S. Hrg. 104-161
HEARING ON GUATEMALA
Y 4, IN 8/19: S, HRG, 104-161
Hearing on Guatenalai S.Hrg. 104-16... A"PT"|\rf^
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
HEARING ON GUATEMALA
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
OCT 2
6 iOi
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
92-921 CC WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by tlie U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047642-9
S. Hrg. 104-161
HEARING ON GUATEMALA
Y 4. IN 8/19: S, HRG, 104-161
Hearing on Guatenala. S.Hrg. 104-16... A'PTlVrf^
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
HEARING ON GUATEMALA
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
OCT 3
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
92-921 CC WASHINGTON : 1995
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-047642-9
\J
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
J. ROBERT KERREY, Nebraska, Vice Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio BOB GRAHAM, Florida
JOHN KYL, Arizona JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma MAX BAUCUS, Montana
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas J. BENNETT JOHNSTON, Louisiana
CONNIE MACK, Florida CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio
Charles Battaglia, Staff Director
Christopher C. Straub, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
(II)
CONTENTS
Hearing held in Washington, DC:
April 5, 1995 1
Statement of:
Baucus, Hon. Max, a U.S. Senator from the State of Montana 162
Bryant, Robert M., Assistant Director, Nationsil Security Division, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation 164
Cohen, Hon. WiUiam S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine 26
Cornell, Allen, Colonel, USA, Ret 129
DeWine, Hon. Mike, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 35
Glenn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio 46
Graham, Hon. Bolj, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 39
Harbury, Jennifer, Widow of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez 134
Hutchison, Hon. Kay Bailey, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas 43
Kerrey, Hon. J. Robert, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nebraska 2
Kerry, Hon. John F., a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts 30
Mack, Hon. Connie, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida 163
Shelby, Hon. Richard C, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alabama 49
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania 1
Studeman, William O., Admiral, Acting Director of Central IntelHgence ... 12
Watson, Alexander F., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State 3
Testimony of:
Barrett, John Q., Counselor to the Inspector General, Department of
Justice 21
Cornell, Allen, Colonel, USA, Ret 131
DeVine, Carol, Widow of Michael DeVine 126
Harbury, Jennifer, Widow of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez 138
Studeman, William O., Admiral, Acting Director of Central Intelligence ... 15
Watson, Alexander F., Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State 8
Supplemental materials, letters, articles, etc.:
Memorandum, dated April 6, 1995, to Mr. Chris Mellon, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, from Mr. Jim Bodner, Legislative Assistant,
Senator Cohen, re: Inserts for Committee Hearing Record on Nick
Blake 53
1. United Press International Article, dated April 21, 1985 54
2. Associated Press Article, dated March 2, 1986 55
3. New York Times Article, dated April 3, 1990 59
4. The Boston Globe Article, dated November 26, 1993 61
5. New York Times Article, dated March 30, 1995 64
6. Detailed Chronology, Department of State 66
7. Telegrams from American Embassy Guatemala to SecState 72
8. Memorandum, dated 3 December 1985 75
9. Department of State Paper, Congressional Briefing 76
10. Letter, dated December 4, 1985, to Mr. Elliott Abrams, Assistant
Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from Sen-
ators Cohen, Hart, Heinz, Mitchell, Specter, Moynihan, Kerry 77
11. Letter, dated February 25, 1986 to Senate Staffers from Sally
Lounsbury, Senator Cohen 79
12. Letter, dated February 19, 1986 to Senator Cohen from U.S.
Department of State 80
(III)
IV
Page
Supplemental materials, letters, ari;icles, etc. — Continued
Memorandum, dated April 6, 1995, to Mr. Chris Mellon, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, from Mr. Jim Bodner, Legislative Assistant,
Senator Cohen, re — Continued
13. Telegram, dated March 1986 to American Embassy Guatemala
from American Embassy in Mexico 89
14. Letter, dated June 22, 1986, to Mr. Bob Carolla, Office of Senator
George Mitchell from Mr. Randy Blake 90
15. Letter, dated October 24, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator
Mitchell to Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Overseas Citizens Services, Department of State 93
16. Letter, dated November 4, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator
Mitchell to the Honorable Oscar Padilla, Ambassador Extraor-
dinary and Plenipotentiary, Office of the Embassy 94
17. Letter, dated November 4, 1986, from Senator Cohen and Senator
Mitchell to Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Overseas Citizens Services, Department of State 95
18. Letter, dated December 9, 1986, to Senator Cohen from J.
Edward Fox, Assistant Secretary, Legislative and Intergovern-
mental Affairs, Department of State 96
19. Letter, dated December 2, 1986, to Senator Cohen from Alberto
M. Piedra, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Guatemala 98
20. Unclassified Memorandimi of Meeting, dated September 3, 1987 .. 99
21. Message from USDAO, Guatemala to Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy, Washington D.C., dated September 1987 102
22. Letter, dated October 2, 1987, from Senator Cohen to The Hon.
George Pratt Shultz, Secretary of State 104
23. Letter, to Senator Cohen, from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Sec-
retar3^ Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State 105
Los Angeles Times Magazine Article, "The Disappearance of Jack
Shelton" 106
The Nation, Article by Allan Nairn 117
HEAREVG ON GUATEMALA
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1995
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Arlen
Specter (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Specter, Shelby, DeWine, Hutchison, Cohen,
Kerrey of Nebraska, Glenn, Bryan, Graham of Florida, Kerry of
Massachusetts and Robb.
Also Present: Charles Battaglia, Staff Director; Chris Straub,
Minority Staff Director; Suzanne Spaulding, Chief Counsel; and
Kathleen McGhee, Chief Clerk.
Chairman Specter. The Committee will come to order.
Today we will proceed to inquire into the events surrounding
payments by the CIA in Guatemala and the allegations which have
been widespread in the public media about alleged improprieties.
We will be seeking to fmd answers to a number of questions:
First, did the CIA continue to make payments to the Guatemalan
military after U.S. policy was articulated in December 1990 to stop
all such payments; second, did the CIA make payments to Guate-
malan Colonel Alpirez after there was substantial evidence incrimi-
nating him into the murder of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine; and
third, why did the Department of Justice decline to pursue a crimi-
nal prosecution against Colonel Alpirez?
A portion of our inquiry today will be conducted in a closed ses-
sion because of our concern not to release or reveal sources or
methods. There has been widespread publicity and notoriety to
these events. And in stating the three questions, that's only a por-
tion of the issues to be inquired into. But it is our thinking that
there ought to be this hearing so that the American people will
learn in an official way what has happened.
It presents Admiral Studeman of the CIA with an opportunity to
make a public on-the-record response to a great many charges and
allegations which have appeared in the media. The acting director
of the CIA has advised us that he welcomes this opportunity to
make this formal statement.
We will not be questioning Admiral Studeman in open session
because of the sensitivity on the disclosure of sources and methods,
but we will hear other witnesses in the public session. We will hear
testimony from Ambassador Alexander Watson, from Colonel Allen
Cornell, from Mrs. Carol DeVine, the widow of the American citi-
zen, Michael DeVine, who was murdered in Guatemala, and from
(1)
Ms. Jennifer Harbury, the widow of Commander Efrain Bamaca
Velasquez.
I yield now to the distinguished Vice Chairman, Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, you're right to hold an open hearing on this topic. Be-
cause of this Committee's oversight responsibilities, it is our duty
to examine all the facts surrounding allegations of CIA involvement
in the murders of Michael DeVine and Efrain Bamaca and to act
upon those facts. I thank all the witnesses in advance for what
may be a very emotional and very painful hearing.
It is past time to replace speculation and anonymous sources
with facts, for the sake of the victims and because the credibility
and the trustworthiness of the CIA is again at issue.
I see four general lines of inquiry. First, we need to know the de-
tails of the DeVine and Bamaca cases.
Second, we need to review U.S. interests and the U.S. policy pur-
poses in Guatemala.
Third, we should consider Guatemala as a case study in the per-
ils of secrecy.
And fourth, every action of government is accountable to its citi-
zens, and we should use this opportunity to inform the public, in-
cluding the mistakes we made in these cases.
We on the Committee already know something about these cases
because of classified agency briefings. It is important to bring out
as many of those classified facts as possible, but the decision to de-
classify them and make them public resides in the executive
branch and not with this committee.
Concealing information in a murder investigation is extremely
serious. Concealing information from the spouses of murder victims
years after the crime is, in my view, a very bad decision.
The American people's confidence in the CIA's ability to operate
in accordance with American values has been called into question.
The subject is Guatemala, but the impact on support for the CIA's
future role will be global. I remind my colleagues there are genuine
concerns here about intelligence sources and methods. Like Admi-
ral Studeman, we walk the line between full disclosure on the one
hand and possibly endangering people who are secretly providing
information to the United States on the other. Even in this post-
cold war world, we need intelligence sources and we need to protect
them. We do need secrecy.
Well-placed sources in foreign governments will not provide sen-
sitive information to CIA officers if there is a good chance their
name will appear in the U.S. press. So, if CIA claims a need to pro-
tect sources, there are likely to be some good reasons.
Mr. Chairman, I have a number of questions and lines of inquiry.
Again, I look forward to what I hope will be a fair and calm process
that will answer these questions and the questions of my col-
leagues.
Chairman SPECTER. We will have 10 minute rounds, so that the
Members will have an opportunity for brief opening statements in
that period. And in the interest of time, we will proceed to you. Ad-
miral Studeman.
And I would repeat that we are all very sensitive to protect
sources and methods, and any questions will be asked of you in
closed session. But this will give you an opportunity, for the record,
to make a reply to the allegations which have been in the media
about the CIA. And you may proceed.
Admiral Studeman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a logical
order of march here is to have Ambassador Watson precede me to
provide a stage-setting comment, and then I will follow.
Chairman SPECTER. If you would prefer to yield to Ambassador
Watson, so be it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alexander F. Watson
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD GUATEMALA:
The Cases of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca
Mr. Chairman:
I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues on the Sen-
ate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss United States policy in Guatemala
and the killings of Michael Devine and Efrain Bamaca. The President has asked the
Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of
the allegations associated with and the policy issues raised by these two cases. The
lOB will review the facts surrounding these cases and make appropriate rec-
ommendations. As the Secretary stated before the Congress last week, should dis-
ciplinary or other such action be indicated, it will be taken. The administration will
provide to the American people as much information about the review as possible.
The Secretary has adready recommended the fullest disclosure possible.
Mr. Chairman, promotion of human rights abroad is a fundamental principle
guiding the Clinton administration's foreign policy. The responsibility to protect and
assist American citizens abroad is a particularly compelling obligation assigned to
the men and women of our foreign service. This statement therefore deals in large
part with how the Department and our embassy in Guatemala discharged those re-
sponsibilities in the two cases at hand. Your staff has indicated, however, that an
overview of United States policy in Guatemala — and how it has evolved over time —
would be helpful. Let me do that before turning to the cases of Michael Devine and
Efrain Bamaca.
Overview of U.S. Policy in Guatemala
Guatemala is a deeply troubled country. It is sharply divided along ethnic and so-
cial lines. The peasantry live in acute poverty. Decades of authoritarian and often
extremely violent politics have inhibited the growth of democratic institutions.
Promising political leaders have often been assassinated or driven into exHe. The
security forces have long violated human rights with impunity. A virulent left-wing
insurgency practiced a policy of "take no prisoners" and assassinated U.S. Ambas-
sador John Gordon Mein in 1968. In recent years electoral politics have begun to
function, but these democratic developments remain fragile.
When the Central American crisis erupted in Nicaragua and El Salvador in the
late 1970's, our relations with Guatemala were problematic. The United States had
provided substantial assistance to Guatemala under the auspices of the Alliance for
Progress. Promotion of greater respect for human rights became a particular con-
cern under the Carter administration. The emphasis on human rights and the con-
ditionality the United States placed on military assistance in particular stimulated
a nationalistic backlash among the Guatemalan military officer corps, leading it in
1977 to reject our military aid. It would not be restored until fiscal year 1986.
In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the guerrilla insurgency acquired much larger
dimensions. It was met by an increasingly brutal counter-insurgency campaign car-
ried out under a succession of military leaders: Laugerud Garcia (1974-78); Lucas
Garcia (1978-1982); and Rios Montt (1982-83). Large-scale out-migration of Guate-
malans began during this period, some 45,000 taking refUge in Mexico. Several hun-
dred thousand Guatemalans who were uprooted by the war reside in the United
States today; about 100,000 have pending asylum claims. There is no generally ac-
cepted figure for the number of Guatemalans killed during the conflict, but esti-
mates range upward from a hundred thousand. Human rights abuses throughout
this period were pervasive and systemic. They are well-documented in the annual
human rights reports of the Department and in those of non-governmental organiza-
tions. It was also under Rios Montt that the military formed community-based civil
defense patrols (PACs'> and armed the nearly half million Indian peasants who were
recruited into them. In time two problems associated with the PACs emerged: forced
recruitment into their ranks and human rights abuses which they committed. In
1983 Rios Montt was overthrown by the Guatemalan Army itself His Defense Min-
ister, General Mejia, was named head of state and moved to hold constituent assem-
bly elections the following year.
Following adoption of a new constitution in 1985, Guatemala held free and fair
elections, won by the Christian Democratic candidate, Vinicio Cerezo. During the
next eight years, between 1985-1992, the United States provided Guatemala ap-
proximately 936 million dollars total aid. Approximately $33 million of that amount
was military, including financing and training. This was a significant amount of
total aid but, for purposes of comparison, in the same period we gave $2.5 billion
dollars to El Salvador and $1,175 billion to Honduras. In terms of aid per capita,
the disproportionality was even more pronounced. El Salvador received between four
and five times as much total aid per capita as Guatemala. The Bush Administration
suspended military assistance — both financing (FMF) and grant aid (MAP) — in 1990
afler concluding that elements of the military were responsible for the murder of
American citizen Michael Devine. Our total aid in 1993 and 1994 was approximately
$113 miUion, of which $148,000 went to IMET programs.
When Cerezo took office in January 1986, a regional diplomatic effort spearheaded
by Mexico, known as the Contadora Process, had been underway for nearly three
years. It was about to give way to an all-Central American initiative — the
Esquipulas Process. Both diplomatic efforts were aimed at bringing the Central
American insurgencies to an end through peaceful negotiations and national rec-
onciliation. The Esquipulas Process produced a series of agreements beginning in
1987 that provided the framework for free elections in Nicaragua in 1990 and the
resulting demobilization of the Nicaraguan "contras." Peace negotiations had begun
on a separate track in El Salvador in 1984; they eventually culminated in the his-
toric 1992 comprehensive accords that ended that conflict.
In Guatemala, President Cerezo initiated talks with the Guatemalan guerrilla
umbrella organization — the URNG — in 1987. Those talks made only limited
progress but were continued and made more headway under President Serrano,
elected in 1990. It was during Serrano's term, in the last year of the Bush Adminis-
tration, that the United States initiated direct contacts with the URNG to encourage
forward movement in the peace process. This support for the peace process has in-
tensified during the Clinton Administration, when at the request of the Guatemalan
Government and the URNG, the United States joined five other governments to con-
stitute a "Group of Friends of the Peace Process."
President Cerezo completed his term and became the first civilian elected leader
in Guatemala's history to turn power over to another civilian elected leader — Jorge
Serrano, in 1991. President Serrano betrayed his oath of office to uphold the con-
stitution and attempted to dissolve the Congress and Supreme Court on May 25,
1993. In the ensuing twelve-day crisis, the Clinton Administration worked inten-
sively to get democracy back on track. We collaborated closely with the Organization
of American States, other interested governments, including Mexico, and with key
sectors of Guatemalan society itself to produce a peaceful, constitutional outcome.
The result was the departure of Serrano and the election by the Guatemalan Con-
gress of Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the widely respected human rights ombudsman.
At the conclusion of the crisis it was clear that the Guatemalan military had acted
responsibly. In particvdar, the military had backed the finding of Guatemala's con-
stitutional court that the actions of Serrano and his vice president were unconstitu-
tional.
De Leon's selection and the role of the military during the crisis gave us consider-
able hope that Guatemala could move to further consolidate its democracy, improve
respect for human rights and end its insurgency through negotiations. Nothing
would have a more dramatic and immediately favorable enect on the human rights
situation than an end to the internal conflict. Our policy has thus placed consider-
able emphasis on that goal.
In January 1994 the government and URNG resumed negotiations and agreed to
a new framework agreement and timetable for concluding the talks. Under the new
framework the talks were moderated by the United Nations and the Friends were
given a supporting role. We appointed a special representative to the Friends Group
to give our own support emphasis and focus.
Under the calendar, the parties laid out a schedule of issues to be negotiated and
set the end of 1994 as the date for a comprehensive agreement. Talks made excel-
lent progress during the first half of 1994. Three accords were particularly note-
worthy. A human rights agreement reached in March last year provided for a Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Verification Mission (MINTJGUA), which has now de-
ployed 313 human rights monitors throughout Guatemala. The accord also provides
that the Hvunan Rights Ombudsman has the responsibility to verify that service in
the Civil Defense Patrols is voluntary and to determine whether PAC members have
committed human rights abuses. The Government declares it will not support these
patrols or arm new volunteer civil defense committees once peace is obtained. Ac-
ceptance by Guatemala of this international presence was a hopeful sign of its grow-
ing desire to abide by intemationallv accepted norms of human rights.
The Guatemalan government and. the URNG also reached accords on aid to per-
sons displaced by the war, which is already attracting international economic and
technical support, and for a Historical Clarification Commission. The latter accord
provoked controversy. The commission will begin to function only after a comprehen-
sive agreement is reached. It will have the mandate to make a pubUc report on
human rights violations committed by both sides during the war but it does not
have the authority to assign individual responsibiUty and its findings are not to be
used for prosecutions.
Partly owing to the adverse reaction to this accord from within its own ranks, the
URNG suspended talks in June, 1994. Negotiations did not resume until last Octo-
ber. Progress thereafter was slow, but last week, in Mexico City, the parties signed
a fourth agreement concerning the rights of Guatemala's indigenous population. The
parties are now attempting to reach a final peace accord by a new target date of
this August. That is an ambitious goal, especially as Guatemala holds presidential
elections in November and the De Leon transitional presidency is drawing to a close.
The Clinton Administration believes that the peace talks still offer the most con-
crete hope for ending the last of Central America's internal wars and for bringing
about a lasting improvement in respect for human rights in Guatemala. In a step
full of symbolism, last year we redirected the remaining $4.6 million of the military
assistance suspended in 1990 into a Peace Fund to support implementation of peace
accords. In sum, the peace talks are key to Guatemala's future and will continue
to receive our full support.
That is not to say that our human rights policy in Guatemala is limited to support
for the peace process. Far from it. Read our human rights reports. They are candid
and detailed. They pull no punches. We believe that they have encouraged Guate-
malan human rights supporters and that our policy has given them some protection
and greater space to act. Our human rights policy is not confined to advocacy and
support of cases in which we have a United States citizen interest. We have been
vocal and active in countless others as well — the cases of Myma Mack, Maritza
Urrutia and Amilcar Mendez to cite just three cases active in recent years.
Our hvunan rights policy also seeks to strengthen Guatemalan institutions that
have responsibility for protecting and improving respect for human rights. Specifi-
cally, we have:
— supported the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman to improve its ability
to gather and analyze information on human rights abuses. Grants totalling $2.6
million in the last five years have enabled the office to set up regional bureaus, in-
stall a computer tracking system and extend education programs to indigenous au-
diences.
— launched this year a three-year, $2 milUon program of education, technical as-
sistance and other support to help indigenous and grassroots non-govenmientsd or-
ganizations increase participation of the disenfranchised in civil society;
— worked to improve the administration of justice through a $5 million project to
increase the judicial system's independence and professionalism and supporting ef-
forts by the Public Ministry and MINUGUA to prepare cases for trial under a new
Criminal Procedures Code that took effect last July;
— assisted municipalities to pursue legal reforms through the Local Government
Outreach Strategy Project;
— provided training to civiUan investigators in the Public Ministry; and
— supported the protection of street children by providing financial assistance to
NGO's and the children's bureau of the Human Rights Ombudsman's office.
Let me say that we see no conflict between our participation in the peace process
and our pursuit of human rights. Indeed, we view these efforts as complementary.
The first major accord in the peace process deals precisely with halting violations
of human rights. It is only by guaranteeing basic human rights and political free-
doms that democracy becomes fundamental and accessible to all Guatemalans and
national reconciliation can be assured.
In sum, our human rights policy is comprehensive and multifaceted. We seek to
protect the rights of individuals and pursue with diligence specific cases of abuse.
We actively support Guatemalan efforts to build the institutions of democracy and
law which ultimately are the only guarantee of human rights. We make clear our
commitment to constitutional government and free and fair elections. We participate
in the peace process whose ultimate objective is to create the conditions for demo-
cratic progress.
Mr. Chairman, hundreds of thousands of American tourists visit Guatemala every
year — not only Guatemala City and the major attractions of Antigua, Lake Atitlan
and Chichicastenango. They also visit the Mayan sites of the Peten and the less ac-
cessible highlands. Protection of citizens who encounter problems is an interest to
which we devote considerable resources: publication of consular information sheets
and travel advisories; warden systems for checking on the welfare of citizens in the
event of a natural disaster. In Guatemala we devote the services of one consular
officer fiill time to the needs of U.S. citizens. Other consular staff lend assistance
as required and on occasion consular welfare cases become the all-consuming focus
of the entire embassy team. There have been numerous instances of such all-out ef-
forts in the last two years in particular, as violent crime throughout in Guatemala
has increased. Kidnappings have been a problem in the last year. In those cases we
turn to Guatemalan authorities — political, police and sometimes military for help.
Cooperation is generally quite good. I make that point because — in fairness to the
Guatemalan government and people — it's the truth.
It is not always the case, however. Let me now turn to the two cases that bring
us here today. These cases date back to the early 1990's but, as they are unresolved,
they remain of concern to us. In both instances, we worked with two courageous
American women whose testimony you will hear today.
Case of Michael Vernon Devine
U.S. citizen Michael Devine was murdered June 8, 1990 near his ranch in Poptun,
Guatemala. Given the remote location and the absence of any police investigative
ability in the area, our embassy in Guatemala initially sought investigative assist-
ance from the Guatemalan mihtary. The embassy concluded in a matter of weeks,
however, that the military itself was likely involved. Thereafter, and until the senior
military commanders at the time of Devine's murder were replaced, we pressed our
interest in resolving the case with the civilian government, first under President
Cerezo and thereafter with Presidents Serrano and De Leon. Our goals throughout
were to see the killers, intellectual authors and senior officers whom we believed
to have covered up the crime face punishment and, in doing so, to have civilian con-
trol over the military effectively exerted.
In December 1990, and to drive home our dissatisfaction with the lack of real
progress toward achieving these goals, the Department suspended FMF and MAP
expenditures, both committed funds in the pipeline and new assistance, to the Gua-
temalan military. It also stopped authorization of the commercial sale of defense
items to Guatemala's military. We maintained a small IMET program totalling
$772,000 between 1991 and 1994.
Sheer persistence on the part of former Ambassador Stroock and his staff", to-
gether with the effective and courageous work of a private investigator and a Guate-
malan attorney hired by Mrs. Devine, resulted in the conviction by a military court
of five enlisted men for the murder in September 1992. The men were given 30-year
sentences. Those sentences subsequently were upheld by the Supreme Court of Gua-
temala. Those men are now serving those sentences. Following continuous pressure
by our Charge d'Affaires and the Embassy after Ambassador Stroock's departure in
November, 1992, Guatemalan army Captain Hugo Contreras was also tried and con-
victed of complicity in the murder in May, 1993. He was given a 20-year sentence
but, in our view, was allowed to escape from military custody the very same day.
We have pressed continually for the Guatemalan military to find and reapprehend
Contreras. Following her arrival in Guatemala in June, 1993, our new Ambassador,
Marilyn McAfee, pressed continually for the Guatemalan military to locate and
reapprehend Contreras. We have not been successful but neither have we aban-
doned that effort.
We believe that senior officials of the Guatemalan Army likely ordered the deten-
tion and interrogation of Michael Devine, possibly in connection with a case of miss-
ing army rifles. We have absolutely no reason to believe that Devine was engaged
in any illegal or even improper activity. Nor is it the case that Devine was a DEA
informant, as has been alleged in the press. It is virtually certain that the two colo-
nels (Garcia Catalan and Portillo) who commanded the base from which the five en-
listed men operated were conspirators in the subsequent coverup. We have conflict-
ing information on the role of Colonel Alpirez. The bulk of the information suggests
that he was involved in a coverup. The Embassy repeatedly pressed and continues
to press the Government of Guatemala and senior military officials themselves to
obtain an honest account from Alpirez and others.
Case of Efrain Bamaca Velasquez
Guatemalan guerrilla Efrain Bamaca Velasquez disappeared on March 12, 1992
after a firefight with the Guatemalan army. For nearly a year, his American citizen
wife, Jennifer Harbury, told us she believed he died in combat. However, a former
guerrilla, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, testified in February 1993 that, while detained
by the Guatemalan military, he had seen Bamaca alive in military custody at the
San Marcos miHtary base in March and July 1992. At that point, Ms. Harbury con-
tacted our Embassy for the first time on March 9, 1993, identifying herself as
Bamaca's wife and seeking our assistance. The Embassy responded quickly, mobiliz-
ing all elements of the Embassy team to raise the case with their contacts in the
Guatemalan Government to seek new information. On March 15, our Charge d'Af-
faires raised the case with the Guatemalan Attorney General.
On March 18, Embassy officials contacted then Human Rights Ombudsman
Ramiro De Leon. He told them of inquiries about Bamaca the previous year — in
1992 — from the URNG and the approaches he made as a result to the Guatemalan
military. The military claimed Bamaca was probably buried in an unmarked grave
in Retalhuleu, the site of the firefight. De Leon had obtained permission to exhume
the grave in May, 1992, but the proceeding was halted on the grounds that no fam-
ily members or dental or other identifying records were present.
On March 22, 1993 the Embassy raised the case with the Guatemalan president's
top human rights adviser. We also raised the case directly, in several channels, with
senior militsiry and military intelligence officials. From the outset, however, and to
this day, the Guatemalan military maintained that they did not capture Mr.
Bamaca.
Ambassador McAfee addressed the subject of clandestine prisons — an issue raised
by the Bamaca case — with President De Leon July 11. She brought up the same
issue, specifically referring to the Bamaca case with Minister of Defense Enriquez
July 29 and did so again with President De Leon August 2. This pattern of aggres-
sively pressing our interest in the Bamaca case continued throughout 1993 to the
{)resent. U.S. Government officials met with Ms. Harbury frequently and at high
evels in Washington and Guatemala, a reflection of our extraordinary interest in
the case. Ambassador McAfee made herself continuously available. In Washington
Ms. Harbury met on numerous occasions with senior officials in our Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs, with Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor Affairs John Shattuck, with Ambassador Geraldine Ferraro and with Na-
tional Security Adviser Anthony Lake.
During Ms. Harbur/s October-November 1994 hunger strike in Guatemala City,
Ambassador McAfee visited her frequently and a consular officer visited her daily.
Concerned for her physical safety, they had the Embassy's security guard visit the
central plaza where she conducted the strike several times a day. Photographs of
a visit to her by Ambassador McAfee and my senior adviser Richard Nuccio ap-
peared on the front pages of most Guatemalan dailies, conveying a graphic message
of official U.S. protection, support and concern.
At the same time we were asking our intelligence services to search their files
and data bases for all available information, to evaluate and re-assess the informa-
tion available (as is often the case, much was from secondary or subsources) and
to collect new intelligence. As additional information was acquired, we became more
and more persuaded that the Guatemalan military had in fact captured Bamaca in
1992. The Department instructed Ambassador McAfee to meet with President De
Leon on November 11, 1994. The Ambassador told De Leon that, according to infor-
mation available to the USG, Bamaca was captured alive by the military, trans-
ferred to the San Marcos military base and that his wounds were not life-tiireaten-
ing. She also told him that, as President, he had a responsibility to ensure that the
investigation underway should be vigorously pursued to confirm the facts of the
case, and to take appropriate strong action.
On the same day, Ambassador McAfee met with Jennifer Harbury, who had just
ended her hunger strike. Ambassador McAfee told Ms. Harbury that she had in-
formed President De Leon that we had credible information that Bamaca had been
captured alive by the military and that his wounds were not life-threatening. The
Ambassador also shared with Ms. Harbury our candid assessment that there were
unfortunately no indications that Bamaca survived much beyond the first few weeks
of his captivity. Ms. Harbury understandably wanted to know more. We felt that
we had a strong obligation to share with her our best assessments drawn from intel-
ligence sources — once we were confident of them — but could not share specific intel-
ligence without putting at risk the people who were helping us find out what hap-
pened.
8
As additional information was acquired in the ensuing months, the intelligence
community became increasingly persuaded that Bamaca had in fact been killed
while in military custody. On several occasions between December 1994 and March
1995 administration officials told Ms. Harbury of our beUef that, while we lacked
conclusive evidence, Bamaca had not survived. Ms. Harbury during the same period
told us of numerous instances of people coming to her anonymously with reports
that Bamaca had recently been seen alive in military custody. The only such report
lending itself to verification turned out to be bogus. None of the intelligence sup-
ported Ms. Harburys hope that Bamaca was still alive and we repeatedly conveyed
that painful message.
When in late January of this year additional intelligence was received and evalu-
ated, we instructed Ambassador McAfee to approach President De Leon again, urg-
ing him to order the re-interrogation of senior military officers who might have been
involved in Bamaca's disappearance. We specifically urged that Colonel Alpirez be
interrogated again. We did not assert to President De Leon any conclusion as to
Colonel Alpirez' role — the information available was not sufficiently definitive — but
we were confident that Alpirez must have had direct knowledge of what happened
to Bamaca and we urged in no uncertain terms that he be interrogated again.
Ambassador McAfee made this demarche on February 6. On February 8 Depart-
ment officials informed Ms. Harbury of the demarche, telling her as well that "the
information available to us, while it is not conclusive, suggests your husband was
killed following his capture." It was the considered view within the administration,
however, that we could not properly mention Alpirez' name to her because it might
prejudice the investigation we expected President De Leon to undertake and be-
cause we could not draw a definitive conclusion about Alpirez' role in the Bamaca
case. Most importantly, it would have put at risk the people who were confidentially
helping us. When, after a month, Alpirez still had not oeen questioned again, we
announced on March 10 the suspension of the participation of Guatemalan military
personnel in IMET programs conducted in the United States for the remainder of
FY 1995. Our announcement of that suspension also contained the considered as-
sessment of the U.S. intelligence community that Bamaca had died in Guatemalan
militaiy custody.
Mr. Chairman, I do not want to leave this subject without saying again how much
we sympathize with Mrs. Devine, Ms. Harbury — with all those who have lost a fam-
ily member in circumstances such as these. We understand, too, the pain, the frus-
tration and the anger that they feel when we cannot answer all the questions that
torment them. At the same time, we made extraordinary efforts on behalf of Carol
Devine and Jennifer Harbury — as we did earlier in the cases of Nicholas Blake,
Griffin Davis and Sister Dianna Ortiz. We acted in good faith throughout, doing our
best to help them and to share with them as much information as we could.
We have pressed the Guatemalan government hard on both the Devine and
Bamaca cases and we will continue to do so. Indeed, on instructions of Secretary
Christopher, Ambassador McAfee met with President De Leon last night, delivering
a personal message from the Secretary underscoring the importance that we attach
to seeing justice achieved in these cases. For our part, we are prepared to provide
the cooperation and assistance of our Federal Bureau of Investigation. For its part,
we believe Guatemala could do much more to find and imprison Captain Contreras.
We believe Guatemala has yet to conduct the kind of vigorous, credible inquiry in
the Bamaca case that we have consistently called for and we will stay the course
on that issue, too. We will continue to protect U.S. citizen interests in Guatemala
to the best of our ability. We will speak up and remain active in our Guatemalan
human rights policy across the board and we will stay engaged in support of the
peace process and the consolidation of what is still a very fragile, imperfect democ-
racy. Enlightened poUcy demands no less.
TESTIMONY OF ALEXANDER F. WATSON
Mr. Watson. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Bill. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your col-
leagues on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence to discuss
U.S. policy in Guatemala and the human rights cases of Michael
DeVine and Efrain Bamaca.
The President and Secretary Christopher are committed to a
thorough review of all aspects of the allegations associated with
these two cases. And the Intelligence Oversight Board will examine
9
the facts and make appropriate recommendations. Should discipli-
nary action be indicated, it will be taken. And Secretary Chris-
topher has recommended the fullest disclosure possible to the
American people.
Mr. Chairman, promotion of human rights is a fundamental prin-
ciple of this administration's foreign policy, and protecting and as-
sisting American citizens abroad is the most solemn obligation of
the State Department. I would like to focus in these summary re-
marks on how we have dealt with the cases of Michael DeVine and
Efrain Bamaca in terms of these policy objectives, as well as our
overall policy toward Guatemala.
And I would ask, sir, that my full remarks be entered into the
record of the Committee.
Chairman Specter. Your full remarks will be made a part of the
record.
Mr. Watson. Thank you very much, sir.
Guatemala is a deeply troubled country. It is sharply divided
along ethnic lines. Decades of authoritarian and often extremely
violent politics have inhibited the growth of democratic institu-
tions. Promising political leaders have often been assassinated or
driven into exile. The security forces have long violated human
rights with impunity. A virulent left-wing insurgency practiced a
policy of take no prisoners and assassinated American Ambassador
John Gordon Mein in 1968. In recent years electoral politics have
begun to function, but these democratic developments remain ex-
tremely fragile in Guatemala.
Let me just make a few points about the difficult situation our
policy confronts in that country. First, there has been only one
transfer of power from a civilian elected president to another in
Guatemala's entire history. That came in 1991 when Vinicio Cerezo
was succeeded peacefully by Jorge Serrano. Guatemala's fragile de-
mocracy was threatened only two years later, however, in May
1993 when President Serrano himself attempted to dissolve the
congress and the supreme court. The Clinton administration ener-
getically assisted the efforts of the international community, and of
enlightened Guatemalans to produce a peaceful and constitutional
outcome, and Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the human rights ombuds-
man who had gained international attention for his courageous be-
havior, took office with the support of the military in a process that
fully respected constitutional procedures.
Second, compared with other countries of Central America, Gua-
temala has not been a major recipient of U.S. assistance, nor mili-
tary aid. During the years from 1985 to 1992, the United States
provided Guatemala approximately $936 million in total aid, and
of that approximately $33 million of it was military assistance.
That relatively modest military assistance was suspended by Presi-
dent Bush when he concluded that elements of the military were
responsible for the murder of American citizen Michael DeVine.
Our total aid in 1993 and 1994 was approximately $113 million,
of which $226,000 went to the non-lethal military training pro-
grams. No military assistance per se, but military training pro-
grams of a non-lethal nature. An important element of our assist-
ance to Guatemala goes to strengthen institutions that protect
humsm rights, such as to fund the Office of the Human Rights Om-
10
budsman, to provide support to indigenous and grass roots organi-
zations, to improve the administration of justice, to train civilian
investigators, and to protect street children.
Our consular staff is also dedicated to protect and serve the hun-
dreds of thousands of American tourists who visit Guatemala every
year.
Third, a negotiated solution to Guatemala's protracted guerrilla
conflict is critical to improving human rights and to deepening
Guatemala's weak democratic experience. After years of stalemate,
the peace process made important progress in 1994, signing several
agreements and deploying a 300-plus person United Nations
human rights verification mission in Guatemala. The talks slowed
late in the year, but they have produced another breakthrough in
the signing of a key accord on indigenous rights and identity last
week in Mexico. The peace talks are the key to Guatemala's future,
and we will continue to support them fully.
Now, our emphasis on protecting human rights and the lives of
American citizens has produced successes in Guatemala, but we've
also had major disappointments. The murder of Michael DeVine in
June 1990 is one tragic example. The efforts of his widow, Carol
DeVine, who is here with us today, and those of our embassy, con-
vinced us long ago, not long after the murder, that the Guatemalan
army itself was involved in that crime. We have pressed three suc-
cessive governments to identify the killers and the intellectual au-
thors of the crime and those involved in the attempted coverup.
Dissatisfaction with the responses we received prompted the sus-
pension of military assistance to the Guatemalan armed forces in
1990, which I mentioned.
Persistence, courage, and cooperation between the DeVine family
and embassy staff resulted in the convictions of five enlisted men
for the murder in September 1992. An army captain, Hugo
Contreras, was also tried and convicted in 1993. But that achieve-
ment of the Guatemalan judicial system was undercut when
Contreras was allowed to escape from military custody shortly
thereafter.
We believe that senior officials of the Guatemalan army likely or-
dered the detention and interrogation of Michael DeVine, possibly
in connection with a case of missing army rifles. We had conflicting
information about the involvement of one officer. Colonel Julio Ro-
berto Alpirez, in the DeVine case, but the bulk of the information
available to our people at that time suggested that Alpirez was
among those who participated in the coverup. We have pressed and
will continue to press for justice in this case.
Let me turn for a moment to the case of Efrain Bamaca. Based
on the testimony of a former guerrilla and army collaborator,
Santiago Cabrera Lopez, Ms. Jennifer Harbury told us she became
convinced in early 1993 that her husband has survived interroga-
tion and torture by the Guatemalan army. She first came to our
embassy in March 1993 seeking our assistance. Within six days of
that request, our Charge d'Affaires was inquiring of the attorney
general of Guatemala about the case. A few days later, our em-
bassy heard from the then human rights ombudsman, Ramiro De
Leon, now president of the country, that he had made inquiries
about Bamaca the year before, had concluded that Mr. Bamaca was
11
dead. We also raised the case with the presidency of Guatemala,
with senior military and intelligence officials, all of whom main-
tained that Bamaca was never even captured by the military.
During this period of great confusion politically in Guatemala —
it's the period I mentioned before when President Serrano tried to
suspend the supreme court and the congress, and it was a complex
process which resulted in Mr. De Leon becoming president — during
this period of great confusion, the embassy team worked tirelessly
to press for results and to obtain new information.
When De Leon became president, our new ambassador, Marilyn
McAfee, asked about the existence of clandestine prisons, an issue
directly raised by the Bamaca case. She pursued the issue with the
Minister of Defense in July and again with President De Leon in
August. And during this period, U.S. Government officials met with
Ms. Harbury frequently and at high levels in Guatemala and
Washington. Her meeting with National Security Advisor Anthony
Lake confirmed our extraordinary interest in the case.
During Ms. Harburys second hunger strike in Guatemala during
October and November 1994, Ambassador McAfee and our embassy
staff were with her daily. And photographs of a visit to her by Am-
bassador McAfee and my senior adviser, Rick Nuccio, conveyed a
message of official U.S. protection, support, and concern on the
front pages of Guatemala's national dailies.
Energetic intelligence collection efforts, as well as searches of
files and data bases about the Bamaca case, began to yield results
in October 1994. With additional reports, we became persuaded
that the Guatemalan military had indeed captured Bamaca alive in
1992, and Ambassador McAfee presented these conclusions to
President De Leon on November 11 and to Ms. Harbury that same
day. She told both that our information indicated that Bamaca was
captured alive, was transferred to the San Marcos military base
and that his wounds were not life-threatening. The ambassador
urged a further investigation to determine the facts of the case and
to take appropriate action. And we let Ms. Harbury know that we
could not confirm at that time that Bamaca had lived beyond the
first few weeks of captivity. We just had no information that indi-
cated that he was still alive.
Over the ensuing months, and based on more information which
we were collecting, we reached even stronger conclusions about
Bamaca's fate and communicated these in increasingly direct terms
to Ms. Harbury. While accepting the information that he had been
captured alive, as the army knew what had happened, she told us
that she continued to receive reports that her husband had been
seen alive and she said she believed he might still be in military
custody, and we tried to chase those reports down as best we could.
When in late January of this year, additional intelligence was re-
ceived and evaluated, we instructed Ambassador McAfee to ap-
proach President De Leon again. We suggested that he should
reinterrogate certain senior military officers, and specifically urged
that Colonel Alpirez be among them. We could not give President
De Leon definitive information about Colonel Alpirez's role, but we
were confident that he must have had direct knowledge of what
happened. This demarche to the president occurred on February 6.
On February 8, department officials informed Ms. Harbury about
12
the demarche, including that the information available to us, while
not conclusive, suggested that Mr. Bamaca had been killed follow-
ing his capture.
One month later, with no movement of any kind by the Guate-
malan government, we took the additional step of suspending the
participation of Guatemalan military personnel in international
military exchange and training programs conducted in the United
States for the remainder of this year. That announcement also con-
tained the considered assessment of the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity that Bamaca had died in Guatemalan military custody.
We wish, Mr. Chairman, that we had produced better or quicker
results in this case and that of other human rights cases of concern
to us and to Guatemala. And I sympathize deeply with Ms.
Harbury, Mrs. DeVine, and all those who have lost loved ones in
circumstances such as these. I know that our inability to provide
answers to all the questions that torment them cause pain, frustra-
tion, and anger. But I also believe that we acted in good faith
throughout, doing our best to help them and to share with them
as much information as we could.
Our dissatisfaction with the response of the Guatemalan govern-
ment is manifest in our actions. Last evening, on instructions from
Secretary Christopher, Ambassador McAfee met with President De
Leon again, delivering a personal message from the Secretary un-
derscoring the importance that we attach to seeing justice achieved
in these cases. We believe that Guatemala can and must do more
to find and imprison Captain Contreras, and a vigorous and credi-
ble investigation of the Bamaca case has, in our view, not even
begun.
When Guatemala is ready to confront its tradition of impunity,
we will provide the cooperation and assistance of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. We will continue to protect U.S. citizen in-
terests in Guatemala to the best of our ability. We will speak up
and remain active in our Guatemala human rights policy across
the board and we will stay engaged in support of a reinvigorated
peace process and the consolidation of what is still a very, very
fragile and imperfect democracy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Ambassador Watson.
We'll turn now to Admiral Studeman.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Studeman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is important that we speak to you
and the American people today about issues related to CIA's involvement in Guate-
mala. The allegations made are serious and the issues are complex. I would like to
be as expansive as possible, given the open and unclassified nature of this hearing.
There are classified aspects of this which I will not be able to address and, regret-
fully, I will have to defer these issues to closed session. Similarly, as you know, most
of the issues I will address are under review by various inspectors general or the
Justice Department working with the Intelligence Oversight Board tasked by the
President. Finally, neither the DCI nor CIA makes foreign policy; accordingly, ques-
tions related to policy need to be deferred to the State Department and the National
Security Council. Nevertheless, given the treatment of these issues and the media
comments, I will provide what I believe to be the facts or conclusions that I know
at present.
13
Extremely serious allegations have been made regarding CIA's conduct in the
events surrounding the murder of the U.S. citizen Michael Devine in June 1990, and
the fate of the Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez. Let me state
emphatically that the CIA is not complicit in the murder of Mr. Devine nor in the
apparent kilUng of Mr. Bamaca. Nor has the CIA deliberately withheld information.
On the contrary, CIA information provided important insights into what transpired
in these two cases. I have already made available to the oversight committees a
comprehensive package of intelligence materials related to them.
Let me review the record.
• CIA acquired its first significant piece of information on the killing of Mr.
Devine in August 1990, and promptly sent an intelligence report on the matter to
the National security Council Staff, the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, this information was a key ele-
ment in furthering US efforts to press Guatemalan authorities to take decisive steps
leading to the arrest and conviction of a number of those directly involved.
• More than one year later, in October 1991, CIA received information that shed
light on the possible presence of an additional Guatemalan — Lt. Colonel Julio Ro-
berto Alpirez — in the interrogation of Mr. Devine. Again we promptly provided this
information to the National Security Council, the Departments of State, Defense,
and Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an intelligence report. We
also prepared a formal written "crime report" containing even more detailed infor-
mation. This report was delivered to the Department of Justice on 19 November
1991.
In sum, all the intelligence information related to the killing of Mr. Devine was
reported to relevant US executive branch authorities in a timely fashion. It is im-
portant to note that there is nothing in our current review of the Devine case that
changes our view of the Guatemalan judicial system's verdict that Army Captain
Contreras and his soldiers killed Mr. Devine.
At the same time, I want to acknowledge that we failed to inform the intelligence
committees in the House and the Senate about the specific information we acquired
in October 1991. I regret this failure to keep the Congressional oversight committees
fully informed.
Now we regard to Bamaca:
• The first information that the CIA received on the capture of Bamaca came in
the spring of 1992 and this was provided to the Departments of State, Defense, and
Treasury, the National Security Council, and the US Southern Command. At that
time, we received no tasking to collect additional information concerning the fate of
Bamaca, a Guatemalan citizen.
• We nonetheless continued to receive conflicting information sporadically over
the next three years. All of this information was also provided promptly to the ap-
propriate US officials in the US Embassy in Guatemala and in Washington.
• In October 1994, US policjonakers asked us to review the information on the
Bamaca case that we had up to this point and to seek additional information in an
effort to determine his fate. This effort resulted in the production of a series of intel-
ligence assessments.
• In late January 1995, CIA received new reporting regarding Bamaca's death.
Once received at Headquarters, this information was provided immediately to ap-
propriate US Government agencies. In addition, because of the cumulative effect of
this report, CIA undertook an analysis of this new information in light of all pre-
viously available reporting, and two days later forwarded this assessment to appro-
priate US Government agencies. In the course of researching this assessment, we
learned additional information about an April 1994 report. The senior Guatemalan
military officer, cited in the report who had interrogated Bamaca in March 1992 was
indeed Colonel Alpirez.
• The CIA also worked with the NSC and the State Department to clear the in-
formation for a presentation to the Guatemalan Government in early February
1995.
• By 3 February, the CIA had briefed this information to the staffs of the Senate
and House oversight committees. There have been a number of other classified brief-
ings and hearings since then.
I would stress that, like some of the reporting in the Devine case, our information
on the fate of Bamaca has been fragmentary, sometimes contradictory, and of vary-
ing reliability. For example, let me describe some of the conflicting information we
have been dealing with regarding Bamaca. We have received reporting that:
• He was killed on the battlefield;
• He committed suicide to avoid capture;
• He was seriously wounded, captured, and died shortly afterwards;
14
• Some sources believe he was killed within weeks of his capture; other informa-
tion has him alive as of July 1992; and we have heard allegations that he was sight-
ed alive in the presence of an Army patrol as late as 1994.
If we focus on the more credible information most recently received, together with
our analysis of other data, our assessment is that Bamaca did not die on the battle-
field as alleged by the Government of Guatemala; rather, we believe that he was
captured alive — with minor wounds — after an armed encounter with Guatemalan
Army troops on 12 March 1992 and taken to San Marcos for interrogation.
Our best judgment, based on the information available, was that Bamaca was
killed while in Guatemalan Army custody within several weeks of his capture, but
we do not know the specific circumstances of his death. We have the name of a Gua-
temalan officer, the previously mentioned Colonel Alpirez, who is reportedly knowl-
edgeable about — and perhaps involved in — the presumed death of Bamaca. This in-
formation has been passed by State Department to the Guatemalan Government for
its investigative follow-up. I repeat tnat CIA was not involved in the death of
Bamaca, or in any coverup related to this case.
As I conclude this aspect of my statement, I would like to again observe that the
US Government — and Guatemalan authorities — would have a far less complete pic-
ture of the fates of Devine or Bamaca had it not been for CIA and overall intel-
ligence community reporting.
The next accusations I will address are that CIA funded inteUigence programs in
Guatemala in contravention of US policy or that it surreptitiously replaced US mili-
tary aid cut off in December 1990 through some kind of deliberate bait and switch
effort. These adlegations are also false.
The programs that CIA conducted were authorized under several Presidential
Findings. They were regularly reviewed by senior officials in the key foreign affairs
and national security agencies of the Executive Branch. They were also regularly
reviewed by the Intelligence Committees in the Houses and the Senate. All funds
expended in these programs were fully authorized and appropriated by the Congres-
sional intelligence and appropriations committees.
While I cannot go into the details of these programs in an open session, I can
deny categorically the charge that we increased funding during the 1989 — 1995 pe-
riod. In fact, total CLA funding of Guatemalan intelligence peaked at about $3.5 mil-
lion in FY 1989 and fell consistently to around $1 million in FY 1995. The Presi-
dent's recent decision to suspend US assistance to the GuatemaJan military will re-
duce substantially the FY 1995 figure. This steady drop represents an orderly phase
out of our Central American program.
These dates are important because it is during FY 1991 — December 1990 — that
CIA is alleged to have increased funding to offset the loss of US military aid.
I cannot comment authoritatively before the work of the CIA Inspector General
is completed. Nevertheless, I believe we have made some management and proce-
dural mistakes in these two cases.
• First, as I have already noted, we did not brief the oversight committees on im-
portant 1991 information related to Devine in the same way we had briefed the De-
partment of Justice. We regret that we did not do so.
• Second, the potential significance of one piece of information obtained in mid-
1994 was not recognized until we received new information in January 1995.
• Third, there is one instance in January 1995 during which an important report
was delayed in the field for six days; we believe this reflected a management lapse,
which contributed to our decision to recall our Chief of Station in Guatemala.
CIA management is reviewing its procedures to implement corrective measures.
At no time, however, did the CIA deliberately withhold or suppress information on
these cases. The charge that we did is false.
As you know, reviews are underway in other US Government agencies regarding
allegations associated with the Bamaca and Devine cases. The investigators were
also tasked to look into information on other cases involving the human rights of
several US citizens.
In addition, the President had assigned the Intelligence Oversight Board certain
specific review tasks working with the departmental and agency investigative bod-
ies. All agencies involved are in the process of securing documents relating to these
inquiries and are cooperating fully in the investigations.
I have been as candid as possible in this hearing, although there are limits to
what I can responsibly say in a public forum. Specifically, I cannot and will not talk
in unclassified, open session about intelligence sources and methods. I will be happy
to do so in classified sessions.
I take this position not out of some abstract devotion to secrecy but because in
a very real sense, it is essential for the protection of the lives of the people who
15
assist the intelligence community and our own national security interests. Indeed,
our success depends on our ability to protect the identities and activities of those
individuals who agree to work with us on a clandestine basis. In agreeing to do so,
they put themselves at great personal risk. If we fail to satisfy this fundamental
obligation to our sources, we will find few people willing to support our efforts.
To conclude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the Intelligence Com-
munity in a democratic society.
• At the direction of US policymakers, we provide information on such difficult
issues as civil wars, terrorism, narcotics, weapons proliferation, organized crime,
and instability related to regional, ethnic, tribal, or religious conflict.
• It is a continuing dilemma that in collecting vital information on such topics
we do not necessarily find our sources among the pristine, the honorable, and the
elegant.
• We do not, however, use this or any other rationale for overlooking or covering
up crimes.
• We fully accept the necessity of being held to high standards of conduct.
• We also recognize that the unique challenges with which the intelligence profes-
sion must grapple make it all the more important to ensure continuous and proper
Executive and Congressional oversight of past, present, and future intelligence and
covert action programs.
This concludes my remarks.
TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM O. STUDEMAN
Admiral Studeman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee.
It's important that we speak to you today and the American peo-
ple about issues related to CIA involvement in Guatemala. The al-
legations made are serious and the issues are complex. I would like
to be as expansive as possible given the open and unclassified na-
ture of this hearing. There are classified aspects of this — which you
have already spoken to — which I will not be able to address, and
regretfully, I will have to defer these issues to closed session. Simi-
larly, as you know, most of the issues I will address are under re-
view by various inspectors general or the Justice Department work-
ing with the Intelligence Oversight Board tasked by the President.
Finally, it's important for everyone to remember that neither the
DCI nor the CIA make foreign policy. Accordingly, questions relat-
ed to policy need to be deferred to the State Department and the
National Security Council.
Nevertheless, given treatment of these issues and media com-
ments, I will provide what I believe to be the facts or conclusions
that I know at present. Extremely serious allegations have been
made regarding CIA's conduct in the events surrounding the mur-
der of U.S. citizen Michael DeVine in June 1990 and the fate of the
Guatemalan insurgent leader Efrain Bamaca. Let me state em-
phatically that the CIA is not complicit in the murder of Mr.
DeVine nor the apparent killing of Mr. Bamaca, nor has the CIA
deliberately withheld information. On the contrary, CIA informa-
tion provided important insights into what transpired in these two
cases. I've already made available to the Oversight Committees a
comprehensive package of intelligence materials related to them.
Let me review the record.
CIA acquired its first significant piece of information on the kill-
ing of Mr. DeVine in August of 1990 and promptly sent an intel-
ligence report on the matter to the National Security Council staff,
the Departments of State, Defense and Justice, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Indeed, this information was a key ele-
ment in furthering U.S. efforts to press Guatemalan authorities to
16
take decisive steps leading to the arrest and conviction of a number
of those directly involved.
More than one year later, in October 1991, CIA received informa-
tion that shed light on the possible presence of an additional Gua-
temalan, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Roberto Alpirez, in the interro-
gation of Mr. DeVine. Again, we promptly provided this informa-
tion to the National Security Council, the Departments of State,
Defense and Justice, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as an
intelligence report. We also prepared a formal crimes report, con-
taining even more detailed information. This report was delivered
to the Department of Justice on 19 November 1991.
In sum, all of the intelligence information related to the killing
of Mr. DeVine was reported to relevant U.S. executive branch au-
thorities in a timely fashion. It is important to note that there is
nothing in our current review of the DeVine case that changes our
view that the Guatemalan judicial system's verdict that Captain
Contreras and his soldiers killed Mr. DeVine.
At the same time, I want to acknowledge that we failed to inform
the Intelligence Committees in the House and the Senate about the
specific information we acquired in October 1991. I regret this fail-
ure to keep the Congressional Oversight Committees informed.
Now, with regard to Bamaca, the first information that the CIA
received on the capture of Bamaca came in the spring of 1992. And
this was provided to the Departments of State, Defense and Treas-
ury, and the National Security Council as well as the U.S. South-
ern Command. At the time, we received no additional tasking to
collect additional information concerning the fate of Bamaca, a
Guatemalan citizen. We nonetheless continued to receive conflict-
ing information sporadically over the next three years. All of this
information was also provided promptly to the appropriate U.S. of-
ficials and the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala and in Washington.
In October 1994, U.S. policymakers asked us to review the infor-
mation on the Bamaca case that we had up to this point and to
seek additional information in an effort to determine his fate. This
effort resulted in the production of a series of intelligence assess-
ments. In late January 1995, CIA received new reporting regarding
Bamaca's death. Once received at headquarters, this information
was provided immediately to appropriate U.S. Government agen-
cies. In addition, because of the cumulative effect of this report,
CIA undertook an analysis of this new information in light of all
previously available reporting and two days later forwarded this
assessment to appropriate U.S. Government agencies.
In the course of researching this assessment, we learned addi-
tional information about an April 1994 report. The senior Guate-
malan military officer cited in this report who had interrogated
Bamaca in March 1992 was indeed Colonel Alpirez. The CIA also
worked with the NSC and the State Department to clear the infor-
mation for a presentation to the Guatemalan government in early
February 1995. By 3 February the CIA had briefed this information
to the staffs of the Senate and House Oversight Committees. There
have been a number of other classified briefings and hearings on
this subject since then with the Intelligence Oversight Committees.
I would stress that like some of the reporting in the DeVine case,
our information on the fate of Bamaca has been fragmentary,
17
sometimes contradictory and of varying reliability. For example, let
me describe some of the conflicting information we've been dealing
with regarding Bamaca. We have received reporting that he was
killed on the battlefield, that he committed suicide to avoid cap-
ture, that he was seriously wounded, captured, and died shortly
thereafter. Some sources believe he was killed within weeks of his
capture; other information has him alive as of July 1992, and we
have heard allegations that he was sighted alive in the presence
of an army patrol as late as 1994.
If we focus on more credible information most recently received,
together with our analysis of other data, our assessment is that
Bamaca did not die on the battlefield, as alleged by the government
of Guatemala, but to repeat what Ambassador Watson has already
said, we believe that he was captured alive with minor wounds
after an armed encounter with the Guatemalan army troops on
March 12, 1992, and that he was taken to San Marcos for interro-
gation. Our best judgment, based on information available, was
that Bamaca was killed while in Guatemala army custody within
several weeks of his capture, but we do not know the specific cir-
cumstances of his death.
