which show, in one instance a member of the confederacy, in 
the two others foreign envoys advocating a course of action. 8 
In this case, when a complaint was made by an ally or a request 
for help came from some quarter outside the league, the first 
step taken by Sparta was to summon the allies before her own 

1 XML Ihll. v. 2, 21. B Time. i. 110, 125 ; v. 30. 

2 Time. 1. 30. Her. v. 74-75. ? #. 91.95. 

3 6 vfacfias ov Terayfttva ftret was 8 Time. i. 67 ff. ; Xen. Hell. v. 2, 
the reply of Archidamus when the 11 ; vi. 3, 3. In these passages of 
allies tried tipurat rby <f>6poi> (Pint. Xenophon the debate in the Spartan 
Apophtii. Lac. p. 268). assembly, after the allies had with- 

4 Thuc. v, 1$ &fiwav /car& v6\&s. drawn, is omitted. 



7 MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 113 

Apella. The complainants speak before this combined assembly, 
but a formal proposal can be made only by a member of the 
confederacy. The proposal made, the Spartans dismiss the 
allies and decide on the question in their own assembly. Then 
the allies are summoned a second time and the question put 
to the vote. The states have, therefore, the final ratifying 
decision ; but two points in the procedure show the weight of 
the leading city. Sparta has the sole right of summoning the 
allies, and, although the first proposal may be made by any 
state of the confederacy, yet in the final debate Sparta is the 
sole mover, and it undoubtedly rests with her either to make a 
proposition or to let the matter drop. It is this great power 
of initiative that more than any other prerogative makes her 
position in the league a true hegemony. 

Such was the organisation of the confederacy, military in 
appearance but political in essence, which long stemmed the tide 
of constitutional development in Greece. Its final overthrow 
by the Thebans, due to the issue of a single disastrous battle, 
does not necessarily exhibit defects in its organisation. A 
graver symptom was its near approach to dissolution during 
the Peloponnesian War. The behaviour of Corinth and Elis 
during that war showed that Sparta was not powerful enough 
to enforce obedience on some of the states of her confederacy, 
and that the conditions of the league, and even the resolutions 
of the council, could be neglected with impunity. The course 
of the war also showed the slenderness of the bond of common 
interest which united the states, and how Argos, the centre of 
democratic aspirations in the Peloponnese, might be a match 
for Sparta in diplomacy, if not in arms. If a democratic union 
was possible within the league and the union of Elis and 
Mantineia with Argos in 420 proved it to be possible Sparta's 
influence was gone, and could only be restored by a successful 
battle against her own allies, followed by armed interference 
with their domestic politics. Eut if her political influence was 
precarious within this limited sphere, how much less likely was 
she to push it further with success ! The Peloponnesian War 
had early resolved itself into a struggle between oligarchy and 
democracy; and the close of that war brought empire to Sparta, 
the only possibility of controlling which, she thought, was to 
organise it on her favourite model, and to make of it a system 
of narrow oligarchies. As force could not be directly exercised 

I 



Ill OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP 

on widely scattered maritime dependencies, and Sparta had no 
intention of devoting her energies to the sea, the only means of 
securing her ascendency was by working on the internal politics 
of the states. This form of state-craft, which applied to Athens 
resulted in the tyranny of the Thirty, had hardly less disastrous 
results in the states which had been Athenian dependencies. 
Lysander, an exaggerated type of the Spartan genius for in- 
trigue, had, on his arrival to take the command in Asia Minor, 
identified himself and the government of Sparta (they were 
practically the same) with the oligarchic clubs of the Greek 
cities there, and, where he did not find them, he organised 
eraipciai of his own. The result was that, after Aegospotami, 
these clubs were used as the universal basis of government 
throughout the cities. The imperial idea contributed by Sparta 
to the history of the world was that of a harmost at the head 
of a board of ten (SeKapxfa), composed of adherents of a past 
oligarchic faction. The day of triumph had come, Greece was 
free, and the result was a worse slavery than her states had ex- 
perienced even under Persian rule a slavery to narrow cliques 
who were made "the sole fountains of honour and the sole 
sources of punishment." 1 The justification for the Athenian 
Empire was that its political rdgime harmonised with the political 
tendencies of the time, and furthered the political progress of 
the Eastern world. The imperial policy of Sparta was only a 
brief interruption to a normal development which finally won 
the recognition of Alexander, the true liberator of the Eastern 
Greeks. 

Expanded conquest arid empire produced an unfavourable 
eiFect on the Spartan polity, based as it was on social conditions 
for which a rigorous isolation from the events of the outer 
world would have been the fittest protection. The outlines of 
this social revolution have been already sketched. It was due 
largely to the introduction of a commercial spirit which fostered 
the accumulation of capital and led to the decrease, not indeed 
of the free population, but of the qualified citizens. Ceaseless 
efforts on the part of the state to retain, and subsequently to 
recover, its position increased the drain on the national life; 
while the loss of Messenia in 309, with the allotments of that 
district, reduced yet further the numbers of the landed class. 
But still the Spartan ideal of what a citizen should be persisted, 
1 Hut. Lya. 13. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 115 

and the privileged members of the state still held that the true 
7ToAm?s must be a man of leisure and an owner of land. Two 
kings of the third century, Agis IV. and Cleomenes III., taking 
the same view but interpreting the principle somewhat differ- 
ently, attempted a renewed division of the land. But the pro- 
jected revolution of Agis was resisted with success, the battle 
of Sellasia (222) put an end to the still more violent projects 
of Cleomenes, and the monarchy did not long survive the 
defeat of the royal reformers. In 211 the double kingship, 
and with it the constitution, came to an end. There are few 
states in the world which have literally perished through lack 
of citizens. Yet this is almost true of Sparta. The fall of 
the constitution was but the overthrow of a narrow oligarchy, 
and it fell to make room for a new state. The city tyrannised 
by Nabis and recognised as a tivitas foederata by Rome is not 
the city whose constitution we have sketched. 

4 The Cities of Crete 

There is a reason which might have determined an inquirer, 
who classifies constitutions according to their form, to place 
those of the Dorian cities of Crete before that of Sparta. The 
reason is that an analysis of Cretan institutions shows a more 
aristocratic character and a less mixed type. But there are 
considerations which justify the order which we have preferred. 
One is that to a certain extent Cretan institutions were derived 
from Sparta, that is, from the primitive Dorian type of un- 
reformed Sparta; the other is that we are able, in the case of 
these Cretan cities, to mark the dissolution of a mixed govern- 
ment and its change to a democracy. Their treatment, there- 
fore, forms a connecting link between the mixed constitutions 
of our present chapter and the democracies of our next. 

The statement that the germ of Cretan institutions was 
derived from the Peloponnesian Dorians, may seem strange to 
one who remembers the fixed belief of the Spartan that his 
institutions came from Crete. 1 But that was a simple argument 
from analogy. Wherever the Greeks found parallelism they 
predicated borrowing, and as the Cretan polity was associated 
with the name of Minos son of Zeus, it was necessarily thought 
older than the work of the human legislator Lycurgus. The 
1 Her. i. 65. 



116 OUTLINES OJ? GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP 

most recent inquiry is on the whole inclined to reject tho 
account which derives the Dorians of Crete from the primitive 
Dorians of Histiaeotis in Thessaly, and which makes Cnossus a 
Doric settlement earlier than the migration. Of the foundation 
of this ancient residence of Minos no traditional records were 
preserved. Its institutions did not give evidence of remote 
antiquity, for Ephorus tell us that the Dorian customs (i/o/u/*a) 
were retained in a more primitive form in Lyctus, Gortyn, and 
many of the smaller cities than in the more famous Cnossus. 1 
This, it is true, might have been the result of the longer develop- 
ment of the most ancient settlement ; but it may also be a sign 
that the town was less purely Dorian, and we have definite 
evidences of the belief that the settlement of most of the cities 
of Crete was the result of Argive and Lacedaemonian colonisa- 
tion after the return of the Heracleidae, 2 and that Lyctus, a 
colony from Sparta, was the earliest of these foundations. 3 
But this origin does not in the least imply that the close corre- 
spondence which we shall trace between Cretan and Spartan 
institutions was the result of conscious imitation; for these 
Argive and Spartan colonies date from the infancy of Dorian 
settlement. A common germ is planted in two soils, and, 
under somewhat similar conditions, grows into the same tree. 
The resemblances are close enough to make us believe in 
parallel development, not close enough to lead us to think of 
imitation. 

Of the forty-three independent cities of Crete of which the 
names have been preserved, 4 three Cnossus, Gortyn, and 
Cydonia were sufficiently powerful to control the activity of 
the rest. When they agreed, they held all the others in sub- 
jection; when they differed, they divided the whole island 
against itself. 5 As a rule Cnossus and Gortyn were hostile, 
and Cydonia but a make-weight, and the normal condition of 
the Cretan cities was one of faction (<rracm). That writers 
use the term faction and not war to describe their mutual 
hostility 6 was clue partly to the very real tie of their common 
nationality, partly to tho close international relations of ro- 
and the like which existed between them, 7 



1 Slrabo p. 481. 2 Diort. v. 80. B hJtrabo p. 476. 

s ArLst, Pul. li. 10 ; I'olyb. iv. 54. ' 5 &. ; Plul. defrat. amwe 10, p. 594 

4 A list lias IMM-II collected by Didfjt. 

Gilbert Stualtxtlt. iu i>. 5il7. 7 1>. 54. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 11? 

but chiefly to their wonderful faculty for combining against an 
external foe. This temporary union in the face of danger was 
known as o-vjKprjTKr^. 1 It may possibly have been connected 
with a common court of arbitration (TO KoivoS/Ktov), which we 
know existed at times for the settlement of differences between 
certain towns, 2 and which, in these periods of occasional calm, may 
have been so composed as to be capable of adjusting the mutual 
claims of all the Cretan cities. 

The settlers in Crete had betrayed a true Dorian incapacity 
for assimilating the conquered nationalities ; and each city is 
a miniature Sparta in relation to its immediate neighbours. 
It is, however, doubtful whether we are to recognise in Crete 
two classes of subject peoples or only one. A Cretan historian 
represents the VTT^KCKH of the island as TTCPLQIKOI, but the latter 
word is indeterminate, and Aristotle compares the VTTTJKOOL in 
more than one respect to the Spartan helots. 3 The great code 
of private law discovered at Gortyn does nothing to settle the 
vexed question ; 4 but its silence on the perioeci is no argument 
against their existence, for if they existed they must have 
been inhabitants of subject towns, which were found by the 
settlers in Crete, and were probably of non-Dorian nationality. 
They were, therefore, as much outside the Cretan iroXirda as the 
perioeci were outside the state of Sparta. The members of the 
serf population were not assigned wholly to the use of in- 
dividual citizens as at Sparta, and the chief sign of that moie 
rigorous communism which distinguished the Cretan cities was 
the existence of a class of slaves working for the state and 
helping to support all the citizens by their collective labour. 
These were called /AVOHTCU, and cultivated the public land. The 
other class of private serfs (d<jJ>a/u<3Tcu or K/Upwrcu), 6 if they are 
to be identified with the FOLK&S of the Gortyn code, exhibit 
the mildest form of slavery in Greece. They were house- 
holders with property of their own, they could apparently 
intermarry with free women, and they had a subsidiary right of 
inheritance to their masters 7 estates. They possessed, however, 
no legal personality of their own, arid before a court and in other 
legal acts were represented by their masters. The revenue 

1 Pint. l.c. 2 Cauer n. 119. suggest a class within the state per- 

3 Pol. ii. 10. liaps "freedmen," as thought by Mr, 

4 The airtraipoi of this code, some- Roby. 

times identified with the perioeci, rather B Athenaeus i. p. 2C3 f. 



118 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

paid by the serfs to the state or to their own lords must, 
as in the case of the helots, have been a fixed one. 

Lastly we have the privileged class of freemen (TroAtareu), 
divided into the Dorian tribes of the Hylleis, Pamphyli, and 
Dymanes. Within this class the noble clans (yevr?) were distin- 
guished from the commons by certain special political privileges. 
These clans as a whole were further subdivided into smaller 
groups, called o-ra/orot, the nature of which is unknown. They 
may have been military, they may have been family divisions : 
perhaps both. But they played the same part in the state 
as the obes did at Sparta, for it was on them that election 
to the higher offices was based. 1 The military character of 
this ruling class, necessitated by the smallness of its numbers, 
was strongly marked, and a Cretan city has been compared, 
with as much justice as Sparta, to a camp. 2 The citizens met 
at public meals (di/Speta), which were supported directly or in- 
directly by the state; for even where, as at Lyctus, each 
member paid a tithe of his produce, he was at least partly 
reimbursed by receipts from the public revenues. 3 The 
common tables, to which the young were admitted, had by no 
means merely a social character, for their organisation was 
directed to military training and to education of a general 
kind. 4 Associations were encouraged of a military, political, 
and exclusive character. The young formed themselves into 
bands (dycXat) for hunting and mimic combat, the older men 
into clubs (Irat/rciat), which dined together at the public tables, 6 
possibly fought together in the field, formed the same party in 
the state, and doubtless fostered the factious life characteristic 
of the Cretan cities. A union of these clubs was often 
sufficiently powerful to impair the constitution, as is shown 
by the occasional abolition of the highest magistracy by tho 
nobles who would not submit to justice. 6 

The political constitution consisted of magistrates, senate, 

1 Baunack (die Inschrift wn> Gortyti wtSov yap iro\LTdav fyere. Cf. *& 
p. 128) thinks that they were military p. 626. 

rclets iuto which tho most distinguished a A risi. Pol. ii. 10; for Lyctus 

of the conquering families were divided. Dosiadas ap. Athenao. v. p. 1 43 a. 

But each of these divisions which had 4 Ephorus ap. Strab. p. 483. Each 

a collective name {&//. b AlOakevs foSpttov contained a TrcuSoix^o?. 

oracrfiy Gortyn Code v. 5) may have 5 Athenae. i. p. 263 f. 

represented a clan, G This suspension of the Co.snii 

2 In Plato's Laws (i. p. 666) the was known as dKoor//fa, Anst. J'oL 
Athenian says to the Crt'tan crrpctro- ii. 10. 



v MIXED CONSTITUTIONS 119 

and people. The highest magistrates were the Kooy/ot, 1 ten in 
number, and chosen only from the noble clans. 2 They were 
apparently elected by the people, but the choice must have 
been exceedingly limited, for, as a particular crrapros is men- 
tioned in connection with the Kooyxot of a year, 3 it has been 
concluded that these aristocratic corporations held office in 
turn, and that the popular choice each year was limited to 
selecting ten members from a single OTC^TOS. The term of 
office, based as it was on a system of rotation, was probably 
annual. Aristotle and Ephorus 4 compare the Cosmi to the 
Spartan Ephors. One point of resemblance was probably the 
gradual growth of their powers and the usurpation of the 
functions of the kings. Their general position in the state is 
the same. Like the Ephors they co-operate with and preside over 
the council ; they are the connecting link between the council and 
the people ; and they possess civil jurisdiction. But the complete 
extinction of the monarchy in Crete had caused them to inherit 
the military duties of the king as well, and command in war 
was one of their most distinctive functions. This unity of 
administration was centred in the hands of a narrow class of 
nobles, and there was no democratic power in the state such 
as that represented by the Spartan ephoralty. The adminis- 
trative functions of the Cosmi were shared with the council, 
which they consulted on the most important matters. 6 In the 
exercise of their judicial functions they probably decided the 
most important civil suits themselves, while sharing criminal 
jurisdiction with the council. 6 

The council (/3wA.a, perhaps too ycpo-wrta) was elected by the 
people from those who had been Cosmi. 7 The numbers of this 
body and their precise mode of election are unknown. It does 
not appear that all the ex-Cosmi were admitted; 8 but if a 
principle of rotation was adopted, similar to that which 
characterised the election of the magistrates, the people could 
have had but little freedom in their choice of councillors. All 

1 Other forms are KOOTUOPTCS and 6 We are not told this, but the 76- 
fffo/uoi. povffLa, -where preserved, seems to have 

2 Arist. I.e. been invariably a criminal court. 

8 Govtyn Code v. 5 al SK 6 AiflaXete 7 Arist. Pol. li. 10 robs ytpovTas 

(orJraoTtfe, tmfffdop d riv Ki5(X)\9. (aipoOj/rat) & r(av jcexoorAMprfrw. 

Bauuack I.e. 8 Ephorus (ap. Str:ib. p. 482) says ol 

4 ap. Strab. p. 482. rr)s T&V Kbajjuav dpx>)s yZuafJ.tvoi KO.\ 

6 Stralio I.e. rSXKa 86/ctjaoi Kpw6fjLevoi. 



120 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

classes of freemen were members of the assembly (ayo/oa), but 
it had, besides its elective functions, only the power of ratifying 
the decrees of the magistrates and council. 1 According to the 
Gortyn code adoption and the renunciation of adoption took 
place before this assembly; but here it appears only as the 
witness of a public act. 

We cannot piece together the fragments of this Cretan 
constitution with such success as those of the Spartan, for some 
of its most important factors the modes of election of the 
Cosmi and Elders are but imperfectly known. It is clearly a 
constitution of a much more oligarchical or dynastic type than 
Sparta. What we classed as the most democratic element in that 
state the vast powers exercised by the freely-chosen magis- 
trates of the city is here lacking; its place is filled by 
officials, elected it is true, but only in the narrowest manner 
from the noble clans. In spite of the apparent division of 
power the council must have been the central point of the 
administration, for a gathering of ex-officials is of all bodies the 
most likely to control a recalcitrant magistrate. The working 
of the constitution, and indeed its structure, must in many 
points have borne a resemblance to that of early Rome 
especially if we consider the council to have been recruited, 
like the Eoman senate, in an automatic manner. Here, as in 
early Borne, the yearly magistrate is vested with a combination 
of functions, military, judicial, and administrative, such as those 
contained in the imperium. He is nominally the controller of, 
really the intermediary between, seriate and people; in both 
states the assembly is equally dependent on the magistrate, 
and can express its opinion only by assent or dissent ; in both 
the magistrate is controlled by a council of ex-officials, in whose 
hands the sovereignty practically resides. But in Crete the 
dynastic element gained a legal recognition that was not present 
even in patrician Rome. The balance of this mixed constitu- 
tion was very much on the side of the nobility. But the 
democracy won in the long run. In Greece the absence of 
barriers is alone sufficient to account for such a change; in 
Crete this absence may be illustrated by the lack of a stable 
democratic element in the constitution itself, and by the lack of 
a strong external motive, such as we found present in Sparta, 
for preserving the antique forms. By the third century 
3 Arist. Pol. ii. 10. 



Y MIXED CONSTITUTION'S 121 

democratic institutions prevailed in certain towns, 1 and seem 
rapidly to have become universal. The names of the old offices 
continued to exist, but their nature had entirely changed. 
Amongst offices (apx a fy to which annual election was now the 
rule 2 the council was probably included. The Cosmi, who 
must now have been elected from all the citizens, still represent 
the state in foreign affairs and preside in the assembly. The 
voice of the freemen in this assembly (a iroXis) is supreme. 3 

1 e.g. at Hierapytna, Cauer n. 181 ii. p. 227). Gilbert concludes from 
I. 69. the usual absence of the pwXd in 

2 Polyb. vi. 46. documents its comparative unimport- 

3 The usual formula of decrees is ance. Its duty was probably chiefly 
!ce rots /c6<j/iois /ecu rj TroXa (Gilbert to prepare business for the assembly. 



CHAPTER VI 

DEMOCRACY 

IN the primitive Greek state there are three powers, king, 
council, and people : the two first real, the last but dimly 
discerned. The monarchy fades first from view, and the 
magistracy which takes over its functions is not much more 
permanent as an independent authority. Even in mixed 
governments the collegiate principle is recognised, and olig- 
archies of a simple type tend to subordinate the magistrate 
to the council. Then comes the turn of the assembly, which, 
controlling or absorbing the functions of magistrate and council, 
claims to direct the whole administration of the state, and, to 
do so effectually, evolves from itself the new growth of a 
popular judicature. It is this rule of the freeman (IXei^epos) 
through his assembly and his law-courts that the Greeks called 
democracy. The democratic principle in its extreme form is 
the assertion that the mere fact of free birth (eXtvOtpia) is alone 
sufficient to constitute a claim to all offices. It is never the 
claim of a majority to rule, but it is the demand that every one, 
whether rich or poor, high- or low-born, shall be equally repre- 
sented in the constitution. This is what Aristotle calls the 
principle of numerical equality. In itself it is the shallowest 
of claims unless it implies a belief in the fitness of the freeman 
to rule that is, unless it is in some sense aristocratic. And 
indeed we find that current Greek thought made an attempt to 
supply an aristocratic basis for democracy. Athenagoras, the 
Syracusari demagogue of Thucydides, represents democracy as 
the " collective name for a state " in which each class finds its 
proper level, in which the rich are the guardians of its" wealth, 
the wise are chosen as its advisers, and the masses only make 



CHAP. VI 



DEMOCRACY 123 



the claim of being capable critics and judges of policy and 
conduct. 1 This belief m the KpiriKr) &W/us which even Aristotle 
believes to reside in the masses, which in large assemblies of 
men eliminates the error of individuals and makes the collective 
judgment well-nigh infallible, 2 is a deeper analysis and a sounder 
defence than the assumed fact of numerical equality. But it is 
only sound because it is narrow, and the claim to equal repre- 
sentation in the state was not justified by the ground advanced. 
It shows that the principle of democracy was clearly one which 
admitted of degrees. These degrees might be determined by 
intention or by accident. 

They are determined by intention when a democracy 
recognises that certain other principles shall prevail in the 
administration of certain duties. The statement of Athenagoras 
has no meaning as a legal maxim unless he implies that the 
different degrees of excellence shall be reflected in the institu- 
tions of the state that appointment to offices requiring special 
skill shall not be made by lot, that the finance offices shall be 
closed to all who cannot show a certain census. But such a 
state is not, according to the strict definition, a pure democracy. 
If, on the other hand, he merely implies that the "general 
will" of the people will recognise these qualities and choose 
their possessors as leaders or advisers, the state may be a 
democracy and the conflict simply be one between legal theory 
and moral influence. But with moral influence constitutional 
law is not concerned. That state only is a pure democracy in 
which no other principle but that of equal representation claims 
legal recognition. As a matter of fact such a pure democracy 
did not exist in Greece. In all we see certain aristocratic or 
oligarchic elements preserved. Yet the state was democratic 
where the true character of such elements was modified by 
subordination to the popular will, which could criticise and 
punish all holders of office. This is indeed the practical 
meaning of democracy in the Greek world; it is a power of 
fearless criticism which can at any moment issue in action. 

A modification of this form of government may be determined 
by accident, when the social conditions of a nation are not 
sufficiently favourable to enable it to realise its own political 
ideals. Democracy in Greece meant personal rule exercised by 
each individual citizen. This was only possible in great com- 
1 Time, vi 39 ; cf. ii. 40. 8 Arist, Pul. m. 11. 



124 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

mercial or imperial states; for personal government meant 
leisure and therefore wealth, and also implied a residence close 
to the centre of affairs. Thus poverty or an agricultural life 
might necessitate a strongly aristocratic element in a nominal 
democracy. 

We need not linger here to classify states according as 
they illustrate these changes in the conception or practice of 
popular government. The long history of Athens which we 
shall sketch illustrates all these conditions and variations in 
turn. To this we shall add the outline of the constitutions of 
a few states, about whose internal history little is known, 
but which seem to illustrate certain particular democratic 
tendencies. 



1 Athens the Classes and the Slate-Divisions 

The foundation of Athens illustrates a process characteristic 
of early Greek societies that of the amalgamation of many 
distinct centres of government into one city ; as this amalgama- 
tion was conceivably accompanied by a corresponding union of 
many distinct nationalities, some consideration of the original 
elements of the population of Attica is necessary even from 
the point of view of constitutional history. 

The population of Attica was generally considered to be 
typically Ionian. Herodotus calls it Pelasgian, which, in this 
context at least, is equivalent to Ionian, 1 and the Athenians 
claimed to be natives of the soil (avroxOoves). But there were 
many legends in Attica which conflicted with this account of 
their origin by recalling memories of the immigration of large 
branches of the population. Amongst such legends we may 
cite that which assigns a Thracian origin to the Eumolpidae 
of Eleusis and a Phoenician origin to the Gephyniei ; 2 while, 
according to Attic tradition, Theseus himself, the highest type 
of lonism, was a wanderer from Troezen in Argolis, and the 
last line of kings, the Melanlliidae or Mcdontidac, came from 
Pylus in Mcsseniti. More tangible evidence of intermixture 

1 Her. i. 56. undermine the belief in the Thracian 

8 ib. v. f>7, 02. Toupller'H dis- origin of i,ho one race or the Phoenician 

iimion of both Ihwje legends (dttibelw origin of the other. 
i>p. 5J4 and 25)3) tends to 



vi DEMOCRACY 125 

is given by local and family cults, such as the Carian worship 
of the family of Isagoras and the Phoenician worship of 
Heracles, which was peculiarly cultivated in Attica, was found 
at Marathon, 1 and formed the bond of union of the "four 
villages" of the South. 2 A further trace of Eastern, possibly 
Hittite, worship which has been noticed is the worship of 
Artemis in Brauron and Munychia. These oriental influences 
were impressed on the latest strata of that ancient civilisation, 
the infancy and maturity of which may both be traced in the 
tombs of Spata, Menidi, and Thoricus ; though some may have 
been borrowed, after Attica, in consequence of the migrations, 
had become a refuge for the dispossessed of other lands. There 
is, therefore, abundant evidence that Attica in early times was 
subjected to varied influences ; and this to some extent helps to 
explain the state of its earliest political organisation, which was 
scattered, circumscribed, and local. 

The early condition of Attica, as sketched by Thucydides, 
was the same as that of Elis prior to its o-Dj/oiKtoy-ios in 4 7 1. 3 
It was inhabited by a country population gathered round 
separate strongholds (TroAets) ; and Thucydides rightly regards 
the local interests and habits of the Athenians of his own day 
as a survival from the times when these local divisions were 
independent organisations. He might have added a further 
proof from the permanence of local legends, which, as Pausanias 
tells us, did not always agree with the legends of the capital. 4 
Attica, according to this view, was composed of a number of 
quite independent organisations, each iroAts having its own 
court-house (Trpvravetoi/) and magistrates (a/>xovrs), and only 
uniting under a central government in times of some pressing 
national danger. At times there was even war between these 
communes, as between the Eleusinians under Eumolpus and the 
Athenians under Erectheus ; 5 and, since some of the small inde- 
pendent TroAets- of early Greece subdued one another, 6 a part of 
the unity of Attica may have been the result of conquest. But 
the main bond of union seems to have been religion. The earliest 
groups of cities were associations for a religious purpose round 
a common centre. Some of these groups can be recovered, and 

1 Diodor. iv. 39 ; Pans. i. 15, 3. suggested the details of Thucydides 1 

2 Pollux iv. 105. description. 

8 Time. ii. 14 - 17. It has been 4 Pans. i. 14, 6. 
thought that this union of Elis, occur- B Thuc. I.e. ; cf. Her. i. 30. 
ring in historical times, may have 6 Thnc. i. 8. 



126 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

may be regarded as the starting-points of the union. Such 
were the rerpdiroXis of Marathon in the North (composed of 
Marathon, Oenoe, Probalinthus, and Tricorythus J ), in the South 
the TTpdK<ojjLOL (two of which villages were Peiraeus and 
Phalerum), and a group known as the T/MKa>/*ot. 2 From in- 
scriptions we learn the existence of the eVaKjoefc and /ieo-oyctoi, 
centres of worship in later times. 3 

But by the side of this isolated grouping we find an 
account of a division of Attica, made by Cecrops, into twelve 
states, the chief division before the time of Theseus. Philo- 
chorus, 4 our authority for this division, gives eleven names, 
Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacria, Deceleia, Eleusis, Aphidnae, 
Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus, and Cephisia ; it has 
been suggested that the twelfth was Phalerum. This enu- 
meration is based on a division which constantly occurs in 
Ionian settlements. The ScoSeKaTroXts was found in Aegialis (the 
later Achaea) in Peloponnese and in the Ionian states of Asia 
Minor* and this may have been the reason why the same 
system was invented for Attica. Invented it clearly was, for 
the country could hardly have been united and then divided 
into twelve prior to its final union. The only importance of 
the list is to be found in the real local unions which it indicates 
in certain cases, especially in those of Cecropia (the original 
Athens), Tetrapolis, and Eleusis. 

The next legendary epoch was marked by the crwoiKurpos 
effected by Theseus, commemorated by the festival of the 
owowaa. 5 Athens was made the political centre of the whole 
of Attica ; the people still dwelt in their old homes as before, 
but had now but one 71-0X15, one /3ovA,euTr//>ioi/, and one irpvravelov. 
Some points in the legends concerning Theseus throw light on 
this work, which is ascribed to him. To the Greek mind he 
was much more of a historical than a mythical figure, and 
belonged, it was felt, to a period of late development in politics. 
He came to be regarded in later times as the hero of the 
democracy, the first creator of popular government, and the 
first who broke down the local influence exercised by the noble 

1 Stralio p. 483. 5 Time. ii. 15. Besides the owofcta 

2 Pollux I.e. ; Stepli. Byz. s.v. Ei)- Theseus is said to have made the 
iropiTat.. Pariathennea a common festival (Plut. 

a For the latter cf. Ath. Pol 21 Tins. 24). It had existed Imibre m 
(ten of Ck'i.slhenes's tiiUyes were TT}S the central state, its origin being 
* aj>. Strak p. 397. attributed to Ericlithonius. 



vi DEMOCRACY 12? 

clans in Attica. 1 How this great union was brought about we 
do not know. The legends of Theseus' many struggles may 
show that it was not effected without violence ; 2 from the Ionian 
character of Athens after the union we may perhaps infer that 
immigrant bands of lonians united the country and turned the 
scale in favour of an Ionian civilisation. 

Attica as a united country is always represented as divided 
into four tribes ($iAcu). The final division into the four Ionic 
tribes of Geleontes (or Teleontes), Hopletes, Aegicoreis, and 
Argadeis lasted down to the time of Cleisthenes, and was the 
basis of much of the religious and political organisation of the 
state. It was believed, however, that these were by no means 
the earliest tribe-names in Attica, and there are no less than 
three lists which precede them. But these earlier lists are 
practically worthless ; they show a cross-classification of epony- 
mous and local names, 8 and may perhaps be regarded as a later 
creation of Attic chroniclers or legend. The final list is at least 
consistent; it was to the Greek mind a classification on a 
system, a division of the citizens according to fttoi. or modes of 
life. The Hopletes are warriors, the Aegicoreis shepherds, the 
Argadeis artisans. Over Geleontes the learned stumbled. To 
Strabo they were priests, to Plutarch field-labourers. The first 
explanation is impossible, as no priestly caste ever existed in 
Attica, and both interpretations are obviously guesses. 4 

It is indeed difficult to see how these tribes could ever have 
denoted classes of the population. By the time of Solon at 
least they were of equal importance, for his council admitted 
an equal number of members from each. Again, by the side of 
this tribal division we have a cross-division that does denote 
class distinctions, that into Eupatridae, Geomori, and Demiurgi, 
which is attributed to Theseus ; 5 and this distribution into Wrrj 
or "classes" is not coincident with the division into tribes. 
The Eupatridae, for instance, and each of the other classes seem 
to have been distributed over all the tribes. 

1 Theophr. Char. viii. (xxvi.) ircpl 'Arflfr, M.e<royata., Aiatcpls (Pollux viii. 
6\Lya,pxta.s : Plut Thes. 25. 109-111). 

2 cf. Time. Ic. yevdnevos /KT& TOU 4 Slrabo p. 383 ; Pint 8ol. 23 ; cf. 
tweroti iud Swart*. Plato Timaeus 24 Zei)s TeAei^ is 

3 e.g. the first (the division under found in au Attic inscription (C.LA. 
Cecrops) is KeKpoirts, AiSr^wv, iii. 2) ; it lias been thought that the 
'AKra/a T HapaXta: the second (the word may mean "brilliant," "glancing." 
division under Cranaos) is Kparo/s, 6 Plut. Thes. 25. 



128 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

If we surrender the view that they were class distinctions, 
the most probable explanation of their origin is that they were 
introduced from abroad, and were arbitrarily applied as the 
divisions of the people of Attica at a time when the meanings 
of the names if these ever signified piot, had been wholly 
lost. The names themselves are genuinely Ionic, and as 
persistently accompany Ionian settlement as the Hylleis, 
Pamphyli, and Dymanes accompany Dorian foundations. They 
are all found at Cyzicus, the Argadeis at Ephesus and Tomi, 
and the Geleontes at Teos. No time seems more suitable for 
their application to Attica than the period of the crvvot/ctcr/tos. 
The country was united by immigrants from abroad, and the 
names were imposed as tribal divisions when lonism finally 
prevailed. If these tribes were local, they were so only in the 
sense that, like the phratries and the clans, they had their local 
religious centres for the tribe was inherited, not acquired by 
residence. 

In fact, the division of the Athenian people into <j>parpi<u 
and yevi?, for the purposes of private life and private law, is 
indissolubly connected with these four Ionic tribes. Our 
authorities 1 represent a thoroughly systematic arrangement, 
each tribe being divided into three phratries, each phratry into 
thirty clans. The total number of clans would thus have been 
three hundred and sixty. But such a systematic division does 
not tally with the character of the clan, which was a natural 
unity or association based on family life. Such associations 
cannot be regulated numerically ; and, if such a distribution was 
made at any period of Athenian history, it could have been at 
the utmost but a selection of those clans whose religious rites 
the* state cared to recognise, and to which, therefore, it attached 
those members of the community who were outside the family 
circles. 

The members of the Attic yei/os appear under three names 
ywvrjrai, o/AoyaAcu<Ts, and o/oyewve?. Of these words gennetae 
may have been used as the generic name including the other 
two ; but strictly it is equivalent to homogalactes, 2 this word 
signifying those members who had traditions and what to them 

1 Pollux viii. 11 ; Scliol. in Plat. those thirty members of each clan &v 
AxiocJi. p. 405. ai lepwrtivu ^/cdorots 

2 In the Lcxie. Demostli. (p. 152) it 
aimean in a still narrower sensu, of 



VI DEMOCRACY 12f) 

were proofs of common descent, wlio were therefore the only 
true members of the clan sharing in all its rights, amongst them 
the decisive family right of inheritance in the last resort. The 
oroeones were those who had no such traditions, who were not 
fufl members, and were only attached to a clan as parlicip;iioiv$ 
in its sacred rites (opyta). 1 From this distinction it is evident 
that the clans at Athens were aristocratic institutions, and th.'it 
all remained noble and exclusive. They never admitted now 
members except as mere participators in their rites or rather in 
some of these, for it is not likely that an opyeu'w would have 
been allowed to share in the inner cultus of the clan. Every 
Athenian citizen was, therefore, in a certain sense a member of 
a y^o^ but only a limited number were in the fullest sense* 
yewyrdi. Thus the created citizens (S^/AOToti/Tot) could iie\or 
become full members, except possibly by adoption. 

The (frparpLai, on the other hand, were in historic times 
unions which included any and every Athenian citizen, for t-Iics 
juristic formula ran : " The members of the phratry must receive 
into their body both the homogalactes and the orgconos.' 1 -' 
Every Athenian father had to bring his child for admission info 
the phratry at the Apaturia, and take the oath that if, had been 
born of a citizen woman who was his wedded wife." Tlui 
<J3pa.Topes voted on the question, and an adverse vote mount ;i 
denial of the legitimacy of the child, arid therefore a denial of 
its right to citizenship. The phratry is thus the connecting 
link between the family and the state, for membership of Ibis 
body was the deciding point in the question of citizenship. 
The external sign of such membership was the right to partici- 
pate in the two sacred cults of Apollo Patrons and Zeus 
Herceius, which were common to all of these associations. 4 

Does this account of family associations as they existed iu 
later times throw any light on the status of those members 
of the old nobility who in early Athens were known as K- 
graT/H&u? The fact that membership of the two phratric cults 
was the old test for admission to the archonship, 6 makes it 
possible that in early times the phratrics with their worship 
were confined to the Eupatrids. This is equivalent, to saying 

* Photius s.v. * J 'holms ,v.r. 'Ify/rrfoj Ktfy. 

- Suidas&w. dpyewires. 5 The question asked of ll wuuli- 
Dem. G. JJubitl. 67 rbv v6fuftov dates was el *.Air6X\wi' tirnv ai/rois /cal 

TOIS 4>pa.rop<Tiv opuov "aerbv e dffrijs Kei>s"jE/>/aos (Pollux vin. SO). 
" 



130 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

that they were composed wholly of homogalactes, and that the 
class of orgeones was of later growth. With the growth of 
this class, participation in these cults, which was originally a 
condition of admissibility to the higher offices, became a con- 
dition of citizenship. If the Eupatrids were originally the only 
phrators, a fortiori they must have been the sole members of the 
clans, and the exclusive possession of both phratry and clan 
would have made them the only full citizens of Athens. The 
true members of the clan, the homogalactes, may have been from 
time to time recruited by adoption, and have swelled to large 
numbers without ever becoming merged in the orgeones, who 
always continued outside this exclusive and select circle. But 
with this change the term Ewra-r/oiS^s ceased eventually to mean 
" true member of a clan," and what it signified in later Athenian 
history cannot be precisely determined. 1 Yet, if the Eupatrids 
were the only citizens, the members of the demos were from the 
first freemen ; Athens shows no trace of the clientship of Rome, 
and has no traditions of a gradual evolution of private and 
personal rights. 

Although the phratries came to include individuals who 
were only partially members of the clans, yet the connection 
between the two forms of association continued unimpaired, 
and in many cases it was a local connection; the centre of 
worship of some important clan might be taken as that of a 
phratry, although in these cases the priests of the two associa- 
tions were probably distinct. The number of the phratries is 
not known, but certainly seems to have been greater than the 
traditional number twelve. A chance of adding to them was 
offered to Cleistheues when he enrolled a number of new 
citizens, who could not be made full members of the ancient 
clans, but had to be made members of the phratries. This 
might have been done either by attaching them as <j>po,Topt$ to 
the existing divisions or by increasing the number of the 
latter. A statement of Aristotle, of rather vague import, has 
been quoted to show that he adopted the latter course ; 2 but it 
is difficult to see how the phratries could be increased without 
either increasing the number of the clans, or disturbing the 

1 The term came to deuolu .such ;t 2 Arist. Put. vi. 4 = p. 1319 b. The 

narrow class, that ToepiFev (AUutdie passage in the Afli. 1W. (21) only 

Uf&Malogie p. 175) thinks that there states that Clci.slhouos did not disturb 

was a special geuos of Eupatridae ut the existing relations of individuals to 

Athens. the ytvv) and Qparpltu. 



vi DEMOCRACY 13] 

existing connection between a particular phratry and a clan, 
and it is more probable that their original number remained 
unaltered. 

As may be gathered from the position of the phratry in the 
state, citizenship at Athens was, as a rule, hereditary. It was, 
indeed, possible to increase the citizen body by a vote of the 
people, but the privilege was jealously guarded ; rash proposals 
for admission were punished by the laws, and Solon laid down 
the conditions that no foreigners should be received but those 
who had been driven from their country into perpetual exile, 
or those who, for the sake of practising a trade, had transferred 
themselves and all their family to Athens. 1 But the hereditary 
principle itself admitted of variations, and in Greek states 
generally the particular qualification by birth depended partly 
on the nature of the constitution, partly on the numbers of the 
population. 2 At Athens it fluctuated considerably. The main 
principle adhered to was that the union from which the child 
was sprung must be one recognised by the state; this was 
usually legitimate marriage with a wife (ywrj), either through 
betrothal by a parent or guardian (lyyu^o-ts), or through assign- 
ment by a magistrate (iTrtSi/cacrta) ; s but the quasi-polygamous 
customs of the fourth century placed on the same level legiti- 
mate cohabitation with a concubine (TraAAa/a's), 4 probably when 
it had been preceded by formal betrothal. Both these conditions 
are included in the oath for admission into the phratry, the 
primary condition of citizenship. The ancient formula also 
demands the possession of citizen rights by both parents. But 
the development which Aristotle traces began at an early 
period in Athens, assisted no doubt by the difficulties of pre- 
serving an accurate register in a large state ; for it was not easy, 
in ancient communities where there were so many grades of 
political status and where birth, descent, and legal marriage 
had to be taken into account, to prevent the entrance of 

1 Plut. SdL 24. maternity of tbo cliild was certain, its 

2 Arist. Pol iii. 5. In this passage paternity might be doubtful. 

it^may be noticed that greater stress is a In the latter case, where tlie 

laid on the citizenship of the mother heiress was a ward in chancery 

than on that of the father. The child Gilbert remarks that formal *yyfWs 

is regarded as belonging naturally to must liave taken place through the 

the mother; and where the condition Arcliou, for the formula (p. l29)IimiliuF 

of legitimate marriage was not taken it. 

into account, as it usually could not 4 Isaetis in her. Fkiluctcm. % 21 

be if one parent was a foreigner, the Dem. c. Btieut. 40. ' 



132 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP 

unqualified names. We find difficulties as early as the time of 
Peisistnitus, 1 and the overthrow of the tyranny was followed 
by a scrutiny of the list. But the old conditions came again 
to be disregarded, and were revived by Pericles in 45 1. 2 He 
is said to have passed a measure limiting citizenship to those 
who were born of two Athenian parents, with the result that 
nearly five thousand citizens were disfranchised. This would 
have been a revolution had it been effected by a new law with 
retrospective force. It was probably a mere scrutiny of the 
list, permitted by a decree of the people, which resulted in the 
removal of names improperly registered. These renewed quali- 
fications were again neglected, or dropped by legal enactment, 
during the Peloponnesian War, partly no doubt through the 
necessity of recruiting the population, partly perhaps through 
the influence of the Athenian Empire, which resulted in freer 
intercourse with other Greek states and a corresponding 
extension of the right of artya/jutt. With the loss of empire the 
mison d'Mre of this extension disappeared. The old conditions 
were revived, at first with retrospective force, in the archonship 
of Eucleidos (403). But the retrospective action of the law 
was felt to be too severe : this was removed, and it became 
simply prospective. 3 At the close of the fourth century the 
old conditions of citizenship were still in force. 

The classes that stood outside the phra tries had no part in 
the constitution ; but without one of these classes the democratic 
constitution, at least in its final form, would not have been 
possible. The four hundred thousand Athenian slaves of the 
fifth and fourth centuries were the " necessary condition " of 
Athenian development. They were the " living instruments " 
of the household and the farm, they worked for the wealthy 
contractor in the mines, they manned the merchant fleet, 
and they sometimes formed a class of country tenants (oi xupls 
<uKouvTs) who paid, like the helot, a fixed proportion of the 
produce to their leisured masters in the city. Socially they 
dilFered little from the poorer classes of citizens, and the 
democratic atmosphere of Athens had given them a freedom of 
demeanour and of speech which found few parallels in Greece. 4 

A At/i. Pol. 1". Thu Diad'ii, lVi.si.s- " Oiry&Uns ap. Ailiunac. xj. p. 577 

trains' followers, were joined by ol r$ c. ; Kchol. in Acscli. c. 2'unarc/t. 89. 

yfrei fri) ttaOapol oca rlv (jjoflov. 4 [Xeu.] Ib'ty). Atlwii. 1, 10 ff. 

2 i&. 20 ; Wut. Per. 37. 



VJ DEMOCRACY 133 

The state used their services for menial employments thought 
unfit for freemen ; there was a Scythian police force, and we 
find public slaves of the mint. But the mass of Lydians, 
Paphlagonians, and Syrians that filled the Athenian slave-market 
could teach little to the Athenian citizen, and slave influence of 
the intellectual kind is not a factor to be reckoned with as at 
Eome. Yet the wealth and power of the aristocratic element, 
like the freedom of the citizen, depended on them, and the 
versatile activity of the Athenian statesman was largely due to 
these passive and nimble instruments. There is, however, 
another reason which forces the slave class at Athens on the 
attention of the constitutional historian; this is, that it is a 
class with rights. The master might not put his slave to death ; 1 
there is some evidence that his brutal treatment necessitated 
an enforced sale ; 2 while an assault on a slave by a third party 
was an offence against the criminal law. 3 Here, as in Greek 
states generally, the theory that the slave as a chattel could 
not be the subject of rights was not rigorously pressed, and the 
state interfered with private ownership where the thing owned 
was also a person. 

The large class of resident aliens, calculated as forty- five 
thousand for the fifth and fourth centuries, was the sign of the 
prosperity and liberalism of a great commercial state. It was 
composed partly of emancipated slaves (oLTrekevOepoi or Igetav- 
0pot), but chiefly of free strangers (evot) residing in Attica. 
The slave might be freed in three ways by the state, by his 
master, or by ransoming himself, although we do not know 
whether, in this last case, his master was obliged to free him 
if he presented the requisite money. After emancipation he 
owed certain duties to his former lord, whom he was obliged to 
take as patron (ir/oooTaT^s). A failure to do this subjected him to 
the 8iw) airoa-rao-iov, defeat in which meant slavery, and victory 
freedom. 4 The stranger could not reside in Attica longer than 
a certain time without enrolling himself as a pJeroiKos. In 
public and private law he was represented by a patron, a failure 
to choose one exposing him to the Stmj dirpocrrcuriov, 6 the loss of 
which involved the confiscation of his property. The privileges 

1 Antiphon de caed. Herod. 8. 4 Harpocrat. s.v. 

2 Pollux viii. 13. The slave had, 6 ib. s.v. ypetTO >yap ftwwros favrf 
under certain conditions, the right r&v iroKtr&v riva, Trpoffr^cr^vov wept 
irpfoiv aireiv. irivrw T&V i5lw Kal TUV KQLVUV. 

3 Hyper, ap, Athenae. p. 266 f. 



134 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of residence possessed by the metoecs were sometimes extended 
by special grants, such us immunity from their special tax 
(crreAeia), ownership of the soil in Attica, and access to the 
council and the ecclosia (Tiywo-oSos TT/OOS rrjv f3ovXrjv KOI TOV ftijpov). 
But their burdens were greater than those of the citizens, for, 
besides the recurring pecuniary duties of the Aetrovpytat and 
the occasional clo-fopd, they paid a special tax for their protection 
(//.eroi/aov). Their military importance was due chiefly to their 
service on the fleet, but those of the requisite census had the 
privilege of serving as hoplites. 

All these classes which we have considered are connected, 
by inclusion or exclusion, with the private law-divisions of the 
state, the phratries and the clans. A brief notice must now be 
given of certain divisions of the tribes which are said to have 
been, from the first, of political importance. These are the 
three rpfarves and the twelve vavKpaptai into which each of the 
Ionic tribes was divided. 

