The Hawaiian Incident: An Examination of Mr. Cleveland's Attitude Toward the Revolution of 1893

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THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

AN EXAMINATION

OF

MR. CLEVELAND'S ATTITUDE

TOWARD THE

REVOLUTION OF 1893

BY

J. A. GILLIS

BOSTON
LEE AND SHEPARD PUBLISHERS

XO MILK STREET '

189 7

i JUL 13 'H'J/

/::?

COPYRIGHT. 1897. BY LEE AND SHEPARD
All rights reserved
The Hawaiian Incident

ROCKWtLI, AKD CHURCHIIX PRtSS
BOSTON

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

No act of Mr. Cleveland's administration has met with
such severe criticism as the course which he adopted
toward the Sandwich Islands at the time of the dethrone-
ment of the Qcieen in 1893. No epithets have seemed
sufficient to characterize his " base and ignoble policy " —
a policy claimed to have been unscrupulous in itself, and
opposed to all republican and democratic ideas. So con-
stant has been the abuse lavished upon Mr. Cleveland, so
pemstent has been the misrepresentation of facts, that not
only those of opposite politics have believed the charges
against him, but some of those who have supported him
in general, have thought that there must have been some
cause for the abuse so freely bestowed, and have supposed
that there was at least one blot upon a record otherwise
unblemished.

It is intended to make some suggestions as to the real
character of the proceedings in question. It is not pro-
posed, of course, to make an exhaustive inquiry into the
events preceding the so-called " revolution " resulting in
the overthrow of the Queen's government, nor to ask
whether this government was a good or bad one, or
whether the action of the Queen was such as to justify her
dethronement. To do that would require too great a
space and might prove a weariness to 'the reader ; but
attention will be called to the letters and statements of the
parties active in the overturn of the Hawaiian throne,
which will show that this event occurred with the conni-

It

4 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

vance and assistance of the American minister and was
aided by the presence in Honolulu of United States troops,
who were called on shore from the United States ship
"Boston," then lying in the harbor, ostensibly for the pur-
pose of protecting life and property, but really for the
purpose of protecting the revolutionists, while the " revolu-
/ tion " was going on. It will be specially noticed tliat the
. letters and statements which are relied upon to show this
will be those of the chief actors, or of those whose inter-
ests lay upon their side ; some testimony of the officers of
the United States navy will be offered, but otherwise no
statements of those interested upon the Queen's side, nor
even of those who might be fairly regarded as disinterested,
will be presented. No special effort will be made to de-
fend or explain Mr. Cleveland's action, except by offering
the facts as gathered in the manner alluded to, and by
showing what that action was ; and the reader will form
his own judgment as to whether or not Mr. Cleveland's
course was controlled by retison and justice, and dictated
by a true regard for American honor.

In February, 1893, a report was made upon the follow-
ing resolution of the United States Senate :

Besolved, That the Committee on Foreign Relations shall
inquire and report whether any, and, if so, what, irregularities
have occurred in the diplomatic or other intercourse between
the United States and Hawaii in relation to the recent politi-
cal revolution in Hawaii, and to this end said committee is
authorized to send for persons and papers and to administer
oaths to witnesses.

This report is published as a public document, entitled
" Hawaiian Islands. Report of the Committee of Foreign
Relations, United States Senate, with accompanying docu-
ments," ^ in two volumes, which contain also the testimony

^ The figures in the text refer to a list at the close of this volume, in which
references are made to the pages of this Report.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT O

taken before the committee, that taken by Mr. Blount in
Honolulu, and various papers, official and otherwise, per-
taining to the Hawaiian Islands.

It is unnecessary to say that the statements made by
the parties testifying on the one side and the other are
wholly contradictory upon nearly every important point.

In order to understand the course of events at Honolulu
it is necessary to take into view the ideas and sentiments
of Mr. John L. Stevens, the United States minister at the
Sandwich Islands. It will appear most clearly that Mr.
Stevens regarded himself as having a mission, that mission
being to bring about the annexation of the islands to the
United States, which he was ready tx) promote and recom-
mend at all times and seasons. To show this a few cita-
tions will be given. He was appointed in June, 1889, and
arrived in Honolulu on the twentieth of September of that
year, and on the seventh of October he writes to Mr.
Blaine : ^

I am much impressed by the strong American feeling per-
vading the best portion of the population, and which is espe-
cially manifest among the men of business and property.

On the 20th of March, 1890, he writes again to Mr.
Blaine : ^

The actions of the department of State afford conclusive
evidence of the interest which the government of the United
States has long taken in the affairs of the Hawaiian Islands.
That these tendencies are of great importance to the future
development and defence of American commerce in the Pacific
hardly will be questioned. To secure the influence over them
which the United States so long has considered its right and
duty to maintain, some decisive steps must soon be taken
which, in the past, were not of pressing necessity. For more
than half a century the American Missionary Board, with the
agencies and influences in its control, has served as a strong
fortress to the United States in these islands. The large
financial contributions, amounting to nearly one million of
dollars, which that organization obtained through innumerable

6 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

channels of American benevolence and religious zeal, and the
large number of educated and resolute agents which it sent to
these islands, secured an influence over the ruling chiefs and
native population which held them as firmly to America as a
permanent military force could have done.

But a change of facts and circumstances in" recent years is
bringing near the time when this well-sustained power must
be strongly reenforced. In a large and increasing degree
other influences have come in to counterbalance and relatively
to decrease the American missionary influences.

Shall American civilization ultimately prevail here ? The
near future is to show conclusively that only the strong
pressure and continual vigilance of the United States can
enable American men and American ideas to hold ascendency
here and make these islands as prosperous and valuable to
American commerce, and to American marine supremacy in
the North Pacific, as the isles of the Mediterranean have been
and are to its adjacent nations.

Oil the 20th of August, 1891, he writes : ^

■ The best security in the future, and the only permanent
security, will be the moral pressure of the business men and
of what are termed " the missionary people," and the presence
in the harbor of Honolulu of an American man-of-war.

• ••••••••••

Btit as early as thejirst of December, without fail, the month
preceding the election, and for sometime thereafter, there
should be a United States vessel here to render things secure.
I have strong reluctance to being regarded an alarmist, but
with due regard to my responsibility I am impelled to express
the oi)inion that a proper regard for American interests will
require one ship here most of the time in* 1892.

On the 8th of February, 1892, he writes:*

There are increasing indications that the annexation senti-
ment is growing among the business men, as well as with the
less responsible of the foreign and native population of the
islands. The present ])olitical situation is feverish, and I see
no prospect of its being permanently otherwise until these
islands become a part of the American Union or a possession
of Great Britain.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 7

At a future time, after the proposed treaty shall have been
ratified, I shall deem it my official duty to give a more elaborate
statement of facts and reasons why a " new departure " by the
United States as to Hawaii is rapidly becoming a necessity,
that a "protectorate" is impracticable, and that annexation
must be the future remedy, or else Great Britain will be fur-
nished with circumstances and opportunity to get a hold on
these islands which will cause future serious embarrassment
to the United States.

Again in a long and elaborate letter to Mr. Foster,
Secretary of State under Mr. Harrison's administration, we
have the following : ^

IConfidenlial.']

United States Legation,

Honolulu. Nov. 20, 1892.

Sir: Fidelity to the trust imposed on me by the President, the
Department of State, and the Senate requires that I should make a
careful and full statement of the financial, agricultural, social, and
political condition of these islands. An intelligent and impartial ex-
amination of the facts can hardly fail to lead to the conclusion that
the relations and policy of the United States toward Hawaii will soon
demand some change, if not the adoption of decisive measures, with
the aim to secure American interests and future supremacy by en-
couraging Hawaiian development and aiding to promote responsible
government in these islands.

Directly and indirectly, the palace probably costs the little kingdom
$160,000 per year. A governor, at $5,000 a year, acting in harmony
with the responsible men of the Legislature, would be far better for
the islands than the present monarchical Government. In truth, the
monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on which
it logically or legitimately stands.

As a crown colony of Great Britain, or a territory of the United
States, the Government modifications could be made readily, and
good administration of the laws secured. Destiny and the vast future
interests of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who, at
no distant day, must be responsible for the government of these
islands. Under a territorial government they could be as easily
governed as any of the existing territories of the United States.

8 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

The men qualified are here to carry on good government, provided
they have the support of the Government of the United States. Why
not postpone American possession ? Would it not be just as well for
the United States to take the islands twenty-five years hence P Facts
and obvious probabilities will answer both of these interrogations.
Hawaii has reached the parting of the ways. She must now take
the road which leads to Asia, or the other, which outlets her in
America, gives her an American civilization, and binds her to the
care of American destiny.

To postpone Ameiican action many years is only to add to present
unfavorable tendencies and to make future possession more difficult.

Then, after pointing out the injury to the sugar planters
by reason of the McKinley bill, he says :

Unless some positive measures of relief be granted, the
depreciation of sugar property here will continue to go on.
Wise, bold action of the United States will rescue the prop-
erty-holders from great loss, give the islands a government
which will put an end to a worse than useless expenditure of
a large proportion of the revenues of the country, using them
for the building of roads and bridges, thus helping to develop
the natural resources of the islands, aiding to diversify the
industries, and to increase the number of the responsible
citizens. One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary
to be followed ; either bold and vigorous measures for annexa-
tion or a " customs union," an ocean cable from the Califor-
nian coast to Honolulu, Pearl harbor perpetually ceded to the
United States, with an implied but not necessarily stipulated
American protectorate over the islands.. I believe the former
to be the better, that which will prove much the more advan-
tageous to the islands, and the cheapest and least embarrass-
ing in the end for the United States.

To-day the United States has five times tlie wealth she pos-
sessed in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation
are much stronger than they were then. I cannot refrain
from expressing the opinion with emphasis that the golden
hour is near at hand.

• ..*•......

So long as the islands retain their own independent govern-
ment there remains the possibility that England or the Cana-
dian Dominion might secure one of the Hawaiian harbors for

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 9

a coaling station. Annexation excludes all dangers of this
kind.

Which of the two lines of policy and action shall be adopted,
our statesmen and Government must decide. Certain it is
that the interests of the United States and the welfare of
these islands will not permit the continuance of the existing
state and tendency of things. Having for so many years
extended a helping hand to the islands and encouraging the
American residents and their friends at home to the extent
we have, we cannot refrain now from aiding them with vigor-
ous measures, without injury to ourselves and those of our
"kith and kin," and without neglecting American opportu-
nities that never seemed so obvious and pressing as they do
now. I have no doubt that the more thoroughly the bed-rock
and controlling facts touching the Hawaiian problem are
understood by our Government and by the American public,
the more readily they will be inclined to approve the views I
have expressed so inadequately in this communication.

•

In a letter to Mr. Foster, Jan. 18, 1893 (the day
after the revolution), having given an account of the trans-
actions of the 16th; he writes as follows : ®

All is quiet here now. Without the sacrifice of a single life
this change of government has been accomplished. Language
can hardly express the enthusiasm and the profound feeling of
relief at this peaceful and salutary change of government.
The underlying' cause of this profound feeling among the
citizens is the hope that the United States Government will
allow these islands to pass to American control and become
American soil. A commission of citizens, duly accredited, will
go by the steamer that takes this despatch to Washington, to
state the wishes of the Provisional Government and of the
responsible people of the islands, and to give a complete
account of the existing state of things here.

And February 1, he writes : ' " The Hawaiian pear is now
fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States
to pluck it." Finally, in the "North American Review"
for December, 1893, Mr. Stevens winds up a long article
in favor of annexation as follows:

10 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

To say that we do not need the Hawaiian Islands as a
seeinity to our immense future interests is but the babble of
children or incompetent men. It is blindly and recklessly to
ignore the logic of inimitable circumstances and to scoff at the
plainest teachings of history. No ! America cannot get rid of
her future responsibilities if she would, and all attempts to do
80 will be at the cost of her future generations. In the light
of these inexorable truths of wliat is most sacred in Christian
civilization, in l)ehalf of a noble American colony holding the
advanced post of America's progress, I cherish the faith that
the American people, the American statesmen, thoughtful of
America's great future, will settle the Hawaiian question wisely
and well — will see to it that tlie flag of the United States floats *
unmolested over the Hawaiian Islands.

Mr. Stevens's sentiments in regard to the Queen were no
less pronounced than those in reference to annexation. As
early as April 2, 1892, he begins to speak of her in the
most disparaging terms. He says, " For twenty years the
palace has been the centre of corruption and scandal, and
is likely to remain so as long as the Hawaiian monarch
exists."

His official correspondence is filled with remarks (which
need not be quoted here) reflecting upon the Queen's
private character, and indeed he finds it difficult to speak
of her without some derogatory allusion.^ In his exami-
nation before the Congressional committee he makes these
references time after time ; he mentions the " semi-
barbaric Queen " and her " semi-barbaric court," and
in speaking of her signing " iniquitous bills " he says,
" Both she and tlie ring of adventurers who surrounded her
expected there would thus be established a scheme to rob
the people of millions of money." These expressions of
Mr. Stevens's, both in regard to annexation and to the
Queen, are here brought forward, not for the purpose of
praise or blame, but that the reader may judge of his

1 Thus, for instance, in his letter of Oct. 19, 1892, he makes three, and in that
of Oct. 31, 1892, four allusions of this kind.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 11

state of mind, and may form an opinion as to what he
would be likely to do in a contingency to which he refers
in a letter which is now to be quoted.

This letter to Mr. Blaine is dated March 8, 1892, about
ten months before the Queen was dethroned, and com-
menced as follows : ®

United States Legation,

Honolulu, March 8, 1892.

Sir : In view of possible contingencies in these islands, I ask for
the instructions of the Department of State on the following, viz. :

If the Government here should be surprised and overturned by
an orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement, largely of native
Hawaiians, and a provisional or republican government organized
and proclaimed, would the United States minister and naval com-
mander here be justified in responding affirmatively to the call of the
members of the removed Government to restore them to power or
replace them in possession of the Government buildings? Or should
the United States minister and naval commander confine themselves
exclusively to the preservation of American property, the protection
of American citizens, and the prevention of anarchy? Should a
revolutionary attempt of the character indicated be made, there are
strong reasons to presume that it would begin with the seizure of
the police-station, with its arms and ammunition, and this accom-
plished, the Royal Palace and the Government building, containing
the cabinet offices and archives, would very soon be captured, the
latter buildins: beins: situated about one-third of a mile from the
police-station. In such contingencies, would it bo justifiable to use
the United States forces here to restore the Government buildings
to the possession of the displaced officials ? Ordinarily in like cir-
cumstances the rule seems to be to limit the landing and movement
of the United States force in foreign waters and dominion exclusively
to the protection of the United States legation, and of the lives and
property of American citizens. But as the relations of the United
States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years the United
States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in circum-
stances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister and
naval coibmander may deviate from established international rules
and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this
despatch.

12 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

It is not claimed that the revolution, foreshadowed in
the above remarkable letter, was the one now in question,
because the latter arose suddenly and upon an unexpected
opportunity, but this letter is of great importance for
several reasons : First, it shows that nearly a year before
the events in question, and while the Queen was reign-
ing in perfect peace and amity with the country which he
represented, Mr. Stevens was contemplating the possibility
of the surprise and overturn of the Government by " an
orderly and peaceful revolutionary movement " (whatever
that may mean), and was considering and inquiring
whether he and the naval commander would be '^ justified "
in restoring the Government, or whether they should " con-
fine themselves exclusively" to protection of American
citizens and property and prevention of anarchy, being ap-
parently in doubt which course should be pursued. Sec-
ondly, it points out what would be the " ordinary " rule ;
but as (in his mind) the relations of the United States to
Hawaii are exceptional, he wishes to know how far he and
the naval commander may " deviate " from established in-
ternational rules and precedent in the contingency named.
The meaning of this suggested " deviation " will become
more clear as we proceed.

Finally, this letter practically writes in advance the his-
tory of the present revolutionary movement, but with one
very important variation. Mr. Stevens, looking to the
future, and considering the course a revolution would be
likely to take, presumes that it would begin with the
seizure of the police-station with its arms and ammunition,
which being accomplished, the remaining work would soon
be done. The possession of the station-house would be an
absolute prerequisite to a successful revolution, and it would
naturally be the first point of attack. But the noticeable
tiling is that when the present revolution was attempted, the
possession of the station-house, in which were the Queen's

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 13

troops, with their arms and ammunition, becomes a matter
of no importance, and Mr. Stevens was ready and willing
to recognize a set of men who had possession of the Gov-
ernment buildings only. This w^ill be amply shown by
his own letters, and it. is very important to this inquiry
that his attitude, as taken in this letter of March 8, ten
months before the revolution, should be noticed and re-
membered when his subsequent acts and letters are
examined.

In 1893 the government of the Sandwich Islands was a
constitutional monarchy. At the head was Queen Liliuo-
kalani ; there was a Cabinet consisting of four ministers,
and a Legislature consisting of twenty-four members of the
House of Nobles, and twenty-four representatives of the
people. Members of both Houses were elected by popular
vote, an educational qualification being necessary for all
voters, and a property qualification for electors for nobles.
The constitution then in force was adopted in 1887.

Upon the fourteenth day of January, 1893, being Satur-
day, the Queen, for various reasons which need not be con-
sidered here, proposed to promulgate, and took some steps
tow^ards promulgating, a new constitution ; an attempt
which was no doubt in violation of the constitution then
existing. More or less excitement and opposition resulted,
and the attempt was abandoned ; and on Monday notice to
this effect was given, and at or about noon the following
printed proclamation w^s circulated through the city: ^

BY AUTHORITY.

Her Majesty's ministers desire to express their appreciation for
the quiet and order which has prevailed in this community since the
events of Saturday, and are authorized to say that the position taken
by Her Majesty in regard to the promulgation of a new constitution
was under the sti'ess of her native subjects. Authority is given for
the assurance that any changes desired in the fundamental law of the
land will be sought only by methods provided in the constitution

14 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

itself. Her Majesty^s ministers request all citizens to accept the
assurance of Her Majesty in the same spirit in which it is given.

LiLIUOKALANI.

Samuel Parker,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,

W. H. CORNWELL,

Minister of Finance.

John F. Colburn,

Minister of the Interior.

A. P. Peterson,

Attorney- General,
lOLANi Palace, Jan. 16, 1893.

In the meantime, on Saturday the 14th,^° some persons
met at the office of Mr. W. O. Smith, a prominent lawyer
of Honolulu, and after some discussion organized them-
selves as a meeting, of which Mr. Smith was secretary,
and a committee of nine, afterwards increased to thirteen,
was appointed to form plans for action, call meetings,
report any time at their discretion, and be called a Com-
mittee of Safety.

It is asserted that at that time there was some serious
apprehension that disorder might follow the attempt of
the Queen to promulgate the new constitution ; that there
was an intense feeling of uncertainty, and a fear that
danger to the community was very imminent.

The claim has been made throughout by Mr. Stevens
and the parties engaged in the movement that the action
of the Queen caused great consternation, that there were
grave apprehensions of disorder and riot, and that there
was great cause to believe that life and property were in
danger. Thus Mr. W. C. Wilder says : ^^

At the request of many citizens, whose wives and families
were helpless and in terror of an expected uprising of the
mob, which would burn and destroy, a request was made and
signed by all of the committee, addressed to Minister Stevens,
that troops might be landed to protect houses and private
property.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 15

All this is denied upon the other side, who claim that
the city was amply protected and perfectly safe, and they
describe the condition of affairs in much. detail. Fortu-
nately we have a test, as will be seen hereafter, in the actions
of the revolutionists themselves, as to what was their real
belief upon this subject.

The following supplementary statement made to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, by Mr. C. Bolte, who,
as well as Mr. W. C. Wilder to whom he refers, was a
member of the Committee of Safety and of the Pro-
visional Government, will perhaps show whether these
two gentlemen and others were overwhelmed with con-
sternation, or whether they welcomed with enthusiasm the
advent of the golden opportunity : ^

The answers which I have given to Mr. Blount's question,
" When was for the first time anything said about deposing
or dethroning the Queen ? '* might lead to misunderstanding in
reading this report. I desire, therefore, to hereby declare as
follows : Words to the effect that the Queen must be deposed
or dethroned were not uttered to my knowledge at any meet-
ing of the Committee of Safety until Monday evening, Jan.
16, 1893 ; but at the very first meeting of citizens at W. 0.
Smith's office on Saturday, January 14, at about 2 P.M., or
even before this meeting had come to order, Paul Neumann
informed the arriving people that the Queen was about to
promulgate a new constitution. The answer then given him
by Mr. W. C. Wilder, by me, and by others was : That is a
very good thing and a splendid opportunity to get rid of the
whole old rotten Government concern and now to get annexa-
tion to the United States. Paul Neumann thought that that
might be going a little too far.

At the second meeting at W. 0. Smith's, between 3 and 4
P.M. on Saturday afternoon, Jan. 14, 1893, when the Com-
mittee of Safety was appointed, sentiments of the same
nature, that this is a splendid opportunity to get rid of the
old regime, and strong demands for annexation, or any kind
of stable government under the supervision of the United
States, were expressed.

Therefore, even if the words that the Queen must be
deposed or dethroned were not spoken, surely the sentiment

i

16 THE HAWAIIAK INCIDENT

that this must be done prevailed at or even before the very-
first meeting, on Jan. 14, 1893.

Mr. Stevens had been absent from Honolulu for about
ten days on a trip to Hilo, one of the Hawaiian Islands, in
the United States shipof-war " Boston," and returned on
Saturday, January 14, the day when the proceedings in
question commenced; and communication was at once
opened with him by tlie revolutionists, and was continued
from day to day, as the progress of events is traced in the
statements of the revolutionists themselves.