We have the name of a Guatemalan officer, the previously men-
tioned Colonel Alpirez, who is reportedly knowledgeable about —
knowledgeable about — and perhaps involved in the presumed death
of Bamaca. This information has been passed by the State Depart-
ment to the Guatemalan government for its investigative followup
in the context that Ambassador Watson has already relayed to you.
I repeat that CIA was not involved in the death of Bamaca or in
any coverup related to this case.
As I conclude this aspect of my statement, I would like to again
observe that the U.S. Government and Guatemalan authorities
would have far less a complete picture about the fates of DeVine
or Bamaca, had it not been for CIA and overall intelligence commu-
nity reporting.
The next accusations I will address are that CIA funded intel-
ligence programs in Guatemala in contravention of U.S. policy or
that it surreptitiously replaced U.S. military aid cut off in Decem-
ber 1990 through some kind of deliberate bait and switch effort.
These allegations are also false. The programs that CIA conducted
were authorized under several Presidential Findings. They were
regularly reviewed by senior officials in the key foreign affairs and
national security agencies of the executive branch. They were also
regularly reviewed by the Intelligence Committees in the House
and the Senate. All funds expended in these programs were fully
authorized and appropriated by Congressional Intelligence and Ap-
propriations Committees.
While I cannot go into the details of these programs in an open
session, I can deny categorically the charges that we increased
funding during the 1989 to 1995 period, specifically the period after
the December 1990 cutoff". In fact, the total CIA funding of Guate-
malan intelligence peaked at about $3.5 million in fiscal year 1989
and fell consistently to about $1 million in fiscal year 1995. The
President's recent decision to suspend all U.S. assistance to the
Guatemalan military will reduce substantially the fiscal year or
current year figure. This steady drop represents an orderly phase-
18
out of the Central American program. These dates are important
because it is during fiscal year 1991 — in fact, December 1990,
again as I've already stated — that CIA is alleged to have increased
funding to offset the loss of U.S. military aid. Now, leaving this
topic, let me address another issue: What do I consider to be the
problems with CIA management in these cases. I cannot comment
authoritatively before the work of the CIA Inspector General is
completed; nevertheless, I believe that we have some management
and procedural mistakes in these two cases. First, as I have al-
ready noted, we did not brief the Oversight Committees on impor-
tant 1991 information related to DeVine in the same way that we
briefed the Department of Justice and other elements of the execu-
tive branch. We regret that we did not do so.
Second, the potential significance of one piece of information ob-
tained in mid- 1994 was not recognized until we received new infor-
mation in January 1995.
Third, there was one instance in January 1995 during which an
important report was delayed in the field for six days. We believe
this reflected a management lapse which contributed to our deci-
sion to recall our chief of station in Guatemala. CIA management
is reviewing its procedures to implement corrective measures. How-
ever, at no time did the CIA deliberately withhold or suppress in-
formation in these cases, and the charges that we did so are false.
As you know, reviews are underway in other U.S. Government
agencies regarding allegations associated with the Bamaca and
DeVine cases. The investigators were also tasked to look into infor-
mation on cases involving the human rights of several other U.S.
citizens. In addition, the President has assigned the Intelligence
Oversight Board certain specific review tasks working with the de-
partmental and agency investigative bodies. All agencies involved,
including the National Security Agency and the U.S. Army, are in
the process of securing documents related to these inquiries and
are cooperating fully in these investigations.
I've been as candid as possible in this hearing, although there
are limits to what I can responsibly say in a public forum. Specifi-
cally, I cannot and will not talk in unclassified, open sessions about
intelligence sources and methods. I will be happy to do so in classi-
fied sessions.
I take this position not out of some abstract devotion to secrecy,
but because in a very real sense it is essential for the protection
of lives of the people who assist the intelligence community and our
national security interests. And this has already been, I think,
articulately discussed also in the opening statement by Senator
Kerrey. Indeed, our success depends on the ability to protect the
identities and activities of those individuals who agree to work
with us on a clandestine basis. In agreeing to do so, they put them-
selves at great personal risk. If we fail to satisfy this fundamental
obligation to our sources, we will find few people who will be will-
ing to support our efforts.
To conclude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the
intelligence community in a democratic society. At the direction of
U.S. polic3nnakers, we provide information on such difficult issues
as civil wars, terrorism, narcotics, weapons proliferation, organized
crime, and the instability related to regional conflict and other
19
forms of conflict around the globe. It is a continuing dilemma that
in collecting vital information on such topics, we do not necessarily
find our sources among the pristine, the honorable, and the ele-
gant, and this will continue to be a problem for the future. We do
not, however, use this or any other rationale for overlooking or cov-
ering up crimes. We fully accept the necessity of being held to high-
er standards of conduct.
We also recognize that the unique challenges with which the in-
telligence profession must grapple make it all the more important
to ensure continuous and proper executive and congressional over-
sight of past, present, and future intelligence and covert action pro-
grams.
Senators, subject to your questions, this concludes my remarks.
I might say that I do have senior CIA staff and our Inspector Gen-
eral here to assist. And now I think Ambassador Watson and I
would be pleased to respond to any of your comments or questions,
sir.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Admiral Studeman.
You have articulated the concerns about the disclosure on
sources and the risk factor. And you and I and Senator Kerrey
have discussed the background of the case. And it is not an easy
balance as to a judgment as to how far the Committee should go
in eliciting information from you. Our determination has been that
we should hear your statement, which you have just given, to give
the CIA an opportunity to respond to the public accusations, and
to allow the public to hear from the CIA about what you can say
to the extent that you can testify.
In our own conversations, as we start to probe more deeply, it
is very difficult to even ask some of the questions to have you re-
spond that you cannot comment without raising some inferences or
some suggestions as to what is going on. The nature of the question
identifies people who may be at risk or jeopardized, even if you say
you can't say. So for that somewhat fuller explanation, the ruling
is that we will not question you. But we'll do so in closed session,
and we'll make a fuller determination about what you could re-
spond on these questions in open session. And as promptly as we
can, to the extent we can, we will have you testify in open session.
But we have convened this hearing at an early date, not awaiting
the conclusion of the recess, which would be several more weeks,
because of our judgment that the American people are entitled to
an inquiry at this time. So that there is assurance to the public
that the Oversight Committee is not lingering or dallying on telling
the American people what it is that we can say.
After hearing Ambassador Watson's testimony, Senator Kerrey
and I conferred briefly and it appears that Ambassador Watson can
respond to questions. But again I say. Ambassador, in the course
of any of the questions, you feel that something is asked of you that
you cannot comment about, exercise your own judgment in declin-
ing to answer.
But let me begin with questions to you to the extent that you can
comment without disclosing sources or methods. What were the
specifics of the information you had about Colonel Alpirez — and I
ask this in the context of the issue of referring the matter to the
Department of Justice for possible prosecution under the United
20
States antiterrorist law. We have laws in effect enacted in 1986
which authorize the prosecution of individuals who commit acts of
terrorism against American citizens anj^where in the world. Cus-
tomarily, jurisdiction attaches in the locale where the event oc-
curred, and while Guatemala would have jurisdiction over Colonel
Alpirez, so would the United States on our extraterritorial asser-
tion of jurisdiction, where there's terrorism involved on a U.S. citi-
zen, Michael DeVine, and that issue is raised. So tell us as specifi-
cally as you can what evidence or information or indicators there
were about Colonel Alpirez' complicity?
Mr. Watson. Well, the information available to us about Colonel
Alpirez and the DeVine case, Mr. Chairman, is still not conclu-
sive— at least the information I've seen. Back at the time, in 1990
and 1991, the information available to us goes more or less like
this. That a group of military personnel came from a base in a
town called Flores under instructions of some sort to detain and in-
terrogate Mr. DeVine. Those people left their base and went down
to another base in a town called Poptun and that is where Colonel
Alpirez — at that time a Lieutenant Colonel, I believe — was the
commanding officer of that base.
The information developed by all elements of the embassy, but
also by Mrs. DeVine — and the people that she had working with
her did a spectacular job in this — suggested that these people
stayed a couple of nights at that base — which was a training
base — before they sequestered Mr. DeVine. And they may even
have used vehicles from that base. At least their vehicle was seen
at that base.
In any case, those individuals, that is, the enlisted men, took Mr.
DeVine prisoner, drove off with him in their vehicle and his vehi-
cle, and somehow, somewhat later, took actions which resulted in
his death. The best information available to me, at least, is that
that did not take place on the base, but someplace else.
In any case, these people were brought to trial and they were
convicted and they were sentenced. Now, our view is that an officer
of the rank of Colonel Alpirez at that base had to have known that
these people from another base were spending a couple of nights
there and receiving
Chairman Specter. Was there evidence that Colonel Alpirez was
present during any part of the interrogation or activity as to
Michael DeVine?
Mr. Watson. To the best of my knowledge, sir — and we really
have to ask the people that were involved in the actual case in
Guatemala at the time — to the best of my knowledge, sir
Chairman Specter. Well, this is not a trial. You're not giving di-
rect evidence. You may testify as to what you learned officially.
Mr. Watson. Sure.
Chairman Specter. What is the information that was transmit-
ted to you in your official capacity?
Mr. Watson. We have a variety of reports. And I have to tell
you. Senator, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen all of the reports from
back in 1990 and 1991. I have not been able to review all of those
reports, and don't even think we have them all in the State Depart-
ment. But the bulk of the evidence is, I gather, as Admiral
Studeman has just laid out, that while there have been some re-
21
ports that say that Colonel Alpirez may have been at the scene of
the crime, may have been more directly involved, the bulk of the
evidence suggests that he's guilty of a coverup, that he had to have
known that these people were in the area and what they were up
to. And that is our tentative conclusion at this point.
Chairman Specter. Was Colonel Alpirez
Mr. Watson. We're very, very frustrated that not only Colonel
Alpirez, but the commanders of the base up in the north, I said in
Flores, where Captain Contreras and his men were based, have not
been who we think gave the orders for the men to go out and de-
tain Mr. DeVine — have not been brought to trial.
Chairman Specter. Well, the information given to the Commit-
tee is that Captain Contreras was convicted and then mysteriously
escaped
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Specter. With all the indications that it was a put-
up deal and he was allowed to escape.
Mr. Watson. That's our conclusion.
Chairman Specter. Was any consideration given to prosecuting
Captain Contreras under U.S. terrorist laws?
Mr. Watson. Not that I know of, sir. Not that I know of.
Chairman Specter. Why not? Why not?
Mr. Watson. I really am unable to comment on any action — deci-
sions made by the Justice Department in this case. I'm simply not
familiar with that, sir.
Chairman Specter. Well, we have someone here from the Justice
Department. And I wonder if Mr. Barrett would step forward,
please? Do we have someone here from Justice?
[Pause.]
Chairman Specter. While we had not formally listed you as wit-
ness, we'd be interested to know if you can at least tell us if the
issue as to Colonel Alpirez was dropped on the jurisdictional
grounds or insufficiency of evidence?
TESTIMONY OF JOHN Q. BARRETT
Mr. Barrett. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Would you state your full name for the
record, please?
Mr. Barrett. Yes. My name is John Barrett. I'm Counselor to
the Inspector General at the Department of Justice. The Depart-
ment of Justice began an inquiry only last week into its receipt of
information and its handling of information regarding the DeVine
killing. That is an inquiry that's being conducted at the request of
the Deputy Attorney General. It's an ongoing inquiry, and it has
not reached definitive conclusions or resulted in a report. And so
what we were asked to do is be present this morning and perhaps
to field questions to describe the existence of that review
Chairman SPECTER. Well we would be perhaps better off by hav-
ing the Justice Department officials who made the judgments, as
opposed to someone from the Inspector General; to hear from some-
one who actually reviewed the case to make a determination as to
whether it was jurisdictional, that is the absence of evidence of ter-
rorism, or whether there was not sufficient evidence to proceed.
22
Mr. Barrett. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Department is committed
to providing a full report to the Committee as soon as the informa-
tion is developed on the receipt and the handling of the information
that came into the Department.
Chairman Specter. Mr. Barrett, stay with us at the witness
table. My time has expired, and we'll come back to you at a later
time.
Mr. Barrett. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. I yield now to the Vice Chairman, Senator
Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Secretary Watson, what's the U.S. inter-
est in Guatemala?
Mr. Watson. The U.S. interest in Guatemala, principal interest,
is to contribute to the development of a democratic society in Gua-
temala where the citizens of Guatemala and of other countries that
are visiting Guatemala or living there enjoy full human rights. And
Guatemala is an integral member of a democratic hemisphere with
open and constructive political life involving all members of society,
irrespective of ethnic background or social origin.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is that the objective during the Bush
and Reagan administrations as well?
Mr. Watson. Senator, I'm really unable to respond fully about
the objectives of the other administrations. But I would, sir, like to
point out that President Bush certainly took strong action, on the
recommendation of Ambassador Stroock, in 1990, to cut off all mili-
tary assistance.
Vice Chairman KERREY. All right, so let's presume that it was
the policy of the Bush administration as well. I won't expect you
to go back further than that. Let's look at another country just as
a litmus test of our policies. What's the greatest threat to democ-
racy in Iraq? What inhibits democracy in Iraq?
Mr. Watson. Well, I'm not an expert on Iraq, Senator-
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Neither am I. But what^ust sort of-
Mr. Watson [continuing]. But I would think the single biggest
obstacle to democracy in Iraq is the existence of the extremely re-
pressive and authoritarian regime run by the president of that
country.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Would you say that the Iraqi military
and the police force used by Saddam Hussein, a dictator, is a
threat to democracy in Iraq?
Mr. Watson. My impression is that the Iraqi police force and
military are firmly under the instructions and control of Mr. Sad-
dam Hussein, are instruments in his implementation of his poli-
cies.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is there a comparable situation in Gua-
temala?
Mr. Watson. I think there's no — there's no way one can compare
Ramiro De Leon Carpio, the President of Guatemala, with Saddam
Hussein. De Leon Carpio is an extraordinary figure in the history
of his country, was the human rights ombudsman at a time when
it was extremely dangerous to do that, and very aggressively pur-
sued cases. And they were brought to him by people of all classes,
including — he pursued the Bamaca case before we even knew about
23
it in 1992. So to compare him with Saddam Hussein would be not
fair at all.
I would argue, however, that
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate that distinction, and I think
it not only is a fair, but an important distinction to make for Amer-
icans who are trying to evaluate not only U.S. interests in Guate-
mala, but how it is that we are to accomplish the objectives that
you've just described, to make certain that Americans understand
the differences between the two. But the question that I'm trying
to get to is whether or not the military in Guatemala is an impedi-
ment to the development of democracy in that country.
Mr. Watson. Well, I think that another dramatic difference be-
tween
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is the military an impediment to the de-
velopment of democracy in Guatemala?
Mr. Watson. I think that the behavior of the armed forces, the
military in Guatemala in the past certainly has been.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Was this a trial that one would expect
and applaud in a democratic environment?
Mr. Watson. A trial?
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Was this — the trial of the soldiers that
were accused in the DeVine murder, was that a trial that you could
look at and say, gee, this is evidence that democracy is flourishing
in Guatemala?
Mr. Watson. Well, for one that's not familiar with the details of
the trial, I would say in a place like Guatemala, where the military
had held sway for so long and are not, I would argue, firmly under
the control of the president — completely different from Iraq — that
to have a trial of a military officer — Contreras — that's the first time
they've ever had a military officer convicted in a military court in
my knowledge in the history of the country. So that was a great
step forward. And the conviction of the enlisted men also was a
great step forward, and that was even held up by the supreme
court.
Of course, the conviction of Contreras was vitiated immediately
by his escaping and disappearing. And we are still pressing the
government of Guatemala to find where he is, bring him back, and
have him serve the time to which he was sentenced.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You said you're not familiar with the de-
tails of the trial.
Mr. Watson. Yes, that's right.
Vice Chairman KERREY. Ajid can you explain why you're not? Is
that principally because it took place before you assumed your re-
sponsibilities?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. There are — I would think that there are
people who were directly involved, even in our embassy in those
days, would be able to give you a lot more information, and we can
research our files and see if we have some more reports on them,
which we would be glad to share with you also.
Vice Chairman KERREY. Would the details of Mr. DeVine's mur-
der been brought out in the trial?
Mr. Watson. I'm not sure, sir. We'd have to look at that. My un-
derstanding is that the people convicted did not admit to what they
did, but they were convicted nevertheless.
24
Vice Chairman KERREY. That's my understanding as well, that
they said nothing during the trial.
What is your own suspicions as to the nature of the interrogation
and the nature of the execution?
Mr. Watson. Well, I laid them out a little bit earlier, sir. We do
not know exactly how Mr. DeVine died, what the specific cir-
cumstances were, but we are convinced that these convictions were
correct and those were the people who actually did it. But we be-
lieve also
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you suspect that the interrogation it-
self was brutal?
Mr. Watson. The interrogation of Mr.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. DeVine.
Mr. Watson. DeVine? My understanding, sir, and please, I don't
want to be boring when I keep adding "it's my understanding," but
I was not there and do not have firsthand knowledge of this. My
understanding by the reports that I've read was
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Had this man been employed at the De-
partment of State, would your attitude be the same as it is right
now, with respect?
Mr. Watson. My attitude would be — yes, absolutely. I mean, he's
an American citizen who was picked up and did nothing wrong,
and was picked up by some people, by military people, for no rea-
son that makes any sense and then somehow resulted in his death.
And I'd be as outraged about that if it were
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Earlier, Mr. Secretary, in your testi-
mony you expressed sympathy, not outrage, to be clear. And I
don't — I'm not holding you responsible for that, but I do observe
that's one of the problems in this case, that the U.S. response was
sympathy, not outrage.
Mr. Watson. Well, Senator, may I please — I think that Ambas-
sador Stroock, at that time our ambassador in Guatemala, per-
formed extraordinarily well in this case. Within 24 hours of Mr.
DeVine's death, he was aware of this and he was pushing ex-
tremely hard to get at the bottom of it. He very quickly discovered
that the military themselves were probably involved in the case, so
he stopped dealing with the military to look for solutions, and
started dealing with the civilians and working very closely with
Mrs. DeVine and her — and people that were working with her put
together the evidence which resulted in this conviction. I think the
embassy — all elements of the embassy, including
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I don't doubt Ambassador Stroock's per-
formance at all, Mr. Secretary, but he is one part of — one employee,
one person in the government. I'm questioning U.S. official re-
sponse.
Mr. Watson. My impression, sir, is that the response was one of
outrage all the way up to the President of the United States when
we cut off that aid at the end of 1990, just six months after the
murder.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is your impression that U.S. efforts in
Guatemala have been to (a) support the Guatemalan army in sup-
pression of the and operation against the insurgency, or (b) empha-
sis on a process of reconciliation?
25
Mr. Watson. I will tell you categorically, sir, in this administra-
tion, at least, which is the only one for which I can speak, it has
been the latter, and including with elements of the military. And
there are some enlightened folks in the military now and they've
played a constructive role, as I mentioned, in that complicated
transfer of power when President Serrano tried to alter the con-
stitution unilaterally.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did the department, Mr. Secretary,
know the purpose, methodology, and cost of CIA programs in Gua-
temala?
Mr. Watson. I'm not sure that I can go into what we knew about
CIA programs in Guatemala in an open session, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. My understanding is that all govern-
ment operations overseas, Mr. Secretary, including programs car-
ried out by the CIA, are reviewed in some kind of an interagency
process before they're undertaken. Is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And that State Department is a part of
that process?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So I presume, since this is an overseas
operation, that some kind of review was undertaken and that the
State Department was a part of that review?
Mr. Watson. There should be some sort of a review, but I can't
tell you, sir, exactly which — every program
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And I presume you're not disclosing any-
thing to say that the State Department knew the purpose, knew
the methodology, and knew the cost. You're saying you didn't know
the cost, methodology, or purpose? I mean, that's hardly, it seems
to me, anything that you're — you're not giving up sources and
methods by telling that you knew what the hell they were doing
down there and why.
Mr. Watson. Well, I'm not sure that I — I certainly don't know
the costs of every program in Guatemala. I rely on what Admiral
Studeman told us just a few minutes ago in that regard.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Admiral Studeman has responsibility as
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. You have a respon-
sibility in the State Department, it would seem to me, to be able
to answer pretty directly that in an interagency process, that you
would know purpose, the methodology, and the cost, and you're
saying to me either you're concerned that telling me that you knew
the purpose was classified or that you didn't Imow the purpose or
the cost or the methodology.
Mr. Watson. I think it's correct to say that the interagency proc-
ess, including the State Department, is aware of the general thrust
of the policies and programs of all agencies in a specific country.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. General thrust? I mean, I — my time is
up, but I
Mr. Watson. Well, I can't tell you in all honesty, sir — I don't
want to be misleading — that every detail of every program is
known. But I'm really uncomfortable going further beyond that
Vice Chairman Kerrey. My time is up, Mr. Secretary, but I
didn't ask you if you knew every detail. I asked you if you knew
purpose, I asked you if you knew methodology, and I asked you if
26
you knew cost. That's not every detail. I didn't ask you if you knew
name, rank, and serial number of every individual that was down
in Guatemala. I asked you a much more generic and general ques-
tion.
Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator Kerrey.
The practice of the Committee is to alternate among Members in
order of arrival, and Senator Cohen is next.
Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me commend you and Senator Kerrey for pursuing with
great dispatch the allegations surrounding the CIA's involvement
with respect to human rights abuses in Guatemala. I must say that
most Americans are justifiably appalled at the statements and alle-
gation concerning the payment of tens of thousands of dollars to an
asset after learning he was probably involved in the brutal torture
and death of a U.S. citizen.
And I must say I also question the role of the CIA and other
agencies in handling information not only about the Bamaca case,
and the Blake case, but other instances of human rights abuses in
Guatemala. I'm certain, however, that the inquiry undertaken by
the Chairman and Vice Chairman will eventually produce a clear
picture of what has occurred.
I say this also with a caveat, that I think a public hearing at this
time may be a bit premature, as we're learning with the responses
given by the witnesses here at the table this morning. On the one
hand we have an FBI investigation underway, which we do not
want to compromise in any way. We have investigations underway
by several inspectors general. We have an investigation underway
by the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. And we have
ground rules which are going to lead to, it seems to me, to a frag-
mentary disclosure. Some of the information will remain behind
the veil of classification. There will be confusion in terms of exactly
what has happened, what the information is. And I think the clas-
sified information is critical to the understanding of what the intel-
ligence community did in Guatemala, who approved it, and how the
information was collected and was used by our government. That
picture will not emerge from this particular hearing, and that's
going to be unfortunate.
It's also my personal belief that the Oversight Committees have
been misled. And I would say, in my own opinion, the evidence will
indicate that they may even have been lied to. So we have a prob-
lem; if we say too little today, we run the risk of misleading the
American people; if we say too much, we run the risk of jeopardiz-
ing sensitive technical capabilities and even lives, as both the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman have pointed out. I think the
American people deserve answers. I'm confident they're going to get
them. But I think it's important for the press and the public to un-
derstand that nothing approaching a complete and accurate picture
is going to emerge today by virtue of the fact that the evidence is
going to be fragmentary and not forthcoming and full.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, let me just pursue one area
that is troubling to me. Admiral Studeman, I think you indicated
in your statement that the CIA failed to inform the Oversight Com-
mittees. Is that correct?
27
Chairman Specter. Senator Cohen, we're going to have to with-
hold questions as to Admiral Studeman, even though that question
does not
Senator CoHEN. I don't think it's going to call for any — here is
part of the problem that I have
Chairman Specter. I think it is not. The question is, once we
start on that line.
Senator Cohen. Well, let me just say that from what I gather
from the statements that have been delivered it has been offered
to the Committee that all of the relevant agencies were appro-
priately advised in the executive branch — State Department, NSC,
Justice Department, every branch but the Intelligence Oversight
Committees of both the House and the Senate. I believe that is the
representation that was made by the witnesses.
Chairman Specter. I think that is accurate, Senator Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Let me then state for the record that I believe
that to be incomplete and inaccurate. I will say without questioning
the witnesses in open session — as we cannot do — that I believe that
the information was not only withheld from the Committee, I be-
lieve the Committee was deliberately misled. And that will not be
a statement coming from the witnesses, but from me, and that is
part of the problem I have today, is that we are presenting an in-
complete and I think a fragmentary picture which is going to lead
to a good deal of misunderstanding. In any event
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Just for the record, I think you make a
very good point, Senator, and I quite agree. Not only were we not
informed, I believe this Committee was indeed intentionally misled.
Senator COHEN. Well, I was going to make the point that we've
had in the past — we've had people prosecuted for withholding infor-
mation from the Congress. In this particular case, I think it goes
flirther. This was not only a withholding of information, a failure
to inform as they're required, but also upon initiation of questions
by this Committee, relating specifically to a case where the infor-
mation was, in fact, misleading, and I believe deliberately designed
to mislead the Committee. I think it goes much further than with-
holding or failure to advise. Apparently that's something we can
pursue or we'll have to pursue at a later time.
Chairman SPECTER. Senator Cohen, in light of the serious com-
ments you've made, let me ask Admiral Studeman if he wants to
respond to that. I think the CIA ought to have an opportunity to
respond to a comment that there's been a deliberate withholding of
information.
Admiral Studeman. Let me see if I can frame an appropriate re-
sponse to you. And I do believe that we're going to have to discuss
this further, clearly, in closed session. The information to which
you refer that was not — that the Committee was not informed of,
was this information that was provided for the crimes reported to
the Justice Department that had to do with the potential involve-
ment of then Lieutenant Colonel Alpirez, involvement in the — in
the DeVine case in the sense that he was alleged to be present at
the interrogation that resulted in Michael DeVine's death?
As the ambassador has already said, this was the essence of the
CIA information, but there is also other — there are other theories
about where and under what circumstances Michael DeVine died:
28
That is, that he was not taken to the Special Forces school base
at Kaibil, where Lieutenant Colonel Alpirez was the — was the com-
manding officer, but that he was, in fact, killed off the premises of
this school, which would provide then an indication that Alpirez
was, in fact, not at the interrogation.
That did not belie the fact that Colonel Alpirez, as the ambas-
sador has already said, is probably involved in a coverup, because
the five enlisted soldiers and the individual that — and Captain
Contreras did operate from this base at Kaibil. And clearly records
were destroyed that reflected that, and the support that the base
gave to these particular individuals.
Now, this information was reported by the intelligence commu-
nity to the — to the Justice Department. The Justice Department
was ruling on the issue of their jurisdiction, which has not yet been
addressed here, and I will not comment on that aspect of it. It took
several months for the Justice Department to essentially make
their determination. In the process of those several months there
was an effort, at least so far as I've been able to track from internal
documentation, to inform — there was a — there is internal docu-
mentation suggesting that there was an intent to inform the House
Intelligence Committee. But as best we can tell from our records,
no such information was, in fact, conveyed to the House Intel-
ligence Committee. As you know, it's also unusual for us to convey
it to one committee and not to the other. And clearly, I think we
have confidence that the information was not conveyed to the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee.
Now, the issue to which I believe you refer, with regard to the
misleading aspects of this, had to do with a separate event which
I think we ought to deal with offline, which has to do with human
rights reports that are made to the Committee and the information
that was provided by CIA with regard to that aspect of our dialog
with you. That only came to my attention this morning, but I will
say that we need to explore that more fulsomely in our discussions
together.
Senator COHEN. Well, I can see my time is running out. That's
part of the difficulty I have, Mr. Chairman, with the nature of the
proceedings today. I understand the public pressure by virtue of
Congress about to — or the Senate about to recess for two weeks
and the need to try to get as much information as possible, but the
difficulty is that by pursuing it piecemeal, going public and then
classified, not really setting forth the ground rules of what can be
discussed, we're going to have a picture which I think is not going
to contribute to a full understanding on the part of the American
people.
Let me just say with respect to the matter you just referred to.
Admiral Studeman, I think perhaps it's appropriate that we pursue
that. I would only like to alert my colleagues to something that's
of concern to me. I've been through this before some years ago with
the Iran-Contra affair, and one thing that became clear during the
course of that is this Committee has to be appropriately informed
and advised of certain matters. In this particular case, this Com-
mittee— this is prior to my coming back on the Committee — but
this Committee expressed specific interest in information, re-
quested a response from the Agency and the response that I have
29
seen from the Agency I believe is misleading in its entirety. So, we
can pursue that at a later time, but this Committee, the Congress
can't do it's job if it isn't given accurate information and truthful
information, and information that is designed not to inform but to
obscure.
And I'll reserve further questions — obviously, since my time has
run out — for a later time.
Chairman Specter. Senator Cohen, I think you have obviously
raised a matter which is of enormous importance when you say
that it's more than a matter of not having been informed but lied
to. And it is not possible, no matter what we do in open session
today, to have comprehensive answers to all the questions that are
pending. But there'll be a good deal of information which will be
available to the American public. And when we try to establish an
appropriate line so that we do not disclose sources and methods,
or do not get into even questions where the witness declines to an-
swer, which raises an inference as to sources and methods, that is
difficult.
But when you raise another issue about misinformation and
lying, then I think on two counts we need to pursue that. One
count is that if that kind of a serious charge is being made against
the CLA — and I know from your background. Senator, that you do
not make any statement lightly, especially a statement like that —
but having said that, the CIA ought to be entitled to respond. And
Admiral Studeman has responded. And the nature of the issue of
lying or misleading does not relate to sources or methods, that re-
lates to the integrity of the CIA. And I think that is a subject, hav-
ing been broached, that we ought to pursue in your next round.
And I do not think that it will encroach on the concerns I have ex-
pressed about sources and methods. I'm not unaware that once
there's a deviation from the rule that a witness can answer ques-
tions if there are going to be other questions which are going to
be
Senator COHEN. Mr. Chairman, one of the problems
Chairman Specter. Well, let me finish.
Other questions which may pose difficulties, but I think that's a
part of the process and we'll just deal with them one by one. But
I think you ought to be permitted to pursue it when the next round
comes.
Senator Cohen. One of the problems is that the information that
I would wish to pursue would remain classified. And as Senator
Kerrey has pointed out, there is only one person that can declassify
that, and that's the President of the United States. So I don't know
that we can, in fact, pursue that under these circumstances be-
cause we haven't had a clarification of what can and what cannot
be discussed.
Chairman Specter. Well, that being so, whenever we pursue
that in a classified form, it's not going to be available to the Amer-
ican people. But the decision was made to proceed as far as we can
go, and I think a good bit has been disclosed and will be disclosed,
so that it's a net gain even though we cannot do it all. And some
of it will have to be conducted behind closed doors, and then we'll
make a judgment as to what can be disclosed. But doing it — and
we're going to have that closed session at the end of our open ses-
30
sion today, so that we can proceed to determine what can be dis-
closed to the maximum amount possible.
Admiral Studeman. Mr. Chairman, if I could say something,
while it may be the impression of this Committee that in this par-
ticular circumstance there was an intent to mislead, I have not had
a chance to get into this particular issue and I have no evidence
at this particular point in time that there was a deliberate intent
to mislead on the part of the CIA in dealing with this matter. So
I believe that we have some homework to do, and I believe also
that it is appropriate to discuss this again in closed session.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I can tell you in response. Admiral
Studeman, that I felt as if I had been misled from the moment of
my first contact with this issue in February. So there is a consider-
able amount of additional work that needs to be done.
Chairman SPECTER. Well, the issue of whether the Committee
has been misled or lied to will be pursued in detail and in depth
and we'll be reporting on that publicly at the earliest appropriate
time.
Senator Kerry from Massachusetts. Senator Kerry is next in
order. I'm alternating in time of arrival.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to associate myself completely with the remarks of Senator
Cohen and perhaps even a little bit further. Like Senator Cohen,
I have also been exposed to this process on two occasions, one
through the Foreign Relations Committee and the Contra efforts in
Central America, and indeed prosecutions came out of my being
lied to by the CIA in the course of that. Claire George was con-
victed, though later overturned.
And in the course of the POW Select Committee, we went
through one of the largest declassifications in American history and
struggled with the effort to deal with these fine lines.
I think it's important to have a hearing, but if we're going to
have a hearing we ought to be able to ask questions that I think
do not raise issues of sources and methods but which really shed
light to the American people on the judgments that are being
made. It's my sense, Mr. Chairman, that everybody has come to
understand that what we're really focused on here is an agency
that has not changed as fast as the world around it has changed,
and that there seems to be a blinding capacity to drive for the col-
lection of, "intelligence," with little regard sometimes for the pos-
sible negative consequences and certainly with little regard of how
useful some of that intelligence may prove to be.
I'm not sure that having colonels on a paid contract basis is a
risk worth taking, measured against what they provide, particu-
larly measured against many of the other ways in which informa-
tion or the very same information is provided. And I think we have
to ask and stop — ask if in this new world that we're in, Mr. Chair-
man, the national interest is always served by the paid collection
of some of the characters that we associate ourselves with. This is
not the first time this has happened and we've learned the lesson
previously about what happens when you sleep with dogs.
I think, Mr. Chairman, there are a legitimate number of ques-
tions. I'd like to just share some. I came here expecting that we
were going to be able to ask the CIA about some policy questions
31
and judgments. I would have liked to have asked Admiral
Studeman, who I didn't know we were not going to be able to ques-
tions of, whether the time has come for Congress and the executive
branch to reevaluate when, where, and how we engage in some of
these paid clandestine relationships and what their value is to his
intelligence efforts. I don't think that violates sources and methods.
I would have liked to have asked him about whether he and his
predecessors are conducting a review of that or whether they would
recommend that kind of review to the new DCI; what the relation-
ship will be to the Aspin Commission; whether we should use paid
clandestine human assets in situations where the ramifications of
discovery are so great and the risk of U.S. security is so minimal.
I would like to know whether that particularly is important, meas-
ured against the fact that the embassy, reporting liaison relation-
ship, signals intelligence, CNN and others provide most of the
same information. I'd like to know from a policy perspective, with-
out the Soviet threat, why we still need to have paid sources in al-
most every country of the world. And I think that's the kind of
question. If it is for narcotics, if it is for stability reasons, if it is
for other reasons, the American people ought to know the answer
to that question. It doesn't violate sources and methods; it's a pol-
icy issue. It's a judgment. It's how their money is being spent. And
it obviously gets the United States into hot water on occasion, and
that is what this hearing is about. That's what these issues are
about. How does the CIA evaluate and handle paid sources in a
way that assures some of those sources are not doing something in-
imical or embarrassing to U.S. interests? What are the financial ob-
ligations that we incur with respect to those sources when we've in-
curred them? I don't think that is violative of this process. Do we
make it clear to those sources in recruiting that we don't finance
or protect criminals? Is there something in our methodology that
perhaps needs review to guarantee that they understand that that
is not the case? At what point do we stop protecting a source? Do
you feel that the United States is obligated to protect somebody
when we know or think that human rights abuses may be con-
ducted? These are all policy questions, and I'm concerned, Mr.
Chairm.an, that we're not exploring them in public today.
I truly do not feel that we are incapable of drawing the line be-
tween those things that might touch on a source or method, and
I've found in my previous excursions in public on these issues that
nobody has been embarrassed or found any difficulty in having
somebody suggest, "Well, Senator, that's something that I think
we're going to have to do in the executive session," and everybody's
agreed and on we've gone.
So I voice a concern about the methodology and I join Senator
Cohen in saying that I think there will be rather less light shed
and rather more questions unanswered and perhaps greater confu-
sion as a consequence of not being able to pursue those things.
Let me ask you, Mr. Watson, if Mr.— Colonel Alpirez attended a
school or military training in the United States?
Mr. Watson. I understand that he did, yes, sir.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Do you know the circumstances
of that and the name of the school?
32
Mr. Watson. My understanding is — and I can get you the full
record afterwards; I don't have it with me here — is that he did at-
tend the School of the Americas at some point back in the late —
maybe the late 1980's. But I can get you the information on that,
sir.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Do you know if there are any
indications, either in his record at school or elsewhere, that he was
the type of person who might, in fact, be untrustworthy or problem-
atical?
Mr. Watson. I simply don't know that, sir.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. You don't know that.
Do you know of other instances of those who have attended the
School for Americas who have engaged in similar kinds of activities
that you believe he's been engaged in?
Mr. Watson. Well, I think that it's common knowledge that some
few people who have passed through the classes and courses of the
School of the Americas have subsequently engaged in behavior that
is quite nefarious. There's no question about that. But I think also
the great — the huge, overwhelming majority of people that have
gone to the School of the Americas, to our knowledge, certainly
have not performed in that fashion.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. In the second panel, Mr. Cornell will be
able to answer that kind of a detailed question.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. OK.
From a policy perspective, Mr. Secretary, is there concern in the
State Department about the clandestine information gathering
process and the way in which, improperly accounted for, it can run
contrary to the interests that the State Department, in fact, places
as its highest priority?
Mr. Watson. Well, I think, sir, in the Department there would
be concern about anything that would make it more difficult for us
to undertake our policy. But the particular issue that you're getting
at, I think, is one of the things that will be looked at by the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board's review. It's my understanding that the
President has asked them to get at all the facts in the cases we're
talking about, to look at our own operations, the interagency oper-
ations as well as within the various departments, to see if we're
doing our job well or not, and if not, give us recommendations. And
then to make as full disclosure as possible to the American people
of their findings, and that's what the President has committed to
do.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, knowing what was
known about Colonel Alpirez at the time he was severed, why
would he be paid a significant sum of money, tens of thousands of
dollars — 40-plus? Is that an appropriate thing to have done under
those circumstances?
Mr. Watson. With all due respect, Senator, that's the kind of
issue that I'm certainly not qualified to address or even to comment
on in an open hearing.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Why can't you comment on
that in open hearing? Why are you here?
Mr, Watson. I'm here, sir, to try to lay out basically what our
policy toward Guatemala is and how we handled these cases.
33
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I'm asking you for your
judgment as an official of the U.S. Government. Is that appro-
priate, to pay a man, knowing what we knew about Mr. Alpirez?
Why do you pay him and give him a going-away parachute know-
ing what we knew?
Mr. Watson. The State Department didn't pay him anything.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Did you know he was going to
be paid?
Mr. Watson. No, sir. I do not know that he was paid by anybody.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Wasn't it signed off of by Jus-
tice?
Mr. Watson. I do not know, sir. I don't know anything about
what Justice may have done in this
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, then, why are you here?
Mr. Watson. I'm here for the purposes that I said. Senator, real-
ly. I mean, with all due respect
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I'm not sure what they
are. I don't have any further questions.
Mr. Watson [continuing]. I can't — I can't answer that kind of a
question, of who might have paid Colonel Alpirez.
Chairman SPECTER. Well, Senator Kerry, had you been here at
the opening, the ambassador testified to the background of what
went on in Guatemala and had some relevant testimony to offer.
That's why he's here.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, Mr. Chairman, I was
here. I heard it. And I'm still asking the question, I think the ques-
tion's still relevant. I mean, this is a judgment issue, it's not a
Vice Chairman Kerrey. For the Committee and for the public as
well, I mean, I appreciate. Senator Kerry, that you say that this
hearing may accomplish nothing, may add additional confusion, but
this Committee has not been silent on this issue up to this day.
And in our responsibility we are trying to walk the line between
the public's right to know and our requirement to try to protect not
just what's going on in Guatemala but what's going on in the rest
of the world. And this Committee asked, after we were informed —
in fact, last November we sent a letter to Tony Lake asking that
the Committee be allowed to share the information that we have
with Jennifer Harbury. We requested an Inspector General's inves-
tigation of the entire incident. And to be fair to Admiral Studeman,
he had already actually launched that IG investigation. This Com-
mittee met with the Directorate of Operations on March 23 along
with other CIA people. And at that time in very strong language —
and I believe Admiral Studeman will confirm that — expressed our
anger and outrage at having not been informed and dealing with
many of the issues that you have already raised.
And so this hearing is not, as Senator Cohen quite correctly said,
being conducted for the purpose of answering every single question
that's out there. We have a very detailed investigation going on
right now. Fred Hitz is in the room. I don't know if he'll be called
later, but I trust, based upon his handling of the Aldrich Ames
case, that he is going to bring not just to us in a classified form
but will bring to the public in a declassified form a much clearer
picture of this entire situation.
34
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Well, I respect that, Senator
Kerrey, and I'm not trying to tread anywhere unfair, but the Amer-
ican people have read a huge amount — the papers, newspapers
once again are frankly — told us more than many of us have learned
through sources we're supposed to learn them.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, that's a consequence, in my judg-
ment, that the administration does control when to declassify. In
my judgment they made a conscious decision to provide background
information beyond what we had. There's no question that that did
take place.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. No, I realize. All I'm trying to
suggest is, that as a consequence of that information now being
public, there are legitimate policy questions swirling around, and
I feel very personally restrained and encumbered when a commit-
tee of this importance meets with the acting director and policy is-
sues that are really judgments that might shed some light on how
billions of dollars are being spent can't be answered. I do not want
to tread across the line of a source or a method, but I don't think
any of the questions that I've framed, that I thought we would be
entitled to ask, did so.
Chairman Specter. Senator Kerry, I appreciate what you're get-
ting at here, and as Senator Kerry commented, some of those mat-
ters were inquired into on the March 23 session where you were
not present. And there will be an opportunity to get into those mat-
ters with Admiral Studeman at a later time.
Admiral Studeman. Senator Specter, I would be prepared to very
briefly comment on three aspects of Senator Kerry's questions if
you want; otherwise, we could wait.
Chairman SPECTER. Well, if you're going to volunteer go ahead.
Admiral Studeman. Let me just talk about the first point you
made about the fact that — do we review the productivity of assets
and your concern about the nature and character of the assets that
we have.
I just would point out that even given the particular case that
we're articulating today, we would not have known, or might not
have known anything about the circumstances associated with Mi-
chael DeVine because the first report on Michael DeVine was cour-
tesy of one of those assets that you talk about, essentially. So,
while you may quibble over colonels and corporals and others in
the context of the HUMINT operations of the CIA, these operations
are productive.
And similarly, I would also say that you would not have known
our current assessment of what happened to the guerrilla chief
Bamaca unless there had been those HUMINT assets associated
with that — point number one.
Point number two, with regard to the CIA and in particular the
Directorate of Operations. Obviously, the cold war is over. In the
context of what we are now doing in the new and future world, CIA
recognized early on that changes had to be made in the Directorate
of Operations. There is a major redesign plan out for the Direc-
torate of Operations. That major redesign plan has substantial
components. It will take years to essentially set it in place inside
the DO. The components of that DO design plan relate to manage-
ment, relate to covert action, relate to HUMINT, relate to technical
35
operations, relate to organization, relate to oversight, relate to ca-
reer service management, and relate to accountability.
And there are major, heavy efforts going on inside the Central
Intelligence Agency in the DO to refme all the different aspects of
this, and we want to come before the Committee and talk about
this. It's very important that the Committee chase around after us
to ensure that division of the redesign of the DO to accommodate
the new world, to work out of the world that we came out of— this
is a world in which there was an insurgency, communism fighting
essentially Cuban-based Marxist or otherwise or indigenous guer-
rilla activities — that as we go into a new world that we have a new
Directorate of Operations and that we have a new sense of how we
deal with things.
We do manage and review asset productivity, payments. There
are legal issues associated with that which we can discuss in closed
session.
Senator Kerry of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the Ad-
miral for that answer, which proved not to be too painful, I think.
And I might say that I want the record to be clear that I really
feel that some of these answers might be helpful to us. I am not
asking them because I'm opposed to paying for clandestine asset in
every circumstance. It's a question of what are the safeguards and
what is the process. Particularly in this new world, we're going to
need to be — in terms of narcotics and other things — as you know
as a former prosecutor of the old saying, that when you're prosecut-
ing the devil, you don't go to heaven to get your witnesses. And
you're going to have a certain number of people you're going to
need to deal with on this level.
I just want to make certain that there's a balance between the
human rights and political goals, humanitarian goals, democracy
goals in a particular place, and the other kinds of goals, and that
the American people understand we're weighing those and we have
a thought-out process rather than a mere continuum of the cold
war thinking, which saw everybody in one light and without those
kinds of restraints and restrictions.
Admiral Studeman. Absolutely.
Chairman SPECTER. We're going to have to move ahead here.
Senator Hutchison, you're next.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sorry that I have stepped away. I had to preside on the floor.
Chairman Specter. Oh, pardon me. Senator Hutchison. I
misspoke. Senator DeWine was here earlier.
Senator Hutchison. I absolutely yield.
Chairman Specter. Michael, you're on. I'm sorry.
Senator DeWine. It doesn't matter. We can — Mr. Barrett, my un-
derstanding is from your testimony, you're the Counselor to the IG
at the Justice Department.
Mr. Barrett. That's correct, Senator.
Senator DeWine. And so what you are doing actually is after the
fact going back, being involved in a review of what the Justice De-
partment's involvement was, what you knew, when you knew it,
what information you had, what information you transmitted back
to the CIA or anybody. Is that correct?
36
Mr. Barrett. That's correct. We're in the process of interviewing
people who had contact with this issue or this realm of issues and
locating documents that are in various Department components.
Senator DeWine. Is there anyone here today who was involved —
at that time who was involved in making the legal judgment?
Mr. Barrett. Senator, from the Department, no, there is not.
Senator DeWine. I think that's unfortunate, and I certainly do
not fault you, Mr. Barrett, for making that decision that you should
be here today instead of someone else. But it seems to me that one
of the things that we always want to know, the American people
always want to know, with our sense of justice, is whether or not,
if a crime has been committed, which obviously it has been here,
whether or not it's possible under American law for any prosecu-
tion to occur, what the analysis — if the answer is no, what analysis
was made of that, what the pertinent laws are, what the review
was.
Mr. Barrett. Yes.
Senator DeWine. And I'm not suggesting that it should have
been or shouldn't have been. But I think that would be — it's one
of the questions that I think the American people and certainly the
families involved would be very interested in knowing. I just think
it's unfortunate there's no one here who can directly respond to
that.
Mr. Barrett. Senator, with the overarching caveat that the re-
view is ongoing, there are a couple of points that are relatively
clear.
Senator DeWine. Why don't you tell us what you can tell us
and
Mr. Barrett. I'm happy to do that.
Senator DeWine [continuing]. And as succinctly as you can be-
cause our time is short, but I do appreciate it.
Mr. Barrett. Yes.
First, in the realm of criminal investigation and prosecution, the
Department of Justice role is relatively limited and defined, and so
many of the issues that have come up in prior questioning are not
DOJ issues. The DOJ issue is a criminal case. And the relevant
statute has a motive element that limits it not to simply a killing
of an American citizen abroad, but a killing that is motivated by
an intention to retaliate, coerce, or intimidate a government or a
population. And so it's a question of the evidence that is available
to the Department of Justice and an evaluation that has to be
made by the people who professionally prosecute those cases year
in and year out on behalf of our government.
In this instance, at this stage of our review, there is no question
that information was referred to the Department of Justice and it
was routed to the appropriate prosecutorial components of the De-
partment, where it was evaluated with an eye on that jurisdictional
question. And at the end of that process, the evidence of motive at
that time, 1992, early 1992, was, in the judgment of those officials,
not present. And so
Senator DeWine. That's very helpful.
Mr. Barrett [continuing]. That is the general summary I can
give you at this stage in our inquiry of the Department of Justice
role.
37
Senator DeWine. Can you tell us whether you have determined
whether that information was routed back to the CIA or to State
Department?
Mr. Barrett. I would actually defer to Admiral Studeman be-
cause of the open session
Admiral Studeman. We did get the Justice Department ruling on
jurisdiction, yes.
Senator DeWine. Was that in writing? If you know.
Admiral Studeman. I would defer to my General Counsel. No,
it's not in writing.
Senator DeWine. And what was the timeframe of that turn-
around, if you know?
Admiral Studeman. We — I believe we made the report in No-
vember, and we got the reply — in November 1991, and got the
reply in March 1992.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Barrett, would that be a normal turn-
around time?
Mr. Barrett. I'm advised both by the CIA and by the prosecu-
tors at the Department who do this that 120 days or four months
is not something that's extraordinarily delayed or subject to criti-
cism, that in a murder case
Senator DeWine. I find that shocking. But-
Mr. Barrett. In a murder case, a review of evidence and con-
templating investigation is not an overnight decision.
Senator DeWine. I can understand the complexity. You seemed
to indicate, however, that the narrowness of the statute certainly
had an impact on applying the facts against that.
Mr. Barrett. Oh, that's absolutely correct.
Senator DeWine. When the Justice Department engages in a re-
view such as this, do you ever, as a matter of policy, go to any
other agency, go back to the CIA for additional information, or
when the law would allow, go to the FBI?
Mr. Barrett. At this point I think I need to invoke the ongoing
nature of our inquiry. That is certainly part of the question that
we're looking at.
Senator DeWine. My question had to do, though, with as policy.
I mean, is — I didn't ask you about this specific case.
Mr. Barrett. Yes, as a general
Senator DeWine. As a general rule, can that be done; is it done?
Mr. Barrett. Yes, as a general matter, the report from the CIA
can begin a dialog. It is not a one-shot communication that the De-
partment of Justice cannot foUowup.
Senator DeWine. And you're not prepared today — and I under-
stand if you're not — but you're not prepared today to tell us about
if there was a dialog back and forth then?
Mr. Barrett. Yes, I'm not prepared to address that.
Senator DeWine. I appreciate that very much.
Ambassador Watson, could you tell me what you know about our
contacting, if we did, the Guatemalan government in regard to
criminal prosecution by the government, beyond what you've al-
ready testified to, in regard to the officers who were tried, but in
regard to any other contact, in either case?
Mr. Watson. Oh, there were a great number of contacts. Senator
DeWine.
38
Senator DeWine. Specifically in regard to Alpirez.
Mr. Watson. I'd have to go back and look very carefully at the
records from 1990-91, to see if Ambassador Stroock — when he
mentioned this, but I know for certain that our ambassador raised
with the government of Guatemala our profound concern that more
senior officers than Captain Contreras were aware of some ele-
ments of this event which resulted in Mr. DeVine's tragic death
and that they were not being forthcoming about those elements
and, in fact, were conspiring to coverup to some extent this event.
And that included people at the training base where Colonel
Alpirez was, that I mentioned earlier, and also at the base further
north in the town of Flores, where Contreras' men came from when
they came down to seek Mr. DeVine near Poptun. So there are peo-
ple in both those bases that we think have more information than
they are making available to the courts or to the public.
This is not to prejudge exactly what their role may or may not
have been, but it is to say that they certainly, in our view, have
information that they should have made public. I know that Am-
bassador Stroock made this point to Guatemalan authorities many
times. I can check our records, sir, if you'd like, and give you a sort
of a chronology of this.
Senator DeWine. That might be helpful, but if — my understand-
ing of your testimony is that you are satisfied that as far as your
department is concerned, you were aggressive in this manner, that
you contacted the Guatemalan government, provided them with the
information that we had, to no avail.
Mr. Watson. Well, that
Senator DeWine. Beyond what criminal prosecutions that did
occur.
Mr. Watson. The quick review that we have done of the files
available to us in the State Department of that period — and we
don't have all the files — indicates very clearly that our ambassador
and all of the elements of the embassy were extremely aggressive,
extremely aggressive both in trying to get information that would
lead to determining who the perpetrators of this crime were and
making a conviction, and also presenting our concerns to the Gua-
temalan government about all aspects of the case, including the
one you're mentioning.
Senator DeWine. I would like to go back, if I could, to your writ-
ten testimony, which you repeated orally, where you state, "We
have conflicting information on the role of Colonel Alpirez. The
bulk of the information suggests that he was involved in a cover-
up." My emphasis on the word "coverup," but that — you did repeat
that.
Later on in your oral testimony you made a statement. I did not
write it down verbatim, so you can correct it, please, as I go, but
basically that indicated that anyone who was in charge of that base
clearly would have known that other officers from another base
were on that base for at least up to two days. And I wonder if you
could elaborate on that and tell us what you think the significance
of that is.
Mr. Watson. Well, let me give you what I can on that, and I
think Admiral Studeman also referred a little bit to this in his
statement. Our perception is that when Captain Contreras' men
39
came down from Flores to Poptun and went to the base where
Alpirez was the senior official that he — that he, Alpirez, should
have known and others would have known that they were there.
They were there for two full days. They had a vehicle there. They
were eating their meals there.
I think that Colonel Cornell, who will be testifying later on
today, can give you much more detail about this than I can because
he was there and did a lot of the work. So he's an eyewitness, and
I'm only a secondary source.
Senator DeWine. I understand.
Mr. Watson. But we went immediately to Alpirez to try to get^
to try to get some cooperation from him in this, and we were basi-
cally stiffed. For example, some records of the base that you would
have expected would have been made available were not available.
Senator DeWine. Mr. Ambassador, my time is up. I do have one
question which you can answer very quickly or take some time
later on: In light of the President's actions the last several days as
reported in the news media, in light of what has occurred the last
several months, I would be interested in your comments about
where American foreign policy goes from here in regard to Guate-
mala, particularly in regard to our concern about human rights and
what leverage that we have in that area?
Mr. Watson. Well, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I can answer
Chairman Specter. Proceed.
Senator DeWine. And my time is up, so if you could be
Mr. Watson. Yeah. I think our policy will continue to be press-
ing to fortify the strengthening of democracy, which is very fragile
in that country, to — and in that context, contributing to the ending
of impunity, which is enjoyed by members of the armed forces and
others in that society, to strengthening the respect for human
rights and a full participation of all citizens in the society, to con-
tributing to this peace process which we think is the key to every-
thing.
If you can get this civil war to end on reasonable terms with an
inclusive political process, then I think that many of the kinds of
horrors we've seen in Guatemala over the last decades will be
much more easy to deal with. And so those are our fundamental
points
Senator DeWine. So-
Mr. Watson [continuing]. And we will keep pushing on that. We
will be providing economic assistance to strengthen the human
rights ombudsman and the administration of justice and that sort
of thing. But at the same time, as we will be putting pressure as
hard as we can on justice in these cases, a particular concern to
the United States of America.
Senator DeWine. Thank you very much.
Chairman Specter. Thank you. Senator DeWine.
Now I turn to Senator Graham.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Studeman — Admiral Studeman, you mentioned that U.S.
funding for intelligence activities in Guatemala began to decline
after 1989, is that correct?
Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir, that's correct.
40
Senator Graham of Florida. What was the level of U.S. intel-
ligence funding prior to 1989 on an annual basis for Guatemalan
activities?
Admiral Studeman. The funding ramped up to a high of about
$4 million to $4.5 million a year and then ramped back down to
its current level. The high was in 1989.
Senator Graham of Florida. And the current level is?
Admiral Studeman. The current level is around $1 million a
year. But as you know, the President has suspended part of that.
Senator Graham of Florida. In the period from 1989 to 1995,
what were our principal intelligence objectives to be secured in
Guatemala?
Chairman Specter. Senator Graham, you may not have been
here when we established the parameter of not inquiring of Admi-
ral Studeman the concern as to sources and methods.
Senator Graham of Florida. Well, I wasn't asking about sources
and methods, just what was the general policy objective, because
in subsequent statement, the Admiral indicated that our high level
of funding was predicated upon certain concerns about communist
infiltration, role of Fidel Castro, et cetera. As those became less of
a threat, what was the policy basis for our intelligence involvement
in Guatemala?
Chairman Specter. Admiral Studeman, if you feel comfortable,
proceed.
Admiral Studeman. Let me just say we met another threshold
here, but I'm not going to hide behind it, with regard to the fact
that there were in place at that time covert action plans, some be-
ginning, some ending. The Central American covert action plan has
now ended. It ended in fiscal year 1994, last year. As of the last
payments, there are no more operations or activities.
The Central American covert action plan started under the
Reagan administration, essentially. There were Findings in the
early 1980's and in the mid-1980's. They were all modified by mem-
orandums of notification. They also were briefed extensively to all
of the executive branch oversight elements as well as to the com-
mittees and funded through these committees, and the focus of the
Central American plan was clearly on fighting insurgency in
Central America.
Senator Graham of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to reserve the
right to pursue that issue when we are in closed session.
