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Full text of "Hearings on American aspects of the Richard Sorge spy case, based on testimony of Mitsusada..."

HARVARD COLLEGE 
LIBRARY 



Sffi 




GIFT OF THE 

GOVERNMENT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 



HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF 
THE RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

(Based on testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa 
and Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby) 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE OE REPRESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-SECOND CONGEESS 

FIRST SESSION 



AUGUST 9, 22, AND 23, 1951 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities 



HARVARD C0LLE6E LIBRARY 

DEPOSITEB BY THE 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 



DtC 10 1951 




UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
90929 WASHINGTON : 1951 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman 
FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois 

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York 

CLYDE DOYLE, California DONALD L. JACKSON, California 

JAMES B. FRAZIER, Jr., Tennessee CHARLES E. POTTER, Michigan 

Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Counsel 
Louis J. Russell, Senior Investigator 
John W. Carrington, Clerk of Committee 
Raphael I. Nixon, Director of Research 
II 



CONTENTS 



Pace 

August '•>. 1951, testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa 1134 

Augusl 22, 1951, testimony of Maj. (leu. Charles Willoughby _ 11(51 

August 23, 1951, testimony of — 

Courtney E. Owens 11H5 

Maj. Gen. Charles Andrew Willoughby 1198 

in 



HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD 
SORGE SPY CASE 

(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and 
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willonghby) 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 9, 1951 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D. C. 

PUBLIC HEARING 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 
10 : 30 a. m. in room 220, Old House Office Building, Hon. Francis E. 
Walter presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter, 
Clyde Doyle, Bernard W. Kearney, Donald L. Jackson, and Charles 
E. Potter (appearance as noted in transcript). 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Courtney 
E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of research; John 
W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will come to order. Is the interpreter 
here, Mr. Kuroda ? 

Mr. Kuroda. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Will you stand and raise your right hand, please. 

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into 
the Japanese language the questions propounded by the committee, 
and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation in the 
English language of the replies made by the witness in the Japanese 
language, so help you God \ 

Mr. Kuroda. I do. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, before swearing in the witness, may 
I suggest that the } r oung lady there be sworn in as a monitor. Due to 
the difficulties in translation of finding the exact equivalent in English 
of the Japanese, it has been the general practice for a monitor to be 
present also, to give her interpretation in the event of a difference. 

Mr. Walter. I think she should be sworn as an interpreter. 

Do you solemnly swear you will truly and accurately interpret into 
the Japanese language the questions propounded in English by the 
committee, and that you will make a true and accurate interpretation 
in the English language of the answers made by the witness in the 
Japanese language, so help j^ou God? 

Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takesiiita. I do. 

Mr. Walter. Will the witness please stand. [To Mr. Kuroda.] 
Repeat this, please. 

1133 



1134 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

I swear that in answering all questions propounded to me in the 
course of this hearing. I will state the truth according to my con- 
science, adding nothing and concealing nothing. 

Mr. Yoshikawa (through Mr. Kuroda). Yes. 

TESTIMONY OF MITSTJSADA YOSHIKAWA 

(Through the Interpreter, Andrew Y. Kuroda, Assisted by the 
Monitor, Mrs. Katsuyo L. Takeshita) 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name, please I 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yoshikawa, Mitsusada. 1 

Mr. Tavenner. Your name is Yoshikawa, Mitsusada \ 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, you are at present in the United 
States on a mission of the Japanese Government, I believe; is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. You are a native of Japan? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was born in Tokyo on January 16, 1907. 

Mr. Tavenner. What position do you now hold with the Japanese 
Government ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am the chief of the special investigation bureau 
of the attorney general's office. 

Mr. Tavenner. How long have you held that position ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. For about 3 years. 

Mr. Tavenner. What other official positions have you held with the | 
Japanese Government ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was a prosecutor and also an official in the 
Ministry of Justice. I was holding those offices concurrently. 

Mr. Tavenner. I notice that the translation given was prosecutor. 
Have you held the position of procurator under the Japanese 
Government? 

Mr. Yoshikaw t a. Yes. It is officially translated as procurator in- 
stead of prosecutor. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, according to An Outline of the 
Japanese Judiciary, by Masataro Miyake, published in Tokyo in 1935, 
page 4, a procurator has the following function : 

To conduct searches, institute prosecutions, and supervise the execution of 
judgments in criminal cases and to act as representative of the public interest in 
civil cases of public concern. 

Mr. Walter. It sounds like duties of the nature of those of the 
Attorney General and the head of the FBI. 

Mr. Tavenner. The duties are even broader than that. Procurators 
are attached to district and appeals courts in Japan, as well as to the 
supreme court. The Library of Congress likens a procurator to a dis- 
trict attorney in the United States, but having much more power than 
a district attorney. 

I would like to ask the witness if that is his understanding of the 
duties of a procurator. 

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.) 



1 In Japanese, it is customary to give last name first. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1135 

Mr. Kuboda. He says that what is written here is right. However, 
he is not quite sure what it means, having much more power than a 
district attorney. 

Mr. Tavenner. When you -were procurator, were you attached to 
the criminal courts of Tokyo ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. For a certain period I was. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was that period '. 

Mi-. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember exactly, but from around Sep- 
tember 1938 for about 8 years. 

Mr. Tavenner. During the period you were procurator, were you 
assigned to the case of Richard Sorge in the performance of your 
duties as a procurator? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you describe very briefly the nature of your 
assignment to the case of Richard Sorge? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. A group 

Mr. Tavenner. Just a moment, please. May I suggest that from 
this point on the interpreter interpret in shorter passages. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. A group of procurators was organized to make 
search and prosecute this case under Mr. Toneo Nakamura. Mr. Naka- 
mura was chief of a division of the Tokyo district criminal court, the 
prosecution bureau, and under Mr. Nakamura I was appointed as the 
one primarily in charge of the prosecution. There were two persons 
appointed, and I was one of the two, and I was in charge of the prose- 
cution of this case, and I used several procurators and engaged in the 
search. 

Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of being engaged in search, do you 
mean engaged in investigation of the case ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I personally conducted the investigation, and also 
I appointed other procurators to help conduct this prosecution, and 
also I ordered the police to help in the investigation. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state, please, what led up to the arrest of 
Richard Sorge? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I remember, I think it was around the spring of 
1941, a woman called Tomo Kitabayashi came to Tokyo from America. 

We received information that this woman Kitabayashi was doing 
some spy activities. 

We ordered police to proceed in investigation. 

Kitabayashi went to Wakayama. 

We couldn't get any evidence against her. 

But in October of that year — that is, 1941 — T recall we received cer- 
tain information, and therefore we arrested Kitabayashi. 

Kitabayashi denied that she was a spy. However, she stated that a 
person called Yotokti Miyagi. who came from America, was doing 
some kind of spy activities. 

Mr. Tavenner. May I interrupt you at that point. Was Yotoku 
Miyagi an American citizen? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure, but I think lie was an American 
citizen. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Mi vagi and investigated him. He 
vehemently denied he was a spy. However, when w 7 e searched his 
house we discovered an odd object. 

It was an English document. 



1136 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

It was a document conducted by the South Manchurian Railway 
Co., and it was regarded as secret material to the Japanese Govern- 
ment. 

We thought it was strange that an artist had such kind of docu- 
ment. 

Mr. Tavenner. Miy agi was an artist ; is that correct % 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was an artist, and he had some reputation as 
an artist in Tokyo. He painted American-style paintings. 

Miyagi continued to deny that he was a spy. However, a certain 
thing happened. 

He was being investigated on the second floor of the Tsukiji police 
station in Tokyo. 

He attempted to commit suicide by jumping out of the window. 

He wasn't injured, nor he died. 

Police jumped after him and captured him. 

After this incident, Miyagi began to state. 

He began to state about a very important spy group ; he began to 
state about the activities of a very important spy group. 

Then he described the person who had closest connection with 
Miyagi was Hidemi Ozaki, who was regarded as the brains of the 
Konoye Cabinet. 

Mr. Tavenner. Excuse me. I did not understand what he said 
about Ozaki's connection with the Konoye Cabinet. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Premier Konoye had around him a group of 
brain trusters or advisers, and they formed a society called Breakfast 
Club, and Ozaki was one of the most brilliant advisers of Konoye. 

As an illustration of his brilliancy, this can be stated : When the 
Marco Polo incident occurred, Ozaki said that the incident would 
become larger, extend larger. At that time people were confused 
whether the incident would be localized or extended. However, the 
development showed that Ozaki's prophecy was right, and his reputa- 
tion increased. 

(Representative Bernard W. Kearney left hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Then I understand Ozaki was very close to Prince 
Konoye, who occupied what position at that time ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. But what position did Prince Konoye hold at that 
time in the Japanese Government ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was the Prime Minister at that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now if you will proceed. 

Mr. Kuroda. He asked if he may smoke. 

Mr. Walter. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. So we were very surprised when we found that 
Ozaki was involved in this case. We were not sure we could proceed 
in this case because of Ozaki's closeness to the Prime Minister. Then 
we found that behind Ozaki there were several foreigners also. 

Moreover, among those foreigners we found there was Richard 
Sorge, who was the highest adviser to German Ambassador Ott, 
although he didn't have any official position. 

My colleague procurator, Tamazawa, investigated Miyagi. 

I examined the content of the investigation. 

And finally we arrested Ozaki. 

I investigated Ozaki personally. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1137 

I examined Ozaki at the Meguro police station, and he con fessed t he 
same day. 

He disclosed the name of Shigeru Mizuno. Therefore we arrested 
Mizuno. 

I began to examine Ozaki in detail. 

We came to the conclusion we should arrest the foreigners, based 
on the examination of Miyagi and Ozaki. 

The Konoye Cabinet was pushed into a difficult position and finally 
resigned. 

It was before the forming of the Tojo Cabinet. 

We were not particularly taking advantage of this situation, but 
we arrested Sorge and Klansen and Vonkelitch. 

I may correct my statement here. Tojo was scheduled to become the 
head of the Cabinet, and it was known that Mr. Iwamura, who was 
the Minister of Justice in the Konoye Cabinet, would stay in the new 
Cabinet; therefore, we received the approval of Mr. Iwamura and 
started arresting these people. 

(Representative Clyde Doyle left hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenxek. With regard to the people who were arrested at that 
time, I want to be certain we have their names listed correctly. You 
spoke of Klausen. Is that Max Klausen, K-1-a-u-s-e-n? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. And the person referred to as Voukelitch was 
Branko Voukelitch, B-r-a-n-k-o V-o-u-k-e-l-i-t-c-h. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Branko de Voukelitch, yes. 

Mr. Tavenxer. You mentioned the name of Mizuno. Is that the 
same person as S-h-i-g-e-r-u M-i-z-u-n-o. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. What is the first name of Ozaki ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. H-i-d-e-m-i. 

Mr. Tavexxer. We have in the record of the Sorge trial the trans- 
lation of Ozaki's first name as H-o-z-u-m-i. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know, but we called him Hidemi. 

Mr. Tavexxer. There was only one Ozaki involved in the Sorge 
case? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexner. Very well. Proceed, please. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. We arrested Max Klausen, his wife, Anna Klausen, 
and Voukelitch, and conducted a house search of these people. 

What we wondered most was whether we could discover a radio 
transmitter. 

Fortunately, we could discover the radio transmitter, and we im- 
pounded it. And also-we found coded messages and messages which 
were to be coded, and also a code book, which was a German statistical 
yearbook. 

We were afraid that Sorge might shoot at us with a pistol. We put 
Sorge's house under surveillance for several days. That morning a 
person from the German Embassy visited Sorge. After that person 
left we went in and arrested Sorge. 

When he was arrested, Sorge insisted that he was a Nazi and held a 
very high position as an adviser in the German Embassy. 

Mr. Walter. About when was that? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Tokyo. 

Mr. Walter. When ? About what date ? 



1138 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think it was November 1941. 

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation disclose that at that time both 
Germany and Russia knew of plans to make the attack at Pearl 
Harbor ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. It wasn't disclosed during the examination. 

Mr. Walter. Was it subsequently learned, as a result of these ar- 
rests and the investigation, that both Germany and Russia were 
informed of the plans for the attack? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. The Pearl Harbor attack did not come up. 

I would like to mention about intelligence activities later. 

Sorge was brought to the Toriisaka police station nearby. 

After a physical examination, Sorge and Voukelitch were brought 
to a Tokyo detention house. 

The following day the procurator started to investigate. 

Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point? Did the investigation 
disclose that the Japanese forces contemplated attacks and that this 
fact was known by the German and Russian Governments ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not sure exactly. 

Since you asked me that question again, I will mention this. Sorge 
informed Russia 2 months before Germany attacked Russia about the 
German readiness of attacking. Sorge informed Russia that 150 divi- 
sions of the German Army were massed at the border, and the German 
high command was of the opinion that Petrograd, or Leningrad, would 
fall within 2 months. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, please. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In connection with the investigation of Sorge, 
Klausen, and Voukelitch, I personally investigated Sorge. 

As I said, I was in charge of the investigation of Sorge, and Mr. 
Hiroshi Iwo was in charge of Klausen. Another procurator was 
appointed to investigate Voukelitch. When I started the investiga- 
tion of Sorge he vehemently denied. 

After one week, and I think it was Saturday evening, Sorge finally 
confessed. 

He wrote on a sheet of paper in German that "I have been an inter- 
national Communist since 1925 and I am still," and then he confessed. 

By that time Klausen and Voukelitch also confessed. This is the 
process up to the prosecution. 

If you have any questions. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there any coercion of any character used in 
obtaining the confession? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. 

Klausen first confessed that he was a spy for the Red Army. 

And Voukelitch confessed that he was a spy for the Comintern. 

And so a very serious ensuing search took place. 

We couldn't tell the nature of this spy group until Sorge confessed. 

I told Sorge that Miyagi and Ozaki confessed and showed evidence. 

While we were repeating this, he confessed himself. 

I have an opinion why Richard Sorge confessed. 

The first reason is this: He thought that his arrest was too late. 
Sorge and his group had almost finished their spy activities and they 
thought they were very successful. A few days before the arrest 
Klausen and Voukelitch met at the house of Sorge and they were won- 
dering why Ozaki failed to show up. They were talking that since 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1139 

their activities were almost through they were going to get out of 
Japan and by all means go to Germany to engage in spy activities 
there. 

Mr. Walter. Did he know of a radio message that wss sent in 
October? 

Mr. Kuroda. Mr. Chairman, when you said "he" you mean Mr. 
Yoshikawa ( 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. 1 don't remember very exactly. 

Mr. Walter. Does he know about this message as a result of his 
invest igat ion : 

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's 
opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and 
French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases in 
French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, 
Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She 
will not attack Borneo because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. 
However, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt 
that Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion, even at the 
expense of her German ally. 

I think I had better show you the message and ask if you know 
about this message [handing message to the witness and Mr. Kuroda]. 

Mr. Kuroda.. He says that he recalls about this message. 

Mr. Walter. So that there is no doubt but that Russia knew in 
advance of the plans on the part of Japan for aggression? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes; and also, Russia would probably welcome 
a Japanese attack, instead of going north, going south. 

Mr. Walter. Exactly. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Along that line, Sorge was doing certain political 
maneuvering in addition to his spy activities. 

Ozaki was also cooperating with Sorge. 

Mr. Walter. In other words, spies paid by the Russian Government 
were using whatever influence they had in order to promote Japanese 
aggression against the United States and the British ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. To a certain extent. 

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.) 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In August of that year, 1,300,000 soldiers were 
mobilized in Japan, and Sorge was very much interested in obtaining 
the information to which direction, in which area, this number of 
soldiers would be used. 

Mr. Potter. In other words, he was anxious. I assume, to have the 
troops go south rather than north toward the Manchurian border; is 
that right? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was very much anxious, and tried to get the 
information. 

Miyagi frequented the eating and drinking places in Tokyo and 
tried to approach soldiers and tried to get information where they 
were headed. Ozaki tried to get the information from the higher 
echelon of the Government. However, the soldiers were wearing 
summer clothes instead of winter, so they thought the soldiers were 
headed toward the south instead of the north. 

Mr. Potter. Did Sorge, posing as a German or Nazi, use his in- 
fluence on various policy makers in Japan to carry out the Communist 
wish to move the soldiers to the south as a threat to the British and 



1140 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

the United States, rather than to the north, which might be a threat 
to Russia ? Did he use his influence to formulate that policy ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think Sorge didn't have much connection with 
the high officials of the Japanese Government. What connection he 
had was rather with the army general staff of Japan. 

Before the Russian-German war started high military officers came 
to Tokyo from Berlin. 

And also an emissary of the German Admiral Canaries, who was 
in charge of antiespionage activities, came to Tokyo. 

When those people came from Germany to Japan they met, of 
course, Ambassador Ott, and they also met Sorge. 

And they went to the Japanese Army general staff, the Japanese 
Army high officials, to see them with Sorge. 

Ambassador Ott went to the Japanese Army general staff showing 
the German plan of attacking Singapore, and told the Japanese that 
if they followed that plan Singapore would fall very easily. At that 
time Sorge was an assistant to the German Ambassador. 

Mr. Tavenner. And that plan was prepared in the German Em- 
bassy, was it not, by Von Kretchner, and at that time all the German 
attaches were recalled for the purpose of that study? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I haven't heard about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. The plan that was presented was a plan for over- 
land attack, just as it did occur finally? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. According to Sorge's confession, the Japanese staff 
officers were not particularly eager to accept that plan right away. 

Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point ? I would like to get 
clear in my mind the connection between some of these individuals. 
Sorge and Ozaki were very close, were they not ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Were more than close. 

Mr. Walter. They were both Communist agents; both agents of 
Russia; were they not? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge started to use Ozaki as his assistant in 
Shanghai. At that time Sorge received approval from Russia. In 
Tokyo, too, when Ozaki was used in the spy ring in Japan, Sorge 
received the approval from Russia, and Ozaki was the closest assistant 
to Sorge. Ozaki was in a secret section of the Central Committee of 
the Russian Communist Party. 

Mr. Walter. And Ozaki was also at that time one of the leading 
Communists out there and was the political adviser to Prince Konoye ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time Gen. Eugene Ott, German Ambassador 
to Japan, along with Richard Sorge, attempted to sell a plan of attack 
on Singapore to the Japanese general staff, do you know whether 
General Ott had taken that plan to Ribbentrop in Germany, where 
discussions were held between Ribbentrop and Matsuoka, the Japanese 
Foreign Minister? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I am not familiar with what you state. However, 
Soi'ge sent important messages concerning Matsuoka. 

Before Matsuoka went to Europe, Prince Konoye told Matsuoka 
that it would be all right to conclude a commercial treaty with Russia, 
however, don't do anything in Germany. 

That message was sent by Sorge, therefore Stalin was waiting for 
Matsuoka. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1141 

What Matsuoka got from Stalin in the form of a treaty was actually 
more than what Konoye was expecting, however. 

That was the information which Sorge sent to Moscow in regard to 
the trip of Matsuoka. 

And so Matsuoka had only a hearty welcome in Germany and 
not hing more. 

So 1 heard. 

Mr. Tavenner. The records of the conversations between Hitler 
and Matsuoka and Oshiina were introduced in the trial of Tojo, were 
they not ? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't remember exactly. 

Mr. Walter. Then, if 1 understand correctly, even after or at the 
moment that Germany attacked Russia, Russia was concerned with 
endeavoring to have the United States become involved in hostilities 
wit h Japan \ 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Yes. from the fact that German Ambassador Ott 
showed plans of attacking Singapore even prior to the German attack 
on Russia. 

Mr. Walter. They probably were still concerned in endeavoring to 
have us involved somewhere throughout the entire conspiracy? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. From these facts I could say that Sorge was pri- 
marily interested in spy work and secondarily he w T as engaged in 
political maneuvering, trying to divert Japanese attention to the 
south instead of to the north. 

Mr. Walter. In other words, he was acting in a dual capacity ? 

Mi-. Yosiiikawa. He was telling the Japanese that the Russian 
Army was strong, and also Siberia was rather barren, so Japan could 
not get anything from Siberia, but in the south Japan could get im- 
portant resources, and also it is easier to attack the south. That is 
what he was trying to convince the Japanese people. 

Mr. Potter. Y^ou stated that when the representatives of the Ger- 
man Government visited Japan with this plan to move the Japanese 
Army south, that there was some reluctance on the part of Japanese 
military officials to accept that plan. Do you know what the official 
position of the Japanese military was concerning wdiat they should 
do with the troops? Did they envision sending their troops north? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I haven't investigated the Japanese Army Gener- 
al Stan 1 ', so I don't know. 

Either right before or right after the war between Germany and 
Russia started, a secret emissary came from Germany and, with Am- 
bassador Ott. went to the Japanese General Staff to persuade the Jap- 
anese Army to attack Russia. 

The Japanese General "Staff replied that when the German Army 
reached the Danube line, the Japanese Army might attack Russia. 

Information like this centering around the German Embassy w 7 as 
lost in fire. 

Mr. Potter. Did the investigation you conducted bring out evidence 
to determine whose idea it was to strike at Pearl Harbor? Was that 
sponsored by Germany, or by the Communists, or was that the 
Japanese Army's own policy? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That didn't come out in the investigation. 
Mr. Tavenner. What was the relationship between General Ott 
and Richard Sorge after the arrest of Richard Sorjre? 



1142 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Ambassador Ott and Mrs. Ott were very surprised 
and became very angry and put pressure on Tojo. 

Ambassador Ott asked, through the Minister of Justice, to let the 
Ambassador see Sorge. 

We were very much embarrassed, because the investigation was 
continuing at that time. 

Fortunately, in 1 week Sorge confessed, and so after his confession 
I told him that the Ambassador "is anxious to see you. Would you 
like to see him?" 

Sorge replied first that he would not like to see him. 

Sorge told me that though their political opinions were different, 
they were personally good friends, and so I told him, "If I were you, 
I would see him. A Japanese in this kind of situation would see him 
to say the last farewell." Sorge said, "Then I will see him." 

So I told the Minister of Justice about that, and Ambassador Ott, 
with Marchiter, Stahmer, and others, came to see Sorge. 

After a brief interview, Sorge told Ott that this would be the last 
time he would see him. 

Ott was stunned and changed his countenance. 

So we closed the interview and took Ott in another room. Ott said 
that he would not do anything concerning this case any more, but 
asked us to finish the investigation as quick as possible and let him 
know about the results. 

However, it appeared that the German Embassy tried to put pres- 
sure upon us, using the Japanese left-wing people. 

And so we made a copy of the first chapter of the investigation of 
the Sorge case and sent it to the German Embassy through the 
Minister of Justice. 

Mr. Tavenner. May I ask a question at that point before you go 
into a further discussion of that matter ? 

Did information come to you, in the course of this investigation, 
to indicate whether or not General Eugene Ott, the German Am- 
bassador, knew of the Communist affiliation of Richard Sorge? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. Ambassador Ott was completely deceived. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the result of General Ott being deceived 
by Sorge, with regard to his relations with his own government? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I think if Ott had gone home he would have been 
killed. 

Mr. Tavenner. He was immediately replaced by Stahmer as Am- 
bassador to Japan, was he not? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct. And instead of going home, 
Ott went to Peking and stayed in China. 

This is not very reliable, but we heard, we had information, that 
after the death of Ott, his wife went to Russia. 

Mr. Waeter. Did Sorge at any time give you information concern- 
ing the extent of Communist espionage in the United States? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. lie did not,. 

Sorge made comments on the American Communist Party. 

Mr. Walter. What were his comments? 

Mi-. Yoshikawa. The American Communist Party, according to 
Sorge, his comment was that the American Communist Party had 
many people of different racial backgrounds, with different lan- 
guages — Italians, Germans, and Japanese — and one language could 
not be used; but in the course of time it may become stronger. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1143 

Mr. Tavenner. Prior to the time of obtaining the confession of 
Sorge, did you show him, and use in obtaining his confession, the 
Gorman Statistical Year book which had been used as a code in the 
transmission of messages by Sorge? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I didn't show it personally, hut I told him that 
Klauscn confessed the fact that the German Statistical Yearbook was 
use I as the code book. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will stand in recess until -2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at L2:25 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. in. of the 
same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The committee reconvened at 2: 10 p. m., Representatives Francis 

E. Walter and Clyde Doyle being present, Mr. Walter presiding.) 

TESTIMONY OF MITSUSADA YOSHIKAWA— Resumed 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, at the time of adjournment T was 
asking about the knowledge that Richard Sorge had of the code that 
was used in the transmission of secret messages at the time of his 
confession. 

I now want to ask you whether he was also familial' with the exist- 
ence of the radio equipment that had been used for that purpose prior 
to giving his confession \ 

Mr. Kuroda. I didn't quite get the question. 

Mr. Tavenner. 1 will break the question down. 

Prior to Mr. Sorge giving his confession, was he told about the 
seizure of the radio equipment, or was he shown the radio equipment 
which had been seized \ 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Before the confession we didn't show any material 
to him. Therefore, we didn't show the radio equipment which was 
impounded. 

May I continue? 

There was an argument among the procurators because he didn't 
confess, an argument that we should show the radio equipment to 
him; but before we came to the point of showing the equipment, he 
confessed. 

Mr. Tavenxer. Had you advised him that you had seized and im- 
pounded the radio equipment ( 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. And that was before he made his confession? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed now and tell the committee how 
the confession was given? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I gave the committee an account about it before, 
but I will speak to you a little further. 

I told you before that they were almost finished their work in Japan, 
and they had a sort of sense of relief after the successful completion 
of their job. 

Many people were arrested at the same time. 

And those people confessed, one by one, before Sorge did. 

Various evidences came up — radio equipment, code book, coded 
messages, and so forth. 



1144 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

As for the code book, it was foimd in a study of the house of 
Klausen. 

It consisted of three volumes. 

I happened to pick them up and I found that there was a mark of 
much use. 

And the figures of general statistics were there. 

I immediately figured that it was a source book for the code. 

In order to make decoding difficult, they added the figures on that 
page on the coded message. 

So after we impounded the German Statistical Yearbook we asked 
Klausen about it, and Klausen confessed it was the key book for the 
code. He confessed it before Sorge did. 

I told Sorge about those facts and he finally confessed. 

We had no program at that time. We were wondering whether 
Sorge was really a spy for Germany and using Communists in Japan 
but actually spying for the Nazi regime in Germany. That was one 
question. 

The second question was whether Sorge was a double spy for both 
Berlin and Moscow. 

The third question was whether he was really a spy for Moscow, 
pretending to be a Nazi. 

Therefore, we examined Sorge without preconceived opinion. 

We took a very cautious attitude. 

There was another question. If he were a spy for Moscow, we 
didn't know whether he was a spy for the fourth section, as Klausen 
said, or whether he was a spy for the Comintern, as Voukelitch said. 

Mr. Tavenner. When you speak of the fourth section, do you mean 
the fourth section of the Red army ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was the intelligence section of the Red army ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Therefore, I never crossed him to get his 
confession. 

I asked his explanation as evidences came up. 

So, finally, at the end of the first week, he confessed, but at that time 
I was not expecting that he would confess. 

About 4 o'clock my colleague, prosecutor Tamazawa, and a police- 
men went to see if his health would stand any further investigation, 
since that was Saturday. 

Thus he finally confessed. Before he confessed he asked for a piece 
of paper and pencil. 

And, as I told you before, he wrote down in German that since 1925 
he was an international Communist, and handed it to me. 

And he took off his coat. 

And he rose and cried: "I have never been defeated since 1 became 
an international Communist. This is the first time that I was beaten." 
he said. 

Mr. Walter. At that time did he say that Ozaki was also an inter- 
national Communist ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge was quite exhausted at that time, and so 
Mr. Tamazawa asked him whether he would continue investigation 
the following day. Sorge wanted to be continued on Monday. So 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 I 45 

he didn'l say that Ozaki was also an international Communisl at that 
time. 

Sorge, generally speaking, admitted that Ozaki and Miyagi and 
others were also international Communists. 

And he consented that be would talk about it Monday. 

(Representative Charles E. Potter entered hearing room.) 

Mr. Yosmik.wya. On Monday, from 9 in the morning until '■'> in the 
afternoon, the police conducted investigation under my supervision. 

However, Sorge asked to be investigated personally by Mr. 
Yoshikawa. 

So from :) o'clock in the afternoon until night I conducted the 
invest igat ion by mysel I. 

And Sorge responded to my questions. 

The police talked to me before the investigation, and alter the in- 
vestigation they reported about the content of the investigation and 
received direction from me. 

When the policemen were conducting the investigation of Sorge, 
Klausen, and Voukelitch, I went along and kept my eyes on the police- 
men on their way of conducting the investigation. 

Before starting the investigation I talked with Sorge about the 
outline of the investigation. 

I showed him the points I would cover in the investigation. 

And Sorge also offered his wishes. 

And when he offered any points, I adopted those points which were 
helpful in the investigation. 

My German and English are both broken. I speak broken in Ger- 
man and English. It took time to conduct the investigation, but Sorge 
didn't want to have an interpreter. I asked him why. and he said an 
interpreter would make the story difficult. 

So, whenever we came into difficulty in understanding, we used a 
sheet of paper and Sorge wrote on the paper and explained. 

When we decided about the outline of the investigation, he took a 
piece of paper and. by means of the paper, he explained about those 
points. When I read what he wrote on the paper I asked him ques- 
tions when I didn't understand: then he made further explanation 
on those points. 

After several days. Sorge typed what we talked, in my presence. 
He corrected misprints. I read what he typed by aid of a dictionary. 

At times the typing was not neat and not sufficient, so I asked him 
to retype. He offered to retype himself, since it was nor neat and not 
sufficient. Thus the typed story increased. 

Either March or April the investigation was completed. 

On various important points I received special explanations from 
him. There were some points where I could not get full explana- 
tion. When the investigation was completed, Sorge took a sheet of 
paper and typed that this investigation was conducted by Mr. 
Yoshikawa. and signed his name. 

Then an official interpreter was appointed. It was Professor Ikoma, 
of the School of Foreign Languages. Mr. Ikoma came to the deten- 
tion camp and confirmed that the story Sorge typed was actually 
his. 

90929 — 51 2 



1146 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICIJARD SORGE SPY CASE 

After taking oath, Mr. Ikoma translated it into Japanese. A copy 
was made. And that copy, Professor Ikoma and I signed. And the 
translation and the typed story were put into a document. 

The criminal bureau of the Ministry of Justice prepared the trans- 
lation of his story into pamphlet form. Sorge asked me to make my 
own official document when he was talking about the activities center- 
ing around the German Embassy. He didn't want to type his own 
story when that story came. 

After his typewritten story was completed and the translation was 
completed, I asked Professor Ikoma to come and investigate Sorge 
about that phase of his activities. 

The official document of that investigation consists of about 38 
volumes. At the end of each volume, Professor Ikoma translated it 
into German and asked Sorge whether there was any disagreement 
on it, and after he found it right he affixed his signature on each 
volume. Then Professor Ikoma and I signed on each volume, and also 
my secretary affixed his signature on it. 

This is the official interrogation document based on law. Of the 
contents, I told you about a couple points in the morning session. 

Therefore, Sorge's story consists of two parts. One is his type- 
written story and the other js this official interrogation document. 

There is another interrogation document which was made by a 
police officer, Ohashi. It took time for Ohashi to conduct his in- 
vestigation. My recollection is that Ohashi's interrogation docu- 
ment was completed around April or May. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of what year ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. 1942. My official interrogation document was com- 
pleted around June 1942. 

The content of my official interrogation document contained infor- 
mation about the process by which Sorge approached the German 
Embassy. N 

I am going to expand about that now. I don't remember exactly 
the date, but Sorge came to Japan in 1934. At that time Ott was not 
the Ambassador. I think he was a colonel attached to a regiment in 
Nagoya. 

At that time Sorge began to approach Ott. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was not General Ott at that time military attache 
to Japan? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't know about it, but maybe he was an 
attache. 

It was about the period of Von Kretehner that Sorge approached 
the German Embassy. By his information and judgment he gained 
the confidence of the staff of the German Embassy. 

He gave General Ott political information. He joined the Nazi 
Party too. Then Ott became the Ambassador. It presented a very 
good chance for Sorge. 

He frequented the Embassy, and though he did not have an official 
position in the Embassy, he was one of the highest advisers of the 
Ambassador. He also cooperated in the intelligence activities of the 
Embassy. 

While he was cooperating, he also drew information from them. 
And, as T told you in the morning, there were many political diplo- 
matic military personnel coming from Germany to Japan, and Sorge 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1147 

got acquainted with those people. They were talking informally on 
many important matters. Therefore, while in Japan, he could get 
the information of Germany. Ott consulted with Sorge on very 
important matters. 

So the information Ambassador Ott could receive from the German 
foreign office and from the .Japanese foreign office went to Sorge. Not 
only the ( rerman foreign office, but diplomat ic circles in Japan. 

Sorge got the military secrets within the German Embassy. There- 
fore, the more the .Japanese military men approached the German 
Embassy, the more information Sorge got out of them. 

1 heard this story. This is contained in my official interrogation 
document. 

A Soviet General Rushikoff fled from the Soviet into Manchuria. 
And he was rescued by the Kwantung Army of Japan. 

Rushikoff gave the information of the military positions and mili- 
tary forces of the Far Eastern Red Army and also Mongolia and 
Siberia. 

The Japanese general staff was delighted to have that kind of 
informal ion. 

Rushikoff was the leader of an anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia. 

The .Japanese Army was so jubilant about it that they talked about 
it to Ott. Ott was also glad and reported to Hitler about it. And 
he sent a staff officer to Japan. 

And after the Japanese examined Rushikoff, the staff officer from 
Germany examined Rushikoff himself. And he made a very minute 
report. That staff officer showed t hat report to Sorge. 

Sorge asked him to leave that document with him for study, and 
he took a picture of the document and sent the film to Moscow. 

Later the so-called Nomonhan incident occurred. The Japanese 
Army lost several divisions. By the mass artillery and tanks the 
Japanese lost a heavy casualty. 

Mr. Tavkxnkr. The casualty loss was reported at 45,000, was it 
not I 

Mr. Vosiiikawa. I do not remember. It was like putting Japan's 
hand in a charcoal brazier. 

Sorge also said that the anti-Stalin bloc in Siberia was also elim- 
inated. The second document, which was the official interrogation 
document, contained that kind of information. 

Unfortunately, no copy was made of this document, and I am afraid 
that the document was lost by fire. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do von mean lost as a result of the bombing of 
Tokyo? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Possibly. 

This is the first time that I talk about this, 10 years after the inci- 
dent. During that period. Ambassador Ott was very pleased with 
Sorge and offered him a high position in the Embassy. Sorge de- 
clined. 

Because he declined, his reputation increased. However, he told 
me that if he had become a member of the official staff he would 
have been investigated about his past in detail, and he was afraid 
of that. He told me about that. 

Thus the official interrogation document was completed. 



1148 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you four pages in Japanese script and 
ask you to identify those and state whether or not your name appears 
in connection with it? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. This is my seal. 

Mr. Tavenner. You are also pointing out, in addition to your sig- 
nature, a seal placed beneath your signature? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. The seal also appears, half at the top of page 2 
and half at the top of page 3, does it not ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

That is the way the Japanese official documents are made. They 
prove that the documents are official by putting the signature on the 
continuation pages. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, that is a method of identification, by 
placing what you call your "han" on the document? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. This document which has your signature and "han" 
attached is an affidavit, I believe, which vou gave on February 19, 
1949, is it not? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. The English translation is attached to your origi- 
nal Japanese affidavit? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the document in evidence and ask 
that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 1." 

Mr. Walter. Let it be marked as an exhibit and received in evi- 
dence. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 1," is filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I would now like to read the English translation 
of the document, which was translated by Minora Endo, an official 
translator of Japanese documents in the employ of general headquar- 
ters, Far East Command. 

(Reading:) 

Statement by Yoshikawa MrrsrsAo-A, Government Official Building 1, 
Dojunkai Aoyama Apartments 1. 1 chome, Aoyama Onden, Shibuya-ku, 
Tokyo-to, February 19, 1949 

I affirm that, according to my conscience, I will state the truth, adding nothing 
and concealing nothing. 

I voluntarily declare as follows: 

That in October 1941, I was a procurator assigned to the procurator's bureau 
of the Tokyo district criminal court; that on said date, in my official capacity I 
was assigned to conduct a procurator's examination on Richard Sors;e who at 
the time was confined in the Tokyo detention house: that I did conduct that 
investigation until May 1942: that the investigation by me of Richard Sorge was 
conducted in the procurator's examination room in the Tokyo detention house; 
that during the proceedings Richard Sorge voluntarily made an offer to me to 
prepare and submit a statement on the general outline of his espionage activities; 
t bat as a result of this offer. Richard Sorge prepared such a statement in the 
German language in my presence and in the procurator's examination room ; that 
I be typewriter used by Richard Sorge for the preparation of said statement was 
bis property which he used in his house before bis arrest and had been confiscated 
as evidence : that after typing a chapter or a paragraph of said statement, Richard 
Sorge read the same in my presence and made deletions, additions, and correc- 
tions in my presence, and banded tbe same to me; that only one original copy of 
said statement was prepared by Richard Sorge; that because in said statement 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1149 

the portion concerning his activities in Shanghai was not sufficient, Richard 
Sorge personally retyped said portion preparing anew 9aid portion bj supple- 
menting thai which was Insufficient, and submitted said new portion to me; 
that I replaced said portion in the original statement ; that the document at i ached 
hereto, consisting i>r i_'i pages, is thai portion which I deleted from the original 
document because I pu1 in the original statement thai portion which Richard 
Sorge later retyped as stated above; that said document is a portion of a state- 
ment which Richard Sorge first prepared and corrected in my presence in the 
procurator's examination room within the Tokyo detention house during October 
and November 1!>41 and handed to me; that said document does not bear the 
Signature of Richard Sorge, the reason being that said document is no more than 
a portion of a statement prepared by Richard Sorge and that Richard Sorge 
affixed his signature at the end when the entire statement was completed and 
thai he was nol asked particularly to atlix ids signature on said document which 

was a portion Of said statement ; that said document has 1 n in my possession 

from the afore-mentioned date until February IS, VM'.K on winch date it was 
turned over by me to Lt. Col. Paul Rusch, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East 
Command, United States Army, at said officer's request. 

YOSHIKAWA MlTSlSAIiA. 

i Translatob's Note. — A seal bearing the name "Yoshikawa" appears over the 
bottom part of the signature. The same seal is also affixed overlapping the first 
and second pages.) 

February 19, 1949. 

I certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the employ 
of General Headquarters. Far East Command, and that to the best of my ability, 
skill, and judgment, the within and foregoing is a true and accurate translation in 
the English language in two pages of the photostat of the original document 
attached hereto consisting of four pages which is the affirmation of Yoshikawa 
Mitsusada. 

Minortj En DO. 

Mr. Tavenner. The statement which you gave at that time over your 
signature and seal was true ; was it not '. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Your statement under oath refers to 24 pages at- 
tached to your affidavit as being the document which Richard Sorge 
wrote on his own typewriter in German ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you to examine the 24 pages attached to 
your affidavit and state whether it is the document written by Sorge 
on his own typewriter in the German language. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. The paper and typewriter impounded were used 
by Sorge. 

Mr. Tavenner. And this is a photostat which he attached to the 
same document ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you examine the document and state whether 
or not the corrections" appearing therein were made personally by 
Richard Sorge in your presence? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is true. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification only 
at this time, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2." 

Mr. Walter. Let it be market for identification only. 

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 2" for identification only.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now a document written in Japanese 
consisting of eight pages, and ask }'ou whether or not your signature 
and seal appear on that document '. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 



1150 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

I dictated this document, but the signature and seal are mine. 

Mr. Tavenner. This is a sworn affidavit which you gave over your 
signature and seal ; is it not ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. And does it bear date of April 1, 1949? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. It does. 

Mr. Tavenner. Attached to your affidavit is the English transla- 
tion ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I desire to offer this document in evidence, both 
the Japanese and the English translation, and ask that it be marked 
"Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 3." 

Mr. Walter. For what purpose are they both offered ? 

Mr. Tavenner. The main purpose is that it is really one exhibit. 
One is the translation of the Japanese. It is all one exhibit. 

Mr. Walter. It will be marked and received. 

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 3," are filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I will read the English translation. [Reading:] 

Oath 

I hereby swear that I will state the truth according to my conscience, adding 
nothing and concealing nothing. 
April 1, 1949. 

/s/ Yoshikawa Mitsitsada. [seal] 

Statement 

I, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, having taken the oath prescribed by Japanese law 
which appears on the attached sheet, do hereby make the following statement. 

1. I am presently serving as Chief of the Special Investigation Bureau of the 
Attorney General's office. During or about 1941 and 1942. I was procurator in 
the procurator's office of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. I worked on the 
so-called international intelligence ring case involving Richard Sorge, Ozaki 
Hozumi et al., myself examining Richard Sorge, Kawai Teikichi, and others. 
Because of the serious nature of the case, and because of the implication of 
Ozaki Hozumi, a Japanese [of] comparatively high social position, and aliens like 
Richard Sorge, Max Klausen, and Branko de Voukelitch, ample consideration had 
to be given to its international repercussions. My investigations were conducted 
in strict secrecy, and I was careful not to libel the defendants and others involved. 
I exercised strict supervision over the judicial police who assisted me in the 
investigations, personally attending the investigations as a witness on frequent 
occasions to see that torture and other coercive methods were not employed. 
Of course, I never resorted to torture or other coercive methods in my own 
investigations of Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi, but assumed throughout 
as gentlemanly an attitude as possible. 

At Sorge's request, I arranged to have the judicial police examinations in 
his case take place in the morning, and I myself examined him in the after- 
noon. At his suggestion, I investigated the broad aspects of the case, and I 
allowed him to type his statement in German before me. Following the com- 
pletion of the judicial police investigations, I was with Sorge both in the morn- 
ings and in the afternoons. After he had finished the afore-mentioned state- 
ment, I examined him with respect to the concrete details of his intelligence 
activities, and, at his request, compiled the results into an interrogation record 
in the presence of an interpreter. 

During the afore-mentioned investigations, Richard Sorge and Kawai Teikichi 
described the intelligence activities of Agnes Smedley in China, and Richard 
Sorge made a statement concerning the intelligence activities of Giienther Stein 
in Tokyo. No changes were made in the facts stated by Richard Surge and Kawai 
Teikichi with regard to Smedley and Stein during the course of the investiga- 
tions by the police ami procurators, the preliminary examinations, and the public 
trials. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1151 

Daring the investigation, I realized thai Smedley and Stein were key litres 
in the ring, but I was unable to arresl and indict them because they were not in 
Japan at the time. Had they been in Japan, I am convinced that, as a procura- 
tor, I would have arrested and indicted them. 

The foregoing is a voluntary statement. I was notified before making it that 
it would be recorded and thai it might be used as evidence. 

April 1, 1949. 

/s/ Yosiiikawa .Mil SISAIIA. [SEAL] 

The translator's certificate is attached, which I will not read. 1 

translator's certificate 

I. Tadao Yamada, CWO, USA, W2141047, having been duly sworn, state that 
1 am an official translator of the Japanese language employed as such by General 
Headquarters, Far East < Command, since July ]!»47, and that the foregoing English 
translation of the statement executed by Yosiiikawa Mitsusada, dated April 1, 
1!)4!>, is a true and accurate translation to the best of my ability, skill, and 
judgment. 

April 10. 104!>. 