Attention is now asked to the following extracts from
the statement of Mr. W. O. Smith, at whose office a meet-
ing had been organized, as stated above, and a committee
of thirteen, to be called a Committee of Safety, appointed.
After giving the names of the committee, he says : ^^

After further delay, almost immediately the others present
Y^ere requested to retire, and the committee held a meeting.
The situation was briefly discussed — the imminence of danger
and the safety of the city ; what action should be taken for
protection was the main subject of discussion. And in view
of the fact that at the station-house there was a large armed
force, and at the barracks, and that nearly all of the arms were
in possession of the supporters of the Queen, and there was no
organization at the time outside of those forces, and it was
simply unknown how many arms were available, the question
was at once discussed whether a protectorate should not be
sought from the United States steamship-of-war " Boston ; "
that question was, of course, first raised, whether the United
States would render assistance, or what their attitude would
be, and then a special committee, consisting of L. A. Thurston,
W. C. Wilder, and H. F. Glade, were appointed to wait upon
Mr. J. L. Stevens, United States minister, and inform him of
the situation, and ascertain from him what, if any, protection
or assistance could be afforded by the United States forces for
the protection of life and property, the unanimous sentiment
and feeling being that life and property were in imminent
danger. By that time it was so dark that I lighted the
electric light. We had to have light before we concluded our
meeting and deliberations.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 17

The probabilities of what the Queen would do were dis-
cussed; there was no certainty in regard to that, excepting
that she would undoubtedly persist in her revolutionary in-
tentions ; what would be done, how soon martial law might be
declared, or any other course would be taken, what steps
would be taken, we simply could not tell, and after discussion
Mr. Thurston made the following motion : " That steps be
taken at once to form and declare a Provisional Government."

The seriousness of the step was considered, but it was
decided unanimously by the committee that some such steps
had got to be taken for protection of life and property, and
it was then, and -after Mr. Cooper's statement in regard to
his visit to the "Boston," that the committee consisting of
Thurston", Wilder, and Glade were appointed to meet the
American minister, and were instructed to report the next
morning at 9 o'clock, at a meeting to be called at the residence
of W. R. Castle.

I w,ent home about dark or a little after, and just had dinner,
when M^. Thurston called at my house on his way home, ask-
ing me to meet the committee and one or two others at his
house at 8 o'clock. I went there and found Mr. Thurston,
W. R. Castle, F. W. Wundenberg, A. S. Hartwell, S. B. Dole,
and C. L. Carter. Mr. Thurston stated that the committee
had waited upon the* American minister, and that he had said
that the United States troops on board the " Boston " would
be ready to land any moment to prevent the destruction of
American life and property, and in regard to the matter of
establishing a Provisional Government, they of course would
recognize the existing Government whatever it might be.

Mr. Thurston stated to Mr. Stevens the proposition that
was under consideration, of establishing a Provisional Govern-
ment, and in case those steps were taken, he asked Mr. Stevens
what his attitude would be, and Mr. Stevens had told him
whatever Government was established, and was actually in
possession of the Government building, the executive depart-
ments aud archives, and in possession of the citi/y that was a
de facto Government proclaiming itself as a Government, would
necessarily have to be recognized. Everything had culmi-
nated in a few hours, we were laboring under intense feeling,
and it was arranged that different ones of those present should
begin di-afting papers. Mr. W. R. Castle undertook to draft
something in the nature of a brief historical statement, which
would be for a preamble to the declaration. Mr. Thurston
was to work upon the matter of the form of the Provisional
Government. Judge Dole quietly stated that he was not pre-

I

18 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

pared to take part in the movement, but that he would assist,
at Mr. Thurston's request, in drafting the declaration. 1 was
requested to draft papers to be submitted to the American
minister requesting the landing of the troops, in case it became
necessary. At a late hour we retired, and the next morning
at 9 o'clock the committee of thirteen met at W. R. Castle's
residence.

The meeting continued until noon. The committee appointed
to wait on the American minister made a report to the com-
mittee similar to the report made to us tlie night before.
Among the various propositions and matters discussed was a
matter of calling a public mass meeting, and it was decided to
call a meeting at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day,
Monday, to be held, if possible, at the old rifle armory on Ber-
etania street, near the corner of Punchbowl street.

At the meeting at Mr. Castle's there was considerable discus-
sion in regard to when to have the mass meeting ; some were
in favor of having it on Sunday ; a feeling, too, had been ex-
pressed at the meeting on Saturday afternoon that there should
be a mass meeting called, and it was finally decided to hold it
at 2 o'clock Monday.

At that meeting [at Mr. Castle's], and the previous and sub-
sequent meetings, most meagre minutes were kept, because of
the possible danger of our being arrested, and of these records
being used against us. The night before, Mr. Thurston re-
quested Mr. Wundenberg to ascertain, as far as he could, what
arms were available and how many men could be depended
upon. Just at the close of the meeting Mr. Wundenberg
came with Mr. Soper, and they reported that the prospect of
obtaining arms was very discouraging, but that after making
a thorough search of the town only about sixty stand of arms
were found that were not in possession of the Government.^

After we adjourned, Mr. Thurston and I called upon the
American minister again and informed him of what was being
done. Among other things we talked over with him what had
better be done in case of our being arrested, or extreme or vio-
lent measures being taken by the monarchy in regard to us.
We did not know what steps would be taken, and there was a
feeling of great unrest and sense of danger in the community.
Mr. Stevens gave assurance of his earnest purpose to afford
all the protection that was in his power to protect life and

* ue.f the Queen's Government.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 19

property ; he explained the fact that, while he would call for
the United States troops to protect life and property, he would
not recognize any government until actually established.

Sunday evening several of the parties met at Mr. Thurs-
ton's house. The next morning, Monday, January 16,
there was a meeting of the whole committee at Mr. Thurs-
ton's office.^* At this meeting a committee of five was
appointed to wait upon the Queen's ministers, who had
requested to see them. Mr. Smith resumes :

The committee of five returned and reported that they had
met the four ministers, and the ministers stated to them that
they had no communication to make, and wanted to know
what the committee wanted. They talked over the situation
and showed our committee a proclamation signed by the Queen
and the ministers, stating that she would never again attempt
to force a new constitution. Before the meeting broke up the
form of the request to the American minister in regard to the
landing of the troops was adopted and signed by the commit-
tee of thirteen, requesting the American minister to land
troops, and this request was signed by the committee of
thirteen, and decided to be delivered to the minister to be
held by him, but not to be acted upon until a further request
was received from the committee.

Then, after speaking of the mass meeting, at whicli he
says there was a very large number of people, and at which
Mr. Thurston spoke, he goes on :

There was a short and earnest discussion of what was to be
done; it was then nearly 4; our plans had* not been per-
fected, papers had not been completed, and after a hasty
discussion, the time being very short, it was decided that it
was impossible for us to take the necessary steps, and we
should request that the troops be not landed until next morn-
ing, the hour in the morning being immaterial, whether it
was 9 or 8 or 6 o'clock in the morning, but we must have
further time to prevent bloodshed, and Mr. Thurston and I
were appointed to proceed at once to the American minister
and inform him of our decision. We proceeded at once to Mr.
Stevens's house, the United States Legation, stated the case to
him, and he said that as a precautionary measure, and to

20 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

protect American life and property, he bad Ordered the troops
to be landed at 5 o'clock, and that they would come. It
was then decided to adjourn to meet at the house of Henry
Waterhouse at 8 o'clock in the evening. The meeting
broke up, and some of us went down to see the troops landed.
Thurston gave up — sick. He had to go to bed.

At 8 o'clock in the evening we met at Mr. Henry Water-
house's. All of the members of the committee were present
except Thurston, Castle, and Wilder, they all being ill. Mr.
James B. Castle w^as present, taking the place of W. R. Castle,
and C. L. Carter taking the place of Thurston. There were
also present by invitation Alexander Young, J. H. Soper,
Cecil Brown, H. P. Baldwin, and F. W. Wundenberg.

Previous to this meeting, beginning with the meeting on
Saturday afternoon, the suggestion of sending the " Claudine "
to San Francisco with despatches to the United States Gov-
ernment was discussed, and at this meeting Monday evening
it was moved that she be sent at once to San Francisco. The
motion was amended that action be deferred until after the
establishment of the Provisional Government. Amendment
carried.

At 10 o'clock the next day, January 17, the committee met
at the office of W. O. Smith ; and Mr. C. L. Carter, on behalf
of the committee, reported the names of those who had con-
sented to go upon the Executive and Advisory Councils. It
was voted that the Advisory Committee be increased from eight
to thirteen, and additional names be suggested to the com-
mittee from whom they could select the live additional names.
Various names were suggested. It was voted that tlie com-
mittee rec^uest Mr. Wilder to report if the " Claudine " could
be chartered to go to San Francisco and at what cost. It was
voted that the inter-island steamship companies be requested
not to allow any vessels to leave for the other islands before
10 o'clock on the next day. At 11 o'clock the judge [S. B.
Dole] came before the committee and stated that he would
accept the position as chairman of the Executive Council.

Then, after giving the names of the persons there, Mr.
Smith adds : " During the meeting iu the forenoon, Mr. S.
M. Damon came in and reported that he had had an inter-
view with the Queen in which he had advised her not to
make resistance, but to submit, and that she would have
every opportunity for presenting her claims."

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 21

Thus we learn, among other things, that immediately
upon the formation of the Committee of Safety, and before
any action whatever had been taken, the first thing thought
of was the United States troops, the point being at once
raised and discussed as to seeking a protectorate from the
ship-of-war " Boston ; " that a special committee of three was
immediately appointed to wait upon Mr. Stevens, inform
him of the situation, and ask what he would do ; that on
that first day (Saturday), before 8 o'clock in the even-
ing, that committee had seen Mr. Stevens, and that a
report of their conference with him was made by the
special committee at a meeting of the Committee of
Safety holden at Mr. Castle's house at 9 o'clock Sunday
morning; that after this meeting adjourned, Mr. Thui-ston
and Mr. Smith again called upon Mr. Stevens and informed
him of what was being done, and talked over with him
what should be done in case of their arrest; and, finally,
that after a mass meeting a sub-committee was appointed
to call upon Mr. Stevens, with the request that the troops
should not be landed that night, the request, however,
coming a little too late, as he had already directed the
troops to be brought on shore.

Mr. Smith's highly significant statement in regard to the
large armed force at the station-house and barracks, and
the fact that nearly all the arms were in the hands of the
Queen's supporters, will not be overlooked.

The following is the request which the committee had
drawn up. It will be noticed that it appeals to the minister
and the United States forces for assistance, and while it
speaks of general alarm and terror it does not use the
formula "protection for life and property," but asks for
assistance and protection for "oui-selves." It will he
seen also what confidential relations existed between Mr.
Stevens and the committee, when it appears that this most
important paper was to be left in Mr. Stevens's hands, but

22 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

action was not to be taken upon it till the committee
should see fit to make a further request: ^

CITIZENS' COMMITTEE OF SAFETY TO MR. STEVENS.

Hawaiian Islands, Honolulu, Jan. 16, 1893.

Sir: We, the undersigned, citizens and residents of Honolulu,
respectfully represent that in view of recent public events in this
kingdom, culminating in the revolutionary acts of Queen Liliou-
kalani on Saturday last, the public safety is menaced and lives and
property are in peril, and we appeal to you and the United States
forces at your command for assistance.

The Queen, with the aid of armed force, and accompanied by
threats of violence and bloodshed from those with whom she was
acting, attempted to proclaim a new constitution ; and, while pre-
vented for the time from accomplishing her object, declared publicly
that she would only defer her action.

This conduct and action was upon an occasion and under circum-
stances which have created general alarm and teiTor.

We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray
for the protection of the United States forces.

Henry E. Cooper,
F. W. McChf.sney,
W. C. Wilder,

C. BOLTE,

A. Brown,
William O. Smith,
IIenky Watekiiouse,
Theo. F. Lansing,
Ed. Suhr,
L. A. Thurston,
John Emmeluth,
Wm. R. Castle,
S. A. McCandless,

Citizens* Committee of Safety.

Of the signers of this letter five were American citizens.

Nothing could be more significant than this attempt
testified to by Mr. Smith, to prevent the landing of the
troops on Monday evening. If there was danger of riot

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 23

and disturbance, if general alarm and terror prevailed, if
there was pressing need of the United States' assistance,
why did this committee wish to deprive themselves of the
surest means of safety? How is it possible to explain
their action in this regard upon the supposition that the
alarm and terror which they speak of really existed?
What explanation could they give to the citizens whose
"wives and families were helpless and in terror of an
expected uprising of the mob," if any such there were?

But it may be asked what harm could the committee
have anticipated from the landing of the troops? Mr.
Smith answers the question plainly enough. The mass
meeting broke up sooner than the committee expected;
they did not know what to do. They were not in readi-
ness to take the tinal steps just yet : plans were not per-
fected, papers not drawn, and the coming of the troops
might possibly have brought about a state of things which
they could not anticipate, and for which they might not
be prepared. So they went straight to the American
minister, with whom they had left their written request,
ready to be complied with when they said the word,
but found that he had already acted and they were too
late.

Mr. John A. McCandless, a member of the Committee
of Safety and of the Provisional Government, in his testi-
mony before the committee, goes into this matter a little
more fully :^^

Senator Gray. — Was anything said in your meeting on
Saturday, after your Committee of Safety was formed and you
had cleared the room, about Mr. Stevens and the United States
ship " Boston " ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes ; we talked that over.

Senator Gray. — So soon as your committee was formed ?

Mr. McCandless. — Well, it was during the conversation.

The Chairman. — On Saturday ?

Senator Gray. — Yes. Was anything said about the atti-
tude of Mr. Stevens ?

24 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Mr. McCandless. — It was talked of — what his attitude
would be.

Senator Gray. — Was anybody deputed to go and see him ?

Mr. McCaxdless. — Yes ; I tliink there was a committee
of one or two appointed on Saturday afternoon to have a talk
with him, to ascertain what his attitude would be in the then
crisis.

Senator Gray. — Did that committee report ?

Mr. McCandless. — The report was tliat there was no
information ; that he was entirely non-committal.

Senator Gray. — Who said that ?

Mr. McCandless. — Mr. Thurston, I believe.

Senator Gray. — But said he would protect life and
property ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — He did not say he was non-committal ?

Mr. McCandless. — Well, he was non-committal as to con-
tending forces, but would protect life and property.

Senator Gray. — Was anything said by them that conveyed
the, idea to you that Mr. Stevens was hostile or indifferent to
the movement of the Committee of Safety, or was without
sympathy for it ?

Mr. McCandless. — I think not.

Senator Gray. — Anything at all ?

Mr. McCandless. — I think we felt this way, that without
any encouragement from him we certainly had the sympathy
of the American minister.

Senator Gray. — That was the general feeling, was it not ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes.

Senator Frye. — A committee was sent to Minister Stevens
to request him not to land the troo])s then ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes ; we did not feel certain that night,
and thought we would get our strength better in a day or two.

Senator Gray. — That the landing of the troops might bring
on a crisis ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — If you were not as well prepared as you
tliought you would be later ?

Mr. McCandless. — No, sir.

• ••••••••••

Senator Gray. — Had Minister Stevens been advised of the
project for a Provisional Government and annexation to the
United States ?

Mr. McCandless. — I do not know.

Senator Gray. — Do you know whether it was understood
there that he knew what was going on ?

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 25

Mr. McCandless. — Well, everybody knew it.

Senator Gray. — Did you not understand that he knew it
— was not that your opinion ?

Mr. McCandless. — It would be my opinion that he would
know.

Senator Gkay. — Do you not know, and did you not know
then, that he did understand it ?

Mr. McCandless. — No ; I do not know it.

Senator Gray. — It was not talked about ?

Mr. McCandless. — Oh, it was discussed, certainly.

Senator Gray. — In what respect was it discussed ?

Mr. McCandless. — It was discussed in respect to what
would be the attitude of the American minister.

Senator Gray. — Was it thought his attitude would be sym-
pathetic or unsympathetic ?

Mr. McCandless. — There were doubts about that.

Senator Gray. — Were there any doubts that Mr. Stevens
sympathized with the movement ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — Did you doubt it ?

Mr. McCandless. — It was doubted that much that we re-
quested him, after we requested the troops to be landed, not
to have them landed, for fear it would precipitate a crisis.

Senator Gray. — Had you any doubt at that time in regard
to Mr. Stevens's sympathies with this movement ?

Mr. McCandless. — I do not think there was any serious
doubt in my mind about it, althougli I was one of the members
who took the side that we would stand a better show on Mon-
day afternoon not to have the troops landed.

Senator Gray. — When did you want them landed ?

Mr. McCandless. — Well, I thought they had better be let
alone. The idea prevailed that they had better be let alone,
and when the crisis came he would land them himself.

Senator Gray. — Then it was your idea it would be better
not to have them landed ? I see it stated here that the propo-
sition of the committee was that they should be landed the
next morning at 9 or 10 o'clock. When did you think they
should be landed ?

Mr. McCandless. — I do not think there was a time stated.
We thought it was better to let them stay there because the
crisis would be precipitated.

Senator Daniel. — What were you afraid of in that crisis ?

Mr. McCandless. — The Queen's forces.

Senator Daniel. — That they would suppress the revolu-
tion ?

Mr. McCandless. — Yes ; might attempt it.

26 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Senator Daniel. — Do you think they could do it ?

Mr. McCandless. — I do not think so.

Senator Daniel. — Did you then think so?

Mr. McCandless. — We did not think so Monday morning.

The idea prevailed that the troops had better be left
alone, and that when the crisis came he would land them
himself! What language could better express the confi-
dence which the committee felt in the friendly zeal of the
American minister ; or better show the real opinion of the
committee as to the probability of an uprising of the mob ?

The following is an abstract from a statement made for
the Congressional Committee by Mr. W. C. Wilder :^^

For ten days prior to noon of Saturday, January 14, the day
that the Queen attempted her revolutionary act, the United
States steamship " Boston," with Minister Stevens on board,
had not been in port. There had been no revolutionary meet-
ings or conferences ; such a thing had not been thought of.
There had not been any consultation with Minister Stevens
with regard to the matter, though of course lie must have seen
what a perilous condition the country was getting into. There
were several meetings at the office of W. 0. Smith that day,
after the attempted promulgation of the new constitution. 1
was not present at the first impromptu gathering ; at that
meeting I was named as one of the Committee of Safety. A
telephonic message was sent to me to meet the committee that
evening, and again we met at his office. The only business
done besides talking over matters was the appointment of the
committee to canvass and report what arms and ammunition
and how many men could be secured.

Another committee was appointed, of which I was a mem-
ber, to call upon Minister-resident John L. Stevens to discuss
the situation. We went at once and talked over the whole
matter, and we asked what his course would be should we take*
possession of the Government and declare a Provisional Gov-
ernment. Mr. Stevens replied that if we obtained possession
of the Government building and the archives, and established
a Government, and became, in fact, the Government, he should
of course recognize us. The matter of landing the troops from
the " Boston " was not mentioned at that meeting.

The United States troops came duly to hand at about

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 27

5 o'clock Monday afternoon. Lieut. Lucien Young, of the
" Boston," tells of the landing and the subsequent march.
After speaking of drills on shore, he says : ^^

We had one of the best battalions I have ever seen.

The Chaibman. — What is the strength ?

A, Three companies of blue jackets ; one of artillery and
one of marines, making one hundred and fifty-four all told,
and about ten officers.

Senator Butler. — How many marines ?

A, Thirty-two, I think.

The Chairman. — What time did you leave the ship ?

A, About 5 o'clock — I suppose about quarter of 5. We
were ordered to land at 4, and our battalion was gotten
together immediately after dinner, which was between 12
and 1. That was Monday, the 16th.

The Chairman. — I want to know if any troops left the
ship before the detachment which you commanded.

Mr. Young. — N"o ; we landed in a body.

The Chairman. — You went first ?

Mr. Young. — Yes.
. The Chairman. — That was 5 o'clock in the evening ?

Mr. Young. — Five o'clock in the eveuing. We got the
men armed and equipped for heavy marching order — knap-
sacks and double belts of cartridges holding from 60 to 80
rounds. And I had the caisson filled, taking in all about
14,000 rounds of calibre .45 for the rifle and Gatling, 1,200
rounds of calibre .38 for the revolvers, and 174 common ex-
plosive shells for the revolving cannon. Each one of these
belts carried from 60 to 80 rounds. About 3 o'clock Min-
ister Stevens came on board and was in consultation with
Captain Wiltse.

Q, Where was the company ordered to go ?

A. We had no definite point at all. We landed at Brewer's
wharf and marched up to the corner of Fort and Merchant
streets, where the Consul-general's office was, and there left a
marine company which was to protect the American Legation
and Consulate. The rest of the battalion turned and marched
down King street in front of the Palace, and as we passed the
Palace the Queen was standing on the balcony, when we gave
her the royal salute by drooping the colors and four ruffles on
the drums. We passed the Palace two hundred and fifty yards,
and there waited until we could find some place to go into
camp. We made an effort at first to get the old armory near
the landing, so as to be near our base of supplies and throw out

28 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

pickets in case of emergency. But we failed to get that, and
then tried to get the 0[)era House. They were the only two
buildings near the centre of the town, and not being able to
get them we went to the yard of a white man named Atherton,
and there we bivouacked under the trees in the rain until
9.30 P.M , when the aid to Captain Wiltse reported they had
secui'ed a little hall in the rear of the Opera House, known as
Arion Hall, which is used as a Mormon temple now, I believe.
We marched there and went into camp.

Thus the United States troops are settled for the night.

In the meantime, on Monday, a protest had been made
against the landing of the troops by the governor of Oahu,
the island on which Honolulu is situated, as follows: *•

Office Governor of Oahu,
Honolulu, Jan. 16, 1898.

