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S. Hrg. 104-161 

HEARING ON GUATEMALA 



Y 4, IN 8/19: S, HRG, 104-161 

Hearing on Guatenalai S.Hrg. 104-16... A"PT"|\rf^ 



BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

HEARING ON GUATEMALA 



WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 




OCT 2 



6 iOi 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
92-921 CC WASHINGTON : 1995 



For sale by tlie U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-047642-9 



S. Hrg. 104-161 

HEARING ON GUATEMALA 



Y 4. IN 8/19: S, HRG, 104-161 

Hearing on Guatenala. S.Hrg. 104-16... A'PTlVrf^ 



BEFORE THE 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON 

HEARING ON GUATEMALA 



WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995 



Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 




OCT 3 



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
92-921 CC WASHINGTON : 1995 

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 
ISBN 0-16-047642-9 



\J 



SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman 
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN GLENN, Ohio 

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada 

MIKE DeWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida 

JOHN KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana 

CONNIE MACK, Florida CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia 

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine 

ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio 
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio 



Charles Battaglia, Staff Director 

Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director 

Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk 



(II) 



CONTENTS 

Hearing held in Washington, DC: 

April 5, 1995 1 

Statement of: 

Baucus, Hon. Max, a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana 162 

Bryant, Robert M., Assistant Director, Nationsil Security Division, Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation 164 

Cohen, Hon. WiUiam S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine 26 

Cornell, Allen, Colonel, USA, Ret 129 

DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 35 

Glenn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 46 

Graham, Hon. Bolj, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 39 

Harbury, Jennifer, Widow of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez 134 

Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas 43 

Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska 2 

Kerry, Hon. John F., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Massa- 
chusetts 30 

Mack, Hon. Connie, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 163 

Shelby, Hon. Richard C, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama 49 

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Penn- 
sylvania 1 

Studeman, William O., Admiral, Acting Director of Central IntelHgence ... 12 
Watson, Alexander F., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 

Department of State 3 

Testimony of: 

Barrett, John Q., Counselor to the Inspector General, Department of 

Justice 21 

Cornell, Allen, Colonel, USA, Ret 131 

DeVine, Carol, Widow of Michael DeVine 126 

Harbury, Jennifer, Widow of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez 138 

Studeman, William O., Admiral, Acting Director of Central Intelligence ... 15 
Watson, Alexander F., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, 

Department of State 8 

Supplemental materials, letters, articles, etc.: 

Memorandum, dated April 6, 1995, to Mr. Chris Mellon, Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, from Mr. Jim Bodner, Legislative Assistant, 
Senator Cohen, re: Inserts for Committee Hearing Record on Nick 

Blake 53 

1. United Press International Article, dated April 21, 1985 54 

2. Associated Press Article, dated March 2, 1986 55 

3. New York Times Article, dated April 3, 1990 59 

4. The Boston Globe Article, dated November 26, 1993 61 

5. New York Times Article, dated March 30, 1995 64 

6. Detailed Chronology, Department of State 66 

7. Telegrams from American Embassy Guatemala to SecState 72 

8. Memorandum, dated 3 December 1985 75 

9. Department of State Paper, Congressional Briefing 76 

10. Letter, dated December 4, 1985, to Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant 
Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from Sen- 
ators Cohen, Hart, Heinz, Mitchell, Specter, Moynihan, Kerry 77 

11. Letter, dated February 25, 1986 to Senate Staffers from Sally 
Lounsbury, Senator Cohen 79 

12. Letter, dated February 19, 1986 to Senator Cohen from U.S. 
Department of State 80 

(III) 



IV 

Page 

Supplemental materials, letters, ari;icles, etc. — Continued 

Memorandum, dated April 6, 1995, to Mr. Chris Mellon, Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, from Mr. Jim Bodner, Legislative Assistant, 
Senator Cohen, re — Continued 

13. Telegram, dated March 1986 to American Embassy Guatemala 
from American Embassy in Mexico 89 

14. Letter, dated June 22, 1986, to Mr. Bob Carolla, Office of Senator 
George Mitchell from Mr. Randy Blake 90 

15. Letter, dated October 24, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator 
Mitchell to Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Overseas Citizens Services, Department of State 93 

16. Letter, dated November 4, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator 
Mitchell to the Honorable Oscar Padilla, Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipotentiary, Office of the Embassy 94 

17. Letter, dated November 4, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator 
Mitchell to Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp, Deputy Assistant Secretary 

for Overseas Citizens Services, Department of State 95 

18. Letter, dated December 9, 1986, to Senator Cohen from J. 
Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovern- 
mental Affairs, Department of State 96 

19. Letter, dated December 2, 1986, to Senator Cohen from Alberto 

M. Piedra, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Guatemala 98 

20. Unclassified Memorandimi of Meeting, dated September 3, 1987 .. 99 

21. Message from USDAO, Guatemala to Defense Intelligence Agen- 
cy, Washington D.C., dated September 1987 102 

22. Letter, dated October 2, 1987, from Senator Cohen to The Hon. 
George Pratt Shultz, Secretary of State 104 

23. Letter, to Senator Cohen, from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Sec- 
retar3^ Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State 105 

Los Angeles Times Magazine Article, "The Disappearance of Jack 

Shelton" 106 

The Nation, Article by Allan Nairn 117 



HEAREVG ON GUATEMALA 



WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995 

U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 

Washington, DC. 

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in 
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen 
Specter (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Shelby, DeWine, Hutchison, Cohen, 
Kerrey of Nebraska, Glenn, Bryan, Graham of Florida, Kerry of 
Massachusetts and Robb. 

Also Present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub, 
Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and 
Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk. 

Chairman Specter. The Committee will come to order. 

Today we will proceed to inquire into the events surrounding 
payments by the CIA in Guatemala and the allegations which have 
been widespread in the public media about alleged improprieties. 

We will be seeking to fmd answers to a number of questions: 
First, did the CIA continue to make payments to the Guatemalan 
military after U.S. policy was articulated in December 1990 to stop 
all such payments; second, did the CIA make payments to Guate- 
malan Colonel Alpirez after there was substantial evidence incrimi- 
nating him into the murder of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine; and 
third, why did the Department of Justice decline to pursue a crimi- 
nal prosecution against Colonel Alpirez? 

A portion of our inquiry today will be conducted in a closed ses- 
sion because of our concern not to release or reveal sources or 
methods. There has been widespread publicity and notoriety to 
these events. And in stating the three questions, that's only a por- 
tion of the issues to be inquired into. But it is our thinking that 
there ought to be this hearing so that the American people will 
learn in an official way what has happened. 

It presents Admiral Studeman of the CIA with an opportunity to 
make a public on-the-record response to a great many charges and 
allegations which have appeared in the media. The acting director 
of the CIA has advised us that he welcomes this opportunity to 
make this formal statement. 

We will not be questioning Admiral Studeman in open session 
because of the sensitivity on the disclosure of sources and methods, 
but we will hear other witnesses in the public session. We will hear 
testimony from Ambassador Alexander Watson, from Colonel Allen 
Cornell, from Mrs. Carol DeVine, the widow of the American citi- 
zen, Michael DeVine, who was murdered in Guatemala, and from 

(1) 



Ms. Jennifer Harbury, the widow of Commander Efrain Bamaca 
Velasquez. 

I yield now to the distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Kerrey. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, you're right to hold an open hearing on this topic. Be- 
cause of this Committee's oversight responsibilities, it is our duty 
to examine all the facts surrounding allegations of CIA involvement 
in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain Bamaca and to act 
upon those facts. I thank all the witnesses in advance for what 
may be a very emotional and very painful hearing. 

It is past time to replace speculation and anonymous sources 
with facts, for the sake of the victims and because the credibility 
and the trustworthiness of the CIA is again at issue. 

I see four general lines of inquiry. First, we need to know the de- 
tails of the DeVine and Bamaca cases. 

Second, we need to review U.S. interests and the U.S. policy pur- 
poses in Guatemala. 

Third, we should consider Guatemala as a case study in the per- 
ils of secrecy. 

And fourth, every action of government is accountable to its citi- 
zens, and we should use this opportunity to inform the public, in- 
cluding the mistakes we made in these cases. 

We on the Committee already know something about these cases 
because of classified agency briefings. It is important to bring out 
as many of those classified facts as possible, but the decision to de- 
classify them and make them public resides in the executive 
branch and not with this committee. 

Concealing information in a murder investigation is extremely 
serious. Concealing information from the spouses of murder victims 
years after the crime is, in my view, a very bad decision. 

The American people's confidence in the CIA's ability to operate 
in accordance with American values has been called into question. 
The subject is Guatemala, but the impact on support for the CIA's 
future role will be global. I remind my colleagues there are genuine 
concerns here about intelligence sources and methods. Like Admi- 
ral Studeman, we walk the line between full disclosure on the one 
hand and possibly endangering people who are secretly providing 
information to the United States on the other. Even in this post- 
cold war world, we need intelligence sources and we need to protect 
them. We do need secrecy. 

Well-placed sources in foreign governments will not provide sen- 
sitive information to CIA officers if there is a good chance their 
name will appear in the U.S. press. So, if CIA claims a need to pro- 
tect sources, there are likely to be some good reasons. 

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions and lines of inquiry. 
Again, I look forward to what I hope will be a fair and calm process 
that will answer these questions and the questions of my col- 
leagues. 

Chairman SPECTER. We will have 10 minute rounds, so that the 
Members will have an opportunity for brief opening statements in 
that period. And in the interest of time, we will proceed to you. Ad- 
miral Studeman. 

And I would repeat that we are all very sensitive to protect 
sources and methods, and any questions will be asked of you in 



closed session. But this will give you an opportunity, for the record, 
to make a reply to the allegations which have been in the media 
about the CIA. And you may proceed. 

Admiral Studeman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a logical 
order of march here is to have Ambassador Watson precede me to 
provide a stage-setting comment, and then I will follow. 

Chairman SPECTER. If you would prefer to yield to Ambassador 
Watson, so be it. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Alexander F. Watson 
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD GUATEMALA: 

The Cases of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca 

Mr. Chairman: 

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues on the Sen- 
ate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss United States policy in Guatemala 
and the killings of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca. The President has asked the 
Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of 
the allegations associated with and the policy issues raised by these two cases. The 
lOB will review the facts surrounding these cases and make appropriate rec- 
ommendations. As the Secretary stated before the Congress last week, should dis- 
ciplinary or other such action be indicated, it will be taken. The administration will 
provide to the American people as much information about the review as possible. 
The Secretary has adready recommended the fullest disclosure possible. 

Mr. Chairman, promotion of human rights abroad is a fundamental principle 
guiding the Clinton administration's foreign policy. The responsibility to protect and 
assist American citizens abroad is a particularly compelling obligation assigned to 
the men and women of our foreign service. This statement therefore deals in large 
part with how the Department and our embassy in Guatemala discharged those re- 
sponsibilities in the two cases at hand. Your staff has indicated, however, that an 
overview of United States policy in Guatemala — and how it has evolved over time — 
would be helpful. Let me do that before turning to the cases of Michael Devine and 
Efrain Bamaca. 

Overview of U.S. Policy in Guatemala 

Guatemala is a deeply troubled country. It is sharply divided along ethnic and so- 
cial lines. The peasantry live in acute poverty. Decades of authoritarian and often 
extremely violent politics have inhibited the growth of democratic institutions. 
Promising political leaders have often been assassinated or driven into exHe. The 
security forces have long violated human rights with impunity. A virulent left-wing 
insurgency practiced a policy of "take no prisoners" and assassinated U.S. Ambas- 
sador John Gordon Mein in 1968. In recent years electoral politics have begun to 
function, but these democratic developments remain fragile. 

When the Central American crisis erupted in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 
late 1970's, our relations with Guatemala were problematic. The United States had 
provided substantial assistance to Guatemala under the auspices of the Alliance for 
Progress. Promotion of greater respect for human rights became a particular con- 
cern under the Carter administration. The emphasis on human rights and the con- 
ditionality the United States placed on military assistance in particular stimulated 
a nationalistic backlash among the Guatemalan military officer corps, leading it in 
1977 to reject our military aid. It would not be restored until fiscal year 1986. 

In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the guerrilla insurgency acquired much larger 
dimensions. It was met by an increasingly brutal counter-insurgency campaign car- 
ried out under a succession of military leaders: Laugerud Garcia (1974-78); Lucas 
Garcia (1978-1982); and Rios Montt (1982-83). Large-scale out-migration of Guate- 
malans began during this period, some 45,000 taking refUge in Mexico. Several hun- 
dred thousand Guatemalans who were uprooted by the war reside in the United 
States today; about 100,000 have pending asylum claims. There is no generally ac- 
cepted figure for the number of Guatemalans killed during the conflict, but esti- 
mates range upward from a hundred thousand. Human rights abuses throughout 
this period were pervasive and systemic. They are well-documented in the annual 
human rights reports of the Department and in those of non-governmental organiza- 



tions. It was also under Rios Montt that the military formed community-based civil 
defense patrols (PACs'> and armed the nearly half million Indian peasants who were 
recruited into them. In time two problems associated with the PACs emerged: forced 
recruitment into their ranks and human rights abuses which they committed. In 
1983 Rios Montt was overthrown by the Guatemalan Army itself His Defense Min- 
ister, General Mejia, was named head of state and moved to hold constituent assem- 
bly elections the following year. 

Following adoption of a new constitution in 1985, Guatemala held free and fair 
elections, won by the Christian Democratic candidate, Vinicio Cerezo. During the 
next eight years, between 1985-1992, the United States provided Guatemala ap- 
proximately 936 million dollars total aid. Approximately $33 million of that amount 
was military, including financing and training. This was a significant amount of 
total aid but, for purposes of comparison, in the same period we gave $2.5 billion 
dollars to El Salvador and $1,175 billion to Honduras. In terms of aid per capita, 
the disproportionality was even more pronounced. El Salvador received between four 
and five times as much total aid per capita as Guatemala. The Bush Administration 
suspended military assistance — both financing (FMF) and grant aid (MAP) — in 1990 
afler concluding that elements of the military were responsible for the murder of 
American citizen Michael Devine. Our total aid in 1993 and 1994 was approximately 
$113 miUion, of which $148,000 went to IMET programs. 

When Cerezo took office in January 1986, a regional diplomatic effort spearheaded 
by Mexico, known as the Contadora Process, had been underway for nearly three 
years. It was about to give way to an all-Central American initiative — the 
Esquipulas Process. Both diplomatic efforts were aimed at bringing the Central 
American insurgencies to an end through peaceful negotiations and national rec- 
onciliation. The Esquipulas Process produced a series of agreements beginning in 
1987 that provided the framework for free elections in Nicaragua in 1990 and the 
resulting demobilization of the Nicaraguan "contras." Peace negotiations had begun 
on a separate track in El Salvador in 1984; they eventually culminated in the his- 
toric 1992 comprehensive accords that ended that conflict. 

In Guatemala, President Cerezo initiated talks with the Guatemalan guerrilla 
umbrella organization — the URNG — in 1987. Those talks made only limited 
progress but were continued and made more headway under President Serrano, 
elected in 1990. It was during Serrano's term, in the last year of the Bush Adminis- 
tration, that the United States initiated direct contacts with the URNG to encourage 
forward movement in the peace process. This support for the peace process has in- 
tensified during the Clinton Administration, when at the request of the Guatemalan 
Government and the URNG, the United States joined five other governments to con- 
stitute a "Group of Friends of the Peace Process." 

President Cerezo completed his term and became the first civilian elected leader 
in Guatemala's history to turn power over to another civilian elected leader — Jorge 
Serrano, in 1991. President Serrano betrayed his oath of office to uphold the con- 
stitution and attempted to dissolve the Congress and Supreme Court on May 25, 
1993. In the ensuing twelve-day crisis, the Clinton Administration worked inten- 
sively to get democracy back on track. We collaborated closely with the Organization 
of American States, other interested governments, including Mexico, and with key 
sectors of Guatemalan society itself to produce a peaceful, constitutional outcome. 
The result was the departure of Serrano and the election by the Guatemalan Con- 
gress of Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the widely respected human rights ombudsman. 
At the conclusion of the crisis it was clear that the Guatemalan military had acted 
responsibly. In particvdar, the military had backed the finding of Guatemala's con- 
stitutional court that the actions of Serrano and his vice president were unconstitu- 
tional. 

De Leon's selection and the role of the military during the crisis gave us consider- 
able hope that Guatemala could move to further consolidate its democracy, improve 
respect for human rights and end its insurgency through negotiations. Nothing 
would have a more dramatic and immediately favorable enect on the human rights 
situation than an end to the internal conflict. Our policy has thus placed consider- 
able emphasis on that goal. 

In January 1994 the government and URNG resumed negotiations and agreed to 
a new framework agreement and timetable for concluding the talks. Under the new 
framework the talks were moderated by the United Nations and the Friends were 
given a supporting role. We appointed a special representative to the Friends Group 
to give our own support emphasis and focus. 

Under the calendar, the parties laid out a schedule of issues to be negotiated and 
set the end of 1994 as the date for a comprehensive agreement. Talks made excel- 
lent progress during the first half of 1994. Three accords were particularly note- 
worthy. A human rights agreement reached in March last year provided for a Unit- 



ed Nations Human Rights Verification Mission (MINTJGUA), which has now de- 
ployed 313 human rights monitors throughout Guatemala. The accord also provides 
that the Hvunan Rights Ombudsman has the responsibility to verify that service in 
the Civil Defense Patrols is voluntary and to determine whether PAC members have 
committed human rights abuses. The Government declares it will not support these 
patrols or arm new volunteer civil defense committees once peace is obtained. Ac- 
ceptance by Guatemala of this international presence was a hopeful sign of its grow- 
ing desire to abide by intemationallv accepted norms of human rights. 

The Guatemalan government and. the URNG also reached accords on aid to per- 
sons displaced by the war, which is already attracting international economic and 
technical support, and for a Historical Clarification Commission. The latter accord 
provoked controversy. The commission will begin to function only after a comprehen- 
sive agreement is reached. It will have the mandate to make a pubUc report on 
human rights violations committed by both sides during the war but it does not 
have the authority to assign individual responsibiUty and its findings are not to be 
used for prosecutions. 

Partly owing to the adverse reaction to this accord from within its own ranks, the 
URNG suspended talks in June, 1994. Negotiations did not resume until last Octo- 
ber. Progress thereafter was slow, but last week, in Mexico City, the parties signed 
a fourth agreement concerning the rights of Guatemala's indigenous population. The 
parties are now attempting to reach a final peace accord by a new target date of 
this August. That is an ambitious goal, especially as Guatemala holds presidential 
elections in November and the De Leon transitional presidency is drawing to a close. 
The Clinton Administration believes that the peace talks still offer the most con- 
crete hope for ending the last of Central America's internal wars and for bringing 
about a lasting improvement in respect for human rights in Guatemala. In a step 
full of symbolism, last year we redirected the remaining $4.6 million of the military 
assistance suspended in 1990 into a Peace Fund to support implementation of peace 
accords. In sum, the peace talks are key to Guatemala's future and will continue 
to receive our full support. 

That is not to say that our human rights policy in Guatemala is limited to support 
for the peace process. Far from it. Read our human rights reports. They are candid 
and detailed. They pull no punches. We believe that they have encouraged Guate- 
malan human rights supporters and that our policy has given them some protection 
and greater space to act. Our human rights policy is not confined to advocacy and 
support of cases in which we have a United States citizen interest. We have been 
vocal and active in countless others as well — the cases of Myma Mack, Maritza 
Urrutia and Amilcar Mendez to cite just three cases active in recent years. 

Our hvunan rights policy also seeks to strengthen Guatemalan institutions that 
have responsibility for protecting and improving respect for human rights. Specifi- 
cally, we have: 

— supported the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman to improve its ability 
to gather and analyze information on human rights abuses. Grants totalling $2.6 
million in the last five years have enabled the office to set up regional bureaus, in- 
stall a computer tracking system and extend education programs to indigenous au- 
diences. 

— launched this year a three-year, $2 milUon program of education, technical as- 
sistance and other support to help indigenous and grassroots non-govenmientsd or- 
ganizations increase participation of the disenfranchised in civil society; 

— worked to improve the administration of justice through a $5 million project to 
increase the judicial system's independence and professionalism and supporting ef- 
forts by the Public Ministry and MINUGUA to prepare cases for trial under a new 
Criminal Procedures Code that took effect last July; 

— assisted municipalities to pursue legal reforms through the Local Government 
Outreach Strategy Project; 

— provided training to civiUan investigators in the Public Ministry; and 

— supported the protection of street children by providing financial assistance to 
NGO's and the children's bureau of the Human Rights Ombudsman's office. 

Let me say that we see no conflict between our participation in the peace process 
and our pursuit of human rights. Indeed, we view these efforts as complementary. 
The first major accord in the peace process deals precisely with halting violations 
of human rights. It is only by guaranteeing basic human rights and political free- 
doms that democracy becomes fundamental and accessible to all Guatemalans and 
national reconciliation can be assured. 

In sum, our human rights policy is comprehensive and multifaceted. We seek to 
protect the rights of individuals and pursue with diligence specific cases of abuse. 
We actively support Guatemalan efforts to build the institutions of democracy and 
law which ultimately are the only guarantee of human rights. We make clear our 



commitment to constitutional government and free and fair elections. We participate 
in the peace process whose ultimate objective is to create the conditions for demo- 
cratic progress. 

Mr. Chairman, hundreds of thousands of American tourists visit Guatemala every 
year — not only Guatemala City and the major attractions of Antigua, Lake Atitlan 
and Chichicastenango. They also visit the Mayan sites of the Peten and the less ac- 
cessible highlands. Protection of citizens who encounter problems is an interest to 
which we devote considerable resources: publication of consular information sheets 
and travel advisories; warden systems for checking on the welfare of citizens in the 
event of a natural disaster. In Guatemala we devote the services of one consular 
officer fiill time to the needs of U.S. citizens. Other consular staff lend assistance 
as required and on occasion consular welfare cases become the all-consuming focus 
of the entire embassy team. There have been numerous instances of such all-out ef- 
forts in the last two years in particular, as violent crime throughout in Guatemala 
has increased. Kidnappings have been a problem in the last year. In those cases we 
turn to Guatemalan authorities — political, police and sometimes military for help. 
Cooperation is generally quite good. I make that point because — in fairness to the 
Guatemalan government and people — it's the truth. 

It is not always the case, however. Let me now turn to the two cases that bring 
us here today. These cases date back to the early 1990's but, as they are unresolved, 
they remain of concern to us. In both instances, we worked with two courageous 
American women whose testimony you will hear today. 

Case of Michael Vernon Devine 

U.S. citizen Michael Devine was murdered June 8, 1990 near his ranch in Poptun, 
Guatemala. Given the remote location and the absence of any police investigative 
ability in the area, our embassy in Guatemala initially sought investigative assist- 
ance from the Guatemalan mihtary. The embassy concluded in a matter of weeks, 
however, that the military itself was likely involved. Thereafter, and until the senior 
military commanders at the time of Devine's murder were replaced, we pressed our 
interest in resolving the case with the civilian government, first under President 
Cerezo and thereafter with Presidents Serrano and De Leon. Our goals throughout 
were to see the killers, intellectual authors and senior officers whom we believed 
to have covered up the crime face punishment and, in doing so, to have civilian con- 
trol over the military effectively exerted. 

In December 1990, and to drive home our dissatisfaction with the lack of real 
progress toward achieving these goals, the Department suspended FMF and MAP 
expenditures, both committed funds in the pipeline and new assistance, to the Gua- 
temalan military. It also stopped authorization of the commercial sale of defense 
items to Guatemala's military. We maintained a small IMET program totalling 
$772,000 between 1991 and 1994. 

Sheer persistence on the part of former Ambassador Stroock and his staff", to- 
gether with the effective and courageous work of a private investigator and a Guate- 
malan attorney hired by Mrs. Devine, resulted in the conviction by a military court 
of five enlisted men for the murder in September 1992. The men were given 30-year 
sentences. Those sentences subsequently were upheld by the Supreme Court of Gua- 
temala. Those men are now serving those sentences. Following continuous pressure 
by our Charge d'Affaires and the Embassy after Ambassador Stroock's departure in 
November, 1992, Guatemalan army Captain Hugo Contreras was also tried and con- 
victed of complicity in the murder in May, 1993. He was given a 20-year sentence 
but, in our view, was allowed to escape from military custody the very same day. 
We have pressed continually for the Guatemalan military to find and reapprehend 
Contreras. Following her arrival in Guatemala in June, 1993, our new Ambassador, 
Marilyn McAfee, pressed continually for the Guatemalan military to locate and 
reapprehend Contreras. We have not been successful but neither have we aban- 
doned that effort. 

We believe that senior officials of the Guatemalan Army likely ordered the deten- 
tion and interrogation of Michael Devine, possibly in connection with a case of miss- 
ing army rifles. We have absolutely no reason to believe that Devine was engaged 
in any illegal or even improper activity. Nor is it the case that Devine was a DEA 
informant, as has been alleged in the press. It is virtually certain that the two colo- 
nels (Garcia Catalan and Portillo) who commanded the base from which the five en- 
listed men operated were conspirators in the subsequent coverup. We have conflict- 
ing information on the role of Colonel Alpirez. The bulk of the information suggests 
that he was involved in a coverup. The Embassy repeatedly pressed and continues 
to press the Government of Guatemala and senior military officials themselves to 
obtain an honest account from Alpirez and others. 



Case of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez 

Guatemalan guerrilla Efrain Bamaca Velasquez disappeared on March 12, 1992 
after a firefight with the Guatemalan army. For nearly a year, his American citizen 
wife, Jennifer Harbury, told us she believed he died in combat. However, a former 
guerrilla, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, testified in February 1993 that, while detained 
by the Guatemalan military, he had seen Bamaca alive in military custody at the 
San Marcos miHtary base in March and July 1992. At that point, Ms. Harbury con- 
tacted our Embassy for the first time on March 9, 1993, identifying herself as 
Bamaca's wife and seeking our assistance. The Embassy responded quickly, mobiliz- 
ing all elements of the Embassy team to raise the case with their contacts in the 
Guatemalan Government to seek new information. On March 15, our Charge d'Af- 
faires raised the case with the Guatemalan Attorney General. 

On March 18, Embassy officials contacted then Human Rights Ombudsman 
Ramiro De Leon. He told them of inquiries about Bamaca the previous year — in 
1992 — from the URNG and the approaches he made as a result to the Guatemalan 
military. The military claimed Bamaca was probably buried in an unmarked grave 
in Retalhuleu, the site of the firefight. De Leon had obtained permission to exhume 
the grave in May, 1992, but the proceeding was halted on the grounds that no fam- 
ily members or dental or other identifying records were present. 

On March 22, 1993 the Embassy raised the case with the Guatemalan president's 
top human rights adviser. We also raised the case directly, in several channels, with 
senior militsiry and military intelligence officials. From the outset, however, and to 
this day, the Guatemalan military maintained that they did not capture Mr. 
Bamaca. 

Ambassador McAfee addressed the subject of clandestine prisons — an issue raised 
by the Bamaca case — with President De Leon July 11. She brought up the same 
issue, specifically referring to the Bamaca case with Minister of Defense Enriquez 
July 29 and did so again with President De Leon August 2. This pattern of aggres- 
sively pressing our interest in the Bamaca case continued throughout 1993 to the 
{)resent. U.S. Government officials met with Ms. Harbury frequently and at high 
evels in Washington and Guatemala, a reflection of our extraordinary interest in 
the case. Ambassador McAfee made herself continuously available. In Washington 
Ms. Harbury met on numerous occasions with senior officials in our Bureau of Inter- 
American Affairs, with Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labor Affairs John Shattuck, with Ambassador Geraldine Ferraro and with Na- 
tional Security Adviser Anthony Lake. 

During Ms. Harbur/s October-November 1994 hunger strike in Guatemala City, 
Ambassador McAfee visited her frequently and a consular officer visited her daily. 
Concerned for her physical safety, they had the Embassy's security guard visit the 
central plaza where she conducted the strike several times a day. Photographs of 
a visit to her by Ambassador McAfee and my senior adviser Richard Nuccio ap- 
peared on the front pages of most Guatemalan dailies, conveying a graphic message 
of official U.S. protection, support and concern. 

At the same time we were asking our intelligence services to search their files 
and data bases for all available information, to evaluate and re-assess the informa- 
tion available (as is often the case, much was from secondary or subsources) and 
to collect new intelligence. As additional information was acquired, we became more 
and more persuaded that the Guatemalan military had in fact captured Bamaca in 
1992. The Department instructed Ambassador McAfee to meet with President De 
Leon on November 11, 1994. The Ambassador told De Leon that, according to infor- 
mation available to the USG, Bamaca was captured alive by the military, trans- 
ferred to the San Marcos military base and that his wounds were not life-tiireaten- 
ing. She also told him that, as President, he had a responsibility to ensure that the 
investigation underway should be vigorously pursued to confirm the facts of the 
case, and to take appropriate strong action. 

On the same day, Ambassador McAfee met with Jennifer Harbury, who had just 
ended her hunger strike. Ambassador McAfee told Ms. Harbury that she had in- 
formed President De Leon that we had credible information that Bamaca had been 
captured alive by the military and that his wounds were not life-threatening. The 
Ambassador also shared with Ms. Harbury our candid assessment that there were 
unfortunately no indications that Bamaca survived much beyond the first few weeks 
of his captivity. Ms. Harbury understandably wanted to know more. We felt that 
we had a strong obligation to share with her our best assessments drawn from intel- 
ligence sources — once we were confident of them — but could not share specific intel- 
ligence without putting at risk the people who were helping us find out what hap- 
pened. 



8 

As additional information was acquired in the ensuing months, the intelligence 
community became increasingly persuaded that Bamaca had in fact been killed 
while in military custody. On several occasions between December 1994 and March 
1995 administration officials told Ms. Harbury of our beUef that, while we lacked 
conclusive evidence, Bamaca had not survived. Ms. Harbury during the same period 
told us of numerous instances of people coming to her anonymously with reports 
that Bamaca had recently been seen alive in military custody. The only such report 
lending itself to verification turned out to be bogus. None of the intelligence sup- 
ported Ms. Harburys hope that Bamaca was still alive and we repeatedly conveyed 
that painful message. 

When in late January of this year additional intelligence was received and evalu- 
ated, we instructed Ambassador McAfee to approach President De Leon again, urg- 
ing him to order the re-interrogation of senior military officers who might have been 
involved in Bamaca's disappearance. We specifically urged that Colonel Alpirez be 
interrogated again. We did not assert to President De Leon any conclusion as to 
Colonel Alpirez' role — the information available was not sufficiently definitive — but 
we were confident that Alpirez must have had direct knowledge of what happened 
to Bamaca and we urged in no uncertain terms that he be interrogated again. 

Ambassador McAfee made this demarche on February 6. On February 8 Depart- 
ment officials informed Ms. Harbury of the demarche, telling her as well that "the 
information available to us, while it is not conclusive, suggests your husband was 
killed following his capture." It was the considered view within the administration, 
however, that we could not properly mention Alpirez' name to her because it might 
prejudice the investigation we expected President De Leon to undertake and be- 
cause we could not draw a definitive conclusion about Alpirez' role in the Bamaca 
case. Most importantly, it would have put at risk the people who were confidentially 
helping us. When, after a month, Alpirez still had not oeen questioned again, we 
announced on March 10 the suspension of the participation of Guatemalan military 
personnel in IMET programs conducted in the United States for the remainder of 
FY 1995. Our announcement of that suspension also contained the considered as- 
sessment of the U.S. intelligence community that Bamaca had died in Guatemalan 
militaiy custody. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to leave this subject without saying again how much 
we sympathize with Mrs. Devine, Ms. Harbury — with all those who have lost a fam- 
ily member in circumstances such as these. We understand, too, the pain, the frus- 
tration and the anger that they feel when we cannot answer all the questions that 
torment them. At the same time, we made extraordinary efforts on behalf of Carol 
Devine and Jennifer Harbury — as we did earlier in the cases of Nicholas Blake, 
Griffin Davis and Sister Dianna Ortiz. We acted in good faith throughout, doing our 
best to help them and to share with them as much information as we could. 

We have pressed the Guatemalan government hard on both the Devine and 
Bamaca cases and we will continue to do so. Indeed, on instructions of Secretary 
Christopher, Ambassador McAfee met with President De Leon last night, delivering 
a personal message from the Secretary underscoring the importance that we attach 
to seeing justice achieved in these cases. For our part, we are prepared to provide 
the cooperation and assistance of our Federal Bureau of Investigation. For its part, 
we believe Guatemala could do much more to find and imprison Captain Contreras. 
We believe Guatemala has yet to conduct the kind of vigorous, credible inquiry in 
the Bamaca case that we have consistently called for and we will stay the course 
on that issue, too. We will continue to protect U.S. citizen interests in Guatemala 
to the best of our ability. We will speak up and remain active in our Guatemalan 
human rights policy across the board and we will stay engaged in support of the 
peace process and the consolidation of what is still a very fragile, imperfect democ- 
racy. Enlightened poUcy demands no less. 

TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER F. WATSON 

Mr. Watson. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Bill. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman. 

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your col- 
leagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss 
U.S. policy in Guatemala and the human rights cases of Michael 
DeVine and Efrain Bamaca. 

The President and Secretary Christopher are committed to a 
thorough review of all aspects of the allegations associated with 
these two cases. And the Intelligence Oversight Board will examine 



9 

the facts and make appropriate recommendations. Should discipli- 
nary action be indicated, it will be taken. And Secretary Chris- 
topher has recommended the fullest disclosure possible to the 
American people. 

Mr. Chairman, promotion of human rights is a fundamental prin- 
ciple of this administration's foreign policy, and protecting and as- 
sisting American citizens abroad is the most solemn obligation of 
the State Department. I would like to focus in these summary re- 
marks on how we have dealt with the cases of Michael DeVine and 
Efrain Bamaca in terms of these policy objectives, as well as our 
overall policy toward Guatemala. 

And I would ask, sir, that my full remarks be entered into the 
record of the Committee. 

Chairman Specter. Your full remarks will be made a part of the 
record. 

Mr. Watson. Thank you very much, sir. 

Guatemala is a deeply troubled country. It is sharply divided 
along ethnic lines. Decades of authoritarian and often extremely 
violent politics have inhibited the growth of democratic institu- 
tions. Promising political leaders have often been assassinated or 
driven into exile. The security forces have long violated human 
rights with impunity. A virulent left-wing insurgency practiced a 
policy of take no prisoners and assassinated American Ambassador 
John Gordon Mein in 1968. In recent years electoral politics have 
begun to function, but these democratic developments remain ex- 
tremely fragile in Guatemala. 

Let me just make a few points about the difficult situation our 
policy confronts in that country. First, there has been only one 
transfer of power from a civilian elected president to another in 
Guatemala's entire history. That came in 1991 when Vinicio Cerezo 
was succeeded peacefully by Jorge Serrano. Guatemala's fragile de- 
mocracy was threatened only two years later, however, in May 
1993 when President Serrano himself attempted to dissolve the 
congress and the supreme court. The Clinton administration ener- 
getically assisted the efforts of the international community, and of 
enlightened Guatemalans to produce a peaceful and constitutional 
outcome, and Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the human rights ombuds- 
man who had gained international attention for his courageous be- 
havior, took office with the support of the military in a process that 
fully respected constitutional procedures. 

Second, compared with other countries of Central America, Gua- 
temala has not been a major recipient of U.S. assistance, nor mili- 
tary aid. During the years from 1985 to 1992, the United States 
provided Guatemala approximately $936 million in total aid, and 
of that approximately $33 million of it was military assistance. 
That relatively modest military assistance was suspended by Presi- 
dent Bush when he concluded that elements of the military were 
responsible for the murder of American citizen Michael DeVine. 

Our total aid in 1993 and 1994 was approximately $113 million, 
of which $226,000 went to the non-lethal military training pro- 
grams. No military assistance per se, but military training pro- 
grams of a non-lethal nature. An important element of our assist- 
ance to Guatemala goes to strengthen institutions that protect 
humsm rights, such as to fund the Office of the Human Rights Om- 



10 

budsman, to provide support to indigenous and grass roots organi- 
zations, to improve the administration of justice, to train civilian 
investigators, and to protect street children. 

Our consular staff is also dedicated to protect and serve the hun- 
dreds of thousands of American tourists who visit Guatemala every 
year. 

Third, a negotiated solution to Guatemala's protracted guerrilla 
conflict is critical to improving human rights and to deepening 
Guatemala's weak democratic experience. After years of stalemate, 
the peace process made important progress in 1994, signing several 
agreements and deploying a 300-plus person United Nations 
human rights verification mission in Guatemala. The talks slowed 
late in the year, but they have produced another breakthrough in 
the signing of a key accord on indigenous rights and identity last 
week in Mexico. The peace talks are the key to Guatemala's future, 
and we will continue to support them fully. 

Now, our emphasis on protecting human rights and the lives of 
American citizens has produced successes in Guatemala, but we've 
also had major disappointments. The murder of Michael DeVine in 
June 1990 is one tragic example. The efforts of his widow, Carol 
DeVine, who is here with us today, and those of our embassy, con- 
vinced us long ago, not long after the murder, that the Guatemalan 
army itself was involved in that crime. We have pressed three suc- 
cessive governments to identify the killers and the intellectual au- 
thors of the crime and those involved in the attempted coverup. 
Dissatisfaction with the responses we received prompted the sus- 
pension of military assistance to the Guatemalan armed forces in 
1990, which I mentioned. 

Persistence, courage, and cooperation between the DeVine family 
and embassy staff resulted in the convictions of five enlisted men 
for the murder in September 1992. An army captain, Hugo 
Contreras, was also tried and convicted in 1993. But that achieve- 
ment of the Guatemalan judicial system was undercut when 
Contreras was allowed to escape from military custody shortly 
thereafter. 

We believe that senior officials of the Guatemalan army likely or- 
dered the detention and interrogation of Michael DeVine, possibly 
in connection with a case of missing army rifles. We had conflicting 
information about the involvement of one officer. Colonel Julio Ro- 
berto Alpirez, in the DeVine case, but the bulk of the information 
available to our people at that time suggested that Alpirez was 
among those who participated in the coverup. We have pressed and 
will continue to press for justice in this case. 

Let me turn for a moment to the case of Efrain Bamaca. Based 
on the testimony of a former guerrilla and army collaborator, 
Santiago Cabrera Lopez, Ms. Jennifer Harbury told us she became 
convinced in early 1993 that her husband has survived interroga- 
tion and torture by the Guatemalan army. She first came to our 
embassy in March 1993 seeking our assistance. Within six days of 
that request, our Charge d'Affaires was inquiring of the attorney 
general of Guatemala about the case. A few days later, our em- 
bassy heard from the then human rights ombudsman, Ramiro De 
Leon, now president of the country, that he had made inquiries 
about Bamaca the year before, had concluded that Mr. Bamaca was 



11 

dead. We also raised the case with the presidency of Guatemala, 
with senior military and intelligence officials, all of whom main- 
tained that Bamaca was never even captured by the military. 

During this period of great confusion politically in Guatemala — 
it's the period I mentioned before when President Serrano tried to 
suspend the supreme court and the congress, and it was a complex 
process which resulted in Mr. De Leon becoming president — during 
this period of great confusion, the embassy team worked tirelessly 
to press for results and to obtain new information. 

When De Leon became president, our new ambassador, Marilyn 
McAfee, asked about the existence of clandestine prisons, an issue 
directly raised by the Bamaca case. She pursued the issue with the 
Minister of Defense in July and again with President De Leon in 
August. And during this period, U.S. Government officials met with 
Ms. Harbury frequently and at high levels in Guatemala and 
Washington. Her meeting with National Security Advisor Anthony 
Lake confirmed our extraordinary interest in the case. 

During Ms. Harburys second hunger strike in Guatemala during 
October and November 1994, Ambassador McAfee and our embassy 
staff were with her daily. And photographs of a visit to her by Am- 
bassador McAfee and my senior adviser, Rick Nuccio, conveyed a 
message of official U.S. protection, support, and concern on the 
front pages of Guatemala's national dailies. 

Energetic intelligence collection efforts, as well as searches of 
files and data bases about the Bamaca case, began to yield results 
in October 1994. With additional reports, we became persuaded 
that the Guatemalan military had indeed captured Bamaca alive in 
1992, and Ambassador McAfee presented these conclusions to 
President De Leon on November 11 and to Ms. Harbury that same 
day. She told both that our information indicated that Bamaca was 
captured alive, was transferred to the San Marcos military base 
and that his wounds were not life-threatening. The ambassador 
urged a further investigation to determine the facts of the case and 
to take appropriate action. And we let Ms. Harbury know that we 
could not confirm at that time that Bamaca had lived beyond the 
first few weeks of captivity. We just had no information that indi- 
cated that he was still alive. 

Over the ensuing months, and based on more information which 
we were collecting, we reached even stronger conclusions about 
Bamaca's fate and communicated these in increasingly direct terms 
to Ms. Harbury. While accepting the information that he had been 
captured alive, as the army knew what had happened, she told us 
that she continued to receive reports that her husband had been 
seen alive and she said she believed he might still be in military 
custody, and we tried to chase those reports down as best we could. 

When in late January of this year, additional intelligence was re- 
ceived and evaluated, we instructed Ambassador McAfee to ap- 
proach President De Leon again. We suggested that he should 
reinterrogate certain senior military officers, and specifically urged 
that Colonel Alpirez be among them. We could not give President 
De Leon definitive information about Colonel Alpirez's role, but we 
were confident that he must have had direct knowledge of what 
happened. This demarche to the president occurred on February 6. 
On February 8, department officials informed Ms. Harbury about 



12 

the demarche, including that the information available to us, while 
not conclusive, suggested that Mr. Bamaca had been killed follow- 
ing his capture. 

One month later, with no movement of any kind by the Guate- 
malan government, we took the additional step of suspending the 
participation of Guatemalan military personnel in international 
military exchange and training programs conducted in the United 
States for the remainder of this year. That announcement also con- 
tained the considered assessment of the U.S. intelligence commu- 
nity that Bamaca had died in Guatemalan military custody. 

We wish, Mr. Chairman, that we had produced better or quicker 
results in this case and that of other human rights cases of concern 
to us and to Guatemala. And I sympathize deeply with Ms. 
Harbury, Mrs. DeVine, and all those who have lost loved ones in 
circumstances such as these. I know that our inability to provide 
answers to all the questions that torment them cause pain, frustra- 
tion, and anger. But I also believe that we acted in good faith 
throughout, doing our best to help them and to share with them 
as much information as we could. 

Our dissatisfaction with the response of the Guatemalan govern- 
ment is manifest in our actions. Last evening, on instructions from 
Secretary Christopher, Ambassador McAfee met with President De 
Leon again, delivering a personal message from the Secretary un- 
derscoring the importance that we attach to seeing justice achieved 
in these cases. We believe that Guatemala can and must do more 
to find and imprison Captain Contreras, and a vigorous and credi- 
ble investigation of the Bamaca case has, in our view, not even 
begun. 

When Guatemala is ready to confront its tradition of impunity, 
we will provide the cooperation and assistance of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. We will continue to protect U.S. citizen in- 
terests in Guatemala to the best of our ability. We will speak up 
and remain active in our Guatemala human rights policy across 
the board and we will stay engaged in support of a reinvigorated 
peace process and the consolidation of what is still a very, very 
fragile and imperfect democracy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Ambassador Watson. 

We'll turn now to Admiral Studeman. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Studeman follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is important that we speak to you 
and the American people today about issues related to CIA's involvement in Guate- 
mala. The allegations made are serious and the issues are complex. I would like to 
be as expansive as possible, given the open and unclassified nature of this hearing. 
There are classified aspects of this which I will not be able to address and, regret- 
fully, I will have to defer these issues to closed session. Similarly, as you know, most 
of the issues I will address are under review by various inspectors general or the 
Justice Department working with the Intelligence Oversight Board tasked by the 
President. Finally, neither the DCI nor CIA makes foreign policy; accordingly, ques- 
tions related to policy need to be deferred to the State Department and the National 
Security Council. Nevertheless, given the treatment of these issues and the media 
comments, I will provide what I believe to be the facts or conclusions that I know 
at present. 



13 

Extremely serious allegations have been made regarding CIA's conduct in the 
events surrounding the murder of the U.S. citizen Michael Devine in June 1990, and 
the fate of the Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. Let me state 
emphatically that the CIA is not complicit in the murder of Mr. Devine nor in the 
apparent kilUng of Mr. Bamaca. Nor has the CIA deliberately withheld information. 
On the contrary, CIA information provided important insights into what transpired 
in these two cases. I have already made available to the oversight committees a 
comprehensive package of intelligence materials related to them. 

Let me review the record. 

• CIA acquired its first significant piece of information on the killing of Mr. 
Devine in August 1990, and promptly sent an intelligence report on the matter to 
the National security Council Staff, the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice, 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, this information was a key ele- 
ment in furthering US efforts to press Guatemalan authorities to take decisive steps 
leading to the arrest and conviction of a number of those directly involved. 

• More than one year later, in October 1991, CIA received information that shed 
light on the possible presence of an additional Guatemalan — Lt. Colonel Julio Ro- 
berto Alpirez — in the interrogation of Mr. Devine. Again we promptly provided this 
information to the National Security Council, the Departments of State, Defense, 
and Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an intelligence report. We 
also prepared a formal written "crime report" containing even more detailed infor- 
mation. This report was delivered to the Department of Justice on 19 November 
1991. 

In sum, all the intelligence information related to the killing of Mr. Devine was 
reported to relevant US executive branch authorities in a timely fashion. It is im- 
portant to note that there is nothing in our current review of the Devine case that 
changes our view of the Guatemalan judicial system's verdict that Army Captain 
Contreras and his soldiers killed Mr. Devine. 

At the same time, I want to acknowledge that we failed to inform the intelligence 
committees in the House and the Senate about the specific information we acquired 
in October 1991. I regret this failure to keep the Congressional oversight committees 
fully informed. 

Now we regard to Bamaca: 

• The first information that the CIA received on the capture of Bamaca came in 
the spring of 1992 and this was provided to the Departments of State, Defense, and 
Treasury, the National Security Council, and the US Southern Command. At that 
time, we received no tasking to collect additional information concerning the fate of 
Bamaca, a Guatemalan citizen. 

• We nonetheless continued to receive conflicting information sporadically over 
the next three years. All of this information was also provided promptly to the ap- 
propriate US officials in the US Embassy in Guatemala and in Washington. 

• In October 1994, US policjonakers asked us to review the information on the 
Bamaca case that we had up to this point and to seek additional information in an 
effort to determine his fate. This effort resulted in the production of a series of intel- 
ligence assessments. 

• In late January 1995, CIA received new reporting regarding Bamaca's death. 
Once received at Headquarters, this information was provided immediately to ap- 
propriate US Government agencies. In addition, because of the cumulative effect of 
this report, CIA undertook an analysis of this new information in light of all pre- 
viously available reporting, and two days later forwarded this assessment to appro- 
priate US Government agencies. In the course of researching this assessment, we 
learned additional information about an April 1994 report. The senior Guatemalan 
military officer, cited in the report who had interrogated Bamaca in March 1992 was 
indeed Colonel Alpirez. 

• The CIA also worked with the NSC and the State Department to clear the in- 
formation for a presentation to the Guatemalan Government in early February 
1995. 

• By 3 February, the CIA had briefed this information to the staffs of the Senate 
and House oversight committees. There have been a number of other classified brief- 
ings and hearings since then. 

I would stress that, like some of the reporting in the Devine case, our information 
on the fate of Bamaca has been fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and of vary- 
ing reliability. For example, let me describe some of the conflicting information we 
have been dealing with regarding Bamaca. We have received reporting that: 

• He was killed on the battlefield; 

• He committed suicide to avoid capture; 

• He was seriously wounded, captured, and died shortly afterwards; 



14 

• Some sources believe he was killed within weeks of his capture; other informa- 
tion has him alive as of July 1992; and we have heard allegations that he was sight- 
ed alive in the presence of an Army patrol as late as 1994. 

If we focus on the more credible information most recently received, together with 
our analysis of other data, our assessment is that Bamaca did not die on the battle- 
field as alleged by the Government of Guatemala; rather, we believe that he was 
captured alive — with minor wounds — after an armed encounter with Guatemalan 
Army troops on 12 March 1992 and taken to San Marcos for interrogation. 

Our best judgment, based on the information available, was that Bamaca was 
killed while in Guatemalan Army custody within several weeks of his capture, but 
we do not know the specific circumstances of his death. We have the name of a Gua- 
temalan officer, the previously mentioned Colonel Alpirez, who is reportedly knowl- 
edgeable about — and perhaps involved in — the presumed death of Bamaca. This in- 
formation has been passed by State Department to the Guatemalan Government for 
its investigative follow-up. I repeat tnat CIA was not involved in the death of 
Bamaca, or in any coverup related to this case. 

As I conclude this aspect of my statement, I would like to again observe that the 
US Government — and Guatemalan authorities — would have a far less complete pic- 
ture of the fates of Devine or Bamaca had it not been for CIA and overall intel- 
ligence community reporting. 

The next accusations I will address are that CIA funded inteUigence programs in 
Guatemala in contravention of US policy or that it surreptitiously replaced US mili- 
tary aid cut off in December 1990 through some kind of deliberate bait and switch 
effort. These adlegations are also false. 

The programs that CIA conducted were authorized under several Presidential 
Findings. They were regularly reviewed by senior officials in the key foreign affairs 
and national security agencies of the Executive Branch. They were also regularly 
reviewed by the Intelligence Committees in the Houses and the Senate. All funds 
expended in these programs were fully authorized and appropriated by the Congres- 
sional intelligence and appropriations committees. 

While I cannot go into the details of these programs in an open session, I can 
deny categorically the charge that we increased funding during the 1989 — 1995 pe- 
riod. In fact, total CLA funding of Guatemalan intelligence peaked at about $3.5 mil- 
lion in FY 1989 and fell consistently to around $1 million in FY 1995. The Presi- 
dent's recent decision to suspend US assistance to the GuatemaJan military will re- 
duce substantially the FY 1995 figure. This steady drop represents an orderly phase 
out of our Central American program. 

These dates are important because it is during FY 1991 — December 1990 — that 
CIA is alleged to have increased funding to offset the loss of US military aid. 

I cannot comment authoritatively before the work of the CIA Inspector General 
is completed. Nevertheless, I believe we have made some management and proce- 
dural mistakes in these two cases. 

• First, as I have already noted, we did not brief the oversight committees on im- 
portant 1991 information related to Devine in the same way we had briefed the De- 
partment of Justice. We regret that we did not do so. 

• Second, the potential significance of one piece of information obtained in mid- 
1994 was not recognized until we received new information in January 1995. 

• Third, there is one instance in January 1995 during which an important report 
was delayed in the field for six days; we believe this reflected a management lapse, 
which contributed to our decision to recall our Chief of Station in Guatemala. 

CIA management is reviewing its procedures to implement corrective measures. 
At no time, however, did the CIA deliberately withhold or suppress information on 
these cases. The charge that we did is false. 

As you know, reviews are underway in other US Government agencies regarding 
allegations associated with the Bamaca and Devine cases. The investigators were 
also tasked to look into information on other cases involving the human rights of 
several US citizens. 

In addition, the President had assigned the Intelligence Oversight Board certain 
specific review tasks working with the departmental and agency investigative bod- 
ies. All agencies involved are in the process of securing documents relating to these 
inquiries and are cooperating fully in the investigations. 

I have been as candid as possible in this hearing, although there are limits to 
what I can responsibly say in a public forum. Specifically, I cannot and will not talk 
in unclassified, open session about intelligence sources and methods. I will be happy 
to do so in classified sessions. 

I take this position not out of some abstract devotion to secrecy but because in 
a very real sense, it is essential for the protection of the lives of the people who 



15 

assist the intelligence community and our own national security interests. Indeed, 
our success depends on our ability to protect the identities and activities of those 
individuals who agree to work with us on a clandestine basis. In agreeing to do so, 
they put themselves at great personal risk. If we fail to satisfy this fundamental 
obligation to our sources, we will find few people willing to support our efforts. 

To conclude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the Intelligence Com- 
munity in a democratic society. 

• At the direction of US policymakers, we provide information on such difficult 
issues as civil wars, terrorism, narcotics, weapons proliferation, organized crime, 
and instability related to regional, ethnic, tribal, or religious conflict. 

• It is a continuing dilemma that in collecting vital information on such topics 
we do not necessarily find our sources among the pristine, the honorable, and the 
elegant. 

• We do not, however, use this or any other rationale for overlooking or covering 
up crimes. 

• We fully accept the necessity of being held to high standards of conduct. 

• We also recognize that the unique challenges with which the intelligence profes- 
sion must grapple make it all the more important to ensure continuous and proper 
Executive and Congressional oversight of past, present, and future intelligence and 
covert action programs. 

This concludes my remarks. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN 

Admiral Studeman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the 
Committee. 

It's important that we speak to you today and the American peo- 
ple about issues related to CIA involvement in Guatemala. The al- 
legations made are serious and the issues are complex. I would like 
to be as expansive as possible given the open and unclassified na- 
ture of this hearing. There are classified aspects of this — which you 
have already spoken to — which I will not be able to address, and 
regretfully, I will have to defer these issues to closed session. Simi- 
larly, as you know, most of the issues I will address are under re- 
view by various inspectors general or the Justice Department work- 
ing with the Intelligence Oversight Board tasked by the President. 
Finally, it's important for everyone to remember that neither the 
DCI nor the CIA make foreign policy. Accordingly, questions relat- 
ed to policy need to be deferred to the State Department and the 
National Security Council. 

Nevertheless, given treatment of these issues and media com- 
ments, I will provide what I believe to be the facts or conclusions 
that I know at present. Extremely serious allegations have been 
made regarding CIA's conduct in the events surrounding the mur- 
der of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine in June 1990 and the fate of the 
Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca. Let me state em- 
phatically that the CIA is not complicit in the murder of Mr. 
DeVine nor the apparent killing of Mr. Bamaca, nor has the CIA 
deliberately withheld information. On the contrary, CIA informa- 
tion provided important insights into what transpired in these two 
cases. I've already made available to the Oversight Committees a 
comprehensive package of intelligence materials related to them. 
Let me review the record. 

CIA acquired its first significant piece of information on the kill- 
ing of Mr. DeVine in August of 1990 and promptly sent an intel- 
ligence report on the matter to the National Security Council staff, 
the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, this information was a key ele- 
ment in furthering U.S. efforts to press Guatemalan authorities to 



16 

take decisive steps leading to the arrest and conviction of a number 
of those directly involved. 

More than one year later, in October 1991, CIA received informa- 
tion that shed light on the possible presence of an additional Gua- 
temalan, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, in the interro- 
gation of Mr. DeVine. Again, we promptly provided this informa- 
tion to the National Security Council, the Departments of State, 
Defense and Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an 
intelligence report. We also prepared a formal crimes report, con- 
taining even more detailed information. This report was delivered 
to the Department of Justice on 19 November 1991. 

In sum, all of the intelligence information related to the killing 
of Mr. DeVine was reported to relevant U.S. executive branch au- 
thorities in a timely fashion. It is important to note that there is 
nothing in our current review of the DeVine case that changes our 
view that the Guatemalan judicial system's verdict that Captain 
Contreras and his soldiers killed Mr. DeVine. 

At the same time, I want to acknowledge that we failed to inform 
the Intelligence Committees in the House and the Senate about the 
specific information we acquired in October 1991. I regret this fail- 
ure to keep the Congressional Oversight Committees informed. 

Now, with regard to Bamaca, the first information that the CIA 
received on the capture of Bamaca came in the spring of 1992. And 
this was provided to the Departments of State, Defense and Treas- 
ury, and the National Security Council as well as the U.S. South- 
ern Command. At the time, we received no additional tasking to 
collect additional information concerning the fate of Bamaca, a 
Guatemalan citizen. We nonetheless continued to receive conflict- 
ing information sporadically over the next three years. All of this 
information was also provided promptly to the appropriate U.S. of- 
ficials and the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala and in Washington. 

In October 1994, U.S. policymakers asked us to review the infor- 
mation on the Bamaca case that we had up to this point and to 
seek additional information in an effort to determine his fate. This 
effort resulted in the production of a series of intelligence assess- 
ments. In late January 1995, CIA received new reporting regarding 
Bamaca's death. Once received at headquarters, this information 
was provided immediately to appropriate U.S. Government agen- 
cies. In addition, because of the cumulative effect of this report, 
CIA undertook an analysis of this new information in light of all 
previously available reporting and two days later forwarded this 
assessment to appropriate U.S. Government agencies. 

In the course of researching this assessment, we learned addi- 
tional information about an April 1994 report. The senior Guate- 
malan military officer cited in this report who had interrogated 
Bamaca in March 1992 was indeed Colonel Alpirez. The CIA also 
worked with the NSC and the State Department to clear the infor- 
mation for a presentation to the Guatemalan government in early 
February 1995. By 3 February the CIA had briefed this information 
to the staffs of the Senate and House Oversight Committees. There 
have been a number of other classified briefings and hearings on 
this subject since then with the Intelligence Oversight Committees. 

I would stress that like some of the reporting in the DeVine case, 
our information on the fate of Bamaca has been fragmentary, 



17 

sometimes contradictory and of varying reliability. For example, let 
me describe some of the conflicting information we've been dealing 
with regarding Bamaca. We have received reporting that he was 
killed on the battlefield, that he committed suicide to avoid cap- 
ture, that he was seriously wounded, captured, and died shortly 
thereafter. Some sources believe he was killed within weeks of his 
capture; other information has him alive as of July 1992, and we 
have heard allegations that he was sighted alive in the presence 
of an army patrol as late as 1994. 

If we focus on more credible information most recently received, 
together with our analysis of other data, our assessment is that 
Bamaca did not die on the battlefield, as alleged by the government 
of Guatemala, but to repeat what Ambassador Watson has already 
said, we believe that he was captured alive with minor wounds 
after an armed encounter with the Guatemalan army troops on 
March 12, 1992, and that he was taken to San Marcos for interro- 
gation. Our best judgment, based on information available, was 
that Bamaca was killed while in Guatemala army custody within 
several weeks of his capture, but we do not know the specific cir- 
cumstances of his death. 