The full significance of the trittys is not known, but prob- 
ably it always had some close connection with the military 
levy. 1 The old arrangement which connected it with the Ionic 
tribe disappeared before the reforms of Cleisthenes. The 
thirty T/WTTWS which he instituted, although primarily meant to 
serve a temporary purpose, 2 were probably permanent, and had 
a strictly local character, which is reflected in such names of 
these divisions as have been preserved. 3 

The naucraries, although known to us chiefly in connection 
with Solon's reforms, existed long before the date of that 
legislator, for their presidents (irpvrdvus) are mentioned as 
taking part in the suppression of the conspiracy of Cylon (circ. 
628). 4 How their distinctly local character was brought into 
relation with the four Ionic tribes we do not know; it is 
more easily understood after Cleisthencs had raised their 
number from forty-eight to fifty, 5 for the purpose of division 
amongst his ten local tribes. They were administrative 
centres found and utilised by two successive legislators. 
Solon employed them for purposes of taxation ; 6 under 
Cleisthenos they still retained what was probably their 



1 rpLTTvapx.^ signifies some sub- 3 Such as Kepairi??, 'EXetfewot, Mu/>- 

onlmale kind of military command /upoiVtoc, 'EvoK/un?. 4 Her. v. 71 

(Plat, RMJ/>. p. 415). c Clcidemns ap. Phot, s.v. 

a Ath. Pol. 21, 6 Ath* Pol. 8. 



vi DEMOCRACY 135 

oldest function the supply of a ship each to the Athenian 
navy. 1 

These state-divisions have little historical interest apart from 
their antiquity, for they are clearly the arbitrary* creations of a 
central government. But the fact of this early centralisation 
is itself of some importance, and the naucraries with their 
presidents or vavKpapot,, officials partly financial, partly military, 
show an attempt at local administration which foreshadows the 
elaborate deme-organisation of later times. 



2 The political Development of Athens the Magistracy and 
the Council 

The early history of Attica consists mainly in the change 
from monarchy to aristocracy. Several lines of kings had held 
power in turn. First came monarchs of the Theseid family ; 
then, about the time of the Dorian migration, these were replaced 
by an immigrant race of Pylians under Melantbus. For many 
generations these Melanthidae, Codridae, or Medontidae, as 
they are indifferently called from the first three successive 
names in the dynasty, continued to hold power until the 
inevitable change came, which tradition puts in the year 752. 
The monarchy was not abolished, as in many contemporary 
states of Greece, but was altered, we are told, into a presidency 
tenable for ten years. 2 This decennial kingship was still kept 
within the family of the Medontidae, and it is probable that 
these rulers still bore the title /3acriAeig. But another juristic 
tradition, strangely interwoven with this, states that even in 
the time of the life-monarchy the power of the king had been 
limited by the introduction of the collegiate principle. At the 
outset of the rule of the Medontidae two other " first and highest 
offices " 3 were established to limit the power of the /WtAeus. 
First a TroX^ap^os was appointed as the assessor of an unwar- 
like king. Then the civil office of o &px<ov was instituted ; and 
these three functionaries continued to exist side by side- a life- 

1 Thus the Athenian fleet at the back the military assessor to the Erech- 

tirae of the war with Aegina consisted theid period (ci Her. viii. 44) ; the 

of fifty ships (Her. vi. 89). office of 6 &pxw was attributed by 

Pans. iv. 5, 10. some to the reign of Meclon, by others 

3 Ath. Pol. 3 ^yitrrai nal irpwrcu to that of his successor Acastus. 
rvv &PX&V. Some traditions carried 



136 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CIUP. 

king without the shadow of power unwillingly assisted Ly two 
(apparently temporary) assessors. The office of Archon, origin- 
ally the lowest of the three posts, in the course of years 
became the highest, and its holder the 7raivuju,os of the year. 
The assessors are no doubt pictured as being also chosen from 
the royal clan. It was not until 712 that the supreme power 
was thrown open to all the Eupatrids. In the year 683 a 
double change occurred which completed the development : six 
0<r//o0T<u 1 were added to the existing ap^ai', and the tenure of 
office became annual. 

It is idle to speculate minutely on this tradition, especially 
on that part of it which deals with the limited life-kingship. 
WG can only say that with some modifications (especially of 
date) it would show an historically possible and not unnatural 
development. It shows us the monarchy stripped first, unlike 
the Spartan, of its military powers, and later on divested of 
its civil authority, and remaining a mere religious presidency 
with powers of religious jurisdiction. It shows us further that, in 
the course of the secularisation of the state, the powers of the 
purely civil magistrate develop, as in the early history of the 
Ephors at Sparta, and "the Archon" becomes the highest 
magistrate of the city. When this stage was reached, the 
administrative functions of state were divided amongst a college 
of nine, although merely routine duties were originally assigned 
to the added six, and the civil, military, and religious presidency 
was still in the hands of the original three. The board is not 
properly a college, for functions are distributed among its 
members, and it is doubtful whether these magistrates bore a 
common official name. 2 The members of the board constituted 
in 683 were called officially by their special titles, and the title 
"Archon" was applied strictly only to the president. 

The executive and judicial powers of this president must 
have been enormous at a time when Athens possessed but an 
ill-organised assembly (probably dependent on the summons of 
the magistrate), no executive council, no written law but a few 
recorded utterances until the time of Draco, and no audit from 
tho popular courts. A guarantee against abuse of authority 

1 According to tlie Ath. Pol (I.e.) a Tho existence of a Trpvravtlov ami 

tlioy arc not officials who givo ju<l#- Trpvravda, LS no evidence tluit they 

nii'iti, lut, who weord and preserve were ever called irpvT&vtLS. 
judicial decisions (0<f<r/a). 



VI DEMOCRACY 137 

was found in the separation of the military from the civil 
powers and in the existence of the council of Elders, which, 
though it did not interfere with the Archon's civil jurisdiction, 
must have held him responsible for his administrative acts. 

But the importance of the office, even after Solon had 
limited its power, is illustrated by the incident of the attempted 
usurpation of Damasias. It was apparently an attempt to 
make the office perpetual ; he was chosen Archon for two years 
in succession (probably in 586 and 585), and was then only 
deposed from office by violence. In consequence of this 
attempt a new principle of election to the archonship was 
introduced. It was enacted that ten Archons should be ap- 
pointed, five to be chosen from the Eupatrids, three from the 
aypoiKoi (i.e. the Geomori), and two from the Demiurgi. This 
change was of no importance in the development of the con- 
stitution, since it seems to have lasted but one year (584) ; but 
its details show something more than the result of a mere 
personal struggle for supremacy. The institution of ten 
Archons, chosen half from the Eupatrids or nobles and half from 
the two other non-noble classes, has been thought to show a 
compromise between the patrician and plebeian elements in 
the state. 1 Such a class struggle would explain the ardcrvs and 
the avapxta which are mentioned as twice preventing election 
to the archonship before the attempt of Damasias. 2 The chief 
importance of the incident, as treated by the authority who 
hands it down to us, is that it shows the great and forgotten 
power which once centred in the person of " the Archon." 

But the decline of the archonship was inherent in the con- 
stitution of Solon, for the popular courts which he instituted 
tended inevitably to lessen its power. The development of the 
jury system reduced the judicial functions of the board of 
nine to little more than those of mere preliminary investigation 
(dva/cpwrts) and the mere formal guidance of the court (yycpwia 
SiKaa-njpiov). Their administrative duties, with the exception 
of the military leadership of the Polemarch which for a time 
continued, became merely duties of routine, and the archonship 
ceased to be one of the great magistracies of the state. 

We must now consider a question which in its ultimate 

1 H. Sulgwick in Classical Review combinations by which the date of 
vol. viii. n. 8. Damasias has been variously fixed set' 

2 Ath. Pol. 13. For the possible Sandys' cd. of Ath. Pol. p, 49. 



138 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

bearings is perhaps the most important in Athenian public 
law, although its treatment at this point will necessarily lead 
us to anticipate some of the reforms of Solon and Cleisthenes. 
The question is that of appointment to office. We are 
told that in the " ancient constitution" which existed before 
the time of Draco "they appointed the magistrates with 
reference to birth and wealth," 1 which apparently means 
merely that officials were chosen from the Eupatrids who were 
the owners of the soil. We do not know whether this is meant 
to apply to the supposed assessors of the fiaa-iXevs either before 
or after the decennial limitation of the monarchy ; the head of 
the state religion (the fiao-iXevs himself) might have been 
selected by the sacred ceremony of the lot; but election is 
meant to be predicated of the archonship after 683. As to 
the electors of this period, the Constitution of Athens con- 
jecturally assigns the appointment of magistrates at this time 
to the Areiopagus. 2 This body was, as we shall see, probably the 
only original council at Athens, and there is nothing strange in 
this power having been possessed by the aristocratic assembly 
of the state before the proper organisation of the ecclesia. If 
we decline to recognise the Draconian constitution embodied in 
this Aristotelian treatise, 3 this system may have continued to 
the time of Solon. Then a new principle was introduced one 
that has sometimes been thought an anachronism, but that is really 
eminently characteristic of the whole Solonian system. It was 
a principle of direct election modified by the use of the lot, 
which was now perhaps becoming divested of its religious 
character and beginning to be applied as a mere political 
institution. Each of the tribes selected ten of its members, and 
from the whole forty the nine Archons were chosen by lot. 4 
This is the mode of appointment which Aristotle describes as 
common to oligarchy and democracy, 6 one therefore eminently 
befitting the professedly mixed type of this constitution. Solon 
retained the elective principle previously existing, 6 but modified 
it in a way which combined a demand for fitness with an 



Kal irKwrlvtyv, Ath. 8 Pol. ii. 6. 

Pol. !J. Arist. Pol. ii. 12 tome 

8 ib. 8. (this is probably Aristotle's own 

3 ih. 4. opinion) ^RCIVO, fjv inrdpxovTa vp&- 

4 if). 8. A reminiscence of this repov ob Kara\v<rai } rfy re povXty ('.& 
niodii of appointment i-s Ibtuul in Tsocr. tho Areiopagus) K<tl ryv rCav 
Panath. 145. ' 



vi DEMOCEACY 139 

assertion of partial equality between the members of tlie circle 
from which the Archons were chosen. An accidental con- 
sequence of this mixed system was that the two stages of 
election were still preserved even after the lot had become the 
sole principle of appointment in both. 1 

At this point we may naturally raise the question, " What 
is the meaning of this new element in political life which was 
destined to become almost the most characteristic feature of the 
Athenian and other democracies ? " From the treatment of the 
lot by Plato and Aristotle we should be inclined to gather that 
it was a consciously adopted democratic institution, 2 that it waa 
the final assertion of the numerical equality of all citizens and 
of the principle of equal representation. But to realise this 
character it must be accompanied by universal admission 
to office. We know, however, that the use of the lot 
preceded universal admission ; we shall see, when we come to 
discuss the qualifications for office, that in early Athens it was 
an assertion of the equal fitness for rule of the members of only 
a narrow circle ; and we are further informed that in some cases 
of its employment it had other meanings than that of an 
assertion of equality. It was sometimes adopted as the final 
solution of a difficulty in the case, for instance, of equality of 
votes. 3 Here it is a mere appeal to chance, as in Homeric 
times it was an appeal to heaven. In the state of Heraea the 
lot was introduced as a means of avoiding the bribery and 
canvassing which accompanied direct election. 1 But, though it 
was a political expedient that might be applied with other 
objects, we must regard its use as being, on the whole, in the 
highest and purest sense democratic. A low view of democracy 
as the right of a majority to rule, such as had begun to be 
entertained at Athens in the fourth century, might justify 
Isocrates* assertion that the direct election of magistrates is 
more favourable to popular government than their selection by 
lot. 5 For under the former system the people choose their own 
representatives, under the latter chance will rule and the 
oligarchically minded sometimes slip into the government of 
the state. But true democracy is the assertion of the equal 
representation of all individuals, classes, and interests; and 
there is much to be said for the view that the effect of the lot 

1 Ath. Pol. l.c. 3 Arist. Pol. vl 3 = p. 1318 a. 

2 The idea is as old as Herodotus 4 ib. v. 3 = p. 1303 a. 
(iii. 80). 8 Isocr. Areop. 23. 



140 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

at Athens was the protection of the rights of minorities, 1 
although wo cannot admit that this was the primary motive for 
its introduction, There is abundant evidence that the lot 
existed at Athens before the constitution could be described as 
democratic ; 2 but, in the developed democracy, its employment 
was a guarantee that all offices should not be swamped by the 
triumphant majority of the moment. It was a standing protest 
against that party government which the Greek thinker knew 
to be the deadliest enemy of liberty, and at which, as realised 
in the pseudo-democracies of America and England, the true 
Greek democrat would have stood aghast. 

Next to the question of its meaning comes that of its 
justification as a working principle. We must here distinguish 
its employment as a mode of appointment to individual offices 
like the archonship, or to small corporations like the financial 
boards, on the one hand, and the faculty of admission it gave 
to large administrative bodies such as the council of five 
hundred on the other. In the former cases there seems a 
greater danger of lack of fitness or of maladministration. For 
in large bodies gifted with the power of discussion and debate 
the aristocracy of intellect is certain to prevail ; the decisions 
of the council at Athens wore often those of a Cleon or an 
Androcles ; and its constitution does not need as its justification 
the modern thesis that "on general questions the votes of 
forty academicians are not better than the votes of an equal 
number of water-carriers," 3 for the lot admitted men of every 
grade of intellect. In the case of smaller bodies at Athens the 
(Linger of the lack of the intellectual element was met by the 
routine nature of their duties and the constant direction of the 
ecclosia, of tho lack of the moral element by the scrutiny before 
admission (<$<>/a/m<n'(i) and the rigorous examination of conduct 
after quitting office (evOuva.). This created an individual 
responsibility which was demanded even of members of as large 
a body as the council. Where special knowledge was required, as 
in the or/xm/yta or the groat finance offices of the fourth 
century, the lot was not employed. It was a misfortune that 
in one sphere at least where special knowledge would have 
been desirable, the law-courts, it was recognised as the 



Arintfljrfiiiiu'it p. 20(5, 

" To the passages in Mm At/i>. 7W. wo may a<M J'lut. Jm/. 1, /'/;/*. 9. 
8 Lo lion Ityrfuiliu/ie tiw 



VE DEMOCRACY 141 

universal principle of admission. In these courts there was no 
debate, and therefore no intellectual guidance, and this is the 
weak point of the Athenian system. 

Some details are given by the Constitution of Athens as 
to the steps by which this development was attained. The 
use of the lot seems to have ceased with the despotism of 
Peisistratus, 1 for it was inconsistent with his personal appoint- 
ment to office, and it was not resumed by Cleisthenes. Under 
his constitution the Archons were directly elected, perhaps by 
the ecclesia. It was not until the year 487 that the lot was 
reinstituted after the Solonian model. The posts were now 
allotted amongst previously elected candidates (trpoKpt.), five 
hundred in all (fifty from each of the ten Cleisthenean tribes), 
chosen by the members of the demes, a certain number being 
apparently elected from each deme. 2 We do not know when 
the lot pure and simple was introduced, but there finally grew 
up, probably in the middle of the fifth century, the practice 
which is described as existing in the fourth, the lot being 
applied first tribally and secondly to the candidates so selected 
from the tribes. 

Almost equal in importance to the history of the mode of 
election would be that of the qualification for what long con- 
tinued to be the highest office in the state. But unfortunately 
we have no credible information as to the conditions required 
for holding the archonship while it still remained a power. The 
little that is known of the prae-Solonian system has been already 
told. Solon's constitution recognised a timocratic qualification 
based on land, and the archonship was apparently restricted to 
the highest class in the census, that of the ^cvraKocrto/wSi/jivot, 
or possessors of land which produced an income of five hundred 
medimni. 3 It is not known how long this qualification con- 
tinued in force, or whether the second class, the Mnrer?, 
were admitted before 479. But in this year the democratic 
fervour which was the result of the victory over the Persians 
induced a radical change, and the whole basis of the property- 
qualification was altered. A decree of the people, introduced 

1 Ath. Pol. 22 ; Thuc. vi. 54. niciit of office each of the ten tribes 

2 Ath. Pol. 22. When m c. 62 it is supplied one or more officials (e.g. the 
said that originally the tiXyptoral d/o^m nine Archons and their secretary, the 
associated with the archonship were &' boards of ten or thirty). 

777$ 0yX?)s 6X175 K\Tjpo^fivoL, we may 3 ib, 8. 
perhaps understand that in the allot- 



142 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

by Aristeidos, changed the land census into a census of all 

property. 1 The principle which Sparta cherished to the last 

that the citizen should be a land-owner was abolished for 
nearly every office of state ; 2 the special privileges of the landed 
aristocracy were swept away ; and the rich trader, who would 
previously have been relegated to the lowest rank of #TJTS 
could now perform the high ceremonial functions of the archon- 
ship. Yet poverty still continued to be a bar to office, and it 
was not until 457 that the third class of fevyirai, the possessors 
of an annual revenue worth two hundred drachmae, were 
admitted. 3 The lowest class of flares, whose income was under 
this sum, were never legally qualified for the archonship at any 
period of Athenian history down to the close of the fourth 
century. This disability must have been a mere oversight of 
the constitution, for the thetes were admitted by the transparent 
legal fiction of never being expected to declare their own 
incapacity. 4 It is valuable to loarn from this recorded fiction 
that even in a Greek state the practice sometimes outstripped 
the legal theory. 

From the magistracy we pass to the council, a belief in 
whose early existence is expressed in the view that even the 
life-monarchy of the Medontidae was a "responsible" office. 5 
Many different efforts havo been made to find in our records 
a suitable body of Eupatrids. The council has been variously 
identified with the three hundred members of this class who 
tried the Alemaeonidae at the time of the conspiracy of Cylon, 6 
and with the " presidents of the naucraries " whoso activity is 
mentioned in connection with the same event. 7 Eut the first- 
named body, although by a strange coincidence their number 
reappears in the three hundred partisans of Isagoras, the aristo- 
cratic opponent of Cleisthenes, 8 may have been but a temporary 

1 This hypothesis is tlie only mode* from Demosth. c. Macart. pp. 1067-8, 

of reconciling the statement of Plutarch that it was 150 medimni or (in terms 

(Arist. 22) that Aristeides made the of the post - Aristeidean assessment) 

TroXcTcta "common" to all, and threw drachmae. 

the arch on si lip open to every citizen 4 Ath. Pol. 7. On the question 

with the system of gradual admission being put as to the candidate's census 

described in the Ath. l*tiL oi)5' u.v as eftrcu OIJTLKUV. 

" hi later tiniGH an Athenian strut e- D I'aus. iv. 5 tori /facrcXcks 

tfus had to own land in Attica, but aryatv <fs upxty $vc&OviHor. 

this wus a guarttuk'ti of good faith. (l Pint. ftnl. 32 rptakucrioi 

3 The Ath. Pol. (c. 7) proves that du;d('ovrts. 

this was the census of the zeugitac, as 7 ller. v. 71. 

agoiubt the conclusion drawn by JJbckli 8 -II). v. 72. 



vi DEMOCRACY 143 

board of judges ; the Latter were apparently military officials to 
whom was entrusted the siege of the acropolis on the occasion 
of Cylon's coup d'&at. A third tendency, which is probably 
correct, is to identify the council with the Areiopagus. A 
belief in the antiquity of this body is expressed in the tradition 
that the Messenians, before their first war with Sparta, offered 
to refer the question in dispute either to the amphictyony of 
Argos or to the Areiopagus at Athens. 1 One authority brings 
the partisans of Cylon before this body, 2 and the Constitution 
of Athens (doubtful as its evidence is for all prae-Solonian 
history) lends weight to the view that there was no other 
original council of Athens. 

But before entering on the history of the Areiopagus it is 
necessary, for reasons which will be soon apparent, to touch 
on that of a body of equal, if not of greater antiquity, whose 
early existence as a corporate body is assured. This is the 
board of Ephetae (e^erat), the earliest mention of whom occurs 
in a law of Draco, a fragment of which has been preserved, 3 
although it is not probable that they were first instituted by 
this legislator. They formed a board of fifty-one members, 
over fifty years of age and chosen from tbe Eupatrids. 4 Their 
name seems to be derived from their judicial function as 
"referees" in cases of homicide, 5 and may have been gained 
after their employment by Draco for what proved to be the 
most permanent of his reforms the amendment of the law of 
homicide which was incorporated by Solon into his legislation. 
Previously to Draco the practice of private vengeance and of 
compensation had prevailed, and vast powers were permitted to 
the family associations to which the slain man had belonged, 
especially to the phratry, to which in the last resort belonged 
the duty of pursuing the slayer. In the case of involuntary 
homicide the phrators seem to have had the power of refusing 
satisfaction by compromise or of settling the terms of the com- 
promise themselves. This power was lessened by the rule that 
" if the Ephetae decide that the homicide was involuntary, ten 
of the phrators shall be chosen, if they please, and with them 
the Ephetae shall compromise the matter. 6 But it is also 

1 Pa^^s. iv. 5. by Pollux (II. cc.) Lango and Gilbert 

2 Sohol. Aristoph, JStfiiites 1. 443. derive the name from ol cirl rcus 

3 Hiclts n. 59. ZTCLLS, " those set over the clan 

4 Photius $.v. ; Pollux viii. 125. brethren." 

5 Suggested' by Photius and given b Hicks l,c. 



144 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL IIISTOKY CHA.P, 

possible that before Draco's time no distinction had been 
drawn between different kinds of slaying, between wilful 
murder and accidental or justifiable homicide. This distinction 
existed under Draco's legislation in connection with the various 
courts on which the Ephetae sat. 1 At the Palladium were ad- 
judged cases of involuntary homicide ; at the Delphinium were 
held the trials of persons declaring that the homicide they had 
committed was justifiable ; at the Prytaneium inanimate objects 
which had slain a man were brought to justice ; while at the 
Phrcattys " exiles against whom a second charge was brought 
made their defence from shipboard to judges sitting on the 
land," in order to avoid the pollution of the soil. The fifth 
court for the trial of wilful murder was the Areiopagus, and, 
unless by this is meant merely the locality, it seems inevitable 
that we should to some extent identify the Ephetae with the 
council of that name. After Solon the two certainly became 
distinct, and it is true that in a retrospect contained in one of 
Solon's laws 2 the Areiopagus and the Ephetae are mentioned 
as two distinct bodies ; but the opposition here is merely formal, 
the latter word standing for " the other courts," and the true 
conclusion may be that the Ephetae did form the bulk of the 
original Areiopagus. 

This body appears, like the Spartan G-erousia, both as a 
council and as a court ; and the name of its place of meeting, 
" the hill of curses " (d/m), is in harmony with its sombre 
functions of criminal jurisdiction. We can only guess at its 
original composition. One of the latest theories on the subject 
of its probable constitution, that of Lange and Gilbert, is a 
development of a hint given by the Attic historian Philochorus 
that the council was composed of the nine Archons and the 
fifty-one Ephelae. 3 That it was constituted through the archon- 
sliip alone, and filled with present and past holders of that 
ofiice a theory favoured by the Constitution of Athens * is far 
less probable; for it is not likely that even after 683 it so 

1 Pans, i, 28 ; Ath. /"V. 57. p. 214) thinks that Qtoos refers to 

2 Hut. SW. 19. Disl'ninchiwd per- trials before the Aruiopaguti, ff<f>aya,l 
HOHH were to he xvutorud to their civic. to tho.se before the lOphi'too. 
privileges ir\}p foot. t| 'Apctov vdyov 3 Philocliorus 58 (Fragn. JIM, 
1) &rot IK. r&v tyertav . . . KaraoiKa- (httec. i. 3!)1). Both the constituent 
ffOfrres . . . M <f>uvt{} $ ff^ayalcri^ elements are hero mentioned, but they 
. . . tfavyw fire 6 fctrftds ttftdvii i)5e. are .separated in time. 

Sandys (ArkttttWs C'W& </ Athens * Ath. fol. 3. 



DEMOCEACY 145 



immediately lost its independent character of a 
The college of nine may have always formed a portion of the body, 
but other members it must have had, and these may have been 
the Ephetae. When Solon is said to have " set the Areiopagus 
before the Ephetae," the meaning may be that he eliminated 
these additional members, composing the council exclusively of 
Archons and ex-Archons a theory which explains Plutarch's 
apparent belief that it was Solon who first made the archonship 
a stepping-stone to the Areiopagus. His further statement 
that "most people" 1 attributed the very creation of this 
assembly to Solon is particularly valuable as showing that 
there could have been little evidence for its constitution or its 
powers before that time, even though its previous existence 
might be proved by its mention in one of Solon's laws. The 
attempt at reconstruction made by the author of the Constitution 
of Athens is characterised by greater boldness than success. 
The Areiopagus, as it was known at a somewhat later date, is 
carried back to a time for which there was no direct evidence ; 
the account throws little light either on its original constitution 
or on the growth of its powers, and refers to a period earlier 
than Draco certain vaguely-defined prerogatives which Plutarch, 
following other authorities, refers to Solon. 

The functions which tradition assigned to the early Areiopagus 
are as various as they are vague. Besides the elective powers 
which we have already noticed, it makes it the chief adminis- 
trative body, 2 credits it with a guardianship of the ordinances of 
the state, 3 with an autocratic censorial authority over the lives of 
the citizens, and, after the time of Draco, with a power of 
enforcing, and apparently revising, the laws. 4 These powers 
reappear, almost in precisely the same forms, in the Solonian 
Areiopagus, that reformer either investing it with or allowing 
it to retain a general oversight of the whole state and the 
guardianship of the laws, together with censorial functions 
which extended to an inquisitorial examination into the means 
of livelihood of particular citizens. An added power, connected 

1 ol ir\eiffTOi, Sol. 19. 3 Ath. Pol 3 rty juto rd^tv 

2 Ath. Pol. 3. Yet, .it the time of dia.rype'tv roOs vtufiQvs. 

the conspiracy of Cylon (cm;. 628), 4 Ath. Pol. 4 ejfiv 5 r< ad 

Tlmcydides (i. 126) makes the nine irpbs rty rwv 'ApcoTrayiTuv 

Arclions, Herodotus (v. 71) apparently cfoayy&Xa?, farwfatrom rap' 

the prytames of the naucraries, the d&jce&rat vfyov. 
chief administrative power. 



U6 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

with its guardianship of the laws but created by Solon, was that 
of protecting the constitution against traitors and it not only 
took the initiatory steps, but originally exercised jurisdiction 
in such cases of treason. 1 Besides these functions we may 
safely attribute to the Areiopagus the powers which it is found 
to possess, in later times, even after its authority had been 
curtailed. Its guardianship of the sacred olive groves, known 
from a speech of Lysias, 2 is probably but one instance of a 
general power of inspection over the cuUus of the community ; 
while even in the fourth century the choice of an advocate to 
plead a religious cause before the amphictyony of Delphi was 
entrusted to this body. 3 The criminal jurisdiction, which it 
still retained and never lost, covered cases of murder, wounding, 
poisoning, and arson. 4 

This summary is sufficient to show that the Areiopagus was 
a great power in the state, and the new mode of its constitution 
made it tend to become a still greater power. Nine Archons 
passed into it each year, 5 and it would thus become a large 
body, yet not so large as to be unwieldy. In the Areiopagus 
of the Solonian constitution we have a dignified self-existent 
council, charged with a great trust and gifted with exceptional 
powers, receiving annually the highest officials of the state, and 
capable, ife seems, of rejecting unworthy members from its body. 6 
The tenure of office was for life, and though at a later period 
we find that the Areiopagites could be called to account, like 
other Athenian magistrates, before the popular courts r (at what 
intervals of time we do not know), yet at this early period they 
may have been irresponsible. The power of the council and its 
dominant position in the state are shown by the fact that the 
struggle which ended in the full assertion of the Athenian 
democracy, is represented as a struggle between the authority 
of the Areiopagus and the rising power of the demos. Aristotle 
sums up the situation when he tells us that "the reputation 
gained by the Areiopagus in the Persian Wars seemed to tighten 

1 Ath. Pol. 8 icai roifs lirl AraraXtf<ra (Plut. Sol. 19), and according to one 
row Sfyov G-wLffra^vovs txptvev, 26Xw- account, in the fourth century, of the 
POS 06r[os] v6fuv (* el<ra.yye\tas) irepl Archons of the year as well (Lysias 
atiruiv. irepl TOV <njK00 22). 

2 Lys, irepl TOV ffijKov. There is evidence of a special Soxir 

3 Dera. d& Cor. 13-i. ftac'ia of incoming members before the 

4 Ath. Pol. 57 ; Lysias de caed. Areiopagus itself, even for the fourth 
Kratosth. 30. century (Athenae. p. 566 f). 

5 It was composed of ex-Archons 7 Aesch. c. Gtes. 20. 



vi DEMOCRACY 147 

the reins of government, while on the other hand the victory 
of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served 
in the fleet and won for the Athenians the empire of the sea, 
strengthened the democracy." l The more detailed narrative 2 
informs us that, after the Persian Wars, the Areiopagus grew in 
strength and "governed the city," basing this supremacy on no 
"act of state" (Soy^a), but simply on the reputation it had 
gained by its conduct of affairs before the battle of Salamis, 
and that this hegemony lasted for seventeen years (479-462). 
A de facto hegemony of this kind possessed by a council is 
generally based on a moral control exercised over individual 
magistrates. The difficulty is to understand how this control 
was extended over the popular bodies, the ecclesia and the 
heliaea ; for the entire dependence of the popular assemblies on 
the magistrates, which guaranteed the Senate's ascendency at 
Eome, seems to have been lacking in the Athens even of this 
period. The control exercised by the council must have been 
more direct and the vague powers, with which it is originally 
credited the guardianship of the law and the direction of the 
magistrate must now, strained to their uttermost, have seemed 
new prerogatives, 3 and have overshadowed every department of 
the state. The people might decide, but the Areiopagus might 
revoke its decision, or impede the magistrate in carrying it into 
effect. Yet, even in the very year when the council had gained 
its new power, Aristeides had carried the reform which under- 
mined the influence of the landed aristocracy; and eminently 
suited as the government of this council was for the active 
imperial organisation of the next few years, it was doomed as 
soon as its efficiency came to be doubted or its necessity failed 
to be realised. The challenge came in 462 from Ephialtes "the 
incorruptible," the first great demagogue of Athens, who crowned 
a successful career of criticism and impeachment of Areiopagites 
and high officials with the destruction of the one barrier which 
impeded the free march of the demos. By his side stood 
Pericles, still a tiro in politics, but a recognised adherent of the 
party of progress. 4 The result of the revolution effected by 

1 PoLv. 4= p. 1304 a. by the Ath. Pol. as the supporter of 

2 Ath. Pol. 23, 25. Ephialtes, has been eliminated from the 

3 They are spoken of as "acquired narrative in accordance with the usually 
powers" (torlffem) (Ath. Pol. 25). accepted chronology of Thucydides (L 

4 Arist. Pol. h. 12 ; Plut. Per. 7 ; Ath. 136-137). 
Pol 25, 27. Themistocles, introduced 



U8 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

the two reformers was to force the Areiopagus from its uncon- 
stitutional position as the de facto head of the state, and .to strip 
it of certain of its legal powers its guardianship of the law, its 
control of the magistrates, and probably its censorial functions. 
The council still retained its criminal jurisdiction and its power 
of religious supervision. The protection of the state against 
treasonable designs, with which Solon had entrusted it, continued 
to be exercised in a modified form. The council had the right 
of making a revelation or statement (<x7ro</>acrts) to the people 
concerning some danger with which it believed the state to be 
threatened. Here its duty might end, aiid the case might be 
tried in one of the popular courts ; but it is probable that the 
people sometimes entrusted the Aroiopagus with the process. 1 

As a political power the council was dead, but its past was 
not wholly forgotten, and the very grimness of the associations 
connected with the ancient council which sat on the seat of the 
Furies and wiped out the stain of blood kept alive a reverence 
for it in the popular mind, of which party leaders like Demos- 
thenes were not slow to avail themselves when it suited their 
political purposes. Throughout the latter part of the fifth 
century we scarcely hear of it ; but with the more self-centred 
politics of the fourth century it again becomes something of a 
power. Social distinctions were then more keenly folt than 
they had been at the time when the whole state was straining 
every nerve to retain an empire. And the Areiopagus was a 
social power, composed as it was almost exclusively of distin- 
guished and wealthy citizens ; for the poorer classes did not often 
present themselves for the unromunerative office of Archon. In 
the last days of Athenian independence it throws in its weight 
with the propertied classes, who lean on Macedon, and opposes 
the irreconcilables, who clamour for war. The assembly, which 
in its prime had helped to save Greece from the Persians, 
recognised in its old age that resistance was useless, and that 
the independent city-state was a thing of the past. 

Our account of the development of the original constituent 
elements of the state has left Athens with a magistracy almost 
annihilated and a council crushed. Let us now observe the 

1 The most extmuu case is that of investigated the case of tho bribery 

the traitor, AuUphon, accused of a plot of Ilarpalus (Dohiurch. c, Dcnuutfh. 

to bum the Athenian docks (I)cin. de 82 11'.), which it sent before a ' 
Oir. 133). Tho AroiojuigiiH also 



vi DEMOCRACY 149 

processes which enabled the popular bodies to be a substitute 
for these vanished authorities. 



3 Epochs of Constitutional Reform at Athens 

The earliest movements of the demos at Athens were 
prompted by two pressing dangers the arbitrary character of 
the Eupatrid government and the economic distress of the 
time. It is difficult to say which of these evils pressed 
hardest; but the first was more easily met than the second, 
and reform was first mooted in the shape of a demand for the 
publication of a code ; the rules according to which Eupatrid 
judges decided were to be known, and the penalties of the 
criminal law to be fixed. The demand was met by the 
publication of the laws by Draco (drc. 62 1) 1 a mighty work, 
of which only a fragment, embodying a reform which we have 
already discussed, has been preserved. The elaborate civil 
code of Solon superseded this Eupatrid law, and what may 
have been Draco's sole change the new law of homicide 
alone survives to mark the work of the legislator. It is true 
that an almost certainly spurious record 2 attributes to Draco, 
and even partly to times preceding him, a constitution of a 
curiously artificial character a timocracy which recognised the 
rule of the middle class, with a magistracy partly elected 
partly chosen by lot, with an assembly attendance at which was 
enforced by fines, and a council the members of which were 
chosen in rotation from the qualified citizens. But these 
prophetic anticipations of the political refinements of a later 
age have with justice been regarded as a political forgery, 
originating perhaps in the reforms contemplated at the close 
of the fifth century : the work of men who wished to get even 
behind Cleisthenes, the darling of the moderate oligarch, and 
by appealing to the name of Draco to enlist authority if not 
sympathy on the side of a partial subversion of the Athenian 
democracy. 

The structure of a constitution, on a carefully-laid-out plan, 
is first found in the work of Solon (eirc. 594). But the 
economic evils of the time were such that the ground had to 
be carefully prepared before the first stone of the structure 

1 Arist. Pol. li. 12 ; Atk. Pol. 41. 2 Ath. Pol. 4. 



150 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

could be laid. Solon bears a double character. He was, in 
the first place, a "corrector" (6\o/>0urnjs) called on t<? abolish 
certain temporary evils, or, regarded as an intermediary 
between certain opposing classes of the population, he might, 
from this point of view, be spoken of as a " reconciler " (SiaA- 
Aa/cT'/}s). In the second place, he is the framer of a con- 
stitution (i/o/zofler^s). 1 It is with this second character that 
we are chiefly concerned, but his social reforms have such an 
important political bearing that they demand some notice. 
The agrarian question which he came to solve seems to have 
originated with the abuse of a system of m&ay&r tenure, which 
worked ill in a country so little fitted by nature for a purely 
agricultural life as Attica. The land which was not the 
immediate domain of the Eupatrid families and worked by 
their slaves, was occupied by tenants who were in a position 
neither of clientship nor of serfdom, but whose dependence 
on a lord was marked by their payment to him of one-sixth 
of the produce of their farms ; 2 otherwise these TreAomxi or 
K'T7//^o/)tot were free, and their allotments were heritable within 
the clan, though not capable of alienation without it. But a 
bad harvest put the farmer at the mercy of his landlord, debts 
were incurred on the security of the persons of the debtor and 
of his family, the tenants became serfs or were sold out of the 
country, and mortgage-pillars (O/MH) marking the debt sprang 
up everywhere on the farmers' lands. Solon seems to have 
found but one means of meeting the difficulty the heroic 
measure of a cancelling of all debts (\ptwv airoKoirij), whether 
owed to individuals or to the state, accompanied by a pro- 
hibition against lending on the security of the person. 3 This 
was the famous seisacMheia, which removed the burdens from 
the bodies of the masses, and was the first step in the 
establishment of a popular constitution in which their minds 
might have free play. The next preliminary was a work of 
amnesty, taking the form of a restoration of civic rights to 
classes of citizens who had lost them. Solon cancelled all 
decrees of TC/AZ except in the case of those who had been 
condemned for murder, homicide, or an attempt at tyranny. 4 



Ko.i ftonoOtTi)? (Pint. Mnl. family could have lived off one-sixth 

16) ; oiaXXci/crv/v *.ai dpxovra, (Ath. of the produce of its land in a country 

Pol. f>). so ban on as Attica is incredible. 
2 Atiotlwr explanation makes the s Ath. Pol. 6. 

pay iive-hixths ; Imt that a 4 p. 144, note 2. 



vi DEMOCRACY 151 

The constitution which he then proceeded to frame cannot 
be defined in simple terms. It wore the external appearance 
of a landed timocracy, for, though it is doubtful whether Solon 
first instituted, or merely availed himself of, the division of the 
citizens into the four classes of pentacosiomedimni, hippeis, 
zeugitae, and thetes, he at any rate first made them the basis 
of political life by making membership of them a requisite 
condition for holding office. As the census was estimated 
wholly on landed property, 1 there is some justification for the 
statement that Solon wished to leave the offices of state "as 
they were," i.e. to the rich proprietors of the land ; 2 but the 
preservation of a wide circle of holders of office may possibly 
be the meaning of the law mentioned by Aristotle, 3 "pro- 
hibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he 
pleased," for every fresh acquisition of land would mean a 
renewed exclusion of certain citizens from the higher classes, 
and a timocracy of this kind might, if indiscriminate acquisi- 
tion were allowed, develop into a narrow oligarchy or Swa- 
crreia although no doubt this law was also directed to prevent 
a return to the economic conditions which preceded the 
seisachtheia. The permanence of these Solonian property-classes 
is remarkable; they survived the Cleisthenean reforms and 
continued down (with important bearings on public and private 
law) late into the fourth century. The census on which they 
were based was, as we saw, 4 altered, to meet the changing 
conditions of the time, from an estimate of land to one of 
all property; and the chief reason for their permanence was 
that, before the institution of the system of taxation by 
"symmories" in 378, the census of Solon became the basis for 
the collection of the extraordinary war-tax (elo-fopa). When 
it became so is not known, and no date is assigned for the 
introduction of the ingenious sliding-scale of taxation by which 
pentacosiomedimni were assessed on an imaginary capital of a 
talent (i.e. twelve times their income), the hippeis on half a 
talent (ten times their income), the zeugitae on ten minae (five 
times their income), and the thetes remained untaxed. 5 But 
if this system be referred to Solon, it is clear that extra- 
ordinary taxation pressed only on land, and that the privileges 

1 "In dry and liquid measures," 3 Pol. ii. 7. 
Ath. Pol. 7 ; Hut Sol. 18. 4 p. 142. 

2 ti>. 18. 5 Pollux viii. 129-130. 



152 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of the aristocracy of office were severely balanced by duties. 
We do indeed find the mention of elcrfopai in connection with 
Solon's system. They were local contributions for local 
purposes, collected in the naucraries and disbursed by the 
vawpapoi, the local officials whom Solon retained for purposes 
of finance ; * but whether these dues were akin to the later 
extraordinary property-tax we do not know. 

Primarily, at least, the census was meant to form the basis 
for admission to office. All our authorities are agreed that 
only the three higher classes were admitted to apxy, the thetes 
being admitted to no office but having only a share in the 
ecclesia and the popular courts ; 2 and this word apx^ includes 
membership of the newly -created council, from which the 
lowest class was also excluded. The office that still stood 
highest in titular rank, and perhaps in real power, the archon- 
ship, was, as we saw, restricted to the pentacosiomedimni ; the 
general result of the new arrangements being, we are told, to 
leave the chief magistracies in the hands of those who already 
possessed them, the yvupifLoi and the eilTro/xu. 3 

A council of four hundred members was created, one 
hundred being chosen from each of the four Ionic tribes. We 
are riot told how the appointment to this body was made; 
there is no anachronism in supposing election by the tribes, 
since this was employed for the preliminary stage in the 
selection of Archons ; but the members were perhaps selected 
by lot from the qualified citizens in rotation. 4 The council 
was of a " probouleutic " character, 5 and its chief, perhaps its 
only, function was to prepare business for the assembly. We 
do not know whether it possessed independent powers as an 
administrative body or the limited jurisdiction of the later 
ftovX'i'i. Its existence seems to imply an extension of the 
deliberative powers of the ecclesia, which may not have been 
created, but which must have been increased, by Solon. The 
proboulculic council of this type is a new thing in Athenian, 
perhaps in Greek, politics. This permanent deliberative board 
secured constant and regular meetings for the ecclesia ; it was 

1 Ath. Pul. 8. special landed qualifications required 

2 Arist. Pol ii. 12; Ath. Pol 7; for each. 

Pollux viii. ISO. Amount offices the 3 Arist. Pol ii. 12 ; Hut. Sol 18. 
Ath. Pol. enumerates the nine Arehons, 4 The mode of appointment which 

fchu treasurers, the I'olelno, the Klcvun, llio Alh. Pol. (4) assigns to the doubtful 

the (Jolaerelae, but does not state the council of Draco. 5 Hut. 8ul 19. 



vi DEMOCRACY 153 

only a modification of the popular assembly, separator! from it 
by no l^rge gap and with only a slight restrictive qualifica- 
tion for its members. We do not know the nature of the 
co-operation between the two assemblies, or whether Solon 
instituted intermediary committees answering to the later irpv- 
rams: it is possible that the Archons, who still possessed 
considerable executive power, may have been the presidents 
of both assemblies. 

But if the tendency of this reform is democratic, in the 
next democracy stares us in the face. A criticism preserved 
in Aristotle's Politics is to the effect that "Solon appears 
to have established the democracy by composing the jury 
courts (TO, SiKacrnjpta) out of all the citizens/' l even though he 
did give what seemed the minimum of power to the people 
the power of electing its magistrates and of calling them to 
account. 2 The function of the courts here characterised as 
democratic is that of the audit of magistrates, and the judg- 
ment is but an illustration of the maxim that the character of 
a constitution will never correspond to the character of its 
nominal executive, if judicial functions (including political 
jurisdiction) are given to another body; for the state will 
always be swayed by the classes represented in the judicial 
body. Now this popular judicature of Solon's was something 
distinct from every other department in the state ; it was not 
even the ecclesia summoned for judicial business, for our 
authorities assert that Solon created separate courts, chosen 
from all the citizens and apparently chosen by lot. 3 This 
plurality need not imply the fixed and permanent panels of 
the later democracy; it rather suggests groups of citizens 
summoned and sworn to hear separate appeals from the 
magistrates. Before these courts the audit of magistrates was 
from the first conducted, if a special charge was made against 
their conduct while in office; and thus the procedure was 
originated for the practice of the later democracy, in which, 
after the examination of the magistrates' accounts by the Aoyi- 
orcu, and, if necessary, by the higher auditors (ei>0woi), the 
ultimate reference, whether on charges of malversation or 
abuse of power, was made to a <k/cao-T?//>ioi/. If the essence 
of the "rule of law" is that magistrates are tried before the 

1 Pol. ii. 12. 2 #. iii. 11. 

3 Anst Pol. 11. 12 (tiaiporto 6V) ; Ath. Pul. 7, 9 ; i'lut. SuL 18. 



154 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

same courts as ordinary citizens, 1 this rule may be said to have 
been inaugurated at Athens by Solon. Democracy, as we saw, 
means, practically though not ideally, the power of criticism 
and punishment by the masses; this power was exercised at 
Athens through the popular courts, and by their institution 
Solon was (perhaps unwittingly) responsible for a startling 
democratic reform. 

The collective aggregate of the people, which assembled 
in sections for purposes of jurisdiction, was known as the 
heliaea 2 ; in organisation it differed wholly from the ecclesia, 
but was chiefly distinguished from it as a sworn from an 
unsworn body, the institution of the heliastic oath being itself 
referred to Solon. 3 In this respect the Athenian popular 
courts differed from the judicia populi of the Eomans, with 
which they have been compared. 4 In Rome they were simply 
the ordinary legislative assemblies, the sovereign body gathered 
to listen to appeals and to exercise their right of pardon. In 
Athens they cannot be regarded even as committees of the 
ecclesia, for with the oath they assume a responsible character 
which makes their members guardians of the constitution even 
against possible decrees of the assembly, sworn, amongst other 
things, to preserve the democracy and never to revert to 
extreme social measures such as a redivision of the land or 
the abolition of debts. 

The final assertion of the exclusive judicial competence of 
the people was the result of gradual growth. 5 It sprang from 
the practice of hearing appeals from the magistrate, who 
passed in consequence from an independent court into a court 
of first instance, and finally into an official mainly engaged in 
conducting the mere preliminaries of a trial. The scope of 
Solon's reform made this development inevitable ; for not only 
was the appeal applied to civil as well as to criminal cases, but 
the courts appealed to were apparently from the first inter- 
preters not of the fact only but of the law, and the very 
obscurity of Solon's legislation was thought to have assisted 

1 Dicey IMW of tlw (jMibtitutiun p. Although portions of this oath show 

181. ' a later origin, the very attribution of it 

- The word 7/Xiaa occurs in a law to Solon expresses the belief that he 

of Solon's quoted by Lysias (Kara, constituted the sworn " heliaea." 