/s/ Tadao Yamada, 
Tadao Yamada, 
CWO, USA, W21J,10Jtf. 

/s/ G. A. Hedley. 
G. A. Hedley, 
Captain (sic). Infantry Summary Court. 

That is a true and correct statement; is it? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. I now hand you a certificate over your signature and 
seal bearing date March 4, 1049, and I will ask you to identify that 
document and your signature and your seal. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. And to it is attached the English translation of the 
certificate, appearing over your signature and seal? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to offer the certificate, accompanied by the 
English translation, in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa 
Exhibit Xo. 4." 

Mr. Walter. It will be so marked and received. 

(The documents above referred to, marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 4," are filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe your seal also appears under your signa- 
ture on the English translation ; does it not \ 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to read this certificate. [Reading: ] 

General Headquarters. Far East Command, 

Military Intelligence Section, General Staff. 

CERTIFICATE 

I hereby certify that the two booklets listed below are printed reproductions 
prepared by the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice of accurate 
Japanese translations made by Translator Ikoma Yoshitoshi of original Ger- 
man notes written by Richard Sorge, whom I examined in my capacity as a pro- 
curator of the Tokyo District Criminal Court, and incorporated together with 
the original notes into the official case records: and that the contents of the 
booklets are identical with the contents of the said translation. 

1. "Sorge case materials (2)" (pt. 1 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), 
February 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau. .Ministry of Justice. 



1 Printed for the record, but not read. 



1152 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

2. "Sorge case materials (3)" (pt. 2 of translated notes of Richard Sorge), 
April 1942, Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice. 
March 4, 1949. 

I shall not read the translator's certificate. 1 

/S/ TOSHIKAWA MlTSUSADA. [SEAL] 

Chief, Special Examination Bureau, 
General Headquarters, 

translator's certificate 

I hereby certify that I am an official translator of Japanese documents in the 
employ of General Headquarters, Far East Command, and that to the best of my 
ability, skill, and judgment, the above is a true and accurate translation in the 
English language of the attached document. 

/s/ Tadao Yamata, 
Tadao Yam ada, 
CWO USA W2141047. 

This certificate refers to two volumes [indicating another docu- 
ment]. I hand you a document in Japanese marked "Consecutive 
Exhibit No. 17," enclosure No. 2, and I will ask you if that bears the 
identification information of the first document which I read to you 
from your certificate? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. The original, which was sent to the court, did not 
have the table of contents and index. The table of contents and index 
were made by the Criminal Affairs Bureau. The rest is an exact 
document. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer that document in Japanese listed 
as the first document in Yoshikawa Exhibit 4 for identification only, 
and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 5." 

Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified. 

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 5" for identification only.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you now another volume identified as con- 
secutive exhibit 20-B, enclosure 2, which bears on the front certain de- 
scriptive data, and ask whether that is the same descriptive data as 
the second item in Yoshikawa exhibit No. 4 ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. It is the same document to which you referred in 
your certificate ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Except that the table of contents and index were 
not in the original. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this document for identification 
only, and ask that it be marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 6." 

Mr. Walter. Let it be so identified. 

(The document above referred to was marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 
No. 6" for identification only.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, did you prepare and furnish the 
material which went into the composition of those two documents? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes, I did; and Mr. Ikoma translated it. 

Mr. Tavenner. I want to ask you a very few questions relating to 
some of the individuals mentioned in the course of these reports. 

You have previously referred to Miyagi. Do you know whether 
Miyagi was an American citizen ? I believe I asked you that question 
before. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection. However, 



1 Printed for the record, but not read. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1153 

Miyagi intended to go back after his mission was completed in Japan, 
therefore I thought that he was an American citizen. 

Mr. Tavenner. You mean hack to the United States? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He said before his death that he wanted to go 
hack" to America. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose the circumstances 
under which Miyagi first came to Japan? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't personally and directly investigate 
Miyagi. I only saw him several times. 

Procurator Yoshioka was in charge of the investigation of Miyagi. 

Also, a policeman investigated him. 

I received their reports and gave them direction. 

I don't have a clear recollection since it was an incident of 10 years 
ago. 

I recall that Miyagi belonged to the Japanese section of the Ameri- 
can Communist Party. 

I recall that Miyagi stated that he received an order from the 
higher echelon of his organization to engage in the world revolution in 
Japan. 

Mr. Tavenner. World revolution? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. To do some important activities in Japan for the 
sake of the world revolution. 

Miyagi told me that he belonged directly to the Comintern doing 
espionage activities. 

That is what he thought. 

I do not have an exact recollection about how he came to Japan. 

But I recall the names Yano and Roy who are involved in sending 
Miyagi to Japan. 

I do not recall where Miyagi met those people, whether in New 
York or in Los Angeles. 

I recall also that Miyagi mentioned in addition to those people he 
met an American Jewish person, but I don't have a clear recollection 
on that. 

He went to Japan with instructions to meet a person who put up 
a newspaper ad saying "Ukiyo-e print wanted." 

Mr. Tavenner. Stating what? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. "Ukiyo-e print wanted." 

According to Sorge's statement, he also had instructions to watch 
for the newspaper ad "Ukiyo-e print wanted," and he found that and 
found the person in Ueno. 

Mr. Tavenner. Ueno is a park in Tokyo? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

That is what I vaguely remember. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the course of the documents referred to there ap- 
pears the name "Jacob." Did your investigation disclose who Jacob 
was or whether or not it was a name thai was used as a code name? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I asked Sorge about it. but Sorge said, "I know 
him as Jacob," but he didn't say whether he knew him or not. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose whether or not he 
was an American citizen? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Sorge said that he was an American news- 
paperman. 

Mr. Tavenner. Stationed where? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai. 



1154 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

When Sorge went to Shanghai from Moscow, he met Smedley, and 
with the help of Smedley he got the cooperation of three Caucasians, 
three foreigners. 

When I heard Sorge saying that, I asked him who they were. Sorge 
said he got the cooperation of three foreigners and not more. He got 
the cooperation of the Japanese and Chinese and only three foreigners. 
When I asked who they were, Sorge told me Jacob was one of them. 

Sorge didn't give any information about Jacob any further, and 
so I asked him what kind of cooperation he got from those people. 

He wrote by typewriter, "These kinds of information." 

I couldn't get any information out of him any further. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any statement made as to what newspaper or 
newspapers the man identified as Jacob was a representative of or 
correspondent for ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say. 

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of three Caucasians, but you have told 
us just of the individual by the name of Jacob. Who were the other 
two? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Another person, he didn't disclose his name, but 
he was an American. He was a young person. He was on the staff of 
the American consulate. 

Mr. Tavenner. He was a member of the staff of the American 
consulate ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Located where? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any further description obtained of the in- 
dividual on the staff of the American consulate? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't say anything about him, so I asked 
him what kind of information he got out of him. 

(Kepresenative Clyde Doyle left the hearing room.) 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He told me that the person was quite brilliant and 
was giving him information concerning the American foreign policy 
toward China and the Nanking government. 

Mr. Walter. Did he give the name ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. He laughed and did not disclose his name. 

Mr. Potter. What was the date ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't remember exactly, but it was around 1931 
and 1932 when Sorge organized the so-called Shanghai group. 

Mr. Potter. How long did this group work for Sorge ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. It was for about 2 years. 

And Sorge's successor was receiving information from that group. 

Mr. Potter. From that same group ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. This information from the American consular office 
in Shanghai was given to Sorge in 1931 and 1932; is that correct? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have given us information relating to two of 
these Caucasians whose assistance was given to Sorge. Who was 
the third one? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He said that it was a German woman. 

Mr. Tavenner. Can you give us further information regarding 
her? 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1155 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I didn't get any information about her of her than 
expressed in bis own story. 

Mr. T.w TENNER. The name "Paul" and the name "John" appear in 
the course of Sorge's con fession. Did your invest igation disclose any 
further identification off hose two persons? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. The information I got concerning Paul appeared 
in Sorge's story, but when I instructed Procurator [wo to investigate 
Sorge, he got further information about Paul; but, since I do not 
have the documents, I do not have a clear recollection. 

While Sorge was working in Shanghai, Ozaki was recalled by a 
newspaper. Asalii. 

Ozaki recommended his successor to Sorge, a Japanese man. 

This Japanese was cooperating with Paul after Sorge left Shang- 
hai. 

This Japanese man was Funakoshi. 

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of the giving of information, after Sorge 
left Shanghai, to Sorge's successor. Who was Sorge's successor? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Paul. 

Mr. Tavenner. The same person called Paul '. 

Mr. Yoshtkawa. Paul was Sorge's successor. 

Mr. Tavenner. Can you furnish the committee with any identify- 
ing information as to the nationality, or any other information re- 
garding Paul '. 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I do not know about the nationality of Paul, but he 
belonged to the fourth section of the Red army, and his rank was 
major general. 

Mi'. Walter. Was he a German, do you know? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I am sorry, but I haven't conducted a full investi- 
gation about Paul. 

Mr. Tavexner. You spoke about the third Caucasian furnishing 
information to Sorge as being a German woman. Did your investiga- 
tion disclose any connection on the part of a woman by the name of 
Regattenhein with the Sorge principals; that is, the principals in the 
Sorge ring ' 

Mr. Yoshtkawa. When Regattenhein appeared in Japan, she was 
in the Japanese group and not the Chinese group. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, this person by the name of Regat- 
tenhein had no connection with the Chinese phase of the Sorge spy 
ring? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. I don't have any information about that. I didn't 
make any investigation of it. 

Mr. Tavenner. I assume from what the witness has said that Sorge 
knew of her presence in Japan \ 

Mr. Kuroda. Regattenhein.' 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Sorge said so. 

Sorge said that Regattenhein is the girl friend of Guenther Stein. 

She was very cooperative with Guenther Stein, and she went to 
Shanghai as a messenger of the group. 

She gathered information also. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was she arrested in Japan in connection with your 
spy investigation? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. No. She wasn't in Japan when the arrests came. 
She left with Guenther Stein. 



1156 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any information as to what country 
she traveled to when she left Japan ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have any information about that. Since 
she disappeared, we lost interest in her. We heard Guenther Stein 
was going to Hong Kong, but really we didn't have any information 
about her. 

Mr. Tavenner. There is an incident related in the course of the 
confession by Richard Sorge regarding his traveling through the 
United States on his way to Tokyo. 

It refers to the fact that while in New York an arrangement was 
made for him to go to Chicago, where he was instructed to meet a 
certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago world fair. 
Did you endeavor to ascertain the name of the individual whom Sorge 
was supposed to meet in Chicago ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I instructed Policeman Ohashi to get that inform- 
ation, and I recall that Ohashi gave me his report, and I tried to con- 
fer with Sorge about it when I talked to him. I also instructed 
Ohashi to find out who that person was. I also asked directly to- 
Sorge who that person was, but Sorge did not disclose his name. 

(Representative Clyde Doyle returned to hearing room.) 

Mr. Walter. In discussing his trip through the United States, did 
Sorge give you the names of any Americans who escorted him or with 
whom he came in contact? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He didn't disclose the names. 

Before he formed a Chinese group and Japanese group, Sorge was 
vice chief of the information bureau of the Comintern. 

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation reveal any information with 
regard to an American named Willie Lehman? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. He was chief of the Lehman group in China. 

Mr. Tavenner. What do you mean by the Lehman group in China? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I don't have an exact recollection about it, but it 
was either a group belonging to the fourth section of the Red army or 
belonging to the Comintern. 

Mr. Tavenner. By that do you mean a separate group from the 
Sorge group ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. That is right. 

I recall that Sorge told me that Sorge and Lehman were personally 
acquainted. 

Mr. Tavenner. What part of China was the seat of the activities of 
the Lehman group? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. In Shanghai ; so I remember. 

I don't have an exact recollection. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any recollection of the names of any 
American citizens who were connected with the Lehman group in ad- 
dition to Lehman himself? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Concerning a group in which Americans had any 
connection, I recall the Harbin group in Manchuria. 

This group existed as a mail box for Sorge while he was working in 
China, and this group belonged to the fourth section of the Red army. 

Klansen was transferred to the Harbin group by order of the fourth 
sect ion of the Red army. 

I recall that Sorge himself also went to Harbin. 

The radio transmitter was established in the American consulate 
in Harbin. 






AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1157 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you mean the radio station that was used in 
the transmission of messages to Moscow? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were those messages transmitted in code? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Smv: I think so. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did thai occur? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. About L931 or L932 Sorge was using hi- Harbin 
group as a mail box. 

Mr. Tavenner. If a radio station in the Ajnerican consulate in 
Harbin in Manchuria was being used t<> t ransmit messages to Moscow, 
who was it in the American consulate who permitted that use or him- 
self engaged in the use of t tie radio for t hat purpose \ 

Mr. VcsniK.wvA. I don't remember the name. 

1 instructed Procurator I wo. who was in charge of Klausen, to in- 
vest igate t hat. 

I recall that Mr. [wo reported to me about the name of that Amer- 
ican, hut I don't recall exactly his name. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there more than one American connected with 
the Harbin group of the fourth section of the Red army, as far as 
your investigation disclosed? 

Mr. Vosiiikawa. 1 don't have any recollection, so I cannot say. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether the confession of Max 
Klausen will throw light on the identification of the American in 
Harbin who cooperated with the fourth section of the Red army \ 

Mr. Vosiiikawa. I think so. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa. you were engaged for a long period 
of time in the investigation of international communism in connec- 
tion with the Sorge case. 

Mr. Vosiiikawa. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you any observations or suggestions that you 
would care to make to this committee, which is a committee of the 
Congress of the United States, with regard to investigations of inter- 
national communism '. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. The Sorge case revealed that the investigation of 
international Communist activities cannot be conducted successfully 
alone by any one country. 

The ivw nat ions of the world should cooperate in helping each other 
to conduct the invest igat ion. 

Information should be exchanged. 

National sectionalism is very harmful. 

We have to keep secrets. However, we need cooperation; so I think. 

My desire is t hat from now on, in the future, we would like to have 
cooperation and assistance from America. 

The second point is : I have found that the spy network of Moscow 
covers all over the world. 

On this point we would like to have American cooperation and 
assistance. 

Mr. Tavenner. Thank you very much. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Yoshikawa, I trust that your visit here to the 
United States has been a pleasant one and a profitable one. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you. 



1158 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Walter. And I do feel that there should be cooperation between 
the Government of the United States and other governments of the 
world so that we may exchange information that will aid all of the 
free peoples of the world to understand what this conspiracy means. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you. 

Mr. Walter. And I express the hope that your visit here has 
provided some sort of basis for the cooperation you have spoken of. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you. 

Mr. Walter. And I assure you that we appreciate very much your 
cooperation with this committee. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. As a person working in the Japanese Government, 
I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Doyle. 

Mr. Doyle. I wish to thank the gentleman also. It is very encourag- 
ing. May I ask one question : 

You stated that Sorge had confessed before you expected him to. 
Why did he do it so early ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. I was expecting that it would take a longer time, 
and if it had taken a longer time I thought I would be pushed in a 
difficult position because of pressure from the German Embassy as 
well as from the Japanese Army. 

His collaborators were all rounded up, and also the evidences came 
up ; so he realized that he had no chance. 

Before he confessed we had this conversation : 

I talked to Sorge and said to him that Klausen belonged to the 
Fourth Section of the Red Army. Voukelitch was of the Comintern. 
Ozaki and Miyagi were also members of the Comintern. And their 
statements were in discrepancy, and so I told Sorge, "I will explain 
to you about this question." 

We were talking about this, and then he began to confess. 

Mr. Doyi:e. Thank you. May I ask this question : About 3 weeks 
ago four gentlemen from Japan visited this committee. You were 
one of them. May I ask, when you go back home do you think of 
having a committee such as this in your own legislative body, or are 
you going to recommend something like this committee? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. About the establishing of a committee similar to 
this, we are going to study that very carefully, but for us the most 
important thing is that the people of Japan realize the menace of 
international communism. 

Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Potter. 

Mr. Potter. Mr. Yoshikawa, 1, too, wish to thank you for your 
splendid testimony. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you. 

Mi-. Potter. Your telling us the story of your efforts in the Sorge 
case has been a dramatic example of how international communism 
works; so we are most grateful to you for giving us the benefit of your 
knowledge. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you. 

Mr. Potter. 1 would like to ask one question. 

I noted your statement that the Japanese people are aware of the 
conspiracy as contained in international communism. Do you feel 
that due to the awareness of the Japanese people the Government <>f 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1159 

Japan lias taken all adequate precautions t«» expose and eliminate the 
conspiracy from the country? 

Mr. Ktjroda. My translation was: I understood him to say the 
important thing was to make the Japanese people realize more fully 
about the menace of international coniinunisin. 

Mr. Potter. Do you feel the Japanese people do realize the menace 
of international communism? 

Mr. Yosiiik.wva. And also they are afraid of it. 

Mr. Potter. Do you have any Communist members in your Japa< 
nese Diet \ 

Mr. Yosiiik.wva. Yes. 

Mr. Potter. How many, in proportion of the total membership of 
the Diet? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. Twenty-five in both Houses. 

There are about 25 Communists in both Houses, but this number is 
after the puree by the SCAP | Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers]. Before the purge there were more Communist members. 

Mr. Potter. Do you feel that the Communist members in your Diet 
will decrease rather than increase in the future? 

Mr. Yosiiikawa. The number will decrease. 

In Japan, members of the Communist Party, like members of other 
parties, have to register. 

As of June last year, the members of the Communist Party regis- 
tered were 1 1 0,001 >.' 

But the number decreased and now it is estimated at about (50,000. 

In my estimation there are about 20,000 unregistered Communists 
in addition to those. 

About 250,000 sympathizers are in Japan. They are not members, 
but are sympathizers. 

Mr. Potter. Do you have any trade-unions that are dominated by 
Communists ? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Yes. There are trade-unions which are under the 
influence of the Communist Party. 

Mr. Potter. In what fields? 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Metal and various industrial fields. 

Also, the Communist Party has operatives operating secretly 
within the democratic organizations. 

Once the Communist Party captured 2,500,000 votes, but now their 
following is dwindling. 

The Communist Party membership is decreasing now. 

Mr. Potter. That is to the credit of the people of Japan, after a 
war when the Communists used that war to gain their end. That is a 
credit to the wisdom of thepeople of Japan. 

Mr. Yoshikawa. Thank you, but the Communists are waiting for 
the next revolutionary wave. 

Mr. PoTrER. Both in Japan and in the United States, 

Mr. Walter. Anything further, Mr. Tavenner? 

Mr. Tavenner. No, sir. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will stand adjourned. 

( Thereupon, at 4 : 25 p. m., an adjournment was taken.) 



HEAKINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHAKD 
SORGE SPY CASE 

(Based on Testimony of Mitsnsada Yoshikawa and 
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby) 



WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1951 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D. 0. 

PUBLIC HEARING 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to call at 
10 : 45 a. m., in room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. 
Wood (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood (chair- 
man), Francis E. Walter, James B. Frazier, Jr., and Harold H. Velde. 

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas W. 
Beale, Si\, assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; 
Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re- 
search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please. 

Whom do you have ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby. 

Mr. Wood. General Willoughby, will you stand and be sworn, 
please ? Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee 
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God ? 

General Willoughby. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please state your name ? 

General Willoughby. Charles Andrew Willoughby. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present position ? 

General Willoughby. Major general, United States Army, awaiting 
retirement for partial disability and length of service as a veteran of 
several wars, namely, World War I, 1917; World War II, 1941; the 
North Korean war, 1950; and the Chinese Communist war, 1951. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where did you last serve and in what capacity ? 

General Willoughby. I served as Mac Arthur's chief of intelligence 
since 1939 throughout the campaigns of the Southwest Pacific and the 
occupation of Japan, and in the same capacity throughout the Korean 
conflict. 

90929—51 3 1161 



1162 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Tavenner. I understand you desire to make a general state- 
ment as the basis for your testimony in this hearing ? 

General Willoughby. With the permission of the chairman, I 
would request the privilege of stating my position throughout this 
entire hearing as follows : 

Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute 
sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain con- 
gressional committees, under normal subpena. I am described as 
"threatening a brand-new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon," 
as "vowing to jar the Capital with spy tales." Yet, another enfant 
terrible of the press charges me with "promises to redden faces and 
to set off explosions," and as being "a thorn in the side of the Penta- 
gon." These are pure journalistic exaggerations. 

I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The 
Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has 
passed summa cum laude, as on many other historical occasions. After 
41 years' service, since 1910, 1 leave the Army with a feeling of regret. 
The Regular service is a hard taskmaster, but it is also a delightful 
fraternal organization. 

As regards the State Department, I have served as military attache 
for many years in our embassies of Caracas, Bogata, and Quito, in 
the period 1920-30. The field personnel is first class. The American 
diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commen- 
surate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp 
competition, since foreign establishments are maintained on a more 
or less lavish scale. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example. 

The real subject matter of my presentation to Congress is in a field 
of international danger, in which all political parties could meet 
amicably, on grounds of common interest. Consequently, my proposed 
statements are completely devoid of any political motivation or 
purpose. 

There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact 
of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past 
rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow 
of Cairo, Yalta, Tehran, and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift 
and terrible. The victors of 1915 have created a Frankenstein that 
may yet slay them : the Red menace of international communism. It 
is only fair, however, to accept that the present administration is 
staggering under an intolerable burden which it inherited from its 
predecessors and did not itself create. 

It fell within the purview of MacArthur's Intelligence Section to 
confront this menace in the Far East, and to unmask the grimacing 
face of the Red Medusa. 

The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle 
of presentation. It has been covered initially by Drew Pearson, then 
by Walter Simmons and Alfred Kohlberg, and more recently, in its 
main features, by Newsweek and United States News & World Re- 
port. However, their stories merely scratched the surface. For a 
period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most 
extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in a number of consecu- 
tive exhibits, aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of 
plates, photostats, and illustrations. 

While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must 
be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1163 

essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and 
to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this 
case should dispel carefully nurtured false notions on the responsibili- 
ties for the China debacle and place this controversial subject into 
proper focus. The real cause for the communization of China is the 
long-range subversive operation, over the last two decades, conducted 
by professional Communists under orders of the Kremlin-controlled 
Third Comintern. 

The element which intrigued Mac Arthur's Intelligence was the 
immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end 
with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet 
strategy. 

An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the Third 
Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early 1930's, we are 
not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviet, 1941-45, 
but with the more significant prewar years of 1929-39, in the heydey 
of the Third Communist International, prelude to the infamous 
Stalin-Hitler Pact, sole factor that made World War II at all possible. 

We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of 
modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here were 
sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of 
today — and the spadework was done by men and women of many 
nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other 
than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist 
"jehad"' of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the western world. 

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party 
appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, 
the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes 
and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; such as Earl 
Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhart E'isler, 
and many others. 

My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases, 
and code designations, derived from court records authenticated by 
American lawyers, or from the fabulous dossiers of the French and 
British sections of the Shanghai international police. In protection 
of innocent people, a sharp distinction has been made by us between 
the "operators" and the "bystanders" — the "joiners" who did not quite 
appreciate the character of the organizations they helped support. 

The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct 
espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow- 
traveling dupes and befuddled liberals — apparently unaware that 
they have drifted into an^ international conspiracy for the sole benefit 
of an alien and hostile Government. While this case applies pri- 
marily to Japan and China, it represents a recognizable pattern that 
is working in the United States today. 

I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies 
and certain congressional committees. They are now in a position to 
follow up these leads. I am not a prosecutor. I am only a police- 
man and investigator. It is thus that I discharge a moral obligation 
toward the United States, which has received me as an immigrant 
boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man. 

I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as it did in 
1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the China 
Digest in Hong Kong to the Far East Spotlight in New York City. 



1164 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East Twelfth 
Street, New York. The Red cells will disgorge their indefatigable 
little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The 
smear brigade will swing into action. Some Red mouthpiece will 
prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I 
will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations, 
I am reminded of an ancient saying : 

It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed 
in a cause that will ultimately fail. 

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wood. Any questions, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Proceed. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, stating as you do that the 
Richard Sorge story was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet 
strategy, is it not your opinion that a full disclosure at this time of 
the ramifications of that story would be useful to the Congress and 
the people of this country in understanding the background and mean- 
ing of incidents which Jiave occurred in this country and which likely 
may recur ? 

General Willoughby. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Counsel's 
opinion. There is no doubt that a disclosure or the development or 
tracing of links that exist between an international spy master and 
the present is of immediate practical value, and this committee is 
peculiarly appropriate to receive this testimony. Ten thousand miles 
away, while on duty in Tokyo over many years, I have followed with 
admiration the investigative work of this committee. Their record 
is unimpeachable, and I consider it a privilege to appear before you. 

In this connection, I might pause to pay tribute to a similar com- 
mittee which has taken its techniques and inspiration from the House 
committee, namely, the California State Legislature's Senate Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities, under the able Senator Jack 
Tenney. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, the problem of putting before 
the Congress and the people of this country the Sorge story so that 
they may see and understand similar incidents which have occurred, 
or incidents of somewhat like character, in this country, and so that 
they may be on guard as to the recurrence of such things, is one of 
the purposes of the committee in conducting this hearing. 

I should also add that it is the immediate purpose of this com- 
mittee, in looking into the Sorge case, to ascertain the nature and ex- 
tent of participation in that great conspiracy of persons of United 
States citizenship, and what place, if any, those persons have in the 
Communist conspiracy in the United States as it exists today. 

Those are the two major purposes of our hearing. 

General Willoughby. I shall attempt to comply with your out- 
line, Mr. Counsel. In the course of this presentation we will establish 
the link between Sorge, on the one hand, and the Shanghai operations, 
perhaps much more important, on the other hand. 

We will also develop the similarity of techniques in penetration of 
political and social fraternal organizations, so-called fronts. 

As stated in general outline in my introductory statement, these 
relationships will be developed. In other words, we are not treating 






AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1165 

the Sorge report as a historical incident or as a repetition of some- 
thing that lias already been told. I will show you that in Sorge's 
fragmentary reports there are enough descriptive data of certain 
organizations in Shanghai which are of paramount interest now be- 
cause American citizens, especially members of the American Com- 
munist Party, were active then. Had we known this, I am sure that 
in the last few years we would have been less tolerant, less patient, 
with these people. 

Therefore, the purpose, as I see it, of your inquiry, is exactly as 
you have stated, to link the pasl \\ it h the present, and I feel confident 
that the consecutive questions and answers that will be presented here 
will accomplish this purpose before a committee which, as I have said, 
is especially qualified and peculiarly appropriate for this type of 
inquir}'. 

Mr. Vfxde. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde. 

Mr. Velde. General, there is a lot of sentiment in this country, and 
a lot of people have said, that this is merely water over the dam, some- 
thing that has happened in the past, and the ramifications are no 
longer important to the American people at this time. What is your 
idea on that issue ? 

General Willoughby. May I refer to my introductory remarks, 
which were designed as an outline or program of what the committee — 
and I consider myself a collaborative agent of this committee — hoped 
to accomplish. 

I have said that "The element which intrigued MacArthur's Intelli- 
gence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did 
not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic 
of Soviet strategy." You will obtain a glimpse of Soviet international 
intrigue, the work of the Third Communist International, which is a 
tool of the foreign policy of the Kremlin. That will become crystal 
clear in the course of this presentation. 

Likewise, you will find the activities of American Communists. 
The well-known Gerhart Eisler, who embarrassed the Justice Depart- 
ment through his escape, is present in Shanghai. He did the same 
thing then that he pulled on the Batory. There is your link with yes- 
terday. Earl Browder and Eugene Dennis, the chief of the American 
Communist Party, appear in the Sorge Shanghai channel. So there 
is you connection. Your connection is a case history which presents 
certain operational details that were applied 15 years later, or 10 
years later, by well-known Communist operators in the United States. 
Or, as I stated in my opening remarks, again — 

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist Party appear to have 
been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the 
clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like 
with the Red menace ; such as Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry 
Berger, Gerhart Eisler, and many others. 

Mr. Velde. In other words, General, to simplify it a little bit, you 
feel that we have to study the manipulations of the Communist Party 
and the international Comintern over the past quarter century in order 
to get a clear picture of what their present manipulations might be? 

General Willoughby. I feel that strongly, and I agree entirely 
with your view on that particular subject. 



1166 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Walter. You feel that the same forces at work then are still 
at work, toward the same objective? 

General Willoughby. Indeed, I do. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, during your tenure in Tokyo, 
did you have occasion to further investigate the Richard Sorge spy 
rings which were operated in China and Japan ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. A perusal of the Sorge reports, frag- 
mentary or incomplete, indicated, nevertheless, and very plainly so, 
that his activities in Tokyo were connected with China, Manchuria, 
and the Siberian mainland. 

Mr. Tavenner. After looking into the Sorge case, were you led, as 
a result of this inquiry, to other localities ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. I became interested in Shanghai as a 
focal point of international intrigue and espionage, and specific data 
in the Sorge papers that the Soviet Third International, known as 
the Communist Third International, to be referred to hereafter as 
the Comintern, was operating in that city. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you subsequently determine that there was 
available in Shanghai information regarding the activities of Com- 
munist agents and sympathizers in Shanghai ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. I learned that the international police 
in Shanghai, especially the British and French political sections in the 
thirties, had developed a considerable volume of information regard- 
ing subversive activities of Americans and foreign nationals. In 
some instances these activities were connected with personnel of the 
American Communist Party. 

Mr. Tavenner. As one result of these investigations conducted by 
you, was there compiled by your command a group of 34 consecutive 
exhibits containing the records and results of the Japanese arrest, 
interrogation, and prosecution of Richard Sorge and other defend- 
ants ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are there also included in these exhibits subsequent 
interrogations and legal opinions compiled by your command after 
the occupation of Japan ? 

General Willoughby. There are. May I give you a brief defini- 
tion of this material ? We use the phraseology "exhibit" as a matter 
of convenience. Actually, they are authenticated, notarized court 
translations, notarized by a battery of reputable American lawyers. 

As this material is voluminous, aggregating hundreds of type- 
written pages, I felt it my duty to assist this committee or any other 
investigative body, to prepare personally a brief, rarely exceeding two 
to three pages. These briefs to these exhibits are referred to as G-2 
comment, number so and so. They are in your possession. 

This is roughly a description of the material and the dispatch of 
these exhibits, if that meets your requirements, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state for the record 
that certified copies of the exhibits referred to by the witness were 
delivered by the Department of the Army to the staff of this com- 
mittee at various times, the first delivery being made in March 1949 
and the last delivery being made on the 15th day of February 1951. 

I am advised that at substantially the same times, copies of the 
same exhibits were delivered to the FBI, CIO, and the State Depart- 
ment. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1167 

As a part of the investigation, the committee, on December 9, 1949, 
through one of its investigators, endeavored to obtain information as 
to the availability of Agnes Smedley, whose name appears throughout 
these reports, for the purpose of serving a subpena upon her, and 
ascertained that Agnes Smedley left the United States for Great 
Britain on December li, which was just 7 days prior to the making 
of that effort. 

Now, the exhibits to which you and I have referred, General Wil- 
loughby, appear on the table next to you. I will ask you to examine 
them and state whether or not they are the exhibits which were 
prepared by your command and under your direct ion and supervision \ 

General Wh-lottghby. 1 have examined these exhibits, Mr. Counsel, 
and identify them as being either originals or copies of the consecu- 
tive reports filed by us in Washington. 

May 1 add a remark, sir? Your statement that you received these 
exhibits through the assistance of the War Department, I would 
heartily concur in, and say that the Intelligence Section, Department 
of the Army, under Major General Boiling, have been and are most 
cooperative in this entire enterprise. 

What you said about Smedley and your attempt to summon her, 
before this committee is news to me, and indicates that you had been 
aware of the implication of this case for a long time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Each of the exhibits is numbered. I believe you 
have them numbered consecutively, from 1 to 34? 

General Willoughby. I believe so. To refresh my memory — [after 
examining documents] yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer these exhibits, 
not in evidence, but merely present them to the committee at this time 
and ask that they be marked for identification only in the same manner 
and in accordance with the same numbers that they now have, for the 
sake of clarity and future reference to them. In other words, they 
would be numbered "Willoughby Exhibits 1 to 34, inclusive." 

Mr. Wood. There is no objection on the part of any member of the 
committee, and they will be so marked. 

(The consecutive reports above referred to were marked "Wil- 
loughby Exhibits Nos. 1 to 34, inclusive," for identification only.) 

Mr. Tavenner. As a further result of your investigation of the 
Sorge case, which led to your travels to Shanghai, were there com- 
piled by your command certain documents relating to Communist 
activities of numerous individuals in Shanghai ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. May I amplify this, please? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

General Willoughby. I was able to track down and obtain a sub- 
stantial portion — though not the complete file, a substantial portion — 
of the Shanghai municipal police files, with the assistance of British, 
French, and Chinese officials and the Central Intelligence Agency, 
with whom I had been on efficient and friendliest collaboration for a 
number of years. 

Mr. Tavenner. As a result of your efforts, you did obtain all of the 
files which were left intact? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. I refer you now, or show you, point out to you, two 
metal lockers. I would like for you to examine the lockers and their 



1168 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

contents and state whether or not they are the Shanghai police files 
to which you refer ? 

General Willottghby (after examining lockers and contents). Mr. 
Counsel, they are. In consideration of the extensive labor of this 
committee, and realizing that your research staff was probably limited, 
I have attempted to organize these files in the technique of a reference 
library in which the contents are systematically numbered, and alpha- 
betical card indexes and cross-references have been prepared. 

Mr. Tavenner. I notice in the top of the trunk two typewritten lists. 
What are they? 

General Willottghby. These are entitled "Indexes to Contents." 
They identify the contents both by title and reference number. 

Mr. Tavenner. These trunks were shipped to me, Frank S. Taven- 
ner, as chief counsel of the Committee on Un-American Activities on 
May 7, 1951, from Tokyo, were they not? 

General Willottghby. I concur. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to present to the committee the two trunks 
with their contents, and ask that they be marked '"Willoughby Exhib- 
its 35 and 36" for identification only. 

Mr. Wood. So ordered. 

(The two metal trunks above referred to, together with their con- 
tents, were marked "Willoughby Exhibits 35 and 36," respectively, 
for identification only.) 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, you will recall that this com- 
mittee first contacted you relative to the subject of this inquiry in 
1949. Subsequently, we requested you to prepare at your conven- 
ience a concise report on the Sorge case, embodying the essential 
parts of that case, particularly those of interest to the United States, 
in order that this matter might be presented more completely at a 
public hearing. Is that correct ? 

General Willoughby. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you able to fulfill that request ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, General Willoughby has filed a 
copy of his report with the staff. This report has been invaluable in 
the preparation of this hearing and in various investigations which 
the committee has from time to time conducted relating to these mat- 
ters, and will be used consistently throughout the conduct of his hear- 
ing, both by the witness and by me as counsel. 

General Willoughby, are you acquained with Yoshikawa Mitsusada ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, I am, over a number of years. He is a 
brilliant Japanese lawyer, long in government service, and I con- 
gratulate the committee on having obtained his appearance here and 
his statement in the general premises. 

Mr. Velde. Would you spell his name, please, General ? 

General Willoughby. Y-o-s-h-i-k-a-w-a, surname, M-i-t-s-u-s-a-d-a ; 
Yoshikawa Mitsusada. 

Mr. Tavenner. You are aware of the fact that he testified before 
this committee regarding certain affidavits which are included in the 
exhibits prepared by you ? 

General Willoughby. Yes; I was very happy to obtain this infor- 
mation through press reports, and consider his contribution, that is, 
his authentication, of correlated Sorge data as important, perhaps 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1169 

supplemental to the equally important authentication by a battery of 
American lawyers in Tokyo. 

Mr. Tavennee. These affidavits were executed by Mr. Yoshikawa in 
19 19 at the request of your command, attest ing to the aul henl icity of 
the Sorge interrogations and confessions which he personally observed. 
That is true, isn't it \ 

General Willougiiry. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Tavennee. A persual of the exhibits, which are in the posses- 
sion of the committee, indicates a quite extensive and sincere effort 
on the part of American authorities since the occupation to establish 
beyond any question of a doubt the validity of the Japanese trials of 
Sorge and his co-defendants, and the validity of the police investiga- 
tions in the Sorge case, and the authentic character of the records 
which you have produced here. 

With reference to this aspect of your investigation, what did you do 
to establish the validity of the trials, according to our concept of trials, 
and the authenticity of the records? 

General Wellottghby. I am very glad to take advantage of your 
question, Mr. Counsel, because juridical authentication, if presented 
at this time to the satisfaction of the committee, appears to me essential 
for the entire range of documentation that is submitted. We felt in 
1949, although the reports date back to 1947, that that authentica- 
tion was desirable because a question had been raised — primarily by 
Miss Smedley at the time, utilizing all the facilities of publicity so 
generously placed at her disposal — and that we should go over this 
case again and have the material notarized in the approved technical 
manner prescribed by American law. 

Without going into details, I would like to go on record with ref- 
erence to so-called exhibit 12, including the G-2 comments previously 
described, as follows 

Mr. Velde. Before you go into that I would like to ask you what 
you meant by the statement you made with reference to Agnes Smed- 
ley and her use of the press and use of the fact that these documents 
were not authenticated ? 

General Willotjghby. I get your point, Mr. Velde. We will have 
to go back to comparatively ancient history as far as I am concerned, 
namely, that when the report was published by the War Department 
in 1949, in February of 1949, Miss Smedley, assisted by Mr. John 
Rogge. her attorney, protested the entire publication, charged the 
contents as being false, untrue or illegal, and obtained, shall we say, 
a generous allocation of radio broadcast time and the full support of 
that portion of the American press which has been ascribed by refer- 
ence to the coloration pink, fellow-traveling, or pale rose, as the case 
may be. 

That statement by her was given, as you recall, extraordinary pub- 
licity at the time. Our response to that was probably one of acquies- 
cence and a desire to go over the evidence once more, this time with 
the support of competent American legal opinion, which is the purpose 
of my reading. 

My reaction personally at the time was to accept Miss Smedley's 
threat of suit for libel which she flung into the airways and which I 
unhesitatingly accepted at the time. She did not press her suit, or 
rather, her lawyer. I believe a Mr. John Rogge, did not press this suit, 
for obvious reasons. 



1170 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Velde. Was any suit filed by Agnes Smedley at all for libel? 

General Willoughby. No. My reference to this legal opinion of 
authentication is related to your question. We felt that a report by 
an investigative agency should be good enough, considering that this 
agency has a record of long service, but we also felt that since reputa- 
ble American legal advice was available in Tokyo, that we should call 
on them, and they are: Messrs. J. Woodall Greene, member of the 
Maryland Bar; Joseph S. Carusi, member of the Connecticut Bar; 
Franklin E. N. Warren, member of the Oklahoma Bar and member 
of the New Mexico Bar. 

These men occupied high positions in the occupation headquarters, 
and are on duty there now. 

In addition to this American talent, we also employed, because of 
the language element, the services of an international Japanese-British 
firm : Messrs. E. V. A. de Becker and R. Usami, member, Middle Tem- 
ple, London; member, Inner Temple, London; member, Tokyo Bar. 

Upon examination, item for item, and notarization of the docu- 
ments, these gentlemen made the following signed summation 
statement : 

We, the undersigned, fully realizing that certain processes and procedures are 
necessary for the authentication or verification of documentary evidence before 
they may be introduced in courts of record in the United States, or be used as 
a basis for evidence, have examined the methods and procedures used for the 
authentication and verification of the documents listed, and after having duly 
considered the testimony of witnesses and having examined their written state- 
ments and interrogations, together with their seals and signatures appended 
thereto, have arrived at the conclusion that the authentication and verification 
of the documents, including the statements from witnesses, is in accordance with 
existing laws and procedures. 

We, therefore, certify that it is our opinion that the authentication and veri- 
fication of each of the several documents mentioned — 

And I am now speaking of this entire collection, both here and in the 
Shanghai files — 

is legally sufficient to give legal standing to their full use within the scope of 
the rules of civil procedures for the courts of the United States, or foreign courts 
adhering to Anglo-American jurisprudence. 

If the committee desires, there is additional opinion by the Judge 
Advocate of General Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. With your per- 
mission I will file an abbreviated extract, if I may. This is taken 
from exhibit No. 14, one of these folders. It is entitled, "Opinion of 
Legal Section, Far East Command, Opinion of the Judge Advocate 
General, Far East Command and Related Matter." [Reading :] 

In further support of the opinions of prominent American, British, and Japa- 
nese lawyers, currently employed in various civil sections, Headquarters Tokyo, 
there is enclosed herewith the opinion of legal section, Far East Command. 

In this opinion, legal section, Far East Command, supports the conclusions of 
the Sorge Spy Ring report of December 15, 1947, and attests to the value of the 
documentary evidence on hand in G-2, Far East Command. 

In their brief, legal section, Far East Command, points out and concurs in 
the general appraisal of evidence in this report, viz: 

(i) The evidence has definite probative value. 

(ii) Ample basis and justification for the report. 

(iii) Evidence is considered to have a rational probative force. 

(iv) It is considered acceptable to reasonable men. 

(v) It is of type employed in congressional investigation committees. 

Apparently, as of the date of this opinion, which is 2 to 3 years old, 
we had a feeling, in our correspondence with this committee, that 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1171 

sooner or later this material might become of more than local interest. 
[Continuing reading:] 

(vi) There is strong evidence of careful Japanese investigation. 

(vii) No indication of employment of force or manufactured testimony. 

(viii) Statements of various accused arc mutually corroborative. 

(ix) The (l-J. report December 15, L947, was justified and properly made. 

Mr. Tavf.xxki:. Mr. Chairman, at this time T would like fco offer in 
evidence the exhibit formerly identified by Yoshikawa Mitsusada and 
marked for identification only as "Yoshikawa Exhibit No. 2," and 
ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 37." 

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit 
No. 37," is filed herewith.) 

Mr. W alter. Is that the exhibit that was marked when Mr. 
Yoshikawa testified? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. This exhibit, it will be recalled, consists of 
the first draft in German of the Sorge confession and its English 
translation. According to the testimony of Mr. Yoshikawa, this con- 
fession was not accepted on the ground that it was inadequate, and 
Mr. Yoshikawa, in his individual capacity retained possession of this 
draft. Subsequently, Richard Sorge completed his confession and 
as the contents of this document are embraced within the completed 
confession, it will not be necessary to allude to it further. 

General Willoughby, I now call your attention to a document en- 
titled '"Sorge Case Materials, Part I of Translation of Statement of 
Richard Sorge," dated February 1942, and immediately following that 
document, "Sorge Case Materials, Part II of Translation of State- 
ment of Richard Sorge," dated April 1942, which appear in your 
report under these titles. These two documents appear also in the 
consecutive exhibits as 20-A and 20-B. Will you tell the committee 
the genesis of this document and what it comprises ? 

General Willoughby. Identified as classified by you, its full and 
official title, translated from the Japanese, is known as "Sorge Case 
Materials." It consists of two parts : "Part 1 of Translation of State- 
ment of Richard Sorge" and "Part 2 of Translation of Statement of 
Richard Sorge." It was published by the Ministry of Justice in its 
Criminal Affairs Bureau. 

The foreword, I believe, Mr. Chairman, describes its content. The 
foreword is contained on the first page of a special number, No. 191, 
and marked "Top secret," top secret at the time as applied to the Japa- 
nese Government, a very interesting sidelight, if I may digress. 