We have the name of a Guatemalan officer, the previously men- 
tioned Colonel Alpirez, who is reportedly knowledgeable about — 
knowledgeable about — and perhaps involved in the presumed death 
of Bamaca. This information has been passed by the State Depart- 
ment to the Guatemalan government for its investigative followup 
in the context that Ambassador Watson has already relayed to you. 
I repeat that CIA was not involved in the death of Bamaca or in 
any coverup related to this case. 

As I conclude this aspect of my statement, I would like to again 
observe that the U.S. Government and Guatemalan authorities 
would have far less a complete picture about the fates of DeVine 
or Bamaca, had it not been for CIA and overall intelligence commu- 
nity reporting. 

The next accusations I will address are that CIA funded intel- 
ligence programs in Guatemala in contravention of U.S. policy or 
that it surreptitiously replaced U.S. military aid cut off in Decem- 
ber 1990 through some kind of deliberate bait and switch effort. 
These allegations are also false. The programs that CIA conducted 
were authorized under several Presidential Findings. They were 
regularly reviewed by senior officials in the key foreign affairs and 
national security agencies of the executive branch. They were also 
regularly reviewed by the Intelligence Committees in the House 
and the Senate. All funds expended in these programs were fully 
authorized and appropriated by Congressional Intelligence and Ap- 
propriations Committees. 

While I cannot go into the details of these programs in an open 
session, I can deny categorically the charges that we increased 
funding during the 1989 to 1995 period, specifically the period after 
the December 1990 cutoff". In fact, the total CIA funding of Guate- 
malan intelligence peaked at about $3.5 million in fiscal year 1989 
and fell consistently to about $1 million in fiscal year 1995. The 
President's recent decision to suspend all U.S. assistance to the 
Guatemalan military will reduce substantially the fiscal year or 
current year figure. This steady drop represents an orderly phase- 



18 

out of the Central American program. These dates are important 
because it is during fiscal year 1991 — in fact, December 1990, 
again as I've already stated — that CIA is alleged to have increased 
funding to offset the loss of U.S. military aid. Now, leaving this 
topic, let me address another issue: What do I consider to be the 
problems with CIA management in these cases. I cannot comment 
authoritatively before the work of the CIA Inspector General is 
completed; nevertheless, I believe that we have some management 
and procedural mistakes in these two cases. First, as I have al- 
ready noted, we did not brief the Oversight Committees on impor- 
tant 1991 information related to DeVine in the same way that we 
briefed the Department of Justice and other elements of the execu- 
tive branch. We regret that we did not do so. 

Second, the potential significance of one piece of information ob- 
tained in mid- 1994 was not recognized until we received new infor- 
mation in January 1995. 

Third, there was one instance in January 1995 during which an 
important report was delayed in the field for six days. We believe 
this reflected a management lapse which contributed to our deci- 
sion to recall our chief of station in Guatemala. CIA management 
is reviewing its procedures to implement corrective measures. How- 
ever, at no time did the CIA deliberately withhold or suppress in- 
formation in these cases, and the charges that we did so are false. 

As you know, reviews are underway in other U.S. Government 
agencies regarding allegations associated with the Bamaca and 
DeVine cases. The investigators were also tasked to look into infor- 
mation on cases involving the human rights of several other U.S. 
citizens. In addition, the President has assigned the Intelligence 
Oversight Board certain specific review tasks working with the de- 
partmental and agency investigative bodies. All agencies involved, 
including the National Security Agency and the U.S. Army, are in 
the process of securing documents related to these inquiries and 
are cooperating fully in these investigations. 

I've been as candid as possible in this hearing, although there 
are limits to what I can responsibly say in a public forum. Specifi- 
cally, I cannot and will not talk in unclassified, open sessions about 
intelligence sources and methods. I will be happy to do so in classi- 
fied sessions. 

I take this position not out of some abstract devotion to secrecy, 
but because in a very real sense it is essential for the protection 
of lives of the people who assist the intelligence community and our 
national security interests. And this has already been, I think, 
articulately discussed also in the opening statement by Senator 
Kerrey. Indeed, our success depends on the ability to protect the 
identities and activities of those individuals who agree to work 
with us on a clandestine basis. In agreeing to do so, they put them- 
selves at great personal risk. If we fail to satisfy this fundamental 
obligation to our sources, we will find few people who will be will- 
ing to support our efforts. 

To conclude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the 
intelligence community in a democratic society. At the direction of 
U.S. polic3nnakers, we provide information on such difficult issues 
as civil wars, terrorism, narcotics, weapons proliferation, organized 
crime, and the instability related to regional conflict and other 



19 

forms of conflict around the globe. It is a continuing dilemma that 
in collecting vital information on such topics, we do not necessarily 
find our sources among the pristine, the honorable, and the ele- 
gant, and this will continue to be a problem for the future. We do 
not, however, use this or any other rationale for overlooking or cov- 
ering up crimes. We fully accept the necessity of being held to high- 
er standards of conduct. 

We also recognize that the unique challenges with which the in- 
telligence profession must grapple make it all the more important 
to ensure continuous and proper executive and congressional over- 
sight of past, present, and future intelligence and covert action pro- 
grams. 

Senators, subject to your questions, this concludes my remarks. 
I might say that I do have senior CIA staff and our Inspector Gen- 
eral here to assist. And now I think Ambassador Watson and I 
would be pleased to respond to any of your comments or questions, 
sir. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Admiral Studeman. 

You have articulated the concerns about the disclosure on 
sources and the risk factor. And you and I and Senator Kerrey 
have discussed the background of the case. And it is not an easy 
balance as to a judgment as to how far the Committee should go 
in eliciting information from you. Our determination has been that 
we should hear your statement, which you have just given, to give 
the CIA an opportunity to respond to the public accusations, and 
to allow the public to hear from the CIA about what you can say 
to the extent that you can testify. 

In our own conversations, as we start to probe more deeply, it 
is very difficult to even ask some of the questions to have you re- 
spond that you cannot comment without raising some inferences or 
some suggestions as to what is going on. The nature of the question 
identifies people who may be at risk or jeopardized, even if you say 
you can't say. So for that somewhat fuller explanation, the ruling 
is that we will not question you. But we'll do so in closed session, 
and we'll make a fuller determination about what you could re- 
spond on these questions in open session. And as promptly as we 
can, to the extent we can, we will have you testify in open session. 

But we have convened this hearing at an early date, not awaiting 
the conclusion of the recess, which would be several more weeks, 
because of our judgment that the American people are entitled to 
an inquiry at this time. So that there is assurance to the public 
that the Oversight Committee is not lingering or dallying on telling 
the American people what it is that we can say. 

After hearing Ambassador Watson's testimony, Senator Kerrey 
and I conferred briefly and it appears that Ambassador Watson can 
respond to questions. But again I say. Ambassador, in the course 
of any of the questions, you feel that something is asked of you that 
you cannot comment about, exercise your own judgment in declin- 
ing to answer. 

But let me begin with questions to you to the extent that you can 
comment without disclosing sources or methods. What were the 
specifics of the information you had about Colonel Alpirez — and I 
ask this in the context of the issue of referring the matter to the 
Department of Justice for possible prosecution under the United 



20 

States antiterrorist law. We have laws in effect enacted in 1986 
which authorize the prosecution of individuals who commit acts of 
terrorism against American citizens anj^where in the world. Cus- 
tomarily, jurisdiction attaches in the locale where the event oc- 
curred, and while Guatemala would have jurisdiction over Colonel 
Alpirez, so would the United States on our extraterritorial asser- 
tion of jurisdiction, where there's terrorism involved on a U.S. citi- 
zen, Michael DeVine, and that issue is raised. So tell us as specifi- 
cally as you can what evidence or information or indicators there 
were about Colonel Alpirez' complicity? 

Mr. Watson. Well, the information available to us about Colonel 
Alpirez and the DeVine case, Mr. Chairman, is still not conclu- 
sive — at least the information I've seen. Back at the time, in 1990 
and 1991, the information available to us goes more or less like 
this. That a group of military personnel came from a base in a 
town called Flores under instructions of some sort to detain and in- 
terrogate Mr. DeVine. Those people left their base and went down 
to another base in a town called Poptun and that is where Colonel 
Alpirez — at that time a Lieutenant Colonel, I believe — was the 
commanding officer of that base. 

The information developed by all elements of the embassy, but 
also by Mrs. DeVine — and the people that she had working with 
her did a spectacular job in this — suggested that these people 
stayed a couple of nights at that base — which was a training 
base — before they sequestered Mr. DeVine. And they may even 
have used vehicles from that base. At least their vehicle was seen 
at that base. 

In any case, those individuals, that is, the enlisted men, took Mr. 
DeVine prisoner, drove off with him in their vehicle and his vehi- 
cle, and somehow, somewhat later, took actions which resulted in 
his death. The best information available to me, at least, is that 
that did not take place on the base, but someplace else. 

In any case, these people were brought to trial and they were 
convicted and they were sentenced. Now, our view is that an officer 
of the rank of Colonel Alpirez at that base had to have known that 
these people from another base were spending a couple of nights 
there and receiving 

Chairman Specter. Was there evidence that Colonel Alpirez was 
present during any part of the interrogation or activity as to 
Michael DeVine? 

Mr. Watson. To the best of my knowledge, sir — and we really 
have to ask the people that were involved in the actual case in 
Guatemala at the time — to the best of my knowledge, sir 

Chairman Specter. Well, this is not a trial. You're not giving di- 
rect evidence. You may testify as to what you learned officially. 

Mr. Watson. Sure. 

Chairman Specter. What is the information that was transmit- 
ted to you in your official capacity? 

Mr. Watson. We have a variety of reports. And I have to tell 
you. Senator, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen all of the reports from 
back in 1990 and 1991. I have not been able to review all of those 
reports, and don't even think we have them all in the State Depart- 
ment. But the bulk of the evidence is, I gather, as Admiral 
Studeman has just laid out, that while there have been some re- 



21 

ports that say that Colonel Alpirez may have been at the scene of 
the crime, may have been more directly involved, the bulk of the 
evidence suggests that he's guilty of a coverup, that he had to have 
known that these people were in the area and what they were up 
to. And that is our tentative conclusion at this point. 

Chairman Specter. Was Colonel Alpirez 

Mr. Watson. We're very, very frustrated that not only Colonel 
Alpirez, but the commanders of the base up in the north, I said in 
Flores, where Captain Contreras and his men were based, have not 
been who we think gave the orders for the men to go out and de- 
tain Mr. DeVine — have not been brought to trial. 

Chairman Specter. Well, the information given to the Commit- 
tee is that Captain Contreras was convicted and then mysteriously 
escaped 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. 

Chairman Specter. With all the indications that it was a put- 
up deal and he was allowed to escape. 

Mr. Watson. That's our conclusion. 

Chairman Specter. Was any consideration given to prosecuting 
Captain Contreras under U.S. terrorist laws? 

Mr. Watson. Not that I know of, sir. Not that I know of. 

Chairman Specter. Why not? Why not? 

Mr. Watson. I really am unable to comment on any action — deci- 
sions made by the Justice Department in this case. I'm simply not 
familiar with that, sir. 

Chairman Specter. Well, we have someone here from the Justice 
Department. And I wonder if Mr. Barrett would step forward, 
please? Do we have someone here from Justice? 

[Pause.] 

Chairman Specter. While we had not formally listed you as wit- 
ness, we'd be interested to know if you can at least tell us if the 
issue as to Colonel Alpirez was dropped on the jurisdictional 
grounds or insufficiency of evidence? 

TESTIMONY OF JOHN Q. BARRETT 

Mr. Barrett. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Would you state your full name for the 
record, please? 

Mr. Barrett. Yes. My name is John Barrett. I'm Counselor to 
the Inspector General at the Department of Justice. The Depart- 
ment of Justice began an inquiry only last week into its receipt of 
information and its handling of information regarding the DeVine 
killing. That is an inquiry that's being conducted at the request of 
the Deputy Attorney General. It's an ongoing inquiry, and it has 
not reached definitive conclusions or resulted in a report. And so 
what we were asked to do is be present this morning and perhaps 
to field questions to describe the existence of that review 

Chairman SPECTER. Well we would be perhaps better off by hav- 
ing the Justice Department officials who made the judgments, as 
opposed to someone from the Inspector General; to hear from some- 
one who actually reviewed the case to make a determination as to 
whether it was jurisdictional, that is the absence of evidence of ter- 
rorism, or whether there was not sufficient evidence to proceed. 



22 

Mr. Barrett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Department is committed 
to providing a full report to the Committee as soon as the informa- 
tion is developed on the receipt and the handling of the information 
that came into the Department. 

Chairman Specter. Mr. Barrett, stay with us at the witness 
table. My time has expired, and we'll come back to you at a later 
time. 

Mr. Barrett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. I yield now to the Vice Chairman, Senator 
Kerrey. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Secretary Watson, what's the U.S. inter- 
est in Guatemala? 

Mr. Watson. The U.S. interest in Guatemala, principal interest, 
is to contribute to the development of a democratic society in Gua- 
temala where the citizens of Guatemala and of other countries that 
are visiting Guatemala or living there enjoy full human rights. And 
Guatemala is an integral member of a democratic hemisphere with 
open and constructive political life involving all members of society, 
irrespective of ethnic background or social origin. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is that the objective during the Bush 
and Reagan administrations as well? 

Mr. Watson. Senator, I'm really unable to respond fully about 
the objectives of the other administrations. But I would, sir, like to 
point out that President Bush certainly took strong action, on the 
recommendation of Ambassador Stroock, in 1990, to cut off all mili- 
tary assistance. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. All right, so let's presume that it was 
the policy of the Bush administration as well. I won't expect you 
to go back further than that. Let's look at another country just as 
a litmus test of our policies. What's the greatest threat to democ- 
racy in Iraq? What inhibits democracy in Iraq? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I'm not an expert on Iraq, Senator- 



Vice Chairman Kerrey. Neither am I. But what^ust sort of- 



Mr. Watson [continuing]. But I would think the single biggest 
obstacle to democracy in Iraq is the existence of the extremely re- 
pressive and authoritarian regime run by the president of that 
country. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Would you say that the Iraqi military 
and the police force used by Saddam Hussein, a dictator, is a 
threat to democracy in Iraq? 

Mr. Watson. My impression is that the Iraqi police force and 
military are firmly under the instructions and control of Mr. Sad- 
dam Hussein, are instruments in his implementation of his poli- 
cies. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is there a comparable situation in Gua- 
temala? 

Mr. Watson. I think there's no — there's no way one can compare 
Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the President of Guatemala, with Saddam 
Hussein. De Leon Carpio is an extraordinary figure in the history 
of his country, was the human rights ombudsman at a time when 
it was extremely dangerous to do that, and very aggressively pur- 
sued cases. And they were brought to him by people of all classes, 
including — he pursued the Bamaca case before we even knew about 



23 

it in 1992. So to compare him with Saddam Hussein would be not 
fair at all. 

I would argue, however, that 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate that distinction, and I think 
it not only is a fair, but an important distinction to make for Amer- 
icans who are trying to evaluate not only U.S. interests in Guate- 
mala, but how it is that we are to accomplish the objectives that 
you've just described, to make certain that Americans understand 
the differences between the two. But the question that I'm trying 
to get to is whether or not the military in Guatemala is an impedi- 
ment to the development of democracy in that country. 

Mr. Watson. Well, I think that another dramatic difference be- 
tween 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is the military an impediment to the de- 
velopment of democracy in Guatemala? 

Mr. Watson. I think that the behavior of the armed forces, the 
military in Guatemala in the past certainly has been. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Was this a trial that one would expect 
and applaud in a democratic environment? 

Mr. Watson. A trial? 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Was this — the trial of the soldiers that 
were accused in the DeVine murder, was that a trial that you could 
look at and say, gee, this is evidence that democracy is flourishing 
in Guatemala? 

Mr. Watson. Well, for one that's not familiar with the details of 
the trial, I would say in a place like Guatemala, where the military 
had held sway for so long and are not, I would argue, firmly under 
the control of the president — completely different from Iraq — that 
to have a trial of a military officer — Contreras — that's the first time 
they've ever had a military officer convicted in a military court in 
my knowledge in the history of the country. So that was a great 
step forward. And the conviction of the enlisted men also was a 
great step forward, and that was even held up by the supreme 
court. 

Of course, the conviction of Contreras was vitiated immediately 
by his escaping and disappearing. And we are still pressing the 
government of Guatemala to find where he is, bring him back, and 
have him serve the time to which he was sentenced. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. You said you're not familiar with the de- 
tails of the trial. 

Mr. Watson. Yes, that's right. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Ajid can you explain why you're not? Is 
that principally because it took place before you assumed your re- 
sponsibilities? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. There are — I would think that there are 
people who were directly involved, even in our embassy in those 
days, would be able to give you a lot more information, and we can 
research our files and see if we have some more reports on them, 
which we would be glad to share with you also. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Would the details of Mr. DeVine's mur- 
der been brought out in the trial? 

Mr. Watson. I'm not sure, sir. We'd have to look at that. My un- 
derstanding is that the people convicted did not admit to what they 
did, but they were convicted nevertheless. 



24 

Vice Chairman KERREY. That's my understanding as well, that 
they said nothing during the trial. 

What is your own suspicions as to the nature of the interrogation 
and the nature of the execution? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I laid them out a little bit earlier, sir. We do 
not know exactly how Mr. DeVine died, what the specific cir- 
cumstances were, but we are convinced that these convictions were 
correct and those were the people who actually did it. But we be- 
lieve also 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you suspect that the interrogation it- 
self was brutal? 

Mr. Watson. The interrogation of Mr. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. DeVine. 

Mr. Watson. DeVine? My understanding, sir, and please, I don't 
want to be boring when I keep adding "it's my understanding," but 
I was not there and do not have firsthand knowledge of this. My 
understanding by the reports that I've read was 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Had this man been employed at the De- 
partment of State, would your attitude be the same as it is right 
now, with respect? 

Mr. Watson. My attitude would be — yes, absolutely. I mean, he's 
an American citizen who was picked up and did nothing wrong, 
and was picked up by some people, by military people, for no rea- 
son that makes any sense and then somehow resulted in his death. 
And I'd be as outraged about that if it were 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Earlier, Mr. Secretary, in your testi- 
mony you expressed sympathy, not outrage, to be clear. And I 
don't — I'm not holding you responsible for that, but I do observe 
that's one of the problems in this case, that the U.S. response was 
sympathy, not outrage. 

Mr. Watson. Well, Senator, may I please — I think that Ambas- 
sador Stroock, at that time our ambassador in Guatemala, per- 
formed extraordinarily well in this case. Within 24 hours of Mr. 
DeVine's death, he was aware of this and he was pushing ex- 
tremely hard to get at the bottom of it. He very quickly discovered 
that the military themselves were probably involved in the case, so 
he stopped dealing with the military to look for solutions, and 
started dealing with the civilians and working very closely with 
Mrs. DeVine and her — and people that were working with her put 
together the evidence which resulted in this conviction. I think the 
embassy — all elements of the embassy, including 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I don't doubt Ambassador Stroock's per- 
formance at all, Mr. Secretary, but he is one part of — one employee, 
one person in the government. I'm questioning U.S. official re- 
sponse. 

Mr. Watson. My impression, sir, is that the response was one of 
outrage all the way up to the President of the United States when 
we cut off that aid at the end of 1990, just six months after the 
murder. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is your impression that U.S. efforts in 
Guatemala have been to (a) support the Guatemalan army in sup- 
pression of the and operation against the insurgency, or (b) empha- 
sis on a process of reconciliation? 



25 

Mr. Watson. I will tell you categorically, sir, in this administra- 
tion, at least, which is the only one for which I can speak, it has 
been the latter, and including with elements of the military. And 
there are some enlightened folks in the military now and they've 
played a constructive role, as I mentioned, in that complicated 
transfer of power when President Serrano tried to alter the con- 
stitution unilaterally. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did the department, Mr. Secretary, 
know the purpose, methodology, and cost of CIA programs in Gua- 
temala? 

Mr. Watson. I'm not sure that I can go into what we knew about 
CIA programs in Guatemala in an open session, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. My understanding is that all govern- 
ment operations overseas, Mr. Secretary, including programs car- 
ried out by the CIA, are reviewed in some kind of an interagency 
process before they're undertaken. Is that correct? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And that State Department is a part of 
that process? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So I presume, since this is an overseas 
operation, that some kind of review was undertaken and that the 
State Department was a part of that review? 

Mr. Watson. There should be some sort of a review, but I can't 
tell you, sir, exactly which — every program 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And I presume you're not disclosing any- 
thing to say that the State Department knew the purpose, knew 
the methodology, and knew the cost. You're saying you didn't know 
the cost, methodology, or purpose? I mean, that's hardly, it seems 
to me, anything that you're — you're not giving up sources and 
methods by telling that you knew what the hell they were doing 
down there and why. 

Mr. Watson. Well, I'm not sure that I — I certainly don't know 
the costs of every program in Guatemala. I rely on what Admiral 
Studeman told us just a few minutes ago in that regard. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Admiral Studeman has responsibility as 
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. You have a respon- 
sibility in the State Department, it would seem to me, to be able 
to answer pretty directly that in an interagency process, that you 
would know purpose, the methodology, and the cost, and you're 
saying to me either you're concerned that telling me that you knew 
the purpose was classified or that you didn't Imow the purpose or 
the cost or the methodology. 

Mr. Watson. I think it's correct to say that the interagency proc- 
ess, including the State Department, is aware of the general thrust 
of the policies and programs of all agencies in a specific country. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. General thrust? I mean, I — my time is 
up, but I 

Mr. Watson. Well, I can't tell you in all honesty, sir — I don't 
want to be misleading — that every detail of every program is 
known. But I'm really uncomfortable going further beyond that 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. My time is up, Mr. Secretary, but I 
didn't ask you if you knew every detail. I asked you if you knew 
purpose, I asked you if you knew methodology, and I asked you if 



26 

you knew cost. That's not every detail. I didn't ask you if you knew 
name, rank, and serial number of every individual that was down 
in Guatemala. I asked you a much more generic and general ques- 
tion. 

Thank you. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Kerrey. 

The practice of the Committee is to alternate among Members in 
order of arrival, and Senator Cohen is next. 

Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me commend you and Senator Kerrey for pursuing with 
great dispatch the allegations surrounding the CIA's involvement 
with respect to human rights abuses in Guatemala. I must say that 
most Americans are justifiably appalled at the statements and alle- 
gation concerning the payment of tens of thousands of dollars to an 
asset after learning he was probably involved in the brutal torture 
and death of a U.S. citizen. 

And I must say I also question the role of the CIA and other 
agencies in handling information not only about the Bamaca case, 
and the Blake case, but other instances of human rights abuses in 
Guatemala. I'm certain, however, that the inquiry undertaken by 
the Chairman and Vice Chairman will eventually produce a clear 
picture of what has occurred. 

I say this also with a caveat, that I think a public hearing at this 
time may be a bit premature, as we're learning with the responses 
given by the witnesses here at the table this morning. On the one 
hand we have an FBI investigation underway, which we do not 
want to compromise in any way. We have investigations underway 
by several inspectors general. We have an investigation underway 
by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. And we have 
ground rules which are going to lead to, it seems to me, to a frag- 
mentary disclosure. Some of the information will remain behind 
the veil of classification. There will be confusion in terms of exactly 
what has happened, what the information is. And I think the clas- 
sified information is critical to the understanding of what the intel- 
ligence community did in Guatemala, who approved it, and how the 
information was collected and was used by our government. That 
picture will not emerge from this particular hearing, and that's 
going to be unfortunate. 

It's also my personal belief that the Oversight Committees have 
been misled. And I would say, in my own opinion, the evidence will 
indicate that they may even have been lied to. So we have a prob- 
lem; if we say too little today, we run the risk of misleading the 
American people; if we say too much, we run the risk of jeopardiz- 
ing sensitive technical capabilities and even lives, as both the 
Chairman and the Vice Chairman have pointed out. I think the 
American people deserve answers. I'm confident they're going to get 
them. But I think it's important for the press and the public to un- 
derstand that nothing approaching a complete and accurate picture 
is going to emerge today by virtue of the fact that the evidence is 
going to be fragmentary and not forthcoming and full. 

Having said that, Mr. Chairman, let me just pursue one area 
that is troubling to me. Admiral Studeman, I think you indicated 
in your statement that the CIA failed to inform the Oversight Com- 
mittees. Is that correct? 



27 

Chairman Specter. Senator Cohen, we're going to have to with- 
hold questions as to Admiral Studeman, even though that question 
does not 

Senator CoHEN. I don't think it's going to call for any — here is 
part of the problem that I have 

Chairman Specter. I think it is not. The question is, once we 
start on that line. 

Senator Cohen. Well, let me just say that from what I gather 
from the statements that have been delivered it has been offered 
to the Committee that all of the relevant agencies were appro- 
priately advised in the executive branch — State Department, NSC, 
Justice Department, every branch but the Intelligence Oversight 
Committees of both the House and the Senate. I believe that is the 
representation that was made by the witnesses. 

Chairman Specter. I think that is accurate, Senator Cohen. 

Senator COHEN. Let me then state for the record that I believe 
that to be incomplete and inaccurate. I will say without questioning 
the witnesses in open session — as we cannot do — that I believe that 
the information was not only withheld from the Committee, I be- 
lieve the Committee was deliberately misled. And that will not be 
a statement coming from the witnesses, but from me, and that is 
part of the problem I have today, is that we are presenting an in- 
complete and I think a fragmentary picture which is going to lead 
to a good deal of misunderstanding. In any event 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Just for the record, I think you make a 
very good point, Senator, and I quite agree. Not only were we not 
informed, I believe this Committee was indeed intentionally misled. 

Senator COHEN. Well, I was going to make the point that we've 
had in the past — we've had people prosecuted for withholding infor- 
mation from the Congress. In this particular case, I think it goes 
flirther. This was not only a withholding of information, a failure 
to inform as they're required, but also upon initiation of questions 
by this Committee, relating specifically to a case where the infor- 
mation was, in fact, misleading, and I believe deliberately designed 
to mislead the Committee. I think it goes much further than with- 
holding or failure to advise. Apparently that's something we can 
pursue or we'll have to pursue at a later time. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Cohen, in light of the serious com- 
ments you've made, let me ask Admiral Studeman if he wants to 
respond to that. I think the CIA ought to have an opportunity to 
respond to a comment that there's been a deliberate withholding of 
information. 

Admiral Studeman. Let me see if I can frame an appropriate re- 
sponse to you. And I do believe that we're going to have to discuss 
this further, clearly, in closed session. The information to which 
you refer that was not — that the Committee was not informed of, 
was this information that was provided for the crimes reported to 
the Justice Department that had to do with the potential involve- 
ment of then Lieutenant Colonel Alpirez, involvement in the — in 
the DeVine case in the sense that he was alleged to be present at 
the interrogation that resulted in Michael DeVine's death? 

As the ambassador has already said, this was the essence of the 
CIA information, but there is also other — there are other theories 
about where and under what circumstances Michael DeVine died: 



28 

That is, that he was not taken to the Special Forces school base 
at Kaibil, where Lieutenant Colonel Alpirez was the — was the com- 
manding officer, but that he was, in fact, killed off the premises of 
this school, which would provide then an indication that Alpirez 
was, in fact, not at the interrogation. 

That did not belie the fact that Colonel Alpirez, as the ambas- 
sador has already said, is probably involved in a coverup, because 
the five enlisted soldiers and the individual that — and Captain 
Contreras did operate from this base at Kaibil. And clearly records 
were destroyed that reflected that, and the support that the base 
gave to these particular individuals. 

Now, this information was reported by the intelligence commu- 
nity to the — to the Justice Department. The Justice Department 
was ruling on the issue of their jurisdiction, which has not yet been 
addressed here, and I will not comment on that aspect of it. It took 
several months for the Justice Department to essentially make 
their determination. In the process of those several months there 
was an effort, at least so far as I've been able to track from internal 
documentation, to inform — there was a — there is internal docu- 
mentation suggesting that there was an intent to inform the House 
Intelligence Committee. But as best we can tell from our records, 
no such information was, in fact, conveyed to the House Intel- 
ligence Committee. As you know, it's also unusual for us to convey 
it to one committee and not to the other. And clearly, I think we 
have confidence that the information was not conveyed to the Sen- 
ate Intelligence Committee. 

Now, the issue to which I believe you refer, with regard to the 
misleading aspects of this, had to do with a separate event which 
I think we ought to deal with offline, which has to do with human 
rights reports that are made to the Committee and the information 
that was provided by CIA with regard to that aspect of our dialog 
with you. That only came to my attention this morning, but I will 
say that we need to explore that more fulsomely in our discussions 
together. 

Senator COHEN. Well, I can see my time is running out. That's 
part of the difficulty I have, Mr. Chairman, with the nature of the 
proceedings today. I understand the public pressure by virtue of 
Congress about to — or the Senate about to recess for two weeks 
and the need to try to get as much information as possible, but the 
difficulty is that by pursuing it piecemeal, going public and then 
classified, not really setting forth the ground rules of what can be 
discussed, we're going to have a picture which I think is not going 
to contribute to a full understanding on the part of the American 
people. 

Let me just say with respect to the matter you just referred to. 
Admiral Studeman, I think perhaps it's appropriate that we pursue 
that. I would only like to alert my colleagues to something that's 
of concern to me. I've been through this before some years ago with 
the Iran-Contra affair, and one thing that became clear during the 
course of that is this Committee has to be appropriately informed 
and advised of certain matters. In this particular case, this Com- 
mittee — this is prior to my coming back on the Committee — but 
this Committee expressed specific interest in information, re- 
quested a response from the Agency and the response that I have 



29 

seen from the Agency I believe is misleading in its entirety. So, we 
can pursue that at a later time, but this Committee, the Congress 
can't do it's job if it isn't given accurate information and truthful 
information, and information that is designed not to inform but to 
obscure. 

And I'll reserve further questions — obviously, since my time has 
run out — for a later time. 

Chairman Specter. Senator Cohen, I think you have obviously 
raised a matter which is of enormous importance when you say 
that it's more than a matter of not having been informed but lied 
to. And it is not possible, no matter what we do in open session 
today, to have comprehensive answers to all the questions that are 
pending. But there'll be a good deal of information which will be 
available to the American public. And when we try to establish an 
appropriate line so that we do not disclose sources and methods, 
or do not get into even questions where the witness declines to an- 
swer, which raises an inference as to sources and methods, that is 
difficult. 

But when you raise another issue about misinformation and 
lying, then I think on two counts we need to pursue that. One 
count is that if that kind of a serious charge is being made against 
the CLA — and I know from your background. Senator, that you do 
not make any statement lightly, especially a statement like that — 
but having said that, the CIA ought to be entitled to respond. And 
Admiral Studeman has responded. And the nature of the issue of 
lying or misleading does not relate to sources or methods, that re- 
lates to the integrity of the CIA. And I think that is a subject, hav- 
ing been broached, that we ought to pursue in your next round. 
And I do not think that it will encroach on the concerns I have ex- 
pressed about sources and methods. I'm not unaware that once 
there's a deviation from the rule that a witness can answer ques- 
tions if there are going to be other questions which are going to 
be 

Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems 

Chairman Specter. Well, let me finish. 

Other questions which may pose difficulties, but I think that's a 
part of the process and we'll just deal with them one by one. But 
I think you ought to be permitted to pursue it when the next round 
comes. 

Senator Cohen. One of the problems is that the information that 
I would wish to pursue would remain classified. And as Senator 
Kerrey has pointed out, there is only one person that can declassify 
that, and that's the President of the United States. So I don't know 
that we can, in fact, pursue that under these circumstances be- 
cause we haven't had a clarification of what can and what cannot 
be discussed. 

Chairman Specter. Well, that being so, whenever we pursue 
that in a classified form, it's not going to be available to the Amer- 
ican people. But the decision was made to proceed as far as we can 
go, and I think a good bit has been disclosed and will be disclosed, 
so that it's a net gain even though we cannot do it all. And some 
of it will have to be conducted behind closed doors, and then we'll 
make a judgment as to what can be disclosed. But doing it — and 
we're going to have that closed session at the end of our open ses- 



30 

sion today, so that we can proceed to determine what can be dis- 
closed to the maximum amount possible. 

Admiral Studeman. Mr. Chairman, if I could say something, 
while it may be the impression of this Committee that in this par- 
ticular circumstance there was an intent to mislead, I have not had 
a chance to get into this particular issue and I have no evidence 
at this particular point in time that there was a deliberate intent 
to mislead on the part of the CIA in dealing with this matter. So 
I believe that we have some homework to do, and I believe also 
that it is appropriate to discuss this again in closed session. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I can tell you in response. Admiral 
Studeman, that I felt as if I had been misled from the moment of 
my first contact with this issue in February. So there is a consider- 
able amount of additional work that needs to be done. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, the issue of whether the Committee 
has been misled or lied to will be pursued in detail and in depth 
and we'll be reporting on that publicly at the earliest appropriate 
time. 

Senator Kerry from Massachusetts. Senator Kerry is next in 
order. I'm alternating in time of arrival. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would 
like to associate myself completely with the remarks of Senator 
Cohen and perhaps even a little bit further. Like Senator Cohen, 
I have also been exposed to this process on two occasions, one 
through the Foreign Relations Committee and the Contra efforts in 
Central America, and indeed prosecutions came out of my being 
lied to by the CIA in the course of that. Claire George was con- 
victed, though later overturned. 

And in the course of the POW Select Committee, we went 
through one of the largest declassifications in American history and 
struggled with the effort to deal with these fine lines. 

I think it's important to have a hearing, but if we're going to 
have a hearing we ought to be able to ask questions that I think 
do not raise issues of sources and methods but which really shed 
light to the American people on the judgments that are being 
made. It's my sense, Mr. Chairman, that everybody has come to 
understand that what we're really focused on here is an agency 
that has not changed as fast as the world around it has changed, 
and that there seems to be a blinding capacity to drive for the col- 
lection of, "intelligence," with little regard sometimes for the pos- 
sible negative consequences and certainly with little regard of how 
useful some of that intelligence may prove to be. 

I'm not sure that having colonels on a paid contract basis is a 
risk worth taking, measured against what they provide, particu- 
larly measured against many of the other ways in which informa- 
tion or the very same information is provided. And I think we have 
to ask and stop — ask if in this new world that we're in, Mr. Chair- 
man, the national interest is always served by the paid collection 
of some of the characters that we associate ourselves with. This is 
not the first time this has happened and we've learned the lesson 
previously about what happens when you sleep with dogs. 

I think, Mr. Chairman, there are a legitimate number of ques- 
tions. I'd like to just share some. I came here expecting that we 
were going to be able to ask the CIA about some policy questions 



31 

and judgments. I would have liked to have asked Admiral 
Studeman, who I didn't know we were not going to be able to ques- 
tions of, whether the time has come for Congress and the executive 
branch to reevaluate when, where, and how we engage in some of 
these paid clandestine relationships and what their value is to his 
intelligence efforts. I don't think that violates sources and methods. 
I would have liked to have asked him about whether he and his 
predecessors are conducting a review of that or whether they would 
recommend that kind of review to the new DCI; what the relation- 
ship will be to the Aspin Commission; whether we should use paid 
clandestine human assets in situations where the ramifications of 
discovery are so great and the risk of U.S. security is so minimal. 
I would like to know whether that particularly is important, meas- 
ured against the fact that the embassy, reporting liaison relation- 
ship, signals intelligence, CNN and others provide most of the 
same information. I'd like to know from a policy perspective, with- 
out the Soviet threat, why we still need to have paid sources in al- 
most every country of the world. And I think that's the kind of 
question. If it is for narcotics, if it is for stability reasons, if it is 
for other reasons, the American people ought to know the answer 
to that question. It doesn't violate sources and methods; it's a pol- 
icy issue. It's a judgment. It's how their money is being spent. And 
it obviously gets the United States into hot water on occasion, and 
that is what this hearing is about. That's what these issues are 
about. How does the CIA evaluate and handle paid sources in a 
way that assures some of those sources are not doing something in- 
imical or embarrassing to U.S. interests? What are the financial ob- 
ligations that we incur with respect to those sources when we've in- 
curred them? I don't think that is violative of this process. Do we 
make it clear to those sources in recruiting that we don't finance 
or protect criminals? Is there something in our methodology that 
perhaps needs review to guarantee that they understand that that 
is not the case? At what point do we stop protecting a source? Do 
you feel that the United States is obligated to protect somebody 
when we know or think that human rights abuses may be con- 
ducted? These are all policy questions, and I'm concerned, Mr. 
Chairm.an, that we're not exploring them in public today. 

I truly do not feel that we are incapable of drawing the line be- 
tween those things that might touch on a source or method, and 
I've found in my previous excursions in public on these issues that 
nobody has been embarrassed or found any difficulty in having 
somebody suggest, "Well, Senator, that's something that I think 
we're going to have to do in the executive session," and everybody's 
agreed and on we've gone. 

So I voice a concern about the methodology and I join Senator 
Cohen in saying that I think there will be rather less light shed 
and rather more questions unanswered and perhaps greater confu- 
sion as a consequence of not being able to pursue those things. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Watson, if Mr.— Colonel Alpirez attended a 
school or military training in the United States? 

Mr. Watson. I understand that he did, yes, sir. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Do you know the circumstances 
of that and the name of the school? 



32 

Mr. Watson. My understanding is — and I can get you the full 
record afterwards; I don't have it with me here — is that he did at- 
tend the School of the Americas at some point back in the late — 
maybe the late 1980's. But I can get you the information on that, 
sir. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Do you know if there are any 
indications, either in his record at school or elsewhere, that he was 
the type of person who might, in fact, be untrustworthy or problem- 
atical? 

Mr. Watson. I simply don't know that, sir. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. You don't know that. 

Do you know of other instances of those who have attended the 
School for Americas who have engaged in similar kinds of activities 
that you believe he's been engaged in? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I think that it's common knowledge that some 
few people who have passed through the classes and courses of the 
School of the Americas have subsequently engaged in behavior that 
is quite nefarious. There's no question about that. But I think also 
the great — the huge, overwhelming majority of people that have 
gone to the School of the Americas, to our knowledge, certainly 
have not performed in that fashion. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. In the second panel, Mr. Cornell will be 
able to answer that kind of a detailed question. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. OK. 

From a policy perspective, Mr. Secretary, is there concern in the 
State Department about the clandestine information gathering 
process and the way in which, improperly accounted for, it can run 
contrary to the interests that the State Department, in fact, places 
as its highest priority? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I think, sir, in the Department there would 
be concern about anything that would make it more difficult for us 
to undertake our policy. But the particular issue that you're getting 
at, I think, is one of the things that will be looked at by the Intel- 
ligence Oversight Board's review. It's my understanding that the 
President has asked them to get at all the facts in the cases we're 
talking about, to look at our own operations, the interagency oper- 
ations as well as within the various departments, to see if we're 
doing our job well or not, and if not, give us recommendations. And 
then to make as full disclosure as possible to the American people 
of their findings, and that's what the President has committed to 
do. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, knowing what was 
known about Colonel Alpirez at the time he was severed, why 
would he be paid a significant sum of money, tens of thousands of 
dollars — 40-plus? Is that an appropriate thing to have done under 
those circumstances? 

Mr. Watson. With all due respect, Senator, that's the kind of 
issue that I'm certainly not qualified to address or even to comment 
on in an open hearing. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Why can't you comment on 
that in open hearing? Why are you here? 

Mr, Watson. I'm here, sir, to try to lay out basically what our 
policy toward Guatemala is and how we handled these cases. 



33 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I'm asking you for your 
judgment as an official of the U.S. Government. Is that appro- 
priate, to pay a man, knowing what we knew about Mr. Alpirez? 
Why do you pay him and give him a going-away parachute know- 
ing what we knew? 

Mr. Watson. The State Department didn't pay him anything. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Did you know he was going to 
be paid? 

Mr. Watson. No, sir. I do not know that he was paid by anybody. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Wasn't it signed off of by Jus- 
tice? 

Mr. Watson. I do not know, sir. I don't know anything about 
what Justice may have done in this 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, then, why are you here? 

Mr. Watson. I'm here for the purposes that I said. Senator, real- 
ly. I mean, with all due respect 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I'm not sure what they 
are. I don't have any further questions. 

Mr. Watson [continuing]. I can't — I can't answer that kind of a 
question, of who might have paid Colonel Alpirez. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, Senator Kerry, had you been here at 
the opening, the ambassador testified to the background of what 
went on in Guatemala and had some relevant testimony to offer. 
That's why he's here. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, I was 
here. I heard it. And I'm still asking the question, I think the ques- 
tion's still relevant. I mean, this is a judgment issue, it's not a 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. For the Committee and for the public as 
well, I mean, I appreciate. Senator Kerry, that you say that this 
hearing may accomplish nothing, may add additional confusion, but 
this Committee has not been silent on this issue up to this day. 
And in our responsibility we are trying to walk the line between 
the public's right to know and our requirement to try to protect not 
just what's going on in Guatemala but what's going on in the rest 
of the world. And this Committee asked, after we were informed — 
in fact, last November we sent a letter to Tony Lake asking that 
the Committee be allowed to share the information that we have 
with Jennifer Harbury. We requested an Inspector General's inves- 
tigation of the entire incident. And to be fair to Admiral Studeman, 
he had already actually launched that IG investigation. This Com- 
mittee met with the Directorate of Operations on March 23 along 
with other CIA people. And at that time in very strong language — 
and I believe Admiral Studeman will confirm that — expressed our 
anger and outrage at having not been informed and dealing with 
many of the issues that you have already raised. 

And so this hearing is not, as Senator Cohen quite correctly said, 
being conducted for the purpose of answering every single question 
that's out there. We have a very detailed investigation going on 
right now. Fred Hitz is in the room. I don't know if he'll be called 
later, but I trust, based upon his handling of the Aldrich Ames 
case, that he is going to bring not just to us in a classified form 
but will bring to the public in a declassified form a much clearer 
picture of this entire situation. 



34 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I respect that, Senator 
Kerrey, and I'm not trying to tread anywhere unfair, but the Amer- 
ican people have read a huge amount — the papers, newspapers 
once again are frankly — told us more than many of us have learned 
through sources we're supposed to learn them. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, that's a consequence, in my judg- 
ment, that the administration does control when to declassify. In 
my judgment they made a conscious decision to provide background 
information beyond what we had. There's no question that that did 
take place. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. No, I realize. All I'm trying to 
suggest is, that as a consequence of that information now being 
public, there are legitimate policy questions swirling around, and 
I feel very personally restrained and encumbered when a commit- 
tee of this importance meets with the acting director and policy is- 
sues that are really judgments that might shed some light on how 
billions of dollars are being spent can't be answered. I do not want 
to tread across the line of a source or a method, but I don't think 
any of the questions that I've framed, that I thought we would be 
entitled to ask, did so. 

Chairman Specter. Senator Kerry, I appreciate what you're get- 
ting at here, and as Senator Kerry commented, some of those mat- 
ters were inquired into on the March 23 session where you were 
not present. And there will be an opportunity to get into those mat- 
ters with Admiral Studeman at a later time. 

Admiral Studeman. Senator Specter, I would be prepared to very 
briefly comment on three aspects of Senator Kerry's questions if 
you want; otherwise, we could wait. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, if you're going to volunteer go ahead. 

Admiral Studeman. Let me just talk about the first point you 
made about the fact that — do we review the productivity of assets 
and your concern about the nature and character of the assets that 
we have. 

I just would point out that even given the particular case that 
we're articulating today, we would not have known, or might not 
have known anything about the circumstances associated with Mi- 
chael DeVine because the first report on Michael DeVine was cour- 
tesy of one of those assets that you talk about, essentially. So, 
while you may quibble over colonels and corporals and others in 
the context of the HUMINT operations of the CIA, these operations 
are productive. 

And similarly, I would also say that you would not have known 
our current assessment of what happened to the guerrilla chief 
Bamaca unless there had been those HUMINT assets associated 
with that — point number one. 

Point number two, with regard to the CIA and in particular the 
Directorate of Operations. Obviously, the cold war is over. In the 
context of what we are now doing in the new and future world, CIA 
recognized early on that changes had to be made in the Directorate 
of Operations. There is a major redesign plan out for the Direc- 
torate of Operations. That major redesign plan has substantial 
components. It will take years to essentially set it in place inside 
the DO. The components of that DO design plan relate to manage- 
ment, relate to covert action, relate to HUMINT, relate to technical 



35 

operations, relate to organization, relate to oversight, relate to ca- 
reer service management, and relate to accountability. 

And there are major, heavy efforts going on inside the Central 
Intelligence Agency in the DO to refme all the different aspects of 
this, and we want to come before the Committee and talk about 
this. It's very important that the Committee chase around after us 
to ensure that division of the redesign of the DO to accommodate 
the new world, to work out of the world that we came out of— this 
is a world in which there was an insurgency, communism fighting 
essentially Cuban-based Marxist or otherwise or indigenous guer- 
rilla activities — that as we go into a new world that we have a new 
Directorate of Operations and that we have a new sense of how we 
deal with things. 

We do manage and review asset productivity, payments. There 
are legal issues associated with that which we can discuss in closed 
session. 

Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Ad- 
miral for that answer, which proved not to be too painful, I think. 
And I might say that I want the record to be clear that I really 
feel that some of these answers might be helpful to us. I am not 
asking them because I'm opposed to paying for clandestine asset in 
every circumstance. It's a question of what are the safeguards and 
what is the process. Particularly in this new world, we're going to 
need to be — in terms of narcotics and other things — as you know 
as a former prosecutor of the old saying, that when you're prosecut- 
ing the devil, you don't go to heaven to get your witnesses. And 
you're going to have a certain number of people you're going to 
need to deal with on this level. 

I just want to make certain that there's a balance between the 
human rights and political goals, humanitarian goals, democracy 
goals in a particular place, and the other kinds of goals, and that 
the American people understand we're weighing those and we have 
a thought-out process rather than a mere continuum of the cold 
war thinking, which saw everybody in one light and without those 
kinds of restraints and restrictions. 

Admiral Studeman. Absolutely. 

Chairman SPECTER. We're going to have to move ahead here. 

Senator Hutchison, you're next. 

Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I'm sorry that I have stepped away. I had to preside on the floor. 

Chairman Specter. Oh, pardon me. Senator Hutchison. I 
misspoke. Senator DeWine was here earlier. 

Senator Hutchison. I absolutely yield. 

Chairman Specter. Michael, you're on. I'm sorry. 

Senator DeWine. It doesn't matter. We can — Mr. Barrett, my un- 
derstanding is from your testimony, you're the Counselor to the IG 
at the Justice Department. 

Mr. Barrett. That's correct, Senator. 

Senator DeWine. And so what you are doing actually is after the 
fact going back, being involved in a review of what the Justice De- 
partment's involvement was, what you knew, when you knew it, 
what information you had, what information you transmitted back 
to the CIA or anybody. Is that correct? 



36 

Mr. Barrett. That's correct. We're in the process of interviewing 
people who had contact with this issue or this realm of issues and 
locating documents that are in various Department components. 

Senator DeWine. Is there anyone here today who was involved — 
at that time who was involved in making the legal judgment? 

Mr. Barrett. Senator, from the Department, no, there is not. 

Senator DeWine. I think that's unfortunate, and I certainly do 
not fault you, Mr. Barrett, for making that decision that you should 
be here today instead of someone else. But it seems to me that one 
of the things that we always want to know, the American people 
always want to know, with our sense of justice, is whether or not, 
if a crime has been committed, which obviously it has been here, 
whether or not it's possible under American law for any prosecu- 
tion to occur, what the analysis — if the answer is no, what analysis 
was made of that, what the pertinent laws are, what the review 
was. 

Mr. Barrett. Yes. 

Senator DeWine. And I'm not suggesting that it should have 
been or shouldn't have been. But I think that would be — it's one 
of the questions that I think the American people and certainly the 
families involved would be very interested in knowing. I just think 
it's unfortunate there's no one here who can directly respond to 
that. 

Mr. Barrett. Senator, with the overarching caveat that the re- 
view is ongoing, there are a couple of points that are relatively 
clear. 

Senator DeWine. Why don't you tell us what you can tell us 
and 

Mr. Barrett. I'm happy to do that. 

Senator DeWine [continuing]. And as succinctly as you can be- 
cause our time is short, but I do appreciate it. 

Mr. Barrett. Yes. 

First, in the realm of criminal investigation and prosecution, the 
Department of Justice role is relatively limited and defined, and so 
many of the issues that have come up in prior questioning are not 
DOJ issues. The DOJ issue is a criminal case. And the relevant 
statute has a motive element that limits it not to simply a killing 
of an American citizen abroad, but a killing that is motivated by 
an intention to retaliate, coerce, or intimidate a government or a 
population. And so it's a question of the evidence that is available 
to the Department of Justice and an evaluation that has to be 
made by the people who professionally prosecute those cases year 
in and year out on behalf of our government. 

In this instance, at this stage of our review, there is no question 
that information was referred to the Department of Justice and it 
was routed to the appropriate prosecutorial components of the De- 
partment, where it was evaluated with an eye on that jurisdictional 
question. And at the end of that process, the evidence of motive at 
that time, 1992, early 1992, was, in the judgment of those officials, 
not present. And so 

Senator DeWine. That's very helpful. 

Mr. Barrett [continuing]. That is the general summary I can 
give you at this stage in our inquiry of the Department of Justice 
role. 



37 

Senator DeWine. Can you tell us whether you have determined 
whether that information was routed back to the CIA or to State 
Department? 

Mr. Barrett. I would actually defer to Admiral Studeman be- 
cause of the open session 

Admiral Studeman. We did get the Justice Department ruling on 
jurisdiction, yes. 

Senator DeWine. Was that in writing? If you know. 

Admiral Studeman. I would defer to my General Counsel. No, 
it's not in writing. 

Senator DeWine. And what was the timeframe of that turn- 
around, if you know? 

Admiral Studeman. We — I believe we made the report in No- 
vember, and we got the reply — in November 1991, and got the 
reply in March 1992. 

Senator DeWine. Mr. Barrett, would that be a normal turn- 
around time? 

Mr. Barrett. I'm advised both by the CIA and by the prosecu- 
tors at the Department who do this that 120 days or four months 
is not something that's extraordinarily delayed or subject to criti- 
cism, that in a murder case 

Senator DeWine. I find that shocking. But- 



Mr. Barrett. In a murder case, a review of evidence and con- 
templating investigation is not an overnight decision. 

Senator DeWine. I can understand the complexity. You seemed 
to indicate, however, that the narrowness of the statute certainly 
had an impact on applying the facts against that. 

Mr. Barrett. Oh, that's absolutely correct. 

Senator DeWine. When the Justice Department engages in a re- 
view such as this, do you ever, as a matter of policy, go to any 
other agency, go back to the CIA for additional information, or 
when the law would allow, go to the FBI? 

Mr. Barrett. At this point I think I need to invoke the ongoing 
nature of our inquiry. That is certainly part of the question that 
we're looking at. 

Senator DeWine. My question had to do, though, with as policy. 
I mean, is — I didn't ask you about this specific case. 

Mr. Barrett. Yes, as a general 

Senator DeWine. As a general rule, can that be done; is it done? 

Mr. Barrett. Yes, as a general matter, the report from the CIA 
can begin a dialog. It is not a one-shot communication that the De- 
partment of Justice cannot foUowup. 

Senator DeWine. And you're not prepared today — and I under- 
stand if you're not — but you're not prepared today to tell us about 
if there was a dialog back and forth then? 

Mr. Barrett. Yes, I'm not prepared to address that. 

Senator DeWine. I appreciate that very much. 

Ambassador Watson, could you tell me what you know about our 
contacting, if we did, the Guatemalan government in regard to 
criminal prosecution by the government, beyond what you've al- 
ready testified to, in regard to the officers who were tried, but in 
regard to any other contact, in either case? 

Mr. Watson. Oh, there were a great number of contacts. Senator 
DeWine. 



38 

Senator DeWine. Specifically in regard to Alpirez. 

Mr. Watson. I'd have to go back and look very carefully at the 
records from 1990-91, to see if Ambassador Stroock — when he 
mentioned this, but I know for certain that our ambassador raised 
with the government of Guatemala our profound concern that more 
senior officers than Captain Contreras were aware of some ele- 
ments of this event which resulted in Mr. DeVine's tragic death 
and that they were not being forthcoming about those elements 
and, in fact, were conspiring to coverup to some extent this event. 
And that included people at the training base where Colonel 
Alpirez was, that I mentioned earlier, and also at the base further 
north in the town of Flores, where Contreras' men came from when 
they came down to seek Mr. DeVine near Poptun. So there are peo- 
ple in both those bases that we think have more information than 
they are making available to the courts or to the public. 

This is not to prejudge exactly what their role may or may not 
have been, but it is to say that they certainly, in our view, have 
information that they should have made public. I know that Am- 
bassador Stroock made this point to Guatemalan authorities many 
times. I can check our records, sir, if you'd like, and give you a sort 
of a chronology of this. 

Senator DeWine. That might be helpful, but if — my understand- 
ing of your testimony is that you are satisfied that as far as your 
department is concerned, you were aggressive in this manner, that 
you contacted the Guatemalan government, provided them with the 
information that we had, to no avail. 

Mr. Watson. Well, that 

Senator DeWine. Beyond what criminal prosecutions that did 
occur. 

Mr. Watson. The quick review that we have done of the files 
available to us in the State Department of that period — and we 
don't have all the files — indicates very clearly that our ambassador 
and all of the elements of the embassy were extremely aggressive, 
extremely aggressive both in trying to get information that would 
lead to determining who the perpetrators of this crime were and 
making a conviction, and also presenting our concerns to the Gua- 
temalan government about all aspects of the case, including the 
one you're mentioning. 

Senator DeWine. I would like to go back, if I could, to your writ- 
ten testimony, which you repeated orally, where you state, "We 
have conflicting information on the role of Colonel Alpirez. The 
bulk of the information suggests that he was involved in a cover- 
up." My emphasis on the word "coverup," but that — you did repeat 
that. 

Later on in your oral testimony you made a statement. I did not 
write it down verbatim, so you can correct it, please, as I go, but 
basically that indicated that anyone who was in charge of that base 
clearly would have known that other officers from another base 
were on that base for at least up to two days. And I wonder if you 
could elaborate on that and tell us what you think the significance 
of that is. 

Mr. Watson. Well, let me give you what I can on that, and I 
think Admiral Studeman also referred a little bit to this in his 
statement. Our perception is that when Captain Contreras' men 



39 

came down from Flores to Poptun and went to the base where 
Alpirez was the senior official that he — that he, Alpirez, should 
have known and others would have known that they were there. 
They were there for two full days. They had a vehicle there. They 
were eating their meals there. 

I think that Colonel Cornell, who will be testifying later on 
today, can give you much more detail about this than I can because 
he was there and did a lot of the work. So he's an eyewitness, and 
I'm only a secondary source. 

Senator DeWine. I understand. 

Mr. Watson. But we went immediately to Alpirez to try to get^ 
to try to get some cooperation from him in this, and we were basi- 
cally stiffed. For example, some records of the base that you would 
have expected would have been made available were not available. 

Senator DeWine. Mr. Ambassador, my time is up. I do have one 
question which you can answer very quickly or take some time 
later on: In light of the President's actions the last several days as 
reported in the news media, in light of what has occurred the last 
several months, I would be interested in your comments about 
where American foreign policy goes from here in regard to Guate- 
mala, particularly in regard to our concern about human rights and 
what leverage that we have in that area? 

Mr. Watson. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I can answer 

Chairman Specter. Proceed. 

Senator DeWine. And my time is up, so if you could be 

Mr. Watson. Yeah. I think our policy will continue to be press- 
ing to fortify the strengthening of democracy, which is very fragile 
in that country, to — and in that context, contributing to the ending 
of impunity, which is enjoyed by members of the armed forces and 
others in that society, to strengthening the respect for human 
rights and a full participation of all citizens in the society, to con- 
tributing to this peace process which we think is the key to every- 
thing. 

If you can get this civil war to end on reasonable terms with an 
inclusive political process, then I think that many of the kinds of 
horrors we've seen in Guatemala over the last decades will be 
much more easy to deal with. And so those are our fundamental 
points 

Senator DeWine. So- 



Mr. Watson [continuing]. And we will keep pushing on that. We 
will be providing economic assistance to strengthen the human 
rights ombudsman and the administration of justice and that sort 
of thing. But at the same time, as we will be putting pressure as 
hard as we can on justice in these cases, a particular concern to 
the United States of America. 

Senator DeWine. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator DeWine. 

Now I turn to Senator Graham. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Studeman — Admiral Studeman, you mentioned that U.S. 
funding for intelligence activities in Guatemala began to decline 
after 1989, is that correct? 

Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir, that's correct. 



40 

Senator Graham of Florida. What was the level of U.S. intel- 
ligence funding prior to 1989 on an annual basis for Guatemalan 
activities? 

Admiral Studeman. The funding ramped up to a high of about 
$4 million to $4.5 million a year and then ramped back down to 
its current level. The high was in 1989. 

Senator Graham of Florida. And the current level is? 

Admiral Studeman. The current level is around $1 million a 
year. But as you know, the President has suspended part of that. 

Senator Graham of Florida. In the period from 1989 to 1995, 
what were our principal intelligence objectives to be secured in 
Guatemala? 

Chairman Specter. Senator Graham, you may not have been 
here when we established the parameter of not inquiring of Admi- 
ral Studeman the concern as to sources and methods. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Well, I wasn't asking about sources 
and methods, just what was the general policy objective, because 
in subsequent statement, the Admiral indicated that our high level 
of funding was predicated upon certain concerns about communist 
infiltration, role of Fidel Castro, et cetera. As those became less of 
a threat, what was the policy basis for our intelligence involvement 
in Guatemala? 

Chairman Specter. Admiral Studeman, if you feel comfortable, 
proceed. 

Admiral Studeman. Let me just say we met another threshold 
here, but I'm not going to hide behind it, with regard to the fact 
that there were in place at that time covert action plans, some be- 
ginning, some ending. The Central American covert action plan has 
now ended. It ended in fiscal year 1994, last year. As of the last 
payments, there are no more operations or activities. 