(Seofwiprov a'), the genuineness of 4 Plufc. tiulunis et Poylicnlae coup. 2. 

which there seenis no reason to doubt. D Anst. Pol. ii. 12; Atk. Pol. 9; 

Demoslh. c. Timoef. pp. 740-47. Hut *SW. 18. 



vi DEMOCRACY 155 

the increase of their power. But under his constitution the 
Archons % probably retained considerable powers of independent 
jurisdiction, and it was some time before their functions de- 
generated into tlie mere formal duties of the avaKpuris. 1 

The general verdict of the later Greek world on the Solonian 
constitution seems to have been that it was intended to be a 
mixed type of government. Athens for the moment seemed to 
be a harmonious mixture of oligarchic, aristocratic, and demo- 
cratic elements ; the first was represented by the hardly im- 
paired power of the Areiopagus, the second by the magistracy, 
the third by the popular courts. 2 Without denying the justice 
of this general view, Aristotle in the passage of the Politics 
which we have cited finds it an easy task to show that the real 
tendency of Solon's reforms was in the direction of democracy. 
The most capable legislator that Greece ever saw found it 
impossible to frame a mixed constitution the balance of which 
should be permanent, for his liberalism almost outweighed his 
capacity. It is true that in the mixed governments of Greece 
generally the demos was to some extent represented directly or 
indirectly, yet it never had that singular power of judicial 
investigation and the scrutiny of public offices which rendered 
it inevitable that in the long run the other powers of the state 
should yield to that of the people. "The demos when it is 
master of the voting pebble becomes master of the constitution," 
was the verdict of a writer of the close of the fourth century, 3 
to whom the retrospect showed the mode in which the demo- 
cracy of his day had been made. But was this foreseen by 
Solon, or are we to accuse him of shortsightedness in laboriously 
building up a complex structure the ruin of which was assured 
by the disproportionate weight given to one of its component 
parts? Perhaps he was neither wholly prescient nor wholly 
blind. The critics of Solon are the critics of change. Greece 
had seen legislators who had established rigid systems of 
government which they meant to be permanent, and which 
they held to be practically, if not ideally, the best; while 
permanence itself, with the strength and reverence which grow 
out of the absence of change, was an object of mingled hope and 

1 Suidas 8.v. &PXW- On this subject 2 Plut. Sol. 18 ; Ari&t. Pol. ii. 12. 
the Ath. Pol. (9) sensibly remarks 01) 3 Ath. Pol. 9 /ti5/>tos yap &v 6 
yap StKaiov K r&v vvv yiyvonfrtov dXV 8f)fw$ ri}$ Mfov Ktipios ylyverat rf?s 
e/c T?)S &\\y$ TroXtret'cw Geupetv rty 
tueivov fio 



156 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

admiration to the political speculators of Greece. Whether 
Solon can be called a legislator or a thinker of t&is type 
is at least an open question. He g<ive the people as much 
power as they could bear, but we have no right to say 
that, because certain elements in his constitution inevitably 
led to further political development, this development was 
wholly unforeseen. He himself represents his reforms as 
essentially measures of compromise : " I gave the people such 
power as is sufficient; I threw my strong shield over both 
parties." 1 Perhaps the power, even as he gave it, was a trine 
more than "sufficient," for he was the most liberal legislator 
that Greece had yet seen. He set Athens politically in advance 
of other Greek states, while, in place of the restricted country 
life characteristic of the Athenians up to this time, he was by 
his commercial legislation the inaugurator of a brisker city life 
which was one of the chief sources of her further political 
development. He was, if not the creator of the Athenian 
democracy, at least the creator of the main conditions which 
rendered this democracy possible. 

But meanwhile, though he had created a liberal government 
for which some degree of permanence might be hoped through 
its seemingly even balance of political claims, Solon had omitted 
to correct certain evils which threatened any constitution in 
Athens with constant danger. He had attempted by one of his 
laws 2 to create a national spirit and to do away with the 
political apathy characteristic of a demos unaccustomed to exert 
its powers ineffectually, as was shown by the fact that it was 
this apathy which rendered the subsequent restoration of 
Peisislratus possible. But there were two disturbing causes 
which he had not banished. The first was to be found in the 
local feuds which existed before his legislation and continued 
after it. So far from attempting to break up these local 
unions, his legislation must have intensified their strength ; for, 
while the " men of the plains " would have been for the most 
part pentacosioiuodimni and hippois, the "men of the hills" 
would probably have been in the main thetes, and thus the 
members of these local divisions, which were based to a large 
extent on distinctions of wealth, must have found themselves 
in different classes of the Solonian census. The second dis- 

1 Solon ap. Ath. /W. 12. of drtjufa on any 0110 guilty of neutrality 

2 Thill which imposed the intimity in a poht-ii-jil ordins (Pint. Hd. 20). 



n DEMOCRACY 157 

integrating influence was due to the power and separate interests 
of the cl^ns, and Solon had kept the four Ionic tribes and the 
clan system which was an integral part of this distribution. 
Both these elements of disturbance soon showed themselves. The 
local feuds were the proximate cause of the usurpation o the 
Peisistratidae, and this despotism seems to have been the first 
power which succeeded in stamping them out entirely. The 
clan feuds reappear again immediately after the expulsion of 
the tyrants in the struggle between Cleisthenes, the leader of 
the dominant Alcmaeonids, and Isagoras, who headed a union 
of the other clans against him. But at this crisis the influence 
of Solon's constitution, and possibly also of the succeeding 
despotism, was felt in the important fact that the demos was a 
factor to be reckoned with and an element which had to be 
taken into account even in a dynastic feud. "Cleisthenes," 
Herodotus tells us, " took the demos into partnership," and 
with its help he inaugurated a new series of reforms. 

It was in the year 508 that the firm foundations for the 
later democratic machinery were laid. 1 That Cleisthenes had 
learnt the lesson taught by the immediate past and the cir- 
cumstances of his own rise to power, is shown by his change in 
the tribes. He abolished the four Ionic tribes and substituted 
ten new ones. Each tribe was composed of smaller units called 
" demes," which were not necessarily contiguous ; and therefore 
each, though of a local character, was not representative of a 
local interest. Their names were derived from eponymous 
Attic heroes and drawn from Attic legends; such names as 
Aegeis, Pandionis, Cecropis, 2 preserving the memory of ancient 
kings of Attica, suggested of themselves a union of the whole 
people. Each tribe had its chapel and cultivated the worship 
of its eponymous hero, but as no local or peculiar traditions 
were associated with the names of these deified personalities, 
these separate worships could not interfere with the feeling of 
the unity of the state. To preserve this unity and to destroy 
the old clan influence by a complete divorce of state from family 
organisation, was the meaning of the redivision ; it was typical 

1 The date of the Cleisthenean con- represents the reforms as not being (at 

stitution, left doubtful by Herodotus least finally) completed until alter the 

(v. 66, 69), is fixed by the A tJi. PuL expulsion of Cleonicnes and Isagoras. 

(21) as the archousliip of Isagoras, in a Aeantis was the only tribe called 

the fourth year after the expulsion of after a &o? : but Aias had been a 

the Peisistratidae. The Ath. Pol. "neighbour and ally " (Her. v. 66). 



158 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of the reforms thought appropriate to a democratic legislator, 
whose object should be to make the people " mix as much as 
possible with one another, to destroy separate interests, and 
thus to create a common national spirit." 1 But, not content 
with fostering the tendencies that might make for democracy 
in the existing members of the state, Cleisthenes infused into 
Athens a fresh strain of plebeian blood and sentiment by con- 
f erring civic rights on a large number of individuals of foreign 
birth, or of the lowest origin. These were metoecs either 
stranger residents or enfranchised slaves, doubtless engaged in 
mercantile callings and therefore of advanced and liberal views 
whom he enrolled in his new tribes. 2 He necessarily gave 
them also membership of the phratry ; for this had become the 
test of citizenship before the time of Cleisthenes, although it is, 
as we saw, improbable that he actually increased the number of 
these associations. The legislator often found in religion a 
potent means of healing the tendency to disintegration; and 
certain words of Aristotle, to the effect that legislators of this 
typo should reduce the number of private cults (t'Sia lepd) and 
make them common to all tho citizens, 3 may imply that 
Cleistherios adopted the remedy of raising into public worships 
some that were originally private. This was possibly effected 
by making the " orgeories " participate to a greater extent than 
they had hitherto done in the worship of the clans. But the 
rights of the clan were not touched by his legislation, so far 
as these were based on natural family ties. Even its indirect 
influence on public life still continued, for membership of a 
powerful clan provided a leader with a ready following; but 
with Cleisthenes its direct political importance disappears. 

This change in the tribes had an important influence both 
on military and civil offices, and some of these changes which 
were realised either immediately or after the lapse of a few 
years may be noticed here. Although we cannot attribute the 
institution of the ten or/xmjyoi to Cleiathenes, we are told that 
tho number was fixed shortly after his reforms, 4 when the 
generals were brought into strict relations with the tribes. 
Each general was elected by the ^uA^ which he commanded 



1 Arist. /W. vi. 4 = p. 1819 b ; Ath. aents Glctalhunes as making citizens of 
Pol. 21. actual slaves. 

2 Aria!,. 7U iii. 2 iro\\ofa y&p 3 ib. vi. 4~p. 1319 b. 
t(lm\{TVff frous ital cSoi'Aoi/s ttcrolKOvs. 4 Ath. /W. 22. 
Others read /cal /xcrokoi/s, winch rupre- 



vr DEMOCRACY 15G 

and to which ho belonged, and at this period each was merely 
a tribal officer. 1 The Polemarch was commander-in-chief, and the 
army was drawn up in the order of the tribes. 2 The Athenian 
fleet was still supplied by the naucraries, which, as we saw, 
were now raised to fifty, and the duty of its upkeep by private 
individuals (the rpn}pa.pxia) was in all probability still connected 
with these divisions. 

When we turn to civil offices of state, we find that, in the 
developed Athenian constitution of the fifth and fourth centuries, 
the number ten or a multiple of ten forms throughout the basis 
of the official boards; but, although it was Cleisthenes who 
introduced this decimal system into Athenian public life, only 
one of these many boards can with any authority be attributed 
to him. This was the body of ten " receivers " (dircSe/crat), 3 
chosen by lot one from each tribe, as these corporations usually 
were. They were controllers and auditors of the Exchequer, 
receiving the revenues " before the senate in the senate-house " * 
and checking the receipts. As the chief financial officials they 
replaced the older board of the Colacretae, 5 but the primitive 
control of the latter over the domestic economy of the prytaneium 
was still continued and even in the course of time increased. 
They were still entrusted with the care of money spent on 
public dinners and on sacrifices, and after the jury-pay had 
been introduced they were its treasurers. For the StKocrrt.^ 
/Ata-flos was paid from the court fees (7rpvrav<-Ta.) } and was thus 
brought within the sphere of the financial officers of the prytan- 
eium. In all their other duties they were replaced by the new 
board of apodectae, which was destined to be permanent. 

But the greatest of all the creations dependent on the new 
state-divisions was the /3ov\r] of five hundred, composed of fifty 
members from each of the ten tribes. What precise organisation 
Cleisthenes gave this council we are never told, but it appears 
from certain indications that it now became a more self-existent 
body than the parallel council of Solon. The connection of the 

1 Thus at Marathon Aristeides of 4 Ath. Pol. 48. 

Alopeke commanded the Antiocliis, B Kw\a.Kp4ra,i is derived l>y Lunge 

Theinistocles the Phrearian the Leoutis IVorn /cwXa and Kctpta. They W<TCJ nin 

(Plut. Arist. 5). who cut up joints for the tlimuTs iu 

2 Her. vi. iii. the itrytaiioiuni. The alternative form 

3 Harpocrat. s.v. ; Androtion stated jtuXayplrou would mean collectors of 
that they were appointed by Cleisthenes joints (aydpw). Ollioin Is of this uunu* 
in place of the Colacretae. were fouud also in Cyzicuu. 



160 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

apodectae with this corporation may point to new financial 
functions, while a few years later the bouleutic oatfa was in- 
stituted, 1 which looks as though its functions of administrative 
jurisdiction commenced about this time. 

A system of local government formerly imperfectly re- 
presented by the naucraries was the completion of the 
legislator's scheme. Its basis was formed by the recognition 
of the SrjjLoi, most of which had existed before as hamlets in 
Attica and were only rearranged by Cleisthenes in his new 
tribes. The denies belonging to the same tribe were not locally 
contiguous, this arrangement being made to break up local 
unions and to prevent tribal jealousies the whole number was 
first divided up into thirty local aggregates called trittyes, and 
these Larger unions were distributed by lot amongst the tribes, 
the effect of this distribution being that each tribe contained 
demes in different parts of Attica. 2 If the apparent statement 
of Herodotus, that the number of demes was originally a 
hundred, is correct, it must have been increased from time to 
time, for later evidences point to a number far in excess of 
this. 3 The deme- names were partly local, partly those of 
eponymous heroes, In later times wo find an elaborate deme- 
organisation, and these unions became very perfect centres of 
local government. How much of this is attributable to 
Cleisthenes wo do not know; he certainly instituted the 
B^ftapxot) who exercised the kind of powers formerly possessed 
by the presidents of the naucraries, and this is equivalent to 
saying that the denies became the centres of local government in 
all questions connected with local taxation. The demarchs had 
also at this time the preservation of the state-register (A^ftap- 
KIKOV ypafi/jMTWH'), the official designation of the Athenian citizen 
by his demo having now been introduced. 4 

The final institution connected with the name of Cleisthenes 
was the great precautionary measure of the ostracism, 5 afterwards 
imitated by the democracies of Argos arid Syracuse, and found also 
at Megara and Milotus. It was a means of securing the absence 

1 Ath. Pol. 22. WC). If wo exclude duplicates (such 

v #. us a "loftw" corresponding to an 

8 Her. v. 61) Stua, Si (ScKa "XV > #t "upper" JLimptrae), the number of 

talllngO KO.I rods Q'fjiJLoiis K&rtvGifJte & known names is 168 ((jclzcr in Her 

T&S $uX<s. Polemo (of the end of tlio nianu's Ntanktalt. pp. 797 if.). 

third or begumiugof the second century ) 4 A th. Pol. l.c. 

gave the number as 174 (fcJlrabo p. ib. 



VI DEMOCRACY 161 

from the state for ten years of an unwelcome citizen by a decree 
of the people, which, however, did not entail the loss of honour, 
rights, or property. The primary motive for its introduction 
at Athens, as subsequently at Syracuse, was the avoidance of 
tyranny. It was, therefore, meant to be employed when one 
man's influence became so great as to threaten the existence of 
the constitution ; it was an effectual way of showing that there 
was an overwhelming majority against him, and a mode of 
frustrating his possible designs without having to resort to 
violence and bloodshed. But it also served the important 
secondary purpose of producing a national consciousness and 
sustaining an interest in the government, as the careful nature 
of the procedure adopted forced the people to continuous re- 
flection on the political situation. The ecclesia had first to 
determine whether a resort to ostracism was advisable, and on 
this occasion the whole political situation would necessarily be 
discussed. If the resolution was in the affirmative, the people 
met again and voted by tribes, under the presidency of the 
nine Archons and the council, 1 recording on tablets the names 
of the men whom they individually destined for exile. A bare 
majority was sufficient to effect it, but at this second stage six 
thousand votes had to be recorded in all. 2 Considering the 
frailty of Greek constitutional governments, and the recent 
experience of Athens in the time of Cleisthenes, the institu- 
tion was a useful one; but it was evidently open to abuse. 
Ostracism might be worked by a powerful party to banish a 
legitimate constitutional leader. It was a combination of this 
kind one resulting from the mutual fears of party leaders 
that resulted in the banishment of the possibly objectionable 
but politically harmless Hyperbolus in 417; :J and this abuse 
caused the downfall of the institution at Athens. Its abstract 
justification is hardly on a level with its utility, unil Aristotle 
rightly treats ostracism as a " tyrannical " act, as an exercise 
of sheer force and a policy comparable to that pursued by 
imperial states, of crushing all likely opposition by force of 
arms; yet he admits that, on the presumption that the ex- 
isting form of the state is worth maintaining, it is a necessary 

1 Append. Photii (Person) p. 675. votes had to be recorded iii all in the 

2 It is improbable that 6000 votes, cases of vfaot iv dvSpL (primler}ia) t 
had to be recorded against a single amongst which ostracism would fall, 
man for ostracism to be effective. It 3 Time. viii. 73, 

was a principle of Attic law that 6000 

M 



162 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

assertion of that community's principle of justice, a means of 
restoring symmetry to the state when it has becgme un- 
symmetrical through the abnormal growth of one of its 
members. 1 

It is somewhat easier to form a general estimate of 
Cleisthenes' work than it was of Solon's, for his aims were 
simpler. To ancient writers he sometimes appeared the 
creator of the democracy ; 2 his restoration of popular govern- 
ment after the despotism of the Peisistratidae might have 
partly suggested the title, 3 but it is sometimes used with a 
deeper meaning which a general review of Cleisthenes' con- 
stitutional arrangements makes it at first sight hard to justify ; 
for, so far as positive reforms went, they were no great advance 
on the Solonian. The Areiopagus still remained a power, the 
magistracy was still limited to the landed class, and we hear of 
no development of the popular judicature. Half a century 
later "the aristocracy of Cleisthenes" was on the lips of con- 
servative statesmen who wished to stem the democratic reforms 
of Pericles; 4 and on the establishment of the oligarchy of 411, 
a proposal was mooted to examine into the laws of Cleisthenes 
as suited to the existing exigencies of the state. 5 His claim as 
a reformer rests on the abolition of certain conditions which 
were unfavourable to any form of established government. 
The break-up of the clan -organisation, the fresh local unions 
which banished old associations and substituted new ones in 
their place, and the introduction of ostracism, wore all means 
of getting rid of disturbing causes. Thus the creations of 
Cleisthenes were permanent, and were the starting-point for 
all further development. The Cleisthenean constitution was 
the unalterable basis on which the future ultra -democratic 
changes rested, and in this sense, but in this sense only, 
Cloisthones was the founder of the Athenian democracy. We 
will now see how this ultimate end was reached. 

Between the times of Cleisthenes and Pericles, Athens had 
passed through the most eventful period of her history. The 
Persians had been fought and conquered, and the Athenian 
Empire had been created. The influence of the Persian War in 
raising the aspirations of the demos is dwelt on by Aristotle, 

1 Arist, Pol iii. 13. * Plut. Oim. 15. 

8 HOT. v. 69 ; vi. 131. c -U/t. Pol. 29. 

8 At/i, Pol 20. Pol. v. 4 = p. 1304 a. 



VI DEMOCRACY 163 

but the influence of the empire was equally great. From 454, 
when tjje treasury of the league was removed from Delos, 
Athens became a "tyrant city," and all Athenians came to feel 
an equal interest in the preservation of the empire which they 
had won and which was a source both of honour and of profit. 
The Periclean idea, as expressed by Thucy elides, is that the 
citizens of Athens, resting on the empire as their material basis, 
should form an ideal of intellectual and political development 
for the Greek world, that the individual Athenian should be a 
type of intellectual many-sidedness and varied political activity. 
Such an ideal as this left no room for an aristocracy within 
Athens, and hence the tendency of political development 
within the state was necessarily democratic. The guidance of 
the Areiopagus had been swept away, and grave duties now 
devolved on the popular bodies. The ecclesia, which had of 
old pronounced on matters of foreign policy, on peace and war, 
had now to decide the most momentous questions of imperial 
administration. To the dicasteries had to be brought important 
cases from the subject allies, such eases as must come under 
the cognisance of an imperial state. This made their business 
infinitely larger, and rendered it necessary to increase the 
attendance at these courts and to properly subdivide their 
functions. When we take all this into consideration, it does 
not surprise us to learn that the chief change connected with 
the name of Pericles was the introduction of payment for state- 
services. Our authorities are inclined to regard this change 
made by Pericles as mere bribery an effort to counteract, the 
influence of his wealthier rival Cimon by "giving the nmssea 
their own property." 1 He taught the people, Greek critics 
said, to live off the state, which practically meant living oil' the 
temporary supremacy of Athens, instead of subsisting on their 
own industry. A possible element of trulh in these charges is 
that the reforms of Pericles may to some extent have been 
directed by the necessities of his political position ; but the 
question of payment admits of another explanation, which shows 
it to be necessarily connected with a political ideal such as that 
which he pursued. Payment for administrative services was 
clearly a necessity of a true democratic constitution, as ancient 
states understood democracy. A modern democracy may tolerate 
the expression of the people's will through representatives, 

1 8id6vat TOIS TroXXois ra a,Mv (Ath. Pol. 27) ; cf. Plut. 1'cr. $>. 



164 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

who may be willing and able to perform their administrative 
duties gratuitously. But to the Greek such a gownment 
WAS aristocratic. Since popular government meant personal 
government on the part of the demos, and such personal 
government, which implied the political education of the 
masses, was part of the Periclean ideal, to secure services from 
the poorer citizens some compensation for the loss of time 
was necessary, and the numerical equality which democracy 
demands would have been a mere fiction had not these services 
been secured by pay. This is the extreme theory of the 
system of payment, the theory as expressed in the institutions 
of the period succeeding the Peloponnesian War. The system 
inaugurated by Pericles fell far short of this. He introduced 
pay only for the courts 1 that is, only for a portion of the 
people engaged in an occupation which absorbed all their time 
and attention. Considering the circumstances of the time this 
was clearly a necessity, for the heliaea was now organised and 
subdivided and perhaps for the first time assumed the form of 
courts sitting permanently, and the increase of business, due to 
the formation of the empire, rendered an increase of attendance 
necessary. Again, the pay as given by Pericles was not a real 
compensation for services. The oi/eaorc/cos /.ucrflos seems origin- 
ally to have been only one obol per day, 2 and, though it was 
afterwards raised to three, the mention of the rpi^oXov by 
Aristophanes in connection with Cleon's name 3 renders it 
probable that it was that statesman, the exaggorator of all 
Periclean tendencies, who was responsible for its introduction. 
Three obols was probably full compensation for services and as 
much as could bo earned in an ordinary trade. 4 But the one 
obol introduced by Pericles must bo looked on rather as an 
<!</>o8wi> a moans of ensuring country people the power of 
getting to Athens and performing their services at all. The 
system as adopted by its first exponent was, therefore, a very 
mild one ; its importance was clue to its recognition of the true 
democratic principle, that services could be expected from all 
the citizens only on the condition of the introduction of some 
such measure. 5 The council of five hundred came also to be 

1 Aiisi. Pol. ii. 12 ; Ath. Pol. 27. hoplites on foreign service. 
8 AriHtoph. Vlmh 803. 5 In Plato's Gmrgiaa (p, 515 B) we find 

3 Kniyhta 255 ; cf. W<utp$ f95. tluit it was Pericles who first made the 

* ft wa the rate of pay for tho llout Athouiana "idle and talkative" (d/ryol 

and half tho rate for tho Athenian /cai \&\oi], which means (interpreted 



vi DEMOCRACY 165 

paid we do not know when, but probably at an early period, 1 

for t&s was a permanent body sitting all the year round, and 

it was as necessary for its members to receive payment as it 
was for the dicasts. The rate was a drachma a day for all 
days except festivals. 2 

The pay for attendance at the ecclesia (/xr0os 1/c/cA^o-tao-Tt- 
KO'S) was a much more sweeping measure. It was not introduced 
until after the Peloponnesian War by Agyrrhius, who became a 
prominent politician about the year 395. The amount was at 
first one obol, which was then raised by a certain Heracleides 
to two, and afterwards by Agyrrhius again to three obols. 3 
This payment was a consequence of the loss of the empire and 
the consequent lack of interest in public business, for we are 
told that it was considered necessary to ensure a sufficient 
attendance of the masses, and a chance reference, dating 
probably from 392, informs us that the attendance became 
larger when the pay had been raised to three obols. 4 This pay- 
ment for the ecclesia was much less necessary than that for the 
other bodies, for the assembly met less frequently and its 
sittings were less prolonged. There is, in fact, some absurdity 
involved in the idea of a whole people paying itself for attend- 
ance on public business, and the payment may have been in the 
nature of a fine, those present gaining what those who were 
absent lost. But the money may have been drawn largely from 
burdens laid upon the rich ; the institution seems to have been 
a desperate effort to keep up the old traditions and retain the 
balance of classes, and this effort pushed up the rate at the 
close of the fourth century to a drachma a day. 5 

Other measures connected with the leaders of this period are 
so-called bribes in the shape of state-distributions to the people 
(Siavopai or SiaSocms). This custom was established long before 
the time of Pericles, for the surplus revenue from the mines of 
Laurium had in early days been so divided. 6 The later distri- 
butions consisted of corn-doles, land-assignments in the form of 

into Periclean language) that they had 69) mentions this iu<r6t>s for the year 

the ffxoM} which became an imperial 411. 

aristocracy, and that they gained the 2 Hesych. s.v. /3ouX^? \axciv. Ac- 
political insight (KpinK^ 56va.{jus} which cording to Ath. Pol. (62) the members 
came from the free discussion of poli- received five obols. 
tical questions. 3 Ath. Pol. 41. 

1 In Alh. Pol (24) the five hundred 4 Aristoph. Ecdesiaz. 301. 
are included in the number of citizens 5 Ath. Pol. 62. 
who lived off the empire. Thuc. (viii. c Her. vii. 144. 



166 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

cleruchies, and payments for festivals (OcwpiKa). Probably none 
of these originated with Pericles, and the third abus, which 
was to become the greatest, grew out of the payment of two 
obols for the theatre (Siw/3eA.tu) which was introduced by 
Cleophon. 1 It is true that the system of distribution went on 
on a far larger scale during the presidency of Pericles and his 
immediate successors than had heretofore been possible. This 
was an inevitable consequence of the vast resources added to 
the state by the existence of the Athenian Empire, and accounts 
for the association of this practice with the name of the greatest 
of the democratic leaders, who may have exaggerated the system, 
and led to the enormous scale on which it was afterwards 
applied. But the principle of "distribution" was one inherent 
in the structure of a G-reek democracy. It was due to the 
simple principle that the state was a KowtavZa, a joint-stock 
company, and hence that any surplus in " goods ;J which accrued 
to it should be distributed vmtim amongst the citizens. Athens 
had now a great deal to distribute, but it was not all unearned 
increment. The profits of the empire were won by rigorous 
work which kept 20,000 Athenian citizens engaged in constant 
political, military, and naval service.- The great change which 
wo have traced, the introduction of pay, was itself not a cause 
bufc a symptom. A people docs not demand payment for 
political services until it is fit to rule. Even the vast slave 
population of Athens could not create the ideal democracy. It 
required an empire. 

4 The Working of the democratic Constitution of Athens 

The apex of the constitution was the council of five hundred, 
which was open to all citizens over thirty years of ago, and 
which continued to be chosen by lot, fifty members from each 
tribe, fifty more being selected as substitutes (en cVt/Uxoms) to 
fill up possible gaps in the body. The office was not a burden 
imposed on tho citizens; the candidates presented themselves 
voluntarily, and competition for membership was keen, since 
the functions of the post wore dignified and important and the 
services well paid. The members had to pass a fioKtjuuria before 
the previous council, 3 and, at the close of their functions, the 

1 Ath. l>ul. 28. a ft 21. i&. 45. 



vi DEMOCRACY 167 

theory of individual responsibility was enforced by submitting 
each co%ncillor to a separate audit. 1 The board had certain 
definite officials connected with it for certain definite purposes ; 
but it seems safest to regard the chief of these as not themselves 
members of the body, for the secretary of the city 2 was elected 
by the people even in the fourth century, and oilier officials had 
been formerly elected in this manner but were afterwards 
chosen by lot. Chief amongst such officials must have been the 
auditor of the council (di/Tty/5a</j>eus rJjs /^oiA-IJs), apparently an 
independent authority and an external check on its actions, 
who kept a record of its proceedings and an audit that was 
probably concerned mainly with finance. 3 

But the council was too large a body to perform its functions 
as an active executive efficiently without further subdivision 
of its members. It worked, therefore, through committees. 
Occasionally these were temporary, appointed for special pur- 
poses. But there were besides regular but changing committees 
known as Tr/wraveis, which brought the council into relation with 
the ecclesia. The council was divided by tribes into committees 
of fifty members each, each presiding tribe (</>iA?/ irpiiravevovo-a) 
sitting in turn for a tenth part of the year, which was called a 
TT/wram'a. In the fifth century a narrower board of ten, chosen 
from this tribe and sitting for seven days, with a president 
(iTrtoraT^s) selected daily by lot from this narrower body, were 
the intermediaries between the council and the ecclesia and 
the presidents of both bodies. 4 A change subsequently intro- 
duced, not known earlier than the year 378 but probably 
dating back to the archonship of Eucleides (403), divorced the 
presidency of the council and popular assembly from the 
committee of the prytany. When the council or ecclesia was 
summoned, the epistates of the prytany selected by lot nine 
7r/>oe6poi, one from each tribe except the one presiding, and a 
second epistates from them, and it was this still more evan- 
escent committee that laid business before the two assemblies/ 1 
The task of the latter was merely formal, for the preparation 
of business was of course made by the permanent board of 

1 Aesch. c. Ctes. 20 ; a psephism Uio title itself does not omir in Ath. 

(C.LA. ii. 114) recommends a coun- Pol (54), although I far i) aeration quotes 

cillor to be crowned "as soon as lie Aristotle, 

shall have passed his audit." 4 Arg . a( j Domosth. c. Androt. p, 

a Ath. Pol 54 ; Thuc. vii. 10. 590. 

8 Pollux viii. 98 ; Harpocrat .s-.-y. ; Ath. /W. 44 ; Siu<l. s.v. ^tcrTdr^. 



1Gb OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

-prytaneis for the daily meetings of the whole body of five 
hundred, and from them, in all matters which the couftcil was 
not competent to decide, the debate spread to the wide circle 
of the people. For the council had a double character. It was 
a probouleutic senate preparing business for the ecclesia, but it 
was also the chief administrative authority which carried out 
the resolutions of the assembly. Its administrative power was 
exercised by a general presidency over other officials, whom it 
could summon for the purpose of instructions, less frequently 
by commissioners appointed from its own body. A review of 
its executive functions shows that they were connected with 
almost every department of administration. The council had 
the peace control of the military arrangements of the state ; it 
inspected the fleet and the wharfs, and saw to the upkeep of 
the cavalry (tTTmg), and doubtless also of the hoplite force. It 
performed the routine duties connected with foreign policy, 
received embassies and brought them before the people, and 
swore to treaties with foreign states ; the empire added new 
duties to its foreign control, and it was the council which 
prepared the schedules of tribute that were to be submitted to 
the people. In the domain of finance it had a real control 
over the details of expenditure, and perhaps the chief voice in 
the question of estimates. It was its duty to see how the 
necessary supplies for the year could be raised ; it leased the 
taxes, receiving the returns with the apodectae ; and it exacted 
debts to the state from private individuals. Lastly, it possessed 
jurisdiction, for special impeachments (eltrayyekiai) were brought 
before the council. These were prosecutions for special crimes 
affecting the welfare of the community such as conspiracy, 
treason, and bribery of certain kinds. 1 Usually (in later times 
almost invariably) it acted only as a court of first instance; 
but we arc told that it originally had summary jurisdiction and 
could punish with fines, imprisonment, and even death. Sub- 
sequently these powers were taken away, and an appeal from 
its judgment was allowed to a dicastery. 2 The council had 
also, in the fourth century, the right of hearing, in the first 
instance, appeals against magistrates for not carrying out 
the laws. Its jurisdiction was therefore to a limited extent 
what we should call " administrative " (i.e. applying only to 
a certain class of offenders), but as a whole it was concurrent 

1 Ilyporeid. pro Kux. 22. a Ath. Pol 45. 



vi DEMOCRACY 169 

with, where it was not merely preliminary to, that of the 
popular Courts. 

The ecclesia was nominally the whole body of free Athenian 
citizens over eighteen years of age j practically it was as many 
as could be got together, and even during the Peloponnesian 
War the maximum attendance did not exceed 5000. 1 For 
those legislative acts the validity of which nominally required 
ratification by the whole people, the number 6000 was taken 
to represent the state ; and this quorum was demanded for acts 
of privilege (vojuoi eir dv8pi)j such as the conferment of citizen- 
ship, of dispensation from the laws (aSaa), and probably for the 
ostracism. 2 The meetings of the ecclesia were of two kinds. 
It was the ordinary and regular meetings (at rera.ypJeva.1, IK T<OV 
I/O/AOJJ/), of which there were four a prytany, which made the 
assembly the chief administrative body; for these meetings 
were independent of the special summons of a magistrate, and 
business was discussed in them according to a regular pro- 
gramme. But the great questions of the hour generally carne 
up for discussion in the extraordinary assemblies (jvyKXyroi), 
which were specially convened by the prytaneis, usually at the 
request of a strategus. In both cases the business was prepared 
for the ecclesia by this committee of the council, and came 
before it in the form of a probouleuma. Sometimes the council 
takes on itself the duty of advice, and sends down a bill con- 
taining a definite proposal which it urges the assembly to 
accept ; at other times it does not venture an opinion, but simply 
states a question in the bill handed down through the prytaneis, 
and asks the members of the lower house to come to some con- 
clusion by themselves. 3 In the case of a proposal of the first 
kind debate in the ecclesia could be entirely avoided, at least 
in the fourth century, by a very effective system of closure 
known as the Trpoxei-porovia, a preliminary vote being taken as 
to whether the assembly should accept the proposal of the 
council without debate or not. 4 

At first sight a very strict limitation on the powers of a 
deliberative assembly seems to be contained in the rule that 
no business could be debated in the ecclesia which had not first 

1 Time. viii. 72. Sn SOKCI TQ pov\rj KT\ : in the second 

2 Andoc. de Myst. 87. 6'n SOKSL TQ jSouXfl rbv Sfaov . . . j8ov- 

3 In the first case the formula of \ei3c0-0cu # TI &v ai3r$ SOKGI Uptcrrov 
decrees runs yv&wv 5 (TOI)S irpo^Sjoovs) ewai. 

cru/tjSciXXea-flcu TTJS fiovXys els rkv ST^OP, 4 Harpocrat. $.v. trpoxeLporovla. 



170 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

been prepared by the council. But at Athens this restriction 
was merely formal. The members of the ecclcsia haTi an un- 
limited power of adding to bills, and inscriptions show numerous 
decrees in which riders have been appended to the original 
probouleuma. Again, though they were limited in debate to 
the matter brought forward by the council, they were not 
bound merely to accept or reject oven a dolinite proposal of 
that body, but could come to a directly opposite or even 
alternative decision on the subject. 1 And lastly, the ecclesia 
gained an indirect power of originating business by suggesting 
that the council ought to bring forward a probouleuma of a 
certain kind. 2 "We may imagine that this moral pressure was 
seldom disregarded. 

The ecclesia was the sovereign administrative power in the 
state, but it was not a true legislative assembly. The idea of 
the full sovereignty of the people did not originate until late 
in Athenian history, and was probably never held quite 
thoroughly. The sovereign was the constitution, and the 
constitution was protected by the courts of law, not so much 
by the heliaea as a whole as by each separate panel of dicasts 
which had taken the heliastic oat li, and which performed in the 
course of its ordinary jurisdiction the functions of a supreme 
court. In the year 409 we find the ecclesia denouncing the 
verdict of a jury which, on appeal, had declared the illegality 
of a decree in honour of one of the assassins of Phrynichus. It 
suggests that the jurors have been bribed, and desires that they 
shall be brought to trial. 3 But its energies are spent in the 
vote of censure ; it cannot upset the decision of the court. 
The ecclesia could, in fact, only bo the author of administrative 
decrees (^</wr/xaTa), not laws (i/o/^ot), and, though it could 
originate legislation, it could not complete it. To support this 
theory some check on the action of individual members of the 
ecclesia was clearly necessary ; otherwise the people might be 
betrayed into the committal of illegal acts. Hence the institu- 
tion of the indictment for illegal proposals (y/w^r/ irapuvonv>v\ 
the efficiency of which as a safeguard to the constitution caused 
it finally to ropkce every other system of checks which had 
beon devised. Id might be levelled equally against the proposer 



1 An instance ia found in Xeu. tyytftlffOat) rip 

Hdl. vii. 1, 1-14. r})v jSouX^ Igeypyjcccp 4 

2 The formula runn KSoxOcu (or /cr\, 8 Hicks n. 56, 



VI 



DEMOCRACY 171 



of a psephism or the initiator of a law, and the mover was 
liable t* prosecution within the limit of a year, if his measure 
was invalid either in matter or in form. A psephism was 
invalid in form if it had not been submitted to the judgment 
of the council, or if it was one of those bills which, like the 
raising of a property -tax, required as a preliminary to its 
promulgation a decree of exemption (aSeia) which had not been 
gained; it was invalid in contents if it was in conflict with an 
existing law. The invalidity of laws rested chiefly on the 
question of form; neglect of proper promulgation or of the 
other rules which regulated the introduction of new laws might 
expose a would-be legislator to this indictment. 1 Attempts on 
the part of the ecclesia to assume a legislative power and on 
the part of individuals to tamper with the constitution were 
thus frustrated. Since there was no proper ministry at Athens 
holding office for a term of years and responsible for all im- 
portant measures, the introduction of the ypruffi TTO pwo/wv 
was necessary to make the unofficial orator feel the responsibility 
of his position, and was the means by which the assembly 
protected itself from the appalling consequences that might 
follow the extreme freedom of initiative permitted in that body. 
It has, indeed, been thought that a law at least might be assailed 
" on the vague charge of inexpediency," and that the indictment 
lay against legislation which was not unconstitutional but 
which subsequent reflection proved to be bad. 2 It is not im- 
possible that the ever -increasing clanger threatened by the 
irresponsible adviser may have forced the Athenians even to 
this stage of iniquitous precaution, but it is unlikely that the 
principle found a place in the original theory of this indictment. 
There were, however, limits to the Graphe and precautions 
against its being used as a mere party weapon. After the 
expiration of a year the mover was free from criminal prosecu- 
tion, and the law or psephism alone could be assailed, while the 
prosecutor who did not obtain one-fifth of the votes was fined 
and lost the right of bringing such indictments in the future. 
There was therefore, properly speaking, no strictly legis- 

1 In one rare case we find a conflict from the day on which they were 

of the contents of laws. Timocratea passed (Dom. c. Tim. 43, 73). 

proposed a law of his own with retro- But this too is resolvable into a 

spective action, without previously re- question of form, 

pealing a law which enacted that - Wayie (Uoin. c. Androt. and c, 

measures should come into operation Twwcr. p. xxxv.) 



172 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

lative sovereign at Athens, no one body whose mandate had 
immediately the force of law ; for the Athenian, like tfee Greek 
citizen generally, conceived himself to be living under the 
impersonal sovereignty of law itself. Yet, although progressive 
legislation was an idea which had little attraction for a Greek, 
revision and amendment were indispensable, and there was a 
means, at once safe, rapid, and scientific, of effecting a change 
in the laws at Athens. The procedure of early times is indeed 
lost to us, and we know the process of legislation only in its 
final stage. Two normal modes of correcting the laws were 
ultimately developed one depending on the initiative of private 
individuals, the other on that of officials whose duty was 
revision. The first mode was initiated in the ecclesia. At 
annual intervals the question was put to the vote whether the 
laws should be confirmed as they stood or be revised, and for 
this purpose they were submitted in groups to the people. 1 If 
a revision of one or more groups was voted for, provision was 
taken for the appointment of vopoQertu by the ecclesia. Mean- 
while individuals who wished to suggest changes had to ensure 
tho proper publication of their amendments, while the assembly 
appointed five public advocates (a-w^yopoi) to argue in defence 
of the laws assailed. The nomothetae, the final ratifying 
authority to which the respective claims of the new and the 
old measures wero to bo submitted, wore not a permanent body, 
but wero on each occasion appointed by lot from the heliaea, 
their numbers varying from five hundred to a thousand, probably 
according to tho importance of tho laws under consideration. 
They wero organised as a miniature ecclesia with an epistates 
and proedri of their own, and their vote, whether given in 
favour of tho existing measure or of the new proposal, was 
final. The second mode (the SwpOtwvs TWV vo^v) differs from 
the first only in tho respect that this machinery was set in 
motion by the thesinothetao of tho year. It was their annual 
duty to examine tho whole code of laws and to see if there 
woro any which wero contradictory or oxit of date. 2 Discoveries 
of this kind were published with amendments suggested by 
these officials, and tho alternatives submitted, as in the former 
case, to tho judgment of nomothetao appointed by the occlesia. 
Legislation, therefore, was a work of co-operation between 
tho two groat popular bodies, the occlosia and the heliaea. But, 
1 Dem. c. Timer. 20 ff. 2 Ausch. c. Vtes. 38. 



v - r DEMOCRACY 173 

though hampered in its legislative action, the administrative 
powers *f the assembly were as wide as they well could be. 1 
It declared war and made peace, received envoys introduced to 
it by the council, appointed ambassadors, and sanctioned com- 
mercial relations with foreign states. It had the supreme 
ratifying authority in all matters affecting revenues and the 
administration of finance, even venturing at times on such 
extreme measures as the creation of monopolies 2 and the 
depreciation of the coinage. 3 It professed to control the state 
religion and to sanction the admission of foreign gods into the 
Attic Pantheon, until the liberalism of the democracy, combined 
with the desire for divine protection of every kind, had made of 
Athens a very Egypt of strange divinities. 4 It conferred citizen- 
ship and the right of intermarriage on foreigners, immunity on 
states or kings, and rewards and honours, such as maintenance 
in the Prytaneium, on its benefactors. There is nothing 
surprising in the exercise of powers of a general or only 
occasionally recurring character by a body constituted like the 
Athenian ecclesia. What may surprise us is the minute 
attention it paid to the details of administration, typical 
instances of which may best be found in its control of the 
highest officials of the state in a department which a popular 
body has peculiar difficulty in administering that of foreign 
policy. The ecclesia exercised a minute supervision over the 
conduct of generals engaged on a foreign campaign, and the 
free criticism of their actions by the assembly was often a 
prelude to prosecution before a court of law. The independent 
powers of commanders on foreign expeditions do not appear to 
have been very clearly defined, and the difficulty of the position 
of the strategi was due to the fact that no clear line was drawn 
between what they might and what they might not do. The 
jealous demos might even censure them for granting unauthorised 
terms to a town which they had captured - y 5 and generals seem 
occasionally to have been convicted for carrying out the literal 

1 On these see Schomann de Qomitiis Alexander (Ael. Var. Hist. 5, 12} and 
Atheniensmm pp. 281-338. paid divine honours to Demetrius 

2 [AristJ Oecon. li. 37. Poliorcetes (Pint. Jjemshr. 10). 

8 Aristoph. Ecdes. 816 ff. 6 Time. li. 70 (the surrender of 

4 Aristoph. ap. Athena, ix. p. 372 Potidaea in the winter of 430)' A0^cw 

b. (Fraym. 476 Dindorf) Afyi/Trrop rofc ffTpctTyyofc tirynfoavro o'n (Lvev 

afaw rfy> irb\w TreTro^/cas dvr 'Affy- afrrwr 

vuv. It was the ecclesia that deified 



174 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

instructions and not the implied wishes of the people. 1 For, 
though it was the courts that condemned, this condemnation 
was but the final expression of the criticism of the assembly. 
The supposed limitations of the ordinary commander are best 
illustrated by the fact that, for distant or important expeditions, 
generals were sometimes appointed with autocratic powers (or/oa- 
r//yot avTOKparopes) who were not expected to refer the details 
of administration to the home government that is, to the council 
and the ecclesia. If patriotism or strong political feeling 
prompted a general in the field to adopt an independent line 
of action, he was playing a somewhat uneven game. Success 
did not always mean condonation, for it might not coincide with 
the political views of the majority for the time, while failure 
meant treason and death. When the Thebans freed themselves 
from their Spartan garrison in 379, two generals co-operated 
with them from the Athenian frontier ; they were successful but 
condemned. When Diopeithes, the Athenian general in the 
Chersonese, made a wanton and unauthorised attack in 342 
on the Macedonian possession of Thrace, his action was justified 
by the people, arid the war which ended with Chaeroneia 
was the result. A strong government can afford to be 
capricious. Its absence of principle does not render it assailable 
from within, and may enable it to accept the results of success 
from without. 

The authority of the ecclesia, great as it was, would have 
been very incomplete had it not been supplemented by that of 
the parallel corporation of the heliaea. This ranks with the 
council as ono of the sworn, responsible, arid (for foreign 
purposes) representative bodies of the Athenian state. 2 It was 
composed nominally of all full Athenian citizens over thirty 
years of age; but, since service appears to have been voluntary, 
it would practically have consisted of those who, having taken 
tho holiaslic oath, 8 had given in their names to the nine Archons 
and been declared duly qualified for the service. Their number 
in the fifth, cerif/ury appears to have been unfixed, and the 

1 As e.(f. in tho condemnation of the 2 e.g. the treaty with Chalcis (Hicks 

pjciujnils of the Sicilian expedition of n, 28) begins Ai6yvriro$ elire* KO,T& r6.de 

4tf> (Time. iv. 65). These generals rbv vpxw o/j,6ffai 'AQymluv rty fiovMiv 

seem to luive acted within their in- /cal roils 5i/ra<rrds. 

struct'ious (if), in. 115), but they 8 All Athenian citizens took the 

had not accomplished the unexpressed heliaaticoath(Harpocrat.s.uArdetttis). 
object of conquering Sicily. 



VJ DEMOCRACY 175 

traditional six thousand, if not an exaggeration, 1 was probably 
a nominal number. For the extreme improbability has been 
pointed out of so many duly-qualified citizens serving in the 
same year. 2 The list must have excluded the magistrates, the 
council of five hundred, and all citizens who did not wish to 
serve, since the duty was not compulsory. Aristophanes' 
references would lead us to suppose that the jurors were 
usually elderly, and indeed the post, though a convenient 
retiring pension for an old man, would not be a good investment 
for the energy of a young one. In the fourth century we find 
the helmsts divided into ten panels (the number having no 
connection with the tribes), and these panels, as well as their 
places of meeting, were called " dicasteries." It is generally 
supposed that they were composed of five hundred jurors each, 
with one thousand as an added and supplementary number. 
But, if the full number was not six thousand, different panels 
must have been partly composed, as Friinkel has shown, of 
the same individuals a practice for which there is direct 
evidence. 3 

These dicasteries were numbered A to K, and each heliast 
was presented with a ticket which contained the number of his 
panel and his own name and deme. The court in which each 
section had to sit for the day was assigned by lot, but every case 
was not tried by a complete section, Some were heard before 
parts of sections, others before several sections combined, the 
numbers varying from 200 to 2500. 4 These panels may doubt- 
less be dated back to the fifth century, and form the final 
development of the right of appeal which Solon gave to the 
people. As these appeals had been made indifferently in civil 
and criminal cases, so the final jurisdiction of the courts covered 
both. The distinction between the civil or private law and tho 
criminal as a part of the public law, though not strongly marked 
in theory, was expressed by a difference of procedure and a 
difference of name. The characteristics of private suits (Suu 
t<5tac or Si/cat simply) were that they could be brought only by 
the interested party, that the compensation recovered belonged 

1 Aristophanes ( Wasps 6(30) gives it aira.vr$ ol 8iKd.ovT$ Oa.fjL& <nrti8ov<riv 
as an approximate, the Ath. Pol. (24) v TroXAofs yypd<f>Oa,L ypd^a-crLv. 

as a round number. 4 Care was, however, taken that the 

2 Fra'nkel die Attische Geschwornen- number should always he an odd one, 
gerichte. to avoid equality of votes, 

8 Aristoph. Plut. 1166 oik eros 



17ft OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



to the plaintiff, that court fees (TrpvTaveia) were deposited as a 
surety, and that if the plaintiff threw up the action h$ was not 
punished for his retirement from the case. In public suits on 
the other hand (Sweat Sipocriat or y/>a<at), which covered criminal 
cases, such as serious offences against the person and offences 
against the state, the charge could be brought by any full 
Athenian citizen and the compensation, if in money, belonged to, 
or, if it took the form of punishment, was inflicted by, the state! 
No court fees were deposited, and if the prosecutor gave up the 
charge or did not get one- fifth of the votes, he was fined a 
thousand drachmae and lost the power of bringing other similar 
charges in the future. 

