tH.N.S.C. No. 104-23)
Y4.SE 2/1 A: 995-96/23
National Defense Authorization Act...^^
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997— H.R. 3230
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FULL COMMITTEE HEARINGS
ON
AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT
HEARINGS HELD
MARCH 6, 8, 13, 27, AND 28, 1996
[HJJ.S.C. No. 104-23]
HEARINGS
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997— H.R. 3230
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED
PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
FULL COMMITTEE HEARINGS
ON
AUTHOraZATION AND OVERSIGHT
HEARINGS HELD
MARCH 6, 8, 13, 27, AND 28, 1996
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-160 WASfflNGTON : 1997
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Supeiintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-054930-2
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
One Hundred Fourth Congress
FLOYD D. SPENCE, South Carolina, Chairman
BOB STUMP, Arizona
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio
HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Virginia
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana
PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts
TILLIE K. FOWLER, Florida
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
JAMES TALENT, Missouri
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD "BUCK" McKEON, California
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
J.C. WATTS, JB., Oklahoma
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida
WALTER B. JONES, JR., North Carolina
JAMES B. LONGLEY, JR., Maine
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas
RICHARD "DOC' HASTINGS, Washington
Andrew K. Elus, Staff Director
Heather L. HeschelES, Staff Assistant
WILUAM Marsh, Staff Assistant
RONALD V. DELLUMS, Cahfomia
G.V. (SONNY) MONTGOMERY, Mississippi
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
IKE SKELTON, Missouri
NORMAN SISISKY, Virginia
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
OWEN PICKETT, Virginia
LANE EVANS, Illinois
JOHN TANNER, Tennessee
GLEN BROWDER, Alabama
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
CHET EDWARDS, Texas
FRANK TEJEDA, Texas
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
JANE HARMAN, California
PAUL McHALE, Pennsylvania
PETE GEREN, Texas
PETE PETERSON, Florida
WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
MIKE WARD, Kentucky
PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
1996
Page
Wednesday, March 6, 1996, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization
Act — Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1
Friday, March 8, 1996, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization
Act Act — Service Secretaries 159
Wednesday, March 13, 1996, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act Act— Service Chiefs 449
Wednesday, March 27, 1996, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act — Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) 613
Thursday, March 28, 1996, Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense Authorization
Act — United States European Command (EUCOM), Central Command
(CENTCOM), Pacific Conmiand (PACOM), Forces Korea (USFK), and At-
lantic Command (ACOM) 693
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Delliuns, Hon. Ronald V., a Representative from CaUfomia, Ranking Minority
Member, Committee on National Security:
Statement 3, 160, 452, 694, 814
Prepared statement 454, 814
Spence, Hon. Floyd D., a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Committee on National Security: Statement 1, 159, 449, 613, 694
PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS
Boorda, Adm. Michael, Chief of Naval Operations: Statement 468
Dalton, Hon. John, Secretary of the Navy:
Statement 288
Prepared statement 292
Fogleman, Gen. Ronald, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
Statement 472
Prepared statement 475
Gehman, Adm. Harold, USN, Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic
Command: Statement 858
Hamre, John, Comptroller, Department of Defense: Statement 6
Joulwan, Gen. George A., USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Com-
mand:
Statement 696
Prepared statement 699
Krulak, Gen. Charles, Commandant of the Marine Corps: Statement 521
Luck, Gen. Gary E., USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea:
Statement 845
Prepared statement 845
Maroni, AUce, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller):
Statement 6
(III)
IV
Page
Peay, Gen. J.H. Binford III, USA, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Com-
mand:
Statement 740
Prepared statement 742
Perry, Dr. William J., Secretary of Defense:
Statement 6
Prepared statement 17
Prueher, Adm. Joseph W., USN, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command:
Statement 818
Prepared statement 819
Ralston, Gen. Joseph W., USAF, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Chairman, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, accompanied by Gen.
Ronald H. Griffith, Vice Chief of Staff" of the Army; Adm. Jay J. Johnson,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Richard D. Heamey, Assistant Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps; and Gen. Thomas S. Moorman, Jr., Vice
Chief of Staff of the Air Force:
Statement 615
Prepared statement 620
Reimer, Gen. Dennis J., Chief of Staff" of the Army:
Statement 454
Prepared statement 455
Shalikashvili, Gen. John M., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff":
Statement 6
Prepared statement 68
Sheehan, Gen. John J., USMC, Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command:
Prepared statement 859
West, Hon. Togo D., Jr., Secretary of the Army:
Statement 162
Prepared statement 165
WidnaU, Hon. Sheila E., Secretary of the Air Force:
Statement 351
Prepared statement 354
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
JCS View of Recapitalization 601
United States Army Posture Statement FY 1997 — Meeting the Challenges
of Today, Tomorrow, and the 21st Century 175
United States Navy Posture Statement FY 1997 293
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Additional questions and answers submitted for the record 124, 148, 422, 425,
426, 428, 433, 438, 572, 573, 592, 594, 597, 602
104TH CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 3230
To authorize appropriations for flscal year 1997 for military activities of the Depart-
ment of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997,
and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
April 15, 1996
Mr. Spence (for himself and Mr. Dellums) (both by request) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the (Committee on National Security
ABHX
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1997 for military activities of the Depart-
ment of Defense, to prescribe military personnel strengths for fiscal year 1997,
and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997".
SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.
The table of contents for this Act is as follows:
Sec. 1. Table of contents.
TITLE I— PROCUREMENT
Subtitle A — Authorization of Appropriations
Sec. 101. Army.
Sec. 102. Navy and Marine Corps.
Sec. 103. Air Force.
Sec. 104. Defense-wide Activities.
Sec. 105. Defense Inspector (Jeneral.
Sec. 106. Defense health pro-am.
Sec. 107. Chemical demilitarization program.
Subtitle B— Other Matters
Sec. 110. Clarification of waiver provision for F-15 aircraft program.
Sec. 111. Increase in the definitional amounts for major systems for Department of
Defense procurement.
Sec. 112. Authorizes revisions to improve the acquisition reporting process for
major defense acquisition programs.
TITLE II— RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION
Sec. 201. Authorization of Appropriations.
Sec. 202. Live-fire survivability testing of V-22 aircraft.
Sec. 203. Live-fire survivability testing of F-22 aircraft.
Sec. 204. Research activities of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
(V)
VI
TITLE III— OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Subtitle A — Authorization of Appropriations
Sec. 301. Operation and maintenance funding.
Sec. 302. irking capital funds.
Subtitle B— Other Matters
Sec. 310. Remedies for contractor employee whistleblowers.
Sec. 311. Repeal of requirement for physical examination on calling militia into
Federal service.
Sec. 312. Defense Business Operations Fund amendment.
TITLE IV— MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Subtitle A — Active Forces
Sec. 401. End strengths for active forces.
Sec. 402. Excluding certain Reserve component members on active duty for 181
days or more from active component end strengths.
Subtitle B — Reserve Forces
Sec. 411. End strengths for Selected Reserve.
Sec. 412. End strengths for Reserves on active duty in support of the Reserves.
TITLE V— MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY
Subtitle A — Matters Relating to Reserve Components
Sec. 501. Discharge or retirement for years of service or after selection for early re-
moval.
Sec. 502. Appointment above 0-2 in the United States Naval Reserve.
Sec. 503. Test program on unlimited use of commissary stores by eligible reservists.
Sec. 504. Active duty retirement sanctuary for reservists.
Sec. 505. Change in time for award of degree to be considered to meet the Selected
Reserve officer education requirement.
Sec. 506. Clarification of limitation on furnishing clothing or allowances for enlisted
National Guard technicians.
Sec. 507. Use of active Guard and Reserve personnel in composite active and re-
serve component activities and in activities and functions assigned to
a reserve component organization.
Subtitle B — Officer Education Programs
Sec. 510. Extension of age requirements for appointment as a cadet or midshipman
in the Senior Reserve OfTicers' Training Corps and the military depart-
ment service academies.
Sec. 511. Expansion of Senior Reserve Officer Training Corps advanced training
program to include graduate students.
Subtitle C— Other Matters
Sec. 515. Clarifying definition of active status.
Sec. 516. Chief warrant officer promotions.
Sec. 517. Revisions to missing persons authorities.
Sec. 518. Authority for the temporary promotions of certain Navy lieutenants.
Sec. 519. Extension in the delayed entry program of up to 180 days for meritorious
cases.
TITLE VI— COMPENSATION AND OTHER PERSONNEL BENEFITS
Subtitle A — Pay and Allowances
Sec. 601. Military pay raise for fiscal year 1997.
Sec. 602. Restriction on entitlement to basic allowance for quarters for reserve com-
ponent members.
Sec. 603. Continuous BAQATHA for single members who PCS to deployed unit; au-
thorization to quarters ashore (either adequate or inadeauate), or basic
allowance for quarters for E-5 members, without dependents, assigned
to sea duty; and BAQAHHA for shipboard military couples.
Sec. 604. Adjustments in cadet and midshipmen pay.
VII
Subtitle B — Extension on Bonuses and Special Pays
Sec. 605. Extension of authority relating to payment of other bonuses and special
pays.
Sec. 606. Extension of certain bonuses for Reserve forces.
Sec. 607. Extension and modification of certain bonuses and special pay for nurse
officer candidates, registered nurses, and nurse anesthetists.
Subtitle C — Travel and Transportation Allowances
Sec. 610. Round-trip travel allowances for shipping motor vehicles at Government
expense.
Sec. 611. Authority to reimburse Department of Defense domestic dependent
school-board members for certain programs and activities.
Sec. 612. Storage of a motor vehicle in lieu of transportation.
Sec. 613. Repem of prohibition on payment of lodging expenses when adequate
Government quarters are available.
Subtitle D — Retired Pay, Survivor Benefits, and Related Matters
Sec. 615. Effective date for military retiree cost-of-living adjustment for fiscal year
1998.
Sec. 616. Clarifying use of military morale, welfare, and recreation facilities by re-
tired reservists.
Subtitle E— Other Matters
Sec. 620. Disability coverage for officers granted excess leave for educational pur-
poses.
Sec. 621. Amendments to the Uniformed Services Former Spouses* Protection Act.
Sec. 622. Travel and transportation allowances: travel performed in connection
with leave between consecutive overseas tours.
TITLE VII— HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS
Sec, 701. Technical revision to CHAMPUS payment limits for TRICARE prime en-
rollees.
Sec. 702. Rej>eal of the statutory restriction on use of funds for abortions.
Sec. 703. Medical and dental care for Reserve component members in a duty status.
Sec. 704. Improved death and disability benefits for reservists.
TITLE VIII— ACQUISITION AND RELATED MATTERS
Sec. 801. Repeal of procurement technical assistance cooperative agreement pro-
gram.
Sec. 802. Extension of pilot mentor program.
Sec. 803. Extension and revision of authority to enter into prototype projects.
Sec. 804. Authority for payments from canceled account for shipouilding and con-
version to be made from prior years account.
Sec. 805. Reliance on the private sector for supplies and services.
TITLE DC— DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
Subtitle A — General Matters
Sec. 901. Change in name of North American Air Defense Command.
Sec. 902. Amendment to board membership of the Ammunition Storage Board.
Subtitle B — Financial Management
Sec. 910. Devolution of environmental restoration transfer accounts to the military
departments.
Sec. 911. Recruiting functions: use of funds.
TITLE X— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A — Financial Matters
Sec. 1001. Repeal of recjuirement for separate budget request for procurement of
Reserve equipment.
Sec. 1002. Acceptance of services for Defense purpose (Defense cooperation ac-
count).
Sec. 1003. Disposition of certain assets arising out of the sale of certain assets at
closed military installations.
VIII
Subtitle B — Civilian Personnel
Sec. 1011. Employment and compensation provisions for faculty members and lead-
ership of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
Sec. 1012. Excepted appointment of judicial non-attorney staff in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.
Sec. 1013. Conversion 01 military positions.
Subtitle C — Miscellaneous Reporting Requirements
Sec. 1020. National Guard and Reserve component equipment: annual report to
Congress.
Sec. 1021. Annual report on strategic defense initiative.
Sec. 1022. Repeal of report on contractor reimbursement costs.
Sec. 1023. Repeal of notice requirements for substantially or seriously affected par-
ties in downsizing efforts.
Subtitle D — Matters Relating to Other Nations
Sec. 1025. Authorization for execution of Department of Defense demining pro-
gram.
Subtitle E— Other Matters
Sec. 1030. National defense technology and industrial base, defense reinvestment,
and defense conversion.
Sec. 1031. Restoration of authority for certain intragovemment transfers in the
base closure and realignment process.
Sec. 1032. Chemical demilitarization citizens advisory commissions.
Sec. 1033. Transfer of excess personal property to support law enforcement agen-
cies.
Sec. 1034. Control of transportation systems in time of war.
Sec. 1035. Redesignation of" Office of Naval Records and History Gift Fund to Naval
Historical Center Fund.
Sec. 1036. Transportation by commissaries and exchanges to overseas locations.
Sec. 1037. Cooperative agreements for the management of cultural resources.
Sec. 1038. Medal of Honor for African American soldiers who served in World War
II.
Sec. 1039. Presidential inauguration assistance.
TITLE XXI— ARMY
Sec. 2101. Authorized Army construction and land acquisition projects.
Sec. 2102. Family housing.
Sec. 2103. Improvements to military family housing units.
Sec. 2104. Authorization of appropriations. Army.
TITLE XXII— NAVY
Sec. 2201. Authorized Navy construction and land acquisition projects.
Sec. 2202. Family housing.
Sec. 2203. Improvements to military family housing units.
Sec. 2204. Authorization of appropriations, Navy.
TITLE XXIII— AIR FORCE
Sec. 2301. Authorized Air Force construction and land acquisition projects.
Sec. 2302. Family housing.
Sec. 2303. Improvements to military family housing units.
Sec. 2304. Authorization of appropriations. Air Force.
TITLE XXIV— DEFENSE AGENCIES
Sec. 2401. Authorized Defense agencies construction and land acquisition projects.
Sec. 2402. Military housing planning and design.
Sec. 2403. Improvements to military family housing units.
Sec. 2404. Military housing improvement program.
Sec. 2405. Energy conservation projects.
Sec. 2406. Authorization of appropriations, Defense agencies.
TITLE XXV— NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SECURITY
INVESTMENT PROGRAM
Sec. 2501. Authorized NATO construction and land acquisition projects.
Sec. 2502. Authorization of appropriations, NATO.
DC
TITLE XXVI— GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES
Sec. 2601. Authorized Guard and Reserve construction and land acquisition
projects.
Sec. 2602. Authorization of construction projects to be funded with previous-year
appropriations.
TITLE XXVII— EXPIRATION AND EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 2701. Expiration of authorizations and amounts required to be specified by
law.
Sec. 2702. Extension of authorizations of certain fiscal year 1994 projects.
Sec. 2703. Extension of authorizations of certain fiscal year 1993 projects.
Sec. 2704. Extension of authorizations of certain fiscal year 1992 projects.
Sec. 2705. Effective date.
TITLE I— PROCUREMENT
Subtitle A— Authorization of Appropriations
SEC. 101. ARMY.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for procure-
ment for the Army as follows:
(1) For aircraft, $970,815,000.
(2) For missiles, $766,329,000.
(3) For weapons and tracked combat vehicles, $1,102,014,000.
(4) For ammunition, $853,428,000.
(5) For other procurement, $2,627,440,000.
SEC. IDS. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for procure-
ment for the Navy as follows:
(1) For aircraft, $5,881,952,000.
(2) For weapons, including missiles and torpedoes, $1,400,363,000.
(3) For shipbuilding and conversion, $4,911,930,000.
(4) For other procurement, $2,714,195,000.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for procure-
ment for the Marine Corps in the amount of $555,507,000.
SEC. 103. AIR FORCE.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for procure-
ment for the Air Force as follows:
(1) For aircraft, $5,779,228,000.
(2) For missiles, $2,733,877,000.
(3) For other procurement, $5,998,819,000.
SEC. 104. DEFENSE- WIDE ACTIVITIES.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for defense-
wide procurement in the amount of $1,814,212,000.
SEC. 105. DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the pro-
curement for the Defense Inspector General in the amount of $2,000,000.
SEC. 106. DEFENSE HEALTH PROGRAM.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the De-
partment of Defense for procurement for carrying out health care programs,
projects, and activities of the Department of Defense in the total amount of
$269,470,000.
SEC. 107. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION PROGRAM.
There is hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 in the amount
of $799,847,000 for—
(1) the destruction of lethal chemical weapons in accordance with section 1412
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (50 U.S.C. 1521), and
(2) the destruction of chemical warfare material of the United States that is
not covered by section 1412 of such Act.
X
Subtitle B— Other Matters
SEC. lia CLARIFICATION OF WAIVER PROVISION FOR F-15 AIRCRAFT PROGRAM.
The prohibition in section 134(aX2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1383) does not apply
to the obligation of funds appropriated by the Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act, 1996 (Public Law 104-61; 109 Stat. 636) under the heading "Aircraft Pro-
curement, Air Force" and authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 186) for F-15E aircraft or to any
appropriation or authorization for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1997.
SEC. Ul. INCREASE IN THE DEFINITIONAL AMOUNTS FOR MAJOR SYSTEMS FOR DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE PROCUREMENT.
Section 2302(5XA) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by striking out "$75,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1980 constant dollars)"
and inserting in lieu thereof "$115,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 dollars)";
(2) by striking out "$300,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1980 constant dollars)"
and inserting in lieu thereof "$540,000,000 (based on fiscal year 1990 constant
dollars)"; ana
(3) by adding to the end of section (5XA), "The Secretary of Defense may ad-
i'ust the amounts (and the base fiscal year) on the basis of Department of De-
'ense escalation rates; however, that adjustment shall not be effective until
after the Secretary transmits a written notification of the adjustment to the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and Committee on National Secu-
rity of the House of Representatives.".
SEC. 112. AUTHORIZES REVISIONS TO IMPROVE THE ACQUISITION REPORTING PROCESS FOR
MAJOR DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS.
Section 2432 of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) in subsection (cXlXB) by striking "proCTam acquisition unit cost" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "procurement unit cost ;
(2) in subsection (e) by striking subparagraph (8) and redesignating subpara-
graph (9) as subparagraph (8), accordingly; and
(3) in subsection (h) oy striking subparagraph (2XD) and by redesignating
subparagraphs (E) and (F) as subparagraphs (D) and (E), respectively.
TITLE II— RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the use
of the Armed Forces for research, development, test, and evaluation, as follows:
(1) For the Army, $4,320,640,000.
(2) For the Navy, $7,334,734,000.
(3) For the Air Force, $14,417,456,000.
(4) For Defense-wide research, development, test, and evaluation,
$8,672,842,000, of which—
(A) $252,038,000 is authorized for the activities of the Director, Test and
Evaluation; and
(B) $21,968,000 is authorized for the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation.
SEC. 202. LIVE-FIRE SURVIVABILmf TESTING OF V-22 AIRCRAFT.
(a) Authority for Retroactive Waiver. — The Secretary of Defense may exercise
the waiver authority in section 2366(c) of title 10, United States Code, with respect
to the application of survivability testing to the V-22 aircraft, notwithstanding that
the program has entered engineering and manufacturing development.
(b) ALTERNATIVE SURVIVABILITY TEST REQUIREMENTS. — The Secretary of Defense
shall make available a sufficient number of components critical to the survivability
of the V-22 aircraft in realistic threat environments to conduct the alternative live-
fire test program.
(c) Funding. — The funds required to carry out any alternative live-fire testing
program for the V-22 aircraft system shall be made available from amounts appro-
priated for the V-22 program.
SEC. 20S. LIVE-FIRE SURVTVABILITY TESTING OF F-22 AIRCRAFT.
(a) Authority for Retroactive Waiver. — The Secretary of Defense may exercise
the waiver authority in section 2366(c) of title 10, United States Code, with respect
XI
to the application of the survivability tests of that section to the F-22 aircraft, not-
withstanoing that such program has entered full-scale engineering development.
(b) Reporting Requirement. — If the Secretary of Defense submits a certiiication
under section 2366(c) of such title 10 that live-fire testing of the F-22 system under
such section would be unreasonably expensive and impractical, the Secretaiy of De-
fense shall require that sufficiently large and realistic components and subsystems
that could afiect the survivability of the F-22 system be made available for any al-
ternative live-fire test program.
(c) Funding. — The funds required to carry out any alternative live-fire testing
program for the F-22 aircraft system shall be made available from amounts appro-
priated for the F-22 program.
SEC. 204. RESEARCH ACXIVITIES OP THE DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGEN-
CY,
Notwithstanding section 1701 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160; 107 Stat. 1853), the Director of the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects Agency, for the Secretary of Defense, may conduct basic
and applied research and advanced technology development, on chemical and bio-
logical warfare defense technologies and systems, independently of any other compo-
nent of the Department of Defense. In conducting its mission of basic and apphed
research and advanced technology development, the Advanced Research Projects
Agency should avoid unnecessary duplication of efibrts of other components of the
Department. With respect to chemical and biological warfare defense activities and
where otherwise appropriate, coordinate its activities with other components of the
Department.
TITLE in— OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
Subtitle A — ^Authorization of Appropriations
SEC. 301. OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDING.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States and other activities and agencies of the
Department of Defense, for expenses, not otherwise provided for, for operation and
maintenance, in amounts as follows:
(1) For the Army, $18,114,479,000.
(2) For the Navy, $20,196,197,000.
(3) For the Marine Corps, $2,203,777,000.
(4) For the Air Force, $17,913,455,000.
(5) For the Defense Agencies, $10,156,468,000.
(6) For the Army Reserve, $1,084,436,000.
(7) For the Naval Reserve, $843,927,000.
(8) For the Marine Corps Reserve, $99,667,000.
(9) For the Air Force Reserve, $1,488,553,000.
(10) For the Army National Guard, $2,208,477,000.
(11) For the Air National Guard, $2,654,473,000.
(12) For the Defense Inspector General, $136,501,000.
(13) For Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities, Defense,
$642,724,000.
(14) For the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, $6,797,000.
(15) For Environmental Restoration, Army, $356,916,000.
(16) For Environmental Restoration, Navy, $302,900,000.
(17) For Environmental Restoration, Air Force, $414,700,000.
(18) For Environmental Restoration, Defense-wide, $258,500,000.
(19) For Medical Programs, Defense, $9,358,288,000.
(20) For Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, $80,544,000.
(21) For Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction, $327,900,000.
(22) For Payments to Kaho'olawe Island, $10,000,000.
SEC. 302. WORKING CAPITAL FUND&
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1997 for the use
of the Armed Forces of the United States and other activities and agencies of the
Department of Defense for providing capital for working capital and revolving funds
in amounts as follows:
(1) For the Defense Business Operations Fund, $947,900,000.
(2) For the National Defense Sealift Fund, $963,002,000.
XII
Subtitle B— Other Matters
SEC. 31 a REMEDIES FOR CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE WHISTLEBLOWERS.
Section 2409(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in subparagraph (B) by striking the period at the end, inserting in lieu
thereof "; or in lieu of reinstatement, order the contractor to pay the person an
amount equal to the compensation (including back pay) that would apply to the
Serson in that position if the reprisal had not been taken and an award for
amages."; and
(2) by adding at the end of paragraph (c)(1) the following new subparagraph
(D):
"(D) Order the contractor to reimburse the agency that conducted the re-
prisal investigation an amount equal to the cost of the investigation.".
SEC. 311. REPEAL OF REQUIREMENT FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION ON CALLING MILITIA
INTO FEDERAL SERVICE.
(a) Repeal of Requirement.— Section 12408 of title 10, United States Code, is
repealed.
(b) Clerical Agreement. — The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 1209
is amended by striking out the item relating to section 12408.
SBC. 312. DEFENSE BUSINESS OPERATIONS FUND AMENDMENT.
Section 2216(iXl) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking
"$50,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$100,000".
TITLE IV— MILITARY PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Subtitle A — ^Active Forces
SEC. 401. END STRENGTHS FOR ACTIVE FORCES.
The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for active duty personnel as of Sep-
tember 30, 1997, as follows:
(l)The Army, 495,000.
(2) The Navy, 406,900.
(3) The Marine Corps, 174,000.
(4) The Air Force, 381,100.
SEC. 402. EXCLUDING CERTAIN RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS ON ACTIVE DUTY FOR 181
DAYS OR MORE FROM ACTIVE COMPONENT END STRENGTHS.
Section 115(d) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
a new paragraph (8) as follows:
(8) Members of reserve components on active duty to perform special work
in support of peacetime requirements of the active components and combatant
commands for 181 days or more. The total number of personnel included in this
category shall not exceed two-tenths of one percent of the end strengths author-
ized pursuant to subsection (aXl)."-
Subtitle B — Reserve Forces
SEC. 411. END STRENGTHS FOR SELECTED RESERVE.
(a) In General. — The Armed Forces are authorized strengths for Selected Reserve
personnel of the reserve components as of September 30, 1997, as follows:
(1) The Army Reserve, 214,925.
(2) The Naval Reserve, 95,941.
(3) The Marine Corps Reserve, 42,000.
(4) The Air Force Reserve, 73,281.
(5) The Army National Guard, 366,758,
(6) The Air National Guard, 108,018.
(7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 8,000.
(b) Waiver Authority. — The Secretary of Defense may vary the end strength au-
thorized by subsection (a) by not more than 2 percent.
(c) Adjustments. — The end strengths prescribed by subsection (a) for the Selected
Reserve of any reserve component shall be reduced proportionately by —
(1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the
Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for
training) at the end of the fiscal year, and
XIII
(2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve
as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty
(other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without
their consent at the end of the fiscal year.
Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty dur-
ing any fiscal year, the end strength prescribed for such fiscal year for the Selected
Reserve of such reserve component shall be increased proportionately by the total
authorized strengths of such units and by the total numoer of such individual mem-
bers.
SEC. 412. END STRENGTHS FOR RESERVES ON ACTIVE DUTY IN SUPPORT OF THE RESERVES.
Within the end strengths prescribed in section 402(b), the reserve components of
the armed forces are authorized, as of September 30, 1997, the following number
of Reserves to be serving on fiill-time active duty or, in the case of members of the
National Guard, full-time National Guard duty for the purpose of organizing, ad-
ministering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components:
(1) The Army Reserve, 11,475.
(2) The Naval Reserve, 16,506.
(3) The Marine Corps Reserve, 2,559.
(4) The Air Force Reserve, 625.
(5) The Army National Guard, 22,798.
(6) The Air National Guard, 10,129.
TITLE V— MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY
Subtitle A — Matters Relating to Reserve Components
SEC. 601. DISCHARGE OR RETIREMENT FOR YEARS OP SERVICE OR AFTER SELECTION FOR
EARLY REMOVAL.
(a) In General. — The text of section 14514 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"Xa) Each reserve officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is
in an active status and who is required to be removed from an active status or from
a reserve active-status list, as the case may be, under section 14507, 14508, 14704,
or 14705 of this title (unless the officer is sooner separated, the officer's separation
is deferred, or the officer is continued in an active status under another provision
of law), in accordance with those sections, shall —
"(1) be transferred to the Retired Reserve, if the officer is qualified and ap-
plies for such transfer; or
"(2) if the officer is not qualified or does not apply for such transfer, be dis-
charged from the officer's reserve appointment.
"(b) Each reserve officer of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who is
in an inactive status and who is required to be removed from an inactive status —
"(1) shall be transferred to the Retired Reserve, if the ofTicer is qualified and
applies for such transfer, or
(2) may, if the officer is not qualified or does not apply for such transfer, be
discharged from the officer's reserve appointment.".
(b) Conforming Amendment.— Section 12683(bXl) of such title is amended by in-
serting "14514," and "12684,".
SEC. 602. APPOINTMENT ABOVE 0-2 IN THE U.S. NAVAL RESERVE.
Section 12205 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by amending subsection
(bX3) to read as follows:
"(3) The appointment in the Naval Reserve of a person appointed for service
under either tne Naval Aviation Cadet or Seaman to Admiral Program.".
SEC. 60S. TEST PROGRAM ON UNLIMITED USE OF COMMISSARY STORES BY ELIGIBLE RE-
SERVISTS.
(a) The Secretary of Defense shall cany out in one or more areas of the United
States a test program under which those Reserve members eligible for commissary
use under sections 1063 and 1064 of title 10, United States Code, will be permitted
to use commissary stores of the Department of Defense on the same basis as mem-
bers on active duty. The test program will begin on January 1, 1997, and will be
conducted for a period of one year.
(b) The Secretaiy of Defense shall report the results of the test program to the
Congress no later than March 31, 1998, together with such comments and rec-
ommendations as he determines appropriate.
XIV
SEC. S04. ACTIVE DUTY RETIREMENT SANCTUARY FOR RESERVISTS
Section 12686 of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by designating the existing matter as paragraph (1); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) The regulations prescribed under paragraph (l) may except from the pro-
hibition on involuntary release in that paragrapn members who serve on active
duty (other than for training) under section 12301 of this title pursuant to or-
ders specifying a period of less than 180 days provided that the member is in-
formea of and consents to such exception prior to entry on active duty.".
SEC. 606. CHANGE IN TIME FOR AWARD OF DEGREE TO BE CONSIDERED TO MEET THE SE-
LECTED RESERVE OFFICER EDUCATION REQUIREMENT.
Section 12205(cX2XC) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking
"three" and inserting in lieu thereof "eight".
SEC. 506. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON FURNISHING CLOTHING OR ALLOWANCES FOR
ENLISTED NATIONAL GUARD TECHNICIANS.
Subsection 418(c) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by striking at the
end of the paragraph "for which a uniform allowance is paid under section 415 or
416 of this title , and inserting in lieu thereof "for which clothing is furnished or
a uniform allowance is paid under this section".
SEC. 507. USE OF ACTIVE GUARD AND RESERVE PERSONNEL IN COMPOSITE ACTIVE AND RE-
SERVE COMPONENT ACTIVITIES AND IN ACTIVITIES AND FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED
TO A RESERVE COMPONENT ORGANIZATION
Section 12310 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following two new subsections:
"Xc) Organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve
components as used in this title and in the authorizations of end strengths required
under section 115 of this title, includes —
"(1) the conduct of activities described in sections 3013(b), 5013(b), and
8013(b) of this title in support of any part of a military department when such
activities have been assigned by the Secretary concerned, with the consent of
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau or the chief of such reserve component,
to a reserve component organization for execution; and
"(2) peacetime standby air defense and ballistic missile defense operations
within the territory of the United States.
"(d) A reserve on duty under subsection (a) may serve in, and supervise and com-
mand any other person serving in a composite organization that conducts activities
described in subsection (c) jointly in support of the reserve components and the ac-
tive components of one or more armed services.".
Subtitle B — Officer Education Programs
SEC. 610. EXTENSION OF AGE REQUIREMENTS FOR APPOINTMENT AS A CADET OR MID-
SHIPMAN IN THE SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS AND THE MILI-
TARY DEPARTMENT SERVICE ACADEMIES.
(a) Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps.— Section 2107(a) of title 10, Unit-
ed States Code, is amended by striking out "25" and inserting in lieu thereof "27".
(b) United States Military Academy.— Section 4346(a) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "twenty-second birthday" and inserting in lieu
thereof "twenty-third birthday^'.
(c) United States Naval Academy.— Clause (1) of section 6958(a) of title 10,
United States Code, is amended by striking out twenty-second birthday" and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "twenty -third birthday".
(d) United States Air Force Academy.— Section 9346(a) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "twenty- second birthday" and inserting in
lieu thereof "twenty-third birthday".
(e) Effective Date. — The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take effect on
the date of enactment of this Act; the amendments made by subsections (b) through
(d) shall take effect with regard to individuals entering the United States Militaryr
Academy, the United States Naval Academy, and the United States Air Force Acad-
emy after June 1, 1997.
SEC. 611. EXPANSION OF SENIOR RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS ADVANCED TRAIN-
ING PROGRAM TO INCLUDE GRADUATE STUDENTS.
(a) In General. — Section 2107(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by
inserting before the last sentence the following new penultimate sentence: "The Sec-
retary of the military department concerned may provide similar financial assist-
XV
ance to a student enrolled in an advanced education program beyond the bacca-
laureate degree level provided the student also is a cadet or midshipman in an ad-
vanced training program.".
(b) Conforming Amendment.— Paragraph (2) of subsection (h) of such section
2107 is amended in the first sentence —
(1) by striking out "two years" and inserting in lieu thereof "up to two years",
and
(2) by striking out "four years" and inserting in lieu thereof "up to four years".
(c) Definitional Change.— Paragraph (3) of section 2101 of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by inserting ' students enrolled in an advanced education
program beyond the baccalaureate degree level or to" after "instruction offered in
the Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps to".
Subtitle C— Other Matters
SEC. 615. CLARIFYING DEFINITION OF ACTIVE STATUS.
The definition of "active status" in section 101(dX4) of title- 10, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "a reserve commissioned officer, other than a com-
missioned warrant officer"; and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "a member
of a reserve component".
SEC. 51 & CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER PROMOTIONS.
(a) Reduction of Minimum Time in Grade Required for Chief Warrant Offi-
cer To Be Considered for Promotion. — Section 574(e) of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "three" and inserting in lieu thereof "two";
(b) Authorization of Below-Zone Selection for Promotion to Grade of
Chief Warrant Officer. — Section 575(b) of such title 10 is amended by inserting
"chief warrant officer, W-3," after "to consider warrant officers for selection for pro-
motion to the grade of.
SEC. 517. REVISIONS TO MISSING PERSONS AUTHORITIES.
(a) Repeal of Judicial Review and Preenactment, Specl\l Interest Cases
Provisions. — Section 1508 and 1509 of title 10, United States Code, are hereby re-
pealed.
(b) Transmission Through Theater Component Commander.— (1) Section 1502
of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(A) in subsection (aX2) —
(i) by striking "48 hours" and inserting in lieu thereof "10 days"; and
(ii) by striking "theater component commander" and inserting in lieu
thereof "Secretary concerned";
(B) by striking out subsection (b);
(C) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b); and
(D) in subsection (b), as so redesignated, by striking "The theater component
commander" and all that follows to the end of the subsection.
(2) Section 1503(a) of such title is amended by striking "1502(b)" and inserting
in lieu thereof "1502(a)".
(3) Section 1513 of such title 10 is amended by striking out paragraph (8).
(c) Counsel for Missing Person.— (1) Section 1503 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended —
(A) by striking subsection (0;
(B) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), (j). and Oc) as subsections (f), (g),
(h), (i) and (j), respectively;
(C) in subsection (gXC)(3), as so redesignated, by striking "(j)" and inserting
in lieu thereof "(i)";
(D) in subsection (j), as so redesignated —
(i) by striking "(i)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(h)"; and
(ii) in paragraph (IXB) by striking "(h)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(g)";
and
(E) in subsection (k), as so redesignated, by striking "(i)" and inserting in lieu
thereof "(h)".
(2) Section 1504 of such title is amended —
(A) in subsection (a) by striking "(i)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(h)";
(B) by striking subsection (f);
(C) by redesignating subsections (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1) and (m) as subsections
(0, (g), (h), (i), (j), (k) and (1), respectively;
(D) in subsection (gX3XA), as so redesignated, by striking "and the counsel
for the missing person appointed under subsection (0";
(E) in subsection (j), as so redesignated —
XVI
(i) in paragraph (1) by striking "(j)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(i)";
(ii) by striking paragraph (1)(B);
(iii) by redesignating paragraph (1)(C) as paragraph (IXB);
(iv) in paragraph (IXB), as so redesignated, by striking "(gX5)" inserting
in Ueu thereoi"(C)(5T; and
(v) in paragraph (2) by striking "(C)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(B)";
(F) in subsection (k), as so redesignated, by striking "(k)" and inserting in lieu
thereof "(j)"; and
(G) in subsection (1), as so redesignated, by striking "(k)" and inserting in lieu
thereof "(j)".
(3) Section 1505(c) of such title is amended —
(A) in paragraph (2) by striking "(A) the designated missing person's counsel
for that person, and (B)"; and
(B) in paragraph (3) by striking "with the advice of the missing person's coun-
sel notified under paragraph (2),' .
(d) Three Year Reviews.— Section 1505 of title 10, United States Code, is amend-
ed by striking subsection (b) and inserting in lieu thereof —
"(b) Frequency of Subsequent Reviews.— The Secretary shall appoint a board
to conduct an inquiry with respect to a missing person under this subsection upon
receipt of information that may result in a change of status of the missing person.".
(e) Wrongful Withholding. — Section 1506 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended —
(1) by striking subsection (e); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (0 as subsection (e), respectively.
(f) Recommendation on Status of Death.— Section 1507(b) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(g) Department of Defense Civill\n Employees and Contractor Employ-
ees.— Section 1501(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by striking "the following persons: (1) Any" and inserting in lieu thereof
"any"; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2).
(h) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 76
of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking the items referring to sec-
tions 1508 and 1509.
SEC. 518. AUTHORmr FOR TEMPORARY PROMOTIONS OF CERTAIN NAVY LIEUTENANTS.
Section 5721 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking subsection
(g).
SEC. 519. EXTENSION IN THE DELAYED ENTRY PROGRAM OF UP TO 180 DAYS FOR MERITORI-
OUS CASES.
Section 513(b) of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by adding after the first sentence the following new sentence: "The Sec-
retary concerned may extend the above 365-day limitation period for a person
in the delayed entry program for up to an additional 180 days when he or she
considers it expedient to do so."; and
(2) in the last sentence by striking out "the preceding sentence" and inserting
in lieu thereof "under this section".
TITLE VI— COMPENSATION AND OTHER PERSONNEL
BENEFITS
Subtitle A — Pay and Allowances
SEC, 601. MILITARY PAY RAISE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997.
(a) Waiver of Section 1009 Adjustment. — Any adjustment required by section
1009 of title 37, United States Code, in elements of compensation of members of the
uniformed services to become effective during fiscal year 1997 shall not be made.
(b) Increase in Basic Pay, BAS, and BAQ.— Effective on January 1, 1997, the
rates of basic pay, basic allowance for subsistence, and basic allowance for quarters
of members of the uniformed services are increased by 3.0 percent.
SEC 602. RESTRICTION ON ENTITLEMENT TO BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS FOR RE-
SERVE component MEMBERS.
Section 403(a) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
of paragraph (1) the following new sentence: "A member of the Readv Reserve who
is serving on active duty for a period of fifteen days or less and who is provided
XVII
government quarters is not entitled to a basic allowance for quarters unless accom-
panied by his dependents.".
SEC. 60S. CONTINUOUS BAQ/VHA FOR SINGLE MEMBERS WHO PCS TO DEPLOYED UNTTt AU-
THORIZATION TO QUARTERS ASHORE (EITHER ADEQUATE OR INADEQUATE), OR
BASIC ALLOWANCE FOR QUARTERS FOR E-5 MEMBERS, WITHOUT DEPENDENTS,
ASSIGNED TO SEA DUTY) AND BAQAHMA FOR SHIPBOARD MILITARY COUPLES.
Section 403(cX2) of title 37, United States Code, is amended—
(1) at the beginning of the first sentence by striking "A member" and insert-
ing in lieu thereof "Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, a member";
and
(2) by striking the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "Under regu-
lations of the Secretary concerned that must consider the availability of quar-
ters, such Secretary may authorize payment of the basic allowance for quarters
to a member of a uniformed service under the Secretary's jurisdiction when the
member is without dependents, is serving in pay grade E-5, and is assigned to
sea duty. Two members of the uniformed services in pay grades below E-6, who
are married to each other and have no other dependents, and who are simulta-
neously assigned to sea duty on ships are entitled to a basic allowance for quar-
ters (equal to the with dependents rate of the pay grade of the senior member
only).".
(b) The amendments made by this section shall become effective July 1, 1997.
With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, if funds are available for such pur-
pose, the Secretary of a Military Department may implement such amendments on
an appropriate date following the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 604. ADJUSTMENTS IN CADET AND MIDSHIPMEN PAY.
Section 203(c) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by striking paragraph
(2) in its entirety and "(1)" at the beginning of the subsection.
Subtitle B — ^Extension of Bonus and Incentive Pays
SEC. 606. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY RELATING TO PAYMENT OF OTHER BONUSES AND SPE-
ClAL PAYS.
(a) Aviation Officer Retention Bonus.— Section 301b(a) of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997," and inserting in lieu
thereof "September 30, 1999".
(b) Reenlistment Bonus for Active Members.— Section 308(g) of title 37, Unit-
ed States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in
lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(c) Enlistment Bonuses for Critical Skills.— Sections 308a(c) and 308ftc) of
title 37, United States Code, are each amended by striking out "September 30,
1997" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(d) Special Pay for Enlisted Members of the Selected Reserve Assigned to
Certain High Priority Units.— Section 308d(c) of title 37, United States Code, is
amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu thereof "Sep-
tember 30, 1999".
(e) Repayment of Education Loans for Certain Health Professionals Who
Serve in the Selected Reserve.— Section 16302(d) of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by striking out "October 1, 1997" and inserting in lieu thereof "October
1, 1999".
(0 Special Pay for Critically Short Wartime Health Specialists in the Se-
lected Reserves.— Section 302g(0 of title 37, United States Code, is amended by
striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30,
1999".
(g) Special Pay for Nuclear-Qualified Officers Extending Period of Active
Service.— Section 312(e) of title 37, United States Code, is amended by striking out
"September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(h) Nuclear Career Accession Bonus.— Section 312b(c) of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu
thereof "September 30, 1999".
(i) Nuclear Career Annual Incentive Bonus.— Section 312c(d) of title 37, Unit-
ed States Code, is amended by striking out "October 1, 1997" and inserting in lieu
thereof "October 1, 1999".
XVIII
SEC. 606. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN BONUSES FOR RESERVE FORCES.
(a) Selected Reserve Reenlistment Bonus.— Section 308b(0 of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu
thereof "September 30, 1999".
(b) Selected Reserve Enustment Bonus. — Section 308c(e) of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu
thereof "September 30, 1999".
(c) Selected Reserve Affiliation Bonus.— Section 308e(e) of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu
thereof "September 30, 1999".
(d) Ready Reserve Enlistment and Reenlistment Bonus. — Section 308h(g) of
title 37, United States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and
inserting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(e) Prior Service Enlistment Bonus.— Section 308i(i) of title 37, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting in lieu thereof
"September 30, 1999".
sec. 607. extension AND MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN BONUSES AND SPECIAL PAY FOR
NURSE OFFICER CANDIDATES. REGISTERED NURSES AND NURSE ANESTHETISTS.
(a) Nurse Officer Candidate Accession Program. — Section 2130a(aXl) of title
10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(b) Accession Bonus for Registered Nurses. — Section 302d(aXl) of title 37,
United States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and inserting
in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
(c) Incentive Special Pay for Nurse Anesthetists.— Section 302e(aXl) of title
37, United States Code, is amended by striking out "September 30, 1997" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "September 30, 1999".
Subtitle C — ^Travel and Transportation Allowances
sec. 610. round-trip travel allowances for shipping motor vehicles at govern-
ment expense.
(a) In General.— Section 406(b)(lXB) of title 37, United States Code, is amended
as follows:
(1) in clause (iXD by inserting ", including return travel to the old duty sta-
tion," after "nearest the old duty station"; and
(2) in subparagraph (ii) by inserting ", including travel from the new duty sta-
tion to the port of debarkation to pick up the vehicle" after "to the new duty
station".
(b) Effective Date. — The amendments made by this section shall become effec-
tive July 1, 1997. With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, if funds are avail-
able for such purpose, the Secretary of a Military Department may implement such
amendments at an earlier date following the date of enactment of this Act.
sec. 611. AUTHORITY TO REIMBURSE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOMESTIC DEPENDENT-
SCHOOL-BOARD MEMBERS FOR CERTAIN PROGRAMS AND ACTrVITIES.
Section 2164(d) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
a new paragraph (7) as follows:
"(7) The Secretary may provide for reimbursement to a school board member
for travel and transportation expenses, to include program and activity fees,
that the Secretary determines are reasonable and necessary to the performance
of school board duties.".
SEC. 612. STORAGE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE IN LIEU OF TRANSPORTATION.
(a) Section 2634 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d), respec-
tively; and
(2) by adding a new subsection (b) as follows:
"(b) In lieu of transportation authorized by this section, if a member is ordered
to a foreign country, and the laws, regulations, or other restrictions imposed by the
foreign country or the United States Government preclude entry or require exten-
sive modification as a condition to entiy of the member's (or a dependent of the
member's) motor vehicle into such country, such member may elect storage at the
expense of the United States, to include authorized costs associated with the deliv-
ery of the motor vehicle for storage and removal for delivery to the next authorized
destination,".
XIX
(b) Clause (h)(lXB) of section 406 of title 37, United States Code, is amended to
read as follows:
"(B) in the case of a member described in paragraph 2(A), authorize the
transportation of one motor vehicle that is owned by the member (or a de-
pendent of a member) and is for his dependent's personal use to that loca-
tion by means of transportation authorized under section 2634 of title 10,
or storage of such motor vehicle as authorized under said section.".
(c) The amendments made by this section shall become effective July 1, 1997.
With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, if funds are available for such pur-
f)08e, the Secretary of a Military Department may implement such amendments ear-
ier than July 1, 1997, but not earlier than the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 613. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON PAYMENT OF LODGING EXPENSES WHEN ADEQUATE
GOVERNMENT QUARTERS ARE AVAILABLE.
Section 1589 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
Subtitle D — ^Retired Pay, Survivor Benefits, and Related
Matters
SEC. 616. EFFECTIVE DATE FOR MILITARY RETIREE COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENT FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 19B8.
(a) Adjustment of Effective Date.— Subparagraph (B) of section 1401a(bX2) of
title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"(B) Special rule for fiscal year i996.— In the case of the increase in
retired pay that, pursuant to paragraph (1), becomes effective on December
1, 1995, the initial month for which such increase is payable as part of such
retired pay shall (notwithstanding such December 1 effective date) be
March 1996.".
(b) Repeal of Contingent Alternative Date for Fiscal Year 1998.— Section
631 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public Law
104—106; 110 Stat. 364) is amended by striking subsection (b) and further, by redes-
ignating subsection (c) as the new subsection (b).
SEC. 616. CLARIFYINC USE OF MILITARY MORALE, WELFARE, AND RECREATION FAdLITIES
BY RETIRED RESERVISTS.
Section 1065(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out the
last sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Such use by members of
the Selected Reserve, and the dependents of such mernbers, shall be permitted on
the same basis as members on active duty. Such use by members who would be eli-
gible for retired pay under chapter 67 of this title but for the fact that the members
are under 60 years of age, and the dependents of such members, shall be on the
same basis as members who retired after serving 20 or more years on active duty.".
Subtitle E— Other Matters
SEC. 620. DISABILITY COVERAGE FOR OFFICERS GRANTED EXCESS LEAVE FOR EDU-
CATIONAL PURPOSES.
(a) Eligibility for Retirement.— Section 1201 of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by striking in the first sentence "Upon a determination" and all that
follows to the first dasn and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Upon a deter-
mination by the Secretary concerned that a member of a regular coniponent of the
armed forces entitled to basic pay, or any other member of the armed forces entitled
to basic pay who has been called or ordered to active duty (other than for training
under section 10148(a) of this title) for a period of more than 30 days, or a member
of a regular component of the armed forces who, while on active duty, is not entitled
to basic pay because he is authorized by the Secretary concerned under section
502(b) of title 37 to participate in an educational program, is unfit to perform the
duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disabihty incurred
while entitled to basic pay, or while not entitled to basic pay because he is author-
ized by the Secretary concerned under section 502(b) of title 37 to participate in an
educational program, the Secretary may retire the member, with retired pay com-
puted under section 1401 of this title, if the Secretary also determines that .
(b) Eligibility for Placement on Temporary Disability Retirement List.—
Section 1202 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting "or a member
of a regfular component of the armed forces who, while on active duty, is not entitled
to basic pay because he is authorized by the Secretary concerned under section
XX
502(b) of title 37 to participate in an educational program," after "for a period of
more than 30 days,".
(c) Eligibility for Separation. — Section 1203 of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking in the first sentence "Upon a determination" and all that fol-
lows to the first dash and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Upon a determina-
tion by the Secretary concerned that a member of a regular component of the armed
forces entitled to basic pay, or any other member of the armed forces entitled to
basic pay who has been called or ordered to active duty (other than for training
under section 10148(a) of this title) for a period of more than 30 days, or a member
of a regular component of the armed forces who, while on active duty, is not entitled
to basic pay because he is authorized by the Secretary concerned under section
502(b) of title 37 to participate in an educational program, is unfit to perform the
duties of his office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability incurred
while entitled to basic pay, or while not entitled to basic pay because he is author-
ized by the Secretary concerned under section 502(b) of title 37 to participate in an
educational program, the member may be separated from his armed force with sev-
erance pay computed under section 1212 of this title, if the Secretary also deter-
mines that — ".
(d) Effective Date. — The amendments made by this section shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act and apply with respect to physical disabilities
incurred on or after such date.
SEC. 621. AMENDMENTS TO THE UNIFORMED SERVICES FORMER SPOUSES' PROTECTION ACT.
Section 1408 of title 10, United States Code, is amended as follows:
(1) In subsection (bXl), by striking out "certified or registered mail, return re-
ceipt requested" in paragraph (A) and inserting in lieu thereof, "facsimile or
electronic transmission, mail".
(2) In subsection (e) —
(A) by adding after subparagraph (3) the following new subparagraph (4):
"('') An order modifying or clarifying the original court order upon which pay-
ments under this section are based and issued by a state other than the state
issuing the original court order shall not be honored unless the court modifying
or clarifying the original court order is found to have jurisdiction over both the
member and former spouse in accordance with the guidance set forth in sub-
section (c)(4).''; and
(B) by redesignating subparagraphs (4), (5), and (6), as subparagraphs
(5), (6), and (7), respectively.
(3) In subsection (h), by amending subparagraph (lOXA) to read as follows:
"(lOXA) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a member of the armed
services who has been sentenced by a court-martial to receive punishment that
will terminate the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay if executed,
the eligibility of that member to receive retired pay may, as determined by the
Secretary concerned, be considered terminated effective either upon the ap-
proval of that sentence by the person acting under section 86(Xc) of this title
(article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), or upon the discharge of
the member from the uniformed services.".
SEC. 622. TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION ALLOWANCES: TRAVEL PERFORMED IN CONNEC-
TION WITH LEAVE BETWEEN CONSECUTIVE OVERSEAS TOURS.
(a) Additignal Deferral. — Paragraph (2) of subsection 411b(a) of title 37, United
States Code, is amended by inserting at the end the following new sentence: "Not-
withstanding the limitation in the preceding sentence, a member who is unable to
travel under this provision prior to completion of the one year period after the date
the member begins the consecutive overseas tour of duty or arrives at a new duty
station due to participation in a critical operational mission, as determined by the
Service Secretaries or their designated representatives, may, under the uniform reg-
ulations referred to in paragraph (1), defer that travel for a period not to exceed
one year after assignment from the critical operational mission that precluded the
travel.".
(b) Effective Date. — The amendment made by this section shall be effective for
all members participating in critical operational missions on or after 1 November
1995.
XXI
TITLE Vn— HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS
SEC. 701. TECHNICAL REVISION TO CHAMPUS PAYMENT LIMITS FOR TRICARE PRIME EN-
ROLLEES.
Section 1079(hX4) of title 10, United States Code, is amended in the second sen-
tence by striking "emergency".
SEC. 702, REPEAL OF THE STATUTORY RESTRICTION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR ABORTIONS.
(a) In General.— Section 1093 of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
(b) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 55,
United States Code, is amended by striking out the item referring to section 1093.
SEC. 703. MEDICAL AND DENTAL CARE FOR RESERVE COMPONENT MEMBERS IN A DUTY STA-
TUS.
(a) In General. — Chapter 55 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by strik-
ing out section 1074a and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
*'§ 1074a. Medical and dental care for Reserve component members in a
duty status
"(a) Under joint regulations prescribed by the administering Secretaries, the fol-
lowing persons are entitled to the benefits described in subsection (b):
"(1) Each member of a reserve component of a uniformed service who incurs
or aggravates an injury, illness, or disease in the line of duty while perform-
ing—
"(A) active duty, active duty for training, annual training or full-time Na-
tional Guard duty, or
"(B) inactive duty training, in a pay or nonpay status.
"(2) Each member of a reserve component of a uniformed service who incurs
or aggravates an injury, illness, or disease while traveling directly to or from
the place at which that member is to {>erform or has performed —
"(A) active duty, active duty for training, annual training or fiiU-time Na-
tional Guard duty, or
"(B) inactive duty training, in a pay or nonpay status.
"(3) Each member of a reserve component of a uniformed service who incurs
or aggravates an injury, illness, or disease in the line of duty while remaining
overnight, between successive periods of inactive duty training, and the site is
outside reasonable commuting distance from the member's residence.
"(b) A person described in subsection (a) is entitled to —
"(1) the medical and dental care appropriate for the treatment of the injury,
illness, or disease of that person until the member completes treatment and is
returned to full military duty or has completed processing in accordance with
chapter 61 of this title;
"(2) upon the member's request, continuation on active duty, for personnel in-
cluded in subsections (aXlXA) and (aX2XA), during the period of hospitalization
resulting from the injury, illness, or disease; and
"(3) the pay and allowances authorized in accordance with sections 204 (g)
and (h) of title 37, United States Code.
"(c) A member is not entitled to benefits under this section if the ingury, illness,
or disease, or aggravation of an injury, illness, or disease described in subsection
(aX2), is the result of the gross negligence or misconduct of the member.".
(b) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections for such chapter 55 is amended
by striking out the item referring to section 1074a and inserting in lieu thereof the
following:
"1074a. Medical and dental care for Reserve component members in a duty status.".
SEC. 704. IMPROVED DEATH AND DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR RESERVISTS.
(a) Medical and Dental Care. — Section 1074a(a) of title 10, United States Code,
is amended by inserting after paragraph (2) the following new paragraph:
"(3) Each member of the armed forces who incurs or aggravates an injury, ill-
ness, or disease in the line of duty while remaining overnight, between succes-
sive periods of inactive-duty training, at or in the vicinity oithe site of the inac-
tive-duty training, and the site is outside reasonable commuting distance from
the member's residence.".
(b) Recovery, Care, and Dispositign of Remains.— Section 1481(aX2) of title 10,
United States Code, is amended —
(1) in subparagraph (C) by striking out "or" at the end;
(2) by redesignating subparagraph (D) as subparagraph (E); and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph:
xxn
"(D) remaining overnight, between successive periods of inactive-duty
training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive-duty training, and
the site is outside reasonable commuting distance from the member's resi-
dence; or".
(c) Retirement/Separation for Disability.— Section 1204(2) of title 10, United
States Code, is amended by striking out the semicolon at the end of the subpara-
graph and inserting the following: "or in line of duty while remaining overnight, be-
tween successive periods of inactive-duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site
of the inactive-duty training, and the site is outside reasonable commuting distance
from the member's residence.".
(d) Entitlement to Basic Pay.— (1) Subsection (gXD of section 204 of title 37,
United States Code, is amended —
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking out "or" at the end of the subparagraph;
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking out the period at the end of the subpara-
graph and inserting in lieu thereof "; or"; and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph:
"(D) in line of duty while remaining overnight, between successive periods
of inactive-duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive-duty
training, and the site is outside reasonable commuting distance from the
member's residence.".
(2) Subsection (hXD of such section is amended —
(A) in subparagraph (B) by striking out "or" at the end of the subparagraph;
(B) in subpara^aph (C), by striking out the period at the end of the subpara-
graph and insertmg in lieu thereof "; or"; and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (C) the following new subparagraph:
"(D) in line of duty while remaining overnight, between successive periods
of inactive-duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive-duty
training, and the site is outside reasonable commuting distance from the
member's residence.".
(e) Compensation for Inactive-Duty Training.— Section 206(aX3) of title 37 is
amended —
(1) in subparagraph (A) by striking out "or" at the end of clause (ii);
(2) in subparagraph (B), bv striking out the period at the end of the subpara-
graph and inserting in lieu thereof "; or"; and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:
(C) in line of duty while overnight, between successive periods of inac-
tive-duty training, at or in the vicinity of the site of the inactive-duty train-
ing, and the site is outside reasonable commuting distance from the mem-
ber's residence.".
TITLE Xin— ACQUISITION AND RELATED MATTERS
SEC. 801. REPEAL OF PROCUREMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT
PROGRAM.
(a) Repeal. — Chapter 142 of title 10, United States Code, is hereby repealed.
(b) Conforming Amendment.— Part IV of Subtitle A of such title is amended by
striking out in the table of chapters at the beginning of such title the item referring
to chapter 142.
SEC. 802. extension OF PILOT MENTOR PROGRAM.
Section 831(jX2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991
(Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2301 note) is amended by striking out "1996" and
inserting in lieu thereof "1998."
SEC. 803. EXTENSION AND REVISION OF AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO PROTOTYPE PROJECTS.
Section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Pub-
lic Law 103-160; 10 U.S.C. 2371 note) is amended—
(1) in subsection (a) by inserting aft^r "Agency" ", the Secretary of a military
department or other official designated by the Secretary of Defense";
(2) in subsection (c) —
(A) by striking "of the Director"; and
(B) by striking "3 years after the date of enactment of this Act" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "on September 30, 1999.";
(3) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(4) by insertmg aft^r subsection (b) the following new subsection (c):
"(c) Follow-On.— Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of
Defense may conduct a follow-on acquisition of any prototype or technology dem-
XXIII
onstrator developed under the authority of this section utilizing such acquisition
procedures as the Secretary determines appropriate.".
SEC. 804. AUTHORrrV FOR PAYMENTS FROM CANCELED ACCOUNT FOR SHIPBUILDING AND
CONVERSION TO BE MADE FROM PRIOR YEARS ACCOUNT.
For purposes of section 1553(b) of title 31, United States Code, any subdivision
of appropriations made in this Act and hereafter under the heading 'Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy" shall be considered to be for the same purpose as any sub-
division under the heading "Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy" appropriations in
any prior year.
SEC. 805. RELIANCE ON THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR SUPPLIES AND SERVICES.
(a) In General. — ^The Secretary of Defense shall rely on the private sector, to the
maximum extent practicable, for commercial or industrial type supplies and services
necessary for or beneficial to the accomplishment of the authorized functions of the
Department, except when the Secretary or his designee determines, in his discre-
tion, that the ftinction should be performed by government personnel.
(b) Authority. — Notwithstanding any provision of title 10, United States Code,
or any statute authorizing appropriations for, or making appropriations for, the De-
partment of Defense, the Secretary may acquire by contract from the private sector
or any non-federal government entities those conmiercial or industrial type supplies
and services necessary for or beneficial to the accomplishment of the authorized
functions of the Department. The Secretary shall use the procurement procedures
of chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code; however, when the Secretary provides
for the procurement of such supplies and services using competitive procedures, the
Secretary may limit the place of performance to the location where such supplies
or services are being provided by federal government personnel when the Secretary
determines it is in the public interest.
TITLE IX— ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
SEC. 901. CHANGE IN NAME OF NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND.
Section 162 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "North
American Air Defense Command" each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof
"United States Element, North American Aerospace Defense Command".
SEC. 902. AMENDMENT TO BOARD MEMBERSHIP OF THE AMMUNITION STORAGE BOARD.
Section 172(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting "composed"
after "a joint board" and hy inserting ", civilian employees of the Department of De-
fense, or both" after "of officers".
Subtitle B — Financial Management
SEC. 9ia DEVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION TRANSFER ACCOUNTS TO THE
MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.
(a) Section 2703 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
"§ 2703. Environmental restoration transfer accounts
"(a) Establishment of Transfer Accounts.—
"(1) Establishment. — There is hereby established in the Department of De-
fense and in each of the Military Departments, an account to be known as the
"Environmental Restoration Account" (hereinafter in this section referred to as
the "transfer accounts"). All sums appropriated to carry out the functions of the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments relating
to environmental restoration under this chapter or to environmental restoration
under any other provision of law shall be appropriated to their respective trans-
fer accounts.
"(2) Requirement of authorization of appropriations.— No funds may be
appropriated to the transfer accounts unless such sums have been specifically
authorized by law.
"(3) Availability of funds in transfer accounts.— Amounts appropriated
to the transfer accounts shall remain available until transferred under sub-
section (b).
"(b) Authority To Transfer to Other Accounts. — Amounts in their respective
transfer accounts shall be available to be transferred by the Secretary of Defense
or the Secretaries of the Military Departments to any appropriation account or fund
of their Departments for obligation from that account or fund to which transferred.
XXIV
"(c) Obugation of Transferred Amounts.— Funds transferred under subsection
(b) may only be obligated or expended from the account or fund to which transferred
in order to carnr out the functions of the Secretary of Defense or the Secretaries
of the Military Departments under this chapter or environmental restoration func-
tions under any other provision of law.
"(d) Amounts Recovered Under CERCLA.— Amounts recovered under section
107 of CERCLA for response actions of the Secretary of Defense or a Secretaiy of
a Militaiy Department snail be credited to their respective transfer account.
"(e) Payments of Fines and Penalties.— None of the funds aopropriated to the
transfer account for fiscal years 1995 through 1999 may be used for the pajrment
of a fine or penalty imposed against the Department of Defense unless the act of
omission for which the fine or penalty is imposed arises out of an activity funded
by the transfer account.
"(f) Conforming Amendment.— Reference to the 'Defense Environmental Restora-
tion Account' elsewhere in the law shall be construed as referring to the 'Environ-
mental Restoration Account' of the Department of Defense and each of the military
departments.".
SEC. 911. RECRUITING FUNCTIONS: USE OF FUNDS.
(a) Authority. — Chapter 31 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
**§ 520c. Recruiting functions: use of funds
"Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, funds appropriated to
the Department of Defense, not to exceed $2,000,000 annually, may be expended for
small meals and snacks during recruiting functions for —
"(1) persons who have entered the Delayed Entry P*rogram under section 513
of this chapter or other persons who are the subject of recruiting efforts by the
regular and reserve components;
(2) influential persons in communities who assist the military departments
in their recruiting efforts;
"(3) military or civilian personnel whose attendance is mandatory at such
functions."; and
"(4) other persons whose presence at recruiting functions will contribute to re-
cruiting efforts."; and
(b) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
"520c. Recruiting functions: use of funds.".
TITLE X— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A — Financial Matters
SEC. 1001. repeal of requirement for separate budget request for procurement
of reserve equipment.
Section 114(e) of title 10, United States Code, is repealed.
SEC. 1008. acceptance OF SERVICES FOR DEFENSE PURPOSE (DEFENSE COOPERATION AC-
COUNT).
Section 2608 of title 10, United States Code is amended —
(1) in subsection (a) by inserting afler "money" ", services,"; and
(2) by amending subsection (k) to read as follows:
"(k) the Secretary of Defense is required to establish written rules to carry out
this section setting forth the criteria to be used in determining whether the accept-
ance of contributions of money, real property, personal property, or services would
reflect unfavorably upon the ability of the Department of Defense or any employee
to carry out its responsibilities or official duties in a fair and objective manner, or
would compromise the integrity or the appearance of integrity of its programs or
any official involved in those programs.".
SEC. 1003. DISPOSITION OF CERTAIN FUNDS ARISING OUT OF THE SALE OF CERTAIN ASSETS
AT CLOSED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS.
(a) Base Closures Under 1988 Act.— Section 204(bX7) of the Defense Authoriza-
tion Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (title 11 to Public Law
100-526, as amended; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended—
(1) by striking out subsection (CXi) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(i) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved
(in whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated
XXV
funds is transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or re-
alignment of a military installation under this part, a portion of the
proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installa-
tion shall be deposited as follows:
"(I) In the case of proceeds from the transfer or other disposal
of property acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part)
with commissary store funds, the applicable portion shall be depos-
ited in the commissary surcharge fund established pursuant to sec-
tion 2685 of title 10, United States Code.
"(II) In the case of proceeds from the transfer or other disposal
of property acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part)
with nonappropriated funds, the applicable portion shall be depos-
ited in a Department of Defense nonappropriated fund account des-
ignated by the Secretary."; and
(2) by redesignating subsection (CXiii) as subsection (CXiv) and inserting the
following new subsection (CXiii):
"(iii) The Secretary may use amounts —
"(I) so deposited in the commissary surcharge fund for the pur-
pose of acquiring, constructing, and improving commissary stores;
and
"(II) so deposited in the nonappropriated fund account designated
by the Secretary for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and im-
proving real property and facilities for nonappropriated fund in-
strumentalities.".
(b) Base Closure Under 1990 Act.— Section 2906 of the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXDC of Public Law 101-510, as
amended; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) is amended—
(1) by striking out subsection (dXl) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(1) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved (in
whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated funds is
transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or realignment of a
military installation under this part, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer
or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited as follows:
"(A) In the case of proceeds from the transfer or other disposal of property
acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with commissary
store funds, the applicable portion shall be deposited in the commissary
surcharge fund established pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2685.
"(B) In the case of proceeds from the transfer or other disposal of property
acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with nonappro-
priated funds, the applicable portion shall be deposited in a Department of
Defense nonappropriated fund account designated by the Secretary."; and
(2) by striking out subsection (dX3) and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
"(3) The Secretary may use amounts —
"(A) so deposited in the commissary surcharge fund for the purpose of ac-
quiring, constructing, and improving commissary stores; and
"(B) so deposited in the nonappropriated fund account designated by the
Secretary for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving real
property and facilities for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.".
(c) Base Closures Under 1991 Act.— Section 2921 of the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (Public Law 101-510, as amended; 10 U.S.C.
2687 note) is amended in subsection (dXl) —
(1) by striking out "in the reserve account established under section
204(bX4XC) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act" and inserting in lieu thereof "in the commissary surcharge
fund established pursuant to section 2685 of title 10 United States Code or in
a Department of Defense nonappropriated fund account designated by the Sec-
retary of Defense, consistent with the source of the funds"; and
(2) by striking out the parenthetical "(in such an aggregate amount as is pro-
vided in advance by appropriation Acts)".
(d) Definition of Proceeds. — For subsections (a), (b), and (c) above, the term
"proceeds" is the amount in excess of the depreciated value from the sale of com-
missary or nonappropriated fund assets.
XXVI
Subtitle B — Civilian Personnel
SEC. 1011. EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION PROVISIONS FOR FACULTY MEMBERS AND
LEADERSHIP OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIE&
Section 1595 of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) in subsection (c) by adding at the end the following new paragraph (4):
"(4) The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies."; and
(2) by adding at the end of the section the following new subsection (f):
"(0 Application to Director and Deputy Director at Asl\-Pacific Center
FOR Security Studies. — In the case of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,
this section also applies with respect to the Director and the Deputy Director.".
SEC. 1012. EXCEPTED APPOINTMENT OF JITOICLW. NON-ATTORNEY STAFF IN THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES.
Article 143(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (10 U.S.C. 943(c)) is amend-
ed—
(1) in the catchline for the subsection by striking "attorney" and inserting in
lieu thereof "certain"; and
(2) in paragraph (1) by inserting after "Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces" "and non-attorney positions established in a judge's chambers".
SEC. 1018. CONVERSION OF MILITARY POSITIONS.
Section 1032 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Pub-
lic Law 104-106; 110 Stat. 429) is hereby repealed.
Subtitle C — Reporting Requirements
SEC. 1020. NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT EQUIPMENT: ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS.
Section 10541(bX5)(A) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out
", shown in accordance with deployment schedules and requirements over successive
30-day periods following mobilization".
SEC. 1021. ANNUAL REPORT ON STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE.
Section 224 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991 (10 U.S.C. 2431 note), is amended—
(1) by striking subsections (bX3), (bX4), (bX7), (bX9) and (bXlO); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (bX5), (bX6), and (bX8), as (bX3), (bX4), and
(bX5), respectively.
SEC. 1022. REPEAL OF REPORT ON CONTRACTOR REIMBURSEMENT COSTS.
Section 2706 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out sub-
section (c) and by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c), respectively.
SEC. 1023. REPEAL OF NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUBSTANTIALLY OR SERIOUSLY AF-
FECTED PARTIES IN DOWNSIZING EFFORTS.
Sections 4101 and 4201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1991 (Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) are hereby repealed.
Subtitle D — Matters Relating to Other Nations
SEC. 1025. AUTHORIZATION FOR EXECUTION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DEMINING PRO-
GRAM.
Section 401(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph (2):
"(2) In providing the assistance described in subsection (e)(5), such expenses
for that assistance may include —
"(A) travel, transportation, and subsistence expenses of personnel partici-
pating in such activities; and
"(B) the cost of any equipment, supplies, and services acquired for the
purpose of carrying out or supporting such activities, including any equip-
ment, supplies, or services transferred or otherwise provided to a foreign
country or other organization in connection with the provision of assistance
under this section.".
XXVII
Subtitle E— Other Matters
SEC. 103a NATIONAL DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE, DEFENSE REINVEST-
MENT, AND DEFENSE CONVERSION.
(a) National Defense Technology and Industrial Base Council.— Section
2502 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out subsection (c)(3).
(b) National Defense Program for Analysis of the Technology and Indus-
trial Base. — Section 2503 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in subsection (a) —
(A) by amending paragraph (1) to read as follows:
"(1) The Secretary of Deiense shall establish a program for analysis of na-
tional technology and industrial base issues, policies, and programs."; and
(B) by striking out paragraphs (2), (3), and (4);
(2) by striking out subsection (b);
(3) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b);
(4) in subsection (cX3XA) —
(A) bv striking out "the National Defense Technology and Industrial Base
Council in"; ana
(B) by striking out "and the periodic plans required by section 2506 of
this title."; and
(5) in subsection (cX3), by striking subparagraph (C).
(c) National Technology and Industrial Base: Periodic Defense Capability
Assessments. — Section 2505 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
''§2505. National technology and industrial base: periodic defense capabil-
ity assessments
"(a) Periodic Assessment. — The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with
the Secretary of Commerce, annually through fiscal year 1998, prepare selected as-
sessments of the capability of the national technology and industrial base to attain
national security requirements.
"(b) Assessment Process. — The Secretary of Defense shall take action to ensure
that technology and industrial capability assessments prepared by the Department
will —
"(1) describe sectors and their underlying infrastructure;
"(2) analyze economic and financial strengths of sectors, especially those por-
tions that might be affected by defense program reductions; and
"(3) identify technological and industrial capabilities of concern.
"(c) Integrated Process. — The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the tech-
nolo^ and industrial base assessments are integrated into the Department of De-
fense s overall budget, acquisition, and logistics decision-making processes.".
(d) Department of Defense Technology and Industrial Base Policy and
Oversight. — Section 2506 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
''§2506. Department of Defense technology and industrial base policy and
oversight
"(a) Departmental Guidance.— The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe Depart-
mental guidance appropriate to implement the national security objectives of the
President. The Secretary should also provide for senior-level Departmental oversight
to ensure that technological and industrial capability issues are integrated into Key
decision processes for budget allocation, weapons acquisition, and logistics support.
"(b) Report to Congress. — The Secretary of Defense shall report on the Depart-
ment's implementation of Departmental guidance in the annual report to Congress
prepared pursuant to section 2508 of this title.".
(e) Annual Report to Congress.— Subchapter II of chapter 148 of title 10, Unit-
ed States Code, is amended by inserting after section 2507 the following new sec-
tion:
"§ 2508. Annual report to Congress
"(a) The Secretary of Defense shall transmit an annual report to Congress in
March 1997 and March 1998 which shall include the following:
"(1) A description of the Department's guidance prepared pursuant to section
2506 of this title.
"(2) A description of the various methods and analysis being undertaken to
address technological and industrial concerns.
"(3) A description of the assessments used to develop the Department's an-
nual budget submission.
XXVIII
"(4) Identification of any programs designed to sustain essential technology
and industrial capabilities.".
(f) Encouragement of Technology Transfer. — Section 2514(c) of title 10, Unit-
ed States Code, is amended by striking out paragraph (5).
(g) Military-Civilian Integration and Technology Transfer Advisory
Board. — Section 2516 of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) bv striking out "National Defense Technology and Industrial Base Council"
each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof in each instemce "Secretary
of Defense"; and
(2) by striking out "Council" each place it appears and inserting in lieu there-
of in each instance "Secretary".
(h) National Defense Manufacturing Technology Program.— Section 2521 of
title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by striking out subsection (b);
(2) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (b).
(i) Conforming Amendments.— Sections 4218, 4219, and 4220 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C.
2501 note, 2505 note, and 2506 note) are repealed.
(j) Clerical Amendments. — ^The table or sections at the beginning of Subchapter
II of chapter 148 of title 10, United States Code, is amended —
(1) by amending the item relating to section 2506 to read as follows:
"2506. Department of Defense technology and industrial base policy and oversight.**;
and
(2) by adding at the end the following new item:
"2508. Annual report to Congress.".
SEC. 1031. restoration OP AUTHORITY FOR CERTAIN INTRAGOVERNMENT TRANSFERS IN
THE BASE closure AND REALIGNMENT PROCESS.
Section 204(bK2 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-256; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note), is amended—
(1) by redesignating subparagraphs (D) and (E) as (E) and (F); and
(2) by insertmg before subparagraph (E), as redesignated, the following new
subparagraph:
"(U) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities lo-
cated at a- military installation to be closed or realigned under this part,
with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity
(including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department
of Defense or the Coast Guard.".
SEC. 1032. CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMISSIONS.
Sections 172(b) and 172(0 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1993 (Public Law 102^84; 106 Stat. 2341) are amended by striking out "(In-
stallations, Logistics and Environment)" and inserting in lieu thereof "(Research,
Development and Acquisition)".
SEC. 1033. TRANSFER OF EXCESS PERSONAL PROPERTY TO SUPPORT LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES.
Section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and
1991 (10 U.S.C. 372 note) is amended by striking out subsection (c).
SEC. 1034. CONTROL OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS IN TIME OF WAR.
(a) Transfer of Army Section to General Military Law Section and Shift
Responsibility to Secretary of Defense.— Section 4742 of title 10, United States
Code, is transferred to chapter 157, inserted at the end, redesi^ated as section
2643, and amended by striking "the Secretary of the Army" inserting in lieu thereof
"the Secretary of Defense".
(b) Conforming Repeal of Air Force Provision.— Section 9742 of such title 10
is hereby repealed.
(c) Clerical Amendments. — (1) the table of sections at the beginning of chapter
447 of such title 10 is amended by striking the item relating to section 4742.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 947 of such title 10 is amend-
ed bv striking the item relating to section 9742.
(3) The tables of sections at the beginning of chapter 157 of such title 10 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 2642 the following new item:
"2643. Control of transportation systems in time of war.".
SEC. 1036. REDESIGNATION OF OFFICE OF NAVAL RECORDS AND HISTORY GIFT FUND TO
NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER FUND.
Section 7222 of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
XXDC
(1) by striking out "Naval Records and History gift fund" in the catchline for
such section inserting in lieu thereof "Naval Historical Center Fund"; and
(2) by striking out in subsections (a) and (c) "Office of Naval Records and His-
tory" each place such phrase occurs, and inserting in lieu thereof "Naval Histor-
ical Center^.
SEC. 1036. TRANSPORTATION BY COMMISSARIES AND EXCHANGES TO OVERSEAS LOCATIONS.
(a) In General. — Chapter 157 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by re-
pealing section 2643.
(b) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter
157 is amended by striking the following item:
"2643. Commissary and exchange services: transportation overseas.".
SEC. 1037. AUTHORITY FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO ENTER INTO COOPERATTVK
AGREEMENTS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF CULTURAL RESOURCES ON MILITARY
INSTALLATIONS.
(a) Chapter 159 of title 10, United States Code is amended by adding the follow-
ing new section at the end:
**§ 2694. Cooperative Agreements for the management of cultviral resoiirces
"(a) Authority. — The Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of a Military Depart-
ment may enter into cooperative agreements with States, local governments, or
other entities upon such terms considered in the public interest for the preservation,
management, maintenance, research, and improvement of cultural resources on
military installations.
"Xb) CONTENT OF AGREEMENTS. — A cooperative agreement entered into under this
section shall be subject to the availability of funds and shall not be considered, nor
treated as, a cooperative agreement to which chapter 63 of title 31 applies, and shall
not subject to section 1535, of such title, provide for the Secretary of Defense and
the other party or parties to the agreement.
^c) Definition. — For the purpose of this section, the term 'cultural resource'
means any building, structure, site, district, and object eligible for or included in
the National Register of Historic Places (16 U.S.C. 470a); a cultural item as defined
by section 2(3) of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (104
Stat. 3048); an archaeological resource as defined by section 3 of the Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979 (16 U.S.C. 470bb(l)); and archaeological artifact
collections and associated records as defined by section 79 of title 36, Code of Fed-
eral Regulations 79.".
(b) The table of sections for such chapter is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 2693 the following new item:
"2694. Cooperative Agreements for the management of cultural resources.".
SEC. 1038. MEDAL OF HONOR FOR AFRICAN AMERICAN SOLDIERS WHO SERVED IN WORLD
WARIL
(a) Inappucability of Time Limitations.— Notwithstanding the time limitation
in section 3744(b) of title 10, United States Code, or any other time limitation, the
President may award the Medal of Honor to each person identified in subsection (b),
each of whom distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at
the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving in the United
States Army during World War II.
(b) African-Americans To Receive the Medal of Honor.—
(1) Vernon J. Baker, who served as a first lieutenant in the 370th Infantry
Regiment, 92nd Infantry Division.
(2) Edward A. Carter, who served as a staff sergeant in the 56th Armored
Infantry Battalion, Twelfth Armored Division.
(3) John R. Fox, who served as a first lieutenant in the 366th Infantry Regi-
ment, 92nd Infantry Division.
(4) Willy F. James, Jr., who served as a private first class in 413th Infantiy
Regiment, 104th Infantry Division.
(5) Ruben Rivers, who served as a staff sergeant in the 761st Tank Battalion.
(6) Charles L. Thomas, who served as a first lieutenant in the 614th Tank
Destroyer Battalion.
(7) George Watson, who served as a private in the 29th Quartermaster Regi-
ment.
(c) Posthumous Award. — The Medal of Honor may be awarded under this section
posthumously, as provided in section 3752 of title 10, United States Code.
(d) Prior Award. — The Medal of Honor may be awarded under this section for
service for which a Distinguished Service Cross, or other award, has been awarded.
XXX
SEC. 1039. PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION ASSISTANCE.
(a) In General.— Section 11543 of title 10, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
**§2543. Presidential Inaugural Assistance
"(a) Furnishing of Materl\ls, Supplies, and Services.— Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the Secretary of Defense may lend materials and supplies,
and provide, on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable oasis, materials, supplies, ana
services of personnel —
"(1) to the Inaugural Conmiittee established under the iirst section of the
Presidential Inaugural Ceremonies Act (36 U.S.C. 721); and
"(2) to the joint committee of the Senate and House of Representatives de-
scribed in section 9 of that Act (36 U.S.C. 729).
"(b) Terms of Assistance. — Assistance under subsection (a) shall be loaned or
provided in such manner as the Secretary of Defense determines to be appropriate
and under such conditions as the Secretary may prescribe.".
(b) Clerical Amendment. — The table of sections at the beginning of subchapter
II, chapter 152 of such title is amended to read as follows:
"2543. Presidential Inauguration Assistance.".
TITLE XXI— ARMY
sec. 2101. AUTHORIZED ARMY CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISITION PROJECTS.
(a) Inside the United States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the au-
thorization of appropriations in section 2104(aXl), tne Secretary of the Army may
acquire real property and cany out military construction projects for the installa-
tions and locations mside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Army: Inside the United States
State
Installation or Location
Total
California
Colorado
District of Columbia
Georgia
Kansas
Kentucky
Texas
Washington
CONUS Classified
Camp Roberts
Naval Weapons Station, Con-
cord.
Fort Carson
$5,500,000
$27,000,000
$13,000,000
$6,900,000
$53,400,000
$6,000,000
$26,000,000
$51,100,000
$40,900,000
$54,600,000
$4,600,000
Fort McNair
Fort Benning
Fort Stewart/Hunter Army
Air Field.
Fort Riley
Fort Campbell
Fort Hood
Fort Lewis
Classified Location
Grand total
$289,000,000
(b) Outside the United States. — Using amount appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations in section 2104(aX2), the Secretary of the Army may
acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the locations
outside the Imited States, and in the amounts, set forth in the following table:
Army: Outside the United States
Country
Installation or location
Total
Italy
Korea
Camp Ederle, Vincenza
Camp Casey
$3,100,000
$16,000,000
XXXI
Army: Outside the United States — Continued
Country
Installation or location
Total
Overseas Classified
Camp Red Cloud
Overseas Classified
$14,000,000
$64,000,000
Grand total
$97,100,000
SEC. 2102. FAMILY HOUSING.
(a) Construction and Acquisition. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to
the authorization of appropriations in section 2104(aX5XA), the Secretary of the
Army may construct or acquire family housing units (including land acquisition) at
the installations, for the purposes, and in the amounts set forth in the following
table:
Army: Family Housing
State
Installation or lo-
cation
Purpose
Total
Hawaii
North Carolina
Texas
Schofield Bar-
racks.
Fort Brace
54 Units
88 Units
140 Units
Grand total ...
$10,000,000
$9,800,000
$18,500,000
Fort Hood
$38,300,000
(b) Planning and Design. — Using amounts approoriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2104(aX5)(A), tne Secretary of the Army may
carry out architectural and engineering services and construction design activities
with respect to the construction or improvement of family housing units in an
amount not to exceed $2,963,000.
SEC. 2103. improvements TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, and using amounts appro-
Sriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 2104(aX5XA), the
ecretary of the Army may improve existing military family housing units in an
amount not to exceed $33,750,000.
SEC. 2104. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPR LOTIONS, ARMY.
(a) In General.-— Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
beginning after September 30, 1996, for military construction, land acquisition, and
military family housing functions of the Department of the Army in the total
amount of $1,722,202,000 as follows:
(1) For militaiy construction projects inside the United States authorized by
section 2101(a), $289,000,000.
(2) For the military construction products outside the United States author-
ized by section 2101(b), $97,100,000.
(3) For unspecified minor military construction projects authorized by section
2805 of title 10, United States Code, $5,000,000.
(4) For architectural and engineering services and construction design under
section 2807 of title 10, United States Code, $43,623,000, which includes
$20,000,000 for Host Nation support.
(5) For military family housing functions:
(A) For construction and acquisition, planning and design, and improve-
ment of military family housing and facilities, $75,013,000.
(B) For support of military family housing (including the functions de-
scribed in section 2833 of title 10, United States Code), $1,212,466,000.
(b) Limitation on Total Cost of Construction Projects. — Notwithstanding
the cost variations authorized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost of all projects carried out
/
xxxu
under section 2101 of this Act may not exceed the total amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
f TITLE XXn— NAVY
SEC. 2201. AUTHORIZED NAVY CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISFTION PROJECTS.
(a) Inside the United States, — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the au-
thorization of appropriations in section 2204(aXl), the Secretary of the Navy may
acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the installa-
tions and locations mside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Navy:
Inside the United States
State
Installation or Location
Total
Arizona
Navy Detachment, Camp
Navajo.
$3,920,000
California
Marine Corps Air Station,
Camp Pendleton.
$6,240,000
Marine Corps Air-Ground
$4,020,000
Combat Center,
Twentynine Palms.
Marine Corps Base, Camp
$51,630,000
Pendleton.
Naval Air Station, North Is-
$86,502,000
land.
Naval Facility, San Clemente
$17,000,000
Island.
Naval Station, San Diego
$7,050,000
Naval Command Control &
$1,960,000
Ocean Surveillance Center,
San Diego.
Connecticut
Naval Submarine Base, New
London.
$13,830,000
District of Columbia
Naval District, Washington ...
$19,300,000
Florida
Naval Air Station, Key West
$2,250,000
Hawaii
Naval Station, Pearl Harbor
$19,600,000
Naval Submarine Base, Pearl
$35,890,000
Harbor.
Idaho
Naval Surface Warfare Cen-
ter, Bayview.
$7,150,000
Illinois
Naval Training Center, Great
Lakes.
$22,900,000
Maryland
Naval Air Warfare Center,
Patuxent River.
$1,270,000
North Carolina
Marine Corps Air Station,
Cherry Point.
$1,630,000
Marine Corps Air Station,
$17,040,000
New River.
Marine Corps Base, Camp
$20,750,000
LeJeune.
Texas
Naval Station, Ingleside
$16,850,000
Naval Air Station, Kingsville
$1,810,000
Virginia
Armed Forces Staff College,
Norfolk.
$12,900,000
xxxni
Navy: Inside the United States — Continued
State
InstaUation or Location
Total
Washington
CONUS Various
Marine Corps Combat Dev
Com, Quantico.
Naval Station, Norfolk
Naval Station, Everett
Defense Access Roads
$14,570,000
$35,520,000
$25,740,000
$300,000
Grand Total
$447,662,000
(b) Outside the United States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations in section 2204(aX2), the Secretary of the Navy may
acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the installa-
tions and locations outside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Navy: Outside the United States
Country
Installation or Location
Total
Bahrain
Greece
Italy
United Kingdom
Administrative Support Unit,
Bahrain.
Naval Support Activity,
Souda Bay.
Naval Air Station, Sigonella
Naval Support Activity,
Naples.
Joint Maritime Communica-
tions Center, St. Mawgan.
Grand Total
$5,980,000
$7,050,000
$15,700,000
$8,620,000
$4,700,000
$42,050,000
SEC. 2202. FAMILY HOUSING.
(a) CONSTRUCITON AND ACQUISITION.— Using amounts appropriated pursuant to
the authorization of appropriations in section 2204(aX6XA), the Secretary of the
Navy may construct or acquire family housing units (including land acquisition) at
the installations, for the purposes, and in the amounts, set forth in the following
table:
Navy: Family Housing
State
Installation or Lo-
cation
Purpose
Total
Arizona
California
Marine Corps Air
Station, Yuma.
Marine Corps
Base, Camp
Pendleton.
Naval Air Station,
Lemoore.
Navy Public
Works Center,
San Diego.
Support
128 Units
276 Units
366 Units
$709,000
$19,483,000
$39,837,000
$48,719,000
38-160 97-2
XXXIV
Navy: Family Housing — Continued
State
Installation or Lo-
cation
Purpose
Total
Hawaii
Maryland
North Carolina
Virginia
Washington
Marine Corps Air-
Ground Combat
Center,
Twentynine
Palms.
Marine Corps Air
Station,
Kaneohe Bay.
Navy Public
Works Center,
Pearl Harbor.
Naval Air War-
fare Center, Pa-
tuxent River.
Marine Corps
Base, Camp
LeJeune.
AEGIS Combat
Systems Center,
Wallops Island.
Naval Security
Group Activity,
Northwest.
Naval Station, Ev-
erett.
Naval Submarine
Base, Bangor.
Support
54 Units
264 Units
Support
Support
20 Units
Support
100 Units
Support
Grand Total
$2,938,000
$11,676,000
$52,586,000
$1,233,000
$845,000
$2,975,000
$741,000
$15,015,000
$934,000
$197,691,000
(b) Planning and Design. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriation in section 2204(a)(6XA), the Secretary of the Navy may
carry out architectural and engineering services and construction design activities
with respect to the construction or improvement of military family housing units in
an amount not to exceed $22,552,000.
SEC. 2203. IMPROVEMENTS TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, and using amounts appro-
griated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 2204(aX6)(A), the
ecretary of the Navy may improve existing military family housing units in an
amount not to exceed $183,483,000.
SEC. 2204. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRL\TIONS, NAVY.
(a) In General. — Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
beginning after September 30, 1996, for military construction, land acquisition, and
military family housing functions of the Department of the Navy in the total
amount of $1,943,313,000 as follows:
(1) For militaiy construction projects inside the United States authorized by
section 2201(a), $447,622,000.
(2) For military construction projects outside the United States authorized by
section 2201(b), $42,050,000.
(3) For unspecified minor construction projects authorized by section 2805 of
title 10, United States Code, $5,115,000.
(4) For architectural and engineering services and construction design under
section 2807 of title 10, United States Code, $42,559,000.
XXXV
(5) For militaiy construction projects which can be financed using unobUgated
prior-year appropriations, Authorization of Appropriations is reduced by
$12,000,000.
(6) For military family housing functions:
(A) For construction and acquisition, planning and design and improve-
ment of military family housing and facilities, $403,726,000.
(B) For support of military housing (including functions described in sec-
tion 2833 of title 10, United States Code), $1,014,241,000.
(b) Limitation on Total Cost of Construction Projects.— Notwithstanding
the cost variations authorized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost of all projects carried out
under section 2201 of this Act may not exceed the total amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
TITLE XXin— Am FORCE
SEC. 8301. AUTHORIZED AIR FORCE CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISITION PROJECTS.
(a) Inside the United States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the au-
thorization of appropriations in section 2304(a)(1), the Secretary of the Air Force
may acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the instal-
lations and locations inside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Air Force: Inside the United States
State
Installation or Location
Total
Alabama
Maxwell Air Force Base
$7,875,000
Alaska
Elmendorf Air Force Base
$21,530,000
Arizona
Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base.
$9,920,000
Arkansas
Little Rock Air Force Base ....
$18,105,000
California
Beale Air Force Base
$14,425,000
Edwards Air Force Base
$20,080,000
McClellan Air Force Base
$8,795,000
Travis Air Force Base
$7,980,000
Vandenberg Air Force Base
$3,290,000
Colorado
Buckley Air National Guard
Base.
$17,960,000
Falcon Air Force Base
$2,095,000
Peterson Air Force Base
$20,720,000
US Air Force Academy
$10,065,000
Delaware
Dover Air Force Base
$7,980,000
Florida
Elgin Air Force Base
$4,590,000
Eglin Auxiliary Field 9
$6,825,000
Patrick Air Force Base
$2,595,000
Georgia
Idaho
Robins Air Force Base
$18,645,000
Mountain Home Air Force
$6,545,000
Base.
Kansas
McConnell Air Force Base
$8,480,000
Louisiana
Barksdale Air Force Base
$4,890,000
Maryland
Andrews Air Force Base
$5,990,000
Mississippi
Nevada
Keesler Air Force Base
$14,465,000
Indian Springs Air Force
$4,690,000
Auxiliary Air Field.
New Jersey
McGuire Air Force Base
$8,080,000
North Carolina
Pope Air Force Base
$5,915,000
XXXVI
Air Force: Inside the United States — Continued
State
Installation or Location
Total
North Dakota
Seymour Johnson Air Force
Base.
Grand Forks Air Force Base
Minot Air Force Base
$11,280,000
$12,470,000
$3,940,000
$7,400,000
$9,880,000
$37,410,000
$5,665,000
$6,781,000
$5,895,000
$3,250,000
$9,413,000
$9,400,000
$3,690,000
$8,005,000
$18,155,000
$57,065,000
Ohio
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base.
Tinker Air Force Base
Charleston Air Force Base ....
Shaw Air Force Base
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Virginia
Arnold Engineering Develop-
ment Center.
Dyess Air Force Base
Kelly Air Force Base
Lackland Air Force Base
Sheppard Air Force Base
Hill Air Force Base
Langley Air Force Base
Fairchild Air Force Base
McChord Air Froce Base
Grand Total
$472,229,000
(b) Outside the United States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations in section 2304(a)(2), the Secretary of the Air Force
may acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the instal-
lations and locations outside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Air Force: Outside the United States
Country
Installation or Location
Total
Germany
Italy
Korea
Turkey
United Kingdom
Overseas Classified
Ramstein Air Force Base
Spangdahlem Air Base
$5,370,000
$1,890,000
$10,060,000
$9,780,000
$7,160,000
$1,740,000
$17,525,000
$6,195,000
$18,395,000
Aviano Air Base
Osan Air Base
Incirlik Air Base
Royal Air Force, Croughton
Royal Air Force, Lakenheath
Royal Air Force, Mildenhall
Overseas Classified
Grand Total
$78,115,000
SEC. 2302. FAMILY HOUSING.
(a) Construction and Acquisition.— Using amounts appropriated pursuant to
the authorization of appropriations in section 2304(aX5XA), the Secretary pf the Air
Force may construct or acquire family housing units (including land acquisition) at
the installations, for the purposes, and in the amounts set forth in the following
table:
XXXVII
Air Force: Family Housing
State
Installation or Lo-
cation
Purpose
Total
Alaska
Eielson Air Force
Base.
72 Units
$21,127,000
Support
$2,950,000
California
Beale Air Force
Base.
56 Units
$8,893,000
Travis Air Force
70 Units
$8,631,000
Base.
Vandenberg Air
112 Units
$20,891,000
Force Base.
District of Colum-
Boiling Air Force
40 Units
$5,000,000
bia.
Base.
Florida
Eglin Auxiliary
Field 9.
1 Units
$249,000
MacDill Air Force
56 Units
$8,822,000
Base.
Patrick Air Force
Support
$2,430,000
Base.
Louisiana
Barksdale Air
Force Base.
80 Units
$9,570,000
Missouri
Whiteman Air
Force Base.
68 Units
$9,600,000
New Mexico
Kirtland Air Force
Base.
50 Units
$5,450,000
North Dakota
Grand Forks Air
Force Base.
66 Units
$7,784,000
Minot Air Force
46 Units
$8,740,000
Base.
Texas
Lackland Air
Force Base.
50 Units
$6,500,000
Support
$800,000
Washington
McChord Air
40 Units
$5,659,000
Force Base.
Grand Total
$133,096,000
(b) Planning and Design. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the author-
ization of appropriations in section 2304(aX5KA), the Secretary of the Air Force may
carry out architectural and engineering services and construction design activities
with respect to the construction or improvement of military family housing units in
an amount not to exceed $9,590,000.
SEC. 8S08. IMPROVEMENTS TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, and using amounts appro-
griated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in section 2304(aX5)(A), the
ecretaiy of the Air Force may improve existing military family housing units in
an amount not to exceed $88,550,000.
SEC. 2304. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, AIR FORCE.
(a) In General. — Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
beginning after September 30, 1996, for military construction, land acquisition, and
military family housing functions of the Department of the Air Force in the total
amount of $1,663,769,000 as follows:
(1) For militaiy construction projects inside the United States authorized by
section 2301(a), $472,229,000.
XXXVIII
(2) For militaiy construction projects outside the United States authorized by
section 2301(b), $78,115,000.
(3) For unspecified minor construction projects authorized by section 2805 of
title 10, United States Code, $9,328,000.
(4) For architectural and engineering services and construction design under
section 2807 of title 10, United States Code, $43,387,000.
(5) For military housing functions:
(A) For construction and acquisition, planning and design and improve-
ment of military family housing and facilities, $231,236,000.
(B) For support of military family housing (including the functions de-
scribed in section 2833 of title 10, United States Code), $829,474,000.
(b) Limitation on Total Cost of Construction Projects.— Notwithstanding
the cost variations authorized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and
any other cost variation authorized by law, the total cost of all projects carried out
under section 2301 of this Act may not exceed the total amount authorized to be
appropriated under paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a).
TITLE XXIV— DEFENSE AGENCIES
SEC. 2401. AUTHORIZED DEFENSE AGENCIES CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISITION
PROJECTS.
(a) Inside the United States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the au-
thorization of appropriations in section 2406(a)(1), the Secretary of Defense may ac-
quire real property and carry out military construction projects for the installations
and locations inside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the follow-
ing table:
Defense Agencies: Inside the United States
Agency
Installation or location
Total
Chemical Demilitariza-
Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado
$179,000,000
tion.
Defense Finance & Ac-
Charleston, South Carolina ...
$6,200,000
counting Service.
Gentile Air Force Station,
$11,400,000
Ohio.
Griffis Air Force Base, New
$10,200,000
York.
Loring Air Force Base, Maine
$6,900,000
Naval Training Center, Or-
$2,600,000
lando, Florida.
Norton Air Force Base, Cali-
$13,800,000
fornia.
Offutt Air Force Base, Ne-
$7,000,000
braska.
Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois
$14,400,000
Defense Intelligence
Boiling Air Force Base, Dis-
$6,790,000
Agency.
trict of Columbia.
Defense Logistics Agen-
Altus Air Force Base, Okla-
$3,200,000
cy.
homa.
XXXDC
Defense Agencies: Inside the United States — Continued
Agency
Installation or location
Total
Andrews Air Force Base,
$12,100,000
Maryland.
Barksdale Air Force Base,
$4,300,000
Louisiana.
Defense Construction Supply
$600,000
Center, Columbus, Ohio.
Defense Distribution San
$15,700,000
Diego, California.
Elmendorf Air Force Base,
$18,000,000
Alaska.
McConnell Air Force Base,
$2,200,000
Kansas.
Naval Air Facility, El Centro,
$5,700,000
California.
Naval Air Station, Fallon,
$2,100,000
Nevada.
Naval Air Station, Oceana,
$1,500,000
Virginia.
Shaw Air Force Base, South
$2,900,000
Carolina.
Travis Air For^e Base, Cali-
$15,200,000
fornia.
Defense Medical Facili-
Andrews Air Force Base
$15,500,000
ties Office.
Maryland.
Charleston Air Force Base,
$1,300,000
South Carolina.
Fort BHss, Texas
$6,600,000
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
$11,400,000
Fort Hood, Texas
$1,950,000
Marine Corps Base, Camp
$3,300,000
Pendleton, California.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala-
$25,000,000
bama.
Naval Air Station, Key West,
$15,200,000
Florida.
Naval Air Station, Norfolk,
$1,250,000
Virginia.
Naval Air Station, Lemoore,
$38,000,000
California.
National Security Agen-
Fort George Meade, Mary-
$25,200,000
cy-
land.
Special Operations
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
$14,000,000
Command.
Fort Campbell, Kentucky
$4,200,000
Naval Amphibious Base,
$7,700,000
Coronado, California.
Naval Station, Ford Island,
$12,800,000
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
Grand Total
$525,190,000
XL
(b) Outside the UrOTED States. — Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the
authorization of appropriations in section 2406(aK2), the Secretary of Defense may
acquire real property and carry out military construction projects for the installa-
tions and locations outside the United States, and in the amounts, set forth in the
following table:
Defense Agencies: Outside the United States
Affency
Installation or Location
Total
Defense Logistics Agen-
cy-
Defense Medical Facili-
ties Office.
Moron Air Base, Spain
Naval Air Station, Sigonella,
Italy.
Administrative Support Unit,
Bahrain, Bahrain.
Grand Total
$12,958,000
$6,100,000
$4,600,000
$23,658,000
SEC. 2402. MILITARY HOUSING PLANNING AND DESIGN.
Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriation in
section 2406(aX14XA), the Secretary of Defense may carry out architectural and en-
gineering services and construction design activities with respect to the construction
or improvement of military family housing units in an amount not to exceed
$500,000.
SEC. 2403. IMPROVEMENTS TO MILITARY FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.
Subject to section 2825 of title 10, United States Code, and using amounts appro-
griated pursuant to the authorization of appropriation in section 2406(aX14XA), the
ecretary of Defense may improve existing military family housing units in an
amount not to exceed $3,871,000.
SEC. 2404. MILITARY HOUSING IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM.
(a) AVAILABIUTY OF FUNDS FOR Intvestment.— -Of the amount authorized to be ap-
propriated pursuant to section 2406(aX14XC), $20,000,000 shall be available for
crediting to the Department of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund estab-
lished by section 2883(aXl) of title 10, United States Code.
(b) Use of Funds. — The Secretary of Defense may use funds credited to the De-
partment of Defense Family Housing Improvement Fund under subsection (a) to
carry out any activities authorized by suDchapter IV of chapter 169 of such title
with respect to military family housing.
SEC. 2405. ENERGY CONSERVATION PROJECTS.
Using amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization of appropriations in
section 2406(aX12), the Secretary of Defense may carry out energy conservation
projects under section 2865 of title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 2406. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, DEFENSE AGENCIES.
(a) In General. — Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years
beginning after September 30, 1996, for military construction, land acauisition, and
military family housing functions of the Department of Defense (other than the mili-
tary departments), in the total amount of $3,411,936,000 as follows:
(1) For militaiy construction projects inside the United States authorized by
section 2401(a), $362,087,000.
(2) For military construction projects outside the United States authorized by
section 2401(a), $23,658,000.
(3) For military construction projects at Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Virginia,
hospital replacement, authorized by section 2401(a) of the Military Construction
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (division B of Pubhc Law
101-189, 103 Stat. 1640), $24,000,000.
(4) For military construction projects at Walter Reed Army Institute of Re-
search, Maryland, hospital replacement, authorized by section 2401(a) of the
Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (division B of Pub-
lic Law 102-484; 106 Stat. 2599), $92,000,000.
(5) For military construction projects at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, hospital
replacement, authorized by section 2401(a) of the Military Construction Author-
XLI
ization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (division B of Public Law 102^84; 106 Stat.
2599), $89,000,000.
(6) For military construction projects at Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, author-
ized by section 2401(a) of the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1995 (division B of Public Law 103-337; 108 Stat. 3040), $46,000,000.
(7) For military construction projects at Umatilla Army Depot, Oregon, au-
thorized by section 2401(a) of the Militaiy Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1995 (division B of Public Uw 103-337; 108 Stat. 3040),
$64,000,000.
(8) For military construction projects at Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, Columbus, Ohio, authorized by section 2401(a) of the Military Con-
struction Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1996 (division B of Public Law 104-
106; Stat???), $20,822,000.
(9) For unspecified minor construction projects under section 2805 of title 10,
United States Code, $21,874,000.
(10) For contingency construction projects of the Secretary of Defense under
section 2804 of title 10, United States Code, $9,500,000.
(11) For architectural and enmneering services and construction design under
section 2807 of title 10, United States Code, $12,239,000.
(12) For Energy Conservation projects authorized by section 2405,
$47,765,000.
(13) For base closure and realignment activities as authorized by the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXDC of Public Law
101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note), $2,507,476,000.
(14) For military family housing functions:
(A) For improvement and planning of military family housing and facili-
ties, $4,371,000.
(B) For support of military housing (including functions described in sec-
tion 2833 of title 10, United States Code), $30,963,000, of which not more
than $25,637,000 may be obligated or expended for the leasing of military
family housing units worldwide.
(C) For the Family Housing Improvement Fund as authorized by section
2404(a), $20,000,000.
(D) For the Homeowners Assistance Program as authorized by section
2832 of title 10, United States Code, $36,181,000, to remain available until
expended.
(b) Limitation of Total Cost of Construction Projects.— Notwithstanding
the cost variation authorized by section 2853 of title 10, United States Code, and
any other cost variations authorized by law, the total cost of all projects carried out
under section 2401 of this Act may not exceed —
(1) the total amount authorized to be appropriated under paragraphs (1) and
(2) of subsection (a);
(2) $161,503,000 (the balance of the amount authorized under section 2401(a)
for the construction of a chemical demilitarization facility at Pueblo Army Depot
in Colorado); and
(3) $1,600,000 (the balance of the amount authorized under section 2401(a)
for the construction of a Medical/Dental clinic replacement, Key West Naval Air
Station, Florida).
TITLE XXV— NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
SECURITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM
SEC. 2801. AUTHORIZED NATO CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISITION PROJECTS.
The Secretaiy of Defense may make contributions for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Security Investment Program as orovided in section 2806 of title 10,
United States Code, in an amount not to exceed the sum of the amount authorized
to be appropriated for this purpose in section 2502 and the amount collected from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a result of construction previously fi-
nanced by the United States.
8KC. 2502. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS, NATO.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years beginning after
September 30, 1996, for contributions by the Secretary of Defense under section
2806 of title 10, United States Code, for the share of the United States of the cost
of projects for the North Atlantic Treaty Security Investment Program as authorized
by section 2501, in the amount of $197,000,000.
XLII
TITLE XXVI— GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES FACILITIES
SEC. 2601. AUTHORIZED GUARD AND RESERVE CONSTRUCTION AND LAND ACQUISITION
PROJECTS.
There are authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years beginning tifter Septem-
ber 30, 1996, for the costs of acquisition, architectural and engineering services, and
construction of facilities for the Guard and Reserve Forces, and for contributions
therefor, under chapter 133 of title 10, United States Code (including the cost of ac-
quisition of land for those facilities), the following amounts:
(1) For the Department of the Army —
(A) for the Army National Guard of the United States, $7,600,000; and
(B) for the Army Reserve, $48,459,000.
(2) For the Department of the Navy, for the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve,
$10,983,000.
(3) For the Department of the Air Force —
(A) for the Air National Guard of the United States, $75,394,000; and
(B) for the Air Force Reserve, $51,655,000.
SEC. 2802. AUTHORIZATION OF CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED WITH PREVIOUS-
YEAR APPROPRIATIONS.
The following projects and architectural and engineering services and construction
design are authorized using prior year appropriations:
(1) Army National Guard:
(A) Hastings Training Range, Nebraska, Modified Record Fire and Multi-
purpose Machine Gun Range, $1,250,000.
(B) Bismarck, North Dakota, Aviation Support Facility and Armory Com-
plex Expansion, $3,650,000.
(C) Of the total amount required for architectural and engineering serv-
ices and construction design, $1,800,000 is authorized using prior appro-
priations.
TITLE XXVn— EXPIRATION AND EXTENSION OF
AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 2701. EXPIRATION OF AUTHORIZATIONS AND AMOUNTS REQUIRED TO BE SPECIFIED BY
LAW.
(a) Expiration of Authorizations After Three Years.— Except as provided in
subsection (b), all authorizations contained in titles XXI through XXVI for military
construction projects, land acquisition, family housing projects and facilities, and
contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure program
(and authorizations of appropriations therefor) shall expire on the later of —
(1) October 1, 1999; or
(2) the date for the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military con-
struction for fiscal year 2000.
(b) Exception. — Subsection (a) shall not apply to authorizations for military con-
struction projects, land acquisition, family housing projects and facilities, and con-
tributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Infrastructure program (and
authorizations of appropriations therefor), for which appropriated funds have been
obligated before the later of —
(1) October 1, 1999; or
(2) the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for fiscal year 2000
for military construction projects, land acquisition, family housing projects and
facilities, or contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Security
Investment Program.
SEC. 2702. EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATIONS OF CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 1994 PROJECTS.
(a) Extensions. — Notwithstanding section 2701 of the Military Construction Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (division B of Public Law 103-160, 107 Stat.
1880), authorizations for the projects set forth in the tables in subsection (b), as pro-
vided in title XXI, XXII, and XXIII of that Act, shall remain in effect until October
1, 1997, or the date of the enactment of an Act authorizing funds for militaiy con-
struction for fiscal year 1998, whichever is later.
(b) Tables. — The tables referred to in subsection (a) are as follows:
XLIII
Army: Extension of 1994 Project Authorizations
State
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
New Jersey
Picatinny Arsenal
Fort Bragg
Fort McCoy
Advance War-
head Devel-
opment Fa-
cility.
Land Acquisi-
tion.
Family Hous-
ing Con-
struction
(16 Units).
$4,400,000
$15,000,000
$2,950,000
North Carolina
Wisconsin
Navy: Extension of 1994 Project Authorizations
State
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
California
Camp Pendleton
Sewage Facil-
$7,930,000
Marine Corps
ity.
Base.
Connecticut
New London
Hazardous
$1,450,000
Naval Sub-
Waste
marine Base.
Transfer
Facility.
New Jersey
Earle Naval
Explosives
$1,290,000
Weapons Sta-
Holding
tion.
Yard.
Virginia
Oceana Naval Air
Jet Engine
$5,300,000
Station.
Test Cell
Replace-
ment.
Various
Various Locations
Land Acquisi-
tion Inside
The U.S.
$540,000
Various
Various Locations
Land Acquisi-
tion Out-
side The
U.S.
$800,000
Air Force: Extension of 1994 Project Authorizations
State/Country
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
Alaska
Eielson Air Force
Base.
Upgrade
Water
Treatment
Plant.
$3,750,000
XLIV
Air Force: Extension of 1994 Project Authorizations —
Continued
State/Country
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
Elmendorf Air
Corrosion
$5,975,000
Force Base.
Control Fa-
cility.
California
Beale Air Force
Educational
$3,150,000
Base.
Center.
Florida
Tyndall Air Force
Base Supply
$2,600,000
Base.
Logistics
Center.
Mississippi
Keesler Air Force
Upgrade Stu-
$4,500,000
Base.
dent Dor-
mitory.
North Carolina
Pope Air Force
Add To And
$4,300,000
Base.
Alter Dor-
mitories.
Virginia
Langley Air Force
Base.
Fire Station
$3,850,000
SEC. S703. EXTENSION OP AUTHORIZATIONS OF CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 1993 PROJECTS.
(a) Extensions.— Notwithstanding section 2701 of the Military Construction Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (division B of Public Law 102-484, 106 Stat.
2602), authorizations for the projects set forth in the tables in subsection (b), as pro-
vided in section 2101, 2301, or 2601 of that Act or in section 2201 of that Act and
extended by the Military Construction Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, shall
remain in effect until October 1, 1997, or the date of the enactment of an Act au-
thorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 1998, whichever is later.
(b) Tables. — The tables referred to in subsection (a) are as follows:
Army: Extension of 1993 Project Authorizations
State/Country
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
Arkansas
Pine Bluff Arsenal
Ammunition
Support Fa-
cility.
$15,000,000
Air Force: Extension of 1993 Project Authorizations
State/Country
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
Portugal
Lajes Field
Water Wells
$865,000
SEC. 2704, EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATIONS OF CERTAIN FISCAL YEAR 1992 PROJECTS.
(a) Extensions.— Notwithstanding section 2701 of the Military Construction Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1992 (division B of Public Law 102-190 105 Stat.
1535), authorizations for the projects set forth in the tables in subsection (b), as pro-
vided in title XXI of that Act and extended by the Military Construction Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 1995 and the Military Construction Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996, shall remain in effect until October 1, 1997, or the date of the
XLV
enactment of an Act authorizing funds for military construction for fiscal year 1998,
whichever is later,
(b) Tables. — The tables referred to in subsection (a) are as follows:
Army: Extension of 1992 Project Authorizations
State/Country
Installation or Lo-
cation
Project
Amount
Oregon
Umatilla Army
Depot.
Umatilla Army
Depot.
Ammunition
Demili-
tarization
Support Fa-
cility.
Ammunition
Demili-
tarization
Utilities.
$3,600,000
$7,500,000
SEC. S706. EFFECTIVE DATE.
Titles XXI, XXn, XXIII, XXIV, XXV, and XXVI shall take effect on the later of—
(1) October 1, 1996; or
(2) the date of the enactment of this Act.
TITLE XXVin— GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A — Military Construction Program and Military
Family Housing Changes
SEC. 2801. INFLATIONARY ADJUSTMENTS TO MINOR CONSTRUCTION AUTHORITY.
(a) ACTIVE Component Unspecified Minor Consttruction Using Operation
AND Maintenance Funds.— Section 2805(cXl) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking out "$300,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$350,000".
(b) Reserve component Unspecified Minor Construction. — Section
18233a(aXl) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking out "$400,000"
and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,500,000".
(c) Reserve Component Unspecified Minor Construction Using Operation
and Maintenance Funds.— Section 18233a(b) of title 10, United States Code, is
amended by striking out "$300,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$350,000".
sec. 2802. improvements TO FAMILY HOUSING UNITS.
(a) Authority.— Section 2825(aX2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by inserting "major" before "maintenance"; and
(2) by inserting "(excluding day-to-day maintenance and repair)" before "to be
accomplished".
(b) Limitation.— Section 2825(bX2) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—
(1) by striking out "repairs" and inserting in lieu thereof "major maintenance
or repair woric Excluding day-to-day maintenance and repair)";
(2) by inserting ", out of the five-foot line of a housing unit," before "in connec-
tion with (A)"; and
(3) by inserting ", drives," after "roads".
Subtitle B — ^Base Closure and Realignment and
Environment
sec. 2805. CONTRACTING FOR CERTAIN SERVICES AT FACILITIES REMAINING ON CLOSED IN-
STALLATIONS.
(a) Authority Under 1988 Act. — Section 204(bX8XA) of the Defense Authoriza-
tion Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Title II of Public Law
100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note), is amended by inserting "or at facilities remaining
on installations closed under this title" after "under this title".
XLVI
(b) Authority Under 1990 Act.— Section 2905(bX8XA) of the Defense Base Clo-
sure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of Title XXIX of Public Uw 101-510; 10
U.S.C. 2687 note), is amended by inserting "or at facilities remaining on installa-
tions closed under this part" after "under this part".
SEC. 2806. PAYMENT OP STIPULATED PENALTIES ASSESSED UNDER CERCLA.
The Secretary of Defense may pay from funds appropriated to the Department of
Defense Base Closure Account (Part II), not more tnan $50,000 as payment of stipu-
lated civil jpenalties assessed under the Conrprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 l/.S.C. 9601 et seq.) against Loring Air
Force Base, Maine.
Subtitle C — ^Land Conveyance
SEC. X807. TRANSFER OP UnLITY SYSTEMS AT BLUEGRASS ARMY DEPOT, KENTUCKY.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to the City
of Richmond, Kentucky (hereinafter the "City"), or to Madison County (hereinafter
the "County"), all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to a parcel
of real property located at Blue Grass Army Depot, Kentucky, consisting of approxi-
mately acres, and all improvements located thereon. TTie parcel is improved
with a sewage treatment plant, sludge disposal facilities, and a sewage collection
system.
(b) Related Easements. — The Secretary may also grant to the City or the County
any easement that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under sub-
section a. for operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance. — The Secretary mav not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the City or tne County agrees
to accept all improvements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the City or the County provide water service to Blue Grass Army
Depot, Kentucky at a rate mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and the City
or the County and approved by the appropriate Federal or State regulatory au-
thority.
(2) That the City or the County comply with all applicable environmental
laws and regulations (including any permit or license requirements) in the oper-
ation and maintenance of the improvements.
(3) That the City or the County assume full responsibility for operation, main-
tenance, and repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable
regulatory requirements.
(4) That the City or the County not commence any expansion of the improve-
ments without the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisTactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section, snail be borne by the City or the County.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions.— The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 2808. TRANSFER OP UTILITY SYSTEMS AT CAMP PARKS, CALIFORNIA.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to the Dublin
San Ramon Services District, California (hereinafter the "District"), all right, title,
and interest of the United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Camp
Parks, CaHfomia consisting of approximately acres, ana all improvements lo-
cated thereon. The parcel is improved with a water treatment plant and a water
distribution system with storayge tanks.
(b) Related Easements.— The Secretary may also grant to the District any ease-
ment that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a.
for operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance. — The Secretaiy may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the Distnct agrees to accept all
improvements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
XLVII
(1) That the District provide water service to Camp Parks, California at a
rate mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and the District and approved by
the appropriate Federal or State regulatory authority.
(2) jfiiat the District comply with all applicable environmental laws and regu-
lations (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and
maintenance of the improvements.
(3) That the District assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance,
and repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regu-
latory requirements.
(4) That the District not commence any expansion of the improvements with-
out the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section, snail be borne by the District.
(f) Additional Terms and Conditions. — The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 280e. TRANSFER OF UnLITY SYSTEMS AT FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to the City
of Leavenworth, Kansas (hereinafter the "City"), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Fort Leavenworth, Kan-
sas, consisting of approximately acres, and all improvements located thereon.
The parcel is improved with a water treatment plant and a water distribution sys-
tem with storage tanks.
(b) Related Easements. — The Secretary may also grant to the City any easement
that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a. for
operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance.— The Secretary may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the City agrees to accept all im-
provements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the City provide water service to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas at a rate
mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and the City and approved by the appro-
priate Federal or State regulatory authority.
(2) That the City comply with all applicable environmental laws and regula-
tions (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and main-
tenance of the improvements.
(3) That the City assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance, and
repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regulatory re-
quirements.
(4) That the City not commence any expansion of the improvements without
the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section snail be borne by the City.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions.— The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 28ia transfer of utility SYSTEMS AT FORT LEWIS, WASHINGTON.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to Pierce
County, Washington (hereinafter the "County"), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Fort Lewis, Washington,
consisting of approximately acres, and all improvements located thereon. The
parcel is improved with a sewage treatment plant, sludge disposal facilities, and a
sewage collection system.
(b) Kelated Easements. — The Secretary may also grant to the County any ease-
ment that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a.
for operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
XLvni
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance.— The Secretary may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the County agrees to accept all
improvements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the County provide water service to Fort Lewis, Washington at a
rate mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and the County and approved by
the appropriate Federal or State regulatory authority.
(2) That the County comply with all applicable environmental laws and regu-
lations (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and
maintenance of the improvements.
(3) That the County assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance,
and repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regu-
latory requirements.
(4) That the County not commence any expansion of the improvements with-
out the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section shall be borne by the County.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions.— The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 2811. transfer OF UTILITY SYSTEMS AT FORT MEADE, MARYLAND.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to the City
of Odenton, Maryland (hereinafter the "City"), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Fort Meade, Maryland,
consisting of approximately acres, and all improvements located thereon. The
parcel is improved with a water treatment plant, a water distribution system with
storage tanks, a wastewater treatment plant, and a wastewater collection system.
(b) Related Easements. — The Secretary may also grant to the City any easement
that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a. for
operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance.- The Secretary may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the City agrees to accept all im-
provements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the City provide water service to Fort Meade, Maryland at a rate
mutually agreed iipon by the Secretary and the City and approved by the appro-
priate Federal or State regulatory autnority.
(2) That the City comply with all applicable environmental laws and regula-
tions (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and main-
tenance of the improvements.
(3) That the City assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance, and
repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regulatory re-
quirements.
(4) That the City not commence any expansion of the improvements without
the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisTactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section snail be borne by the City.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions. — The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 2812. transfer OF UTILmf SYSTEMS AT FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY.
(a) Authority To Convey. — The Secretary of the Army may convey to Monmouth
County, New Jersey (hereinafter the "County"), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey, consisting of approximately acres, and all improvements located
XLIX
thereon. The parcel is improved with a water treatment plant, a water distribution
system with storage tanks, a sewage treatment plant, and a sewage collection sys-
tem.
(b) Related Easements. — The Secretary may also grant to the County any ease-
ment that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a.
for operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance.— The Secretary may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the County agrees to accept all
improvements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the County provide water service to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey at
a rate mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and the County and approved by
the appropriate Federal or State regulatory authority.
(2) That the County comply with all applicable environmental laws and regu-
lations (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and
maintenance of the improvements.
(3) That the County assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance,
and repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regu-
latory requirements.
(4) That the County not commence any expansion of the improvements with-
out the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisfactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section, snail be borne by the County.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions.— The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 2813. TRANSFER OF UTILITY SYSTEMS AT HUNTER ARMY AIR FIELD, FORT STEWART,
GEORGIA.
(a) Authority To Convey.— The Secretary of the Army may convey to the City
of Hinesville, Georgia (hereinafter the "City"), all right, title, and interest of the
United States in and to a parcel of real property located at Hunter Army Air Field,
Fort Stewart, Georgia, consisting of approximately acres, and all improve-
ments located thereon. The parcel is improved with a sewage treatment plant,
sludge disposal facilities, and a sewage collection system.
(b) Related Easements.— The Secretary may also grant to the City any easement
that is necessary for access to the real property conveyed under subsection a. for
operation and maintenance of the facilities located thereon.
(c) Requirement Relating to Conveyance.— The Secretary may not exercise the
authority granted by subsection a. unless and until the City agrees to accept all im-
provements in their existing conditions at the time of conveyance.
(d) Condition of Conveyance. — The conveyance authorized by subsection a. is
subject to the following conditions:
(1) That the City provide water service to Hunter Army Air Field, Fort Stew-
art, (Jeorgia at a rate mutually agreed upon by the Secretary and tiie City and
approved Dy the appropriate Federal or State regulatory authority.
(2) That the City comply with all applicable environmental laws and regula-
tions (including any permit or license requirements) in the operation and main-
tenance of the improvements.
(3) That the City assume full responsibility for operation, maintenance, and
repair of the improvements and for compliance with all applicable regulatory re-
quirements.
(4) That the City not commence any expansion of the improvements without
the prior approval of the Secretary.
(e) Description of Property. — The exact legal description of the real property
to be conveyed under subsection a., including the improvements located thereon,
and of any easements granted under subsection b., shall be determined by a survey
and other means satisiactory to the Secretary. The cost of such survey and other
services performed at the direction of the Secretary under the authority of this sub-
section shall be borne by the City.
(0 Additional Terms and Conditions.— The Secretary may require such addi-
tional terms and conditions in connection with the conveyance under subsection a.
and the grant of any easement under subsection b. as the Secretary considers appro-
priate to protect the interests of the United States.
SEC. 2814. EASEMENTS FOR RIGHTS-OF-WAY.
Section 2668(a) of title 10, United States Code is amended—
(1) by striking out "and" at the end of paragraph (9);
(2) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (12);
(3) by inserting the following two new paragraphs after paragraph (9):
"(10) poles and lines for the transmission and distribution of electrical power;
"(11) poles and lines for communication purposes, and for radio, television,
and other forms of communication transmitting, relay, and receiving structures
and facilities; and"; and
(4) at the end of paragraph (12), as redesignated by this section, by striking
out "or by the Act of March 4, 1911 (43 U.S.C. 961)".
Subtitle D— Other Matters
SEC, 2815. INSTALLATION AND OWNERSHIP OF ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AT
YOUNGSTOWN AIR RESERVE STATION, OHIO.
(a) Finding. — The Congress finds that it would be advantageous to the United
States to consider, as a test program, utilizing non-governmental entities to provide
certain utility services at Youngstown Air Reserve Station, Ohio.
(b) Authorization. — The Secretary of the Air Force is authorized to enter into an
agreement with a local electric utility or private company to have the utility or com-
pany install, operate, and maintain a new electrical distribution system, satisfactory
to laoth the Secretary and the utility or company, at Youngstown Air Reserve Sta-
tion.
(c) Agreement. — The agreement between the Air Force and the utility or com-
pany may contain the following terms and conditions:
(1) The Air Force may provide the company with such licenses or easements
as the Air Force determines necessary for the installation, operation, and main-
tenance of the new distribution system.
(2) The resulting electrical distribution system may be the property of the
company but any rates for utilities or other services provided by the company
to tne (jovemment shall not include the cost of installing the new distribution
system as authorized by this Act.
(3) Such other terms and conditions as the Secretary considers appropriate
to protect the interests of the United States.
(d) Source of Funds.— The Secretary may use funds authorized in Title XXIII,
Division B, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 (Public
Law 104-106) and appropriated in the Military Construction Appropriations Act,
1996 (Public Law 104-32) for the purpose of rebuilding the electrical distribution
system at Youngstown Air Reserve Station, to pay the cost of acquiring the services
of the company in accordance with this Act.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA-
TION ACT— SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND CHAIRMAN
OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m. in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
The Chairman. The committee will please come to order.
Mr. Secretary, Greneral Shalikashvili, welcome to the committee
this morning. It is always an honor to have you before the commit-
tee, and we all look forward to your testimony and the dialog to
follow.
For the members' information the committee will proceed until
11:45, at which point we will recess until 2 o'clock to accommodate
a prior commitment of the Secretary. Then the committee will re-
convene at 2 o'clock.
Mr. Secretary, during the past 3 years there has been much de-
bate over and criticism of the administration's long-term defense
plan. The Bottom-Up Review was initiated after the Clinton eco-
nomic plan was firmly in place and was an attempt, in the minds
of many, to fit a strategy to economic realities that already in-
cluded deep reductions in defense spending.
In one form or another, the wide-ranging criticism has focused on
the mismatches between resources and strategy. The administra-
tion's defense budgets do not support the recommended military
force structure; and, even if it did, the force structure is inadequate
for the execution of the two MRC strategy. In turn, the critics have
been criticized. Yet the record of the debate, as it has evolved,
would seem to validate the perspective of the Bottom-Up Review's
critics.
On readiness, in the fall of 1994 the Congress shed some much-
needed light on the readiness problems afflicting the services at
precisely the same time we were being told by senior Department
officials that the services were at a higher rate of readiness than
on the eve of Desert Storm. Despite the Department's denial that
there was a problem, several months later the President announced
his decision to add $25 billion to the defense budget. Internally, the
Department and the services also took a number of steps to im-
prove the readiness assessment process.
(1)
On modernization, we are all aware of the extent to which the
administration has sacrificed recapitalization in an attempt to ad-
dress more pressing near-term readiness shortfalls. Basically, there
is not enough funding in the budget for both timely recapitalization
and maintenance of short-term readiness, so modernization has be-
come the bill payer. However, in part as a result of this procure-
ment holiday, CBO has testified to a modernization shortfall of be-
tween $70 and $300 billion beginning early next century.
In addressing the problem, last year the Congress took a two-
pronged approach. First, we passed the most aggressive package of
acquisition reform measures in decades; and, second, we were so
concerned with the low level of spending in the President's budget
that we increased the defense top line. Approximately $5 billion of
the increase went to modernization. Yet we were roundly criticized
by the administration.
I find it ironic that the Chairman's program assessment offered
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in calling for significant increases in
modernization funding leaked out last fall at about the same time
the administration was threatening to veto the defense bill because
of increased funding.
Mr. Secretary, you yourself have recently brought some focus to
the third piece of the three-piece puzzle, force structure. It has
been reported that you believe without the generation of significant
internal savings or the infusion of necessary immediate resources
that further reductions in force structure could be necessary to
maintain readiness and modernization. I take this to mean that
without additional resources from somewhere, internal savings, in-
creased funding, or both, the administration's long-term defense
plan does not work, at least not to the extent that protecting readi-
ness and modernization could require the reduction of force struc-
ture below the already significant reductions implemented on the
Bottom-Up Review.
Mr. Secretary, when I step back and look at the readiness, mod-
ernization and impending force structure debate, it strikes me that
the burden of proof is squarely on the administration's shoulders
when it comes to demonstrating that the long-term defense plan is
not underfunded, is not broken. The administration has confronted
the underlying problem to date by using modernization to pay for
shortfalls elsewhere. Now when the time comes to modernize, the
underljdng problem of inadequate resources remains unaddressed
by the administration. So discussion starts about the possibility of
using deeper force structure reductions to pay for modernization.
I would hope we could all agree to bring this debilitating shell
game to an end. Even with optimistic assumptions about base clos-
ings and acquisition reform savings, this budget nonetheless begins
down the slippery slope of deeper force structure reduction. Based
on preliminary data, this budget assumes both Army and Air Force
end strength below Bottom-Up Review levels in the years ahead.
Mr. Secretary, there is little doubt that the force is already
stretched in peacetime, so where is the "give" in terms of our global
commitments and presence if the force is reduced further? I believe
that there is a widespread consensus that the administration's
long-term defense plan is underfunded, that the services are facing
significant short-term challenges and even more serious long-term
problems.
To paraphrase a refrain the committee has heard numerous
times over the past 3 years, the services cannot remain on the ra-
zor's edge forever. Problems either get managed and fixed or they
grow and the system becomes increasingly dysfunctional.
Yet the fiscal year 1997 budget does not appear to offer solutions.
Instead, it seems to rely on 3-year-old assumptions that base clos-
ings and acquisition reform savings will somehow magically save
the day. In many instances, this budget appears to exacerbate the
problem.
The request of $10 to $20 billion below current spending levels
reflects a real decline of more than 6 percent. Spending in all major
titles is declining in real terms from current spending levels. De-
spite the added attraction that the Joint Chiefs brought to the
modernization problem last fall, instead of addressing the rec-
ommendation that annual procurement funding should reach $60
billion by fiscal year 1998, 2 years earlier than the administration
plan, this budget further delays achievements on this objective by
1 year, to fiscal year 200 1.
Mr. Secretary, I believe that Congress will take a similar two-
pronged approach to the problem this year. We will continue to ag-
gressively push to generate internal savings through reform,
downsizing and consolidation and privatization. I would hope that
the Department will take full advantage of the opportunities we af-
forded in this area in the fiscal year 1996 bill.
As was the case last year, we will also increase the defense
spending top line in the budget resolution. But at the end of the
day, Mr. Secretary, Congress cannot help the administration if the
administration does not want the help. If we labor through too
many more years like last year, with the administration asserting
that all is well in defense, the outyear problems that many of us
in this room are worried about will simply become self-fulfilling.
Admiral Owens testified last week before the Senate that we
have to stop promising ourselves and do something. Although the
Admiral was specifically referring to the procurement problem, I
believe his statement is appropriate in the broader context of the
problems this administration's long-term defense plan poses.
Accordingly, with all that, I look forward to our witnesses' testi-
mony this morning.
Before beginning, I would like to recognize the distinguished gen-
tleman from California, the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr.
Dellums, for any comments he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM CALIFORNLV, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
I join with you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses today
and look forward to hearing from both Defense Secretary Perry and
General Shalikashvili regarding their views on the state of our
military and the administration's proposal for fiscal year 1997 de-
fense authorization programs. I welcome the opportunity to com-
4
mence the formal inquiry into the nature of our national security
strategy, the force structure and equipment and operations pro-
posed to meet the strategy and the Department's assessment of the
resources required to support those elements of the strategy.
As I have indicated before, Mr. Chairman, the Nation's budget is
the best reflection of its priorities across all the competing needs
that our citizens face. In the current environment, the ascertain-
ment of appropriate priorities is made more urgent by the move-
ment toward a balanced budget. We have less flexibility across ac-
counts, and all accounts must, in my opinion, share in the burdens
of attaining such a goal if indeed the goal is deemed a national re-
quirement. Although setting total budget priorities may be beyond
this committee's responsibilities, we can participate in reaching
sensible conclusions about the national security threats we face
and in making sensible decisions about the best strategies to pre-
vent, deter or meet those threats and the elements necessary to im-
plement those strategies.
It is clearly against this backdrop that Secretary Perry and Gen-
eral Shalikashvili appear, to present their views regarding the de-
fense strategy and fiscal plan and how they fit within the larger
budget perspective. They can advise us whether, given this bal-
ancing, they believe the department can indeed perform its mis-
sion; and, of course, they can respond to the number of questions
that we may have regarding these issues.
Mr. Chairman, reasonable people may disagree with their conclu-
sions, and that is the beauty of the democratic process. Democracy
implies and values diversity of opinion, the exchange of ideas and
the deliberative search for policies that vindicate our national aspi-
rations and provide for our citizens.
So whether, for example, one believes in meeting the threat of
the proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass de-
struction by aggressively pursuing expensive missile defense tech-
nology on the one hand or by an equally aggressive pursuit of non-
proliferation strategies in combination with appropriately scaled
military strategies to meet a reduced threat, this is an opportunity
for an interchange of these varying views to occur. This is where
we begin to make policy as a government, executive branch and the
legislative branch together.
Mr. Chairman, we are 1 year further into whatever we will even-
tually call the post-cold war era. What once was unknown is be-
coming clearer, at least in the near term. Some imagined threats
are not emerging. Others are changing before us, and some not
fully anticipated are challenging our ingenuity.
As many of us predicted, peacekeeping, humanitarian and other
such missions occupy more of our attention, and appropriately so,
because they can eliminate instability, end conflict, stop or prevent
genocide or avoid engulfing us in full-scale war. We are beginning
to grapple more successfully with meeting the requirements gen-
erated by the activities we see during this new reality — better plan-
ning for funding, more appropriate training, improving multi-
national command relationships, meeting the family needs of de-
ployed personnel and thinking about logistical requirements, just to
name a few.
Further, Mr. Chairman, it strikes me as well that the events of
these years suggest that earlier predictions that the Bottom-Up Re-
view planning requirements might need to be modified in accord-
ance with these new modes of activity should have gained now
some currency. Operations in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Bosnia-
Herzegovina provide valuable data bases for lessons learned — both
with regard to the characteristics of the force we need to employ
in those types of operations as well as with regard to how those op-
erations might impact on the total force's ability to perform its
other missions. They give us further insight into how we might
most profitably allocate scarce resources.
These and many other questions await answers. For example:
How do we continue to best contribute to stability and democra-
tization in Europe? What should be the pace and scale of NATO ex-
pansion and what continuing role should the United States play in
NATO? Events in Bosnia, Russia and throughout Central and East-
ern Europe challenge us to confront these issues. How can we
make similar contributions in other regions of concern — the Middle
East, Africa, the Americas and the Pacific and Asia?
How do we enhance high leverage programs that can prevent
conflict, and which accounts should pay for them? How do we most
effectively incorporate our national principles in favor of democracy
and human rights into our foreign policy, and what role do our
Armed Forces appropriately play in achieving those national secu-
rity goals?
How do the Department and the services best avail themselves
of the resources of our Nation and economy, and how might a
weaker economy, a poorly trained and educated citizenry, or a de-
clining national infrastructure or technology base adversely affect
their ability to do so? How and when is it appropriate for the De-
partment to contribute to these elements of our national security
strategy?
These and many other questions I believe are significant and im-
portant as we move toward the 21st century and as we invite the
testimony of our distinguished witnesses this morning.
I hope that my colleagues will receive today's presentation in its
proper context — as presenting a major element of a much larger
national security strategy that has to be balanced against multiple
national requirements, many of which affect our national security
but which are not traditionally considered in the rubric of pro-
grams. I am very confident that Secretary Perry and General
Shalikashvili are well positioned to contribute constructively to the
dialogue that is required for us to reach a national consensus on
how best to meet these requirements and to balance these compet-
ing priorities. I look forward to hearing what I am certain will be
a very professional, informed and insightful view of these issues.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Before we turn the floor over to the Secretary and Greneral
Shalikashvili, I also want to welcome Sandy Stewart of DOD, Mr.
Bacon and Ms. Maroni, who is a former member of this committee
staff. Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DE-
FENSE; GEN. JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF; JOHN HAMRE, COMPTROLLER, DEPART-
MENT OF DEFENSE; AND ALICE MARONI, PRINCIPAL DEP-
UTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you have the floor.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to sub-
mit my statement for the record and in my oral testimony today
will give you highlights from it.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Secretary Perry. I am here to present the fiscal year 1997 de-
fense budget. The budget, by definition, is a collection of programs
and requested funding.
The important questions are: How did we arrive at these pro-
grams, what are our priorities, what hard choices were we con-
fronted with, and how do we make those choices.
These priorities and the hard choices are based on our views of
the dangers to the United States in the world today and the de-
fense strategy formulated to deal with these dangers. Therefore, for
an effective dialogue with this committee, I am going to start with
a description of those dangers and strategy and follow that with a
description of the programs that we are proposing along with the
management approaches to implement that strategy. I have some
charts to assist me here.
Mr. Chairman, as you well know, I have spent almost my entire
career as a cold-war warrior where I was focusing on the issues of
how to prevent a war. The dangers we face today are very different
from that.
I have summarized on this chart proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, instability, particularly in Eastern and Central Eu-
rope, which could lead to new threats of nuclear war, and the local
and regional conflicts with which we have been confronted. These
are the real and present dangers which we face today, and the de-
fense strategy we have formulated to deal with that puts three
lines of defense here between those dangers and United States se-
curity.
The first line of defense is preventive defense. What can we do
to prevent these dangers from becoming military threats to the
United States, threats to the United States or our allies, threats
of economic strangulation or threats of the use of weapons of mass
destruction?
I will talk to you briefly about these preventive programs. Then
the bulk of my discussion will be on the programs we have to deter
these military threats from becoming military conflict and, if they
become military conflict, the capability of our forces to fight and,
within that conflict, thereby protecting U.S. security.
I want to emphasize that there are three lines of defense. I will
start, first of all, by talking about the first line, preventive defense.
This is one we have not discussed much, although we have done
many of these things for years.
The first component is reducing the nuclear threat from the
former Soviet Union, preventing new nuclear threats from arising
in other countries, encouraging defense reform, particularly in the
newly independent countries formed from the former Soviet Union
and in Eastern Europe, and building defense-to-defense relation-
ships.
Let me discuss first what we are doing today to reduce the nu-
clear threat.
There is a program in the Defense Department called the Nunn-
Lugar program. We call it cooperative threat reduction. In fiscal
year 1997, we are requesting about $300 million to continue this
program. In the last 3 years this program has been responsible for
removing thousands of missiles from the former Soviet tJnion, from
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakstan and destroying many
hundreds of missiles and launchers.
Let me just give you one important example of this. At
Pervomaysk in the former Soviet Union, now in Ukraine, I visited
there in March, 1994, to witness the removal of the warheads from
the SS-19 missile. One year later, in April, 1995, I visited there
to witness the removal of the missile itself, the SS-19 missile
which was taken out for destruction.
Just 2 months ago, I returned again, along with the Russian and
the Ukrainian Defense Minister, to participate in the blowing up
of the SS-19 silo there. That silo and the SS-19 missile that was
in it was one of 80 at Pervomaysk, which in aggregate contained
700 nuclear warheads.
On my first visit there, all of those warheads, all 700 of them,
were aimed at targets in the United States. I will return there in
June. By June, all 700 of those missiles will have been removed,
warheads will have been removed, and the missile field at
Pervomaysk will have been returned to a wheat field.
It is the funding under the Nunn-Lugar program that has made
this possible. That is what I am calling preventive defense, what
your former chairman, Les Aspin, used to call defense by other
means.
We are also concerned about keeping those nuclear weapons from
getting out into other countries. This is the proliferation threat.
Again, in the Nunn-Lugar program, a major part of that involves
denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus. Kazakstan
today is already a nonnuclear state. By the end of the year,
Belarus and Ukraine will be. Ukraine, which had the fourth largest
nuclear arsenal in the world, will be nonnuclear by the end of this
year.
Project Sapphire — we took the highly enriched uranium, several
hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium, which we took out
of Kazakstan where we thought it might be in some danger of pro-
liferating and moved it to the United States.
Improved warhead security in Russia.
The North Korea Framework Agreement stopped the North Ko-
rean nuclear program dead in its tracks. It has been stopped for
the last year and a half, since we made this agreement. These are
the sort of things we do to counter the proliferation threat.
The next item, preventive defense, was building partnership rela-
tions, defense-to-defense relationships first of all with the nations
of Central and Eastern Europe. This chart depicts a very important
innovation in which National Guard units from the States in the
United States — South Carolina, Tennessee, Alabama, Colorado,
Ohio, Pennsylvania — have each formed special defense relation-
8
ships with a country in Eastern or Central Europe. There are 12
such relationships in Eastern and Central Europe and 9 with na-
tions of the former Soviet Union.
When the Kazakstan Defense Minister visited me last week,
after he finished visiting in Washington, he went to Arizona and
met with the Arizona National Guard where they are working on
programs together.
This defense-to-defense relationship with these nations has been
significant and important. Even more significant has been the de-
fense-to-defense relationship we have formed with Russia.
This is a picture of the first joint exercise between United States
and Russian troops in the United States held at Fort Riley, KS,
last fall. This is Minister Grachev and myself with the Russian and
American troops, talking with them at the end of the exercise. Per-
haps more significantly, just after that I met with Minister
Grachev in Brussels to make the final agreement on the Russian
participation in IFOR, which is the NATO peacekeeping force in
Bosnia.
This picture shows the time we signed the final agreement ham-
mered out between General Joulwan and General Shetshov. We
wanted to bring Russia into that Bosnia operation not because we
needed their troops so much in Bosnia but because this was the
biggest security problem in Europe at the end of the post-cold-war
era and we wanted Russia inside the circle helping us solve the
problem instead of outside the circle throwing rocks at us.
As we speak, the Russian brigade is in the Tuzla area working
for General Nash and carrying out its peacekeeping operations.
A key part of our military-to-military confidence-building effort is
the Partnership for Peace. This picture is the first Partnership For
Peace exercise in the United States. Fourteen nations came to Fort
Polk, LA, last summer and conducted a peacekeeping exercise. This
is a centerpiece of the work we are doing in the Partnership for
Peace, which I believe is the most important security development
perhaps since the formation of NATO and bringing nations to-
gether to create a zone of security and stability, extending it not
only from Western Europe but into Central and Eastern Europe as
well.
So we have a small but highly leveraged, important part of our
program in defense designed to prevent dangers from becoming
military threats; but we still have the bulk of our program involved
in the deterrence of military threat.
Deterrence worked during the cold war. It works today, but it is
a very different program today. Today we have to focus on our con-
ventional military capability plus the credibility that we are willing
to use it. We have demonstrated that twice in the last few years,
once in Iraq in October 1994 where our timely and rapid deploy-
ment of United States forces stopped the Iraqis from moving into
Kuwait a second time; and it has worked in Korea, a combination
of the major capability we have deployed along with the South Ko-
reans in South Korea plus the Framework Agreement to stop the
nuclear weapon program.
So deterrence is a key to our success, but even in the best case,
deterrence — we cannot count on deterrence working. We have to be
prepared to use military power.
We have used it when our interests are affected in a vital way,
as they were in Desert Storm. We have used it in important inter-
ests in Haiti and Bosnia. We have even used it, on occasion, for hu-
manitarian purposes.
This is at the Rwandan refugee site where we sent for a few
weeks United States engineers in, and in their timely intervention
they stopped a cholera epidemic which was killing 5,000 people a
day.
So these are the circumstances in which we use military power,
and the bulk of our program presented today is to provide deter-
rence and to provide the ability for war fighting. There are five
principal components of it, and I will cover these each in turn,
starting off with force structure.
I am not going to dwell on this chart because it is not substan-
tially different from the chart which I showed you last year. It re-
flects the structure of the forces today to provide for deterrence and
the forces that we would use if we had to go to war. The drawdown
is essentially over today. That is, the force structure level in 1997
is very, very close to the projected goal we have. It is equal to it
in the case of Army divisions and Air Force wings and very, very
close to it in the case of Navy ships.
So the good news is that drawdown is over. We have stabilized
our forces at the fiscal year 1997 level. Of these forces, IV2 million
in the active duty forces, 900,000 reserve and 800,000-plus civilian.
But of the active duty forces, 230,000 of them are forward de-
ployed, about 100,000 in Europe, about 100,000 in the western Pa-
cific, 20,000 in southwest Asia and, on the average, about 10,000
in SOUTHCOM.
These 230,000 forward-deployed forces are a critical part of our
deterrence. But the balance of the forces, the ones that are not de-
ployed, of course, in the United States, if we have an emergency
we will have to project them to that emergency.