Chairman Specter. Fine, Senator Graham. That would be en-
tirely permissible.
Senator Graham of Florida. Mr. Watson, when did the State De-
partment become aware of the death of Mr. DeVine?
Mr. Watson. I believe within 24 hours after his body was found.
Ambassador Stroock was aware of that.
Senator Graham of Florida. And what date was that?
Mr. Watson. I think that would have — be then about the 9th or
so of June 1990. Don't pin me down on that, but the death took
place on the 8th. It was very shortly thereafter, and I asked Am-
bassador Stroock in a telephone conversation about this yesterday,
and he said that within 24 hours he was apprised of this.
41
Senator Graham of Florida. At the time that the State Depart-
ment received the information of Mr. DeVine's death, was there
any theory as to the motive behind his death?
Mr. Watson. My understanding, Senator — and this comes from
people who were involved at the time, as it was several years ago —
is that there was no initial assumption of why he was killed. They
just knew that he was killed — and that we needed to investigate
immediately. Because of the weakness of the police presence in
that part of Guatemala — I gather that they didn't even have any
telephones, only had a couple of officers — the embassy initially
turned to the military for assistance in discovering who the per-
petrators were and what happened.
But within a very short period of time — and I think can say, with
excellent help from the Central Intelligence Agency — the ambas-
sador and others came to the conclusion that the military were, in
fact, part of the problem, not part of the solution. And so we then
started to look — to work with the civilian government and cooperat-
ing very much with Mrs. DeVine and people that she had working
with her to put together the pieces of the case. And by August or
so — ^but within two-and-a-half months of the murder, I think our
embassy was pretty confident they knew really what had happened
and who had done it.
Admiral Studeman. The ambassador's statement and, I think,
also our evidence suggest again the principal motivation had to do
with the recovery of these weapons. That's why this team was es-
sentially sent down there. There were weapons stolen which were
accountable to the senior Guatemalan military officer, the sus-
picion that Mr. DeVine had possession of these weapons, and so
this team was sent, essentially, with the original instructions of es-
sentially reacquiring custody of these weapons.
Mr. Watson. I think that's correct, but
Admiral Studeman. Beyond that, it could have developed into
other things, clearly, and the djmamics we're not clear on.
Mr. Watson. But at the very outset — I think the Senator's ques-
tion was right at the very outset, when Ambassador Stroock was
first informed, it's — and my understanding is that there was no as-
sumption as to exactly who did it or what. In fact, they might have
thought it was common crime of some sort. But they wanted to ex-
plain it, they turned to the military first because of the weakness
of the police organization, then rather quickly realized, with some
good help from a variety of people, that the military were part of
the problem rather than the solution, and they started to turn to
civilian authorities, and working very closely with Mrs. DeVine and
people that she had working with her, put together the pieces of
this puzzle within about — within a little over two months.
And then it was a question of pushing for action in the judicial
system against these people. And that took a long time, but they
were finally convicted in September 1992, and then Contreras in
May 1993.
Senator Graham of Florida. And it was based on that question-
ing of the reliability of the military that the United States in De-
cember 1990 suspended its military assistance, is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir, because the pieces were there, action need-
ed to be taken, and it wasn't being taken. And the military leaders.
42
as I mentioned earlier, were stonewalling us and their own judicial
folks. And we thought that was intolerable, and so the President
decided to suspend foreign military financing and military assist-
ance program funding. The total in the pipeline and in new funding
was about $13.6 million, which was stopped definitively at that
point.
Senator Graham of Florida. However, as recently as March 10 of
this year, the United States was still providing international mili-
tary and education training funds to Guatemala, is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Senator Graham of Florida. Were there any other exceptions to
the prohibition of funding to the Guatemalan military other than
the ramping down of the intelligence funding and the $200,000 a
year for IMET?
Mr. Watson. My understanding is that, while there is no foreign
military financing, there is no military assistance program, there
is still a very small amount of IMET for three courses inside Gua-
temala, and the President on March 10 stopped programs that
would take place in this country. The remaining courses deal with
resource management, with democracy and human rights and with
civil society and those kinds of things which we think are impor-
tant to go ahead with. So those programs are going ahead. But
that's all that — in military assistance that's within our jurisdiction
that I know is going forward.
Senator Graham of Florida. Subsequent to our knowledge in De-
cember 1990 that the military, as you say, may have been more of
the problem than the solution, what was the rationale for our con-
tinuing to utilize the Guatemalan military as a source of intel-
ligence information?
Mr. Watson. Well, I simply can't give you a description of the
decisionmaking process in 1990 inside the administration. Senator.
Senator Graham of Florida. When we have our closed session I
wonder if we could have some testimony as to what the rationale
was in December 1990 relative to continuing what level of intel-
ligence and military support would still be made available to the
Guatemalan military.
Chairman Specter. We certainly can at that time. Senator
Graham.
Mr. Watson. May I add. Senator, Mr. Chairman, that if— in the
course of our review of documents and in the course of the Intel-
ligence Oversight Board's review we may come up with some more
information about how the decisionmaking process worked back
then that's not available to me at this point.
Senator Graham of Florida. There have been allegations that
there might have been some drug involvement in these incidents.
Does the State Department have any evidence that that might
have been part of the motivation?
Mr. Watson. In which sense, sir?
Senator Graham of Florida. The allegation is that the Guate-
malan military was involved in protecting various drug operations
and that one of the reasons that Mr. DeVine was killed was be-
cause he had evidence of that involvement.
43
Mr. Watson. Sir, we have absolutely no corroboration of that re-
port. We've seen that report in the press. We have no corroboration
of that.
Senator Graham of Florida. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, at the
closed hearing, if we could have representatives of appropriate
agencies, such as the DEA, who might be able to discuss whether
they are aware of any corroboration of that allegation.
Chairman Specter. Yes, Senator Graham we can pursue that.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you.
Can I ask one last question? In October 1993, two of the individ-
uals who had been imprisoned as a result of the trial relative to
the murder of Mr. DeVine, Army Specialist Francisco Solobol and
Army Specialist Dibersio Hernandez publicly claimed that they had
been engaged in Army-run death squad activities and had informa-
tion of clandestine cemeteries and jails. Are you aware of that, and
if so, do you know if those individuals were interrogated, and if so
what were the results of those interrogations?
Mr. Watson. Yeah, I know in a general sense. Senator. I can get
you more detail later. We were aware of these remarks, we tried
to follow them up immediately, and in following them up we found
we got nowhere.
Senator Graham of Florida. Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Graham.
We're allowing just a little latitude hoping that, with the possible
exception of Senator Cohen, we can complete this on one round.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say
first that I had to leave to go preside in the Senate, but I'm sorry
to have missed much of this testimony.
I am a firm believer that we should have intelligence gathering
in our country. I think it is essential for our security and for the
security of our allies. However, because of the covert nature of
what intelligence gathering must be, I think the role of Oversight
Committees in Congress is even more important, and one of the
areas of concern that I have is exactly what policies we should have
regarding information to the Oversight Committees. I would like to
ask anyone on the panel — after the death of Mr. DeVine in 1990,
the Justice Department was consulted about whether there was
enough evidence regarding the CIA asset to prosecute him or any-
one in connection with the murders, but the Oversight Committees
of Congress were not consulted about what truly was an ethical
issue and one that I would think would be within the oversight.
Is there anyone on the panel who could say if the Committee
should have been — the Committees should have been consulted?
Admiral Studeman. That's a question clearly for me. And let me
say that — as I've already said in my statement — we do believe cer-
tainly that the Committee should have been informed and that,
based on our review, there was clearly somebody in the CIA think-
ing about it, but it never connected. It never happened. And so, as
I said, there's no explanation for that. I don't believe it's nec-
essarily an intent to mislead, but I don't know that for a fact, and
I think that's going to have to await the final results of the IG in-
spection.
44
I absolutely agree with you that if we're going to make a crimes
report to the Justice Department about the alleged presence of an
individual at the interrogation of a U.S. citizen in which that citi-
zen dies, that information should come to the Committee.
Senator HUTCHISON. Thank you. I really do appreciate your com-
ing forth with that, because I certainly agree with you. Ajid I hope
that we will have policies in the future that we don't learn some-
thing like this four years after the fact. Let me say that another
issue, I think, here, of course has to be what our policy is regarding
the character and actions of CIA assets, and that is something that
I know we will take up in closed session. Is there anj^hing that
any of you would like to say regarding where the line should be
drawn? I think it has been stated many times that when you are
in intelligence gathering, there are standards that perhaps we
wouldn't have if things could be gotten in the open. But neverthe-
less, there are standards beyond which I think we can't go as a de-
mocracy. Do you have a thought on that?
Chairman Specter. Admiral Studeman, as the hearings
progress, you have shown more of a willingness to respond to these
questions. When you do so, you're starting to open the door and
starting to get very close, but the Chair will-
Admiral Studeman. Well, I begin — let me just say
Chairman Specter. Excuse me, excuse me.
Admiral STUDEMAN [continuing]. The doors
Chairman SPECTER. Excuse me, excuse me.
Admiral Studeman [continuing]. The doors I simply can't
Chairman Specter. Excuse me, Admiral.
The Chairman will leave it within your discretion to what extent
you want to answer that question.
Admiral Studeman. Again, let me just say, the two doors I can't
walk through here have to do with sources and methods and de-
tailed discussions of covert action programs. To answer, I think,
your question as theoretically as I can, we ought to deal with
human assets on the basis of access and productivity — that is, what
it is they know and how much they are essentially telling us — and
we ought to deal with assets on the basis of the fact that they are
not engaged essentially in some kind of despicable activity or ac-
tual crimes. And we do have a process inside the Agency for essen-
tially trying to evaluate productivity, certainly relative to the in-
vestment we make in these resources, and we do have a process
that's supposed to work that determines whether or not these peo-
ple are engaged in nefarious activities and if the3^re so engaged in
nefarious activities some steps are then taken to terminate our re-
lationship with those people and to make the necessary reports up
the line, particularly to the Justice Department if there are crimes
indicated. That's standard policy in the Agency.
Senator Hutchison. Let me turn to Secretary Watson and just
ask if you feel the U.S. intelligence did everything that it could and
should have done with regard to the two killings in Guatemala.
Mr. Watson. Well, Senator Hutchison, I suppose none of us ever
do everything we should and could have done in any circumstances,
although we do the very best we can. And I think that the informa-
tion provided by the Central Intelligence Agency in these cases has
been extremely helpful and crucial.
45
But in terms of drawing any final conclusions to answer your
question, I would prefer to wait and see what the results of the ef-
fort by the Intelligence Oversight Board are, because that's exactly
I think why the President asked them to take a look into these sit-
uations, to see how well we've done and see if we could have done
better and if so in the future how we can do better.
Senator Hutchison. Do you feel that the ambassador to Guate-
mala from the United States had full information? And is the CIA
in your view responsible for giving all of the information that it has
within a country to the ambassador from America to that country?
Mr. Watson. Well, I think that in any country, questions of
sources and methods and things like that that the Admiral has
been mentioning, have to be dealt with in a separate way. But re-
porting should be made available, certainly, to the ambassador,
and she, in this case, should have the ability to comment on that.
I think that, just to pick up the first part of your question. Sen-
ator, I think that the question of whether or not all information
went in all the right places at all the right times is something that
the Intelligence Oversight Board is going to be looking into.
Senator Hutchison. In general, do you think that the intel-
ligence community is providing relevant, timely, and productive in-
formation to our ambassadors?
Mr. Watson. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. OK.
There's a third area here that I think we need to pursue, and
that is the State Department's role with regard to American citi-
zens, and do you feel in this case that the State Department treat-
ed these American citizens in the way that they deserve to be
treated? And did they fully inform them — let me say, are you com-
fortable that the State Department and the ambassador did every-
thing they could have done in these two circumstances with regard
to the deaths of Mr. DeVine and Mrs. Harbury's husband?
Mr. Watson. Yes, I think so. I certainly can understand, as I
mentioned in my statement, the frustration that people feel, that
we feel also, in our inability to get more information about these
cases, and more definitive and more conclusive information. And
it's so often we're working in a world of half-facts or half-truths,
information we can't judge the reliability of. But I think that in
both of these cases our ambassadors and also people in Washington
as well, have been enormously supportive, have applied an enor-
mous amount of energy to try to find out what happened and to
make the appropriate representations to the government of Guate-
mala, to uncover as much information as possible and to analyze
it to the very best of their ability and to inform the concerned indi-
viduals to the best of our ability.
Now, that does not mean always reporting every bit of intel-
ligence. That would not be appropriate for us to do. It means being
very careful not to mislead and to give unformed assessments or
judgments. We're dealing with situations of enormous sensitivity
and importance, and the last thing we want to do is be misleading.
But it means also, as we think we have done, is sharing our very
best and our honest assessments with the people most concerned
when we have confidence that those assessments are correct and
accurate, and I think that we have done that.
46
Senator Hutchison. I see that my time has expired.
Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Hutchison.
Senator Glenn.
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to associate myself with the remarks of Senator Cohen.
But I had concerns I expressed to some other Committee members.
And Mr. Chairman, I apologize, I should have talked to you about
this earlier, which I did not. But I think it's a mistake to ha . -
hearings on these matters in open session. Every time we have a
problem like this occur, we try and have an open session; it doesn't
usually accomplish anything worth a hoot. And then we go into
closed session and get some real information because you have to
protect sources and methods. That's the way things should operate.
So I don't think the Committee should be in open session because
you can't give us the information we really need in this forum.
This Committee, though, has special responsibilities. And we're
supposed to be given all the information privately so we can make
our judgments. We do that by getting Presidential Findings first
and then reports on how those Presidential Findings are being car-
ried out.
My question is not on sources and methods. My first question
would be on, do we have all Presidential Findings at this Commit-
tee? And I say that because we had an incident in the past where
we had a retroactive Finding in the Iran-Contra matter, and it
wasn't reported to this Committee for over a year; and we were
kept in the dark deliberately. Now, do we have all the Presidential
Findings — because that's key to carrying out our responsibilities as
a Committee?
Admiral Studeman. To my knowledge, Senator, you have not
only all the Findings but all the interlocking memorandums and
notification that relate to the changes to those Findings, and I
would be happy to inventory your collection of Findings against my
collection of Findings.
Senator Glenn. All right, good.
Would you know of all the Findings? I presume you would.
Admiral Studeman. I certainly do know of all the Findings.
Again, these Findings are reviewed not only every year by the ad-
ministration but when they're made they're briefed to the adminis-
tration and briefed also to these Committees.
Senator Glenn. The MON's, the memoranda of notification, are
used to change anything that's going to be carried out under those
findings. Have we had all those MON's?
Admiral STUDEMAN. As far as I know you do.
Senator Glenn. OK, that's good.
Now, in a little different area, on page 11 of your testimony you
indicated that the CIA made some management procedural mis-
takes: "First, as already noted, we did not brief the Oversight Com-
mittees on important 1991 information related to DeVine in the
same way we had briefed the Department of Justice. We regret we
did not do so." Question: Who made the decision not to brief this
Committee and why was that decision made?
Admiral STUDEMAN. Well, I've already addressed that, based on
my knowledge, based on an answer to two previous questions.
47
Senator. But to repeat, I am not aware of any conscious decision
not to brief the Committee. In fact, there is internal correspondence
in CIA reflecting an intent to at least brief the HPSCI. We can —
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, your coun-
terpart Committee in the House. And we almost never brief the
House without briefing the Senate. Now, our methodologies for
briefing, as you know, go from everything from staff to staff to
staff — to our staff to principals, and also dealing in very restricted
sessions with only the Chairman. In that period of time — and this
is no excuse — there are no — there were not very good records kept
about what was essentially briefed up here. I think it is highly like-
ly, based on our total analysis to date, that it was simply not
briefed. I don't think it was intentional. I think part of the factors
that had — that bear on this had to do again with the issues that
we had reported this to the Justice Department, there were issues
associated with that, that we were awaiting a reply, and I think
it actually slipped under the carpet, in all honesty.
Senator Glenn. OK.
Admiral Studeman. I'm not sure we'll ever know.
Senator Glenn. All right, fine.
Mr. Secretary, have we demarched the Guatemalan government
to ask them for information and details on the DeVine and Bamaca
cases?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. Frequently.
Senator Glenn. Can you tell us when they were demarched and
how they responded to those demarches?
Mr. Watson. Well, there were an enormous number of
demarches, the most recent one was last night when our ambas-
sador went in to see President De Leon at the instruction of the
Secretary of State and carried a letter from the Secretary of State
urging the president to do everything necessary to get at the root
of these two cases and telling him how enormously important it
was, advising him also formally of the President's decision to take
some steps to reduce the level of CIA support — or liaison — and also
to make available to President De Leon the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to help out in these investigations whenever the gov-
ernment of Guatemala decides to abandon a policy of impunity and
start getting to work on it.
Senator Glenn. Can you tell us what their response has been —
in open session?
Mr. Watson. The response — I could give you a much longer chro-
nology, but the response last night was a tentative response by
President De Leon, who indicated a deep awareness of our con-
cerns, very impressed by getting the letter from the Secretary, and
promised to get back to us as soon as possible with at least what
ne would recommend be the next steps in these cases.
Senator Glenn. OK, we haven't had the level of cooperation yet
that we'd like to really get any inside information from their gov-
ernment.
Mr. Watson. We certainly have not had the level of cooperation
that we would like. I do just want to point out that Captain
Contreras and five enlisted men were convicted, and the enlisted
men are serving time for the murder of Michael DeVine. But what
we're after in that case is recapture of Contreras so he serves his
48
20 years and that the more senior officers that have to have known
something about this case, either in dispatching Contreras' men to
pick up Mr. DeVine, or in harboring them, these men, during some
point associated with the crime, that those people come forth and
bear the responsibiHty they have, if there is any, for the crime and
certainly for what appears to be to us a coverup.
Senator Glenn. Just one other question.
Admiral, as a matter of policy, are CIA chiefs of station required
to consult with and seek the approval of the U.S. ambassador be-
fore engaging in intelligence operations in a host country?
Admiral Studeman. The chiefs of stations coordinate extensively
with the ambassador, and that's done — the ambassador is author-
ized to know all that the chief of station knows. Some ambassadors
choose to know that and some ambassadors choose to have a more
distant relationship with the chiefs of station. But generally speak-
ing, the dialog around the world between chiefs of station and the
ambassadors is very good. I do not
Senator Glenn. As far as CIA's concerned, though, your people
are instructed that if the ambassador wants to be fully briefed on
everything, he's briefed. Is that right?
Admiral Studeman. Right.
Senator Glenn. OK, so it's up to the ambassador, then, as to
how
Admiral Studeman. To define the relationship.
Senator Glenn [continuing]. He wants to get into these things.
OK, was there close consultation in Guatemala between the chief
of station and the ambassador?
Admiral Studeman. As far as I'm aware, there was. We're talk-
ing about now several ambassadors and several chiefs of station,
but as best I can tell, there was.
Senator Glenn. What was that?
Admiral Studeman. Again, I don't — I'll look at the people back
here and see if they — any nodding or — again, I get no nods at — I
guess if it wasn't, it will come out in the context of the investiga-
tion.
Senator Glenn. All right. Thank you.
That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Glenn.
Senator Shelby.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Studeman and Secretary Watson, do you believe it's
ver>' important not only for the State Department or the Central
Intelligence Agency or any other governmental agencies to never lie
to or mislead the American people, or, for that matter, the Con-
gress?
Mr. Watson. Certainly.
Admiral Studeman. My answer to that's an unambiguous yes.
Senator Shelby. That's very — same answer from
Mr. Watson. Certainly.
Senator Shelby. Do you believe that it's very, very important
that the CIA maintain integrity, not only in the eyes of the Amer-
ican people but the Congress, and especially the Oversight Commit-
tee that we're sitting on now, the Intelligence Committee, that
49
deals with intelligence matters? Do you believe that's important?
The integrity of the CIA is very important.
Mr. Watson. Yes — are you addressing that question to me,
Senator?
Senator Shelby. Yes, sir. I'm
Mr. Watson. Yes, I do.
Senator Shelby. And Admiral?
Admiral Studeman. Absolutely.
Senator Shelby. That's a given, isn't it?
Admiral Studeman. It is a given. Now, not to say that it's easy
to do, but it's a given. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. That's right. But it's very important, isn't it?
Admiral Studeman. It is important.
Senator Shelby. Candor's important.
Now, without getting into — and I'm not going to get into sources
and methods. We'll get into that later. And you're very right that
you have to protect that. Otherwise, you'll have no intelligence
gathering sources. Admiral, you said in your statement, "To con-
clude, let me reflect in a larger sense on the role of the intelligence
community in a democratic society." And I know we operate as in
the democratic society, and that's tough at times on intelligence
gathering methods and sources. But you say at the direction of U.S.
policymakers — and I know the President of the United States
makes the policy through the State Department and others, and
the CIA is basically not a policymaker. Is that correct?
Admiral Studeman. That's correct.
Senator Shelby. And to quote, you said, "We provide information
on such difficult issues" — and they are difficult — "as civil wars, ter-
rorism, narcotics, weapons, proliferation, organized crime, instabil-
ity related to regional ethnic, tribal or religious conflict like we're
talking about here." And you say, "It's a continuing dilemma that
in collecting vital information on such topics, we do not necessarily
find our sources among the pristine, the honorable and the ele-
gant." That's a given, too. We know who you have to deal with at
times.
But when you deal with these people, you can always deal with
them, can't you, on an honorable basis, protecting the integrity of
the Central Intelligence Agency at all times, upholding the dignity
and the honor of the American people?
Admiral Studeman. I certainly hope we would try. Yes, sir.
Senator Shelby. Now, you said a few minutes ago, when we've
been questioning — various Members of the Senate here today been
then questioning you about timely information, information that's
timely is important, you know, in the gathering of intelligence or
the sharing of information. But to fail to inform the Oversight
Committee here, the Intelligence Committee of the U.S. Senate,
from time to time — this is not the first time that this has hap-
pened— and then you come up and you say, "Well, we regret — I re-
gret this failure to keep the Congressional Oversight Committees
fully informed." Well, if you're not fully informed on vital informa-
tion you're not really into the loop, are you?
Admiral Studeman. In the sense of compliance?
50
Senator Shelby. Right. Right. In other words, if you withhold,
consciously or unconsciously, information from us, the Oversight
Committee of the Intelligence Committee, we're shortchanged
Admiral Studeman. We're not performing up to our trust. That's
correct.
Senator Shelby. You're not performing your duty. Was this a
careful choice of words, here? Fully informed?
Admiral STUDEMAN. I believe that's the way the statute reads,
that we're required to keep the Committees of the Congress fully
and I think it says completely informed, I think.
Senator Shelby. OK, you said that actually this information ac-
tually slipped, probably slipped under the carpet. That's a big car-
pet over there at Langley, isn't it? To hold all the things that have
slipped under it? It'd have to be a large carpet.
Admiral Studeman. I will say — not in defense of ourselves — but
of course we are dealing with hundreds of thousands of pieces of
information that are of possible relevance to the Committee or in-
terest to the Committee.
Senator Shelby. We understand that. We understand that you
have to analyze this information. But you've got some of the bright-
est people in the world over at Langley to do this and we know
this, and we want you to have — because intelligence gathering is
important to this nation. But honor and truth is important too,
isn't it?
Admiral Studeman. Absolutely.
Senator Shelby. It's the very foundation of this. Human rights
are important to America, too, aren't they? Whether they're involv-
ing someone in Central America, whether they're involving an
American citizen — that puts a little more intensity on it. Whether
they're involving someone that's married to an American citizen.
Aren't human rights important?
Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir, they're not only, I think, of para-
mount importance, but you have to recognize that like the State
Department, we teach human rights in the context of our
Senator Shelby. We know you teach it, but do you practice it?
Admiral Studeman. We teach it — I'm talking about teaching
human rights to the liaison services and the people with whom we
have training relationships over there, and, in fact, there's good
evidence that our sensitivity training and human rights as it is
with the State Department pays dividends.
Senator Shelby. But not under all circumstances?
Admiral Studeman. Not under all circumstances. The record is
ragged.
Senator Shelby. Would your concern as an American and as the
acting director of CIA, concern for human rights, knowing that —
what we believe in in America and what the standards are, would
that impede you in carrying out your operations in intelligence
gathering through the CIA?
Admiral Studeman. No, I don't think it would impede us.
Senator Shelby. In other words, you could have both, couldn't
you?
Admiral Studeman. Sure.
Senator Shelby. And isn't that the goal that you just alluded to,
is to have both? We've got to have good intelligence. We've got to
51
have timely — well, intelligence that's not timely is not worth much.
But at the same time, if we adhere to the other standard of human
rights at all times, timely information to this Committee at all
times, we probably wouldn't be here today, would we?
Admiral Studeman. No, sir, but I think it's important for me to
inform the Senator that the vast majority or a large proportion of
the reports of human rights violations that are made the subject
of things like political diplomatic demarches to other countries are
based on information derived by intelligence sources and methods.
Senator Shelby. But if we're going to rebuild the image of the
Central Intelligence Agency, not only dealing in situations like this,
but because of the Ames case and others, with a new Director
that's been nominated by the President of the United States, Dr.
I)eutch, we're going to have to work together and you're going to
have to set some premises to deal with this Committee on a timely
basis, not let things slip under the rug, consciously or uncon-
sciously, or at least that you can draw an inference to that.
Admiral Studeman. I concur with that comment completely. Cer-
tainly as a senior manager, you certainly wouldn't think that I like
to come up here and say I didn't do my job. It's certainly not a very
comfortable position for me to be in. And every time I hear about
more of these circumstances, essentially it certainly doesn't please
me.
Senator Shelby. But Secretary Watson, it's very important from
the perspective of the State Department carrying out the policy of
the United States, that the policy at all times be above board, that
you, too, in the State Department be candid with this Committee;
is that correct?
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir, and with other Committees of the Con-
gress as well.
Senator Shelby. Why would one or both of you be timely and
candid with the Justice Department but not timely and candid or
timely detail information to this very Committee, this Oversight
Committee on Intelligence? Was that a slip, as you call it?
Mr. Watson. Senator, I think the issue concerning the Justice
Department to which you are referring, as far as I can tell, did not
have any State Department involvement.
Senator Shelby. Admiral, do you want to respond to that?
Admiral Studeman. Yes, sir. I've already addressed this on sev-
eral occasions to previous questions. Yes, sir, I think it was an in-
advertent oversight unfortunately effected, and obviously we regret
it.
Senator Shelby. Do you have a list over there saying, gosh, this
is a very sensitive matter, this is important, this is important to
the Justice Department, it's important to the President that he
know, the Secretary of State know? Why not the Chairman of the
Intelligence Committee and the Ranking and others on this Com-
mittee, and the House likewise? Why couldn't they be informed, if
you have a checklist?
Admiral Studeman. They should have been informed. And we do
have lists that describe the kinds of information and categories of
data that we are to convey to this and the other Committee.
Senator Shelby. I guess whoever is carrying out that list didn't
come to work that day.
52
Admiral Studeman. That's correct.
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Specter. Thank you, Senator Shelby.
Senator Cohen.
Senator Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be very brief in
view of the hour.
First, I'd like to indicate that while we are focusing principally
on the DeVine case and the Bamaca case, there are also a number
of allegations concerning Nick Blake and also Griffith Davis, both
of whom were murdered back in 1985. And I have a long list of cor-
respondence that I've had concerning the Blake case over the years
I'd like to be made a part of the record. It's correspondence with
the State Department, it's unclassified.
Chairman Specter. It will be made a part of the record.
[The documents referred to follow:]
53
MEMORANDUM
DATE April 6, 1995
TO: Chris Mellon
FROM: Jim Bodner
RE: Insert for Committee Hearing Record on Nick Blake
Attached are two sets of document that may be appropriate for
insertion in the record of yesterday's hearing:
— Five press reports from April 1985 to March 1995 that
summarize the case and the efforts of the Blake family to learn the
fate of Nick Blake and Griffith Davis.
Correspondence between Senator Cohen and the State
Department and associated official documents, such as State
Department cables and memoranda.
The second set of documents are arranged chronologically. Two
documents in the latter set are not dated, but I have inserted them
where they appear to fit in the chronology. If I have placed these
two items in the wrong sequence, it should not affect a reader's
understanding of the case.
One of the undated documents, which does not indicate its
source, appears to be a cable from the US Embassy in Guatemala
City; since it deals exclusively with an 18 April 1985 trip by
embassy officials retracing by helicopter the assumed route of
Blake and Davis, I assume it dates to April or May 1985. The other
undated document, entitled "Congressional Briefing," is the sixth
item in the set; we do not have a copy of the cable referred to in
that document .
If you think this compilation is either excessive or
deficient, let me know.
54
8TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.
Proprietary to the United Press International 1985
April 21, 1985, Sunday, AM cycle
SECTION: International
LENGTH: 299 words
HEADLINE: No clues on two missing Americans
DATELINE: GUATEMALA CITY
BODY:
Army searchers failed to find any clues to the whereabouts of two Americans
who reportedly traveled to Guatemala's western highlands to do an artiche on
leftist guerrillas, authorities said Sunday.
Nicholas Blake, 26, a freelance journalist from Biddeford Pool, Maine, and
Griffith Davis, 38, a longtime resident of Guatemala, were reported missing last
week when they did not return from a trip to the Cuchumatanes mountains in
Huehuetenango province, authorities said.
Davis, who has lived in the popular tourist region of Lake Atitlan for 10
years, and Blake left on their trip March 25 and were .due back April 4, a U.S.
Embassy spokesman said.
Army patrols and air force aircraft have searched the area without coming up
with any information on the men's whereabouts in the region 90 miles northwest
of Guatemala City, the armed forces said.
The Guatemala City newspaper Prensa Libre reported that Blake had planned to
interview leftist guerrillas operating in the area, which has served as a
traditional base for insurgents fighting Guatemala's military governments.
Prensa Libre quoted David Lowe, who met Blake in the colonial city of
Antigua, as saying that the journalist had planned to ''obtain unique
information for a possible report about the guerrilla movement.''
''I met Nick in the city of Antigua a few weeks ago,'' Lowe told Prensa
Libre. ''At that time he told me that for two years he had been planning the
trip to the mountains to do a special report.
''I think he had food for five days and identification with him, including a
letter of introduction from the United Nations for which he had done special
work in the past,'' Lowe said.
''Although I don't know a whole lot about Nick ... I hope he turns up soon so
we can drink some beers,'' Lowe said.
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
55
2ND STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.
The Associated Press
The materials in the AP file were compiled by The Associated Press. These
materials may not be republished without the express written consent of The
Associated Press.
March 2, 1986, Sunday, BC cycle
ADVANCED-DATE: February 17, 1986, Monday, BC cycle
SECTION: Domestic News
LENGTH: 1600 words
BYLINE: From AP Newsf eatures , By DIANNE KEARNS , Associated Press Writer
DATELINE: BIDDEFORD POOL, Maine
BODY:
He was the privileged son of a Philadelphia banker, an ambitious free-lance
journalist who liked to live on the edge of danger. Before Nick Blake
disappeared in the jungles of Guatemala a year ago, he may have forecast his own
fate .
Nick Blake, last seen following in the footsteps of a character he invented,
is lost.
In Blake's unpublished novel, a young journalist treks into the jungles of
Guatemala in search of the story that will "make" his career.
Like his own hero, Blake ventured into that dense mountain region, a
27-year-old free-lancer looking for the scoop that would justify three years of
probing Central America. He never came out again.
No one knows if he found his story.
Blake and his traveling companion, Griffith Davis, have been missing a year
this month. Searches by U.S. and Guatemalan teams turned up no clues and were
abandoned last spring.
In November and December, Blake's two brothers Randy, 25, and Sam, 24
went to Guatemala in search of answers, but they uncovered nothing conclusive.
During one visit, they joined the Mutual Support Group for the Appearance Alive
of Our Relatives.
They now believe their brother is dead.
In the family's weathered summer home, here in this wealthy coastal community
on the southwestern tip of Maine, are recollections of a young man whose idol
was Ernest Hemingway and whose privileged upbringing spawned a desire to live on
the edge. A poster bearing the Spanish translation of "Liberty or Death,
Guatemala" hangs in an upstairs bathroom.
The 266-page manuscript of his unpublished novel offers some clues as to why
the son of a Philadelphia banker would journey into a land of deprivation and
56
The Associated Press, March 2, 1986
misery, where death is commonplace.
"David Seeker had come to Central America for a variety of reasons," Blake
wrote in the opening pages of his novel. "Like so many other young journalists,
he was there to make a reputation. Escape the glacial process of dues-paying
journalism back in the States. And hopefully, break some good stories that would
thrust him permanently into the orbit of world-class media.
"But it wasn't only ambition. He had been nurtured on revolutions, starting
with television images in the '60s and later in his reading. It exhilarated him
to see the people rising in mass catharsis. ... Here was the chance to write
what he was supposed to write about, to be close to people who were hanging
things out front. Seeker felt like his life had begun in Central America."
As the story progresses. Seeker joins two others and heads along an isolated
mountain trail littered with the remnants of Guatemalan Indian villages
destroyed in a civil war between the army and guerrilla forces. The gentle
Indian peasants are victims caught in the middle, the reader is told.
Before Blake undertook what appears to have been his final odyssey in March
1985, he confided to friends a purpose that closely resembled what he defined as
David Seeker's in his fiction.
"This was going to be one of his last trips down to Central America," said
Lucien Yokana, who grew up near Nick in Princeton, N.J., and also spent summers
in Biddeford Pool. "He had a sense of make or break, that in order to set up his
reporting career back in the United States, he had to write a big story. I think
for him, this was it."
From what Blake told him, Yokana thinks his friend's desire to put his career
on a fast track somehow balanced the dangers .
There is little doubt that Blake knew the risks when he and Davis set off to
make contact with the EGP, the Spanish acronym for Guerrilla Army of the Poor,
one of four armed insurgent groups in Guatemala.
First, in a note left for a friend who was meeting him in Antigua, Blake
wrote that he was off on a "suicide expedition" and would be in Nebaj for a
reunion in a couple of days. Second, he had been in areas of Guatemala where
rebel and army forces wrought destruction. That provided the backdrop for the
novel, written in 1983.
"They had heard too many stories of soldiers dressing up as guerrillas so
they could carry out their atrocities and have it blamed on the other side,"
Blake wrote. "Then there were the real guerrillas. No one knew what they were
like. Perhaps they were so desperate by now that they wouldn't care about
getting bad press would be downright happy to rob and kill three backpackers
who had blundered into their midst.
"Then there was the third force, the patrulla (civil patrols). They were so
scared that Seeker was almost sure they'd shoot first in a moment of
uncertainty. Who would blame them?"
A later passage reveals a measure of trepidation over meeting up with the
rebels, Blake's real-life goal.
57
The Associated Press, March 2, 1986
"Guerrillas were supposed to treat (journalists) well, so they could get
their story out. That was how it worked in Salvador anyway. But in Salvador, the
guerrillas were winning. They could afford to be civilized. It was all different
here. The army was running things. The EGP couldn't depend on any village
anymore, it seemed."
But the differences between the neighboring countries of El Salvador and
Guatemala don't compare with the gap between the cultures of strife-torn Central
America and the America of Biddeford Pool.
In Guatemala, days of pestering officials for assistance and answers often
end in frustration.
In Blake's world back home, connections got Vice President George Bush
involved in the quest for Nick. Bush summers down the road from Biddeford Pool,
occasionally plays golf at a private club opposite the Blakes' cottage, and his
son-in-law was an acquaintance of Nick's.
Despite the vice president's involvement, the response of U.S. officials has
not satisfied the Blake brothers. They no longer accept embassy reports quoting
Guatemalan military figures who say their rother wandered into guerrilla
territory and was killed by rebels.
The brothers have enlisted eight U.S. senators in their crusade to find out
what happened to Blake and Griffith.
Among family and friends, anecdotes about Nick abound: his youth in
Princeton, how he resented a family move to Philadelphia during adolescence, his
return to his hometown to attend private school; his years at the University of
Vermont, where he studied history and literature and was known as a restless
sort who "wanted things on his own terms," and his first newspaper job at
Foster's Daily Democrat in Dover, N.H., where he balked at covering fires and
boards of selectmen.
In Central America, friends say, Nick seemed to be coming into his own. They
noted Harper's magazine ran a Blake article the summer before. His pieces
appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mall and were carried as well by a wire
service based in Washington, D.C.
They say Blake was both attracted to and worried by the element of risk, and
had spoken of a developing addiction to danger.
"He used to tell me he found it exciting to find himself in dangerous
situations," recalls Peter Lindsay, whose association with Blake dates back to
their sandbox days in Biddeford Pool. "He admired people like Hemingway and Jack
Kerouac, who died of their excesses. He wouldn't have been in Central America if
it wasn't exciting."
But for Blake, as with his fictional creation, ambition and thrill-seeking
were not the only motivations. Idealism was another.
"In the past when we got together, he told me of scorched villages and how
these forces were massacring these innocent, humble people. I know how much it
hurt him to discover what he was uncovering," says Jimmy Adriance, who left his
Peace Corps post in Costa Rica last year to join Nick in Guatemala during
58
The Associated Press, March 2, 1986
Easter week.
The Easter reunion never took place. Adriance waited two days in Nebaj for
Blake, then returned to Costa Rica figuring his strawberry blond pal was on to a
hot story. Weeks later, Adriance learned Blake had disappeared.
Among those who knew Nick best were his brothers. Randy and Sam.
"The story of the Guatemalan Indians probably summed up his outrage at what
was going on in Central America a seemingly placid Indian population getting
killed by death squads," Randy says.
"For him, it was the greatest journalistic challenge of all because it caused
him so much anguish. He saw Guatemala as the big story that wasn't being told.
He used to say, 'A civil war is going on here.' He wanted to bring it to light,
do something about it. The bottom line is, he'd been angling to do something
like that for a long time."
To Sam, Nick represented "the great liberator, a kind of voice in the dark
screaming against conventions."
"Guatemala really was his favorite country. So it would be really ironic if
he died there," the youngest Blake brother said. "I always said to Nick, 'If you
ever get in trouble, we'll be there. We've got the resources and we'll use
them.' Nick didn't realize how much people really treasured him."
As the months drag on, those who treasured him have wished for the unlikely t
hat Nick, known for a flair for the dramatic, would show up.
"It would be like Nick to all of a sudden come out and say, 'What do you
mean, missing? That's ludicrous. I've been vacationing in Mexico,"' Yokana said.
But the happy ending Yokana envisions is not what Blake himself saw for the
hero of his book.
In the closing passages. Seeker is killed by "short, ragged men, with
bandannas tied over their faces, Jesse James-style."
He is shouting "Periodista ! " (Spanish for journalist) and throws up his hands
as bullets from an automatic rifle and several pistols tear into him and one of
his companions .
"They were still shouting when the shots knocked them over into the mud."
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
59
4TH STORY of Level 2 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1990 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
April 3, 1990, Tuesday, Late Edition - Final
SECTION: Section A; Page 3, Column 1; Foreign Desk
LENGTH: 6 70 words
HEADLINE: U.S. Kin Press Case of 2 Killed in Guatemala in '85
BYLINE: By CLIFFORD KRAUSS, Special to The New York Times
DATELINE: WASHINGTON, April 2
BODY:
Five years ago last Friday, a freelance journalist and a companion hiked
through the Guatemalan highlands on their way into territory frequented by the
Guerrilla Army of the Poor. They were never heard from again.
Tens of thousands of people were slain in Guatemala in the 1980's without the
world taking much notice. But this was a different case because the two victims
were from the United States and because the 27-year-old journalist, Nicholas
Blake, was a member of a prosperous Philadelphia family with connections in
Washington .
Members of the Blake family worked to keep the case alive. They lobbied eight
senators to write letters to the State Department to keep pressure on Guatemala
to investigate the case.
Appealing through George Bush's daughter Dorothy, whom they knew from
spending summers in Maine, the Blakes even moved the Vice President to intervene
on their behalf in 1985. Mr. Bush telephoned Gen. Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores,
who was then the Guatemalan chief of state, to ask him to get to the bottom of
the case. As President, Mr. Bush instructed his Ambassador to Guatemala, Thomas
F. Stroock, to continue asking the Guatemalan authorities to investigate.
''The Guatemalans understand our keen interest in the case,'' said Philip B.
Taylor, deputy chief of mission at the American Embassy in Guatemala.
New Turn in Investigation
After years of pressure, the investigation took a new turn last week with
interviews of two suspects. But members of the family, who have made 20 trips to
Guatemala since Mr. Blake's ill-fated trip, said that despite official United
States interest, the Guatemalan Army refuses to cooperate in any substantive
way .
''Guatemala has 50,000-plus disappeared people, and the Guatemalan military
doesn't want to solve any of those cases,'' said Randy Blake, 29, one of
Nicholas's two brothers and a Washington real estate lobbyist. ''And along comes
an American family trying to solve a case of a disappearance in an area under
their control, and I think they are very, very afraid of the information on Nick
getting out . ' '
60
The New York Times, April 3, 1990
Gen. Hector Alejandro Grama jo Morales, Guatemala's Defense Minister, denied
the accusation. ''We are doing all we can,'' he said by telephone.
One lead after another has proved false. For a time, the Blake family
suspected that the guerrillas had killed their son. Then they thought the
Guatemalan Army was responsible.
Friends said Nicholas Blake wanted to write about the Guatemalan guerrillas
because he was revolted by the suffering of the poor and because he wanted to
make a name for himself in journalism. The rebel group had long shunned
publicity.
Having completed a novel a few months before about a young American
journalist who was killed while traveling with the Guatemalan guerrillas, he set
out into the highlands with Griffin Davis, a 38-year-old American merchant of
Mayan handicrafts and amateur photographer.
Bodies Never Found
The two were last seen on March 30, 1985, in El Llano, a hamlet on the edge
of a guerrilla zone. Their bodies were never found.
The case appeared hopeless until late 1987, when a Guatemalan teacher
familiar with El Llano came to the United States Embassy and said villagers had
told him that five civil patrolmen had accompanied the two men out of the
village and shot them.
For two years, American officials requested that the Guatemalan Army locate
the patrolmen for interrogation. The Guatemalan officers produced two of the
patrolmen on Tuesday for interrogation by three United States officials,
including an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The two patrolmen
denied the allegations.
An American diplomat said the embassy would press to have the other patrolmen
interviewed.
The Blakes said they would continue seeking justice. ''We have the patience
to hang in there as long as it takes to get results,'' Randy Blake said. ''If
the United States and Guatemalan Governments haven't gotten the message yet,
they will, because we aren't going away.''
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
61
2ND STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1993 Globe Newspaper Company
The Boston Globe
November 26, 1993, Friday, City Edition
SECTION: METRO/REGION; Pg . 48
LENGTH: 921 words
HEADLINE: Family charges cover-up in murder of journalist;
Says Guatemalan military killed brother
BYLINE: By Philip Bennett, Globe Staff
DATELINE: CAMBRIDGE
BODY:
The case study that Sam Blake is directing at Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government this fall examines the rol? of a powerful Central American military
official. Gen. Hector Gramajo of Guatemala, in his country's return toward
democracy.
Blake knows Gramajo well. Years ago, he posed the most important question he
will ever ask the general, when he sought Gramajo's aid to learn who killed his
brother in the Guatemalan highlands.
Last month, the Blake family filed a lawsuit charging that the Guatemalan
military was responsible for the murder in 1985 of Nicholas Blake, a 27-year-old
journalist. The suit accuses the Guatemalan government of a cover-up that
concealed Nicholas Blake's remains for seven years, and conceals his killers
today.
Sam Blake, who does not blame Gramajo for the murder, said he separates his
scholarly work from his brother's case. The distinction seems less clear in his
Kennedy School office, with its huge map of Guatemala, piles of books on
low-intensity conflict, and the photograph of his brother's profile, intelligent
and wistful, set against the Mayan ruins at Tikal.
"I'll always be tied to Guatemala," Sam Blake said. "Emotionally, ask anyone
who's had a family member murdered. I'll live with that all my life."
Mystery surrounding Nick Blake's disappearance has led Sam Blake, his brother
Randy, and their parents on an odyssey that they hope will end with the outcome
of the suit, which was filed before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights in Washington.
The Blakes are seeking acknowledgement from Guatemala that one of its
military-controlled civil patrols carried out the murder of Blake and a
traveling companion, a fellow US citizen named Griffith Davis. They also want
the arrest and prosecution of those responsible for the crime, and financial
compensation.
Nicholas Blake and Davis were last seen alive on the morning of March 29,
1985, near the community of El Llano, in northwestern Guatemala. Blake was
planning to write a story about a rebel army, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor,
62
The Boston Globe, November 26, 1993
that was active in the mountainous and rugged province of Huehuetenango .
At the time, Blake already had spent years as a member of a loose
confederation of young, dedicated, mostly brave and often incautious freelance
journalists who went to Central America in the early 1980s. While working in El
Salvador and Nicaragua, he was drawn particularly to Guatemala, his brother
said, where the army massacred tens of thousands of civilians in a conflict that
was all but ignored by the media.
Two weeks after Blake and Davis failed to return from their search for the
rebels, the State Department telephoned Mary Blake to report that her son was
missing. During the next seven years, the family members made more than 20 trips
to Guatemala to press officials and anyone else for information on the case.
In their investigation, the Blakes drew on resources unimaginable to most
Guatemalans on similar quests for loved ones. Through a family friendship, they
contacted George Bush, then vice president, who called Guatemala on their
behalf. The Blakes chartered helicopters, offered a cash reward, and were
received by President Vinicio Cerezo and Grama jo, then the army chief of staff.
They got nowhere. Guatemalan military officials first told Mary Blake that
her son was a "subversive." Officials at the US Embassy, Sam Blake said,
suggested that perhaps Nicholas had been killed by rebels. Perhaps he was alive,
traveling with rebels in rugged jungle on the Mexican border.
"This was a crime that in a way bothered me most: how the Guatemalan
government and US Embassy twisted my mother's mind, a mother's belief that her
son might be alive," Sam Blake said.
In 1988, a schoolteacher told Sam and Randy Blake that their brother and
Davis had been shot dead by civil patrol members on the morning they left El
Llano. The teacher said they were killed for their possessions and because they
were considered guerrilla sympathizers.
Four years later, in June 1992, the Blake brothers recovered Nicholas'
charred remains after paying a regional paramilitary commander. In return for a
promise that they would not prosecute the killers - a promise they say is
invalid because it was the result of blackmail for Nicholas' body - they
obtained a signed note acknowledging that the civil patrol committed the
murders .
Sam Blake said that he was later told by a high-ranking military official
that the army knew of the murders almost immediately after they occurred. In
1987, the suit alleges, the army ordered the men's remains moved and
incinerated.
For years the family had worked to discover what had happened.
"But after we got the remains back and solved the main question, Sam and I
focused on the blatant facts that Nick was definitely murdered and his murder
had been definitely covered up," said Randy Blake, an economist at the US
Department of the Treasury. "Nick wanted that country to achieve a sense of
judicial process. That was very strong for Sam and me."
63
PAGE 13
The Boston Globe, November 26, 1993
In 1990, four years after he first met him in the army chief of staff's
office, Sam Blake saw Grama jo on the the Harvard campus. Retired and mulling a
run for the presidency, Gramajo had accepted a fellowship from the Kennedy
School .
"When I met him here he was wearing jeans, a flannel shirt, carrying a
backpack," Blake said. "He's actually an amiable guy."
If their suit is successful, the Blake family plans to establish a grant for
freelance journalists in Nicholas Blake's name.
GRAPHIC: PHOTO, GLOBE FILE PHOTO/ / Nicholas Blake, who was a free-lance
journalist, disappeared in Guatemala in 1985.
LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
LOAD-DATE-MDC: November 29, 1993
64
1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
Copyright 1995 The New York Times Company
The New York Times
March 30, 1995, Thursday, Late Edition - Final
SECTION: Section A; Page 23; Column 2; Editorial Desk
LENGTH: 4 87 words
HEADLINE: What Else Did The C.I. A. Know?
BYLINE: By Samuel Blake; Samuel Blake is a consultant to the Pentagon on
national security affairs.
BODY:
The disclosure that the C.I. A employed a Guatemalan Army colonel involved in
the torture and murder of Michael DeVine, an American who ran an inn in the
jungle, and an insurgent married to Jennifer Harbury, an American lawyer, comes
as no surprise to my family.
Exactly 10 years ago, Guatemalan paramilitary forces escorted my brother Nick
Blake, a freelance journalist, and a photographer. Griffin Davis, out of the
village of El Llano in the highlands and shot them dead with high-powered
rifles. Both men had gone into the mountains to try to interview left-wing
guerrillas who had been waging a civil war in Guatemala for more than three
decades .
The paramilitary forces hid the bodies for a year until public pressure
forced the army to burn and rebury the remains in hopes that the truth would
never be known.
From 1985 to 1992, the highest levels of Guatemala's Government lied to my
family about what had happened to Nick and Griff, blaming guerrillas for their
disappearance .
In June 1992, after information implicating the army in the deaths came to
our attention, my brother and I went to the highlands where their remains lay,
90 miles northwest of Guatemala City. We excavated the remains, and Dr. Douglas
Owsley, a forensic anthropologist at the Smithsonian Institution, identified
them.
In December 1992, the U.S. Ambassador, Marilyn McAfee, took me to see
President Ramiro de Leon Carpio. He admitted that the security forces had killed
Nick and Griff and that the army high command had covered up the murders. He
promised to seek justice for our families.
To this day, the promises remain empty. The Government won't admit officially
who ordered Nick's and Griff's executions, why they were killed, why their
deaths were covered up and by whom, and it refuses to discipline or prosecute
those involved in the murders and cover-up.
For the most part, for 10 years Washington has parroted the nonsense spouted
by the Guatemalans that guerrillas or "brigands" killed Nick and Griff. As we
pressed our own investigation, it became clear that elements of our Government,
mainly C.I. A. and State Department officials, were running interference for
65
The New York Times, March 30, 1995
their friends in the Guatemalan Army.
We always suspected that our Government knew a great deal about the army's
role in the murders. With the disclosures about Mr. DeVine and Ms. Harbury's
husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez (a guerrilla supposedly protected by the Geneva
Convention on the treatment of prisoners), our worst fears have been confirmed
-- that our intelligence and national security agencies are withholding
information that could shed light on the slayings.
Our families would like the Congressional intelligence committees to hold
public hearings and subpoena officials and documents from the C.I. A. and the
State and Defense Departments that might help in the quest for truth and justice
in our case and the other cases.
GRAPHIC: Drawing
LANGUAGE : ENGL I SH
LOAD-DATE-MDC: March 30, 1995
66
:2.'''"TW0' EMBOFFS'TRAVELED by helicopter on !APRIL''18/y>..
il985,'-I0"THEr.DEPARTMENTS OF HUEHUETENANGO. 'AND', EL ;!■,',.:;::,.'''
;QUICEE' in 'AN INVESTIGATION OF THE WELFARE AND ' ' , " ' ^' '
.WHEREABOUTS' OF TWO" MISSING AMCITS, N ICHOLAS' BLAiCE AND ■"
GRIIFITH WILLIAM DAVIS. ' .ACCOMPANY ING :THE ' EMBOFFS' WERE
'•THE CONSULAR SECTION FSN' INVESTIGATOR — A VETERAN"OF,'
GOG'S NATIONAL POLICE— AND A 'MEMBER OF THE' EMBASSY'S I-.
iSECURlTY FORCE," A NATIVE OF EL ' QUI CHE/ WHO ;SPEAKS''.ONE'X
OF... THE .REGION'S MAJOR INDIAN' DIALECTS . •: ■.' ' ■ . •'r^■i^;^v''•''
'Sl''^' THROUGH 'friends 'and family'- OF BLAKE AND ' DAVIS ,' THE
,EMBASSY"'LEARNED' THAT;,THE TWO AMERICANS PLANNED TO^HI|[E^
FROM THE''T0WN;0F SAN'JUAN IXCOY, IN' CENTRAL ' ■'■" ■'■'f^."'yy^
,HUEnUETENANGO,'TO: THE' TOWN OF ,NEBAJ , 'IN'' WESTERN lEL T--:"' '
.QUICHE.-:.-,,.,:,: ,;;;■- ; .■...:.,; ;j.c I' .<:....,.::■.,::... ■:.:.:: ;.\.:..- ;,^.,,;^ .■::.. ^^
',._ , . ; I. , : ■ I ,' !•! J 1 ; . .. |. J . . , ,, . .1.1,;.'. i /.
4.'''' "although' THE' DISTANCE BETWEEN THE TWO' TOWNS" IS '""%>:■(
;ONLY '.APPROXIMATELY 40 .KILOMETERS ,' THE AREA'"'IS RUGGED,',(fe
HIGH sierra;ilwith few roads; and- AN active: GUERRILLA <v.';:4
lIUSURGEHCY."'' THE,;j?OUrB THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS ..PLANNED,, i:„,.
■70 IflfCB IS 'ALOHG THE NORTHERN FACE OF LOS '' ■ '
CUCHUMATANES, '.THE HIGHEST MOUNTAIN 'RANGE IN" CENTRAL.)!-!":''
.AMERICA. "THE ELEVATIONS' ALONG' THE ROUTE.. V ARY'iFROM :' .;•.
ABOUT' 6000' TO..9000 FEET ABOVE SEA .LEVEL. THE AREA"' IS ■'.,
CHARACTERIZED BY. STEEP MOUNTAINS , DEEP RIVER RAVINES ,..;,.
PRIMITIVE HIKING TRAILS, AND THICK PINE FOREST ... THE..... ■
ENTIRE.AREA IS INCLUDED IN THE EMBASSY 'S TRAVEL ,'
67
:. ADVISORY, 'which. IDENTIFIES PLACES ' WHICH ' ARE ' NOT '^'^■^'^v'^;
:a..CONSIDEK£D' SAFE 'FOR TOURIST 'TRAVEL BECAUSE OF "•'';■■;'■'■'■'''(=
^-:FREQUENT,.CLASRES*;bETWEEN 'THE. GUERRILLAS' AND' GOG ;•'.'' V':
l>5.:f-'' AT'''0908:|HGURSV'EMBOFFS -FLEW" INTO' SAN""JUAN''lXCOr:(^
'•i;iN' THE' TOyN':TeEI"ENCOUNTERED' THREE FRIENDS -OF'BLAKE.'^-i
,M AND 'DAVIS •--' AMC I T'"LORr-LEGATOR"( WHO' ORIGINALLY' ':'^';;:^:f"7
■REPORTED. THE'DISAPPEARANCE; OF DAVIS-'AND' BLAKE' ON ^■■■^!^i^.
..'APRIL' 8),' CANADIAN CITIZEN MAGDALENA 'VERGARA / AND V"'^
;'■• GERMAN CITIZEN MECHTHILD LINDKEN (WHO DESCRIBES "' ■'■■••;:'>'
IHERSELFAS' DAVIS' 'COMMON-LAWWIFE) / ' THEY SAID THEY'":!"'
.;HAD ARRIVED..THE NIGHT'BEFORE , ' AND' HAD, ALREADY'^ '•7^' '''^i'i
.''riSTP.IBUTED''"PHOTOGRAPHS"OF'THE..MlSSlNG' AMBRICArJ_5. T0 7V'
:;.T0WN'0FJICIALS-'AND;;RESIDENTS. • ■ MS.' LINDKEN"SAID 'SHE '"■:•'
'.^CHECKED RECORDS AT TRANSPORTACIONES ' CIFUENTES , A BUS'
.VCOMPANY'IN THE' CITY' OF HUEHUETENANGO , WHICH' SHOWED ?;--^;.''
..THAT BLAKE AND' DAVIS HAD LEFT ' THE^DEPARTMENTAL ^"' 'r''.'.'i';
T'CAPITALIMARCH' 26 ON THE 10:00' A.M. BUS' TO SAN: JUAN K':.