Sir : It is my duty to solemnly protest to your Excellency against
the landing this evening, without permission from the proper author-
ities, of an armed force from the United States ship ** Boston." Your
Excellency well knows that when you have desired to land naval
forces of the United States for the purpose of drill, permission by
the local authorities has been readily accorded. On the present
occasion, however, the circumstances are different, and ostensibly
the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are dis-
tinctly responsible duties of the Hawaiian Government. Such being
the case, I am compelled to impress upon your Excellency the inter-
national questions involved in the matter and the grave responsibility
thereby assumed.

While solemnly protesting to your Excellency against this un-
warrantable proceeding to which I have refeiTed,

I have the honor to remain. Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient and humble sei'vant,

A. S. Cleghorn,

Governor of Oahu.
His Excellency John L. Stevens,

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, United Stoics of

America,

To which Mr. Stevens makes the following reply the
next day, Tuesday : *°

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 29

United States Legation,
Honolulu, Jan. 17, 1893.

Sir : Yours of yesterday, the 16th, regarding the landing of the
United States naval forces in Honolulu, is received. I have carefully
read its terms and import. My responsibility as the United States
minister plenipotentiary at this critical time in Hawaiian affairs it is
impossible for me to ignore. I assure you that in whatever respon-
sibility the American diplomatic and naval representatives have
assumed or may assume, we shall do our utmost to regard the welfare
of all present and interests concerned.

Yours sincerely, and with the kindest consideration,

John L. Stevens.
Hon. A. S. Cleghorn,

Governor of Oahu.

This landing of troops upon a foreign shore not only
without permission, but even against the protest of the
authorities, and in defiance of a Queen who was recognized
as such by these very troops themselves, was a deliberate
and flagrant act of war, unless justified by an actual
necessity for the protection of American life and property,
and carried out with perfect sincerity and good faith.
Perhaps nothing could show Mr. Stevens's utter contempt
for the Hawaiian Government more clearly than his neglect
to give Governor Cleghorn the slightest intimation as to
his purpose or motives in taking so extreme action upon
the governor's own soil.

Of course all parties concerned in this landing of the
troops have felt the necessity of dwelling upon and mag-
nifying in every way the need of protection to " life and
property," and it may be well in this connection to call
attention to a very significant fact. At the time now
spoken of there were in Hawaii representatives of Eng-
land, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Spain,
The Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Mexico, Chili, Peru,
and China. It might be fairly presumed that these gen-
tlemen would be solicitous for the protection of '' life and

30 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

property." Yet while Mr. Stevens is supposed to have
been in a state of the most nervous anxiety about danger
to life and property, there is nothing in the whole course
of the 2,200 pages of the committee's Keport, in all the
voluminous examinations and interviews, which shows, or
in any manner indicates, that any of these ministerial or
consular officers felt any anxiety, or were otherwise tlian
perfectly tranquil during the four days of the revolution.^
That the English minister was disposed to look at the whole
matter in a somewhat humorous light will appear here-
after.

It is seen that the troops marched through the streets of
Honolulu, passed the Pahice, and went to the United States
Legation and Consulate ; for the protection of both these
places, — where American citizens would be likely to seek
refuge in case of a riot or hostile demonstrations, — a com-
pany of marines, thirty-five in number, was thought suffi-
cient. The remainder of the forces then marched to the
land of one Atherton and finally to Arion Hall. Why
was this place chosen? Arion Hall is a building lying
in the rear of the Opera House, so-called, which is south
of the Palace grounds and about two hundred yards distant
from the Palace. It is west of the Government building,
and is separated from it only by a narrow street. The
question asked above is answered by Mr. Stevens : ^^

Senator Frye. — As a matter of fact, is Arion Hall, so far
as American property is concerned, — and I mean by that, of
course, residences as well as anything else, — a reasonably cen-
tral location ?

Mr. Stkvens. — A reasonably central location.

Senator Frye. — Do you know of any place large enough,
other than that, for quartering those troops in the city of
Honolulu ?

Mr. Stevens. — Not obtainable. I had thought of another
on my own street. If Arion Hall had not been gotten we

^ With the exception of H. F. Glade, German consul and Austro-Hungamn
consul, who took part in the mass meeting.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 31

would have tried another hall, which was nearer me, but the
owner was not there.

Senator Frye. — The only purpose you had was to place
the troops where they could be protected during the night ?

Mr. Stevens. — Yes ; and where they would be useful in
case of fire.

Lieut. De Witt Coff raan, commanding a company in the
battalion of troops landed, testifies as follows : 22

Senator Gray. — Was there, to your knowledge, any other
building suitable for the use of the troops of the " Boston '' than
the Opera House and Arion Hall ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — Where ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — On Nuuana avenue, a little more than
half-wg,y between the United States Consulate and the Ameri-
can minister's residence.

Senator Gray. — What sort of building was that ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — It was a large, three-story brand-new
hotel, and unoccupied.

Senator Gray. — Do you know who owned it ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — Mr. John Thomas Waterhouse, who was
present while our troops were standing in the street waiting
to find out where Mr. Atherton's was.

Senator Gray. — Do you know whether that building was
obtainable ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — I have no doubt in the world that it was
obtainable.

Senator Gray. — Is that simply an opinion ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — That is my opinion.

Senator Gray. — Did you hear Mr. Waterhouse say any-
thing about it ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — I heard Mr. Waterhouse say that he was
glad to see the .troops, and marched down in front of us after
we had halted. He said, " I am glad to see this," and passed
on in front of our troops, as much as to say he was glad to see
our troops.

Senator Gray. — He owned that hotel building ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — Is the situation of that building in a more
thickly built up part of the town ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — I cannot say more thickly built up; but
there are fine residences around there, and it is more accessible
to the business portion.

32 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Senator Gray. — Was it nearer to what you considered the
property of American citizens than Arion Hall ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — More so, or how ?

Mr. CoFFMAN. — It was nearer to the residence portion,
which was tlie part which would be attacked in any incendiary
work to go on.

Senator Gray. — Will you point on that map where it is ?

Mr. CoFFMAX. — On Nuuana avenue.

Senator Gray. — You say it is on Nuuana avenue, a little
more than half-way between the United States Consulate and
the United States Legation ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — Yes. (Indicating on diagram.) There is
Nuuana avenue ; that is the Legation ; it is about here — the
house is not down here.

Senator Gray. — It was a new and unoccupied building ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — It was a new and unoccupied building.

Senator Gray. — Large enough to have accommodated your
force ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — Did any one suggest the use of that build-
ing ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — Yes ; I did myself.

Senator Gray. — Where and wlien ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — When the troops were drawn up — I think
first when they were drawn up in the street, and certainly
afterward, when we were waiting for a place to go.

Senator Gray. — Whom did you suggest it to ?

Mr. CoFFMAx. — To the officers in general.

About the 27th of February, 181)3, Admiral Skerrett, of
the United States Navy, arrived at Honolulu in the United
States flagship "Mohican.'' lie looked over Arion Hall
and its position reUitive to the other buildings, and made
the following report : '^^

ADMIRAL SKEKKETT TO MR. BLOUNT.

U.S.S. *' Boston," Flagship of the rACiFic Station,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands. May 20, 1893.

Sir: I have examined with ii view of insj^cction the premises first
occupied by the force landed from the U.S.S. ** Boston," and known as
Arion Hall, situated on the west side of the Government building.
The position of this location is in the rear of a large brick building

i

6

)

c

0-:

OS

<33

Govtrnment
BuildiDg.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 33

known as Music Hall. The street it faces is comparatively a narrow
one, the building itself facing the Government building. In my
opinion it was unadvisable to locate, the troops there if they were
landed for the protection of the United States citizens, being dis-
tantly removed from the business portion of the town and generally
far away from the United States Legation and Consulate-general, as
well as being distant from the houses and residences of United
States citizens. It will be seen from the accompanying sketch that
had the Provisional Government troops been attacked from the east,
such attack would have placed them in the line of fire.

Had Music Hall been seized by the Queen's troops, they would
have been under their fire, had such been their desire. It is for
these reasons that I consider the position occupied as illy selected.
Naturally, if they were landed with a view to support the Provisional
Government troops th«i occupying the Government building, it was
a wise choice, as they could enfilade any troops attacking them from
the Palace grounds in front. There is nothing further for me to
state with reference to this matter, and as has been called by you to
my attention ; — all of which is submitted for your consideration.

Very respectfully,

J. S. Skerrett,

Rear-Admiral U,8, Navy, Commanding U.8, NavcU Force,

Pacific Station.
Col. J. H. Blount,

U.S. Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

The sketch accompanying this letter is. here reproduced.

Before taking up the events of the fourth day (Tuesday)
it may be well to go back to the mass meeting held on
Monday. The number of those present has been variously
given by those sympathizing with the revolution, but per-
haps a fair average of their estimate would be 1,200 to 1,300
persons.* Seven speeches were made, of which we have

1 Mr. Stevens says over 1,300 ; Mr. McCandless, 1,000 to 1,200; the ** Hawaiian
Gazette," a paper strongly in favor of Provisional Grovernment, says 1,260 by actual
count, while many others came later ; Francis B. Day, a sympathizer with the
revolutionists, 1,200 to 1,300.

In a statement made by Mr. Thurston for publication, at Washington, Nov. 21,

34 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

room only for the close of the first, that of Mr. Thui'ston,
and of the last, that of Mr. R. G. Greene.^

It is an old saying that a royal promise is made to be broken.

Fellow-citizens remember it. We have not sought this situ-
ation. Last Saturday the sun rose on a peaceful and smiling
city ; to-day it is otherwise. Whose fault is it — Queen Liliuo-
kalani's ? It is not her fault that the streets have not run red
with blood. She has printed a proclamation expressing her
repentance for what she has done, and at the same time —
perhaps sent out by the same carriers — her organ prints an
extra with her speech, with bitterer language than that quoted
in the " Advertiser." She wants us to sleep on a slumbering
volcano, which will some morning spew out blood and destroy
us all. The constitution gives us the right to assemble peace-
fully and express our grievances. We are here doing that to-day
without arms. The man who has not the spirit to rise after
the menace to our liberties, has no right to keep them. Has
the tropic sun cooled and thinned our blood, or have we flow-
ing in our veins the warm, rich blood which makes men love.
lil)erty and die for it ? I move the adoption of the resolution.
[Tumultuous applause !]

Mr. Greene said :

We all agree about the case. The question is the remedy.
John Greene, of Rhode Island, entered the War of the Revolu-
tion and served throughout. His son, my father, served through
the War of 1812, until that little matter was settled. In
1862 John Greene, my father, stood before a meeting like this,
and said he had four sons in the war, of whom I was the young-
est, and would serve himself if he was not too old. This ex-
perience has biased my judgment as to some matters of civil
government. It is too late to throw obstacles across the path
of its progress here. I have adopted this flag and am loyal to
it, but I am not willing to go one step back in the matter of

1893, setting forth the position and claims of the Hawaiian Government, and mak-
ing reply to charges contained in Mr. Blount*s report, appears the following : ** At
2 o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, the 16th, a mass meeting of 3,000 unarmed
men was held within a block of the Palace. The meeting was addressed by a
number of speakers, all denouncing the Queen." **

Seeing that all the right which Mr. Thui'ston and his friends had to give away
the Hawaiian Islands, with their 90,000 people, purpoited to be derived from the
action of this meeting, this slight exaggeration of the numbers present may be
looked upon with charity.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 35

civil liberty, and I will give the last drop of Ehode Island
blood in my veins to go forward and not back. [Cheers.]

Chairman Wilder read the latter part of the resolution.

It was passed by a unanimous standing vote, without a dis-
senting voice and amid tremendous cheers, after which the
meeting broke up.

After reading these remarks, thus received with tumult-
uous applause, the reader will hardly be prepared for the
outcome of the meeting, which was extremely mild, and
partaking somewhat of the nature of an anti-climax. The
final resolution is here given :

6. And whereas such committee has recommended the
calling of this mass meeting of citizens to protest against and
condemn such action, and has this day presented a report to
such meeting, denouncing the action of the Queen and her sup-
porters as being unlawful, unwarranted, in derogation of the
rights of the people, endangering the peace of the community,
and tending to excite riot, and cause the loss of life and de-
struction of property ;

Now, therefore, we, the citizens of Honolulu, of all nation-
alities, and regardless of political party affiliations, do hereby
condemn and denounce the action of the Queen and her sup-
porters ;

And we do hereby ratify the appointment and indorse the
action taken and report made by the said Committee of Safety ;
and we do hereby further empower such committee to further
consider the situation and further devise such ways and means
as may be necessary to secure the permanent maintenance of
law and order, and the protection of life, liberty, and property
in Hawaii.

Not a word here about dethroning the Queen or taking
possession of the Government building, nor of handing
over the islands to the United States, nor can such word
be found in any of the seven speeches. But whatever may
have been the character of this assemblage, whatever may
be thought of its action, and whatever were the rights and
powers which it assumed to grant, they are all contained in

36 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

that resolution ; and upon the strength of it the committee
proceeded that very Monday night, nearly twenty-four
hours before the surrender of the Queen, to charter the
steamer '' Claudine," wherein " Commissioners " embarked
on Friday, the 20th, for the United States, with a treaty of
annexation in their pockets.

Mr. Bolte, in the following extract from his statement
to Mr. Blount, gives us the reason for the excessive caution
of the managers of the mass meeting ; they did not know
whether their action would be indorsed ; a fact pretty
effectually disposing of the theory that there was a grand
uprising of the people, desperately bent on protecting
their rights and liberties from the assaults of tyranny; and
showing that this little band of revolutionists were never
sure of their ground, but felt their way gradually along,
always reaching out for aid from the United States and
the United States minister and the United States troops.
He also incidentally affords us some information about the
station-house.^ He says : ^

This committee met several times at various places, and de-
cided that the only perfect safeguard against future occurrences
of this kind would lie in annexation to the United States, or in a
protectorate, or in anything of that kind, but that we could not
go on with the form of government as it was then. They
decided to call a mass meeting of citizens on Monday afternoon
at 2 o'clock, and see what people there would say about it.
At this meeting were various speakers, some of the committee
of thirteen, and also others. The people were asked by the
speakers if they were satisfied with the promises the Queen
liad made, and let the matter drop, let everything go on as
it was before, or if they wanted a change and guarantees for

^ There is considerable discrepancy in the CTidcnee as to the number of men at
the station-house, but we may take the number as stated by the Commissioners,
Mr. Thurston and others, in their letter of Feb. 3, 1893, to Mr. Foster : " " On the
afternoon of the same day, the Queen then haying about four hundred men under
arms, and the people being in open preparation for dethroning her, with every
indication of a conflict, the United States troops landed, and a guard was stationed
at the American Consulate and Legation, and the remainder were quartered in
a public hall hired for that pui'pose."

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 37

the future. They desired guarantees for the future, and ap-
pointed the committee of thirteen — or rather continued the
committee — to take such farther steps as might be necessary.

Q. Let me ask you what you meant and what people meant
by saying they wanted guarantees?

A, I meant a change of government. What the people
meant I cannot say, but I am fully convinced that they meant
the same as it has been very often spoken of diuing the last
few years.

Q. What has been spoken of so often ?

A, Annexation to the United States has been advocated
publicly in the papers — I meant change of government.

Q. Why didn't you use language that conveyed distinctly
the idea — dethronement of the Queen, and annexation to the
United States ?

A, The Hawaiian Government, as it was then, was still in
existence, and in stating there publicly we wanted to de-
throne the Queen and have a government of our own, with an
intention of being annexed to the United States, might be
going a little too far.

Q. You mean making you liable to interference on the part
of the local authorities ?

A. Yes.

Q. And that you were trying to avoid at that time ?

A, Yes, especially for this reason. We did not know
whether the action of the committee would be indorsed by
this large majority of the people at the mass meeting. We
thought it would.

Q. Was there any expression in that meeting asking for
guarantees for the future in the shape of a vote ?

A, Yes ; the resolution was all prepared.

Q. It was a resolution indorsing the report of the Com-
mittee of Safety ?

A» Yes. The meeting dispersed, and the Committee of
Safety went back to W. 0. Smith's office to talk matters over.

Q. What time in the day was that ?

A, About half-past 3. After talking matters over, and
seeing that the Queen had concentrated her forces, — meaning
thereby that the soldiers were all in the barracks, — the Palace
barricaded with sand-bags, and the station-house barricaded —

Q. How about the Government house ?

A, I didn't notice anything going on there. The station-
house has always been considered the stronghold of the Gov-
ernment. It looked as if there might be trouble. So we came
to the conclusion to ask Mr. Stevens if he would protect the
life and property of the citizens by sending some soldiers

38 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

ashore, stating that we considered the situation very grave —
even dangerous. After a short while Mr. Stevens sent his an
swer that he would.

Q, Sent it to the meeting ?

A, Yes ; sent it to the meeting, and then at 5 o'clock the
soldiers came ashore. They were quartered at various places.
That same evening, Monday, January 16, the Committee of
Safety had another meeting.

Let us now take up the events of the fourth day, Tues-
day, the 17th. Mr. W. O. Smith has informed us that a
meeting of the Committee of Safety was held at 10 o'clock
in the forenoon, at which he says Mr. Dole signed his writ-
ten resignation as a judge of the Supreme Court, and for-
warded it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The meeting adjourned and met again at 1.30. After
some mention in regard to the choice of members, Mr.
Smith says : *®

The members of the Executive Council and Advisory Com-
mittee were then finally approved and acted upon.

The committee of thirteen then signed the proclamation,
and the Executive Council then signed the commission of J. H.
Soper as commander-in-chief of the forces, and three copies of
the proclamation were completed. The final signing of the
papers was completed about twenty minutes past 2, and after
a little delay the committee of thirteen, with the Executive
and Advisory Councils, started to proceed to the Government
building. They had hardly reached the corner of Merchant
street before a shot was heard, and it was reported that a po-
liceman had been shot at E. 0. Hall & Sons' store, and peo-
ple were seen running from the direction of the Government
building towards the spot, and there was considerable commo-
tion. The committee and councils proceeded to tlie Govern-
ment building and the proclamation was read. Previous to
starting, leaving my office, Mr. Dole requested Mr. A. S. Wil-
cox to go up to the Government building, and come back and
report whether there was any armed force at the Government
building. He went up and looked through, and went through
to Queen street, and came back and reported that he did not
see any armed men.

Mr. S. M. Damon is a man who played a very promi-

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 39

nent part at the close of the proceedings in question, hav-
ing been the one, as will be seen, who finally brought
about the surrender of the Queen. He was not a mem-
ber of the original Committee of Safety, but at the time
referred to was a member of the Provisional Government.
He is vouched for by Mr. Stevens as follows : *'

•

Senator Gray. — What sort of a person is Mr. Damon ?

Mr. Stevens. — He is a man of the highest respectability.

Senator Gray. — What is his business ?

Mr. Stevens. — He is a banker. Mr. Damon is the son of
an American missionary, who went there forty years ago, and
whom our Government recognized officially. He became a
clerk to Banker Bishop aad a great friend of the natives. He
is an excellent financial manager, and largely increased the
value of the property of two prominent natives. When the
natives get into any financial trouble Damon is the man they
go to to get them out. He is a man of the highest character.

Mr. Damon's testimony was given at great length and
is of great importance, and it is ventured to give it here
in full, with the exception of a portion towards the close,
where he answers some inquiries as to the form of govern-
ment desired by the natives, etc., not bearing upon the
question now under consideration.'^

Honolulu, April 29, 1893.

Mr. Blount. — How long have you lived here ?

Mr. Damon. — I was born here in 1845. I have been away
several times — perhaps to the extent of three or four years in
that time.

Q. Where were you on the 14th of January, 1893, at the
time the proclamation dethroning the Queen and establishing
the Provisional Government was read?

A, I was at Honolulu. I was one of the members of that
body who went up.

Q. The paper was read by Mr. Cooper ?

A. By Judge Cooper.

Q. How many of you were there in that body which went
up — about ?

A, The whole body. There would be four of the Executive
and fourteen of the Advisory

40 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

y. Please look at this paper and see if they are the persons.

A, Thurston was not present, and I do not think Wilhelm
was there.

Q. Where did you start from ?

A, From W. O. Smith's office on Fort street.

Q, And what street did you take going from there ?

A, We walked up directly to the Government house on
Merchant street. It was suggested that a part should go by
the way of Queen street, but a majority of us went by way of
Merchant street.

Q. What was the idea for dividing the committee ?

A So that it should not attract so much attention, and it
would be safer perhaps to have it divided than going in mass.

Q. Was it because it occurred to them that it might invite
attack if they went in mass ?

A, That was partly the idea — that it was more prudent.
I think we, most 6i us, walked together — not compactly, but
together.

Q. Any crowd following you ?

A, No ; the crowd was attracted to the corner of Fort and
King streets, owing to the shot that was fired by Mr. Good at
a policeman. In fact, the crowd cleared from the Government
house and was attracted there. From all directions they
centred at the corner of Hall's store.

Q. You found, then, scarcely any one at the Government
house when the committee arrived ?

A. Scarcely any one there except porters. After Mr.
Cooper began to read the proclamation, then different ones
came out of the offices — clerks and officials — while the
proclamation was being read.

Q. Some of the Provisional Government troops, or rather
troops raised at the direction of the Committee of Safety,
came on the ground before the reading of the proclamation
was finished?

A, When we arrived there was but one man with a rifle on
the premises — Mr. Oscar White ; but some little time later
they commenced to come in from the armory, troops that were
under the supervision of Colonel Soper.

Q. Was that before or during the reading of the proclama-
tion?

A, During the reading. Toward the end of it.

Q. How many troops came in ? Do you have any knowledge
of the number you have enlisted ?

A, There were enough came in to make us feel more de-
cidedly at ease than before they arrived.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 41

Q, You could not say how many there were ?

A, No ; they kept coming in right along. They got to be
quite a body.

Q. After the reading of the proclamation the late ministers
were sent for ?

A. After the reading of the proclamation we adjourned to
the office of the Minister of the Interior, and then we com-
menced to formulate our plans and get ourselves into working
order. Mr. Dole was at the head. While we were there in
consultation, Mr. Cornwell and Mr. Parker came up there from
the station-house and held a conference with us.