The Central American covert action plan started under the 
Reagan administration, essentially. There were Findings in the 
early 1980's and in the mid-1980's. They were all modified by mem- 
orandums of notification. They also were briefed extensively to all 
of the executive branch oversight elements as well as to the com- 
mittees and funded through these committees, and the focus of the 
Central American plan was clearly on fighting insurgency in 
Central America. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reserve the 
right to pursue that issue when we are in closed session. 

Chairman Specter. Fine, Senator Graham. That would be en- 
tirely permissible. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Mr. Watson, when did the State De- 
partment become aware of the death of Mr. DeVine? 

Mr. Watson. I believe within 24 hours after his body was found. 
Ambassador Stroock was aware of that. 

Senator Graham of Florida. And what date was that? 

Mr. Watson. I think that would have — be then about the 9th or 
so of June 1990. Don't pin me down on that, but the death took 
place on the 8th. It was very shortly thereafter, and I asked Am- 
bassador Stroock in a telephone conversation about this yesterday, 
and he said that within 24 hours he was apprised of this. 



41 

Senator Graham of Florida. At the time that the State Depart- 
ment received the information of Mr. DeVine's death, was there 
any theory as to the motive behind his death? 

Mr. Watson. My understanding, Senator — and this comes from 
people who were involved at the time, as it was several years ago — 
is that there was no initial assumption of why he was killed. They 
just knew that he was killed — and that we needed to investigate 
immediately. Because of the weakness of the police presence in 
that part of Guatemala — I gather that they didn't even have any 
telephones, only had a couple of officers — the embassy initially 
turned to the military for assistance in discovering who the per- 
petrators were and what happened. 

But within a very short period of time — and I think can say, with 
excellent help from the Central Intelligence Agency — the ambas- 
sador and others came to the conclusion that the military were, in 
fact, part of the problem, not part of the solution. And so we then 
started to look — to work with the civilian government and cooperat- 
ing very much with Mrs. DeVine and people that she had working 
with her to put together the pieces of the case. And by August or 
so — ^but within two-and-a-half months of the murder, I think our 
embassy was pretty confident they knew really what had happened 
and who had done it. 

Admiral Studeman. The ambassador's statement and, I think, 
also our evidence suggest again the principal motivation had to do 
with the recovery of these weapons. That's why this team was es- 
sentially sent down there. There were weapons stolen which were 
accountable to the senior Guatemalan military officer, the sus- 
picion that Mr. DeVine had possession of these weapons, and so 
this team was sent, essentially, with the original instructions of es- 
sentially reacquiring custody of these weapons. 

Mr. Watson. I think that's correct, but 

Admiral Studeman. Beyond that, it could have developed into 
other things, clearly, and the djmamics we're not clear on. 

Mr. Watson. But at the very outset — I think the Senator's ques- 
tion was right at the very outset, when Ambassador Stroock was 
first informed, it's — and my understanding is that there was no as- 
sumption as to exactly who did it or what. In fact, they might have 
thought it was common crime of some sort. But they wanted to ex- 
plain it, they turned to the military first because of the weakness 
of the police organization, then rather quickly realized, with some 
good help from a variety of people, that the military were part of 
the problem rather than the solution, and they started to turn to 
civilian authorities, and working very closely with Mrs. DeVine and 
people that she had working with her, put together the pieces of 
this puzzle within about — within a little over two months. 

And then it was a question of pushing for action in the judicial 
system against these people. And that took a long time, but they 
were finally convicted in September 1992, and then Contreras in 
May 1993. 

Senator Graham of Florida. And it was based on that question- 
ing of the reliability of the military that the United States in De- 
cember 1990 suspended its military assistance, is that correct? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir, because the pieces were there, action need- 
ed to be taken, and it wasn't being taken. And the military leaders. 



42 

as I mentioned earlier, were stonewalling us and their own judicial 
folks. And we thought that was intolerable, and so the President 
decided to suspend foreign military financing and military assist- 
ance program funding. The total in the pipeline and in new funding 
was about $13.6 million, which was stopped definitively at that 
point. 

Senator Graham of Florida. However, as recently as March 10 of 
this year, the United States was still providing international mili- 
tary and education training funds to Guatemala, is that correct? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. That is correct. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Were there any other exceptions to 
the prohibition of funding to the Guatemalan military other than 
the ramping down of the intelligence funding and the $200,000 a 
year for IMET? 

Mr. Watson. My understanding is that, while there is no foreign 
military financing, there is no military assistance program, there 
is still a very small amount of IMET for three courses inside Gua- 
temala, and the President on March 10 stopped programs that 
would take place in this country. The remaining courses deal with 
resource management, with democracy and human rights and with 
civil society and those kinds of things which we think are impor- 
tant to go ahead with. So those programs are going ahead. But 
that's all that — in military assistance that's within our jurisdiction 
that I know is going forward. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Subsequent to our knowledge in De- 
cember 1990 that the military, as you say, may have been more of 
the problem than the solution, what was the rationale for our con- 
tinuing to utilize the Guatemalan military as a source of intel- 
ligence information? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I simply can't give you a description of the 
decisionmaking process in 1990 inside the administration. Senator. 

Senator Graham of Florida. When we have our closed session I 
wonder if we could have some testimony as to what the rationale 
was in December 1990 relative to continuing what level of intel- 
ligence and military support would still be made available to the 
Guatemalan military. 

Chairman Specter. We certainly can at that time. Senator 
Graham. 

Mr. Watson. May I add. Senator, Mr. Chairman, that if— in the 
course of our review of documents and in the course of the Intel- 
ligence Oversight Board's review we may come up with some more 
information about how the decisionmaking process worked back 
then that's not available to me at this point. 

Senator Graham of Florida. There have been allegations that 
there might have been some drug involvement in these incidents. 
Does the State Department have any evidence that that might 
have been part of the motivation? 

Mr. Watson. In which sense, sir? 

Senator Graham of Florida. The allegation is that the Guate- 
malan military was involved in protecting various drug operations 
and that one of the reasons that Mr. DeVine was killed was be- 
cause he had evidence of that involvement. 



43 

Mr. Watson. Sir, we have absolutely no corroboration of that re- 
port. We've seen that report in the press. We have no corroboration 
of that. 

Senator Graham of Florida. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, at the 
closed hearing, if we could have representatives of appropriate 
agencies, such as the DEA, who might be able to discuss whether 
they are aware of any corroboration of that allegation. 

Chairman Specter. Yes, Senator Graham we can pursue that. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you. 

Can I ask one last question? In October 1993, two of the individ- 
uals who had been imprisoned as a result of the trial relative to 
the murder of Mr. DeVine, Army Specialist Francisco Solobol and 
Army Specialist Dibersio Hernandez publicly claimed that they had 
been engaged in Army-run death squad activities and had informa- 
tion of clandestine cemeteries and jails. Are you aware of that, and 
if so, do you know if those individuals were interrogated, and if so 
what were the results of those interrogations? 

Mr. Watson. Yeah, I know in a general sense. Senator. I can get 
you more detail later. We were aware of these remarks, we tried 
to follow them up immediately, and in following them up we found 
we got nowhere. 

Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Graham. 
We're allowing just a little latitude hoping that, with the possible 
exception of Senator Cohen, we can complete this on one round. 

Senator Hutchison. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say 
first that I had to leave to go preside in the Senate, but I'm sorry 
to have missed much of this testimony. 

I am a firm believer that we should have intelligence gathering 
in our country. I think it is essential for our security and for the 
security of our allies. However, because of the covert nature of 
what intelligence gathering must be, I think the role of Oversight 
Committees in Congress is even more important, and one of the 
areas of concern that I have is exactly what policies we should have 
regarding information to the Oversight Committees. I would like to 
ask anyone on the panel — after the death of Mr. DeVine in 1990, 
the Justice Department was consulted about whether there was 
enough evidence regarding the CIA asset to prosecute him or any- 
one in connection with the murders, but the Oversight Committees 
of Congress were not consulted about what truly was an ethical 
issue and one that I would think would be within the oversight. 

Is there anyone on the panel who could say if the Committee 
should have been — the Committees should have been consulted? 

Admiral Studeman. That's a question clearly for me. And let me 
say that — as I've already said in my statement — we do believe cer- 
tainly that the Committee should have been informed and that, 
based on our review, there was clearly somebody in the CIA think- 
ing about it, but it never connected. It never happened. And so, as 
I said, there's no explanation for that. I don't believe it's nec- 
essarily an intent to mislead, but I don't know that for a fact, and 
I think that's going to have to await the final results of the IG in- 
spection. 



44 

I absolutely agree with you that if we're going to make a crimes 
report to the Justice Department about the alleged presence of an 
individual at the interrogation of a U.S. citizen in which that citi- 
zen dies, that information should come to the Committee. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. I really do appreciate your com- 
ing forth with that, because I certainly agree with you. Ajid I hope 
that we will have policies in the future that we don't learn some- 
thing like this four years after the fact. Let me say that another 
issue, I think, here, of course has to be what our policy is regarding 
the character and actions of CIA assets, and that is something that 
I know we will take up in closed session. Is there anj^hing that 
any of you would like to say regarding where the line should be 
drawn? I think it has been stated many times that when you are 
in intelligence gathering, there are standards that perhaps we 
wouldn't have if things could be gotten in the open. But neverthe- 
less, there are standards beyond which I think we can't go as a de- 
mocracy. Do you have a thought on that? 

Chairman Specter. Admiral Studeman, as the hearings 
progress, you have shown more of a willingness to respond to these 
questions. When you do so, you're starting to open the door and 
starting to get very close, but the Chair will- 



Admiral Studeman. Well, I begin — let me just say 

Chairman Specter. Excuse me, excuse me. 

Admiral STUDEMAN [continuing]. The doors 

Chairman SPECTER. Excuse me, excuse me. 

Admiral Studeman [continuing]. The doors I simply can't 

Chairman Specter. Excuse me, Admiral. 

The Chairman will leave it within your discretion to what extent 
you want to answer that question. 

Admiral Studeman. Again, let me just say, the two doors I can't 
walk through here have to do with sources and methods and de- 
tailed discussions of covert action programs. To answer, I think, 
your question as theoretically as I can, we ought to deal with 
human assets on the basis of access and productivity — that is, what 
it is they know and how much they are essentially telling us — and 
we ought to deal with assets on the basis of the fact that they are 
not engaged essentially in some kind of despicable activity or ac- 
tual crimes. And we do have a process inside the Agency for essen- 
tially trying to evaluate productivity, certainly relative to the in- 
vestment we make in these resources, and we do have a process 
that's supposed to work that determines whether or not these peo- 
ple are engaged in nefarious activities and if the3^re so engaged in 
nefarious activities some steps are then taken to terminate our re- 
lationship with those people and to make the necessary reports up 
the line, particularly to the Justice Department if there are crimes 
indicated. That's standard policy in the Agency. 

Senator Hutchison. Let me turn to Secretary Watson and just 
ask if you feel the U.S. intelligence did everything that it could and 
should have done with regard to the two killings in Guatemala. 

Mr. Watson. Well, Senator Hutchison, I suppose none of us ever 
do everything we should and could have done in any circumstances, 
although we do the very best we can. And I think that the informa- 
tion provided by the Central Intelligence Agency in these cases has 
been extremely helpful and crucial. 



45 

But in terms of drawing any final conclusions to answer your 
question, I would prefer to wait and see what the results of the ef- 
fort by the Intelligence Oversight Board are, because that's exactly 
I think why the President asked them to take a look into these sit- 
uations, to see how well we've done and see if we could have done 
better and if so in the future how we can do better. 

Senator Hutchison. Do you feel that the ambassador to Guate- 
mala from the United States had full information? And is the CIA 
in your view responsible for giving all of the information that it has 
within a country to the ambassador from America to that country? 

Mr. Watson. Well, I think that in any country, questions of 
sources and methods and things like that that the Admiral has 
been mentioning, have to be dealt with in a separate way. But re- 
porting should be made available, certainly, to the ambassador, 
and she, in this case, should have the ability to comment on that. 

I think that, just to pick up the first part of your question. Sen- 
ator, I think that the question of whether or not all information 
went in all the right places at all the right times is something that 
the Intelligence Oversight Board is going to be looking into. 

Senator Hutchison. In general, do you think that the intel- 
ligence community is providing relevant, timely, and productive in- 
formation to our ambassadors? 

Mr. Watson. Yes. 

Senator Hutchison. OK. 

There's a third area here that I think we need to pursue, and 
that is the State Department's role with regard to American citi- 
zens, and do you feel in this case that the State Department treat- 
ed these American citizens in the way that they deserve to be 
treated? And did they fully inform them — let me say, are you com- 
fortable that the State Department and the ambassador did every- 
thing they could have done in these two circumstances with regard 
to the deaths of Mr. DeVine and Mrs. Harbury's husband? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, I think so. I certainly can understand, as I 
mentioned in my statement, the frustration that people feel, that 
we feel also, in our inability to get more information about these 
cases, and more definitive and more conclusive information. And 
it's so often we're working in a world of half-facts or half-truths, 
information we can't judge the reliability of. But I think that in 
both of these cases our ambassadors and also people in Washington 
as well, have been enormously supportive, have applied an enor- 
mous amount of energy to try to find out what happened and to 
make the appropriate representations to the government of Guate- 
mala, to uncover as much information as possible and to analyze 
it to the very best of their ability and to inform the concerned indi- 
viduals to the best of our ability. 

Now, that does not mean always reporting every bit of intel- 
ligence. That would not be appropriate for us to do. It means being 
very careful not to mislead and to give unformed assessments or 
judgments. We're dealing with situations of enormous sensitivity 
and importance, and the last thing we want to do is be misleading. 
But it means also, as we think we have done, is sharing our very 
best and our honest assessments with the people most concerned 
when we have confidence that those assessments are correct and 
accurate, and I think that we have done that. 



46 

Senator Hutchison. I see that my time has expired. 

Thank you. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison. 

Senator Glenn. 

Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Cohen. 
But I had concerns I expressed to some other Committee members. 
And Mr. Chairman, I apologize, I should have talked to you about 
this earlier, which I did not. But I think it's a mistake to ha . - 
hearings on these matters in open session. Every time we have a 
problem like this occur, we try and have an open session; it doesn't 
usually accomplish anything worth a hoot. And then we go into 
closed session and get some real information because you have to 
protect sources and methods. That's the way things should operate. 
So I don't think the Committee should be in open session because 
you can't give us the information we really need in this forum. 

This Committee, though, has special responsibilities. And we're 
supposed to be given all the information privately so we can make 
our judgments. We do that by getting Presidential Findings first 
and then reports on how those Presidential Findings are being car- 
ried out. 

My question is not on sources and methods. My first question 
would be on, do we have all Presidential Findings at this Commit- 
tee? And I say that because we had an incident in the past where 
we had a retroactive Finding in the Iran-Contra matter, and it 
wasn't reported to this Committee for over a year; and we were 
kept in the dark deliberately. Now, do we have all the Presidential 
Findings — because that's key to carrying out our responsibilities as 
a Committee? 

Admiral Studeman. To my knowledge, Senator, you have not 
only all the Findings but all the interlocking memorandums and 
notification that relate to the changes to those Findings, and I 
would be happy to inventory your collection of Findings against my 
collection of Findings. 

Senator Glenn. All right, good. 

Would you know of all the Findings? I presume you would. 

Admiral Studeman. I certainly do know of all the Findings. 
Again, these Findings are reviewed not only every year by the ad- 
ministration but when they're made they're briefed to the adminis- 
tration and briefed also to these Committees. 

Senator Glenn. The MON's, the memoranda of notification, are 
used to change anything that's going to be carried out under those 
findings. Have we had all those MON's? 

Admiral STUDEMAN. As far as I know you do. 

Senator Glenn. OK, that's good. 

Now, in a little different area, on page 11 of your testimony you 
indicated that the CIA made some management procedural mis- 
takes: "First, as already noted, we did not brief the Oversight Com- 
mittees on important 1991 information related to DeVine in the 
same way we had briefed the Department of Justice. We regret we 
did not do so." Question: Who made the decision not to brief this 
Committee and why was that decision made? 

Admiral STUDEMAN. Well, I've already addressed that, based on 
my knowledge, based on an answer to two previous questions. 



47 

Senator. But to repeat, I am not aware of any conscious decision 
not to brief the Committee. In fact, there is internal correspondence 
in CIA reflecting an intent to at least brief the HPSCI. We can — 
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, your coun- 
terpart Committee in the House. And we almost never brief the 
House without briefing the Senate. Now, our methodologies for 
briefing, as you know, go from everything from staff to staff to 
staff — to our staff to principals, and also dealing in very restricted 
sessions with only the Chairman. In that period of time — and this 
is no excuse — there are no — there were not very good records kept 
about what was essentially briefed up here. I think it is highly like- 
ly, based on our total analysis to date, that it was simply not 
briefed. I don't think it was intentional. I think part of the factors 
that had — that bear on this had to do again with the issues that 
we had reported this to the Justice Department, there were issues 
associated with that, that we were awaiting a reply, and I think 
it actually slipped under the carpet, in all honesty. 

Senator Glenn. OK. 

Admiral Studeman. I'm not sure we'll ever know. 

Senator Glenn. All right, fine. 

Mr. Secretary, have we demarched the Guatemalan government 
to ask them for information and details on the DeVine and Bamaca 
cases? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. Frequently. 

Senator Glenn. Can you tell us when they were demarched and 
how they responded to those demarches? 

Mr. Watson. Well, there were an enormous number of 
demarches, the most recent one was last night when our ambas- 
sador went in to see President De Leon at the instruction of the 
Secretary of State and carried a letter from the Secretary of State 
urging the president to do everything necessary to get at the root 
of these two cases and telling him how enormously important it 
was, advising him also formally of the President's decision to take 
some steps to reduce the level of CIA support — or liaison — and also 
to make available to President De Leon the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to help out in these investigations whenever the gov- 
ernment of Guatemala decides to abandon a policy of impunity and 
start getting to work on it. 

Senator Glenn. Can you tell us what their response has been — 
in open session? 

Mr. Watson. The response — I could give you a much longer chro- 
nology, but the response last night was a tentative response by 
President De Leon, who indicated a deep awareness of our con- 
cerns, very impressed by getting the letter from the Secretary, and 
promised to get back to us as soon as possible with at least what 
ne would recommend be the next steps in these cases. 

Senator Glenn. OK, we haven't had the level of cooperation yet 
that we'd like to really get any inside information from their gov- 
ernment. 

Mr. Watson. We certainly have not had the level of cooperation 
that we would like. I do just want to point out that Captain 
Contreras and five enlisted men were convicted, and the enlisted 
men are serving time for the murder of Michael DeVine. But what 
we're after in that case is recapture of Contreras so he serves his 



48 

20 years and that the more senior officers that have to have known 
something about this case, either in dispatching Contreras' men to 
pick up Mr. DeVine, or in harboring them, these men, during some 
point associated with the crime, that those people come forth and 
bear the responsibiHty they have, if there is any, for the crime and 
certainly for what appears to be to us a coverup. 

Senator Glenn. Just one other question. 

Admiral, as a matter of policy, are CIA chiefs of station required 
to consult with and seek the approval of the U.S. ambassador be- 
fore engaging in intelligence operations in a host country? 

Admiral Studeman. The chiefs of stations coordinate extensively 
with the ambassador, and that's done — the ambassador is author- 
ized to know all that the chief of station knows. Some ambassadors 
choose to know that and some ambassadors choose to have a more 
distant relationship with the chiefs of station. But generally speak- 
ing, the dialog around the world between chiefs of station and the 
ambassadors is very good. I do not 

Senator Glenn. As far as CIA's concerned, though, your people 
are instructed that if the ambassador wants to be fully briefed on 
everything, he's briefed. Is that right? 

Admiral Studeman. Right. 

Senator Glenn. OK, so it's up to the ambassador, then, as to 
how 

Admiral Studeman. To define the relationship. 

Senator Glenn [continuing]. He wants to get into these things. 

OK, was there close consultation in Guatemala between the chief 
of station and the ambassador? 

Admiral Studeman. As far as I'm aware, there was. We're talk- 
ing about now several ambassadors and several chiefs of station, 
but as best I can tell, there was. 

Senator Glenn. What was that? 

Admiral Studeman. Again, I don't — I'll look at the people back 
here and see if they — any nodding or — again, I get no nods at — I 
guess if it wasn't, it will come out in the context of the investiga- 
tion. 

Senator Glenn. All right. Thank you. 

That's all I have, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Glenn. 

Senator Shelby. 

Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Studeman and Secretary Watson, do you believe it's 
ver>' important not only for the State Department or the Central 
Intelligence Agency or any other governmental agencies to never lie 
to or mislead the American people, or, for that matter, the Con- 
gress? 

Mr. Watson. Certainly. 

Admiral Studeman. My answer to that's an unambiguous yes. 

Senator Shelby. That's very — same answer from 

Mr. Watson. Certainly. 

Senator Shelby. Do you believe that it's very, very important 
that the CIA maintain integrity, not only in the eyes of the Amer- 
ican people but the Congress, and especially the Oversight Commit- 
tee that we're sitting on now, the Intelligence Committee, that 



49 

deals with intelligence matters? Do you believe that's important? 
The integrity of the CIA is very important. 

Mr. Watson. Yes — are you addressing that question to me, 
Senator? 

Senator Shelby. Yes, sir. I'm 

Mr. Watson. Yes, I do. 

Senator Shelby. And Admiral? 

Admiral Studeman. Absolutely. 

Senator Shelby. That's a given, isn't it? 

Admiral Studeman. It is a given. Now, not to say that it's easy 
to do, but it's a given. Yes, sir. 

Senator Shelby. That's right. But it's very important, isn't it? 

Admiral Studeman. It is important. 

Senator Shelby. Candor's important. 

Now, without getting into — and I'm not going to get into sources 
and methods. We'll get into that later. And you're very right that 
you have to protect that. Otherwise, you'll have no intelligence 
gathering sources. Admiral, you said in your statement, "To con- 
clude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the intelligence 
community in a democratic society." And I know we operate as in 
the democratic society, and that's tough at times on intelligence 
gathering methods and sources. But you say at the direction of U.S. 
policymakers — and I know the President of the United States 
makes the policy through the State Department and others, and 
the CIA is basically not a policymaker. Is that correct? 

Admiral Studeman. That's correct. 

Senator Shelby. And to quote, you said, "We provide information 
on such difficult issues" — and they are difficult — "as civil wars, ter- 
rorism, narcotics, weapons, proliferation, organized crime, instabil- 
ity related to regional ethnic, tribal or religious conflict like we're 
talking about here." And you say, "It's a continuing dilemma that 
in collecting vital information on such topics, we do not necessarily 
find our sources among the pristine, the honorable and the ele- 
gant." That's a given, too. We know who you have to deal with at 
times. 

But when you deal with these people, you can always deal with 
them, can't you, on an honorable basis, protecting the integrity of 
the Central Intelligence Agency at all times, upholding the dignity 
and the honor of the American people? 

Admiral Studeman. I certainly hope we would try. Yes, sir. 

Senator Shelby. Now, you said a few minutes ago, when we've 
been questioning — various Members of the Senate here today been 
then questioning you about timely information, information that's 
timely is important, you know, in the gathering of intelligence or 
the sharing of information. But to fail to inform the Oversight 
Committee here, the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate, 
from time to time — this is not the first time that this has hap- 
pened — and then you come up and you say, "Well, we regret — I re- 
gret this failure to keep the Congressional Oversight Committees 
fully informed." Well, if you're not fully informed on vital informa- 
tion you're not really into the loop, are you? 

Admiral Studeman. In the sense of compliance? 



50 

Senator Shelby. Right. Right. In other words, if you withhold, 
consciously or unconsciously, information from us, the Oversight 
Committee of the Intelligence Committee, we're shortchanged 

Admiral Studeman. We're not performing up to our trust. That's 
correct. 

Senator Shelby. You're not performing your duty. Was this a 
careful choice of words, here? Fully informed? 

Admiral STUDEMAN. I believe that's the way the statute reads, 
that we're required to keep the Committees of the Congress fully 
and I think it says completely informed, I think. 

Senator Shelby. OK, you said that actually this information ac- 
tually slipped, probably slipped under the carpet. That's a big car- 
pet over there at Langley, isn't it? To hold all the things that have 
slipped under it? It'd have to be a large carpet. 

Admiral Studeman. I will say — not in defense of ourselves — but 
of course we are dealing with hundreds of thousands of pieces of 
information that are of possible relevance to the Committee or in- 
terest to the Committee. 

Senator Shelby. We understand that. We understand that you 
have to analyze this information. But you've got some of the bright- 
est people in the world over at Langley to do this and we know 
this, and we want you to have — because intelligence gathering is 
important to this nation. But honor and truth is important too, 
isn't it? 

Admiral Studeman. Absolutely. 

Senator Shelby. It's the very foundation of this. Human rights 
are important to America, too, aren't they? Whether they're involv- 
ing someone in Central America, whether they're involving an 
American citizen — that puts a little more intensity on it. Whether 
they're involving someone that's married to an American citizen. 
Aren't human rights important? 

Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir, they're not only, I think, of para- 
mount importance, but you have to recognize that like the State 
Department, we teach human rights in the context of our 

Senator Shelby. We know you teach it, but do you practice it? 

Admiral Studeman. We teach it — I'm talking about teaching 
human rights to the liaison services and the people with whom we 
have training relationships over there, and, in fact, there's good 
evidence that our sensitivity training and human rights as it is 
with the State Department pays dividends. 

Senator Shelby. But not under all circumstances? 

Admiral Studeman. Not under all circumstances. The record is 
ragged. 

Senator Shelby. Would your concern as an American and as the 
acting director of CIA, concern for human rights, knowing that — 
what we believe in in America and what the standards are, would 
that impede you in carrying out your operations in intelligence 
gathering through the CIA? 

Admiral Studeman. No, I don't think it would impede us. 

Senator Shelby. In other words, you could have both, couldn't 
you? 

Admiral Studeman. Sure. 

Senator Shelby. And isn't that the goal that you just alluded to, 
is to have both? We've got to have good intelligence. We've got to 



51 

have timely — well, intelligence that's not timely is not worth much. 
But at the same time, if we adhere to the other standard of human 
rights at all times, timely information to this Committee at all 
times, we probably wouldn't be here today, would we? 

Admiral Studeman. No, sir, but I think it's important for me to 
inform the Senator that the vast majority or a large proportion of 
the reports of human rights violations that are made the subject 
of things like political diplomatic demarches to other countries are 
based on information derived by intelligence sources and methods. 

Senator Shelby. But if we're going to rebuild the image of the 
Central Intelligence Agency, not only dealing in situations like this, 
but because of the Ames case and others, with a new Director 
that's been nominated by the President of the United States, Dr. 
I)eutch, we're going to have to work together and you're going to 
have to set some premises to deal with this Committee on a timely 
basis, not let things slip under the rug, consciously or uncon- 
sciously, or at least that you can draw an inference to that. 

Admiral Studeman. I concur with that comment completely. Cer- 
tainly as a senior manager, you certainly wouldn't think that I like 
to come up here and say I didn't do my job. It's certainly not a very 
comfortable position for me to be in. And every time I hear about 
more of these circumstances, essentially it certainly doesn't please 
me. 

Senator Shelby. But Secretary Watson, it's very important from 
the perspective of the State Department carrying out the policy of 
the United States, that the policy at all times be above board, that 
you, too, in the State Department be candid with this Committee; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Watson. Yes, sir, and with other Committees of the Con- 
gress as well. 

Senator Shelby. Why would one or both of you be timely and 
candid with the Justice Department but not timely and candid or 
timely detail information to this very Committee, this Oversight 
Committee on Intelligence? Was that a slip, as you call it? 

Mr. Watson. Senator, I think the issue concerning the Justice 
Department to which you are referring, as far as I can tell, did not 
have any State Department involvement. 

Senator Shelby. Admiral, do you want to respond to that? 

Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir. I've already addressed this on sev- 
eral occasions to previous questions. Yes, sir, I think it was an in- 
advertent oversight unfortunately effected, and obviously we regret 
it. 

Senator Shelby. Do you have a list over there saying, gosh, this 
is a very sensitive matter, this is important, this is important to 
the Justice Department, it's important to the President that he 
know, the Secretary of State know? Why not the Chairman of the 
Intelligence Committee and the Ranking and others on this Com- 
mittee, and the House likewise? Why couldn't they be informed, if 
you have a checklist? 

Admiral Studeman. They should have been informed. And we do 
have lists that describe the kinds of information and categories of 
data that we are to convey to this and the other Committee. 

Senator Shelby. I guess whoever is carrying out that list didn't 
come to work that day. 



52 

Admiral Studeman. That's correct. 

Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you, Senator Shelby. 

Senator Cohen. 

Senator Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief in 
view of the hour. 

First, I'd like to indicate that while we are focusing principally 
on the DeVine case and the Bamaca case, there are also a number 
of allegations concerning Nick Blake and also Griffith Davis, both 
of whom were murdered back in 1985. And I have a long list of cor- 
respondence that I've had concerning the Blake case over the years 
I'd like to be made a part of the record. It's correspondence with 
the State Department, it's unclassified. 

Chairman Specter. It will be made a part of the record. 

[The documents referred to follow:] 



53 



MEMORANDUM 



DATE April 6, 1995 

TO: Chris Mellon 
FROM: Jim Bodner 

RE: Insert for Committee Hearing Record on Nick Blake 

Attached are two sets of document that may be appropriate for 
insertion in the record of yesterday's hearing: 

— Five press reports from April 1985 to March 1995 that 
summarize the case and the efforts of the Blake family to learn the 
fate of Nick Blake and Griffith Davis. 

Correspondence between Senator Cohen and the State 
Department and associated official documents, such as State 
Department cables and memoranda. 

The second set of documents are arranged chronologically. Two 
documents in the latter set are not dated, but I have inserted them 
where they appear to fit in the chronology. If I have placed these 
two items in the wrong sequence, it should not affect a reader's 
understanding of the case. 

One of the undated documents, which does not indicate its 
source, appears to be a cable from the US Embassy in Guatemala 
City; since it deals exclusively with an 18 April 1985 trip by 
embassy officials retracing by helicopter the assumed route of 
Blake and Davis, I assume it dates to April or May 1985. The other 
undated document, entitled "Congressional Briefing," is the sixth 
item in the set; we do not have a copy of the cable referred to in 
that document . 

If you think this compilation is either excessive or 
deficient, let me know. 



54 



8TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format. 

Proprietary to the United Press International 1985 

April 21, 1985, Sunday, AM cycle 

SECTION: International 

LENGTH: 299 words 

HEADLINE: No clues on two missing Americans 

DATELINE: GUATEMALA CITY 

BODY: 

Army searchers failed to find any clues to the whereabouts of two Americans 
who reportedly traveled to Guatemala's western highlands to do an artiche on 
leftist guerrillas, authorities said Sunday. 

Nicholas Blake, 26, a freelance journalist from Biddeford Pool, Maine, and 
Griffith Davis, 38, a longtime resident of Guatemala, were reported missing last 
week when they did not return from a trip to the Cuchumatanes mountains in 
Huehuetenango province, authorities said. 

Davis, who has lived in the popular tourist region of Lake Atitlan for 10 
years, and Blake left on their trip March 25 and were .due back April 4, a U.S. 
Embassy spokesman said. 

Army patrols and air force aircraft have searched the area without coming up 
with any information on the men's whereabouts in the region 90 miles northwest 
of Guatemala City, the armed forces said. 

The Guatemala City newspaper Prensa Libre reported that Blake had planned to 
interview leftist guerrillas operating in the area, which has served as a 
traditional base for insurgents fighting Guatemala's military governments. 

Prensa Libre quoted David Lowe, who met Blake in the colonial city of 
Antigua, as saying that the journalist had planned to ''obtain unique 
information for a possible report about the guerrilla movement.'' 

''I met Nick in the city of Antigua a few weeks ago,'' Lowe told Prensa 
Libre. ''At that time he told me that for two years he had been planning the 
trip to the mountains to do a special report. 

''I think he had food for five days and identification with him, including a 
letter of introduction from the United Nations for which he had done special 
work in the past,'' Lowe said. 

''Although I don't know a whole lot about Nick ... I hope he turns up soon so 
we can drink some beers,'' Lowe said. 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 



55 



2ND STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format. 

The Associated Press 

The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These 
materials may not be republished without the express written consent of The 
Associated Press. 

March 2, 1986, Sunday, BC cycle 

ADVANCED-DATE: February 17, 1986, Monday, BC cycle 

SECTION: Domestic News 

LENGTH: 1600 words 

BYLINE: From AP Newsf eatures , By DIANNE KEARNS , Associated Press Writer 

DATELINE: BIDDEFORD POOL, Maine 

BODY: 

He was the privileged son of a Philadelphia banker, an ambitious free-lance 
journalist who liked to live on the edge of danger. Before Nick Blake 
disappeared in the jungles of Guatemala a year ago, he may have forecast his own 
fate . 

Nick Blake, last seen following in the footsteps of a character he invented, 
is lost. 

In Blake's unpublished novel, a young journalist treks into the jungles of 
Guatemala in search of the story that will "make" his career. 

Like his own hero, Blake ventured into that dense mountain region, a 
27-year-old free-lancer looking for the scoop that would justify three years of 
probing Central America. He never came out again. 

No one knows if he found his story. 

Blake and his traveling companion, Griffith Davis, have been missing a year 
this month. Searches by U.S. and Guatemalan teams turned up no clues and were 
abandoned last spring. 

In November and December, Blake's two brothers Randy, 25, and Sam, 24 
went to Guatemala in search of answers, but they uncovered nothing conclusive. 
During one visit, they joined the Mutual Support Group for the Appearance Alive 
of Our Relatives. 

They now believe their brother is dead. 

In the family's weathered summer home, here in this wealthy coastal community 
on the southwestern tip of Maine, are recollections of a young man whose idol 
was Ernest Hemingway and whose privileged upbringing spawned a desire to live on 
the edge. A poster bearing the Spanish translation of "Liberty or Death, 
Guatemala" hangs in an upstairs bathroom. 

The 266-page manuscript of his unpublished novel offers some clues as to why 
the son of a Philadelphia banker would journey into a land of deprivation and 



56 



The Associated Press, March 2, 1986 

misery, where death is commonplace. 

"David Seeker had come to Central America for a variety of reasons," Blake 
wrote in the opening pages of his novel. "Like so many other young journalists, 
he was there to make a reputation. Escape the glacial process of dues-paying 
journalism back in the States. And hopefully, break some good stories that would 
thrust him permanently into the orbit of world-class media. 

"But it wasn't only ambition. He had been nurtured on revolutions, starting 
with television images in the '60s and later in his reading. It exhilarated him 
to see the people rising in mass catharsis. ... Here was the chance to write 
what he was supposed to write about, to be close to people who were hanging 
things out front. Seeker felt like his life had begun in Central America." 

As the story progresses. Seeker joins two others and heads along an isolated 
mountain trail littered with the remnants of Guatemalan Indian villages 
destroyed in a civil war between the army and guerrilla forces. The gentle 
Indian peasants are victims caught in the middle, the reader is told. 

Before Blake undertook what appears to have been his final odyssey in March 
1985, he confided to friends a purpose that closely resembled what he defined as 
David Seeker's in his fiction. 

"This was going to be one of his last trips down to Central America," said 
Lucien Yokana, who grew up near Nick in Princeton, N.J., and also spent summers 
in Biddeford Pool. "He had a sense of make or break, that in order to set up his 
reporting career back in the United States, he had to write a big story. I think 
for him, this was it." 

From what Blake told him, Yokana thinks his friend's desire to put his career 
on a fast track somehow balanced the dangers . 

There is little doubt that Blake knew the risks when he and Davis set off to 
make contact with the EGP, the Spanish acronym for Guerrilla Army of the Poor, 
one of four armed insurgent groups in Guatemala. 

First, in a note left for a friend who was meeting him in Antigua, Blake 
wrote that he was off on a "suicide expedition" and would be in Nebaj for a 
reunion in a couple of days. Second, he had been in areas of Guatemala where 
rebel and army forces wrought destruction. That provided the backdrop for the 
novel, written in 1983. 

"They had heard too many stories of soldiers dressing up as guerrillas so 
they could carry out their atrocities and have it blamed on the other side," 
Blake wrote. "Then there were the real guerrillas. No one knew what they were 
like. Perhaps they were so desperate by now that they wouldn't care about 
getting bad press would be downright happy to rob and kill three backpackers 
who had blundered into their midst. 

"Then there was the third force, the patrulla (civil patrols). They were so 
scared that Seeker was almost sure they'd shoot first in a moment of 
uncertainty. Who would blame them?" 

A later passage reveals a measure of trepidation over meeting up with the 
rebels, Blake's real-life goal. 



57 



The Associated Press, March 2, 1986 

"Guerrillas were supposed to treat (journalists) well, so they could get 
their story out. That was how it worked in Salvador anyway. But in Salvador, the 
guerrillas were winning. They could afford to be civilized. It was all different 
here. The army was running things. The EGP couldn't depend on any village 
anymore, it seemed." 

But the differences between the neighboring countries of El Salvador and 
Guatemala don't compare with the gap between the cultures of strife-torn Central 
America and the America of Biddeford Pool. 

In Guatemala, days of pestering officials for assistance and answers often 
end in frustration. 

In Blake's world back home, connections got Vice President George Bush 
involved in the quest for Nick. Bush summers down the road from Biddeford Pool, 
occasionally plays golf at a private club opposite the Blakes' cottage, and his 
son-in-law was an acquaintance of Nick's. 

Despite the vice president's involvement, the response of U.S. officials has 
not satisfied the Blake brothers. They no longer accept embassy reports quoting 
Guatemalan military figures who say their rother wandered into guerrilla 
territory and was killed by rebels. 

The brothers have enlisted eight U.S. senators in their crusade to find out 
what happened to Blake and Griffith. 

Among family and friends, anecdotes about Nick abound: his youth in 
Princeton, how he resented a family move to Philadelphia during adolescence, his 
return to his hometown to attend private school; his years at the University of 
Vermont, where he studied history and literature and was known as a restless 
sort who "wanted things on his own terms," and his first newspaper job at 
Foster's Daily Democrat in Dover, N.H., where he balked at covering fires and 
boards of selectmen. 

In Central America, friends say, Nick seemed to be coming into his own. They 
noted Harper's magazine ran a Blake article the summer before. His pieces 
appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mall and were carried as well by a wire 
service based in Washington, D.C. 

They say Blake was both attracted to and worried by the element of risk, and 
had spoken of a developing addiction to danger. 

"He used to tell me he found it exciting to find himself in dangerous 
situations," recalls Peter Lindsay, whose association with Blake dates back to 
their sandbox days in Biddeford Pool. "He admired people like Hemingway and Jack 
Kerouac, who died of their excesses. He wouldn't have been in Central America if 
it wasn't exciting." 

But for Blake, as with his fictional creation, ambition and thrill-seeking 
were not the only motivations. Idealism was another. 

"In the past when we got together, he told me of scorched villages and how 
these forces were massacring these innocent, humble people. I know how much it 
hurt him to discover what he was uncovering," says Jimmy Adriance, who left his 
Peace Corps post in Costa Rica last year to join Nick in Guatemala during 



58 



The Associated Press, March 2, 1986 

Easter week. 

The Easter reunion never took place. Adriance waited two days in Nebaj for 
Blake, then returned to Costa Rica figuring his strawberry blond pal was on to a 
hot story. Weeks later, Adriance learned Blake had disappeared. 

Among those who knew Nick best were his brothers. Randy and Sam. 

"The story of the Guatemalan Indians probably summed up his outrage at what 
was going on in Central America a seemingly placid Indian population getting 
killed by death squads," Randy says. 

"For him, it was the greatest journalistic challenge of all because it caused 
him so much anguish. He saw Guatemala as the big story that wasn't being told. 
He used to say, 'A civil war is going on here.' He wanted to bring it to light, 
do something about it. The bottom line is, he'd been angling to do something 
like that for a long time." 

To Sam, Nick represented "the great liberator, a kind of voice in the dark 
screaming against conventions." 

"Guatemala really was his favorite country. So it would be really ironic if 
he died there," the youngest Blake brother said. "I always said to Nick, 'If you 
ever get in trouble, we'll be there. We've got the resources and we'll use 
them.' Nick didn't realize how much people really treasured him." 

As the months drag on, those who treasured him have wished for the unlikely t 
hat Nick, known for a flair for the dramatic, would show up. 

"It would be like Nick to all of a sudden come out and say, 'What do you 
mean, missing? That's ludicrous. I've been vacationing in Mexico,"' Yokana said. 

But the happy ending Yokana envisions is not what Blake himself saw for the 
hero of his book. 

In the closing passages. Seeker is killed by "short, ragged men, with 
bandannas tied over their faces, Jesse James-style." 

He is shouting "Periodista ! " (Spanish for journalist) and throws up his hands 
as bullets from an automatic rifle and several pistols tear into him and one of 
his companions . 

"They were still shouting when the shots knocked them over into the mud." 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 



59 



4TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format. 

Copyright 1990 The New York Times Company 
The New York Times 

April 3, 1990, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final 

SECTION: Section A; Page 3, Column 1; Foreign Desk 

LENGTH: 6 70 words 

HEADLINE: U.S. Kin Press Case of 2 Killed in Guatemala in '85 

BYLINE: By CLIFFORD KRAUSS, Special to The New York Times 

DATELINE: WASHINGTON, April 2 

BODY: 

Five years ago last Friday, a freelance journalist and a companion hiked 
through the Guatemalan highlands on their way into territory frequented by the 
Guerrilla Army of the Poor. They were never heard from again. 

Tens of thousands of people were slain in Guatemala in the 1980's without the 
world taking much notice. But this was a different case because the two victims 
were from the United States and because the 27-year-old journalist, Nicholas 
Blake, was a member of a prosperous Philadelphia family with connections in 
Washington . 

Members of the Blake family worked to keep the case alive. They lobbied eight 
senators to write letters to the State Department to keep pressure on Guatemala 
to investigate the case. 

Appealing through George Bush's daughter Dorothy, whom they knew from 
spending summers in Maine, the Blakes even moved the Vice President to intervene 
on their behalf in 1985. Mr. Bush telephoned Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, 
who was then the Guatemalan chief of state, to ask him to get to the bottom of 
the case. As President, Mr. Bush instructed his Ambassador to Guatemala, Thomas 
F. Stroock, to continue asking the Guatemalan authorities to investigate. 

''The Guatemalans understand our keen interest in the case,'' said Philip B. 
Taylor, deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy in Guatemala. 

New Turn in Investigation 

After years of pressure, the investigation took a new turn last week with 
interviews of two suspects. But members of the family, who have made 20 trips to 
Guatemala since Mr. Blake's ill-fated trip, said that despite official United 
States interest, the Guatemalan Army refuses to cooperate in any substantive 
way . 

''Guatemala has 50,000-plus disappeared people, and the Guatemalan military 
doesn't want to solve any of those cases,'' said Randy Blake, 29, one of 
Nicholas's two brothers and a Washington real estate lobbyist. ''And along comes 
an American family trying to solve a case of a disappearance in an area under 
their control, and I think they are very, very afraid of the information on Nick 
getting out . ' ' 



60 



The New York Times, April 3, 1990 

Gen. Hector Alejandro Grama jo Morales, Guatemala's Defense Minister, denied 
the accusation. ''We are doing all we can,'' he said by telephone. 

One lead after another has proved false. For a time, the Blake family 
suspected that the guerrillas had killed their son. Then they thought the 
Guatemalan Army was responsible. 

Friends said Nicholas Blake wanted to write about the Guatemalan guerrillas 
because he was revolted by the suffering of the poor and because he wanted to 
make a name for himself in journalism. The rebel group had long shunned 
publicity. 

Having completed a novel a few months before about a young American 
journalist who was killed while traveling with the Guatemalan guerrillas, he set 
out into the highlands with Griffin Davis, a 38-year-old American merchant of 
Mayan handicrafts and amateur photographer. 

Bodies Never Found 

The two were last seen on March 30, 1985, in El Llano, a hamlet on the edge 
of a guerrilla zone. Their bodies were never found. 

The case appeared hopeless until late 1987, when a Guatemalan teacher 
familiar with El Llano came to the United States Embassy and said villagers had 
told him that five civil patrolmen had accompanied the two men out of the 
village and shot them. 

For two years, American officials requested that the Guatemalan Army locate 
the patrolmen for interrogation. The Guatemalan officers produced two of the 
patrolmen on Tuesday for interrogation by three United States officials, 
including an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The two patrolmen 
denied the allegations. 

An American diplomat said the embassy would press to have the other patrolmen 
interviewed. 

The Blakes said they would continue seeking justice. ''We have the patience 
to hang in there as long as it takes to get results,'' Randy Blake said. ''If 
the United States and Guatemalan Governments haven't gotten the message yet, 
they will, because we aren't going away.'' 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 



61 



2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 

Copyright 1993 Globe Newspaper Company 
The Boston Globe 

November 26, 1993, Friday, City Edition 

SECTION: METRO/REGION; Pg . 48 

LENGTH: 921 words 

HEADLINE: Family charges cover-up in murder of journalist; 
Says Guatemalan military killed brother 

BYLINE: By Philip Bennett, Globe Staff 

DATELINE: CAMBRIDGE 

BODY: 

The case study that Sam Blake is directing at Harvard's Kennedy School of 
Government this fall examines the rol? of a powerful Central American military 
official. Gen. Hector Gramajo of Guatemala, in his country's return toward 
democracy. 

Blake knows Gramajo well. Years ago, he posed the most important question he 
will ever ask the general, when he sought Gramajo's aid to learn who killed his 
brother in the Guatemalan highlands. 

Last month, the Blake family filed a lawsuit charging that the Guatemalan 
military was responsible for the murder in 1985 of Nicholas Blake, a 27-year-old 
journalist. The suit accuses the Guatemalan government of a cover-up that 
concealed Nicholas Blake's remains for seven years, and conceals his killers 
today. 

Sam Blake, who does not blame Gramajo for the murder, said he separates his 
scholarly work from his brother's case. The distinction seems less clear in his 
Kennedy School office, with its huge map of Guatemala, piles of books on 
low-intensity conflict, and the photograph of his brother's profile, intelligent 
and wistful, set against the Mayan ruins at Tikal. 

"I'll always be tied to Guatemala," Sam Blake said. "Emotionally, ask anyone 
who's had a family member murdered. I'll live with that all my life." 

Mystery surrounding Nick Blake's disappearance has led Sam Blake, his brother 
Randy, and their parents on an odyssey that they hope will end with the outcome 
of the suit, which was filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights in Washington. 

The Blakes are seeking acknowledgement from Guatemala that one of its 
military-controlled civil patrols carried out the murder of Blake and a 
traveling companion, a fellow US citizen named Griffith Davis. They also want 
the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for the crime, and financial 
compensation. 

Nicholas Blake and Davis were last seen alive on the morning of March 29, 
1985, near the community of El Llano, in northwestern Guatemala. Blake was 
planning to write a story about a rebel army, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor, 



62 



The Boston Globe, November 26, 1993 

that was active in the mountainous and rugged province of Huehuetenango . 

At the time, Blake already had spent years as a member of a loose 
confederation of young, dedicated, mostly brave and often incautious freelance 
journalists who went to Central America in the early 1980s. While working in El 
Salvador and Nicaragua, he was drawn particularly to Guatemala, his brother 
said, where the army massacred tens of thousands of civilians in a conflict that 
was all but ignored by the media. 

Two weeks after Blake and Davis failed to return from their search for the 
rebels, the State Department telephoned Mary Blake to report that her son was 
missing. During the next seven years, the family members made more than 20 trips 
to Guatemala to press officials and anyone else for information on the case. 

In their investigation, the Blakes drew on resources unimaginable to most 
Guatemalans on similar quests for loved ones. Through a family friendship, they 
contacted George Bush, then vice president, who called Guatemala on their 
behalf. The Blakes chartered helicopters, offered a cash reward, and were 
received by President Vinicio Cerezo and Grama jo, then the army chief of staff. 

They got nowhere. Guatemalan military officials first told Mary Blake that 

her son was a "subversive." Officials at the US Embassy, Sam Blake said, 

suggested that perhaps Nicholas had been killed by rebels. Perhaps he was alive, 
traveling with rebels in rugged jungle on the Mexican border. 

"This was a crime that in a way bothered me most: how the Guatemalan 
government and US Embassy twisted my mother's mind, a mother's belief that her 
son might be alive," Sam Blake said. 

In 1988, a schoolteacher told Sam and Randy Blake that their brother and 
Davis had been shot dead by civil patrol members on the morning they left El 
Llano. The teacher said they were killed for their possessions and because they 
were considered guerrilla sympathizers. 

Four years later, in June 1992, the Blake brothers recovered Nicholas' 
charred remains after paying a regional paramilitary commander. In return for a 
promise that they would not prosecute the killers - a promise they say is 
invalid because it was the result of blackmail for Nicholas' body - they 
obtained a signed note acknowledging that the civil patrol committed the 
murders . 

Sam Blake said that he was later told by a high-ranking military official 
that the army knew of the murders almost immediately after they occurred. In 
1987, the suit alleges, the army ordered the men's remains moved and 
incinerated. 

For years the family had worked to discover what had happened. 

"But after we got the remains back and solved the main question, Sam and I 
focused on the blatant facts that Nick was definitely murdered and his murder 
had been definitely covered up," said Randy Blake, an economist at the US 
Department of the Treasury. "Nick wanted that country to achieve a sense of 
judicial process. That was very strong for Sam and me." 



63 



PAGE 13 
The Boston Globe, November 26, 1993 

In 1990, four years after he first met him in the army chief of staff's 
office, Sam Blake saw Grama jo on the the Harvard campus. Retired and mulling a 
run for the presidency, Gramajo had accepted a fellowship from the Kennedy 
School . 

"When I met him here he was wearing jeans, a flannel shirt, carrying a 
backpack," Blake said. "He's actually an amiable guy." 

If their suit is successful, the Blake family plans to establish a grant for 
freelance journalists in Nicholas Blake's name. 

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, GLOBE FILE PHOTO/ / Nicholas Blake, who was a free-lance 
journalist, disappeared in Guatemala in 1985. 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 

LOAD-DATE-MDC: November 29, 1993 



64 



1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format. 

Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company 
The New York Times 

March 30, 1995, Thursday, Late Edition - Final 

SECTION: Section A; Page 23; Column 2; Editorial Desk 

LENGTH: 4 87 words 

HEADLINE: What Else Did The C.I. A. Know? 

BYLINE: By Samuel Blake; Samuel Blake is a consultant to the Pentagon on 
national security affairs. 

BODY: 

The disclosure that the C.I. A employed a Guatemalan Army colonel involved in 
the torture and murder of Michael DeVine, an American who ran an inn in the 
jungle, and an insurgent married to Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer, comes 
as no surprise to my family. 

Exactly 10 years ago, Guatemalan paramilitary forces escorted my brother Nick 
Blake, a freelance journalist, and a photographer. Griffin Davis, out of the 
village of El Llano in the highlands and shot them dead with high-powered 
rifles. Both men had gone into the mountains to try to interview left-wing 
guerrillas who had been waging a civil war in Guatemala for more than three 
decades . 

The paramilitary forces hid the bodies for a year until public pressure 
forced the army to burn and rebury the remains in hopes that the truth would 
never be known. 

From 1985 to 1992, the highest levels of Guatemala's Government lied to my 
family about what had happened to Nick and Griff, blaming guerrillas for their 
disappearance . 

In June 1992, after information implicating the army in the deaths came to 
our attention, my brother and I went to the highlands where their remains lay, 
90 miles northwest of Guatemala City. We excavated the remains, and Dr. Douglas 
Owsley, a forensic anthropologist at the Smithsonian Institution, identified 
them. 

In December 1992, the U.S. Ambassador, Marilyn McAfee, took me to see 
President Ramiro de Leon Carpio. He admitted that the security forces had killed 
Nick and Griff and that the army high command had covered up the murders. He 
promised to seek justice for our families. 

To this day, the promises remain empty. The Government won't admit officially 
who ordered Nick's and Griff's executions, why they were killed, why their 
deaths were covered up and by whom, and it refuses to discipline or prosecute 
those involved in the murders and cover-up. 

For the most part, for 10 years Washington has parroted the nonsense spouted 
by the Guatemalans that guerrillas or "brigands" killed Nick and Griff. As we 
pressed our own investigation, it became clear that elements of our Government, 
mainly C.I. A. and State Department officials, were running interference for 



65 



The New York Times, March 30, 1995 

their friends in the Guatemalan Army. 

We always suspected that our Government knew a great deal about the army's 
role in the murders. With the disclosures about Mr. DeVine and Ms. Harbury's 
husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez (a guerrilla supposedly protected by the Geneva 
Convention on the treatment of prisoners), our worst fears have been confirmed 
-- that our intelligence and national security agencies are withholding 
information that could shed light on the slayings. 

Our families would like the Congressional intelligence committees to hold 

public hearings and subpoena officials and documents from the C.I. A. and the 

State and Defense Departments that might help in the quest for truth and justice 
in our case and the other cases. 



GRAPHIC: Drawing 
LANGUAGE : ENGL I SH 
LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 30, 1995 



66 



:2.'''"TW0' EMBOFFS'TRAVELED by helicopter on !APRIL''18/y>.. 
il985,'-I0"THEr.DEPARTMENTS OF HUEHUETENANGO. 'AND', EL ;!■,',.:;::,.''' 
;QUICEE' in 'AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WELFARE AND ' ' , " ' ^' ' 
.WHEREABOUTS' OF TWO" MISSING AMCITS, N ICHOLAS' BLAiCE AND ■" 

GRIIFITH WILLIAM DAVIS. ' .ACCOMPANY ING :THE ' EMBOFFS' WERE 
'•THE CONSULAR SECTION FSN' INVESTIGATOR — A VETERAN"OF,' 

GOG'S NATIONAL POLICE— AND A 'MEMBER OF THE' EMBASSY'S I-. 
iSECURlTY FORCE," A NATIVE OF EL ' QUI CHE/ WHO ;SPEAKS''.ONE'X 

OF... THE .REGION'S MAJOR INDIAN' DIALECTS . •: ■.' ' ■ . •'r^■i^;^v''•'' 

'Sl''^' THROUGH 'friends 'and family'- OF BLAKE AND ' DAVIS ,' THE 
,EMBASSY"'LEARNED' THAT;,THE TWO AMERICANS PLANNED TO^HI|[E^ 
FROM THE''T0WN;0F SAN'JUAN IXCOY, IN' CENTRAL ' ■'■" ■'■'f^."'yy^ 
,HUEnUETENANGO,'TO: THE' TOWN OF ,NEBAJ , 'IN'' WESTERN lEL T--:"' ' 

.QUICHE.-:.-,,.,:,: ,;;;■- ; .■...:.,; ;j.c I' .<:....,.::■.,::... ■:.:.:: ;.\.:..- ;,^.,,;^ .■::.. ^^ 

',._ , . ; I. , : ■ I ,' !•! J 1 ; . .. |. J . . , ,, . .1.1,;.'. i /. 

4.'''' "although' THE' DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO' TOWNS" IS '""%>:■( 
;ONLY '.APPROXIMATELY 40 .KILOMETERS ,' THE AREA'"'IS RUGGED,',(fe 

HIGH sierra;ilwith few roads; and- AN active: GUERRILLA <v.';:4 

lIUSURGEHCY."'' THE,;j?OUrB THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS ..PLANNED,, i:„,. 
■70 IflfCB IS 'ALOHG THE NORTHERN FACE OF LOS '' ■ ' 
CUCHUMATANES, '.THE HIGHEST MOUNTAIN 'RANGE IN" CENTRAL.)!-!":'' 

.AMERICA. "THE ELEVATIONS' ALONG' THE ROUTE.. V ARY'iFROM :' .;•. 

ABOUT' 6000' TO..9000 FEET ABOVE SEA .LEVEL. THE AREA"' IS ■'., 
CHARACTERIZED BY. STEEP MOUNTAINS , DEEP RIVER RAVINES ,..;,. 
PRIMITIVE HIKING TRAILS, AND THICK PINE FOREST ... THE..... ■ 
ENTIRE.AREA IS INCLUDED IN THE EMBASSY 'S TRAVEL ,' 



67 



:. ADVISORY, 'which. IDENTIFIES PLACES ' WHICH ' ARE ' NOT '^'^■^'^v'^; 
:a..CONSIDEK£D' SAFE 'FOR TOURIST 'TRAVEL BECAUSE OF "•'';■■;'■'■'■'''(= 
^-:FREQUENT,.CLASRES*;bETWEEN 'THE. GUERRILLAS' AND' GOG ;•'.'' V': 

l>5.:f-'' AT'''0908:|HGURSV'EMBOFFS -FLEW" INTO' SAN""JUAN''lXCOr:(^ 
'•i;iN' THE' TOyN':TeEI"ENCOUNTERED' THREE FRIENDS -OF'BLAKE.'^-i 
,M AND 'DAVIS •--' AMC I T'"LORr-LEGATOR"( WHO' ORIGINALLY' ':'^';;:^:f"7 
■REPORTED. THE'DISAPPEARANCE; OF DAVIS-'AND' BLAKE' ON ^■■■^!^i^. 
..'APRIL' 8),' CANADIAN CITIZEN MAGDALENA 'VERGARA / AND V"'^ 
;'■• GERMAN CITIZEN MECHTHILD LINDKEN (WHO DESCRIBES "' ■'■■••;:'>' 
IHERSELFAS' DAVIS' 'COMMON-LAWWIFE) / ' THEY SAID THEY'":!"' 
.;HAD ARRIVED..THE NIGHT'BEFORE , ' AND' HAD, ALREADY'^ '•7^' '''^i'i 
.''riSTP.IBUTED''"PHOTOGRAPHS"OF'THE..MlSSlNG' AMBRICArJ_5. T0 7V' 
:;.T0WN'0FJICIALS-'AND;;RESIDENTS. • ■ MS.' LINDKEN"SAID 'SHE '"■:•' 
'.^CHECKED RECORDS AT TRANSPORTACIONES ' CIFUENTES , A BUS' 
.VCOMPANY'IN THE' CITY' OF HUEHUETENANGO , WHICH' SHOWED ?;--^;.'' 
..THAT BLAKE AND' DAVIS HAD LEFT ' THE^DEPARTMENTAL ^"' 'r''.'.'i'; 
T'CAPITALIMARCH' 26 ON THE 10:00' A.M. BUS' TO SAN: JUAN K':. 