In the heliastic oath the jurors swore to give their decisions 
according to the laws and decrees in force; 1 but there was 
little guarantee that they knew the law, and the circumstances 
were adverse to their respecting it when known. It is true 
thai Athens, as perhaps most Greek states, took care to sim- 
plify her law as much as possible by constant revision, and the 
process of codification and publication which was ever going 
on enabled her to dispense with a professional class of lawyers. 
But the theory that every Athenian citizen knew the whole 
law was hardly a justifiable corollary from this practice, or a 
sufficient ground for dispensing with a class of skilled inter- 
preters. The dicasts did riot, like the Roman judices in criminal 
trials and like the modern jurymen, decide on questions of fact 
under the legal guidance of a judge. The only guidance they 
had was that of interested parties quoting the law on either 
side. Most of their verdicts must have been mere decisions in 
equity, on what seemed to them the merits of the case; and 
appeals to an Athenian jury must have been at ihe best appeals 
to abstract considerations of justice, at the worst to personal 
passions and prejudices. There was no power which could 
revise their sentences; a new trial might be granted by the 
legal fiction of false evidence having been tendered in the first 
(OIK?/ \fiu&)pa,pTvpi,<w) 9 but most of the cases before these courts 
were of the nature of Sweat aworcXcw, final and irrevocable. If 
we add to all this the fact that the dicasts were the only irre- 
sponsible officials at Athens, the great powers which they 
wielded are manifest and must have been only too clearly felt 

1 Dem. c. Timocr. p. 74(1 ^r/nov- fffiwra roO Srjjuou TOV } AO-rjva.l(av /raj 
/EMU KO.T& raits iftiftow Kal ret ifsytfil- r?p /3ouX?}s r&v iri 



VI DEMOCRACY 177 

by themselves. Their capacity may be gauged by the fact that 
they were composed of the classes who found it profitable to 
give up**egular employment for the pittance of three obols a 
day. Their purity of administration does not seem to have 
been often tainted with direct bribery a precaution against 
which was found in the provision that a dicast should not 
know until the very day of the trial in what court he was to 
sit. The two earliest cases of suspected bribery both date 
from the year 40 9, 1 but there is ample evidence that about 
this time a peculiarly shameless form of corruption had grown 
up in state trials. The juries were a professional class and 
lived off their pay ; they were the poorest class and knew their 
advantage over the rich : consequently it was not uncommon 
for prosecutors to tell the jury that such was the state of the 
public finances, they could not hope to draw their pay if they 
did not convict the accused and confiscate his property. 2 This 
practice hardly credible if not so well supported by first-hand 
evidence was merely one of the phases of the free fight between 
rich and poor in which the Peloponnesian War resulted, and a 
sign of the evils which necessarily followed the ill-judged effort 
to maintain a political regime which the empire alone justified. 
But national feeling must have been almost as grave a source 
of wrong as party interest. The Athenian courts were com- 
posed of large masses of men, varying from two hundred to 
a thousand, and subject therefore to those waves of emotion 
which the Aristotelian theory of the infallibility of judgment 
of the gathered multitude ignores. 3 Arguing before such a 
court was like speaking before a political audience, and its 
decisions must to a large extent have been directed by the 
political prejudices of the moment. The history of the impeach- 
ment of Pericles and of many another statesman shows that not 
only was it a change in political sentiment which directed the 
prosecution, but that the same change decided the verdict. It 
was the policy of party leaders and their followers that was really 
on trial in these courts, and the collapse of almost every states- 
man and general who fell was determined by their sentences. 
For the fifth century we may cite the instances of Pericles, 
Paches, Laches and the other generals to Sicily ; in the fourth 
the charges become more frequent as changes of policy become 

1 Hicks n. 56 3 ; Ath. Pol. 27. (c. Mcom.} 22. Cf. Aristoph. Eq. 

3 Lysias 27 (c. Epter.} 1, 2 ; 30 1357. 3 Arist. Pol. iii. 11. 



178 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

more rapid. The peace of Antalcidas brought with it the 
prosecution of Agyrrhius and of almost every other pi^uninent 
man whose influence seemed to have led up to it ; Callistratus' 
long rule of oratory ended in exile and death ; and after the 
battle of Ohaeroneia, which was fought over again in the courts, 
many were found to have escaped the chances of war only to 
fall victims to the relentless oratory of Lycurgus. Yet this 
was perhaps the purest form of government that the Greek 
world saw, for even its tyranny was open and undisguised; and 
the judgment of a sober critic of the close of the fourth century, 
while it notes the absolutism of the demos, justifies it by its 
results. "The demos has made itself lord of everything, and 
manages all branches of the administration by its decrees in 
the ecclesia and by its judgments in the law-courts. In these 
it is the people which is the sovereign, for even the decisions 
of the council are brought before it. And the principle seems 
to "be right. For the few are more corruptible than the many, 
more susceptible to bribery and to favour." l 

But the assembly and the courts, although the main, were 
not the only channels through which popular energy was 
expended and political education won. The administrative 
offices held by individuals were particularly large in number, 
and were at least doubled when Athens became an imperial 
state and a new Athens grow up in the cleruchies and colonies 
beyond the sea. Many of these we have already mentioned, 
and many more will be treated when we come to deal with the 
organisation of the empire. It is sufficient to observe that 
the Constitution of Athens^ in an attempt to estimate the 
numbers of the bureaucracy for the middle of the fifth century, 
makes the total reach the alarming proportions of fourteen 
hundred, of which half were "home" and half "foreign " offices. 2 
As appointment to most of these was made by lot, the Athenian 
citizen was unfortunate who did not once in his lifetime get 
his share of individual rale. And even a year of such office 
implied an education of no mean order; even at home, where 
the duties were mainly those of routine, it meant an insight 
into the working of the hidden machinery of the state ; abroad, 

1 At.1i. Pol. 41 ; cf. Arist. Pol. in. purer the stream." 

15 "aj, r ain the many are more in- a Ath. Pol. 24 apxctl 5' frSij/uoi v&v 

corruptible than tho tow ; it is like eJs tTrrcc/focrfous (LvSpas, birepbpLoi. 3' cfr 

watwr: the greater the volume the lirraKotrlovs. 



vi DEMOCRACY 179 

in the cities of the empire and in the clenichies 3 it gave a 
knowledge of how men must be guided, new contingencies faced, 
and unforeseen dangers overcome. 

But, if democracy be taken to imply the levelling of indi- 
vidual eminence, that of Athens was a failure. Few states 
have ever been more completely under the sway of great 
personalities. It is a phase of national life which, on general 
grounds, should not create the least surprise ; for it is one of 
the oldest lessons in history that, while oligarchy is the true 
leveller of merit, a democracy brings with it a hero-worship 
generally of an extravagant kind, and that the masses attain 
sufficient union for the exercise of power only through the 
worship of a supposed intellectual king. At Athens periods of 
long personal ascendency will be recalled by the bare mention 
of a few names. For the fifth century we need but cite those 
of Pericles 3 Cleon, Nicias, and Alcibiades; for the fourth 
those of Timotheus, Agyrrhius, Callistratus, Eubulus, Demo- 
sthenes, and Lycurgus. The types of power represented by 
these names, and those of others almost equally great, are 
very varied. Pericles holds a long and continued series of 
military commands; the influence of Nicias, Alcibiades, 
and Timotheus also rests mainly on the personal conduct 
of expeditions; Callistratus and Demosthenes sway the state 
almost exclusively by their oratory ; Cleon, Agyrrhius, Eubulus, 
and Lycurgus are financial geniuses of a very high order. We 
are here only briefly characterising the main sources of the 
influence of these men. In many cases the various personal 
qualifications are combined, and the happy possessor of these 
versatile gifts assumes a position greater than that of a modern 
prime minister, for he combines a greater number of powers 
and exercises personally a greater variety of functions than 
the highest official of any modern state. Now the constitu- 
tional historian is hardly concerned at all with this phenomenon, 
if the personal ascendency which he observes is simply the 
result of a wholly informal personal influence, and can be 
proved to rest simply on public opinion. He need only note 
it as an effect of the practice and a violation of the spirit of 
the constitution. The ecclesia which will listen only to the 
voice of Pericles and Callistratus, and the courts which condemn 
at the nod of Cleon and Lycurgus, are still thoroughly demo- 
cratic bodies. It is only when he observes traces of the fact 



180 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

that such personal power was, if not contemplated, at least 
allowed by the actual form of the constitution, that h%feels it 
his duty to discuss those spheres of office which might have 
made their holders possible heads of the state. 

The first office which attracts attention is that of the generals 
(o-rpaT??yot), who formed, as we saw, a college of ten based on 
the ten Cleisthenean tribes. Their most distinctive right was 
that of procuring special meetings of the ecclesia, 1 debate in 
which seems to have been strictly limited to proposals put 
before them by the general; and no other meetings were allowed 
to take precedence of assemblies thus specially convened. 2 From 
this power of meeting the council and ecclesia was developed a 
series of financial functions, including the estimates of the 
military budget for the year and proposals for raising the 
requisite supplies. This was especially the case in the fifth 
century, when the great finance offices had not yet arisen : the 
separate state treasuries were in the hands of controlling boards, 
but the estimates for different departments could be made only 
by magistrates. The strategi were thus ministers of finance for 
foreign affairs, 3 and controlled the details of expenditure in their 
own departments, all the funds voted from the treasuries for 
military purposes passing through their hands. 4 Amongst their 
special military duties we may reckon, besides their actual 
leadership in war, the general command of the home forces and 
control of the home defences. They possessed jurisdiction in 
military matters, for the appeal against the levy (/caraXoyos) 
was made to them, and they had the direction of the court in 
all offences against martial law, which they either undertook in 
person or remitted to the taxiarchs ; while in the field they had 
the right of punishing summarily with death the most serious 
offences, such as treasonable negotiations with the enemy. 5 One 
of their chief responsibilities at home was the care of the corn 
supply of Athens. 6 

In the details of foreign administration their influence must 
also have been very great. It was they who introduced most 
of such business to the assembly and brought forward questions 



1 It was effected through the pry- the court (yyettovla, diKaffryptov} in 

taneis, but it is unlikely that the suits arising from the trierarchy and 

permission was ever refused. the elfffapd. * Hicks n. 46. 

9 Hicks n. 44, 1. 59. 5 Lys. 13 (c. Agarat.), 67. 

3 As such they nominated to the G rty TrapairofMrfy rov trlrov (Bockh 

trierarchy, and had the presidency of SeeurL xiii. p. 423). 



vi DEMOCRACY 181 

arising from treaties or from negotiations with foreign states. 
They officiated in treaties and were responsible for their formal 
execution, seeing that the oath was taken and that the proper 
sacrifices were offered on the occasion. 1 The existence of the 
Athenian Empire added to the sphere of their powers. They 
were the commanders -in -chief of the garrisons and of the 
captains of the guard (^povpap^ot) whom we find in the subject 
states. 2 They saw to the exaction of the tribute when it was 
in arrears by commanding the " tribute-collecting ships," 3 and 
probably had the levying of the contingents from the allies both 
in ships and men 

It will be seen from this enumeration of their functions that 
the Athenian generals were at once leaders in war, ministers of 
war, foreign ministers, and to a great extent ministers of finance. 
It is difficult to see how such powers could be exercised 
collectively by a college of ten. But the difficulty applies only 
to the greater part of the fifth century. In the earlier years 
of this century the polemarch was still commander- in -chief, 
the generals tribal officers. In the fourth century we find a 
complete differentiation of functions amongst the members of 
the college : each general has a title answering to his special 
competence, and is commander of the docks, the Peiraeus, tlic 
home defences, or the fleet, as the case may be; while 
in the early part of the third century the "general of 
the hoplites" appears to be the head of the board. 4 It 
would not therefore be a very extreme hypothesis to 
assume a similar presidency for the period when it is most 
needed that of the Peloponnesian War, when Athens is par 
excelknce a military state. And indeed, though direct evidence 
fails us, constructive evidence is strongly in favour of this view/' 
The college would only follow the analogy of other Athenian 
boards which are constructed of a president and colleagues 
(crwdpxovTes) ; 6 and if the president of the strategi could direct 
the actions of his colleagues, we have only to remember the 
duties of his office to realise what a power in the state he was. 

1 Hicks n. 2811. 19, 67. rods dirMrcw (Ath. Pol 61). He is 

2 As in Erythrae (Hicks n. 23 1. 6). xuporoj>y6ds M ra oVXa TT/JWTOS M 
At the end of the charter of Chalcis we rov ofaov, circa 272 B.c. (0.1. A. li. 
find also irepl 8t 0vXa/o?j Eyj3o/as robs n. 331). 

erpaTyyobs Aryi&r0eu (Hicks n. 28 5 See Appendix. 
* 77). s Time. iv. 50. 6 <rrparr77ots 'iTTiro/cparet XoXapyei 

orparq-yfo 6 eirl rb 6VXa, or 6 eiri nal ffvva,pxov<nv (Hicks n. 46 1. 5). 



182 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

He would have been the only magistrate at Athena in the fifth 
century who was in constant contact with the ecclesi%; he at 
least, if not his colleagues, was elected by the whole people and 
no longer by a single tribe ; and his tenure of power might be 
perpetual, for indefinite re-election to the strategia was allowed. 1 
The president and his colleagues might be returned year after 
year by their supporters, or might, by a change of feeling, be 
turned out of office to be replaced by a body of an equally 
homogeneous character. The annual elections must in any 
case have been expressive of the political feeling of the time 
but, if this theory of the presidency be valid, it is hardly an 
anachronism to speak of " party " in the sense of " ministerial " 
government when we are dealing with Athenian politics of the 
fifth century. There are, it is true, important differences between 
this accidental and imperfect and the modern contemplated and 
perfect form of responsible government. An Athenian ministry 
did not retire when defeated, and a general might be elected 
for military skill alone and be at political variance with his 
colleagues. But some such personal pre-eminence as that which 
we have described seems to be impjied in the accounts of the 
position of Pericles during the last fourteen or fifteen years of 
his life. The only alternative is to suppose that he either 
strained to the utmost or violated the existing forms of the 
constitution. 2 

The strategia was, therefore, undoubtedly the highest office 
of the state, the most natural object of ambition, and the 
surest basis of power. It depended very much on the holder, 
and to a certain extent on the times, whether it became the 
real central point of the Athenian administration ; but by the 
extent of the duties it involved, its special powers of initiative, 
and its continuity it offered opportunities of influence far 
above those presented by any other magistracy in the state. 
Yet it was the least democratic office at Athens. Direct 
election is often, if not generally, in favour of men of birth 
and rank, even when it is perfectly free. But election to the 
strategia was practically not free. The office was felt to 
demand a degree of military training and skill which was to be 



1 Phocion is said to have been general /wtra tTrtrpefav. A similar position 
forty-five times (Plut. Phoc. 8). seems to have been held by Nicias in . 

2 Plut. Per. 16 ; cf. Thuc. ii. 65 425 (Thuc. iv. 28). 

l irAvTa TO, irp&y- 



tt DEMOCRACY 183 

found only in the ranks of the constantly drilled and practised 
" knights," and not even amongst the hoplites ; while the mere 
mob orator, whose strength was his irresponsibility, shrank 
from putting himself forward for a post which might necessitate 
his carrying out in the field with disastrous consequences to 
himself the suggestions he put forward in the ecclesia. Since 
this office was closed to the rabble, men of the lower classes, 
if they were ambitious of leadership, had to seek some other 
stepping-stone to power; and this was found in financial 
activity. But this activity was necessarily unofficial, since it 
is almost certain that no great finance office, which could be 
held by an individual, existed in the fifth century. 1 Finance 
during this period was managed by boards or by magistrates 
with other functions. It was partly in the hands of the central 
board of the apodectae working with the council, partly in 
those of the separate controlling boards of separate treasuries, 
such as the Hellenotamiae, the " treasurers of the sacred money 
of Athene," and the " treasurers of the other gods," which had 
no initiative but acted merely on the command of the council 
and the assembly ; while separate departments had the control 
of their own expenditure, and of these the most important 
were the strategi. There is no evidence of any central 
individual authority directing the finances of the state as a 
whole before the year of reform marked by the archonship of 
Eucleides (403). But the references to Cleon in the Knights 
of Aristophanes exhibit a man of marvellous financial activity : 
which is not only shown in the criticism and prosecution of 
magistrates on their audit, 2 but has a positive connection with 
state contracts, with the sale of confiscated property, even 
with the imposition of such burdens as the trierarchy and the 
property -tax. 3 A portion of this influence may have been 
exercised by Cleon in a semi-official capacity, for there is 
evidence that he was at one time a member of the council ; * 
a persuasive orator might easily sway the decisions of the Five 
Hundred, and the proposer of a measure in this body usually 
(perhaps invariably) carried it through in the ecclesia. But 



1 The evidence of the numerous bftuv aipe&els ^irtfie^T^s (ArisL 4). 

official documents preserved in inscrip- 2 11. 258 ff v 304 ff. 

tions seems to be decisive 011 this 3 11. 103, 258, 912, 923, 1226, 

point, although Plutarch speaks of 1250. 

Aristeides as rwv [&] &wo<rlwv Tpocr- * Aristoph. Ec[. 774. 



184 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

perhaps such influence was as often exercised by men who were 
merely private members of the assembly, by means oi amend- 
ments to bills or alternative proposals on the measures before the 
house. The financial genius of the fifth century who was not 
a, general had to content himself with this informal control. 
But the early part of the fourth century marks a period of 
complete reform in this department, and it is to this century 
that the names of the great chancellors and treasurers, Eubulus, 
Diophantus, Demosthenes, and Lycurgus, belong. The chief 
reason for this reform, and for the new specialisation in finance, 
was the loss of the empire with its abundant revenues. The 
rabble wanted as much, or rather more, in the way of festival- 
money (QcupiKa) than they had got during the empire ; the state 
was still often engaged in war ; and how, with a greatly reduced 
income, to supply both these channels of expenditure was the 
aim of most practical statesmen. The burden could not now 
bo kid so heavily on the richer classes as it had been by the 
old sliding-scale of the property-tax, and the older mode of 
imposing the burden of the upkeep of the fleet. Excessive 
taxation had in 411 prompted the richer classes to conspiracy, 
and degrees of wealth had been levelled by the long and 
disastrous war. This was the motive for the introduction of 
taxation by symmories (cru/^optai), which was applied first to 
the property-tax and afterwards to the trierarchy a system 
by which pecuniary burdens were made to fall mainly upon 
the upper middle class. This motive is particularly obvious in 
the organisation of the new trierarchic service introduced by 
Periander shortly after 358. A selection of twelve hundred of 
the richer members of the state was made, who were divided 
into twenty symmories, two to a tribe, of sixty members each. 1 
We do not know how the maintenance and upkeep of ships 
of war was distributed amongst these symmories ; the greater 
portion of the expense was supposed to fall on the three 
hundred wealthiest members, but the object and working of 
the law was clearly to extend the incidence of this pecuniary 
burden. Some twenty years earlier, in 378, a similar system, 
tho details of which are si/ill more imperfectly known to us, 
had boon devised for the oisphora, which apparently made three 
hundred of the wealthiest citizens responsible for the immediate 
advance of this war- tax when required. These then recovered 
1 Dem. de fymm. 182. 



vi DEMOCRACY 185 

from a larger circle of less wealthy citizens the dues owed by 
the latter. Both changes meant a gain to society and to the 
state, for they took from the oligarchically minded their one 
ground of complaint, and provided (what in the absence of a 
reserve fund was now an essential) a rapid mode of furnishing 
supplies. But they emphasised still further the distinction 
between the propertied and unpropertied classes, between the 
lovers of peace and retrenchment and the irresponsible 
proletariat reckless about plunging into a war the burdens of 
which fell neither on their persons nor their purses, and careful 
only of the preservation of their city shows and of the public 
doles which enabled them to enjoy their holidays. The great 
financiers were those who could hold the balance between 
classes, show a full treasury whose demands were moderate, 
and yet distribute the theorikon with a lavish hand. No states- 
man has better achieved the apparently impossible in finance 
than Eubulus as president of the theoric fund (6 ITTI TO 0eo>- 
piKov) ; but the later financier Lycurgus holds an honourable 
second place in his administration of a post somewhat re- 
sembling that of a chancellor of the exchequer (6 JTT* ry 
SioiKrjcrei). Of these two new offices the second is the higher 
in titular rank and in the sphere of its administrative duties, 
and the importance of the first is due chiefly to the nature of 
the fund which it controlled. 1 There was no regular hierarchy 
in the bureaucracy of Athens, and statesmen who managed 
relatively minor departments might be as powerful as the 
chancellor. Given a foothold in office, influence depended on 
the personality of the holder ; Demosthenes, for instance, pro- 
posed his reform of the trierarchy as superintendent of the 
navy (In-to-TaTT/? rov VOLVTIKOV). 

The head of the financial administration 2 was the channel 
through which most of the revenue flowed into the different 
departments for whose use it was destined. His function was 
that of a distributer, and when all other claims were satisfied 
he paid the surplus originally into the theoric fund, but, after 
Demosthenes had in 339 succeeded in persuading the people 

1 Gilbert (Staatsalt. i. p. 231) ex- which largely replaced it, was not 

plains the apparently equal importance instituted until 339. 
of the two offices by the supposition 2 6 e?ri rj SioiKyffei is the official 

that the presidency of the theoric fund title in inscriptions, but we find ra/uas 

originated with Eubulus (circa 354), TTJS KOLV^ irpoffddov in the decree in 

and that the office of 6 tirl TQ duucyaei, [Plut.] Vit. X Orat. p. 852 b. 



186 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

to use this surplus for military purposes, into the war-office 
under the control of the strategi. He was, therefore^in theory 
merely a paymaster acting on the command of the ecclesia 
and obeying its decrees, some of which were of permanent 
application, others only of an occasional character. But it 
is obvious what influence a man who knew every detail of 
revenue, every item of expenditure must have had in that 
assembly. He was not gifted, like a modern chancellor, with 
the sole right of initiating financial proposals : that right 
was possessed by every individual citizen; but something 
approaching a ministerial character and implying the sole 
right of initiative came to attach to an office the holder of 
which was directly elected, was hampered by no colleagues, 
and remained in power for four years consecutively ; and the 
twelve years' presidency of Lyourgus teaches us how nearly 
the working of the institutions of Athens, where the two 
elements of responsible government, individual control and 
continuity of power, were recognised, might approximate to 
that of a modern state. The presidency of the theoric fund, 
perhaps created in the year 354 by its first great holder 
Eubulus, represented only a single department of the state; 
but that department was one which attracted so much popular 
interest and anxiety that the assumption of the office did in 
certain cases carry with it the leading position in the govern- 
ment. 1 The anxiety of the mob to bee that the festival- 
money, supplied from the surplus revenue, was increased by 
care and retrenchment in other branches of the service, was 
no doubt the motive which led to this office encroaching on 
the duties of other financial departments. It gradually sub- 
sumed the duties of auditor, of apodectae, of the presidents 
of clocks and arsenals, and in fact "almost the whole ad- 
ministration." 2 This development was largely due to the 
personal influence of the first great president, for the office 
would never have been assumed as a fitting basis for power 
had it not been thought capable of indefinite extension. 

A review of the military and finance offices which we have 
discussed shows that constitutional history can supply some- 

1 Besides Eulmlns we may instance 8 Aesch. c. Ctes. 25 ; through the 

Diophautus, Demosthenes after Chae- confidence which EubulnsinspiiedoJ&rJ 

roneia, and Demades during the same rb dwptKbv KexeipoTovwfrQLtrxeSto 

purled, as great holders of the oilice. ryv tiXyv Stoliajcnv efyov TTJS ir6Xcws. 



vi DEMOCRACY 187 

thing approaching a legal basis for the exercise of great 
individual power at Athens. It can point to great offices 
which naturally fell to men who had won the confidence of the 
people ; but it does not assert that all who had the confidence 
of the people at any given time were holders of these offices. 
This theory, which underlies modern party government., was 
never distinctly held as a principle of Athenian public life; 
and we cannot better conclude a discussion on the working of 
the Athenian constitution than by supplying that corrective to 
the ministerial theory of government which is presented by 
the popular orator at Athens, the so-called " champion of the 
people" (-Tr/DocrTarTys TOV Br^o-v). His sphere of influence was 
twofold, and comprised both the ecclesia and the courts. In 
modern deliberative assemblies, the functions of which corre- 
spond to those of the Athenian ecclesia, positive proposals, 
especially those affecting great imperial interests, are usually 
put forward only by a responsible ministry, and the opposition 
is supposed to confine itself to criticism and to attempts at 
throwing out bills. But a popular demagogue at Athens 
might baffle the " ministry " at every turn, whether this 
ministry were represented by the generals or a great financial 
official acting in concert with the council. He might, by 
having a temporary majority on his side, succeed, as Cleon 
did in 427, 1 in getting a measure passed which ran entirely 
counter to the wishes of the government, and which this 
government, so far from retiring on defeat, had to put into 
execution. The shifting nature of the Athenian ecclesia 
rendered defeats of this kind not uncommon, for the house 
did not always represent the nation. If the majority of the 
opposition proved to be a lasting one, the results would no 
doubt be shown in the elections of the following year, and the 
demagogue might, like Cleon in 424, be forced to step forward 
into the hierarchy of the ministry. In this way we can to 
a limited extent trace the "iris" and "outs" of parties at 
Athens ; but as a rule the demagogue shrank from office and 
its consequent responsibilities, and one of the weakest points 
of the Athenian system is that the magistrates are by no 
means always the men who have the fullest confidence of the 
people. 

It was, indeed, the purely negative and criticising attitude 
1 Time. iii. 36. 



188 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of the popular leaders that mainly invested them with their 
proud title of {> champions of the people." Thtfr critical 
activity began in the ecclesia and ended in the law-courts. 
They were the self-constituted protectors of the people, and 
guardians of popular liberty against attacks, real or supposed, 
on the part of the chief magistrates in power or the richer 
classes backed up by the political clubs which they had at 
their disposal. A "rhetor" might excite suspicions by accusa- 
tion or suggestion, and profess to ward off the imaginary 
danger of his own invention ; he mighb practically close the 
mouths of moderate men by hinting that they were hostile to 
the constitution, 1 with the effect of excluding from political 
life, by the suspicions attached to their character and motives, 
those who were branded as oligarchs. 2 The "prostates" also 
assumed a guardianship of the poorer citizens, and posed as 
a champion of the oppressed. 3 But his favourite sphere of 
activity was the law-courts. His prosecution at the audit 
(evQvvrj) was the phantom that dogged a general's steps on a 
foreign campaign. 4 He professed himself guardian of the 
constitution, and in this capacity attacked the " conspiracies " 
of the political clubs by impeachment before the council or 
a dicastery - 5 and as prosecutor he might have a semi-official 
position, for the ecclesia sometimes elected a public advocate 
(o-uvryyopos) to assist an accuser, and a prominent "rhetor" 
would readily be appointed to this post. 

The powers of such a man are obvious, and not the least of 
these was his unassailability. Hence the undying hostility 
felt for the " sycophant " by the official classes ; but the mental 
attitude such a career assumes is not one that is inconsistent 
with honesty of purpose. For a picture of this mental attitude 
we have only to turn to the dramatic portrayal of Athena- 
goras, "prostates' 3 of the demos at Syracuse in 415, by the 
great analyst Thucydides. There we find a man on the look-out 
for the slightest appearance of oligarchic proclivities on the part 
of magistrates chosen from the aristocracy. He suspects their 
every act, and trios to make the people equally suspicious ; the 
very news of the Athenian armament which was then sailing 
against Syracuse he conceives to be only a deep plot meant 

1 Thuo. iii. 42. 4 ib. Acharn. 938 ; Thnc. vii. 14. 

2 'ib. viii. 68. 5 Aristoph. KniyUs 861. 
8 Aristoph. Frogs 569. 6 Thuc. vi. 35. 



vi DEMOCRACY 189 

to induce the people to confer greater military power on the 
aristocrat^ leaders. The demagogue, as here portrayed, repre- 
sents that atmosphere of doubt and suspicion, equally terrible 
whether valid or not, which clouds the brilliant picture of 
democracy in Greece. He may have been a necessary product 
of her unstable constitutions, but like many other necessary 
symptoms he was neither pleasant nor harmless. 



5 The Athenian Empire 

The Athenian Empire was the chief product, basis, and 
perpetuator of democracy in Greece \ through it the liberty of 
the citizen was secured at the temporary expense of the liberty 
of the state. We shall now proceed to show how it was that 
a democracy became a tyrant, and how this tyrant performed 
the not unusual tyrannical function of protecting the lights of 
man. 

The basis of the Athenian Empire was laid in the year 
478, when the command of the Greek fleet, which had been 
victorious over the Persians, was transferred to Athens with 
Sparta's consent. 1 The earliest constituents of this naval 
union were the Greeks of many of the Aegean islands and 
most of the helpless Hellenic cities of the Asiatic coast. Both 
groups of cities had been made members of the great league 
of the united Greeks formed in 479, the European portion of 
which now died a natural death, while the maritime division, 
and with it the defence of the Asiatic coast, which had not been 
formally incorporated with but only placed under the protec- 
tion of the league, 2 fell to the lot of Athens. The fleet under 
the command of the Spartan Pausanias had also freed from 
the Persians the states of the Hellespont and Propontis, and 
these too were added as active or protected members to the 
new Athenian hegemony. 3 To this original nucleus two 
subsequent additions were soon made. Cimon's conquest of 
Eion in 476 freed the Thracian cities, and some ten years later 
(circa 466) the victory of the Eurymedon added the Carian 
quarter, composed of the towns of the Carian, Lycian, and 

1 Time. i. 95 ; Atk. Pol. 23, Lesbians, etc.) as having been incor- 

2 Herodotus (is. 106) represents porated into this league, 
only the islanders (Saimans, Chians, 3 Tlrac. i. 95. 



190 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

Pamphylian coast. 1 The greater part of the Aegean was now 
a united whole, and from the cities that either tyidged or 
fringed it was formed the Confederacy of Delos under the 
leadership of Athens. The essential feature of this confederacy 
was that, while deliberative and judicial powers were exercised 
by the cities of the league, the chief executive authority was 
from the first placed in the hands of Athens. All the states 
were independent (avroi/o/iot), and their delegates met in common 
assemblies at the temple of Apollo in the island of Delos. 2 
These assemblies deliberated on all matters concerned with the 
interests of the league, and must have acted as a common court of 
justice, perhaps in punishing individual cases of treason committed 
against the whole body, but certainly in exacting the required 
obligations from the cities, and in adjudging those states to be 
guilty which did not perform their part of the duties for which 
the league was framed. 3 The common treasury was also at 
Delos controlled by officials, who bore the title Hellenotamiae. 
But these were from the first purely Athenian officials, and the 
complete executive control of Athens is shown also by the fact 
that it was she who fixed at the outset the mode in which the 
contributions to the league should be assessed. 4 Some of the 
states were to furnish ships of war, others money a difference 
in burdens which may to some extent have corresponded to 
the distinction which we have noted as existing between the 
active and the protected members of the confederacy. Doubt- 
less the states which furnished ships of war would have had a 
more potent voice at the council; but the principle was not 
yet established that the power of debate and of voting was 
confined to these, and that the cities which furnished money 
should be reduced to a condition of passive and silent 
obedience. In fact, some of the states may have furnished 
both ships and money; 6 but the tribute (<o/>os) said to have 
been assessed by the Athenian Aristeides G included the money 
contributions alone. 

A change in the character of the league is visible at an 
early period of its existence. Fresh cities were taken and 

1 Her. vii. 107 ; Time. i. 100. 5 Pint. dm. 11. This passage also 

2 Koival &i>odoi, ib. i. 97. implies that the cities, which furnished 
5 This judicial function of the league ships supplied land contingents besi<le 

was employed by the Athenians as a their crews (otfre ris vavs 
means of strengthening their hegemony otfr' 8.vdpa.s d7r<?<7rcX\cw). 
(Thuc. vi. 76). 4 ib. i. 96. 6 AtJk Pol. 23. 



n DEMOCRACY 191 

added against their will, and one of these, Scyros, became an 
Athenian ^leruchy and was wholly appropriated by the leading 
state. 1 In these deeds of force Athens was no doubt actively 
assisted by her confederates. We have only to remember the 
object for which the league was formed, and the way in which 
the allies regarded this object, to understand the events 
immediately following. The professed object was to keep the 
Aegean clear of the Persians and their Phoenician fleet and to 
guarantee the independence not only of the islanders but of 
the helpless Greek cities of the Asiatic coast. To effect this 
object a permanent defensive force was necessary, and the 
allies had taxed themselves heavily in ships and money. They 
would naturally wish these burdens to be distributed as evenly 
as possible over the states benefited by their protection ; for 
the wider the limits of the league, the lighter would be the 
strain on its individual members. Thus their hostility would 
naturally be directed against two classes of Aegean cities: 
those that stood aloof altogether, and those that had belonged 
to the confederacy but refused to continue their contributions ; 
both were reaping the benefits while others were bearing the 
burdens. Hence when Naxos, one of the bulwarks of the 
league, revolted in 4-66, and refused any longer to supply ships 
or to pay its equivalent quota, Athens was assisted in its 
reduction by her allies, and its subjection was no doubt felt to 
be justified on grounds of equity. More dangerous was the 
principle which dictated that its enforced re-entrance into the 
league should be made only on certain terms. It was to pay 
tribute in the future, to be deprived of its vote to become in 
fact a subject of the confederacy. 2 Meanwhile more general 
causes had been at work which profoundly modified the 
relations of the states to Athens. The efforts of the con- 
federates could not keep pace with the restless activity of the 
leading state. A tribal inscription of this period records the 
names of Athenians who in the year 460 had fallen in Cyprus, 
Egypt, Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara. 3 But a career 
of active interference with the empires of the East was some- 
thing more than the mere protection from aggression, which 
was all that the allies desired and all that the league was 

1 Thuc. i. 98. &rra 8t Kal r&v &\\wv ws 

2 ib. TTP&TVI re avrrj 7r6Xts fyfjt,- $Wj9ty. 

7rapa rb Katfecmj/cds tSovX&Oij, 3 Hicks n. 19. 



192 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHA?, 

intended to secure. They fell into arrears in money and ships, 
and the penalty was doubtless the loss of their votes ; they 
offered a monetary payment in place of meantime contingents, 
and Athens accepted the compromise. Thus the allies tended 
to become a class of tributaries (wroreAets), while Athens held a 
fleet kept in the fullest degree of efficiency by constant active 
service. Her increased power was shown by the ease with 
which she crushed the revolt of Thasos in 465, her intentions 
by her persistent efforts to occupy strategical positions in the 
neighbouring district of Thrace, which was to be the key of her 
future empire. It was now plain to the Greek world that 
Athens was not the head merely but the only power in the league, 
and even Sparta took the alarm. But no efforts could be made 
to stay the development of the confederacy into an empire, 
which was finally attained in the year 454, when the common 
treasury was transferred from Delos to Athens, and the first- 
fruits of the tribute (one-sixtieth of each state's assessment), 
which had formerly been paid to Apollo of Delos, were now 
presented to Athene of the Athenians. 1 At this time the only 
states whose autonomy was guaranteed by the supply of ships 
in place of tribute were apparently Samos, Lesbos, Chios, and 
the Euboean towns; and it is probable that tributary states 
had now been excluded from all direct influence in the league 
that, in fact, the votes of the great congress had dwindled down 
to the votes of these four islands and the city of Athens. For 
a time victory on the mainland of Greece had kept pace with 
success on the seas. But the land hegemony of Athens, who 
between tho years 407" and 447 had either conquered or entered 
into close alliance with Boeotia, Phocis, Opuntian Locris, 
Mogara, Achaea, and Argos, was closed by the loss of Boeotia 
in 447 and the revolt of Megara in 445. To Pericles the loss 
of this supremacy by land mattered little : it was more burden 
than profit to maintain control over all this extent of territory, 
and diverted the state's attention from its main object the 
strengthening of its maritime power. In 445 even this seemed 
threatened by tho revolt of Eubooa, the towns of which had up 
to this time been autonomous. But the conclusion of this 
revolt strengthened Athens' hands ; Euboea was subdued, 
Histiaea became an Athenian cleruchy, and the remainder of 

1 Tho year 454 is tho date at which fruits (a.Trapx^) appear as "a mina 
tho tribute lists commence. Tho first- in tho talent " (nva, fab re 



vi DEMOCRACY 193 

the island was made tributary. 1 In 440 Samos revolted, and 
was subdued during tlie following year after a hard struggle, 
in which Athens was assisted by the only two remaining free 
allies the Chians and Lesbians. 2 This island also ceased to 
be free and became tributary. Yet even after this it required 
open revolt to forfeit the condition of independent alliance. 
After the defection of the greater part of Lesbos and its reduction 
in 427, one of its towns, Methymna, still shared with Chios the 
honour of remaining a free city ; 3 while Samos for good service 
to the democracy regained its autonomy in 412. 4 These 
autonomous allies were strictly speaking not under the dominion 
(dpx>i) of Athens at all, 5 and their independence was defined as 
consisting in control of their own courts and of their own 
finances. 6 They brought neither suits nor tribute to Athens, 
and were perhaps bound only by the prescriptions of the old 
Delian league, but they were by no means free from the 
practical interference of the leading state, which stopped any 
procedure likely to lead to their revolt. 7 For a time indeed an 
effort seems to have been made to keep up the fiction of a 
council, its object being to give a shadow of legality and a show 
of independent support to the aggressions of Athens on her 
revolted subjects ; 8 but it is scarcely possible that this fiction 
survived the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Yet the legal 
language of official documents still recognises the permanence 
of the confederacy, and claims no sovereignty of Athens over 
any of the states. What Greek historians call the empire 
appears there as the " symmachy " of the Athenians ; what they 
call the subjects (UTT^KOOI) appear under the colourless names 
of "the allies" or "the cities." 9 

There is little doubt that the legal basis of the Athenian 
Empire was formed by a system of separate agreements with 
the separate states, although we have no means of determining 
whether this basis was universal and whether all the states of 
the Delian league were brought into new relations with Athens 

1 Time. i. 114. 2 ib. i. 116. ' Thus in 424 the Chians were 

3 ib. vi. 81. 4 ib. viii. 21. made to pull down their new fortifica- 

8 The Mytileneans describe them- tions on suspicion of an intended 

selves as O$K dpxo/xepoi wffirep ol &\\oc revolt (ib. iv. 51). 

(ib. iii. 36). 8 a llit n< 

6 aMvofjLot is explained by the 9 y 'LQnva&w (fu/Kjaaxfo (Hicks n. 23 

words atfroTeXew and atirbdiKoi, ib. 1. 30). The allies are ol ff&wut'xpi or 

v. 18. al 7r6\6is. 



194 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTOIIY CHAP. 

by a series of documents dictated by the people. The one- 
sided character of these agreements makes them of tjie nature 
rather of charters than of treaties, although sometimes they 
are confirmed by the mutual oath of the contracting parties. 
The character of these documents can best be estimated by a 
brief review of the contents of the two fullest which have 
been preserved a charter granted to Erythrae in Ionia between 
455 and 450, and another to Chalcis in Euboea on the settle- 
ment of that island in 445. 1 The charter of Erythrae gives 
that state a constitution, and is a remarkable and no doubt 
exceptional instance of the detailed reorganisation of a city 
which, when it passed into the power of Athens, possessed no 
regular form of polity. 2 The constitution is closely modelled 
on that of Athens. The existence of an ecclesia being pre- 
sumed, the chief attention is devoted to the establishment of 
a council of a hundred and twenty members, which is to be the 
chief deliberative and executive, and, in this case, probably the 
chief judicial body. The qualifications of the members, 3 their 
scrutiny on entrance, and their audit follow the rules at Athens. 
They are to be selected by lot by the "overseer" (cVwr KOTOS) 
and the " captain of the guard " (r/fxny>apxos) for the current 
year in subsequent years by the captain acting with the 
council. The civil official here mentioned was merely a 
temporary commissioner sent out for a special work of organisa- 
tion, and retiring when it was completed, 4 for Athens had 
no harmosts in her cities. But the military official is meant 
to be permanent, and therefore wo must conclude that an 
Athenian garrison (rj>povpd) was to be kept in Erythrae. It 
wan, however, unusual for Athens to garrison the cities of her 
empire, and it, scorns only to have been done where, as at 
Samoa in 439, it was thought necessary to secure the 
allegiance of the state, 5 or where, as in Thrace, the cities were 
actually the seat of war. 6 The council of Eiythrao takes an 
oath, in which, after expressing in general terms the fullest 

1 iliuks mi. li.'J and 2ft ; a valuable Athens. In luf.cr times moru than 
KtipplmiKMit to these is the decrue of mm rwippoiniment to the jftouXr) wa 
the puoplt* relerriiijjj to Mothouc (Ilickw iurbiddrn (Ath. YW. (J2). 

i. 4-1), 4 Iliw temporary .oluuwtcr is proved 

2 The dncinnunt shows that Ifrytlinto both by thu document ilBwlf and by 
had boon hi tin" hands of r&pawot. llic reference to the tTrlffKoiros in 

:i Kvcn the rule that Iho MUIU* Ari&inph. Birds 10*23. 
member may not be diosen n#ain Tor n Thuc. i. 115. 
lour yeant may luivo existed at 6 tfr. iv. 7, 108 ; v. 39. 



vi DEMOCRACY 195 

allegiance to Athens and to her other allies, it agrees to limit 
its jurisdiction by reserving for the Athenian courts all cases 
of treason involving capital punishment. 

This document represents but one side of the compact the 
relations of the subject state to Athens ; the charter given to 
Chalcis represents the other side as well, and grants distinct 
privileges. It opens with an oath taken by the two sworn 
bodies at Athens the council and the heliaea to the effect 
that they will take no extreme measures against the citizens 
of Chalcis, nor inflict death or exile, apart from such juris- 
diction as the ecclesia ordains, 1 that the prytaneis shall never 
put the question to the vote where a charge has been im- 
properly brought, and that free access to the council and to 
the ecclesia shall be allowed to envoys from the state. The 
Chalcidians take a counter oath. It professes general allegiance 
to Athens, expresses a promise to pay such tribute as the two 
states may agree on, and gives an indefinite guarantee of 
service and obedience, especially in the form of personal 
assistance. For the payment of tribute by no means ex- 
hausted the duties of the allies to Athens ; they were bound 
to furnish land contingents, and to follow her to war when 
called on to do so, whether by a special decree applicable 
to a special state or by a common decree (KOWQV ^<i(r/Aa) 
which applied to the whole empire. 2 The charter goes on 
to confer immunity from all taxation and consequently 
from the tribute which was collected from the local dues 
on strangers resident in Chalcis and on certain classes of 
the citizens themselves, in terms which show that Athens, 
like Rome, claimed the singular privilege of exempting in- 
dividuals or classes in the allied communities not only from 
imperial but from local burdens. 3 The final clause enacts that 
the audit of the magistrates of Chalcis shall take place in their 
native state, except where the charge is a capital one involving 
exile, death, or disfranchisement. In such cases there shall be 
a remit to the Athenian courts " in accordance with the decree 
of the people " probably that decree which regulated the juris- 
diction of this particular state. 

1 This is the only intelligible mean- levy see Time. ii. 9 ; iv. 42; vi. 26, 43. 
ing that can be given to the words &vev 3 Exemption from the 06joos alone 
TOU dijfj,ov TOU 'Adyvaiwv (1. 9). would have been impossible, as there 

2 KQivbv ^rifavfjia . . . irepl poydelas was probably no fixed mode for its 
(Hicks 11. 44 1. 44). For instances of this assessment in the allied states. 