Q. What was the purport of that conference ?

A. The result of that conference was that Mr. Bolte and
myself were requested to return with Mr. Cernwell and Mr.
Parker to the station-house and recommend and urge upon
the parties in power at the police-station to surrender to the
Provisional Government. We had a conference with the
ministers in the room occupied generally by the Deputy
Marshal. There were present Messrs. Peterson, Colburn,
Parker, Cornwell, Bolte, and later Mr. Neumann, who was
asked to come in. After consultation of the matter of their
yielding up their power to the Provisional Government they
asked to be let alone for a few moments, and I went into one
of the rear cells in the corridor with Marshal Wilson and
urged him very strongly to give up any hope or any thought
of making any attack -^ or resistance, more properly.

Q. What reason did you give him ?

A. I cannot remember at the present moment giving him a
reason, but I remember distinctly saying to him: "Now, if
you will cooperate with us, if in future I can be of service to
you I will do so."

Q, Was there any suggestion of sympathy on the part of
the United States minister in your movement?

A. While I was in the station-house a man by the name of
Bowler said to me : " We are all prepared, but I will never
light against the American flag."

Q. Was there anything in the conversation between you
and him, in which any intimation direct or indirect that the
United States minister was in sympathy with you or the
United States troops and officers?

A. I cannot remember any definite thing, but from Mr.
Bowler's remark they must have thought that the United
States troops were here for some purpose.

Q. Was Mr. Bowler with the Queen's party ?

A, He was. He was part of the force in the station-
house.

42 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Q. Did you say anything at all indicating an opinion that
there was any sympathy on the part of Mr. Stevens or
Captain Wiltse with the movement for the new Govern-
ment?

A. I cannot remember. I may possibly have said so.

Q. Did you think so at that time ?

A. I may have had an impression, but I know nothing
about it.

Q. What was your impression ?

A, My impression was, seeing the troops landed here in this
time of excitement and turmoil, that — well, I suppose I might
say that they could not stand it any longer, the Americans
could not stand it any longer.

Q. Your impression, then, was that the American minister
and Captain Wiltse and the troops were in sympathy with the
movement of the white residents here in the pending con-
troversy between them and the Queen?

A, While we were in the Government building and during
the reading of the proclamation and while we were all ex-
tremely nervous as to our personal safety, I asked one of the
men with me there : " Will not the American troops support
us?" Finally I asked one of the men to go over and ask
Lieutenant Swinburne if he was not going to send some one
over to protect us. The man returned and said to me,
." Captain Wiltse's orders are, ^ I remain passive.' " That is all
I know of what passed between us.

Q. You speak of your impression. That relates to a par-
ticular conversation between two or three persons ; but what
was your impression as to the matter of whether or not the
American minister and the American naval officers were in
sympathy with the movement?

A, I was perfectly nonplussed by not receiving any support.
I could not imagine why we were there without being sup-
ported by American troops, prior to the troops coming from
the armory. We were not supported in any way.

Q. You had not been in council with the Committee of
Public Safety up to that time?

A, No.

Q. Well, the troops were — how far off from the reading of
the proclamation ?

A. They were over in that yard known as Gilson yard in
the rear of the Music Hall. They were quartered there.

Q. Any artillery ?

A, I think they had a small gun — Gatling gun and how-
itzer.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 43

Q. Where were they pointed — in what direction ?

A, I cannot tell you.

Q. You were surprised that they did not come into the
grounds while the proclamation was being read. Is that what
you mean by not supporting you ?

A, I had no definite information what the movement was,
as I told you before in a private interview, but knowing that
they were on shore I supposed that they would support us,
and when they did not support us, and we were there for
fifteen or twenty minutes, I was perfectly astonished that we
were in that position without any support.

Q. How far would you say, in yards, it was from where
the proclamation was being read to where the nearest troops
were ?

A. I think about seventy-five yards.

Q, Was there a piece of artillery in the street between the
building the troops were stationed in and the Government
building ?

A, The only piece of firearms of any kind in that street
was Oscar White's rifle. We met him as we came around the
corner.

Q. Did you have occasion to look there to see ?

A. We stopped before turning into the side gate to con-
verse with Oscar White, before proceeding into the Govern-
ment building.

Q, Are you sure there was not a piece of artillery in that
street before the reading of the proclamation ?

A, I cannot tell you ; but the only gun I could see was
Oscar White's. I remarked, " Oscar, this is not so very pru-
dent for you to be here with only one rifle in this street."

Q, Where did you see the troops first ?

A, I came up from Monolalua by a back street and
turned into Nuuana street, one house above Mr. Stevens's, and
as I turned the comer I saw the American troops marching
up towards Mr. Stevens's house, and directly in front of his
house.

Q. Did you meet Mr. Henry Waterhouse ?

A. I met him there at that time.

Q, What conversation passed between you ?

A. I think I said, " Henry, what does all this mean ? " If
I remember rightly now, he said, ^^ It is all up."

Q. And what did you understand by the expression, " It is
all up"?

A, I understand from that that the American troops had
taken possession of the island. That was my impression.

44 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Q. And was that favorable to the Queen or favorable to the
other side, as you understood it ?

A. That was distinctly favorable to the foreign element here.

Q. You mean the movement for a Provisional Grovern-
ment?

A, Yes.

Q, Did you see Mr. Stevens that day ?

A. No ; I did not see him that day.

Q. What is Mr. Waterhouse doing now ?

A, Henry ? He is a member of the Council.

Q. Was he a member of the Committee of Public Safety ?

^. If I remember right, he was.

Q, Is that his signature ? (Exhibiting letter of Committee
of Public Safety to Mr. Stevens.)

A. Yes, it is.

Q, Did he seem then pleased or alarmed ?

A, He was very much strained and excited. There was no
pleasure in it, but still there was a feeling of security. That
was it. He evinced a feeling of security. He was not smiling
or joking.

Q. It was not a joking time. Well, you say there was
nothing in the first visit of yours to the station-house to
indicate any impression on your part that you believed the
United States minister or the United States troops, or both,
were in sympathy with the movement of the Committee of
Safety ?

A, I was nonplussed. I did suppose they were going to
support us.

Q. You did not say anything to the people in the station-
house to lead them to suppose you were hopeful of aid?

A» I cannot remember saying it now ; I might have done so.

Q. Did you say it at any place ?

A. I do not remember ; I may have said it.

Q. Was there an effort on the part of those who were
moving for a change of government to make that impres-
sion?

A, I think there was.

Q. Was that impression among the whites generally ?

A, That I cannot say. I know there was that impression.
Some of the members tried to convey that impression.

Q, On what occasion ?

A, Many occasions. One particular occasion was while we
were in the Government building, the day the proclamation
was read.

Q, What was said, and who said it ?

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 45

A. Charles Carter said to me, " After you are in possession
of the Government building, the troops will support you." I
think that was his remark.

Q. Was he on the Committee of Public Safety ?

A. I think so.

Q. Was he in the party that went up to read the proclama-
tion?

A, He was present there during the time it was read.
Whether he went up with us or not I do not remember.

Q. It was during that time he made that remark ?

A, Yes.

Q. Was he an active promoter of the movement ?

A. I think he was.

Q, Has he any connection with the Government to-day ?

A. No, except he is one of the Commissioners in Wash-
ington.

Q. You have been in previous revolutions here ?

A. I have been in the Wilcox revolution. I took quite a
prominent part in its suppression. I was one of the ministers
at the time.

Q, You had a conversation with Mr. Carter about the time
the proclamation was being read ?

A. Yes.

Q. You were somewhat anxious as to whether or not you
would be supported by United States troops?

A. Yes.

Q, Did you express any fear in the presence of Mr.
Carter ?

A. Well, no man likes to tell he was afraid.

Q. I do not mean in a cowardly sense.

A, Well, with others, I was convinced that we were in a
position of danger.

Q. What did Mr. Carter say ?

A, He gave me to understand that we would be protected.

Q, By United States troops ?

A, Yes ; and when we were not protected by them I wanted
to know the reason why.

Q, Do you mean by that that you expected them to march

over?

A. I was under the impression that they would.

Q, What did you accomplish by that first visit to the sta-
tion-house — any agreement ?

A. We accomplished this — that it was a virtual giving up.

Q, What was said ? What did the ministers say ?

A. This is my impression of it to-day : That if they had

46 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

only to contend with the Provisional Government, and the
forces of the Provisional Government, that they would not
give up. That was the impression that I gathered from them
— that they felt themselves equal to the occasion so far as the
Provisional Government went.

Q. Then having that sort of feeling, what did they propose
to do ?

A. They proposed to immediately deliver up. Then they
went up, four of them, and had a parley with Mr. Dole
and the Provisional Government. They agreed to desist, but
said they must go to the Queen and get her to confer with
them.

Q. So far as they were concerned they were willing to
yield, provided the Queen was ?

A. Yes. Then I went along with them to the Palace. We
all met in the Blue Room. There were present the Queen,
two young princes, the four ministers, Judge Widdeman, Paul
Neumann, J. O. Carter, E. C. McFarland, and myself. We
went over between 4 and 5 and remained until 6 discussing the
situation.

Q. In that conversation you asked for a surrender of the
forces, and the ministers advised it ?

A, The different ones spoke and they all recommended it.
Each one spoke. At first Judge Widdeman was opposed to
it, but he finally changed his mind on the advice of Mr.
Neumann. Mr. Neumann advised yielding. Each one ad-
vised it.

Q. Was this advice of Neumann and the Cabinet based on
the idea that the Queen would have to contend with the
United States forces as well as the forces of the Provisional
Government ?

A, It was the Queen's idea that she could surrender pend-
ing a settlement at Washington, and it was on that condition
that she gave up. If I remember right, I spoke to her also. I
said she could surrender or abdicate under protest.

Q, And that the protest would be considered at a later
period at Washington?

A, At a later period.

Q, Did the Cabinet in recommending her to yield to the
Provisional Government give her to understand that they sup-
posed that the American minister and the United States troops
were in sympathy with the Provisional Government or with
the Committee of Public Safety?

A. I know it was the Queen's idea that Mr. Stevens was in
sympathy with this movement.

. THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 47

Q. But I am asking now as to what reasons the ministers
gave for her acquiescence.

A, It was their idea that it was useless to carry on — that
it would be provocative of bloodshed and trouble if she per-
sisted in this matter longer ; that it was wiser for her to abdi-
cate under protest and have a hearing at a later time ; that
the forces against her were too strong.

Q. Did they indicate the United States forces at all in any
way?

A, I do not remember their doing so.

Q. Do you know whether or not at that time they were
under the impression that the United States forces were in
sympathy with the revolution ?

A, Beyond an impression I know nothing definite.

Q. What was the result of this conference with the Queen ?
What was agreed on ?

A, She signed a document surrendering her rights to the
Provisional Government under protest.

Q. Is this the protest on page 22, Ex. Doc. No. 76, 52d
Cong., 2d Sess. ?

A. Yes. This was written out by Mr. Neumann and J. 0.
Carter while we were present. She was reluctant to agree to
this, but was advised that the whole subject would come up
for final consideration at Washington.

Q. Did you at the time consent to recommend this proposi-
tion or not ?

A. I was there as a member of the Provisional Government,
but I did not advise as to the wording of it. I did tell her
that she would have a perfect right to be heard at a later
period.

Q. By the United States Government ?

A. Yes.

Q. You yourself, at that time, before consulting with your
colleagues, were favorably impressed with that settlement ?

A, Well, it was the only settlement that could be brought
about. Personally I was satisfied with it.

Q, And you took that back to the Provisional Government ?

A. Yes.

Q. And they rejected it ?

A. It was received and indorsed by Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, was there any message sent to the Queen after
that?

A. No.

Q. No message declaring that they would not accept it ?

A. No.

48 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Q. The surrender was then made on that proposition ?

A, Yes ; w«ll, then she sent down word through Mr. Peter-
son to Mr. Wilson to deliver up the station-house. That
wound up the whole affair. We immediately took possession
of it. It was not delivered up until after this conference.

Q. Now, how long after that was it before the Provisional
Government was recognized ?

A, Mr. Stevens sent Cadet Pringle, his aid, and Captain
Wiltse sent one of his officers, to personally examine the build-
ing and report if the Provisional Government was in actual
possession of the Government building. That was done that
afternoon.

Q. What time?

A, Between 4 and 5.

Q, What time was the interview with the Queen ?

A, After 4, and ended at 6.

Q. You took reply ?

A. Mr. Neumann took the reply to Mr. Dole.

Q. Now, when this interview was going on between you,
the Cabinet ministers, and the Queen, it was known then that
the Government had been recognized ?

A. That the Queen knew it ? I do not think she was told.
I no not remember of it being spoken of.

Q. Didn't you know it ?

A, I think I knew it.

Q. Didn't these ministers know it then ?

A. They may have been present. I cannot say. The
Provisional Government were all present when Mr. Stevens
recognized it as the de facto Government.

Q. What I mean is this : Before you took the message of
the Queen back — this protest — the Provisional Government
had been recognized ?

A. Yes ; that is my impression.

Q. Had that been done at the time you left the Govern-
ment house to go with the Cabinet ministers to talk with the

Queen ?

A, If my memory serves me right, it had.

Q. Did not the Cabinet officers know of it at this time ?

A, I cannot say.

Q. What do you know about the contents of the constitu-
tion she wanted to proclaim ?

A. It is too long to write down. I can tell you my connec-
tion with it.

Q. Have you seen it ?

A, No.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 49

Q, What is the aspiration of the native mind as to the form
of government, etc., etc. ?

Tuesday, May 2, 1893.

Q. Mr. Damon, at the time of the writing of the protest of
the Queen on the 17th day of January, 1893, signed by her-
self and ministers, had the Provisional Government been
recognized by the American minister, Mr. Stevens ?

A, It is my impression that it had been, but I cannot say
positively.

Q. Would the conversation you had with the Queen on that
day aid you in determining that fact ?

A. I do not think it would.

Q, In referring to Mrs. Wilson living with the Queen, in a
previous part of this statement, did you mean to say that she
stayed with her at night ?

A. I mean to say that she was with the Queen a great deal
of the time — both day and night.

Q. As a companion ?

A. Yes ; as a personal friend and companion.

Q, But where do you suppose she slept — at the bungalow
or Palace ?

A, My impression is that her quarters were with heir-
husband in the bungalow.

I have carefully read through the foregoing and pronounoe-
it an accurate report of the two interviews between Mr. Bloun.1t
and myself.

S. M. Damon..

To supplement Mr. Damon's testimony, the Queen's
protest is here given i^^

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the Constitution
of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly protest against
any and all acts done against myself and the Constitutional Govern-
ment of the Hawaiian Kingdom by certain persons claiming to have
established a Provisional Government of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of America,
whose minister plenipotentiary, His Excellency John L. Stevens, has
caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu, and declared
that he would support the said Provisional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces, and perhaps the loss

50 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

•

of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said force, yield my
authority until such time as the Goyernment of the United States
shall, upon the facts being presented to it, undo the action of its
representative, and reinstate me in the authority which I claim as
the constitutional Sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.
Done at Honolulu, this 17th day of Januai*y, A.D. 1893.

LiUUOKALANI, R.

Samuel Parker,

Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Wm. H. Cornwell,

Minister of Finance.

Jno. F. Colburn,

Minister of the Interior,

A. P. Peterson,

Attorney 'General.
S. B. Dole, Esq., and others,

Composing the Provisional Oovernment of the Hawaiian Islands.

(Indorsed) Received by the hands of the late Cabinet this 17th
day of January, A.D. 1893. (Signed) Sanford B. Dole, chairman
of the Executive Council of Provisional Government.

Let us now go back for q. while and examine the all-
important question in regard to Mr. Stevens's recognition
of the Government. Perhaps nothing is more remarkable
in this whole transaction than the account given by Mr.
Stevens himself of his actions at the time of recognizing
the Provisional Government, under what was practically
a cross-examination by Senator Gray. By this recognition
the destinies of 90,000 inhabitants of the Sandwich Islands
were to be affected ; these were to be brought under a totally
different form of government, with possible annexation to
the United States, and with all that implied. Upon this
latter country was to be thrown the burden of many trou-
blesome and perplexing questions which must arise from
annexation and which cannot be ignored, and there would
be added to its population some 25,000 to 80,000 native
Hawaiians, and some 30,000 Chinese and Japanese ; in short,
an endless series of important and far-reaching consequences

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 51

rested upon the word which Mr. Stevens was about to
speak.

Mr. Stevens, as he says himself, was no novice in these
matters, and he must have known and did know that his
duty as a United States minister to a foreign and friendly
country demanded of him calm and deliberate judgment,
and the exercise of perfect good faith.

Now, when Mr. Stevens was forming a judgment as to
the existence of a de facto Government, what need was
there of excessive haste? If the Provisional Government
really existed and was in possession, the mere recognition
as such could not add to its validity. It was as much a
de facto Government without recognition as it was with
recognition. To test this, it may be asked whether that
Government was any less established before it was recog-
nized, for instance, .by the Portuguese consul the next
day, or was it anymore established after such recognition?

The recognition of the Provisional Government when
the revolution was only partly accomplished would, of
course, be of the greatest moral force to assist in bringing
it to a finish by the surrender of the Queen ; but if, at
any time during the day, the revolution was successfully
accomplished, then this Provisional Government was in
fact a Government; it stood upon its own rights before
the world, and it could have gone on exercising them if
Mr. Stevens had remained in Hilo, and had said neither
yea nor nay. If it was not really and truly a de facto
Government it ought not to have been recognized at all.

If Mr. Stevens was feeling unwell or was weary, why
could he not have waited till next day, and then calmly
and coolly, and with due deliberation, have examined the
position of affairs for himself ? The request for recognition
expressl}'^ says that the Provisional Government was in con-
trol of the city. The United States troops were stationed
part at the Consulate and part near the Government build*

52 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

ing; they were all ready and prepared " to protect life and
property " whenever either was assailed, and according to
Mr. Stevens that was the very purpose for which they were
brought on shore. What, then, was the need of hasty or
precipitate action ?

If we suppose Mr. Stevens to have been acting in this
matter in entire good faith, wishing simply to do equal
and exact justice to all, this question would be difiBcult to
answer. But if this recognition was to be used p,s a means
to force a reluctant Queen to surrender her troops and her
throne without a struggle, then the recognition was of the
greatest importance to the revolutionists, and we can per-
fectly undei-stand why they were in such desperate haste
to receive it. Whether this was the object for which
recognition was so hastily asked and granted, and whether
the purpose of such recognition was fulfilled, the reader
will judge from the evidence before him. The testimony
of Mr. Stevens most particularly bearing upon the recog-
nition is now given. ^

Senator Gray. — When you sent the note of recognition to
the Provisional Government, to whom did you send it ?

Mr. Stevens. — I have no doubt I sent it to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Dole, under their organization, was
President and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Of course, the
official usage is to send such notes to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. I have no doubt I sent it to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs. I presume I conformed to the custom.

The Chairman. — Had you previously heard of the procla-
mation of the Provisional Government ?

Mr. Stevens. — Yes.

Senator Gray. — Had you a copy of that proclamation ?

Mr. Stevens. — I cannot say.^

> The letter to Mr. Stevens asking recognition expressly refers to the procla-
mation, " a copy of which is hereby enclosed for your consideration."
The impoi*tant part of this proclamation was as follows :

" 1. The Hawaiian monarchical system of government is hereby abrogated.

** 2. A Provisional (iovcrnmcnt f^or the control and management of pablic
affaii*s and the protection of the public peace is hereby established, to exist until
terms of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and agreed
upon."

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 53

Senator Gray. — Had you read that proclamation ?

Mr. Stevens. -^ I cannot say that I had.

Senator Gray. — Could you say that you had not ?

Mr. Stevens. — I could not say that I hod not.

Senator Gray. — Was any proclamation sent to you ?

Mr. Stevens. — Things had to be done very rapidly that
afternoon. I had no clerk and I was a sick man, and it was
impossible for me to make notes. I have no doubt I received
the proclamation.

Senator Gray. — And you cannot say one way or the other
whether a copy of that proclamation was sent to you ?

Mr. Stevens. — I cannot ; I presume so. Mr. Pringle
brought me information, and so did Mr. Carter, and so did
others. I had it in various ways.

Senator Gray. — Were you aware when it was sent to you
that the terms of the Provisional Government were not settled
until there was annexation to the United States ?

Mr. Stevens. — I did not understand that.

Senator Gray. — Were you aware that the proclamation was
so made ?

Mr. Stevens. — I never heard of it.

Senator Gray. — Never heard of the proclamation ?

Mr. Stevens. — I did not know that that was the limit of
the Provisional Government until this controversy of Mr.
Thurston and Mr. Gresham.

Senator Gray. — When you were acting for the Government,
you did not understand the terms in which the Government
you were about to recognize had been proclaimed ?

Mr. Stevens. — The only fact that I took under considera-
tion was that it was a de facto Government, and if that de
facto Government had proposed to annex to Mormondom, 1
should have recognized it. I should have recognized it regard-
less of any ulterior purposes of that Government.

Senator Gray. — In this important condition of affairs in
Hawaii, you did not consider it necessary to examine the terms
on which that Government was established ?

Mr. Stevens. — All I wanted to know was that it was a
de facto Government, and that information I had.

Senator Gray. — Where did you get it, except from the
proclamation ?

Mr. Stevens — From parties who came from the Govern-
ment house and informed me, and I presume they sent a copy
of the proclamation.

Senator Gray. — Who were they ?

Mr. Stevens. — My impression is that Charles Carter was

54 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

one and Mr. Priiigle was another. Mr. Pringle was acting as
my aid. Others gave me the information. Which one brought
it first I could not swear. I think I first received the informa-
tion from my daughter.