When this ring was discovered and the members of the ring ar- 
rested, a very leisurely investigative process ensued, because the Japa- 
nese Government at that time was in a state of neutrality with Soviet 
Russia and did not wish to disturb this by the implication contained 
in this case. For that reason, the publications were marked "Secret" 
and were handled with very considerable delicacy. It was some years 
later when it became apparent to the Japanese Government that the 
Soviet neutrality would soon end. Then they proceeded with more 
vigor in this case, to the extent of condemning the principals Sorge 
and Ozaki. 

I now proceed with the reading of the foreword, to comply with the 
request of counsel. 



1172 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Velde. General Willoughby, can you fix the period of this neu- 
trality between Japan and Russia a little more exactly? 

General Willoughby. Yes. Our war entry is December 7, 1941. 
And, incidentally, Sorge will have something to say about this in his 
coded messages to Moscow. The Japanese Government felt it pru- 
dent, shall we say, or within the realm of their international purposes, 
to enter into a neutrality agreement with the Soviets. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was in April 1941 as Matsuoka was returning 
from Germany to Japan ? 

General Willoughby. Yes ; some months prior to our entry into the 
war. 

Mr. Velde. Approximately how long prior to our entry into the 
war was this period of neutrality, as you call it ? 

General Willoughby. Six months, roughly. Roughly 6 months 
would cover the period of negotiation, of weighing and balancing 
favorable and unfavorable factors and the decision to develop a neu- 
trality pact with Russia. 

Mr. Velde. General, in your investigations did you find any evidence 
that the Russian Government was aware of the planned attack on 
Pearl Harbor? 

General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Velde ; and, if I am permitted the 
liberty of suggesting, the counsel has provided for that in a later ques- 
tion. 

Mr. Velde. I withdraw the question. 

General Willoughby. And I am sure he will call your attention to 
it. Your question is well taken and is an important historical ele- 
ment. They did get the information. We will read, probably, the 
contents of that message later on. In other words, they knew in 
advance what was going to happen, and I wish I had known it in 
advance, too. We were then sweating it out in the Philippines, know- 
ing that the Philippines would be a very probable target. 

Mr. Walter. May I ask a question at this point, General ? 

General Willoughby. Certainly. 

Mr. Walter. The Ozaki you mentioned was the political adviser to 
Konoye, and Ozaki was a Communist agent ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. He was the closest right-hand man to 
Dr. Sorge. It is a sort of astonishing piece of information that an 
intimate of the Prime Minister of Japan, with access to the secrets of 
the Foreign Office of Japan, should also be an intimate of a Russian- 
controlled espionage identity. 

Mr. Walter. He was more than an intimate ; wasn't he the political 
adviser to Konoye ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. I think we will cover that later on, but 
I will be glad to outline it to you. Ozaki belonged to a group of 
political experts. He was rated as an expert on China and the Man- 
churian Railway, and as such he was a consultant to the Foreign 
Office; that was actually his official position. But he was more than 
that, because he developed an intimate personal relationship with the 
Prime Minister, who had around him what was then known as a group 
of bright young men around the Foreign Office who met with the 
Prime Minister at irregular intervals in an informal fashion at break- 
fast, and sometimes at dinner, and became known as the Breakfast 
Club. The Breakfast Club meant something to the Japanese, although 
it meant nothing to us until the development of the Sorge story. We 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1173 

found there a local related group of consultants and Foreign Ollice 
officials who were to some extent responsible for at least the dra I' l Lng of 
foreign policy, and this man was a member of t Ids powerful and influ- 
ential group. What he found he immediately relayed to his boss and 
associate. Dr. Sorge, who put it on his radio station which he main- 
tained, and it was relayed to Khabarovsk, the Russian official relay 
station in Siberia, and then onward to Moscow. 

So, this extraordinary man, this Dr. Sorge, had access on the one 
hand to the inner councils of the Japanese Government, and on the 
other hand to the inner councils of the German Government, because 
he occupied the position of press attache to the German Embassy in 
Tokyo. In other words, he got it coming and going. 

Mr. Tavenner. Didn't he also have access to more or less a degree to 
the inner councils of the British Foreign Office? 

General Willoughby. Yes. His ring involved an English subject,, 
Guenther Stein, who was persona grata with the British Foreign 
Office in Tokyo. 

He also had access at one time or another to American information 
through Smedley and her associates. 

Mr. Tavenner. May I suggest, General, that to go into the details 
of this matter now, which you are doing in response to my question,, 
may rather interfere with the orderly development of the testimony ; 
and I suggest, if satisfactory to the committee, that we proceed more 
or less in chronological order. 

General Willoughby. Very good. Needless to say, I am delighted 
to respond to a question by Mr. Walter, but I was aware 

A Ir. Tavenner. Well, I asked the question about the British, and I 
realize we are getting deeply into testimony with which we will be 
concerned later. 

General Willoughby. Indeed, sir. 

In order to get back on the track, your last inquiry was the identi- 
fication of Sorge Case Materials, and I suggested that the foreword 
of the document is self-explanatory. I will read this foreword, which 
should dispose of this important document : 

The German Richard S'orge entered the German Communist Party in 1919, 
was sent to Comintern headquarters — 

Russian headquarters — 

in January 1925, immediately became a member of the Russian Communist 
Party, joined the staff of the Comintern intelligence department and engaged in 
espionage activities in the northern European nations, China and elsewhere. He 
was ordered to serve as a spy in Japan in 1933, went to that country as a corre- 
spondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, organized a secret espionage ring, includ- 
ing the German Max Klausen, a member of the German Communist Party and 
radio technician sent out by the same Soviet intelligence authorities; the Yugo- 
slav and member of the French Communist Party, Branko de Voukelitch, the 
United States Communist Party member Miyagi Yotoku, who had been sent to 
Japan by his party to perform espionage work — 

I pause here to point out the significance of the international recruit- 
ment by which this man was furnished a member of the French Com- 
munist Party, a member of the American Communist Party, and a 
member of the German Communist Party as a part of his working 
staff. With reference to your question, Mr. Walter [continuing 
reading] : 

the political adviser to the Chinese Comnmnist Party Ozaki Hozumi, whom.' 
Sorge himself had recruited around 1930 in Shanghai — 



1174 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

In other words, Ozaki Hozumi, in the early part of the 1930's, irre- 
spective of his future high official position with the Japanese Govern- 
ment, was also listed by Sorge as a political adviser to the Chinese 
Communist Party in 1930. There are many items I have either for- 
gotten or that the detailed investigation has brought forth. [Contin- 
uing reading:] 

and others, and directed and supervised the said ring in the collection and trans- 
mission to Soviet headquarters, either in writing or via radio, of information 
concerning military affairs, foreign relations, politics, economics, and other mis- 
cellaneous subjects. 

The contents of the present printed document comprise part 1 of a translation 
of typewritten German notes prepared by Sorge in lieu of a statement at the 
direction of the Tokyo District Criminal Court. 

Mr. Tavenner. At this point, I desire to offer in evidence as "Wil- 
loughy Exhibit No. 38" the German notes and the English translation 
referred to as being a part of consecutive exhibit 20-A. 

Mr. Wood. It will be received. 

( The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 
38," is filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. All right; if you will proceed to part 2. 

General Willoughby. Part 2 has an identical title. Its foreword 
merely consists of this description : 

This document comprises the second and last part of a translation by the 
Procurator's Bureau of the Tokyo District Criminal Court of typewritten German 
notes prepared by Richard Sorge in lieu of a statement. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire at this time to offer in evidence so much of 
consecutive exhibit 20-B, both in the German text and in the English 
translation, as conforms to the witness' description. 

Mr. Wood. It will be received. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 
39," is filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, these two documents, marked 
"Willoughby Exhibit No. 38" and "Willoughby Exhibit No. 39," are 
what is known as the Sorge confession ; are they not ? 

General Willoughby. Yes; they are, though the correct title has 
been read by me now, namely, "Sorge Case Materials." We finally 
gave it a convenient title of our own out in Tokyo; namely, "Sorge s 
Own Story." Actually, it is a rather loose designation. They are not 
confessions; they are not really Sorge's own story; they are not a 
diary ; but they contain elements of all three, and you are at liberty to 
refer to them as you choose. We have used those terms indiscrimi- 
nately for some time. 

Mr. Tavenner. And the translation of the title of the document 
itself, the printed title which I read, is "Parts 1 and 2 of the Statement 
of Richard Sorge" ? 

General Willoughby. Sorge Case Materials. 

Mr. Tavenner. Let me put the question this way : There is no diary 
or confession by Sorge separate and apart from the document which I 
introduced a moment ago, previously marked "Yoshikawa Exhibit 2," 
and these two documents, "Willoughby Exhibit 38" and "Willoughby 
Exhibit 39," which have just been introduced? 

General Willoughby. There is none. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, when Yoshikawa put the story 
together and reduced it to typewritten sheets, they were submitted to 
Sorge and he initialed them ; isn't that correct ? 






AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1175 

General Willoughby. I think he made corrections. The original I 
have seen shows ink entries of a leisurely, editorial, corrective process. 

Mr. Walter. Did he initial each page? 

General Willoughby. I don't recall that point, but I have accepted 
this particular document at full face value. 

Mr. Walter. It is just as much a confession as though the entire 
thing had been written by his own hand ? 

Genera] Willoughby. I think your point is well taken. The man 
wrote it and filed it juridically, and I believe you could accept that 
classification, sir. 

Mr. Taykn'xkk. This confession or statement by Richard Sorge, 
comprising exhibits 38 and 39, is very long. They are very interest- 
ing, Mr. Chairman. They go with great detail into the history of the 
Communist Party and the Comintern in the East ; but, as they are ex- 
hibits, we will not undertake to read the documents. I would like, 
however, to question the witness more or less in a chronological fash- 
ion regarding matters that are set forth in the diary. 

General Willoughby, I call your attention to page 14 of part 1 of 
exhibit 38, in which there appears chapter 4, entitled "The Writer's 
Espionage Group and Activities in China Between January 1930 and 
December 1932." Will you please give the committee the benefit of 
the information contained therein relating to the organization of this 
group? In referring to "the writer," I was referring to Richard 
Sorge. 

General Willoughby. I think extracts from this very voluminous 
exhibit, which is available in totality, will give the story. For ex- 
ample, when he speaks of the organization of the China group he has 
this to say : 

I came to China with two foreign coworkers who had been dispatched on or- 
ders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. 

That is a rather significant line. They had been dispatched on 
orders from the fourth bureau of the Red army. The fourth bureau 
of the Red army is the intelligence section of the Soviet army, and 
Sorge says he came to China with two coworkers who had been fur- 
nished him by the fourth bureau of the Red army. That indicates he 
was working for the fourth section of the Soviet army ; he was an 
operator, an agent, an under-cover agent, so to speak, of the intelli- 
gence section of the Soviet army. 

Now, he says : 

The only person in China upon whom I knew I could depend was Agnes Smed- 
ley, of whom I had first heard in Europe. I solicited her aid in establishing my 
group in Shanghai and particularly in selecting Chinese coworkers. I met as 
many as possible of her young Chinese friends, making special efforts to be- 
come acquainted with those who volunteered to cooperate and work with 
foreigners for leftist causes. 

Then later on, to pick another significant fragment, he said : 

I used the same method in obtaining foreign coworkers for my espionage 
group. At first I selected people from among Smedley's friends, approaching 
them by asking Smedley to introduce me to them and then waiting until I 
could negotiate with them directly. 

Then this will interest Mr. Walter : 

It was in that way that I met Ozaki, and I think Smedley was the one who 
introduced us. After that Smedley and I met Ozaki frequently at Smedley's 
home. 



1176 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

He goes on in the same vein in this lengthy description of his 
operations. 

Mr. Tavenner. I call your attention to page 15 of this same exhibit 
28, where there appears subtitle C, entitled "Methods Used in Collec- 
tion of Information by Japanese Members; Methods of Contacting 
Japanese Members," and ask you to tell the committee what Sorge had 
to say about his contacts with Japanese members. 

General Willoughey. Here again I make some selective references 
to his statements because they are descriptive of his work. He said : 

My meetings with Japanese members took place at restaurants, cafes or 
Smedley's home * * *. I felt most at ease when we met at Smedley's home, 
and I took Ozaki and Kawai there on many occasions. 

May I pause here to identify this man Kawai, K-a-w-a-i ? Kawai 
is a member of Sorge's ring, arrested, tried, and convicted, whom we 
released under the political amnesty following the occupation of 
Japan. We released a lot of people under the casual classification of 
political prisoners. The fact that they included convicted espionage 
agents and a slight assortment of murderers was incidental. We were 
too busy with the occupation of Japan to go into case histories. Later 
we got those people. 

Kawai became important because he is an actual living eyewitness 
of this association with Smedley and others, has said so, his affidavit 
is available, and were funds available he could have been brought 
before this committee. 

Mr. Tavenner. In that connection, General, is it not correct that 
he is one of the two individuals of whom this committee wrote you 
regarding the taking of his deposition by this committee during April 
1950 when a subcommittee was in Hawaii ? 

General Willoughby. Quite. I am glad you reminded me of it, 
Mr. Counsel, and it shows that this committee has been actually work- 
ing on this case over a long period. 

This affidavit was prepared in lieu of a personal appearance, and it 
has the same probative value. 

In other words, if Smedley and her lawyers in her days — and she 
had to defend herself, of course ; I had no objection then or now to 
this attitude — if she maintained this was a typical forced Japanese 
disclosure, it has been supported by witnesses of high standing willing 
to make that statement before an American investigative group such 
as this one. Kawai is in a more important category than Ozaki be- 
cause you can summon him if you want to, though he has made a 
sworn statement, notarized, and so forth. 

Mr. Velde. You have mentioned meetings between Ozaki and 
Kawai in Smedley's home. Can you place the time they were held 
and where was Smedley's home ? 

General Willottghby. These conferences were in the city of 
Shanghai. Smedley and Stein were never active in Japan, and refer- 
ence to her is as to her work as Sorge's assistant in Shanghai. Later 
on — and I did not know it at the lime — our interest in the Sorge file 
brought confirmation of that in the Shanghai police records. A Japa- 
nese court record of an espionage ring points to activities in Shanghai, 
and that is confirmed by a later investigation of collateral supporting 
information of identical quality by a reputable international policing 
body, the Shanghai municipal police, which at that time was an extra- 
territorial enclave in China. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF .RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1177 

Mr. Velde. You think the evidence such I hat il would sal isfy almost 
any American court? 

Genera] Willoughby. Yes. 1 would accept it. 

Mr. Vki.dk. What was the period? 

General Willoughby. 1929 to 1934. Am I correct about that, Mr. 
Counsel? As a matter of fact, the counsel to this committee lias be- 
come much more expert than I am on these files. 

Mr. T.wk.nxkr. 1 think the interrogation will indicate' that these 
particular conferences took" place in L932 and the last one in 1933, so 
far as Kawai is concerned. 

General Willoughby. I was tempted to throw into the hopper the 
Shanghai police document. 

Mi'. Tavkxxki;. Before you do that, you referred to Guenther Stein 
not having been involved in Japan. 

General Willoughby. I take that back. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wasn't that an error? 

General Willoughby. Yes. That was a slip of the tongue, an error. 
Smedley was not in Japan, but Guenther Stein was there. In fact, 
he ran a radio station for Sorge for a long time. 

As to the relationship between the Sorge report, a Japanese report, 
and the report of the British and French concessions of the Shanghai 
municipal police, the committee holds in the Shanghai files a typical 
dossier containing an elaborate report and a typical index card on 
Smedley. This is a 5- by 3-inch index card, and it fixes the date. 

"Shanghai municipal police" is written in the upper left-hand 
corner; file number; date, August 1933; American; age, 23/2/1892; 
height, 5 feet G inches; hair, brown; eyes, gray; face, oval. I would 
say a rather slipshod description. 

Antecedents: Agnes Smedley, alias Alice Bird, alias Mrs. Petroikos, American 
citizen horn in Osgoo, Mo., United States of America, on February 23, 1892. 
Member of the following societies. 

That is rather interesting. From 1933 to 1951 we have heard of such 
lists elsewhere, where fellow travelers and joiners join certain fronts. 
[Continuing reading:] 

Friends of the U. S. S. R., Hindustan Association in Berlin, Berlin Indian 
Revolutionary Society, Noulens Defense Committee — 

The "Noulens Defense Committee" is a forerunner of the Civil Eights 
Congress; it works in Shanghai on the same principle as the Civil 
Eight Congress works in New York City now ; namely, legal defense 
of Communists caught in the business. 

Mr. Walter. What is the American counterpart ? 

General Willoughby." 1 The Civil Rights Congress. I will trace it 
from its noble birth to its American tendrils. 

Mr. Walter. Noble birth? I would say birth out of wedlock. 

General Willoughby. I accept your fine genealogical nuance, Mr. 
Walter. [Continuing reading:] 

All China Labor Federation, and the China League for Civil Rights. Speaks 
English, French, and German and is in possession of two passports — German 
and American. 

I will show individuals with 15 passports. [Continuing reading:] 

Arrived in Shanghai in May in2D from Berlin as the correspondent of the 
German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung. 
90929—51 4 



1178 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

That is the same cover Sorge had, who was also a correspondent for 
the Frankfurter Zeitung. [Continuing reading:] 

She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central committee of the 
Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted local Indian 
seditionists on several occasions during the past few years. It is believed that 
her chief duties comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among 
workers and that she receives orders direct from the central committee of the 
Communist International in Moscow. 

This is a statement by the Shanghai municipal police, who did not 
then know or have, of course, Sorge's record, known here as exhibit 
38, but they had a fair knowledge of it. [Continuing reading :] 

May 1929 to May 15, 1930—85 Avenue Dubail. May 15, 1930, to October 1930— 
Canton, and French concession, Shameen. October 1930 — 72 Route Groushy — 

A Shanghai street. [Continuing reading :] 

January 22, 1931, to March 5, 1931— Nanking. June 16, 1931, to July 5, 1931— 
Canton. December 1931 — removed to apartment 102, I. S. S. Apartments, 1552 
Avenue Joffre. 

On May 17, 1933, she left Shanghai by rail for Peiping. Unconfirmed informa- 
tion is to the effect that she intends to proceed to Moscow. October 23, 1934 — 
returned to Shanghai — 

A lapse of 2 years. [Continuing reading :] 

from the United States, in the S. S. President Coolidge — 

And so forth and so forth. 

Behind this brief, typical index card maintained by the Shanghai 
police, there is a more extensive file, but here is a rough fixation of 
the time period, views of the British police, her aliases and her asso- 
ciations, in broad outline, of which a more complete record is going 
to be filed by the counsel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Willoughby, I call your attention to section F, 
page 16, part 1, of the document referred to — that is, exhibit 38 — 
which is entitled, "Persons Directly Attached to Writer's Chinese 
Group," and by "writer" I am referring to Richard Sorge. 

Will you tell the committee what Richard Sorge had to say about 
this subject? 

General Willoughby. With reference to foreigners, Mr. Counsel? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. It is section F. 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. I have it. Here, again, I act as an 
assistant counsel in protecting the limited time of the committee and 
picking out what I know from my long experience to be the high 
lights. This is the type of comment he makes on his foreign associates. 
He has one by the name of Seber Weingarten : 

Weingarten, the man in charge of wireless operations in my group, remained in 
Shanghai after I returned to Moscow. He was a graduate of the radio school in 
Moscow who had been ordered by headquarters to work with me. 

He has this to say about Agnes Smedley, though he has other things to 
say in other parts of this document : 

She was an American and a correspondent of the German newspaper Frank- 
furter Zeitung. She was used in Shanghai by me as a direct member of my 
group. She worked for me very competently. 

Then there are a number of code and surnames. Some we have identi- 
fied ; others we suspect ; and others we don't know who they are. One 
was John : 

John — He was sent to Shanghai to work for me by the fourth bureau of 
the Red Army in 1931. Although he acted as my proxy in a few liaison 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1179 

duties, he was chiefly concerned with code :md photographic work. He was a 
Pole, a former member of the Polish Communist Tarty. 

Here we have an interesting one. By cross reference to Sorge and 
the Shanghai police, we have been able to establish his identity : 

Paul — He was designated as my successor by the fourth bureau of the Red 
Army. While I was in Shanghai, he was chiefly concerned with military mat- 
ters, on which he was an expert. He became the leader of the group after I left. 

Here, while the mater is covered more extensively later on, I would 
like to pause and read to you again one of those police identities, and 
it is in line with the purposes of this committee. In a general manner, 
this is what I said in my correspondence with Washington : 

The significance of this material of yesterday is that it, carries into tomorrow. 
Time in its issue of April 25, 11)49, featured Eugene Dennis. There is no point 
in repeating this terse, well-writen story of the growth and world itinerary of 
a Soviet agent ; important, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge 
case. 

Dennis, who used to be Francis X. Wahlron, obtained a fraudulent passport as 
'Paul Walsh'* and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide 
ramifications of the Third International, with Shanghai as the far eastern 
operating center, are reflected in the itinerary of this prominent American disci- 
ple. Paul Eugene Walsh, alias "Paul" or "Milton," suddenly appears in the 
records of the Shanghai police. 

The Shanghai police had the same type of card on him as I read to you 
on Smedley. 

Mr. Tavenner. And a person designated by the name Paul is said by 
Sorge to have been his successor at Shanghai ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. Here I am quoting the Shanghai 
police report : 

Name : Paul Eugene Walsh ; alias Milton. 
Date and place of birth : Unknown. 
Address in Shanghai : 35-D, 643 Route Frelupt. 

Particulars of passport : American Passport No. 331741 issued by the Depart- 
ment of State, Washington, D. C. on 12.12.1930. 
When and how Walsh arrived in Shanghai are unknown, as are his previous 
activities. From December 1, 1933, until June 1, 1934, he resided at Flat 0, 
Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. On May 30, 1934, the lease of 
Flat 34-D, Foncim Apartments, No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his 
name from Harry Berger — 

This is important. Harry Berger is a well-known international Com- 
munist identity. [Continuing reading:] 

with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh resided at 
the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 1S34, when he secretly left 
Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. Conte Verde. It has been established — 

says the Shanghai police — 

that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local machine of the Comintern, 
and as such was responsible for the collation of many important documents re- 
lating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far East. 

Now, Sorge describes this particular Comintern machine, and we 
will read it shortly. Sorge does not always give complete identities. 
He was cautious, even in his story, because he hoped against hope, 
from 1941 to 1944, that the Soviets would intervene and rescue him 
from his predicament. 

The cross-reference, Mr. Velde, is that this Comintern apparatus 
or machine with which the police associates him, and which is de- 
scribed fully by Sorge as to its purposes, was founded by Earl Browder, 



1180 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

the head of the American Communist Party. It was Dennis who 
took the place of Browder. That constitutes the value of this pseudo- 
historical tracing of fine lines of relationship which is one of the tasks 
of this committee and one of the tasks of the Tokyo intelligence system. 

Mr. Velde. Do I get you right that the corroboration consists of 
the Shanghai police reports, which mention the names of Browder, 
Dennis, and others, and they are also contained in the Sorge file ? 

General Willoughby. Yes ; either in code name or surname. 

Mr. Walter. General, you stated that some of the names you merely 
suspected. Have you pursued all avenues of investigation to determine 
who they were, and do you think we might well look further for the 
identity of these persons ? 

General Willoughby. We have done practically all we could in the 
Orient, but when you encounter identities of persons, then the local 
investigative agencies, including your committee, would pursue this, 
and it is my understanding this is being done. American investiga- 
tive agencies have become interested in these clues or leads or refer- 
ences, and this case might still be said to be open, in that whenever such 
unidentified or partially identified individuals appear the investigative 
processes are in course now. These sources are not available to me, 
since I left my post under dramatic circumstances 60 days ago. 

Mr. Tavenner. I might add to what you have said that, where the 
identities of persons in Japan have been made available to the com- 
mittee, this committee is endeavoring to ascertain where they are now 
and what they are doing. 

General Willoughby. May I compliment the counsel and this com- 
mittee. I was surprised at the amount of information this committee 
has on persons whose names appear in the oriental files. I am sure this 
will be brought out in the course of these hearings. I have a feeling 
that a number of these identities are already known and have been 
investigated on parallel lines by this committee. 

Mr. Tavenner. There are some names we do not desire to disclose 
at this time. 

General Willoughby. The committee controls the subject matter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you completed your answer to the question 
relating to section F % 

General Willoughby. Yes. I have picked a few of his comments. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you turn back to section F, page 17? I do 
not believe you have completed your testimony with regard to that. 

General Willoughby. Your point is well taken, sir. Sorge lists 
a few more which are important, such as Max Klausen : 

Klausen, who went to Shanghai before I did, handled wireless operations 
for his operator, a man known as Jim. He wasi attached to the Fourth Bu- 
reau of the Red Army in Moscow. I first met him in his role of wireless 
operator in Shanghai. He worked for me for quite a while at Canton, although 
not as an active member, after which he was transferred to a group in Man- 
churia. I knew he was an able man ; so I proposed at Moscow in 1935 that 
he be sent to Japan. 

Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, established radio stations both in 
Shanghai and Tokyo, used to relay messages to Khabarovsk, Siberia, 
which were then relayed to Moscow. 

Klausen is well remembered by me because he was released in 
Tokyo under this political amnesty, and he disappeared. He disap- 
peared with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy. That started me,, 
actually, in tracking down this case. I felt if this individual, or any 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1181 

individual of this crowd, was that important, that this thing was an 
international case. We found later on, as will be developed by the 
counsel in connection with exhibit 17, that an attempt was made to 
get this Sorge case in the International Tribunal in Tokyo, where 
it met strong opposition by the Russian member; again, to any 
trained intelligence or investigative ollicer, indicative of the impor- 
tance of this material. 

We will come to that later. 

Mr. Tavenner. It appears that after a discussion of the paragraph 
relating to Paul in Sorge's statement, you omitted the next threei 
paragraphs. When you returned to the records relating to Paul you 
failed to pick them up. So, will you go back to the paragraph be- 
ginning "A German woman"? 

General Willoughby. Oh, yes. We find an entry : 

A German woman who was called "Hamburg." She offered us the use 
of her home and engaged in various liaison functions, such as performing mes- 
senger duties and holding materials for us. 

The next entry relates to Jacob : 

Jacob — a young American newspaper reporter. For the most part he gathered 
various kinds of political information from foreigners. 

I have not been able to obtain an identification on this entry. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you been able to identify the newspaper for 
which the individual worked as a reporter? 

General Willoughby. I am sorry to say, no. 

Mr. Walter. Does the record disclose his first name, his given name ? 

General Willoughby. Just "Jacob," which could be his code name 
or his surname. You find some names like "Hamburg," who is prob- 
ably Miss Weitemeyer, and there is a great deal known about her. 
These were clues to descriptive activities, such as a spy-ring apparatus. 

Mr. Tavenner. There is still another paragraph. 

General Willoughby. Which one ? 

Mr. Tavenner. It begins with "A young employee." 

General Willoughby. Oh, yes: 

A young employee of the American consulate who brought in economic and 
political news. 

Sorge then says : 

I have forgotten his name. 

Sorge hoped for 4 years that someone would "spring" him. He 
bragged to the Japanese: "I am an important Soviet operator; I hold 
the rank of colonel in the Soviet Army," and so forth. He played on 
the desire of the Japanese to have no friction with the Russians during 
the war years, the neutrality arrangement. So, we felt that his own 
statements were more or less influenced by this cautious, protective 
attitude. But the systematic interrogation of other members of his 
ring brought out other facts, and that shows the importance of your 
witness, Yoshikawa Mitsusada. 

Mr. Velde. As to this young employee of the American consulate, 
is there any corroborating evidence in the Shanghai police records ? 

General Willoughby. Our efforts were to try to grab the Shanghai 
files. Everything points to Shanghai as headquarters, with Tokyo 
an outpost. We tried to do that, but we were charged with the occu- 
pation of Japan, a nation of 80 million, and my job was not to pursue 



1182 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

these juicy morsels, but to keep a sort of FBI surveillance in Japan 
and to maintain tranquillity in Japan. So, we could not engage in 
activities in China. 

I am continually charged with failure to obtain information else- 
where. It would be the same as if the FBI was giving you the records 
of the French Surete Nationale in Paris. We have done all we could 
to track down these "birds." Actually, I was less interested in getting 
the dope on Jacob than on Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, and Gerhart 
Eisler. They were in the headlines, and I feel if that had been known 
Judge Medina's job would have been easier. 

Mr. Velde. Don't misunderstand me, General. I realize your juris- 
diction was limited to Japan and the Philippine Islands, as I 
understand it. 

General Willoughby. Quite. 

Mr. Velde. And you had no jurisdiction in Korea, either at that 
time ? 

General Willoughby. I did not. Of course, I had interest and 
picked up everything that was not nailed down. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa was asked the question whether or 
not effort had been made to identify the individual alleged to have 
been in the American consulate and furnishing information. His 
testimony was that they had been unable to establish his identity, but 
it is possible that the State Department has information that would 
lead to discovery of at least the names of persons in the consulate at 
that time, which is not your function, but probably our function. 

General Willoughby. I feel that the committee is in a position 
to inquire from the State Department directly. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Section J on page 23 of the same document, exhibit 38, is entitled 
"Other Groups in China." The first group listed thereunder is the 
"Jim" or "Lehman" group. What does Sorge report on this group? 

General Willoughby. With an eye on Mr. Velde, now we come 
to a portion of Sorge's own story which, on perusal, led me, or us, 
the investigative intelligence groups, to try to obtain further data on 
the operations in Shanghai, and it is this portion of the Sorge story 
which, while cautiously worded, nevertheless gave us really the bird's- 
eye view of the international Comintern character of the organizations 
then in Shanghai. When you read this and put yourselves in out- 
place, or my place, there was enough there — though Sorge, as usual, 
was conservative in his designations — enough of the purposes of these 
organizations to recognize a similar pattern in the United States. 
After we pursued this investigation which resulted in the Shanghai 
file and saw the picture that evolved from it, we felt that we then had 
a pattern recognizable in the United States. 

For example, if we find Noulens is a type case of a protective legal 
defense of a captured convicted espionage agent which is an exact 
counterpart of the Civil Rights Congress, when we see that, we bring 
the report up to date. 

When we find the same man — namely, Gerhart Eisler — operating 
in Japan, and find him later defended by — what is her name? Carol 
Wise? 

Mr. Walter. Carol King. 

Mr. Beale. Carol Weiss King. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1183 

General Willougiiby. Then there develops a pattern which must 
be known by the legislators and the people so that they can under- 
stand and identify these things. For example, I notice Mr. Saypol — 
I am speaking as a reader of several papers, such as the New York 
Times — though I don't feel so kindly as to the Herald Tribune; as 
a matter of fact, I wonder why New York requires the Herald Tribune 
when it has the Times. Is the Times man here? And including that 
unmatched series of papers known as the Hearst papers, completely in 
favor for years. Mr. Sentner [addressing reporter]. 

When we see that Gerhart Eisler is defended by an organization 
headed by Miss King, and we find Eisler in Shanghai, and find Noulens 
defended in Shanghai in a similar manner to Eisler's defense in the 
United States, then we can trace the Kremlin-sponsored, Comintern- 
created so-called International lied Aid, which became the Labor 
Defense in the States, which became the Civil Rights Congress and 
the Association for the Defense of the Foreign Born ; and that is a 
pattern which I think is of substance and value to the committee and 
the Congress and the people. 

This is a departure from your question to introduce the importance 
of the description of these organizations. Xo doubt you will recog- 
nize them. They are operating in the States under some other name. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you read what Sorge had to say about the 
"Jim" or "Lehman" group? 

General Willougiiby. That will take us a bit of time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then, Mr. Chairman, I believe this woidd be a good 
opportunity for a break. 

Mr. Wood. The committee stands in recess until 2 : 30. 

(Thereupon, at 12:40 p. m., a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. 
of the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— 

Resumed 

Air. Tavenner. General Willougiiby, I refer you again to section J, 
on page 23, of exhibit No. 38. That section is entitled "Other Groups 
in China." The first group listed thereunder is the Jim or Lehman 
group. AVill you examine the exhibit, please, and state what the Sorge 
statement shows on this unit? 

General W 7 illoughby. Mr. Counsel, I regard this section of the 
Sorge story as possibly' the most important in this documentation, 
because it led us to believe that, while fragmentary, the descriptions 
of these international people then working in Shanghai for the pur- 
pose of communizing China were so descriptive in their functional 
outline that we might have something of value to the American people 
today. And, actually, as I read these, I would like to suggest that 
you put yourselves in our positions in Tokyo, groping with this 
uncrystallized information at the time, and at the end of the reading 
realize we would have had to go after the Shanghai record or to pro- 
cure someone who would know about that activity. 



1184 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Consequently, this represents a turning point in the process 'of in- 
vestigation, in the sense that we had already disposed of Sorge, you 
might say, as an interesting specimen of international espionage 
somewhat in the manner of what was later disclosed in Canada ; but 
these next two pages, written by an individual who was in the busi- 
ness, an expert in his line, gave us the clue to the existence in Shanghai 
of a number of bodies that looked very much like the Communist 
fronts everywhere in the world, including America. 

Here, again, we go into that twilight zone of why and how a his- 
torical case, so to speak — because everything of 5 or 10 years ago is 
in the realm of historical research— can be linked to something that is 
of interest to the committee today. 

I will link it, or the counsel, through his questioning, will develop 
it, and I will pause in one of these groups and trace it from 1935 until 
1951, in a comparatively brief statement. 

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation develop a connection between 
that group and a group in the United States? 

General Willotjghby. It did, unmistakably and positively, and 
that is of value to your committee, to get that on the record. 

Mr. Tavenner. I suggest you read on page 23 the portion dealing 
with that group, that is, the Lehman group. 

General Willotjghby. Yes, sir. This is a series of groups or appa- 
ratus or front organizations described by Sorge. 

The first is the Jim or Lehman group, code name of the person in 
charge. He said : 

The first group to work in Shanghai was the Jim group, also known as the 
Lehman group. I had never heard of it until I had arrived in Shanghai. Jim had 
been sent out from the fourth bureau of the Red army, arriving in Shanghai 
slightly before me. His chief duty was to establish radio communication between 
Shanghai and other parts of China and Moscow. * * * When I arrived in 
Shanghai, he had already succeeded in establishing radio communication between 
Shanghai and Moscow and was trying to establish contacts with other districts 
in a similar manner. However, it seems that he was unsuccessful in the case 
of Canton. Jim employed Klausen— 

who became Sorge's radio operator — 

as his subordinate. Futher, he employed a White Russian called Mischa or 
Mishin in Shanghai. 

We do not know too much about Lehman. Does he appear in your 
files, Mr. Tavenner, L-e-h-m-a-n? 

Mr. Tavenner. Whether it is the same Lehman or not, I am unable 
to say. 

General Willoughry. Nevertheless, the sense of this description is 
that Shanghai is a radio-transmitting station or relay station en route 
to Khabarovsk and then Moscow The operator who appears here 
first, Klausen, later on used himself in establishing his own station 
in Tokyo. 

Mr. Walter. When was that, approximately? 

General Willougitby. In Japan in the period 1935 to 1941, roughly. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed to the next group listed there, 
known as the Harbin group ? 

General Willougiiby. Sorge says about this group : 

The next group with which I came into contact in the course of my work 
was the Harbin group, which had also been sent out by the fourth bureau of 
the Red army. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1185 

You have this recurrent reference to his job description, namely, an 
agent of the fourth bureau of the Red army, the intelligence section 
of the Red army. [Continuing reading :] 

Its duty was to gather military Informs I ion in Manchuria. As a sideline, it gath- 
ered political intelligence as well. The Harbin group acted as a letter box for 
me; I forwarded letters ami documents from Moscow to it. and it sent them on. 
Money sent to me by Moscow also came through this channel. Liaison with 
the Harbin group was established in the following way: To begin with, some- 
body from the group came to Shanghai to confer on the technique of the letter- 
box communication system, and thereafter members of my group and members 
of the Harbin group took turns in serving as mail carriers and traveling be- 
tween Harbin and Shanghai. 

Klausen acted as contact lor me on numerous occasions. I believe it was in 
the spring of 1032 that I myself carried mail to Harbin. 

The significance here is the carrier or mail delivery method which oc- 
curs throughout the technique of Sorge, that is, how such a ring oper- 
ates in a foreign country. And some of the names he mentioned ear- 
lier, in the main, were the ones he used again in Japan; and some of 
the names occurring now you will find recurring elsewhere as this 
presentation proceeds. 

The next group 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe you still have another paragraph to read 
in connection with the Harbin group. 

General Willougiiby. Yes: 

I met Ott-Gloemberg, chief of the Harbin group, for the first time in Shang- 
hai. I called on him at Harbin to turn over the mail to him. I also met Fro- 
lich, sometimes called Theo, who had formerly worked at Shanghai, at Harbin. 
I do not believe I met the radio technician, Artur, at Harbin, although I, heard 
about him. Theo and Ott-Gloemberg left Harbin in 1932. I happened to meet 
them by chance and not in connection with my work in Russia in January 1933. 
My relationship with the Harbin group was strictly a letter-box affair. There 
was no administrative relationship at all. 

The significance there is that these elusive names appear elsewhere. 
The Shanghai record will pick them up. They had them under sur- 
veillance. There is your bridge from Sorge to Shanghai today. I keep 
repeating that, but it is a very practical element in these proceedings. 

Mr. Tavexner. Now if you will describe the Frohlich-Feldmann 
group in Shanghai according to Sorge's statement. 

General Willoughby. The next group reported on by Sorge is the 
Frohlich-Feldmann group in Shanghai. He said : 

The Frohlich-Feldmann group was also operating in Shanghai in 1931. Like 
the others, it had been sent out by the fourth bureau of the Red army. Its duty 
was to make connections with the Chinese Red army and to gather intelligence 
concerning it. 

Here Sorge reports on a staff, a group or front whose duty it was to 
do what? To make connection with the Chinese Red Army and to 
gather intelligence concerning it, an interesting sideline. [Continu- 
ing reading:] 

It had its own radio connection with Moscow and therefore did not use our 
station. The chief of the group was Frohlich, also known as Theo, who held the 
rank of major general in the Red army. Feldmann was a radio technician and 
held the rank of lieutenant colonel. There was another man in the group, but 
I do not know who he was. Unable to fulfill their mission, these people left 
Shanghai during 1931. I had no working relationship with them and met them 
only by chance. Shanghai is such a small city that it was difficult to avoid such 
chance encounters. I did not receive instructions from Moscow to contact 
them. They had their own mission to perform and there was no formal con- 
nection between us. 



1186 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

All of this, fragmentary to some extent, nevertheless describes the 
mechanics of the operation, and describes their missions. The duty of 
the Frohlich-Feldmann group was to gather intelligence concerning 
the Chinese Red army. That is the same Red army which we are 
now fighting in North Korea. Therefore, any collateral relationship 
that will develop, as the case may be, may have found its origin in the 
reading of this, shall we say, slightly historical case known as the 
Sorge case. Without that we would never have been interested in 
Shanghai at all. After all, we had a lot of more pressing questions. 
But that development was enough to make Shanghai an irresistible 
target of investigation. 

The next group is a key group. Always bear in mind that Sorge 
is not going to identify this group by name, he is not ready to do this 
when he writes this paper, but he tells enough about it that we are 
able to establish its identity later on. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is the name of the group to which you refer? 

General Willoughbt. He calls it the Comintern group in Shanghai. 
I will give you the correct identity later. Sorge says : 

I met the Comintern group in Shanghai by chance in 1931. It consisted of a 
political branch and an organization branch, the latter comprised of Noulens— 

a name to which I invite your attention — 

who became famous after his arrest, and one or two assistants. Karl Lesse later 
came to Shanghai to assume the post left vacant by Noulens. The organization 
branch bad various duties to perform, but it was primarily concerned with the 
maintenance of liaison between the Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party 
and the political branch of the Shanghai Comintern group. Liaison duty was of 
three* different types: (1) Personnel work, i. e., the movement of personnel be- 
tween Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party; (2) the transmittal of docu- 
ments and letters; and (3) radio communication. The organization branch also 
assumed the duty of financial liaison between Moscow, the Chinese Communist 
Party, and the political branch; assisted in finding meeting places and houses 
for the organization branch and the Chinese Communist Party ; rendered all kinds 
of technical and organizational assistance to illegal activities in China ; took an 
active part in the exchange of secret materials between Moscow and China ; and 
assumed responsibility for the safety of members of the political branch. In 
this last connection, it had the authority to issue orders to political branch mem- 
bers, restrict their movements, etc. 

Now, this description of the job of this outfit is then later confirmed 
by the Shanghai files and other investigations which we conducted. 
Its name and personnel then is disclosed. Sorge did not disclose it 
except to refer to Noulens, which is a famous case quite similar to the 
defense of Gerhart Eisler, for the same reason and conducted by the 
same legalistic front which is used for such purposes, namely, the 
International Red Aid, a Communist-financed unit whose counter- 
part to the American organization will develop as we proceed. 

Then Sorge describes the political branch : 

The political branch consisted of Gerhardt — 

Eisler ; I will supply the last name — 

whom I had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days, and one 
or two assistants. I did not meet the assistants. 

Incidentally, Eisler's wife * appeared before this committee quite 
recently, I believe. 

1 Hede Massing, former wife of Gerhardt Eisler. 






AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1187 

Mr. Taykxner. That is correct. 

General Willoughby. In her book, This Deception, she knew In I Le 
about Eisler's China mission. 1 will put in a plug for Hede Massing's 
book, This Deception, published by Duell, Sloane <S Pearce, because one 
of the Pearces ol that company worked for me in Japan. 

Sorge continues : 

I chanced to meet Gerhardt [Eisler] in Shanghai and renewed our old acquaint- 
ance, but our work was absolutely unrelated. Gerhardt's duty, or rather that of 
the political branch, was to act as a spokesman for the political policy with 
respect to the Chinese Communist Party decided upon by the Comintern general 
conference. It also acted as an intermediary for the exchange of information 
between the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern and submit tod reports 
concerning all the social problems involved in the labor movement in < 'hina. The 
reports were forwarded to Moscow through the organization branch. I must 
state here that these reports were never sent through my radio facilities or my 
other liaison channels. With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai 
became precarious, and he decided to return to Moscow in 1931. 

He skipped, just as he did on the Batory. He is an internationally 
skillful dodger. 

I would like to pause here. Knowing that the essence of this pres- 
entation is linked with today, this is too tempting an opportunity. 
Of course, Ave are now all familiar with the elusive Gerhart Eisler. 
I call your attention to an article in the Saturday Evening Post, in 
its issue of February 17, 1951. I pause, in fact, to pay tribute to the 
Saturday Evening Fost, as this article is brilliant. The author, Craig 
Thompson, unknown to me, is a most skillful investigator of Com- 
munist fronts. 

The title of the article is "The Communist's Dearest Friend," and its 
lead photograph shows one Carol King, smiling amiably, I suppose, 
and leading by the hand her protege and client, one Gerhart Eisler. 

Mr. Velde. General, is there any question in your mind that the 
Gerhart referred to by Richard Sorge is one and the same as Gerhart 
Eisler? 

General Wieloughby. Xone whatever. We know he was in Shang- 
hai. The Shanghai police said he was. His wife said he was. He 
was not there for his health. Furthermore, the story of Sorge tells 
what he was doing. 