This chart simply reminds you of how far away we are from the
areas of greatest crisis: 5,000 miles to Korea from Fort Lewis, 8 to
9,000 miles to southwest Asia from Fort Bragg or Fort Hood. So we
have a significant problem of power projection, and we have pro-
grams designed to maintain our capability and power projection.
This is the C-17, which performed spectacularly well in Bosnia.
I would be happy to answer questions and give you detail about
that. This was an outstanding performance in Bosnia.
This is a cartoon of the new fast sealift ship, the Bob Hope. This
illustrates the two different components of lifting power overseas.
This third picture is a picture of the warehouse in Kuwait where
we have an armored brigade — equipment for an armored brigade
pre-positioned. That was a key to our being able to respond in just
a matter of a few days in October of 1994 when Saddam Hussein
sent his forces to the border of Kuwait again. We were able to send
in a matter of a few days troops from Fort Stewart, GA, to marry
up with this equipment and have a full armored unit on the border
in a matter of a few days from the crisis. Pre-positioning is a criti-
cal part of our strategy.
We go from force structure and forward deployment and power
projection to readiness, both for forces in the United States and de-
ployed forces overseas.
10
This picture is to illustrate one critical component of readiness,
which is training. I will be talking more about the importance of
training and how it fits into our budget today. But we have the
training fully funded in the 1997 budget so that we can maintain
the full capability of our forces.
I have argued with this committee before that a very important
component of readiness is quality of life for our soldiers. I want to
take this opportunity to thank this committee, particularly the
Military Construction Subcommittee, for the very good support you
have given us in improving the quality of our housing.
In order to protect readiness, which I say again is our No. 1 pri-
ority, several things need to be done. Even though we have the
funding both in the 1996 and the 1997 budget to perform the full
levels of training requested by the services, those can be eroded by
funds being diverted for contingency operations. That is happening
as we speak for the operations going on in Bosnia. Therefore, we
have to reprogram funds to deal with that problem.
We have a request for reprogramming in for 1996 to fund this
Bosnian operation, and three of our four committees have acted on
it. This committee has not. We urge you to act on this so we can
get moving with the businesslike funding of the operation we have
going on in Bosnia today.
Second, in terms of the fiscal year 1997 budget, for the first time
we have submitted a budget to include these planned military oper-
ations in our funding. We have more than $1 billion in this budget
to accommodate the tail end of the Bosnian operation, which will
occur after 1 October this year, and to accommodate the funding
of the southwest Asia operations.
I have concluded myself that it was a mistake not to have those
in the budget in the past. I have put them in this budget. That way
we will not have to come back to you for supplemental reprogram-
ming unless there are truly unexpected contingencies that arise
during the year.
So we have continued in this budget robust O&M funding. This
term "robust" is much overused. I want to define it that the O&M
dollars divided by end strength, this year, last year are the highest
that they have ever been historically and are about 10 to 20 higher
than they were during the 1980's at the levels of our highest de-
fense budgets. So we are funding O&M, and we are funding it well.
That is reflected in the readiness and performance of our forces as
we have seen in Haiti and in Bosnia.
We continue to monitor and manage readiness and continue to
work to enhance the quality of life. Besides the good work that this
committee has already done for us in the housing area, we will be
coming to the committee this year to seek legislative authority to
create a new military housing authority so that we can accelerate
the introduction of new housing for our military forces.
I am now moving to weapon systems, which is in some ways the
most controversial part of the budget. I have it divided in six dif-
ferent categories, nuclear deterrence, ballistic missile defense, air-
sea and land dominance, and what I call battlefield awareness,
sometimes called situation awareness.
Let me talk first about nuclear deterrence. The nuclear posture
review held over a year ago concluded we still needed a nuclear
11
force for deterrence purposes. It could be smaller than in the past,
but we still needed to maintain a ready and a safe force.
This chart from 1990 to the year 2003 reflects the drawdown of
the nuclear force in terms of number of warheads, from approxi-
mately 11,000 in 1990, headed down to 6,000 in 1998 as part of the
START I agreement. Both we and the Russians are ahead of sched-
ule in the drawdown on START I.
Now, from 1998 on I have a more complicated picture because it
depends: First, it depends on whether the Russian Parliament rati-
fies the START II treaty. It is now debating the START II treaty,
but we do not know whether they will ratify it. Our policy will be
not to draw below the 6,000 limit until or unless the Russians rat-
ify the START II treaty and begin complying with it.
If they do ratify it, there are still several alternatives depending
on the geopolitical developments at that time. One would be to re-
constitute the force if things take a really adverse turn, and the
other would be to make even faster and deeper reductions. These
are decisions to be made in the future. In the meantime, we are
on this course in START I, and we are keeping our powder dry in
START II until such time as the treaty is actually ratified.
The next area is ballistic missile defense. I have represented on
this chart what our program in national missile defense is. Our as-
sessment is the threat is not now, but it could emerge. I will be
happy to discuss with you the conditions under which a threat
might emerge and what kind of a threat might emerge.
Our response to this is that we should have a readiness for de-
ployment. In this program we are proceeding on development that
will make us ready for a deployment decision in 3 years. The chart
says if we decided in 3 years to deploy the system, we could begin
deployment at that time and 3 years later have an operational ca-
pability. So we are 6 years away from an operational capability if
we make the decision 3 years from now to deploy.
When that time comes, depending on what is happening to this
threat emergence and depending on what is happening in tech-
nology, we might either decide to go ahead with the deployment or
we might decide to move to a more advanced system here and that
is depicted by the different options in the chart.
We also have a National Missile Defense Program. In this FYDP
we have $2 billion for national missile defense, which provides only
for taldng us to the readiness for deployment. It does not include
the funding for deployment. If we decide to deploy in 3 years, we
would need to add additional money at that point to accommodate
the production and the deployment of the system.
In the theater missile defense the situation is very different. In
theater missile defense the threat is here and now and we feel ur-
gency about getting a system built and deployed to replace the Pa-
triot System in the field, which we think is only marginally ade-
quate for this purpose. Our CINC's and Joint Chiefs have agreed
that the chief priority on theater missile defense is moving expedi-
tiously to a system which we can deploy in the field.
Our program does this in two different ways. First, it has a Navy
area system to be based on the Aegis and the next version of the
Patriot, the so-called PAC III, and each of these is a substantial
improvement over the Patriot System, and we are moving expedi-
12
tiously to make those systems ready for deplojnuent in the near fu-
ture.
One of the things that was done in the last program review is
we added more funding to these two programs to be sure that we
can sustain a rapid deployment decision on that.
In addition to that, since these systems are somewhat limited in
the area that they cover, we wanted to have a wider area system
developed, too. We also have both a ground-based system, THAAD,
and a sea-based system, the Navy Theater-wide System, formerly
called Navy Upper Tier System, under development, and this budg-
et permits a deliberate deployment of those next generation sys-
tems. All in all, we have $10 billion in the FYDP for this set of pro-
grams.
I want to go from there to air, sea, and land dominance. This
chart, shows the sorties, air sorties of the Iraqi Air Force at the
time of Desert Storm, and it shows the number of sorties, this
number is 40 here, not a very impressive record, but still some at-
tempt to field an air force right up until the time the air war start-
ed. And at that time, you can see we basically shutdown the Iraqi
Air Force.
The point I want to make from this chart is that for years we
have described our objective in air power is we wanted air superi-
ority. What we had in Iraq was not air superiority, it was air domi-
nance. We had it, we liked it, and we want to continue it. So our
objective in this field now is to have air dominance. This set of pro-
grams describes what we will do to maintain the air dominance we
have. This is a fairly richly funded set of programs running to $6
billion a year in fiscal year 1997 and the outyears. I call this out
to you because we have been criticized for having the wrong prior-
ities, putting too much money in tactical air as opposed to other
programs. We do have a rich program here.
Moving to the F-22, which is the next generation air superiority
fighter, the joint strike fighter which is the follow-on to the F-16,
the F-18, which is the next generation Navy aircraft, has substan-
tial funding, and the V-22, which is the marine and special oper-
ations forces aircraft. So this is a vigorous program, $6 billion a
year moving forward in tactical air. We are doing it because we
want to maintain air dominance and are not prepared to settle for
this.
Do not take seriously people when they tell you we do not need
advanced fighters like the F-22 and the F-18 because we will not
face advanced fighters. We are not looking for an equal or fair
fight. If we get into an air fight with somebody, we want the ad-
vantage to be wholly and completely on our side.
We have programs in the air to sea dominance. This depicts
ships that we are building. This is the program. I have fiscal year
1996 and fiscal year 1997 here because we buy ships in lumps and
it is not a smooth year-to-year basis. It comes to about $6 billion
a year for ships and that is sustained over the FYDP. It includes
a new generation of attack submarines, as well as maintaining our
surface vessels and maintaining sealift, a very important part of
our program.
Land dominance, this chart gives pictures of our land systems.
This funding, as you can see, is only about half the size of what
13
we are spending for air dominance and sea dominance. We have,
again, been criticized, on the one hand, for having too much money
in TAG AIR, and on the other for not having enough money in
some of these land equipments. But I would point out to you that
a key to success of our land battle is maintaining this air domi-
nance.
It completely changes the dynamics of the battlefield. We not
only are able to attack enemy ground forces with our air, but our
own ground forces are immune to attack because of our air domi-
nance. A big part of this is precision-guided missiles, which are
. more and more a key to our success.
Let me go to battlefield awareness, which the Army and the Air
Force call situational awareness. This is the glue that holds it all
together. We have a sizable program in this area. It is very often
not understood, the importance of this program.
This cartoon, I have chosen the Predator, which is now in Bosnia
and operating reconnaissance surveillance for our forces there. This
shows the Predator looking at an enemy disposition either with a
camera or with a radar imaging system, and in real time it relays
that image to a satellite, which relays it back to a tactical intel-
ligence center on the ground in the battle area.
At that center we get this image and plus data coming in from
other sources including national intelligence sources and relay
those data out to the American units in the field. This gives them
detailed and precise knowledge of the disposition and the location
of the enemy forces, an advantage which the enemy forces do not
have. This was a critical advantage that we had in Desert Storm.
In Desert Storm we knew where every tank, every vehicle, every
unit of the Iraqi Army was, all over the battlefield. What the Iraqi
commander knew was what he could learn by looking out of the
foxhole, and that advantage was absolutely critical to our success
in Desert Storm. We want to sustain that advantage. It is the key
to giving us the dominance on air, land, or sea warfare.
Where do we get the funds to buy these systems? You have seen
this chart before. This is the decline in procurement spending. It
started even earlier than 1990, goes back into the late 1980's.
There has been a 60-percent decline since 1990, actually about a
70-percent decline since 1987, which is when this decline began.
We have for the last 3 years been able to more or less level that
off and the budget presented to you we project a 40-percent in-
crease getting to the $60 billion a year level by the end of the dec-
ade.
This decline meant we could buy very few airplanes, very few
tanks, very few ships ordinarily a decline like this in a company
by an aging of equipment in the field. That did not happen in this
case because the decline happened at the same time that we were
drawing down our forces and therefore pulling out the older equip-
ment, and therefore what actually happened, and this is a picture
for just one of our forces, which is the Air Force tactical aircraft;
during this same period that we had the decline here the average
age of our tactical aircraft remains almost constant, very slight in-
crease and less than one-half the service life. So therefore we were
and are today still in very good shape in that.
14
But what this also shows is now that the drawdown is over and
we still don't have a strong procurement rate, then we are going
to start to get aging on a year-to-year basis. As we go into the next
decade, if we do not correct this problem, we will start going up in
that direction, ending up with having old, obsolete equipment in
the field. Therefore, we have to deal with this problem. We have
to start ramping up our modernization.
I think we have fairly complete agreement in the administration
and the Congress on that point. The debate has been over when to
start ramping it up and how much to start ramping it up. This re-
flects the ramp-up in this budget; and let me say flat out, this will
not be enough to solve the problem I have described to you unless
we have success in some other areas as well.
Let me describe three fundamentals.
We have to sustain the top-line budget which the President has
proposed, we have to have success in BRAC in the privatization ini-
tiatives we have, and we have to have success in acquisition re-
form. I will talk about each briefly.
Lets look at the top-line budget first. You have seen these fig-
ures. They show a decline in budget in 1997 and then a stabiliza-
tion of the budget after that with a very modest increase in real
terms. That is, the budget goes up each year here in nominal dol-
lars, but it actually slightly increases in purchasing power in real
dollars toward the end of the period.
Maintaining this gain is essential to solving the problem I have
described, and that is what I mean by saying we have to maintain
the top line which is in the President's budget. If it is eroded, for
example, by inflation, not compensated for, then that would be one
way of defeating the plan which we are proposing.
Let me talk about the next item, which is BRAC for privatiza-
tion. I have talked to you many times about BRAC in the past.
This is the first time I have had some results to give you in terms
of ability to project numerically what the savings are going to
amount to.
This chart shows, first of all, the cost of BRAC. That is the one
element which is the best defined. This is historical, from 1990 to
fiscal year 1996. In fiscal year 1996, we show the cost reaching a
maximum of about $4 billion. We will be using $4 billion of Defense
money this year to close the bases. That is the cost associated with
closing the bases. Next year, that is fiscal year 1997, the budget
we' are proposing, the budget is $2.8 billion for BRAC. Not shown
here is that will be offset by $300 million for sale of land, so a net
of $2.5 billion.
These costs we incur because we expect to make savings; and the
green line represents the savings, historical to this point, achieved
by BRAC.
In fiscal year 1996, an interesting development. This is the first
year where we will get a break-even. That is going to be a great
relief for us. In fiscal year 1996, the savings from BRAC will be
about equal to the costs; and, therefore, we will have a break-even
point.
In fiscal year 1997, the budget we are submitting to you now, we
are expecting $2.8 billion of cost, $4.5 billion of savings for a net
of $1.7 billion. So this is the first year where we will be able to
15
take this money, harvest it for our modernization programs. In
time, that will go up to about $6 billion a year savings, and you
can see during the course of the rest of this decade the number
goes up to about $4 billion and off the chart up to $6 billion. That
is one very key element.
Last year when I talked to you I was much more uncertain about
being able to effect these savings. This year, with a year of history
behind us, I am much more confident in the figures that I am pro-
jecting.
The other area of harvesting savings is in acquisition reform. I
have testified many times how important I think acquisition reform
is and how dedicated I am to achieving it, but I have also said I
cannot quantify the savings from it. This year, I can begin to quan-
tify the savings; and I would like to start doing that.
This is one program. The SMART-T Program it is called. It is
an Army field tactical terminal — communication terminal. That
program was started in fiscal year 1992 at an estimated cost of
about $800 million.
We made this a model for acquisition reform in 1994 in two dif-
ferent ways: first, we reexamined the requirements for the system,
reduced them somewhat. For example, we determined the system
did not have to be nuclear hardened. Second, we determined that
the way we bought it could be changed by changing the specs, re-
ducing the data requirements, calling for a failure-free warranty.
The net of all of these was just a few months ago we awarded
a fixed price contract for $250 million. So from the initial estimate
of almost $800 million we ended up with a $250 million fixed price
program, with a savings of over $500 million.
The point I want to make is that the savings in acquisition re-
form are not a few percent, they are not on the margin. We can
cut costs in half — more than in half, if we do it right. This is not
an isolated case.
I want to go to the JDAM Program, Joint Direct Attack Muni-
tions. This is a program where we are taking bombs already in our
inventory, 1,000-pound bombs, putting in GPS receivers, having a
control system that causes the fins to wiggle, and we turn a dumb
bomb into a smart bomb. We will be building thousands of these.
The unit cost when we started the program in 1994 was $42,000,
and we went in and said we relieve you of the MILSPEC require-
ments, of the reporting and requirements that are set up. In a
sense, we introduced the features of acquisition reform; and now
that program is coming in at $14,000— from $42 000 to $14,000.
Over the life of this program we will save about $3 billion on the
JDAM. Again, this is not marginal or small savings. These are very
real dollars and very large dollars.
The last example is the C-17, one of our most important aircraft
programs. Just 3 years ago, this program was in such deep trouble
that it was in danger of being cancelled; and there were calls from
some Members of Congress, as a matter of fact, to cancel it. Today,
it is the most successful aircraft program that we have. Not only
is it successful in performance, but I want to tell you something
about the contracting of it.
First of all, by introducing integrated product teams in the man-
agement of the program quite early on and by relieving some of the
38-160 97-3
16
requirements of the program, including some of the reporting re-
quirements, we got costs down. We got a good program, and the
program was good enough that we are going for a multiyear pro-
curement of both the airplane and the engine. All these have re-
sulted in savings over the life of the program of $5.3 billion, $3 bil-
lion of which is during the period of this budget proposal that I am
making to you. These are real dollars, and they are big dollars, and
they are what we are getting from acquisition reform.
A final comment about acquisition reform. Late last year we ex-
tended the authority for acquisition reform to programs already un-
derway. What I have described to you are three new starts, but we
can have many programs underway where we can retroactively go
back and try to get additional savings. So all of these together are
going to make a big difference in our ability to run the program
more efficiently and get more value from the dollars that are avail-
able to us.
I would like to conclude with a statement that we have today the
best military force in the world. That sounds, I am sure, like a
boastful statement. I can assure you that this is not just my judg-
ment. This is the judgment of every senior military leader that I
know in the world today, that the U.S. military is the best military
force in the world today.
These were taken at the Saga River Bridge in January in Bosnia.
I went there the day after they opened that bridge and walked
from the Croatian side to the Bosnian side across the bridge.
Halfway across the bridge, I came across 20 or 30 soldiers still
working on one section of the bridge. They were cold, dirty, tired,
and exhausted; but they were very proud about what they had
done. A staff sergeant in the group stepped forward. It turned out
his enlistment was up; and he said he wanted to reenlist. So Gen-
eral Joulwan and General Shalikashvili and I swore him in to 4
more years in the U.S. Army out in the middle of the Saga River
Bridge.
I can tell you I have never been so proud of the U.S. Army as
I was at that time, nor have I ever been so proud to be the Sec-
retary of Defense of soldiers that have that kind of morale and that
kind of spirit. This is one fine military force we have. We want to
keep it that way.
I want to end with the statement, people in our program are our
first priority, and as long as I am Secretary of Defense it will stay
that way. We have gotten great support from this committee and
this Congress on the initiatives I have in this area.
The full pay raises, for the first time in our history we have
budgeted the pay raises all through the periods of the FYDP, 3 per-
cent in fiscal year 1997 and what the current law will allow from
1998 through the rest of the periods.
We budgeted high-quality health care benefits.
Retirement — again with the support of this committee, the retire-
ment benefits remain unchanged.
Housing — 49,000 new barrack spaces over the FYDP and new
family housing authorities getting started, support we have already
gotten from this committee and more support we will be asking for
this year.
17
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention and for the support
this committee has given me. I would like to now turn over to Gen-
eral Shalikashvili before we entertain questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Perry follows:]
18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE NATIONAL
SECURITY COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WILLIAM J. PERRY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
IN CONNECTION WITH THE FY 1997
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
6 March 1996
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE NATIONAL
SECURITY COMMTTTEE
19
Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry
In Connection with the FY 1997 Defense Budget
House National Security Committee
March 6, 1996
A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
Mr. Chaimuin, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here to present President
Clinton's fiscal year (FY) 1997 Department of Defense (DoD) budget In this statement my goal is
to summarize the strategic context in which this budget has been developed.
THE DANGERS OF THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
Contrary to the hopes of many and predictions of some, the end of die Cold War did not being
an end to international conflict The most daunting threats to our national security that we faced
during the Cold War have gone away, but they have been replaced widi new jJaaggs. (Figure 1)
During the Cold War, we faced the threat of nuclear holocaust; today we face the dangers
attendant to the proliferation of weq>ons of mass destruction. Nuclear weqxms in the hands of
rogue nations or terrorists are especially dangerous because, unlike the nuclear powers during the
Cold War, they might not be deterred by the threat of retaliation.
During the Cold War, we faced the threat of Warsaw Pact forces charging through the Fulda
Gap and driving for the English Chaimel; today we face the dangers attendant to the instability in
Central and Eastern Europe resulting from the painful transition to democracy and market
economies now underway there. This instability could lead to civil wars or even die reemergmce
of totalitarian regimes hostile to the West
During the Cold War, we faced the direat of the Soviet Union using third world nations as
proxies in die Cold War confrontation; today we face the dangers arising from an explosion of local
and regional conflicts, uiuvlated to Cold War ideology, but rooted in deep-seated ethnic and
religious hatreds and frtquendy resulting in horrible suffering. These conflicts do not direcdy
threaten the survival of the United States, but they can threaten our allies and our vital interests,
particularly if the regional aggressors possess we^mns of mass destruction.
The new post-Cold War dangers make the task of protecting America's national security
different and in some ways more conqilex than it was during the Cold War. Our task of planning
force structure is more complex than when we had a single, overriding threat Previously, our force
structure was planned to deter a global war with die Soviet Union, which we considered a threat to
our very survival as a nation. All odier threats, including regional threats, were considered "lesser,
but included" cases. The forces we maintained to counter the Soviet threat were assumed to be
capable of dealing with any of these lesser challenges. Today, the threat of global conflict is gready
diminished, but the danger of regional conflict is neither lesser nor included and has therefore
required us to take this danger explicidy into account in structuring our forces. These risks are
especially worrisome because many of the likely aggressor nations possess weapons of mass
destruction. Additionally, our defense planning must provide a hedge for the possibility of a
reemetgence at some iiiture time of die threat of global conflict
20
Also, our task of building alliances and coalitions is more complex in the absence of a global
threat With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the raison
d'6tre of NATO, for example, had to be reconsidered from fost principles in order to relate its
missions to the new dangers. And new coalitions and parteerships needed to be formed wi& the
newly emerging democratic countries. In building such international coalitions, we understand that
the United States is the only country with truly global interests and a full range of global assets -
miUtary, economic, and political. Thus, we are the natural leader of the international community.
However, even the United States caimot achieve its goals without the active assistance of other
nations. No state can aa unilaterally and expect to fully address threats to its interests, particularly
those that are transnational in character. '
Thus the new post-Cold War security environment requires a significant evolution in our
strategy for managing conflict, and it requires new and iimovative defense programs and
management philosophies to implement that strategy.
MANAGING POST-COLD WAR DANGERS: PREVENT, DETER, AND DEFEAT
Today, our policy for managing post-Cold War dangers to our security rests on three basic
lines of defense. (Figure 2) The firet line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the
second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to
defeat the threat to our security by using military force. A renewed emphasis on the first line of
defense ~ preventive defense ~ is ^ipropriate in dealing with the post-Cold War dangers, and is a
significant departure frtsm our Cold War defense poUcies, where ^e primary emphasis was on
deterrence.
Prevenflve Defense
During Wnld War II, all of America's defense resources were dedicated to defeating the
threat posed by Germany and Ji^an and their allies. That war ended with a demonstration of the
incredibly destructive power of atomic weapcms. Thus, when the Cold War began, the fundamental
predicate of our defense strategy was that fighting a nuclear war was an unacceptable proposition ~
unacceptable from a military as well as a moral standpoint So we formulated a strategy of
deterrence ~ a logical response to the single overarching threat we faced during that era: an
expansionist Soviet Union heavily armed with nuclear and conventional weapons. This strategy
meant that the primary responsibility of previous Secretaries of Defense was making sure that we
had adequate forces ~ both nuclear and conventional ~ to provide unambiguous detmence.
Today, we ontinue to deter potential adversaries by maintaining the best military forces in the
world. But in the post-Cold War era, the Secretary of Defense and the Department also devote
significant efforts to working on preventive defense. Preventive defense seeks to keep potential
dangers to our security from becoming full-blown threats. It is perhaps our most important tool for
protecting American interests from the special dangers that characterize the post-Cold War era.
When successful, preventive defense precludes the need to deter or fight a war.
Preventive defense is nothing new - it has been a central idea of military strategists for over
two thousand years. Indeed, it has been an important strand in United States defense policy that
has been used before with notable success. After World War n, the United States and its allies
undertook significant efforts to prevent a future war by holding out a hand of reconciliation and
ec<momic assistance to our former enemies, Japan and Germany. These efforts were an
21
outstanding success, especially the Marshall Plan in Europe. The economies of J^>an and Western
Europe rebounded, democracy grew deep roots, and our military cooperation and strategic
alliances flourished. But Joseph Stalin turned down the Marshall Plan for the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European countries that he dominated, and our preventive efforts with the Soviet Union
failed.
Instead, the Cold War ensued, and for more than forty years the world faced the threat of
global war and tvea nuclear holocaust Having failed to prevent the conditions for conflict, the
United States concentrated on the second line of defense - deterrence. Over the next forty plus
years, deterrence worked, and World War m was averted. I^nally, largely as a result of
fundamental flaws in its political and economic system, the Soviet Union coll^sed, and many of
the New Independent States sought to establish democratic governments and free-market systems.
The outcome of that unprecedented transformation is still uncertain, but today the threat of
worldwide nuclear conflict has receded, former Warsaw Pact nations are seeking to join NATO,
and Russia and the United States are cooperating in both economic and security programs.
Qearly, deterrence and warfighdng capability still have to remain central to America's post-
Cold War security strategy, but they caimot be our only approaches to dealing with the threats to
our security. Instead, the dangers facing us today point us towards a greater role for preventive
defense measures. Just as preventive defense measures helped shape our security environment
following World War n, preventive measures can help us deal with post-Cold War dangers.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War allows us to build on the types of preventive measures successfully
introduced by George Marshall in Western Europe, and extend them to all of Europe and the Asia-
Pacific region.
In addition to maintaining strong alliances with our traditional allies in NATO and the Asia-
Pacific region, our ixeventive defense approach consists of four core activities (Figure 3):
• Working cooperatively with Russia, Ulcraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus to reduce the nuclear
legacy of the former Soviet Union and to improve the safety of residual weapons;
• Establishing programs to limit the proliferatioD of weapons of mass destruction;
• Encouraging newly independent and newly democratic nations to restructure their defense
establishments to emphasize civilian control of their military, transparency in their defense
programs, and confidence-building measures mtb dieir neighbors; and
• Establishing cooperative defense-to-defense relationships with nations that are neither full-
fledged allies nor adversaries, but who are, nonetheless, important to our security.
Investing in these programs today, which my predecessor Les Aspin a{)tly dubbed "defense by o&er
means," saves us boA blood and treasure tomorrow.
Proliferation is a prime example. The possession of nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction by a potential aggressor not only increases the potential lethality of any regional
conflict, but the mere possession of the weapons by the potential aggressor increases the chances of
ccmflict arising in the first place. In other words, it is not just that a nuclear-armed Iraq or North
Korea would be a more deadly adversary in a war — it is that with nuclear weapons they are likely
to be harder to deter and more likely to coerce their neighbors or start a war in the first place. The
Frameworic Agreement widi North Korea is a prime example of our counterproliferation program
at work. The dangerous North Korean nuclear program has been frozen since October 1994, when
die Frameworic Agreement was signed.
22
Another example of preventive defense is our Cooperative Threat Reduction program, often
referred to as the Nuim-Uigar program. Under this program, we have assisted the nuclear states of
the former Soviet Union to dismantle thousands of nuclear waiiieads and destroy hundreds of
launchers and silos.
Reducing the nuclear threat to the United States and stopping proliferation are only the most
dramatic examples of why prevention is so important to our security. The Department has initiated
other imaginative programs to strengthen our preventive defense ~ most notably Partnership for
Peace, which will be described in a Later section.
Deterrence
No matter how hard we work on preventive defense, we cannot be sure that we wiU always be
successful in preventing new threats from developing. That is why we must deter threats to our
security, should they emerge. The risk of global conflict today is greatiy reduced from the time of
the Cold War, but as long as nuclear weapons still exist, some risk of global conflict remains. The
United States, therefore, retains a small but highly effective nuclear force as a deterrent These
forces (as well as those of Russia) have been reduced significantly, consistent with the START I
treaty, and will be further reduced when Russia ratifies the START n treaty.
Similarly, to deter regional conflict, we must maintain strong, ready, forward-deployed,
conventionaUy-armed forces; make their presence felt; and demonstrate the will to use them. While
the diminished threat of global conflict has allowed us to reduce U.S. force structure accordingly,
the increased risk of regional conflict places sharp limits on how far those reductions can go.
Today, the size and composition of American military forces, consistent with the Bottom-Up
Review conducted in 1993, are based on the need to deter and, if necessary, fight and win, in
concert with regional allies, two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. The guiding
principle is that the United States will fight to win, and to win decisively, quickly, and with
minimum casualties.
This principle requires us to maintain a force structure today of about 1 .5 million active duty
personnel and 900,000 Selected Reserve personnel. These forces are organized into 10 active
Army divisions and 15 Army National Guard enhanced readiness brigades; 20 Air Force wings
(including 7 reserve wings); 360 Navy ships, including 12 aircraft carriers; and 4 Marine divisions
(including 1 reserve division). (Figure 4) Equally important to the size of the force is the
requirement to maintain a commanding overseas presence, including 100,000 troops in Europe and
about the same number in the Pacific, all in a high state of readiness. Our overseas presence not
only deters aggression, it also improves coalition effectiveness in the event deterrence fails,
demonstrates U.S. security commitments, provides initial crisis response capabiUty, and underwrites
regional stability. Strong deterrence also requires us to maintain prepositioned equipment in the
Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Korea and Europe, and carrier task forces and Marine
Expeditionary Units afloat, able to move quickly to any crisis point And finally, it requires that we
keep our forces in the United States in a high state of readiness, and that we have the lift capability
to transport them and their equipment rapidly to distant theaters. Having the capability to deploy
forces quickly to a crisis decreases the likelihood that they will actually have to be used and
increases their chances for success if force is necessary. Our planning involves the extensive use of
well-trained Reserve Component forces. Fifteen Army National Guard brigades and many combat
support reserve units will be maintained at a high readiness level to allow their use at early stages in
23
militaiy operations. The rest are intended to be used as follow-on forces available for later
deployment in longa-tetin contingencies.
Those are die requirements that go with the ability to fight and win, in concert widi regional
allies, two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. U.S. forces today meet these requirements.
While being able to fight and win is essential, that ability alone cannot deter conflict Deterrence
stems from military capabiUty coupled with political will, both real and perceived; credibility is as
important to detorence as military c^Mibility. Detenence of regional coiflict failed, for example, in
1950 when North Korea doubted American poUtical will. Some World War II veterans had to turn
around and return to the Far East to reassert that political will, at a very high price. Today,
American forces in the region serve as a visible reminder of our willingness and cq>ability to help
defend our South Korean allies.
In 1990, deteirence of regional conflict failed again when Iraq doubted our political will to
defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. We demonstrated that will through a cosdy but highly successful
war to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait In contrast deterrence succeeded in October 1994 when
Iraq moved forces down to the Kuwaiti border a second time. This time, the United States
demonstrated political will by r^idly deploying additional U.S. military forces to the Gulf. Within
a few days after the Iraqi forces had moved to the Kuwaiti border, we had deployed 200 fighter
aircraft an armored brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Unit and a carrier battle group to the theater.
These forces created in a few days a presence that took many weeks to assemble in 1990. Faced
with that presence and the lessons of Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein sent his brigades back to their
barracks. We achieved deterrence through the capability to rapidly build up a highly c^>able force,
coupled with the credible poUtical will to use that force.
Defending U^. Interests Throngh Use of Mflltarv Force
Deterrence can sometimes fail, however, particularly against an irrational or desperate
adversary, so the United States must be prepared to actually use military force. Use of force is the
method of last resort for defending our national interests and requires a careful balancing of those
interests against the risks and costs involved. The key criteria are whether the risks at stake are
vital, important or humanitarian.
If prevention and deterrence fail, vital U.S. interests can be at risk when the United States or
an ally is threatened by conventional military force, by economic strangulation, or by the threat of
weapons of mass destruction. These threats to vital interests are most likely to arise in a regional
conflict and, by definition, may require military intervention.
In contrast military intervention in ethnic conflicts or civil wars, where we have important but
rarely vital interests at stake, requires the balancing of those interests against the risks and costs
involved. In general, any U.S. intervention wiU be undertaken only after thorough consideration of
the following critical factors: whether the intervention advances U.S. interests; whether the
intervention is likely to accomplish U.S. objectives; whetiier the risks and costs are commensurate
with the U.S. interests at stake; and whether all other means of achieving U.S. objectives have been
exhausted. The United States chose not to intervene as a ground combatant in the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina because the risks and costs were too high when weighed against our interests.
This decision was made by two successive administrations for essentiaUy the same reasons.
However, after successful American diplomacy and NATO miUtary force reshaped the situation and
24
the risks, we made the decision to paiticipate, not as a combatant, but in the NATO peace
io^lementation force.
The bottom line is diat the United States is a global power with global interests, and as
President Clinton has said, "Problems that stait beyond our boders can quickly become problems
within them." American leadership, global presence, and strong armed forces can help keep
localized problems from becoming our problems, and protect us if they do. At the same time, there
are limits to what the United States and its forces can or must do about problems around the globe.
As the President said:
America caimot and must not be the world's policeman. We cannot stop war for all time,
but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and children, but we can save
many of theuL We can't do everytiiing, but we must do what we can. There are times
and places where our leadership can mean the difference between peace and war, and
where we can defend our fundamental values as a people and serve our most basic,
strategic interests.
Finally, in some instances, the United States may act out of humanitarian concern, even in the
absence of a direct threat to U.S. national interests. Agencies and programs other than the U.S.
Armed Forces are generally the best tools for addressing humanitarian crises, but military forces
may be appropriate in certain specific situations, such as when:
• a humanitarian crisis dwarfs the ability of civilian agencies to respond.
• the need for relief is urgent, and only the military can jump-start a response.
• the response requires resources unique to the military.
• the risk to American service members is minimal.
A good case in point was America's humanitarian intervention in Rwanda in the summer of
1994 to stop the cholera epidemic, which was killing 5,000 Rwandans a day. Only the U.S. military
had the ability to rapidly initiate the humanitarian effort to bring clean water, food, and medicine to
Hutu refugees who had fled from Rwanda in the wake of a catastrophic tribal conflict U.S. forces
carried out their mission successfully, at little cost, with little risk, and then quickly withdrew.
IMPLEMENTING OUR PREVENT, DETER, AND DEFEAT STRATEGY
Implementing our defense strategy involves literally hundreds of programs. Highlighted below
are some key ways that we are implementing our approach of prevent, deter, and defeat
Reducing the Danger of Weapons of Mass Destmction
During the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov said that preventing a
nuclear holocaust must be the "absolute priority" of mankind. This is still true. Today, a primary
means for accomplishing this goal is the continued dismantlement of nuclear warheads, bombers,
and ballistic missile launchers. The touchstone of our preventive activities in this area is die
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which helps expedite the START I Treaty reductions in
the states of the former Soviet Union. (Figure 5) This program contributes to some remarkable
accomplishments: over 4,000 nuclear warheads and more than 700 bombers and ballistic missile
launchers dismanded, a nuclear-free Kazakstan, Ukraine and Belarus on the way to becoming
nuclear free, and successful removal of nuclear material from Kazakstan through Project S:q>phire.
25
It is also vitally important diat we prevent potential regional conflicts from assuming a nuclear
aspect (Figured) That is why we have worked hard to help implement the framework agreement
which has frozen Nortii Korea's dangerous nuclear program and, when fully implemented, will
eliminate the program altogether. Efforts to reduce the nuclear threat also include sanctions on
Iraq and Iran and the indefinite extension without conditions of the historic Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Such diplomatic measures do not stand in isolation - they are an integral and
crucial part of the U.S. approach to preventing conflict
n«^ytny iiyalnrt Potential Fnture Threats
Despite our best efforts to reduce the danger of we^xns of mass destruction, it is still possible
that America - and our forces and allies ~ could again be Areatened by these terrible weiq>ons.
That is why it is inqxirtant for the United States to maintain a small but effective nuclear force.
(Figure 7) This deterrent hedge is not incompatible widi significant reductions in American nuclear
forces, nor is it incon^atible widi American support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty aiKl a
conq>r^ensive ban on nuclear testing. This nuclear hedge strategy is complemented by a program
to develop a ballistic missile defense system that could be deployed to protect the continental
United States from limited attacks, should a strategic threat to our nation arise from
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of hostile rogue states. (Figure 8)
Another way we hedge against potential future threats is by maintaining selected critical and
irreplaceable elements of the defense industrial base, such as shipyards Aat build nuclear
submarines. Widi the end of the Cold War and the defense downsizing, die need for large numbers
of mayx new ships, aircraft, and armored vehicles has declmed significantly. Allowing diese
defense-unique production ^ilities to shut down or dis^>pear completely, however, would curtail
die natioi's ability to modernize or prepare for new threats down the road. Therefore, the
Department will selectively procure certain major systems - such as the Navy's Seawolf fost-attack
submarine - in limited quantities to keep their producti(Hi capabilities '*wann** - until we are ready
to build the next generation nuclear submarines.
M^lntetntno Strong AMianP^ and B«ighlng Out tn Old Rivals and New Statea
Maintaining strong alliances widi our traditional allies in Eurc^ and die Asia-Pacific,
maintaining constructive relations widi Russia and China, and reaching out to new democracies and
friends are key elements of our defense posture.
Europe
In Europe, NATO is the foundation of our security strategy, and we plan to continue to play a
leadership role widiin NATO. There are diose who allege that NATO is now obsolete. But, in
fact, NATO has provided a zone of stability for Western Emx^ for over 40 years, and all 16
members have reaffirmed the importance of the Alliance. Indeed, NATO has received requests
from new nations wishing to join, to be a part of diis zone of stability.
NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) program is already extending a zone of stabiUty eastward
across Europe and Central Asia by promoting military cooperation among NATO countries, former
members of the Warsaw Pact, and other countries in the region. This cooperation takes place at
many levels, from frequent meetings between Defense Ministers to officer exchanges at schools and
planning headquarters. The highlight of PFP, though, is the joint exercise program, focusing on
peacekeeping training. In August 1995, the United States hosted one of these exercises.
26
"Cooperative Nugget," at Fort Polk. Such exercises have had a remaricable effect on European
security by building confidence, promoting tranq>arency, and reducing tensions among nations diat
have, in many cases, been at odds far long periods of Europe's history. FFP is also die pathway to
NATO membership for those Partners diat wish to join the Alliance.
In fact, the positive effiects of PFP resonate far beyond the security sfrtiete. Since political and
economic reforms are a prerequisite to participation in PFP or monbership in NATO, many Parmer
nations have accelerated such changes. In additim, many Partno- nations are starting to see value
in actual PFP activities, irrespective of whether they lead to NATO membership. The lessons
learned and values fostered dirough the program are intrinsically usefiiL
PFP is one of the most significant institutions of the post-Cold War era. Like the Marshall
Plan in die 1940s, PFP today is creating a network of people and institutions aooss all of Eunqw
WOTking together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and free markets, and cooperate
internationally - all of which are critical to e}q>anding the zone of stability in Europe in our day.
(Figure 9)
It is critical diat diis zone of stability in Europe iiKlude Russia. Key to this is Russia's active
membership in PFP, NATO's development of a special security relatitnship widi Russia, and
Russia's integral involvement in broader European security issues, as in Bosnia. Open, productive
security relations with Russia are an essential element of our approach to advancing security in
Europe and ultimately limiting the potential for conflict Recc^nizing that Russia remains a major
worid power with global interests and a large nuclear arsenal, die United States seeks a pragmatic
partnership with Russia whereby we pursue areas of agreement and seek to reduce tensions and
misunderstandings in areas whoe we disagree. Our successful efforts to include a Russian brigade
in the U.S. sector of die NATO-led peace inqilementation force in Bosnia readily reflect this
parmershq).
In addition to cooperative direat reduction efforts such as die Nuim-Lugar program, we also
seek to foster greater openness in die Russian defense establishment and to encourage Russia to
participate in global notqproliferaticn activities and regional confidence building measures, by
participating in the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Coopoation. The
Conmission, established by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chemcnnyrdin in 1993, seeks
to build confidence by forging a better economic relatimship between the United States and Russia.
The Defense Dqiartment is part of an interagency effort sponsored by the Commissirai focused on
finding, facilitating, and helping finance investments in the region by American business enterprises,
targeting a wide range of opportunities - fixnn defense conversion to space exploration to
prefabricated housing. The Conmission's activities benefit Russia's attempts to achieve a market
ecmomy, benefit American cotaptaaes, and benefit American security interests — a triple win!
Asia-Pacific
In the Pacific, die United States and Japan have entered into a new era in our regional
relationship, as well as in our global paimership. A stronger U.S.-J^>anese alliance wiU amtinue to
provide a safe envircmment for regional peace and prosperity. Our alliance with South Korea not
only saves to deta war on the peninsula, but also is key to stability in die region. These security
alliances and the Anmican military presence in die Western Pacific preserve security in the region,
and are a i»iiKq>al factor in dan^iening a regional arms race.
27
We are also fiilly participating in multilateral security dialogues, such as the ASEAN Regional
Fonun, which he^ reduce tensions and build confidence so that tough problems like the territorial
dispute over the Spratly Islands in the Soudi China Sea can be resolved peaceably.
Central to our efforts to prevent conflia in the Asia-Pacific region is our policy of
conqnehensive engagement witii China, a major power with a nuclear capability. The United States
will not ignore China's record on human rights, political repression, or its sale and testing of
dangerous weapons, but we also will not try to isolate China over these issues. We want to see
China become a responsible, positive participant in the intematicmal arena, and the best way to
encourage this is to maintain a vigorous dialogue over a wide range of issues - including security
issues - so that we can pursue areas of common interests and reduce tensions.
In South Asia, die United States has restarted a bilateral security relationship with Pakistan
and begun a new security dialogue with India. These ongoing dialogues can help all three countries
focus OD areas of common interest, such as international peacekeeping, and could in time provide
the ccmfidence necessary to address more difficult problems, such as nuclear proliferation and the
long-simmering conflict over Kashmir.
The Americas
In our own hemisphere, we are wimessing a new era of peace, stability, and security. Irom
Point Barrow to Tierra del Fuego, aU 34 natirais except Cuba have chosen democracy, and
economic and political reforms are sweeping the region. This historic development paved the way
for the first Defense Ministerial of the Americas last summer, at which delegations from all 34
democracies gathered in Williamsburg, Virginia, to consider ways to build more trust, confidence,
and cooperation on security issues throughout the region. Following on the success and progress
at Williamsburg, the naticms of this hemisphere already are planning for the second Defense
Ministerial in Argentina in die fall of 1996.
Like the Partnership for Peace in Europe, the Defense Ministerial of the Americas provides an
opportunity to build a "zone of stability" in a region once destabilized by Cold War tensions. In
the Americas, as in Eurt^, die tools for building stability include joint training and education
I»ograms that promote professimal, civilian-c<mtrolled militaries as well as personal interactions;
information sharing aa national military plans, policies, and budgets; and confidence-building
measures. In Eurt^, these activities are led by the United States and NATO. In the Americas,
diey are emerging by consensus and encouragnl by the U.S.. But ultimately, the result is the same:
more democracy, more cooperation, more peace, and more security for die United States.
Regional Preventive Defense Efforts
In each of die regions discussed, die United States has military-to-military relationships and is
conducting joint exercises with a much wider range of countries than ever before. These activities
promote trust and enable forces from different countries to operate together more effe :tively,
which is essential given the increasing prevalence of combined operations. In the Gulf War, for
example, about 40 countries made military contributions. Nearly three dozen countries are
participating in the peacdceeping force in Bosnia, including many non-NATO countries.
Anodier important part of preventive defense is our effort to promote democratic civil-military
relations. One such program, conducted joindy with die State Department, is die International
Military Education and Training program, which has now trained half a million foreign officers in
28
the fundamentals of civil-military relaticms over die last sevend decades. Similariy, recoitly
established regional training and study centers like die Marshall Center in Germany and Asia-Pacific
Center for Security in Hawaii are designed to promote contacts between regional military offica:s
and civilian defense officials and to foster the principles of civilian control of die military.
PROTECTING THE READINESS OF OUR FORCES - NEAR- AND MEDIUM-TERM
No security strategy is better than the forces diat carry it out Today, the United States has
forces that are well-trained, well-equipped, and ~ most of all ~ ready to fight, as their performance
over die past year in die Persian Gulf, Haiti, and Bosnia illustrates. The Department has maintained
diis readiness in spite of a drawdown of historic proportions. Drawdowns create turbulence in the
force. Which historically has undermined readiness. Recognizing this history, we have taken >
unprecedented steps to maintain readiness while reducing our forces in the wake of the Cold War.
(Figure 10) By the end of 1996 the drawdown will be nearly complete, which means an end to the
turbulence. In the meantime, though, the Department continues to maintain high near-term
readiness through robust funding of its Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts. This remains
the Department's top budget priority. Manifesting this priority, die Department's FY 1995 and FY
1996 budgets and die FY 1997 budget request are at historically high levels of O&M funding
(normalized to force size). (Figure 11)
Medium-term readiness depends on attracting top quality people and retaining them after they
have developed technical and leadership skills. To do so, we must offer not only challenging and
rewarding woiic, but also an iqipropriate "quality of life," a term used to encompass the entire
package of compensaticxi and benefits, as well as the weak and living envinnment for military
service personnel. Protecting quality of life is not only die right diing to do for the men and women
who serve and sacrifice for their country, it is also critical to preserving medium-tram readiness.
Last year, President Clinton approved an increase in defense spending of $25 billion over six
years largely aimed at inqiroving die quality of military life. This includes a commitment to ensure
diat military pers(xmel receive die full pay raise audiorized by law through the end of the century.
It is also directed at extensive inqnovements in military quality of life programs, including housing -
- a key concern to service families. (Figure 12) This past year, a distinguished panel, led by
former Army Secretary John Marsh, looked beyond existing DoD efforts to identify quality of life
problems and suggest high-levoage, affordable soluticxis. The panel concentrated on diree major
areas: housing, personnel tempo, and community and family services. Action on the panel's
recommendations is being incorporated into DoD's overall effort to preserve quality of life.
MODERNIZATION - THE KEY TO LONG-TERM READINESS
To ensure military readiness in the long term requires die Department to modernize the armed
forces with new systems and upgrades to existing systems to maintain America's technological
advantage on the battiefield. For the past five years, the Department has taken advantage of the
drawdown and slowed modernization in order to fully fund those expenditures that guarantee near-
term readiness - spare parts, training, and maintenance. (Figure 13) As a result, the
modernization account in FY 1997 will be the lowest it has been in many years, about one-third of
what it was in FY 1985. At the same time, the average age of our military equipment has not
increased, because as the forces were drawn down, the older equipment was weeded out
(Figure 14) But now that die drawdown is nearly over, the modonization reprieve from aging is
nearly over, too.
U>
29
So, begmning in FY 1997, die Department is planning a modernization 'Yao^up," which will
be critical to the readiness of the forces in the next cenQiiy . By the year 2001 , funding to procure
equipment to modernize our forces will increase to $60.1 billion in current dollars ~ over 40
percent higher than what it is in the FY 1 997 budget This five-year plan will focus on building a
ready, flexible, and responsive force for a changing security environmoiL The force will continue
to maintain our technological superiority on the battlefield by seizing on the advances in
information-age technology, such as advanced sensors, computers, and communication systems. At
the same time, the modernization program will focus on bread and butter needs, such as airlift and
sealift, and the "everyday equipment" ground forces need in die field, such as tactical
communications gear, trucks, and armored personnel carriers. (Figure 15)
This five-year modernization plan is based on fliree assunq)tions. Fast, that the defrase budget
top line will stop its decline in FY 1997 and begin to rise again (as proposed in the President's five-
year budget). (Ilgiire 16) Second, that the Department will achieve significant savings from
infrastructure reductions, most importantly from base-closings. The thhd assumption of our
modernization program is diat the Dqiartment will achieve significant savings by "outsouremg"
many support activities and overhauling the defense acquisition system.
Base Realignment and aosure (BRAO
Tlie Base Realignment and Closure process is directly linked to modonization and long-term
readiness. As we downsize the military force, we must also reduce our Cold War infrastructure.
Our efforts to manage tiiis process have been aimed at saving money while ensuring that troops
have the training and equipment they need to be ready in die future. While the Department has
made significant progress in base closings, many BRAC recommendations have not yet been
implemented, and an imbalance between force structure atxl infrastructure remains.
Until we fully execute die BRAC process, money will be ded up in non-performing real estate,
draining fimds from our modernization efforts and other programs. While base-closing initially
costs money - die FY 1996 budget iiKluded $4 billion allocated to base closing costs - diere will
be significant savings m the fiiture. In the FY 1999 budget, the Department projects S6 billion in
savings from closing the bases, dius allowing a $10 UUion "swing" in savings. (Ftgnre 17) These
and future savings from base-closing will be devoted to modernization.
Completing the BRAC process quickly is not aaly key to saving money, it also is the right
diing to do for die communities involved. The Department is helping these communities find
imaginative ways to put the excess defense property to productive use as quickly as possible.
When base closure is done right, it can leave communities better off, with a more diverse economy
and more jobs. The key is early community involvement and planning. For example, when
Louisiana's England Air Force Base was slated for closure, the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce
woriced with die Air Force to develop a base reuse plan. Months before the base did close, small
business enterprises had abeady signed leases, resulting today in hundreds of new jobs for
Alexandria.
ACQUISITION REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION
Over the past two years, the Department has undertaken the most revolutionary changes in its
acquisition system in 50 years, and is looking for ways to further reform the system through
{KivatizatiaD.
30
Acquisition Reform
First, the Department discarded die system of military specifications, or MilSpecs, which
spelled out how contractors must design and produce military systems, supplies, and services. In
its place, the Department will use commercial and performance standards. These will call for the
highest quality standards available in the commercial maiicet or, if there are no relevant commercial
standards, will use functional specifications which describe how the equipment is to perfonn - and
challenge suppliers to meet that standard any way they want
The second major change in the defense acquisition system began on October 1, 1995, when
the new federal acquisition streamlining regulations were published. These regulations, in effect,
will allow the Defense Department to buy from the commercial maike^lace more often, and buy
more like commercial firms do. (Figure 18)
Defense acquisition reform is important not only because it will help pay for the defense
modernization program, but also because of a phenomenon called "technology pull." This phrase
describes the demand for advanced technology to give the United States battlefield superiority.
'Technology pull" has its roots in the U.S. military experience in Desert Storm. Before Desert
Storm, many U.S. military commanders and outside experts were skeptical of advanced technology
applied to combat For example, they questioned the concept of the Reconnaissance Strike
Forces, developed in the 1970s and deployed in the 1980s. This concept combined stealth aircraft,
precision-guided munitions, and advanced surveillance technology to offset superior numbers of
Soviet forces. But there was great concern that such advanced technology was too delicate, or that
it would not work in the fog of war. In Desert Storm, however, the same Reconnaissance Strike
Forces crushed the Iraqi military force with very low U.S. losses. Skeptics became believers.
Advanced technology proved itself. And military commanders are finding myriad uses for it - not
just smart weapons, but also smart logistics, smart intelligence, and smart communications.
Commanders are revising their doctrine and tactics to take advantage of this technology, and they
want to "pull" it faster into their war planning.
The key technology they want is information technology, and it is being developed at a
breathtaking pace, but not by the Defense Department It is being developed by commercial
computer and telecommunications companies, dual-use (defense-commercial) technology firms, and
small high-tech businesses and universities. The Department cannot pull this technology from these
sources without acquisition reform, because the cunent system limits access to these sources either
directly, by throwing up regulatory barriers, or indirectly, by slowing the ability to purchase and
employ new generations of technology in a timely way.
Privatization
The Department not only needs to do more business with commercial industry, it also needs to
act more like commercial industry.
There are numerous examples of private sector companies turning to outside suppliers for a
wide variety of specific, non-core goods and services. By focusing on core competencies, they
have reduced their costs by lowering overhead and improved their performance.
Major opportunities exist for the Department to operate more efficiently and effectively by
turning over to the private sector many non-core activities. For exaiiq>le, private sector
31
companies are already under contract to perfonn some commercial activities on bases around the
world. This type of outsourcing can be expanded.
To implement this strategy, the Department has been systematically examining opportunities
for privatizing, as well as reviewing both institutional and statutory obstacles to its full utilization.
Early in 1996, work groups engaged in these efforts will provide reports on how privatization can
be better used to lower DoD costs while enhancing its effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
In the uncertainty that has followed the Cold War, the United States has not only the
opportunity, but also the responsibility to help ensure a safer world for generations of Americans.
President Clinton has said: "As the world's greatest power, we have an obligation to lead and, at
times when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake, to act"
The Department of Defense is supporting American leadership in diis new era. As the
Department completes the transition to a post-Cold War military force, it has undertaken policies
and programs to prevent threats to our security fixnn emerging and to maintain well-trained, ready
forces able to deter or respond quickly to a range of potential threats and seize opportunities.
The world has changed dramatically over the past few years, but one thing remains constant a
strong military force, made up of the finest American men and women, is the nation's best
insurance policy. Each element of President Ointon's defense program supports this fundamental,
indisputable fact
32
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65
The Chairman. General.
General Shalikashvili. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would ask that my
written statement be entered into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
General Shalikashvili. It seems that each time I have appeared
before you these past 2 years I have begun by describing how busy
these past years have been, and today will be no exception.
Let me start with a description of some of the operations we have
been involved in, then offer my views on the issues that I believe
merit your emphasis in your deliberations on the 1997 budget.
Among the operations involving our forces there have been two
recent milestones. Two months ago at Guantanamo, we conducted
a closing ceremony for Task Force 160, the same task force that for
the previous 20 months so superbly handled the delicate refugee
crises in the Caribbean. In that time we plucked some 60,000 refu-
gees out of the ocean, built 15 huge camps to house, fed and cared
for them and provided safe and humane conditions until the refu-
gees were either returned to their homelands or were allowed to
enter the United States. Throughout, we handled these many thou-
sands of refugees with great compassion and understanding, ad-
ministering to their needs with unequaled efficiency. Their mission
now has been accomplished. The camps today are closed, and the
task force has returned home.
The second milestone occurred on 7 February of this year when
President Preval was inaugurated as President of Haiti and Presi-
dent Aristide stepped down. This, as you know, was the first time
in Haiti's history when power passed from one freely elected presi-
dent to another. The force we sent into the troubled nation in Sep-
tember 1994, is now on their way home, having accomplished their
mission superbly, on time and with utmost care for the safety of
our troops.
We developed a workable plan. We did not deviate from that plan
or make mission changes in midstream. The results speak for
themselves. From the original 23,000, there are today only 800 left.
By 15 April, all of the remaining United States forces will be out
of Haiti, and we will shift to periodic engineering exercises such as
those that we conduct with a number of other countries.
As you so well know, in December we began the deployment of
our forces as part of the NATO operation to oversee the peace ac-
cord in Bosnia. Now, nearly 80 days into this operation, I believe
our presence has been pivotal in both forging the coalition on the
ground and in helping keep the momentum going toward the direc-
tion of peace. We have helped oversee the withdrawal of warring
factions from the zones of separation and the separation of military
forces and their withdrawal from the territories to be transferred.
While there are still problems to be overcome, to be sure, such
as pockets of banned foreign forces, the full exchange of all pris-
oners of war and the occasional intransigence by the various fac-
tions, overall it is proceeding better than we had a right to expect.
What is worth noting once again, just as we saw in Haiti, has
been the great benefit of thorough preparation, adhering to the
mission we set out to perform, and the high readiness of our forces.
Our commanders correctly identified the threats they would face —
mines, lone snipers, the weather, and the dangerous road condi-
66
tions — and through a combination of sound preparation and good
training they have so far minimized the casualties that could have
resulted.
From my three visits since the operation began, I have seen
nothing but superb leadership, high morale, and complete deter-
mination on the part of the roughly 20,000 men and women in
Bosnia itself and the several thousand men and women in sur-
rounding countries who are supporting our troops in Bosnia.
Our challenge now, I submit, is to remember that we still have
9 months left to go and that we must ensure that our forces are
as ready, as alert, and as resolute on the last day as they were on
the first. That is the best guarantee I know of to assure success of
the mission and the safety of our force.
Now, there are also some 23,000 service men and women de-
ployed today in the Persian Gulf region preserving regional peace
and stability and enforcing the U.N.-ordered sanction against Iraq,
protecting the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south and
deterring further Iraqi aggression.
We are involved in a series of operations to accomplish these pur-
poses, even as we are continuing our efforts to improve our ability
to respond to unexpected threats in the region both by working
with our regional allies to strengthen the readiness of our coali-
tions and proceeding on course with our prepositioning programs.
Here it is worth noting that, since the gulf war, we have made sig-
nificant improvements in this vital region in our readiness and
ability to respond rapidly to any aggression.
On the other side of the world, in Korea, the 36,000 men and
women who are stationed there have remained vigilant and aware
of the deteriorating conditions to their north as a potential for in-
stability fueled by food and energy shortages continues to increase.
Our troops in Korea have not lost sight of the fact that theirs re-
mains the most dangerous corner of the world nor of the need to
continually improve our deterrence and defensive postures.
Here again, as I have seen during my visits to Seoul and to the
DMZ, between our force modernization, our efforts at increasing
interoperability with South Korean forces, and our pre-positioning
programs, over the past 2 years we have made substantial strides
in improving our deterrent and defensive postures in South Korea.
As you know, the operations I have just described have only in-
volved a small part of our overall force. The rest have been actively
engaged in other operations that I did not mention here, in train-
ing and in maintaining their readiness to respond to their wartime
missions.
But there is an important point to be made about the past year's
operations and the state of our forces. What we have seen is a se-
ries of most successful military operations. There have been none
of the kinds of problems that we experienced in the 1970's and
early 1980's. It is, above all, a tribute to our people, to the superb
leadership in the field, to the courage and skill and dedication, but
it is also due to the high readiness of our force.
Two-and-a-half years ago, when I became Chairman, I asked that
we keep readiness our top priority, that we not allow it to erode
or atrophy as has happened so often in past drawdowns. The bene-
fits are clearly evident, and I thank you for your support.
67
As Secretary Perry just mentioned, 1997 marks, by and large,
the end of the massive drawdown we began when the cold war
ended. For once, we have done it right. We have successfully bro-
ken the cycle of feast and famine. We have preserved the quality
of our people; and, judging by last year's recruiting figures, where
over 96 percent of new recruits were high school graduates, we are
continuing to attract and retain the kind of men and women Amer-
ica needs in uniform.
The hidden benefit of the drawdown was that it allowed us to
discard the oldest equipment in inventories and to redistribute the
newest and most modern equipment within our remaining struc-
ture, in effect leaving a new, most capable inventory that we have
had in many decades. In short, we have been through the deepest
drawdown since the end of the Vietnam war without undermining
the excellence of our force.
That said, you all know that we preserved our readiness and
force structure at the expense of modernization and equipment re-
placement, but we have been able to enjoy a procurement hiatus
like this, but our procurement account has now actually shrunk to
just below $40 billion, the lowest level since before the Korean war.
As I testified in past years, this procurement hiatus was acceptable
but, of course, cannot be sustained indefinitely.
We are now fast approaching the time when we will no longer
be able to rely on what we built in the 1980's, and so we must com-
mit ourselves to a sufficient procurement goal, a goal I assess to
be approximately $60 billion annually, if our force is to remain as
ready tomorrow it is today.
Now while I would clearly like to see such a goal set sooner rath-
er than later, it is more important to me that we set such a target
as this budget does, for I feel strongly that if we don't commit our-
selves to a $60 billion procurement target we will never meet it.
We have the structure we need through the end of the century and
into the next. We have a strategy that is the right strategy. These
past several years have shown that having the capability to fight
and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts is not merely a
hedge against the unexpected, it is the right insurance against the
world we are in.
But we must also ensure that we now protect the structure and
that we enhance it. Specifically, we must continue to improve our
strategic lift improvements. I think that we are making good
progress in improving our airlift, and this year we must pass the
multiyear procurement for the C-17 so that we can stay on track.
I am more concerned about our continuing failure to keep up with
our sealift objectives, and I hope that we can use this year to get
back on track.
As Secretary Perry mentioned, we must remember that our pre-
positioning initiatives are an essential part of our strategic lift so-
lution; so I ask that you continue to support them as well. Now
that we are more and more a power projection force, strategic air
and sealift complemented by our pre-positioning initiatives must be
our No. 1 war-fighting priority.
We also need to continue with our improvements in command,
control, communications and computers, and in intelligence surveil-
lance and reconnaissance systems.
68
We must also maintain our emphasis on the readiness of the 15
enhanced National Guard brigades, and we must continue to field
the long-range precision munitions and systems that give us such
a decisive edge.
The challenge, of course, is to maintain readiness and our force
structure, procure the enhancements to our forces I just mentioned,
and to get on with recapitalization of the force, all within the cur-
rent defense top line.
I agree that acquisition reform and BRA.C savings will move us
in the right direction, but I also believe that we must get on with
privatization, outsourcing, not be afraid to take another look at fur-
ther reductions of our infrastructure, and continue to find savings
in reduced redundancies and increase jointness. We need your sup-
port to make the hard choices and changes to make these initia-
tives work, and I particularly ask for your support where changes
in law will be required.
There is, of course, also the need for the CINC's, the chiefs and
I to continue to make hard choices and to use jointness to create
new efficiencies in the way we fight. As I described in my written
statement, we have devised in the past 2 years new joint processes
to examine the most efficient and effective ways to improve joint
war fighting, to look for and reduce unnecessary redundancies and
combat systems that have marginal benefits so that I can offer the
Secretary recommendations from a joint war fighter's perspective
on programmatic and budgetary issues.
Through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and its sup-
porting processes, I have already, in the past year, offered specific
recommendations to the Secretary; and I intend to continue to
strengthen this process. We have today, as you have already heard
and which I believe firmly, the finest and the most ready military
force in the world. If we are able to bring our procurement account
to approximately $60 billion per year and are able to keep the
same top line, we should be able to assure ourselves the same
ready force tomorrow.
We have just engineered the most successful postwar drawdown
in our history. We have protected our readiness, our ranks continue
to be filled with men and women who are the envy of every mili-
tary in the world, and we have simultaneously accomplished a se-
ries of successes in one operation after another.
With that, thank you very much for your attention. I believe Sec-
retary Perry and I are now ready to answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Shalikashvili follows:]
For Official Use Only
Until Released by the
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
POSTURE STATEMENT
BY
GENERAL JOHN M. SHALKASHVILI
CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GRESS
ECURTTY
OF
For Official Use Only
Until Released by the
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives
70
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Statement to Congress
March 1996
Mr. Chairman, members of the comminee.
It is a great pleasure and a great honor to be here today representing
America's men and women in uniform. It seems that each time I've come before
you for these hearings, I've begun my testimony with a description of how very
busy the past year has been for our forces and how very well they've performed.
Today will be no different.
Contingency Operations (1995-1996)
\9MLKim
$4,000 FbfMS D*pliqf»(}
SOUTHWEST
ASA
71
OPERATtONS
During the last year, our forces have remained engaged in a sizable
number of simultaneous operations spread across the globe. Today, there are
approximately 54,000 of our men and women in uniform and around 1 ,300
defense civilians committed to overseas contingencies. For those who've been
deployed for these missions, and for their families, it has been often stressful,
arduous and demanding. Yet they have, and they continue, to perform superbly.
We owe them our gratitude for, despite a high operations tempo, the readiness
of our units and the morale and enthusiasm of the troops have stayed very high.
They make it impossible to look back at this year without feeling an enormous
sense of pride.
Among the past year's efforts, there were two particularly notable
milestones. Two months ago, I attended the formal closing ceremony for Joint
Task Force 160 -- the same unit that for the previous 20 months handled the
migrants that poured out of the dictatorships in Haiti and Cuba; that plucked over
60,000 men, women and children out of the dangerous Caribbean waters; that
built 15 huge camps to house, feed, and care for them; and that provided safe
and humane conditions until the migrants were either allowed to enter the United
States or returned to their homelands. I could not be more proud of the way our
men and women performed this long and uniquely difficult mission. They
72
handled these many thousands of migrants with compassion and understanding
while administering to their needs with unequaled efficiency. Today, their
mission completed, the camps have been closed, and the men and women of the
Task Force have returned home.
The other milestone occurred this past month when the second
democratically-elected President of Haiti took office, and shortly thereafter we
began the redeployment of our forces -- right on schedule. We entered Haiti in
September 1994 with a sound military plan, we followed that plan, and we
accomplished all that was asked of us. The rapid introduction of American
military forces stopped the cycle of violence, halted the flow of migrants, and
created a secure and stable environment which made possible the legislative
and presidential election process. By 31 March 1 995, in part due to the
recruitment and training of a new Haitian police force, the s ituation had so
stabilized, that American forces could be greatly reduced, and the Haitian
operation was turned over to the United Nations.
Despite some initial problems, legislative and presidential elections were
conducted and, on 7 February, for the first time in Haiti's history, an elected
president turned over his office to another freely elected president. While a
smaller United Nations presence will remain in Haiti a while longer, American
units will continue to return home and all those who served with the United
73
Nations in Haiti will be home by 1 5 April of this year. All that will continue will be
small, periodic, engineer exercises, like those we conduct with a number of our
other Southern neighbors.
Starting in December, we became actively engaged in the NATO
operation in Bosnia. Over the course of two months, we deployed nearly 20,000
active and reserve military personnel into Bosnia to join a coalition of some 30
other countries to help carry out the military aspects of the Dayton Peace
Accord. Additionally, nearly 8,000 support forces were deployed to countries
around Bosnia.
Now, nearly 80 days into the operation, our presence has been pivotal in
forging the coalition that is helping to manage the peace and in brokering the on-
the-ground implementation of the Accord: Withdrawal of the warring factions
from the zones of separation; the release of prisoners of war; the separation of
military forces; and their withdrawal from territory to be transferred. While there
are still problems to be overcome, such as remaining, small pockets of banned
foreign forces, completing the release of prisoners of war, and occasional
intransigence by the parties, overall compliance has been relatively good.
As I have witnessed on each of my three trips to Bosnia, our troops are
performing extremely well and morale is high. Much of this is due to outstanding
leadership, diligent preparation, and the impressive strides being made in the
74
quality of life for our forces through extensive base camp preparation, the
opening of AAFES store outlets, and routine mail and Stars and Stripes
newspaper deliveries. From the beginning, we correctly perceived that mines,
the lone sniper, and severe weather and road conditions would be our major
enemies. We were correct, and the combination of smart precautions and good
training have gone a long way to minimizing the numbers of casualties .
Our forces operating in Bosnia were very well prepared and rehearsed
before they were allowed to deploy. Their mission and rules of engagement
have been properly framed, and they have established a strong, controlling
presence between the former warring parties. More than that, they have also
been instrumental in forging an historic coalition. Just a few years ago, few
would have imagined that it would have been possible to put together a force
including NATO nations, Central Europeans, and Russians, striving to achieve a
common purpose. Here again, sound preparation on the part of our forces has
paid off well.
Our challenge now is to remember that we still have over 9 months to go,
and we must ensure our force is as ready, alert, and resolute on the last day of
this mission as it was on the first. That is the best guarantee for success of the
mission and the safety of the force.
75
But these have not been the only operations involving our forces. We
have over 23,000 service men and women deployed in the Persian Gulf region
to preserve regional peace and stability, to enforce UN-ordered sanctions
against Iraq, and to deter further Iraqi aggression. We have added
prepositioned equipment to the region to support brigade-sized units;
periodically deployed an Army mechanized task force for training ; and for the
first time ever, conducted a no-notice deployment of an Air Expeditionary Force
into the region. We are also maintaining a very active joint and multinational
exercise program which includes participation from carrier battle groups, special
forces and amphibious ready groups with embarked Marine Expeditionary Units
operating in the region. Farther north in Turkey, we continue to work with our
coalition partners to enforce the No-Fly Zone and to oversee the humanitarian
aid program in Northern Iraq.
In addition to this, the Army continues to provide forces in support of the
1 1 -nation Multinational Force and Obsen/ers on the Sinai Peninsula, as
specified in the Camp David Accord. Currently, nearly 1000 US sen/icemembers
are deployed as part of the Infantry Battalion Task Force and Logistics Support
Element. Of note, the last infantry battalion rotation for 1 995 was formed, for the
first time, as a composite unit of Active Duty and Reserve Component personnel.
This initiative proved highly successful and will be considered for future
rotations.
76
In Korea, some 36,000 US forces remain ready as political, cultural, and
economic conditions continue to deteriorate in the North. The increasing
instability in North Korea, fueled by severe food and energy problems, requires
constant vigilance and further complicates our indications and warning
capability. Force modernization efforts continue to focus on increasing
interoperability between ROK and US forces and increasing the theater's
counterbattery fire capability. As well, all armored elements of the Korean
Prepositioning Brigade set are in place. My recent visits to Seoul and the DMZ
have reaffirmed to me that our efforts of the last two years to strengthen our
defensive posture have been timely, appropriate and most effective.
In the Southern Hemisphere, US forces were engaged in defusing one
conflict, while simultaneously supporting efforts to reduce the traffic of drugs.
Hostilities empted in January 1995 in the region along the Peruvian -Ecuadorian
border, and in March 1 995, four countries - Argentine, Brazil, Chile and the US -
- responded to a request to provide military observers to assist in the monitoring
of a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces. We presently have 61 US military
personnel and four helicopters participating in this mission. There have been no
cease-fire violations since September 1 995, while Peru and Ecuador continue to
pursue a diplomatic solution to the border dispute.
77
While the Peru-Ecuador dispute was on-going, USSOUTHCOM
organized and initiated the most extensive counterdrug surge operation ever
aimed against the narco-traffickers air bridge between Peru and Colombia. In
cooperation with allied nations and law enforcement agencies, we focused our
detection and monitoring assets on disrupting and hindering drug trafficking air
operations. The results were impressive - overall air activity decreased
significantly and cooperation between allied nations as well as the interagency
process improved noticeably. The successes were significant enough to warrant
USSOUTHCOM to plan a follow on operation aimed simultaneously at riverine,
maritime, land, as well as air drug traffickers.
READINESS
Our success in these many recent military operations is a testament to the
readiness of our forces. When I became Chairman, I asked to make and keep
readiness our number one priority. This has been done and the benefits have
been, and remain evident in every one of these operations. That said, I ask that
you continue your support for the readiness of the force, even as the Chiefs and
I are redoubling our efforts to ensure that potential lapses in readiness are
detected before they become problems.
We have introduced a new way of looking at readiness. It includes the
traditional measures that ensure individual battalions and squadrons and ships
78
are manned, trained and equipped for mission success. But in addition to that,
we have added a critical link to how we look at joint readiness-the theater
commander's ability to integrate and synchronize his forces and capabilities into
an effective and cohesive fighting team.
The system by which we look at unit and joint readiness centers on a
monthly report by Services, Unified Commands, and Department of Defense
Combat Support Agencies. We ask them to assess their readiness to conduct
day-to-day operations as well as the most demanding aspects of executing our
National Military Strategy. Participants also forecast their readiness over the
next 12 months. In addition to looking at specific units, we assess broad
functional areas like mobility, intelligence, communications, and logistics.
This Joint Monthly Readiness Review has been up and running for a little
over a year. To complement this, I have directed the development of a
comprehensive readiness information management system to integrate the
existing and developing readiness tools of the Services and CINCs. It will
provide easily accessible and timely information for all users over the newly-
activated Global Command and Control System.
Our Joint Exercise and Training program continues to be a readiness
multiplier. Joint simulation efforts are providing innovative opportunities to
79
stress our battle staffs while enhancing the overall utility of joint exercises for
every participant. I am continuing to work with the CINCs to further focus our
joint training efforts on key readiness challenges, while taking advantage of
opportunities to leverage technology to conserve our training resources. This
emphasis on readiness helps ensure that the men and women who have
dedicated their lives to our nation's defense have the resources and training
they need to do the job. It also ensures that their commanders can raise red
flags and take quick action when called for.
We are also continuing to enhance our long-term readiness through our
education system. Joint education now starts before officers are commissioned
and continues throughout their careers. Increased emphasis on joint doctrine,
multinational operations, and systems integration provides the CINCs a more
capable, adaptive force.
Finally, the new reporting systems provide us the vital readiness
information needed to make timely decisions on resource allocation and force
commitment. All these efforts, and others, have helped keep readiness at the
consistently high levels maintained over the past ten years, as shown on the
chart below.
10
38-160 97-5
80
READINESS TRENDS
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Although readiness trends remain strong, we must maintain a vigilant
watch. A major challenge to near-term readiness is how to use the unique
capabilities of the Armed Forces to advance US national interests in peacetime,
while maintaining our readiness to fight and win this nation's wars. We are
getting much smarter at this and at anticipating areas of stress before they
become readiness problems. To that end, we are incorporating better the
significant capabilities that reside in our reserve forces. We are continually
looking for ways to conduct wartime mission training even while our forces are
deployed to real-world operations. We are closely managing those low density,
81
high leverage capabilities - including intelligence, mobility, and support assets-
needed to execute the full range of our military missions.
I must point out, however, that readiness is a fragile commodity. Once
the intricate processes of manning with quality personnel, and equipping and
training units are disrupted, recovery often requires significant time and
resources. That is why maintaining readiness is critically dependent on timely
and full reimbursement of costs associated with unplanned contingency
operations.
Thanks to your support, and the unyielding care and concern and support
of the American people, I can report to you that ours is the most ready force in
the world today. Which leads to the true source of our successes over the past
year -- great people and our strong and continued commitment to them and their
families. Readiness is inextricably tied to the quality of life we provide for these
outstanding men and women in uniform and their families.
PEOPLE
With regard to quality of life, the Joint Chiefs, CINCs, and I have
revalidated the central importance of our Top Four" priorities in support of our
people, elaborated in the following.
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82
Quality of Life Concerns |
•
Pay
Maintain fair and adequate compensation
•
Retirem ent
Protect the retirement system
•
M edical
Quality medical care through TRICARE
•
Housing
Safe and affordable places to live
Adequate and fair compensation, a stable retirement system, steady and
dependable level of medical benefits, and adequate housing, especially outside
CONUS, each require special attention. The recent trend of full funding for the
maximum allowable pay raises has been welcome. The Secretary's decision to
increase funding for military housing, including efforts to increase barracks
support, pursue housing phvatization initiatives, and boost Basic Allowance for
Quarters, when coupled with other policies in support of our "Top Four." are
helping to maintain the quality of life of our personnel and their families.
13
83
The quality of recruits in our four Services remains high. Last year, 96%
of our recruits were high school graduates. We must continue to keep this high
standard even as we face increasing recruitment challenges in the years
ahead; thus, your support of the Services' recruiting budgets is essential. It
goes without saying that protecting the "Top Four" Quality of Life priorities also
greatly enhances our recruiting and retention efforts.
FORCE STRUCTURE
i FWCM
FY 1997
!•
42 :
ll/l
lO/l
13
7
3/1
' U.S. Force Structure (
Vm 1
i End Of Cold War
FY 1990
1
Amy
Active Divisions
Rcmvr ComponcDi Brigade*
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57
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24
12
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Navy
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Navy Carrier Wings
Ships
Air F.ree
Active Fighier Wings
Reserve Fighier Wings
1
MariM C.rpa
Divisions
* Enilsiait g.al li }4« Sblpi
As the at}0ve chart shows, the drawdown, which has been ongoing since
the end of the Cold War, is nearly complete. The manner in which this
drawdown has been managed and executed is a real success story. We've
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84
stayed on a steady, controlled glidepath, adjusting where we had to, and
ensured that those measures most critical to the health of our force were
properly protected. Every important indicator of military excellence remains
strong -- readiness is high, the quality of our people and their morale remains
superb, and our force structure, despite deep cuts, has been reduced with
minimum instability and turbulence.
We have broken the cycle of military decline that has followed every
conflict in this century. Making this success all the more impressive is that we
accomplished this drawdown without missing a beat, while at the same time,
engaging in a wide range of contingencies and operations.
The experience of these past few years has fortified our confidence that
the force structure we will have at the end of the drawdown will be what we will
continue to require during the remainder of this decade and into the next
century. Our enduring force structure requirements are based on our tasks: To
prevent threats to our interests from arising ; to deter those threats that do
emerge; and to defeat those threats by military force, should deterrence fail.
The United States is a global power, with farflung, vital security interests
in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and important interests on
nearly every continent. Day-to-day military engagement with our friends and
15
85
allies through a combination of fonward deployed and overseas-based US
forces in exercises, exchanges, visits, and force presence worldwide will
remain an essential element of our strategy to prevent threats to our interests
from arising.
Ultimately, protecting our interests will remain dependent o n preserving
sufficiently strong deterrent capabilities to handle both today's known, near-
term threats, and those that could materialize from a more uncertain and
rapidly changing world than we have known for many decades. Managing that
uncertainty has led us to modify our Cold War approach of maintaining a
threat-based force, towards a capability-based approach that ensures we
protect the balance to handle today's real threats, as well as tomorrow's
equally real possibilities.
First and foremost, that means we must preserve a robust triad of
nuclear forces - the backbone of deterrence. Currently our nuclear forces are
within START I limits, but we have planned our future nuclear force to achieve
START II limits, after the treaty is ratified and implemented by the Russians.
The shape of the remainder of our forces are based on the need to fight and
win two, nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. Just looking back at the past
few years, when we have several times found ourselves in a state of
heightened tensions with North Korea and Iraq, our need to preserve this
capability could not have been shown more clearly.
86
But it would be a mistake to think of tliis capability as contingent on
contemporary threats alone. It is based, instead, on a longer range calculation
of our extensive global interests and the corresponding necessity to ensure
that we never find ourselves in the precarious predicament of committing our
forces to one conflict, and by so doing, finding ourselves unable to protect our
interests in another part of the world, should an adversary choose to challenge
us there. As long as we wish to remain a global power with global interests, we
must preserve our capability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major
regional conflicts.
The force structure we have designed for this purpose is as lean as the
calculus of risk will afford. But it will do the job and this is the force structure we
must retain.
REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND MODERNIZATION
While our force today is fully ready, I continue to be concerned about the
recapitalization of the force. Accordingly we must turn our attention in earnest to
this challenge or risk the future combat readiness of the US military.
Procurement has continued to pay the bill for readiness and force structure over
the past decade and now hovers at a post-World War II low of about $40 billion.
17
87
For the past two years, I have testified that we could sustain this procurement
hiatus temporarily, but not indefinitely. It was the proper course of action at a
time when, because we were reducing our forces, through a combination of
discarding our oldest equipment, and preserving and redistributing only our
newest and most modern equipment, the average age of our remaining arsenal
was younger than any time in recent decades. With downsizing coming to an
end, we must now increase our procurement accounts.
PROCUREMENT
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
18
88
For if we fail to do that, we may well wear out our weapons systems and
equipment before thiey can be modernized or replaced.
To recapitalize this force, we must face head-on some rather difficult
decisions. I firmly believe that we must commit ourselves to the adequate
recapitalization of our force structure -- that will require a procurement goal of
approximately $60 billion annually. It will take tough management decisions,
innovation, and even revolutionary approaches, as well as your continued
support to accomplish this challenging task within our current budget topline
projections.
One answer lies in aggressively pursuing institutional and business
opportunities. We must continue to push with all energy, acquisition reforms,
commercial off-the-shelf opportunities, privatization, outsourcing of non-core
activities, and further reductions of our infrastructure. The sum of all of these
initiatives must be reinvested into our procurement accounts. Just as important,
we must strive to reap the benefits of the ongoing tech nology explosion and to
gain greater efficiencies in warfighting . We have already started this process
through the energized Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).
19
89
EVOLUTION OF THE JOINT PROCESS
Over the past two years, we have built a new process to tietter assess our
joint warfighting needs and provide sound, joint programnriatic advice. As you
know, before the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the programmatic
influence, role, and responsibilities of the Chairman were, by design, narrow and
tightly circumscribed. We've worked to institutionalize the spirit of Goldwater-
Nichols to create new joint mechanisms and systems so we can provide the
Secretary of Defense, the President, and the Congress with a joint view on
programmatic and budgetary issues.
As the engine for this process, the responsibilities of the JROC have been
expanded to produce this joint view. Although the JROC has been in existence
for nearly a decade, the Vice Chairman and I have broadened its mandate and
made it a focal point for addressing our joint warfighting needs and making
specific programmatic recommendations. The nature of these recommendations
will lead to an increased joint warfighting capability, increased interoperability
between systems, and a reduction in unnecessary redundancies and marginally
effective systems, all within existing budget levels. Those of you who remember
the very limited and constrained influence that jointness suffered in the way
business was done in the past will recognize the shift presented by this new
charter.
90
I appreciate the support of Congress for recently including the JROC in
Title 10, and codifying both its membership and charter. This body has already
proven itself and its value will only increase over time.
Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment
Services OSD CINC« AcenciM Othen
To provide the analyses needed to support this effort, we've also created
the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process as detailed
above. This is our primary vehicle for obtaining a capabilities-based
assessment of broad mission areas across Service and Defense agency lines.
JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate, examine key
21
91
relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify
opportunities for improved effectiveness. The assessments are continuous and
lend insight into issues involving requirements, readiness, and plans for
recapitalizing joint military capabilities. The JROC oversees the JWCA process
and provides its findings to the CINCs and the JCS.
The JROC / JWCA Cycle
DalMM
Ot^ectiw
J<rimChi»ht
B9VKW
Pfogr^ni
One of the more important provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols legislatio n
was the requirement for me to submit to the Secretary of Defense an annual
Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA), an internal document that
independently assesses the joint adequacy of programs, which I provide to the
22
92
SECDEF for his consideration during his budgetary deliberations. I have found
the JWCA process extraordinarily helpful in providing the analysis and insights
to craft the recommendations I offer in the CPA, which has become a
comprehensive and influential document in the budgetary process. As this
process has evolved, we have also found it useful to use the JWCA products in
developing a front-end recommendation, the Chairman's Program
Recommendations (CPR). The CPR is provided to the SECDEF for his use in
developing the Defense Planning Guidance, the key document that guides the
Services in the development of their budgets.
JOINT VISION
The difficult choices to be made require strong processes, but they also
require a strategic vision, a template to provide a common direction for our
Services in developing their unique capabilities. To meet this need, I will
approve for release this month a document entitled Joint Vision 2010.
Joint Vision 201 0 provides an operationally-based framework for the
further development of the US Armed Forces. It recognizes as the basis for our
future, the significant institutional achievements and the outstanding men and
women of our Armed Forces which have brought us today's high quality force.
Then, examining the strategic environment, the missions we face, and the
23
93
implications of modern technology, it develops new joint operational concepts
from which our future military requirements can be derived.
i Joint Vision j
G America's Military Shaping the Future: Quality People
Trained, Equipped, and Ready for Joint Operations
• Guided by Joint Doctrine
• Empowered by World Class Leadership Schooled in
Joint Military Operations
• Advantaged by America's Revolutionary Technology
• Rapidly Deplovable Worldwide and Tactically Mobile
as Never Before
• Enabled Through Dominant Battlefield Awareness
Persuasive in Peace-Decisive in War:
Preeminent in Any Form of Conflict
The objective of this vision is to achieve what we term Full Spectrum
Dominance -- the capability of our Armed Forces to dominate any opponent
across the range of military operations. We can achieve this objective by
leveraging today's high quality forces and force structure with leading-edge
technology to attain better command, control and intelligence, and to
implement new operational concepts - dominant maneuver, precision
engagement, full dimensional protection, and focused logistics. It is these new
24
94
joint operational concepts, and the improved command, control and intelligence
which will make them possible, that will focus the strengths of each of our
Services and guide the evolution of joint doctrine, joint education, and joint
training to bring us Full Spectrum Dominance.
CONCLUSION
This past year the men and women of our Armed Forces have given us
any number of reasons to be proud. We have called on them often to go and
perform difficult missions, from Korea to Bosnia, from Haiti to Kuwait. They are
performing at levels of excellence unsurpassed by any other time in our
country's history. Wherever we send them, they go with pride and
determination.
Americans are rightfully proud of the men and women who serve our
country so ably and well. For me, it is a great honor to represent them and to
come before you today. On their behalf, I thank you for your unwavering
support.
25
95
The Chairman. Before we get into the questions, I thought it
might be a good place to just say that in my opening remarks this
morning it probably appeared that I was a little bit critical of the
way things have been going. Of course, that is the way it was last
year. But we were critical of one another, both sides in this game
that we are all involved in. But we are both I think trying to fulfill
our responsibilities as we see them, and I hope that no one takes
anything personal that comes out of these discussions.
We had differences last year; and I want to thank you, Mr. Sec-
retary and General Shalikashvili, for helping us to arrive at a bill
that was finally agreed to by the President. I know your influence
meant a lot in arriving at that conclusion. I look forward to work-
ing with you again this time.
We are innocent bystanders looking in on this scene. So they
won't misunderstand, we are both, I am sure, trying to do what we
think is best for the military; and that part there about the Con-
stitution giving us the power and the duty to provide for a military
makes us look at it from that standpoint. I won't ask any questions
at this time but give others an opportunity to get to their ques-
tions.
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I have had an opportunity to make a comprehensive overview
statement and pose questions that I deem appropriate in the con-
text of the debate that must occur in the context of the fiscal 1997
budget, so I would reserve my time and give Members with less se-
niority an opportunity to engage the witnesses this morning.
I would yield back the time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Chairman, I
also appreciate the presentation of Secretary Perry and General
Shalikashvili, but let me say, perhaps less charitably, that I have
looked at your procurement numbers and in my estimate your pro-
curement numbers do a disservice to the people in uniform who are
going to have to use that equipment, what equipment we have, in
the outyears, people like that sergeant that you mentioned reenlist-
ing, Mr. Secretary.
And I looked carefully at Admiral Owens' testimony, who is Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, when he testified before the Senate
Armed Services Committee and he made a very clear point that
doesn't come out clearly in your presentation and that point is that
you predicted several years ago that we would be up — we would be
increasing modernization up to the $16 billion level. That seems to
be the level that we need to get to.
Let me just quote Admiral Owens; he says that in 1993 the
President's budget had for procurement $62 billion. It also proves,
he said, that in 1994 that procurement would be up at $63 billion.
Of course what really happened was it went to $48 billion. That is
a $15 billion-reduction from what you projected. But we all thought
it was going to go up. In the 1995, it said it was going to go up.
It says it was going up to $55 billion but in fact what really hap-
pened was $46 billion. That is $11 billion below what you told us
you would have that year. But it promised it would go up.
96
"But in 1996," and I am still quoting the admiral, "we are now
down to $39 billion and we are promising that it will go up. We
have to stop promising ourselves and start doing something which
I think is the basis of our ability to recapitalize America's military
not just the ships and tanks and airplanes but also these remark-
able technologies," unquote.
The point is that you are very familiar with the problem that Ad-
miral Owens speaks about. General Shalikashvili, you said you
wanted to have a $20 billion-increase in modernization so that we
didn't deprive our troops in the outyears and you said you wanted
to have that modernization by 1998.
Looking at your program, you not only didn't move the $20 bil-
lion increase in modernization up to 1998, you moved it further out
past the turn of the century.
Mr. Secretary, you showed a levelling off of the drop in mod-
ernization in one of your charts. If you could put that chart back
up on the procurement level. The only reason it leveled out is be-
cause we added under Chairman Spence in this committee an addi-
tional $5 billion to procurement.
Mr. Weldon. That is right.
Mr. Hunter. When you projected initially an increase of $20 bil-
lion in procurement, the military consensus was that is what we
needed, $20 billion more modernization. Chairman Spence gave
you $5 billion more in modernization, gave you roughly 25 percent
of the increase that we thought would really be satisfactory. Your
department complained that this was unnecessary congressional
add-ons and classified it as pork.
This is the President's budget. This President is disservicing
American men and women in uniform and disservicing the Amer-
ican people if we make them think we can continue to shove mod-
ernization out into the next century when some new President
theoretically will make these increases and we don't bite the bullet
and modernize now and buy that new equipment that the troops
are going to need.
So General, maybe you and maybe Secretary Perry could tell us
why once again you have pushed modernization out into the future
someplace and have not picked up that burden, that duty this year
and modernized.
Just one other question. Secretary Perry, I had an opportunity
to also listen to some average Americans, smart Americans a cou-
ple of weeks ago when we had a focus group in my town in San
Diego. We asked them if they thought that if a missile was fired
at the United States if we could shoot it down. They were all edu-
cated, intelligent folks. They all answered, yes, they thought that
we could shoot the missile down.
The sum total of that is that all the charts that we have put up
over the years, all of the discussions that we have given over the
years have given the American people the idea that we could shoot
down incoming missiles. Just like you would start off your presen-
tation since China just made a statement to the effect that if they
should take action in Taiwan they would hope that the United
States would value Los Angeles more than Taiwan, I think we all
read a threat there. If a missile was fired by the Chinese at Los
Angeles, would we be able to shoot that missile down before it im-
97
pacted? Could you answer that question first and then go to mod-
ernization. Thank you for being with us today.
Secretary Perry. I will answer your first question first, which is,
as you well know, we have no capability to shoot down any ballistic
missiles fired at the United States.
The second question?
Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir. The second question, why did we push the
modernization that General Shalikashvili said we needed, the in-
crease of $20 billion that we needed to get on with as quickly as
possible to modernize our forces? Why did we not do that this year?
In fact, why did we push that out past the turn of the century?
Secretary PERRY. The question, of course, revolves around what
the size of the total defense budget is and how we allocate within
that budget.
The size of the total defense budget is a complex issue involving
both Congress' and the administration's desire to balance the budg-
et in 7 years. The toplines have been arrived at primarily on the
basis of a judgment of what it takes to balance that budget in 7
years. Within that budget, which is where I have the ability to
exert influence, we have made our priorities and our choices, and
the priorities were readiness and care of the troops comes first,
maintaining the force structure that I have described to you comes
second, and modernization came third.
That has caused this hiatus in modernization which we have
talked about and I am doing everything I know how to do to get
more funds into that modernization. I described the efforts in ac-
quisition reform and in harvesting the BRAC funds but that will
take some years. As I pointed out to you, BRAC actually cost us
money for the last few years and the savings are only coming in
the later years. Therefore, getting those funds shifted over from ac-_
quisition reform savings and BRAC savings into modernization is
taking some 7 years to effect.
In the meantime, it is my judgment which I expressed in my
talk, and I reaffirm now, that I will hold as long as I am Secretary
of Defense, I will hold the care of our people and readiness of forces
as the No. 1 priority.
General Shalikashvili. May I make a statement?
Mr. HUNT^ER. Sure.
General Shalikashvili. I believe firmly our priorities have been
correct up to now, that you would have been surprised if we had
sacrificed readiness and care of our people. I also believe that our
structure is correct and that we must not look at the structure as
a billpayer. I also believe that it would be good to get through this
$60 billion procurement target sooner rather than later.
But I think it is more important that we reach agreement here
that such a target is the right one and then do everything we can
to discipline ourselves to stay, to reach that target, otherwise what
will happen or most likely will happen is what has happened in the
past, that we find ourselves pushing that target further to the
right.
So Secretary Perry and I are in total agreement on the priorities.
I don't want to put words in his mouth, but I believe he shares
with me the desire to be able to reach such a goal sooner rather
than later but within what is possible. It is more important that
98
we now agree on such a $60 billion procurement goal and then hold
it steady while at the same time we preserve the topline because
that is as critical as anything else in the defense budget as we ap-
proach our desire to have a balanced budget, that we retain the
topline or all of those desires for a procurement target or troop
readiness or structure will not be sustainable.
The Chairman. We are
Secretary Perry. One other comment on Mr. Hunter's point rel-
ative to the 1996 budget. I applauded the efforts of this Congress
in most of the items that were added to the 1996 bill because you
did what I had requested during the discussions here with this
committee, which is that most of that add-on was not pork. They
were programs that were in our budget in the out years and they
were moved forward. By moving them forward, you were able to
get the capability sooner, in some cases actually able to save money
by doing it that way.
I want to be clear, I think the bulk of the money added in 1996
served that purpose. I took exception to some items, the B-2 is one
of them, and I still take exception to the B-2 having been added
in 1996.
The Chairman. Mr. Montgomery — ^before we go to Mr. Montgom-
ery, I would like to mention the fact we have in our audience a
former very valuable member of this Congress, Ms. Marilyn Lloyd
from Tennessee. Welcome.
Ms. Lloyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Montgomery, Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the Sec-
retary and General Shali on the fine presentations, maybe a little
long but it was good, especially you, Mr. Secretary, you were easy
to follow. Members like pictures and you sure had a lot of pictures.
Helps us to get a better feel.
Talking about what you expect in the total force that will work,
you have taken the National Guard and Reserves and you have im-
plemented them, as the general said and you said, Mr. Secretary,
about using Guard units from different States over in Europe. That
is certainly good. I hope you would continue to do that and in the
35th Division at Fort Leavenworth, Mr. Skelton tells me you are
training forces right here in the States today with American Na-
tional Guardsmen.
So keep working it and keep combat units in the Army National
Guard. If you take too many combat units away from us, the Guard
is not going to back off, they will continue to want to be involved
in combat units. That is what you have done, and thank you very
much.
I would like to mention a letter that came from the Under Sec-
retary of the Veterans Department to Mr. Dorn, who is your Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and I quote from
the letter, and it is an important point I want to make here. My
only point this afternoon, as you know the National Defense Au-
thorization Act of 1996 is now in law and signed by the President.
Section 2822 of this law provides the Department of Veterans' Af-
fairs and the Department of Defense the authority to conduct a
pilot program to assist military personnel to obtain VA home loans.
The bottom line is the VA is saying to you, Mr. Secretary, and
to you, general, we have some funds to lend out there. We want
99
to help you on the quaHty of Hfe by having the active duty person-
nel get veterans' loans. They don't have to live on the post and it
is a test program, and my point is that I would hope that you
would look into this. It will save money in the long run if you can
get active duty persons to have their family — they can buy a house
under the veterans' programs and not have to live on the post. You
don't have to do the building. It has merit to it.
What I am asking you, Mr. Secretary, is please look into it. It
is up to you to implement it. If you don't implement it, then we
don't know whether it will work or not. It is $10 million. It will
come from military construction.
Secretary Perry. I will look into it, Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. You, general?
General Shalikashvili. Exactly.
Mr. Montgomery. Well, I am within my time. I yield to my
former Chairman.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Secretary, when you responded to my col-
league from California, Mr. Hunter, with respect to our lack of ca-
pacity to shoot down an incoming missile, isn't the "B" part of your
answer with respect to China that we also reserve — ^we also have
the capacity to deter weapons from China and that has, indeed,
been an integral part of our strategy and that indeed deterrence
has worked?
Secretary PERRY. Yes, Mr. Dellums. I had already testified in my
opening statement that we do not see a threat from, against the
United States and that is why of course we are not building — that
is not why we don't have such a system deployed. So we don't be-
lieve there is a threat. What capability they have, we have more
than adequate deterrence for.
So that is of course the reason that the answer to that question
is no, and I think that is a very good, elaborate point. I thought
I had already made that point in my initial testimony.
Mr. Dellums. I would simply say each time you answer that
question give the full answer. I have a feeling here this is a very
narrow view in this respect.
I would yield back my time to the gentleman.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Secretary, General Shalikashvili. I think you made a very articu-
late statement of the nature of the threat and of the strategy that
we should employ. I find nothing to quarrel with in that.
I would have to hasten to add, though, that I fear the concerns
of my colleague, Mr. Hunter, with reference to whether or not the
President's budget request is equal to the proper implementation
of the strategy to counter the threats.
I intuitively suspect that you are engaged in a struggle with the
White House and the Office of Management and Budget over the
topline of the defense budget and that you could — did not come out
in the struggle as either you, and certainly not as well as I, would
have preferred.
But let me ask something of a very specific concern. In our fiscal
year 1996 authorization bill there was a construction program that
was laid out in significant detail for procurement of the next gen-
100
eration of new attack submarines. It is my understanding from
statements made at the time that the President's budget was first
discussed with the news media, and my understanding from the
statements you have made before the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee that the Department remains committed to executing that
submarine construction program. But to me incredibly there is
nothing in the budget either for fiscal year 1997 nor elsewhere in
the FYDP for the two submarines that are supposed to be built in
1999 and in the year 2001.
You cannot implement that submarine program without advance
procurement funds in the fiscal year 1997 budget for the fiscal year
1999 budget.
From your responses in the Senate yesterday, I was encouraged
that the Department does support the program and on March 26
will be presenting a detailed program to the Congress to implement
the fiscal year 1996 authorization bill on that subject. I would like
to hear that at the time you do that you will suggest some alter-
ation in the top line of the budget in order to pay for it because
you can't implement programs that you have no budget authority
or appropriations to implement, and it is a vital program.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Bateman, I will try to clarify the Depart-
ment's position on this new attack submarine.
First of all, we believe there is a requirement for the new attack
submarines. Second, we believe the timing is now for that and we
should be on with that program. Third, we believe there should be
competition in that program and do support competition. Fourth
and finally, we had in our plans and our budget a way of achieving
that competition which involved a second contractor coming on
board in the year 2000. The Congress had a different judgment on
that and judged they should come on board in 1999, so we of course
will comply with that.
But the budget — ^we have to readjust our budget to make that op-
tion. Our budget all involved that program starting in 2000. So we
have yet to get back to you how we will comply with the 1999 start.
Mr. Bateman, But I hope I can anticipate that that will be hap-
pening and you will be advising the committee how we can imple-
ment the program that was worked out and agreed to last year.
Secretary Perry. We will do whatever we have to do to comply
with the congressional guidance on this issue.
Mr. Bateman. Well, I think I am taking great comfort in that.
I look forward to seeing and doing all I can to help you see that
it happens. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
One other thing that I would like to — I have a comment on if I
still have a little time.
Your budget request has $1.1 billion for contingency operations.
That is really not a contingency fund. That is to pay for ongoing
operations that are foreseeable and will be ongoing within that
budget year for which you are submitting.
I hope that is responsive to the injunction in our bill last year
that doesn't submit to us a defense budget that doesn't include
funding for ongoing operations that are taking place even as the
budget was put together.
Am I correct in that or is this an unfunded contingency?
101
Secretary Perry. Mr. Bateman, your point is exactly correct.
This $1.1 billion is for planned military operations, not for un-
planned contingencies. They represent our best estimate of what
the present programs under way will cost during fiscal 1996. If we
have an unplanned military contingency, we would have to come
back to you for additional support.
Mr. Bateman. I have many other things I would like to ask.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry. We will try to, but it is not contingency oper-
ations.
The Chairman. I appreciate the gentleman abiding by the 5-
minute rule so we can get to other people.
I would like to remind members at this time that when we break
for lunch at 11:45 those members who arrive late when we recon-
vene at 2 o'clock, we will take questions according to their arrival
in accordance with the rules.
Mrs. Schroeder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank both of you for being here. I also want to say
to the Secretary of Defense I don't think I would have ever allowed
his picture to be in the paper as it was this morning with his wife
with five stars and you only had four. Good guy. I want to thank
you for that.
I think one of the things that I think we have bipartisan consen-
sus on is if there is anything, anything, anything, that we can do
to fast forward research into what to do about land mines at any
time during the year I wish we would know. I know that is a con-
cern of yours, too. So all of us are desperately seeking answers to
that. Thank you for your leadership in it, and please let us know
if you see anything that we can move on because I think the whole
world is looking at that.
Let me make a plug for the Marine Commandant because he has
been talking about less than lethal research and how effective
those types of things that were done with defense research and the
law enforcement people, how effective some of that was vis-a-vis
Haiti and other deployments. It is just a little tiny part of the
budget, but as we look at Israel, as presently we look at terrorism,
that is one of the things that often gets crowded out and by the
Marines being there on the ground he made a very eloquent re-
quest for that here, and I just wanted to underline it, highlight it
and say how tragically the events of the weekend make that once
again appear to be something that we may be needing to beef up.
I think in the Terrorism Act we do beef it up as it is written now.
I don't know if it will pass or not, but it might be something that
if DOD worked with us it could be helpful.
I am going to ask a question that sounds facetious but I must
say again events have driven this to be a question that has con-
cerned me. I often thought one thing we would never block grant
in this Congress is the defense bill, but as I have watched what has
been going on in south Florida I am almost ready to block grant
the defense bill and say, if Floridians want to provoke a war down
there, fine, but I am not sure I want to be in it.
I am a little concerned about the provocation. Is the Defense De-
partment in that loop or is that all being driven by the State De-
partment?
102
If somebody does something and we see all sorts of emotions un-
leashed on television, can they come to you and say, OK, one more
time, go?
So I guess what I am really sa5dng is, are you in that loop, be-
cause while at this moment it appears to be in check; there have
been some very tense moments where it appears some people
would like to push that envelope a little further to get an incident,
.then people would want a military to response to it.
Secretary Perry. Yes, we are very much in that loop, Mrs.
Schroeder. We participated in all the planning both at the working
level and at the very highest level on the decisions to what actions
needed to be taken on a day-to-day basis and on Saturday on an
hour-to-hour basis. I am quite comfortable that not only is our
counsel being sought, it is being followed in those areas.
Let me reassure you, though, that while we provided a — while
the point of view we bring to this is a cautionary point of view, we
were not the only voice providing a point of view at all. None of
the levels at the principal's level were even contemplating rash ac-
tions there.
General Shall, would you add to that?
General Shalikashvili. First of all, I fully agree with Secretary
Perry on that, and I felt quite comfortable that both the Secretary
and I were included in all the meetings and on all the discussions.
I would like to make one other answer to your question, although
I know that it wasn't the gist of your question.
We normally talk about the military being joined, and I am very
proud of what we have done in jointness, but this operation of this
last weekend in south of Florida was principally a Coast Guard op-
eration, we were providing some support to the Coast Guard.
You could not have seen better excellence by a service than by
the Coast Guard and you could not have seen better jointness than
between the military forces in the Defense Department and the
Coast Guard. It was really a very well-executed operation.
I think we all ought to take great comfort from the fact that even
when something involves the Coast Guard on the shores of our Na-
tion that the Coast Guard and the military have learned to work
together like I believe we have never done before.
Mrs. Schroeder. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Hansen.
Mr. Hansen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Like many members of the committee, we have grave concerns
about what has been stated today. What disturbs me is a question
I would like to ask the witnesses. I think this administration feels
they are above the law. They have gone so far as to take MILCON
dollars to approve closing facilities and handouts to the private sec-
tor.
Mr. Secretary, we have worked on something called the base
closing law. Finally it got through; it was a tough law to get
through. I remember the many debates and the hours we worked
on this thing. This is now Public Law 101-510 and it clearly states
that if the President disapproves the recommendation of the Com-
103
mission in whole or in part the President shall transmit it back to
the Commission and they can approve or disapprove.
The law gives the President no authority whatsoever to accept
the list with changes or to offer specific guidelines for its imple-
mentation.
That same thing applies to Members of Congress. We have 45
legislative days. We can't say we want to privatize this or the other
one. We have one choice, up or down. That is all there is in the
law.
This law was carefully crafted with only one intention, to keep
politics out of the BRAC process, forgetting how many electoral
votes would be in Texas, California, or somewhere else and allow
the Commission to do the important work of eliminating excess ca-
pacity based on military value and not on politics.
This Commission strongly upheld the position that this commit-
tee did in accepting BRAC last September as Congress did. We
didn't fuss around with it.
My questions would be, Mr. Secretary, why does this administra-
tion continue to flaunt BRAC law and pursue a policy that is in
clear violation of several longstanding laws passed by Congress?
No. 2, why would this administration want to risk military readi-
ness and the long-term efficiency of its best facilities by retaining
excess capacity and forcing the use of its most inefficient and most
costly facilities?
As we stood at the BRAC meeting and General Fogleman was
there, they flashed up on the screen five air logistics centers. The
question was asked, of the five ALC's, name them in order of effi-
ciency and the Air Force rated them. This was your work, your peo-
ple did this.
They rated them one, two, three, four, so the Commission, Chair-
man Dixon, closed the bottom two. And he closed them as per the
law. No strings hanging on it.
So as time goes on we now find we are keeping the two lowest
rated, least efficient. We want to keep them open and spend mil-
lions of dollars and millions of MILCON dollars to keep them open
as was not proposed in the BRAC Commission report.
My question three, the BRAC Commission report and the GAO
specifically noted that closure of McClellan Air Base and San Anto-
nio Air Station will permit significant improved utilization of the
remaining depots and reduces DOD operating costs. I can't under-
stand why we would want to privatize this, and I would like to
know what your plan is to do work with the remaining depots.
The last thing I would like to ask, and I know these questions
are rarely answered so I am going to specifically hand-carry to your
office these questions, how come we are changing the definition of
core maintenance, which I see that most of our people want to have
left as is?
If you would go to those questions, Mr. Secretary, and General
Shalikashvili, I would appreciate it.
The No. 1 matter I would like to hear somebody responsibly re-
spond to is How you get around the law when the law is so basi-
cally clear.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Hansen, I guess I challenge your premise.
I do not believe we are flaunting the laws here. The privatizing ac-
104
tions we are taking, in my judgment, do fall within the scope of the
conclusions made by the Commission.
The second point you made had to do with the efficiency of what
we are doing. I think it is a perfectly valid point, and I can tell you
that against my judgment that the privatizing actions which we
have underway deal with only one segment of the activity of those
depots, picking out those segments that are most modem and most
efficient, and we believe this will be an action that leads to effi-
ciency. It led to that kind of result in Newark. Deputy Secretary
White visited Kelly and is satisfied that the programs underway
will be efficient.
Just last month I visited McClellan and saw the privatization ac-
tions underway there. It is a small segment of the total changes
that are going on there but it is picking the most modern, the most
efficient facilities they have and making good use of them.
So I myself am satisfied that the results of this will be improved
efficiency, not decreased efficiency.
Mr. Hansen. Mr. Secretary, you feel your best legal counsel in
the Pentagon have told you that under law the President can
change these recommendations?
Secretary Perry. My counsel has advised me — we considered this
many months ago, and I have not looked at it recently, but many
months have gone by since we laid these programs on. Yes, we had
the advice of counsel that what we were doing was entirely consist-
ent with the law.
Mr. Hansen. Mr. Secretary, I would appreciate having their legal
opinion. And I would like you to look at the opinions from GAO and
people from the BRAC Closing Commission that are contrary to
that.
If that is the case, then Congress would have exactly that same
premise, that we could do the same thing with the other 41 bases.
I don't know how you can draw any other conclusion.
I see my time is up. Thank you, sir. I appreciate your response.
The Chairman. Mr. Skelton, the gentleman from Missouri.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.
I welcome Secretary Perry and General Shali to our hearing
today. You bring with you a great deal — not the least of which is
the highest integrity and thoughtfulness. I appreciate your efforts
in your constitutional role in assisting us in ours.
My first question is a simple one to Mr. Secretary. In the recent
article, either this last Sunday or the previous Sunday, Warren
Christopher, the Secretary of State, was quoted as saying, regard-
ing Bosnia, this is not a permanent commitment; this is approxi-
mately a 1-year commitment. This is not a guarantee. It is an op-
portunity. We will give the warring parties in Bosnia a major op-
portunity to carry out the Da3rton peace accords. It can be done in
a year; perhaps it can't be done — perhaps it can't be done in a
longer period of time.
Is it your understanding, Mr. Secretary, that we are still sub-
scribing to the 1-year operation?
Secretary Perry. Yes.
Mr. Skelton. General Shali, from my observation and from var-
ious briefings that I have had and other information, it appears
that the Bosnian deployment is going well. The bridge, which is a
105
historic military effort, is completed. The troops have been moving
in well. The morale is high. There appears to be no sign of mission
creep and the mine effort, antimine effort has been accelerated. I
did raise this issue with the Army and it appears a special task
force is moving ahead with that under the leadership of the Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army.
I would like your assessment, General Shall, on how the Bosnian
deplojonent is coming and how the mission is appearing as of this
time?
General Shalikashvili. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. I believe that
the deployment has gone very well. I still recall appearing before
this committee prior to the operation and we discussed all the dif-
ficulties that could have arisen. Most of them did not. As I alluded
in my statement, it was due to the training and the preparedness
and the competence of the force.
We moved into Bosnia and I think received a better reception
than we had expected from the local population. Wherever our
troops went, they were in fact received very well. We had much
less, if any, military resistance to our deployment.
What we did find were those things that we had really expected
and that mines would be our big problem, and that occasionally the
lone sniper would be, as well as our road and weather conditions.
But to some degree at least, and I think to an awful lot of degree,
our training and our preparedness proved to have been correct and
the results speak for themselves.
The question is, where do we go from here. I again stated that
we are doing well but we must be mindful every day that some-
thing unexpected is still possible and so we must stay ready and
alert and the leadership must stay as well as it is.
Ultimately, I think the bigger problem is not that military imple-
mentation of the peace agreement. I have fairly high confidence
that we will be able to do that.
What we need to make sure we understand is that it is equally
important to the overall effort and also to the safety of the troops
that we get on with the civilian functions that need to be per-
formed. When I say "we," I don't mean the military, but the nations
that are involved in this effort.
The elections have to go forward, the refugees have to begin to
return, reconstruction has to start, the infrastructure has to be re-
built so that the people in the country see an advantage to not
fighting and see a tangible advantage, and therefore have less of
an incentive to resume fighting because they see life getting better.
This, I believe, is directly tied to the security of the force there
now. So I would encourage that whenever you have before you de-
liberations whether money should be made available for the assist-
ance of the civilian effort, that you think upon it not only as some-
thing that someone else is doing and it has no impact on our mili-
tary— I submit to you it has an impact on the military because if
we can get the roads and the bridges and the tunnels fixed so that
we have better freedom of movement, it helps our security. If we
can have a civilian demining effort going, less of the demining has
to be done by us, and the mere fact that mines will be removed will
make it safer for us.
106
It is these kinds of civilian efforts that are certainly directly tied
to the military, and I think that is where we need to now provide
our support as a Nation as much as we do, and you have done so
well in your support for the troops.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much. My time is up, Mr. Chair-
man. I might give the Secretary a heads-up that you will receive
questions later, I know, regarding your posture statement regard-
ing end strength, particularly the Army and the Air Force, but I
will. Since I am out of time, I cannot pursue that.
Thank you both.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We have a vote underway but we will try to get to Mr. Weldon
before we break for lunch and come back at 2 o'clock. Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for
coming in. I see Dr. Hamre has joined us. Thank you for joining
us.
Dr. Perry, I will not get into the specifics of where we disagree.
1 think it is clear that we have some major disagreements in a bi-
partisan way in this Congress in the outline you presented to us.
We will have a healthy debate on those issues as the next several
months unfold.
However, what I do want to use my time for today is to express
my dismay at a pattern that I see emerging that in some cases is
not allowing this Congress to play its rightful role in determining
what the appropriate budget levels are, what the priorities should
be, and allowing us to interact with the appropriate military per-
sonnel on key decisions that are, in fact, being made.
As you know, Dr. Perry, the fiscal year 1996 Authorization Act
is very specific with regard to deployment dates of specific missile
defense systems. The Congress in a strong bipartisan effort, coming
out of this committee with a vote of 448 to 3 from this committee,
funded the program to meet deployment dates we specified. The
President signed the bill into law. But the administration is ignor-
ing the legislative direction, even to the detriment of the command-
ers in the field. As you know, we have got General Luck in the
Korea theater who has requested certain equipment, and we are
slipping the THAAD Program despite the supposed commitment we
are making to THAAD.
The Pentagon is selectively muscling its highest ranking gen-
erals. I was scheduled to have a briefing by an Army general, three
star, who asked to brief me. He was told the day of the briefing
he could not show up at my office because he was not allowed to
brief Members of Congress on national missile defense on the Hill.
And that three-star general is General Gamer, who did come in
yesterday, but I had to talk with him about Army modernization
as opposed to national missile defense. The Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, or JROC, has had the greater say in allocation
of resources within the Department. I don't dispute that. Yet, it has
refused to share with the Congress the basis for some of its find-
ings and decisions and recommendations that involves tens of bil-
lions of dollars.
The Hunter UAV program, last January it was the No. 1 or No.
2 priority of the Pentagon. In June, it was No. 1 or No. 2. In the
fall of last year, the program was terminated. We have spent $1
107
billion on that program. When we asked for the justification or ra-
tionale in canceling it, we were told it was refused, that the Penta-
gon did not have to turn over that information to us, that the staff
of the Joint Chiefs did not have to provide that. That is outrageous.
Your Department sent us a $12 billion reprogramming for Bosnia
characterizing it as minimal program impact because of changed
economic assumptions because of lower inflation than estimated.
What we all referred to as a free lunch. We are coming to find out
as it filters out from the ranks in the field that it is not a free
lunch. We find out 3,100 people at the Engineering Center will be
laid off a week to help pay for Bosnia.
We find out that Eglin Air Force Station in Florida is considering
laying off a part or all of its work force for 2 weeks to take care
of the funding required in this effort.
I just heard from my colleague, Duke Cunningham, that we are
canceling repair of four ships in San Diego.
We have asked the services for specific reductions. We have yet
to receive the information.
But the most outrageous part of this whole effort is last week
when my subcommittee, which had nine Republicans and two
Democrats show up in this committee, had place settings for three
generals. General O'Neill, General Garner, and General Linhard
from the Air Force. We held the hearing and we had their testi-
mony which was prepared.
They were denied the opportunity to come before us. They were
denied the opportunity by Dr. White. He only told me an hour be-
fore the hearing on Wednesday that they could not come after re-
considering his decision for 2 days. We were told the reason they
could not come in on this, which has become one of the most sig-
nificant differences between this Congress and this administration,
is because they didn't want anyone appearing before the Congress
prior to you coming before us.
Then I find out the day before that Admiral Owens in his capac-
ity as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is testifying before the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
Also, that reasoning was given by members of the minority in a
press release they put out stating that that is the reason why the
witnesses did not show.
General O'Neill wanted to be here. General Garner wanted to be
here. General Linhard wanted to be here. I have their testimony.
Two Democrats and nine Republicans were here.
I don't want to suggest the reasons why perhaps they were not
allowed, but it leads me to believe because they were going to tes-
tify as to the capability of a limited national missile defense system
which is compliant, which is the premise of our bill, this adminis-
tration doesn't want that information to be brought forth for the
American public or for Members of this Congress. I can tell you
that is not going to happen.
As Chairman Spence mentioned, down in the front of that first
level here on the dais there is a statement that gives us the respon-
sibility under article 1, section 8, of the Constitution, that we shall
have the power to raise and support the Army, provide and main-
tain the Navy and make rules for the government and regulation
of the land and naval forces.
108
We are not going to stand for that again.
I have talked to the chairman about this and Speaker Gingrich.
If you deny people to come before us in open hearings, we will sub-
poena them, but even more importantly the distinguished ranking
member of this committee whom I have the deepest respect for has
assured me that he will support our efforts not to have that kind
of action taking place in the future.
All I am sajdng is we may have differences but allow us as elect-
ed Members of Congress to have access to information and data so
we can understand why you are doing what you are doing, we can
understand the decisions and conclusions you are reaching so we
have an honest and open debate. We can disagree but when you
were not willing to let those people talk to us or give us the infor-
mation, we are at a tremendous disadvantage.
I don't think we are going to stand for that.
Thank you. And I join with Duncan Hunter in thanking you for
coming today.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Weldon, is General O'Neill scheduled to
testify before your committee tomorrow?
Mr. Weldon. General O'Neill is going to testify but not about
that issue. The issue last week. Dr. Perry, as you know, was on
ABM Treaty compliant existing capability that we have that could
be deployed in less than 5 years at a cost of between $2.5 billion
and $5 billion. That was the issue. They were not coming to testify
about program issues for this fiscal year and General O'Neill knew
that.
Yes, he is coming in tomorrow to talk about programs for this
year as we were going to have a meeting. That was not the subject
of last week's hearing.
Secretary Perry. Let me state in the strongest possible terms,
Mr. Weldon, that this administration, this Department, and this
Secretary is not withholding information from anybody, and you
can schedule any hearing you want to with General O'Neill to tes-
tify on any subject within his competence, and I will support that.
Mr. Weldon. Does that include General Garner and (Jeneral
Linhard?
Secretary Perry. Yes.
Mr. Weldon, Thank you very much.
The Chairman, Thank you.
We will break for lunch. Back at 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee recessed to reconvene
at 2 p.m,, this same day,]
The Chairman. Moving right along, Mr. Hefley,
Mr, Hefley. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you, General
and Mr. Secretary, for being here.
Mr. Secretary, at the outset I want to express my appreciation
for your personal commitment to try to improve the quality of life
for our military personnel and their families. I think it is a commit-
ment we all share, and we spent a lot of time, you and I, last year
talking about this.
Secretary Perry, We could not have done it without your sup-
port, I want to personally thank you for that,
Mr, Hefley, It was a good team effort. You folks, and you per-
sonally, you can't minimize the commitment you personally made
109
to it that got your folks moving in that direction so well, and I ap-
preciate it.
I have had an opportunity to review the 1997 military construc-
tion budget request, and while there are some aspects to the ad-
ministration proposal that I think are helpful to solving our long-
term infrastructure problems, I have concerns about the budget re-
quest overall.
First let me do the positive side. I am pleased that the adminis-
tration has committed itself to a serious barracks program this
year. The request for barracks construction is nearly one-third
more than you requested last year and nearly matches the funding
provided for last year.
However, on the other side of the quality of life effort, in military
family housing, I am disturbed by what looks like an erosion of
that. The budget request would provide $355 million for new con-
struction, a 21 percent reduction from the enacted 1996 level; near-
ly 3,000 new units of housing, 30 percent fewer than Congress pro-
vided last year; and a reduction in the construction improvements
accounts of nearly 29 percent from the current program; over 7 per-
cent cut in the maintenance accounts for family housing when we
know there is a substantial backlog of maintenance and repair in
military neighborhoods.
I don't think that we can rely solely on the privatization initia-
tive, as good as I think that is, to solve our military family housing
problems overnight. We need to put more dollars against the prob-
lem in the short term.
As far as overall military construction accounts are concerned,
you are requesting $9.1 billion. The 1997 request is 14 percent less
than you requested last year and 18 percent less than the enacted
program.
More telling to me, however, is that this budget is nearly 5 per-
cent less than you planned to spend in 1997 when you presented
the budget last year.
As we modernize military equipment and weapon systems, there
is very little discussion of the bed-down and other infrastructures
requirements required to support modernization. As I look at the
outyear funding proposed by the administration, I have serious
questions whether facilities modernization can keep up with the
modernization efforts, let alone fix the significant problems that we
already have.
It seems to me that the administration's budget proposal for mili-
tary construction fell within a defense top line that is underfunded
and merely rearranges money in accounts. It is a classic "rob Peter
to pay Paul" exercise, it appears to me. At a minimum, we are
treading water.
What is worse is that in some areas I fear we are not making
significant investment to prevent a further erosion in the quality
of military facilities. That has implications for retention, training,
and readiness. I think that you did a marvelous job of convincing
all of us that we do have a terrible backlog and we do have to ad-
dress that backlog, and we got excited about addressing it.
I would like you to respond to my observations about this one.
And then, completely off the subject, I have some concern about
military — about the Army end strength. We are talking 495,000.
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You indicated that we are through with the drawdown substan-
tially, and yet I get the feeling that if savings can't be found other
places we may go to the 475 figure, and so if you would comment
on that too I would appreciate it.
Secretary Perry. TTiank you, Mr, Hefley.
The MILCON housing budget which we submitted is the best
balance I could make with the various trade-offs that I was faced
with in putting this budget together.
I am not satisfied with the effort on housing, as you are not sat-
isfied with it. My efforts to deal with this problem are going to
focus on bringing in private capital to try to make up for the defi-
ciencies, to accelerate the efforts to getting more housing and more
modifications to housing, and to get more efficiency in the process
that we have.
It would be a lot easier if I simply had more money. It is harder
to work the problem the way we are working it, but I will not give
up but continue to apply the best management efforts I can put to
get more resources to bear, because I am not satisfied with the
pace of housing building modification which you cite and which is
reflected in this budget.
Mr. Hefley. We are still singing off the same page as we did last
year. It is still a high priority with you as it is with us?
Secretary Perry. Yes. End strength of the Army, General
Shalikashvili and I discussed this intensively over the last 6 to 9
months. I will ask him to comment, but we have exactly the same
view on the subjects.
General Shalikashvili. As we try we try to ensure that we have
the right size force and the right end strength to match it, it ap-
pears to us that it is not out of the question that as we replace ca-
pabilities, in all the services, but certainly in the Army as well,
with increased capabilities, it affords us an opportunity not to
change the structure but to see if we can retain the same capabili-
ties at a lower structure.
An example in the Army, that is as you upgrade from an Ml
tank to MlAl, M1A2 tank, by any measure you can argue whether
that is an 18 percent or 20 percent increased capability that the
new piece of equipment brings you. So you have to ask yourself, in
the absence of someone fielding something better than the threat
tank that we would be facing, whether it isn't possible to take a
unit that now has five tanks in it and make it a unit with four
tanks and thereby make some reductions in the end strength while
maintaining the same capability.
More importantly, when you look at how much of the Army end
strength is in the fighting piece and how much that is in the sup-
port piece, the kind of infrastructure that supports the fighting
force, it seems to me that whenever we talk of a potential reduction
in end strength to gain a savings we immediately turn over to the
fighting side, and how we could get there I described.
I think a larger potential for end strength savings is in the infra-
structure side, through privatization of things that we do, through
outsourcing, through jointness.
For instance, we have a number of installations where we have
three services having installations close by, each having its own
Ill
management structure. Can we combine them and have one man-
agement structure handle it and thereby get savings?
I continue to look and I continue to ask the Secretary to keep
looking for ways where we can maintain the same capability and
certainly the same force structure in the Army but perhaps at a re-
duced end strength.
Mr. Hamre. If I could amplify, sir, the force structure that is in
there is not cut because of the potential reduction of 495 to 475.
We have resourced the same force structure and the OPTEMPO to
go with it. So it doesn't presume any reduction in combat capability
for the forces for the Army.
Mr. Hefley. But we are looking at 475 or 495 down the line,
would you project?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, it depends on the efficiencies the Army can
achieve inside the administrative side of the Army, the TDA side
of the Army, the noncombat side of the Army, sir.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. We just heard from John Hamre, the Comptrol-
ler of DOD.
Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. Sisisky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have read all your testimony today, and I appreciate the chair-
man's ability to have the people clean up and straighten up here.
They took my notes away. I think I know what I want to talk
about: No. 1, restructuring of the industrial base. I happen to agree
with it. As you know, I put in some amendments in restructuring.
Now I understand a lot of people want to do away with it, includ-
ing those in the Pentagon.
I want your opinion, and I agree with restructuring of the indus-
trial base, but I think there should be some controls on that, and
I would like to hear from you on that. Somebody mentioned today's
mines. Do you know
Secretary Perry. Could you elaborate on that, please?
Mr. Sisisky. It was General Dynamics that had a company in
California, moved to Arizona, and by a wave of the arm you gave
them $200 million. I said that may not be the right thing to do.
We wrote these things, and I admit that some of them are very
strict and may need some fine tuning, but I hope, because I will
fight to keep that thing in there as best I can, because I think it
is very important.
But anjrway, we brought up the question of mines. We had a
hearing on mines; 12 years ago I brought up about mines, how im-
portant it is. I can't tell you — everything that we have done in tech-
nology, why we can't find a way, whether it is laser or whatever —
I know that we have provided funds and you have reprogrammed
some of the funds.
Correct me if I am wrong. Mines kill more people than anything
else. Is that a fair statement? At least the Marine Corps told me
that 12 years ago. I found out in the hearing, one of the problems
was the doctrines; the Army has one doctrine: You mark it and
move on. Marines have to clear it out. Someone has to take a look,
and I think it has to be from the top. We found out in Bosnia, and
we are doing well, but it is a slow process.
38-160 97-6
112
You brought up the subject of submarines. I think what you said
is very credible. I do worry why it wasn't put on this year's budget,
because if you want competition, one of the competitors goes out of
business in 1999 unless they get some money to keep that. So I
trust what you say, and I hope it will happen.
One other thing that I have read about NCO's: that you have
taken NCO's all over CONUS and sent them to Bosnia. I asked the
Army about it. They said they had to have the specialties. I under-
stand that. But one thing I haven't got an answer to, and I think
this really reflects upon readiness, and that is that NCO's are not
being promoted now in order to save money.
I remember listening to General Sullivan, who I think said it
takes 15 years to train a good first sergeant, 20 years to train a
division commander. If this is true — and I just read it in one of the
periodicals — that we are not promoting NCO's, then we are doing
very badly in this country.
The other thing, Mr. Hamre's favorite subject, but I think it goes
higher than Mr. Hamre, and that is the thing of privatization. We
were allowed to do some privatization on some pilot programs last
year, but I am here to tell you, in my opinion — and I hope I am
wrong — if you go too far on privatization it will be the worst mis-
take that is made in this country, in my opinion.
The military is there for war, and I think if you privatize every-
thing, and you talk about privatizing a whole naval base, the larg-
est naval base in the world, privatizing that, I think you will be
making a major, major mistake. I am not against privatization
where you can save money, but I am against the wholesale use of
privatization, and I worry very much about that.
I was going to bring up about the Army that Mr. Hefley brought
up because I looked at the figures, and in 1999 I think it was
20,000 less. I hope they are not doing that, but you assured us they
are not, not doing that just to meet a budget figure.
Secretary Perry. I will comment on several points and ask Gen-
eral Shalikashvili to comment as well.
Relating to privatization, there is enormous inertia in the system
resisting privatization. Therefore, I don't think we are going too
far. The problem you raise is a valid issue, but I just don't think
we will reach that point any time in the foreseeable future.
Mr. SisiSKY. The only reason I brought it up, that is not what
I am hearing from some, and I have in mind one of your executives,
that it has to go through Congress before it happens an3rway.
Secretary Perry. On restructuring of the defense industry, since
the market of the defense industry has decreased 50 to 60 percent,
some restructuring is inevitable and necessary to bring efficiencies
in getting the overhead down, which will benefit our Department
as well as benefiting the companies.
Each of those proposed transactions, though, has to be reviewed
by the Trust Department for antitrust considerations. Our Depart-
ment's role in that is serving as advisers to the Trust Department
as to whether we believe that the proposed merger would cause us
to lose desirable competition in order to maintain efficiency.
Mr. SisiSKY. It is more than that. You have to prove to three dif-
ferent committees whether or not the savings were there. That is
what was bothering me, whether the real savings would be there,
113
and they were doing it over a 10-year period. I am not going to be
here in 10 years, and a lot of other people. I want to be sure we
keep our hands on that to be sure that the restructuring is right
and the savings will be there. We should share savings.
Secretary Perry. It is like the BRAC question. The infrastruc-
ture has to come down in the defense industry as well as in our
bases. But we have more or less control over bringing it down in
the bases, but no control at all, except we have a way of stopping
the changes if we think that they might be harmful.
On the submarine program, I will tell you, we are committed to
the fast attack submarine program and are committed to doing it
with competition, and I am confident we will work out a way of
doing that.
General Shalikashvili.
General Shalikashvili. On mines, I will certainly take a look
whether there is a disconnect in doctrine between two of our serv-
ices. We have worked it very, very hard, and I will make sure —
and particularly as Bosnia was coming upon us — to make sure that
everyone understood those rules. I think you will find, as you look
into conflicts up to now, the greatest killer has been the artillery,
but mines are very close to it.
Not promoting noncommissioned officers, I will look into that and
get back to you. It is possibly because the Army had set a goal of
promotion of 98 percent of MPA and they might have run into that
ceiling right now. I will get to you on that issue.
General Shalikashvili. On privatization, if I may, I understand
fully well what you are saying, Mr. Sisisky.
But if we are really serious about being underfunded in our ac-
quisition accounts and that in order to keep our readiness high and
to keep the structure that all of you have said, if anything, is the
bare minimum that we need to have to do what this Nation wants
us to do and still increase our acquisition accounts, then we must,
we must not be afraid to explore all possibilities in privatization,
because I think that could be a significant chunk of money that
could then be migrated into the acquisition accounts. But we can't
do that without all of you, so I ask you that you encourage us in
this process and help us along in that process.
The Chairman. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start off by saying, Mr. Secretary and General
Shalikashvili, if I was the President, I would not mind your ap-
pointment and you sitting in the same chair. I think that if you
had a different administration you would be much more able to jus-
tify an unjustifiable plan.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Cunningham, I am very happy with the ad-
ministration that I am in.
Mr. Cunningham. I am sure you are, but we are going to change
that.
Let me be specific on what I think are the unrealistic assump-
tions: First of all, that we have had industry testify that the best
thing that could happen to them is flat line procurement, and when
you base — and I realize that you have to make some of your projec-
tions on current inflation at 2.5 percent, but I don't think there is
114
anybody here who believes that inflation is going to stay at 2.5 per-
cent over the next 7 years.
Then BRAC, you need to upgrade your chart. I Hstened to the
Senate hearings last week where you are a billion dollars behind,
not even in BRAC, and you have other costs, for example NTC and
the Navy right in my home town, and El Toro that the marines are
having to eat the overhead on because they can't move down to
Miramar. They are having to eat those costs in base after base.
And then the environmental costs. And if you justify your future
plans on those things, it is going to be disastrous.
Let me give you a case. This is the shipbuilding repair that you
said in worst case we are going to make this happen. You have set
up worst case because if you look at the inflationary mode that you
have set forth in your plan and BRAC savings and acquisition,
under this plan we won't have money to acquisition anything.
What is going to happen is, you will cost thousands of jobs in San
Diego in just ship repair. You say it is only worst case. That has
happened, according to SUPSHIPS, and those ship repairs were
put off because of the 1993 cuts, and now we are putting money
into O&M, and now you are saying even with that increase that
you are going to cut the ships. That is unrealistic.
I take a look at the F-14, and the JAST is not just an F-16 re-
placement. JAST is for the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air
Force.
Secretary Perry. I stand corrected on that.
Mr. Cunningham. The F-14 we have to make run through to
2001 to 2004.
By the way, those F-14 crashes, I would not be afraid to step
foot in an F-14A. But if we delay because of these assumptions the
FA-18E/F in that time period and delay JAST, we will not have
national security assets to meet the threats in the future and it is
going to be disastrous for us. So there are two.
Your assumption of the budget threat on the SSN-19. I could
show you the USS Lexington being cut up into razor blades, but we
are building new carriers. The Russians are building three nuclear-
class Typhoon submarines a year plus the deep submersibles and
a new nuclear weapon program.
Where you say that we had air dominance in Iraq, I have trained
those kinds of pilots, and they would be better suited on camels
and more effective. They are the worst pilots in the world. You go
to Korea, Russia, China, places like that with those kind of as-
sumptions, we will get our lunch handed to us.
Haiti. You said great planning. Ask Jimmy Carter when he
screams at the President about the great planning and the multi-
national force that wasn't even there until day 3. Aristide is still
there; Papa Doc management is still in effect.
If you look at Somalia, we still have Aideed there, and it cost us
billions of dollars in Haiti and Somalia.
In Bosnia, I have talked to the Serbs in California, and they are
telling me that yes, they are leaving Croatia but they are coming
back when the snow melts. I hope you have planning for that, be-
cause I still believe we will be in deep kimchi there. The Mujahedin
is still there, and we are going to have problems there. The U.N.
and NATO are broke. Who is going to pay for that?
115
My question is, with all of these assumptions, where do we his-
torically take out those dollars? Out of DOD. That gives us even
less capability to meet the goals that you want to and hurts us in
national security and I think is disingenuous to our kids.
I understand what you are going through in this budget, but if
you look realistically, it is not going to work, sir. I know you have
the best interest of our kids and you are trying to do the best job
you can, but when you make assumptions like this and it costs
more in the long run — I know you have put money into JAST and
into the F-18E/F, but when you take assumptions and say, "We
will come back to you if the 2.5 percent doesn't work," then we
have to readjust. That means all the job markets out there and the
people have to readjust their markets and it costs more money.
That is one of the reasons the B-2 cost so much more.
I have a lot of concerns with what you have presented, and I
don't think it will work, sir.
Thank you.
Secretary Perry. Let me make one comment on the very fun-
damental point you made on inflation. I want to repeat that the
success of the program that I laid out here hinges on three assump-
tions. I make it clear and explicit to you:
We have to be able to harvest the BRAC savings. We have to
have continued success in acquisition reform. Fortunately, we are
having real success there now. Third, we have to sustain the
topline of the budget, and that means purchasing power of the
topline, and therefore the point you made is very fundamental. If
the inflation goes up, we will have to come back for higher dollars
to compensate for that. We have to sustain purchasing power.
Mr. Cunningham. Logically, don't you think it is going to go
higher than 2.5 percent?
Secretary Perry. Last time that happened, fortunately we did
get authorization for a higher topline to accommodate inflation.
Recently inflation went down, which is an unusual situation. I
am not sure that is going to be repeated in my career. Fortunately,
when it went down this time, the converse to what I said is, you
would expect to see your budget lowered when inflation goes down.
In this case, the President allowed us to keep two-thirds of the sav-
ings from that inflation, and that is reflected back so that this
budget actually has somewhat more purchasing power than we had
anticipated when we put it together because of that fact.
But the fundamental point is, if inflation goes up, for this pro-
gram to be successful we have to have the dollar line in the out-
years go up with it.
Mr. Hamre, do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Hamre. Sir, two times in the last 3 years we have had our
topline increased because inflation went up. This year it went
down, and, as the Secretary said, we have $30 billion greater pur-
chasing power in this budget for these assumptions. We do not cre-
ate our own economic assumptions. We are given the economic as-
sumptions and honestly budget them. But we need good numbers
across the board.
Mr. Cunningham. But in the next 7 years, wouldn't it be reason-
able to assume it is going to go above 2.5 percent? If you justify
a plan on that, it is certainly going to happen.
116
Mr. Hamre. It could, but the administration had to cut $297 bil-
Hon out of discretionary spending in this period; $16 bilUon came
out of defense and $280 biUion out of nondefense. I think the Presi-
dent was very strong for a strong defense with this budget, sir.
Secretary Perry. Finally, Mr. Cunningham, I would like to
thank you for the important point you made about JAST being a
joint program, which of course it is. It is a Navy and an Air Force
program. It does much more than just replace the F-16. It will be
our low-cost fighter for decades ahead and into the next century for
all services.
The Chairman. Mr. Pickett, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome.
I would like to start by commenting on the privatization issue.
I hear privatization talked about in some instances as, if you do
away with the Government employees and bring in a private con-
tractor, somehow you are not spending the money that you will be
paying to the private contractor.
I am aware of cases where activities have been discontinued in
the military, contracted out for a higher price than it was costing
when it was being done in-house. That is not efficiency, and it
should not be forced on the military services.
On the issue of the infrastructure that you commented about,
there are two ways that you can help toward getting the right size
infrastructure, and one of those ways would be to give the military
departments the money that they need to make demolition of build-
ings on the bases that they want to have demolished.
In many cases the payback on this expenditure is just 2, 3, at
the maximum 4, years for the money expended because you save
the operational costs that have to be paid out to maintain the
buildings. If they could get the money to demolish, they could save
a lot of dollars down the line.
On the flip side, I am hearing that in the operations of the bases
not enough money is being allocated to preserve essential assets.
These are structures that must be preserved in order for the base
to be mission capable.
No. 1 is the roofs. We allow the roof to deteriorate, and it doesn't
take long for the entire building to become uninhabitable if the roof
is not secure. So not taking care of real property maintenance and
pushing the problem into the future will cost more dollars instead
of less.
Finally, the sizing and shaping of the force. In 1990, it was my
recollection that the then Secretary of Defense along with the
President and the Congress came together on a plan over a 5-year
period to bring our military down about 25 percent in size, from
about 2.1 million people down to about 1.5 million people. We have
accelerated that decline somewhat.
I would like to have you comment on how you view today the
plans that were implemented back in 1990 to downsize the mili-
tary, the efficiency with which that has been carried out, and
whether or not you are at the objective that we should be seeking
as a nation to resize and reshape our forces to meet the threats of
today.
117
Secretary Perry. Let me make two quick comments, and then I
will ask Greneral Shalikashvili to comment specifically on the
downsizing.
Historically it has been true that real property maintenance has
been the bill payer at the end of the year when we run out of
money in our O&M accounts. The first thing that the base manager
will dip into is the real property maintenance, which is one of the
reasons we have the kinds of problems that you are describing.
I probably didn't make it clear enough in my presentation, but
this budget is less vulnerable to that problem than any budget we
have ever submitted. The reason is because the planned military
operations for the first time are funded in this budget, and it is
those — it is the money being drained from the O&M account by the
military operations which has caused us to run out of money at the
end of the year. This year we face that problem squarely and are
actually funding over a billion dollars for these planned military
operations.
If we have unplanned contingencies, we will have to come back
for more money but will not have the kind of problems we have his-
torically had which have had an adverse effect on real property
maintenance.
The second bill payer in line has been training and exercises. So
we are trying to avoid that problem for exactly the reasons that
you are describing.
In the drawdown, I am quite satisfied with the way the
drawdown has gone both in the active duty forces and in the re-
serve forces. I am dissatisfied with the fact that the civilian
drawdown got started later so we now have it under way at a
steeper slope than the others. It is still running 2 years behind the
active duties. The active duty drawdown is almost over now. We
should have a period of stability ahead for many years to come.
General SHALIKASHVILI. Two points, one on the issue of infra-
structure.
We started reducing infrastructure at a point when I thought we
had an excess capacity of infrastructure. Since that time we have
reduced our force by over 30 percent. We will have reduced our in-
frastructure by some 18 percent.
Clearly, if we are serious about getting our acquisition accounts
up and being able to migrate money into those accounts, we have
all agreed on that, that we also must not be afraid to take one
more stab at further reducing infrastructure.
As far as the overall reduction is concerned, I have been involved
in it in various capacities, as a deputy commander in Europe, as
a CINC, and as the chairman. I think it is an extraordinary success
story. The fact that you can take an all-volunteer force, reduce it
by some 700,000 military personnel, do so at a time of great de-
mand upon the force as far as operations is concerned, and do it
with that much expertise and retain that much capability and ex-
cellence in the force is something I would challenge any civilian
corporation to do.
You all had such an important part in it, not only in ensuring
that the process was done correctly but also providing the safety
nets that you did throughout to allow us to make those reductions
118
without more severe hardships than in some cases already were in-
volved.
But I think through the years, from the 1990-91 period on as I
watched the force come down and watched the quality and the ex-
cellence of the product, their operations throughout the process, it
is something that we as a Nation, you and we as an institution,
should be extraordinarily proud of.
I lived, in a similar vein, through a drawdown after Vietnam,
such a night and day operation, and I think we have arrived al-
most at the end of it by the time we finish with the 1997 budget
with a force that we can argue whether it is large enough or not
large enough. I happen to think it is about right. But no one can
argue about the quality of the force and the quality of the people
in that force.
Secretary PERRY. In the 3 years of this administration, we have
drawn down the active duty military and the civilians a few hun-
dred thousand people. It has been a big drawdown. And during
that period the involuntary separations were less than 10 percent,
partly by, I think, good management, but largely because of the
provisions which the Congress gave us to allow us to manage this
process carefully.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mrs. Fowler, the gentlelady from Florida.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
I apologize for not having been here for part of the hearings
today, but they keep scheduling three or four at one time.
As you know, an issue that occupied a lot of time, particularly
on the Readiness Subcommittee under the able leadership of our
chairman, Mr. Bateman, was the question of depot maintenance
and repair. This is an issue of great concern to me and to many
others on the committee.
As a result of the provisions that the President signed into law
early in the fiscal year 1996 authorization bill, we are on the com-
mittee looking forward to receiving a comprehensive depot policy
from you later this month.
As you know, the law provides some flexibility to the Department
in how it fashions policy, but it also provides some very clear guide-
lines on how depot-level maintenance and repair is to be done. By
all accounts that we are getting, unfortunately, the Department
seems to be moving in exactly the opposite direction of what this
law requires.
I understand Deputy Secretary John White, both in his former
capacity and his current, seems to be the point person on this
issue. I know our chairman, Mr. Bateman, is having hearings next
month on depot. I would hope that Mr. White will be made avail-
able to come to those so we can go in depth on some of these issues
with him.
Secretary Perry. Let me volunteer Mr. White right now. I am
sure he would like very much to participate in that hearing.
Mrs. Fowler. Great.
With regard to privatization, as you may know, the GAO pro-
jected back in December of 1994 that privatization in place at the
Aerospace Guidance and Metrology Center in Newark, OH, would
cost $456 million more over the 5-year period from fiscal year 1996
119
to 2001 to operate as a contractor-run facility than would have
been the case had that facility remained an Air Force depot.
They just released a new report this week called Closing Mainte-
nance Depots, Savings Workload, et cetera, in which they note in
regard to that AGMC that a later cost estimate projected that over
a 5-year period the privatization option may cost $600 million more
than costs that would have been incurred had the depot continued
operations as a military depot.
Now, I understand that this morning you referred to the success
that we are experiencing with regard to privatization using this
AGMC in Newark as an example, and if this small contractor-run
facility, if its costs are going to be between $456 to $600 million
more over a 5-year period than running it as a Government oper-
ation, how can that be called success? Under those sort of cir-
cumstances, is it making sense to pursue privatization in place
elsewhere?
I just got this afternoon the new GAO report called Depot Main-
tenance, Opportunities to Privatize Repair of Military Engines, and
I just want to read one quote from that. It says:
Prior to the administration's decision to privatize the workload, the recommended
closure of one of the two major Air Force engine depots offers the potential to im-
prove the efficiency of the remaining engine depots as well as to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of privatizing additional commercial counterpart engine workloads
through public-private competitions. If core military-unique workloads from a clos-
ing activity are transferred to another public depot with proven capability to per-
form the work, DOD could not only save cost from the elimination of unneeded in-
frastructure but also from the economies resulting from the consolidation of engine
workload and improved utilization of remaining engine facilities.
I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that in your position as a steward
of those resources and with the great cost problems that you have
facing you, that you would act as far as the remaining Govern-
ment-run depots in such a manner as to make sure that they do
continue to be able to be run in a cost-effective manner, that we
are not throwing dollars away, as I know Mr. Hansen pointed to,
about the dollars in the new budget from McClellen and Kelly,
bases that are closing and would not pursue what I see as the po-
litical goals of this President trjdng to gain votes in California ver-
sus what I think your goals are and should be, that we want to
maintain core level in our Government-run depots, have them work
well and efficiently, and that is what we need to be pursuing.