Senator Gray. — What time in tlie afternoon did this fact
come to your knowledge, that the Provisional Government had
been proclaimed ?

Mr. Stevens. — l*robably — I cannot say positively ; I did
not look at the watch — half -past 2 or 3. It might have been
earlier or a little later.

Senator Gray. — By whom did you send your note of recog-
nition ?

Mr. Stevens. — That I cannot say positively.

Senator Gray. — Did you send it back by the messenger
from the Provisional Government?

Mr. Stevens. — I sent it by some one whom I considered a
reliable messenger.

Senator Gray. — And you cannot say who it was ?

Mr. Stevens. — No; I cannot say that. It may have been
Mr. ]*ringle, or it may have been one of the clerks in the
foreign office

Senator Gray. — How soon after you were notified of the
fjict that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed
that you sent your note of recognition ?

Mr. Stevens. — That I could not swear positively. I put it
on record. I think it was about 5 o'clock. Mrs. Stevens and
my daughter think that when this gentleman, meaning Hop-
kins, called with the note from the Queen's recent ministers it
was later. But not regarding that a vital point I put it down
in the records about 5. And the fact that the Chief Justice
called on me shortly and said that they had the rumor all
through the streets that the American minister had refused to
reco^'nize the Provisional Government. He came to see if it
were so, and it was about dusk when Judge Judd called,
when I said to him I had just recognized. But I put it down
as my opinion that it was about 5.

Senator Gray. — You do not claim to be accurate about
that ?

Mr. Stevens. — No ; the official records will show that.
Senator Gray. — Have you the official record ?
Mr. Stevens. — I think that is in Honolulu. I do not know
that Mr. Blount has put that on paper. My wife and daughter
afterward said they thought it was later.

Senator Gray. — After the messenger who first came from
the ]^ro visional Government to notify you that the Provisional

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 55

Government had been proclaimed, what other intelligence did
you receive of its proclamation ?

Mr. Stevens. — Now, I have to answer that in the way I
have already answered, that I considered that there was an
absolute interregnum between the afternoon of the 14th and
the establishment of the Provisional Government, and my
relief from the situation was that there was a de facto Govern-
ment. The moment I got information that a de facto Govern-
ment was established and was master of the situation, master
of the archives, I thought it was my duty to recognize it, and
all the other foreign officials immediately did the same. And
the English minister called on the Provisional Government in
person before I did.

Senator Gray. — Recognized it before you did ?

Mr. Stevens. — The English minister in person went before
I did and offered his congratulations.

Senator Gray, — Did you before that get your note ?

Mr. Stevens. — I cannot say. All those members of the
official corps knew the circumstances under which the Provi-
sional Government had been constituted as well as I did.

Senator Gray. — I understood you to say, in answer to that
question as to whether you h^d any information of the procla-
mation of the Provisional Government than the messenger
conveyed to you, although not directly responsive, that it was
not necessary, because it was thoroughly understood for the
last two or three days there was an interregnum, and that any
Government or any proclamation of any set of people would
constitute a de facto Government.

Mr. Stevens. — I did not say that. Let me answer it.

Senator Gray. — What did you say when I asked you in
regard to the fact, that it was notorious that there was an
interregnum and it was not necessary to have the information ?

Mr. Stevens. — I do not ])ut it in that form. I say that
the collapse of all government on the islands took place on the
attempted covp d^etat of the Queen on the 14th, and from that
time up to the time the Provisional Government took posses-
sion of the Government buildings the only Government was
the 1,000 citizens who called the mass meeting, and the
presence of ship " Boston " in the harbor. I had got informa-
tion that I deemed reliable that a Government springing out
of that condition of things had become a de facto Government,
and by the invariable usage of the world I was bound to recog-
nize it.

Senator Gray. — Then, I suppose, you give that answer as
accounting for the fact that you did not need any other infor-

56 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

mation than the first reliable information which you received,
that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed ?

Mr. Stevens. — I had the most thorough information on
that.

Senator Gray. — I ask you what that was ?

Mr. Stevens. — I said before, probably by a note. But by
various means I got that information perhaps twenty times
within an hour.

Senator Gray. — From whom?

Mr. Stevens. — The parties who called.

Senator Gray. — Who were the parties ?

Mr. Stevens. — I will give you one instance. Chief Justice
Judd is one of the representative men of the islands. He
came, I may say, at 5 or a little later, and he said the rumor
had got on the street that I had not recognized the Provisional
Government. I am sure during those hours there were many
persons who called and talked of what had been done.

Senator Gray. — Who were the many persons ?

Mr. Stevens. — I could not be positive.

Senator Gray. — Who was one ?

Mr. Stevens. — I presume that Mr. Dole sent his clerk of
the foreign office, and in addition to that Mr. Cooper, Carter,
and Pringle, and I presume there were many other persons
who told me.

Senator Gray. — Were they sympathizers with the Provi-
sional Government who told you ?

Mr. Stevens. — They were men who would give me absolute
information.

Senator Gray. — I ask if that was a fact ?

Mr. Stevens. — That was a fact.

Senator Gray. — You were not out of your house ?

Mr. Stevens. — Not out of my house.

Senator Gray. — And on this information that the Provi-
sional Government had been proclaimed you sent the note ?

Mr. Stevens. — So soon as I had evidence of the fact.

Senator Gray. — What. fact ?

Mr. Stevens. — The fact that out of that interregnum had
sprung a de facto Government.

Senator Gray. — The fact of its being a de facto Govern-
ment is a conclusion?

Mr. Stevens. — Of which I had to be the judge.

Senator Gray. — Did you judge that that was the de fa^to
Government upon the information that came to you that a
Provisional Government had been proclaimed ?

Mr, Stevens. — Only in part. I judged it from the condi-

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 57

tion of the town and all the cipcumstances. I knew that the
Provisional Government had been talked of for sixty honrs,
and I had it from many persons. I was living on the prin-
cipal street, and they would hear it on the street and tell
my daughter about it, and would come by in a carriage and
tell me.

Senator Gbay. — Had you any knowledge of any other fact
in regard to the transactions of that afternoon that bore upon
the question at all, except the fact that the Provisional Gov-
ernment had been proclaimed?

Mr. Stevens. — I knew the fact an hour and a half before.
You will see how importantly this fact bears on the situation,
the efforts of the Provisional Government to transfer the arms
from the store, and the abortive attempt of one of Mr.
Wilson's policemen to interfere, and that was all the resistance
for sixty hours —

Senator Gray. — Who told you that ?

Mr. Stevens. — I learned it probably from twenty different
sources. I heard the shot.

Senator Gray. — Tell me the name of some one who told
you.

Mr. Stevens. — I guess my own daughter told me first.

Senator Gray. — Who told you afterward ?

Mr. Stevens. — That I could not tell, because events pass-
ing so rapidly like that, and a hundred men calling on me,
it would be impossible to remember who the individual was.
But there were many.

Senator Gray. — Why did you not wait until the next day
before you sent the note of recognition ?

Mr. Stevens. — For the reason that a half-century of the
study of government on both continents and thirteen years of
diplomatic experience would have told me it was right.

Senator Gray. — That was the result of your study ?

Mr. Stevens. — My study and experience would have told
me so.

Senator Gray. — And your study and experience told you
that it was right to recognize that 'Government within an hour
or an hour and a half ?

Mr. Stevens. — I do not accept it in that form.

Senator Gray. — I ask you as a matter of fact whether you
did recognize it within an hour or an hour and a half ?

Mr. Stevens. — I do not think that material ; probably
within an hour and a half or two hours.

Senator Gray. — Whether it is material or not, answer the
question.

58 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Mr. Stevens. — I do not know the precise time by the
clock.

Senator Gray. — That is sufficient; you do not know the
time ; you cannot say whether it was an hour or an hour and a
half ?

Mr. Stevens. — It was probably inside of two hours.

Senator Gray. — Were you well acquainted with Mr.
Thurston ?

Mr. Stevens. — Pretty well acquainted with him, because
he was a minister of the Government when I went to Hono-
lulu.

Senator Gray. — Are you well acquainted with W. 0.
Smith ?

Mr. Stevens. — Passably well. He lived near me, within
half a mile. I never had much acquaintance with him ; met
him occasionally, and as Americans we went to the same church.
In tlie course of a year he and his wife called at our house two
or tliree times.

Senator Gray. — Did any of these gentlemen, Mr. Thurston,
Mr. Smith, — any of them connected with the Committee of
Public Safety, — call upon you pn Sunday?

Mr. Stevens. — I have already stated that Mr. Thurston
called a few minutes at my house Sunday. I would not know
when a gentleman called on me whether he was on the Com-
mittee of Safety or not, because I would not know until I saw
the list. On Sunday they had not been appointed.

Senator Gray. — I say, not whom you knew were on the
Committee of Safety, but whether any of these gentlemen
whom you knew afterward were on the Committee of Safety ?
Mr. Stevens. — I have said that I think tliat Mr. Thurston
called ; stopped in five minutes, as he passed down, and I think
Judge Hartwell called also. Others called, of both parties,
during Sunday ?

Senator Gray. — Did Mr. Damon call?

Mr. Stevens. — I do not recollect Mr. Damon calling.

Senator Gray. — Did Mr. Damon and Mr. Thurston call on
Monday ?

Mr. Stevens. — I have no reliable recollection in that
regard. My acquaintance with Mr. Thurston grew out of the
fact that he was Minister of the Interior for the first thirteen
months of my residence in Honolulu. I knew him officially
and privately, for he lived in the part of the city in which
the Legation is situated.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 59

Here we find that this gentleman, a United States min-
ister, a trained diplomatist, is unable to give a connected
and intelligible account of what took place on the occasion
in question. He does not know to whom he sent the note
of recognition. Reasoning upon the matter, he has no
doubt that he sent it to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
forgetful, apparently, of the fact that the note requesting
his signature was signed by Mr. Dole and fourteen others,
•' members of the Executive and Advisory Councils of the
Provisional Government," and did not contain the slightest
hint that Mr. Dole was Minister of Foreign Affairs, or that
there had been any minister appointed for foreign affairs,
or for anything whatever.

He cannot say whether he had a copy of the proclama-
tion. He cannot say whether the proclamation was sent
to him, though he presumes it was. He cannot say
whether he had or had not read it. He did not know
what was the limit of the Provisional Government (in
reference to annexation). He is unable to tell who gave
him the information that a de facto Government had been
established, although he has an " impression " upon the
subject. He cannot tell how the fact that the Provisional
Government had been proclaimed came to his knowledge.
He cannot say by whom he sent his note of recognition.
He cannot tell positively how long it was after he was
notified by the Provisional Government that he sent his
note. He says that the English minister called * on the
Provisional Government before he did, but does not know
whether or not that occurred before he got the note
requesting recognition.

Though he says that he had the most thorough informa-
tion that the Provisional Government had been proclaimed,

^ He does not saj recognized ; that would have been going too far. In point of
£tfct, all the notes of the foreign officials are dated the 18th, the day after, except
the English minister's, which was dated the 19th.

60 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

he does not tell how he got the information, but " proba-
bly " by note ; he is not certain. He also got it from many
other persons.

Being asked who these persons were, he names one,
Chief Justice Judd. But Judge Judd, who was in
sympathy with the revolutionists, simply tells him that
the rumor had got on the street that he (Stevens) had not
recognized the Provisional Government. Being asked
again who were the persons informing him-, he cannot be
positive ; being asked to name one, he " presumes " that
Mr. Dole sent " his clerk of the foreign office ; " in addition
to that, he names Cooper, Carter, and Pringle, his clerk.

Mr. Cooper was chairman of the meeting that chose the
Committee of Safety, and was himself on the committee.
Charles Carter was one of the commissioners afterwards
sent to the United States to negotiate the treaty, and it
will be remembered that he was mentioned by Mr. Damon
as saying to him, "After you are in possession of the Gov-
ernment building, the troops will support you." Being
asked whether the persons who told him were sympa-
thizers with the Provisional Government, he does not
answer plainly yes or no, but contents himself with making
an evasive reply. Finally he says that he did not leave
the house, so that he did not and could not see for himself
what had happened.

The situation, then, on Tuesday, January 17, was this :
The Queen herself was at the Palace with a small body of
troops; at a short distance south of the Palace was the
Government building entirely undefended ; directly oppo-
site the Government building, and almost adjoining it, lay
the United States troops, fully equipped with Gatling gun,
arms, and ammunition. At the station-house were the
troops of the Queen.^

^The Queen appears to have had some troops at the *' barracks/' a short dis-
tance from the station-house.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 61

• The Committee of Safety, having held their mass meet-
ing, were preparing to make the move which was to result
in the dethronement of the Queen, and in making them
the de facto Government.

Now, it will be remembered that when Mr. Stevens in
his letter to Mr. Blaine of March 8, 1892, already, cited,
wrote up the history of a revolution, as it were, in advance,
and asked instructions in case it should take place, he said
that there were strong reasons to presume that it would
begin with the seizure of the police-station with its arms
and ammunitions, which being effected, the royal Palace
and the Government building, containing the Cabinet
offices and archives, would very soon be captured; a very
sensible and judicious suggestion, as it would seem, in
case parties were really arrayed against each other, and it
was intended to fight the matter out. Until the station-
house was captured, the taking of the Palace and Govern-
ment building would be but a barren victory.

But now times were changed. The actore in this drama
did not wish nor intend to fight, and it is curious to observe
how Mr., Stevens's views have now changed, and the taking
of the station-house becomes entirely unnecessary for the
success of a de facto Government. Consequently the state-
ment made by Mr. Stevens to Mr. Thurston, according to
Mr. W. O. Smith, as we have seen, was this : That whatever
Government was established and was actually in possession
of the Government building, the executive department
and archives, and in possession of the city, that Gov-
ernment would have to be recognized.

Here, then, was a fair understanding all round, and
knowing exactly what they must do to receive recognition,
the committee were content to let the station-house alone
till after recognition ; and in accordance with the pro-
gramme laid down, and Mr. Wilcox having been sent to
see if "there was any armed force at the Government

62 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

building," and it appearing that the coast is clear, they take
up their line of march for the Government building, going
part one way and part another ; this being done as a matter
of safety and so as not to attract so much attention. When
there, they found, according to Mr. Damon, "scarcely any
one except porters ; " but there was also a head clerk of a
department and a man with a rifle. Some of the clerks and
officials also came out of the ofiBces, and this being the au-
dience, the chairman of the committee, Mr. Cooper, began
to read, the proclamation. It was a somewhat long docu-
ment, and before it was finished some troops came in
from the armory and kept coming until they became,
as Mr. Damon puts it, quite a body.^ A message having
come from the station-house, Mr. Damon and Mr. Bolte
go down there to have a talk with the Marshal. In
the meantime all parties " were extremely nervous as to
their personal safety," and of course application was at
once made to the commander of the United States troops,
who were close by for the purpose, as Mr. Damon supposes,
of protecting them. Captain Wiltse appears to have thought
that under the circumstances there was no occasion to be
'' nervous," and sends word that he will remain " passive,"
very much to Mr. Damon's surprise, who was " nonplussed "
by such conduct. He could not imagine why they were
not supported by the American troops previous to their
own troops coming from the armory.

The Government building, with its ofiices, archives, and
its treasury, being now captured and the proclamation
read, the revolutionists had done their part, and it re-
mained for Mr. Stevens to do his. Accordingly notice
of what had been done was at once sent him, and an

1 J. U. Soper, an American citizen in command of the forces of the revolu-
tionists, thinks that an hour after the reading of the proclamation there were about
one hundred and fifty men.

It is claimed by some of the witnesses that this number was afterwai*ds largely
increased.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 63

immediate reply was received. The correspondence is
now given : ^

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, Jan. 17, i893.

Sir : The undersigned, members of the Executive and Advisory
Councils of the Provisional Government this day established in Hawaii,
hereby state to you that for the reasons set forth in the proclamation
this day issued, a copy of which is herewith enclosed for your consid-
eration, the Hawaiian monarchy has been abrogated and a Provisional
Government established in accordance with the said above-mentioned
proclamation.

Such Provisional Government has been proclaimed, is now in pos-
session of the Government departmental buildings, the archives and
the treasury, and is in control of the city. We hereby request that
you will, on behalf of the United States of America, recognize it as
the existing de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands, and afiford
to it the moral support of your Government, and, if necessary, the
support of American troops to assist in preserving the public peace.

We have the honor to remain your obedient servants,

Sanford B. Dole.
J. A. King.
P. C. Jones.
William O. Smith.
S. M. Dawson.
John Emmeluth.
F. W. McChesney.
W. C. Wilder.
J. A. McCandless.
Andrew Brown.
Jas. F. Morgan.
Henry Waterhouse.

E. D. Tenney.

F. J. Wilhelm.
W. G. Ashley.

C. BOLTE.

His Excellency John L. Stevens,
United States Minister Resident,

To which Mr. Stevens made this reply : ^

64 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

United States Legation,
Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, Jan. 17, 1893.

A Provisional Government having been duly constituted in place
of the recent Government of Queen Lilioukalani, and said Provisional
Government being in full possession of the Government buildings,
the archives and the treasury, and in control of the capital of the
Hawaiian Islands, I hereby recognize said Provisional Government
as the de facto Government of the Hawaiian Islands.

John L. Stevens,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary of the United States.

Mr. Dole then writes to Mr. Stevens as follows : ^

Government Building,

Honolulu, Jan. 17, 1893.

His Excellency John L. Stevens, United States Minister Resident :

Sir : I acknowledge the receipt of your valued communication of
this day, recognizing the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and
express deep appreciation of the same.

We have conferred with the ministers of the late Government,
and have made demand upon the Marshal to surrender the station-
house. We are not actually yet in possession of the station-house,
but as night is approaching and our forces may be insufficient to
maintain order, we request the immediate support of the United
States forces, and would request that the commander of the United
States forces take command of our military forces so that they may
act together for the protection of the city.

Respectfully, etc.,

Sanford B. Dole,

Chairman Executive Council.

(Note of Mr. Stevens at the end of the above communication:
•*The above request not complied 'with. — Stevens.")

While matters were in progress, and in the excitement
of this sudden movement for the overthrow of the Queen,
Mr. Stevens's formula of possession of Government build-
ing, archives, etc., seemed to be fully sufficient, and it does
not appear to have occurred to the parties that such pos-

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 65

session might not fully warrant the recognition ; but after-
wards, when the matter came to be examined in cooler
moments, the absurdity of the recognition, while the
station-house was still in the hands of the Queen's troops,
began to be perceived. Consequently the attempt was
made to have it appear that the recognition took place
after the surrender. Thus in their letter to Secretary
Foster, dated at Washington, Feb. 11, 1893, the Commis-
sioners, replying to the Queen's protest, say : ^

Sixth. At the time the Provisional Grovernment took pos-
session of the Government buildings, no American troops or
officers were present or took part in such proceedings in any
manner whatever. No public recognition was accorded the
Provisional Government by the American minister until they
were in possession of the Government buildings, the archives
and the treasury, supported by several hundred armed men,
and after the abdication by the Queen and the surrender to the
Provisional Government of her forces.

Secretary Foster, in his report of February 15 to Presi-
dent Harrison, in the course of his narrative of the events
in question, and apparently following these statements,
writes as follows:^

At the time the Provisional Government took possession of
the Government buildings, no troops or officers of the United
States were present or took any part whatever in the pro-
ceedings. No pubhc recognition was accorded to the Provi-
sional Government by the United States minister until after
the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective pos-
session of the Government buildings, the archives, the treas-
ury, the barracks, the police-station, and all the potential
machinery of the Government.

And he adds :

The Provisional Government of the Hawaiian Islands is, by
all usual and proper tests, in the sole and supreme possession
of power, and in control of all the resources of the Hawaiian
nation, not only through the Queen's formal submission, but
through its possession of all the armed forces, anus and am-

66 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

munitions, public offices and administration of law, unopposed
by any adherents of the late Government.

These two last extracts are interesting, not only as
showing the apparent readiness of the Administration to
take the Commissioners' statements on trust without
further examination, but they show what Mr. Foster re-
garded as the usual and proper tests of a de facto Govern-
ment ; namely, " the effective possession of the Government
buildings, the archives, the treasury, barracks, the police-
station, and all the potential machinery of the Govern-
ment." And again, the "possession of all the armed
forces, arms and ammunition, public offices and adminis-
tration of law, unopposed by any adherents of the late
Government."

However desirable it might have been to push the treaty
with the utmost haste, if Mr. Foster had thought it worth
while to read the correspondence which has just been
given, and could have found time so to do, he never would
have written and sent to the President, as a basis for
action, the first of the sentences above quoted.

Much testimony has been given by various parties as to
the precise time when the station-house was surrendered.

In the course of the afternoon the following note was
addressed to Mr. Stevens : '®

Department op Foreign AppAms,

Honolulu, Jan. 17, 1893.

His Excellency John L. Stevens, Envoy Extraordinary and Minis-
ter Plenipotentiary ^ etc, :

Sir : Her Hawaiian Majesty's Government, having been informed
that certain persons to them unknown have issued proclamation de-
claring a Provisional Government to exist in opposition to her Maj-
esty's Government, and having pretended to depose the Queen, her
Cabinet and Marshal, and that certain treasonable persons at present
occupy the Government building in Honolulu with an armed force.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 67

and pretending that your Excellency, on behalf of the United States
of America, has recognized such Provisional Government, her Maj-
esty's Cabinet asks respectfully. Has your Excellency recognized said
Provisional Government? and if not, her Majesty's Government,
under the above existing .circumstances, respectfully requests the
assistance of your Government in preserving the peace of the
country.

We have the honor to be your Excellency's obedient servants,

Samuel Parker,

Minister Foreign Affairs,
Wm. H. Cornwell,

Minister of Finance,
John F. Colburn,

Minister of the Interior,
A. P. Peterson,

Attorney- Oe7ieral,

In regard to which the following memorandum is here
cited : '•

EXTRACt FROM RECORDS OP THE UNITED STATES LEGATION.