196 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

The general duties of the allies to Athens may be easily 
gathered from these two charters. They consist in a, promise 
of fealty, a promise to pay the required tribute and to furnish 
active assistance in case Athens required it, and, further, in an 
agreement to give up some of their autonomous rights, the 
chief of these rights surrendered being that of jurisdiction in 
exceptional cases, such as those of treason to the central state 
and to the empire. The return that Athens made for all this 
was her protection. She is irresponsible, a " tyrant city," and 
in the position of one who commands. If she makes concessions, 
they are in the nature of privileges. She might impose limits 
to her own irresponsible power, and she sometimes grants 
special favours such as immunity to individuals or practical 
exemption from tribute to whole states, which she allows to 
pay only the sixtieth as first-fruits to the goddess. But these 
are acts of grace, and the exemption granted to states was 
perhaps as much intended to promote differences of interests as 
to cultivate tho loyalty of important outposts. 1 

The chief burden was the tribute, but its variations show 
it to have been always on a moderate scale, Tho amount 
imposed at the formation of the league in 478 is said by 
Thucydicles to have amounted to four hundred and sixty 
talents. By the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 431 
it had risen to only six hundred talents. 2 It has been thought 
that Thucydides, in his estimate of the original tribute, 
antedates a maximum which was only reached somo years 
after the formation of the confederacy, when more states 
had been forced to join the league and many more had 
ceased to furnish naval contingents and had become tributary. 
For a time an effort seems to have been made to keep the 
maximum tho same by lowering the individual assessments as 
frosh cities joined. But after the year 437 this principle was 
abandoned, tho older and higher rate was reverted to, 3 and the 
tribute swelled to tho maximum which it had reached in 431. 4 
Tho remaining epochs in its history were due to the pressure 
of the Pelopomiesian War. The assessment list for the year 
425 shows such an increase in tho payments of individual cities 
as to verify tho statement that the tribute was doubled before 

1 Such as Methoue, on which this s Probably the rate which is called the 
exemption is conferred (Hicks n. 44). "Aristiudean assessment "iu Time. v. 18. 
8 Time. i. 96 ; ii. 13. 4 Kirchhoff in Hermes xi. p. 27 ff. 



n DEMOCRACY 197 

the close of this struggle. 1 Finally in 413, when the empire 
was falling to pieces, the <o/>os was commuted for a tax of five 
per cent (cwcoon}), 2 probably on all imports and exports of the 
allied communities. The moderation of the tribute is shown 
by the fact that this commutation could be made with the 
hope of increasing the total ; but the tribute list, when the 
assessment is at its highest, tells the same tale. Paros paid 
thirty talents, Naxos and Andros fifteen each, Thera five, 
while little islands like Belbina and Cimolus contributed from 
three hundred to a thousand drachmae. This was the rating 
of the allies only three years after the date when Athens had 
in a single year collected a property-tax of two hundred talents 
from her own citizens. 8 The assessment of the tribute produced 
the only modification of the view that the Athenian Empire 
was an aggregate not of districts but of cities ; for it was 
divided into larger areas for purposes of taxation. These areas 
were convenient geographical divisions and corresponded to the 
stages in the acquisition of the empire. The tribute lists earlier 
than the year 437 show a division of the territory ruled by 
Athens into Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace, Caria, and the 
Islanders. After this date a change occurs. The Carian 
quarter as an independent unit disappears, possibly in con- 
sequence of the unrecorded loss of some of the cities in this 
district, and the Ionian and Carian cities are classed together, 
appearing first as Ionian and afterwards as Carian. 4 A revision 
of the tribute, for the purpose of renewed assessment, was 
generally undertaken every fifth year. 5 For this the council 
was mainly responsible, but to secure assistance and advice it 
was in the habit of appointing special commissioners (TCKT<U), 
eight of whom are found (two for each of the great divisions 
of the empire) in the assessment list for the year 425. The 
mode of taxation, which had no less than five stages, illustrates 
the genius of the Greeks for minute political organisation. 
First each city proposed the amount of its own tribute. 6 This 

1 Aeschin. defats. Leg. p. 337. In the assessment for 425 (n. 47} the 

2 Thuc. vii. 28. Its collectors were Ionian and Carian cities are classed 
etKoffroXoyoi (Aiistoph. Frogs 363). together. 

3 Thuc. iii. 19. * [Xen.] Resp. Mh. 3, 5. 

4 In the quota list for 443 (Hicks n. 6 Hence the expression in the oath 
30) the Ionian and Carian tribute are of the Chalcidians (Hicks n. 28 1. 26) 
both included ; in that for 436 (n. 35) KO! rbv <j>6poi> tiirore\Q 'Adijvaioiffu* fo 
the Ionian is found, the Carian omitted. &v ireiQu 'A.8i]valovs. 



198 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

proposal might be accepted by tho council, or this body might 
reject it and prefer instead the estimate given by the com- 
missioners. The whole case then went before the ecclesia, which 
might either accept the assessment of the council or reject it in 
preference for an estimate proposed by some private individual 
member of its own body. Matters did not even end here ; for 
there might be an appeal from the ecclesia to the law-courts, 
and according to their final verdict the new taxation might be 
confirmed or invalidated. 1 These modes of assessment give us 
the four classes of states which are found in our inscriptions ; 
the division is into cities assessed (i) by themselves, (ii) by the 
commissioners, (iii) by private individuals (tStomu), (iv) by the 
council (or presumably any of the other initiating powers) and 
the five hundred heliasts. The mention of an additional impost 
(!?n</>o/w) is sometimes met with in the tribute lists, but on 
what grounds it was imposed we do not know. The payment 
of the tribute was made to the Hellenotamiae by the allied 
states themselves at the Great Dionysia, 2 the "money- 
collecting ships " (apyvpoXoyoi vfy<s) of which we hear so much 
in the historians being sent out only in exceptional cases to 
collect debts from states which were backward in their pay- 
ment. 3 The official records of the tribute, of which many 
specimens have been preserved in inscriptions, were of two 
kinds. They were cither the so-culled "quota" lists, i.e. lists 
of cities with the sixtieth part of the tribute paid to Athene 
appended to their names, or "assessment" lists (raets ^O/JOM), 
which gave the full tribute imposed on each state opposite its 
name. 4 The practice of grouping states together for the 
purposes of assessment makes these lists unsafe guides for an 
estimate of the number of contributing cities, which Aristo- 
phanes (probably with some exaggeration) represents as reaching 
the total of a thousand. 6 For, although in such groups (cruv- 
reA-efc) taxation would be distributed over the cities in proportion 
to their size, yet the largest and most important would probably 

1 This right of appeal is stated in Kowbv ^faff/i-a, for collecting arrears of 
the assessment for 425 ( Hicks n. 47 h). tribute (TO, (J^etX^ara) as that men- 

2 Schol. Aristoph. Acharn. 1. 504 ; tioned in the decree about Methone 
ho quotes Eupolis. (Hicks n. 44 1. 13). 

3 They are first mentioned in 428, 4 The assessment for 425 will be 
when the Athenians were hard pressed found in Hicks n. 47 ; five quota lists 
for money (Time. iii. 10), and were no in nn. 24, 30, 35, 48. 

doubt sent out as tho result of such a fi Aristoph. Ittwjw 1. 707. 



v-i DEMOCRACY 199 

be responsible for the payment, and as such would alone appear 
in the tribute list. 

The jurisdiction of the Athenian courts was the second great 
limitation on the independence of the allied states. It was 
inevitable that an imperial state in the position of Athens 
should reserve many cases for her own courts ; but the 
scantiness of our information makes it very difficult to discover 
general principles, especially in the regulation of civil juris- 
diction, and perhaps the practice recognised in the different 
charters varied considerably. An approach to a principle 
regulating criminal jurisdiction can be discerned in clauses of 
the two charters which we have discussed. In that of Erythrae 
it is laid down that no citizen shall be capitally punished in 
defiance of the jurisdiction ordained by the ecclcsia; in that 
of Chalcis jurisdiction is given to the local courts, " except in 
cases involving exile, death, or disf ranchisement." l It is clear 
that capital charges, at least of certain kinds, had to be brought 
to Athens. In the charter of Erythrae revolt from the empire 
and Medism are mentioned in connection with this provision, 
while the clause in the charter of Chalcis refers to the audit of 
local magistrates. It seems, therefore, that most of the criminal 
cases brought to Athens would be capital charges of treason ; 
and this conclusion is borne out by an adverse comment of the 
time, which states that the individuals condemned at Athens 
belonged to the oligarchical element in the allied states, and 
hints that their condemnation was due chiefly to political 
motives. 2 The assignment of criminal cases to special courts 
whether by general or particular decrees was entirely in the 
hands of the ecclesia, and in no other department of the state 
was the sovereignty of this body so clearly asserted as in the 
regulation of the jurisdiction of the empire. 

Of civil jurisdiction we know nothing beyond certain 
ordinances affecting certain states. From an extremely muti- 
lated fragment of an inscription recording a treaty between 
Athens and Miletus it has been gathered that private suits, 
where the question at issue involved a sum over a hundred 
drachmae, had to be brought to Athens. 3 But there is little 
to show that this stringent regulation was universal. An im- 

1 See p. 195. $' frwrlovs d7roXXi5oi><n fr ro?s OIKO,- 

2 [Xen.] Rettp. Ath, 1, 16 teal a"njpLoa. 

robs [tlv TOV S^fjiov or&fovfft, rote !J (J.I.A. iv. 22 a. 



200 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

portant class of cases seem to have been the suits of private 
international law known as Swai OLTTO criy^oAwi/ suits arising 
from contracts concluded either "between individuals in the 
respective states, or between individuals and the state, or 
between the state and individuals." 1 It has been supposed, 
from the analogy of the procedure adopted in such cases during 
the second Athenian confederacy, that the equitable principle 
was adopted of recognising the jurisdiction of the local courts 
when the contract had been concluded in the allied city, and 
of bringing the case to Athens only when the contract had 
been concluded there. 2 

Our ignorance of this civil jurisdiction is the more to be 
regretted as the commercial was one of the fairest aspects of 
the Athenian Empire. The Aegean must have benefited by the 
secure trade which was maintained by the lasting peace, and 
which it was the interest of Athens to encourage, since active 
commerce meant the security of her revenues. It is possible 
that she may herself have profited by the creation of monopolies, 3 
but there is no hint even from the most adverse sources of 
injustice committed by her commercial regulations. The 
Athenian jurisdiction was regarded as a grievance, but the 
hardship consisted in the summons of the parties to Athens, 
and perhaps in the application of Athenian law to these 
dependencies. We are never told distinctly that even the 
criminal jurisdiction was abused, although it would seem so to 
one hostile to the democracy, since convictions of oligarchs who 
stirred up sedition in the allied states were frequent. The greater 
part of the tribute was used to keep up tho Athenian fleet, and so 
far in tho interest of tho allies. The empire fulfilled the promise 
of the confederacy in keeping tho Aegean clear of enemies, and 
it is almost certain that until its fall tho Greeks of Asia paid 
no tribute to Persia. But the surplus was employed by Athens 
for public buildings and for tho thcoric fund, and land was 
annexed in the conquered districts for the establishment of 
cieruchies. The primary object of these settlements was to 
provide land for the poorer citizens of Athens ; they seem 

1 Hiclts n. 58 4. They are prob- supposition becomes a certainty, since 
Ably the frppfaatai Skat of Time. i. this treaty with Phaselis would refer 
77. back to the procedure of the earlier 

2 C. LA. ii. 11. If with Gilbert league. 

we rood KO.T[& rds irpb] ^u^oXcts and 3 Such as that created in I'eos during 
not Ra.r[b, r&s X(wv] u/Aj8oXds, the the second confederacy (Hicks u, 108) 



vl DEMOCRACY 201 

usually to have been settled on territory that had become the 
prize of^war, and their advent came to be dreaded rather as a 
sign of military coercion than because they interfered with the 
rights of peaceful members of the league. For their strategic 
came to outweigh their social importance, and one of their 
main functions was to inspire fear into the allies and to serve 
as a guard against intended revolt. 1 They assumed the form 
of organised communities, and as such mark the last stage in 
the history of state-directed colonisation. The settlement was 
decreed by the people and the settlers cbosen from the poorer 
citizens by lot. The cleruchs remained Athenian citizens ; 
collectively they were but a fragment of the demos settled in a 
distant outpost, 2 individually they still bore the designations 
which marked them as members of the Attic tribes. These 
settlements present rather the theory of an extended local 
government than that of the possession of a twofold citizenship 
by the same individuals. In some respects they resembled the 
states of the empire, and their jurisdiction was limited by the 
provision that all important cases had to be brought to Athens. 
Their structure was that of the typical democracy, and decrees 
were voted by their council and assembly. But they paid no 
tribute, and, unlike the allied cities, received magistrates from 
Athens. 3 

These Athenian stations were no greater abuses of power 
than the Roman military colonies which they strikingly 
resemble, and must have been less invidious than the only 
other alternative the quartering of permanent garrisons in 
cities whose position was important or whose loyalty was 
suspected. The sins of commission with which Athens can be 
charged being so few, we are not surprised that greater stress 
is laid on her sins of omission. She ought, the Emperor 
Claudius considered, to have extended political rights to her 
allies. 4 But, if we regard the bare fact of her empire as a 
political crime, we must remember that a crime of this sort is 



1 Plut. Per. 11. Where this motive iv 'H^awrHg, or 'AOyvatw 01 fr lion- 
was not present the cleruchs at times datg. KaroiKowTes. 

did not even go out to their allotments. 3 Hpxovres in Antiph. de caed. Jf&r. 

Those to whom the forfeited lands of 47. 

the Lesbians were assigned in 427 4 Tac. Ann. xi. 24 quid alind 

remained at Athens receiving an annual exitio Lacedaemoniin cl Allienjiensdnui 

rent from the original occupiers (Thuc. fuit . . . nisi quod vwtos pro 

lii. 50). gcnis arcdxtnt $ 

2 Hence such titles as 6 fl^os 6 



202 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

to be judged by the political conscience of the age in which it 
is committed. We have already noted the absence o general 
international principles in Greece, and the idea had not yet 
originated that the only justification for empire is that it should 
l)e a burden. Whether the theory of despotism so brutally 
stated in the pages of Thucydides l was really cultivated and 
expressed with this unblushing frankness by Pericles and his 
successors, we do not know. If it was, it was mainly the 
result of alarm at the irresponsible position into which Athens 
had been forced ; and fear was the pretext, though it cannot 
be the justification, of her occasional acts of cruelty. 2 But 
Athens as a rule expended her insolence in words, and was on 
the whole a kind and just task-mistress. More she could not 
be, although a certain class of politicians men of the moderate 
or middle party seem even to have hinted at the possibility of 
Imperial Federation. 3 But this was after the Sicilian expedi- 
tion, when the empire was rapidly falling to pieces ; it was a 
last resort, and is well compared by Beloch with the similar 
proposals for unification which were made at Rome after the 
battle of Cannae. 4 The federal system was indeed the only 
alternative to direct rule, for the states would not have thanked 
Athens for the useless gift of her citizenship, and, even had 
representative government been dreamed of, the mere muni- 
cipal life which it would have left to the cities would have 
been a poor exchange for the relics of autonomy which they 
possessed. The only actual unity assumed by the Athenian 
Empire was the merely religious unity characteristic of Greece. 
The states were regarded, from a religious point of view, in the 
light of Athenian colonies, and had like them to send to the 
Panathenaea sacred offerings which were not meant as burdens 
but as symbols of a sentimental allegiance. 5 In 426 Athens 
made a really great and definite attempt at a unification of part 
of her empire by the reinstitution of the Delian games and the 
revival of the amphictyony of Ionian islanders. 6 There are 
also indications that at least a partial admission to the franchise 
was granted to some states during the later period of the 

1 Time. v. 105 ; vi. 85. 8 They are instructed to send an ox 

2 Sncli AS the massacres at Scione and two shuop, and to take part in tho 
and at Mulos. Tro^riJ (Hicks n. 47) ; of. the fliimlar 

{ Arisloph. Lysistr, 528 ff. injunctions on tlio Athenian colonists 

4 Italoflh AttiscJM Witflt p. 07 to Brea (Tlwkfl n. 29). 



VT DEMOCRACY 203 

empire, 1 a modification of the policy of exclusiveness inaugurated 
by Pericjes, which aimed at keeping Athens as the privileged 
aristocracy with the empire as its material basis. Yet even 
this policy was tempered by the nobler aim of asserting 
individual liberty by the spread of the democratic ideal, and 
of raising the subject classes of Athens' subject states by freeing 
them from the government of restricted oligarchies. An empire 
governed by a democracy must needs be democratic ; and 
community of political interests between the rulers and their 
subjects need not necessarily be destroyed by the absolutism 
of the former and the partial loss of independence by the 
latter. In the Athenian Empire the tie between the govern- 
ment of the central state and the masses in the allied 
communities seems to have been peculiarly strong. The 
whole point of Cleon's gibe that " a democracy cannot govern 
an empire " is that the demos at Athens was much too prone 
to regard with tolerance and to rule with mercy their counter- 
parts in the states. 2 This government was " the champion of 
the masses, the enemy of dynasties, denying the right of the 
many to be at the mercy of the few." 3 But it did not assert 
this right in the tyrannical form of overthrowing established 
constitutions to make way for democracies. The statement of 
Isocrates 4 that Athens " did not create confusion in the cities 
by establishing counter-governments " is borne out by facts. 
Where she had to reconstitute a state afresh she naturally 
established a constitution of a democratic type, as at Erythrae ; 
but the only certain instance of the subversion of an existing 
oligarchy the change of government effected in 440 at fcJamos 
on the eve of its revolt was a transitory attempt to meet a 
pressing danger, for she allowed the state to resume its narrow 
polity before the close of the Peloponnesian War. 5 She 
recognised that loyalty could not be created; but the proof 
that it was felt in most of the states of the empire is so clear 
from the whole history of the Peloponnesian War, that we 
hardly need the definite statement of the moderate Diodotus 
that " the democracy in all the states is loyal," or the still more 
valuable confession of the oligarch Phrynichus that the cities 
look on the demos of Athens as " their refuge and the chastisers 
of the so-called nobility. 6 But, though a democratic govern- 

1 p. 132, 2 Time. iii. 37. 6 Time. i. 115 ; viii. 21. 

3 Isocr. Paneg. p. 62. 4 I.e. * ib. iii. 47 ; viii. 48. 



204 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

ment would feel its existence imperilled by defection from tlie 
empire, and interest as well as sympathy dictated Igyalty, if 
we look at the opposite side of the picture we see nothing but 
baffled resistance and constraint. " The few " must have hated 
the rule of Athens ; for it is probable that the burden of the 
tribute, collected on the basis of a property- tax, fell most 
heavily on them, and they found themselves deprived of all 
chance of personal distinction in their own cities and of a free 
hand in administration. In most of the states we may imagine 
a patriotic party generally in the minority, an Athenian party 
generally in the majority ; and this majority proves the truth 
of Aristotle's dictum 1 that the masses will remain quiet if 
only they are decently treated. " The poor," it has been said, 
" have no passions, only wants." The average democracy seeks 
protection even more than power, and if it cannot defend its 
interests by the absolutism of a Pericles of its own, will be 
content to seek shelter under the wing of a great imperial 
state. 

The final break-up of this vast organisation did not come 
from the empire itself ; and it is doubtful whether any revolt 
would have been stirred had not the disaster in Sicily given 
courage and strength to the patriots abroad and a chance of 
reaction to the oligarchs at home which fatally weakened the 
bonds of democratic allegiance in the states. But the effects 
of the empire were permanent. It had for seventy years 
fostered popular government in the East, and inscriptions tell 
us with what result. The fiovXfi Kal S-fJ/^os appear as the 
governing power throughout the Aegean and in Asia Minor, 
at Samos, Chios, Paros, Mytileno, Halicarnassus, Rhodes, 
Byzantium, and many other cities. Crushed for a moment by 
Spartan despotism, many of these cities again sought Athens 
as a liberator, and to assert their freedom formed the alliance 
generally known as the Second Athenian Confederacy. 

6 The Athenian Confederacy 

The origin of this confederacy is to be sought in the victory 
gained by the Athenian admiral Conon at Cnidus in 394. 
This victory brought Athens again into close relations with the 

1 Pol. vi. 4= 1318 b. 



vi DEMOCRACY 20^ 

cities of the Asiatic const, and for the second time she appears, 
us a liberator bent on establishing a naval supremacy in 
concert with the cities which she protects. The Chians ex- 
pelled their Spartan garrison and entered into close alliance 
with Athens. Mytilene, Ephesus, and Erythrae followed- 
then ensued a general expulsion of harmosts from the states, 
and the maritime empire of Sparta was at an end. 1 But 
Athens did not form a definite confederacy until 378, when 
the open hostility of Sparta displayed by the condonation of 
Sphodrias' attack on the Peiraeus gave her a pretext for 
forming an association to resist further attacks on herself and 
other states. Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Byzantium, 
and Thebes joined the defensive union, and in the next year 
an invitation to alliance was offered to all cities, whether 
Greek or barbarian, which (out of respect for the terms of the 
peace of Antalcidas) "did not belong to the Persian king." 2 
This invitation met with a ready response, and the league 
finally reached the formidable total of seventy or seventy-five 
members. 3 Its professed object was still to secure the freedom 
and autonomy guaranteed by the peace of Antalcidas against 
Lacedaemonian attacks, but it is needless to say that the 
confederacy continued long after this terror had passed away. 
Any distrust of Athens' real intentions that the history of the 
first confederacy may have sown in the minds of cities eager 
to join seems to have been removed by the proclamation 
issued by the Athenian ecclesia in 377. 4 It declared that each 
ally should be free and autonomous, that it should enjoy any 
constitution it pleased, that it should never be compelled to 
receive an Athenian garrison or governor or to pay tribute. 
To remove the fear of Athenian cleruchies it was further 
declared unlawful for any Athenian citizen, either in a public 
or a private capacity, to possess land or house in the territory of 
the allies. The penalty was confiscation by the council of the 
confederates. 

In form this was almost a revival of the confederacy of 
Delos, for Athens was not a simple member of the alliance, and 
furnished no delegate to the council. She was, like Sparta in 
her Peloponnesian confederacy, the head. Her position was 

1 Diod. xiv. 84, 94 ; of. xv. 30. 3 Seventy in Diod. xv. 30 ; seventy- 

2 off 01 $ jSao-fXews efotv (Hicks n, five in Aesclnn. defals. Leg. 70. 
81 1. 15). 4 Hicks n. 81. 



SOiJ OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

secured by a system of separate treaties with the particular 
cities. The details of organisation may have been Arranged 
by Athens, and must have been committed to writing ; but 
there is no evidence for any general charter, other than the 
above-mentioned manifesto, which regulated the relations of the 
allies to the leading state. 

Athens stood to her allies as the executive to the deliberative 
power. The council was composed of delegates from the states 
(DC Q-vveBpoi roJv o-v/^axtov), each of which had an equal vote. 
Its opinion was taken on all foreign relations; we find it 
framing decrees on war, peace, and alliance, and voting on the 
use of money contributed by the allies. 1 But, as was usual in 
Greek confederacies, the executive power had the final voice in 
deliberation, and in the last resort everything depended on the 
decision of the Athenian ecclesia. While in the Peloponnesian 
confederacy a conflict between Sparta and her allies was avoided 
by the simple device of making Sparta the sole mover and the 
allies the iinal ratifying authority, in the Athenian confederacy 
the opinion of the " syncdrion " went either directly or through 
the council of Athens to the ecclesia, 2 and this latter body had 
the final voice. The council of the allies was therefore a 
probouleutic, and as such tended naturally to become a mere 
advising, body. Community of interest may have been thought 
sufficient to secure absence of conflict, but the clumsy procedure 
did not ; and we know that late in the history of the league, 
in 346, such a conflict did take place between the now 
attenuated synedrion and tho Athenian assembly. The peace 
concluded in that year with Philip of Macedon ran counter to 
the first resolution (Soy/m) of the council of the league, and a 
tardy consent was unwillingly wrung from the allies. 3 The 
tendency of events was, as in the earlier confederacy, in favour 
of the increased supremacy of Athens. Even money contribu- 



1 Husks n. 84 ; (J. 1. A. li. 62. From irepl ii.lv rQv ypa/j,fjt.dT(av &v 

a clause of the proclamation (Hicks n, Atovfoiot . , . robs <rvp,/j.iixov$ 

81 1. 51) thut "whoever proposes any- i&vvyKGiv tis TQV 8?iiu.ov. It was proh- 

thiiitf contrary to this dccruo npivtcrOw uhly more usual for the 067/10, to pass 

h Mymtois Ka.1 rots (ru/u/uixois, " it thiough the council. 
has buiiii concluded that tho council 3 Aeach. tie fats. Leg. GO ; c. Ctt't, 

.sat as a court of justice. But the 69. The passages show that the 

words may mean only "in Athens and allies finally confcciilud to tho pcaw 

in thti citicK of Uio allies." without committing themselves to ap 

8 In tho decree voting honours to proval of its terms. 
Dioujwus I. (Hicks n. 84) it is enacted 



vi DEMOCRACY 207 

tions came in time to be imposed and exacted. It is probable 
that no Contributions at all were contemplated when the league 
was first formed ; but one of the causes which developed the 
former empire was still at work, and the smaller states were 
eager to compound for personal service by a money payment. 
The Athenian financier Callistratus, realising how much depends 
on names, avoided the hated word <l>6pos, and the colourless 
" contributions " (a-wrd^s) fixed by the ecclesia were collected 
when in arrears by Athenian officials. 1 

But the basis of this league was insecure, and it had its 
weak points both in East and West. It admitted the great 
land power of Thebes, and the sphere of Athenian influence in 
Asia Minor did not extend far inland. The great period of 
Theban supremacy began with the battle of Leuctra in 371, 
and parted the state from the alliance; the Euboean towns 
followed the new leader, and were not recovered until 358. 
The naval expeditions of Epaminondas severed other allies 
from the confederacy; and in 357 came the breach with the 
chief Eastern states which led to the Social War. The intrigues 
of Mausolus, working on the fears of Chios, Byzantium, and 
Rhodes, led them to believe that Athens was plotting against 
their liberties ; 2 and this feeling, assisted by the distrust 
inspired by new Athenian cleruchies planted at Samos and 
Potidaea, led to the revolt of the former states. They were 
freed by the peace of 355; but a diminished number of 
satellites of Athens still lingered round her until Chaeroneia 
put an end to the shadow of a league and the last relics of 
Athenian supremacy. 3 

The permanence of this confederacy would not have added 
much to the constitutional history of Greece. It had in its 
origin performed the service of restoring democracy to many of 
the cities of the Aegean, but Macedon, after enslaving Greece, 
took over the rdle of liberator of the Eastern cities from the 
Persians. The gift of the Athenian Empire was perpetuated, 
and a new epoch of Hellenistic civilisation, based on a free 
political life, begins, which gradually merges, without essential 
changes, into the period of the all-embracing protectorate of 
Rome. 

1 Harpocrat. s.v. <rtvrats. For the See Gilbert jStaatsaU. i. pp. -110, J17. 
collection of these dues, C.LA. ii. 62. 2 Dem. pro Rliod. 3. - { Pans, i, i& 



208 OUTLINES OF GKEUK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 



7 iJixlii'i'banccs in th.e Athwium Goiislilidwn tJic ch^l^j Scene 

In treating Athenian political life, both internally and ex 
tcrnjilly, as first an unimpeded march and tlien a triumphant 
progress of democracy, we have wilfully shut our eyes to all 
violent disturbing causes which ended in revolution. Such 
revolution is but the occasional storm that disturbs even the 
calmest sea. At Athens oligarchic reaction never led to a 
violent counter-reaction except in the one case of the supremacy 
of the Arciopagus, which we have treated. The changes are 
subtle and gradual, and oligarchic plots, whether successful or 
otherwise, had little influence on the main course of political 
development. 

But the pathology of Greek states, which Aristotle thought 
as important a branch of politics as their normal development, 
may be instructively illustrated by the occasional breaks in the 
democratic life of Athens, The democrats had two enemies to 
fear, the one a subtle friend, the other a secret foe. The first was 
represented by the party of moderates which had opposed the 
radical reforms of Pericles, which felt, though it rarely ventured 
to express, disbelief in the system of imperial administration 
which gave birth to the ultra- democracy, and which looked 
back with admiration on the golden days of Olcisthcncs. 
This admiration was largely the fruit of ignorance, foi 
Clcisthenes was no framer of a constitution ; but the Athens of 
Solon, defended from internal attack by the protective measures 
of his successor, seemed a modified, form of popular government 
which appealed irresistibly to men wearied and. alarmed by what 
seemed to them the caprice and excesses of the mob. The 
moderation which they desired could best be seen red by a 
slight restriction of the franchise, for merely protective measures 
seemed hopeless against the irresponsible ignorance and poverty 
of the masses. Twice they gained their point, and once in a 
moment of temporary weakness, once in the days of her 
decrepitude Athens became a timocracy. Separated by but 
a thin line from this party of conservative idealists was 
the faction of the oligarchs- men whoso extreme views were 
prompted as much by the desire for protection as by the hope 
of advancement, and whose destructive power was greater than 
their reconstructive ability. Some among thorn were fanatics 



vi DEMOCRACY 209 

of the type of Antiphon, others political sceptics such as Phry- 
nichus jnil Peisander; the bulk were wealthy men engaged 
solely in the effort to save their fast-diminishing properties 
from what seemed to them the plunder of the mob. For even 
in time of peace the distribution of wealth was effected by 
heavy pecuniary burdens laid on the rich for choruses, gym- 
nastic shows, and festivals; while in time of war the demos 
acted rigidly on the principle that in case of need the wealth 
of the individual becomes the wealth of the state, and cheer- 
fully increased the number of triremes to be equipped by 
the wealthy and the amount of the property-tax which they 
mainly defrayed. Conviction, disgust, ambition, necessity, all 
prompted oligarchic moves; but as the open proposal of a 
measure directly hostile to the constitution was treason at 
Athens, such moves had to be made in secret through the 
associations known at Athens as in other Greek states as 



The hetaeria or band of associates was the usual caucus or 
nucleus of a party which, first invented by Themistocles to 
replace the clan-following of the older times, 1 had come by 
the time of the Peloponnesian War. to be a source of poli- 
tical influence which could not be neglected by any states- 
man. Pericles boasted a large body of recognised personal 
supporters through whom he acted and through whom he even 
spoke; Cimon numbered a hundred comrades (eratpot) openly 
devoted to his cause ; 2 and it is clear that these associations, 
when used in accordance with the constitution, were open and 
undisguised and were not looked on with jealousy by the demos. 
Even the oligarchical clubs had outwardly an innocent appear- 
ance. They were often on the surface mere social or even 
religious associations, 3 which had existed from very early times 
at Athens and were recognised by law. Even their political 
character had an external side, for they were employed for 
assistance in canvassing for office and for mutual support in the 
law-courts. 4 It was only when employed for unconstitutional 
purposes that their main working was necessarily secret and 
that inwardly they sought their peculiar political ends by secret 

1 Pint. Arist. 2. 4 Time. viii. 54 j-wufjuMrttu &rl 

* id. Per. 7 ; cf. 14 ; dm. 17. dlxats KO.! dp^ats : cf. Plato Tlieaet. 

3 dvffias eVe/ca Kal ffwoveias, Arist. p. 173. 
&h. viii. 5, 



210 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

wire-pulling and, if necessary, by the dagger of the assassin. 
They were called " conspiracies " (f UJ/W/AOO-MU) on account of the 
secret oath taken by the members, an oath which in sonie states, 
we are told, contained the promise " I will be an enemy to the 
people, and will devise all the harm against them which I can." l 
In the very infancy of the democracy there are one or two 
doubtful instances of oligarchic designs against the constitution 
which may have been the work of these clubs. 2 But otherwise 
the working of parties during this early period was open and 
undisguised, and for many years after the last suspected plot in 
457 we hear nothing of secret machinations of the oligarchs. 
No severe pressure was as yet put on the opposition to induce 
it to resort to extreme measures, for the fiscal difficulties which 
ciime with the Peloponnesian War had not yet originated. 
Towards the close of this war the clubs became secret combina- 
tions on the part of the wealthier classes to protect themselves 
against the attacks of the tribe of sycophants, the " drones with 
stings," which the democracy fostered ; and although hetaeriae 
as a rule acted independently of one another, yet combination 
was easy, for communications were kept up between the various 
oligarchic centres, not only in Athens but throughout the cities 
of the empire. 3 In 413 such a combination was rapidly effected, 
and moderate und oligarch competed for the realisation of their 
pet schemes ; for the Sicilian disaster offered a chance such as 
might never occur again for an open protest against extreme 
democracy. The war party had disgraced itself and felt itself 
deservedly discredited ; but moderate counsels at first prevailed. 
Advantage was taken of the strong feeling running through 
Athenian society, that some check must be placed on the free- 
dom of initiative, to establish a provisional board of ten TT/JO- 
fioyXoi,, elderly men who would deliberate on all matters to be 
submitted to the people. 4 But the time was ripe for oligarchic 
roaclion 3 to which even moderates like Therainenes gave their 
sanction, and in the next year (412-111) a movement first 
suggested by Alcibiades was carried out through the clubs. The 
procedure adopted illustrates the difficulty of reforming a Greek 
state by constitutional moans. No constituent assembly was 

1 Arist. PoL v. 9=p. 1310 a. 8 Time. viii. 48, 54. 

2 The conspiracy- in the camp at 4 ib, viii. ] ; the office Aristotle 
llataoa (Pint. Ar'ust, 13), and that classes as oligarchic (Pol. iv. 14= p. 
before the battlo of Tauagra (Thuc. i. 1298 b). 

107 ; Plut Cm. 11). 



vi DEMOCRACY 211 

contemplated in the constitution 3 and the ecclesia had now to be 
made into such a body. This could be done only by repealing 
all protective measures, and by a decree of the ecclesia that no 
one should resort to the ypa<?) irapavopuv under heavy penalties 
and that any Athenian could propose any measure he pleased. 1 
A resolution was thereupon proposed and carried that five 
presidents (irpoe&poi) should be appointed, who should select a 
hundred men, and that each of the hundred so selected should 
choose three colleagues. Thus a narrow government of 400 
was established, which was intended to be merely provisional. 
The professed object of the reformers was to entrust the ad- 
ministration ultimately to a larger body of 5000 selected citizens; 
but the selection was indefinitely adjourned, and before the 
elaborate paper-constitution drawn up by the provisional govern- 
ment could be applied in practice, 2 the rule of the 400 was 
brought to an abrupt conclusion by a split between the 
moderates and the extremists. But the reaction was not 
violent ; the moderates now had their turn. Their ideal was 
realised for the moment by the framing of a constitution in which 
payment for state services was abolished and the government 
was entrusted to a class of citizens approximately resembling 
that which was to have been specified in the never published 
list. But careful selection was now dispensed with, and the 
test for admission to the new body of 5000 was capacity 
to furnish the arms of a hoplite. 8 Athens was now in 
the hands of the middle class, but it is doubtful whether she 
remained even for a single year under the guidance of this 
respectable body. The government lasted just so long as the 
shadow of fear hung over the state. With the splendid efforts 
made by Athens to repair her disasters and regain her maritime 
control the old feelings returned and the old government was 
restored. It fell with Aegospotami and the fall of Athens, and 
a violent effort was made, under Spartan influence, to weed out 
the supposed vices of democracy. A commission of thirty was 
appointed to revise the laws, so as to leave no hold for the 
professional informer and to cut down the authority of the law- 
courts. 4 The commission became a government which during 

1 Thuc. viii. 67. A meeting of 6000 2 Ath. Pol 29 ff. 
members of the ecclesia was legally 3 Thuc. vhi. 97. 
capable of passing such a decree of 4 Xen. Hdl. ii. 3, 2; Ath. Pol, 

USeia, (see p. 169). 35. 



212 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

its reign of terror (404-403) exhibited the worst vices of 
oligarchy and tyranny combined. A patriotic movement, 
passively countenanced by the moderate party in 1 "' Sparta, 
secured its suppression- and the good sense and equity invari- 
ably displayed in times of sore trial by the masses at Athens, 
whose virtues were always dimmed by prosperity, completed 
the work of amnesty and pacification. The archonship of 
Eucleides (403), although marked by detailed reform with a 
strengthening and revision of the laws, introduced no essential 
change in the constitution. 1 There was a better pretext now 
than there had ever been for narrowing the constitution : for 
with the loss of the empire the services of all the citizens were 
not wanted, and could not be employed, in the work of ad- 
ministration, and extreme democracy now meant an idle city- 
mob. But the proposal of Phormisius to limit the citizenship 
to land -holders a proposal which if carried would have dis- 
franchised 5000 citizens was rejected. 2 The ideal of the 
moderate man, the return to the Cleisthenean constitution, was 
attained only by the loss of Athenian independence. In 322, 
after the close of the Lamian War, all Athenians who did not 
possess property of the value of at least 2000 drachmae 
were deprived of their active rights ; the number of citizens 
so disfranchised proved to be more than 12,000, and the state 
became a timocracy governed by a minority of its former 
members. 3 It is true that Athens again became a democracy, 
and a democracy she remained, with intervals of Macedonian 
occupation and tyrannical rule, until her absorption in Rome. 
It is possible that, in accordance with the usual Eoman principle, 
the franchise was limited and the state once more a timocracy ; 
but the magic of its name was alone sufficient to secure it from 
provincial rule. Revolts, which would have entailod the 
degradation of any other city, were winked at by Roman states- 
men, who saw in Athens the source and the living embodiment 
of their acquired Hellenic culture ; the young life which had 
taught the world what democracy might mean was succeeded 
by a long old age of dignified academic repose, and the state 
which had been one of the great powers of the Eastern world 

1 If we can trust the decree in a Argument to Lysias de Anty. 

Andoc. de Myst. 83, the Areiopagus Reip. 

wtw ogata entrusted with the guardian- 8 Diod. xviii. 18. The number of 

altip of the laws. But no farther trace citizens left, in power was about 9000. 
of this power appears. 



V j DEMOCRACY 213 

continued to enjoy, as a quiet university town, the sovereign 
rights possessed by a "free and allied city" of Rome. 



8 Other Democracies EHs, Argos, Syracuse, Rhodes 

Athens through her long political history exhausts almost 
every phase through which a democracy can pass. She is the 
mother of democracies in Greece, and most of the distinctively 
popular institutions which we meet with elsewhere are hut 
copies of the work of her mighty statesmen. But these con- 
siderations do not exempt us from the task of completing this 
sketch of the last phase of city development hy tracing the out- 
line of the constitutional life of some other cities of this kind. 
For parallels are valuable since they are never exact; and 
divergences from a kindred type or cases of arrested develop- 
ment are still more worthy of notice. 

The constitutional history of ELIS presents us with a popular 
government of a moderate and stable type a democracy 
consciously preserving aristocratic elements, and still more 
aristocratic in practice than in theory from the fact that it was 
based not on a close civic but on an open country life. The 
union of the country under its original monarchy was soon 
dissolved \ for two generations only does royalty seem to have 
survived, and the supreme power then passed into the hands of 
a territorial aristocracy. Efforts had been made by legislation, 
as at Thebes, to preserve the numbers and importance of the 
landed class, for a " law of Oxylus " is quoted which forbade 
the incurring of debts on the security of territorial possessions. 1 
An inscription, probably as early as the opening years of the 
sixth century, shows the importance of the phratry and the 
clan (-Trccr/Nct K<U yevca) ; 2 and the local influence of this clan- 
nobility seems to have rendered the different communities of 
the country largely independent of one another. 

With union came the impulse to popular government which 
usually accompanied it. Rarely did the Greek world in the 
historic period witness amalgamation on a larger scale than that 
effected by the (rvvoiKio-pos of Elis in 471. It recalled the work 
of Theseus of Athens, and had the same effect of merging the 

1 Arist. Pel. vi. 4=p. 1319 a, (jSa<n\as) mentioned in this document 

2 Cauer n. 253. The "kings" are probably religious officials. 



214 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

loosely connected communes into a single capital, the town of 
Elis, which became the sole centre of political life! This 
union must have involved some alteration in the original con- 
stitution, but when the latter assumed a form that could justly 
be described as popular we do not know. Further developments 
took place, for Phormio of Elis is compared as a reformer with 
Ephialtes of Athens, 2 and cut down the power of some 
dominant aristocratic council. An outline of the developed 
democratic constitution for the year 420 shows us a hierarchy 
of magistrates who bear, as in former times, the title ot TO, T&y 
e'xovres, a popular council of six hundred, and the still surviving 
%uou/>yot. 8 What powers were exercised by the " demiurgia " 
we are not told. In many states the title denoted an individual 
magistracy ; but it is thought that at Elis the term may have 
been applied to a curious survival of the old aristocratic con- 
stitution. This was a council composed of ninety members 
holding office for life 4 (perhaps the very body whose powers 
were curtailed by Phormio), which appears to have been still 
retained, after the creation of the larger democratic council, 
as a narrower within a wider executive. The ecclesia held 
the supreme power, and that inevitable product of popular 
government, the "champion of the people," is sometimes its 
ruler. 6 But the state never developed an extreme democracy, 
for it had no intense city life. Elis was the garden of Greece, 
and most of its inhabitants preferred to live in the country 
the capital remained unwalled, 6 and even in the time of Polybius 
there were families who had not been in the city for genera- 
tions. 7 This democracy belonged to the class described by 
Aristotle, " where the husbandmen and those who have moderate 
fortunes hold the supreme power and the government is 
administered according to law " ; and where " the citizens being 
compelled to live by labour have no leisure, and where therefore 
they set up the authority of the law and attend assemblies 
only when necessary." 8 

ARGOS in its later history is an isolated instance of a con- 
tinuous democracy amongst the Dorian settlements of the 
Peloponnesus. It is credited from its first foundation with 

1 The original communes are called 4 Ari&t. Pol. v. 6= p. 1306 a. 
by Diodorus (xi. 54) ir<5Xs, "by Strabo fl Xou. Hdl, iii. 2, 27. 

(p. 336) SWOL. 6 il). I.e. 

2 Plut, Praec, ff&r. Rtip. 10. 7 Polyb. iv. 73. 

8 Thuc. v. 47 ; cf. Cauer l.c. 8 Arist, Pol iv. 6=p. 1292 b. 



vt DEMOCRACY 215 

democratic tendencies, and at a very early period limited the 
power Q$ its kings l ; and although these restrictions were for a 
time broken through by Pheidon, who raised the royal preroga- 
tive to its old height and is consequently classed as a tyrant, 
they were reimposed on his successors, and this limitation saved 
the office. A titular king with some military power at the 
time of the Persian Wars marks the conservatism of a Dorian 
state ; and the constitution at this period may have been some 
moderate type of mixed government. 2 But social and political 
reasons combined to give it a popular tendency. Argos was a 
maritime state and subject to the progressive influences of a 
commercial life ; and these influences were accentuated by the 
intermixture with the native population which followed the 
great defeat inflicted by the Spartans at Hebdome, in the early 
years of the fifth century. Six thousand Argives fell, the thinned 
ranks of the population had to be recruited by the reception 
into citizenship of members of the perioecic towns, 3 and 
necessity effected here what design accomplished at Athens. 
But her deadly hostility to Sparta would alone have prompted 
Argos to develop a polity the very opposite of that which was 
inculcated by the encroaching diplomacy of the friend of 
oligarchies ; and the climax of her political history was reached 
when in 461 she entered into close alliance with Athens. It 
was then in all probability that the democracy, which we find 
existing in 4 2 1, 4 received its final touches, some of which seem 
to have been consciously borrowed from Athens. Ostracism 
was introduced, popular courts instituted, 5 and the highest 
magistracy was represented by a college of five strategi the 
normal type of executive in a democratic state frequently 
engaged in war. A mention of the larger administrative 
bodies as they existed in the years 420 to 418 shows a double 
council as at Elis, 7 "the eighty" which existed by the side of 
the larger democratic /SouA.?} being in this case also probably a 
survival from the older constitution. 

The Argive democracy was amongst the most permanent in 

1 Pans. ii. 19. * Tlmfl< v 31 

2 A king and a council are mentioned 8 Called 'AXtala in Schol. ad Kur. 
in Her. vii. 148, 149. Orest. 861 ; a curious court hold out," 

3 Aitat, Pol. v. 3=p. 1303 a ; cf. side the city for trying caws of martial 
Her. vn. 148. This disaster may law is mentioned by ThuoyduVs (v 00) 
perhaps be placed as late as the year 6 Time. v. 59 ; cf. c. 37 

495 - 7 ib. v. 47, 59. 



216 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

Greece, and it yielded only once to a mistaken policy co-oper- 
ating with external forces which the state could nol^ control. 
A small standing army, which the misguided ambition of the 
demos had selected from the Mite of the citizens and trained to 
meet the professional soldiers of Sparta, betrayed the govern- 
ment, weakened by the recent defeat at Mantineia, in 418. 
Sparta set up an oligarchy which was overthrown with violence 
in the next year. 1 Nor was this unfortunately the only 
occasion on which the deinos asserted its rights with sword and 
bludgeon. In the early part of the fourth century it was re- 
sponsible for one of the worst massacres in Greek history, in 
which from twelve to fifteen hundred suspected or declared oli- 
garchs perished. 2 We cannot expect a government such as that 
of Argos an oasis of democracy in a desert of oligarchy, ever 
beset by danger from without and treason from within to 
behave with the gentleness which a sense of security gave to 
the Athenian mind. Where the nerves of a democracy are 
highly strung its acts become marked by a grim fanaticism, and 
even this best of Greek governments has its sombre side. But 
the faith which was sometimes too vividly expressed, kept 
Argos a free government until the close of the period of Greek 
independence, and restored her, again a democracy, to the 
bosom of the Achaean league. 

In SYRACUSE, as in most states, tyranny gave birth to 
democracy, and the despotism which began with Gelo and 
ended with Thrasybulus in 466 was followed by the framing of 
a popular constitution which, however vigorously undertaken, 
was not for the moment successful. Syracuse, like the other 
cities in Sicily, had had no experience of self-government, the 
composite state founded by Gelo had never known a political 
life of its own, and the tyrants by their arbitrary bestowal or 
deprivation of rights had left a legacy of discontent behind 
them. Syracuse was attempting democracy without possessing 
a national life, and the result was nearly another lapse towards 
tyranny. The danger threatened by the demagogue Tyndarides, 
who attached the poorer classes to himself and was obviously 
aiming at tyranny, led to his own destruction and the intro- 

1 Thnc. v. 81,82; Avist. Pol. v. 4 (xv. 57) describes the massacre as 

=p. 130 1 a. rfibvos TOffovros ucros irap trlpots r&v 

15 T lie fio-calltul " LI ml ^0011 ing" 'Ji)\X'//j'w;> ovodrorc 

(ffKVTa\icrfjL<!}$) of 1370 B.C. "Oiodorus ywt'vat.. 



vr DEMOCRACY 21? 

duction of Cleisthenes' great preventive measure for the 
avoidance of similar attempts in the future. But the Trcra- 
Xurpos, as the ostracism was called at Syracuse, was frightfully 
abused by the suspicious and undisciplined demos. Every 
Muentiai citizen, rather than take his chance of the five years' 
exile which prominence entailed, buried himself in the obscurity 
of private life, and evenly balanced demagogues of the lowest 
type played fast, and loose with the constitution. 1 The abolition 
of the institution restored confidence, and the upper classes 
again took the lead in public affairs. The external relations of 
Syracuse now admirably fitted her for the development of an 
extreme democracy, for she drew a heavy tribute from the 
native Sicel tribes which she had subdued, 2 and political leisure 
was secured by wealth. Yet for the time the constitution 
remained a popular government of a moderate type. This 
moderation was probably a matter of practice nil her than of 
theory, for a state which means to conquer, as Syracuse meant. 
to conquer Sicily, must entrust its highest offices to men of rank 
and knowledge ; and we are not surprised to find that at tho 
time of the last Athenian expedition in 415 the representative 
of the lower classes is the critical "prostates" who is riot in 
office. 3 But the victory in the Great Harbour brought with it. 
the results that Salamis had brought to Athens. 4 The people 
were the victors' and they meant to rule. Their demand WHS 
met not by a succession of measures as at Athens but by a 
recodification, which marks a later period of growth, and 
which would have been impossible but for the tentative steps 
taken by their late enemy and present model. Diodes, the 
originator and the head of a commission for reorganising the 
constitution, in 412 introduced the lot as a mode of appoint,, 
ment to office, and published a code which so completely bore 
the stamp of his own personality as to be called die "laws of 
Diocles/' and attracted an admiration which caused it to be 
voluntarily and permanently adopted by many other Sicilian 
cities. 6 But the political creations of Diodes were of short/ 
duration, for the democracy came to an abrupt conclusion in 
405. In Sicilian history the external pressure from thn 
Carthaginians often disturbed the even current of the coiiKtitn- 

* Died. xi. SO, 87. 4 ArisL Pd. v. -I=:j. 1JJO-1 .-i a 

2 ib. xii. 30. TroXtrefas l$ SifiMUpwrtw ficrttitiluv, 

3 Time. vi. 35. & J)iod. xiii. 34, an. 



218 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

tional life of the cities, and it was the fear of invasion that, 
co-operating with social causes, raised Dionysius I. fco power. 
The tyranny inherited by his son was disturbed by internal 
factions, and the pressure of the Carthaginians on the divided 
state was renewed. In this crisis Corinth, in the person of 
Tinioleon, came to the help of her daughter city; but the 
democracy which Timoleon established after the expulsion of 
the second Dionysius, 1 was of short duration. It changed into 
an oligarchy, which was soon merged in the tyrannies (or 
" monarchies," as they were called from their legitimate recog- 
nition) of Agathocles and Hiero, until the state fell under 
Roman rule. 