Mr. Tavenxer. For the purpose of the record, I would like to refer 
to an interrogation which took place before this committee February 
6, 1947, of Ruth Fischer, a sister of Gerhart Eisler : 

Mr. Russell. When did you next learn of the whereabouts of your brother and 
what country was he in? 

Miss Fischer. * * * Eisler had been in disgrace during 1928, 1929, and 
1930, and everybody of the^Communist Party in Berlin expected his expulsion 
from the Communist Party of Germany because of his rebellion against Stalin 
at that time. 

Then he was sent to a mission in China, with the GPU delegation, to purge 
rebellious Chinese Communists. At that time Eisler's mission was not a very 
high one, in China ; he was one of a group of men sent there to carry out orders. 
In these Chinese purges he behaved so cruelly and carried out the orders so 
well that the report about him in Berlin said that he was really the hangman 
of the rebellious Chinese Communists, who were sentenced by the decisions of 
Moscow. 

After the Chinese trip, he came back in 1930 or 1931 to Moscow, where he then 
married his wife, and where his daughter was born, and where he remained until 
1933. What missions he carried out between 1931 and 1933 I do not know, but 
I want to repeat that he has not walked on German soil in these years. 



1188 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

General Willoughby. That is a very interesting interview, not 
known to me, and would merely confirm me in my current under- 
standing. 

Mr. Tavenner. You were proceeding to discuss the article of Craig 
Thompson. 

General Willoughby. Yes. This article, as of February 1951, 
covers the evaluation of organizations and the participation of Miss 
King in the development of a systematic legal defense for Commu- 
nist agents that have run afoul the American law. 

The article says in 1925, in association with one Brodsky, who was 
the United States receiver of party funds from Moscow. 

Mr. Wood. Who is that? Brodsky? 

General Willoughby. B-r-o-d-s-k-y. Together they helped organ- 
ize and launch the International Labor Defense. 

The records in Shanghai and elsewhere will show, in an organiza- 
tion chart which is included in my studies, that the International Red 
Aid is the Kremlin mother unit of defense bodies in all countries for 
the defense of this type of clientele. 

So it became known as the Labor Defense in this country, and this 
article, with which I am in complete agreement, so states. The 
author, who knows his business, also says : 

This effort had been preceded by a meeting in Moscow at which a directive, 
binding on Communist parties everywhere, was issued. It demanded : "The 
proletariat must gather and organize those lawyers and learned barristers in 
various countries who sympathize with the liberation struggle." From this was 
born a world-wide Communist bar association called International Red Aid. The 
International Labor Defense was its United States section. 

Without going into details which are in this file, the International 
Red Aid, Soviet-Comintern sponsored, becomes the International 
Labor Defense, and the American Labor Defense becomes the Civil 
Rights Congress. And, incidentally, again Weiss, as an organizer, 
develops other agencies, such as the American Committee for the De- 
fense of the Foreign Born, and several other organizations, all of 
which have been analyzed and commented on adversely by Mr. Morris 
Ernst, a reputable New York lawyer, who resented, apparently, ever 
having been mixed up with this group. 

The coincidence that Eisler and Noulens find legal counsel, one in 
China and one in New York, all connected with the International Red 
Aid, is so impressive that an investigative officer dare not ignore it. 

Pausing again, in order to tie this thing into a recognizable pattern, 
you will find that what Sorge cautiously called the Comintern group, 
is reported by the Chinese police much more specifically. It will be 
covered later on, but I dwell on it now. It is the Pan-Pacific Trade 
Union Secretariat, abbreviated PPTLTS. and its parent organization, 
the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. They were the most- 
important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activi- 
ties in the Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's. 

The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at a conference in Hankow, was attended 
by several prominent Comintern leaders, including Lozovsky, who, 
incidentally, has risen to a high position in the Soviet labor movement. 
Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first 
head of the PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who 
was assisted in his work in China by an American woman. Other 
Americans prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS were James H. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1189 

Dolsen, a journalist, and one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret 
Undjus. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you idenf i i'y Jim Dolsen as one of the individu- 
als connected with this organization? 

General Welloughby. Yes. He was connected with the organiza- 
tion in the thirties. 

Mr. Velde. Will you spell that? 

General Willoughby. D-o-l-s-e-n, James H. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Jim Dolsen is the person who has 
been identified as a member of the Communist Party by Matthew 
Cvetic in his testimony on February 21, 1950, and is one of those 
arrested on August 17, 1951, in Pittsburgh. 

General Willotjghby. That is news to me. It again shows the 
efficacy of this committee's work in tracking down these people. This 
is why the Sorge and related matters could not be ignored. Here you 
have the case of an individual, Dolsen, trafficking in a Communist 
front in the thirties in China ; he recurs in Pittsburgh in the forties, 
and this committee picks him up and reports on him in this fashion. 
If you were pressed for time and decided to terminate this meeting 
now, you would still have made your case, because the reference to 
Dolsen is only one of many others, almost repetitive in their similarity. 

Mr. Tavenner. In describing Earl Browder as the head of the Far 
East bureau, you referred to a person as his assistant who was an 
American woman, but did not give the name of the American woman. 

General "Willoughby. Perhaps an instinctive gallantry which is not 
applicable in this kind of meeting. I will now fill the gap. Her 
name, said he reluctantly, is Katherine Harrison, "K" as In cat, "H" 
as in house. I am likely to misspell words in six languages, so I 
occasionally get confused on the subject. 

Since this committee is taking me from one surprise to another — 
pleasant ones, I must say, as in the case of Dolsen — do you also have 
something on Miss Harrison? 

Mr. Tavenner. The committee is in possession of information that 
she was the wife at one time of Earl Browder. 

General Willoughby. A very interesting social relationship, I 
should say. 

I have strayed afar a bit. The point I made is, I became interested 
in Shanghai through the slightly reluctant Sorge in describing these 
people in Shanghai, and began to spend funds furnished me by the 
benevolent Federal Government to find out some more. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have some further questions to ask you about 
the Noulens group, but inasmuch as some Americans are tied up pretty 
closely with it in the Snanghai files, I will wait until we reach that. 

General Willoughby. Very well. I will agree with you that the 
Noulens case is very interesting. It is a prototype of the Eisler case 
with respect to the abuse of legal defense. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you proceed with the Japanese group that 
Sorge established in Tokyo in 1933, and will you tell the committee 
what the Sorge report shows as to how he obtained the members for 
his group in Japan? You will find it on page 6 of exhibit 38. 

General Willoughby. I take it you are interested in some individ- 
uals that Sorge recruited for his Japanese ring? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is correct, but in addition, those who were 
assigned to him by Moscow 



1190 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

General Willoughby. We will go back to Shanghai. This is a 
closing item of Sorge's activity. To go back to his work related to 
Shanghai, he has this to say : 

When the orders came through, I asked for a technical aide ( radio man ) , a 
Japanese collaborator and a competent foreign assistant, and the services of 
Klausen, Miyagi, and Voukelitch were made available. I was authorized to 
recruit other personnel as necessary in the place where I was working. 

Is this the item yon are interested in ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

General Willoughby. My idea of the significance of this comment 
is that Sorge, when he gets a job, applies to the head office and says, 
"I. want certain technicians, a radio man, a Japanese collaborator, and 
a competent foreign assistant." If he were working for General Elec- 
tric or some other reputable concern, they would look at their colored 
pins on the map of the world and say, "We will transfer our represent- 
ative from Buenos Aires to some other place," and it would be done. 

By analogy, the way the Kremlin-Moscow staff organization worked 
there was just as good. They pressed a button and summoned from 
a world-wide job distribution, Klausen 

Mr. Tavenner. Where was Klausen obtained from? 

General Willoughby. He had gone back to Russia, and they pulled 
him from there. The competent foreign assistant was Voukelitch, 
who was a French Communist in Belgrade at the time. They pulled 
him out, and these men converged and reported to their new jobs. 

Mr. Tavenner. From where did they get the Japanese assistant? 

General Willoughby. They went to California and found a Nisei, a 
citizen technically but not in heart, and had him report to Tokyo. 

Mr. Tavenner. Does the report say Miyagi was a member of the 
American Communist Party? 

General Willoughby. Yes. Here is what Sorge had to say about 
Miyagi : 

Miyagi's position was identical with that of Voukelitch. He, too, was a mem- 
ber of a Communist Party (American), he, too, was ordered through Moscow to 
participate in my activities, he, too, was a Comintern member in the broad 
sense, he, too. was registered with and accepted by some major Moscow organi- 
zation as a member of my group, and in his case, too, it made absolutely no 
difference whether the agency in question was the Comintern, central committee 
of the Russian Communist Party, or the Fourth Bureau of the red army. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, does there appear as one of 
the 34 exhibits an interrogation of this individual, that is, Miyagi, 
relative to his knowledge of the American Communist Party? 

General Willoughby. My recollection is that it does, and I be- 
lieve 3 r ou have custodianship of this exhibit. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. I have before me exhibit 25, marked for 
identification only, and, Mr. Chairman, rather than introduce the whole 
document in evidence, I would like to read what I consider the perti- 
nent portions of it. I am doing this because of its length. 

The following are extracts from interrogations of Miyagi Yotoku 
conducted in March and April of 1942. This is from volume 4 of the 
procurator's records on Miyagi. 

Question 3. The accused will describe his activities for the Communist cause 
during his stay in the United States. 

Answer. In about September 1D2G, I purchased a house facing Los Angeles 
station, and in November I opened a restaurant there. My three business part- 
ners (Yabe, Noritsugu; Matayoshi, Atsushi; and Nakamura, Koki), two other 









AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1191 

acquaintances and I began to meet once a week in the dressing room at the rear 
of the restaurant to exchange persona] views on social sciences, philosophy, 
and art. This Social Problems Study Group, as we called ii, gradually ab- 
sorbed new members, among whom were an anarchist and close friend of Kotoku, 
Shusui, an Intimate Communist colleague of Katayama, Sen, and several clergy- 
men. In the course of time, our liberal sessions gradually veered toward I he Left, 
becoming completely leftist when .Marxists Herbert Harris, a Russian, and Fister, 
a Swiss, who had joined the circle through the introduction of Communists Yada 
and Takahashi of West Los Angeles early in 1927, volunteered to lecture to 
us on Marxian theory. 

Both Yada and Takahashi had joined our circle hoping to prevail upon the 
members of the working class who attended it to form a Communist study 
group. Our meetings, therefore, were the scenes of incessant wrangling be- 
tween the anarchists and the Communist members. Yada and about 20 others 
bolted the group eventually, leaving me and about 10 others behind, set up 
their own .Marxist study group, and established a temporary office on Weller 
Street in the Japanese section of Los Angeles. Their official organ, Class Strug- 
gle (Kaikyusen), became the Labor News (Redo Shimbun) in about 1928. 

It was around this time that Japanese Marxists began to join the American 
Communist Party and to participate actively in its work. At this stage, the 
Labor News moved to San Francisco, where Tatemono, Teiichi succeeded Yada 
as supervisor, and Post Street became more or less the headquarters of the 
Japanese division of the American Communist Party. I remained in Los An- 
geles and had no further association with that group. 

In about 1929, I joined the Proletarian Art Society and the Japanese branch 
of the Red Relief Association (both organizations affiliated with the Japanese 
division of the Oriental People's Section of the American Communist Party). I 
lectured to the former on the history of fine arts, edited its magazine, and ar- 
ranged exhibitions, while for the latter I helped collect money to aid Commu- 
nists arrested by the authorities. When almost all the delegates to the party 
eonvention held in Los Angeles in 1930 were arrested, including seven Japanese 
who were served deportation notices, Hamakiyo, Yabe and I managed to gain 
asylum for our seven countrymen in the Soviet Union. 

Toward the end of the 1930, I was visited in Los Angeles by a Communist 
named Yano who had just returned from Moscow with orders from the Comin- 
tern to build up an organization in the United States. Yano was on intimate 
terms with Sain Darcy, the organizer for District 13 (California). I kept in 
touch with him and in the autumn of 1931, he encouraged me to join the Commu- 
nist Party. I objected on the ground that my previous record was sufficient 
reason for not doing so, but he said that I should be registered with the party, 
and that membership would facilitate my activities. I then agreed to join and 
assumed the party alias of Joe. Since I was not in good health, I was excused 
from party meetings and a number of other activities. My chief tasks were to 
study the distribution of Japanese farm workers and to analyze Chinese prob- 
lems with the assistance of a party member named Yamada. 

Though I went to assist the strikers when Yano informed me of the labor 
dispute at the Japanese-American News (Nichibei Shimbunsha) in San Fran- 
cisco in about May 1933, my work was mainly invisible. 

Question 4 : Describe your current relations with the American Communist 
Party. 

Answer : I do not think I am a member of the American Communist Party 
now. I said last time that Y T ano and a certain Caucasian approached me on the 
question of my returning to Japan toward the close of 1932. On that occasion, 
the Caucasian requested that I return within a month or so to the United 
States, my place of residence, which meant that I was being sent to Japan 
as a United States Communist Party member. He told me to contact Roy, a 
party member in Los Angeles whom I had known personally for some time. 

Although I had consented to return to Japan, I continued to help strikers 
and roam about in search of suitable subjects for paintings. Roy urged me 
repeatedly to sail at an early date, and one day in September 1933, Yano and 
Roy called on me and informed me that I was to leave immediately. I em- 
barked around the beginning of October with instructions from Roy to return 
in about a month, or 3 months at the latest. I left my baggage behind because 
I did not expect to be away for very long. 

According to Mrs. Kitabayashi, Roy called on her and her husband several 
times after my departure to inquire about my whereabouts and my activities. 



1192 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

I believe he assumed that I was postponing my return indefinitely in order 
to engage in activities in Japan and arranged to have my name stricken from 
the register of the American Communist Party. 

Question 5 : The accused will describe his relations with the Comintern. 

Answer: When I joined the United States Communist Party (i. e., the Ameri- 
can branch of the Comintern) at Yano's request, I did not go through the usual 
formality of submitting a signed application ; I entrusted all the details to 
Yano. Since he maintained direct contact with the Comintern as the party 
organizer in the United States, I am certain that he registered me with the 
Comintern under the alias of Joe, shortly after I gave him my acceptance. 
Since I have been engaged in espionage work for the Comintern as a member 
of the Sorge ring since my return to Japan, I believe my registration is stiU 
effective and that I am a member of the Comintern intelligence department. 

Question 6 : Were you given travel expenses and operating funds before you 
sailed for Japan? 

Answer : Roy gave me $200 to cover travel expenses just before my departure. 
In addition, he handed me a dollar bill which I was to use in contacting an 
agent in Japan. He told me that the other man, to whom I was to present the 
bill, would have in his possession a similar bill bearing a successive serial num- 
ber. I carried it the first time I met Sorge, but we did not bother to make the 
comparison. 

In describing further the Communist Party of the United States, 
Miyagi had this to say : 

The headquarters of district 13 of the United States Communist Party, the 
California branch, is in S'an Francisco (organized by Levin Owen). Party 
organizations have been established in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Berkeley, 
Oakland, Sacramento, Fresno, San Jose, San Pedro, and other cities. Subordin- 
ate to the party organization are such unions, people's groups, and youth societ- 
ies as the following : 

1. Workers International Relief. 

2. Friends of the Soviet Union. 

3. Anti-Imperialist League. 

4. Young Pioneers of America. 

5. Young Communist League of America. 

6. International Labor Defense League. 

7. Marine Workers Industrial Union. 

8. Trade Union Unity League. 

Inasmuch as these organizations, as is the case the world over, are subject to 
Comintern policy and direction, I shall not discuss their activities. 

Further, he stated : 

Participation by Japanese in party activities. 

Here he names several Japanese prominent in the Communist Party 
in the 1920's. 

Then, the last I shall read in this interrogation is what occurred, ac- 
cording to his deposition, in 1930 : 

In this year, there were fresh developments in the party movement, the result 
of orders from American party headquarters calling for a new program of ex- 
pansion and solidification and a more vigorous policy toward the masses. ( S'am 
Darcy was made the organizer of district 13, the California branch.) In Cali- 
fornia, the party launched a campaign in the rural communities to enlist farm 
workers (particularly seasonal farm labor), sought to organize the marine 
workers, and work to strengthen the Young Communists League and Young 
Pioneers. 

The Japanese division was absorbed by the Oriental Peoples Section and 
given the new mission of cooperating with the Chinese and Filipino membership. 

In 1930 the Japanese division adopted the popularization of the party as its 
watchword and embarked upon a concrete program designed to organize farm 
and fishery workers. It fostered strikes in the Imperial Valley against such 
large capital concerns as the Gerard Co. and the Sun Fruit Co. and agitated 
among the fishermen and fishing industry workers in San Pedro. (Except in 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1193 

isolated cases, these efforts ended in dismal failure because of the firm inter- 
vention of the authorities. » 

A movement was also started to boycott Japanese celebrities visiting Los 
Angeles, specifically Bunji' Suzuki, Totsudo Kato, Toyohiko Kagawa, Tenko 
Nishida, Tokuzo Asahara, Shunji Tahara, Ki Kimura, and [kuo Oyama. (By 
arrangement with Local Foreign Otiiee officials ami Japanese-language papers, 

these so-called celebrities made it a practice to defray their traveling expenses 

by charging admission to lectures at wifieh they ostensibly enlightened the audi- 
ence on the Japanese situation. To give a few examples, Bunji Suzuki collected 

several thousand dollars for three lectures delivered in Los Angeles while he 
was en route to an international labdr conference, and Totsudo Kato and Toyohiko 
Kagawa each took from $20,000 to $30,000 from needy Japanese immigrants 
during a week of religious lecturing. These meetings were nothing but a Cheap 
fraud.) Meanwhile, party members began campaigning on the streets. 

The expansion of the party's sphere of activity to the streets merits praise in 
that it attracted public attention, but it was not without its adverse effects, one 
of the most noteworthy being the aggravation of the hostility of the local Japa- 
nese community toward the party. This blunder may be traced to lack of 
caution in evaluating the Japanese mind and the predominant position occupied 
by the traditional Japanese spirit. 

As party activity started to get into full swing in May and June of 1930, the 
repressive hand of the American authorities tightened. In a mass arrest staged 
during a meeting of the Los Angeles branch in Long Beach, Comrades Hakomori, 
Fukunaga, Nishimura, Miyagi ( Vosaburo), Nagahama, Shima, Matayoshi, Yoshi- 
oka, and Teraya were taken into custody, and the Japanese division, deprived of 
its leading members, was brought to the verge of collapse. 

General Willoughby. May I raise a question, sir? 

I take it, Mr. Tavenner, that you established by these quotations 
that a bona fide member of the American Communist Party who was 
a Japanese linguist was requested by Sorge, and he got him as a push- 
button request in such organization, and this man has been identified 
as a member of the American Communist Party from district 13, the 
California branch. 

Mr. Yki.de. Do you have any information as to where Miyagi Yotoku 
is now '. 

Genera] Willoughby. My recollection is he died of illness, either 
in prison or shortly after our political amnesty in 1945. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think he died in prison. 

General Willoughby. He was tubercular, I believe. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is right. 

General Willoughby. I read this many months ago. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, to return to other members 
of the Japanese group, it would appear from Sorge's statement that 
other than the three individuals who he was advised would be avail- 
able in Tokyo when he arrived there, the rest of his Japanese group 
was recruited in Tokyo by Sorge? 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether that is the way in which 
Guenther Stein was recruited into the organization? 

General Willoughby. It was. 

Mr. Tavenner. What does the record disclose its to the extent of 
Guenther Stein"s activities in Sorge's Japanese group? 

General AVilloughby. That is a very interesting figure, this Guen- 
ther Stein. I would prefer to read the summation of the three Ameri- 
can lawyers who passed on this documentation, although the docu- 
mentation, meaning statements to the court, on the subject of 

90929—51 5 



1194 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Guenther Stein, are also in your possession. This is a matter of 
preserving the time of the committee. This is what the record says : 

Guenther Stein, special correspondent for a London newspaper, was a regular 
member of the Sorge spy ring. A notebook confiscated from Sorge listed six 
members of this ring, together with their aliases, and Stein was listed among 
the six. An intercepted radio message to Moscow referred to his code name. 
There is testimony by Max Klausen and Sorge that Klausen, a wireless operator 
specialist, erected a wireless transmission set in Stein's residence to forward 
reports to Russia. Stein not only was living on the premises at the time, but 
gave his consent. Being a correspondent for a reputable English newspaper, he 
had various contacts which permitted him to secure valuable information. This 
information, passed on to Sorge, was forwarded to Russia. Stein also acted as a 
courier for Sorge and carried photographs and microfilm to Shanghai where they 
were delivered to a liaison agent from Moscow at the Metropole Hotel. On one 
occasion Stein was instructed to, and did bring back from Shanghai a smoking 
pipe of extraordinary design, a woman's shawl, and a brooch. These items,, 
given to him by a liaison agent from Moscow, were later used by Anna Klausen 
for identification purposes when she was sent to Shanghai in 1937-38 to deliver 
20 to 30 rolls of film to the Moscow agent. 

These are high lights. Each of the entries I have read is supported 
by a direct reference to a sworn statement in the course of the court 
interrogation. 

I will add to this, again to link Stein with yesterday, as it were: 
When the original report was published in 1949, and prior to the 
protestation by Agnes Smedley, Guenther Stein disappeared. In 
other words, not knowing exactly what the outcome or implication of 
this report might be on either the public or official action, he felt it 
prudent to vanish. 

Personally, I would be interested in how fast one can vanish. Ap- 
parently he procured both passport and transportation facilities to 
Europe in 24 hours, something which I challenge anyone of legitimate 
purposes and identification to accomplish. 

Then he was not heard from for a couple years, until he got himself 
arrested by the French Police, Surete Nationale, for espionage. He 
later went to Poland, where he holds citizenship. 

Here you have the case of a man who disappears to Europe and gets 
himself arrested once more for doing business at the same old stand ; 
namely, espionage. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he leave Japan prior to the breaking of the 
Sorge case ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, he left, prudently, prior to the breaking 
of this case. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the procurator in Japan state that if he had 
remained in Japan he would have been indicted ? 

General Willoughby. He did. 

Mr. Tavenner. I regret that we cannot go further this afternoon. 
It will be necessary to call you back again tomorrow. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 10 : 30 tomorrow 
morning. 

(Thereupon, at 4:30 p. m. on Wednesday, August 22, 1951, an 
adjournment was taken until Thursday, August 23, 1951, at 10 : 30 
a. m.) 



HEARINGS ON AMERICAN ASPECTS OF THE RICHARD 
SORUE SPY CASE 

(Based on Testimony of Mitsusada Yoshikawa and 
Maj.^Gen. Charles A. Willoughby) 



THURSDAY, AUGUST 23, 1951 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D. O. 

PUBLIC HEARING 

The Committee on Un-American Activities met pursuant to 
adjournment at 10 :45 a. m. in room 226. Old House Office Building, 
Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood (chair- 
man), Francis E. Walter, Clyde Doyle, and Harold H. Velde (ap- 
pearance as noted in transcript). 

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Thomas 
W. Beale, Sr., assistant counsel; Louis J. Russell, senior investigator; 
Courtney E. Owens, investigator; Raphael I. Nixon, director of re- 
search ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

Are you ready to proceed, Mr. Tavenner ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recall General Willoughby as a 
witness this morning. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. 

Mr. Tavener. It will facilitate the handling of the introduction 
of the testimony if I also have Mr. Owens, an investigator of the com- 
mittee, sworn in, and introduce some of the documents through him, 
(Mid then call upon the witness for his comments. 

Mr. Owens, will you take the stand, please? 

Mr. Wood. Raise your right hand and be sworn, please, Mr. Owens. 

You do solemnly swear that the evidence you will give before this 
committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Owens. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your name, please? 

Mr. Owens. Courtney E. Owens. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you hold a position with this committee? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir; I am employed as investigator. 

1195 



1196 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Tavenner. How long have you been so employed ? 

Mr. Owens. Three years. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, will you select consecutive exhibit No. 
13 from the documents in front of you and examine it and describe to 
the committee its contents? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. Consecutive exhibit 13, as compiled by G-2, 
Far East Command, is entitled ''Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 1942." 
From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police- 
Mr. Tavenner. Will you state again the nature of the document 
you have before you ? 

Mr. Owens. This document is entitled "Foreign Affairs Yearbook, 
1942. " It was compiled by the Criminal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of 
Justice, of the Japanese Government. 

From October 1941 to October 1942, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police 
compiled the formerly undiscovered records of the Sorge spy ring. 
Assembled from a great mass of official notes, interrogations, and so 
forth, the Japanese collated this material and included it in pages 
398 through 600 of their annual publication of the Foreign Affairs 
Yearbook. That is to say, pages 398 to 600 deal exclusively with the 
Japanese results of their investigations and interrogations in the Sorge 
spy case. 

Described by the Home Ministry officials, the Japanese Home Min- 
istry officials, as a case "which may find no parallel in the history 
of espionage," the undercover system of the Sorge spy ring in China 
and Japan sought, found, and sent to Moscow over a period of 10 
years top-secret plans and policies of the Japanese Government. 

We have here the full English translation of that portion of the 
Foreign Affairs Yearbook. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, this Foreign Affairs Yearbook of 1942 iden- 
tified by you, pages 44 through 141 of the English translation, deals 
with the information accumulated by Sorge and other members of 
his ring and forwarded to Moscow. The first listing of his informa- 
tion is that obtained by Sorge through his connection with the German 
Embassy, I believe. The following paragraph precedes the informa- 
tion Sorge received through the German Embassy, which I will read : 

In addition to the agents working under him, Sorge had a rich source of 
news in the German Embassy, where he enjoyed confidence and respect. Some 
of the information he obtained through the Embassy is listed below. 

And there appears a considerable listing of material, and this is 
the general subject upon which General Willoughby testified early 
in the hearing yesterday. 

Some indication of the accuracy of his information is contained in 
paragraphs 18 through 22, dealing with the Russian-German relations 
prior to the German attack on Russia on June 22, 1941. 

Will you please read to the committee the messages relating to these 
negotiations? 

Mr. Owens (reading) : 

In March 1941, he was told by Ambassador Ott 

Mr. Tavenner. When you say "he," you are referring to Sorge? 
Mr. Owens. Richard Sorge, yes. [Continuing reading: | 

He was told by Ambassador ott that Foreign Minister Matsuoka's trip te 
Europe w:is being made at Hitler's invitation, and that Matsuoka \v;is author- 
ized by the Japanese Government to give German; certain informal guaranties. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1 1 97 

That is the basis of one message. 

in the beginning of 1941, he learned from Ambassador Otl and a special 
German envoy senl to Japan thai the envoy's mission was to find oul whether 
or not there was any possibility of Japan's starting a war against the Soviet 
Union. 

In the middle of April 1941, Ambassador Otl told him thai he was surprised 
by the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact, because German circles had been 
expecting a crisis between Japan and Russia. Sorge was do! surprised; he had 
already informed the Soviet Governmenl by radio thai one of the purposes of 
Matsuoka's trip to Europe was to conclude a pact with Russia. 

On the occasion of Hess - flight to England in May 1941, he was told at the 
German Embassy that Hitler intended to make peace with England and to 

flghl Russia, and that lie had sent Hess to England as a last resort. Sorge 

judged that, in spite <>i' the Etusso-German Nonaggression Pact, a German attack 
on Russia was inevitable and even imminent. 

About June 20, 1941, lie was told by Military Attache - "Schohl," who was 
proceeding from Germany to his new post in Siam, that Germany would launch 
a full-Scale attack on Russia about June 20; that the main effort would he 
directed against Moscow; and that from 170 to 190 divisions were concentrated 
on the border. Colonel Kretschmar informed him that 175 divisions were 
concentrated on the Russo-Gennun frontier. 

Mr. Tavenner. ?Tust a moment. Kretschmar was the German mili- 
tary attache attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo? 
Mr. Owens. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then, as a result of that information, Russia learned 
of the impending attack by Germany on June 22, 1941. 

Does that complete the messages that appear at that point? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, yon referred in the course 
of your test iuiony yesterday to certain messages that were received or 
sent to Moscow through this Sorge ring. But, before asking you to 
comment upon that, I want to ask Mr. Owens to refer to page 47, 
where there appears an interesting message dealing with the Japanese 
and German policies before the war with the United States. Do 
you have it? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please read it? 

Mr. Owens. It actually involves four messages. The one you had 
particular reference to is the last one. 

Mr. Tavenner. And I would like for you also to read the message 
which was referred to in the testimony of Yoshikawa, when he test- 
ified here a week or two ago, so that we have the whole, picture as 
complete as possible before General YVilloughby comments upon it. 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. [Reading:] 

In June 1941. he (Sorge) learned from the members of the German Economic 
Mission to Japan. Wohl "Voss" and "Spinsler," that the upshot of the Ger- 
man-Japanese economic discussions was that Japan would receive munitions 
from Germany in return for rubber and petroleum and that the two countries 
would collaborate in the establishment of factories in Japan. 

The next message : 

In the beginning of July 1941 he (Sorce) was told by Ambassador Ott and 
Military Attache Kretschmar that it had been decided at a conference before the 
throne that Japan would push forward her policy of expansion to the south, 
hut that, at the same time, she would prepare to declare war on Russia when 
the opportunity presented itself. 

The third message : 

In July 1941. he (Sorge) learned from Ambassador Ott. from the militarv at- 
tache, and others that the Japanese armed forces were saying that they 



1198 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

would enter the Russian war if and when Germany captured Moscow and Len- 
ingrad and reached the Volga ; that the enthusiasm of the Japanese Army and 
people for a Russian war was waning ; that Ott had had an unproductive con- 
versation with Tojo because the latter was not interested in military problems 
in the north ; and that Konoye had resigned and formed a third cabinet in 
order to oust Matsuoka and open the way for a new agreement with America. 

The fourth message : 

During July and August 1941, after receiving information concerning Japan's 
large-scale mobilization from Ambassador Ott and the military attache^ he 
came to the conclusion that there would be no war against Russia that year. 
His reasoning was as follows : At the end of the mobilization, approximately 
30 divisions were concentrated in Manchuria. This corresponds to only one- 
third of the newly mobilized forces. The divisions were sent out after August 
15, which means that it is too late to start a war before winter. There- 
fore, Japan will not fight Russia but will challenge America and England in 
the south. 

Now, the message you have reference to, that Mr. Yoshikawa testi- 
fied about, was a radio sent in the beginning of October 1941, classi- 
fied "State secret." Do you desire me to read that at this time? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, if you will read it again. , 

Mr. Owens (reading) : 

The American-Japanese talks have entered upon their final stage. In Konoye's 
opinion they will end successfully if Japan decreases her forces in China and 
French Indochina and gives up her plan of building eight naval and air bases 
in French Indochina. If America refuses to compromise by the middle of October, 
Japan will attack America, the Malay countries, Singapore, and Sumatra. She 
will not attack Borneo, because it is within reach of Singapore and Manila. How- 
ever, there will be war only if the talks break down, and there is no doubt that 
Japan is doing her best to bring them to a successful conclusion even at the 
expense of her German ally. 

That was the message that Mr. Yoshikawa testified about. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, will you care to comment upon 
the action of the Sorge ring and the transmission of these messages 
to Moscow ? 

Mr. Walter. Before you go into that, may I ask the General a ques- 
tion, Mr. Chairman ? 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter. 

Mr. Walter. General, as a result of your very careful consideration 
of these messages, are you of the opinion that when the attack came at 
Pearl Harbor it came as a result of a complete understanding between 
Germany, Italy, and Japan ? 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— 

Resumed 

General Willoughby. That is a very difficult question, Mr. Walter. 
The relationship with Italy and Germany at that time was initially 
directed against the Third Communist International. It was a Comin- 
tern political understanding rather than a military one, if I interpret 
this series of messages correctly. 

The fact, however, remained that at some time during the summer, 
under the phraseology of these messages, the Japanese Foreign Office 
veered away from an open military attack against Russia. And again 
referring to the trend of these messages over several months, you can- 
not take a single one and conclusively select it. You have to follow 
the trend of all of them. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1199 

The trend shows thai an attack- via Siberia was contemplated, and 
certain military divisions were made ready for it. 

Then public and official military opinion changed, possibly in 
August, and the trend toward a movement in the south became pro- 
gressively apparent. When I say "progressively apparent," Sorge of 
course did not have any split-second service of information.. He had 
to rely on Ozaki, who was his leg man. into the Japanese foreign office, 
to keep him advised. And I notice that there are time lags of 2 to 3 
weeks, even. So we may assume, then, that Sorge's mission was to 
determine in broad terms : Are the Russians, are the Japanese, utilizing 
the Manchurian or Kwantung army to attack Siberia, or is the military 
power of Japan going to be shifted south ? That is the strategic ques- 
tion, and that is the one that affects us immediately. 

Once decided that the Japanese would move south in the direction 
of Indochina, Malaya, and so forth, a collision with the United 
States and England, of course, became inevitable. And had we known 
this in August or September or October, it is of course historically dem- 
onstrable that that would have been in the nature of advance warning 
of the war ; not advance warning toward a specific date of a specific 
month, but the general feeling that there is going to be a collision 
between the Japanese Empire and ourselves. 

(Representative Harold H. Velde entered the hearing room at this 
point.) 

And it is that report or the series of reports that are reflected in 
this message exchange, that brought this question forward and solved 
it; namely, as late as October 15, Sorge positively relayed to Moscow 
a general statement that "it is decided to move south, and all military 
preparations of the Japanese Empire are to that effect for that purpose 
and that intent." 

Now, I take advantage of Mr. Velde's entry now in an amicable point 
of correction. Mr. Velde's question yesterday was practically the 
same as yours, Mr. Walter, this morning, except that he put it in terms 
of Pearl Harbor. Well, Pearl Harbor is a fixed date in a fixed month. 
And that does not appear in the Sorge message, and it is comparatively 
unimportant that it did not appear. The important thing is: Is the 
trend of Japanese military operations in the summer of 1941 directed 
to the south, meaning toward collision with the United States and 
England, or is it directed toward the north, in other words toward 
Russia? That was so important to the Russians, and inferentially 
would have been so important to us had we known it, that the Russians 
•did not dare to remove the divisions then stationed in Siberia and 
transfer them to the west front, where they were badly needed, until 
Sorge furnished that assurance. That is the historical interpretation 
•on a broad basis rather than a specific-date basis. 

I am not sure, Mr. Walter, if that is a satisfactory answer. 

Mr. Walter. Yes, that is exactly what I wanted. 

General W t illoughby. Historically we can say, without reference to 
December 7 or December 12, a specific date, that if we had that informa- 
tion in September or October that the Japanese decision was to move 
south, I think it would have constituted an enormous political, eco- 
nomic, and military warning, in which we might have gone on an alert 
basis or at any rate we might have been perhaps better prepared to 
meet the attack on the date it actually took place. 



1200 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Velde. General, where were you stationed at the time of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor ? 

General Willoughby. I was stationed in Manila, in the same job that 
I have been holding for the last 13 years, namely, MaeArthurs intelli- 
gence officer. So, of course, this type of information was of vital 
importance to us. We were the outpost of America, and we were 
seeking desperately every clue, every nuance of public or other reperto- 
rial opinion, in order to determine how close this menace would come. 
And therefore it is an acute perception in these particular months of 
the year or period of the year 1941 that I am talking about. 

Mr. Velde. But you had no idea at that time that Japan would 
attack Pearl Harbor ? 

General Willoughby. This cannot be answered by a clear-cut "yes" 
or "no:" We had assayed, appraised, examined the position of Japan 
and their potential, and we knew that some movements had taken place 
on the Chinese mainland. But the final decisive report, like Sorge 
rendered to his master, Russia — he was not available to us, you see, 
in anything of that quality. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, to consider further Mr. Walter's 
question about the notice or knowledge that Italy and Germany may 
have had regarding the actual plans of attack on Pearl Harbor, I 
may say that that question was pretty thoroughly examined, and con- 
siderable evidence introduced in regard to it, in the trial of Tojo and 
others, and the actual message is in existence between the Japanese 
foreign office and its ambassador in Italy, calling upon Mussolini for 
his consent and approval of war with the United States, although Pearl 
Harbor was not mentioned in any way in connection with the message. 
And the documents also show that as early as December 2, conversa- 
tions between the Japanese Ambassador, Oshima, with Hitler, indi- 
cated knowledge of the general plan, but no mention of Pearl Harbor. 

If the committee is interested, I am pretty certain I can get the 
exact judgment and finding of the international military tribunal on 
those matters. 

General Willoughby. I think Mr. Tavenner's remarks are of great 
importance, since he was associated with the international military 
tribunal in Tokyo. His work there, his superior work there, is of course 
well known to me as a member of the Tokyo staff. He is probably as 
well informed on the factors which this international tribunal searched 
for, as any man available at this time. 

Mr. Walter. Of course, it was more than a mere coincidence that 
Italy was ready to declare war the moment the attack came. That is 
the point. In other words, they had committed themselves to make 
war on the United States in advance of the actual attack made by 
Japan. And that was merely the signal to Italy and Germany to 
declare war on the United States. 

General Willoughby. May I ask Mr. Tavenner on this point : That 
came up in the tribunal. What was their decision, their verdict, on 
that point? 

Mr. Tavenner. I would not undertake, I believe, to state what the 
verdict was, without consulting the record. I am not certain that I 
understood the question exactly. 

General Willoughby. While I am not familiar with the European 
situation, since I am fairly integrated in the Far East since 1938, 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1201 

I would agree with you. Mr. Waller, thai the military commitments 
between Italy and Germany on the spot, you see, < ailed for military 
action together in the European theater of war, regardless of what 
the Japanese mighl or might not do in the Far East. Actually, the 
Japanese did not attack Russia. As you know, they sought instead 
a painful neutrality, letting us fight it out alone until 5 days before 
the end of the war. 

Mr. Tavkxm.i:. There is no doubt hut what the terms of the tri- 
partite pact between the three nations committed all three to join in 
military force in the event of a war with the United States. 

General Willoughby. Of a universal war? I believe that is so. 

Mr. Walter. That is exactly the thing I was directing my attention 
to. So that no matter which one of the three powers made t he attack 
anywhere in the world, the others were committed at the same moment 
to make an attack with joint forces. 

Mr. Tavenner. And by reason of the document which was dis- 
covered, as I mentioned a moment ago, Mussolini was questioned in 
advance to ascertain whether or not he would abide by the terms of 
the agreement in the event of such a war. And my recollection is that 
he gave unqualified approval. 

Mr. Velde. Again, you have had a lot of experience, of course, in 
the intelligence field. And as far as I know, the only definite informa- 
tion you have that Russia knew that Pearl Harbor w T as to be attacked 
was the message of October 15 between Sorge and the Russian Gov- 
ernment. 

General Willoughby. I dislike to correct a member of this com- 
mittee, of course. The message does not mention Pearl Harbor. 

Mr. Velde. I realize it does not. 

General Willoughby. The message mentions that a collision with 
America and England had become inevitable ; their move south. Now, 
whether they would attack Manila first or Pearl Harbor first was still 
in the realm of the next 8 weeks after October 15. 

Mr. Velde. Well, the question I was going to ask you, General, was 
on the basis of your experience in the intelligence field, and it is in the 
nature of an opinion. Do you, in your own mind, feel that Russia 
knew that an attack on Pearl Harbor or any of our other possessions 
or Territories was imminent? 

General Willoughby. I sympathize with your query, because Pearl 
Harbor was such a dramatic incident. But, after all, it was only one 
of many war actions. The collision would take place somewdiere in 
the Pacific once the Japanese had decided to move south. 

So I go back again to^the broad historical interpretation of this 
message, which does not mention Pearl Harbor. And I stated then 
that it is unimportant that it did not mention Pearl Harbor. But 
it mentioned the fact that they were on a political international de- 
cision that would bring them into collision with the United States. 
And the first target, in our opinion, then, was the Philippines. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, in answer to these various 
questions, have you completed your comment as to the messages? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Yoshikawa, in his testimony before this com- 
mittee, made it plain that in his opinion and from his study of the 
records in the Sorge case and his knowledge of Japanese affairs, the 



1202 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Sorge spy ring not only performed its duties as an espionage group 
but it also acted in, at least in one instance, a political way. 

This appears, I believe, from Sorge's own confession or statement. 

I do not know whether you are well enough acquainted with it on 
the spur of the moment to refer to it or comment on it. Suppose that 
I read it first, and then you may make such comment as you desire. 

General Willoughby. You have your fingers on it in the document. 

Mr. Tavenner. I read from exhibit 39 a section of the Sorge con- 
fession or diary or statement, as it has been variously called, as follows. 
It is section E : 

The political work of my group. 1. General remarks. I was strictly forbidden 
by Moscow to engage in any nonintelligence activity, that is, to undertake any 
propaganda or organized functions of a political nature. 

This appears on page 24. 

This ban meant that my group and I were not allowed to make the least 
attempt to exercise any political influence on any persons or group of persons. 
We obeyed it faithfully, with one exception, that we worked actively on other 
people to influence their opinions of Soviet national strength. It was utterly 
impossible not to violate a general restriction which made no special provision 
for such cases. If Ozaki and myself as advisers, political experts and experienced 
advisers, had endorsed the prevailing derogatory opinion and underestimation 
of Soviet strength, our positions would have been directly endangered. It was 
for this reason that our group took a special stand in connection with the evalua- 
tion of Soviet strength. In doing so, we did not engage in propaganda on behalf 
of the Soviet Union, but endeavored to teach various persons and classes of 
society to evaluate Soviet strength with due caution. We encouraged individuals 
and groups not to underestimate Russian strength and to strive for a peaceful 
solution of the pending Soviet-Japanese problems. 

Ozaki, Voukelitch, and I maintained this attitude for a number of years. When 
the cry for war with the Soviet Union became urgent, in 1941, I sent an inquiry 
to Moscow, prompted by conversations with Ozaki, in which he expressed the 
belief that he could successfully exceed the limits mentioned above and influ- 
ence members of his group in favor of a positive peace policy toward the Soviet 
Union. He was confident that if he took a strong stand against a Soviet-Japanese 
war in the Konoye group he could turn Japan's expansion policy south. 

The inquiry was very general, outlining the possibilities of positive action 
by Ozaki, myself, and other members of the group. The reply was negative, 
not forbidding such activities outright but labeling them unnecessary. 

I want you to look at that particularly, that the reply was of a 
negative character, not forbidding the action but labeling it as un- 
necessary. 

With tension ever mounting over the outbreak of the Soviet-German war in 
1941, I felt that it was within my authority not to interpret .the reply as a clear- 
cut prohibition. I imported a wider and more discretionary meaning to the 
word "unnecessary," refusing to construe it as an explicit ban on our partici- 
pation in such activities. Accordingly, I did not restrict Ozaki's positive ma- 
neuvers within the Konoye group, nor did I hesitate to work on the Germans, 
particularly in view of the fact that my attitude had remained unchanged over 
the past several years. The maneuvers that my group and I attempted were 
confined to the scope and the political problems described on the two preceding 
pages. Not one of our members exceeded this restriction, because to have done 
so would have been to endanger our original and principal mission. I would 
like to emphasize this point thoroughly. What we did was not propaganda by 
any means. 