Correspondence with Hawaiian Oovernment,

United States Legation,

Honolulu, Jan. 17, 1893.

About 4 to 5 P.M. of this date — am not certain of the precise time

— the note on file from the four ministers of the deposed Queen, in-
quiring if I had recognized the Provisional Government, came to my
hands while I was lying sick on the couch. Not far from 5 P.M. —
I did not think to look at the watch — I addressed a short note to
Hon. Samuel Parker, Hon. Wm. H. Cornwell, Hon. John F. Col-
burn, and Hon. A. P. Peterson — no longer regarding them ministers

— informing them that I had recognized the Provisional Govern-
ment.

John L. Stevens,

United States Minister,

It will be seen, then, that before writing their letter to
Mr. Stevens, the Queen's ministers had heard of the recog-
nition, and that about 4 to 5 o'clock (if Mr. Stevens is

•

(58 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

correct) he informed them that the recognition had already-
taken place.

Mr. Bolte, after speaking of a conversation with one
McFarlane, says, in answer to the question " Was this con-
versation at the barracks, or Government house ? " *°

A, At the station-house. The four ministers, Sam Damon,
and I took two hacks and went t6'*the Government house. All
said about the same thing, that they would have to give up,
but they wanted to enter a protest. Then Sam Damon went
with the ministers to the Queen. He rei)orted after he came
back that the Queen liad said in substance the same thing.

Q. Wliat time was it when they came back ?

A, Fully 6 o'clock.

Q. About quarter of an hour before sunset ?

A, Yes. Very soon after Billy Cornwell came over bring-
ing the protest that you know of. Mr. Dole acknowledged the
receipt of the protest on the back of it, stating the hour, and
he then said the Queen would send orders to the station-house
that her people should vacate the premises. Very soon after
that, Captain Zeigler, with a number of our men, went to the
station-house and took possession, and the others went away,
leaving their arms.

Q. Who was in command of the station-house ?

A. Charles B. Wilson, Marshal.

A statement by Lieutenant Draper, of the " Boston," is
now given : ^^

May 5, 1893. Herbert L. Draper, Lieutenant Marino Corps at-
tached to ** Boston" :

I was at the United States Consulate-general at the time the Pro-
visional Government troops went to the station-house, and it was
turned over to them by Marshal Wilson. It was about half-past 7
o'clock. The station-house is near the Consulate-general on the same
street. As soon as it happened I telephoned to the ship. I wanted
my con^nanding officer to know, as I regarded it as an especially
important thing.

1 was the commanding officer at the Consulate-general. There was

no other United States officer there at the time excepting myself.

The above is a correct statement.

Herbert L. Draper,

First Lieutenant^ U.S. Marine Corps.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 69

To which may be appended the following extract from
a letter of Lieutenant Swinburne to Mr. Blount: ^

About half-past 7 P.M. Twas informed by telephone by Lieu-
tenant Draper, who was then in charge of a squad of marines*
at the United States Consulate, that the citizen troops had taken
possession of the police-station and that everything was quiet.

The question of the exact time of the recognition
has no special importance, except as bearing upon the
question whether it was granted before the surrender of
the station-house, and this point is made absolutely clear
by Mr. Dole himself, because in the same letter in which
he acknowledges the recognition (of which he expresses
deep appreciation), he also states that he was not in actual
possession of the station-house, though a demand had
been made for its surrender. This, if anything can be, is
conclusive, though if further evidence were wanted it
might be found in the fact that neither in Mr. Dole's letter
asking recognition, nor in Mr. Stevens's according it, is the
station-house mentioned, though the Government build-
ings, archives, etc., are duly enumerated, nor in the letter
written by Mr. Stevens to Secretary Foster and dated the
next day, Thursday the 18th, from which the following is
an extract: ^^

The Committee of Public Safety forthwith took possession
of the Government buildings, archives and treasury, and in-
stalled the Provisional Government at the heads of the respec-
tive departments. This being an accomplished fact, I promptly
recognized the Provisional Government as the de facto Govern-
ment of the Hawaiian Islands. %

Let us look again at this last letter of Mr. Dole's and
the circumstances under which it was written. The com-
mittee had come up to the Government building, and find-
ing it deserted proceeded to capture it. Recognition is at
once demanded and at once accorded. But time flies ;
night is approaching. Mr. Damon is at the Palace trying

70 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

to overcome the resistance of the Queen. He may not
succeed. The Queen's troops at the station-house still
stand to their arms.

Suppose they should attack in the night? This might
mean bloodshed, and although Mr. Thurston at the mass
meeting was ready to shed his blood and if need be even
to die for liberty, yet he is sick and far away, and nobody
else seems to have the least idea of dying. In case of
attack, what if at that the supreme moment Captain Wiltse
should fail them ! What if there should have been any
misunderstanding between him and Mr. Stevens, as to what
was expected of the United States troops ! It is now that
Mr. Dole throws off all disguise, and again turns with a
cry for help to his never-failing friend, and asks for the
immediate support of the United States troops, and that
Captain Wiltse may take command of their forces in con-
junction with his own! With this formidable combination
all will be safe.

This moving appeal seems to have been a little too much
even for Mr. Stevens, who, however, will do what he can,
and replies with his usual promptness and with his inevi-
table reference to " protection of life and property " : **

United States Legation,

Honolulu, Jan. 17, 1893.

Think Captain Wiltse will endeavor to maintain order and protect
life and property, but do not think he would take command of the
men of Provisional Government.

Will have him come to help the Legation soon as possible, and take
his opinion and inform you as soon as possible.

Yours truly,

John L. Stevens.

Mr. Dole's fears were not realized. The Queen surren-
dered, sending to the Provisional Government the follow-
ing paper signed by herself and her ministers, which was

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 71

received by Mr. .Dole, as appears by his indorsement
thereon :

I, Liliuokalani, by the grace of God and under the consti-
tution of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Queen, do hereby solemnly
protest against any and all acts done against myself and the
constitutional Government of the Hawaiian Kingdom by cer-
tain persons claiming to have established a Provisional Govern-
ment of and for this Kingdom.

That I yield to the superior force of the United States of
America, whose minister plenipotentiary. His Excellency John
L. Stevens, has caused United States troops to be landed at
Honolulu and declared that he would supi)ort the said Provi
sional Government.

Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the
loss of life, I do, under this protest, and impelled by said
force, yield my authority until such time as the Government
of the United States shall, upon the facts being presented to
it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in
the authority which I claim as the constitutional sovereign of
the Hawaiian Islands.

Done at Honolulu this 17th day of January, A.D. 1893.

Liliuokalani, R.

(Indorsed) Received from the hands of the late Cabinet, this 17th
day of January, 1893. Sanford B. Dole.

Tlius there was no fear of further trouble that night.

In a letter to Mr. Willis, dated December 23, 1893,
Mr. Dole disposes of Mr. Damon as follows : ^

Mr. Damon, on the occasion mentioned, was allowed to
accompany the Cabinet of the former Government, who had
been in conference with me and my associates, to meet the
ex-Queen. He went informally, without instructions and
without authority to represent the Government, or to assure
the ex-Queen " that if she surrendered under protest, her case
would afterwards be fairly considered by the President of the
United States." Our ultimatum had already been given to the
members of the ex-Cabinet who had been in conference with us.
What Mr. Damon said to the ex-Queen he said on his individual
responsibility and did not report it to us.

If Mr. Damon was " allowed " to meet the Queen, who
allowed him except the Provisional Government? He

72 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

was himself a leading member, and he went to the Palace
from the men constituting this Government, then grouped
together at the Government building, where Mr. Dole was
delivering his " ultimatum " and writing his call for help.
Under these circumstances the Queen had every right
to suppose that Mr. Damon was clothed with due au-
thority. When Mr. Dole received the above paper, why
did he not then state that Mr. Damon had gone without
instructions and without authority, if this was- the true
state of affairs? Why was he then silent, when, if ever,
he was called upon to speak ?

Before leaving this branch of the subject it is desired to
call attention to two pieces of testimony given by Lieu-
tenant Swinburne, who was in command of the troops
when landed. The first is as follows : ^®

Senator Gray. — And you were there, as I understand,
under your orders to preserve order ?

Mr. Swinburne. — To preserve order, to protect the prop-
erty and lives of Americans.

Senator Gray. — And if a crowd of people, disorderly or
otherwise, should have attempted to arrest or maltreat Mr.
Damon, Mr. Dole, or Mr. Carter on that day, you would have
protected them ?

Mr. Swinburne. — It would have depended upon what they
were doing.

Senator Gray. — Suppose they were walking up to the
Government building, as they were doing that morning, and
, they were set upon, would you have protected them ?

Mr. Swinburne. — If they were going to the Government
building ?

Senator Gray. — Yes.

Mr. Swinburne. — I should think I would have been called
upon to protect them.

Senator Gray. — I think so.

Mr. Swinburne. — They were entitled to the liberty of the
streets, but if they were organized as a force —

Senator Gray. — I say if they were going up to the Govern-
ment buildings, as they were on that day, and were set upon ?

Mr. Swinburne. — And if I had been informed, as I was,
that this party was going in to take the Government building ?

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 73

Senator Gray. — Would you have allowed them to be mal-
treated or set upon ?

Mr. Swinburne. — That is a difficult question to answer.
Senator Gray. — I sympathize with you in it.
Mr. Swinburne. — That would be difficult to answer.
Senator Gray. — I think so.

From this it would appear that if Messrs. Damon, Dole,
and Carter were walking up through the street as indi-
viduals, they would have been protected. That was easy
to decide. But if they were going up to take the Govern-
ment house, then Lieutenant Swinburne finds the question
whether he would have allowed them to be set upon a dif-
ficult one. Why difficult ? Unless the preventing of the
Queen's troops from attacking the revolutionists had been
contemplated, what could.have been easier than the answer
that he was on shore to protect life and property, and not
to interfere with either party ?

If the lieutenant could have said this truthfully, why
should he not have said it?

But this was not the only difficult question the chief
officer was called upon to answer. The following appears
in his testimony : ^^

The next morning about 11 o'clock, while standing outside
the camp, the English minister and the Portuguese minister
came along.

Senator Gray. — When was that ?

Mr. Swinburne. — Wednesday morning. The English
minister stopped and notified me that he had just been to
notify the Provisional Government that he would recognize
them as the de facto Government, pending advice from his
Government ; but he said, as a sort of parenthesis, " I found
it necessary to ask tliem, if they were the de facto Government,
why it was necessary to bring foreign troops on the soil." He
expected an answer from me. I lookeS as if I had no answer
to give, and he looked at me a few minutes and went on.

One is here reminded of Cicero's oft-quoted remark that
he wondered how two augurs could look each other in the

74 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

face without laughing. We can imagine the smile that
must have stolen over the countenances of these gentle-
men, as they stood looking at each other for a few minutes,
after the English minister's very significant question and
Lieutenant Swinburne's still more significant silence.

It may not be wholly out of place to say here that the
Provisional Government were duly grateful for the " pro-
tection to life and property " which the United States
troops had given, as appears by the following resolutions : **

Be it resolved by the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian

Islands as follows :

That the thanks of this Government are due and are
hereby tendered to Gilbert C. Wiltse, captain in the United
States Navy, now commanding the United States steamship-of-
war " Boston," for his gallant, well-timed, and judicious conduct
in protecting life and property in the city of Honolulu, upon
the occasion of his landing his forces at the request of the
United States envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotenti-
ary ; that like thanks are due and are hereby tendered to the
officers and men of the United States Navy who composed the
landing force from the " Boston," and whose discipline, forbear-
ance, and gentlemanly conduct under circumstances of con-
siderable annoyance, and in several instances of much exas-
peration, entitle them to the gratitude of the people of the
Hawaiian Islands.

There can be no doubt that Captain Wiltse is a brave
and capable officer; but seeing that neither he nor his
ofiicers nor men were called upon to make the slightest
exhibition of their courage, and in view of the fact that the
Committee of Safety did their best to postpone the landing,
the epithets " gallant " and " well-timed," as applied to his
conduct by the Provisional Government, must have struck
Captain Wiltse as somewhat curious.

It might be fairly supposed that the Provisional Govern-
ment, which was supposed to be, in the language of Mr.
Foster already quoted, "in the sole and supreme possession
of power, and in control of all the resources of the Hawaiian

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 75

nation, and in the possession of all the armed forces, arms
and ammunition, public offices, and all the potential ma-
chinery of the Government," might have contrived to run
along without asking further aid from Mr. Stevens or the
United States, if it were only for the looks of the thing.
But not so ; " protection for life and property " was still
needed, the old formula being still advanced; and in less
than a fortnight from the dethronement of the Queen an
appeal is made to Mr. Stevens not only for protection to
life and property, but this time for protection to the Gov-
ernment of the Hawaiian Islands itself. Here is the cor-
respondence :

49

Honolulu, Hawahan Islands, Jan. 31, 1893.

Sir : Believing that we are unable to satisfactorily protect life and
property, and to prevent civil disorders to Honolulu and throughout
the Hawaiian Islands, we hereby, in obedience to the instructions of
the Advisory Council, pray that you will raise the flag of the United
States of America for the protection of the Hawaiian Islands for the
time being, and to that end we hereby confer upon the Government
of the United States, through you, freedom of occupation of the pub-
lic buildings of this Govenmient, and of the soil of this country, so
far as may be necessary for the exercise of such protection, but not
interfering with the administration of public affairs by this Govern-
ment.

We have, etc.,

Sanford B. Dole,
President of the Provisional Government of the Hawaiian

Islands and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

J. A. King,

Minister of Interior.
P. C. Jones,

Minister of Finance.
William O. Smith,

Attorney- General,
His Excellency John L. Stevens,
Envoy Extraordinary and Miiiister

Plenipotentiary of the United States.

76 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Mr. Stevens is quite ready and willing, and takes imme-
diate action :^^

United States Legation,

Honolulu, Feb. 1, 1893.

Sir : The Provisional Grovernment of the Hawaiian Islands having
duly and officially expressed to the undersigned the fear that said
Government may be unable to protect life and property, and to pre-
vent civil disorder in Honolulu, the capital of said Hawaiian Islands,
request that the flag of the United States may be raised for the pro-
tection of the Hawaiian Islands, and to that end confer on the United
States, through the undersigned, freedom of occupation of the pub-
lic buildings of the Hawaiian Government and the soil of the Hawa-
iian Islands, so far as may be necessary for the exercise of such
protection, but not interfering with the administration of the public
affairs by said Provisional Government.

I hereby ask you to comply with the spirit and terms of the request
of the Hawaiian Provisional Government, and to that end to use all
the force at your command, in the exercise of your best judgment
and discretion, you and myself awaiting instructions from the United
States Government at Washington.

I am, sir, etc.,

John L. Stevens,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister

Plenipotentiary of the United States,
Capt. G. C. WiLTSE,

Commander of the U.S. Ship ** Boston.''''

Lieutenant Swinburne gives us an interesting account
of the ceremonies attending the raising of the flag : ^^

At half-past 8 the battalion was paraded, the captain arrived
and handed me the orders, a copy of which is there, and dated
the 1st of February. He ordered me to take charge of the
Government building, the flag to be hoisted at 9 o'clock. I
marched down with the battalion. At the Government build-
ing I found all the members of the Advisory Council and the
members of the Cabinet of the Provisional Government. The
three companies of troops were drawn up on the three sides
of the square. We marched in and were drawn up in front of
the building, and then by direction of the captain the adjutant
read the proclamation of the minister establishing a protecto-
rate over the islands, pending negotiations with the United

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 77

States. As I understand, that was at the request of the Pro-
visional Government. Then the American flag was hoisted and
saluted. After the American flag was hoisted the Hawaiian
flag was hoisted.

Senator Gray. — How was the American flag saluted ?

Mr. Swinburne. — The troops presented arms, and three
flourishes of the trumpets were given.

Senator Gray. — Was a salute tired from the ship?

Mr. Swinburne. — A salute of 21 guns was fired from the
ship.

Senator Gray. — What was the salute from the ship ?

Mr. Swinburne. — The national salute.

The Chairman. — And then you faced about —

Mr. Swinburne. — Faced about and gave the same honors
to the Hawaiian flag.

The Chairman. — Was any salute fired ?

Mr. Swinburne. — No salute was fired. Then the building
was turned over to my custody, and the Provisional Govern-
ment's troops marched out.

In the further course of his testimony Lieutenant Swin-
burne throws a bit of side-light upon the then existing
state of things : ^

So two days passed, when President Dole came to me and
said he would like to have the Government building opened,
that the court might be held, and to that end he would like to
have the sentry removed from the front gate during the hours
from 9 till 4.

The Chairman. — What court ?

Mr. Swinburne. — The Supreme Court. I suggested that
it would be better to go further than that, to remove all sen-
tries for the time, so as not to have the appearance of keeping
anybody away, which was done. All the sentries were taken
from the public building from 9 to 4, all the gates were opened,
and the court held its sessions.

From which it would appear that the sovereign and
independent Provisional Government of Hawaii, then in
treaty for annexation with the United States, could not
even open its courts, without the consent of an oflficer of
the United States Navy.

78 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Five commissioners of the Provisional Government left
for Washington on Friday, January 20, with full power
to treat for the annexation of the Sandwich Islands to the
United States. Mr. Stevens gives them a good send-off: ^

mr. stevens to mb. foster.

United States Legation,
Honolulu, Jan. 19, 1893. [Received February 3.]

Sir : The Provisional Government of Hawaii, by special steamer,
send a commission to Washington with full powers to negotiate with
the Government of tlie United States. It is composed of six * repre-
sentative men of the highest respectability : Hon. William C. Wilder
is the president and chief manager of the Inter-island Steamship
Company, running steamers among the islands, and he has large
property interests in Honolulu. Hon. C. M. [surname omitted] is a
leading lumber merchant, doing business with Puget Sound and
Oregon, born here of the best American stock. Hon. L. A. Thurston
is one of the most if not the most talented and influential man on
the islands, and is of the highest respectability. He and his father
were born on the islands, of Connecticut parentage. Though a
young man, he was the leading member of the reform Cabinet from
July, 1887, to 1890.

Hon. William II. Castle is a lawyer of eminence, born on the
islands, of western New York parentage, his father still living here
at the age of eighty-four, having resided in Honolulu nearly half a
century, and for many years exercised a large influence here. Mr.
Charles P. Carter is the son of the recent Hawaiian minister at
Washington, Hon. H. P. Carter, and is an accomplished and most
reliable gentleman, American to the core, and has a Michigan wife.
Hon. Mr. Marsden is of English birth, is a prominent business man,
and a noble in the Legislature.

These six commissioners represent a large preponderating pro-
portion of the property-holders and commercial interests of these
islands. They are backed by the influences which will enable
them to fully carry out their agreements with the United States

Government. »

I am, sir, etc.,

John L. Stevens.

^ A mistake ; it should be five.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 79

It will be remembered that three of these gentlemen,
Messrs. Thurston, Wilder, and Castle, were members of
the Committee of Safety and of the Provisional Govern-
ment.

The Commissioners arrived in Washington February 3,
and on the same day opened a correspondence with Secre-
tary Foster, informing him of their appointment, and
making, among other statements, the following : ^

And also the said Commissioners are instructed and fully
authorized and empowered by the said Provisional Government
to negotiate a treaty between the said Provisional Government
of the Hawaiian Islands and the Government of the United
States of America, by the terms of which full and complete
political union may be secured between the United States of
America and the Hawaiian Islands.

On the 4th of February an outline of the proposed treaty
was sent to Mr. Foster, and on the 15th Mr. Foster sent
the treaty agreed upon to President Harrison, who upon
the same day transmitted it to the Senate, stating that he
did not deem it necessary to discuss at any length the con-
ditions which had resulted in this decisive action, and with
the recommendation already referred to, that it should be
promptly acted upon. The treaty, however, remained
with the Senate till Mr. Cleveland withdrew it.

In the meantime, when the Commissioners left Hono-
lulu on the " Claudine," the Queen desired to send agents
of her own on the same steamer to lay her side of the case
before the President. This, however, was refused, and it
was not till February 1st that her attorney and envoy,
Mr. Paul Neumann, started for Washington.^ The

1 In their letter to Secretary Foster under date of Feb. 11, 1893, the Commis-
sioners say : "

«

As the Provisional Government had allowed a mail to be sent by the chartered
steamer, they did not consider that there was any reason for financially assisting
the Queen in forwarding to Washington an agent hostile to the Government and
its oDJects."

80 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Queen, however, was allowed to use the mail, and she
sent the following letter to Mr. Hariison : ^^

His Excellency Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States:

My Great and Good Friend: It is with deep regret that I
address you on this occasion. Some of my subjects, aided by aliens,
have renounced their loyally and revolted against the constitutional
Government of my Kingdom. They have attempted to depose me
and to establish a Provisional Government in direct conflict with the
organic law of this Kingdom. Upon receiving incontestable proofs
that His Excellency the minister plenipotentiary of the United States
aided and abetted their unlawful movement and caused United States
troops to be landed for that purpose, I submitted to force, believing
that he would not have acted in that manner unless by authority of
the Government which he represents.

This action on my part was prompted by three reasons : the futility
of a conflict with the United States, the desire to avoid violence and
bloodshed and tlie destruction of life and property, and the certainty
which I feel that you and your Government will right whatever
wrongs may have been inflicted upon us in the premises. In due
time a statement of the true facts relating to this matter will be laid
before you, and I live in the hope that you will judge uprightly and
justly between myself and my enemies.

This appeal is not made for myself personally, but for my people,
who have hitherto always enjoyed the friendship and protection of
the United States

My opponents have taken the only vessel which could be obtained
here for the purpose, and hearing of their intention to send a dele-
gation of their number to present their side of this conflict before
you, I requested the favor of sending by the same vessel an envoy to

This might appear to be a case where the decision was a very prudent one,
but the reason alleged hardly sufficient. Seeing that the Provisional Government
had taken the Queen's treasury and all the money in it, it i*eally seems as if a
little Ilnancial aid would not have been out of place.