;wixcqY..O:::;o;r..:;;;,.':: :.■,:;;,,_,,,:. ;. .,", :,: ., .; ■ . " ■,.,';,'^i'^
|J'6'.''''''aCC0RDING to' MS . ■ LINDKEN , "BLAKE AND' DAVIS HAd"-'"'"'' ■'•
:''ARRIVED IN SAN JUAN IXCOY AT' 12:30 P.M. ^' MS. LINDKEN '"
^STATED THAT^ SEVERAL'ITOWNSPEOPLE NOTICED- A' LARGE c":;' :.;'
^'FOREIGNER RIDING ON THE TOP OF' THE BUS,' A PRACTICE V'''-,'
; SHE' SAID. MR. ^BLAKE' ENJOYED.,' ... ' ....:.:,::':. .:'r;; ; i.,;!;f.,
...^7.'"'"EMB0FF'INTERVIEWED' THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN'"IICOY, ',•.■;■
r'ANDREAS VELAZQUEZ, WHO IS ALSO THE' LEADER OF THE.',
-TOWN'S' CIVIL' DEFENSE 'FORCE ." VELASQUEZ ■' CONFIRMED.'THAT
J..BUKE AND DAVIS HAD ARRIVED' ON ' THE BUS 'FROM ' ' ■""" -;
^HUEHUETENANGO/'AND HAD" LEFT' THE' SAME' DAY, TAKING ' THE-r
.'-.EASTERN' TRAIL TO' JOLOMHUITZ AND SAN FRANCISCO' LAS ir:.-'"
■•FLORES. THE FRIENDS OF BLAKE AND DAVIS'SAID" THAT ' * ;' '^
-THEYi FELT' CONFIDENT THAT THE TWO' AMERICANS HAD LEFT '."•
.'SAN" JUAN ''.IX COY IN. THE DIRECTION'.OF SAN .FRANClSCO,.LAS;v
uFLORES .?.' ;n'1..',;:v:.;^...„r;;,.;^^':^ ■■^;,[.r-.- /vVrA^liv/i,.' ;..;:• , ;; 'H ;■!. > P:'",'';;
is; -"IN 'SAN'JUiiN 'IXCOY,' EMBOFFS' ALSO ENCOUNTERED' TWO 'J-'
;.GOG ARMY' SPECIALISTS FROM THE' ARMY' BASE IN' .■■•■''^ ";:-:;;
'HUEHUETENANGO, ALBERTO CORTEZ RUIZ AND ANGEL GARCIA, -
:'-WflO'.HAD;;BEENrSENT'TO.;THE.",TOWN..THE;:DAY' BEFORE:;.BYi'.THE,,|; .
'■«!i";>vv ':<:r;;..^''K;:--v!.'n)-iv:.l ..'•■^ ''■'!■ •'>„'^ ■ ■■■ .'■'. v'/'r-':--'!.'--:'::''"'- "'i-!^'":-.' !•■'"■■ '''v'-ti'-'i-'i:;'!'
68
" GUATEMALAN ARMTTO I NVEST IGATE'tHE WHEREABOUTS'Oli'
'BLAKE AND DAVIS. THE MAYOR SAID THAT THE MAYORS OF
31 NEIGHBORING VILLAGES WERE COMING TO SAN JUAN IXCOY
APRIL- 18, AND WOULD BE ASKED IF THEY RAD ANY
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE TWO AMERICANS.
9. SINCE JOLOMHUITZ IS ONLY A LITTLE MORE THAN ONE
HOUR BY FOOT FROM SAN JUAN IXCOY, EMBOFFS DECIDED TO
FLY DIRECTLY TO SAN FRANCISCO LAS FLORES. IN SAN
FRANCISCO LAS FLORES THEY SPOKE TO ARMANDO FIGUEROA, '
-WHO WAS ON DUTY WITH THE LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL:
MARCH 26, AND WITH MIGUEL CARTAGENA, THE TEACHER AT
THE VILLAGE SCHOOL. FIGUEROA AND CARTAGENA SAID THAT
TWO AMERICANS ARRIVED AT ABOUT 4 P.M. MARCH 26 AND ■
SPENT THE NIGHT IN THE SCHOOLHOUSE. THE' PHYSICAL
DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN BY VILLAGERS CLOSELY MATCHED THOSE
OF BLAKE AND DAVIS, AND THEY RECOGNIZED THE
PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE TWO AMERICANS PROVIDED BY
EMBOFFS. CARTAGENA SAID THE TWO AMERICANS IDENTIFIED
THEMSELVES AS A REPORTER AND A PHOTOGRAPHER, AND SAID
THEY WERE HEADED TO THE MAYAN RUINS OF MIXLAJ, A
VILLAGE FARTHER EAST.
10. CARTAGENA SAID HE TOLD THE AMERICANS THAT THE
AREA WAS DANGEROUS AND THE TRAIL RUGGED. HE SAID THE
TWO AMERICANS REPLIED THAT THEY WERE AWARE OF THE
DANGER AND THAT THEY HAD MAPS.
11. FIGUEROA AND CAHTAGENA SAID THE TWO AMERICANS
DEPARTED SAN FRANCISCO LAS FLORES ABOUT 7 A .M . ON
MARCH 27.
12. EMBOFFS THEN FLEW TO MIXLAJ, PASSING THROUGH AN '
AREA OF HEAVILY WOODED MOUNTAINS BROKEN BY SHEER
DROPS INTO RIVER RAVINES. IN MIXLAJ, EMBOFFS TALKED
TO EULALIO HERRERA MERIDA, ASSISTANT MAYOR, AND
SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE PATROL. HERRERA
SAID HE FIRST NOTICED TWO AMERICANS AT ABOUT 10:30 '
A.M. ON MARCH 27, BATHING IN THE RIVER THAT PASSES
.THROUGH THE VILLAGE. HE SAID ONE OF THE AMERICANS
-WAS TALL WITH A HEAVY BEARD, AND THAT THE OTHER WAS
EVEN TALLER AND HAD NO BEARD. THESE DESCRIPTIONS
WERE PROVIDED BEFORE EMBOFFS SHOWED HIM PHOTOGRAPHS
OF BLAKE AND DAVIS, AND ARE GOOD THUMBNAIL SKETCHES
OF THE. TWO. HERRERA THEN IDENTIFIED THE PHOTOGRAPHS.
13. HERRERA AND OTHER VILLAGERS SAID THE TWO
AMERICANS SPENT THE DAY IN MIXLAJ, AND SLEPT THE
NIGHT IN THE LOCAL SCHOOLHOUSE. HE SAID THAT BLAKE
AND DAVIS NEVER VISITED THE RUINS AT MIXLAJ.
14. HERRERA SAID THAT THE TWO AMERICANS TOLD HIM
THAT THEY WANTED TO GO TO SUMAL, A MOUNTAINTOP
VILLAGE,' EAST-SOUTHEAST OF MIXLAJ IN THE DEPARTMENT
OF EL QUICHE. (COMMENT: BRITISH JOURNALIST MICHAEL
SHAWCROSS SAID IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION ON APRIL
17 WITH EMBOFFS THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS ALSO HAD TOLD
HIM THAT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN GOING TO SUMAL. END
69
'^COMMENT)^nERRERA^SAID^HE TOLDi"THEM^NOT^TO'"GO THEREt*^
BECAUSE' THE"AREA WAS ' DANGEROUS . '- WHILE ' EMBOFFS";WERE, ,'';;■,'
'in"'san"juan:;iicot/they were, told^by- gog 'armt ''""■ '■■' T'^v
SPECIALISTS'NOT TO TRAVEL TO SUMAL' BECAUSE IT' WAS' A' "."
GUERRILLA'STRONGHOLD- and THAT 'their HELICOPTER WOULD'''
.PROBABLY. BE'. SHOT;.DOWN.':.:i'':;:;:'i.'''!-, ■' ' y'lr •:'^^^^;.';^:SH":- :i,-;i.';K«'V;;.'
"j-.:. ,:^:-.,..>j- ii--ii.-.'...'i "-A-H': r,.k./i- ' . ■ , -• >.■•■'■. vi'i ■' ':;.■'. "' • <■'''<':'" ■ ■■r..''yf ■ i ;i.'!-r.'-ir''. -l^^^r.!r-,y.^■.•
■■ 15 /' •'' ACCORDI NG "' TO HERRERA , ' THE"' TWO. AMER I CA NS ''LEFT '' ''■'' ' '"'
"HULA J -THE'' MORNING 'OF MARCH"28 ,'TRAV,EL I NG' TOWARD' LAS! '^
MAJADAS, A MILITARY' BASE OVERLOOKING'-A GROUP OF HIGH •!•,
SIERRAN' VILLAGES.' "THE' COUNTRYSIDE AROUND'LAS' MAJADAS^
■■IS'LIGHTLY'FORESTED,' WITH FLAT' LAND^ AND' RI VER/'VALLEYS^T
brok.en';bY-'ROCk;.outcroppings. :•::,>•':■'■•.: ■••.■ ■""'.'.,;/' I ■'••K':
:i6. 'ATTHE MILITARY' BASE' IN LAS MAJADAS , ' EMBOFFS '"^'•'''"■'
: TALKED TO LIEUTENANT" ALEJANDRO "ELEL."^ HE SAID' THAT' ON;i
■ MARCH:'29 THE "CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE OF' LLANO, A VILLAGE '"
'WHICH REPORTS TO THE' ARMY AT " LAS' MAJ ADAS ,' CAME TO i' ":'';.■''
..TELL HIM THAT TWO AMERICAN JOURNALISTS. WERE : ■,.'•;.•:■'; "•'•■
1'.EEQUESTING. PERMISSION TO GO TO" SUMAL._ ','.;...■;.. ■;•'""■"!■;
■;■■"'■"■••!' i;.;"' ' , . ' / ■ ■■""''
■ 17. "THE: LIEUTENANT SAID' THAT THE AMERI CANS' PRESENTED
A TRAVEL 'PASS FROM THE ARMY BASE' IN 'HUEHUETENANGO /•'' '
.GIVING THEM PERMISS ION TO' BE " IN THE' AREA . 'LIEUTENANT
.:.ELEL*SAID HE WAS NOT SURE OF .THE DATE OF THE' TRAVEL ?^^'
' PASS, ^^ BUT' HE BELIEVED IT WAS JANUARY .• (COMMENT : !:, •T-"''"
'-"■"■-'■-■■■■' ' ■ ■■'■■■)'■'■■ •^^':Mi
70
MICHAEL SHAWCROSS RAD TOLD EMBOfF DURING AM' APRIL 9
-MEETING IN THE EMBASSY THAT "MR .• BLAKE' HAD PREVIOUSLY
REQUESTED'AND RRCEIVED PERMISSION FROM THE ARMY TO
TRAVEL- IN HUEHUETENANGO KARLIER THIS YEAR, BUT THAT
HE HAD NOT-REQUESTED PERMISSION THIS TIME BECAUSE HE
WAS AFRAID' THAT IT WOULD- BE DENIED. END COMMENT.) '
18. ACCORDING TO THE LIEUTENANT, THE' TWO AMERICANS
SPENT THE "NIGHT OF MARCH 29 IN LLANO,' AND LEFT THE
NEXT MORNING SAYING THAT THEY WERE GOING TO TRAVEL TO
SALQUILV A TOWN TO THE NORTHWEST OF LAS MAJADAS. THE
LIEUTENANT SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN THEM PERMISSION TO
GO THERE. SALQUIL IS A MODEL VILLAGE SET ON A '"
MOUNTAIN TOP, DEFENDED BY A WELL-DUG IN ARMY
DETACHMENT.
19. WHEN EMBOFFS ARRIVED IN SALQUIL, THEY WERE TOLD
BY- LIEUTENANT ARTURO VELASQUEZ THAT HE THOUGHT THE '
HELICOPTER WAS BRINGING ARMY REINFORCEMENTS FOR A
BATTLE THEN' IN PROGRESS ABOUT FIVE MILES FROM THE
VILLAGE.' SOLDIERS WERE DEPLOYED AROUND THE
HELICOPTER TO PROTECT IT FROM POSSIBLE GUERRILLA
ATTACK. ■
20. LIEUTENANT VELASQUEZ SAID NO AMERICANS HAD
ARRIVED IN SALQUIL ON MARCH 29 OR 30, OR ANY DAY
AFTER. HE SAID THAT IF ANY AMERICANS HAD ARRIVED, HE
DEFINITELY WOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED. THE HEAD OF
THE CIVIL' DEFENSE FORCE OF THE VILLAGE CONFIRMED THAT
NO AMERICANS HAD COME THERE ON OR ABOUT MARCH 29 OR
30. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THAT THERE WAS FREQUENT
COMBAT IN THE AREA AND THAT A BATTLE HAD BEEN FOUGHT
CLOSE TO SALQUIL ABOUT 15 DAYS EARLIER, I.E. ON OR
ABOUT APRIL 3.
21. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THAT SUMAL WAS A GUERRILLA
STRONGHOLD, CONSISTING OF A SERIES OF TUNNELS DUG
INTO A MOUNTAINSIDE. HE SAID THAT SUMAL AND THE
VILLAGES SURROUNDING IT HAD BEEN ABANDONED, AND THAT
ONLY GUERRILLAS OF THE EGP (THE GUERRILLA ARMY OF THE
POOR) WERE THERE. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID THE ARMY ONLY
GOES' INTO- THE AREA IN ORDER TO FIGHT THE GUERRILLAS.
HE' SAID THAT. THE ARMY WAS NOT IN CONTROL OF THAT AREA
AND ANY ARMY PATROL ENTERING THAT AREA EXPECTED TO BE
IN A COMBAT SITUATION. THE LIEUTENANT TOLD EMBOFFS
THAT IF THEY WENT TO' SUMAL THEY SHOULD EXPECT THEIR
HELICOPTER TO BE SHOT DOWN.
22. THE LIEUTENANT SAID THE TRAIL BETWEEN LLANO AND
SUMAL IS PATROLLED BY THE GUERRILLAS, AND THAT IF ANY
OUTSIDERS HAD ENTERED THE AREA, THEY WOULD DEFINITELY
HAVE ENCOUNTERED MEMBERS OF THE EGp .
23. FROM SALQUIL, EMBOFFS FLEW TO THE TOWN OF NEBAJ,
IN ORDER TO REFUEL BEFORE BACKTRACttI NG TO LLANO. IN
NEBAJ,' TWO ARMY CAPTAINS SAID THAT NEITHER MR. BLAKE
NOR MR. DAVIS HAD VISITED THE TOWN. THEY WERE ABLE
TO CONFIRM THIS BECAUSE THE ARMY CHECKS THE RECORDS
71
;OF"ALL H0TELS~INNEBAJ"AND'THBT'w0ULD'HAVE-BEEN"'~'-'V^':
INF0RMED;'IF-TW0--AMERICANS ^.HAC arrived. ■• THEr'SAID"''-'-'|V|.'
;THAT"'J'RIENDS' OF 'BLAKE and: DAV I S HAD' VISITED' THE TOWN V
^TO- DISTRIBUTE PHOTOGRAPHS OF'THE TWO, AND TO' ASK ■ ' " ■' ■^■■
:TOWNSPEOPLE'ABOUT THEIR WHEREABOUTS. ' INTERVI EWS "WITfl
'SEVERAL'PEOPLE'IN NEBAJ, INCLUDING' AN AMERICAN - ' V.s;:..>
.-TOURIST /CONFIRMED' THAT THE TOWN WAS" WELL AWARE OF '■<••>
'THE SEARCH'FOR-: BLAKE' AND' DAVIS.' •• (COMMENT:^'' MILGROUpK
commander: COL . VmCLAUGHLIN , IN NEBAJ^ ON' SEPARATE 'j'";'"'"^'
'BUSINESS, ALSO REQUESTED' LOCAL GOG MILITARY TO"'"" '••■■^
'piSTRIBUTE'-pflOTOS; of: DAVIS AND BLAKE. ;• END-.COMMENT ; )1 •
24 .'"'THE ARMT CAPTAINS SAID THAT EGP WAS FRAGMENTED ,'•'•
AND' LACKED' A CENTRAL COMMAND.'^ ■ THE REACTION OF 'T,' v-.-.'v'
'GUERRILLAS TO THE ARRIVAL OF' OUTSIDERS WOULD BE ''^- ':''
UNPREDICTABLE, AND THAT THEY MIGHT NOT RECOGNIZE THE "
'POLITICAL' VALUE'IN SHELTERING JOURNALISTS. •' THEY ALSO '
•SAID THAT^LIFE WAS CHEAP IN THAT AREA ,' AND THAT ' IF 'v"'''-
OUTSIDERS ARRIVED WITH 'MONEY, THE' GUERRILLAS ' MIGHT '''■''
WELL.EOB;AND f[ILL :THEM.' • • ■•.■•■ -■,..,..•.•■,; ■-■h's,.^
2 5.*''- FROM NEBAJ, EMBOFFS WENT TO QUILEN NOVILLO, A r' '-"
.VILLAGE' BETWEEN' LLANO AND SALQUIL. 'MEMBERS' OF ~THE''*'^'w
CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE AND THE LOCAL TEACHER SAID THAT,,^::
NO AMERICANS' HAD COME TO THEIR VILLAGE ON OR ABOUT '"
MARCHi 29 ' OR^30 , ' AND THAT THE ' OTHER V ILLAGES_JE'riEEiC' •,
salquil: AND llano^had' BEEN^ abandoned'./{!^n.!-:.;k ,;[;;J'-i^v^^
26 ."""EMBOFFS ' TH EN WENT TO LLANO ."''" THE'" SECOND ' i''':^ ' ' - ''s'-r
COMMANDER' OF THE VILLAGE' C IVIL'DEFENSEVPATROL ,' ^ '.*',:¥'/.
VICENTE 'CIFUENTES, '-SAID THAT BLAKE AND' DAVI S HAD' ■'::•.::!';
SPENT"THE NIGHT OF MARCH 28 ' IN ''LLANO , AND LEFT THE '',.Si":
MORNING" OF MARCH 29' SAYING THE WERE HEADING TO "^T' !.'-'i;! '
SALQUIL." THE' DATE" OF THEIR DEPARTURE FROM LLANO ' v'
DIFFERS" FROM" THAT" OFi LIEUTENANT ELEL'/OFi LAS MAJADAS, .f
WH0:DID NOT MEET' ;THE TWO AMERICANS . ,;.V;';..Viv;; ;<!' i'V. 1' •';■':.,
27/'""bECAUSE' OF ENVELOPING DEEP CLOUD COVER, EMBOFFS.';',.
WERE' TOLD BY THE HELICOPTER PILOT , THAT ' THET MUST "".,';:; :
LEAVE' LLANO IMMEDIATELY ,' OR SPEND THR NIGHT IN THE:
VILLAGE.- AT' 1500 HOURS ,' EMBOFFS FLEW OUT OF LLANO AT,,
:TREET0P: LEVEL, > AND RETURNED :T0 GUATEMALA Cm ......... .^^^
72
L l2 L L. t.
L. L.L;k.Llk.L.klU
UNCLASSIFIED
Depart nicnt of State
INCOMING
TELEGRAM
PACE 81 cutTEii em:
•CTIOII Hcm-oi!
i OF 12 OMSSSZ
NutiBER WHICH i: n«Ntuo luErm-fouR hour: « o«y.
-m AR1.-CI0 OCS-Oj. /003
31S<1< DSlt.5!! /SO 3!
..#\^
IIIFO lOC-00 COPY-Ol A03
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FB AnEKOASSr CU/.TEIMI A
TO SEc:iAi[ «a:hoc :)!7
INFO AnEneAs:v ncsico
UHCU: CUATEnAiA titii
K PASS
CEPT Also FOR ARA/CEN AND CA/OCS/EtlR
E.O. niii: N/A
TACS: CASC, CT (DAVIS, GRIFFITH AND BLAKE, HICHOLAS)
SUBJECT: V/W: CASE OF GRIFFITH DAVIS AND NICHOLAS
BLAKE
REF: CA/OCS/ENR DOC. NO. B-ES370; INOIAL)
TO: THE HONORABLE JOHN HEINZ
UNITED STATES SENATE
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE
94Se FEDERAL BUILDING
PHILADELPHIA, PA ISlOi
ATTENTION: SKIP IRVINE
1. THE DEPARTHENT OF STATE HAS REQUESTED THIS EMBASSY
TO RESPOND TO VOUR HAY t LETTER TO THE DEPARTMENT
REGARDING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF nR. NICHOLAS BLAKE, THE
SON OF YOUR COICTITUEUT, MRS. NARY BLAKE. NICHOLAS
ELAKE, ACCOnPAHIED BY AnERICAH CITIZEN GRIFFITH DAVIS,
DEPARTED THE CITY OF HUEHUETENAUCO ON MARCH 2S.
NEITHER MAN HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH FAMILY OR FRIENDS
SINCE THAT TIM£.
2. FRIENDS OF MR. BLAKE AND MS. DAVIS FIRST ADVISED
THE EMBASSY ON APRIL t THAT THEY WERE OVERDUE AND
KEOUESTED THE EMBASSY'S ASSISTANCE IN TRYING TO LOCATE
THEM. THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE, THE
EMBASSY REQUESTED THE GUATEMALAN ARMY TO BE ON THE
LOOKOUT FOR BOTH MEN, AND TO ADVISE US IF THEY WERE
ENCOUNTERED.
3. ALTHOUGH THE GUATEMALAN ARMY DID SEND OUT PATROLS
BEGINNING ON APRIL 9, THEY WERE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE
MEN. A SUBSEQUENT GUATEMALAN ARMY SEARCH WHICH BEGAN
ON APRIL K, INVOLVING MORE THAN HI TROOPS AND
LASTING MORE THAN A WEEK, ALSO FAILED TO UNCOVER ANY
TRACE OF THE TWO MEN.
m
i. OH APRIL It. MRS. BLAKE ARRIVED III GUATEMALA 10
PERiONALlY REVIEW IH[ ACTIOli: TA«CN TO lOCAIS
NICHOLAS 6LAi;;. SHE WA3 ACCOnPAIIICD BY Hfll SOIi.
RANDY ELAKE, FAMILY FRIEND lUCIEII YOHAN>, AND EDUARD
GOFF, All AIIORHEY EMPLOYED BY WBEAIOi: IIIDUSTRIE;.
MRS. BLAKE'S PARTY MET WITH AMSASSAOOh PIEDDA ON
APRIL li AND wa: thoroughiv briefed by mission
orricERS, IHCLUOINC the defense attache, the same
DAY. on APRIL J7, THE BLARE PARTY, ACCOMPANIED BY
THE DEFENSE ATTACHE, VISITED THE ACTING COMMANDER OF
THE 20TH MILITARY ZONE, THE AREA WHERE THE MISSING
MEN WERE LAST SEEN. MRS. BLAKE DEPARTED GUATEMALA ON
APRIL 29.
7. THE ORIGINAL SEARCH AREA HAS BEEN EXPAIJDED TO
INCLUDE BELIZE AND SOUTHERN MEXICO ON THE CHANCE THAT
THE MISSING MEN MIGHT SURFACE OUTSIDE OF GUATEMALA.
IN THE INTERIM, MR. GOFF HAS HADE A SECOND VISIT TO
REVIEW THE SITUATION HERE. THE BLAKE FAMILY AND
FRIENDS OF MR. DAVIS HAVE EMPLOYED A PRIVATE
INVESTIGATOR HERE TD AUGMENT THE EFFORTS OF THE
EMBASSY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA.
I. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE AREA IN WHICH MR.
BLAKE WAS KNOWN TO BE TRAVELING IS THE SCENE OF
FREQUENT CLASHES BETWEEN GUERRILLA INSURGENTS AND
GUATEMALAN SECURITY FORCES. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
AWARE OF THE RISK SUCH VIOLENT ENCOUNTERS COULD POSE
TO AMERICAN CITIZENS, HAS MAINTAINED IN EFFECT SINCE
AUGUST, 1911 A TRAVEL ADVISORY CAUTIONING AMERICAN
CITIZENS NOT TO TRAVEL IN THAT AREA. RESIDENTS OF
THE AREA STATED TO THE EMBASSY OFFICERS THAT THEY
ALSO CAUTIONED MR. BLAKE REGARDING THE PRESENCE OF
ARMED GUERRILLA INSURGENTS IN THE TOWN OF SUMAL.
S. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT VET BEEN POSSIBLE TO LOCATE
MR. BLAKE, THE EMBASSY WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN ALERT
TO ANY LEAD REGARDING HIS WHEREABOUTS. THE
GUATEMALAN ARMY ALSO WILL CONTINUE TO BE ON THE
LOOKOUT FOR ANY SIGN OF HIM.
IB. VE HOPE THIS INFORMATION IS HELPFUL TO YOU.
PI EASE BE ASSURED THAT EVERY ASSET AVAILABLE TO THIS
MISSION IS BEING USED IN AH EFFORT TO LOCATE THEM.
UIERICAN EMBASSY
eUATEHALA. PIEDRA
4. ON APRIL It, TWO EMBASSY OFFICERS TRAVELED BY
HELICOPTER TO THE AREA WHERE BLAKE AND DAVIS HAD
INTENDED TO KIKE. ALTHOUGH THEY WERE ABLE TO TRACE
THEIR MOVEMENTS UP TO MARCH 29 OR 3D TO THE SMALL
VILLAGE OF LLANO, FROM THAT POINT, THEIR TRAIL
VANISHED. THE EMBASSY OFFICERS WERE ABLE TO
DETERMINE, HOWEVER, THAT BLAKE AND DAVIS EXPRESSED
INTEREST IN WALKING TO THE NEARBY TOWN OF SUMAL, A
KNOWN GUERRILLA STRONGHOLD, DESPITE THE ADVICE OF
LOCAL TOWNSPEOPLE IN LLANO AND THE GUATEMALAN ARMY.
i. ON APRIL 2S, ANOTHER EMBASSY OFFICER FLEW OVER
THE TOWN OF SUMAL AND DROPPED <,SB8 LEAFLETS
REQUESTING ANY PERSON HAVING INFORMATION REGARDING
BLAKE OR DAVi: TO ADVISE THE AMERICAN CONSUL IN
GUATEMALA CITY. THE UOTICES, PBIIITED 111 BOTH SPANISH
AND THE LOCAL INOIAI: DIALECT, PROVIDED k TELEPHONE
UNCLASSIFIED
ACTIOf
COPY
73
UNCLASSIFIED
INCOMING
TELEGRAM
INFO LOG- a
Department of ^Pei'kr.Lf, ^ TELE!
TEM B6244 261651Z ^ ^ C^'i g" [fJf0V
<Rr2616482 JUN 8S ^.
FM AMEMBaSSY GUATEMALA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 923^
INFO AMEMBASSY BELIZE
AMEMBASSY MEXICO
UNCLAS GUATEMALA 0 6 2 •« 4
E. O. I 23S6:
TAGS: CASC.
SUBJECT: W/
NICHOLAS BL
=DATE ON CASE OF GRIFFITH DAVIS
1. DATT SPOKE WITH LIEUTENANT COLONEL SOUS. DEPUTY
COMMANDER OF MILITARY ZONE 20 IN EL OUICHE. ON JUNE 18
ABOUT MISSING AMERICAN CITIZENS GRIFFITH DAVIS AND
NICHOLAS BLAKE. SOLIS SAID THE MILITARY HAD UNCOVERED
NO NEW INFORMATION OR LEADS ABOUT THE WELFARE AND
WHEREABOUTS OF THE AMERICANS.
2. EMBOFF QUESTIONED GOG ARMY LIEUTENANT FEDERICO
GUILLEHMO PADILLA CASTILLO ON JUNE 19. DURING A
NONIMMIGRANT VISA INTERVIEW. ABOUT BLAKE AND DAVIS-
PADILLA CLAIMED TO BE STATIONED IN NEBAJ. THE TOWN
WHERE BLAKE AND DAVIS WERE SUPPOSED TO MEET FRIENDS
AFTER THEIR HIKE FROM SAN JUAN IXCOY. THE LIEUTENANT
SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT THE FATE OF THE
MISSING AMERICANS. HOWEVER. HE SAID THAT FIGHTING
BETWEEN GUERRILLA INSURGENTS AND GOG SECURITY FORCES
HAD INTENSIFIED IN THE AREA AROUND NEBAJ. AND THAT
SEVERAL OFFICERS HAD BEEN KILLED.
3. THE JUNE 19
■PRENSA LIBRE".
CLASHES BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT
THE ROAD BETWEE
EDITION OF GUATEMALAN DAILY. THE
CAiRRIED A STORY REPORTING SEVERAL
INSURGENTS AND GOG SECURITY FORCES IN
3F EL OUICHE ONE OF THESE OCCURRED ON
■J SALOUIL AND NEBAJ, WHEN INSURGENTS
MG CREV
MG ONE ;
MG ONE GOG
EMBOFF SF
EST SAID TK
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE.
rvo \>.
UNCLASSIFIED
74
ACTION
COPY
PAGE 01
ACT I OIJ OC5-n5
lli^CL;;i>STr I'lu;
GUATEM 10718 1718352
DcparhiVouf of itl^ii;, In r'pi','P,
IWrO LOG-OO ADj-00
AMAD-
CA-02 /009 W
0 7 6 5 0 4 ICOOUZ 3
R 1 7 1 8 3 1 Z 0 C 1 8 5
FM AMEMLiASSY GUATEMALA
TO SECLlATt W^bHDC 1 i .M
UNCLA5 GUATEMALA 107 18
E.O. 12356 N/A
TAGS CASC, GT (BLAKE, NICHOLAS AND DAVIS, GRIFFITH)
SUBJECT: WW BLAKE DAVIS CASE - UNSUCCESSFUL INQUIRIES
7229
1. ON OCTOBER 5, EMBOFF TRAVELLING BY HELICOPTER IN A
REMOTE AREA IN NORTHERN HUE HUE T E N ANG 0 TOOK THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ASK LOCAL AUTHORITIES IF THEY HAD ANY
NEWS WHICH MIGHT RELATE TO THE MISSING AMERICANS.
2. NO ONE IN NENTON, BARILLAS, OR FINCA MONTE CRISTO
HAD ANY NEW INFORMATION ON THE CASE. THE LIEUTENANT
COMMANDING THE GARRISON AT LOS SARGENTES, NEAR THE RIO
I XT AN, WAS INTERVIEWED AS WELL, ALSO WITHOUT NEW
I NFORMaT I ON RESULTING. P I EDRA
UNCLASSIFIED
75
UNITED ■""/ 'S GOVERNMENT
memorandum
DATE: 3 December 198 5
?fNo?: Col Hooker - DATT-4^
uBjECT: Status Report on Blake-Davis case
TO, DCM
1. The following actions have been taken ref the Blake-Davis
case since our last meeting on this subject with the Blake
family.
a. Our Sources indicate one (1) FAG helicopter #170 was
attached for duty to the Playa Grande MZ Commander during the
period 2-11 April 1985. The area of operations included,
Huehuetenango , El QuichS and Playa Grande. There is no record
of landings in Nebaj but it is possible that this could have
occurred. Pilots were Lt Tobar Barrera and Lt Jiron Guerra.
b. On 7 Nov 85 I discussed the Blake-Davis case with the
D-2 Col Dorantes. He could not shed any more light on the
subject. He did state that the MZ commanders and detachment
commanders reported the visit by foreigners to the MZ if
they presented themselves to the military authorities. I
asked if I could review his D-2 Daily Journal for the months
of March and April 1985 to see if such a report had been filed
from Nebaj. Col Dorantes acceded and I personally reviewed
the journals with negative findings concerning Americans in
Nebaj having been transported by helicopter to the Army Detach-
ment. There were references to others in the area but not
during the period in question.
c. Passed on Ambassador Piedra's concern over the well
being of alleged or possible informants alluded to by the
Blake family. Col Dorantes indicated that the military had no
interest in these so called informants and would not pursue
the matter. He also hoped for a prompt resolution to the
disappearance .
2. Prior to leaving, Col Dorantes once again expressed to me
the actual practice of the Army in turning over American Citizens
to U.S. Embassy /Consular control. He stated that the U.S.
Embassy is informed immediately of cases involving U.S. Citizens
and if there is any problems with them they are turned over as
soon as possible in order to avoid future misunderstandings.
76
United States Department of State
fTashington, D.C. 20520
CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING
Senators' offices are no doubt aware that the Embassy in
Guatemala has been asked to check clandestinely on a story that
the men were loaded into a helicopter at an army base in Nebaj,
El Quiche.
The latest cable from Guatemala states that "every logical
and appropriate action has been taken to locate these missing
Americans but in view of the Blakes' unwillingness to share
information there is no way to respond to their claim that the
[story to be checked] is accurate and useful."
There was a meeting in the Department 11/21/85 in which we
explained to Randy Blake and the family attorney, Edward Goff
the need to verify the sources in order to inquire
intelligently about their helicopter story. Randy explained
that since his uncle, who had interviewed the sources, promised
never to reveal their names, the names obviously cannot be
revealed. The uncle never believed the story according to the
family attorney, but intends to keep his promise.
We agreed to inquire openly of the Guatemalans asking them
to find out what helicopter may have landed on that date and
time and who the passengers may have been. We will also
attempt to see whether there may have been an agreement or
communication between Salvadoran and Guatemalan authorities
pertaining to Nick Blake, whom Randy fears might have been
considered by the Salvadorans to have been a courier for the
guerrillas. We will also see if inquiries can be made safely
in a new area along a different route which the Blake brothers
hypothesize may have been used by the missing men.
77
Bnitd States Senate
WASHINGTON. DC 20610
December n, 1935
Mr. Elliott Abrams
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of Inter American Affairs
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
He respectfully request a formal investigation and
report by the State Department and the American Embassy in
Guatemala into the disappearance of Americans Nicholas Blake
and Griffith William Davis. Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis were
last seen in Guatemala in April, 1985.
The Blake family initially shared the belief that Mr.
Blake and Mr. Davis were seized by Guatemalan guerrillas in
the Department of El Quiche. However, based on their own
ina.uiries, Randall and Samual Blake, Mr. Blake's brothers,
have now come to suspect that the two men were captured by
the Guatemalan Army and taken by helicopter to the town of
Nebaj. The Americans' fate after their arrival in f.'ebaj is
unknown .
During a visit to Guatemala by Randy and Sam Blake last
month, we cabled the Embassy in Guatemala to request its full
cooperation and assistance. VJe appreciate the attention given
to the brothers and efforts made thus far by Ambassador
Piedra and the staff of the Embassy. Nevertheless, we share
the Slakes' concern that all possible evidence in the case
may not yet have been fully investigated or disclosed.
We therefore request a written report exploring the
different hypotneses which have been offered for Mr. Blake
and Mr. Davis's disappearance. This report should, to the
extent appropriate, describe the Embassy's own inquiries and
investigation, as well as its findings and conclusions.
We are particularly concerned that a full, independent
investigation be made into reports of:
-- a Guatemalan Army helicopter bringing two men fitting
Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis's descriptions to Nebaj about the
time of their disappearance;
-- possible cooperation and intelligence sharing between
El Salvadoran and Guatemalan military authorities to monitor
Mr. Blake's activities as a free lance journalist; and,
-- reported contacts with the BlaKe family by a
Guatemalan array procurement chief and a Guatemalan military
78
intelligence officer claiming to be the former's brother, in
which Mr. Blake and Mr. Davis were reported to be alive and
under close guerrilla guard.
We have encouraged the Blake family to share as much of
the information in their possession as possible with the
Embassy, in order to facilitate its investigation. Our
primary concern is that the true fate of Mr. Blake and Mr.
Davis be known.
Thank you for your attention and assistance.
Sincerely ,
'VQ/U.>..«v^
79
To: Janet Lynch, Senator Hart, SR-237
Dennis Calkin, Senator Heinz, SR-277
Bob Carolla, Senator Mitchell, SR-176
Martha Pope, Senator Mitchell, SR-176
Tom Melia, Senator Moynihan, SR-464
Dick McCall, Senator Kerry, SR-364
Charles Kallenbach, Senator Specter, SH-331
FROM: Sally Lounsbury, Senator Cohen, SH-322
DATE: February 25, 1986
RE: Nicholas Blake
Enclosed is a copy of the response we received from our Embassy in
Guatemala in coordination with the Department of State.
Randy And Sam Blake would like to meet with us regarding
this letter at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March A. Sam will be flying
in from school in Massachusetts. They can't make it any earlier
in the day or any other day of the week. I'll be happy to have the
meeting here in our conference room. \ n I
A friend of Randy's from the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
met personally with President Cerezo<,recently . ThiS' person asked
the President what he thought of the Blake's situation and he
indicated he was not familiar at all/with the case. Needless to
say, this has upset Randy.
Please let me know if you can/make it. Sally 49223
\j , ^J^ P^^ ■'f^^
80
Lnited States Departmerrt-'Of State
Washinglon, D.C. 20520
' iletruary 1 9, 1995
Dear Senator Cohen:
Thank you for your letter of December 4 about the
missing Americans Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis who
vanished in the Guatemalan highlands in late March or
early April 1985, In response to your inquiries our
Embassy in Guatemala ' and officers in the Department of
State have reviewed their actions on behalf of the men and
double checked, to the best of their ability, the most
recent information presented by Sam and Randy Blake, This
letter responds to your request for a written report on
our efforts, provides you with the results of our review,
and gives a reaction to some of the theories put forward
about the missing men.
The case first came to the Embassy's attention when an
American citizen called the consular section on April 8,
1985, to report that a friend, American citizen Griffith
Davis, was overdue from a walking trip in Guatemala's
western highlands. According to the caller, Davis was to
meet friends in Nebaj, a market town in the Department of
Quiche, on March 29. She thought it unlikely that he was
purposely overdue as he had planned to attend his sister's
wedding in the United States during the second week in
April. Davis was traveling with an acquaintance named
Nick Blake, she said, who she thought was an American
living in Antigua, near Guatemala City.
Later on April 8, Embassy officers confirmed the
American nationality of both of the missing men through
immigration records. A telephone check of registration
records at the Hotel Central in Huehuetenango confirmed
the report that the men met and spent the night of March
25 at the hotel before beginning their journey. Consular
officers called .National Police and Treasury Police
headquarters and asked that units in the western highlands
be alerted. Catholic and Protestant missionary groups
with people working in the region were also alerted. That
evening, a consular officer was able to speak by telephone
with a British citizen friend of Nick Blake, Michael
Shawcrcss. Shawcross confirmed the basics of the story
given by the original caller and said that he too was
concerned for the men's safety.
The Honorable
William Cohen,
United States Senate.
81
2 -
On April 9, Shawcross, German citizen Mikki-Linden ,
and the U.S. citizen who first brought the case to our
attention met with an Embassy officer in the Chancery.
Shawcross said that Blake was a working journalist with an
interest in the insurgency in the western highlands.
Blake might take an opportunity to spend time with the
guerrillas, said Shawcross. Davis was described as a
long-term Guatemalan resident and an experienced hiker who
had no political interests, but had long wanted to hike
through the area in question. Blake and Davis, according
to their friends, had met only recently. Shawcross was
able to give a general description of the planned route.
The men had planned to take a bus from Huehuetenango to
San Juan Ixchoy where they were to begin their walk east
to Neba j .
Embassy officers called the military zone headquarters
in Huehuetenango and Quiche later that morning, requesting
the commanders' assistance in the search for the missing
Americans. The Embassy then made a telegraphic report to
the Department outlining the situation. The Department
began a search of passport records in order to locate and
contact the families in the United States.
On April 10, the Embassy Defense Attache followed an
earlier telephone call with a letter to the , Guatemalan
Chief of Military Intelligence requesting assistance in
finding the lost Americans.
During the following week. Embassy officers tried to
track rumors that messages had been received from Nick
Blake by another American friend, and by the owner of the
small Antigua pension where Nick Blake generally stayed in
Guatemala. The American Embassy in San Jose reported that
the friend told Embassy officers he had received a note at
Blake's Antigua pension on March 31. That note supposedly
said Blake would be in Nebaj between April 1 and 3. When
Blake did not arrive in Nebaj, the friend returned to
Antigua, where the owner of the pension said that another
person, name unknown, had left a message that Blake would
be unable to meet the friend. Embassy officers in
Guatemala were able to question him regarding this
sequence of events later. He said that he had been
misunderstood when interviewed by our officers in Costa
Rica, that he had received no message. The pension owner
had a somewhat different story to tell.. He said he had
received two written messages in early April, purportedly
from Nick Blake, saying that his return would be delayed
and to say nothing to the authorities. The pension owner
now says that he destroyed the notes. The Embassy
82
- 3 -
believes there were never any notes. The Department
contacted the mothers of the missing men April 13th. They
had not heard from their sons and agreed that there was
real reason for concern. Within a week, the Blakes had
drawn on many of their own contacts with connections in
Central America to help locate their son. Officials at
the highest level of the Administration and several
Congressmen, yourself included, were contacted by the
family for assistance.
On April 18, two Embassy officers in a chartered
helicopter flew to the Department of Huehuetenango and
Quiche to investigate the disappearance. Accompanying the
officers were the consular section fraud investigator (a
veteran of the Guatemalan national police) and an Embassy
security agent who speaks the area's predominate dialect.
The use of a helicopter was required because the route
planned by Blake and Davis between San Juan Ixcoy and
Nebaj is serviced only by hiking trails and includes some
of the roughest high country in Central America. In San
Juan Ixcoy, where Blake and Davis left the bus and began
their trek. Embassy officers met two Guatemalan army
intelligence specialists who were conducting their own
search for the missing Americans. The Embassy team was
able to trace the route followed by Blake and Davis from
San Juan Ixcoy on March 26 through San Francisco Las
Flores and Mixlaj to the village of Llano, along the
border between Quiche and Huehuetenango, several days
later. It appears that on the morning of March 29 or 30,
Blake and Davis left Llano, saying they were heading to
Salquil, a large model village which can be reached by
road from Nebaj . The commander of the army detachment at
Las Majadas, the military outpost closest to Llano, said
that he was told by Llano villagers on March 29 that two
Americans were requesting permission to go to Sumal, a
stronghold of the EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor). The
Lieutenant said he instead gave the Americans permission
to travel to Salquil. Villagers at Mixlaj, where Blake
and Davis had spent a night during their trip, also said
that the Americans had expressed an interest in going to
Sumal. The villagers said they told Blake and Davis not
to go to Sumal because the area was dangerous.
The date of their departure from Llano was March 29
according to the Llano villagers, and March 30, according
to the Lieutenant at Las Majadas, who never met Blake and
Davis. Embassy officers in Guatemala find no significance
in the difference in dates. They believe it is very
likely that the villagers erred, as no written record was
kept. No trace of the whereabouts of Blake and Davis was
found from the time they left Llano. At one point the
83
- 4
Blake family heard their sons may have been involved in a
battle, but their confusion stemmed from the account of
our Embassy officers flight into Salquil, where the army
detachment mistook their helicopter as one bringing in
reinforcements for a firefight then in progress about five
miles from the village. According to the Lieutenant in
charge of the Salquil garrison, Blake and Davis never
arrived at Salquil. Embassy officers then backtracked to
Quilen Novillo, the only occupied village between El Llano
and Salquil. Villagers at Quilen Novillo said that the
missing Americans had not passed through the village. At
Nebaj, interviews with townspeople and military officials
turned up no sighting of Blake and Davis. However, it was
apparent that townspeople in Nebaj were well aware of the
search for the Americans. None of the villages along the
planned route are garrisoned by the Guatemalan army.
There are no indications that Blake and Davis had any
contact with regular government forces. Throughout the
search. Embassy officers distributed flyers which included
photos and descriptions of Blake and Davis, as well as
numbers and addresses to contact in case someone had
information to report. It should be added that this trip
included a certain degree of physical risk on the part of
the Embassy team. The village of Mixlaj, for example, is
considered a dangerous place for official Americans.
Another American citizen friend of Nicholas Blake told
Embassy officers in San Jose, Costa Rica, he had talked
with Blake and Davis in Huehuetenango the night before
they began their trip and Blake had said that he and Davis
were going to "back door" into the guerrilla zone,
avoiding the army patrols he believed were blocking the
area. Blake fully expected to be "caught" (Blake's words)
by the army or the guerrillas, according to this friend.
Lieutenant Colonel Jose Solis, Deputy Commander of
Miltary Zone 20 (Quiche) came to the Embassy on April 30
to brief the Defense Attache and consular officers on a
planned army sweep through the area in which Blake and
Davis were believed to have disappeared. The sweep,
involving some 450 infantrymen, began the following day.
Units were broken into reinforced squads and employed in
small "force patrols". This tactic involved greater risk
as larger units are normally employed in such areas, but
the smaller patrols offered more thorough coverage.
Guatemalan sources reported two officers and ten enlisted
men killed in the sweep. No sign of the missing Americans
was reported.
84
- 5
On April 25, an Embassy officer in a chartered light
aircraft, dropped leaflets over the Sumal area. The
leaflets, printed in Spanish and the prevalent Indian
dialect, Ixchil, had photos of both men. Leaflets were
also provided to the zone headquarters for distribution to
army patrol leaders and civil guard units.
Mrs. Mary Blake, Nicholas Blake's mother, came to
Guatemala on April 25 accompanied by her son Randy Blake,
family friend Lucien Yokana, and Attorney Edward Goff.
Mrs. Blake's party met with Ambassador Piedra and received
a thorough briefing on the investigation to that point.
Embassy officers accompanied the party to Military
Zone 20 headquarters in Santa Cruz del Quiche on April 27
where the zone commander briefed them on the actions he
had taken to locate Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis.
The family hired a private investigator in Guatemala at
about this time.
Attorney Edward Goff, representing the Blake family,
came to Guatemala again on May 23 after spending several
weeks in Chiapas, Mexico near the border with Guatemala.
He was accompanied by the private investigator. Both were
briefed on the status of the investigation.
Sam and Randy Blake, accompanied by friends, visited
Guatemala during the first week of November and again one
month later. On both occasions they met with Ambassador
Piedra, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and other Embassy
officers. During the November visit, Sam and Randy Blake
divulged two potential leads in the case. 1) The Blake
brothers had heard that two persons fitting the
description of their brother and Griffith Davis had landed
in a helicopter in Nebaj at the end of the first week of
April. According to this story, the passengers were
forcibly removed from the helicopter by Guatemalan army
troops and taken to the garrison headquarters, 2) a
second line of inquiry was opened by their description of
contacts between a Guatemalan army procurement officer and
a close business contact of the Blake family. Embassy
officers immediately began to check both stories.
85
- 6 -
The helicopter story was made very difficult to check
since source was unknown to the officers who worked on
it. The brothers could not divulge any information that
could lead back to the date or time of the event or the
name of anyone who may have witnessed it. The Guatemalan
military officer responsible showed the U.S. Defense
Attache his log indicating there were no helicopter
flights in the area described during the time frame
mentioned. We have not been able to establish any
information to contradict this log.
According to Sam and Randy Blake, Mrs. Remidios Diaz,
a family friend and business associate living in Miami,
had been approached by a Guatemalan army officer who
worked in the army's procurement section. This officer,
according to the story, told Ms. Diaz that his brother, a
Guatemalan intelligence officer, had personal knowledge
that Blake and Davis were being held by guerrillas. For a
sum, it was said, an army expedition could be organized to
rescue them. On hearing the story, the Ambassador asked
Sam and Randy Blake to have Ms. Diaz call or write the
Embassy. Embassy officers later tried to identify a
procurement officer and an intelligence officer who are
brothers in the Guatemalan army. No such persons could be
identified. During a visit to Guatemala December 13th and
14th, a meeting took place between key officers of the
Embassy, Mr. Richard Blake, Nicholas Blake's father, Mr.
George Strawmueller , the missing man's uncle, and the
family attorney, Mr. Edward Goff. At that time the
Ambassador raised the question of the Diaz contact.
Mr. Strawmueller said that he was the only member of the
family who had spoken with Mrs. Diaz. He said she had
been contacted by someone who offered to use his influence
and knowledge to have a search made for the missing men.
Based on the information he received from Ms. Diaz,
Mr. Strawmueller did not pursue the offer. Mr.
Strawmueller indicated that the story of a Guatemalan
procurement officer and his intelligence officer brother
was invented by Sam and Randy Blake to fill in details
regarding the contact, details that Mr. Strawmueller and
Ms. Diaz were unwilling to share. At the request of Sam
and Randy Blake, Ambassador Piedra attempted to verify
this with Ms. Diaz during his December consultations in
the United States but was unable to reach her because she
was abroad. In January she told the Department that she
had asked all her Guatemalan contacts to assist the family
but had no leads. There are notes in the Department of
calls she made here with offers of assistance and support
for the case, also. She denied any direct contacts with
Guatemalan military.
86
- 7 -
On December 17, Embassy officers flew to Nebaj where
they interviewed six former members of the EGP (Guerrilla
Army of the Poor), a Marxist guerrilla organization
operating in northern Huehuetenango and Quiche, All six
had been operating in the general area of Sumal until they
returned to government control in 1985.
Sumal itself is a small cluster of buildings at the
end of a high mountain ridge surrounded on three sides by
sheer walls of bare stone. It is not a population center
of any importance, but rather is the geographical center
of a zone of conflict.
None of the six ex-guerrillas had knowledge of any
strangers recently observed in the area. One mentioned
Cuban advisors seen in the area in 1981 as the last
strangers of whom he had heard. Two other former
combatants said that two "Negroes" of unknown nationality
were rumored to be traveling with an EGP unit. Each of
the six said that is was impossible to believe that
individual EGP members happening upon the two Americans
would have harmed them. All insisted that any strangers
encountered would be taken to the central committee or a
guerrilla officer. After these interviews. Embassy
officers went to Las Violetas, a refugee camp on the
outskirts of Nebaj, to interview civilians who had fled
the Sumal area in recent weeks. The refugees indicated
that they knew nothing of the Americans.
Regarding theories that the Guatemalans may have been
alerted by Salvadoran government officials to Nick Blake's
presence in the area, American officers in Washington and
Guatemala consider it very likely that Guatemalan and
Salvadoran intelligence services sometimes share
information of mutual interest. There is no reason to
believe, however, that authorities of either government
have any particular interest in Nick Blake who is neither
a well-known nor controversial journalist. In a country
where high-visibility journalists continue to travel
freely after writing articles critical of the Guatemalan
government, it is not credible that intelligence services
would monitor the activities of a freelance writer who was
evidently unpublished on Guatemalan affairs. Had the
Government of Guatemala determined that Nick Blake was a
security risk, his entry into the country could easily
have been blocked. Further, it is unlikely that the army
would have given him a travel permit for the conflict zone
87
in Huehuetenango, as they did in late 1984, if he was
considered a threat. Griffith Davis appears to have shown
no particular interest in Guatemalan politics. His status
as a casual resident would have provided Guatemalan
authorities with ample opportunity to expel him from the
country had they wished to do so. It would have been very
difficult for the activities of the two Americans to have
been closely monitored while in the highlands. Many of
the civil defense groups in the small villages north of
Nebaj have no radio or telephone service, and depend on
hand carried messages for communication with the outside.
The frequency of armed encounters between army troops and
insurgents in this area would argue against any plan to
send a patrol or individual agent in pursuit of the two
Americans. Based on the above, and all possible inquiries
along this line, the Embassy concludes that is is unlikely
that either of the two Americans was of special interest
to Guatemalan intelligence authorities.
Concerning the supposition that an abduction took
place, it should be understood that Military Zone 20, the
location of the alleged sighting, is frequently visited by
Embassy officers. Our contacts there are excellent. In
the considered judgement of American military and civilian
officers familiar with the zone and the key personalities
who operate there, an abduction of American citizens is
extremely unlikely. Guatemalan Lt. Col. Marin, Commander
of the Nebaj garrison at the time in question, has since
been moved to a sensitive position in the new civilian
government of Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo. Embassy
officers consider him one of Guatemala's best soldiers.
Deputy Zone Commander Solis is a sophisticated officer who
understands the political significance such an abduction
would have. The zone commander. Col. Byron Lima, is
considered to be an honest, straightforward soldier. This
assessment is not meant to be seen as a defense of the
Guatemalan military. However, the Guatemalan army has
traditionally sent its best officers to the "conflictive
zones" of the highlands, and the Embassy pays close
attention to this critical area and the people who are
assigned there.
This overview is by no means a complete summary of all
actions taken by Embassy Guatemala in the search for
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis. The Ambassador and
other Embassy officers have made an ongoing series of
requests for assistance and information from Guatemalan
88
- 9
authorities at all levels, including the Chief of State.
The Embassy and the Department have, as well, looked into
a number of rumors which have proved to be totally
groundless .
The case will remain open and active until we have
solid evidence of the welfare and whereabouts of Mr. Blake
and Mr. Davis. Embassy officers regularly travel to the
highlands, including areas on the northern face of the
Cuchumatanes Mountain chain and along the Mexican border,
and always make inquiries regarding Blake, Davis and any
"strangers" who might be rumored to be, or have been in
the area. In the Department, all country desk officers
are aware of the case should any information about the men
come from another country in the Caribbean or Central
American region. All U.S. Embassies in Central America
have been provided details about the missing men.
As you can well understand, the disappearance of
Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis engenders frustration
and concern both for the families of the missing men and
for the Americans and Guatemalans charged with finding
them. A solution to this case remains a very high
priority in the Department of State.
Ms. Renny Smith in the Citizens Emergency Center is
following the case closely, and is in frequent contact
with the family and government officials on behalf of the
missing men. Please encourage anyone who may be
interested in this case to call her at (202) 647-5225. If
your office would like to be kept informed of
developments, please call and she will contact you
whenever there is significant activity on the case.
With best wishes.
Sincerely, ^'''
William L. Ball, III
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs
ACT I oil
COPY
89
UNCLASS
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IMMEDIATE
E. O. 1 2356: N/A
TAGS: CASC, MX IB
SUBJECT: v;/W: NIC
NICHOL
AND cr>
/IS
GRIFFI Th
1. EMBASSY SEN
BORDERING GUATE
GRIFFITH DAVIS
BLAK.E AND GRIFFITH DA
TEMALA 1333 Bl MEXICO 2917 C) MEXICO
CONSULAR OFFICER TO CHIAP/JS,
ALA AND THE AREA WHERE NICHOI
HE PRESUMED TO BE IF 1
A STATE
AS BLAKE AN
RE IN MEXICO.
i/IEXICAN
TALISMAN AND CIUDAD CU/.UHTE
= LYERS CONTAINING PHOTOS At
WERE DISTRIBUTED. REOUESTir
IN MERIDA BE NOTIFIED OF AT
3 CHECH
DC HE!
DESCRU
THAT T h
SIGHTir
>01l
GUATEMALAn DORDE
!TS CIUDAD HIDALC
S IVERE NEGATIVE
TIONS OF THE TV/O
■E EMBASSY
OR CONEL
3. AT AN IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINT BETV/EEN CIUDAD
AND COMITAN. IMMIGRATION OFFICERS DID NOT RECOGNIZE
TWO MEN, BUT INDICATED THAT THIS ¥;AS A HEAVILY-TPAV
ROUTE FOR AMERICANS TRAVELING BY CAR TO AND FROM GU
UHTEMOC
4. AN IMMIGRATION
OFFICIAL IN COMITAN
POSITIVELY
IDENTIFIED A PHOTO
OF GRIFFITH DAVIS
SHE STATED THAT
DAVIS WAS IN HER OF
FICE ATJD ASKED PERM
ISSION TO STAY IN
MEXICO FOR 60 MORE
DAYS IN APPROXIMATE
LY AUGUST 1985. SHI
HAD THE IMPRESSION
THAT DAVIS WAS LIVI
NG WITH AN INDIGENT
GROUP OF FOREIGNERS
DAVIE TOLD HER H
E WAS LIVING IN SAN
CRISTOBAL DE LAS CA
.SAS. HOWEVER, NO RECORD OF DAVIS COULI
BE FOUND IN EITHER
COMITAN OR SAN CRISTOBAL DE LAS CASAS.
5.. ANOTHER IMMIGRA
,TION OFFICIAL IN SA
N CRISTOBAL DE LAS
CASAS SAID HE HAD ►;
lANY CONTACTS AMONG
THE FOREIGN
COMMUNITY THERE ANC
WOULD TRY TO DETER
MINE IF BLAKE OR
DAVIS WERE LIVING I
N THAT CITY. HE AL
=0 TOOK ABOUT 3 5 OF
THE FLYERS FOR DIET
RIBUTION AROUND THE
CITY, ASKING THAT
HIS OFFICE BE CONTA
.CTED.