RHODES is the last of the great democracies of the Greek 
world. Its three cities, Lindus, lalysus, and Camirus, ex- 
perienced the usual changes of states, tossed about between 
the Athenian and the Spartan powers. In the Athenian 
empire they are democracies, under Sparta oligarchies. In 
the second Athenian confederacy the whole island forms a 
democracy, for now the three cities have become a single 
state ; and the voluntary surrender of their independent rights 
in 408 to the central government established at the capital 
Rhodes was probably due to a sense of the weakness of 
division, and was the prelude to a long history, of independence, 
and even, to some extent, of empire. The greatness of Rhodes, 
unlike that of most other Greek states, begins after the epoch 
of Macedonian conquest. The expulsion of the Macedonian 
garrison in 323 was followed by a career of successful diplomacy \ 
but with the thalassocratia of Rhodes, her relations with Rome 
and other powers, and the foreign possessions on the mainland 
which these alliances guaranteed to her, 2 we have here no direct 
concern. The chief interest which the state affords to a con- 
stitutional historian is twofold: it illustrates the organisation 
of a stable democracy that governs dependencies, and it shows 
an adjustment of the relations of the three great cities to 
the central government under democratic rule. 

This central government possesses the normal boule and 
ecclesia, but the Trpvrams, the chief executive officials, are 
real presidents of the state. 3 The authority that we saw 

1 Died. xvi. 70. 2 Strabo p. 652. the Strategia at Athens and the office 
8 Plutarch (Praec. ger. Rdp. 17, 3) of Boeotarch at Thebes. For its func- 
classes the rpvrwcla at Rhodes with tions cf, Diod. xx. 98, Polyb. xxix. 4. 



VI DEMOCRACY 219 

merely shadowed at Athens exists to the full In Rhodes, and 
here we $nd a democracy with a real presidency uniting civil 
with military powers. The prytaneis preside over the council 
and the assembly, guide the foreign politics of the state, and 
even command its army. Below them stands a college of 
strategi, one of whom is in command of the possessions on 
the mainland. 1 The strength of the central executive in the 
capital was probably due in the first instance to the con- 
tinuance of town life in the other parts of the island, which 
made popular government less direct than it was at Athens j and 
it was perpetuated by the importance of the foreign relations 
of the state. 

The three towns still continue to possess some degree of 
municipal independence. By the side of 6 (ri'/^wras Sa/uos of 
Rhodes stands r% TrXrjOos of the municipal community, 2 which 
passes decrees (^a^Mr/zara), and has its council of /zacrr/xu, with 
a "college of iTrto-rarcu. 3 How wide the competence of these 
municipal governments was we do not know ; inscriptions show 
us merely the voting of money for sacral purposes, regulations 
for temple usages, and decrees of honour. 

1 Cauer n. 182 1. 25 ((rrparayol) wl rb,v x^pctz/ and irl TO 
* ib. n. 185. 8 ib. nn. 177, 183. 



CHAPTER VII 

FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 

FEDERAL government marks an expansion of political life beyond 
the limits of the city-state. We have already found that such 
expansion is not unknown in the early history of Greece, where 
we have found evidence of the existence both of nations and 
of leagues. A federal association occupies an intermediate 
place between these two extremes. It is a political unit which 
is itself an aggregate of units ; it is something less than a 
nation and something more than a league. But, although it 
may be possible to feel, it is not possible to express with 
scientific precision the stage at which a government ceases to 
be a league or confederacy and becomes a true federation ; 
nor is the line that separates such a state from true national 
life easier to draw. A federation must be defined positively 
by the degree of union which it has, and negatively by the 
degree of union which it has not, attained. Positively a 
federation of cities or districts implies the theoretically com- 
plete surrender of all foreign activity and foreign policy to 
a central government, a single deliberative and elective body 
and a single executive for the discussion, control, and conduct 
of external affairs, a common court of justice for offences com- 
mitted against the association, or at least a central control 

O ' 

over the local courts when deciding such matters, a power 
of raising and maintaining common military contingents, and 
either a common power of taxation or at least some control 
over local supplies destined to support the common action of 
the federation. Negatively the states must be sovereign in 
all matters unconnected with the purposes of the federation ; 
each state must possess a constitution, a citizenship, and 



CHAP, vii FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 221 

civic privileges peculiarly its own, and the freedom of its 
public lifo must be something more than a mere municipal 
independence. 

Judged by these criteria the Peloponnesian confederacy is 
not a federal government. The first and second Athenian 
leagues very nearly deserve this designation, the points in 
which they fail being the absence of a common magistracy 
and the too great preponderance given to the executive power 
of a single state. But they are distinct stages in the growth 
of such associations, and familiarised the Greek mind with the 
idea of a union which was one neither of conquest nor of 
absorption, and which reconciled the demand for close corporate 
action with the claims of individual sovereignty. They snowed 
that the only means by which the city-slate could protect itself 
against a great national power from without, or even at times 
from a great dynastic power from within, was the wholesale 
surrender of that side of its autonomous life which was con- 
cerned with foreign relations. 

The surrender of this cherished activity by the developed 
city-state, which has enjoyed a long History of independence, 
is a wonderful instance of political conversion due to bitter 
experience. It does not, however, show its internal decline 
but merely its external helplessness in the struggle with great 
nations such as Persia, Macedon, or Eome. Often it is a 
struggle for constitutional independence, which would be wholly 
lost by isolation, and might be partially regained by union, 
a free life under limitations being better than no free life 
at all. 

But sometimes a federal government has its origin in the 
very absence of developed city life. The canton or the village 
tends more naturally than the city to a wider form of union, 
as we learn from the instances of Acarnania, Arcadia, Aetolk, 
and Epirus. In such cases it is sometimes difficult to dis- 
tinguish between a federal and a strictly national life; but 
something approaching a federation is an early stage of the 
undeveloped as it is a late stage of the developed political 
society. The first federal impulse is therefore easier in such 
cases, and the federal history of such states is longer and more 
continuous. 

We cannot, however, classify federal governments as they 
fall under one or other of these two heads, for in the course 



222 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of time the two classes became combined. In the case of 
the two nations which carried out the federal system most 
thoroughly and consistently, Aetolia and Achaea, an* absence 
of city life in the one and of intense city life in the other was 
favourable to the early formation of these close unions; but 
this very tendency helped them subsequently to assimilate 
states that had enjoyed a brilliant and independent city life. 
Other developed cities, such as those of Thessaly and Boeotia, 
worked out the problem for themselves, sometimes voluntarily, 
sometimes under pressure from a leading state; while else- 
where, in the transitory Olynthian federation, the motive for 
union is resistance against a threatening barbarian power. 
Lycia stands alone, for the federal government which we find 
there is apparently a conscious imitation of a Greek system 
an adaptation of the only mode in which the political civilisation 
of the Hellenes could be applied to the national feeling which 
early tribal association had perpetuated. 

In the order of their development, as known to us from 
scattered records (and therefore not necessarily in the order 
of their actual birth), the chief federal governments of Greece 
are those of Thessaly, Boeotia, Acarnania, Olynthus, Arcadia, 
Aetolia, Achaea, and Lycia. 

The earliest union of THESSALY was attained by the 
voluntary subjection of the aristocracies of her towns to a king 
of their own choosing. He was chosen from the Heracleidae, 
but not always from the same branch of this widely-diffused 
race, with which all the noble Thessalian families seem to have 
claimed connection, and several clans and states were in turn 
represented in the monarchy. Thessaly is found acting as a 
united whole in the year 51 1. 1 At the time of the Persian Wars 
she is still a monarchy, although the power of the Aleuadae, who 
then held sway, 2 is evidently weakened by a stubborn resistance 
to their rule, partly due perhaps to the hostility of local 
dynasties, partly to a growing democratic sentiment, which 
soon asserts itself in the downfall of the monarchy, a change 
in the constitution, and an alliance with Athens in 461. Ifc is 
not probable that the monarchy long survived the Persian Wars ; 
and the government that concluded the treaty with Athens, 
sent her assistance at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War 
in 431, and tried to stop the march of Brasidas to Thrace in 

1 Her. v. 63. a ib. vu. 6. 



vr , FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 223 

424, was probably some kind of federal council, 1 the political 
sentiments of which were certainly democratic, and which was 
the first expression of the collective life of TO KOWOV OerTaAcov. 
As a primary assembly could not have permanently represented 
the interests of such an area as Thessaly, the council must 
have been composed of delegates from the states; and this 
unknown Thessalian synod furnishes the earliest instance of 
political representation on a large scale in Greece. But the 
new government was as powerless as the late monarchy had 
been to control the dynastic influence which guided the 
politics of the separate towns and introduced the disorder and 
confusion which we have elsewhere traced. 2 The rule of the 
feudal nobility continued until the close of the Peloponnesian 
War, when unity was sought by the new method of a partial 
revival of the monarchical power. This was represented by 
the office of rayos, which, like the Roman dictatorship, was a 
temporary resumption of the military authority of the early 
kings for the purpose of uniting the independent states of 
Thessaly for some common purpose. The tagus was apparently 
elected by a majority of the states, and the whole military force 
of the country was placed under his command ; while the subject 
tribes of Perrhaebi, Magnetes, and Achaeans, which seem 
ordinarily to have been dependent on particular towns, 3 were 
brought under the control of the new government, to which 
they paid tribute and furnished contingents. 4 An attempt had 
been made by Lycophron of Pherae to secure this position in 
404, but his violent efforts to unite the whole of Thessaly 
under his sway gained no constitiitional recognition ; he died a 
" tyrant," and his successor Jason, whose position was recognised 
in 375, was the first and last tagus of united Thessaly. 5 His 
assassination five years later brought the government to a 
close; none of his successors was able to maintain the con- 
stitutional hegemony, and the attempt of one of them, Alexander 
of Pherae, at regaining it again called into existence a federal 
government of a republican type. Only the executive officials 
of this government are known ; they show that, for the purposes 
of organisation, the four rerpaSes of Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, 

1 Thuc. i. 102 ; ii. 22 ; iv. 78 (rb 3 Thus the Porrliaeln were dependent 
irdvTwv KOIVQV}. Yet in 454 mention on Larisa (Strabo p. 440). 

is made of a son of a '* King of the 4 Xen. Ildl. vi. 1, 8-12. 
Thessalians" (Time. i. 111). 5 ib. ii. 3, 4, vi. 1, 18 ; Died. xiv. 

2 p. 64. 82, xv. GO. 



224 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAK 

Histiaeotis, and Phthiotis formed an intermediate stage between 
the city and the whole country : for while an ap^wv^tands at 
the head of the league, each tetras has its own polemarch, with 
subordinate commanders for the infantry and the cavalry. 1 
But this second attempt at a federal system was still more 
transitory than the first. It was powerless to resist the 
attempts at usurpation which were constantly being made by 
the would-be followers of Jason ; the aristocracy called in the 
assistance of Philip of Macedon in 352, interference paved the 
way for conquest 3 and Thessaly became a dependency of 
Macedonia in 344. From this time it has no independent 
history, for from Macedonian it passed into Roman hands 
through the battle of Cynoscephalae in 197. Its autonomy 
was indeed restored, but its constitution was organised by 
Roman commissioners and it was henceforth within the sphere 
of Roman influence. 

The federal system was perpetuated under both dominions, 
and was in fact the only one applicable to a country of the size, 
the traditions, and the ill-organised city life of Thessaly. But 
these adaptations of it, imposed and even borrowed in some of 
their details from without, have little historical interest. The 
Macedonians combined the federal divisions (especially those of 
the great "tetrades") with a close oligarchical government. 
It is not known whether the councils of ten (Se/caSa/^tcu) 2 
which they established were at the head of the whole league 
or of each of the four divisions ; but the idea of this govern- 
ment seems to have been adopted from the Spartan system 
of imperial rule. The executive officials of rb KOLV&V Gerra- 
A<3i/ after Flaniminus' victory as clecarly resemble those of the 
Achaean league, although the democratic character of this 
latter organisation was not imitated. At the head of the state 
stood a strategus ; arid the " consilium " which met at Larisa s 
was doubtless elected by the states. But there was probably no 
general assembly, tho structure of the government reflecting the 
now constitutions of the cities which, in accordance with the 
usual Roman principle, wore organised on timocratic lines. 4 

In BOEOTIA tho earliest impulse to national unity seems to 
have been manifested in religious association, and we have 



and tTnrapxot (CJ.A. 3 Livy xxxv. 31 ; xlii. 38. 
ii. n. 88 ; Dittenbergcr n. 85). 4 $. xxxiv. 51 (Flaminimis) 

8 Ocm. JPhd. ii. 24. censu maxime ct tmntttwni ctjudfoes legit. 



7JI FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 225 

already noticed that the amphictyony which met at OncliosLus 
was proljjtbly the first form of union amongst its towns. 1 The 
memory of this religious origin of the federation was preserved 
in the titular headship of united Boeotia being vested in 
the person of a wholly non-political official called 6 a/^wi', who 
was doubtless the president of the association which still con- 
tinued the cult of Poseidon at Onchestus ; 2 the memory of the 
final union of the territory under a single government was still 
further fostered by a festival of incorporation, the "PamboeoliM," 
celebrated in the temple of Athene Itonia near Coroneia. 3 
The union, thus accidentally begun, would never have developed 
into a permanent federal government had it not been for the 
activity of Thebes. Linked by interest with some powerful 
states, she coerces unwilling cities into joining the league ; her 
own individuality is never merged in the political union which 
she holds together ; sometimes she is but a powerful associate, 
sometimes the actual mistress of the other cities, but she has a 
political life of her own, while the history of the other cities of 
Boeotia is but the history of Thebes. "We have already noticed 
how the internal politics of the leading state and its weaker 
partners interacted on one another; 4 the federation, in the 
days of its independence, passes through two stages, an oligarchic 
and a democratic, and in structure the former shows the far 
more perfect federal system of the two. In the year 424, 
when this structure is first revealed to us, we find seven in- 
dependent towns, Thebes, Haliartus, Coroneia, Copae, Thcspiao, 
Tanagra, and Orchomenus, the other localities in Boeotia, 
whether cities or villages, being incorporated into these federal 
units, to which they probably supplied contingents and money 
for the purposes of the league. 5 The supreme controlling 
power was vested in a large council, which was composed of 
four smaller /?ouAat' 6 These minor councils were doubtless 
local, controlling four departments of Boeotia. We do not 
know the nature of this control, nor how far it affected the 
autonomy of the nominally independent states. Probably 
the councils existed wholly for federal purposes ; and the 
difficulty of imagining a sudden combination of these local 

1 P- 60-. 2 p. 50. forming owrAaou with tin 1 tvntml 

8 Strabo p. 411. cities, see Time. iv. 76, 93 ; Slrabo ii. 

4 p. 68. 409. 

6 For these attached communities, Time, v. 38. 

Q 



226 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTOEY CHAP. 

bodies leads to the supposition that the votes on federal 
questions were taken separately in each, a majority of the 
four votes being decisive. The chief executive officials were 
the BoiojTapx^j eleven or thirteen in number, of whom two 
were Theban, the rest being appointed by the other federal 
divisions, but on what principle is unknown. 1 During their 
year of office they were the guiding power of the league in 
matters political and military ; they conducted negotiations for 
external alliances with greater discretionary power than that 
possessed by most foreign ministers of Greece, although the 
validity of the agreement was dependent on the final consent of 
the four councils ; and they were the generals of the Boeotian 
army in the field, the supreme command circulating amongst 
the members of the college in turn. 2 

When we next catch a glimpse of this federal organisation 
Thebes is democratic, and the political character of the other 
states is in harmony with that of their leader. But no true 
democratic federation was formed. The origin of the league 
was unfavourable to such a result, for the hegemony which 
Thebes renewed in Boeotia after 379 was founded on conquest; 
and the league is a crushed and half-unwilling partner of the 
central state in the short but brilliant period of Theban 
ascendency. Formally the federal government was still con- 
tinued, and the federal council which met at the capital was the 
Koivi) cruvoSos TWI/ BoiWTwi'. 8 We may imagine an assembly of 
delegates resembling the synedrion of the second Athenian con- 
federacy, the votes being taken, as at a much later period of 
the league's history, 4 by cities and not by heads. Practically 
it must have been a mere advising body, whose counsel was 
disregarded when out of accordance with the wishes of the 
Theban assembly. For this cK/cybjcria appears to have been 
supreme, and we find it initiating new lines of foreign policy 
for its city and for the league. 5 The chief executive power is 
still held by the annually elected Bocotarchs, and the other 
federal citios, if they had u. share in the appointment of these 
officials, may still have exercised an indirect control over aftairs. 
The Boeotarchs now form a college of seven, who decide by a 

1 Thuc. iv. 91 TUV &\\tav /3otw- s Diod. xv. 80. 

ra.px.uv (i.c. otlusr than the two 4 Livy xxxiii. 2 (197 B.C.). 

Tliobaii) d dfftv tVocAa. 8 Diod. xv. 78, 79. 

8 ift. v. 37, 38 ; iv. 91. 



vii FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 227 

majority of votes ; 1 sometimes they command the army collect- 
ively, b#t a distant expedition, such as that of Pelopidas to 
Thessaly in 364, was sometimes led by a single Boeotarch, 
and in 369 we find the college delegating the command to 
Epaminondas and Pelopidas. 2 

The confederacy fell with the subjection of Thebes to 
Macedon in 338; but, like the Thessalian federation, it was 
resumed again under Macedonian and Eoman rule. Its self- 
dissolution through fear of Piome in 171 was not its closing 
scene, for it is mentioned amongst the associations which Rome 
broke up on the formation of the province of Achaea in 146. 3 

ACARNANIA, little as we know about its history, is an in- 
structive type of the form of government which we are illustrat- 
ing, since it presents two distinct stages of federal organisation. 
It is first a union of tribes or villages, and afterwards a union of 
cities. During the latter part of the fifth century it was still one 
of the most backward of Greek communities. Its inhabitants 
dwelt in unwalled villages and lived by plunder. 4 Yet even at 
this time the nation possessed a kind of unity, for at Olpae, a 
strong fort on a hill, they had a common court of justice (KOLVQV 
Suwxcmj/Diov). 5 This court was probably established, like the 
KowoSiKiov of Crete, for the settlement of international disputes 
between the tribes, and does not necessarily show a federal 
government. But such a government is known to have existed 
in the year 391, when we find a r<oivbv TWI/ 'A/ca/ovai/wv meeting ' 
at Stratos. 6 At this time the tribe was still the highest 
political unit, and it was not until the year 314 that, on 
Cassander's advice, the Acarnanians began to form small cities. 
The federation was still continued, is found existing at the close 
of the third and in the second century, and was not disturbed 
by Borne. It possessed a council (ftovXd) 7 probably, as in most 
federal governments, composed of an equal number of repre- 
sentatives from each city arid a primary assembly (KQWQV) of 
such members of the cities as chose to attend. There is every 
reason to suppose that, as in the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, 
the votes were taken by cities after free deliberation, in which 
any member present might engage. The Acarnanian assembly, 

1 Diod. xv. 52, 53. c Xcn. ffett. iv. 6, 4. 

2 Plut. Pelop. 26 ; Diod: xv. 62, * Cauer im. 240, 241. The first of 
8 Polyb. xnni. 2; Paus. vii. 16. these inscriptions is thought, from 

4 Time. i. 5. internal evidence, to date irom about 

5 & iii. 105. the year 220. 



228 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

besides deciding questions of foreign policy, possessed criminal 
jurisdiction and the power of deposing its own magisti^tes \ on 
one occasion we find it condemning two of the leading citizens 
for treason and abrogating the command of its own trTparyyos. 1 

OLYNTHUS, which made the next effort at federation which 
Greek history has handed down to us, attempted to be to her 
Thracian and Macedonian neighbours what Thebes was to 
Boeotia. Her motives, if not wholly disinterested, were 
at l6ast favourable to the political liberties of the states 
which she endeavoured to incorporate. Nowhere was a strong 
Greek barrier more necessary than on the frontier of Macedon, 
and the Thracian domain might again be coveted by the 
southern powers, Her policy of incorporation was marked by 
liberal views, but where persuasion was not sufficient, force 
was used; a stout resistance was offered by Acanthus and 
other Greek cities threatened, which failed to realise that " the 
half was better than the whole " ; Spartan assistance was called 
in ; the league begun in 382 was dissolved in 379, and the path 
to Greece lay open to the Macedonian kings. 

The little that we learn of this federation comes from the 
lips of a political enemy, 2 who is more interested in its 
aggressions than in its organisation. From this vague account 
we gather that Olynthus had attempted to free some cities 
from the King of Macedon, and was already in possession of 
" Pella j that she had induced towns to " use tho same laws " 
as herself and to enter into the relation of ouproAtreuz ; and 
that the incorporated states, which are represented as sharing 
in her "politeia," possessed the rights of intermarriage and 
of owning land with her and amongst themselves. It is un- 
likely that Olynthus contemplated full absorption, which would 
have involved the merging of her own identity in that of the 
other cities. Her proposal was apparently the interchange of 
full and not merely of partial citizenship between the towns, 
and a federal government of which Olynthus was, for the time 
at least, to be the head. The opposition to the scheme was 
perhaps intensified by the closeness of tho relations (un- 
necessary to a federal government) which were suggested, and 
which scorned to leave little beyond municipal independence 
to tho separate cities. 

1 Livy XAxiii. 1(J. 
2 Cleigeiies, the Acaiitluau envoy at Sjiorlu. iu Jii52 (Xou. Udl, v. iJ, 11-19). 



VII FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 229 

The federal union of ARCADIA was, unlike those which 
we hav^ considered, the result neither of a spontaneous 
national movement nor of the ambition of a single Arcadian 
cifcy. It was the result of external forces working on a nation 
already predisposed to such a form of organisation but unable 
by its own efforts to obtain it. We have seen how the iron 
hand of Sparta repressed all tendencies to union amongst the 
Arcadian tribes and cities, when efforts were made to found 
this union on conquest. 1 It is far from likely that she would 
have lent more encouragement to voluntary political associa- 
tion ; and therefore we must conclude that the early national 
coinage stamped 'ApKaSiKov is but the sign of a common temple- 
mint, and the evidence merely of a religious amphictyony, not 
of a political league. But Sparta's policy of dissociation was, 
as we saw, coupled with an objection to the growth of walled 
cities in the district ; 2 and the encouragement which she thus 
gave to tribal life was itself favourable to a federal form of 
government at the moment when her direct pressure was 
removed. 

This pressure was removed by the battle of Leuctra in 
371. The Arcadians found themselves free, and ready, with 
the assistance of Thebes, to play their part in history as a 
nation. The immediate effect of the victory was the resuscita- 
tion of Mantineia, whose villages again became a town ; 3 but 
the traditional rivalry between this city and Tcgea, which had 
been the representatives respectively of the independent and 
the Laconising influences in Arcadia, unfitted either for being 
the capital of the new federation. A new city, with no 
traditions and from which nothing was to be feared, arose in 
Megalopolis, and this became the seat of the federal govern- 
ment. The supreme power of T& KOWOV r&v 'ApKoSwv was 
vested in a large assembly, which is generally spoken of as 
"the Ten Thousand" (ol frfptoi)* But it is difficult to believe 
that the assembly contained precisely this number of qualified 
citizens, still more that it represented precisely this number 
of votes. The votes were probably taken, as was usual in 
federal governments, by cities, and "the Ten Thousand" was 
in all likelihood merely a name for the vast primary assembly, 
at which every Arcadian could meet, listen, and discuss the 

1 p. 110. * Xen. Hell vi. 5, 3. 

2 p. 110, * ri. vii. 1, 38 ; 4, 35 and 38. 



230 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY omr. 

number of citizens present from any given state in no way 
determining the voting power of that state. We ma^; assume 
that a nucleus of this large assembly was composed of the 
regularly appointed delegates of the states. This may have been 
the council which met in the povharfpLov known as the Ther- 
silion ; l and it may have had the threefold character which we 
shall see exhibited in the councils of the Aetolian and Achaean 
leagues, of a probouleutic, an executive, and a permanently 
representative body. This, however, can be regarded only as 
a probable conjecture ; actual records confine themselves to ex- 
hibiting the exercise of sovereign power by the Ten Thousand. 
This body concludes alliances in the name of all Arcadia, 2 
receives ambassadors from other states, 3 and even sits as a 
court exorcising political jurisdiction and passing sentence on 
members guilty of offences against the league. 4 The federation 
had common magistrates (u/^on-es), whose functions and whose 
very titles are unknown ; 5 they may have been elected by the 
assembly, and must have been the executive body which 
assisted the strategus who was at the head of the government. 6 
The latter probably combined, as in most Greek democracies 
and in the federal governments modelled on them, civil with 
military duties ; as commander-in-chief he was the head of the 
select standing army which the league supported. 7 

The league was for a time successful, but its capital, 
Megalopolis, never fulfilled its intended function of focusing 
and absorbing the political life of the other towns, and the 
rivalries of the older cities tended to destroy a union which, 
even in its best days, may never have comprehended the whole 
of Arcadia. Mantineia and Tegea again became hostile, with 
the result that the former quitted the league ; but Megalopolis 
still remained the nominal centre of Arcadia, and the Ten 
Thousand survived to be addressed by Demosthenes. The 

1 Pausauias (viii. 32) calls it the ; Xcn. Hell. vn. 4, 2. 

8Qv\evT-/]piov 8 ro?s fAvpiots TreTrofyro 3 Dem. da fats. Leg. 1 ] . 

^Apuddw. A pov\j) existed in the * Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 33. 

revived league of the third century D ib. vii. 1, 24 ; 4, 33. They were 

(diner n. 444). The remains of tlie perhaps the oajuopyot of the later 

Thersilion, which measure 175 x 135 league, who then appear as reprcsent- 

fect approximately (Jfacavatums in, atives of cities (Cauer l.c.). 

Metjnlnjwlis, published by the Society (l ib. vn. 3, 1. 

for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies) 7 ib. vii. 4, 33 ol tir&pLToi was the 

show an accommodation fora general name borne l>y this standing army, 
assembly of considerable size. 



vir FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 231 

federation was perhaps dissolved by Alexander in 324 ; but 
the federal traditions wore strong enough to prompt the 
Arcadians eagerly to seek admission into the revived Achaean 
league of 2 SO. 1 Yet late in the third century a formal 
revival of the old KOLVOV is witnessed by an official document, 
which mentions the pvpioi, with a council as the supreme 
authority. 2 

The Aetolian and Achaean leagues, which we have next to 
consider, open up to us a new vista of Hellenic politics. 
Federalism has become the rule, and any state which does not 
attach itself to one of these two associations is an isolated 
unit, which must either live a life of political torpor or attach 
itself to one of the great foreign powers. In both cases federal 
government has its origin in national life, but in both it 
extends far beyond the limits of the nation. The forces which 
had been silently working for unity in the Greek world, but 
had hitherto found voluntary expression chiefly in religious 
association, now led, under the pressure of enemies from 
without or tyranny from within, to the acceptance of a political 
organisation which saved by infringing the independence of the 
city, and which, looked to as the last safeguard of Greek city 
life, was consciously thought out and carefully elaborated. But 
the highest political unity which Greece attained was still 
singularly incomplete. Even if we except the recalcitrants and 
the waverers, and neglect the stubborn resistance of Sparta 
and the proud isolation of Athens, we find that the history of 
the two leagues is one of conflict : that their method of con- 
version to the new political faith is persuasion tempered by 
annexation: that even Achaea is willing to spread her pro- 
paganda by the sword : that Aetolia is a shameless plunderer, 
ready to share her spoils with Macedon or Kome : and that 
finally the rivalries of both compel them to call in the 
assistance of foreign powers, whose alliance brings Greece into 
the vortex of the world-politics of Eome and submerges her with 
Macedon under the protectorate of the great Western power. 

The AETOLIANS of the fifth century are described AS a 
backward portion of the Hellenic race, still preserving some 
barbarous customs and living in unfortified villages. 3 They 



1 Pans. viii. 6 ffvvefyloi, d rQv 2 3oc rg 

nerfaxov ol 'ApicdSes irpo- rots pvptois (Caner l.c.). 
'EXX^aw. 3 Time. iii. 94. 



232 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

are described as a nation (e'0i/os); but this word, which 
emphasises both the feeling of racial connection ^ind the 
absence of its expression in city life, does not necessarily imply 
a form of political organisation closer than that of a federal 
government, although the federation which doubtless existed at 
this time between the different Aetolian tribes was necessarily 
more compact than one like the Achaean league, which was 
composed of an aggregate of cities. The canton tends to a 
closer form of union than the town, and it is difficult to 
determine what degree of independence was left, either in 
earlier or later times, to the different districts of Aetolia. But 
it is natural to believe that their independence was greater 
after the tribal league had expanded into a city federation, and 
that originally the cantons had a common political life of a 
closer kind than was usual in federal governments. The 
federation seems to have had a continuous and uninterrupted 
life up to the date of the reformation of the Achaean league in 
280. United action of the whole nation in foreign politics is 
proved by the negotiations with Philip of Macedon with respect 
to the cession of Naupactus to Aetolia as a whole, 1 and by the 
embassy sent by TO /cotj/bv TWV AmoAwi/ to Demetrius in 305 or 
30 4. 2 We have every reason, therefore, for believing that the 
federal organisation, such as we know it in later times, was in 
all its main outlines perfected at an early period, although it 
doubtless admitted of modifications as the league expanded to 
include cities such as Naupactus and Hcracleia in Trachis, two 
of its earlier annexations, or Mantineia, Tcgea, and Orchomcnus, 
some of its later voluntary associates. The modes in which 
accretions wore made to the original nucleus wore very 
various ; sometimes they were the result of voluntary alliance, 
sometimes of conquest, sometimes of agreements into which 
states were forced in order to protect themselves from the 
piratical exploits of the Aetolians. For the race retain edi to 
the last its character as a nest of plunderers and brigands ; its 
history is one of wanton aggression for the annexation of new 
territory, and more than onco the Aetolians entered into agreo- 

1 Dem. Phil. hi. 44 (338 H.C.). death (fStantsrttt. ii. p. 22). But Free- 

Yist Arrian (1, 10) spunks of the man's view (Hint, of Federal Cfovt. p. 

Aetolians sending ambassadors io 256), thai they wore ambassadors sent 

Alexander in 335 /car& Miry. Uencu by the whole Autoliaii nation, but one 

Gilbert concludes that the league was for each tribe, appears more probable. 

not formed until after Alexander's 2 Dioil. xx. 99 ; cf. xix. 66. 



vii FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 233 

ment with foreign powers for the partitioning of Greek soil. They 
conspire^!. with Antigonus Gonatas of Maccdon to break up the 
Achaean league, and subsequently came to terms with Rome for 
conquests in Acarnania, the spoils of which were to be divided 
between the two powers. 1 It is no wonder that the mixed 
motives of hope and fear drew states into their net, that towns 
like Mantineia quitted the quieter sphere of the Achaean league 
to join this band of robbers, and that even cities across the sea 
such as Ceos and Teos were willing to make terms which would 
secure them immunity from plunder (ao-vXta). 2 We should 
naturally expect that the mode of annexation would have 
dictated the status of the acquired community ; and geographical 
position might also have decided whether a state should be 
admitted a full member of the league or remain only its ally. 
But general principles of treatment are difficult to discover, and 
there is no clear evidence that the league ever assumed a dis- 
tinctly imperial character. While it incorporated some states 
it exercised a vague protectorate over others ; even those dis- 
tant cities which paid tribute and were garrisoned as military 
outposts by Aetolian troops, may conceivably have returned 
representatives to the federal council. 3 

The constitution of the league was as thoroughly democratic 
as was consistent with federal institutions. Democracy pure 
and simple was a gift reserved for the city-state alone, and we 
can prove for Aetolia what we can only suggest for the other 
federations of the Greek world the presence of representative 
institutions. But the system of representation was modified 
in a manner which makes the federal organisation as here 
elaborated a kind of mean between the popular government of 
a Greek city and that of a modern nation. The council of 
Aetolia was, like a modern parliament, the permanently re- 
presentative body ; for we know that the fio-uXevrat were 
chosen by the states, and it is probable that, in accordance with 
the true federal principle which recognises the interests of 
every state, whether great or small, as being exactly equal, 
every commune furnished one senator and had but one 



1 Polyb. ii. 45 ; ix. 38. these towns aKowtws 

2 ib. ii. 57 ; Cauer nn. 237, AiYwXw? o-v/iTroAire/a?. By these 
238; in the last -cited document (a words are meant, I think, merely 
treaty with Teos) &<rv\ia is specially participation in the federal system. 
guaranteed. Sec Polyb. ii. 41 for a similar use of 

* In Polybius (iv. 25) it is said that <n^7ro\iTefet, and cf. ii. 57. 



234 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

vote. 1 But, though the voting capacity of the states was fixed, 
and their permanent representation was secured by the r council, 
every individual citizen of the Aetolian league had the right to 
deliberate and to vote in the popular assembly (the Travcu- 
ToXtKov). The citizens from any particular city or commune 
who chose to attend, voted with the councillor from that state, 
the vote counting only as one but the majority of voices 
deciding its character. If no unofficial members presented 
themselves from a city, the councillor alone gave the vote for 
that city. The general assemblies of the Aetolians were 
therefore partly representative, partly primary ; and by possess- 
ing this double character they secured the rights of minorities 
more effectively than a modern parliament, for the elected 
councillor would necessarily represent the majority of his town, 
while a large proportion of the unofficial members from the 
same state who were eager to appear in the assembly would 
probably be politicians of opposite views who were eager to 
outvote him. Yet even with this provision the federal- could 
not be as democratic as the city-state. The poorest class from 
distant cities or districts would not be able to attend the 
assemblies at all, and the real voting was in the hands of 
the aristocratic element ; while the impossibility of the exercise 
of direct personal government by the masses rendered the 
permanent executive authority very powerful. 

This executive authority may to a large extent have been 
represented by the council, which, in addition to its being the 
board of permanent representatives in the assembly, may have 
been also a probouleutic and executive body. The question 
whether it possessed administrative functions depends on the 
possibility of its identification with the board known as the 
(a-oKA??roi. We find the apocleti summoning the assembly in 
concert with the general, 2 and they have large spheres of 
competence within which they may act in the nation's name 
without consulting the assembly. 3 The large numbers of the 
body, from which a committee of thirty could be chosen, 4 

1 A decree (probably of the end of 8 Livy xxxv. 34. They are there 

tli a third century B.O.) referring to the called "sanctiiis concilium" which 

towns Molitaea and Peraea enacts that, "ex delectis constat vins," as opposed 

if they should form two states, Xax<5vrts to the "concilium universae gentis" 

airoiropcvfoffw ovXevr&? fra (Cauer The word efoeSpot, sometimes found, 

u. yjJ9, 1. 1 0). seems also to designate the council. 

8 L'olyb. xx. 10. 4 Polyb. xx. 1. 



VII 



FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 235 



increase the probability suggested by the character of its 
functioi^ that in the apocleti we have, not a separate federal 
executive, but the council under another name. 

The general assembly, composed of the councillors and the 
chance attendants, had one regular meeting a year for the 
election of magistrates. 1 Other meetings were specially con- 
vened by the executive for the discussion of important affairs. 
At these the usual sovereign powers of a declaration of war 
and acceptance of peace, of the commissioning and reception of 
ambassadors, were exercised. 

At the head of the league stood a oT/>a-n?yos, annually elected 
and entering office on the day of his election. 2 He possessed 
the usual combination of military and civil powers, commanded 
in the field, and represented the state in negotiations. The 
peculiarity of the Aetolian general is his relation to the assembly. 
It shows a judicious attempt to keep the executive and the 
deliberative powers apart; for, although the general presided 
over the assembly, he was forbidden to give any opinion on 
questions of peace or war. 3 He was a president and not a 
minister; and this regulation must have been particularly 
valuable in a state like Aetolia, where some chief with all the 
predatory instincts of his race might have hurried the nation 
into a disastrous war. 

A board of regularly appointed officials for the revision of 
the laws and the care of public documents completed the 
personnel of the league. It was one of the duties of these 
vopoypafoi to insert in the public acts agreements with foreign 
states or with new members of the federation which had been 
entered into since the last revision.* 

The history of the ACHAEAN league is more inspiring than 
that of any of its predecessors, for it marks the last glorious 
struggle for constitutional freedom against overwhelming force. 
Yet this last stand was made by a nation which, through all the 
most brilliant period of Greek history, had remained aloof from 
political rivalry, had kept its neutrality whenever it could while 
Sparta and Athens rent one another and Theban armies swept 
over the Peloponnese, and was content to retain its democratic 
independence in isolation from the events of the great world. 

1 Polyb. iv. 37. apud Aetnlos essc, tie praetor, tpwm 

2 ib. ii. 3 ; iv. 67. de Idlo consuluisset, ipse sententimn 

3 Livy xxxv. 25 bene comparatum diceret. 4 Cauer n. 238. 



236 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

But this independence was probably preserved by a, very earJy 
union amongst the twelve Achaean cities. They scei%to have 
been united by some kind of federal tie, which was rendered 
possible by the similarity of their governments, which were all 
apparently of a moderately democratic type. The Peloponnesian 
War created some slight disturbance in their relations, for 
Pollene is found on the side of Sparta and Patrae on that of 
Athens, and in 417 Spartan influence was brought to bear on 
their internal politics. 1 But in 391 " the Achaeans " are spoken 
of us a whole : they admit a state to their citizenship, they have 
a common army, and they despatch ambassadors on behalf of the 
whole nation to foreign powers. 2 The democratic federation 
seems to have existed until the Macedonian conquest ; whether 
Alexander destroyed it we do not know; but his successors 
established garrisons in some of the cities, tyrants in others, 
with the result that the dissolution of the league had been 
completely effected by the time of Antigonus Gonatas. The 
rise of a new Macedonian power under this founder of the 
later Antigonid dynasty was marked by an effort to extend its 
sphere of influence over all Greek cities not directly subject to 
its rule. Everywhere this influence meant the death of the 
constitution, for the means of control chiefly cultivated by 
Antigonus was the rule of the local tyrant. 3 The struggle for 
constitutional liberty began with the almost immediate revival 
of tho league in 280. The beginnings were modest. Of the 
original twelve cities but ten remained, llelice having been 
destroyed by an earthquake and Olenus having disappeared ; 
of these ten cities four Patrae, Dyme, Tritaea, and Pharae 
formed a nucleus for the federation, which gradually spread to 
the other towns; 4 and for nearly thirty years (280-251) the 
national league grew up quietly, and, under the guidance of 
men like Margos and Iseas of Ceryneia, assumed a constitution 
which was already fully formed when the federation was 
extended beyond the geographical limits of Achaea. Its history 
as a union of the Peloponriese and as a Hellenic power falls 
into two distinct periods. The personal influence of men of 
genius played a large part in its extension as well as in its 

1 Thnc. ii. ; v. 52, 82. 3 Polyb. n. 40, 41. 

- Xen. UclL iv. 0, 1. Yet traces of 4 The other six towns wore Leontion, 

local oligarchies arc found in tho year Acgira, Pullene, Aogmn, Bourn, and 

306 (Ib. ui. 1, 42). Ueryuuia (I'olyk 11. 41). 



VJI FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 237 

formation ; and the first period is associated with the name of 
Aratus, tjie second with the names of Philopoemen and Lycortas. 1 
In 251 Sicyon was added by Aratus; in 243 Corinth, freed 
from the Macedonians, was attached ; and she was soon followed 
by Megara, Troezen, and Epidaurus, and later by Heraea and 
Cleonae. In 234 or 233 Lydiades laid down the tyranny of 
Megalopolis and added his state to the league ; Megalopolis was 
followed by nearly the whole of Arcadia, and after 229 Argos, 
Hermione, and Phlius were admitted as members of the federa- 
tion. The league was at its greatest when it was still only a 
combination of the three districts of Achaea, Arcadia, and the 
Argolid ; for its real independence practically ceases with the 
year 221, which marks the close of the war with Sparta and the 
extinction of their only rival in the Peloponnese. For to crush 
this rival power which had been joined by the counter-league of 
the Aetolians, the fatal mistake was made of seeking the aid of 
Macedon. The league is now but a member of an Hellenic 
alliance under the presidency of the Macedonian king, who 
garrisons some of its towns and dictates its policy. 

A new period of its history begins with the guidance of 
Philopoemen (207), when the league, weaker in actual power, 
reaches its widest territorial extent and makes of the Pelo- 
ponnese a single state ; 2 for Sparta had now been forced to join, 
and Messenia and Elis were attached. But active interference 
was now felt from Rome ; the league could only shift from one 
protectorate to another, and anything like an independent 
policy was impossible. The last attempt at an assertion of 
Hellenic freedom closed with the conquest of Corinth by 
Mummius in 146, and the federation was for a time dissolved. 
It was never again revived with a political meaning ; but, as 
in the case of other kindred associations, its harmless forms 
were allowed to continue under Roman rule, and the KOWQV of 
the Achaeans still existed in the times of the Empire. 3 

The Achaean league possessed a constitution of a strictly 
federal character, the constituent states being sovereign in all 
matters distinct from the common purposes for which the 
federation was formed, and the central government exercising 
no interference with their internal laws or constitutions. 

1 Polybius (li. 40) calls Aratus of orrty KO.I Tetecriovpyts, and Lycortas the 
Sicyon the apwybs Kal KadiqyeiJu&v, jSe/Saiwnfc of the league. 
Philopoemen of Megalopolis the ayun- 2 Polyh, ii. 37. 3 Ditteuberger u. 272. 



238 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

For, although the latter appear to have been all democratic, 
this was the result of a natural tendency, and was noft a fixed 
condition of the union. 1 The whole league was spoken of, 
somewhat loosely, as forming a nation (!0i/os), and there was 
probably some interchange of civic rights between the different 
communities, although of this there is no direct proof. 2 The 
sovereign powers of the cities in all foreign and diplomatic 
action were surrendered entirely to the league. Once indeed 
we find a dispensation granted to Megalopolis, which was in 
224 allowed to send envoys to Macedonia ; 3 but, as permission 
was accorded by the central government, this was really an 
embassy of the league ; and a statement of the true federal 
principle was contained in a clause of the first treaty between 
Achaea and Rome (198 B.C.), by which it was agreed that no 
embassy should be sent to Rome by any particular Achaean 
city, but only by the common government. 4 

The strength of the league was also shown in its financial 
and military requisitions on the separate cities. Wo find the 
federal congress voting supplies, 5 and, as we hear of cities 
refusing to pay contributions to the common treasury, the 
government must have assessed each city at a fixed sum. It 
probably did not dictate the manner in which this amount was 
to be raised, but we find it on one occasion interfering to check 
a financial revolution at Sparta in order to secure its own 
interests. 6 The whole military force of the cities was at the 
disposal of the federal assembly, which either required par- 
ticular cities to furnish particular contingents, 7 or raised 
mercenary armies to be paid from the common funds. All 
questions of international law were as a matter of course 
referred to the central government, and not, as in the looser 
Peloponnesian confederacy, to arbitration ; and the government 
had the power not merely of arbitrating but of punishing, 8 

Polybius describes the constitution of the league as a type 
of the purest democracy ; 9 but its democratic possibilities wore, 

1 Further instances of uniformity are 4 Pans, vii. 9. 

given by Poly Imis (ii. 37) in the common c Polyb. v. 1. 

weights, measures, and money of the Q ib. xxv. 8. 

cities of the league. 7 t&. v. 91 ; iv. 7. 

8 y tOvutfy <ri'/uroXtrcfa in Polybius 8 Thus we find a fine inflicted on the 

(ii. 44) is equivalent to jj KOLV^J iro\trda Spartans* for offences against the people 

(xxvi. 1), and simply means the federal of Megalopolis (ArcJuteoloy. Zeitung 

government. 1879 p. 127). 

8 Polyb. ii. 48. 9 Polyb. ii. 38, 



VII FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 239 

as in the case of Aetolia, limited by its federal character. The 
vast primary assembly which was the nominal sovereign could, 
it is true, be attended by any citizen over thirty years of age 
from any state in the league; practically it was composed of 
those whose political enthusiasm or whose wealth urged or 
enabled them to attend. This assembly had to be summoned 
twice a year ; its other extraordinary meetings were dependent 
on the discretion of the magistrates. But the comparative 
infrequency of these, combined with the constant pressure of 
important business, military and diplomatic, on the permanent 
officials, threw great responsibility on the shoulders of the 
magistrates, and often placed the duty of deciding great ques- 
tions of the moment entirely in the hands of the regularly 
constituted fiovXr), which was always at the centre of affairs. 1 
We are told neither the numbers nor the mode of constitution 
of this council, but the fact that it could and often did act for 
the assembly leads us to suppose that, like that of Aetolia, it 
was composed of representatives appointed by the states. It 
was thus the nucleus of the assembly, the votes of which were 
always taken by cities and not by heads, and a permanent 
guarantee that the interests of each state should be fully 
represented, independently of the chance attendance of the 
masses (ol TroAAot, TO irX^Oos), who voted with the representatives 
of their several cities. It is probable that the councillors were 
appointed annually, and were real representatives and not mere 
delegates with fixed instructions. The split between the Argive 
members of the assembly in 198, on the momentous question of 
alliance with Rome, may point to a division of opinion either 
between the councillors and the chance attendance from Argos 
or between the councillors themselves. 2 It is not improbable 
that this council, as a permanent body, may have had pro- 
bouleutic and executive functions, although the passages of 
Polybius 3 which are usually quoted to support this view arc 
inconclusive and may simply show the representatives of the 
states acting in the name of the general assembly. The place 
of meeting for the ordinary assemblies was originally Aegiuin, 
while the extraordinary convocations were held at any time or 

1 Polybius (zxix. 9) speaks of a o-i^y- 37 the fiovXevrat are mentioned. 

Kkqros (at Sicyon) & $ ffwtpaive fify 2 Livy xxxii. 22. 

fj.6vov trujiwropetfeo-flcu <rty fiovMjv dXXi 3 Polyb. li. 46 ; iv. 26. 
Tdvras rofls a.irb TpifaovTa &T&V. In ii. 