Secretary Perry. Mrs. Fowler, I appreciate your comments. Dr.
White is leading this effort in the Department. He recommended it
to the Department before he came in as part of his Commission on
Roles and Missions.
I believe, and I know he believes also, that privatization is not
a panacea, and it is an important tool, and when we apply it, it
has to be applied very selectively and it has to be implemented
very carefully. I believe that in doing this you should hold us to the
test of whether we are gaining efficiencies, and I can tell you that
Dr. White holds us to that test.
With any particular move we are making, we should be able to
answer you and explain to you, and to Mr. Bateman's committee,
whether we are meeting this test of lower cost and greater effi-
ciency. We are not doing this as a public works project but as a
120
means of improving ' aciency. It will only work in certain cases
and even then has to be implemented carefully.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Evans.
Mr. Evans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have a question about humanitarian land mine clear-
ing. Last year the committee included in its bill language that se-
verely limited the humanitarian demining program by rescinding
authorities that were given to the program by Congress, and now
I understand that the language effectively kills the program by re-
stricting the use of fiscal year 1996 funds to fully fund operational
costs such as transportation expenses associated with the DOD
demining activity.
General, can you tell us how this language affects execution of
this program? And please outline your view of the program and
your understanding of the support that it has from the theater
CINC's.
General Shalikashvili. I believe that the restrictions now im-
posed upon us have had a very unfortunate effect. I think that the
demining efforts that we had ongoing from Cambodia to places in
the other part of the world have in fact been severely restricted,
and I would urge, if you can, for us to relook at the possibility of
reestablishing those programs.
I think that the latitudes we had before allowed us to do some
very, very good work. Now, in essence, we are restricted to going
somewhere as part of an exercise doing something. We are not al-
lowed to leave behind the tools that the people would have to use
in order to clear mines and therefore, in essence, can't put into ef-
fect whatever limited instructions we are now able to give them.
So it has set back the program, and I, for one, feel strongly that
the dangers from mines, particularly in the Third World area, are
just so enormous that for a very limited amount of money we can
do a great deal. I think in the end most likely it will assist the
military as far as their safety is concerned should we some day
have to deploy in these areas.
So it has both the benefit to the populations that have to live in
these areas but also certainly has at least an indirect and, in many
cases, a direct impact on the safety of our troops. So I would urge
you, if you can, to see if we could reopen that issue and give us
back the latitudes we had before.
Mr. Evans. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, I have a question about the Persian Gulf Advisory
Committee. The Presidential Advisory Committee on Persian Gulf
war veterans has recently released its interim report.
The report made two specific recommendations: First, that the
DOD must do a better job in monitoring the health of soldiers be-
fore, during, and after a conflict; and, second, DOD should devote
more attention to monitoring low levels of exposure to chemical
warfare agents.
Considering the deployment of our soldiers to Bosnia and other
theaters in the future, I think it is vitally important that these rec-
ommendations be implemented as quickly as possible. Could you
please tell the committee what is DOD doing in this regard? And
I have several other questions which I will submit for the record.
121
Secretary Perry. Let me say here and now that there are impor-
tant lessons learned in Desert Storm which we are applying to the
Bosnia operation, and they are affecting the potential illness of our
troops there, much broader than just exposure to chemical weap-
ons. There is a uniqueness of diseases and viruses in the area too.
The whole set of actions we take to minimize the risk to our
troops, to keep better records than we kept in Desert Storm, to en-
sure that we have consent from our soldiers for any experimental
drugs that are being used with them, all those things are lessons
from Desert Storm, and I personally follow this very closely. I think
I can give you a high level of confidence that we are benefiting
from those lessons.
General Shaliicashvili. We are very well aware that with the al-
most totally deteriorated infrastructure that exists in a place like
Bosnia the chance for diseases is greatly increased. So in our pre-
ventive medicine in ensuring that our camps maintain the highest
hygiene standards, et cetera, I think we have gone to great lengths
to minimize the chances that our troops would be adversely af-
fected by what I think could be some serious diseases in that area.
But we are, in fact, paying great attention to it, and while occa-
sionally we get a scare that some new strain of something has been
discovered, so far we have been lucky and been able to stay on top
of it.
Secretary Perry. Let me give you one example. I have had prob-
ably four or five personal interventions myself, and I am sure with
General Shalikashvili also, on one soldier coming down with a bac-
terial disease because we thought it might be a virus that was
unique to that area. Until it was properly diagnosed, it was getting
that kind of attention.
We care very much about the unique hazards that our soldiers
face in that area, and it comes to our level to make sure we are
doing the extraordinary things that we need to do to minimize
those risks.
Mr. Evans. I appreciate that very much. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, the question I will ask after making a few intro-
ductory statements, I believe, is in the policy area, so it is probably
directed to you. I would like to make statements of present realities
as I think many people on the committee and outside the commit-
tee see them and then to ask you a question about our position and
policy.
It is my understanding that last year Russia launched, I believe,
six submarines, that some of them run faster, deeper, and quieter
than anything we have. They have a second generation on the
drawing boards which will do even better.
I know, sir, that you are familiar with classified documents that
indicate that Russian submarines now come closer to our coast,
they stay longer, and if they run deep and slowly we have lost
them for several days at a time.
I would like next to reference the state of Chinese missilery. The
Chinese are now launching synchronous satellites. I think it is a
reasonable extension that if a country has the ability to launch a
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synchronous satellite that they have the ability to target any site
on the globe.
The Chinese have a nuclear capability. Whether or not that has
been reduced to warhead technology is may be moot, since I think
that it is generally recognized that, either directly or indirectly,
through acquiring the know-how or the actual devices that, if they
were of a mind to, they could acquire the warhead from the coun-
tries that used to be part of the USSR.
Apparently we are still operating under the MAD — that is, the
mutually assured destruction — philosophy of the cold war. Due to
technical limitations, this was perhaps the best we could do during
the cold war, but I think there are serious questions about its ade-
quacy now. For instance, let me reference Saddam Hussein and
what he did. No sane, rational person would have attempted to do
what he did.
Let me also remind you of the situation in Russia, which is mov-
ing right to nationalism. Zhirinovsky, one of the leading political
figures there, has two goals once he takes over Russia, and I don't
know in which order. One is to take back Alaska, they sold it too
cheaply, and the other is to father a child in each of the provinces
of Russia. I don't know in which sequence he intends to achieve
those goals.
China has made the statement, as a result of our response to
their missile activities near Taiwan, that they hope that we value
Los Angeles more than Taiwan. That, I think, sir, is not a very
thinly veiled threat.
You indicated in an answer to Mr. Hunter's question that we
have no defense against even a single intercontinental ballistic
missile such as Saddam Hussein might well be able to launch. He
certainly has the financial wherewithal to acquire a missile from
China and a warhead from Russia.
Our citizens, when they learn where we are, are at first dis-
believing. They cannot believe that we would do this to them. Sec-
ond, they are appalled, and then they are angry.
My question is, how do we answer our citizens that we are not
irresponsible and exposing them to these potential and real dan-
gers?
I see a real argument that you cannot easily defend putting this
off* as a future danger. I think the situations you have run through
indicate to many, this is a real and potent danger now. How do we
answer their question, that we are not irresponsible in exposing
them to these potential and real dangers, and why are we not pro-
ceeding post haste to correct the deficiency?
Secretary Perry. There is a lot wrapped up in your comments
there, Mr. Bartlett. Let me try to answer them as well as I can.
We have, ever since the dawn of the nuclear age and the dawn
of the ICBM's, going back almost 30 years, when the Soviet Union
could put nuclear weapons on ICBM's, have had this threat, the
possibility of another country launching a nuclear warhead at the
United States on a ballistic missile through which we had no
means of defending.
For 30 years this country has debated back and forth about
whether to build such a defense, through many, many administra-
tions, and we have never chosen to do that, for a variety of reasons.
123
but mostly it hinged on the extreme technical difficulty and cost of
getting a high credible defense and the belief that we could deter
such attacks by having very strong nuclear forces ourselves.
We still have those nuclear forces which were built originally to
deter against a threat from the Soviet Union. They have important
residual value. One is if the threat in Russia should ever reemerge.
The second is if the Chinese were able to develop an ICBM capabil-
ity and, for whatever reason, choose to threaten the United States
with it.
I do not believe there is any plausible national objective to the
Chinese launching a missile at the United States, but in any event,
we do maintain a very, very powerful deterrence to that happening.
In the case of countries which might not be so susceptible to a
national deterrence, Iraq, Iran, Libya, they do not have the capabil-
ity to launch an ICBM, and I don't believe they will have the capa-
bility any time in the foreseeable future.
In any event, if they started moving in that direction, our intel-
ligence is good enough that we would have adequate time to re-
spond to that in a variety of ways, and I would not limit our re-
sponse to building a defensive missile system. That would be one
of the ones we would consider but by no means the only one we
would consider.
Finally, we are developing a national missile defense system. It
will be ready in 3 years for a decision as to whether we want to
deploy that system. The system that we are developing today is
limited in capability. It would defend only against a relatively
small scale attack. As I see the technical features of the system,
it would defend opening the 48 contiguous States; it would be dubi-
ous whether it would provide any defense to Alaska and Hawaii.
So it is a very limited system.
When it comes time to deploy, we need to determine what the
threat is to the United States, what sort of investment do we want
to make in building defenses, and what capability do we want. We
want a better system than the one we are now developing.
I am sorry, it was a complicated answer, but it was a complicated
question that you asked.
Mr. Bartlett. I know my time is up, but I would just like to
note, sir, that in spite of the statements you have made, you all are
proposing to cut spending in this area rather than, I think, what
most citizens would like, to proceed quickly to develop a capability
here, because they feel very vulnerable, exposed to the reality that
we cannot defend ourselves even against a single ICBM, which I
think is a more likely threat than a massive assault from a
Secretary Perry. We are moving rather expeditiously to get the
capability to defend against a limited attack of that sort.
Mr. Bartlett. But they don't see that we are moving expedi-
tiously because we are cutting funding. I think that doesn't send
a message of comfort to the people.
Secretary Perry. The system will be ready for deployment in 3
years.
The Chairman. Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you. I will be brief.
I want to thank the Secretary and General Shalikashvili and the
entire staff that is with you for your dedication to duty, for your
124
forthrightness, for your intellectual honesty and sincerity. There
are members of this committee who extend to you that same degree
of intellectual honesty and sincerity that we claim for ourselves on
this side of the desk, and I thank you for being here and for the
job that you are doing.
I have two things, Mr. Chairman. We talked sometime earlier
about some Workers' Compensation coverage on overseas contracts,
about packaging those like the State Department did. It was an
area that we identified on the subcommittee as a way to save a lit-
tle money. We have corresponded about it.
Due to the lateness of our authorization bill last year, you all
were directed to report back on March 1 on this matter. I realize
you probably can't meet that deadline, but if you could look into it
I would appreciate it.
Secretary Perry. We will look into it.
Mr. Tanner. It might be a way to save a little money. It has to
do with a master package for overseas contracts rather than each
contractor doing their own, so you get some economy of scale.
The other question is about reactive armor tiles. We put $14 mil-
lion in the defense authorization bill last year to try to develop a
domestic source for reactive armor tile. We need those in Bosnia
now. I am told that we may have to use some of that money to go
ahead and procure externally those tiles, but I would like, if you
could sometime, for somebody to give us an update on where that
one is.
Secretary Perry. We will get you the answer to both questions.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
General Shalikashvili. The reactive armor in question is for Bradley Fighting
Vehicles. The Army has a requirement for 178 sets of Bradley armor tile. In FY96,
Congress provided $14 million for procurement of "one Battalion set of Bradley
armor tiles". Subsequently, a request citing an urgent need for 82 sets of Bradley
armor tiles was received from USAREUR in December 1995 in support of US Forces
in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. This request was approved by the Army in Janu-
ary 1996. After reviewing options for expedient procurement, it was determined that
Rafael Industries, Israel, with whom the Army had an open armor tile contract,
could provide additional sets in the fastest time possible. Given additional funding,
the Army intends to complete procurement of the 178 tile set requirement and to
establish a domestic source.
Mr. Tanner. We have corresponded with you about it.
Secretary Perry. Those are both valid points.
Mr. Tanner. I want to compliment you on the work that is going
on on the total force concept both as to mix and the mission. I
think what you have done is light years from where we were and
is the right step, and I want you to know that not only for the ac-
tive component but speaking for the Guard and Reserves, I think
you are doing wonderful work in that area and I want to congratu-
late you for it.
Secretary Perry. Thank you, Mr. Tanner. We are dedicated to
the Guard and Reserve components in our forces. They give us the
total force we are talking about.
Mr. Tanner. If you can satisfy Sonny, you will be doing well.
The Chairman. Thank you. We better break for this vote on the
Cuba resolution and come right back.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. May we please come to order.
125
We will go ahead and get started.
Mr. Chet Edwards of Texas.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, thank you very much for
your testimony today and for your leadership in developing a strat-
egy and priorities for our national defense in a very difficult budget
time. I respect the leadership that you have provided this country.
Mr. Hamre, thank you for your service to the Department of De-
fense.
I would like to touch on one point and then focus on the issue
of Army force structure.
Last year, I raised the question in these hearings about impact
aid, and I would just like to once again request that you work with
other administration officials, particularly in the Department of
Education, to keep an eye on what is going on with impact aid.
There has been great interruption of education of military chil-
dren in the last 12 months. Even today as our military-related
school districts are trying to plan for next year's budgets deciding
how many teachers to hire, they cannot depend on any dollars for
impact aid. And I think it would be a tragedy, the fact that you
worked so hard to support quality-of-life issues, that you would pull
the rug out from under the education of the children of our military
families. I can think of few things that would be more important
to the morale of military families than seeing that their children
will get a first-class education, and if we further cut impact aid
through the Department of Education, I think that is going to have
an adverse impact on the good work that you are doing for quality
of life and morale for our military families.
On the issue of Army force structure, I guess the first thing I
would want to say is that I think I can speak for Members on both
sides of the aisle in saying that there is a lot of concern of moving
the Army from 495,000 to 475,000, and I think at a future date
perhaps others will have an opportunity to talk to you about this.
My question. General Shall, you mentioned that, I believe, if a
decision were to be made to go down from 495,000, do I understand
you correctly in saying that we would not reduce the number of
Army divisions below 10 in terms of active duty or would that actu-
ally be one the options in going down to 475,000?
General Shalikashvili. I think it is absolutely essential that
whatever we do with end strength, we do only if we can preserve
the Army force structure, that is the 10 divisions, and the units
that it takes to support those 10 divisions. It is easy to talk about
the 10 divisions, but we have to remember that is just the tip of
the pyramid.
There are lots of support units that are below that supporting
that division. And that structure must remain as it is because I
think it is the minimum structure that we need to execute the task
that we have set ourselves, to be able to fight potentially on two
separate parts of the world.
It is only if we are clever enough to cut end strength and retain
the same capability that I think we can proceed. And whether you
cut that strength inside the fighting force, that is inside the divi-
sions because you have restructured the divisions because of in-
creased capability of the equipment, or whether you do that in the
126
TDA part of the Army, depends only if you can retain the capabiU-
ties.
Mr. Edwards. But you would not go below 10 divisions?
General Shalikashvili. Absolutely not. I would urge the Sec-
retary in the strongest possible terms to not go below 10 divisions.
Mr. Edwards. Could I ask you and the Secretary what the times
and the process is for making this decision? For example, I assume
such a decision would not be made this fiscal year since in our au-
thorization bill we have a floor on the Army force structure of
495,000.
Could this decision to go down to 475,000 be made as quickly as
the fiscal year 1997 fiscal year?
General SHALIKASHVILI. No.
Mr. Edwards. What would be the earliest possible time that de-
cision would be made?
Secretary Perry. Probably fiscal 1999, and only if it met the con-
ditions which General Shall has stated, that is the challenge, which
the Army Chief of Staff has to see if he can transfer money from
his personnel account into a modernization account, but maintain-
ing the force structure and maintaining the fighting capability.
Mr. Edwards. How much extra money would it require, just in
ballpark figures, to maintain the Army at 495,000, rather than
going to 475,000, if you had an add-on in the Defense budget in the
fiscal year 1999 budget?
Mr. Hamre. It is about $1.1 billion.
May I reemphasize, Mr. Edwards, that we do not in this budget
anywhere in the FYDP cut the force structure. The 10 divisions
and the OPTEMPO associated with the 10 divisions is fully funded
throughout the period.
Mr. Edwards. The ball isn't rolling downhill, at this point, so
that when we get to fiscal year 1998 or 1999, it is not a complete
decision at that point; is that correct?
Secretary Perry. That is correct.
Mr. Edwards. And that really answers my final question, that
is my hope would be that this committee, as well as the leadership
in the Department of Defense, would work together in looking at
that decision. Because I really do think there are a lot of members
on this committee that feel strongly about that, have great con-
cerns. Perhaps you could ultimately answer all of those concerns.
But I hope we could be informed prior to a decision being made
rather than after the fact.
But apparently we have some time to look at that issue. And I
know the constraints you are working under, trying to balance
readiness, modernization, and force structure, and I respect that.
But that answers my questions. And I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Edwards, I can also say I appreciate very
much your calling attention to impact aid. This is a program not
well understood, but is a very important program for the morale
and well-being of our service people.
So I thank you in your interest and attention to that.
Mr. Edwards. If you could help.
The Department of Education, for some reason, it gets into every
President's budget to zero-out impact aid for off-post children. And
127
those children deserve a good education just as on-post children do,
considering the sacrifices they make away from their families.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for recognizing that.
The Chairman. Mr. Saxby Chambliss from Georgia.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Chairman, before I address a question to this panel, I
would like to make just a brief comment to the committee, that
every year the Georgia National Guard comes up to Washington for
a day with a lot of guardsmen and they bring with them their em-
ployers, and the purpose of that trip is to recognize the employers
of their guardsmen.
For the last 3 years, they have had a luncheon in which they rec-
ognize a public servant who has been a real friend to the Guard
and give that individual an award that is named in honor of a
great Georgian named Sam Nunn. The Sam Nunn Award has been
given to a couple of members of this committee who have been real
friends of the Guard.
My good colleague. Congressman Dellums, and our friend Sonny
Montgomery, have been recipients, and your colleague from South
Carolina, Senator Thurmond, was the recipient last year.
Today at the luncheon, I was pleased to attend that luncheon
and was very happy that the recipient this year was Secretary
Perry.
Mr. Secretary, again on behalf of myself and all members of this
committee, we congratulate you and we appreciate the service you
have given to your country, and in particular to the Guard.
Secretary Perry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chambliss.
I might say, I was not only honored to receive the award, but I
wanted to point out that more than 100 Georgia guardsmen came
up for this commemoration on their own time and at their own ex-
pense. And the dedication of the Georgia Guard is an example for
the Guards all over the country.
Mr. Chambliss. And those employers, too. We couldn't do it with-
out them.
Gentlemen, let me just echo the thanks that you have received
already for coming here today to talk with us. And I have listened
with great interest to your testimony today. And I also listened
yesterday to your testimony before our colleagues across the Cap-
itol.
And let me first say that I am deeply disturbed about your pro-
posed fiscal year 1997 procurement budget. At $13 billion, it rep-
resents a full $21 billion shortfall which even you acknowledge will
be necessary for modernization of the services in the future.
What disturbs me even more than the meager budget for fiscal
year 1997 is your proposition for the future, because while you
promise a ramp-up of procurement spending in the outyears, I
would argue this ramp-up is based on unrealistic savings.
It is wrong to make the modernization of our force and indeed
the adequate equipping of our men and women dependent on an-
ticipated saving from the BRAC and acquisition reform. Further-
more, how are we to believe at this point in time that this Presi-
dent will keep his commitment this time around that defense
spending has, in fact, hit its floor?
128
Once again, it seems that where defense is concerned, the Presi-
dent has sought the poHtically popular position, and in this budget,
it is the 3-percent pay raise for personnel. Yet at the same time,
the President has failed to provide the same personnel the re-
sources necessary to do their job in the form of modernized sys-
tems.
Now, I hope on another subject that I want to particularly ad-
dress, I hope the message is being received loud and clear that
there is strong bipartisan opposition from the Hill to wholesale pri-
vatization. It has been addressed by at least four other members
of this committee today on both sides of the aisle, and I again want
to express my strong reservation about wholesale privatization of
our armed services.
I would not have raised this issue but, Mr. Secretary, you men-
tioned in your remarks that major opportunities exist for the De-
partment to operate more efficiently and effectively by turning over
to the private sector many of the noncore activities.
Now, if you would, would you please elaborate on your personal
view of what constitutes noncore activities, and can I assume from
your comments, your printed comments, that you recognize the im-
portance of maintaining an organic core capability for the support
of our war-fighters?
Secretary Perry. That is exactly correct, Mr. Chambliss.
Let me rephrase what I said in the printed comments to empha-
size that we will maintain an organic core capability. That is at the
heart of our plan. And as I commented in my answer to Mrs. Fowl-
er, the opportunities for privatization have to be select and we have
to pursue them very carefully.
We have to demonstrate that we are going to get more efficiency,
not just in the short term but in the long term as well. It is a very
difficult test to pass but I believe we can pass it with more exam-
ples than we have undertaken to this date.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank the Secretary and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs for sticking around so long. I know you are extremely busy
people, and I appreciate you being here.
Secretary Perry, in your prepared statement, you briefly touched
on our role in the Americas and presumably Latin America. I was
just curious, what is your opinion of what we should do as far as
a post-2000 presence in Panama?
I am of the opinion that if the American taxpayers have paid the
$30- to $40-billion to build most of those bases, the ones that have
been reverted, in most instances, are looted or abandoned in short
order. I would hope it is the Department's policy to try to negotiate
something with the Panamanians for a continued American pres-
ence there. I think it is a part of the world that we should not be
ignoring or turning our backs on. That is question No. 1.
Question No. 2 is you mentioned the need to go from base closure
being a loss leader to at least breaking even and, hopefully, at
some point making some money.
129
I want to personally bring your attention, because of your capac-
ity, to the Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant built at anywhere
from a $600 million to a $900 million cost to the taxpayers, closed
during the Bush administration as a preview to BRAC, and to this
day, still a drain on the resources of the U.S. Army, anywhere from
$4 to $15 million a year.
It is my understanding they are even paid to market the plant,
whether they are successful or not. And I don't know of a single
salesman in the world who is paid that way. I am sure hoping you
would take a look at it and examine the opportunities of selling it.
I have been told repeatedly by the Army Materiel Command that
even when they go back to the 150 millimeter round in the future,
they are not considering using this base for the manufacture of
that round. And if you are not going to use it, sell it. It is in an
ideal location near a barge canal, rail line, two interstate highways.
It is a waste of taxpayers dollars. And, again, the approximately
$4 million a year that the contractor gets to babysit it is a drain
on your budget. It doesn't do anything productive.
I would also ask you that in your different arms initiatives, as
we have the closure of facilities and as equipment becomes avail-
able, I would hope that you would take a look at making some of
that equipment available to our Nation's shipbuilders, especially
the big six that do almost entirely defense work.
I think it would be a very logical thing for us to do to help them
with their infrastructure. I know that one of the first things that
one of the yards did with the national shipbuilding plan, where we
included a loan guarantee program, was go out and purchase some
cranes. There is not a doubt in my mind that there are some cranes
available in a closed facility. There is no sense in wasting some-
thing that the taxpayers have paid for. And above all, if they can
use some of this equipment to get back into commercial work, it
will lower their dependence on the Nation and the taxpayers and
provide a lot of good things.
I hope you could respond to some of those things.
Secretary Perry. Before I do, let me ask you to, if you could
elaborate a little more on your ideas about Panama. I am very in-
terested in what you were saying.
Mr. Taylor. I have been down there a few times. I am always
amazed as you fly into Howard Air Force Base, over 13,000 ships
a year go by Howard and Rodman and go right by the jungle
school, and I think it sends a message not only to Latin America
but to the world that we are still actively involved in the world;
that we are not going back to fortress America.
I have been told by two commanders of SOUTHCOM by General
McCaffrey and General Joulwan, that the infrastructure we have
invested is between $30 and $40 billion.
I have toured the School of the Americas after we had turned it
over to the Panamanians, and it has been looted. There is nothing
left. The wiring is out of the walls. The marble is off the walls. The
aluminum that holds the panels to the ceiling, it is gone. And it
is just a waste.
So, I would think that we as a nation would be well served to
have some sort of a presence. As you know, the treaty required us
to leave by September 31, 1999, but poll after poll has shown that
130
the Panamanians would like us to stay. I think it sends a message
to Latin America that we are still involved in that part of the world
and we are not spending all of our time looking at Europe or Asia.
I would hope it would be your suggestion to the President that
we try to do that. I realize SOUTHCOM is not going to stay there,
but an American presence, in my opinion, should.
Secretary Perry. Thank you very much for those comments.
General Shall and I discussed at some length the desirability of
maintaining some presence in Panama.
I will ask him to comment on that.
General Shalikashvili. As you said, Mr. Taylor, the head-
quarters for SOUTHCOM will be moving to Miami. But we do be-
lieve that a continued United States presence in Panama is poten-
tially beneficial to Panama and to the United States.
Although we don't have vital interests there, we do have deep in-
terests in the area, as you said. So, we have been prepared and
have mentioned to the Government of Panama that we are pre-
pared to enter into discussions leading in that direction. And, ulti-
mately, though, the decision has to be the Panamanians'. But I be-
lieve that they will understand and do understand that there is
considerable value and interest for Panama for continued United
States presence, but it is a delicate issue and we need to work that
carefully with their government, and that is being done.
Mr. Taylor. Well, I hope so. General, because time is running
out and it strikes me like an eighth grade dance, where both par-
ties want to dance but no one has the nerve to ask the other one
to do so. I think at some point someone has to ask the other one
to dance.
General Shalikashvili. We have done so. I have been in discus-
sions myself with the Government in Panama on this issue. We
have looked at our turn-back program very, very carefully. We
know exactly how much time we have left for each particular in-
stallation, what the final installations would be that we would wish
to retain. We are cognizant of that.
On the other hand, we do not wish to put the Government of
Panama into an awkward position right now and we want to make
sure that we derive an answer that is mutually beneficial, but I
share your view on the importance of Panama.
Secretary Perry. I will be in Panama, as it turns out, later this
week, and you may be sure that discussion will come up.
Mr. Taylor. And again, I sure hope you will take the time to put
the Mississippi Army Ammunition Plant on your radar screen. We
need to get off of dead center.
Secretary PERRY. I took very careful notes on your points there.
The Chairman. Mr. Tejeda.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you very much for your testimony and your emphasis
on readiness as the number one priority. I listened closely when my
colleagues spoke about the closure of some of our bases and the
perceived threat to readiness if privatization comes about. I feel the
need to respond to these sentiments because there are some of us
in Congress who agree with your privatization initiatives and want
to help you succeed in these efforts.
131
And we will work with you on a bipartisan basis — let me repeat
that — we will work with you on a bipartisan basis in an effort to
make privatization work.
The fact is that BRAC's final recommendation gives you the lati-
tude to privatize these workloads. And I look forward to examining
this matter more closely with the Service Secretaries and later this
year, within the Readiness Subcommittee.
One question I would like to ask and would like for you to an-
swer is what are our readiness concerns if privatization does not
happen? I would imagine that there are cost implications as well,
because some of the work at Kelly would require significant
MILCON dollars. I can S3mnpathize with my colleagues who are
concerned about the future viability of their depots. But can you as-
sure them that current privatization efforts will not jeopardize the
future of their depots?
And one last question: Can I assume, Mr. Secretary, that some
core workload will be performed by the private sector and that
some noncore workload will be performed within the depots?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Tejeda, our plan on privatization is to pro-
ceed on it deliberately, but also very carefully. Our plans are that
the core workloads stay at the depots, that is almost our definition
of the word "core." But we still see opportunities for privatization
beyond that. And significant savings which we could achieve by
pursuing them. And I look forward to working with you on a bipar-
tisan basis to achieve those.
There is a fair amount of resistance to privatization, some of it
is very objective reasons; namely, they question whether the effi-
ciencies can really be achieved. And other objections to it is just ba-
sically people trying to protect their own depots or their own jobs.
So it is a difficult political problem to work. We are proceeding on
it but on the basis that we can achieve important efficiencies in
some specialized areas and we are going to try to do those.
Failure to do that probably has some effect on readiness, but the
effect is probably more directly on our modernization account be-
cause of the way we set up the priorities, in our budget we protect
readiness, and so the account that suffers the most if we don't suc-
ceed in privatization, if we don't succeed in BRAC, and we don't
succeed in acquisition reform, what gets hurt is the modernization
account.
General Shalikashvili. The only point I would make, Mr.
Tejeda, is that privatization does not necessarily have to look only
at depots. There are other things that we do and run that we ought
to explore whether they cannot be done more economically if it is
turned over to the private sector.
For instance, we do have, in some instances, where bases are run
by private contract. And, in some cases, have been very success-
fully done cheaper by the private contractor than if the military
were to run it.
So, I would hope that we can be very open what it is we can look
at that is not core, but not core in the sense that we talk about
the core work in a depot, but core to our business. Obviously, we
are not going to privatize our business of war-fighting, but there
are other things that we do that perhaps we could.
132
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Abercrombie, the gentleman from Hawaii.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I have two points I would like to make and just
an observation. I think it was in the 1970's that I first came up
here as the chairman of Education Committee in Hawaii on impact
aid, trying to fathom the rationale for having a Department of Edu-
cation have responsibility for the educating of military children
within the boundaries of the United States when we were assum-
ing the full costs overseas.
And I do think that should become an item in the budget. And
I just find it reprehensible, very frankly, that people would see the
education of the children of military personnel as somehow detract-
ing from the budget of the armed services of the United States or
that children are somehow depriving some element of the defense
budget from its rightful due.
I think they — any quality-of-life commitment, it seems to me,
should include the education of children in today's world, in today's
armed services where families obviously are not the exception; far
from it. That is the observation.
With respect to page 10 of your testimony, and in reference to
figure 12, that has to do with the pay. I will make an observation
there. You need not answer, and I don't know if General
Shalikashvili would want to answer necessarily on it.
I have for a long time been a proponent of a cash increase in pay
as opposed to a percentage increase, particularly given the gap that
now exists over the last decade or so between those at the upper
level of income and those at the lower levels.
My point being, I won't dwell on it. I have, and I am sure it is
available to you, the 1995 Basic Pay Guide, and if you start at the
854, at the bottom of the list, and members with about 4 months
of service, going on through your A-5's with 4 years, I have got ex-
amples to myself, you start at, roughly, $10,000.
I am leaving out the basic allowance for quarters and depend-
ents. Roughly, $10,000. If it is 3 percent, it is about $300. If you
are up at the upper levels, like I say, A-5 with 4 years, you are
at $380; if you are at, roughly, $60,000, with 20 years of experience
as a colonel, you are probably $1,860. When you are up in the gen-
eral officers, it is about $2,400; eight times more.
My point being that there is a pool of money there for pay, and
all I want to do is to suggest to you that maybe for at least a period
of time we consider a cash increase, $1,000, whatever it would be.
Obviously, it would be, in percentage terms, a lot more down at the
enlisted members' ranks, at beginnings and middles, than it would
be at the top. But I think it would help to offset some of the dispar-
ity which surely exists as much in the armed services, because the
dollars spend the same way; right? As to the gap.
And this is not something I am suggesting merely to you, I sug-
gested it to Federal employees and to other unions and people who
are interested in collective bargaining. I feel very strongly that is
something at least that should be looked at.
My final point has to do with the presentation on page 4, in par-
ticular, and then on page 8. Asian-Pacific receives two sentences in
133
the whole presentation, yet we see NATO, Warsaw Pact, Soviets,
Marshall plan, and so forth, over and over and over again all
throughout the presentation. In the Asia-Pacific, two sentences.
There is no mention of Okinawa in the context of the Japan/United
States security arrangement.
Again, just an observation, I feel this is crucial. I think it is un-
fortunate when we have military officers making comments at this
particular stage before the President meets with the Prime Min-
ister Hashimoto in April. I think that this situation is resolvable
in a way that meets all the interests.
I am familiar with the Okinawa situation. I certainly won't go
into a lecture on it at this point; just to make the observation that
the people of Okinawa are very pro-United States. They are very
pro-American. They want to have our presence there. But they also
need to have and should have a recognition that the war in the Pa-
cific is over, World War II is over. They don't want to be treated
either by default or design as an occupied territory in Okinawa.
And I think with some sensitivity to the context, political, eco-
nomic, and social in Okinawa, we can arrive at a solution there
that would be to the interests of the — the security interests of
Japan and the United States as well as in the mutual interests of
friendship into the 21st century that would take into account the
legitimate questions that have been raised, desires and hopes of
the people of Okinawa.
In that context, I say I don't think at this stage it does a lot of
good for pronouncements to be made, if you will, to the Japanese
people or the Okinawan people by our side, at this stage, pending
further negotiations, which I am sure you are closely involved in
and which I appreciate being informed of through the special com-
mittee liaison that you have established.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Abercrombie, on the first point you made
relative to the compensation, I think that is a very interesting pro-
posal. As you probably know, we have a quadrennial commission
that meets every 4 years. I will be sure that this proposal comes
before them, because this is the right time for considering.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am familiar with the commission. I have not
seen the commission's report, but I am afraid it just speaks in the
usual terms of percentage increases. And if it is going to be per-
centage increase, let's give a boost at the bottom and middle.
Secretary Perry. We will look at that.
There are also some legal constraints that we operate on on
these pay raises, too.
On the other point, I accept the criticism of the text report. It
does not, however, reflect that I have a European as opposed to a
global orientation. I am very much, as you well know, interested
and concerned with the security problems we have in the western
Pacific.
Next month, in fact, I will be having my second meeting in 6
months in Tokyo and Seoul, and between those two meetings, there
have probably been four or five meetings, either in Tokyo and
Seoul or in Washington dealing with the whole set of security is-
sues, not the least of which is the problems relevant to basing in
Okinawa. So, it is a matter very much on my mind and on General
Shali's mind as well.
134
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Chairman, might I claim my time at this
point? I have got to make a quick appearance somewhere and then
I will return.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
So far I have observed, Mr. Secretary, General Shall and Mr.
Hamre, that there clearly are four issues that will be contentious
as we proceed with the markup of the fiscal year 1997 authoriza-
tion bill, and one of them, privatization, I will not get into. Several
members have spoken to it.
There is one issue that will arise that is reflected in the com-
ments of a number of my colleagues here today. We are taking too
many dollars out of the Department of Defense. There is not
enough money in the top line. Not enough is being spent on na-
tional security.
My view is that these comments and this challenge emerges from
a very narrowly constructed notion of what is indeed national secu-
rity. In fact, this committee is called the Committee on National
Security as if this is the only committee that addresses the totality
of our national security agenda and indeed our national security
strategy.
I would beg to differ. I believe that the post-cold war era now al-
lows us the opportunity to structure a different national security
agenda and establish a different set of national security strategies
that involve at least minimally three elements. A healthy and vi-
brant American economy, which is based upon a well-trained, edu-
cated, informed, healthy citizenry, based on the notions of a strat-
egy that invests in scientific, technological advancements and a
commitment to a conversion strategy.
A second component of our national security agenda and/or strat-
egy is the development of a foreign policy based on the notions of
a commitment to democracy, human rights, economic development.
A commitment to engage the world in what I choose to call preven-
tive engagement or a strategy designed to prevent war by increas-
ing stabilization, addressing myriad human problems in the world
that give rise to war, and third, an adequate military force. And
that many of my colleagues in challenging the top line of the mili-
tary budget are not looking at the military budget, as I think you
are, and that is A, in the context of the totality of our budget; and
B, in relationship to other parts of the budget and the strategies
that evolve in the other parts of the budget, and the extent to
which they are prepared to do that, then these notions about we
are not spending enough here, and taking too much money out of
DOD begins to dissipate.
The B part of that, it seems to me, is that many of my colleagues
hammered the table that it now must be an integral part of our
national security strategy to balance the budget and do so in 7
years. It would seem to me that people who have made that a na-
tional priority who believe that the military budget must stand out-
side that calculation are living the life of an ostrich and are not ad-
dressing the reality, and as we come to the table to look at the to-
135
tality of the budget, then the military budget has to be perceived
in that context as well.
So, the second contentious issue as I see it is going to be how
much is the topline.
Another contentious issue is going to be why have you lowered
the procurement budget?
And as I understand it, and last night I tried to stay awake and
watch the cable rebroadcast of your presentation before the Senate,
and it seems to me, Mr. Hamre that, you pointed out that at least
$4 billion are constructed as follows: $1.6 billion was because you
recalculated inflation; $2 billion was a bookkeeping function, that
is you carried $2 billion worth of programs that you decided looked
more like research and development programs than they did pro-
curement, you simply shifted the money in a bookkeeping fashion;
and $400 million, because my colleagues in the House and the Sen-
ate added on moneys in the fiscal year 1996, for a total of $4 billion
change, which would not allow you to lower purchasing power.
These were simply shifts.
And that the B part of that is that in lowering force structure,
there is greater reliance on the inventory which allows you at least
one more year of the so-called procurement holiday, and that does
not, as you perceive it, threaten long-term readiness. That is an
issue that is going to come up. We have to continue to try to clarify
that.
The third and final issue that I would raise that clearly is a con-
tentious issue, there are even focus groups on it and that is our na-
tional missile defense. And when you are out there pumping up
focus groups, it is clear that this issue has moved beyond pro-
grammatic consideration, national security consideration, and has
entered the arena of politics. In that regard, I would like to make
several comments.
First, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Weldon, is indeed
correct. I was more than prepared to stand with him in seeing to
it that witnesses from the administration come here, A, because I
am committed to a vibrant, open and fair exchange between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branch, but I would hasten to say to you,
Mr. Secretary, B, was because I knew to a moral certainty what
your response would be, and that is that people are free to come
here and testify; that the posture statement has been made against
that backdrop, we can have a free and open exchange.
Second, I would like to say, Mr. Secretary, that I appreciated
your response to my elaboration this morning with respect to
China, because I think every time this issue arises that it is ter-
ribly important for people in this country to understand what we
perceive to be the threats, what the timeframe of those threats are,
and to lay out in clear and unequivocal what the nature of this pro-
gram is.
And so each time the questions get raised, I would ask the ad-
ministration to lay out in minute detail every single aspect of this
issue, because comments will be quoted out of context because, in
my humble opinion, and in the spirit of candor, I think there are
some narrowly focused views on this issue.
So, to summarize, national missile defense will be a contentious
issue, and unfortunately, it will be a highly politically charged
136
question rather than a focused, bipartisan, reasoned approach to
this problem.
The national budget is an issue, and I hope that you would com-
ment on my observation in that regard, because I see the military
budget in a much larger context. I think, too, many people are nar-
rowly focused and we are arrogant enough to think that this com-
mittee is the only committee that deals with national security,
given its name.
And finally, as I said, privatization is an issue, and the lowered
procurement budget. I lay that out as observations. I have listened
carefully over the afternoon. My hope is that those of you, Mr. Sec-
retary, General Shall, or Mr. Hamre, would comment to those is-
sues as I have laid them out.
Secretary Perry. Thank you very much, Mr. Dellums.
I think you have correctly identified three major issues that come
out of this hearing. I will comment very briefly on each of the
three.
The national missile defense you suggest is going to be a highly
politicized debate. That is probably correct. Nevertheless, I will do
my best to present the technical facts as I understand them and
hope that thus will generate some light as well as some heat in the
debate.
Second, the overall budget, we have many things at the Pentagon
but we do not have a printing press for generating money and
therefore I work within the overall frame of the budget, which is,
as I understand, at least is largely constrained by both the view
of the Congress and the administration, that they want to have def-
icit reduction, and therefore within that overall budget, we have
presented our best, the best way we know how to know of introduc-
ing, first of all, the right choices and priorities within that budget,
and second, the efficiencies which we can get through management
to get the most out of that budget.
Third, on the modernization program, I would like to see, and
General Shall would like to see, the increase in modernization
reached sooner than we have it in this budget. There is no question
about that. But I think we can — I do very much disagree with the
assertions that the numbers we have presented to you were not re-
alistic. They are quite realistic. They were based on our best judg-
ment.
I have resisted for 2 years giving this committee and putting in
the budget our estimates for savings from acquisition reform and
our estimates from savings for BRAG, because I did not have the
basis for those estimates. I do have that basis now, and we are in-
cluding them, and we are including them in a reasonably conserv-
ative fashion. I think the errors in the estimates we made today
will probably be on the upside. That is, I think we will probably
do better than indicated by those figures.
Those are the three comments I would make on your points.
General Shall, do you have anything further to say on those?
General Shalikashvili. The only point I would make is on two
points: One, is not enough money for acquisition procurement.
Clearly, it has been brought out here, and there is no magic way
to do it. And so while privatization might be a difficult issue, we
must not take it off the table, because if done prudently, and if we
137
cast our net widely, we might find that there are savings in privat-
ization that can then be appUed to the war-fighting capabiHty of
this force.
As far as the issue of the procurement itself is concerned, I can-
not stress strongly enough how important I feel it is that we put
a nail on the wall of what it is that we need to sustain our procure-
ment accounts over time. I feel comfortable that at $60 billion a
year, it is more important to me that we reach that agreement and
work toward that goal than whether that occurs in 1999 or 1998
or 2000.
Sooner the better, but more importantly, that we have that nail
on the wall, that we agree upon it and that we work toward that
goal, and with your help, and what we can get out of BRAC, and
acquisition accounts, privatization, outsourcing, and so on, we
might just surprise ourselves and make it.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would move out for just a few moments and I would ask Mr.
Taylor to resume the responsibility of ranking member in my ab-
sence.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
And while we are right there, let me put my 2 cents in on this
business. I have been holding off, too. But mainly, they concern
modernization.
And I was observing from the chart — and, Mr. Chairman, you
just mentioned about putting that nail on the wall, and it is impor-
tant to try to do it, and it is not as important whether we do it
1997, 1998, 1999, or 2000.
I saw from that chart that the topline still declines in 1997,
1998, is even in 1999, and 0.5 goes up in 2000. I ask the question,
you know, who are we obligating to do all of these things in these
other years? We can only speak for ourselves right now, you know.
With the good job that both of you do, I don't know if you are
going to be around in 1998, 1999, or 2000. Are you giving that job
to somebody else?
The same thing goes for the Commander in Chief. It might be
a different administration. He has only promised and you have
promised to do these things if you are there. And past experience
has proven that even that doesn't hold too tight sometimes. It
tends to shift out.
We keep putting it off to somebody else's watch. So I ask the
question: What assurance have we got that we are ever going to
do the modernization that we all agree is so important?
And aside from that, I was just thinking, too, Mr. Secretary,
about answering this question, and it is a relevant thing, I think.
And I can understand your position, you have answered Mr. Hun-
ter this morning about the additional funds that we add to the
budget mainly in modernization. And I was pleased to hear you say
that a lot of these things that we did last time were for things that
you had in the budget, but you just had them at a later time.
But I can understand also that you have to go along with the
President's overall budget, and that affects your topline, and your
modernization plans. I can understand that. That is your job. You
are down there representing the President of the United States. He
138
appointed you to that job to uphold his budget and his view of the
world.
I couldn't expect you do anything else but that. And you do a
good job of it. As does the chairman. And I have said before, pri-
vately and openly that I respect you for the job you do. That is a
job that you are there to do.
But — and I know you can't and I won't put you on the spot and
make it even appear that you are not supporting the President's
overall budget, but what if we do, in fact, have an addition to the
topline again, no matter how it works into the President's overall
budget?
When you and I sit down to review some of these things, can we
get your best advice on how we can spend this additional money
when the promise has been fulfilled and that we actually have it,
regardless of what the President says?
In other words, we can turn it down or can you tell us how we
ought to use it? That is the question that I am asking.
Secretary Perry. Mr. Chairman, I do as you say, represent this
budget for the President. I also represented it to the President, be-
cause I believed in the budget. So, I am not over here simply say-
ing what he wants me to say. I am saying what I believe, and I
think that is an important
The Chairman. Just happens to be the same.
Secretary Perry. There are some problems in this budget. My
obligation to you is to describe those to you honestly, as well as the
good features of the budget, so that we can have a fulsome debate
on those.
You are also correct in saying that even though we submit this
budget for 5 years into the future, as well as the coming year, that
many of us will not be around to see that implemented. The best
chance of getting a program like this implemented on to the future
is that it be fundamentally sound when it is prepared so it will best
stand up under criticism.
In that regard, I notice and I call to your attention that for the
first time we have included all the way through this budget a pay
raise. We know it is going to happen. We believe it is the right
thing to happen. But we have not done that in the past. We are
doing it this year. We have also included funding for the planned
deployments for the first time. That gives a soundness to this budg-
et.
We have also included full funding for all of the training. So, this
is a budget which is as a fundamentally sound budget. The dis-
agreement on the budget we are talking about is some of you want
a more robust national missile defense program. That is a fair sub-
ject to debate. But we lay it out for you straight and honest.
Some of you want more money in the modernization account or
want that moved up sooner. That is a fair subject for debate. But
this is a fundamentally sound budget and it is an honest budget.
So, those are the principal comments I would make in response
to yours.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
And as I said, you just mentioned some things a while ago, too,
that we are doing now in this new budget that you presented, fund-
ing for contingencies, for instance, and the other things you men-
139
tioned a while ago, a lot of those this committee has urged you to
do. And I think we have found agreement on that for doing those
kind of things. And so we have worked through a lot of these
things.
You are right, we are going to have some honest disagreement
on things and we are going to have this debate on the national mis-
sile defense.
My colleague, the gentleman mentioned that it got into the realm
of politics. I would suggest that there might be a little politics on
both sides of a question like this.
I can't just say that one side is politics and the other is not. Any
issue that affects the American people and is not being handled to
the satisfaction of all the people, you are going to find the dif-
ference of agreement, and it is going to be political and it is going
to be exploited; the fact that people are not doing what they are
supposed to do.
And if that is political, then thank God for more politics. That
is the only way we have of forcing the people to do sometimes what
they ought to do, is through politics.
But I don't want to take any more time. I will let Mr. Dornan
be recognized because he is next.
Mr. Dornan. Gentlemen, Mr. Hunter and Mr. Weldon told me I
should give you softball questions so you would want to come back
in the future, so I will stay on personnel matters for a while.
One predicate, though, I just came back with four members of
this, three other members of this committee, Mr. Stump, one of our
senior members, chairman of the VA, and Mr. Doc Hastings and
Mac Thornberry, four of us and five other members on a bipartisan
trip between Tulza, Taszar, and Kaposvar, and our two overriding
impressions, I think I speak for all of us on this committee, were
the utter professionalism of our people there and the hemorrhaging
of money that is going to take place, whether or not we run into
the worst scenario, that Mr. Weldon outlined a few months ago, or
my optimistic scenario, that the competing and killing forces there
would so respect our overwhelming force that the casualties would
be very low.
And I hope that Sgt. Donald Duggan, nicknamed McGuyver for
his bravado, you put tough men with bravado in a tough scene, and
sometimes they push the envelope and get themselves killed. I still
think that until it came down definitively as to how we are to dif-
fuse mines, that he is a hero in my book; not someone who was di-
rectly disobeying orders, which I don't think it was clear up to that
point, at least not down to that level. General Nash told me he was
an outstanding soldier, but pointed out that nickname McGuyver,
which I heard later in the day.
Here are the personnel questions I would like to ask, I am going
to ask all four, and you pick the ones that you want to answer. If
we don't have time, we will do it by written response.
In another area your briefing charts proclaim that military per-
sonnel reductions are nearly complete as the services reach the
Aspin Bottom-Up Review but, in effect, you are telling Congress
and the 1.5 million men and women in service right now that the
drawdown is over.
140
As you know, Congress in the National Defense Authorization
Act, very controversial, that final signing on February 10, antici-
pated you and established the strength floors at the manpower lev-
els as a way to ensure that minimally acceptable manpower levels
were maintained to meet our security requirements.
I think some of us are disturbed to see the DOD projections that
indicated the drawdown will continue below the Bottom-Up Review
level after 1997. Apparently, you are going to fund an Army end
strength of only 475,000, a full 20,000 below what we in Congress
mandated and you folks signed. Air Force will continue drawing
down to at least 6,000 below the BUR levels and the Navy will
drop at least 1,000 below the BUR levels. So, please address that.
No. 2, is the quality-of-life initiatives. We put in that 5.2-percent
increase in the basic allowance for quarters. The Department of
Defense promised they would help military personnel living off-post
to eventually reduce the, quote, "out-of-pocket," end quote, ex-
penses to a level of about 15 percent of total costs.
To that end, you committed more than $200 million. We added
$62 million in the aforementioned authorization bill to make a
great large down payment on your promise. I congratulate you for
your initiative to add a 3-percent military pay raise this year and
in the outyears. That is going to make my hearings very interest-
ing in a couple of weeks, because I am still going to continue com-
paring it to civilian pay levels, and you have really done something
exemplary there which will keep the morale up and keep the "hoo-
ha's" at about 5 on a scale of 10, whenever the Commander in
Chief appears before the troops, at least a 5.
Then, in another area, your briefing charts didn't really get into
the health issues, but — Mr. Secretary, you can take this first. In
the limited budget materials we have been provided so far, we see
an unequivocal promise of strong commitment to maintain the
DOD health care system. In contrast, it is an estimated $600 mil-
lion to $900 million that your health aff'airs staff is calling under-
funding and your comptroller is calling it a savings. Please clarify
this.
Is the DOD health care system underfunded or not? If so, by how
much? And what effect do you think it will have on health care?
I am having hearings on that on the morrow.
The final one is, do you support a COLA for our military veter-
ans? In the President's CBO-scored 7-year budget — and, of course,
95 percent of the discretionary spending cuts take place in 6 or 7
years out and we will be running a library in Fayetteville hopefully
next year, the President's budget cuts in the military veterans'
cola's are the same way he approached these in 1993. Will you
fight against the budget in the COLA area?
There are four questions. If you took notes, fire away at all of
them.
I don't know how we are going to fund this great operation in the
Balkans that is stopping the killing hopefully longer than tempo-
rarily, which is my bad scenario. I think when the snow melts they
will still not kill one another. They will just sharpen their knives,
oil their guns, and wait until a great United States with its mys-
tique— which I see again intimidating all the countries of the
world. They look to us for leadership. When our leadership is gone.
141
the degrading of U.N. forces and the sniping will probably begin.
Let's hope not.
And I think the minute we leave Haiti it blows. As someone said,
the Papa Doc mentality is still there. I think it was Mr.
Cunningham.
Secretary Perry. Let me start on the health care. We welcome
your interest and attention to health care, including the hearings
that you are holding. We believe that TRICARE allows us to give
a more responsive service at a lower cost. That is, we believe it is
really introducing some efficiencies. We will submit to you our ra-
tionale and data that leads to this conclusion, and your committee
can come to your own conclusions on that. That is our belief, and
that is the reconciliation of the two different forces.
Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Weldon has an interest in the COLA thing.
Could you take that next?
Mr. Hamre. I think we followed the guidance and budgeted to
the guidance that was provided in the authorization bill. I think
the COLA is funded.
Mr. DoRNAN. Not this year. I didn't mean 1997, 1998, and the
outyears.
Mr. Hamre. I thought we brought them into alignment, and I
think it is funded. I will get back to you. I hope that is not an
issue.
Mr. DORNAN. BAQ, basic allowance for quarters. You know how
important this is to the men and women, General, when they are
really calibrating what part of their small checks in the E ranks
is allocated to housing.
Mr. Hamre. Let me explain. We had a proposal for increasing it
last year. You accelerated that by bringing in additional funding.
We annualized that so we maintained that rate throughout the 5-
year period and have launched a study — it turns out we don't have
good econometric models for what impact this has on our soldiers
by having the absorption level being so large. Maybe if we could
close that absorption gap it might help us with the housing short-
age on post because people would be willing to live off post on the
economy.
Mr. DORNAN. Not only is this the most professional force I have
ever seen but the sharpest politically. They knew who I am, what
I did, and they thanked me for the BAQ increase.
Let's get to the core of the end strength thing. This is the tough-
est part, personnelwise.
General Shalikashvili. We are going toward the end strength of
1,418,000, I believe is the end strength that we are going to.
On the issue of the Army, whether the Army will stay at 495,000
or 475,000 I think we are looking at whether it is possible to retain
the structure in the Army and the capability in the Army and
achieve that at a lower end strength.
I happen to believe that it must be possible through two ways.
One is to look at the TDA Army to see if savings can be achieved
there through privatization perhaps, through outsourcing certain
functions perhaps; and on the side of the fighting Army, that you
can redesign set units because you have measurably increased the
capability of the systems that you have brought into the Army.
142
I mentioned earlier the increased capability of the tank when you
go from an Ml to an MlAl, A2 tank, that you have an 18-, 20-per-
cent increase in capability. So it might be possible to take a 5-tank
unit and retain the same capability with only four tanks in the
unit.
The other one is we have made tremendous changes that we will
continue in the near future with artillery. Must you still have an
8-gun battery, 6-gun battery, 4-gun battery, whatever capability
the new system will give you, and through such reevaluations of
structure you might be able to retain the same capability within
the same 10 divisions, which you absolutely must have, but achieve
that at a slightly lower end strength. We have asked the Army to
take a look at that to see if it isn't possible to free up money in
end strength without degrading structure and without degrading
capability but be able to migrate some of that money into the pro-
curement accounts that we have talked about all day today. We
must find ways to increase.
Mr. DORNAN. Is that a formal study?
Mr. Hamre. There is a series of efforts under way. If I may put
it in context, the 20,000 represents about 12 percent of the admin-
istrative side of the Army. About 180,000 of the 495,000 are in the
administrative side of the Army, not combat arms side, not the
force structure side. We have proposed no cut in force structure.
We have fully resourced the 10 divisions throughout the 5-year pe-
riod and presume no reduction to combat capability with this. This
is looking for efficiencies on the administrative side of the Army,
sir.
Mr. DORNAN. That is good news. Keep us informed.
The Chairman. Mr. Geren.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the Secretary, General Shalikashvili and Mr.
Hamre. I appreciate all your work and all your time here today. I
don't have anything to add.
I am glad to hear so much discussion about the modernization
procurement accounts, because when you look at the charts about
the aging of all the major weapon systems and you look at all we
have planning to come on stream — the F-22, V-22, JAST, F/A-
18E/F, Comanche — the list is long and so many of these most ex-
pensive parts of those programs are ahead of us. If you don't get
to $60 billion a year until 2002 I just don't see how we meet all
these program needs.
In almost every case we are talking about a program that each
service has sacrificed greatly in other areas in order to advance
those programs, the V-22 with the Marines, the F-22 with the Air
Force. They have just put a lot of eggs in very few baskets.
It just seems to me we have a demand — that we are going to get
to a point where we are going to have to make a decision to delay
a whole bunch of these or build very few of them, and under the
current funding profile it just seems it is going to present us some
very difficult choices. We might end up with a great showing at air
shows, one or two of each, but not able to meet the very highest
priorities of each of the services.
If we don't get to that $60 billion until 2002, do you feel that
these major top-priority weapon systems that you have identified
143
here, can we keep them moving ahead as planned? And if we can't,
where do you start to drop things out?
Secretary Perry. I believe that the program we presented to you
will keep these key programs moving into the force.
The difference between the 1997 and 1998 or 2000, reaching the
$60-billion level, is in that one set of curves I showed you, which
is the aging of the equipment in the field, that curve will continue
to go up until we start serial production of those units; and it will
go up for 2 more years before it starts coming down again. That
will be the difference. That means for that extra 2 years we will
have older equipment and more problems maintaining it, lower re-
liability rates. Those are the downsides that come from it.
General.
General Shalikashvili. I think we all have our eye on the major
piece of equipment that we saw on the charts here today. I think
they will be protected. My concern is that there is an awful lot of
equipment from trucks to tents to generators, you name it, that
also ages through constant use, through training, and that also
needs to be replaced. It is more likely that it is in that area that
we will not have the money to make the replacements.
So I am trying to keep my eye very much on all the great, great
number of equipment that normally does not make the cut and ap-
pear on somebody's chart that needs to be replaced as well; and the
Secretary and I have watched that very carefully. But that is the
equipment that I think is in most immediate danger as we are not
able to reach the $60 billion sooner and have to settle for later.
Mr. Geren. That is an important point. It is for the same reason
we decided to wait until next year to start the ramp up on procure-
ment rather than do it this year, makes me worry that next year
will be the same and next year will be the same. You still have the
same kind of pressures at work that caused procurement to be
funded next year out of savings from BRAG, savings from acquisi-
tion reform, and I do hope — we have to have things work out in
those two areas that you project, and I hope they prove to be con-
servative.
I guess I am just glad to see as much concentration of the discus-
sion today focused on the modernization acquisition accounts, be-
cause I don't see how all this fits through the funnel as we move
ahead. As General Shalikashvili mentioned, a lot of the things that
aren't high profile and that don't have somebody banging away for
them every day, those are the ones that would get neglected and
those with a big constituency around the country and in the Con-
gress would do better and we don't fill the potholes, so to speak.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We have gone through the first round. Have we gotten anybody
that came back? Mr. Hunter is twisting my arm about wanting to
prevail upon you to answer a question for him.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Shalikashvili
and Secretary Perry asked me to try to extend the hearing a bit.
I want to do everything I can to help out.
Just a couple of questions. I am glad that our distinguished col-
league from California is here because I wanted to follow on his
line.
144
The point that I made in my question this morning to General
ShaUkashviU went directly to your statement that you made a few
minutes ago that we need to put a nail on the wall to increase pro-
curement by $20 billion. That is about a 50-percent increase. The
point that I was making and that I would like Secretary Perry to
expound upon was this:
If you look at your Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Owens' statement before the Senate, he said, doggone it, we put a
nail on the wall in 1993 and we moved the nail; in lt>94 we moved
the nail; in 1995 we moved, and in 1996 we moved the nail. My
point to you today is, after General Shalikashvili made the state-
ment that he wanted to see the $60 billion procurement in 1998
rather than the year 2000, we now get your budget and your budg-
et moves the nail not just to the second term of a Clinton adminis-
tration but into a future President's administration, past the year
2000.
President Clinton was elected in 1992. Regardless of what hap-
pens in this next election, there is no chance that he is going to
be around then with his Secretary of Defense.
So my question to you, Mr. Secretary, is how do you expect a fu-
ture Secretary of Defense at your suggestion — and that is what
your outyear defense program is, because you don't control it, do
you? You are not going to control the defense program in 2002.
How do you expect him to act differently with respect to mod-
ernization accounts than the Clinton administration has acted dur-
ing its tenure in office — that is, to move the nail to the right and
give it to the next guy?
Secretary Perry. I believe that the Secretary of Defense in 2000,
whoever he is, can benefit substantially by the legacy that we are
leaving him with this 1997 budget submission in several respects.
First of all, it is an honest budget. It includes items in it which
we have never put in budgets before that we know are going to be
expenses. So it has that soundness.
Second, it fundamentally addresses the key problems we face
today that he is going to be facing in the year 2000.
The nail that you are talking about at $60 billion procurement
is not a singular event, as you can see in the chart. We increase
each year in getting to that event. So the procurement budget, the
modernization budget on this program we have submitted, is in-
creasing year after year until it gets up to that $60 billion.
The other point — the other critical point in the legacy is whether
what we can achieve through success in the efficiencies we are in-
troducing. There has not been much discussion of those efficiencies.
I must say that, as Secretary of Defense, it would be easy to do
the things you are asking us to do if we had an unlimited supply
of funds. Instead, realistically, we have to try to achieve these with
a very constrained set of funds; and, therefore, we have to pay at-
tention to management to try to get at deficiencies.
What we are doing in defense acquisition reform, which has had
little discussion here today, is critically important and is the legacy
that we are leaving that the next Secretary of Defense will be very
pleased to have. We are doing all the hard work in closing the
bases. That will be a legacy he will benefit from also.
Mr, Hunter. One quick point on that.
145
General Shalikashvili responded to Congressman Dornan that
there is a lot of innovation going on with respect to drawing down
the number of people in the Army without drawing down your bat-
tlefield effectiveness. In the studies that we did, we saw there were
approximately 300,000 acquisition people in DOD, professional
shoppers, so you have basically the U.S. Marine Corps of shoppers.
This chairman offered a 30,000-person cut in the shoppers under
the idea that you don't just draw down the Marines from 18 to 10
divisions and the Air Force and the Navy similarly without looking
at your civilian bureaucracy that provides the systems for DOD.
It was like pulling teeth to try to get cooperation, frankly, from
your officers. It ended up we had a 30,000 cut. Your folks argued
forcefully for no cut whatsoever to our Senate counterparts, and I
think in the conference we came up with 15,000. But I would ask
in this next session, and I know you want to get these efficiencies,
that we spend a lot of time trying to bring down those two U.S.
Marine Corps of professional shoppers to help achieve some of
these free-ups in dollars for this much needed modernization. We
will work with this this year.
Secretary Perry. I am working that issue. I consider it extremely
important. The comptroller will tell you, if there is any person
pushing hard on getting civilian manpower down, including defense
acquisition, I am leading that charge; and it is being quite success-
ful.
We are going from a civilian work force of 1.2 million not too long
ago down to a force of less than 800,000; and the bulk of that,
many of those people, are coming directly out of the acquisition
force; and they are coming down at the rate of about 4- or 5-percent
a year. Also, they are coming down with virtually no reduction in
force. Fewer than 10 percent are involuntary, coming out of a re-
duction in force.
We are doing that, I think, by good management and because of
the tools which this Congress gave us in being able to provide in-
centives to reduce the civilian work force. This is hardly noticed.
This is one of the most remarkable developments in Government
going on now. Taking the civilian work force in the Defense De-
partment from 1.2 million to 700-plus thousand is a big develop-
ment, and the key to that is our acquisition force.
The Chairman. Mr. Weldon has a short comment he wants to
make.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to ask one additional question.
Secretary Perry, much of your presentation today focused on the
efforts that you are taking, most of which I agree with, with regard
to Russia in stabilizing our relationship and working with them in
a realistic manner to get them to reduce their armaments and to
find ways to work to build confidence with them; and I supported
publicly the efforts in cooperative threat reduction funding on the
House floor and will continue to do that in this session.
This Congress is playing a leading role in establishing new link-
ages with the legislative body in Russia, the Duma. In January, I
delivered a letter from Speaker Gingrich to the new Speaker of the
Duma, Mr. Seleznyev, that asked him to support two new initia-
tives. One is a Russian Duma-American Congress study group, and
146
the second is a new Internet capability that will allow us as legisla-
tors to communicate with simultaneous translation to members of
the Duma.
Specifically within that effort, which the Russians accepted last
week when the Ambassador came in to meet with me and hand de-
livered the response from Mr. Seleznyev accepting our proposal and
offering to bring a delegation to Washington on March 18, which
we expect to have, we will have individual focus groups where
Members can participate aggressively, one of which will be defense
and foreign policy.
This builds upon the work of our chairman, Mr. Spence, last year
in having a group of us meet for 3 hours behind closed doors with
senior members of the Duma Defense Committee. So we are com-
mitted to that communication process and to an ongoing effort of
reaching out to the Russians to help them understand why we are
doing some of the things that we are doing.
In fact, hearings in our subcommittee include having our missile
defense people and the Russians sit side by side and talk about
joint missile defense research that has been ongoing, funded by
BMDO; continuing to fund programs the Russians are using with
the Navy in cleaning up their nuclear waste problems in the Arctic
and the Sea of Japan, which has been a very successful program;
working even to the point where I have offered to Mr. Kortunov,
who advises Yeltsin on defense matters, that he bring over a con-
tingent to have an informal discussion to advise us on the political
sensitivity of the ABM Treaty in Russia and allowing us that same
opportunity in terms of sensitizing our political concerns with the
ABM Treaty.
My problem is that I think the administration sometimes, in hav-
ing the same policy objective that we do, wants to deny some very
basic fundamental facts and occurrences that are primarily caused
by the Russian military leadership that is the same today as it was
under the former Soviet Union. That is why I think we have dis-
agreements.
Let me ask you a question. Part of the concern needed to prepare
ourselves for the future threat is technology transfer. We will de-
bate that issue in this session of Congress, and we will debate the
intelligence that was prepared and whether or not it was politi-
cized. But the fact is that on December 15 the Washington Post re-
ported that Jordanian and Israel intelligence had intercepted a
number of advanced accelerometers and gyroscopes that were going
from Russia to Iraq. The only purpose for these accelerometers and
gyroscopes is to be used in long range ICBM's, documenting what
we knew all along — ^the Iraqis are looking at a long-range ICBM ca-
pability.
That happened on December 15, and we suspect that there are
other instances of that type that have occurred with the Iraqis. My
question is, since I have asked the administration as to whether or
not they have demarched the Russians on that issue and they have
said no, I don't understand why, except that perhaps I think the
reason is that since we brought Russia into the MTCR process last
fall the administration knows either way they answer that question
they are then going to have to follow through with economic sane-
147
tions which then poses a problem of undermining Boris Yeltsin's
leadership, something you don't want to have to deal with.
Have either of you had any discussions with the Russians on the
technology transfer of the gyroscopes and accelerometers? No. 2,
would your department support our request to the administration
to officially demarche Russia on the technology transfer of the
accelerometers and the gyroscopes to Iraq?
Secretary Perry. Let me, first of all, strongly encourage the joint
efforts you have with the Russian Duma. I think that may be —
there is nothing that you do that could be more potentially impor-
tant for national security. I meet with the Russian Duma every
time I go to Moscow, and I meet with them when they are in the
United States, but I think your meeting with them will be more ef-
fective. So I would strongly encourage you to do that.
I don't want to continue in public session either on the intel-
ligence underlying that report which you quoted or the specifying
demarche we would take about that but would be happy to discuss
with you privately, first of all, what I know about that event and
also what action I think is appropriate to take on it. I will say that
it is typical of the kind of issues and problems which we expect to
confront today and which we have to have a strong method of deal-
ing with.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
The Chairman. Does anyone present — we appreciate your ap-
pearance today. I think we have accomplished a whole lot. A whole
lot of time has been eaten up. I appreciate your time.
Mr. Taylor. Could I ask one question? Mr. Abercrombie raised
I think an interesting question.
I know the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs started ofi" as a draftee;
Mr. Spence was an enlisted man, I know; and Mr. Dellums was an
enlisted man. I do think he asked good questions about fairness in
pay increases.
Obviously, officers are paid more than enlisted, and those who
have served a long time are paid more than those who are just be-
ginning, and there are ways to get pay raises and cost-of-living ad-
justments. I think it is tough on the E-3, E-4 or 5 who may have
a young family and that he needs a dollar increase every bit as
much as the colonel does.
I would like to request that you take a look at what that 2.1-per-
cent pay increase translates to in dollars, that you divide that by
the number of active duty personnel and find out if there would be
more winners than losers if, on a periodic basis, they were given
a dollar increase as opposed to a percentage increase.
I do know that that is a big issue, for example, for State employ-
ees back home; and we periodically go back and forth so that some-
times the guys at the top get a little bit bigger increase and some-
times the folks at the bottom get a little bit bigger increase. I think
it would be a great morale booster for the enlisted ranks.
Secretary Perry. I assure you, Mr. Taylor, I took Mr.
Abercrombie's suggestion very seriously, and we will follow up on
it very carefully.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you.
The Chairman. This meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
148
[The following questions and answers were submitted for the
record:]
Questions Submitted for the Record
The Chairman. We understand the FY-97 budget submission is predicated on
Russian ratification and entry-into-force of the START II Treaty. What are the De-
partment's plans for ensuring robust funding for continued operation of US strategic
systems at the START I level if Russia does not ratify START II in the coming
months?
Secretary Perry. START I entered into force in December 1994. US and the FSU
are well ahead of the treaty's reductions schedule, having already met the reduction
for December 1997. In addition, all nuclear warheads have been removed from
Kazakstan, and nuclear warheads remaining in Belarus and Ukraine will be re-
turned to Russia this year. The US Senate ratified START II in January 1996, but
the Russian parUament has not yet ratified it. Ratification is not certain and could
be accompanied by conditions that might require renegotiation of certain treaty pro-
visions. The key issue for the US is what force structure to retain under START
I if START II entry into force is significantly delayed or does not occur. The DoD
START I Force Structure Task Force is examining this issue and, in particular, is
reviewing the number of B-52s to maintain in active inventory, the number of "Tri-
dent SSBNs to backfit with D-5 missiles, and fianding for retention of Peacekeepers.
The Administration's policy is, and has been, to maintain US strategic forces at
START I levels until START II enters into force.
The FY 96 DoD Authorization Act prohibits expending FY 96 funds to retire or
dismantle (or to prepare to retire or dismantle) B-52Hs, Trident SSBNs, Minute-
man Ills, or Peacekeepers. The Act also contains a sense of the Congress that the
Department should not take any action to retire or dismantle these systems until
S'TART II enters into force. Furthermore, the Senate's resolution of ratification on
START II contains a condition discouraging the President from reducing US strate-
gic forces below START I levels before START II enters into force. If the President
elects to do so, he must first consult with the Senate and submit a determination
that such reductions are in the US security interest.
As we await for the aforementioned task force to conclude its study, rough cost
data for FY-97 were provided to Congress to assist in its Authorization Bill prepa-
ration. A range was given since the figures depend on two variables not yet decided:
the force mix (e.g., 18 D-5 SSBNs or 14 D-5/4 C-4 SSBNs; 56 PAA/71 TAI or 74
PAA/94 TAI B-52 bombers); and the assiunption made as to how long the US must
remain at START I levels— that is, until START II is ratified (1998 or later) and
enters into force (on time, i.e., 2003, or delayed, e.g., 2006).
The draft cost deltas for FY-97 are:
Trident submarines: $0-$125M.
B-52H bombers: $5-$125M.
Peacekeepers: $35M.
B-IB: No additional funding is required.
B-2: No additional funding is required.
Minuteman: No additional funding is required.
Further funding requirements for FY 98 and beyond have not yet been deter-
mined.
CHINA/TAIWAN
The Chairman. China has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.
What steps is the United States prepared to take to respond to any mainland ag-
gression against Taiwan?
Secretary Perry. We have communicated to the PRC on many occasions that any
effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means would con-
stitute a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave con-
cern to the United States.
Though I do not beUeve I should discuss specific options to a hypothetical scenario
involving many unknown variables, I can say that we would consxilt closely with the
Congress to determine the appropriate U.S. response.
B-2 bomber
The Chairman. The President decided against building additional B-2 bombers,
yet he directed that an on-going DoD study of "deep strike" capabilities consider
tradeoffs among tactical air, carrier-based air, and bomber forces. This study will
149
not be completed until early 1997. Should the Congress take steps in the FY 97
budget to preserve the B-2 industrial base on the prospect that the deep strike
study just might recommend procurement of additional B-2s?
Secretary Perry. As a result of the review of B-2 acquisition options by the Na-
tional Security Council, the President decided to continue the current B-2 program
and to not include funds for additional B-2s in the fiscal year 1997 Defense budget.
The fiscal year 1997 Defense budget request supports the existing B-2 fleet.
Regarding the B-2 production base, the fabrication and assembly of all B-2 struc-
tural components were completed and delivered to final assembly approximately two
years ago. These manufacturing lines, as well as those of their major suppliers, are
cold and would require a major investment to restart. Consequently, the greatest
decline in the B-2 production base has already occurred. Remaining B-2 industrial
activity includes: completing system development (less than eight percent of cost to
go), final assembly and checkout of the last five production aircraft, modifications
to bring each aircraft into final combat configuration, manufacture of some spares
or replacement parts, and system operating support, to include contractor depot sup-
port for the airframe and software.
A decision to build more B-2s would require production restart. Estimates of the
cost to produce 20 more B-2s by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Analysis
Improvement Group and by the Institute for Defense Analyses placed the cost for
restart at $1 billion.
MASTER PLAN FOR ACCELERATED ACQUISITION OF PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS
The Chairman. Given the decision not to support additional B-2s, is there a mas-
ter plan for accelerated acquisition of the precision guided munitions the Depart-
ment's most recent bomber study called for in lieu of more B-2s? How does the pro-
posed rescission of ftinds added by Congress in Fiscal Year 96 for such missiles as
the HAVE NAP and the AGM-130 comport with its decision to procure PGMs on
an accelerated basis?
Secretary Perry. There is a master plan for acquisition of precision guided muni-
tions (PGMs). The ongoing Deep Attack Weapons Mix Studv (DAWMS) will provide
data for the Department to determine which PGMs should be acquired, and provide
insight into quantities and which PGMs to accelerate, if any. Results of the study
are expected to be available in June.
Fiscal Year 1996 funding for HAVE NAP and AGM-130 will not be proposed for
rescission.
The Chairman. Are you convinced that the Department of Energy is doing enough
to ensure the ability to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons capability and to ensure
an adequate supply of tritium for U.S. nuclear weapons?
Secretary Perry. Yes, our nuclear weapons stockpile is currently safe and reli-
able; and, I believe that DOE has a solid plan to keep it so for the foreseeable fu-
ture. Nonetheless, DoE's task is formidable: to maintain safety and reliability in the
absence of nuclear testing and to modernize an aging weapons complex, including
developing an assured supply of tritium for the next century. Among other things,
a robust and adequately ninded stockpile stewardship and management program is
essential to achieve these goals.
thaad funding
The Chairman. The commander of U.S. forces in Korea, General Luck, wrote to
you, General Shalikashvili, to urge that funding be provided for the THAAI) theater
missile defense system to ensure deployment of the system by 2001. Yet the Depart-
ment's recently-completed review of missile defense programs cut funds for THAAD
such that the system won't be available until 2004 or later. Why has the Depart-
ment again rejected the advice of a commander in the field? On what basis was the
decision made to deny a warfighting commander the forces he deems appropriate?
General Shalikashvili. We look to the JROC to integrate the priorities of the
CINCs. In this situation, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council criticized the
Department's Ballistic Missile Defense programs as funded at a level too high com-
pared with other higher-priority, pressing modernization and re-capitalization
needs. Second, we were not focused sharply on dealing with the here-and-now
threat.
Our first theater missile defense priority is to enhance the capability of our lower-
tier systems beyond what we not have deployed. Our intent is to strengthen our ef-
fort to field a capability to defeat short-to-medium range theater ballistic missiles
as soon as possible.
I believe the program we have developed in the BMD Program Review is respon-
sive to General Luck's concerns. First, we have added funds to the highest priority,
150
lower-tier systems — PAC-3 and Navy Area TBMD, to make these programs more
executable. Second, we have kept in place the THAAD UOES concept and schedule.
This provides us with the opportunity for user testing as well as capability for a
limited contingency deplojrment of the THAAD system in fiscal year 1998 to counter
a near-term threat.
DOD BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM REVIEW
The Chairman. The DoD Missile Defense Review has resulted in additional funds
being cut from theater missile defense systems — those that up until now DoD has
claimed were their "highest priority." General Shalikashvili, it has been reported
that you stated in a memo to General Luck that "the primary objective [of the re-
view] was to free up dollars" for other weapons systems. Is this accurate? Why has
the Department slashed funds for TMD systems when its own rhetoric asserts that
the threat is "here and now" and when you, General Shalikashvili, have complained
that five years after the Gulf War we still do not have a replacement for Patriot.
General Shalikashvili. The reduction in ballistic missile defense funding is driv-
en by threat and program balance.
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council criticized the Department's Ballistic
Missile Defense programs as funded at a level too high compared with other higher-
priority, pressing modernization and recapitalization needs. Second, we were not fo-
cused sharply on dealing with the here-and-now threat.
We have identified a more balanced missile defense program, one that is more af-
fordable, and one that has better prospects for successful execution. It is also better
matched to the missile threats we will be facing. We have reaffirmed the fiindamen-
tal priorities in the Department's missile defense program — the first priority re-
maining defense against theater ballistic missiles and cruise missiles — the first sub-
priority is to field systems to defend against existing short-to-medium range mis-
siles.
The changes adopted by the Department respond to the threats, to the priorities
expressed by the Joint Staff, and also to fact-of-life changes in the program status.
The TMD program fully supports deployment of early operational capabilities for
the high-priority lower-tier systems, and provides the ability to deploy upper-tier
systems in response to the threat and availability of funding for those systems.
The Chairman. The United States is back in Geneva again trying to reach agree-
ment with Russia to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and "demarcate" the line be-
tween strategic and theater missile defenses. How can such a deal possibly be in
the U.S. national interest? Don't you agree that the ABM Treaty does not require
us to reach agreement with Russia on these matters — that is, that we can make
such compliance determinations on a unilateral basis? Why or why not?
Secretary Perry. With regard to demarcation, the U.S. is within its legal rights
in making unilateral ABM Treaty compliance determinations (rights we will uphold,
as we have made clear to the Russian side, in the absence of any demarcation agree-
ment). However, the agreement we have reached with Russia in the Standing Con-
sultative Commission on the demarcation between strategic and theater missile de-
fenses will accomplish two things. First, it will remove any questions or challenges
as to the compliance of all lower-velocity missile defense systems; so long as these
systems are not tested against targets exceeding 5 km/s velocity or 3500 km range,
they will not be considered to have been given "capabilities to counter" strategic bal-
listic missiles nor to have been "tested in an ABM mode." Second, it will enhance
our ongoing security dialogue with Russia. Given Russian linkage of the ABM Trea-
ty generally, and demarcation specifically, with other arms control issues — espe-
cially START II — we believe it is useful to continue cooperative discussions to en-
hance our security equities. As Gen. Shalikashvili stated in his 28 June 1995 letter
to Senator Levin on this point, in the absence of this dialogue "we might find our-
selves forced to choose between giving up elements of our TMD development pro-
grams or proceeding unilaterally in a manner which would undermine the ABM
Treaty and our broader security relationship with Russia." We are seeking to avoid
the costs and risks associated with either alternative.
With regard to ABM Treaty succession, upon dissolution of the USSR the U.S.
was faced with the issue of resolving succession for a number of important agree-
ments, ensuring that the arms control obligations of the former Soviet Union (FSU)
were met by successor states, and establishing positive and cooperative relation-
ships with FSU states on security matters. Certain FSU states — notably Belarus,
Kazakstan, and Ukraine — have taken a strong interest in the ABM Treaty and per-
ceive a clear relationship between their participation in this and other treaties, such
as START I and INF. Russia has supported multilateralization, reflecting at least
in part concerns over continued access to ABM Treaty-related facilities now located
151
in other states. Considerations such as these led to the U.S. decision to accept
multilateralization; however, the U.S. has made clear that all potential successor
states must agree to an acceptable demarcation agreement before we would agree
to multilateralize the Treaty.
The Chairman. Is Russia complying with the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty? The Biological Weapons Convention? Is Russia continuing to develop new
chemical weapons? Is Russia developing a new ICBM, a new SLBM, possibly a new
strategic missile-canying submarine, new nuclear warheads, and continuing to con-
struct new deep underground bunkers for nuclear warfighting? Why is Russia
spending scarce resources on these activities?
Secretary Perry. Russia's overall record on meeting its CFE Treaty destruction
obligations, providing the required information, and accepting on-site inspections
has been go<Kl. Russia's equipment levels were below its overall, national ceiling by
the Treaty's 17 November 1995 deadline. (A small exception was with equipment
associated with the Black Sea Fleet, for which negotiations with Ukraine were not
yet completed. Other CFE parties were willing to wait until the Black Sea Fleet
issue was resolved to deal with this equipment). Since late 1993, the 30 parties to
the CFE Treaty have been discussing Russia's (and Ukraine's) concerns with the
flank equipment sub-limits. On 17 November 1995, the 30 CFE states agreed to a
framework for resolution of the flank issue. On 31 May 1996, at the end of the CFE
Treaty's first Review Conference, a flank solution was found. All states have until
15 December 1996 to gain domestic approval of the flank agreement; Russia will
have until 31 May 1999 to meet the ceilings in the flank agreement.
With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the U.S. has concluded
that Russia has not fully met its obligations under the BWC. While President
Yeltsin has made commitments to comply, and Russia has taken some concrete
steps in this direction, the evidence suggests that his commitment may not be uni-
versally shared and may not have been effectively implemented. Russia must still
take additional concrete steps to follow through on these commitments and rectify
existing problems. We will continue to follow developments in this area very closely,
and will continue actively to follow up and do our part to help ensure the elimi-
nation of the offensive BW program that Russia inherited from the former Soviet
Union.
With regard to chemical weapons (CW), the U.S. remains concerned about the CW
program Russia inherited from the former Soviet Union. In 1987, the Soviet Union
publicly acknowledged that it possessed chemical weapons and declared that it had
ceased production. However, disclosures by Russian scientists who worked on the
CW program indicate that an offensive CW program continued aftier that date.
President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and other senior Russian officials
have repeatedly expressed their support for the Chemical Weapons Convention upon
its ratification and entry into force. The U.S. will judge Russia s future CWC compli-
ance by its actions. While awaiting Russian CWC ratification, the U.S. will continue
to underscore to Russia its obligation as a signatory to refi*ain from acts that would
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention. The U.S. also will stress the impor-
tance of prompt Russian CWC ratification. U.S. leverage in this effort will be en-
hanced once the U.S. itself has ratified the CWC.
Russia is carrying out some strategic modernization programs. However, those are
much more limited than in the past and consistent with the START Treaties. Russia
is currently developing follow-on missiles for the SS-25 ICBM and the SS-N-20
SLBM, and Russian press reports indicate that a new SSBN is being developed.
These programs are being pursued, at least in part, to replace certain currently-de-
ployed strategic systems that are approaching the end of their service life; they also
reflect movement toward the stable force structure encouraged by START II — single-
warhead ICBMs and survivable SSBNs/SLBMs. Overall, Russian military spending
has fallen dramatically in recent years, and strategic and conventional weapons pro-
curement is expected to continue to decline in the future. We are aware of the con-
struction underway for an underground complex at Yamantau Mountain. We believe
the facility is defense-related and have discussed it with various Russian officials,
but they have not explained to us its purpose.
The Chairman. Is the Congress going to receive a non-Bosnia, non-Jordan-related
rescission package? If so, when, for what purpose, and why, based on Program/
Budget Decision 719, are the funds all coming out of Congressional modernization
efforts, which you admitted were the weakest part of your Fiscal Year 96 budget?
Secretary Perry. The FY 1997 President's budget identifies $400.4 million of FY
1996 funding for rescission. $250 million of these funds will be used to finance en-
hanced drug control activities in support of the Office of National Drug Control Pol-
icy. The rescission message for the $400.4 million will be forwarded to the Congress
in mid-April. The programs proposed for rescission are excess to DoD requirements
152
and will have no impact on our efforts to improve modernization. In addition, the
FY 1997 budget includes a legislative proposal to cancel $599.6 million in FY 1996
programs. The specific program savings will be identified when this legislative pro-
posal is enacted.
The Chairman. General Shall, please tell us why in your Chairman's Program As-
sessment you recommend to Secretary Perry that he snould accelerate by two years
attaining a $60 billion procurement fiinding level — from FYOO to FY98? How do you
fell about the fact that this level of procurement funding is now projected to be
reached in FYOl — one year later than forecasted last year? Do you support this
delay?
General Shalikashvili. As I have stated, our procurement accounts are not where
I think they ought to be. After careful deliberation, I judged that approximately $60
billion is the right level to maintain and sustain the current force structure and
strategy, which are sized correctly for today's world environment. While I would like
to see such a procurement level sooner rather than later, it is more important to
me that we set such a target as this budget does, and discipline the process to make
sure we reach it. The challenge is to maintain readiness and get on with recapital-
ization of the force all within the current defense top lines that are in the adminis-
tration budget.
The Chairman. Secretary Perry, given the Chairman's recommendation to in-
crease the procurement accounts, why did you not insist that OMB "passback" the
entire $35 billion in inflation savings that were scrubbed from your FY 97 through
FY 01 budgets? What was the basis for the $20 billion you were "allowed to keep?"
How can you justify telling the committee, for example, that an attack submarine
funded in FY 99 would be a "budget buster" when you let $15 billion slip away?
Secretary Perry. When infiation projections increase, a U.S. President ideally
would add money to departmental budgets like DoD's, in order to preserve the
spending plans previously endorsed. Under these circumstances, departments have
a strong case in requesting added funding. But when inflation projections decrease,
the President is justified in earmarking the savings for the U.S. Treasury, because
departments should be able to fulfill their plans with reduced budgets. Departments
do not have a strong case and are in no position to "insist" that the President allo-
cate inflation savings to them.
President Clinton's decision to allow DoD to keep all but $15 billion in inflation
savings constitutes an increase in our defense plans. It enables us to better meet
our procurement and other military needs. The basis of the President's defense
spending decision was, as it always should be, the military needs of our nation.
The President's decision is especially noteworthy because of the extraordinary po-
litical pressures on him to allocate inflation savings elsewhere: to hasten achieve-
ment of a balanced budget (the subject of intense negotiations with Congress), and
to help counter the expected deep reductions in domestic discretionary spending.
BRAC AND ACQUISITION REFORM SAVINGS
The Chairman. Secretary Perry, given that procurement funding for FY96 was
projected to be $63 billion in FY 93 and three years later actually became a request
of less than $40 billion, how much confidence do you have in the projected ramping
up of this account? How confident are you in your BRAC savings and acquisition
reform savings, which are the underpinnings of your projected modernization
growth?
Secretary Perry. You are correct that BRAC and Acquisition Reform savings are
critical to increasing our procurement accounts. I am very confident that we can
generate the required savings in these areas to help make the necessary increases
to our modernization funding. As you know, one significant source of these savings
is the now diminishing cost for base closure. This is a now decling up-front cost that
we are investing to reap future savings. In FY 1996 we invested approximately $4
billion in BRAC. In FY 1997 we are requesting only $2.8 billion for BRAC costs.
These costs are made up of $2.5 billion in new appropriations and $244 million in
anticipated land sale revenue. Further, the current fiscal year is the first year that
BRAC costs equal BRAC savings. I expect that trend to continue to the point where
we can expect about $6 billion in annual savings from BRAC that can be put to
modernization accounts. With respect to Acquisition Reform savings we have hard
evidence accumulating from such programs as the C-17, the Joint Direct Attack
Munition (JDAM), and the SMART-T Army communications terminal for
MILSTAR, that acquisition reform is working. For example, JDAM alone will gen-
erate cumulative savings of about $3 billion over the life of the program. The sav-
ings we're talking about in acquisition reform, are not five and ten percent. Nor are
they at the margin. These are substantial savings that can be redirected to mod-
153
emization accounts as the reforms work their way through all the Department's ac-
quisition programs.
The Chairman. Why didn't the Department comply with the Fiscal Year 96 Au-
thorization Act provision directing that funding for National Guard and Reserve
Component Equipment be included in the President's Budget?
Secretary PERRY. The Department has complied with tne provision that funding
be included in the FY 1997 budget for National Guard and Reserve Component
Equipment. There is $912.3 million budgeted in the Procurement title for specific
National Guard and Reserve equipment requirements. The Prociu-ement Pro-
grams— Reserve Components budget justification book (P-IR), to be forwarded by
April 19, will provide line item detail on the budgeted programs. In addition, the
Department will forward to you the National Guard and Reserve component extract
from the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP, Program 5) and an extract of the
Military Construction program budget justification book (C-1) that will provide ad-
ditional details on the funding budgeted to support National Guard and Reserve
programs.
IMPROVED CHEMICAL WARFARE DETECTORS
Mr. Evans. Recently the Presidential Advisory Committee on Persian Gulf War
Veterans' Illnesses reported that DoD's chemical warfare detectors could not ade-
quately detect unhealthy low levels of chemical warfare agents in the Persian Gulf
War. What progress has been made to alert and protect service personnel from low
level chemical warfare agent exposures over a period of time?
Secretary Perry. Since the Gulf War we have spent over $436 million for research
and development to push the state-of-the-art in chemical and biological detection.
We have spent over $170 million to procure additional and new capabilities. Our
current and near term chemical warning alarms are designed to avoid acute thresh-
old effects exposures. We currently have no warfighting requirement to detect lower
levels or exposures over time. However, we are studying the potential effects of sub-
acute exposures and will fiiUy consider such requirements if merited by those stud-
ies. There are many risks on the battlefield and limited fiinding to address them.
Each new risk must be weighed with all other risks to optimize winning the battle
and defending the soldier. The following is detailed information on progress being
made in both the near and far term.
Near-Term Improvements:
(1) Improved Point Detection System (IPDS): The IPDS replaces the Chemical
Agent Point Detection System (CAPDS) on Naval ships, detects nerve/blister agents,
and is expandable for new threat agents. IPDS consists of port and starboard exter-
nal air sampling and detector units, a remote control unit located in the Damage
Control Center and a remote display unit located on the bridge. Fielding begins in
FY96.
(2) KAS-1 Chemical Weapons Detection Device (CWDD) Upgrade: The KAS-IA
is an upgrade to the existing KAS-1. The improved system provides remote video
transmission capability and an on-site training capability with remote playback fea-
tures. The KAS-1 A also provides relative bearing display and has an increased
operational life due to cooler improvements. Approximately 250 units have been
backfitted and installed, however, installation/backfit efforts have now ceased due
to the lack of O&M funding to support the effort. Approximately, 550 systems re-
main to be retrofitted.
(3) M21 Remote Sensing Chemical Agent Alarm: An automatic scanning, passive
infrared sensor that detects nerve and blister agent vapor clouds. It is effective at
line-of-sight distances up to five kilometers. Alarm is used for surveillance and re-
connaissance missions in both vehicle-mounted and tripod mounted modes. M21 was
Tjrpe Classified Standard, in March 1995. First Unit Equipped is scheduled for Jan-
uary 1997.
(4) XM22 Automatic Chemical Agent Detection Alarm (ACADA): The ACADA is
a man portable, point sampling alarm system that provides significant improvement
over current capabilities. The ACADA is an advanced point-sampling, chemical
agent alarm system. It replaces the M8A1 alarm as an automatic point detector and
augments the M 1 CAM as a survey instrument. The Automatic Vapor Agent Detec-
tor (AVAD), an Air Force requirement will be satisfied using the ACADA detector
technology. Initial fielding is scheduled to begin in September 1997.
(5) Shipboard Automatic Liquid Agent Detector (SALAD): An exterior, liquid
agent point detection and monitoring system that will detect and alarm in the pres-
ence of liquid nerve and blister agents. SALAD consists of a detector unit, optical
scanners, a central processing unit and alarms on the bridge and Damage Control
Central. Initial fielding is scheduled to begin in FY98.
154
(6) M93E1 NBCRS System Improvement Upgrade: Upgrades the M93 NBCRS to
detect chemical contamination in its immediate environment using the M21 RSCAL
stand-off detector. It will automatically integrate contamination information from
sensors with input from on-board navigation and meteorological systems. The Sys-
tem Improvement will also replace the current mass spectrometer with the chemi-
cal/biological mass spectrometer. Initial fielding of the Block 1 Mod improvements
of the FOX NBCRS is scheduled for March 1998.
Far-Term Improvements:
Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM): Materiel Change (MC) will improve the
CAM by significantly reducing the level and frequency of maintenance without af-
fecting the CAMs performance. The ICAM will have twice the operational life of the
CAM. Materiel Change was Type Classified Standard in Aug 93. A multiyear pro-
duction contract was recently awarded. Initial fielding of improved CAMs is sched-
uled for Jan 99.
Progress is being made on multi-Service requirements leading to Joint Service
RDT&E efforts. Joint projects related to improved chemical detection capabilities are
outlined below:
(1) Joint Service Chemical Miniature Agent Detector (JSCMAD): a ftilly coopera-
tive RDT&E effort, chartered to develop a family of miniature chemical agent detec-
tors for all services. The family of detectors will provide individuals near-real time
information on the presence of chemical agents so that misosis or more severe ef-
fects can be avoided and not subvert the mission. The program accommodates the
Services' requirements for miniature agent detectors. Initial fielding dates for
JSCMAD are estimated to be beyond FY2000.
(2) Joint Service Lightweight Stand-off" Chemical Agent Detector (JSLSCAD): a
fully coordinated joint service RDT&E program, charted to develop a lightweight
stand-off chemical detector for the four services. The system will be capable of scan-
ning 360 degrees x 60 degrees, and automatically detecting nerve or blister agents
at a distance up to 5 km. It will be light and compact and operate both from a sta-
tionary position and on the move. Initial fielding dates are estimated to be in
FY2001.
(3) Joint Service Chemical Warning and Identification LIDAR (JSCWILD): a fully
coordinated joint service program to develop a chemical warning and identification
system for the four services. The JSCWILD will be a lightweight, vehicle mountable,
contamination monitoring system which detects and quantifies, from a distance of
3 kilometers, all kinds of chemical agent contamination (including agent rain, va-
pors, aerosols, and ground contamination), in a stand-off mode. It will operate from
fixed sites and ground vehicles. The system has distance-ranging and contamina-
tion-mapping capabilities and transmits this information to a battlefield information
network. Initial fielding dates are estimated to be in FY2002.
(4) Joint Service Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN): an integrated NBC
detection, warning and reporting system capable of interfacing with all CB detectors
and sensors. The system will be interoperable with all service command and control
systems, capable of generating NBC reports and automatic transmission of NBC
alarms and data. Program will consolidate HAZWARN (warning and reporting) with
the Multipurpose Integrated Chemical Agent Alarm (MICAD) and Automated Nu-
clear, Biological and Chemical Information System (ANBACIS) to form a com-
prehensive upgradable NBC component to the emerging C3I systems in the services.
Initial fielding dates are estimated to be in FY2000.
Mr. Evans. What t3^e of chemical and biological warfare agent detectors are cur-
rently being used by the United States military in Bosnia?
General Shalikashvili. U.S. forces in Bosnia are equipped with XM93 NBC
Recon Systems, M8A1 Chemical Automatic Alarms, Chemical Detector Kits, M9 De-
tector Paper and MS Detector Paper.
Mr. Evans. Since the alarms sounded so many times, what type of research was
conducted to confirm that the tens of thousands of alarm warnings were all false?
If all these alarms were false, how was it determined that no chemical agents were
present?
General Shalikashvili. During Gulf War deployment, we conducted live agent
laboratory testing to make sure our M8A1 alarms worked. During the Gulf War,
every incidence of M8A1 alarm was investigated using other detectors. In no case
could we confirm the presence of chemical warfare agents. We know our current
alarms can produce false alarms. Current detector technology forces a direct trade-
off between false positive alarms which forces soldiers to don unnecessary protection
(i.e., alarm with no agent present) and false negative alarms which cause casualties
(i.e., no alarm with agent present). Because we prefer unnecessary protection to cas-
ualties, our detectors tend to false positive. The Joint Advance Chemical Agent De-
tector Alarm (ACADA) Program has expended considerable expense and effort to
155
solve this technology problem. The ACADA program is now culminating in a test
between three candidate detectors (FY96) and full scale production is scheduled to
begin next year (FY97).
CHEMICAL DETECTION SYSTEM FALSE ALARMS
Mr. Evans. DoD maintains that the tens of thousands of alarms that sounded re-
peatedly during the Persian Gulf War were all false alarms. What progress has DoD
initiated to ensure accurate "real time" detections and cumulative exposures over
time?
Secretary Perry. Current detector technology forces trade-off between false posi-
tive alarm rates (i.e., alarm with no agent present=unnecessary protection) and false
negative (i.e., no alarm with agent present=casualties). Because we prefer unneces-
sary protection to casualties, our detectors tend to false positive. The Advanced
Chemical Agency Detector Alarm (ACADA) program has expended considerable ex-
pense and effort to push chemical detection state-of-the-art. Eliminating false
alarms has been and continues to be an ACADA high priority. The ACADA program
is now culminating in a test off between three candidate detectors (FY 96). Full
scale production is scheduled to begin next year (FY 97).
Mr. Evans. What specific measures has DoD initiated to ensure "safe-kill" of fu-
ture chemical and biological manufacturing and storage facilities?
Secretary Perry. Under the Counterproliferation Support Program, the DoD is
pursing the following objectives: ( 1) development of sensors for chemical-biological
target identification, battle damage assessment, and collateral effects monitoring,
(2) in-depth understanding of chemical-biological warfare agent release phenomenol-
ogy and transport, (3) reliable characterization of chemical-biological effects and tar-
get vulnerability/response, (4) development of an advanced penetrating weapon, the
Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), for the defeat of underground chemical-biologi-
cal facilities, (5) development of a Hard Target Smart Fuze (HTSF) for enhanced
lethality of penetrating weapons against underground targets, (6) evaluation of
chemical-biological agent defeat mechanisms, (7) development of advanced war-
heads/payloads for enhanced lethality against, and functional kill (agent defeat) of,
WMD-related targets, (8) development of the inertial terrain-aided guidance (ITAG)
package for all-weather utilization of existing munitions, (9) development of the In-
tegrated Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (IMEA) targeting tools to assist in
targeting, weaponeering, and strike planning for minimal collateral effects, and ( 10)
integrated operational testing, as part of the Counterproliferation Advanced Concept
Technology Demonstration, to support the rapid fielding of these new capabilities.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENT DEFEAT
Mr. Evans. During the Persian Gulf War, the United States extensively bombed
known and suspected facilities which produced chemical and biological warfare
agents. What specific measures has DoD initiated to ensure safe chemical and bio-
logical warfare agent defeat?
Secretary PERRY. The Department of Defense does not expect to field capability
in the near term which would allow for a completely safe attack on chemical and
biological facilities. However, the Department has made progress in our ability to
reduce the possible negative consequences of such an attack.
First, we have demonstrated in field tests the most advantageous means to de-
liver current weapons against suspected chemical and biological storage sites during
the initial phase of an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD). Cer-
tain attack parameters were verified to achieve adequate facility damage while re-
ducing collateral effects significantly. This attack planning information, combined
with collateral effects prediction capability is central to a new fast running PC-
based tool designed for in-theater, including Bosnia.
To advance our capability to use current weapons systems in attacking weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) facilities, the Department is currently developing a
"smart" fuse, which will sense the depth that the weapon has penetrated, or sense
when the weapon is inside a compartment. This fuse, combined with the planning
tools, will allow the warfighter to select optimal weapon placement against WMD
facilities to minimize collateral effects.
The Department is also pursuing technologies for special warheads which negate
the toxicity of chemical and biological agents. One example is the use of High Tem-
perature Incendiaries (HTIs) which may kill most chemical or biological agents that
would be expelled into the atmosphere. While these programs are developmental, we
expect to demonstrate the most promising capabilities in weapon form during a pro-
posed ACTD in approximately FY 99 and FY 00.
156
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENT DETECTORS
Mr. Evans. Currently the United States does not possess adequate "real time"
battlefield biological warfare agent detectors. What steps has DoD initiated to ac-
quire adequate 'real time" battlefield biological warfare agent detectors? When will
tnese detectors be available for use by United States militanr personnel?
Secretary Perry. Ehiring the current year, the Services have begun to field sev-
eral biological point detection systems. These efforts were initiated in response to
shortfalls identified during DESERT STORM, and provide unprecedented biological
detection capabilities to protect U.S. forces. These systems include (1) the Biological
Integrated Detection System (BIDS) Non-Developmental Item (NDI), (2) the Interim
Biological Agent Detection System (IBADS), and the Long Range Biological Standoff
Detection System (LRBSDS) NDI.
BIDS NDI is a vehicle-mounted, fully integrated biological detection system. It
employs developmental and off-the-shelf technologies to detect biological agents with
maximvun accuracy. The system is being fielded for use in contingency operations
to provide detection and identification of biological agents in the 2-10 micron range
in 15-30 minutes. BIDS will be integrated into the force structure of active duty
units over the next year. The system, which is housed in a collectively-protected
HMMV shelter, is modular to aUow component replacement and exploitation of "leap
ahead" technologies. Planned improvements will provide detection of a greater num-
ber of agents, with greater sensitivity, and with improved response time.
IBADS provides automatic point collection and identification of a limited number
of biological agents, including all high threat agents. It is designed to operate in a
shipboard environment, be operated and maintained by ship's force, and provide
automatic collection and identification of biological warfare agents while a ship is
underway. IBADS consists of a particle sizer/counter, particle wet cyclone sanipler
and a detection unit which uses unproved membrane calorimetric tickets (flow-
through assay). This rapid prototype system is currently being fielded, tailored to
shipboard applications, including deplojmient to support operations in Bosnia.
IBADS provides a key capabihty for the protection oi fixed, high-value sites such
as ports and airfields.
The LRBSDS NDI provides the first capability to U.S. forces for the stand-off de-
tection of biological warfare agents. This system provides the capability to detect
aerosol clouds at a range of up to 50 kilometers utihzing infrared LlDAR technology.
It provides the relative concentration, range, location, and tracking of suspect aero-
sol clouds. This systems is mounted in a UH-60 (Huey) helicopter.
Several efforts are underway to improve biological point and early warning detec-
tion capabiUties in the near- to mid-term. Improvements include increased number
of agents; improved sensitivity; reduced power, size, and weight of systems; im-
proved safety; improved detection time; automatic warning; and advanced hazard
prediction and assessment. Key systems being developed included pre-planned prod-
uct improvements to BIDS and LRBSDS; the Joint Point Biological Detection Sys-
tem (JPBDS); advanced remote biological agent detection and early warning detec-
tion, the Biological Standoff Detection System (BSDS). Technologies for these sys-
tems are being developed through several joint efforts and through several tech-
nology demonstrations, including the Integrated Biodetection Advanced Technology
Demonstration, the Port and Airbase Biodetection Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration (ACTD), the Biological Early Warning ACTD, and annual Joint/
International Field Trials.
BRAC
Mr. Watts. If the Commission had decided to realign any of the 3 ALC's that
stood this there would not be a privatization-in-place alternative underway. The rea-
sons are simple; continued operations at Kelly and McClellan fail to address the
over capacity issue cited by the BRAC as the basis for their closiu^ recommenda-
tions and will cost millions of dollars that could better be used for modernization
and readiness. Sir, for every unnecessary dollar spent to support private sector man-
agement of our depot activities, there is one less dollar available for readiness. This
is especially true if contractors who take over the depot functions are prevented
from wholesale layoffs and terminations that occur as a standard business takeover
practice. If the same workers, in the same facility, perform the same jobs, using the
same equipment, how is the Air Force going to save the American taxpayer any
money?
Secretary Perry. The original Department recommendation called for the
downsizing of each of the Air Logistics Centers. The BRAC Commission rejected
that recommendation and instead voted to close McClellan and San Antonio. The
Department will continue to try to size the organic depot system to Core. That work-
157
load currently performed at McClellan and San Antonio that is iiltimately identified
by the Air Force as necessary to sustain Core capabiUties will be moved to other
organic DoD depots taking advantage of excess capacity.
Our goal is to save money. We only want to privatize when it is smart to do so.
The remaining depots shoiild be sized to meet our Core capability requirements.
Best value for the remaining workloads wUl be achieved through competition in the
private sector. Privatization-in-place capitalizes on our previous investments in fa-
cilities, equipment and people. If it doesn't work, our business will go elsewhere.
Mr. Watts. All that has been done at that point is the addition of another level
of management, and cost, to the business of depot maintenance. And the readiness
issue is not simply affected by costs, but by the general processes that are at work
within the private sector. I ask you Mr. Secretary to consider the impacts on readi-
ness if private sector workers who may be responsible for Core work decide to
strike, walk out, or are shut out. Where will our soldiers, sailors, airmen and ma-
rines be if they are engaged in a fight and their equipment cannot be repaired be-
cause the depot is lock«i-down due to a employee/employer disagreement?
Secretary Perry. This is an important issue. The Department believes that risk
avoidance drives Core capability requirements. Senior warfighters have carefully es-
timated the resources required to support our national security strategy. The
outso\ircing risk assessment is an informed decision based upon market place per-
formance. Risk avoidance drives Core capability requirements. In the context of
depot maintenance support to the operating forces, readiness, sustainability, and
technology risks are of prime concern and are considered in depth. The risks you
have identified are fully considered in our Core methodology discussion in Section
II of the March 1996 Report to Congress, titled "Pohcy Regarding Performance of
Depot-Level Maintenance and Repair'. Therefore, necessary critical capabiUties are
maintained in organic depots and only those workloads with acceptable risk are per-
formed in the private sector.
Mr. Watts. In closing Mr. Secretary, the President's vision of privatization needs
to be modified. While I support expansion of the private sector into government
services and the associated savings tnat may come from a well thought out strategy,
privatization must be done with due regard for its impact on modernization and
readiness needs. We cannot afford to allow the men and women of our armed forces
be brought to their knees by virtue of an inability to repair the tools of their trade.
A right-sized depot system must be put into place before we open the door to whole-
sale privatization of these extremely important services. Only then will we have
done what is required of our pledge to support and defend our nation against those
who may attack ovu* security. I encourage your personal re-examination of the so-
called privatize-in-place option at McClellan and Kelly. I encourage the Administra-
tion to please move slowly, for if this door is open I assure you it will come at the
expense of modernization and readiness.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your patience and I ask the Secretary to offer his
view on privatization-in-place at KeUy and McClellan Air Logistics Centers.
Secretary PERRY. The Department believes that the DoD Core policy does in fact
"right size" the depot system such that risk avoidance drives organic Core capabil-
ity. As stated earUer, the workload currently performed at McClellan and San Anto-
nio that is ultimately identified by the Air Force as necessary to sustain Core capa-
bilities will be moved to other organic DoD depots taking advantage of excess capac-
ity.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT— SERVICE SECRETARIES
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Friday, March 8, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
The Chairman. The meeting will please come to order. Good
morning. I would like to welcome our witnesses and thank them for
appearing before us this morning, especially in view of the fact that
we have some inclement weather outside and some of our members
have taken early leave for the weekend. Because of the scheduling
difficulties, I thought we ought to go ahead and proceed in order
to receive the testimony by our distinguished witnesses this morn-
ing.
Today, we are continuing our initial examination of the adminis-
tration's fiscal year 1997 budget request. Two days ago, we heard
from Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili, who presented the
broad framework and rationale for the Department's 1997 budget.
This morning we will hear from Hon. Togo West, Secretary of the
Army; Hon. John Dalton, Secretary of the Navy; and Hon. Sheila
Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force.
As Secretary Perry noted during our hearing on Wednesday, this
year's request represents a real decline of more than 6 percent rel-
ative to current spending levels. Within the approximately $243
billion requested for the Department, all the services are facing re-
ductions from their current level of efforts.
There is a growing consensus that the long-term defense program
is underfunded. During the past year. Congress sought to restore
faith with our men and women in uniform by providing an increase
in their standard of living, a cost-of-living increase, and providing
them with the equipment they need to be second to none.
It appears that this year's budget not only fails to follow Con-
gress' lead from last year, but also places our country's Armed
Forces back on the slippery slope of readiness shortfalls, procure-
ment holidays, and even the prospect of force structure reductions
below Bottom-Up Review levels.
For instance, last fall General Shalikashvili's Chairman's Pro-
gram Assessment concluded that roughly $60 billion in annual pro-
curement funding was necessary by fiscal year 1998 to properly re-
(159)
160
capitalize the force. However, by the Department's own estimates,
achievement of this goal has been postponed until fiscal year 2001,
3 years beyond the recommended date and 1 year later than
planned for just a year ago. The administration is not even stand-
ing still, it is moving backward.
Even as the Department continues the extended procurement
holiday, the pace of contingency operations has not abated, and in
fact, has increased. The Army is fully engaged in Bosnia, and I
would be surprised if this operation is over by year's end. Extensive
air operations continue in the Persian Gulf and there is no slacken-
ing of Navy and Marine Corps operations around the world.
In general, OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO are stretched to the
limit. Nevertheless, the budget simply does not propose any solu-
tions. In sum, and to paraphrase Admiral Owens' recent testimony,
it is time to stop promising to address the shortfall in the long-
term defense program and do something about it.
I look forward to your testimony this morning and to working
with each one of you in the months ahead as the Congress tries to
do something about these problems.
Before beginning, I would like to recognize Mr. Dellums, the
ranking Democrat on the committee, the gentleman from Califor-
nia.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you
in welcoming today's witnesses this morning: Army Secretary Togo
West, Navy Secretary Dayton, and Air Force Secretary Widnall. I
welcome the opportunity to hear their views as they build upon the
earlier testimony of Secretary of Defense Perry and Joint Chiefs
Chairman General John Shalikashvili.
The fact that the fiscal year 1996 budget cycle is pushed so far
into the planning for fiscal year 1997 delays presentation to the
committee of more complete budgetary information. Given our ac-
celerated schedule on the fiscal year 1997 request, it will be espe-
cially helpful to this committee for us to hear the early views of the
Secretaries, and I appreciate that they are appearing early in the
process regarding their surface programs and direction. They can
amplify on the broader, thematic presentation presented in
Wednesday's DOD posture hearing and can, we hope, begin to an-
swer some of the more detailed follow-on questions and concerns
that have emerged from the DOD hearing.
Mr. Chairman, as I noted to Secretary Perry and General
Shalikashvili, near the conclusion of Wednesday's hearings there
appeared to be several areas of concern emerging in which elevated
controversy and concern on this committee is manifesting itself.
They are primarily the debate over missile defense priorities and
scope, scale, and pace of development; the procurement funding
level in fiscal year 1997 and beyond, and its impact on moderniza-
tion efforts, the overall level of spending in the defense topline;
and, the privatization initiatives being undertaken within the De-
partment.
161
It strikes this member that our service Secretaries can speak
very knowledgeably to us concerning these matters as well as with
regard to others. They can provide us with important information
regarding the resources available to them to meet their programs
and whether the procurement strategy will meet their respective
services' modernization requirements. They can shed light on serv-
ice priorities among systems under procurement and projected for
procurement in later years.
They can provide us with important information regarding the
morale and welfare of their personnel. An important issue in this
connection will be the hearings to be held later in the year by this
committee that will deal with the impact on the force of the alarm-
ing actions of extremist hate groups.
I hope that we will be able to have a full and complete discussion
of this debilitating problem within the ranks of our Armed Forces.
The Secretaries can also advise us as to the impact that projected
housing and military construction programs will have on quality of
life of our service personnel. They can inform us regarding whether
this proposal would meet the training and operational require-
ments for the missions they are expected to perform, whether it is
participation in peacekeeping, forward deployment, or rapid re-
sponse to emerging crises.
While Secretary Perry, in my opinion, eloquently set out the
broad parameters of our approach to the threat posed by missile
technology and the weapons of mass destruction, including non-
proliferation and threat reduction programs, the service Secretaries
can amplify on theater missile defense programs with which they
have particular concerns and responsibilities.
As I noted on Wednesday, we have lived with the threat of nu-
clear missile attacks on the United States for a generation, through
several Democratic and Republican administrations. Throughout
that time, those administrations have relied on the policy of nu-
clear deterrence that continues today. Such a policy, though, will
not work against theater threats that may require urgent atten-
tion. Their comments on the character of these threats will be espe-
cially insightful with respect to the allocation of priorities as be-
tween theater and national missile defenses.
They can provide us with expanded information about the mod-
ernization and procurement requirements and any concerns they
might have regarding their ability to stay on target within the
budgeted plan laid out by Secretary Perry on Wednesday. There-
fore, I look forward to their presentations, to our dialog, and to
their knowledge and professionalism and sense of duties that all of
the distinguished witnesses bring to the table today in service of
this Nation.
With those opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back
the balance of my time.
The Chairman. The Chair thanks the gentleman. Without objec-
tion, the prepared statements of all the witnesses will be accepted
for the record and we will proceed as you like starting with Sec-
retary West.
162
STATEMENT OF TOGO D. WEST, JR., SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
Secretary West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to
be with you, Mr. Chairman, ranking minority member Dellums,
members of the committee. Indeed, it is an honor to represent the
men and women of the U.S. Army, Active and Reserve components,
military and civilian and their families today in what is now my
third year as Secretary of the Army.
During that period I have, as you have, watched these extraor-
dinary soldiers as they have answered every call of their country
with professionalism, dedication and with sacrifice, and it is for
that reason that I am pleased to say how proud I am of them as
I know every one of you to be as well.
It is also a pleasure in their behalf to thank the many of you who
have taken the time to visit them wherever they are stationed or
deployed whether in United States or abroad, in Bosnia, wherever
they serve their country, wherever they find themselves merely be-
cause their country has asked that they be there. I am proud to
support them, and I know you are, too.
Mr. Chairman, as we prepare our Army for the coming year, our
focus is, as it has always been, readiness, and it is our commitment
to the readiness of that force that informs our decisions about our
soldiers, about their training, about their equipping and about
their way of life. If I may, I will highlight a few things from the
testimony that I have submitted for the record.
We remain, as we are required to be ready as an Army, to fulfill
our role in the national military strategy, to compel other forces
where that becomes the recourse that we have to resort to, to deter
aggression from potential adversaries, to reassure our allies and
partners of our commitment to common defense goals and to sup-
port civil authorities in the United States where emergencies be-
yond their control is required.
We are making considerable efforts, as Secretary Perry men-
tioned to you when he appeared, contributions to conflict preven-
tion through our military-to-military contacts, through the Partner-
ship for Peace, through our efforts with respect to nonproliferation
agreements and in maintaining our forward presence abroad in Eu-
rope and in the Pacific.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, today more than
41,000 members of the U.S. Army are deployed around the world
on nearly 1,700 missions in some 60 countries. Last year's missions
included upholding democracy in Haiti, deterring the threat in
Southeast Asia, delivering relief supplies to Rwandan refugees,
peacekeeping in the Sinai, supporting refugees in the Caribbean,
Panama, and in the Pacific, deterring aggression in Korea; and,
yes, preparing for peace enforcement in that war- torn part of the
world known as Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have supported civil au-
thorities in the United States during fires in the Pacific Northwest,
floods in the South and Midwest and in Hurricane Marilyn.
People are the Army's most important asset, and we continue to
have success in attracting and retaining high quality recruits. Last
year, the Army achieved its active component goals in terms of
both quality and quantity, and we are on track to achieve our goals
this year as well.
163
Success, of course, does not come easy in this effort. Recruiters
are working hard. Your continued support has been and will con-
tinue to be key. The additional funds that you provided last year
for advertising have paid off. The 1995 Youth Attitude Tracking
Survey shows that the 1994 drop in positive propensity, which I re-
ported to you last year of young males to join the Army, has been
reversed. We believe that is directly attributable to the support you
provided us in advertising.
You authorized as well last year additional recruiter positions.
That has helped, as well. Thus, the Army has been able to meet
its recruiting mission in the Active Army, a mission which is in-
creasing as we approach the end state of our drawdown. For exam-
ple, the Active Duty Army recruiting mission went from some
63,000 last year to 70,000 this year, and is projected to be in the
area of 90,000 in the fiscal year whose budget I report on today.
It is our unparalleled system of training that turns these promis-
ing young recruits into professional soldiers, and training remains
one of the Army's greatest strengths. From individual training and
professional development to unit training supported by the Combat
Training Center Program and joint and combined exercises, our
training, the training of the U.S. Army, remains a model across the
world, especially so for the armies of developing democracies.
To maximize funds, to be careful about our stewardship, we have
invested in simulators and simulations. We are streamlining the
total Army school system. The fiscal year 1997 budget will provide
for 11 brigade rotations through the National Training Center Fort
Irwin, and some 8 brigade rotations through the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk. All combat brigades in Europe will
be able to train at the CMTC in Hohenfels, Germany, and it also
funds the Battle Command Training Program exercises for four
corps headquarters and four division headquarters' training cycles.
Mr. Chairman, a well-trained Army must also be well led. Our
Noncommissioned Officer Corps is recognized throughout the world
of armies for its professionalism, a strength that cannot be over-
looked in terms not only of its impact internally on our soldiers,
but externally as well, upon members of the armed forces of our al-
lies, new partners, and potential adversaries.
Our NCO's are at the heart of our success in operational deploy-
ments. But they are also a key to success in joint and combined
training exercises, in Partnership For Peace Programs and in the
military-to-military contacts to which I referred earlier. They have
earned and deserve our highest respect and our greatest support.
As those professional leaders will tell you, as they have told me
often, quality of life issues are a top priority among both married
and single soldiers. Places where our soldiers live and work and
the support we provide to their families, often in the absence of
service members deployed, are among my top and I know your top
priorities. Pay and benefits, medical care, commissary privileges
demonstrate our commitment, yours and mine, to our soldiers and
to our families.
Some 65 percent of the U.S. Army soldiers are married, 8 percent
are single parents. The fiscal year 1997 budget supports items that
are high on the priority list for those service members, all of them,
and for their families; a 3 percent pay raise, 5,000 additional child
164
care spaces, eight new barracks complexes and construction or ren-
ovation of 742 family quarters.
We are not merely the finest Army in the world, Mr. Chairman.
We are also the most technologically advanced. To maintain that
status, we must look, as you have said, to modernization. Procure-
ment accounts have been at relatively low levels for several years
now for the Army. While we have downsized our force structure
and while we have removed older equipment from that smaller
force, we are now taking steps with this budget to recapitalize our
procurement and RDT&E accounts.
We are achieving savings for reinvestment in R&D and procure-
ment through reduction of infrastructure, through vigorous pursuit
of acquisition reform, and through the use, led by our Chief,
through the seeking and use of greater efficiencies throughout the
Army's business operations.
Our strategy, then, for these intervening years as we accumulate
these savings will be to equip the force for near-term readiness
while working toward future modernization goals. We are buying
a limited number of high pay-off weapons while extending the lives
and capabilities of many existing systems. We are retiring some
older systems that are expensive to maintain and that provide
minimal return in combat capability.
This budget will allow continued development of Comanche. We
will pursue the Flight Test Program, begin the development of the
reconnaissance mission equipment. It will allow the continued de-
velopments of Crusader. We will complete the majority of our dem-
onstration and validation phase and should be prepared by the
year 2000 to enter the engineering, manufacturing, and develop-
ment phase, looking toward a 2005 deployment.
This budget will fund improvements and upgrades to the Abrams
tank, the Apache helicopter, the Bradley fighting vehicle and other
systems that are essential to Army battlefield digitization, and it
will provide procurement funds for the family of medium tactical
trucks. We will continue with this budget to make progress in fill-
ing our prepositioned sets of equipment both ashore and afloat
which provide important assets for contingencies and which we
have needed to resort to time and time again. One example of these
war reserves is the now much-discussed, much-photographed, and
much-visited bridge over the Saga River between Croatia and
Bosnia.
Mr. Chairman, this request for 1997 is a result of very careful
assessments by the Armys leaders of our needs and priorities. We
have identified readiness, modernization and soldiers' quality of life
as our highest priorities. We believe this budget will balance the
demands of recruiting high quality soldiers and preserving near-
term readiness while we prepare to provide for our long-term mod-
ernization needs. We are convinced that it will provide a force that
is capable of accomplishing its missions for the foreseeable future.
Not more than 24 hours ago, Mr. Chairman, I stood in Aviano,
Italy, with the soldiers of the 325th battalion, a battalion of the
Lion Brigade, which is part of the Southern European Task Force.
They were the first combat unit to enter the Bosnia deployment.
They paved the way for all who came after. They were the first
165
ones to see the mud and to feel the cold, to endure the hardships
to be in when our Nation called.
I had the opportunity to provide awards to some 55 of those who
participated and are now back with their families, for they were de-
signed merely to pave the way, to do the first part of opening
roads, removing snow, to clear their sector and to clear the Russian
sector, to cover in battalion strength a brigade size territory. And
had you been there with me, I Imow you would have shared the
pride I felt at that moment. I know you share today the pride we
feel at what our service members are doing in that far off place.
So it is a pleasure to thank you for the support that you have
given them in your legislative processes, in your encouragement
and in your everyday devotion to the service that they have ren-
dered. On behalf of them and all the soldiers and families they rep-
resent around the world, I thank you for your support in past
budgets. I ask you for your support today, and I thank you for your
time.
[The prepared statement of Secretary West follows:]
166
RECORD VERSION
STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE TOGO D. WEST, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SECOND SESSION, 104TH CONGRESS
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET REQUEST
AND
THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
8 MARCH 1996
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
167
STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE TOGO D. WEST, JR.
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET REQUEST AND
THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to
appear before you today to report on the state of the Army and to discuss
the Army's budget request for fiscal year 1997.
As I begin my third year as Secretary of the Army, I could not be
more proud of the men and women who serve than I am today. Like you,
I have watched these brave young soldiers respond to their nation's every
calling with extraordinary professionalism, dedication, and personal
sacrifice. Today, more than 41 ,000 of them are deployed on nearly 1 ,700
missions in 60 countries around the world - that is in addition to those
who are stationed overseas.
Over the last year, even as the Army's missions increased, we
continued to downsize and to prepare for the 21st century by sustaining
readiness, enhancing versatility, and improving our power-projection
capability. I am proud to represent the Army, its soldiers, civilian
employees, and their families before this committee today.
Readiness is our first priority, just as our people remain our most
important asset. The Army is ready because we continue to recruit top
quality soldiers. Because you have supported our quality of life programs
and recruiting initiatives, you deserve much of the credit for our continued
success in recruiting -- and, therefore, in readiness.
Today's national security environment is one of diverse dangers
and complex challenges. The Army Posture Statement, which has been
provided to you, reviews the challenges of the post-Cold War world.
Today, though, let us focus on the certainties of the future: the Army's
missions and its continued readiness.
168
Army Missions: Selective Engagement
One certainty is the continuing need to deploy American soldiers
around the globe in order to reassure our allies, to deter potential
aggression and, if deterrence fails, to fight and win. Regardless of the
mission - combat, pec.oekeeping, or humanitarian support -- the nation
will continue to call on the Army.
Why? Because American leadership is essential in today's world.
The goals of our National Security Strategy are to enhance our security, to
bolster our economy, and to promote democracy. In keeping with those
goals, the National Military Strategy calls for flexible and selective
engagement. The military strategy focuses on American interests and our
ability to make a difference.
As the nation's land force and the strategic core of joint military
operations, the Army is a critical player in the National Military Strategy.
The Army's role continues to be fourfold: to compel, deter, reassure, and
support. And, consistent with the national strategy, the Army contributes
to conflict prevention by controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, strengthening military relationships with other countries, and
maintaining a forward presence overseas.
In the last year, American soldiers upheld democracy in Haiti;
responded to another threat to regional stability in Southwest Asia;
delivered relief supplies to Rwandan refugees; reinforced peace in the
Sinai Peninsula; supported refugees in the Caribbean, Panama, and the
Pacific; demonstrated resolve in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia; deterred aggression in Korea; and prepared to keep peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
While we continue to perform missions like these, the Amny will
also retain a forward presence in places like Korea and Germany. These
forces, along with U.S. -based units that can rapidly deploy, not only
reassure our allies, but serve as a deterrent to any potential adversary.
This overseas presence is vitally important to our national security.
Another certainty is that the Army will continue to provide support
to civil authorities within the United States during natural disasters and
169
civil disturbances. In 1995, active and reserve soldiers assisted local
authorities in fighting fires in the Pacific Northwest: aided flood victims in
the South and Midwest; provided relief supplies, logistical support, a
hospital and other equipment in the aftermath of Hurricane Marilyn; and
assisted in numerous other similar situations. Our tremendous capacity to
help has earned the respect of the nation.
Readiness: The Right People, Training and Equipment
The Army must be ready to accomplish the missions of today and
those of tomorrow. Readiness requires that we continue to recruit high
quality people and provide them with effective training, responsible
leadership, a decent quality of life, and modern equipment.
Recruit
Our people are our most important asset, and we continue to have
success in attracting and retaining high quality recruits. We are meeting
our recruiting goals in the Active Army, in terms of both quantity and
quality. However, success is not easy in the recruiting business. In an
era of steadily increasing missions, we will continue to succeed only with
adequate funding and with the tenacity of our enthusiastic and dedicated
force of recruiters.
In the last two years, we asked Congress for increased funding for
advertising and recruiter support. We received it, and that funding has
produced results. Our latest Youth Attitude Tracking Survey shows that
positive propensity among the nation's youth to enlist in the armed forces
remained steady from 1992 through 1995. The drop in propensity among
young males -- experienced by the Army alone among the Services in
1994 - has been reversed. Reflecting our success in advertising, the
survey also shows increased awareness among youth of the Army's
opportunities.
At the same time, again with the help of Congress, we were able to
add more noncommissioned officers to the active recruiting force,
increasing authorizations from 4,600 in FY 95 to 4,950 in FY 96. That
increase, added to the one authohzed the previous year, gave us the
force we needed to meet this continuing challenge.
170
Our recruiting goals are two-fold: the right quantity and the right
quality. The Active Component recruiting mission has increased in
quantity from 63,000 last fiscal year to 70,000 this year. In 1997, as we
approach the end of the drawdown - and therefore must begin to replace
losses one-for-one - our recruiting mission is projected in the 90,000
range. I am pleased to report that we will meet our quantitative goal in the
Active Component this year. However, we are behind in Resen/e and
National Guard accessions and do not project that we will meet the FY 96
quantity goals in the Reserve Component.
The Army achieved its Active Component quality goals in FY 95
and is projected to meet them again in FY 96. In FY 95, more than 95
percent of our active Army recruits were high school diploma graduates,
while almost 70 percent tested in the upper half of the Armed Forces
Qualification Test. Fewer than 2 percent of our enlistees scored in the
lowest test score category. We have achieved similar results for all
categories in FY 96.
Clearly, Army recruiters are working exceedingly hard, as they
always have. And, we need the continued support of Congress to meet
the increasing challenge in recruiting.
Train
It takes training to turn a promising recruit into a soldier, and it
takes training to keep our Army ready. Training remains one of the
Army's greatest strengths. Our system of individual training and
professional development for soldiers remains a model for other armies,
particularly for new and developing democracies working to build
professional noncommissioned officers corps. Our system of training
units is equally strong, with local unit training building up to events at the
combat training centers and major joint and combined exercises.
The Combat Training Center program is central to maintaining the
Army's readiness. The keys to the program's success are its professional
staff, realistic opposing forces, instrumentation on a mock battlefield, and
feedback to participants. This budget provides for training at the Army's
four combat training centers. It funds 1 1 brigade rotations through the
National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; and 8 brigade rotations
through the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. It
171
enables all available USAREUR battalions to complete a rotation at the
Army's Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. In
addition, the Battle Command Training Program, a computer-driven
tactical exercise, will train four corps headquarters and four division
headquarters in FY 97.
To enhance training and make the best use of our training funds,
the Army is investing in simulators and simulations. Through an initiative
called "Future Army Schools - 21st Century," the Army is establishing a
Total Army School System w/ith fully accredited and integrated active
Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard Schools. Each component is
expanding efforts to reduce duplication, share information and resources,
and make tough, but necessary, decisions on organizational change.
Besides preparing our individual soldiers and our units for combat,
our training system plays a key role in redesigning the Army's operational
forces for the 21st century. Through our battle labs program and
warfighting expehments, we are testing and refining the components of
success on the battlefield: docthne, training, leader development,
organization, materiel and soldier system requirements. The Army of the
21st century will be designed and built based on what we learn through
these battle labs and warfighting expehments.
Lead
A ready Army is not only well trained but also well led. Our
noncommissioned officer corps is unparalleled, both in terms of the
professional development system that sustains it, and the caliber of the
soldiers who comprise it. Our noncommissioned officers are an important
source of strength. They are highly esteemed not only throughout the
Army, but throughout the armed forces of other nations as well. They
provide the foundation for our success in joint and combined training
exercises, in our Partnership for Peace programs, in military-to-military
contacts, and in operational deployments around the world. They are one
of the chief reasons for our Army's success. They have earned our
highest respect, and they deserve our greatest support.
172
Sustain
As those highly professional leaders can tell you - and often tell
me - quality of life issues remain a top priority of the Army for both
married and single soldiers. The places where our soldiers live and work,
and the support provided to families, often in the absence of service
members who are deployed, are of utmost concern to soldiers and to
Army leaders at all levels.
Quality of life initiatives are critical to attracting and retaining high
quality soldiers. Pay and benefits, medical care, commissary privileges
and retirement demonstrate our nation's recognition of and appreciation
for the sacrifices soldiers and their families make. We are committed to
ensuring that our soldiers and their families have a standard of living
roughly equivalent to their civilian counterparts.
The majority - 65 percent - of our soldiers are married, and 8
percent are single parents. We are continuing to expand family support
initiatives such as the New Parent Support Program, Programs for
School-Age Teens, and Army Community Service programs. We are also
continuing to expand the availability of child care facilities throughout the
Army.
The FY 97 budget recognizes that high quality people are essential
to readiness. It supports a 3 percent pay raise, adds 5,000 child care
spaces, builds eight new ban-acks complexes, and builds or renovates
742 family quarters. In addition, the budget supports increased initiatives
for at-risk youth and expansion of child care options.
Equip
A ready force must be well equipped, and American soldiers are
the best equipped in the worid. The challenge facing your Army is
maintaining - or even improving - that status in this era of fiscal
constraint.
American industry provides us numerous technologically advanced
systems. That equipment is a force multiplier: it permits us to remain
173
dominant on the battlefield although we may have a smaller force than our
adversary. In order to maintain this edge, we must continue to modernize.
Because modernization dollars are scarce, we are buying a limited
number of new, high pay-off weapons while extending the lives and
capabilities of many existing^ystems. We will also retire some older,
expensive-to-maintain systems that provide minimal return in combat
capability. Upgrading proven weapons by adding infonnation technology
will increase capabilities and lengthen the lives of our weapon systems.
Still, the Army will eventually reach the point where additional product
improvement of today's systems will provide only marginal benefits.
Therefore, in the out-years of the Future Years Defense Program, we are
programming the resources necessary to maintain decisive battlefield
dominance.
Procurement accounts have been at relatively low levels for several
years while we have downsized force structure and removed older
equipment from the smaller force. We know that in order to achieve an
appropriate level of modernization, the Army will have to once again fund
modernization more robustly, and we are taking prudent, appropriate
steps to recapitalize our procurement and Research, Development, Test
and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts. We are achieving savings for
reinvestment through two major approaches to recapitalization. First, we
are reducing infrastructure through phvatization and base closings, and
we are reducing our force structure or manpower. Second, we are
pursuing acquisition refonn. Beyond acquisition reform, we are looking for
savings throughout all of the Army's business operations. We are also
reducing some programs in order to maintain the health of those that
remain. We are retihng old, inefficient systems, like the Combat Engineer
Vehicle, and saving the operations and support costs for reinvestment into
other, more modern and critically necessary systems. -~
The FY 97 budget will allow us to continue development of these
and other programs. It will enable us to continue the flight test program
and develop the reconnaissance mission equipment for the Comanche.
The budget will also carry us through most of the demonstration and
validation phase on the Crusader program, a phase we entered in
November 1994. This should allow the program to transition into the
engineering and manufacturing development phase on schedule in FY
2000. We plan to commence low rate production in FY 2003 and have
174
the first unit equipped with Crusader in FY 2005. The budget continues
improvements and upgrades to the Abrams tank, the Apache helicopter,
the Bradley fighting vehicle, and other systems that are essential to
digitization of the battlefield. And it provides procurement funds for the
family of medium tactical vehicles, which will modernize the Army's aging
medium truck fleet.
Finally, we are making progress in filling our prepositioned brigade
sets of equipment, stored around the world, both ashore and afioat. The
much-publicized bridge over the Sava River is a war reserve bridge that
was stored in a fonward location and quickly deployed.
The Right Balance
To conclude, let me offer a few comments on our decision-making
process for this budget submission. The President has submitted a
budget of $60.1 billion for the U.S. Amny. This request is the result of a
very careful assessment by the Army's leaders of our needs and phorities.
We identified readiness, modernization, and soldiers' quality of life as our
highest priorities. Most importantly, we insisted on the level of readiness
necessary to support the National Security Strategy. This budget request
provides the Army that level of readiness. Furthermore, this budget
balances the demands of recruiting high quality soldiers and preserving
near-term readiness, while we prepare to provide for long-temri
modernization needs.
We structured our priorities to ensure that we are ready to meet
tomorrow's challenges successfully. Additionally, we seek some stability
in our budget and force structure so that we can meet today's missions
while preparing for the future. Although this budget contains some risk in
modernization, it provides a force capable of accomplishing its missions
for the foreseeable future.
The budget before you reflects today's fiscal realities, and it also
reflects the Army's commitment to our nation. That commitment is to
serve America proudly - as the Army has for over 220 years - and to
ensure that our soldiers are trained, equipped, and fully prepared for the
missions they are called upon to perform. We look to the Congress,
charged to raise and support Armies, for wisdom, guidance, and support
as we uphold our commitment to the American people.
175
38-160 97-8
176
In September of 1944, on the Crozon
Peninsula, German General Herman Ramcke
asked to discuss surrender terms with
the American Army.
He was in his bunker when his staff
brought in the 8th Infantry Division 's
Assistant Division Commander,
Brigadier General Charles Canham.
Ramcke addressed Canham through an
interpreter and said, "I am to surrender to you.
Let me see your credentials."
Pointing to the American infantrymen
crowding the dugout entrance, Canham
replied, "These are my credentials."
Soldiers are still our credentials!
177
A Statement on the Posture of
the United States Army
Fiscal Year 1997
by
The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
and
General Dennis J. Reimer
Presented to
the Committees and Subcommittees of the
I
UNITED STATES SENATE
and the
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SECOND SESSION, 104TH CONGRESS
178
COVER PHOTO: American soldiers begin crossing
the Sava River. The bridge enabled Task Force Eagle
to enter Bosnia and begin participation in Operation
Joint Endeavor.
179
The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr.
Secretary of the Army
General Dennis J. Reimer
Chief of Staff
Foreword
The Army has served the nation for over two centuries Our Army is truly America's
Army — a seamless force composed of Active Duty, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers,
civilian employees, and family members serving the nation at home and abroad We have an
obFigation to give them the best leadership, weapons, technology, and quality of life possible
Today's Army is unmatched in the world We remain prepared to answer the nation's call
— a call which is coming more often than ever before The Army's primary purpose is to fight
and win the nation's wars Our soldiers also can conduct many other operations — from
delivering humanitarian aid to enforcing peace These diverse missions highlight the talent,
flexibility, and versatility gained in their training
These wide-ranging missions also highlight the complex global security environment. The
threats today are less predictable than in the past, but just as real and just as dangerous Rising
sophistication among terrorists and rogue states, the standing armies of potential adversaries, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction portend increased challenges for the fiiture The
Army will continue to play a key role in the nation's response to those challenges
In order to conduct our operations at home and abroad, in war and in peace, the Army
must have well trained, highly disciplined soldiers We must provide them with modern
equipment and offer them and their families the best quality of life possible A high quality Army
— one that is prepared to execute a variety of missions — costs money Our resources, more than
any other factor, affect the Army's capabilities Resources determine our recruiting efforts, our
training programs, our modernization plans, and our force structure
We must forge an Army prepared to meet the many new challenges of today's world
America's 21st century Army must be a capabilities-based force — a force capable of executing
diverse missions across the continuum of conflict America's Army is stalwart in its determination
to meet the challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century.
180
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ix
1 . America's Army Today I
The Environment Today 1
Complex Global Security Environment . 1
Diminishing Resources 2
More and Expanded Missions 3
The Army Vision 4
The Army's Role 4
Fundamental Purpose 4
Strategic Force of Necessity 5
Force of Decision 5
Supporting the National Security Strategy 5
Supporting the National Military Strategy 6
Overseas Presence 7
Power Projection 11
Power Projection Characteristics 11
Power Projection Capabilities 12
Serving at Home 14
Conclusion 17
2. The Readiness Challenge: Balancing the Imperatives 19
Quality People 20
Recruiting 21
Retention 21
Doctrine 22
FM 100-5, Operations 22
Joint Doctrine 22
Multinational Operations 23
Future Doctrine 23
Force Mix 24
Heavy Forces 24
Light Forces 24
Special Operations Forces 25
Force Structure Actions/Trends 25
Access to Reserve Components 26
Training 27
Combat Training Centers 27
Army and Joint Exercise Program 29
Overseas Deployment Training of the Reserve Component .... 30
Operating Tempo 30
Operational Readiness 31
181
Future Army Schools 31
Modem Equipment 32
Army Modernization Objectives 32
Summary 37
Leader Development 37
The Army's Leader Development System 37
Reserve Component Leader Development 38
Civilian Leader Development . 38
Future Leader Development 39
Conclusion 39
3. The Stability Challenge 41
Personnel 41
Drawdown Status 41
Effects ofthe Drawdown and an Unstable World 43
The Bottom Line 43
Quality of Life 44
Healthcare 44
Army Continuing Education System 45
Housing 46
The Family and the Community 46
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 47
The Army Safety Program 48
Summary 48
Installations 48
Power Projection Installations 48
Installation Management Action Plan 49
Installation Status Report 49
Base Realignment and Closure 50
Base Operations 50
Utilities 51
Funding 52
Impact of Contingency Operations 52
FY96 Budget Overview 52
FY97 Budget Overview 53
Conclusion 54
4. The Efficiency Challenge 55
Governmental Initiatives 55
The National Performance Review 55
The Financial Officers Act of 1990 56
TheGovemment Performance and Results Act of 1993 56
Becoming More Efficient 57
Redesigning the Institutional Anny 57
Efficiency Working Group 57
182
Total Army Quality 58
Cost Saving Initiatives 58
Total Asset Visibility 58
Manpower and Personnel Integration 59
Integrated Sustainment Maintenance 59
Acquisition Reform 60
Other Examples 61
Conclusion 62
5. America's Army Tomorrow and into the 21st Century 63
21st Century Warfare 63
Some Constants 65
The Army Ethos 65
Professional Qualities 66
The Army - Nation Bond 66
Forging America's 21st Century Army 66
Force XXI 66
Horizontal Technology Integration 68
Digitization 69
Battle Labs 70
Experimental Force 71
Information Age Intelligence 71
Theater Missile Defense 72
National Missile Defense 73
Space Support 73
TeleMedicine 74
Conclusion 74
Acronyms 77
Addendum: Data Required by the FY94 National Defense Authorization Act . . A-1
The annual Army Posture Statement (APS) is an unclassified summary of Army roles
missions, accomplishments, plans, and programs. Designed to reinforce annual Secretary of
the Army and Chief of Staff, Army, posture and budget testimony before Congress, the APS
is subsequently distributed extensively and serves a broad audience as a basic reference
document on the state of the Army
The APS is produced by the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Congressional
Activities Division (DACS-CAD); Telephone: (703)695-9913/9997; DSN 225-9913/9997;
address E-mail to Bennetb@hqda.army.mil
183
Executive Summary
America's Army today is the best land force in the
world. It has won victory in Panama and Southwest Asia,
provided assistance to Americans who suffered the devastation
of floods and hurricanes, fed starving people in Somalia, and
upheld democratic principles in Haiti. Now it is upholding
peace in war-torn Bosnia. Today's Army serves America
capably around the world. It is prepared to answer the nation's
call in peace, in crisis, and in war to accomplish any task
necessary for the protection of American interests.
The Army is a good investment in national security Although smaller than at any time
since before World War II, the Army is being called upon to conduct an increasing number of
missions around the worid. America has committed its forces in response to crises nearly 40
times since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The majority of the personnel committed to diverse
operations — such as counterdrug, noncombatant evacuation, nation assistance, and
humanitarian and disaster relief — are soldiers. For less than one-quarter of the defense budget,
America's Army leads the way in achieving national objectives in places like Haiti, Rwanda, and
now Bosnia. Since 1989, the Army has experienced a 300 percent increase in operational
deployments. While the Army has successftilly met that challenge, constraints on defense
resources make it more difficult to balance operational requirements, readiness, modernization,
and quality of life programs.
American leadership is essential in today's world Ethnic, religious, territorial and
economic tensions, held in check by the pressures of the Cold War's bipolar global competition,
erupted when those constraints dissolved. Today's threats are more diverse, more
unpredictable, and more numerous than at any other time in our nation's history.
The Army's senior leadership recognizes the inherent unpredictability of today's global
environment and is adapting to the requirements mandated by a changing world. As we
approach the 2 1 st century, the Army must transition from a Cold War, threat-based force to a
capabilities-based force that can successfully meet any challenges that lie ahead. The
responsibility we share with Congress is to accommodate these changes while conducting
operations, preserving the Army's readiness, modernizing for the future, and sustaining the
quality of life of our soldiers and their families.
The Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win the nation's wars It also conducts
other operations as required by our country's leadership The employment of the Army is the
ultimate symbol of American will. The sight of an American soldier on the ground symbolizes
our nation's determination to prevail in any situation Combined with air and naval forces, the
Army provides the nation with the ability to employ its military might in support of national
policy However, America's ability to impose its will ultimately depends on its ability to control
the land, if necessary, through prompt and sustained land-combat operations The application
of military force on land is an action an opponent cannot ignore The Army is the nation's force
of decision.
Soldiers are our Credentials
184
Executive Sununary
The Anny is organized to compel, deter, reassure and support. When all else fails, the
Army compels adversaries to yield to our nation's will, as evidenced by recent operations in
Panama, Kuwait, and Haiti. The Army deters others from actions counter to our interests by
maintaining a trained and ready force, as demonstrated by our long-standing presence in Europe
and the Pacific The Army reassures friends and allies. We are a visible symbol of U.S.
commitment to stand firm against any external threat to their sovereignty, as demonstrated in
the Sinai, Macedonia, and many other places around the world. Finally, the Army supports
communities within the United States For decades, the Army has provided military support to
civil authorities during natural disasters, civil disturbances, and other emergencies.
Our National Security Strategy is one of engagement and enlargement. The National
Military Strategy, in supporting the National Security Strategy, calls for flexible and selective
engagement. As the nation's land force and the strategic core of joint military operations, the
Army is critical to the successful execution of the National Military Strategy. The strategy
involves a broad range of activities and capabilities to address and influence events in the
evolving international environment. Its objectives are to promote stability and thwart
aggression, through overseas presence and power projection.
The Army is committed to maintaining a robust overseas presence. We maintain
125,000 soldiers forward-stationed in Europe, the Pacific, and Panama. At the same time, on
any given day, an average of over 21,500 soldiers are deployed from their home stations to
countries around the world.
America's Army is a ready, versatile force, capable of projecting power. The Army may
be called upon to win major regional conflicts, conduct peace operations, or deliver
humanitarian assistance. As a mostly U.S. -based force, it must be a power-projection army,
capable of rapid response, trained and ready to deliver decisive victory. Our Army provides
national leaders the ability to respond to crises with forces tailored to the mission.