The foregoing instance, in which we sent an inquiry to Moscow and received 
a negative reply, was the only one in which I learned of maneuvers on Ozaki's 
part. As far as I know, he began to work on his friends actively after our dis- 
cussions. The argument which he employed was briefly as follows : 

"The Soviet Union has no intention whatsoever of fighting Japan, and even 
if Japan should invade Siberia would simply defend herself. It would be a short- 
sighted and mistaken view for Japan to attack Russia, since she cannot expect 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1203 

to gain anything in eastern Siberia or to wrest any sizable political or economic 
benefits from such a war. The United Stales and Britain would very likely 
welcome such a Japanese embroilment with open arms and seize the opportunity 
to strike at the nation after her oil and iron reserves were depleted. Moreover, 
if Germany should succeed in defeating the Soviet Onion, Siberia might fall into 
Japan's lap without her raising a ringer. Should Japan aspire to further expan- 
sion elsewhere than in China, the southern area alone would be worth going 
into, for there Japan would find the critical resources so essential to her war- 
time economy, and there she would confront the true enemy blocking her bid 
for a place in the sun." 

Ozaki worked in this way to ease the tension in 1941. Whether he attempted 
any other maneuvers, I do not know, but I am sure that like myself he must 
have disagreed at times with superficial evaluations of the Soviet strength and 
the prevailing tendency to underestimate the enemy. In conversation he doubt- 
less pointed out the lesson learned at Nomenheim and emphasized Hitler's mis- 
calculation concerning the Soviet-German war. 

That is Sorge's own story, or at least as much of it as he would tell, 
regarding the political effort made by his group, and leading Japan 
to the south instead of to the north. 

General Willoughby. I take it, Mr. Tavenner, you would like my 
professional off-the-cuff comment on the value of this maneuver, as 
he termed it, Ozaki's maneuver? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

General Willoughby. I think it is very clearly put that regardless 
of his instructions, he permitted his right-hand man, who had ex- 
ceptional facilities and an exceptional position within the highest 
official quarters of the Japanese Government, namely, the Foreign 
Office — he permitted him, he encouraged him, to exercise whatever 
influence he could develop toward keeping Japan from attacking Rus- 
sia, and to encourage them, conversely, to move south toward a col- 
lision with England and the United States. By so doing, and Ozaki 
felt he was successful in it or felt confident that he could accomplish 
it, they of course rendered Russia, in her war situation, a tremendously 
vital service. The mechanics used, as you remember — that has already 
been developed, I believe, or is available in the files — were the intimacy 
of Ozaki with the Prime Minister, Konoye, and his position as a con- 
sultant of the Cabinet. 

Mr. Tavenner. This statement by Sorge also shows that the Soviet 
Government was fully advised of the purpose and desire of Sorge and 
his associates to use such a political influence. 
.General Willoughby. Quite. 

Mr. Tavenner. Sorge's own statement also shows that the Soviet 
Government in its reply was not specific and was, by its very nature, 
would you say, an invitation to Sorge to proceed on his own respon- 
sibility? 

General Willoughby. I would concur in your view, Mr. Counsel. 
A tacit encouragement is the term. 

Mr. Tavenner. Earlier in the course of the hearings, you have 
referred to the fact that an effort was made to place information; 
concerning the Sorge ring in the Tojo trials before the international 
tribunal. Do you have any further statement you desire to make in 
regard to that? 

General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Tavenner. Your intimate acquaint- 
ance, of course, with the international tribunal is an introduction to 
this incident which I, at least, attach considerable importance to. It 
is practically proof of the commitment or involvement of the Soviet 



1204 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Government in this spy mechanism, because they objected strenu- 
ously and seriously to having their case introduced into the interna- 
tional military tribunal in Tokyo. 

Mr. Walter. May I interrupt at that point, General ? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Is that because this spy mechanism, as you described 
it, is the same sort of mechanism that the Soviet has introduced into 
other nations all over the world ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, indeed, Mr. Walter. 

Mr. Walter. Including our own? 

General Willoughby. Yes. And they are reluctant or were 
reluctant at such a dramatic public session as the international 
tribunal, to have this story brought to public attention. It would 
embarrass them. 

Mr. Walter. In other words, these Trojan-horse tactics have been 
and are being employed wherever it is possible, and it has been possi- 
ble to employ them? 

General Willoughby. That is my affirmative belief, sir. 

Mr. Velde. General, in that connection, I think you had a little 
difficulty, too, in introducing this evidence or getting the evidence 
reported to Secretary of the Army Royall. I understand that Sec- 
retary Royall repudiated the statements contained in your report. 
Would you care to comment on that ? 

General Willoughby. With your permission, may I comment on 
it later? Because, at the moment, to assist the counsel, I was about 
to cover the story of the international tribunal. But I will be de- 
lighted to defer to your wishes, of course. 

Mr. Wood. The question will be held for the time being. 

General Willoughby. We will return to it, Mr. Velde. I have a 
definite thought on the subject. 

I invite your attention, Mr. Chairman, to what is our exhibit No. 17. 
And the title is "The Sorge Case Before the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East" — about as public a setting as could con- 
ceivably be devised. And the reaction to our proposal, meaning the 
tribunal proposal, is very significant, in my opinion. 

Mr. Cunningham, one of the lawyers on the defense panel, attempted to in- 
troduce the Sorge espionage case (see case file No. 38456). In a record of 13 
pages, there is a picture of an argument between Mr. Cunningham and the 
Russian General Vasiliev, a member of the court, on question of evidence. 

Mr. Walter. When was that, General ? 

Mr. Tavenner. It was in September 1947. 

And may I make a correction? General Vasiliev was the Russian 
prosecutor; not a member of the court, He was not a judge on the 
tribunal. 

General Willoughby. A pertinent correction, sir. 

Vasiliev entered 15 separate objections in keeping Mr. Cunningham's material 
out of the record. The Russian evidently could not afford to get this material 
in evidence. Mr. Cunningham would have brought out that Sorge worked for 
the Soviet Government. 

Of course, this Russian high-ranking official would react as he did. 
But the inferential significance of this maneuver is that they just 
couldn't afford to bring (his story out in their connection, which this 
committee has already clarified, namely, Sorge working for the fourth 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1205 

bureau of the Soviet Red army. So they squelched or killed the 
attempt to inl roduce it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owen-, will you examine part L5 of the Foreign 
A Hairs Year Book of 1942, pages 185 to 208, where there appears the 
Dotes or confession by Sorgeas reported in that document? 

On pages 201 and 202, a reference is made by Sorge to forged pass- 
ports. We have at various times in this committee, in fact on many 
occasions, had testimony relating to forged passports, and this com- 
mittee has made every effort to discover the sources of these frauds 
and how they have been set up. 1 would like you to read what Sorge 
says about fraudulent passports. 

Mr. Owens Yes. [Reading:] 

When I went to the Soviet Union via the United Slates from Japan in lO.'iij, the 
Communist Party contact man in New York gave me a forged passport. I used 
it to go to Moscow and destroyed it in Holland on my return trip. I used a forged 
passport because I did not want my real passport to show that I had been in 
Soviet Russia. Prior to that, when returning to Moscow from Scandinavia, I 
had also used a forged Scandinavian passport. In neither of these cases did I 
forge the passport ; contact men gave them to me. I do not know, therefore, 
whether or not there is a special section in the Comintern which makes forged 
passports. 

I used my real passport twice to go to Moscow; once when I first went there 
from Germany in 11)24, and once when I returned from China via Siberia in 
1933. 

The passport I received in the United states was not new. It was an old one 
that had belonged to someone, but it bore my picture and description. The 
nationality was given as Austrian and the name was long and outlandish; I 
have forgotten it now. An Austrian visa had been stamped on it. so all I had 
to do in Paris was to get Czechoslovakian, Polish, and Russian visas. I had to 
go through the regular procedure just like any other traveler; I was not given 
any special privileges when I went to apply for my entrance and exit visas at 
the Soviet consulate. 

When I was buying a ticket at a steamship office preparatory to going to 
Europe with the forged passoport, I found that I had forgotten the outlandish 
name on it and had to take it out of my pocket to refresh my memory. 

When I was leaving New York I had a suit tailored, giving the tailor my real 
name, and on my return trip I went to the same tailor and gave him the name 
in the forged passport. The tailor remembered me and noted that my name 
was different, but he was not interested in the change and made the suit for me. 
People in the United States do not think it strange if the same man uses two 
different names. 

In this respect, the British are rather strict and their passport inspection is 
thorough. It is said that England knows more about spies than any other nation 
in Europe, but I am not in a position to make a definite statement, because I have 
made no special study of the subject. 

I shall give an illustration of how loosely everything is done in the United 
State . I did not pay my exit tax and forgOl to get a stamped receipt when 1 
went on board the ship for Europe. Just as the ship was about to sail, a customs 
officer found out about it, and it looked ;i s though he were going to lake me off 
the ship, but I slipped him $50, and the matter was dropped at once. Things are 
very flexible in the United States. 

JNIr. Tavenner. In other words, according to Sorge's own state- 
ment, there must exist in this country a fraudulent passport mill from 
which lie would receive the necessary assistance to accomplish his 
purpose. 

Mr. Owens. It would appear so. 

Mr. Tavenner. Since you have now gone into the subject of Sorge's 
itinerary through the United States, I would like at this time to pre- 
sent the results of the interrogation as to other experiences which 
Sorge had in the United States. I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will 



1206 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

facilitate matters if I were to attempt to read these exerpts, rather than 
to do it through question-and-answer form to the witness. 

We have taken from the exhibits produced by General Willoughby, 
or rather through General Willoughby, an interrogation of December 
21, 1941, of Sorge. 

Question : Continue from where you stopped yesterday to your description of 
your mission to Japan. 

Answer : As I stated yesterday, I left Moscow and went to Berlin. On July 
14 or 15 I departed from Berlin for Paris, where, as previously arranged, I reg- 
istered at the Neua Hotel. On the following day a contact man called me at the 
hotel, told me that a certain Voukelitch was already living in Tokyo in a large 
apartment house, and told me the passwords I was to use when meeting him. 
I might add here that back in Berlin I had been notified that a man was already 
in Tokyo. Voukelitch was that man. 

The contact man instructed me to register at the Lincoln Hotel, East Forty- 
second Street, New York City. I stayed 4 or 5 days in Paris, sailed from South- 
ampton, France, around August 1, 1933, arrived in New York 

apparently he has the geography mixed a little — 

in about 5 days, registered at the Lincoln Hotel, and saw a contact man, who 
instructed me to meet a certain employee of the Washington Post at the Chicago 
World's Fair. 

I spent around 8 days in New York, around 3 days in Washington, D. C, and 
around 4 days in Chicago. I met the man from the Washington Post in Chicago 
at the fairgrounds on the shore of Lake Michigan and he informed me that a 
certain Japanese would soon return to Japan, and told me how to get in touch 
with him. 

I would like to turn to the interrogation of Miyagi also taken from 
the exhibits produced here, in which this question was asked : 

Question 10. The accused will describe the circumstances leading to his par- 
ticipation in espionage activities. 

Answer. As I have told the police officer during his investigation, Yano and a 
Comintern agent, a Caucasian, whose nationality I did not know, came from San 
Francisco to Los Angeles to see me sometime around the end of 1932, told me to 
return to Tokyo, said that I would learn the nature of my work when I got 
there. They said I should be back in about a month. I left America in about 
September 1933, and arrived in Yokohama in about the end of October. Using 
the method in which I had been coached by Yano, I was able to contact Sorge 
around the end of November. 

Then, continuing again with Sorge's statement: 

In December 1933 I called at the office of the Japan Advertiser, and as in- 
structed by the American contact man inserted an ad in the Japan Advertiser 
and the Pan Pacific, its weekly publication, to the effect that I was collecting 
Yukioi and books on art and wanted interested persons to reply to the Japan 
Advertiser. I ran the ad twice for several days in a row, called at the office of 
the Advertiser to pick up the replies, had Voukelitch arrange a meeting with our 
man, and finally met Miyagi at the Yuno Art Museum and brought him into the 
group. 

General Willoughby, in the course of your investigation, did any 
knowledge come to your attention as to the identity of this person 
referred to as an employee of the Washington Post, who gave instruc- 
tions to Sorge as to how he was to contact the Japanese in Japan \ 

General Willoughby. No, sir; it is one of those cases where there is 
reference in the files, in the records, to individuals whose identities, 
in spite of our efforts subsequently, were not identified by us — mean- 
ing Tokyo. It is one of those points of which we have been officially 
apprehensive, in the sense that there was at no time a desire to em- 
barrass people who are associated with these agencies, these subversive 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1207 

agencies, by accident or physical location. And we have leaned 
over backward, and I will continue to do so here within my limitations, 
to protect individuals whose appearance may have been incidental. 
When, however, the evidence is positive, then of course we made an 
effort to develop this clue or lead, in police language, further. 

In genera] terms, I believe it is the sense of this committee, too, 
that that protective distinction is made wherever possible, and re- 
gardless of what the files really show. After all, the Shanghai police 
hies are just that. They are not an arraignment. They are a series 
of reports that we have attempted to piece together. We found 
astonishing coincidences here and there. And in many cases we have 
drawn a blank. In that ease we will give the individual the benefit 
of the doubt. 

Mr. Tavenner. But as to this matter, this is not a matter relating 
to the Shanghai police files. It is a matter that appears from Sorge's 
own confession or statement. 

General Willoughry. Your point is well taken, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. "Wood. But at the same time, as I understand from your state- 
ment, General, you have been unable to so far obtain sufficient data 
on the identity of this individual. 

General Willoughby. In this particular case, sir. 

Mi-. "Wood. Sufficient to venture a statement as to who he was. 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, you were not present, but Mr. 
Yoshikawa testified before this committee several weeks ago that he 
had endeavored to ascertain from Sorge the identity of this individual 
hut had been unsuccessful in doing so. So the matter had been brought 
directly to Sorge's attention, as to the identity. 

Mr. Wood. For what reason had he been unable to do so? Because 
Sorge refused to give him the information, or professed he did not 
know a man by that name ? 

Mr. Tavenner. My recollection is that a police officer by the name 
of Ohashe obtained this information, and that the witness who ap- 
peared here directed him to go back and ascertain the identity of the 
individual. And as far as the witness was able to go, we must say 
he had been unable to get it. The record is not clear as to whether 
Sorge failed in his memory to identify the individual or whether he 
would not disclose his identity. The record is not clear on that. There 
is no record on that subject, and that is really what I mean to say. 

Mr. Owens, will you turn again to the Foreign Affairs Year Book 
of 19-12, part lfi, which contains the confession or statement of Max 
Klausen, who was Sorge's radio operator in Tokyo? The portion of 
Klausen's notes dealing with his first experiences in Shanghai \ 

Mr. Wood. Before going into that, Mr. Counsel, I would like for 
the record to have it appear at this point that all facilities available 
to this committee have been utilized and exhausted to determine the 
identity of this person. And so far this committee has been unable 
to proceed further with it than the information here disclosed. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, the portion of Klausen's notes dealing 
with his first experiences in Shanghai contains an interesting refer- 
ence to an American citizen. Will you examine that and read it to 
the committee? 



1208 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. [Beading :] 

* * * Around July 1929, as I was about to leave for Harbin. Miss Rett 
Bennett, whom I shall discuss later, arrived in town. I believe she came to 
Shanghai from the United States. Lehmann taught her how to encode and 
decipher messages, and after I returned from Harbin she gave me messages 
to be transmitted and I gave her incoming messages. She left Shanghai for 
Moscow via Dairen and Siberia around November. To the best of my knowledge, 
she was a member of the American Communist Party ; I believe that she had 
been ordered by the party to proceed to Moscow and that she stopped at Shanghai 
to assist Lehmann. She was about 25 years old, about 5 feet 5 inches tall, 
of medium stature, and beautiful despite a large nose * * *. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the name, please ? 

Mr. Owens. Eeh Bennett. 

Mr. Tavenner. A portion of Klausen's notes deals with the 6 weeks 
that he spent in Harbin in July of 1929 on a mission to set up a wireless 
set for the Harbin Intelligence group, headed by Gloemberg-Ott. 

Will you relate to the committee what Max Klausen writes about 
his experiences in Harbin on this particular mission ? 

Mr. Owens (reading) : 

Nothing in particular happened on the trip to Harbin. The water police merely 
inspected our passports before we landed in Dairen. Like any other traveler, I 
bought a second-class ticket, boarded a train for Changchun (the present Hsing- 
king), changed trains at Changchun carrying two suitcases containing spare 
suits and other necessities, and arrived in Harbin in the evening. 

I registei-ed at the Priston Hotel Moderne as directed by Benedict in a letter 
to- Lehmann, met Benedict 2 days later, and took custody of the transmitter, which 
had been brought in by the diplomat. Soon thereafter, I moved to a lodging 
house near the broadcasting station. 

Benedict introduced me to Gloemberg-Ott, who took me to his home, but, 
perhaps because his wife was a White Russian, refrained from discussing secret 
matters. Several days later, I accompanied Ott to a cafe operated by a White 
Russian and then, for the first time, he asked me to install the wireless set and 
gave me several hundred Harbin dollars so that I could buy parts for a receiver 
and defray incidental expenses. 

He told me about Lilliestrom several days later. Lilliestrom was a big fat 
six footer about 50 years old. His house was a villa-type, two-story gray tile 
brick building with a large yard enclosed by a palisade. He went to work at 
the United States consulate from there. 

Soviet-Chinese relations were rather tense at the time, with the result that 
the Chinese police were busily making secret inquiries into the affairs of White 
Russians and Russians living in China. Ott realized that the best way of 
escaping detection was to use the private home of the American vice counsul, 
which was conveniently located, and that, needless to say, the easiest way of 
getting information was to gain Lilliestrom's confidence. I believe it was for 
these reasons that he won over Lilliestrom as a sympathizer. 

After spending the first 2 weeks idly with Ott and Benedict in conferences 
and at eating places, I went to inspect Lilliestrom's home and decided to nse 
two rooms (both were vacant; one was about an eight-mat room) on the second 
floor, one as a wireless operating room and the other as a technician's room. 
I bought an antenna and parts to transform a receiver into a short-wave 
set 

Mr. Walter. Does the record show when that was, Mr. Owens? 
Mr. Owens. 1929 (continuing to read) : 

began installation operations, completed the work in about 2 weeks, tested the 
set with Wiesbaden for 2 days and delivered it to Ott * * *. 

Mr. Tavenner. You referred, in the reading of those notes, to Max 
Klausen having received direction from Lehmann. On yesterday. 
General Wi Hough by described the Lehmann group, which was active 
in the promotion of Communist purposes. I will ask you to look at 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1209 

page 225 of the year book and see if at that point or at sonic other 
point it fixes Max Klanson as a member of the Lehmann group. 

First of all. can yon establish the fact that Max Klausen became 
a member of t he Lehmann group? 

Mr. Owens. I believe that part of his notes here will establish- 
that. 

Mr. T.wixnki;. All right. Will yon read it. please? 

Mr. Owens (reading) : 

* * * As a full-fledged member of the spy ring after my return from 
Harbin — 

relating to the trip which I just read — 

I now became its wireless technician. I still received coded messages from 
Lehmann and .wiss Bennett and transmitted them, in contrast to the typed code 
messages thai Sorge gave me in Tokyo, the messages I received from Lehmann 
and Miss Bennetl were always written out in longhand. 1 am inclined to believe 
that the latter method is more accurate. 

For 1! or :: months after my return from Harbin, I used Lehmann's transmitter, 
hut during that period 1 built and began to use a new Armstrong set. All of 
Lehmann's messages were short, consisting at the most of not more than 50-word 
groups. Lp to the time I left for Canton, he sent a total of ahout 2,000 groups. 

.Meanwhile. I also took care of photographing documents and smuggling out 
the film. I photographed Intelligence documents written in English or Chinese 
(they were typed and there were no photographs or maps) that Lehmann 
brought in from somewhere, working in my room with a Zeiss camera which 
they had previously given to me. It was postcard size (."> by 4 inches). I was 
able to take six documents in one roll of film. I delivered the photographs 
chiefly to Lehmann. but at times to Miss Lenin It when so ordered hy him. I 
suppose they sent them to Moscow through some connection. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Now, continuing with Max Klaussen's notes, he 
states that in April of 1935 he returned to Shanghai, where he re- 
mained until September. He states that he was called in to depart- 
ment 4, where, in the presence of Sorge, "the chief of the Far East De- 
partment informed me that I was to accompany Sorge to Tokyo, and 
that as of that day I was assigned to the Far East." 

Klaussen further states that prior to proceeding to Tokyo he was 
authorized to rest up at Khimki. 

On page 253 of the Yearbook, there appears a paragraph dealing 
with an association in Khimki. Would yon turn to that page and 
read the portion that deals with the association? 

Mr. Owens. Page 253 of the Yearbook contains the following state- 
ment by Klaussen, after he has dealt with having gone to Khimki to 
rest prior to his leaving for Tokyo. [Reading : J 

I might add that at Khimki, Charlie, an American Jew, was my next door 
neighhor. lie lived there with his wife and two children. I understood that 
he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai espionage group for ahout a 
year around 1934. He was around 40 years of age, stood around ."i foot 6, and 
had dark hair; his only distinguishing feature was a big nose. I heard that 
before going to Shanghai he had operated a fair-sized amateur radio station in 
the United States, through which he had tried to contact the Moscow wireless 
school, hut that his efforts, for the most part, were failures. Because of the dis- 
tance between Russia and the United States, I believe that information is con- 
veyed via the Russian Embassy rather than through radio contact. 

Charlie presented me with a green huekskin belt with four pouches attached. 
I took it with me to Japan and used it for hiding film when I went to Shanghai 
on liaison missions. 

Both Weingart and my wife were friendly with Charlie and his wife. I do 
not know what became of them, since I left for Japan shortly thereafter, nor 
do I know the names of Charlie's comembers in the Shanghai espionage group. 
00929—51 6 



1210 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

I understood that Charlie taught foreigners at one of the branches of the 
wireless school, but the location of the school and the nationalities of the stu- 
dents were kept secret. * * * 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, do you have any comment to 
make upon this American identified only as "Charlie"? 

General Willoughbt. Yes, sir. This is an interesting case, though 
spotty evidence, in which a reference by one of Sorge's group fits into 
a collateral possibly supporting evidence in the Shanghai files. I pre- 
sent this merely as an incident in the technique of investigation. The 
conclusions are not necessarily final. But with this vague description 
and the coincidence of the year, the Shanghai files, in its abbreviated 
card index, have the following to say about Leon Minster, as follows : 

Leon Minster, Russian Jew, born 1898 at Selidovo, District of Ekaterinoslav, 
became an American citizen in 1919. Holds passport No. 7152, of April 13, 1933, 
Washington, D. C. ; home address : 167 Maple Street, Bridgeport, Conn., U. S. A. 
Arrived in Shanghai from America 17, 10, 1934, in the S. S. General Pershing. 
In November 1934 took over fiat No. 6, Loriot, on a lease expiring in 1935. On 
December 4, 1934, rented a shop at No. 4 Voylon and started a business known as 
the Ellem Radio Equipment, which was established as a cover for the installation 
of a long-range radio transmitter. In March 1935, left for Yokohama to meet his 
wife, children, and his brother-in-law, Harry Kahan, who came from America 
in the S. S. Empress of Canada. They arrived in Shanghai on April 9th. Mrs. 
Bessie Minster is a sister of V. M. Molotov, Chairman of the People's Commis- 
sariat of the U. S. S. R. They have relatives, Robert Minster and his wife Emma, 
nee Kantor, who were connected with naval espionage in the United States in 1932 
and were connected with Mr. and Mrs. Switz, concerned in Soviet espionage in 
France, in 1934. Minster left for Japan on May 21, 1935, in the S. S. Shanghai 
Marti. It is definitely known that Minster was connected with a foreign Com- 
munist known as Joseph Walden, who was arrested by the municipal police on 
May 5, 1934. The connection there is in Klausen's sworn statement, referring to 
this code name "Charlie." 

I understood that he had served as wireless operator for a Shanghai 
espionage group for years around 1934. In Shanghai he had operated 
a fair-sized amateur radio station, and so forth, which fits the Ellem 
Radio Equipment Shop, which is set up and which the Shanghai 
police classifies as "no doubt established as a cover for the installa- 
tion of a long-distance radio-transmitting station." 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, this is a convenient place for a 
break, if you have completed your answer, General. 

General Willoughby. Yes ; I have completed it. 

I believe you have some collateral reference to Switz and to the 
Kantors on naval espionage in 1932 ; also, the Switz in Soviet espionage 
in France in 1934, in your own record. 

Mr. Walter. Where was this naval espionage in 1932? 

General Willoughby. That I don't know, Mr. Walter. I felt that 
possibly the committee had better American references than I had 
in Tokyo. 

I recall personnally from reading the current newspaper at the 
time that this couple, Mr. and Mrs. Switz, were picked up in France 
in 1934, and we had some trouble in getting thorn out of there, and 
the naval espionage case centers around Robert Minster and his wife, 
Kantor. That is as far as I know 7 . 

The Shanghai police, of course, picks up that kind of juicy col- 
lateral information and records it. I presume it could be determined 
by further research. 

Mr. Tavenner. We have information on the subject, General Wil- 
loughby, but it is executive session testimony. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1211 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

I am prepared to answer Mr. Velde's question, Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Due to another appointment that we have here in 
just 10 or 12 minutes, I believe that we had better wait until this 
afternoon for that. 

Mr. Wood. We will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Whereupon, at 12: 05 p. in., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. this 
same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Mr. Wood. Are you ready to proceed ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES ANDREW WILLOUGHBY— 

Resumed 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, during the course of your testi- 
mony you have brought out various facts relating to the association 
of Agnes Smedley with Sorge and other members of the Sorge ring. 
I think it would be well if I make as a part of the record of this 
hearing some of the actual interrogations of members of the ring 
with relation to Agnes Smedley's participation. Rather than burden 
you with the reading of it, I will refer to these items myself. 

In the interrogation of Ozaki on March 5, 1942, we find the fol- 
lowing : 

Question. Now describe your relationship with Agnes Smedley. 
That is, Ozaki's relationship with Agnes Smedley. 

Answer. I began to pay occasional visits to the Zeitgeist Bookstore on Soo- 
ehow Creek around the summer of 1929, became friendly with Mrs. Wiedemeyer, 
the manager of the store, and through her met Agnes Smedley around the end 
of 1929 or the beginning of 1930. Smedley, the Shanghai correspondent of the 
Frankfurter Zeitung and a well-known American writer, was contributing many 
articles to the American leftist magazine New Masses at that time. She also 
worked on behalf of the International Relief Society in Shanghai and devoted a 
great deal of time to the famous Noulens incident. 

Through .Mrs. Wiedemeyer, I met Smedley for the first time at her residence 
in the British Settlement, and at her request agreed to exchange information 
with her. At the time, we traded information mainly as newspaper reporters, 
hut the fact that both of us inclined toward the left caused our conversations to 
tend in the direction of exposures of internal conditions in the Kuomintang. 
Not only did my relationship with Smedley continue after this, but it was she 
who brought ahout the establishment of my contact with Sorge. 

Question. Describe the circumstances surrounding your affiliation with Sorge's 
espionage ring. % 

Answer. A man named KitO, Ginichi, began to come to see me around October 
or November 1930. He was connected with the American Communist Party and 
had come to Shanghai from the United States via Annam to engage in espionage 
activities. Soon after I became acquainted with him, he urged me to meet an 
American newspaperman named Johnson, but I did not yet trust him completely 
and felt that it might be dangerous to do so. 1 thought that I could find out 
about Johnson from Agnes Smedley; so I got in touch with her and told her 
what had happened. She looked extremely grave and asked whether I had 
discussed the matter with anyone else, to which I replied that I had not. She 
then said that she had heard of him but warned me strongly against mentioning 
the subject to anyone else. Shortly thereafter I met her again, and she told me 
that Johnson was a fine man; said that she herself would introduce me to him. 
She took me to a certain Chinese restaurant on Nanking Road and there pre- 
sented me to the foreigner. Tins man who called himself "Johnson" was 
-"Richard Sorge. 



1212 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Sorge asked me at that meeting to give him (1) the data on the internal 
situation in China which I was able to gather as a Japanese newspaperman 
and (2) information on the local application of Japan's China policy, and I 
agreed to cooperate in his espionage activities by doing so. Since I had origi- 
nally been approached by Kito, Ginichi, a member of the United States Com- 
munist Party, and since I had been introduced by Smedley, an internationally 
famous leftist writer, I guessed at once that Sorge was a functionary of the 
International Communist Party engaged in espionage activities. My reason 
for deciding to cooperate with him was that, as I have stated, I believed in 
communism and had decided to become active as a Communist; I felt that I 
would be doing something of real importance by assisting Sorge in espionage 
work on behalf of the Comintern. From then until I left Shanghai in February 
1932, I got in touch with Sorge about once a month at Smedley's room in a 
suburban apartment on Tsing-An-Szu Road, at Chinese restaurants inside 
Shanghai proper, and elsewhere, to turn over information and offer suggestions. 

While my first assignment was as indicated above, after the outbreak of the 
Manchurian incident in September 1931, I was directed to take up such prob- 
lems as (1) Japan's present and future Manchurian policy; (2) the effects 
of Japan's Manchurian policy on her relations with the U. S. S. R., and (3) 
Japan's present and future China policy, and was asked for information and 
opinions concerning them. I prepared reports on them, but I have forgotten 
most of the details now. 

Question. Describe the composition of the Shanghai Sorge spy ring. 

Answer. While in Shanghai, I was not in possession of detailed information 
concerning the nature of the group with which Sorge was operating. I knew, 
of course, that Smedley was working with him, but I was not clear as to whose 
position was the higher, although I conjectured, from the manner in which 
they talked to one another and from the nature of the reports which were made, 
that Sorge was the superior. 

Smedley was the only foreigner in Sorge's group with whom I was acquainted, 
but I knew that he had Japanese confederates. * * * 

Another interrogation of Ozaki, taken on July 21, 1942, is as follows :. 

Question. What was your impression of Sorge? 

That question, of course, was asked of Ozaki. 

Answer. Smedley introduced him as a reporter, but I was rather dubious 
about that. At the outset, I was inclined to believe that he was a member of 
Smedley's circle and associated with the Red Relief Association — 

General Willoughby, I believe you will have something to say 
about the Red Relief Association a little later in your testimony. 
[Continuing reading:] 

but his connection with the investigation of the Hankow flood damage in 
1931 caused me to think it possible that he held a position of considerable im- 
portance within the Comintern. I therefore assumed that he was either con- 
nected with the International Relief Society or one of the top men in the Com- 
intern's Far East section. Judging from .the fact that Smedley was extremely 
respectful to him, I gathered that he held a position of considerable importance 
in the Comintern. 

Then on July 27, 1942, this question was asked Ozaki and answer 
given : 

Question. Did you investigate and report to Sorge on the new American ac- 
tivity in China; that is to say, on new investments by Americans in Shanghai 
and America's steadily increasing role in China? 

Answer. That is correct. I recall having investigated and reported on the- 
matter. In 1930 or 1931, a group known as the Kemmerer Committee was en- 
deavoring to put the Nationalist Government's maladministered finances on a 
solid footing, and the relationship between China and the United States was be- 
coming increasingly intimate. I investigated the committee's activities with 
Smedley's help and. at times, that of members of minority groups in the Na- 
tionalist Government, and submitted information to Sorge which was quite re- 
liable. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 121.3 

Continuing with the interrogation <>f Ozaki, we find the following 
answer to a question propounded on August L2, L942. The question 
related to Ozaki's leftist activities involving Smedley after he him- 
self had returned from Shanghai. This is the answer by the witness 
Ozaki : 

In the late autumn of thai year I L932), I received a message from Smedley 
in Shanghai which contained her Peking address and said that she wanted to 
inrct me in Peking to discuss certain matters. <>n a previous occasion, Smedley 
had asked me to come to <'hina and I had replied thai I would be able to g<> 
during my vacation in late December. < >f course, thai was the reason for the 
above proposal to meet me in Peking. I sailed from Kobe around December 25 
without notifying my employers, arrived at Peking on December 31, gol a room 
at the Te-Kuo restaurant, and at once asked Smedley to come there, it developed 
that, in \ie\\ of the vital importance n< w attached to the North China problem, 
she wanted t<> establish a Sino-Japanese intelligence agency to operate in and 
around North China. I bad kepi in touch with Kawai concerning my trip to 
Peking, and I proposed to Smedley that he be made the keyman in the group. 
Inasmuch as site knew him she agreed, and I took him to sec her at her Peking 
residence, a little rented cottage within a Chinese home. 

At this point I would like to leave the interrogation of Ozaki. At 
this point the statement is made that Kawai was previously known 
to Smedley, so I want to turn now to the interrogation of the defen- 
dant Kawai relating to the earlier experience. In an interrogation 
conducted on November 9, 1941, in answer to a question relating to the 
witness' participation in espionage activities, Kawai replied as fol- 
lows : 

During the latter part of October 1931 I was, as previously stated, receiving 
instructions and training as a Japanese intelligence agent under the direction 
of Chiang of the Chinese Communist Party, which meant that I was a frequent 
visitor at Chiang's 1 home. One day Chiang told me that he had some important 
work for me to do, and shortly thereafter he introduced me at his home to 
ozaki Hozumi, Shanghai correspondent of the Osaka Ashahi. whom I knew by 
Bight. It was then that I first learned that Ozaki and * hi&ng were on close 
terms. It struck me as strange when I heard Ozaki. in making arrangements 
for this important task, tell Chiang : "Chiang, you're not going." 

On the following day. I met Ozaki in front of the post office on North Szeehuan 
Road. A Caucasian lady was waiting in an automobile, and Ozaki and I got in. 
We got out of the car directly in front of a restaurant featuring Canton-style 
foml in the neighborhood of Nanking Road, the name of which, as I recall, was 
the Bsiang Hua Low, entered it, and found a tall foreigner waiting. 

The gist of the conversation between the tall foreigner and myself, which was 
interpreted by Ozaki, was as follows : 

First, he asked: "I want you to go to Manchuria from North China. Can you 
do it?" 

I will omit several paragraphs which appear unimportant from the 
standpoint that we are addressing ourselves to. After agreeing to 
undertake the mission, Kawai says: 

Concerning the foreign woman — when I contacted Funakoshi Hisao, my 
superior during my Shanghai days, at Tientsin around January 1934, 1 was told 
for the first time that her name was Smedley. 

Then there was presented to the witness a photograph of Richard 
Singe, and the question was asked: 

Is this the unidentified Caucasian man to whom you referred? 

Answer. Yes, it is. He is the one to whom Ozaki referred as Robinson Crusoe 
(luring my Shanghai days. 

Question. What do you know about the spy ring identified with Sorge and his 
group? 

Answer: I have already stated thai when embarking on these spy activities 
in collaboration with Ozaki Hozumi, I felt it strange that there was no con- 
nection with Chiang, the man in charge of the intelligence activities of the 



1214 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Chinese Communist Party. Later on, after being introduced by Ozaki to the 
Causasians Sorge and Smedley, and after working with Smedley and a Chinese 
in North China, I gradually realized that we were working for the International 
Communist Party (Comintern). Since I had already accepted communism, 
and since I supported the Comintern and believed in the desirability of an inter- 
national Communist society, I approved of the spy organization and continued 
my activities in its behalf. 

That is the testimony showing the connection between Kawai and 
Agnes Smedley prior to 1932. 

Now, continuing with the testimony of Ozaki at the place I departed 
from the text, we continue : 

We asked for the names of some persons whom he could trust absolutely, 
and he listed two or three, among them Kawamura, whom I knew and endorsed. 
I recall that I approved the others with the remark, "If you have absolute confi- 
dence in them, they are all right with me," and asked him to arrange to get all 
of them together without delay. 

Parenthetically, I should explain that this was a conference between 
Smedley, Ozaki, and Kawai. [Continuing reading:] 

Smedley asked me to stay until the organization was completed, but I declined 
on the ground that I had not told my employers about the trip and, therefore, 
did not have the time. On January 3 I left Tientsin for Japan. 

I learned from Kawai in the summer of 1933, when he paid me another visit 
at my home in Inanomura, that he had rounded up two or three persons, in- 
cluding Kawamura, parted with Smedley, and engaged in espionage activities 
both in North China and in Manchuria. His reports had been submitted 
through a Chinese contact man, but he had lost touch with him in April or 
June of that year and was completely unable to resume the contact, with the 
result that their activities had come to a standstill and he had come to ask 
me to do something about it. At the time, however, my correspondence with 
Smedley had been cut off completely because, as was revealed later, she had 
gone to convalesce at a sanitarium in the Odessa area of southern Russia. 

Mr. Velde. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to ask the 
general a question. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde. 

Mr. Velde. In view of the evidence that has been produced by you 
and sent to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, con- 
cerning the connections of Agnes Smedley with Soviet Russia, it is a 
little difficult for me to see why Secretary Royall would repudiate the 
statements made in your report, General. Can you explain that ? 

General Willoughbt. Mr. Velde, in a public broadcast on Febru- 
ary 21, 1949, 1 objected to what might be termed an inferential repudi- 
ation by the Secretary. It might be said that I had a grievance then, 
in 1949, but I feel differently today, in 1951. World events have 
moved so rapidly, this Red menace confronts all of us. I am reluctant 
to revive what might be termed interdepartmental wrangling, and I 
am prepared to absolve the Secretary with my pontifical blessing. 

Mr. Velde. I would like at this point in the record to read an article 
that was written by a former statesman, now a columnist, Harold L. 
Ickes. It is dated March 16, 1949, and captioned "Army tricks cover 
general's mistakes." He says : 

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking, shoulder-shrugging Army officer 
can smear a private citizen is truly alarming. I refer, of course, to the report 
given out recently by Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, who is chief of G-2 on 
General MaeArthur's staff in Tokyo. This report, handed out "inadvertently," 
to quote Kenneth Royall, Secretary of the Army, charged that "Agnes Smedley 
(a native-born American citizen) is a spy and agent of the Soviet Government," - 
still "at large." No facts; no opportunity to be heard; no right to cross- 
examine witnesses on charges that tamo unexpectedly hurtling through the air 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1215 

against a woman who denied them specifically and categorically and at once 
demanded a retraction. Secretary Royall, on the Meet the Press broadcast on 
February 25, when questioned about this Tokyo spy report, said that it was an 
"inadvertence." Excepi for t his, be side-stepped questions relating to the incident. 
Was it an "inadvertence" in the sense that Miss Srnedley was unjustly charged? 
If so, common decency, as well as official responsibility, would seem to call for 
an explanation and something by way of an apology. After all, neither a Sec- 
retary of the Army, nor a high-ranking Army officer, should be allowed to get 
away with what, as a matter of fact, is a cowardly act. 

Do you feel that Mr. Iekes, or any of the others who wrote along 
similar lines, had any influence on Secretary Royall in making him 
retract the report that you made? 

General Willougiihy. Mr. Yekle, while I was very anxious to make 
fraternal concessions to a former Secretary of the Army, I am by no 
means prepared to acquiesce silently in Mr. Iekes' classification of the 
work of Tokyo intelligence regarding Miss Srnedley. In fact, while 
you have made perfect extracts in your quotation, may I be permitted 
to add another comment by this writer, referring to me, namely : 

The nonchalance with which a high-ranking Army officer can smear a private 
citizen is truly alarming. * * * 

No one who knows Miss Srnedley would ever suspect that this courageous and 
intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy for any 
country — even for her own, to which she is deeply attached. 

I presume the attachment of Miss Srnedley is made in comparison to 
my own of 41 years of service, not without honor. He continues : 

And who is this gallant soldier — 

referring to your witness — 

wearing two stars, who, without producing a scintilla of evidence, charges an 
American woman with being "a spy and agent of the Soviet Government" * * *. 

And so forth, and so forth. 

This fine flowering of American journalism is a classical example 
of reportorial Communist labor. Indeed, as I look upon my research, 
I am appalled at the thought to turning out a piece every 24 hours. 
I think this effusion has been amply refuted by Miss Srnedley herself — 
may she rest in peace — by leaving her ashes to Chu-Teh, commander 
in chief of the Chinese Communist army with which the United 
States is now engaged in war in North Korea, and having her ashes 
placed, in a ceremonial gathering of the highest Communist hier- 
archy, in a special shrine in Peiping, the heartland of Asiatic com- 
munism. 

However, if Mr. Iekes raised a historical question as to "Xo one 
who knows Miss Srnedley w r ould ever suspect that this courageous and 
intelligent American citizen has stooped to be so low as to be a spy," I 
would like to cite to this committee a letter by Harold L. Iekes, then 
Secretary of the Interior, to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25. 
1941, on the subject of the League of American Writers: 

The league is generally regarded as a Communist subsidiary. Its policies, of 
course, always parallel those of the Communist Party. 

That letter was signed by Harold L. Iekes, who apparently was 
aware at that time, April 25, 1941. that Srnedley served on the staff 
of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, the forerunner 
of the League of American Writers quoted in this inquiry by Mr. 
Lovett. 



1216 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Mr. Ickes' memory evidently failed in the period 1911 to 1919; it 
lapsed, with which I am to some degree in sympathy in view of my 
own growing age. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, I believe you testified before 
another congressional committee regarding certain documentation 
affecting Agnes Smedley. 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I do not want to repeat any testimony that you have 
heretofore given, unless it is absolutely necessary in our hearing, but 
I believe in connection with that you prepared a separate documenta- 
tion entitled "Smedley and Associates: 1918-48." 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have it before me, and it is rather long, it is 17 
pages in length, and I am inclined to offer it as an exhibit rather than 
ask you to read it, and make it a part of the hearing record. I intro- 
duce it in evidence and ask that it be marked "Willoughby Exhibit 
No. 40." 

Mr. Wood. Is that for reference? 

Mr. Tavenner. No, sir, that is introduction in evidence, and to be 
made a part of the record. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. It is so ordered. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 
40," is as follows:) 

Willoughby Exhibit No. 40 
Smedley and Associates : 1918-48 
The Truth and Agnes Smedley 

Smedley was not juridically charged with anything. No one suggested trial 
or prosecution. G-2 Tokyo merely reported Smedley's historical association 
with a Soviet espionage ring and filed proof. Testimony of living eyewitnesses 
was available. Collateral sources and court .records were Listed and officially 
filed in photostat copies. A bibliography appended to the original report was 
significantly or inadvertently omitted from the Army release; it would have 
convinced the average reader that ample, numerous documentary evidence was, 
in fact, available ; it might even have convinced the Department of the Army 
Public Information Chief or made him pause in his bland but meaningless 
generalizations. 

There is nothing in Smedley's career to justify or explain the Army's strange 
repudiation of one of its faithful henchmen. In simplest terms — if the public 
were really that naive — the argument boils down to whom to believe ! On this 
fascinating theme, Plain Talk found it necessary to editorialize and Congressman 
Judd considered the editorial appropriate for full insert into the Congressional 
Record. 

Under the circumstances, one can hardly ignore a revealing bit of character 
tendency which Agnes Smedley herself admits with disarming frankness : 

" * * * It has been one of the greatest struggles in my life to learn to tell 
the truth. To tell something not quite true became almost an instinct. * * *" 

This trend, if congenital, is also one of the most useful attributes of the clan- 
destine fraternity and will have to be acquired by the undercover operator or 
espionage agent, in order to survive ; it explains, in part, Smedley's smooth 
integration into all sorts of international intrigues. 

Chronological organization of facts in Smedley's career show that, throughout 
her adult life, she has thrown in her lot with social and political revolutionaries. 