SJiO OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

place that was convenient; but in 189 the unfairness to distant 
cities involved in having a fixed capital for a federal* govern- 
ment a defect which scarcely appeals to us, but which must 
have been seriously felt in the ancient world on account of 
the difficulties of communication was remedied by a measure 
carried by Philopoemen, which obliged the assemblies to be held 
in every city of the league in turn. 1 

The chief executive officials were the or^ar^yoi, who stood 
at the head of the government, and ten purely civil ministers 
called SyiMovpyoi, who assisted them in the work of administration. 
Por the first twenty-five years of the renewed existence of the 
league it was guided by two generals, but in the year 255 the 
number was reduced to one; 2 and the influence of strong 
personalities, which is such a marked feature of the history of 
this federation, henceforth has free play. The general was 
commander-in-chief of the army, and had unrestricted power 
while it was in the field ; he conducted negotiations with foreign 
states, and was expected to initiate all important decrees of the 
assembly. Unlike the Aetolian general, he was not merely a 
president but a member of this body ; and his membership 
inevitably made him its leader, to whom all looked for an ex- 
pression of opinion on any important business. 3 The infrequent 
meetings of the assembly and the fact that the general had no 
colleagues possessing this unity of civil and military authority, 
made his ministerial powers far greater than those of similar 
officials in a city democracy. He was held responsible after the 
expiry of his year of office, but during that year detailed 
control was impossible ; and that the vast powers possessed by 
this first minister were fully appreciated and felt to be dangerous 
was shown by the rule prohibiting immediate re-election to the 
post. A general might, however, be elected in alternate years, 
and, if he retained the confidence of the people, might secure in 
the intermediate periods the election of one of his own adherents. 
This was the way in which Aratus secured the continuity of his 
rule. 1 The general had little to fear from the irresponsible 
demagogue. He flourished only in large assemblies which met 
frequently, and the aristocratic character of the thinly attended 

1 Livy xxxviu. 30. u Polyb. ii, 4tf. * Tint. ArtU. 24 ira.fl cViauroj> alpct- 

:{ ib. xxviii. 7 c'/cdXa yap ret irpay- aQai <?Tpa,ri]ybv otnbv Jjbv "A/jaro?), 

fjidra. r}]v rou ffTpoLTtjyou yv&wv. Ut'. tpyy S /cai 7^/*j? foot Travrbs &p- 

Livy xiJtv. 25. Xp. 



vn FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS 241 

meetings of the Achaean league gave little opportunity for this 
exhibition of democratic mistrust. 

The Delations of the demiurgi to the general were not unlike 
those existing between the prytaneis and the strategus at 
Athens. "With him they summoned the extraordinary meetings 
of the assembly, 1 and they doubtless had the presidency of this 
body and the right of putting questions to the vote ; but, unlike 
the Athenian prytaneis, they were a board of at least the same 
degree of permanence as the general himself, and it was of 
the highest importance to him to secure their co-operation. 
Whether the mode in which the demiurgi were appointed pro- 
vided a guarantee that they were of the same political views as 
the strategus, we do not know. Their number ten seems to 
point to an original representation of the ten Achaean towns ; 
but this number must have been a mere survival after the 
league expanded, and their mode of appointment may con- 
sequently have been changed. The ministerial character of the 
Achaean government must have been still more marked if we 
imagine that the members of this controlling board were chosen 
by the assembly at the annual elections. In this case the 
general and his civil colleagues must have represented the same 
political views, and would have formed a kind of cabinet. 

The expanded democracy which we have discussed thus 
bears many resemblances to modern popular governments. 
Citizenship, as Aristotle defines that term, was for the masses 
in the Achaean league, as it is with us, a mere potentiality. 
The power of the central government increased the wider the 
limits of privilege were extended, and the exercise of this power 
involved a foreshadowing of the modern ministerial system. 

The last federal government which we have to chronicle is a 
very perfect Hellenic system evolved by a non- Hellenic race. 
The LYOIAN league is the fairest product of that Hellenism, that 
mastery of the barbarian mind by Greek political thought, 
which took such strong root in Asia Minor. The origin of the 
league is unknown, and the period of its independence, when 
its assembly used to decide on war, peace, and alliance, 2 is a 
blank. Lycia appears in its later history first as a dependency 

* Polyb. v. 1 ; here the &pxoi>Ts are (xxxvui. 30) speaks of u demiurgi dvita- 

said to have summoned the assembly. Hum" as "summits vnayistfa&us" 

Other names for the demiurgi are <rw- 2 Strabo p. 665. 
dpxovres, ffwapxtcu, irpofffT&res. Livy 

R 



242 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

of Uhodus (188-168), then after 108 as a free state under 
Roman protectorate, until its independence is taken ipvay by 
the Emperor Claudius and it is made subject to provincial 
rule. Yet through, all the changes that precede the closing 
scene it preserves its federal institutions, a description of which 
is given by Strabo 1 for his own time (circa 29 U.C.-1S A.D.). 

From this description we learn that twenty-three Lycian 
cities met in a federal assembly (KOIVW o-uv&pwv), the place of 
meeting being any city which was thought best suited to the 
immediate gathering. The voting power of the cities was 
regulated in proportion to their size : the greatest had three, 
the middle-sized two, the rest one vote. In the same propor- 
tion they paid war-taxes arid shared in public burdens. 2 In 
the federal assembly the Lyciarch was chosen with the other 
magistrates of the league, and federal courts (oi/cacrn/pia) were 
constituted by this body. But the principle of proportion was 
observed even here ; for judges and magistrates were appointed 
from each city in accordance with the number of votes which it 
possessed. 

The peculiarities of this government are twofold. The first 
striking feature its non- possession of a capital which it 
shared with the later Achaean league, was one of particular 
value, if we conceive the federal assembly to have been primary 
as well as representative. But its distinguishing although 
perhaps not wholly unique 8 characteristic was the proportion- 
ing of votes, executive powers, and burdens to the size of the 
cities. This idea, in the extreme form in which it is found in 
the Lycian league, exhibits a very perfect form of national, but 
not of federal, government. The Lycian league stood midway 
between the two, and ignored the principle of equal representa- 
tion, which should be found somewhere in a true federal system, 
since it is the expression of the equal interest and of the equal 
sovereignty of the only true unit of such governments the 
state. 

In concluding this sketch of federal governments wo need 
not dwell again on their political significance, and on the part 
they played in maintaining the last fragments of Hellenic indo- 

1 Lc. SafMopyot ui*e apparently chosou in pro- 

3 r&s eiff<f>opas dcrQfyovffi nal rds portion to the sixe of the cities (Cauci 
#XXa Xr<w/)ytas (8lrnlx> I.e.). 11. 444), 

3 hi the later Arcfuliun league the 



vii FEDERAL GOVEHNMENTS 243 

pendence. But a final word may be said on the constitutional 
machinery which they adopted for this purpose. It has some- 
times been denied that representative institutions for the 
purpose of political government were known to the ancient 
world. This denial cannot in any case apply to the area which 
forms the district of the city-state, for in Athens and elsewhere 
we have seen election to state offices based on such divisions 
as tribes and even families. An extension of this system to 
federal purposes is proved by the representative senate of the 
Aetolian league, and the probabilities are strongly in favour of 
all the later federations having possessed a board of regularly 
appointed delegates or representatives from the states which 
they comprised ; for even if we disregard the probability of a 
common type of federation, as of democracy, having been 
evolved, it is almost inconceivable that this device should not 
have been adopted by nations familiar with the representative 
institutions of the arnphictyonies. The Greeks in their appli- 
cation of this system recognised in the main the true federal 
principle that each state must be equally represented. But 
they were not so happy in the solution which they adopted as 
to how the claims of individual citizens were to be met. To 
satisfy these claims they combined primary assemblies with 
representative bodies ; but the tendency of primary assemblies 
on a large scale, even as regards the expression of opinion, is, 
as we have pointed out, really aristocratic, and no means were 
adopted of regulating voting power by population except in 
the Lycian league, which in attempting to secure this object 
disregarded the equal claims of states. This difficulty of 
balancing the claims of states arid of populations in federal 
governments has first been solved in the modern world by a 
double system of representation by the institution, for instance, 
of a senate which represents the votes of states and of a lower 
house which represents the votes of heads of the population. 
It is doubtful how far this system would have satisfied the 
Greek desire for personal rule; but its working is certainly 
more democratic than the solution which they adopted of 
primary assemblies, which were really not representative in 
character and whose voting power was strictly limited. Demo- 
cracy in its purest form is to be found in the city-state alone. 
If we rise a stage above it, the modern world offers better 
instances of popular government than Greece, 



CHAPTER VIII 

HELLENISM AND TIIJB FATE OF THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 

IT has always been an open question whore the history of 
Greece should end, Some have taken Chaeroncia as the final 
scene ; others have with greater justice recognised that there is 
a history of Greek independence down to the close of the 
struggle with Rome in 146. Both these dates are purely 
arbitrary ; for, even if we admit that at one of these two periods 
the Greek states did lose their liberties, it is somewhat mean- 
ingless to identify the history of a nation with that of its 
political independence. A nation may perform its function in 
the economy of the world all the better for being in a state 
of bondage, It is, indeed, possible that conquest may mean 
denationalisation, the wholesale destruction of a people's most 
essential characteristics under the pressure of a foreign civili- 
sation ; and in this case the nation's history closes. But it has 
never been maintained that this is true of Greece, whether we 
think of the Hellenic peninsula or of its offshoots in West or 
East, On the contrary, the fact that has most powerfully 
impressed historians is that the period of the subjection of the 
Greeks is a poriod of Hellenic conquest, of triumphant progress 
over and .absorption of barbarian nationalities. Greece strikes 
her roots still deeper and more widely in the East; and the 
oriental world, assisted by a new political civilisation, acquires 
the language, the culture, and the art which, on account of its 
derived character and its deflections from the primitive type, 
we aro accustomed to call not Hellenic but Hellenistic a word 
which does not necessarily convey any shade of depreciation, for 
the old and the now arc incomparable. In the West and North 
the Greek influence is more subtle, more purely an intellectual 



CHAP, vni HELLENISM AND THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 245 

suggestion ; for some of these regions had been barely touched 
by Grek colonisation, and even where the Greek city-state 
existed, it finally came into conflict with another political 
civilisation that of Rome. This was not a better civilisation, 
n.or was it even stronger in its actual organisation (for beneath 
barbarian attacks the Roman civitas succumbed even more rapidly 
than the Greek TrdAts) ; but it was one whose destiny was dictated 
by geographical considerations and the past history of the sur- 
rounding peoples, and fulfilled by the decree of Rome which 
enacted that the West should be united to her by the strong 
ties of a Latin civilisation, if the East was to be the prize of 
the Greeks. 

The general historian must needs take account of this 
Hellenism, if his work is not to be a mere torso a thing 
imperfect only because it is incomplete. The historian of 
Greek constitutions, although he cannot dwell on it, must at 
least mention it, for it is his sole justification for the claim that 
Greek constitutional history does not close with the conquest 
of Greece by Macedon or by Rome. Every atom of this 
civilisation, the permanence of Greek art, coinage, literature, 
and the new forms which they assume, are dependent on the 
existence of the Greek city and on the maintenance of its 
constitution, It is true that, with the exception of the leagues 
which we have already treated, the centuries following the 
Macedonian conquest show few attempts at political creation. 
Such as were made were, in the first instance, mainly attempts 
to bring the life of the Greek city into harmony with the 
bureaucratic system of administration, which accompanied the 
more highly organised of the monarchies held by the successors 
of Alexander ; and at a much later period fresh products were 
evolved by the attempt at a strong centralisation of govern- 
ment made by the Roman Empire. But tho continuance of the 
forms of the old city life is the only adequate explanation both 
of Hellenism and of the possibility of organised empire in the 
countries of the East. 

The original extension of Greek political civilisation to the 
barbarian was, as we saw, due to the unconscious influence of 
colonisation. Where the Greek city was planted Hellenism 
took firm root; but the strange cessation of the impulse to 
emigration in the fifth century left many Western lands nn- 
touched by this influence, arid there was no possibility of its 



246 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, 

extension to the far East until the Persian power was broken 
by Alexander. The new conqueror of the East fortunately did 
not mean to become a ruler of the oriental type. A permanent 
and organised empire, governed by a man who professed himself 
the typical representative of Hellenism, must have city-states as 
the administrative centres for its districts and provinces. The 
city, not the tribe, was meant to be the unit of empire; and 
thus a movement, perhaps undertaken in the first instance 
purely as a means to the maintenance of a central govern- 
ment, ultimately gave a common political organisation and a 
common Hellenic civilisation to the East. The universal 
empire of Macedon soon passed away, but the means were 
more permanent than the end. The successors of Alexander 
realised that the security of their rule over barbarian popula- 
tions, often unsympathetic and refractory, depended on the 
cultivation and extension of the Greek TroJV/s. The lesson 
was learnt by Tiomo. She found the problem of government 
solved for her in those Eastern countries where the Greek city 
flourished ; where it did not exist she followed in the footsteps 
of Alexander and his successors by consciously cultivating it; 
and the Roman Pompeius is an even mightier founder of cities 
than the Macedonian Alexander. 

It was not, however, the whole of the inheritance left by 
the Macedonian conqueror that fell into the lap of Home. 
Faint traces of Hellenism persisted in lands far beyond the 
limits of the Eoman Empire, as a result of the transitory 
settlements ellected by Alexander on the Jaxartes, beyond the 
Oxus, in the Punjaub, and on the Indus. The semi-Greek 
towns north of the Hindoo-Kooah were swamped by a Scythian 
invasion, and even those of the Gal ml valley yielded to the Indo- 
Scythian Empire. But the dynasty of these Sacae, established 
in 78 A.I), and lasting down to the third century, employs the 
Greek letters and generally Greek legends on its coins. And 
Hellenism had nourished for a length of time sufficient to 
influence the art and coinage of the Indian kings of Maghada, 
Guzerat, and Cabul. 1 

If we next glance at what becomes the Parthian Empire of 
the first centuries of our era, we find lhat directly east of the 
Euphrates Mesopotamia is covered with Greek commonwealths, 

1 (iantncr Niw Chnplm in Greek of the Roman. Jtiupire ii. pp. 8 ff. 
History pp. 433 IT.; Mommsen Provinces 



vin HELLENISM AND THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 247 

and that in Babylonia there is a great Greek city, Selcum on 
the Ti<ms, with more than half a million inhabitants, with the 
Greek "language and Greek customs, and governed by a /3ov/\/J 
of three hundred elected members. In these (owns tlnj Hellenes 
formed the dominant element, and by their side existed a 
mixed population of Syrians arid Jews. The commercial \alue 
of cities such, as Selcucia was so great that the Hellenic polity 
was almost entirely independent of the central power. These 
towns gave a coinage with Greek legends to the empire, a 
polite language to the court, and the plays of Athenian 
dramatists to delight the heart of the Great King, and to be 
quoted in triumph over a fallen "Roman foe. 

Across the Euphrates we are within the limits of the Kom.-ui 
Empire, and here we find tho almost complde spread of 
Hellenism from West to East. In Asia Minor Hubs remained 
for the Romans to do in the way of founding or developing 
cities. It is true that, as long as the Persian Empire lasted, 
the Greek towns had formed but a fringe along the coast of 
the Aegean. Although they had stamped out. 1lie native 
organisation arid almost the native huigiuige in tin '.so, districts, 
they had not penetrated far inland. But the Hellenism of the 
interior had been effected by the Macedonian successors of 
Alexander. Galatia, the home of the Gallo-Graeci {an ollsliout 
of the great Gallic migration of 280 B.C.), was for a long time 
an exception to this political Hellenism; for he.ro, tho Celtic 
canton flourished. But city life developed rapidly uftcr if, had 
been converted into a province in 25 li.o. and Greek had bc<;n 
made the official language. 

The close of the Mzthridatic War (f,*J II.CL) gave Itoiwj 
the provinces of Pontus, Syria, and Gilicia, and a suzerainty 
over the dependent districts of Cappwlnuia, ('onmmgeno, and 
Palestine; and now the imperfect* Hellenism of the rountrios 
from the Black Sea to Judaea was completed by the grout ost 
of Roman organisers, Pompoins. Kvory whore, it w;is otl'oHod 
by the cultivation of urban lif, by the restoration of old cities 
and the establishment of new. On the Propontis and the 
Euxine, Cyzicus, Jlcracleia, Sinopc, and Amisus rose afresh; in 
Pontus the work of "synoecising" towns from villages wont 
on, and the Great City (Megalopolis), lhc New City (Neapolis), 
and the City of Pompeius (Pompeiopolis) we/re, formed. 
Another city in Paphlagonia bore the founder's name; and 



218 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

in Cappadocia, although as yet a dependent kingdom and not 
a province, eight towns were restored and given constitutions. 
But the greatest, triumph of order was the housing of the 
piratical hordes of Cilicia in cities the moral influence of the 
Greek "politeia" was still all that was needed to make a 
citizen of a bandit. Altogether thirty -nine towns in these 
newly acquired provinces are said to have owed their creation 
to Pompeius. This outburst of creative energy was not due 
to any passionate pursuit of the Hellenic ideal ; all that the 
unimaginative Roman desired was order, and this could be 
secured only within the sphere of influence of the Greek city. 

In old Greece a kind of weak Panhellenic spirit had long 
prevailed at the time when its government was taken over by 
Home. This Panhellenism had in the first instance been 
forced on Greece after her conquest by Philip of Macedon, 
when he had himself recognised as the leader of an unwilling; 
confederacy. It disappeared with the universal empire of 
Macedon, but an attempt at its revival was again made by 
Antigonus Gonatas and his successors, arid this attempt was 
rendered partially successful by the internal conflicts which led 
the Achaean league to attach itself to the fortunes of that 
house. This union between the wholly and the partially 
Greek was recognised by Rome when in 146 she constituted 
Macedonia and Achaea a single province. But, probably 
before the close of the Republic, the two were parted into two 
separate provinces ; and the leading motive for this change may 
have been, as Monvmsen suggests, 1 that of "separating the 
purely Hellenic from what was half Hellenic." But the desire 
of extending the Hellenic system to the more backward 
portions of Western Greece is shown by Augustus' foundation 
of Nicopolis in Kpirus. It was a thoroughly Greek city, the 
result of a crui/o/,/acr//os of Southern Epinis with portions of 
Acarnauia and Aololia and the island of Leucas ; it celebrated 
the Actian as Elis the Olympic games, and it was evidently 
destined to become the capital of Western as the Roman colony 
of Corinth was of Eastern Greece. But, like Megalopolis and 
other such mushroom growths, it did not fulfil its promise, 
and, though ifc remained a large city, even the neighbouring 
Patrac, which became a Roman colony, was of greater com- 
mercial importance. In fact, charters of freedom were granted 

1 Pnmineeit of the Ruitmn Empire, i. p. 250. 



vin HELLENISM AND THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 249 

to the cities with such a lavish hand that there was little room 
for a p^uliarly privileged capital. Sparta and Athens were 
free and allied communities (civifates liberae et foederafae) ; and 
the grant of libertas, which meant free control of their local 
courts, finances, and coinage, was possessed by towns in 
Boeotia, Phocis, and Locris, besides the two Roman colonies 
of PatiMC and Corinth, and was conferred by Augustus on the 
eighteen communities of the Free Laconians ('EAe^^oAaArwes), 
which had been formerly perioecic dependencies on Sparta. 
Once, indeed, during the Empire all the cites of Greece were 
declared free; for Nero carried the exercise of his mimetic 
tendencies so far as to personate a second FUmininus at the 
Isthmian games. But the grant was withdrawn by Vespasian, 
and provincial rule again asserted over the less favoured cities. 
Yet care was taken not to make this rule repulsive, and the 
forms at least of the old free life were maintained. The 
leagues which were at first dissolved were afterwards restored, 
retaining their sacral if not their political character, and 
Augustus reconstituted the amphictyony of Delphi on a new 
basis. The constitution of most of the states was probably of 
a timocratic character, but the patiently wrought out structure 
remained unimpaired. Here as elsewhere the Roman rule 
established, and did not destroy, the most perfect work of the 
nation, 

To the north of the peninsula the two countries of Macedonia 
and Thrace had been only partly hellenised politically. The 
interior of Macedonia, occupied by a people partly Greek in 
origin and in the rudiments of its political civilisation, which 
recalled that of Homeric times, had scarcely been touched by 
the influences of the city-state ; but the Greek polities of 
Southern Macedonia had been zealously cultivated by the 
kings. This fringe of Hellenism Rome took care to preserve, 
and one city at least, Thossalonica, now the capital of the 
province, was made a free state. In the Roman colonies of 
veterans, established at Dyrrachium on the West, and at 
Dium, Pella, and Philippi on the East, the Latin replaced the 
Greek organisation; but these settlements had little political 
significance : the province retained its Greek character, but in 
no higher degree than in the time of the kings ; for no attempt 
was made to cultivate the n-oXi? in the interior of Macedonia 
or to disturb its tribal life. Thrace too had been only fringed 



250 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP. 

with Greek settlements on its three seas ; but here the numbei 
of inland towns with Greek civic rights was increased by 
Trajan and Hadrian. North of Thrace came the genuinely 
barbarian world, and here Greek foundations such as Tyra and 
Olbia found it difficult to preserve their Hellenism or even 
their existence in the face of the Scythian and Sarmatian 
hordes. In the same wild regions, beyond the limits of direct 
imperial rule but within the sphere of Roman influence, two 
Greek states in the Crimea Chersonnesus, a republic, and 
Fanticapaoum, a monarchy maintained for centuries an almost 
complete independence, until the former was merged by sub- 
sequent conquest in the Eastern Empire of Justinian, and the 
latter was swamped by the invading Huris. Alliance with 
Rome meant here what dependence on her meant elsewhere 
the protection of Hellenism against the barbarian. 

When we turn to the Western world we find a very 
different picture. The city here is also the unit of empire 
and the basis of government ; but, though it sometimes starts 
by being the Greek woAis, it becomes in time the Latin civitas. 
The influence of Rome on the organisation of the Greek cities 
of Southern Italy is easily understood. They were from an 
early time amongst the immediate allies (socii) of Rome, and 
political necessities dictated that they should be brought into 
very close legal relations with her; hence the old juristic 
term lofffiti (the wearers of the toga) grows into the wider 
term It olid, which includes the Greek wearers of the pallium in 
the South. The history of Sicily is more remarkable, for 
here wo find the conscious alteration of a deeply-rooted Greek 
into a Latin political civilisation. The Greek cities, which in 
the Peloponnesian War formed only a fringe round the coast 
and left four other distinguishable nationalities in the territory, 
had by Cicero's time so thoroughly holleniscd the island that 
there WJIR no longer any distinction between Siccl and Greek ; 
and it is difficult' to believe that this absorption of the native 
populations was unassisted by the Roman government. But 
the dictator Caesar conferred Latin rights on Sicily, and hence- 
forth its states are mnnidpid^ not TroJWt?. Latin is the official 
language, and Roman law replaces the ordinances of Diocles. 
The political organisation of Africa was directed by the same 
considerations as that of Sicily. The nucleus of Hellenic 
civilisation created by Cyrene might have spread indefinitely 



nil ' HELLENISM AND THE GREEK CONSTITUTIONS 251 

under the fostering care of Rome ; but the government willed 
it otherwise, and the history of the more important native 
towns of Africa is that of a Phoenician civilisation which 
gradually becomes Latin. In Spain and Gaul there was little 
chance for Hellenism, for they had been only touched by Greek 
colonisation ; and this accident, while it made the organisation 
of these provinces the most difficult problem which the Romans 
had to face, dictated that this organisation when completed 
should be either purely Latin, as in Spain, or a blending of the 
Latin polity with the native canton system, as in Gaul. Even 
in Southern Gaul, where Massilia had spread her hellenising 
influence over the surrounding territory, symmetry enjoined 
that the Greek civilisation should be secondary to the Roman. 
Massilia still remains a Greek university, a centre for the 
spread of Hellenic culture and learning, but political influence 
centres in the Roman colonies of Narbo and Arelate. 

Thus the political civilisation of the West is Italian, that of 
the East is Greek. And hence, when the huge empire parted 
asunder and Byzantium became a second Rome, this partition 
was but the natural fulfilment of a policy which had begun 
with the close of the Republic and had been actively carried 
out by the imperial rulers, who, while they could manipulate 
the barbarism of the West and even turn the sparse Greek 
tendencies found there into Latin channels, were themselves 
the slaves of the triumph of the Hellenic civilisation of the 
East. 

But the law which the Eastern emperors took with them 
was Roman law, and it was their application of this system 
as a system not merely of privafe but of administrative law to 
their dependencies that finally caused the death of the Greek 
constitutions. During the existence of the Roman Republic 
there had been but little interference with the internal con- 
stitutions of the cities under its control. Some favoured states 
were entirely exempted from provincial jurisdiction ; these were 
either free (Ulerae) or free and allied communities (Ulerae et 
foederatae civitates), the two classes differing not in the rights 
they enjoyed but in the legal basis on which those rights 
rested. Both the free and the allied communities possessed self- 
government, immunity from tribute, and exemption from the 
quartering of troops; but while the former could boast only 
of a charter (lex data) revocable by Rome, the latter had 



252 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY CHAP, vin 

their rights guaranteed by a sworn treaty (foedus). But, even 
outside this select circle of privileged states, the practical 
independence enjoyed by the communities directly under 
provincial rule was considerable. It was an autonomy which, 
so far as it was not enjoyed by the charter of the province (lex 
provmcme), was permitted by the governor but the permission 
was inevitable, for the very object of the cultivation of 
urban life in the provinces was to render a minute bureaucratic 
organisation avoidable. The provincial governor seldom usurped 
the criminal jurisdiction of the towns, which was theoretically 
entirely under his control ; and, although it was his duty to 
exercise a general inspection over the financial affairs of the 
cities, he left the collection of local taxes and the defraying 
of local expenditure entirely to the native corporations. The 
provincial civitates or TroAets of the Republic are in fact still true 
states, not mere municipal towns; centralisation, the force that 
can alone annihilate a nation's best intellectual gifts and turn 
its thoughts into vulgar channels, had not spread beyond the 
limits of Italy. The very beginning of the Principate heralds 
a change. The era of paternal government begins, and the 
military despot at Rome comes eventually to be consulted by 
meddling governors about trivialities which might be left to 
the subordinate officials of the meanest municipal corporation. 
The theory of provincial life is completely altered. In place 
of the view that the political energy of each state contributes 
to that of the empire, we find the new view that any energy 
which it may exercise flows directly from the centre of affairs. 
With the accession of Trajan this suicidal policy, which per- 
manently weakened the strength of the empire and rendered 
it incapable of taking any action in its own defence against 
barbarian aggressions, gathered fresh strength, and it was 
elaborated by emperors and lawyers of the second and third 
centuries. The creation of the Eastern empire only strengthened 
this autocratic rule by tinging it with a colour of oriental 
despotism ; and the Greek cities of this empire are now mere 
municipal towns subject to the most crushing system of central 
government that perhaps the-wodtl has ever seen. 



APPENDIX 

(Note to p. 182) 
THE PRESIDENT OF THE COLLEGE OF STRATEGI 

IN an article on the word " Strategus," written in 1890 for Smith's 
Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (3rd eel.), I attempted to 
give a summary of the views which have been held as to the possible 
presidency of the college and the modes in which it may have been 
exercised, together with a brief statement of the indirect evidence on 
which this theory of a presidency is based. Since the article was 
written the Aristotelian treatise on the Constitution of Athens has 
been discovered ; but, though it gives us a clearer picture of the 
functions of the strategi in the latter part of the fourth century, it 
throws, as might be expected, little light on the position which they 
held in the state during the fifth. The only statement which bears 
directly on this question i.e. that the generals were formerly chosen 
one from each tribe, but were, in the writer's time, elected from all 
the citizens (! cbravrwi/, Ath. Pol. 61) contains a verification of 
what had been previously an almost certain conjecture. Yet even 
this assertion does not prove that all the generals were so chosen in 
the fifth century. It was a mode of appointment naturally resorted to 
when there was a complete differentiation of functions between the. 
members of the college, but it may not have existed at a time when 
there appears to have been no assignment of functions to the different 
generals at their election. 

It is possible that during the period of the Peloponnesian War we 
see a transition stage between the method of tribal and the method of 
popular appointment. It is known that at the close of the fifth 
century generals still offered' themselves as representatives of special 
tribes (Xen. Memor. iii. 4, !),', although why tliey should have continued 
to represent phylae at a time when the ta)ciiircli and not the stratcgus 
was the tribal commander, 'is not clear. Itf is also known that more 



254 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

than, uuo general might belong to the same tribe. [Instances in Beloch 
Attache Politik p. 270.] A combination of these two factors lias <nven 
rise to three alternative views of their appointment. 

(i) The view of Droysen (Hermes ix. p. 8), that the generals were 
elected for each tribe from all Athenians and by the whole people. 

(ii) That of Modi (I.e.), who thinks that a president was elected 
by all out of all, but his nine colleagues each by his own tribe, one of 
the ten tribes each year giving up its right of election. This theory 
receives strong support from external evidence. On Beloch's system 
"when t\\o generalb are found to belong to the same phyle one of 
them nui^,t be the pry tank " (Ic.) ; and lie has shown that "between the 
years 4 11-0 and 350-5 there are nine certain instances of two generals 
but no certain instance of more than two, belonging to the same tribe 
in the same year ; this occurs twice when Pericles, once when Laches 
is general, and one of the names is usually of sufficient eminence for 
us to consider its bearer a possible president of the college " (Diet, of 
Antitj. ii. p. 719). See, however, for 432-1, Mr. H. S. Jones in 
Philologua, vol iv. 

(iii) A possible alternative, is that the generals were elected out of 
all the Athenian people by the special tribes and for the special tribes 
a system resembling the modern representation of constituencies. 
The reader may decide for himself which of these three views is the 
niOht probable. 

I hliall content myself in conclusion with supplementing the 
account of the oT/ymjyiu which is given in the text by a very brief 
statement of the evidence from ancient sources on which the hypothesis 
of a "president of the generalb" re&ts. 

(i) We have general hlatemcnta or indications which may point to 
such an oilico. It is said of Pericles that in 430 the Athenians o-rpcm/- 
yoy eLXovro /cat Trdi/Ttt TO, 7T/>ay/jt,ara cVer/H^av (Thuc. ii. C5). In 
181 Pericles had power to prevent the eccle&ia from assembling (a 
power which would have been uselessly exercised had it prevented 
only the specially convened meetings, and must therefore have affected 
the regular assemblies as well), and albo exercised his authority to 
prohibit siny informal gathering from being summoned (Thuc. ii. 22 
cKxXtjo'iu.v re QVK eVo/et HUTMV oi'Se i'AAoyov ouSei/a). Pie could 
have exercised this power only as commander-in-chief over the whole 
body of Athenians regarded -as an army. In 408 Alcibiades was 
appointed uirui/raw tyc/iky (u^iffariap (XLon. Hell. i. 4, 20). A slighter 
evidence is found in the position of Nicias in 425 (Thuc. iv. 28), when, 
in transferring the command to Oleon, he at least acts as spokesman for 
the whole college. r ' 

(ii) We (hid two UiuhuMjal expressions descriptive of the position of 
the slrati'gi which suggest f a h'aderhhrp^of' the college. 



APPENDIX 255 



(a) GTTpo.Ti]yoLS 'iTTTTOicpaTei XoAa/jyet KO.I vi'dp)(ovcriv Is found in 
a financial decree of the year 426-5 (Hicks n. 46). The expression ot 
o-wdpxovTts iiere clearly denotes that the nine generals are in an 
inferior position to Hippocrates. But as the generals may have taken 
the presidency of the board hy agreement, by lot, or in rotation, the 
evidence is not conclusive for a permanent head. 

(b) oT/DdTv/yo? Se/caros avros. The numeral adjectives 7re//7rTo?, 
rerapros added to a general's name clearly imply some superiority of 
the general mentioned over the four or three colleagues who are 
suggested. On this analogy oe/varo? ai/ros should imply supremacy over 
nine colleagues (whether strategi or not), who accompany on an expedi- 
tion the individual general whose name is given. But in one of the 
two passages where the expression is applied to Pericles (Time. ii. 13) 
there is no question of an expedition ; Hc/jt/cA-iJs o ^(ivOiTnrov crTpari]- 
yos &v 3 AGr]vai(DV Se/caros auras simply describes his position at Athens 
in 431. It may, therefore, have been a technical expression employed 
to designate the head of the college ; and this may be its meaning in 
Time. i. 116, where it is applied to Pericles at the siege of Sanios. 
In any case it is not likely that the Athenians often sent out ten 
generals at once on a single expedition, leaving no commanders of the 
home defences and no foreign ministry in the city. 

If we believe in a president of the generals, it is by no means 
necessary to suppose that he was always a crrpaT'^yos avroKpdr^p. 
" Autocratic " power, which implied freedom of action on a foreign 
campaign, if conferred on a single general, would naturally be conferred 
on the head of the college, and this would still more naturally be the 
case if it was conferred at his election [Plutarch (Arist. 8) speaks of 
Aristeides as xeiporovrjOtls GrTparrjybs avroKpaTtop before the battle of 
Plataea]. But, usually at least, it was conferred after the elections 
with reference to a special service, and might be granted to several 
commanders, as it was to the three generals of the great Sicilian 
expedition (Time. vi. 26). 

If we do not believe in a regular head of the college, yet the grant 
of autocratic power to one of the generals would place him in a position 
superior to that of his colleagues, at least of those who accompanied 
him to the Held. 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



(The references are to the pages ; "n." signifies the note on a page) 



ABDERA, 37 

Abydos, 37 

Acanthus, 228 

Acarnaiiia, 39, 248 ; constitution of, 

227 

Acastus, 135 n. 3 
Accidents in history, 57 
Achaea, Roman province of, 248 
Achaean league, 71 ; constitution of, 

235 
Achaeans (of Peloponnese), 108, 126, 

192 

Achaeans (of Phthiotis), 51 11. 1, 223 
Actian games, 24.8 
Administrative jurisdiction, 168 
Adoption, laws of, 67 
Adrastus, the hero, 32 
Aeaces, 37 
Aegeidae, 80, 89 
Aegialeis, 95 
Aegialis, 126 
Aegicoreis, 127 
Aegina, 50, 58 
Aegira, 236 n. 4 
Aeginm, 236 11. 4, 239 
Aegon, 18 

Aegospotami, battle of, 114, 211 
Aethaea, 81 n. 3 
Aetolia, 12, 248 ; federal government 

of, 231 
Africa, 250 
Agathocles, 218 
Agidae, 79, 96, 97 
Agis IV. of Sparta, 77, 115 
Agrigentum, 30 
.Agyrrhius, 165, 178, 179 
Alalia, 37 n. 1 



Alcibiades, 34, 179, 210 

Alcmaeoni<lae, 142 

Aleuadae, 19, 63, 222 

Alexander of Macedon, 114, 231, 236, 

246 

Alexander of Phcrae, 223 
Alienation of land forbidden, 42, 65, 

91 

Alliances between states, 55 
Aniasis, 39 
Amisus, 247 
Aniphictyonies, 48 
Amphipolis, 40 
Arnyclae, 79 
Anactorium, 83 n. 3 
Anaxilas, 45 
Androclcs, 140 
Andros, 197 

Antalcidas, peace of, 68, 178, 205 
Antigonid dynasty, 236 
Antigoiuis Gonatas, 233, 236, 248 
Antiphon, the orator, 209 
Antiphon condemned for treason by 

the Areiopagus, 148 n. 1 
Apella at Sparta, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 

106, 113 
Apliidnae, 126 
Apocleti, 234 
Apodectac, 159, 183, 186 
Apollo Archegctes, 40 n. 4, 43 ; 

Patrons, 129 ; of Delos, 192 
Aratus, 71, 237, 240 
Arbitration between states, 55 
Arcadia, 12, 110 ; constitution of 

united, 229 
Arcesine, 20 
Archias, 25 



258 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



Aiclion of Onchcstus, 50, 225 ; archons 
at Athens, 136, 141, 146, 153 

Areiopagus, 138 ; history of, 144: 

Arclate, 251 

Argadcis, 127, 128 

Argos, 18, 49, 57, 70, 72, 108, 113, 
192 ; united with Cormlh, 70 ; 
amphictyouies of, 50, 143 ; con- 
stitution of, 214 

Aristn.gor.LS of Cumae, 37 

Aristeidciiii assessment, 196 n. 3 

Aristeides, 112, 147, 159 n. 1, 190 

Aristcus, 47 n. 3 

Aristocracies, early, 20, 62 

Aristocratic element in oligarchy, 61 

Arjstodemus of Cnnmc, 30 

Aristodemns of Sparta, 79 

Asia Minor, Greek cities of, 17, 10, 
23, 37, 38, 114, 120, 189, 247 

Assembly, 122 ; at amphictyony of 
Delphi, 53 ; at Sparta (see Apella) ; 
at Crute, 120 ; at Athens, 152, 163, 
1C5, 199, 206, 207 ; organisation 
and character of, at Athens, 169, 
173 ,* at Athens, acting as a con- 
stituent assembly, 211 ; at Elis, 
214 ; at Uhodca, 218 ; at Thebes, 
220 ; of Acurnanian league, 227 ; 
of Aetolian league, 234 ; of Achaean 
league, 239 

Abteropus, 104 

Athenagoras, 122, 123, 188 

Athene, Hellania, 94; of Athens, 192; 
Itoniti, 225 ; treasurers of at Athens, 
183 

Athena, 17, 20, 25, 29, 31, 37, 50, 
57, 58 ; constitution of, 124 

Atrcidae, 80 

Audit of magistrates, 153, 183; of 
councillors, 107 ; of officials at 
(JhaU-is, 195 

Auditor of thu ronncil at Athens, 167 

Augustus, 4 248, 219 

Autonomous allies of Athens, 193 

BABYOK, 94 
Babylonia, 247 
llacishiadac, 19, 31 
Basileidae, liO, 24 
Mbina, 197 
Bocae, 79 n. 4 
Bucotarulis, 226 

Buoolia, 51 n. 1, 1913, 249; federal 
governinciit of, 224 



Boura, 236 n. 4 

Brauron, 125, 126 

Brea, 39 ; charter of, 41,*202 n. 5 

Byzantium, 44, 58, 204, 205, 207, 



OAIJINET in England, 77 

Cadmeia, 68 

Caesar, 250 

Calauria, arnphictyony of, 50 

Ualli&tratus, 178, 179, 207 

Camirus, 218 

Cappadocia, 247, 248 

Carian woiship, 125 ; relics, 125 ; 

quarter of Athenian Empire, 189 

197 ' 

Cassander, 227 
Catana, 45 

Cavalry in Thcsbaly, 63 
Cccropia, 126 
Cecrops, 12(5 
Censorial authority of Spartan 

Gcrou&ia, 101 ; of Areiopagus, 145 
Census of Solon, 151 
Central government of Roman Empire, 

252 

Ceos, 233 
Cephibia, 126 
Ceraaus, 43 
Cerycos, 33 
Ccryneia, 236 n. 4 
Chapronoia, battle of, 68, 174, 178, 

207, 244 

Chalcis, charter of, 194, 195, 199 
Uhalcion, 47 n. 2, 66 
Charondas, 17, 45 
Charters of Athenian Empire, 194 
(Jhersonesus (Tauric), 250 
Ohilon, 104 n. 3 
Chios, 39 n. 1, 58, 192, 193, 204, 

205, 207 
Cilicia, 217, 248 
Cirnolus, 197 
Cimon, 189, 209 
Cinadon, 81, 88 n. 2, 92 
Cifcixcnship, 7 ; ph rut tic conception 

of, 8 ; at Athens, 131 
Cliiiw in Greece, 13, 19, 20; in 

Thessaly, 63 ; in Opuntiau Locris, 

65 ; in Attica, 95, 128 ; in Crete, 

118 ; in Elis, 213 
Claudius, 242 
CJleigencs, 228 n. 2 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



259 



Cleisthenes of Athens, 20, 130, 134, 
141, 149, 157, 208; constitution 
of, 157 

Cleisthenes of Sicyon, 32, 33, 71 

Cleomenes III. of Sparta, 115 

Oleon, 140, 164, 179, 183, 187, 203 

Gleonae, 49, 237 

Cleophon, 166 

Oleruchies, 40, 200 

Clubs, political, 188 ; see Hetacriae 

Cnacion, 94 

Cnidus, 39 n. 1 ; battle of, 204 

Cnossus, 116 

Codification at Athens, 176 

Codridae, 135 

Colacretae, 152 n. 2, 159 

Colonisation, causes of, 24, 36 ; 
political characteristics of, 36 ; 
effects of, 245 

Colophon, 23 

Commagene, 247 

Commerce in relation to colonisation, 
38 

Commercial treaties, 54 

Committees of council at Athens, 167 

Confederacy of Athens, 204 

Conon, 204 

Consilium of Thcssaly, 224 

Constitution, conception of, 4 

Constitutional compared with general 
history, 4 

Copae, 225 

Corinth, 19, 26, 29, 31, 39, 44, 49, 
70, 109, 110, 113, 237, 249 ; unitc-d 
with Argos, 73 ; constitution of, 
71 

Coroneia, 225 ; battle of, 67 

Council of Elders, 13, 72 ; at Athens, 
137, 142, 145 

Council of Corinth, 72 ; of Erythrae, 
194; of Sparta, 96, 97, 100; of 
Peloponnesian confederacy, 112 ; of 
Delian confederacy, 190, 193 ; ol 
later Athenian confederacy, 206 ; 
of four hundred at Athens, 152 ; 
of five hundred at Athens, 159, 
164, 183 ; &tructuro and powers of 
council of five hundred at Athens, 
166; of ninety at Elis, 214; of 
six hundred at Elis, 214 ; of eighty 
at Argos, 215 ; of lihodes, 218 ; of 
Thessaly, 63, 223; of Arcadian 
league, 230 ; of Aetoliau league, 
234 ; of Achaean league, 239 ; of 



Seleucia, 247 ; four councils of 

Boeotia, 225 
Cranon, 19, 63 
Creondae, 19, 63 
Cresphoiites, 19 
Crete, 9, 77, 91, 93 ; constitution of 

cities of, 115 
Croton, 23, 44, 45 
Cumae, 31 
Cydouia, 116 
Cylon, 31, 134, 142 
Cyrue, 18, 23, 27 n 4 
Cynoscephalac, battle of, 224 
Cynosura, 94 
Cynuria, 80, 83, 108 
Cypselidae, 33 
Cypselus, 29, 30, 31 
Gyrene, 44 n. 1, 83 n. 3, 250 
Cythera, 82 
Cyzicus, 127, 159 n. 5, 247 

DAMASIAS, 137 

Daphnis of Abydos, 37 

Deceleia, 126 

Delos, amphietyony of, 48, 49, 202 ; 
confederacy of, 190, 192 

Delphi, oraclo of, 40 ; amphietyony 
of, 48 n. 5, 49, 94, 249 ; constitu- 
tiou of Delphic amphietyony, 51 

Delphinium, 144 

Demadcs, 186 n. 1 

Demarehs, 160 

Demus, 13, 141, 160 

Demetrius, 232 

Democracy, 12:2 ; the ideal, 7 ; tend- 
ency to, 7, 57 ; forms of, 58 ; in 
Crete, 120 

Demosthenes, 148, 179, 184, 185, 
186 n. 1 

Depreciation of coinage, 173 

Diacrii, 26, 132 n. 1 

Dictatorship in Greece, 27 

Diodotus, 203 

Dionybiiic worship cultivated by 
tyrants, 33; democratic character 
of, 33 

Dionysius I. of Syracuse', 29, 218 

Diony&ius II. of Syracuse, 31, U18 

Diopeithos, 174 

Diofmautus, 184, 186 n. 1 

Dipaea, 108 

piura, 249 

Dolopes, 51 n. 1 

Dorious, 42 n. 5 



200 OUTLINES OF GUEEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 

Itoris, 51 n. 1, 52, 59 11. 2 

Draco, 17, 23 n. 1, 143, 145, 149, 

constitution of, 138, 149 
Dymane.s, 95 
D)ine, 230 

Dynastic governments, 63 
Dyrrauhinui, 249 



KHUN, 18U 

Elciifiis, 33, 124, 125, 320 

Elis, 1-2, 21, 49, 79, S3, 109, 110, 

113, 125, 237; constitution of, 

213 
Emancipation at Athens, 133 ; at 

Sparta, 86 
Empire of Sparta, 113 ; of Athens, 

GO, 114, 132, 1G2, ICC, 181 , 

organisation and character of 

Athenian Enipirr, 189 
Emporium becoming a stiito, 38 
English constitution as a mixed 

government, 76 
Epacria, 126 
Eparai non das, 207, 227 
Ephcsus, IS, -20, 128, 205 
Ephetae, L13 
Ephialtcs, 147, 211 
Ephors at Sparta, 77, 85, 92, 98, 101, 

102, 107 

Epidaurus, 50, 65, 111, 237 
Epirus, SO, 248 
Epitadeus, 91 

Kponymous ancestor, 13, 20 
Erect) i ens, 125 
Ericthonius, 126 n. 5 
Erythrac, 20, 205; charter of, 1!U, 

199 ; constitution of, 194 
Euboea, 52, 192, 207 
Eiibuhis, T79, 184, 185, 18C 
Eacluides, nrchonship of, 132, 1C7, 

183, 232 

Rmnolpidao, 21, 33, 124 
Eumolpus, 125 
Kuphron, 71 

Kurymcdon, battle of, 189 
Enrypontid.'ic, 79, 9fJ, 97 

FACTION, influence of on colonisation, 

38 

Family, influence of on state, 8, li'i 
Family worship, 10', 21, 99, 128; 

claims prosiTVcd by colonists, 4i 
Federal diameter of umphictyony of ( 

Delphi, f3 ; govonmient, 59 ; char- i 



aetei its tics of fcdeial government 

220 ' 

Festivals instituted by tyftnts, 33 
Finance at Athens, 168, 173, 180 

183 

Fine paid to temple, 54 n. 1 
First-f i uits of tribute, 192 
Five Thousand at Athens, 211 
Flamminns, 224 n. 4, 249 
Foedus, 252 
Four Hundred at Athens, 62 (cf. 