As we move towards the 21st century, America's Army confronts three key challenges:
maintaining readiness, gaining stability in the force, and becoming more efficient.
First, to maintain readiness, we must make difficult decisions and identify trade-offs. We
make those decisions by balancing six fundamental imperatives: quality people, doctrine, force
mix, training, modem equipment, and leader development.
QUALITY reoFLC
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DOCnUNI
Quality people are the defining characteristic of a
trained and ready Army They are the single most
important requirement for the Army's success today and
in the future. Quality people are versatile enough to
respond rapidly to unforeseen situations. They are
critical to successful mission accomplishment.
Soldiers are our Credentials
185
Executive Sununary
Our doctrine provides guidelines for the conduct of military operations. It establishes
the intellectual and theoretical foundation for our disciplined evolution to the future.
We must have the appropriate force mix of heavy, light, and special operations units,
their supporting elements, and sustaining base activities. A proper force mix ensures the Army's
ability to project a tailored, sustained land combat capability worldwide.
Training ensures that soldiers, leaders, and units are prepared to fight and win. The
Army has set the training standard for armies everywhere. Our demanding training and high
standards are absolute requirements for a ready force.
Modem equipment takes advantage of our nation's technological strengths.
Modernization is essential as we prepare to enter a new century. A smaller army requires
increased lethality, and obsolete equipment must be replaced. The Army's modernization
objectives — project the force, protect the force, win the information war, conduct precision
strikes, and dominate the maneuver battle — serve to focus our modernization efforts
Leader development, the sixth imperative, is key to Army success in peacetime as well
as in combat. Today's soldiers are tomorrow's leaders. They take time to develop, but the
development of confident, competent, and professional military and civilian leaders is our most
enduring contribution to the future of the Army and the nation
The Army's second challenge is to gain stability in the force The personnel drawdown,
base closures and realignments were anticipated, but increased operational commitments have
added to recent turbulence. In order to forge a 21st century Army, we must gain a level of
stability in personnel, quality of life, installations, and funding.
The Anny's most important resource is its people As General Abrams said, the Army
is not made up of people; the Army is people In order to continue attracting and retaining the
quality people vital to the Army's success, we must stabilize the force and ease personnel
turbulence. No amount of training or technologically superior equipment will suflBce if we do
not have enough quality people to accomplish what the nation demands. Numbers do matter.
The force is being stretched by commitments that require soldiers in operational units to deploy
away fi"om home station and family for 138 days a year, on average. We are concerned that we
may have reached the limit on how small the Army can be and still credibly accomplish assigned
missions. The Army must remain of sufiBcient size, strength, and capabiUty.
The quality of life of our soldiers, civilian employees, and family members is an
important factor in ensuring we attract and retain quality soldiers. It is vitally important to their
commitment and to Army readiness. We are committed to ensuring they receive adequate pay,
stable retirement benefits, health care, and housing We also are working to remedy those issues
unique to Reserve Component soldiers and Army civilian employees who we call on to deploy
with the force.
Soldiers are our Credentials
186
Executive Swunmary
The Army is making a concerted effort to reengineer our installations. We are
converting our installations into power projection bases capable of moving and sustaining a
force anywhere in the world while continuing to provide an adequate living and working
environment. Under the Army's strategy for guiding the transformation of installations, we have
instituted numerous programs that will improve both efiBciency and capability.
The Army also needs stability in its budget Maintaining and modernizing the world's
premier Army costs money. The dollars on which the Army depends have steadily decreased in
real terms. Since 1989, our budget has decreased by 38 percent in constant dollars. Sustaining
a high quality force within the Army's current dollar constraints will require choices between
today's operational readiness and the needed investment in modernization and future readiness.
Today, Army modernization is badly in need of more resources. Scarce modernization
resources are one of the Army's toughest challenges and require that we execute a strategy of
buying a limited number of new weapons, while extending the lives and improving the
capabilities of existing systems. But ultimately, the modernization necessary to maintain the
technological edge that allows us to dominate the battlefield can only occur with additional
resources. We continue to search for ways to overcome shortfalls, but if modernization remains
underfunded, the Army's long-term readiness and quality of the future force may be at risk.
The third major challenge confi-onting America's Army is becoming more efiBcient. We
intend to gamer savings to pay for a force structure commensurate with operational
commitments, to increase investment in essential modernization programs, and to increase
spending on quality of life programs. The Army is emphasizing financial stewardship at every
level and is aggressively seeking to get the most out of scarce resources by fundamentally
changing our operating practices. All reasonable avenues to avoid costs and generate savings
are being explored. These include reviewing business practices, revising policies, and proposing
organizational changes.
The Army, widely acknowledged as setting the standard for financial management
reform within the Defense Department, continues to implement governmental initiatives
designed to make government work better and cost less. These initiatives include the National
Performance Review, the Chief Financial OfBcers Act of 1990, and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.
The Army is developing an Army-wide efficiency strategy. We will use comparable
industry efforts as benchmarks for the Army's business operations. Processes, programs, and
organizations are all under review. Our goal is to generate significant savings by driving down
the cost of doing business, husbanding constrained resources, and continuing to adopt sound
business practices.
Equally important is the fundamental redesign of our institutional forces. We will
reduce the number of major army commands, divest the Army of those functions that are not
absolutely essential, and reallocate resources to support our core capabilities. At the same time.
Soldiers are our Credentials
187
Executive Summary
we are conducting comprehensive reviews of all our headquarters field operating and staff
support agencies. We expect to reduce significantly the number of headquarters agencies, and
we will explore every opportunity to privatize or out-source a number of administrative support
functions.
Several cost-saving programs and initiatives already instituted by the Army are now
coming to fhiition. Examples are Total Asset Visibility, which enables the Army to continuously
track the flow of equipment and suppUes from factory to foxhole, and Integrated Sustainment
Maintenance, which maximizes the Army's sustaining base repair capability and provides a
focused logistics effort. Additionally, the Army has streamlined and reengineered several
acquisition programs Each of these efforts makes the Army a more efficient, productive, and
cost-effective organization today, and they each promise to generate increased savings in the
years ahead.
As we look to the future, the 21st century holds unprecedented challenges and
opportunities for America's Army. The nature of warfare is changing as we enter the
information age. The principles and root causes of war, however, wiU not change, nor will the
consequences of being unprepared to fight and win. Our adversaries will be spread across the
continuum of conflict, fi^om irregular forces — such as ethnic militias, terrorists, and drug cartels
— to the standing armies of foreign powers armed with weapons of mass destruction.
In anticipation of the coming millennium, the Army is
P Q f Q Q transitioning from an industrial-age, threat-based. Cold War
— Army to an information-age, capabilities-based Army — a
ground force with the capabilities necessary to conduct
simultaneous and seamless operations across the spectrum
of conflict. Force XXI is our comprehensive approach to
this transformation. Simply stated. Force XXI projects our
quality soldiers into the 21st century and provides them the
right doctrine, organization, and training; and the best
equipment, weapons, and sustaiimient our nation can provide. The product of our Force XXI
process will be a versatile army with the capabilities that America needs for the next century —
Army XXI. Our civilian and military leadership is committed to forging a 21st century Army
organized, equipped, and manned to maximize the potential of the information age
America's Army has changed significantly in the past five years — in the way it thinks,
in the way it operates, and in the way it conducts business. Today, the Army is a technologically
enhanced Total Force composed of outstanding soldiers and civiUan employees, ready to meet
the challenges of an uncertain world. That world has required an increased operational
commitment, the pace of which is not likely to abate To ensure the quality of the future force,
we must ensure that sufficient resources are provided to meet those operational requirements,
to maintain readiness, to conduct essential modernization, and to improve quality of life
programs for the world's premier land force — America's Army.
Soldiers are our Credentials
188
"In today's international security climate, the United
States has to respond quickly and, often, forcefully, to a
range of contingencies."
Secretary of the Army,
Togo D. West, Jr.
"Operational deployments have gone up dramatically
since 1989. It is not a totally peaceful and stable world
that we live in."
General Dennis J. Reimer
189
1. AMERICA'S ARMY TODAY
America 's Army has proudly served the Nation for over two centuries, providing for the
common defense and serving in countless other ways It is a unique institution bound closely to
American society and culture. The Army's focus has changed from a Cold War, forward-
deployed force to a mostly U.S.-based, power projection force. Although smaller now than at any
time since before World War II, the Army is being called upon for an increasing number of
diverse missions around the world This accelerated pace has meant more fi'equent and longer
deployments for America's soldiers At the same time, constraints on resources devoted to
defense make it more challenging to balance operatiorud requirements, readiness, moderniza-
tion, and quality of life.
The Environment Today
Complex Global Security
Environment
Ethnic, religious, territorial and
economic tensions, held in check by the
pressures of bipolar global competition,
erupted when Cold War constraints dis-
solved. The world has entered a period of
radical and often violent change. The threats
today are more diverse, yet less predictable,
than during any other period in our history;
they are, however, just as real.
The United States faces no immedi-
ate threat to its national survival. Still, our
worldwide interests require that we remain
engaged in the world. The National Military
Strategy notes four principal dangers to
which we must be prepared to respond:
regional instability, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, transnational
dangers, and threats to democracy and
reform. Already, America has committed its
forces to respond to such dangers nearly 40
times in the short period since the fall of the
Beriin Wall.
Regional instability, often based on
ethnic or territorial disputes, is evident
throughout the world Somalia, Rwanda,
Haiti, and Bosnia are just a few examples of
countries where America's interests have
been affected by instability Some regional
powers, those with strong conventional
armies and aggressive modernization pro-
grams, can threaten American interests
directly. In addition, thousands of nuclear,
biological and chemical warheads and strate-
gic delivery systems exist throughout the
world. These weapons of mass destruction
could present a very real danger in the hands
of terrorists or rogue states Terrorism, drug
trafficking, and other transnational dangers
exceed the capabilities of any single nation to
resolve while posing a significant threat to all
if left unchecked In response to threats to
democracy and reform, the United States is
committed to strong, active support for
nations transitioning into the community of
democratic nations. The failure of demo-
cratic reform would adversely affiect our
nation and our interests.
190
Diminishing Resources
In today's complex global environ-
ment, the Army must remain trained and
ready, versatile, engaged overseas with our
friends and trading partners, and capable of
projecting America's power worldwide It
takes significant resources to maintain such
an Army Resource levels affect the number
and quality of soldiers and Army civilians,
the pace of training, modernization, and
maintenance of equipment and facilities.
Since 1989, the Army's budget has
decreased by 38 percent in constant dollars,
while personnel strength has decreased by 35
percent Yet we are committed to more
operations than were anticipated with the
conclusion of the Cold War, with fewer sol-
diers and resources to execute those opera-
tions. The Army's share of the Department
of Defense budget averaged 26 3 percent
during fiscal years 1989 to 1996. It will
decrease to an average of 23 6 percent dur-
ing fiscal years 1997 through 2001.
Average % Shares of DoD Budget
The Army also has the lowest per-
centage (13) of the Department of Defense
budget for Research, Development and
Acquisition (RDA) Army RDA funds are
so low that necessary modernization is
extremely difficult in spite of the fact that the
Army has shed facilities and force structure
as resources have declined.
The Defense Department invests 32% of
its budget in RDA - for the Services and
Defense Agencies
Since 1989, the Army has closed 674
facilities worldwide (8 1 in the United States,
572 in Europe, 1 7 in Korea and the Pacific,
and 4 in Panama) At the same time, the
active Army reduced in size from 18
divisions to 10; the Army Reserve has
reduced from 29 command and control
headquarters and training divisions to 10
support commands and 7 training divisions,
and the National Guard has reduced from 10
divisions and 23 brigade equivalents to 8
divisions, 15 enhanced brigades, 2 separate
brigades, and an infantry scout group. Since
1989, the active Army has reduced by
262,000 soldiers; our civilian workforce has
decreased by 133,000; the Army Reserve has
cut 1 1 1 ,000 soldiers; and the Army National
Guard has reduced 90,000.
191
More and Expanded Missions
In spite of its smaller size, the Army's
activities today are more demariding, more
diverse, and more soldier-intensive than at
any peacetime period during the Cold War
Operational deployments have increased
over 300 percent since 1989. On any given
day, over 21,500 soldiers are deployed from
their home stations to countries around the
world The amount of time deployed yearly
averages 138 days for soldiers in operational
units At the same time, we maintain about
125,000 soldiers forward-stationed in
Europe, Panama, and the Pacific
In the past eighteen months, Amer-
ica's soldiers have upheld democratic princi-
ples in Haiti; responded to a second threat to
regional stability in Southwest Asia, deliv-
ered relief supplies to Rwandan refugees,
reinforced peace on the Sinai Peninsula; sup-
ported refugees in Panama, the Caribbean,
and the Pacific; treated wounded in Croatia,
demonstrated resolve
in Macedonia; de-
terred aggression in
Korea, helped keep
the peace between
Peru and Ecuador;
and began peace-
keeping duty in
Bosnia
At home, Amer-
ican soldiers have
assisted local authori-
ties in fighting fires in
the Pacific North-
west; aided flood vic-
tims in the south and
midwest; provided
relief supplies, logis-
tical support, a hospital, and other equipment
in the aftermath of Hurricane Marilyn; con-
tributed substantially to the counterdrug
activities of federal, state, and local drug law
enforcement agencies; and provided health
care to underserved populations in the
United States through the Army National
Guard's Operation Guard Care.
For the foreseeable future, US inter-
ests will require the Army to remain engaged
in the world This is a simple matter of fact
America has forged economic, cultural, and
security links to nations all around the globe
The Army's challenge in this environment is
to balance readiness, modernization, and
quality of life while continuing to respond to
threats ranging from regional wars to peace
operations The Army must remain prepared
to confront any future threat. As an instru-
ment of American policy, the Army must be
ready to perform a variety of activities to
influence the international environment.
American soldiers cross the Sava River on a pontoon bridge to begin keeping the peace m
Bosnia. Such operational deployments have increased 300 percent since 1989.
192
The Army Vision
The world's best Army—trained and ready for victory.
A Total Force of quality soldiers and civilians:
A values-based organization
An integral part of the joint team
Equipped with the most modem weapons and equipment the
country can provide
Able to respond to out nation's needs
Changing to meet challenges of today. ..tomorrow.. .and the
21st century
The Army's Role
The Army's employment is the ultimate symbol of American will. It is an indispensable
component of the U.S. national security strategy of engagement and enlargement, and is essential
to deterring or defeating an adversary. The Army has been, is, and will remain a strategic and
necessary force.
Fundamental Purpose
The Army exists to fight and win the
nation's wars The Army ably fulfilled its
role throughout the formative years of the
nation The Army's role has expanded in the
modem era to include defense of U.S.
national interests on a global scale. Whether
acting unilaterally or as part of a coalition,
the Army provides the joint or combined
force commander the capability to achieve
land force dominance — dominance that is
attained through the application of appropri-
ate overwhelming combat power. Mission
success, with minimum casualties and collat-
eral damage, is accomplished by the world's
best soldiers, employing the most modem
equipment, trained and led by superior lead-
ers applying effective doctrine.
The Army is designed to compel,
deter, reassure and support. When all else
fails, the Army compels adversaries to yield
to our nation's will, as evidenced by recent
operations to compel Noriega to leave
Panama, Sadam Hussein to depart from
Kuwait, and the military junta to leave Haiti.
The Army deters others fi'om actions hostile
to our nation's interests by maintaining a
trained and ready force, as demonstrated by
our long-standing presence in Europe and
Korea. The Army reassures friends and
allies. We are a visible symbol of U.S. com-
mitment to stand firm against any extemal
threat to their sovereignty. Our deployment
of PATRIOT missiles to Korea reassured
Korean allies, and the deployment of forces
to Haiti stabilized the political situation and
provided time for democratic development.
The Army also reassures allies in Kuwait, the
Sinai, Macedonia, and many other places
around the world. Finally, the Army sup-
ports communities within the United States.
For decades, the Army has provided military
support to civil authorities during natural
disasters, civil disturbances, and other emer-
gencies requiring humanitarian assistance.
193
Strategic Force of Necessity
While specific threats to the United
States have changed, the Anny's relevance
endures. The Army is America's strategic
land combat force and provides the capabil-
ity for sustained combat operations. The
Anny's light forces — airborne, air assault,
and light infantry — provide the nation a
versatile, strategic force projection and
forcible entry capability They also have the
ability to operate in restricted terrain, such as
mountains, jungles, and urban areas. Heavy
forces — armored and mechanized —
provide a mobile warfare capability. Special
operations forces provide capabilities
uniquely suited to the nation's security
requirements. The proper mix of light,
heavy, and special operations units generates
overwhelming combat power. With these
forces, stationed overseas and in the United
States, the nation has the ability to put a
trained and ready contingency force on the
ground anywhere in the world on short
notice. Furthermore, as proven most
recently in Haiti, the Army can reestablish
civil infi^astructure, and bring order and
stability The Army provides our national
leaders great flexibility in dealing with chal-
lenges to our national interests Because of
this, the Army provides the National Com-
mand Authority with a unique, necessary
tool of statecraft.
Force of Decision
The Army provides the capability for
decisive victory. Combined with the air and
naval forces, the Army provides the nation
with the ability to employ its military might
in support of national policy; however, the
conduct of sustained land operations forms
the core of the nation's ability to dominate
an adversary. Wars are won on the ground
Only the Army can dominate the land, its
populace and other resources. The sight of
an American soldier, standing sentry next to
a firmly planted American flag, is our
nation's strongest signal of determination to
prevail.
The Army affects long-term, lasting
change. Against any opponent, in any region
of the world, the Army has the assets and
staying power to bring any conflict to a suc-
cessful conclusion While an opponent
might be able to avoid our naval forces or
endure punishment from the air, it cannot
ignore the application of military force on its
own land From major wars, through lesser
conflicts, to peace operations, America's
Army is the force of decision.
"You can fly over a land forever, you may bomb il.
atomize it. pulverize it and wipe il clean of life but if
you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for
civilization you must do this on the ground, the way
the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men
into the mud. "
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War
Supporting the National Security
Strategy
With new threats come new opportu-
nities. American leadership is essential to
calming a troubled worid while capitalizing
on its opportunities. Focusing on these
threats and opportunities, our national secu-
rity strategy is one of engagement and
enlargement Its goals are to enhance our
194
security, bolster our economic prosperity,
and promote democracy Our engagement
will be selective, focusing on our own
national interests and our ability to make a
difference. The strategy stresses preventive
diplomacy in order to resolve problems,
reduce tensions, and defuse crises before
they become conflicts. This is accomplished
through such means as support for democ-
racy, economic assistance, overseas military
presence, military-to-military contacts, and
involvement in multilateral negotiations.
The nation's military capabilities are essential
to executing this strategy. We are the secu-
rity partner of choice in many regions, and
we provide the foundation for stability
throughout the world.
Supporting the National Military
Strategy
The National Military Strategy calls
for flexible and selective engagement. Its
objectives are to promote stability and thwart
aggression America's Army is engaged
worldwide on a continual basis and con-
tributes substantially to both objectives
through its overseas presence and power
projection capability.
Our overseas presence reassures
friends and deters potential enemies. It also
can reduce the time it takes to respond to
crises by positioning forces near potential
trouble spots. The Army's overseas presence
ranges from highly visible forces stationed
permanently overseas, to periodic deploy-
ments for exercises, assistance to other
nations, prepositioned equipment, military-
to-military contacts, and execution of diverse
military operations On any given day,
America's Army is engaged in a variety of
missions, in countries all over the world
Our overseas presence provides visible proof
of the nation's commitment to defend Ameri-
can interests and those of our allies
While the Army's forward-deployed
forces are capable of responding quickly to
crises, the bulk of the Army's contingency
forces for crisis response are based in the
continental United States The existence of
a credible power projection capability com-
plements the Army's overseas presence by
acting as a strong deterrent to potential
adversaries It provides our national leaders
great flexibility in employing military force
Our ready and versatile Army is
essential to fulfilling the nation's requirement
for overseas presence and power projection.
We continue to refine and enhance our
power projection capabilities while providing
a continual overseas presence through
forward-stationing and operational de-
ployments, in close to 70 countries on any
given day.
Army Missions
Provide a credible deterrent to those states hostile to our nation's
interests. If deterrence fails, project power into the region rapidly,
defend our interests, and achieve decisive victory.
Provide forces forward deployed, promoting regional stability by
demonstrating a commitment to our friends and a credible deterrence
against aggression.
Be prepared to participate in multilateral efforts to broker settlements
of international conflict and to bolster fledgling democracies.
Cooperation with allies is extremely important.
Be prepared to conduct diverse missions such as counterterrorism,
punitive attacks, noncombatant evacuation, counterdrug operations,
nation assistance, humanitarian and disaster relief.
195
Overseas Presence
America's Amiy is both a power projection force and a major contributor to U.S.
overseas presence. Deployed or stationed around the world, America's Army serves the nation
on the front lines of the world's trouble spots. Approximately 125,000 American soldiers are
stationed throughout the world in forward units, while on any given day, another 21,500 soldiers
are deployed from their home stations to contingencies around the globe. Each contributes to
deterring aggression, promoting stability, strengthening alliances, and maintaining American
presence in regions vital to national interests.
■^p?^
The Army . . . engaged around the world
— protecting the national interests,
supporting the National Security Strategy
Southwest Asia Southwest Asia con-
tinues to demand a high level of Army
involvement. Enforcement of UN resolu-
tions, as well as commitments to our allies in
the region, require the continuing presence
of Army forces. Throughout the past year,
the Army demonstrated U.S. commitment to
the security of its allies and to the mainte-
nance of peace in the region. Army efforts
included training exercises and operational
deployments. Multinational and joint exer-
cises — such as BRIGHT STAR in Egypt
and INTRINSIC ACTION in Kuwait —
provided important training for the Army
and host-nation forces. These exercises
featured the deployment of Army combat,
combat support, and combat service support
units from the United States and Europe.
The deployment of Army combat forces to
Kuwait provides a US presence in this
volatile area, serves as a credible deterrent,
and promotes stability in the region. Addi-
tionally, over 1 500 soldiers with fixed wing
aircraft, helicopters, and other support con-
tinue to assist Joint Task Force SOUTH-
ERN WATCH in monitoring no-fly areas
and support Operation PROVIDE COM-
FORT to protect the Kurds in northern Iraq.
The Army continues to provide
regional peacekeeping forces to the Multina-
196
tional Force and Observer (MFO) organiza-
tion monitoring the Israeli-Egyptian border,
as agreed to in the Camp David Accords
The United States has contributed to this
effort, along with 10 other nations, for 13
years. The Army provides nearly 1000 sol-
diers to this mission, mainly from light
infantry battalions. They are rotated every
six months; others serve one-year tours to
provide logistical support to the entire multi-
national force. The Army conducted a
unique MFO rotation in 1995; a composite
battalion of the 4-505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment assumed the MFO mission from
20 January to 24 July. The task force com-
position was 80 percent Army National
Guard and Army Reserve and 20 percent
Active Component. A total of 401 Guard
and 45 Reserve soldiers reported for duty.
Southwest Asia will continue to be
important to the United States in the years
ahead because of the region's energy
resources and strong U.S. political and mili-
tary ties to many of the region's countries.
The Army will continue to promote stability
in the region by providing overseas presence,
strengthening ties with our allies, and closely
monitoring the activities of our potential
adversaries.
Pacific Rim. The Army contributes signifi-
cantly to the overseas presence of U.S.
forces in the Pacific region with a total of
50,000 soldiers based in Korea, Hawaii,
Alaska, and Japan. For the U.S. Pacific
Command, they provide a centrally located,
rapidly deployable force as well as the ability
to participate in nation assistance programs
and military-to-military contacts. Special
Operations Forces are also continually pre-
sent throughout the region, providing over-
seas presence by conducting foreign internal
defense missions.
In the Republic of Korea, the Army,
as part of the Combined Forces Command,
has continued to deter North Korean aggres-
sion and has promoted stability on the penin-
sula for over 40 years. Army forces, in
conjunction with the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Korea, maintain a constant vigil
against North Korean aggression American
and South Korean forces, together in com-
bined headquarters, regularly exercise and
closely coordinate plans for the defense of
the Republic of Korea.
A Special Forces Medical Officer provides medical
assistance in Thailand.
Throughout the remainder of the
Pacific Rim, the Army is engaged with over
35 Pacific nations in exercises, joint training,
exchanges, conferences, and humanitarian
assistance operations. U.S. Army, Pacific
directs the Pacific, Armies Management
Seminar, which arranges periodic symposia
on topics of broad interest. The Army
conducts staff talks with Japan and Korea on
a regular basis. Additionally, the Army
participates in humanitarian and civic action
programs, such as construction and medical
projects, throughout the region. These pro-
grams enhance professional bonds between
the Army and the armed forces of those
countries and improves host-nation living
standards. Finally, Pacific Command has
named the Army the principal military agent
assisting law enforcement agencies combat-
ing illegal drug trafficking.
U.S. Army, Pacific has soldiers per-
manently assigned to the Investigation and
197
Recovery Team of Joint Task Force FULL
ACCOUNTING, which conducts investiga-
tions, excavations, and recovery operations
of missing American service personnel from
the Vietnam War This support includes
explosive ordnance disposal and medical
support to the Investigation and Recovery
Team.
Europe. Europe continues to play an
important role in Army operations. US
Army, Europe, is no longer focused on War-
saw Pact aggression It has shifted from a
Central European to a regional focus It is
trained and ready for operations ranging
from combat to humanitarian assistance It
participates in multinational formations, adds
stability to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO), possesses power projection
capability, and is prepared to receive and
sustain reinforcing units from the United
States.
The Army maintains approximately
65,000 soldiers in Europe and stores pre-
positioned equipment on the continent to
facilitate rapid reinforcement of those forces
The Army's permanently assigned forces in
Europe are a visible affirmation of US com-
mitment to NATO
Since 1991, the Army has reduced
combat battalions in Europe from 147 to 37,
reduced 39 military communities to eight
area support groups, returned 505 installa-
tions and 15,100 buildings to host nations,
and removed all nuclear and chemical
weapons. The Army has reduced its combat
structure in Europe from two corps with four
divisions and two armored cavalry regiments
to one corps with two divisions
US Army, Europe, soldiers are con-
tinually involved in numerous multinational
exercises and operations. In 1995, they par-
ticipated in six "Partnership for Peace" Exer-
cises involving 22 of the 27 nations partici-
pating in NATO's "Partnership for Peace"
program. In Operation ABLE SENTRY, a
reinforced mechanized infantry company
performs an observation and reporting mis-
sion as part of the UN Preventive Deploy-
ment Force in Macedonia; and soldiers con-
tinue to support Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT Army soldiers have also sup-
plied humanitarian assistance to the states of
the former Soviet Union, and recently began
enforcing the peace in Bosnia in support of
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR This oper-
ation will employ approximately 32,000 U.S.
military personnel — 20,000 in Bosnia,
7,000 in Hungary and Italy, and 5,000 in
Croatia The prepondance of these forces
will be Army soldiers
Approximately 30,000 soldiers will support Operatio
JOINT ENDEAVOR in the Balkans.
Western Hemisphere. In the western
hemisphere, the Army supports two unified
commands — the US Atlantic Command
and the US. Southern Command The Army
has approximately 3000 soldiers permanently
stationed in Latin America, while hundreds
more deploy on a temporary basis to partici-
pate in joint and multinational exercises,
nation-building activities, counterdrug oper-
ations, and civic action programs. These
activities are particularly important to
promoting stability in nations adjusting to
democratic rule
198
In the past year. Army soldiers pro-
vided the bulk of the force supporting the
UN Mission in Haiti That mission, sched-
uled to end in April, 1996, is assisting the
Government of Haiti in maintaining a secure
and stable environment, developing a public
security force, facilitating the development
of a functional government, and repatriating
Haitian migrants. Ongoing Army operations
include security for nongovernmental orga-
nization food convoys and high-visibility
presence patrols. The Army also provides a
quick reaction force to the UN Mission and
support for Haitian National Police training,
which started at Fort Leonard Wood, Mis-
souri in June 1995. Approximately 5275
students will participate in the training,
which is scheduled to conclude in early
1996.
The Army also assists in migrant
operations at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba by
performing security and combat service sup-
port functions.
Today, the Army is engaged with
every Latin American nation except
Nicaragua and Cuba. The Army participates
in the biannual Conference of American
Armies and regularly holds staff talks with
countries throughout the region. It conducts
civic action, medical, and engineer opera-
tional deployments throughout the hemi-
sphere; it funds a variety of delegation visits
through the Latin American Cooperation
Fund; and it hosts the multinational School
of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia.
Additionally, much of the U.S. Southern
Command's internal development program is
built around the capabilities of Army Special
Operations Forces.
The Army's work fosters profes-
sional militaries throughout the region, pro-
motes human rights, and supports the
national counterdrug strategy. Additionally,
Operation SAFE BORDER, which began in
March 1995, assists in the peaceful settle-
ment of the border dispute between Peru and
Ecuador. The Army provides support per-
sonnel, helicopters, and US observers to
this effort As part ofthe withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Panama, Fort Davis and Fort
Gulick were officially transferred to the
Government of Panama on September 2,
1995. This transfer marks a significant mile-
stone in the implementation of the Panama
Canal Treaty of 1977.
Africa. Africa is strategically important as
a major contributor to the world supply of
raw materials and minerals. Army activities
on that continent are designed to promote
stability and support the U.S. commitment to
economic, political, and social development.
The United States seeks to foster regional
stability and the growth of democratic insti-
tutions by assisting African governments in
protecting their natural resources and in
resisting destabilizing outside influences.
The Army provides US European Com-
mand and U.S. Central Command with a
range of capabilities for potential employ-
ment in the region. For example, in 1994 the
Army contributed to the US. government's
response to the desperate need for humani-
tarian relief operations in Rwanda by provid-
ing clean water to combat outbreaks of
cholera, assisting in burying the dead, and
integrating the transportation and distribu-
tion of relief supplies Additionally, the
Army school system trains officers and
soldiers from the region and conducts a
variety of exchange programs.
Army International Activities Plan. The
Army International Activities Plan (AIAP)
establishes guidance, methods, and means
for the conduct of Army activities with the
armed forces, governments, and people of
foreign nations. An effective international
activities plan strengthens collective defense
measures and helps meet the legitimate secu-
10
199
rity needs of friends and allies by improving
their ability to protect mutual security inter-
ests Successful international activities
strengthen army-to-army relations, promote
allied and friendly support of U.S. foreign
policy and military strategic objectives, and
lower US force requirements to meet
regional contingencies.
The scope of international activities
covers four broad areas. These are politico
military programs, such as army-to-army
relations, training exercises, counterpart
visits, and other foreign military interaction
programs, multinational force compatibility
programs to improve interoperability in the
multinational environment; materiel techni-
cal programs conducted primarily with
industrialized countries to foster defense
cooperation in armaments, and security
assistance activities that provide highly visi-
ble instruments for achieving foreign policy
and national security objectives.
Power Projection
America's Army today is a power projection force capable of responding rapidly to threats
against national interests anywhere in the world Our power projection Army provides national
leaders the option of responding to crises with tailored infantry, armored, airborne, air assault, and
special operations forces In partnership with the Air Force and Navy, the Army, based largely in
the United States, can strategically project a ground combat force capable of delivering decisive
victory.
America's Army is capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict It is prepared to
win major regional conflicts, conduct peace operations, and deliver humanitarian assistance The
essential characteristics of the Army are readiness, deployability, versatility, and sufficiency
Additionally, it must be capable of dominating maneuver, conducting precision strikes, winning
the battlefield information war, protecting the joint force, and projecting and sustaining combat
power.
Power Projection Characteristics
Readiness. Readiness, the essence of
power projection, is the ability to field a wide
range and mix of forces as they are needed
Selected active forces are prepared to deploy
initial elements in 18 hours Other active
forces are prepared to follow as mobility
assets become available Selected Reserve
Component forces are prepared to deploy or
to man deployment facilities within a few
days or even hours Other reserve forces are
prepared to deploy only after longer periods
of training. Today, the Reserve Component
is essential to flilfilling operational require-
ments.
Deployability. Our goal is to project the fol-
lowing forces rapidly anywhere in the world;
a light brigade in 4 days, a light division in 12
days, a heavy brigade afloat in 15 days; 2
heavy divisions from the continental United
States in 30 days, and a 5 division contin-
gency corps, with its associated support and
combat service, support in 75 days
The Army relies on its partnership
with naval and air forces, including mobilized
assets from the civil sector, such as the Civil
200
Reserve Air Fleet and Ready Reserve Force
to achieve this level of power projection. We
need all 19 medium-speed roll-on roll-off
ships planned for by the Navy, and the 120
C-17 Globemasters being fielded by the Air
Force
Deployable Force Posture
' NEED SHIFS TO SWA IN IS-U DAYS
' NEEDSEAUFT ENHANCEMENTS
TRIAD
'must PROVIDE ~
CAPABa-rrv to rapidly
PROJECT ARMY PCWCES
The Army also must do its part. We
are responsible for moving the force from
"fort to port" and possess an extensive fleet
of rail cars and other infrastructure to do so
We have made significant improvements in
these areas and will continue to do so in the
future. For instance, we have upgraded on-
post rail lines and loading docks, acquired
more port handling equipment, and pur-
chased additional heavy duty flatcars. Addi-
tionally, we are restoring our global network
of equipment pre-positioned overseas, pre-
positioning additional equipment afloat, and
streamlining our operational stocks and sup-
plies. In addition, we are building a training
prepositioned set at the National Training
Center. This will provide units the opportu-
nity to train under the conditions they are
likely to experience in the event of a major
deployment to a hostile area or in support of
humanitarian or peace operations.
Versatility. The Army's force structure of
heavy, light, and special operations forces
coupled with the balance between active and
Reserve Component forces provides the
nation with a versatile force that can rapidly
respond across the range of potential mis-
sions Versatility also is built into the design
and training of Army units and into the
development of Army leaders. Versatility
enables American combat infantry battalions
to be the best infantry in the world and also
the best peacekeepers in the world.
Sufficiency. Decisive victory requires ade-
quate force — enough force to ensure suc-
cess when combined with the elements of
other services and our allies. The Army
maintains a variety of unit types that are not
completely interchangeable; therefore, the
right mix of forces is essential. To confront
the myriad of threats and meet the require-
ments of a wide range of missions, the Army
needs a mix of heavy (armored and mecha-
nized) light, and special operations forces.
In addition to combat forces, the
Army also provides sustainment to the joint
force — rations, water, common items of
ammunition, bulk fuel, transportation, and
other services. To accomplish its Army mis-
sions and executive agency functions
throughout a theater, the Army requires a
robust mix of combat support and combat
service support forces For the foreseeable
future, the operational pace necessitated by a
troubled world requires an integrated force
drawn from the Active and Reserve Compo-
nents along with the civilian work force,
specifically structured to meet the require-
ments of the National Military Strategy
Power Projection Capabilities
Executing sustained land combat and
other diverse missions for which the nation
uses force requires that the Army possess
the capability to dominate maneuver, con-
duct precision strikes, protect the force, win
the battlefield information war, and project
and sustain combat power. These capabili-
12
201
ties provide the joint commander the
resources to establish control of the land in a
wide range of environments for as long as it
takes to accomplish the mission.
Power Projection Capabilities
Precision Strike Win Information War
Dominate Maneuver. We achieve final
dominance of the battlefield through the
simultaneous application of fires and control
of terrain This simultaneous employmem of
combat power throughout the battiespace
permits the rapid exploitation of enemy
vulnerabilities, denies the enemy the
initiative, and leads to its rapid defeat.
Conduct Precision Strikes. Our ability to
execute precision strikes rapidly is essential
to facilitating maneuver and unhinging
enemy actions and plans This requires that
the ground force commander have extensive
sensors to identify targets throughout the
depth of the battiespace, robust command,
control, communications, and intelligence
systems to direct multiple strikes rapidly, and
control of a variety of weapon systems that
can destroy enemy targets.
Win the Battlefield Information War. A
prerequisite for battiespace dominance is
decisive superiority in the collection,
analysis, dissemination, and utilization of
information. Information is a vital force
multiplier. Army efforts in digitizing the
battiespace, developing artificial intelligence,
and integrating 'sensor to shooter' links,
enable the commander to mass the decisive
effects of weapon systems, in less time, and
with more agilify than the adversary.
Protect the Force. Our ability to defeat
an enemy, as well as our ability to deter
potential conflicts, is directly related to our
ability to protect the joint force fi-om threats.
Adequate force protection is achieved
through fully integrated air and theater
missile defense; defense against nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons; and our
ability to detect and destroy these weapons
prior to their employment Further force
protection is achieved by denying adversaries
access to our communications. To be
successful, the ground commander must
have the ability to attack the enemy and to
protect fiiendly forces.
Project and Sustain Combat Power. In
order to achieve national policy objectives
around the world, we must be able to deploy
and sustain the Army America's commit-
ment to power projection is embodied in
programs of all the services The Mobility
Requirements Study identified requirements
for all the Services in support of the National
Military Strategy It cited the need for criti-
cal improvements to the nation's air and
sealift capabilities and continued support of
Army programs such as prepositioned ships
and "fort to port" For its part, the Army
continues to create an infrastructure capable
of rapidly responding to the wide range of
potential sustainment requirements.
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202
Serving at Home
The Army is committed to overseas presence, and it also serves the nation at home.
Throughout the past year, the Army supported domestic relief operations, counterdrug
operations, and other activities benefiting the American people. Just a few of those actions are
outlined below
Disaster Relief. The Army began providing
disaster assistance in Oklahoma City immedi-
ately after the bombing of the Alfred P. Mur-
rah Federal Building. The Army provided
support to the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (FBI), Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Secret Ser-
vice, other federal and state agencies. This
support included providing Army Corps of
Engineer structural and blast effects engi-
neers; medical evacuation helicopters; bomb
dog teams; and coordinated airlift for search
and rescue teams, FBI crime vans, and medi-
cal personnel A total of 793 active Army
and Army Reserve and 465 National Guard
personnel participated in this relief effort.
The Army also assisted the US
Virgin Islands in the aftermath of Hurricane
Marilyn. Army support included ground
transportation for distribution of relief
supplies, logistical support, an 80-bed hospi-
tal, and facilities and equipment to assist
FEMA in command and control. The Army
Corps of Engineers conducted assessments
and contracted for services and supplies
totaling over $161 million. The Corps also
shipped 50,000 gallons of water each day by
barge to the islands, assisted in the restora-
tion of power, and supervised debris
removal. A total of 200 Corps of Engineer
personnel and 670 National Guardsmen sup-
ported the relief effort
The Army also serves the nation
through the National Guard's Operation
GUARDCARE, a two-year pilot program to
provide health care to underserved popula-
tions in the United States. In fiscal year
1995, over 60 communities were visited
with over 20,000 patients served.
Assisting in the aftermath of Hurricane Marilyn.
Army Civil Works Program. Civil Works
missions conducted by the Army Corps of
Engineers are extremely beneficial to the
nation The Army's harbor projects are vital
to the import and export trade. Corps of
Engineers-maintained waterways help move
inter-city cargo, and flood protection pro-
jects have prevented billions of dollars in
damage The Army also produces 25
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203
percent of the nation's hydropower, and
provides water to about 10 million people.
The Anny maintains a force of
approximately 300 military and 27,000 civil-
ians, supported by tens of thousands of
contractor employees, to carry out the Civil
Works program Civil Works provide the
Army experience in many specialized fields
— resulting in a trained and ready force, able
to meet the Army's and the nation's engi-
neering and technical needs.
Civil Works also maintain the Army's
capacity for large scale construction. This
enables the Army to tackle large military
construction missions. The program relies
heavily on contracted services, which lever-
age the Army's capabilities and multiplies its
surge capacity for national emergencies.
Civil Works missions in natural resources,
water quality, flood plain management, and
toxic waste control assist the Army in com-
plying with federal envirorunental statutes
and helps the Army maintain a grass roots
presence in communities across the nation
Counterdrug Operations. The Army
continues to contribute substantially to the
counterdrug activities of federal, state, and
local drug law enforcement agencies
(DLEAs). The Army provides over 4,000
Active Component, National Guard, and
Reserve soldiers on a daily basis to the coun-
terdrug effort. Over 200 Army soldiers and
civilians are permanently assigned to coun-
terdrug joint task forces, and 21 are detailed
to selected federal agencies to assist in coor-
dinating Department of Defense support
The Army provides operational
support, facilities, reconnaissance, mainte-
nance, intelligence analysis, linguistic
support, engineering support, equipment,
training, and planning to DLEAs in the
United States and its territories. The Army
also provides training, aviation support,
intelligence, planning, and reconnaissance
support to U.S. federal DLEAs in foreign
nations. Currently, American soldiers
support counterdrug missions in nine
countries in Latin America and in selected
Caribbean nations. The Army also extends
support to the counterdrug activities of
countries in Southeast and Southwest Asia.
During 1995, the Army's commit-
ment to the nation's counterdrug strategy
continued to expand: operations along the
U.S. southwest border increased over the
previous year's levels, and soldiers partici-
pated in over 100 overseas deployments.
Military intelligence analysts and linguists
also continued to be in high demand by
DLEAs as was the Army Aviation Center at
Fort Rucker, Alabama, which trained pilots
and crews. Training of DLEAs by Army
mobile training teams also increased signifi-
cantly.
The Army Reserve and National
Guard execute major roles in counterdrug
operations. This year the Army Reserve
conducted 202 missions involving 1785
soldiers through August 1995, and the
National Guard participated in 8,204 opera-
tions and averaged 3,000 soldiers per day
commited to missions Guard personnel are
in a state active duty status, executing their
respective governor's counterdrug plans by
supporting the US Customs Service, con-
ducting aviation surveillance of suspected
drug activities, manning observation posts
near international borders and clandestine
airfields, eradicating marijuana, and provid-
ing intelligence, data processing, and train-
ing support
1996 Olympics. The Deputy Secretary
of Defense appointed the Secretary of the
Army the Executive Agent for Department
of Defense support to the 1996 Olympic
Games. A Joint Task Force, subordinate to
the Commander, Forces Command, will
IS
204
provide command and control for all active
duty personnel supporting the games and
coordinate with the National Guard elements
also providing support.
The major portion of Army support
to the Olympics will be security support to
the Georgia State Patrol, Atlanta Police
Department, and other law enforcement
agencies. In a state active duty status, the
Army National Guard will assist in maintain-
ing the security of the Olympic village and
event venues. Other Army missions include
aviation support, warehouse space, and
equipment support. It is likely that 8,000 to
10,000 American soldiers will participate in
the operation.
Environmental Stewardship. The Army
recognizes its environmental responsibilities
and is successfully blending its military
mission with environmental stewardship.
The Army is committed to protecting the
nation's environment and conserving natural
resources for future generations. The Army
environmental program is based on the four
major pillars of compliance, restoration,
prevention, and conservation.
The Army spent almost $600 million
in 1 995 to comply with environmental laws
and regulations, such as the Clean Water Act
and Clean Air Act. The Army has also evalu-
ated contamination from past environmental
practices and initiated restoration through its
Installation Restoration Program. The Army
spent over $395 million in 1995 for environ-
mental restoration at Army installations.
Spending for pollution prevention exceeded
$69 million in 1995 as the Army continued to
make progress in eliminating ozone-
depleting substances and reducing the use of
hazardous materials.
Conservation ensures the future
integrity of valuable national resources, such
as wetlands, endangered species, and historic
and cultural sites. Conservation protects
sensitive resources, repairs impacted training
lands, and ensures proper maintenance and
protection of resources and land for the
Army's future use. The Army spent $51
million on conservation programs in 1995.
Army Corps of Engineer scientists are in the forefront of
efforts to preserve the nation 's wetlands.
Support to Small and Small Disadvantaged
Businesses. The Army remains a leader
among the military services in increasing
small business and small-disadvantaged busi-
ness participation in both the prime contract-
ing and subcontracting arena For the fourth
straight year, the Army improved its perfor-
mance toward meeting or exceeding
Congressional goals for direct prime awards,
subcontract awards, and awards to histori-
cally black colleges and minority institutions.
In fact, during fiscal year 1995, we awarded
the Defense Department's largest single
educational contract ever to a black college
under the aegis of the Historically Black Col-
leges and Universities/Minority Institutions
initiative.
The Army continues to work toward
increased participation of small businesses in
Army contracts and actively supports partici-
pation of small business entities in all areas of
industry. The Army participates actively in
the Mentor-Protege Program, which
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205
provides incentives for prime contractors to
assist small and small-disadvantaged busi-
nesses. Our aggressive commitment was
demonstrated by the award of over $3 65
million in subcontracts to firms under the
program.
Conclusion
The Army, now based largely in the United States, continues to refine and enhance its
power projection capabilities. It provides the nation land force dominance It also is a versatile
force, capable of responding to situations as diverse as regional war, lesser conflicts, and peace
operations It remains a highly trained and professional Army, serving the nation in a challenging
time at home and abroad and contributing to the strategic requirements of power projection and
overseas presence The Army is smaller than at any time since World War II, but is conducting
an ever increasing number of operations throughout the world Today's operational pace is
unprecedented. This means longer and more fi^equent deployments for American soldiers; tough
decisions to allocate scarce resources among readiness, modernization, and quality of life; and an
even greater need to maintain trained and ready forces capable of delivering decisive victory to the
nation.
"Well, you can talk all you want
about it, but if you see troops on
the ground you know America
means business "
Soldier deployed to Kuwait
October 1994
The Army 's employment is the ultimate
symbol of America 's will.
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206
"Readiness remains, unequivocably, our number one
priority. It affects and is affected by everything the
Army does."
Secretary of the Army
Togo D. West, Jr.
"The nation's resources available for defense are
limited, but the uncertainties of today require a ready
force capable of responding quickly and decisively to
protect our nation's needs."
General Dermis J. Reimer
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207
2. THE READINESS CHALLENGE:
BALANCING THE IMPERATIVES
The challenge of maintaining readiness while simultaneously fulfilling worldwide
operational commitments and building America 's 21st century Army requires difficult decisions
and trade-offs. The Army guides its decisions by balancing the fimdamental imperatives that
have shaped the development of today's Army.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
Developing Competent
Leaders
MODERN EQUIPMENT
Modernizing Essential
Equipment
QUAUTY PEOPLE
Recruiting <£ Retaining
Quality Soldiers
DOCTRINE
Executing Revised
Doctrine
TRAINING
Conducting Realistic
Training
FORCE MIX
Employing Appropriate
Force Mix
The first of these imperatives — the
overarching requirement for the Army of
today and tomorrow — is quality people.
Quality people enable the Army to fijlfill
worldwide strategic roles in spite of a rela-
tively small structure Quality people are
versatile enough to respond rapidly to
unforeseen situations They are critical to
successful mission accomplishment
The second imperative is to maintain
forward-looking warfighting doctrine. Doc-
trine is the foundation for the Army's disci-
plined evolution to the future In its doc-
trine, the Army recognizes the need to inte-
grate its capabilities with those of the other
services and of our allies in order to achieve
maximum combat power and effectiveness.
The third imperative is to maintain
the appropriate mix of armored, light, and
special operations forces in the Active and
Reserve Components A proper force mix
ensures the Army's ability to project a
tailored, sustained land combat capability
worldwide.
19
38-160 97-9
208
The fourth imperative is tough, real-
istic training. America's Army has set the
training standard for armies everywhere.
Demanding training, accomplished to high
standards, is an absolute requirement for a
ready force.
The fifth imperative is modern
equipment. The Army continually modern-
izes for one reason: to enhance our warfight-
ing capability. To develop needed cap-
abilities on time, the Army must emphasize
aggressive research and development in the
key areas of operational concepts, unit
designs, materiel, and training innovations.
The sixth imperative is leader devel-
opment. The Army depends on the high
quality of its soldiers, and on the compe-
tence of its leaders Developing leaders of
soldiers and civilians is an important and
lasting contribution to the future Army.
Adherence to these imperatives has
positioned today's Army to address the chal-
lenges of tomorrow and the 21st century.
Only by properly balancing these proven
imperatives will the Army continue to be
trained and ready .
Quality People
The Army must continue to attract and retain America's best young men and women.
The importance of these quality people was clearly demonstrated in operations in Panama,
Southwest Asia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and elsewhere where our soldiers and their leaders
performed superbly under extremely adverse conditions. The Army's success in responding to
these diverse and expanding missions, where versatility and adaptability were essential, validates
the importance of quality people.
Quality people are critical to successful mission accomplishment.
20
The Army needs competent
and flexible soldiers and civilians to
forge the Army of the future. The
challenging global security environ-
ment, the complexity of emerging
technologies, and the diverse mis-
sions being assigned to the Army
will continue to require men and
women of intelligence and dedica-
tion who are able to adapt quickly to
the mission at hand.
Consequently, maintaining
quality soldiers and civilians, as we
forge the 21st century Anny is our
top priority. The Army is com-
mitted to taking care of our soldiers,
civilians, and their families by con-
tinuing to enhance essential quality
209
of life programs, by maintaining a steady
flow of promotions and schooling
opportunities, and by providing adequate
career opportunities.
Recruiting
In fiscal year 1995, the Active Com-
ponent achieved its quality and quantity
goals for enlisted accessions. It accessed
62,929 soldiers, 95 percent of whom pos-
sessed high school diplomas, and 70 percent
of whom scored in the highest Test Score
Categories on the Armed Services Voca-
tional Aptitude Battery Fewer than 2
percent scored in the lowest category The
Army Reserve accessed 48,098 enlisted
soldiers in 1995, exceeding its quality goal
and nearly achieving its quantity goal for
enlisted accessions Of the non-prior service
soldiers, more than 95 percent possessed
high school diplomas, almost 75 percent
scored in the highest test score categories,
and fewer than 2 percent scored in the
lowest The Army National Guard accessed
56,71 1 soldiers in 1995, not quite achieving
quality and quantity goals Over 82 percent
possessed high school diplomas, 54 percent
scored in the highest test score categories,
and fewer than 2 percent scored in the
lowest.
Although the Army achieved its
enlistment goals in 1995, challenges loom on
the horizon In the period fi^om 1989 to
1994, surveys show a 39 percent drop in
young people's propensity to enlist in the
armed forces With the end of the draw-
down, the goal for active Army enlistments
will be about 90,000 yearly Cleariy, for
these reasons, the recruiting environment
will continue to become increasingly
difficult
The Army is ready to face that chal-
lenge. We have already added 350 active
Army recruiters to the force and are adding
another 250 We are also adding $ 1 6 million
to our advertising budget and plan to keep it
at that higher level through the end of the
century We will sustain sound bonuses and
benefits as well These initiatives, coupled
with a professional recruiting organization,
will ensure that the Army is manned with
quality personnel.
Retention
The retention of quality soldiers,
particulariy soldiers in their first term of
service, continues to contribute to personnel
readiness. It is equally important that we
retain the skills and experience of soldiers
leaving the active force by having them
affiliate with Reserve Component units. As
we continue the transition to a smaller
Army, our focus is on the selective retention
of only our top performers
In fiscal year 1995, the Army accom-
plished 104 percent of its initial term reenlist-
ment goal and 100 percent of its mid-career
goal. The transition program into the
Reserve Component for soldiers leaving
active duty was slightly above the goal of
13,500 Enhanced advertising efforts, the
lessened intensity of the drawdown, and
command involvement all played a role in
this success Today's soldiers approaching
reenlistment are high caliber individuals who
entered the Army three to five years ago
This indicates that the future noncommis-
sioned officers corps of the Army will remain
as professional and capable as it is today
The future will present new chal-
lenges in retention Frequent deployments,
instability during the drawdown, and a
perceived loss of benefits have the potential
to affect retention adversely. Soldiers'
quality of life, compensation, and health and
retirement benefits influence their decision to
leave or to remain in the service. Percep-
tions of public support also play a large role
in retaining a strong, quality Army.
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210
Doctrine
America's Army is based on doctrine. Doctrinal principles, tenets, and fijndamentais
guide the conduct of all military operations. The Army's doctrine is based on fundamental, well
understood principles rooted in military experience It applies to Army forces worldwide but is
readily adaptable to the specific strategic and operational requirements of each theater or regional
area Our doctrine is forward-looking and takes advantage of technology to maximize the
application of military power Army doctrine also is the authoritative basis for force design,
materiel acquisition, professional education, individual and unit training It provides an
intellectual foundation for the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures.
FM 100-5, Operations
The Army's capstone manual is FM
100-5, Operations. It explains how the
Army, in conjunction with the other military
services, operates when committed to war
or other military operations. It focuses on
the linkage of the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels of war, and it outlines an oper-
ational concept of simultaneous, continuous,
all-weather, joint and combined land combat
operations across the battlespace. It reflects
the realities of changing security and reource
environments.
The Army's concept of waging war
is to dominate an enemy in space and time.
Through the conduct of decisive joint and
combined land combat operations, we deny
the enemy the physical and psychological
ability to maintain a coherent operational
plan or to respond to battlefield conditions
By continuously and simultaneously apply-
ing the complementary capabilities of all the
services across the battlefield, U.S forces
will overwhelm opponents. By applying
joint and Army doctrine, operational con-
cepts, organizational skills, and mental
agility, we assure decisive victory. Our abil-
ity to conduct simultaneous, synchronized
attacks on multiple objectives using every
tool of the services exemplifies the dawn of
a new age in warfare.
FM 100-5 focuses on decisive land
combat through greater operational flexibil-
ity, improved force projection, and incorpo-
ration of technological advances. At the
same time, it recognizes the Army's role in
joint and coalition operations worldwide
This manual also stresses the importance of
mobilization and deployment. Our doctrine
requires versatile leaders who understand the
requirements of decisive victory and can use
that understanding to ensure success in any
operation.
Joint Doctrine
The tenets of FM 100-5 also guide
the Army's participation in the development
of joint doctrine. Joint and Army doctrine
assists commanders in the conduct of simul-
taneous joint operations over the entire
theater of operations. All of today's military
operations are joint, and the effective coordi-
nation of forces from all the services is
essential for success. Consequently, the
serices and the Joint Staff have developed
joint doctrine. The Joint Doctrine Master
Plan standardizes the development of joint
doctrine, ensures combatant command par-
ticipation, and directs consistency of service
doctrine with joint doctrine
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211
Joint doctrine development is enter-
ing its second phase, known as "Integration
and Improvement " During this phase, we
will assess doctrine through deployments,
exercises, training and simulations. We will
integrate doctrine vertically and horizontally
across all echelons of the services and
expand multinational considerations. There
are currently 63 joint publications, and
almost 40 more are under development.
Multinational Operations
Recent operations in Southwest Asia,
Somalia, and Haiti remind us of the Army's
need to operate in conjunction with the
armed forces of other nations Multinational
operations are an integral part of our nation's
coalition-based defense strategy. To be
successfiil in multinational operations, we
must maximize interoperability and standard-
ization among US forces and our allies.
Multinational doctrine guides the conduct of
coalition operations.
A variety of efforts between the
United States and our major allies, such as
military-to-military exchanges and formal
standardization agreements, are aimed at
improving our ability to operate together
Multinational exercises also contribute to the
development and refinement of common
doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, and
equipment. FM 100-5 provides the basic
framework for developing tactical doctrine
compatible with our allies
Future Doctrine
The Army will continue to be an
institution based in doctrine — that is, doc-
trine will remain the primary means of
embodying the Army's operational concepts.
Changes in our national security strategy,
developments in the human sciences, and
advancements in information technologies
will influence future doctrine. These
advancements, reflected in doctrine, will
inform change in the Army's training, equip-
ment and organization. Future doctrine will
reflect a fluid strategic environment, lessons
learned from operations, emergence of new
warfighting technologies, and the results of
simulations and experiments in our battle
labs.
Versatility will be a key characteristic
of future doctrine. The expanding scope and
unpredictable nature of military operations
require a versatile doctrine to ensure success
in war and other military operations The
21st century Army will also have to work
with other services, foreign forces, and even
nongovernmental agencies in doctrine devel-
opment. Progressive, relevant, realistic, flex-
ible doctrine will be critical to success in the
future.
The Army s concept for waging war is to dominate c
enemy in space and time.
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212
Force Mix
America's Army maintains the appropriate mix of heavy, light, and special operations
units, their supporting elements, and sustaining base activities. These units are organized,
equipped, and trained to deliver the decisive victory demanded by the nation The size and
composition of the force are based on assessments of potential threats and of the capabilities
required to meet them These assessments are tempered by considerations of affordability and
risk.
The Army is now largely based in the
continental United States It is a trained and
ready, power projection army focused on
responding to crises with tailored force pack-
ages While we draw crisis-response contin-
gency forces primarily from the active Army,
these forces rely on the sustainment capabili-
ties of the Reserve Component. Our force
structure will stabilize in 1996 with a 4-
corps, 18-division Total Army. This force
will consist of four active divisions based
overseas (2 in Europe and 2 in the Pacific) to
maintain credible deterrence and to demon-
strate unambiguous commitment to allies
worldwide; four active US. -based contin-
gency-force divisions prepared to deploy as
part of crisis response forces; two active
U.S. -based rapid-response reinforcing divi-
sions; fifleen National Guard enhanced
brigades to serve as reinforcing forces; and
eight National Guard divisions to serve as a
strategic reserve in the event of a protracted
conflict. The Army is conducting a study to
determine how best to utilize Army National
Guard divisions to alleviate identified short-
ages in combat support and combat service
support units.
Heavy Forces
Operation DESERT STORM
demonstrated that heavy forces are essential
in modem maneuver warfare. The Army's
heavy forces — armored and mechanized
infantry divisions equipped with Abrams
tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Apache
attack helicopters, and Crusader advanced
field artillery systems — possess the
firepower necessary to dominate any
opponent on mid- and high-intensity
battlefields and to complement light forces
on lower-intensity battlefields. At the end of
fiscal year 1996, the Active Army will have
four mechanized infantry and two armored
divisions. The Army National Guard will
have two mechanized infantry divisions, two
armored divisions, three medium divisions,
two enhanced armor brigades, five enhanced
mechanized brigades, one enhanced armored
cavalry regiment, and one separate armor
brigade. Through modernization, the Army
will increase the lethality of its heavy forces
to ensure continued dominance into the 21st
century.
Light Forces
Army light forces consist of airborne,
air assault, and light infantry divisions
designed to deploy quickly to trouble spots
worldwide. They provide the nation an
extremely versatile, strategic force projection
and forcible entry capability Light forces
can be integrated with armored forces to
provide a mix of combat power to meet the
requirements of any contingency Integrated
training at our training centers and the educa-
tion of leaders in our school system ensure
24
213
that light and heavy forces can work in
concert Currently, there are four light
divisions in the active Army and one in the
Army National Guard. In addition, the
Guard has seven enhanced infantry brigades,
one separate infantry brigade, and one
infantry scout group
Amiv light forces provide the iialion an extremely versatile,
strategic force projection and forcible entry capability.
Special Operations Forces
The Army's Special Operations
Forces provide a broad range of military
capabilities to support national security
They execute sensitive missions authorized
by the National Command Authority and
also support all Army and joint operations.
These forces include Special Forces, Ranger,
Special Operations Aviation, Psychological
Operations, and Civil Affairs
Special Forces. The Army's Special
Forces units conduct unconventional warfare
and perform special reconnaissance, coun-
terterrorism, and direct action missions
They also train and assist foreign military and
paramilitary forces in internal defense There
are seven Special Forces Groups - five in the
active Army and two in the National Guard
Rangers. Army Rangers are
specially trained light infantry units
organized to deploy rapidly to any region of
the world to conduct special operations
against critical military objectives. The 75th
Ranger Regiment consists of a regimental
headquarters and three Ranger battalions.
Special Operations Aviation (SO A).
Army Special Operations Aviation, with its
specially trained crews and modified aircraft,
provide the unique capability to support the
missions of special operations forces at night
and during adverse weather These unique
aviation assets are organized into an SOA
regiment consisting of three active Army
battalions and one forward-stationed com-
pany
Psychological Operations forces
provide theater commanders with a means to
shorten conflict, reduce casualties, and
achieve military objectives with minimum
force With psychological operations forces,
the commander can communicate US
policy to denied areas and create appropriate
perceptions to facilitate operational success.
The Army maintains two of these groups in
the Army Reserve and one in the active
Army
Civil Affairs units provide the impor-
tant interface between deployed military
forces, the civilian population, and govern-
mental and nongovernmental agencies Civil
Affairs units are directly concerned with the
political, economic, and informational
elements which support the military's
accomplishment of national objectives
There are currently 36 Reserve Civil Affairs
units and one active Civil Affairs battalion
Force Structure Actions and
Trends
The fundamental roles of America's
armed forces are to deter war and, should
deterrence fail, to fight and win Army mis-
sions are derived from the National Security
Strategy and the National Military Strategy
In supporting these strategies. Active Army
25
214
divisions have been reduced from the 1989
level of 18 to the current level of 10, focused
on continued overseas presence and power
projection. Army National Guard divisions,
reduced from 10 to 8, provide a strategic
reserve in the event of a protracted conflict
At the end of fiscal year 1995, total force
strength was 508,038 in the active Army
(down 262,000 from 1989) and 616,000 in
the Reserve Component (down 160,000
from 1989). At the end of fiscal year 1996,
the active Army will have an end strength of
495,000 and the Reserve Component will
have an end strength of 603,000.
In fiscal year 1995, we made several
changes in force structure We inactivated
two brigades (194th Armored Brigade at
Fort Knox, Kentucky and the 3rd Brigade,
25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks,
Hawaii). We realigned the 1st Brigade, 7th
Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington,
as 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The
1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division at Fort
Richardson, Alaska became the 6th Separate
Infantry Brigade and is aligned with the 10th
Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York,
as the division's third brigade for planning
purposes only.
Realignment of the Continental
United States Armies (CONUSAs) also was
completed in 1995. CONUSAs provide
regional oversight of the training and
mobilization of Reserve forces and have
domestic responsibilities, such as disaster
assistance. In 1995, we inactivated the 6th
Army at Presidio of San Francisco, Califor-
nia, and consolidated oversight of Reserve
units under the remaining two CONUSAs,
5th Army at San Antonio, Texas, and 2nd
Army at Fort Gillem, Georgia
Access to Reserve Components
To meet the security needs of the
nation, the Army maintains a balance of
active Army, Army National Guard, and
Army Reserve units and personnel Active
units form the bulk of early deploying forces
during a contingency operation, while high-
priority Guard and Reserve units provide
augmentation support and essential capabili-
ties not found in the active force. As an
operation continues, a larger proportion of
the force comes from the Reserve Compo-
nent. The Guard and Reserve also play an
increasingly important role in peacetime
engagement missions, such as peacekeeping
and humanitarian and civil assistance opera-
tions, while continuing to respond to domes-
tic emergencies. Timely access to the
Reserve Comf)onent remains essential to
successful planning and execution of contin-
gencies.
In 1994, Congress extended the
limits of involuntary service for Reserve
Component units called to active duty under
the Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up
from 90 to 270 days. This initiative has con-
tributed to greater continuity, dependability,
and integration of the Reserve Component
into the conduct of military operations. With
the support of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Army
continues to seek congressional authority to
access the individuals of the Individual
Ready Reserve under Presidential Selective
Reserve Call-Up. The ability to recall
members of the Individual Ready Reserve is
critical to achieving total personnel readiness
of deploying units in a variety of operations.
Access to this essential component is
presently limited to periods of declared
national emergencies and partial mobiliza-
tion.
The October 1993 Active and
Reserve Component Senior Leaders Offsite_
Agreement, endorsed by the Defense
Department, stabilizes the Reserve Compo-
nent end strength at 575,000 (367,00 Guard
and 208,000 Reserve) through fiscal year
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215
1999. It also guides the realignment of func-
tions between the Army Reserve and
National Guard. This realignment places the
preponderance of Reserve Component
combat power within the National Guard,
enabling them to maintain a balanced force.
The Army Reserve will then have a prepon-
derance of combat support and combat
service support units. A total of 22 combat
and 28 aviation units from the Army Reserve
are migrating to the National Guard, while
128 combat support and combat service
support units are migrating from the National
Guard to the Army Reserve. The transfer of
units began in fiscal year 1994 with the
National Guard receiving responsibility for
all Reserve Component Special Forces It
continued in fiscal year 1995 with the
transfer of over 8,000 positions The
transfers are projected for completion in
fiscal year 1997
Like the active Army, the Reserve
Component will have to improve in capabil-
ity while declining in size To improve unit
and individual skills, we have associated 15
enhanced brigades from the National Guard
with active Army combat units for training
The Army will ensure that these units receive
resources sufficient to enable them to begin
deployment to a crisis within 90 days of
mobilization
Additionally, three other initiatives
ensure that early-deploying units are fully
manned, totally equipped, and trained to
standard The BOLD SHIFT program has
been enhancing Reserve Component readi-
ness for four years. Under this program,
active Army officers and noncommissioned
officers help train the Reserve Component
The National Guard instituted a managed
readiness philosophy to set priorities for
resources and to ensure attainment and
sustainment of required levels of readiness
for all National Guard units. The Army
Reserve instituted the Priority Reserve
Initiatives in Mobilization Enhancement
(PRIME) Program, which evolved into
tiered readiness/tiered resourcing, to ensure
high-priority units are ready and immediately
available for deployment
Training
Training molds the Army into a force capable of decisive victory in any endeavor
Training ensures that soldiers, leaders, and units are prepared to fight and win. Well trained and
led, quality soldiers have proven capable of adapting to any situation, against any opponent,
anywhere in the world Only by remaining well trained can America's Army expect to deliver
decisive victory The Army has one standard tough, realistic, battle-focused training which
prepares soldiers and units for a wide variety of missions Training must remain our top priority.
The three pillars of the Army training system are institutional training, unit training, and
self development Each serves one underlying purpose, to enhance the ability of units to perform
their missions. Unit readiness is the objective of all Army training
Combat Training Centers
The Combat Training Center (CTC)
Program is central to the Army's strategy of
maintaining a lethal, versatile, and ready
force capable of rapidly projecting power
and obtaining land force dominance The
CTC Program was established to increase
unit readiness for deployment and warfight-
ing; to produce bold, innovative leaders
through stressful tactical and operational
exercises, to embed doctrine throughout the
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216
Total Army; and to provide a data source for
lessons learned to improve doctrine, train-
ing, leader development, organizations, and
materiel The objective of the CTCs is to
provide realistic, tough, and stressful train-
ing based on Army and Joint doctrine.
Combat Training Centers are an
investment in the professionalism of Amer-
ica's Army. The centers provide a learning
environment for units to conduct realistic
battlefield rehearsals. Instrumented battle-
fields allow the employment of fighting
systems according to established doctrine as
part of a combined arms team. As the Army
prepares for the 21st century, its doctrine,
training, and organizations will continue to
be restructured and institutionalized based
on lessons learned at the Combat Training
Centers.
The CTCs include a world-class
opposing force, professional observers and
controllers, an environment of unrestricted
force-on-force training, and live-fire ranges
that approximate actual combat. The CTC
program includes the National Training Cen-
ter (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California; the Joint
Readiness Training Center
(JRTC) at Fort Polk,
Louisiana; the Combat Ma-
neuver Training Center
(CMTC) at Hohenfels, Ger-
many; and the Battle Com-
mand Training Program
(BCTP) at Fort Leaven-
worth, Kansas.
The National Training
Center provides realistic
combat training under mid- to
high-intensity conflict condi-
tions. A brigade task force
with two maneuver battalions
trains during each rotation.
Various mixes of light and
heavy battalions as well as
aviation and armored cavalry
units are employed The NTC objective is to
sustain 12 of these rotations each year.
The Joint Readiness Training Center
provides training focused on low- to mid-
intensity contingency operations. Forces
trained include airborne, air assault, light
infantry, and other rapid deployment units.
All rotations include Special Operations
Forces, and one rotation is focused entirely
on special operations. Armored operations
also are extensively integrated into training,
and strong Air Force participation results in
substantial joint training. The JRTC objec-
tive is to sustain 10 rotations per year.
The Combat Maneuver Training
Center provides training to the forward-
based forces of U.S. Army, Europe
(USAREUR) Able to simulate situations
from peace operations to high-intensity
conflict, the CMTC objective is to train all
maneuver battalions in USAREUR at least
once each year as part of a brigade task
force. USAREUR also permits three
German and other allied (French, Dutch,
German, and British) rotations each year on
a reimbursable basis.
Training ensures that soldiers, leaders, and units are prepared to fight and win.
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217
The Battle Command Training Pro-
gram extends CTC training to division and
corps commanders and their staffs. The two-
part BCTP experience consists of a seminar
followed several months later by a computer
battle simulation command post exercise.
Both phases can be conducted at the unit's
home station, permitting more realistic train-
ing, with wider involvement of staffs in a
tactical field environment at lower cost. The
BCTP objective is to train all active compo-
nent division and corps staffs once every two
years (12-15 rotations per year) and all Army
National Guard division staffs once every
three years. National Guard enhanced
brigades also conduct BCTP with their
associated active component units.
Army and Joint Exercise Program
The Army conducts military exer-
cises to simulate wartime operations Exer-
cises conducted in a realistic battle-focused
setting help train commanders, staffs, and
units for combat and enhance force readi-
ness. Seruor commanders use military exer-
cises to integrate units performing separate
battlefield functions into combined arms
forces Exercises allow leaders, staffs, and
units to practice operational procedures and
to refine war plans The Army conducts
unilateral exercises at all levels from Head-
quarters, Department of the Army, to corps
level and below. Joint exercises are normally
conducted as part of the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Exercise Program
The primary objective of the CJCS
Exercise Program is to improve the regional
Commander-in-Chiefs' (CINC) warfighting
capabilities Joint exercises ensure that US.
forces are trained to accomplish tasks essen-
tial to executing a CINC's missions The
CJCS Exercise Program is the Army's
primary joint training vehicle CJCS exer-
cises provide Army forces the opportunity to
train under the operational control of
warfighting CINCs and to deploy troops and
equipment to such varied environments as
Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, the Pacific,
and Central America The Army participates
in approximately 50 CJCS exercises each
year.
The Partnership for Peace (PFP)
Exercise Program was begun in 1995 It is
one of NATO's top priority political/military
initiatives. It is designed to expand and
improve military and political cooperation
among NATO nations and other European
nations that belong to NATO's Partnership
for Peace program The scenarios for these
exercises focus on non-combat operations.
The exercises enhance the coordination of
military forces for peacekeeping, humanitar-
ian assistance, and search and rescue opera-
tions. In 1995, the focus was on company
and battalion-level participation In 1996,
the program will involve brigades and divi-
sions A PFP exercise, COOPERATIVE
NUGGET, was conducted at the Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk,
Louisiana, in August 1995 The exercise,
designed to improve interoperability between
participating forces in peacekeeping and
humanitarian relief operations at the com-
pany and platoon level, involved fourteen
East European countries.
Overseas Deployment Training of
the Reserve Component
Overseas deployment training en-
ables Reserve Component units and individu-
als to conduct mobilization and deployment
activities, tailor peacetime training to
wartime mission requirements, strengthen
associations with active units, and improve
readiness through realistic training Partici-
pants gain familiarity with the terrain and
political environment in their assigned
wartime theaters and support active compo-
nent programs and missions In some
instances, they contribute humanitarian assis-
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218
tance to developing countries while receiving
valuable mission related training
Approximately 45,000 Reserve Com-
ponent soldiers participate in overseas
deployment training annually — in joint
exercises such as FUERTES CAMINOS and
FUERTES DEFENSAS in Central America,
BRIGHT STAR in Egypt, ATLANTIC RE-
SOLVE in Germany, ULCHI FOCUS LENS
in Korea, and KEEN EDGE in Japan.
Overseas deployment training for the Reserve Component
is a key part of overseas presence. Here, Army National
Guard engineers build a road in Panama during Joint
Exercise FUERTES CAMINOS.
Reserve Component soldiers provide
medical care, dental care, and education in
preventative medicine local populations
worldwide In 1995, National Guard human-
itarian and civic assistance operations
resulted in the construction or rehabilitation
of 24 schools, six clinics, one hospital, two
community centers, 27 wells, 90 kilometers
of road, and six bridges. Army Reserve
soldiers provided port services and retro-
grade operations in Southwest Asia, rebuilt
training areas in Germany, and constructed
miles of roads in Central America Addition-
ally, Reserve Component soldiers provided
maintenance support for pre-positioned
equipment overseas and assisted in the retro-
grade of equipment from Europe. National
Guard soldiers also executed an engineer
exercise in Albania — the first in an Eastern
European country.
The intelligence arena offers a proto-
type of future Reserve Component incorpo-
ration into active Army missions. In the past
year. Army Reserve and National Guard
military intelligence soldiers contributed
more than 8300 soldier days of intelligence
collection and production support to a vari-
ety of national, joint, and Army commands
and agencies.
The Army's senior leaders recognize
that overseas deployment training for the
Reserve Component is a key part of overseas
presence It is a visible demonstration of the
Army's resolve to support our allies and
emerging nations.
Operating Tempo
Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) is
the Army's mechanism to align training
resource requirements with training readi-
ness. The Flying Hour Program, set at 14.5
hours per crew per month, is driven by unit
Mission Essential Tasks Lists and Army
regulations. Ground OPTEMPO, based on
800 miles per year for a tank battalion, is the
product of event-based execution models
that generate requirements for fuel, repair
parts, depot level reparables, and other re-
curring operating costs. The dollar require-
ments for both programs are developed by
analyzing the most recent force structure
information and programmed vehicle usage
and cost per mile of operations The intent
is to support the financial planning require-
ments at the major commands while provid-
ing Congress a credible means of defining the
Army's training resource requirements.
Since 1995, this methodology has
been supported by analysis of monthly Unit
Status Report data, quarteriy ground mileage
data, and flying hour execution data How-
ever, since Operation Desert Storm, the link
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219
between training execution and readiness
reporting has not been entirely accurate
Many units have continued to report high
readiness while underexecuting ground
mileage and flying hour allocations. Several
factors, such as the substitution of less
maneuver intensive training and the acquisi-
tion of excess parts from deactivating units,
contributed to this trend Accordingly, the
Army is developing a new methodology,
known as Operational Readiness, to reflect
better the total cost of preparing a unit for
war.
Operational Readiness
Operational Readiness (OPRED) is
the methodology that the Army is developing
to reflect more accurately the total cost of
preparing a unit for war In addition to
OPTEMPO, it includes other associated
costs, such as training aids, devices, simula-
tors, ranges, land, maintenance, and force
projection facilities Already, commanders
are obligating their funds in this manner
OPRED will reflect the Army's belief that
describing total readiness requires more than
just taking inventory of unit training funds in
the OPTEMPO account OPRED defines
readiness with more rigor and establishes a
framework to report readiness and resource
execution
Currently, OPTEMPO is computed
from specific Battalion Level Training Mod-
els (BLTM). In the case of ground
OPTEMPO, for example, the 800 miles of
execution a year required for a tank in an
armor battalion represents what is necessary
to maintain a readiness level of CI This
number has remained relatively constant
since 1987 OPTEMPO does not account
for the use of simulations and other efficien-
cies that some units are able to achieve. In
recent years OPTEMPO has been fully
resourced while other readiness related
programs like range operations, railhead
maintenance, and civilian pay were not This
required commanders to borrow funds from
OPTEMPO accounts in order to make up
shortfalls Late reimbursements from contin-
gency operations also contribute to underex-
ecution
To fiirther develop the OPRED
concept, the Army is in the process of revis-
ing training strategies The revised strategies
will reflect the way units train today. The
Army's Training and Doctrine Command,
assisted by the Army Research Institute, is in
the process of revising the training strategies
for the ten most expensive battalion types.
These revised strategies, referred to as
Combined Arms Training Strategies
(CATS), will then inform a revised BLTM.
The strategy will provide the baseline for
readiness reporting The resulting Training
Resource Model (TRM) also will include the
cost of maintaining training facilities and
other activities essential for OPRED
Future Army Schools
Through an initiative called "Future
Army Schools-21st Century," the Army is
establishing a Total Army School System
(TASS) with fully accredited and integrated
active Army, Army Reserve, and National
Guard schools Each component is expand-
ing its efforts to reduce duplication, share
information and resources, and make the
tough decisions on necessary organizational
change. TASS will provide the Total Army
a school house that shares the training load,
uses certified instructors, meets equal
accreditation standards, and teaches standard
courses. Distance Learning Technology will
further enhance operation of TASS and
provide high quality, standardized training to
soldiers and civilians. Most elements of the
TASS plan are approved, and a prototype is
being tested TASS will be implemented in
phases incorporating the lessons from the
prototype, and it will be in use by FY98
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220
Modern Equipment
Modernization is the continuous process by whiph the Army develops and fields
warfighting capabilities. The principal goal of the Army's modernization strategy is to enhance
our soldiers' warfighting capabilities and their ability to survive in combat by taking advantage of
our technological strengths Modernization is essential for the Army as it prepares to enter a new^
century. A smaller army requires increased lethality, and obsolete equipment must be replaced.
The Army's modernization plan, science and technology master plan, intelligence master plan, and
logistics plan describe the future force's overall characteristics and define its parameters, critical
capabilities, key technologies, and advanced concepts. The characteristics required of a power
projection army — project and sustain the force, protect the force, win the information war,
conduct precision strikes, and dominate the maneuver battle — are also our modernization
objectives They focus our modernization efforts
MODERNIZATION VISION
NEW GEO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
Cnsii Response
>Wm Decisively
procured for the future force The modern-
ization necessary to maintain the technologi-
cal edge that allows us to dominate the batle-
field can only occur with additional
resources.
NEW SECURITY ENVTRONMENT
*UnprcdicUbIc
•Unsuble
•Voliule
Today's environment of constrained
resources requires the Army to fundamen-
tally change its modernization strategy
Limited modernization resources prohibit
large investments at this time. We must buy
a limited number of new weapons while we
extend the lives and improve the capabilities
of existing systems. Upgrading proven
weapons by adding information technology
will increase capabilities and utilization, but
the Army will eventually reach the point
where additional technological improve-
ments of today's systems will provide only
marginal benefits. New weapon systems and
tactical truck fleets must be developed and
The Army Modernization
Objectives
The Army's modernization strategy
is designed to support our doctrine, to pre-
serve our country's technological overmatch
against any potential foe, and to compensate
for a smaller force structure The strategy
emphasizes integration of technology and
upgrading of existing systems, and it relies
on retaining our scientific and technological
edge Our five modernization objectives
coincide with the essential characteristics of
a lethal, versatile, power projection force.
Project and Sustain the Force. As a mostly
US. -based, power projection force, the
Army must be capable of rapidly deploying
and sustaining forces. To meet future
requirements, the Army is:
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221
setting priorities for improving power
projection from its US. installations
These include rail and air-head upgrades
and improved information infrastructure
to allow split-based operations,
improving logistical support through ini-
tiatives such as total asset visibility
(discussed in Chapter 4);
implementing logistical operations that
are deployable, expandable, split-based,
and include civil sector involvement,
pre-positioning equipment (PREPO)
afloat and on land;
developing equipment that is lightweight,
durable, and multipurpose; and
adopting international commercial stan-
dards wherever possible to improve
interoperability.
KEY TO POWER PROJECTION
THE STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROGRAM
The Army's strategic mobility is
based on a critical triad of pre-positioned
unit equipment, strategic sealift, and strate-
gic airlift The Army has been reorganizing
its war reserves and distributing them in
strategic common-user stockpiles, which
support multiple regional commanders-in-
chief At the end of the consolidation, the
Army will have stockpiles in the United
States, Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, and
pre-positioned afloat The congressionally
mandated Mobility Requirements Study
directed the Army to enhance its equipment
and supplies pre-positioned afloat. The pre-
positioned afloat fleet's objective size is 16
ships, which will give the United States the
critical capability of delivering heavy forces
early in a crisis. The Army currently has pre-
positioned afloat an armor brigade set of
equipment with doctrinal field artillery,
combat engineer, air defense artillery, chemi-
cal, signal, logistics, and military intelligence
support. Several other pre-positioning ships
provide equipment which, in addition to its
wartime role, could be used to aid in disaster
relief and humanitarian assistance efforts.
The Mobility Requirements Study
identified a requirement for 19 large
medium-speed roll-on roll-off vessels to be
added to the Navy's fast sealift fleet by the
year 2001 . Eight of these ships are dedicated
to the Army pre-positioned afloat package
and the remaining 1 1 will be strategically
berthed for surge deployment of heavy
forces. The Navy's acquisition efforts have
this portion of the strategic sealift program
well on course. Another aspect of strategic
sealift is the Ready Reserve Force, which
provides over half the lift needed to deploy
heavy forces by sea The Mobility Require-
ments Study recommended that the current
inventory of 29 Ready Reserve Force roll-on
roll-off ships be increased to 36 These ships
are essential to ensure the availability of
sufficient force in the early stages of crisis
response
The Mobility Requirements Study
also validated the need to modernize our
airlift capability The Defense Department's
recent decision to acquire 120 C-17s ensures
that unparalleled strategic airlift capability
will be available well into the 21st century.
The C- 1 7 will allow strategic access to addi-
tional airfields woridwide, will carry outsize
equipment, and enable faster force closure
Improvements in installation infras-
tructure include upgrading rail lines, access
roads, and loading facilities, plus purchasing
additional railcars and containers Also, by
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222
improving the information infrastructure
with advanced communications, we increase
total asset visibility and logistical efficiency.
This allows the Army to manage distribution
from factory to foxhole.
The Army's tactical wheeled vehicles
and utility/cargo helicopter programs also
are essential to projecting and sustaining the
force. However, the Army's aging truck
fleet is currently hampered by procurement
reductions, and the age of utility and cargo
helicopters will become a sustainment prob-
lem in the far-term without additional
procurements.
Protect the Force. This objective is com-
posed of two elements — protection against
fratricide and protection from an opponent's
missile and nuclear, chemical, and biological
capabilities. Both require situational aware-
ness. Future capabilities to protect ground
forces include:
• Theater Missile Defense (discussed in
Chapter 5);
• measures to improve situational aware-
ness, such as improved precision naviga-
tion and combat identification systems;
• improved nuclear, biological, and chemi-
cal protection;
• extended range and enhanced precision
for intelligence systems, allowing more
time to synchronize battlefield actions;
and
• medical survivability, such as improved
TeleMedicine capabilities (discussed in
Chapter 5).
Under the "protect the force" objec-
tive, the fielding of Patriot Advanced Capa-
bility 3 (PAC-3) and neater High Altitude
Area Defense (THAAD), assisted by early
warning alert from Joint Tactical Ground
Stations (JTAGS), will provide the capability
to respond to the growing theater and cruise
missile threat Improvements to the Stinger
missile and onboard launch capability from
the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle -
Ehanced (BSF-E) are also required to
counter this threat Missile defense against
very short range theater ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and UAVs requires that we
field the Corps Surface-to-Air Missile
(SAM)/Medium Extended Air Defense Sys-
tem (MEADS).
To reduce fratricide, commanders
and soldiers must have accurate situational
awareness. The Army is actively focusing
information technologies to digitize the
battlefield and reduce fratricide. Improved
precision location and navigation, combat
identification systems, and improved identifi-
cation of friend or foe will contribute to
enhanced situational awareness and reduced
fratricide. To enhance survivability, we have
developed a biological detection capability; a
nuclear, biological, and chemical stand-off
detection capability, and a multiagent chemi-
cal detection capability.
Win the Information War. The opportunity
to affect an adversaries information systems,
while defending one's own, may facilitate
deep attacks and the massing of forces at
critical times and places. Additionally,
rapidly advancing technologies provide new
opportunities for efficiently executing com-
mand and control responsibilities Winning
the information war requires:
• real time intelligence on moving targets
and the capability to disseminate it;
• electromagnetic spectrum supremacy;
• access to national intelligence sources at
all levels of command and interoperabil-
ity with joint and multinational organiza-
tions;
• space systems that provide surveillance,
communications, weather data, terrain
and mapping data, and positioning and
34
223
targeting data (See Chapter 5);
wide-band terrestrial communications
systems with seamless communication
architectures;
joint, multinational, and interagency
interoperability;
systems with enhanced electronic war-
fere capabilities and protection;
systems that provide a relevant common
picture to commanders at all levels; and
security of the system from outside
exploitation.
The Comanche is a key long-range
modernization project.
Th^e are several systems which will
enhance our ability to win the information
war. Airborne capabilities, including the
Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter,
Advanced Quick Fix, the Guardrail Com-
mon Sensor, and Airborne Recon Low (ARL)
provide real-time signals intelligence,
imagery intelligence, moving target informa-
tion, and electronic attack capabilities to
assure electromagnetic spectrum supremacy.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will
assist commanders at brigade level and above
in controling their fight by providing target-
ing information and intelligence on the loca-
tion of enemy forces. Other systems that
enhance our capability to gather information
rapidly include the Joint Surveillance Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) target acqui-
sition through the Common Ground Station
(CGS), the Ground Based Common Sensor
(GBCS), and the Ground Based Sensor
(GBS).) The Army is maintaining access to
national intelligence sources by continuously
improving the Army Tactical Exploitation of
National Capabilities (TENCAP) program,
which provides intelligence from national to
tactical levels. The All Source Analysis
System (ASAS) fuses information from multi-
ple systems. Extensive use of space-based
systems also contributes to winning the
information war (see chapter 5). Space
systems provide communications through
satellite sources, surveillance capability from
national assets, up-to-date weather and envi-
ronmental effects data, terrain and mapping
data, and precise position location using
small Global Positioning System (GPS)
receivers Information capabilities are also
enhanced by terrestrial systems, such as the
Army Data Distribution System (ADDS).
which passes increased quantities of data and
the Secure, Mobile, Anti-jam, Reliable,
Tactical Terminal (SMART-T) multi-channel
satellite terminal, that will extend the range
of the Army's Mobile Subscriber Equipment
(MSE).
Conduct Precision Strike. To assist in
accomplishing the land force mission of seiz-
ing and controlling terrain, we must have an
organic capability to conduct deep attacks
Rapid, successful deep precision strikes help
defeat the threat and protect the force The
21st century land component commander
must have these capabilities
• a system that is highly responsive to the
commander's immediate needs (reduced
sensor to shooter time);
• the ability to control operational tempo
• the ability to seize and retain the initia-
tive;
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224
• the ability to limit the opponent's free-
dom of action;
• the ability to dictate the terms of the
close battle;
• effective day/night and all weather opera-
tional capability; and
• force protection to minimize friendly
casualties.
To enable the 21st century Army to
see deep, we are fielding a family of sensors.
UAVs designed for close, short, and
extended ranges will provide the warfighter
with unprecedented real time situational
awareness. The capabilities of UAVs, in
concert with airborne sensor platforms such
as JSTARS, the Comanche armed reconnais-
sance helicopter, and downlinked national
assets, will provide the warfighter with the
information needed to attack deep targets
quickly and efficiently. Improvements in
precision strike munitions will enable the
Army to deliver deep fires with unequaled
range and precision. The longer-range A T-
ACMS Block J A will be fielded in fiscal year
1998, followed in fiscal year 2001 by AT-
ACMS Block II carrying Brilliant Anti-
Armor (BAT) submunitions. The extended
Tingt ATACMS Block II A will be fielded in
fiscal year 2003.
Dominate the Maneuver Battle. Rapid,
decisive victory is the essence of land force
dominance. Future modifications to existing
systems and the development and introduc-
tion of new platforms can provide our forces
capabilities to defeat any threat. The maneu-
ver forces of the 21st century require:
• lethal and nonlethal weapons with
increased range;
• better night and all weather fighting
capabilities,
• light armored packages;
• command and control on the move;
automated threat location data;
rapid force dispersion while massing fire;
and
digital map displays of friendly and
threat force locations, routes, and control
The technological advantage displayed in Operation
DESERT STORM will be reduced without sustained
modernization and recapitalization.
Maneuver force improvements in
anti-armor range and lethality are being
achieved with the fielding of the Javelin "fire
and forget" missile and the Tow Missile
Improved Target Acquisition System.
Mounted force (MI Abrams and M2/3
Bradley) improvements continue through
digitization programs and Second Genera-
tion Forward Looking Infrared (FUR) tech-
nologies for night vision. Mounted force
command and control will be enhanced by
the Command and Control Vehicle (C2V),
which we will field in small numbers. Also,
the current Maneuver Control System, as a
component of the Army Battle Command
System, will be fielded to additional forces
To help close the modernization gap
between maneuver weapon systems and
counter-obstacle capabilities, we will field
limited quantities of the MI Breacher, the
Heavy Assault Bridge, and the Airborne
Stand-off Minefield Detection System.
36
225
An automated threat location capa-
bility is a key maneuver force requirement.
As a result of the Army's digitization efforts
(see chapter 5), fusion of data from an
increasing number of better battlefield sensor
suites will provide a common picture of the
battlefield to maneuver force commanders
The Comanche armed reconnaissance heli-
copter. Crusader advanced field artillery
system, and the Long Range Advanced
Scout Surveillance System (a man-portable
target acquisition device) are digital systems
that will enable the massing of fires without
massing forces, thus increasing both our
survivability and our lethality
Summary
The Army will spend dollars saved
by cutting selected programs on developing
and improving critical systems, such as the
Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter,
the Crusader artillery system, the Abrams
tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the
AH-64 Apache Longbow attack helicopter.
For example, we will start the low rate initial
production of the highly lethal Longbow
Hellfire Missile, continue upgrading OH-58
helicopters to the armed Kiowa Warrior
OH-58D configuration, and continue pro-
curement of tactical vehicles, small arms,
and ammunition.
The technological advantage dis-
played in Operation DESERT STORM will
be reduced without sustained modernization
and recapitalization The Army is committed
to supporting the warfighting combatant
commands and our soldiers with modem,
technologically advanced weapons
Leader Development
Tlie Army is committed to the long-term education and training necessary to develop the
leaders of tomorrow's Army. The leadership responsibilities of Army leaders vary from leading a
squad of infantry soldiers to dealing with civilian industry in the acquisition of expensive weapon
systems Proficient and professional leaders are key to the Army's success, both in peacetime
activities and in combat The development of competent, confident, and professional military and
civilian leaders is our most enduring legacy to the future of the Army and the nation
The Army's Leader Development
System
The Army maintains the best leader
development system in the world, and its
record of success in battle and service to
nation reflects that excellence. Today's
leader must have skills that can be trans-
ferred quickly from peace operations to
warfighting. Leaders must be capable of
operating in a complex, ambiguous environ-
ment and with constant change They must
be creative and adaptive problem solvers
The Army develops leaders through a
dynamic leader development system consist-
ing of three equally important pillars: formal
education, professional experience, and self
development
Formal Education. The formal Army
school system produces leaders by instilling
the professional knowledge and leadership
skills required in war or in other military
operations. It provides the formal education
and training required for the development of
specific job-related skills and of basic leader-
ship skills Formal education is conducted
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226
on a progressive basis to prepare the individ-
ual for positions of increasing responsibility.
Professional Experience. Profess-
ional experience complements formal school-
ing by providing hands-on learning and
personal practice. Professional experience is
the laboratory of leadership development: it
provides opportunities to test theory,
develop and practice personal style, and inte-
grate the counsel of superiors, peers, and
subordinates. Army leaders are responsible
for providing an environment that facilitates
the development of leadership abilities of all
their subordinates.
Self Development. Self development
is an important personal responsibility.
Many of the most successful leaders of the
American Army followed life-long patterns
of reading, study, and analysis of history and
contemporary national and international
affairs. Individual initiative is key to devel-
oping every leader Leaders can and must
continue to expand their knowledge base
through correspondence courses, civilian
education, reading, and self-study programs.
Proficient and professional leaders are key to the
Army 's success.
The Army has several initiatives to
continue our successful leader development
program into the next century Use of
emerging information technologies, such as
interactive classrooms linked to data bases
around the world, will improve formal
education Additionally, the Army is exam-
ining uses of automated and semiautomated
simulations as tools for staff planning and
analysis These technologies and concepts
will create open schools and centers, with
information freely available to all Army lead-
ers anywhere in the world. These initiatives
will enhance all three pillars — formal educa-
tion, professional education, and self devel-
opment.
Reserve Component Leader
Development
Leader development in the Reserve
Component is based on the same three pillars
of leader development. Institutional training
includes resident and exportable professional
development and functional courses. The
training, however, is modified somewhat as
a result of the unique circumstances facing
Reserve Component leaders. Self develop-
ment is especially important and has always
been a hallmark of Reserve Component lead-
ers
Regional training brigades and the
Ground Force Readiness Enhancement
Program will increase battle focused and
realistic training opportunities for the
Reserve Component Also, the Leadership
Assessment Development Program will
provide leaders a planned, progressive, and
sequential methodology for enhancing and
sustaining military competencies. The
program will provide instruction for the
developmental leader assessment process,
identify strengths and weaknesses, and plan
actions for improving performance through
the Reserve Component Education System
Civilian Leader Development
The Army of the 21st century will
rely on civilians in professional, technical,
and leadership positions to provide continu-
ity of operations and expertise essential to
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227
national defense. The Army's Civilian Train-
ing, Education and Development System
(ACTEDS) supports the acquisition and
training of a technically proficient, profes-
sional work force as well as the progressive
development of competent, confident leaders
that are critical to a high performing work
force. A robust suite of basic civilian leader-
ship training is in place that includes manda-
tory training at four broad levels: intem-
/entry, supervisory, managerial, and execu-
tive Civilian leader development parallels
the formal training pillar of the oflBcer leader
development system and is targeted to the
skills and competencies required of civilian
leaders at each of the four broad levels.
Future Leader Development
Future leaders will have to be keenly
aware of the world and understand the role
of military force. In their professional devel-
opment, they will be exposed to ideas on
military art and science that go beyond tradi-
tional models Future leaders will face
complex, difficult situations under fi-equently
changing conditions. They will be called
upon to make rapid, doctrinally sound deci-
sions as they plan and execute missions in
diverse, high-pressure operational environ-
ments. Tactical level leaders, for example,
must be prepared to make decisions that
have major strategic consequences under the
scrutiny of the international media
The Army's leader development
initiatives will provide steady development of
individuals who demonstrate potential for
mastering the art of command Institutions
and commanders will train and develop lead-
ers who are intuitive, mentally agile, innova-
tive and disciplined Future leaders will be
trained under conditions that approximate
projected operational environments. Leaders
will continue to be schooled in joint and
multinational operations as well as in the
synchronization of all aspects of combat and
noncombat operations Future leaders will
have a higher level of doctrine-based skills,
knowledge, and experience to bring to a
wide range of complex missions
Conclusion
The Army's highest priority is to provide the nation with a thoroughly trained and ready
force capable of executing the diverse missions required in a troubled world When a crisis arises,
the President wiU not ask if America's Army is ready The President will assume, and rightly so,
that the Army is ready to protect the nation's interests, wherever and whenever needed
The Army's imperatives, properly balanced based on affordability and risk, ensure a ready
and versatile force capable of delivering decisive victory The Army's senior leadership is address-
ing the readiness challenge by adhering to these historically proven imperatives Maintaining a
ready force, however, requires a joint effort fi"om the Army, the Executive Branch, and Congress.
Stability in personnel, quality of life, installations, and funding are essential to maintaining a
trained and ready force. The next chapter will address the Army's stability challenge
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228
'We must ensure endstrength and fisca] stability, suitable
force structure to meet readiness requirements, and
implementation of the Army vision for Force XXI."
Secretary of the Army,
Togo D. West, Jr.
"In the midst of an era of change and turbulence, we
must not lose sight of the continuity and stabiUty required
to preserve our long-term readiness."
General Dennis J. Reimer
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229
3. THE STABILITY CHALLENGE
Gaining stability in the force is the second challenge confronting America 's Army. When the
Cold War ended y»e planned changes and anticipated some turbulence due to changed missions,
the personnel drawdown, base closures and base realignments. But since 1989, we have
experienced a 300 percent increase in operational deployments. These unanticipated
operational commitments have further increased instability. To execute expanded missions
while maintaining readiness and forging an Army for the 21 si century, the Army must have a
level of stability in personnel, quality of life, installations, and funding.
The Secretary of Defense approved and
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
published a new National Military Strategy
in February 1995. This new strategy reflects
the need to promote stability and thwart
aggression in an unpredictable world. The
Army contributes substantially to this strat-
egy: the majority of the nation's personnel
commitment to operations as diverse as
counterdrug operations, noncombatant evac-
uation operations, nation assistance, and
humanitarian and disaster relief is conducted
by the Army. The Army has successfiiUy
met these increased operational commit-
ments and simultaneously maintained readi-
ness
The Army has adjusted to the new world
of danger and uncertainty, a world in which
soldiers are the nation's most relevant
national security asset It developed a vision
for transitioning to the 21st century.
Stability is necessary to help us achieve that
vision
Personnel
Without question, the Army's most important resource is its people. The Army is people.
Maintaining the quality of the force is one of the Army's highest priorities and challenges Our
increased operational commitments and reduced force strxjcture have combined to place a burden
on the young men and women serving the nation as soldiers Soldiers in operational units are
deployed away from home station and family for 138 days a year, on average In order to
continue attracting and retaining the quality people so vital to the nation's Army, we must stabilize
the force by easing personnel turbulence and maintaining sufficient force structure
Drawdown Status
The Army began its personnel drawdown
in fiscal year 1989.
• The Army's Active Component strength
at the end of fiscal year 1995 was
508,559 — a decrease of 262,000 The
force will stabilize at 495,000 in fiscal
year 1996
The Army's civilian strength at the end of
fiscal year 1995 was 269,673 — a
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230
decrease of 133,000. The civilian work
force will stabilize at 233,341 in fiscal
year 2001.
• The Army Reserve (Selected Reserve)
strength at the end of fiscal year 1 995
was 242,000 — a decrease of 1 1 1,000.
It wall stabilize at 208,000 in fiscal year
1998.
• National Guard strength at the end of fis-
cal year 1995 was 387,000 — a decrease
of 90,000 The Guard will stabilize at
367,000 in fiscal year 1998.
Throughout the drawdown, we have been
committed to caring for our transitioning
soldiers, civilian employees, and family
members. Because most of the drawdown is
now complete, we can begin to stabilize the
force.
Drawdown Tools. The Army used the tools
Congress provided to assist in military
personnel reductions The Voluntary Sepa-
ration Incentive (VSI) and the Special Sepa-
ration Benefit (SSB), authorized by
Congress in 1992, allowed the Army to
target soldiers in overstrength military occu-
pational specialties and overstrength year
groups Both programs will continue for the
duration of the drawdown but will no longer
target overstrength year groups
In 1993, Congress also provided the Tem-
porary Early Retirement Authority (TERA)
as another drawdown tool. This measure
allows the Army to offer early retirement to
certain soldiers who have at least 1 5, but not
yet 20, years of service. Early retirement is
not an entitlement, and the Army offers it
only to selected soldiers in excess grades and
skills. The Army intends to continue using
TERA through fiscal year 1999, primarily for
officers in excess skill areas not selected for
promotion, and for sergeants with over 18
years of service who have been barred from
reenlistment or who have declined continued
service
Tools used to achieve civilian drawdown
goals include functional transfers to agencies
outside the Army, release of nonessential
temporary employees, managed hire freezes,
the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay
(VSIP) program, and the Voluntary Early
Retirement Authority (VERA). Involuntary
separation procedures are used only as a last
resort The Army is dedicated to reducing its
civilian strength conunensurate with reduced
funding. Our prime considerations are to
protect the welfare of our civilian employees
and to minimize adverse impact on organiza-
tions.
Transition Assistance. A vital part of reduc-
ing the Army in a caring manner is assisting
the transition of departing personnel in every
way possible. The Army Career and Alumni
Program (ACAP) is a comprehensive
program that provides a broad spectrum of
transition services ACAP has assisted more
than 500,000 individuals worldwide in transi-
tioning to the civilian sector. The program
provides valuable information and services,
including benefits counseling and job search
assistance.
Providing high quality, comprehensive
transition services has proven highly benefi-
cial to the Army An independent evaluation
found that 83 percent of those who
completed the job assistance program would
recommend the military as a career. Addi-
tionally, the Army has dramatically reduced
its unemployment insurance costs over 35
percent as a result of job assistance provided
to transitioning soldiers Soldiers benefit
greatly from the program as well. For exam-
ple, studies show that an E6 or below, with
less than a Bachelors Degree, who completes
the assistance program will earn an average
of $7,300 more per year in starting salary
than those not receiving the services.
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231
Additionally, Army retirement services
officers provide group and individual pre-
retirement counseling on retirement entitle-
ments and benefits, and the Survivor Benefit
Plan (SBP). Retirement services officers
assist soldiers in making a smooth transition
fi-om active duty to retirement, provide
support to retirees, and provide a vital
communication link between the active force
and retired soldiers.
Effects of the Drawdown and an
Unstable World
The effects of a massive, planned draw-
down in personnel, coupled with a changed
national security environment has placed a
great burden on soldiers. Nevertheless, they
continually surpass our expectations and
make us proud of their dedication, vigor, and
flexibility in the faxx of these and other chal-
lenges.
Changes in force structure and reductions
in infi-astructure have caused turbulence in
the ranks. For instance, personnel reductions
have led to shortened tour lengths which, in
turn, mean that soldiers and their families
have to move more fi^equently. Tour lengths
are again increasing; however, during the
height of the drawdown, soldiers stationed in
Europe served an average tour of only 28 or
29 months Similarly, tour lengths in Korea
and the United States also declined. Several
policies and laws influenced this trend. Our
distribution policy, for example, directs that
contingency forces be provided resources at
a higher priority than other units. As soldiers
leave those high-priority units by accepting
drawdown incentives, vacancies must be
filled. Soldiers moving for military educa-
tion and professional development also leave
vacancies. Congressionally mandated
requirements, such as Title XI and base
realignment and closures create others
In today's changed world, our Army is
operating at an unprecedented pace. The
average number of soldiers deployed away
fi-om home station on any given day in 1995
— in addition to those 125,000 already
forward based — was 21,500 The
participation of approximately 30,000
soldiers in support of Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR in Bosnia will exacerbate these
trends.
The Army is operating at an unprecedented pace.
The Bottom Line
The Army's operational pace demon-
strates our increasing involvement in and
total commitment to defending US national
interests around the world While busier
than ever, America's soldiers remain moti-
vated and dedicated They are versatile
enough to succeed in any environment They
are truly America's greatest resource Still,
our soldiers are continually being asked to do
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232
more with less Because stability is essential
to attracting and retaining high quality
soldiers, we must stabilize our personnel
reductions and maintain a sufficient force
structure.
To execute assigned missions, the Army must
sufficient size, strength, and capability.
America's Army is the world's best Army
largely because what we lack in quantity —
numbers of soldiers — we make up in the
high quality of those soldiers. No amount of
training or technologically superior equip-
ment, however, will suffice if we do not
have enough soldiers to accomplish our
missions Numbers do matter For every
unit deployed on an operational
commitment, one is preparing to deploy to
the area of operations and one is refitting and
retraining after completing service and
redeployment To continue executing our
missions in the high quality manner expected
by the American people, we must have an
Army of sufficient size, strength, and
capability. The quality of the Army is
unquestioned, however, we are concerned
that we may have reached the limit on how
small the Army can be and still credibly
accomplish assigned missions.
Quality of Life
A decent quality of life is another important factor in ensuring we attract and retain quality
soldiers in America's Army. Quality of life, more than any other single factor, influences a
soldier's decision to reenlist or leave the Army Therefore, focusing on issues important to the
men and women who serve the nation is essential to gaining stability in the ranks. The quality of
life of family members also is important. Sixty-five percent of the Army's soldiers are married
Soldiers and their families are concerned about adequate pay, housing, retirement benefits, and
health care. Quality of life issues unique to Guard and Reserve soldiers include re-employment
rights, continuation of salary and benefits on mobilization, and getting time off fi-om work for
training
Health Care
Medical care is one of the most valuable
benefits of life in the service. The draw-
down, base closings and realignment, and the
reduction in Army medical resources has
constrained access to medical care for all
beneficiaries. The resulting increase in
uncompensated out-of-pocket health care
expenses contributes to the widespread
perception that this benefit is eroding
The Army medical system is an efficient,
cost-effective system that provides care to
beneficiaries in peacetime — care that con-
tributes to medical and soldier readiness.
Health care providers manning peacetime
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233
medical treatment facilities are the same
personnel who fill deployable medical units.
This dual-hatting of health care personnel
requires decentralized command and control
with maximum command flexibility in order
to maintain readiness and meet the require-
ment for rapid power projection The Army,
in concert with the other services, is focused
on implementing a cost-eflFective health care
system that provides beneficiaries with
choices, provides a standard health care ben-
efit, addresses the needs of soldiers and their
families in remote locations, and supports the
overarching readiness mission. We have
developed TRICARE, a managed care
program, to achieve all these objectives
Medical care is one of the most valuable benefits of life
in the service.
TRICARE. TRICARE is DoD's regionally
managed care program for members of the
uniformed services, retirees, and their fami-
lies TRICARE brings together the health
care delivery systems of each of the Services
and the Civilian Health and Medical Program
of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) in
order to serve beneficiaries better and make
more efficient use of the resources available
to military medicine. The military services
cooperate in the implementation of TRI-
CARE. Across the United States, twelve
regions have been formed, each administered
by a service as Lead Agent. The Army is the
Lead Agent in five regions The managed
care support contracts that supplement the
capabilities of regional military health care
delivery networks are the defining character-
istic of TRICARE. There are to be a total of
seven fixed-price, at-risk contracts support-
ing the twelve regions. Each will be compet-
itively awarded before the end of fiscal year
1996.
Another important element of TRICARE,
which is not visible to the patient population,
is the new method of funding military medi-
cal facilities. The Services will receive
resources based upon the population they
serve. They will, in turn, allocate fiinds to
their medical facilities on a similar basis.
This methodology is designed to motivate
military medical managers to provide cost-
effective, appropriate, and timely patient
care.
As we implement TRICARE, we must
also protect access for beneficiaries covered
by Medicare We continue to seek demon-
stration authority to offer TRICARE partici-
pation through coordination with the Health
Care Finance Administration (HCFA) to our
eligible beneficiaries.
Army Continuing Education
System
Research indicates that in-service and
post-service educational benefits continue to
be the top two reasons young men and
women enlist in the Army The Army
Continuing Education System (ACES)
provides soldiers with personal and
professional self development opportunities.
Education programs target many levels of
need. The ACES is focused on soldiers but
also is available to Department of the Army
Civilians and adult family members. It
represents a primary quality of life program.
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234
Housing
Our soldiers and their families deserve
decent living conditions The Army is
strongly committed to providing sufificient
resources for revitalization, construction,
and maintenance of facilities. This year, we
will begin to build, revitalize, or replace 750
family housing units and 3000 barracks
rooms. We are focusing our efforts on
investing in essential, high-payoff facilities.
Two current programs illustrate this
approach.
Soldiers and families deserve decent living conditions.
The Whole Barracks Renewal Program. The
goal of the Whole Barracks Renewal Pro-
gram (WBRP) is to transform existing
barracks into single soldier communities. It
provides funds for constructing and
modernizing barracks in the continental
United States (COhfUS) and represents a
long-term commitment by the Army to
improving the living conditions of single
soldiers Today, many of our soldiers live in
barracks 30 to 40 years old These barracks
were designed to the austere standards of a
conscript Army and now need to be
modernized The Whole Barracks Renewal
Program requires a 17-year investment of at
least $5 billion to bring barracks to the
design standard agreed upon by all the
services. This standard allows each soldier
to have a net living area of 1 1 8 square feet
The Army's goal is to fiind this program at
$250 million per year over the next six years
to meet the Army's most critical barracks
construction and renovation requirements.
Upon completion of the most critical
barracks requirements, the Army will
program construction and maintenance
dollars as necessary to continue to improve
soldier living conditions.
The Whole Neighborhood Revitalization
Program. The Whole Neighborhood Revi-
talization Program provides a systematic
upgrade, repair, or replacement of Army
family housing. A large portion of the
Army's family quarters are 35 to 40 years
old, in poor condition, and in need of revital-
ization Our goal is to renovate family quar-
ters on a 35-year cycle, while reducing recur-
ring maintenance, energj' consumption, and
inconvenience to occupants.
The Army's goals are to have high quality
housing in the quantities needed and to meet
annual, recurring requirements in mainte-
nance and repair We must meet these goals
in order to gain stability in quality of life for
soldiers and families and to avoid increased
long-term costs for replacing soldier and
family housing However, decreased fund-
ing limits the Army's ability to maintain even
current standards.
The Family and the Community
The mission of the Army Communities
of Excellence (ACOE) Program is to provide
excellence in customer service and facilities
which, in turn, contributes significantly to
improving quality of life and overall readi-
ness ACOE improves the quality of
community services with customer service,
commitment to courtesy, and promptness in
delivery It promotes activities such as self-
help projects designed to keep well furnished
and well maintained facilities.
To spur performance, the program uses
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235
evaluations and awards. Army communities
compete by using the world-class Malcolm
Baldrige National Quality Award criteria,
and winners recieve cash incentives.
Through education and publicity, ACOE also
rapidly spreads good ideas for promoting
excellence throughout the Army.
By fostering overall community excel-
lence, ACOE makes a direct contribution to
Army readiness. Moreover, ACOE fosters
pride in the profession and the community
that will sustain each soldier, civilian
employee, and family member through the
most demanding of times
The ACOE program is neither burden-
some nor costly; it works because it taps the
boundless reservoir of energy, enthusiasm,
and ingenuity of all community members.
ACOE makes an unambiguous, cost-effec-
tive contribution to quality of life. This
program is essential to enhancing the stability
of Army facilities and services
Just as ACOE contributes to readiness,
families are also key to the Army mission
Family members can strongly influence a
soldier's decision to remain in the service
Army families endure the hardships of opera-
tional deployments, long separations, and
frequent moves. They must be cared for in a
high quality manner
The Army Family Action Plan (AFAP)
provides a process by which the Army can
monitor and improve quality of life for all
members of the Army community This
program is a vehicle through which members
of the Army community express their
concerns. It is a "town hall" process, the
only one among the services, that identifies
and resolves issues of concern to soldiers.
Army civilians, retirees, and family members
through symposia held at installation, major
command, and Department of the Army
level. AFAP issues reflect the stresses faced
in Army units and communities and serve as
a sensing tool for the Army leadership by
identifying and validating factors that impact
on readiness and retention.
For instance, the Army Family Team
Building Program is the result of an AFAP
initiative It is a training program designed
to teach and promote personal and family
readiness. The program educates soldiers,
families, and civilians about the Army
lifestyle, explains their personal responsibili-
ties in meeting the associated challenges, and
helps families deal with problem frequently
encountered during deployments
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR)
programs are a vital element of quality of life
for soldiers and their families MWR
programs directly support readiness by
providing a variety of community, soldier,
and family activities such as social, fitness,
recreational, and educational programs
These activities enhance community life and
provide an environment that attracts and
retains quality people The MWR strategic
plan, unveiled in 1994, established goals for
corporate leadership, human resources,
financial management, facilities, and support
services. It also laid out guiding principles
for returning nonappropriated funds to the
Army through the provision of market-
driven services, activities, and capital
improvements
Morale. Welfare, and Recreation Programs are a vital
element of quality of life.
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236
The Army Safety Program
Providing a safe environment for our
soldiers and their families to work and live in
is a high priority for the Army leadership.
Having peace of mind is key to maintaining a
high quality of life The safety mission seeks
to minimize accidental losses of human and
materiel resources. The Army provides
commanders mission-oriented policies,
procedures, and standards. Our accident
prevention programs integrate safety and risk
management into operations, training, and
materiel acquisition.
As we prepare for the 21st century, the
Army is developing many new programs for
enhancing safety. The Army is aggressively
integrating risk management into all its activ-
ities and is incorporating safety standards
into training exercises to demonstrate to
soldiers and leaders that unsafe operations
can render a unit ineffective before the battle
even begins. This practice reinforces the
concept of "train as we fight"
Summary
Well managed quality of life programs for
soldiers, civilian employees, and their fami-
lies are critical to ensuring that we will
continue to attract and retain the quality
people necessary for a quality Army A
stable and predictable lifestyle, comparable
to that found in civilian life, is directly linked
to successful mission accomplishment. The
Army has initiated improvements and
enhancements to many of its quality of life
programs, but constrained resources will
force some tough decisions. The Army will
consider the impact of every decision on
soldiers and their families.
Installations
Installations are undergoing significant changes in order to support our Army successfully
today and in the future. Base realignments and closures, the return of some of our forces from
overseas, and the transition to power projection bases have taxed installations' efforts to meet
training, facility, and support requirements. The Army is converting our installations into power
projection bases capable of moving and sustaining a force anywhere in the world. Those same
installations must continue to provide an adequate living and working environment for our quality
people.
The Army's comprehensive strategy for transforming Army installations is described in detail
in Installations: a Strategy for the 21st Century. The publication is a guide for the conversion of
Army installations into power projection platforms that also provide the quality of life that our
soldiers, families, and civilian employees deserve Under the strategy, the Army has established
numerous programs to improve efficiency and capability, while we gain stability in our
installations.
Power Projection Installations
In order to project and sustain a power
projection army, we need world-class power
projection platforms. Installations support
and facilitate virtually every deployment.
Strategic mobility requires modern rail
systems, airfield and port deployment
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237
operations, and installation storage facilities.
Installations must meet tough requirements
to ensure strategic agility and sustainment
for our forces.
By converting our installations to power
projection platforms, we can directly link
deployed forces to the installations that
provide sustaining supplies by way of seam-
less communications and information man-
agement networks. The Army has identified
and set priorities for infi-astructure improve-
ments at 21 key installations and depots
throughout the nation. Improvements
include upgrades to telecommunications, rail
lines and airfields, as well as enhancements
in warehousing and deployment facilities.
The Army is also purchasing 16,000
containers and over 1,000 rail cars to
improve our deployment capabilities.
Installations support and facilitate virtually every
deployment
Installation Management Action
Plan
implementing initiatives covering eight
installation management goals:
• reshaping installations into power
projection platforms;
• enhancing quality of life,
• totally integrating environmental stew-
ardship into installation operations;
• establishing and resourcing an installa-
tion investment plan,
• redesigning installation business pro-
cesses,
• achieving community, interservice, and
interagency partnerships,
• attaining resource management flexibil-
ity; and
• transforming the Army's human
resource programs
The Installation Management Action Plan
establishes a framework for installation
management planning and clarifies the
impact of key initiatives It recommends
broad policy changes to enhance efficiency
and improve the commander's ability to
plan, program, and budget It also assists
installation commanders in making plans for
the future and fosters communication
between major commands and installations.
The plan identifies how installations will
achieve long-range Army installation man-
agement goals and provides a documented
source of information on installation
management resource requirements
The Installation Status Report
The Installation Management Action Plan
(IMAP) is the tool the Army uses to meet its
installation challenges head-on The objec-
tive of this plan is to improve installation
management by promoting a consistent
approach to long-range planning and by
The Installation Status Report (ISR) is a
decision support system designed to
improve management and decision-making
for Army installations As the Army
reshapes its installations into power projec-
tion platforms, the Installation Status Report
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238
is a means to measure the strengths and
weaknesses of every installation. It is a
mechanism designed to provide commanders
and the Department of the Army leaders with
an assessment of installation infrastructure,
environment, and services. It gives
managers an objective means to compare
conditions across installations and across
functional areas Each installation will
submit a status report annually.
Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC)
Most installations have been affected in
one way or another by BRAC, either by
being considered as a BRAC candidate or by
receiving functions from closing and realign-
ing sites Closure and realignment have been
a major part of the Army's reshaping efforts
during the past decade. The years ahead
promise a more stable and predictable envi-
ronment as the Army looks toward the
future.
During 1995, the Army reached an
important milestone for the BRAC program,
closing the last of the installations scheduled
for closure by the Defense Secretary's
Commission of 1988. The past year also
witnessed approval of the final list of installa-
tions to be closed or realigned under the
BRAC Act of 1990 and the conclusion of an
arduous but extraordinarily successful
process designed to reshape Defense
infrastructure. The approval of most of the
Army's recommendations by the BRAC
commission in 1995 was important because
this was the last downsizing opportunity for
the foreseeable future.
The Army is continuing efforts to
accelerate all BRAC actions from previous
rounds in order to obtain savings as quickly
as feasible. Four of the five closures
approved by the 1991 Commission have
already occurred: Fort Ord, California;
Sacramento Army Depot, California; Fort
Benjamin Harrison, Indiana; and the Wood-
bridge Research Facility in Virginia. In
1996, Fort Devens, Massachusetts will close
one year ahead of schedule and in 1997, Vint
Hill Farms Station, Virginia, will close two
years ahead of schedule
On Labor Day, President Clinton attended
the dedication ceremony for California State
University at Monterey Bay on former Fort
Ord, citing it as a model for base conversion.
Sacramento Army depot is another example
of how the Army and the local community
have worked together to create an
environment for economic recovery:
Packard Bell now employs over 5,000
people there, about 2,000 more than the
Army did. More successes will follow.
In 1995, the Army began to work
aggressively to initiate the 29 closures and 1 1
realignments recommended by the 1995
Commission. In accordance with the Presi-
dent's Five-Part Plan for Revitalizing Base
Closure Communities, the Army will work
with local communities to expedite the reuse
of the installations being closed.
Although overseas closures do not
receive the same publicity as those in the
United States, they are extensive and repre-
sent the Army's fundamental strategic shift
from a forward-deployed force to an over-
seas presence and power projection force.
We are closing seven of every ten overseas
sites — from Europe to Korea to Panama.
These necessay base closures and
realignments cause short-term turbulence
but, in the long-term, result in a more effi-
cient infrastructure and, ultimately, in stabil-
ity throughout the Army. BRAC enables the
Army to move into the 21st century unbur-
dened by excess infrastructure and without
having to take scarce dollars from readiness
SO
239
and modernization programs to maintain
unneeded installations.
Base Operations
Base operations are those activities that
keep Army installations functioning. They
are essential to maintaining an acceptable
quality of life and developing power
projection platforms. Base operations also
affect readiness in areas such as maintenance
of ranges and trairung areas, food service and
supply operations, and installation-level
maintenance for deployable units. Con-
tinuously underflinding base operations
accounts adversely affects Army instal-
lations. Installation commanders, at times,
must divert funds from operational tempo
and training to pay for essential services.
Underfunding base operations accounts adversely affects
the maintenance of ranges and training areas, food
service and supply operations, and installation-level
maintenance.
Backlog of Maintenance and Repair
(BMAR) is the Army's end-of-year estimate
of important projects not accomplished due
to funding shortfalls This measure is
expected to rise to an unprecedented level of
$5 1 billion by the end of fiscal year 1997.
Deferring these projects can become costly.
If the backlog continues, facilities will
continue to deteriorate and be more costly to
repair or replace.
Utilities
Installations require reliable, energy
efficient, and environmentally safe utilities.
Years of underfunding utility accounts,
coupled with more stringent environmental
requirements, have resulted in an Army-wide
utilities modernization requirement of $3 2
billion.
The Army Utilities Strategy is a three-
pronged plan for bringing the utilities
infrastructure into the next century.
Through a privatization program, ownership
of utility systems will be transferred to
certified municipal, county, regional, or
private investor-owned utility companies.
These companies will be responsible for
renovation, upgrade, operations and
maintenance. Installations will become
utility service customers able to negotiate
terms and conditions The Army plans to
divest itself of at least 75 percent of all
utilities by the year 2000.
Through a combination of education, new
technologies, industry participation, and
command support, the Army has reduced
facilities-related energy consumption by 15
percent since 1985. One innovative energy-
saving project — known as Energy Savings
Performance Contracting (ESPC) —
leverages a private contractor's capability to
evaluate, design, finance, procure, install,
operate, and maintain energy-saving
equipment that serves an installation's
energy needs, while receiving compensation
based on performance and dollar savings.
51
38-160 97 - 10
240
Funding
In order to plan for the future, the Army needs stability in its budget. From fiscal year 1989 to
fiscal year 1995, the Army's total obligation authority has declined 33 percent. The Army's share
of the Department of Defense budget averaged 26 3 percent between fiscal years 1989 and 1996.
It decreases to an average of 23.6 percent between fiscal years 1997 through 2001. Scarce
modernization resources is one of the Army's toughest challenges, and we continue to search for
ways to overcome our modernization shortfalls. The Army must modernize in order to maintain
the technological edge that allows us to dominate the battlefield. Sustaining a high quality force
within the Army's current dollar constraints will require difficult choices between operational
readiness today and needed investment in modernization and readiness for the fiiture.
Impact of Contingency Operations
Funding contingency operations remains
a problem. Historically, they have been
fiinded fi"om third and fourth quarter Opera-
tions and Maintenance, Army (OMA)
accounts, hoping for congressional supple-
mental appropriations later. This takes
dollars fi^om readiness activities and prevents
the Army fi-om performing the unresourced
missions unless reimbursed. In fiscal year
1994, contingency operations that developed
during the last two quarters without supple-
mental appropriations resulted in degraded
readiness ratings for three of the Army's
combat divisions.
If current trends continue, the Army can
expect to pay between $400 million and $1
billion for contingency operations in fiscal
year 1997. Exacerbating the problem is the
current moratorium on reimbursement for
goods and services by the United Nations
(UN) for peacekeeping operations. The UN
is currently $51.9 million in arrears to the
Army for support provided on a reim-
bursable basis, most of which will never
return to Army coffers.
Several proposals have been presented to
Congress requesting a special contingency
operations fund or a readiness preservation
account. The Army will continue to work
with Congress to find a better funding mech-
anism to ensure training fijnds are not contin-
ually diverted to fund contingencies at the
expense of readiness.
FY 96 Budget Overview
The fiscal year 1996 budget for the Army
provided a total obligation authority (TOA)
of $63 billion. It supports the planned
endstrength of 495,000 soldiers. The budget
maintains near-term readiness by funding air
and ground operating tempo (OPTEMPO)
and the high quality training at the Combat
Training Centers in order to protect the vital
training foundation upon which our readiness
is firmly based.
The FY96 Research Development and
Acquisition account is budgeted for $12.2
billion dollars, a decrease of 39 percent since
FY89. Limited modernization resources
prohibited any large investments. The
Army's modernization strategy focuses on
long-term technology that creates overmatch
capabilities against any potential threat. We
do not want to enter the 21st century with
outdated technology. The Army's modem-
52
241
ization objectives give us focus and direction
for our scarce resources while we maintain
core programs. With scarce modernization
dollars, we will fund only the most critical
modernization programs. We will buy a
limited number of new weapons, extend the
lives and improve the capabilities of selected
existing systems, and terminate procurement
and support funding to programs that
provide only marginal improvements in
warfighting or sustainability Even by
upgrading proven weapons with information
technology, however, the Army will eventu-
ally reach the point where additional techno-
logical improvements of today's systems will
provide only marginal benefits. Likewise,
the cost of maintaining aging equipment will
become prohibitive. New, replacement
weapon systems and equipment must be
developed for the future force.
FY 97 Budget Overview
The FY97 Army Budget Submission
totals $60 1 billion The Army's buying
power for this fiscal year, converted to FY97
constant dollars, is $4.3 billion lower than
FY95 and $1 billion lower than FY96 The
following chart reflects appropriation trends
by major spending categories.
Army Total Obligation Authority Summary
(CURRENT DOLLARS IN BILLIONS)
APPN FY95
FY96 FY97
Military Personnel $26 1
Operation & Maintenance 21.3
Procurement 6.8
$25.3 $25.9
194 214
7.9 6.3
Research, Development,
Test & Evaluation 5.5
48 4.3
Military Construction .8
Army Family Housing 1.2
Environmental Restoration*
8 .5
1.5 1.3
.4
Total SfiT?*
• M9.7*«$607l"*
SupplemenUls & Transfer 2 . 3
3.3
• Becomes a service approprialion in FY 97
** Appropriated by Congress (excludes subsequent supplementals and
transfers)
••• Army's President's Budget Submission
The FY97 Army Budget Submission
adequately supports near-term readiness.
Operating tempo (OPTEMPO) is fiilly
funded in both the ground and flying hour
programs However, long-term readiness
continues to be underfunded, particularly in
the following modernization areas:
purchase of modernized ammunition,
reduction of ammunition demilitarization
backlog,
elimination of ammunition War Reserve
drawdown,
completion of first Family of Wheeled
Tactical Vehicle multi-year program,
funding of heavy trucks and smaU arms
multi-year procurement,
continuation of UH-60L procurement,
funding of force sustainment moderniza-
tion,
small arms,
long haul communications, and
acceleration of key warfighting systems
If resources continue to decline and mod-
ernization remains underfunded, the Army's
long-term readiness and the quality of the
future force may be at risk.
Constraints on resources devoted to defense make
it more challenging to balance operational
requirements, readiness, modernization, and
quality of life.
53
242
Conclusion
Constrained resources constitute the Army's toughest challenge. Resources affect virtually
every aspect of Army operations — the number of quality people serving, the pace of training, the
maintenance of equipment and infrastructure, and the amount of modernization. The Army
recognizes that resources are in demand throughout government and that they must be used
wisely Constrained resources force tough choices. We have succeeded thus far in remaining
trained and ready, but to continue to do so with a high degree of assurance requires stability in
resources. America's Army must be of sufficient quality, capability and size to deter potential
adversaries and meet our operational commitments.
Internally, the Army must do its part to ensure the most efficient use of scarce resources. We
are emphasizing financial stewardship at every level and developing an Army-wide efficiency
strategy. The next chapter will present our efficiency challenge.
We have succeeded thus far in remaining trained and ready, but to continue to do so with a high degree
of assurance requires a level of stability in resources.
54
243
4. THE EFFICIENCY CHALLENGE
Becoming more efficient is the third major challenge confronting America 's Army. By
becoming efficient, the Army intends to gamer savings to help ensure it can maintain a force
structure commensurate with operational commitments, to increase investment in essential
modernization programs, and to increase spending in our vital quality of life programs.
By taking advantage of technological
advances, streamlining our processes, and
reorganizing our institutions the Army can
gain significant savings and improve effec-
tiveness and efficiency. In this era of
constrained resources, the Army is empha-
sizing financial stewardship at every level
We must demonstrate that we are good
stewards of the nation's resources and of the
taxpayers' investment in us. The Army is
aggressively seeking to maximize scarce
resources by fundamentally changing our
operating practices Just as private busi-
nesses have become more efficient by modi-
fying internal operations, the Army is reex-
amining every aspect of its operations and
activities. We are exploring all reasonable
avenues to provide commanders with oppor-
tunities to avoid costs and to generate
savings We are reviewing our business
practices, revising our policies, and propos-
ing legislative changes Motivated by the
National Performance Review, we are
already implementing new policies designed
to make government work better and cost
less.
Governmental Initiatives
The National Performance Review
In the spring of 1995, the National
Performance Review entered its third year by
continuing toward its goal of a more effi-
cient, effective, and productive government.
This review — designed to make govern-
ment work better and cost less — challenges
the Army to shift from rules to results, to
insist on customer satisfaction, to decentral-
ize authority, and to focus on core missions
We continue to work directly with the
Department of Defense and other Federal
agencies to address specific cost-cutting
initiatives, such as streamlining our work
force, improving customer service, imple-
menting acquisition reform, and reducing
regulations. All major Army commands are
working on reengineering and redesign
initiatives that will institutionalize a high
quality approach to managing organizational
change One provision of the National Per-
formance Review charters reinvention labo-
ratories. This process allows agencies to test
new ways of doing business Reinvention
labs demonstrate the immediate benefits of
freedom from red tape and provide incen-
tives to operate more efficiently In the last
year, the Army intensified its efforts in this
area by increasing the number of Reinvention
Labs Even more significant, the Army cre-
ated the only two Reinvention Centers within
the Defense Department (one each at Train-
ing and Doctrine Command and Forces
Command) This designation provides broad
powers to the commanders of those organi-
zations to establish their own reinvention
labs, to waive regulations in support of rein-
55
244
vention, and to coordinate directly with the
Department of Defense regarding legislative
changes necessary to support reinvention.
Clearly, Reinvention Centers will expedite
the reform process.
'REINVENTING GOVERNMENT"
OLD
(70'S To 90'S)
• Overly Ccnlralizi:d
• Distnistfiil
• Overregulation
• Hierarchical
• Bureaucratic
Cut Red Tape
Put Custofnei^ First
Cut Back to Basics
Empower Employees
NEW
(90'sTo2010)
• Empowered Work-
• Foster Innovation
• Quality Focus
• Ctistomer Service
• De-regulation
Smaller, more empowered, inspired, productive Federal Workforce
Waivers of existing regulations and
instructions to support better business prac-
tices are another important tool in the
Army's eflForts to implement measures asso-
ciated with the National Performance
Review. In August 1994, the Army imple-
mented a new policy to waive restrictive
Army regulations that impede good business
practices. In order to conserve and focus
resources for America's 21st century Army,
we must continue to generate, test and
implement efficient business practices.
The Chief Financial Officers Act of
1990
The Chief Financial Officers Act of
1990 introduced a new era of financial man-
agement reform and represented a significant
shift fi'om appropriation-based management
to private industry standards. A significant
provision of this act requires audited annual
financial statements for revolving fimds, trust
funds, and substantially commercial func-
tions. The Army, as one of only ten federal
agencies designated a pilot under this law has
prepared audited annual financial statements
covering all Army funds since fiscal year
1991. The Government Management
Reform Act of 1994 expands the
requirement for agency-wide financial state-
ments to all agencies covered by the
CFO Act, beginning in fiscal year
1996.
The Army set the standard for
financial management reform within
the Defense Department and contin-
ues to implement the Chief Financial
Officers Act aggressively. Successful
Army-led initiatives include revised
policies on physical inventory, the
valuation of assets, the incorporation
of outcome-oriented performance
measures, and restructuring of the
management control process.
The Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993
The Government Performance and
Results Act is a major step in the inevitable
transition to results-oriented program man-
agement and performance budgeting This
act builds on the legislative mandate to mea-
sure performance and to manage functional
programs with accurate fmancial data that
began with the Chief Financial Officers Act.
The purpose of the Government Perfor-
mance and Results Act is to improve pro-
gram effectiveness and aid congressional
decision making by systematically holding
federal agencies accountable for program
results The law requires strategic plans and
annual performance plans beginning in fiscal
year 1997.
The Act also requires a series of pilot
projects. The first, known as Performance
Measurement, tests the costs and benefits of
strategic planning, performance-based plan-
ning, and performance measurement. Of the
S6
245
approximately 70 pilot projects, three are in
the Army: the U.S. Army Research Labora-
tory, U.S. Corps of Engineers Civil Works
National Operation and Maintenance Pro-
gram, and the US Army Audit Agency
Becoming More Efficient
The Army is developing an Army-wide efficiency strategy to generate revenues for
reinvestment. We will use industry efforts as examples for the Army's business operations. We
are reviewing all of our processes, programs, and organizations. We have established a senior-
level Efficiency Working Group, initiated several cost-saving initiatives, and have embedded
within the organization a management philosophy known as Total Army Quality.
Redesigning the Institutional Army
The Army is also becoming more
efficient by fundamentally redesigning and
reengineering its institutional forces — the
infrastructure that supports the Army's
functions under Title 10 of the US Code
This effort, which is part of the Force XXI
process and is linked to the national military
strategy and the Commission on Roles and
Missions, will eliminate unnecessary layering
of functions and headquarters. We are
conducting top-to-bottom assessments of the
institutional processes in all functional areas
We will reduce the number of major Army
commands, divest the Army of those func-
tions that are not absolutely essential, and
reallocate resources to support our core
capabilities.
At the same time, we are conducting
comprehensive reviews of all our headquar-
ters field operating and staff support agen-
cies. Each will be rigorously scrutinized, and
we will consider eliminating, consolidating
or transferring out as many as possible We
expect to reduce significantly the number of
headquarters agencies, and we will explore
every opportunity to privatize or out-source
a number of administrative support func-
tions.
In support of the redesign effort, we
have initiated some ancillary reviews to
identify cost saving initiatives both across the
Army and specifically in the acquisition and
modernization processes. These initiatives
will increase efficiency and effectiveness.
Efficiency Working Group
Another way in which the Army is
developing ways to gamer savings is through
a recently established senior-level Efficiency
Working Group During the Program
Objective Memorandum (POM) 97-01
update, it became evident that the Army
could not sustain essential modernization,
improve quality of life, and maintain an
endstrength of 495,000 active duty personnel
while conducting business as usual Accord-
ingly, the Army began earnestly reviewing
policies and procedures to identify potential
efficiencies The Army's goal is to generate
significant savings each year by driving down
the cost of doing business, husbanding
constrained resources, reengineering the
Army throughout the breadth and depth of
the organization, and continuing to adopt
sound business practices.
The Army Chief of Staff charged the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and
Plans with carrying out this efficiency
review He established a senior-level review
group to identify specific, quantifiable areas
from which to gamer savings The Army
57
246
Audit Agency and the Cost and Economic
Analysis Center are reviewing and validating
proposals developed by the working group
After approval by senior leaders, the Army
.will implement worthy initiatives.
Total Army Quality
In 1992, the Army adopted a new
management philosophy Total Army Qual-
ity This philosophy is now well established
in all major Army commands. This funda-
mental cultural change will produce organi-
zations capable of anticipating and leading
change rather than simply responding to it.
Our new quality-conscious culture will be
characterized by the following:
• Senior-level leadership and guidance —
manifested in organizational visions,
mission statements, and definitions of
core competencies and processes.
• Customer focus — all of our organiza-
tions will focus on their customers and
fully understand the customers' require-
ments and needs
• Empowered employees — because no
one can better improve the processes
than those who work within them every
day.
• Continuous improvement — every unit
must be capable of continuous improve-
ment.
Recently, three Army organizations
were recognized in the 1995 President's
Quality Award Program. The Army domi-
nated the awards by having three of the best
five organizations in the Federal sector All
three are part of the Army Materiel
Command: the Red River Army Depot and
the Armament Research, Development and
Engineering Center both won in the Quality
Improvement Prototype category, and the
Tank-Automotive Research, Development
and Engineering Center won in the
Presidential Category In order to win,
organizations must prove that they have
made world-class improvements in efficiency
and cost effectiveness.
We will not rest on our laurels. In an
effort to accelerate implementation of quality
management, the Army is implementing the
Army Performance Improvement Criteria.
These organizational assessment criteria are
derived from the Malcolm Baldridge
National Quality Award. They assess all
aspects of an organization's operations,
including leadership, human resource devel-
opment, process management, operational
results, and customer satisfaction.
Cost Saving Initiatives
While we continue to search for additional, innovative ways to generate savings, we are
now benefiting from several programs and initiatives we instituted over the past several years.
Initiatives such as Total Asset Visibility and acquisition reform are making the Army more
efficient, productive, and cost-effective today, and they promise to generate increased savings in
the years ahead.
Total Asset Visibility
Total Asset Visibility is a compre-
hensive Army program that improves the
Army's ability to obtain and act on informa-
tion about the location, quantity, condition,
and movement of our assets. This effort
enables the Army to track the flow of equip-
58
247
ment and supplies continuously, whether
they are in production, at a repair depot, in
the inventory, or on the move between vari-
ous locations. This capability allows the
Army to get the right item to the right loca-
tion at the right time, to redistribute assets to
meet needs, to divert in-transit assets when
required, and to avoid buying unnecessary
items. To track assets, we use automated
identification technologies, such as bar
coding, laser optical cards, and radio
frequency tags and readers These tools
provide rapid and accurate data capture,
retrieval, and transmission.
With Total Asset Visibility, the Army
has made sigiuficant gains in providing iirfor-
mation to managers who can reduce new
item procurement, improve the use of avail-
able assets through redistribution, and
improve command and control decisions
Through this system. Army managers can
track over 311,000 items representing 90
percent of the Army's supplies. In 1995,
Government Executive magazine, which
recognizes innovative technology-related
programs within the federal community,
selected TAV from more than 330 nomina-
tions as one of the winners of the Federal
Technology Leadership Award
Total Asset Visibility is critical in peace, var and other
operations. It helps commanders and logistics managers
provide timely and effective support while improving
Army operational and materiel readiness.
Manpower and Personnel
Integration
Through Manpower and Personnel
Integration (MANPRINT), we are integrat-
ing systems with soldiers. This initiative
ensures that systems are designed around the
soldiers who will use them by assessing the
impact of system design on individual opera-
tors and maintainers, the fighting unit, and
the force as a whole MANPRINT defines
manpower and personnel requirements, min-
imizes the need for redesign, identifies and
implements effective training technologies,
and enhances soldier safety, health and
survivability The goal is to balance design
factors which optimize life cycle costs, force
structure requirements, and combat effec-
tiveness
MANPRINT is forward looking: it
addresses the design of future systems today
and accounts for projected changes in the
structure and technology of tomorrow's
Army MANPRINT systematically identi-
fies essential knowledge and skills, provides
the necessary training, and ensures systems
maximize the effectiveness of human
resources.
The Comanche helicopter is an
excellent example of MANPRINT 's contri-
butions to system design Its cockpit is
designed to support the full range of size and
motion of both male and female pilots. By
modularizing components, we have de-
creased maintenance requirements and we
will reduce the risk of damage to surround-
ing components By applying the MAN-
PRINT process early, we have saved in
excess of three billion dollars
Integrated Sustainment
Maintenance
Integrated Sustairunent Maintenance
(ISM) integrates, under a single manage-
59
248
ment structure, all Active and Reserve Com-
ponent General Support maintenance units,
installation Directorate of Logistics facilities,
maintenance depots, and defense contractors
who perform maintenance on weapon
systems. ISM streamlines maintenance and
repair activities by centrally managing all
Army sustainment maintenance workloads.
This integration of maintenance levels
ensures the best use of maintenance skills
and reduces costs by eliminating redundant
layers of management and maximizing the
Army's sustaining base repair capability.
ISM provides a focused logistics effort and
permits greater workload distribution result-
ing in a more effective, efficient use of the
Army's total maintenance capability.
Integrated Sustainment Maintenance maximizes the
Army 's sustaining base repair capability.
A nine month test of the ISM pro-
gram concluded in 1 994 was so positive that
the Army decided to commence an expanded
demonstration in 1995. This ongoing
demonstration is evaluating procedures for
expanding ISM across major Army com-
mands and establishing the roles and func-
tions of national level sustainment manage-
ment. Final details for implementing ISM
throughout the Army are expected to be
presented to senior Army leaders for
approval in 1996.
Acquisition Reform
The Army is teaming with the
Defense Department and industry to improve
our acquisition process by promoting
innovation, good business judgment, and by
changing laws, regulations, and processes
that impede smart practices. Army
acquisition reform efforts are directly linked
to initiatives in the National Performance
Review. Each year, the Army places over
$32 billion on contract. Everyone involved
in determining requirements and acquiring
equipment, supplies, and services for
soldiers, their families, and our civilian
employees must work together to improve
our contracting practices Implementing
acquisition reform initiatives will provide the
Army with excellent opportunities to
stabilize requirements and programs, and
provide savings for modernization,
readiness, and quality of life initiatives.
In an effort to cut red tape, the Army
provided resources directly to Program
Executive Officers and Program Managers,
eliminated unique government requirements
for Army contracts, mandated compliance
with the Army Technical Architecture, and
reduced data and management reports in
Army contracts. By specifying how a system
should perform instead of specifying how it
should be manufactured, the Army has saved
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249
precious funds on weapon systems, such as
the COMANCHE helicopter, and routine
maintenance contracts at Army installations.
The Army also has established a preference
for commercial items, which generally cost
much less than items made to unique military
specifications. Our dedication to real, lasting
acquisition reform is reflected in our training
program: we have trained over 5,000 person-
nel through our acquisition training seminars
known as "Roadshows," and we are devel-
oping career path training programs for
Army acquisition personnel.
We have fostered significant acquisi-
tion successes by streamlining and reengi-
neering our acquisition programs Working
under the new Federal Acquisition Stream-
lining Act, we will be able to reduce docu-
mentation and oversight and remove many of
the legal barriers that preclude much of the
industrial base from selling to the Army Our
acquisition reform initiatives allow us to save
money and, more importantly, to provide
soldiers with new equipment more quickly.
We have developed many of the
Army's reengineering successes through
Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements. These agreements are new
mechanisms for the development and transfer
of technology between the Army, academia,
and private industry under which we provide
purpose and overhead while academia and
industry research technological advance-
ments
The Army Material Command, a
major Army command responsible for equip-
ping and sustaining the Army, also has insti-
tuted numerous programs and initiatives to
improve the acquisition process. One,
known as Direct Vendor Delivery, allows
vendors to deliver directly to the ultimate
user. In a two-year pilot program, the Tank-
Automotive and Armaments Command has
received 75 percent of its tires directly from
vendors at a savings of more than $45
million. Another initiative, the purchasing of
nondevelopmental items that are available
commercially instead of developing, testing
and evaluating new systems, has saved the
Army over $400 million.
Other Commands have also instituted
innovative reforms that are producing
savings. Medical Command has used the
Prime Vendor concept to improve their
delivery of quality medical services at a
reduced cost. This concept allows a single
supplier to distribute a specified class of
commercial supplies in a given geographical
area Orders are placed electronically and
the Army is able to maintain minimal stocks
as the prime vendor provides just-in-time
delivery to meet requirements Along with
increased use of electronic commerce in con-
tracting, the Army is the largest user of the
credit card within the federal Govermnent.
Our credit card usage increased three-fold in
FY95 The Army hopes to achieve a savings
of over $76 million in FY96 by using credit
cards in lieu of purchase orders.
These initiatives are among the many
approaches the Army is taking to reform and
improve the acquisition process. Acquisition
reform enables us to leverage resources,
thereby creating significant savings needed
for developing our 21st century Army.
Other Examples
The Army has undertaken many
other efforts to save money Throughout the
drawdown, we have been converting under-
utilized facilities to commercial use The
Army had been spending $3 million annually
to maintain the Indiana Ammo Plant By
leasing the plant's facilities, equipment, and
land to over 43 commercial companies, the
Army avoids those costs Our success at the
Indiana Ammo Plant is a model for defense
conversions.
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By establishing Material Redistribu-
tion Centers, we have generated significant
savings. These centers streamline the proce-
dures for collecting and redistributing excess
equipment from deactivated units. Thus far,
we estimate that these centers have
precluded expenditures of $74 million in
operations and maintenance.