There is no specific evidence of Smedley's membership in the American Com- 
munist Party and she repeatedly denied it; however, her own writings contradict 
her habitual denials of Communist affiliations, the customary protective screen 
expected to be used by an experienced political agitator. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1217 

The Sorge report and Smedley's protestation* 

Amies Smedley has dedicated her life to the political and geographical advance 
nit'iii of communism in China, li is one of the vagaries of Americana thai this 
woman, born in the heartland of the United States, in Missouri, should have east 
her lnt with Mongoloid-Panslavism in the remote and alien Far Fast. Her intel- 
lectual evolution is an interesting "case history" of the development of a party 
worker and fellow traveler. 

Life, in its issue of January l">. L948, has published a brillianl and incisive 
essay that is like a flashlighl beam in a darkened room: "Portrait of an Amer- 
ican Communist" i with the disarming party name of "Kelly" i . Agnes Smedley's 
career is more dramatic more Significant and colorful than Kelly's. As regards 
her public protests, coupled with the threat of a personal libel suit against 
MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence, it was inevitable that a noisy and highly pub- 
licized attempt at defense would he made because the issues accentuate the 
sinister ramifications of American communism in the international field, already 
brilliantly exposed by congressional investigations, particularly the House Un- 
American Activities Committee inquiry into the Whittaker Chambers case. 

The fanatical beliefs of Communist converts permit no moral obligation to the 
State where they were born nor a grateful recognition of the civic protection 
and advantages they enjoy. Their ability to secure professional legal services, 
on call, is an index of the high moral order of American civilization, but it is also 
a symptom of the cynical arrogance of these ideological renegades, who are 
ceaselessly busy, termite-like, in destroying the foundations of the \ cry order to 
Which they scurry for legal shelter when the storm begins. 

In the case Of Agnes Smedley, her attorney is a former Assistant Attorney 
General, < >. John Rogge, whose connection with the Department of Justice was 
abruptly severed. It is highly suggestive that Rogge demanded an end to the 
New York grand jury investigations into Soviet espionage activities. It is 
equally significant that lie promptly appeared as the attorney of Anna Louise 
Si rong. 

Agnes Smedley has been one of the most active workers for the Communist 
cause in China for the past twenty-odd years. In her third book, China lights 
Pack. Hie dedication is "to my beloved brothers and comrades, the heroic dead 
ami the unconquerable living of the Eighth Route Army of China" (the Chinese 
Red Communist army). This partisan vein runs through all her Chinese re- 
ports, revealing her as definite propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party, 
then witli headquarters at Yenan. 

Press reports from the United States have hinted at a link between Whit- 
taker Chambers and Soviet espionage in the Far East in furnishing agents 
for Japan in the Sorge period. It is noteworthy that Whittaker Chambers 
served on the 1082 staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers, on 
which Miss Smedley also served in 1933. The IURW was founded in Moscow, 
is Soviet dominated, and held its second conference in Kharkov, November 15, 
1930. 

Miss Smedley has also sewed on the staff of the League of American Writers, 
an offshoot of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers. This league is 
classified by the United States Attorney General as communistic, and is cited in 
tlie House record of the Seventy-ninth Congress. 

The second report of the Joint Fact-Finding Committee for the fifty-sixth 
California Legislature, Sacramento, Calif., lists Miss Smedley as a member of 
the National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of the 
IURW. This league was established at the First American Writers' Congress 
in New York; the committee^ reported on this congress thus (pp. 121—122) : 

"The committee is in possession id' a photostatic copy of the proceedings of 
the First American Writers' Congress. The most naive spectator and quarter- 
witted participant of this first writers' congress could not have been deceived 
as to its Communist revolutionary character. 

"A report by Moissaye J. Olgin, author of Why Communism V (one of the 
most inflammatory and revolutionary pieces of modern Communist literature 
in existence), was read to the congress. The report was on the First All-Union 
Congress of Soviet Writers, and glorified Karl Radek and .Nikolai Bukharin, 
old Bolsheviks who were 'liquidated' by Stalin's purge in 1937-38." 

The league is repeatedly cited as a Communist front by the Special Committee 
on Un-American Activities. 

"The League of American Writers is generally regarded as a Communist 
subsidiary. Its policies, of course, always parallel those of the Communist Party." 



121S AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

(State Department, quoted in a letter from Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of Interior, 
to Robert Morss Lovett, dated April 25, 1941.) 

"The League of American Writers was founded under Communist auspices in 
1935. The overt activities of the League of American Writers in the last 2 years 
leaves little doubt of its Communist control" (Attorney General Francis Biddle, 
Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686). 

As regards Smedley's association with Sorge, documentary evidence is available 
in the intelligence files of Tokyo in the form of authenticated extracts from official 
court proceedings against the three principals in the Sorge Ring. Their state- 
ments establish conclusively that Smedley was heavily implicated in the general 
activities of this ring. Numerous exhibits, in this series, have established these 
points ad infinitum et nauseam. 

There is nothing vindictive in the Sorge report ; it is an impartial recital listing 
court records, eyewitness testimony and related judicial evidence. Agnes Smedley 
is merely shown as caught in the web of a stupendous international intrigue, 
through her own choice or her own indiscretions. She cannot complain that her 
gown is spattered by the mud of her surroundings. She walked in the shadow 
of dangerous companions, in a milieu of her own choice. 

A semichronological review of her life, her activities and associations should 
make this point crystal clear ; it is not the story of an average, law-abiding 
American citizen, but that of a restless spirit, devoted to alien and subversive 
causes, roaming in far places in the service of predominantly foreign interests. 

Agnes Smedley: Chronology and biography 

1894 : Born in northern Missouri, eldest of five children of Charles H. and 
Sarah (Rallis) Smedley. At an early age she moved to southern Colorado where 
her father was employed as an unskilled laborer and her mother kept boarders. 
She did not finish grade school and never attended high school. 

1911 : Student in the normal school at Teinpe, Ariz., supporting herself by 
working as a waitress. 

1912 : Married an engineer, Ernest W. Brundin, on August 25. Subsequently 
-divorced. In her early twenties she went to New York where she spent 4 years. 
Worked during the day and attended lectures at New York University at night. 
She became involved with a subversive, Indian nationalist group, Friends of 
Freedom for India, operating in violation of current United States laws. Smedley 
kept their correspondence, their codes and foreign addresses, a significant early 
trend. 

1915 : Attended summer school at the University of California. 

1918: Smedley was arrested (March 18/19) with Salindranath Ghose, an 
Indian political agitator, on charges of acting as an agent of a foreign govern- 
ment and aiding and abetting such actions in violation of section 3, title 8 of 
the Espionage Act, and section 332 of the United States Criminal Code. She 
was released on bail May 7 and the case was never brought to trial. A significant 
facet of this case was the apperance of German funds, reaching Indian National- 
ist groups. Smedley was aware of the nature of these funds. It must be 
recalled that in these critical war years the German General Staff was notor- 
iously engaged in fomenting subversive political movements throughout the 
world to damage the allied war effort. Rebellions flared up from north Africa 
to India. German secret agents stirred' up the Berbers, the Touaregs and 
Senussi, the Kurds and Afghans. Subversive, nationalistic movements were 
tailor-made for this purely military enterprise. 

On June 11, parallel indictments were returned by Federal grand jury in 
San Francisco against Salindranath Ghose. Tarak Nath Das, Kulin B. Bose, 
William Wotherspoon, Agnes Smedley, of New York, and Blurna Zalnik, accus- 
ing them of attempting to defraud President Wilson through representations that 
they were on a accredited mission from the Nationalist Party of India. Smedley 
was not brought to trial in this action either. Wrote her first short stories. 
Cell Mates. 

1919 : She sailed from New York on a Polish-American freighter as a 
stewardess. Smedley jumped ship in Danzig and went to Berlin. 

1920: In Berlin, she joined Yirendranath Chattopadhyaya, an international 
agitator, with whom she lived informally for 8 years. They were never married. 
She characterized him as the epitome of the secret Indian revolutionary move- 
ment and its most brilliant protagonist abroad. He eventually became a 
Communist Party member. 

1921 : Smedley visited Moscow in June and attended a meeting of Indian 
revolutionaries held at the Hotel Lux. In commenting on this trip, she admits 
membership in the delegation from Germany. In October, Smedley was re- 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1219 

ported to he in Geneva, Switzerland, and Information was received that she 
was paid the sum of 5,000 marks by the Soviel Legation there Cor traveling 
expenses. In the same month, she attended the Congress of Syndicalists at 
Dusseldorf. At this meeting she used among several aliases that of Mrs. 
Petroikos. 

L923 : Lefl Chal topadhyaya twice to rest in the Bavarian Alps and later became 
very ill. She soughl the help of an alienist who gave her psychoanalytic treat- 
ments Cor - years. Smedley then tanght an English seminar at the Uni- 
versity of Berlin and also lectured on Indian history. She entered the University 
of Berlin to study for her Ph. D. but lack of scholastic background forced her to 
drop this project before the end of the first term. Smedley wrote two works on 
Indian history which were published in German historical journals. She also 
joined a group of Republican. Socialist, and Communist physicians who were 
trying to establish the first birth-control clinic in Berlin. 

T.tL'7: Smedley spent a number of months in Denmark and Czechoslovakia 
where she wrote her first book, Daughter of the Earth. 

1928 : Broke off her informal liaison with Chattopadhyaya and went to France. 
She later returned to Germany where she was hired as a correspondent for the 
Frankfurter Zeitung. Smedley made her way to China, stopping in Moscow and 
then traveling across Siberia. It is pertinent to note that the Soviet master spy, 
Richard Sorge, also used an assignment as a Frankfurter Zeitung correspondent 
as a convenient cover for his espionage activities. 

1!t29: Smedley arrived in Harbin and after spending 3 months in Manchuria 
entered China through Tientsin. She spent some months in Peiping, visited 
Nanking and then went to Shanghai. It was here that she began to frequent 
leftist and Communist groups. 

(a) Arrival in Shanghai. — Miss Agnes Smedley, also known as Alice Bird and 
Mrs. Petroikos, arrived in Shanghai in May 1929 as a correspondent of the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, the official organ of the German Social Democratic Party. 
She had traveled from Berlin via Moscow, Harbin, Mukden, Tientsin, and Peiping 
on United States passport No. 1266 issued June 27, 1928, by the United States 
consulate in Berlin ; she was known to possess an alternate German passport in 
addition. During her trip across the U. S. S. R. she stopped in Moscow in the 
period of the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in Moscow in July and 
August 1928. Shanghai police report that Smedley was in the direct service of 
the far eastern bureau (FEB) of the Central Committee of the Third (Com- 
munist) International (Comintern), receiving orders directly from the central 
committee (ECCI) in Moscow but maintaining no direct connection with the 
local Soviet Communists in order to camouflage her activities. 

(b) Organisations. — Agnes Smedley arrived in Shanghai when international 
Communist activities were becoming prominent again after the 1927 split be- 
tween the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists and the subsequent rupture 
in diplomatic relations between China and the U. S. S. R. had caused a break- 
down of the Comintern structure. The Comintern already had organized the 
Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) as its major organ for agitation 
and propaganda in China, and a variety of collateral subversive organizations 
received support from this Comintern agency. The Shanghai municipal police 
soon placed Smedley under surveillance, on the grounds of being affiliated with 
the Far Eastern Bureau and of having been charged by the Comintern with the 
establishment of Communist organizations among workers, an undertaking simi- 
lar to that of the PPTUS. Smedley's connections with Chinese radical move- 
ments, however, were considered more direct than those of the foreign-run 
PPTUS. Police considered her to be a member of the All China Labor Federa- 
tion (Union Syndicate Pan Chinoise), an ostensibly Chinese labor group which 
received considerable aid from the PPTUS and its parent body, the Shanghai 
"branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. 

Smedley was an active member of the Shanghai branch of the notorious 
Nbulens Defense Committee, a world-wide Communist-front organization set up 
by International Red Aid (MOPR) specifically to free Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, 
more commonly known as Noulens. the leaders of the Shanghai FEB, tried and 
convicted for espionage. With Harold Isaacs, she was a member of the China 
League for Civil Rights, and of the local Friends of the U. S. S. R., a Communist- 
front group, directed by the Comintern through local agents. When the Anti- 
War Congress, another front for the Comintern's League Against Imperialism, 
sent a mission to Shanghai in 19. ,. >, Agnes Smedley was listed prominently as 
one of the local supporters. As an erstwhile member of the Hindustan Associa- 
tion of Berlin and of the Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society, Smedley con- 



1220 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

tinned to devote considerable attention to the independence movement in India, 
a political agitation in which the Comintern took great interest. She was known 
to have been in touch with anti-British Indians in Shanghai, on several occa- 
sions to have edited anti-British propaganda on behalf of the Shanghai branch 
of the Indian Youth League, and to have given considerable financial support 
to Indian revolutionary organizations. 

(c) Publications. — Agnes Smedley came initially to the attention of the 
Shanghai authorities through an article published in the Frankfurter Zeitung 
regarding alleged gigantic preparations taken by the Shanghai Municipal Coun- 
cil for the suppression of anticipated Communist disturbances in August 1929. 
The article was reproduced in Izvestia on December 8, 1929. In addition to 
acting as correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung, Smedley contributed 
articles to the China Weekly Review, a Shanghai publication with intermittent 
leftist trends. An article under her own name entitled "Philippine Sketches" 
was published in the June 1930 issue of New Masses, definitive American Com- 
munist Party organ, and an anonymous article was ascribed to her entitled 
"London Behind the Hangman Chiang Kai-shek," which appeared in Rote Fahne 
(Red Flag), the organ of the German Communist Party September 5, 1931. In 
1933 she appeared under her own name in International Literature, the foreign- 
language organ of the Comintern International Union of Revolutionary 
Writers, in an account of the Communist uprising in Kingsi. Her book, China's 
Red Army Marches, an account of the Communist "Long March, - ' was banned 
both by Chinese and 'Shanghai authorities shortly after its publication in 1934 
because of its violently anti-Kuomintang tone. 

(d) Associations. — Agnes Smedley was an associate of Harold Isaacs, and 
C. Frank Glass, locally classified as a card-bearing Communist. Isaacs was 
for some time the editor of China Forum, an English-language Communist peri- 
odical first published in 1932. She was also in close contact with the German 
woman, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), a secret Comintern agent and dis- 
tributor of Communist publications, who was involved in the Sorge espionage 
case. Edgar Snow and his wife, who wrote under the name of Nym Wales, were 
associated with Smedley both in Shanghai and later in Peipin^. where the Snows 
edited the publication. Democracy. Shanghai police authorities knew that she 
was closely connected with the Soviet propagandist, Anna Louise Strong, writing 
articles for her Moscow Daily News, and with known and suspected Shanghai 
Communists, often visiting Tass, the Soviet news and propaganda agency at 
their Shanghai offices. Her secret association with *Sorge is not specifically 
covered here, as it appears in the Tokyo records elsewhere. Her house became 
the rendezvous of Sorge's ring ; it was here that Ozaki and Kawai were given 
espionage missions and their reports were, in turn, received. The Shanghai 
police were on her trail, though they never caught up with either Sorge or 
Smedley though they came pretty close, through the Noulens case, which led 
straight into the heart of the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB). 

Smedley came to the more serious professional attention of the Shanghai 
Secret Service when an arrested Comintern agent, Joseph Walden, was found to 
be carrying a typewritten document listing several local persons who were 
shadowed by detectives of the settlements, evidently a protective warning list. 
Agnes Smedley's name led a column of 12. 

1930: She visited the Philippines and Canton where she professed to be 
concerned at the plight of workers in the silk industry. She was arrested in 
Canton at (he insistence of the British secret police under a charge of traveling 
on a false passport and being a representative of the Communist International. 
Apparently she was released after protests were made by the German counsul. 
Back in Shanghai, Smedley was introduced to Ozaki Hozumi, protagonist of the 
Sorge Spy Ring, by Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), owner of the Zeitgeist 
Bookshop, a Communist front and mail drop for Comintern spies. At Smedley's 
request. Ozaki agreed to supply her with information. Later she became asso- 
ciated with Richard Sorge when he arrived in China and introduced him to ( >zaki. 
Smedley became a member of the Soviet spy ring headed by Richard Sorge and 
became one of his principal and most trusted assistants. Her house was 
often used as a rendezvous for Sorge's agents. 

L931: Active in aiding Labor representatives in trouble with the Shanghai 
police. In this period the Shanghai Evening Post and .Mercury branded her a 
"bolshevik" and other publications openly charged that she was in league with 
the I'. S. S. R. Local comments, based on intimate observations on the spot, are 
Significant. The police records were simply Confirmatory. She left the Frank- 
furter Zeitung, allegedly at the request of the British and other foreign interests 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1221 

in China. She was introduced by <>/.aki to Kawai Teikichi and Smedley per- 
suaded him to become a member of the Shanghai spj ring. She joined the 
Noulens Defense Committee which was organized in behalf of Paul and Gerl rude 
Ruegg (alias Noulens) who were jailed by Chinese authorities Cor espionage 
activities, and tried and convicted as bona fide Comintern agents. Associated 
with Smedley on the committee was Harold Isaacs, as well as many other 
prominent leftists. 

( Jonversely, the leading agitators in the movement were under orders of Moscow. 
The frantic efforts in behalf of the Noulens were, of course, inspired by and with 
the intervention of International Hod Aid, the Soviet agency for the assistance 
el" secret operators in trouble. What looked like a humanitarian gesture by 
the foreign colony in Shanghai was a brazen rescue scheme ordered by the 
Comintern. In this period she also published an article on the Communist up- 
rising in Kiangsi in International Literature, organ of the Comintern's Inter- 
nation Union of Revolutionary Writers. 

Even had Smedley not been professionally trained or skilled as an agent or 
associate of agents, her experiences in Shanghai with the police would have made 
her especially cautious in covering her tracks. Following is a digest of some of 
her experiences in this connection : 

"* * * I had been arrested by the Chinese police of Canton, acting upon 
a secret official document sen! them by the British police of Shanghai; the docu- 
ment had charged that I was a Russian Bolshevik, traveling on a false American 
passport. When the German consul general intervened, the chief of police 
showed him the document from Shanghai. The American consul general also 
saw it, but equivocated when I asked about it * * * For weeks I lived under 
house arrest, with armed gendarmes wandering in and out of my apartment at 
will. If I went out. they followed * * This Canton Incident was really 

the setting of Woodhead's attack on me. * * *" 

]'.K','2: Smedley and Isaacs with a group of leftist sympathizers were members 
of the first League of Civil Rights in Shanghai. This organization seems to have 
been a failure. Smedley also became n member of the Society of Friends of the 
F. S. S. R., Shanghai Branch, whose roster included such Comintern agents as 
Irene Wiedemeyer. Smedley also became very friendly with a British Commu- 
nist, C. Frank Class, a suspected Comintern agent. With the aid of Ozaki, Smed- 
ley set up a spy ring' in Peiping and Tientsin and put Kawai Teikichi in charge. 
This northern espionage organisation operated until June 1.933. She also en- 
rolled Funakoshi Ilisao and met Xo/.awa Fusaji in the Shanghai ring. 

1933: In failing health, she went to the Soviet Union, where she was at the 
Workers' Rest Center at Kislovodsk, in the Caucasus, a concession not usually 
granted to foreigners. She mentions close associations with Soviet and American 
Communists. It was here that she wrote her hook China's Red Army Marches. 
It seems unlikely that she could have ever gotten the manuscript out of the coun- 
try if it had not had official Soviet approval. Her previous hooks had been 
translated into Russian anil were widely circulated. Smedley remained in the 
F. S. S. R. for 11 months. She again met Chattopadhyaya in Leningrad, where he 
was connected with the Communist Academy of Sciences. At this time. Smedley 
Served on the staff of the Intel-national Union of Revolutionary Writers, which 
had been founded some years earlier in Moscow. Whittaker Chambers bad been 
on the organization's staff in 1933. 

l!t.",4 : Traveled through Central Europe and France and then returned to 
New York, where she unsuccessfully sought a correspondent's berth with an 
American publication. After visiting her family in the United States, she sailed 
for china. Her ship, the President Cleveland, stopped for a day (October 19) at 
Yokohama. She called on Ozaki at the Tokyo Asahi newspaper offices. He 
took her to see the Imperial Museum and dined with her. This was the period 
of Sorge's active operations in Tokyo. 

F>.">r>: Smedley was back in Shanghai. Her name appeared on a list of 12 
persons under Shanghai police surveillance. Amongst other incriminatory 
documents, the list was found in the possession of Joseph Walden (alias Max- 
im Rivosh), who was later sentenced to 15 years in prison for subversive 
activities. 

1936: In the fall, Smedley went to Sian, and was there when Chiang Kai-shek 
was kidnaped. Apparently it was here that she made arrangements for her 
later trip through Chinese Communist territory. 

1937: In August, she went to the Chinese Communist capital, Yenan, where 
she rapidly gained the confidence of top Red army leaders. Thereafter, Smed- 
ley gives every personal, intellectual, and literary evidence of supporting their 



1222 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

cause without reservation. She then went through Sanyuan to Sian, where 
she was treated for a back injury. In October she was in Taiyuan, where she 
met Chou En-lai. By late October Smedley was with the mobile headquarters 
of the Communist Eighth Route Army. It was there that she became friendly 
with Communist army leaders, Chu Teh and Peng Teh-hwei. She spent early 
November with units of Lin Pao's First Front Army of the "workers' and peas- 
ants' Red army from Kiangsi," a unit of the Eighth Route Army. Later in the 
month Smedley returned to Chinese Communist headquarters. At the end of 
November she was in Pingyanfu with fighting units. After another stay at 
Communist headquarters, she started back to Hankow just after the end of the 
year. 

1938 : During the early part of the year Smedley was in Tungkwan. Then at 
the request of Mao Tze-tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party, she went 
to Hankow to continue her work for the Communist cause. Here she did pub- 
licity for the Chinese Red Cross, lectured and wrote urging support for the 
Communist armies. She left the city before it fell to the Japanese (October 25) 
and started toward Chungking. 

1939: Smedley visited units of the Communist New Fourth Army and made 
her way through Central China with various Communist guerrilla groups. She 
also visited certain Central Government units and finally rejoined the Communist 
irregulars in Hupeh Province toward the end of the year. 

1940 : In June she made her way to Chungking, where she lectured and worked 
for increased medical aid for the Communists. 

1941 : Flew to Hongkong, where she was treated for chronic illness and con- 
tinued active in collaboration with leftist and Communist elements. She returned 
to the United States in midsummer. 

1943: Smedley spent considerable time at Taddo, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., a 
retreat for artists and writers. She left to lecture at Skidmore College. 

1944 : Smedley was working on a play about China and had in mind a revolu- 
tionary novel on the same subject. 

1945_47 : Lectured and wrote for periodicals, many of which were leftist. Dur- 
ing this period she became active in the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern 
Policy, a Communist-front organization. Smedley became a member of the 
National Council of the League of American Writers, an affiliate of tbe Interna- 
tional Union of Revolutionary Writers. The league has been branded a Com- 
munist-front organization by the congressional Committee on Un-American; 
Activities and by the Attorney General's office. 

1948: Moved to Palisades, N. Y. She published articles on China in the leftist 
New York Star. Smedley was one of the supporters of the National Writers-for~ 
Wallace Committee formed under the auspices of the National Council of Arts,. 
Sciences and Professions. Smedley also published an article in The Protestant,, 
which is listed by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a Com- 
munist-dominated publication. 

1949: Embroiled in a controversy with the Chief, Military Intelligence, Far 
East Command, Tokyo, over release (by Washington) of a report, dated Decem- 
ber 15, 1947, "The Sorge Espionage Case," she threatened to sue tor libel, aim- 
ing at General MacArthur instead of General Willoughby, who was the respon- 
sible head of the department that compiled and prepared the report. Having 
gained the maximum amount of publicity from tying her name with that of 
the famous wartime commander, Smedley lapsed into discreet silence and made 
no motion to pursue her suit which would have brought to light the voluminous 
records of this case. 

The Communist press, the world over, took up the case of Agnes Smedley. Her 
protest against the Army release appeared in the China Digest, March 194'.». a 
mouthpiece for Chinese communism, published in Hongkong. At a distance of 
10,000 miles, another Communist-front magazine, the Far East Spotlight, pub- 
lished in New York City, took up her cause on practically the same date. This 
perfect timing over vast geographical distances is an impressive example of 
split-second coordination of international communism. The propaganda efforts 
of the vacillating western democracies can hardly match this deadly precision. 
Inferentially, the solidarity of the Communist front in defense of Smedley speaks 
for itself. 
Smedley's Red and pink associations 

Not even a casual reader of Smedley's writings could fail to notice that she 
carefully omits reference to all of her Communist, fellow-traveling, and/or leftist 
associates whose work might be damaged by such publicity. Smedley did not 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1223 

fully realize, however, despite her overt and covert attempts to protect her 
friends and associates, thai the "Red net" in China was closely observed and 
the actions of many of its agents recorded by a number of intelligence, police, 
aud other agencies, particularly the special branch of the Shanghai municipal 
police; thai such tracks as Bhe did uol cover furnished interesting lends into 
the maze of Communisl operations in China which lii neatly into an unmistak- 
able pattern. The following list of Smedley's associates can hardly be explained 
away on the basis of purely journalistic contacts. For convenience, names are 
grouped chronologically according to the approximate period during which 
Smedley was associated, in varying degrees. 

1920 28, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya : Indian revolutionary and one of the 
founders of the League Against Imperialism, a Communist organization. Smed- 
ley herself Leaves no doubt about the personal quality of their relationship. 

1929-31, Max Klausen: Active member of the Sorge spy organizations both in 
Japan and China. 

19.'!0, Richard Sorge: Communist master spy who headed an intricate espio- 
nage oganization in China and later operated an immensely successful spy ring 
in Japan. Smedley worked as an active member of his organization in China. 

Ozaki Hozumi: Sorge's principal assistant and source of much information 
both in China and Japan. In Shanghai, Ozaki often reported to Smedley rather 
than Sorge. 

1030-36, Lu Hsun: Leftist writer, called "Gorky of China." 

1930, Mao Tun : Leftist writer, pupil of Lu Hsun. Jou Shih, pupil of Lu 
Hsun. executed as a Communist. 

L931, Willi Muenzenberg : German Communist leader who organized the 
Noulens Defense Committee. 

Harold Isaacs : Publisher of the China Forum in Shanghai. He was associated 
with Smedley on the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends 
of the U. S. S. R. 

C. Frank Glass: British Communist. 

Irene Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) : Prominent Comintern agent who was the 
proprietor of the Zeitgeist Bookshop, which sold Communist literature. She 
was also a member of the Noulens Defense Committee. 

Paul and Gertrude Ruegg (alias Noulens) : Two Comintern agents who were 
apprehended, tried, and imprisoned by the Chinese authorities. Noulens was 
an official in the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat, then headed by Earl 
Browder, the American Communist. 

Oswald Doenitz : A Comintern agent who was in Shanghai briefly after the 
arrest of the Rueggs. 

Victor Franz Nauman : Who was associated with Comintern agent, Oswald 
Doenitz. 

Mizuno Shige : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai. 

Yamagami Masayoshi : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai. 

Kawai Teikichi : Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai, who was a fre- 
quent visitor to Smedley's home. 

Funakoshi Hisao: Member of the Sorge spy ring in Shanghai briefly after 
the arrest of the Rueggs. 

1032, Edmond Egon Kisch : Agent of the Third International and organizer 
of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R. 

Henri Barhusse: A member of the Comintern and publisher of the Communist 
journals L'Humanite and Le Monde. 

Rolf Audouard : An associate of Edmond Egon Kisch. 

K. A. Seebohm : Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., known 
to have been in close touch with Edmond Egon Kisch. 

Victor Mussik : Czechoslovakia!] journalist, a close associate of Edmond Egon 
Kisch. 

Harry Berger : alias Arthur Ewert. Arthur Ernst Ewert, Braun (Brown). 
George Keller, Ulrich Dach and Arthur Korner, an important agent for the Third 
International in the Far East. 

1933-34. Rudolf Herman Richard Konig: Associate of Paul Eugene Walsh 
(Eugene Dennis). He acted as liaison agent for the Comintern Shanghai. 

Fred Ellis: Staff artist for the Soviet newspaper Trud (Toil). He was also 
on the staff of the International Union of Revolutionary Writers with Smedley. 

Harry Pavton Howard, alias Ivan Kuzlof, alias Frank Godwin: Communist 
reported to be an agent of the Third International. 

Langston Hughes : American Communist and staff member of the International 
League of Revolutionary Writers. 



1224 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Kawamnra Yoshio : member of the spy group organized by Smedley and Ozaki 
Hozumi in Peiping. 

Nozawa Fusaji : In contact with members of Richard Sorge's Shanghai spy 
group ; was recruited by Funakoshi Hisao. 

F. H. Schiff : Member of the Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R., and a close 
associate of Edmond Egon Kisch. 

1933-38, Ting Ling : Communist writer. 

1933, Chou Chien-ping : Commander of the Tenth Red Army Corps who lived 
for a time in Smedley's home in Shanghai. 

1934-35, Leon Minster : Operator a radio-equipment business in Shanghai, 
cited in police records as a blind for a long-distance transmitting installation. 
His wife, Bessie, is the sister of "Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Politburo member. 

1937-38, Chu Teh : Commander in chief of the Chinese Communist forces. 

Mao Tze-tung: Secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party. 

Peng Teh-hwei : Commander of the Front Red armies. 

Chou En-lai : Vice chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council and chief 
representative of the Chinese Communist Party in the United Front negotiations 
with the Chinese Government. 

Jen Peh-si : Political commissar of the Eighth Communist Route Army. 

Ting Hsiao-ping : Assistant to Jen Peh-si. 

Kwang Keh-chin : Wife of Chu Teh and political worker with the Eighth Route 
Army. 

Lin Piao : Commander of the First Division, Eighth Communist Route Army. 

Nieh Jung-chen : Political director of Lin Piao's division. 

Ho Lung : Commander of the Second Red Army Corps. 

Liu Peh-cheng : Commander of the One Hundred Twenty-ninth Division of the 
Eighth Route Army. 

Hsiao Keh : Political director of Second Red Army Corps. 

Tso Chuan : Commander of the First Red Army Corps. 

Chen Ken : Commander in Eighth Communist Route Army. 

Chou Ping : Leader of the Communist guerrilla unit. 

Mr. Walter. General Willougliby, when was the authentication 
of the Sorge story completed \ 

General Willoughby. Mr. Walter, do you refer to the authentica- 
tion by a battery of competent American lawyers and other technical 
assistants? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

General Willougiiby. It was done after the period in which 
Smedley's suit for libel would at least, if unchallenged, throw doubt 
in the public mind on the quality of this testimony. It was done — 
Mr. Tavenner, can you help ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Offhand I am not able to state the date. 

General Willougiiby. I think I can find the date. The date is 
available. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think it appeared in connection with your testi- 
mony when vou read the statement by the lawyers. 

General Willougiiby. May 18, 1949. Consecutive exhibit No. 14 
is the opinion of the Legal Section, Far East Command, opinion of 
the judge advocate general. Far East Command, and related matter, 
and I think the three gentlemen of the bar, my benevolent collaborators 
at the time in this same time period. 

Mr. Walter. When did the Ickes article appear that you just read \ 

General Willougiiby. I can find that for you, sir, though I did 
not find it necessary, as a literary gem, to keep it in my library. 

Mr. Walter. I was wondering if it was before or after the authen- 
tication. 

General Willougiiby. I have a photo offset of it. I must have been 
considerably annoyed, because I certainly would not keep it now. 
March 16, i949. That is one, the one entitled "Army Tricks Cover 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1225 

General's Mistakes." Then there are others, "Old Curmudgeon 
Thinks MacArthur Should Be Sued,-' and "Some Brass in Rather 
Than on Army Heads." 

Mr. Tayennhr. You mentioned all this criticism in your report 
to the staff I 

General Willoughby. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. AValter. It sounds like some of it might have been said by 
some « > i* your junior officers? 

Genera] WiujOughby, Quite possibly; quite possibly. 

Mr. Tavennee. Genera] Willoughly, t ho references to the Shanghai 
police cards referred to before are based on the Shanghai police records 
which are in the possession of the committee, and have been produced 
for identification as Willoughby exhibits 35 and 36. Will you assist 
us in the appraisal of these files and their relationship to the Sorge 
ease, if yon feel you have not already adequately covered the point? 

General Willofoiiby. Being very anxious to assist this meritorious 
committee at all times, I might give you my notes under exhibit 34, 
which give you a glimpse of the genesis of the Shanghai files, as 
follows : 

AMERICANS CNDER SURVKII.ANCE IN SHANGHAI 

Communist subversive activities in China drew the attention of Shanghai 
municipal police (British and French division) in 1916. Police raids over a 
Ui-year period resulted in confiscation of tons of subversive literature and in 
I he arrest el' many Communist agents. Until 1926 these agents were principally 
Russian and Chinese with a smattering of German, Spanish, and French nation- 
als involved. 

In 1927 Americans entered the subversive picture. Earl Browder, Gerhardt 
Fisler, James H. Dolsen, W. A. Haskell, M. Undjus, and a German woman, Irene 
Wiedemeyer, along with many others, arrived in Shanghai in the late 1920's to 
join the Soviet's Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) or the Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Secretariat (PPTUS). The German woman, Irene Wiedemeyer, was closely 
associated with Smedley. Sorge, and Ozaki in the Zietgeist Bookstore operation, 
a mail drop and rendezvous of Sorge spy ring members, agents and leftist fellow 
travelers. 

******* 

\Ut^ again, the pattern of Soviet Third International action is apparent. 

Working through trade unions, bureaus and other professional or labor-con- 
nected fronts, the Soviet wedge again drove smoothly into the economic and 
local government systems of the Chinese Nation. The objective, of course, was 
the ultimate destruction of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Far-sighted, 
insidious and viciously efficient, its success was evident in the Chinese debacle 
of 1949. Another nation and 500. million people entered the Soviet orbit. 

This is the information contained in collateral reports known as 
the Shanghai municipal police file. For your information, Shanghai 
was an extraterritorial enclave which maintained its own police and. 
had French and British police in the French and British municipali- 
ties. These were high official police officers, and I had made it a point 
of having interviewed the past high-ranking officials of that police 
where they were available, with the assistance of their governments, 
as, for example, the former chief of the British political section who 
is in Hongkong. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Will you give the committee the benefit of your 
compilation so far as we are prepared to make it public at this time? 

General Willoughby. I am prepared to read selective points — 
though the full text is available to the committee — or salient points 
to show the international character of this apparatus or mechanism 

90929— 51 7 



1226 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

or machinery that was working toward the downfall of the Chinese- 
Nationalist Government, as a sample or pattern of how they operate- 
elsewhere. 

Mr. Doyle. And when you say "elsewhere" do you include the 
United States? 

General Willotjghby. I include the United States, because we have 
already developed the presence of operatives then in Shanghai still 
in our midst — Earl Browder, Eugene Dennis, Gerhart Eisler, Jim 
Dolsen — in this interplay between the counsel and myself, where I 
furnished the oriental information and the committee had in its pos- 
session, to my pleasant surprise, some very specific collateral data. 

Mr. Wood. Proceed. 

General Willoughby (reading) : 

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police 
in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Com- 
munist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the 
Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the ground- 
work was laid for the Communist successes of today. 

******* 

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue, 
a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the 
Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of 
Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer, appear again, viewed 
from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable international police 
body. 

******* 

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accusa- 
tion against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the 
history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here 
were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and 
the farm labor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no 
personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien 
cause, the Communist "jehad" of pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the Western 
World. 

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the east is already clear in the 
confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate 
pattern of the Third International apparatus. Shanghai was the focal point 
of sabotage and subversion, and to this mecca flocked the Communist operators 
of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments. 

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third Inter- 
national and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United 
Slates of America) ; Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of 
others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would 
be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl 
Browder was made secretary (or chief). He soon afterward became active in 
this work in which he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, con- 
sidered by the police as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his 
female assistant continued their work in the following year (1928) and spent 
most of (heir time in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one 
W. A. Haskell who also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably 
his wife. 

Time in its issue of April 25, 1949, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the 
American Communists, now on trial. 

The language, of course, is a year old. The trial is past. 

There is no point in repeating this terse, well-written story of the growth and 
world itinerary of a Soviet agent: important, however, are certain connecting 
links with the Sorge espionage case. 

Dennis who used to Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport as 
Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world-wide 
ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the far-eastern operat- 
ing center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul Eugene- 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1227 

Walsh, alias Paul or Milton, suddenly appears in the records of the Shanghai 
police ; his police card states : 

••• * * From December 1, l93o, untilJune 1934, he resided at Flat 6, Grosh- 
am Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue Joffre. ( >n .May SO, 1934, the lease of Flat 34D, 
Foncim Apartments No. 643 Route Frelupt, was transferred to his name from 
Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friendship. Walsh 
resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9. 1934, when he 
secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the steamship Contc Verde." 

This is the important abbreviated statement by the police : 

It has been established that Walsh was one of the master minds of the local 
machine of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many 
Important documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far 
East * * *. 

I pause here to establish the link in this police investigation. Sorge 
mentioned the Comintern group in Shanghai. This we pick up as 
the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat since Noulens was arrested. 
Obviously this man Walsh, or Eugene Dennis, and his subsequent con- 
nection with Browder, establishes the strongest inference that he was 
associated with him then. 

Further relationship between what we have established in the Sorge 
records is covered in paragraph 24. Incidentally, I took the title "The 
Shadowy Men With Changeable Names," from the report of April 
24, 1949, on Walsh, which is a very good report, indeed (reading) : 

In 1930 a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai 
and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and another 
Important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau. 
The new arrivals included Hilaire Noulens — 

I invite your attention to that name, as it will appear later, N-o-u- 
1-e-n-s [continuing reading] : 

(or Paul Ruegg), and Mrs. Noulens, of unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, 
Margaret Undjus, and Judea Codkind, Americans, and Irene Wiedemeyer — 

Wiedemeyer spells her name sometimes W-i-e-t — 

who was German. 

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated the 
Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for espion- 
age agents. Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weit- 
meyer's place. 

I have already read Sorge's testimony and will not repeat it. [Con- 
tinuing reading :] 

The police card on Smedley states : 

" * * * Agnes Smedley alias Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * Member of 
the following societies : Friends of the U. S. S. R. ; Hindustan Association in 
Berlin ; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society ; Noulens Defense Committee ; All 
China Labor Federation and 'the China League for Civil Rights * * * In 
possession of two passports, German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in 
May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frank- 
furter Zeitung. She is in the service of the eastern branch of the central com- 
mittee of the Communist International and is definitely known to have assisted 
local Indian seditionists on several occasions * * * her chief duties comprise 
the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that she receives 
orders direct from the central committee of the Communist International in 
Moscow. * * *" 

The Shanghai police observed and recorded these furtive men and women, often 
without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative surveillance, 
but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, these names are 
tainted. 



1228 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

The case of Hilaire Noulens (known as) Paul Ruegg is both interesting and 
typical : The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, 
or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to 
rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency for this 
defense was The International Red Aid (hereafter referred to as MOPR, the 
initials of its Russian name), created in 1922, known as International Labor De- 
fense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into action it was 
a foregone conclusion' that the chief protagonists were under orders of the 
Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might look like a legiti- 
mate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal ; however, to 
the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, agents, 
and fellow travelers. 

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport 
as Fred Vandercruysen to head the far eastern bureau. Fifteen months later, 
he was arrested for Communist activities linked with a French Communist, 
Joseph Ducroux also known as Serge LeFranc, then operating in Singapore. 
During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in 
the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a very considerable scale ; 
they maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a veritable 
political rabbit warren ; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and 
carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 
Belgian passports. 

Here again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities. In a 
subparagraph headed "The Little Kremlin" it says — 

I thought it was so good that I included it. 

"* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States 
were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 
35 East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor 
offices came the Communists' international 'reps.' the shadowy men with the 
changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * 
which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or 
Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word 
which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party 
hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of 
organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *" 

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names 
like A. Ewert, H. Berger, A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, is that these same 
names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police 
files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United 
States — 

As we shall shortly develop. [Continuing reading :] 

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been 
operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clande- 
stine fraternity as well as the acolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the Red 
menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the furtive 
rendezvous of the Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle of 
30 pieces of silver. 

I would like to pause here, Mr. Chairman, to make one point clear of 
mutual interest. The reference to the Shanghai name cards, as far 
as Tokyo was concerned, did not represent an arraignment, not even 
an indictment. There are in the list of these names — and of course we 
are not disclosing all of them — there are undoubtedly a number (if 
people who were present by accidental association rather than by de- 
sign, and, as stated in my introductory remarks at the beginning of 
this hearing, a constant effort has been made to protect innocent peo- 
ple and gullible people, and to distinguish between the joiners who 
might not have realized the character of the organization to which they 
belonged. 

The quotations are not evaluations by G-2. They are the state- 
ments by this reputable investigative body. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1229 

Mr. Wood. I gather from your statement that you make a distinc- 
tion between a fool and a knave ? 

General Willougiiby. Yes, indeed. It is not a very flattering dis- 
tinction, but a protective one. [Continuing reading :] 

The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates — 

"Apparatus" is their own word. They seem to take pride in that 
pseudoscientific term. [Continuing reading:] 

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to 
the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understand- 
able only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship 
requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery 
of tiir Comintern apparatus. Machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of 
the Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czarist am- 
bition. In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where 
the Czars left off and made further and more significant strides. 

Comintern headquarters: The Moscow headquarters of the Third (Com- 
munist! International I Comintern I during the 1930's paralleled the organiza- 
tional structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet 
and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual 
control of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the 
world Communis! movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave 
the largest representation to the nation playing host to the Congress — in every 
case the Soviet Union. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested 
in the executive committee of the Communist international (ECCI), which 
advertised several foreign members but was actually controlled by its pre- 
dominant Soviet representation. Like the world congress, the ECCI met pe- 
riodically, primarily to determine general lines of policy, but final control of 
the Comintern rested in the praesidium, which was made up, among others, 
of a politburo, several standing Commissions, and a political secretariat — 

Iii the interest of time I will become selective. The material is here. 
[Continuing reading :] 

"The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organ- 
ized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 
1943, a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and 
Communist-front groups in the capitalist world in order to carry out such 
Communist strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential 
to the promotion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection 
of the Soviet Union. 

There are also a number of auxiliary organizations I invite your 
attention to : 

Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organizations are of immediate concern 
here, although all of them, numbering about 13, had variable interests in 
Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety of channels : 

Profintern: The Red International of Labor (Profintern) was created in 1919 
in order to counteract the influence of the International Federation of Labor 
Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The Profintern consisted of a 
headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sections 
which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade-union 
oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propaganda com- 
mittees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern sponsored 
the creation of parallel labor union federations of which the Pan Pacific Trade 
Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation were important 
examples. 

Krestintern: The Red peasants International (Krestintern) was founded in 
1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various coun- 
tries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the 
laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which organ- 
ized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League. 

VOKS : The Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (VOKS) 
was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad as an 
instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attache of each Soviet 



1230 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with 
liaison with the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called 
friendly societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of 
its headquarters : 

Foreign relations ; reception of foreigners ; international book exchange ; 
press ; exhibitions, etc. — 

I may say that personal observation of the embassy set-up in Tokyo 
recently revealed this trend. [Continuing reading:] 

MOPR: International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, has been character- 
ized as the Red Cross of the Communist International, designed primarily to 
assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other "victims 
of bourgeois reaction." International Red Aid, which functioned legally and 
illegally in 67 countries, was complemented by Workers International Relief, 
both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenberg. 
Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front 
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading 
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities. 