LATER, THE OFFICIAL
LIC. MONTES OF TH
E SUBDELEGACI ON DE
SERVICIOS MIGRATORIOS, REPORTED THAT H
E HAD RECEIVED
INFORMATION THAT BL
AKE WAS SEEN IN THE
COMPANY OF GABRIEL
SUARE2, PRESIDENT C
IF AYUDA DE GUATEMAL
TECOS, AN
ORGANIZATION WHICH
RECEIVES DONATIONS
FOR GUATEMALAN
REFUGEES- BLAfE AL
LEGEDLY APPROACHED
SUARE2 EXPRESSING
HIS CONCERNS AND OF
FERING TO HELP THE
CAUSE BLAKE AND
SUARE2 LEFT SAN CRI
STOBAL DE LAS CASAS
TOGETHER AND
PROCEEDED TO HUCHUETENANGO. GUATEMALA.
LIC. MONTES HAS
TRIED TO CONTACT SU
IARE2 DIRECTLY BUT W
AS UNABLE TO,
ACCORDING TO MONTES
., SUAREZ MAY BE UNW
ILLING TO BE
QUESTIONED BECAUSE
OF HIS ALLEGED I NVO
LVE.MENT IN
ILLEGALLY-USURPING
FUNDS FROM HIS ORGA
NI2ATION. EMBASSY
ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT
SUAREZ WERE ALSO U
NSUCCESSFUL.
6. ON MARCH 2. 1986. LIC. MONTES RECEIVED AN ANONYMOUS
CALL FROM A MEXICAN
1 MALE WHO STATED TH
AT THE TWO MISSING
AMERICANS WERE INCA
.RCERATED IN THE SAN
MARCOS JAIL.
DEPARTMENT OF SAN fc
1ARC0S, GUATEMALA.
BUSBY
KICOLllflG;^/^
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90
1412 15tl) :^l . N. W. #6
Washington, D.C. 20005
June 22, 1986
Bob Carolla
Office of Sen. George Miichell
Russell Building Room 176
Washing* on , D.C. 20510
Dear Bob,
We have not communicated lately so I tliought that I would
bring you up to date on our case. Since we last spoke, we hav<?
changed drastically our thinking about what hnf'ppi\''cl to flick -ind
Griff.
Sam and I recently traveled again to Mexico f'ity on May 30
for another meeting with an EGP representative. We eiiderl tip nc>t
having the meeting because of a communication foul -up, hut we did
have a number- of ottier productive discussions.
Our reason for meeting with the EGP this time is because we
now believe that they perished at thrir hands. We wanted to
inform them directly about this and to delivpr t hom an ultimatum
for releasing information and whereabouts of (h'^it remains.
We have ritincluck>d this based on i n f or ma t i oji (hat we hcnt^
recently from the Reuters Bureau Chie^f in Mexico City, Bernd
DeBussmann. In April, Mr. DeBussmann infrirmed us that his main
EGP contact in Mexico City told him thai Hlako and I'avis harl
perished at their hands some time ago.
Mr. DeBussmann stated that this admission occurred during a
conversation that was unrelated to the case, jlr sairl tii.tl while
they were discu.ssing general events, h i .s (.'.utacl staled, "Yi5u
know, we are capable of doing some te-rrible things also, like
look at those two American journalists that we executed. " Mr .
[)eBussmann maintains that this was a deflnllc allusion to tllck
and Griff. DeBussmann had not solicited this information. The EGP
person offered this information spontaneously.
Later, Mr. DeBussmann approached this same contact again to
ask for further details and if they mi^ht mfpt with t ho Dlskr-s.
The EGP contact replied that the Blake's had been' given the
official line, that there would be no change.
Because of the context of this admission, we take tliis very
seriously. It is one thing to receive information through second
91
(2)
and third hand channels. However, this was received as a direct
admission from a very reputable journalist. Moreover, it matches
what at least one other Journalist haj^ heard through sources in
Mexico City. It also could be the same story that we were hearing
through our connections in Guatemala City and Managua as early as
last June.
The latest trip to Guatemala in March by Sam and Jim
Adriance forced us to reevaluate the Army disappearance theory.
As you know, Sam was able to meet with the sister in another town
away from Nebaj. She insisted that- the helicopter abduction story
was groundless.
When she heard the story, she looked into it herself for
about five days last Fall, and found nothing to back it up. Be-
cause she was always being approached by third parties for
information, we thought that she was too intimidated to spejik
openly. Sam and Jim Adriance found her believable during their
meeti ng.
You will recall that Sam visited the village of El Llano
during that trip. The village leader of El Llano insisted that
Nick and Griff had been permitted to j»o to Sumal. .Sam also
spoke to the Army lieutenant who commanded the garrison of Los
Majades, around El Llano, who claimed ttiat ttiey had been
permitted to go wherever they pleased.
Originally, we thought that Nick had been told to stay
away from Sumal, and that he had decided to walk back to
NebaJ. However, the village leader of El Llano claimed that they
had taken the path that would have lead them to Sumal.
Based on this recent information, we have decided to press
the EGP to the fullest extent about their disappearance.
We think that their official policy is to stonewall us, and that
they concluded very cynically some time ago that they could gain
a propaganda victory by letting us bash the Army publicly over
this case. That is the way they do things.
Thua, w* *r« now dsmanding that tl)« EOF explain what
happened on this case. Our basic premise is this: they are
•xpactad to glv* ua Information In oxchanee for na not hlnwlng
up this case in western media.
We have already sent them an uilimaium by letter. One letter
la being sent through a high Sandlnlsta official, Omar Cabezaa of
the Ministry of the Interior, who is expected to deliver it to
his contacts within the EGP. In addition, Bernd DeBussmann and
92
(3)
another journalist are delivering it to their contacts within t 1ip
Mexico City-based EGP. As soon as we know that they received it,
they have three weeks to contact us.
If the EGP don't contact us, then we will wage a media war
on them. Some of the things that we will do are:
1) Run a week of full-page advertisements in Guatemala City's
dailies accusing the EGP.
2) Both ABC and CBS have done pieces on the case. After they run
those, they have agreed to do follow-ups, with which we will
conclude that they were the culprits.
3) Major dailies like the New York Times, the Miami Herald want
to do follow-ups on their other stories. We will conclude that it
was the EGP who did them in.
4) We will write letters to every Senator and Congressman about
the case.
5) We will hold press conferences in Guatemala City and on
Capitol Hill about our conclusions. We will actively call on
Senators and Congressman who are sympathetic to this C'Tsp to
appear with us.
Basically, we feel that there is really no other way to deal
with the EGP. I know they are sensitive to public perception
because the only reason they met with us last November is because
as they stated, we had become for them "a political problem."
Since this is their motivation, this action will raise the stakes
for their stonewalling.
We are not sanguine about the EGP resolving this case. Thus,
we are going to need help on Capitol Hill for getting our message
out .
I know that this is a lot for one letter. I would like to
hear your thoughts on where we should go from here. Pleasp
contact me as soon as you get a chance.
cc: Sally Lounsberry
Rnndy Dlak<?
93
WILLIAM S. COHEN
Unlli-d Stiles Senator
JOHN K. McKERNAN. JR.
Mi-inbcr of Congress
/ ^
October 24, 1986
GEORGE J. MITCHELL
Unili-,1 Sl.itfS Senatoi
OLYMPIA J. SNOVVE
Memb«;t o( Congress
Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Overseas Citizens Services
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Tharp:
We are writing to restate our interest in Randy anc3 Sam Blake,
whose brother, Nick, disappeared in the area of El Llano, Guatemala,
about April 1, 1985.
We appreciate the time and effort the State Department has
spent thus far in trying to determine the fate of Nick and his com-
panion. Griff Davis, and are aware that more effort and staff time
has been given this case than on other disappearances.
Randy and Sam have vigorously pursued many avenues in an effort
to gain information on Nick. Most of these leads have proven fruit-
less, and they are left with the strong feeling that the E.G.P. does
indeed have knowledge of Nick's disappearance.
We would like to determine if our Embassy in Guatemala City
can encourage the Guatemalan government to negotiate with the E.G.P.
in an effort to gain additional information.
Thank you.
Sincerely ,
/^^%^ ^02.(^7
?orge »CJ . Mitchell
United States Senator
Wi/ilSam S. Cohen
United States Senator
94
WILLIAM S. COHEN
United States Senator
JOHN R. McKERNAN. JR.
Member of Congress
GEORGE J. MITCHELL
United States Senator
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
Member of Congress
November 4, 1986
The Hon. Oscar Padilla
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Office of the Embassy
2220 "R" Street
Washington, D.C. 20008
Dear Ambassador Padilla:
We understand you have been in touch with Randy Blake, the
brother of Nicholas Blake, who has been missing in Guatemala since
April 1985.
We learned that official negotiations have now begun between
the Guatemalan government and the rebels. As you may be aware,
Mr. Blake feels strongly that the E.G. P. may have knowledge of his
brother's disappearance.
We are enclosing copies of our recent letters to the U.S.
Bureau of Consular Affairs which indicate our strong interest in
these negotiations going forward on behalf of the Blake family.
Thank you for any efforts you may make in reaching this goal.
With best wishes, we are
Sincerely,
Gebrge -K Mitchell
United States Senator
96
WILLIAM S. COHEN
United States Senator
JOHN R. McKERNAN, JR.
Member of Congress
laine
rgressio\al
GEORGE J. MITCHELL
United States Senator
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE
Member of Congress
November A, 1986
Mr. Thomas A.D. Tharp
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Overseas Citizens Services
Bureau of Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Tharp:
This is a follow-up to our letter of October 24, 1986, concern-
ing the Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis disappearance in Guatemala.
We understand that official negotiations have begun between the
rebels and the Guatemalan government. We are hopeful that Ambassador
Piedra will personally meet with President Cerezo in an effort to
ensure that negotiations go forward on behalf of the Blake and Davis
f ami lies.
Thank you. .
With best wishes, we are
Sincerely ,
George J. Tlitchell
United States Senator
cc: Ambassador Alberto M. Piedra
cc : Elliott Abrams , Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
96
United States Department of Slate
Washington. D.C. 20520
December - *:J.1S36
Dear Senator Cohen:
Thank you for your letters of October 24 and November 4
from yourself and Senator Mitchell expressing your
interest in the case of Griffith Davis and Nicholas Blake
who disappeared in Guatemala in 1985.
Rand
for over
officer
the Stat
par ties '
Griffith
U.S. gov
place hi
talks be
Army of
of the f
official
to assis
y Blake
seas cit
here at
us of th
interes
Davis ,
ernment
s brothe
tween Gu
the Poor
amily in
s in bot
t them i
met with
izens se
the Depa
e case,
t in the
Randy ' s
to press
r ' s disa
atemalan
(EGP) .
tend to
h Guatem.
n their
the
rvice
r tmen
Besi
disa
pr ima
the
ppear
auth
In a
keep
ala a
ef for
deputy assista
s and the cons
t on November
des keeping al
ppearance of h
ry objective i
government of
ance on the ag
orities and th
ddition, he an
in contact wit
nd the U.S. wh
ts.
nt secretary
ular case
5 to discuss
ive all
is brother and
s now for the
Guatemala to
enda of any
e Guerrilla
d other members
h government
o may be able
At the present time, there are no active negotiations
taking place between the government of Guatemala and the
guerrilla forces. Following the recent killing of seven
government soldiers, allegedly by members of the EGP,
President Vincio Cerezo stated that the killing of the
soldiers was "totally incongruent" with their call for
dialogue. He reiterated this position at the recent
meeting of the Organization of American States in
Guatemala.
The current climate affecting relations between the
government of Guatemala and the guerrillas, including the
public statements by President Cerezo, appear to make it
unlikely that President Cerezo will enter into
negotiations in the near future. The embassy and the
Department of State, sensitive to the Guatemalan
government's stance on any negotiations, will closely
follow the situation and await further developments before
deciding upon an appropriate course of action.
The Honorable
William S. Cohen,
United States Senate,
97
2 -
Please be assured that I share your concern in this
unfortunate case, and that I will call to the attention of
the embassy your continuing interest and your desire to
see the case on the agenda of any meeting between the
government and the guerrillas. Ambassador Piedra has been
personally involved in trying to solve the case, having
met with the family on several occasions. You may be sure
he will continue his efforts to bring about a final
resolution.
I hope this information is of help to you. If I can
be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to
contact me.
With best wishes.
Sincerely ,
''^J. ESward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative' and Intergovernmental Affairs
98
Embassy of the United States of America
Guateidala, Guatemala
December 2, 1986
Honorable William S. Cohen
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Cohen:
Thank you for your letter of November 4, 1986,
concerning the disappearance of Nicholas Blake and
Griffith Davis. ^^^8]c^^tfe§43&.il«et^»H.thSPxesid«'i:^t
Cerezo and encoura ge^'ne got iat ions jwlthvtbe rcbel'-Lgrdiips on
behalf of the families of -Messrs- Blake and Davis.
¥Bi^,eu5it emalanlGoyer hmeht'ncu^^ ly iihas ^ho plans , jt o
5fenter£into^ negotiatjions^with the , r.ebelX,,- however , should
tKis^poiicy change, I Will discuss the Blake/ Davis ca&e
with appropriate Guatemalan officials as I have dcme on
several occasions in the past.
I hope the above information will be useful to you in
responding to the Blake and Davis families.
Sincerely,
Alberto M. Piedra
Ambassador
99
Ktnbassy.ofjlie United Stales of America
UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM OF MEETING
Date: '3 September, 1987 ,
Place: Consul General ' s Office
Those Present:
CONSrDTrujirio; DATT:GHo<3l^er ; CONS;Con)Uerse;
Mr. Jim Ellesen^ (aka Tim Raub Ellis)
Subj^ectf
Blake/Davi s^Case
As arranged, Mr. Ellesen presented himself at the Embassy at
10AM to discuss the status of his investigation into the where-
abouts of Nicholas Blake and Griff Davis.
Mr. Ellesen said that he came to Guatemala in 1976 to flee a
sentence of one and a half years in prison for sale of drugs in
Boston. He was familiar with Guatemala from frequent travel
here to visit friends in the Peace Corps.
Last year for the first time since he came to Guatemala he
re-entered the States and did it without papers. He said that
he was stopped, but talked his way in. He worked for six
months, but loved his two Guatemalan children too much to spend
any more time away from them, so returned.
He has a range of Guatemalan identification, including a carnet
as a Commissional Militar, a driver's license and a cedula
indicating he was born in Guatemala (although he was actually
born in PA in 1945). He used an altered birth certificate to
establish an identity here in Guatemala as Jim Ellesen Ralb.
Mr. Ellesen 's contacts with the embassy began in 1984 when he
contacted then DATT Charlie Stokes and later Lt. Col. Herzog
from Embassy Mexico. Everything he told Stokes was repeated to
him by the Military Zone Commander the next day, leading him to
believe that the embassy is bugged. He doesn't believe that
Col. Stokes was the source of the information.
Mr. Ellesen managed to stay neutral in Guatemalan internal
troubles until the guerilla forces moved into Huehuetenango in
force. He then decided to make friends with the military, and
established a close relationship with then Zona Militar Comman-
der Col. Hector Catalan. He supplied them with information and
they gave him the run of the base. While making friends in the
military he also made enemies, and he was told in 1985 that
there was a clique on the base intending to kill him. He then
decided to come to the embassy and talk to the DATT. He
reported on such things as the shipment of arms, Mexican support
for the insurgency and military responses. In the conversations
100
he was asked, "Is Col. Catalan stealing more than" another
colonel. He doesn't remember his answer, but Col. Catalan
decided that his answer was a negative reflexion on him, and
turned him out of the base and cut him off from support. Mr.
Ellesen then cut his relations with the embassy from then until
a month ago.
Over the course of those months of embassy contact Col. Stokes
mentioned that the embassy was very interested in locating Jack
Shelton, an American who had disappeared in the Huehuetenango
area. After the disappearance of Blake and Davis, interest was
expressed in knowing what happened to them, also. Stokes
involved then ConGen Phil Taylor at that point. According to
"Ellesen, Taylor offered to help him with his legal troubles in
the U.S. while discussing information on Blake and Davis.
(Taylor does not remember this being an offer of assistance in
exchange for information.)
Ellesen says that Blake and Davis were killed the day after they
were last seen. They left Huehuetenango to go to Nabaj, but had
difficulty in getting there and turned back. They were shot on
the way back to Huehuetenango by people who wanted their cameras
and other objects of value. He does not yet know exactly where
they are buried and probably won't know for a month. He is
paying a person to make contact and become friendly with the
murderer. This is at a delicate stage, and cannot be hurried or
meddled with. The information was given to him about 6 weeks
ago by someone who apparently knew about it within two days of
its happening.
As an aside he reported that last Sunday the insurgents took the
village of Aquacatan and held it for the night. The Civil Guard
called for the military, then hid. The military never came to
the assistance of the village. There are Peace Corps volunteers
there, and he suggests that they be withdrawn. He also suggests
that people not venture off the main roads in that part of
Guatemala .
Ellesen suggested two things at this point in the conversation:
1) Don't investigate the murders to closely. It will open a
can of worms and cause trouble for Ellesen, the government and
other people whom he declined to identify; and 2) Exhume the
bodies and get out with minimal publicity, which might threaten
the life of the. go-between.
The ConGen described the logistics of getting a team of people
there for the exhumation and Col Hooker said that it would be
difficult without involving the military, depending on where the
grave is located.
Ellesen hopes to avoid his involvement becoming known. He will
not be present at the exhumation, and discussed ways to pinpoint
the grave without his having to return. He is concerned with
his safety and that of the people who have helped him. He has
101
left letters with two people addressed to the embassy with all
the details as he knows them to this point. If he should be
killed or disappear, they will be delivered. If his sources dry
up, he will also give us the details dO we can try on our own.
He left us a list of numbers where he can reached during the
day, but he has no telephone in his hcuse.
Ellesen is willing to talk to the Blake and Davis families, but
feels that now is premature. He is also willing to speak to the
Blake" lawyer, but only on his terms and if the lawyer will
accept him as a client so that he cannot be discussed with the
Blake family. When- it was suggested that this might be a
conflict of interest, he said that he would probably not speak
to the lawyer at this time.
The conversation turned to his legal problems in the states and
his desire to register his children as U.S. citizens. The
ConGen deliberately did not bring the subject up, leaving it to
Mr. Elleseson. When he finally did bring it up, it came in the
form of a request, and not a quid pro quo arrangement. He
clearly understood that the embassy could not assist him in
settling his affairs in the U.S. Various options were outlined
to him about how to register his children, but it was reiterated
that his legal problems in the states are his problems. These
problems include resolving his fugative status and his use of
multiple names to clear the way for registration of his children
and for his marriage.
In response to ConGen 's question about whether they were killed
because they were Americans, he said no, they were killed
because they had cameras. It was not ant i -American or anti- or
pro- anything.
He left saying that he would keep in touch and expressing the
hope that we would soon have an exhumation.
102
A^
UriJCLASSIFIED
Ori
Z»W BUWGTAS8C3 lilZZW
IMNEDPTE , ,
^0 1423001 "SEP «7 I
' m 05BAO GUATtKALA GT
TO DIA KASHDC//0AH-5// IWtOI.'IE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 Of 02 GUATEHALA GT 1
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOB IHFORMATION
REF^ US 1121482 SEP 87
" ir , Hl'lEPL* TO BEF NSG, I HAVE PBEPADED «
- CHUONCLXICAL LISTING OF ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN TAtEN^
BY THE DAG la SUPPORT OF THE US CONSULATE EFFORTS TO
DETERMIhE THE WHEREABOUTS OF HICHOLAS BLA(£ AND
GRIFFITH OAVIS. '
2. FYI THIS IS A CONSULAR MAnER. HOWEVER, ACTING
UNDER THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE AMBASSADOR WE HAVE
COOPERATED FULLY WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL AS THE
INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED DISAPPEARED IN A COHBAT AREA.
THE CONSUL GENERAL HAIKTAINS THE ACTIVE FILE IN THE
EMBASSY OUR FILES ARE LINITED TO HILnARY -,
■INVOLVEHENT BY THE DAO AND THE ST ARKY. THERE IS 0«E v
*EXCEPTIO»l AND THAT IS A RECENT INTERVIFW (3 SEP 17) ■^
WITH A SOURCE WHO CUIMS 10 HAVE INFORMATION THAT THE
'ITItlVIOUALS INVOLVED WERE IILLED AND BURIED. SOURCE
■-WOICATES THAT THE MOTIVE FOR THE ALLEGED HILLINGS
WAS ROBBERY. I CAUTION TO SAT THAT THIS IS AN
UNSUSSTANTIATED REPORT WHICH IS UNDER ACTIVE
INVESTIGATION SY THE CONSUL GENERAL. I PARTICIPATED
IN THE MEETING WITH SOURCE AND HAVE A COPY OF THE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. THIS WILL BE DELIVERED
PERSONALLY DURING MY VISIT TO'WASHDC 15-22 SEP 87.
j.'TKi F0110WIM6 :s a"chr6nolgy Of Eve'Sts'ajidT
AniCNS carried out by this office in support of the
CONSULAR INVESTIGATION:
18 APR 85 - OAn TRAVELED TO QUICHE AND NEBAJ AND NET
WITH ZONE CDR COL BYRON LIMA AND S-2.
MAJ ALFREDO MERIDA ■ NO INFO.
23 APR 85 - DAn MET WITH LTC EDGAR SOL IS. DEPUTY COR
HZ 120. SOL IS STATED THAT 15 ARMY PATROLS
WOULD BE SENT INTO THE VICINITY OF SUMAL
TO SEARCH FOR BLAtE A,VO OAVIS.
25 APR 85 - DATT TALUO TO LTC SOLiS RE: UPDATE ON
THE PATROLS • 15 PATROLS IN AREA - NO
INFORMATION TO RE.»ORT.
25 APR 85 - DAn SENT LEHER TO VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
ASIING PERMISSION FOR BLAIE FAMILY TO
TRAVEL TO MZ 120 TO DISCUSS THE CASE WITH
THE LOCAL MILHARY OFFICIALS - ALSO
EMBASSY/CONSULAR OFFICER ACCOMPANIED.
25 APR 85 • LEHER FROM DAH TO CHIEF OF STAFF
REQUESTING A COHPLETE SET OF 1:30,000
MAPS OF GUATEMALA.
2 MAY 85 - OAH CALLED LTC SCLIS TO INQUIRE ON SUtE-
OAVIS CASE - NEGATIVE INFOSMSTiCN
JUN 85 - DATT AND AMBASSADOR TRAVELLED TO MZ !20
ABO DISCUSSED BLAIE-DAVIS CASE WITH COL
LIMA - NEGATIVE INFO.i'lATICN.
7 JUN 85 - DATT DISCUSSED SLAIlE-DAVIS CASE WITH 0-2
CCL CARLOS DORANIES - NO INFO AVAILABLE.
CORANTES STATED THAI MZ CORS ALWAYS REPORT
incident: INVOLVING FOREIGNERS TO THE 0-2.
MY REPORT WAS BASED CN INfO PROVIDED BY
THE BLAHE FAMILY THAT THE INDIVIDUALS IN
QUESTION NAO BEEN SEEN DEBARHNG FROM AN
ARMY HELD IN NEBAJ. I REVIEWED THE 0-2
JOURNALS PERSONALLY A.iiO FOUND NO SUCH
REPORT.
OORANTES STATED THAT ANY INFO WOULD BE
PASSED ON TO THE U.S. EMBASSY. .
I EXPLAINED OUR CONCERN OVER THE CASE AND
THE WELL-BEING Or INFORMANTS WOPUNG 'OR
THE BLAIE FAMILY OORANTES ACCEPTED MY
ADVICE ANO STATED THAT THE ARMY WAS
BT
UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 GUATEMALA GT 03808
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
REF: UR I12:«8Z SEP 87
ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM ANO THAT
NO HARM WOULD CC«£ TO THE INFORMANTS
7 NOV 85 - OUR SOURCES INDICATED THAT ONE ARMY HELO
1170, OPERATED IN THE AREA OF PLATA GRANDE
MZ «2 DURING THE PERIOD 2-11 APR 35 IT
PROVIDED REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR MZ'S tU.
20. ANO 22. NO RECORD OF « LANDING IN
NEBAJ. (PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY BLAKE
FAMILY INFORMANTS.)
10 NOV 85 - OAn. AMBASSADOR, CONSUL ANO OCM MET WITH
RANDY ANO SAM BLA<E AND ASSISTANTS TO
DISCUSS THE CASE PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW
DEALING WITH EMBASSY EFFORTS TO DATE.
MAY OR JUN 86 - DAn MET WITH MR 6LAIE, FATHER OF
NICHaAS BLAIE. ANO DISCUSSED ACTIONS
TA(EN BY GT ARMY, MR BLAtE THA«ED THE
OAn AND EMBASSY FOR EFFORTS. HE BELIEVEO
THAT THE EGP HAD (ILLEO HIS SON
INDICATED NO HOPE FOR FINDING SON ALIVE OR
RECOVERY Of BODY.
26 APR 85
30 APR 85 - LtnER FROI AMBASSADOR TO CHIEF OF STAFF
DIA SPECIAL
HANDLING REQUIRED
ACTION 31A/SPEC(8>
MCN=a7I57/OS26S
/ ioDDT ■
(H.C)
TaR = a7;s7,':303
31 JUL 86 - MET WHH BLAIE FAMILY AND ADVISORS IN
AMBASSADOR'S OFFICE - FANIlY CaWINCEO
THAT THE EGP HAD ULLEO SLAIE-OAVIS -
t C» S-7 "-*''f ""'-* '"" «(1"'S'JRS TRAVELLED TO
" ' ° CMICHE ON BOARD MILITARY HELO PROVIDED
■^.^ SY PRESIDENT CiREZO.
16 MAK 37 - AARNA VISITED MI S20 ON ROUTINE LIAISON
: Ti0=37257/23042 C0EN=MIA759
UNCLASSIFIED
103
UNCLASSfFSED
VISIT - NO INFO ON BLtlE-OAVIS CASE
:C MA» 87 - AARHA VISITED HI IK ON ROUTINE LIAISON
VISIT - NO INFO ON 3LA(!;DAVIS CASE.
Z; AUG SI - AARXA VISITED NZ JM CN ROUTINE LIAISON
VISIT - NO INFO ON BLAIE-OAVIS CASE.
9 SEP a; - OAH AND AARMA VISITED Hi m OH ROUTINE
LIAISON VISIT • NO INFO ON BLAIE-OAVIS
CASE.
4 OAO *ILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE CONSUL GENERAL
IN THIS ONGOING INVESTIGATION THE «ST PRCMISIKG
LEAO APPEAJS TO BE THE ONE lENTIONfD IN PARA ! ABOVE.
•E WIlL REPORT ANY DETAILS RESULTING FROM THIS LEAD.
REGARDS. BT
MCN=87257/OS2S6 TOR = 87:57 ;;30
UNCLASSIFIED
WILLIAM S. COHEN
104
Bnitd States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
October 2, 1987
The Hon. George Pratt Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I have had an active interest in the case of the missing Ameri-
cans Nicholas Blake and Griffith Davis since shortly after their
disappearance in the Guatemalan highlands in late March or early
April 1985.
The State Department staff has been very helpful in meeting
here on the Hill with our office and with members of the Blake fam-
ily, and in keeping us informed of any developments.
Randy and Sam Blake, the brothers of Nicholas Blake, remain
concerned with what level of activity was expended by the Embassy
in Guatemala City since their brother's disappearance.
Because of the various contacts used by the Embassy and in
much of the material being classified, it has been impossible for
the Blakes to determine precisely what has been done.
Would it be possible for a copy of the Embassy file to be pro-
vided to the Senate Intelligence Committee to be reviewed by my
staff person who holds a security clearance? This would be very
helpful to us in explaining to Randy and Sam that every possible
avenue has been explored in an effort to locate their brother.
I have also been in touch with the CIA and the DIA. The CIA
does not have a file on this subject and the DIA has provided me
with what information it could on what support services it lent the
Embassy .
Thank you.
With best wishes, I am
Sincerely,
William S. Cohen
United States Senator
WSCsal
105
^;3wii4,
L nited States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
(j:
.y^'-
i-
Dear Senator Cohen:
The Secretary has ask
letter inquiring into the
Intelligence Committee re
regarding Nicholas Blake
Guatemala in 1985. Mr. M
Citizens Emergency Center
spoken with Mr. Jim Dykst
about reviewing Departmen
visit the Citizens Emerge
earliest convenience. He
set a time for the review
ed that I respond to your recent
possibility of having the Senate
ceive a copy of our Embassy's file
and Griffin Davis who disappeared in
ichael Mahoney, Director of the
in the Consular Affairs Bureau has
ra of the Intelligence Committee staff
t files. Mr. Dykstra is welcome to
ncy Center for that purpose at his
may call Mr. Mahoney at 647-9018 to
As you may know. Randy Blake, Nick's brother, recently met
with our newly appointed Ambassador to Guatemala Mr. James
Michel, just prior to the Ambassador's departure for post. The
Ambassador assured Mr. Blake that the Embassy will continue to
pursue all avenues of inquiry in an effort to find out the fate
of his brother and Griff Davis.
If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate
to contact me.
Sincerely,
J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
The Honorable
William S. Cohen,
United States Senate.
106
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agiJin
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107
•WHAT no VCIU DO WHIN YOUI filllLD UISAF-
inn kl a <nn<p awntyf Kilbr/o Svkaa mt*. • Itac
quadon hu amumnl her (br i dcade. ihe 10 yBm An
iht b« law her eUot na Jul- Jt(i mu bcOini and
inirapeDlvc a nan >rha'd gmkuKd fran ciilq(o wWi honon in pNkaofjhy
omy 10 joki thr Mslnci «l]en jola ncK Innl 10 ctnr h)!. H* 11S7 have irdbcd
qulrl^ lAer he edkicd doi i)* wm ba faihcr'l p«h. not hk uwn, and rfte
ihrae uncunlbruUe yean In (Ir irtHcajy ttHl a fow uuncha kl Europe aa a
The
Osoal Amerie*.' in the «vnk oC 1 kxal mWnw)'— Go*'
tanala mi Id ihc nidn al anodirr violax putiie. It »a< the
bus tioedcutng in !9 ;«« ofdrll aiVt iIbi Anwricaa
Watch cMimtti haK kft 100,000 dead and 40,000 irinki)i.
• Jad['> paitnti newr heani ncm him tfikt. * Uurinif ihc nru dgh yaan.
■be Kanli Itar I ton bcame a learcli for a body. By eaily (hk year, k ma
linpty a March for cocnfcnt. "You uy tn accept dw tl is awer," twft Kadwyn,
6U, a KUall womaa wldi dion. doc-cropped hair and tunc gfaaas. "I )icn you
iJisappearance
tuuilit. he moml lo .San FrandKu tram ta |annit' quiri Kimvllr, Teim..
laJKhhnlnDd and be^i pRfarlnfi for a ulp i« Meidcu. He hoped thai tnwl
Kutid help odki the "dcgfadinj" mUeary eiiierimct- -"You know." Katlnyn
•ays "llir gruup Crgig and the RKl In inleaitia» hewi'i uKd lu ihc lult*." •
5hc Riancet amunri JacVi bedroom, apfanmly much u he tind left ii In (he
iprinf of 1981 In a duaet. hk thaical ffiar liu nen lo a
»'ruMU(^ sack uf NaUraad (.nigr^ihin. A Ujukihdrii lied whh
renikxien uf hk ittkd» — the ccdlectnl work* uT BahcJiiii dc
IfiitvOuuiy FtoKti uuria. a voluiic endrlcd "^yie Wkdom of
Uiuu aid indat" aid anxlKT calcri The Wkrtnm oT IneL' •
Kailayn mndi ai tlie deik, rcaiiaiiginf ume Cii>!inxn dertiy an. Sr'tUm
olnily and ncttfly deKrUng her lun ui mc- -lii km rf rlia*il naidr, hk
track cuDpnlTUa. the waylrdkln'tinxicurdiink- buiwhenhrrcynUi^a
on a Uiinle nTkoerv al ic lalk lilem. ojarit, at 28 a icaaoatd iravder, h»d betn
tee hk h.'utdwiiiiiiii, and itjuai mdta yui. Vnul Hiid out. ir you <
wmeoae. The moat perianal pan ufanncaro b da:lr hnh«nifai||.*
of
THE kNII OF JAOCS XTFAHV muvul or LErrUtK WAS THt. Mn TtlNr ( I tKT
due Ilai mneduiii ««■ rnai%. In Aiiguat. 1981, vhcn theic had been ou
word bom Jack Id aewial weckt, Kailuyn and Cunk mre woiTitd,
but they had nu kiea whci* lo snn. k'our cidk u> die US. EoAiniay
in Mexko proved taipradaeUw. They toU ua ilia vhm people
get down ta dial clmaie, diey (eod lo fbi]gu aboul iknc," Kailnyn
remembesv So Oink, now 67, diddcd w (u to Moilco u> icardi
for I A BXi hmteff. • Ahhoufh he dnct not ipeaik .SpanUi aal hadn°iu-.«cle<l
ounidc die Unkcd Suia ikKic he wai a Maihie On Othawn ncvly 40 yean
bcfoir. Cunk uxik leave Itom hk poa aa ai agrk\Jiund cngaieertng
prnfntor a the Utaiwiilly ofTcUDaiec and made hi> way to San Criatdbol de
Jack S&elton
a aruemadc. faiihAil eore^ioialeiir Hk Bml leaer, tkiedjuly 9, 1 M I , waaooe
itf duve Ir 'd anttini to Kafaiyn aod Mi fabrr. Omk in only MO anekL - rv
picked up a few Kiapa of SpenWi,~ be had prtucd In hk tdUaptuMeticn
writing. "Fiintish fcjr sirvlval.'' He had faeai bi auudwrri Mcakn loura^
Mayan Indan ndna, |al wrote, aid
iddiou|^ he ma ruvang dni of tiaaicy.
he lajpcd to vkil caie moiv WKient du Id the Yuatio bcfnrc leiiMlJim to the
.Sato to kul for work. • Thioc dayi buer. anuninfi to knnafpiiMi ki^ he
ontaed Inin UuaiBULt. tik ttanaig aaid hanlly haw been wocie. Under lla
lldfcaiy Rgne nt Feimto Roinen Luoi (Janii — 'die &>Uam I hado nf
By Kevin McKiernan
LuCatai m Mada\ dw urn whenjKi'ilai kllcTlad bent piaitinaiketl A
huaaaikm on the hat leg of Ilia trip waafijufatfo, land Ingwkhpaiicngefi
aid noky with the rapid qicceh i^term oT the iKiTaaaliar rultun:. C^mk,
dievKd In (lie aamc bnwn wool niiktajy ihht he'd worn aa a young Maiine,
WB rdkvcd wlim a kmXhHired manger
afnogid, ipeakiiig Knglidi, nneikig
aamnifc But » ifikUy m [be m>i appeiaed. he Ma gone. Cunk checked
for hk wallet and paapoci. Ibey were pmc, Ku. • Cunk wov lane for orw
fund* and crerientiak, rcfuming twn iMcks later. IMicn nu uoe ai the ikrary
Jack Hid he had mided In San CrinAbal rau,|nisiMl hia
The Seiircli for Their Son Brnuglit Kalliryii ami Curtis Sheltoii Face to Facp With Guatomnla's Everyday Horrors
a loa aNoaiai inoa aaoABinL amaiapjti, i
108
??& rj'4 St4
109
p(iuu>giaph, Uinb ict 00*00 a lO-huur bus ride 10 the Vucatin. to (he Mayan niiiu
Jack IimI visited u Palaiquc. There, he searched out Americans, because iheytpeali
Ei^lUsh and becauac he bcBeved (i)cy would remenibef aitothcr Amefkan better. "I
tsfii begitwiiiK to ice that to Mcxkara, we aU looked the anie," CuitB s^m. But none
oT tltc Americana Ik loct in Faknque remcnAxrredJadi. CurtB iwived on.
jHck had mentioned in >^ but letter that he might go to Bonamjali, a renxtle
Mayan «c si eanem Mexico noted for ii3 colored lueraxlyiifajca. Curtis' car gnt
Muck levcral lima on liie way (ht^r, and he had to hike In (he bett five mlcs over
mrain too nxigh Tor a vdidc. But when he arrived, the vidtor bonk jhuwcd no
entry fur Jack, and no one ki the area could Idetttiiy hfan pnaitivdy from the
photograprt A Uuatonalan woitsin acemed to remember a foreigper who kxikcd
Ike Jack UaixUng on a street comer in an obscure viBagc in nonhem OuaionaU
aonK dmc ago. But ihc cotikjn't provide any ntlier infomation.
At that point, Curdi ran out of chies. So, after more invciti^uloii ki the San
CriM6bal ana, he poued fiycn wltti Jack'i picture and returned tu Tcnnewee.
Several nun: wceka patted without a word froai Jack, and the CunSy waa
diitnught Kathryn (xxibisl the CSlizcnt Emergency Colter, a bnnch of the VS.
State Ocpanmeat in Wathlngion, that Jack was n^atiiii^ llie family appealed to
mcinben of Coogrets, iodudlng (hen-SciL Howaid M. Baker (R-Tcna), Sea Jkn
TM SMteK fanlly In 197»i ■•ny, toft, Natferya. Jack ft CmiUt.
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SasKT (TVTcnn.] and ihclMe Rep. John J. Duncan (R-Tenn.X to
pfcaiuie !hc Stale DepaniixA Kxr kifonmaticfi. In October, the
State Ocpannicnt oOcd widi iKWs Innigratlon records had turned
up Jack's oaroe ai Lb Me*Uh, a imal Guatemalan border pcM on the
Pan Araericaii Highway, three houn louih o( San CritioboL Jack's
ni«Dc had appealed on die July 12 Kstof travdcnwiiowefvlicaded
south Into tin pixxrince of Hudaieteiiango.
ftioyed by the news, the ShdtoiH telephoned the SUic Depamnent, asking
oOdals fur an orvcitc bwestiipilnn n Huehueienangin and for the Ur oT ottwn Mliu
had crossed that dsy. bopk^ someunc— perhaps another fbreigHT— ntigbt
remLinber Uk tal, <tuk4iali«d boy (mm Teimessec. But (Ie 1974 Piivacy Act bars
(he rekasc of a^r faiTonnatktn boat die State Dcpaitnw. And when the findy
approadwd Amerkan Express lor informadon about where psii caiiK:d Nt
tnvder's checks, they wen; toid that dw tatuc bw kept dKsc recoRb aeciet. (DO.
Undetored, the Sheftoos lauxhed a tckiphooe and letter-writing campaign tn
push for an invctilgRtkjo ofjack's disappearance. 1lu7 contacted almost two dozen
Oft^rizatkina, indudkig Amnesty Intenudonal. Aniericat Watch snd the Wwid
GounciofChurcbesw
The strakB of tiic scardi were slwwing on die fiunOy. J«i"s brother. B«Ty, jpwe
up a sdMbnhJp in plant and toi science at the UHvenicy of Tcntestce because he
o(w)d not cooccntnuc on his siudlei And Kathiyn, bdng treated Gar hipus. a pdnM
uthritk condkkm i»a« attacks the knmune ayttcm, fuund Uut stress ag^avated die
diae«e. Easily ftilgued. jdic nonetheless spent boon on die (eiephooe each day whBe
Outis hcU down his job at (he univcirity. At night, her head ached btxn the
oans«nt pressure oT iIk receiver a{pinst her ev.
Bix Uk work acemed to be paytaig off. In November, Raker's office in WMhngton
takik was working to obtain die names of the July 1 2 travdeia, and it succeeded in
rehasing the irtfennaftiija from Ajnerican lUpKst. Jack's last check had been OHhed
in Mcxkxi, In July. But $600 in unused checks was ouistamfk^ no trace of the
checks ind tunied up in Guatenuia.
I
110
RY DECF.MKER, THE SHFLTONS WERE FKANTIC. BOKUKR CHECKS
from Rdizc to Puiwiu indicated that Jade had not left GuatemaU, and Mi SOndav
vUa.ivhidihadeq3irodanAug. 11, had not been turned in. If Jack had been In an
aecideoi. iTIw hftd been IdUed 'n Guatemala, wouldn'l hii body have thown up bf
now? If he wcic alvc, «TOukkiU tomeoiic ham respotkied to the fl)icn? The ShdtoiB
paki |74X)0 ID a Brkfah ineraemtfy to hunt Cor Jaci; btd be found nortitatE.
Cunb wBDied lo go tn MuetnettnangD to retume Ua March, but VS. offidab
diamaded him from raakinx the liipi Leftist guordDax were SLtMfy f^f^t*ia the
Cualemalan dkiamnfaip, vrhich was lupportcd by $3 millkn in annual VS. amary
akl and |90 iTulfioa in erocknik: ainiuiocc. (In DeccnibeT. 1990, the mlkaiy aidwtt
luqioided beouM of fauman-tigbia viobMiuns.) In 1981 . widi i«iwteboaba(htidci,
ooiptes ihowed up regularly on roadi and «r«ets-, death KJuada teemed to be
everywhene. I'ravel on the Pan American Highway between GuatemaLi City and
Huchueieiiangn. (Kc lioun to the hchUi, axdd be dangerous. So Curdi canujed hb
trip. 'Tm tlv Idnd of penon wiw goe* aloiitc with authority," he nys. "1 thought
lltey knew— ur ought to have known — more than we did."
Ute Shchm Instcsl placed ad* in four natkmal newspapen in Uateinaia and
Beiiac The advcnitemenu in tlK "miasing" section carried photograph* of
Jati—indudk^ ODc modinecl by an artist to ihow him wkb ioog hair— hit panport
number and a dciciiption of Mm as 6 feet, 2 indies and 1 46 pounds. The ads bcg^n
apxaraiKonChrisuiiasEve, 1961.
Ail spring, ihc bmOy received icapomcs to the ads, wiiich later were ancnded to
iixliKle a rewBid for Infuiination. 1l>c Sheitons hired a trarabtor in Knoxvflle lo lift
out tlie dues thai tecnicd pnorairing. And Curtis flew to Gtatnoala Cky.
At the VS En^aaiy in Guatemala, un official exprcaicd his belief that Jack hMl
been Uled l^ guerriUas. but there was no supporting cvklence.
After ttwiJiig down more dcKl-end ieadi In GuatemJa, Gunis received a report
that a "giingD ynuih" had been iuund barely alive in a park h Tuxtb Cuti^Tcz, the
capital of the staie of Chiapas In Mexico. Curtis flew to thai city, north of San
Critf^bal de Las Caaas, where ihe (tstfcfa had begun ihc previous summer.
The North American in die park wai emaciaied, unconscious and riMwed signs of
"dreadhi" naltreatment. Curtls necuiaicd dut the buy had been "drug^and in
jsir before he aiThcd fai tlK pari, but he was " too &r g^" for Cuitla to determine
whedwr be wMjadu Ibe man died the next day. Two weeks laser, an nu fingeipiim
analysis indkaied dm die yiaii^ man was, ki fiict. an American, but he was not Jack
Sbdtoc
THf. GUATEMALAN IIOVERNMKNT FINALLY RELKASFP Tilt NAMES
of dK 22 pctjplc who enicnrd Guatemala on the Pan American Hi(#iwBy on July 1 8,
19RI. But by then k was October, 1982. A year had patKd sinae die Shdtona (Iru
telephoned the Stale llepEvtmcm to pressure Guatemala for the list. The trai had
grown cold
In IVccndxr. Baker received a letter frani Guatemalan Ambassador Jor^ U
Teiaya. At hxigbstdtere appeared ui be tome real news — an oflidal reapunac ftxxn
the gtwciiaaent, the conduaion of an inquiry corauassioned by ibc Guaienatan
t was clear th«t parts of Jack's
life would always be a mystery*
National Pulice into Jack's cUsappcarance.
Fmphaiiidng "ihe lehuimeH with which my envernincrx vievwd this matter, and
(be thoroughness with which die Invcsdgadon was cnnductcd," Telaya infonucd
Baker that "Mr. Sbckon docs noi appear tn have rvcr been ki the country.''
"Not mr ai thi eauntryt' The Shchmt were traumatized. "Wc wc^^ kicking for
our son in a couniiy that aM he dkkn'i exitt there." Kaihryn soys.
As the months passed, die Sicituni cKmg to the hope tiiai somehow Jack bad
survived. In Mardi, 198.% tlicy placed more reward advertitcmenis with Jack's
picture bi Madcan and Cuatcraalan popcn. In Juoc, dwn: was a breakthrough.
Ibe onnsid general of the U£. Embay ki Cuauanaia Uiy, Phiip Bof e$ Taykv,
finaly traveled tu Huehuetcnango and dwdtcd die tanmigiaikin kj^t at tlic border.
He atanedbudy ioimd Jack'i name and taK of t^ic other tr^vckrs wlw cnMcd on
J\iy12, 1961. Then he backtrarked to the pmrindat capital, tatjiighinch at the nafci
hotel on die city at^are. Afiemiarti, he icvkwed the bottl'i guest regiuy. Kndktg
iscMhing diere far dK date in quodon, Ik waked across the street tn ilr B Cential. a
kmHiKome boiel wt icn: She bus fimm the border Mopped. As Taylor racaDed later, die
hold iiimagcr reniwcd a *'dust-cf)vercd bnrfc'' frotn die #icif h hi) office. Turnkig to
July 12, 1981, S-imunths before, TaykjriaddKnene>(*.SWtM.
Ill
AugiiH brought DKiTx: duo and dUturfaing notes A both was exhumed in
Huehiictenango, and iu denul X-nys were cofufored lu >«**. but thtj didn't
mattii. A luciittp victim wrote to the £imi)y frum Guatemala City, uying that he hai
just esciiped frum a prison cell set up ai a mDltaiy acadanj, where "hcavUy aimed
men" were haUiw three nthcn, Indudkig one who nttuiKd Jack's phoox
SMhr Ictien from odien had cunvinccd the Shdiora ihat Jade vns a c^xire.
"Yoi cannnt idagktc the anguish my tedy caoiiniiCT to wndr after twi> yean,"
Barry wrote in a letter to a dozen U^ ofndsib.
THt rAMILV CONTINUCn MAKING CONTACTS. Ar.(2UAINlANC»UJ AND
ttends rood's netvwA," Kaihiyn calk ii) In the search far Jadt In July. 1984,
Cunb made one more crip lo Guatemala. Ai that time, I jiincd the Karch, along
widi two others: a dixrict ationtey htim Oretjou v«faQ Is active In astiiting
CuatennlBn reibgecs aod an h^pbcupal priest fhxn Palo Alia who has a lumber of
conucis in GtMlciDBla. Thi* time, Cunis (fid not notify the State Department he was
going, nur did he siGiir the Inlbrmatian that dtuvc this seardr a padiet of recent
rentonics to the stQtrunning Kh.
One writer daimcd lo Ibivc seen Jack playing Willi a dog In Guatemala City. '"He
told me daft his natnc was ShekocL" AnodnT mncrobered seeing a Nonh Americin
man and a Spiinish woman near Lake AtMihi. They had bixn captuicd by (lie
CiBtemaian array and, he vagudy recaled, executed.
We sifted through ihe duct. T1>e stroi^est of them led Curtis and roc to a
neig^iboTtwod in Guateinda 0(y where muncruus nesldeijts, biriependcni of one
anMher, recognized Jack's picture and idendiied him as a local struct penioa We let
up a sbtkcom at an Iniersectian where tlie foreigner wa* known lo pass. Ourb^ the
nem two days, a Chevrolet SUv«rado witli blackened windnMi and no license
piaics — the type of vcblde asMxiated widi Otucenulin deaUl i<]iiads — appeared
and reappeared nciir our poikcd renul car. "It kind of makes you woodcr where oor
taxes gu," Guns said quietly.
When (be stranger finaOy showed up, he was lut Jade after all, aldKiu{^ Hs uec,
Cwlia kaatfasl Ml flyara wNh Jwk'a dMcr4>tloa In QiMtMMta.
BI^
PlwVv^^l
ri-g, :i,«^
IKtwB
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illH
^m^i
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kIi^HBBB
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Infr ook)rtiig and physique were similar. Hs ratiier was American, he
related in brofcen Eni^ish. The rx» of las story as a homeless
expatriate inded off, conAited by dru^ or amneaa or peihi^
boifa.
Curtis Jnumeycd lo Lake AdiUa It was Uh: Fouitii^of July, and
louiisulnthcinwnufPaniijaKhel — 'YM^MtNiinf»"in'thewufdsaf
one itsideni — were slxwdng off Brcvmiis. A wnlcer there dmuglil
he remenbcred tedng sftHMoDe who looked like Jack "but dait was )«sin agft"
»UT CUKTIS WAS EAOKR TO CO NOBTH TO IMR SECUBITY PRISON IN THE
eity of (^ctabenanflo. Kadxyn had nxcived iwu calb Irum Chicago from a wcnun
who hwi just returned from Guaircmakt Qty, where she iiid seen d)c ad At the tiiiic,
ihe told Kathryn, she mentioned Jack's disappearance to her son, a Gtutetnalan
kidier. Acootdbg to die caUcr, her son responded. "No, Mama, he b not mUi^
He has been kidrwpcd faiy Uk miliiaiy aeryice and B bckj ai pftein. " If tMt cUm was
true, Jadi CouU nil be alive
112
ihe woman told the Shduxs that the and her son went to the tccuritv piltoa U)
QuealUD»ngc>, where they law Jack in a "lub-basemcni" so daA ihey "nid U> use
(mA» u> sec." Nine pocple weie bek^ held inihe area, ibc said, jxk wm "tal,
ihln. wearing dd ckHbei," wmI he kepi asking vvhy "no one had come for (hkn)." "1
Udd him," the wotnan retatad lo KaUnyn/'ihai 1 woidd coiiUcthis parenis,''
In (^icnlicnango, the California priest planned to use his connections with a
GoaiesiBJan frfend who WW rckMcd 10 an anny officer to obUki pcmMOD for our
groi^ ID enter the prison. Bui ai route, an astoniahing coincidence occurred wfacn
we stopped on a rural highway to pick up a Mayan hitchhiker. Without knowing
Jack's sioiy, the Indian picked hkn out from a fondly photo, posithv he'd seen Jack
the year before — ihou^ with k>ngiT hair— in the Quezaltcnango prisixi when be
visited his brodKT, who was serrinff dine for assault. It was an innfjrubahle ckic frnni
■n improbable source. Cutis was dearly askaied.
Bu no "tuhbttcmcni" could be fouitd at the prison. And aAer wc made a fiidfe
tour of the cumpound, the guards told us it was time to go. Cuiils and (he priest
lingered, caBing to Jack In Engllsli through the ban of locked cellbkxks. At one
point. Curtb cwid see only the mUsectkxi of one prisoner, someone who was aeated
at the ertd of a kxked oorrkkir. Tlie psiaaner appeared to be weaving something,
perttaps a bag, but Ms fitce was out of sight. "That ami sccnM whiter dian the rat of
these peoplct" Cnnb ocdaimcd nervously, liktu the man stood up and turned
around, bewUdered Ijy the North Americans jockeying for a better view at the
Oppodle cod of the corndor. He was a Latkm.
We druvc nortli to Hudiueicnangu, where Curtis ttadOy located Jaik's nanic. his
signature and handwiitkiK in the regidy at the n Central I lotcL
Of aBilic guests Ested Tor July 12. 1981, or^ one rnncmbeied Jack liurviewed
io Mexico, Antonio Ouik»i Barrios, a idKidicacher, cbiincd thai In- had spent pan
of tint cveniiiK in tlic bar of the El Genual Hotd drinking witii Jack and a young
"South Aiucrkaii wonuu." Jack had introduced her as "his wife." but Barrios
thought at tltc Unte that she was a prostitute. They each had three Callus
(Guatanalaii beers), he said, hoking 141 three fingers. Jack bought two rounds. Then
dte couple left for a hold room.
Barrios, who nanenibcred Jade Rom Shdton as "RusscD" and correctly recaBed
liis room number despite the paaage of itvcc years, said Ike went to Jack's room
about 1 a-m. and knocked on the duor. llic wonon stayed inside, but Jack (tipped
out into the haUwov, where he shaved 'a couple of drinks" frum Barrios' buttle of
Madao vodka. Jack mentioned thM Ik was "horn S;m Francisco. " bi the mominK,
Banioa said, he saw the couple osice more. Tht woman said the two were on thdr
way to Panajachd and Lake Adtlin, sevCTvl hours away.
Throughout lite tdHngof tlie sdtoolteadicr's story, Cunit leavd rorward. arnis
Cnkkd, hanging on every detail. At the mention uf the mysterious woman in the El
Centi^ Haul, hk flngcn dug Into his biceps. "It doesn't sound Eke Jack," he said
tfileUy.
Curtis old he wanted to spend one night in Ihe room where Jack had stayed Usnee
yean befoir, "In case there arc messagn or maribgi stS on the waL" Rut it was
thnctogo.
FOR THE FAMILY. WRITINC; LEITERS BECAME A WAV OF LIFE THAT
persisted even when hope did not. In early 198S. they again wrote Amnesty
Inteniailooal, uiging the gruup nut to Ibinet Jatk't disappearance. Barry Shdton
{rxmd ihe unceitalnty iitenabk, ''afaoost l3ic havingjkii die over and over ^aiii.''
"We sevdied and seadied for bfan." Barry says. "The irony is that Jack waa ilic
onewhowistheseanlin' — hk whole life wasaseardi."
Barry, 3), is four years younger ilauiJacL and aknost one-third of his Ufc has been
dcvraed to teiing his brother. He is not a tall man. but he stoops a kuk, almost as If
to avoid a weigbt the wortdhas put on hit thoukkn.
Barry remcmbeia Jack as a big brother wib ({cntly gave lum ttlviM, Uie how to uM
rubber cemml tu rmdr hit tennis Ktoci, and who "reached out hb band arvj puled
me up" wbcn Barry KHt hb footkig akJri^kk! a cable cu- 1 1> &n Fi^ndica
At hone, Barry ays. Jack was "me a taltwaser Mi in fresh water." He ckdn't fit in,
Jack kwed his Eaiiily, but he ^On'i want Ui cultivate the famiy vegetable gardeti (he
didn't like die "Nwtfc ethic'l He dklD't bke it when his &ther cried to swiidi tlic car
radio from a staiwo that was playing a song in a (uTcIgn language, and t^ien he was a
lcc^-agt^r, he started resisting Curtis' haircuts. But must of all, he didn't like
Irst Jack was the black sheep*
JL Ihen he was the lost sheep.'
KnoxviBc. It was the wroi% cnvirunmcni. "a cunllict of acsdwks," in Harry's wotds,
like wburbia vcrauk a Miyat^ tem^. Ir was Hke Jadi hod been dmppcd into the
wrongpUcc on Earth."
m
113
"Fk« he v»t the bladi ihcjcp," Barry ttys warmly. "Then h< WM ihe k»i jhecp."
TTie but of Jack'i Rnaxviile friends known to have seen Wni alh« wm V4ut
MuMon, a fbnDcr Mighbor. win >Bd leA Tennettee to jubi the Mer^
He had beoi on diip't llbeny in the Bay Area In die late '70i when he and Jxi met
by dMUX In a Beiidcy booksore. Tbcrcafter, whenever Jotinsun was In pnn, "twe]
would pal around loffeiher." When he heartl that Jack had disappeared, it fint
ooairred to iohnion »ai "he inight hxye thrown in with the rebeb" or perhaps "he
AM tu diWaig wkh Kxnc students in a cafe where tlie army had sinol pigeons, and
8icn the mfiitary got him. " JohtKxi thinl4 Jadi nay have Itept part of faimiclf Eronri
hit family, not telUiig them that he went to ban. "Jack was close in tii« ramMy,"
Johnson ays. "He tSdn't want lo faun theta"
IN JUI.V. igss. THtKK WAS AN ASTONISIIINC. DKVKLOPMENT IN THE
case.