Army family housing is adopting the
Business Occupancy Program to improve
efficiency and generate savings Under this
program, family housing funding will no
longer be based on the number of units in an
installation's inventory Instead, installations
will be fijnded for housing based solely on
occupancy. Housing managers can improve
the condition of housing with stable funding
and remove uneconomical units from the
inventory by divestment or demolition. In
addition to saving money, this program will
enable soldiers to live in high quality on-post
housing
Conclusion
The Army is rapidly becoming more efficient in virtually all of its business practices.
Readiness, essential modernization, and quality of life improvements for our deserving soldiers
require money. The challenge is difficult, but by streamlining operations, adopting suitable
commercial practices, and reorganizing our processes and programs, we have a significant
"window of opportunity" to generate savings. Several programs and initiatives are already saving
money, and those savings will increase exponentially as they continue to be implemented Army-
wide.
Even with the many initiatives currently in effect and the promise of more to come, the
Army requires the support of the President and Congress. We need continued legislative support
in repealing statutes that inhibit efficiency, and we must be able to retain the savings we gamer
for investment in readiness, modernization, and quality of life.
Savings we generate by becoming more
ejjicient will help keep the force trained
and ready, modernize the Army for the 21st
century, and improve quality of life pro-
grams for soldiers.
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5. AMERICA'S ARMY
TOMORROW AND INTO THE
21st CENTURY
The nature of ■warfare will change in the 2 1st century as the divisions between the
strategic, operational and tactical levels of war become less distinct. The principles and root
causes of war, however, will not change, nor will the consequences of being unprepared to fight
and win The Army is moving today to corweive, shape, test, and field an Army prepared to meet
the challenges of the coming millennium. America 's 21st century Army will be a capabilities-
based force, with the ability to conduct simultaneous and seamless operations across the
spectrum of conflict.
21st Century Warfare
Advancements in technology will change warfare in the 21st century. Soldiers, America's
ultimate weapon, will still be required to close with and destroy the enemy, but emerging
technologies will yield new combat capabilities In fact, technological advances promise to
revolutionize future battlefields in five key areas: lethality and dispersion, volume and precision of
fire, integrative technology, mass and effects, and invisibility and detectability
Increased lethality and the corre-
sponding dispersion of forces will signifi-
cantly change the complexion of the battle-
field. The battlefield will remain bloody and
dangerous, but as weapons of mass destruc-
tion and long-range precision strike weapon
systems proliferate, soldiers and units will
necessarily become more dispersed. Unit
cohesion will become even more important
and may be the difference between tactical
victory and defeat To remain capable of
providing decisive victory in the emerging
environment, America's Army must make
major changes in tactics, organizations,
doctrine, equipment, force mixes, and meth-
ods of command and control.
Future battlefields will also be char-
acterized by significantly increased volume
and precision of fires delivered at greater
ranges The Gulf War provided only the first
glimpses of how the ability to deliver precise,
high volume fires at extended ranges will
affect the battlefield Emerging technology
will make the delivery of fires on future bat-
tlefields even more accurate and more lethal
Battlefield of the Future
►Unprecedented
Lethality
•Fast Tempo
•Increased Depth
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Integrative technologies will have a
profound effect in digital communications,
intelligence, global positioning and logistics.
Technology will allow the commander to
visualize the battlespace, the current state of
friendly and enemy forces, weather and
terrain. The commander will be able to
visualize the desired end state and the steps
to achieve it in a single system for planning,
rehearsal, and execution
Emerging technologies will allow
future forces, though smaller in size, to be
more capable of massing decisive effects.
They will shoot more often, more accurately,
and be better able to transit the battlefield
because of improved mobility and communi-
cations. Cooperation between different
levels of command will increase as advances
in global positioning and other technologies
enhance the effects of both direct and indi-
rect fires Units will be able to mass the
effects of weapons due to better organization
of flexible, tailored task forces. In the 21st
century, battlefields will see greater integra-
tion of maneuver forces with artillery, engi-
neers, aviation, and the forces of other
services. Maneuver will be conducted by
small, lethal, mobile and tailorable units.
Advanced technology will maximize the
benefits of maneuver by increasing the tempo
of operations and improving the ability to
function day or night and under adverse
weather conditions
As technology permits greater detec-
tion at extended ranges and the delivery of
fires from over the horizon, the need to
become less visible becomes increasingly
important. The future land force commander
must make the battlefield more transparent
for friendly forces and more opaque to
opponents Increased control, volume,
range, and lethality of fires provides a
distinct advantage to the force that sees and
understands the battlefield better than its
opponent. Enhanced situational awareness
at all levels from the individual soldier
through senior commanders contribute to
achieving dominant battlespace awareness.
Threats
It is expected that there will be four
types of military threat to the United States
and its interests in the next century: informa-
tion warfare; nuclear, biological and chemi-
cal weapons; standing armies of foreign
powers; and irregular forces ranging from
ethnic militias to terrorists.
The information warfare threat is
genuine and world-wide. The global con-
nectivity and openness of our national infor-
mation infi-astructure makes it vulnerable to
interference. Whether at peace or war, US.
forces can expect an adversary to use
advanced technologies to damage, disrupt,
or destroy information and communication
systems — or the information residing in
them.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons pose a
deadly threat.
Nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons are viewed as potential equalizers
by states that cannot compete with the
advanced technology, wealth, and military
power of the United States. These weapons
pose a deadly threat, and many potential
adversaries are seeking to acquire them
Standing armies of nations hostile to
US interests always pose a threat Potential
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adversaries witnessed our awesome power in
the Gulf War; however, most states recog-
nize the military power of the United States
and will likely try to avoid presenting a direct
military challenge. If a military confrontation
does occur, they are apt to seek asymmetri-
cal responses designed to exploit perceived
U.S. vulnerabilities, such as the sensitivity of
the U.S. public regarding military casualties
and weaknesses in our reliance on advanced
technology.
Conflicts involving irregular forces
could draw U.S. involvement. Paramilitary
forces, militias, rogue militaries, bandits,
terrorists, narco-criminals and other non-
state threats can be the most challenging
threat. Except for terrorists and criminals,
they rarely present a direct threat to the
United States, but their skills for creating
disorder in peripheral regions routinely result
in calls for international intervention As
entrepreneurs of conflict, irregulars usually
fight asymmetrically, limiting or even
negating the U.S. military's conventional and
technological advantages. Such enemies
fight unrestrained by laws or ethical codes,
while U.S. forces remain bound by
internationally accepted standards of
conduct The most capable, adaptable
weapon system for this environment is the
highly motivated, well trained, and well led
American soldier
Some Constants
As the Army prepares for the 21st century, some things will not change America's Army
will continue to be a values-based organization The guiding beliefs which characterize the Army
will still be described in one word: DUTY. Likewise, the professional qualities of commitment,
competence, candor, compassion, and courage will continue to undergird the belief in duty
These qualities will remain the foundation of our doctrine and of the unique American way of
waging war.
The Army's fundamental purpose — fighting and winning the nation's wars — will remain
unchanged also. The Army will continue to be involved in operations as diverse as humanitarian
assistance and peacekeeping, but success will depend on well trained, disciplined soldiers who are
ready for war. The bond between the Army and the nation will also remain firm We will continue
to be partners with the American people for national defense
The Army Ethos
The Army ethos are the standards
and ideals that distinguish, characterize and
motivate the Army They inspire the sense
of purpose necessary to sustain soldiers in
the brutal realities of combat and help them
deal with the ambiguities of military opera-
tions where war has not been declared. The
Army ethos are succinctly described in the
word "DUTY, " which means behavior
required by moral obligation, demanded by
custom, or enjoined by feelings of rightness
Duty compels us to do what needs to be
done despite difficulty or danger Contained
within the concept of duty, integrity and
selfless service give moral foundation to the
qualities the ethos demand of all soldiers
Integrity is the uncompromising adherence
to a code of moral values, the avoidance of
deception or expediency of any kind
Integrity provides the basis for trust and
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confidence. Selfless service puts the welfare
of the nation and the accomplishment of the
mission ahead of individual desires; it leads
to teamwork and unity of effort.
Professional Qualities
The core professional qualities of
commitment, competence, candor, compas-
sion, and courage are the facets of the pro-
fessional soldier's character that undergird
the ethos. Commitment is dedication to serv-
ing the Nation, the Army, the unit, and one's
comrades; commitment is seeing every task
to completion. Competence is finely tuned
proficiency that ensures success. Candor is
unreserved, honest expression. Mission
accomplishment and soldier lives depend on
the honest answer delivered directly and
forthrightly. Compassion is basic respect for
the dignity of each individual. Courage, both
physical and moral, makes it possible for
soldiers to fight and win in the chaos of
battle Physical and moral courage can be
the difference between failure and success,
whether in peace or in war.
The Army - Nation Bond
Committing the Army commits the
Nation. No other single gesture so readily
demonstrates U.S. resolve as placing Ameri-
can soldiers in harm's way The Army's
strength always has been, and always will be,
the American soldier Soldiers are our most
important asset. An American soldier, on the
ground, is the most visible symbol of Ameri-
can determination and will. Committing
America's Army makes a strong statement
that adversaries cannot misinterpret. The
Army makes the most significant investment
it can make to the nation's security by prop-
erly training, equipping, and supporting our
soldiers.
Forging America's 21st Century Army
As the world enters the information age, the Army must stay ahead of changes in warfare
The fliture force must be prepared to conduct quick, decisive, highly sophisticated operations. It
must also be ready to execute peace operations and limited, often protracted, operations against
less sophisticated enemies. In the past five years, the Army has accomplished much towards
building a capable and versatile 21st century army, but there is still much to do. The Army flilly
intends to remain the world's most formidable land force in the next century and has developed a
plan to convert that vision into reality by taking advantage of the revolution in information
technology. America's 21st century Army will integrate emerging information technologies with
sound doctrine, reinvented organizations, and quality people to make a smaller force more lethal,
more survivable, more versatile, and more deployable.
Force XXI
Simply stated. Force XXI is a
process that projects our quality soldiers into
the 21st century and provides them the right
doctrine, organization, training; and the best
equipment, weapons, and sustainment our
nation can provide. Force XXI is the Army's
com-prehensive approach to transforming an
industrial age army to an information age
army. The product of our Force XXI
process will be a versatile army with the
capabilities that America needs for the next
century — Army XXI. The concept of
Force XXI calls for major changes in philos-
ophy, theory, materiel, and organization
The Army must change how we think about
war, how we fight and lead on future battle-
fields, and how we succeed in military opera-
tions other than war.
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Force XXI prajeeta our Ugfi quality soldiers into the
21st century
Decisive victory in the 21st century
will be achieved by dominating the enemy in
speed, space and time, and by achieving and
sustaining a high pace of continuous opera-
tions in all types of environments. Competi-
tive advantage will derive from the quantity,
quality, and use of information. Emerging
information and digital technologies signifi-
cantly enhance the Army's capabilities by
creating a synergistic effect among weapons
and organizations. In forging our 21st
century Army, Force XXI will maximize the
science of modem digital technology, the art
of integrating doctrine and organization, and
the skills of the Army's quality people.
Force XXI is enhanced command and
control capability. It is not overmatch in
every conceivable weapon system. Force
XXI looks at the capability to integrate all
elements of combat power faster than an
adversary.
Force XXI focuses on the following
characteristics essential to develop a smaller,
more lethal and versatile 21st century Army:
quality soldiers, flexible doctrine, tailorability
and modularity, joint and multinational con-
nectivity, versatility, and shared situational
awareness
Quality Soldiers. Quality soliiiers
will remain as critically important in the 2 1 st
century as they are today. Intelligent, physi-
cally fit, highly motivated, educated, and well
trained soldiers will be required to leverage
technology to its full potential
Flexible Doctrine. The fijture
strategic environment possesses great poten-
tial for operations across the entire contin-
uum of conflict — from war, to lesser
conflicts, to peace operations. Leaders must
have the skill to apply principles in ways as
varied as the scenarios presented. Through
flexible doctrine, our leaders and soldiers will
be able to adapt tactics, techniques, proce-
dures, and organizations to meet require-
ments in the future.
Tailorability and Modularity.
Strategic lift limitations, other service capa-
bilities, time limits, and other factors require
tailoring forces to meet the needs of the joint
force commander. Our 21st century Army
will be modular in nature to enable the tailor-
ing of necessary force packages. Modular
forces will allow the generation, projection,
and sustainment of force packages for any
contingency.
Joint & Multinational Connectivity.
Execution of operations throughout the
battlespace demands the use of all service
assets. Likewise, political and military con-
siderations will require that most operations
involve many nations and agencies. The
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ability to pass information unhindered among
the elements of the joint or multinational
force will be essential. Likewise, the
operational systems of all elements must be
compatible
Versatility. The requirement to be
trained and ready to fight and win remains
the Army's absolute priority. The Army also
must be capabilities-based, with the ability to
conduct missions across the continuum
Future military operations will be character-
ized by diversity and complexity. Our 21st
century Army must possess the requisite
versatility to succeed in these operations.
Shared Situational A wareness. Fast,
precise communications among all echelons
of the force will greatly improve situational
awareness and agility of the force. Improved
awareness and agility, in turn, produce sig-
nificantly better lethality, survivability, com-
mand and control, versatility, sustainability,
and deployability.
Horizontal Technology Integration
As the Army builds a 21st century
force, it faces formidable challenges in mod-
ernization. Advanced Technology offers
significant operational advantages, but it is
expensive and must be tested. When techno-
logical breakthroughs do occur, our Hori-
zontal Technology Integration (HTl) initia-
tive allows the Army to capitalize on them
and apply the improved capability across the
force. The HTI approach simultaneously
integrates and fields emerging technologies
into different weapon systems and support
platforms that work together Integrating
technologies across multiple systems
improves warfighting capabilities and inter-
operability The Army implements integra-
tion within the framework of existing struc-
tures and organizations and supports the
evolving streamlined acquisition process
developed by the Defense Department.
The Army's HTI activities break
away fi^om traditional and expensive vertical
technology integration and materiel acquisi-
tion processes. Through new acquisitions,
product improvements and system-compo-
nent upgrades, we are integrating dissimilar
systems. When we field common subsys-
tems, we reduce operational and support
costs by allowing standardization of comjJo-
nents, simplified maintenance and more effi-
cient use of manpower.
In our technology integration
program, the Army is currently applying
technologies in four areas which will enhance
both the capability and survivability of the
future force One area, known as "Own the
Night, " permits our forces to achieve tactical
surprise and maintain momentum around the
clock. The second. Battlefield Combat Iden-
tification, provides enhanced situational
awareness and reduces the risk of fratricide
A third. Battlefield Digitization, ensures the
right information gets to the right warfighter
at the right time. Fourth, the Suite of Surviv-
ability Enhancement Systems, the newest
HTI program, capitalizes on technologies
designed to enhance survivability.
Digitization
The digitized battlefield is the comer-
stone of the horizontal technology integra-
tion initiative It is critical to ensuring Amer-
ica's Army remains the premier land combat
force into the 21st century. Digitization is
the application of information technologies
to acquire, exchange, and employ timely
battlefield information throughout the entire
battlespace. It enables fiiendly forces to
share a relevant, common picture of the bat-
tlefield while communicating and targeting in
real or near-real time Digitization will
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enable the Army to collect and exploit battle-
field infonnation rapidly. It will reduce the
"fog of war" and decrease decision-making
time by optimizing the flow of command and
control information. Digitization will allow
commanders to synchronize effectively and
mass combat power at the critical time and
place — faster than any adversary can —
thereby increasing lethality, survivability, and
operational tempo while reducing the poten-
tial for fi-atricide
The Army Digitization Office
(ADO), formed in 1994, integrates digital
information technology to ensure seamless
digital communications from the sustaining
base to the tactical and strategic levels
ADO analyzes elements of architecture,
communications and integration, identifies
requirements, and evaluates digitization
efforts. The ADO also works closely with
our sister services and coalition partners to
ensure that digitization programs are inter-
operable.
The Anny Enterprise Strategy sup-
ports digitization by unifying and integrating
a wide range of command, control, commu-
nications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
initiatives. The Enterprise Strategy inte-
grates current doctrine and modernization
plans for information systems and addresses
the requirements to organize, train, and
equip the force. It provides a fi^amework for
winning the information war, by focusing on
Army infonnation needs as a whole
A key component of the Army Enter-
prise Strategy and to supplying warfighters
with integrated information systems is the
Army Enterprise Architectures. These archi-
tectures — Operational, Technical and Sys-
tems — define information exchange
requirements, mandate and promote use of
commercial standards and protocols, and
ensure systems are interoperable. In recog-
nition of this focus, the Army Technical
Architecture was selected by the Defense
Department as the baseline for development
of a Joint Technical Architecture
Digitization will enable the Army to collect and exploit
battlefield information rapidly.
Command and control will be
particularly critical in the high-tempo
environment of the future battlefield The
Army Battle Command System (ABCS) is
the umbrella architecture that supports the
Army from the foxhole to the strategic level
The programs under ABCS — Army Global
Command and Control System (AGCCS)
and Army Tactical Command and Control
System (ATCCS) — represent a comprehen-
sive approach to automating command and
control
AGCCS consolidates the develop-
ment of command and control programs at
echelons above corps and implements the
Army's extensions to the Global Command
and Control System ATCCS meshes the
battlefield command and control systems for
commanders and their staffs from corps to
battalion and improves interoperability
among Army, joint, and allied systems.
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ATCCS has five systems in various stages of
development, testing, and fielding: the
Maneuver Control System will integrate all
fire support, intelligence, air defense, logis-
tics, and maneuver information; the All
Source Analysis System is a computer-based
threat integration intelligence system that
automatically receives, stores and integrates
threat information into intelligence products;
the Combat Service Support Control System
provides timely situational awareness and
force projection information to determine the
capability to support current operations and
sustain fiiture operations, the Advanced
Field Tactical Artillery Data System
provides integrated, automated support for
planning, coordinating, and controlling all
fire support assets; and the Forward Area
Air Defense Command, Control, and Intelli-
gence System is an automated means of
providing timely target data to facilitate
management of the air battle.
Battle Labs
The Battle Labs Program is essential
to improve Army requirements and acquisi-
tion processes as we prepare for the 21st
century. The Army has established six Bat-
tle Labs, Early Entry, Mounted Battlespace,
Dismounted Battlespace, Command and
Control, Depth and Simultaneous Attack,
and Combat Service Support. Each of them
uses distributed interactive real, construc-
tive, and virtual simulations. These simula-
tions test options to ensure that Army
resources are applied against initiatives that
provide the best battlefield payoff. The
Advanced Concepts and Technology II
(ACT II) program allows industry to demon-
strate promising technology and prototypes
Each Advanced Technology Demonstration
(ATD) must sponsor and have at least one
experiment performed at one of the battle
labs. We then rapidly prototype promising
technologies to the warfighting customer.
The Army works as a team with the devel-
oper, user, and industry. This teamwork is
critical in simulating, experimenting, and
assessing advanced technologies and con-
cepts and determining their potential for use
in weapon systems, advanced warfighting
concepts, and even organizational improve-
ments.
In our Battle Labs, we can appraise
options for joint and coalition warfighting.
Our sister services have been active partici-
pants in a number of warfighting experi-
ments. The British and German armies are
establishing similar battle labs and intend to
coordinate programs to ensure interoperabil-
ity These joint and coalition linkages
provide a real world context in which to
develop America's land combat force of the
21st century.
Battle Lab warfighting experiments
begin with formal hypotheses derived from
contemporary operations They employ a
progressive and iterative mix of constructive,
virtual and live simulations, involving field
soldiers and units in relevant, tactically
competitive scenarios. They use a wide
variety of warfighting experiments ranging
from narrowly focused scenarios to
comprehensive, detailed exploration of
complex issues The latter are called
Advanced Warfighting Experiments (AWEs)
and address the elements of doctrine,
training, leader development, organization
design, materiel and soldier system
requirements.
AWEs have focused on specific force
improvements. Atlantic Resolve pTO\\ded
insights about linking disparate constructive,
virtual and live simulations in a "synthetic
theater of war " Theater Missile Defense
explored ways to integrate national, joint and
Army capabilities into a cohesive tactical
missile defense force. Prairie Warrior/Mo-
bile Strike Force explored future division-
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259
level organizational, materiel,
and operational concepts that
will influence division redesign
efforts. Focused Dispatch
evaluated processes and
functions of digital connectivity
in a mounted battalion task
force among fire support,
intelligence, combat service
support, and battle command.
Warrior Focus established the
baseline for digitization of
dismounted battalion task
forces and continued to explore
dismounted "own the night"
issues.
Experimental Force
The Army uses experimental forces
to better understand issues and to develop
solutions under realistic conditions with field
soldiers and units. Designated as the
Army's experimental force on March 15,
1995, the 4th Infiiatry Division (Mechanized)
(EXFOR) will be the Army's primary vehicle
to experiment with information age concepts
and technologies. It will include all types of
operational forces so that its experiments will
provide insights that will benefit the entire
Army. It will be organized around informa-
tion and information technologies. The
EXFOR will conduct a brigade-level exercise
in February 1997 and a division exercise in
November 1997 While the EXFOR will
experiment with new technologies in its
training and exercises, the primary focus is
new organization design and battle command
concepts.
Information Age Intelligence
With information age systems. Army
intelligence will do much more than merely
collect and process dau. Information age
Advanced V\feirfighting Experiment Calendar
CY94 I CY95 | CY96 | CY97 I CY98 I CY99
technology creates the opportunity to detect,
target, and attack enemy forces throughout
the depth of the battlefield rapidly Army
intelligence operations will be a critical force
multiplier, with requirements to simultane-
ously deny our potential adversaries access
to our critical information, to gain intelli-
gence through access and analysis of enemy
information, and to engage in operations that
will deny enemy use of command and
control.
Intelligence in the 2 1 st century Army
will differ from the past in five ways First,
commanders -will drive intelligence needs
and must assume a central position in the
intelligence process Second, intelligence
synchronization will ensure intelligence
never stands as a separate entity but is syn-
chronized with operational objectives Intel-
ligence will provide complementary cover-
age and be driven by operational timelines
Third, split-based intelligence operations
will provide efficient, tailored and flexible
intelligence support from multiple locations,
including nearby sanctuaries and home sta-
tions in the United States. Fourth, broadcast
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intelligence will allow the system to reach
echelons and headquarters simultaneously
and efficiently. And finally, through tactical
tailoring, commanders will package and
sequence the intelligence necessary to
conduct operations
The Threat Spectrum Model will
support fijture military operations by reduc-
ing the uncertainty of potential threats and
providing analytical structure to current
assessments and estimates. It integrates
general military intelligence with science and
technical intelligence for a qualitative, aggre-
gate assessment of a threat force's capability.
In order to access patterns and capabilities
accurately, the Threat Spectrum Model
depicts threats along a spectrum fi-om non-
military threats to traditional standing
armies.
Army intelligence will support the
21st century Army with a tailored architec-
ture of procedures, organizations, and equip-
ment focused on a common objective and
driven by the warfighter's requirements.
Support will be comprehensive and virtually
seamless fi-om tactical to strategic level.
Theater Missile Defense
Ballistic, cruise, and air-to-surface
missiles present a serious and expanding
threat to current and future operations.
These theater missiles can be technologically
unsophisticated, inexpensive, and capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction. To
counter this threat, the Army is moving
rapidly to field systems such as the Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC)-3, Theater High
Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the
Corps Surface-to-Air (SAM)/Medium Ex-
tended Air Defense System (MEADS).
Theater missile defense, a joint oper-
ation, consists of four operational elements:
attack operations; active defensive; passive
defense; and battle management/ command,
control, communications, and computers and
intelligence
Attack operations are offensive
actions to destroy or disrupt enemy theater
missile capabilities. In the mid to long-term,
the improved Army Tactical Missile System,
Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Co-
manche helicopter, and others will enable the
ground commander to extend his reach,
reduce sensor to shooter time, improve tar-
geting accuracy, and significantly increase
lethality.
Active defense destroys hostile the-
ater missiles, airborne launch platforms, and
unmanned aerial vehicles in flight The
Patriot PAC-3 will expand lower tier pro-
tected areas and provide increased lethality
against enemy missiles. Similarly, for the
upper tier, the THAAD system will provide
full-range protection against incoming mis-
siles both in and above the atmosphere.
For the maneuver force, we are
developing an active defense option against
very short range theater ballistic missiles.
The Army, in unison with France, Germany,
and Italy, is developing the Corps
SAM/MEADS. Corps SAM/MEADS is the
only programmed system capable of provid-
ing air and missile defense for Army and
Marine maneuver forces.
Passive defense includes operational
security, deception, early warning, surviv-
ability, and reconstitution measures to
reduce the probability and vulnerability of a
theater missile attack. Passive defense will
be supported by the Joint Tactical Ground
Station (JTAGS), which provides a direct
downlink into a theater of operations for
launch detection warning and impact point
prediction data from national level systems
Battle Management/Command, Con-
trol, Communications, Computers and Intel-
ligence fuses disparate, geographically sepa-
rate, active defense, passive defense, and
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attack operations into a focused effort under
the Army Battle Command System. During
the Advanced Warfighting Exercise Theater
Missile Defense in April 1995, a prototype
Theater Missile Defense Tactical Operations
Center demonstrated its ability to integrate
the four elements of theater missile defense.
National Missile Defense
Over fifteen developing countries
possess ballistic missiles and at least twenty-
three countries are pursuing weapons of
mass destruction. In response to the emerg-
ing ballistic missile threat, the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization has developed
a joint National Missile Defense (NMD)
system architecture. The Army is the
Executing Agent for critical components of
that architecture, including the ground-based
interceptor and ground-based radar
elements The Department of Defense's
NMD program is characterized as a Deploy-
ment Readiness program, which during the
next three years will focus on developing the
critical systems and technologies to support
a deployment decision. If, at the end of that
three year development effort, the ballistic
missile threat warrants, the US. could
deploy an initial NMD system in three years.
Based on this "3 plus 3" program approach,
an initial operational capability could be
achieved in approximately six years. This
initial NMD system, with the Army playing a
critical role, would be capable of protecting
the U.S. against limited ballistic missile
attacks.
Space Support
As we enter the 21st century, the
Army will continue to use space products.
Space systems provide communications;
weather and earth resource monitoring;
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
acquisition; position, navigation, and digital
mapping; missile defense warning. As we
look to the next century, space products will
help us turn a smaller Army into an even
more effective national security asset.
The Army uses space products tn virlutiUv
every operation.
The Army uses space products in
virtually every operation. During Desert
Shield, early operations were directly
supported by graphical maps produced using
LandSat imagery. During Desert Storm,
satellite communications and navigation
provided the land component commander a
viable means of controlling the rapid move-
ment of widely dispersed formations The
commander used real time weather data from
polar orbiting satellites to anticipate weather
effects During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY
in Haiti, space products provided deployed
73
262
forces with critical video teleconferencing
connectivity, near real-time intelligence
reports, and high resolution maps.
Space ^ a force multiplier — is key
to future warfighting missions. Space
systems enhance operations by providing
timely situational awareness. The Anny will
continue to organize and train forces using
space capabilities that make forces more
responsive, flexible, interoperable, and
survivable. By aggressively exploiting space
products, the Army will maintain land force
dominance in the 21st century.
TeleMedicine
The Army's TeleMedicine program
is a promising information-age capability. It
provides around-the-clock medical consulta-
tion services. Current technology allows the
transference of diagnostic quality images
from deployed remote facilities to medical
centers. It also allows video teleconsultation
with diagnostic scopes (otoscope, endo-
scope, dermoscope, and oral camera) , high
speed file transfer, telephone and facsimile
support. Ongoing integration efforts are
focused on adding digital stethoscopes.
ultrasound, and film digitizers. It is already
operational at remote deployment sites
throughout the world. Since its initial use in
Somalia, remote teleconsultation has been
projected to Macedonia, Croatia, Haiti, and
Kuwait.
TeleMedicine also allows clinicians
in remote locations to confer with medicaf
specialists located at medical centers around
the world. This capability enables clinical
specialty consuhations, improved emergency
trauma management, patient evacuation con-
sultation, and continuing medical education.
A new concept. Reverse TeleMedicine, will
determine whether deployed physicians can
continue management of their patients back
at their home station.
TeleMedicine has two advanced
technology goals One, Worldwide Consul-
tation, will extend more medical assets to
battlefield medical treatment facilities by
instantaneously connecting medical officers
in the field with specialty consultants in med-
ical centers. The second. Information
Access, will integrate TeleMedicine with
established medical databases, such as the
National Library of Medicine.
Conclusion
America's Army is committed to meeting the demands of the future. With its boots firmly
planted in the realities of today's world, the Army is focused on the 21st century. The Army is
looking to and planning for the fijture, while simultaneously responding to the nation's call both
at home and abroad The information age is upon us, and the Army is changing to meet the
challenges of this new era. The Army must harness the technology that fliels the information
explosion to successfully transform itself from the premier Cold War, industrial-age army to the
premier 21st century information-age army The Army must make this transformation while
remaining trained and ready to respond to the nation's call.
We know the capabilities the Army needs in the next century. We have developed a plan
to convert that vision into reality. The Army's leaders are committed to forging a 21st Century
army — one that is organized, equipped, and manned to maximize the power of the information
age.
74
263
The information age is upon us, and
the Army is changing to meet the
challenges of this new era.
75
264
ACRONYMS
ABCS
Anny Battle Command System
ACAP
Anny Career and Alumni
Program
ACES
Army Continuing Education
System
ACOE
Army Communities of
Excellence
ACTEDS
Army Civilian Training,
Education, and Development
System
ADDS
Army Data Distribution System
AFAP
Army Family Action Plan
AFTBP
Army Family Team Building
Program
AGCCS
Army Global Command and
Control System
AlAP
Army International Activities
Plan
APIC
Army Performance
Improvement Criteria
ARL
Airborne Recon Low
ASAS
All Source Analysis System
ASTAMIDS
Airborne Stand-off Minefield
Detection System
ATCCS
Army Tactical Command and
Control System
AWE
Advanced Warfighting
Experiment
BAT
BriUant Anti-armor
Technology
BCIC
Battlefield Combat
Identification System
BCTP
Battle Command Training
Program
BLTM
Battalion Level Training
Model
BMAR
Backlog of Maintenance and
Repair
BOP
Business Occupancy
Program
BRAG
Base Realignment and
Closure
BSF-E
Bradley Stinger Fighting
Vehicle-Enhanced
CA
Civil Afi^rs
GATS
Combined Arms Training
Strategies
GBGS
Ground Based Common
Senser
GBS
Ground Based Senser
CFO
Chief Financial Officer
CGS
Common Ground Station
CHAMPUS
Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed
Services
C4I
Command, Control,
Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence
CJCS
Chairman Joint Chiefs of StafiF
CMTC
Combat Maneuver Training
Center
CONUSA
Continental United States Army
CRDA
Cooperative Research and
Development Agreements
CTC
Combat Training Center
C2V
Command and Control Vdiicle
DCSOPS
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans
DIS
Distributed Interactive
Simulation
DLEA
Drug Law Enforcement Agency
DMFCS
Digitized Mortar Fire Control
System
DVD
Direct Vendor Dehvery
EXFOR
Experimental Force
FASTA
Federal Acquisition Streamling
Act
FEMA
Federal Emergency
Management Agency
FLIR
Forward Looking Infi^red
Radar
FM
Field Manual
GT
General Technical
77
265
GPRA
Great Perfonnance and Results
Act
GPS
Global Positioiiiiig System
HAB
Heavy Assault Bridge
HTl
Horizontal Technology Integration
ICBM
Intercontinental Ballastic Missile
IMAP
Installation Management Action
Plan
ISM
Integrated Sustainment
Maintenance
ISR
Installation Status Report
ITAS
Improved Tai^get Acquisition
System
IVIS
Intervdiicular Information System
JRTC
Joint Readiness Training Center
JSTARS
Joint Surveillance Target Attack
Radar System
JTAGS
Joint Tactical Ground Station
MANPRINT
Manpower and Personnel
Integration
MFO
Multinatioaal Force and Observer
MILSTAR
Military Strat^c Tactical Relay
MSE
Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MWR
Morale, Wel£ue, and Recreation
NATO
Nordi Atlantic Treaty
Organization
NMD
National Missile Defense
NPR
National Performance Review
NTC
National Training Center
ODT
Overseas Deployment Training
OMA
Operations and Maintenance,
Army
OPRED
Operational Readiness
OPTEMPO
Operational Tempo
PEG
Program Executive OfiBcer
PLS
Palletized Loading System
POM
Program Objective Memorandum
PQA
President's Quality Award
PSYOP
Psychological Operations
RC
Reserve Component
RDA
Research, Development, and
Acquisition
RFP
Request For Proposal
SAM
Sur&ce to Air Missile
SATS
Standard Army Training System
SERB
Selective Early Retirement Board
SCAMP
Single Channel Anti-Jam,
Manportable
SMART-T
Secure, Mobile, Anti-Jam,
Rehable, Tactical
SOA
Special Operations Aviation
SSB
Special Separation Benefit
TASS
Total Army School System
TAQ
Total Army Quality
TAV
Total Assest VisibiUty
TENCAP
Tcictical Exploitation of National
Capabilities
THAAD
Theater High Altitude Area
Defense
TMD
Theater Missile Defense
TOA
Total Obhgation Authority
TRM
Training Resource Model
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN
United Nations
USAREUR
United States Army Europe
VERA
Voluntary Early Retirement
Authority
VSI
Voluntary Separation Incentive
VSIP
Voluntary Separation Incentive
Pay
WAM
Wide Area Munition
WBRP
Whole Barracks Renewal Program
78
266
ADDENDUM
DA TA REQUIRED BY THE
NA TIONAL DEFENSE A UTHORIZA TIONACTFOR FY 1994
(BOLD ITALICS INDICA TE SUPPLEMENTAL DA TA REQUIRED BYHQDA)
Section 517 (b)(2)(A): The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within
the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected
Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the
promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in
the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.
Section 517 (b)(2)(B): The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below
the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected
Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same
manner (as the para above).
The following tables provide a comparison of promotion selection rates for officers considered for
promotion from both within and below the promotion zone who are serving as active component
advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve against the promotion selection
rates for other officers considered for promotion from within and below the promotion zone in the
same pay grade and same competitive category. Data summarizes results of the FY95 Major and .
Lieutenant Colonel selection boards:
FY 95 MAJOR TO LIEUTENANT COLONEL RESULTS
AC/RC* ARMY**
PRIMARY ZONE 37,1% 61 .0%
BELOW ZONE 0.0% 5.7%
FY 95 CAPTAIN TO MAJOR RESULTS
AC/RC* ARMY**
PRIMARY ZONE 65 6% 73.2%
BELOW ZONE 4.4% 4.9%
♦AC/RC=ACTIVE COMPONENT OFFICERS SERVING IN RESERVE COMPONENT
ASSIGNMENTS AT TIME OF CONSIDERATION
**ARMY=ACTIVE COMPONENT OFHCERS NOT SERVING IN RESERVE COMPONENT
ASSIGNMENTS AT THE TIME OF CONSIDERATION
Section 521(b):
(1) The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active-duty before
becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve
units.
NUMBER %
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 21,509 49.8%
US ARMY RESERVE 21,623 53.8%
A-1
267
(2) The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active-duty
before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the U.S. Army Reserve Selected
Reserve units.
NUMBER %
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD 169,518 511%
U.S. ARMY RESERVE 76,738 40 6%
(3) The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were
released from active duty before the completion of their active-duty service obligation: 446
officers who were graduates of one of the service academies were released from active duty before
they completed their active duty service obligation. Of those officers —
(A) the number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service
obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
223 officers of the 446 academy graduates are now serving as members of the Selected Reserve.
(B) the number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section
1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver: Of the remaining 223
officers, 186 received VERRP releases and the remaining 37 received waivers for
compassionate/hardship reasons
(4) The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers'
Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their
active-duty service obligation: 63 officers who were commissioned as Distinguished Reserve
Officers' Training Corps Graduates were released from active duty before they completed their
active duty service obligation. Of those officers —
(A) the number who are serving the remaining period of their active-duty service
obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1 1 1 2(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
36 officers out of the 63 graduates are now serving in the Selected Reserve.
(B) the number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section
1112(aK2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver: Of the remaining 27
officers, 17 received VERRP releases, 9 received waivers for compassionate/hardship reasons,
and one was non-select to captain.
(5) The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps
program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance
with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B)
such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation
served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to
perform their minimum period of obUgated service in accordance with that section was
granted during the preceding fiscal year. 145 ROTC graduates were released after serving a
minimum of two years active duty. Effective FY95, the Army initiated a program to insure these
officers have a letter of acceptance from a National Guard or Army Reserve unit prior to release
fitjm Active Duty.
A-2
268
6) The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal
year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those
reconmiendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty
officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three
categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA:
ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
Promotions to fill unit vacancies for officers previously selected for promotion by the
Department of the Army (DA) mandatory promotion board were not forwarded for review by an
active duty officer. Many of the officers promoted in the specified units in FY95 had been
previously selected by the DA mandatory boards.
In the Army National Guard, FY95, 154 recommended unit vacancy promotions were
forwarded to the associated active duty unit commanders for concurrence/non-concurrence. Of
those recommended, 144 were received from the active duty commander for a 93.5% concurrence
rate. The balance of 10 officers are pending review in Alaska.
U.S. ARMY RESERVE
During FY95, 90 officers were recommended for a unit vacancy promotion. Of these 16
were from Contingency Force Pool (CFP) units and 74 were from other units.
All recommendations were concurred with by the boards.
(7) The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of
ANGCRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a miUtary education
requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver. In the ARNG,
no waivers were reported. In the USAR, 12 waivers were granted. All were military operational
necessities.
(8) The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial
entry training and nondeployability personnel accounting category estabUshed under 1115 of
ANGCRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum
training required for deployment or Who are otherwise not available for deployment and a
narrative summarizing procedures to be followed in FY95 to account for members of the
USAR who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are
otherwise not available for deployment:
NATIONAL GUARD
16,552 are awaiting or in Initial Entry Training
3,228 are pending medical evaluation
2,668 are for other reasons (Family Care Plan, Sole Surviving Family Member, Due HTV
test. Require Panorex, etc.)
22,448 total non-deployable
Information by grade and state is maintained by National Guard Bureau.
ARMY RESERVE
The number and distribution of USAR soldiers in initial entry training and other non-
deployable personnel accounting status is now being maintained by ARCOM/GOCOM. The total
number of non-deployables ii the USAR is 33,698.
A -3
269
(9) The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were
discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for not
completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering
the National Guard and a narrative summarizing procedures to be followed in FY95 for
discharging members of the USAR who have not completed the minimum training required
for deployment within 24 months of entering the USAR.
NATIONAL GUARD None
ARMY RESERVE
Completion of minimum training requirements will be monitored through quarterly
SIDPERS-USAR rosters that identify those USAR soldiers whose record does not indicate their
mihtary education requirements m accordance with regulatory guidelines
Specific procedures for dischargmg officers and enlisted personnel who fail to meet requirements
within 24 months are maintained by OCAR.
(10) The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary during
the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section
1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each
waiver. Account was fully implemented in July, 1994. During FY95, no waivers were granted.
(11) The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, and the number
of US Army Reserve members shown by each ARCOM/GOCOM, who were screened during
the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards
required for deployment and, of those members-
(A) the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards
required for deployment: 246,022 members of the ARNG were screened and 6,754 (2.8%) did
not meet standards for deployment 2 1 ,433 members of the USAR were screened and 29 (0. 1%)
did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.
(B) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1 1 16 of
ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8): 4.347 or 1 .8%
of those ARNG members identified were transferred to the non-deployable account.
864, or 4%, of those USAR members identified were transferred to the non-deployable
account.
(12) The number of members, and the percentage total membership, of the Army National
Guard, shown for each State, and for the U.S. Army reserve shown by each Army Reserve
Command/General Officer Command, who underwent a medical screening during the
previous fbcal year as provided in section 1 1 1 7 of ANGCRRA. Dunng FY95, 246,022 or
65.6% of Army National Guard members underwent medical screemng Dunng FY95, 2 1 ,440, or
9.5%, of USAR members underwent medical screemng.
(13) The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army
National Guard, shown for each State, and the number of members, and the percentage of the
total membership, of the U.S. Army Reserve shown for each ARCOM/GOCOM, who
underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1 1 17 of
ANGCRRA. Funding for dental screening is programmed to begui in FY96.
270
The following tables provide detailed medical/dental screening information for on the ARNG (by
state) and for the USAR (by commands) regarding paragraphs 12 and 13 above.
Army National Guard
ARNG TITLE XI MEDICAL/DENTAL SCREENING FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
Sute
# Medical Screened
% Medical Screened
# Dental Screened
% Dental Screened
AK
n
.6%
252
11.7%
AL
4,153
23.4%
0
0%
AZ
815
19.8%
445
10.8%
AR
7,015
81.2%
3,284
38.0%
CA
10,858
61.0%
10,858
61.0%
CO
1,889
53.1%
1.889
53.1%
CT
2,575
63.7%
0
0%
DE
1,066
64.0%
946
57.0%
DC
318
18.0%
0
0%
FL
3,600
36.0%
0
0%
GA
3,608
39.0%
5,400
59.0%
GU
555
91.0%
0
0%
HI
1,277
34.8%
758
20.7%
IN
3,487
29.0%
1,083
9.0%
IL
8,640
90.0%
2,880
30.0%
lA
7,393
100.0%
0
0%
ID
0
0%
200
6%
KS
4,193
65.0%
4,193
65.0%
KY
5,865
90.0%
5,865
90.0%
LA
8,197
72.0%
1,005
10.0%
ME
2,259
96.5%
1,485
63.4%
MD
4,526
73.0%
3,038
60.0%
MA
6,500
70.0%
3.569
38.0%
MI
7,708
79.0%
0
0%
MN
7,650
85.0%
4.500
50.0%
A-5
271
State
# Medical Screened
% Medical Screened
1 # Dental Screened |
% Dental Screened
MS
12,000
98.0%
0
0%
MO
2,196
30 0%
MT
2,253
80 0%
0
0%
NE
3,120
90,7%
0
0%
NV
980
60.0%
0
0%
NH
1,479
87.0%
600
35.0%
NJ
3,343
47,4%
2,538
36.0%
MM
336
8.5%
336
8.5%
NY
5,000
41.7%
1,000
8.4%
NC
10,500
95.5%
0
0%
ND
3,100
90.0%
1,700
50.0%
OH
607
5.7%
0
0%
OK
5,997
83,0%
2,020
28.0%
OR
361
56%
737
11.5%
PA
17.193
98 9%
3,473
19.9%
PR
8,480
97.7%
8,480
97.7%
Rl
1,478
60 0%
1,478
60.0%
SC
9,684
85.0%
0
0%
SD
3,067
90.0%
1,394
413%
TN
9,500
78.0%
0
0%
TX
17,706
97 0%
UT
3,902
77.0%
480
9.4%
VT
1,568
45.7%
0
0%
VI
319
39 0%
0
0%
VA
6,800
90 5%
150
20%
WA
1,237
22.0%
0
0%
WV
2,990
90 0%
997
30 0%
WI
6,247
79.7%
2,800
357%
WY
1,018
65 0%
799
510%
TOTAL
246,022
65.6%
84032
2i5%
*NOTE; Based on ARNG total end strength of 374,930
38-160 97-11
272
ARNG TITLE XI MEDICAL NONPEPLOYABLE STATUS FOR FISCAL YEAR 199S
State
# Medical
Screened
# Not Deployable
%Nol Deployable
# Transfered-
NDPA
% Transfered-
NDPA
AL
4,153
71
1.7%
0
0%
AK
13
M
815
1
.1%
0
0%
AR
7,015
138
2.0%
0
0%
CA
10.858
763
7.0%
763
4.0%
CO
1,889
7
.4%
0
0%
CT
2,575
DE
1,066
14
1.3%
0
0%
DC
318
FL
3.600
119
3.3%
119
1.06%
GA
3,608
554
15.3%
554
6.0%
GU
555
31
5.5%
31
5.0%
HI
1.277
58
4.5%
0
0%
IN
3,487
10
.3%
0
0%
IL
8,640
23
.3%
0
0%
lA
7.393
163
2.2%
113
1.5%
ID
0
KS
4,193
KY
5,865
117
2.1%
117
2.1%
LA
8.197
72
1.0%
35
.3%
ME
2,259
MD
4,526
26
.6%
0
0%
MA
6,500
9
.1%
0
0%
MI
7,708
772
10%
54
7.5%
MN
7.650
4
.04%
MS
12.000
1,933
16.1%
1,933
16 1%
MO
2.1%
1
.05%
1
.05%
A-7
273
State
# Mrdk-al
Screened
# Not Deployable
% Not DeployaWe
# Transfered-
NDPA
% Transfered-
NDPA
MT
2,253
17
.1%
0
0%
NE
3,120
NV
980
NH
1,479
30
2.0%
0
0%
NJ
3,343
75
22%
0
0%
NM
336
NY
5,000
NC
10,500
2
.02%
0
0%
ND
3.100
7
.2%
0
0%
OH
607
19
1.2%
19
1.2%
OK
5,997
557
9.0%
557
90%
OR
361
6
2.0%
0
0%
PA
17,193
51
3.0%
12
1.0%
PR
8.480
Rl
1,478
2
08%
SC
9,684
75
.8%
6
.1%
SD
3,067
3
.1%
0
0%
TN
9.500
27
3%
2
.1%
TX
17.706
647
.4%
0
0%
UT
3.902
235
5.0%
0
0%
VT
1.568
1
1%
0
0%
VI
319
VA
6.800
22
.3%
0
0%
WA
1.237
0
0%
0
0%
WV
2.990
3
.1%
3
.1%
WI
6.247
69
.1%
0
0%
WY
1.018
24
25%
24
25%
TOTA
246,022
6,754
2.8%
4347
1.8%
• NOTE: Based on ARNG total end strength of 374.930.
A-8
274
U.S. ARMY RESERVE
MEMBERS MEDICALLY SCREENED IN FY 95 PER SEC 1 1 17
ARCO
TOTAL
ASSG
END FY 95
TOTAL
SCBEKNED
FY95
PERCENTAGE
TRANSFERRED
19 DIV (IT)
2,001
166
8.3%
63 ARCOM
5,401
438
8.1%
65 DIV (IT)
2,213
127
5.7%
70 DIV (IT)
3,402
168
4.9%
75 ARCOM
7,678
885
11.5%
76 ARCOM
8,945
777
8.7%
77 ARCOM
4,794
341
7.1%
78 ARCOM
1,812
89
4.9%
7 9 ARCOM
8,037
534
6.6%
80 ARCOM
6,239
591
9.5%
81 TRANS
1,469
189
12.9%
«3 TAACOM
769
78
10.1%
84 TAACOM
3,387
563
16.6%
85 COS COM
877
108
12.3%
86 SIGNAL
819
47
5.7%
87 TAACOM
773
31
4.0%
88 EN CMD
254
41
16.1%
89 EN CMD
614
47
7.7%
90 EN BDE
2,942
264
9.0%
91 ARCOM
8,601
1,225
14.2%
94 ARCOM
5,011
459
9.2%
95 DIV (IT)
1,889
150
7.9%
96 DIV EX
1,784
100
5.6%
97 DIV (IT)
2,348
184
7.8%
98 ARCOM
13,514
1,528
11.3%
99 DIV EX
1,930
126
6.5%
100 ARCOM
9,331
671
7.2%
102 DIV (IT)
2,544
140
5.5%
104 MED BDE
4,299
240
5.6%
108 ARCOM
10,124
693
6.8%
120 ARCOM
5,539
734
13.3%
121 DIV (IT)
2,696
185
6.9%
122 DIV EX
2,201
150
6.8%
123 ARCOM
8,606
635
7.4%
124 DIV EX
2,122
231
10.9%
125 ARCOM
14,711
1,400
9.5%
143 ARCOM
8,204
683
8.3%
310 ARCOM
8,541
813
9.5%
311 DIV EX
1,722
131
7.6%
335 ARCOM
7,002
1,119
16.0%
377 DIV (IT)
2,533
250
9.9%
412 ARCOM
6,584
626
9.5%
275
416 ARCOM
8,196
875
10.7*
420 DIV (IT)
2,105
229
10.9%
807 ARCOM
8,594
1,084
12.6%
USAPAC
3,129
268
8.6%
USASOC
8,348
1,027
12.3%
TOTAL: 224,634 21,440 9.5«
(14) The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National
Guard, shown for each State, and the number of members, and the percentage of total Selected
Reserve unit membership, of the U.S. Army Reserve, shown for each ARCOM/GOCOM, over the
age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of
section 1117 of ANGCRRA. The over 40 population of the Anny National Guard is 91,825, or 21% of
the total membership. Of the over 40 population, 3 1,901 (34.7%) received full physical exams during
FY95. By state data is maintained by National Guard Bureau.
The over 40 population of the US. Army Reserve is 51,982, or 24% of the total membership. Of
the over 40 population, 3,637 (7%) received full physical exams during FY95. ARCOM/GOCOM data is
maintained by Office, Chief Army Reserve.
(15) The number of units of the Army National Guard, and of the U.S. Army Reserve, that are
scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are
dental ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA. 44 CFP 1 and 2 Army
National Guard units are scheduled for early deployment. 659 U.S. Army Reserve units are scheduled for
early deployment. Dental screening and treatment funding is programmed to begin FY96. (Of the 44
ARNG CFP 1 and 2 units, 19 were dental ready at the end of FY95.)
(16) The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat and CFP
unit, and U.S. Army Reserve CFP unit, and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State
for Army National Guard units, and by the ARCOM/GOCOM for U.S. Army Reserve units, of what
training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat and CFP units, and U.S.
Army Reserve units, in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.
Initiatives continue to ensure Reserve Component post-mobilization training is completed adequately in the
minimum amount of time necessary.
ARNG Divisions. FORSCOM has established pnorities for support to early deploying and high priority
units. The ARNG divisions are not sourced against either of the Major Regional Contingencies and are at
the end of the deployment list in the event of major conflict. The current ARNG initiative to restructure the
divisions will obviously impact their fiiture status. For the present, the divisions have little expectation for
dedicated AC support outside the assistance that is available from the 10 man Field Training Group of
Title XI personnel that cover the staff and assist the divisions in lane training efforts. In addition, the
consensus is that the ARNG divisions can assume the mission of providing OPFOR for RC units to include
the Enhanced Brigades and FSP units. FORSCOM continues to examine the requirement to determine just
how much OPFOR capability will be necessary to support both premobilization and postmobilization
training focused on high priority units Once the requirements are identified, FORSCOM, in conjunction
with NGB will work to determine the impact on the divisions.
CFP 1-4 Units
Review of ORE data over the past year has shown some improvement in the readiness of CFP
units, influenced by the AC associated unit that has been assigned as sponsor. This is particularly evident
A- 10
276
in those units supported by Resident Training Detachments or Regional Training Teams composed of Title
VII personnel fielded in the FY92/93 time frame. These quality soldiers continue to make a difference and
are dedicated to the support of approximately 50% of the units in support packages 1-4. FORSCOM is
redesigning the contingency force into Force Support Packages I and 2 to replace the CFP. As many of the
former CFP units as possible will be carried forward into the FSP, but there will be some changes. Also,
it is anticipated that some adjustment in the support structure will result As the GFRE contuiues to be
fielded, improvement in these high priority units will continue.
Enhanced Brigades
Initiatives continue to ensure Enhanced Brigades are prepared to deploy within 90 days of
mobilization. FORSCOM/National Guard Bureau Regulation 350-2 and FORSCOM Commander's Pre-
Mobilization Training Guidance Memorandum, dated 1 December 1995, remain the guideposts for
Enhanced Brigade training in the near term. Specific data regarding the training requirements of the
mdividual Enhanced Brigades is maintamed by Directorate of Operations (G-3), Forces Command.
The following diagram depicts the Post-Mobilization Training phases of the ARNG Enhanced Brigades.
—f^l POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING
PHASE I
HOME STATION
MOVE TO MOBSTA
SOLDIER TRAINING
MOVE TO
TRAINING SITE
PHASE II
GUNNERY:
TABLES VI-VIII
TABLES XI-XII
PLATOON LANES
COMPANY/TEAM LANES
PHASE III
BATTALION/
BRIGADE
TASK FORCE
OPERATIONS
MAINTENANCE
RECOVERY
PREP FOR LOADING
PHASE IV
FORSCOM
- THIS DUGRAM DISPLAYS THE COMPOSITION A^^D SEQUENCE OF THE ENHANCED BRIGADE POST-
MOBIUZATION TRAINING PLAN. IT ENCOMPASSES FOUR PHASES AND WILL TAKE 90 DAYS.
- THE PLAN REALIZES A REDUCTION IN THE TIMELINES STATED BY RAND. THE REASONS FOR 90
DAYS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, TWO ENHANCEMENTS:
- THE ENHANCED AT FOR EVERY BRIGADE EVERY YEAR WILL IMPROVE PRE-MOBILIZATION
TRAINING READINESS - WHICH TRANSFERS TO BETTER AND FASTER POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING.
- ADVANCING THE AT IS THE EQUIVALENT OF 14 TO 21 DAYS OF FOUND ADDITIONAL TRAINING TIME.
A-11
277
The following diagram demonstrates how ARNG Enhanced Brigades would flow into the various
post-mobilization training sites.
(^^IMOBII l7ATinN TPAIMIKin f^lTPQ
^„. y
X
X
X
FTlRmiSl: '^—
^
1-
M
l-l
^
X
X
III
FT hood:, -^ —
■^ —
^x
■M
( ^y\
X
X
-^
H
X
;*:>;.„„,„ .
p^s^ ^
a
FT LEWIS
J
■^ —
ex
X
1
X
j-
X
X
nr^ J
^
FT POLK *
X
X
>?.
1
•^ ^s.
. PQ
RSCOM-
- THIS DIAGRAM DEPICTS HOW UNITS WOULD FLOW INTO THE NUMBER OF HEAVY ENHANCED
BRIGADE POST-MOBILIZATION TRAINING SITES RECOMMENDED BY RAND P). AND UGHT ENHANCED
BRIGADE SITE.
- THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, AT FORT IRWIN, WOULD TRAIN THREE MECHANIZED ENHANCED
BRIGADES,
- FORT HOOD WOULD BE USED TO TRAIN THREE HEAVIES
- ENHANCED BRIGADES HOME-STATIONED IN THE NORTHWEST, NEAR I CORPS, AS WELL AS THE 29TH
HAWAII, WOULD TRAIN AT YAKIMA.
- THE UGHT ENHANCED BRIGADES (EXCEPT FOR THE 4IST IN OREGON AND 29TH IN HAWAII) WOULD
GO TO THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER, TO MRC REQUIREMENTS.
(17) A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the
requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and
advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard and
the U.S. Army Reserve. The ARNG has contuiued to incorporate simulation into individual, unit, and
school house training. The use of Army Training Battle Simulation System (ARTBASS), Training Set,
Fire Observer (TSFO), maintenance trainers, and Conduct of Fire Trainer (COPT) remains a cornerstone
of ARNG training that increases individual and unit readiness.
A -12
278
The use of standardized, multi-echelon training exercises, developed by the ARNG, provides the
ARNG with the opportunity to train at the level organized with virtual and constructive simulations using
the Simulation Network (SIMNET) and JANUS.
The ARNG is aggressively using and expanding distance learning as a means to train. The
addition of hardware, software, and an integrated strategy now provides the ARNG with a method to
distribute training to a large geographic area.
In FY95, the ARNG started fielding the Abrams-Fullcrew Interactive Simulation Trainer (A-
FIST), the Guard Armory Device Fullcrew Interactive Simulation Trainer II (GUARDFIST II), and the
Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) to ARNG units.
Limited funding has constrained ARNG efforts to increase the use of simulations, simulators, and
advanced technology to support individual and unit training.
(18) Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State for Army National Guard units, and for
each ARCOM/GOCOM for the U.S. Army Reserve units, and drawn from the unit readiness rating
system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating
information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together
with-
(A) explanations of the information shown in the table: Classified tables have been developed
with detailed narrative analysis of personnel and equipment readiness trends indicated since implementation
of the January, 1994, revision to Army Regulation 220-1 on Unit Status Reporting. They are maintained
by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-TRO).
(B) based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary's overall assessment of the
deployability of units of the Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, including a discussion of
personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121: The classified
overall assessment of the deployability of ARNG combat units, and CFP units of both Reserve
Components is maintained by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DAMO-
TRO). The Director of the Army National Guard has effectively managed the readiness improvement of
high priority Enhanced Brigade and Contingency Force Pool imits through intensive management under the
Project Standard Bearer program. A similar and equally effective program, PRIME, is managed by the
Chief, Army Reserve.
(19) Summary tables, shown for each State, for units of the Army National Guard and for each
ARCOM/GOCOM for units of the U.S. Army Reserve, of the results of inspections of units of the
Army National Guard by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army
under the provisions of section 105 of title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in
the tables, and including display of-
(A) the number of such inspections;
(B) identification of the entity conducting each inspection;
(C) the number of units inspected; and
(D) the overall results of such inspections, including the inspector's determination for each
inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting
deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. For
purposes of this report data for Operational Readiness Evaluations will be provided on Enhanced
A-13
279
Brigade and CFP units of the Army National Guard and for CFP units of the U.S. Army Reserve.
Training Assessment Model data will be provided to meet this reporting requirement for all other units
of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve. Data on Army National Guard units will be
reported by State and on U.S. Army Reserve units by Army Reserve Command/ General Officer
Command The ORE Program has been in existence for nearly three years, with modifications being made
to the program in the last year Specifically, Active Component units (which were evaluated at a AC:RC
rate of 1 4,) were omitted from the program; likewise, the Enhanced Brigades in the ARNG were eliminated
from these CONUSA evaluations Forces Command Regulation 220-2 governs the ORE Program and the
standards and checklist are used by all ORE Teams at the CONUSA. There may be differences in the
actual execution of the ORE, but Army Standard on all phases is adhered to by the individual ORE teams.
The statistical breakdown of units completing the CT portion of the ORE by branch is maintained at the
Directorate of Operations (G-3), FORSCOM. (Note: At the time the majority of the OREs were rendered
for FY 94-95, there were four CONUSA.)
a. First U.S. Army: During the FY 94-95 time frame. First US Army conducted a total of 74 OREs
on Company, Battery, or Detachment sized units from the CFP. Thirty-five evaluations were rendered on
ARNG units; thirty-nine evaluations were rendered on USAR units
(1) A total of 12 units (7 ARNG and 5 USAR) performed the Compliance Phase, consistmg of
Personnel Qualification Records, Personnel Mobilization Records. Training Management, Supply
Management, and Maintenance Management of the ORE to Army Standards (data maintained at the
Directorate of Operations, FORSCOM).
(2) Thirty-four of the 74 units in First U.S. Army Area completed the Collective Training Phase to
Army Standards; 17 ARNG and 16 USAR units met Mission Essential Training standards (METL) for
their particular type of umts.
(3) The Individual Training Phase of the ORE consists of Common Task Training (CTT), Army
Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks System (PMCS) and Individual Weapons
Qualification (not all units had ranges available to perform this particular area). Seven ARNG and eight
USAR units completed the CTT portion of the Individual Phase to Army Standards; ten ARNG and ten
USAR units completed the APFT to Army Standards; 13 ARNG and 17 USAR units completed the PMCS
portion of the ORE to Army Standards; and 12 ARNG and 1 1 USAR units completed the Weapons
Qualification portion of the ORE.
b. Second U.S. Army: Dunng the FY 94-95 time frame. Second US Army conducted a total of 40
OREs; 33 were on ARNG units and seven were on USAR units
(1) A total of 1 1 umts (1 1 ARNG and 0 USAR) performed the Compliance Phase (consisting of
Personnel Qualification Records, Personnel Mobilization Records, Training Management, Supply
Management, and Maintenance of the ORE to Army Standards (data maintained at the Directorate of
Operations, FORSCOM)
(2) Thirteen of the 40 units in Second US Army Area completed the Collective Training Phase to
Army Standards; 12 ARNG and 1 USAR unit met Mission Essential Training standards (METL) for their
particular type of units (data maintained at the Directorate of Operations. FORSCOM)
(3) The Individual Training Phase of the ORE consists of Common Task Training (CTT), Army
Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks System (PMCS) and Individual Weapons
Qualification (not all units had ranges available to perform this particular area). Twelve ARNG and one
USAR unit completed the CTT portion of the Individual Phase to Army Standards; 1 1 ARNG and 3 USAR
units completed the APFT to Army Standards; 13 ARNG and 5 USAR units completed the PMCS portion
of the ORE to Army Standards; and 17 ARNG and 2 USAR umts completed the Weapons Qualification
portion of the ORE.
280
c Fifth U.S. Army: During the FY 94-95 time frame. Fifth U.S. Army conducted a total of 55 OREs;
37 were on ARNG units and 18 were on US AR units.
(1) A total of 14 units (14 ARNG and 0 USAR) performed the Comphance Phase consisting of
Personnel Qualification Records, Personnel Mobilization Records, Training Management, Supply
Management, and Maintenance Management of the ORE to Army Standards (data maintained at the
Directorate of Operations, FORSCOM).
(2) Fifteen of the 55 units in Fifth U.S. Army Area completed the Collective Training Phase to Army
Standards; 12 ARNG and 3 USAR unit met Mission Essential Training standards (METL) for their
particular type of units (data maintained at the Directorate of Operations, FORSCOM)
(3) The Individual Training Phase of the ORE consists of Common Task Training (CTT), Army
Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks System (PMCS) and Individual Weapons
Qualification (not all units had ranges available to perform this particular area). Twelve ARNG and 3
USAR unit completed the CTT portion of the Individual Phase to Army Standards; 7 ARNG and 8 USAR
units completed the APFT to Army Standards; 14 ARNG and 8 USAR units completed the PMCS portion
of the ORE to Army Standards; and 19 ARNG and 3 USAR units completed the Weapons Qualification
portion of the ORE.
d. Sixth U.S. Army: During the FY 94-95 time frame. Sixth U.S. Aimy conducted a total of 23 OREs;
20 were on ARNG units and 3 were on USAR units.
(1) A total of 14 units (14 ARNG and 0 USAR) performed the Compliance Phase consisting of
Personnel Qualification Records, Personnel Mobilization Records, Training Management, Supply
Management, and Maintenance Management the ORE to Army Standards (data maintained at the
Directorate of Operations, FORSCOM).
(2) Fifteen of the 23 units in Sixth U.S. Army Area completed the Collective Training Phase to Army
Standards; 12 ARNG and 3 USAR unit met Mission Essential Training standards (METL) for their
particular type of units (data maintained at the Directorate of Operations, FORSCOM).
(3) The Individual Training Phase of the ORE consists of Common Task Training (CTT), Army
Physical Fitness Test (APFT), Preventive Maintenance Checks System (PMCS) and Individual Weapons
Qualification (not all units had ranges available to perform this particular area). Nine ARNG and two
USAR unit completed the CTT portion of the Individual Phase to Army Standards; 10 ARNG and 2 USAR
umts completed the APFT to Army Standards; 14 ARNG and 1 USAR units completed the PMCS portion
of the ORE to Aimy Standards; and 12 ARNG and 2 USAR units completed the Weapons QuaUfication
portion of the ORE.
(20) A listing, for each Army National Guard combat and CFP, and the U.S. Army Reserve CFP
unit, of the active-duty combat and other units associated with that Army National Guard and U.S.
Army Reserve unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State for the Army
National Guard and ARCOM/GOCOM for the U.S. Army Reserve: In April, 1994 the Secretary of
the Army designated the Army National Guard Enhanced Brigades as the principal Reserve Component
maneuver forces of the Army. Enhanced Brigade locations and Active Army training associations are
shown below.
TRAINING ASSOCIATIONS
HEAVY BRIGADES LIGHT BRIGADES
ARNG UNIT STATE AC UNIT ARNG UNIT STATE AC UNIT
116 ARMOR ID/MT 4TH 1D(M) 27 IN NY lOTH MTN DIV
155 ARMOR MS ISTCAVDIV 29 IN HI 25TH ID(L)
30MECH NC 3RDID(M) 39 IN AR lOlST AASLT(ABN)
A-15
281
48MECH
GA
3RDID(M)
41 IN
OR
3/25 ID(L)
81MECH
WA
3/2ND ID(M)
45 IN
OK
ISTCAVDIV
218MECH
SC
1STID(M)
53 IN
FL
82NDABNDIV
256 MECH
LA
4THID(M)
76 IN
IN
101 AASLT(ABN)
ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT
278TH ACR TN 3RD ACR
and to be accompanied, for each such National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve unit, by —
(A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the manpower,
equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve unit in
accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of ANGCRRA. At the time of publication these assessments were
under development. The completed assessments, likely to contain classified infonnation will be maintained
by the Directorate of Operations (G-3) FORSCOM
and
(B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active-duty unit of the
compatibility of that National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve unit with active duty forces in
accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA. At the time of publication these assessments were
under development. The completed assessments, likely to contain classified data and infonnation, will be
maintained by the Office of the Directorate of Operations (G-3) FORSCOM.
(21) A specification of the active-duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to
section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C.
261 note), shown (A) by State /or the Army National Guard and ARCOM/GOCOM for the U.S. Army
Reserve, (b) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (c) by unit or
other organizational entity of assignment.
In FY92, the National Defense Authonzation Act (NDAA), section 414c, (10 U S C. 261 note)
established the implementation of a Active Comfionent (AC) Support to Reserve Component (RC)
program. This is a two phase Congressionally mandated program. The first phase, the Pilot Program
assigned 2,000 Active Duty personnel as fiill-time advisors to selected Army National Guard and Reserve
Component Units. Personnel rotations for phase one FY94 and 95.
Phase two followed enactment of Sec 1 132, Title XI, FY93, National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA). This expanded the dedicated AC support to RC by 3,000 active duty personnel by the end of
FY97, bringing the total to 5,000 Congressionally mandated active duty personnel. Assignment of the next
3,000 active duty personnel
began in FY95 All 3,000 Title XI personnel will be assigned by the end of FY97, bringing the total
number of active duty persormel to 5,000.
The following table represents the number of active duty personnel, by rank, by state, assigned as
of the end of FY95. Personnel are assigned on a geographic basis and many support multiple units from
both the Army National Guard and/or the Anny Reserve. Specification of personnel assigned by component
supported is not possible.
A -16
282
.GROUND FORCES READINESS ENHANCEMENT
END OF FY95
STATE
GRADE
ASSIGNED
AL
E7
41
AL
E8
23
AL
03
25
AL
04
IS
AL
05
5
AL
06
2
AL
W4
1
112
AR
E6
31
AR
E7
39
AR
E8
2
AR
E9
1
AR
03
14
AR
04
8
AR
OS
3
98
ML
E7
4
AZ
03
4
AZ
04
1
AZ
W2
1
10
CA
E6
4
CA
E7
S3
CA
E8
14
CA
03
34
CA
04
33
CA
05
18
CA
06
3
CA
W2
2
CA
W4
S
166
CO
E5
4
CO
E6
3
CO
E7
13
CO
E8
1
CO
E9
2
CO
03
7
CO
04
8
CO
OS
3
CO
06
1
CO
W4
3
S1
E6
20
E7
2
E8
1
W2
1
W4
10
FL
03
IS
FL
04
2
FL
OS
44
FL
E7
9
107
GA
E8
1
GA
E9
41
GA
03
20
GA
04
S
GA
OS
1
GA
06
10
GA
W2
6
84
HI
E7
5
HI
03
6
HI
04
1
HI
OS
3
15
lA
E7
1
lA
03
1
lA
W2
8
10
ID
E7
2
ID
E8
1
ID
E9
14
ID
03
S
ID
04
1
ID
OS
3
ID
W2
1
ID
W4
21
48
IL
E7
7
IL
E8
9
IL
03
12
IL
04
2
IL
OS
2
IL
W4
IS
283
IL
04
2
IL
05
2
IL
W4
15
47
IN
£7
10
IN
E8
4
IN
03
14
IN
04
2
IN
05
3
33
KS
E4
3
KS
E5
1
KS
E6
20
KS
E7
4
KS
E8
26
KS
03
32
KS
04
13
KS
05
1
KS
06
4
0
KY
E5
51
KY
E6
60
KY
E7
7
KY
E8
2
KY
E9
30
KY
03
12
KY
04
8
KY
05
1
KY
06
2
KY
W2
14
KY
W4
20
207
LA
E7
1
LA
E8
2
LA
E9
22
LA
03
9
LA
04
1
LA
05
5
U
W2
2
LA
W4
19
61
MA
E7
11
MA
E8
2
MA
E9
4
MA
03
11
MA
04
1
MA
OS
5
34
MD
E5
3
MD
E6
36
MD
E7
5
MD
E8
1
MD
E9
13
MD
03
11
MD
04
5
MD
05
2
MD
06
6
MD
W4
8
90
Ml
E7
3
Ml
E8
2
Ml
03
2
Ml
04
1
Ml
05
4
7
MN
E6
15
MN
E7
1
MN
E8
6
MN
03
4
MN
04
1
MN
05
1
MN
W2
2
MN
W4
21
51
MO
E7
2
MO
E8
1
MO
E9
4
MO
03
8
MO
04
4
MO
05
1
20
MS
E6
15
MS
E7
1
MS
E8
23
MS
03
7
MS
04
1
MS
05
5
MS
W2
2
MS
W4
1
55
284
MT
E6
2
MT
E7
1
MT
E8
1
MT
E9
1
MT
03
26
31
NC
E6
22
NC
E7
6
NC
E8
15
NC
03
17
NC
04
2
NC
05
1
NC
W4
1
64
ND
E6
8
ND
E7
3
ND
03
4
15
NJ
E6
29
NJ
E7
6
NJ
E8
1
NJ
E9
13
NJ
03
13
NJ
04
7
NJ
05
3
NJ
06
4
76
NM
E6
15
NM
E7
1
NM
E8
6
NM
03
4
NM
04
1
NM
OS
1
NM
W2
2
NM
W4
19
49
NY
E6
24
NY
E7
6
NY
E8
3
NY
E9
11
NY
03
15
NY
04
3
NY
05
1
NY
06
3
66
OH
E6
1
OH
E7
1
OH
03
3
OH
W4
2
7
OK
E6
25
OK
E7
3
OK
E8
9
OK
03
13
OK
04
1
OK
05
5
OK
W2
2
OK
W4
6
64
OR
E7
1
OR
E8
10
OR
03
9
OR
04
1
OR
05
3
OR
W2
7
31
PA
E6
39
PA
E7
6
PA
E8
1
PA
E9
14
PA
03
10
PA
04
1
PA
05
1
PA
06
10
82
RQ
E7
4
RQ
E8
5
RQ
03
6
RQ
04
1
RQ
05
1
17
SO
E6
26
SC
E7
4
SC
E8
31
SC
03
14
SC
04
2
SC
05
6
SC
W2
3
SC
W4
10
96
A-19
285
SD
E7
6
SO
03
2
SD
W2
2
10
TN
E7
1
TN
03
6
TN
04
4
11
TX
E5
6
TX
E6
78
TX
E7
12
TX
E8
4
TX
E9
40
TX
03
34
TX
04
15
TX
05
5
TX
06
5
TX
W2
10
TX
W4
22
231
UT
E7
3
UT
E8
1
UT
E9
8
UT
03
4
UT
04
1
UT
06
1
UT
W2
5
23
VA
E4
4
VA
E5
9
VA
E6
59
VA
E7
40
VA
E8
2
VA
E9
18
VA
03
16
VA
04
VA
OS
WA
E5
WA
E6
WA
E7
WA
E8
WA
E9
WA
03
WA
04
WA
05
WA
06
WA
W2
WA
W4
Wl
E5
Wl
E6
Wl
E7
Wl
E8
Wl
E9
Wl
03
Wl
04
Wl
05
Wl
06
Wl
W4
WV
E7
WV
04
TOTAL
17
1
166
86
79
12
2
60
26
10
1
2
9
5
292
3
25
3
1
5
12
3
1
2
1
56
1
1
2
2845
A -20
286
287
288
The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Dalton.
STATEMENT OF JOHN DALTON, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Dellums, distin-
guished members of this committee, it is a privilege for me to be
back for my third year to address you concerning the state of the
Navy and Marine Corps. I must tell you that I am indeed very hon-
ored to sit here as Secretary of the Navy. Part of what makes my
position so rewarding is I have the privilege of working with the
finest Navy and Marine Corps team this country has ever known.
America's naval services are focused and efficient, and we are op-
erating forward to protect America's interest around the world. Our
forces are second to none, and I intend to keep it that way.
Since I have been Secretary, I have focused on four themes with
a vision for the future. Those themes are readiness, technology, ef-
ficiency, and most important, people. The first theme I would like
to discuss is readiness in the Department of the Navy.
When I had my confirmation hearing in July 1993, the Senators
were most concerned about readiness. Several asked me about
readiness of the Navy-Marine Corps. Some expressed deep concern
that our Navy Department was not as ready as it should have
been. Readiness may have been a real concern 3 years ago, and I
certainly keep it in my sights today, but I believe we have ad-
dressed the issue effectively. I am confident that America is now
getting a solid return on its investment in the Navy and Marine
Corps. Here are two examples to emphasize that we are indeed
ready.
Early last summer when Saddam Hussein moved some of his
forces toward Kuwait, the Navy-Marine Corps team was right
there. Within hours we had strike aircraft flying sorties. We were
ready, we responded, we got the job done.
A more recent example of our readiness is Bosnia. The rescue of
Capt. Scott O'Grady is a prime example. The Navy and Marine
Forces were there on the scene when we needed them and they got
the job done. Later that summer, American military leadership
brought the warring factions to the peace table with precision de-
livery of air- and surface-launched weapons. The Theodore Roo-
sevelt and America battle groups conducted air and Tomahawk
strikes last September. They made the difference.
It is my job to ensure that the men and women of our Navy and
Marine Corps are properly trained and ready to fight because that
is what we are all in the business of doing; to fight and win our
Nation's wars, and with our forward presence to prevent them. The
bottom line is the Navy Department's readiness is where it should
be.
My second theme for the Navy Department is technology. Tech-
nology isn't a goal in and of itself, but it is the single biggest input
to our Department-wide priorities of innovation and modernization.
Our posture statement and statutory report which has been deliv-
ered to you talk more about this.
Let me give you two examples of successful investments in
emerging technologies. First, 5 years ago in the gulf war the world
watched as our battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines
launched highly accurate Tomahawk cruise missiles against enemy
289
positions in Iraq. Tomahawk's performances exceeded all expecta-
tions in its first operational use, with an overall success rate of ap-
proximately 60 percent. We weren't satisfied with Tomahawk's suc-
cess, and the Department had a vision to make that missile better.
The improved Tomahawk cruise missiles launched last summer
into Bosnia had a better than 90 percent success rate. We took a
great product and made it even better. That is the Navy Depart-
ment standard of business, and it is exactly the kind of innovation
and vision we must continue to emphasize in order to prepare the
Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges 20 to 30 years from now.
A second successful investment in emerging technologies is our
cooperative engagement capability, or CEC. Beginning with highly
successful live firing tests in the summer of 1994 and continuing
through a series of challenging demonstrations and exercises in the
last year, CEC continues to exceed our most optimistic expecta-
tions.
Most recently, CEC was a key element in an advanced concept
technology demonstration better known as Mountain Top, which
took place in Hawaii last month. In Mountain Top the Navy proved
that it could conduct surface-to-air engagements of cruise missiles
while those threats are still located far beyond the ship's own radar
horizon. The true significance of Mountain Top is that our service
combatants will have the capability to provide effective air defense
of forces ashore, debarkation ports and air fields against low-flying
Tomahawk-like cruise missiles.
Secretary Perry has declared CEC the most significant techno-
logical development since stealth. Since Secretary Perry is consid-
ered the father of stealth, that is quite a statement coming from
him.
Looking to the future, we have some important aircraft and ship
programs in the works that indicate our commitment to the tech-
nology necessary to win the next war. One is the next generation
of aircraft carrier, the CVX. I emphasize that X, because I don't
know yet what that carrier will look like. We are spending the
time, money, and creativity on research and development to make
sure that we have the best aircraft carrier for the future.
And there are more programs all across the board, sea, air, land,
and special forces requirements such as the Marine Corps V-22 Os-
prey, an aircraft program that we truly need and one that we have
worked hard with this Congress to support. The Marines advanced
amphibious assault vehicle, the Arleigh Burke DDG's, the LPD-17
program, initial concept planning for the arsenal ship and the sur-
face combatant for the 21st century.
These are programs we will need for the challenges of the year
2015 and beyond. It is important that we invest in science and
technology, that we invest in research and development to ensure
that we have the right Navy-Marine Corps not just for today and
tomorrow, but for the Navy and Marine Corps after next.
My third theme is efficiency. The Department is taking a hard
look at what decisions we must make now, particularly in mod-
ernization and capital investment, to ensure the Navy and Marine
Corps are prepared for the future. My written testimony covers this
area in detail, but let me cite one area where our vision for the fu-
290
ture rests in changing the way things used to be done. That is ac-
quisition reform.
The Navy and Marine Corps are learning to develop, build, and
buy systems according to the most successful industry models. Just
last fall in Norfolk, I hosted the first annual Department of the
Navy Chief Executive Officer Conference where our acquisition
leadership met with leading defense industry executives to map out
our relationship for the future. We are breaking new ground in ac-
quisition reform and becoming more innovative and productive in
the process.
The first major acquisition reform success story is the F/A-18-
E/F Super Hornet. It is a program where we have used a modern
business approach to develop an aircraft that is ahead of time, on
budget and underway. I am pleased to note that just 2 days ago
Dr. Kaminsld recognized the Navy Department with the first ever
acquisition excellence award for the success of this project.
I am also pleased about the cost-effective way that we are ap-
proaching the joint strike fighter to meet the Navy, Marine Corps
and Air Force needs of the future by the year 2008 and beyond. By
combining forces and funding this project together, 80 percent of
the avionics and technology will be common. We will end up with
an airframe unique to each service, but one that can be produced
for roughly $10 billion less than if each service approached the buy
on its own.
One final initiative is, I brought the leadership of the Marine
Corps into the Pentagon. For the first time in history, the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, his assistant and his leading staff
operate in the Pentagon. Gen. Chuck Krulak's office is next to mine
just as Adm. Mike Boorda's. We'll be a more cohesive team and
more cost-effective as well.
These examples should tell you that there has, in fact, been a
paradigm shift in the way we conduct business. We are more effi-
cient, more innovative, and more productive.
Let me conclude by addressing the fourth theme, and my No. 1
priority, our people. We have the best people serving in the Navy
and Marine Corps we have ever had. I served on active duty in the
1960's and in the Reserves in the early 1970's. We had good sailors
and marines then, but in many ways they are so much better
today. They are better educated, they are higher quality people
with a tremendous interest in community service. Our primary per-
sonnel challenge is retaining these high quality men and women
and recruiting the sailors that will follow.
Let me address both of these points. First, recruiting. We con-
tinue to face one of the toughest recruiting environments in the
history of the All Volunteer Force. The market of recruitable 17-
to 21-year-olds is one of the smallest and the propensity to enlist,
although improving, is low and that works against us as well as
for civilian personnel recruitment.
The Department is focused on the issue and in 1995 we met the
challenge. Last year, we recruited roughly 60,000 sailors and
40,000 marines. This year and next we will continue to need ap-
proximately 100,000 men and women in order to remain at peak
readiness. Diversity continues to be an important objective for our
Navy-Marine Corps and the Department is making a greater effort
291
to recruit women and minorities; 97 percent of all Navy career
fields and all Marine Corps units except infantry regiments and ar-
tillery and some separate ground combat battalions are now open
to women. That is a significant change from just a few years ago
and it signals greater opportunity for career advancements across
the board.
The bottom line is that we will continue to recruit the very best
men and women for our services, and I want to thank this commit-
tee for your support of this endeavor. Your help last year was par-
ticularly beneficial.
Second, the Department will continue every effort to retain the
top quality personnel we now have on board and enhancing quality
of life, including compensation and services, is crucial to this effort.
As could be imagined, competitive pay and benefits is of great con-
cern to our sailors and marines, housing allowances including BAQ
and VHA rates and selective reenlistment bonus are important ele-
ments of our quality-of-life program and are effective retention
tools.
Our quality-of-life programs and resources are designed to pro-
vide an equitable baseline of services to every sailor, marine, and
family member. The Department is putting additional resources to-
ward more and better housing, libraries, computer centers, and fit-
ness facilities. Quality of life is the single most frequently ques-
tioned area during my many visits to ships, squadrons, and shore
installation and it is an issue on which I will continue to work very
closely with this committee.
In addition to our personnel successes, the Department has also
faced some difficult issues particularly as we have continued the
integration of women into the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy
Department is making significant strides in that regard. Obviously,
cultural change presents a challenge. I am confident that we will
meet that challenge and we will meet it with our core values of
honor, courage, and commitment.
The Navy Department has hit patches of stormy water now and
then throughout its history. It has at times endured critical scru-
tiny of insiders and outsiders alike. But it has attracted that scru-
tiny for the simple reason that our standards are so high, and it
represents, not just in my view, but also in the public's, a touch-
stone of e^raordinary integrity, character, and discipline.
My point is that the Navy and Marine Corps have always had
a tradition of character so our efforts at reemphasizing the need for
ethical leadership is not something new; it is a heritage. It is
strong individual character that allows teamwork to flourish and
ensures that our force is ready and capable to meet any challenge
to America's interests.
Let me close by emphasizing that the Navy Department is indeed
an organization for the future. The Department's programs, poli-
cies, and organizational changes are forward looking and in step
with the rapidly changing challenges of our national security. The
Navy and Marine Corps are on course and speed to meet these
challenges and we are poised to remain the preeminent military
force for decades to come.
In the last 2 weeks I, too, have had the privilege to visit our
troops in the Mediterranean and Adriatic. I was aboard six ships.
292
visited Naples and Aviano. I am very proud of these young men
and women. They know their mission, their morale is high, they
understand their objectives, and they are committed to doing a pro-
fessional job, and I am awful proud to have the privilege to serve
as their Secretary.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee.
I look forward to responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Dalton follows:]
293
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
1996 POSTURE STATEMENT
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM
WHRPUBBne corps team the navy-marine corps
team the navy-marine
THE NAVY-
TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS
CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-MARIf
MARINE d
NAVY-MAR
THE NAVyJ
TEAM THI
CORPS T!
MARINE
NAVY-MARj
THE Hm-
TEAM THE
CORPS Tl
MARINE
NAVY-MARI
THE NAVY-M^INE CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS
TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE
CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-
TEAM THE
RPS TEAM
INE CORPS
VY-MARINE
THE NAVY-
TEAM THE
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NE CORPS
Y-MARINE
HE NAVY-
TEAM THE
RPS TEAM
294
\ven with all me changes in me woru,
some basic facts endure.,. We are a
maritime nation,.. As long as these facts
remain true, we need naval forces that
can dominate the sea^ project power,
and protect our interest, "
i
William J, Clinton
President of the United States
i
295
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
1996 POSTURE STATEMENT
The Department of the Navy fills a critical role in defending America's interests around the
world. Operations over the past year in Bosnia, the Arabian Gulf, Haiti, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and along the Pacific Rim demonstrate the requirement for ready, capable, and forward deployed
naval forces. Our goal for 1996 is to maintain a high state of readiness while completing the
remainder of infrastructure and force right-sizing efforts. The Department of the Navy will
continue aggressive programs to streamline our acquisition process and to develop promising
technologies to ensure the viability of the Navy and Marine Corps well into the 21 st Century.
A critical element in the readiness of the Navy and Marine Corps Team is our people - the
Sailors, Marines, and civilians who comprise our force. The Department of the Navy is com-
mitted to providing the best living and working conditions possible for our men and women
and their families. Quality of life initiatives, such as advancement and retention incentives,
housing improvements and morale, welfare, and recreation activities, are integral to our pro-
gram for 1996. An enduring tradition of character and ethics that protects individual dignity
and respect remains the foundation for our personnel training.
The Department of the Navy will continue to press forward in our modernization and recapital-
ization programs. Our strategy for these programs balances the current fiscal environment against
requirements for a ready, capable force now and in the future. The watchword for 1996 is
affordability. We will continue to look for efficiencies in our research, development and acqui-
sition processes to ensure our next generation of systems and equipment are cost effective and
capable.
This posture statement explains the Department of the Navy's mission, our plan for the coming
year and the priorities which guide our decision making. America is a maritime nation and
requires the unique capabilities of the Navy-Marine Corps team. As you read through the fol-
lowing pages, you will see that, across the spectrum of peace and war, our Sailors and Marines
are well prepared to respond to any mission ordered by the National Command Authorities.
You will also see that in 1996 the Navy-Marine Corps team will continue to provide the pre-
mier forces from the sea that are adaphve, ready and forward deployed to support the nation's
interests around the world.
John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
^^a^£fc:
6\ J. M. Boorda, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
296
CONTENTS
I. OUR STRATEGY. 6
Forward. . .From the Sea, a Reality 6
Creating the Environment for Change 7
Closer Department of the Navy Integration 7
II. THE NATION NEEDS THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM '. 8
The Strategic Framework 8
Forward Presence 8
Expeditionary Readiness 9
On-Scene Power Projection From the Sea 9
HI. THE TEAM IN ACTION 10
Summary of 1 995 Navy-Marine Corps Operations 10
Freedom of Navigation Program 14
Major Joint/Combined Exercises 15
IV. TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION 17
Linchpin for Joint Operations 17
First to Annve, Last to Leave 17
Joint Task Force Headquarters 17
Equipment Interoperability 17
Joint Training and Exercises 18
Joint Force Missile Defense 18
Sealift and Sea Control 19
Reserve Forces Integration 19
One Team 20
V. PEOPLE 21
Shaping the Force 21
Recruiting 22
Retention 23
Enhancing Quality of Life 24
Meeting Medical Needs 25
Equal Opportunity 26
Safety 27
VL READINESS 28
Future Readiness 28
Impact of Environmental Protection on Operations, Training and Testing 29
297
CONTENTS
VII. TECHNOLOGY. . .INNOVATION AND MODERNIZATION 30
Modernization 30
Acquisition Investment 30
Acquisition Leadership 31
Business Strategy 31
Institutionalizing Innovation 32
Training Innovation 33
Fruits of Modeling and Simulation 33
New Developments 34
VIII. EFFICIENCY 36
Efficiency Through Innovation 36
Operational Fleet Reorganization 36
Acquisition Reform Success Stories 37
Streamlining Shore Infrastructure (BRAC) 38
Post-Base Closure Strategy 39
Regional Maintenance Strategy 39
Environmental Stewardship 40
IX. PROGRAMS 41
Programming for the Force 41
Program Summaries 41
X. CONCLUSION 56
298
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
1996 POSTURE STATEMENT
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM
CORPo
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM
TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS
'- TEAM THE NAVY-MARi
NE D
-MAR
HE NAVY
TEAM THEl
CORPS Tl
MARINE
NAVY-MAR
THE NAVY-
TEAM THE
CORPS TE
MARINE Ci
NAVY-MAR
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM
TEAM THE NAVY MARINE CORPS
CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS
TEAM THE NAVY MARINE
THE NAVY-
TEAM THE
RPS TEAM
NE CORPS
VY MARINE
THE NAVY-
TEAM THE
RPS TEAM
Hi CORPS
YMARINE
HE NAVY-
TEAM THE
RPS TEAM
THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS
TEAM THE NAVY-MARINE
CORPS TEAM THE NAVY-.
299
I. OUR STRATEGY
Marines return after the successful recovery Oj
Captain Scott O'Grady, highlighting the versa-
tility of Naval Forces
The events of the past year continue to highlight
the Navy-Marine Corps team's key national se-
cunty role. Sea-based, combat ready, forward
deployed naval forces were involved in more than
15 major operations during 1995 — operations
that required immediate responses in support of
national interests. Through actions ranging from
the quick Tomahawk strike by the USSNormandv
(CG 60) against Bosnian-Serb aggression to the
expeditious recovery of a downed F-16 pilot in
Bosnia by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable) [MEU (SOC)],
strikes by Navy and Marine Corps aircraft in
Bosnia, presence operations to deter Iraqi aggres-
sion and integrated air- land-sea support of Jordan
in a time of need, naval forces continue to fulfill a
vital operational role for which they are uniquely
suited.
Forward.^From the Sea, a Reality
Such success in meeting today's operational chal-
lenges can be attributed to thorough plaiming and
Tomahawks fired from USS Normandy (CG 60)
within hours of arriving on station in support of
Operation Deliberate Force
innovative execution, but it is the strategic under-
pirming — introduced three years ago in From the
Sea and expanded in 1 994 by Forward... From the
Sea — which provides the foundation for this suc-
cess. This common foundation, coupled with the
teamworic built through a daily interaction of our
naval services, explains why these expeditionary
forces are frequently the theater commander's joint
force of choice during the early phases of a crisis.
The Navy-Marine Corps team embodies unique
core capabilities — forward presence, expedition-
300
ary readiness and on-scene power projection from
the sea. These capabihties assume greater impor-
tance as U.S. land-based overseas presence de-
clines or is inhibited by sovereignty restrictions.
Operations of our forward deployed forces, high-
lighted by the diversion of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN 71 ) and Hth MEU (SOC) from
scheduled exercises to crisis in Jordan, demon-
strate the flexibility and mobility of expedition-
ary forces. They further reaffirm the role of naval
forward presence as a major pillar of our U.S.
National Security Strategy.
During 1995, the Navy and Marine Corps main-
tained an average of more than 100 ships and
23,000 Marines forward deployed conducting
presence missions, training and operations with
military forces from more than 69 nations. Com-
bined naval exercises provide other nations the
opportimity to train with U.S. forces and to de-
velop multilateral relationships that enhance re-
gional stability, enabling us to form coalitions
when required. Forward deployed amphibious
ready groups with embarked MEU (SOC)s, and
carrier battle groups give theater commanders a
flexible, responsive force that can be positioned
in potential trouble spots for extended periods as
a visible symbol of U.S. commitment and resolve.
Put simply, naval expeditionary forces are the right
mix of forces, positioned in the right place, at the
right time.
Creating the Environment for Change
With heavy operational demands, the Department
of the Navy (DoN) challenges all of its activities
to reengineer and reinvent themselves, emulating
industry's best business practices. This challenge
is not a one time effort; it is a continuous commit-
ment to change. The DoN, guided by the
President's National Performance Review, began
identifying new ways of doing business aimed at
effecting immediate change while laying the
groundwork for long term change. Efficiencies
gained from these initiatives are being transformed
into resources for maintaining a ready, capable and
credible naval force. One example is our drive to
further enhance the working relationship between
the Navy and Marine Corps. This includes im-
proved integration at the operational level — as
the focus shifls to the littorals of the world — and
a greater degree of integration in our peacetime
planning efforts.
Closer Department of the Navy Integration
Operational integration continues to be highlighted
by the successful integration of Marine F/A-18
and EA-6B squadrons into carrier air wings. In
1995, both Navy and Marine aircraft were
launched from the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN
71) and the USS America (CV 66) to participate
in the August air strikes against Bosnian-Serb
forces.
The Department of the Navy continues to inte-
grate the Navy and Marine Corps Program Ob-
jective Memorandum (POM) processes in order
to better identify and articulate major Navy and
Marine Corps issues early. To facilitate this inte-
gration, the two Services' programming databases
are being merged into a common DoN database.
Each Service will continue to develop its own sub-
mission to the DoN POM, but such early coordi-
nation in the process will articulate program re-
quirements more effectively and allow for better
use of DoN resources.
Another step toward a closer working relationship
is the movement of Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps into the Pentagon. Phase One of this move
was initiated in January 1996; the Corrunandant
and selected staff members relocated their offices
adjacent to those of the Secretary of the Navy and
the Chief of Naval Operations. The continued
move of the Headquarters staff will occur over the
next several years.
From planning and programming through train-
ing and operations, greater integration within the
DoN is enhancing the unique synergy already
present within the Navy-Marine Corps team.
301
II. THE NATION NEEDS THE NAVY-MARINE CORPS TEAM
The Strategic Framework
With a full range of economic and security inter-
ests widely dispersed around the globe and across
vast oceans, the United States is, and will remain,
a maritime nation. Our strategy, as outlined in the
National Security' Strategy and National Military
Strategy-, is necessarily transoceanic and requires
the five enduring roles of naval forces:
• Forward presence
• Power projection
• Sea control and maritime supremacy
• Strategic deterrence
• Strategic sealift
U.S. interests involve trade with partners located
at the endpoints of "highways of the seas." These
endpoints lie in the world's littoral regions, which
coincide with the concentration of our vital inter-
ests in Europe, the Middle East, Latin America
and particularly in the Pacific Rim and Indian
Ocean— the area that is the fastest growing eco-
nomically and demographically. The littorals pro-
vide homes to more than 75 percent of the world's
population, locations for more than 80 percent of
the world's capital cities and nearly all the major
marke^laces of international trade. It is in our
national interest, therefore, for the littorals of the
world to remain stable. The Navy-Marine Corps
team regularly influences events in the littorals
from its sovereign combat capable bases at sea.
Routinely operating in all the world's oceans, these
combat credible naval expeditionary forces exert
"Forward presence demonstrates U.S.
commitment, strengthens deterrence, and
facilitates transition from peace to war.
Naval forces are critical to our long term
forward presence because of their flexible
offshore stationing. "
Gen Binford Peay, USA
USSStupan (LHA 2) with 24th MEL (SOQ em-
barked conducting pre-deployment exercises
real influence and provide assurance to fiiends be-
cause real on-scene power still counts.
Forward Presence
Each service plays an impwrtant role in support of
the National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement. With respect to forward presence
and jxjwer projection, the Army and Air Force
maintain permanently stationed forces on the Ko-
rean Peninsula and in Europe. Although the Navy-
Marine Corps team complements the other Ser-
vices as part of an overall engagement strategy, it
is unique in its ability to position credible combat
power overseas without the consent or imposed
limitations of foreign governments. Naval expe-
ditionary forces operate from sea bases that allow
unobtrusive presence across the full range of op-
erations, from peacetime engagement and crisis
response through major conflict.
Forward deployed and forward based naval forces
are built to fight and win wars, but an equally im-
portant role is to help prevent conflict. During
1995, naval forces demonstrated their inherent
302
flexibility and deterrent value with their rapid re-
sponse to Iraqi threats after the defection of se-
nior Iraqi ofTicials to Jordan. To support and en-
courage Jordanian leadership, the President di-
rected the USS Theodore Roosevelt {CVN 71 ) to
move from the Adriatic Sea to the eastern Medi-
terranean, within striking range of Jordan's bor-
derwithlraq. Additionally, the previously sched-
uled movement of the 24th MEU (SOC) into
Aqaba was accelerated. These moves, along with
the repositioning of Tomahawk-carrymg surface
combatants, clearly demonstrated U.S. resolve to
protect a friend while underscoring the maneu-
verability and utility of unencumbered naval
forces. Cause and effect are difficult to prove in
such circumstances, but it is clear that Iraqi threats
against Jordan went unfulfilled once the USS
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) moved closer to
the scene.
Expeditionary Readiness
The term "expeditionary" captures the essence of
U.S. national security strategy into the 21st Cen-
tury — countering military threats overseas, not
on our own shores. The Navy-Marine Corps team
provides the nation a fully integrated air, land and
sea combined arms force founded on expedition-
ary readiness, designed to be swiftly employed to
confront threats at the source.
Naval expeditionary forces are uniquely posi-
tioned, trained and organized to accomplish a wide
range of missions, including long range strike and
early forcible entry to expedite the arrival of fol-
low-on forces. Power projection is just one of the
options available to naval expeditionary forces,
which can move rapidly and easily with little or
no shore infrastructure and go into action imme-
diately upon arrival. They can do this because
they carry their infrastructure on their backs or in
the holds of ships. Naval expeditionary forces are
tailored economical packages that can accomplish
the mission without having to wait for additional
assets or personnel. These self-reliant and self-
sustaining forces are effective in the most austere
environments, as Navy and Marine Corps units
recently demonstrated in Bosnia and Somalia.
"Expeditionary forces are a cocked pis-
tol, ready to fight Tuesday's war on Tues-
day, with Tuesday's fifrces. "
LtGen Charles Wilhelm, USMC
June 1995
On - Scene Power Projection From the Sea
Sized to provide staying power with maximum
flexibility anywhere in the world, naval expedi-
tionary forces can converge on a crisis with little
warning — a capability that largely is already
funded in our Operations and Maintenance ac-
count. Should deterrence fail, naval forces pro-
vide immediate, on-scene power projection.
Armed with the most sophisticated weapons and
mobile enough to react quickly, this combined-
arms team can blunt an initial attack. Addition-
ally, they are part of a globally integrated C41 and
surveillance network that enables follow-on forces
to "plug-in" quickly, should they be needed. This
network provides surveillance data from all
sources which permits naval forces to target and
strike from a variety of land, sea and airplatforms.
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) conducting
operations in the Gulf of Oman .
303
III. THE TEAM IN ACTION
In 1 995, naval forces were called upon to respond
to significant contingencies around the world.
Carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and amphibious
ready groups (ARGs) with embarked MEU
(SOC)s moved from crisis to crisis, as theater
commanders called for their unique capabilities.
Sea-based forces provided the preponderance of
immediate response, but our land-based Marine
expeditionary forces, maritime patrol squadrons,
and maritime prepositioning forces also supported
real-world operations, along with numerous joint
and combined exercises.
Summary of 1995 Navy-Marine Corps
Operations
EUROPE
Bosnia: Operation Provide Promise (July 1 992-
present). This joint operation with the U.S. Air
Force, involving both naval carrier and land-based
air, protected humanitarian relief efforts in be-
sieged cities of the former Yugoslavia. Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft, a Marine aerial reftjeling
squadron, a military police unit, a Navy fleet hos-
pital manned with both regular and reserve per-
sonnel and on-call Marines of the European
theater's ARG/MEU (SOC) supplied vital support
to United Nations forces.
Operation Deny Flight (April 1993-December
1995). Naval air forces — comprised of carrier-
based air wings and shore-based Marine F/A-1 8D
and EA-6B squadrons operating from Aviano, Italy
— participated in a joint and combined operation
to enforce a United Nations mandated no-fly zone
in the airspace over the Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The Navy-Marine Corps team also
provided protective air support to the United Na-
tions Protection Forces. Maritime patrol aircraft
NAVY & MARINE CORPS
367 SHIPS
UNDERWAY: 1B6 ISmo)
BCVs.eiHAs/LHDs/LPHs
DEPLOYED: 114 131%)
4 CVBGs, 4 ARGs
MARINES DEPLOYED 23.870
11 EXERCISES /OPERATIONS ONGOING
10
38-160 97- 12
304
equipped with electro-optical sensors supported
overland imagery collection efforts by providing
real-time still and full motion video imagery to
ground commanders.
O'Crady Rescue (8 June 1995). In response to
the downing of Basher 52 by hostile fire over
Bosnia, the 24th MEU (SOC), operating from the
USS Kearsape ( LHD 3), was placed on an alert to
conduct one of the special operations missions for
which all MEU (SOC)s are trained and certified.
Six days later. U.S. Air Force Captain Scott
O'Grady contacted a USAF aircraft and, within
hours of notification. Marines aboard two CH-53s,
covered by AH-IW Cobra gunships and AV-8B
Harriers, rescued the downed pilot. The special
training process proved crucial during this fast
moving mission, as the MEU (SOC) achieved the
goal of 6-hour rapid response. The operation
stands out as a textbook example of the crisis re-
sponse capability of naval forces and highlights
the value of the ARG/MEU (SOC).
Operation Deliberate Force (August-September
1995). In conjunction with U.S. Air Force units
and NATO allies, the USS Theodore Roosevelt
CVBG and shore-based Manne F/A-18Ds and
EA-6Bs operating from Aviano, Italy conducted
precision air stnkes in Bosnia. In a seamless tran-
sition, the USS America CVBG arrived in theater,
relieved the USS Theodore Roosevelt CVBG on
station, and within 24 hours conducted strike op-
erations with carrier based aircraft and tomahawk
cruise missiles from USS Normandy (CG 60)
Navy Surface Combatants conducting maritime
intercept operations in support of V.N. imposed
sanctions
against Bosnian-Serb forces. This use of force
was instrumental in bringing the warring factions
back to the negotiating table.
Adriatic Sea: Operation Sharp Guard (June
1993-present). U.S. naval forces, including sur-
face combatants, intelligence gathering attack sub-
marines and regular and reserve maritime patrol
aircraft, operated with combined NATO and West-
em European Union naval forces to block sea com-
merce to and from Serbia and Montenegro, along
with weapon shipments intended for all of the re-
publics of the former Yugoslavia. The long-term
enforcement of these U.N. sanctions was an im-
portant factor in bnnging the warring parties to
the peace table in Dayton, Ohio.
Operation Joint Endeavor (December 1995-pre-
sent). The European Commands ARG/MEU (SOC)
was assigned as a theater reserve for NATO forces
while a Marine Corps security force detachment
provided security for NATO International Force
headquarters in Sarajevo. Additionally, naval con-
struction battalion personnel built several camps
for the Aimy in Croatia and Bosnia.
Central and Eastern Europe: The Partnership
For Peace (PFP) program was the centerpiece of
NATO's strategic relationship with Central and
Eastern Europe this year. Naval forces conducted
three major PFP exercises with Eastern European
nations. Part of our bilateral Militaiy-to-Military
Contacts Program included basic seamanship ex-
ercises and numerous familiarization visits with
the naval forces of this region. Units from the Sixth
Fleet, including assigned Marine expeditionary
forces and the Coast Guard cutter USCGC Dallas
(WHEC 716), conducted fleet and amphibious
training exercises with forces from Romania,
Ukraine, Bulgaria and Albania. A major exercise
was also conducted in the Baltic with long -stand-
ing friends and newly independent nations' forces.
Additionally, regular and reserve Navy and Ma-
rine Corps officers were involved with in-country
military liaison teams and developed other pro-
grams to further naval contact with nations of the
region.
11
305
SOUTHWEST ASIA
CARIBBEAN
Kuwait: Operation Vigilant Sentinel (August-
December 1995). Navy and Marine Corps com-
bat forces and regular and reserve Military Sealift
Command forces quickly responded to Iraqi
threats to Jordan and Kuwait. Normal Middle East
Force presence rapidly expanded as this crisis de-
veloped. In the initial stages, the USS Abraham
Lincoln (CVN 72) and USS Independence (CV
62) battle groups and the 11 th MEU (SOC) em-
barked in the USS New Orleans (LPH 1 1 ) am-
phibious ready group rep>ositioned off the coast
of Kuwait. Additionally, the USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN 71) deployed to the Eastern
Mediterranean. This naval task force rapidly
planned and coordinated a contingency defense
of Kuwait and Jordan. Within one day. Maritime
Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two from Diego
Garcia was underway with equipment for an ad-
ditional 1 7,300-Marine combat force, while 1
MEF offload preparation party personnel deployed
from Camp Pendleton. Throughout this crisis, na-
val aircraft made up the largest portion of U.S.
strike aircraft in theater.
Iraq: Operation Southern Watch (1991-
present). Naval forces continued to share respon-
sibility with the U.S. Air Force for no-fly opera-
tions over Iraq in support of U.N. efforts to pro-
tect Iraqi minority populations. Naval operations
included extensive Navy and Marine aircraft sor-
ties from carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf
Maritime Intercept Operations: Throughout
1 995, surface combatants and maritime patrol air-
craft continued to execute maritime interception
operations in the Persian Gulf in support of U.N.
sanctions against Iraq. These at-sea sanction op-
erations, enacted five years earlier at the begin-
ning of the Gulf War, were terminated in the Red
Sea in the fall of 1 994, but they continue in the
Persian Gulf By the end of 1 995, surface com-
batants had conducted over 23,000 at-sea inter-
cepts while simultaneously carrying out other for-
ward presence missions.
Haiti: United Nations Mission Haiti (April 1995
- present). Marine linguists were provided to U.S.
forces supporting the U.N. mission as the success-
ful operations Uphold Democracy and Support
Democracy came to a close and the U.S. passed
control of Haitian nation building to the United
Nations.
Cuba: Operation Sea Signal (August 1994-
Present). The II Marine Expeditionary Force (II
MEF) with reserve augmentation continued to
support Joint Task Force 1 60 in handling, process-
ing and providing security for more than 54,(X)0
Cuban and Haitian migrants. The operation was
completed in eariy 1 996, closing out a year and a
half of support.
Medical support was provided to all migrants
during Operation Sea Signal
Operation Safe Passage (January-February
1995). The amphibious ships USS Austin (LPD
4) and USS LaMoure Countv (LST 1 1 94) with II
12
306
MEF Marines and four anti-terrorist security teams
onboard were deployed to transfer and provide
security for Cubans from Panama to holding
camps at Guantanamo Bay. Navy and Marine
Corps forces remained in theater as a reserve for
the U.S. Atlantic Command until all Cubans re-
turned safely to Guantanamo Bay.
Counterdnig Operations: The Department of
the Navy continues to supjjort U.S. government
efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs enter-
ing the country. Regular and Reserve Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft, ships and unique sensors
contributed to detection and monitoring missions
in the transit zone. Naval forces also assisted the
Coast Guard with interdiction operations and pro-
vided a wide range of domestic support that in-
cluded training and the use of facilities, equipment
and personnel. In addition, regular and reserve
Marine Corps units provided operational support
to the combatant Commanders-in-Chief, the Joint
Interagency Task Force, Joint Task Force 6 and
drug enforcement agencies — participating in 58
counterdrug missions along the southwest border
and in the Caribbean.
Hurricane Marilyn: Navy units conducted nu-
merous relief efforts for local communities af-
fected by disastrous hurricanes in the Caribbean
and the southeastern United States. As the focal
point for relief efforts. Naval Station Roosevelt
Roads in Puerto Rico was the base for disaster
material staging and support. Naval station per-
sonnel also provided airlift for inter-island trans-
port and helped officials survey the damaged ar-
eas. While Navy seabees helped repair damaged
facilities. Navy divers surveyed and cleared navi-
gational channels for St. Thomas and St. Croix.
RUSSIA
As a clear sign of improving relations, the United
States and Russia no longer target each other with
strategic nuclear weapons and have increased the
scope and complexity of their combined military
exercises. In August 1 995, the two countries con-
ducted Exercise Cooperation From The Sea in Ha-
waii executing both at-sea and amphibious train-
ing. This historic event marked the first time that
the U.S. and Russia have conducted a bilateral
military exercise in U.S. waters.
Expanding military to military contacts, U.S. and Russian Naval Officers meet during Exercise
Cooperation from the Sea
13
307
USS ESSEX (LHD 2) with 13th MEU (SOQ exercising with Kuwaiti forces prior to responding for
OPERATION UNITED SHIELD
NORTHEAST ASIA
Korea: Events in Korea remained relatively calm
during 1995. Continuous naval forward presence
was a key contributor to this region's stability. If
events in Korea had required greater U.S. mili-
tary presence, naval expeditionary forces were pre-
pared to expand rapidly the theater commander's
air, land and sea capabilities.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
ThailandA^ietnam: Operation Full Account-
ing (March-April 1995). Marines from III MEF
continued to support ongoing joint task force ef-
forts with helicopter lift in the identification and
recovery of U.S. servicemen unaccounted for af-
ter the Vietnam War. Additionally, the annual
combined U.S. /Thai exercise. Cobra Gold, con-
tinued to reinforce the strategic interest we have
in the region.
INDIAN OCEAN
Somalia: Operation United Shield (Febniary-
March 1995). As the humanitarian relief mission
14
came to an end, the Navy-Marine Corps team
found itself in the world spotlight again as the USS
Essex (LHD 2) amphibious ready group with the
13th MEU (SOC) embarked and USS Belleau
Wood (LHA 3), with a special purpose Marine
air-ground task force embariced, covered the with-
drawal of U.N. troops from Somalia. Using early
arriving naval forces, a Joint/Combined Task Force
totaling 23 ships and 1 6,500 pereonnel was formed
under the command of I MEF's commanding gen-
eral and Navy Central Command in the regjoa De-
spite hazardous conditions, all personnel were
safely evacuated with zero casualties. The Navy-
Marine Corps team was, once again, the first to
be called and the last to leave.
Freedom of Navigation Program
An essential element of U.S. foreign policy is en-
suring free and safe transit through international
waters and air space as a matter of legal right not
contingent upon the approval of adjacent coun-
tries. Naval forces are critical tools in demon-
strating transit rights under international law. In
1995, Navy ships and aircraft conducted numer-
ous freedom of navigation operations in or through
areas where other nations have maintained sover-
eignty claims that contradict existing international
agreements. Ratification of the U.N. Law of the
Sea Convention, sent to the U.S. Senate in Octo-
ber 1994, is crucial to global acceptance of the
legal norms that guarantee navigational and over-
flight freedoms. A stable oceans regime under the
Convention will guarantee the ability of naval
forces to support national interests Forward . . .
From the Sea.
Major Joint/Combined Exercises
Joint and combined exercises form a cornerstone
of U.S. engagement strategy. Forward presence
forces promote regional stability by exercising
routinely with military forces of other nations.
This year naval forces participated in more than
1 30 combined exercises. Large scale annual ex-
ercises with our friends and allies proved particu-
larly effective in promoting understanding,
interoperability and laying the groundwork for fti-
ture coalitions.
• The annual UNITAS deployment is a primary
means of supporting regional stability in the West-
em Hemisphere. For five months each year, regu-
lar and reserve surface combatants and P-3 air-
craft, a submarine and Marines embarked in an
amphibious ship circumnavigate South America.
At each stop, our naval forces exercise with the
host nation's air, sea and land forces. These exer-
cises generally provide the only opportunity each
year for these Latin American nations to operate
with U.S. forces; they commit a large portion of
their military exercise budgets to UNITAS, which
demonstrates our interest and resolve to cooper-
ate in a region that otherwise would receive little
U.S. military attention.
• Regional stability in Southeast Asia is supported
by the Pacific Fleet's Cooperation Afloat Readi-
ness and Training program, patterned after the
UNITAS deployment. This program fosters coop-
erative engagement, coalition building,
interoperability and training through the partici-
pation of U.S. naval forces in an annual series of
15
309
Naval cooperation is demonstrated during operations in the Baltic Sea, which include Russian ships
sailing side-by-side with surface combatants from the U.S. and Baltic nations
bilateral exercises. The inaugural deployment oc-
curred fk)m May-July 1995 and involvedaU.S. force
made up of two frigates, a submarine and an am-
phibious ship with embarked Marines and special
forces. Exercises included military forces from
Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Phil-
ippines and Brunei.
• Exercise Cobra Gold is an annual event involv-
ing U.S./Thai military forces training in a large-
scale land, air and sea joint/combmed operation.
U.S. Seventh Fleet ships and Marines from III
MEF, including the 31st MEU are among the na-
val expeditionary forces that benefit from this an-
nual exercise. Our participation enhances U.S./
Thai military interoperability and provides clear
evidence of continuing U.S. interest in the region.
• Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens, one of the largest
combined command f)OSt exercises, involved staffs
from all four Services as well as the Republic of
Korea (ROK). Under direction of the Commander,
Combined Forces Command/United Nations
Command these forces exercise annually, focus-
ing on crisis response and transition from peace-
time to war. Unique to this year's exercise was the
initial testing of a Combined Marine Expedition-
ary Corps that comprised forces from I and 111
MEF and ROK Marines.
• The principal naval demonstration of U.S. in-
terests in northern Europe is the annual Baltic Sea
Operation, a three week exercise involving three
U.S. surface combatants and military forces from
almost all the countries in the Baltic region, in-
cluding those from the former Soviet Union.
• The Navy continues to dedicate surface com-
batants as participants in each of two NATO led
maritime forces: Standing Naval Forces Atlantic
and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean. Dur-
ing 1995, both of these forces contributed to the
enforcement of the U.N. mandated embargo in the
Adriatic. With the ongoing implementation of the
Bosnian peace agreement, these forces may re-
vert to their traditional role of peacetime regional
engagement and interoperability.
16
310
IV. TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION
Linchpin for Joint Operations
Our national strategy relies on the ability of each
service to operate jointly, to ensure successful
mission performance across the full range of mili-
tary operations. Essential to the success of joint
operations is the integration of all supporting arms.
This IS a capability inherent in naval expedition-
ary forces and is the basis on which joint air,
ground and sea task forces can be built. Exercis-
ing and operating daily in an integrated fashion,
the Navy and Marine Corps provide the theater
commanders forces that are uniquely suited as the
linchpin for joint operations.
First to Arrive, Last to Leave
Forward deployed naval expeditionary forces of-
ten are the closest to the scene of emerging crises.
As a result, they can form the core of a joint force
that contams crises and expedites the arrival or
departure of follow-on forces. Such was the case
again in 1995. In Operation Vigilant Sentinel, the
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) repositioned
to respond to Iraqi threats and was ready to as-
sume duties as the Joint Task Force Headquarters.
In Operation United Shield, the 1 3th MEU (SOC),
embarked in the USS Essex (LHD 2) amphibious
ready group, formed the core of a Combined/Joint
Task Force headed by I MEF's Commanding Gen-
eral, charged with covering the withdrawal of U.N.
forces from Somalia.
Joint Task Force Headquarters
Future joint task force headquarters will be orga-
nized around the service component staff first on
the scene that can work in the joint arena. As dem-
onstrated repeatedly, working with and integrat-
ing the elements of air, land and sea has become
second nature to naval expeditionary forces. They
are ideally suited to function as a joint task force
headquarters because they deploy in flexible, task-
organized groups and possess a broad range of ca-
Joint Task Force United Shield Commander
meets with UNOSOM officers in preparation for
United Nations forces withdrawal
pabilities that cut across a wide variety of opera-
tions. In 1995, operations in Somalia rnd
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba demonstrated this capa-
bility. In each case. Marine and Navy assets, with
joint and other service component augmentation,
manned and equipped the joint task force head-
quarters.
Working closely with regional Commanders-in-
Chief and their component commanders, the Navy
and Marine Corps are aggressively tailoring man-
ning and training requirements to support the op-
eration of a joint task force headquarters. As part
of this initiative, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps called for the establishment of a standing
capability that can respond to emerging crises
anywhere in the world. Navy numbered fleet com-
manders worldwide are ready to assume duties as
Joint Force Task Group or Force commanders on
short notice.
Equipment Interoperability
Naval expeditionary forces are outfitted with the
17
311
command and control links needed for joint op-
erations. This naval C41 not only supports mari-
time and littoral operations, but also provides an
expandable core infrastructure for joint C41. This
provides combatant Commanders-in-Chief
(CinCs) and follow-on joint forces access to a
common battlespace picture, quickly and
seamlessly. With this common core, the Navy and
Marine Corps also have a well defined basis and
experience for multilateral operations with friends
and allies.
New developments in naval C4I continue to en-
hance joint interoperability. The Joint Maritime
Command Information System (JMCIS) forms the
current basis for both ashore and afloat Copernicus
C41 systems for the Navy and MAGTF C41 for
the Marine Corps. In addition, the JMCIS core
design is the baseline element within the Global
Command and Control System, the CinCs' strate-
gic level joint command system. Continued in-
stallation of the Contingency Tactical Air Plan-
ning System in aircraft carriers, command ships
and in the Marine Tactical Air Command and
Control systems will improve their ability to sup-
port a Joint Force Air Component Commander
The Marine Corps is buying equipment that will
integrate fully with joint task forces ashore while
ensuring connectivity to command and control
nodes afloat. New systems such as the Digital
Widd)and Transmission System will allow Navy
and Marine units afloat to extend telephone switch-
ing and computer circuits ashore as well as among
afloat units.
Joint Training and Exercises
Carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups
with embarked MEU (SOC)s train to stay on the
cutting edge of joint operations. Prior to each
deployment, naval units participate in joint task
force (JTF) exercise scenarios with Army, Air
Force and Coast Guard units, to hone their readi-
ness to function in a joint operational environment.
In 1995 alone, naval forces participated in 123 joint
exercises. Through the CinC exercise program,
numbered Fleet and MEF headquarters staffs train
to serve as JTF headquarters. Navy and Marine
Corps unit exercise programs focus on the par-
ticipation of naval forces within the larger JTF
Command and Control Structure. Persormel train-
ing and education programs also emphasize un-
derstanding the capabilities and employment of
joint forces. Joint Air Operations, fire support and
exchange programs are just a few ways that naval
forces work with, and learn from, the other Ser-
vices.
Joint Force Missile Defense
Protection fi-om ballistic missile attack — includ-
ing missiles armed with nuclear, biological, or
chemical warheads — is crucial to the survival of
threatened populations and U.S. military forces
arriving early in theater. In the absence of
prepositioned land-based missile defense systems,
this essential regional and force protection must
come from ships. To meet this vital and urgent
requirement, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council approved a theater missile defense mis-
sion needs statement that calls for the develop-
ment of a sea-based Theater Ballistic Missile De-
fense (TBMD) capability.
The Navy is making great strides toward meeting
these requirements. Naval Area TBMD capabil-
ity, cumently planned for fielding in FY98, and
follow-on development of Naval Theater Wide
TBMD will provide defense-in-depth over an en-
tire theater of operations. Major savings in devel-
opment time and cost are realized by building on
the existing capabilities and engineering base of
Aegis equipped Ticonderoga-class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke-ciass destroyers. In addition to pro-
viding an eariy missile defense umbrella, sea-
based TBMD operates without host nation con-
straints and does not require airlift resources in
the critical eariy days of conflict — resources that
are currently dedicated to bringing ground-based
TBMD into theater.
Still in the early stages as a potential TBMD sys-
tem, the Marine Corps Improved Hawk Missile
System demonstrated short range TBMD capabil-
18
312
Future Saval Theater-Wide TBMD will provide defense-in-depth over an entire theater of opera-
tions
ity during recent tests. The Marine Corps is ex-
ploring the potential of firing Navy Standard Mis-
siles from Hawk missile launchers, to extend
TBMD coverage and standardize weapons pro-
curement.
Sealift and Sea Control
A unique Navy mission in any joint campaign plan
is the movement and protection of military sealift.
More than 90 percent of the material and equip-
ment required for U.S. participation in a major
regional contingency must arrive by sea. The pro-
liferation of submarines in regions of key U.S. eco-
nomic and security interests, reiterates that the U .S .
Navy must maintain the anti-submarine warfare
capability to counter this potential threat. The
Desert Storm Scud missiles stimulated new efforts
in TBMD developments, but British lessons
learned during the Falkland Islands War with re-
gard to submarines must not be forgotten. Bellig-
erent submarines impact the land campaign not
only through the attrition of sealift ships, but also
through disiiiption of sea lanes and choke points.
Navy programs and acquisition focus on both the
open-ocean and littoral threats:
• Shallow water anti-submarine torpedoes
• Surface ship torpedo defense
0 Advanced Distributed System of under-
water hydrophones
• Sensor Arrays
• Explosive echo ranging and low fre-
quency active sonar
Anti-submarine warfare remains critical to the suc-
cess of power projection fi-om the sea as well as
any land campaign that relies on seaborne logis-
tics for success. It is challenging, force level in-
tensive and requires a significant commitment in
training to field an effective force.
Reserve Forces Integration
The National Military Strategy focuses our mili-
tary capabilities on flexible and selective engage-
ment to meet both anticipated and unanticipated
global threats. Supporting this strategy with fewer
forces is a challenge that is being answered by the
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313
increased integration of Reserve forces into both
wartime and peacetime operations. This integra-
tion must be seamless and must involve Reserve
forces with a solid foundation of highly capable
leadership, people and equipment. These stan-
dards are being attained through equipment mod-
ernization, increased integration of Reserve train-
ing with that of regular forces and the identifica-
tion and retention of high quality people.
When personnel rightsizing is completed in FY99,
the Naval Reserve will make up 20 percent of a
Navy that has the proper mix of individuals and
units to meet the CinCs' requirements. The Ma-
rine Corps has redesignated its Reserve Marine
air-ground task force as augmentation command
elements (MACE) of the Marine expeditionary
forces (MEFs). Other initiatives include:
tions Provide Promise and Deny Flight. During
1 995, NRF ships also provided more than 1 8 per-
cent of the total ship steaming days dedicated to
counterdnig operations.
The Marine Corps Reserve also was heavily en-
gaged in 1995. More than 500 Reserve Marines
participated in Operation Safe Haven/Sea Signal
at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Marine Corps Re-
serve KC- 1 30s flew Reserve Marine engineers and
security personnel to Albania in support of Op-
eration Uje Kristal. Other Reserve operations in-
cluded exercises in Norway, Thailand, Kuwait and
Korea. Of special note is the upcoming NATO
exercise. Battle Griffin 96 — a predominately
Reserve forces event focused on the Marine Corps
Norway air-landed prepositioning program that
will test and highlight the command and control
capabilities of our reserve forces.
Decentralized control of Active Duty Spe-
cial Work to allow field commanders better
access to Reserve forces.
Installation of the Reserve Information Net-
work to provide a link to the Total Force
Marine Corps and a gateway into the Depart-
ment of Defense information network.
One Team
The Navy and Marine Corps Reserve were inte-
gral parts of Total Force operations during 1995.
Naval reservists contributed to military operations,
both in peacetime support and in crisis response,
with more than 1 .7 million man-days of support.
They deployed as part of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt battle group, flying EA-6B combat mis-
sions in support of operations in Bosnia. They
also augmented fleet hospitals in Zagreb, Croatia
and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Ten Naval Reserve
Fleet (NRF) ships deployed to the western Pacific,
Great Lakes, Northern Europe and South America.
While assigned to NRF ships and maritime patrol
squadrons. Naval reservists participated in Opera-
The shared goal for the Navy and Marine Corps is
to attain a balanced, affordable Total Force, able
to meet peacetime and crisis commitments imme-
diately. This is being accomplished through the
seamless integration of a well trained, well
equipped reserve force.
20
314
V. PEOPLE
The heart of the Department of the Navy's readi-
ness is its people who kept faith with the Navy
and Marine Corps through the rightsizing pro-
cess and who now look to the future. Operating
some of the most technologically advanced
equipment of any force in the world, they must
be ready every day of the year. Maintaining
highly motivated and trained personnel during
these challenging times requires innovative
leadership, diligent planning and careful man-
agement of resources.
Shaping the Force
During 1995, the Navy's active end strength was
reduced from 468,662 to 433,744. This will con-
tinue until the Navy reaches 394,900 active Navy
and 96,000 reservists by 1999. The current force
of 1 74,000 active duty Marines will be maintained.
while reserve end strength is near the authorized
level of 42,000. Department of the Navy civiHan
stafTmg continues to keep pace with overall
rightsizing objectives, with a projected decline
from 240,044 in FY96 to 204,363 in FYOl.
Careful application of Congressionally authorized
force shaping tools has allowed the Navy to ad-
just officer, enlisted and civilian numbers gradu-
ally and fairly. Separation programs have been
fully funded to ensure an orderly transition to ci-
vilian life. The Department has kept faith with
mid-career personnel by avoiding involuntary
separations before retirement eligibility. There is
no longer a need for an enlisted selected early re-
tirement (SER) program and the requirement for
ofTicer SER has been significantly reduced. We
are working to eliminate it.
21
315
We are working closely with the Army and Air
Force to seek permanent grade relief from DoD
Officer Personnel Management Act grade restric-
tions. These restrictions were in place before the
drawdown and rightsizing of the force and prior
to establishment of significant joint field grade re-
quirements mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols
DoD Reorganization Act.
Department of the Navy civilian employees rep-
resent about 25 percent of our total work force
end strength. Although the majority of civilians
contribute directly to the readiness of operational
forces, many others provide essentia! support in
such diverse functions as:
• Training
• Medical care
• Communications
• Morale, welfare and recreation programs
• Research, development, and acquisition of
new platforms and weapon systems
22
V\econi I I lake every effort to minimize the
adverse impact of necessary force reductions on
our civilian employees. Aggressive use of sepa-
ration incentives has diminished the need for
forced reductions.
Recruiting
The primary recruiting challenge is continuing to
attract sufficient numbers of high quality people.
Over the past year. Navy and Marine Corps re-
cruiting commands continued to battle one of the
toughest recruiting climates in the history of the
all volunteer force. The market of eligible young
people, 1 7-21 years old, is one of the smallest in
memory and the propensity to enlist is low. This
has Ijeen aggravated by the policy of some schools
to withhold cooperation from military recruiters.
Additionally, a strong economy has contributed to
a challenging recruiting environment.
In 1995, our recruiting forces met the challenge.
316
We are increasing the resources available to re-
cmiters as we look ahead to 1996 and the task of
bringing in almost 60,000 new Sailors and 40,000
new Marines. To meet these requirements, we will
continue to assign the best people to recruiting
duty and provide them a comparable quality of
life while working in remote locations, far from
the support of military installations. Recruiters
greatly benefited from Congress' FY96 plus-up for
recruiting and advertising and the authorization
for a higher level of special duty assignment pay.
FY95 was also a successfiil year in officer re-
cruiting. We met very late-in-the-year require-
ments for more Navy pilots. Naval Flight Of-
ficers, nurses and doctors — and made signifi-
cant gains in minority representation across all
officer categories. Our Immediate Scholarship
USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) winner of the
1995 Golden Anchor Award for outstanding re-
tention
Decision and NROTC scholarship programs
worked particularly well, as did the Baccalaureate
Degree Completion Program. The Navy's Seaman-
to-Admiral Program and the Marine Corps En-
listed-to-Officer Commissioning Programs pro-
vided broader career opportunities for our most
talented enlisted personnel.
The Navy and Marine Corps are remaining com-
petitive in the recruiting environment by making
innovative use of new systems and technology,
such as advertising on the Internet and creating
CD-ROM multimedia sales presentations. For the
long term, the Department remains committed to
strong and adequately resourced recruiting pro-
grams. Motivated recruiters, adequate budgets
and meaningftil incentive programs, such as the
Montgomery G.I. Bill, the Navy and Marine Corps
college funds and the enlistment bonus programs
are key to continued success. With continued sup-
port and sustained, effective advertising we can
attract the numbers of high quality young men and
women we need.
Retention
As the drawdown and rightsizing of the force nears
its conclusion, we must redouble our efforts to
retain high caliber people. Maintaining adequate
retention levels not only ensures high readiness
levels through retention of highly trained, critical
skill personnel, but also eases the pressure on our
recruiting force by lowering the yearly accession
requirement. We are regaining the ground lost
during rightsizing and have policies in place to
continue the present positive trends in first- and
second-term retention established during the past
two years. In 1995 the Marine Corps met its en-
listed retention goals for first-termers (20.^ per-
cent) and second-termers (73.1 percent). The
Navy also met 1995 goals for first-termers (36.4
percent) and second-termers (49.2 percent).
A number of programs and initiatives presently
under way have a major impact on retention:
• Quality of life enhancements
• Improved advancement opportunities
• Competitive pay and benefits
• Selective reenlistment bonuses remain the
most effective program for short term reten-
tion of highly skilled enlisted personnel
• Protection of retirement benefits for the
vital retention of career personnel
The Navy Goal Card is a new personal manage-
ment tool that also supports our recruiting and re-
23
317
tention efforts. It is a first ever enlisted career path
chart that assists first-term sailors in setting and
achieving personal and professional goals. Avail-
able now on the Internet, the Goal Card continu-
ously updates educational opportunities and pro-
vides information on jobs, training and advance-
ment for anyone thinking of entering or staying in
the Navy.
Enhancing Quality of Life
A comfortable standard of living, positive work
environment and excellent care of femilies are
essential in retaining capable people. The follow-
ing programs and initiatives support these require-
ments:
• Legislative initiatives have been proposed to
authorize quarters allowances for single E-5s on
sea duty. Additional proposals support payment
of Basic Allowance for Quarters/Variable Hous-
ing Allowance to joint military couples (without
dependents) assigned to sea duty as well as single
24
E-6s and above who receive permanent change of
station orders to deployed units.
• Bachelor and family housing continue to be
high priority quality of life issues in the Depart-
ment. We continue working to provide quality
housing for all personnel and their families, look-
ing first at private sector housing and partnerships
with private sector investors. Approval of the new
DoD construction standard for unaccompanied en-
listed personnel housing will significantly improve
the quality of life of our bachelor enlisted person-
nel, but available fiinding will delay attainment of
this standard well into the next century. An ag-
gressive housing referral program provides com-
prehensive listings of available community hous-
ing, to ease the transition of newly transferred
families. The Navy's 'T^eighborhoods of Excel-
lence" program and the Marine Corps "Housing
Campaign Plan" provide long term vision and
goals for bringing housing up to modem standards.
• Chaplains supply around-the-clock ministry
and pastoral presence to deployed units and serve
as linchpins in the personal connection between
sea-service personnel and their families. Chaplain
crisis intervention ministry is crucial in times of
personal loss, bereavement and transition. Their
awareness and prevention programs dealing with
suicide, HIV/AIDS and domestic violence—in
addition to the core values training they provide—
are integral to quality of life and combat readi-
ness.
• The Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps and
Marine Corps Judge Advocates provide extensive
legal support for the sea services. The Navy and
Marine Corps Legal Assistance program- not a
statutory entitlement, but an "as resources are
available" program-continues to emphasize qual-
ity of life programs. In 1 996, a ft'ee Electronic Tax
Filing Program will be available at 90 Navy and
Marine Corps bases and installations worldwide,
enabling quicker tax refunds and significant indi-
vidual savings.
• Voluntary education programs are significant
318
contributors to recruiting, retention and readiness.
They provide continuous access to educational
opportunities even during deployments and assign-
ment to remote or overseas locations. The Navy's
program for afloat college education offers col-
lege courses and academic skills modules to indi-
viduals deployed on ships. Academic skills learn-
ing centers will be available at 52 shore locations
by FYOl. The Marine Corps satellite education
program, located at 14 sites, provides two way
real-time video connection between scattered
classrooms and an instructor, greatly assisting the
pursuit of a college degree, even during a change
of duty stations.
• Family service centers encompass a variety of
important programs, including relocation and tran-
sition assistance, deployment support and personal
financial management. The Navy and Marine
Corps have established a "New Parent" program,
designed to help our younger personnel meet their
family responsibilities.
Effective quality of life programs have quite a posi-
tive impact on our recruiting and retention efforts
and, ultimately, our combat readiness.
Meeting Medical Needs
The Department of the Navy is committed to pro-
viding the highest quality health care to active-
duty and retired service members and their femi-
lies. The Navy Medical Department's primary
mission is readiness. This means keeping people
on the job, at sea and ashore, by providing medi-
cal services close to the operators and by moving
information — instead of patients — whenever
possible. To achieve this, U.S. based and forward
deployed medical department personnel are em-
ploying new and innovative technology and pro-
cedures:
crease in readmess and significant savings in time
and money.
• Fleet Marine Force medical units continue to
pursue solutions in support of the Operational Ma-
neuver From the Sea concept which links maneu-
ver at sea directly with maneuver ashore. The fast
paced action envisioned by this concept requires
more mobile, responsive and lighter medical units.
Medical battalions are addressing these needs
through new initiatives, such as the recently de-
veloped shock trauma platoons. Emerging medi-
cal technologies are analyzed continuously so that
new advances can be incorporated into operational
medicine supporting Marine forces worldwide.
• The Total Health Care Support Readiness Re-
quirement model will ensure that we have the right
number and mix of regular and reserve medical
department personnel to meet our wartime and
day-to-day operational missions. Navy medicine
is a leader within DoD medicine with this new
tool for assessing manpower requirements.
• Advanced technologies such as teleradiology • The Defense Women's Health Research Pro-
and other telemedicine techniques are revolution-
izing quality on-site patient care. This results in
drastic reductions in the number of patients trans-
ported to medical facilities, with a resulting in-
gram addresses emerging health issues that have
surfaced with the expansion of assignment oppor-
tunities for women in shipboard and other opera-
tional billets.
25
319
• We are streamlining procedures and policies
to meet our needs. Policy changes in the aviation
physical examination review process have reduced
backlogs and man-hours without compromising
quality of care. Implementation of system wide
changes in patient appointments is greatly re-
ducing waiting times.
• A new method of providing on-site optical sup-
port to fleet and field units is being tested through
the use of mobile vans outfitted with optical feb-
rication equipment.
We continue to work closely with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and other
Services' surgeons-general to establish TRICARE
regionally managed care support contracts. These
regional contracts will create a seamless medical
system that provides beneficiaries a choice of qual-
ity health care services. As the lead agent in San
Diego, California and Portsmouth, Virginia the
Navy is educating the beneficiary population about
the benefits, choices and responsibilities of
TRICARE Prime enrollment.
The need to keep faith with the armed forces' re-
tired community with regard to medical benefits
requires constant vigilance. The Department of
Defense continues to work for authority to receive
reimbursement fi"om Medicare for health care pro-
vided to those medicare eligibles within the Mili-
tary Health Services System (Medicare
subvention). Congressional approval of Medicare
subvention would allow Medicare eligibles to en-
roll in TRICARE Prime and allow DoD to im-
prove access to medical services to retirees while
providing quality health care at a reasonable cost.
It would also allow Health and Human Services
to control medical spending for Medicare eligible
retirees enrolled in a Health Maintenance Organi-
zation program with costs significantly below the
fee for service care. In the interim. Medicare eli-
gible patients continue to be seen by military treat-
ment facilities on a space available basis.
Equal Opportunity
A key component of the Navy and Marine Corps
26
vision is a totally integrated and diverse team of
regular and reserve personnel, encouraged,
mentored and developed by their peers and lead-
ers to attain their fiill potential through a wide
range of career opportunities and professional
challenges. Attaining this vision requires careftil
attention to all aspects of our plans to ensure eq-
uitable assignment of minorities and women into
all available career fields.
Recent changes have opened many new positions
to women. More than 94 percent of all Navy bil-
lets and 93 percent of all Marine Corps occupa-
tional specialties are now available. Today, the
most senior women in the active-duty military,
enlisted and officer, are Marines . All new Navy
surface ships are now designed to incorporate
berthing for officer and enlisted women includ-
ing the llSS^enfijld (DDG 65), the first U .S. Navy
ship built from the keel up with habitability modi-
fications necessary for full integration of women
into the crew.
A significant equal opporttinity undertaking dur-
ing the past year was the Secretary of the Navy's
"Enhanced Opportunities for Minorities Initia-
320
live," which called for the examination of all as-
pects of recruiting, accessions, promotion, reten-
tion and augmentation. The intent of the initia-
tive is to create a Navy and Marine Corps that re-
flect the demographics of American society. Based
on Census Bureau population forecasts for the year
2005, the Department of the Navy should reflect
1 2 percent African- American, 1 2 percent Hispanic
and five percent Asian Pacific Islander/Native
American (12%/12%/5%) across all ranks, rates
and designators. Attaining this goal will take 20-
25 years, after allowing those accessed under the
new percentages to progress through their full ca-
reers, with lasting effect on the demographics of
the Department of the Nav7. We will increase ac-
cessions each year in order to meet the overarching
goal of 1 2%/l 2%/5''/o minority officer accessions
by the year 2000. Our FY96 goal exceeds minor-
ity representation within the most recent class of
college graduates.
Safety
Operational safety and survivability initiatives in
training and actual combat not only save lives, but
reduce losses to the fleet and the Fleet Marine
Force. Shipboard damage control and firefighting
upgrades have steadily reduced losses over the past
ten years. These efforts decreased dollar losses in
both surface and subsurface mishaps from S93
million in FY90 to less than $21 million m FY94.
In aviation, emerging technologies from commer-
cial aviation and other military sources are being
assessed in demonstrations at several locations.
Even in our best year ever for modem aviation
safety, any loss is unacceptable. Each mishap is
investigated thoroughly for information that will
prevent repeated mishaps from the same cause.
Early in 1995, flight recorders were being retro-
fitted into many naval combat aircraft. This will
provide vital information to ftirther reduce losses.
Other technologies that hold promise for reduc-
ing operational losses are being assessed and
implemented in fleet aircraft. This is an ongoing,
high priority effort for the Safety and Survivabil-
ity "Reinvention" Lab.
The Navy Occupational Safety and Health pro-
gram focuses on protecting military and civilian
personnel in their workplaces. It is essential to
military readiness that safety and occupational
health goals and objectives be integrated into the
Department of the Navy's mission at every level.
To achieve this, the program has published a stra-
tegic plan that focuses on four main initiatives in
the strategic plan;
• Process review and measurement
• Communication and information systems
• Planning and engineering
• Training and education
Through these initiatives, the Department contin-
ues to emphasize personnel safety and health
awareness. We are targeting high risk^high haz-
ard operations afloat by developing new training
and awareness videos that discuss safety and health
issues.
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321
VI. READINESS
Today, Navy and Marine Corps readiness is high,
but there remains concern for the fiiture. Readi-
ness is key to forward presence, crisis response,
war prevention and winning wars. It remains a
top priority. A smaller force structure demands
that we maintain technological superiority over
potential adversaries. Retaining that superiority
means recruiting and retaining quality people, and
providing them with the finest equipment possible.
We must make the correct decisions now to sup-
port both current readiness and future capabili-
ties.
The Navy and Marine Corps require fewer supple-
COSTSAND CONTRIBUTIONS TO
CONTINGENCY OPS
mental contingency funds than the other Services
because most naval crisis response capability is in-
herent within routine forward deployments. Such
operations are included in the "sticker price" of na-
val forces. Nevertheless, our operating budget leaves
little room to support unfunded contingencies that
require us to deploy additional ships, squadrons and
Marines. Unplanned deployments often cause re-
ductions in other accounts, which affect current readi-
ness. The Navy and Marine Corps Active and Re-
serve Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appro-
priations bear the burden of supporting unfunded con-
tingencies. Diverting programmed O&M fiinds de-
lays vital equipment repairs and also disrupts qual-
ity training. These disruptions to approved programs
can be minimized when supplemental appropriations
are passed in a timely manner
Future Readiness
Future readiness can be answered by sizing the
force correctly. A force that is too small for its
operational commitments burdens both people
and equipment. As rightsizing slows and infra-
structure stabilizes, maintaining readiness to sup-
port national security interests requires close scru-
tiny. Heavy demands on forces this year indicate
that previously programmed force levels require
adjustment to meet the tempo of operations actu-
ally being experienced. We need to make these
adjustments to avoid excessive impact on people,
equipment and readiness.
Force sizing is only part of the readiness equa-
tion. Future readiness requires investing now in
the programs of the future. Both the Navy and
Marine Corps seek increases in procurement and
R&D accounts to ensure future readiness. Replac-
ing aging platforms such as CH-46 medium-lift
helicopters and LPD-4 Class amphibious ships in
the near term, and investment in next generation
platforms and systems such as the 21st Century
surface combatant (SC-21) and the Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) aircraft in the long term, are essen-
tial for that to occur
2S
322
Replacement of an aging platform, like the CH-46 and investment for next generation platforms,
like the Joint Strike Fighter, are key to future readiness
Impact of Environmental Protection on Opera-
tions, Training and Testing
The Department's environmental programs are de-
signed to ensure a ready, cost effective and environ-
mentally conscious force. This includes conplying
with all applicable environmental laws and regula-
tions and protecting natural resources . In order to
meet this challenge, the Department has developed
a long term environmental strategy that is being in-
tegrated into everyday business practices and opera-
tions.
Some environmental requirements have caused
significant delays and additional expense. For ex-
ample, the ship shock trial of the USS John Paul
Jones (DDG 53), scheduled to occur off the coast
of Califomia, was delayed for approximately 30
days by litigation that questioned compliance with
envirorunental rules. In another example, older
regulations designed to protect against contami-
nation from liquid polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) in transformers and capacitors now affect
the ability to dispose of decommissioned ships.
New proposed PCB regulations could increase
costs and delays for ship maintenance and dis-
posal.
The expansion of the Humpback Whale Sanctu-
ary in the Hawaiian Islands required extensive high
level coordination to ensure that routine Navy and
Marine Corps operations around Oahu and test-
ing and development of systems at Barking Sands
could continue. Regulations established for a
marine sanctuary off the Northwest Pacific coast
of the United States drastically reduced close-in
bombing practice in a long used training area. New
regulations intended to preclude harassment of
marine mammals are the subject of ongoing dis-
cussions, between the Department of the Navy and
the National Marine Fisheries Service, to ensure
that costs and procedures associated with routine
and special exercise operations do not significantly
increase.
The Department is working hard to ensure that
laws and regulations are sensitive to the require-
ment to maintain a ready and effective national
defense and, equally, that naval operations mini-
mize adverse effects on valuable national and glo-
bal resources. When we do our job well, both
military readiness and the environment are pro-
tected.
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323
Vn. TECHNOLOGY. . .INNOVATION AND MODERNIZATION
Acquisition Investment
The maiden flight of the F/A-18E
Events of the past year clearly demonstrate that
we live in an uncertain world that requires naval
forces to meet a wide range of contingencies.
Through a combination of innovation and mod-
ernization we are building and maintaining naval
forces that are ready to meet those contingencies.
We are exploiting the explosive changes occur-
ring in high technology, to conceive and build new
and more capable platforms and weapon systems
for the future.
Modernization
Economic conditions dictate that we take advan-
tage of emerging technologies to breathe new life
into some of our older systems and platforms or
tie together disparate systems to synergize the
whole. Capability upgrades to current ships, na-
val tactical aircraft and various weapon systems
all are critical parts of the modernization program.
Continued upgrades of our ultra high frequency
super high frequency, extremely high frequency,
and commercial satellite communications capa-
bility are necessary to enhance the support and
integration of joint/combined operations. The Co-
operative Engagement Capability, successfully
demonstrated last year, provides the opportunity
to tie an entire theater of currently existing sys-
tems together for targeting. Funding these mod-
ernization programs provides a tremendous boost
to capabilities at a lower cost.
We are investing today in the platforms, equip-
ment and infrastructure for future naval forces.
Tomorrow's naval force will be smaller than its
Cold War predecessor but much more advanced
technologically. The Department's acquisition
investment strategy makes the most of scarce pro-
curement dollars without compromising quality.
It also emphasizes that future programs must pro-
duce survivable multimission platforms and
weapon systems — true force multipliers — ca-
pable of meeting a great variety of mission require-
ments.