;wixcqY..O:::;o;r..:;;;,.':: :.■,:;;,,_,,,:. ;. .,", :,: ., .; ■ . " ■,.,';,'^i'^ 

|J'6'.''''''aCC0RDING to' MS . ■ LINDKEN , "BLAKE AND' DAVIS HAd"-'"'"'' ■'• 
:''ARRIVED IN SAN JUAN IXCOY AT' 12:30 P.M. ^' MS. LINDKEN '" 

^STATED THAT^ SEVERAL'ITOWNSPEOPLE NOTICED- A' LARGE c":;' :.;' 

^'FOREIGNER RIDING ON THE TOP OF' THE BUS,' A PRACTICE V'''-,' 
; SHE' SAID. MR. ^BLAKE' ENJOYED.,' ... ' ....:.:,::':. .:'r;; ; i.,;!;f., 

...^7.'"'"EMB0FF'INTERVIEWED' THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN'"IICOY, ',•.■;■ 
r'ANDREAS VELAZQUEZ, WHO IS ALSO THE' LEADER OF THE.', 
-TOWN'S' CIVIL' DEFENSE 'FORCE ." VELASQUEZ ■' CONFIRMED.'THAT 

J..BUKE AND DAVIS HAD ARRIVED' ON ' THE BUS 'FROM ' ' ■""" -; 

^HUEHUETENANGO/'AND HAD" LEFT' THE' SAME' DAY, TAKING ' THE-r 
.'-.EASTERN' TRAIL TO' JOLOMHUITZ AND SAN FRANCISCO' LAS ir:.-'" 
■•FLORES. THE FRIENDS OF BLAKE AND DAVIS'SAID" THAT ' * ;' '^ 
-THEYi FELT' CONFIDENT THAT THE TWO' AMERICANS HAD LEFT '."• 
.'SAN" JUAN ''.IX COY IN. THE DIRECTION'.OF SAN .FRANClSCO,.LAS;v 
uFLORES .?.' ;n'1..',;:v:.;^...„r;;,.;^^':^ ■■^;,[.r-.- /vVrA^liv/i,.' ;..;:• , ;; 'H ;■!. > P:'",'';; 

is; -"IN 'SAN'JUiiN 'IXCOY,' EMBOFFS' ALSO ENCOUNTERED' TWO 'J-' 
;.GOG ARMY' SPECIALISTS FROM THE' ARMY' BASE IN' .■■•■''^ ";:-:;; 
'HUEHUETENANGO, ALBERTO CORTEZ RUIZ AND ANGEL GARCIA, - 
:'-WflO'.HAD;;BEENrSENT'TO.;THE.",TOWN..THE;:DAY' BEFORE:;.BYi'.THE,,|; . 

'■«!i";>vv ':<:r;;..^''K;:--v!.'n)-iv:.l ..'•■^ ''■'!■ •'>„'^ ■ ■■■ .'■'. v'/'r-':--'!.'--:'::''"'- "'i-!^'":-.' !•■'"■■ '''v'-ti'-'i-'i:;'!' 



68 



" GUATEMALAN ARMTTO I NVEST IGATE'tHE WHEREABOUTS'Oli' 

'BLAKE AND DAVIS. THE MAYOR SAID THAT THE MAYORS OF 
31 NEIGHBORING VILLAGES WERE COMING TO SAN JUAN IXCOY 
APRIL- 18, AND WOULD BE ASKED IF THEY RAD ANY 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE TWO AMERICANS. 

9. SINCE JOLOMHUITZ IS ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN ONE 
HOUR BY FOOT FROM SAN JUAN IXCOY, EMBOFFS DECIDED TO 
FLY DIRECTLY TO SAN FRANCISCO LAS FLORES. IN SAN 
FRANCISCO LAS FLORES THEY SPOKE TO ARMANDO FIGUEROA, ' 

-WHO WAS ON DUTY WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL: 
MARCH 26, AND WITH MIGUEL CARTAGENA, THE TEACHER AT 
THE VILLAGE SCHOOL. FIGUEROA AND CARTAGENA SAID THAT 
TWO AMERICANS ARRIVED AT ABOUT 4 P.M. MARCH 26 AND ■ 
SPENT THE NIGHT IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE. THE' PHYSICAL 
DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN BY VILLAGERS CLOSELY MATCHED THOSE 
OF BLAKE AND DAVIS, AND THEY RECOGNIZED THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TWO AMERICANS PROVIDED BY 
EMBOFFS. CARTAGENA SAID THE TWO AMERICANS IDENTIFIED 
THEMSELVES AS A REPORTER AND A PHOTOGRAPHER, AND SAID 
THEY WERE HEADED TO THE MAYAN RUINS OF MIXLAJ, A 
VILLAGE FARTHER EAST. 

10. CARTAGENA SAID HE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE 
AREA WAS DANGEROUS AND THE TRAIL RUGGED. HE SAID THE 
TWO AMERICANS REPLIED THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE 
DANGER AND THAT THEY HAD MAPS. 

11. FIGUEROA AND CAHTAGENA SAID THE TWO AMERICANS 
DEPARTED SAN FRANCISCO LAS FLORES ABOUT 7 A .M . ON 
MARCH 27. 

12. EMBOFFS THEN FLEW TO MIXLAJ, PASSING THROUGH AN ' 
AREA OF HEAVILY WOODED MOUNTAINS BROKEN BY SHEER 
DROPS INTO RIVER RAVINES. IN MIXLAJ, EMBOFFS TALKED 
TO EULALIO HERRERA MERIDA, ASSISTANT MAYOR, AND 
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL. HERRERA 
SAID HE FIRST NOTICED TWO AMERICANS AT ABOUT 10:30 ' 
A.M. ON MARCH 27, BATHING IN THE RIVER THAT PASSES 

.THROUGH THE VILLAGE. HE SAID ONE OF THE AMERICANS 
-WAS TALL WITH A HEAVY BEARD, AND THAT THE OTHER WAS 
EVEN TALLER AND HAD NO BEARD. THESE DESCRIPTIONS 
WERE PROVIDED BEFORE EMBOFFS SHOWED HIM PHOTOGRAPHS 
OF BLAKE AND DAVIS, AND ARE GOOD THUMBNAIL SKETCHES 
OF THE. TWO. HERRERA THEN IDENTIFIED THE PHOTOGRAPHS. 

13. HERRERA AND OTHER VILLAGERS SAID THE TWO 
AMERICANS SPENT THE DAY IN MIXLAJ, AND SLEPT THE 
NIGHT IN THE LOCAL SCHOOLHOUSE. HE SAID THAT BLAKE 
AND DAVIS NEVER VISITED THE RUINS AT MIXLAJ. 

14. HERRERA SAID THAT THE TWO AMERICANS TOLD HIM 
THAT THEY WANTED TO GO TO SUMAL, A MOUNTAINTOP 
VILLAGE,' EAST-SOUTHEAST OF MIXLAJ IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF EL QUICHE. (COMMENT: BRITISH JOURNALIST MICHAEL 
SHAWCROSS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON APRIL 
17 WITH EMBOFFS THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS ALSO HAD TOLD 
HIM THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN GOING TO SUMAL. END 



69 



'^COMMENT)^nERRERA^SAID^HE TOLDi"THEM^NOT^TO'"GO THEREt*^ 
BECAUSE' THE"AREA WAS ' DANGEROUS . '- WHILE ' EMBOFFS";WERE, ,'';;■,' 

'in"'san"juan:;iicot/they were, told^by- gog 'armt ''""■ '■■' T'^v 

SPECIALISTS'NOT TO TRAVEL TO SUMAL' BECAUSE IT' WAS' A' "." 
GUERRILLA'STRONGHOLD- and THAT 'their HELICOPTER WOULD''' 
.PROBABLY. BE'. SHOT;.DOWN.':.:i'':;:;:'i.'''!-, ■' ' y'lr •:'^^^^;.';^:SH":- :i,-;i.';K«'V;;.' 
"j-.:. ,:^:-.,..>j- ii--ii.-.'...'i "-A-H': r,.k./i- ' . ■ , -• >.■•■'■. vi'i ■' ':;.■'. "' • <■'''<':'" ■ ■■r..''yf ■ i ;i.'!-r.'-ir''. -l^^^r.!r-,y.^■.• 
■■ 15 /' •'' ACCORDI NG "' TO HERRERA , ' THE"' TWO. AMER I CA NS ''LEFT '' ''■'' ' '"' 
"HULA J -THE'' MORNING 'OF MARCH"28 ,'TRAV,EL I NG' TOWARD' LAS! '^ 
MAJADAS, A MILITARY' BASE OVERLOOKING'-A GROUP OF HIGH •!•, 
SIERRAN' VILLAGES.' "THE' COUNTRYSIDE AROUND'LAS' MAJADAS^ 
■■IS'LIGHTLY'FORESTED,' WITH FLAT' LAND^ AND' RI VER/'VALLEYS^T 

brok.en';bY-'ROCk;.outcroppings. :•::,>•':■'■•.: ■••.■ ■""'.'.,;/' I ■'••K': 

:i6. 'ATTHE MILITARY' BASE' IN LAS MAJADAS , ' EMBOFFS '"^'•'''"■' 
: TALKED TO LIEUTENANT" ALEJANDRO "ELEL."^ HE SAID' THAT' ON;i 

■ MARCH:'29 THE "CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE OF' LLANO, A VILLAGE '" 
'WHICH REPORTS TO THE' ARMY AT " LAS' MAJ ADAS ,' CAME TO i' ":'';.■'' 
..TELL HIM THAT TWO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. WERE : ■,.'•;.•:■'; "•'•■ 
1'.EEQUESTING. PERMISSION TO GO TO" SUMAL._ ','.;...■;.. ■;•'""■"!■; 

■;■■"'■"■••!' i;.;"' ' , . ' / ■ ■■""'' 

■ 17. "THE: LIEUTENANT SAID' THAT THE AMERI CANS' PRESENTED 
A TRAVEL 'PASS FROM THE ARMY BASE' IN 'HUEHUETENANGO /•'' ' 

.GIVING THEM PERMISS ION TO' BE " IN THE' AREA . 'LIEUTENANT 
.:.ELEL*SAID HE WAS NOT SURE OF .THE DATE OF THE' TRAVEL ?^^' 
' PASS, ^^ BUT' HE BELIEVED IT WAS JANUARY .• (COMMENT : !:, •T-"''" 

'-"■"■-'■-■■■■' ' ■ ■■'■■■)'■'■■ •^^':Mi 



70 



MICHAEL SHAWCROSS RAD TOLD EMBOfF DURING AM' APRIL 9 
-MEETING IN THE EMBASSY THAT "MR .• BLAKE' HAD PREVIOUSLY 
REQUESTED'AND RRCEIVED PERMISSION FROM THE ARMY TO 
TRAVEL- IN HUEHUETENANGO KARLIER THIS YEAR, BUT THAT 
HE HAD NOT-REQUESTED PERMISSION THIS TIME BECAUSE HE 
WAS AFRAID' THAT IT WOULD- BE DENIED. END COMMENT.) ' 

18. ACCORDING TO THE LIEUTENANT, THE' TWO AMERICANS 
SPENT THE "NIGHT OF MARCH 29 IN LLANO,' AND LEFT THE 
NEXT MORNING SAYING THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TRAVEL TO 
SALQUILV A TOWN TO THE NORTHWEST OF LAS MAJADAS. THE 
LIEUTENANT SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN THEM PERMISSION TO 
GO THERE. SALQUIL IS A MODEL VILLAGE SET ON A '" 
MOUNTAIN TOP, DEFENDED BY A WELL-DUG IN ARMY 
DETACHMENT. 

19. WHEN EMBOFFS ARRIVED IN SALQUIL, THEY WERE TOLD 
BY- LIEUTENANT ARTURO VELASQUEZ THAT HE THOUGHT THE ' 
HELICOPTER WAS BRINGING ARMY REINFORCEMENTS FOR A 
BATTLE THEN' IN PROGRESS ABOUT FIVE MILES FROM THE 
VILLAGE.' SOLDIERS WERE DEPLOYED AROUND THE 
HELICOPTER TO PROTECT IT FROM POSSIBLE GUERRILLA 
ATTACK. ■ 

20. LIEUTENANT VELASQUEZ SAID NO AMERICANS HAD 
ARRIVED IN SALQUIL ON MARCH 29 OR 30, OR ANY DAY 
AFTER. HE SAID THAT IF ANY AMERICANS HAD ARRIVED, HE 
DEFINITELY WOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED. THE HEAD OF 
THE CIVIL' DEFENSE FORCE OF THE VILLAGE CONFIRMED THAT 
NO AMERICANS HAD COME THERE ON OR ABOUT MARCH 29 OR 
30. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THAT THERE WAS FREQUENT 
COMBAT IN THE AREA AND THAT A BATTLE HAD BEEN FOUGHT 
CLOSE TO SALQUIL ABOUT 15 DAYS EARLIER, I.E. ON OR 
ABOUT APRIL 3. 

21. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THAT SUMAL WAS A GUERRILLA 
STRONGHOLD, CONSISTING OF A SERIES OF TUNNELS DUG 
INTO A MOUNTAINSIDE. HE SAID THAT SUMAL AND THE 
VILLAGES SURROUNDING IT HAD BEEN ABANDONED, AND THAT 
ONLY GUERRILLAS OF THE EGP (THE GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE 
POOR) WERE THERE. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID THE ARMY ONLY 
GOES' INTO- THE AREA IN ORDER TO FIGHT THE GUERRILLAS. 
HE' SAID THAT. THE ARMY WAS NOT IN CONTROL OF THAT AREA 
AND ANY ARMY PATROL ENTERING THAT AREA EXPECTED TO BE 
IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THE LIEUTENANT TOLD EMBOFFS 
THAT IF THEY WENT TO' SUMAL THEY SHOULD EXPECT THEIR 
HELICOPTER TO BE SHOT DOWN. 

22. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THE TRAIL BETWEEN LLANO AND 
SUMAL IS PATROLLED BY THE GUERRILLAS, AND THAT IF ANY 
OUTSIDERS HAD ENTERED THE AREA, THEY WOULD DEFINITELY 
HAVE ENCOUNTERED MEMBERS OF THE EGp . 

23. FROM SALQUIL, EMBOFFS FLEW TO THE TOWN OF NEBAJ, 
IN ORDER TO REFUEL BEFORE BACKTRACttI NG TO LLANO. IN 
NEBAJ,' TWO ARMY CAPTAINS SAID THAT NEITHER MR. BLAKE 
NOR MR. DAVIS HAD VISITED THE TOWN. THEY WERE ABLE 
TO CONFIRM THIS BECAUSE THE ARMY CHECKS THE RECORDS 



71 



;OF"ALL H0TELS~INNEBAJ"AND'THBT'w0ULD'HAVE-BEEN"'~'-'V^': 
INF0RMED;'IF-TW0--AMERICANS ^.HAC arrived. ■• THEr'SAID"''-'-'|V|.' 
;THAT"'J'RIENDS' OF 'BLAKE and: DAV I S HAD' VISITED' THE TOWN V 
^TO- DISTRIBUTE PHOTOGRAPHS OF'THE TWO, AND TO' ASK ■ ' " ■' ■^■■ 
:TOWNSPEOPLE'ABOUT THEIR WHEREABOUTS. ' INTERVI EWS "WITfl 
'SEVERAL'PEOPLE'IN NEBAJ, INCLUDING' AN AMERICAN - ' V.s;:..> 
.-TOURIST /CONFIRMED' THAT THE TOWN WAS" WELL AWARE OF '■<••> 
'THE SEARCH'FOR-: BLAKE' AND' DAVIS.' •• (COMMENT:^'' MILGROUpK 
commander: COL . VmCLAUGHLIN , IN NEBAJ^ ON' SEPARATE 'j'";'"'"^' 
'BUSINESS, ALSO REQUESTED' LOCAL GOG MILITARY TO"'"" '••■■^ 
'piSTRIBUTE'-pflOTOS; of: DAVIS AND BLAKE. ;• END-.COMMENT ; )1 • 

24 .'"'THE ARMT CAPTAINS SAID THAT EGP WAS FRAGMENTED ,'•'• 
AND' LACKED' A CENTRAL COMMAND.'^ ■ THE REACTION OF 'T,' v-.-.'v' 
'GUERRILLAS TO THE ARRIVAL OF' OUTSIDERS WOULD BE ''^- ':'' 
UNPREDICTABLE, AND THAT THEY MIGHT NOT RECOGNIZE THE " 
'POLITICAL' VALUE'IN SHELTERING JOURNALISTS. •' THEY ALSO ' 
•SAID THAT^LIFE WAS CHEAP IN THAT AREA ,' AND THAT ' IF 'v"'''- 
OUTSIDERS ARRIVED WITH 'MONEY, THE' GUERRILLAS ' MIGHT '''■'' 
WELL.EOB;AND f[ILL :THEM.' • • ■•.■•■ -■,..,..•.•■,; ■-■h's,.^ 

2 5.*''- FROM NEBAJ, EMBOFFS WENT TO QUILEN NOVILLO, A r' '-" 
.VILLAGE' BETWEEN' LLANO AND SALQUIL. 'MEMBERS' OF ~THE''*'^'w 
CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE AND THE LOCAL TEACHER SAID THAT,,^:: 
NO AMERICANS' HAD COME TO THEIR VILLAGE ON OR ABOUT '" 
MARCHi 29 ' OR^30 , ' AND THAT THE ' OTHER V ILLAGES_JE'riEEiC' •, 

salquil: AND llano^had' BEEN^ abandoned'./{!^n.!-:.;k ,;[;;J'-i^v^^ 

26 ."""EMBOFFS ' TH EN WENT TO LLANO ."''" THE'" SECOND ' i''':^ ' ' - ''s'-r 
COMMANDER' OF THE VILLAGE' C IVIL'DEFENSEVPATROL ,' ^ '.*',:¥'/. 
VICENTE 'CIFUENTES, '-SAID THAT BLAKE AND' DAVI S HAD' ■'::•.::!'; 
SPENT"THE NIGHT OF MARCH 28 ' IN ''LLANO , AND LEFT THE '',.Si": 
MORNING" OF MARCH 29' SAYING THE WERE HEADING TO "^T' !.'-'i;! ' 
SALQUIL." THE' DATE" OF THEIR DEPARTURE FROM LLANO ' v' 
DIFFERS" FROM" THAT" OFi LIEUTENANT ELEL'/OFi LAS MAJADAS, .f 
WH0:DID NOT MEET' ;THE TWO AMERICANS . ,;.V;';..Viv;; ;<!' i'V. 1' •';■':., 

27/'""bECAUSE' OF ENVELOPING DEEP CLOUD COVER, EMBOFFS.';',. 
WERE' TOLD BY THE HELICOPTER PILOT , THAT ' THET MUST "".,';:; : 
LEAVE' LLANO IMMEDIATELY ,' OR SPEND THR NIGHT IN THE: 
VILLAGE.- AT' 1500 HOURS ,' EMBOFFS FLEW OUT OF LLANO AT,, 
:TREET0P: LEVEL, > AND RETURNED :T0 GUATEMALA Cm ..... .... .^^^ 



72 



L l2 L L. t. 



L. L.L;k.Llk.L.klU 



UNCLASSIFIED 
Depart nicnt of State 



INCOMING 
TELEGRAM 



PACE 81 cutTEii em: 

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i OF 12 OMSSSZ 



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CEPT Also FOR ARA/CEN AND CA/OCS/EtlR 



E.O. niii: N/A 

TACS: CASC, CT (DAVIS, GRIFFITH AND BLAKE, HICHOLAS) 

SUBJECT: V/W: CASE OF GRIFFITH DAVIS AND NICHOLAS 

BLAKE 

REF: CA/OCS/ENR DOC. NO. B-ES370; INOIAL) 

TO: THE HONORABLE JOHN HEINZ 
UNITED STATES SENATE 
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE 
94Se FEDERAL BUILDING 
PHILADELPHIA, PA ISlOi 
ATTENTION: SKIP IRVINE 

1. THE DEPARTHENT OF STATE HAS REQUESTED THIS EMBASSY 
TO RESPOND TO VOUR HAY t LETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT 
REGARDING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF nR. NICHOLAS BLAKE, THE 
SON OF YOUR COICTITUEUT, MRS. NARY BLAKE. NICHOLAS 
ELAKE, ACCOnPAHIED BY AnERICAH CITIZEN GRIFFITH DAVIS, 
DEPARTED THE CITY OF HUEHUETENAUCO ON MARCH 2S. 
NEITHER MAN HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH FAMILY OR FRIENDS 
SINCE THAT TIM£. 

2. FRIENDS OF MR. BLAKE AND MS. DAVIS FIRST ADVISED 
THE EMBASSY ON APRIL t THAT THEY WERE OVERDUE AND 
KEOUESTED THE EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE IN TRYING TO LOCATE 
THEM. THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE, THE 
EMBASSY REQUESTED THE GUATEMALAN ARMY TO BE ON THE 
LOOKOUT FOR BOTH MEN, AND TO ADVISE US IF THEY WERE 
ENCOUNTERED. 

3. ALTHOUGH THE GUATEMALAN ARMY DID SEND OUT PATROLS 
BEGINNING ON APRIL 9, THEY WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE 
MEN. A SUBSEQUENT GUATEMALAN ARMY SEARCH WHICH BEGAN 
ON APRIL K, INVOLVING MORE THAN HI TROOPS AND 
LASTING MORE THAN A WEEK, ALSO FAILED TO UNCOVER ANY 
TRACE OF THE TWO MEN. 



m 



i. OH APRIL It. MRS. BLAKE ARRIVED III GUATEMALA 10 
PERiONALlY REVIEW IH[ ACTIOli: TA«CN TO lOCAIS 
NICHOLAS 6LAi;;. SHE WA3 ACCOnPAIIICD BY Hfll SOIi. 
RANDY ELAKE, FAMILY FRIEND lUCIEII YOHAN>, AND EDUARD 
GOFF, All AIIORHEY EMPLOYED BY WBEAIOi: IIIDUSTRIE;. 
MRS. BLAKE'S PARTY MET WITH AMSASSAOOh PIEDDA ON 

APRIL li AND wa: thoroughiv briefed by mission 
orricERS, IHCLUOINC the defense attache, the same 

DAY. on APRIL J7, THE BLARE PARTY, ACCOMPANIED BY 
THE DEFENSE ATTACHE, VISITED THE ACTING COMMANDER OF 
THE 20TH MILITARY ZONE, THE AREA WHERE THE MISSING 
MEN WERE LAST SEEN. MRS. BLAKE DEPARTED GUATEMALA ON 
APRIL 29. 

7. THE ORIGINAL SEARCH AREA HAS BEEN EXPAIJDED TO 
INCLUDE BELIZE AND SOUTHERN MEXICO ON THE CHANCE THAT 
THE MISSING MEN MIGHT SURFACE OUTSIDE OF GUATEMALA. 
IN THE INTERIM, MR. GOFF HAS HADE A SECOND VISIT TO 
REVIEW THE SITUATION HERE. THE BLAKE FAMILY AND 
FRIENDS OF MR. DAVIS HAVE EMPLOYED A PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATOR HERE TD AUGMENT THE EFFORTS OF THE 
EMBASSY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA. 

I. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE AREA IN WHICH MR. 
BLAKE WAS KNOWN TO BE TRAVELING IS THE SCENE OF 
FREQUENT CLASHES BETWEEN GUERRILLA INSURGENTS AND 

GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
AWARE OF THE RISK SUCH VIOLENT ENCOUNTERS COULD POSE 
TO AMERICAN CITIZENS, HAS MAINTAINED IN EFFECT SINCE 
AUGUST, 1911 A TRAVEL ADVISORY CAUTIONING AMERICAN 
CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL IN THAT AREA. RESIDENTS OF 
THE AREA STATED TO THE EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT THEY 
ALSO CAUTIONED MR. BLAKE REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF 
ARMED GUERRILLA INSURGENTS IN THE TOWN OF SUMAL. 

S. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT VET BEEN POSSIBLE TO LOCATE 
MR. BLAKE, THE EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN ALERT 
TO ANY LEAD REGARDING HIS WHEREABOUTS. THE 
GUATEMALAN ARMY ALSO WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON THE 
LOOKOUT FOR ANY SIGN OF HIM. 

IB. VE HOPE THIS INFORMATION IS HELPFUL TO YOU. 

PI EASE BE ASSURED THAT EVERY ASSET AVAILABLE TO THIS 

MISSION IS BEING USED IN AH EFFORT TO LOCATE THEM. 

UIERICAN EMBASSY 
eUATEHALA. PIEDRA 



4. ON APRIL It, TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS TRAVELED BY 
HELICOPTER TO THE AREA WHERE BLAKE AND DAVIS HAD 
INTENDED TO KIKE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE ABLE TO TRACE 
THEIR MOVEMENTS UP TO MARCH 29 OR 3D TO THE SMALL 
VILLAGE OF LLANO, FROM THAT POINT, THEIR TRAIL 
VANISHED. THE EMBASSY OFFICERS WERE ABLE TO 
DETERMINE, HOWEVER, THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS EXPRESSED 
INTEREST IN WALKING TO THE NEARBY TOWN OF SUMAL, A 
KNOWN GUERRILLA STRONGHOLD, DESPITE THE ADVICE OF 
LOCAL TOWNSPEOPLE IN LLANO AND THE GUATEMALAN ARMY. 



i. ON APRIL 2S, ANOTHER EMBASSY OFFICER FLEW OVER 
THE TOWN OF SUMAL AND DROPPED <,SB8 LEAFLETS 
REQUESTING ANY PERSON HAVING INFORMATION REGARDING 
BLAKE OR DAVi: TO ADVISE THE AMERICAN CONSUL IN 
GUATEMALA CITY. THE UOTICES, PBIIITED 111 BOTH SPANISH 
AND THE LOCAL INOIAI: DIALECT, PROVIDED k TELEPHONE 



UNCLASSIFIED 



ACTIOf 
COPY 



73 



UNCLASSIFIED 



INCOMING 
TELEGRAM 



INFO LOG- a 



Department of ^Pei'kr.Lf, ^ TELE! 

TEM B6244 261651Z ^ ^ C^'i g" [fJf0V 



<Rr2616482 JUN 8S ^. 

FM AMEMBaSSY GUATEMALA 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 923^ 
INFO AMEMBASSY BELIZE 
AMEMBASSY MEXICO 

UNCLAS GUATEMALA 6 2 •« 4 



E. O. I 23S6: 
TAGS: CASC. 
SUBJECT: W/ 
NICHOLAS BL 



=DATE ON CASE OF GRIFFITH DAVIS 



1. DATT SPOKE WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOUS. DEPUTY 
COMMANDER OF MILITARY ZONE 20 IN EL OUICHE. ON JUNE 18 
ABOUT MISSING AMERICAN CITIZENS GRIFFITH DAVIS AND 
NICHOLAS BLAKE. SOLIS SAID THE MILITARY HAD UNCOVERED 
NO NEW INFORMATION OR LEADS ABOUT THE WELFARE AND 
WHEREABOUTS OF THE AMERICANS. 

2. EMBOFF QUESTIONED GOG ARMY LIEUTENANT FEDERICO 
GUILLEHMO PADILLA CASTILLO ON JUNE 19. DURING A 
NONIMMIGRANT VISA INTERVIEW. ABOUT BLAKE AND DAVIS- 
PADILLA CLAIMED TO BE STATIONED IN NEBAJ. THE TOWN 
WHERE BLAKE AND DAVIS WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET FRIENDS 
AFTER THEIR HIKE FROM SAN JUAN IXCOY. THE LIEUTENANT 
SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THE FATE OF THE 
MISSING AMERICANS. HOWEVER. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING 
BETWEEN GUERRILLA INSURGENTS AND GOG SECURITY FORCES 
HAD INTENSIFIED IN THE AREA AROUND NEBAJ. AND THAT 
SEVERAL OFFICERS HAD BEEN KILLED. 



3. THE JUNE 19 

■PRENSA LIBRE". 
CLASHES BETWEEN 
THE DEPARTMENT 
THE ROAD BETWEE 



EDITION OF GUATEMALAN DAILY. THE 
CAiRRIED A STORY REPORTING SEVERAL 
INSURGENTS AND GOG SECURITY FORCES IN 
3F EL OUICHE ONE OF THESE OCCURRED ON 

■J SALOUIL AND NEBAJ, WHEN INSURGENTS 



MG CREV 
MG ONE ; 



MG ONE GOG 



EMBOFF SF 



EST SAID TK 




DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE. 






rvo \>. 



UNCLASSIFIED 



74 



ACTION 
COPY 



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GUATEM 10718 1718352 



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R 1 7 1 8 3 1 Z C 1 8 5 

FM AMEMLiASSY GUATEMALA 

TO SECLlATt W^bHDC 1 i .M 

UNCLA5 GUATEMALA 107 18 

E.O. 12356 N/A 

TAGS CASC, GT (BLAKE, NICHOLAS AND DAVIS, GRIFFITH) 

SUBJECT: WW BLAKE DAVIS CASE - UNSUCCESSFUL INQUIRIES 



7229 




1. ON OCTOBER 5, EMBOFF TRAVELLING BY HELICOPTER IN A 
REMOTE AREA IN NORTHERN HUE HUE T E N ANG TOOK THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO ASK LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF THEY HAD ANY 
NEWS WHICH MIGHT RELATE TO THE MISSING AMERICANS. 

2. NO ONE IN NENTON, BARILLAS, OR FINCA MONTE CRISTO 
HAD ANY NEW INFORMATION ON THE CASE. THE LIEUTENANT 
COMMANDING THE GARRISON AT LOS SARGENTES, NEAR THE RIO 
I XT AN, WAS INTERVIEWED AS WELL, ALSO WITHOUT NEW 

I NFORMaT I ON RESULTING. P I EDRA 



UNCLASSIFIED 



75 



UNITED ■""/ 'S GOVERNMENT 

memorandum 



DATE: 3 December 198 5 
?fNo?: Col Hooker - DATT-4^ 
uBjECT: Status Report on Blake-Davis case 

TO, DCM 

1. The following actions have been taken ref the Blake-Davis 
case since our last meeting on this subject with the Blake 
family. 

a. Our Sources indicate one (1) FAG helicopter #170 was 
attached for duty to the Playa Grande MZ Commander during the 
period 2-11 April 1985. The area of operations included, 
Huehuetenango , El QuichS and Playa Grande. There is no record 
of landings in Nebaj but it is possible that this could have 
occurred. Pilots were Lt Tobar Barrera and Lt Jiron Guerra. 

b. On 7 Nov 85 I discussed the Blake-Davis case with the 
D-2 Col Dorantes. He could not shed any more light on the 
subject. He did state that the MZ commanders and detachment 
commanders reported the visit by foreigners to the MZ if 
they presented themselves to the military authorities. I 
asked if I could review his D-2 Daily Journal for the months 
of March and April 1985 to see if such a report had been filed 
from Nebaj. Col Dorantes acceded and I personally reviewed 
the journals with negative findings concerning Americans in 
Nebaj having been transported by helicopter to the Army Detach- 
ment. There were references to others in the area but not 
during the period in question. 

c. Passed on Ambassador Piedra's concern over the well 
being of alleged or possible informants alluded to by the 
Blake family. Col Dorantes indicated that the military had no 
interest in these so called informants and would not pursue 
the matter. He also hoped for a prompt resolution to the 
disappearance . 

2. Prior to leaving, Col Dorantes once again expressed to me 
the actual practice of the Army in turning over American Citizens 
to U.S. Embassy /Consular control. He stated that the U.S. 
Embassy is informed immediately of cases involving U.S. Citizens 
and if there is any problems with them they are turned over as 
soon as possible in order to avoid future misunderstandings. 



76 



United States Department of State 
fTashington, D.C. 20520 



CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING 



Senators' offices are no doubt aware that the Embassy in 
Guatemala has been asked to check clandestinely on a story that 
the men were loaded into a helicopter at an army base in Nebaj, 
El Quiche. 

The latest cable from Guatemala states that "every logical 
and appropriate action has been taken to locate these missing 
Americans but in view of the Blakes' unwillingness to share 
information there is no way to respond to their claim that the 
[story to be checked] is accurate and useful." 

There was a meeting in the Department 11/21/85 in which we 
explained to Randy Blake and the family attorney, Edward Goff 
the need to verify the sources in order to inquire 
intelligently about their helicopter story. Randy explained 
that since his uncle, who had interviewed the sources, promised 
never to reveal their names, the names obviously cannot be 
revealed. The uncle never believed the story according to the 
family attorney, but intends to keep his promise. 

We agreed to inquire openly of the Guatemalans asking them 
to find out what helicopter may have landed on that date and 
time and who the passengers may have been. We will also 
attempt to see whether there may have been an agreement or 
communication between Salvadoran and Guatemalan authorities 
pertaining to Nick Blake, whom Randy fears might have been 
considered by the Salvadorans to have been a courier for the 
guerrillas. We will also see if inquiries can be made safely 
in a new area along a different route which the Blake brothers 
hypothesize may have been used by the missing men. 



77 






Bnitd States Senate 

WASHINGTON. DC 20610 



December n, 1935 



Mr. Elliott Abrams 
Assistant Secretary of State 
Bureau of Inter American Affairs 
2201 C Street NW 
Washington, DC 20520 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

He respectfully request a formal investigation and 
report by the State Department and the American Embassy in 
Guatemala into the disappearance of Americans Nicholas Blake 
and Griffith William Davis. Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis were 
last seen in Guatemala in April, 1985. 

The Blake family initially shared the belief that Mr. 
Blake and Mr. Davis were seized by Guatemalan guerrillas in 
the Department of El Quiche. However, based on their own 
ina.uiries, Randall and Samual Blake, Mr. Blake's brothers, 
have now come to suspect that the two men were captured by 
the Guatemalan Army and taken by helicopter to the town of 
Nebaj. The Americans' fate after their arrival in f.'ebaj is 
unknown . 

During a visit to Guatemala by Randy and Sam Blake last 
month, we cabled the Embassy in Guatemala to request its full 
cooperation and assistance. VJe appreciate the attention given 
to the brothers and efforts made thus far by Ambassador 
Piedra and the staff of the Embassy. Nevertheless, we share 
the Slakes' concern that all possible evidence in the case 
may not yet have been fully investigated or disclosed. 

We therefore request a written report exploring the 
different hypotneses which have been offered for Mr. Blake 
and Mr. Davis's disappearance. This report should, to the 
extent appropriate, describe the Embassy's own inquiries and 
investigation, as well as its findings and conclusions. 

We are particularly concerned that a full, independent 
investigation be made into reports of: 

-- a Guatemalan Army helicopter bringing two men fitting 
Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis's descriptions to Nebaj about the 
time of their disappearance; 

-- possible cooperation and intelligence sharing between 
El Salvadoran and Guatemalan military authorities to monitor 
Mr. Blake's activities as a free lance journalist; and, 

-- reported contacts with the BlaKe family by a 
Guatemalan array procurement chief and a Guatemalan military 



78 



intelligence officer claiming to be the former's brother, in 
which Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis were reported to be alive and 
under close guerrilla guard. 

We have encouraged the Blake family to share as much of 
the information in their possession as possible with the 
Embassy, in order to facilitate its investigation. Our 
primary concern is that the true fate of Mr. Blake and Mr. 
Davis be known. 

Thank you for your attention and assistance. 



Sincerely , 




'VQ/U.>..«v^ 



79 



To: Janet Lynch, Senator Hart, SR-237 

Dennis Calkin, Senator Heinz, SR-277 

Bob Carolla, Senator Mitchell, SR-176 

Martha Pope, Senator Mitchell, SR-176 

Tom Melia, Senator Moynihan, SR-464 

Dick McCall, Senator Kerry, SR-364 

Charles Kallenbach, Senator Specter, SH-331 

FROM: Sally Lounsbury, Senator Cohen, SH-322 

DATE: February 25, 1986 

RE: Nicholas Blake 



Enclosed is a copy of the response we received from our Embassy in 
Guatemala in coordination with the Department of State. 

Randy And Sam Blake would like to meet with us regarding 
this letter at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March A. Sam will be flying 
in from school in Massachusetts. They can't make it any earlier 
in the day or any other day of the week. I'll be happy to have the 
meeting here in our conference room. \ n I 

A friend of Randy's from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs 
met personally with President Cerezo<,recently . ThiS' person asked 
the President what he thought of the Blake's situation and he 
indicated he was not familiar at all/with the case. Needless to 
say, this has upset Randy. 

Please let me know if you can/make it. Sally 49223 





\j , ^J^ P^^ ■'f^^ 



80 




Lnited States Departmerrt-'Of State 
Washinglon, D.C. 20520 

' iletruary 1 9, 1995 



Dear Senator Cohen: 

Thank you for your letter of December 4 about the 
missing Americans Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis who 
vanished in the Guatemalan highlands in late March or 
early April 1985, In response to your inquiries our 
Embassy in Guatemala ' and officers in the Department of 
State have reviewed their actions on behalf of the men and 
double checked, to the best of their ability, the most 
recent information presented by Sam and Randy Blake, This 
letter responds to your request for a written report on 
our efforts, provides you with the results of our review, 
and gives a reaction to some of the theories put forward 
about the missing men. 

The case first came to the Embassy's attention when an 
American citizen called the consular section on April 8, 
1985, to report that a friend, American citizen Griffith 
Davis, was overdue from a walking trip in Guatemala's 
western highlands. According to the caller, Davis was to 
meet friends in Nebaj, a market town in the Department of 
Quiche, on March 29. She thought it unlikely that he was 
purposely overdue as he had planned to attend his sister's 
wedding in the United States during the second week in 
April. Davis was traveling with an acquaintance named 
Nick Blake, she said, who she thought was an American 
living in Antigua, near Guatemala City. 

Later on April 8, Embassy officers confirmed the 
American nationality of both of the missing men through 
immigration records. A telephone check of registration 
records at the Hotel Central in Huehuetenango confirmed 
the report that the men met and spent the night of March 
25 at the hotel before beginning their journey. Consular 
officers called .National Police and Treasury Police 
headquarters and asked that units in the western highlands 
be alerted. Catholic and Protestant missionary groups 
with people working in the region were also alerted. That 
evening, a consular officer was able to speak by telephone 
with a British citizen friend of Nick Blake, Michael 
Shawcrcss. Shawcross confirmed the basics of the story 
given by the original caller and said that he too was 
concerned for the men's safety. 



The Honorable 

William Cohen, 

United States Senate. 



81 



2 - 



On April 9, Shawcross, German citizen Mikki-Linden , 
and the U.S. citizen who first brought the case to our 
attention met with an Embassy officer in the Chancery. 
Shawcross said that Blake was a working journalist with an 
interest in the insurgency in the western highlands. 
Blake might take an opportunity to spend time with the 
guerrillas, said Shawcross. Davis was described as a 
long-term Guatemalan resident and an experienced hiker who 
had no political interests, but had long wanted to hike 
through the area in question. Blake and Davis, according 
to their friends, had met only recently. Shawcross was 
able to give a general description of the planned route. 
The men had planned to take a bus from Huehuetenango to 
San Juan Ixchoy where they were to begin their walk east 
to Neba j . 

Embassy officers called the military zone headquarters 
in Huehuetenango and Quiche later that morning, requesting 
the commanders' assistance in the search for the missing 
Americans. The Embassy then made a telegraphic report to 
the Department outlining the situation. The Department 
began a search of passport records in order to locate and 
contact the families in the United States. 

On April 10, the Embassy Defense Attache followed an 
earlier telephone call with a letter to the , Guatemalan 
Chief of Military Intelligence requesting assistance in 
finding the lost Americans. 

During the following week. Embassy officers tried to 
track rumors that messages had been received from Nick 
Blake by another American friend, and by the owner of the 
small Antigua pension where Nick Blake generally stayed in 
Guatemala. The American Embassy in San Jose reported that 
the friend told Embassy officers he had received a note at 
Blake's Antigua pension on March 31. That note supposedly 
said Blake would be in Nebaj between April 1 and 3. When 
Blake did not arrive in Nebaj, the friend returned to 
Antigua, where the owner of the pension said that another 
person, name unknown, had left a message that Blake would 
be unable to meet the friend. Embassy officers in 
Guatemala were able to question him regarding this 
sequence of events later. He said that he had been 
misunderstood when interviewed by our officers in Costa 
Rica, that he had received no message. The pension owner 
had a somewhat different story to tell.. He said he had 
received two written messages in early April, purportedly 
from Nick Blake, saying that his return would be delayed 
and to say nothing to the authorities. The pension owner 
now says that he destroyed the notes. The Embassy 



82 



- 3 - 



believes there were never any notes. The Department 
contacted the mothers of the missing men April 13th. They 
had not heard from their sons and agreed that there was 
real reason for concern. Within a week, the Blakes had 
drawn on many of their own contacts with connections in 
Central America to help locate their son. Officials at 
the highest level of the Administration and several 
Congressmen, yourself included, were contacted by the 
family for assistance. 

On April 18, two Embassy officers in a chartered 
helicopter flew to the Department of Huehuetenango and 
Quiche to investigate the disappearance. Accompanying the 
officers were the consular section fraud investigator (a 
veteran of the Guatemalan national police) and an Embassy 
security agent who speaks the area's predominate dialect. 
The use of a helicopter was required because the route 
planned by Blake and Davis between San Juan Ixcoy and 
Nebaj is serviced only by hiking trails and includes some 
of the roughest high country in Central America. In San 
Juan Ixcoy, where Blake and Davis left the bus and began 
their trek. Embassy officers met two Guatemalan army 
intelligence specialists who were conducting their own 
search for the missing Americans. The Embassy team was 
able to trace the route followed by Blake and Davis from 
San Juan Ixcoy on March 26 through San Francisco Las 
Flores and Mixlaj to the village of Llano, along the 
border between Quiche and Huehuetenango, several days 
later. It appears that on the morning of March 29 or 30, 
Blake and Davis left Llano, saying they were heading to 
Salquil, a large model village which can be reached by 
road from Nebaj . The commander of the army detachment at 
Las Majadas, the military outpost closest to Llano, said 
that he was told by Llano villagers on March 29 that two 
Americans were requesting permission to go to Sumal, a 
stronghold of the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor). The 
Lieutenant said he instead gave the Americans permission 
to travel to Salquil. Villagers at Mixlaj, where Blake 
and Davis had spent a night during their trip, also said 
that the Americans had expressed an interest in going to 
Sumal. The villagers said they told Blake and Davis not 
to go to Sumal because the area was dangerous. 

The date of their departure from Llano was March 29 
according to the Llano villagers, and March 30, according 
to the Lieutenant at Las Majadas, who never met Blake and 
Davis. Embassy officers in Guatemala find no significance 
in the difference in dates. They believe it is very 
likely that the villagers erred, as no written record was 
kept. No trace of the whereabouts of Blake and Davis was 
found from the time they left Llano. At one point the 



83 



- 4 



Blake family heard their sons may have been involved in a 
battle, but their confusion stemmed from the account of 
our Embassy officers flight into Salquil, where the army 
detachment mistook their helicopter as one bringing in 
reinforcements for a firefight then in progress about five 
miles from the village. According to the Lieutenant in 
charge of the Salquil garrison, Blake and Davis never 
arrived at Salquil. Embassy officers then backtracked to 
Quilen Novillo, the only occupied village between El Llano 
and Salquil. Villagers at Quilen Novillo said that the 
missing Americans had not passed through the village. At 
Nebaj, interviews with townspeople and military officials 
turned up no sighting of Blake and Davis. However, it was 
apparent that townspeople in Nebaj were well aware of the 
search for the Americans. None of the villages along the 
planned route are garrisoned by the Guatemalan army. 
There are no indications that Blake and Davis had any 
contact with regular government forces. Throughout the 
search. Embassy officers distributed flyers which included 
photos and descriptions of Blake and Davis, as well as 
numbers and addresses to contact in case someone had 
information to report. It should be added that this trip 
included a certain degree of physical risk on the part of 
the Embassy team. The village of Mixlaj, for example, is 
considered a dangerous place for official Americans. 

Another American citizen friend of Nicholas Blake told 
Embassy officers in San Jose, Costa Rica, he had talked 
with Blake and Davis in Huehuetenango the night before 
they began their trip and Blake had said that he and Davis 
were going to "back door" into the guerrilla zone, 
avoiding the army patrols he believed were blocking the 
area. Blake fully expected to be "caught" (Blake's words) 
by the army or the guerrillas, according to this friend. 

Lieutenant Colonel Jose Solis, Deputy Commander of 
Miltary Zone 20 (Quiche) came to the Embassy on April 30 
to brief the Defense Attache and consular officers on a 
planned army sweep through the area in which Blake and 
Davis were believed to have disappeared. The sweep, 
involving some 450 infantrymen, began the following day. 
Units were broken into reinforced squads and employed in 
small "force patrols". This tactic involved greater risk 
as larger units are normally employed in such areas, but 
the smaller patrols offered more thorough coverage. 
Guatemalan sources reported two officers and ten enlisted 
men killed in the sweep. No sign of the missing Americans 
was reported. 



84 



- 5 



On April 25, an Embassy officer in a chartered light 
aircraft, dropped leaflets over the Sumal area. The 
leaflets, printed in Spanish and the prevalent Indian 
dialect, Ixchil, had photos of both men. Leaflets were 
also provided to the zone headquarters for distribution to 
army patrol leaders and civil guard units. 

Mrs. Mary Blake, Nicholas Blake's mother, came to 
Guatemala on April 25 accompanied by her son Randy Blake, 
family friend Lucien Yokana, and Attorney Edward Goff. 
Mrs. Blake's party met with Ambassador Piedra and received 
a thorough briefing on the investigation to that point. 

Embassy officers accompanied the party to Military 
Zone 20 headquarters in Santa Cruz del Quiche on April 27 
where the zone commander briefed them on the actions he 
had taken to locate Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. 
The family hired a private investigator in Guatemala at 
about this time. 

Attorney Edward Goff, representing the Blake family, 
came to Guatemala again on May 23 after spending several 
weeks in Chiapas, Mexico near the border with Guatemala. 
He was accompanied by the private investigator. Both were 
briefed on the status of the investigation. 

Sam and Randy Blake, accompanied by friends, visited 
Guatemala during the first week of November and again one 
month later. On both occasions they met with Ambassador 
Piedra, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and other Embassy 
officers. During the November visit, Sam and Randy Blake 
divulged two potential leads in the case. 1) The Blake 
brothers had heard that two persons fitting the 
description of their brother and Griffith Davis had landed 
in a helicopter in Nebaj at the end of the first week of 
April. According to this story, the passengers were 
forcibly removed from the helicopter by Guatemalan army 
troops and taken to the garrison headquarters, 2) a 
second line of inquiry was opened by their description of 
contacts between a Guatemalan army procurement officer and 
a close business contact of the Blake family. Embassy 
officers immediately began to check both stories. 



85 



- 6 - 



The helicopter story was made very difficult to check 
since source was unknown to the officers who worked on 
it. The brothers could not divulge any information that 
could lead back to the date or time of the event or the 
name of anyone who may have witnessed it. The Guatemalan 
military officer responsible showed the U.S. Defense 
Attache his log indicating there were no helicopter 
flights in the area described during the time frame 
mentioned. We have not been able to establish any 
information to contradict this log. 

According to Sam and Randy Blake, Mrs. Remidios Diaz, 
a family friend and business associate living in Miami, 
had been approached by a Guatemalan army officer who 
worked in the army's procurement section. This officer, 
according to the story, told Ms. Diaz that his brother, a 
Guatemalan intelligence officer, had personal knowledge 
that Blake and Davis were being held by guerrillas. For a 
sum, it was said, an army expedition could be organized to 
rescue them. On hearing the story, the Ambassador asked 
Sam and Randy Blake to have Ms. Diaz call or write the 
Embassy. Embassy officers later tried to identify a 
procurement officer and an intelligence officer who are 
brothers in the Guatemalan army. No such persons could be 
identified. During a visit to Guatemala December 13th and 
14th, a meeting took place between key officers of the 
Embassy, Mr. Richard Blake, Nicholas Blake's father, Mr. 
George Strawmueller , the missing man's uncle, and the 
family attorney, Mr. Edward Goff. At that time the 
Ambassador raised the question of the Diaz contact. 
Mr. Strawmueller said that he was the only member of the 
family who had spoken with Mrs. Diaz. He said she had 
been contacted by someone who offered to use his influence 
and knowledge to have a search made for the missing men. 
Based on the information he received from Ms. Diaz, 
Mr. Strawmueller did not pursue the offer. Mr. 
Strawmueller indicated that the story of a Guatemalan 
procurement officer and his intelligence officer brother 
was invented by Sam and Randy Blake to fill in details 
regarding the contact, details that Mr. Strawmueller and 
Ms. Diaz were unwilling to share. At the request of Sam 
and Randy Blake, Ambassador Piedra attempted to verify 
this with Ms. Diaz during his December consultations in 
the United States but was unable to reach her because she 
was abroad. In January she told the Department that she 
had asked all her Guatemalan contacts to assist the family 
but had no leads. There are notes in the Department of 
calls she made here with offers of assistance and support 
for the case, also. She denied any direct contacts with 
Guatemalan military. 



86 



- 7 - 



On December 17, Embassy officers flew to Nebaj where 
they interviewed six former members of the EGP (Guerrilla 
Army of the Poor), a Marxist guerrilla organization 
operating in northern Huehuetenango and Quiche, All six 
had been operating in the general area of Sumal until they 
returned to government control in 1985. 

Sumal itself is a small cluster of buildings at the 
end of a high mountain ridge surrounded on three sides by 
sheer walls of bare stone. It is not a population center 
of any importance, but rather is the geographical center 
of a zone of conflict. 

None of the six ex-guerrillas had knowledge of any 
strangers recently observed in the area. One mentioned 
Cuban advisors seen in the area in 1981 as the last 
strangers of whom he had heard. Two other former 
combatants said that two "Negroes" of unknown nationality 
were rumored to be traveling with an EGP unit. Each of 
the six said that is was impossible to believe that 
individual EGP members happening upon the two Americans 
would have harmed them. All insisted that any strangers 
encountered would be taken to the central committee or a 
guerrilla officer. After these interviews. Embassy 
officers went to Las Violetas, a refugee camp on the 
outskirts of Nebaj, to interview civilians who had fled 
the Sumal area in recent weeks. The refugees indicated 
that they knew nothing of the Americans. 

Regarding theories that the Guatemalans may have been 
alerted by Salvadoran government officials to Nick Blake's 
presence in the area, American officers in Washington and 
Guatemala consider it very likely that Guatemalan and 
Salvadoran intelligence services sometimes share 
information of mutual interest. There is no reason to 
believe, however, that authorities of either government 
have any particular interest in Nick Blake who is neither 
a well-known nor controversial journalist. In a country 
where high-visibility journalists continue to travel 
freely after writing articles critical of the Guatemalan 
government, it is not credible that intelligence services 
would monitor the activities of a freelance writer who was 
evidently unpublished on Guatemalan affairs. Had the 
Government of Guatemala determined that Nick Blake was a 
security risk, his entry into the country could easily 
have been blocked. Further, it is unlikely that the army 
would have given him a travel permit for the conflict zone 



87 



in Huehuetenango, as they did in late 1984, if he was 
considered a threat. Griffith Davis appears to have shown 
no particular interest in Guatemalan politics. His status 
as a casual resident would have provided Guatemalan 
authorities with ample opportunity to expel him from the 
country had they wished to do so. It would have been very 
difficult for the activities of the two Americans to have 
been closely monitored while in the highlands. Many of 
the civil defense groups in the small villages north of 
Nebaj have no radio or telephone service, and depend on 
hand carried messages for communication with the outside. 
The frequency of armed encounters between army troops and 
insurgents in this area would argue against any plan to 
send a patrol or individual agent in pursuit of the two 
Americans. Based on the above, and all possible inquiries 
along this line, the Embassy concludes that is is unlikely 
that either of the two Americans was of special interest 
to Guatemalan intelligence authorities. 

Concerning the supposition that an abduction took 
place, it should be understood that Military Zone 20, the 
location of the alleged sighting, is frequently visited by 
Embassy officers. Our contacts there are excellent. In 
the considered judgement of American military and civilian 
officers familiar with the zone and the key personalities 
who operate there, an abduction of American citizens is 
extremely unlikely. Guatemalan Lt. Col. Marin, Commander 
of the Nebaj garrison at the time in question, has since 
been moved to a sensitive position in the new civilian 
government of Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo. Embassy 
officers consider him one of Guatemala's best soldiers. 
Deputy Zone Commander Solis is a sophisticated officer who 
understands the political significance such an abduction 
would have. The zone commander. Col. Byron Lima, is 
considered to be an honest, straightforward soldier. This 
assessment is not meant to be seen as a defense of the 
Guatemalan military. However, the Guatemalan army has 
traditionally sent its best officers to the "conflictive 
zones" of the highlands, and the Embassy pays close 
attention to this critical area and the people who are 
assigned there. 

This overview is by no means a complete summary of all 
actions taken by Embassy Guatemala in the search for 
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. The Ambassador and 
other Embassy officers have made an ongoing series of 
requests for assistance and information from Guatemalan 



88 



- 9 



authorities at all levels, including the Chief of State. 
The Embassy and the Department have, as well, looked into 
a number of rumors which have proved to be totally 
groundless . 

The case will remain open and active until we have 
solid evidence of the welfare and whereabouts of Mr. Blake 
and Mr. Davis. Embassy officers regularly travel to the 
highlands, including areas on the northern face of the 
Cuchumatanes Mountain chain and along the Mexican border, 
and always make inquiries regarding Blake, Davis and any 
"strangers" who might be rumored to be, or have been in 
the area. In the Department, all country desk officers 
are aware of the case should any information about the men 
come from another country in the Caribbean or Central 
American region. All U.S. Embassies in Central America 
have been provided details about the missing men. 

As you can well understand, the disappearance of 
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis engenders frustration 
and concern both for the families of the missing men and 
for the Americans and Guatemalans charged with finding 
them. A solution to this case remains a very high 
priority in the Department of State. 

Ms. Renny Smith in the Citizens Emergency Center is 
following the case closely, and is in frequent contact 
with the family and government officials on behalf of the 
missing men. Please encourage anyone who may be 
interested in this case to call her at (202) 647-5225. If 
your office would like to be kept informed of 
developments, please call and she will contact you 
whenever there is significant activity on the case. 

With best wishes. 

Sincerely, ^''' 

William L. Ball, III 
Assistant Secretary 
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs 



ACT I oil 
COPY 



89 



UNCLASS 
Dcpdvtmcmlif 

MEXICO 0^992 B5;i47Z 




INFO UOG-00 ADS-BO 



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0521152 MAR 
VI AME^^EA£SY K 
3 AMEMBASSY C 
MFC SECSTATE 



XI CO 
tTEMAL A 
ASHDC BO 

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IMMEDIATE 






E. O. 1 2356: N/A 
TAGS: CASC, MX IB 
SUBJECT: v;/W: NIC 



NICHOL 



AND cr> 



/IS 



GRIFFI Th 



1. EMBASSY SEN 

BORDERING GUATE 
GRIFFITH DAVIS 



BLAK.E AND GRIFFITH DA 

TEMALA 1333 Bl MEXICO 2917 C) MEXICO 

CONSULAR OFFICER TO CHIAP/JS, 
ALA AND THE AREA WHERE NICHOI 
HE PRESUMED TO BE IF 1 



A STATE 
AS BLAKE AN 
RE IN MEXICO. 



i/IEXICAN 



TALISMAN AND CIUDAD CU/.UHTE 
= LYERS CONTAINING PHOTOS At 
WERE DISTRIBUTED. REOUESTir 
IN MERIDA BE NOTIFIED OF AT 



3 CHECH 
DC HE! 

DESCRU 
THAT T h 

SIGHTir 



>01l 



GUATEMALAn DORDE 
!TS CIUDAD HIDALC 
S IVERE NEGATIVE 



TIONS OF THE TV/O 



■E EMBASSY 



OR CONEL 



3. AT AN IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINT BETV/EEN CIUDAD 

AND COMITAN. IMMIGRATION OFFICERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE 
TWO MEN, BUT INDICATED THAT THIS ¥;AS A HEAVILY-TPAV 
ROUTE FOR AMERICANS TRAVELING BY CAR TO AND FROM GU 



UHTEMOC 



4. AN IMMIGRATION 


OFFICIAL IN COMITAN 


POSITIVELY 


IDENTIFIED A PHOTO 


OF GRIFFITH DAVIS 


SHE STATED THAT 


DAVIS WAS IN HER OF 


FICE ATJD ASKED PERM 


ISSION TO STAY IN 


MEXICO FOR 60 MORE 


DAYS IN APPROXIMATE 


LY AUGUST 1985. SHI 


HAD THE IMPRESSION 


THAT DAVIS WAS LIVI 


NG WITH AN INDIGENT 


GROUP OF FOREIGNERS 


DAVIE TOLD HER H 


E WAS LIVING IN SAN 


CRISTOBAL DE LAS CA 


.SAS. HOWEVER, NO RECORD OF DAVIS COULI 


BE FOUND IN EITHER 


COMITAN OR SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS. 


5.. ANOTHER IMMIGRA 


,TION OFFICIAL IN SA 


N CRISTOBAL DE LAS 


CASAS SAID HE HAD ►; 


lANY CONTACTS AMONG 


THE FOREIGN 


COMMUNITY THERE ANC 


WOULD TRY TO DETER 


MINE IF BLAKE OR 


DAVIS WERE LIVING I 


N THAT CITY. HE AL 


=0 TOOK ABOUT 3 5 OF 


THE FLYERS FOR DIET 


RIBUTION AROUND THE 


CITY, ASKING THAT 


HIS OFFICE BE CONTA 


.CTED. 