I pause here to establish the link. Gerhart Eisler was defended by 
an offshoot of International Red Aid. Noulens was defended by an 
offshoot of International Red Aid. And I previously called the 
committee's attention to a brilliant article in the Saturday Evening 
Post as of February 17, 1951, entitled "The Communist's Dearest 
Friend," by Craig Thompson. The lead picture shows Carol King 
escorting Gerhart Eisler, who later fled to Europe and became a 
high-ranking officer in Red Germany. This article traces Interna- 
tional Red Aid into American Labor Defense, into Civil Rights Con- 
gress and other organizations in which Carol Weiss King has taken an 
active part. 

Mr. Wood. I might interpose that she actually led him up the 
gangplank when he left the United States on the Batory. 

General Willoughby (continuing reading) : 

The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized in 1925, 
probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for the 
promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow 
the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow 
Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulga- 
tion of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Carmon, 
was an assistant editor of International Literature. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like the record to show that Walt Carmon 
was subpenaed before the committee in recent weeks and refused to 
testify relating to alleged Communist activities. 

General Willoughby. I take it with the usual phraseology, on 
advice of competent lawyer refused to testify on ground of fear 
of self-incrimination? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is right. 

General Willoughby (continuing reading) : 

Langston Hughes, the American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were 
contributors. Anna Louise Strong for years was editor of the Moscow Daily 
News, while another American, Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on 
the staff of Trud, the official organ of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade 
Unions. The printing of these foreign-language periodicals was done by the 
State Publishing House in cooperation with the International Book Publishing 
Association, both Soviet Government enterprises. 

I pause here to invite the attention of the committee to an offshoot 
of this International Union of Revolutionary Writers in the Ameri- 
can scenery, the League of American Writers; and it was in this 
connection that Mr. Lovett inquired from Mr. Ickes if he knew any- 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1231 

tiling about this outfit, and lie described it as completely Communist- 
dominated, as you recall, knowing, probably, that Smedley was on 
the staff. I believe she was chairman. So was Whittaker Chambers 
on the staff in that period. 

In order to further bring you the picture of what these associations 
really mean 

Mr. Walter. General, before you go into that, I would like to ask 
Mr. Tavenner, this Walt Cannon didn't testify before this com- 
mittee, did he ? 

Mr. Tavenner. He appeared before this committee, but declined 
to answer questions other than those of the most casual character. 

Mr. Walter. Is that the same Carmon ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir ; and the same one to whom Mr. Clubb took 
a letter of introduction allegedly from Agues Smedley in July 1942. 

Mr. Wood. It wasn't alleged, was it ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Alleged as to the character of the letter. There is 
no doubt that he took an envelope with a letter in it. 

Mr. Doyle. That was where the question was, of whether it was 
sealed or unsealed ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

General Willoughby. I would cite the Second Report, Un- 
American Activities in California, 1945, Report of the Joint Fact- 
Finding Committee to the Fifty-sixth California Legislature, pages 
119-120. 

I have had occasion to refer to the California State Un-American 
Activities Committee, a brilliant example of what a State legisla- 
ture can accomplish under the able direction of Senator Jack Tenney. 
Their reports are a must in the research library of investigative bodies. 

In the report just cited, Langston Hughes is reported. Indicative 
of the character and membership of the International Union of Revo- 
lutionary Writers and its American offshoot, the League of American 
Writers, note the poem by Langston Hughes published in Literary 
Service, the monthly organ of IURW I won't bore you with the 
entire poem. Its title is "Good-by Christ" and it begins : 

Listen, Christ, 

You did alright in your day, I reckon — 

But that day's gone now. 

They ghosted you up a swell story too, 

Called it Bible— 

But it's dead now. 

The popes and the preachers've 

Made too much money from it. 

It is hardly worth while to take the time of the committee to read the 
rest of it. 

Mr. Doyle. On page 5 of your statement, under paragraph (4) — I 
think you read that paragraph ? 

General Willoughby. MOPR or IURW? 

Mr. Doyle. MOPR. In the last sentence you say : 

Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front 
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading 
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities. 

General Willoughby. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Doyle. Because you were in the Far East so many years, I 
would like to ask you, what kind of subversive activities would cause 



1232 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

the arrest, say in China, of Communists ? What would they do which 
would cause their arrest? What would be the evidence of their 
activities ? 

General Willoughby. That is an interesting question. To answer 
it, I would have to practically read an endless array of the material 
in the hands of your counsel. I will give you a brief of what they do : 
Public disturbances; public disorders; strikes; tie-ups of maritime 
and coastal traffic; aspersion of opposing or competing political 
organizations; disorder; subversions, political, fraternal, collective; 
the distribution of literature abhorrent to the existing government. 

It is this cumulative picture which emerges from any study of their 
operations abroad. This, roughly, is the definition. 

Mr. Doyle. Then they would be arrested in China, in those days, 
the same as they might be in this country ? 

General Willoughby. Indeed. 

Mr. Doyle. And for the same causes ? 

General Willoughby. For the same causes. As an example, the 
police files of Shanghai are those of a highly organized political entity 
maintaining conservative business houses and an extraterritorial en- 
clave. But their purpose was the same as any other, and it is this 
police upon whom I relied for the identification of subversives much 
more than the Chinese themselves. 

We are not talking about the Chinese police, only incidentally. We 
are talking about a reputable police of prewar vintage composed of a 
French section and a British section, known as the international 
municipal police body. So their reactions, to me, viewed at this dis- 
tance, are those of a law-enforcing agency maintained for the protec- 
tion of the county or city in which they operate. 

Mr. Walter. Isn't it important to take into consideration also that 
the Nationalist Government was very sensitive to the things that were 
happening, and there were probably more arrests than was the case 
before the Nationalist Government was aware of what was going on? 

General Willoughby. Your point is well taken. I do not attempt 
to disassociate the government at Shanghai and the Nationalist Gov- 
ernment. They both worked against Soviet communism, not just 
communism. 

In paragraph 26 I touch upon the types of Chinese organizations 
and Communist fronts. The indication is that the same thing hap- 
pened in Czechoslovakia and Poland and Bulgaria. I describe them 
thusly : 

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to- 
lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of 
forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented 
abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright 
Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated 
by Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be 
traced to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different 
fields of the Soviet Praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or 
local movements designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate 
aim; just as often, howver, they were serious long-term projects. As these 
groups touched the Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence 
there, they form an interesting and often highly interconnected web which 
requires relatively detailed treatment. 

The first one, given this priority because of its intrinsic importance 
is the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and its parent organization, 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1233 

the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau. [Continuing 
reading:] 

The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its parent organiza- 
tion, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern I'.ureau, were the most Important 
and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the Far East 
during the late 1920's and early 1930'S. The PPTUS, set up in i927 at a con- 
ference in Hankow, was attendind by several prominent Comintern leaders, 
including Lozovsky, a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Proiintern 
in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. Another 
member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the PPTUS 
was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisited in his work in 
Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Americans, in- 
cluding a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and Margaret 
Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the German woman 
Wiedemeyer. 

Wiedemeyer is the same person whose house was a mail drop and 
rendezvous for the Sorge ring. [Continuing reading:] 

Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shanghai police of having come 
on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shanghai in 1930. 

Mr. Walter. General, may I interrupt you at this point? 

General Willoughby. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Did you ever make an investigation, or was any made 
that you know of, of the files of the Shanghai police force for the 
purpose of determining whether or not they contained the names of 
members of the PPTUS? 

General Willoughby. We took what we found, belatedly. The 
files were not complete but, roughly, GO to 80 percent in some cate- 
gories. This is not an apology for not having it, but actually the Far 
East Command is limited to Japan and the outlying islands. Where 
we were able without unusual exertions, we would either call on a 
sister intelligence agency to do something or grab it while grabbing 
was good. 

On the whole, if we are able to pick up some prominent persons like 
Browder, Eugene Dennis, Dolsen, I think you have made substantial 
progress in tracing a pattern so that it will be picked up again when it 
makes its appearance. This is not a punitive enterprise for ultimate 
arrests, but rather a historical enterprise for educational purposes. 

While your mind is on the PPTUS and Earl Browder, I would like 
\o call your attention to the remarks of one of your colleagues, the 
Honorable Walter H. Judd, of Minnesota, made in the House of 
Representatives on Tuesday, July 18, 1950: 

* * * The Daily Worker, September 7, 1937, reproduced three letters ad- 
dressed to Earl Browder, who was then the head of the Communist Party of 
America: one was from MaoVTse Tung, who signed himself as president of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic: one from Chu-Teh, leader of the Chinese Red army, 
and one from Chou-En-Lai, now prime minister of the Communist regime in 
China. Chou-En-Lai began his letter to Browder: " * * * Comrade, do you 
still remember the Chinese who worked with you in China 10 years ago? We 
feel that when we achieve victory in China, this will be of considerable help to 
the struggle of the American people for liberation * * *." 

Then Mr. Judd asks : 

What had Earl Browder been doing in China in 1927? He was there with 
other leaders of the Communist hierarchy from all over the world to help the 
Reds seize complete control of China, as the Bolsheviks had done in Russia in 
the October revolution, just 10 years before. Chiang Kai-shek in China was 
scheduled to be what Kerensky had been in Russia — an interim leader to be 
overthrown by the Reds as soon as he had defeated the war lords. 



1234 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Here, Mr. Doyle, is your purpose, your plan, your fraternal rela- 
tionship. The Shanghai police files fully confirm Mr. Judd's views. 
American Commies, in fraternal correspondence with Chinese Com- 
mies — who are now fighting the United States in North Korea. It 
is these considerations that make these old files so alive today. 

Mr. Doyle. I was directing my question to you because of the assign- 
ment this committee has. I call your attention, if you haven't had 
an opportunity to read it recently, to the assignment this committee 
has. We are assigned to make investigations of — 

(1) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in 
the United States; (2) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and 
un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a do- 
mestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of Government as guaranteed 
by our Constitution. 

That is why I directed the question to you. I, as a member of the 
committee, am interested in getting into the record as much positive 
evidence as there is of the actual existence of a world-wide conspiracy 
to overthrow not only our constitutional form of Government, but 
the constitutional governments of all free peoples. That is the point 
of my question to you. 

General Willoughby. The point is well taken, Mr. Doyle. 

Mr. Doyle. I feel it very important that the world-wide knowl- 
edge of men like yourself, who got first-hand the conditions in other 
parts of the world, be given to us as proof, if you have it. 

General Willoughby. Your point is weli taken, and I trust that 
I have been able to contribute something to the committee by per- 
haps not tracing the entire picture in its detailed ramifications, but 
building a brief on the basis of which your research staff may pro- 
ceed with its investigations. 

Mr. Doyle. I am sure you are being very helpful. A few weeks 
ago we had an undercover FBI agent who testified before us, who 
was a member of a Communist cell in Massachusetts. He heard dis- 
cussions in the cell of means by which arms might be obtained. 

I wanted to ask you very briefly, do you believe and feel, from your 
own personal knowledge, that that is the sort of revolution that is 
aimed at our Nation if and when the time comes, and under what 
conditions could that come in this country, a revolution with the use 
of arms? What conditions could bring that about? Is it possible 
the international conspiracy could ever bring about such a hellish 
thing? 

General Willoughby. Yes, Mr. Doyle, I firmly believe that there 
is an international conspiracy; that there is a mechanism for its ac- 
complishment; that these perhaps fragmentary disclosures here are 
the early glimpses of the framework of the conspiracy. We have seen 
nation after nation fall in the past 5 years. I call your attention to 
Czechoslovakia, which fell through this type of intrigue. There is 
no doubt that the economic conditions following a defeat in war — 
unemployment and al] other social tensions — furnish the soil in which 
this type of thing grows rapidly. Fortunately, the United States 
is not in that condition. But they try. The perversion is in full 
swing. We are fortunate that it has not taken hold here as it has else- 
where. 

Mr. Wood. Wouldn't we be very foolish to assume that the efforts 
are going to be relaxed ? 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1235 

General Willoughby. Yes, indeed. This committee is the watch- 
dog duly appointed by Congress to recognize well in advance the 
trends, and I believe yon have done a very good job. Here I come 
from the Orient with certain information, and find the committee 
lias collateral, dovetailing information in the United States. I was 
very much impressed with this in the course of this presentation. 

Mr. DoyIiE. That should be pretty clear evidence of a proficient 
staff with an objective view of the whole thing. 

General Willoughby. Indeed. You have heard me make compli- 
mentary remarks toward the California State Legislature. Of course, 
this committee is not only in a better position but its work has been 
much more far reaching from the standpoint of public knowledge 
than that of a State legislature. 

Mr. Doyle. I would like to ask you this question right at this point: 
Is there anything this committee should do, in your judgment, that 
it is not doing? For instance, part of our assignment is we are charged 
with recommending to Congress any necessary remedial legislation. 
Will you bear that in mind and tell us what, in your judgment, this 
committee should recommend in the way of remedial legislation. In 
other words, I have frequently asked the question, Should the Com- 
munist Party be outlawed? 

General Willoughby. Your question is well taken; and, while it is 
presumptuous of me to advise the committee, I shall take this oppor- 
tunity of making the following recommendations against the following 
back-ground: 

Japan is a nation of 80 million people. My section was charged with 
the organization in Japan of an organization something like the FBI. 
So, I am aware of the problems from the standpoint of density of popu- 
lation. 

I had intended making those recommendations, by agreement with. 
counsel, at the end of the session, but this is as good a place as any. 

Mr. Doyle. Then I will withdraw my question at this time. 

General Willoughby. "Withdraw" means it will be cheerfully com- 
plied with at a later time. 

Mr. Wood. You will not withdraw it, but withhold it. 

Mr. Doyle. Yes. 

General Whloughby. I have recommendations, and will present 
them with apologies, feeling I see eye to eye with this committee. 

Mr. Doyle. I was fearful, because I was not here yesterday, that 
point was not raised. I am on the Armed Services Committee also, 
and I was there all da}* yesterday ; so I couldn't be here. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, I am aware of the fact you 
are anxious to complete your testimony today if possible. 

General Willoughby. Not necessarily, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. There are several sections of this document which 
I am very anxious for you to read into the record. We can then intro- 
duce the rest without reading it, if that is agreeable to you. 

General Willoughby. I am entirely in your hands, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. May I suggest you discuss the Xoulens Defense 
Committee, appearing under paragraph b on page 7, and on the next 
page the Friends of China section, entitled "d". If you will do that 
first, we will then desire to ask you other questions. 

General Willoughby. You have selected the Noulens case. I con- 
sider it completely analogous to the legal assistance given Gerhart 



1236 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Eisler. The defense was simply given in two different cases. Eisler 
skipped Shanghai, or he would have been in the same fix as Noulens. 

Sorge describes the Comintern group. He mentions two subdi- 
visions. One was in charge of Eisler and one in charge of Noulens. 
Noulens was caught ; and Eisler, as soon as the heat was put on, van- 
ished. 

We say, speaking of the Noulens Defense Committee : 

International Red Aid (MOPR), as stated, has taken various forms abroad. 
In Shanghai MOPR played its most spectacular role during the early 1930's in 
the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg, alias Hilaire Noulens, alias 
Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruyssen, and a host of other names. 
When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 1931, the International 
Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg, German Communist 
wheel-horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organizers of both Com- 
munist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as the Noulens 
Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs and boast- 
ing among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (or Weitemeyer) and 
Mine. Sun Yet-sen ; the group continued efforts to free these Comintern agents 
for several years after they were finally sentenced. 

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herssens, and 
had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had pre- 
viously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian 
protection was disapproved, and the couple was handed over to the Chinese au- 
thorities for prosecution as Communist agents. 

The League Against Imperialism and other Comintern groups protested that 
Noulens, as he was then known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS. 

That is the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat in which Browder 
took a leading part in its formation — 

possibly a more easily defensible position than his actual post as leader of the 
FEB. Later in 1931 a collateral English defense group, apparently inadvent- 
ly, referred to him as "Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul 
Ruegg was an active Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier 
in Switzerland and had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone 
to Moscow in 1924. After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international 
committee adopted his real name for their "Committee for the Defense of Paul 
and Gertrude Ruegg." The committee attracted or solicited known Gommu- 
ists, incidental sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion 
Feuchtwanger and Albert Einstein as German members of the committee — 

probably without their permission — 

and several sentimental Americans then at the height of their fame, including 
Floyd Dell, Sinclair Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald 
Garrison Villard. 

Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and 
imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when 
Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have 
since disappeared. Ruegg is reported to have entered the United States in 1939 
as Naum Katzenberg and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai in 
1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941. 

You have a similar case in the movements of Guenther Stein, (Tiien- 
ther Stein was associated with Sorge. He disappeared. Suddenly 
he appears in France. He was arrested by the French police, who 
advised me of that fact. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is a very strong argument for continual watch- 
fulness to follow up these people to see where they are and what they 
are doing and what part they are taking in communism today. 

General Willoughby. Your point is extremely well taken. Mr. 
Counsel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now will you turn to section d. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1237 

General Willoughby. Yes. You have Friends of Communist Russia 
in the States. You have Friends of Communist China, also. Here is 
Friends of China. [Reading :] 

Outside the original range of the friendly societies, but similar to foreign 

cultural groups for the support of countries presently within the Soviet orbit, 
the International Friends of China was a front organization which capitalized on 
western sympathy for China and its defense against Japanese aggression, in order 
to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. Like individual fellow- 
travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with offices in New York, 
London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resistance to the Chinese Com- 
munists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to support of one party in 
China. 

Here you have a glimpse of the political purposes of some of these 
movement s. The Chinese Communists claimed for a long time to have 
fought Russian communism. They did nothing of the kind. Actually, 
to my knowledge, the Chinese Communist commanders in western 
China had a tacit agreement with the Japanese to allow free passage 
into Hankow. [Continuing reading :] 

Although its stated aims were lofty, the society tipped its hand when it claimed 
to have "done much to expose the collaboration of Chiang Kai-shek with the 
Japanese, British and American imperialists." 

We are now getting into language similar to that of the New York 
Spotlight. [Continuing reading:] 

Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, 
European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labour Party's 
chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long 
known for his interest in China, as well as Edmond Egon Kisch, classified as an 
active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York branch, 
the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its membership, 
was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front American League 
Against War and Fascism, the American Friends of China published its own 
monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. The American 
group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, Voice of China, 
published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper published from March 1036 
until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist publication, 
portrayed the Chinese Communist as the only defenders of China's independence 
and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed after more than 
18 months of existence and the Graniches returned to the United States 
December 21, 1937. 

One could go on and on with the description of similar fronts. 
They all have their ancillaries in foreign countries, including the 
United States. 

Mr. Tavenner. The pattern as you have shown it in China is very 
similar to that we have found in the United States with reference to 
the use of book clubs. ^ 

General Willoughby. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have a paragraph on that subject ? 

General Willoughby. Yes, indeed. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think it would be well for you to give us that at 
this time. 

General Willoughby. The Attorney General, I see from reading 
the newspapers, has gone about a very laudable job, to classify certain 
organizations as Communist fronts. I suppose the committee had a 
hand in that. You have done a good job. 

You find a number of book stores, Washington Book Shop, Cin- 
cinnati, and so forth. They are scattered from the east coast to the 



1238 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

west coast. You find these book shops 15 or 20 years ago. This is 
paragraph g, entitled "Zeitgeist Bookstore" : 

The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) 
in November 1930, was part of a widespread and elaborate Comintern network 
operating from the International Union of Revolutionary Writers in Moscow. 

You have had the quotation by our pal Langston Hughes which I 
threw into the arena. [Continuing reading :] 

Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist Buchhandlung in Berlin, with a 
branch office of its own in Moscow, was an important Comintern cultural outlet, 
part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzenberg, who was also German head 
of the League Against Imperialism, of the Comintern's own bank in Paris, the 
Banque Commerciale Pour l'Europe du Nord, and a vast number of other Com- 
intern organizations and enterprises until he was read out of the Comintern 
in 1938, 2 years before his suicide. The Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Book- 
store was set as a focal distribution point of the International Union of Revolu- 
tionary Writers, stocking Communist publications in German and English as 
well as more legitimate literature, mainly in German. The amount of business 
transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore was small and the shop closed in 1933, 
ostensibly due to its poor finances. A more likely reason was the destruction of 
the legalized German Communist Party since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn 
of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned to Shanghai on September 9, 1934, to set 
herself up in the book business again, this time as the Shanghai representative 
of International Publishers, of New York. The latter organization has long been 
the publishers of American Communist Party writings and the American distribu- 
tor of international literature. 

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, 
another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for interna- 
tional literature. Mrs. V. N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the Shang- 
hai agency of Tass, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which sold inter- 
national literature ; it is significant, however, that the American Book & Supply 
Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same building at 410 
Szechuan Road. 

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International 
although there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had 
married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 1925 and had studied 
the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen University 
in Moscow in 192G-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well and was a 
member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends of the 
U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932, were reported to 
have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent 
for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of 
the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and 
Colonial Oppression of Canada. In any event the particular role of the leftist 
book shop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous of 
espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) Zeit- 
geist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge trial records. Ozaki, Sorge's 
right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's book shop, ren- 
dezvous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. Later on, during 
his imprisonment in Sugamo, he (Ozaki) wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943: 

" * * * I might say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes 
Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent 
decision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with 
them * * *." 

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth 
Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army — but the narrow road led to Ozaki's 
gallows. 

This is as good a description of the character, purposes and oper- 
ational quality of the so-called bookstores as outlets for Communist 
printed matter as I can give. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the document prepared by Gen- 
eral Willoughby from which he has been reading, and ask that it be 
marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 41." 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1239 

General Willoughby. May I amplify this, Mr. Counsel? There 
are footnote references which are not shown in the mimeographed 
copy. There is not a single statement in this mimeographed abbre- 
viated summary that is not backed by documentation. 

At random, paragraph 8 is supported by SMP (Shanghai munic- 
ipal police) tile D-64S0, November 1-i, 1934, to February 13, 1935, page 
5, and so on. 

Mr. Tavennek. The copy which has been introduced in the record 
contains the full documentation. 

General Willolgiii-.v. It was really for the benefit of the corre- 
spondents that I made that remark. 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted with the understanding it is adopted 
by the witness in toto as part of his testimony? 

General Willoughby. I do. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 
41," is as follows:) 

Wir.i.ouGHBY Exhibit No. 41 

The Shanghai Conspiracy: 1929-49 

22. Shanghai police dossiers support Sorge records 

The element which intrigued MacArthur's intelligence research was the imme- 
diate and dramatic recognition that the Sorge story did not begin nor end with 
Tokyo, that it was no accident that Sorge served in Shanghai first, and that his 
later operations, localized in Japan, were only a chip in the general mosaic of 
Soviet and Comintern international design. An investigation was opened into 
the Shanghai period and the Shanghai personages. 

Miscellaneous records of the British and French Shanghai municipal police 
in the early thirties, open up an astonishing vista on a fantastic array of Com- 
munist fronts, ancillary agencies, and the vast interlocking operations of the 
Third International in China. It is in this particular period that the groundwork 
was laid for the Communist successes of today. 

As in the Japanese court records, Smedley now appears in these independent 
-documents, associated with well-known Comintern agents, leftists, and sympa- 
thizers ; affiliated with or assisting in activities, most of which were Comtintern- 
directed for the ultimate strategic benefit of Soviet Russia. 

The role of Shanghai, a veritable witch's caldron of international intrigue, 
a focal point of Communist effort, is already apparent in the records of the 
Sorge trial and collateral testimony. The Zeitgeist Bookshop, rendezvous of 
Sorge and Ozaki, and its astute owner, Miss Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), appear 
again, viewed from a different angle, recorded this time by a reputable inter- 
national police body. 1 Smedley has attacked the Japanese court materials as 
"obtained under torture and duress" ; this claim is, of course, a typical "red 
herring" and the customary smear-defense expected of a cornered individual. 
On the other hand, the files of the Shanghai international police can hardly be 
impugned as obtained under torture and duress, which Smedley slyly attributes 
to the "Japanese Fascists who were enemies of the United States." Commu- 
nist strategic defense is often brilliant. This innuendo is a clever but futile 
defense maneuver. Smedley here manipulates both time and space. In Shang- 
hai, in the early thirties, we are not dealing with the period of our uneasy alli- 
ance with the Soviets (1941-45), but with the prewar years of 1930-39, in the 
heyday of the Third International, prelude to the infamous Stalin-Hitler Pact, 
sole factor that made World War II at all possible. 



1 In parly recognition that Shanghai was the focal point of Communist espionage and 
political subversion, F-2/Tokyo was lucky in acquiring substantial parts of these police 
records. Files had already been tampered with, especially reference to American per- 
sonalities, but someone had bungled (or G-2 worked too fast) ; enough material remained 
to present an impressive continuity. Some of the Shanghai police officers were traced to 
Hong Kong, like Mr. J. Crighton, former chief detective-inspector, political intelligence 
group, Shanghai municipal police, who has a perfect recollection of Agnes Smedley, Identi- 
fied her as a Communist, working with the Communist Party in Shanghai, states she worked 
^'ith the Noulens, and recalls that her police file was voluminous. His confirmation of 
the Shanghai files actually acquired by G-2 is collateral evidence from most authoritative 
•quarters. 



1240 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

23. Shanghai, focal point of Third International conspiracy 

There is more to the Shanghai municipal police files than an inferential accu- 
sation against Smedley. We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in 
the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of communism. Here 
were sown the dragon's teeth that ripened into the Red harvest of today, and 
the farm lahor was done by men and women of many nationalities who had 
no personal stakes in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien 
cause, the Communist "jehad" of Pan-slavism for the subjugation of the western 
world. 

The greater design of the Soviet conquest of the East is already clear in the 
confession of Sorge, Soviet master spy. It is again recognizable in the intricate 
pattern of the Third International "apparatus." Shanghai was the focal point 
of sabotage and subversion, and to this Mecca flocked the Communist operators 
of the world for training, for experimentation, for career investments. 

In 1927 a conference was held in Hankow under the auspices of the Third 
International and attended by Tom Mann (Great Britain), Earl Browder (United 
States of America), Jacques Doriot (France), Roy (India), and a number of 
others. It was decided that Communist work in this part of the world would 
be conducted by the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, of which Earl Browder 
was made secretary. He soon afterward became active in this work in which 
he was assisted by Katherine Harrison alias Alice Reed, considered by the police 
as a convenient "menage-a-deux." Earl Browder and his female assistant con- 
tinued their work in the following year (1928) and spent most of their time 
in Shanghai. They were joined in August that year by one W. A. Haskell who 
also was assisted by a woman named Emerson, presumably his wife. 2 

Time, in its issue of April 25, 1849, features Eugene Dennis, the boss of the 
American Communists, now on trial. There is no point in repeating this terse, 
well-written story of the growth and world itinerary of a Soviet agent ; impor- 
tant, however, are certain connecting links with the Sorge espionage case. 3 

Dennis who used to be Francis X. Waldron, obtained a fraudulent passport 
as Paul Walsh and traveled via Europe, South Africa to China. The world- 
wide ramifications of the Third Comintern, with Shanghai as the Far Eastern 
operating center, is reflected in the itinerary of this American disciple. Paul 
Eugene Walsh, alias Paul or Milton suddenly appears in the records of the 
Shanghai police ; his police card states : 

"* * * From December 1, 1933, until June 1934, he resided at Flat 6, 
Gresham Apartments, No. 1224 Avenue J off re. On May 30, 1934, the lease of 
Flat 34D, Foncim Apartments, No. 634 Route Frelupt was transferred to his 
name from Harry Berger, with whom he was obviously on terms of good friend- 
ship. Walsh resided at the latter address from June 1, 1934, until October 9, 
1934, when he secretly left Shanghai for Trieste on the S. S. Conte Verde. It has 
been established that Walsh was one of the masterminds of the local machine 
of the Comintern and as such was responsible for the collation of many im- 
portant documents relating to the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far 
East. * * *" 

The Shanghai police classification ties in neatly with related fragments in 
the Sorge case; Sorge's assistants operated habitually under aliases or codes, 
usually their Christian names, viz: Paul, Max, Alex. John, etc. Significantly, 
a Comintern agent, under the code name of Paul took over the Shanghai station 
after S'orge's transfer to Japan. 4 

24- The shadow-]/ men with changeable names 

In i !>.'!() a large host of agents of the Third International came to Shanghai 
and became associated with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, and an- 
other important organ of the Third International, called the Far Eastern Bureau. 



-G-2 Doc. No. 5: SMP File D-4825, May 2-10, 1933, p. 20. The presence of this 
prominent American Communist is significant. 

Ibid., p. 22, "During l!»2!t. W. A. Haskell and Miss Emerson left Shanghai, but the ranks 
of the foreign Communist agents were by no means reduced, for Gerhart Eisler who lived 
in Wong Ka Shaw Gardens between March 20 and November 30 and George Hardy and 
.1. II. Didsen also visited Shanghai one after another * * *." 

8 There were plenty of other leads iii the original G-2 report, converging on American 
Communists principally on the Pacific coast, the novitiate of Dennis, is names listing 
Communist agitators, agents, and suspects were reported as connected with the Sorge ease 
and covered in the trial records i Ltr. to Mil >, Oct. 17, 1H47 I. 

4 Sorge : "Besides these two agents, Paul and John were dispatched from Moscow to 
work directly under Sorge." See also : <; 2 Doc. No. 24 : SMP File l> 6227, June 15, 1933- 
Angust 5, 1936, pp. 8, 9. 

Klausen : "I worked with Weinuart. Then were also Paul. Smedley, and Dr. Woidt, 
all of whom I met in Shanghai. I'aul succeeded Sorge as leader of the ring." 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1241 

The new arrivals included Bilaire Noulens (or Paul Ruegg), and .Mrs. Noulens, 
ef unknown nationality, A. E. Stewart, Blargarel Undjus, and Judea Codkind, 
Americans, and Erene Wiedemeyer I Weitemeyer) who was German." 

Smedley was an associate of Irene's. Weitmeyer (Wiedemeyer) operated 
the Zeitgeist Bookshop in Shanghai, rendezvous of leftists and mail drop for 
espionage agents. Ozaki, Sorge*s right-hand man was introduced by Smedley 
in Weitmeyer's place." Sorge testified: 

"* * * As previously slated I first met Smedley in Shanghai, acquired 
her as a member, and through my recommendations, she was registered with 
Comintern headquarters. 1 d<> net knew as to whether she was affiliated with 
the American Communist Party. <>zaki was also acquired in China. I reestab- 
lished contacl wiili him alter arriving in Japan, worked with bim and recom- 
mended him to Comintern headquarters for registration. Tims I recommended 
both of them and offered myself as one of the two sponsors required for each new 
member. A member in .Moscow consented to he the other sponsor on the strength 
of my recommendations and reports. * * *" 

The police card on Smedley states: 

•.* * * Agnes Smedley alias Alice Bird and Mrs. Petroikos * * * mem- 
ber of the following societies: Friends of the U. S. S. R. ; Hindustan Association 
in Berlin; Berlin Indian Revolutionary Society. Noulens Defense Committee; 
All China Labor Federation and the China League for Civil Rights. * * * 
In possession of two passports German and American. Arrived in Shanghai in 
.May 1929 from Berlin as the correspondent of the German newspaper Frank- 
furter Zeitung. She is in the service of the Eastern Branch of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Internationa! and is definitely known to have 
assisted local Indian seditionists on several occasions. * * * her chief duties 
comprise the supervising of Communist organizations among workers, and that 
she receives orders direct from the Central Committee of the Communist In- 
ternational in Moscow. * * *" 

The Shanghai police observed and reeorded these furtive men and women, 
often without direct accusations. Such things are a matter of cumulative 
surveillance, but dossiers are never opened without some reason. Somehow, 
these names are tainted. 

The case of Hilaire Noulens also know as Paul Ruegg is both interesting and 
typical : The clandestine fraternity, working under the aegis of the Comintern, 
or the Soviet Army, could always count on a variety of front organizations to 
rally to their defense, if they got into trouble. The principal agency was The 
International Red Aid (MOPR), created in 1922, known as International 
Labor Defense in America. Inferentially, whenever the defense swung into 
action it was a foregone conclusion that the chief protagonists were under 
orders of the Comintern. To the gullible outsider, the defense action might 
look like a legitimate civil liberty agitation even with some sentimental appeal; 
however to the cognoscenti it was just another Red front mobilizing pink lawyers, 
agents, and fellow travelers. 

Noulens arrived in Shanghai in 1930 under cover of a stolen Belgian passport 
as Fred Vandercruysen to head the Far Eastern Bureau. Fifteen months later, 
lie was arrested for Communist activities Jinked with a French Communist, 
Joseph Ducroux (also know as Serge LeFranc) then operating in Singapore. 
During the trial (and conviction) the authorities learned of his importance in 
the Comintern apparatus. This group operated on a considerable scale; they 
maintained 7 bank accounts, rented 15 houses or apartments, a vertiable political 
rabbit warren; Ruegg-Noulens used at least 12 names in Shanghai and carried 
1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports, while his wife used 5 names and 2 Belgian 
passports. 7 



"G-2 Doc. No. 5 : SMF File D 4s-jr,. May s-10. 1!»::::. p. 22. 

6 Foreign Affairs Yearbook 1942. Sec. XV. par. 2— i (Sorge). 

7 G-2 Document No. Mo: SMP File 7.C< 827, March 7, 19.°,2. See also gorge's Own 
Story (pt. T, eh. 4. sec. J. par. 4). He is quite specific. The Comintern group (FEB) 
consisted <>f two branches, the political branch (headed by Gerhart Eisler) and the organi- 
sation branch (headed by Noulens) : in the light of the current China debacle, the opera 
tional missions were significant : liaison between the Comintern (Soviet) and the Chinese 
Communist Party: political policy (decided upon by the Comintern) with respect to the 
Chinese Communist Party: exchange of information between the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Comintern; financial liaison between the Comintern and the Chinese Communist 
Party; the movement of personnel between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party. 
Smedley's and Isaacs' support of the Noulens Defense Committee or any other members 
must be viewed against the background of these international subversive missions. 

90929— si g 



1242 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

Here, again, the Time article furnishes an interesting clue to identities ; in 
a subparagraph heading : "The Little Kremlin," it says : 

''* * * All but the most secret Communist operations in the United States 
were and still are, directed from the ramshackle, nine-story loft building, on 35 
East Twelfth Street, not far from Manhattan's Union Square. To its top-floor 
offices came the Communists' international 'Reps,' the shadowy men with the 
changeable names like P. Green, G. Williams, A. Ewert, H. Berger * * * 
which in a wink of the eye might become Drabkin, B. Mikhailov, Braun, or 
Gerhart Eisler. These were Moscow's agents. From the ninth floor the word 
which they brought from Moscow was passed along to the faithful, to the party 
hacks on the Daily Worker and Yiddish-language Freiheit, to the cultivators of 
organized labor's vineyards, to men like Christoffel in Milwaukee. * * *" 

The interesting thing about Time's shadowy men with the changeable names 
like A. Ewert, H. Berger, 8 A. Steinburg, and Gerhart Eisler, 9 is that these same 
names and identities appear both in the Sorge records and the Shanghai police 
files. Their crooked paths meander on into the forties and into the United 
States. 

Most of the old wheel horses of the Communist Party appear to have been 
operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clan- 
destine fraternity as well as the accolytes and dupes, who are flirting with the 
Red menace. And somewhere in the bistros of the French concession, in the 
furtive rendezvous of the ^Shanghai conspirators, you can hear the metallic tinkle 
of 30 pieces of silver 

25. The Comintern apparatus and Shanghai affiliates 

Other individuals, in variable degrees of implication with or commitment to 
the Communist movement, are covered elsewhere. All of them are understand- 
able only in terms of their subservience to a foreign master; this relationship 
requires a background examination of the formidable world-wide machinery of 
the Comintern apparatus, machiavellian tool of the imperialist expansion of the 
Soviets, who have made progress beyond the wildest dream of Czari.-L ambition. 
In fact, it may be factually stated that the Soviets have taken up where the Czars 
left oft' and made further and more significant strides. 

(a) Comintern headquarters. — The Moscow headquarters of the Third ( Com- 
munist ) International (Comintern) during the 1930's paralleled the organiza- 
tional structure of the Soviet Government. Led by a world congress of Soviet 
and foreign Communists, who met at intervals between 1919 and 1935, actual con- 
trol of the Comintern fell to the U. S. S. R. through its leadership of the world 
Communist movement and a Comintern organizational ruling which gave the 



8 G-2 Document No. 24. SMP File D-6227, June 15, 1933-August 5, 1936 : A man of 
many aliases, when Paul Walsh appeared, it was Berger who rented his Shanghai apartment 
to him. Flat 35D Foneim Apartments No. 643. Route Frelupt. Berger left Shanghai for 
Vladivostoek July 19, 1934, on the steamship Yingchow due to police raids at No. 38 Race 
Road, which netted incriminating Communist documents. 

He appears in the Canadian espionage case as an "agent in the United States" ; Fred 
Rose, Communist member of the Parliament in Canada used Freda Lipshitz as go-between 
from himself (cover name Debouz) to Berger, and others in Washington. 

9 Gerhart Eisler Sorge Material (Crimiual Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Justice, ch. IV, 
sec. J-4) : "The Comintern group in Shanghai consisted of a political branch and an 
organization branch. The political branch was in charge of "Gerhardt" (Eisler) whom I 
had known in Germany and worked with in my Comintern days. 

With the arrest of Noulens, Gerhardt's status in Shanghai became precarious and he 
decided to return to Moscow in 1931 * * *." 

The tendrils of Mr. Eisler weave into far places. He next appears as Communist 
International representative in the United States in 1936. His first wife was Hede 
Gumperz. Eisler was later transferred to Europe. His second wife, Hede's sister, Elli 
whom he married in 1931 said she was still his wife in 1946. He returned to the United 
States with another woman, whom he apparently married in 1942. The amorous exploits 
of Comintern agents appear as complicated as their professional work. Hede Gumperz 
was in charge of an underground Communist apparatus in Washington. She broke with 
Stalin later on. She knew Alger Hiss and talked with him in an apartment of Noel Field, 
State Department official who was a member of her apparatus. Incidentally, she was not 
allowed to tell her story to the jury in the first trial of the Hiss case (Counterattack, 
July 8, 1949). The character of her former husband makes this story more than plausible. 

An arriere pensee of slight comfort to the mothers of America : A considerable number 
of young American soldiers died in the war period 1941-45, so that "Gearhardt" Eisler 
could pursue his business of treason and sabotage in the comparative safety of the United 
States. It is noted that lie found Europe too hot in 1941. Needless to say, there is no 
mention of a draft for service in the United States except perhaps to subvert some Govern- 
ment employees. Eisler's spectacular arrest in New York and subsequent escape to 
London recently, dovetail accurately into the general pattern of long ago. He left 
Shanghai in 1931 in just as much of a hurry and for the same reasons. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1243 

largest representation i<> the nation playing host to the Congress— in evei'y case 
the Soviel Onion. The executive functions of the Comintern were vested in the 
Executive Committee of the Communist international (ECCI)', which advertised 
several foreign members l»ut was actually controlled by its predominant Soviet 
represent a i ion. Like the "World'" Congress, the E< !< 'l met periodically, primarily 
to determine general lines of policy, but final control of the Comintern rested in 
the "praesidium," which was made up, among others, of a "politburo," several 
standing Commissions, and a political Secretariat Under the praesidium there 
were several training schools, sectional or regional secretariats and auxiliary 
departments, which w< re concerned with generalized work in specific fields and, 
finally, certain auxiliary organizations which worked directly and specifically 
with foreign Communist or Communist-front groups. 

The Comintern was the nondiplomatic foreign arm of the U. S. S. R. Organ- 
ized at Moscow in 1919, the Comintern was, until its alleged dissolution in 1943, 
a quasi-governmental body aimed largely at fostering Communist and Commu- 
nist-front groups iu the capitalist world in order to carry out such Communist 
strategy as the Government of the U. S. S. R. considered essential to the promo- 
tion of world revolution or, as conditions required, the protection of the Soviet 
Union. 

(6) Auxiliary organizations. — Only a few of the Moscow auxiliary organiza- 
tions are of immediate concern here, although all of them, numbering about 13, 
had variable interests in Shanghai, operating through an extraordinary variety 
of channels : 

(1) Profintern : The Red International of Labor (Proiintern) was created in 
1919 in older to counteract the influence of the International Federation of 
Lahor Unions of the Second (Socialist) International. The profintern consisted 
of a headquarters apparatus controlled by the praesidium and of affiliated sec- 
tions which in most countries outside the U. S. S. R. took the form of Red trade- 
union oppositions. In the field, the Profintern organized international propa- 
ganda committees for work among specific trades. In addition, the Profintern 
sponsored the creation of parallel labor-union federations of which the Pan 
Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and the All China Labor Federation 
were important examples. 

(2) Krestintern : The Red Peasant International (Krestintern) was founded 
in 1923 to break the resistance to communism of the peasantry in various coun- 
tries. Although it enjoyed far less success than organizations devoted to the 
laborer and the intelligentsia, it directed local Communist groups which or- 
ganized so-called peasants' unions including the Chinese Peasant League. 

(3) VOKS: The Society for Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries 
(VOKS) was established in Moscow in 1923 to promote Soviet culture abroad 
as an instrument of political propaganda. The cultural attache of each Soviet 
Embassy abroad was in direct charge of VOKS and, as such, was charged with 
liaison witli the ECCI in Moscow and with the formation of the so-called friendly 
societies. The activities of VOKS can be gaged from the sections of its head- 
quarters: Foreign relations; reception of foreigners; international book 
exchange ; press ; exhibitions, etc. 

(4) MOPR: International Red Aid CMOPR), created in 1922, has been char- 
acterized as the "Red Cross of the Communist International," designed primarly 
to assist political prisoners, secret agents caught red-handed and other victims 
of bourgeois reaction. 10 International Red Aid, which functioned legally and 
illegally in 67 countries was complemented by Workers International Relief, 
both directed for many years by the German Communist Willi Muenzenherg. 
Abroad not only International Red Aid itself but separate Communist-front 
groups organized for the defense of a particular case have played the leading 
role in assisting individual Communists jailed for subversive activities. 

(5) IURW: The International Union of Revolutionary Writers was organized 
in 1925, probably under VOKS auspices, to enlist sympathetic literati abroad for 
the promotion of pro-Soviet and anti-Fascist and antiwar themes. In Moscow 
the IURW was responsible for the publication of the English-language Moscow 
Daily News and International Literature, a periodical devoted to the promulga- 
tion of Communist ideology abroad. At one time an American, Walt Cannon, 



°With calculated skill international communism long ago subverted semantics to con- 
tuse the slogans and cliches of capitalist society ; the universal sentimental appeal of the 
historical Red Cross and its protection of the weak and oppressed was hound to be 
•exploited. In the United States the agency was known as International Labor Defense. 



1244 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

was an assistant editor of International Literature. 11 Langston Hughes, the 
American Communist poet, and Agnes Smedley were contributors. Anna Louise 
Strong for years was editor of the Moscow Daily News, while another American, 
Fred Ellis, was employed as a cartoonist on the staff of Trud, the official organ 
of the All Union Council of Soviet Trade-Unions. 12 The printing of these foreign 
language periodicals was done by the State Publishing House (Goszdat) in 
cooperation with the International Book Publishing Association (Mezhkniga), 
both Soviet Government enterprises. 