This strategy involves prudent risk. Many of the
platforms and weapon systems in the fleet today
were procured during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Lower Post-Cold War force level requirements
allowed retirement of older and less capable plat-
forms and we^wn systems, leaving us with a plat-
form average age that is actually lower than it was
when annual procurement budgets were much
higher Based upon current production rates, how-
ever, average age will steadily increase. Current
programs such as the USS Arieigh Burke (DDG
51) - class destroyer, the Osprey (MV-22) tilt-ro-
tor aircraft, ^ Super Hornet fig^itet/attack aircraft
(F/A-18E/F) and the advanced amphibious assault
vehicle (AAAV) will help to ameliorate this ef-
fect and are critical parts of Navy and Marine
Corps future readiness.
To support long term acquisition, we plan to in-
crease procurement accounts. Resources for this
must come from four areas:
• Cost reductions from acquisition reform
• Execution of base realignment and closure
recommendations and infrastructure reduction
decisions
• Actions to reduce the operating and support
costs of our systems
• Outyear real budget growth
30
324
The FY97 budget request represents the continu-
ation of a carefully constructed acquisition invest-
ment plan. It extends the modernization strategy
through an integrated program approach.
Acquisition Leadership
Within the acquisition community, the Department
is embarking on a bold new initiative in the Naval
Research, Development and Acquisition organi-
zation. Built along the principles of Total Quality
Leadership, the combined Navy and Marine Corps
acquisition team leadership is focusing on improv-
ing the planning and processes for developing,
acquiring and supporting the products and services
provided to naval forces.
The Department is dedicated to using a team ap-
proach, built on trust and a true partnership with
industry, the other Services and allies to define
cost effective warfighting options for the ftiture.
We plan to be flexible and adaptive, committed to
transforming ourselves and the products we pro-
vide to meet the challenges of an affordable Navy
and Marine Corps of the ftiture. In the coming
year, the Department will publish a strategic plan
that lays out our vision, mission and guiding prin-
ciples and identifies goals and objectives.
This is a period of significant organizational change.
Plans are well under way to geographically disperse
the majority of the program managers, program ex-
ecutive officers and systems commands fhim Arling-
ton, Virginia to Patuxent River, Maryland;
Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania and San Diego,
California. The Department is committed to con-
tinue delivery of the very best products and ser-
vices by learning new ways to communicate, ex-
change information, manage and lead.
Business Strategy
The Department also recognizes the need to con-
tinue improving business practices by finding ad-
ditional ways to reduce costs and make the acqui-
sition process more responsive to rapidly chang-
ing technology. Acquisition reform initiatives
support modernization programs by addressing
three key areas:
• Advanced technology insertion
• Cost reduction
• Avoidance of platform obsolescence
In several critical areas, technological advances
in the commercial sector outpace those in the de-
fense sector. This is particularly true with infor-
mation and communications systems. The De-
partment is taking advantage of commercially
developed advanced technologies by incorporat-
ing them into our acquisition programs earlier.
Cooperative Engagement Capability is a good
example — more than 60 percent of this program
involves commercial off-the-shelf and non-devel-
opmental technology, which integrates and shares
real time detection data from a variety of sources,
including ships' sensors and units ashore.
Modem business practices were the focus of a
Department of the Navy CEO Conference that
took place in Norfolk, Virginia in November 1 995 .
This conference was the first in an annual series
intended to foster dialogue between the Depart-
ment of the Navy and its supporting industrial
base. The first conference was co-chaired by the
DoN Acquisition Reform Executive and the presi-
dent of a major defense contractor. This coopera-
tive effort will improve acquisition efficiency as
well as day-to-day operations.
Enhanced warfighting results from technology
insertion. Closer ties are being developed between
the science and technology community and the
operators to establish realistic acquisition program
priorities based on warfighting needs, technologi-
cal attainability and realistic life cycle affordability.
The Navy and Marine Corps also are increasing
effectiveness and extending the life of existing
systems through affordable near term improve-
ments such as upgrades to the Marine Corps UH-
IN Utility and AH-1 W Attack helicopters and to
the Navy's P-3C maritime patrol aircraft and SH-
60 helicopters. Science and technology roadmaps
are being developed to outline critical path devel-
31
325
opments, risk reduction for advanced system per-
formance achievement and basic and applied re-
search in the production of new systems. Navy
and Marine Corps programs benefit from increased
attention to manufacturing science and technol-
ogy. Specific examples include focused attention
in advanced composite structures for integrated
hull and systems designs, production of multifunc-
tional integrated systems, agile ship construction
integrated into advanced design procedures and
simulation capabilities for systems performance
and production.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS), international co-
operative programs and defense industry-to- indus-
try cooperation with other nations provide ways
to stretch the investment budget by minimizing
duplicative defense technology investments and
maximizing commonality of deployed equip-
ments. Cooperative research and development
agreements with friends and allies, such as those
supporting the development of the anti-air Sea
Sparrow missile and the AV-8B Harrier aircraft,
yielded foreign contributions of over $250 mil-
lion in CY95 and $1 .2 billion over the past nine
years. FMS initiatives, such as sales of F/A-18
aircraft and Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles,
support U.S. foreign pobcy, enhance interoperability
and reduce Navy and Marine Corps production
costs by combining procurement requirements
with purchases by other nations.
Today's platforms are more expensive, but they
are also significantly more capable and reliable.
Since ships have long service lives, they are de-
signed to accommodate future upgrades. Exist-
ing platforms are being modernized with weapon
systems to allow future growth and technology
refi^shment. To this end, extensive use is being
made of open systems architecture, commercial
standards, modular components and fiber optics.
Institutionalizing Innovation
The Navy and Marine Corps have only begun to
exploit the possibilities offered by digital conunu-
nications, miniaturization, precision guidance and
a host of other technologies. But ultimately
people, not machines, define successes in war.
In addition to pursuing integration of technolo-
gies that are here today but not yet on-hand, the
Department is also exploring innovative new or-
ganizational and doctrinal concepts that are ap-
propriate to the mission.
• Taking advantage of explosive changes in tech-
nology requires the means by which this exploi-
tation can occur. Last year, a CNO Executive
Panel (CEP) task force recommended that the
Navy initiate a formal process to conceive, eval-
uate and rapidly exploit major opportunities for
innovation in naval warfare. The aim of this pro-
cess is to explore new and innovative concepts,
operations, organizations and emerging technolo-
gies that could provide major advantages to U.S.
and combined forces in addressing future war-
fare needs. The CNO founded a strong and inde-
pendent concept generation organization by en-
gaging personnel and resources from the Strate-
gic Studies Group, CNO Executive Panel, Naval
War College, Naval E)octrine Command, Naval
Postgraduate School and the Office of Naval Re-
search.
• The Commandant's Warfighting Laboratory
(CWL) was recently established as the centerpiece
of operational reform for the Marine Corps. The
mission of CWL is to ensure that emerging tech-
nologies, with application for both the naval ser-
vices and the individual Marine, are brought into
service expeditiously and effectively. This labo-
ratory will be the cradle and test bed for the de-
velopment of new warfighting concepts and the
integration of new technologies.
"A key objective . . .is to encourage — to
demand — creativity and innovation. "
Gen C.C. Krulak, USMC
CMC
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326
• Sea Dragon is the methcxl through which the
Marine Corps will seek to shape naval expedition-
ary warfare for the next century. Sea Dragon is a
process through which innovative organizational
concepts and operational techniques, incorporat-
ing the full range of available technologies, are
subjected to rigorous testing and validation. This
effort has far reaching potential for both the Navy
and Marine Corps. Working together, we will en-
sure that we are prepared for the 21st Century.
.OR/4
Training Innovation
U.S. naval forces are the best trained in the world.
To maintain that advantage in the current fiscal
environment of reduced personnel and force struc-
ture, we are adopting innovative ways of apply-
ing new technology into naval training programs.
• Embedded training systems with advanced tac-
tical simulation capability are being developed to
allow our personnel to safely and inexpensively
train on their own equipment at sea and in port as
part of individual and unit training. New technolo-
gies will also allow reduced ammunition expen-
ditures through simulators such as the Indoor
Simulated Marksmanship Trainer.
• Automated electronic classrooms, interactive
courseware and computer based training are mak-
ing available from personal computers an infinite
network of experts, electronic textbooks, case stud-
ies and technical manuals. Eariy results show that
these new technologies significantly reduce train-
ing time and improve test scores. Accordingly, they
are being expanded to include specialized skill
training courses with large numbers of students.
• "Distance learning" through video teleconfer-
encing provides training to deployed forces and
Technological advances will allow Navy and
Marine Corps personnel to gain realistic train-
ing on their own equipment
eliminates travel costs associated with shore train-
ing at distant locations.
Fruits of Modeling and Simulation
Major strides have been made in the area of mod-
eling and simulation (M&S). Both the Navy and
Marine Corps management offices are actively
promoting the evolution and application of ad-
vanced computing hardware and software devel-
opment in operational planning and execution sup-
port, requirements assessment analysis and train-
ing functions. In accordance with the 1995 De-
fense Planning Guidance, the Department is pur-
suing simulations, simulators and advanced train-
ing devices and technologies to enhance the ac-
quisition process and increase operational and
training effectiveness.
The Joint Simulation System (JSIMS) will incor-
porate all the missions of all the Services within a
common framework that supports live, virtual and
constructive M&S capabilities and will eventually
include acquisition support and analysis. The
Naval Simulation System is working to provide
simulation support for operational planning, ex-
ercises and war games as well as acquisition as-
sessment and force structure analysis. The Navy's
Battle Force Tactical Training (BFTT) system,
which will achieve initial operational capability
in FY97, will link more than 140 ships and 10
33
327
shore sites with a simulation capability, ^cilitating
training from the individual to the joint task force
level. Additionally, BFTT technology will provide
the basis for the maritime component of JSIMS.
The Marine Corps is an active participant in joint
and DoD development and implementation of
M&S technologies that will enhance training
(JSIMS), operational readiness (mission planning
devices), acquisition (Joint Warfare System) and
analysis (Joint M&S System). The Marine Corps
Emerald series of M&S demonstrations (for in-
strumentation, distributed learning, simulation
networking and analytical model development) is
providing a proof of concept of viable, emerging
technologies. These real-time demonstrations are
providing the warfighter with a hands-on sampling
of the capabilities being developed. The Emer-
ald demonstrations complement the development
of programmatic initiatives that identify the in-
vestment required to implement the Marine Corps
future joint and interoperable M&S vision.
A particularly promising use of modeling and
simulation is in acquisition. The Department is
expanding the use of M&S early in the develop-
ment of new technology as a partial substitute for
the "hard" prototypes of the past. Use of M&S
holds the promise of revolutionizing the DoN ac-
quisition process through distributed, simulation
based acquisition to produce superior systems
while reducing cost and cycle time.
New Developments
The Navy and Marine Corps are pursuing new
developments that are not only evolutionary but
revolutionary. New technology has received the
most attention, but development of innovative con-
cepts for using this technology is equally impor-
tant. This applies not only to operations but to
training and preparing forces as well.
Copernicus Forward: The Navy and Marine
Corps are expanding the Copernicus blueprint by
developing a true sensor-to-shooter architecture.
As a modem command and control (C2) capabil-
ity, it provides the naval foundation for joint and
combined interoperability. Copernicus Forward
extends the C4I architecture to include all mobile
and fixed forces in the battlespace. It focuses on
four areas:
• The connectivity embodied in the Joint Mari-
time Communications (JMCOMS) initiative
which includes dynamic bandwidth manage-
ment
• The common tactical picture provided by the
Joint Maritime Command Information System
(JMCIS)
• The sensor-to-shooter capability resulting
from C41 and combat direction system inte-
gration
• Information Warfare where the information
system itself becomes a powerful weapon for
use in future warfare
The Copernicus Forward architecture is a continu-
ally evolving system that adapts new technologies
and capabilities to fully support the warfighter.
Arsenal Ship: The Navy and Marine Corps, in
coordination with the Army and the Air Force, are
exploring new ways to maximize naval firepower
from the sea to support and impact the land cam-
paign to a much greater degree than ever before.
Bom out of the theater commander's requirement
for greater on-scene strike capability, the arsenal
ship concept focuses on large numbers of afford-
able, precision weapons in a platform with drasti-
cally reduced manning requirements and overall
cost. The arsenal ship is envisioned to be a large,
mobile magazine with a simplified receive-only
combat system capable of delivering on demand
any of the vertically launched missiles in the DoD
inventory.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC):
The increased complexity of emerging threats in
the air defense arena makes it necessary to link all
available sea, air and land based sensors with all
potential firing platforms. CEC harnesses the tech-
nology that allows each firing unit to make use of
34
328
An artist's concept of an arsenal ship
real time sensor data from the most capable avail-
able systems. CEC was operationally tested in
1995. In one test during the deployment of the
I ]SS Eisenhower (CVN 69) battlegroup, the CEC
air picture, composed of real world composite air
tracks and synthetic ballistic missile tracks, was
relayed to an Army Patriot site 800 miles away.
The Army and Air Force are beginning compre-
hensive studies on the potential applications of
CEC in their systems. In 1996, all four services
will participate in an exercise in which CEC will
allow the first ever engagement of an air target
beyond the firing unit's radar horizon.
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force:
Responding to the increasing threat of ftiture bio-
logical or chemical incidents, the Marine Corps is
developing a capability to meet this threat. Using
the latest technology in chemical/biological de-
tection and decontamination, this new force con-
cept is being designed to evolve as ftiture threats
in this area are more clearly understood and new
systems are developed. The Commandant's
Warfighting Lab will soon announce the initial
operating capability date for the first Chemical/
Biological Incident Response Force.
Surface Combatant of the 21st Century (SC-
21): The Surface Combatant Force Level and
Force Architecture Studies are providing analyti-
cal input to the ongoing SC-21 cost and opera-
tional effectiveness analysis (COEA). This COEA
is examining mission requirements and altema-
tive approaches to replacing ships nearing the end
of their service lives early in the 2 1 st Century. De-
signed to be highly survivable with full joint
interoperability, SC-2 1 will support the land cam-
paign as well as perform the traditional roles of
surface combatants. Initial indications point to a
family of ships with time phased introduction of
emerging technologies and tailored capabilities.
Integrated information distribution through an
open computer architecture combined with ad-
vanced equipment modularity and automation will
greatly reduce manpower and life cycle costs.
35
329
Vin. EFFICENCY
Efficiency Through Innovation
In conjunction with the National Performance
Review (NPR), recontmendations from the Com-
mission on Roles and Missions of the Armed
Forces and other related activities, the Department
of the Navy continues to pursue innovative ideas
to increase our efficiency. We are learning a great
deal from private industry and have undertaken
several major initiatives, including delegation of
waiver authority, designation of reinvention labo-
ratories, reduction of cycle time, acquisition re-
form and initial implementation of the Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act.
The waiver authority delegation initiative elimi-
nates unnecessary and burdensome restrictions on
operational commands. Capping a year of re-
search, test and evaluation, all DoN Reinvention
Laboratories (17 Navy and 10 Marine Corps in-
stallations and commands) are now authorized to
waive policies and regulations standing in the way
of innovation, breakthroughs and successes.
The cycle-time reduction initiative is creating
shorter turn around times on all processes, thereby
contributing to improved readiness. As part of
NPR streamlining initiatives, the Department iden-
tified 25 candidate areas within which to create
more efficient cycle times. These areas cover the
budget process, acquisition management, test and
evaluation, maintenance, training and general ad-
ministration.
Acquisition reform produces significant cost re-
duction in the procurement of major weapon sys-
tems. A special Acquisition Reform Office was
established within the Department of the Navy to
help focus on structuring executable programs in
the face of declining resources. With an antici-
pated three year charter, its intent is to encourage
and facilitate exemplary business practices in such
areas as joint government/commercial ventures,
procurement streamlining and acquisition woiic-
force training.
36
Cultural change, training and education are keys
to the sustained improvement and long term suc-
cess of acquisition reform. To achieve these aims,
the Department has established an acquisition pro-
fessional community of highly skilled Navy, Ma-
rine Corps and civilian personnel. The high qual-
ity of our career personnel is maintained through
enhanced certification requirements, up-to-date
training, increased educational opportunities and
an improved intern program.
Looking inward for additional efficiencies, the
Marine Corps created an "Enterprise ModeI"of its
key activities, fianctions and processes to improve
the interfaces between Headquarters, the Marine
Corps Combat Development Command and the
Marine Corps Systems Command, as well as ex-
ternal interfaces between the Marine Corps and
other Services and agencies. Using the Business
Process Reengineering Methodology under the
DoD Corporate Information Management Initia-
tive, these efforts are achieving efficiencies
through the realignment of naval activities as di-
rected or recommended by the National Perfor-
mance Review/Defense Performance Review,
Base Realignment and Closure Commission and
the Commission on Roles and Missions of the
Armed Forces. The result will be a Marine Corps
positioned to meet the many challenges of the 2 1 st
Century.
All these initiatives seek to reengineer key man-
agement processes, so the nation will receive the
best return for invested defense dollars. The
Department's overall objective is to provide high
quality, cost effective, combat ready forces.
Operational Fleet Reorganization
The dramatic emphasis on operational reorgani-
zation in 1 995 has brought to a peak the efficiency
of time spent at sea and eliminated non-mission
essential training. These initiatives reduced the
amount of time our men and women spend away
from homeport between deployments and en-
330
hanced our ability to meet emerging operational
commitments worldwide.
Last year, the Navy recommissioned the U.S. Fifth
Fleet in the Southwest Asia area of responsibility.
The recommissioning symbolized strong U.S.
commitment to the region and enhanced
interoperability with local naval forces. Imple-
mentation required no additional personnel. The
existing staff assigned to Commander, U.S. Na-
val Forces Central Command will also serve as
the Fifth Fleet staff.
To make more efficient use of smaller naval forces
and enhance presence in the Westem Hemisphere,
the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet estab-
lished the Westem Hemisphere Group. This force
will focus on naval operations throughout the Car-
ibbean Sea and South America. It will fulfill re-
gional presence requirements, mcluding UNITAS,
Caribbean basin security, bilateral/multilateral
training, cooperation with Latin American countries,
humanitarian contingencies and countemarcotic op-
erations. Establishing the Westem Hemisphere
Group will reduce costs and personnel operating
tempo by allowing the rest of the fleet to focus spe-
cifically on operations in the Mediterranean, West-
em Pacific and Indian Ocean.
During 1995, all Atlantic and Pacific Fleet com-
batants were organized into twelve core battle
groups, each comprised of one carrier, two cruis-
ers, or one of nine Atlantic or eight Pacific de-
stroyer squadrons. After joining their core battle
groups in the intermediate predeployment train-
ing phase, the destroyer squadrons will remain
with them throughout the deployment cycle.
Training, operating and deploying together will
ensure a fiilly integrated fighting unit.
Acquisition Reform Success Stories
The Department of the Navy is committed to main-
taining U.S. military superiority at reduced cost,
and with increased responsiveness to the opera-
tors. The Navy Acquisition Reform program, led
by the Navy Acquisition Reform Senior Oversight
Council, is achieving that goal. The Navy's for-
ward looking strategy explores applications of
innovative practices to accomplish cost and time
reductions in the defense acquisition process and
works to attain a culture that will ensure that these
practices flourish.
The Navy's bold approach is already accruing re-
sults. The New Attack Submarine Open Systems
Architecture (OSA) Demonstration Project pro-
moted early industrial partnership and involvement
in Commercial Off-the-Shelf/OSA. This program
received the 1 994 Buying Our Spares Smart Award
as the top federal government project in planning
and migration to reduced development time and
procurement cost. Another example is the F/A-
1 8E/F Super Hornet Program which, as a result
of acquisition reforms, rolled out the first aircraft
in September, 1995: ahead of schedule, under
weight and on budget.
In FY95 the first fiiiits were seen ft-om an acquisi-
tion strategy adopted in 1993 for Marine Air-
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) C4I systems. The
Marine Corps Tactical System Support Activity
created the first version of the MAGTF C4I Soft-
ware Baseline (MCSB). This software provides
the fianctionality required to support the three key
Marine Corps C41 programs:
• Tactical Combat Operations
• Intelligence Analysis System
• Improved Direct Air Support System
The MCSB derives most of its capabilities from
the Global Command and Control System (GCCS)
Common Operating Environment (COE) and re-
duces software lines of code being supported by
the Marine Corps by 83 percent. This will achieve
the goal of seamless interoperability with joint
37
331
forces in any theater of operations by having the
identical software. A management structure has
been established to manage acquisition of MAGTF
C41 systems as they migrate to the GCCS COE.
All MAGTF C41 acquisition programs under cog-
nizance of the Marine Corps Systems Command
are now consolidated under the Director, C41. This
consolidated approach, coupled with defining
technical, operational and system architecture as
part of the requirements definition process, will
simplify coordination and greatly improve the ac-
quisition process.
Challenge Athena is another acquisition success
story under the Copernicus aegis. The system
merges commercial off-the-shelf communication
technologies into a communications architecture
never before employed at sea. Initially installed
in the USS George Washington (CVTM 73), it per-
mits real-time telephone communications for
battle group leaders and can save thousands of
dollars in medical evacuation costs through data
transfer and video conferencing between the ship's
medical personnel and medical facilities ashore
to provide timely, accurate diagnoses. Perhaps
most important, is the improved morale of
crewmembers who now have the means of mak-
ing inexpensive personal calls while at sea. Chal-
lenge Athena provides full duplex commercial sat-
ellite throughput to warfighters afloat. It also al-
lows shipboard communicators to allocate band-
width and channel assignments to fit mission pn-
orities.
Under the Navy's AN/ARC-21 0(V) radio program,
the acquisition strategy was restructured to re-
semble more closely a commercial business based
procurement. This strategy allowed the Navy to
reduce system cost by 1 8 percent while managing
the risk far more effectively through the use of
detailed and highly specific performance based
contract and warranty provisions. The AN/SQS-
53A EC-16, which replaced the AN/SQS-53A
sonar subsystems with rugged modem commer-
cial electronics, provided major savings. This
aggressive program will reduce life cycle cost by
more than $100 million while also reducing sys-
tem weight, man-year requirements, spares re-
38
quirements and operational downtime. This pro-
gram received Vice President Gore's 1995 "He-
roes of Reinvention Hammer Award."
The Navy's Trident II (D-5) missile program also
benefited significantly from acquisition reform
measures. Under the Trident II Propulsion Con-
solidation Program, successfully undertaken in
1995, production of D-5 missile first, second, and
third stage boost motors was consolidated from
two suppliers to one. Without the savings gener-
ated by this initiative, the Navy's ability to pro-
cure an affordable missile at unprecedented low
annual rates — without compromising product
performance, reliability or safety — would have
been severely inhibited.
The Smart Ship Project is examining reduced
manning initiatives for application on existing and
future ships. By combining available technology,
such as "gold disk" electronic troubleshooting,
with changes to shipboard manning policies, the
project will reduce the workload to allow a smaller
crew size. The Smart Ship Project is reviewing
and selecting proposals fi^om industry, academia
and government which will be tested aboard the
Aegis-equipped cruiser USS Yorktown (CG 48).
The lessons learned fi"om the tests can then be ap-
plied to current and future ships to reduce ship
life cycle costs.
STREAMLINING SHORE
INFRASTRUCTURE
Base Realignment and Closure Strategy
With the Congressional approval of Base Realign-
ment and Closure (BRAC-95), we now can focus
all our BRAC -related efforts on implementing the
plan. BRAC-95 identified 36 bases/activities for
closure and 6 for realignment, bringing the grand
total for all four rounds of BRAC to 135 bases/
activities for closure and 44 for realignment. To
date, 79 closure/realignment actions have been
completed. The Department of the Navy is re-
doubling efforts to implement BRAC actions and
experience the savings that will become available
332
through the remaining closures and realignments.
The prompt and efficient closure of excess shore
infrastructure will generate savings of approxi-
mately $10.2 billion over the next six years that
can be applied to modernizing naval forces and
supporting infrastrricture. Investment now in
these efforts is critical to ensure the savings from
BRAC implementation are realized quickly and
the remaining infrastructure is correctly aligned
with future force structure.
Toward that end, $2.5 billion was appropriated
in FY96 and $1 .5 billion is requested for FY97.
FY96 will be the largest and most costly year for
BRAC implementation, with costs projected to
decline progressively through FYOl when all
BRAC actions must be completed. Efforts
through FY96 are expected to yield $2.0 billion
in savings in FY97 alone, and build through the
end of the century. Repetition of the earlier expe-
rience of underfimded appropriations in support
of BRAC will hinder our ability to execute an
aggressive program and will have the compound-
ing effect of reducing anticipated savings and cre-
ating a bow wave of future BRAC implementa-
tion costs.
As a key part of the base closure process, the De-
partment intends to ensure a smooth and efficient
turnover of the facilities to the communities that
hosted forces for so many years. We are sensi-
tive to the varying needs and desires of those com-
munities and only by working with them indi-
vidually can we ensure that we meet their expec-
tations. Building on base closure successes at
locations such as Mobile, Alabama and Glenview,
Illinois will ensure that the conversion and rede-
velopment of bases is accomplished with the host
communities in mind.
Post-Base Closure Strategy
Beyond the significant savings to be attained
through closure and realignment of bases, addi-
tional efficiencies are targeted in operation of the
remaining bases. The key to this is the compre-
hensive int^ration of shore requirements with
new business practices and improved organiza-
tional approaches. Shore infrastructure require-
ments have been carefully analyzed to ensure that
remaining shore capacity is used to best support
current and projected force structure.
The Navy's approach to shore management has
been realigned in a manner similar to project man-
agement for platforms and weapon systems. Life
cycle costs and alternative methods of service de-
livery are considered in every infrastmcture plan.
Private sector provision of common support ser-
vices ashore is the preferred alternative, with in-
vestment in new fecilities and upgrading of aging
infrastructure reserved for those fecilities deter-
mined to be critical to the direct support of our
ships, aircraft, organizations and personnel.
Specific initiatives to implement this strategy for
shore infrastructure after base closures include:
• Streamlining Echelon II installation manage-
ment responsibilities by reducing overhead
• Organizational restructuring for both contract
and in-house common support services on a
regional basis in areas of fleet concentrations
such as San Diego, California; Norfolk, Vir-
ginia and Jacksonville, Florida
• Consolidating or eliminating excess and re-
dundant capacity for functions being per-
formed by multiple tenant commands in one
geographic region
• Aggressive pursuit of public and private part-
nerships and other innovative solutions to
provide services formerly provided in-house
Regional Maintenance Strategy
The Navy is streamlining its ashore maintenance
infrastructure through a combination of process
improvement, infrastructure reduction and con-
solidation. Announced in March 1994, this ini-
tiative is intended to reduce edacity and capabil-
ity while protecting responsiveness. It will inte-
grate maintenance with supply and reinforce posi-
39
333
live technical control. Advances in automated in-
formation systems, the relatively low price of
transportation and the high price of labor make
this strategy both desirable and possible.
In keeping with BRAC, the Navy is making best
use of its repair shops and workforce (military and
civilian) by sizing its repair activities to keep a
level work load and sending overflow work to the
private sector. Consolidations are occurring across
platform programs and intermediate level (versus
depot \eve\) funding constraints are being reduced
wherever it makes sense.
Process improvement savings are expected from
reduced rework, elimination of redundant plan-
ning and engineering at different locations, con-
tinued use of the Reserve Force and reduction of
E)efense Business Operating Fund losses. In an-
ticipation of the these savings, $1 .28 billion was
removed from Navy's maintenance accounts
across the FYDP starting with FY95. Additional
savings generated as a result of continued process
improvements will be available for force modern-
ization.
Regional maintenance is being accomplished in
three parts:
• Parts I and II commenced 1 October 1 995, with
emphasis on int^rating intermediate and de-
pot level maintenance and full regionalization
of maintenance in the Mid-Atlantic and North-
west regions (our most demanding cases). The
other six regions will follow.
• Part III will establish an integrated approach
to maintenance to connect the customer with
a single responsible and accessible provider.
Completion of this initiative is expected to
occur after the turn of the century.
Environmental Stewardship
The Department has begun a comprehensive re-
view of the environmental planning process, to
ensure that environmental protection consider-
ations are analyzed early in the planning process
for military operations and the acquisition process
for weapons, platforms and facilities. Pollution
prevention is a key element for both shore instal-
lations and vessels. The Navy and Marine Corps
have institutionalized a major hazardous materials
control program at shore installations that will
minimize and carefully control the use of hazard-
ous materials. After a successful prototyping in
1 993, this program has been targeted for 1 75 shore
installations by the end of 1998. Lessons learned
are being shared through a pollution prevention
opportunities guide.
Last year, we introduced the concept of the envi-
ronmentally sound ship. This year, the concept
moved a step closer to reality with the passage of
an amendment to the Clean Water Act, which al-
lows the Navy to develop cost effective, practical
technologies for controlling waste water dis-
charges from vessels. Woriung closely with fed-
eral agencies, states, the Congress and marine-
protection interest groups, we have proposed the
authorization of uniform national discharge stan-
dards for military vessels. Over the next several
years, the Navy plans to work with these same
stockholders to identify vessel discharges warrant-
ing control and then establish practicable discharge
guidelines through the regulatory process.
The Navy is presently analyzing alternatives to
manage solid waste at sea effectively. As required
by law, the Navy will report to Congress on the
status of compliance with the Act to Prevent Pol-
lution from Ships. The combination of plans for
liquid discharges and solid waste management,
along with the ongoing shipboard hazardous ma-
terials control program, will establish the U.S.
Navy as a leader in pollution prevention among
the worid's navies.
40
334
IX. PROGRAMS
Programming for the Force
The Department of the Navy budget reflects the
priorities established in the Defense Planning
Guidance. The emphasis in this second year of
the FY96/97 Biennial Budget remains unchanged
from the first:
• Preservation of near-term readiness
• Protection of quality of life enhancements
• Commitment to increased efficiency in our in-
frastructure and other resources
• Continued emphasis on near-term moderniza-
tion and the research, development and acqui-
sition of future platforms and weapon systems.
the world is as survivable while simultaneously
possessing the ability to sustain around-the-clock
high tempo manned aircrafl operations.
"This aircraft, and the aviators who fly
her, will ensure that fitture Presidents,
when they ask 'Where is the nearest car-
rier?' will get the right answer....Within
range, Mr. President, with a full load of
capable combat aircraft ready to do what
you require, Sir!"
ADM J. M. Boorda, USN
CNO
Program Summaries
Current programs and those in development will
give the Navy-Marine Corps team the right mix
of capabilities to meet today's national security
requirements, while adapting to the changing se-
curity environment of tomorrow.
Aircraft Carriers: Twelve aircraft carriers form
the centerpiece of naval global forward presence,
crisis response, warfighting and deterrence c^a-
bility. Going beyond their power projection role,
they also serve as joint command platforms in the
worldwide command-and-control network. The
USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) was commissioned
in December 1 995 and the USS America (CV 66)
will be transitioned to the inactive fleet this year.
Project 78, the development effort for our future
carrier, is examining projected requirements for
sea-based tactical aviation platforms and the air-
craft carrier that will support those platforms well
into the 21st Century. The changing world has
increased reliance on the aircraft carrier, which
continues to prove itself in supporting the nation's
political and military needs. No otherplatform in
F/A - 18E/F Super Hornet: The F/A-1 8 Hornet
is the backbone of naval aviation strike warfare.
This year's budget request will include first year
production funding for the procurement of 1 2 F/
A-18E/F aircraft. The successful first flight oc-
curred in November 1995 and the program is on
schedule and on cost. Procurement of the first 1 2
low rate initial production aircraft will begin the
orderly transition of the F/A-1 8 inventory to this
improved strike fighter aircraft. Building upon
the proven technology of earlier model F/A-1 8 air-
craft, the F/A-1 8E/F will have greater range, pay-
load flexibility, an improved capability of return-
ing to the carrier with unexpended ordnance, room
for avionics growth and enhanced survivability
features. It will increase our ability to conduct
night strike warfere, close air support, fighter es-
cort, air interdiction and fleet air defense. The F/
A-18E/F will constitute the majority of strike
fighter assets on aircraft carriers and will comple-
ment future aircraft that evolve from the Joint
Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. In order to enhance
strike fighter capability further,this year's budget
also contains continued funding for warfighting
improvements to our existing F/A-1 8C/D aircraft.
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335
MV-22 Osprev: The MV-22 aircraft remains the
Marine Corps highest aviation acquisition prior-
ity and is key to successfully implementing our
Operational Maneuver From the Sea concept — a
concept that finally links maneuver at sea with
maneuver ashore. The acquisition of this medium-
lift tiltrotor, vertical/short takeoff and landing
(VSTOL) aircraft represents a major improvement
in our ability to project forces from over the hori-
zon toward inland objectives. The MV-22 will
give Marine air-ground task forces the ability to
fly significantly farther and faster with a greater
payload than the aging fleet of medium-lift CH-
46 helicopters. The MV-22's ability to carry 24
combat-loaded Marines at a cruising speed of 240
knots will provide the operational capability to ex-
ploit gaps in enemy defenses and rapidly insert
assault forces, while enhancing security and sur-
vivability. This combat multiplier nearly triples
the present day battlespace and will give com-
manders the tactical flexibility to respond, to adapt
to, and to defeat a wide range of threats, while
minimizing friendly casualties. In addition, the
MV-22 is completely self-deployable to any area
in the world, saving critical strategic airlift and
sealift. In FY97 low rate production will begin
on the first lot for receipt by the Marine Corps.
With an initial operational capability of 2001, the
technical innovation of the MV-22 will constitute
a revolutionary leap in our ability to maintain
battlefield dominance well into the 21st Century.
AV-8B Remanufacture: The remanufacture of
the AV-8B Day Attadc Harrier to the AV-8B Ra-
dar/Night Attack Harrier configuration will in-
42
crease the multimission capabilities of this proven
aircraft in the role of offensive air support. This
program greatly increases the Harrier's night, re-
duced-visibility and poor weather capabilities for
close air support and also enhances the air defense
capability of amphibious ready groups. The AV-
8B remanufacturing program will- also extend the
aircraft's life by 6,000 hours. Still the only tacti-
cal aircraft capable of operating from small flight
decks at sea or unimproved areas on land, the AV-
88 will be capable of delivering all future smart
weapons, such as the Joint Direct Attack Muni-
tion and the Joint Stand Off Weapon, in support
of ground forces. This program also improves the
aircraft's combat utility and survivability through
standardized configuration and safety enhance-
ments. This AV-8B program will modernize 72
aircraft at 77 percent of a new aircraft's cost. The
first flight was successfully conducted in Novem-
ber 1995. Delivery of the first three
remanufactured aircraft will occur in FY96.
Joint Strike Fighter LKFV. The Joim Strike
Fighter program serves as the Department of
Defense's focal point for defining future strike
aircraft weapon systems for the Navy, Marine
Corps and Air Force. The key focus of the pro-
gram is affordability — reducing the life cycle cost
of follow-on strike aircraft development and pro-
duction programs. Were the Services to pursue
development of the next generation strike fighter
through separate programs, the cost would be ap-
proximately $27 billion; a joint approach is ex-
pected to cost about SI 7 billion, a savings of $10
billion to the taxpayer. Further savings are antici-
pated through participation by the United
Kingdom's Royal Navy as well.
38-160 97 - 13
336
F-1 4 Upgrade: Continuing to improve carrier air-
wing multimission capabilities, the Navy will up-
grade the F-14 Tomcat by procuring a limited num-
ber of LANTIRN laser targeting systems that will
be used to outfit forward deployed units and by
incorporating provisions for system installation in
212 F-14 air-superiority fighters. All models have
been cleared to release basic MK-80 series free
fall bombs as well as laser guided equivalents. The
emerging strike role was first demonstrated dur-
ing 1995 NATO operations in Bosnia, when Tom-
cats from VF-41 successftjlly destroyed an am-
munition dump using GBU-16s (1000 pound h
ser guided bombs) with F/A-1 8s providing targt
lasing. With a LANTIRN initial operational Cc
pability in June 1996, the Navy will rapidly ir
crease the total number of multimission, precisio
strike capable aircraft in today's air wings. Add
tionally, the F-1 48 Upgrade program will provid
the fleet with enhanced survivability and digit;
improvements in 81 aircraft. The F-1 48, alon
with the F-14D, will provide the Navy with fle>
ibility for additional warfare capabilities in the li
torals until replaced by the F/A-1 8E/F or the Joii
Strike Fighter, or both.
els, achieving a standardized configuration and im-
proving warfighting capability.
SH-60R/lVlultimission Helicopter Reman-
ufacture: The multimission helicopter upgrade
(SH-60R) is a remanufacture program which will
include service life extension improvements to 1 70
SH-60B and 1 8 SH-60F helicopters. Essential to
fixture tactical rotary wing effectiveness in attain-
ing littoral battlespace dominance, the light air-
borne multi-purpose system (LAMPS) combines
EA-6B Prowler: With the scheduled retirement
of the U.S. Air Force EF-1 11 A Raven jammer,
the EA-68 Prowler will assume the role as the
Department of Defense's primary provider of
standoff radar jamming. In addition to radar jam-
ming, the Prowler will support joint operations by
providing communications jamming capability
and employment of the high-speed anti-radiation
missile (HARM). Supporting the EA-68's ex-
panding role in joint operations requires all 127
aircraft in the inventory and the re-establishment
of two squadrons in FY96 and FY97. Navy and
Marine Corps EA-6B squadrons will be deployed
overseas at U.S. and coalition air bases to support
U.S. Air Force operations with Joint Suppression
of Enemy Air Defense capability. These opera-
tions are in addition to the continuing EA-68 sup-
port to Navy carrier wings and Marine air-ground
include the addition of improved four-bladed lift
task forces. Emphasis in the EA-6B program is
on maintaining aircraft safety and inventory lev-
shipboard system to extend the range and overall
capabilities of surfece combatants for antisurface
and antisubmarine warfare, surface surveillance
and targeting of hostile threats. This upgrade
brings advances in active sonar and acoustic pro-
cessing, radar detection and imaging, expanded
surveillance, weapons flexibility and command-
and-control capabilities to a joint expeditionary
force or battle group. With an initial operational
capability of 2001 , the SH-60R will be the Navy's
centerpiece of ftiture tactical rotary wing aviation.
The integrated helicopter sensors and a real-time
exchange of sensor and tactical data with the host
surface combatant bring a new dimension in
battlespace control to the naval commander.
UH-IN and AH-1 W Four-Bladed Upgrade
(4BN/4BW>; The Marine Corps is examining al-
ternatives for upgrading or replacing its aging fleet
of utility and attack helicopters. Alternatives
43
337
include the addition of improved four-bladed lift
capabilities to both helicopter fleets, the incorpo-
ration of an improved targeting system and an in-
tegrated weapons station on the AH-1 W and vari-
ous replacement options. The program will un-
dergo an acquisition milestone review in late
FY96, at which time a decision on proceeding into
demonstration/validation will be made.
P-3C Orion: The P-3C sustained readiness pro-
gram and out-year service life extension program
will extend the operational service life and fatigue
life of existing airframes to approximately 48
years, thereby delaying the requirement for deliv-
ery of a follow-on production aircraft until 2015.
The antisurface warfare improvement program
enhances the aircraft's ability to perform both au-
tonomous and joint battle group missions in the
littorals. Improvements will allow the P-3C to
collect, correlate, and confirm tactical data and
transmit information and imagery to the joint task
force commander in near real-time. Both the ac-
tive and reserve P-3C fleet are converted to a com-
mon avionics force that consolidates maintenance.
improves training efficiency, reduces long term
logistic support cost, and maximizes Reserve
forces participation.
Air-to-Ground Weapon Programs: The three
most significant joint air-to-ground weapon de-
velopment initiatives are the Joint Standoff
Weapon (JSOW), Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM), and Standoff Land Attack Missile Ex-
panded Response (SLAM-ER). JSOW is a Navy-
led joint Navy/Air Force program for a family of
weapons using a common vehicle. JSOW will
provide air-to-ground standoff attack capability
against a broad target set during day, night and
adverse weather conditions and will replace a va-
riety of weapons in the current inventory. JDAM,
an Air Force-led program, will develop adverse
weather guidance kits and multi-flinction fusing
for general purpose bombs. Recent cancellation
of the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile
(TSSAM) program placed an urgent requirement
on the SLAM-ER program to meet the
Department's near term requirements. SLAM-ER
modifies the original SLAM, nearly doubles its
range, increases penetration of hardened targets,
and increases data link control range and missile
survivability. It will meet the Department's near-
term requirement for a Standoff Outside Area
Defenses (SOAD) precision air-to-ground
weapon. The Joint Air-To-Surface Standoff Mis-
sile (JASSM) is a new start program that will meet
the Air Force's need for a SOAD weapon in the
near term. A preplanned product improvement
(P3I) version of the weapon will meet the Navy's
need for a long term follow-on SLAM-ER sys-
tem.
Air-to-Air Weapon Programs: The A1M-9X
(Sidewinder Upgrade) and the AIM- 120 (Ad-
vanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) con-
tinue to be the Navy's foremost air-to-air weap-
ons. The Navy and the Air Force continue to work
closely together on both programs. The P3I ver-
sion of the AIM- 120 and the Navy-led A1M-9X
provide an improved seeker and a more maneu-
verable airframe. Both are being defined in a to-
tal systems approach to avoid unnecessary dupli-
44
338
cation in capability and to assist in overall
affordability of air-to-air weapons.
Expeditionary Air Support: The Marine Corps
maintains the unique capability to establish and
operate tactical airfields to project power ashore.
Expeditionary airfields are the natural, land-based
extensions of sea-based operations. The three
basic components of EAF 2000 are: (1) enough
AM-2 aluminum matting for construction of a
3850-by-72 foot runway, with parking areas for
75 tactical aircraft, (2) expeditionary arresting gear
for tailhook configured aircraft, and (3) optical
landing aids or airfield lighting. The Marine Corps
is vigorously pursuing programs to reduce the lo-
gistical footprint and the time required to set up
an expeditionary airfield. A research, develop-
ment, test and evaluation effort is underway to
reduce the AM-2 matting's weight and cubic di-
mension by 50 percent, while reducing installa-
tion time by one-third. An expeditionary aircraft
arresting gear that will be fester to install and will
increase aircraft landing parameters also is being
developed. The minimum operating strip light-
ing system has been programmed to reduce the
lighting installation time fi-om four days to one
hour while providing compatible Night Vision
Goggle/Night Vision Device systems.
Amphibious Lift: Naval amphibious forces pro-
vide the most flexible and adaptive combined arms
crisis response capability today and remain the
nation's only self-sustainable forcible entry force.
The Department of the Navy's current modern-
ization plan will provide amphibious lift for 2.5
Marine expeditionary brigade equivalents, in ac-
cordance with Defense Planning Guidance. The
fiiture amphibious force is being shaped in the cor-
rect number and types of ships that will also al-
low the formation of twelve amphibious ready
groups (ARGs) to meet our forward presence re-
quirements. Completion of this plan is vital to
maintaining our warfighting and forward presence
capabilities.
The Department is modernizing and tailoring its
amphibious fleet to provide over-the-horizon
launch platforms for the MV-22 aircraft, the ad-
vanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) and
the already proven Landing Craft Air Cushion
(LCAC). In addition to substantial qualitative
advances, this acquisition strategy also addresses
the quantitative goal of 2.5 MEB lift equivalents.
Amphibious lift is defined by five parameters:
vehicle square foot stowage capacity, cubic cargo
capacity, troop capacity, VTOL capacity, and
LCAC capacity. The current active amphibious
fleet meets or exceeds the 2.5 MEB goal in all
areas except vehicle stowage capacity. The ve-
hicle lift shortfall is being met through a combi-
nation of active and Ready Reserve Fleet assets.
We believe this reliance on tank landing ships
(LSTs) and attack caigo ships (LKAs) in the Na-
val and Military Sealift Command Reserve Force
to be an acceptable short term risk. The shortfall
in vehicle lift will be corrected with the acquisi-
tion of the new LPD-17 class of ships that will
incorporate improved command-and-control ca-
pabilities allowing them to operate independently
with enhanced survivability features including
self-defense against fiiture cruise missiles. The
first ship is programmed to begin construction in
FY96 with first delivery in FY02. A critical link
in the amphibious lift program, the LPD-1 7 class,
will replace the aging LPD-4, LKA, LST and
LSD-36 classes of ships. Once construction of
the twelve LPD- 1 7s is complete, the goal of form-
ing twelve modem amphibious ready groups can
be achieved. The seventh LHD will be the twelfth
ARG centerpiece and will start construction in
FY96. Delivery of the final two LSD 49 class
ships will be made in the next three years.
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339
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV>:
Currently in the demonstration/validation phase
of the acquisition process, this is the Marine Corps'
number one ground program. When procured, the
AAAV will replace the 30-40 year old AAV7A1
inventory, providing a quantum leap in maneuver-
ability, speed, firepower and survivability. With
its ability to maintain high speeds during
waterbome assaults, the AAAV will improve forc-
ible entry capability while minimizing exposure
to enemy fires. Once ashore, the AAAV will pro-
vide Marine ground forces with superior tactical
mobility and the speed and maneuverability to in-
tegrate with tank forces. For the first time, Ma-
rines will be able to directly link maneuver of ships
with the landing force maneuver ashore, fully
complementing the MV-22's capabilities.
"This Ship is built to fight, you had bet-
ter know how. "
ADM ARLEIGH BURKE
At the Christening Ceremony of the VSS
Arleigh Burke (DDG 51)
46
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51 > Class Destroyer: Joint
strike capability is significantly strengthened by
the introduction of the newest version of the
Arleigh Burice-class guided missile destroyer This
state-of-the-art warship is critical to the Navy's
modernization plan. Continued acquisition is
needed to support surface combatant force levels
and multimission capabilities essential in littoral
warfare. The DDG-51 operates both offensively
and defensively in multi-threat environments. It
plays an integral part in power projection and strike
missions through its land attack cruise missile ca-
pability. It also provides battlespace dominance
and area defense capability for carrier battle
groups, surface action groups, amphibious ready
groups and joint expeditionary forces. In order to
keep pace with advancing technologies and stay
ahead of emerging threats, the Navy constructs
Aegis destroyers in "flights" to introduce improve-
ments in combat capability continuously. Of the
21 planned Flight 1 Aegis destroyers. 13 are in
commission. The remaining eight Flight Is, seven
Flight Us, and four Flight II As are under contract.
The Aegis destroyers requested this year will con-
tinue to incorporate Flight IIA warfighting im-
provements, including improved surface-to-air
missiles (SM2 Block IV and Evolved Sea Spar-
row Missile), embarked helicopters and the Battle
340
Force Tactical Trainer. Future ships will include
other essential improvements such as AN/SPY-
1D(V) EDM-4B radar upgrade, Cooperative En-
gagement Capability and Theater Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense capability.
Area Defense: Area defense of carrier battle
groups, surface action groups, amphibious ready
groups and joint expeditionary forces remains a
preeminent warfighting requirement for our anti-
aircraft warfare ( AAW) surface ships. Future ships
will include essential capability improvements to
the SPY-1 radar, Joint Tactical Information Data
System (JTIDS) and Cooperative Engagement Ca-
pability (CEC) in order to pace advancing tech-
nologies and to remain ahead of emerging threats.
SPY radar improvements will provide for better
surveillance, detection, tracking and engagement
support against the demanding supersonic low al-
titude cruise missile, theater ballistic missiles and
electronic countermeasures (ECM) environment.
JTIDS will provide better data link connectivity
with Navy and other services while CEC will pro-
vide sensor netting with off-board Navy and joint
sensors, allowing better situational awareness,
battlespace management and weapons employ-
ment.
Common Missile Development/Standard Mis-
sile: The Navy is continuing to build on the proven
Standard missile family by adding capability to
counter existing and emerging threats. With over
70 countries now capable of employing anti-ship
cruise missiles, and with the addition of the the-
ater ballistic missile defense challenge, the Navy
is capitalizing on previous fiscal investments in
the Standard missile. The Navy plans to evolve
this common missile base to counter specific
threats and to improve these missiles to perform
multiple missions, thereby preserving combat flex-
ibility and magazine load out space. Presently two
new block upgrades are progressing toward pro-
duction. The SM-2 Block IV will complement
SM-2 medium range missiles aboard Aegis cruis-
ers and destroyers equipped with the vertical
launching system. Following successful comple-
tion of a series of four SM-2 Block IIIB flight tests,
approval was granted to proceed to a Navy pro-
gram decision meeting in FY96. The SM-2 IIIB
missile incorporates a dual mode seeker for im-
proved countermeasure resistance and will also
be deployed aboard Aegis cruisers and destroy-
ers. A new version, the SM-2 Block IVA, will
build on the Block IV while spanning two mis-
sion areas, providing cruise missile defense and
area theater ballistic missile defense.
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMP): Sea-
based theater ballistic missile defense is consid-
ered essential to protect expeditionary, forward-
deployed elements of our Armed Forces and to
support the defense of friendly forces and threat-
ened coalition allies, including population centers.
In response to the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council's Theater Missile Defense Mission Needs
Statement, and to meet an urgent national require-
ment, the Navy is developing a sea-based TBMD.
Naval Area TBMD, to be fielded in FY98, is criti-
cal to support littoral warfare. It will provide the
nation's only forcible entry capability in the face
of TBM attack. Naval Theater-Wide TBMD is
equally important to providing defense in depth
over an entire theater of operations. Advantages
of naval TBMD include the ability to operate in-
dependently of constraints, with no need for air-
lift in the critical early days of conflict, high sur-
vivability, rapid relocation capability, self
sustainability and dramatic cost effectiveness by
leveraging existing capabilities and engineering
base. Both the area and theater-wide programs, as
currently designed, comply with the ABM treaty.
Tomahawk Baseline Improvement Program
(TBIP): The Tomahawk land attack missile
(TLAM) provides Navy surface combatants and
attack submarines with the unique capability to
conduct long range precision strikes from the sea.
The FY97 budget request provides funds to up-
grade the Tomahawk Missile and its associated
command-and-control system, which targets and
plans strike missions. The TBIP will improve ac-
curacy by a factor of two and reduce the missiles
required per target by incorporating Jam-Resis-
tant GPS and inertial navigation systems. The mis-
47
341
sile will have a dual anti-shipping and land attack
warhead with hardened target penetration capa-
bility which will expand potential targets to in-
clude weapons bunkers, buried POL storage,
bridges and armored doors. The advanced Toma-
hawk weapon control system and afloat planning
system will improve tactical responsiveness and
reliability by reducing mission planning timelines
and limiting the possibility of collateral damage.
Developing concepts include improving Toma-
hawk performance in a tactical role. This will in-
clude in-flight communications, various warheads,
sub munitions and real-time targeting.
Naval Surface Fire Support fNSFS): NSFS is
the coordinated use of sea-based weapon systems
to provide offensive support to the maneuver com-
mander ashore. During the eariy phases of an
amphibious assault NSFS provides neccessary fire
support to the landing force. Once organic artil-
lery is operational ashore, NSFS complements the
firepower available from artillery and close air
support. The Navy-Marine Corps team has em-
barked on an aggressive development program that
will significantly improve range and lethality of
our surface fire support pnor to 2001 . The pro-
gram plan to increase range and improve effec-
tiveness includes improvements to existing MK
45 five-inch guns and propellants and development
of gun-launched guided projectiles. In addition,
we are conducting shipboard firing tests of
ATACMs, SLAM and Standard missiles to evalu-
ate future employment of fast reaction missile sys-
tems in support of forces ashore.
Trident SSBN and D-S Missile: The Tndent 11
D-5 missile is the most capable and survivable
weapon in the strategic triad. The only strategic
ballistic missile currently in production, the Tri-
dent 11 D-5 missile will provide the U.S. with a
modem and credible strategic deterrent for the
foreseeable future.
In September 1 994, the Department of Defense
completed the Nuclear Posture Review. This com-
prehensive assessment, which is predicated on the
ratification of the START 11 Treaty, determined
that the optimal force structure for the nation's sea-
based leg of the strategic triad would be 14 Ohio
(SSBN-726) class submarines, all equipped with
the Trident 11 D-5 missile. To meet this require-
ment, four Ohio-class submarines currently
equipped with the Trident 1 C-4 missile will be
upgraded to carry the larger and more capable
Trident 11 D-5. If the START II treaty is ratified,
four other Ohio-class submarines could be con-
verted to non-strategic service— enhancing con-
ventional strike and/or providing special operat-
ing forces platforms— or be dismantled.
Seawolf fSSN-2n - Class Attack Submarine:
Seawolf-class submarines were designed to oper-
ate autonomously against the world's most capable
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342
submarine and surface threats; these impressive
capabilities translate directly into enhanced joint
warfighting performance in high threat littoral ar-
eas. These multimission combatants will set the
standard for submarine technology well into the
next century. In addition to their abilities to
counter enemy submarines and surface shipping,
Seawolf-class submarines are ideally suited for
battlespace preparation roles. Incorporation of
sophisticated electronics greatly enhances indica-
tions and waming, surveillance and communica-
tions capabilities. These platforms are capable of
integrating seamlessly into a battle group or shift-
ing rapidly into a land battle support role. With
twice as many torpedo tubes and a 30 percent in-
crease in weapons magazine size over Los Ange-
les (SSN-688) class submarines, the Seawolf is
exceptionally capable of establishing and main-
taining battlespace dominance. The Seawolf s in-
herent stealth fits well into the clandestine nature
of Special Operations Forces missions and enables
surreptitious insertion of combat swimmers into
denied areas with minimum risk to U.S. forces.
The SSN-23 will incorporate Special Operations
Forces capabilities, including a dry deck shelter
and a new, specially designed combat swimmer
silo. The shelter is an air-transportable device that
piggybacks on the submarine and can be used to
store and launch a swimmer delivery vehicle and
combat swimmers. The silo is an internal lock-
out chamber that will deploy up to eight combat
swimmers and their equipment at one time.
Seawolf-class submarines will allow us to main-
tain our preeminent role in submarine operations.
New Attack Submarine (New SSN); The New
Attack Submarine (NSSN) design has been tai-
lored for the 21st Century joint littoral opera-
tions envisioned in the Navy Department's
...From the Sea and Forward. ..From the Sea stra-
tegic concepts. Uniquely suited for all opera-
tions in the littoral, the NSSN incorporates the
best new technologies and is designed for flex-
ibility and affordability.
The NSSN maintains U.S. undersea superiority
against a continuing Russian submarine develop-
ment and construction effort. Its designed-in flex-
ibility includes provisions for mission specific
equipment, carry-on electronics, alternative weap-
onry and remotely operated or autonomous ve-
hicles. Improved electromagnetic and acoustic
stealth will ensure the NSSN's ability to destroy
advanced capability submarines expected in hos-
tile littoral areas. Additionally, the NSSN will be
able to interdict shipping or defend Sea Lines of
Corrununication, a role that will become increas-
ingly important as the number of overseas bases
is reduced.
The New Attack Submarine also plays a pivotal
role in the Navy's acquisition investment plan. By
the year 201 1 , SSN-688 class submarines will start
to reach the end of their service lives at a rate of
2-4 per year. The Navy needs to achieve a low,
continuous and efficient submarine introduction
rate by 2002 in order to sustain SSN force levels.
Starting the NSSN in 1 998 accomplishes this goal,
effectively counters an ever increasing and sophis-
ticated submarine threat and is the foundation for
future development and technology insertion into
the submarine force.
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUV): Clan-
destine mine reconnaissance is the Navy's top
UUV priority. Learning the full dimension of the
mine threat without exposing reconnaissance plat-
forms is vital to execution of maneuver warfare.
An initial capability, designated the Near Term
Mine Reconnaissance System (NMRS), is a mine-
hunting UUV launched and recovered from a 688-
class submarine's torpedo tube. The UUV, in com-
bination with an SSN, represents a clandestine
system capable of providing time-sensitive infor-
mation on mining activities to the theater com-
mander The NMRS will provide an effective and
much needed capability to the fleet in FY98. The
long term mine reconnaissance and avoidance sys-
tem will leverage developing technologies and
lessons learned from the NMRS. This system will
be capable of launch from submannes and will
reach areas over the horizon to develop a thor-
ough and accurate minefield reconnaissance pic-
ture.
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Mine Warfare: This essential supporting war-
fare capability is integral to the ability of naval
forces to effectively open and maintain Sea Lines
of Communication, assure the unimpeded flow of
regional forces and shape and dominate the lit-
toral battlespace. An array of modem systems con-
tinues to be developed and procured for our mine
countermeasures (MCM) forces, which are among
the best in the world. Our airborne MCM forces
provide the only rapid deployment MCM capa-
bility available today. This capability will be en-
hanced with the completion of the mine counter-
measures helicopter carrier in 1996. Also signifi-
cant is the addition of the MK 37U variable depth
mechanical sweep. The Osprey (MHC-1) class
coastal mine hunters are being delivered at a rate
of two per year and are performing to specifica-
tions. Efforts to defeat mines in the difficult surf
zone region such as the shallow water assault
breaching system and the distributed explosive
technology are on schedule. Another system be-
ing supported within our program to improve our
MCM capability is the remote minehunting sys-
tem (RMS) which will provide an organic, sur-
face ship hosted mine reconnaissance capability.
The addition of RMS to the surface MCM force
means fewer ships will have to enter minefields
to neutralize mines.
Medium Tactical Vehicle Remanufacture
(MTVR): In October 1995, the MTVR program
launched into the engineering and manufacturing
development phase of the acquisition process to
fill Marine Corps unique requirements for on- and
off-road mobility. Under this program, the aging
fleet of Marine M809/M939 series trucks will be
remanufactured, making it the most capable cargo
truck in its class in the world. By integrating many
of the industry's standard truck components on the
existing five-ton truck, its mobility, range and ca-
pacity is greatly increased while retaining a smaller
footprint to meet expeditionary requirements.
Once fielded, the added mobility provided by in-
dependent suspension, all-wheel drive and an au-
tomatic tire inflation system will allow Marine
support elements to keep pace with the faster
moving maneuver elements on the battlefield.
Many of the improvements are specifically de-
signed to reduce life cycle maintenance costs.
Light Weight 155 Artillery (LW155); The
LW155 is a joint Marine Corps/Army program
with the Marine Corps as the lead service. Proto-
type evaluations have been completed, and based
on successes in the operational assessments, the
program is anticipated to move into the engineer-
ing and manufacturing development phase in early
1996. The LW155 is designed to improve mark-
edly the tactical and strategic mobility of artillery
units because of its light weight, resulting in the
enhanced ability of Marine commanders to pro-
vide uidirect fire support to engage forces. Cur-
rent development of new artillery ammunition will
provide even greater range and lethality for the
LW-1 55. It will be transportable by five-ton cargo
trucks or MTVR, MV-22 and the CH-53D/E.
Navy Sealift: The coming year will see the Navy
contmuing its historical commitment to a strong
strategic sealift capability. In the 1980s a $7 bil-
lion uivestment in strategic sealift spawned the fast
sealift ships, a modernized Ready Reserve Force,
and the core of our modem afloat prepositioned
force. The 1990s will see another investment of
S7 billion. Ongoing strategic sealift acquisition and
readiness initiatives will expand surge, afloat pre-
positioning and sustainment capabilities. Never
has the Navy been more determined to carry out
its endunng mission of strategic sealift. We will
deploy and sustain U.S. military forces, wherever
needed, through the delivery of combat and com-
bat support equipment, petroleum products and
other supplies. Desert Shield/Desert Storm confirmed
the need for a mix of sealift operational capabilities
that offers prepositioned assets in strategic locations,
surge shipping of critical weapons and heavy mili-
tary equipment and sustainment shipping of supplies
needed by U.S. forces m any theater of operations.
We are committed to maintaining a strong sealift
force and increasing its readiness level in order to
meet DoD's ocean transportation requirements by
three operational strategies — prejxjsitioning, surge
and sustainment.
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344
Prepositioned Sealift; The Navy established its
prepositioned force in the early 1980s in order to
improve response time for delivery of urgently
needed equipment and supplies to a theater of
operations during war or contingency. Over the
last decade this force has increased in importance
and grown in number as the Department of De-
fense has reduced the number of troops and re-
sources forward deployed. Prepositioned assets
are able to transport equipment and supplies
quickly to theaters of operation where they can be
used by arriving military persormel. This is es-
sential to the Department of the Navy's guiding
strategy of Forward. . .From the Sea.
Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF): The APF
is divided into three groups: 13 maritime
prepositioning force (MPF) ships, loaded with
Marine Corps equipment; 14 Army war reserve
ships, including 3 ships that support a U.S. Army
heavy brigade; and 7 prepositioned ships dedicated
to multiservice requirements such as transporting
fuel for the Defense Logistics Agency, ammuni-
tion for the Air Force and a field hospital for the
Navy.
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF): The 1 3
ships of the MPF continue to be a vital part of the
Marine Corps ability to respond quickly to crises
worldwide and will significantly improve opera-
tional flexibility for combat, disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance operations. In 1995, to
ensure even better response. Maritime
Prepositioning Squadron (MPS) One relocated
forward from the continental United States to the
Mediterranean. Procurement of an additional ship
for MPS — known as MPF enhancement — will
provide the Marine air-ground task force enhanced
capabilities in naval construction, medical support
and expeditionary airfield construction. The first
MPF enhancement ship is planned for delivery by
FY98, with procurement of the second and third
ships to occur after the large, medium-speed roll-
on/roll-off (LMSR) ship program is completed.
Norway Air Landed Marine Expeditionary Bri-
gade (NALMEB): The NALMEB remains an
ideally positioned, cost effective deterrent to as-
sist in the protection of NATO's northern flank. A
new burden sharing agreement governing
NALMEB went into effect this fiscal year. This
agreement significantly reduces program costs and
serves as a tangible re-affirmation of U.S. com-
mitment to NATO and to our Norwegian allies.
Surge Sealift: Surge shipping is the immedi-
ate transportation of heavy military equipment
that our forces will need to meet warfighting
requirements. The Navy's surge capability de-
pends on a mix of sealift, including eight fast
sealift ships. Ready Reserve Force ships and
chartered ships from private industry. As a re-
sult of the 1992 Mobility Requirements Study,
the Navy is currently undertaking a sealift ex-
pansion effort to increase DoD's ability to move
military equipment quickly in the event of a
contingency or war. The study highlighted a
strategic sealift surge and afloat prepositioning
shortfall of five million square feet and recom-
mended the acquisition of ships to meet it. This
enhanced sealift capability was validated by the
Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Re-
view Update, signed by the Secretary of Defense
on 28 March 1995. Specifically, the updated
study recommends that DoD add three million
square feet of surge shipping and two million
square feet of prepositioned shipping by the year
2001 . This translates to 1 9 large, medium-speed
roll-on/roll-off ships (LMSRs): 11 for surge and
8 for pre-positioning.
The LMSRs are ideally suited to transport large
military vehicles and other equipment and cargo
that cannot be containerized. Those LMSRs
designated for the Afloat Prepositioning Force
will provide strategically located, at-sea stor-
age for military equipment and supplies, mak-
ing them immediately available for transport to
potential contingency sites around the world.
LMSRs designated as surge shipping assets will
provide the Navy with the capability to rapidly
deploy the military equipment and supplies
needed by U.S. troops in a theater of operations.
In order to acquire the 1 9 LMSRs by 2001 , the
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345
Navy's sealift acquisition program calls for the
conversion of 5 existing commercial ships and new
construction of 14 ships. These ships will begin
delivery in 1996.
The Mobility Requirements Study also recom-
mended that the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) in-
clude a total of 36 RO/ROs by 1 996, which would
provide additional surge sealift for rapid response
in time of crisis. To reach that total, the study
concluded that DoD required 19 additional RO/
ROs. Currently there are 29 of the required 36
RO/ROs in the Ready Reserve Force. Two addi-
tional ships were procured in FY95 and will join
the force after they are upgraded to meet U.S.
Coast Guard standards in 1996.
As of FY96, Ready Reserve Force program fund-
ing was transferred from the Department of Trans-
portation to DoD, and will be executed by the
Navy. The Navy will pursue the acquisition of
the remaining five RO/ROs.
Our surge shipping capability was successftilly
tested in mid-September 1994 when we activated
a dozen RO/ROs, a crane ship, and a barge carrier
from our Ready Reserve Force to move unit equip-
ment quickly from Fort Bragg, North Carolina and
Fort Drum, New York in support of the deploy-
ment of U.S. forces to Haiti. Additionally, an-
other three vessels from the Ready Reserve Force
were activated to support the British Army's de-
ployment in Operation Quick Lift and again in
Operations Joint Venture and Joint Endeavor to
Bosnia. Their successftjl activation demonstrated
the value of the Ready Reserve Force surge ship-
ping for both U.S. and allied forces.
Short Range Anti-Armor Weapon fSRAW):
The SRAW, also known as Predator, is a unique
Marine Corps anti-armor program. SRAW will
provide the Marine Coips with a lightweight
(< 20 lbs) anti-tank weapon capable of defeating
armor threats from current and ftiture main battle
tanks at ranges up to 600 meters, including those
equipped with explosive reactive armor or supple-
mental armor kits. Its soft-launch capability will
fjermit firing within enclosed spaces. During 1995,
the design of the SRAW was completed and engi-
neering models were febricated for subsequent test
flights in 1 996. Production is planned to begin in
1999 following the completion of the engineering
and manufacturing development phase. A joint
effort relationship was established in 1994 with
the U.S. Army's Multi-Purpose Individual Muni-
tion program, which will use the SRAW's flight
module and launcher assemblies.
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (M AGTF> C4;
Littoral operations — operations that cross the
boundaries among air, land and sea — continue
to be the focus of the Marine Corps. Therefore,
the MAGTF must be both interoperable with the
Navy afloat and with forces ashore and in the air.
The most important programs for making this hap-
pen are the Joint Maritime Command Informa-
tion System (JMCIS) and the MAGTF C41 mi-
gration to llill Global Command and Control com-
pliance, amphibious ship C4I upgrades and the in-
tegration of systems such as the Position Loca-
tion Reporting System (PLRS) into Naval C2. Ad-
ditionally, as a fiill participant in the Joint Tacti-
cal Information Distribution System (JTIDS), the
Marine Corps remains committed to the migra-
tion to common data links and other joint C4 pro-
grams as well.
Critical to ongoing migration is the procurement
of new equipment and upgrades to older equip-
ment. The Marine Corps continues to spend a large
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346
portion of its procurement budget for these sys-
tems. Among these are:
• MILSTAR ottremely high frequency termi-
nals
• Tri-band super high frequency terminals
• Enhanced Manpack ultra high frequency ter-
minal
• Single channel ground and airborne radio
system (SINCGARS)
• Tactical Data Network
• Defense Message System
• Position Location Reporting System Product
Improvement Program (PIP)
• AN/MRC-142P1P
• Global Command and Control System
Of these, SINCGARS is considered one of the
most important. Fielding was completed in 1995
to 1 MEF, and 11 MEF fielding is under way. De-
livery to 111 MEF and the Reserve is scheduled to
begin in August 1996 and August 1997, respec-
tively.
In addition, the Marine Corps is upgrading the
communications infrastructure at its bases and air
stations to include new telephone switches and
fiber optic cable installation.
Joint Maritime Command Information System
(JMCIS) Strategy: The Navy version of the OSD
migration path uses a single software engineering
approach. JMCIS is the C2I implementation of
the Navy's Copernicus strategy for a common C41
architecture. JMCIS uses a common operating en-
vironment, common application programming in-
terfaces, common integration standards for devel-
opers and a common human/computer interface
to ensure modularity and functional interoperability
among various applications at all levels of com-
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347
mand. JMCIS is the Navy's migration strategy to
full Global Command and Control System com-
pliance.
Global Broadcast Service (GBS): Another ma-
jor Copernicus effort, GBS is a revolutionary ad-
vancement in communications, providing high
data rate service to many users at once and very
high delivery rates to very small user temiinals.
No other currently fielded DoD satellite provides
this type of capability.
Joint Maritime Communications System
(JMCOMS): Under the JMCOMS effort, the
Navy IS migrating multiple communications pro-
grams into a common architecture to functionally
provide the Copernicus tactical communications
pillars. All Navy tactical communications will
move technologically from stand-alone networks
on specific satellites to an int^rated network man-
agement concept that will allow the operator to
use both military and commercial satellite com-
munications, greatly multiplying capacity.
JMCOMS will provide an integrated network
manager that will implement an automated tacti-
cal voice and video network. This program is cur-
rently conceptual in nature and is planned to be
implemented in incremental stages.
Digital Wideband Transmission System
(DWTS): DWTS provides secure, bulk-encrypted
voice and data, ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore com-
munication at data rates up to 2.048 Mbps, oper-
ating over UHF Line-of-Sight. This system is also
capable of supporting conditioned diphase, full du-
plex, TRI-TAC communications. DWTS will pro-
vide the necessary communications path to sup-
port joint task force, amphibious task force and
landing force staffs in expeditionary warfare plan-
ning and operations. It will be inter-operable with
both Marine Corps and Army wideband systems
currently in use.
Navy Tactical Command System-Afloat
(NTCS-A): The afloat segment of the Global
Conunand and Control System is common oper-
ating environment compliant. It provides the tac-
tical commander with timely, accurate, and com-
plete all-source information management, display
and dissemination capabilities. These include mul-
tisource data fusion and distribution of conunand,
surveillance, meteorology, oceanography and in-
telligence data and imagery to support warfare
mission assessment, planning and execution.
Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Systems;
The Navy and Marine Corps team is significantly
increasing the effectiveness of its intelligence or-
ganizations. The Marine Corps is developing a
self-sustaining intelligence occupational field.
Numerous changes in the organization and man-
ning of intelligence units also will enharKe hu-
man intelligence capabilities and support intelli-
gence collection, analysis and dissemination in the
operating forces. Under the joint umbrella, the
Navy and Manne Corps continue to install the
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System to allow maritime forces greater access to
the national intelligence community. This is now
the core architecture for SCI conununications at
all levels— National Command Authorities, Uni-
fied Commanders, Joint Task Forces and Tactical
Commanders.
Improvements in tactical intelligence capabilities
are being addressed through enhanced RDT&E
and procurement investment programs within the
Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities. The Marine
Corps is addressing shortfalls in its imagery inter-
pretation capability through fielding of manpack
digital camera systems, secondary imagery dis-
semination systems and initiatives to improve ac-
cess to national and theater collectors under the
Joint Services Imagery Processing System
(JSIPS). The National Input Segment of the JSIPS
is located at Camp Pendleton, California and
manned by the Marine Coips Imagery Support
Unit. A tactical exploitation group will be de-
ployed with each MEF to receive, process and dis-
seminate imagery from F/A-18D ATARS-
equipped aircraft, UAVs, the U-2 and other the-
ater and national collectors.
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348
Improvements to Marine Corps signal intelligence
capabilities include the Radio Reconnaissance Dis-
tribution Device fielded to the Radio Battalions
during the summer of 1994, the Portable Auto-
mated Computerized Lightweight Expandable
Search System and product improvement upgrades
to the Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System,
the Technical Control and Analysis Center and the
Team Portable Communications Intelligence Sys-
tem. Systems that will help the Marine Corps
benefit from the latest commercial technology and
maintain our signal exploitation advantage over
potential adversaries are additionally being pur-
sued in projects such as the Cryptologic Carry-on
Initiative and radio battalion modifications.
Key Navy systems also include the Cryptologic
Carry-on Initiative, which matches new intelli-
gence requirements with the latest commercial
technology to more rapidly field compatible hard-
ware. This initiative will meet tactical require-
ments through a central clearing house. The joint
staff selected the Naval Warfare Tactical Data
Base (N WTDB) as the process model for the Glo-
bal Command and Control System (GCCS). The
Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System
(JDISS) has largely solved the operability prob-
lem for joint U.S. operations and for operations
with NATO and U.N. forces. JDISS provides a
responsive, secure exchange between and among
intelligence centers and operational commanders.
JDISS gives commanders what they need, when
then need it, by providing "demand pull" as well
as "smart push" intelligence. Finally, Intelink has
been established as the intelligence community's
version of the Internet, providing intelligence from
an easy-access bulletin board.
To meet the need for properly trained intelligence
personnel, we have formed three centers of ex-
cellence for Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence
Training. These centers provide Service training
and host Joint Task Force, Joint Targeting, Joint
Intelligence Center and Joint Information War-
fare courses. Both in the schoolhouses and dur-
ing exercises and operations, the Naval Intelli-
gence Doctrine (NDP-2) and the Naval Compo-
nent Intelligence Tactics, Techniques and Proce-
dures (now Naval Warfare Publication 2-01) ap-
ply joint doctrine to naval intelligence during
peacetime, crisis and wartime.
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349
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): The Navy
and Marine Corps Team continues to refine its
requirements for UAVs. Promising new systems
now in development include the Medium Altitude
Endurance (MAE)/Predator and High Altitude En-
durance UAVs. The Navy plans to test the feasi-
bility of landing and launching the MAE from
the deck of an aircraft carrier. These platforms
would give the Navy the capability to conduct sur-
veillance of small mobile targets for long periods
of time, greatly improving our awareness of the
battlefield. Naval forces are today employing the
Pioneer UAV, based from Sixth Fleet amphibious
ships, in Bosnian Operations.
Information Warfare; The new concept of In-
formation Warfare (IW) is accompanied by sub-
stantive operational progress. The Naval Informa-
tion Warfare Activity is the principal technical
agent and interface among Service and national
level agencies engaged in the pursuit of IW tech-
nologies. It is also the technical agent for devel-
opment and acquisition of counter-C2 and C2-
protect systems and is the technical support ac-
tivity for the fiill range of IW actions. In addi-
tion, the Navy established the Fleet Information
Warfere Center charged with developing IW/C2W
tactics, procedures and training responsive to fleet
commanders. They deploy IW/C2W trained per-
sonnel and systems to support naval forces.
X. CONCLUSION
As part of our continuing effort to maintain the
future relevance of naval forces, we are complet-
ing the development of a new naval operational
concept that will serve as a coherent link between
the naval services' strategic concept presented in
From the Sea. as well as Forward. . . From the
Sea and the tactics, techniques and procedures in
Navy and Marine Corps doctrinal publications.
The concept will logically support our National
Security Strategy and National Military Strategy
while highlighting the unique operational and
warfighting capabilities that naval forces provide
to our nation. As we proceed, we will continue to
emphasize our underlying priorities of people,
readiness, innovation, modernization and effi-
ciency.
During the past year, the Navy and Marine Corps
always answered the nation's call with success.
We are proud of our achievement in making the
strategic vision oi Forward. . .From the Sea a com-
pelling reality. In places as diverse as Kuwait,
Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, the Navy-Marine Corps
team has been, and is now forward deployed and
engaged in the ftill range of operations from peace-
time presence through humanitarian assistance to
crisis response. That achievement is the result of
the effort of many people over the past year and
is the most important indicator of naval expedi-
tionary capability Forward. . .From the Sea.
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350
^Fortune favors the hold and
there is no force bolder than
the Navy and Marine Corps
team. "
John H. Dalton
Secretary of the Navy
351
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. A Uttle his-
tory note, if I might, at this time. Mr. Stump just told me that he
got out of the Navy 50 years ago today
Mr. Hunter. That was a big part of your problem.
The Chairman. Senator Thurmond was commissioned a second
lieutenant in 1924. We have got quite a history behind us.
Madam Secretary, we will be pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF SHEILA E. WIDNALL, SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
Secretary Widnall. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Con-
gressman Dellums, members of this committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear today with my colleagues to discuss plans
and priorities for the military services. Although our tools and mis-
sions differ, I think you will see that we come to you with similar
concerns; to attract and retain the quality people we need to per-
form our missions, and to proceed with the modernization pro-
grams we have defined in close consultation with the CINC's to en-
sure our future capabilities.
As in the past, I have submitted an extended posture statement
for the record, but I would like to take a few minutes to focus on
some priorities.
The Air Force, like our sister services, has had a comparative
break in modernization over the past few years. We could afford
that for a limited time, given the high quality of our fielded forces,
but it is imperative now that we move ahead with our new pro-
grams. So we have carefully constructed a time-phased moderniza-
tion plan that balances the needs of the CINC's against fiscal reali-
ties.
Over the next decade, that plan meets the operational require-
ments established by our combatants commanders and postures the
Air Force to provide America the most capable and efficient air and
space forces possible both for today and for the future.
Our most more near-term priority, the C-17, is designed to fill
our most urgent operational shortfall. The CINC's identify strategic
lift as DOD's greatest single deficiency. The C-17 will satisfy this
demand and maintain the health of our strategic airlift fleet.
With its ability to operate from small airfields and in hostile en-
vironments, to deliver oversized and outsized cargo wherever we
need it, the C-17 is an essential resource for our war fighters. We
have all seen its capabilities in Bosnia and I think the advantages
it offers are clear.
Over the midterm of our modernization efforts the focus is on
conventional bombers and smart munitions upgrades to provide our
national command authorities and the CINC's a quick reaction
global capability while other forces are still in the deployment
phase.
In the long term, our most urgent need is to modernize our fight-
er force. By the time the F-22 reaches IOC in 2005 the F-15 will
be in its fourth decade of active service as our frontline fighter. We
have concentrated on upgrading that aircraft to preserve its capa-
bility, but airframes, age, and nations around the world have
caught up with us in technology.
352
We must ensure that we can win air supremacy against any op-
ponent, for only that supremacy offers our forces freedom of action
throughout the battle space. In the coming decade, the F-15 will
not give us that assurance. The F-22 will. Its combinations of
supercruise, stealth, and advanced avionics make it an
unmatchable adversary. It will embody the information revolution
in warfare.
More importantly, the air superiority it guarantees will nail us
to protect and operate the range of information platforms, AWACS,
JSTARS, and RIVET JOINT being the most obvious examples, that
we will rely on to give our commanders the information dominance
they need to win. It is the only fighter either fielded or in develop-
ment today that will have that capability.
It is the linchpin to success not just for the air battle, but for the
theater campaign as a whole; 5 years after the F-22 reaches IOC,
the joint strike fighter will enter the force. As the F-16 com-
plements the F-15, providing a lower cost multirole complement, so
the joint strike fighter will complement the F-22, both operation-
ally and technically. We have structured the JSF Program to take
full advantage of the technical advances developed by the F-22 and
to leverage its operational capabilities as well.
Like the F-15, the F-16 will be entering its fourth decade as the
most numerous fighter in our inventory by the time its replacement
arrives on the scene. Like the F-15, it has been upgraded contin-
ually during its lifetime, but it is reaching the extent of useful de-
velopment that can be done within the limits of its airframe.
The JSF will take its place in our inventory and provide the ad-
vanced avionics and reduced signatures necessary to survive on the
battlefield of the 21st century. The JSF will provide another role
now performed admirably by the F-16 for two decades now, of pro-
viding an affordable frontline fighter for our friends and allies
around the world. It will provide the next generation fighters for
both the Navy and the Marine Corps and is being designed and
built in a remarkably joint program.
Some 30 years ago our predecessors on both sides of this table
structured the Nation's fighter force that has served us so well in
the decade since. It is now up to us to show that same foresight
as we look toward the uncertain world of tomorrow. We owe this
to the Nation and to the young people of today who will face the
risk of combat in the decades ahead.
Finally, several of our ongoing programs span all three mod-
ernization phases: near term, mid term and far term, such as the
space-based infrared system and the evolved expendable launch ve-
hicle which will provide us continuous assured access to space.
To execute this modernization plan effectively, it is imperative
that we streamline our acquisition processes and improve our busi-
ness practices. That is a pass-fail item and we are already begin-
ning to reap some significant benefits. For instance, the joint direct
attack munitions, JDAM, will be delivered to the users a year early
at a saving of $1.57 billion and the PACER CRAIG Program, a
navigation package for the KC-135 eliminated military specifica-
tions and reduced reporting requirements to save $90 million in
planned acquisition costs.
353
To date, our acquisition reform efforts and programs such as the
C-17, JDAM, MILSTAR, and GPS have resulted in a total cost
avoidance of $13 billion in the Air Force alone.
We continue to find ways to be more efficient and you can help
with a few. For instance, we are requesting legislative approval for
the C-17 multiyear procurement. The $900 million cost avoidance
will allow us to fund other programs and, in fact, these savings
have already been redistributed among the F-22 and our other key
modernization efforts. Beside streamling, we are taking a hard look
at commercialization and privatization options for virtually every-
thing, from computers to ground maintenance to base security.
Since our current focus is on depot maintenance, I visited Rome,
Newark Air Force Base, Kelly, and McClellan Air Force Bases to
check on our progress. We are making strides, but a number of bar-
riers remain. For instance, the law limiting private sector depot ef-
fort to 40 percent of our depot funds must be changed to allow
flexibility and ensure success in this area.
Not only does this help contractors work more efficiently, it saves
taxpayer dollars. Despite some upheaval, our people realize the ad-
vantages inherent in the privatization efforts. They are enthusias-
tic about the possibilities and ready to make it work as long as we
help eliminate some of the hurdles.
That brings me to the next major Air Force priority, attracting
and retaining motivated, high quality people. As a force that relies
heavily on its technological advantage, we must retain our well-
trained, experienced men and women. Quality of life is the No. 1
reason they remain in the Air Force.
When we ask our people how they are handling the stress of new
missions and high operations tempo, they consistently tell us that
they are ready to face up to just about anything. They understand
the importance of what they are doing. They ask only that their
families be well taken care of.
Thank you for your support in the past. We look forward to in-
creasing success that guarantees the welfare of our people. As I
speak, we have 11,000 people deployed around the globe supporting
operations in Bosnia, Iraq, the Caribbean, and South America.
Since Desert Storm, we have averaged three to four times the level
of overseas deployment as we did during the cold war.
Another 80,000 of our roughly 400,000 are permanently stationed
overseas. We are doing what we can to alleviate the stress by dis-
tributing the deployment burden better and looking at new ways
to use Guards and Reserve. You can help those stationed abroad
by approving the funds for overseas housing and other overseas
construction.
Last year, this committee demonstrated a careful and measured
approach that targeted our greatest needs and will have a measur-
able impact for our people. We appreciate your support and look
forward to continuing our joint efforts in quality-of-life programs.
This year we are continuing our expansion of the housing at
Aviano Air Base in Italy and we desperately need dormitories at
Osan in Korea. We have delayed these projects long enough. Now
that our basing posture has stabilized, we must improve the living
conditions of our troops.
354
Like our approach to modernization, we want a balanced ap-
proach toward these people-first programs. So our strategy focuses
on seven priorities: compensation and benefits, housing, health
care, balance PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO, community and family
programs, retirement, and educational opportunities.
The posture statement describes in more detail our efforts in
each of those areas. Concentrating on those programs, we will
strive to provide our professional airmen with the quality of life
they deserve. Only then can we ask of them the personal sacrifice
and commitment that our profession requires.
As our world grows ever smaller, American forces are the most
visible forms of courage, trust, and cooperation on the planet. Air
Force men and women have long been a part of the efforts to build
bridges and share values. Over the past year, your Air Force has
acted decisively to curb war, to feed starving people around the
globe, to forge stronger bonds of friendship, and to further the
spread of liberty into nations which had never before enjoyed its
blessings. We will continue these efforts in the years to come and
in the decades to follow. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Widnall follows:]
355
POSTURE HEARING STATEMENT
OF
SECRETARY WIDNALL
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chainnan and Members of the Committee. I welcome tWs
opportunity to discuss our plans to modernize our force and support the men and women
of the nation's Air Force— the world's premier air and space force. To maintain this air and
space advantage, we have built a comprehensive, time-phased modernization plan to meet
the needs of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Commanders-in-Chief
(CINCs). With your support, we will achieve these objectives and preserve an acceptable
quality of life for our people. Your support will ensure the Air Force continues to provide
strong and credible airpower options in pursuit of our nation's security goals.
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of our Service, we are proud and honored
to s^. we are the nation's Air Force—the only American military institution organized,
trained, and equipped solely to exploit air and space power in the defense of our nation.
We exist to fight and win our nation's wars. To that end, we are dedicated to providing
America the most capable and efficient air and space forces possible-today and in the
fiiture. As a direct result, our forces give dominant warfighting capabilities to the U.S.
CINCs. Specifically, the Air Force provides the joint force commander with a broad range
of air and space capabilities, to include: Air Superiority. Space Superiority, Global
Mobility, Precision Employment, and Information Dominance.
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BIOGRAPHY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
S«cratary of the Air Force
Office of Pobllc Affairs
Washington. O.C. 20330-1690
DR. SHEILA E. WIDNALL
Sheila E. Widnall is secretary of the Air Force. She is responsible for and
has the authority to conduct all Department of the Air Force matters
including recruiting, organizing, training, administration, logistical support,
maintenance and welfare of personnel. Her responsibilities also include
research and development, and other activities prescribed by the
president or the secretary of defense.
In previous positions with the Air Force, Dr. Widnall served on the
USAF Academy Board of Visitors, and on advisory committees to Military
Airlift Comnnand and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Dr. Widnall,
a faculty member of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for 28
years, became an associate provost at the university in January 1992. A
professor of aeronautics and astronautics, she is internationally known
for her work in fluid dynamics, specifically in the areas of aircraft
turbulence and the spiraling airflows, called vortices, created by
helicopters. She has served on many boards, panels and committees in
govemment, academia and industry. The Tacoma. Washington, native is
the author of some 70 publications. She assumed her current position
Augusts. 1993.
Dr. Widnall and her husband, William, an aeronautical engineer.
have two children.
EDUCATION:
1960 Bachelor of science degree, aeronautics and astronautics, MIT
1961 Master of science degree, aeronautics and astronautics. MIT
1964 Doctor of science degree. MIT
CAREER CHRONOLOGY:
1. 1964-1970. assistant professor, MIT
2. 1970-1974, associate professor, MIT
3. 1974-1993. professor, MIT
4. 1975-1979. division head. Division of Fluid Mechanics, MIT
5. 1979-1980, faculty chairperson. MIT
6. 1979-1990, director. Fluid Dynamics Research Laboratory
7. 1991 - 1992. chairperson, MlTs Committee on Academic Responsibility
8. 1992-1993. associate provost, MIT
9. 1993- present, secretary of the Air Force
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The warfighting advantages the nation's Air Force brings to the joint table spring
from the expertise and dedication of our people and the technological edge we maintain
in our force structure. Our well educated, technically competent, and highly motivated
men and women are committed to keeping this great nation strong and free. That is why
we consistently invest in cutting edge technologies that exploit the inherent operating
advantages of air and space. The synergy of our dedicated, professional people and our
technologically advanced force structure produces a distinct perspective on how best to
apply military power through the all-encompassing air and space media. This global
perspective provides our national leadership a more versatile range of military options-
options that place fewer American lives at risk-to accomplish security objectives.
The Nation 's Air Force
Airpower increases the alternatives available for all Service components so they
can fight effectively and respond quickly to changing circumstances. Airpower can
selectively degrade or erase the capabilities that support an enemy's war effort, thus
diminishing or eliminating an opponent's options and ultimately defeating his strategy.
This ability to limit enemy options, while simultaneously boosting the effective combat
power of all our forces, makes U.S. air and space power a dominant force in its own right,
as well as an indispensable force multiplier in modem combat.
The nation's Air Force is ideally suited for the challenges posed by today's
security environment. Our men and women have built upon our investment in technology
to create robust air and space forces capable of achieving decisive advantages against
potential aggressors. As a result, your Air Force is first to arrive and first to fight. We
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provide global situation awareness. We employ while others deploy. We carry the critical
leading-edge components of our country's land forces to the fight and control the air to
provide all forces freedom of maneuver. We sustain military forces during the fight and
contribute decisive air and space assets across the theater and around the globe.
Expertly trained and highly skilled men and women are the backbone of the
nation's Air Force. Today, our Service has 396,000 members on active duty, 188,000
members in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and 186,000 civilians. This
year, 81,000 are forward stationed overseas and on average nearly 13,000 airmen are
deployed in support of exercises and contingencies worldwide. Of that latter group, nearly
9,000 are currently deployed, and we anticipate that number increasing as we support
major contingency operations overseas, such as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, and Air
Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments. These forces demonstrate U.S. commitment and
resolve-not over the horizon, but in direct contact~24-hours a day.
When called, the talented and professional men and women of the nation's Air
Force respond. During the past year, that meant delivering medical supplies to Albania,
flood relief to Germany, and earthquake relief to Japan. It also included supporting
United Nations (UN) mandates in Operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE,
DELIBERATE FORCE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR over Bosnia; Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT over Northern Iraq; Operation SOUTHERN WATCH over Southwest Asia;
Operation SAFE BORDER patrolling the border separating Ecuador and Peru; Operation
JTF-BRAVO in Honduras; Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and SEA SIGNAL in
the Caribbean; and supporting the UN Mission in Haiti.
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The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have played an important role in
supporting contingency operations. As the pace of operations increase, we rely even more
on our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve partners. They serve side-by-side with
active duty airmen, performing the full range of missions that support joint and
multinational operations. Theater commanders welcome the contributions of our Guard
and Reserve units because they know these outfits are well equipped and expertly trained.
With the dedication of our citizen airmen and with initiatives like associate flying
programs, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are integral to the success of the
Total Force.
Air Force civilians are also key members of our Total Force team. From the
flightline to the control room to the launch pad to the headquarters, our civilians give us
functional expertise and institutional stability— they are our corporate memory. Some
deploy with our combat forces, while others provide stability at home as our military
forces deploy. In addition, as service members move between assignments, our senior
civilians provide continuity in leadership, particularly during periods of high turnover.
Together, we will carry the nation's Air Force into the next century.
Global Reach-Global Power
Whether conducting operations in peacetime, in times of crisis, or in war, we are
fully committed to supporting the CINCs-the nation's warfighters. The air and space
capabilities our airmen bring to the joint team are in higher demand than ever. We have
maintained these capabilities even while reducing our overall force structure. We
succeeded because we started with a clear strategic vision. That vision. Global Reach-
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Global Power, sharpened our focus on our core air and space contributions to the
National Military Strategy, allowing us to prioritize our modernization investments and
shape our force drawdown.
The principles underlying Global Reach-Global Power-Sustain Deterrence,
Provide Versatile Combat Forces, Supply Rapid Global Air Mobility, Control the High
Ground, Build U.S. Influence—proved successful during Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM. Since then, that national strategy has been more rigorously tested
by global involvement in operations in Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti. It has
also been tested here at home in California, Texas, Florida, New York, Oklahoma, along
the banks of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, in Puerto Rico, and elsewhere, fighting
fires, delivering relief supplies, and responding to natural disasters. Reflecting an
operations tempo (OPTEMPO) far beyond our Cold War norm, these and other
operations involve tens of thousands of flying hours and the sacrifices of many military
members and their families. With these as examples, we remain confident that Air Force
capabilities will continue to serve our nation well into the next century.
Consequently, with last year's updated National Military Strategy, focusing on
"flexible and selective engagement," we are more certain than ever that our guiding
construct hit the mark. Today, the nation's Air Force-Active, Guard, Reserve, and
civilian-is fully prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. Since the 1992 update of our
vision, we have added Information Dominance to the original five objectives to explicitly
reflect the importance the Air Force places on controlling and exploiting information.
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These six objectives serve as the building blocks we use for planning and programming
future forces.
Sustain Deterrence
Our air and space forces are key to deterring hostile actions against the United
States, our aUies, and our vital interests. This is as true today as it was during the Cold
War. Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of national security. We provide the
National Command Authorities a ready and responsive ICBM force in addition to a
nuclear-capable, long-range bomber force. We also provide a reliable warning network, a
secure and survivable command and control capability, an effective attack
characterization and assessment capability, and dependable strategic reconnaissance
platforms. All these assets contribute to the credibility and effectiveness of America's
nuclear deterrent force.
Our versatile fighters and long-range bombers also offer the nation a strong,
credible conventional deterrent. Their conventional munitions can stop an aggressor in his
tracks. Our bombers can employ while other forces are still deploying. Conventional
upgrades to our bomber force combined with acquisition of a family of smart munitions,
particularly the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW),
and Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), will enable our forces to attack a
variety of targets anywhere in the world, day or night, in good weather or bad, within
hours of tasking.
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Provide Versatile Combat Forces
The Air Force offers the quickest response and longest range forces available to
the President in a fast-breaking crisis. We can deter, deploy for influence, or rapidly
employ with lethal force anywhere in the world. Air Force bombers can launch from the
U.S. and reach any point on the globe with precise, lethal strikes in 20 hours. We vividly
demonstrated our long reach in July 1995 when the men and women of Dyess AFB,
Texas, launched and recovered two B-ls that flew non-stop around-the-world while
delivering ordnance on military training ranges in Italy, Korea, and Utah.
Our bomber roadmap is coming together. With continued upgrades, our planned
bomber force of B-52s, B-ls, and B-2s will sustain deterrence, provide flexible,
sustainable long-range combat power, and demonstrate resolve with their global presence
capabilities well into the next century. As our highest mid-term modernization priority,
the integration of precision munitions and other conventional upgrades to our bomber
fleet will provide the U.S. with a high leverage force by the turn of the century. The B-2,
for example, will have an accurate capability with the GATS/GAM (GPS-aided Targeting
System/GPS-aided Munition) this July: furnishing us a near term capability to
independently target 16 separate aimpoints on a single pass. Our modem bombers provide
a force we can capitalize on for the defense of the nation, rapid crisis response, and
warfighting. Air Force bombers provide the NCA with a unique long-range, lethal
precision strike capability no other force can match.
Our rapidly deployable fighter forces provide us the staying power to overwhelm
an opponent's forces, infrastructure, and command elements. To maintain the robustness
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of our fighter forces and continue to support high-tempo, worldwide operations, we must
continue our ongoing F-15E and F-16 recapitalization programs and fleetwide high-
leverage system enhancement efforts.
In September 1995, NATO air operations in Bosnia-Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE—once again proved airpower can have a decisive role when serving achievable,
clear policy objectives. Airpower's efforts in helping to lift the siege of Sarejevo saved
lives and helped pave the way for a negotiated settlement. Our successes over Bosnia
have also demonstrated the expanded range of military options available to our nation's
leaders when we have unquestioned air dominance.
Indeed, air superiority provides the shield that makes all other operations feasible.
During World War II, all sides learned that air superiority was necessary to conduct
ground operations successfully. From the beaches of North Africa and Normandy to the
amphibious landing at Inchon, from the valiant defense of Khe Sanh to the famous "left
hook" during the Gulf War—American air superiority proved vital. Maintaining air
superiority in a major conflict or a lesser contingency requires operations deep within
hostile airspace to eliminate enemy opportunities to conduct long-range reconnaissance,
launch stand-off weapons, or to gain any other benefit from air operations. The F-22
incorporates revolutionary advances in airframe, engine and avionics technology,
ensuring the Air Force retains the critical combat edge in air superiority.
The F-22 is the first-and the only to date-major weapons system designed to
incorporate the full potential of the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)." Today all
the Services are seeking to understand the impact of the RMA. While others debate the
effects of the RMA, the Air Force is directly investing in it. Clearly, in contrast to other
more evolutionary weapons programs, the F-22 represents a quantum leap in capability
for the CINCs.
The F-22 will combine stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics in a highly
maneuverable platform that will be able to deploy rapidly to heavily defended enemy
territory and achieve first-look/first-shot/first-kill. Stealth will enable the F-22 to gain
surprise by entering combat undetected. Supercruise will allow the F-22 to range the
battlefield rapidly and more effectively employ its weapons. Integrated avionics,
including on and off-board multi-sensor collection and data fusion, will provide the pilot
an unprecedented level of situational awareness. Two-dimensional thrust vectoring will
greatly enhance the F-22's maneuverability, permitting a quick reaction to airborne and
surface threats. Together, the F-22's stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics will give
America the most advanced, practical, and potent weapon system for ensuring freedom of
operation and minimizing risk and casualties wherever military forces operate.
Many of the technological advances that are making the F-22 revolutionary also
serve as critical components for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)"0ur F-16 replacement.
Previously known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST), JSF will likely serve
as the foundation for other future aircraft designs. The F-22 and JSF will help us retain
America's aerial combat advantage. So will improvements we are making to the current
family of smart weapons.
In addition to advanced systems, we will continue to require fully trained, combat
ready aircrews. To keep our forces fit to fight, we must have access to training ranges.
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That access depends on cooperative use arrangements with those who have competing
interests for the same land and airspace. For our part, we are committed to responsible
custodial care, preserving the environmental and cultural uniqueness of our nation's
resources. To guarantee that our combat aircrews remain prepared to meet the security
needs of our nation, assured access to local training ranges and airspace is an Air Force
priority.
Supply Rapid Global Air Mobility
America's air mobility fleet gives our nation the speed and agility to respond to the
full range of contingencies~from airlifting or airdropping troops and equipment during a
crisis to delivering supplies after a natural disaster. No other nation in the world has this
capability.
Our airlifters and tankers offer the CINCs the ability to influence operations
throughout the theater. Our air mobility aircraft can deploy fighting forces or provide
humanitarian assistance worldwide. They enable support forces to remain airborne longer
and combat forces to strike deeper. They airdrop or insert troops and equipment, sustain
operations throughout the theater, provide lift for critical supplies, and provide emergency
aeromedical evacuation.
To ensure we maintain these capabilities, we must modernize the fleet. Our
workhorse for the last 30 years, the C- 141, has served us well but is nearing the end of its
service life. That is why the C- 17 is our highest priority near-term modernization
program.
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The November 1995 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decision to procure 120
C-17s was the right one for the nation. The C-17 will ensure we can meet airlift
requirements during major regional contingencies-especially during the crucial first 30
days. With its ability to operate from small airfields and in hostile environments, to
deliver oversize and outsize cargo to forward operating areas, and to increase throughput
to the region, the C-17 is an essential resource for the warfighter. It has already proven its
worth in operations from the Caribbean to Bosnia.
In February, the DAB made another decision that is right for the nation: it
approved a C-17 multi-year procurement plan. This seven-year contract completes the Air
Force requirement for 120 C-17 aircraft at the lowest possible price-clearly, this is the
best value for America. Acquisition streamlining initiatives have already dramatically
reduced the cost of the C-17. This multi-year procurement proposal crowns our successful
cost reduction effort. By providing contractors and subcontractors with a stable, extended
buy profile, we will be able to obtain significant efficiencies over the course of this
program. This contract, if approved, will save the nation nearly $900 million.
We are also ensuring our other mobility assets remain viable. For example, we are
modifying the Air Force' s KC- 1 35 air-refueling fleet and the C-5 force to improve
performance, reduce maintenance required, and reduce operating costs.
Control The High Ground
The nation's Air Force exploits air and space to provide access to any point on the
earth's surface. This capability gives us an extraordinary military advantage. Indeed, our
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space systems have become an indispensable part of our versatile combat forces. For that
reason, the Air Force is pursuing a number of key space modernization programs.
Not unlike the airlift needed to bring combat and support forces to the fight,
spacelift deploys critical space systems into orbit. The nation depends on routine,
affordable, and reliable access to space, but current spacelift is too expensive. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program will provide affordable spacelift
to military and commercial users. For the military, affordable spacelift will facilitate
replacement of older space platforms, such as Defense Support Program (DSP), as they
reach the end of their service life. In the case of DSP, we are already pursuing its
replacement, the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Component, to meet the
increasing demands of theater ballistic missile warning.
More than in most technical areas, space technology has historically seen a
blurring of the lines between military and civilian use. The widespread commercial use of
the Global Positioning System (GPS) is one example. In a bit of role reversal, however,
the Global Broadcast System (GBS) is borrowing from commercial innovations to satisfy
military requirements. As the DoD executive agent for multi-user space systems, the Air
Force proposes to lead this fast track program through a series of three phases, including
buying commercial direct-broadcast services, flying a GBS package on other DoD
satellites, and finally launching our own objective system to fulfill all joint user wide
band communication requirements. Managing the GBS program from within our Military
Satellite Communications Program Office will ensure maximum synergy with other high
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value military satellite communication programs, such as ME^TAR and Defense
Satellite Communications System.
The establishment of the DoD Space Architect, to work closely with the
Intelligence Community Space Architect, has been a key step toward a future, fully
integrated space capability for the nation. This step, building upon previous close
cooperation efforts like the SBIRS Study, holds the promise of reducing architecture costs
and laying the groundwork for integrated development and acquisition of future space
forces.
Ensure Information Dominance
Dominating the information spectrum has become as critical to warfare as
occupying the land or controlling the air. In military operations, information is a weapon
used not only to support other operations but also to attack the enemy directly. Within
today's information domain, events are seen and felt at the speed of light. If we can
analyze, assess, and act faster than our adversary, we will win. As the DoD executive
agent for Theater Air Defense Battle Management Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I), the Air Force commits time, energy, and resources
to maintain this critical edge over potential adversaries.
At the heart of this process is information— collected, processed, and distributed
through a joint BMC4I architecture. This "system of systems" consists of Air Force space
platforms such as MILSTAR and GPS; aircraft such as the U-2, RC-135, Joint STARS,
AW ACS, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs); and ground command and control
elements comprising the Theater Air Control System. During Operation DELIBERATE
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FORCE, this iiftegrated joint BMC4I architecture significantly increased the situational
awareness of U.S. and NATO political leaders and military forces. This awareness
improved our capacity to shape events on the ground and to respond rapidly as each
situation required.
Rapid technological improvements in storing, processing, and disseminating data
have sparked a greater emphasis on the role of information operations in warfare. The Air
Force recently published Cornerstones of Information Warfare to provide a sound
doctrinal basis for exploiting information capabilities while addressing our own
vulnerabilities. The recently activated 609th Information Warfare Squadron at Shaw Air
Force Base, South Carolina will be responsible to a Joint Forces Air Component
Commander (JFACC) for coordinating a vast array of in-theater information
requirements. It will orchestrate how we exploit information to support traditional
operations, how we protect our own information architectures, and how we plan to attack
an enemy's information capabilities. An important part of this squadron's responsibilities
will include the ability to "reach back" for specific tools provided by the Air Force
Information Warfare Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas and the Air Force Space
Warfare Center at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado.
Build U.S. Influence
The core capabilities provided by the Air Force allow the NCA to extend a
helping hand, to use airpower for diplomatic and humanitarian purposes, and to support
other U.S. objectives worldwide. Indeed, the first arrival of U.S. airlifters demonstrates
commitment and resolve few can ignore. This presence is real and it extends across the
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globe. To put it into perspective, in 1994 the U.S. Transportation Command
(USTRANSCOM) executed the equivalent of five Berlin airlifts in support of operations
in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti. During the past year, we have kept
up the same pace, supporting UN mandates in Iraq and Bosnia and conducting
humanitarian mission around the world.
Global access and influence ultimately depend on the bonds of alliance and
international cooperation. Partnership-for-Peace (PFP) is one of many initiatives the Air
Force supports that underscore this conviction. The forward stationing of our forces, on-
going contingency operations, and multi-national exercises create numerous opportunities
to strengthen alliances and project U.S. influence. The Air Force, through the Air
National Guard, also supports the National Guard State Partnership Program, linking U.S.
states to Central and Eastern European nations. These efforts join International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and technical training initiatives, such as the Inter-
American Air Forces Academy, and combine with the work our security assistance
personnel and air attaches do around the globe to foster stability, sustain hope, and
provide relief. Efforts like these are samples of Air Force programs that pay direct
dividends by building trust and cooperation among our friends and allies.
Building the Future Air Force
As stewards of the nation's air and space forces, we have produced forces that are
ready, versatile, and tailored to support our National Security Strategy. We will continue
to execute our responsibilities with the disciplined approach we have followed in the past.
This approach is based on four key commitments:
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• We will define our operational requirements and provide national capabilities
with a clear vision of what we contribute to the U.S. military's joint team.
• We will fill those requirements with a lean and agile acquisition system.
• We will recruit quality people and ensure they are trained and motivated to
operate in a disciplined manner and to exhibit and respect Service core values.
• We will ensure our people and their families have the quality of life they
deserve as they serve our nation.
Balanced, Time-Phased Modernization
In 1990, the Air Force undertook a thorough analysis of its future potential
contributions to national security. The result was Global Reach-Global Power, which we
published in 1990. In 1993, the Department of Defense conducted a bottom-up review
(BUR) of our National Military Strategy. The BUR confirmed one of the basic premises
of Global Reach-Global Power: "The likelihood that U.S. military forces will be called
upon to defend U.S. interests in a lethal environment is high, but the time and place are
difficult to predict." Events since 1993 have confirmed this assumption.
The strategic planning effort we accomplished after the Cold War focused the Air
Force on core air and space contributions to the National Military Strategy, helping us
prioritize modernization investments and shape our force structure. By drawing down
forces early we have been able to maintain ready forces to support a key component of the
BUR strategy, to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts, while
retaining the ability to respond to a wide range of lesser contingencies, without
abandoning our modernization priorities.
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To make the most of the nation's investment, the Air Force carefully constructed a
time-phased modernization plan that synchronizes the sizing and timing of multiple
programs. This approach helped us achieve our modernization objectives without creating
"bow waves" in out-year budget requirements. In the past, the "bow waves" were the
result of "small changes" in programs to achieve short-term savings. These "small
changes" often resulted in large costs and disruption of numerous programs in the out-
years.
Our time-phased approach covers near-term, mid-term, and long-term efforts.
Coupling time-phasing with aggressive acquisition reform initiatives ensures that the Air
Force will continue to provide our nation a broad range of capabilities at an affordable
price.
Near-Term Priorities
Our CINCs identify strategic lift, air and sea, as DoD's greatest single deficiency.
In response to this need, the C-17 is the Air Force's foremost near-term modernization
priority.
Our C- 14 Is are showing signs of age. At the same time, demand for airlift has
increased. Based on a comprehensive analysis of strategic and tactical airlift
requirements, aircraft and contractor performance, and cost effectiveness, the DAB
recommended that we plan, program, and budget for the procurement of 120 C-17s. Our
plan includes taking advantage of a stable multi-year procurement contracting
environment at high production rates to offer substantial savings for C-17 acquisition.
This will not only provide a savings, but also will enable us to fill the gap in needed airlift
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sooner and finish the 120 airframe C-17 procurement prior to the peak expense years for
the F-22.
The C-17 has been flying operational missions since October 1994, supporting
operations in Southwest Asia, Panama, the Virgin Islands, and now in Bosnia.
Concurrently, our acquisition program has exceeded expectations with the last 12 aircraft
delivered to the Air Force ahead of schedule. The success of last year's Reliability,
Maintainability, and Availability Evaluation (RM&AE) is solid proof of the aircraft's
performance. The C-17 exceeded all key performance parameters during this rigorous
thirty-day evaluation. It is clear, this is the right airplane at the right time.
In addition to these efforts to upgrade our mobility forces, we must continue to
sustain the health of our combat forces until the arrival of our next generation forces,
particularly the F-22 and JSF. To this end, we are continuing to recapitalize our F-15E
and F-16 fleets. We are also pursuing modernization upgrades to our fighter forces and
purchasing enhanced conventional munitions, such as JDAM and sensor-fused weapons,
to improve their effectiveness.
Mid-Term Priorities
Conventional bomber upgrades and smart munitions improvements are Air Force
mid-term modernization priorities.
The B-2 will give America a credible capability to penetrate advanced defenses
and conduct precision strikes-nuclear and conventional~any where in the world. The B-1
will supplant the B-52 as the workhorse of our bomber fleet, while the B-52 will continue
to provide a nuclear hedge and offer long-range stand-off
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Bomber upgrade programs are helping us integrate our newest conventional
weapons onto all our bombers. These upgrades will give our non-stealthy B-52s and B-ls
multiple target, stand-off, precision strike capabilities as well as increase their
survivability. The combination of highly capable B-2s with upgrades to our existing
bombers provides an affordable approach to maintain the minimum overall long-range
strike capability required to "swing" between two Major Regional Conflicts.
Critical to the effectiveness of our bombers and our fighters is the continued
development and procurement of smart and precision guided weapons. Stand-off, smart
weapons extend the range, increase the lethality, and improve the survivability of older
and newer aircraft alike. The JDAM, JSOW, and JASSM provide a balanced and
affordable approach for increasing the versatility and lethality of Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft.
JDAM will significantly improve our ability to conduct adverse-weather, round-
the-clock operations. JDAM adds an Inertial Navigation System and GPS-guided nose
and tail kit to the MK-84 general purpose and BLU-109 penetrator bombs. JSOW is a
1000 pound class accurate glide weapon which provides us a low cost option for
attacking highly defended targets from intermediate stand-off ranges. JASSM is a
precision long-range stand-off weapon designed to penetrate and attack targets in high
threat areas. JASSM will significantly increases our capability to hit critical, high value
targets in the early stages of a conflict.
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Long-Term Priorities
The F-22 is our most important long-term modernization priority-the need for air
superiority is unquestioned. The F-22 will guarantee air superiority well into the next
century. Its airframe and powerplant provide a highly maneuverable stealth platform
capable of extended supersonic flight. Revolutionary integrated avionics~on-and off-
board multi-sensor collection and data-fusion-will provide F-22 pilots unequaled
battlespace awareness. The unique capabilities of the F-22 will enable the Air Force to
dominate aerial environments-operating at will over hostile or contested territories,
attaining unprecedented first-look, first-shot, first-kill successes, while protecting the
many high-value assets necessary for success in modern military operations.
We have sized and sequenced the F-22 Program to meet critical warfighting
requirements at a cost the nation can afford. This sequencing is critical. When the F-22
meets its initial operational capability in 2005, it will replace the F-lSC-a 35 year old
weapon system that will no longer be able to counter the full range of operational threats
it was designed for. Furthermore, the F-22 will be cheaper to operate, require fewer
personnel to operate, and require less airlift to deploy abroad. We made a substantial
long-term investment commitment to achieve these revolutionary improvements and
ensure we retain air superiority. Non-programmatic reductions will undermine the
program stability necessary to control costs and maintain affordability. Already, during
the course of the program, these reductions have increased program costs 2.5 to 3 times
over the amount of the funds removed. Funding stability continues to be a major concern
for the future of the F-22 program.
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JSF is another critical Air Force long-term modernization effort. When the first
operational JSF aircraft become available in 2008, they will begin replacing our fleet of
F-16s, which entered service in 1979 and will be increasingly vulnerable in future threat
environments. Operationally, the F-22 and JSF are designed to be complementary. In fact,
JSF will rely on the F-22 to provide day one air superiority. Technologically, advances
that make the F-22 revolutionary—in avionics, composites, engines, and signature
reduction-are being heavily leveraged into the JSF, thereby reducing risk and cost and
increasing weapon system commonality. The JSF program will result in a family of
affordable fighter aircraft capable of meeting the future warfighting requirements of the
Air Force, Navy, and the Marine Corps. The affordability and versatility of JSF may also
provide the most attractive alternative to many of our allies and coalition partners as they
seek to modernize their existing fleets of fighter aircraft in the next century. The JSF team
has developed a basic framework for international participation. Already, we have entered
into an agreement through which the United Kingdom will contribute $200 million to
share in the development costs of the concept demonstration. JSF has the potential to
become the world's standard multi-role fighter of the 21st century.
The Air Force plan to acquire the CV-22 for Air Force Special Operations Forces
(AFSOF) complements conventional deep strike assets, such as the F-22 and JSF, by
providing long range combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) as well as deep battle airlift. The
CV-22' s speed, extended range, and survivability will significantly increase the
warfighting CINCs' ability to exfiltratc personnel from denied territory. These inherent
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advantages will reduce dependence on refueling while providing a greater range of
options for Special Operations employment.
The next century will also bring advances in the numbers and varieties of threats.
While the F-22, JSF, and CV-22 will provide the CINCs potent offensive tools to counter
those threats, the Airborne Laser (ABL) will provide an equally potent defensive tool.
Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the potential of theater ballistic
missiles to serve as an effective delivery means for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Our current approach to counter this threat integrates complementary capabilities from
the different Services to create a multi-tiered defense consisting of attack operations,
boost-phase interceptors, and terminal defenses. We have programmed $700 million in an
ABL over the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). ABL will provide a boost-
phase intercept capability to destroy ballistic missiles over an aggressor's territory. The
prospect of WMD debris falling on an enemy's own forces or people may serve as a
strong deterrent to WMD use.
On-Going Priorities
Several modernization programs transcend our time-phased approach. Along with
the Department of the Navy, we are procuring a new training alrcraft~the Joint Primary
Aircraft Training System (JPATS). The recently selected Beech Mkll aircraft meets or
exceeds every Air Force and Navy requirement at an affordable life-cycle cost. With its
pressurized cabin, advanced navigation suite, and state-of-the-art propulsion system, the
JPATS will better prepare our future pilots to fly advanced aircraft. Acquisition of JPATS
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will improve commonality with the Navy, support on-going efforts to consolidate Air
Force and Navy flight training, and improve overall training safety.
Air Force modernization programs also reflect the need to provide the nation
continuous, assured access to space. EELV will help us maintain that access. EELV is an
evolutionary launch system that will be designed to deploy a broad range of spacecraft
and support increasingly demanding launch requirements. It is expected to lower the cost
of both military and commercial access to space and ensure the long-term
competitiveness of America's commercial launch industry.
SBIRS is another key system that will improve the CENCs' ability to defend
against theater ballistic missiles. As a replacement for DSP, SBIRS will enable U.S. and
allied forces to detect targets, such as theater ballistic missiles, sooner and at lower
altitudes, enabling allied forces to destroy them at longer ranges. As a result, the
warfighter will possess an even greater ability to neutralize the theater ballistic missile
threat.
SBIRS is part of the information age technology that will give theater level
commanders increased opportunities to influence operations in real or near-real time.
With SBIRS, space-based cueing will be available for direct downlink to a variety of
offensive systems that can then destroy transport erector launchers immediately after
launch detection. This space-based cueing will also be available for boost-phase intercept
platforms, such as ABL, to intercept missiles early in flight and to ground and sea-based
terminal defense systems.
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While space systems, such as SBIRS, are designed to enhance our warfighting
capability, they also represent technologies that are important to our commercial partners.
Indeed, many key air, space, and information technologies are commercially based.
Information technologies have become increasingly important to military and civilian
users and permeate almost every level of C^I and combat weapons systems. Many of
these technologies, such as high-speed computers, distributive simulation, and
miniaturization, have migrated back and forth between military and commercial users.
Such information technologies can be a powerful force multiplier, offering offensive and
defensive applications. As a result, the Air Force is placing increased emphasis on
electronic combat and distributed information networks to enable decentralized execution
of air operations.
High Leverage Player on the Joint Team
We continue to enhance operational relationships with the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps in many areas, but nowhere are these ties more evident than in Air Force
platforms providing joint C'l. Air Force systems, such as AWACS, Joint STARS,
RC-135s, U-2s, UAVs, and theater battle management core systems, provide
comprehensive situation awareness, early warning, and detailed real-time targeting
information for all warfighters.
A large part of this C*! infrastructure is space-based. The Air Force continues to
launch and operate over 90% of DoD's space assets, including MILSTAR, the most
recent addition to our space-based C"! capability. MILSTAR provides a worldwide, anti-
jam, scintillation resistant, low-probability-of-intercept-and-detection communications
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capability for all warfighting forces. Often described as a switchboard in space,
MILSTAR can reconfigure immediately as warfighter connectivity needs change,
providing dynamic communication networks.
Of historic significance, in 1995 we inaugurated a new era of military C"! with the
first MILSTAR satellite-to-satellite information crosslinks. These crosslinks provide the
capability to transmit messages from a single fixed or mobile ground terminal to a
satellite, rout them through the satellite constellation, and transmit them directly to a
destination. Such crosslinks decrease our dependence upon an expensive and vulnerable
network of overseas ground relay stations.
Our interaction with the other services is not one-way. We also depend on key
capabilities they provide. By FY99, the Air Force will depend largely on the Navy's
EA-6B for stand-off jamming, replacing the EF- 111. Savings from this decision will
offset upgrade costs for the EA-6B. Similarly, the services share a responsibility to defend
against theater ballistic missiles. Army and Navy systems provide terminal defense
against theater ballistic missiles, while the Air Force concentrates on attack operations
and boost-phase intercept options to ensure the CINCs possess an effective defense
against theater ballistic missiles.
The Net Result
Our modernization plan, which supports our strategic vision of providing Global
Reach-Global Power for the nation, will enable us to keep providing force options across
the spectrum of conflict. We have made tough decisions, weighing technological
advantages against affordability.
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We have structured our programs for stability. Stability is vital to producing the
best systems at the lowest possible cost. Most importantly, we have carefully sequenced
our programs to balance year-to-year affordability concerns, readiness, and technical
feasibility.
This is the right plan to ensure the nation's Air Force continues to meet National
Military Strategy requirements.
Leariy Agile Acquisition
A key challenge to our vision is keeping pace with meteoric advances in essential
warfighting technologies. Acquisition processes designed under Cold War rules can no
longer respond quickly enough to benefit from radical shifts in design, much less from
technological breakthroughs. To take advantage of increasingly dynamic opportunities,
the Air Force is building a lean, agile acquisition system.
Adopting new processes is an important first step. Implementing these processes
requires overcoming embedded barriers to change, such as statutory and regulatory
constraints, cultural biases, and fear of the unknown. Most of these barriers are self-
induced and, as such, can be overcome through dedicated, innovative leadership. Others,
however, will be more difficult to master. Ultimately, the actions we take today will form
the foundation for the lean, agile acquisition system of the future.
Acquisition Reform
Nine Lightning Bolt Acquisition Reform Initiatives have fueled an acquisition
renaissance within the Air Force, building trust, empowering people, and strengthening
teamwork. Individually, each initiative has helped tear down specific barriers to progress.
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Together, they have created a momentum ensuring the Air Force provides timely,
affordable, and advanced systems to meet the needs of our warfighters.
One measure of the success of the Lightning Bolt Initiatives has been the number
of obsolete or redundant acquisition policies we have eliminated. Another measure is the
cost savings realized from streamlined processes. The true measure of success of these
reforms is the efficient, timely delivery of systems that meet the warfighters' requirements
at a cost the nation can afford. For instance, the F-22 has become a model acquisition
program.
The F-22 Team is using Engineering and Manufacturing Development (HMD)
proven, event-driven management techniques, such as performance based acceptance and
reduced dependency upon military specifications and standards. Additionally, the F-22
Team has implemented a lean manufacturing philosophy that provides a balance between
cost and risk. One element of the strategy is the level of concurrency between program
development and production. The F-22 program has scheduled significant ground and
flight test activities in advance of the initiation of low-rate production. When a Defense
Science Board review in 1995 compared the F-22 to other fighter development programs,
they reported the degree of concurrency in the F-22 program appears not only reasonable,
but in many ways, more conservative than the other programs. Based on the current status
of the program, the cost and schedule risk of an extended HMD program outweighs any
concurrency risk. Tying it all together, the F-22 program successfully uses Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) merging stakeholders from all disciplines and ensuring that designs
strike the proper balance between cost, performance, and supportability. This close
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govemment-to-contractor working relationship gives government personnel a superior
degree of insight into the status of the program down to the lowest level.
We have also seen results in several of other programs, including JDAM, GPS,
PACER CRAG, and Peace Shield. The JDAM program supports the requirement to
provide bomber and fighter aircraft an adverse weather, medium and high altitude attack
capability against fixed or relocatable land and maritime targets. Thanks to a streamlined
acquisition process, we have accelerated the JDAM program, increased JDAM's warranty
from five years to twenty, and reduced the average unit price to $14,000. This places
crucial, advanced systems in the hands of the warfighters one year earlier than requested
with a total savings of $2.9 billion.
GPS is a space-based, all-weather system providing reliable and accurate
worldwide positioning, navigation, and precision timing through 24 satellites and
associated ground control stations to an unlimited number of military and civil users.
During Operation DESERT STORM, the U.S. Army needed a highly reliable and
accurate method of navigating in the harsh desert environment. The joint GPS team
orchestrated the rapid purchase of commercial off-the-shelf receivers and quickly
delivered this equipment to the field in time for the ground offensive.
Another example is PACER CRAG. This program includes modifications and
additions to the KC-135 aircraft's GPS, radar, and compass. This modification, among
other things, makes it possible to reduce the KC-135 cockpit crew from three to two. In
addition to manpower savings, this will significantly enhance KC-13S reliability and
maintainability. Our PACER CRAG team has used all available tools within the
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acquisition community to reduce reporting requirements and to eliminate unnecessary
military standards and specifications. We applied the resulting savings of approximately
$90 million to other unfunded KC-I35 modernization programs.
The Peace Shield program is another acquisition reform success story. This
advanced command, control, and communication system for the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia provides an example of how we can downsize by identifying a program's core
requirements, creating a fixed program baseline, and resisting the constant urge to update.
In addition, every personnel position had a sunset clause tied to the completion of a
milestone or a task. These reform efforts enabled a program that began behind schedule in
October 1992 to deliver a completed system to the customer six months ahead of
schedule. Peace Shield also reduced its System Program Office (SPO) size from 325 to
105, saving over $25 million in personnel costs.
Improving Business Practices
Beyond reforming our internal acquisition processes, the Air Force has pursued
other solutions to more efficiently and effectively meet requirements.
We have moved increasingly into cooperative programs with industry, our sister
Services, other government agencies, and our allies. Most of our programs~for example,
C-17, EELV, SBIRS, MILSTAR, and most of our Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
programs-have joint users. Two major programs go beyond that and have been structured
as joint acquisition programs: the JPATS and the JSF programs. By combining
acquisition efforts we have been able to decrease costs and improve manpower savings.
JPATS made this a reality. JSF offers similar opportunities. With JSF, we have agreed to
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divide expenses and expertise equally with the Department of the Navy and have
concluded arrangements with the United Kingdom, allowing early fmancial and
developmental participation in the JSF program. This approach will facilitate the
development of an affordable multi-role aircraft.
We also have joint-service and international cooperative Science and Technology
(S&T) efforts underway that will make significant contributions to joint warfighting. For
example, we are currently conducting joint S&T programs with France and Germany in
the field of ducted rockets, a technology crucial to extending the range of air-to-air
missiles. Additionally, we are working with the Navy and with multinational partners on
a new system to expand the escape envelope and increase the occupant size range for our
ejection seats.
When we began to break down the barriers between the "defense" and
"commercial" sectors of the economy, we discovered new opportunities to better use the
nation's resources. Clearly, our nation can no longer sustain two separate industrial bases
for military and civilian requirements. Therefore, we are moving toward cooperative
arrangements to integrate military and commercial activities. Over the past twelve
months, this approach has proven quite successful.
During 1995, the Air Force approved leases and awarded dual-use launch grants
for commercial space ventures at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. In fact, over the next three years, Air Force launch
pads will support more commercial than military satellite launches. Similarly, our EELV
program is taking both the military and commercial sector to the next generation of
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spacelift capability. We have included commercial-sector members on the EELV
acquisition team, removed unnecessary layers of management, and eliminated overly
restrictive military specifications (MILSPECS) from the program. Private sector
involvement is particularly crucial for this program because we expect the EELV to
satisfy the needs of the military and bolster U.S. industry's competitive position in the
world space-launch market.
Commercialization policies, outlined in the Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, require DoD to rely on private
sector sources for goods and services. Since 1979, outsourcing has produced operating
savings of more than $500 million annually.
Outsourcing is not a new way of doing business for the Air Force~we have been
on the cutting edge for decades. Our policy is clear: outsource where and when it is most
cost effective.
One major challenge will be privatizing major portions of our depot maintenance
capabilities, concentrating on those efforts which do not have wartime surge
requirements. Our pathfinder privatization project is at Newark Air Force Base, Ohio.
Newark was closed by the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. We selected
a privatization-in-place option for Newark because moving workloads to other organic
depots posed significant operational and economic challenges.
Currently, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is aggressively evaluating Air
Force-wide depot workload as the first step in privatizing depot maintenance work at
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, and McClellan Air Force Base, California. Already AFMC
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has begun to identify pilot programs to gain an increased understanding of the benefits
and the drawbacks to privatization.
Expanding Access for Small Businesses
An unexpected benefit garnered from the acquisition renaissance has been an
increase in business opportunities for smaller commercial ventures. Since small
businesses frequently lack the resources or expertise to tap into these opportunities, we
challenged ourselves to improve access, increase awareness, and ease availability for
America's small businesses. We predicated our efforts on a simple belief—all businesses
should have equal access to Air Force procurement opportunities. As a result, the Air
Force leads DoD and much of the entire federal government in support to small
businesses. Our Small Business efforts center around the Air Force Marketing
Information Package (AFMIP). AFMIP provides the Air Force Long Range Acquisition
Estimate (LRAE) for FY96 and beyond in the form of practical "how to" guidance on
selling to the Air Force. AFMIP also includes the full text of the Air Force Mentor-
Protege Handbook and information on international and domestic commercial
diversification. In addition to AFMIP, the Air Force has continued its support for the
Interagency Committee On Women's Business Enterprise (lACWBE), expanding access
for women-owned businesses in Federal procurement opportunities.
Motivated, Disciplined People
The Air Force operates on the leading edge of technology and the tools of our
trade are lethal. Such a force requires motivated, disciplined airmen led by superior
leaders. To ensure the nation's Air Force continues to be the world's premier air and space
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force, we recruit and train quality people, nurture leaders, and embrace unambiguous,
high standards.
Recruiting and Retention
The publicity surrounding the defense drawdown, skyrocketing college
enrollments, a youth population at its lowest level since the advent of the all-volunteer
force: these are the hurdles for recruiting new members. Yet, to maintain a balanced force
with the right distribution of rank, age, and skills, we must constantly replenish our ranks.
Therefore, we are closely monitoring the pool of potential recruits, tracking workforce
trends, and rewarding our recruits with top notch training, meaningful work, and a
lifetime of educational opportunities.
Aggressive recruiting expands the pool of potential talent and it ensures a
workforce that represents the total population. Continuing to attract qualified minorities
to the Air Force will sustain the future growth of an increasingly diverse population. It
also molds a workforce representative of society. Diversity brings credibility and
relevance to the Air Force. It also helps us weave our values into every fabric of society-
through the varied backgrounds of the sons and daughters who serve.
While attracting diverse populations to a workforce is essential, retaining them
matters just as much. We are convinced that putting people first is the best way we can
guarantee the readiness of our force. As a result, we are committed to providing and
maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our people and their families.
Thinking Globally-Training Locally
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As an essential ingredient of America's combat readiness, our airmen think
globally but train locally. That means Air Force training is designed to represent, as
accurately as possible, the environment, conditions, and experiences our men and women
would most likely face while participating in operations around the world. Such U-aining
requires use of a wide variety of land, sea, and air resources to create realistic and
representative circumstances.
To ensure access to such areas, we have developed cooperative use arrangements
with those who may have competing interests for the same land and airspace. Such
arrangements are predicated on responsible custodial care of these resources. Currently,
Air Force ranges incorporate over nine million acres. Sixty percent of this training space
is dual-use. shared by the military and the public. These ranges include managed forests,
farming and grazing areas, and protected wetlands. Additionally, we are minimizing the
use of hazardous materials, broadening recycling programs, and incorporating
environmental improvements into our aircraft designs.
We will continue to search for improved ways to execute our responsibilities and
steward our nation's resources.
Excellence in Command
Leadership is the foundation of our organization. We depend on our ability to
train, educate, and select our leaders and then provide an atmosphere where they can use
their talents toward mission accomplishment. As the demands of Air Force leadership
grow, and the issues facing our leaders become increasingly complex, it has become
necessary to improve the way we ensure our readiness to face these challenges. For
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instance, we are improving connmander selection and training processes. We have
designed a centralized system to provide all candidates for command equal consideration
and central screening of their records. This should ensure a fair and open system with the
best possible criteria for selection.
We have also instituted leadership courses to ensure our commanders are as well
prepared as possible for their new responsibilities and know what we expect of them.
Squadron, Group, and Wing Commander Courses are a first step. In addition, our
Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Senior NCO Academy
have included extra leadership and accountability case studies in their curricula.
Concurrently, across the Air Force we have vigorously reinforced the importance
of professionalism, accountability, and responsibility. Air Force leaders must focus on the
mission, demand professional standards of conduct, and hold people accountable if they
fail to meet these standards. We have provided specific guidelines for commanders that
link disciplinary and personnel actions while protecting the commander's prerogative.
Furthermore, we have emphasized the need for more stringent documentation of all
adverse actions, and we require evidence of those adverse actions at all accountability
points, such as promotions, evaluations, assignments, and decorations.
Unambiguous, High Standards
Technical competency, drive, diplomacy, and team-building skills are important
qualities for any leader. We will continue to require those skills from our commanders.
Just as crucial, however, are the personal qualities of integrity . . . service before self . . .
excellence in all we do. We've stressed the importance of these core values in our
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discussions with Air Force people at all levels. Our core values are the standard for our
behavior, our service to country, and our treatment of one another. All who wear the
uniform, especially our leaders, have a duty to live according to the values of this
institution. Personal values, professionalism, demanding standards, and accountability-
all flow from our vision of the future Air Force.
People First
To ensure we recruit and retain the right people, we will continue to reward the
challenges of this profession with an equitable quality of life. Readiness and quality of "
life are inseparable. That is why we put "People First."
This year we conducted the first ever hands-on, computerized Quality of Life
Survey of everyone in the Air Force. This survey identified strengths and weaknesses
among Service efforts to assure our people an acceptable quality of life. On a positive
note, many of our people intend to make the Air Force a career. On the other hand, many
had concerns, such as the high OPTEMPO of their units.
To assure a balanced approach, the Air Force continues to support its Quality of
Life Strategy, focusing on seven priorities: compensation and benefits, safe and
affordable housing, health care, balanced Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) and
OPTEMPO, community and family programs, retirement benefits, and educational
opportunities.
Compensation and Benefits
One of the fundamental requirements for maintaining an all-volunteer force is
ensuring fair and adequate military compensation. To help maintain a quality force, the
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Air Force supports full statutory pay raises through the FYDP as proposed in the
President's budget. In addition, for civilians, the Air Force supports pay equity with
industry through the locality pay provisions of the Federal Employees Pay Comparability
Act.
Housing
Like most Americans, members of the Air Force want to live and raise their
families in comfortable homes in secure neighborhoods. Unlike most Americans,
however, airmen must live where their orders take them in support of worldwide
deployments and contingencies. It is vital for all airmen, particularly junior members, to
have access to safe, affordable housing. Air Force people do not expect to live in luxury.
Simply, they want to be able to place their families in housing that will give them peace
of mind when they are deployed.
Unfortunately, there are insufficient quantities of quality housing to meet existing
and projected demand-currently, 39,000 families are on waiting lists to move into base
housing. The average age of Air Force housing is 33 years, with over 60,000 homes
requiring improvement or replacement. At current funding levels, it will take 24 years to
catch up with this backlog.
Our goal is to get well within the next 10 years. The solution is innovation, not
just increased investment. With the support of Congress, the Air Force could realize both
the flexibility and the authority to satisfy much of its housing needs through the private
sector, thereby reducing costly infrastructure and overhead.
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Dormitory improvements for single and unaccompanied personnel are another key
part of our housing problem. The Air Force strongly supports OSD's one-plus-one
standard for single and unaccompanied dorms, an initiative aimed at enhancing individual
performance while assuring personal privacy.
Health Care
Airmen rank quality health care for their families as their number one non-cash
benefit. To alleviate stresses on the military health care system and mitigate the financial
burden on military members, the Air Force supports the current TRICARE program. This
program requires neither user fees in Military Treatment Facilities nor enrollment fees for
active duty families. TRICARE is the only program in today's economic environment that
can assure military members and their families the broadest range of uninterrupted
medical coverage—and we are committed to making TRICARE work.
We are also concerned about quality dental care. While the family member dental
plan allows overseas family members to remain enrolled, there are no provisions under
the plan for overseas treatment. As a result, the Air Force supports the Overseas Family
Member E>ental Program (OFMDP), which is in place in Europe and soon will be
implemented in the Pacific.
Balanced PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO
The OPTEMPO for many of our units remains high-and it will only increase as
we are called upon to support additional contingency operations. Four times as many Air
Force people are deployed today as in 1989 enforcing no-fly zones, maintaining air
refueling bridges, supporting humanitarian operations on three continents, and helping
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stem the flow of illegal drugs. We are committed to supporting these operations.
Concurrently, we are working to reduce high PERSTEMPO to below the maximum
desired level of 120 deployed days per person per year.
The Air Force is employing three main initiatives to achieve this goal. First, we
are using global sourcing to balance the workload across all active duty Air Force units,
regardless of the theater to which they are assigned. Second, we are reducing taskings on
the systems where our people have the highest PERSTEMPO. That is, we prioritize tasks
to determine which missions we can support, offer substitutions, or request relief. Third,
we are using Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve volunteers to reduce active duty
taskings and are integrating them into additional mission areas, such as AW ACS, space
operations, and information warfare. Air Combat Command has developed a successful
scheduling process that has Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve participation in
contingency operations planned and programmed through 1998. As we rely more on Air
National Guard and Air Force Reserve people, we must be prepared to extend to them
appropriate services and benefits~to include those Guardsmen and Reservists serving on
active duty for less than thirty-one days. This requires improved guidance, full funding,
and advanced scheduling to maximize volunteer availability and to ensure we can offer
benefits and protections regardless of the duration of active service.
In a Spring 1995 survey, Air Force commanders and first sergeants said that
family readiness is directly tied to mission readiness. The Family Readiness Program
provides special emphasis on family separations through a variety of services, including
deployment preparation, support during separations, and reunion guidance. With the high
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number of deployments, these services have become an essential capability at many
bases. They must be continued to ensure we support our airmen and their families.
Community Support and Family Programs
Conununity support and family programs also help the Air Force recruit and retain
the right people. Our highest priority efforts in this area are to preserve commissary
benefits, expand child care, and expand Services' activities.
Coimnissary savings are vital to the entire military community and are ranked
second, behind health care, as the most valued non-cash benefit. Military members
depend on conunissaiy savings to extend already stretched military income.
The Air Force Child Development Program provides care for 45,000 children
daily in child development centers, family day care homes, and youth center programs.
The Air Force will continue to expand Air Force child care facilities to achieve the DoD
goal of 80% of the requirement.
Services' activities directly support unit readiness through programs that enhance
individual fitness, unit cohesion, and a sense of community. The Aii Force will continue
to expand and improve Services opportunities.
Retirement
The Air Force remains committed to the nation's military retirees. A solid
retirement benefits package compensates for the extraordinary demands we place on our
people over the course of a career.
We believe it is important to preserve the military retirement system. Reforms to
the military retirement system during the 1980s have reduced the lifetime value of retired
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pay for newer service members by as much as 26%. Further reductions in the net value of
retiree benefits could have a dramatic, negative impact on recruiting, retention, and
readiness.
Educational Opportunities
We also are committed to preserving and expanding educational opportunities.
Tuition assistance has proven a valuable recruiting and retention tool, providing our
airmen the means to obtain associate, undergraduate, and graduate degrees. The Air Force
supports maintaining current Air Force tuition assistance levels. At the same time, the
Montgomery GI Bill continues to be a success story. These self-improvement
opportunities serve not only as incentives to our people but also lift them to greater levels
of productivity. Ninety-five percent of those who enter the Air Force enroll in the
Montgomery GI Bill program. However, many of those wishing to enroll in the current
program are no longer eligible. For these, the Air Force is studying options to improve
their access to advanced education.
Toward The Horizon
The capabilities spelled out in our vision paper. Global Reach-Global Power, are
battle tested. They have enabled us to identify and build the unique contributions of air
and space power to joint warfare and the nation's defense. These objectives continue to
serve as our intellectual compass.
We are poised to accept the challenges ahead. We have strengthened our
commitment to Science and Technology (S&T), the foundation for Air Force
modernization, and we are celebrating the publication of New World Vistas, which
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identifies those technologies that will shape the Air Force of the 21st century. In addition,
we have built a team to help us ensure we achieve the clearest sense of our planning
horizon and institutionalize across-the-board long-range planning for the Air Force of
2023. With the benefit of experience, insight, and imagination, we will continue to
provide the nation the premier air and space force for the future.
Today, we are ready to fight and win our nation's wars. We have in hand those
modernization and training efforts necessary to sustain that capability in the decades
ahead. In the future as in the past, the nation's Air Force will provide Global Reach-
Global Power to help shape the world our children will live in.
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The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
Before we get into the questions, I would like to recognize the
power behind Secretary Dalton, his young wife, Mrs. Dalton. We
are pleased to have you with us this morning.
I will ask my questions a little bit later on, so we can go on and
get into the questions of other members.
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
I, too, would note the presence of a number of our colleagues, Mr.
Chairman. I would reserve and allow my colleagues to engage the
witnesses early on.
The Chairman. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank our Sec-
retaries for their being with us this morning and for their testi-
mony.
I am just going to make a general observation and then invite
your responses, and then I do have one specific programmatic mat-
ter I wanted to address to Secretary Dalton. I will bet he can guess
what it is.
The data that I am looking at in the memorandum before me in-
dicates another reduction, not increase, in procurement accounts.
While my principal concern, like yours, is the state of readiness of
our forces presently, as the chairman of the Readiness Subcommit-
tee, our forces are not going to be ready in the future if we don't
invest in the equipment that they are going to need in the future;
and we are starving, in my opinion, the procurement accounts.
I even have indications from the news media that the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs has expressed in some document a need for a
level of procurement budget that we thought was being promised
but which is not forthcoming. It is my view, and I think most of
us on the committee share that view, that we are drastically under-
funding modernization and procurement accounts generally and
that it has to be addressed.
You are obviously required to deal with whatever the White
House and 0MB present to you as your top-line figures, but we are
not; and something that I would suggest that you be ready for is,
if others do not, this Member is certainly going to be calling upon
you for your priorities, for what you need for modernization in
order that we can try to more adequately address your needs than
they have been addressed in the budget request.
Now for my specific question to Secretary Dalton, I waited to
hear you say something about submarines; and in all of the Navy
ship construction programs submarines were not mentioned. I take
it that was an inadvertent oversight; and I want the further reas-
surance that what you expressed in the brief letter to Senator War-
ner that you were kind enough to send to me, that it is the Navy's
plan and intention to go forward with the submarine construction
program that we worked out with so much difficulty, but ultimately
with such great success, and put in the fiscal year 1996 authoriza-
tion bill.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Bateman, I was in most of your offices
over the last year talking about the submarines, so we are clearly
committed to our submarine program. As directed by the fiscal year
1996 Defense Authorization Act, the Navy is preparing a plan for
399
building four ships in fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001.
This plan, to be provided to Congress later this month, by the
March 26, will identify the funding required to build these ships.
If the four-ship plan is funded by Congress, the Navy will con-
tract for the construction of the first and third ships at Electric
Boat in fiscal year 1998 and the year 2000, and the second and
fourth ships at Newport News Shipbuilding in the fiscal year 1999
and fiscal year 2001.
Before the Armed Services Committee hearing on March 5, Sec-
retary Perry agreed with Senator Warner, and also stated before
this committee, that the Department will work with Congress to
ensure the submarine funding profile supports fair and equal com-
petition in the next generation nuclear attack submarine program.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That is reassuring.
The thing, of course, that I find a little difficult, but I don't know
that there is anything you or I can do about it at this moment, is
the fact that the Navy and the Department of Defense are commit-
ted to the four-submarine program but we see a budget that in-
cludes none of the funding to implement that program in the con-
text of the 1999 and the 2001 submarine; and the program can't
be implemented without advanced procurement in order to meet
that schedule.
Secretary Dalton. As I indicated, Mr. Bateman, we plan to work
with the Congress with respect to that. As we discussed and as is
in the authorization bill for fiscal year 1996, there was discussion
of that program exceeding the President's budget; and we plan to
work with you with respect to that.
Mr. Bateman. Well, we, of course, understood when we put the
program together for the fiscal year 1996 budget that it exceeded
what was anticipated when that budget was submitted, but this is
a new budget that was submitted after the agreement and the un-
derstanding.
Now, as long as it ultimately gets done, I am not fussing with
you or quarreling with you; but it is passing strange to this mem-
ber that the administration agreed to a program, presented a budg-
et, but then included none of the funding to implement that par-
ticular program. I assume we are going to do it later. It would have
certainly made sense to me to have done it at the outset.
Secretary Dalton. We look forward to working with you on that,
sir.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. DeLauro. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. DeLauro. If I might, I just want to make one comment that
had to do with the submarines, and I don't want to interrupt any-
one else. I will be very quick about it. It just seemed appropriate
at this moment to mention it, just very, very, very quickly.
The Chairman. Very briefly, go ahead.
Ms. DeLauro. I want to, first of all, thank the Secretaries for
their testimony. I just wanted to add on to what my colleague from
Virginia has said.
There was a program laid out in the authorization. I am hoping,
in listening to the response of the Secretary, that we can continue
to have a discussion about this and also would hope that you will.
38-160 97 - 15
400
Mr. Secretary, reaffirm your strong support for Seawolf and for
moving ahead with a new attack submarine, for the completion of
the Seawolf. I look forward to talking with you and with my col-
leagues in Virginia so that we can see the program to fruition, as
we had all talked about and discussed in the past.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Montgom-
ery.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two of the three Secretaries, you have given us very strong
statements today. I really notice that you have a lot of confidence
in your jobs now, and you have been serving 3 years. All I can say
is congratulations.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you.
Mr. Montgomery. To you, Madam Secretary, thank you for
pushing the line on the C-17's. It is a wonderful aircraft, and it
is doing its job in Bosnia.
Mr. Secretary of the Navy, you mentioned in your points about
acquisition reform. Do you have any further comments on that?
Then I have a question for Secretary West.
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir, Mr. Montgomery. Acquisition reform
is one of those issues that doesn't have a lot of sponsorship per se,
parochial or otherwise; but it is one that is extremely important
and extremely exciting in terms of what we are doing in that area.
Acquisition reform is something that the Department of Defense is
committed to and the Department of the Navy. We are really em-
phasizing it a great deal and feel very good about some of the ob-
jectives we have set, some of the initiatives we have begun and
some of the accomplishments that we have realized.
First of all, with respect to Navy initiatives, we are implement-
ing new ways of doing business provided through the Federal Ac-
quisition Streamlining Act. We have established acquisition coordi-
nating teams to integrate requirements of the generation system,
the planning, programming and budgeting system, and acquisition
management. We have changed the logistic response time cycle re-
duction team and have been the leading effort with respect to OSD
in that area. We have a new road show that has been in Washing-
ton and San Diego and has got six more scheduled, working with
small- and medium-sized businesses.
As I mentioned in my statement, we had a CEO Department of
the Navy conference this past November with 100 CEO's of indus-
try and some high-level members of the Navy acquisition commu-
nity to see how we can streamline activity of delivering products
in a more cost-effective manner.