LATER, THE OFFICIAL 


LIC. MONTES OF TH 


E SUBDELEGACI ON DE 


SERVICIOS MIGRATORIOS, REPORTED THAT H 


E HAD RECEIVED 


INFORMATION THAT BL 


AKE WAS SEEN IN THE 


COMPANY OF GABRIEL 


SUARE2, PRESIDENT C 


IF AYUDA DE GUATEMAL 


TECOS, AN 


ORGANIZATION WHICH 


RECEIVES DONATIONS 


FOR GUATEMALAN 


REFUGEES- BLAfE AL 


LEGEDLY APPROACHED 


SUARE2 EXPRESSING 


HIS CONCERNS AND OF 


FERING TO HELP THE 


CAUSE BLAKE AND 


SUARE2 LEFT SAN CRI 


STOBAL DE LAS CASAS 


TOGETHER AND 


PROCEEDED TO HUCHUETENANGO. GUATEMALA. 


LIC. MONTES HAS 


TRIED TO CONTACT SU 


IARE2 DIRECTLY BUT W 


AS UNABLE TO, 


ACCORDING TO MONTES 


., SUAREZ MAY BE UNW 


ILLING TO BE 


QUESTIONED BECAUSE 


OF HIS ALLEGED I NVO 


LVE.MENT IN 


ILLEGALLY-USURPING 


FUNDS FROM HIS ORGA 


NI2ATION. EMBASSY 


ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT 


SUAREZ WERE ALSO U 


NSUCCESSFUL. 


6. ON MARCH 2. 1986. LIC. MONTES RECEIVED AN ANONYMOUS 


CALL FROM A MEXICAN 


1 MALE WHO STATED TH 


AT THE TWO MISSING 


AMERICANS WERE INCA 


.RCERATED IN THE SAN 


MARCOS JAIL. 


DEPARTMENT OF SAN fc 


1ARC0S, GUATEMALA. 




BUSBY 







KICOLllflG;^/^ 
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90 



1412 15tl) :^l . N. W. #6 
Washington, D.C. 20005 

June 22, 1986 

Bob Carolla 

Office of Sen. George Miichell 
Russell Building Room 176 
Washing* on , D.C. 20510 

Dear Bob, 

We have not communicated lately so I tliought that I would 

bring you up to date on our case. Since we last spoke, we hav<? 

changed drastically our thinking about what hnf'ppi\''cl to flick -ind 
Griff. 

Sam and I recently traveled again to Mexico f'ity on May 30 

for another meeting with an EGP representative. We eiiderl tip nc>t 

having the meeting because of a communication foul -up, hut we did 
have a number- of ottier productive discussions. 

Our reason for meeting with the EGP this time is because we 
now believe that they perished at thrir hands. We wanted to 
inform them directly about this and to delivpr t hom an ultimatum 
for releasing information and whereabouts of (h'^it remains. 

We have ritincluck>d this based on i n f or ma t i oji (hat we hcnt^ 
recently from the Reuters Bureau Chie^f in Mexico City, Bernd 
DeBussmann. In April, Mr. DeBussmann infrirmed us that his main 
EGP contact in Mexico City told him thai Hlako and I'avis harl 
perished at their hands some time ago. 



Mr. DeBussmann stated that this admission occurred during a 
conversation that was unrelated to the case, jlr sairl tii.tl while 
they were discu.ssing general events, h i .s (.'.utacl staled, "Yi5u 
know, we are capable of doing some te-rrible things also, like 
look at those two American journalists that we executed. " Mr . 
[)eBussmann maintains that this was a deflnllc allusion to tllck 
and Griff. DeBussmann had not solicited this information. The EGP 
person offered this information spontaneously. 

Later, Mr. DeBussmann approached this same contact again to 
ask for further details and if they mi^ht mfpt with t ho Dlskr-s. 
The EGP contact replied that the Blake's had been' given the 
official line, that there would be no change. 

Because of the context of this admission, we take tliis very 
seriously. It is one thing to receive information through second 



91 



(2) 



and third hand channels. However, this was received as a direct 
admission from a very reputable journalist. Moreover, it matches 
what at least one other Journalist haj^ heard through sources in 
Mexico City. It also could be the same story that we were hearing 
through our connections in Guatemala City and Managua as early as 
last June. 



The latest trip to Guatemala in March by Sam and Jim 
Adriance forced us to reevaluate the Army disappearance theory. 
As you know, Sam was able to meet with the sister in another town 
away from Nebaj. She insisted that- the helicopter abduction story 
was groundless. 

When she heard the story, she looked into it herself for 
about five days last Fall, and found nothing to back it up. Be- 
cause she was always being approached by third parties for 
information, we thought that she was too intimidated to spejik 
openly. Sam and Jim Adriance found her believable during their 
meeti ng. 

You will recall that Sam visited the village of El Llano 
during that trip. The village leader of El Llano insisted that 
Nick and Griff had been permitted to j»o to Sumal. .Sam also 
spoke to the Army lieutenant who commanded the garrison of Los 
Majades, around El Llano, who claimed ttiat ttiey had been 
permitted to go wherever they pleased. 

Originally, we thought that Nick had been told to stay 
away from Sumal, and that he had decided to walk back to 
NebaJ. However, the village leader of El Llano claimed that they 
had taken the path that would have lead them to Sumal. 

Based on this recent information, we have decided to press 
the EGP to the fullest extent about their disappearance. 
We think that their official policy is to stonewall us, and that 
they concluded very cynically some time ago that they could gain 
a propaganda victory by letting us bash the Army publicly over 
this case. That is the way they do things. 

Thua, w* *r« now dsmanding that tl)« EOF explain what 

happened on this case. Our basic premise is this: they are 

•xpactad to glv* ua Information In oxchanee for na not hlnwlng 
up this case in western media. 

We have already sent them an uilimaium by letter. One letter 
la being sent through a high Sandlnlsta official, Omar Cabezaa of 
the Ministry of the Interior, who is expected to deliver it to 
his contacts within the EGP. In addition, Bernd DeBussmann and 



92 



(3) 



another journalist are delivering it to their contacts within t 1ip 
Mexico City-based EGP. As soon as we know that they received it, 
they have three weeks to contact us. 

If the EGP don't contact us, then we will wage a media war 
on them. Some of the things that we will do are: 

1) Run a week of full-page advertisements in Guatemala City's 
dailies accusing the EGP. 

2) Both ABC and CBS have done pieces on the case. After they run 
those, they have agreed to do follow-ups, with which we will 
conclude that they were the culprits. 

3) Major dailies like the New York Times, the Miami Herald want 
to do follow-ups on their other stories. We will conclude that it 
was the EGP who did them in. 

4) We will write letters to every Senator and Congressman about 
the case. 

5) We will hold press conferences in Guatemala City and on 
Capitol Hill about our conclusions. We will actively call on 
Senators and Congressman who are sympathetic to this C'Tsp to 
appear with us. 

Basically, we feel that there is really no other way to deal 
with the EGP. I know they are sensitive to public perception 
because the only reason they met with us last November is because 
as they stated, we had become for them "a political problem." 
Since this is their motivation, this action will raise the stakes 
for their stonewalling. 

We are not sanguine about the EGP resolving this case. Thus, 
we are going to need help on Capitol Hill for getting our message 
out . 

I know that this is a lot for one letter. I would like to 
hear your thoughts on where we should go from here. Pleasp 
contact me as soon as you get a chance. 



cc: Sally Lounsberry 




Rnndy Dlak<? 



93 



WILLIAM S. COHEN 

Unlli-d Stiles Senator 



JOHN K. McKERNAN. JR. 

Mi-inbcr of Congress 



/ ^ 






October 24, 1986 



GEORGE J. MITCHELL 

Unili-,1 Sl.itfS Senatoi 



OLYMPIA J. SNOVVE 

Memb«;t o( Congress 



Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Overseas Citizens Services 
Bureau of Consular Affairs 
Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Mr. Tharp: 

We are writing to restate our interest in Randy anc3 Sam Blake, 
whose brother, Nick, disappeared in the area of El Llano, Guatemala, 
about April 1, 1985. 

We appreciate the time and effort the State Department has 
spent thus far in trying to determine the fate of Nick and his com- 
panion. Griff Davis, and are aware that more effort and staff time 
has been given this case than on other disappearances. 

Randy and Sam have vigorously pursued many avenues in an effort 
to gain information on Nick. Most of these leads have proven fruit- 
less, and they are left with the strong feeling that the E.G.P. does 
indeed have knowledge of Nick's disappearance. 

We would like to determine if our Embassy in Guatemala City 
can encourage the Guatemalan government to negotiate with the E.G.P. 
in an effort to gain additional information. 



Thank you. 



Sincerely , 




/^^%^ ^02.(^7 



?orge »CJ . Mitchell 
United States Senator 



Wi/ilSam S. Cohen 
United States Senator 



94 



WILLIAM S. COHEN 

United States Senator 



JOHN R. McKERNAN. JR. 

Member of Congress 




GEORGE J. MITCHELL 

United States Senator 



OLYMPIA J. SNOWE 

Member of Congress 



November 4, 1986 



The Hon. Oscar Padilla 

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 

Office of the Embassy 

2220 "R" Street 

Washington, D.C. 20008 

Dear Ambassador Padilla: 

We understand you have been in touch with Randy Blake, the 
brother of Nicholas Blake, who has been missing in Guatemala since 
April 1985. 

We learned that official negotiations have now begun between 
the Guatemalan government and the rebels. As you may be aware, 
Mr. Blake feels strongly that the E.G. P. may have knowledge of his 
brother's disappearance. 

We are enclosing copies of our recent letters to the U.S. 
Bureau of Consular Affairs which indicate our strong interest in 
these negotiations going forward on behalf of the Blake family. 

Thank you for any efforts you may make in reaching this goal. 

With best wishes, we are 

Sincerely, 




Gebrge -K Mitchell 
United States Senator 




96 



WILLIAM S. COHEN 
United States Senator 



JOHN R. McKERNAN, JR. 

Member of Congress 




laine 
rgressio\al 



GEORGE J. MITCHELL 

United States Senator 



OLYMPIA J. SNOWE 

Member of Congress 



November A, 1986 



Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Overseas Citizens Services 
Bureau of Consular Affairs 
Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Mr. Tharp: 

This is a follow-up to our letter of October 24, 1986, concern- 
ing the Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis disappearance in Guatemala. 

We understand that official negotiations have begun between the 
rebels and the Guatemalan government. We are hopeful that Ambassador 
Piedra will personally meet with President Cerezo in an effort to 
ensure that negotiations go forward on behalf of the Blake and Davis 
f ami lies. 

Thank you. . 

With best wishes, we are 



Sincerely , 




George J. Tlitchell 
United States Senator 

cc: Ambassador Alberto M. Piedra 

cc : Elliott Abrams , Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 



96 



United States Department of Slate 
Washington. D.C. 20520 

December - *:J.1S36 



Dear Senator Cohen: 

Thank you for your letters of October 24 and November 4 
from yourself and Senator Mitchell expressing your 
interest in the case of Griffith Davis and Nicholas Blake 
who disappeared in Guatemala in 1985. 



Rand 
for over 
officer 
the Stat 
par ties ' 
Griffith 
U.S. gov 
place hi 
talks be 
Army of 
of the f 
official 
to assis 



y Blake 
seas cit 
here at 
us of th 
interes 
Davis , 
ernment 
s brothe 
tween Gu 
the Poor 
amily in 
s in bot 
t them i 



met with 
izens se 
the Depa 
e case, 
t in the 
Randy ' s 
to press 
r ' s disa 
atemalan 

(EGP) . 
tend to 
h Guatem. 
n their 



the 

rvice 

r tmen 

Besi 

disa 

pr ima 

the 
ppear 
auth 
In a 
keep 
ala a 
ef for 



deputy assista 
s and the cons 
t on November 
des keeping al 
ppearance of h 
ry objective i 
government of 
ance on the ag 
orities and th 
ddition, he an 
in contact wit 
nd the U.S. wh 
ts. 



nt secretary 
ular case 
5 to discuss 
ive all 

is brother and 
s now for the 
Guatemala to 
enda of any 
e Guerrilla 
d other members 
h government 
o may be able 



At the present time, there are no active negotiations 
taking place between the government of Guatemala and the 
guerrilla forces. Following the recent killing of seven 
government soldiers, allegedly by members of the EGP, 
President Vincio Cerezo stated that the killing of the 
soldiers was "totally incongruent" with their call for 
dialogue. He reiterated this position at the recent 
meeting of the Organization of American States in 
Guatemala. 

The current climate affecting relations between the 
government of Guatemala and the guerrillas, including the 
public statements by President Cerezo, appear to make it 
unlikely that President Cerezo will enter into 
negotiations in the near future. The embassy and the 
Department of State, sensitive to the Guatemalan 
government's stance on any negotiations, will closely 
follow the situation and await further developments before 
deciding upon an appropriate course of action. 



The Honorable 

William S. Cohen, 

United States Senate, 



97 



2 - 



Please be assured that I share your concern in this 
unfortunate case, and that I will call to the attention of 
the embassy your continuing interest and your desire to 
see the case on the agenda of any meeting between the 
government and the guerrillas. Ambassador Piedra has been 
personally involved in trying to solve the case, having 
met with the family on several occasions. You may be sure 
he will continue his efforts to bring about a final 
resolution. 

I hope this information is of help to you. If I can 
be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 

With best wishes. 



Sincerely , 



''^J. ESward Fox 
Assistant Secretary 
Legislative' and Intergovernmental Affairs 





98 

Embassy of the United States of America 
Guateidala, Guatemala 



December 2, 1986 



Honorable William S. Cohen 
United States Senate 
Washington, D.C. 20510 

Dear Senator Cohen: 

Thank you for your letter of November 4, 1986, 
concerning the disappearance of Nicholas Blake and 
Griffith Davis. ^^^8]c^^tfe§43&.il«et^»H.thSPxesid«'i:^t 
Cerezo and encoura ge^'ne got iat ions jwlthvtbe rcbel'-Lgrdiips on 
behalf of the families of -Messrs- Blake and Davis. 

¥Bi^,eu5it emalanlGoyer hmeht'ncu^^ ly iihas ^ho plans , jt o 

5fenter£into^ negotiatjions^with the , r.ebelX,,- however , should 
tKis^poiicy change, I Will discuss the Blake/ Davis ca&e 
with appropriate Guatemalan officials as I have dcme on 
several occasions in the past. 

I hope the above information will be useful to you in 
responding to the Blake and Davis families. 



Sincerely, 

Alberto M. Piedra 
Ambassador 



99 



Ktnbassy.ofjlie United Stales of America 






UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM OF MEETING 
Date: '3 September, 1987 , 

Place: Consul Gen eral ' s Office 

Those Present: 



CONSrDTrujirio; DATT:GHo<3l^er ; CONS;Con)Uerse; 
Mr. Jim Ellesen^ (aka Tim Raub Ellis) 



Subj^ectf 



Blake/Davi s^Case 



As arranged, Mr. Ellesen presented himself at the Embassy at 
10AM to discuss the status of his investigation into the where- 
abouts of Nicholas Blake and Griff Davis. 

Mr. Ellesen said that he came to Guatemala in 1976 to flee a 
sentence of one and a half years in prison for sale of drugs in 
Boston. He was familiar with Guatemala from frequent travel 
here to visit friends in the Peace Corps. 

Last year for the first time since he came to Guatemala he 
re-entered the States and did it without papers. He said that 
he was stopped, but talked his way in. He worked for six 
months, but loved his two Guatemalan children too much to spend 
any more time away from them, so returned. 

He has a range of Guatemalan identification, including a carnet 
as a Commissional Militar, a driver's license and a cedula 
indicating he was born in Guatemala (although he was actually 
born in PA in 1945). He used an altered birth certificate to 
establish an identity here in Guatemala as Jim Ellesen Ralb. 

Mr. Ellesen 's contacts with the embassy began in 1984 when he 
contacted then DATT Charlie Stokes and later Lt. Col. Herzog 
from Embassy Mexico. Everything he told Stokes was repeated to 
him by the Military Zone Commander the next day, leading him to 
believe that the embassy is bugged. He doesn't believe that 
Col. Stokes was the source of the information. 

Mr. Ellesen managed to stay neutral in Guatemalan internal 
troubles until the guerilla forces moved into Huehuetenango in 
force. He then decided to make friends with the military, and 
established a close relationship with then Zona Militar Comman- 
der Col. Hector Catalan. He supplied them with information and 
they gave him the run of the base. While making friends in the 
military he also made enemies, and he was told in 1985 that 
there was a clique on the base intending to kill him. He then 
decided to come to the embassy and talk to the DATT. He 
reported on such things as the shipment of arms, Mexican support 
for the insurgency and military responses. In the conversations 



100 



he was asked, "Is Col. Catalan stealing more than" another 
colonel. He doesn't remember his answer, but Col. Catalan 
decided that his answer was a negative reflexion on him, and 
turned him out of the base and cut him off from support. Mr. 
Ellesen then cut his relations with the embassy from then until 
a month ago. 

Over the course of those months of embassy contact Col. Stokes 
mentioned that the embassy was very interested in locating Jack 
Shelton, an American who had disappeared in the Huehuetenango 
area. After the disappearance of Blake and Davis, interest was 
expressed in knowing what happened to them, also. Stokes 
involved then ConGen Phil Taylor at that point. According to 
"Ellesen, Taylor offered to help him with his legal troubles in 
the U.S. while discussing information on Blake and Davis. 
(Taylor does not remember this being an offer of assistance in 
exchange for information.) 

Ellesen says that Blake and Davis were killed the day after they 
were last seen. They left Huehuetenango to go to Nabaj, but had 
difficulty in getting there and turned back. They were shot on 
the way back to Huehuetenango by people who wanted their cameras 
and other objects of value. He does not yet know exactly where 
they are buried and probably won't know for a month. He is 
paying a person to make contact and become friendly with the 
murderer. This is at a delicate stage, and cannot be hurried or 
meddled with. The information was given to him about 6 weeks 
ago by someone who apparently knew about it within two days of 
its happening. 

As an aside he reported that last Sunday the insurgents took the 
village of Aquacatan and held it for the night. The Civil Guard 
called for the military, then hid. The military never came to 
the assistance of the village. There are Peace Corps volunteers 
there, and he suggests that they be withdrawn. He also suggests 
that people not venture off the main roads in that part of 
Guatemala . 

Ellesen suggested two things at this point in the conversation: 
1) Don't investigate the murders to closely. It will open a 
can of worms and cause trouble for Ellesen, the government and 
other people whom he declined to identify; and 2) Exhume the 
bodies and get out with minimal publicity, which might threaten 
the life of the. go-between. 

The ConGen described the logistics of getting a team of people 
there for the exhumation and Col Hooker said that it would be 
difficult without involving the military, depending on where the 
grave is located. 

Ellesen hopes to avoid his involvement becoming known. He will 
not be present at the exhumation, and discussed ways to pinpoint 
the grave without his having to return. He is concerned with 
his safety and that of the people who have helped him. He has 



101 



left letters with two people addressed to the embassy with all 
the details as he knows them to this point. If he should be 
killed or disappear, they will be delivered. If his sources dry 
up, he will also give us the details dO we can try on our own. 
He left us a list of numbers where he can reached during the 
day, but he has no telephone in his hcuse. 

Ellesen is willing to talk to the Blake and Davis families, but 
feels that now is premature. He is also willing to speak to the 
Blake" lawyer, but only on his terms and if the lawyer will 
accept him as a client so that he cannot be discussed with the 
Blake family. When- it was suggested that this might be a 
conflict of interest, he said that he would probably not speak 
to the lawyer at this time. 

The conversation turned to his legal problems in the states and 
his desire to register his children as U.S. citizens. The 
ConGen deliberately did not bring the subject up, leaving it to 
Mr. Elleseson. When he finally did bring it up, it came in the 
form of a request, and not a quid pro quo arrangement. He 
clearly understood that the embassy could not assist him in 
settling his affairs in the U.S. Various options were outlined 
to him about how to register his children, but it was reiterated 
that his legal problems in the states are his problems. These 
problems include resolving his fugative status and his use of 
multiple names to clear the way for registration of his children 
and for his marriage. 

In response to ConGen 's question about whether they were killed 
because they were Americans, he said no, they were killed 
because they had cameras. It was not ant i -American or anti- or 
pro- anything. 

He left saying that he would keep in touch and expressing the 
hope that we would soon have an exhumation. 



102 



A^ 



UriJCLASSIFIED 



Ori 



Z»W BUWGTAS8C3 lilZZW 



IMNEDPTE , , 

^0 1423001 "SEP «7 I 
' m 05BAO GUATtKALA GT 
TO DIA KASHDC//0AH-5// IWtOI.'IE 

UNCLAS SECTION 01 Of 02 GUATEHALA GT 1 



SUBJECT: REQUEST FOB IHFORMATION 

REF^ US 1121482 SEP 87 

" ir , Hl'lEPL* TO BEF NSG, I HAVE PBEPADED « 
- CHUONCLXICAL LISTING OF ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAtEN^ 
BY THE DAG la SUPPORT OF THE US CONSULATE EFFORTS TO 
DETERMIhE THE WHEREABOUTS OF HICHOLAS BLA(£ AND 
GRIFFITH OAVIS. ' 

2. FYI THIS IS A CONSULAR MAnER. HOWEVER, ACTING 
UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMBASSADOR WE HAVE 
COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL AS THE 
INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED DISAPPEARED IN A COHBAT AREA. 
THE CONSUL GENERAL HAIKTAINS THE ACTIVE FILE IN THE 
EMBASSY OUR FILES ARE LINITED TO HILnARY -, 
■INVOLVEHENT BY THE DAO AND THE ST ARKY. THERE IS 0«E v 
*EXCEPTIO»l AND THAT IS A RECENT INTERVIFW (3 SEP 17) ■^ 

WITH A SOURCE WHO CUIMS 10 HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE 
'ITItlVIOUALS INVOLVED WERE IILLED AND BURIED. SOURCE 
■-WOICATES THAT THE MOTIVE FOR THE ALLEGED HILLINGS 
WAS ROBBERY. I CAUTION TO SAT THAT THIS IS AN 
UNSUSSTANTIATED REPORT WHICH IS UNDER ACTIVE 
INVESTIGATION SY THE CONSUL GENERAL. I PARTICIPATED 
IN THE MEETING WITH SOURCE AND HAVE A COPY OF THE 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. THIS WILL BE DELIVERED 
PERSONALLY DURING MY VISIT TO'WASHDC 15-22 SEP 87. 

j.'TKi F0110WIM6 :s a"chr6nolgy Of Eve'Sts'ajidT 
AniCNS carried out by this office in support of the 

CONSULAR INVESTIGATION: 

18 APR 85 - OAn TRAVELED TO QUICHE AND NEBAJ AND NET 
WITH ZONE CDR COL BYRON LIMA AND S-2. 
MAJ ALFREDO MERIDA ■ NO INFO. 

23 APR 85 - DAn MET WITH LTC EDGAR SOL IS. DEPUTY COR 
HZ 120. SOL IS STATED THAT 15 ARMY PATROLS 
WOULD BE SENT INTO THE VICINITY OF SUMAL 
TO SEARCH FOR BLAtE A,VO OAVIS. 

25 APR 85 - DATT TALUO TO LTC SOLiS RE: UPDATE ON 
THE PATROLS • 15 PATROLS IN AREA - NO 
INFORMATION TO RE.»ORT. 

25 APR 85 - DAn SENT LEHER TO VICE CHIEF OF STAFF 
ASIING PERMISSION FOR BLAIE FAMILY TO 
TRAVEL TO MZ 120 TO DISCUSS THE CASE WITH 
THE LOCAL MILHARY OFFICIALS - ALSO 
EMBASSY/CONSULAR OFFICER ACCOMPANIED. 

25 APR 85 • LEHER FROM DAH TO CHIEF OF STAFF 

REQUESTING A COHPLETE SET OF 1:30,000 
MAPS OF GUATEMALA. 



2 MAY 85 - OAH CALLED LTC SCLIS TO INQUIRE ON SUtE- 
OAVIS CASE - NEGATIVE INFOSMSTiCN 

JUN 85 - DATT AND AMBASSADOR TRAVELLED TO MZ !20 
ABO DISCUSSED BLAIE-DAVIS CASE WITH COL 
LIMA - NEGATIVE INFO.i'lATICN. 

7 JUN 85 - DATT DISCUSSED SLAIlE-DAVIS CASE WITH 0-2 
CCL CARLOS DORANIES - NO INFO AVAILABLE. 
CORANTES STATED THAI MZ CORS ALWAYS REPORT 
incident: INVOLVING FOREIGNERS TO THE 0-2. 
MY REPORT WAS BASED CN INfO PROVIDED BY 
THE BLAHE FAMILY THAT THE INDIVIDUALS IN 
QUESTION NAO BEEN SEEN DEBARHNG FROM AN 
ARMY HELD IN NEBAJ. I REVIEWED THE 0-2 
JOURNALS PERSONALLY A.iiO FOUND NO SUCH 
REPORT. 

OORANTES STATED THAT ANY INFO WOULD BE 
PASSED ON TO THE U.S. EMBASSY. . 

I EXPLAINED OUR CONCERN OVER THE CASE AND 
THE WELL-BEING Or INFORMANTS WOPUNG 'OR 
THE BLAIE FAMILY OORANTES ACCEPTED MY 
ADVICE ANO STATED THAT THE ARMY WAS 

BT 

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 GUATEMALA GT 03808 



SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 

REF: UR I12:«8Z SEP 87 

ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM ANO THAT 
NO HARM WOULD CC«£ TO THE INFORMANTS 

7 NOV 85 - OUR SOURCES INDICATED THAT ONE ARMY HELO 
1170, OPERATED IN THE AREA OF PLATA GRANDE 
MZ «2 DURING THE PERIOD 2-11 APR 35 IT 
PROVIDED REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR MZ'S tU. 
20. ANO 22. NO RECORD OF « LANDING IN 
NEBAJ. (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY BLAKE 
FAMILY INFORMANTS.) 

10 NOV 85 - OAn. AMBASSADOR, CONSUL ANO OCM MET WITH 
RANDY ANO SAM BLA<E AND ASSISTANTS TO 
DISCUSS THE CASE PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW 
DEALING WITH EMBASSY EFFORTS TO DATE. 

MAY OR JUN 86 - DAn MET WITH MR 6LAIE, FATHER OF 
NICHaAS BLAIE. ANO DISCUSSED ACTIONS 
TA(EN BY GT ARMY, MR BLAtE THA«ED THE 
OAn AND EMBASSY FOR EFFORTS. HE BELIEVEO 
THAT THE EGP HAD (ILLEO HIS SON 
INDICATED NO HOPE FOR FINDING SON ALIVE OR 
RECOVERY Of BODY. 



26 APR 85 



30 APR 85 - LtnER FROI AMBASSADOR TO CHIEF OF STAFF 



DIA SPECIAL 
HANDLING REQUIRED 



ACTION 31A/SPEC(8> 



MCN=a7I57/OS26S 



/ ioDDT ■ 

(H.C) 

TaR = a7;s7,':303 



31 JUL 86 - MET WHH BLAIE FAMILY AND ADVISORS IN 

AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE - FANIlY CaWINCEO 

THAT THE EGP HAD ULLEO SLAIE-OAVIS - 

t C» S-7 "-*''f ""'-* '"" «(1"'S'JRS TRAVELLED TO 

" ' ° CMICHE ON BOARD MILITARY HELO PROVIDED 

■^.^ SY PRESIDENT CiREZO. 

16 MAK 37 - AARNA VISITED MI S20 ON ROUTINE LIAISON 

: Ti0=37257/23042 C0EN=MIA759 



UNCLASSIFIED 



103 



UNCLASSfFSED 



VISIT - NO INFO ON BLtlE-OAVIS CASE 

:C MA» 87 - AARHA VISITED HI IK ON ROUTINE LIAISON 
VISIT - NO INFO ON 3LA(!;DAVIS CASE. 

Z; AUG SI - AARXA VISITED NZ JM CN ROUTINE LIAISON 
VISIT - NO INFO ON BLAIE-OAVIS CASE. 

9 SEP a; - OAH AND AARMA VISITED Hi m OH ROUTINE 
LIAISON VISIT • NO INFO ON BLAIE-OAVIS 
CASE. 

4 OAO *ILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CONSUL GENERAL 
IN THIS ONGOING INVESTIGATION THE «ST PRCMISIKG 
LEAO APPEAJS TO BE THE ONE lENTIONfD IN PARA ! ABOVE. 
•E WIlL REPORT ANY DETAILS RESULTING FROM THIS LEAD. 
REGARDS. BT 



MCN=87257/OS2S6 TOR = 87:57 ;;30 



UNCLASSIFIED 



WILLIAM S. COHEN 



104 



Bnitd States Senate 

WASHINGTON, DC 20510 

October 2, 1987 



The Hon. George Pratt Shultz 
Secretary of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 

Dear Mr. Secretary: 

I have had an active interest in the case of the missing Ameri- 
cans Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis since shortly after their 
disappearance in the Guatemalan highlands in late March or early 
April 1985. 

The State Department staff has been very helpful in meeting 
here on the Hill with our office and with members of the Blake fam- 
ily, and in keeping us informed of any developments. 

Randy and Sam Blake, the brothers of Nicholas Blake, remain 
concerned with what level of activity was expended by the Embassy 
in Guatemala City since their brother's disappearance. 

Because of the various contacts used by the Embassy and in 
much of the material being classified, it has been impossible for 
the Blakes to determine precisely what has been done. 

Would it be possible for a copy of the Embassy file to be pro- 
vided to the Senate Intelligence Committee to be reviewed by my 
staff person who holds a security clearance? This would be very 
helpful to us in explaining to Randy and Sam that every possible 
avenue has been explored in an effort to locate their brother. 

I have also been in touch with the CIA and the DIA. The CIA 
does not have a file on this subject and the DIA has provided me 
with what information it could on what support services it lent the 
Embassy . 

Thank you. 

With best wishes, I am 

Sincerely, 



William S. Cohen 
United States Senator 



WSCsal 



105 



^;3wii4, 



L nited States Department of State 
Washington, D.C. 20520 



(j: 



.y^'- 



i- 



Dear Senator Cohen: 

The Secretary has ask 
letter inquiring into the 
Intelligence Committee re 
regarding Nicholas Blake 
Guatemala in 1985. Mr. M 
Citizens Emergency Center 
spoken with Mr. Jim Dykst 
about reviewing Departmen 
visit the Citizens Emerge 
earliest convenience. He 
set a time for the review 



ed that I respond to your recent 

possibility of having the Senate 
ceive a copy of our Embassy's file 
and Griffin Davis who disappeared in 
ichael Mahoney, Director of the 

in the Consular Affairs Bureau has 
ra of the Intelligence Committee staff 
t files. Mr. Dykstra is welcome to 
ncy Center for that purpose at his 
may call Mr. Mahoney at 647-9018 to 



As you may know. Randy Blake, Nick's brother, recently met 
with our newly appointed Ambassador to Guatemala Mr. James 
Michel, just prior to the Ambassador's departure for post. The 
Ambassador assured Mr. Blake that the Embassy will continue to 
pursue all avenues of inquiry in an effort to find out the fate 
of his brother and Griff Davis. 



If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate 
to contact me. 



Sincerely, 




J. Edward Fox 

Assistant Secretary 

Legislative Affairs 



The Honorable 

William S. Cohen, 

United States Senate. 



106 



SI 




m 

M 



£6- 






agiJin 



^ 

o 



"s f J5 

S y * ■* J* 



if|5* 



I 



G 



107 



•WHAT no VCIU DO WHIN YOUI filllLD UISAF- 
inn kl a <nn<p awntyf Kilbr/o Svkaa mt*. • Itac 
quadon hu amumnl her (br i dcade. ihe 10 yBm An 
iht b« law her eUot na Jul- Jt(i mu bcOini and 
inirapeDlvc a nan >rha'd gmkuKd fran ciilq(o wWi honon in pNkaofjhy 
omy 10 joki thr Mslnci «l]en jola ncK Innl 10 ctnr h)!. H* 11S7 have irdbcd 
qulrl^ lAer he edkicd doi i)* wm ba faihcr'l p«h. not hk uwn, and rfte 
ihrae uncunlbruUe yean In (Ir irtHcajy ttHl a fow uuncha kl Europe aa a 



The 



Osoal Amerie*.' in the «vnk oC 1 kxal mWnw)'— Go*' 
tanala mi Id ihc nidn al anodirr violax putiie. It »a< the 
bus tioedcutng in !9 ;«« ofdrll aiVt iIbi Anwricaa 
Watch cMimtti haK kft 100,000 dead and 40,000 irinki)i. 
• Jad['> paitnti newr heani ncm him tfikt. * Uurinif ihc nru dgh yaan. 
■be Kanli Itar I ton bcame a learcli for a body. By eaily (hk year, k ma 
linpty a March for cocnfcnt. "You uy tn accept dw tl is awer," twft Kadwyn, 
6U, a KUall womaa wldi dion. doc-cropped hair and tunc gfaaas. "I )icn you 



iJisappearance 



tuuilit. he moml lo .San FrandKu tram ta |annit' quiri Kimvllr, Teim.. 
laJKhhnlnDd and be^i pRfarlnfi for a ulp i« Meidcu. He hoped thai tnwl 
Kutid help odki the "dcgfadinj" mUeary eiiierimct- -"You know." Katlnyn 
•ays "llir gruup Crgig and the RKl In inleaitia» hewi'i uKd lu ihc lult*." • 
5hc Riancet amunri JacVi bedroom, apfanmly much u he tind left ii In (he 
iprinf of 1981 In a duaet. hk thaical ffiar liu nen lo a 
»'ruMU(^ sack uf NaUraad (.nigr^ihin. A Ujukihdrii lied whh 
renikxien uf hk ittkd» — the ccdlectnl work* uT BahcJiiii dc 
IfiitvOuuiy FtoKti uuria. a voluiic endrlcd "^yie Wkdom of 
Uiuu aid indat" aid anxlKT calcri The Wkrtnm oT IneL' • 
Kailayn mndi ai tlie deik, rcaiiaiiginf ume Cii>!inxn dertiy an. Sr'tUm 
olnily and ncttfly deKrUng her lun ui mc- -lii km rf rlia*il naidr, hk 
track cuDpnlTUa. the waylrdkln'tinxicurdiink- buiwhenhrrcynUi^a 
on a Uiinle nTkoerv al ic lalk lilem. ojarit, at 28 a icaaoatd iravder, h»d betn 



tee hk h.'utdwiiiiiiii, and itjuai mdta yui. Vnul Hiid out. ir you < 
wmeoae. The moat perianal pan ufanncaro b da:lr hnh«nifai||.* 



of 



THE kNII OF JAOCS XTFAHV muvul or LErrUtK WAS THt. Mn TtlNr ( I tKT 
due Ilai mneduiii ««■ rnai%. In Aiiguat. 1981, vhcn theic had been ou 
word bom Jack Id aewial weckt, Kailuyn and Cunk mre woiTitd, 
but they had nu kiea whci* lo snn. k'our cidk u> die US. EoAiniay 
in Mexko proved taipradaeUw. They toU ua ilia vhm people 
get down ta dial clmaie, diey (eod lo fbi]gu aboul iknc," Kailnyn 
remembesv So Oink, now 67, diddcd w (u to Moilco u> icardi 
for I A BXi hmteff. • Ahhoufh he dnct not ipeaik .SpanUi aal hadn°iu-.«cle<l 
ounidc die Unkcd Suia ikKic he wai a Maihie On Othawn ncvly 40 yean 
bcfoir. Cunk uxik leave Itom hk poa aa ai agrk\Jiund cngaieertng 
prnfntor a the Utaiwiilly ofTcUDaiec and made hi> way to San Criatdbol de 



Jack S&elton 



a aruemadc. faiihAil eore^ioialeiir Hk Bml leaer, tkiedjuly 9, 1 M I , waaooe 
itf duve Ir 'd anttini to Kafaiyn aod Mi fabrr. Omk in only MO anekL - rv 
picked up a few Kiapa of SpenWi,~ be had prtucd In hk tdUaptuMeticn 
writing. "Fiintish fcjr sirvlval.'' He had faeai bi auudwrri Mcakn loura^ 
Mayan Indan ndna, |al wrote, aid 
iddiou|^ he ma ruvang dni of tiaaicy. 
he lajpcd to vkil caie moiv WKient du Id the Yuatio bcfnrc lei iMlJ i m to the 
.Sato to kul for work. • Thioc dayi buer. anuninfi to knnafpiiMi ki^ he 
ontaed Inin UuaiBULt. tik ttanaig aaid hanlly haw been wocie. Under lla 
lldfcaiy Rgne nt Feimto Roinen Luoi (Janii — 'die &>Uam I hado nf 



By Kevin McKiernan 



LuCatai m Mada\ dw urn whenjKi'ilai kllcTlad bent piaitinaiketl A 
huaaaikm on the hat leg of Ilia trip waafijufatfo, land Ingwkhpaiicngefi 
aid noky with the rapid qicceh i^term oT the iKiTaaaliar rultun:. C^mk, 
dievKd In (lie aamc bnwn wool niiktajy ihht he'd worn aa a young Maiine, 
WB rdkvcd wlim a kmXhHired manger 
afnogid, ipeakiiig Knglidi, nneikig 
aamnifc But » ifikUy m [be m>i appeiaed. he Ma gone. Cunk checked 
for hk wallet and paapoci. Ibey were pmc, Ku. • Cunk wov lane for orw 
fund* and crerientiak, rcfuming twn iMcks later. IMicn nu uoe ai the ikrary 
Jack Hid he had mided In San CrinAbal rau,|nisiMl hia 



The Seiircli for Their Son Brnuglit Kalliryii ami Curtis Sheltoii Face to Facp With Guatomnla's Everyday Horrors 



a loa aNoaiai inoa aaoABinL amaiapjti, i 



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??& rj'4 St4 



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p(iuu>giaph, Uinb ict 00*00 a lO-huur bus ride 10 the Vucatin. to (he Mayan niiiu 
Jack IimI visited u Palaiquc. There, he searched out Americans, because iheytpeali 
Ei^lUsh and becauac he bcBeved (i)cy would remenibef aitothcr Amefkan better. "I 
tsfii begitwiiiK to ice that to Mcxkara, we aU looked the anie," CuitB s^m. But none 
oT tltc Americana Ik loct in Faknque remcnAxrredJadi. CurtB iwived on. 

jHck had mentioned in >^ but letter that he might go to Bonamjali, a renxtle 
Mayan «c si eanem Mexico noted for ii3 colored lueraxlyiifajca. Curtis' car gnt 
Muck levcral lima on liie way (ht^r, and he had to hike In (he bett five mlcs over 
mrain too nxigh Tor a vdidc. But when he arrived, the vidtor bonk jhuwcd no 
entry fur Jack, and no one ki the area could Idetttiiy hfan pnaitivdy from the 
photograprt A Uuatonalan woitsin acemed to remember a foreigper who kxikcd 
Ike Jack UaixUng on a street comer in an obscure viBagc in nonhem OuaionaU 
aonK dmc ago. But ihc cotikjn't provide any ntlier infomation. 

At that point, Curdi ran out of chies. So, after more invciti^uloii ki the San 
CriM6bal ana, he poued fiycn wltti Jack'i picture and returned tu Tc nn ewe e . 

Several nun: wceka patted without a word froai Jack, and the CunSy waa 
diitnught Kathryn (xxibisl the CSlizcnt Emergency Colter, a bnnch of the VS. 
State Ocpanmeat in Wathlngion, that Jack was n^atiiii^ llie family appealed to 
mcinben of Coogrets, iodudlng (hen-SciL Howaid M. Baker (R-Tcna), Sea Jkn 

TM SMteK fanlly In 197»i ■•ny, toft, Natferya. Jack ft CmiUt. 





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SasKT (TVTcnn.] and ihclMe Rep. John J. Duncan (R-Tenn.X to 
pfcaiuie !hc Stale DepaniixA Kxr kifonmaticfi. In October, the 
State Ocpannicnt oOcd widi iKWs Innigratlon records had turned 
up Jack's oaroe ai Lb Me*Uh, a imal Guatemalan border pcM on the 
Pan Araericaii Highway, three houn louih o( San CritioboL Jack's 
ni«Dc had appealed on die July 12 Kstof travdcnwiiowefvlicaded 
south Into tin pixxrince of Hudaieteiiango. 

ftioyed by the news, the ShdtoiH telephoned the SUic Depamnent, asking 
oOdals fur an orvcitc bwestiipilnn n Huehueienangin and for the Ur oT ottwn Mliu 
had crossed that dsy. bopk^ someunc— perhaps another fbreigHT— ntigbt 
remLinber Uk tal, <tuk4iali«d boy (mm Teimessec. But (Ie 1974 Piivacy Act bars 
(he rekasc of a^r faiTonnatktn boat die State Dcpaitnw. And when the findy 
approadwd Amerkan Express lor informadon about where psii caiiK:d Nt 
tnvder's checks, they wen; toid that dw tatuc bw kept dKsc recoRb aeciet. (DO. 

Undetored, the Sheftoos lauxhed a tckiphooe and letter-writing campaign tn 
push for an invctilgRtkjo ofjack's disappearance. 1lu7 contacted almost two dozen 
Oft^rizatkina, indudkig Amnesty Intenudonal. Aniericat Watch snd the Wwid 
GounciofChurcbesw 

The strakB of tiic scardi were slwwing on die fiunOy. J«i"s brother. B«Ty, jpwe 
up a sdMbnhJp in plant and toi science at the UHvenicy of Tcntestce because he 
o(w)d not cooccntnuc on his siudlei And Kathiyn, bdng treated Gar hipus. a pdnM 
uthritk condkkm i»a« attacks the knmune ayttcm, fuund Uut stress ag^avated die 
diae«e. Easily ftilgued. jdic nonetheless spent boon on die (eiephooe each day whBe 
Outis hcU down his job at (he univcirity. At night, her head ached btxn the 
oans«nt pressure oT iIk receiver a{pinst her ev. 

Bix Uk work acemed to be paytaig off. In November, Raker's office in WMhngton 
takik was working to obtain die names of the July 1 2 travdeia, and it succeeded in 
rehasing the irtfennaftiija from Ajnerican lUpKst. Jack's last check had been OHhed 
in Mcxkxi, In July. But $600 in unused checks was ouistamfk^ no trace of the 
checks ind tunied up in Guatenuia. 



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110 



RY DECF.MKER, THE SHFLTONS WERE FKANTIC. BOKUKR CHECKS 
from Rdizc to Puiwiu indicated that Jade had not left GuatemaU, and Mi SOndav 
vUa.ivhidihadeq3irodanAug. 11, had not been turned in. If Jack had been In an 
aecideoi. iTIw hftd been IdUed 'n Guatemala, wouldn'l hii body have thown up bf 
now? If he wcic alvc, «TOukkiU tomeoiic ham respotkied to the fl)icn? The ShdtoiB 
paki |74X)0 ID a Brkfah ineraemtfy to hunt Cor Jaci; btd be found nortitatE. 

Cunb wBDied lo go tn MuetnettnangD to retume Ua March, but VS. offidab 
diamaded him from raakinx the liipi Leftist guordDax were SLtMfy f^f^t*ia the 
Cualemalan dkiamnfaip, vrhich was lupportcd by $3 millkn in annual VS. amary 
akl and |90 iTulfioa in erocknik: ainiuiocc. (In DeccnibeT. 1990, the mlkaiy aidwtt 
luqioided beouM of fauman-tigbia viobMiuns.) In 1981 . widi i«iwteboaba(htidci, 
ooiptes ihowed up regularly on roadi and «r«ets-, death KJuada teemed to be 
everywhene. I'ravel on the Pan American Highway between GuatemaLi City and 
Huchueieiiangn. (Kc lioun to the hchUi, axdd be dangerous. So Curdi canujed hb 
trip. 'Tm tlv Idnd of penon wiw goe* aloiitc with authority," he nys. "1 thought 
lltey knew— ur ought to have known — more than we did." 

Ute Shchm Instcsl placed ad* in four natkmal newspapen in Ua tein aia and 
Beiiac The advcnitemenu in tlK "miasing" section carried photograph* of 
Jati—indudk^ ODc modinecl by an artist to ihow him wkb ioog hair— hit panport 
number and a dciciiption of Mm as 6 feet, 2 indies and 1 46 pounds. The ads bcg^n 
apxaraiKonChrisuiiasEve, 1961. 

Ail spring, ihc bmOy received icapomcs to the ads, wiiich later were ancnded to 
iixliKle a rewBid for Infuiination. 1l>c Sheitons hired a trarabtor in Knoxvflle lo lift 
out tlie dues thai tecnicd pnorairing. And Curtis flew to Gtatnoala Cky. 

At the VS En^aaiy in Guatemala, un official exprcaicd his belief that Jack hMl 
been Uled l^ guerriUas. but there was no supporting cvklence. 

After ttwiJiig down more dcKl-end ieadi In GuatemJa, Gunis received a report 
that a "giingD ynuih" had been iuund barely alive in a park h Tuxtb Cuti^Tcz, the 
capital of the staie of Chiapas In Mexico. Curtis flew to thai city, north of San 
Critf^bal de Las Caaas, where ihe (tstfcfa had begun ihc previous summer. 

The North American in die park wai emaciaied, unconscious and riMwed signs of 
"dreadhi" naltreatment. Curtls necuiaicd dut the buy had been "drug^and in 
jsir before he aiThcd fai tlK pari, but he was " too &r g^" for Cuitla to determine 
whedwr be wMjadu Ibe man died the next day. Two weeks laser, an nu fingeipiim 
analysis indkaied dm die yiaii^ man was, ki fiict. an American, but he was not Jack 
Sbdtoc 

THf. GUATEMALAN IIOVERNMKNT FINALLY RELKASFP Tilt NAMES 
of dK 22 pctjplc who enicnrd Guatemala on the Pan American Hi(#iwBy on July 1 8, 
19RI. But by then k was October, 1982. A year had patKd sinae die Shdtona (Iru 
telephoned the Stale llepEvtmcm to pressure Guatemala for the list. The trai had 
grown cold 

In IVccndxr. Baker received a letter frani Guatemalan Ambassador Jor^ U 
Teiaya. At hxigbstdtere appeared ui be tome real news — an oflidal reapunac ftxxn 
the gt w c iiaaent, the conduaion of an inquiry corauassioned by ibc Guaienatan 

t was clear th«t parts of Jack's 
life would always be a mystery* 

National Pulice into Jack's cUsappcarance. 

Fmphaiiidng "ihe lehuimeH with which my envernincrx vievwd this matter, and 
(be thoroughness with which die Invcsdgadon was cnnductcd," Telaya infonucd 
Baker that "Mr. Sbckon docs noi appear tn have rvcr been ki the country.'' 

"Not mr ai thi eauntryt' The Shchmt were traumatized. "Wc wc^^ kicking for 
our son in a couniiy that aM he dkkn'i exitt there." Kaihryn soys. 

As the months passed, die Sicituni cKmg to the hope tiiai somehow Jack bad 
survived. In Mardi, 198.% tlicy placed more reward advertitcmenis with Jack's 
picture bi Madcan and Cuatcraalan popcn. In Juoc, dwn: was a breakthrough. 

Ibe onnsid general of the U£. Embay ki Cuauanaia Uiy, Phiip Bof e$ Taykv, 
finaly traveled tu Huehuetcnango and dwdtcd die tanmigiaikin kj^t at tlic border. 
He atanedbudy ioimd Jack'i name and taK of t^ic other tr^vckrs wlw cnMcd on 
J\iy12, 1961. Then he ba ck trarked to the pm rindat capital, tatjiighinch at the nafci 
hotel on die city at^are. Afiemiarti, he icvkwed the bottl'i guest regiuy. Kndktg 
iscMhing diere far dK date in quodon, Ik waked across the street tn ilr B Cential. a 
kmHiKome boiel wt icn: She bus fimm the border Mopped. As Taylor racaDed later, die 
hold iiimagcr reniwcd a *'dust-cf)vercd bnrfc'' frotn die #icif h hi) office. Turnkig to 
July 12, 1981, S-imunths before, TaykjriaddKnene>(*.SWtM. 



Ill 



AugiiH brought DKiTx: duo and dUturfaing notes A both was exhumed in 
Huehiictenango, and iu denul X-nys were cofufored lu >«**. but thtj didn't 
mattii. A luciittp victim wrote to the £imi)y frum Guatemala City, uying that he hai 
just esciiped frum a prison cell set up ai a mDltaiy acadanj, where "hcavUy aimed 
men" were haUiw three nthcn, Indudkig one who nttuiKd Jack's phoox 

SMhr Ictien from odien had cunvinccd the Shdiora ihat Jade vns a c^xire. 
"Yoi cannnt idagktc the anguish my tedy caoiiniiCT to wndr after twi> yean," 
Barry wrote in a letter to a dozen U^ ofndsib. 

THt rAMILV CONTINUCn MAKING CONTACTS. Ar.(2UAINlANC»UJ AND 
ttends rood's netvwA," Kaihiyn calk ii) In the search far Jadt In July. 1984, 
Cunb made one more crip lo Guatemala. Ai that time, I jiincd the Karch, along 
widi two others: a dixrict ationtey htim Oretjou v«faQ Is active In astiiting 
CuatennlBn reibgecs aod an h^pbcupal priest fhxn Palo Alia who has a lumber of 
conucis in GtMlciDBla. Thi* time, Cunis (fid not notify the State Department he was 
going, nur did he siGiir the Inlbrmatian that dtuvc this seardr a padiet of recent 
rentonics to the stQtrunning Kh. 

One writer daimcd lo Ibivc seen Jack playing Willi a dog In Guatemala City. '"He 
told me daft his natnc was ShekocL" AnodnT mncrobered seeing a Nonh Americin 
man and a Spiinish woman near Lake AtMihi. They had bixn captuicd by (lie 
CiBtemaian array and, he vagudy recaled, executed. 

We sifted through ihe duct. T1>e stroi^est of them led Curtis and roc to a 
neig^iboTtwod in Guateinda 0(y where muncruus ne sl de ijts , biriependcni of one 
anMher, recognized Jack's picture and idendiied him as a local struct penioa We let 
up a sbtkcom at an Iniersectian where tlie foreigner wa* known lo pass. Ourb^ the 
nem two days, a Chevrolet SUv«rado witli blackened windnMi and no license 
piaics — the type of vcblde asMxiated widi Otucenulin deaUl i<]iiads — appeared 
and reappeared nciir our poikcd renul car. "It kind of makes you woodcr where oor 
taxes gu," Guns said quietly. 

When (be stranger finaOy showed up, he was lut Jade after all, aldKiu{^ Hs uec, 

Cwlia kaatfasl Ml flyara wNh Jwk'a dMcr4>tloa In QiMtMMta. 



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Infr ook)rtiig and physique were similar. Hs ratiier was American, he 
related in brofcen Eni^ish. The rx» of las story as a homeless 
expatriate inded off, conAited by dru^ or amneaa or peihi^ 
boifa. 

Curtis Jnumeycd lo Lake AdiUa It was Uh: Fouitii^of July, and 
louiisulnthcinwnufPaniijaKhel — 'YM^MtNiinf»"in'thewufdsaf 
one itsideni — were slxwdng off Brcvmiis. A wnlcer there dmuglil 
he remenbcred tedng sftHMoDe who looked like Jack "but dait was )«sin agft" 

»UT CUKTIS WAS EAOKR TO CO NOBTH TO IMR SECUBITY PRISON IN THE 
eity of (^ctabenanflo. Kadxyn had nxcived iwu calb Irum Chicago from a wcnun 
who hwi just returned from Guaircmakt Qty, where she iiid seen d)c ad At the tiiiic, 
ihe told Kathryn, she mentioned Jack's disappearance to her son, a Gtutetnalan 
kidier. Acootdbg to die caUcr, her son responded. "No, Mama, he b not mUi^ 
He has been kidrwpcd faiy Uk miliiaiy aeryice and B bckj ai pftein. " If tMt cUm was 
true, Jadi CouU nil be alive 



112 



ihe woman told the Shduxs that the and her son went to the tccuritv piltoa U) 
QuealUD»ngc>, where they law Jack in a "lub-basemcni" so daA ihey "nid U> use 
(mA» u> sec." Nine pocple weie bek^ held inihe area, ibc said, jxk wm "tal, 
ihln. wearing dd ckHbei," wmI he kepi asking vvhy "no one had come for (hkn)." "1 
Udd him," the wotnan retatad lo KaUnyn/'ihai 1 woidd coiiUcthis parenis,'' 

In (^icnlicnango, the California priest planned to use his connections with a 
GoaiesiBJan frfend who WW rckMcd 10 an anny officer to obUki pcmMOD for our 
groi^ ID enter the prison. Bui ai route, an astoniahing coincidence occurred wfacn 
we stopped on a rural highway to pick up a Mayan hitchhiker. Without knowing 
Jack's sioiy, the Indian picked hkn out from a fondly photo, posithv he'd seen Jack 
the year before — ihou^ with k>ngiT hair— in the Quezaltcnango prisixi when be 
visited his brodKT, who was serrinff dine for assault. It was an innfjrubahle ckic frnni 
■n improbable source. Cutis was dearly askaied. 

Bu no "tuhbttcmcni" could be fouitd at the prison. And aAer wc made a fiidfe 
tour of the cumpound, the guards told us it was time to go. Cuiils and (he priest 
lingered, caBing to Jack In Engllsli through the ban of locked cellbkxks. At one 
point. Curtb cwid see only the mUsectkxi of one prisoner, someone who was aeated 
at the ertd of a kxked oorrkkir. Tlie psiaaner appeared to be weaving something, 
perttaps a bag, but Ms fitce was out of sight. "That ami sccnM whiter dian the rat of 
these peoplct" Cnnb ocdaimcd nervously, liktu the man stood up and turned 
around, bewUdered Ijy the North Americans jockeying for a better view at the 
Oppodle cod of the corndor. He was a Latkm. 

We druvc nortli to Hudiueicnangu, where Curtis ttadOy located Jaik's nanic. his 
signature and handwiitkiK in the regidy at the n Central I lotcL 

Of aBilic guests Ested Tor July 12. 1981, or^ one rnncmbeied Jack liurviewed 
io Mexico, Antonio Ouik»i Barrios, a idKidicacher, cbiincd thai In- had spent pan 
of tint cveniiiK in tlic bar of the El Genual Hotd drinking witii Jack and a young 
"South Aiucrkaii wonuu." Jack had introduced her as "his wife." but Barrios 
thought at tltc Unte that she was a prostitute. They each had three Callus 
(Guatanalaii beers), he said, hoking 141 three fingers. Jack bought two rounds. Then 
dte couple left for a hold room. 

Barrios, who nanenibcred Jade Rom Shdton as "RusscD" and correctly recaBed 
liis room number despite the paaage of itvcc years, said Ike went to Jack's room 
about 1 a-m. and knocked on the duor. llic wonon stayed inside, but Jack (tipped 
out into the haUwov, where he shaved 'a couple of drinks" frum Barrios' buttle of 
Madao vodka. Jack mentioned thM Ik was "horn S;m Francisco. " bi the mominK, 
Banioa said, he saw the couple osice more. Tht woman said the two were on thdr 
way to Panajachd and Lake Adtlin, sevCTvl hours away. 

Throughout lite tdHngof tlie sdtoolteadicr's story, Cunit leavd rorward. arnis 
Cnkkd, hanging on every detail. At the mention uf the mysterious woman in the El 
Centi^ Haul, hk flngcn dug Into his biceps. "It doesn't sound Eke Jack," he said 
tfileUy. 

Curtis old he wanted to spend one night in Ihe room where Jack had stayed Usnee 
yean befoir, "In case there arc messagn or maribgi stS on the waL" Rut it was 
thnctogo. 

FOR THE FAMILY. WRITINC; LEITERS BECAME A WAV OF LIFE THAT 
persisted even when hope did not. In early 198S. they again wrote Amnesty 
Inteniailooal, uiging the gruup nut to Ibinet Jatk't disappearance. Barry Shdton 
{rxmd ihe unceitalnty iitenabk, ''afaoost l3ic havingjkii die over and over ^aiii.'' 

"We sevdied and seadied for bfan." Barry says. "The irony is that Jack waa ilic 
onewhowistheseanlin' — hk whole life wasaseardi." 

Barry, 3), is four years younger ilauiJacL and aknost one-third of his Ufc has been 
dcvraed to teiing his brother. He is not a tall man. but he stoops a kuk, almost as If 
to avoid a weigbt the wortdhas put on hit thoukkn. 

Barry remcmbeia Jack as a big brother wib ({cntly gave lum ttlviM, Uie how to uM 
rubber cemml tu rmdr hit tennis Ktoci, and who "reached out hb band arvj puled 
me up" wbcn Barry KHt hb footkig akJri^kk! a cable cu- 1 1> &n Fi^ndica 

At hone, Barry ays. Jack was "me a taltwaser Mi in fresh water." He ckdn't fit in, 
Jack kwed his Eaiiily, but he ^On'i want Ui cultivate the famiy vegetable gardeti (he 
didn't like die "Nwtfc ethic'l He dklD't bke it when his &ther cried to swiidi tlic car 
radio from a staiwo that was playing a song in a (uTcIgn language, and t^ien he was a 
lcc^-agt^r, he started resisting Curtis' haircuts. But must of all, he didn't like 

Irst Jack was the black sheep* 
JL Ihen he was the lost sheep.' 

KnoxviBc. It was the wroi% cnvirunmcni. "a cunllict of acsdwks," in Harry's wotds, 
like wburbia vcrauk a Miyat^ tem^. Ir was Hke Jadi hod been dmppcd into the 
wrongpUcc on Earth." 



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"Fk« he v»t the bladi ihcjcp," Barry ttys warmly. "Then h< WM ihe k»i jhecp." 
TTie but of Jack'i Rnaxviile friends known to have seen Wni alh« wm V4ut 
MuMon, a fbnDcr Mighbor. win >Bd leA Tennettee to jubi the Mer^ 
He had beoi on diip't llbeny in the Bay Area In die late '70i when he and Jxi met 
by dMUX In a Beiidcy booksore. Tbcrcafter, whenever Jotinsun was In pnn, "twe] 
would pal around loffeiher." When he heartl that Jack had disappeared, it fint 
ooairred to iohnion »ai "he inight hxye thrown in with the rebeb" or perhaps "he 
AM tu diWaig wkh Kxnc students in a cafe where tlie army had sinol pigeons, and 
8icn the mfiitary got him. " JohtKxi thinl4 Jadi nay have Itept part of faimiclf Eronri 
hit family, not telUiig them that he went to ban. "Jack was close in tii« ramMy," 
Johnson ays. "He tSdn't want lo faun theta" 

IN JUI.V. igss. THtKK WAS AN ASTONISIIINC. DKVKLOPMENT IN THE 
case. 