162) ; establishment of, 211 
Free Laconians, 249 
Free or free and allied states of 

Rome, 251 
Freedom, charters of granted by 

Rome, 249 

G \LATIA, 247 

Oallo-Giaoci, 247 

Games attached to religious associa- 
tions, 49 

Gaul, 250 

Gela, 26 

Goleontes, 127, 128 

Gelo, 31, 32, 216 

General tendencies in Greek history, 
57 

(iGumori, 127, 137 

Gophyraci, 21, 124 

Germanic monarch}', 15 

Ciuiontlirac, 79 

Gortyn, 116 ; code of, 117, 120 

Gylippus, 87 

Gytheiuin, 82 

HADKANUS, worship of, 41 n. 4 

Hadrian, 250 

Haliartus, 225 

Halicarnassua, 39 n. 1, 201 

Harpalua, 148 n. 1 

Ifebdcimc, battle of, 215 

Ilcliaca, 154, 161, 172; organisation 

and powers of, 174 
ITelice, 236 
Hellas, 45 

I fellows of The&saly, 94 
Hellenic name, spread of, 51, 94 
Hellenism, 244 
frellcnotamiae, 183, 190 
Ilellofepout, 197 
Jfclos, 84 
JFolota, 83 
JTeracleia (on the Kuxinc), 83, 247 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



201 



Heracleia (in Trachis), -10, 44 11. 2, 

232 

Heracleidae, 19, 222 
Heracleides of Athens, 165 
Heracles, the Phoenician, 1 25 
Heraea, 12, 139, 237 
Herald, sanctity of, 47 
Heredity, 15 
Hermione, 50, 237 
Hetaerine at Athens, 209 
Hierapytna, 54 n. 2, 121 11. I 
Hiero, 218 

Himera, battle of, 32 
Hippocrates of Athens, 255 
Histiaea, 192 
Histiaeotis, 116, 224 
Hittite worship, 125 
Homeric recitals suppressed at Sicyon, 

32 

Homicide, 143 
Hopletes, 127 
Hylleis, 95 
Hyperbolus, 161 
Hyrnathiae, 95 
Hysiae, battle of, 108 

IALYSTTS, 218 

lamidae, 21 

Illyria, 39 

Imperial Federation suggested at 

Athens, 202 

Indian settlements of Alexander, 246 
Indo-Scythian Empire, 246 
International custom, 41 ; law, 45 ; 

relations, 54 
Ionia, 197 
lonians, 51 n. 1, 52 
Isadoras, 125, 142, 157 
Iseas, 236 

Islanders in Athenian Empire, 197 
Italian Greeks subject to Koine, 250 
Italioi, 250 

JASON of Fherae, 223 

Jurisdiction in Athenian Empire, 109 

Jury-pay, 159 

KINGS of Sparta, 79, 92, 97 ; at Elis, 
213 n. 2 ; king at Argos, 215 ; sec 
Monarchy 

Knights, aristocracy of, 22; in Asia 
Minor, 23 ; in Athens, 182 ; see 



LACHES, 177, 254 

Laconia, 78, 79, 81, 108 

Lamian War, 212 

Landed aribtocKU'ics, C5 : 67 

Land-distribution at Sparta, 81, 90 

Language as a source of unity, 46 

Larisa, 19, 63, 64, 221 

Latin civilisation in the West, 250 

Laurium, revenue from mines at, 165 

Law in Greece, 8 ; public and private, 
9 ; civil and criminal, 175 ; a 
covenant, 10; nmmttcn, 10; 
customary, 17; at Spaita, 91i 

Law-courts at Athens, 140, 153, 163, 
174 

Law -giver in Greece, 2, 56, 155; 
early law-givers, 17 

Legislative authority, division of, 75 ; 
at Sparta, 97, 100 ; at Athens, 
170, 172 

Leontini, 23, 26 

Leontion, 236 n. 4 

Leros, 40 n. 2 

Lesbos, 18, 192, 193, 201 n. 1 

Leucadia, 83 n 3, 248 

Leuctra, battle of, 207, 229 

Lex data, 251 

Lex provinciae, 252 

Limnae, 94 

Lindus, 218 

Local feuds at Atliens, 156 ; govern- 
ment at Athens, 160 

Locrians, 51 n. 1 

Locri Epizephym, 23, 27, 42, 41, 
45 

Locris (Opuntian), 39, 192 ; constitu- 
tion of, 65 

Locris (Ozolian), 12, 59 n. 2 ; con- 
stitution of, 66 

Lot, appointment by, 138, 166 ; 
meaning and use of, 139 

Lycia, 189 

Lycian league, 241 

Lyciarch, 242 

Lycophron of Fhcrae, 223 

Lycortas, 237 

Lyctus, 116, 118 

Lycurgus (of Sparta), 92 ; constitution 
of, 93 

Lycurgtis (of Athens), 178, 179, 184, 
185, 18G 

Lyduidcs, 237 

Lygdamis, 30 

Lysander, 87, 114 



262 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTOKY 



MACEDONIA, 62, 148, 207, 246, 248, 

249 ; Rowan province of, 248 
Magistracy, conception of, 7, 122 
Magnesia on the Maeander, 23 
Magnetes, 51 n. 1, 223 
Maliaiis, 51 n. 1 ; constitution of, 64 
Manlineia, 108 n. 1, 110, 113, 229, 

230, 232, 233; tattle of, 57, 71, 

109, 216 

Marathon, 125, 12G 
Margos, 236 
Marian dyui, 83, 81 n. 2 
Massilia, 43, 251 
Mausolus, 207 
Medon, 135 n. 3 
Medontidae, 124, 135 
Megalopolis (in Arcadia), 229, 230, 

237, 238 

Megalopolis (in Pontus), 247 
Megan* 27 n. 4, 44, 95, 108, 1GO, 

192, 237 ; constitution of, 68 
Melanthidae, 17, 124, 135 
Melanthus, 135 
Mclitaea, 234 n. 1 
Menidi, 125 

Mercenaries of tyrants, 30 
Mesembria, 37 n. 1 
Mesopotamia,, 216 
Messenia, 18, 19, 79, 84, 108, 114, 

237 

MosHoa, 94 

Metayer tenure in Attica, 150 
Mcthone, 196 n. 1 
Mcthymua, 193, 205 
Miletus, 30, 37, 160, 399; colonies 

of, 38, 40 n. 2, 44 n. 1 
Military colonies, 39 ; service as a 

claim to rule, 62, 64 
Ministerial government, approaches 

to in Greece, 182,^186, 211 
Ministry, absence of a true at Athens, 

171, 182, 187 
Minos, 10, 115, 110 
Minyans, 80 
Mithridatie "War, 247 
Mixed governments, 6, 10, GO, 1\ ; 

Athens after Solon ns a mixed 

government, 155 
Moderates at Athens, 208 
Molossians, 15 
Monarchy, origin of, 14 ; heroic, 14 ; 

downfall of, 18; at Sparta, 97 ; al 

Athens, 135 ; in Thrssaly, 222 
Monopolies, creation of, 173, 200 



Mnmmius, 237 

Municipal autonomy, 65 ; ^t Rhodes, 

219 

Municipia, 250 
Munychia, 125 
Mutilation, 47 n, 5 
Mycale, amphictyony of, 48, 49 
Mycenae, 16 
Mytilene, 19, 27, 38 n 1, 193 n. 5, 

204, 205 

NARBO, 251 

National characteristics, 58 

Naucraiies, 134, 159 

Naucratis, 39 

Naupactus, 39, 232 ; charter of, 43, 

44, 55 n. 4 
Nan pi ia, 50 

Naxos, 27 n. 4, 30, 191, 197 
Ncapolis (in Pontus), 247 
Neodamodeis, 86 
Nero, 249 

Nieias, 179, 182 n. 2 
Niropolis (in Epirus), 248 
Nobles, growth of power of, 18 ; rule 

of the, 21 
Nomothetae at Athens, 172 

OATH of king, 15, 92, 103 ; in inter- 
national law, 48, 54, 55, 194 ; of 
jurors at Athens, 154, 170, 174, 
176 ; of council at Athens, 160 ; of 
political clubs, 210 

Obes, 94, 95, 96 

Oeanthia, 47 n. 2, 66 

Oenophyta, battle of, 67 

Genus (town), 79 n. 4 ; (river) 94 n. 5 

Oetaeans, 51 n. 1 

Olbio, 250 

Olcnus, 236 

Oligarchic constitutions, character- 
istics of, 73 

Oligarchs at Athens, 208 

Oligarchy, 60 

Olpae, 227 

Olympic games, 248 ; see Games 

Olynthus, 228 ; constitution of Olyn- 
thian league, 228 

Onuhostns, amphictyony of, 48, GO, 
225 

Opus, 65 

Oracle in colonisation, 40; political 
value of oracles, 99 n. 3 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



263 



Orchomenus (in Boeotia), 50, SO, 225, 

232 

Ortliagoraif 29 
Orthagoridac, 33 
Ostracism, 160, 169, 215, 217 
Oxylus, law of, 213 

PACHES, 177 

Palestine, Hellenic civilisation in, 

247 

Palladium, 144 
Pamboeotia, 225 
Pamphyli, 95 
Panathenaea, 33, 126 
Panhellenisin, 248 
Panionium, 49 
Panticapaeuin, 250 
Paphlagonia, 247 
Paros, 197, 204 
Parrhasians, 110 
Partheniae, 25 
Parthian Empire, 246 
Patrae, 236, 248, 249 
Payment for state services, 163 
Peiraeus, 126 
Peisander, 209 
Peisistratidae, rule of, 29, 31, 32, 3i, 

157 
Peisistratus, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 

132, 141 
Pelasgi, 124 
Pelasgiotis, 223 
Pella, 228, 249 
Pellene, 236 
Pelopidas, 227 
Peloponnesian confederacy, 60, 62, 

70, 72, 106, 107, 221 ; constitution 

of, 108 
Peloponnesian War, 61, 68, 69, 86, 

91, 108, 113, 132, 109, 177, 181, 

236 

Penestae, 63, 83, 84 
Peraea, 234 n. 1 

Periander (of Corinth), 28 n. 1, 33 
Periander (of Athens), 184 
Pericles, 132, 147, 177, 179, 182, 102, 

209, 254 ; reforms of, 162 
Perioeci (of Sparta), 19, 78, 249 ; (of 

Argos), 215 
Phalaris, 30 
Phalerum, 126 
Pharae, 236 
Pharis, 79 
Pharaalus, 19, 63 



Pliaselis, 39 n. 1 

Plieidon of Avgos, 215 

Pherae, 64, 223 

Philip of Macedon, 53, 64, 224, 232, 

248 

Phihppi, 249 
Philolaus, 67 
Philopocinen, 207, 240 
Phlins, 110, 237 
Phocaea, 39 n. 1, 40 
Phocians, 51 n. 1 
Phocion, 87 } 182 n. 1 
Phocis, 59 n. 2, 192, 219 
Phoenicians, 124, 12r> ; of Carthage, 

76 ; Phoenician civilisation in 

Africa, 251 
Phormio ofElis, 214 
Phormisms, 212 
Phratry at Athens, 129, M3, 158 ; at 

Elis, 213 
Phreattys, 144 
Phrynichus, 170, 203, 209 
Phthiotis, 224 

Piracy in international law, 54 
L'isatans, 49 
Pitane, 94 
Pittacus, 27 
Pleistoanax, 20 n. 6 
Polemarch at Athens, 137, 159, 181 ; 

polemarchs of Thessaly, 224 
Poletae at Athens, 152 n. 2 
Polity as a form of government, 60, 

64 

Polycrates of Samos, 30 
Polyclorus, 101, 103 
Pompeiopolis, 247 
Pompoms, 246, 247 
Pontus, 247 
Poseidon at Blensia, 33 ; Samios, 50 ; 

at Orichestus, 225 
Potidaea, 207 
Prasiae, 50 
Priaiisius, 54 n. 2 
Priesthood in Greece, 16, 21 
Prisoners, treatment of, 47 
Probalinthus, 126 
Probouleuma, form of at Atlinns, 

169 

Proportional representation, 242 
Prytaneis, 168, 169, ISO n. ] 
Prytancium, 159; court of the, 144 
Psephism, 171 
Public meals at Sparta, 87 : in Crete. 

91, 118 



2C1 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



Public opinion us a .support of go\ em- 
inent, 58 
Pylus, 124 
Pyihagoicans, 45 
Pythian games, 48 

RANSOM of prisoners, 47 

Religion as a source of unity, 40 ; 
control of \>y st.itc at Athens, 173 

Representation in federal govern- 
ments, f>2, 243 ; in Thcssaly, 223 ; 
in Aololia, 23'"J 

Revolution, ; in the colonies, 45 ; 
in mived governments, 77 ; at 
Athens, 208 

Rhenium, 23, 20, 41, 45 

Rhodes, 39 n. 1, 201, 205, 207, 242 ; 
constitution of, 218 

Roman Empire ami GITOCO, 38, 115 ; 
law applied to Greece, 251 ; organisa- 
tion of provinces, 246; institutions 
compaiud with Creek, 7, 20, 21, 
SI, 41 n. 4, 76, 77, 78, 90, 97, 08, 
90 n. 1, 10J, 103, 120, 176, 395, 
202, 223 



SACAB, 210 

Sacred wars, 52 

Saliunis, kittlo of, 57, M 

Sainos, 2y, SJO, 192, 19tf, 191, 203, 

204, 207 
Sciritae, 80 
ScojKidae, 19, G3 
Scyros, 191 

Secretary of thn city at Athens, 107 
Seisactheia, 150 
Seleuijia on the Tigris, 217 
Scllasia, battle of, 115 
Senate ol Homo, 13, 77 
Sir 'ana, 41 
SicelH, 41, 217 
Sicilian expedition, eflVo.ts of, 210, 

217 

Sicily, 2G ; 38, 2."Q ; w Syracuse 
Siisyon, 20, 29, 70, 95, 109, 2U7 ; 

coiiKtitution of, 71 
Ninope, 4fJ, 247 
Slain, duties to, 47 
Slaves, 7 ; io tin* soil, S3 , in Crete, 

117; al- Athens, KJ2 
Social War, 207 
Sntiii, 250 
Solon, 3, 11, 27, til, 127, Ifil, KM, 



137, 138, 145, 149; constitution 

of, 149 
Sovereignty, conception oftin Greece. 

75 ; at Athens, 170 
Spain, 251 
Sparta, 9, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 34, 

44, 237 ; constitution of, 77 
Spartiarae, 80, 87 
Spata, 125 
Sphettus, 126 
Stcnycloms, 79 
Strategi of Athens, 173, ISO, 253; 

of Argos, 215 ; of Rhodes, 219 
Slrategus of Thessnly, 224; of 

Acarnania, 228 ; of Arcadia, 230 ; 

of Aetolian league, 235; of Achaean 

league, 240 
Stratos, 227 
Sybaris, 44, 45 
Sycophant, 188, 210 
Syncdrion in Athenian confederacy 

200 
Syracuse, 23, 25, 29, 31, 34, 44, 45, 

57, 101, 18S ; constitution of, 216 

TAGUS of Thcssaly, 223 

Talthyhiadac, 21 

Talthyhins, 47 n. 4 

Tanagra, 225 

Taronlum, 25, 41, 58,72 

Taxiai-clis, 180, 253 

Teiroa, 10S n. 1, 109, 229, 230, 232 

Tellidae, 21 

Tclya, 45 

Tenedos, 58 

Ton Thousand in Arcadia, 229 

Teos, 27 n. 4, HO n. 1, 128, 200 n. a, 

233 

Territorial sovereignty, 43, 80 
Tetrapolis, 126 
Thasos, 192 
Thcagencs, 29, 69 
Tliebes, 205, 225 ; constitution of, 

66 

Thomistoclcs, 147 n. 4, 159 n. I, 209 
Theopompus, King of Sparta, 101, 

103 

Thcra, 197 

Thcramenes of Athens, 210 
Thermopylae, 51, 52 
Thersihon, 2J50 
Theseus, 124, 120, 127,213 
Thosprotinns, 84 
Thessaliotis, 223 



INDEX OF SUBJECTS 



265 



Thessalonica, 249 

Thessaly, 14, 19, 51 n. 1, 84 ; con- 
stitution of cities of, 62 ; federal 
government of, 222 

Thetes, 41 

Thirty at Athens, 114, 211 

Thorieus, 126 

Thrace, 33, 192, 194, 197, 249 

Thrasybulus of Syracuse, 34, 216 

Thtirii, 43, 44 n. 2 

Thyrea, 81 n. 3 

Tiasa, 94 n. 5 

Timocracy, 44 (cf. 23), 69, 151 ; at 
Athens, 212 ; in Thessaly, 224 

Timocrates, 171 n. 1 

Timoleon, 218 

Timotheus, 179 

Tiryns, 16 

Togati, 250 

Tomi, 128 . 

Trade debarring from office, 67 ; see 
pavavcrla 

Trajan, 250, 252 

Trapezus, 43 

Treasurers at Athens, 152 n. 2 

Tribal unions, 12, 59, 65 

Tribe, 13 

Tribe-names, Dorian, 71, 95, 128 ; 
Ionian, 127, 128 ; of Cleisthenes 
of Athens, 157 

Tribute of Athenian Empire, 196 



Tricorythus, 126 

Trierarchy, 159, 183. 184 

Triopium, amphictyony of, 48, 50 

Triphylia, 110 n. 4 ; amphicfcyony of, 
50 

Tritaea, 236 

Trittys, 134, 160 

Troezen, 124, 237 

Tyndarides, 216 

Tyra, 250 

Tyranny, 25, 45 ; conception of, 27, 
34 ; downfall of early, 34 

Tyrants of Asia Minor, 37 ; estab- 
lished by Macedon, 236 

VELIA, 37 n. 1 
Vespasian, 249 

WAR, laws of, 47 

Wealth as an element in government, 
22, 37, 60 

XENAGI, 111 

ZALEUCITS, 17, 23, 27, 45 

Zeugitae, 41 

Zeus Areius, 15 ; Lacedaemon and 

TJranius, 20 ; Hcllanius, 94; Geleon, 

127 n. 4; Herceius, 129 



INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 



(The refcnMicrs are to UIP p,ij,'os ; " n " signifies the note on a iiage) 



dyAtu, 118 
ayopa, 120 
, 137 



d7<3m, d8 

Meia, 1G9, 171, 211 n, 1 

auru/WTjnjs, 27 

dKo<r/i/a, 77, 118 n. 6 

dXicua, 215 n. 5 

d/i0anWs or d/t^tKrt'wa, 4S n. 8 

drdquw, 137, 155 

, 118 

rfy /3onXJ?s 167 

J, 192 Ji. 1 



, 117 n. 4 
cwroS&rat, 150 
diroHr/a, 3D 
drofoia, 41 
droidijrd, 234 
dird^oo-is, 148 
dpcri 15, 21, 75, 80, 87 
apyvpoKbyoi ^fs, IDS (cf. LSI) 
apurrtotipt 16, 100, IDS 11. 1 

%(TT()t, fll, 21 



14, 97 
rfo, 21, 72 
s, 47 J). 5 
/ia<T(\acs, 213 n. 2 



d, 82 

.5 
, 14, 97 

0, 121, 13(5 ; /:Xi//)wra/, 141 n. I* 
(ripa, HO 
apjrf, 0,110, 152, 193 

<5, 125 
w, 64, 224, 225 ; iiMuts, 01 



, 134 
aVt/xa, 150, 156 n. 2 



193 n. 6 
t 98 
t, 110, 190, 193n. S 

110 

aiyroreXs, 193 n. 6 
$, 121 



, , 

Hao-iXarai, 20 
j, 14, 138 

81 n. 1 
, 220 

/3ouXd, 227 ; jSouXi ical oa/xos, 70 n. 2 
ouXaf, 225 

ouX?), 152, 230, 11. 1, 239, 247; 
/SovX); /cat 5^os, 201 
233, 239 n. 1 
ov, 120, 230 
119, 121 n. 2 



23 (cf. 42 and 45) 
213 

95, 118, 128 
76/05, 13, 20, SO n. 1 
7T3rai, 20, 128 
Tfyomj, 13, 17 n. 4, 90, 100 
7e/)ou<r(o, 13, IS, 72, 80, 9G, 100, 101, 

119 

ywvfywi, 42 
, 01 
170 

apa^/zwv, 170, 171, 211 
i7, 131 



INDEX OF GREEK WORDS 



267 



l, 230 11. 5, 242 n. 3 

5 o cnjf.uras Sapos, 219 
8tKO.8a.pxia, 224 
SeKapxta, 114 
StKCLTos ai/ros, 255 
8rnJ.apX.oi, 160 
8wiovpyoi, 04, 214, 240 
, 12, 160 

, 129 

ff, 16, 17, 89 
8ia86ffets, 165 
&aXXaKTi}s, 150 
OLa.vofJ.ai, 165 

fcu, 175 , rSiat, 175 ; %to<n<u, 176 ; 
aflroreXefr, 176 ; enri avjjLpoXw, 51, 
200 

, 17 

, 153 (cf. 175), 242 ^ 
17; diroffTaaioy, 1D3 ; aTrpoora- 
o-tou, 133 
dioiOTJwi, 6 ^vrl rg, 185^ 

Sl6p6b)fflS T&V VOflLWV, 172 

StopQurfy, 150 
SiWjSeXia, 166 
567/ia, 147 ; TWV o-i^/axw, 206 

, 140, 166 

, 18, 24, 67, 151 

ts, 126 

t?, 131 
7^5 /cal oi/c/as, 54 

j, 46 n. 2 
>9, 51, 127 

, 232, 238 
etSos r^s 7r6Xews, 5 
ekoo-r^, 197 
c'/Xwres, 83 
ewrayyeXfcu, 168 

eiV^opd, 134, 151, ISO n. 3 (cf. I S3 
and 184) 

, 80, 152 

i5, 82, 83 
a,, 49 
ir<5Xw, 54 

l, 150 

, 122 

s, 249 
os, 123 

134 n. 3 
t 133 
eis or 'E?raA/)iy, 12(5, 134 n. 3 

, 230 n. 7 
iwiyaptn, 54, 116, 132 
3D 



131 
, 166 



n. 1 



irpoffoSuv, 1S3 



, 194 
, 219 
eTriffT&Tys, 167 (cf. 172) ; ro VO.VTLKOV 

185 

tvttpopA, 19S 
4rtbi>vfuis t 105, 136 
eTatpelat, 88, 114, 118, 209 
ercupot, 15, 209 

15 n 5, 61 
, 140, 1SS 
oi, 153 
Tpioai, 129 
143 

, 42, 164 
ttyopot, 103 



t, 142 

StKCurTyptou, 137, 180 n, 3 
, 154 n. 2 



, 17, 101 

1 3G n. 1 
ai, 136 (cf. 172) 
IGfi, 181 
, o cVi TO, 185 
0?}res, 142 



Zepel, 



158 

49 

Ov<riai, 17 
es, 52, 53 n. 1 



, 224 n. 1 
22 n. S, Ml, 108 
22 

., 54, llfi 
Ifcrrwp, 17 n. 4 



t', 61, 81, 80 
, 180 
Kepa/iiys, 134 n. 3 
/cXapwrat, 117 
67, 90 
,, 40 (nf. 200) 



KOWQQlKlOV, 117 

05, 227 ; 
t, 05 ; 



, 226 
AoKp&v 




OiGlCiC.O.OjO'0 S A 

1l33J!m$ 2 

$ * ft 2 R> ft ^ o ^ a J u 




tt 





ft 





cc 

H 



H CO 
P H 

EN', 





H 

01 



(M 

H 



O 

rl 



u a* 



s s |! 

( ill t S 



4 
be 



n * 

(M 



> 



03 
N 



tf* "*f! 

.?!: igSSS 

|^|j 

A ^ & fc* 

>a 3 > & 
bbbb 



8 i 

V 

3^ 



& A a b 

3 3 3 5 

b b bb 



i C rt 
) (.8 
^5, 

ixj a 

( t- 



ENDEX OF AUTHORS CITED 



I. GIIEICK AUTHORS 



AELTAN 




Equitcs 




fAOE 


Vwriac Hi&toriae 






PAGE 


viii. 5 . . , 209 


I'AOK 


11. 103, 


258, 304, 




10 . . .28 


i. 19 .26 


774, 


912, 923, 




Politics 


v! 12 ! '. . 173 
ix. 25 . , 32 
xii. 43 . . .87 


122G 
1. 255 
1. 861 
1. 1003 


, 1250 


183 

164 
188 
99 


i. 2 . .7, 13, 14 
ii. 6 . . . 138 
7 . 3, 42, 65, 151 


AKSUHINKS 
contra Timarchum 


1. 1357 


Nulcs 


177 


8 . . .10 
9 80,85,87,88,89, 
90, 91, 92, 100 


13 . . .9 
defalsn Lq/tt.twne 


1. 863 


VctS'fXM 


164 


102, 104, 105 
10 116, 117, 118, 
119, 120 


60 . . . 200 
70 . . . 205 
115 . . . 57 

' 


I. 595 
I. 600 
1. 707 




164 
175 
198 


12 7, 45, 57, 67, 
138, 147, 149, 
152, 153, 154, 
155, 164 






A 'Ws" 




iii. 1 . . 7, 8, 105 


20 . 146, 167 
25 . . . 180 


1. 1023 




194 


2 . .64, 158 
3 . . . 1, 5 


38 . . . 172 




Lvwlrtititi 




4 . . .15 


61) . . . 200 
124. . . . 53 


1. 528 


. 


202 


5 . . 67, 131 
6 . . 5, 11 


ANJMWJDKH 




HtMMG 




7 , .28, 58 


dc Mysteriis 


11. 363, 


509 . 


188 


11 . 123, 153, 177 
13 . . 61, 162 


83 . . . 212 


J*j 


xteswz'iiMte 




14 . 14, 17, 27, 98 


87 . . . 109 


1. 301 




165 


15 . 27, 57, 178 


ANTIPHUN 
dc autlc J/M'otl'is 


1. 816 


1'1'idutt 


173 


16 . . .10 
p. 1289 a . . 5 
1289 I) 22, 58, 64 


8 . KW 


t 






1290 a . .60 


40 . . . 201 


1. 1160 




1/5 


1290 b . . 58 


AULSTOl'llANKB 


AH.ISTOTL.B 

Ethics 


1291 b 58, 60, 61 
1292 a . . 11 
1292 b 22, 24, 214 


I. 938 . . .188 


v. 7 




-17 


1293 b . . 61 



INDEX OF GREEK AUTHORS 



271 



PAGE 


PAGE 


de Corona 


p. 1294 a . . 15 


12 . . . .156 


PAGE 


1294*b , . 104 


13 . . . 132, 137 


133 . . . 148 


1295 a . 27, 57 


16 . . 31, 32 


134 . . . 146 


1295 b . . 5 
1296 a . . 75 


20 . . . ,162 
21 . 126, 130, 134, 157, 


de falsa Leyatione 


1296 b . . 58 


158 


11 . . .230 


1297 b 22, 57, 64 
1298 b . 101, 210 


22 . . 14, 158, 160 
23 . .147, 189, 190 


contra Aristocratem 


1300 a . . 69 


24 . 165, 166, 175, 178 


238 . . .63 


1301 b . . 15 
1302 b . . 67 


25 . . . .147 
26 .. . 132 


contra Timocratcm 


1303 a . 139, 215 


27 . 147, 163, 164, 177 


20 ff . . . 172 


1304 a 57, 147, 162, 


28 . . . .166 


43,73 . 171 


216, 217 


29 . . . 162, 211 


148 . . 154, 176 


1304 b . . 69 


35 . . . . 211 


149 . . . 154 


1305 a 26, 29, 30 
1305 b 20, 30, 64 


41 . . 149, 165, 178 
44 . . . .167 


contra Anstuyatonem 


1306 a 27, 100, 214 


45 . . . 166, 168 


16 . . .10 


1308 a . . 88 
1310 a . . 210 


48 . . . .159 
54 . . . .167 


adversus Hoeotuwi 


1310 b . 28, 30 


57 . . . 144, 146 


40 . . .131 


1311 a . . 30 

1312 b . . 34 


61 . . .181, 254 
62 . . 141, 165, 193 


adversus Macartatum 


1313 a . . 103 


AllRIAN 


54 . . .142 


1313 b . 28, 32 
1315 b . 30, 31 


Anabasis 


contra ISulntlidem 


1317 b . . 7 


i. 10 . . 232 


67 . . .129 


1318 a . . 139 
1318 b . . 204 


ATHENAEUS 


DJSIMAUCUUS 


1319 a . . 213 


Dcipnosoplbistae 


contra Dcinoslltmcm 


1319 b . 130, 158 


y. 141 f . . .90 


82 ff . . . 148 


1320 b . . 72 
1322 b . . 14 


143 a. . 113 
263 (1 . 86 


Dl 01)0 HUH SlOULUS 


1324 a . . 22 


263 f . 117, 118 


iv. 39 . . . 125 


1326 a . . 10 


266 f . . 134 


v. 80 . . . 116 


1332 b . . 7 


271 c . 88 


via. 24 . . .29 


1341 a . 57 


372 b .173 


xi. 26 . . .32 


Itfictunc 


566 f . 14C 


54 . . . 214 




577 c . 132 


68 . . .34 


i. 10 . , .9 

Oeconoinics 


DEMOSTJJENES 


86, 87 . . 217 
xii. 9 . . .45 


ii. 37 ... 173 


in Philtppivrn 


10 . . 13, 44 


Constitution of Athens 


ii. 24 . . . 224 
iii. 44 . . .232 


30 .. . S17 
\iii. 34, 35 . .217 


3 . 135, 138, 144, 145 
4 . 23, 138, 145, 149, 


de Clbcraoncso 


xiv. 82 . . . 223 

84, J)l . . 205 


152 


Argt. . . .42 


92 . . . 72 


5 . . . .150 
6 . . . .150 


de Mymuiuria 


xv. 30 . . . 205 
40 . . . 70 


7 . 142, 151, 152, 153 


182 . . . 18} 


52, 53 . . 227 


8. 134,138,141,146, 
152 


pro JRhod'iorum liber ta(,e 


57 . . . 210 
60 . . , 223 


. . 153, 154, 155 


3. . . .207 


61 . . .63 



272 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



PACK 




PAG15 


FAH 


jtv. 62 . . 227 


iv. 159 


. 83 


ix. 7. . .106 


78, 79, 80 . 226 


v. 40 


. 105 


9. . 98,106 


xvi. 11 . .63 


44 


21, 45 


11. . . 81* 


65 , . 72 


52 


. 42 


33 . 21 


70 , . 218 


57 


. 21, 124 


35. . . 108 


82 . . 34 


62 


. 124 


37. . .21 


xvui. IS . . 212 


63 


. 64 


58. . .63 


xix. 66 , . 232 


65 


. 30 


79. . .47 


xx. 98 . .218 


66 


tiO, 29, 157 


106. . . 189 


99 . . 232 


07 


. 33 




DIOGENKS LAISUTIUS 


68 


26, 71 


HOMER 


i. 3, 68 . . . 101 
DroNYsiua UALICAII- 


69 
71 


. 160, 162 
31,134, 142, 
145 


Iliad 
i. 238 . . 17 


N ASS ENS IS 

*tntiquitoes Itoinanao 
ii. 14 ... 102 


72 

74-75 
77 
90 


. 79, 142 
. 112 
. 22, 47 
. 99 


337 . , 20 
ii. 206 . . 17 
402 ff . . 16 
404 . . 13 


iv. 25 . . 48 


91-95 


. 112 


iv. 266, 267 . 15 


vi. 60 . . .28 
vii. 2-11 . . 31 


92 19 

.,: o 


, 30, 31, 32, 
34,72 


344 . . 13 
xi. 823 . . 20 
xvi. 269 ff . .15 


HEIIAOLKIUB.S L'ONTIOUS 


VI. O 

7 


*. 50 


xvhi. 497 . . 17 


Jfragm. 
2 . . . . 91 


38 
43 


. 42 

. 38 


Odyssey 


7 . . 91 


51 


. 97 


iv. 63 . 20 


25 .... 23 


56 


. 98 


xiii. 181 . . 16 


HKKOUOTU& 


57 
59 


. 99, 102 
07 


ISABUS 


i. 23 . . . 33 


67, 68 


j i 

. 32 


de Ph'iloctemouLS 


30 . . . 125 


79 


. 47 


hcredttate 


56 ... 121 


82 


. 105 


21 . . .131 


59 . . 26, 31 
61 . . .30 


89 
92 


. 135 
. 50 


IBOCRATES 


65 . 93, 94, 115 
66 . . . 109 


103 
127 


, 31 

. 63 


Areopafftticiis 


144 . . 48, 50 


131 


. 162 


14 . . .1 


140 . . 37, 44 


vii. 3 


. 98 


23 . . .139 


148 . . 4ft, 49 


6 


63, 99 


Panathenaicus 


167, 108 . . 37 
ii. 143 . . . 20 
167 . . 22, 72 
178 . . . 39 
iii. 19 . . . 43 
48 . . .72 


134 
144 
148 
149 
153 
155 


. 21, 47 
. 165 
. 48, 215 
18, 106, 215 
. 13 
. 45 


105 . . . 203 
145 . . .138 
154 . . . 102 
170 . . .81 
178 . . .78 


52 . . . 26 


157 


. 31 


181 . .81 


80 . 28, J, 139 


161 


. 32 


Panegyricus 


120 . . . 
118 . . . 101 


163 
viii. 22 


. 31 
. 43 


p. 62 ... 203 


iv. 98 ... 47 


44 


. 135 


LYCURGUH 


138 . . .37 
148 . 50, 80, 110 


73 
107 


. 80 
. 190 


contra Leocratem 


149 ... 80 


144 


. 46 j 4. . . . y 



INDEX OF GREEK AUTHORS 



273 



LYSIAS 




Laws 




IMGI: 


ire/jurou 2?7/:ou 


P- 


626 . 


P\CE 

us 


7 . . . .38 

S . . ,81, 00 


PAGE 




633 . 


85 


12 . . SS 


22 . . .146 




666 . 


118 


13 . . 92 


de cnede Eratosthcnis 




680 H . 
691 c . 


17 
18 


2J . . 100 

2S . , . Sf. 


30 , . .146 




692 . 93, 103 


105 








708 . 


45 




contm Epicratem 




754 . 


42 


2 ... 87 


1, 2 . . . 177 




859 a . 


10 


13 . . 1M 


contra, Nicomaclium 




Itcjniblic 




l j eloj)idas 


g 09 177 


p. 


415 . 


134 


26 . . 907 


g *& . Lit 




565 d 


28 




contra, Agoratum 




580 . 


28 


Pericles 


67 . . .180 




Theacfetits 




7 . . . .147 


PAUSANIAS 


P- 


173 . 


209 


7-14 . . . 209 
9 . , . 140, 163 


i. 14. 15 . . 125 




Timctcus 




n . . . . aoi 


25 . . . 207 


24 




127 


16 .... 182 


28 ., . 144 








j/ . . . 1'}"2 


ii. 19 . . . 215 




PMJI'AIM'II 




I'htir'u 


iii. 2 . . .79 
5 . 101, 102, 105 


5 


Ayis 


01 


. . . 382 
20 . 87 


14 . . . 103 
20 . . .84 
IT. 5 . 135, 142, 143 


11 


Aratm 


100 


J'yrt'hm 


vii. 6 . . .108 








b . . ,15 


9 . . 23S 

16 ... 227 


2? 


- 


71 
210 


Mutvu 


viii. 6 . . . 23] 




Ar isle ides 




10. . . . 5f> 


32 , . 230 








1 r . , , J tJ, 1 1 li 


x. 10 . . .25 


1 




140 


1 (> . f > J J*J(J 




2 




209 


is . ir.i, j<?/ ir.;{,' ini, 




4 


i 


183 




PlNDAtt 


5 

8 




159 

Ofjpj 


19 . HI, 145, 1H5, iw 


Olymyfa 


13 





210 


S| " }SS 


13, 6 ff . , .72 


a - 




14L' 


21 i ! .' ! lijj 


Pythm 




CimoiL 




77w?/.i 


10 ad fin. . . 63 


11 
If 


. 100, 


210 








1 *7 





16'J 


-*'" 1M ]"" 


J. LA TO 


17 





aon 


' 


Alcibiades 




Clcomciies 




AmtttoriM Namttitw* 


p. 123 . . . 98 


10 




103 


p. 041 . . . yf, 


Cratijlus ' 




JJcmdmis 




AiMiihtfotftimht Jj<(cnH fat 


p. 394 a . . . 15 


10 




17'} 


p. 268 . H k > 


Gorgfas 




Lymrym 




tlcfntfaww Anwrf 


p. 515 e , . . 164 


6 


. . 93, 91, 


101 


>. rut . . .no 



274 OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



Profec/ita. ffercnrfae 




PM1E 




PAGE 


licijntllicue 
PAGE 


xxvii. 2 . 
.\xviii. 7 


. 227 
. 210 


i. 06 . 
97 . 


190, 190 
. 100 


10 . . . . 214 


xxix. 4 


. 218 


98 . 


. 101 


17, 3 . . .48 


9 


. 230 


100 . 


. 190 


Qimcstfunt's Grarcac 


SntABo 




101 
102 


. 84 
. 220 


1 . . . .05 


p. 03 . 


. 20 


307 . 


. 210 


5 . . . 109 


200 . 


. 45 


in . 


. 220 


IS . . . . Of) 


325 . 


. 26 


112 


. 52 




300 . 


. 214 


114 . 


. 193 


1 r ititc dt'ccm Oratoriim 


340 . 


. no 


115 . 55, 


194, 203 


p. S52b. . . 185 


040 . 


. SO 


310 . 


100, 255 


POLLUX 


054, 001 . 
001 . 


70 

78, SO 


110, 125 . 
120 . 


. 112 
31, 145 


hi. So . . 80 


005 . 


. 84 


301 . 


. 105 


iv. 105 . . 125 


074 . 


. 50 


100, 107 . 


147 


viii 11 . .328 


082 . 


. 20 


141 . 


. 109 


10 . . 133 


000 . 


, 160 


ii. 5 . 


. 48 


08 , . 107 


401 . 


. 80 


7 . 


. 108 


100-111 . 127 


400,411 . 


225 


9 . 108, 


105, 236 


125. . .143 


412 . 


. 50 


10 . 


100, 255 


120, 100 . .151 


420 . 


. 2f 


1M7 . 


. 125 


130. . .152 


410 , 


. 223 


15 . 


. 126 


POLY lill'S 


447 
470, 481 . 


. 22 

. 11G 


22 . 08, 
25 . 


203, 254 
. 83 


ii. . . 205 


482 , 


. 110 


40 . 


. 123 


07 207, 208, 200 


480 . 


. 120 


65 . 


182, 251 


OS . . 2-)S 


005 . 


. 40 


07 . 


. 47 


40 . 200, W 
41 . 230, 206 


Gf.2 . 
005 . 


. 218 
. 241 


70 . 
81 . 


. 173 
. 83 


43 . . 240 


THKOPFIUAf 


i'l'US 


ui. 11 . 


. 103 


41 . . 208 


('} '//'* 




10 


107, 108 


45 . . 233 
40 . . 280 


viii. (xxvi,) 


. 127 


HO . 
37 . 


. 193 
. 200 


48 . . 238 


TllUlJYJDll'HH 


42 . 


. 188 


57 . . 230 


5. 2 . 


. 12 


40 . 


. 120 


iv. 7 . 208 


5 . 


. 227 


47 . 


. 208 


25 . . 233 


. 


. 88 


50 . 


. 201 


20 . . 239 


8 . 


. 125 


58 . 


. 47 


07 . . 235 


10 . 


15, 25 


02 . 


. 67 


54 . . 116 


17 . 


, 01 


80 . 


108, 187 


07 , . 205 


18 . 


. 34 


02 . 


40, 44 


73 . . 214 


11) . 


100, 112 


01 . 


12, 201 


v. 1, 91 . . 238 


20 . 


. 102 


101, 11)2 . 


. 12 


vi. 10 . . 100 


21 . 


. 40 


104 . 


48, 40 


45 . 90, 102 


27 . 


. 41 


105 . 


. 227 


40 . . 121 


28 . 


. 55 


114 . 


. 55 


is. 38 . . 203 


84 


. 43 


110 


. 174 


xii. 5 . , 05 


56 . 


. 00 


iv. 7 . 


. 194 


10 , . 23 


07 . 


. 112 


28 . 


182, 254 


xx. 1, 10 . . 281 


70 . 


. KM) 


42 . 


. 195 


xxv. 8 . . 203 


H7 . 100, 


101, 105 


50 . 


106, 181 


xxvi. 1 . . 238 


05 . 


37, 189 


51 . 


. 193 



INDEX OF LATIN AUTHORS 



275 





PAGE 


PAGE 


PAGE 


iv. 53 


. 83 


vi. 43 . 


195 


iv. 6, 4 . 227 


65 


. 174 


54 . 31, 32, 


141 


7, 1 . .98 


74 . 


. 69 


81 . 


193 


v. 1, 04 . 98 


76 . 


225 


85 . 


202 


1, 36 . . 72 


78 . 


! ! 223 


vii. 14 


188 


2, 7 ; 2, S . 110 


80 . 


. 85 


28 


197 


2, 11 j 2. 21 . 112 


91 . 


. 226 


58 


86 


2, 11-19 . . 228 


93 . 


. 225 


viii. 5 . 


98 


3, 9 . 81, 87 


108 . 


. 194 


6 . 


81 


3, 10 . . 110 


v. 11 . 


. 42 


21 . . 193, 


203 


4, 46 . . 68 


16 . 


20, 97, 99 


22 . 


81 


vi. 1, 8 . .63 


18 . 


55, 193, 196 


48 . . 203, 


210 


1, 8-12 ; 1, 18 . 223 


29 . 


. 110 


54 . . 209, 


210 


3, 3 . . 112 


30 . 


, 112 


67 . 


211 


5, 3 . . 229 


31 . 


. 110, 215 


68 . 


1SS 


vii. 1, 1-14 . . 170 


33 . 


. . 110 


72 ... 


169 


1, 24 . 230 


34 . 


. 86 


73 


161 


1, 88 . . 229 


36 . 


. 106 


97 . . 22, 


211 


1, 42 . . 23ii 


37 . 
38 . 


. 215, 226 
225, 226 


XENOPHON 




1, 44 . . 71 
3, 1 . . 230 


39 . 


. 194 


A natasis 




3, 4 . . ,71 


41 . 


. 55 


iv. 6, 14 


87 


4, 2 ; 4, 33 . 230 


47 . 


55, 214, 215 


v. 5, 10 


43 


4, 35 ; 4, 38 . 229 


52 


. 236 








53 .' 


. 50 


Hdlenica 




Jies^ullica Lacedac- 


59 . 


. 215 


i. 4, 20 


254 


vnoniorum 


63 . 


. 98 


ii. 2, 7 


98 




67 . 


. 86 


3, 2 


211 


10, 2 . . . 101 


68 . 


. 85 


84 . . 


223 


10, 7 . . .87 


77 . 


. 110 


3, 34 . 


105 


15, 1 . . .92 


79 . 


. 55 


4, 36 


98 


15, 2 ; 15, 3 . .98 


81 . 


71, 109, 216 


iii. 1, 4 . 


86 


15, 7 . 15, 92 


82 . 


. 210, 236 


2, 27 


2H 


15, 9 . . .07 


105 . 
vi. 3 . 


. 202 
. 25 


3, 6 . . 

4, 2 . SG 


81 
, 99 


llcspuUica A tlieniciis ium 


26 . 


. 195, 255 


iv. 4, 6 . 


72 


1, 10 . . . 132 


35 . 


. . 217 


6, 1 . 


23G 


1, 1C . . . 199 


39 . 


. 123 


6, 3 . . 


IOC 


3, 5 - , .197 



II. LATIN AUTHORS 



ClCEUO 


LIVY 




xxx viii. 30 . 240, 241 


de Republics, 


xxxii. 22 


. 239 


xln. 38 . . 224 


ii. 4, 9 . . , 38 


xxxiu. 2 


. 226 




de Dimnatione 


16 


. 228 


TACITUS 


i. 1, 3 . . .40 


xxxiv. 51 


. 224 


An/iales 


GELLIUS 


xxxv. 25 
31 


235, 240 
. 224 


iv. 33 . . . 71 


xviii. 3 . 101 


34 


. 234 


xi. 24 ... 206 



276 



OUTLINES OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 



III. INSCRIPTIONS 



CorjJUfi Inscriptionum 


PACK 


PAGE 


GraccaTuin 


no. 240, 241 . . 227 


no. 28, 1. 26 . . 197 


PAGE 


253 . . . 213 


29 . . 39, 202 


no. 1171 . . 53 


444 . . 230, 242 


29 A, 11. 8, 9 . 41 


3438 , . 27 


D ITTEN BERGE II 


30 . . 197, 198 

31,1.8 . .. 47 


Corpus Inscriptwniwn 
Atlicarum 

II. no. 11 . , 200 
62 . 201), 207 
SS . . 221 


tiylloyc Inscriptionum 
Gfrctecarum 

no. 85 . . 55, 224 
272 . . .237 


31, 1. 15 . . 66 
35 . . 197, 198 
44 . 194, 195, 196 
4.4, 1. 44 . . 195 
4-4, 1. 59 . . 180 


114 '. '. 107 
331 . .181 


GOKTYN CODE 


46 . . 180, 255 
46, 1. 5 . . 181 


814 ! ". 49 


v. 5 . . 118, 116 


47 . 197, 198, 202 


iv. no. 22 a . . 199 


HICKS 


48 . . 198 
56 . . . 170 


CAIIEIL 


Manual of (Jrcelc 


56 3 . . 177 
58 4 . . 200 


Dllcctus Jnscriptwnwni 


Hixloriatl Inscriptions 


59 . . 16, 143 


Gracearitm 


no. 8 . . 12, 54 


63 . 39, 55, 65 


no. 10S. . .70 


19 ... 191 


63, i. A . . 43 


119 . . 5-1, 117 


23 . . . 194 


63 AFII . , 44 


177, 182, 183, 


23, 1. C . . 181 


63 z . .47 


185 . . 219 


23, 1. 30 . . 193 


SI . . .. 205 


181, 1. 01) . 121 


24 . . . 198 


81, 1. 51 . . 206 


237, 238 . . 233 


28 . .17-1, 194 


82 ... 4.9 


28S . . . 2;>5 


28, 11. 19, 67, 


84 . . . 206 


2ft'.), 1. 10 . 2IJ4 


77 . . 181 


176, 1. 35 If . 54 



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