We have completed a review of the Department of the Navy mili-
tary specifications and standards. Of these 8,400 MILSPECS and
standards, 35 percent have been canceled, 30 percent are being re-
tained as performance-based inspection standards, and 10 percent
are being converted to commercial specs or standards, and 25 per-
cent are being retained as military-unique detail specs or stand-
ards. So I think this is an indication of where we are headed.
I think that, clearly, we are trying to have things happen at a
lower level, that managers can make decisions and implement
things, just such things as credit card usage; and with proper
401
guidelines we think it is going to significantly enhance that oppor-
tunity.
We have also prototyped the integrated product teams in the new
attack submarine program, the LPD-17 and the ship self-defense
system program. We have set up a management action plan which
we call a MAP. The four cardinal points on that MAP are leader-
ship, relationships, processes, and people.
I think Assistant Secretary John Douglas is doing a fine job in
leading that effort for us, and I am very optimistic about the re-
sults that will go to the benefit of building a stronger Department
and also benefit the taxpayer at the same time.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary of the Army, the Active Duty Army will receive in
this new budget $435 million in military construction. The Army
and the National Guard gets $8 million. They have about one-third
of the forces. What is the problem?
Secretary West. Mr. Montgomery, I don't think there is a prob-
lem there so much as it is an effort to set priorities for our require-
ments. The fact is that supporting the Guard, as you know, has
been a big priority both of the Department of Defense and of us in
the Army, too. I am not exactly certain about the numbers you just
mentioned, but I will say this: The National Guard has been and
continues to be an important part of our deployments and our read-
iness efforts. To the extent that that construction, as it does, re-
lates to ensuring the readiness of the Guard
Mr. Montgomery. Mr. Secretary, I meant to say earlier, all
three of the Secretaries have done a tremendous job on the total
force. The Reserves are there now. You can't even move without
them. So you have done a real good job. But I am worried about
only $8 million, no Army included, and you have the Army Reserve
and Army Guard, at least one-third of all of the missions in the
Army now, and they have got to have some military construction
money.
Secretary West. I understand, sir. But I do want to point out
that we have put a lot of resourcing into assuring that the Guard,
its divisions and its enhanced brigades are ready and able to par-
ticipate in all the deployments and all the calls that will be made
upon them. Underlying your comment to me is I think the realiza-
tion that we simply can't carry out all of these missions with just
the active components and that the Guard is an important part of
that.
Today, all of the divisions are deployable, are ready for deploy-
ment. The enhanced brigades, 12 of the 15 are deployable, are
ready for deployment. So I think we are making progress in being
alert to the points you make overall, but your point on construction
I take
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you. My time is up.
The Chairman. We will be pleased to yield another few minutes
to you to ask about the C-20 if you want to, Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. I will be glad to ask about the C-20.
I would like to ask the Secretary about this, the great airplane,
the C-20. It has been authorized and appropriated and we hope
continues to move forward and will not run into any bottlenecks of
402
being acquired. It is a cargo C-20, and it would go to the Reserves.
So that is what the chairman was talking about. Thank you.
Secretary WiDNALL. I don't have any comment at all. I will get
back to you on that issue.
The Chairman. Mr. Hansen.
Mr. Hansen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
state that I have the highest regard and respect for these three
Secretaries. I think you have done an admirable job, and I am al-
ways pleased to talk to them. So when I say that, anything I
have — I am not picking a fight with any one of you three, but I
may be picking a fight with someone that is a little higher up;
namely, the President of the United States.
You know, in the late 1980's a lot of us worked very diligently
on a base-closing bill, and a lot of us have pored over every sen-
tence of it, and we have had legal opinions of almost every sentence
of the base-closing bill. What is it that you have the right to do in
wearing the uniform — what does the OSD have the right to do,
what does the BRAC Commission have the right to do, what does
the President have the right to do and what does Congress have
the right to do?
I think that has been clearly spelled out. I could clearly state
that I think it is going to be even further spelled out, because there
are lawsuits being filed now; and that is the issue that I would like
to discuss with you at this point.
If you look at that Public Law, you will see it is very clear what
the right of the President is. The President has 15 days to say ei-
ther he rejects or accepts, period. He can't put a caveat on it and
say, well, I do, but — that is just not in the law. Then after he
makes one decision or the other, if he sends it back to the BRAC
Commission, they have to work again. If he sends it on to Con-
gress, they have 45 legislative days. Now, what does Congress get
the right to do? Exactly as the President: accept or reject.
In the last BRAC Commission, the President accepted, the Con-
gress accepted. However, the President cut a caveat on it that he
doesn't really have the right to do, and that goes to Secretary
Widnall in your five ALC's, probably the five biggest bases that we
probably have. In those particular instances, they decided that two
of those would be closed. They didn't say they would be privatized.
They said they would be closed.
Now, to make sure that we are on good legal ground on this, I
have in my hand the letter of two of the Commissioners. Commis-
sioner Steele: The Commission clearly did not intend to privatize
and place all of the workload from the two ALC's we voted to close.
Further on: Moreover, not allowing the remaining ALC's, all of
which rank higher in military value, to complete the additional
workload will cause them to become increasingly less cost competi-
tive in the future.
As difficult as it is to vote for the closure of two facilities of this
size and quality, the Commission voted 6 to 2 to do so because we
felt that it was in the best interests of the Air Force. If any Com-
missioner had offered a motion to privatize in place as the Presi-
dent proposes, I am 100-percent certain that such a motion would
have been defeated.
403
Commissioner Klink, in his letter: The Commission's review
clearly documented significant excess capacity in the five Air Force
ALC's. Privatization in place of all of the workload of Sacramento
and the San Antonio air logistic centers could result in little or no
savings to the Air Force by the closures. Further, it might result
in privatizing excess capacity rather than eliminating it and could
also miss the opportunity to improve the efficiency of the other
ALC's.
So here we have an interesting situation where the Sacramento
Bee, in their letter that they put out recently, talked in great detail
about the idea of the necessity of 54 electoral votes in California,
and I guess a person has that right. All I am saying — and I know
this is maybe something that you folks have to listen to, and I re-
spect you and appreciate you doing that, but keep in mind that I
am still waiting for Secretary Perry to give me the best legal opin-
ion he has that gives him the right to do it.
Also, on that same yardstick, if he has the right to do it, then
every Member of Congress has that same right, because the lan-
guage is identical. Fifty-nine other spaces, those other people may
feel they would just as soon privatize. But we have a situation, as
I read the things about the five ALC's, that they are operating at
about 48 percent capacity. I have also heard over my many years
in Congress that it should be around 70 percent capacity. So I can-
not understand why anyone would want to privatize.
I further would like to state that we recently, in Mr. Hefley's
committee, noticed that the Air Force was asking for $9 million to
go in and take care of a flood problem in McClellan. I asked the
question of the Air Force why they would do that, if it was being
closed; and I did not get an answer from them.
Now, I know — Secretary Widnall, I am almost embarrassed to
bring these things up, because I know what a great job you do and
I know that you answer to certain people; but I want to put you
on notice that many, many Members of Congress — I am not speak-
ing for all of them, but I am probably speaking for a lot of Members
of Congress — feel exactly as I do, that the President had no right
whatsoever, no legal right, to try to privatize those two bases; and
many of us cannot see a reason to do it.
Now, if you would like to respond, I think the light has not come
on, but if you want to respond
Secretary Widnall. First of all, let me make it perfectly clear
that we follow the BRAC language; and those bases will be closed.
Closed has a meaning, and they will be closed. But I do think we
view it in the framework of our interactions with the private sector.
A good part of the closing of a base is the whole question of how
to transfer the assets to the community for, you know, sort of reuse
and stimulation of commercial development within a community.
That is going on at all of our bases. It is a very important part of
the BRAC process. We have unique assets at those depots, ALC's,
and so we are anxious to turn those over in a form where they can
be useful for the commercial sector.
We routinely contract out work with the private sector, with the
aerospace industry, with the various companies that are involved
in maintenance, and I see the issue in that framework.
Mr. Hansen. I see my time is up.
404
Just let me state this: I would hope that the Air Force doesn't
change the definition of core work, and you mentioned in your
opening statement the idea of 60-40 had to be taken away. I hon-
estly think you are probably right, eventually, but it has to be after
this is resolved.
Now, when you say that you are contracting it out, I am saying
that the work that is currently done in these bases that the Com-
mission said should be closed, if that is merely turned over to the
private sector to do and the other three bases stay at about 48 per-
cent capacity, we have done nothing but waste money, as I read
what the Commission has said.
Now, I think you are going to see a parade of every Commis-
sioner brought before a court, and I would dare say that every one
of them will say that that was not the intent of the Commission
to privatize that work, it was to actually reduce the work, not to
just turn it over to the private sector. I believe in privatization. I
have no problem with that to a certain extent. I also believe very
strongly in core maintenance, and I think maybe we have gone be-
yond that.
I appreciate your indulgence. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me welcome the respective Secretaries to our committee and
thank you for your excellent work in these difficult times when
there are budget constraints and, at the same time, you are produc-
ing the finest uniformed men and women we have ever had. I am
proud of what you do, and I am proud of what those in uniform
do today.
It is with sadness. Secretary West, that we know, and I know ev-
eryone on our committee expresses S3nTipathy to you and the sol-
diers' families who died at Fort Campbell in the helicopter crash
just a few hours ago.
I also want to brag on the men and women who are working in
all uniforms in the Bosnian area. Whether they fly over or into
Bosnia, whether they are in the Adriatic aboard ship or whether
they are in a tent in 10 inches of snow, they are doing superb work.
They are professionals. It is a dangerous area not limited to the
mines, but it is dangerous. They are representing the United States
of America well, and you can be immensely proud of them.
I also wish to say something positive about the war colleges that
I am now in the process of revisiting. I was chairman of the mili-
tary education panel a few years ago which reviewed the war col-
leges, and the various services have responded very positively, and
the results that I am now seeing are excellent.
Secretary West, I notice that you spoke of the many young
women in our services; and each of you spoke about quality of life,
training and taking care of the other soldiers and sailors and ma-
rines. Those of you who have heard me at hearings before — and I
know I sound like a broken record, but I have used the phrase: If
mom ain't happy, nobody ain't happy. Probably in today's province,
it should be: If your spouse ain't happy, nobody ain't happy.
You have to take care of the families as well as the troops. As
a matter of fact, I have a friend from California who heard me say-
405
ing so many times, if mom ain't happy, nobody ain't happy, and he
gave me a plaque which I now have framed in my office.
But I urge you to continue working on the quality of life to keep-
ing the good — it takes a long time to grow a crew chief. It takes
a long time to grow a first sergeant. It takes a long time to grow
a chief petty officer.
In this vein, Secretary West, let me just mention very briefly Lt.
Gen. Ted Stroup testified about the stress and the strains on your
particular service, the Army, at the end-strength of 520,000; and
it is going down, as you know, to 495,000. But there was some tes-
timony the other day by Secretary Perry that bothers me, that be-
cause we did put a floor on all of the services, and 495,000, accord-
ing to General Stroup, would even stretch and stretch them more.
To go below that floor not only would be against what we have in
the law but would be very detrimental to them and their families,
so I hope that this — and it is not just your service, but since he tes-
tified to that I would bring that to your attention.
Let me ask each of you this in this vein: Secretary Dalton, you
did touch on it, and this deals with recruiting. You have to keep
the pipeline of the young serviceman and woman coming in. Be-
cause people do retire, people do get out of the military, and you
have to keep the quality up.
I would like to ask each of you — and since Secretary Dalton
raised this, let me ask him first. I think from the statistics that I
have read, the Navy may be having a bit tougher time. Then I
would ask Secretary West and Secretary Widnall to respond to it.
How about your recruiting. Secretary Dalton?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Skelton, this has been a priority of mine
since we recognized the problem that was identified in these sur-
veys that Secretary West referred to.
I am pleased to say that we have made some significant progress.
Our quality has stayed up; the percent of high school graduates ex-
ceeds the 95 percent level. Of our recruits, 62 percent are in the
CAT 1 through CAT 3 areas, which is above 50 on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test; and we have not taken CAT 4's.
We have done well, I think, because we have reached out and
used some rather unique means of recruiting. I wrote every high
school principal in the country in each of the last 2 years to make
them aware of programs that were available to young men and
women who are graduates of high school. Each of our flag officers,
admirals, and general officers — admirals in the Navy, general offi-
cers in the Marine Corps — have been back to visit their high
schools in the first half of this year; and 60 percent — we are 60 per-
cent done with that program, and we hope to have it all done by
the end of this calendar year. That has reaped some benefits.
We have an awful lot of hard-working young men and women
who are out there on the line. It is tough duty. Just last night I
met with the Recruiters of the Year who were here in Washington
to receive their awards for the fine job they have done in this envi-
ronment.
The good news is that your help in advertising — helping us with
our advertising budget has been a big plus, a tremendous positive
impact. We have had 11 percent improvement in male youth pro-
pensity to enlist, a 15-percent increase in the number of leads gen-
406
erated. We can directly link 11,800 of our new contracts to the ad-
vertising that we did in the last year, and this committee was very
supportive of that.
I am optimistic. The last 5 months the Marine Corps has ex-
ceeded their goal. The Marine Corps has exceeded in the last 5
months. The Navy exceeded their goal last month. So I think the
Marine Corps is leading the force services in recruiting, and I think
the Navy is about on par with our sister services here.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.
Secretary West and then Secretary Widnall, please.
Secretary WEST. Mr. Skelton, let me offer sort of my own experi-
ence of the last 2-plus years.
It seems to me that, in talking with our youngsters everywhere
I have traveled, that few of them joined the service just because
they are patriots. Oh, sure, after about 6 months they become —
they get the sense of being part of something bigger than they are,
the pride of country and service. But, at the outset, the very good
ones that we are recruiting recently out of high school or about to
leave high school, they are looking, yes, for something they can feel
good about, perhaps for a way to get some college education money,
and they are interested in the benefits and packages. They are
looking for a job and a place in America.
One former member of this committee whose death we com-
memorated not long ago gave a speech to his graduating high
school class in which, among other things, he wished for them that
they would find a useful place in American society. I believe that
we recruit our youngsters because we offer them a useful place in
American society at a time when they are very unsure that they
will be able to find it. If that is the case, then the things that you
do for us in advertising, which Secretary Dalton has referred to, in
putting recruiters on the street can make a big difference. Because
we have to reach them. We have to reach them and make them un-
derstand what they can find for themselves, what they can achieve.
A few weeks ago I had the opportunity to visit a recruiting sta-
tion. I don't know how many of us knew that since 1944, right
there on Times Square, there is a small recruiting station. All of
the services are represented there. They get an extraordinary flow
of people past there, past Times Square, as you might suspect. But
every one of those recruiters makes his or her goal or quota for the
month. It is tough, it is hard, but they get out there and work on
it.
I say that as a reminder again of the extraordinary stress to
which we put our recruiting sergeants and our recruiting captains
and recruiting officers to find these youngsters who, first of all, are
looking for a place in society and then begin to feel that sense of
patriotism and pride as they sign up.
Yes, sir; you are correct, that though we recruit the soldier with
a lot of emphasis on convincing the soldier's mother, by the time
that soldier has been there awhile and become a producing and
constructive part and maybe married, then we find out that we re-
tain the spouse, we retain the family. So whether it is at the begin-
ning of the process, when we are trying to make sure that they un-
derstand the benefits that they will receive, the place in society,
the benefits of the Montgomery bill and the like, or as we are sim-
407
ply attempting to retain them, when we make clear to them when
they begin to get a sense of the quality of life and our concern
about the quality of life for them and their families. It is a difficult
job, and it requires constant attention to making them feel appre-
ciated for their services to their country.
I apologize for this lengthy answer, but I want to end it by say-
ing this: And your soldiers and their families are getting that
sense. From the very things you have authorized us to do, whether
it is in advertising to get to them or quality of life for them and
their families, they are getting the sense that their country, their
Congress, the people in the United States care about them. We will
continue to have success in recruiting them, though at a high price,
as long as you continue to enable us to give them that impression.
Secretary Widnall. Let me just add to what my colleagues have
said.
With respect to the Air Force, we have been successful at meet-
ing our recruiting goals. It is with a lot of attention — and one point
I would want to make is that the issue of recruiting is receiving
very senior-level attention within the Pentagon. The service Sec-
retaries, together with Dr. Perry and Mr. Dorn, review recruiting
results and advertising budgets on the — at least a semiannual, if
not quarterly basis. So it is a high priority item.
Again, jumping back to the Air Force, I would say that we have
set a tone in the Air Force with the slogan: Everybody is a re-
cruiter. We really, as Secretary Dalton mentioned, really try to
draw on the energy of all of our people to, you know, send out the
message about what this way of life and service to our country is
all about.
So it is — it is an important issue for us. I guess — jumping to one
of the other ends — recruiting service is a tough job. It is a high-
stress job. So we have paid some special attention to supporting
our recruiters. They are out in the field. They are not close to a
large military installation in most cases. We have tried to provide
special ways for them to get into a base, and in a very quick and
efficient way, get the services they need for them and their families
so that they can get back out on the job and have access to medical
care and the kinds of things they need to keep working as effec-
tively as they do.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to — at the end of my statement, I am
going to ask Secretary Dalton a question on the F-14, but — I know
the situation, but I think it is important for the record for you to
state that. I want to personally thank you not only for the timeli-
ness but the intent and what you have put into that with Admiral
Boorda.
I also want to thank you for speaking for Carol Hultgreen and
her family and their loss. I think that is very, very important.
I would also like to thank the Secretaries. You know, from the
Republican side, in some cases I got better service, better profes-
sionalism from staff and yourselves than I have at any other time,
and I want to thank you.
I am going to make a statement, and I don't want you to have
to even put on a thick skin, because this is not directed at you. You
408
are doing the best you can with what you end up getting in that
ball of wax. But I think it is important for the record to show that
you are doing the best you can; and, in the future, you are going
to have a difficult time with what you are given.
Secretary West, I agree with what you are talking about with pa-
triotism and the recruiting and getting our kids — and we have the
best kids in the service. I also view the men and women with the
prideful respect that you do and that they also have got to be pro-
fessionally led. But I think it is long — at least my personal opinion,
I don't think they can be led when you have a Commander in Chief
who, himself, turned his back on that prideful service. There is not
a person in here in a military uniform that outside this room won't
tell you the same thing.
Congressman Hunter last week — or this week — talked about Sec-
retary Perry and how he felt that we were doing a disservice to our
men and women. Not you, but what has come down to them.
This is a recent article that came out in the Times, and I quote
to you:
The Clinton Administration has overruled its top miUtary advisor, General
Shalikashvili, and cut Pentagon weapon procurement budget at a level the general
believes risks combat readiness, internal Joint Chiefs of Staff document shows. This
was a classified document that was released.
I believe we risk future combat readiness and U.S. military if we fail to ade-
quately fund recapitalization study in fiscal year 1997. It goes on and on and on
with the amount of cuts.
This is also the view of Maj. — of Chief Adm. William Owens:
"After we won control of the House, the President vowed to end the
slide of the Pentagon cuts, and he hasn't done that."
Let me make my case by saying that in the testimony it said that
all of these savings that we were going to do in these adds were
going to come from the assumption that inflation would never go
higher than 2.5 percent over 7 years. That is not going to happen.
I don't think that you believe it, and I don't think anybody else in
this room would.
It was also testified that BRAC savings — how long have we had
BRAC? The chart showed that we were level at BRAC savings
right now, when even last week the record shows in the Senate
that you are $1 billion in the hole currently on BRAC. Also, acqui-
sition reform, that hasn't happened.
Those are going to limit you. The reason that I say this is that
you talk about the F-14 for the Navy, the Comanche and Apache
for the Army and the F-22 for the Air Force. If you take a look
at the time line when all of these are projected, the F-18 through
2001, through 2004, the F-22 coming on board and then relying on
JAST to fulfill that mode down the line in 2008, 2010, all of that
is going to be shifted.
Another area that I think that we are doomed — absolutely
doomed to failure is we recently got a list that says we are going
to cancel four ships for repair — that were slipped from the Clinton
1993 cuts. We are going to cancel the repair on those ships. Four
other ships were cut down to 10 percent of the work to pay for
Bosnia.
Now, the word that came back to us: Well, this is just worst case.
You have doomed it to worst case just by the assumption that infla-
tion is not going to go higher than 2.5 percent and you are going
409
to have these other savings. I would say to you that this is going
to destroy not only military readiness, as is stated in here by even
the President's military advisers, but it is going to destroy any
chance that we have to maintain the support services of our ship-
building and ship repair; and thousands of jobs are going to be lost
in California with this policy.
I think it is important to put it on the record that also, when you
look at the President, how it ties in, the President's balanced budg-
et in 7 years scored by CBO, that 90 percent of the cuts that the
President makes comes in 2001 and 2002. That just happens to be
the same time that you are going to increase your military procure-
ment. And you think this President — ^well, he won't be here by that
time, even if he is elected for a second term, but do you think that
they are going to raise the cost of military and reduce the cost of
all of the social programs? It won't happen. I just think that you
are tasked with a very difficult task, and I would ask the Secretary
to comment on the F-14.
Secretary West. Before you do, Mr. Chairman, since I was men-
tioned in your comments, Congressman, may I say a word?
I respond to your comment's about the President's leadership of
our troops. I speak for the Army. I suspect I speak for all of ihem.
My soldiers will follow the President wherever he leads. They
will do so for two reasons: First of all, they took an oath when they
were sworn in, an oath with which you are familiar, sir, in which
they agreed to obey the orders of law placed in over them and of
the President of the United States. He is their Commander in
Chief.
I say this not necessarily because I am called to respond but be-
cause there are uniformed officers in our presence and within the
reach of our voices. They will follow him, and he can lead them.
Second, this is the President who, unlike any other President,
has committed himself to pay the maximum pay raise permitted by
law throughout a period passed — passed just this year; and he com-
mitted to it a year ago, with pressure from none other than those
who advise him. That is his choice, and he has made that commit-
ment, and he has lived up to it.
This is the President who himself placed $25 billion — an addi-
tional $25 billion in the budget devoted to the concerns that we just
talked about, Congressman Skelton. That is, the concerns of fami-
lies and taking care and providing quality of life for his soldiers.
Mr. Cunningham. Reclaiming my time.
Secretary West. This
Mr. Cunningham. This is the same President in 1993 that cut
veterans and military COLA's. This is the same President in this
balanced budget that did the same thing with military COLA's, and
we saved it right here.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, can we get back to the hearing
at hand as opposed to the politicking? Or I am going to start going
into Mr. Gingrich's great service record.
Secretary West. This is the President who has been greeted
around the world by soldiers who have displayed their affection
and respect for him.
I am done, Mr. Chairman.
410
Mr. Cunningham. The point is, the mihtary budget has been cut;
and it puts, even according to General Shalikashvih, below what is
readiness levels.
The Chairman. The Secretary would like to answer the question.
Secretary Dalton. I would like to answer the question. I do also
want to respond briefly to that comment.
I have been with the President with seamen and corporals of the
Marine Corps, up to four-star admirals and generals in the Navy.
He does enjoy their respect. This is the President that did give us
the pay raise, that increased housing for sailors and marines by 30
percent in 1994 and 1995 and also was supportive for their retire-
ment benefits for HI-1 and HI-12.
With respect to the F-14 that you asked about, Mr,
Cunningham, and what is being done with respect to it, the first
thing we did was have a CNO stand-down that was for 3 days and
looked at all of the F-14's for maintenance, for training, looking at
what we were doing and learning from past mistakes and reviewed
procedures and flat operations from the standpoint of saving.
Similarly, we have made some changes with respect to the me-
chanics. On the TF-30 engine, we have a new engine breather that
we have now funded. We have also a new digital flight control sys-
tem where testing was completed in December 1995. It is an $80
million issue, starting with $9.6 million in 1996, $30.4 million for
the 1997 budget; and the remaining $40 million for the total $80
million will be done in fiscal year 1998.
We are also doing significant and comprehensive examinations,
investigations of each of the accidents; and they are in process as
we speak and will be completed in the near term.
Also, I would like to point out, to put this into perspective, as of
March 4, 1996, if you look at our record over our history of 50
years — and I have a chart here that illustrates this — but 1994 was
our safest year in naval aviation history and 1995 was second to
it, followed very closely to it; and up to today of fiscal year 1996
we are very near that 1995 record. We have come down signifi-
cantly.
Obviously, any accident where someone's life is lost or we lose a
type A aircraft of $1 million or more is serious and we regret it;
and we treat each one individually and look into them with great
detail, in as comprehensive and professional a manner as we pos-
sibly can, because the loss of life is precious and this is a dan-
gerous business. These are outstanding professionals that are out
there every day doing their job, and I salute them.
The Chairman. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. Sisisky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank all of you for being here. I am not going to make a state-
ment. I will just ask some questions, really, basically what I
brought up in front of Dr. Perry and the other people, with some
exceptions; and one of them is privatization.
It seems that there is a wave in the Pentagon and in the Con-
gress, too, about privatization; and all I said the other day, be very
careful. I think in the long term, if we go too far — and there is a
provision in the Pentagon I know to go very far — then we are going
to be very sorry.
411
You know, we talk about war. This is what you do. It is different
than a lot of things, and sometimes you need Federal employees to
do these things. So please be very careful in going too far with
that.
There were two things. Secretary West. I notice in your testi-
mony, and it may be because you consolidated, but over the years
I thought that the Comanche was the real priority, and you didn't
really stress that. Did I notice a cut in the research and develop-
ment— and I would like to ask all of my questions first, if you will.
Did I notice a cut in the research and development of the Coman-
che? I asked the staff, and they said, no, but I thought I saw that.
The other thing that somebody brought up that I brought up to
the Secretary of Defense, I noticed in there that the $495,000 in
1999 could be reduced to $475,000, because you could make the in-
fantryman a better — but I don't think that solves the problem of
stress. Be very careful about that. A 20,000-person cut is a big cut
in the Army today.
I have Army installations, and I know what they are working
at — in laying off good people. This is the thing that we need to
worry about.
You also brought up a question of mines, the clearing of mines.
We had a hearing a few weeks ago, and I think there is a dif-
ference in the doctrine between the Army and the Marine Corps.
Remember about 12 years ago I brought up the question of
mines. I had a resolution, and everybody said they would work on
it. You progressed somewhat but not what you should be. Now, if
we are not putting enough money in there — we put money in there,
and we noticed it was reprogrammed at some time, and that is not
the best thing in the world.
So hopefully — but Bosnia, we all understand that we need to put
high technology in there to destroy mines. General Shalikashvili
corrected me. I thought mines were the biggest killer of people. He
said it was artillery. But if you do all people, I think mines would
be the thing that destroyed the most.
To Secretary Dalton, and I know we talked about this, and I am
not bringing to bring it up again, except the submarines. You
know, please don't wait too long to work on this to get the money.
We need to do it as soon as possible.
You spoke about readiness today, and I am worried about, you
know, what are we going to do in the future to be sure that we
have the readiness. This is in all services.
You heard Mr. Cunningham, one part of it, the casting repair on
ships and things like that, but I want to be sure that we don't —
there are some money problems and not repair and do the things
we need to do, because in the end it is going to cost us more money.
But what I would like to know is what we are going to do to ensure
readiness in all of the services in the future?
Secretary Dalton. Well, as far as ensuring in the future, I think
we have to know where we are today. These are things that we
measure, and I get reported to on monthly — things like the
teaming days per quarter, flight hours per month, percent of spare
parts availability, personnel, the backlog of maintenance for air-
craft and engines. These are indicators that we can measure and
keep up with.
412
There are some things you can't measure, and that is one of the
reasons I hke to get out to the fleet on a regular basis, to check
on morale, how we are doing with our core values, commitment,
character, integrity, development. Those are things very much a
part of readiness as well.
In terms of predictive indicators for personnel, recruit quality is
one indicator, retention, reenlistment, how we are doing in terms
of maintenance spares and projection — projection of those procure-
ments and maintenance installations and how we are doing with
the maintenance repair that needs to be done. Those are all impor-
tant indicators that we need to follow and prepare for and have a
time line to address, and I think those are the types of predictive
measures of readiness that we think are important to follow and
be prepared to deal with.
Mr. SisiSKY. I might just — I might say, I want to congratulate
the Navy and the Air Force. I notice the lack of carriers in the
Mediterranean and the Air Force picking up the slack there. I don't
know how — is it Bahrain that you had
Secretary Widnall. Yes. In fact, we are on our way to Jordan,
maybe today.
Mr. SislSKY. That is right. Jordan is a place — but it also brings
up another problem. If we would have a carrier damaged in some
way, whether a crash on it or something like that, if you have to
have an area of 5 months, it could really add into a year or two
in doing it, and that is another readiness problem. But I want to
congratulate both of you for doing it, because that is what the
inter-service thing is all about, and I think very important.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Watts?
Mr. SisiSKY. Secretary West had a response.
Secretary West. No, we have not cut our funding for the pro-
gram as was restructured, I think, back in 1995. The RDT&E fund-
ing is not cut. We are fully funded
Mr. SisiSKY. I mean, I was sold
Secretary WEST [continuing]. On the Comanche
Mr. SiSiSKY. I was sold on the Comanche.
Secretary West [continuing]. And we are committed to it.
Mr. SiSiSKY. It is a quarterback in the digital warfare, and I just
want to be sure we keep that up.
Secretary West. We are committed to it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Watts, the gentleman from Oklahoma.
Mr. Watts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary West and Secretary Dalton and Madam Secretary
Widnall, I appreciate you being here this morning and taking the
time from your busy schedules to be here.
Let me first say that I have great respect for what you all do and
for the soldiers and sailors and airmen and marines that you lead.
I take great pride in America's military forces and who they are
and what they stand for, and it is always an honor for me to be
in your company and talk about our military issues and trying to
come up with solutions as we make sure that we sustain the great-
ness of our Nation. I especially want to thank you, Madam Sec-
retary, for being here today.
413
It is with great concern that I address the Air Force plan for the
implementation of the Defense Base Realignment and Closure
Committee recommendations. Specifically, I want to discuss the
President's privatization in place plan for your air logistic centers.
Simply put, when we talk about privatization, it implies we are
moving Government-provided services into the private sector with
an associated cost-savings to the American taxpayer. But that is
not the direction our Air Force has apparently taken. The Presi-
dent has taken an apolitical process that may save billions of dol-
lars if implemented, as recommended, and turned it into a — what
seems to be a political quid pro quo.
Moreover, his privatize in place plan appears to violate the public
law, robs funding from modernization accounts and will unfavor-
ably impact readiness as money is spent to keep facilities open that
the BRAC directed be closed.
While privatization can be a good thing, the devil is in the de-
tails. There are so many problems with the idea to privatize in
place that it is hard to talk about one or two, but allow me to try.
Privatization in place was never a BRAC option. In fact, as Mr.
Hansen said, I kind of started the inquiry process in talking to the
commissioners of BRAC and talked to them at length about this
issue. Several of the commissioners responded back, and one Mr.
Hansen quoted.
She responded to my inquiry by saying, "The Commission clearly
did not intend to privatize in place. As noted in our findings, clo-
sure permits significantly improved utilization of the remaining de-
pots and reduces DOD operating costs. While the Commission en-
couraged privatization in place, our report addresses it directly.
Such was not the case with air logistics centers. If any Commis-
sioner had offered a motion to privatize in place, as the President
proposes, I am 100 percent certain that such a motion would have
been defeated handily."
If the Commission had decided to realign any of the ALC's that
stood the test, to offer that there would not be a privatization in
place alternative under way, the reasons are simple. I think elec-
toral votes are not at stake. Moreover, continued operations at
Kelly and McClellan would fail to address the overcapacity issues
cited by the BRAC as a basis for their closure recommendations.
Continuing investment in keeping bases open that were rec-
ommended for closure will cost millions of dollars that could be bet-
ter used for modernization and readiness. You see, for every unnec-
essary dollar spent to support private sector management in our
depot activities, there is one less dollar available for modernization
and readiness. This is especially true of contractors who take over
the depot functions, who take over the terminations that occur, the
standard business takeover practice.
If the same workers in the same facility perform the same jobs
using the same equipment, the Air Force will not save the Amer-
ican taxpayer a single dollar. All that has been done at that point
is the addition of another level of management and cost to the busi-
ness of depot maintenance. The readiness issue is not simply af-
fected by cost but by the general processes that are at work within
the private sector.
414
I ask you, Madam Secretary, to consider the impacts on readi-
ness; and I ask the administration to consider the impact on readi-
ness if private sector workers who may be responsible for core
maintenance efforts decide to strike, walk out or shut out. Where
will our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines be if they are en-
gaged in a fight and their equipment cannot be repaired because
the depot is locked down due to an employee-employer disagree-
ment?
This would be horrible, because I believe that we expect Ameri-
ca's sons and daughters to go around the world to protect the free-
doms and the interests and the principles and values that we hold
dear as a Nation. I believe that if we expect them to do that, we
must give them the resources to win, not the resources to play a
good game. These soldiers, airmen, sailors, and marines, where
they go, they go where they are asked to go, and they defend and
they do their work proudly.
In closing. Madam Secretary, the President's vision of privatiza-
tion needs to be modified. While I support expansion of the private
sector of the Government services and the associated savings that
may come from a well-thought-out strategy, privatization must be
done with due regard for its impact on modernization and readi-
ness. We cannot afford to allow the men and women of our Armed
Forces to be brought to their knees by virtue of the inability to re-
pair the tools of their trade.
A rightsized depot system must be put into place before we open
the door to wholesale privatization of these extremely important
services. Only then will we have done what is required of our
pledge to support and defend our Nation against those who may at-
tack our security.
I encourage this administration to reexamine the privatize in
place option, and I encourage the administration to please move
slowly. For if this door is opened I assure you it will come at the
continued expense of modernization and readiness.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience.
Madam Secretary, if you feel that you would like to respond to
that, I would appreciate it. But I know that Mr. Hansen was not
aware of it but got into some of my statement or question, which-
ever you recognize it to be. But if you would like to respond.
Secretary WiDNALL. Yes. I would like to respond and make sev-
eral points without going on at great length.
First of all, let me make it clear that we will follow the BRAC
law. We will close those bases. We will turn those rather unique
assets over to the private sector.
In my view, privatization in place supports readiness. It is one
of the main reasons why the privatization in place initiative is at-
tractive. I could use the example of Newark Air Force Base where
we have incredibly unique facilities. The cost to duplicate those fa-
cilities at another base is prohibitive. The only way to get value for
the taxpayers, avoid a break in our ability to repair the guidance
systern on Minuteman missiles, which is the primary work of New-
ark Air Force Base, is to work with the private sector to turn those
facilities over for reuse use.
We intend to follow best commercial practices in our dealings
with industry. We will not constrain private industry to do some-
415
thing that is not cost-effective for the American taxpayer. So we
are far along with what I view as a very successful experiment at
Newark Air Force Base, which is our sort of leading wedge at pri-
vatization.
The same situation exists at the other ALC's. We have truly
unique facilities which were constructed at great expense to the
American taxpayer that are dedicated to repair of certain compo-
nents. To try to duplicate those facilities at another ALC would be
prohibitively expensive and would not provide best value to the
taxpayer. To be able to turn these over to private industry so that
industry cannot only do work for us but for the commercial sector
as well, offers opportunities in reuse of taxpayer-provided facilities
and we need to get the best value for the process that we are going
through.
So I am optimistic about privatization. I am cautious about the
challenges of privatization. I do not want to oversell the challenge
that we are faced with in moving this successfully forward.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Pickett.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our
witness today.
Secretary Dalton, when you got pressed on the issue of what you
were doing about procurement and how technology plays a role, I
think you overlooked an excellent example that the Navy achieved
in the LANTIRN system for precision-guided ordnance for the F-
14. That is a hugely successful story about cooperation between the
Navy and the Air Force, where the Navy took a pod which had
been designed and built for the F-15, I believe it was, and man-
aged to link it onto an F-14 without changing the internal elec-
tronics of the F-14, and got a precision-guided bombing capability
out of the F-14; a remarkable program that I think we owe a lot
of thanks to Adm. Richard Allen, better known as Sweet Pea, who
headed up the effort.
That leads me to the next issue, the impact of the increasing ca-
pability of the units that you have. General Shalikashvili on
Wednesday gave us the example perhaps of a tank unit where if
you increased the capability by 20 percent and you have five tanks
in a unit, then that enables you to maintain the same capability
and reduce the number of tanks down to four. I know all the other
services have similar stories that they can tell about things they
have done to increase their efficiency and operational capabilities.
The issue about operational support aircraft, Secretary Dalton, is
one that concerns me a great deal. I follow this issue fairly closely
and this is not a parochial kind of thing, but I think the proposal
to take all operational support aircraft and centralize them under
the Air Force would be a big mistake and would cut deeply into the
readiness capabilities of the Navy. I hope you will look at this issue
very carefully before you give any ground on giving up your oper-
ational support aircraft.
The one thing I would like to hear from you all on is this; when
the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was here on
Wednesday, they said that number one priority in what they were
attempting to do was readiness, and that the key component of
416
readiness was the people that we depend upon to execute their pro-
grams.
I would like to hear from each of you whether or not you believe
that the readiness requirement for your respective services is ade-
quately funded in the budget as presented to the Congress, and I
would like to know whether or not you believe that the personnel
component has been adequately funded; and third, I would like to
know from each of you if there were additional monies to be made
available to your respective service, where would you like to see
that money go?
Thank you.
Secretary West. Do you have a preference of how we start?
Mr. Pickett. No. You work that out among yourselves.
Secretary West. Since you referred to General Shalikashvili's
comment about enhanced capabilities of weapon systems, and he
mentioned tanks, as I recall, that was in the context of a discussion
about Army end strength. That was the 495 issue which has sort
of appeared already here.
Certainly we as a service are putting a lot of our time into en-
hancing our capabilities. That is what modernization is all about.
It is not just keeping up with current requirements; it is looking
at the threat we will face.
Sometimes those enhanced capabilities do not necessarily connect
to an immediate lessening of the numbers or the units we may
need. They may simply meet a threat of a different sort, a threat
of a different quantity, a threat of a different quality.
In terms of if it is the issue of end strength that you want me
to comment about, our number is 495,000. That is a Bottom-Up Re-
view number, a number arrived at by analysis. It is a number that
the Secretary of Defense has blessed for us.
At the same time, we remain challenged by the Secretary and by
General Shalikashvili's observations, among others, to look at what
the increasing capabilities may do, to look at whether there will be
a point at which — because, as he said, a unit might be more capa-
ble, that that means we could look at a different division or brigade
organization or what have you. I think that is the context in which
it came up.
Mr. Pickett. I think he was emphasizing more bang for the
buck.
Secretary West. That is certainly the effort towards which we
look, more bang for the buck. I think I am jumping a question or
two, but you also asked if the services are willing to in essence cer-
tify to you that we have in the budget sufficient money to meet our
personnel requirements and our readiness needs; is that right?
Mr. Pickett. Yes.
Secretary West. We have funded readiness here. It was, as Dr.
Perry said, our number one requirement. For us, our measure-
ments of readiness are not that dissimilar to other services. They
go by different names, OPTEMPO is one of the crucial elements,
tank miles and air miles we have funded to our requirement. This
budget contains funding for 800 miles of active component, 14.5 fly-
ing hours, 800 miles for tank miles, 14.5 flying hours. That is the
very optimum requirement that we have for readiness; 181 tank
417
miles for the Army National Guard, 5.4 fl5dng hours, and a similar
requirement for the U.S. Army Reserve.
We believe that funding the OPTEMPO along with the funding
we have done for power projection platforms and for quality of life,
because we consider that putting the soldier's mind at rest about
his or her family is an important component of that soldier's ability
to do the job to the best of their ability. We believe those combina-
tions enable me to say that the Army fiscal year 1997 budget funds
readiness and makes us able to deliver to the American public a
ready Army; near-term readiness.
If your questions have to do with far-term readiness, which has
to do with the modernization debate, then we have before, already
today, that the funding for modernization we must look to. We
have described what our plans are. But today we don't think that
the funding for modernization endangers readiness for today's
Army. But what it calls into question is that we be sure to do
things to keep that Army ready in the coming years. I think we
have a plan to do that.
Secretary Dalton. I appreciate your confidence in Adm. Sweet
Pea Allen. And I also agree with that program. I didn't attempt to
cover all the programs that we have had some very positive success
in, but I agree with you about that.
With respect to change and how we are doing things differently
than we used to, we are indeed moving to more cost-effective ships.
The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke class destroyer uses fewer people, has
more firepower than the ships it is replacing; therefore we need
fewer of them. What we are doing with the arsenal ship, the design
for it and SC-21, we are talking about having greater firepower be-
yond that, 500 to 1,000 missiles on a ship that has as few as 50
people. SC-21, the follow on to the DDG, would follow a similar
theme.
As far as fiiUy funding readiness, we have done that in this
budget. That does include the personnel account. I point out the 3
percent pay raise that we have in this year's budget, and that is
being well-received by sailors and marines in the Navy Depart-
ment.
With respect to additional funds that might become available,
our high priority there would be the submarine program, to get the
1999 boat, fast procurement for it, and funding the four sub-
marines, two of which will be built at EB, two of which will be built
at Newport News, and also accelerating our shipbuilding account.
We do have a relatively young fleet and we are blessed by that, but
in the out years we do have a bow wave to address. If we could
move that forward and f\ind some of the ships in this FYDP, that
is how we would use additional resources.
And the same thing would apply to perhaps more rapidly funding
the AA AV and building as many of 6 V-22's in this year's budget.
Those are the priorities of how we would use the dollars should
they become available.
Secretary WiDNALL. It is clear that technology has given the Air
Force dramatic improvements. We saw the value of stealth tech-
nology in the gulf where we could operate at will in the skies over
Baghdad. We saw the advantage of precision-guided munitions
both in the gulf war where there were a small percentage of the
418
weapons used, but specifically in the recent action in Bosnia where
minimizing collateral damage because of the obvious political fall-
out was an absolute requirement. We are sold on PGM's. We have
seen the future. We like what we see.
Another thing is we have been involved in these operations, we
are beginning to learn what is really important. One of those is the
linkage of information between platforms, ground commanders and
the component commanders using our space systems to get the in-
telligence to the war fighter, intelligence to the cockpit; that is an-
other area where technology has given us a great leap forward.
We are bringing on the potential use of a direct global broadcast
system to the theater. We are running real-time experiments in
Bosnia to try to link all these things together. We are learning very
rapidly what technology can bring to us, and we like what we see.
With respect to readiness, the Air Force has put a very high pri-
ority on readiness. It is fully funded. The training, the spare parts,
the depot maintenance for our platforms, training for our people,
we pay a lot of attention to quality of life, we pay a lot of attention
to providing support on our bases that do the things that we know
are necessary to take care of families. The pay raise is extremely
important. So I am very pleased with the state of readiness in the
Air Force.
With respect to our needs, our priorities, the issue of moderniza-
tion, let me characterize our modernization program that we have
presented in the following way. We have funded our top priority
modernization programs in this budget, the C-17, the bomber up-
grades, the PGM's the F-22 and JSF Program. It is a high priority
for us to see that these programs are well managed and that they
give best value to the taxpayer.
There are several categories that we would want to put addi-
tional investment into. I guess I would characterize these in sev-
eral ways. One is recapitalization, and by that I mean filling what
we see as a requirement to add to our F-15, F-16 forces in order
to have the required force structure until the new stealth tech-
nology comes into the force. So that I would characterize as recapi-
talization.
There is another category I would characterize as upgrades. I
could give an example. We, for example, did a recent study to see
at what point in time could the AWACS mission be done from
space. The result of that study convinced us that we would have
the AWACS up through 2025.
So what needs to be done between now and then in order that
we keep the AWACS in the fleet? We have to take care of the air-
frames, we should think about upgrading the engines, we should
think about taking the sort of previous-generation avionics and up-
grading to more of a commercial off-the-shelf open architecture avi-
onics system, so that there are several examples of that all through
our fleet; better data links for F-16's. So there is a whole category
of modernization that I would put in the category of upgrades to
current platforms that we know we are going to keep in the force
for the foreseeable future.
The final category would be to accelerate those programs which
JJ? already in our budget but it is possible to accelerate them.
With some programs it is not. The F-22 can't be accelerated. That
419
is fully funded, and it is right on track. But there are other pro-
grams that can be accelerated such as PGM's.
Mr. Pickett. Mr. Chairman, I think that Secretary West over-
looked giving his priority list. Could you do that please?
The Chairman. If it is not too long.
Secretary WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We wouldn't want to
pass up this opportunity.
We, too, think that the most important thing for us would be to
buy out some programs early. That allows us to realize for the tax-
payers the advantage of some better business practices while at the
same time getting us the capability that you referred to earlier;
Avenger, VS-armored tiles, those kinds of programs that we are ac-
celerating and bu3dng out early rather than adding new kinds of
programs to our collection.
We could do more investment for economic efficiencies, again
looking for ways to improve our ability both to get what we need
but to do business better for the taxpayer, the Aquillo Warrior, for
example, ATCMS block 1-A, JSTARS; those kinds of things, as
well as IRV, would enable us to do business better; logistics auto-
mation, combat support and combat service support and a host of
things.
And, oh, yes, there are some things we would like to do to sup-
port the Reserve components as well, MRLS, Paladin, Avenger for
the Army National Guard, redesign requirements.
Thank you for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Pickett.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me echo the welcome and appreciation to you for being here
today. It is enlightening to have this group testify before us. And
it is always a pleasure to have a chance to visit with my long-time
friend. Secretary Dalton, who we go back more decades than either
wants to admit.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased for you to note that his young wife
is here. Margaret and I graduated in the same high school class in
Shreveport, so I know how young she is. She is just as pretty now
as she was back then.
Secretary Widnall, while I agree with you on more issues than
we disagree, I must tell you that our disagreement over this privat-
ization in place is very significant. You have mentioned as referring
to Newark as a successful experiment at Newark and that it saves
taxpayer dollars. We know that in December 1994, the GAO report
came out in which it stated that privatization in place at Newark
would cost $456 million more over the 5-year period, from fiscal
year 1996 to fiscal year 2000, to operate as a contractor-run facility
than would have been the case had the facility remained as an Air
Force depot.
You are also aware that the GAO has just released this week a
new report entitled, "Closing Maintenance Depots, Savings Work-
load and Redistribution Issues," in which they note with regard to
Newark, and I quote, "a later cost estimate projected that over a
5-year period the privatization option may cost $600 million more
than would have been incurred had the depot continued operations
as a military depot."
420
In referring to Newark as being a success and with the experi-
ence that we are seeking there, based upon the GAO report, I real-
ly am somewhat appalled that we would even think of that exam-
ple as being a success. Under the circumstances, I am wondering
whether or not it even makes sense to pursue privatization in place
anywhere else. I would like you to comment on that.
Second, I want to make specific reference to the privatization of
McClellan and Kelly. I reference your commander of Air Force Ma-
teriel Command, General Viccellio's February 6 announcement, in
which he identified five prototype workloads presently performed
that will be contracted out to private industry only. In light of that
announcement, let me remind you that title X, section 2469 of the
U.S. Code says that a depot level maintenance or repair workload
is not changed to performance by a contractor or the Department
of Defense unless the change is made using competitive procedures
for competitions among private and public sector entities.
That requirement applies to all workloads of values over $3 mil-
lion, a category into which all five of those prototypes falls.
My question is, I know you understand the requirements of 2469,
but is it your testimony here today that your prototype plans for
privatization in place comply with that statutory requirements?
Secretary WiDNALL. Let me first deal with the issue of Newark,
because I think it depends a little bit on what baseline you are
looking at.
When I came in as Secretary of the Air Force, that was post-
BRAC 93. So the decision to close Newark Air Force Base had al-
ready been made. The situation facing the Air Force then at that
point was whether to move those facilities, which basically means
rebuilding those facilities at another base or to privatize that rath-
er unique workload in place.
I think with respect to that decision, it is much more cost-effec-
tive for the taxpayer to privatize that workload in place than to
even contemplate reconstructing those facilities at another location.
These are truly unique facilities. I am talking about concrete floors
that are 12 feet thick, buildings that were built for special pur-
poses, incredibly detailed scientific and engineering equipment.
We are certainly cognizant of the GAO report, and I guess our
view — of course, they are comparing a slightly different situation.
They are comparing what would have happened if Newark had re-
mained an Air Force base. We are watching those numbers. We are
not convinced that in the end the GAO numbers will be proven
right. So I think we are very comfortable with where we are in
terms of the projections of what it is going to cost to do that work
at Newark relative to what it was when it was an Air Force depot.
With respect
Mr. Chambliss. Before you leave Newark, there was a reason
why BRAC said we ought to close Newark. They took into consider-
ation exactly what you are saying, that maybe other facilities
would have to be constructed elsewhere, but there was a reason.
That is an independent body that made that decision, and we are
flymg in the face of that decision.
Secretary Widnall. I understand that, but I was not involved in
that decision and have never reviewed the basis for that decision
421
or the number set on which that decision was made. I am dealing
with a situation as I found it when I came in.
Mr. Chambliss. That is my point. That decision was made to
close that base. That decision was made that those facilities ought
to be moved somewhere else.
Secretary WiDNALL. I am not sure the second part necessarily fol-
lows.
Mr. Chambliss. That is the purpose of BRAC, as I understand
it. But the report shows that what we are doing is costing the tax-
payers between $456 and $600 million.
Secretary WiDNALL. Sir, I believe that is a projection based on
their best analysis of what will happen, and the Air Force has a
different view.
Mr. Chambliss. Go ahead.
Secretary Widnall. With respect to the second issue, not being
that close to the contractual issue myself and certainly not being
a lawyer, I would hesitate to comment on that, Greneral Viccellio's
interpretation of that.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by thanking the three Secretaries for sticking
around for 2V2 hours. I know you are busy. Let me begin. Secretary
Dalton, by thanking you for the timely signing of the contract on
LHD No. 7. As the rescue of Captain O'Grady proved, it is a very
valuable resource to all the armed services.
I want to encourage you to consider the good work of the
Pascagoula Shipyard when you sign the contract on LPD-17.
I also want to make a very personal request; that since it has
been the decision of the Navy to name the LPD ships after Marine
battles or marines, that you strongly consider Lance Cpl. Roy
Wheat of Mosel, MS, who won the Medal of Honor, who dove on
a land mine to save his fellow marines during the Vietnam conflict.
I certainly would encourage you to consider that.
If I may. Secretary West, I hate to be the bearer of bad news,
but I am going to make a personal request of you. I think this is
kind of unusual. I am going to ask you to close a facility in my dis-
trict. Back in 1989, it was the decision of the President of the Unit-
ed States, and the House voted to save it, the Senate did not, the
Mississippi Ammunition Plant. Since then you have spent, in the
last 3 years, something like $15 million a year to maintain a facil-
ity that your Army Materiel Command won't even consider for the
next style of 155 millimeter rounds, the Centurion.
If you are not going to use it, sir, let me encourage you to close
it. Either sell it to the private sector or transfer it to the Navy.
There are two Navy oceanographic commands within rock-throw-
ing distance of that facility. It is at the National Space and Admin-
istration Testing Facility in Hancock County, MS. It is a waste of
the taxpayers' assets. They spent from $600 to $900 million to
build it and the Army Materiel Command has been the biggest
roadblock toward the privatization of it.
422
If you are not going to use it, sir; let it go. If you are going to
keep it, use it. It is not fair to the taxpayers under the present cir-
cumstances.
That is really all I have to say.
I want to thank the Secretary. It is my understanding that he
has included four DDG Class 51's in his request this year. It con-
tinues to be the mainstay of the Navy surface combatants.
I want to thank all of you. You do an outstanding job.
Secretary West, please don't take my criticism of one very small
aspect of what the Army does as an overall criticism. Overall, you
do an outstanding job with the resources that you have. This is just
something that I think needs fixing.
Thank you.
Secretary Dalton. We will certainly consider your request with
respect to naming of the ship. One of the privileges I have is nam-
ing ships, and I will certainly entertain that.
As you correctly state, we are calling for that number of DDG's,
one of which is to pay for one which is authorized but not appro-
priated in last year's budget, and then the three for this year.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Stump.
Before we get any further, I understand the Secretary has to
leave by what, 1315?
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir, I do.
The Chairman. If we can get through by that time. Otherwise,
we will have to come back for the rest later on. We will try to push
along.
Mr. Stump.
Mr. Stump. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will do my best to expe-
dite.
I want to thank all of you for appearing today. I do have some
questions that I will submit in writing, if I could, Mr. Chairman,
but would like to ask Secretary Dalton one question.
Our recent DOD Authorization Act, I believe, instructed you to
restore at least two of the battleships back to inactive status. Now,
I hear or I understand, perhaps. Navy Sea Command has ordered
the destruction of some of the 16-inch barrels that we have. Is that
true?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Stump, we plan to abide by the legisla-
tion and we are called on to keep two in a situation of mothballs
where they could be rehabilitated, and plan to do that. I am not
aware of anything with the guns, but will check on that.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
The Navy disposed of nine 16" gun barrels because they are excess to the Navy's
needs as replacement spares. An additional twenty-six 16" gun barrels are being
held as spares at several locations in the United States. In view of the excellent ma-
terial condition of existing 16" gun barrels on each of the IOWA Class battleships,
this inventory of spare barrels is more than sufficient to meet possible replacement
needs.
Mr. Stump. I understand Naval Sea Command has ordered de-
struction of some of those barrels. They are probably irreplaceable.
I don t think anybody in the world could reproduce them. It seems
to me they could be stored someplace. If, in fact, we did have to
423
use the two, I think with just two, those barrels that are on there
would wear out pretty fast.
Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Tejeda.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome to each and every one of the Secretaries, Secretary
West, Secretary Dalton, Secretary Widnall. Thank you very much.
I would like to say that I greatly appreciate. Secretary Dalton,
all the information and your comments on the Navy and the Ma-
rine Corps, and I thank you very much for the outstanding work
you have done and you are doing as Secretary of the Navy. Thank
you very much.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Tejeda. Secretary Dalton, what success have you seen in re-
cruiting minority officers in the Navy and in the Marine Corps?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Tejeda, in the Navy-Marine Corps we
have historically done well in the enlisted ranks. But one of the
things I noticed upon assuming office is that we were not doing
well with recruiting minorities, and asked for a study to see, to
project using demographic studies to see where our population
would be by the year 2005, and found that approximately 12 per-
cent of our population would be black, approximately 12 percent
would be Hispanic and approximately 5 percent would be Native
Americans and Asian-Pacific Islanders as a group. With our goal
to reach out and have the highest quality Navy and Marine Corps
and to attract people into the Navy and Marine Corps at the high-
est level in order to protect the society and defend the society that
we represent, we established goals to try to have accessions into
our officer ranks as goals to reflect those in the 10 to 12 percent,
4 to 5 percent range. I am pleased to say that we have enjoyed sig-
nificant progress with regard to that.
In the Navy ROTC Program, we offered a program called Imme-
diate Scholarship Decision. When we had an attractive candidate
that met the criteria, we knew that they were going to be selected,
rather than put them in the pool and delay it, we let the recruiter
say on the spot, if you will sign here, we will accept you. That plus
advertising, such things as you find in the current issue of the
Black Collegian magazine, how we are advertising on college cam-
puses that are historically minority, has reaped real benefits.
We have a Seaman to Admiral Program that has given minori-
ties an enhanced opportunity. We have the Marine Corps Grow
Your Own Program. Those kinds of things, we are on track to reach
the goals that we have established so by the year 2000, we will
have accessions going into commissioned officer programs, includ-
ing the Naval Academy, Naval ROTC, OCS and other programs
that I mentioned.
I am gratified by the progress we have made. Our goal is to keep
quality up where it should be but have a broader net go out to at-
tract and make opportunities available to our entire society.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you.
Secretary Widnall, you and other Pentagon officials have taken
to task for plans of privatizing depot workload. I would like to focus
on this for is a moment so that my colleagues clearly understand
that there are benefits to privatization.
424
First of all, privatization of depot workload is only one part of
your overall effort to improve business practices. You cited Newark
as your pathfinder project, a base closed by the BRAC in 1993. As
far as I know, you were not directed to privatize in place the work-
load at Newark.
You stated that you did so because there were significant oper-
ational and economic challenges to moving the work to other de-
pots. Is this not the case with other workload at Kelly and McClel-
lan?
Are there not, as Secretary Perry stated the other day, means of
gaining efficiencies by privatizing the work where it is currently
being done?
Secretary WiDNALL. Yes. As I mentioned earlier, my view is that
privatization in place supports readiness, and I would emphasize
the unique facilities that exist at both those depots that have been
built by taxpayer money and are currently repairing extremely
complicated equipment. I think it is the best value and the best
support of readiness to use those facilities to continue that work
and to allow the private sector to have, acquire those facilities so
that they can expand the work that they do to include commercial
work as well.
Mr. Tejeda. I appreciate your comments on the legislative bar-
riers to privatization, and I can say that many of us on the commit-
tee and in Congress will work with you in a bipartisan fashion to
make it happen.
Let me mention and one final note, in response to some of my
colleagues' statements on BRAC, the final BRAC 95 report allows
the Pentagon to consolidate the workload at the remaining depots
or the private sector commercial activities as determined by the
Defense Depot Maintenance Council. I will make it very clear; I
know that those persons have spoken to you and have clearly stat-
ed that privatization should not, will not, and legally cannot be put
into place. I understand quite clearly that they are from Utah and
Georgia and Oklahoma. But in the beginning, there were many of
them that stated, frankly, had we been closed down, believe me, we
would be attempting and trying the same thing that Texas and
California is.
So again I greatly appreciate your comments and the work that
you are doing.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. And thank you for your
testimony today.
One of you mentioned that the second most frequently asked
question had to do with quality of life. What is the first? I forget
whether that was Secretary West or Secretary Dalton.
Secretary Dalton. I think compensation tends to come up first
with the Sailors and Marines. We appreciate your support on the
pay raises, and that clearly is important to our troops.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Secretary Dalton, as you know from classified information, Rus-
sian submarines, they launched, I think, six last year, and the next
generation will run faster, deeper, and quieter than anything we
425
have. Their submarines are now coming closer to our shores, they
are staying longer and when they drop deep and run slowly for
days at a time, we cannot track them; is that correct?
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Bartlett, we clearly have a major threat
with respect to potential capabilities of the Russians, Chinese, now
Iranians — there are 43 nations that have a submarine capability
today as compared to a much fewer number than that just 10 or
15 years ago. Clearly, they're a threat. And as you point out, the
Russian Navy, this is one area that they continue to focus attention
on, and that is one of the reasons that we have been moving for-
ward to get the third and final Seawolf done and the new attack
submarine program started, and also focusing on ASW.
Mr. Bartlett. My concern is that in the present political cli-
mate, with the budgetary constraints you are under, I am con-
cerned that we will be able to respond appropriately to that threat.
I think we need a new focus and funding there.
Secretary Dalton. Clearly, I spent most of my time here last
year talking about our submarine program. As I say, there were
many who thought that the third Seawolf was a dead issue, and
I was pleased to see that we got 70 votes for that program. And
now we are moving into advanced procurement for the new attack
submarine to follow, and that will be a program that we have had
the pleasure of working with many leaders on this committee, Mr.
Hunter and others to develop a program to have state-of-art tech-
nology in these new boats.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
Secretary Widnall, you mentioned the value of precision-guided
munitions. Last year's bomber study emphasized the Air Force's
need for precision-guided munitions. With this in mind, what is the
Air Force budget and plan for the AGM-130, which this committee
recognized as an integral part of our PGM base?
Secretary WiDNALL. I would like to get back for the record with
the specifics of the program.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
Dr. Widnall. Through FY96, the Air Force bought 602 AGM-130 missiles. The
Air Force did not include funding for the AGM-130 in its FY97 PB request. How-
ever, the Chiefs of Staffs FY97 Plus-Up Request includes $40M to fiind an addi-
tional 100 AGM-130S for employment on the F-15E.
Secretary WiDNALL. But let me reiterate that we have a substan-
tial number of PGM programs underway now, including the
JASSM program, which we are about to issue an early RFP on. We
are fully committed to it, have seen what it can do and are anxious
to get on with it.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you for your offer to provide specific infor-
mation.
The Chairman. Mr. McHale.
Mr. McHale. I, too, thank you for your diligence and especially
for your patience.
My first question is for Secretary West. On page 27 of your pos-
ture statement, you make reference to the Army's continuing obli-
gation to make sure that the 15 enhanced readiness brigades for
the National Guard be combat ready. During your earlier testi-
mony, you mentioned that 12 of the 15 are deploy able.
426
My question is, are they combat ready? And of those 15 enhanced
readiness brigades, how many have been through the NTC in the
last 3 years?
Secretary West. In answer to the second question, Congressman,
we will get you the number. I don't have it with me.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
National Guard Enhanced Brigades
Each of the 15 Enhanced Brigades will go through a 90 day train-up prior to de-
ployment. There are four pre-designated sites where the brigades will receive a Na-
tional Training Center (NTC)-like experience during their trian-up. Additionally, the
48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) from Georgia is scheduled to train at the NTC
in June 1996. The 53rd Infantry Brigade (Light) from Florida trained at the Joint
Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in June 1995 and the 39th Infantry Brigade
(Light) from Arkansas will train there in June 1996.
Secretary West. But in terms of how many are combat
deployable, we measure their readiness for purposes of using them
for deployments. I would expect that of the 15 — the reason, inciden-
tally, that the other three are not rated at the appropriate level of
readiness is that we are taking directed action to bring them up.
But our purpose is to be able to use them, if necessary, for support
of deployments.
Mr. McHale. My concern is that it is our purpose to use them,
but we are not prepared to use them. The question is not intended
to be a trick question. I asked the same question last year, and at
that time, none of the 15 had been through the NTC.
Our two-MRC strategy is wholly dependent upon the combat ca-
pability of those units. And as someone who presents this question
in a challenging but not aggressive way, we need to make sure that
when we promise that they are ready to fight, that we can deliver
on that promise, and I have grave reservations in that regard;
which do not reflect on the quality of the soldiers or their leader-
ship, or certainly yourself. These are superb soldiers, as good as we
can find anywhere, but if we don't bring them together in peace-
time as a unit and train them in peacetime as we will fight them
in war, saying that they are deployable when they in fact don't go
through the live fire training that is essential to that capability,
holds out a promise upon which we cannot deliver.
So as someone who wants to work with you to make sure that
they receive that training, I would urge you to look into not just
their deplo3mrient capability but are these units ready to fight with-
in 90 days, and I have grave reservations as to whether or not that
is the case.
Mr. West. There is a distinction between immediately deployable
in terms of 90 days and other deployability criteria. We believe
these units can make the contribution that we have in mind for
those enhanced brigades. Nevertheless, I take your message.
Mr. McHale. I think it is critically important that you establish
a routine rotation schedule such that these brigades, like active-
duty brigades, pass through the NTC on a routine basis to make
sure that they are ready to fight. They certainly have that capabil-
ity. If we give them the training, I have no doubt that they are able
to do so.
^y second question has to do with a possible plus-up for the
AAAV. Once in a while I get a decent haircut and go back on active
427
duty. I trained in January with the 24th MU down at Camp
Lejeune. Both the Navy ARG commander and the MU commander
are superb individuals, and that unit is going to do a great job on
deployment.
When they deploy, however, later this year, they will be deploy-
ing with AAVs that date to 1971, and a technology that goes back
to the early 1950's. I applaud your efforts to move forward on the
AAAV and encourage you to work with some of us who would like
to see a plus-up in that area to see if we might increase the rate
of procurement so that the AAAV ends up in the fleet a little more
quickly than currently planned.
Could you comment on the AAAV?
Secretary Dalton. Yes, sir.
It is a very high priority for the Marine Corps. As you know, it
is the primary means of armor-protected water and land mobility
and direct fire support for our Marine infantry during all types of
combat operations. As I stated, responding to Mr. Pickett, if addi-
tional money were available, that is certainly one place that we
would look. The program did lose 2 years and $190 million in the
fiscal year 1995 cuts. We regained 9 months of that in a $170 mil-
lion plus-up over the FYDP from PDM 2, and an additional year
could be gained to put us back on track, I think, with some $80
million over the FYDP. But we think our program is balanced that
we have, and does meet the needs on a reasonable time frame. Ob-
viously, if more resources were available, we would certainly accel-
erate this program as one of our priorities.
Mr. McHale. I would simply say that a possible plus-up in the
range of $20 to $40 million on this program is my top personal pri-
ority. And to the extent that I can be helpful in committee or in
conference, it is something where I think we can bring to the fleet
a dramatic step forward in terms of combat capability.
Finally, as you are aware, we have authorized and appropriated
the funds for one of the three ships necessary for the NPF-en-
hanced program. I would simply bring to your attention that based
on current law and the authorization given to you, realizing that
we give you authorization but not money, and I appreciate the posi-
tion you are in, if we can move on the second ship before the end
of this year based on the RFP as it now exists, we can acquire that
second ship without duplicating the bidding process that otherwise
would be necessary. So I would ask you to take a look at that.
We have a December 31 deadline, but if we can find the funds,
we don't have to duplicate the bidding process, we acquire a second
ship very quickly and at a lower expense to the taxpayer. 1 bring
that to your attention and I hope we can speak about it later at
length.
Secretary Dalton. I would be happy to discuss that with you.
The Chairman. Mr. McKeon.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1 want to thank the Secretaries for being here. 1 am new on this
committee and maybe my questions will reflect that, but I am in
a learning mode.
Secretary West, I am having a great deal of difficulty under-
standing the rationale for moving an Army helicopter detachment
from Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards Air Force to Ala-
428
bama. The GAO and DOD have written studies promoting the idea
of having the services employ each others' research, development,
test, and evaluation and maintenance facilities as a way to reduce
excess capacity.
The Army's mission could have been consolidated in California by
using the Navy's test range at China Lake. Under the Army's plan
just announced, this mission will be based at separate facilities
that are 2,000 miles apart. Millions of military construction dollars
would have been saved if the Army had kept the test wing at Ed-
wards and used China Lake. Could you respond to that please?
Secretary West. I believe you are talking about part of a decision
to consolidate helicopter activity, testing in two locations rather
than three, and one of those locations was in Alabama which is the
center at Fort McClellan of our helicopter activity.
Mr. McKeon. Edwards and China Lake could serve the same
purpose. Instead of being 2,000 miles apart
Secretary West. We are moving from three locations for all our
helicopter activity, testing and development activity, to two. Ed-
wards had been part of a group of Edwards, Yuma, and Fort
McClellan. The decision we made, which can't please everyone, was
to try to save money by consolidating the three in two locations.
Mr. McKeon. What I am saying is, it didn't save money because
it results in new construction.
Could you, maybe you could respond
Secretary WEST. The other factor; in fact, it is our belief — and I
would be happy to share our numbers with you; you probably have
access to them. We believe that not only will we have economies
of operation over time, but that also we will get benefits from the
synergy of combining our helicopter activities and testing activities
at the two locations which we will end up with at Fort McClellan,
which is already the site of sizable helicopter activity, that plus the
activities that are already there.
I am sorry; Fort Rucker, not McClellan. I am giving credit to the
wrong location. I will make headlines.
The alternative of leaving it at three locations was not one that
would have been satisfactory to us. The possibility you raise is that
we could have consolidated at Edwards rather than Fort Rucker.
Mr. McKeon. Edwards, China Lake, which is a much closer facil-
ity. Maybe you could get us more information on that.
Secretary West. But the analyses are always the same. You are
looking at the immediate cost, whatever initial investment you
have to make. To move if move you have to; it is almost like a
BRAC decision. You look at the savings you may have over time
by virtue of the combined operations and the synergies that you
will get from having them combined in one location.
Mr. McKeon. That is what I would like to see, your numbers
that were the rationale for that decision.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
Movement of U.S. Army Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC) From
Edwards Air Force Base, CA to Fort Rucker, AL
In June 1995, the Army concluded that the Airworthiness Qualification Test Di-
rectorate (AQTD) of ATTC, at Edwards Air Force Base (EAFB) California should
•"^y® <^o Fort Rucker, Alabama. Rationale for this action was budget reductions
which would not allow the continuance of sustaining overhead losses required to op-
429
erate three separate test facilities (Fort Rucker, EAFB, and Yuma Proving Ground,
Arizona). The one-time cost of moving the AQTD to Fort Rucker is $3.2 miUion. The
savings over the Program Objective Memorandum years (98-03) are $10.5 million,
which the Army has reappUed toward modernization. There is no new construction
required by moving the directorate to Fort Rucker.
Mr. McKeon. Secretary Widnall, in talking about the F-22 and
the replacements of the F-15 and F-16's, you talked about the aim
of those planes. I would like to talk about the B-52's. Could you
maybe tell me how many B-52's we have now in operation, B-52's,
B-l's, and B-2's?
Secretary Widnall. This is like a pop quiz. I would like to supply
the specific numbers for the record.
Mr. McKeon. That would be fine.
Secretary Widnall. We have a program, we use the B-52 to sup-
port the nuclear p)osture review and are tailoring the B-1 for con-
ventional operations. I think roughly speaking, we have 95 B-l's,
and clearly we are headed to a number like 56 B-52's to support
the nuclear posture review, with some attrition reserve to provide
for depot maintenance and other issues. That is roughly the size
of the force. And of course, we are headed to 20 B-2's. We will sup-
ply the actual numbers for the record.
The B-52 is very old. I worked on that when I was a freshman
in college, so I know it is an old airplane. Based on airframe life,
we will have it in the inventory up through 2010, 2020.
Mr. McICeon. I wouldn't argue, if you want to say 2030. At some
point, we probably agree that they will no longer be flying.
Secretary Widnall. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. At some point, probably the B-l's will no longer
be flying, and then we are down to 20 B-2's. I guess I have empa-
thy for keeping two submarine lines to keep our industrial base. I
have real concerns about closing down the industrial base for the
B-2. That happens to be built in my district.
I have visited the site. I have been there many times. And I see
the technology and what we are losing is we are closing that pro-
duction line down, and what it would cost to fire it up again if we
ever needed it. I guess I am a supporter of building those on a
slower capacity at a slower rate instead of how we have built
planes in the past where we have tried to condense it and they all
come on-line at the same time and go off-line at about the same
time. We are not going to resolve that issue here today.
Does that red light mean my time is up?
Secretary WiDNALL. Could I respond?
I speak here as an aeronautical engineer, which is my profession.
I think it is the case that there is no bomber industrial base; that
the bomber industrial base is part of the aerospace industrial space
base, part the transport industrial and the fighter industrial base
and the bomber industrial base.
Clearly, the B-2 is a very important technology development.
The stealth technology is in fact making its way into all Air Force
combat aircraft of the future. So, in fact, we are not shutting down
the stealth technology base; we are using that for F-22 and JAST.
Mr. McKeon. But the tooling
Secretary Widnall. Specifically to build that particular airframe,
I agree, but not just for the general question of industrial base or
technology.
430
Mr. Stump [presiding]. The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Aber-
crombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
the Secretaries for your patience.
A couple of issues don't need to be resolved here today. I am
going to bring them to your attention hoping that you can look at
them and perhaps we can get back on it, up to and including deal-
ing with Mr. Hefley's committee in a productive — it has to do with
housing.
I have been through the testimony, and ask. Secretary Dalton, if
you and Secretary West could perhaps consult with one another
and take as a proposition that the budget as presented, the capital
budget, the military construction budget, the official one put out by
the Department, indicates that just on the whole barracks renewal
aspects the Navy — my figures are just — $145 million for the Navy
and about $40 million for the Marine Corps. I realize that the num-
bers don't necessarily reflect any less of a priority for the Marine
Corps, that it has to do with different ages of buildings and facili-
ties, et cetera.
Secretary Dalton. And the Navy is considerably larger, 400,000-
plus sailors versus 174,000 Marines,
Mr. Abercrombie. My point being that if you could take a look
internally there to see whether or not the numbers utilized have
to all come in this year. I am thinking particularly of the Marine
barracks at Kaneoi.
I realize the sub base at Pearl Harbor needs not just refurbish-
ing, but renewal. There is zero at this point for the barracks at
Kaneoi for the Marines and there is movement from Barbers Point
over to Kaneoi. We have $6 out of every $7 on the Navy side, noth-
ing on the other. I am asking for consideration of possible realloca-
tion of the numbers so we can get some of this under way.
I don't have it in detail, and don't know, so I am presuming good
faith all around. Having seen these barracks situations, I hope that
as the budget evolves through the process here — as you know, it is
carried on in a bipartisan way on this committee — that we could
take it into account and see if something can be done.
Secretary Dalton. If I could respond.
I can tell you that housing has been a major priority of mine as
one of the quality-of-life issues. In your State on my first trip to
the Pacific, in Hawaii when I visit Marines, the first lady of the
Navy goes to see housing, hospitals, and so forth. I came in one day
and said how was your day, and she started telling me about the
housing that she saw in Hawaii, and literally with tears in her
eyes talking about how bad it was.
We have bulldozed those houses down and had a ground break-
ing 9 months ago, we will have the ribbon cutting at Easter. We
are emphasizing BEQ's and BOQ's for single sailors and marines.
We are going to have to do pilot projects with limited partnerships,
and also the new housing corporation that the Secretary of Defense
is interested in.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am pleased to say that I think I was able
to be useful and helpful in that process. That is one of the things
about going into the community. I have emphasized getting hous-
ing on the base for both married couples and single mothers, and
431
single parents, and then I did not want to see in that process — we
have had such an emphasis on that, I didn't want to see the single
sailor/soldier to get ignored in the process.
Secretary West, your testimony indicates we still have one-quar-
ter to one-third of the members of the armed services who are still
single. That is where the barracks renewal comes in for Navy, Ma-
rine, and Army. In that regard, Secretary West, as you know, we
started the whole Barracks Renewal Program at Scoffield. Whereas
you indicate in your testimony, many of the buildings are between
30 and 40 years old, as you know, at Scoffield, they are 70-plus
years old, and we are working on that. General Meyer and others
are doing an outstanding job.
I notice in the construction budget there is zero in 1997 for the
whole barracks renewal which is under way. That may be a func-
tion of the contracting period, I don't know. I am just looking into
it, and if it is fine.
But I don't want to — I hope we won't get started with some of
the other whole barracks, all of which — I have looked through
them; I am sure they are all a worthy project. But given the em-
phasis in the Pacific right now, I do think that we don't want to
fall behind. I am not trying to cram projects in.
This is a 15-to-20-year project; long after I am gone from here,
this project will be going on. I will be happy that I helped get it
started. But could we take a look at that, because I believe there
is at least a minimum of $10 million, and that really goes to all
of the Secretaries here. I hope you will be amenable to the idea
that when we go into the installations and the housing that we use
the budget as a starting point and that you will accept our good
faith. We don't look at these things as pork barrel projects.
It is common in the community out there, some of these commit-
tees, self-styled committees of Government waste and so on, to take
quality-of-life issues and say that they are pork-barrel projects, and
they are not. So I hope that all of the Secretaries will be open to
the idea of discussing whether or not we can move some of the
projects around so that everybody gets something going and com-
ing.
Particularly where barracks are concerned, that is not a project
you can finish in a year. That is at least, I would say, a decade-
and-a-half proposition if we are going to adequately deal with it.
Secretary West. Your points are well made, Mr. Abercrombie. As
you know, we have put a lot of attention to old barracks renewal.
We are continuing to do it in this budget.
No, we don't think that pushing for barracks in a particular loca-
tion is pork, because wherever those barracks are, they are still our
soldiers.
Mr. Abercrombie. Right. And as people switch around, I want
to emphasize to you, I am not just pushing for one area; I am inter-
ested in the whole thing.
Mr. Chairman, if you would just indulge me one moment — this
is again by way of observation to you; you need not comment on
it today, but General Shalikashvili and Secretary Perry indicated
an interest in this one when I brought it up, and Mr. Dornan has
indicated that he is willing to have hearings along these lines, or
38-160 97-16
432
incorporated into his hearings. That has to do with the 3-percent
raise that was emphasized in all of our testimony.
I won't go on at any length; I will bring it up in the hearings.
But that goes as low as $314 a year at the E-1 level, at the O-
7 level; with 24 years of experience, it goes as high as $2,500. I
would like you to consider, if you would, instead of a percentage
increase based on current rates of pay, which I have here, the 1996
pay chart, in setting aside for a moment basic allowance for quar-
ters and basic allowance for subsistence, consider making, at least
for part of the time, a cash increase, rather than a percentage in-
crease.
I have urged this — this is not just for the armed services, but all
public employees. That would increase the percentage at the lower
levels. It would decrease the percentage, obviously, at the higher
levels, but it would be equal for everybody across the board.
I am going to pick $1,000 out of the air. My understanding is
that there is a pool of money that will be utilized to sustain the
3-percent raise. That comes down to a dollar figure is what I am
driving at. So all I am proposing is that before we lock into 3 per-
cent right now, at current pay rates, that we, at least, consider the
idea of an across-the-board cash increase, or even perhaps a pro-
gressive cash increase, as opposed to percentage, to bring up the
lower ranks and the — ^both for enlisted and officer categories as a
way of increasing morale and increasing spending power.
Mr. Chairman, my last point being — the reason I bring up the
cash is that my understanding is that the gap in spending power
exists in the armed services the same way it exists in the private
sector with respect to the last decade or so, that is, those who are
at the higher pay levels have a greater — not just greater spending
power in absolute dollar terms, but the percentage of ^ter-tax
money available to them has increased at the upper levels as op-
posed to those at the lower levels, including the lower officer rank
levels; and that a cash increase as opposed to a percentage increase
based on present pay levels might help to offset some of that in-
equity that was developed in spending power over the last decade-
and-a-half or so. I hope you will take it into consideration.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Abercrombie, I can tell you, I know of two
people who would support that, my son — my two sons; those are
two votes for your proposal.
Mr. Abercrombie. This doesn't consist then of an utterly shame-
less appeal to the mass of those in the voting ranks.
The Chairman. The gentleman just set a new definition for a
brief statement.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
witnesses for being with us. And to the first lady of the Navy, Mrs.
Dalton, you can now attest to everyone that your husband indeed
works very hard for a living. This is combat duty.
Mr. Secretary, we rescheduled the F-14 hearings that I had set
with the Procurement Subcommittee, primarily on the basis that
we needed to recover the wreckage of the third F-14. Has that re-
covery effort been undertaken at this point?
433
Secretary Dalton. We have located, and whether we have actu-
ally begun a retrieval, Mr. Hunter, I can't respond. I don't know
the answer to that, but I will find out and get back to you.
[The information referred to was submitted for the record:]
Recovery of the third aircraft (Persian Gulf) is not as vital as recovery of the sec-
ond aircraft (the F-14D in the SoCal area). Major portions of the F-14D have been
recovered and the engines are now at Tinker Air Force Base undergoing full engi-
neering investigation. Other portions of the aircraft will likewise be investigated in
San Diego. The third mishap aircraft has been located and salvage operations will
begin shortly.
Secretary Dalton. But we appreciate, I think you did the right
thing, by postponing the hearing until we do have the information
so we can give you a better response to what we have found and
be able to tell you something that will be of use to the committee.
Mr. Hunter. OK. If you could let us know what the status is of
the retrieval operation, that is important to us.
Secretary Dalton. I will.
Mr. Hunter. You have asked roughly, between the Air Force and
the Navy, for 20 aircraft, 12 F/A-18's, and four F-15's and F-16's.
You might ask, or maybe some of your staff members could work
on this question, as to what our loss has been in terms of lost air-
craft by crashes or retired aircraft over the last year, because it ap-
pears to me that we are not replacing planes as fast as they attrit
out of the system.
I have a number of questions. Let me run over them quickly, and
the ones that you can answer, if you could note these down, and
I will make the list available to you. The ones you can answer here,
that would be good; but if you want me to take the rest for the
record, that is fine.
Nearly $2 billion has been removed from the fiscal year 1996
budget due to these revised economic assumptions. So to all serv-
ices, how have the service budgets been affected? Were any pro-
grams cut as a result of that? Will any contracts have to be renego-
tiated?
The Department has also proposed to rescind $1 billion of fiscal
year 1996 appropriations. Included in this is the Kiowa Warrior,
the Navy's standoff land attack missile, and the Air Force's AGM-
130 and AGM-142 missiles. In light of the fact that we don't have
additional funding for Comanche and that you said in your state-
ments that we need precision-guided munitions, why are these pro-
grams, the Kiowa Warrior and those precision-guided munition
programs, proposed for rescission?
For the Army, Secretary West, could you give us the rationale for
cancelling the armored gun system? Was it to protect funding for
force structure? And how will direct fire support to early deploying
light forces be provided when tanks aren't available?
Also for the Army, how much of the $26 billion in procurement
decrement from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001 is coming from
the Army, of that big cut that we made?
Finally, does the Army intend to comply with the 1996 DOD di-
rection to implement a multiyear procurement of small arms?
For the Navy, Secretary Dalton, you have been grilled on the
submarines. Suffice it to say that this was an arrangement that
was entered into at the conference level with your attendance; the
434
CNO speaker involved himself a lot. We put a lot of work into this
thing, and the spirit of the agreement in terms of letting the yards
innovate to produce a better sub is as important as the substance;
and I — for the record, you might tell us — one thing that I was dis-
appointed in was the fact that you didn't have the 1999 submarine
in and yet you had a new LPD-17 in the budget.
Let me go down my list here before you respond to that.
Also, does the Department intend to maintain the naval reactor
billet at the four-star level when the incumbent officer retires at
the end of October? Why have
Mr. Dellums. Will the gentleman yield? I don't think any of
them can write that fast.
Mr. Hunter. Here is what I am doing, if the gentleman — I will
just respond to the gentleman. When we come to a question that
you have got a response for and want to make here on the record,
take that; and I am going to give you the list of questions when
we finish, but you may — I am giving you the opportunity to pick
and choose which of these you think necessitates a response now.
I thank the gentleman for his observation.
So we had a $26-billion procurement decrement from 1999 to
2001, and how much of that is coming out of the Navy for you, Sec-
retary Dalton?
The EA-6B, we still don't have a direction. Secretary Dalton, for
a plan for modernizing the EA-6B, if you could comment on that.
Also, the F-14, are there any F-14 upgrades proposed in your
budget? That is an important item for us.
For the Air Force, how much of the $26 billion procurement dec-
rement from 1997 to 2001 is coming out of your budget?
Finally, what is a long-term procurement plan for C-130J? At
one aircraft a year, as required under fiscal year 1997, it is going
to be a long time before you modernize your tactical air fleet.
And what is the impact of the F-22 program, because there is
some commonality of production facilities there if there aren't — if
there are no C-130J's procured for Guard and Reserves.
So that is a long laundry list. Thanks for your indulgence, and
I will give you the written questions. But if you could comment on
one or two of those, the ones that you think are appropriate.
The Chairman. The gentleman did say you could answer these
in writing, so the ball is in your court as to when we get out of
here.
Secretary Dalton. I will answer mine for the record. I have sev-
eral here, but in lieu of time, I think we will opt to answer for the
record, Mr. Hunter.
Secretary WiDNALL. I would prefer to answer for the record.
Secretary WEST. One word about the HES gun system. It was
part of a process of review by both our professional uniformed — at
headquarters — and our procurement people, our position people, to
take a look at programs and see where we could use those that
weren't going to make the kind of imperative contribution that we
could take care of with something else, terminate the program, yes,
and put that money into other more rewarding procurement oppor-
tunities.
435
So, first and foremost, except for a very small portion of the AGS
money, it is all going back into modernization accounts. I think
that answers at least one of the thrusts of your questions.
The other part is, yes, my professionals in uniform, your profes-
sionals in uniform are satisfied that they can do — provide the nec-
essary firepower. One of the programs that has been referred to
here, the C-17, is part of the answer. I grant you, the C-17 doesn't
shoot at anybody, but with its capacity to put essentially what I
will call C-5 cargoes on C-130 landing strips, we can get the fire-
power we need into some places where we once thought we
wouldn't be able to.
Mr. Hunter. OK.
The Chairman. Secretary Widnall, did you say you wanted to an-
swer?
Secretary Widnall. No. I prefer to answer for the record, al-
though just to say, when asked about, you know, what some of our
priorities were that were not funded, I would say the C-130 J is in
that category of things that we believe are extremely valuable; and
we would like to get on with recapitalizing that aircraft.
The Chairman. Finally, the Chair recognizes the ranking mem-
ber.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me make this observation: At one point in these pro-
ceedings it was very possible that the whole thing could have dete-
riorated, and I am appreciative of the fact that it did not. I recog-
nize the fact that all of us in this room are laboring under extraor-
dinary stress, stress brought on by the gravity of the issues that
we have to deal with, brought on by the reality of the life-and-
death implications of the actions that we take, and finally, the
magnitude of the billions of dollars that we have to deal with as
we address our fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of millions of
people. So I am very pleased about that.
I just think that whether we agree or disagree from a partisan
perspective, or ideologically, I think that the highest and the best
is required in us, and I think that it is terribly important for us
to stay on the high ground and address these issues, given their
significance and their import.
Having said that, I want to come back to the point that I tried
to make in my opening remarks, when I observed near the end of
the proceedings when we met with Secretary Perry and General
Shalikashvili, that as the hearings evolved, there were clearly four
issues that, as I see it, will be contentious as we move forward in
the markup.
One of them is privatization, and that has been addressed, it
seems to me, as I observed that clearly the response there is that
privatization may make sense in one situation, it may not make
sense in another situation. The important cornerstone here is that
the issues be addressed on their merit, rise above politics; and that
is all I would say with respect to that.
The second significant issue that will be quite controversial and
contentious obviously will be the ballistic missile defense program.
In that regard, I would like to ask you as the Secretaries, are you
comfortable with the priorities established in the overall ballistic
missile defense program that establishes theater missile defense as
436
the priority — given the close proximity of the threat as you perceive
it and the need to deploy theater defenses out there — given that,
that perceived threat, may we just have your comment on that, and
then I would like to make a few other comments.
Secretary Widnall. Well, let me begin. Yes, I am very com-
fortable. I believe the Department has laid out a very responsible
program.
It takes a reflection of the threat and also a reflection of the level
of technologies in being able to accomplish these various missions.
So I feel it is a challenging technical area, and I feel that we are
on the right track towards achieving the goals in both the theater
area and the national area.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
Secretary Dalton. We did have a very useful dialogue within the
Department, and I agree with Dr. Widnall's conclusion, that where-
as it was a deliberative process and in all ways all decisions were
unanimous, it was clear that I think Dr. Kaminski and his staff
came to the appropriate resolution.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
Secretary West. The Army and I are strongly supportive.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you. The third contentious issue that
emerged in the context of the Secretary's posture statement has
been alluded to in different ways today, the so-called shortfall in
the acquisition account modernization program. In that regard, I
might observe, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, that
it was very interesting — and this is important for those of you who
have defined the shortfall — that when asked in a very direct man-
ner by the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Pickett, of all of the serv-
ice Secretaries, because I don't think you have to be a genius or
a spiritualist to know that given the construct, the makeup of this
committee, there is going to be a plus-up.
When asked by Mr. Pickett if that plus-up occurred, what would
be your priorities? I found it fascinating that on no one's list did
B-2 bomber emerge, and on no one's list did increasing national
missile defense occur.
So I think that the interesting challenge for members of this
committee is if indeed you found a shortfall in the acquisition ac-
count, in the modernization program, what is the rationale for mov-
ing beyond the priorities that they played out as the so-called ex-
perts in this area as opposed to us placing big-ticket items that
throw their entire acquisition accounts into gross disarray?
Final observation and question: The final contentious issue is the
issue of the topline, and many of my colleagues have suggested
that we are not spending enough money on defense, taking too
much money out of DOD, we don't have adequate resources, we are
in danger of slipping back — whatever the rhetoric, but it is there.
My question to you is, since we don't today have line-item de-
tails, but simply the broad outlines of the overall budget, broad
outlines of the budgets that each of you have presented, are you
comfortable that within the context of the FYDP, that you can say
to this committee that it is your judgment, or not your judgment,
that given those dollars, based upon the FYDP that has been pro-
jected, that you can adequately address the national security needs
of this country?
437
And then my final, final question is, do you feel from your per-
spective, are you adequately structured to meet the needs of the
post-cold war? And in that regard, I have very specific allusion to
activities other than war.
And that would be my final question, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary West. Mr. Dellums, for the Army, I can say, yes, to the
question as to whether this budget, this topline allows the Army
to meet those needs. Indeed, I can say more, that that topline is
important to us as we try to get a stable and predictable program.
Moreover, I will add this: I am comfortable on behalf of the Army
that this budget and this topline lays the groundwork for us to con-
tinue in future budgets over the next years to meet those needs.
I see both the ability to do what we need to do this year and in
the coming years.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Dellums, I would also answer in the af-
firmative and say that I do feel comfortable with the FYDP.
Also having heard what you said about the reality is that there
will be a plus-up, I would encourage this committee to look at what
we have in our FYDP, in our budget, things that we need and
bring them forward, whether it be submarine — which is the first
thing I mentioned, the submarine program — the AAAV and so
forth, things that we know that we are going to need and want to
have as opposed to pet projects that somebody else might want or
might like for us to have.
We have spent a great deal of time and effort and energy in com-
ing up with this FYDP program, and we think that is what should
be funded as a priority.
Secretary WiDNALL. With respect to the Air Force, I would say
that this budget funds our highest priorities. I believe we can sup-
port the national military strategy and we can keep our important
modernization programs on track. We will need your help to
achieve the kinds of efficiencies that we must achieve over the fu-
ture, such as C-17 multiyear. We have already counted in this
budget on $ 1 billion savings as a result of that kind of streamlining
acquisition reform, and we need your help to get those savings.
Otherwise, our budget would be in a more serious problem.
I believe that — I think we are an important part of the national
debate in this country about how this society is going to allocate
its resources. We look forward to that debate.
I also believe that today's military — and I believe the President
has stated this on more than one occasion — has played an incred-
ibly important role in the post-cold war world, not just in preparing
to carry out the national military strategy, but in the daily activi-
ties that we are involved in — the peacekeeping, the military-to-
military contacts, the international program of the Department.
So, again, I welcome this debate, and I look to your support to
help us achieve the kinds of efficiencies that we need in order to
keep our modernization program on track.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
The two Secretaries, Secretary Dalton and Secretary West, did
not address the second question, which was, from your perspective,
are you properly structured to address the challenges of the post-
cold war; and there I was focusing, as Secretary Widnall zeroed in
on, on activities other than war.
438
Secretary West. I think we are, and I think we have reflected
those in both of our budgets and in our plans.
I might also add, if I may, a word of support for the last point
that Secretary Widnall made in support of efficiencies. I might al-
most say that more than additional money, if we can get sufficient
flexibility from the Congress with respect to the 64-year-old — with
respect to the $3 million contract threshold, the Davis-Bacon Act
and a whole host of things that limit our ability to operate our
services less expensively than we operate them now, that could do
as much for us as plus-ups.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
Secretary Dalton. I concur with Dr. West concerning — Secretary
West with respect to the operation of, and as I mentioned in re-
sponse to one of the questions, things like acquisition reform, those
kinds of things, we certainly would like to have the support of the
Congress on.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Secretar-
ies for their responses to my questions, and thank you for your gen-
erosity.
Mr. Cunningham. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent
request.
The Chairman. Does the gentleman have another question, Mr.
Cunningham?
Mr. Cunningham. No, not a question, but I would like to insert
into the record this article and the classified document from Sec-
retary Shalikashvili, which is in contrast to the Secretary's state-
ments.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, since
the witnesses took most of my questions for the record and since
Mr. Dellums' statement or questions were — I think went right to
the heart of our bigger questions on how much we spend for de-
fense this year, I would like to just ask one question, and that is
that in light of General Shalikashvili's statement in his readiness
assessment or his program assessment, and I quote,
I believe we risk future combat readiness of the U.S. military if we fail to ade-
quately fund recapitalization starting in fiscal year 1997, and I urge you to set a
procurement goal of almost $60 billion per year, beginning in fiscal year 1998.
We haven't done that in the budget that you have given us. Do
you disagree with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in that state-
ment? I don't think we can have it both ways. I don't think we can
have him saying we risk combat readiness and you say, look, I
think we have everything that we need.
Secretary West. I think I will let what the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs has said in the document that you referred to stand, which
I have not seen, and what he said when he appeared before you,
in which he endorsed this budget, in which he endorsed the plan,
and in which he gave you his statement that we could do the job
for our country on this basis.
That is the statement I endorse.
Mr. Hunter. Well, I am asking for your personal assessment, not
just your endorsement.
439
Secretary West. Well, they are the same.
Secretary WiDNALL. Let me just say that there is no question
that this year is the year to talk about modernization, and to keep
these programs on track and to do it in a way using best business
practices and acquisition reform and other efficiencies to really
push this program forward. We are all concerned about it; it is
probably a top priority item in the Department this year, no ques-
tion about it. We are looking forward to working with you toward
getting the best value for the taxpayer in this extremely important
area.
Secretary Dalton. Mr. Hunter, in the Navy program, we are on
an up-ramp starting from fiscal year 1996 to 1997. Granted, with
the change in the program with respect to the Congress, it is not
an up-ramp now, but we clearly were on an up-ramp with respect
to our recapitalization. As I mentioned earlier in my answer to
questions, we do have a bow wave problem.
We are fine through this FYDP, and I fully support where we are
in this budget. In the outyears we do have a bow wave of shipbuild-
ing that we are going to have to address.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Chairman, just one thing. I might say to the
gentleman from California and you, Mr. Chairman, that with re-
spect to the unanimous consent, on — on sober reflection, this article
alludes to a document that is a classified document. It raises some
interesting, if not provocative questions about whether we ought to
be alluding to that in the record at this point, when we are not
quite sure whether this is a classified document or an unclassified
document, and so I would just raise that with you. I think it is im-
portant, whatever our politics, that on a procedural basis we ought
to be trying to deal with the integrity of that responsibility.
Mr. Cunningham. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Dellums. Yes, sir. The chairman can rule on it, whatever.
Mr. Cunningham. I don't have any problem with your statement,
other than it is on a statement by General Shalikashvili; it is his
feeling that if we don't increase those procurement accounts, we
are going to have shortfalls.
Mr. Dellums. You are talking about a secret document that was
leaked, so we don't know that. I don't believe everything I read in
the press.
The Chairman. I believe that if it was a classified document, it
would appear in the proper place, but not in the open record.
Any other questions?
Secretary West, Secretary Dalton, Secretary Widnall, we thank
you. We thank you especially for staying so that we would not have
to come back.
One question. Those questions that were submitted to you, we
would appreciate as rapid a response as possible.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you.
Secretary Widnall. Thank you very much.
Secretary West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Dalton. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The following questions and answers were submitted for the
record:]
440
Questions Submitted for the Record
joint surveillance target attack radar systems (jstars)
Mr. Stump. We know that at General Joulwan's request Secretary Perry deployed
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to Bosnia in support of
the Dayton Peace Accords. According to the open press, it has been performing quite
well. Can you tell us how Joint STARS is preforming from your perspective?
Secretary WEST. JSTARS is a highly effective system in support of Operation
Joint Endeavor. Both the Army and Air Force service members on the JSTARS
team have accomplished their mission well. Both the air and ground segment of the
JSTARS system make a powerful team providing real time intelligence directly to
the commander on the ground. JSTARS has been an invaluable tool in covering re-
mote and dangerous areas both day and night. Missions have included monitoring
convoys, rail lines, refueling points, weapons collection points, known artillery/mor-
tar sites, ferry crossings and even helicopter movement. It is important to note that
some of the most successful missions were ones that showed no activity. Lack of
movement in an area is critical intelligence as well.
COMMON GROUND STATION [CGS]
Mr. Stump. We understand that the Army has recently awarded the contract for
the Common Ground Station Module. What additional capabilities will this provide
the tactical commander and will this include additional sensors such as the Predator
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System — ^Two
(ASARS II), and Airborne Reconnaissance-Low (ARD?
Secretary West. We have, in fact, awarded a competitive contract for the Common
Ground Station (CGS) to an industry team lead by Motorola which will greatly en-
hance the capabilities of the JSTARS CGS. The CGS design incorporates the latest
in commercial technology and employs an open system architecture that will ensure
rapid insertion of technology into the system. The CGS design will allow additional
sensor products to be received and correlated with current products. Motorola, as
part of the government/ industry team, has demonstrated links to the Predator UAV
and is also working with Hughes on the ASARS HE and California Microwave, the
ARL contractor, to have a direct downlink into the CGS. We expect to add these
capabilities to the units in support of Operation Joint Endeavor, if required.
Mr. Stump. Last year, Department of Defense provided a demonstration of the
JSTARS capability to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) officials aboard
the USS Mount Whitney. How did this effort go and what are we doing to promote
the JSTARS as the candidate for the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) mission?
Secretary West. Last October, at the USS Mount Whitney demonstration, we
demonstrated the ability to downlink JSTARS data from the E-8 aircraft to the de-
ployed Rapid Reaction Force Command element aboard the USS Mount Whitney.
The demonstration went extremely well. Since that time, we have deployed a proto-
type CGS to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Technical
Center at the Hague. This system is assisting NATO in identifying and developing
the various technical interface requirements between JSTARS and the NATO com-
mand and control system.
REVISED ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
Mr. Hunter. Nearly $2 billion has been removed from the FY 96 budget due to
revised economic assumptions. How have the service budgets been affected by this
adjustment? Were any programs cut by more than a pro-rata share of the adjust-
ment? If so, which programs and how much were they cut?
Secretary WEST. There should be no programmatic impacts associated with the re-
ductions for revised economic assumptions. No program was cut by more than its
f»ro-rata share, however, DoD directed the exclusion of the National Foreign Intel-
igence Program/General Defense Intelligence Program. In the Research, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation, Army Appropriation, the Army also exempted the
Digitization Program. The exclusion of these two programs increased the pro-rata
share for all other programs by only a small amount.
PROPOSED RESCISSION OF FISCAL YEAR 1996 APPROPRIATIONS
Mr. Hunter. The Department has proposed to rescind $1 billion of fiscal year
(FY) 96 appropriations for reasons which have not been publicly stated. These re-
scissions are in addition to those proposed for Bosnia and Jordan and included in
them are funding for the Army's Kiowa Warrior, the Navy's Standoff Land Attack
441
missile, and the Air Force's AGM-130 and AGM-142 missiles. In view of the fact
that the Army has not added any additional funding to its FY 97 Comanche devel-
opment program and the Department professes to be in need of precision guided
munitions, why are these programs proposed?
Secretary West. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) directed the $1 bil-
lion rescission by the Army in a Program Budget Decision. The Kiowa Warrior heli-
copter and a number of other Army Research, Development and Acquisition appro-
priation items were identified. The Army share is about $202.6 million.
The RAH-66 Comanche is the Army's number one long-term modernization pro-
gram and is executable at the current FY 97 funding level. We are resourced to pro-
vide Early Operational Capability (EOC) aircraft beginning in FY 01 and to ensure
Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by FY 06.
ARMORED GUN SYSTEM
Mr. Hunter. Please provide the committee with the Army's rationale for cancel-
ing the Armored Gun System (AGS). Was it to protect funding for force structure?
How will direct fire support to early deploying light forces be provided when tanks
are not available?
Secretary West. The Army decided to terminate AGS because of a combination
of operational, budgetary and modernization priority considerations. The AGS is a
low density (only 237 systems) program that requires approximately $1.5 billion to
complete development, procure and field two units (3-73 Armor Battalion, 82d Air-
borne Division and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR)(L)). One of the internal
solutions for recapitalization was to terminate a major program and reinvest into
more critical modernization needs. It is important to understand that we only took
the action we did because we have alternative means of accomplishing the same
mission for which the AGS was designed. The direct fire support can be met by our
currently fielded forces (equipped with Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehi-
cles), as well as by accelerating Javelin into early deploying forces. Additionally, the
recent decision to procure 120 C-17 aircraft increases the capability to put armored
forces into an airhead more rapidly.
ARMY'S SHARE OF $26 BILLION PROCUREMENT DECREMENT
Mr. Hunter. How much of the $26 billion procurement decrement from FY 97-
FY 01 is coming from the Army?
Secretary West. The Army's share of the $26 billion procurement decrement was
$2,014 billion, which was available due to revised economic assumptions.
However, by FY 2001 total DoD funding to procure modernized equipment will
increase to $60. 1 billion — in real terms about 40 percent higher than the $38.9 bil-
lion requested for FY 1997. The Army received an additional $5.9 billion from FY
1997 to FY 2001, which were a result of the more optimistic economic assumptions
described above. Army modernization funds increase from $10.6 billion in FY 1997
to $14.8 billion in FY 2001.
MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT OF SMALL ARMS
Mr. Hunter. Does the Army intend to comply with the fiscal year (FY96) 1996
Department of Defense Authorization Act's direction to implement multiyear pro-
curement of small arms?
Secretary WEST. The Army has included a modest fiinding stream in its FY97
budget request to support multiyear procurements for small arms weapons. At
present, we intend to pursue multiyear awards for the MK19-3 Grenade Machine
Gun, M249 Squad Automatic Weapon, and M16A2 Rifle.
Mr. Hunter. Nearly $2B has been removed from the FY 96 budget due to revised
economic assumptions. How have the service budgets been affected by this adjust-
ment? Were any programs cut by more than a pro-rata share of the adjustment?
If so, which programs and how much were they cut?
Secretary Dalton. Initial distributions were all based on pro-rata. Some, such as
the initial reductions included in appropriations were directed by Congress to be
done pro-rata, and we are following such guidance. However, because programs are
in execution, we may have to deviate on a case by case basis. If so, we will notify
the Defense Oversight Committees of an alternative program reductions that are
necessary.
Mr. Hunter. The Department has proposed to rescind $1 billion of FY 96 appro-
priations for reasons which have not been publicly stated. These rescissions are in
addition to those proposed for Bosnia and Jordan and included in them are funding
for the Army's Kiowa Warrior, the Navy's Standoff Land Attack Missile, and the Air
442
Force's AGM-133 and AGM-142 missiles. In view of the fact that the Army has not
added any additional funding to its FY 97 Comanche development program and the
Department professes to be in need of precision guided munitions, why are these
programs proposed?
Secretary Dalton. The funding proposed for rescission from the Navy's Standoff
Land Attack Missile program ($40 million) was added by Congress to procure an
additional 45 SLAM missiles in FY 1996. The Department of the Navy had budgeted
for a procurement of 30 SLAM missiles in FY 1996, the last year in which SLAM
all up-round procurement had been funded. In view of the fact that the first LRIP
for the SLAM-ER program is scheduled for FY 1997, and in light of the large bills
which needed to be paid by the Department, offering up the SLAM funding would
have a lesser impact when compared to other Departmental priorities. This ten-
tative position is reflected in the FY 1997 President s Budget backup material; how-
ever, the final list has not yet been determined.
Mr. Hunter. I was deeply disappointed — but not suprised — with the Navy's not
having come anywhere near complying with the attack submarine legislation con-
tained in the FY96 DOD Authorization Act. However, in response to a question from
Mr. Bateman in the committee's hearing with Secretary Perry, the Secretary as-
sured us that — and I quote — ^"We'U do whatever we have to do to comply with con-
gressional guidance on this issue." Why then did the Navy refuse to include a sub-
marine in it FY99 program while at the same time adding an LPD-17 that was not
heretofore budgeted? Similarly, why did the Navy refuse to include a submarine in
its FYOl program, even though the resources that were formerly required for the
LHD-7 in that year are available to do this, since the LHD-7 is funded in the cur-
rent fiscal year?
Secretary Dalton. Navy is preparing a plan to address how, if funded, it would
execute the four ship plan described in the Authorization Act. The plan will be sub-
mitted to Congress in March 1996.
The LPD-17 program was originally planned for a FY96 lead ship to replace
aging LST, LKA, and LPD amphibious ships. Higher budgeting priorities shifted the
lead ship to FY98. Under a FY98 lead ship profile, there was no planned procure-
ment in FY99. With Congressional acceleration of lead ship to FY96, the program
supported construction in FY99. FYOl LHD-7 resources were applied against other
DoD priority issues.
Mr. Hunter. The FY 1996 DOD Authorization Act requires a transfer of $50 mil-
lion in the National Defense Sealifl Fund to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency. These funds, which are excess to the budget request, are to be used
for the specific purpose of developing advanced submarine technologies. The only
budget document you have provided to the committee thus far does not indicate this
transfer has been made. Will you assure the committee this transfer will be made
in accordance with legislation?
Secretary Dalton. The Department received conflicting direction for the use of
$50 million above the budget, authorized and appropriated to the National Defense
Sealift Fund. Moreover, the Authorization Act did not provide for the transfer of
these additional funds. We have deferred spending these funds pending further
study of the issue.
Mr. Hunter. Does the Department intend to maintain the Naval Reactor billet
at the four-star level when the incumbent officer retires at the end of October? Why?
Is there a continuing necessity to maintain an eight year term of office for this posi-
tion? Why?
Secretary Dalton. The Department intends to maintain the position of Director,
Naval Nuclear Propulsion as a four-star billet with an eight year term. The mobil-
ity, endurance, and tactical advantage provided by nuclear propulsion in warships
are becoming increasingly vital as Navy is called upon to do more with less. Of
equal importance is maintaining the high standards and excellent safety record so
necessary to ensure continued acceptance of U.S. nuclear powered ships in over 150
ports throughout the world. The director. Naval Nuclear Propulsion, is personally
reasonable for the safety, design, construction, operation, operator-training, mainte-
nance, and disposal of more nuclear reactors than the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion regulates. The seniority and tenure of the Director enable the objectivity and
independence needed for engineering and safety decisions. With the existing ar-
rangements, the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program has proven to be a successful,
efficient undertaking, providing safe and reliable nuclear propulsion for warships
and the trained personnel to operate them. These arrangements should remain as-
is. More specifically:
Over 40% of our warships are nuclear powered. Two-thirds of our aircraft carriers
are nuclear, and carriers are the Navy's chief means for projecting significant mili-
tary power. The Navy's strategic deterrent resides in nuclear powered submarines,
443
ships which are the least vulnerable of the nation's strategic deterrent forces. Equal-
ly important, our nuclear powered attack submarines are essential to control of the
seas. When there is a potential or actual need to project power, ninety percent of
the time, attack submarines are the first to arrive on the scene. Their presence acts
as a necessary constraint on a real or potential adversary. Though the number of
nuclear powered warships is declining, the worldwide demand on the Navy to pro-
tect national interests remains high. In this situation, each nuclear powered ship
grows in importance, and we must have continuing assurance that these ships are
available to meet our needs worldwide.
Nuclear energy is a demanding and unforgiving technology requiring careful engi-
neering and constant critical oversight to ensure the Nation can continue reaping
the benefit from Naval nuclear propulsion — without suffering adverse consequences
such as have befallen other nuclear programs. President Reagan recognized this in
1982 when he issued Executive Order 12344 "for the purpose for preserving the
basic structure, policies, and practices developed for this Program in the past and
assuring that the Program will continue to function with excellence." The Executive
Order requires the Director to be "qualified by reason of technical background and
experience in naval nuclear propulsion" and specifies the four-star grade and eight-
year term. These requirements are necessary given the crucial importance and
broad scope of the Director's responsibilities; i.e., the Director must have the req-
uisite authority, stature, expertise, experience, and tenure needed to assure that de-
cisions impacting reactor safety and reliability are not compromised by other consid-
erations.
For 130 reactors, the Naval Reactors organization, with only 750 people, has a
major regulatory responsibility, plus total responsibility (cradle-to-grave) for Naval
reactor plants. In contrast, for 109 commercial reactor plants, the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission, with 3,000 people, does only the regulatory job.
The Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's record of excellence speaks for itself.
Since NAUTILUS first put to sea 40 years ago, the Navy has delivered 203 nuclear
ships — and their propulsion plants have provided the fleet unparalleled stealth and
mobility, safely and reliably, without harm to the environment. In 1994, the Navy's
nuclear powered warships achieved 100 million miles safely steamed on nuclear
power. The Program received Presidential and Congressional recognition for this,
e.g., the President's letter of 25 April 1994 states: 'The Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program, with its high standards and efficiency, exemplifies the level of excellence
we are working toward throughout our Government". Likewise, the Senate's 1994
Defense Authorization Report states the Program "Is synonymous with excellence".
The Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program's record has not been easily achieved, and
is even harder to maintain. The record results in part from having the requisite
structure and authority to get results. This is crucial to sustaining the Program's
record, which is a must if nuclear powered warships are to continue their important
contribution to national defense. The four-star billet and eight-year term for the
Program's director are key elements of the existing arrangements set forth by law
and executive order. There is no reason to alter these arrangements; they must re-
main as-is.
Mr. Hunter. Why have you proposed $20 million — one-fifl;h of the funds enacted
for advanced submarine technology programs in FY 96 — for rescission?
Secretary Dalton. Congress provided a $20 million plus-up for the Advanced Sub-
marine Systems Development program. The Department originally offered $10 mil-
lion of the $20 million plus-up for rescission since this level of effort was not sup-
ported in the budget and to avoid starting programs that could not be supported
in later years based on funding restraints. The final list has not yet been deter-
mined.
Mr. Hunter. How much of the $26 billion procurement decrement from FY 1997-
FY 2001 is coming from the Navy?
Secretary Dalton. I am not aware of a $26 billion procurement decrement.
While a higher level of funding for procurement would be desirable, the Depart-
ment of the Navy has focused clearly on the best possible use of the funding that
we do have. We have made our priorities and our choices; readiness and care of the
troops come first, followed by maintaining the force structure and modernization. In
taking action to ensure our readiness is ftilly supported in the near-term, we appor-
tioned some additional risk to mid-term and long-term readiness areas. Ship depot
maintenance and aircraft rework programs have been funded at levels proven to be
manageable without impacting ship deployments or requiring the grounding of air-
craft;. Over the long-term, our strategy continues to be based on a strong reliance
on future recapitalization, to be made possible by success in achieving efficiencies
in all aspects of operations. The Department is continuing an ambitious program to
improve the quality of life of our personnel.
444
The Department is aggressively reducing the cost of maintaining it's infrastruc-
ture Recapitalization efforts have been accelerated from the track established by
the President's biennial budget for FY 1996/1997. For surface ships, the FY 1997
budget includes procurement of four Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyers
as facilitated by Congressional action in FY 1996, and conversion of two ammunition
ships. In addition, the National Defense Sealift Fund budget for FY 1997 includes
funds for construction of two Large Medium Speed Roll-on/RoU-off ships for
prepositioning/surge.
The budget also reflects our commitment to sustain the submarine industrial base
and support the necessary replacement of our submarine force in the next decade.
The SSN-23, approved by Congress in FY 1996, will bridge the gap in submarine
construction until the New Attack Submarine begins construction in FY 1998. Ad-
vance procurement funds for the New Attack Submarine are budgeted in both FY
1996 and FY 1997.
Recapitalization of our aviation forces also remains on track with initial procure-
ment of the F/A-18E/F and the V-22 budgeted in FY 1997.
Mr. Hunter. What is the Department doing to comply with the Congressional di-
rection to submit a plan for modernizing the EA-6B?
Secretary Dalton. The Department's plan for modernization of the EA-6B is
nearly complete and will be submitted to the Congressional Defense Committees in
April 1996. The Joint Tactical Air Electronic Warfare Study, also requested by the
Fiscal Year 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, was forwarded to the Con-
gressional Defense Committees on 18 March 1996 by the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Acquisition and Technology.
Mr. Hunter. What F-14 upgrades are proposed in the budget request? What up-
grades are not funded? Why?
Secretary Dalton. Three new F-14 modification programs are proposed in FY 97
President's budget submission. The first modification includes fiinding for the Digi-
tal Flight Control System (DECS). $9.6M of FY 96 funds will be provided to initiate
program implementation. A total of $80M will be allocated to complete this modi-
fication program. The second modification funds the F-14 Precision Strike Program.
This upgrade incorporates the LANTIRN FLIR System, ALR-67, night vision capa-
bility and BOL chaff. $358M is funded inside the FYDP for program execution. The
third F-14 upgrade includes funding for ASP J. This program will modify all F-14D
aircraft to accept previously procured ASPJ systems.
Unfunded upgrades include ALE-50 towed decoy for TARPS aircraft, as well as
additional ALR-67, LANTIRN pods and night vision devices. Funding restraints
precluded acquiring this additional equipment.
Mr. Hunter. Nearly $2 billion has been removed from the FY96 budget due to
revised economic assumptions. How have the service budgets been affected by this
adjustment?
Dr. WiDNALL. All Air Force appropriations shared in this adjustment. Operations
and Maintenance reductions are applied equally across the appropriation (pay ex-
cluded). Applying these reductions during execution increases risk and limits the
flexibility of field commanders. Procurement/Research, Development, Test and Engi-
neering reductions are distributed proportionally to mission areas (e.g., space pro-
grams, air superiority programs, global mobility programs, information dominance
programs, etc). While some program phasing may be affected, effort was made to
minimize programmatic impacts.
Mr. Hunter. Were any programs cut by more than a pro-rata share of the adjust-
ment? If so, which programs and how much were they cut?
Dr. WiDNALL. Operations and Maintenance reductions are applied equally across
the appropriation (pay excluded). Procurement/Research, Development, Test and En-
gineering reductions are distributed proportionally to mission areas, e.g.: space pro-
grams, air superiority programs, global mobility programs, information dominance
programs, etc.
Mr. Hunter. The Department has proposed to rescind $1 billion of FY96 appro-
priations for reasons which have not been publicly stated. These rescissions are in
addition to those proposed for Bosnia and Jordan and included in them are funding
for the Army's Kiowa Warrior, the Navy's Standoff Land Attack Missile, and the Air
Force's AGM-130 and AGM-142 missiles. In view of the fact that the Army has not
added any additional funding to its FY97 Comanche development program and the
Department professes to be in need of precision guided munitions, why are these
programs proposed?
Dr. WiDNALL. We are not aware of any proposed rescissions other than those for
Bosnia, Jordan, Israel, and Counterdrug Operations. Air Force rescission candidates
total approximately $181 million. Of that, about $60 million is for revised economic
assumptions in Research, Development, Test, and Engineering and Military Con-
445
struction appropriations. The AGM-130 and AGM-142 are not sources for these re-
scissions.
Mr. Hunter. How much of the $26 biUion procurement decrement from FY 1997-
FY 2001 is coming from the Air Force?
Dr. WlDNALL. The delta in the Air Force procurement accounts between the FY96
President's Budget (PB) submission and the FY97 President's Budget submission is
as follows:
[In millions of dollars]
1997
Fiscal year-
1998
1999
2000
2001
Aircraft procurement:
Fiscal year 97 PB 5,768.3 6,381.2 8,203.5 9,715.1 10,826.2 40,894.3
Fiscal year 96 PB 6,566.5 7,693.4 9,143.5 10,935.7 12,576.5 46,915.6
Delta -798.2 -1,312.2 -940.0 -1,220.6 -1,750.3 -6,021.3
Missile procurement:
Fiscal year 97 PB 1,959.1 2,516.9 2,632.1 3,071.9 3,240.8 13,420.8
Fiscal year 96 PB 2,334.0 2,888.3 2,817.0 3,171.2 3,283.0 14,493.5
Delta -374.9 -371.4 -184.9 -99.3 -42.2 -1,072.7
Ottier procurement:
Fiscal year 97 PB 1,272.3 1.430.9 1,518.0 1,501.3 1,515.7 7,238.2
Fiscal year 96 PB 1,340.1 1,411.3 1,476.6 1,496.7 1,543.8 7.268.5
Delta -67.8 19.6 41.4 4.6 -28.1 -30.3
Total Air Force Blue' Procurement
Delta -7124.3
' Excludes National Foreign Intelligence Programs, Defense Health Programs and Special Operations Command.
Numbers represent Blue Air Force only. Offsets exist in other appropriations which in aggregate aaount tor the overall Air Force delta be-
tween the FY96 and FY97 PB submissions. The Air Force's budget submission must be combined with other Service submissions to determine
the overall Department of Defense delta.
Mr. Hunter. At one aircraft per year — as requested in FY97 — it would appear
there is no plan to modernize the active tactical airlift fleet. Is there a long-term
procurement plan for the C-130J?
Dr. WlDNALL. C-130J acquisition is programmed at two aircraft per year through
the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) with the exception of one aircraft in FY97.
Budget considerations necessitated the FY97 decrease from two aircraft to one air-
craft.
Initial C-130J deliveries will be used to test advanced C-130J technologies, de-
velop tactics and procedures, and permit modernization of specialized mission units
before theater airlift replacement begins in earnest. The Chief of Staff has testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee that one of his top ten priorities, given
increased quantities of C-130Js, is to modernize Airborne Command, Control and
Communications (ABCCC), psychological operations (EC-130), and weather recon-
naissance (WC-130) aircraft.
The Air Force C-130 fleet will begin reaching the end of its service life and losing
capability shortly after the turn of the century. We have undertaken an incremental
approach to modernization which will allow the Air Force to establish a C-130 re-
placement program with far lower risk than waiting for the service life situation to
become critical. Our modernization effort will continue to focus on meeting the
needs of anticipated C-130 fleet retirements.
Mr. Hunter. What is the impact on the F-22 program if there are no C-130Js
procured for Guard/Reserve units, as has traditionally been done over the last dec-
ade?
Dr. WlDNALL. If Lockheed's C-130J production line runs at a lower rate than pro-
jected, the company overhead will have to be re-allocated over the rest of their pro-
grams. The restructure of overhead would probably lead to an increase in F-22 pro-
gram overhead rates.
After Milestone II, the F-22 program overhead rates increased above the level
agreed to in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract, due largely
to reductions in Department of Defense programs. To encourage contractor action
to lower the overhead costs, then Secretary of the Air Force, Dr. Rice, directed over-
446
head cost management be an award fee criterion. Due to commitment at the Chief
Executive Officer level, the contractor team has done an exceptional job in reducing
the overhead charged to the F-22 program. Current overhead rates are back to the
level agreed to at the beginning of F-22 Engineering Manufacture and Design. If
the F-22 rates are impacted by reductions to the C-130J program, we anticipate
the contractors will once again work to lower those rates as much and as quickly
as possible.
Mr. Hunter. According to FY96 procurement documents, the Air Force F-22 pro-
gram programmed $53 million for advanced procurement in FY97. This year's re-
quest has no FY97 F-22 procurement. What happened to the $53 million?
Dr. WiDNALL. The $53 million advanced-buy, originally programmed for FY97,
was for the four Pre-Production Verification (PPV) aircraft. These four aircraft will
be used for dedicated Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (lOT&E). The aircraft
are now funded using Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) ac-
count funds. The funding change complies with the Secretary of Defense's policy to
fund lOT&E assets with RDT&E funds. Because of the funding change, the total
number of aircraft that are now bought with procurement money is 438 instead of
442, and the number of aircraft bought with RDT&E money is 13 instead of 9. All
the aircraft (RDT&E and production) will be delivered on the same schedule and
in the same configuration as they were prior to the funding change.
Mr. Hunter. The Secretary of Defense specified as part of his third modernization
objective, replacement/continued production of precision guided bombs for our tac-
tical aircraft. If this is true, why did the Department rescind all of the $40M added
funding for one hundred AGM-130 precision guided stand-off munitions?
Dr. WiDNALL. The $40 million for AGM-130 was under consideration as a source
of funds to pay for the Bosnia deployment. However, the Department of Defense
elected not to rescind the funds and the money is currently under contract to pro-
cure the weapons.
Mr. Hunter. The Secretary of Defense also highlighted as key capability, other
advance munitions, especially ones for defeating enemy tanks. Why then was the
FY97 funding for CBU-97 Sensor Fuze Weapon (SFW) reduced from the amount
programmed for FY97 in the FY96 procurement request?
Dr. WiDNALL. Use of Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) procurement money was re-
quired to fund the FY97 SFW Planned Product Improvement (P31) Research, Devel-
opment, Testing, and Evaluation program. Fiscal constraints then forced the Air
Force to reprogram some of the FY96 SFW funds. The SFW P31 remains an un-
ftinded priority for FY97 and is being considered in the Service's FY98 Program Ob-
jective Memorandum.
Mr. Hunter. While the C-17 missions flown in support of Bosnia are both visible
and impressive, how many missions/sorties were flown by active duty USAF C-
130s? How many by National Guard and Reserve C-130s?
Dr. WiDNALL. During the same period the 12 C-17s were deployed to Rhein Mein,
the C-130 flew the following in support of Operation Joint Endeavor: Active Duty:
1,048 sorties; AF Reserve: 280 sorties; National Guard: 0 sorties.
The Air National Guard (ANG) deployed 12 C-130s to Ramstein Air Base on April
9, 1996, to support Operation Joint Endeavor. The ANG is currently flying in sup-
port of Joint Endeavor until July 10, 1996.
Mr. Hunter. The FY96 APAF request included $88M for two C-130 J aircraft
which was authorized and appropriated, and programmed two more C-130 J aircraft
in FY97. The Congress also added funding for three additonal WC-130J aircraft in
FY96. With the procurement request for C-130Js already at questionably low rates
of two per year, why was the FY97 request reduced from two aircraft to only one?
Dr. WiDNALL. Funding reduction dictated the FY97 decrease from two to one C-
130 J aircraft. Still, no operational impact is anticipated because of only one C-130 J
procurement in FY 97. Initial deliveries will facilitate the testing of new tech-
nologies and development of new tactics procedures.
The Air Force plans to replace unique mission aircraft with the C-130 J to help
mature this new weapon system. The C-130J's greater predicted reliability and
manpower savings will be carefully evaluated in order to facilitate modernization of
the older theater airlift fleet at the turn of the century.
Question. With a total seven C-130 J aircraft currently authorized and appro-
priated for the US Air Force budgeted at an average unit cost of approximately
$44M per aircarft, why is the request for one C-130 J in FY97 budgeted at $63M?
Answer. The unit cost for the FY97 buy of one aircraft is $51.9 million. The dif-
ference between this cost and the amount budgeted is support costs and Engineer-
ing Change Orders (ECO). The following provides FY97 budget details:
447
Item: Millions
Basic aircraft and engines $51.9
Support costs 9.6
Support equipment 1.0
Mission support 3.7
Interim contractor support 2.9
Training 1.0
Data 1.0
ECO's L4
Total 62.9
Mr. Hunter. With the C-130J still not operationally tested or integrated into the
active Air Force, is there a strategy to initially field this new configuration of tac-
tical airlift aircraft into the Air National Guard and Air Reserves forces in order
to replace older aircraft?
Dr. WiDNALL. The Air Force recognizes a future need for theater (tactical) airlift
modernization, but significant modernization now is "early to need" and
unaflfordable. To accommodate the planned acquisition profile, two aircraft per year
across the Future Years Defense Plan (except for only one aircraft in FY97), smaller
units with unique mission variants of the C-130 (e.g., WC-130s, Airborne Com-
mand, Control, and Communications, and EC-130s) will field the C-130J.
Modernizing Active Duty, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve "unique
mission" aircraft with the C-130Js will help mature this new weapon system. The
C-130J's greater predicted reliability and manpower savings will be carefully evalu-
ated in order to facilitate modernization of the older theater airlift fleet near the
turn of the century.
Mr. Geren. In the near term, the Air Force has projected a shortfall of 120 F-
16's between now and 2008 to 2010 when the JSF is due to enter the Air Force in-
ventory; however, at the current rate that we are bu5dng F-16's (6 in FY96, 4 in
FY97), we will never be able to modernize our fleet to meet this shortfall. What deci-
sions, if any, have been made to deal with this issue?
Dr. WiDNALL. We are aware that six aircraft a year will not sustain our F-16 fleet
at the presently projected attrition rates. We continuously assess the F-16 require-
ment and options to fill it. We are balancing this priority versus all other Air Force
Erograms in the FY98 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process and will
ave a decision on future procurement rates prior to submitting the POM in May
1996.
Mr. Geren. Secondly, the long term implications are even worse. Beginning
around the year 2012, F-16's will begin to retire at a rate of 150 to 180 a year be-
cause of their age. Is a plan in place to ensure that we will have the resources avail-
able to buy enough F-16 replacements (JSF) to deal with this attrition?
Dr. WiDNALL. We have developed a disciplined "time-phased" fighter acquisition
plan to match the resources available with force structure requirements. The sub-
stantial investment required to design, develop, and field modern fighters compels
the Air Force to pursue a time-phased approach to fighter acquisition. Investments
in the fighter force are essential to maintain sufficient combat power to execute the
National Military Strategy. At projected attrition rates, the force structure is pro-
jected to fall below 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents around FYOO. Unless arrested by
the infusion of F-16s and F-15Es in the short term and F-22 and Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) in the long term, the force structure shortfall gradually increases
through 2010 and then accelerates as older aircraft reach their service life limits
and retire in large numbers.
Early procurement of F-16s and F-15Es fixes short-term force structure require-
ments and is deconflicted from F-22 procurement requirements. F-22 procurement
must begin on schedule to maintain America's air dominance and avoid unmanage-
able budgetary conflicts with JSF procurement. Timely JSF delivery will avoid se-
vere fighter force structure shortfalls past 2010 caused by F-16 service life limits.
We have carefully managed our fighter force sustainment and modernization efforts
to produce a strong and ready force within fiscal realities.
Mr. Geren. Third, has a decision been made to allow for shortfalls in current gen-
eration aircraft in order to ensure that we will be able to afford their eventual re-
placements or will we face both a shortfall of current aircraft while also not being
able to pay for their replacements?
Dr. WiDNALL. Our "time-phased" fighter acquisition strategy matches the force
structure requirements with fiscal realities. Our planning guidance requires us to
maintain 20 Fighter Wing Equivalents (FWE) to meet the needs of the warfighting
commanders-in-chief The F-16 and its replacement, the Joint Strike Fighter, are
448
an integral component of the 20 FWE force structure. We will continue to seek ap-
propriate balance between near term and longer term force structure needs to meet
the 20 FWE guidance.
Mr. Geren. Finally, have the necessary steps been taken to ensvu^ that our pro-
curement crisis does not force us to delay the purchase of the F-22, which woxild
result in a shortfall of both ovu: joint tactical aircraft fleet as well as our air superi-
ority fleet?
Dr. WiDNALL. It is imperative that the Air Force move ahead with new programs.
The Air Force has developed a time-phased modernization plan that balances costs
with operational Commander-in-Chief needs. In the near-term, airlift modernization
in the form of the C-17 fills an important shortfall. In the mid-term, the moderniza-
tion plan focuses on the need for conventional bomber and smart munitions up-
grades to bolster US quick reaction forces. In the long-term, fighter replacements
are the most urgent item. The F-22 program's current schedule fits within the his-
torical budget percentage that the Air Force has spent on fighter modernization, and
is affordable as part of the Air Force's integrated, time-phase modernization plan.
The greatest threat to the Air Force's fighter modernization plan is funding insta-
bihty. Seemingly small funding cuts have disproportionally large program impacts.
Historically, one dollar taken fix)m the F-22 program requires two and one-half to
three dollars to be replaced in the futvu-e. Funding cuts since 1991 have caused En-
gineering and Manufacturing Development costs to increase approximately $2B. Not
only do funding cuts cause costs to increase, they also cause the schedule to slip.
Since 1991, the F-22 Initial Operational Capability has slipped 32 months. If the
F-22 schedule slips further, it will create an unacceptable overlap with the require-
ment to replace the F-16. iSiying to replace both air superiority and multi-role fleets
simultaneously has serious affordability and force structure implications. Further
funding cuts to the F-22 program imperil the force modernization plan by causing
cost increases and schedule sUps.
The Air Force is fully committed to keeping the F-22 on its current schedule, al-
lowing affordable force modernization in the next decade and beyond.
Mr. Geren. I would like you to comment on your assessment of the progress of
the CV-22 program for the Air Force.
Dr. WiDNALL. The Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Dec. 16, 1994 Program De-
cision Memorandum FV directed the Air Force to provide funding for procurement
of four CV-22s in FYOO and FYOl. The Air Force supported that decision and on
March 28, 1995 the Chief of Staff" of the Air Force approved the procurement profile
for 50 CV-22s. The Feb. 10, 1995 Acquisition Decision Memorandum authorized the
Navy, the Air Force, and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to proceed
with an integrated MV-22/CV-22 program. The Navy was designated as the lead
service and program funding responsibilities were identified. The Navy will fund
completion of Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD). The Air Force
will fund procurement costs for the airframe and equipment common to the MV-
22. USSOCOM will fund procurement costs of special operations-peculiar mission
equipment and installation requirements. The Joint Multi-Mission Vertical Lift Air-
craft Operational Requirements Document was vaUdated and approved by the Joint
Reqviirements Oversight Council on March 4, 1995. Since then, a risk reduction ef-
fort has been underway to complete radar modification, initiate integration, and pro-
vide planning support. In September 1995, the Navy Program Office released a Re-
quest for Proposal to develop the fiill scope of CV-22 modifications and integration
through EMD. The Bell-Boeing proposal is under review with contract award antici-
pated later this year. The Air Force Special Operations Forces are scheduled to re-
ceive their first aircraft in FY03 and to establish initial operational capability with
15 aircraft in FY05. Full operational capability for 50 aircraft will be achieved by
FYIO. The Air Force remains committed to the long lead buy in FYOO and the pur-
chase of the first four CV-22s in FYOl.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION ACT— SERVICE CHIEFS
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 13, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m. in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
The Chairman. The meeting will please come to order.
I would like first of all to welcome our witnesses this morning
and thank them for appearing before the committee.
The committee this morning continues to receive testimony on
the President's fiscal year 1997 defense budget request, and, as
such, we are pleased to have with us this morning the following:
The Army Chief of Staff, General Reimer; Chief of Naval Oper-
ations, Admiral Bcorda; the Air Force Chief of Staff, General
Fogleman; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General
Krulak. v^though neither General Reimer nor General Krulak are
strangers to the committee, I want to extend a special welcome as
each of them is formally appearing before the committee for the
first time.
Last year when the four service chiefs testified together before
the committee, I cited what was then a very recent quote from an
anonymous officer in the Army's 3d Division. He said — and I
quote — We're an expensive instrument of power for a nation to
have. When you don't need us, you don't want to pay for us. When
you do need us, you want us to be better than we could ever pos-
sibly be.
This was a striking statement a year ago and is, in my niind, an
even more compelling depiction and indictment of the situation
today. The administration continues to employ the U.S. military
forces at record operating tempos, yet it simultaneously requests a
defense budget that declines in real terms by more than 6 percent
over current spending levels, a budget that represents the 12th
consecutive year of decline in defense spending.
What is especially disconcerting to me is that the President
would submit such a budget following a budget cycle in which the
Congress was so concerned with the low levels of spending pro-
posed by the President that, for the first time in the 20 years I
have been on this committee, we have been doing budget reduc-
tions, the 1996 resolution significantly increased the President's re-
(449)
450
quest. The situation is even worse than that anonymous officer
thought earher.
The administration wants, needs, and is using the miUtary but
refuses to provide adequate resources. As I indicated last week dur-
ing Secretary Perry's testimony, I believe that the burden of proof
rests squarely on the administration's shoulders when it comes to
demonstrating that the long-term defense plan is not underfunded
and is, in fact, not broken.
The administration has confronted the underfunding problem to
date by using modernization to pay for shortfalls elsewhere. Now
when the time comes to modernize and the administration has
failed to address the underlying problem of inadequate resources,
the possibility of using deeper force structure and end strength re-
ductions has recently been raised by the Secretary.
With an Army funded at only 475,000 in this long-term plan,
General Reimer is already confronting this slippery slope of force
reduction below the Bottom-Up Review recommended levels. The
force is already stretched in peacetime, so where is the give in
terms of our global commitments and presence if the force is fur-
ther reduced?
I would appreciate it if each of our witnesses this morning would
address in their opening remarks this particular issue of the impli-
cations of force structure and end strength reduction beyond Bot-
tom-Up Review levels.
Gentlemen, you or your predecessors have, in one fashion or an-
other, over the past several years described the overall posture of
your respective services as being on the proverbial razor's edge. Are
you still on the razor's edge? And, if so, isn't it getting a little bit
painful by now?
How much longer can any of you stay on the edge without caus-
ing irreparable long-term damage to a force that is made up en-
tirely of volunteers?
One would think from last week's testimony that the long-term
defense plan, as reflected in the 1997 defense request, is sufficient
and that the service is doing just fine, but this budget cannot even
be described as a treading water budget. It is already under water
and sinking fast.
As I indicated a moment ago, this budget already heads some of
the services in the area of end strength and force structure cuts
below the Bottom-Up Review.
In the area of modernization, despite the much publicized chair-
man's program assessment that recommended annual procurement
funding at the $60 billion level by the fiscal year 1998 — 2 years
earlier than planned by the administration — this budget slips
achievement of this objective by another year to fiscal year 2001.
Frankly, not only does this budget not propose solutions to identi-
fied shortfalls, it adds to the problem.
This committee will continue trying to work with the Department
and the services to identify problems and, more importantly, to
focus on solutions. Ultimately, however, Congress will not be able
to effectively help unless the help is wanted. To this end, I appre-
ciate the candid testimony we received last year during this hear-
ing and I look forward to equally candid testimony today.
451
A significant percentage of the action this committee took last
year was based in part or in whole on recommendations received
from the service secretaries and chiefs in both public testimony and
private conversations. I hope you are in a position to help us help
you again this year. Accordingly, the committee welcomes the valu-
able opportunity your presence here this morning provides.
Before commencing, however, let me recognize the gentleman
from California, the committee's ranking Democrat, Mr. Dellums,
for any comments he might like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First let me join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses
this morning.
Second, I would like very much to give maximum opportunity for
members of the committee to engage our distinguished witnesses
on the critical issues that they will be testifying upon this morning.
So, with that, I would resist the temptation to engage in offering
a further formal statement but simply at this point would ask
unanimous consent that my formal remarks appear at the appro-
priate point in the record, and with those opening remarks and
welcoming our witnesses, I would yield back the balance of my
time.
The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]
452
OPENING STATEMENT
HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS
BEFORE THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
POSTURE STATEMENT OF THE SERVICE CHIEFS
MARCH 13, 1996
I join with the Chairman in welcoming the testimony of the Commandant,
the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air
Force. Your views - like those of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, and the Service Secretaries from whom we heard earlier
regarding the posture of their respective services are very important to the
Committee as it seeks to discharge its role in the formulation of our national
security policy. We could not properly complete that responsibility without
hearing your thoughts early in the process.
As I stated to this Committee before, the nation's budget is the best
reflection of its priorities across all of the competing needs that our citizens
face. And, in the current em'ironment, the ascertainment of appropriate
priorities is made more urgent by the movement towards balancing the budget.
Although setting total budget priorities may be beyond our committee's
responsibility, we can participate in reaching sensible conclusions about the
8
453
national security threats we face, and in making sensible decisions about the
best strategies to prevent, deter or meet those threats and the elements
necessary to implement those strategies.
I previously noted to Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, the Service
Secretaries and my colleagues during earlier hearings, that several areas have
emerged in which there is elevated controversy and concern on this committee.
They are primarily the debate over missile defense priorities; the over-all level
of spending in the defense top[ line; the procurement funding level in FY 1997
and beyond and its impact on modernization efforts; and the privatization
initiatives being undertaken within the Department.
Your contribution here today will help us to understand more about these
issues, and thereby help to ensure that we preserve our nation's security and its
economic health. I look forward to your testimony.
454
The Chairman. We will begin this morning with General Reimer.
STATEMENT OF GEN. DENNIS J. REIMER, CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMY
General Reimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, and thank you for that special welcome. I am delighted
to have the opportunity to talk about the Army in front of this com-
mittee.
I have a written statement, and I would ask that it be included
in the record if that is possible.
The Chairman. Without objection.
General Reimer. I would like to say just a couple of things about
the U.S. Army. First of all, as all of you know, we are completing
a 5-year drawdown. We have drawn down the Army by over
500,000 people. That is active component, reserve components, and
Department of the Army civilians. That is about the combined total
of what works for Chrysler and Ford. We have also closed about
600 bases across the world, most of those in Europe but many of
them in the United States.
At that point, I thank the members of the committee and the
Members of Congress for helping us take care of our people during
this difficult drawdown period. That was terribly important to us,
and through your help we were able to do that, and I think the re-
sult is that the Army remains trained and ready. You have seen
that in the missions that we have accomplished in the last 4 or 5
years, and you see that in the mission we are conducting in Bosnia
today.
I visited Bosnia. I have talked to the troops. I am enormously
proud of what they are doing. They are doing it under very difficult
conditions, conditions that are almost unbelievable. They fought
the snow, the ice, the water, the mud, and they have come out win-
ners in each case.
I think that is a tribute to a number of things. It is a tribute to
our doctrine, it is a tribute to our training system, it is a tribute
to technology, but most of all it is a tribute to the fine young men
and women that we are fortunate to have in the U.S. Army.
I would say that the Army has done more than reshape ourselves
during this last 5-year period. We have introduced new doctrine.
We have eliminated the tactical nuclear and chemical weapons
from Europe and the U.S. Army arsenal. We have embarked upon
a journey into the future, a journey we referred to as Force 21, and
we are in the third year of that journey. It is a journey where we
have taken a series of advanced war-fighting experiments, linked
them together, and moving to the Army that we see necessary for
the 21st century.
I think what has happened in the last 4 or 5 years under the
leadership of my predecessor. General Sullivan, has been a remark-
able accomplishment, but it has not been without pain. The sol-
diers that we have out there are extremely busy. We say that the
pace of operation is up about 300 percent, and I think that is true.
This is an Army that is 65 percent married, and we are spending
an awful lot of time away from the families. The latent effects of
all of that may not show up for many years.
455
I would tell you, as you asked in your opening remarks, Mr.
Chairman, that I think the end strength that we have programmed
for 1997, 495,000 is the right end strength for the current strategy
that we have.
The 1997 budget that we have submitted sustains the readiness
of America's Army Active and Reserve components. It honors our
commitment to the quality of life of our people, and it continues the
momentum towards Army 21, which is terribly important to us,
and it starts to deal with the very difficult problem we have in
terms of recapitalization of the force. I would say to you that it is
in balance, but it is very delicately balanced and it is very difficult
to be moving things around in that budget and still achieve all that
we want to achieve with the U.S. Army in 1997.
I want to thank the members of the committee for the help you
gave us in fiscal year 1996. You helped us plug some big holes in
our modernization account, and for that I am deeply appreciative.
Finally, I would close with just one request, and that is that the
fiscal year 1996 continue to fund operations in reprogramming,
which is terribly important to us, and I would ask your continued
support for that.
I look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of General Reimer follows:!
456
RECORD VERSION
STATEMENT BY
GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SECOND SESSION, 104TH CONGRESS
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET REQUEST
AND
THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
13 MARCH 1996
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
457
STATEMENT BY
GENERAL DENNIS J. REIMER
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
ON THE FISCAL YEAR 1997 BUDGET REQUEST AND
THE POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to talk to you about America's Army. I would like to begin by
highlighting areas where the Army needs continued support from this
Committee and the United States Congress. I will then talk in detail about
today's and tomorrow's Army.
First and foremost, thank you for your support in maintaining the
current readiness of the force. Your support for operations and maintenance
has been absolutely crucial. Your actions have helped and will continue to
help save lives in the future. This effort has maintained forces that were able
to answer the nation's call and achieve decisive victory in war and in
maintaining the peace. The Army appreciates your continued support in this
important area.
Second, I ask your support of Army end strength and force structure
sufficient to meet the requirements to deter conflict while actively reassuring
allies and performing other critical missions. A properly sized force will be
able to achieve the objectives directed by the National Command Authority
without placing excessive strain on units, soldiers or families. Today's Army
is stretched thin. Valiant soldiers will accomplish all assigned tasks, but if
they see this profession as inconsistent with raising a family, then the future
of the Army is in serious doubt.
Third, I ask your support for Quality of Life programs identified by the
Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Our soldiers sacrifice a great deal to
serve their country. It is right and proper for us to provide them and their
families fair and adequate pay, stable retirement benefits, quality medical
care and safe, affordable housing.
Lastly, I ask your support for Army modernization. I do not know
when or where, but we will sometime place soldiers in harm's way, on short
notice and ask them to defeat a detennined and dangerous foe. When that
happens, we should be satisfied that we have done our best to prepare them
for the task at hand. We are providing adequately for the soldiers of 1995,
but we have concerns about the soldiers of 2005. Currently, the Army
Research, Development and Acquisition (RDA) budget is only 15% of DoD
458
RDA. It will continue to be a challenge to balance the readiness needs of
today's and tomorrow's soldiers. The increased resources resulting from
inflation adjustments should help us to maintain that critical balance.
Drawdown Update
The Army is nearing the end of an historic drawdown. Army
resources have been reduced by about 40% and personnel by 35%. About
450,000 volunteer soldiers and civilians have left the Army. They left with
new skills and with the dignity warranted by their service. Many did not want
to leave but understood the changing requirements.
To put the size of this drawdown in perspective, the Army rolls have
been reduced by about as many people as are employed by Ford and
Chrysler Motor Companies combined. All of these patriots were volunteers
who returned to civilian life with training and with the pride that comes from a
job well done. That has been a traumatic change both for soldiers and
families leaving the service and for those who remain.
It was important to us to ensure that we took care of the people who
had served the country so well and to keep the remaining Army trained and
ready during the drawdown. In order to do this, the accounts for
modernization were reduced, and the most modern equipment distributed
across the remaining force. The truly historic accomplishment is that the
Army remained trained and ready throughout the drawdown. That has never
been done before. This unprecedented accomplishment was achieved
through the dedication and selfless service of great soldiers. However, there
was a cost. We paid a price that may not be seen for some time.
We have yet to see the drawdown's effects on leadership and
retention. In Cavalry terms, our units have been ridden hard and put away
wet. Good people will continue to answer the nation's call until they or their
families decide they have done enough. It is hard to predict when Operating
Tempo (OPTEMPO) will affect retention of quality soldiers, but the time may
be growing closer. We are asking a lot of our soldiers these days, and they
are magnificent in their response. Still, they are our most precious resource,
and we must give them the quality of life that they have certainly earned by
their service. The Army needs predictability in funding and stability in
personnel end strength.
Worlds best Army; on the job every day
The Army sustains 100,000 soldiers forward deployed, primarily in
Europe and in the Pacific. In addition, this past year, the Total Army had an
average of 21 ,500 soldiers deployed to missions in about 70 countries on
any given day. Current missions include Sinai, Macedonia, Kuwait, Haiti,
Partnership for Peace Exercises, Joint Task Forces for the drug war,
hurricane and flood relief, and of course Bosnia. Concurrently, units are
training to maintain readiness for possible regional conflicts.