On hb last day in CuatemaU, Dr. Michael Brabcck, a Rhode Island phyiiclan 
flrMiIng hi* annual volurMeer work near l^tnaja<i\e], overheard < uxivcrBDon stout 
a Biingo who'd been kilktl some time ago bv a death Sffad in the neigbburii^ Cown 
of SoloU. The tpeakcr, an Anioiain viho nas lived in Guatemala for more than a 
ilccade, had been afraid to report the murder, thougli he gueued it "probably 
iiwoives that tenly froniTenncMee." the one advertising in the newspapers. 

As soon as Rnfcock landed at a U.S. ahpon tlic next day, lie lekphoned me inSana 
Barbara (by cuincidence, wc bad attended Hgh sdiOGi together tn (lie 19601; wt had 
rcmtaQcdintnudi.andbekriewofrtiyinvolmnentintheShdtcns'scaich). I left far 
CuBtanala seven] davs later without idtinf[ the Sheitons. Thc/d been dkappointed 
too many Ijnics over tne yean, and I dkbi't warn to &ltcly raise their hopes agaia But 
In SotoU, I learned ttis nnry, Mach uoa theti nxxe tinn seven years old: 

FRIDAY IS MAKRKT DAY IN St)I.Olj(. A SMAl.I. TOWN NESll.KI) ON A 

mounudnikic plateau. On Nov. 27, IBRl, Indten traders, descendants of the 
Mayans, filtered into town to sd their rugp, dotting, vegetables aiai coffce heans. 
Dressed b (iiw, traditJoual dodikig with inilcBie wovoi patterns, the waikei* iiKNCxl 
riowty along the edf{c of the main roadway thai winds steeply throtigl t dK nxauHains. 

Teresa I lemandez and Iter ft^car-old daughter made their way to the marlcet with 
the two /kbiof of beans and rice that they hoped to leV that day. As tiiey walked a ilrt 
side street dial leads from the main road to tlie viUa^ square, 1'eicai heard a noise 
and looked up with a gasp. Condng toward dxm was a naked roan, a gringa He MM 
running from house to bouae, knodcng on doors, trying ttic kxis. kwkbig for one 
that wuuklapeit. Down the street, someone ydcd "Loco! I xxx>!"Tcieia'i daughter 
put down her ptato of iinod and hU behind a tree. 

Teresa fnne. At (he runner passed by, their cya met for a split second. Sbc 
tlwugbt she heard some Mortk in Engfislt "He was white," she mnenten. "^ay 
white. " 

Juat beyond her, the maniwKbcd an okt shacL The law thingTcrem saw thiuugh 
the open door WHS the naked man hy a pdc of old dottxs, puifing on a pair of coltaa 
ponia and tying them widi a cloth belt. 

Aratmd die comer, in a dirt-aoor house oveHnoking the lake, Kiialto Martin WM 

Cwlte and lUthnm at tMr MMMnMt to Jack In th* SolvM ofliMtMy. 



114 



fMdiiig breakfiot to Ms ichoui-oge dddnen. When he arawered a 
knock at (Ik door, he Bw biiir reel luxter the crack and flpeiicd ihe 
kuh, aHuming that the caller was tonxxme he knew. "I'hat's when 
the taD gringo came tn," Martin says. The stianger wore a pair of 
pauts ihai were too ihuit for hfan. He had frcih scrapes and 
scratches over hb back md on hb lower legs. His Adain's apple was 

fbc nwi kx>ked Ikx and indk»cd in bn>lu:n Spaiiish that he was thirsty, so Mfllin 
gave hlru a ffan of wMcr. Tlw vUtor shook liandt wlQi the children in the room, 
pattir^ wane of them on t^ iKad. I Ic seemed frlendber than the forcsners who 
cnngnrpted down at the Ukc. but. Judging IVom hia cocxlition and UK oveniB 
stM^meuof liic encounter, Martkt iluu^t. he, like many totnists, ntight be mdcr 
the itmuence of dnig^ 

Suddenly, there wm bar^^ y». the door. VVlicn Martin opcrxd k, he saw wo 
unifbmMd men armed with mta. One was from tlie Poltda Hadenda, tlte fieared 
Treanoy Puikx. Mc wore the forcc't dixtinctlve green Guigues arxl a hat wkh dibi 
Strap, and be mnled a U.S.-made M-l carbine. 'Die other man wure the hehnei 
assigned to BROK. (Brigada dc Opendnnet Ejqiecialct), ttrongiuin l^icas' 
nntonous anti-riot poHce unit. He, too, carried a weapon, but Mtviin oouU not 
remember what kind. 

"Send him out," thcv ordered 

Martin hcsitaiod.'*] have duklren — you can't kill him here," he sakl bluntly. 

At this, one uf the men pointed las rifle at Mania "Well ki8 jnu ITyuu gel in our 
way." he said. 

Manio stepped away from the pointed gun. Ihcn. biaqdkably, (Ik men moved 
bull across itic stiecL Martin ckxcd tlic door. 

The visitor noticed a cupy of die BiUe lying on a table. He picked It up and waited 
over to Martin, 'ttumo, dune," be sakJ, placing hat palm on (he book's cover. 
"Jkuno," Martin rcpeatol, (oudiing the BiUc. For a few mnmcncs. tircy sioud irere 
lugetlieT. Thcu the man handed the Bibk to Martin. Opening the dnor. the gringo 
walked outade. 

When the unlfonocd men saw (Ik foreigner, Uary nuwd their rifles and Suited 
toward hhn. The Rringo, Manki now noticed, was hi(faigsoinctiiin([lnhis hand-lbc 
men Mopped, afraid he was raocealiiig a weapon, peiteipi a grenEtde. Suddenly he 
lairlod the ofajeii in liKir (fircriiun. It lih one of tlxir boots, but tliere was no 
cxpkakxc it was juM an old IcmuiL 1ltcn Aie men oune at hiin agabi, grabbing him 
by the anus, but the gringo resisted, and he raamgcxi to break away. 

'Die griitgo was running ayiin, tuwani itie 14> of the hiU thai dropped down to (he 
lake baiow. 11k ounnicn iiillmvcd, radng by Martin't house, disappearing lnu> a 
nearby comiicid Munents bier, there were gundxKS. 

Before kng, the solcfcn returned. As diey pasted the Inuse, one of them aaid to 
Manbi: "Watdi oul We arc guing to exterminate every nnc of (Ic putgat |Qcia] In 
(his town.'* 

IN .SOLOLA, A.S in many Vll.LAr.tS IN CUATKMAl.A, THE JUB OP 
picking up floqjses fidb to the bonbra, the firemen. Sok)ljktonte70 Pedro fijKfMi, 
by his own caknatc, has picked up "atxMit S.OOO bodies" during ^ P^ ^^ yc^ 
He was naUeiHjf-iaa. mh oilcn dwelling on indvidual cases, but Jack's was 
panioitariy un{ui]getlabie. 

*jB griagv 411/ ito ffirrimivf'' Yes, of course, he trtnenlxred the gringo who was 
ninnlog. Kvcryoiic knew about (Ik gringn, he saiU when he was siwwn Jack's photo. 
Belbic that da^ in laic Nnvonbcr, IWl.iiucnc had seen llrman around. But tucby 
he is wefl renKHibeicd 

The gTimo appeared after (be guerriBas came through Soioki, busy dayt for die 
btmJma. AJk)uichi got word uf a body soon after the sliuoUi^, hui then dKic had 
been a mix-up. CuiiDiii({ up the street in his Ore-Ocpanincnt ptdutpk lie had spotted 
another body by the ruadndc, and he had collected k inoead. Three days later, when 
he returned to (lie area, he found jack's Loipsc In (be contfiekL 

The coroacr's report said the deceased was an unknown niale, between 2ft and 30 
years of aKC, dressed in gny panu fastened by a "typlrar ' cord. He had bmwn eyes, 
an angular ttct with levcral days' gniwth of besrd and a long "Afro" hairayle. He 
had been shot twice in d «: aixkxnen and unrc In tiK back of (Ik head 

"lliey were bringing a lot of hudiet in Atutc rtays," saU Domingo Hixul, a woricer 
at the Solol^ hospital, Ucmifylng Jack's photo. "Bui he was dlftcrent." Bbtul't Job 
was to wrap the bodtes of the uiKbimcd victinu — cIk "XXs, " or unknowns — with 
Muc plaitk: sheeting, (ylng each with mpc. Uke a bundle, before kxtdlng it on ttte 
back of die trudc to hail 10 li IC cooeicry . 

The plastic was prc-cut to a standard length, a prublem for Bbcul because Jack was, 
by Mayun standards, a tall maa "I renKmixT hini." Kml said. "We had to use more 
plastic." 

805 966 9770 







115 



IN OCTOBtR OF I9S8. AFTPR OBTAININC JACIfS DEATH CKRTIFICATE 
aid (peaking uocc more with Jtnaa. Hernandez and EnOo Martin, I ftoUy wai 
abte in wiitc to Ojn» Kxl Kaihfyn and idi UKin how thdr ton dkd Kaifanm caled 
ine on ihc tdephwK, him and conJuscd cvm ai^py « «»» infcnmikia S^ 
tried tu ixti up," ite Hid bier, "even without knowing the tnjitL When thit 
happened, vwc didn't luww if wc oQutd go thrtMijih it ^aia" 

In lUBS. al dvn icraainad o£iw qucM waft to brkigjidi's bndjr home. Kaihryn 
«nd Cuitii hii^ M lawyer In Cuaicnab CO Ilk a ooim to Older the bodjr cxbuiiied Bui 

ver the yeara, the Sheltons spent 
$75,000 searching for Jack. 

the Judge otknatcd that \heiv were SOO tu 400 desol^squad vktais tn Ote oemcteiy, 
and thcic was no lectNXl Indicadng vvlich of ■m«tul treiKTM cofMatoed J^^ 
Kxhuming them wouU be a grudome prufcn requiriiff the pretence of the pcikx, 
the heahh deptninicnt and the Judge iKradf; the jiid}^ tald na 

But the Sheltnm made one wuK aoempt Bccaiue 1 used tn be an attorney, they 
aiked mc to gn tu the Ouaienialin ooun to appeal tlic Judge's dcudon. JuM before 
the tr^ Katinyn leiephuncd. "niierc arc lome Udngi thai weren't In lite ad that you 
ought to kntiw for purpoaen of cooflnnatkm," the taid "JaHi had very kmg, veiy 
thin flngcn— and he had a big Adani*! apple.** Ihe uie of die wcni A«( ws a ihocL 
For the Drtt tane, tite wat leTerriiiff tojari, in the pad tenu:. 

I departed for Ctatemala, accompanied by RcgcUu Tmjlki, a Mexican ffOxiBitr 
In Saiiu Baifauv who wodd help with irarKbuun. The judge Uitened to lu — and 
revcncd herxi£ If Uk bther of the boy wuukl ctxnc brvn I'ennciaee to lign the 
rcqueu. abc wauU giant tile outer. 

It WW a condtion tiwt alarmed Kathryn. jack never one haci ftun Soldi and 
the feared dial Curtb raig^ not cidier. 1he Ksrch w-,is knporiain, but they n>« not 
be dragged under by k. Shoiddn*t tliey draw the line at ihcir owniurvival? "Cuitfa la 
goii\g to retire next year, and 1 am going to need htm," Katfaiyn nid. "1 wan 
lonxrthk^ kft In my lie.'* 

But Cimii had to know more. 

AT Tlli: F.DCli OF SOI.OLA. THE ROAO THAT SNAIOlS UP THK MOUN. 
tain atmn a flat plateau that oveitookt a steep, biurivcovercd ravine icveral 
huiidred feet deep. Mklwayilnwtiihiittretch of rradix a guard pa« — no more than 
a mall i«d--wtwrc inuiiidpal poBce monitor iuoi trafifk and reconl biu nunb^ 
and ioinctimet Ucciae-platc nuiwxm of autonvibiies. 

"I figure Uiey had Jack here." Omit taid. driving by fur the tectnd dmc. "Maybe 
they were tramfcrrsig him from one Jail to anodicr — maybe they lad dn^;^ 

hhn — and they topped to check wiiJi 
tlie f^oni Anybody UKng down thai 
nvine wuukJ get pretty scraiched up on 
the way down." 

Cunit had Jun come irnm the 
ocmeterv, whldi tits on the Ear ^Uifnt 
die ravine, and fWiin the honics of 
Tereta Hcmandex and EnUlio Martin. 
"I have io|^-JkJi the bciKfli of Ur 
doubt," Cunii cuniiiiuefL Pan of the 
pain of thlK search lad bccnnie hii 
rcaUiBilon that there were aspects of 
jadt he might ixrver knuw. "I'm rtui 
going to lUnk he was on drug*. Not 
vntundirfiy. lie could have been. I'm 
not rultr^ it out Hut h doesi'i account 
for his wiiereabouB dnae last lour 
nnntfai. Widml any miaieT. Out nf 
respect for hiin. I tMnk he waa tvked 
and runnfaighcre becauae he'd been in 
capiMiy." 

At Flipper's Cantkia, Omit waa 
havit^ a Coke with \mi we were 
<MiUng GuaienviUii beer. Neart^y, 
several pollrfincn ki unlfona gaihenxl 
at a taue Utiered with ciapcy bottles of 



116 



„\ef^, thought th» bodie* wei* buried 



tlvUlcr? 

Th« Pollci» 1 l»6cr>d> got up l 
lurchk^ b^ tie fiilicr of Jarii Ron 
Shdton. twnOTCTing (mm the bar w«h 
Iht biwadn ol amwl inioxioteri men. 
Curdi wa» trembling. "I (toi'l undcr- 
tland a police oTOcer who drinja," he 
maiut]{cd lo lay. "1 low cdn he have any 
mpeci for hknulf?" 

TV iKTO nighc, Curtis and hk 
cunifMknlonf met tJ%e txmctcry dirertor 
ai Fippci'i ",A*iduu caida. Mio 
mum'" the aU ( >uaiemalao cxdainied 
with a drunken bugli. taming another 
empry bottle nei iu ink:. Machete down, 
IntiBn tfead- If t)ic ghngrat n'Amcd 
more Infomaik*!. nfw wa Ihi: liirw lo 
buy the ceoneiery dircnor anuihcr 
round. The gringos complied, and the 
graveyard man dcscrfccd ijic ftjrmida- 
Uc taA that hiy ahead. 

Tttat were two trcrviies aiid many 

bodies uinJcmcath. Cravcyiird space iu 

^oli had been ai a prrmhim in rrcent 

yean. That cnuki be a probknti. Some 

tnwnspeupk; had had to bury Ucit 

Lttifulk on ky> ut the XXs' ticnche^ 

ntsturhlng ilir dead — tliesc dead — 

could ujM-i the vUage. Hut c\%n if tlic 

imches imdcmcaui OMild be un- 

artlKtl, there was still no system for 

iratinft specifa corpses, inx even a^ 

r dates cm tJic plank sheets. It ^ 

nuld Iwvi. to be donr by hand. 

The cuaviiiKxi would be uianive. 

od)o slink terribly. Everyone would 

etxl a face nuA. Sotne people Mjuld 

^t ^k. Figirt or 10 gi2vc(ig)^n 

.iMJid he hiitd. Illat wnukln't cost 

-nurJi. maybe a little more If they 

)ruught their own tbuwlR or picks. 

I^KTe slunjld be two lcani\ — one todlg 

ind one to driiik. Thai was a kM ul com 

itfsor. Ihcrc w-rts rw chIict way to 

landkit 

IXiring the search, dicre would be 
KTiics "everywhere." Some trf Own 
iiif^ ^ mlxDd up. The giingn's bones 
hould be longer than tir others. But it 
juuld s(ll be a lot of worV. 
^Maduu Aaido, hvUo muaia! 



Notebook in hand, (^rtls 
puced badt and forth, eitainn- 
ing tlK iOil, flguritig and 
reDguring tfistanres. About a 
dozen wtxiden croiaeA tnarkcd 
the rocky, weed-covered 
gnjtind, the sites where shaAow 
burials tjf known Soiolaleect 
tnok place on top of livr 
trcTKhcs. The prospect of 
opening these graves made lite 
Uxjught of gelling m the 
others, the ones belo^. even 
nxjTc octttxia. 

Curtis had a short, natlen 
night, and he awakened wfde it 
was stUl dari. "What happens to 
a body thai lies in the ski for 
three days?" he wanted to know. 
"Were Uire tm ur tiam buUei 
btia}" It was like a bad dreaiii. 
And there vxsk other thoughl^ 
too. Curtis lunwd on the Iglil lo 
get ictnetlnng out of his suit- 
case. It was an old FatlicT'i Visty 
cud, one that he laid carriLxl 
will) him from home. Jack had 
trade lie card as a ynuri^ier Cur 
hk daddy. Ihtre was very Uuir 
wriljng on it "rni sorry I hisacd 
about the haircut,' k said 
aiu^. "Lowe.Jack-'* 

Jlm ailef flawn. Courtis was 
aisleil ai the daiVcncd kjbby of 
the hotel, alntic. Wearing the 
oid Mslne shin, he w» audy- 
k>g lis Ulilc nxi:bonk. trying in 
resoh* any contradicLions, 
wringirig wtastevcr meankig lie 
couklficziit)iclasi fcwdetidliof 
the scaidi. Now he imde the 
deciskxt Thtnuinttn/tliggmf. 
"It weighs hwvy on mc," he 
aid. "to go In dxie and dlnurb 
the dead" As simple » thai. 
Jack's mnaim woukl stay In 
CiUalemab. With ttw other 



Before leaving the oountry, 
Curtis wanted a phutograpii 
taken urTere» Hernandez and 
then one of hinitelf wldi Teresa, 
(i/r KaihryiL AfWrward, Tereaa 
embraced him like a rdallvc. 
lite Rucxljy was a lor^ one. 
Nearby, at Erailio Martin's 
hotuc, Che slop was tfxjner. 
Martin was sKk In bed. No mctv 
deoils about Jack's vUt or the 
death iquad This was just for 
tHmksgiving. 

Uut In Manln't ample hotne, 
Cunis pirxkjool cue more 
phoio t^Jack, a picture Martin 
had nevi-r seen Ezdllo re- 
maiicd on die pmnlnencT, n 
Ihe photograph, of lack's Ad. 
am's apple and how tills itiired 
his monory of the barefoot 
visitor who came in hb tkxr so 
many years aRO Curtis, standiiR 
Uicre in his hoiiK, resembled 
that yciung man, Martin aid. 

fiirtli wanted to hokl the 
Bible thai his son hekl thai day. 
As it was brought to him, 
Martin tat up in bed. "It is for 
yuu, diit Bible isyoun," Manin 
said Chirtis was treinfaling, 
almoil twilcliing Now be 
placTd one palm oii the book's 
ewer. "And Jesus aid," Ik 
Uuncd uut, koking lo Rugelio 
1'rvjillo for tranaU^n, " 1 was 
a Mtjuiger, and you tnok me 
Into your hotnel' " A king aiKl 
difficull silence followed liujU- 
k) was crying oixl could ntjt 
Iransbic. 



LAST NOVFMBHt. NINK 
years to ihc day after the 
murder. Jack Shelmn's niolher 
and father wenl to make peace 
with his mernory, arranging a 
funeral scivicc at tlie cemetery 
at Solola. where diey IvttI hired 
a local ctxilractnr in huikl a 
laroc but simple moruiiiem set 
wiUi oaUve aonci and flanked 
by fonrrcte bencties. *lhe moli- 
umciit ovedookj Lake Alittto, 
oflen called tlie jcwd ofCciural 
America. But these western 
highlands of Cuaiciiiala have 
been— and still are— the teem- 
of gruetnine murdcn. rotting 
corpses and quici fuiicraU. 

Tlie ceremony at this niialii- 
menl, raised in riicniory of hotli 
Jack and Guatemala's other 
disappeared, m6 a iwnarkablf 
ptoc«e<ling Cuaieniaki s liarri- 
ly leady for a public admis.wiii 
of govemmeni murder, cri- 
lalnly not one cast in stone It 
was. Ainetii^ Waldi represen- 
tative Ann Klanud said later. » 
tlKHigli son^onc had raised a 
"pubUc tncniorial to Nari vW- 
tin» while the Third Reich wa.'> 
still in power." 

Noting that they wrir Hand- 
le above the hrxto ol dcaili- 
squad vitlirns, one of tlie 
mourners ulked about the 
"cursed beauty" ul CaaniBla 
Then Brabecks l2-yejr-ok1 
daughter, Kalina, read a \x-dyn 
ilK llaU written. "LXs«- Cj^' 
she said, 'plcxse blcvs liv. 
Shriioiij. llsiiik you lot wvav 
them courage and sirengib 
Katilly. hdp ('.uBicnailii. Hetji 
Ouaiemala to be at peace " 

A large marble tabtei Bt» 
atop the monunna |ack a«+ 
(nn's epitapii. wrincn by ht 
fwitily. is inscribed then* B' 
Spankih: 

<ial 
AnttotJuwwmury^ikt 

Wis J 




Ucmi„jDry\ 



mgntanJ 
Nuimtrr22. IV}3— 



ix» *NC<u* nstaa luiCAiiNih Kmmns, iiai 



117 



^riie Nation. 



n FUTH AVENUE 
NEWYORK-N.Y. 10011 



FAX Transmission Cover Sheet 



DATE; 

TO: 

OF: 

FAX: '2-''^ 2-2.M C=F^7. 



TELEPHONE: 



FROM: Jt/WOxu^ TL ^ 

of THE NATION magazine 

TELEPHONE: (212)242-8400 y 'Z-C- 

PAX: (212)463-9712/Editarial 

(212) 67S-3499/BiuiDeu 

Number of Page* INCLUDING this cover sheet: 



?f-4 



L 



J 



.n^iioOrVvJiil Following la Allan Nairn's Nation article, published 

today, diacloeing further detaiTo about U.S. 

intelligence participation In the Guatemalan mili- 
tary's terror activities. 

Ws think it ohould be of interest to Committee members 
and staff in light of next week's hearings on the 
issue- 

Please feel free to call with any questions. 

Sincerely, 



Jonathan Taylor 
Publicity Director 



118 



ml BWI^mmwmFmm^ convnunications ik. 

eont«:tiD«v/ldUmw / KathyEngBi 1*1212 260 5000 Swrti^'***^ 



forvymaom: ffll TWmjATl ITTimffl 



TBI WATIQN MAaXZmB RgVlALB PBAimfTG M»r Tsm^jggSMJSL 
CIA ROLM m (ltnTW«T.>W PEXTW HQOMi ACTIVCTY 

Xoport Saaas US Zntalllgane* Op«r*tiv«« Mm 

8«Ip«d Tr*ia. Aidvifl* mnd Xra lilt* au«t«m»Ivi Kllliaa Ctalti UOr* 

OuatMulux Official* on CXA Payroll Llakad To KUllsa* 

X«w York. Karoh 31, l»»l - In the wakn o£ official acknowladgmant: 
oi; • CIA aaseta involvemenC in the killing of an Anerlean eitlsen 
and a fomer Ouatamalan rebal leader stunning naw ravalatlona about 
llnka batwaaa XJS Intalllaonoa oparativas and quatawalan death 
•quadfl are revealad in the April 17th iaeue of the MATZOM Magazine, 
publlahed today. In a series of In-dqpth interviews with U8 and 
Ouatemalon intelligenea operatives aa well as three past Quatemalan 
h«ada of state, award- wlontag MATXOtr contributor ^l«n imini 
datalls tha cia's role in directing and advising the notorious 
Guatemalan 0-2 and its aCflliatSi tha Arohlvo. 

Based on hia Inveatlgacions Nairn raveals the following i 

* Merth Aaeriean latelllgeciae operatives •- two of «hon are 
aamed •- Xandy Capistar and Je« Jaearlae worked who 

out of tha vs aabassy helped to train, advise* aae and e^uip 
the a-) Ouetenalas Anv infcalllgeace unit. 

* The artlele identifies three r«esnt 0-2 directors who were 
paid by the V8i Oe&eral Bdgar Oodoy Saltan, linked to the 
assasalnatiea of a fasous Ouataaalan anthropologiaty Oenersl 
Otto Perea Molina, whose aea were ixsgplioated la the aurder of 
a judge; and Col. Vraaolaeo Ortega Xanaldo who headed the 0-3 
during a series of assaaalnatlons of students, peasants and 
huaaa rights aotlvists. Ortega Kastalde is earr«atXy based in 
Washington, O.C. at the v«itagaa-haofc»d Xater-Aasrlean Defense 
Board 



KMV Olftl • DavM Unwr^lM tta wMay « Kwr YMk-Mw Vmk lOOia . iMptmi* m MO tOOO, Fix 21 S 940 S1«1 



119 



• remsT Ouattaalan D*£*it«« Nlnisttir and ourraat praglda&t«l 
a«ndld«t« l*cter Oraakjo, r«s and »up«nrls«d 0-2 «b«tt •zaiy 
•V«ata kida«pp«4/ rap*d and tortar*d ApMrlean «im Dluma Ortls 
durlntf • ••xi«B e£ •■cuiainatlon.a of ■tad«Bt«« p««Mnta, axtd 
human vlghta aotiriata. •• va* alao on th« payroll of fcha CXX* 

• VoxBar Arohlye CUaf, Qanaral Bobarta Matta Oalvacr '•'bo 
oosnaadad aMataoraa ta tha 11 Quioha dapasaaati «aa alao cm 
tlia payroll oC tha CXK. 

• Thraa fermar OuataaaXaa baada ot acata paint a conalatant 
piatuTM of CUk ralatlona with 0-3. Oaear Ivaibareo Kajla 
Vletovaa told iralxn of tba OXA rola la £oiindisa tha daath 
aqoada and la i^prenrtao aaaaaoraa and oasrylna ovt 
aaaaaainationa. rermav Praaidanfei Bfxain mioa lioatt and 
ol-riliaa vraaidaat Vlniole Caxaao dlaouaaad i:ha praaa&oa of 
tha CZX ia 0-a. 

• la a Marah asth iatarvlaw with M&lra, Col. Japiraa apeka at 
langth en tha eleaa aoopaaatlpn and aaalatanea taa OIX gava O- 
a laeludina training, advioa, pelltioal atratagy/ and 
taehaical aaalatanoa. 

• Zadapaadaatly Vaim haa dlaaovarad that 0-a tfaa paid and 
■raparvlaad la tha If 10' a by cix atatloa ehlaf, JAofc xaCavitt 
and that tba taobnleal aaalafeaaoa allndad to fay Alplres 
inoludad eooputar and ecaaninlaationa aqoipBoat, apooial 
waapoaa and tha axtanaWa uaa q£ CIX ballooptara. 

Award-winning joumaliac Allan ITaim, haa wrlttan axtanelvaly 

en Quatamala and ice military since 1980. Laat fall in tha Nation 

ha broka the etory on U.S. intallisrenoe oolloboratlon with Haiti's 

FRAPK. For inberviaws and furthar information and interviews with 

Nairn pleaaa contact David Lamer at Klptida Comrainications , Xno. 

or Jonathan Taylor at the Nation Magazine, (312) 342-8400 or (212) 

343-8130 

-30- 



120 



April 17.1995 



Tbe NatJoQ since 3865. 



CONTENTS. 



Volume 260, Number IS 



EXCHANGE 

510 O*orf Kountowis 

MlcMangdo Slgnorik, Greg ScoU 

Qabriti RoltOo, Lawmtu D. Mast, MIX 

Jay Blotcher, David L Kirp 

EDrrORlALS 

S09 RaUytni to Education 

311 C.LA. Death Squad Allan Naim 

513 Silent Radun Valtrit Burgher 

514- CllBtonACa:CaIlloftbeWUd DavUCcm 



ARTICLES 

517 PDhtic] for Profit: 

Tlie Rich Rite of Lamar Aioander Doug Inland 
522 Mrs. Contempladon's Sliten: 

Tlie Philippines' Shameful Export Ninolchka Rosea 
327 The Vforld lUnu Away: 

Who Caia Who's Killing Chechnya? Anna Cataktt 



COLUMNS 
314 The Bigs 
515 Beat the Devil 



Calvin THJiin 
Alaxandtr Cockburn 



BOOKS & THE ARTS 
531 The Sound and the Fuiet 
S34 Blacic Dance: Revdaiioas 

539 Music Note 

540 First Formal (poem) 

lUnstnUions by Paul Maicus 



Daniel Singer 

Lynn Oamjbia 

OeneSanlon 

Sharon Oldt 



EdUot, Katrfau vudcs Hcuvtl 

ExKalivtBdtar, Wdari I Ininnin; AaoclanEdiien,iM»ftiBia,ttiia 
ShVliei Kfldh L. StftTi tOn^filiiarr, ElM Dbda Alt WlulOTr, A«lr7 
£tf «ar. Once SdtVLkauE Mtufftt Aflnr. JoAai «)rpiievitt Copit CM, 
IsoM Cnv, Coiv UUtt, Addi \jm^ Aatttam Copf tUtaf, BDOy 
Ooidac itsMo/ *> A» Sflnr. tkuli Sdw: ilianc, M*ni Ab - 
Bo«r, ladaBia nscau. aMBoe neb. Lawmicc 1j<1 Erie ^ 
UanSbeq. 

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EDITORIALS. 



GLA. Death Squad 

The VS. govenimeni hai systematic links to Ouate- 
raelan Army death squad opetalions that (o far 
boned the dliclosures thai have lecenily jhaksi of- 
ficial Wksblngion. The news that the CIA. em- 
ployed a Quatenialan colonel who repoitedly ordered two 
murders has been greeted with profesiloni of sbodc and oat- 
rage. But in fact the story goes much deeper, as UJS. offidais 
well know. 

North American C.I. A. operatives work inside a Ouaiema- 
lan Army unit that iruintainf a network of torture noters and 
has kfiled thousands of Ouatemalan civilians. The G-2, bead- 
quanered on the fourth floor of the Ouateinalan National 
Palace, has, snce at least the I9fi0s, been advised, tiained. 



aimed and equipped by U.S. ondercover agents. Working out 
of the U.S. Embassy and Uviflg in saiebouses and hotels, these 
agents work through an elite group of Guatemalan ofTioen 
who are secretly paid by the CI A. and who have been implicat- 
ed personally in numerous pohtkal crimes and assassinatioos. 

This seciet G-2/C.LA. collaboration has been described by 
Guatemalan and U.S. operatives and confirmed, in various 
aspects, by three former Guatemalan heads of state. These 
accounts also mesh with that given In a March 28 interview 
by CoL Julio Roberto Alptrez. the C.lA.-paid Guatemalan 
G-2 officer who has been im|)licated in the muiden of Gua- 
temalan guerrilla lader Efialn Bimaca VeUsquei and a U.S. 
dtlMn, Michael DeVlae. 

One of the American agents who works with the G-2, a thin 
blond man in his 40s who goes by the name of Randy Capistei, i 
has been involved in limilaT operations wbh the army of 



121 



312 



The Nation. 



April 17, 1995 



ndghboiing El Salvador. Another, a weaponi enpen known 
M Joe Jacarino. hat openled ihrougbout (he Caribbean, ami 
has accompanied G-2 uniu on miuiODs Into niral zones. 

Jacarino't presence in the embeuy was conflmed by David 
Wright, a former embassy intelligence employee who called 
Jacarino a "military liaison." Col. George Hooker, the V£. 
Defense Intelligeoce Agency chief in Ouatemtla from 198S 
to 1989, says he also knew Jacarino, though heaays Jacarino 
waa not with the D.I.A. When asked whether Jacarino was 
with the C.I.A. he replied, "I'm not at litierty to say." 

CeleriDO Castillo, a former agent for the Dnig Enforcemem 
AdniniitralioD who dealt with the G-2 and the CXA. In Gua- 
lonala, ttys he vrorked with Caplster as weD as with Jacaiina 
He showed photographs of himself and Capister at cmbauy 
evoua and hi the Tieid. Ouaiemalan sounds cay Capisur meett 
regularly with Guatemalan Army chiefs. He has beea seen in 
meetings in Coaiemala City as recently as the spring of 1994. 

When I reached Colonel Alpfrez at the La Aurora base in 
Guatemala, he denied an involvement in the deaths of BAaa- 
c« and D^ine and said he was never paid by the C.I.A. Bnt 
be db ci issed at length how the agency advises and helps nm 
the 0-2. He praised the CIA. for "professionalism" and 
dose rapport with Guatemalan onieers. He said that agency 
operatrve: often come to Guatemala on temporary duty, dur- 
ing which thty train G-2 men and pnjvide "adviw and tech- 



STRONGMAN ON CAMPUS 

Ci«dh Democntlc Representative Robert 1brTic«Ui 
for aisckeing the latest CIA. horror story: An 
American hotelier and a Ouatemalaa rebel leadetinar- 
ried to a£ Atnaiian were ecectited on the orden of a 
paid asset of the ageitcy. \b in his letter to the White 
House deoyfaig the C.LA., Torrieelli ovnlookai a key 
aspect of the q>i8ode— the tsurtleroiu cdond, Julio Ro- 
berto Alpiiez, was twice a student ai the US. Aim/s 
School of the Americas. There ia good reason for the 
CoQgietsman to be forgetful on tliis point. In Septem- 
bo- 1993 , wboi Rcpresentabve Joseph Kennedy 2d pro- 
posed an amendment to defund the SX3A., Torrieeili, 
then chairman of the Western HeDu^heresubcommii- 
tee, was a prime onMnem of the measure Kennedy 
argued that the school too often had trained thugs, ith 
eluding the head of an Argentine Jimta, an organizer 
of SalvBdoran death acguadi and Mamul Noriega. But 
IbmceUl hailed the institntion and actnally profened 
a Guatemalan ofTicer as a good eumple: This promi- 
nent alnmaus of the Khool had declined to join a coi^) 
hi Guatemala earlier In the yeat Torrieelli did not meo- 
tioB that the three offlcei« most Identified with that 
coup had also prepped at the School of the Americas. 
Coiudder tUs, Congnascian: Six months after Alplrez 
finished hia aecood stint at the school — whl:± includ- 
ed sevoal houn of tiaining in huaon rights— tiiis 
CJ A. and SjDA. man in Guatemala reportedly had an 
American Idlled. David Corn 



oical assistance" He described attending C.LA. sessions at 
G-2 bases on "contta-subversion" tactics and "how to man- 
age the factors of power" to " fortify democracy." He said the 
C.I.A. men were on call to respond to 0-2 que3dons,.and that 
the 0-2 often consulted the agency on how to deal with "po- 
litical problems." Alpiiez said he was not authorized to give 
specifics on tlie technical assistance, nor would he name the 
North Americans the G-2 worked with, though he said they 
were "very good friends." 

Other officials, though, say that at least during the mid- 
1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack McCavitt, then CJA. 
station chief, and that the "technical assistance" Indndea 
comsuinicaaons gear; computers and spetaal firearms, as wen 
as collaborative use of C.lA.-owned helicopters that are 
flown out of the Piper hangar at the La Aurora dvihan air- 
port and from a separate U.S. air facility. 

Through what Amnesty International has called "a gov- 
eniment program of political muidec" the Guatemalan Army 
has. since 197J. killed more than 110,000 civilians. The 0-2 
and a smallo, affiliated unit called ttK Aichivo have long been 
openly known in Guatemala as the brain of the terns' tote. 
With a contingem of more than 2,000 agents and with sub- 
units in the local army bases, the G-2— under orders of the 
army high commaixl — coordinates the uxture, assaasinailOQ 
and ditiu>peaiance of disiidents. 

"If the G-2 wants to kill you, they kill you," former atmy 
Chief of Staff Gen. Benedicto Lucas Oaida once said. "TlKy 
send one of their trucks with a bit squad and that 'I it." Cur- 
rent and former C-2 agents desciibe a piogiam of stuvciDinoB 
backed by a web of torture cemen and dandesdiM body 
dumps. In 198£, then-anny Oiief of Stiff Gen. Hictor Ora- 
majo Morales, a VS piatift, said that the G-2 malntafaii fUei 
on and watches "anyone who Is an opponoit of the Guate- 
malan state in any realm." A former Gb-2 agent says tliat the 
base he worked at in Huefaactenango maintained Its own cie- 
matorium aod "pcocesaod" abduaees by chopping off limbs, 
singeing flesh and administering electric shocks. 

At lea^t three of the recent G-2 cUefi have been paid by the 
CI.A., accoiding to US. and Guatemalan intelligence souicea. 
One of them. Gen. Edgar Godoy Galtin, a farmer army Chief 
of Staff, has been accused in court by the vkaim's family of 
being one of the prime "intellectual authors" of the 1990 
murder of the noted Ouatanalan anthropologist Mynia Mack 
Chang [see Victor Peroa, " Wbeie Is Justice in GiattemaU?" 
May 24, 1993). Another, CoL Ouo Perez Molina, who now 
runs the Presidential General Staff and ovenees the ArcUvo, 
was in charge hi 1994, when, according to the Archbishop's 
human rights office, there ivas evidence of General Staff ic- 
voivemeu in tlie assassination of Jutige Edgar Ramiro Bias 
Ogaldez. The ihiid. Gen. Francisco Ortega Menoido, who 
now works in Vi^hinflon as general staff director at the Pen- 
ugoo-backed Inier-Anerican Defense Board, was G-2 chief 
in the late 1980s during a series of assassinaiions of students, 
fieasantt and human righu aetivisu. Reached at his hotne In 
Florida, Jack McCavin said he does not talk to journalists. 
Whoi asked whether Ortega Menaldo was on the CIA, pay. 
roll, be shouted "Enoughl" and slammed down the phone. 



122 



April 17. ms 



TbeNiatkn. 



TtMK crimei are merely eomplei or a vin, syncnadc p«t- 
tern; UkEwlK; these BMS are Mily cop In a large U^ govern' 
ment appiiatni. CoIomI Hooker, the fonna- Dtl jV chief for 
Ouateaalo, toys, "It would b« in Mttbarraismg tituatioa if 
you evg had aroU can of everybody in the ChiafrmalmAniiy 
who wer ooOected a CIA. {wycbecfc." Hooker ays the agency 
payroll it 10 large that it encompases most of the anDy** top 
dedsiao-oukcn. WhcD I told him that bb (Hcsd, Ces. Mario 
Eoiitpiez Morale*, the current DeCoise Miioster, had reaaed 
to the Alpirez scandal by laying pubUdy that it wai "dbloyal" 
and 'Shameful" for officer) to take CIA. money, Hooker 
burit out laughing and egdalmed: "OoodI Good anivvi; 
MaiioH'd haie to think how maoy guyi wot on that pqtoU. 
It'i a perfectly normal thing." 

Other top commandet* paid by the C LA. iodude OcD. Ro- 
berto MattaOaKez, former army Chief of Staff, head of the 
Presidential General Staff and commander of massacres in 
the EI Qmcfa^ departinem: and General Gramai o. Defense 
Minister during tlM aimed forces' abduction, rape and torture 
of Diaona Oitiz, an American nun. (Si ster Ortli has test ified 
that a man the believes to be North American seemtd j p be 
the TOgviaof of the ay n'f »*? i!?^"^t<1 ***• c^'«nt^*aiA 
sheliMtasiainedheT 111 bum woimds during a 'Oesbian love 
tty»t.'*)OiaBnjo ahonwnagwi the early 1960i highland mat- 
tacfcs. Colottd Hooker sayi h« ooce bronght Giami^ 00 a 
ten-day toor of the United States to speak at VS. onlitary > 
bases and eoofcr vlth the US. Army Chief of Staff. 

Three recent Ouaicmabn heads of state confirm that the 
CIA. works doiely with the G-2. Last year, when I asked 
O m. Oscar Hnmberto Mgia Vfctores (military dictator from 
1^ to 1966) how the country's death squads had origina ed, 
» 1ie saki they had been started "in the IWh ttt ihftCXA.^'Oen. 
iiuamKloiMoatt(<llctaior from ]9€2 to 1983 and the ouneni 
Coogiess Piesideat), who ordered the main biebland massa- 
aea (6fi2 villages dettroyvd, by the army's owrt coum), said 
tlK CI A. <8d have agents inside the 0-2. When I asked Rios 
Montt— a fl^ believer hi the death penatty— if he thought 
ht should be aiwaittrt for his role in the ilaugfaier be leapt 
to his feet and shoottd "Yeil Tty mel Put me againsi the 
walll" but he said he should be tried only If Americans woe 
trted too. Spedflcally, he died President Reagan, who, in the 
midst of the massacres, embiaoed iUos Moott and said be vias 
getting "^ bum r^oo human tights. Vnado Certao Ar^valo, 
dvili an Presideot from 19** "? 1??) (""il**^ whom the rate of 
killing actually increased), said "theCIA. often eootiacts 
with our milttary and G-2 people," and that ftom what he 
knew they "very probably" had people inside "who have par- 
tidpatcd with our 0-2 in technical aul«t«Tii-.» and advice" 

These C.I.A. opetatioos are^ of course, pan of the larger 
US. policy. The Buth and Clinton State Deportments, for 
example. In the midst of ■ mudt-toated "cutofT' of miliiary 
aid to Ouatemala after 1990, a uthorized — accordin g to 
da gtfkd State Department records— oMfe than 114 tepai ate 
sai o of U.5. pistou and rtlTea . . 

The kilfing of defenaeless people has been state policy in 
Ouatemala (or thirty jcan. The question Is not whriher the 
VS govamment has known— it Is obviously awaie of hs own 



actions. It is why, with overt and covert aid, it has bdped 
commit the army's murden. Allan Kairn 

Allan Nairn has written txwulvely on Ouatemala and ia 
military ana 1980. Last fall In The Nadon he broke the Story 
(4 VS. inielUgtrKt coUaborntion with Haiti's FRAPH 

SUent Racism 

ID Fdiruary student activists at Rutgers University gave 
America their own version of a comparative history 
Iojod: Racism Then and Now. In protesting a racist 
statement by university president Frands Lawitnca, the 
United Students Coalition at Rutgers brought the difficulties 
of avU rights activism in the I990i to the national stage: 
Rutgers students woe seriously laddng in boaography: They 
had DO visual representation of their oppresskin— no fire 
hoses, police dogs or billy clubs— for tbe front pages and 
nightly news. The Rutgen coalition had only Lawrence's in- 
fbunmaiory words — be called Afhcan-Americans a disadvan- 
taged population because of their genetic and hereditary 
background. Since mstitutional racism is not easily photo- 
graphed, tbe difficulty for activists whose causes are lacc- 
based becomes how to combat the "nuaspolzn" word. 

Otis RoOey. one of the heads of the student coalition's pub- 
he relations committee; used tbe fanaget of protests past to 
guide the coalitkm. although he was fully aware that times 
have dianged. Before embarking on the campaign against 
Lawrence, RoUey and other students referred to Rkfaard Mi> 
Cormidc's The Black Student Protest Mmement at Rutters, 
an account of campus activism a generation ago. The stu- 
dents' knowledge of this history and their understanding of 
past tactics helped them turn what could have tieea a passing 
murmur into a roll-scale movemeot. But the comparison re- 
vealed the differences between the adivism of yesterday and 
today. "Ba£k then tbetv was such blatant tadsm: 'Vbu're black 
and I don't want you at school,' " RoUeyieflects. "Nowevery- 
ttnng is so much mote covert that when you cry out, people 
say, 'What are you talking about? It's a great school, kid.' " 
But at universities Hke Rutgen, young people of cok3T con- 
tinue to face shrouded but sipilficam ittcisin— the su^idous 
glance, the continual requests for identification not made of 
wliite students, the assumptions of (kvtnitisffl due to quotas. 
Only rarely cb woids sur&ce as a blunt reminder that the play- 
ing field ii still slaiued Around the Rutgers campus, RoUey 
says, "some people ycQ 'nigga' from a car but they don't stick 
around. The artaclcs are always cowardly." 

As cowardly, perhaps, as Lawrence's attempts to hide be- 
hind his "good" record on race relations. In the 19S0t Rnt- 
gers failed to meet the most basic afTuroaiivc acdoa goals for 
the cniolbnem of minority students. In response, the Rutgers 
Board of Governors aeated a MltKrity Community Leaden 
Advisory Board. LawretKC disbanded the board as soon as 
minimum minority enrollment levels were met. And despite 
the media's focus on Lavnenca, tbe nudents' demands go far 
be^nd removing hire as president— to nothing less than a de- 
mand for full liqual oppommity, inchidbig minority tenure 



123 

Senator Cohen. Second, I would like to say to the acting director, 
number one, I know a number of people have called for the aboli- 
tion of the CIA. I am not one of them. I think we need a strong 
CIA, and I've been a very strong supporter of maintaining the very 
highest level of capability within the Agency itself. And as Senator 
Shelby has indicated, the Agency has some of the brightest people 
in this country and the most dedicated and hard working. In fact, 
as I look around the room, without getting too specific since I can't 
identify any of them, as I look around the room I recognize many 
faces in the audience today that I work closely with, this Commit- 
tee works closely with, and they are truly dedicated public serv- 
ants. And I would not want the message to go forth that they are 
in any way acting in contrast to the interests of this country or the 
principles that we adhere to. 

I also want to point out that you have been an outstanding naval 
officer, you've been an outstanding director of NSA, and I would 
say outstanding acting director of the CIA. Much of what I have 
raised did not happen on your watch. As a matter of fact, I was 
surprised to learn that you were apprised only this morning of an 
area of interest to me, namely, a report that is required to be sub- 
mitted on a semi-annual basis concerning human rights. In no way 
can you really be required to know each and every report that is 
issued, particularly since all of this occurred prior to your serving 
as acting director. So I wanted to make this very clear that this 
in no way was — my comments were directed toward you. 

My concern has been that in the past we used to have a mental- 
ity that if you asked the wrong question of the Agency you never 
got the right answer. If you asked the right question you got only 
half the right answer. That changed under Bill Webster, it changed 
under Bob Gates, and it has changed under you. But nonetheless, 
there are still some — and I suspect that those who were responsible 
for the report given to this Committee are no longer with the Agen- 
cy, in terms of the language that was supplied and the answers 
that were supplied to the Committee are no longer with the Agen- 
cy. That, too, is somewhat regrettable. We'd like to have them be- 
fore the Committee to examine them. To come back to the point 
that I think it's important that we take down any wall of distrust 
that may be erected between the Agency or State Department, any 
of our agencies and Congress itself. If that wall of distrust is al- 
lowed to remain in any form, then we're going to have conflict in 
the future, you're going to have more calls for the dismantling of 
the Agency. And that's not going to serve the overall interests of 
this country. So I wanted to make it clear that none of my com- 
ments were directed to you. I suspect that you are only familiariz- 
ing yourself in recent days and hours with much of the information 
that's been furnished to this Committee. So I wanted to make that 
clear to both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. I do want to 
reiterate, however, that I believe that the information furnished to 
this Committee was misleading. Whether you call it misleading, 
leading to the deception — deliberate deception or inadvertent, it 
nonetheless diverted this Committee from pursuing its responsibil- 
ities. And that cannot be allowed to continue in the future. 

So Mr. Chairman, I will not pursue the questions I want to ask. 
I'll save them for the closed session, and once again reiterate the 



124 

problem that we have here by going from pubUc to closed informa- 
tion that is stated openly and then perhaps clarified in classified 
sessions. It's going to present a somewhat fragmented and perhaps 
even ultimately misleading picture to the American people. But 
nonetheless I wanted to clarify the issue with respect to Admiral 
Studeman. He has been an outstanding public servant. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Cohen. 

I think you have well stated the importance of the CIA and the 
fact that there are many hard-working competent men and women 
working in the CIA performing a very, very vital function. And 
Senator Cohen accurately characterized your contribution. Admiral 
Studeman, in your career generally and as acting director of the 
CIA. 

We will be looking at the deaths of the Americans in Guatemala, 
including those of Nick Blake and Griffin Davis, and I believe we 
have in the hearing room today Randy Blake and Sam Blake, the 
brothers of Nick Blake, and I wanted to recognize them and to give 
them the formal assurance that there will be inquiries made into 
that matter as well. 

It is now 1 o'clock, and we will recess these hearings to recon- 
vene at 2 p.m. 

Thank you. 

[Thereupon, at 1 p.m., the Committee stood in recess, to recon- 
vene at 2 p.m. that same day.] 



AFTERNOON SESSION 

[2:08 P.M.] 

Chairman Specter. The hearing will resume, ladies and gentle- 
men, and we will — we now have with us Mrs. DeVine, Ms. Harbury 
and Colonel Cornell. And at the outset, may I say to Mrs. DeVine 
and Ms. Harbury, on behalf of the Committee, really the Senate, 
and beyond that, how deeply troubled we all are with what has 
happened here, with the murder of Mr. Michael DeVine and the 
murder of Commander Efrain Bamaca and how we are determined 
to get to the bottom of it. 

Today's hearing is just the beginning in terms of what this Com- 
mittee will be doing, and there are many investigations which have 
already been announced. And it was the sense of the Committee 
that we should not wait but should proceed at an early moment 
and that what you have to say, Mrs. DeVine, and what you have 
to say, Ms. Harbury, ought to be said officially and on the record. 
There has already been enormous publicity, and you Ms. Harbury 
have been interviewed very, very extensively, but we thought that 
it ought to be a matter that the Committee would show its official 
response to. 

And regrettably we cannot, could not this morning as you saw, 
go into all aspects of all questions as we would have liked to. And 
there's never total agreement among any group of Senators as to 
exactly how to proceed and there was some sentiment, as you 
heard, that we might have been better advised not to have a public 
hearing, and our conclusion was that we should have done it, and 
I think we did have much important evidence come out this morn- 
ing. Already a concession from the acting director of CIA, Admiral 
Studeman, about errors that the CIA acknowledges in not giving 
timely notice to this Committee. And we've already had beginning 
testimony from the Department of Justice, characterizing a four- 
month lag as appropriate, which you heard one Senator, Senator 
DeWine, comment about. Senator DeWine's an ex-prosecuting at- 
torney, as am I, as is Senator Cohen. And that kind of a time lag 
on a matter of this sensitivity ought not to be tolerated. 

So we've already had a substantial amount to say by way of criti- 
cal comment, which needs to be understood. And of course it has 
to be understood in the broader context of our need for intelligence 
gathering and our effort to try to provide leadership and try to pro- 
vide new direction for the Central Intelligence Agency, which is an 
ongoing matter. We have a new nominee where we'll be having 
hearings immediately after the recess. But we felt it important to 
proceed at this time. 

And as soon as we finish this session we're going to be going into 
closed session with Admiral Studeman, and you can be sure that 
he'll have some very, very tough questioning in closed session. And 

(125) 



126 

in order to protect sources and methods and make sure we don't 
impinge upon important intelligence-gathering operations, we sim- 
ply could not do that in open session. But you ought to understand 
fully and explicitly that our decision not to proceed in open session 
does not reflect in any way on our determination to ask the tough 
questions and to get the answers and to get to the bottom of it. 

So with that brief preliminary, let us turn to you, Mrs. Carol 
DeVine, and again, on behalf of the Committee and the Senate, 
really the Congress and beyond, we express our sjrmpathy and we'll 
do everything we can to see that justice is done here. 

Senator Kerrey, would you like to make an additional comment? 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Just briefly. There was a great deal of 
interest in the first panel and for obvious reasons; I mean, there 
was an expectation of fireworks and so forth. And I will say to you 
that, for my part, my standpoint, this panel could be an awful lot 
more important. As was noted earlier, some of us set policy and 
some of us carry out policy. The four of us here are in the business 
of setting policy, trying to figure out, you know, specifically, what 
should our policy be in Guatemala, what should we be doing. 

And I note with considerable interest that in this panel we have, 
in you, Mrs. DeVine, an individual who despite the tragedy contin- 
ues to live in Guatemala, and there must be a reason for that. And 
you must have ideas on what can be done to end this cycle of terror 
and violence that has caused Guatemala such suffering. 

And in you. Colonel Cornell, we've got someone who's spent a lot 
of time on the ground, who understands the military, I presume, 
understands what's going on in the country, and perhaps as well 
can give us some clues on what we should do from this moment for- 
ward. 

And Ms. Harbury has experience with enough, it seems to me, 
that perhaps she can give us some clues on what we need to do to 
achieve reconciliation and peace in this country. 

So, I appreciate very much, in spite of the difficulty, your coming 
before this Committee, and I look forward to hearing your testi- 
mony and asking some questions that might help me, one policy- 
maker, decide what this nation ought to be doing, both in and for 
Guatemala. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Senator Kerrey. 

And Mrs. DeVine, we look forward to your testimony. You may 
proceed. 

STATEMENT OF CAROLE ANN DEVINE 

Mrs. DeVine. Thank you. My name is Carole Ann DeVine. I am 
the widow of Michael Vernon DeVine. I am a permanent resident 
in the rain forest of Poptun, Peten, Republic of Guatemala in 
Central America. I have been asked by the Committee to come here 
and bear witness to facts surrounding the death of my husband. 

Let me say, at the outset, I am not an orator, I am not a public 
speaker or a public person. I am not a student of the CIA or intel- 
ligence agencies. I am not familiar with sources or methods. But 
it is important that this Committee hear what I have to say. 

Twenty-four years ago my husband and I emigrated to Guate- 
mala, where we began a farm called Ixobel. As the years went by, 
we developed part of it as a campground and a guest house. Over 



127 

the years many people have come and visited us and we have 
friends around the world. My husband and I loved Guatemala from 
the very first. We were very grateful to the people and government 
of Guatemala for giving us the opportunity to live and work and 
raise our children in that beautiful country. And I today continue 
to be grateful. 

Concerning the death of my husband, I can tell you that on June 
8, 1990, Michael and I started a very normal day at our farm. That 
morning I went to our small cafeteria in the town of Poptun to at- 
tend to business. Michael was taking care of some minor repairs 
on our gas stove at the farm, and late in the morning he went into 
town on his bicycle to get a part. He stopped by the cafeteria 
around 1 p.m. and we had lunch together. Just before 3 p.m. Mi- 
chael was preparing to return to the farm and I asked him to take 
the van back home with some of the supplies that we needed on 
the farm and that I would bring his bicycle in our pickup truck. 
Michael kissed me goodbye and left. That was the last time I ever 
saw him alive. 

I now know that Michael was intercepted on his way back to the 
farm, just after turning off the main road onto the farm road. He 
was abducted by armed men using a white Toyota stout pick-up 
truck and subsequently taken to a place called Montana Rusa lo- 
cated less than a mile and a half from the farm entrance. 

Based upon the facts discovered during the investigation and 
subsequent trial, we know that Michael was murdered with a ma- 
chete that his murderers used to nearly decapitate him. We do not, 
however, to this date know why my husband was executed, nor do 
we know who caused his death. 

Michael was a gentle, kind, clean-living, nature-loving, law-abid- 
ing man. He was a good father to our two adopted children. He was 
a responsible and well-liked member of the Poptun community. To 
my knowledge, he had no enemies — his death is inexplicable. I was 
proud to be his wife and continue to be proud of his memory. Mi- 
chael DeVine did not deserve to die. 

For the past five years I have devoted my life to try to determine 
why this good man died. I sponsored an investigation into the 
crime and used all legal processes available to me in Guatemala. 
I hired a private investigator as well as an attorney in an attempt 
to prosecute my husband's assassins. This effort met with a meas- 
ure of success when in September 1992 six soldiers were convicted 
for the murder of my husband. In September — no, excuse me, in 
March 1993, a captain of the Guatemalan army was also convicted. 
Each of the six soldiers were sentenced to 30 years in prison. Two 
of the soldiers were implicated but never brought to trial, even 
though there are outstanding arrest warrants against them. Even 
this limited success represents a significant milestone for justice in 
Guatemala. For the first time in Guatemalan history, an officer of 
the Guatemalan military was convicted in a human rights case. 
The captain was sentenced to 20 years. But it was a limited suc- 
cess because he was permitted to escape as he was being held in 
a military installation. Rumors abound concerning his where- 
abouts. What is certain, though, is that he is not in prison. He has 
not served any penalty for having killed my husband. There is no 
effort by the Guatemalan government to apprehend him. It would 



128 

be unfair of me not to mention the fact that the military tribunal 
that saw the case did, in fact, convict seven of the people who were 
involved in the death of my husband, all of whom were members 
of the army. To those members of the military-judicial system who 
had the courage to see this case through, I must express my admi- 
ration and respect. It is important for this Committee to keep in 
mind that there are people in Guatemala who want badly to see 
justice take root in their country and have been willing to risk and 
suffer a great deal in order to make that a reality. 

The history of this case is proof of the risk inherent in the pur- 
suit of justice. Let me give you a few examples. My lawyer was run 
off the road and nearly killed three days prior to trial. Witnesses 
were regularly threatened. Relatives of witnesses were killed. And 
evidence was manipulated. The embassy's reports and the public 
record of the trial make clear that enormous irregularities occurred 
in connection with the judicial proceedings in Guatemala. 

I also wish to express my profound appreciation for all the in- 
valuable support, both moral and beyond, that we received from 
the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, under the most able leadership of 
former Ambassador Thomas Stroock as well as the former consul 
general Sue Patterson, Colonel Al Cornell, and the rest of the staff 
that was in the country at the time of my husband's death. That 
same level of support continues today under Ambassador Marilyn 
McAfee and consul general Charles Keil — a fact for which I am 
most grateful. 

Obviously, my deepest sense of gratitude and respect also goes 
out to the legal and investigative team that worked tirelessly, and 
very especially to those wonderful Guatemalan citizens who, not- 
withstanding the obvious dangers they had to face, served as truth- 
ful witnesses. 

Why am I here today? Due to recent news accounts, I have been 
made aware of allegations concerning the possible involvement of 
the Central Intelligence Agency and/or a Guatemalan army officer 
who, while on the CIA payroll, may have been involved in the 
death of my husband. I do not know all the facts concerning these 
allegations. But I am certain that the truth has not been fully iden- 
tified. 