On hb last day in CuatemaU, Dr. Michael Brabcck, a Rhode Island phyiiclan
flrMiIng hi* annual volurMeer work near l^tnaja<i\e], overheard < uxivcrBDon stout
a Biingo who'd been kilktl some time ago bv a death Sffad in the neigbburii^ Cown
of SoloU. The tpeakcr, an Anioiain viho nas lived in Guatemala for more than a
ilccade, had been afraid to report the murder, thougli he gueued it "probably
iiwoives that tenly froniTenncMee." the one advertising in the newspapers.
As soon as Rnfcock landed at a U.S. ahpon tlic next day, lie lekphoned me inSana
Barbara (by cuincidence, wc bad attended Hgh sdiOGi together tn (lie 19601; wt had
rcmtaQcdintnudi.andbekriewofrtiyinvolmnentintheShdtcns'scaich). I left far
CuBtanala seven] davs later without idtinf[ the Sheitons. Thc/d been dkappointed
too many Ijnics over tne yean, and I dkbi't warn to <cly raise their hopes agaia But
In SotoU, I learned ttis nnry, Mach uoa theti nxxe tinn seven years old:
FRIDAY IS MAKRKT DAY IN St)I.Olj(. A SMAl.I. TOWN NESll.KI) ON A
mounudnikic plateau. On Nov. 27, IBRl, Indten traders, descendants of the
Mayans, filtered into town to sd their rugp, dotting, vegetables aiai coffce heans.
Dressed b (iiw, traditJoual dodikig with inilcBie wovoi patterns, the waikei* iiKNCxl
riowty along the edf{c of the main roadway thai winds steeply throtigl t dK nxauHains.
Teresa I lemandez and Iter ft^car-old daughter made their way to the marlcet with
the two /kbiof of beans and rice that they hoped to leV that day. As tiiey walked a ilrt
side street dial leads from the main road to tlie viUa^ square, 1'eicai heard a noise
and looked up with a gasp. Condng toward dxm was a naked roan, a gringa He MM
running from house to bouae, knodcng on doors, trying ttic kxis. kwkbig for one
that wuuklapeit. Down the street, someone ydcd "Loco! I xxx>!"Tcieia'i daughter
put down her ptato of iinod and hU behind a tree.
Teresa fnne. At (he runner passed by, their cya met for a split second. Sbc
tlwugbt she heard some Mortk in Engfislt "He was white," she mnenten. "^ay
white. "
Juat beyond her, the maniwKbcd an okt shacL The law thingTcrem saw thiuugh
the open door WHS the naked man hy a pdc of old dottxs, puifing on a pair of coltaa
ponia and tying them widi a cloth belt.
Aratmd die comer, in a dirt-aoor house oveHnoking the lake, Kiialto Martin WM
Cwlte and lUthnm at tMr MMMnMt to Jack In th* SolvM ofliMtMy.
114
fMdiiig breakfiot to Ms ichoui-oge dddnen. When he arawered a
knock at (Ik door, he Bw biiir reel luxter the crack and flpeiicd ihe
kuh, aHuming that the caller was tonxxme he knew. "I'hat's when
the taD gringo came tn," Martin says. The stianger wore a pair of
pauts ihai were too ihuit for hfan. He had frcih scrapes and
scratches over hb back md on hb lower legs. His Adain's apple was
fbc nwi kx>ked Ikx and indk»cd in bn>lu:n Spaiiish that he was thirsty, so Mfllin
gave hlru a ffan of wMcr. Tlw vUtor shook liandt wlQi the children in the room,
pattir^ wane of them on t^ iKad. I Ic seemed frlendber than the forcsners who
cnngnrpted down at the Ukc. but. Judging IVom hia cocxlition and UK oveniB
stM^meuof liic encounter, Martkt iluu^t. he, like many totnists, ntight be mdcr
the itmuence of dnig^
Suddenly, there wm bar^^ y». the door. VVlicn Martin opcrxd k, he saw wo
unifbmMd men armed with mta. One was from tlie Poltda Hadenda, tlte fieared
Treanoy Puikx. Mc wore the forcc't dixtinctlve green Guigues arxl a hat wkh dibi
Strap, and be mnled a U.S.-made M-l carbine. 'Die other man wure the hehnei
assigned to BROK. (Brigada dc Opendnnet Ejqiecialct), ttrongiuin l^icas'
nntonous anti-riot poHce unit. He, too, carried a weapon, but Mtviin oouU not
remember what kind.
"Send him out," thcv ordered
Martin hcsitaiod.'*] have duklren — you can't kill him here," he sakl bluntly.
At this, one uf the men pointed las rifle at Mania "Well ki8 jnu ITyuu gel in our
way." he said.
Manio stepped away from the pointed gun. Ihcn. biaqdkably, (Ik men moved
bull across itic stiecL Martin ckxcd tlic door.
The visitor noticed a cupy of die BiUe lying on a table. He picked It up and waited
over to Martin, 'ttumo, dune," be sakJ, placing hat palm on (he book's cover.
"Jkuno," Martin rcpeatol, (oudiing the BiUc. For a few mnmcncs. tircy sioud irere
lugetlieT. Thcu the man handed the Bibk to Martin. Opening the dnor. the gringo
walked outade.
When the unlfonocd men saw (Ik foreigner, Uary nuwd their rifles and Suited
toward hhn. The Rringo, Manki now noticed, was hi(faigsoinctiiin([lnhis hand-lbc
men Mopped, afraid he was raocealiiig a weapon, peiteipi a grenEtde. Suddenly he
lairlod the ofajeii in liKir (fircriiun. It lih one of tlxir boots, but tliere was no
cxpkakxc it was juM an old IcmuiL 1ltcn Aie men oune at hiin agabi, grabbing him
by the anus, but the gringo resisted, and he raamgcxi to break away.
'Die griitgo was running ayiin, tuwani itie 14> of the hiU thai dropped down to (he
lake baiow. 11k ounnicn iiillmvcd, radng by Martin't house, disappearing lnu> a
nearby comiicid Munents bier, there were gundxKS.
Before kng, the solcfcn returned. As diey pasted the Inuse, one of them aaid to
Manbi: "Watdi oul We arc guing to exterminate every nnc of (Ic putgat |Qcia] In
(his town.'*
IN .SOLOLA, A.S in many Vll.LAr.tS IN CUATKMAl.A, THE JUB OP
picking up floqjses fidb to the bonbra, the firemen. Sok)ljktonte70 Pedro fijKfMi,
by his own caknatc, has picked up "atxMit S.OOO bodies" during ^ P^ ^^ yc^
He was naUeiHjf-iaa. mh oilcn dwelling on indvidual cases, but Jack's was
panioitariy un{ui]getlabie.
*jB griagv 411/ ito ffirrimivf'' Yes, of course, he trtnenlxred the gringo who was
ninnlog. Kvcryoiic knew about (Ik gringn, he saiU when he was siwwn Jack's photo.
Belbic that da^ in laic Nnvonbcr, IWl.iiucnc had seen llrman around. But tucby
he is wefl renKHibeicd
The gTimo appeared after (be guerriBas came through Soioki, busy dayt for die
btmJma. AJk)uichi got word uf a body soon after the sliuoUi^, hui then dKic had
been a mix-up. CuiiDiii({ up the street in his Ore-Ocpanincnt ptdutpk lie had spotted
another body by the ruadndc, and he had collected k inoead. Three days later, when
he returned to (lie area, he found jack's Loipsc In (be contfiekL
The coroacr's report said the deceased was an unknown niale, between 2ft and 30
years of aKC, dressed in gny panu fastened by a "typlrar ' cord. He had bmwn eyes,
an angular ttct with levcral days' gniwth of besrd and a long "Afro" hairayle. He
had been shot twice in d «: aixkxnen and unrc In tiK back of (Ik head
"lliey were bringing a lot of hudiet in Atutc rtays," saU Domingo Hixul, a woricer
at the Solol^ hospital, Ucmifylng Jack's photo. "Bui he was dlftcrent." Bbtul't Job
was to wrap the bodtes of the uiKbimcd victinu — cIk "XXs, " or unknowns — with
Muc plaitk: sheeting, (ylng each with mpc. Uke a bundle, before kxtdlng it on ttte
back of die trudc to hail 10 li IC cooeicry .
The plastic was prc-cut to a standard length, a prublem for Bbcul because Jack was,
by Mayun standards, a tall maa "I renKmixT hini." Kml said. "We had to use more
plastic."
805 966 9770
0
115
IN OCTOBtR OF I9S8. AFTPR OBTAININC JACIfS DEATH CKRTIFICATE
aid (peaking uocc more with Jtnaa. Hernandez and EnOo Martin, I ftoUy wai
abte in wiitc to Ojn» Kxl Kaihfyn and idi UKin how thdr ton dkd Kaifanm caled
ine on ihc tdephwK, him and conJuscd cvm ai^py « «»» infcnmikia S^
tried tu ixti up," ite Hid bier, "even without knowing the tnjitL When thit
happened, vwc didn't luww if wc oQutd go thrtMijih it ^aia"
In lUBS. al dvn icraainad o£iw qucM waft to brkigjidi's bndjr home. Kaihryn
«nd Cuitii hii^ M lawyer In Cuaicnab CO Ilk a ooim to Older the bodjr cxbuiiied Bui
ver the yeara, the Sheltons spent
$75,000 searching for Jack.
the Judge otknatcd that \heiv were SOO tu 400 desol^squad vktais tn Ote oemcteiy,
and thcic was no lectNXl Indicadng vvlich of ■m«tul treiKTM cofMatoed J^^
Kxhuming them wouU be a grudome prufcn requiriiff the pretence of the pcikx,
the heahh deptninicnt and the Judge iKradf; the jiid}^ tald na
But the Sheltnm made one wuK aoempt Bccaiue 1 used tn be an attorney, they
aiked mc to gn tu the Ouaienialin ooun to appeal tlic Judge's dcudon. JuM before
the tr^ Katinyn leiephuncd. "niierc arc lome Udngi thai weren't In lite ad that you
ought to kntiw for purpoaen of cooflnnatkm," the taid "JaHi had very kmg, veiy
thin flngcn— and he had a big Adani*! apple.** Ihe uie of die wcni A«( ws a ihocL
For the Drtt tane, tite wat leTerriiiff tojari, in the pad tenu:.
I departed for Ctatemala, accompanied by RcgcUu Tmjlki, a Mexican ffOxiBitr
In Saiiu Baifauv who wodd help with irarKbuun. The judge Uitened to lu — and
revcncd herxi£ If Uk bther of the boy wuukl ctxnc brvn I'ennciaee to lign the
rcqueu. abc wauU giant tile outer.
It WW a condtion tiwt alarmed Kathryn. jack never one haci ftun Soldi and
the feared dial Curtb raig^ not cidier. 1he Ksrch w-,is knporiain, but they n>« not
be dragged under by k. Shoiddn*t tliey draw the line at ihcir owniurvival? "Cuitfa la
goii\g to retire next year, and 1 am going to need htm," Katfaiyn nid. "1 wan
lonxrthk^ kft In my lie.'*
But Cimii had to know more.
AT Tlli: F.DCli OF SOI.OLA. THE ROAO THAT SNAIOlS UP THK MOUN.
tain atmn a flat plateau that oveitookt a steep, biurivcovercd ravine icveral
huiidred feet deep. Mklwayilnwtiihiittretch of rradix a guard pa« — no more than
a mall i«d--wtwrc inuiiidpal poBce monitor iuoi trafifk and reconl biu nunb^
and ioinctimet Ucciae-platc nuiwxm of autonvibiies.
"I figure Uiey had Jack here." Omit taid. driving by fur the tectnd dmc. "Maybe
they were tramfcrrsig him from one Jail to anodicr — maybe they lad dn^;^
hhn — and they topped to check wiiJi
tlie f^oni Anybody UKng down thai
nvine wuukJ get pretty scraiched up on
the way down."
Cunit had Jun come irnm the
ocmeterv, whldi tits on the Ear ^Uifnt
die ravine, and fWiin the honics of
Tereta Hcmandex and EnUlio Martin.
"I have io|^-JkJi the bciKfli of Ur
doubt," Cunii cuniiiiuefL Pan of the
pain of thlK search lad bccnnie hii
rcaUiBilon that there were aspects of
jadt he might ixrver knuw. "I'm rtui
going to lUnk he was on drug*. Not
vntundirfiy. lie could have been. I'm
not rultr^ it out Hut h doesi'i account
for his wiiereabouB dnae last lour
nnntfai. Widml any miaieT. Out nf
respect for hiin. I tMnk he waa tvked
and runnfaighcre becauae he'd been in
capiMiy."
At Flipper's Cantkia, Omit waa
havit^ a Coke with \mi we were
<MiUng GuaienviUii beer. Neart^y,
several pollrfincn ki unlfona gaihenxl
at a taue Utiered with ciapcy bottles of
116
„\ef^, thought th» bodie* wei* buried
tlvUlcr?
Th« Pollci» 1 l»6cr>d> got up l
lurchk^ b^ tie fiilicr of Jarii Ron
Shdton. twnOTCTing (mm the bar w«h
Iht biwadn ol amwl inioxioteri men.
Curdi wa» trembling. "I (toi'l undcr-
tland a police oTOcer who drinja," he
maiut]{cd lo lay. "1 low cdn he have any
mpeci for hknulf?"
TV iKTO nighc, Curtis and hk
cunifMknlonf met tJ%e txmctcry dirertor
ai Fippci'i ",A*iduu caida. Mio
mum'" the aU ( >uaiemalao cxdainied
with a drunken bugli. taming another
empry bottle nei iu ink:. Machete down,
IntiBn tfead- If t)ic ghngrat n'Amcd
more Infomaik*!. nfw wa Ihi: liirw lo
buy the ceoneiery dircnor anuihcr
round. The gringos complied, and the
graveyard man dcscrfccd ijic ftjrmida-
Uc taA that hiy ahead.
Tttat were two trcrviies aiid many
bodies uinJcmcath. Cravcyiird space iu
^oli had been ai a prrmhim in rrcent
yean. That cnuki be a probknti. Some
tnwnspeupk; had had to bury Ucit
Lttifulk on ky> ut the XXs' ticnche^
ntsturhlng ilir dead — tliesc dead —
could ujM-i the vUage. Hut c\%n if tlic
imches imdcmcaui OMild be un-
artlKtl, there was still no system for
iratinft specifa corpses, inx even a^
r dates cm tJic plank sheets. It ^
nuld Iwvi. to be donr by hand.
The cuaviiiKxi would be uianive.
od)o slink terribly. Everyone would
etxl a face nuA. Sotne people Mjuld
^t ^k. Figirt or 10 gi2vc(ig)^n
.iMJid he hiitd. Illat wnukln't cost
-nurJi. maybe a little more If they
)ruught their own tbuwlR or picks.
I^KTe slunjld be two lcani\ — one todlg
ind one to driiik. Thai was a kM ul com
itfsor. Ihcrc w-rts rw chIict way to
landkit
IXiring the search, dicre would be
KTiics "everywhere." Some trf Own
iiif^ ^ mlxDd up. The giingn's bones
hould be longer than tir others. But it
juuld s(ll be a lot of worV.
^Maduu Aaido, hvUo muaia!
Notebook in hand, (^rtls
puced badt and forth, eitainn-
ing tlK iOil, flguritig and
reDguring tfistanres. About a
dozen wtxiden croiaeA tnarkcd
the rocky, weed-covered
gnjtind, the sites where shaAow
burials tjf known Soiolaleect
tnok place on top of livr
trcTKhcs. The prospect of
opening these graves made lite
Uxjught of gelling m the
others, the ones belo^. even
nxjTc octttxia.
Curtis had a short, natlen
night, and he awakened wfde it
was stUl dari. "What happens to
a body thai lies in the ski for
three days?" he wanted to know.
"Were Uire tm ur tiam buUei
btia}" It was like a bad dreaiii.
And there vxsk other thoughl^
too. Curtis lunwd on the Iglil lo
get ictnetlnng out of his suit-
case. It was an old FatlicT'i Visty
cud, one that he laid carriLxl
will) him from home. Jack had
trade lie card as a ynuri^ier Cur
hk daddy. Ihtre was very Uuir
wriljng on it "rni sorry I hisacd
about the haircut,' k said
aiu^. "Lowe.Jack-'*
Jlm ailef flawn. Courtis was
aisleil ai the daiVcncd kjbby of
the hotel, alntic. Wearing the
oid Mslne shin, he w» audy-
k>g lis Ulilc nxi:bonk. trying in
resoh* any contradicLions,
wringirig wtastevcr meankig lie
couklficziit)iclasi fcwdetidliof
the scaidi. Now he imde the
deciskxt Thtnuinttn/tliggmf.
"It weighs hwvy on mc," he
aid. "to go In dxie and dlnurb
the dead" As simple » thai.
Jack's mnaim woukl stay In
CiUalemab. With ttw other
Before leaving the oountry,
Curtis wanted a phutograpii
taken urTere» Hernandez and
then one of hinitelf wldi Teresa,
(i/r KaihryiL AfWrward, Tereaa
embraced him like a rdallvc.
lite Rucxljy was a lor^ one.
Nearby, at Erailio Martin's
hotuc, Che slop was tfxjner.
Martin was sKk In bed. No mctv
deoils about Jack's vUt or the
death iquad This was just for
tHmksgiving.
Uut In Manln't ample hotne,
Cunis pirxkjool cue more
phoio t^Jack, a picture Martin
had nevi-r seen Ezdllo re-
maiicd on die pmnlnencT, n
Ihe photograph, of lack's Ad.
am's apple and how tills itiired
his monory of the barefoot
visitor who came in hb tkxr so
many years aRO Curtis, standiiR
Uicre in his hoiiK, resembled
that yciung man, Martin aid.
fiirtli wanted to hokl the
Bible thai his son hekl thai day.
As it was brought to him,
Martin tat up in bed. "It is for
yuu, diit Bible isyoun," Manin
said Chirtis was treinfaling,
almoil twilcliing Now be
placTd one palm oii the book's
ewer. "And Jesus aid," Ik
Uuncd uut, koking lo Rugelio
1'rvjillo for tranaU^n, " 1 was
a Mtjuiger, and you tnok me
Into your hotnel' " A king aiKl
difficull silence followed liujU-
k) was crying oixl could ntjt
Iransbic.
LAST NOVFMBHt. NINK
years to ihc day after the
murder. Jack Shelmn's niolher
and father wenl to make peace
with his mernory, arranging a
funeral scivicc at tlie cemetery
at Solola. where diey IvttI hired
a local ctxilractnr in huikl a
laroc but simple moruiiiem set
wiUi oaUve aonci and flanked
by fonrrcte bencties. *lhe moli-
umciit ovedookj Lake Alittto,
oflen called tlie jcwd ofCciural
America. But these western
highlands of Cuaiciiiala have
been— and still are— the teem-
of gruetnine murdcn. rotting
corpses and quici fuiicraU.
Tlie ceremony at this niialii-
menl, raised in riicniory of hotli
Jack and Guatemala's other
disappeared, m6 a iwnarkablf
ptoc«e<ling Cuaieniaki s liarri-
ly leady for a public admis.wiii
of govemmeni murder, cri-
lalnly not one cast in stone It
was. Ainetii^ Waldi represen-
tative Ann Klanud said later. »
tlKHigli son^onc had raised a
"pubUc tncniorial to Nari vW-
tin» while the Third Reich wa.'>
still in power."
Noting that they wrir Hand-
le above the hrxto ol dcaili-
squad vitlirns, one of tlie
mourners ulked about the
"cursed beauty" ul CaaniBla
Then Brabecks l2-yejr-ok1
daughter, Kalina, read a \x-dyn
ilK llaU written. "LXs«- Cj^'
she said, 'plcxse blcvs liv.
Shriioiij. llsiiik you lot wvav
them courage and sirengib
Katilly. hdp ('.uBicnailii. Hetji
Ouaiemala to be at peace "
A large marble tabtei Bt»
atop the monunna |ack a«+
(nn's epitapii. wrincn by ht
fwitily. is inscribed then* B'
Spankih:
<ial
AnttotJuwwmury^ikt
Wis J
Ucmi„jDry\
mgntanJ
Nuimtrr22. IV}3—
ix» *NC<u* nstaa luiCAiiNih Kmmns, iiai
117
^riie Nation.
n FUTH AVENUE
NEWYORK-N.Y. 10011
FAX Transmission Cover Sheet
DATE;
TO:
OF:
FAX: '2-''^ 2-2.M C=F^7.
TELEPHONE:
FROM: Jt/WOxu^ TL^
of THE NATION magazine
TELEPHONE: (212)242-8400 y 'Z-C-
PAX: (212)463-9712/Editarial
(212) 67S-3499/BiuiDeu
Number of Page* INCLUDING this cover sheet:
?f-4
L
J
.n^iioOrVvJiil Following la Allan Nairn's Nation article, published
today, diacloeing further detaiTo about U.S.
intelligence participation In the Guatemalan mili-
tary's terror activities.
Ws think it ohould be of interest to Committee members
and staff in light of next week's hearings on the
issue-
Please feel free to call with any questions.
Sincerely,
Jonathan Taylor
Publicity Director
118
ml BWI^mmwmFmm^ convnunications ik.
eont«:tiD«v/ldUmw / KathyEngBi 1*1212 260 5000 Swrti^'***^
forvymaom: ffll TWmjATl ITTimffl
TBI WATIQN MAaXZmB RgVlALB PBAimfTG M»r Tsm^jggSMJSL
CIA ROLM m (ltnTW«T.>W PEXTW HQOMi ACTIVCTY
Xoport Saaas US Zntalllgane* Op«r*tiv«« Mm
8«Ip«d Tr*ia. Aidvifl* mnd Xra lilt* au«t«m»Ivi Kllliaa Ctalti UOr*
OuatMulux Official* on CXA Payroll Llakad To KUllsa*
X«w York. Karoh 31, l»»l - In the wakn o£ official acknowladgmant:
oi; • CIA aaseta involvemenC in the killing of an Anerlean eitlsen
and a fomer Ouatamalan rebal leader stunning naw ravalatlona about
llnka batwaaa XJS Intalllaonoa oparativas and quatawalan death
•quadfl are revealad in the April 17th iaeue of the MATZOM Magazine,
publlahed today. In a series of In-dqpth interviews with U8 and
Ouatemalon intelligenea operatives aa well as three past Quatemalan
h«ada of state, award- wlontag MATXOtr contributor ^l«n imini
datalls tha cia's role in directing and advising the notorious
Guatemalan 0-2 and its aCflliatSi tha Arohlvo.
Based on hia Inveatlgacions Nairn raveals the following i
* Merth Aaeriean latelllgeciae operatives •- two of «hon are
aamed •- Xandy Capistar and Je« Jaearlae worked who
out of tha vs aabassy helped to train, advise* aae and e^uip
the a-) Ouetenalas Anv infcalllgeace unit.
* The artlele identifies three r«esnt 0-2 directors who were
paid by the V8i Oe&eral Bdgar Oodoy Saltan, linked to the
assasalnatiea of a fasous Ouataaalan anthropologiaty Oenersl
Otto Perea Molina, whose aea were ixsgplioated la the aurder of
a judge; and Col. Vraaolaeo Ortega Xanaldo who headed the 0-3
during a series of assaaalnatlons of students, peasants and
huaaa rights aotlvists. Ortega Kastalde is earr«atXy based in
Washington, O.C. at the v«itagaa-haofc»d Xater-Aasrlean Defense
Board
KMV Olftl • DavM Unwr^lM ttawMay « Kwr YMk-Mw Vmk lOOia . iMptmi* m MO tOOO, Fix 21 S 940 S1«1
119
• remsT Ouattaalan D*£*it«« Nlnisttir and ourraat praglda&t«l
a«ndld«t« l*cter Oraakjo, r«s and »up«nrls«d 0-2 «b«tt •zaiy
•V«ata kida«pp«4/ rap*d and tortar*d ApMrlean «im Dluma Ortls
durlntf • ••xi«B e£ •■cuiainatlon.a of ■tad«Bt«« p««Mnta, axtd
human vlghta aotiriata. •• va* alao on th« payroll of fcha CXX*
• VoxBar Arohlye CUaf, Qanaral Bobarta Matta Oalvacr '•'bo
oosnaadad aMataoraa ta tha 11 Quioha dapasaaati «aa alao cm
tlia payroll oC tha CXK.
• Thraa fermar OuataaaXaa baada ot acata paint a conalatant
piatuTM of CUk ralatlona with 0-3. Oaear Ivaibareo Kajla
Vletovaa told iralxn of tba OXA rola la £oiindisa tha daath
aqoada and la i^prenrtao aaaaaoraa and oasrylna ovt
aaaaaainationa. rermav Praaidanfei Bfxain mioa lioatt and
ol-riliaa vraaidaat Vlniole Caxaao dlaouaaad i:ha praaa&oa of
tha CZX ia 0-a.
• la a Marah asth iatarvlaw with M&lra, Col. Japiraa apeka at
langth en tha eleaa aoopaaatlpn and aaalatanea taa OIX gava O-
a laeludina training, advioa, pelltioal atratagy/ and
taehaical aaalatanoa.
• Zadapaadaatly Vaim haa dlaaovarad that 0-a tfaa paid and
■raparvlaad la tha If 10' a by cix atatloa ehlaf, JAofc xaCavitt
and that tba taobnleal aaalafeaaoa allndad to fay Alplres
inoludad eooputar and ecaaninlaationa aqoipBoat, apooial
waapoaa and tha axtanaWa uaa q£ CIX ballooptara.
Award-winning joumaliac Allan ITaim, haa wrlttan axtanelvaly
en Quatamala and ice military since 1980. Laat fall in tha Nation
ha broka the etory on U.S. intallisrenoe oolloboratlon with Haiti's
FRAPK. For inberviaws and furthar information and interviews with
Nairn pleaaa contact David Lamer at Klptida Comrainications , Xno.
or Jonathan Taylor at the Nation Magazine, (312) 342-8400 or (212)
343-8130
-30-
120
April 17.1995
Tbe NatJoQ since 3865.
CONTENTS.
Volume 260, Number IS
EXCHANGE
510 O*orf Kountowis
MlcMangdo Slgnorik, Greg ScoU
Qabriti RoltOo, Lawmtu D. Mast, MIX
Jay Blotcher, David L Kirp
EDrrORlALS
S09 RaUytni to Education
311 C.LA. Death Squad Allan Naim
513 Silent Radun Valtrit Burgher
514- CllBtonACa:CaIlloftbeWUd DavUCcm
ARTICLES
517 PDhtic] for Profit:
Tlie Rich Rite of Lamar Aioander Doug Inland
522 Mrs. Contempladon's Sliten:
Tlie Philippines' Shameful Export Ninolchka Rosea
327 The Vforld lUnu Away:
Who Caia Who's Killing Chechnya? Anna Cataktt
COLUMNS
314 The Bigs
515 Beat the Devil
Calvin THJiin
Alaxandtr Cockburn
BOOKS & THE ARTS
531 The Sound and the Fuiet
S34 Blacic Dance: Revdaiioas
539 Music Note
540 First Formal (poem)
lUnstnUions by Paul Maicus
Daniel Singer
Lynn Oamjbia
OeneSanlon
Sharon Oldt
EdUot, Katrfau vudcs Hcuvtl
ExKalivtBdtar, Wdari I Ininnin; AaoclanEdiien,iM»ftiBia,ttiia
ShVliei Kfldh L. StftTi tOn^filiiarr, ElM Dbda Alt WlulOTr, A«lr7
£tf «ar. Once SdtVLkauE Mtufftt Aflnr. JoAai «)rpiievitt Copit CM,
IsoM Cnv, Coiv UUtt, Addi \jm^ Aatttam Copf tUtaf, BDOy
Ooidac itsMo/ *> A» Sflnr. tkuli Sdw: ilianc, M*ni Ab -
Bo«r, ladaBia nscau. aMBoe neb. Lawmicc 1j<1 Erie ^
UanSbeq.
ikpstnora: /4nMMctm. luc Hofei bgr: /4rt. Ankar C.Itacat n>iM,
Jata Uonl: /itai. Souk UmaK Mbv, BMul W. SiM. OBsaBXCnc
Wwt^ Uwit Ooic; 7h««; Tteut M. Udc JWHiic MaKntM,
Ikro Omalriii; Sauton Afike, Mat Oevioo. Caifontlom. loiiai
Akapikr Codttm <Am( ik» Crvtf), Chrioaplur HUdMW (MInffv
too/rt, Ai>rik Nd« (MtaURf it<|Al4. Ktlht ftiUin (Siiltto m CMMt,
BlKM SorL CiMb IVakE QiRrrftel<«f Sdtora: Luda AsnmAta, u
BM. Otant Blact, Kobcn I. Bcnogc SopbcD P. Cotok Mate Coara;
MJka Divta, aUMBika DnkaU, Tbooui Feiiaion. I}ouf HenwDOd, Mn
HctaKi Moib lv<iB, iod Rsni, Urt^iUifelE 3ak, KoMn Sclwi. Henou
Scfaniti. Aa^cw I_ a^ra. Bd Solocirar, Con vtdal, ta> WicMi; Aov
t/itau, PlOioia WUUbek £dUwM Anvrf: Nannn Btnibuat, RleftiM
Mk. fttaos Fhi(]«tld, PWUp OncD, Rmlill bootdr. E&u Lu^aer,
□etieab W. MeiK IW Mantua, BliAaii) FMic Mictiid AnKlvk, Blo-
bafa Ttoctodi, NeB ftaCBU, Mnnta RMkla. D»U Mil; laao- wouai.
£Ubsr « lajf . Rldinl Nkk.
iMBoenlM: AddHM B 'Tte Educ" Noi inooAk fcrtta ranifflof SB.
bjr MdRSMl* KUBpcd caMtopM-
Doc b( ackaowlalacd goMB icecpud.
PutBalur Bitd SdliofUU Dinaar, Victor Navasl;
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EDITORIALS.
GLA. Death Squad
The VS. govenimeni hai systematic links to Ouate-
raelan Army death squad opetalions that (o far
boned the dliclosures thai have lecenily jhaksi of-
ficial Wksblngion. The news that the CIA. em-
ployed a Quatenialan colonel who repoitedly ordered two
murders has been greeted with profesiloni of sbodc and oat-
rage. But in fact the story goes much deeper, as UJS. offidais
well know.
North American C.I. A. operatives work inside a Ouaiema-
lan Army unit that iruintainf a network of torture noters and
has kfiled thousands of Ouatemalan civilians. The G-2, bead-
quanered on the fourth floor of the Ouateinalan National
Palace, has, snce at least the I9fi0s, been advised, tiained.
aimed and equipped by U.S. ondercover agents. Working out
of the U.S. Embassy and Uviflg in saiebouses and hotels, these
agents work through an elite group of Guatemalan ofTioen
who are secretly paid by the CI A. and who have been implicat-
ed personally in numerous pohtkal crimes and assassinatioos.
This seciet G-2/C.LA. collaboration has been described by
Guatemalan and U.S. operatives and confirmed, in various
aspects, by three former Guatemalan heads of state. These
accounts also mesh with that given In a March 28 interview
by CoL Julio Roberto Alptrez. the C.lA.-paid Guatemalan
G-2 officer who has been im|)licated in the muiden of Gua-
temalan guerrilla lader Efialn Bimaca VeUsquei and a U.S.
dtlMn, Michael DeVlae.
One of the American agents who works with the G-2, a thin
blond man in his 40s who goes by the name of Randy Capistei, i
has been involved in limilaT operations wbh the army of
121
312
The Nation.
April 17, 1995
ndghboiing El Salvador. Another, a weaponi enpen known
M Joe Jacarino. hat openled ihrougbout (he Caribbean, ami
has accompanied G-2 uniu on miuiODs Into niral zones.
Jacarino't presence in the embeuy was conflmed by David
Wright, a former embassy intelligence employee who called
Jacarino a "military liaison." Col. George Hooker, the V£.
Defense Intelligeoce Agency chief in Ouatemtla from 198S
to 1989, says he also knew Jacarino, though heaays Jacarino
waa not with the D.I.A. When asked whether Jacarino was
with the C.I.A. he replied, "I'm not at litierty to say."
CeleriDO Castillo, a former agent for the Dnig Enforcemem
AdniniitralioD who dealt with the G-2 and the CXA. In Gua-
lonala, ttys he vrorked with Caplster as weD as with Jacaiina
He showed photographs of himself and Capister at cmbauy
evoua and hi the Tieid. Ouaiemalan sounds cay Capisur meett
regularly with Guatemalan Army chiefs. He has beea seen in
meetings in Coaiemala City as recently as the spring of 1994.
When I reached Colonel Alpfrez at the La Aurora base in
Guatemala, he denied an involvement in the deaths of BAaa-
c« and D^ine and said he was never paid by the C.I.A. Bnt
be dbciissed at length how the agency advises and helps nm
the 0-2. He praised the CIA. for "professionalism" and
dose rapport with Guatemalan onieers. He said that agency
operatrve: often come to Guatemala on temporary duty, dur-
ing which thty train G-2 men and pnjvide "adviw and tech-
STRONGMAN ON CAMPUS
Ci«dh Democntlc Representative Robert 1brTic«Ui
for aisckeing the latest CIA. horror story: An
American hotelier and a Ouatemalaa rebel leadetinar-
ried to a£ Atnaiian were ecectited on the orden of a
paid asset of the ageitcy. \b in his letter to the White
House deoyfaig the C.LA., Torrieelli ovnlookai a key
aspect of the q>i8ode— the tsurtleroiu cdond, Julio Ro-
berto Alpiiez, was twice a student ai the US. Aim/s
School of the Americas. There ia good reason for the
CoQgietsman to be forgetful on tliis point. In Septem-
bo- 1993 , wboi Rcpresentabve Joseph Kennedy 2d pro-
posed an amendment to defund the SX3A., Torrieeili,
then chairman of the Western HeDu^heresubcommii-
tee, was a prime onMnem of the measure Kennedy
argued that the school too often had trained thugs, ith
eluding the head of an Argentine Jimta, an organizer
of SalvBdoran death acguadi and Mamul Noriega. But
IbmceUl hailed the institntion and actnally profened
a Guatemalan ofTicer as a good eumple: This promi-
nent alnmaus of the Khool had declined to join a coi^)
hi Guatemala earlier In the yeat Torrieelli did not meo-
tioB that the three offlcei« most Identified with that
coup had also prepped at the School of the Americas.
Coiudder tUs, Congnascian: Six months after Alplrez
finished hia aecood stint at the school — whl:± includ-
ed sevoal houn of tiaining in huaon rights— tiiis
CJ A. and SjDA. man in Guatemala reportedly had an
American Idlled. David Corn
oical assistance" He described attending C.LA. sessions at
G-2 bases on "contta-subversion" tactics and "how to man-
age the factors of power" to " fortify democracy." He said the
C.I.A. men were on call to respond to 0-2 que3dons,.and that
the 0-2 often consulted the agency on how to deal with "po-
litical problems." Alpiiez said he was not authorized to give
specifics on tlie technical assistance, nor would he name the
North Americans the G-2 worked with, though he said they
were "very good friends."
Other officials, though, say that at least during the mid-
1980s G-2 officers were paid by Jack McCavitt, then CJA.
station chief, and that the "technical assistance" Indndea
comsuinicaaons gear; computers and spetaal firearms, as wen
as collaborative use of C.lA.-owned helicopters that are
flown out of the Piper hangar at the La Aurora dvihan air-
port and from a separate U.S. air facility.
Through what Amnesty International has called "a gov-
eniment program of political muidec" the Guatemalan Army
has. since 197J. killed more than 110,000 civilians. The 0-2
and a smallo, affiliated unit called ttK Aichivo have long been
openly known in Guatemala as the brain of the terns' tote.
With a contingem of more than 2,000 agents and with sub-
units in the local army bases, the G-2— under orders of the
army high commaixl — coordinates the uxture, assaasinailOQ
and ditiu>peaiance of disiidents.
"If the G-2 wants to kill you, they kill you," former atmy
Chief of Staff Gen. Benedicto Lucas Oaida once said. "TlKy
send one of their trucks with a bit squad and that 'I it." Cur-
rent and former C-2 agents desciibe a piogiam of stuvciDinoB
backed by a web of torture cemen and dandesdiM body
dumps. In 198£, then-anny Oiief of Stiff Gen. Hictor Ora-
majo Morales, a VS piatift, said that the G-2 malntafaii fUei
on and watches "anyone who Is an opponoit of the Guate-
malan state in any realm." A former Gb-2 agent says tliat the
base he worked at in Huefaactenango maintained Its own cie-
matorium aod "pcocesaod" abduaees by chopping off limbs,
singeing flesh and administering electric shocks.
At lea^t three of the recent G-2 cUefi have been paid by the
CI.A., accoiding to US. and Guatemalan intelligence souicea.
One of them. Gen. Edgar Godoy Galtin, a farmer army Chief
of Staff, has been accused in court by the vkaim's family of
being one of the prime "intellectual authors" of the 1990
murder of the noted Ouatanalan anthropologist Mynia Mack
Chang [see Victor Peroa, " Wbeie Is Justice in GiattemaU?"
May 24, 1993). Another, CoL Ouo Perez Molina, who now
runs the Presidential General Staff and ovenees the ArcUvo,
was in charge hi 1994, when, according to the Archbishop's
human rights office, there ivas evidence of General Staff ic-
voivemeu in tlie assassination of Jutige Edgar Ramiro Bias
Ogaldez. The ihiid. Gen. Francisco Ortega Menoido, who
now works in Vi^hinflon as general staff director at the Pen-
ugoo-backed Inier-Anerican Defense Board, was G-2 chief
in the late 1980s during a series of assassinaiions of students,
fieasantt and human righu aetivisu. Reached at his hotne In
Florida, Jack McCavin said he does not talk to journalists.
Whoi asked whether Ortega Menaldo was on the CIA, pay.
roll, be shouted "Enoughl" and slammed down the phone.
122
April 17. ms
TbeNiatkn.
TtMK crimei are merely eomplei or a vin, syncnadc p«t-
tern; UkEwlK; these BMS are Mily cop In a large U^ govern'
ment appiiatni. CoIomI Hooker, the fonna- Dtl jV chief for
Ouateaalo, toys, "It would b« in Mttbarraismg tituatioa if
you evg had aroU can of everybody in the ChiafrmalmAniiy
who wer ooOected a CIA. {wycbecfc." Hooker ays the agency
payroll it 10 large that it encompases most of the anDy** top
dedsiao-oukcn. WhcD I told him that bb (Hcsd, Ces. Mario
Eoiitpiez Morale*, the current DeCoise Miioster, had reaaed
to the Alpirez scandal by laying pubUdy that it wai "dbloyal"
and 'Shameful" for officer) to take CIA. money, Hooker
burit out laughing and egdalmed: "OoodI Good anivvi;
MaiioH'd haie to think how maoy guyi wot on that pqtoU.
It'i a perfectly normal thing."
Other top commandet* paid by the C LA. iodude OcD. Ro-
berto MattaOaKez, former army Chief of Staff, head of the
Presidential General Staff and commander of massacres in
the EI Qmcfa^ departinem: and General Gramaio. Defense
Minister during tlM aimed forces' abduction, rape and torture
of Diaona Oitiz, an American nun. (Sister Ortli has testified
that a man the believes to be North American seemtd jp be
theTOgviaof of the ayn'f »*? i!?^"^t<1 ***• c^'«nt^*aiA
sheliMtasiainedheT 111 bum woimds during a 'Oesbian love
tty»t.'*)OiaBnjo ahonwnagwi the early 1960i highland mat-
tacfcs. Colottd Hooker sayi h« ooce bronght Giami^ 00 a
ten-day toor of the United States to speak at VS. onlitary >
bases and eoofcr vlth the US. Army Chief of Staff.
Three recent Ouaicmabn heads of state confirm that the
CIA. works doiely with the G-2. Last year, when I asked
Om. Oscar Hnmberto Mgia Vfctores (military dictator from
1^ to 1966) how the country's death squads had originaed,
»1ie saki they had been started "in the IWh tttihftCXA.^'Oen.
iiuamKloiMoatt(<llctaior from ]9€2 to 1983 and the ouneni
Coogiess Piesideat), who ordered the main biebland massa-
aea (6fi2 villages dettroyvd, by the army's owrt coum), said
tlK CI A. <8d have agents inside the 0-2. When I asked Rios
Montt— a fl^ believer hi the death penatty— if he thought
ht should be aiwaittrt for his role in the ilaugfaier be leapt
to his feet and shoottd "Yeil Tty mel Put me againsi the
walll" but he said he should be tried only If Americans woe
trted too. Spedflcally, he died President Reagan, who, in the
midst of the massacres, embiaoed iUos Moott and said be vias
getting "^ bum r^oo human tights. VnadoCertaoAr^valo,
dvilian Presideot from 19**"? 1??) (""il**^ whom the rate of
killing actually increased), said "theCIA. often eootiacts
with our milttary and G-2 people," and that ftom what he
knew they "very probably" had people inside "who have par-
tidpatcd with our 0-2 in technical aul«t«Tii-.» and advice"
These C.I.A. opetatioos are^ of course, pan of the larger
US. policy. The Buth and Clinton State Deportments, for
example. In the midst of ■ mudt-toated "cutofT' of miliiary
aid to Ouatemala after 1990, authorized — according to
dagtfkd State Department records— oMfe than 114 tepaiate
saio of U.5. pistou and rtlTea. .
The kilfing of defenaeless people has been state policy in
Ouatemala (or thirty jcan. The question Is not whriher the
VS govamment has known— it Is obviously awaie of hs own
actions. It is why, with overt and covert aid, it has bdped
commit the army's murden. Allan Kairn
Allan Nairn has written txwulvely on Ouatemala and ia
military ana 1980. Last fall In The Nadon he broke the Story
(4 VS. inielUgtrKt coUaborntion with Haiti's FRAPH
SUent Racism
ID Fdiruary student activists at Rutgers University gave
America their own version of a comparative history
Iojod: Racism Then and Now. In protesting a racist
statement by university president Frands Lawitnca, the
United Students Coalition at Rutgers brought the difficulties
of avU rights activism in the I990i to the national stage:
Rutgers students woe seriously laddng in boaography: They
had DO visual representation of their oppresskin— no fire
hoses, police dogs or billy clubs— for tbe front pages and
nightly news. The Rutgen coalition had only Lawrence's in-
fbunmaiory words — be called Afhcan-Americans a disadvan-
taged population because of their genetic and hereditary
background. Since mstitutional racism is not easily photo-
graphed, tbe difficulty for activists whose causes are lacc-
based becomes how to combat the "nuaspolzn" word.
Otis RoOey. one of the heads of the student coalition's pub-
he relations committee; used tbe fanaget of protests past to
guide the coalitkm. although he was fully aware that times
have dianged. Before embarking on the campaign against
Lawrence, RoUey and other students referred to Rkfaard Mi>
Cormidc's The Black Student Protest Mmement at Rutters,
an account of campus activism a generation ago. The stu-
dents' knowledge of this history and their understanding of
past tactics helped them turn what could have tieea a passing
murmur into a roll-scale movemeot. But the comparison re-
vealed the differences between the adivism of yesterday and
today. "Ba£k then tbetv was such blatant tadsm: 'Vbu're black
and I don't want you at school,' " RoUeyieflects. "Nowevery-
ttnng is so much mote covert that when you cry out, people
say, 'What are you talking about? It's a great school, kid.' "
But at universities Hke Rutgen, young people of cok3T con-
tinue to face shrouded but sipilficam ittcisin— the su^idous
glance, the continual requests for identification not made of
wliite students, the assumptions of (kvtnitisffl due to quotas.
Only rarely cb woids sur&ce as a blunt reminder that the play-
ing field ii still slaiued Around the Rutgers campus, RoUey
says, "some people ycQ 'nigga' from a car but they don't stick
around. The artaclcs are always cowardly."
As cowardly, perhaps, as Lawrence's attempts to hide be-
hind his "good" record on race relations. In the 19S0t Rnt-
gers failed to meet the most basic afTuroaiivc acdoa goals for
the cniolbnem of minority students. In response, the Rutgers
Board of Governors aeated a MltKrity Community Leaden
Advisory Board. LawretKC disbanded the board as soon as
minimum minority enrollment levels were met. And despite
the media's focus on Lavnenca, tbe nudents' demands go far
be^nd removing hire as president— to nothing less than a de-
mand for full liqual oppommity, inchidbig minority tenure
123
Senator Cohen. Second, I would like to say to the acting director,
number one, I know a number of people have called for the aboli-
tion of the CIA. I am not one of them. I think we need a strong
CIA, and I've been a very strong supporter of maintaining the very
highest level of capability within the Agency itself. And as Senator
Shelby has indicated, the Agency has some of the brightest people
in this country and the most dedicated and hard working. In fact,
as I look around the room, without getting too specific since I can't
identify any of them, as I look around the room I recognize many
faces in the audience today that I work closely with, this Commit-
tee works closely with, and they are truly dedicated public serv-
ants. And I would not want the message to go forth that they are
in any way acting in contrast to the interests of this country or the
principles that we adhere to.
I also want to point out that you have been an outstanding naval
officer, you've been an outstanding director of NSA, and I would
say outstanding acting director of the CIA. Much of what I have
raised did not happen on your watch. As a matter of fact, I was
surprised to learn that you were apprised only this morning of an
area of interest to me, namely, a report that is required to be sub-
mitted on a semi-annual basis concerning human rights. In no way
can you really be required to know each and every report that is
issued, particularly since all of this occurred prior to your serving
as acting director. So I wanted to make this very clear that this
in no way was — my comments were directed toward you.
My concern has been that in the past we used to have a mental-
ity that if you asked the wrong question of the Agency you never
got the right answer. If you asked the right question you got only
half the right answer. That changed under Bill Webster, it changed
under Bob Gates, and it has changed under you. But nonetheless,
there are still some — and I suspect that those who were responsible
for the report given to this Committee are no longer with the Agen-
cy, in terms of the language that was supplied and the answers
that were supplied to the Committee are no longer with the Agen-
cy. That, too, is somewhat regrettable. We'd like to have them be-
fore the Committee to examine them. To come back to the point
that I think it's important that we take down any wall of distrust
that may be erected between the Agency or State Department, any
of our agencies and Congress itself. If that wall of distrust is al-
lowed to remain in any form, then we're going to have conflict in
the future, you're going to have more calls for the dismantling of
the Agency. And that's not going to serve the overall interests of
this country. So I wanted to make it clear that none of my com-
ments were directed to you. I suspect that you are only familiariz-
ing yourself in recent days and hours with much of the information
that's been furnished to this Committee. So I wanted to make that
clear to both the Chairman and the Vice Chairman. I do want to
reiterate, however, that I believe that the information furnished to
this Committee was misleading. Whether you call it misleading,
leading to the deception — deliberate deception or inadvertent, it
nonetheless diverted this Committee from pursuing its responsibil-
ities. And that cannot be allowed to continue in the future.
So Mr. Chairman, I will not pursue the questions I want to ask.
I'll save them for the closed session, and once again reiterate the
124
problem that we have here by going from pubUc to closed informa-
tion that is stated openly and then perhaps clarified in classified
sessions. It's going to present a somewhat fragmented and perhaps
even ultimately misleading picture to the American people. But
nonetheless I wanted to clarify the issue with respect to Admiral
Studeman. He has been an outstanding public servant.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Cohen.
I think you have well stated the importance of the CIA and the
fact that there are many hard-working competent men and women
working in the CIA performing a very, very vital function. And
Senator Cohen accurately characterized your contribution. Admiral
Studeman, in your career generally and as acting director of the
CIA.
We will be looking at the deaths of the Americans in Guatemala,
including those of Nick Blake and Griffin Davis, and I believe we
have in the hearing room today Randy Blake and Sam Blake, the
brothers of Nick Blake, and I wanted to recognize them and to give
them the formal assurance that there will be inquiries made into
that matter as well.
It is now 1 o'clock, and we will recess these hearings to recon-
vene at 2 p.m.
Thank you.
[Thereupon, at 1 p.m., the Committee stood in recess, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m. that same day.]
AFTERNOON SESSION
[2:08 P.M.]
Chairman Specter. The hearing will resume, ladies and gentle-
men, and we will — we now have with us Mrs. DeVine, Ms. Harbury
and Colonel Cornell. And at the outset, may I say to Mrs. DeVine
and Ms. Harbury, on behalf of the Committee, really the Senate,
and beyond that, how deeply troubled we all are with what has
happened here, with the murder of Mr. Michael DeVine and the
murder of Commander Efrain Bamaca and how we are determined
to get to the bottom of it.
Today's hearing is just the beginning in terms of what this Com-
mittee will be doing, and there are many investigations which have
already been announced. And it was the sense of the Committee
that we should not wait but should proceed at an early moment
and that what you have to say, Mrs. DeVine, and what you have
to say, Ms. Harbury, ought to be said officially and on the record.
There has already been enormous publicity, and you Ms. Harbury
have been interviewed very, very extensively, but we thought that
it ought to be a matter that the Committee would show its official
response to.
And regrettably we cannot, could not this morning as you saw,
go into all aspects of all questions as we would have liked to. And
there's never total agreement among any group of Senators as to
exactly how to proceed and there was some sentiment, as you
heard, that we might have been better advised not to have a public
hearing, and our conclusion was that we should have done it, and
I think we did have much important evidence come out this morn-
ing. Already a concession from the acting director of CIA, Admiral
Studeman, about errors that the CIA acknowledges in not giving
timely notice to this Committee. And we've already had beginning
testimony from the Department of Justice, characterizing a four-
month lag as appropriate, which you heard one Senator, Senator
DeWine, comment about. Senator DeWine's an ex-prosecuting at-
torney, as am I, as is Senator Cohen. And that kind of a time lag
on a matter of this sensitivity ought not to be tolerated.
So we've already had a substantial amount to say by way of criti-
cal comment, which needs to be understood. And of course it has
to be understood in the broader context of our need for intelligence
gathering and our effort to try to provide leadership and try to pro-
vide new direction for the Central Intelligence Agency, which is an
ongoing matter. We have a new nominee where we'll be having
hearings immediately after the recess. But we felt it important to
proceed at this time.
And as soon as we finish this session we're going to be going into
closed session with Admiral Studeman, and you can be sure that
he'll have some very, very tough questioning in closed session. And
(125)
126
in order to protect sources and methods and make sure we don't
impinge upon important intelligence-gathering operations, we sim-
ply could not do that in open session. But you ought to understand
fully and explicitly that our decision not to proceed in open session
does not reflect in any way on our determination to ask the tough
questions and to get the answers and to get to the bottom of it.
So with that brief preliminary, let us turn to you, Mrs. Carol
DeVine, and again, on behalf of the Committee and the Senate,
really the Congress and beyond, we express our sjrmpathy and we'll
do everything we can to see that justice is done here.
Senator Kerrey, would you like to make an additional comment?
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Just briefly. There was a great deal of
interest in the first panel and for obvious reasons; I mean, there
was an expectation of fireworks and so forth. And I will say to you
that, for my part, my standpoint, this panel could be an awful lot
more important. As was noted earlier, some of us set policy and
some of us carry out policy. The four of us here are in the business
of setting policy, trying to figure out, you know, specifically, what
should our policy be in Guatemala, what should we be doing.
And I note with considerable interest that in this panel we have,
in you, Mrs. DeVine, an individual who despite the tragedy contin-
ues to live in Guatemala, and there must be a reason for that. And
you must have ideas on what can be done to end this cycle of terror
and violence that has caused Guatemala such suffering.
And in you. Colonel Cornell, we've got someone who's spent a lot
of time on the ground, who understands the military, I presume,
understands what's going on in the country, and perhaps as well
can give us some clues on what we should do from this moment for-
ward.
And Ms. Harbury has experience with enough, it seems to me,
that perhaps she can give us some clues on what we need to do to
achieve reconciliation and peace in this country.
So, I appreciate very much, in spite of the difficulty, your coming
before this Committee, and I look forward to hearing your testi-
mony and asking some questions that might help me, one policy-
maker, decide what this nation ought to be doing, both in and for
Guatemala.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Senator Kerrey.
And Mrs. DeVine, we look forward to your testimony. You may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF CAROLE ANN DEVINE
Mrs. DeVine. Thank you. My name is Carole Ann DeVine. I am
the widow of Michael Vernon DeVine. I am a permanent resident
in the rain forest of Poptun, Peten, Republic of Guatemala in
Central America. I have been asked by the Committee to come here
and bear witness to facts surrounding the death of my husband.
Let me say, at the outset, I am not an orator, I am not a public
speaker or a public person. I am not a student of the CIA or intel-
ligence agencies. I am not familiar with sources or methods. But
it is important that this Committee hear what I have to say.
Twenty-four years ago my husband and I emigrated to Guate-
mala, where we began a farm called Ixobel. As the years went by,
we developed part of it as a campground and a guest house. Over
127
the years many people have come and visited us and we have
friends around the world. My husband and I loved Guatemala from
the very first. We were very grateful to the people and government
of Guatemala for giving us the opportunity to live and work and
raise our children in that beautiful country. And I today continue
to be grateful.
Concerning the death of my husband, I can tell you that on June
8, 1990, Michael and I started a very normal day at our farm. That
morning I went to our small cafeteria in the town of Poptun to at-
tend to business. Michael was taking care of some minor repairs
on our gas stove at the farm, and late in the morning he went into
town on his bicycle to get a part. He stopped by the cafeteria
around 1 p.m. and we had lunch together. Just before 3 p.m. Mi-
chael was preparing to return to the farm and I asked him to take
the van back home with some of the supplies that we needed on
the farm and that I would bring his bicycle in our pickup truck.
Michael kissed me goodbye and left. That was the last time I ever
saw him alive.
I now know that Michael was intercepted on his way back to the
farm, just after turning off the main road onto the farm road. He
was abducted by armed men using a white Toyota stout pick-up
truck and subsequently taken to a place called Montana Rusa lo-
cated less than a mile and a half from the farm entrance.
Based upon the facts discovered during the investigation and
subsequent trial, we know that Michael was murdered with a ma-
chete that his murderers used to nearly decapitate him. We do not,
however, to this date know why my husband was executed, nor do
we know who caused his death.
Michael was a gentle, kind, clean-living, nature-loving, law-abid-
ing man. He was a good father to our two adopted children. He was
a responsible and well-liked member of the Poptun community. To
my knowledge, he had no enemies — his death is inexplicable. I was
proud to be his wife and continue to be proud of his memory. Mi-
chael DeVine did not deserve to die.
For the past five years I have devoted my life to try to determine
why this good man died. I sponsored an investigation into the
crime and used all legal processes available to me in Guatemala.
I hired a private investigator as well as an attorney in an attempt
to prosecute my husband's assassins. This effort met with a meas-
ure of success when in September 1992 six soldiers were convicted
for the murder of my husband. In September — no, excuse me, in
March 1993, a captain of the Guatemalan army was also convicted.
Each of the six soldiers were sentenced to 30 years in prison. Two
of the soldiers were implicated but never brought to trial, even
though there are outstanding arrest warrants against them. Even
this limited success represents a significant milestone for justice in
Guatemala. For the first time in Guatemalan history, an officer of
the Guatemalan military was convicted in a human rights case.
The captain was sentenced to 20 years. But it was a limited suc-
cess because he was permitted to escape as he was being held in
a military installation. Rumors abound concerning his where-
abouts. What is certain, though, is that he is not in prison. He has
not served any penalty for having killed my husband. There is no
effort by the Guatemalan government to apprehend him. It would
128
be unfair of me not to mention the fact that the military tribunal
that saw the case did, in fact, convict seven of the people who were
involved in the death of my husband, all of whom were members
of the army. To those members of the military-judicial system who
had the courage to see this case through, I must express my admi-
ration and respect. It is important for this Committee to keep in
mind that there are people in Guatemala who want badly to see
justice take root in their country and have been willing to risk and
suffer a great deal in order to make that a reality.
The history of this case is proof of the risk inherent in the pur-
suit of justice. Let me give you a few examples. My lawyer was run
off the road and nearly killed three days prior to trial. Witnesses
were regularly threatened. Relatives of witnesses were killed. And
evidence was manipulated. The embassy's reports and the public
record of the trial make clear that enormous irregularities occurred
in connection with the judicial proceedings in Guatemala.