** The Chairman. — Was there any actual capture of the money by the Provi-
sional Government ?

•• Mr. McCandless. — The information was that they went up there to inquire
for the ministei*s, the Advisory and Executive Councils. Of course it merged right
from the Committee of Safety into them. They asked for the Queen's ministers,
and thev were not in there, and they asked for the chief clerk, Mr. Hassinger, and
demanded the keys, and they were turned over.

•* The Chairman. — That carried with it the custody of the money ?

**Mr. McCandless. —Yes, and of the Government depaitments —all the
aflfairs of the Government." '^

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 81

you to lay before you my statement as the facts appear to myself and
my loyal subjects.

This request has been refused, and I now ask you that in justice to
myself and to my people that no steps be taken by the Government
of the United States until my cause can be heard by you. I shall be
able to despatch an envoy about the 2d day of February, as that will
be the first available opportunity hence, and he will reach you with
every possible haste, that there may be no delay in the settlement ot
this matter.

I pray you, therefore, my good friend, that you will not allow
any conclusions to be reached by you until my envoy arrives.

I beg to assure you of the continuance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Liliuokalani, R.

This letter is not introduced as evidence of the state-
ments therein contained, but only as a part of the record..
Mr. Harrison's acts and motives are not in issue here ajid
will not be discussed ; but it is important to know to what,
his attention had been called at the time he sent his mes-
sage to the Senate. It does not appear that the slightest
notice was ever taken of this letter, or that Mr.. Neumann's,
story was ever heard either by Mr. Harrison or by any one
connected with his administration. The above letter
having been sent, and Mr. Neumann afterwards being-
about to leave Honolulu, Mr. Stevens gives him also a,
good send-off, as will appear from the following extract
from his letter to Mr. Foster, dated January 26 : *•

United States Legation,

Honolulu, Jan. 26, 1893.

Sir : By the steamer taking this despatch goes Mr. Paul Neumann
to Washington, the attorney of the desposed Queen. Nominally he
may make at the Department of State a ♦* protest " as to the way
his client lost her crown. In reality his mission is to get a large fee
out of whatever sum it is supposed may be paid by the treaty of
annexation to the fallen monarch and the crown princess. This
attorney, as the Hawaiian Commissioners now in Washington may
inform you, was a former resident of San Francisco, where he had

82 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

and still has an unsavory reputation. For years his influence in
politics here has been pernicious. He was a boon companion of the
debased Kalakaua, the recent king, shared in his corruptions, and is
reputed to have won at cards the money of the weak monarch.*

He arrived in Washington February 11, at which time
it may be assumed that the treaty of annexation had been
practically agreed upon by the commissioners and Mr. Fos-
ter, this being only four days before it was sent in for
ratification.

Thus the matter stood until Mr. Cleveland was inaugu-
rated in March, 1893. When Mr. Cleveland took this
matter into consideration, some things he must necessarily
have known. He knew that Hawaii had been a friendly
nation ; that a few months before, thirteen individuals
naming themselves a Committee of Safety had called to-
gether a meeting of the inhabitants of Honolulu, at which
certain resolutions were passed ; that that same day United
States troops had been landed against the protest of the
authorities, and that the next day the Queen was deposed
and a Provisional Government organized, which was im-
mediately recognized by the United States minister ; that
two days afterwards Commissioners for annexation were
on their way to Washington, and that the Queen had sent
the letter cited above ; that the resolutions passed by the
mass meeting from which the Commissioners professed to
derive their power said no word about dethroning the
Queen or of annexation, and that so far as official docu-
ments went there was nothing to show that any living soul
upon the island either had, or could have had, the slightest
opportunity to express assent to or disapproval of the
action the Commissioners were about to take, or that the
Commissioners represented any one except themselves and
the other members of the Provisional Government which

^ It is unnecessaiy to say that Mr. Neumann is very diffei^ntly spoken of in other
portions of the Itepoi*t.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 83

I

sent them. He knew also that the statements made by
the United States minister and by the Commissioner had
been vigorously denied, and that the Queen had made an
appeal to his predecessor to take no steps until she had
had an opportunity to be heard.

These facts were disputed by no one, and Mr. Cleveland
must necessarily have been aware of them. What course,
then, should he take ? A grave accusation had been made
against the United States, involving its honor and reputa-
tion, and circumstances which were undisputed gave color
to tlie charge. A great responsibility rested upon the Presi-
dent. Should he let the matter remain as it was, taking
the account of the revolution given by the Commissioners,
interested as they were, as absolutely true, or should he
make inquiry for himself ? Mr. Cleveland was a lawyer,
and was familiar with that maxim which lies at the foun-
dation of the administration of justice, Audi alteram
partem : Hear the other side. He determined to hear
both sides.^

For the purpose of making an investigation he chose
Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, eighteen years a member
of the House of Representatives, where his position as chair-
man of the Committee of Foreign Affairs had given him
great familiarity with international affaii*s. Mr. Blount
was a man of high character and honorable reputation, and
upon his leaving Congress all parties, Republicans as well
as Democrats, joined in a tribute of praise such as seldom
•falls to the lot of any public man.^

1 The ti*eaty involved, amon^ other things), a question of money ; it proposed to
fdve the Qaeen $20,000 per year, and the Princess Kaiulani, the next heir to the
throne, the ^oss sum of $150,000, conditioned upon their submission in ^ood faith
to the United States and to the local Government, so that the private interests of
both were to some extent involved. Why these or any other sums should be paid
if the Queen was rinrlitfully deposed is not explained.

« Mr. Ilitt, of Illinois, of the Republican party, made the following remarks :
" But I cannot see the time approach when he [Mr. Blount] is to leave our hall
without heai*tily joining, as one member of the House, with the honorable gentle-

84 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

The object of Mr. Blount's mission is given in the fol-
lowing paragraphs from Mr. Gresham's instructions : ^^

Department op State,
Washington, March 11, 1893.
Hon. James U. Blount, etc. :

Sir : The situation created in the Hawaiian Islands by the recent
deposition of Queen Liliuokalani and the erection of a Provisional
Government demands the fullest consideration of the president, and
in order to obtain trustworthy information on this subject, as well as^
for the discharge of other duties herein specified, he has decided to
despatch you to the Hawaiian Islands as his special commissioner, in
which capacity you will herewith receive a commission and also a
letter, whereby the President accredits you to the president of the
Executive and Advisory Councils of the Hawaiian Islands.

The comprehensive, delicate, and confidential character of your
mission can now only be briefly outlined, the details of its execution
being necessarily left, in a great measure, to your good judgment
and wise discretion.

You will investigate and fully report to the President all the facts
you can learn respecting the condition of affairs in the Hawaiian
Islands, the causes of the revolution by which the Queen's Govern-
ment was overthrown, the sentiment of the people toward existing
authority, and, in general, all that can fully enlighten the President
touching the subjects of your mission.

To enable you to fulfil this charge, your authority in all matters
touching the relations of this Government to the existing or other
Government of the Islands, and the protection of our citizens therein,
is paramount, and in you alone, acting in cooperation with the com-
mander of the naval forces, is vested full discretion and power to
determine when such forces should be landed or withdrawn.

man from Indiana [Mr. Holman] in every word he has said in testimony of the
personal worth, of the high character, of the industiy, the energy, of the honorable
gentleman from Georgia ; and I will mark most of all that paitriotism above party
that inspired him in this House, when last year, leading a great committee
charged to consider the affairs and interests, not of a part, but of a whole nation,
embroiled in a sharp dispute with a foreign power, he rose with the occasion, and
proved himself first and altogether a patriot, an American ; so that a foreigner
looking down from the gallery upon the hall could neither have told whether he
was a Republican or Democrat, but would have known that he was in every fibre
an American,"

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 85

Thus far the action of Mr. Cleveland is confined to the
sending of a messenger for the purpose of investigation.

Mr. Blount arrived at Honolulu on the 29th of March,
1893, and left about the 1st of August of that year.
While there he busied himself in interviewing a great
many people, taking a great deal of testimony, and gener-
ally endeavoring with due diligence and in good faith to
fulfil the object of his mission, from time to time sending
reports of his doings and of his conclusions to Mr. Gresham,
together with the evidence upon which these conclusions
were based. These reports were not satisfactory to the
Provisional Government and its adherents, but thev are
open to public inspection, and are all set forth in the Report
upon the Hawaiian Islands. They convinced Mr. Cleve-
land, as set forth in his message of Dec. 18, 1893, that the
lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without
the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot, by a
process every step of which was directly traceable to and
dependent for its success upon the agency of the United
States acting through its diplomatic and naval representa-
tives ; that but for the presence of the United States
forces in the immediate vicinity and in position to afford
all needed protection and support, the committee would
not have proclaimed the Provisional Government from the
steps of the Government building ; that by an act of war
committed with the participation of a diplomatic represent-
ative of the United States, and without authority of Con-
gress, the Government of a feeble, but friendly and confid-
ing people had been overthrown, and that a substantial
wrong had been done, which a regard to our national char-
acter, as well as the rights of the injured party, required an
effort to repair; that the Queen surrendered not to the
Provisional Government, but to the United States; not
absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and condi-
tionally, until such time as the facts could be considered

86 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

by the United States ; and that the Provisional Govern-
ment acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on
those terms, not only by tacit consent, but through the
positive acts of some members of that Government who
urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid blood-
shed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon
the justice of the United States, and that the whole subject
would be finally considered at Washington.

It is assumed here that whatever final judgment may be
passed upon the character of the revolution, Mr. Cleveland
had, at least, reasonable grounds for the conclusions which
he formed. What now should be his next step? That
would seem to depend somewhat upon the question whether
there are or should be such things as justice and equity in
the dealings of nations with each other. In his message
Mr. Cleveland gives to this question an affirmative answer,
influenced possibly by the words of President Washington,
who in his farewell address, a document now regarded as
almost sacred, and as containing a most authoritative
exposition of true American principles, lays down the fol-
lowing precepts :

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations ; cul-
tivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality
enjoin this conduct, and can it be that good policy does not
equally enjoin it ? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and
at no distant period a great nation, to give to mankind the
magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided
by an exalted justice and benevolence.*

Mr. Cleveland determined to right what he believed was a
flagrant wrong, so far as he could within the limited powers

» See also the following remarks of President McKinley :

" Next to tlie Declaration of Independence itself, Washinjrton's farewell address
is the richest heritage that has come down to us from the Father of the Kepublic.
It is not only a perfect analysis of the spirit of the Constitution, but it is a lofty
appeal to true American patriotism, accompanied by words of solemn warning
and advice, the wisdom or which has been increasingly demonstitited by added
experience of each successive generation.**

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 87

vested in him as President, although in taking this action
he undoubtedly ran counter to the views of Mr. Dole as
expressed in his letter to Mr. Willis, of December 23, 1893,
in which, after denying each and every one of the allega-
tions of fact referred to in a portion of Mr. Willis.'8 letter,
he proceeds as follows : **

My position is, briefly, this : If the American forces illegally
assisted the revolutionists in the establishment of the Provi-
sional Government, that Government is not responsible for their
wrong-doing It was purely a private matter for discipline
between the United States Government and its own officers.
There is, I submit, no precedent in international law for the
theory that such action of the American troops has conferred
upon the United States authority over the internal affairs of
this Government. Should it be true, as you have suggested,
that the American Government made itself responsible to the
Queen, who, it is alleged, lost her throne through such action,
that is not a matter for me to discuss, except to submit that if
such be the case, it is a matter for the American Government
and her to settle between them. This Government, a recog-
nized sovereign power, equal in authority with the United
States Government and enjoying diplomatic relations with
it, cannot be destroyed by it for the sake of discharging its
obligations to the ex-Queen.*

Mr. Blount having returned from Honolulu, instruc-
tions were given to Mr. Albert S. Willis, then United
States minister to the islands, to advise the Queen and
her supporters of the President's desire to aid in the resto-
ration of the status existing before the lawless landing of
the United States forces at Honolulu on the 16th of

1 The principles here laid down may be tested by stating au exti*eme case.
Suppose tnat Mr. Stevens, Captain Wiltse, and Mr. Dole had entered into a formal
conspiracy ; that for a sum ot money paid by Mr. Dole, Mr. Stevens and Captain
WUtse had agreed that the Queen should be deposed; that thereupon they landed
ti*oops, proceeded to bombard and knock to pieces the Palace and Government
house, compelled the sun'cnder of the Queen, and established Mr. Dole and his
associates in the Government of Hawaii. It is understood that Mr. Dole in such
case would say that the United States and the Queen mi^ht settle the matter
between themselves, and that the United States might discipline its offending
officers, but could take no further action in the premises.

Mr. Dole, in stating his principle of international law, omits reference to the
somewhat important fact that his Government almost immediately upon its incep-
tion had placed itself under a protectorate of the United States.

88 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

January last, if such restoration could be effected upon
terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all
parties concerned. The conditions suggested contem-
plated a general amnesty to those concerned in setting
up the Provisional Government, and a recognition of all
its bona fide acts and obligations. In short, they required
that the past should be buried, and that the restored Gov-
ernment should reassume its authority as if its continuity
had not been interrupted.

In pursuance of these instructions Mr. Willis on the
13th of November •* made known to the Queen the Presi-
dent's regret that through the unauthorized intervention
of the United States she had been obliged to surrender
her sovereignty, and his hope that with her consent and
cooperation the wrongs done to her and her people might
be redressed ; and she was asked whether if restored to
the throne she would grant full amnesty as to life and
property to the members of the Provisional Government,
and all who had been instrumental in her overthrow. She
refused to make this promise, and the fact of such refusal
was immediately made known by Mr. Willis to President
Cleveland.^

On the 3d of December, 1893, the following additional
instructions were sent to Mr. Willis. ®*

[^Telegram. '\

Department op State,
Washington. December 3, 1893.

Sir: Your despatch, which was answered by steamer on the
twenty-fifth of November, seems to call for additional instruc-
tions.

Should the Queen refuse assent to the written conditions, you will
at once inform her that the President will cease interposition in her
behalf, and that while he deems it his duty to endeavor to restore
to the sovereign the constitutional government of the islands, his
further efforts in that direction will depend upon the Queen's un-
qualified agreement that all obligations created by the Provisional

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDEXT 89

Government in a proper course of adntiinistration shall be assumed,
and upon such pledges by her as will prevent the adoption of any
measures of proscription or punishment for what has been done in
the past by those setting up or supporting the Provisional Govern-
ment. The President feels that by our original interference and
what followed we have incurred responsibilities to the whole
Hawaiian community, and it would not be just to put one party at
the mercy of the other.

Should the Queen ask whether, if she accedes to conditions,
active steps will be taken by the United States to effect her resto-
ration, or to maintain her authority thereafter, you will say that
the President cannot use force without the authority of Congress.

Should the Queen accept conditions, and the Provisional Gov-
eniment refuse to surrender, you will be governed by previous
instnictions. If the Provisional Government asks whether the
United States will hold the Queen to fulfilment of stipulated con-
ditions, you will say the President, acting under dictates of honor
and duty as he has done in endeavoring to effect restoration, will
do all In his constitutional power to cause observance of the con-
ditions he has imposed.

I am, etc.,

W. Q. Gresham.

.In a message of Dec. 18, 1893, the President laid all the
facts relating to the Hawaiian revolution before Congress,
to whose " extended powers and wide discretion " the subject
was commended. '*

In the meantime, upon the same date of this message,
the Queen having changed her mind, sent a note to Mr.
Willis agreeing that if restored she would grant full par-
don and amnesty^ to all parties concerned in the revolu-
tion. ®* Mr. Willis, not being aware that the matter was
now in the hands of Congress, immediately informed the

* Seuator Hoar was clearly of opinion that as matter of law the promise of the
Queen to grant pardon was in strict violation of the Hawaiian constitution, as
appeal's by his speech in the Senate in January, 1894. He goes on to say :

*' Mr. President, there is but one point of sympathy between the present Execu-
tive of the United Stat^^s and the deposed Queen of Hawaii, and that is a purpose
on the part of each recklessly to disregard the Constitution of their countiy — the
only difference being that the President of the United States disregards our Con-
stitution recklessly and without provocation, while the Queen of Hawaii, in this
instance, proposes to disregard it only before the great temptation of a throne."

90 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Provisional Government of this fact, and asked whether
it was willing to abide Mr. Cleveland's decision and yield
to the Queen her constitutional authority; to which it
replied through Mr. Dole in the negative, as follows : •'

T am instructed to inform you, Mr. Minister, that the Pro-
visional Government of the Hawaiian Islands respectfully and
unhesitatingly declines to entertain the proposition of the
United States that it should surrender its authority to the
ex-Queen.

All this was at once communicated by Mr. Willis to the
President, and by him to Congress. Mr. Gresham finally
writes Mr. Willis, Jan. 12, 1894, as follows: •'

Your reports show that on further reflection the Queen gave
her unqualified assent in writing to the conditions suggested,
but that the Provisional Government refuses to acquiesce in
the President's decision.

The matter now being in the hands of Congress, the Presi-
dent will keep that body fully advised of the situation, and
will lay before it from time to time the reports received from
you, including your No. 3, heretofore withheld, and all in-
structions sent to you. In the meantime, while keeping the
Department fully informed of the course of events, you will,
until further notice, consider that your special instructions
upon this subject have been fully complied with.

So ended Mr. Cleveland's effort to restore her Govern-
ment to the Queen.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 91

In order that the full extent of Mr. Cleveland's offend-
ing may be shown, an incident must be referred to which
exposed hira, and still exposes him, to the severest censure.

We have seen under what circumstances and by what
authority, and with what imposing ceremonies, the United
States flag was hoisted over the Hawaiian public buildings,
and the circumstances must now be mentioned under
which it was taken down.

First let us see how the action of Mr. Stevens in raising
the flag was received by President Harrison. Mr. Stevens
gave immediate notice to Secretary Foster, who on the
14th of February replied as follows : •'

Department of State,
Washington, Feb. 14, 1893.

Your telegram of the 1st instant has been received, with coinci-
dent report from commander of the ** Boston." Press telegrams
fi'ora San Francisco give fail details of events of Ist instant, with
text of your proclamation. The latter, in announcing assumption of
protection of the Hawaiian Islands in the name of the United States,
would seem to be tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate
over those islands on behalf of the United States, with all the rights
and obligations which the term implies. It is not thought, however,
that the request of the Provisional Government for protection or
your action in compliance therewith contemplated more than the co-
operation of the moral and material forces of the United States to
strengthen the authority of the Provisional Government, by accord-
ing to it adequate protection for life and property during the negoti-
ations instituted here, and without interfering with the execution of
public affairs. Such cooperation was and is within your standing
instructions and those of the naval commanders in Hawaiian waters.
So far as your course accords to the de facto sovereign Government
the material cooperation of the United States for the maintenance of
good order and protection of life and property from apprehended
disorders, it is commended ; but so far as it may appear to overstep
that limit by setting the authority of the United States above that of
the Hawaiian Government in the capacity of protector, or to impair
the independent sovereignty of that Government by substituting the
flag and power of the United States, it is disavowed.

92 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Instructions will be sent to naval commanders confirmins: and re-
newing those heretofore given them, under which they are author-
ized and directed to cooperate with you in case of need. Your own
instructions are likewise renewed, and you are accordingly author-
ized to arrange with the commanding officer for the continued
presence on shore of such marine force as may be practicable
and requisite for the security of the lives and property interests of
American citizens and the repression of lawlessness threatening
them, whenever in your judgment it shall be necessary so to do, or
when such cooperation may be sought for good cause by the Govern-
ment of the Hawaiian Islands; being, however, always careful to
distinguish between these functions of voluntary or accorded pro-
tection and the assumption of a protectorate over the Government of
the Hawaiian Islands, which the United States have recoo^nized as
sovereign, and with which they treat on terms of sovereign equality.

John W. Foster.

Here it appears that Mr. Foster regarded the action of
Mr. Stevens as tantamount to the establishment of a pro-
tectorate, with all the rights and obligations which the
terms implied.^

It will be noticed that the substituting of the United
States flag is especially included in the disavowal.

' It is, perhaps, only fair to say that Senator Hoar, who has given a great deal
of attention to Hawaiian affairs, and who has discussed them from time to time
with great ability, came to a radically different conclusion from that reached by
Mr. Foster.

In a debate in the Senate, Jan. 17, 1894, the following remarks occur :

" Senator Daniel. — I understand I he Senator [Mr. Hoar] to say that the United
States occupies Hawaii, and ruised its Hag over the capitol by the invitation of the
de facto Provisional Government. Now, laving aside the invitation, the question I
should like to ask the Senator is, What right had the American minister or the
Ameiican admiral, at anybody's invitation, to assume the sovereignty of a foreign
country in the name of the Lfnitcd States, without the authority of the President^
or Congress ?

" Senator Hoak. — None at all.

** Senator Daniel. — And as the Senator has investigated the subject, I should
like to ask him, iurthermore, what was the condition of affairs brought about by
the establishment of the militaiT protectorate over a foreign country in the name
of the United States, and if aner that the same legal condition existed that ex-
isted when there was a de Jacto government.

" Senator. Hoar. — There was no such protectorate established; there was no
such function assumed ; there was no such significance given to the hoisting of the
flag. It was an act oi courtesy, pure and simple, on ihe part of the de fado Gov-
ernment, as I understand it. It had no more significance than my hanging the
United States flag out of my window on the 4th of July when I was travelling in
Europe last summer."