26. Chinese organizations and Communist fronts 

On a national and sectional level the organs of the Comintern often began to 
lose their distinctive coloring, becoming Communist-front groups in a host of 
forms. However, each auxiliary organization of the Comintern was represented 
abroad, often by apparently unconnected groups, which ranged from outright 
Communist to pseudo-liberal movements, which were organized or infiltrated by 
Comintern agents. In many cases, these national organizations could be traced 
to more than one Moscow group as activities impinged on the different fields of 
the praesidium. Often they were temporary organizations or local movements 
designed to gain popular or mass support for an immediate aim; just as often, 
however, they were serious long-term projects. As these groups touched the 
Shanghai scene during the period of Smedley's residence there, they form 
an interesting and often highly interconnected web which requires relatively 
detailed treatment. 

(a) PPTU8— The Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (PPTUS) and its par- 
ent organization, the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bureau, were the most 
important and highly organized apparatus for Comintern labor activities in the 
Far East during the late 1920's and early 1930's. 13 The PPTUS, set up in 1927 at 
a conference in Hankow, was attended by several prominent Comintern leaders, 
including Lozovsky 14 a Comintern agent who rose from secretary of the Profin- 
tern in 1928 to a transient position as leader of the Soviet labor movement. 
Another member of the Hankow conference who later became first head of the 
PPTUS was the American Communist Earl Browder, who was assisted in his 
work in Shanghai by an American woman, Katherine Harrison. Other Ameri- 
cans, including a journalist, James H. Dolsen, one Albert Edward Stewart, and 
Margaret Undjus, were prominent in the affairs of the PPTUS as was the Ger- 
man woman, Wiedemeyer. 16 Richard Sorge himself was suspected by the Shang- 
hai police of having come on a mission for the PPTUS when he arrived in Shang- 
hai in 1930. 16 

Set up for Comintern work in China, Indochina, Malaya, Japan, Formosa, 
Korea, and the Philippines, the PPTUS had no direct connection with the ECCI 
or the Praesidium in Moscow although a chain of liaison existed to the Profintern 
and some instances of direct connection between Moscow and Shanghai were 
discovered. In that particular period and primarily for security, the PPTUS 
derived its authority from a Comintern subsidiary in Berlin, the Western Euro- 
pean Bureau (WEB) and from the WEB through the Far Eastern Bureau (FEB) 
in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok." 

* The Western European Bureau, largely an organ of the immensely powerful 
and well organized (pre-Hitler) German Communist Party, went far beyond 
its stated function of maintaining contact with the sections in Western Europe : 
in fact, the WEB appears to have been, for a time, almost a peer of the ECCI, 
operating often independently. From the WEB authority -went to the Far 
Eastern Bureau in Shanghai. There was also an FEB (Dalburo) in Khabarovsk 
(later transferred to Vladivostok) which maintained direct contact with both 
the illegal FEB in Shanghai and the Praesidium of the Comintern in Moscow. 
Instructions and cash subsidies for distribution by the FEB were transmitted 
from the WEB in Berlin through courier channels to an import business in 



"Editor: Walt Carmon is listed in the Fourth Report. Un-American Activities in Cali- 
fornia, 1048, p. 273, as a meinlier of the League of American Writers and affiliated with 
its congress. 

'- G 2 Document No. 40 : SMP File D-5834. April 25, 1934, p. 4. 

" G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1032. p. 13. 

"G-2 Document No. 97: SMP File D-7884, May 10. 1027 to April 16, 102S. Editor, 
Solomon Abramovich Lozovsky, an old-time Bolshevik, was known as an expert on the Far 
East and has held important posts in the Dalhnro (Far Eastern Bureau). His early con- 
nection with Sorge is worthy of note. Norge's Own Story, eh. Ill, p. 35. 

w G-2 Document No. 5 : SMP File 4S25, May 8 to 10, 1933, pp. 20 22. 

"'0-2 Document No. 18 : SMP File I> 3509. January 10. 1032. to August 31, 1033, p. 5. 

"G-2 Document No. 30. SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932. Memorandum 17, October 
29, 1947. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1245 

Shanghai dealing in wines, perfumes, and other luxury articles. Comintern 
agents in the import company passed on these funds and instructions to the staff 
of the FEB (Shanghai) which consisted of eight or nine Europeans and several 
Chinese. Funds of the FEB were deposited in no less than seven Chinese banks 
from which they then were withdrawn as needed. The FEB was a regional organ 
of the Comintern, responsible for the dispatch of students for training in .Moscow 
and for payments to Chinese organizations led by the PPTUS." The size of the 
payments, at least $500,000 annually, gives some indication of the importance 
attached to China alone by the Comintern strategists of the early 1930's. 18 

The operational unit of the FEU although preceding the parent body in date 
of formation in Shanghai, the PPTUS (also known as TOSS) was stalled largely 
by the same personalities although direct PPTUS work was done by three 
foreigners aided by Chinese translators. Two of the foreigners working for 
PPTUS during the early 1930's are known to have been Albert Edward Stewart 
and Margarel Undjus, while the third was reported to have been James Dolsen, 
all Americans." 

When Karl Browder left Shanghai in 1929 or 1930, Gerhart Eisler is reported 
to have taken his place as secretary of the PPTUS. It is certain that Eisler was 
in Shanghai in 1929 in connection with the PPTUS. 20 The interlocking evidence 
of the Sorge records settle this point beyond a doubt: the FEI'» was divided into 
an organizational section, under Noulens and a political branch under Gerhart 
(Eisler). ^'hen Noulens was arrested, Eisler fled and other operators went 
underground. Conversely, this fact puts the Noulens defense group in a proper 
light : Soviet agents staging a defense rally for another agent. 

The most famous of the Comintern agents connected with the FEB (and 
PPTUS), were Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, more widely known as Mr. and .Airs. 
Hilaire Noulens. Noulens, traveling on a stolen Melgian passport as Ferdinand 
Vandercruysen, arrived in Shanghai March 19, 1930, to head the FEB. Fifteen 
months later, on June 13, 1931, he was arrested for Communist activities as a 
result of a cable address found on a French Communist Joseph Ducroux, alias 
Serge LeFranc, when the latter was arrested in Singapore on June 1, 1930. 
Following Ruegg's arrest, trial, and conviction, authorities learned that he and 
other members of the FEB and PPTUS, in addition to seven bank accounts, had 
rented 14 or 15 houses and apartments while in Shanghai, seven of which were 
known to have been maintained concurrently. Ruegg himself used at least 12 
names in Shanghai and carried 1 Canadian and 2 Belgian passports and his wife 
used 5 names and also carried 2 Belgian passports. 21 



13 Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, p. 40ff. See also report by Deputy Commissioner of 
Intelligence in the French Municipal Police. Shanghai : Simultanement avec l'etablisse- 
ment du Bureau extreme-oriental de la Illeme Internationale, le Profintern (International 
Syndicate Rouge) installa, egalement a Shanghai, une branche du Secretariat de l'Union 
I'an-Pacifique Ouvriere (organization auxiliaire du Profintern, chargee de la direction du 
inouvement syndicaliste militant dans les pays du Pacifique et dont le si&ge se trouve 
depuis 1929 ji Vladivostock). G-2 Document No. 104. (English translation supplied by 
the committee: Shanghai: Simultaneously with the establishment of the Far Eastern 
Bureau of the Third International, the Profintern (Red International of Labor) Installed, 
likewise at Shanghai, a branch of the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat (auxiliary organ- 
ization of the Profintern, charged with the direction of the militant trade-union move- 
ment in the Pacific countries, and of which the headquarters have been since 1929 in 
Vladivostock).) 

19 G-2 Document No. 30: SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 15, 29, 30. 

20 G-2 Document No. 5: SMP Pile No. 4825, May 8 to 10, 1933, p. 21. The records of 
these men as Communists and Comintern operators is beyond question and has become 
crystal-clear in recent years. Eisler is probably the more dangerous of the two. His 
recent flight aboard a Polish ship, his seizure and release by the British are all of a 
pattern. See also Sorge Story, pti I. ch. 4, sec. J, pars. 4 and 5. 

21 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File No. ZCS-S27, March 7, 1932, p. 19ff. The French 
report previously quoted bears out the Shanghai documents: Sur Lefranc on trouxa deux 
feuilles de papier dont l'une portait l'indication, Post Office Box 208, Shanghai et l'autre : 
Hilonoul. Shanghai * * * Des descentes furent aussitot operees dans les autres 
maisons loupes par Noulens sous differents noms. Elles amenerent la saisie d'une quantity 
importante de litterature communiste et de nombreux documents en differentes langueB, 
relatifs au mouvement communiste en Extreme-Orient et l'arrestation de la femme de 
Noulens connue sous les noms de Madame Vandercruysen, Motte. Ruck, etc. (G-2 Document 
No. 104). (English translation supplied by the committee: On the person of Le Franc 
were found two sheets of paper, of which one carried the notation, "Post Office Box 208, 
Shanghai," and the other : Hilonoul, Shanghai . . . Raids were Immediately conducted 
in tile other houses leased by Noulens under different names. They led to the seizure of a 
sizable quantity of Communist literature and of numerous documents in different languages 
relative to the Communist movement in the Far East and the arrest of the wife of Noulens 
known under the names of Madame Vandercruysen. Motte, Ruck, etc.) 



1246 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

The All-China Labor Federation, of which Smedley was a member 22 was one- 
of the recipients of the FEB subsidies, receiving $1,800 monthly from the 
PPTUS. 23 

(b) Noulens Defense Committee. — International Red Aid (MOPR),as stated,, 
has taken various forms abroad. 24 In Shanghai MOPIt played its most spectacu- 
lar role during the early 1930's in the defense of the head of the FEB, Paul Ruegg,. 
alias Hilaire Noulens, alias Hilarie Noulens, alias Ferdinand Vandercruysen and 
a host of other names. When Paul and Gertrude Ruegg were arrested June 13, 
1931, the International Red Aid took charge of their defense. Willi Muenzenberg,. 
German Communist wheel horse and one of the Comintern's most efficient organ- 
izers of both Communist and front groups, formed a defense unit first known as 
the Noulens Defense Committee, the Shanghai branch being led by Harold Isaacs, 25 
and boasting among its members Agnes Smedley, Irene Wiedemeyer (Weite- 
meyer) and Madam Sun Yat-sen ; the group continued efforts to free these Comin- 
tern agents for several years after they were finally sentenced. 2 * 

The Rueggs, when arrested, posed as Belgian citizens named Herssens, and 
had used many aliases, such as Vandercruyssen, although the man had pre- 
viously been known in Shanghai as Hilaire Noulens. Their claim to Belgian 
protection was disapproved and the couple was handed over to the Chinese- 
authorities for prosecution as Communist agents. The League Against Im- 
perialism and other Comintern groups protested that Noulens, as he was then 
known, was merely the paid secretary of the PPTUS, possibly a more easily 
defensible position than his actual post as leader of the FEB. Later in 1931 a 
collateral English defense group, apparently inadvertently, referred to him as 
"Ruegg." The ensuing investigation disclosed that Paul Ruegg was an active 



22 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-471S, January 4 to May 20, 1933, p. 22. 

23 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP ZCS-S27, March 7, 1932, p. 14. Editor : Like so many 
front organizations, this Profintern agency is difficult to trace In all its ramifications.. 
As a Chinese labor organization it attempted to channelize laborers' grievance toward 
Communist ends. As a foreigner, Smedley's position is not quite clear, though as an out- 
side adviser Smedley gave the All-China Labor Federation a direct connection with the 
Profintern in addition to its indirect liaison through the PPTUS, the FEB, and finally 
the WEB. 

24 Editor : In the United States MOPR has been known as International Labor Defense, 
headed for several years by Representative Vito Marcantonio. A more recent offshoot is- 
the Civil Rights Congress, a postwar development, which drew heavy non-Communist sup- 
port to make it a genuine front group. An important part of the technique of this and' 
similar MOPR groups is to form in democratic countries so-called civil rights groups tc 
defend individual cases. Characteristically, the Civil Rights Congress has formed an 
Eisler Defense Committee, or committees to protest the denial of public meeting privileges 
to known Communists, and others which can enlist the support of many Americans genuinely 
interested in the protection of civil rights (Union Calendar 575, H. Rept. No. 1115, SOth 
Cong., 1st sess., Report on Civil Rights Congress as a Communist-Front Organization, 
September 2, 1947. Fifth report. Un-American Activities in California, 1949, pp. 439, 446).. 

25 G-2 Document No. 16 : SMP File D-6628, April 1935, p. 4 ; G-2 Document No. 6 : 
SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-Mav 23, 1935, pp. 10, 11. 

26 G-2 Document No. 12: SMP (French) Dossier No. III-A-3C, March 10, 1930-Novem- 
ber 10, 1941, 2-C-16. J. M. Jobez, the former deputy commissioner of intelligence in the 
French municipal police, Shanghai, again provides collateral information on this notorious 
case: "Les 19 et 20 aout 1931. Madame Sun Yat-sen qui venait de rentrer de Berlin ft 
Shanghai, recevait de differents organizations et groupes radicaux d'Europe, une serie de 
telegrammes lui demandant d'intervenir dans l'affaire Noulens et reclamant la liberation- 
des inculpes. Parmi ces telegrammes, a noter ceux des ecrivains et des artists allemands, 
des avocats allemands, de Clara Zetkine, membre de la faction communistre du Reichstag 
(decedee fin juin 1933, en URSS), d'un groupe de membres travaillistes du Parlement 
Anglais, d'ecrivains, d'artistes et de savants Espagnols, du Comity Central de la Ligue Contre 
l'lmperialisme, du Comite Central du Secours Ouvrier International, de Romain Rolland, 
d'Henri Barbusse, etc. * * * Au debut du mois de September 1931 les milieux 
radicaux etrangers ft Shanghai avaient form£, de leur cot£, un comity de 'secours* air 
Secretairs de l'Union Pan-pacifique Ouvriers.' Parmi les membres de ce comity se trou- 
vaient Madame Agnes Smedley, anarchiste syndicaliste Amerieaine, hien connue dans les; 
milieux radicaux de la Place, J. B. Powell, redacteur du journal China Weekly Review, 
Edgar Snow, H. Isaacs, iournalistes radicaux Americains (G-2 Document No. 104). 
(English translation supplied by the committee: August 19 and 20, 1931. Madame Sun 
Yat-sen. who had just returned from Berlin to Shanghai, received from various radical 
European organizations and groups, a series of telegrams demanding of her to intervene- 
in the Noulens case and demanding the liberation of the defendants. Among these tele- 
grams were noted those from writers. German artists, and lawyers: from Clara Zetkin, 
member of the Communist faction of the Reichstag (deceased the last of June 1933, in the- 
U. S. S. R.) : and from a group of members of the Workers Party of the English Parliament ; 
from Spanish writers, artists, and intellectuals : from the Central Committee or the League' 
Against Imperialism : from the Central Committee of the International Labor Defense ; 
from, Romain Rolland, Henry Barbusse, etc. ... At the beginning of the month of Sep- 
temper 1931, the intellectual radical foreigners in Shanghai formed, for their part, a 
committee for aid to the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat. Among the members of 
this committee was discovered to have been Agnes Smedley, American anarchist trade- 
unionist, well known in the radical circles of Shanghai; J. B. Powell, editor of the paper, 
China Weekly Review ; Edgar Snow and H. Isaacs, radical American journalists (G-2 
Document No. 104).) 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1247 

Swiss Communist who had been prominent a decade earlier in Switzerland and 
had come to police notice only sporadically after he had gone to Moscow in 
1924. 27 After the disclosure of Ruegg's identity, the international committees 

adopted his real name for their Committee for the Defense of Paul and Gertrude 
Ruegg. The committee attracted or solicited known Communists, incidental 
sympathizers, and non-Communist humanitarians, listing Lion Feuchtwanger 
and Albeit Einstein as German members of the committee, and several senti- 
mental Americans then at the height of their fame, including Floyd Dell, Sinclair 
Lewis, Theodore Dreiser, John Dos Passos, and Oswald Garrison Villard. 28 

Despite MOPR efforts, the Rueggs were found guilty of seditious activities and 
imprisoned in Nanking. With the release of many political prisoners, when 
Nanking fell to the Japanese, the pair were liberated in September 1937 and have 
since disappeared. Ruegg is reported t<» have entered the United States in 1939 
as Naum Katzenberg 20 and another report claims that he again visited Shanghai 
in 1939, Chungking in 1940, and the Philippines in 1941. 80 

(c) Friends of the U. S. S. R— The Society of Friends of the U. S. S. R.,. 
Shanghai branch was founded in 1932 by Edmond Egon Kisch, a Czechoslovakian 
journalist long known as a Comintern agent. 31 The Shanghai branch of this pro- 
Soviet Communist front was one of a series of typical overseas societies for 
cultural relations between the U. S. S. R. and a given country, the autonomous 
and ostensibly independent branch in the United States being known as the 
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, the successor to the (American) 
Friends of the Soviet Union and the American Council on Soviet Relations. 82 
The purpose behind the formation of these groups is to gain support for Soviet 
foreign policy objectives through highly publicized participation in these front 
organizations of "liberal" elements who were presumed to believe sincerely in the 
altruistic nature of Soviet policy. 33 

The names of some of the more important members of the Shanghai branch 
are known, listing among others in the early 1930's Agnes Smedley, Irene- 
Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer), and Harold Isaacs. 34 Communism unmasks boldly 
when successful. The character of this society is made plain by its sudden re- 
vival in our days in the wake of the Communist conquest of China. A new 
label appeared, "China-Soviet Friendship Association," and opening meetings 
were attended by Communist bigwigs like Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-chi. Madame 
Snn Yat-sen was listed as one of the sponsors of an organization which pro- 
claimed its mission as "the establishment and consolidation of the cultural, ec- 
onomic, and other relations of China and the Soviet Union. 

(d) Friends of China. — Outside the original range of the friendly societies, 
but similar to foreign cultural groups for the support of countries presently 
within the Soviet orbit, the International Friends of China was a front organ- 
ization which capitalized on western sympathy for China and its defense against 
Japanese aggression, in order to promote the ends of the Chinese Communists. 
Like individual fellow travelers, the Friends of China, founded in 1934 with 
offices in New York, London, and Paris, gave sole credit for Chinese resis- 
tance to the Chinese Communists and attempted to divert normal sympathy to 
support of one party in China. Although its stated aims were lofty, the society 
tipped its hand when it claimed to have "done much to expose the collaboration, 
of Chiang Kai-shek with the Japanese, British, and American imperialists." 
Although the London and Paris branches engaged in relatively little activity, 
European members then included such respectable fronts as the Labor Party's 
chief whip in the House of Lords, Lord Marley and Bertrand Russell, long 
known for his interest in China, as well as Edmund Egon Kisch, classified as 



17 G-2 Document No. 30 : SMP File ZCS-827, March 7, 1932, pp. 21-22. 

28 G-2 Document No. 6: SMP File D-3956, August 18, 1932-May 23, 1935, p. 10. 

29 Memorandum 19, December 1, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Personnel, 
p. 43. 

30 G-2 Document No. 33 : SMP File ZCS-638, October 9. 1947. p. 9. 

31 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718, January 4, 1933-Mav 20, 1933, p. 31. 
82 DA Cir. 192. DA Washington 25, D. C, June 29, 1948. 

^WDGS, The Soviet Union, p. 56. (Editor:) Membership In a Soviet friendship 
society is neither charge nor proof of Communist Party membership. Affiliation could be 
Classified as misplaced sympathy. However, when association is combined with more 
obviously Communist groups, membership in a "friendly" society becomes a practical' 
indication of strong support of Communist world objectives. Thus the imperceptible 
evolution of the fellow traveler. 

M G-2 Document No. 31 : SMP file cards, various : G-2 Document No. 10, SMP File 
D— 1718, various. 



1248 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

an active Comintern agent, and other known Communists. The New York 
branch, the American Friends of China, which included Earl Browder in its 
membership, was the most active. Affiliated with the Communist-front Amer- 
ican League Against War and Fascism, 35 the American Friends of China pub- 
lished its own monthly magazine China Today which was pro-Communist. 36 

The American group also sponsored a Shanghai publication of similar nature, 
Voice of China, published by Max and Grace Granich. This paper, published 
from March 1936 until the latter part of 1937, although not overtly a Communist 
publication, portrayed the Chinese Communists as the only defenders of China's 
independence and resistance to the Japanese. The magazine was suppressed 
after more than IS months of existence and the Graniches returned to the 
United States December 21, 1937. 3 ' 

(e) League for Civil Rights. — The China League for Civil Rights remained in 
a twilight zone of respectability en route to becoming a Communist-front organi- 
zation. The group was initially organized by such liberal Kuomintang members 
as Madame Sun Yat-sen, who, despite her sojourn in Moscow and her acceptance 
by the CCP, was not then regarded as a Communist, Hu Shih, Lin Yu-tang, and 
Dr. Tsai Yuan-pei at the height of the Kuomintang persecution of dissident 
opinion. 38 As a Communist front during its comparatively short existence, it 
was a perfect example of such an organization. Obviously objected to by Kuo- 
mintang authorities, who closed its Peiping branch, the high position of the 
Chinese leaders of the parent organization in Shanghai precluded any direct 
action against the league by the Nanking authorities until the organization 
finally liquidated itself after complete lack of success in its objectives. 39 

(/) League Against Imperialism. — The League Against Imperialism was a 
relatively early Comintern body, founded by German Communists and various 
colonial nationals as the League for Struggle Against Colonial Oppression. While 
it existed outside any of the auxiliary groups of the ECCI, its direct connection 
with Moscow was obvious and its basis was article 8 of the conditions of adminis- 
sion to the Comintern, obliging Comintern sections in countries with colonies to 
advocate and support the "liberation" of colonial populations. At a 1927 
Congress in Brussels, the notorious Willi Muenzenberg formed the League 
Against Imperialism as a front or so-called innocents group which would 
serve as a rallying point for anti-imperialist national revolutionary movements 
and promote the U. S. S. R. as the champion of the liberty of colonial people. 40 
Agnes Smedley, during her Berlin days, admits having been present when her 
Indian friends participated with the Communists in founding the league 41 and 
took an active part, shortly after her arrival in Shanghai in May 1929, in organ- 
izing the China League Against Imperialism. 42 The Chinese branch, along with 
its western counterpart, took an active part in attempting to agitate mass pres- 
sure in the Noulens case 43 and participated in several antiforeign movements, 
later becoming involved with the Antiwar Congress. 

Typical of the Communist-front organization in seeking respectable stooges, the 
Antiwar Congress boasted Ellen Wilkinson, the Labor MP, and Lord Marley as 
leading names. 44 Following a congress in Amsterdam in August 1932, Lord 
Marley and a party of foreigners sailed for Shanghai to attend an Asiatic Con- 
gress Against Imperialist War. The Chinese Communists had no illusions about 
this group, despite its "liberal" front, often referring to it as the Barbusse Mis- 
sion after one of its members, Henri Barbusse, a prominent member of the Comin- 
tern and publisher of the French Communist organs L'Humanit^ and Le Monde. 45 



35 (Editor.) The World Committee Against War and Fascism, organized in 1932, was 
■designed to direct public opinion against any aggressor against the Soviet Union and to 
promote noninterventional pacifism. Although many members of the World Committee 
were non-Communists, its control was in the hands of such Communists as Willi Muenzen- 
T)erg and Henri Barbusse. Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) Inter- 
national, Structure and Functions, p. 56. 

39 G-2 Document No. 91 : SMP File D-7356, April 16, 1936, p. 3. 

37 G-2 Document No. 4 : SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937. 

^Editor: The presence of at least two foreigners, Smedley and Isaacs, is worthy of 
note. G-2 Document No. 31. SMP file cords, various. 

39 G-2 Document No. 96 : SMP File D-4455, February 2, 1933-May 14, 1935, p. 32. 

«° Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International Structure and 
Functions, pp. 7, 56 et al. 

41 Battle Hvmn of China, op. cit., p. 24. 

42 G-2 Document No. 4 : SMP File D-7298. March 3, 1936-December 30, 1937, p. 55. 

43 G-2 Document No. 19: SMP File No. D-3527, April 18, 1932-AugUSt 18, 1932, p. 4. 
G-2 Document No. 68 : SMP File D-2554, October 12, 1933, pp. 10, 11, 15. 

44 G-2 Document No. 59: SMP File D-4380, July 6, 1933-Februarv 10, 1936. 

40 G-2 Document No. 45: SMP File D-517, September 19-Octoher 28, 1929, p. 12; 
G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-43S0/5, August 25, 1933, pp. 90, 113, etc. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE ] 249 

The Antiwar Congress presumably was to gather data on Japanese aggression, 
the Comintern having denounced the 1931 Lytton Mission as a "whitewash" by 
the "imperialist organ," the League of Nations. Madame Sun Yat-sen, China 
representative of the World Committee Against Imperialist War. headed Un- 
welcoming committee and a host of organizations in China promoted the mission, 
organizing mass welcome demonstrations but tying in the visit with the necessity 
for the "extension of the revolutionary struggle." Joined with these ostensibly 
Chinese problems were demands "to oppose the imperialist attack on the U. S. 
S. R." as well as to "celebrate the recent victories of the (Chinese) Red armies" 
and "to oppose Christianity and fascism." 46 On hand to welcome the mission 
were Agnes Smedley and delegates from America, Canada, and Australia. It 
appears, however, that the Antiwar Congress accomplished nothing : Lord Marley 
spoke at a few meetings, was shocked when taken through a colony of laborers' 
hovels, and departed Shanghai less than 2 months after his arrival." 

((f) Zeitgeist Bookstore. — The Zeitgeist Bookstore, established by Irene 
E. I. Wiedemeyer (Weitemeyer) in November 1930, was part of a widespread 
and elaborate Comintern network operating from the International Union of 
Revolutionary Writers in Moscow. Prior to the advent of Hitler, the Zeitgeist 
Buehhandlung in Berlin, with a branch office of its own in Moscow, was an im- 
portant Comintern cultural outlet, part of a syndicate headed by Willi Muenzen- 
berg, who was also German head of the League Against Imperialism, of the 
Comintern's own bank in Paris, the Banque Commerciale Pour L'Europe du 
Nord. and a vast number of other Comintern organizations and enterprises until 
he was read out of the Comintern in 1938, 2 years before his suicide. 48 The 
Shanghai branch of the Zeitgeist Bookstore was set up as a focal distribution 
point (if the international Union of Revolutionary Writers, stocking Communist 
publications in German and English as well as more legitimate literature, mainly 
in German. The amount of business transacted by the Zeitgeist Bookstore 
was small and the shop closed in 1933, ostensibly due to its poor finances. A 
more likely reason was the destruction of the legalized German Communist Party 
since, after a trip to Europe in the autumn of 1933, Irene Weidemeyer returned 
to Shanghai on September 9, 1934 to set herself up in the book business again, 
this time as the Shanghai representative of International Publishers of New 
York. 49 The latter organization has long been the publishers of American Com- 
munist Party writings and the American distributor of International Literature. 60 

Although Miss Wiedemeyer acted as the agent of International Publishers, 
another Shanghai group was also known as the authorized agents for Inter- 
national Literature. Mrs. V, N. Sotoff (Sotov), the wife of the head of the 
Shanghai agency of TASS, operated the American Book & Supply Co., which 
sold International Literature ; it is significant, however, that the American 
Book & Supply Co. and Miss Wiedemeyer's agency occupied offices in the same 
building at 410 Szechuan Road. 51 

Miss Wiedemeyer had had some background in the Third International al- 
though there are gaps in information on her activities in Shanghai. She had 
married Wu Shao-kuo, a Chinese Communist, in Germany in 192.1 and had 
studied the principles of revolutionary movements in Asia at the Sun Yat-sen 
University in Moscow in 1926-27. In Shanghai she knew Agnes Smedley well 
and was a member of the Noulens Defense Committee and the Society of Friends 
of the U. S. S. R. She, as well as Smedley and Isaacs during 1932 were reported 
to have been in close contact with John M. Murray, an American correspondent 
for the Pacific News Agency, a Vancouver organization listed as an outlet of 
the Comintern and possibly a front for the League Against Imperialism and 
Colonial Oppression of Canada. 62 In any event the particular role of the leftist 
bookshop was to operate as an outlet for revolutionary literature, rendezvous 
of espionage partisans and fellow travelers. Wiedemeyer's (Weitemeyer) Zeit- 
geist Bookstore is covered elsewhere in the Sorge Trial Records. Ozaki, Sorge's 



48 G-2 Document No. 68: SMP File D-4380, Julv 15-August 18. 1933, pp. 161, 186. 

47 G-2 Document No. 68 : SMP File D-43S0/5, September 28, 1933, p. 93. G-2 Docu- 
ment No. 59 ; SMP File D-4380, July 6. 1933-February 10. 1936. 

48 Memorandum 17, October 29, 1947, Third (Communist) International, Structure and 
Functions, pp. 37. 41, 42, et al. (Editor:) This report presents an interesting picture of 
some of the activities of a remarkable Comintern agent. 

49 G-2 Document No. 23 : SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5. 
SMP file card ( Weitmever). 

60 G-2 Document No. 23 : SMP File D-6480, November 14, 1934-February 13, 1935, p. 5. 

61 G-2 Document No. 31 : SMP file card (Weitmever). 

82 G-2 Document No. 10: SMP File D-4718. January 4, 1933-Mav 20, 1933. pp. 29-32. 



1250 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

right-hand man, was introduced by Smedley in Weitemeyer's bookshop, rendez- 
vous of Shanghai leftists, mail drop for espionage agents. 53 Later on, during 
his imprisonment in Sugamo, he wrote a pathetic letter on June 8, 1943 : 

" * * * I may say that, in a more profound sense, my meeting with Agnes 
Smedley and Richard Sorge had been predestined * * * my subsequent de- 
cision to follow the narrow road was determined by my encounter with 
them * * *" 

The little bookshop had done its bit as a recruiting station for the Fourth 
Bureau (Intelligence) of the Soviet Army — but the narrow road led to the 
gallows ! 

(h) Ancillary American contributory factors. — The interlocking court records 
of the Sorge case and the files of the Shanghai municipal police show a very 
considerable traffic of shady international characters, over a long period of years. 
Their clandestine operations in the thirties have paved the way for the collapse 
of Nationalist China in recent years, under the cumulative impact of the Japanese 
occupation. 

The recent State Department white paper throws some flickering light on 
this complex, general problem : 

"* * * i^ combined force of overpopulation and new ideas set in motion 
the Chinese revolution, first under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen and later 
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. It should be remembered that Soviet doctrine 
and practice had a measurable effect upon the thinking and principles of Dr. 
Sun Yat-Sen particularly in terms of economics and party organization and that 
the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated until 1927, when the 
Third International demanded a predominant position in the Government and 
in the Army. It was this demand which precipitated the break between the two 
groups. * * *" 

This is an oblique admission that the infant republic was weaned on Soviet 
doctrine and practice; it easily explains the widow Sun Yat-Sen as a front for 
many Communist efforts and it concedes naively, that the Chinese Communist 
Party came under the orders of the Third International, the recognized Soviet 
tool of internal sabotage and subversion, in its demands on the government and 
army in 1927 — and thereafter. 

The Shanghai police records contain many items in which American diplo- 
matic and consular officers have attempted to stem the Red tide, by denying the 
protection of the International Settlement or American pseudo-citizenship to 
these operators ; a classical case is the intervention of the American consul to stop 
the publication of The Voice of China. 54 

While the white paper apparently skirts the conspiratorial underground, it 
-confirms the impact of the Comintern apparatus, amply evident in the Sorge and 
Shanghai documents ; it can at once be stated that individual propagandists and 
operators like Smedley and Stein, and the horde of saboteurs, agents, fellow 
travelers and dupes, unleashed by the Comintern, represent the major element 
in this Oriental disaster and their nefarious work must be considered a contribu- 
tory and even decisive factor. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire also to introduce in evidence a map tracing 
the connection of the various organizations concerning which you 
liave testified with various Soviet Government agencies and divisions 
of the Comintern. I will hand it to you and ask you to identify it. 

General Willoughby. It is so identified, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked 
"Willoughby Exhibit No. 42." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The map above referred to, marked "Willoughby Exhibit No. 42," 
is filed herewith.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain briefly to the committee what it 
purports to show? 



M Vol. II of five volumes of procurator's examination of Ozaki, Hozumi ; Interrogation 
No. 20, March 5, 1042, Question 14 ct al. 

M See footnote 30; pt. Ill; G-2 Doc. 4, SMP File D-7298, March 3, 1936-December 
.30, 1!K>,7. 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1251 

General Willoughby. Intensive examination of the Shanghai 

records, plus other supporting evidence available to the G-2 section 
in Tokyo, made it comparatively easy to reconst nut the organizational 
family tree of the Third (Communist) International. 

The upper part of this family tree is the Communist mother unit. 
The next part shows the foreign ancillaries, in this instance leading 
into China. The third part is devoted to Shanghai. The box Inter- 
national lied Aid leads to International Labor Defense (United 
States) and Civil Rights Congress. I again refer to the article by 
Craig Thompson in the Saturday Evening Post of February 17, 1951, 
•which covers this specifically with reference to the United States. I 
covered it specifically with reference to Shanghai. That is the purpose 
•of this chart. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Willoughby, in the course of your tenure 
in Tokyo, were you acquainted with a person by the name of Philip 
Keeney, or did you have occasion to look into the case of Philip 
Keeney '. 

General Willoughby. As a citizen, Mr. Counsel, I am very anxious 
to be of service to this committee, but as a Federal employee and func- 
tionary, I am expected to carry out to the letter the regulations of the 
Army and the Presidential directive of March 1948, under the terms 
of which I must respectfully decline to dwell on this individual, 
since he was a Federal employee and no reference to his files is per- 
mitted, derogatory or otherwise. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Keeney has appeared before this committee, but 
he did not cooperate. 

I believe you were asked questions before another committee relat- 
ing to several other Government employees ? 

General Willoughby. I was. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is your answer the same as to those as to Philip 
Keeney ? 

General Willoughby. My technical objection is the same, on ac- 
count of the clear-cut regulatory orders. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I believe that is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Doyle, do you have further questions ? 

Mr. Doyle. I want to renew my question, then, if it is proper at 
this place to ask the general to give us the benefit of his recommenda- 
tions as to remedial legislation to meet the problem facing this coun- 
try with regard to subversive activities. If you have any suggestions 
or advice as to what further we can do in meeting the situation which 
originates domestically or is instigated from foreign countries, give us 
that. 

General Willoughby. I have strong feelings on this entire field, and 
am delighted at this opportunity of submitting certain thoughts that 
might be termed recommendations. 

First, the Federal Government should give full and unqualified sup- 
port to this committee. Possibly a joint House-Senate committee is 
indicated, as they are operating in the same sphere of investigation. 

Such committee should be supported financially in order that their 
research staffs may be increased. I have the impression that while 
these staffs are doing a first-class job, they obviously are limited both 
in time and personnel. 



1252 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

With reference to such expanded allocation of funds to support 
the research staffs of such committees as this, there should be establish- 
ed a central file or record system in which information of this kind 
ultimately finds its place, for future reference, or so that these inter- 
locking relationships could be traced. 

Second, the FBI should be vigorously supported. In my associa- 
tion over many years with the FBI, I hold the highest regard for the 
efficiency of that body. The authority should be extended from its 
present field to include the international relationships in the areas 
of subversion. 

Third, their work should be made easier by the elimination 'of legal- 
istic juridical objections. For example, to determine whether wire- 
tapping under certain conditions is illegal. Wiretapping is in the 
same category as furnishing a pistol to a law enforcing agency com- 
bating crime. All law-enforcing agencies, with particular regard to 
the FBI, should be given free play in their fight against these sub- 
terranean forces of evil which have no such fine distinction as to 
whether or not wiretapping is or is not illegal. The law-enforcing 
agency combating them should be given complete liberty of action. 

Fourth, having remarked once on the excellent work of the Cali- 
fornia State Committee on Un-American Activities, I would recom- 
mend that each State legislature form and maintain such a committee 
and that this network of proposed State un-American activities com- 
mittees cooperate, on a correspondence or secretarial basis, with this 
congressional committee, so that the investigative process Statewide 
blankets the Nation. 

I also would recommend that at least one State university, or uni- 
versities, should at once institute special research courses leading to 
academic degrees, or acceptable under that classification, to study 
the mechanism of communism and to disseminate combative literature 
to that effect. 

That, roughly, is my thought on the subject. 

Mr. Doyle. You didn't mention any legislation other than what we 
now have. 

General Willoughby. I am glad you reminded me of it. 

I think that any legislation that in your experience you have found 
to be deficient in your line of inquiry should be strengthened or new 
legislation provided, in order to satisfy the experience, for example, 
by this committee in its past dealings; in fact, legislation to make this 
committee permanent and not subject to, shall we say, an allocation 
of funds, so that if the funds are not forthcoming the personnel col- 
lapses. There is room for a permanent watchdog on a congressional 
and State level for the laudable purposes of this inquiry. 

Mr. Doyle. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde, any further questions? 

Mr. Velde. General, I want to thank you for the very fine contribu- 
tion you have made to this committee as a result of your very extensive 
and distinguished service as Intelligence Chief to General MacArthur. 

It occurred to me while you were testifying that your hands were 
tied a little bit by this Presidential directive issued in April of 1948, 
and subsequent Presidential directives. I realize full well that it 
would be unwise for this committee to have available to it all of the 
files of the FBI, or all of the G-2 files, but it does seem to me that 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1253 

certain files, especially the older files, personnel files, loyalty files, 
should be available to congressional committees for their examination 
and perusal. 

I wonder i 1' you agree with me on that ? 

General Willoughiiy. May I say that I am reluctant to criticize 
Presidential directives, but that the legislative liberty which is ac- 
corded to Congress would, of course, enable them to pursue their 
channels of inquiry according to the dictates of their conscience. 

Mr. Velde. With reference to your recommendation relative to the 
FBI and other investigative agencies, I happen to be familiar with 
the operations of the FBI, being a former FBI agent myself. I 
realize their hands are tied in certain investigations, especially those 
involving subversives, by the fact it is difficult to obtain the permission 
of the Attorney General in many cases to install wire taps or secret 
means of obtaining information. However, it may be done, with the 
authority of the Attorney General, and he only grants that authority, 
as I understand it, when there is other corroborative evidence of sub- 
versive activity in violation of the Federal laws. Do you think that 
procedure should be changed in any way? 

General Willoughbt. While I am anxious to be of assistance to you, 
Mr. Velde, of course my specialty has been in a slightly different 
category. I believe the Congress is in a position to effect such regu- 
lations as they see fit, and my opinion is practically worthless. 

Mr. Velde. When did you say that the Japanese intelligence were 
first aware of the fact that the Sorge spy ring was operating in Japan? 

General Willoughby. They must have been aware of it for some 
time, because they intercepted Klauseivs radio messages to the Siber- 
ian radio station. They knew by that token they were in contact with 
some foreign agent. But Klausen had domicile furnished by the 
British subject Guenther Stein, and shifted his station continually so 
that they were not able to catch up with him. 

Mr. Velde. Japan was on peaceful terms with Russia during the 
thirties? 

General Willoughbt. Yes. That was a contributing factor. 

Mr. Velde. Would you say the Japanese had intelligence of the 
Sorge spy ring as far back as 1935 ? 

General Wiluutghby. That is not my impression; that is too far 
back; that is too far back. As a matter of fact, Sorge, as I recall, 
was in and out twice. I would have to look this up. 

Mr. Velde. Of course, it isn't too important. I just wanted to bring 
out the fact you have so ably brought out so many times, that we have 
a counterpart to the Sorge spy ring, or did have, and I suppose it is 
still functioning in the United States of America, and the first con- 
clusive evidence that there was a Soviet spy ring operating in this 
country was adduced in March 1943, that late, although it was deter- 
mined the spy ring had been operating sometime prior to that time, 
and probably back as far as 1934 or 1935. And I might say that the 
evidence that was produced was substantiated by highly confidential 
means such as you have been discussing. 

The only difficulty that we have, as I see it, is the fact that after 
evidence is obtained by highly confidential means, it is not permitted 
as evidence in courts of law. I think our distinguished colleague. Mr. 
Walter, is considering a bill before the Judiciary Committee at this 



]254 AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 

time to make evidence secured by wire tapping and other confidential' 
means admissible in courts of law. 

Do you concur that that would be a good recommendation for 
legislation ? 

General Willoughby. I concur. I have already gone on record 
that all legalistic juridical objections in the way of law-enforcing and 
investigative agencies should be removed, without touching the in- 
dividual liberty in its broad concept, in order to make their work: 
both easier and more effective. I selected wire tapping. Perhaps there 
are other references possible. To be morally sensitive when you are 
dealing with a criminal strikes me as silly. 

Mr. Velde. Of course we all hate to have our rights of privacy 
violated. I know I do, and I am sure you do too. But in cases where 
we are liable to lose all our rights if we don't use such method, I 
think the method is justified. 

General Willotjghby. I assume it would only be applied against 
subversive and criminal groups. The average citizen of probity would 
hardly be exposed to it, and if he were, he could easily make his posi- 
tion defensible, I have a feeling. 

Mr. Velde. Thank you again. 

Mr. Wood. General, I join with other members of the committee 
in conveying to you the very deep appreciation that this committee 
feels for the effort you have expended, and the considerable sacrifice 
of your strength in the present condition of your health, as well as 
your time, to come here and give the committee and the American 
people the valuable information you have given. 

After all, we only operate as the agents and representatives of the 
people. We have no power other than to make known to the American 
people, as best we can, what is going on that strikes at our liberty and 
way of life. I am particularly impressed with what you had to say,, 
and appreciative. 

I wouldn't be entirely human if I didn't also take this opportunity 
to express very great gratification for your feeling about this com- 
mittee. This committee has been in existence a relatively short time.. 
We operate under a limited budget. It is significant that this com- 
mittee has in its employ only eight investigators, who have to cover a 
a wide area. Every member of this committee, elected Member of" 
the Congress itself, has other committee assignments besides this, in 
addition to the general work as Members of Congress in undertaking 
to study and pass intelligently on legislation that comes before the- 
Congress, which makes it obviously imperative that we lean rather 
heavily upon our counsel and staff, and we are very fortunate to have 
a staff and counsel of which no one needs to be ashamed, and of 
which we are very proud. 

It has occurred to me — not now but sometime at your leisure, today 
or tomorrow or some future time — you might find an opportunity to 
confer with the investigative staff and counsel of this committee 
and, out of the abundance of your wide knowledge and experience, 
you might make some suggestions, perhaps, to the staff that would be 
beneficial to them in the performance of the various and many duties 
piling in both day and night. 

I happen to know that members of this staff work long hours.. There 
is no clock- watching on this committee. Frequently they go for 24 



AMERICAN ASPECTS OF RICHARD SORGE SPY CASE 1255 

hours at a time without sleep. I felt that perhaps you might be in a 
position to be of some assistance to them by making such suggestions 
as you might think would be helpful to them, out of the abundance 
of your experience. 

Mr. Counsel, do you have any further questions you desire to ask 
the general \ 

Mr. Tavenner. It is my thought that there is other testimony which 
is vital to the committee. 

Mr. Woon. I understood we wanted to have an executive session 
with the general, and if he can join us for an executive session we 
would be very grateful to him. 

(Thereupon, at 4:50 p. in., the public testimony of General Wil- 
loughby was concluded, and a subcommittee of the Committee on 
Un-American Activities proceeded to go into executive session.) 



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