I also wish to express my profound appreciation for all the in-
valuable support, both moral and beyond, that we received from
the U.S. Embassy in Guatemala, under the most able leadership of
former Ambassador Thomas Stroock as well as the former consul
general Sue Patterson, Colonel Al Cornell, and the rest of the staff
that was in the country at the time of my husband's death. That
same level of support continues today under Ambassador Marilyn
McAfee and consul general Charles Keil — a fact for which I am
most grateful.
Obviously, my deepest sense of gratitude and respect also goes
out to the legal and investigative team that worked tirelessly, and
very especially to those wonderful Guatemalan citizens who, not-
withstanding the obvious dangers they had to face, served as truth-
ful witnesses.
Why am I here today? Due to recent news accounts, I have been
made aware of allegations concerning the possible involvement of
the Central Intelligence Agency and/or a Guatemalan army officer
who, while on the CIA payroll, may have been involved in the
death of my husband. I do not know all the facts concerning these
allegations. But I am certain that the truth has not been fully iden-
tified.
When I return to Guatemala, I will as appropriate pursue this
to the full extent possible under the Guatemalan justice system.
However, I do not wish to be alone in this pursuit. I want to leave
here confident that I will continue to have the support of this Com-
mittee as I try to find the truth of my husband's death in Guate-
mala.
There is also the profound issue of the role of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. It is for this Committee to investigate and evaluate
the conduct of the CIA. I hope that this Committee will discharge
its function and fully follow all inquiries so that the truth emerges.
I now come to the end of my statement. In doing so, I have a
deep sense of inadequacy. No person could communicate in the fev/
minutes we have here today the depth of my loss or my children's
loss or the powerful emotions that we feel. Michael was the verj'
best thing that ever happened to me and I have lost him need-
lessly.
129
Before I stop, though, I want to leave you with a picture of my
husband. This picture was taken just a few days before he died. I
do this to remind you that there is a human being who has lost
his life here. This is not some abstraction or some Committee foot-
note that you're dealing with. A good man died and the truth must
be pursued.
Thank you.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Mrs. DeVine. We un-
derstand that it is a difficult matter for you to appear here and to
testify. And when you asked to be able to leave here confident that
the Committee will support you fully, on behalf of the Committee
I give you that assurance, that we will support you. Let us turn
now to Colonel Allen C. Cornell, who was the U.S. defense attache
in Guatemala from 1989 to 1994 and had important participation
in these events. And we now invite your testimony. Colonel
Cornell.
[The prepared statement of Col. Cornell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Allen C. Cornell
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, Committee members, I am
Al Cornell, a soldier who retired as a colonel from the U.S. Army with 30 years ac-
tive service. I spent 13 years of my military career in Latin America — nine of those
as a Defense Attache — with my final assignment being that of Defense and Army
Attache to Guatemala from September 1989 to January 1994.
During my 4^2 years in Guatemala, U.S. Government policies toward Guatemala
can be characterized as revolving around the four "D's": Democracy, Development,
Drugs, and "Derechos Humanos,' or human rights in Spanish. The issue of human
rights was clearly foremost in the minds of the three chiefs-of-mission during my
tenure — Ambassador Tom Stroock from October 1989 to November 1992, Charge
d'Affaires John Keene from November 1992 to June 1993, and Ambassador Marilyn
McAfee who has been our Chief-of-Mission from June 1993 to the present.
It is my belief that human rights was foremost in the minds of every member of
these three country teams. The feeUng among us was: how could there be continuing
movement toward democracy and development without a corresponding increase in
respect for human rights? Thus, human rights always enjoyed the highest priority
within the U.S. Embassy.
At this time I would like to provide you with some information and then answer
any questions you may have. In addition to the Devine case, which you have invited
me to address, 1 am also willing to discuss the hvunan rights case of Guatemalan
guerrilla leader Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, which I also understand is of interest to
you. But, my knowledge with regard to this case is rather limited because it arose
during the closing months of my time in Guatemala. I did, however, attend at least
three meetings — all of them between Ambassador McAfee and Guatemala's Minister
of Defense during which information regarding the fate of Mr. Bamaca was sought,
and our concern expressed over the accusation that the Guatemalan Army might
be operating clandestine jails. During those meetings, the Minister of Defense
cleiimed to have no knowledge of Mr. Bamaca's status nor the existence of such hid-
den detention facilities.
At this point it would be most useful for me to recall some events related to the
Devine case during my tenure.
8 June 1990: Mr. Michael Devine is found murdered near his tourist farm in
Poptun, Peten Department.
18 July 1990: Defense Attache and Naval Attache visit the headquarters of the
Guatemalan Army's military command for the Peten, located in Santa Elena and
known as Military Zone 23, and also visit the Kaibil (Ranger) training base in
Poptun. Both commanders, Colonel Mario Garcia Catalan of the military zone and
then-LTC Julio Alpirez of Poptun, claim no knowledge, characterizing the crime as
a police matter.
Aug-Sep 1990: A private investigator hired by Mrs. Carol Devine develops names
of possible Guatemalan Army suspects.
Sep 1990: Ambassador Stroock gives these names to Minister of Defense, Greneral
Bolanos, asking for action, and five enlisted men are detained. The Minister prom-
ises progress.
130
Mid-Dec 1990: Despite continued urging of Guatemalan authorities, no progress
has been made. Ambassador Stroock recommends to the Department of State that
a suspension of US military assistance be imposed.
21 Dec 1990: The Department of State announces the suspension of all materiel
assistance, to include acquisitions already in the pipeline and cash sales.
14 Jan 1991: The newly elected Guatemalan president, Jorge Serrano, assumes
office and appoints a new Minister of Defense and a new Army Chief
31 Jan 1991: Ambassador Stroock tells President Serrano there can be no resump-
tion of military aid without progress in human rights, to include the Devine case.
Feb 1991: The five deteiined Guatemalan enlisted men decide to talk and impli-
cate another group of enlisted men and an Army captain in Mr. Devine's murder.
The second group of enlisted men are detained, but the military court decides not
to detain the Captain, Hugo Contreras.
7 Aug 1991: Captain Contreras is ordered detained by the appellate court, over-
turning a military court ruling.
Mid-Aug 1991: There is still no perceived judicial movement in the Devine case.
The Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command visits Guatemala and tells
Minister of Defense General Mendoza that there will be no improvement in the bi-
lateral military to military relationship until the Devine case is resolved.
6 Dec 1991: General Mendoza is fired by President Serrano. The President ap-
points General Jose Garcia Samayoa as Minister of Defense and General Roberto
Perussina as Army Chief.
13 Dec 1991: The new Minister of Defense and new Army Chief promise progress
in the Devine case.
Mid-Feb 1992: Secretary of Defense Cheney visits Guatemala. He strongly encour-
ages President Serrano and Generals Garcia and Perussina to resolve the Devine
case.
Sep 1992: After much delay the military court finally announces its verdict: a ver-
dict of guilty for five enlisted men of the second group and a guilty verdict for one
of the men from the first group, and acquittal for Captain Contreras. Ambassador
Stroock immediately protests the acquittal of the Captain and the fact that the in-
tellectual authors oi Mr. Devine's murder remain free.
10 Nov 1992: Ambassador Stroock departs Guatemala. Deputy Chief of Mission,
Mr. John Keene, becomes Charge d'Aifaires.
11 May 1993: After lengthy proceedings at the appellate court — constituted as a
court martial — the court reamrms the convictions and 30-year sentences of the six
enlisted men. The court also reverses the military court's acquittal of Captain
Contreras, finding him guilty and sentencing him to 20 years in prison.
11 May 1993: During that evening Captain Contreras disappears from confine-
ment.
Mid-May 1993: Charge d'Aifaires, John Keene immediately protests Contreras' es-
cape to Guatemalan authorities. As a sign of US Government displeasure, Mr.
Keene also cancels US Armed Forces Day activities being planned and hosted by
US military officers in the Embassy for the military attache community and Guate-
malan Army officers .
24 May 93: President Serrano breaks with the constitution and shuts down con-
gress and the supreme court.
2 Jun 1993: President Serrano departs office due to civilian and military demands
that the country return to constitutional rule. The Minister of Defense rejects an
offer to take over, thus maintaining civilian rule.
5 Jun 1993: Guatemala's Human Rights ombudsman, Ramiro DeLeon Caspio is
elected President by the reconstituted legislature. He chooses an interim Minister
of Defense for three weeks, then appoints General Mario Enriques as his permanent
Minister of Defense.
14 Jun 1993: Ambassador Marilyn McAfee arrives on station.
Jul-Dec 1993: Ambassador McAfee, accompanied by the Defense Attache, raises
the Devine case on numerous occasions with the President, Minister of Defense and
Army Chief. All continue to respond that the whereabouts of Captain Contreras are
unknown.
Throughout this chronology the Ambassador and various country team members
made approaches to their counterparts in the host government concerning the
Devine case.
I personally participated in more than 30 meetings with senior civilian and mili-
tary leaders to seek a just conclusion to Mr. Devine's murder.
In closing this brief chronology, I can state that once the decisions were made,
all members of the country teams of the three chiefs of mission mentioned earlier
were onboard with the measures, pressures, and approaches being made to the Gua-
temalan Government concerning our search for justice in the Devine case. I should
131
also stress that despite the importance of the Devine case, other cases firmly held
our attention, such as the case of the 1985 disappearance of Mr. Blake and Mr.
Davis, the murder of anthropologist Myma Mack, and the Bamaca case.
This concludes my statement and I am available to respond to your questions.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN C. CORNELL
Colonel Cornell. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Mr.
Chairman, Committee members.
As you have said, I am Al Cornell, a retired soldier. I retired
after 30 years of active service as a colonel, February of last year.
Before I go any further, let me say that I'm humbled to be at the
table with these two ladies here. I worked very closely with Carol
DeVine and I have read a lot about Miss Jennifer Harbury and I
have the utmost respect for their courage and their perseverance.
I am most familiar with the DeVine case, and I can tell you that
without the perseverance of Carol DeVine, I'm not convinced we
would be where we are today, and that is the absolute truth.
I spent 13 years in Latin America, nine of it as an attache, and
the last four and a half years of my time I was in Guatemala. I
can tell you that in my time in Guatemala, the policy of the em-
bassy revolved around what we called the four D's: Democracy, de-
velopment, drugs, and "derechos humanos," which is Spanish for
human rights. And the thinking of the country team through all
that time was you really don't have development and you really
can't see progress and democracy if you don't have respect for
human rights. So human rights, I can assure you, was the center-
piece of the embassy and the centerpiece of all of our offices while
we were there.
I would like at this time to give you some more information and
then answer some questions. What I'd like to do is go through a
chronology of the DeVine case, if that would be all right with you.
Chairman SPECTER. That's fine. Proceed.
Colonel Cornell. Before I start, I can say that I'm also willing
to answer some questions about the Efrain Bamaca case, but that
arose toward the end of my time in Guatemala. I did participate
in three meetings with the ambassador and the minister of defense
in Guatemala, where she raised two issues: What's the status of
Mr. Bamaca; and what's the status of the accusations that there
are clandestine prisons in Guatemala? So I did participate in three
of those meetings. But then I departed, and so — I'm limited in that
area.
With regard to DeVine, 8 June 1990, Mr. Michael DeViile is
found murdered near his tourist farm in Poptun in the Peten De-
partment. 18 July 1990, the defense attache — myself — and the
naval attache visit the headquarters of military zone 23, which is
the military zone that covers the Peten, and subsequently we visit
Poptun, to the ranger base known as Kaibil Base. We talked to the
commanders of both bases. Both of those commanders claim they
had no knowledge about the killing, other than it had happened
and that the killing was, the investigation of it, was a police mat-
ter.
I did pick up a police report on that visit and I brought it back
to the embassy, but in essence all it said was, we found Mr.
DeVine, he had been killed by unknown assailants, and it didn't
have much more.
132
In August- September 1990, a private investigator hired by Mrs.
DeVine developed some leads into names of possible Guatemalan
army suspects.
In September 1990 Ambassador Stroock went down to the min-
ister of defense, General Balanos, presented him with those names
and asked for action. The minister did detain the five men that
were on the list and promised that there would be progress. But
by mid-December 1990 there was no progress, and the ambassador
really was frustrated, the whole country team was frustrated.
He recommended to the Department of State that action be
taken and that the action be aimed at the military community of
Guatemala, that it be aimed at materiel assistance. On 21 Decem-
ber 1990 the State Department announced a suspension of materiel
aid, which included cash sales, to the army of Guatemala. The
International Military Education Training program was not sus-
pended at that time because the thought was that was the one ve-
hicle we could keep to try to influence the young Guatemalan offi-
cers toward our way of thinking, our way of doing business was
through that education.
14 January 1991, a new president assumes power in Guatemala,
elected, civilian-elected. And he appoints immediately a new min-
ister of defense and a new army chief. On 31 January 1991, Am-
bassador Stroock goes to visit President Serrano and tells him
there will be no resumption of military aid without some progress
on the DeVine case, among other things.
In February 1991 the five enlisted men that are in jail decide
they better talk, because they've been left out on a limb. And they
actually implicate the real culprits. They implicate seven people,
seven more people, and they implicate Captain Hugo Contreras.
With the naming of the second group, they're all detained except
the captain. The military court had decided the captain did have
to be detained. But on August 7, 1991 an appellate court over-
turned that ruling and said the captain must go to jail just like the
other accused.
In mid- August 1991 we still didn't have what we felt was per-
ceived judicial movement in the case. We had a visit at that time
from General Joulwan, the commander-in-chief of the Southern
Command, and we had a closed-door session with the minister of
defense, at that time General Mendoza. And he said to Mendoza,
there will be no improvement in the bilateral relationship, military
to military, until you resolve this DeVine case, eyeball to eyeball.
I can tell you, at that meeting, Mendoza didn't like the message,
but that's the way we left it with him.
On 6 December 1991 General Mendoza was fired by the presi-
dent and sent home. The president then appoints a brigadier gen-
eral Garcia as the minister of defense and a brigadier general
Perucina as the army chief. It was just a week later, 13 December,
when the new minister of defense and new army chief promised
that there would be an opening in the DeVine case. Then in mid-
February 1992 there was a visit by Secretary of Defense Cheney
to Guatemala. We had a session with President Serrano, had a ses-
sion with both Generals Garcia and Perussina, and the message
was the same: Until you show improvements in human rights and
until you show a resolution of the DeVine case, there will be no im-
133
provement in the relationship and there will be no military aid re-
opened to Guatemala.
In September 1992, and this is after much delay and a lot of
work by Carol DeVine's lawyer and the embassy, we finally got a
verdict on the case — a verdict of guilty for six enlisted men, five of
the second group and one of the first group, and an innocent ver-
dict for the captain. Well, it wasn't more than a heartbeat when
the ambassador was downtown complaining about the verdict be-
cause it was obvious if you have the same testimony against the
enlisted men and they're guilty and the same testimony against the
captain and he's innocent, it just didn't track. But that was the
military tribunal's decision.
Ambassador Stroock protested, I went down and protested to
both the chief of the army and minister of defense, and their re-
sponse at that time was, "Well, the procedure has to keep going.
Let's see what happens at the next level." Well, on 10 November
1992 Ambassador Stroock departed Guatemala, and John Keene,
the Deputy Chief of Mission, became the Charge d'Affaires.
On 11 May 1993, again after lengthy delays, et cetera in that
court system, the appellate court, which was comprised of three ci-
vilian judges and two military voters, or what they call vocales, or
speakers, convicted the captain and gave him 20 years in prison
and reaffirmed the 30-year prison sentences of the six enlisted
men. And it was that very evening, the May 11, that the captain
disappeared from military custody. When the captain disappeared,
John Keene, the charge, immediately went down to the palace to
protest. And an amazing number of meetings were held with the
leaders — the chief of the army, the minister of defense, the staff
judge advocate of their army — about recovering this captain as
soon as possible.
On about 24 May — I say approximate because this is coming out
of my head — because I've been away for a while — President
Serrano breaks with the constitution, shuts down the courts, and
shuts down the legislature. On June 2, approximately, a coalition
of civilian interests — labor unions, businessmen, ranchers, stu-
dents, teachers — and the military combine to pressure President
Serrano to leave office. As an aside, a number of politicians offered
the reins of control to the minister of defense: He refused to take
it. He wanted to maintain civilian continuity. And so they reconsti-
tuted the legislature, and by June 5 they had elected Ramiro De
Leon Carpio as the new president, who as you know had been the
human rights ombudsman.
He immediately changed the minister of defense, brought in an
interim minister, which was General Perussina, and then finally
brought in a new minister three weeks later, the minister that's
there now. General Enriquez. From July to December 1993, I ac-
companied the ambassador on numerous visits to the president, the
minister of defense, the army chief, on what's being done to recover
Captain Contreras.
I can say that throughout this chronology, all members of the
country team involved in these things were, as we say, forward-
leaning in the foxhole in this one — the cooperation, the team effort,
everybody involved and everybody with the same intentions on the
DeVine case. I personally participated in over 30 meetings — well
134
over 30 meetings with the minister of defense, army chief or presi-
dent on just the DeVine case.
In closing this brief chronology I can state that once again, with-
in the embassy, when a decision was made, everybody was on
board. And everybody agreed and participated in the measures,
pressures, approaches, demarches we made to the host govern-
ment. I should also stress that during my tenure, although the
DeVine case is what I'm talking about now, there were numerous
other cases that held our attention at the same time. Blake Davis
case, for example, was an important case. And I participated in a
lot of that. You had the murder of anthropologist Myma Mack, the
Bamaca case. So, although I'm talking about DeVine, all the cases
held our interest. And that really concludes my statement, sir.
Chairman Specter. Thank you very much. Colonel Cornell. We
now turn to Ms. Harbury.
[The statement of Ms. Harbury follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer K. Harbury
1. My name is Jennifer K. Harbury. I am a United States citizen, forty-three
years of age, and a licensed attorney. I received my B.A. degree from Cornell Uni-
versity in 1974, and my law degree from Harvard Law School in 1978.
2. My husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, was a Mayan citizen of Guatemala,
and the last surviving Mayan commander of the Guatemalan resistance, or
U.R.N.G. forces. His nom de guerre was Everardo. We met in 1990 when I traveled
to a base camp in the TajUmulco volcano to interview women combatants for my
book. We met again, and married in 1991.
3. Everardo vanished in combat on March 12, 1992, after some seventeen years
in the mountains. The skirmish took place at the Rio Ixcucua, in southwestern Gua-
temala. No other combatants were missing afterwards. The army, on the following
day, announced that they had found a body there after the combat, and had sent
it to the nearby town of Retalhuleu for an autopsy and burial. When the U.R.N.G.
leadership, fearing a hoax, requested a description of the cadaver they were sent
a perfect, feature by description of Everardo, accurate to the centimeter. They were
also told that Everardo had been wounded and committed suicide by shooting him-
self through the mouth in order to avoid being captured and tortiired for his infor-
mation.
4. In late 1992, a young man named Santiago Cabrera Lopez escaped from a mili-
tary base in Guatemala . Santiago had been a U.R.N.G. combatant under Everardo's
command, and had been captured in 1991. He stated that he had been secretly de-
tained since the army since that time and severely tortured. He also reported that
G-2, or army intelligence was carrying out a secret experiment with selected pris-
oners. The objective was to "break" such prisoners through physical and
physchological abuse until they began working as secret intelligence collaborators
with the army.
5. Santiago saw Everardo in an army base on March 12, 1992 and for the next
20 days. Everardo was chained hands and feet to a bed and was being interrogated.
Santiago again saw Everardo in late July 1992. This time he witnessed Everardo
being tortured by a number of high level army officials, including Col. Julio Alpirez
and many others. He gave the names and ranks of all of these officers.
6. Santiago Cabrera Lopez testified at the United Nations conference in Geneva
in February 1993 and I gave his testimony to the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in March 1993. I also shared his testimony with State Department
officials, members of the Senate and House of Representatives, and numerous
human rights organizations.
7. When the Guatemalan army denied taking Everardo prisoner despite this testi-
mony, I traveled to Retalhuleu and filed for an exhumation of the grave where they
claimed he was buried. There I found the body of a young man five centimeters
shorter and about fifteen years younger than Everardo. His dental patterns were
also quite different. The report of the autopsy performed in 1992 when the body was
first brought in from the combat site showed that the young man looked nothing
like Everardo. Moreover, he had not died in combat. He had been tied by the ankles,
fingerprinted, shot, stabbed, strangled, beaten, and had a skull smashed in by
blows. The ejchumation took place in August 1993.
135
8. In short, my husband had been captured alive by the Guatemalan army in
March 1992, and was held as a secret prisoner and subjected to torture. In order
to conceal this fact and avoid international outcry, a different orisoner was brought
to the combat site and killed there, and the army announced that they had "found"
Everardo's cadaver. When the U.R.N.G. requested a description of the body, the
army sent a perfect description of Everardo instead of the young man actually in
the grave. This hoax was carried out during the 1992 peace negotiations on the
issue of human rights.
1994
9. After the exhumation, I feared that Everardo was still alive and being brutally
tortured. According to Santiago, a number of the prisoners had been kept alive for
many years, and indeed this has been independently confirmed. To date, all infor-
mation given by Santiago has proven to be true and correct. Given my husband's
rank and experience, he was literally a treasure trove of information for military
intelligence. I therefore set about trying to obtain his presentation to the courts for
his fair trial, and if necessary his imprisonment pursuant to the minimum require-
ments of the Geneva Conventions or international humanitarian law.
10. The Inter-American Commission, after the exhumation, issued interim protec-
tive order against the Guatemalan army, and Monica Pinto, the U.N. Special Ex-
pert, decried the case in her 1994 presentation in Geneva, Switzerland. The case
was also included in a congressional resolution sponsored by Rep. Connie Morella,
and was protested by numerous U.S. Congresspersons, Senators, and human rights
organizations.
11. Throughout the year of 1994 I spoke frequently with State Department offi-
cials, including Mr. Charlie Harrington. Mr. Richard Nuccio, and Ms. Anne Patter-
son. I also communicated with Mr. John Shattuck. I met on numerous occasions
with Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee. Her attitude was representative of all State
Department officials. She seemed to find the case interesting, but when I repeatedly
asked for her assistance she would simply say, "Well I have mentioned it many
times to the armv officials and they say they don't have him, so what more can I
do?" Even limited sanctions against the army were out of the question, as were any
further forms of pressure other than "mentioning" the case. She was quite well
aware of the name of Julio Alpirez and the many other names offered by Santiago
Cabrera Lopez, but apparently took no action.
12. As the peace talks progressed in 1994, and as Vice President Gore began to
discuss regional trade plans for Central America, the State Department became
more and more impatient with my pleas for help. They clearly wished for me to pre-
sume him dead and get out of their way, as my case was obviously embarrassing
for the peace process. After the Global Human Rights Accord was signed in March
1994, the officially sponsored human rights violations began to skyrocket. The army
clearly felt that its funding from Washington D.C. could never be cut during the
peace process, and that they could thus kill their dissidents with full impunity. This
they did, while State Department simply looked the other way. The people of Guate-
mala then lost faith in the peace process. As a result ,the peace talks disintegrated
in late 1994.
13. Ambassador Marilyn MacAffee had repeatedly assured me that my case would
be treated the same as all of the other human rights cases. Yet I soon learned that
she had written Rep. Connie Morella, asking that my case be removed from her res-
olution. When I asked her about this, she said that she could not ask that funding
be cut for an individual case. When I pointed out that she had not asked that the
other cases be removed from the resolution, she looked very uncomfortable, and
pointed out that he was a combatant, and that this was a difference. I reminded
her that the legal prohibitions against torture, clandestine prisons, and extrajudicial
execution do not recognize any such distinctions. She had no answer.
14. By late 1994, I reaUzed that I had come to the end of the road in trying to
save my husband's life. There was a good chance that the case would be sent to the
Inter-Ajnerican Court in Costa Rica, but this process would be extremely slow. The
Inter-American Commission orders had been ignored by the army, as had all other
forms of international pressure. The peace accords were scheduled to be signed soon,
and when they were, the army would have no further need to keep Everardo alive.
I was still under much pressure by the U.S. Embassy to simply assume he was
dead. However, I had believed him dead in 1992, when he was actually alive and
suffering terrible torture. I would not make the same mistake again. Moreover,
there was confirming evidence that a number of prisoners in this experimental army
program had been kept alive for years. One way or the other, time was of the es-
sence.
136
15. Given this situation, I began my hunger strike in October 1994 in front of the
National Palace in Guatemala City. I dranJc only water and some electrolyte solu-
tion to remain clear minded. I came under severe harassment by the Guatemalan
authorities, including being placed on a public death list.
16. In late October, a State Department official spoke with the Guatemalan au-
thorities about my hunger strike. He then told me that an official investigation was
foing to be carried out, clearly expecting me to end my hunger strike on this basis,
explained that the case had been very thoroughly investigated for some time, and
that now was the time to save my husband's life, and that I would not cease my
strike for anything less. The "investigation" was then carried out by the Guate-
malan authorities, and consisted in having me subpoenaed to answer sixty six inter-
rogatories by the prosecutors. Only a few of these were aimed at finding Everardo.
Almost all were aimed at either intimidating, insulting, or threatening me. My law-
yer was not allowed to be present. I was also forced to twice travel to the town of
Coatepeque at the other end of the country, for the exhumation of certain persons
who had been killed two weeks before Everardo vanished, and who, according to the
autopsy reports, in no way resembled him. The authorities were hoping to break my
strength in order to force and end to my strike. In the end, a few of the named mili-
tary officers, including Alpirez, were superficially questioned for the first time, but
never even detained.
17. After about twenty-five days, "Sixty Minutes" aired a program about the case
and revealed that the CIA had long since sent a memo to Dotli State Department
and the U.S. Embassy, confirming that Everardo had indeed been captured alive by
the Guatemalan army in 1992.
18. On the thirty-first day of my hunger strike, the U.S. Ambassador issued a for-
mal dem£irche to the Guatemalan President Ramiro DeLeon Carpio. It stated that
according to U.S. intelligence sources, Everardo was captured alive in March 1992
by the Guatemalan army, that he was lightly but not seriously wounded, that he
was a prisoner for a short time period, and that after that there was no further in-
formation. The Ambassador made it clear that in her personal opinion, he must be
dead, but when I pressed her she stated clearly that she had no further information
of any kind one way or the other.
19. I also received word during this time period that Mr. Anthony Lake and Mr.
Leon Fuerth of the National Security Council were willing to meet with me. I be-
lieved that this, combined with the recent demarche, would lead to a resolution of
the case, so I then suspended my hunger strike and returned to Washington D.C.
20. I met with Mr. Anthony Lake, Mr. Leon Fuerth, Mr. Richard Feinberg and
Mr. John Shattuck in November 1994. They expressed great interest in the case and
assured me that they had no further information about Everardo's fate one way or
the other. I asked for all documents to be released to me at once so as to avoid the
delay of F.O.I.A. requests, given the urgency of the case. I also asked that the U.S.
indicate that some kind of sanctions would result if my husband were assassinated
without a trial. I gave several suggestions of options, stressing that if no con-
sequences were attached to his murder, that he had no chance for survival. I also
stressed that if the army killed him with full impunity, despite the international
outcry and the full and clear evidence, that they would know they could get away
with anything at all. Manv more Guatemalans would die. They agreed to take all
of this under serious consideration.
1995
21. I never received any documents, and was forced to file my F.O.I.A. requests
in January 1995. To date, I have received virtually no information.
22. In early 1995, the U.S. sent our National Guard to Guatemala. The Guate-
malan Minister of Defense welcomed them with open arms. State Department offi-
cials made it clear that no sanctions of any kind were going to be imposed, despite
the frightening rise in officially sponsored human rights violations. The Minister of
Defense made declarations to liie Guatemalan press that the Bamaca case had come
and gone and was no longer a problem.
23. Throughout January and February 1995 I spoke on various occasions with
State Department officials as well as with Ambassador MacAffee. They all told me
the same thing. They made numerous comments to the effect that "Jennifer, we
really don't think he is alive." When I pressed them as to why they didn't think so,
they would respond that a very intensive investigation had been carried out through
intelligence sources, and that no one could find any evidence that he was aUve.
When I asked point blank if any of their sources had found him dead, they replied
no. I also asked if their sources had evidence of a body or grave or anything else
concrete, or if there was anything else they were withholding from me. They replied
137
"no" to all of these questions, merely repeating that given how much time had gone
by, it was a logical conclusion.
24. Santiago had described for me the torture that my husband was suffering. I
loved him very much and could never abandon him to such cruelty if there was any
chance he were still in pain. Given that many Guatemalans were reporting that
they had seen him alive recently, and given that the goal of the army experiment
was to keep the prisoners alive for a long period of time, I could not abandon my
search on the basis of mere opinion and conjecture. I informed the Embassy and
Mr. Richard Feinberg that if no further steps were taken to save his life, that I was
wrong to have suspended my hunger strike and would resume it on March 12, 1995,
the third anniversary of his capture.
25. In February 1995 I also spoke with one of the team members of MINUGUA,
the U.N. team now investigating human rights violations in Guatemala. I described
my meetings with the State Department members and asked if there was anything
new they were hiding from me. I was told by the team member that the Ambassador
had issued a second demarche, that it had recommended that Alpirez be re-ques-
tioned, and that it confirmed that other prisoners had been held for a period of time
for lengthy interrogation and then killed. However, the team member hastened to
assure me that there was no new evidence that Everardo was dead, and that this
remained mere opinion on the part of the U.S. Embassy. This was based on lengthy
discussions with U.S. Embassy staff.
26. During this time period I also stressed to all U.S. officials that if no concrete
evidence existed, it was wrongful to insist that he must be dead, when, in fact, he
might well be alive and suffering. If concrete information did exist, then it was im-
moral to allow me to risk my life with a second hunger strike so soon after the first
one without telling me the truth. I received no information.
27. On March 10, 1995 I spoke briefly with Mr. Richard Feinberg, and he in-
formed me of the cuts in IMET funding. I saw the press release, which referred to
the official "conclusion" that Everardo was dead. But once again, it was never stated
that anyone KNEW he was dead, or that concrete evidence existed that established
his death as a certainty as opposed to a mere matter of opinion.
28. I have seen Ambassador MacAffee quoted as stating that she told me on
March the 7th that "Bamaca is dead". She made no such statement to me. Her exact
wording was "Jennifer, I really don't think he is alive." When I pressed her she re-
fused to answer. On March 10, she issued a press statement, declaring as follows:
"Impunity runs counter to the basic principles of law. We believe that the rights of
every man are diminished when the rights of one man are threatened. ♦ * ♦ And
that is why questions continue to swirl around the case of Efrain Bamaca. What
happened there?" Hardly the concrete "Bamaca is dead" statement she now claims.
29. On March the 12, 1995 I renewed my hunger strike. After 12 days I had lost
14 pounds and was extremely weak, but determined to find out the truth. It was
then that Rep. Toricelli called me to his office and informed me that our intelligence
sources show that sometime in 1992 Col. Alpirez, (the same man named by Santiago
in early 1993), had given an order to execute Everardo. Col. Alpirez had been on
CIA payroll for a long time and had also ordered the assassination of U.S. citizen
Michael Devine several years earlier. An investigation had been called off, and he
was given a substantial lump sum payment by the CIA during the same time period
that ne ordered my husband's assassination. Also, although funding to the Guate-
malan army had been cut off after Devine's murder, the CIA continued to secretly
fund them with U.S. tax dollars.
30. Despite my repeated requests for the documents I have received nothing I do
not know where, when or how my husband died. I cannot even bury his remains.
I know, from the experience of the Blake family, as well as the testimony of certain
G-2 defectors, that they army may soon incinerate his bones so that I will never
find him. It is only too clear, moreover, that they are hurriedly carrying out their
own coverup. Our Embassy has given no documentation to the Guatemalan authori-
ties. As a result. Alpirez has not even been arrested and remains in his post. On
the other hand, it has been announced that if I return to Guatemala I will be ar-
rested as a subversive. It is far from clear that the files in the U.S. are safe from
destruction.
31. These three years have been long and terrible. Yet it was necessary for me
to learn the truth. I can only hope that something positive can come from so much
pain. 150,000 civilians Guatemalans have been killed or "disappeared" by the Gua-
temalan death squads. Let it end now. Never again.
32. I would like to make the following requests:
a. I would ask that all information about my case be immediately declassified.
This would allow me to locate his body and give him a decent burial before his re-
mains are destroyed and scattered. It would also prevent fiirther destruction of evi-
138
dence in Guatemala, as well as here in the United States. It would also promote
justice in both nations. National Security must never be allowed to conceal illegal
or improper official conduct. Moreover, immediate release of all such files will help
to restore public confidence in the American government. Other key cases should
also be declassified.
b. I would also ask that afi^r the documents in this case and in other key human
rights cases have been thoroughly reviewed, that in depth and lengthy hearings be
held on the CIA and State Department conduct of our affairs in Guatemala during
the last twenty years. These agencies must carry out our international policies as
formulated by government officials elected by our citizens. If mistakes have been
made, if these agencies have strayed, let us now set our house in order. Lives are
at stake.
c. Should the Guatemalan army continue to defy the basic requirements of inter-
national humanitarian law, as well as their own recently signed Global Human
Rights Accord, then we must take action. Our tax dollars must not support a gross
and systematic human rights violator. Should the army remain intransigent, let us
begin to phase in sanctions which will only have impact on the Guatemalan mili-
tary. Let us insist on the extradition of those officers known to engage in drug traf-
ficking. Let us cancel military visas to the United States. Let us cancel private sales
of helicopter and truck parts. Let us cancel all training exercises. There is so much
we can do, and so very much at stake. As members of the international community,
we must stand firm on the principles of international law. If human rights are not
insisted upon, then they are rendered meaningless.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER HARBURY
Ms. Harbury. That's right. I'd like to thank the Committee for
inviting us here today and offering us a chance to speak. I agree
that it's very important — even though all of us have been inter-
viewed at length — that we be able to give the entirety of our sto-
ries, because often facts are left out during interviews that might
prove to be very critical to your work as the Committee.
My name is Jennifer Harbury. I'm an attorney. I'm a U.S. citi-
zen. I'm 43 years of age. I've been practicing law since 1978. I've
been heavily involved in Guatemalan affairs since 1985. I lived
there and did human rights work for two years — 1985 and 1986 —
losing an average of one friend a week to the death squads in Gua-
temala during that time period. I was forced to leave the country
because of the work I was doing in late 1986, and continued to
work closely with the Guatemalan people, whom I dearly love. I
very much share Mrs. DeVine's feelings about Guatemala and
would love to be able to return someday to Guatemala to live there
as well.
I remain very involved in Guatemalan human rights. I worked
on a book for a number of years. And that's, in fact, how I met my
husband, Efrain Bamaca Velasquez, who is also known as
Commandante Everado of the URNG forces, when I traveled to the
volcano to carry out interviews. Can you hear me? I'm sorry, my
voice has come down to about its half-life during this last week.
Chairman Specter. We can hear you, Ms. Harbury, but to the
extent you can pull it closer it would be even more helpful.
Ms. Harbury. I had traveled to a combat zone to interview
women combatants for my book about the ongoing civil war. Since
almost no interviews with any of these people existed, I thought it
was important to include their side of the story. This combat unit
was virtually all Mayan peasant and my husband was in charge of
that division. And he, in fact, had been in combat for some 17
years, he had spent his life in the mountains. He's a Mayan peas-
ant himself. His first fortunately for me.
139
I would like to give a brief chronology of the events surrounding
his death because I think that's very critical in interpreting the dif-
ferent versions of information that have come in through the CIA.
I think it's very critical in being able to decide which is the true
version and which isn't.
My husband vanished in combat on March 12, 1992, near the Rio
Ixcacoa, which is in Guatemala toward the Mexican border in the
southwest, Orpa territory. He literally disappeared. There were
only a few people in the unit that he was with at the moment, and
at the end of the combat no one else was missing; there was lit-
erally a lot of smoke and explosions, everyone took cover, when
they looked up he was gone. No boots, no backpack, no rifle, no
nothing.
The next day the army issued a brief statement sa3dng that they
had found a cadaver right there at the river after the combat and
sent it to the town of Retalhuleu for burial. Well, he was the only
one missing; that made sense that that would be him. But the
commandante was still very concerned, for a number of reasons,
that a hoax was being carried out, and asked for a description of
that body. And they were sent a feature-by-feature to-the-centi-
meter accurate description of my husband as being the description
of that cadaver that had been found and buried.
I would for a long time have continued to think that he was dead
and buried in Retalhuleu if Santiago Cabrero Lopez had not es-
caped from an army base in late 1992. Now, in fact, Santiago had
fought in my husband's division and he himself was taken prisoner
in 1991. He had been very badly tortured for a period of about six
months and was placed in a new experimental program being car-
ried out by G-2, or military intelligence, which was only a few
years old at that time. A few selected-out prisoners who were cap-
tured, instead of being promptly killed, were actually taken aside
and subjected to long-term torture and psychological abuse until
they would snap or break down and become part of a secret and
permanent cadre of informants for the army. A number of these
prisoners that he was able to name, we have confirmed are still
alive and in army hands. Some of them have been alive for years.
Again, the purpose was not to kill them, it was to keep them alive
but broken.
On March 12, 1992, Santiago saw my husband in an army base,
chained hands and feet to a bed, undergoing interrogation. He was
even able to speak with him briefly because the G— 2 officials
wished for him to confirm that that was, in fact, the legendary
Commander Everado that they had been trying to catch for so long.
They saw him chained to a bed, hands and feet, without a blanket,
under interrogation, for about 20 days. Everado was then moved;
they were told he had been shot.
But he saw him again in late July 1992, in a different base. This
time, he saw him strapped to a hospital table with an unidentified
gas tank next to the bed. He was stripped down to his underwear.
His entire body was grotesquely swollen several times normal size.
One arm was bandaged completely shoulder to wrist, and one leg
was bandaged completely hip to ankle as if they had ruptured, and
he was speaking in a raving voice.
140
The man bending over the torture table was someone that
Santiago knew quite well; it was Colonel Julio Alpirez. Santiago
also named first name, both last names, rank and position of all
the other very high level intelligence officials who were involved in
his torture and interrogation. He also said that they had actually
called a doctor to standby to make sure they didn't accidentally kill
Everado. The point was to break him, not to kill him. He was the
goose that laid the golden egg in terms of military intelligence.
There's nothing, after 17 years as a commander and founder, that
he did not know.
Santiago did see him alive a few days later. The swelling had
gone down. He looked very ill but he was still alive. He could not
see the arm and leg because he was dressed in a military uniform.
A few months later, Santiago escaped having not seen Everado
again, and had been threatened many, many times to never tell of
what he had seen. Mr. Cabrera Lopez in January met with me. I
interrogated him very attorney style, up one wall and down the
other. He has a memory like a computer and never contradicts
himself. He went to Geneva and gave all of this testimony to the
United Nations Conference in Geneva in February 1993. I testified
March 4, 1993, and gave all of this list of names as well to the OAS
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. I then proceeded to
give all of this information to the State Department, to Members
of the U.S. Congress and Senate, and to all of the Human Rights
Organizations, begging for help.
At that point, the army, of course, in Guatemala responded that
it was a propaganda stunt, that Santiago was lying, that he was
a deserter, he was trying to blackmail them, he was a drunk, and
that my husband was buried in Retalhuleu where they told me in
the first place. So I returned to Guatemala with my marriage cer-
tificate and said, "Fine, open the grave." And that's the one thing
no one had ever counted on. If I were Guatemalan, I would have
been shot on the spot. They didn't expect anyone ever to come back
to Guatemala and say, "Right, that Mayan guerrilla commander
happens to be my husband, open the grave."
But I had a right under Guatemalan law absolutely to do it, so
the judge also gave me the judicial records. And under Guatemalan
law at that time those records were normally sealed, but as a rel-
ative I had a right to see them, and being an attorney, I read them
and started flipping through. And I found the autopsy report done
the same day the body was brought in from the river, March 13,
1992. It wasn't him. It was someone five centimeters too short,
about 15 years too young; had a moustache instead of being clean-
shaven, different coloring, different eyes, different scars. He did not
die in combat. He was tied by the ankles with a sock so tightly that
the weaving pattern was etched into his skin. He had black ink on
his fingertips where he was fingerprinted. He was shot. He was
stabbed. He was beaten. He was kicked in the face. He had a two-
centimeter strangulation gash around his throat, and his skull was
smashed in — not from a bullet through the mouth, as we had been
told that my husband had committed suicide by shooting himself
through the mouth to avoid being captured alive, but by rifle-butt
blows. His head had been smashed in. I did open the grave. That's
141
who I found, an 18-year-old who comes to my shoulder who had
been tied up and beaten to death.
What the army had done was taken my husband alive to torture
him long-term for his treasure trove of information. And to cover
that up so that no one would interfere as I am interfering so egre-
giously right now, they brought another young prisoner to the river
on the same day, tied him up, beat him to death and told the press,
"Here's the body we found yesterday after the combat. We're send-
ing it to Retalhuleu for burial." And when the URNG commandants
here requested a description of the body, they were given a feature-
by-feature to-the-centimeter description of my husband and not of
the young 18-year-old actually buried in the grave. All of this oc-
curred while they were sitting at the peace talk table in 1992 dis-
cussing the issue of human rights.
I came back to Washington after this experience and testified
again to the Inter-American Commission. They immediately issued
protective orders against the army. I flew to Geneva and testified
at the U.N. conference in 1993, February. Monica Pinto, the special
expert, blasted the army in this case in her address to the U.N.
conference.
I went across the House of Representatives and the Senate here
in Washington, and I want to thank all of those Members who have
been so incredibly helpful all of these years. The case was included
in a congressional resolution sponsored by Connie Morella. The
army ignored all of these things. Every human rights group in the
world has protested at the top of their lungs. The army ignored all
of them. It simply made no difference.
At the beginning, I was working frequently with the State De-
partment officials and also with Ambassador Marilyn McAfee. And
throughout the winter of 1992 and 1993 she would say, "Well, we're
very concerned about all this information, and we've mentioned it
many times to the army." And I would say, "Well, I think my hus-
band might be getting his fingernails torn out. Could we do some-
thing more than mention it?" But apparently we couldn't. As I've
said, the name Colonel Alpirez is not exactly new. It's been public
information since January 1993, February 1993.
Toward the spring of 1994, the message I started getting began
to shift at State Department. The peace talks were in progress. Mr.
Gore was in the region discussing interim trade programs for all
of Central America. Everybody wanted a peace agreement signed,
but there wasn't enough stress on compliance with that agreement.
A human rights agreement was signed in March. Human rights
violations began to skyrocket and nothing was done. That's why the
peace process fell apart at the end of last year: Because the public
in Guatemala no longer had faith in that process. If you're going
to sign a peace agreement and they're all going to be shot down in
the streets, nobody felt like it was going to work very well. Hope-
fully, that will not happen again.
That's right about the time all doors began to close in my face.
GAS had done what they could. The United Nations' special expert
had done what she could. Congress and Senate had done what they
could. The army was totally defiant. They felt that they didn't have
to do anything any more. They could shoot anybody they wanted.
92-921 - 95 - 6
142
Their money was guaranteed from Washington because they were
in the peace process. Who was going to shut off their money?
At that point I was shown a letter that Ambassador Marilyn
McAfee had written to Congresswoman Connie Morella, asking
that my case be removed from congressional resolution. She had
been telling me that she was pushing my case exactly equally to
all other cases. So I asked her, "Whoa, wait a minute. That's not
equal treatment. What happened?" And the first time around she
said she would have to review her files. I returned and asked her
again, "What happened?" And she said, "Well, I don't think you can
cut off aid to a country or any kind of aid just for one individual
case." I said, "Well, number one, it's a test case. You'll never have
this kind of concrete evidence again. Then number two, you didn't
ask for the other individual cases to be taken out, only mine." And
she said, "Well, he is a combatant. I guess that makes a dif-
ference." And I said, "Not in the eyes of the law it doesn't. You
show me where the Geneva Conventions and international humani-
tarian law say it's okay sometimes to torture, to kidnap, to secretly
imprison or to execute without a trial." I've never asked for am-
nesty for my husband. I've never asked for anything, except that
he be given a fair trial and that he not be subjected to torture and
abuse. That was the spring of 1994.
By the summer, the peace talks were still scheduled to come to
a close by January, and I realized at that point they would have
no reason to keep my husband alive any more. They wouldn't need
his military information any more and they would have every in-
centive to shoot him to shut him up, if he were, in fact, still alive.
So out of desperation, because OAS would be too slow, because the
United Nations has no enforcement power, because I could get no-
where with the State Department, I went on my hunger strike in
the National Plaza, in front of the National Palace in Guatemala
City, because I felt like I had come to the end of the road, and my
life and his life, we go together. I wasn't going to just stand by and
have him shredded physically while I just pretended it hadn't hap-
pened.
One of my jobs, when I was a human rights observer in Guate-
mala in 1985 and 1986, was to go to the morgues and help identify
the dead. And I didn't want to find him that way and I didn't plan
to find him that way.
So I went on my hunger strike, and the Guatemalan response
was remarkable. People came out with flowers. Poor people gave
me 50-cent pieces to buy new candles with. Little old ladies would
come out and cry and say prayers for my husband and for their
children who had been taken by the death squads. They came out
in droves, risking their life to hug me, wish me well, bring me
glasses of water, and tell me to speak for all of them who could not
speak without being murdered themselves.
By the end of my hunger strike I was drinking only water and
electrolyte solution, as you know. Since 80 percent of the Mayan
people in Guatemala suffer from severe malnutrition, including my
husband, at 5'3", I'm a giant in Guatemala. I felt like it would be
hypocritical to go on a fruit juice fast. I know few Mayan peasants
who could afford fruit juice.
143
By Day 25, I think, the 60 Minutes broadcast reported that, in
fact, the embassy did have a report that my husband was taken
aHve in 1992 by the army, that he was shghtly but not seriously
wounded, that he had been a prisoner for a while. And that was
leaked the first time through the 60 Minutes broadcast. I had
never heard this information.
Throughout the first 25 days of my hunger strike we were get-
ting the same old answers from the Guatemalan army: "We never
had him in the first place." You know, you — "We found a body out
there. You yourself say it's not him, so we never had him." Well,
where'd this perfect description of him come from? If you never had
him in the first place, where'd you get this perfect feature-by-fea-
ture description of him? Why did you send it? Here's the letter. It's
signed by President Ramiro De Leon Carpio. "Oh, well, the guerril-
las must have switched the body in the grave to make us look bad.
That's how the subversives are, you know." Well, that's funny.
Here's the autopsy report done before the body was buried. It's the
same body. And it wasn't ever him. "Well, you must have gotten
confused. It's five centimeters too short, 15 years too young, and
there's completely different dental records, but all Indians look
alike. So you got confused. It's really him out there. Maybe he ran
off with another woman."
But finally, with the 60 Minutes report, it was clear that the CIA
had sent something to both the State Department and the U.S.
Embassy to show that none of those things were the case. He was
captured alive, which, of course, I already knew. Try to figiire a
way out of that particular combination of evidence, right? It just —
it's against the laws of physics. They took him.
But a few days after that the American ambassador, Marilyn
McAfee, did go issue a demarche to the Guatemalan president,
Ramiro De Leon Carpio, confirming that they did have evidence
that he was taken alive, that he was not seriously wounded, that
he was a prisoner for a while, and that after that there was no fur-
ther information.
At that point I was also informed that Mr. Anthony Lake and
Leon Furth were willing to meet me at the White House. Given
that combination of events, I felt that I would be much better off
halting my hunger strike — it was now Day 32. I was in danger
within about 10 more days of either seriously damaging my inter-
nal organs or going into a coma — which I was not relishing. And
I thought, you know, I can do that and be dragged off to a hospital
by the Guatemalan army — they were already threatening to force
me into a hospital and put me on an IV — or I can let the U.S. Gov-
ernment save my husband's life. They're a lot bigger and stronger
than I am.
So I came back to Washington and I did meet with Mr. Anthony
Lake right away and also Mr. Leon Furth, Mr. John Shattuck, and
Mr. Richard Feinberg. That would have been the second week of
November by then. And it was a very courteous meeting, they told
me there was no further information of any kind, that they had
scraped the bottom of the barrel on — that they were certainly going
to be looking into that and what they really wanted from me was
all of the facts. And I said that's what I wanted too, and I also
needed, desperately, all of the documents about this case that un-
144
derlay the demarche. I needed to be able to evaluate them and I
didn't want to have to follow through the Freedom of Information
Act because it was too slow — he could be dead before I ever got the
documents — it was life and death.
They were very sympathetic to that, and I also stressed that it
was very important that we had to do more than mention this case
to the army because it's a test case. If the army thinks that it can
get away with this case despite all the evidence and the total inter-
national uproar, if they get away with it with no consequences, by
assassinating him, then they'll know they can get away with any-
thing. There's already 150,000 civilians dead in Guatemala, prob-
ably double that number--440 Mayan villages wiped off the map,
maybe many more. That's enough. Let's don't tell them that it's
okay to do this. Let's say that they've got to obey international law.
He was very sympathetic. The next thing I heard our National
Guard was sent to Guatemala, the general — minister of defense of
Guatemala was welcoming our troops with open arms, there was
a clear message from State Department there would be no sanc-
tions of any kind under any circumstances, and the headline news
was, it's okay, the Bamaca case is over. I was not happy. If there's
no consequences attached to his assassination what chance does he
have for survival? But I was still going to bed every night with the
image of my husband strapped down to a table being pumped up
like an overblown inner tube, and I didn't feel like leaving him
under those conditions. And I didn't think it was right to leave him
under those conditions because it's a green light to continue torture
and assassination and kidnapping and secret prisons for many
more people, and I felt like I had lost enough friends in Guatemala
for one lifetime.
So I went back and forth to the State Department and to the
U.S. ambassador in Guatemala and back and forth to the White
House for some time. January and February. What I can tell you
is a summary of what I was told consistently by all State Depart-
ment people, January and February of this year: "Jennifer, we real-
ly don't think your husband is alive any more. It's been three
years." "Well, why don't you think he's not alive?" "Well, it's been
three years, it's a logical conclusion, we've done a very intensive in-
vestigation, we cannot fmd him alive anywhere." "Well, all right.
Can you fmd him dead?" "No." "Can you fmd any evidence of a
grave or a body or an execution?" "No, no, no." "Is there any con-
crete evidence that he is dead?" "No." "Are you withholding any-
thing from me?" "No."
I went down to Guatemala in February and I talked to someone
from the United Nations investigatory team and said, "This is driv-
ing me nuts. They keep telling me they don't think he's alive but
are they holding something back from me, what's going on? They
won't give me anything underlying this new demarche. I'm asking
and asking, I filed my FOIA request in January, I have nothing.
Today I still have nothing. I have a certified transcript of a press
release done by the ambassador back in the fall. I have nothing
else." And the United Nations person was very sympathetic and
told me not to worry, that she'd had lengthy discussions with the
ambassador. That they had asked for Alpirez to be re-questioned.
145
In fact, the U.S. State Department people here had told me that
the ambassador had requested a new round of questioning but had
not mentioned Alpirez' name. She also said there had been men-
tioned that they knew that a number of other prisoners had been
taken and that these were often executed. I had not heard that up
here in Washington .
And then I said, "Well, so what do you think? Do you think he's
dead? I mean, what's going on?" And she said, "No, no, no. They've
reassured me that there's no concrete evidence that he's dead. They
only think he's dead because no one can find any evidence that he's
alive."
Meanwhile, I was getting many reports from Guatemalans who
said they had seen him alive, and I turned all of those over to the
State Department.
So I didn't know what to think. And when I returned to Wash-
ington just before the hunger strike started, I actually spoke in the
White House to Mr. Feinberg, who had not made these concrete
statements — I want to make that very clear; this was State Depart-
ment officials that I've just quoted at length. I said to Mr.
Feinberg, "I'm really worried. If you folks have information that
he's dead, you should tell me because I'm about to risk my life
going on another hunger strike so soon to the last one. I'm not that
strong. I'm 43 years old, but I'm going to do it. You know, if you
know he's dead, you have to tell me, and if you don't know he's
dead, you have no right to be telling the world that you think he's
dead when he could be suffering from these horrible tortures." And
I didn't get an answer.
On March 10, two days before I started my hunger strike for the
second time, I was called in and did speak with Mr. Feinberg. He
did tell me about the cuts in IMET. I thought that was a very posi-
tive first step. And I did see the press release that said, you know,
that we conclude that he is dead. Once again it said, "conclude."
It didn't say we know it, it didn't say there was any evidence of
an order of execution, it said nothing.
And I'd like to read you the words of Marilyn McAfee at her
press conference in Guatemala that same day. She now says, I told
Jennifer, Bamaca is dead. Here's her written statement: "Impunity
runs counter to the basic principles of law. We believe that the
rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one man are
threatened. That ideal is why the United States places such great
emphasis upon our policy of human rights." Et cetera, et cetera.
"And that is why questions continued to swirl about the case of
Efrain Bamaca. What happened there?" Does that sound to you
like Bamaca is dead?
So I went on another hunger strike, this time in front of the
White House. And I sat there for 12 days drinking water and elec-
trolyte solution. I lost 14 pounds in 12 days and went staggering
up and down the Halls of Congress asking for help once again. And
it was on the 12th day that Congressman Torricelli had the kind-
ness to call me into his office and say, "Jennifer, it's more than we
think he's dead, there was an order of execution by Colonel Julio
Alpirez in 1992. He was on CIA payroll. He's the same person that
ordered the death of Michael DeVine. He was on payroll when he
killed Michael DeVine. There was an investigation, it was called
146
off. He wasn't on payroll for a while. It's unclear if he was still on
payroll the day your husband was killed, but he did receive a large
lump sum of money right about that time."
Now, I've been given no dates. I don't know when he died. I don't
know who pulled the trigger. I don't know how he was killed.
Maybe it wasn't with a gun. I shudder to think how he was killed.
Let's don't try to imagine it. I don't know where he's buried. At this
moment they may be digging up his body and burning his bones
so that I'll never fmd them. That's what was done to the body of
Nicholas Blake.
I've talked to a number of G— 2 defectors who come through Mex-
ico who've routinely been ordered to go to dynamited areas behind
military areas, pour gasoline over cadavers and light them on fire
when they think someone's coming.
I know that papers are being shredded a mile a minute in Guate-
mala City. There's not much I can do since I'm not being given any
information up here. Not even my Freedom of Information Act have
gotten me anything except a certified copy of a press statement and
two sheets of paper almost completely whited out with one sen-
tence at the bottom. I know nothing. I'm the only one that cares
about this human being. I'm the only one that wants to bury him
and I'm the only one who is not allowed to know anything about
it other than what Congressman Torricelli was kind enough to tell
me. At least I don't have to wake at night now with nightmares
that he is still screaming from a torture cell.
I'm just the tip of the iceberg in Guatemala. There are more than
150,000 women like myself that no one has yet given an answer
to. It has to stop.
I would like to ask for my case to be immediately declassified for
a number of reasons:
Number one, so that I can find his body and offer him a decent
burial before his body is destroyed;
Number two, so that there will not be total destruction of the evi-
dence down there before I can get to it;
Number three, to restore public confidence in what our own gov-
ernment has done in this case. I don't know what's gone on. I want
to know. If nothing bad has gone on, why can't I see the file? I'm
not interested in knowing the names of informants. I want to know
what happened. It's not the same thing.
Number four, national security cannot be used to shield illegal
or improper or immoral official conduct. What worse for national
security can there be but criminal activity by our own government
officials? And if it didn't take place, show us the records. Then we'll
all know it didn't take place and public confidence will be restored.
I would also like to ask that many other cases be declassified as
well. Sister Diana Ortiz, a nun who was raped, left with 110 ciga-
rette bums on her back and lowered into a pit with cadavers and
rats was then picked up and taken out of the torture cell by a man
with an absolute North American accent who drove her back out
of the torture cell, who knew where she was and would have the
authority to take her out of there. She's never heard anything. Why
not?
I would like to ask for there — as soon as these records are re-
leased, for there to be in-depth hearings on what's happened with
147
our State Department and the CIA in Central America for the last
20 years. It shouldn't matter what nationality all of us women are
or what our color is or anything else. We all have a right to know
what happened to our sons, our daughters, our loved ones, our hus-
bands. We have the right to know, all of us. We're the same, we're
all people, we're all human beings.