When I return to Guatemala, I will as appropriate pursue this 
to the full extent possible under the Guatemalan justice system. 
However, I do not wish to be alone in this pursuit. I want to leave 
here confident that I will continue to have the support of this Com- 
mittee as I try to find the truth of my husband's death in Guate- 
mala. 

There is also the profound issue of the role of the Central Intel- 
ligence Agency. It is for this Committee to investigate and evaluate 
the conduct of the CIA. I hope that this Committee will discharge 
its function and fully follow all inquiries so that the truth emerges. 

I now come to the end of my statement. In doing so, I have a 
deep sense of inadequacy. No person could communicate in the fev/ 
minutes we have here today the depth of my loss or my children's 
loss or the powerful emotions that we feel. Michael was the verj' 
best thing that ever happened to me and I have lost him need- 
lessly. 



129 

Before I stop, though, I want to leave you with a picture of my 
husband. This picture was taken just a few days before he died. I 
do this to remind you that there is a human being who has lost 
his life here. This is not some abstraction or some Committee foot- 
note that you're dealing with. A good man died and the truth must 
be pursued. 

Thank you. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Mrs. DeVine. We un- 
derstand that it is a difficult matter for you to appear here and to 
testify. And when you asked to be able to leave here confident that 
the Committee will support you fully, on behalf of the Committee 
I give you that assurance, that we will support you. Let us turn 
now to Colonel Allen C. Cornell, who was the U.S. defense attache 
in Guatemala from 1989 to 1994 and had important participation 
in these events. And we now invite your testimony. Colonel 
Cornell. 

[The prepared statement of Col. Cornell follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Allen C. Cornell 

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, Committee members, I am 
Al Cornell, a soldier who retired as a colonel from the U.S. Army with 30 years ac- 
tive service. I spent 13 years of my military career in Latin America — nine of those 
as a Defense Attache — with my final assignment being that of Defense and Army 
Attache to Guatemala from September 1989 to January 1994. 

During my 4^2 years in Guatemala, U.S. Government policies toward Guatemala 
can be characterized as revolving around the four "D's": Democracy, Development, 
Drugs, and "Derechos Humanos,' or human rights in Spanish. The issue of human 
rights was clearly foremost in the minds of the three chiefs-of-mission during my 
tenure — Ambassador Tom Stroock from October 1989 to November 1992, Charge 
d'Affaires John Keene from November 1992 to June 1993, and Ambassador Marilyn 
McAfee who has been our Chief-of-Mission from June 1993 to the present. 

It is my belief that human rights was foremost in the minds of every member of 
these three country teams. The feeUng among us was: how could there be continuing 
movement toward democracy and development without a corresponding increase in 
respect for human rights? Thus, human rights always enjoyed the highest priority 
within the U.S. Embassy. 

At this time I would like to provide you with some information and then answer 
any questions you may have. In addition to the Devine case, which you have invited 
me to address, 1 am also willing to discuss the hvunan rights case of Guatemalan 
guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, which I also understand is of interest to 
you. But, my knowledge with regard to this case is rather limited because it arose 
during the closing months of my time in Guatemala. I did, however, attend at least 
three meetings — all of them between Ambassador McAfee and Guatemala's Minister 
of Defense during which information regarding the fate of Mr. Bamaca was sought, 
and our concern expressed over the accusation that the Guatemalan Army might 
be operating clandestine jails. During those meetings, the Minister of Defense 
cleiimed to have no knowledge of Mr. Bamaca's status nor the existence of such hid- 
den detention facilities. 

At this point it would be most useful for me to recall some events related to the 
Devine case during my tenure. 

8 June 1990: Mr. Michael Devine is found murdered near his tourist farm in 
Poptun, Peten Department. 

18 July 1990: Defense Attache and Naval Attache visit the headquarters of the 
Guatemalan Army's military command for the Peten, located in Santa Elena and 
known as Military Zone 23, and also visit the Kaibil (Ranger) training base in 
Poptun. Both commanders, Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan of the military zone and 
then-LTC Julio Alpirez of Poptun, claim no knowledge, characterizing the crime as 
a police matter. 

Aug-Sep 1990: A private investigator hired by Mrs. Carol Devine develops names 
of possible Guatemalan Army suspects. 

Sep 1990: Ambassador Stroock gives these names to Minister of Defense, Greneral 
Bolanos, asking for action, and five enlisted men are detained. The Minister prom- 
ises progress. 



130 

Mid-Dec 1990: Despite continued urging of Guatemalan authorities, no progress 
has been made. Ambassador Stroock recommends to the Department of State that 
a suspension of US military assistance be imposed. 

21 Dec 1990: The Department of State announces the suspension of all materiel 
assistance, to include acquisitions already in the pipeline and cash sales. 

14 Jan 1991: The newly elected Guatemalan president, Jorge Serrano, assumes 
office and appoints a new Minister of Defense and a new Army Chief 

31 Jan 1991: Ambassador Stroock tells President Serrano there can be no resump- 
tion of military aid without progress in human rights, to include the Devine case. 

Feb 1991: The five deteiined Guatemalan enlisted men decide to talk and impli- 
cate another group of enlisted men and an Army captain in Mr. Devine's murder. 
The second group of enlisted men are detained, but the military court decides not 
to detain the Captain, Hugo Contreras. 

7 Aug 1991: Captain Contreras is ordered detained by the appellate court, over- 
turning a military court ruling. 

Mid-Aug 1991: There is still no perceived judicial movement in the Devine case. 
The Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command visits Guatemala and tells 
Minister of Defense General Mendoza that there will be no improvement in the bi- 
lateral military to military relationship until the Devine case is resolved. 

6 Dec 1991: General Mendoza is fired by President Serrano. The President ap- 
points General Jose Garcia Samayoa as Minister of Defense and General Roberto 
Perussina as Army Chief. 

13 Dec 1991: The new Minister of Defense and new Army Chief promise progress 
in the Devine case. 

Mid-Feb 1992: Secretary of Defense Cheney visits Guatemala. He strongly encour- 
ages President Serrano and Generals Garcia and Perussina to resolve the Devine 
case. 

Sep 1992: After much delay the military court finally announces its verdict: a ver- 
dict of guilty for five enlisted men of the second group and a guilty verdict for one 
of the men from the first group, and acquittal for Captain Contreras. Ambassador 
Stroock immediately protests the acquittal of the Captain and the fact that the in- 
tellectual authors oi Mr. Devine's murder remain free. 

10 Nov 1992: Ambassador Stroock departs Guatemala. Deputy Chief of Mission, 
Mr. John Keene, becomes Charge d'Aifaires. 

11 May 1993: After lengthy proceedings at the appellate court — constituted as a 
court martial — the court reamrms the convictions and 30-year sentences of the six 
enlisted men. The court also reverses the military court's acquittal of Captain 
Contreras, finding him guilty and sentencing him to 20 years in prison. 

11 May 1993: During that evening Captain Contreras disappears from confine- 
ment. 

Mid-May 1993: Charge d'Aifaires, John Keene immediately protests Contreras' es- 
cape to Guatemalan authorities. As a sign of US Government displeasure, Mr. 
Keene also cancels US Armed Forces Day activities being planned and hosted by 
US military officers in the Embassy for the military attache community and Guate- 
malan Army officers . 

24 May 93: President Serrano breaks with the constitution and shuts down con- 
gress and the supreme court. 

2 Jun 1993: President Serrano departs office due to civilian and military demands 
that the country return to constitutional rule. The Minister of Defense rejects an 
offer to take over, thus maintaining civilian rule. 

5 Jun 1993: Guatemala's Human Rights ombudsman, Ramiro DeLeon Caspio is 
elected President by the reconstituted legislature. He chooses an interim Minister 
of Defense for three weeks, then appoints General Mario Enriques as his permanent 
Minister of Defense. 

14 Jun 1993: Ambassador Marilyn McAfee arrives on station. 

Jul-Dec 1993: Ambassador McAfee, accompanied by the Defense Attache, raises 
the Devine case on numerous occasions with the President, Minister of Defense and 
Army Chief. All continue to respond that the whereabouts of Captain Contreras are 
unknown. 

Throughout this chronology the Ambassador and various country team members 
made approaches to their counterparts in the host government concerning the 
Devine case. 

I personally participated in more than 30 meetings with senior civilian and mili- 
tary leaders to seek a just conclusion to Mr. Devine's murder. 

In closing this brief chronology, I can state that once the decisions were made, 
all members of the country teams of the three chiefs of mission mentioned earlier 
were onboard with the measures, pressures, and approaches being made to the Gua- 
temalan Government concerning our search for justice in the Devine case. I should 



131 

also stress that despite the importance of the Devine case, other cases firmly held 
our attention, such as the case of the 1985 disappearance of Mr. Blake and Mr. 
Davis, the murder of anthropologist Myma Mack, and the Bamaca case. 
This concludes my statement and I am available to respond to your questions. 

STATEMENT OF ALLEN C. CORNELL 

Colonel Cornell. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. 
Chairman, Committee members. 

As you have said, I am Al Cornell, a retired soldier. I retired 
after 30 years of active service as a colonel, February of last year. 

Before I go any further, let me say that I'm humbled to be at the 
table with these two ladies here. I worked very closely with Carol 
DeVine and I have read a lot about Miss Jennifer Harbury and I 
have the utmost respect for their courage and their perseverance. 
I am most familiar with the DeVine case, and I can tell you that 
without the perseverance of Carol DeVine, I'm not convinced we 
would be where we are today, and that is the absolute truth. 

I spent 13 years in Latin America, nine of it as an attache, and 
the last four and a half years of my time I was in Guatemala. I 
can tell you that in my time in Guatemala, the policy of the em- 
bassy revolved around what we called the four D's: Democracy, de- 
velopment, drugs, and "derechos humanos," which is Spanish for 
human rights. And the thinking of the country team through all 
that time was you really don't have development and you really 
can't see progress and democracy if you don't have respect for 
human rights. So human rights, I can assure you, was the center- 
piece of the embassy and the centerpiece of all of our offices while 
we were there. 

I would like at this time to give you some more information and 
then answer some questions. What I'd like to do is go through a 
chronology of the DeVine case, if that would be all right with you. 

Chairman SPECTER. That's fine. Proceed. 

Colonel Cornell. Before I start, I can say that I'm also willing 
to answer some questions about the Efrain Bamaca case, but that 
arose toward the end of my time in Guatemala. I did participate 
in three meetings with the ambassador and the minister of defense 
in Guatemala, where she raised two issues: What's the status of 
Mr. Bamaca; and what's the status of the accusations that there 
are clandestine prisons in Guatemala? So I did participate in three 
of those meetings. But then I departed, and so — I'm limited in that 
area. 

With regard to DeVine, 8 June 1990, Mr. Michael DeViile is 
found murdered near his tourist farm in Poptun in the Peten De- 
partment. 18 July 1990, the defense attache — myself — and the 
naval attache visit the headquarters of military zone 23, which is 
the military zone that covers the Peten, and subsequently we visit 
Poptun, to the ranger base known as Kaibil Base. We talked to the 
commanders of both bases. Both of those commanders claim they 
had no knowledge about the killing, other than it had happened 
and that the killing was, the investigation of it, was a police mat- 
ter. 

I did pick up a police report on that visit and I brought it back 
to the embassy, but in essence all it said was, we found Mr. 
DeVine, he had been killed by unknown assailants, and it didn't 
have much more. 



132 

In August- September 1990, a private investigator hired by Mrs. 
DeVine developed some leads into names of possible Guatemalan 
army suspects. 

In September 1990 Ambassador Stroock went down to the min- 
ister of defense, General Balanos, presented him with those names 
and asked for action. The minister did detain the five men that 
were on the list and promised that there would be progress. But 
by mid-December 1990 there was no progress, and the ambassador 
really was frustrated, the whole country team was frustrated. 

He recommended to the Department of State that action be 
taken and that the action be aimed at the military community of 
Guatemala, that it be aimed at materiel assistance. On 21 Decem- 
ber 1990 the State Department announced a suspension of materiel 
aid, which included cash sales, to the army of Guatemala. The 
International Military Education Training program was not sus- 
pended at that time because the thought was that was the one ve- 
hicle we could keep to try to influence the young Guatemalan offi- 
cers toward our way of thinking, our way of doing business was 
through that education. 

14 January 1991, a new president assumes power in Guatemala, 
elected, civilian-elected. And he appoints immediately a new min- 
ister of defense and a new army chief. On 31 January 1991, Am- 
bassador Stroock goes to visit President Serrano and tells him 
there will be no resumption of military aid without some progress 
on the DeVine case, among other things. 

In February 1991 the five enlisted men that are in jail decide 
they better talk, because they've been left out on a limb. And they 
actually implicate the real culprits. They implicate seven people, 
seven more people, and they implicate Captain Hugo Contreras. 
With the naming of the second group, they're all detained except 
the captain. The military court had decided the captain did have 
to be detained. But on August 7, 1991 an appellate court over- 
turned that ruling and said the captain must go to jail just like the 
other accused. 

In mid- August 1991 we still didn't have what we felt was per- 
ceived judicial movement in the case. We had a visit at that time 
from General Joulwan, the commander-in-chief of the Southern 
Command, and we had a closed-door session with the minister of 
defense, at that time General Mendoza. And he said to Mendoza, 
there will be no improvement in the bilateral relationship, military 
to military, until you resolve this DeVine case, eyeball to eyeball. 

I can tell you, at that meeting, Mendoza didn't like the message, 
but that's the way we left it with him. 

On 6 December 1991 General Mendoza was fired by the presi- 
dent and sent home. The president then appoints a brigadier gen- 
eral Garcia as the minister of defense and a brigadier general 
Perucina as the army chief. It was just a week later, 13 December, 
when the new minister of defense and new army chief promised 
that there would be an opening in the DeVine case. Then in mid- 
February 1992 there was a visit by Secretary of Defense Cheney 
to Guatemala. We had a session with President Serrano, had a ses- 
sion with both Generals Garcia and Perussina, and the message 
was the same: Until you show improvements in human rights and 
until you show a resolution of the DeVine case, there will be no im- 



133 

provement in the relationship and there will be no military aid re- 
opened to Guatemala. 

In September 1992, and this is after much delay and a lot of 
work by Carol DeVine's lawyer and the embassy, we finally got a 
verdict on the case — a verdict of guilty for six enlisted men, five of 
the second group and one of the first group, and an innocent ver- 
dict for the captain. Well, it wasn't more than a heartbeat when 
the ambassador was downtown complaining about the verdict be- 
cause it was obvious if you have the same testimony against the 
enlisted men and they're guilty and the same testimony against the 
captain and he's innocent, it just didn't track. But that was the 
military tribunal's decision. 

Ambassador Stroock protested, I went down and protested to 
both the chief of the army and minister of defense, and their re- 
sponse at that time was, "Well, the procedure has to keep going. 
Let's see what happens at the next level." Well, on 10 November 
1992 Ambassador Stroock departed Guatemala, and John Keene, 
the Deputy Chief of Mission, became the Charge d'Affaires. 

On 11 May 1993, again after lengthy delays, et cetera in that 
court system, the appellate court, which was comprised of three ci- 
vilian judges and two military voters, or what they call vocales, or 
speakers, convicted the captain and gave him 20 years in prison 
and reaffirmed the 30-year prison sentences of the six enlisted 
men. And it was that very evening, the May 11, that the captain 
disappeared from military custody. When the captain disappeared, 
John Keene, the charge, immediately went down to the palace to 
protest. And an amazing number of meetings were held with the 
leaders — the chief of the army, the minister of defense, the staff 
judge advocate of their army — about recovering this captain as 
soon as possible. 

On about 24 May — I say approximate because this is coming out 
of my head — because I've been away for a while — President 
Serrano breaks with the constitution, shuts down the courts, and 
shuts down the legislature. On June 2, approximately, a coalition 
of civilian interests — labor unions, businessmen, ranchers, stu- 
dents, teachers — and the military combine to pressure President 
Serrano to leave office. As an aside, a number of politicians offered 
the reins of control to the minister of defense: He refused to take 
it. He wanted to maintain civilian continuity. And so they reconsti- 
tuted the legislature, and by June 5 they had elected Ramiro De 
Leon Carpio as the new president, who as you know had been the 
human rights ombudsman. 

He immediately changed the minister of defense, brought in an 
interim minister, which was General Perussina, and then finally 
brought in a new minister three weeks later, the minister that's 
there now. General Enriquez. From July to December 1993, I ac- 
companied the ambassador on numerous visits to the president, the 
minister of defense, the army chief, on what's being done to recover 
Captain Contreras. 

I can say that throughout this chronology, all members of the 
country team involved in these things were, as we say, forward- 
leaning in the foxhole in this one — the cooperation, the team effort, 
everybody involved and everybody with the same intentions on the 
DeVine case. I personally participated in over 30 meetings — well 



134 

over 30 meetings with the minister of defense, army chief or presi- 
dent on just the DeVine case. 

In closing this brief chronology I can state that once again, with- 
in the embassy, when a decision was made, everybody was on 
board. And everybody agreed and participated in the measures, 
pressures, approaches, demarches we made to the host govern- 
ment. I should also stress that during my tenure, although the 
DeVine case is what I'm talking about now, there were numerous 
other cases that held our attention at the same time. Blake Davis 
case, for example, was an important case. And I participated in a 
lot of that. You had the murder of anthropologist Myma Mack, the 
Bamaca case. So, although I'm talking about DeVine, all the cases 
held our interest. And that really concludes my statement, sir. 

Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Colonel Cornell. We 
now turn to Ms. Harbury. 

[The statement of Ms. Harbury follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Jennifer K. Harbury 

1. My name is Jennifer K. Harbury. I am a United States citizen, forty-three 
years of age, and a licensed attorney. I received my B.A. degree from Cornell Uni- 
versity in 1974, and my law degree from Harvard Law School in 1978. 

2. My husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, was a Mayan citizen of Guatemala, 
and the last surviving Mayan commander of the Guatemalan resistance, or 
U.R.N.G. forces. His nom de guerre was Everardo. We met in 1990 when I traveled 
to a base camp in the TajUmulco volcano to interview women combatants for my 
book. We met again, and married in 1991. 

3. Everardo vanished in combat on March 12, 1992, after some seventeen years 
in the mountains. The skirmish took place at the Rio Ixcucua, in southwestern Gua- 
temala. No other combatants were missing afterwards. The army, on the following 
day, announced that they had found a body there after the combat, and had sent 
it to the nearby town of Retalhuleu for an autopsy and burial. When the U.R.N.G. 
leadership, fearing a hoax, requested a description of the cadaver they were sent 
a perfect, feature by description of Everardo, accurate to the centimeter. They were 
also told that Everardo had been wounded and committed suicide by shooting him- 
self through the mouth in order to avoid being captured and tortiired for his infor- 
mation. 

4. In late 1992, a young man named Santiago Cabrera Lopez escaped from a mili- 
tary base in Guatemala . Santiago had been a U.R.N.G. combatant under Everardo's 
command, and had been captured in 1991. He stated that he had been secretly de- 
tained since the army since that time and severely tortured. He also reported that 
G-2, or army intelligence was carrying out a secret experiment with selected pris- 
oners. The objective was to "break" such prisoners through physical and 
physchological abuse until they began working as secret intelligence collaborators 
with the army. 

5. Santiago saw Everardo in an army base on March 12, 1992 and for the next 
20 days. Everardo was chained hands and feet to a bed and was being interrogated. 
Santiago again saw Everardo in late July 1992. This time he witnessed Everardo 
being tortured by a number of high level army officials, including Col. Julio Alpirez 
and many others. He gave the names and ranks of all of these officers. 

6. Santiago Cabrera Lopez testified at the United Nations conference in Geneva 
in February 1993 and I gave his testimony to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights in March 1993. I also shared his testimony with State Department 
officials, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and numerous 
human rights organizations. 

7. When the Guatemalan army denied taking Everardo prisoner despite this testi- 
mony, I traveled to Retalhuleu and filed for an exhumation of the grave where they 
claimed he was buried. There I found the body of a young man five centimeters 
shorter and about fifteen years younger than Everardo. His dental patterns were 
also quite different. The report of the autopsy performed in 1992 when the body was 
first brought in from the combat site showed that the young man looked nothing 
like Everardo. Moreover, he had not died in combat. He had been tied by the ankles, 
fingerprinted, shot, stabbed, strangled, beaten, and had a skull smashed in by 
blows. The ejchumation took place in August 1993. 



135 

8. In short, my husband had been captured alive by the Guatemalan army in 
March 1992, and was held as a secret prisoner and subjected to torture. In order 
to conceal this fact and avoid international outcry, a different orisoner was brought 
to the combat site and killed there, and the army announced that they had "found" 
Everardo's cadaver. When the U.R.N.G. requested a description of the body, the 
army sent a perfect description of Everardo instead of the young man actually in 
the grave. This hoax was carried out during the 1992 peace negotiations on the 
issue of human rights. 

1994 

9. After the exhumation, I feared that Everardo was still alive and being brutally 
tortured. According to Santiago, a number of the prisoners had been kept alive for 
many years, and indeed this has been independently confirmed. To date, all infor- 
mation given by Santiago has proven to be true and correct. Given my husband's 
rank and experience, he was literally a treasure trove of information for military 
intelligence. I therefore set about trying to obtain his presentation to the courts for 
his fair trial, and if necessary his imprisonment pursuant to the minimum require- 
ments of the Geneva Conventions or international humanitarian law. 

10. The Inter-American Commission, after the exhumation, issued interim protec- 
tive order against the Guatemalan army, and Monica Pinto, the U.N. Special Ex- 
pert, decried the case in her 1994 presentation in Geneva, Switzerland. The case 
was also included in a congressional resolution sponsored by Rep. Connie Morella, 
and was protested by numerous U.S. Congresspersons, Senators, and human rights 
organizations. 

11. Throughout the year of 1994 I spoke frequently with State Department offi- 
cials, including Mr. Charlie Harrington. Mr. Richard Nuccio, and Ms. Anne Patter- 
son. I also communicated with Mr. John Shattuck. I met on numerous occasions 
with Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee. Her attitude was representative of all State 
Department officials. She seemed to find the case interesting, but when I repeatedly 
asked for her assistance she would simply say, "Well I have mentioned it many 
times to the armv officials and they say they don't have him, so what more can I 
do?" Even limited sanctions against the army were out of the question, as were any 
further forms of pressure other than "mentioning" the case. She was quite well 
aware of the name of Julio Alpirez and the many other names offered by Santiago 
Cabrera Lopez, but apparently took no action. 

12. As the peace talks progressed in 1994, and as Vice President Gore began to 
discuss regional trade plans for Central America, the State Department became 
more and more impatient with my pleas for help. They clearly wished for me to pre- 
sume him dead and get out of their way, as my case was obviously embarrassing 
for the peace process. After the Global Human Rights Accord was signed in March 
1994, the officially sponsored human rights violations began to skyrocket. The army 
clearly felt that its funding from Washington D.C. could never be cut during the 
peace process, and that they could thus kill their dissidents with full impunity. This 
they did, while State Department simply looked the other way. The people of Guate- 
mala then lost faith in the peace process. As a result ,the peace talks disintegrated 
in late 1994. 

13. Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee had repeatedly assured me that my case would 
be treated the same as all of the other human rights cases. Yet I soon learned that 
she had written Rep. Connie Morella, asking that my case be removed from her res- 
olution. When I asked her about this, she said that she could not ask that funding 
be cut for an individual case. When I pointed out that she had not asked that the 
other cases be removed from the resolution, she looked very uncomfortable, and 
pointed out that he was a combatant, and that this was a difference. I reminded 
her that the legal prohibitions against torture, clandestine prisons, and extrajudicial 
execution do not recognize any such distinctions. She had no answer. 

14. By late 1994, I reaUzed that I had come to the end of the road in trying to 
save my husband's life. There was a good chance that the case would be sent to the 
Inter-Ajnerican Court in Costa Rica, but this process would be extremely slow. The 
Inter-American Commission orders had been ignored by the army, as had all other 
forms of international pressure. The peace accords were scheduled to be signed soon, 
and when they were, the army would have no further need to keep Everardo alive. 
I was still under much pressure by the U.S. Embassy to simply assume he was 
dead. However, I had believed him dead in 1992, when he was actually alive and 
suffering terrible torture. I would not make the same mistake again. Moreover, 
there was confirming evidence that a number of prisoners in this experimental army 
program had been kept alive for years. One way or the other, time was of the es- 
sence. 



136 

15. Given this situation, I began my hunger strike in October 1994 in front of the 
National Palace in Guatemala City. I dranJc only water and some electrolyte solu- 
tion to remain clear minded. I came under severe harassment by the Guatemalan 
authorities, including being placed on a public death list. 

16. In late October, a State Department official spoke with the Guatemalan au- 
thorities about my hunger strike. He then told me that an official investigation was 

foing to be carried out, clearly expecting me to end my hunger strike on this basis, 
explained that the case had been very thoroughly investigated for some time, and 
that now was the time to save my husband's life, and that I would not cease my 
strike for anything less. The "investigation" was then carried out by the Guate- 
malan authorities, and consisted in having me subpoenaed to answer sixty six inter- 
rogatories by the prosecutors. Only a few of these were aimed at finding Everardo. 
Almost all were aimed at either intimidating, insulting, or threatening me. My law- 
yer was not allowed to be present. I was also forced to twice travel to the town of 
Coatepeque at the other end of the country, for the exhumation of certain persons 
who had been killed two weeks before Everardo vanished, and who, according to the 
autopsy reports, in no way resembled him. The authorities were hoping to break my 
strength in order to force and end to my strike. In the end, a few of the named mili- 
tary officers, including Alpirez, were superficially questioned for the first time, but 
never even detained. 

17. After about twenty-five days, "Sixty Minutes" aired a program about the case 
and revealed that the CIA had long since sent a memo to Dotli State Department 
and the U.S. Embassy, confirming that Everardo had indeed been captured alive by 
the Guatemalan army in 1992. 

18. On the thirty-first day of my hunger strike, the U.S. Ambassador issued a for- 
mal dem£irche to the Guatemalan President Ramiro DeLeon Carpio. It stated that 
according to U.S. intelligence sources, Everardo was captured alive in March 1992 
by the Guatemalan army, that he was lightly but not seriously wounded, that he 
was a prisoner for a short time period, and that after that there was no further in- 
formation. The Ambassador made it clear that in her personal opinion, he must be 
dead, but when I pressed her she stated clearly that she had no further information 
of any kind one way or the other. 

19. I also received word during this time period that Mr. Anthony Lake and Mr. 
Leon Fuerth of the National Security Council were willing to meet with me. I be- 
lieved that this, combined with the recent demarche, would lead to a resolution of 
the case, so I then suspended my hunger strike and returned to Washington D.C. 

20. I met with Mr. Anthony Lake, Mr. Leon Fuerth, Mr. Richard Feinberg and 
Mr. John Shattuck in November 1994. They expressed great interest in the case and 
assured me that they had no further information about Everardo's fate one way or 
the other. I asked for all documents to be released to me at once so as to avoid the 
delay of F.O.I.A. requests, given the urgency of the case. I also asked that the U.S. 
indicate that some kind of sanctions would result if my husband were assassinated 
without a trial. I gave several suggestions of options, stressing that if no con- 
sequences were attached to his murder, that he had no chance for survival. I also 
stressed that if the army killed him with full impunity, despite the international 
outcry and the full and clear evidence, that they would know they could get away 
with anything at all. Manv more Guatemalans would die. They agreed to take all 
of this under serious consideration. 

1995 

21. I never received any documents, and was forced to file my F.O.I.A. requests 
in January 1995. To date, I have received virtually no information. 

22. In early 1995, the U.S. sent our National Guard to Guatemala. The Guate- 
malan Minister of Defense welcomed them with open arms. State Department offi- 
cials made it clear that no sanctions of any kind were going to be imposed, despite 
the frightening rise in officially sponsored human rights violations. The Minister of 
Defense made declarations to liie Guatemalan press that the Bamaca case had come 
and gone and was no longer a problem. 

23. Throughout January and February 1995 I spoke on various occasions with 
State Department officials as well as with Ambassador MacAffee. They all told me 
the same thing. They made numerous comments to the effect that "Jennifer, we 
really don't think he is alive." When I pressed them as to why they didn't think so, 
they would respond that a very intensive investigation had been carried out through 
intelligence sources, and that no one could find any evidence that he was aUve. 
When I asked point blank if any of their sources had found him dead, they replied 
no. I also asked if their sources had evidence of a body or grave or anything else 
concrete, or if there was anything else they were withholding from me. They replied 



137 

"no" to all of these questions, merely repeating that given how much time had gone 
by, it was a logical conclusion. 

24. Santiago had described for me the torture that my husband was suffering. I 
loved him very much and could never abandon him to such cruelty if there was any 
chance he were still in pain. Given that many Guatemalans were reporting that 
they had seen him alive recently, and given that the goal of the army experiment 
was to keep the prisoners alive for a long period of time, I could not abandon my 
search on the basis of mere opinion and conjecture. I informed the Embassy and 
Mr. Richard Feinberg that if no further steps were taken to save his life, that I was 
wrong to have suspended my hunger strike and would resume it on March 12, 1995, 
the third anniversary of his capture. 

25. In February 1995 I also spoke with one of the team members of MINUGUA, 
the U.N. team now investigating human rights violations in Guatemala. I described 
my meetings with the State Department members and asked if there was anything 
new they were hiding from me. I was told by the team member that the Ambassador 
had issued a second demarche, that it had recommended that Alpirez be re-ques- 
tioned, and that it confirmed that other prisoners had been held for a period of time 
for lengthy interrogation and then killed. However, the team member hastened to 
assure me that there was no new evidence that Everardo was dead, and that this 
remained mere opinion on the part of the U.S. Embassy. This was based on lengthy 
discussions with U.S. Embassy staff. 

26. During this time period I also stressed to all U.S. officials that if no concrete 
evidence existed, it was wrongful to insist that he must be dead, when, in fact, he 
might well be alive and suffering. If concrete information did exist, then it was im- 
moral to allow me to risk my life with a second hunger strike so soon after the first 
one without telling me the truth. I received no information. 

27. On March 10, 1995 I spoke briefly with Mr. Richard Feinberg, and he in- 
formed me of the cuts in IMET funding. I saw the press release, which referred to 
the official "conclusion" that Everardo was dead. But once again, it was never stated 
that anyone KNEW he was dead, or that concrete evidence existed that established 
his death as a certainty as opposed to a mere matter of opinion. 

28. I have seen Ambassador MacAffee quoted as stating that she told me on 
March the 7th that "Bamaca is dead". She made no such statement to me. Her exact 
wording was "Jennifer, I really don't think he is alive." When I pressed her she re- 
fused to answer. On March 10, she issued a press statement, declaring as follows: 
"Impunity runs counter to the basic principles of law. We believe that the rights of 
every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened. ♦ * ♦ And 
that is why questions continue to swirl around the case of Efrain Bamaca. What 
happened there?" Hardly the concrete "Bamaca is dead" statement she now claims. 

29. On March the 12, 1995 I renewed my hunger strike. After 12 days I had lost 
14 pounds and was extremely weak, but determined to find out the truth. It was 
then that Rep. Toricelli called me to his office and informed me that our intelligence 
sources show that sometime in 1992 Col. Alpirez, (the same man named by Santiago 
in early 1993), had given an order to execute Everardo. Col. Alpirez had been on 
CIA payroll for a long time and had also ordered the assassination of U.S. citizen 
Michael Devine several years earlier. An investigation had been called off, and he 
was given a substantial lump sum payment by the CIA during the same time period 
that ne ordered my husband's assassination. Also, although funding to the Guate- 
malan army had been cut off after Devine's murder, the CIA continued to secretly 
fund them with U.S. tax dollars. 

30. Despite my repeated requests for the documents I have received nothing I do 
not know where, when or how my husband died. I cannot even bury his remains. 
I know, from the experience of the Blake family, as well as the testimony of certain 
G-2 defectors, that they army may soon incinerate his bones so that I will never 
find him. It is only too clear, moreover, that they are hurriedly carrying out their 
own coverup. Our Embassy has given no documentation to the Guatemalan authori- 
ties. As a result. Alpirez has not even been arrested and remains in his post. On 
the other hand, it has been announced that if I return to Guatemala I will be ar- 
rested as a subversive. It is far from clear that the files in the U.S. are safe from 
destruction. 

31. These three years have been long and terrible. Yet it was necessary for me 
to learn the truth. I can only hope that something positive can come from so much 
pain. 150,000 civilians Guatemalans have been killed or "disappeared" by the Gua- 
temalan death squads. Let it end now. Never again. 

32. I would like to make the following requests: 

a. I would ask that all information about my case be immediately declassified. 
This would allow me to locate his body and give him a decent burial before his re- 
mains are destroyed and scattered. It would also prevent fiirther destruction of evi- 



138 

dence in Guatemala, as well as here in the United States. It would also promote 
justice in both nations. National Security must never be allowed to conceal illegal 
or improper official conduct. Moreover, immediate release of all such files will help 
to restore public confidence in the American government. Other key cases should 
also be declassified. 

b. I would also ask that afi^r the documents in this case and in other key human 
rights cases have been thoroughly reviewed, that in depth and lengthy hearings be 
held on the CIA and State Department conduct of our affairs in Guatemala during 
the last twenty years. These agencies must carry out our international policies as 
formulated by government officials elected by our citizens. If mistakes have been 
made, if these agencies have strayed, let us now set our house in order. Lives are 
at stake. 

c. Should the Guatemalan army continue to defy the basic requirements of inter- 
national humanitarian law, as well as their own recently signed Global Human 
Rights Accord, then we must take action. Our tax dollars must not support a gross 
and systematic human rights violator. Should the army remain intransigent, let us 
begin to phase in sanctions which will only have impact on the Guatemalan mili- 
tary. Let us insist on the extradition of those officers known to engage in drug traf- 
ficking. Let us cancel military visas to the United States. Let us cancel private sales 
of helicopter and truck parts. Let us cancel all training exercises. There is so much 
we can do, and so very much at stake. As members of the international community, 
we must stand firm on the principles of international law. If human rights are not 
insisted upon, then they are rendered meaningless. 

STATEMENT OF JENNIFER HARBURY 

Ms. Harbury. That's right. I'd like to thank the Committee for 
inviting us here today and offering us a chance to speak. I agree 
that it's very important — even though all of us have been inter- 
viewed at length — that we be able to give the entirety of our sto- 
ries, because often facts are left out during interviews that might 
prove to be very critical to your work as the Committee. 

My name is Jennifer Harbury. I'm an attorney. I'm a U.S. citi- 
zen. I'm 43 years of age. I've been practicing law since 1978. I've 
been heavily involved in Guatemalan affairs since 1985. I lived 
there and did human rights work for two years — 1985 and 1986 — 
losing an average of one friend a week to the death squads in Gua- 
temala during that time period. I was forced to leave the country 
because of the work I was doing in late 1986, and continued to 
work closely with the Guatemalan people, whom I dearly love. I 
very much share Mrs. DeVine's feelings about Guatemala and 
would love to be able to return someday to Guatemala to live there 
as well. 

I remain very involved in Guatemalan human rights. I worked 
on a book for a number of years. And that's, in fact, how I met my 
husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who is also known as 
Commandante Everado of the URNG forces, when I traveled to the 
volcano to carry out interviews. Can you hear me? I'm sorry, my 
voice has come down to about its half-life during this last week. 

Chairman Specter. We can hear you, Ms. Harbury, but to the 
extent you can pull it closer it would be even more helpful. 

Ms. Harbury. I had traveled to a combat zone to interview 
women combatants for my book about the ongoing civil war. Since 
almost no interviews with any of these people existed, I thought it 
was important to include their side of the story. This combat unit 
was virtually all Mayan peasant and my husband was in charge of 
that division. And he, in fact, had been in combat for some 17 
years, he had spent his life in the mountains. He's a Mayan peas- 
ant himself. His first fortunately for me. 



139 

I would like to give a brief chronology of the events surrounding 
his death because I think that's very critical in interpreting the dif- 
ferent versions of information that have come in through the CIA. 
I think it's very critical in being able to decide which is the true 
version and which isn't. 

My husband vanished in combat on March 12, 1992, near the Rio 
Ixcacoa, which is in Guatemala toward the Mexican border in the 
southwest, Orpa territory. He literally disappeared. There were 
only a few people in the unit that he was with at the moment, and 
at the end of the combat no one else was missing; there was lit- 
erally a lot of smoke and explosions, everyone took cover, when 
they looked up he was gone. No boots, no backpack, no rifle, no 
nothing. 

The next day the army issued a brief statement sa3dng that they 
had found a cadaver right there at the river after the combat and 
sent it to the town of Retalhuleu for burial. Well, he was the only 
one missing; that made sense that that would be him. But the 
commandante was still very concerned, for a number of reasons, 
that a hoax was being carried out, and asked for a description of 
that body. And they were sent a feature-by-feature to-the-centi- 
meter accurate description of my husband as being the description 
of that cadaver that had been found and buried. 

I would for a long time have continued to think that he was dead 
and buried in Retalhuleu if Santiago Cabrero Lopez had not es- 
caped from an army base in late 1992. Now, in fact, Santiago had 
fought in my husband's division and he himself was taken prisoner 
in 1991. He had been very badly tortured for a period of about six 
months and was placed in a new experimental program being car- 
ried out by G-2, or military intelligence, which was only a few 
years old at that time. A few selected-out prisoners who were cap- 
tured, instead of being promptly killed, were actually taken aside 
and subjected to long-term torture and psychological abuse until 
they would snap or break down and become part of a secret and 
permanent cadre of informants for the army. A number of these 
prisoners that he was able to name, we have confirmed are still 
alive and in army hands. Some of them have been alive for years. 
Again, the purpose was not to kill them, it was to keep them alive 
but broken. 

On March 12, 1992, Santiago saw my husband in an army base, 
chained hands and feet to a bed, undergoing interrogation. He was 
even able to speak with him briefly because the G— 2 officials 
wished for him to confirm that that was, in fact, the legendary 
Commander Everado that they had been trying to catch for so long. 
They saw him chained to a bed, hands and feet, without a blanket, 
under interrogation, for about 20 days. Everado was then moved; 
they were told he had been shot. 

But he saw him again in late July 1992, in a different base. This 
time, he saw him strapped to a hospital table with an unidentified 
gas tank next to the bed. He was stripped down to his underwear. 
His entire body was grotesquely swollen several times normal size. 
One arm was bandaged completely shoulder to wrist, and one leg 
was bandaged completely hip to ankle as if they had ruptured, and 
he was speaking in a raving voice. 



140 

The man bending over the torture table was someone that 
Santiago knew quite well; it was Colonel Julio Alpirez. Santiago 
also named first name, both last names, rank and position of all 
the other very high level intelligence officials who were involved in 
his torture and interrogation. He also said that they had actually 
called a doctor to standby to make sure they didn't accidentally kill 
Everado. The point was to break him, not to kill him. He was the 
goose that laid the golden egg in terms of military intelligence. 
There's nothing, after 17 years as a commander and founder, that 
he did not know. 

Santiago did see him alive a few days later. The swelling had 
gone down. He looked very ill but he was still alive. He could not 
see the arm and leg because he was dressed in a military uniform. 
A few months later, Santiago escaped having not seen Everado 
again, and had been threatened many, many times to never tell of 
what he had seen. Mr. Cabrera Lopez in January met with me. I 
interrogated him very attorney style, up one wall and down the 
other. He has a memory like a computer and never contradicts 
himself. He went to Geneva and gave all of this testimony to the 
United Nations Conference in Geneva in February 1993. I testified 
March 4, 1993, and gave all of this list of names as well to the OAS 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. I then proceeded to 
give all of this information to the State Department, to Members 
of the U.S. Congress and Senate, and to all of the Human Rights 
Organizations, begging for help. 

At that point, the army, of course, in Guatemala responded that 
it was a propaganda stunt, that Santiago was lying, that he was 
a deserter, he was trying to blackmail them, he was a drunk, and 
that my husband was buried in Retalhuleu where they told me in 
the first place. So I returned to Guatemala with my marriage cer- 
tificate and said, "Fine, open the grave." And that's the one thing 
no one had ever counted on. If I were Guatemalan, I would have 
been shot on the spot. They didn't expect anyone ever to come back 
to Guatemala and say, "Right, that Mayan guerrilla commander 
happens to be my husband, open the grave." 

But I had a right under Guatemalan law absolutely to do it, so 
the judge also gave me the judicial records. And under Guatemalan 
law at that time those records were normally sealed, but as a rel- 
ative I had a right to see them, and being an attorney, I read them 
and started flipping through. And I found the autopsy report done 
the same day the body was brought in from the river, March 13, 
1992. It wasn't him. It was someone five centimeters too short, 
about 15 years too young; had a moustache instead of being clean- 
shaven, different coloring, different eyes, different scars. He did not 
die in combat. He was tied by the ankles with a sock so tightly that 
the weaving pattern was etched into his skin. He had black ink on 
his fingertips where he was fingerprinted. He was shot. He was 
stabbed. He was beaten. He was kicked in the face. He had a two- 
centimeter strangulation gash around his throat, and his skull was 
smashed in — not from a bullet through the mouth, as we had been 
told that my husband had committed suicide by shooting himself 
through the mouth to avoid being captured alive, but by rifle-butt 
blows. His head had been smashed in. I did open the grave. That's 



141 

who I found, an 18-year-old who comes to my shoulder who had 
been tied up and beaten to death. 

What the army had done was taken my husband alive to torture 
him long-term for his treasure trove of information. And to cover 
that up so that no one would interfere as I am interfering so egre- 
giously right now, they brought another young prisoner to the river 
on the same day, tied him up, beat him to death and told the press, 
"Here's the body we found yesterday after the combat. We're send- 
ing it to Retalhuleu for burial." And when the URNG commandants 
here requested a description of the body, they were given a feature- 
by-feature to-the-centimeter description of my husband and not of 
the young 18-year-old actually buried in the grave. All of this oc- 
curred while they were sitting at the peace talk table in 1992 dis- 
cussing the issue of human rights. 

I came back to Washington after this experience and testified 
again to the Inter-American Commission. They immediately issued 
protective orders against the army. I flew to Geneva and testified 
at the U.N. conference in 1993, February. Monica Pinto, the special 
expert, blasted the army in this case in her address to the U.N. 
conference. 

I went across the House of Representatives and the Senate here 
in Washington, and I want to thank all of those Members who have 
been so incredibly helpful all of these years. The case was included 
in a congressional resolution sponsored by Connie Morella. The 
army ignored all of these things. Every human rights group in the 
world has protested at the top of their lungs. The army ignored all 
of them. It simply made no difference. 

At the beginning, I was working frequently with the State De- 
partment officials and also with Ambassador Marilyn McAfee. And 
throughout the winter of 1992 and 1993 she would say, "Well, we're 
very concerned about all this information, and we've mentioned it 
many times to the army." And I would say, "Well, I think my hus- 
band might be getting his fingernails torn out. Could we do some- 
thing more than mention it?" But apparently we couldn't. As I've 
said, the name Colonel Alpirez is not exactly new. It's been public 
information since January 1993, February 1993. 

Toward the spring of 1994, the message I started getting began 
to shift at State Department. The peace talks were in progress. Mr. 
Gore was in the region discussing interim trade programs for all 
of Central America. Everybody wanted a peace agreement signed, 
but there wasn't enough stress on compliance with that agreement. 
A human rights agreement was signed in March. Human rights 
violations began to skyrocket and nothing was done. That's why the 
peace process fell apart at the end of last year: Because the public 
in Guatemala no longer had faith in that process. If you're going 
to sign a peace agreement and they're all going to be shot down in 
the streets, nobody felt like it was going to work very well. Hope- 
fully, that will not happen again. 

That's right about the time all doors began to close in my face. 
GAS had done what they could. The United Nations' special expert 
had done what she could. Congress and Senate had done what they 
could. The army was totally defiant. They felt that they didn't have 
to do anything any more. They could shoot anybody they wanted. 



92-921 - 95 - 6 



142 

Their money was guaranteed from Washington because they were 
in the peace process. Who was going to shut off their money? 

At that point I was shown a letter that Ambassador Marilyn 
McAfee had written to Congresswoman Connie Morella, asking 
that my case be removed from congressional resolution. She had 
been telling me that she was pushing my case exactly equally to 
all other cases. So I asked her, "Whoa, wait a minute. That's not 
equal treatment. What happened?" And the first time around she 
said she would have to review her files. I returned and asked her 
again, "What happened?" And she said, "Well, I don't think you can 
cut off aid to a country or any kind of aid just for one individual 
case." I said, "Well, number one, it's a test case. You'll never have 
this kind of concrete evidence again. Then number two, you didn't 
ask for the other individual cases to be taken out, only mine." And 
she said, "Well, he is a combatant. I guess that makes a dif- 
ference." And I said, "Not in the eyes of the law it doesn't. You 
show me where the Geneva Conventions and international humani- 
tarian law say it's okay sometimes to torture, to kidnap, to secretly 
imprison or to execute without a trial." I've never asked for am- 
nesty for my husband. I've never asked for anything, except that 
he be given a fair trial and that he not be subjected to torture and 
abuse. That was the spring of 1994. 

By the summer, the peace talks were still scheduled to come to 
a close by January, and I realized at that point they would have 
no reason to keep my husband alive any more. They wouldn't need 
his military information any more and they would have every in- 
centive to shoot him to shut him up, if he were, in fact, still alive. 
So out of desperation, because OAS would be too slow, because the 
United Nations has no enforcement power, because I could get no- 
where with the State Department, I went on my hunger strike in 
the National Plaza, in front of the National Palace in Guatemala 
City, because I felt like I had come to the end of the road, and my 
life and his life, we go together. I wasn't going to just stand by and 
have him shredded physically while I just pretended it hadn't hap- 
pened. 

One of my jobs, when I was a human rights observer in Guate- 
mala in 1985 and 1986, was to go to the morgues and help identify 
the dead. And I didn't want to find him that way and I didn't plan 
to find him that way. 

So I went on my hunger strike, and the Guatemalan response 
was remarkable. People came out with flowers. Poor people gave 
me 50-cent pieces to buy new candles with. Little old ladies would 
come out and cry and say prayers for my husband and for their 
children who had been taken by the death squads. They came out 
in droves, risking their life to hug me, wish me well, bring me 
glasses of water, and tell me to speak for all of them who could not 
speak without being murdered themselves. 

By the end of my hunger strike I was drinking only water and 
electrolyte solution, as you know. Since 80 percent of the Mayan 
people in Guatemala suffer from severe malnutrition, including my 
husband, at 5'3", I'm a giant in Guatemala. I felt like it would be 
hypocritical to go on a fruit juice fast. I know few Mayan peasants 
who could afford fruit juice. 



143 

By Day 25, I think, the 60 Minutes broadcast reported that, in 
fact, the embassy did have a report that my husband was taken 
aHve in 1992 by the army, that he was shghtly but not seriously 
wounded, that he had been a prisoner for a while. And that was 
leaked the first time through the 60 Minutes broadcast. I had 
never heard this information. 

Throughout the first 25 days of my hunger strike we were get- 
ting the same old answers from the Guatemalan army: "We never 
had him in the first place." You know, you — "We found a body out 
there. You yourself say it's not him, so we never had him." Well, 
where'd this perfect description of him come from? If you never had 
him in the first place, where'd you get this perfect feature-by-fea- 
ture description of him? Why did you send it? Here's the letter. It's 
signed by President Ramiro De Leon Carpio. "Oh, well, the guerril- 
las must have switched the body in the grave to make us look bad. 
That's how the subversives are, you know." Well, that's funny. 
Here's the autopsy report done before the body was buried. It's the 
same body. And it wasn't ever him. "Well, you must have gotten 
confused. It's five centimeters too short, 15 years too young, and 
there's completely different dental records, but all Indians look 
alike. So you got confused. It's really him out there. Maybe he ran 
off with another woman." 

But finally, with the 60 Minutes report, it was clear that the CIA 
had sent something to both the State Department and the U.S. 
Embassy to show that none of those things were the case. He was 
captured alive, which, of course, I already knew. Try to figiire a 
way out of that particular combination of evidence, right? It just — 
it's against the laws of physics. They took him. 

But a few days after that the American ambassador, Marilyn 
McAfee, did go issue a demarche to the Guatemalan president, 
Ramiro De Leon Carpio, confirming that they did have evidence 
that he was taken alive, that he was not seriously wounded, that 
he was a prisoner for a while, and that after that there was no fur- 
ther information. 

At that point I was also informed that Mr. Anthony Lake and 
Leon Furth were willing to meet me at the White House. Given 
that combination of events, I felt that I would be much better off 
halting my hunger strike — it was now Day 32. I was in danger 
within about 10 more days of either seriously damaging my inter- 
nal organs or going into a coma — which I was not relishing. And 
I thought, you know, I can do that and be dragged off to a hospital 
by the Guatemalan army — they were already threatening to force 
me into a hospital and put me on an IV — or I can let the U.S. Gov- 
ernment save my husband's life. They're a lot bigger and stronger 
than I am. 

So I came back to Washington and I did meet with Mr. Anthony 
Lake right away and also Mr. Leon Furth, Mr. John Shattuck, and 
Mr. Richard Feinberg. That would have been the second week of 
November by then. And it was a very courteous meeting, they told 
me there was no further information of any kind, that they had 
scraped the bottom of the barrel on — that they were certainly going 
to be looking into that and what they really wanted from me was 
all of the facts. And I said that's what I wanted too, and I also 
needed, desperately, all of the documents about this case that un- 



144 

derlay the demarche. I needed to be able to evaluate them and I 
didn't want to have to follow through the Freedom of Information 
Act because it was too slow — he could be dead before I ever got the 
documents — it was life and death. 

They were very sympathetic to that, and I also stressed that it 
was very important that we had to do more than mention this case 
to the army because it's a test case. If the army thinks that it can 
get away with this case despite all the evidence and the total inter- 
national uproar, if they get away with it with no consequences, by 
assassinating him, then they'll know they can get away with any- 
thing. There's already 150,000 civilians dead in Guatemala, prob- 
ably double that number--440 Mayan villages wiped off the map, 
maybe many more. That's enough. Let's don't tell them that it's 
okay to do this. Let's say that they've got to obey international law. 

He was very sympathetic. The next thing I heard our National 
Guard was sent to Guatemala, the general — minister of defense of 
Guatemala was welcoming our troops with open arms, there was 
a clear message from State Department there would be no sanc- 
tions of any kind under any circumstances, and the headline news 
was, it's okay, the Bamaca case is over. I was not happy. If there's 
no consequences attached to his assassination what chance does he 
have for survival? But I was still going to bed every night with the 
image of my husband strapped down to a table being pumped up 
like an overblown inner tube, and I didn't feel like leaving him 
under those conditions. And I didn't think it was right to leave him 
under those conditions because it's a green light to continue torture 
and assassination and kidnapping and secret prisons for many 
more people, and I felt like I had lost enough friends in Guatemala 
for one lifetime. 

So I went back and forth to the State Department and to the 
U.S. ambassador in Guatemala and back and forth to the White 
House for some time. January and February. What I can tell you 
is a summary of what I was told consistently by all State Depart- 
ment people, January and February of this year: "Jennifer, we real- 
ly don't think your husband is alive any more. It's been three 
years." "Well, why don't you think he's not alive?" "Well, it's been 
three years, it's a logical conclusion, we've done a very intensive in- 
vestigation, we cannot fmd him alive anywhere." "Well, all right. 
Can you fmd him dead?" "No." "Can you fmd any evidence of a 
grave or a body or an execution?" "No, no, no." "Is there any con- 
crete evidence that he is dead?" "No." "Are you withholding any- 
thing from me?" "No." 

I went down to Guatemala in February and I talked to someone 
from the United Nations investigatory team and said, "This is driv- 
ing me nuts. They keep telling me they don't think he's alive but 
are they holding something back from me, what's going on? They 
won't give me anything underlying this new demarche. I'm asking 
and asking, I filed my FOIA request in January, I have nothing. 
Today I still have nothing. I have a certified transcript of a press 
release done by the ambassador back in the fall. I have nothing 
else." And the United Nations person was very sympathetic and 
told me not to worry, that she'd had lengthy discussions with the 
ambassador. That they had asked for Alpirez to be re-questioned. 



145 

In fact, the U.S. State Department people here had told me that 
the ambassador had requested a new round of questioning but had 
not mentioned Alpirez' name. She also said there had been men- 
tioned that they knew that a number of other prisoners had been 
taken and that these were often executed. I had not heard that up 
here in Washington . 

And then I said, "Well, so what do you think? Do you think he's 
dead? I mean, what's going on?" And she said, "No, no, no. They've 
reassured me that there's no concrete evidence that he's dead. They 
only think he's dead because no one can find any evidence that he's 
alive." 

Meanwhile, I was getting many reports from Guatemalans who 
said they had seen him alive, and I turned all of those over to the 
State Department. 

So I didn't know what to think. And when I returned to Wash- 
ington just before the hunger strike started, I actually spoke in the 
White House to Mr. Feinberg, who had not made these concrete 
statements — I want to make that very clear; this was State Depart- 
ment officials that I've just quoted at length. I said to Mr. 
Feinberg, "I'm really worried. If you folks have information that 
he's dead, you should tell me because I'm about to risk my life 
going on another hunger strike so soon to the last one. I'm not that 
strong. I'm 43 years old, but I'm going to do it. You know, if you 
know he's dead, you have to tell me, and if you don't know he's 
dead, you have no right to be telling the world that you think he's 
dead when he could be suffering from these horrible tortures." And 
I didn't get an answer. 

On March 10, two days before I started my hunger strike for the 
second time, I was called in and did speak with Mr. Feinberg. He 
did tell me about the cuts in IMET. I thought that was a very posi- 
tive first step. And I did see the press release that said, you know, 
that we conclude that he is dead. Once again it said, "conclude." 
It didn't say we know it, it didn't say there was any evidence of 
an order of execution, it said nothing. 

And I'd like to read you the words of Marilyn McAfee at her 
press conference in Guatemala that same day. She now says, I told 
Jennifer, Bamaca is dead. Here's her written statement: "Impunity 
runs counter to the basic principles of law. We believe that the 
rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are 
threatened. That ideal is why the United States places such great 
emphasis upon our policy of human rights." Et cetera, et cetera. 

"And that is why questions continued to swirl about the case of 
Efrain Bamaca. What happened there?" Does that sound to you 
like Bamaca is dead? 

So I went on another hunger strike, this time in front of the 
White House. And I sat there for 12 days drinking water and elec- 
trolyte solution. I lost 14 pounds in 12 days and went staggering 
up and down the Halls of Congress asking for help once again. And 
it was on the 12th day that Congressman Torricelli had the kind- 
ness to call me into his office and say, "Jennifer, it's more than we 
think he's dead, there was an order of execution by Colonel Julio 
Alpirez in 1992. He was on CIA payroll. He's the same person that 
ordered the death of Michael DeVine. He was on payroll when he 
killed Michael DeVine. There was an investigation, it was called 



146 

off. He wasn't on payroll for a while. It's unclear if he was still on 
payroll the day your husband was killed, but he did receive a large 
lump sum of money right about that time." 

Now, I've been given no dates. I don't know when he died. I don't 
know who pulled the trigger. I don't know how he was killed. 
Maybe it wasn't with a gun. I shudder to think how he was killed. 
Let's don't try to imagine it. I don't know where he's buried. At this 
moment they may be digging up his body and burning his bones 
so that I'll never fmd them. That's what was done to the body of 
Nicholas Blake. 

I've talked to a number of G— 2 defectors who come through Mex- 
ico who've routinely been ordered to go to dynamited areas behind 
military areas, pour gasoline over cadavers and light them on fire 
when they think someone's coming. 

I know that papers are being shredded a mile a minute in Guate- 
mala City. There's not much I can do since I'm not being given any 
information up here. Not even my Freedom of Information Act have 
gotten me anything except a certified copy of a press statement and 
two sheets of paper almost completely whited out with one sen- 
tence at the bottom. I know nothing. I'm the only one that cares 
about this human being. I'm the only one that wants to bury him 
and I'm the only one who is not allowed to know anything about 
it other than what Congressman Torricelli was kind enough to tell 
me. At least I don't have to wake at night now with nightmares 
that he is still screaming from a torture cell. 

I'm just the tip of the iceberg in Guatemala. There are more than 
150,000 women like myself that no one has yet given an answer 
to. It has to stop. 

I would like to ask for my case to be immediately declassified for 
a number of reasons: 

Number one, so that I can find his body and offer him a decent 
burial before his body is destroyed; 

Number two, so that there will not be total destruction of the evi- 
dence down there before I can get to it; 

Number three, to restore public confidence in what our own gov- 
ernment has done in this case. I don't know what's gone on. I want 
to know. If nothing bad has gone on, why can't I see the file? I'm 
not interested in knowing the names of informants. I want to know 
what happened. It's not the same thing. 

Number four, national security cannot be used to shield illegal 
or improper or immoral official conduct. What worse for national 
security can there be but criminal activity by our own government 
officials? And if it didn't take place, show us the records. Then we'll 
all know it didn't take place and public confidence will be restored. 

I would also like to ask that many other cases be declassified as 
well. Sister Diana Ortiz, a nun who was raped, left with 110 ciga- 
rette bums on her back and lowered into a pit with cadavers and 
rats was then picked up and taken out of the torture cell by a man 
with an absolute North American accent who drove her back out 
of the torture cell, who knew where she was and would have the 
authority to take her out of there. She's never heard anything. Why 
not? 

I would like to ask for there — as soon as these records are re- 
leased, for there to be in-depth hearings on what's happened with 



147 

our State Department and the CIA in Central America for the last 
20 years. It shouldn't matter what nationality all of us women are 
or what our color is or anything else. We all have a right to know 
what happened to our sons, our daughters, our loved ones, our hus- 
bands. We have the right to know, all of us. We're the same, we're 
all people, we're all human beings. 

And last, I would like to ask that since the human rights viola- 
tions continue to escalate in Guatemala, not because Ramiro De 
Leon Carpio is a bad man, but he's not the president. He can't even 
protect his own family, his cousin was assassinated as soon as he 
took office. He has since reversed every human rights position he 
ever held. 