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 93

. This letter from Mr. Foster was written on the 14th day
of February. At that time there was about to be sent to the
Senate a treaty, in which the Provisional Government, one
of the " High Contracting Parties," proposed to cede " abso-
lutely and without reserve to the United States forever all
rights of sovereignty of whatsoever kind in and over the
Hawaiian Islands and their dependencies, renouncing in
favor of the United States every sovereign right of which,
as an independent nation, it is now possessed." It would
not be right to accuse Mr. Harrison of too careful scrutiny
of the circumstances under which this treaty was offered ;
but the incongruity, not to say absurdity, of professing to
make a treaty with a sovereign and independent nation,
while that nation's public buildings were occupied by
United States troops, and the United States flag was fly-
ing over its capitol, in token of what Mr. Foster considered
tantamount to the assumption of a protectorate, could not
but make itself manifest. Nevertheless, for reasons which
are left to conjecture, Mr. Foster did not in so many words
order the flag to be taken down ; and as Mr. Stevens did
not think proper to take the hint so broadly given, nor even
thought that his action had been disavowed,^ the flag cpn-

^ Mr. Stevens testified as follows :

" The Chairman. — How long before you received that despatch was it that
Admiral iSkerrett came ?

** Mr. Steven*. — I cannot recall.

** The Chairman. — But it was before you received that despatch disavowing —

"Mr. Stevens. — I shall object to the tenn disavowal; I do not admit it was a
disavowal."

See also testimony of Mr. McCandless, member of Committee of Safety and

Fi*ovisional Government :

" Senator Frye. — Do you know what the estimate of his [Mr. Stevens's]
character was among the citizens there ?

** Mr. McCandless. — 1 do not know of an American who was not proud of him
as a citizen and as the American representative. I happened to have a conversa-
tion with him just the day before the tlag was taken down; had business with
him. I went up to call upon him to talk about some matters. That was the 31st
day of March, I think. It was cither that or the 30th. At all events it was the
day before the ilag was taken down. We talked of the siiuatiou some, and he
stated that he was very well satisfied with everything as it was ; and the flag was
mentioned, I am quite sure it was among other things, and he said the flag would
never come down, and that afternoon or that dav, at II o'clock, Mr. Blount called
on President Dole and said lie was going to take the flag down at 4 o'clock that

94 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

tinued upon the Hawaiian capitol, and the United States
troops remained in possession of the public buildings.

This state of things continued until Mr. Blount came to
Honolulu, with the instructions from Mr. Gresham, which
have already been refeiTed to. Upon his arrival, having
looked the ground over, and for reasons which he sets forth
in his report, he thought it proper and expedient and in
accordance with his instructions to cause the flag to be
hauled down and the troops of the " Boston," with the
exception of one company left at the Consulate, to be re-
turned to their ship.

The following is Admiral Skerrett's report to Secretary
Herbert in reference to this matter.'^

»
U.S.S. *• Mohican," Flagship of the Pacific Station,

Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands, April 6, 1893.

Sir : Since my last of the 29th ultimo, I have to inform the Depart-,
ment of the arrival, after closing my mail on that day, of the
U.S.R.S. *♦ Richard Rush," having on board Special United States
Commissioner J. H. Blount. On March 31 I was called by Mr.
Blount for a special inteiTiew, on which occasion, by his directions,
I was ordered to withdraw the * 'Boston's " force from the shore, and
at 11 A.M. on April 1 to haul down the United States flag from the
Government building, which was to be replaced by the Provisional
Government hoisting the Hawaiian flag. These orders were
promptly executed as directed. There was not the remotest evi-
dence shown, by the crowd of natives and others about the Govern-
ment building, of any feeling ; no demonstration of any description.
Since which time, by the advice of Mr. Blount, the guard that had
been placed at the United States legation was allowed to be returned
to that place. This was done to quiet the apprehensions of Minister
Stevens. There has been no turmoil of any description on shore ;
peace and quiet have reigned throughout. The cadets will leave by
this steamer, and are ordered to report arrival on reaching San Fran-
cisco. The U.S.R.S. ** Richard Rush" left for San Diego on the 6th

afternoon. Of course, it was very much of a surprise ; and it was agreed that the
flag should come down the next day.

'* Senator Fryb. — Were anv demonstrations made at all in taking it down ?

** Mr. McCandlbss. -- No.'*^

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 95

instant, after I had had her supplied with eighty tons of coal from
the Government coal-pile.

Political affairs remain as formerly stated. I would further state
that the ** Boston's" force was, before its withdrawal from shore, re-
lieved at the Government building by one company of the Provisional
Government's troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. S. Skerrett,
Rear- Admiral y U.S. Navy,
Commanding U.S. Naval Force, Pacific Station.

Hon. Secretary op the Navy,

Na'vy Department, Washington, B.C.

To which may be added a letter to Mr. Blount from
Captain Hooper, of the United States Revenue Marine : '*

U.S. Revenue Steamer ** Rush,"
Honolulu, April 2, 1893.
Hon. J. H. Blount :

My dear Sir : I witnessed the hauling down of the American flag
and the raising of the Hawaiian flag over the Government building
at this place yesterday, and was surprised not only at the absence of
any indication of the violent and partisan feeling which I had been
led to expect, but by the apparent apathy and indiflference of the
native portion of the assembled crowd, and also their politeness and
evident good feeling towards Americans. As I passed freely around
among them, accompanied by my son, we were kept busy returning
their friendly salutes. The greatest good order prevailed through-
out. There were no demonstrations of any kind as the American,
flag came down, and not a single cheer greeted the Hawaiian flag as.
it was raised aloft.

The native men stood around in gi'oups or singly, smoking and
chatting, and nodding familiarly to passing friends, or leaning idly
against the trees and fences, while the women and children who
formed a large proportion of the assemblage were talking and laugh-
ing good-naturedly. As the hour for hauling down the American
flag approached, many people, men and women and children, could
be seen approaching the Government square in a most leisurely man-
ner, and showing more interest in the gala-day appearance of the
crowd than in the restoration of their national flag. The air of good-
natured indifference and idle curiosity with which the native men re-

96 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

garded the proceedings, and the presence of the women and children
in their white or bright-colored dresses, was more suggestive of a
country ** fair" or horse-race than the sequel to a "revolution."

Even the presence of the •* armed forces" of the Provisional Gov-
eiiiment, numbering perhaps two hundred, parading the corridors
of the Government house, failed to elicit any sign of a feeling of
anger or resentment. In half an hour after the exchange of flags
had been made, the crowd had dispersed and only the ** force" of
the Provisional Government, which I was told was necessary to pre-
vent mob violence, remained to indicate that a ** revolution " had
recently taken place. While among the crowd I looked carefully for
indications of ** arms " upon the person of tlie natives, but saw none,
although with the thin clothing worn by them the presence of a
revolver or such an arm could easily have been detected.

If any danger of mob violence on the part of the natives existed,
all outward signs of it were carefully concealed. Only evidences of
the greatest good feeling were apparent.

Hoping that this short statement of the facts as they appeared to
me may prove of interest to you,

I am, very truly yours,

C. L. Hooper,
Captain, U.8, Eeventce Marine.

This action having been taken, Mr. Cleveland was made
the object of attacks of the most varied character. The
first objection rose to the dignity of a constitutional ques-
tion. Could Mr. Cleveland order the flag to be taken
down at the instance of Mr. Blount ? Mr. Stevens, United
States minister, might bring the troops on shore and re-
quire the flag to be hoisted over the Hawaiian capitol,
taking action " tantamount to the creation of a protecto-
rate ; " Secretary Foster, in behalf of President Harrison,
might disavow this act, and Mr. Stevens might take no
notice of such disavowal, and still keep the troops on shore
and the flag flying ; but could President Cleveland, Com-
mander-in-chief of the United States Army and Navy,
order, in the manner he did, his subordinate naval oflBcers
to take down the flag and go back on board their ship ?

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 97

This question cannot be considered here. At first blush
it might seem to present no serious constitutional difficulty ;
but if the reader wishes to see it discussed in all its bear-
ings, and would like to know what elaborate and ingenious
arguments could be urged against the constitutionality of
this action, he has only to consult the congressional records
during the early part of the year 1894.

If such things were interesting, some very curious com-
ments made by Mr. Cleveland's opponents and the Repub-
lican press might be quoted here. One main suggestion,
upon which the changes were rung in every possible way,
was that the taking down of the flag was, and was in-
tended by Mr. Cleveland to be, an invitation to over-
turn the Provisional Government. But in view of the
letters of the United States officers above quoted, and
as the facts became better known, the futility of such a
charge came gradually to be recognized, and the ground
was taken that it was a bitter disgrace to the American
people that the flag of the United States should ever have
been lowered from the Hawaiian capitol, under any cir-
cumstances whatever.

"This is the first time in thirty years," said Senator
Davis, of Minnesota, in a debate on Hawaiian affairs in
January, 1894, " that an American flag has been lowered by
an American hand, under circumstances which brought a
feeling of shame and dishonor to the American heart."

Mr. Blair in the House of Representatives, in February,
1894, said that the first action of Commissioner Blount on
arriving at Honolulu was to give an order to haul down
the American flag.

" Why, Mr. Speaker," he said, " I had grown into the idea
that the American ensign could not be hauled down. In times
past an order had been given, under other circumstances, * to
shoot any man who attempts to haul down the flag.' "

98 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

If takeu down at all, so argued one leading and influential
newspaper of the day, the flag should have been hauled down
at sunset in the usual course, and not have been hoisted
again in the morning. In other words, an act which might
be right in itself, should not be done publicly and in the
face of day. The idea that the United States flag, once
raised as an act of sovereignty, should never be pulled
down, whether flying rightfully or wrongfully, survives
and is inculcated at the present day, with what result to
the principles and morals of the country the moralist
must decide.^

Other singular comments upon this whole Hawaiian
affair might be presented. One or two may be reproduced
here by way of illustration. Thus, Mr. Boutelle, in a
debate in the House of Representatives on the 10th of
August, 1894, referring to resolutions for recognition of the
republic of Hawaii, remarked :

The mere formal performance of a duty, on the part of the
Executive, which ought to have been performed long since —
the fact that the administration has performed this duty reluc-
tantly, haltingly, grudgingly, and secretly — does not relieve us
from our responsibility or our duty. The outrage upon every
principle of public honor that has characterized the so-called
" Hawaiian policy " from the beginning has been carried fit-
tingly to the end ; and every principle of international probity,
every idea of national dignity, every sentiment of public
honesty, and every impulse of American manhood has been
trampled under foot by this administration.

Senator Cullum, of Illinois, in a speech in the Senate in
January, 1894, on Hawaiian affairs, expressed himself as
follows :

1 As late as March of the cun'ent year a leading journal of New York, in an
article purporting to sum up in an impartial manner the chief acts of Mr. Cleve-
land's administration, says :

** In the Hawaiian matter he ofifended the national sentiment. His order to haul
down the American flag, and his attempt to use the bayonets of our marines to
restore a prejxosterous Queen to an overturned throne, were acts distinctly hostile
to Amencan ideas."

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 99

Where is the living man whose very heart has not swelled
with indignation as he has witnessed the perpetration of inex-
cusable and unprecedented outrages upon a weak and strug-
gling people ? Outrages which, unjust and immoral as they
were towards that little band, were a thousand times more dis-
graceful and immoral against our own American citizenship.
The shield and panoply of honor, which has shone like a star
over the pathway of American glory, has been blackened and
tarnished, while our entire people are doing the penance of
humiliation and shame.

But the above products of our colder clime seem almost
prosaic, when the refusal of the Provisional Government
to accept Mr. Willis's peaceful overtures becomes trans-
muted and, as it were, idealized in the richer and more
exuberant imagination of the tropics.

In a speech at Honolulu upon the first anniversary of
the Provisional Government, Mr. Walter G. Smith offers
the following tribute to his fellow-countrymen. After
drawing a parallel between the fight at Bunker Hill and
the proceedings at the time of the dethronement of the
Queen, he goes on to say :

It must ever be remembered that your defiance to the tot-
tering Hawaiian monarchy lost no tone of sternness or of
courage when you stood at bay to the President of the United
States and the power which he misused. There is nothing
more inspiring in the annals of 1776 than the imwavering
front which you preserved in your great emergency. There,
on the ouQ side, was the chief of sixty millions — here was an
armed body of a paltry thousand ; there was the strongest of
modern powers, with its army and its fleets — here were a few
lone rocks in the ocean without a fort upon their pinnacles and
without a gun upon a deck ; there was a great Government
whose President had declared that our dethroned Queen
should reign again — here was a little band of men who said
that she must pass over their dead bodies first ; there in our
harbor were the broadsides of a possible foe — here on shore
was a battalion behind its sand-bags ! The odds were great,
but the patriots of Hawaii took them ; and if the American
people, aroused by that spectacle, had not placed themselves

100 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

between us and all harm, I feel that here upon this soil would
have been a new Thermopylae, not less consecrated to human
courage than was that which made immortal the memory of
300 Greeks.

It is, of course, fortunate that the American people inter-
posed to frustrate Mr. Cleveland's sanguinary designs ; but
one cannot help feeling that, by so doing, they may have
prevented an exhibition of heroic and inspiring self-
sacrifice which the world could ill afford to lose.

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 101

APPENDIX.

It may be permitted to say a few words about the present
Government of the Sandwich Islands, which calls itself repub-
lican.

About a year after the establishment of the Provisional
Government, the work of framing a constitution was entered
upon, and a convention was called for that purpose.

Only those who were willing to take an oath to support the
Government and oppose the reestablishment of the monarchy
were permitted to vote for the members of this assemblage.
About 3,200 were registeriBd and voted.

The task before the convention was not an easy one, because
it was necessary, under the forms of republicanism, to estab-
lish and perpetuate the rule of the Provisional Government
and its adherents over a population of 90,000, of which the
American numbered only about 2,000.

But hope of present annexation had been given up, and the
convention having met, a constitution was presented and
adopted, and in July, 1894, was promulgated ; the new name
thought proper to be given to the country being the " Republic
of Hawaii."

To know what a republic is according to the views which
obtain in this country, it may be convenient to turn to the
constitution of Massachusetts. In this instrument we find.
Article 5 :

All powers residing originally with the people, and being de-
rived from them, the several magistrates and officers of gov-
ernment vested with authority, whether legislative, executive,
or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all
times accountable to them.

And again, Article 7 :

Government is instituted for the common good, for the pro-
tection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and

102 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man,
family, or class of men.

Therefore the people alone have an incontestable, unalien-
able, and indefeasible right to institute the government, and to
reform, alter, or wholly change the same, when their protec-
tion, safety, property, and happiness require it.

Under the constitution of Hawaii there are two Chambers,
a Senate and House of Representatives, each consisting of fif-
teen members. Senators are chosen for six years, Representa-
tives for two years. The Legislature meets once in two years,
but the session cannot extend over more than sixty days, with-
out the consent of the President. The latter is elected by
vote of the two Houses sitting together, but the majority must
include a majority of the Senate.

Male citizens twenty years of age, who can fluently speak,
read, and write either the English or Hawaiian language, can
vote for Representatives. Those are also admitted to the fran-
chise who have special letters of denization, entitling them to
all the privileges of Hawaiian citizenship, without their being
required to renounce allegiance to their native government.
Many American residents of the Sandwich Islands hold such
letters.

The qualification of voters for members of the Senate are
the same as those for Representatives, with the addition of a
property requirement. Thus the voter for members of the
Senate must be either in receipt of a money income of $600,
or must be able to show either that he possesses real estate in
the republic worth $1,500, or that he has personal property
of not less than $3,000.

In order to be a member of the House, a person must be in
receipt of an income of $600, or must own property worth
$1,000. A Senator must be a property-owner to the extent of
$3,000, or must be in receipt of an income of $1,200.

A very important feature of this constitution is the estab-
lishment of a body entitled the Council of State, consisting of
fifteen members, five of whom are appointed by the President,
and five elected by each branch of the Legislature.

It will be seen that this body is not in touch with the voters

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 103

at any point, but its powers are very extensive. The President
and Cabinet, constituting the Executive Council, may at any
time, when the Legislature is not sitting, call together the
Council of State for special advice, and in time of emergency
may upon the request of the President and Cabinet appro-
priate public money, thus acting with all the authority of
the supreme law-making body.

To obtain naturalization, a man must possess property worth
$200, must renounce all foreign allegiance, and he must come
from a country with which Hawaii has a naturalization treaty.

This constitution was never submitted to the people or any
portion of them for their approval.

The President of the republic, as above related, is elected
for a term of six years. In the present instance the formality
of an election was dispensed with, and Mr. Dole was appointed
by the convention President for the first six years.

The power to do this was nowhere granted to the conven-
tion, which was chosen simply for the purpose of framing a
constitution. It took the power into its own hands, and there
has been no pretence of submitting this appointment to an
assent or ratification of the Legislature or of th^ people, in any
form whatever.

According to the census of 1890, the people of Hawaii at
that time numbered about 90,000, of these about 3/),00() were
natives, 6,000 half-caste, 7,500 American and Englisli descent,
15,000 Chinese, 13,000 Japanese, 8,500 Portuguese, 2,000
Americans, 1,400 British, 600 Polynesians, 250 Norwc^gians,
70 French, and some 400 other foreigners. The native popu-
lation is now probably less than 30,000.

How can it be said that the Government of Hawaii is
republican in any such sense as we use this term, or that it
has anything in common with the Governments of our Union,
State or National ?

Mr. Z. S. Spalding, formerly a confidential agent of the
United States State Department, afterwards in tlie war lieu-
tenant-colonel of the Twenty-seventh Ohio Regiment, and in
1894 a sugar planter on an extensive scale, stated the following
opinions before the congressional committee : ''*

104 THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

Senator Gray. — You do not think a republic would be a
good form of government for the people of that country who
are now entitled to suffrage ?

Mr. Spalding. — No.

Senator Frye. — With the suffrage practically universal ?

Mr. Spalding. — Not as it is now, under the constitution
of 1887.

Senator Gray. — Would you think the outlook for a re-
publican form of government better if the right of suffrage
were more extensive ?

Mr. Spalding. — No ; I should think that the people
there, from the circumstances surrounding them, are not
favorable to a republican form of government. There is not
enough interest in the country for a republic — there are too
many waves of prosperity and depression.

Senator Frye. — Suppose there were a limit to the
suffrage ?

Mr. Spalding. — If you were to limit the suffrage, then
you might have a government which would, in my opinion, be
safe and advisable in the proportion that it would be limited.

Senator Frye. — But that would not be a government of
the people ?

Mr. Spalding. — It would not.

Senator Gray. — The more narrow the suffrage, the more
stable the government ?

Mr. Spalding. — Yes, because these people are like a
good many in the United States — better governed than
governing.

Senator Gray. — They need to be governed ?

Mr. Spalding. — I think so.

The Chairman. — What do you think of the future success
of Hawaii as a government, having reference to the welfare of
all classes in that country, if that government — taking the
constitution of 1887 as a basis — should be placed in the
hands of a native Kanaka dynasty ?

Mr. Spalding. — If it were placed in the hands of a
native Kanaka dynasty it would probably run back to where
it was when Captain Cook visited it.

The Chairman. — You think those people need to be under
control ?

Mr. Spalding. — While the King has been on the throne
the brains of the white man have carried on the government.

Senator Gray. — You think they need an autocratic gov-
ernment ?

Mr. Spalding. — We have now as near an approach to

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT 105

autocratic government as anywhere. We have a council of
fifteen perhaps, composed of the business men of Honolulu —
some of them workingmen, some capitalists, but they are all
business men of Honolulu. They go up to the Palace, which
is now the official home of the Cabinet, — they go up there
perhaps every day and hold a session of an hour to examine
into the business of the country, just the same as is done in a
large factory or on a farm.

Senator Gray. — They control the government ?

Mr. Spalding. — They control it. They assemble — " Now
it is desired to do so and so ; what do you think about it ? "
They will appoint a committee, if they think it necessary, or
they will appoint some one to do something, just as though
the Legislature had passed a law to be carried out by the
officers of the people.

As a supplement to this, a passage is cited from a letter
written to the New York " Tribune," in 1894, by Mr. Gorham
D. Gilman, the able and vigilant representative of the Hawaiian
Government in this country :

The men at the head of affairs in Hawaii at the present
time are largely descendants of Americans, most of them bom
on the islands. They have but one object in view — that of
endeavoring to found a government upon the principles which
actuated the patriots of the United States. They have taken
their lessons of jurisprudence from the constitutional laws
which govern New England. They are impressed by the same
lofty ideas of personal liberty ; they are endeavoring to es-
tablish a government of the people, for the people, and by the
people, and although the Hawaiian race is not largely active in
participating in the formation of this government, yet it is
confidently expected that the day is not far distant when they
will cheerfully fall into line, and accept the condition of affairs
as vastly bette-r for their interests than those preceding the
revolution of July, 1893.

To which it may be added, that whether the Hawaiian race
fall into line cheerfully or mournfully, they must in either
event accept such condition of affairs as their rulers, in pur-
suance of their lofty ideals, may see fit to impose upon them.

106

THE HAWAIIAN INCIDENT

REFERENCES TO CONGRESSIONAL REPORT.

No. Pafj^e.

1 1100

2 1128

8 1166

4 .... . 1161

6 1185

6 1196

7 1210

8 1162

9 1036

10 1769

11 448

12 452

18 1769

14 1778

15 1864

16 618

17 448

18 336

19 1846

20 1867

21 543

22 ... . 639

28 1846

24 599

No. Page.

25 1591

26 1528

27 1033

28 1776

29 581

80 1818

81 1394

82 576

38 1198

34 1415

85 1400

86 1046

87 1006

.38 1337

39 1397

40 1527

41 1337

42 1831

48 1195

44 1415

45 2125

46 483

47 413

48 2209

No. Page.

49 1054

60 1054

51 473

52 473

53 1205

54 1032

65 1046

66 681

57 1027

68 1206

69 1012

60 1993

61 2126

62 2087

68 2087

64 1245

65 1266

66 2115

67 2128

68 2129

69 1989

70 2211

71 1870

72 . . .256

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