And last, I would like to ask that since the human rights viola-
tions continue to escalate in Guatemala, not because Ramiro De
Leon Carpio is a bad man, but he's not the president. He can't even
protect his own family, his cousin was assassinated as soon as he
took office. He has since reversed every human rights position he
ever held.
The daughter-in-law of the assassinated cousin is often run out
of the country. The widow is under consistent death threats. He
can't protect his own family members, much less set the country
in order. The army is still the president. They control the courts.
A judge rules wrong, he's dead. We have brave lawyers like Mrs.
DeVine's lawyer, who is run off the road and almost killed. We
have a brave lawyer like mine, who has a bomb go off in her office
right after the exhumation. I mean, it doesn't work, as long as the
army blocks all institutions and terrorizes all good officials. It's not
that the Guatemalans are bad, it's that there is an evil army con-
trolling them and blocking all evolution.
I'm therefore asking that if they continue to shoot, to murder, to
torture, to rape, to bum, please start phasing in sanctions only
against the army. There are many things we can do. We can stop
the training exercises. We can cancel their visas here. Many of
them are heavily implicated in the drug trade. That is well known.
Why don't we extradite them? Why are we selling them helicopter
parts? Why are we sending them bullets? I mean, there are private
sales.
There are many things we can do to get a clear message through
to the army, We will not support you if you don't respect the law
and if you don't respect the agreements in the peace process that
you have just signed yourselves; you must support your peace
agreements, you must comply. I'm asking you to do that. It's too
late for my husband. It's too late for Mrs. DeVine's husband. It's
too late for both of us as women who loved their husbands. Please
don't let it be too late for anyone else.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Specter. Well, thank you, Ms. Harbury, for that very
compelling testimony.
The course of action that you suggest has a lot of merit, in terms
of the maximum amount of pressure which can be applied by the
United States and other law-abiding and decent countries to try to
stem the abuses of human rights in Guatemala. And your heroic
efforts are instrumental in leading this country in the right path.
It is astounding, in a sense, that you have to undertake hunger
strikes to attract sufficient attention to bring about this kind of a
remedy. But to repeat, this Committee will investigate the matter
fully and do our very best to get to the bottom of it and take action
and make the recommendations and act legislatively to implement
the policy to do our utmost to stop these human rights violations.
148
You mentioned in your testimony Sister Dianna Ortiz, and the
Committee would like to recognize her today. She is a U.S. citizen.
She was raped and tortured in Guatemala with 111 cigarette bums
on her back, which is the information provided to me, which you
have mentioned yourself.
Mrs. DeVine, you have lived in Guatemala many years
Mrs. DeVine. Twenty-four years.
Chairman Specter. You have testified about your own victimiza-
tion through the murder of your husband. You have heard Ms.
Harbury's testimony. What suggestions would you make? Would
you concur with what Ms. Harbury has said? Would you have any
other additional suggestions as to what the United States should
do to try to reverse the human rights abuses in Guatemala?
Mrs. DeVine. Well, my sentiments parallel those of Senator
Kerrey and Senator Shelby. And I'm just asking, do we need tax
dollars to go into covert operations? I don't really know. Like I say,
I don't have much of an idea if we do indeed need these — the CIA
and operating the way they're operating. I lean toward trying it in
the peaceful manner. What about putting dollars into educating the
people?
I'm not really sure, but the idea of paying off, giving our tax dol-
lars to people like perhaps Alpirez and other officers, how do we
know what they tell us is the truth anyway? And aren't there other
ways to find out what we need to find out? Do we have to sneak
around? Can't we do things openly?
As far as my case goes, I would really ask that the Committee
conduct a full and honest investigation into the facts surrounding
the death of my husband. What we want is to find out the truth.
Guatemala is a beautiful country. It needs all the help it can get
from those of us that are here today. And some of us are sitting
here now, some of us are in the audience and others are not
present. It doesn't deserve what's been happening to it, and I don't
know that our government has helped. I don't think the CIA is
really helping by their actions. I really don't know if these allega-
tions are true. But if they are, I think it did a great injustice to
Guatemala.
Chairman Specter. Colonel Cornell, you have been on the scene
for a substantial period of time in Guatemala, and you have a mili-
tary man's perspective and some background in the value of intel-
ligence operations. How do you evaluate what Mrs. DeVine has
said about questioning covert actions? Without making any inap-
propriate disclosure, is the activity being undertaken by the U.S.
Government in Guatemala today worth it in light of what you have
observed as to human rights violations?
Colonel Cornell. Well, I can only speak up to the end of 1993,
but we learned an awful lot and we were able to influence through
the information we received, through various sources, both civilian
and military, in the government of Guatemala. I would hate to see
those cut off, because that information is sometimes very vital to
understanding what is going on, or to prevent something from hap-
pening. Very vital. And so I — I have been out of the scene for over
a year, so I can't evaluate the accusations either.
My time there, though, I felt the activities of all the intelligence
collectors in Guatemala and the products they produced were ex-
149
tremely vital to our efforts, and extremely vital in our efforts to
support human rights, to get to the bottom of cases.
Chairman Specter. To what extent is the U.S. support key, criti-
cal, or important on the war against drugs. Colonel?
Colonel Cornell. I think it is absolutely necessary on the war
against drugs. Guatemala is a transition point — transfer point of
drugs. Literally tons of cocaine coming into Guatemala and then
being transferred from there up to the U.S.
The only intelligence apparatus in Guatemala is the Guatemalan
army's intelligence. So the DEA has had to work close with them
for intelligence and the sharing has, in my time, been very good,
and led to a number of seizures of drug traffickers, drug aircraft,
you know, tons of cocaine. So yes, it's extremely important in the
drug war. Extremely important.
Chairman SPECTER. Ms. DeVine, you have hired a private inves-
tigator. Could you tell the Committee what evidence has been un-
covered or what facts or what indicators, pointing to anybody spe-
cial as being implicated in the assassination, execution of your hus-
band?
Mrs. DeVine. Well, I think both Al Cornell and I went into that,
and are you wanting names right now?
Chairman Specter. Well, if you have — if your investigator — I'm
sorry, I didn't hear your question. You say, do I want names?
Mrs. DeVine. Well, we did perform a complete investigation, we
think, and the soldiers are in prison, the officers are not, and there
are still a few officers out there that we believe are implicated in
the crime, and they have never been brought to trial, and the U.S.
Embassy has been trying to get that accomplished, but it hasn't
come about.
Chairman SPECTER. Well, we will pursue those leads to — one av-
enue which has already been mentioned is to put pressure on the
Guatemalan government and another angle might be to see if there
is sufficient evidence to qualify under the terrorist statute which
would invoke a grant of U.S. jurisdiction to prosecute them our-
selves, to extradite them.
Colonel Cornell, do you have a point to add there?
Colonel Cornell. Go ahead, sir. I lost track of it now.
Chairman SPECTER. Ms. Harbury, do you have anything specific
to add by way of any evidence of directed at whoever murdered
your husband?
Ms. Harbury. The eyewitness, Santiago Cabrera Lopez, issued a
very full list of high level intelligence officials, including Colonel
Alpirez and also Major Sosa Orellana, both of whom are School of
the Americas graduates, as well. That list has been freely available
to all authorities since the very beginning. We still need the files
that the Intelligence Committee has as to, as I started to say be-
fore, progress properly in a number of different forums. Or we ask
the Inter-American Commission needs all the evidence so that they
can send it on up to the Inter-American Court. We need it to
progress for a criminal proceedings in Guatemala.
One of the reasons Colonel Alpirez has not been detained is be-
cause they are saying there is no evidence. They need your evi-
dence, some of the Committee's evidence of some kind. The same
150
thing up here. I can't proceed anywhere on anything until we get
hold of those files.
Chairman Specter. Well, my time has expired. I want to say
now, and I will have a few words to say later about how powerful
your testimony is. There is nothing like hearing it in person, and
like many Americans who will hear your words and see your faces,
will hear the passion and the emotion on television, I think it is
a very, very powerful message which you have conveyed in this
hearing today, and I thank you.
Ms. Harbury. Thank you very much.
Chairman Specter. Senator Kerrey.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Cornell, I would hke to, in this first round, ask you a se-
ries of questions just so I can get an understanding of the detail,
the chronology, and your relationship, in particular, to the CIA and
some of the things that you observed at the time.
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. To be clear on this, you were present in
country, you were the defense attache in June—June 8, 1990, when
Michael DeVine was murdered?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And you remained in country all the
way through the end of December 1993?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, I left on January 11, 1994. January 11,
1994 I departed Guatemala.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And then you got out of the service in
February 1994?
Colonel Cornell. 1994, yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you were there all the way through
January 1994, you were there all the way through the trial?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there for the guilty verdict
and you were there for the appellate court conviction in May 1993.
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there when Serrano closed the
court.
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. No, you were not there when Serrano
closed the courts.
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. In May 1994?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. No, that was in May 1993.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. May 1993 he closed the courts?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you were there when he closed the
courts. I got my date, year off, which is why I need to go through
this. So you were there then through the election of Carpio?
Colonel Cornell. Of De Leon, yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You were there? All right.
Let me — I just wanted to set that for my own understanding. Let
me go through a series of questions with you.
You then worked on the DeVine case, not necessarily from June,
but certainly July 18 when you made a visit to military zone 23
along with the naval attache?
151
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Were you involved from then all the way
through January 1994 when you departed country?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman KERREY. Now, during that period, did any mem-
ber of the embassy staff present information naming a specific
Guatemalan officer as having ordered the killing of Mr. DeVine?
Colonel Cornell. No. No, not a specific officer, no.
Vice Chairman KERREY. I mean, did — when you say not a specific
officer
Colonel Cornell. Well, we do have some information I'd rather
discuss in a closed hearing concerning some of the — some sources
and some reports made as to where the blame may lie, but I am
like Carole right now, I still don't know today what was the real
reason they killed him. I have heard a couple of versions. I am still
not convinced that we know the whole story yet.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, without getting into specifics then,
was U.S. intelligence collected in Guatemala and elsewhere impor-
tant in the identification and conviction of Mr. DeVine's mur-
derers? In other words, did the intelligence that we collect provide
some assists to the conviction, or what the incriminating informa-
tion provided from sources other than intelligence?
Colonel Cornell. No, the incriminating information really was
provided by the situation itself, not from intelligence sources. The
five originally arrested enlisted men finally, thinking they were
being sold out, finally talked, explained what they had seen, the or-
ganization of this second group under Captain Contrares, going to
Poptun, and
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did intelligence provide any information
to the ambassador that enabled him to keep the pressure on the
Guatemalan government?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. For trial?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So even though it may not have resulted
in any evidence at the trial
Colonel Cornell. Initial information that we were getting was
that the — certain members of the army staff were stiffing us, and
so we realized we were on the right track.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So for example, when Ambassador
Stroock goes and sees the President on 31 January 1991, saying no
military aid, he's being supplied information by our intelligence
people that enabled him to say that or reinforced his
Colonel Cornell. It enabled him to say there's been no progress,
you're not cooperating, your blocking the case, and therefore, we
can't reopen it. Serrano wanted a clean slate.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Similarly, when Cheney came in Feb-
ruary 1992, I mean, was intelligence providing our Defense Sec-
retary with information that enables him to deliver the same mes-
sage?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. You observed the Guatemalan military
for four years. Colonel Cornell. To what extent did U.S. training
152
and U.S. intelligence programs make the Guatemalan military sen-
sitive to human rights?
Colonel Cornell. My impression was that we had, when I ar-
rived, a layer of hardliners and a layer of progressives. The pro-
gressives tended to be the mid-range junior officers, some of them
were senior officers.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you speak directly to the issue of
the School of the Americas?
Colonel Cornell. Well, the School of the Americas, I think,
played a role in helping these officers understand our position on
human rights, understand the value of human rights to other pro-
grams, such as democracy and development.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you believe it changed behavior?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Constructively?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. From your observation of the readiness
and the equipment of the Guatemalan military, did it appear to
you — and we have read reports to the contrary, but did it appear
to you that they received compensation funding from some other
source to make up for the 1991 cutoff?
Colonel Cornell. No, sir. The cutoff was 21 December 90,
and
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So you saw nothing in 1991 that indi-
cated to you that there was an alternative source of funding that
the Guatemalan military was using?
Colonel Cornell. Absolutely not, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Did you see any indication that there
was a deterioration of capacity as a result of the cut off in military
funding? Did it have an impact?
Colonel Cornell. It was minimal, sir. The impact was primarily
in the air force and the navy. They relied on our parts to keep their
aircraft flying.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And were they unable to keep their air-
craft flying as a consequence?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. By the time I left, almost all
their aircraft, especially a jet aircraft, were grounded.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you describe. Colonel, the Guate-
malan environment at the time of your service there? You were
there for four and a half years, in terms of political crime and
human rights situation?
Colonel Cornell. It was an environment that — it was a transi-
tion environment or atmosphere. It had been very difficult during
the height of the guerrilla war. Now we had gone through one com-
plete civilian presidency into another and we were seeing improve-
ments being made, we were seeing, for example, the press talking
about human rights in 1989 and 1990, where they wouldn't talk
about it in 1985 because they were scared to death. So we were
seeing improvements, but still we were seeing problems. And we
were continuing to have problems in the embassy with the govern-
ment over human rights cases.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So speaking to your four D's, democra-
tization being the top of the list, do you believe that U.S. involve-
153
ment in Guatemala has advanced the cause of democracy in the
country?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir, I do.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Can you give me some examples beyond
the freedom of press?
Colonel Cornell. I think the best one is when President Serrano
took over the government. It was mid and junior range officers, up
to majors, lieutenant colonels that went to the minister of defense
and said, hey, we're outside the constitution. You need to go back
to the president and get us back into constitution;. And if you guys
don't, we're going to ask you guys to step down and we'll go up to
the president and ask him to step down and put this country back
under civilian rule. And this was in May 1993, and this was a
shock to all Guatemalans because Guatemalans themselves didn't
realize that the mentality of the military had been transforming
away from dominating the government.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you have ideas on how this Commit-
tee could assist Mrs. DeVine and Ms. Harbury in getting the Gua-
temalan government — I mean, it seems to me that we could put
pressure on the Guatemalan government to, on the one hand, pro-
vide an accounting of an individual who is presumed dead and/or
missing, or on the other hand, to get Captain Contreras back or to
carry on the prosecution. Perhaps you can describe the current lay
of the land in Guatemala as to the case against Alpirez?
Colonel Cornell. I think you have to keep up the diplomatic
pressure. I think that is where the answer is. You have got to keep
the pressure on and hang on to it just like Carole did with her
case, you have to hang on like a bull dog, even though they may
not like it. There is not much you can do — you can cut off aid,
we've already done that. You can cut off their schooling. I believe
we've already done that. You just have to keep up the diplomatic
pressure and the demarches and just keep beating them over the
head until you get their attention, until you start seeing some
changes in behavior. And I believe we have seen a lot of changes
over my time there, but there is still more to come.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I appreciate it. Colonel.
Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much. Senator Kerrey.
I am going to have to excuse myself for a few moments, because
there is a conference on appropriations going on and I have just
gotten a call from Senator Kerry and Congressman Porter and I
will be back as promptly as I can, and Senator Kerrey will preside,
and our next Senator for questioning is Senator Cohen.
Senator Cohen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me thank this panel for its testimony. I must say I wish
you had actually been listed as our first panel. I think that your
stories would have placed in greater perspective the monstrous evil
that you've had to confront over the years and the absolute level
of frustration you've experienced in trying to gather up whatever
resources were available to you personally and to you as a citizen
of the United States. You have described your frustration in lan-
guage and with passion that has rarely been demonstrated before
any panel of Congress that I have ever served on.
154
I might suggest, Colonel, you said very little we could do but
pressure. What about cutting off their visas? Has that been done
as well?
Colonel Cornell. It has been done, I don't know to what extent.
I do know, for example, that officers or enlisted men that are sus-
pected of being involved in drug trafficking, if we can get somebody
to tell us who they are, then we make an effort, for example, to
prevent their travel to the States. I am not sure the status, for ex-
ample, of — I believe that, for example, Colonel Alpirez is cut off
from going to the States. I may be talking out of turn or out of
school, but I am pretty sure that's the case.
I do know the commander of military zone 23 that was the com-
mander of that whole area when Mrs. DeVine's husband was killed,
he came in the embassy in 1993 for a visa and the counsel general
sent him packing. So I do know that it does take place. I was not
in the consulate every day but I watched it take place.
Senator COHEN. As a retired Army officer, and one who had, I
assume, considerable contact with the Guatemalan military, did
you not? Is it fair to say that the enlisted men would have been
able to engage in the abduction of Mr. DeVine without either the
knowledge of or complicity on the part of their superiors based on
your knowledge of their actions, activities?
Colonel Cornell. Based on my knowledge, I can't imagine such
a thing happening without orders from above.
Senator COHEN. So it's reasonable to presume that a team from
military zone 23 headquarters would not be able to work out of spe-
cial forces school that Colonel Alpirez headed, arrest Mr. DeVine,
torture him, question him at special forces school, and then kill
him without the colonel's knowledge or approval?
Colonel Cornell. It's unreasonable to think they did anything
like that without orders.
Senator Cohen. So when you first met Colonel Alpirez, he simply
dismissed it as a police matter, has no knowledge.
Colonel Cornell. When I first met Colonel Alpirez, and of
course, I went over and talked to the zone commander, at that time
we had not had any evidence in any direction. We had no sus-
picions of who might have done it and they knew that at the time
also. Their coverup had started. We didn't know it yet. We really
knew it when Mrs. DeVine gave us a list of five names and then
the reaction to the army to us starting to pressure for that, we re-
alized, oh, we're on to something now. And from then on it was evi-
dent.
Senator COHEN. And during that time, what was the nature of
the information being shared with you from our intelligence agen-
cies? You, and embassy officials?
Colonel Cornell. I would classify it as good. We had regular
country team meetings with the ambassador to discuss all of these
types of cases. But when the DeVine case hit, it was a regular topic
of discussion.
Senator COHEN. Are you satisfied that you were given full infor-
mation during the time that you were involved in this particular
matter by the intelligence agencies? I am asking you now in retro-
spect, looking back, based upon what you know today as to what —
compared to what you knew then?
155
Colonel Cornell. Well, I hope I was. I have seen some things
in the press that I wasn't aware of, but I don't know the validity
of what's in the press. I know some things in the press are com-
pletely erroneous, so I am not sure how to gauge the rest of it. But
I felt I had a real good relationship with the station chief and that
he was sharing things with us as he was with the ambassador and
the rest of the country team.
Senator Cohen. And were it to turn out that information was not
being shared with you, that would sort of undercut what the am-
bassador was doing very courageously in issuing demarches. I am
told that he was virtually in danger of being thrown out of the
country and listed as persona non grata at one point.
Colonel Cornell. He came very close on 31 January 1991, when
he had a confrontation with President Serrano over the DeVine
case and human rights, and it was human rights that it was over,
and he came very close. But I felt that he was being given all the
information.
Senator Cohen. I'm sorry?
Colonel Cornell. I always felt that he was being given all the
information.
Senator Cohen. That's' your belief.
Colonel Cornell. That's a personal opinion; I don't know that.
I don't have knowledge of that for a fact. I know I gave him every-
thing, because he read everything we wrote and everything we did.
Senator COHEN. Mrs. DeVine, you hired a private investigator?
Mrs. DeVine. Yes, I did.
Senator COHEN. And almost immediately after your hiring a per-
sonal investigator, you started to get information that was helpful
to you at that time?
Mrs. DeVine. Definitely, yes.
Senator Cohen. Can you tell us why it was a personal investiga-
tor was able to get information where the embassy or other officials
were not able to do so? I mean, what kind of access did he or she
have that was not available to you through the official channels
that you tried?
Mrs. DeVine. Since I really don't know how things like this
work, it was two days after we buried my husband that I had a
meeting with this private investigator who was referred to me by
a very good friend, and my prospective lawyer, who turned out to
be the lawyer that I did contract. I had no idea how to proceed.
Like I really am not sure now. I was just being guided along and
this particular investigator had lived in Guatemala a number of
years and he had handled very delicate cases with great success be-
fore that. And I didn't know if it was my responsibility to acquire
an investigator or if the embassy — at this point I hadn't even met
Ambassador Stroock. I was on my way to meet the ambassador, but
an hour before I met him, I met my investigator.
And no one ever said that you shouldn't hire an investigator, the
embassy will take over and do it. It just flowed, and we all worked
together, and I always thought that was the way it was supposed
to be, because I really don't know. But it worked.
Senator Cohen. Now, you indicated that your attorney had been
threatened, driven off the road
156
Mrs. DeVine. He had been threatened on many, many occasions,
as well as the investigator, close friends, people that work for me,
witnesses.
Senator Cohen. What about you, have you been threatened?
Mrs. DeVine. I personally hadn't been threatened, no.
Senator Cohen. And Mrs. Harbury, what about you?
Ms. Harbury. In the last, on the hunger strike, a truck drove —
a car drove in front of the national palace and hung a machine gun
or some large shotgun out the window — I was asleep. I was threat-
ened with deportation, they were saying I had entered the country
illegally, even though I had the stamp on my passport. They sent
the equivalent of a lynch mob out until I started telling police that
we don't have to do another travel advisory, it would be bad for
your tourist industry, then they all left. I was put number one on
a list of eight in a death list, a hit squad list that was published
in the papers the day I got taken out to the cemetery. I have had
frivolous law suits filed against me. I have difficulty getting any
stamps from the consulates. The last I heard, after IMET was cut
off, there were headline banners saying that I admitted in my book
I was a gun runner for the guerrillas. Funny thing, I wrote the
book and I don't remember that particular quotation. And I under-
stand now that although Colonel Alpirez has not been detained
and, in fact, the president is suggesting he sue Mr. Torrecilli for
slander, but if I returned to the country, I would be immediately
subject to arrest as a subversive.
Senator Cohen. Well, I was particularly interested in the state-
ment that was given to you that just one person shouldn't impede
the peace process. It struck me, as I was listening to you say that,
I was thinking of the quote attributed to Stalin, who said that the
death of one person is a tragedy, the death of a million, a statistic.
And it seems that it has almost been inverted in your case and
that your husband's death has been treated much like a statistic
rather than a tragedy.
Ms. Harbury. Well, it was very terrifying for me, and which I
left my Guatemalan friends had been in agreement with. And I
would point out I have a letter of support signed by 25 of the lead-
ing indigenous rights groups and widows co-ops, et cetera, in Gua-
temala, was that with this level of clear evidence, never again will
we have this much evidence, an eyewitness that can name all of
the top level colonels and majors, first names, both last names,
rank and position, date and place, together with confirmation by
the CIA, this is never going to happen again. And I knew that if
I just gave up and let this happen and they got away with it, then
there go another 150,000 civilians. I just couldn't let that happen.
It's not an individual case. It was landmark test case.
Senator Cohen. Mrs. Harbury and Mrs. DeVine, let me say that
you have given some of the most powerful and passionate testi-
mony I have ever heard, and you have carried it yourselves with
I think great grace and restraint under the circumstances. The old
expression about one man with courage makes a majority has to
be revised now. We have to say two women with courage can make
a revolution, in terms of our relationships with other countries.
And I really believe that what you have done personally in terms
of your own personal persistence and perseverance and heroism as
157
such can change our attitudes, and not simply permit your husband
or Mr. DeVine to be a statistic in the relationship while pursuing
this peace process in Guatemala.
But thank you very much for coming before us.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. DeVine, you have lived in Guatemala for 24 years, I believe
you said.
Mrs. DeVine. Yes.
Senator DeWine. Could you describe for me what your weekly
contact would be, if any, with the military, or your observations of
the military? What — for the area where you lived, what contact
would you have, or what would you observe?
Mrs. DeVine. Are you speaking at the present time or in the
past? It changed.
Senator DeWine.
Senator Cohen. Tell me the difference. Talk about both.
Mrs. DeVine. When Michael and I first arrived in Poptun, the
army played a bigger role in the community. They would do things
like work on the roads. It was a construction battalion. And they
would often have dinners, formal — very, very formal affairs out in
the middle of nowhere, in the middle of the jungle. The town had
no electricity, but they would have these beautiful dinners, ma-
rimba music, and we would receive engraved invitations by the
commander to go to these affairs, which we did.
And as time went on, the construction battalion was moved to
another area, and new people came in, and there was less and less
contact with the local townsfolk.
And Mike and I owned a cafeteria in the town — a very small
town of Poptun, it's like a frontier town. And soldiers and officers
would come in. We were one of the very few restaurants in town.
We weren't a bar. It was a very decent place. Very reasonable
prices. And people could come in, the Indian people, the local folks
that didn't nave a lot of money, could have a hamburger which
they didn't even know what they were most of the time — we had
to educate them. And they could bring their family in for a cup of
hot chocolate and feel like they went somewhere. Before there was
nothing like that in the town of Poptun.
Well, because of the business, we got to know more soldiers, their
families, the officers. But in reality, our social life had very little
to do with anybody in the military. We were closer to the local
townsfolk, the school teachers, some specialists in the army, which
just means like a man goes to work for the army but he is not a
part of the army and he goes home to his house at night in the
town of Poptun.
But basically we were not on friendly terms, meaning friends,
friends to visit in the evening, with anybody in the army.
Senator DeWine. Did that change over time? Or was that the
change?
Mrs. DeVine. That was in the latter years. The first 10 years,
yes. After that, no. Then, after my husband's — always, though, be-
cause we ran a camp ground and guest house, people were curious
about us. Whenever there were visiting dignitaries to the base of
Poptun, the commanders or officials would bring them out to intro-
158
duce us, for Mike to show them around our farm. We were doing
things that they hadn't heard of, Uke organic farming. So we did
frequently have visitors. But it was still more in an official sense,
not friendly-friendly.
After the death of Michael and the new commander came in,
about two years ago, things changed. He was under orders from
General Kilo who was the minister of state or something like
that — he's with the army. To take care of us out there. So the com-
mander of the base came out with his family, two boys, frequently.
He had dinner, very polite man. He was one of the new style offi-
cers that Colonel Cornell was telling us about, that looked to the
future. He was a very gentle, I felt, honest man, and he would
bring his officers out and they would bring their wives out. It was
nice. I wouldn't ever say we were friendly-friendly, but they made
an effort.
Senator DeWine. Thank you.
Colonel, you served in Central America and South America for
some time. Where would you place Guatemala on the scale as far
as human rights violations?
Colonel Cornell. Well, that's difficult, because there are so
many countries in Latin America, so many I haven't served in.
Senator DeWine. I understand.
Colonel Cornell. But I would say it's toward the bottom of the
rung. It's got a ways to go from what I've seen in a lot of the other
countries.
Senator DeWine. During the time you were there, you have de-
scribed— well, I'll let you categorize it, I won't — improvement?
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. You, in response to another question that was
asked, talked a little bit about the use of the intelligence informa-
tion that you received, the embassy received. And I understand and
you understand we are in a public meeting, but I wonder if you
could give us a little more feel, without getting too specific, about
how valuable that type of information is? I mean, you described it
as vital, enabled you to get to the bottom of cases — I assume you
meant human rights violation cases. Because I think it goes to one
of the bigger questions that has to be looked at, not just in regard
to Guatemala, but obviously in regard to the use of the CIA in this
era.
Colonel Cornell. In a real time sense, in my experience in Gua-
temala, there were instances where information received allowed
us to react quickly with the host government or react quickly with
other sources to try to save someone's life.
Senator DeWine. Did it save lives do you think, or not?
Colonel Cornell. I think it did, yes, sir. I wouldn't say a lot of
them, but I would say there are situations where our quick inter-
vention as an embassy, based on information slipped to us really
had an impact or really got a favorable reaction when we didn't ex-
pect it.
Senator DeWine. I assume the situation was that in some cases
the information was good and in some cases the information wasn't
good?
Colonel Cornell. Well, that happens, but, yes, sir. But I would
say most of the time it was good. It also helped us in another way.
159
not so life threatening, but through information received Hke that
about human rights, it helped us go to the host government, when
we would hear, for example, of some important changes or impor-
tant appointments within the military, it would allow us to go to
the host government and say, you guys are making a big mistake.
You're going to put so and so in that job? With his background?
And they would look at us like, how do you know that? And all of
a sudden you would see them back away or you would see a change
of assignment and it was directly a result of information we had
found out and we would go and we would raise the issue. And it
was information on human rights and information on suspicion of
an officer, for example, involved in drugs.
Senator DeWine. You described a situation in regard to — speak-
ing of drugs — Guatemala being a transshipment point for drugs.
How did that change over the period of time you were there, if it
did, and again in regard to the information you were receiving, the
intelligence information, what impact did that have on what you
did? Did it matter?
Colonel Cornell. No, it had a major impact on seizures and
working together. You can have the information, but you've got to
be able to work with the host government. In the case there, the
treasury police are responsible for — they have the arrest authority
in drug cases. So the DEA and the embassy would have to work
with the Treasury police to make seizures. And the intelligence
provided by Guatemalans who were key in taking down those sei-
zures.
Yes, sir.
Senator DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to say, as several members have, that the testimony, Ms.
Harbury, and I missed your's, Ms. DeVine, but from the followup,
I will just say I appreciate the loyalty and the tenacity that you
have to your late husbands. I think that you have shown a lot of
guts and I appreciate it very, very much.
This morning I said I thought there were basically three issues
here. First is the policy regarding the information that comes to
this Committee as the oversight Committee for the CIA, and how
important I think it is because of the nature of covert operations,
that the communications be very open, so that we can put some
judgment into some of these very difficult issues. And I am very
concerned about the fact that after the death of your husband, Ms.
DeVine, the issue was brought to the Justice Department, which I
certainly appreciate the fact that the officials felt that we should
try to prosecute the murderers of your husband. But nevertheless,
we were not informed and therefore this potential CIA asset contin-
ued to be paid by the United States after there was suspicion that
he was involved.
That is a policy with which we must deal, but certainly your
courage has brought that to our attention.
The second issue is the policy regarding the standards we have
in the CIA for our assets. And once again, you have brought this
160
to our attention with your bravery, but it is something that we
must deal with, and I assure you that we will.
The third issue is the basic treatment of American citizens by the
Department of State. This morning I asked the Secretary of State,
the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Watson, if he felt that the State De-
partment had been forthcoming with both of you regarding your
circumstances? They are different, but clearly you both had need
of help and information and still do, regarding your husbands. Sec-
retary Watson said he felt that they had been forthcoming. And yt,u
I hear your testimony that you had to go to an open records re-
quest and you got the certified copy of a press release. I would like
to ask both Ms. Harbury and Mrs. DeVine how you feel you were
treated by the State Department, and particularly since I didn't
hear your testimony, Mrs. DeVine, I would like to know if you felt
they were forthcoming with regard to your situation. And then I
would like Ms. Harbury to add to that.
Mrs. DeVine. I always thought they were, but right now I am
not so sure. I mean, I am sure that the embassy did everjdihing
that it could and shared with me everything that they knew. But
I am not so sure that there wasn't more to it that they and I didn't
know, and that's what we would like to fmd out.
Senator HUTCHISON. Do you feel — and I still want to give you an
opportunity — but Mrs. DeVine, do you feel that you got information
from the CIA or from the State Department, actually — ^you
wouldn't perhaps have dealt with the CIA — but from the State De-
partment, that was significant in comparison to what your own pri-
vate investigator has brought you?
Mrs. DeVine. I felt that they always shared information and
worked together from the very beginning and still are, as far as I
know it.
Senator Hutchison. So you do feel that they have been forth-
coming .
Mrs. DeVine. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. Ms. Harbury?
Ms. Harbury. You've heard my testimony, of course. I feel that
they were dishonest with me in a very positive sense. And that the
intentionally led me to believe that their opinion that my husband
was dead was only an opinion and nothing more, when, in fact,
there was concrete evidence that he had been ordered executed.
There is a gulf of a difference there and they were willing to let
me risk my life on a second hunger strike without telling me that,
because it was embarrassing.
I would also like to add that there is a coalition called Coalition
Missing of myself and a number of other U.S. citizens, including
Mr. Blake, the brothers of Nicholas Blake, the journalist who was
killed there, and also Diana Ortiz, and a number of other of us. We
have all either ourselves been abused physically or tortured in the
case of Sister Diana Ortiz, or ourselves lost a family member there
as in my own case, or in the Blake family case, and I don't think
any of us are satisfied with the assistance we received from the
U.S. Embassy, although we do understand that Mrs. DeVine was
treated, you know, as she herself was saying, she's been satisfied
with her treatment. But none of the rest of us are. No, we've been
very dissatisfied.
161
Senator Hutchison. You said that you thought you had to go the
open records request route and that was not satisfactory. Let me
say, I think that in defense of U.S. officials, if there is classified
information, obviously there has to be a judgment call about what
can be revealed because it might harm someone else. I think that
is a fair statement.
On the other hand, I think that we do need to look at the policy
of what is shared, particularly in a situation like your's where your
husband was missing really, and you were trying to confirm just
a closure, and I know a closure would be very comforting, even
now, knowing for sure one way or the other. And I want to look
at that policy as well.
I have not heard this just from you. I have heard from many peo-
ple, through the years, not in a partisan way at all, during Repub-
lican administrations, during Democrat administrations, the State
Department has not been forthcoming or helpful many times to our
citizens, and that may or may not be fair, but I certainly think that
we ought to keep looking at that issue and making sure that to the
extent that we can be, that we improve that cooperation, because
many times, when a person is overseas, they have really no other
help and no one to look to other than our own U.S. representative.
And that is something that once again, this coming to light just fo-
cuses a need that I think we must address.
Let me just ask one other question, and perhaps Colonel Cornell
could also add to this, and I would throw it out to any of you, not
as experts, but as people with real world experience in Guatemala.
The President has cut off funding now to the army units in Guate-
mala except for the anti-drug smuggling. Well, from what I have
heard from you today, it seems that there is a lot of suspicion that
there are army personnel involved in the drug smuggling. So I
would just ask you from your experience there if you think that the
Call Cartel drug unit, or I guess an3rwhere else, does it come
through Guatemala, do you think that the money that we would
still be spending on the efforts to shut that down are also possibly
being diverted to the same types of people that would be actually
doing the drug smuggling themselves? In other words, are we con-
tinuing to throw money down a rat hole, even as we have cut off
everything but that?
Ms. Harbury. Yes. And I would recommend reading the 18
writings of a journalist named Mr. Frank Smythe. He has read
through all of the embassy files, and as is common knowledge in
Guatemala, most of the really serious drug runners are high level
military officials. They're the ones with the airplanes. Most Guate-
malans can't afford food, let alone an airplane or a strip of land
where an airplane could land. And any money that goes to drug
trafficking that goes to the army. It's not going to end drug traf-
ficking. No, I mean. I think that is something we have to look very
carefully at.
Senator HUTCHISON. Who did you say, Mr. Wyeth?
Ms. Harbury. Frank Smythe. He wrote a recent article in the
Wall Street Journal which I think exposed that a number of extra-
dition requests of high level military people that we know are in-
volved in drug trafficking, that those extradition requests have not
162
been respected. That was within the last 30 days that that ap-
peared.
Senator HUTCHISON. Colonel?
Colonel Cornell. Well, I have a different view. I don't believe
the Guatemalan army, as an institution, is involved in drug traf-
ficking. I know about Guatemalan officers having been involved
and I am sure there are some still involved. It is true that the
army has kicked out in probably the last four or five years upwards
of 20 to 25 officers because they were involved in drug trafficking.
They kicked them out because they didn't have enough evidence to
try them. Example. An air force colonel flew an aircraft up to Texas
without applying for leave. And when they discovered he had left
country and came back, they figured the only excuse for him doing
that without telling anybody was that he probably got involved in
drug trafficking. So they held an honor board and kicked him out.
We did try to extradite a lieutenant colonel — I don't have a grasp
of the name right now, but we weren't, at least up to the time I
left, able to get him extradited. It was a legal problem. But the
army kicked him out and put him on the streets.
So I am not sure, listening to your question, where this money
is going. I wasn't aware that any money was going to the army
with regards to the drug program. I thought it was primarily being
funneled through the embassy to support the treasury policy. So
maybe I am not well informed in that specific area.
Senator Hutchison. I am only reading the newspaper, and from
what it says here, it appears there is that one amount of funding
that would go to intelligence related activities regarding drug
smuggling, so
Colonel Cornell. Oh, strictly to intelligence related activities,
yes, that possibly is. But the intelligence directorate in Guatemala
has always been very forthcoming with intelligence on trafficking.
They have played a key role in that whole drug war.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Did you want to add, Mrs. DeVine, because my time is up. You
are welcome to.
Mrs. DeVine. The only thing I know is that rumors abound
amongst my Guatemalan friends that army officials are involved in
drugs. That's it. Rumors. I don't know any more.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Thank you. Senator.
I have statements that Senator Baucus and also Senator Mack
wanted included in the record.
[The statements of Senator Baucus and Senator Mack follow:]
Opening Statement of Senator Max Baucus
I would like to thank the Chairman and Vice Chairman for holding this very im-
portant hearing. We have all been seized by the allegations in the press of CLA in-
volvement in Guatemala. The importance of this hearing, therefore, is the fact that
it is being held under the full scrutiny of the public. Now that important allegations
of CIA misdeeds are before the public, we all must work to get accurate information
to them. Intelligence is extremely important, but the American people have dif-
ficulty supporting this activity when these sorts of allegations arise and they remain
unanswered.
I am hopeful that the Committee's investigation into the allegations will answer
some very important questions.
163
Was the CIA a channel for funds to the Guatemalan Government after official
funding had been cut off in the wake of the brutal murder of the American, Michael
DeVine?
Were any funds used by the CIA consistent with U.S. policy at the time?
Were all CIA activities within full view of U.S. pohcy makers, both in Guatemala
and in Washington?
Did the CIA knowingly support people in Guatemala who were suspected of per-
petrating human rights abuses?
If CIA personnel acted outside U.S. poUcy, have they been held accountable for
their actions, and what actions have been taken to hold them accountable?
I realize that some of the answers to these questions may be difficult to answer
in an open forum. But as we are all well aware, CIA's future is being seriously ques-
tioned. One of the most important issues being raised about their futiire concerns
accountability. This Committee seriously questioned whether those involved in the
Aldrich Ames spy case had been properly held accountable for their actions. At the
time that we were looking into the Ames case, I believed that they had not been.
In the issue before us today, the question of accountability is even larger. Not only
am I concerned whether or not members of the CIA are being held accountable for
their actions, but was the CIA itself accountable to policy makers who were trying
to pursue a consistent foreign policy with regard to Guatemala and alleged human
rights abuses there?
So Mr. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, thank you for holding this public hear-
ing and for getting the Committee involved in this very important matter. I am sure
that the Committee's report will help the American people to understand better
what has happened.
Opening Statement of Senator Connie Mack
Congress has an obligation to ensure that U.S. intelligence agencies operate with-
in the law and in a fashion consistent with U.S. interests and values. Congress also
has a responsibility to ensure that the intelligence community has the resources, or-
ganization, and personnel necessary to effectively support civilian policymakers and
the U.S. military. In order to simultaneously meet both objectives — conducting over-
sight while protecting U.S. national security — the InteUigence Committees in both
Houses of Congress conduct almost all of their deliberations in private.
Last year, there was a public clamor for information regarding the Ames case.
The Senate Intelligence Committee responded, after a thorough and lengthy inves-
tigation, by publishing a detailed report, passing counterintelligence legislation and
makinjg administrative recommendations to improve U.S. counterintelligence prac-
tices. The Committee did not, however, hold public hearings on the Ames case or
release information until after it had carefully gathered and assessed the facts. In
my view, that is also the approach that the committee should follow with regard
to the recent allegations concerning CIA activities in Guatemala.
Unfortunately, todays hearing is being held at a time when security classification
prevents committee members from candidly questioning the witnesses or stating
facts that are critical to the issues that will be raised. Without in any way intending
to do so, this hearing could therefore mislead the public. Alternatively, or in addi-
tion, this hearing coiUd inadvertently lead to the disclosure of sensitive information.
I believe that as a result of the investigations being undertaken by the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees, the CIA, NSA, and Army IG's, the President's In-
telligence Oversight Board, and the FBI, virtually everything connected with intel-
ligence activities in Guatemala will soon come to light. Holding a hearing at this
time, however, when members and witnesses are severely constrained by the classi-
fication of critical information, and the sensitivity of ongoing investigations, seems
at best awkward and at worst a potential disservice to U.S. government employees,
the families involved, and the public. Consequently, I expressed my concerns to the
Chairman and informed him that I would not be participating in the hearing.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I think it relevant to read at least part
of a statement that was provided — testimony provided by Mr. Rob-
ert M. Bryant, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation, regarding a copy of a letter sent to
the Attorney General from Congressman Torricelli, a letter sent for
an allegation that an Army intelligence officer currently assigned
at NSA is involved in purging records regarding communications
intercepts which show U.S. Army Intelligence involvement in the
164
murders that we are discussing today. DOJ referred this to the FBI
on March 29.
On March 30, the FBI was tasked by DOJ to investigate allega-
tions of possible obstruction of justice. The investigation was initi-
ated at NSA to determine if any records were being destroyed.
On March 31 contact was established with the respective Inspec-
tor General elements of the CIA, Department of Defense, and Drug
Enforcement Administration regarding the alleged destruction of
materials and the possible obstruction of justice.
As a result of the FBI's investigation into the possible obstruc-
tion of justice, the FBI is aware that separate inquiries are being
conducted by the respective IGs of the Central Intelligence Agency,
the DOJ, NSA, and the Department of Defense. The FBI is unable
to comment on the scope and current status of each.
[The statement of Mr. Bryant follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Bryant
On 3/29/95, the Department of Justice (DOJ) referred to the FBI a copy of a letter
sent to the Attorney General from Robert G. Torricelli, a Member of Congress. The
letter set forth an allegation that an Army Intelligence Officer, currently assigned
to the National Security Agency (NSA), is involved in purging records regarding
communication intercepts which show U.S. Army Intelligence involvement in the
mvu-der of Michael DeVine in 1990, and Efrain Bamaca Velasquez in 1992.
On 3/30/95, the FBI was tasked by DOJ to investigate allegations of possible ob-
struction of justice. The investigation was initiated at NSA to determine if any
records were being destroyed or purged regarding the allegations as set forth by
Congressman TorricelU. The FBI is undertaking the appropriate investigation, in-
cluding interviews and review of documents, in connection with this matter. How-
ever, the FBI is not involved in directing or participating in any other criminal
investigation(s) at the present time.
On 3/31795, contact was estabUshed with the respective Inspector General ele-
ments of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration, regarding the alleged destruction of materials and the
possible obstruction of justice.
As a result of the FBI's investigation into the possible obstruction of justice, the
FBI is aware that separate inquiries are being conducted by the respective Inspector
Generals for the Central Intelligence Agency, the DOJ, the NSA, and the Depart-
ment of Defense. The FBI is unable to comment on the scope and current status
of each.
The FBI's investigation into the alleged obstruction of justice is pending and will
be resolved as soon as possible after appropriate consultation with DOJ.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Colonel, and Mrs. DeVine as well, and
Ms. Harbury, I would like to talk about current status in Guate-
mala. We are going to be going into closed session in another 15
or 20 minutes and we are going to be trying to decide, not just
then, of course, but at points here in the future, precisely what it
is that we ought to do. I mean, for your information, there are four
Guatemalan legislators in town this week. Staff will be meeting
with them to discuss some questions that they have as well, so
there is contact that is continuing.
But in order for me to sort of ascertain what might be possible,
it would be useful to kind of walk through Colonel Cornell, what
caused the Guatemalan government to take action as they did in
1991 and 1992. I mean, Mrs. DeVine said regarding this first ever
conviction by a military tribunal, it took a great deal of courage to
do it, it demonstrates that people are willing to risk their lives,
though you go on to say quite accurately, the truth is not yet been
identified. It does seem to me that there are the rudiments of a jus-
165
tice system operating there and certainly with a kind of human
rights abuses in the country, it's not the sort of thing that some-
body typically thinks of when you're looking for redress for these
kinds of grievances. I need to look there to try to discover whether
or not courses of action that we are going to consider likely can be
successful.
As I understand it again, Colonel Cornell, from your testimony,
after you met, defense and naval attache had a visit on July 18,
1990, that five names end up being identified by the private inves-
tigator that Mrs. DeVine had hired. Ambassador Stroock then pre-
sents this list to the defense minister. And sometime in September
1990, the ambassador recommends action to the Department of
State in December 1990. Suspended limited aid that was being pro-
vided about that time, around the first of the year. Serrano was
elected in January with a new minister of defense. Stroock now
says no military aid, that's about the time they were going to make
him persona non grata. The five that were held in jail implicate
seven others and then you end up with a military tribunal that
takes action, not until when — not until September 1992.
What was successful during that? I mean, what — again, is it —
is it pressure from the ambassador? Is it the cutting off of aid? Is
it public opinion in Guatemala, I mean, what sort of things occur
there that would provide you, if you were sitting in my diminutive
shoes, what would you consider on your list of things to do at this
point in time?
Colonel Cornell. That's a good question.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Again, if the goal is still to advance de-
mocracy and improve the environment for human rights in Guate-
mala?
Colonel Cornell. When Ambassador Stroock, with the State De-
partment instructions, in essence the State Department or the U.S.
Government cut off assistance to Guatemala, we really didn't get
much of a reaction out of the minister of defense. It didn't seem to
bother him that much. But it was important in the process, be-
cause when President Serrano fired him in December 1991 and ap-
pointed a General Garcia Samayoa as minister and General Ro-
berto Perussina as army chief, they immediately turned all that at-
titude around. They called me into the office. They said look, we
know you have been having a rough time up to now on this DeVine
case, but we're going to solve it. We're going to open the doors,
we're going to tell the tribunal to get moving, and we want this
thing resolved. And the attitude of those two generals was com-
pletely different than their predecessors.
And I think a lot of it, the pressure contributed to that. These
two generals felt that the image of the army was suffering and it
needed to be repaired. The generals prior to that just weren't — we
just weren't able to motivate them strongly enough. So the pres-
sure did help, but it helped with the next pair of generals that
came up.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And President De Leon was elected last
June 5 by the Congress to fill out
Colonel Cornell. He was elected in June 1993 to fill out the rest
of Serrano's term. Yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So he's been in place almost two years?
166
Colonel Cornell. Yes, sir. The new president will come in next
January.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. There will be an election in
Colonel Cornell. Be an election in November.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Of this year.
Colonel Cornell. Of this year, yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And is there campaigning going on right
now then?
Colonel Cornell. Well, Carole could probably tell you more than
I. I am hearing just little bits and pieces that there's a lot of ma-
neuvering going on, but there'll be first rounds in November and
if nobody wins by 50 percent or more, then the second round of the
top two candidates will occur beginning in January, and two weeks
later the new government moves in.
Vice Chairman KERREY. Ms. DeVine, can you talk about the elec-
tions? What is the environment? What is the environment for de-
mocracy amongst your Guatemalan friends?
Mrs. DeVine. Well, that's very difficult for me. There were some-
thing like 20 candidates the last time I read a paper, and of course,
I don't know how many are really going to end up running for
president. Everybody has high hopes and the presidents promise
you the world.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Is the army the strongest institution in
the country?
Mrs. DeVine. I believe it is.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. And is there a standing army in Guate-
mala in excess of what is necessary to maintain order, would you
say. Colonel Cornell, in your experience?
Colonel Cornell. No, sir, I wouldn't say it is excessive in terms
of per capita. The unfortunate part about Guatemala, there just
hasn't been enough resources. It's a very poor country. They are
not able to hire a lot of police and when they do have police, they
are not able to train them very well, and in the area where Carole
DeVine lives is larger than El Salvador and it only has 80 police-
men on duty — I mean 80 policemen period. That's treasury policy,
national police, customs police. So you may have 20 or 25 on duty
at any one time in an area larger than El Salvador, with 300,000
people.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. So what is the value then of providing
X millions of dollars a year for military intelligence?
Colonel Cornell. I am not sure I understand where that ques-
tion
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Well, we were providing X millions of
dollars to Guatemala, were we not, to improve the quality of their
military intelligence. Yes, is that
Colonel Cornell. I suppose. I wasn't involved in that program,
sir.
Vice Chairman ICerrey. Well, what kind of development assist-
ance were you providing during your period of time there? That
was the second D on your list? I mean, what
Colonel Cornell. There was a number of programs through AID.
It was starting to be scaled back when I arrived, but as I think
Ambassador Watson said, a total of over $900 million in assistance
through the 1980's into the 1990's. It was in all variety of things.
167
from small businesses to helping farmers, it was in all kinds of sec-
tors, economic sectors.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Ms. Harbury, were you going to
Ms. Harbury. Yeah, I would like to comment just very briefly on
the two issues that you just raised. I mean, it is true that there
are few police in Guatemala. Guatemala is a Mayan country. They
are 70 percent Maya. They have had their own way of policing
their people and taking care of their regions. And I would like to
point out, until the army began its rampage of counterinsurgency,
there weren't massacres, there werent burning villages, there
weren't any of those things. If you read the recent MINUGUA Re-
port, the investigatory report by the U.N. team down there, the
army has a virtual monopoly on human rights violations. It's not
common crime.
If we want the country to be able to settle down and institutions
to begin to grow, we've got to get the army off the backs of the
courts, off the backs of the police, and out of these villages. The
same goes for the electoral process. There can be a million can-
didates running, but if none can run on an independent platform
without fear of assassination, there can be no reform and therefore
no change. And meanwhile there still remains a very large chunk
of the Mayan population that hasn't even been registered to vote.
So I don't see a very good prognosis, no. I think it will be very simi-
lar to the last election where almost no one voted, and as a result
Rios Mont, known to be the worst human rights violator ever in
Guatemala, let alone the hemisphere, is hoping to run for president
again and has already been elected to a high position in the con-
gress.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. What do you make then, Ms. Harbury,
of the coalition of student, business, and military forces that forced
President Serrano from office in June 1993.
Ms. Harbury. I thought that that was very wonderful, that
Serrano was forced from office for his improper efforts. I thought
it was also very good that Clinton cut off all moneys immediately
to Guatemala. That's why De Leon Carpio was able to become
president. The problem is that we didn't follow up on it and the
Guatemalan civilians weren't strong enough to follow up on it.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. But was the military a part of that coali-
tion to force President Serrano from office?
Ms. Harbury. No, I don't believe they were.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Colonel Cornell, in your chronology, you
said that they were.
Colonel Cornell. They were the major player, yes, sir. They
were the ones that finally went to the president, eyeball to eyeball,
and said you're going to have to leave.
Ms. Harbury. But then they also tried to put the vice president
in. It was not the army's idea to put De Leon Carpio into power.
That's why De Leon Carpio's cousin was assassinated shortly after
he came into office. It was a warning to him.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Do you agree?
Colonel Cornell. No, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. What's your view?
Colonel Cornell. All evidence indicates that the death of Jorge
Carpio was a criminal activity by a gang of thieves that operated
168
on the road between Chichicastenango and the main highway to
Guatemala City. We had had a number of incidents before where
those same thieves had stopped, even bus loads of people — had a
soccer team from Puerto Rico stopped and everything was stolen by
those thieves. They always worked at night. And Jorge Carpio
chose to drive back to the city late at night and ran into that
group. That was the evidence we had by the time I left. There was
no evidence it was politically motivated at all.
Ms. Harbury. In fact, he was assassinated very near a military
base on a rural road by I think 27 or 25 gunmen, with ski masks,
military style rifles and boots, yelling "Get Carpio." Both the widow
and daughter-in-law have tirelessly worked to uncover that it was
the army that assassinated their father-in-law and their husband.
I believe that both the United Nations and the local archbishop's
office, et cetera, have long since accepted that this was an army as-
sassination.
Of course, this all did come to light, I think. Colonel Cornell,
with all due respect, after you had left. Because I had heard at the
beginning that it was believed to be a gangland killing. That is not
the accepted interpretation any longer.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Anything else. Colonel Cornell, on that?
Colonel Cornell. Just to make a comment. The officers were
scared when Serrano took over the government, what the
autogolpe, or the self coup, because they, especially the mid and
junior range officers felt they were heading in the right direction,
complete democracy. And they got scared they were going to get
thrown back to the days of the early 1980's or the late 1970's all
over again. And so they really spoke up.
Once Ramiro De Leon Carpio came into office — up to that time
he was not a friend of the army, I'll tell you that — he took the army
to task on every human rights case that he thought involved the
army — he took them to task. But a number of officers got me aside
quietly and said, you know, we may not know this guy and he may
not know us, and we may have been, you know, on opposite sides
of issues for the last three years, but a number of officers said, you
know, it is probably the best thing that is going to happen for the
army to have somebody of his caliber and his credibility to keep us
going in the right direction — keep us going in the right direction.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Has it been good?
Colonel Cornell. Well, I left then in January 1994. Up to then
I thought the relationship between the military and De Leon was
a good one, up to the time I left, and I thought they were working
well together to get things done.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Have you made contact with the country
since then?
Colonel Cornell. No, sir.
I made a few calls to the DAO down there to see how things are
going, but you can't discuss things on an open line.
Mrs. DeVine. I just might make a comment. It seems that we
all had high hopes in Ramerio De Leon Carpio. But one man
against an institution like the army, the very powerful, he hasn't
done as well as we had hoped. He hasn't got whatever it takes to
strength — they're just too big for him. We think he has tried, but
he hasn't been as successful as we had hoped.
169
Vice Chairman Kerrey. How many people in the army, do you
know, Colonel? How large the army is?
Colonel Cornell. Approximately 40,000.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. 40,000, population 10 million?
Colonel Cornell. Approximately, yes, sir.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine?
Senator DeWine. Nothing further.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. How does that compare — I'm not that
good at math — to U.S. forces?
Colonel Cornell. It compares about the same, sir. We used to
play with that figure when we were on station to see because
there's been so many accusations that they were too big or there
were accusations from neighboring countries that said, you know,
you should decrease the size of your army and all of that, and they
would say wait a minute, if we're going to decrease the size of ar-
mies, we all need to do it as a per capita issue, and so we used
to play with the numbers. And so it was about the same ratio as
ours.
Ms. Harbury. Again, just answering to several different issues.
It's not a matter of just the army in Guatemala. There's the stand-
ard military forces. Then I believe there's an enormous number of
civil patrollers together with the security forces that are not your
standard soldiers. These would be all of the different treasury po-
lice, et cetera, et cetera. When all of those are taken together, we
have the most militarized nation in the Western Hemisphere. You
can't get two feet in Guatemala without going through a check-
point, et cetera, et cetera.
And I did want to say one word also about the current president
of Guatemala, because before he became president, I met with him
on my case — he was actually very kind to me and very professional
and was storming up and down the room, behind bullet proof glass,
and heavily locked doors, saying God only knows what the army is
up to in this case, you have every right to be suspicious, this is ter-
rible. He is a great man.
After his cousin was assassinated, as I said, he reversed all of
his human rights positions, one by one, publicly. He has not been
able to speak up or lift a fmger for his own relatives who are under
death threats and being run out of the country since they named
Colonel Merida, the one who was in charge of the assassination of
his cousin, and also he's always refused to meet with me. He now
says that in all his time as human rights procurador, he never saw
any evidence of a clandestine prison, yet he is the one who inves-
tigated the case of Diana Ortiz, the nun that was raped and tor-
tured there in a clandestine prison. The man is working with a gun
to his head. I share Carol DeVine's opinion of him. He's a good man
who can do nothing. The army is too big for him. The army is too
big for all of Guatemala.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. Senator DeWine, if you don't have any
additional questions, I will thank all three of the witnesses. Mrs.
DeVine, you asked us specifically to continue to support you and
I pledge that I, and I suspect the Committee will do all that we
can to provide that support. Ms. Harbury, you asked for among
other things, declassification of information and the Committee will
take that up.
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^^^ 3 9999 05983 940 5
Ms. Harbury. I wish to bury my husband.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. I thank all three of you for your testi-
mony and for your coming here today.
Ms. Harbury. Thank you very much.
Mrs. DeVine. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Kerrey. This hearing is closed.
[Thereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the hearing was concluded.]
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