The daughter-in-law of the assassinated cousin is often run out 
of the country. The widow is under consistent death threats. He 
can't protect his own family members, much less set the country 
in order. The army is still the president. They control the courts. 
A judge rules wrong, he's dead. We have brave lawyers like Mrs. 
DeVine's lawyer, who is run off the road and almost killed. We 
have a brave lawyer like mine, who has a bomb go off in her office 
right after the exhumation. I mean, it doesn't work, as long as the 
army blocks all institutions and terrorizes all good officials. It's not 
that the Guatemalans are bad, it's that there is an evil army con- 
trolling them and blocking all evolution. 

I'm therefore asking that if they continue to shoot, to murder, to 
torture, to rape, to bum, please start phasing in sanctions only 
against the army. There are many things we can do. We can stop 
the training exercises. We can cancel their visas here. Many of 
them are heavily implicated in the drug trade. That is well known. 
Why don't we extradite them? Why are we selling them helicopter 
parts? Why are we sending them bullets? I mean, there are private 
sales. 

There are many things we can do to get a clear message through 
to the army, We will not support you if you don't respect the law 
and if you don't respect the agreements in the peace process that 
you have just signed yourselves; you must support your peace 
agreements, you must comply. I'm asking you to do that. It's too 
late for my husband. It's too late for Mrs. DeVine's husband. It's 
too late for both of us as women who loved their husbands. Please 
don't let it be too late for anyone else. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman Specter. Well, thank you, Ms. Harbury, for that very 
compelling testimony. 

The course of action that you suggest has a lot of merit, in terms 
of the maximum amount of pressure which can be applied by the 
United States and other law-abiding and decent countries to try to 
stem the abuses of human rights in Guatemala. And your heroic 
efforts are instrumental in leading this country in the right path. 
It is astounding, in a sense, that you have to undertake hunger 
strikes to attract sufficient attention to bring about this kind of a 
remedy. But to repeat, this Committee will investigate the matter 
fully and do our very best to get to the bottom of it and take action 
and make the recommendations and act legislatively to implement 
the policy to do our utmost to stop these human rights violations. 



148 

You mentioned in your testimony Sister Dianna Ortiz, and the 
Committee would like to recognize her today. She is a U.S. citizen. 
She was raped and tortured in Guatemala with 111 cigarette bums 
on her back, which is the information provided to me, which you 
have mentioned yourself. 

Mrs. DeVine, you have lived in Guatemala many years 

Mrs. DeVine. Twenty-four years. 

Chairman Specter. You have testified about your own victimiza- 
tion through the murder of your husband. You have heard Ms. 
Harbury's testimony. What suggestions would you make? Would 
you concur with what Ms. Harbury has said? Would you have any 
other additional suggestions as to what the United States should 
do to try to reverse the human rights abuses in Guatemala? 

Mrs. DeVine. Well, my sentiments parallel those of Senator 
Kerrey and Senator Shelby. And I'm just asking, do we need tax 
dollars to go into covert operations? I don't really know. Like I say, 
I don't have much of an idea if we do indeed need these — the CIA 
and operating the way they're operating. I lean toward trying it in 
the peaceful manner. What about putting dollars into educating the 
people? 

I'm not really sure, but the idea of paying off, giving our tax dol- 
lars to people like perhaps Alpirez and other officers, how do we 
know what they tell us is the truth anyway? And aren't there other 
ways to find out what we need to find out? Do we have to sneak 
around? Can't we do things openly? 

As far as my case goes, I would really ask that the Committee 
conduct a full and honest investigation into the facts surrounding 
the death of my husband. What we want is to find out the truth. 

Guatemala is a beautiful country. It needs all the help it can get 
from those of us that are here today. And some of us are sitting 
here now, some of us are in the audience and others are not 
present. It doesn't deserve what's been happening to it, and I don't 
know that our government has helped. I don't think the CIA is 
really helping by their actions. I really don't know if these allega- 
tions are true. But if they are, I think it did a great injustice to 
Guatemala. 

Chairman Specter. Colonel Cornell, you have been on the scene 
for a substantial period of time in Guatemala, and you have a mili- 
tary man's perspective and some background in the value of intel- 
ligence operations. How do you evaluate what Mrs. DeVine has 
said about questioning covert actions? Without making any inap- 
propriate disclosure, is the activity being undertaken by the U.S. 
Government in Guatemala today worth it in light of what you have 
observed as to human rights violations? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, I can only speak up to the end of 1993, 
but we learned an awful lot and we were able to influence through 
the information we received, through various sources, both civilian 
and military, in the government of Guatemala. I would hate to see 
those cut off, because that information is sometimes very vital to 
understanding what is going on, or to prevent something from hap- 
pening. Very vital. And so I — I have been out of the scene for over 
a year, so I can't evaluate the accusations either. 

My time there, though, I felt the activities of all the intelligence 
collectors in Guatemala and the products they produced were ex- 



149 

tremely vital to our efforts, and extremely vital in our efforts to 
support human rights, to get to the bottom of cases. 

Chairman Specter. To what extent is the U.S. support key, criti- 
cal, or important on the war against drugs. Colonel? 

Colonel Cornell. I think it is absolutely necessary on the war 
against drugs. Guatemala is a transition point — transfer point of 
drugs. Literally tons of cocaine coming into Guatemala and then 
being transferred from there up to the U.S. 

The only intelligence apparatus in Guatemala is the Guatemalan 
army's intelligence. So the DEA has had to work close with them 
for intelligence and the sharing has, in my time, been very good, 
and led to a number of seizures of drug traffickers, drug aircraft, 
you know, tons of cocaine. So yes, it's extremely important in the 
drug war. Extremely important. 

Chairman SPECTER. Ms. DeVine, you have hired a private inves- 
tigator. Could you tell the Committee what evidence has been un- 
covered or what facts or what indicators, pointing to anybody spe- 
cial as being implicated in the assassination, execution of your hus- 
band? 

Mrs. DeVine. Well, I think both Al Cornell and I went into that, 
and are you wanting names right now? 

Chairman Specter. Well, if you have — if your investigator — I'm 
sorry, I didn't hear your question. You say, do I want names? 

Mrs. DeVine. Well, we did perform a complete investigation, we 
think, and the soldiers are in prison, the officers are not, and there 
are still a few officers out there that we believe are implicated in 
the crime, and they have never been brought to trial, and the U.S. 
Embassy has been trying to get that accomplished, but it hasn't 
come about. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, we will pursue those leads to — one av- 
enue which has already been mentioned is to put pressure on the 
Guatemalan government and another angle might be to see if there 
is sufficient evidence to qualify under the terrorist statute which 
would invoke a grant of U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute them our- 
selves, to extradite them. 

Colonel Cornell, do you have a point to add there? 

Colonel Cornell. Go ahead, sir. I lost track of it now. 

Chairman SPECTER. Ms. Harbury, do you have anything specific 
to add by way of any evidence of directed at whoever murdered 
your husband? 

Ms. Harbury. The eyewitness, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, issued a 
very full list of high level intelligence officials, including Colonel 
Alpirez and also Major Sosa Orellana, both of whom are School of 
the Americas graduates, as well. That list has been freely available 
to all authorities since the very beginning. We still need the files 
that the Intelligence Committee has as to, as I started to say be- 
fore, progress properly in a number of different forums. Or we ask 
the Inter-American Commission needs all the evidence so that they 
can send it on up to the Inter-American Court. We need it to 
progress for a criminal proceedings in Guatemala. 

One of the reasons Colonel Alpirez has not been detained is be- 
cause they are saying there is no evidence. They need your evi- 
dence, some of the Committee's evidence of some kind. The same 



150 

thing up here. I can't proceed anywhere on anything until we get 
hold of those files. 

Chairman Specter. Well, my time has expired. I want to say 
now, and I will have a few words to say later about how powerful 
your testimony is. There is nothing like hearing it in person, and 
like many Americans who will hear your words and see your faces, 
will hear the passion and the emotion on television, I think it is 
a very, very powerful message which you have conveyed in this 
hearing today, and I thank you. 

Ms. Harbury. Thank you very much. 

Chairman Specter. Senator Kerrey. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Colonel Cornell, I would hke to, in this first round, ask you a se- 
ries of questions just so I can get an understanding of the detail, 
the chronology, and your relationship, in particular, to the CIA and 
some of the things that you observed at the time. 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. To be clear on this, you were present in 
country, you were the defense attache in June—June 8, 1990, when 
Michael DeVine was murdered? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And you remained in country all the 
way through the end of December 1993? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, I left on January 11, 1994. January 11, 
1994 I departed Guatemala. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And then you got out of the service in 
February 1994? 

Colonel Cornell. 1994, yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you were there all the way through 
January 1994, you were there all the way through the trial? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there for the guilty verdict 
and you were there for the appellate court conviction in May 1993. 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there when Serrano closed the 
court. 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. No, you were not there when Serrano 
closed the courts. 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. In May 1994? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. No, that was in May 1993. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. May 1993 he closed the courts? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you were there when he closed the 
courts. I got my date, year off, which is why I need to go through 
this. So you were there then through the election of Carpio? 

Colonel Cornell. Of De Leon, yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there? All right. 

Let me — I just wanted to set that for my own understanding. Let 
me go through a series of questions with you. 

You then worked on the DeVine case, not necessarily from June, 
but certainly July 18 when you made a visit to military zone 23 
along with the naval attache? 



151 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Were you involved from then all the way 
through January 1994 when you departed country? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Now, during that period, did any mem- 
ber of the embassy staff present information naming a specific 
Guatemalan officer as having ordered the killing of Mr. DeVine? 

Colonel Cornell. No. No, not a specific officer, no. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. I mean, did — when you say not a specific 
officer 

Colonel Cornell. Well, we do have some information I'd rather 
discuss in a closed hearing concerning some of the — some sources 
and some reports made as to where the blame may lie, but I am 
like Carole right now, I still don't know today what was the real 
reason they killed him. I have heard a couple of versions. I am still 
not convinced that we know the whole story yet. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, without getting into specifics then, 
was U.S. intelligence collected in Guatemala and elsewhere impor- 
tant in the identification and conviction of Mr. DeVine's mur- 
derers? In other words, did the intelligence that we collect provide 
some assists to the conviction, or what the incriminating informa- 
tion provided from sources other than intelligence? 

Colonel Cornell. No, the incriminating information really was 
provided by the situation itself, not from intelligence sources. The 
five originally arrested enlisted men finally, thinking they were 
being sold out, finally talked, explained what they had seen, the or- 
ganization of this second group under Captain Contrares, going to 
Poptun, and 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did intelligence provide any information 
to the ambassador that enabled him to keep the pressure on the 
Guatemalan government? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. For trial? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So even though it may not have resulted 
in any evidence at the trial 

Colonel Cornell. Initial information that we were getting was 
that the — certain members of the army staff were stiffing us, and 
so we realized we were on the right track. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So for example, when Ambassador 
Stroock goes and sees the President on 31 January 1991, saying no 
military aid, he's being supplied information by our intelligence 
people that enabled him to say that or reinforced his 

Colonel Cornell. It enabled him to say there's been no progress, 
you're not cooperating, your blocking the case, and therefore, we 
can't reopen it. Serrano wanted a clean slate. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Similarly, when Cheney came in Feb- 
ruary 1992, I mean, was intelligence providing our Defense Sec- 
retary with information that enables him to deliver the same mes- 
sage? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. You observed the Guatemalan military 
for four years. Colonel Cornell. To what extent did U.S. training 



152 

and U.S. intelligence programs make the Guatemalan military sen- 
sitive to human rights? 

Colonel Cornell. My impression was that we had, when I ar- 
rived, a layer of hardliners and a layer of progressives. The pro- 
gressives tended to be the mid-range junior officers, some of them 
were senior officers. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you speak directly to the issue of 
the School of the Americas? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, the School of the Americas, I think, 
played a role in helping these officers understand our position on 
human rights, understand the value of human rights to other pro- 
grams, such as democracy and development. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you believe it changed behavior? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Constructively? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir; yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. From your observation of the readiness 
and the equipment of the Guatemalan military, did it appear to 
you — and we have read reports to the contrary, but did it appear 
to you that they received compensation funding from some other 
source to make up for the 1991 cutoff? 

Colonel Cornell. No, sir. The cutoff was 21 December 90, 
and 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you saw nothing in 1991 that indi- 
cated to you that there was an alternative source of funding that 
the Guatemalan military was using? 

Colonel Cornell. Absolutely not, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did you see any indication that there 
was a deterioration of capacity as a result of the cut off in military 
funding? Did it have an impact? 

Colonel Cornell. It was minimal, sir. The impact was primarily 
in the air force and the navy. They relied on our parts to keep their 
aircraft flying. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And were they unable to keep their air- 
craft flying as a consequence? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. By the time I left, almost all 
their aircraft, especially a jet aircraft, were grounded. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you describe. Colonel, the Guate- 
malan environment at the time of your service there? You were 
there for four and a half years, in terms of political crime and 
human rights situation? 

Colonel Cornell. It was an environment that — it was a transi- 
tion environment or atmosphere. It had been very difficult during 
the height of the guerrilla war. Now we had gone through one com- 
plete civilian presidency into another and we were seeing improve- 
ments being made, we were seeing, for example, the press talking 
about human rights in 1989 and 1990, where they wouldn't talk 
about it in 1985 because they were scared to death. So we were 
seeing improvements, but still we were seeing problems. And we 
were continuing to have problems in the embassy with the govern- 
ment over human rights cases. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So speaking to your four D's, democra- 
tization being the top of the list, do you believe that U.S. involve- 



153 

ment in Guatemala has advanced the cause of democracy in the 
country? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir, I do. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you give me some examples beyond 
the freedom of press? 

Colonel Cornell. I think the best one is when President Serrano 
took over the government. It was mid and junior range officers, up 
to majors, lieutenant colonels that went to the minister of defense 
and said, hey, we're outside the constitution. You need to go back 
to the president and get us back into constitution;. And if you guys 
don't, we're going to ask you guys to step down and we'll go up to 
the president and ask him to step down and put this country back 
under civilian rule. And this was in May 1993, and this was a 
shock to all Guatemalans because Guatemalans themselves didn't 
realize that the mentality of the military had been transforming 
away from dominating the government. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you have ideas on how this Commit- 
tee could assist Mrs. DeVine and Ms. Harbury in getting the Gua- 
temalan government — I mean, it seems to me that we could put 
pressure on the Guatemalan government to, on the one hand, pro- 
vide an accounting of an individual who is presumed dead and/or 
missing, or on the other hand, to get Captain Contreras back or to 
carry on the prosecution. Perhaps you can describe the current lay 
of the land in Guatemala as to the case against Alpirez? 

Colonel Cornell. I think you have to keep up the diplomatic 
pressure. I think that is where the answer is. You have got to keep 
the pressure on and hang on to it just like Carole did with her 
case, you have to hang on like a bull dog, even though they may 
not like it. There is not much you can do — you can cut off aid, 
we've already done that. You can cut off their schooling. I believe 
we've already done that. You just have to keep up the diplomatic 
pressure and the demarches and just keep beating them over the 
head until you get their attention, until you start seeing some 
changes in behavior. And I believe we have seen a lot of changes 
over my time there, but there is still more to come. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate it. Colonel. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. Senator Kerrey. 

I am going to have to excuse myself for a few moments, because 
there is a conference on appropriations going on and I have just 
gotten a call from Senator Kerry and Congressman Porter and I 
will be back as promptly as I can, and Senator Kerrey will preside, 
and our next Senator for questioning is Senator Cohen. 

Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First, let me thank this panel for its testimony. I must say I wish 
you had actually been listed as our first panel. I think that your 
stories would have placed in greater perspective the monstrous evil 
that you've had to confront over the years and the absolute level 
of frustration you've experienced in trying to gather up whatever 
resources were available to you personally and to you as a citizen 
of the United States. You have described your frustration in lan- 
guage and with passion that has rarely been demonstrated before 
any panel of Congress that I have ever served on. 



154 

I might suggest, Colonel, you said very little we could do but 
pressure. What about cutting off their visas? Has that been done 
as well? 

Colonel Cornell. It has been done, I don't know to what extent. 
I do know, for example, that officers or enlisted men that are sus- 
pected of being involved in drug trafficking, if we can get somebody 
to tell us who they are, then we make an effort, for example, to 
prevent their travel to the States. I am not sure the status, for ex- 
ample, of — I believe that, for example, Colonel Alpirez is cut off 
from going to the States. I may be talking out of turn or out of 
school, but I am pretty sure that's the case. 

I do know the commander of military zone 23 that was the com- 
mander of that whole area when Mrs. DeVine's husband was killed, 
he came in the embassy in 1993 for a visa and the counsel general 
sent him packing. So I do know that it does take place. I was not 
in the consulate every day but I watched it take place. 

Senator COHEN. As a retired Army officer, and one who had, I 
assume, considerable contact with the Guatemalan military, did 
you not? Is it fair to say that the enlisted men would have been 
able to engage in the abduction of Mr. DeVine without either the 
knowledge of or complicity on the part of their superiors based on 
your knowledge of their actions, activities? 

Colonel Cornell. Based on my knowledge, I can't imagine such 
a thing happening without orders from above. 

Senator COHEN. So it's reasonable to presume that a team from 
military zone 23 headquarters would not be able to work out of spe- 
cial forces school that Colonel Alpirez headed, arrest Mr. DeVine, 
torture him, question him at special forces school, and then kill 
him without the colonel's knowledge or approval? 

Colonel Cornell. It's unreasonable to think they did anything 
like that without orders. 

Senator Cohen. So when you first met Colonel Alpirez, he simply 
dismissed it as a police matter, has no knowledge. 

Colonel Cornell. When I first met Colonel Alpirez, and of 
course, I went over and talked to the zone commander, at that time 
we had not had any evidence in any direction. We had no sus- 
picions of who might have done it and they knew that at the time 
also. Their coverup had started. We didn't know it yet. We really 
knew it when Mrs. DeVine gave us a list of five names and then 
the reaction to the army to us starting to pressure for that, we re- 
alized, oh, we're on to something now. And from then on it was evi- 
dent. 

Senator COHEN. And during that time, what was the nature of 
the information being shared with you from our intelligence agen- 
cies? You, and embassy officials? 

Colonel Cornell. I would classify it as good. We had regular 
country team meetings with the ambassador to discuss all of these 
types of cases. But when the DeVine case hit, it was a regular topic 
of discussion. 

Senator COHEN. Are you satisfied that you were given full infor- 
mation during the time that you were involved in this particular 
matter by the intelligence agencies? I am asking you now in retro- 
spect, looking back, based upon what you know today as to what — 
compared to what you knew then? 



155 

Colonel Cornell. Well, I hope I was. I have seen some things 
in the press that I wasn't aware of, but I don't know the validity 
of what's in the press. I know some things in the press are com- 
pletely erroneous, so I am not sure how to gauge the rest of it. But 
I felt I had a real good relationship with the station chief and that 
he was sharing things with us as he was with the ambassador and 
the rest of the country team. 

Senator Cohen. And were it to turn out that information was not 
being shared with you, that would sort of undercut what the am- 
bassador was doing very courageously in issuing demarches. I am 
told that he was virtually in danger of being thrown out of the 
country and listed as persona non grata at one point. 

Colonel Cornell. He came very close on 31 January 1991, when 
he had a confrontation with President Serrano over the DeVine 
case and human rights, and it was human rights that it was over, 
and he came very close. But I felt that he was being given all the 
information. 

Senator Cohen. I'm sorry? 

Colonel Cornell. I always felt that he was being given all the 
information. 

Senator Cohen. That's' your belief. 

Colonel Cornell. That's a personal opinion; I don't know that. 
I don't have knowledge of that for a fact. I know I gave him every- 
thing, because he read everything we wrote and everything we did. 

Senator COHEN. Mrs. DeVine, you hired a private investigator? 

Mrs. DeVine. Yes, I did. 

Senator COHEN. And almost immediately after your hiring a per- 
sonal investigator, you started to get information that was helpful 
to you at that time? 

Mrs. DeVine. Definitely, yes. 

Senator Cohen. Can you tell us why it was a personal investiga- 
tor was able to get information where the embassy or other officials 
were not able to do so? I mean, what kind of access did he or she 
have that was not available to you through the official channels 
that you tried? 

Mrs. DeVine. Since I really don't know how things like this 
work, it was two days after we buried my husband that I had a 
meeting with this private investigator who was referred to me by 
a very good friend, and my prospective lawyer, who turned out to 
be the lawyer that I did contract. I had no idea how to proceed. 
Like I really am not sure now. I was just being guided along and 
this particular investigator had lived in Guatemala a number of 
years and he had handled very delicate cases with great success be- 
fore that. And I didn't know if it was my responsibility to acquire 
an investigator or if the embassy — at this point I hadn't even met 
Ambassador Stroock. I was on my way to meet the ambassador, but 
an hour before I met him, I met my investigator. 

And no one ever said that you shouldn't hire an investigator, the 
embassy will take over and do it. It just flowed, and we all worked 
together, and I always thought that was the way it was supposed 
to be, because I really don't know. But it worked. 

Senator Cohen. Now, you indicated that your attorney had been 
threatened, driven off the road 



156 

Mrs. DeVine. He had been threatened on many, many occasions, 
as well as the investigator, close friends, people that work for me, 
witnesses. 

Senator Cohen. What about you, have you been threatened? 

Mrs. DeVine. I personally hadn't been threatened, no. 

Senator Cohen. And Mrs. Harbury, what about you? 

Ms. Harbury. In the last, on the hunger strike, a truck drove — 
a car drove in front of the national palace and hung a machine gun 
or some large shotgun out the window — I was asleep. I was threat- 
ened with deportation, they were saying I had entered the country 
illegally, even though I had the stamp on my passport. They sent 
the equivalent of a lynch mob out until I started telling police that 
we don't have to do another travel advisory, it would be bad for 
your tourist industry, then they all left. I was put number one on 
a list of eight in a death list, a hit squad list that was published 
in the papers the day I got taken out to the cemetery. I have had 
frivolous law suits filed against me. I have difficulty getting any 
stamps from the consulates. The last I heard, after IMET was cut 
off, there were headline banners saying that I admitted in my book 
I was a gun runner for the guerrillas. Funny thing, I wrote the 
book and I don't remember that particular quotation. And I under- 
stand now that although Colonel Alpirez has not been detained 
and, in fact, the president is suggesting he sue Mr. Torrecilli for 
slander, but if I returned to the country, I would be immediately 
subject to arrest as a subversive. 

Senator Cohen. Well, I was particularly interested in the state- 
ment that was given to you that just one person shouldn't impede 
the peace process. It struck me, as I was listening to you say that, 
I was thinking of the quote attributed to Stalin, who said that the 
death of one person is a tragedy, the death of a million, a statistic. 
And it seems that it has almost been inverted in your case and 
that your husband's death has been treated much like a statistic 
rather than a tragedy. 

Ms. Harbury. Well, it was very terrifying for me, and which I 
left my Guatemalan friends had been in agreement with. And I 
would point out I have a letter of support signed by 25 of the lead- 
ing indigenous rights groups and widows co-ops, et cetera, in Gua- 
temala, was that with this level of clear evidence, never again will 
we have this much evidence, an eyewitness that can name all of 
the top level colonels and majors, first names, both last names, 
rank and position, date and place, together with confirmation by 
the CIA, this is never going to happen again. And I knew that if 
I just gave up and let this happen and they got away with it, then 
there go another 150,000 civilians. I just couldn't let that happen. 
It's not an individual case. It was landmark test case. 

Senator Cohen. Mrs. Harbury and Mrs. DeVine, let me say that 
you have given some of the most powerful and passionate testi- 
mony I have ever heard, and you have carried it yourselves with 
I think great grace and restraint under the circumstances. The old 
expression about one man with courage makes a majority has to 
be revised now. We have to say two women with courage can make 
a revolution, in terms of our relationships with other countries. 
And I really believe that what you have done personally in terms 
of your own personal persistence and perseverance and heroism as 



157 

such can change our attitudes, and not simply permit your husband 
or Mr. DeVine to be a statistic in the relationship while pursuing 
this peace process in Guatemala. 

But thank you very much for coming before us. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine. 

Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mrs. DeVine, you have lived in Guatemala for 24 years, I believe 
you said. 

Mrs. DeVine. Yes. 

Senator DeWine. Could you describe for me what your weekly 
contact would be, if any, with the military, or your observations of 
the military? What — for the area where you lived, what contact 
would you have, or what would you observe? 

Mrs. DeVine. Are you speaking at the present time or in the 
past? It changed. 

Senator DeWine. 

Senator Cohen. Tell me the difference. Talk about both. 

Mrs. DeVine. When Michael and I first arrived in Poptun, the 
army played a bigger role in the community. They would do things 
like work on the roads. It was a construction battalion. And they 
would often have dinners, formal — very, very formal affairs out in 
the middle of nowhere, in the middle of the jungle. The town had 
no electricity, but they would have these beautiful dinners, ma- 
rimba music, and we would receive engraved invitations by the 
commander to go to these affairs, which we did. 

And as time went on, the construction battalion was moved to 
another area, and new people came in, and there was less and less 
contact with the local townsfolk. 

And Mike and I owned a cafeteria in the town — a very small 
town of Poptun, it's like a frontier town. And soldiers and officers 
would come in. We were one of the very few restaurants in town. 
We weren't a bar. It was a very decent place. Very reasonable 
prices. And people could come in, the Indian people, the local folks 
that didn't nave a lot of money, could have a hamburger which 
they didn't even know what they were most of the time — we had 
to educate them. And they could bring their family in for a cup of 
hot chocolate and feel like they went somewhere. Before there was 
nothing like that in the town of Poptun. 

Well, because of the business, we got to know more soldiers, their 
families, the officers. But in reality, our social life had very little 
to do with anybody in the military. We were closer to the local 
townsfolk, the school teachers, some specialists in the army, which 
just means like a man goes to work for the army but he is not a 
part of the army and he goes home to his house at night in the 
town of Poptun. 

But basically we were not on friendly terms, meaning friends, 
friends to visit in the evening, with anybody in the army. 

Senator DeWine. Did that change over time? Or was that the 
change? 

Mrs. DeVine. That was in the latter years. The first 10 years, 
yes. After that, no. Then, after my husband's — always, though, be- 
cause we ran a camp ground and guest house, people were curious 
about us. Whenever there were visiting dignitaries to the base of 
Poptun, the commanders or officials would bring them out to intro- 



158 

duce us, for Mike to show them around our farm. We were doing 
things that they hadn't heard of, Uke organic farming. So we did 
frequently have visitors. But it was still more in an official sense, 
not friendly-friendly. 

After the death of Michael and the new commander came in, 
about two years ago, things changed. He was under orders from 
General Kilo who was the minister of state or something like 
that — he's with the army. To take care of us out there. So the com- 
mander of the base came out with his family, two boys, frequently. 
He had dinner, very polite man. He was one of the new style offi- 
cers that Colonel Cornell was telling us about, that looked to the 
future. He was a very gentle, I felt, honest man, and he would 
bring his officers out and they would bring their wives out. It was 
nice. I wouldn't ever say we were friendly-friendly, but they made 
an effort. 

Senator DeWine. Thank you. 

Colonel, you served in Central America and South America for 
some time. Where would you place Guatemala on the scale as far 
as human rights violations? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, that's difficult, because there are so 
many countries in Latin America, so many I haven't served in. 

Senator DeWine. I understand. 

Colonel Cornell. But I would say it's toward the bottom of the 
rung. It's got a ways to go from what I've seen in a lot of the other 
countries. 

Senator DeWine. During the time you were there, you have de- 
scribed — well, I'll let you categorize it, I won't — improvement? 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. 

Senator DeWine. You, in response to another question that was 
asked, talked a little bit about the use of the intelligence informa- 
tion that you received, the embassy received. And I understand and 
you understand we are in a public meeting, but I wonder if you 
could give us a little more feel, without getting too specific, about 
how valuable that type of information is? I mean, you described it 
as vital, enabled you to get to the bottom of cases — I assume you 
meant human rights violation cases. Because I think it goes to one 
of the bigger questions that has to be looked at, not just in regard 
to Guatemala, but obviously in regard to the use of the CIA in this 
era. 

Colonel Cornell. In a real time sense, in my experience in Gua- 
temala, there were instances where information received allowed 
us to react quickly with the host government or react quickly with 
other sources to try to save someone's life. 

Senator DeWine. Did it save lives do you think, or not? 

Colonel Cornell. I think it did, yes, sir. I wouldn't say a lot of 
them, but I would say there are situations where our quick inter- 
vention as an embassy, based on information slipped to us really 
had an impact or really got a favorable reaction when we didn't ex- 
pect it. 

Senator DeWine. I assume the situation was that in some cases 
the information was good and in some cases the information wasn't 
good? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, that happens, but, yes, sir. But I would 
say most of the time it was good. It also helped us in another way. 



159 

not so life threatening, but through information received Hke that 
about human rights, it helped us go to the host government, when 
we would hear, for example, of some important changes or impor- 
tant appointments within the military, it would allow us to go to 
the host government and say, you guys are making a big mistake. 
You're going to put so and so in that job? With his background? 
And they would look at us like, how do you know that? And all of 
a sudden you would see them back away or you would see a change 
of assignment and it was directly a result of information we had 
found out and we would go and we would raise the issue. And it 
was information on human rights and information on suspicion of 
an officer, for example, involved in drugs. 

Senator DeWine. You described a situation in regard to — speak- 
ing of drugs — Guatemala being a transshipment point for drugs. 
How did that change over the period of time you were there, if it 
did, and again in regard to the information you were receiving, the 
intelligence information, what impact did that have on what you 
did? Did it matter? 

Colonel Cornell. No, it had a major impact on seizures and 
working together. You can have the information, but you've got to 
be able to work with the host government. In the case there, the 
treasury police are responsible for — they have the arrest authority 
in drug cases. So the DEA and the embassy would have to work 
with the Treasury police to make seizures. And the intelligence 
provided by Guatemalans who were key in taking down those sei- 
zures. 

Yes, sir. 

Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Hutchison. 

Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to say, as several members have, that the testimony, Ms. 
Harbury, and I missed your's, Ms. DeVine, but from the followup, 
I will just say I appreciate the loyalty and the tenacity that you 
have to your late husbands. I think that you have shown a lot of 
guts and I appreciate it very, very much. 

This morning I said I thought there were basically three issues 
here. First is the policy regarding the information that comes to 
this Committee as the oversight Committee for the CIA, and how 
important I think it is because of the nature of covert operations, 
that the communications be very open, so that we can put some 
judgment into some of these very difficult issues. And I am very 
concerned about the fact that after the death of your husband, Ms. 
DeVine, the issue was brought to the Justice Department, which I 
certainly appreciate the fact that the officials felt that we should 
try to prosecute the murderers of your husband. But nevertheless, 
we were not informed and therefore this potential CIA asset contin- 
ued to be paid by the United States after there was suspicion that 
he was involved. 

That is a policy with which we must deal, but certainly your 
courage has brought that to our attention. 

The second issue is the policy regarding the standards we have 
in the CIA for our assets. And once again, you have brought this 



160 

to our attention with your bravery, but it is something that we 
must deal with, and I assure you that we will. 

The third issue is the basic treatment of American citizens by the 
Department of State. This morning I asked the Secretary of State, 
the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Watson, if he felt that the State De- 
partment had been forthcoming with both of you regarding your 
circumstances? They are different, but clearly you both had need 
of help and information and still do, regarding your husbands. Sec- 
retary Watson said he felt that they had been forthcoming. And yt,u 
I hear your testimony that you had to go to an open records re- 
quest and you got the certified copy of a press release. I would like 
to ask both Ms. Harbury and Mrs. DeVine how you feel you were 
treated by the State Department, and particularly since I didn't 
hear your testimony, Mrs. DeVine, I would like to know if you felt 
they were forthcoming with regard to your situation. And then I 
would like Ms. Harbury to add to that. 

Mrs. DeVine. I always thought they were, but right now I am 
not so sure. I mean, I am sure that the embassy did everjdihing 
that it could and shared with me everything that they knew. But 
I am not so sure that there wasn't more to it that they and I didn't 
know, and that's what we would like to fmd out. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Do you feel — and I still want to give you an 
opportunity — but Mrs. DeVine, do you feel that you got information 
from the CIA or from the State Department, actually — ^you 
wouldn't perhaps have dealt with the CIA — but from the State De- 
partment, that was significant in comparison to what your own pri- 
vate investigator has brought you? 

Mrs. DeVine. I felt that they always shared information and 
worked together from the very beginning and still are, as far as I 
know it. 

Senator Hutchison. So you do feel that they have been forth- 
coming . 

Mrs. DeVine. Yes. 

Senator Hutchison. Ms. Harbury? 

Ms. Harbury. You've heard my testimony, of course. I feel that 
they were dishonest with me in a very positive sense. And that the 
intentionally led me to believe that their opinion that my husband 
was dead was only an opinion and nothing more, when, in fact, 
there was concrete evidence that he had been ordered executed. 
There is a gulf of a difference there and they were willing to let 
me risk my life on a second hunger strike without telling me that, 
because it was embarrassing. 

I would also like to add that there is a coalition called Coalition 
Missing of myself and a number of other U.S. citizens, including 
Mr. Blake, the brothers of Nicholas Blake, the journalist who was 
killed there, and also Diana Ortiz, and a number of other of us. We 
have all either ourselves been abused physically or tortured in the 
case of Sister Diana Ortiz, or ourselves lost a family member there 
as in my own case, or in the Blake family case, and I don't think 
any of us are satisfied with the assistance we received from the 
U.S. Embassy, although we do understand that Mrs. DeVine was 
treated, you know, as she herself was saying, she's been satisfied 
with her treatment. But none of the rest of us are. No, we've been 
very dissatisfied. 



161 

Senator Hutchison. You said that you thought you had to go the 
open records request route and that was not satisfactory. Let me 
say, I think that in defense of U.S. officials, if there is classified 
information, obviously there has to be a judgment call about what 
can be revealed because it might harm someone else. I think that 
is a fair statement. 

On the other hand, I think that we do need to look at the policy 
of what is shared, particularly in a situation like your's where your 
husband was missing really, and you were trying to confirm just 
a closure, and I know a closure would be very comforting, even 
now, knowing for sure one way or the other. And I want to look 
at that policy as well. 

I have not heard this just from you. I have heard from many peo- 
ple, through the years, not in a partisan way at all, during Repub- 
lican administrations, during Democrat administrations, the State 
Department has not been forthcoming or helpful many times to our 
citizens, and that may or may not be fair, but I certainly think that 
we ought to keep looking at that issue and making sure that to the 
extent that we can be, that we improve that cooperation, because 
many times, when a person is overseas, they have really no other 
help and no one to look to other than our own U.S. representative. 
And that is something that once again, this coming to light just fo- 
cuses a need that I think we must address. 

Let me just ask one other question, and perhaps Colonel Cornell 
could also add to this, and I would throw it out to any of you, not 
as experts, but as people with real world experience in Guatemala. 
The President has cut off funding now to the army units in Guate- 
mala except for the anti-drug smuggling. Well, from what I have 
heard from you today, it seems that there is a lot of suspicion that 
there are army personnel involved in the drug smuggling. So I 
would just ask you from your experience there if you think that the 
Call Cartel drug unit, or I guess an3rwhere else, does it come 
through Guatemala, do you think that the money that we would 
still be spending on the efforts to shut that down are also possibly 
being diverted to the same types of people that would be actually 
doing the drug smuggling themselves? In other words, are we con- 
tinuing to throw money down a rat hole, even as we have cut off 
everything but that? 

Ms. Harbury. Yes. And I would recommend reading the 18 
writings of a journalist named Mr. Frank Smythe. He has read 
through all of the embassy files, and as is common knowledge in 
Guatemala, most of the really serious drug runners are high level 
military officials. They're the ones with the airplanes. Most Guate- 
malans can't afford food, let alone an airplane or a strip of land 
where an airplane could land. And any money that goes to drug 
trafficking that goes to the army. It's not going to end drug traf- 
ficking. No, I mean. I think that is something we have to look very 
carefully at. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Who did you say, Mr. Wyeth? 

Ms. Harbury. Frank Smythe. He wrote a recent article in the 
Wall Street Journal which I think exposed that a number of extra- 
dition requests of high level military people that we know are in- 
volved in drug trafficking, that those extradition requests have not 



162 

been respected. That was within the last 30 days that that ap- 
peared. 

Senator HUTCHISON. Colonel? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, I have a different view. I don't believe 
the Guatemalan army, as an institution, is involved in drug traf- 
ficking. I know about Guatemalan officers having been involved 
and I am sure there are some still involved. It is true that the 
army has kicked out in probably the last four or five years upwards 
of 20 to 25 officers because they were involved in drug trafficking. 
They kicked them out because they didn't have enough evidence to 
try them. Example. An air force colonel flew an aircraft up to Texas 
without applying for leave. And when they discovered he had left 
country and came back, they figured the only excuse for him doing 
that without telling anybody was that he probably got involved in 
drug trafficking. So they held an honor board and kicked him out. 

We did try to extradite a lieutenant colonel — I don't have a grasp 
of the name right now, but we weren't, at least up to the time I 
left, able to get him extradited. It was a legal problem. But the 
army kicked him out and put him on the streets. 

So I am not sure, listening to your question, where this money 
is going. I wasn't aware that any money was going to the army 
with regards to the drug program. I thought it was primarily being 
funneled through the embassy to support the treasury policy. So 
maybe I am not well informed in that specific area. 

Senator Hutchison. I am only reading the newspaper, and from 
what it says here, it appears there is that one amount of funding 
that would go to intelligence related activities regarding drug 
smuggling, so 

Colonel Cornell. Oh, strictly to intelligence related activities, 
yes, that possibly is. But the intelligence directorate in Guatemala 
has always been very forthcoming with intelligence on trafficking. 
They have played a key role in that whole drug war. 

Senator Hutchison. Thank you. 

Did you want to add, Mrs. DeVine, because my time is up. You 
are welcome to. 

Mrs. DeVine. The only thing I know is that rumors abound 
amongst my Guatemalan friends that army officials are involved in 
drugs. That's it. Rumors. I don't know any more. 

Senator Hutchison. Thank you. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you. Senator. 

I have statements that Senator Baucus and also Senator Mack 
wanted included in the record. 

[The statements of Senator Baucus and Senator Mack follow:] 

Opening Statement of Senator Max Baucus 

I would like to thank the Chairman and Vice Chairman for holding this very im- 
portant hearing. We have all been seized by the allegations in the press of CLA in- 
volvement in Guatemala. The importance of this hearing, therefore, is the fact that 
it is being held under the full scrutiny of the public. Now that important allegations 
of CIA misdeeds are before the public, we all must work to get accurate information 
to them. Intelligence is extremely important, but the American people have dif- 
ficulty supporting this activity when these sorts of allegations arise and they remain 
unanswered. 

I am hopeful that the Committee's investigation into the allegations will answer 
some very important questions. 



163 

Was the CIA a channel for funds to the Guatemalan Government after official 
funding had been cut off in the wake of the brutal murder of the American, Michael 
DeVine? 

Were any funds used by the CIA consistent with U.S. policy at the time? 

Were all CIA activities within full view of U.S. pohcy makers, both in Guatemala 
and in Washington? 

Did the CIA knowingly support people in Guatemala who were suspected of per- 
petrating human rights abuses? 

If CIA personnel acted outside U.S. poUcy, have they been held accountable for 
their actions, and what actions have been taken to hold them accountable? 

I realize that some of the answers to these questions may be difficult to answer 
in an open forum. But as we are all well aware, CIA's future is being seriously ques- 
tioned. One of the most important issues being raised about their futiire concerns 
accountability. This Committee seriously questioned whether those involved in the 
Aldrich Ames spy case had been properly held accountable for their actions. At the 
time that we were looking into the Ames case, I believed that they had not been. 
In the issue before us today, the question of accountability is even larger. Not only 
am I concerned whether or not members of the CIA are being held accountable for 
their actions, but was the CIA itself accountable to policy makers who were trying 
to pursue a consistent foreign policy with regard to Guatemala and alleged human 
rights abuses there? 

So Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this public hear- 
ing and for getting the Committee involved in this very important matter. I am sure 
that the Committee's report will help the American people to understand better 
what has happened. 

Opening Statement of Senator Connie Mack 

Congress has an obligation to ensure that U.S. intelligence agencies operate with- 
in the law and in a fashion consistent with U.S. interests and values. Congress also 
has a responsibility to ensure that the intelligence community has the resources, or- 
ganization, and personnel necessary to effectively support civilian policymakers and 
the U.S. military. In order to simultaneously meet both objectives — conducting over- 
sight while protecting U.S. national security — the InteUigence Committees in both 
Houses of Congress conduct almost all of their deliberations in private. 

Last year, there was a public clamor for information regarding the Ames case. 
The Senate Intelligence Committee responded, after a thorough and lengthy inves- 
tigation, by publishing a detailed report, passing counterintelligence legislation and 
makinjg administrative recommendations to improve U.S. counterintelligence prac- 
tices. The Committee did not, however, hold public hearings on the Ames case or 
release information until after it had carefully gathered and assessed the facts. In 
my view, that is also the approach that the committee should follow with regard 
to the recent allegations concerning CIA activities in Guatemala. 

Unfortunately, todays hearing is being held at a time when security classification 
prevents committee members from candidly questioning the witnesses or stating 
facts that are critical to the issues that will be raised. Without in any way intending 
to do so, this hearing could therefore mislead the public. Alternatively, or in addi- 
tion, this hearing coiUd inadvertently lead to the disclosure of sensitive information. 

I believe that as a result of the investigations being undertaken by the House and 
Senate Intelligence Committees, the CIA, NSA, and Army IG's, the President's In- 
telligence Oversight Board, and the FBI, virtually everything connected with intel- 
ligence activities in Guatemala will soon come to light. Holding a hearing at this 
time, however, when members and witnesses are severely constrained by the classi- 
fication of critical information, and the sensitivity of ongoing investigations, seems 
at best awkward and at worst a potential disservice to U.S. government employees, 
the families involved, and the public. Consequently, I expressed my concerns to the 
Chairman and informed him that I would not be participating in the hearing. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I think it relevant to read at least part 
of a statement that was provided — testimony provided by Mr. Rob- 
ert M. Bryant, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Fed- 
eral Bureau of Investigation, regarding a copy of a letter sent to 
the Attorney General from Congressman Torricelli, a letter sent for 
an allegation that an Army intelligence officer currently assigned 
at NSA is involved in purging records regarding communications 
intercepts which show U.S. Army Intelligence involvement in the 



164 

murders that we are discussing today. DOJ referred this to the FBI 
on March 29. 

On March 30, the FBI was tasked by DOJ to investigate allega- 
tions of possible obstruction of justice. The investigation was initi- 
ated at NSA to determine if any records were being destroyed. 

On March 31 contact was established with the respective Inspec- 
tor General elements of the CIA, Department of Defense, and Drug 
Enforcement Administration regarding the alleged destruction of 
materials and the possible obstruction of justice. 

As a result of the FBI's investigation into the possible obstruc- 
tion of justice, the FBI is aware that separate inquiries are being 
conducted by the respective IGs of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
the DOJ, NSA, and the Department of Defense. The FBI is unable 
to comment on the scope and current status of each. 

[The statement of Mr. Bryant follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Robert M. Bryant 

On 3/29/95, the Department of Justice (DOJ) referred to the FBI a copy of a letter 
sent to the Attorney General from Robert G. Torricelli, a Member of Congress. The 
letter set forth an allegation that an Army Intelligence Officer, currently assigned 
to the National Security Agency (NSA), is involved in purging records regarding 
communication intercepts which show U.S. Army Intelligence involvement in the 
mvu-der of Michael DeVine in 1990, and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez in 1992. 

On 3/30/95, the FBI was tasked by DOJ to investigate allegations of possible ob- 
struction of justice. The investigation was initiated at NSA to determine if any 
records were being destroyed or purged regarding the allegations as set forth by 
Congressman TorricelU. The FBI is undertaking the appropriate investigation, in- 
cluding interviews and review of documents, in connection with this matter. How- 
ever, the FBI is not involved in directing or participating in any other criminal 
investigation(s) at the present time. 

On 3/31795, contact was estabUshed with the respective Inspector General ele- 
ments of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration, regarding the alleged destruction of materials and the 
possible obstruction of justice. 

As a result of the FBI's investigation into the possible obstruction of justice, the 
FBI is aware that separate inquiries are being conducted by the respective Inspector 
Generals for the Central Intelligence Agency, the DOJ, the NSA, and the Depart- 
ment of Defense. The FBI is unable to comment on the scope and current status 
of each. 

The FBI's investigation into the alleged obstruction of justice is pending and will 
be resolved as soon as possible after appropriate consultation with DOJ. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Colonel, and Mrs. DeVine as well, and 
Ms. Harbury, I would like to talk about current status in Guate- 
mala. We are going to be going into closed session in another 15 
or 20 minutes and we are going to be trying to decide, not just 
then, of course, but at points here in the future, precisely what it 
is that we ought to do. I mean, for your information, there are four 
Guatemalan legislators in town this week. Staff will be meeting 
with them to discuss some questions that they have as well, so 
there is contact that is continuing. 

But in order for me to sort of ascertain what might be possible, 
it would be useful to kind of walk through Colonel Cornell, what 
caused the Guatemalan government to take action as they did in 
1991 and 1992. I mean, Mrs. DeVine said regarding this first ever 
conviction by a military tribunal, it took a great deal of courage to 
do it, it demonstrates that people are willing to risk their lives, 
though you go on to say quite accurately, the truth is not yet been 
identified. It does seem to me that there are the rudiments of a jus- 



165 

tice system operating there and certainly with a kind of human 
rights abuses in the country, it's not the sort of thing that some- 
body typically thinks of when you're looking for redress for these 
kinds of grievances. I need to look there to try to discover whether 
or not courses of action that we are going to consider likely can be 
successful. 

As I understand it again, Colonel Cornell, from your testimony, 
after you met, defense and naval attache had a visit on July 18, 
1990, that five names end up being identified by the private inves- 
tigator that Mrs. DeVine had hired. Ambassador Stroock then pre- 
sents this list to the defense minister. And sometime in September 
1990, the ambassador recommends action to the Department of 
State in December 1990. Suspended limited aid that was being pro- 
vided about that time, around the first of the year. Serrano was 
elected in January with a new minister of defense. Stroock now 
says no military aid, that's about the time they were going to make 
him persona non grata. The five that were held in jail implicate 
seven others and then you end up with a military tribunal that 
takes action, not until when — not until September 1992. 

What was successful during that? I mean, what — again, is it — 
is it pressure from the ambassador? Is it the cutting off of aid? Is 
it public opinion in Guatemala, I mean, what sort of things occur 
there that would provide you, if you were sitting in my diminutive 
shoes, what would you consider on your list of things to do at this 
point in time? 

Colonel Cornell. That's a good question. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Again, if the goal is still to advance de- 
mocracy and improve the environment for human rights in Guate- 
mala? 

Colonel Cornell. When Ambassador Stroock, with the State De- 
partment instructions, in essence the State Department or the U.S. 
Government cut off assistance to Guatemala, we really didn't get 
much of a reaction out of the minister of defense. It didn't seem to 
bother him that much. But it was important in the process, be- 
cause when President Serrano fired him in December 1991 and ap- 
pointed a General Garcia Samayoa as minister and General Ro- 
berto Perussina as army chief, they immediately turned all that at- 
titude around. They called me into the office. They said look, we 
know you have been having a rough time up to now on this DeVine 
case, but we're going to solve it. We're going to open the doors, 
we're going to tell the tribunal to get moving, and we want this 
thing resolved. And the attitude of those two generals was com- 
pletely different than their predecessors. 

And I think a lot of it, the pressure contributed to that. These 
two generals felt that the image of the army was suffering and it 
needed to be repaired. The generals prior to that just weren't — we 
just weren't able to motivate them strongly enough. So the pres- 
sure did help, but it helped with the next pair of generals that 
came up. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And President De Leon was elected last 
June 5 by the Congress to fill out 

Colonel Cornell. He was elected in June 1993 to fill out the rest 
of Serrano's term. Yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So he's been in place almost two years? 



166 

Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. The new president will come in next 
January. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. There will be an election in 

Colonel Cornell. Be an election in November. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Of this year. 

Colonel Cornell. Of this year, yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And is there campaigning going on right 
now then? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, Carole could probably tell you more than 
I. I am hearing just little bits and pieces that there's a lot of ma- 
neuvering going on, but there'll be first rounds in November and 
if nobody wins by 50 percent or more, then the second round of the 
top two candidates will occur beginning in January, and two weeks 
later the new government moves in. 

Vice Chairman KERREY. Ms. DeVine, can you talk about the elec- 
tions? What is the environment? What is the environment for de- 
mocracy amongst your Guatemalan friends? 

Mrs. DeVine. Well, that's very difficult for me. There were some- 
thing like 20 candidates the last time I read a paper, and of course, 
I don't know how many are really going to end up running for 
president. Everybody has high hopes and the presidents promise 
you the world. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is the army the strongest institution in 
the country? 

Mrs. DeVine. I believe it is. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. And is there a standing army in Guate- 
mala in excess of what is necessary to maintain order, would you 
say. Colonel Cornell, in your experience? 

Colonel Cornell. No, sir, I wouldn't say it is excessive in terms 
of per capita. The unfortunate part about Guatemala, there just 
hasn't been enough resources. It's a very poor country. They are 
not able to hire a lot of police and when they do have police, they 
are not able to train them very well, and in the area where Carole 
DeVine lives is larger than El Salvador and it only has 80 police- 
men on duty — I mean 80 policemen period. That's treasury policy, 
national police, customs police. So you may have 20 or 25 on duty 
at any one time in an area larger than El Salvador, with 300,000 
people. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. So what is the value then of providing 
X millions of dollars a year for military intelligence? 

Colonel Cornell. I am not sure I understand where that ques- 
tion 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, we were providing X millions of 
dollars to Guatemala, were we not, to improve the quality of their 
military intelligence. Yes, is that 

Colonel Cornell. I suppose. I wasn't involved in that program, 
sir. 

Vice Chairman ICerrey. Well, what kind of development assist- 
ance were you providing during your period of time there? That 
was the second D on your list? I mean, what 

Colonel Cornell. There was a number of programs through AID. 
It was starting to be scaled back when I arrived, but as I think 
Ambassador Watson said, a total of over $900 million in assistance 
through the 1980's into the 1990's. It was in all variety of things. 



167 

from small businesses to helping farmers, it was in all kinds of sec- 
tors, economic sectors. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Ms. Harbury, were you going to 

Ms. Harbury. Yeah, I would like to comment just very briefly on 
the two issues that you just raised. I mean, it is true that there 
are few police in Guatemala. Guatemala is a Mayan country. They 
are 70 percent Maya. They have had their own way of policing 
their people and taking care of their regions. And I would like to 
point out, until the army began its rampage of counterinsurgency, 
there weren't massacres, there werent burning villages, there 
weren't any of those things. If you read the recent MINUGUA Re- 
port, the investigatory report by the U.N. team down there, the 
army has a virtual monopoly on human rights violations. It's not 
common crime. 

If we want the country to be able to settle down and institutions 
to begin to grow, we've got to get the army off the backs of the 
courts, off the backs of the police, and out of these villages. The 
same goes for the electoral process. There can be a million can- 
didates running, but if none can run on an independent platform 
without fear of assassination, there can be no reform and therefore 
no change. And meanwhile there still remains a very large chunk 
of the Mayan population that hasn't even been registered to vote. 
So I don't see a very good prognosis, no. I think it will be very simi- 
lar to the last election where almost no one voted, and as a result 
Rios Mont, known to be the worst human rights violator ever in 
Guatemala, let alone the hemisphere, is hoping to run for president 
again and has already been elected to a high position in the con- 
gress. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. What do you make then, Ms. Harbury, 
of the coalition of student, business, and military forces that forced 
President Serrano from office in June 1993. 

Ms. Harbury. I thought that that was very wonderful, that 
Serrano was forced from office for his improper efforts. I thought 
it was also very good that Clinton cut off all moneys immediately 
to Guatemala. That's why De Leon Carpio was able to become 
president. The problem is that we didn't follow up on it and the 
Guatemalan civilians weren't strong enough to follow up on it. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. But was the military a part of that coali- 
tion to force President Serrano from office? 

Ms. Harbury. No, I don't believe they were. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Colonel Cornell, in your chronology, you 
said that they were. 

Colonel Cornell. They were the major player, yes, sir. They 
were the ones that finally went to the president, eyeball to eyeball, 
and said you're going to have to leave. 

Ms. Harbury. But then they also tried to put the vice president 
in. It was not the army's idea to put De Leon Carpio into power. 
That's why De Leon Carpio's cousin was assassinated shortly after 
he came into office. It was a warning to him. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you agree? 

Colonel Cornell. No, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. What's your view? 

Colonel Cornell. All evidence indicates that the death of Jorge 
Carpio was a criminal activity by a gang of thieves that operated 



168 

on the road between Chichicastenango and the main highway to 
Guatemala City. We had had a number of incidents before where 
those same thieves had stopped, even bus loads of people — had a 
soccer team from Puerto Rico stopped and everything was stolen by 
those thieves. They always worked at night. And Jorge Carpio 
chose to drive back to the city late at night and ran into that 
group. That was the evidence we had by the time I left. There was 
no evidence it was politically motivated at all. 

Ms. Harbury. In fact, he was assassinated very near a military 
base on a rural road by I think 27 or 25 gunmen, with ski masks, 
military style rifles and boots, yelling "Get Carpio." Both the widow 
and daughter-in-law have tirelessly worked to uncover that it was 
the army that assassinated their father-in-law and their husband. 
I believe that both the United Nations and the local archbishop's 
office, et cetera, have long since accepted that this was an army as- 
sassination. 

Of course, this all did come to light, I think. Colonel Cornell, 
with all due respect, after you had left. Because I had heard at the 
beginning that it was believed to be a gangland killing. That is not 
the accepted interpretation any longer. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Anything else. Colonel Cornell, on that? 

Colonel Cornell. Just to make a comment. The officers were 
scared when Serrano took over the government, what the 
autogolpe, or the self coup, because they, especially the mid and 
junior range officers felt they were heading in the right direction, 
complete democracy. And they got scared they were going to get 
thrown back to the days of the early 1980's or the late 1970's all 
over again. And so they really spoke up. 

Once Ramiro De Leon Carpio came into office — up to that time 
he was not a friend of the army, I'll tell you that — he took the army 
to task on every human rights case that he thought involved the 
army — he took them to task. But a number of officers got me aside 
quietly and said, you know, we may not know this guy and he may 
not know us, and we may have been, you know, on opposite sides 
of issues for the last three years, but a number of officers said, you 
know, it is probably the best thing that is going to happen for the 
army to have somebody of his caliber and his credibility to keep us 
going in the right direction — keep us going in the right direction. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Has it been good? 

Colonel Cornell. Well, I left then in January 1994. Up to then 
I thought the relationship between the military and De Leon was 
a good one, up to the time I left, and I thought they were working 
well together to get things done. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Have you made contact with the country 
since then? 

Colonel Cornell. No, sir. 

I made a few calls to the DAO down there to see how things are 
going, but you can't discuss things on an open line. 

Mrs. DeVine. I just might make a comment. It seems that we 
all had high hopes in Ramerio De Leon Carpio. But one man 
against an institution like the army, the very powerful, he hasn't 
done as well as we had hoped. He hasn't got whatever it takes to 
strength — they're just too big for him. We think he has tried, but 
he hasn't been as successful as we had hoped. 



169 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. How many people in the army, do you 
know, Colonel? How large the army is? 

Colonel Cornell. Approximately 40,000. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. 40,000, population 10 million? 

Colonel Cornell. Approximately, yes, sir. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine? 

Senator DeWine. Nothing further. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. How does that compare — I'm not that 
good at math — to U.S. forces? 

Colonel Cornell. It compares about the same, sir. We used to 
play with that figure when we were on station to see because 
there's been so many accusations that they were too big or there 
were accusations from neighboring countries that said, you know, 
you should decrease the size of your army and all of that, and they 
would say wait a minute, if we're going to decrease the size of ar- 
mies, we all need to do it as a per capita issue, and so we used 
to play with the numbers. And so it was about the same ratio as 
ours. 

Ms. Harbury. Again, just answering to several different issues. 
It's not a matter of just the army in Guatemala. There's the stand- 
ard military forces. Then I believe there's an enormous number of 
civil patrollers together with the security forces that are not your 
standard soldiers. These would be all of the different treasury po- 
lice, et cetera, et cetera. When all of those are taken together, we 
have the most militarized nation in the Western Hemisphere. You 
can't get two feet in Guatemala without going through a check- 
point, et cetera, et cetera. 

And I did want to say one word also about the current president 
of Guatemala, because before he became president, I met with him 
on my case — he was actually very kind to me and very professional 
and was storming up and down the room, behind bullet proof glass, 
and heavily locked doors, saying God only knows what the army is 
up to in this case, you have every right to be suspicious, this is ter- 
rible. He is a great man. 

After his cousin was assassinated, as I said, he reversed all of 
his human rights positions, one by one, publicly. He has not been 
able to speak up or lift a fmger for his own relatives who are under 
death threats and being run out of the country since they named 
Colonel Merida, the one who was in charge of the assassination of 
his cousin, and also he's always refused to meet with me. He now 
says that in all his time as human rights procurador, he never saw 
any evidence of a clandestine prison, yet he is the one who inves- 
tigated the case of Diana Ortiz, the nun that was raped and tor- 
tured there in a clandestine prison. The man is working with a gun 
to his head. I share Carol DeVine's opinion of him. He's a good man 
who can do nothing. The army is too big for him. The army is too 
big for all of Guatemala. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine, if you don't have any 
additional questions, I will thank all three of the witnesses. Mrs. 
DeVine, you asked us specifically to continue to support you and 
I pledge that I, and I suspect the Committee will do all that we 
can to provide that support. Ms. Harbury, you asked for among 
other things, declassification of information and the Committee will 
take that up. 



BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY 



^^^ 3 9999 05983 940 5 

Ms. Harbury. I wish to bury my husband. 

Vice Chairman Kerrey. I thank all three of you for your testi- 
mony and for your coming here today. 
Ms. Harbury. Thank you very much. 
Mrs. DeVine. Thank you. 
Vice Chairman Kerrey. This hearing is closed. 
[Thereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was concluded.] 



O 



ISBN 0-16-047642-9 



780160"476426 



90000