While the majority of soldiers deployed were active duty personnel,
these missions could not have been accomplished without our Army Reserve
and National Guard forces. The Total Army effort included more than 17,000
soldiers of the Army Reserve on training operations or missions in 74
countries. In FY 95, 24,000 soldiers of the National Guard participated in
training missions in 58 countries. Together these soldiers provided medical
care in Thailand, taught computer skills in Jordan, and built roads in Central
America. They have also responded to hurricanes, floods and other natural
disasters in the United States.
Domestic operations were also demanding. During FY 1995, 17,000
soldiers from the Army National Guard responded to 460 emergency
missions in 47 states. Army Reserve and National Guard forces are integral
to the execution of the National Military Strategy. All components of the
force are involved in executing the Amny's missions - along with DA civilians
who are indispensable to the total team. Today's Army is a seamless blend
of active component, reserve component and DA civilians working together
to achieve America's goals.
The part of the Army not in units consists of Table of Distribution and
Allowances (TDA) organizations. The TDA Army is meeting the challenges
of future war and resource management well, and allowing units to focus on
combat readiness. This essential part of the Army develops the doctrine for
the Army's future challenges while meeting today's challenges. Our TDA
organizations recruit, train and equip soldiers for the Army. Training and
Doctrine Command, (TRADOC) one of our largest TDA organizations,
continues to run the Combat Training Centers that are the centerpiece of the
Army's unit training program. Other TDA organizations run the installation
base that supports all our soldiers, develop and acquire equipment for the
Army and DoD in areas of Army proponency. This part of the Army is about
25% of the active force, the lowest ratio of any of the Services. The Army is
trained and ready today. Our forces are accomplishing all missions, but they
are very busy.
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Projecting the US Army into the Future
The Army provides capable land forces to the joint force commander
to compel, deter, reassure and support. Future threats and challenges are
likely to continue across the spectrum of conflict. There is no indication that
challenges to our security will disappear. There is evidence that challenges
will take new forms, and the Army is preparing for that. The best preparation
for an unpredictable world is a force with balanced capabilities that the joint
force commander can tailor to meet multiple, varying requirements.
The United States currently has the best Navy and Mahne Corps in
the world. They are fully capable of defeating any threat to US access to the
sea lanes and providing power projection for its land forces. The United
States is also fortunate to have the best Air Force in the world. The US Air
Force is fully capable of defeating any competitor in the skies to achieve air
supremacy and global power projection. The US Air Force's ability to
achieve air supremacy and destroy targets on the ground is critical to
successful operations in any environment. The Army is proud to be part of
the best joint forces in the world today.
For its part, the US Army must continue to provide land forces with the
capability to deter challenges to US interests and, if necessary, to compel
behavior more consistent with US security.
Our capability to wage high intensity conflict deters those who would
challenge the United Sates. Our commitment to maintain our warfighting
capabilities deters those who would challenge us in this most dangerous
type of conflict. Deterrence is far cheaper than fighting a war. Consistent
commitment by the United States both decreases our risk and also sustains
the lowest defense spending over the long term. General purpose Army
forces achieve these and other policy goals. We must continue to
recapitalize heavy and light forces to ensure the continued ability of the Army
to accomplish its primary mission ~ to help win the nation's wars.
The US strategy of Peacetime Engagement has led to a dramatic
increase in the role of the Army as an instrument of policy. The Army
remains uniquely capable of reassuring our allies and supporting efforts
directed by the National Command Authority to enhance US security. In the
single superpower world, these requirements have dramatically increased.
Every foreign military official I meet seeks closer cooperation with the US
Army, primarily through exercises or training. Our cooperation with "boots on
the ground" helps assure their future military and political cooperation while
increasing United States influence worldwide. However, in the tumultuous
461
world political arena, there will continue to be a connpetition of interests, and
there will continue to be those whose interests conflict with ours. Those who
wish to threaten the US will do so in the way that most favors their success.
History shows that we build military capabilities like engineers building
a dam -- to hold back the water that might threaten us. But history also
shows that those who wish to threaten us will do so at our weakest point -
much as water finds cracks in a dam. During the Cold War our nuclear
deterrent led others to challenge us below the nuclear threshold. Similarly,
we are challenged today by rogue actors on the world stage -- national, sub-
national and some without borders. We are also challenged by proxy and by
terrorists or others who seek to exploit perceived weaknesses. They know
we cannot afford to protect everything. Those who seek to threaten US
interests will continue to do so in the manner that appears to offer the
greatest advantage. They will seek to exploit a perceived lack of US
commitment or capability. If we concentrate our resources on any one
particular type of conflict, we may deter that conflict while possibly
encouraging another.
Securing peace for our future requires that we field joint forces with
balanced capabilities sufficient to deter others from threatening our interests
or if necessary to compel behavior consistent with our security. Further,
these joint forces must be of sufficient size and strength to reassure our
allies and execute necessary operations without providing a window of
vulnerability for others to exploit. Modern, professional forces are complex
organizations requiring long lead times to organize train and equip. We have
to be forward looking in the decisions on structure and size. It takes 10-15
years to rebuild brigade or division sized force structure, but it takes 20-25
years to train the commanders for these organizations.
Army Force Structure
The exact structure of our forces is always a subject for discussion.
This discussion must always begin by addressing the requirements that flow
from our National Security Strategy. In my view, the key to providing the
requisite capabilities to the nation is balanced, general purpose forces. I
encourage you to ask the joint force commande*^ in the field what additional
capabilities would add most to their ability to execute the National Military
Strategy. I think they will agree that US success and influence ultimately
depend on putting soldiers on the ground. Those soldiers must be trained
and ready when needed.
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The Army must be prepared for the most dangerous circumstance,
the requirement to deter or, if necessary, compel another significant power in
future decades. This requirement drives recapitalization of balanced ground
forces with heavy emphasis on modernization. The current force is designed
based on acceptable risk - based on the current low likelihood of such a
competitor - but further forestalling of modernization would greatly increase
risk. There are long lead times for modern equipment and longer lead times
to develop and train the leaders who will employ it. Consequently, further
deferral of modernization could delay a modernized force beyond the limits
of our ability to anticipate future security challenges. Creating such a
window of vulnerability could lead to a future environment where the
interests of the United States are directly threatened. The current program.
as laid out in the new FYDP, provides additional future funding for Army
modernization.
The US strategy of Engagement and Enlargement exploits US
capabilities to sustain regional stability and foster conditions for economic
prosperity. The threats to stability are varied and unpredictable. Many
threats occur on the lower end of the spectrum of conflict where a less
capable, extremely committed adversary can challenge us. Such opponents
often fade into the population or terrain and sustain themselves for long
periods. Our participation with Army forces of other nations enables them to
deal with such threats better and earlier. As in high intensity conflict, our
soldiers need the best available equipment. The Anny is aggressively
pursuing technology to enhance distributed decision making to facilitate
faster, better response at all levels.
Across the spectrum of conflict, the balance between "capital and
labor" shifts. In situations where we seek less than total destruction of what
occupies the battlespace, soldiers become increasingly important.
Compelling or deterring the behavior of a hostile nation, or reassuring and
supporting a friendly nation requires soldiers in numbers sufficient to the
task. Requirements for US soldiers on the ground continue to increase.
Today's Army provides balanced capabilities but is stretched. The
critical element to future peace is balanced capabilities sufficient to deter
conflict or to compel a potential adversary to behave in a manner consistent
with US security. Equally important is the ability to pursue the US strategy of
engagement and enlargement. The deployment of an engineer platoon to
train in Mongolia went unnoticed here, but the school that was built was big
news in Ulan Bator. Similarly, 61 soldiers in South America were the
difference between peace and a border war between two US trading
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463
partners there. There are many such actions - daily advancing the security
interests of the United States.
The US Amy is meeting current commitments, but requirements are
still rising. General Sullivan told you requirements have risen 300%. I agree
with his estimate and, if anything, requirements continue to increase. I have
already discussed the numbers of soldiers deployed and missions performed
worldw/ide. As the v\/orld's remaining super power, our participation in
operations to reassure warring parties is the only path to peace in many
parts of the world.
All of this is a lot to ask from an Army whose active component
personnel, if assembled in Washington, would fit inside the Mall between the
Lincoln and Washington Monuments. Today's Anny is the best in the world,
but certainly not the largest. The active component is the eighth largest in
the world, right behind Pakistan. To execute the National Military Strategy,
we should not get any smaller. Numbers matter.
The Army is working to ensure balanced, capable land forces in the
future. Army warfighting experiments address mechanized and light warfare
as well as command and control and the needs of the individual soldier. Our
Force XXI process is showing us better ways to structure our forces for the
future. We do not have all the answers yet, but these experiments will
continue to guide us toward the most effective systems, organizations and
training techniques. Our goal is to enhance warfighting capability by making
faster and better decisions at each level of the chain of command and
making soldiers more capable of accomplishing their missions at the lowest
risk.
Modernization Requirements
The Army has maintained current readiness, in part, by deferring
modernization and redistributing modernized equipment across the smaller
force. Further deferral of modernization will incur significant risk to future
readiness. With a smaller Army, every unit must be able to execute a full
range of operations. Our heavy units are general purpose forces that not
only can win our wars but can also accomplish other missions, as the First
Armored Division has shown in Bosnia. We must modernize their equipment
to deter mid and high intensity conflict. Light forces also need the
advantages available from information age equipment to enhance their
lethality and survivability for the challenges of this unstable world.
38-160 97-17
464
Increased production and trade in modern Soviet style equipment
affords other nations a chance to field armies with advanced technical
capabilities. We must continue to produce and field adequate modern
equipment or we risk seeing our systems simply wear out. At the current
rate of replacement our tank fleet will not be completely modernized for 40
years. Even the most capable equipment model becomes less desirable
when operating beyond its life cycle.
We need to modernize to protect our soldiers. Soldiers with a
technological advantage are not just more capable, they are more
survivable. The American people expect us to achieve our missions
decisively with minimum losses. Providing soldiers the modern equipment
they need helps to give them the edge. We cannot defer this until conflict
seems inevitable. It is the irony of deterrence that we will be challenged
when least ready. The FY 97 Budget reflects the Army's minimum
requirement for modernization. Further reduction in modernization would put
the Army's long term readiness at risk.
Some have called for personnel reductions to pay for modernization,
but further personnel reductions would incur additional risk. Not only would
the Army's ability to execute the National Military Strategy be impaired, the
long term viability of the force could be placed at risk. The Army must
maintain sufficient structure to execute assigned missions without placing
excessive burdens on soldiers and families. Adequate and balanced force
structure allows the Army to support and reassure allies in peacetime without
compromising its ability to deter regional conflict or requiring it to deploy
soldiers so often and so long that it creates hardships for their families.
Rather than cut structure, the Army is reexamining and reengineering
systems to save money and provide funds needed for modernization.
Reengineering Efforts
The Army has embarked on an ambitious campaign to become the
most efficient organization possible and free up resources for modernization.
To achieve balance, the Army is pursuing initiatives and efficiencies
throughout the breadth and depth of our operation. Nothing is off limits. We
are conducting a functional area analysis of every aspect of the Army, from
the fighting force to the infrastructure. The institutional Army, Department of
the Army Headquarters, Major Commands, and all our business-like
practices are being looked at under a microscope. This is our effort to
reorganize and redesign the Army for the world we see in the twenty-first
century. However, I must tell you that legislated restrictions, such as those
465
restricting the amount of depot maintenance that can be privatized, limit our
potential in this area.
The Army is also conducting a thorough review of development and
acquisition programs. The Amy w/ill be retiring some older equipment
without immediate replacement and accepting the attendant risks. We are
doing this to save the exorbitant maintenance costs of these older items.
Our intent is to apply these dollars to systems for Army XXI, the force of the
Twenty First century. We are making tough choices in the allocation of
limited resources. The Army must do this to ensure readiness in the next
century. The Army cannot continue to invest both in legacy systems and in
replacement systems. Rather than stretching out systems to uneconomic
rates of production, we have cut whole systems. We are attempting to
maintain economic production of the essential systems we need and can
afford. The alternative, deeper cuts in structure, would have resulted in
greater capability shortfall in the force.
Risk
As I have stated the Army is trained and ready today, but there is one
area of short-term risk and two significant long-term risks. Let me talk to you
first about the short-term risk.
The most significant short-term risk is the impact of the
unprogrammed costs of Operation Joint Endeavor. If the Army were
required to resource Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, funds would have
to be reprogrammed from operations and maintenance accounts. By our
estimate this would eliminate fourth quarter training for units not directly
involved in the ongoing operation. The loss of training would reduce our
ability to react to regional contingencies. The units concerned would require
additional training time to achieve the required readiness level once
resources become available. The Army needs the supplemental funding
and reprogramming that has been submitted to fund Operation Joint
Endeavor in Bosnia.
The greatest potential threat to Army readiness is the medium and
long term impact of an increased operational pace and insufficient
modernization funding. Requirements in this uncertain world have increased
while personnel authorizations and financial resources have declined.
The first risk is that by failing to modernize and update our equipment,
we put tomorrow's soldiers at risk. In the event of conflict, a lack of modem
equipment will cost the lives of brave soldiers. Speaking of our failure to
466
modernize after World War II, General Creighton Abrams said, "We paid
dearly for unpreparedness during those early days in Korea with our most
precious currency -- the lives of our young men. The monuments we raise to
their heroism and sacrifice are really surrogates for the monuments we owe
ourselves for our blindness to reality, for our indifference to real threats to
our security, and our determination to deal in intentions and perceptions, for
our unsubstantiated wishful thinking about how war could not come."
The second risk is more difficult to assess or to quantify, the risk of
loss of future leadership. In the Army today there are hundreds of young
soldiers who will be the platoon sergeants of 2010. They will set the
standards of readiness and training, and will set the conditions for the
success and survival of the Army in future combat. Those soldiers are out
there today serving their country proudly. They are training hard and
learning well. They may have deployed to Haiti or Guantanamo or both, and
may be in Bosnia today. Those soldiers are proud of their units'
accomplishments and most want to continue in the Army. But those soldiers
have personal goals as well, most notably the desire to have and raise a
family.
Excessive time away from home is often cited by quality professionals
as the reason for their decision to leave the military. The Army has adapted
personnel practices to assure that individual soldiers do not bear a
disproportionate share of these requirements and has increased reliance on
our Guard and Reserve forces for deployment missions. Still, it is common
to find soldiers in today's Army that have been away from home, answering
the nation's call for 140, 160 or 190 days of this past year. These soldiers
do not complain but proudly perform magnificently every day. It is also not
uncommon to see spouses who, though proud and supportive of their
soldier's past service, believe they have done their part. All our research
shows the spouse to be the most important factor in a soldier's decision to
stay in the Amiy. The Anny's future depends on our ability to retain the best
soldiers to be tomorrow's leaders.
The Amny must have soldiers in sufficient numbers to meet our
commitments without placing excessive burdens on individual service
members. It is crucial that the Army maintain balanced capabilities, and
quality soldiers are the foundation of those capabilities. The country owes its
soldiers a quality of life sufficient to raise their families successfully and with
dignity. We should do no less.
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467
Quality of Life for Soldiers and Families
I want to reiterate what the other Chiefs and I have agreed are the
critical elements of quality of life initiatives that are necessary to retain quality
soldiers:
- Pay - Maintain fair and adequate compensation.
- Retirement - Preserve the retirement system.
- Medical - Quality medical care through TRICARE.
- Housing - Safe and affordable places to live.
Closing
I thank you for your kind attention and I would like to conclude with
this observation. The Army needs to maintain sufficient force structure and
capabilities to respond to the missions assigned. Inside the Army we have
sought to keep things in balance. Our objective is to get the right balance
between readiness, force structure, modernization, and quality of life. The
Army has retained a trained and ready force through the post Cold War
drawdown for the first time in history. America's Army is trained and ready
today and is working hard to meet the inevitable challenges of tomorrow and
the twenty first century. The American soldier is the finest in the world.
Soldiers are our credentials.
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The Chairman. Thank you.
Admiral Boorda.
STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL BOORDA, CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS
Admiral Boorda. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
I also have a statement for the record which I would like to sub-
mit and then make just a few brief remarks this morning.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Admiral BoORDA. I would like to talk really about three things
in this oral statement: First, about what we are doing in ongoing
operations or very recent ones; second, a few facts regarding the
Navy today; and then finally a few of the key points of our budget
request; and I think in so doing I can respond to what you asked
for in your opening statement.
It is not hard for me to find accomplishments of our people in
that last year, and, as Greneral Reimer said, I am very proud of our
people as well. Last year we talked a lot about readiness: How
ready were we going to be, and was that our first priority? In fact,
we made it our first priority, and this past year showed that it
worked. Let me give you a few examples.
Haiti is now essentially completed for the Navy, and an also dif-
ficult operation for us was Guantanamo. At the high point of Guan-
tanamo, we had almost 50,000 migrants at that base. That is com-
pleted now. The families are returning. Many of them are back.
School has started, and the base is returning to normal, but it does
have the capability to surge again if it has to.
That was a difficult and different kind of task for our people. It
was a joint task. All four services and the Coast Guard partici-
pated, and it was very well done. I am proud of them, and I know
you are too.
Four deployments are our stock in trade. That is what we in the
Navy and in the Marine Corps do. On any given day, about 25 per-
cent of our ships are forward deployed. I mean deployed for 6
months away from home, not just a short, temporary, additional
duty. And about 50 percent of our ships are under way doing train-
ing, getting ready to deploy, or actually deploying.
I checked this morning before I came over here just to see if
today was a typical day; 28 percent of the Navy is forward deployed
as I speak this morning, and 55 percent of our Navy is under way.
That gives you some feel for the operations tempo that we are fac-
ing.
Let me talk a little bit about some of those underway people,
and, again, I could give you lots and lots of examples; I will just
mention a few.
First of all, there is nobody here who didn't hear about the USS
Kearsage last summer in the Adriatic when Capt. Scott O'Grady of
the Air Force was shot down, and I mention that only because the
embarked Marines did a great job. They did a fantastic job, and,
had that amphibious group and the Marines not been forward de-
ployed, it wouldn't have worked.
So, working together, our two services are out there and ready
to react on a moment's notice or, in this case, on a couple of hours'
notice. That was a great job by two services working together.
469
This past year we also had an aircraft carrier called the Theodore
Roosevelt deployed. They went down into the Persian Gulf because
Saddam Hussein was doing some things that gave all the chiefs
and our civilian leadership cause for concern, and then they were
brought back to the waters off of Bosnia because that was heating
up. And then, you will recall — this was all in one carrier's deploy-
ment. And then, you will recall that Saddam Hussein's son-in-law
defected to Jordan. About that time, Jordan wanted some reassur-
ance from the United States.
The question went out: Where is the nearest carrier? I will also
add, it went out: Where is the nearest amphibious readiness group
with its Marines? And Theodore Roosevelt was moved very quickly
to the eastern Mediterranean on the first day, on arrival, flying
over Jordan, exercising with the Jordanian Air Force, a signal no-
body could miss, particularly Saddam Hussein.
At the same time, the USS New Orleans and her ships moved up
in the Red Sea into the Gulf of Aqaba, and their Marines, the Ma-
rine Expeditionary Unit, moved ashore to train with the Jor-
danians on Jordanian soil. Once again, a signal nobody could miss.
And that turned out pretty well because nobody fought anybody,
and isn't that what deterrence is about, after all? We couldn't do
that if they had not been forward deployed.
But that does not end Teddy Roosevelt's deployment. You will re-
call in Tuzla, when they had a tragic incident and several civilians
were killed, much like the one I remember when I was stationed
in that region in February 1994 in the Sarajevo marketplace. This
time, we and our allies responded, and Teddy Roosevelt was or-
dered to steam back to the Adriatic, and on arrival 39 hours after
getting the order, she began to launch strikes.
Now, she doesn't do that by herself Marine Corps and Air Force
aircraft and our allies joined in, or, perhaps better said, we joined
with them. That worked very well. Precision guide weapons, les-
sons we had learned from the gulf war, worked, and it became
clear after a while that some more needed to be done.
We knew that should our aircraft have to go against targets in
the Banja Luka area up in northwestern Bosnia, that there was a
pretty good air defense system there and that the pilots would run
a greater risk than what they were doing.
The Normandy, an Aegis cruiser, just happened to deploy with
the America and arrive in the Adriatic. Within the first couple of
hours of being in the Adriatic, they got the call from the battle
group commander on Teddy Roosevelt, not even the carrier they
worked up with, and he said shoot 13 missiles at the command and
control sites and air defense sites in northwest Bosnia.
Four and a half minutes is how long it took to shoot those 13
missiles, 90 percent accuracy, and that is a lot better than we had
planned for that weapon system. It is getting better and better.
And they shot the eyes and the thinking out of the Bosnian Serbs
with those missiles.
That was followed up immediately by Air Force, Marine, and
Navy aircraft, and the Bosnian Serbs, along with the others, found
themselves in Dayton.
Now, we talk about OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO and how long
our ships are away. We were really committed to getting Teddy
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Roosevelt home on time even though she was fighting. Her aviators
were going over Bosnia and dropping weapons. So we deployed the
America. She steamed across the Atlantic quickly. She arrived on
station, began bombing the first day, and Teddy Roosevelt got home
on time.
That is a Navy that can do what it is supposed to do, and it is
ready, but it is stretched when it has to do it that way, there is
no question about that. That is a lot of hands-on stuff to get those
people home on time.
When United States forces entered Bosnia — in fact, even before
they did — our Seabees went with them. Those were forward de-
ployed Seabees. They moved from Rota, Spain, with no need for
any other outside support, and began working with the Army and
building with the Army, and I think that went pretty well, and I
know Denny would agree with me.
And, you know, I can't talk about Navy readiness without talking
about Admiral — he likes to call himself^Leighton; I call him
Snuffy, Adm. Snuffy Smith, who is commanding the whole thing on
the ground in Sarajevo, and he is part of our readiness too. But
today, as I speak, we are getting a chance to prove it one more
time.
The Independence, which was supposed to be in port in
Yokosuka, one of our aircraft carriers is on station about 100 miles
east of Taiwan. Her battle force is with her, and one of the ships
is an Aegis cruiser. Bunker Hill, a ship like Normandy I talked
about a little while ago.
Bunker Hill has tracked each of those four, and there was a
fourth one yesterday, missiles that came out of China and landed
in the areas near Taiwan. They tracked those missiles automati-
cally with their Aegis system as they lifted off from China, broke
the radar horizon, they tracked them up at 6 and 700,000 feet at
speeds approaching mach 4 — in fact, sometimes exceeding that —
and all the way to splashdown. That system works as advertised,
and the sailors out there know how to make it go.
As we speak, the Nimitz has been ordered with some of her bat-
tle group ships to leave the Persian Gulf and head to waters off of
Taiwan. She was there doing the jobs we need done in the Persian
Gulf. This is a higher priority.
At the same time, the priority in the Persian Gulf was not
deemed to be low enough that we didn't have to cover it, and the
George Washington, our deployed carrier in the Mediterranean, is
steaming towards the Suez Canal and will shortly go through and
become the central command carrier.
That is readiness, and it is flexibility, and it is stretching the
force.
I guess I have told you the Navy of today is ready and I am
proud of it, but I want to tell you something else. Our men and
women who serve in these ships and do the kinds of things I am
talking about — and I have only talked about a sample of a year's
worth of work — they don't ask you for very much, and they don't
ask us for very much. They want and they require ships and weap-
on systems that are effective, and they need that not only today
but they need it in the future. We talk a lot about quality of life;
471
that is the ultimate quaUty of life if you go in harm's way, and I
think I have made it clear that we do that frequently.
They also ask for reasonable pay and benefits and housing and
medical care and retirement, but, most importantly, they ask that
those things be reliable and predictable and they don't have to
worry about it all the time. And you can make a real difference
there.
They also, Mr. Chairman, require sufficient force levels so that
we can do everything I talked about and not overstress the people
or the equipment. We will not go below the Bottom-Up Review. If
you read other budget displays, it looks a little bit questionable
about that. It is the way we wrote it, and we need to be more care-
ful.
We include also in our Bottom-Up Review force our 18 reserve
ships because we are employing the reserve ships to do real work
every day. We have always done that, that is not a change, but we
are real close to the Bottom-Up Review number now.
Our manpower is coming down. This year we are going to come
down between 17 and 18,000 people. I must tell you that is
planned. That is to go to our Bottom-Up Review number, and we
are phasing in our reductions over several years to be fair to our
career people. And I want to do it that way, but we cannot go below
the Bottom-Up Review number, and we simply cannot do what we
are doing if we do that.
Given the fiscal resources available to us, I think we have asked
for modest but critically needed acquisition. This year, because we
only, although you authorized four destroyers — three destroyers,
excuse me, they only appropriated enough money for two and a lit-
tle bit more. So this year, to maintain the balance in that program,
we have asked for four, and what we will do then is have three in
each year. In 1996 we will contract for that one, and then in 1997,
with an authorization and funding for four, we will be able to
spread those six ships over 2 years.
We need to look ahead to 1998 because we only have enough
money for two out there, although we are working that budget
hard, even as I speak, in the Pentagon.
The F-18 E/F, I hope you want to talk about it a little more.
That airplane now is the fighter, tactical fighter, in production in
the United States, delivered on time, actually a little bit early. It
is at Patuxent River now and testing. It is a thousand pounds un-
derweight, which my aviator friends will tell you that is real impor-
tant at this phase of testing and a little bit unusual, and it is doing
everything it is supposed to do. We are asking for the first 12 in
this budget to get on with the program for the future.
Submarine shipbuilding is something we need to talk about. We
made great strides last year, I think, in having a plan for sub-
marine shipbuilding. We owe you a report on the 26th of March,
and you will get it, and I hope we have a chance to talk about that
today, because it is our future in that business and I think we can
make great strides working together.
I guess basically I would like to finish by sa3dng I am real proud
of our Navy. The thousands and thousands, really hundreds of
thousands, of men and women who are out there doing a job every
day don't get much publicity, but if you watch CNN and look where
472
the hotspot is, you will find the Navy and Marine Corps right
there.
Thank you.
[The statement referred to can be found on page 293.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral Boorda.
General Fogleman.
STATEMENT OF GEN. RONALD FOGLEMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE AIR FORCE
General Fogleman. Again, I have a written statement that I
would request be submitted for the record and a few brief remarks
that I would like to make.
The Chairman. Without objection.
General Fogleman. First of all, I will tell you that my priority
in this year's budget really falls in two areas, people and in mod-
ernization, and so while I will take a few moments, as my fellow
chiefs have done, and describe for the committee what the Air
Force looks like today and what it has been doing, I would like to
return to those two subjects.
First of all, the Air Force today is just slightly under 395,000, on
our way to an end strength of 381,000, which was the Bottom-Up
Review end strength for the U.S. Air Force.
The fact of the matter is, you will see if you look out into fiscal
year 1998 that the end strength of the U.S. Air Force drops below
381,000. In fact, it goes to about 375,000. That is a combination of
force structure reductions that started a couple of years ago in
weapons systems like the F-111, the C-141, C-130 weapon sys-
tems that we were in the process of downsizing or modernizing
with more capable weapon systems.
At the same time, those numbers include plus-ups in things like
the C-17, in the RVBIX joint program, in the joint STARS pro-
gram. Additionally, you will find in those reductions, though, al-
most 3,000 numbers — 3,000 personnel, the numbers of which rep-
resent, generally, efficiencies — ways we have gone in and cut head-
quarters, places where we have done military-to-civilian conver-
sions, et cetera. So we are prepared to go in and show how that
force structure has been adjusted.
We have, from the very beginning of the Bottom-Up Review,
made no secret of the fact that the Air Force did not have the force
structure required in the Bottom-Up Review. We had, in fact, fewer
bombers called for, et cetera, and we have adjusted as we have
gone from there.
What that has meant for us, though, is for our people — they have
been looking for a period of stability. We accelerated our
drawdown. We are in a period now where we are able to give them
that stability because these additional reductions will come
through normal personnel actions, recruitment, retention, retire-
ment kinds of things.
We are an Air Force that has 81,000 people forward deployed, or
forward assigned, every day in Europe, in the Pacific, in Southern
Command. In addition to those 81,000 people, for instance, nearly
3,000 of them at Aviano. Many of you have been to Aviano. Mike
Boorda likes the talk about his carriers. He is very proud of them.
He ought to be proud of them; they are a great weapon. Aviano is
473
a great Air Force carrier, if you will, stationed right there in the
Adriatic, never has to steam back and forth, is there day in and
day out.
Those people work their duffs off out there in support of this op-
eration, just as the people at Incirlik do, the people at Osan, the
people at Howard Air Force Base. These are forward deployed peo-
ple who are very much a part of an effort like we saw in Bosnia,
a joint effort, if you will. Of course, the commander of that whole
operation over there from the air was Lt. Gen. Mike Ryan, the guy
who gave the order that sent those Tomahawks on the way as part
of an integrated war plan that we had in that theater of operation.
But the fact of the matter is, in addition to the 81,000 — and this
morning I checked the op summary and there were some 9,300 peo-
ple out there, TDY. They will be away from home anywhere from
60, 90, to 180 days this year, supporting operations. Many of them
are going to be in what we call the reconnaissance, surveillance,
and intelligence platforms. The RUBIX joints, the compass call air-
planes, the U-2's, the things that the theatre CINC's want and
want immediately when they want to have information dominance
in an area they are going to operate in.
So along with Mike's carrier operations out there in the Pacific,
we have the RUBIX joint airplanes out there that are collecting, so
that we know what is being said, so that we understand what is
going on inside the system that we need to know about so we can
provide that to the decisionmakers. So these are assets that are
being used all around the world by people that I am very proud of
and you should be very proud of.
I switched to modernization. When I talk about modernization,
it is clear that in this budget we have a fiscally constrained mod-
ernization program, and clearly it doesn't meet all the needs of the
war fighters that are out there. We are asking — the war fighters
are asking for more assets in the theater than we can provide and
keep an OPTEMPO of a reasonable state for our people, but what
we have provided is a budget that has, we think, balance; that is,
we accept some risk in it. If there were more money, there are
more than enough appropriate places that money could be spent.
But within a fiscally constrained environment, we think we have
given a pretty balanced budget.
Within modernization, just to talk about a couple of our pro-
grams, C-17. I think that has been a very great success story, well
supported by this committee. And during the past year it had real-
ly its inaugural operations in Bosnia where it turned out to be a
tremendous workhorse. In one day we were able to move 15 Brad-
ley fighting vehicles into Tuzla. When the Army ran into some dif-
ficulties bridging the Sava River, due to the flood beyond their con-
trol, and they needed extra bridging material, we had an aircraft
that you could load those oversized bridge spans on, fly them into
Hungary and get them down to the engineers very, very quickly.
So it is an aircraft that has received its baptism, if you will, very
quickly and has proven to be very, very effective.
We see a big turnaround in the contractor and in the procure-
ment and on the price of that aircraft, but we have an opportunity
to save nearly another billion dollars if we can get approval for a
multiyear program by the 1st of June of this year. And so that is
474
a program that is over on the Hill, and we are hopeful that we can
get support for.
We also are involved in continuing to upgrade our conventional
bomber force out there, both the B-1, the B-52, and the B-2's that
we have in the force. We have in this modernization program
money for precision munitions to make these systems more effec-
tive, and these are precision munitions that don't come at the cost
of a million or a million-and-a-half dollars a shot. We are talking
about success stories like the joint direct attack munition that ini-
tially started out at about — we thought, best estimate, we might be
able to buy this thing for $40,000 a copy. Due to acquisition reform,
we have been able to get the price of this thing down to $14,000.
It is a tremendous high-leverage weapon.
In space, we are continuing to work on cheaper, more reliable,
more responsive launch systems. The expendable launch vehicle,
Mike talked about how the Aegis cruiser out there can track these
missiles as they launch out of someplace. There are lots of places
in the world where missiles will be launched, and unfortunately,
we will not have the Aegis cruiser there. So just as those missiles
are being tracked in China with the Aegis cruiser, they are also
being tracked by the Defense Support Program, the DSP satellite
from space.
And so it is a system, though, that really is decades old that
needs upgrading. So we have a program called Space Based Infra-
red System that will do that, will give us better infrared and geo-
location types of signals. So that is in our program and we would
request support on that.
We are also supporting our Special Operations Forces, because
they have been deployed in all these operations over the past year
around the world — in the Middle East, in Bosnia, as we speak, they
are sitting in Italy today engaged in Bosnia. So we have the CA^-
22 in there as one of our programs.
And then another modernization priority that has gotten a lot of
attention through somewhat, I consider to be, rather faulty labeling
here lately; and that has to do with something that is extremely
important to all three of us here, TACAJR modernization.
I have seen some headlines that scream TACAIR modernization
takes 45 percent of DOD budget. That is absolutely false. When
you go in and you look at the percent of the DOD budget that
TACAIR modernization takes in this particular budget, it is less
than 10 percent of the total DOD expenditures in the procurement
area. But it is clearly an expensive proposition and something we
need to pay attention to, and hopefully we will discuss more as we
go through.
So personnel and modernization, these are our two priorities.
They are priorities that this committee has historically supported.
I would like to thank you for your support last year, both in your
quality-of-life initiatives, particularly within the MilCon area.
Folks would like to sometimes describe these plus-ups in quality of
life as unnecessary, but the fact of the matter is, the plus-ups that
we saw in MilCon last year were accelerations of things that our
people would have had to wait for, so we did not see that as waste-
ful.
475
We saw that the plus-ups in the procurement accounts were
measured, and they are the kinds of things that help us with that
procurement that we see out there in the future. So we welcome
the opportunity to work with you as we go down the road.
In summary, you have a very ready Air Force. You have an en-
gaged Air Force. You have an Air Force that has been operating
the equipment that you have given to us. We think we have done
that in a joint fashion in support of our national military objec-
tives. I look forward to taking the questions from the members
later. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Fogleman follows:]
476
MARCH 13. 1996
STATEMENT OF GENERAL FOGLEMAN
TO THE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chainnan and Members of the Comminee. I welcome this
opportunity to discuss our plans to modernize our force and support the men and women
of the nation's Air Force-the world's premier air and space force. To maintain this air
and space advantage, we have built a comprehensive, time-phased modernization plan to
meet the needs of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and the Commanders-in-
Chief (CINCs). With your support, we will achieve these objectives and preserve an
acceptable quality of life for our people. Your support will ensure the Air Force continues
to provide strong and credible airpower options in pursuit of our nation's security goals.
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of our Service, we are proud and honored
to say: we are the nation's Air Force~the only American military institution organized,
trained, and equipped solely to exploit air and space power in the defense of our nation.
We exist to fight and win our nation's wars. We provide national presence and influence
in every part of the world. To th^t end, we are dedicated to providing America the most
capable and efficient air and space forces possible-today and in the future. As a direct
result, our forces give dominant warfighting capabilities to the U.S. CDMCs. Specifically,
the Air Force provides the joint force commander with a broad range of air and space
capabilities, to include: Air Superiority, Space Superiority, Global Mobility, Precision
Employment, and Information Dominance.
477
BIOGRAPHY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
SMntarytfOMiUrFwn
OfflMffMHc/UMn
Mtehinglon, O.C. 2IQ30-1690
GENERAL RONALD R. FOGLEMAN
General Ronald R. Fogleman is chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force,
Washington, O.C. As chief, he serves as the senior uniformed Air Force
officer responsible for the organization, training and equipage of 800,000
active duty. Guard. Reserve ar>d dvifian forces serving in tfte United
States and overseas. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he and
the other service chiefs function as ntirrtary advisers to the secretary of
defense. National Security Coundl and the president
The general graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1963.
In eaily assignments he instnjcted student pilots, performed combat duty
as a Tighter pilot and high-speed forward air controller in Vietnam and
Thailand, was a history instructor at the Ak Force Academy, and
corxjucted flight operations in Europe-including duty as an F- 15 aircraft
demonstration pilot for numerous international airshows. Most recently
he flew tanker artd airlift aircraft Over the past decade, he comrrumded
an Air Force wing and air division, directed Air Force programs at the
Pentagon, and served as commarKJer of ttw Pacific Air Forces' 7th Air
Force, with added respofttibifity as deputy commander of U.S. Forces
Korea. ar>d commarxJer of Korean and U.S. air components assigned
under the Combined Forces Command. Prior to becoming chief of staff,
fie was commander in chief of the United States Transportation
Command, and commander of the Air Force's Air Mobility Command.
General Fogleman and his wife, Miss Jane, have two sons.
EDUCATION:
1 963 Bachelor of science degree, U.S. Air Force Academy
1971 Master's degree in mOtuy history and political science, Oul(s University
1976 Army War College, Carfisle Barracks, Pa.
ASSIGNMENTS:
1 . June 1 963 - September 1 964, pikM training, 3576th Student Squadron, Vance Air Force Base, OMa.
2. September 1964 - May 1967, T-37 ffight training instructor, 3575th Pitot Training Squadron, Vance Air
Force Base, OUa.
3. May 1967 • December 1967, IGght examiner, 3575th Pilot Training Wing, Vance Air Force Base, OMa.
4. December1967-June1968,F-100 combat crew training, Luke Air Force Base, Ariz.
5. June 1968 • December 1968, F-100 fighter pikM. 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron. Bien Hoa Air Base.
South Vietnam
6. December 1968 • Apifl 1969, Operation Commando Sabre F-100 forward air controller, 37Ih Tactical
Fighter Wing, South Vietnam
7. April 1969 - September 1969, F-100 fighter pikM. 510th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Bien Hoa Air Base,
South Vietnam
8. September 1969 - December 1970, student history preparatnn for U.S. Air Force Academy instructor,
Duke University, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohk>
9. December 1 970 - Aprd 1973, hMory instructor, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo.
478
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
1&
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
April 1973 • August 1974. F-40/E llgM commander, 421M TacOcai ngMar Squadron. Udom Royal Thai
Air Fores Base, Thailand
August 1974 • July 1975. chief, rated officer career planning section. Headquarters Air Reseraa
Personnel Center. Lowry Air Force Base. Colo.
July 1975 • August 1976. Student officer. U.S. Army War College. Caifisle Banaefca. Pa.
August 1976 • Febfuaiy 1978, assistant deputy commander tor operations, later, chief of the
standardization and evaluation division. 36th Tactical Fighter Wing, Bitburg Air Base, West Germany
March 1978 ■ June 1979. deputy commander (or operations. 32nd Tactical Rghter Squadron. Camp
New Amsterdam, Netherlands
June 1979 - August 1981 , chief, tactical forces division, directorate of programs. Headquarters U.S. Air
Force, Washington, O.C.
August 1981 - June 1982, vice commander, 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, HHI Air Force Base, Utah
June 1982 - March 1983, director of fighter operations, deputy chief of staff, operations, Headquartera
Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
Match 1983 • August 1984, commander, 56th Tactical Training Wing, MacOai Air Force Base, Fla.
August 1984 - March 1966, commander, 836th Air Division, Oavis-Monthan Air Force Base, Ariz.
March 1986 - January 1988, deputy director, prograns and evaluation. Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, programs and resources; cftairman. Programs Review CouncS, Headquarters VS. Air Force,
Washington, O.C.
January 1988 • June 1990, director, programs and evaluation, and chainnan. Air Staff Board,
Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Washington. D.C-
July 1990 - August 1992, commander, 7lh Air Force, deputy commander in chief. United Natiorts
Command; deputy commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and commander. Republic of KoraaAi.S. Air
Component Command, Combined Forces Commarid, Osan Air Base, Korea
August 1992 - October 1994, CINCUSTRANSCOM; commander, AMC, Scott Air Force Base, II.
October 1994 • present, chief of staff. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington. D.C.
PI IQHTIMFQRMATIQM!
Rating: Command pilot, parachutist
Flight hours: More than 6,300
Aircraft flown: T-37, T-33, F-100, F-4, F-IS, F-16. A-10. UH-1. C-21. C-141. C-5 and C-17
Pilot wings from: Republic of Korea
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:
Defense Distinguished Sennce Medal with oalc leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
SBverStar
Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Flying Cross with oalc leaf cluster
Purple Hean
Meritorious Sennce Medal
Air Medal with 1 7 oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal
Air Force Commendatk>n Medal with two oak
leaf clusters
Vietnam Sennce Medal with three service stars
Order of Natk>nal Security Merit. Kooksun
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm
QTHgR ACHIEVEMENTS:
Feltow, Inter University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
Member. Council on Foreign Relations. New York City
Lance S^ Award for leadership
EFFgCnVE DATES OF PROMOTION:
Second Lieutenant
Ftrst Ueuterunt
Captain
Maior
Ueulenant Cotortel
Jun5. 1963
Dec 5. 1964
Mario. 1967
Man. 1971
May 1, 1975
CokxMl
Brigadier General
Major General
Lieutenant General
General
Jan 1.1980
Oct 1.1985
Fab 1.1988
Jul 1.1990
Sap 1.1992
(CuneniaaofMay198S)
479
The warfighting advantages the nation's Air Force brings to the joint table spring
from the expertise and dedication of our people and the technological edge we maintain
in our force structure. Our well educated, technically competent, and highly motivated
men and women are commined to keeping this great nation strong and free. That is why
we consistently invest in cutting edge technologies that exploit the inherent operating
advantages of air and space. The synergy of our dedicated, professional people and our
technologically advanced force structure produces a distinct perspective on how best to
apply military power through the all-encompassing air and space media. This global
perspective provides our national leadership a more versatile range of military options-
options that place fewer American lives at risk-to accomplish security objectives.
The Nation *s Air Force
Airpower increases the alternatives available for all Service components so they
can fight effectively and respond quickly to changing circumstances. Airpower can
selectively degrade or erase the capabilities that support an enemy's war effort, thus
diminishing or eliminating an opponent's options and ultimately defeating his strategy.
This ability to limit enemy options, while simultaneously boosting the effective combat
power of all our forces, makes U.S. air and space power a dominant force in its own right,
as well as an indispensable force multiplier in modem combat.
The nation's Air Force is ideally suited for the challenges posed by today's
security environment. Our men and women have built upon our investment in technology
to create robust air and space forces capable of achieving decisive advantages against
potential aggressors. As a result, your Air Force is first to arrive and first to fight. We
480
provide global situation awareness. We employ while others deploy. We carry the critical
leading-edge components of our country's land forces to the fight and control the air to
provide all forces freedom of maneuver. We sustain military forces during the fight and
contribute decisive air and space assets across the theater and around the globe.
Expertly trained and highly skilled men and women are the backbone of the
nation's Air Force. Today, our Service has 396.000 members on active duty. 188.000
members in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, and 186,000 civilians. This
year, 81,000 are forward stationed overseas and on average nearly 13,000 airmen are
deployed in support of exercises and contingencies worldwide. Of that latter group, nearly
9,000 are currently deployed, and we anticipate that number increasing as we support
major contingency operations overseas, such as Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, and Air
Expeditionary Force (AEF) deployments. These forces demonstrate U.S. commitment and
resolve~not over the horizon, but in direct contact~24-hours a day.
When called, the talented and professional men and women of the nation's Air
Force respond. During the past year, that meant delivering medical supplies to Albania.
flood relief to Germany, and earthquake relief to Japan. It also included supporting
United Nations (UN) mandates in Operations DENY FLIGHT, PROVIDE PROMISE.
DELIBERATE FORCE, and JOINT ENDEAVOR over Bosnia; Operation PROVIDE
COMFORT over Northern Iraq; Operation SOUTHERN WATCH over Southwest Asia;
Operation SAFE BORDER patrolling the border separating Ecuador and Peru; Operation
JTF-BRAVO in Honduras; Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and SEA SIGNAL in
the Caribbean; and supporting the UN Mission in Haiti.
481
The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have played an important role in
supporting contingency operations. As the pace of operations increase, we rely even nxxe
on our Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve partners. They serve side-by-side with
active duty airmen, performing the fiill range of missions that support joint and
multinational operations. Theater commanders welcome the contributions of our Guard
and Reserve units because they know these outfits are well equipped and expertly trained.
With the dedication of our citizen airmen and with initiatives like associate flying
programs, the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve are integral to the success of the
Total Force.
Air Force civilians are also key members of our Total Force team. From the
flightline to the control room to the launch pad to the headquarters, our civilians give us
functional expertise and institutional stability~they are our coqwrate memory. Some
deploy with our combat forces, while others provide stability at home as our military
forces deploy. In addition, as service members move between assignments, our senior
civilians provide continuity in leadership, particularly during periods of high turnover.
Together, we will cany the nation's Air Force into the next century.
Global Reach-Global Power
Whether conducting operations in peacetime, in times of crisis, or in war, we are
fully committed to supporting the CINCs-the nation's warfighters. The air and space
capabilities our airmen bring to the joint team are in higher demand than ever. We have
maintained these capabilities even while reducing our overall force structure. We
succeeded because we started with a clear strategic vision. That vision. Global Reach-
482
Global Power, shaqxned our focus on our core air and space contributions to the
National Military Strategy, allowing us to prioritize our modernization investments and
shape our force drawdown.
The principles underlying Global Reach-Global Power-Sustain Deterrence,
Provide Versatile Combat Forces, Supply Rapid Global Air Mobility, Control the High
Ground, Build U.S. influence-proved successful during Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM. Since then, that national strategy has been more rigorously tested
by global involvement in operations in Bosnia, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti. It has
also been tested here at home in California. Texas, Rorida. New York, Oklahoma, along
the banks of the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, in Puerto Rico, and elsewhere, fighting
fires, delivering relief supplies, and responding to natural disasters. Reflecting an
operations tempo (OPTEMPO) far beyond our Cold War norm, these and other
operations involve tens of thousands of flying hours and the sacrifices of many military
members and their families. With these as examples, we remain confident that Air Force
capabilities will continue to serve our nation well into the next century.
Consequently, with last year's updated National Military Strategy, focusing on
"flexible and selective engagement." we are more certain than ever that our guiding
construct hit the mark. Today, the nation's Air Force-Active, Guard, Reserve.and
civilian-is fully prepared to fight and win our nation's wars. Since the 1992 update of our
vision, we have added Information Dominance to the original five objectives to explicitly
reflect the importance the Air Force places on controlling and exploiting information.
483
These six objectives serve as the building blocks we use for planning and programming
future forces.
Sustain Deterrence
Our air and space forces are key to deterring hostile actions against the United
States, our allies, and our vital interests. This is as true today as it was during the Cold
War. Nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of national security. We provide the
National Command Authorities a ready and responsive ICBM force in addition to a
nuclear-capable, long-range bomber force. We also provide a reliable warning network, a
secure and survivabie command and control capability, an effective attack
characterization and assessment capability, and dependable strategic reconnaissance
platforms. All these assets conuibute to the credibility and effectiveness of America's
nuclear deterrent force.
Our versatile fighters and long-range bombers also offer the nation a strong,
credible conventional deterrent. Their conventional munitions can stop an aggressor in his
tracks. Our bombers can employ while other forces are still deploying. Conventional
upgrades to our bomber force combined with acquisition of a family of smart munitions,
particularly the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Stand-off Weapon (JSOW),
and Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), will enable our forces to attack a
variety of targets anywhere in the world, day or night, in good weather or bad, within
hours of tasking.
484
Provide Versatile Combat Forces
The Air Force offers the quickest response and longest range forces available to
the President in a fast-breaking crisis. We can deter, deploy for influence, or rapidly
employ with lethal force anywhere in the world. Air Force bombers can launch from the
U.S. and reach any point on the globe with precise, lethal strikes in 20 hours. We vividly
demonstrated our long reach in July 1995 when the men and women of Dyess AFB,
Texas, launched and recovered two B-ls that flew non-stop around-the-world while
delivering ordnance on military training ranges in Italy, Korea, and Utah.
Our bomber roadmap is coming together. With continued upgrades, our planned
bomber force of B-S2s, B-ls, and B-2s will sustain deterrence, provide flexible,
sustainable long-range combat power, and demonstrate resolve with their global presence
capabilities well into the next century. As our highest mid-term modernization priority,
the integration of precision munitions and other conventional upgrades to our bomber
fleet will provide the U.S. with a high leverage force by the turn of the century. The B-2,
for example, will have an accurate capability with the GATS/GAM (GPS-aided Targeting
System/GPS-aided Munition) this July: furnishing us a near term capability to
independently target 16 separate aimpoints on a single pass. Our modem bombers provide
a force we can capitalize on for the defense of the nation, rapid crisis response, and
warfighting. Air Force bombers provide the NCA with a unique long-range, lethal
precision strike capability no other force can match.
Our rapidly deployable fighter forces provide us the staying power to overwhelm
an opponent's forces, infrastructure, and command elements. To maintain the robustness
485
of our fighter forces and continue to support high-tempo, worldwide operations, we must
continue our modest F-ISE and F-I6 recapitalization programs and fleetwide high-
leverage system enhancement efforts.
In September 1995. NATO air operations in Bosnia-Operation DELIBERATE
FORCE-once again proved airpower can have a decisive role when serving achievable,
clear policy objectives. Airpower's efforts in helping to lift the siege of Sarcjevo saved
lives and helped pave the way for a negotiated settlement. Our successes over Bosnia
have also demonstrated the expanded range of military options available to our nation's
leaders when we have unquestioned air dominance.
Indeed, air superiority provides the shield that makes all other operations feasible.
During World War D, all sides learned that air superiority was necessary to conduct
ground operations successfully. From the beaches of North Aftica and Normandy to the
amphibious landing at Inchon, from the valiant defense of Khe Sanh to the famous "left
hook" during the Gulf War-American air superiority proved vital. Maintaining air
superiority in a major conflict or a lesser contingency requires operations deep within
hostile airspace to eliminate enemy opportunities to conduct long-range reconnaissance,
launch stand-off weapons, or to gain any other benefit from air operations. The F-22
incorporates revolutionary advances in airframe, engine and avionics technology,
ensuring the Air Force retains the critical combat edge in air superiority.
The F-22 is the first-and the only to date-major weapons system designed to
incorporate the full potential of the "Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)." Today all
the Services are seeking to understand the impact of the RMA. While others debate the
486
effects of the RMA, the Air Force is directly investing in it. Clearly, in contrast to other
more evolutionary weapons programs, the F-22 represents a quantum leap in capability
for the CINCs.
The F-22 will combine stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics in a highly
maneuvcrable platform that will be able to deploy rapidly to heavily defended enemy
territory and achieve first-look/first-shot/first-kill. Stealth will enable the F-22 to gain
surprise by entering combat undetected. Supercruise will allow the F-22 to range the
battlefield rapidly and more effectively employ its weapons. Integrated avionics,
including on and off-board multi-sensor collection and data fusion, will provide the pilot
an unprecedented level of situational awareness. Two-dimensional thrust vectoring will
greatly enhance the F-22's maneuverability, permitting a quick reaction to airborne and
surface threats. Together, the F-22's stealth, supercruise, and integrated avionics will give
America the most advanced, practical, and potent weapon system for ensuring freedom of
operation and minimizing risk and casualties wherever military forces operate.
Many of the technological advances that are making the F-22 revolutionary also
serve as critical components for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)~our F-16 replacement.
Previously known as the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST). JSF will likely serve
as the foundation for other fiiture aircraft designs. The F-22 and JSF will help us retain
America's aerial combat advantage. So will improvements we are making to the current
family of smart weapons.
In addition to advanced systems, we will continue to require fiilly trained, combat
ready aircrews. To keep our forces fit to fight, we must have access to training ranges.
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That access depends on cooperative use arrangements with those who have competing
interests for the same land and airspace. For our part, we are committed to responsible
custodial care, preserving the environmental and cultural uniqueness of our nation's
resources. To guarantee that our combat aircrews remain prepared to meet the security
needs of our nation, assured access to local training ranges and airspace is an Air Force
priority.
Supply Rapid Global Air Mobility
America's air mobility fleet gives our nation the speed and agility to respond to the
full range of contingencies—from airlifting or airdropping troops and equipment during a
crisis to delivering supplies after a natural disaster. No other nation in the world has this
capability.
Our airlifters and tankers offer the CINCs the ability to influence operations
throughout the theater. Our air mobility aircraft can deploy fighting forces or provide
humanitarian assistance worldwide. They enable support forces to remain airborne longer
and combat forces to strike deeper. They airdrop or insert troops and equipment, sustain
operations throughout the theater, provide lift for critical supplies, and provide emergency
aeromedical evacuation.
To ensure we maintain these capabilities, we must modernize the fleet Our
workhorse for the last 30 years, the C- 14 1 , has served us well but is nearing the end of its
service life. That is why the C- 17 is our highest priority near-term modernization
program.
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The November 1995 Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) decision to procure 120
C- 1 7s was the right one for the nation. The C- 1 7 will ensure we can meet airlift
requirements during major regional contingencies-especially during the crucial first 30
days. With its ability to operate from small airfields and in hostile environments, to
deliver oversize and outsize cargo to forward operating areas, and to increase throughput
to the region, the C- 17 is an essential resource for the warfighter. It has already proven its
worth in operations from the Caribbean to Bosnia.
In February, the DAB made another decision that is right for the nation: it
approved a C-17 multi-year procurement plan. This seven-year contract completes the Air
Force requirement for 120 C-17 aircraft at the lowest possible price-clearly, this is the
best value for America. Acquisition streamlining initiatives have already dramatically
reduced the cost of the C-17. This multi-year procurement proposal crowns our successful
cost reduction effort. By providing contractors and subcontractors with a stable, extended
buy profile, we will be able to obtain significant efficiencies over the course of this
program. This contract, if approved, will save the nation nearly $900 million.
We are also ensuring our other mobility assets remain viable. For example, we are
modifying the Air Force' s KC-135 air-refueling fleet and the C-5 force to improve
performance, reduce maintenance required, and reduce operating costs.
Control The High Ground
The nation's Air Force exploits air and space to provide access to any point on the
earth's surface. This capability gives us an extraordinary military advantage. Indeed, our
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space systems have become an indispensable part of our versatile combat forces. For that
reason, the Air Force is pursuing a number of key space modernization programs.
Not unlike the airlift needed to bring combat and support forces to the fight,
spacelift deploys critical space systems into orbit. The nation depends on routine,
affordable, and reliable access to space, but current spacelift is too expensive. The
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program will provide affordable spacelift
to military and commercial users. For the military, affordable spacelift will facilitate
replacement of older space platforms, such as Defense Support Program (DSP), as they
reach the end of their service life. In the case of DSP, we are already pursuing its
replacement, the Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) High Component, to meet the
increasing demands of theater ballistic missile warning.
More than in most technical areas, space technology has historically seen a
blurring of the lines between military and civilian use. The widespread commercial use of
the Global Positioning System (GPS) is one example. In a bit of role reversal, however,
the Global Broadcast System (CBS) is borrowing from commercial innovations to satisfy
military requirements. As the DoD executive agent for multi-user space systems, the Air
Force proposes to lead this fast track program through a series of three phases, including
buying conunercial direct-broadcast services, flying a GBS package on other DoD
satellites, and fmally launching our own objective system to fulfill all joint user wide
band conmiunication requirements. Managing the GBS program from within our Military
Satellite Communications Program Office will ensure maximum synergy with other high
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value military satellite communication programs, such as MILSTAR and Defense
Satellite Communications System.
The establishment of the DoD Space Architect, to work closely with the
Intelligence Community Space Architect, has been a key step toward a future, fully
integrated space capability for the nation. This step, building upon previous close
cooperation efforts like the SBIRS Study, holds the promise of reducing architecture costs
and laying the groundwork for integrated development and acquisition of future space
forces.
Ensure Information Dominance
Dominating the information spectrum has become as critical to warfare as
occupying the land or controlling the air. In military operations, information is a weapon
used not only to support other operations but also to atuck the enemy directly. Within
today's information domain, events are seen and felt at the speed of Ught. If we can
analyze, assess, and act faster than our adversary, we will win. As the DoD executive
agent for Theater Air Defense Battle Management Conunand. Control. Communications.
Computers, and Intelligence (BMC4I). the Air Force commits time, energy, and resources
to maintain this critical edge over potential adversaries.
At the heart of this process is information-collected, processed, and distributed
through a joint BMC4I architecture. This "system of systems" consists of Air Force space
platforms such as MILSTAR and GPS; aircraft such as the U-2. RC-13S. Joint STARS,
AW ACS, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs); and ground command and control
elements comprising the Theater Air Control System. During Operation DELIBERATE
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FORCE, this integrated joint BMC4I architecture significantly increased the situational
awareness of U.S. and NATO political leaders and military forces. This awareness
improved our capacity to shape events on the ground and to respond rapidly as each
situation required.
Rapid technological improvenwnts in storing, processing, and disseminating data
have sparked a greater emphasis on the role of information operations in warfare. The Air
Force recently published Cornerstones of Information Warfare to provide a sound
doctrinal basis for exploiting information capabilities while addressing our own
vulnerabilities. The recently activated 609th Information Warfare Squadron at Shaw Air
Force Base, South CaroUna will be responsible to a Joint Forces Air Component
Commander (JFACC) for coordinating a vast array of in-theater information
requirements. It will orchestrate how we exploit information to support traditional
operations, how we protect our own information architectures, and how we plan to attack
an enemy's information capabilities. An important part of this squadron's responsibilities
will include the ability to "reach back" for specific tools provided by the Air Force
Information Warfare Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas and the Air Force Space
Warfare Center at Falcon Air Force Base, Colorado.
Build U.S. Influence
The core capabilities provided by the Air Force allow the NCA to extend a
helping hand, to use airpower for diplomatic and humanitarian purposes, and to support
other U.S. objectives worldwide. Indeed, the first anival of U.S. airlifters demonstrates
commitment and resolve few can ignore. This presence is real and it extends across the
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globe. To put it into perspective, in 1994 the U.S. Transportation Conunand
(USTRANSCOM) executed the equivalent of five Berlin airlifts in support of operations
in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Haiti. During the past year, we have kept
up the same pace, supporting UN mandates in Iraq and Bosnia and conducting
humanitarian mission around the world.
Global access and influence ultimately depend on the bonds of alliance and
international cooperation. Partnership-for-Peace (PFP) is one of many initiatives the Air
Force supports that underscore this conviction. The forward stationing of our forces, on-
going contingency operations, and multi-national exercises create numerous opportunities
to strengthen alliances and project U.S. influence. The Air Force, through the Air
National Guard, also supports the National Guard State Partnership Program, linking U.S.
sutes to Central and Eastern European nations. These efforts join International Military
Education and Training (IMET) and technical training initiatives, such as the Inter-
American Air Forces Academy, and combine with the work our security assistance
personnel and air attaches do around the globe to foster stability, sustain hope, and
provide relief. Efforts like these are samples of Air Force programs that pay direct
dividends by building trust and cooperation among our friends and allies.
Building the Future Air Force
As stewards of the nation's air and space forces, we have produced forces that are
ready, versatile, and tailored to support our National Security Strategy. We will continue
to execute our responsibilities with the disciplined approach we have followed in the past.
This approach is based on four key commitments:
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• We will deflne our operational requirements and provide national capabilities
with a clear vision of what we contribute to the U.S. military's joint team.
• We will fill those requirements with a lean and agile acquisition system.
• We will recruit quality people and ensure they are trained and motivated to
operate in a disciplined manner and to exhibit and respect Service core values.
• We will ensure our people and their families have the quality of life they
deserve as they serve our nation.
Balanced, Time-Phased Modernization
In 1990, the Air Force undertook a thorough analysis of its future potential
contributions to national security. The result was Global Reach-Global Power, which we
published in 1990. In 1993, the Department of Defense conducted a bottom-up review
(BUR) of our National Military Strategy. The BUR confirmed one of the basic premises
of Global Reach-Global Power: "The likelihood that U.S. military forces will be called
upon to defend U.S. interests in a lethal environment is high, but the time and place are
difficult to predict." Events since 1993 have confumed this assumption.
The strategic planning effort we accomplished after the Cold War focused the Air
Force on core air and space contributions to the National Military Strategy, helping us
prioritize modernization investments and shape our force structure. By drawing down
forces early we have been able to maintain ready forces to support a key component of the
BUR strategy, to fight and win two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts, while
retaining the ability to respond to a wide range of lesser contingencies, without
abandoning our modernization priorities.
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To make the most of the nation's investment, the Air Force carefully constructed a
time-phased modernization plan that synchronizes the sizing and timing of multiple
programs. This approach helped us achieve our modernization objectives without creating
"bow waves" in out-year budget requirements. In the past, the "bow waves" were the
result of "small changes" in programs to achieve short-term savings. These "small
changes" often resulted in large costs and disruption of numerous programs in the out-
yeais.
Our time-phased approach covers near-term, mid-term, and long-term efforts.
Coupling time-phasing with aggressive acquisition reform initiatives ensures that the Air
Force will continue to provide our nation a broad range of capabilities at an affordable
price.
Near-Term Priorities
Our CINCs identify strategic lift, air and sea. as DoD's greatest single deHciency.
In response to this need, the C- 17 is the Air Force's foremost near-term modernization
priority.
Our C- 14 Is are showing signs of age. At the same time, demand for airlift has
increased. Based on a comprehensive analysis of strategic and tactical airlift
requirements, aircraft and contractor performance, and cost effectiveness, the DAB
recommended that we plan, program, and budget for the procurement of 120 C-17s. Our
plan includes taking advantage of a suble multi-year procurement contracting
environment at high production rates to offer substantial savings for C-17 acquisition.
This will not only provide a savings, but also will enable us to fill the gap in needed airlift
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sooner and finish the 120 airframe C-17 procurement prior to the peak expense years for
the F-22.
The C-17 has been flying operational missions since October 1994, supporting
operations in Southwest Asia, Panama, the Virgin Islands, and now in Bosnia.
Concurrently, our acquisition program has exceeded expectations with the last 12 aircraft
delivered to the Air Force ahead of schedule. The success of last year's Reliability,
Maintainability, and Availability Evaluation (RM&AE) is solid proof of the aircraft's
performance. The C-17 exceeded all key performance parameters during this rigorous
thirty-day evaluation. It is clear, this is the right airplane at the right time.
In addition to these efforts to upgrade our mobility forces, we must continue to
sustain the health of our combat forces until the arrival of our next generation forces,
particularly the F-22 and JSF. To this end, we are continuing to recapitalize our F-ISE
and F-16 fleets. We are also pursuing modernization upgrades to our fighter forces and
purchasing enhanced conventional munitions, such as JDAM and sensor-fused weapons,
to improve their effectiveness.
Mid-Term Priorities
Conventional bomber upgrades and smart munitions improvements are Air Force
mid-term modernization priorities.
The B-2 will give America a credible capability to penetrate advanced defenses
and conduct precision strikes-nuclear and conventional-anywhere in the world. The B- 1
will supplant the B-S2 as the workhorse of our bomber fleet, while the B-S2 will continue
to provide a nuclear hedge and offer long-range stand-off.
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Bomber upgrade prognuns are helping us integrate our newest cooventiooal
weapons onto all our bombers. These upgrades will give our non-stealthy B-S2s and B-ls
multiple target, stand-off, precision strike capabilities as well as increase their
survivability. The combination of highly capable B-2s with upgrades to our existing
bombers provides an affordable approach to maintain the minimum overall long-range
strike capability required to "swing" between two Major Regional Conflicts.
Critical to the effectiveness of our bombers and our fighters is the continued
development and procurement of affordable, smart and precision guided weapons. These
weapons will extend the range, increase the lethality, and improve the survivability of
older and newer aircraft alike. The JDAM, JSOW, and JASSM provide a balanced and
affordable approach for increasing the versatility and lethality of Air Force, Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft.
JDAM will significantly improve our ability to conduct adverse-weather, round-
the-clock operations. JDAM adds an Inertial Navigation System and GPS-guided nose
and tail kit to the MK-84 general purpose and BLU-109 penetrator bombs. JSOW is a
1000 pound class accurate glide weapon which provides us a low cost option for
attacking highly defended targets from intermediate stand-off ranges. JASSM is a
precision long-range stand-off weapon designed to penetrate and attack targets in high
threat areas. JASSM will significantly increases our capability to hit critical, high value
targets in the early stages of a conflict.
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Long-Term Priorities
The F-22 is our most important long-temi modernization priority-the need for air
superiority is unquestioned. The F-22 will guarantee air superiority well into the next
century. Its airframe and powerplant provide a highly maneuverable stealth platform
capable of extended supersonic flight. Revolutionary integrated avionics~on-and off-
board multi-sensor collection and data-fusion-will provide F-22 pilots unequaled
battlespace awareness. The unique capabilities of the F-22 will enable the Air Force to
dominate aerial environments—operating at will over hostile or contested territories,
defended by very capable defensive systems, attaining unprecedented first-look, first-shot,
first-kill successes, while protecting the many high-value assets necessary for success in
modem military operations.
We have sized and sequenced the F-22 Program to meet critical warfighting
requirements at a cost the nation can afford. This sequencing is critical. When the F-22
meets its initial operational capability in 2005, it will replace the F-lSC-a 35 year old
weapon system that will no longer be able to counter the full range of operational threats
it was designed for. Furthermore, the F-22 will be cheaper to operate, require fewer
personnel to operate, and require less airlift to deploy abroad. We made a substantia]
long-term investment commitment to achieve these revolutionary improvements and
ensure we retain air superiority. Non-programmatic reductions will undermine the
program subility necessary to control costs and maintain affordability. Already, during
the course of the program, these reductions have increased program costs 2.5 to 3 times
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over the amount of the funds removed. Funding stability continues to be a major concern
for the future of the F-22 program.
JSP is another critical Air Force long-term modernization effort. When the first
operational JSF aircraft become available in 2008. they will begin replacing our fleet of
F-16s, which entered service in 1979 and will be increasingly vulnerable in fiiture threat
environments. Operationally, the F-22 and JSF are designed to be complementary. In fact,
JSF will rely on the F-22 to provide day one air superiority. Technologically, advances
that make the F-22 revolutionary-in avionics, composites, engines, and signature
reduction-are being heavily leveraged into the JSF, thereby reducing risk and cost and
increasing weapon system commonality. The JSF program will result in a family of
affordable fighter aircraft capable of meeting the fiiture warfighting requirements of the
Air Force. Navy, and the Marine Corps. The affordability and versatility of JSF may also
provide the most attractive alternative to many of our allies and coalition partners as they
seek to modernize their existing fleets of fighter aircraft in the next century. The JSF team
has developed a basic framework for international participation. Already, we have entered
into an agreement through which the United Kingdom will contribute S200 million to
share in the development costs of the concept demonstration. JSF has the potential to
become the world's standard multi-role fighter of the 2ist century.
The Air Force plan to acquire the CV-22 for Air Force Special Operations Forces
(AFSOF) complements conventional deep strike assets, such as the F-22 and JSF. by
providing long range combat search-and-rescue (CSAR) as well as deep battle airlift. The
CV-22's speed, extended range, and survivability will significantly increase the
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warfighting CINCs' ability to exfiltrate personnel from denied teiritory. These inherent
advantages will reduce dependence on refueling while providing a greater range of
options for Special Operations employment.
The next century will also bring advances in the numbers and varieties of threats.
While the F-22, JSF, and CV-22 will provide the CINCs potent offensive tools to counter
those threats, the Airborne Laser (ABL) will provide an equally potent defensive tool.
Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated the potential of theater ballistic
missiles to serve as an effective delivery means for weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Our current approach to counter this threat integrates complementary capabilities from
the different Services to create a muhi-tiered defense consisting of attack operations,
boost-phase interceptors, and terminal defenses. We have programmed $700 nullion in an
ABL over the current Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). ABL will provide a robust
boost-phase intercept capability to destroy ballistic missiles over an aggressor's territory.
The prospect of WMD debris falling on an enemy's own forces or people may serve as a
strong deterrent to WMD use.
On-Going Priorities
Several modernization programs transcend our time-phased approach. Along with
the Department of the Navy, we arc procuring a new training aircraft—the Joint Primary
Aircraft Training System (JPATS). The recently selected Beech Mkll aircraft meets or
exceeds every Air Force and Navy requirement at an affordable life-cycle cost. With its
pressurized cabin, advanced navigation suite, and state-of-the-art propulsion system, the
JPATS will better prepare our ftiture pilots to fly advanced aircraft. Acquisition of JPATS
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will improve commonality with the Navy, support on-going efforts to consolidate Air
Force and Navy flight training, and improve overall training safety.
Air Force modernization programs also reflect the need to provide the nation
continuous, assured access to space. EELV will help us maintain that access. EELV is an
evolutionary launch system that will be designed to deploy a broad range of spacecraft
and support increasingly demanding launch requirements. It will lower the cost of both
military and commercial access to space and ensure the long-term competitiveness of
America's commercial launch industry.
SBIRS is another key system that will improve the CINCs' ability to defend
against theater ballistic missiles. As a replacement for DSP, SBIRS will enable U.S. and
allied forces to detect targets, such as theater ballistic missiles, sooner and at lower
altitudes, enabling allied forces to destroy them at longer ranges. As a result, the
warfighter will possess an even greater ability to neutralize the theater ballistic missile
threat.
SBIRS is part of the information age technology that will give theater level
conunanders increased opportunities to influence operations in real or near-real time.
With SBIRS, space-based cueing will be available for direct downlink to a variety of
offiensive systems that can then destroy transport erector launchers immediately after
lauiKh detection. This space-based cueing will also be available for boost-phase intercept
platforms, such as ABL, to intercept missiles early in flight and to ground and sea-based
terminal defense systems.
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While space systems, such as SBIRS, are designed to enhance our warfighting
capability, they also represent technologies that are important to our commercial partners.
Indeed, many key air, space, and information technologies are commercially based.
Information technologies have become increasingly important to military and civilian
users and permeate almost every level of C*l and combat weapons systems. Many of
these technologies, such as high-speed computers, distributive simulation, and
miniaturization, have migrated back and forth between military and commercial users.
Such information technologies can be a powerful force multiplier, offering offensive and
defensive applications. As a result, the Air Force is placing increased emphasis on
electronic combat and distributed information networks to enable decentralized execution
of air operations.
High Leverage Player on the Joint Team
We continue to enhance operational relationships with the Army, Navy, and
Marine Corps in many areas, but nowhere are these ties more evident than in Air Force
platforms providing joint C*I. Air Force systems, such as AWACS, Joint STARS,
RC- 1 35s, U-2s, UAVs, and theater battle management core systems, provide
comprehensive situation awareness, early warning, and detailed real-time targeting
information for all warfighters.
A large part of this C*l infrastructure is space-based. The Air Force continues to
launch and operate over 90% of DoD's space assets, including MILSTAR. the most
recent addition to our space-based C*l capability. MILSTAR provides a worldwide, anti-
jam, scintillation resistant, low-probability-of-intercept-and-detection communications
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capability for all warfighting forces. Often described as a switchboard in space,
MILSTAR can reconfigure immediately as warftghter connectivity needs change,
providing dynamic communication networics.
Of historic significance, in 1995 we inaugurated a new era of military C*I with the
first MILSTAR satellite-to-satellite information crosslinks. These crosslinks provide the
capability to transmit messages from a single fixed or mobile ground terminal to a
satellite, rout them through the satellite constellation, and transmit them directly to a
destination. Such crosslinks decrease our dependence upon an expensive and vulnerable
network of overseas ground relay sutions.
Our interaction with the other services is not one-way. We also depend on key
capabilities they provide. By FY99, the Air Force will depend largely on the Navy's
EA-6B for stand-off jamming, replacing the EF-1 1 1. Savings from this decision will
offset upgrade costs for the EA-6B. Similarly, the services share a responsibility to defend
against theater ballistic missiles. Army and Navy systems provide terminal defense
against theater ballistic missiles, while the Air Force concentrates on battle management
and attack operations and boost-phase intercept options to ensure the CINCs possess an
effective defense against theater ballistic missiles.
The Net Result
Our modernization plan, which supports our strategic vision of providing Global
Reach-Global Power for the nation, will enable us to keep providing force options across
the spectrum of conflict. We have made tough decisions, weighing technological
advantages against affordabtlity.
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We have structured our programs for subility. Stability is vital to producing the
best systems at the lowest possible cost. Most importantly, we have carefully sequenced
our programs to balance year-to-year affordability concents, readiness, and technical
feasibility.
This is the right plan to ensure the nation's Air Force continues to meet National
Military Strategy requirements.
Lean, Agile Acquisition
A key challenge to our vision is keeping pace with meteoric advances in essential
warfighting technologies. Acquisition processes designed under Cold War rules can no
longer respond quickly enough to benefit from radical shifts in design, much less from
technological breakthroughs. To take advantage of increasingly dynamic opportunities,
the Air Force is building a lean, agile acquisition system.
Adopting new processes is an important Hrst step. Implementing these processes
requires overcoming embedded barriers to change, such as statutory and regulatory
constraints, cultural biases, and fear of the unknown. Most of these barriers are self-
induced and, as such, can be overcome through dedicated, innovative leadership. Others,
however, will be more difficult to master. Ultimately, the actions we take today will form
the foundation for the lean, agile acquisition system of the future.
Acquisition Reform
Nine Lightning Bolt Acquisition Reform Initiatives have fueled an acquisition
renaissance within the Air Force, building trust, empowering people, and strengthening
teamwork. Individually, each initiative has helped tear down specific barriers to progress.
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Together, they have created a momeotum ensuring the Air Force provides timely,
affordable, and advanced systems to meet the needs of our warftghters.
One measure of the success of the Lightning Bolt Initiatives has been the number
of obsolete or redundant acquisition policies we have eliminated. Another measure is the
cost savings realized from streamlined processes. The true measure of success of these
reforms is the efficient, timely delivery of systems that meet the warfighters' requirements
at a cost the nation can afford. For instance, the F-22 has become a model acquisition
program.
The F-22 Team is using Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
proven, event-driven management techniques, such as performance based acceptance and
reduced dependency upon military specifications and standards. Additionally, the F-22
Team has implemented a lean manufacturing philosophy that provides a balance between
cost and risk. One element of the strategy is the level of concurrency between program
development and production. The F-22 program has scheduled significant ground and
flight test activities in advance of the initiation of low-rate production. When a Defense
Science Board review in 199S compared the F-22 to other fighter development programs,
they reported the degree of concurrency in the F-22 program appears not only reasonable,
but in many ways, more conservative than the other programs. Based on the current status
of the program, the cost and schedule risk of an extended EMD program outweighs any
concurrency risk. Tying it all together, the F-22 program successfully uses Integrated
Product Teams (IPTs) merging stakeholders from all disciplines and ensuring that designs
strike the proper balance between cost, performance, and supportability. This close
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govemment-to-contractor working relationship gives government personnel a superior
degree of insight into the status of the program down to the lowest level.
We have also seen results in several of other programs, including JDAM, GPS,
PACER CRAG, and Peace Shield. The JDAM program supports the requirement to
provide bomber and fighter aircraft an adverse weather, medium and high altitude attack
capability against fixed or relocatable land and maritime targets. Thanks to a streamlined
acquisition process, we have accelerated the JDAM program, increased JDAM's warranty
from five years to twenty, and reduced the average unit price to $14,000. This places
crucial, advanced systems in the hands of the warfighters one year earlier than requested
with a total savings of $2.9 billion.
GPS is a space-based, aJI-weather system providing reliable and accurate
worldwide positioning, navigation, and precision timing through 24 satellites and
associated ground control stations to an unlimited number of military and civil users.
During Operation DESERT STORM, the U.S. Army needed a highly rehable and
accurate method of navigating in the harsh desert environment. The joint GPS team
orchestrated the rapid purchase of commercial off-the-shelf receivers and quickly
delivered this equipment to the field in time for the ground offensive.
Another example is PACER CRAG. This program includes modifications and
additions to the KC-135 aircraft's GPS, radar, and compass. This modification, among
other things, makes it possible to reduce the KC-13S cockpit crew from three to two. In
addition to manpower savings, this will significantly enhance KC-I3S reliabihty and
maintainability. Our PACER CRAG team has used all available tools within the
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acquisition community to reduce fepoitlng requirements and to eliminate unnecessary
military standards and specifications. We applied the resulting savings of approximately
$90 million to other unfunded KC-135 modernization programs.
The Peace Shield program is another acquisition reform success story. This
advanced command, control, and communication system for the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia provides an example of how we can downsize by identifying a program's core
requirements, creating a fixed program baseline, and resisting the constant urge to update.
In addition, every personnel position had a sunset clause tied to the completion of a
milestone or a task. These reform efforts enabled a program that began behind schedule in
October 1992 to deliver a completed system to the customer six months ahead of
schedule. Peace Shield also reduced its System Program Office (SPO) size from 325 to
lOS, saving over S2S million in personnel costs.
Improving Business Practices
Beyond reforming our internal acquisition processes, the Air Force has pursued
other solutions to more efficiently and effectively meet requirements.
We have moved increasingly into cooperative programs with industry, our sister
Services, other government agencies, and our allies. Most of our programs~for example,
C-17. EELV, SBIRS, MILSTAR, and most of our Precision Guided Munitions (PGM)
programs-have joint users. Two major programs go beyond that and have been structured
as joint acquisition programs: the JPATS and the JSF programs. By combining
acquisition efforts we have been able to decrease costs and improve manpower savings.
JPATS made this a reality. JSF offers similar opportunities. With JSF, we have agreed to
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divide expenses and expertise equally with the Department of the Navy and have
concluded arrangements with the United Kingdom, allowing early fmancial and
developmental participation in the JSF program. This approach will facilitate the
development of an affordable multi-role aircraft.
We also have joint-service and international cooperative Science and Technology
(S&T) efforts underway that will make significant contributions to joint warfighting. For
example, we axe currently conducting joint S&T programs with France and Germany in
the field of ducted rockets, a technology crucial to extending the range of air-to-air
missiles. Additionally, we are working with the Navy and with multinational partners on
a new system to expand the escape envelope and increase the occupant size range for our
ejection seats.
When we began to break down the barriers between the "defense" and
"commercial" sectors of the economy, we discovered new opportunities to better use the
nation's resources. Clearly, our nation can no longer sustain two separate industrial bases
for military and civilian requirements. Therefore, we are moving toward cooperative
arrangements to integrate military and commercial activities. Over the past twelve
months, this approach has proven quite successful.
During 1 995, the Air Force approved leases and awarded dual-use launch grants
for commercial space ventures at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California and Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. In fact, over the next three years. Air Force launch
pads will support more conunercial than ii\ilitary satellite launches. Similarly, our EELV
program is taking both the military and commercial sector to the next generation of
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spacelift capability. We have included commercial-sector members on the F.F.I ,V
acquisition team, removed unnecessary layers of management, and eliminated overly
restrictive military specifications (MILSPECS) from the program. Private sector
involvement is particularly crucial for this program because we expect the EELV to
satisfy the needs of the military and bolster U.S. industry's competitive position in the
world space-launch market.
Commercialization policies, outlined in the Office of Management and Budget
Circular A-76, Performance of Commercial Activities, require DoD to rely on private
sector sources for goods and services. Since 1979, outsourcing has produced operating
savings of more than $500 million annually.
Outsourcing is not a new way of doing business for the Air Force~we have been
on the cutting edge for decades. Our policy is clear: outsource where and when it is most
cost effective.
One major challenge will be privatizing major portions of our depot maintenance
capabilities, concentrating on those efforts which do not have wartime surge
requirements. Our pathflnder privatization project is at Newark Air Force Base, Ohio.
Newark was closed by the 1993 Base Realignment and Closure Commission. We selected
a privatization-in-place option for Newark because moving workloads to other organic
depots posed significant operational and economic challenges.
Currently, Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) is aggressively evaluating Air
Force-wide depot workload as the first step in privatizing depot maintenance work at
Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, and McClellan Air Force Base, California. Already AFMC
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has begun to identify pilot programs to gain an increased understanding of the benefits
and the drawbacks to privatization.
Expanding Access for Small Businesses
An unexpected benefit garnered from the acquisition renaissance has been an
increase in business opportunities for smaller commercial ventures. Since small
businesses frequently lack the resources or expertise to tap into these opportunities, we
challenged ourselves to improve access, increase awareness, and ease availability for
America's small businesses. We predicated our efforts on a simple belief-all businesses
should have equal access to Air Force procurement opportunities. As a result, the Air
Force leads DoD and much of the entire federal govenunent in support to small
businesses. Our Small Business efforts center around the Air Force Marketing
Information Package (AFMIP). AFMIP provides the Air Force Long Range Acquisition
Estimate (LRAE) for FY96 and beyond in the form of practical "how to" guidance on
selling to the Air Force. AFMIP also includes the full text of the Air Force Mentor-
Protege Handbook and information on international and domestic commercial
diversification. In addition to AFMIP, the Air Force has continued its support for the
Interagency Committee On Women's Business Enterprise (lACWBE), expanding access
for women-owned businesses in Federal procurement opportunities.
Motivated, Disciplined People
The Air Force operates on the leading edge of technology and the tools of our
trade are lethal. Such a force requires motivated, disciplined airmen led by superior
leaders. To ensure the nation's Air Force continues to be the world's premier air and space
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force, we recruit and train quality people, nurture leaders, and embrace unambiguous,
high standards.
Recruiting and Retention
The publicity surrounding the defense drawdown, skyrocketing college
enrollments, a youth population at its lowest level since the advent of the all-volunteer
force: these are the hurdles for recruiting new members. Yet. to maintain a balanced force
with the right distribution of rank. age. and skills, we must constantly replenish our ranks.
Therefore, we are closely monitoring the pool of potential recruits, tracking workforce
trends, and rewarding our recruits with top notch training, meaningful work, and a
lifetime of educational opportunities.
Aggressive recruiting expands the pool of potential talent and it ensures a
workforce that represents the total population. Continuing to attract qualified minorities
to the Air Force will sustain the future growth of an increasingly diverse population. It
also molds a workforce representative of society. Diversity brings credibility and
relevance to the Air Force. It also helps us weave our values into every fabric of society-
through the varied backgrounds of the sons and daughters who serve.
While attracting diverse populations to a workforce is essential, retaining them
matters just as much. We are convinced that putting people first is the best way we can
guarantee the readiness of our force. As a result, we are conunined to providing and
maintaining an acceptable quality of life for our people and their families.
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Thinking Globally-Training Locally
As an essential ingredient of America's combat readiness, our ainnen think
globally but train locally. That means Air Force training is designed to represent, as
accurately as possible, the environment, conditions, and experiences our men and women
would most likely face while participating in operations around the world. Such training
requires use of a wide variety of land. sea. and air resources to create realistic and
representative circumstances.
To ensure access to such areas, we have developed cooperative use arrangements
with those who may have competing interests for the same land and airspace. Such
arrangements are predicated on responsible custodial care of these resources. Currently,
Air Force ranges incorporate over nine million acres. Sixty percent of this training space
is dual-use, shared by the mihtary and the public. These ranges include managed forests,
fanning and grazing areas, and protected wetlands. Additionally, we are minimizing the
use of hazardous materials, broadening recycling programs, and incorporating
environmental improvements into our aircraft designs.
We will continue to search for improved ways to execute our responsibiUties and
steward our nation's resources.
Excellence in Command
Leadership is the foundation of our organization. We depend on our ability to
train, educate, and select our leaders and then provide an atmosphere where they can use
their talents toward mission accomplishment. As the demands of Air Force leadership
grow, and the issues facing our leaders become iiKreasingly complex, it has beconne
512
necessary to improve the way we ensure our readiness to face these challenges. For
instance, we are improving commander selection and training processes. We have
designed a centralized system to provide all candidates for command equal consideration
and central screening of their records. This should ensure a fair and open system with the
best possible criteria for selection.
We have also instituted leadership courses to ensure our commanders are as well
prepared as possible for their new responsibilities and know what we expect of them.
Squadron, Group, and Wing Commander Courses are a first step. In addition, our
Squadron Officer School, Air Conunand and Staff College, and Senior NCO Academy
have included extra leadership and accountability case studies in their curricula.
Concurrently, across the Air Force we have vigorously reinforced the importance
of professionalism, accountability, and responsibility. Air Force leaders must focus on the
mission, demand professional standards of conduct, and hold people accountable if they
fail to meet these standards. We have provided specific guidehnes for commanders that
link disciplinary and personnel actions while protecting the commander's prerogative.
Furthermore, we have emphasized the need for more stringent documentation of all
adverse actions, and we require evidence of those adverse actions at all accountability
points, such as promotions, evaluations, assignments, and decorations.
Unambiguous, High Standards
Technical competency, drive, diplomacy, and team-building skills are important
qualities for any leader. We will continue to require those skills from our commanders.
Just as crucial, however, are the personal qualities of integrity . . . service before self . . .
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513
excellence in all we do. We've stressed the importance of these core values in our
discussions with Air Force people at all levels. Our core values are the standard for our
behavior, our service to country, and our treatment of one another. All who wear the
uniform, especially our leaders, have a duty to live according to the values of this
institution. Personal values, professionalism, demanding standards, and accountability-
all flow from our vision of the future Air Force.
People First
To ensure we recruit and retain the right people, we will continue to reward the
challenges of this profession with an equitable quality of life. Readiness and quality of
life are inseparable. That is why we put "People First."
This year we conducted the first ever hands-on, computerized Quality of Life
Survey of everyone in the Air Force. This survey identified strengths and weaknesses
among Service efforu to assure our people an acceptable quality of life. On a positive
note, many of our people intend to make the Air Force a career. On the other hand, many
had concerns, such as the high OPTEMPO of their units.
To assure a balanced approach, the Air Force continues to support its Quality of
Life Strategy, focusing on seven priorities: compensation and benefits, safe and
affordable housing, health care, balanced Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) and
OPTEMPO. community and family programs, retirement benefits, and educational
opportunities.
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Compensation and Benefits
One of the fundamental requirements for maintaining an all-volunteer force is
ensuring fair and adequate military compensation. To help maintain a quality force, the
Air Force supports full statutory pay raises through the FYDP as proposed in the
President's budget. In addition, for civilians, the Air Force supports pay equity with
industry through the locality pay provisions of the Federal Employees Fay Comparability
Act.
Housing
Like most Americans, members of the Air Force want to live and raise their
families in comfortable homes in secure neighborhoods. Unlike most Americans,
however, airmen must live where their orders take them in support of worldwide
deployments and contingencies. It is vital for all airmen, particularly junior members, to
have access to safe, affordable housing. Air Force people do not expect to live in luxury.
Simply, they want to be able to place their families in housing that will give them peace
of mind when they are deployed.
Unfortunately, there are insufficient quantities of quality housing to meet existing
and projected demand-currently, 39,000 families are on waiting lists to move into base
housing. The average age of Air Force housing is 33 years, with over 60,000 homes
requiring improvement or replacement. At current funding levels, it will take 24 years to
catch up with this backlog.
Our goal is to get well within the next 10 years. The solution is innovation, not
just increased investment. With the support of Congress, the Air Force could realize both
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515
the flexibility and the authority to satisfy much of its housing needs through the private
sector, thereby reducing costly infrastructure and overhead.
Dormitory improvements for single and unaccompanied personnel are another key
part of our housing problem. The Air Force strongly supports OSD's one-plus-one
standard for single and unaccompanied dorms, an initiative aimed at enhancing individual
performance while assuring personal privacy.
Health Care
Airmen rank quality health care for their families as their number one non-cash
benefit. To alleviate stresses on the military health care system and mitigate the fmancial
burden on military members, the Air Force supporu the current TRICARE program. This
program requires neither user fees in Military Treatment Facilities nor enrollment fees for
active duty families. TRICARE is the only program in today's economic environment that
can assure military members and their families the broadest range of uninterrupted
medical coverage-and we are commined to making TRICARE work.
However, we are concerned about the provision of health care to retirees and their
families who are 6S years old and older. Currently, we allow these patients to continue
on a space available basis in our military medical facilities. However, space is becoming
less and less available as our military medical facilities are closed through the Base
Realignment and Closure process and as the competition for military medical facility
access increases. The Administration is considering a demonstration of a promising new
alternative where DoD would maintain its current level of effort and would expend those
funds first; then, turn to HCFA to cover additional dual eligible beneficiaries who choose
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to enroll in TRICARE Prime. We would like to see this demonstration begin as soon as
possible and look forward to the outcome.
We are also concerned about quality dental care. While the family member dental
plan allows overseas family members to remain enrolled, there are no provisions under
the plan for overseas treatment. As a result, the Air Force supports the Overseas Family
Member Dental Program (OFMDP). which is in place in Europe and soon will be
implemented in the Pacific.
Balanced PERSTEMPO and OPTEMPO
The OPTEMPO for many of our units remains high--and it will only increase as
we are called upon to support additional contingency operations. Four times as many Air
Force people are deployed today as in 1989 enforcing no-fly zones, maintaining air
refueling bridges, supporting humanitarian operations on three continents, and helping
stem the flow of illegal drugs. We are committed to supponing these operations.
Concurrently, we are working to reduce high PERSTEMPO to below the maximum
desired level of 120 deployed days per person per year.
The Air Force is employing three main initiatives to achieve this goal. First, we
are using global sourcing to balance the workload across ail active duty Air Force units,
regardless of the theater to which they are assigned. Second, we are reducing taskings on
the systems where our people have the h ghest PERSTEMPO. That is, we prioritize tasks
to determine which missions we can support, offer substitutions, or request relief. Third,
we are using Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve volunteers to reduce active duty
taskings and are integrating them into additional mission areas, such as AW ACS, space
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517
operations, and infonnation warfare. Air Combat Command has developed a successful
scheduling process that has Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve paitjcipation in
contingency operations planned through 1998. As we rely more on Air National Guard
and Air Force Reserve people, we must be prepared to extend to them appropriate
services and benefits-to include those Guardsmen and Reservists serving on active duty
for less than thirty-one days. This requires improved guidance, full funding, and advanced
scheduling to maximize volunteer availability and to ensure we can offer benefits and
protections regardless of the duration of active service.
In a Spring 1995 survey. Air Force commanders and fu^t sergeants said that
family readiness is directly tied to mission readiness. The Family Readiness Program
provides special emphasis on family separations through a variety of services, including
deployment preparation, support during separations, and reunion guidance. With the high
number of deployments, these services have become an essential capability at many
bases. They must be continued to ensure we support our airmen and their families.
Community Support and Family Programs
Community support and family programs also help the Air Force recruit and retain
the right people. Our highest priority efforts in this area are to preserve commissary
benefits, expand child care, and expand Services' activities.
Commissary savings are vital to the entire military community and are ranked
second, behind health care, as the most valued non-cash benefit. Military members
depend on commissary savings to extend already stretched military income.
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The Air Force Child Development Program provides care for 43,000 children
daily in child development centers, family day care homes, and youth center programs.
The Air Force will continue to expand Air Force child care facilities to achieve the DoD
goal of 80% of the requirement.
Services' activities directly support unit readiness through programs that enhance
individual fitness, unit cohesion, and a sense of community. The Air Force will continue
to expand and improve Services' opportunities.
Retirement
The Air Force remains committed to the nation's military retirees. A solid
retirement benefits package compensates for the extraordinary demands we place on our
people over the course of a career.
Access to quality health care is critical to military retirees. Medicare-eligible
retirees who are 65 and older are not eligible for CHAMPUS and thus cannot be enrolled
in TRICARE. As mentioned earlier, we applaud the Administration's effort to design a
Medicare demonstration project which would provide access to quality and cost effective
health care for the entire military family regardless of age.
We believe it is important to preserve the military retirement system. Reforms to
the military retirement system during the 1980s have reduced the lifetime value of retired
pay for newer service members by as much as 26%. Further reductions in the net value of
retiree benefits could have a dramatic, negative impact on recruiting, retention, and
readiness.
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Educational Opportunities
We also are conunined to preserving and expanding educational opportunities.
Tuition assistance has proven a valuable recruiting and retention tool, providing our
airmen the means to obtain associate, undergraduate, and graduate degrees. The Air Force
supports maintaining current Air Force tuition assistance levels. At the same time, the
Montgomery GI Bill continues to be a success story. These self-improvement
opportunities serve not only as incentives to our people but also lift them to greater levels
of productivity. Ninety-five percent of those who enter the Air Force enroll in the
Montgomery GI Bill program. However, many of those wishing to enroll in the current
program are no longer eligible. For these, the Air Force is studying options to improve
their access to advanced education.
Toward The Horizon
The capabilities spelled out in our vision paper. Global Reach-Global Power, are
battle tested. They have enabled us to identify and build the unique contributions of air
and space power to Joint warfare and the nation's defense. These objectives continue to
serve as our intellectual compass.
We are poised to accept the challenges ahead. We have strengthened our
commitment to Science and Technology (S&T), the foundation for Air Force
modernization, and we are celebrating the publication of New World Vistas, which
identifies those technologies that will shape the Air Force of the 21st century. In addition,
we have built a team to help us ensure we achieve the clearest sense of our planning
horizon and institutionalize across-the-board long-range planning for the Air Force of
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520
2025. With the benefit of experience, insight, and imagination, we will continue to
provide the nation the premier air and space force for the future.
Today, we are ready to fight and win our nation's wars. We have in hand those
modernization and training efforts necessary to sustain that capability in the decades
ahead. In the future as in the past, the nation's Air Force will provide Global Reach-
Global Power to help shape the world our children will live in.
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The Chairman. General Krulak.
STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES KRULAK, COMMANDANT, U.S.
MARINE CORPS
General Krulak. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
I am deeply honored to be here. As the chairman mentioned, this
is the first time that I have been before this committee as the Com-
mandant of the Marine Corps, and that, in itself, is not the honor;
the honor is that for the first time, I get to represent my Corps and
your Corps and their families and the civilian Marines that make
up the Marine Corps in front of this distinguished body. And so I
am honored and very thrilled.
I am going to be very brief. I am going to talk first a little bit
about the past, a little bit about the present, and then about the
future.
Nearly 45 years ago, the second session of the 82d Congress of
the United States crafted some language — and much of that lan-
guage was crafted by this committee — that basically mandated that
the Marine Corps would be an expeditionary force in readiness,
combined arms, ground and air, strike force, most ready when the
Nation is least ready. And over the years, Marines, helped by our
Navy counterparts, have shed blood, sweat, and tears to make sure
that that mandate was met; and we got an awful lot of help from
the Congress of the United States and this committee.
Today, 27,000 Marines are forward deployed around the world.
In excess of 3,000 of that 27,000 are Reservists from the States of
Massachusetts, Ohio, Florida — Reservists, part of the total force
Marine Corps.
The Marine Corps is in the Adriatic, the Persian Gulf; the Ma-
rine Corps is in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Australia, Malaysia, Nor-
way, Central America, South America, Haiti, Cuba. The Marine
Corps is around the world managing what I call instability. By de-
sign, the Marine Corps has never been focused on a single threat.
The demise of the Soviet Union has not changed the way the Ma-
rine Corps thinks or operates. We focus on uncertainty; that is
what we focus on, the ability to fight across the entire spectrum of
warfare from major regional contingencies to things that we call
crisis response.
But in the future, the dimensions over this uncertainty are going
to change; fueled by the splintering of nations along ethnic, reli-
gious, and tribal lines, crisis is going to take on a new dimension,
a dimension that I call chaos. Where crisis rises from relative sta-
bility in known state actors and known chains of command, chaos
is a byproduct of growing confusion, growing instability, and it is
led by nonstate actors.
The tensions in Cuba, the tensions in Taiwan and China are cri-
ses; but what we saw in Somalia, what we are seeing with terror-
ists in Israel, in Japan, and what we are seeing in Bosnia is chaos.
And that will play a major role, in my opinion, in the 21st century.
If you couple chaos with the tremendous economic explosion that
we are going to see in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and in the
Persian Gulf, and you tie the health and welfare of our Nation to
that economic explosion, then you see how important your naval
522
forces are when managing instability across vast oceans like the
ones I just mentioned.
In the case of the Marine Corps, the Nation has demanded and
mandated an expeditionary force in readiness. We are going to
need them even more in the 21st century. To meet this challenge,
we need to maintain a quality Marine Corps. We need to invest in
the future. We need to proceed with our modernization effort, the
V-22, the AAAV, the lightweight 155, the JAST program.
At the same time, and probably even more important in mod-
ernizing our equipment, we had better start modernizing our
minds, and we are doing that through a series of experiments
under the war fighting laboratory called Sea Dragon. The idea is
to modernize the mind. We need to recruit, we need to train and
maintain our superb Marines, but we need to recognize that they
are coming from a different society than any of you or I came from,
and it is changing almost every 5 years. So we need to look hard
at our entry-level training, not just for enlisted, but for officers, to
make sure that we are able to instill in them the ethos of the
Corps, of courage and honor and commitment. And if it takes
longer than what is normal boot camp, then so be it, we extend the
length of that boot camp.
Finally, we need to treat each and every Marine as a parent
would a son or a daughter, or a teacher would a scholar. They need
to be disciplined when it is necessary, but above all they need to
be loved. They need to be cared for, and that is my commitment;
and with the help that I have seen come out of this committee and
out of this Hill over the years — and I have been looking at it for
54 years — I know that I can count on that, and I appreciate it
greatly.
And I am prepared for your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. I want to thank all of you
Chiefs for your statements and your testimony to come. You do a
good job, all of you. It is made more difficult because you are being
asked to do more with less, and in these days and times when
many people cannot see the many threats we have facing this coun-
try and are blind to it.
I want to put — if I might, put this old problem we have in con-
text by saying that I think the framers of our Constitution must
have foreseen times like these when a President or administration
did not properly request funds adequately to provide for our mili-
tary; and so in article I, section 8, of the Constitution they gave the
Congress the power and the duty and the responsibility of provid-
ing for the military and the defense needs of our country. And so
it seems odd to some people, I am sure, when you hear statements
like, the Congress is giving the military things they don't want,
didn't ask for; and as some of you have referred to this morning,
even in some quarters it is called "pork."
The criterion has been, if we provide you with something that
you could not officially ask for, knowing the political realities and
fiscal restraints and word given to you by your higher-ups, it is
called pork if it was not asked for by the administration. These
things, these plus-ups that you talked about. General Fogleman,
that we gave you last year, which you said were needed and helped
and all those kind of things were called pork, some people cannot
.: 523
see what is going on, and so we have to somehow or another get
around this veil that we have and try to get from the military part
of our Department of Defense what the true needs of our miUtary
are when the official request had to be otherwise.
So the way we have had to try to do this over the years is to go
around about and ask hypothetical questions and all kinds of
things because we realize the position you are in. You cannot offi-
cially go against the official position of the administration. So as
we did last year, I want to ask a question of you, a hypothetical-
type question, because we are going to add to the budget. We are
going to try to give you those things you couldn't ask for, that you
need. And without putting you in an untenable position in answer-
ing directly, let us do it hypothetically and let me ask you this way:
If we were able to add $ 1 or $2 or $3 billion to each of you in
your requests for those things that you — I know you asked for and
couldn't get in the official budget, what would you use it for? What
are your priorities and your needs that you foresee in your budget?
And feel free to respond generally. And then I would like you to
give the priorities, too, if you don't mind and I will foUowup later
on with a written request of you, so you can expand on that.
Let's see, G^eneral, we will start with you.
General Reimer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and in response to
that question, I would just say that there are a number of places
that the Army could use help in this particular area, particularly
in modernization. As I think you know, most of our challenges
revolve around modernization and preparing for the future. What
I would ask, in those terms of the question you framed for me, is
that we take a look at the programs that we have already, the
modernization programs, and accelerate as many of those as pos-
sible, to get them in a more economical buy and to get the stuff
in the field faster than what we have planned for right now.
For example, we are short some 40,000 trucks, in excess of
40,000 trucks. We could use help in that particular area. We could
use help in terms of more Bradleys, faster, so that we get the field-
ing of the M1A2 and the Bradley vehicle synchronized better.
We certainly would like help in terms of Force 21, our movement
towards the future, be able to accelerate that process, and as we
find the new technologies, such as night vision devices and situa-
tional awareness and command and control, we could accelerate
those systems.
I would also ask that we look hard at the capabilities of Ameri-
ca's Army. We could invest more into the MLRS for the National
Guard and their log automation systems that would help us both
in the Active and U.S. Army Reserve and the Army National
Guard.
So I would answer your question, and we will be glad to provide
specifics, but I would answer it this way: I would like to see us ac-
celerate as much as we can those programs that are already on the
books to get a more economical buy and to field that equipment
faster; and I would like to see us invest in systems that will save
us money in the outyears, save us money in terms of the cost of
running the Army, primarily log automation systems, primarily
simulators, those things that will help us reduce the cost of doing
business in the outyears. Then I would take a small piece of that
524
and try to put it in some infrastructure and probably some bar-
racks remodeling to help our soldiers. But most of that I would ask
to go in the modernization.
Admiral BOORDA. My answer is very similar and it is also very
similar, if not identical, to last year. As you know, we have stressed
readiness. That is what I talked about; in fact, that is what most
of us talked about. And we have shortchanged modernization to do
that. We have a particular problem in the outyears where bills are
going to come due to buy things to keep the Navy ready in the fu-
ture, so it is really future readiness we are talking about.
I don't think we need new programs; I think we need to fund the
ones that we planned earlier, if we can. Let me give you an exam-
ple of how that worked last year and worked really well. Last year
you moved LHD-7, the last large-deck amphibious ship we were
going to buy in that class, you moved it from — it had continued to
slip into the outyears and you moved it back in and we are buying
that. It is under contract in 1996 right now. So this is already
done. What that caused to happen was a nice steady work flow at
the shipyard that is building those LHD's; they could plan ahead,
they could buy their lead equipment early, buying two and three
sets for the ships they are building, instead of one, and we saved
a lot of money and got a ship we needed when we needed it instead
of later. And we reduced that mountain of shipbuilding costs that
is out there in future years, because we moved it up now when you
thought we could afford it. That is a great way to do business, and
it helps us a lot.
So I would ask that you look at programs like that and I will be
very specific. I don't have a hypothetical list; I have a real list of
things that fit that mold, things that we have thought about, got-
ten approved, would fund if we had more money, but simply do not
have enough.
Let me tell you about the one that is at the top of the list. Last
year we had a lot of discussion and you had a lot of discussion
about what we were going to do with the future attack submarine
force, how we were going to build that and how we were going to
fund it. We all together chose an option that bought a couple more
submarines in the early years than we had money to buy, but we
thought it was a good option, and you did, and it showed up in the
authorization bill.
What is not there is enough money to execute that in our top
line. And so we asked for some special language last year to allow
us to put a 1999 submarine in to be built at Newport News, and
to put that submarine in, but not have all the money in there to
do it. Why am I talking about a 1999 submarine in a 1997 budget?
Because you have to buy the long lead and advance things early
or you won't have them and you can't build them. So we have a
specific bill to pay for this year.
I am not off the reservation. Secretary Perry and Secretary Dal-
ton both have said this is a high priority for them, and it is prob-
ably our — it is not probably, it is our first priority of unfunded
things that we need to fix to keep our commitment to you last year
and to have a healthy and proper program.
There are other issues. I will mention only a few; I obviously
have a longer list. I think it is time to get on with the building of
525
the LHD-17 class. We will have the first ship under contract this
year and we ought to move out with that. So that is one you should
look at very closely.
The older LPD part of our amphibious force that General Krulak
and I talked about that is so important to getting marines where
they need to be and supporting them when they are there, part of
that force, the LPD class is old, it is steam powered. We can do a
lot better for our people and for our country.
Now that we are going to build the one in 1996, we should get
on with that class. Again, that reduces our shipbuilding budget in
the outyears. It is a one-for-one replacement, so we are not adding
things to the total budget; we are getting them in closer when we
need them.
You may be surprised, but I would bring the Marine Corps Avi-
ator B program back up to the numbers that we had before we had
to take cuts in the program. It is not just Navy aircraft I worry
about. We procure aircraft for both services, and the same is true
of A2C's, and I could go on and on. But an important program is
the DDG program, where I really think we can do a lot better job
and save money by getting some logical buys and doing them in the
early years, and that will also allow me to decommission some less
capable ships and stay within the Bottom-Up Review numbers.
I will be glad to provide more for the record.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Fogleman.
General Fogleman. Again, Mr. Chairman, my response will be
very similar to that of General Reimer and Admiral Boorda. I
would tell you that our list, which is again very specific and has
been developed as a result of the process in which things that were
very valid requirements were dropped off the table as we went
through this prioritization and this fiscally constrained exercise,
but they fall fundamentally into two categories. One I would call
systems; that is, all weapons systems included in this would be
those kinds of items that the war fighters find very attractive and
need very quickly when a crisis develops. Joint STARS aircraft, for
instance, are those kinds of things. Again, that was a system that
we are using in Bosnia with good effect. When we used it in the
desert, it was used for targeting. Now we are seeing a method of
using that aircraft in a reconnaissance — if you will, in an observa-
tion role over there.
So you would have systems, both air-breathing and space sys-
tems that we would have on our list; but in addition to that, you
would also have many of what I would call upgrades. Because one
of the things that suffers when you get into a modernization crunch
is that you begin to push aside modification programs for aircraft
and you begin to extend old systems that cost you more money in
terms of operations and support funding and cause you to use more
people.
So if we could get some upgrades, and again in these categories
I would put things like AWACS, for instance. There is a system
that will be with us for a long time. There is an AWACS improve-
ment program that is on the books, but it does not complete until
well beyond fiscal year 1999. We can pull those things forward.
They become much more efficient, much more effective.
526
We also have in this category of upgrades re-engining programs.
It is tremendous savings for you when you can re-engine an air-
craft, and particularly as we see the possibility to re-engine with
commercial derivatives and it begins to ripple through your whole
fleet, because you can put commercial derivative engines on an air-
plane like the RUBIX Joint or the AW ACS, just as we have on our
refueling aircraft, and it changes your whole support mechanism
because they are a much larger base being supported out there, so
it is cheaper. So we would recommend things of that nature also.
Again, I have a very specific list I would be willing to submit.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General.
General Krulak. Yes, sir, I have a specific list also that I will
be more than willing to submit. Let me just first start off by saying
that my fellow Chiefs think I am crazy for what I am about to tell
you, but the first thing I would buy would be something like Gore-
Tex cold-weather rain suits for my marines, tents, boots, things
that make their life — if you want to know what quality of life is
like for the marine, he is out in the field 3 or 4 days a week, and
the quality of life is a tent that doesn't leak.
You all helped me on that last year, and I really appreciate it;
and I will tell you it made a big difference for about 44,000 ma-
rines. So the very first thing I would look for is $10 million — again,
I know that is
General FOGLEMAN. It is tough to compete with tent pegs. I al-
ways ask him how many of these tent pegs he really needs every
year.
General Krulak. A $10 million tent peg, huh?
And then we have some things that I am sure the committee is
aware of The V-22. The buy rate for that V-22 right now, in my
opinion, is ludicrous and it is dangerous and we need to get on with
getting it quicker. MPFE, an ACL, remanned JAST, Javelin, again
simulators, all of the things that make a land force capable. But
I will provide those to you in detail, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I note the presence of
a number of my colleagues. I would like to let some of my junior
colleagues question the witnesses and maybe we will come back
later in the process.
The Chairman. All right, we have Mr. Total Force Montgomery.
Mr. Dellums. I like that, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Montgomery. Two compliments — Junior Member by Mr.
Dellums, and Total Force by the chairman.
Mr. Dellums. It is fun to outrank Sonny.
Mr. Montgomery. I was going to talk about the total force; I am
going to change a little here.
I want to thank the four gentlemen for their wonderful testimony
this morning, and in listening to you, I am really very comfortable
with the four Chiefs we have, to my colleagues here, that I know
you are going to make the right decisions, and that is good for all
of us.
Back to the total force. I was talking to Pete Geren, and Sunday
afternoon he went out to the airport there in Fort Worth and Dal-
527
las and the 301st Air Reserve Squadron came in with the F-16's,
and they had flown 9'/2 hours coming back from Bosnia and they
had been over there for 2 months. The story that can be told on
each one of the Chiefs is that you are using the Reserves and the
total force has finally arrived. We have been working on it for 30
years, so that is good.
Quality of life, we had a hearing on that yesterday. If you use
the Reserves more and the National Guard more to take the place
of some people out at sea and around the world, reservists, and
bring these Active people home to see their families some, I really
think that has a lot of merit to it; and that came from Secretary
Jack Marsh, quality of life that Secretary Perry is using. Use the
Guard and Reserve; if they cannot do the job, we would like to find
out.
A question to General Fogleman. We are proud of the C-17's.
Chairman Spence and I are interested not only in the C-17's, but
the C20G cargo jet that has been authorized and appropriated, if
you have to put this new C-20 within another force, where it would
do more, I think that would be all right with the chairman and I.
We just think we ought to buy this C-20 and eventually let it get
to the National Guard in some way, even if you have to shift them
around. We would appreciate it if you would look at that.
And, General Reimer, you have recommendations of $435 million
for military construction, but you have only got $8 million in there
for the Army Guard military construction account and no funding
for any armory. And if they are going to train up there, you are
going to have to give them some decent ranges and some places to
train; $8 million is not very much. Do you want to comment on
that?
General Reimer. I agree with you. Congressman, it is not very
much. It is something we are conscious of. We will continue to
work it. It is just simply a matter of priorities. We have a limited
amount of money in that whole area and when we went through
the scrub in terms of putting this together, that is where it fell out.
So we will continue to look at it — hopefully, be able to beef it up
in the future years.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thanks for being with us today and thanks for
your excellent opening statements. I think I agree with the chair-
man that you are doing more with less and you are rising to the
occasion and meeting the challenge. Let me just ask a brief ques-
tion for each of you in a little different area.
General Reimer, I know that of course basic ammunition stocks
are the — that is the foundation of the Army's readiness capability.
Are you satisfied with the state of ammunition right from your
basic rounds right up to your more sophisticated systems?
General Reimer. That is an area that we are looking at very
hard, Congressman; and as you know and as you have implied, we
have drawn down that account as we have gone through reshaping
the Army. Part of that was that we funded the training ammuni-
38-160 97 - 19
528
tion last — we took some of the war reserve stocks and moved that
into training ammunition because you have to rotate them anyway.
We have had a large amount of demilitarization requirements
that we have had to take on. What we have tried to do is to bal-
ance the resources we have had to cover all of those functions. We
think we have gone as low as we can go right now in the war re-
serve. The 1997 budget funds the training ammunition at a 100
percent, so we should not have to go down below that anjmriore.
We are conducting right now a functional area analysis in that
whole area of ammunition, but we share your concern and we are
taking a hard look at that, that we do not take it too low. We don't
think we are too low at this point but we have to get that in bal-
ance also.
Mr. Hunter. Congressman Skelton and I will be working with
you. We are interested in that area, and we have had a few meet-
ings together already and we will work with you on that.
Admiral Boorda, F-18, you have the E and F's. You have a re-
quest for 12. Could you use more this year in this year's budget?
Admiral Boorda. It is time to move on with that program. The
airplane is flying — it actually flew early. It delivered to us early,
and it went to Pax River and it is there now, early.
Mr. Hunter. You actually got Duke Cunningham to like that
plane. I don't know what you did with him.
Admiral BoORDA. He likes it a lot. It is a bigger, faster, carries
more, airplane than the old F-18 and it has a lower signature. Of
course, we want to get that. We just got a new carrier, the Stennis,
on the 9th of December last year; and we have two more building
and need to build one more of that class. And they are going to
need airplanes for the future, and that is our airplane for the fu-
ture and it is here now. So of course we want to do that.
Our plan right now is in this year to buy 12, to ramp up to 24,
36, 48 and start getting economies of scale; and that is the way to
buy an airplane. So the earlier we do that, the happier I will be.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
General Fogleman, PGM's are a major force multiplier in every
analysis that you folks have done lately with respect to future con-
flicts. But the budget doesn't reflect a — it reflects more of an out-
year PGM ramp-up than it does the execution years. Could you
take more precision-guided munitions funding this year?
General Fogleman. Yes, sir. Again, this is one of those pro-
grams, as you indicate, from an affordability standpoint, we have
an outyear ramp, but quite frankly, we think we could execute
slightly over $100 million worth of additional funding this year;
and that would be on this list that I would provide, yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
General Krulak, the Marine Corps maritime prepositioning force
is something that is near and dear to your heart.
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. One thing about it, when we have a conversation
with you. Democrats and Republicans on this committee, we never
leave with the idea you are undecided on these issues. You have
a real style in that regard.
Let me ask you — we have kind of gone round and round on this
program; we have had a little confusion as to how we are going to
529
get you this pre-position capability, and that has been reflected, I
think, not in confusion on your part, but in confusion with respect
to Congress' markups, if the cost is the same to build a new ship
versus convert an old ship. And one thing I was struck with were
some of the analyses on big conversions a couple of years ago,
where we got 300,000-square-foot converted ships for about $210
million, we discovered we could have built new 400,000-square-foot
ships for about the same cost.
If we could build new versus convert old ships, and given the life
cycle costs would be less for the new ships, would you folks prefer
to have newly constructed ships if funding were provided?
General Krulak. You are saying that the ships that we are talk-
ing about, new and old, are the same price, sir?
Mr. Hunter. Yes, if we could get you the funding for newly con-
structed pre-positioning ships.
General Krulak. There is no question, you would want new
ships.
Mr. Hunter. OK. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the four gentle-
men out in front of us today have to be the proudest people in uni-
form in our country, because as I see it, the young folks that are
wearing your uniform are the finest I have ever seen; and it is our
hope, personally and on this committee, that we are able to sustain
that.
The committee last year — as you may know, title IV, section 691,
put a permanent floor on the various end strengths, and I note. Ad-
miral Boorda, you said in your opening comments that we cannot
go below the Bottom-Up Review number, and that is the number
for each of the services. There is in this section a safety valve, how-
ever, but we intend for this to stay.
I don't see how the Army can do what they are going to do, what
they need to do, with 495,000. In testimony last year. General Ted
Stroup said, with 520,000, the Army was stretched and stretched
because of the Operation Tempo.
Admiral Boorda spoke of the ships that are constantly at sea. I
have been to Aviano, General Fogleman, and I know the work that
they do and the Marines. You are all doing superb work. We must
not let temporary financial pushes get us below the Bottom-Up Re-
view figures. I will do all I can to keep you within that.
Now, as many know, I have been interested in the area of mili-
tary education. Since the late 1980's, 1987-88, there was a panel
I chaired on professional military education which dealt with all
the 10 war colleges, at the time holding 28 hearings all over, and
we came out with recommendations. Ajid to the credit of each of
the militaries, they have abided by the recommendations. We had
to change some laws, but not much.
I have this year visited the Armed Forces Staff College, all of
your colleges down at Quantico, Fort Leavenworth — both the Gen-
eral Command Staff College, General Reimer, and the SAM's col-
lege out there, and the Army War College. Admiral Boorda, Gen-
eral Fogleman, I have not visited your schools as yet; I intend to.
530
It is important that we understand that military education fore-
tells victories, whether taking a hill or winning a cold war or some-
thing in between. Between the wars, the one thing that the mili-
tary did right between the two sea services and the Army, they put
their best young officers, up-and-coming young officers, not only in
the war colleges, but they had themi as instructors.
I refer to this as the golden era of military education. I think we
have revived that, from what I see. I am extremely pleased with
the schools that I have seen the last few weeks.
But let me ask you, each of you, and, General Reimer, I will start
with you; though I have not visited the Navy or the Air Force yet,
I would ask each of you gentlemen to touch on this. I am concerned
that you may not be able to sustain the level of professional mili-
tary education, given your current and projected funding. To not
sustain them, of course, would be a failure to heed the lessons of
history, for it is clear that the high level of professional military
education that I mentioned in the 1930's was a significant contribu-
tion to the success of World War II.
As a matter of fact, the Navy War College had Plan Orange that
worked out the potential war in the Pacific. The Army War College
and the General Staff College did the same thing. So, General
Reimer, let me ask you that first; would you speak of my concern?
General Reimer. Thank you. Congressman. Yes, I share your
concern because I understand how fundamental it is to the U.S.
Army. I just spent about 2V'2 days in Carlisle talking with the lead-
ership of the Army, and during that time General Crouch, Bill
Crouch, who is the commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, gave
us a briefing on how the operation in Bosnia was going. The thing
that he emphasized was the importance of the Army doctrine and
the Army training and education program. And when you listen to
him talk about that you understand fully that that is terribly im-
portant.
When you start shaving that at this point in time, you pay the
price 5, 10 years later. So what we have tried to do is to look very
carefully; in our case, the institutional piece of this, as you know,
is the training and doctrine command. They have paid a heavy
price in our reshaping, and I am concerned that we have gone as
low as we can possibly go in that area.
I look at some of the signs, and they have taken out some of the
training they have been doing in the past. I look at the experience
level of some of our officers that are going in there, and they are
all high-quality officers, but we have had higher experience levels
in the past.
So I share that concern, and that is one of the primary emphasis
as we look to the future, that we make sure that that base, the
training and doctrine command, which is the institutional part of
our leadership training program, is rock solid. We cannot afford to
do anything but keep it that way. So I share your concern.
Admiral Boorda. Let me answer that in really three parts.
As you know, as preamble, we have increased the number of peo-
ple we send to senior service colleges, in all the senior service col-
leges. And yesterday, I should have invited you, I promoted Al
Cracketts to vice admiral, a graduate of the Army Command and
Staff College and Navy War College Senior School. We have not
531
done that in the past a whole lot, and you know that. We are mak-
ing real progress.
We have stood up, even as we are downsizing, we stood up the
naval doctrine command, and that is good. And they have gone
through their initial work of updating our doctrine and publishing
it, but now they are doing concept development and exploration,
much as General Krulak talked about.
It is important that they have a place to talk about that and to
test it in the most modern way in war games, and we have a $10
million war gaming center that you funded a couple of years ago.
We have been trying to get the other 18 to do a real quality facility,
and we have not been able to come up with that yet. So it is a con-
cern to me, and it is something we will probably want to talk about
later in the year. I think that is a real demonstration of what we
are trying to do, and it will help us.
Finally, let me say that my problem is not so much money right
now with respect to getting students there and having students
who are of the right quality. The problem is with having enough
officers to do it. So this year we have asked for a slight increase
in the DOPMA grade tables, not something we would normally
worry about in the full committee, but I think it is important. I
need a few more lieutenant commanders and commanders, not
great numbers, so that we can have the time during their careers
to educate them. Not asking for more officers, just to skew it a lit-
tle bit more.
The reason for that, to be quite honest, is Goldwater-Nichols
caused us to have many more senior level joint billets but we didn't
get increased people to do that. In order to be able to train people
and send them into those joint jobs, I have to have them. I can't
just make them out of nothing. So this year I really need your help
in not increasing the size of our officer corps at all, but slightly in-
creasing the numbers in those control grades.
General Fogleman. Well, Mr. Congressman, I would tell you
that we very clearly see professional military education as really
the, if you will, the seed corn out there for future leaders. In fact,
during the past year we have expanded the attendance at our first
level of professional military education and now have gone to 100
percent attendance at our squadron officers school. We have done
that because, as we look at the disciplinary problems, we look at
the understanding of the values and standards of the force, the
basic understanding of the profession, we think that it is critical
that everybody have the opportunity to attend such a course at
that point in their career. So we have done that. We think it in-
creases their understanding of the profession and what is expected
of them.
We have also, as you know from the past — I think if you go down
to Air University you will be pleased to see the continued improve-
ment that we have made down there in the quality of the curricu-
lum and in the use of things like distributed education assets,
where we can actually take these students and tie them into exer-
cises from one war college to another and from one service to an-
other, so they are getting both the professional military education
as well as some good practical training while they are there; and
it seems to make a big difference in the motivation of the people.
532
Just as an aside, to show you how far reaching the benefits of
these senior service schools are, yesterday I shared the podium
with a Swedish air chief at a symposium, and it turned out that
he is a 1989 graduate of the Air War College. And I think across
the air forces that I have had an opportunity to interface with over
the last 6 months, I have run into about three or four of these peo-
ple. So they are certainly sending the right people and we think we
are.
General Krulak. Sir, I think in my statement I pretty much laid
out what I feel. I believe that equally as important as modernizing
your systems, you need to modernize your mind, particularly with
what we are about ready to face in the 21st century. I think it is
critical. We in the Marine Corps have increased funding in both
our training and education accounts. We are increasing the number
of people going to school for the very reasons that you have talked
about.
We are also taking the schools into the individual work space,
where marines on a daily basis are taking war-fighting exercises in
the first 30 minutes of their time at their normal work space, just
to continue with their day-to-day education in war fighting, and I
think it is critical.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weldon.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, forgive me, but I am disgusted and I am not going
to play along with the game today that the administration puts us
in every year, where they present a request for a budget that is far
below what you have asked for, knowing that you cannot come out
and tell us what you need publicly.
We hold these hearings and then you or your representatives
come and lobby us for those priorities you know are critical and
that you asked for and didn't get. We put the money back in, as
we did last year, much of which you have acknowledged today.
General Reimer used the quote that we "plugged some big holes."
General Fogleman said we have "helped him out." All of you have
made specific cases of what we did last year.
Secretary Perry gets up here, in one of the most hypocritical
presentations I have ever seen, and shows us a bottoming out of
the acquisition line saying that the Clinton administration sup-
ports acquisition as evidenced by the line over the past several
years, when he was the one who criticized us for plussing up the
acquisition account by $7 billion last year. So last year they were
critical; this year they are taking credit for it.
I am disgusted with the process and the way it works. You and
I both know what goes on, and I don't want to be a party to it. We
have a photo op Commander in Chief who uses the military when
it is good for his image, but when it comes down to asking for those
priorities that are essential to allow us to meet not just the readi-
ness needs of Haiti and Somalia today, which we know are the rea-
son the readiness accounts are up, but the capitalization require-
ments of tomorrow, the money is not there. And that is outrageous
to me.
So let me ask you a question. This is the JCS review of recapital-
ization that was submitted by General Shalikashvili to Secretary
533
Perry. As you know, this request, which was the legitimate Defense
Department request, not what the media calls Secretary Perry's po-
litical photo-op Clinton defense request, this is your real request
for what you need over the next 5 years; and in this request, you
state that starting in fiscal year 1998 the acquisition accounts
should average $60 billion a year.
Are the recommendations that you are going to give to the chair-
man following this hearing the same recommendations that were
in that JCS request for the next 5 years in terms of capital acquisi-
tion accounts? Are they the same recommendations?
General Reimer. Ready to start?
General Krulak. I will take that first, if I may.
Mr. Weldon. I knew you would. General.
General Krulak. First off, since 1971 the Marine Corps' procure-
ment account has averaged $1.2 billion. This year, my green ac-
count is $556 million — $556 million, less than half. I think that all
of the Chiefs believe that the $60 billion is where we ought to be.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you, general, and that was in the JCS inter-
nal document that none of us can see because this administration
will not allow General Shalikashvili to give us his recommenda-
tions. If you read the Washington Times with the reprint of it, you
will see it in black and white.
Admiral BOORDA. Let me answer you directly. My recommenda-
tions for adding money back, if there is money to add, will be in
exactly that line and exactly in accordance with our discussions
when we developed that guidance.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you. Admiral Boorda.
General Reimer. I would say the same thing, Mr. Congressman.
We talked about the $60 billion. We all agreed that was probably
a good figure as a goal up there. The issue here for us in the Army
is we must keep it balanced. If we don't have enough in the person-
nel account to train our people and take care of them, putting all
that money in modernization isn't going to do us any good.
So what we tried to do with the 1997 budget was to keep it bal-
anced. We are underfunded in modernization, we realize that, but
we are trying to keep the Army held together through a balanced
program.
Mr. Weldon. I agree with you, general. Let me ask this.
We have some internal documents from DOD on their planned
fiscal year unfunded costs. You are saying we should not put it all
into modernization, and I agree, readiness is a top priority.
Should we put $3.6 million into Haitian police training travel
costs out of DOD's budget? Should we put $2.5 million into the Pal-
estinian police drawdown for equipment? Shall we put $3.7 million
to refurbish equipment for Somalia?
I don't think they are necessarily issues of modernization or
readiness for our troops, and that is what this administration, who
criticized this committee for plussing up funding last year, is going
to ask us to do with dollars that we put in last year. That is the
hypocrisy that has to end.
Just like when this President stood before the American people
and pounded his fist on the dais in the House Chamber and said,
I will not stand for any more defense cuts, I am going to put $25
billion back into the defense budget. Well, that is great after the
534
next 4 years are over. We all know that is a great pledge. That is
what I am talking about.
We didn't give General Fogleman a chance to answer.
General FOGLEMAN. Well, I am in that position of having
watched the Air Force procurement accounts decrease by some 60
percent. We had no fighter procurement in our 1994 budget, none
in our 1995 budget; there was a plus-up fi-om the Hill in the 1996
budget. We have made these kinds of decisions in order to try to
keep a balanced force. We are living off of the procurement of the
past. It has to stop. That is why we were a part of that decision
that said, we need at least this level of funding as we go forward.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Pickett, the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome
our witnesses today.
Admiral Boorda, one issue that is kind of a carryover from last
year has to do with the Navy practice of spot promotion. I wonder
if you could tell us a little bit about why that is important to you,
and as I understand it, how it operates to save the Navy some
money.
Admiral BoORDA. Basically what has happened is that, as we
downsize, following the Korean war, we took a smaller portion of
our force and said it was going to be officers. And over a long pe-
riod of time, that is the way we have been, with a smaller officer
corps than you might otherwise start with if you were writing on
a blank piece of paper.
Then DOPMA was passed. When DOPMA was passed, it gave
grade tables for that officer corps based on its size. So not only did
we end up with an officer corps that was smaller than you would
expect for our force, which hurt things, like I talked about with
Congressman Skelton; it also then became more junior than the bil-
let structure, the jobs that it had to do. That was particularly pro-
nounced in the more junior, middle grade officers, lieutenant com-
manders, for example.
So we now have, as a result of all of that, several officers, and
by several, we are talking about the low hundreds, who are serving
in much more responsible, much more demanding at-sea positions
primarily in nuclear engineering, but in other engineering tasks as
well, whom we need to motivate and properly compensate for what
they are doing. So in order to overcome those grade tables, and
corps size, which is not right, we have asked for the ability to spot-
promote people who are in those jobs, who are doing a good job,
and have that pertain only while they are in the position.
I think that is more than just a morale factor; I think it is a
readiness factor, and we would like to continue it.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you. The next question is for all four of you
gentlemen, and it has three parts to it so you might want to note
it.
Beginning with the readiness issue, I would like to know if each
of you believe that your budget adequately funds your readiness for
1997. But along with that, each of you, I think, has mentioned the
issue of quality of life. There continue to be initiatives toward
interfering with the military resale system, and I would like to
know if you all believe this is an important benefit that our mill-
535
tary members have become accustomed to and depend upon and if
you think that it is important to continue that benefit as a part of
our quaUty-of-hfe program.
I would also like for you to comment on the personnel tempo, and
tell us whether there is anything that you can do in your respective
service to try to moderate the tempo which seems to continue to
increase?
And third, I would like to know what impact the requirements
relating to full-time equivalent civilian employees is having on your
operations, whether it is becoming difficult to comply with the re-
quirements for downsizing your civilian work force at the rate that
you are being required to do it, and if that is having an impact on
your readiness. Whatever order you gentlemen would like to an-
swer those.
General Reimer. Let me go ahead and start, Mr. Congressman.
I would say on the first part, in terms of the near-term readi-
ness, the 1997 budget, the amount of money that we put into — the
OMA account, I think, funds at the minimum level the readiness
of the force. It will keep it up where it is basically right now.
What that does not take into consideration is any unprogrammed
contingencies. If those are coming without resources, then you have
to cut into your OMA accounts, and that is a given and we all un-
derstand that.
In terms of the quality-of-life issue that you mentioned and how
important are the benefits that our soldiers get from medical care
and commissary and PX and retirement benefits, I would echo
what I think Mike said about the stability of that particular pro-
gram.
We have changed this retirement system three times since I have
been in the military. What our soldiers want to know is, what is
the system? Can we make a commitment to them and are we going
to honor that commitment to them? I think it is terribly important
we get across to the force that we have a stable benefit program
and we are going to keep it stable. So I think that is terribly impor-
tant.
In terms of PERSTEMPO, what can we do to reduce it? We are
doing an awful lot right now to try to reduce it. We are trying to
substitute those units that are most frequently used. In our case,
since the wall came down, it has been units like Patriot, it has
been military police and our combat service support units.
I said good-bye to a young soldier at Fort Bliss, TX, about 1 year
ago, and he was on his seventh deployment since Operation Desert
Shield. His family, with a wife and two young kids, were out there.
That is tough on them. So we are trying, where we can, to replace
them with other units.
Patriot is difficult because that is almost unique, but we can take
the military police and we can take some of the combat service sup-
ports and we can spread that across the force through America's
Army, the Reserve, and the National Guard and pick up some of
that.
So I think we are doing everything we can. We are very, very
sensitive to that issue, to try to dampen that down and hit those
MOS's that are most affected by it.
/ 536
The last point had to do with the full-time equivalents and the
civilian work force. We have reduced the civilian work force now
about 37 percent since 1989, and we are not quite done with the
reduction yet in that particular area. I will tell you that I am get-
ting a little bit concerned about the borrowed military manpower
that is going from some of the troop units to run some of the essen-
tial quality-of-life facilities. That is something we have to watch
very carefully. Right now, I think it is controllable, but it is going
to get away from us if we don't keep our finger on the pulse. So,
yes, I am concerned about that part of it.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral BOORDA. I want to answer quickly, because in most
cases our answers are going to be exactly the same. With respect
to near-term readiness, that was the going-in position of putting
this budget together, so we funded that as a minimum, at the mini-
mum levels.
Where our problems will come is with unfunded requirements,
and also because O&M is a large account, it sometimes is used to
move money around to pay for other things. We need to watch for
that because we put the readiness money in, but at the minimum
levels, to do what we now know we have to do; and, of course, we
have not funded the unknown.
With regard to OPTEMPO, we have done a few things in the
Navy this year
Mr. Pickett. You didn't mention the issue of quality of life and
the resale system, commissary exchanges, whether that is an im-
portant benefit to you.
Admiral Boorda. I will get to that. I can do that next, if you
want.
With respect to the entire resale system, but the whole benefit
system, in truth, the best thing we can do with that is leave it
alone. It is working. They don't need to hear about it and see in
all the newspapers, particularly the ones that they read a lot, that
you are going to lose this benefit or you are going to lose that bene-
fit; and then we flail with it together for a year or two, and they
don't lose it. And the loss was on page 1, the saving is on page 97,
and nobody ever gets to page 97. So as far as they are concerned,
they lost it.
Couldn't we just leave them alone? I think that is the best an-
swer. They would like that a lot and so would I.
With respect to OPTEMPO, we have been able to get ships home
and people home at the 6-month point. Six months is a normal de-
plojmnent for us, and they are doing that. But we realized that we
cannot keep doing this for the long haul with some of the force lev-
els that we have; and so this year in the budget we have kept three
additional squadrons that we were going to decommission. Instead
of decommissioning them — they are an F-14 squadron and two A-
6 squadrons — we are going to transition them to F and A teams
and keep our squadron numbers up so that we are not beginning
to overtax our aviators. We are dangerously close to that right now.
In addition, in our surface ships, we reorganized our fleet in a
more innovative way to avoid doing exactly what we were worried
about doing, and that is why we have built the Western Hemi-
537
sphere group to take things like South American work, counter-
drug ops, some of the exercises, and free up the newer battleforce
ships to make the longer deployments, the Aegis cruisers and the
DDG-51's. It is why I want to keep the DDG-51 building program
going, so I can keep that replenished and fresh, and we need to do
that.
Finally, with regard to civilians, our cuts are probably about the
same percentage across the services because in many cases they
have been mandated. We are looking for about an overall, by the
time we are done, 35-percent cut in our civilian numbers, and we
are pretty close to there. And I think we are at this time — particu-
larly in the wage grade, which I think is a lot of what you are talk-
ing about — where we should be managing, not by FTE, but by
funded workload.
General FOGLEMAN. Well, again, going down the list, Mr. Con-
gressman, 1997 readiness, I believe, is funded; and quite frankly,
we are pleased that in the 1997 budget that came to the Hill there
was, in fact, some contingency funding in there, which gives us
some recognition of the fact that there will be operations ongoing
into 1997. That has not always happened as budgets have come
across. I know that in the past when we have done that sometimes
that money has not made it through the process. But from our per-
spective there are certain of these contingencies that look like they
are going to continue.
On the other hand, for instance in the case of Bosnia, that con-
tingency has only been funded for one quarter, because we have an
objective and a goal to be out of there within a year, and so the
first qualifier of the fiscal year should cover that and we should not
have to have it. So we need to look, I think again, at the
unprogrammed things that will come up which would impact us.
On quality of life, what has been described by both General
Reimer and Admiral Boorda is a fact of life. There have been so
many initiatives. There have been in the past — and it is such an
emotional issue with the troops that the best thing would be some
stability. And in some cases that may be unfortunate because what
you are doing there is, you are giving up brainpower and innova-
tion and looking at other ways maybe to provide something. But we
have just jerked the troops around on these things so much that
they don't have a lot of faith and confidence in us.
So, for instance, I know the latest thing is a review of the com-
missary system, maybe a private corporation kind of thing. I don't
know whether that will work or not. I have not seen the details of
it, but I can tell you that that is going to inflame the passions of
the troops out there, whether it would — even if it were to save
them more money in the end, if that were to come out, perhaps be-
cause they just have not seen very many things that work to their
advantage in this. It has always been sort of a detriment.
Finally, in the PERSTEMPO, the things that we have done, first
of all, we decided it was very important to know what the
PERSTEMPO was, and so we turned to the Navy that has a kind
of a system that puts a mark on the wall. We operate entirely dif-
ferent, but they have their 6-month crew that is going to come
back, they have their training they have to do, then they have their
538
6-month workup. So in an aggregate, that looked — ^you know, you
are talking about somebody being gone about a third of the time.
And so we took a simplistic approach that said, we do our deploy-
ments differently, but that looks pretty reasonable to us, 120 days
a year. If we don't exceed that, that should allow somebody time
to take some leave, do some home station training, do the spinup
to get ready to go to the next specific tasking, whatever it is.
Since we started that, the first year we started it, 13 of our 21
weapon systems, we exceeded our own standard. So we went to
work, we used more of a total force. We really got the Guard and
Reserve involved, and that has helped drop the OPTEMPO in those
weapon systems.
We went to another thing called forcewide tasking, which in the
past, if something was happening in Europe, either the forces in
Europe or the people in CONUS took care of that. We have now
started going to the Pacific and talking to the CINC out there and
moving forces back and forth to make sure everybody gets a chance
to operate.
So the combination of total force, forcewide tasking and in some
of these high-use systems, like AW ACS, we have nov/ stood up and
are starting to man a Reserve associate unit, which essentially will
give us more crews per the same number of airplanes, using reserv-
ists, and so we hope to drop the OPTEMPO.
Finally, on the civilian work force, when we started our
drawdown in the U.S. Air Force, we had about 266,000 civilians.
Today we have about 195,000 and we are driving to an end-state
of about 165,000. I would tell you that going from 266,000 to
195,000 was painful, but we were able to sort of pick off some low-
hanging fruit, do some things, and do that without really having
to dedicate too much blue suit labor to jobs and still get the job
done.
It will be painful to make that next drop, and we will need some,
I really believe we may need some legislative assistance in that for
incentive programs, these kinds of things.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
General Krulak. Sir, I will be very brief. On the readiness,
again that is why we have a Marine Corps; it is the expeditionary
force in readiness. So that is key to me, and that is what we put
our money against.
Second, the PX and commissary and other areas, I agree with my
fellow service Chiefs. We just have to hold the line there. We can-
not continue to jerk our people around.
PERSTEMPO, we are working very hard on that because, like I
mentioned, we have a lot of marines out doing a lot of things. We
have got a similar system as Mike Boorda has and that Ron has
just described that looks at our exercises, looks at our deplojonent,
tells us where we can use other forces, that is, the Reserves.
I mentioned that we have over 37,300 Reserves right now on a
major exercise. That is the wave of the future. You just cannot con-
tinue to look at yourself unless you look at yourself as a total force.
So we are doing that.
On the civilian work force, we have a very small number of civil-
ians working for the Marine Corps, and we have experienced no
problem in our drawdown.
539
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have several questions that I would like to submit
to you in writing. General Reimer, I have a question for you about
Reserve training in the Northeast.
Admiral Boorda, I have a question for you. Our DDG Program,
I would say in a kind of humorous vein, last year we authorized
three, this year we are asked to authorize four, so we can add four
to three and build six. That is fine, just so it works, and I think
there may be some problems in getting it off the ground. I will sub-
mit that question in writing.
General Fogleman, you mentioned the re-engining program. I
will submit a question to you, if I may, in writing.
Let me ask this question. In today's press there are — we are talk-
ing about what I call three potential MRC's. We have one potential
in Bosnia, we have another potential in China-Taiwan, we have an-
other potential in the Middle East — not Israel necessarily, maybe
Saudi Arabia, which I think is another problem — and those are in
the paper today. Korea is not in the paper today, which I identify
as another potential MRC.
I was sitting having lunch the other day with a retired Army
friend of mine and we were talking about how we have these poten-
tial MRC's when we have planned for two and how we could
stretch ourselves, could happen in the next several months where
we have two or more MRC's.
He says, well, I have news for you. He said, you have not heard
all the bad news yet. Some of my friends in the Pentagon have
been tasked to plan for a one-MRC scenario with yet another Bot-
tom-Up Review to come.
Now, let me ask this as specifically as I can. I don't like putting
people on the spot, but is that true? Have you all been tasked to
make ready for another Bottom-Up Review, and have you been
tasked or do you expect to be tasked to plan for a one-MRC sce-
nario?
General Reimer. Congressman, I will let everyone else speak for
themselves, but I have no knowledge of any tasking to plan for a
one-MRC. In fact, that has been just the opposite. We have talked
many times about the need to hold to the two-MRC.
I am not saying there is not somebody in the Pentagon some-
where that is not doing some planning, but I will tell you there is
nothing that has been tasked that I know of to do that type of
thing. I think we are holding right where we are at the two-MRC.
Admiral BooRDA. My answer is exactly the same. I am sure
there is somebody somewhere writing papers as we speak on just
about every subject you can think about and looking at it from
every direction, but I have had no tasking, either formal or infor-
mal, to do that.
I think that for us in the Navy, and let me just speak for the
Navy, two MRC's is a placeholder for force structure. There are two
directions — I was going to say two oceans, but there are a lot more
oceans than that — but two directions in which we can go. We need
540
to have mass as well as capability, and we need to be able to be
where we need to be.
I hope I explained that well in my opening remarks, and both
Chuck and I talked about it a lot. So the way of thinking about two
MRC's generates the kind of numbers we need to properly support
the other forces and do what we need to do. And to be quite honest
with you, if you called it something else, I think I would still come
up with about this kind of force to do the job that I think needs
to be done. I think it is an exercise we don't need to go through,
to be quite honest.
General FOGLEMAN. Again, I would have the same answer to the
basic question. I know of no tasking, either formal or informal, and
I would also comment along the lines of Admiral Boorda.
I have already explained to the chairman that our end strength
in the U.S. Air Force is projected to go below the end-strength floor
that has been set. We plan to make the appropriate report in ac-
cordance with the legislation on that, and we have made no secret
of the fact that we have never had the force structure that was
called for in the BUR to execute the two-MRC strategy.
We felt, to this point, that because of the inherent flexibility, the
range, the speed, the capability to move from one theater, the fact
that the two-MRC strategy swung an awful lot of air forces was
probably achievable, but it is certainly something that is on the
margin; and as we described the risk associated today with the
force structure and two MRC's, we would not like to see that occur
here.
General Krulak. Sir, I have not received any tasking nor have
I heard of any tasking for us to look at a one-MRC. I agree with
my fellow service Chiefs that somewhere in the rabbit warrens
somebody could easily be thinking about it, but there has been
nothing to me about that. Obviously, 174,000, if we went below
that after describing how active we are right now, I think we would
literally break.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to thank the witnesses today. And may I take this time to express
my personal admiration and appreciation for what you all are try-
ing to accomplish.
This is one of the most difficult periods in our history, militarily
speaking. We don't have as clearly a defined enemy threatening
our territorial integrity or our sovereignty as we have had virtually
all of my life, and therefore, it becomes a difficult exercise at times
to adequately express to the American people what those of us who
serve on this committee and who understand, I think maybe a little
more than some of the other elements of our society do, that there
are dangers there that we need to be concerned about and so on.
I will not make a long speech about that, but I simply wanted
to say that, because I know that each of you is serving in a time
where there are priorities being made that really have not had to
be made before by your predecessors in office, because we had the
cold war and we had all of the dangers that were more easily ex-
plainable to our citizenry than we do today. So I want to express
541
my appreciation for what your assignments are and how you are
performing, because I think you are performing magnificently.
I am going to have a couple of comments and then maybe a cou-
ple of questions, and I would like leave to submit a couple of ques-
tions on the ammunition question for both the Army and the Ma-
rine Corps, as well as to Admiral Boorda on a couple of things that
we have talked about previously as it relates to naval personnel.
Making the observation — as I heard you all talk about the total
force concept, I know there is a lot of activity going on, particularly
in the Army, with the Guard and Reserve and so forth, and the
total force concept. I have been privy to a couple of briefings, and
I think that I am encouraged by both the mix of the force and the
missions that I know about, General Reimer.
I would just simply ask that as all of you gentlemen go through
the total force exercise, as to mix and mission of the force, that we
continue to keep in mind that the Guard and Reserves need to be
afforded the same modernization, talking about the M-IA tank, the
school question. I know sometimes it is harder for the Guard and
reservists to get to schools that are 8 and 9 months long, but I
would hope that there would be slots made available for that.
One specific question for General Reimer. Do you know where
the rescission package is that contains the Kiowa Warrior OH-58,
General? I know the Army has not been heretofore supportive of
the rescission that is, I think, at OMB now.
General Reimer. I am not sure where it is right now. Congress-
man, but
Mr. Tanner. I would think that would be a terrible mistake, and
we will try to do whatever we can on that one.
I know there are some other people who want to try to get
through some questions before lunch. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I
will submit some questions for the record.
The Chairman. That would be fine.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you. Chiefs.
The Chairman. Mrs. Fowler.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here. I just have a comment I would like to make and one
question, please.
You all, I know, are very aware there has been a debate raging
in this Congress for some time with regard to depot level mainte-
nance of repair and whether or not we should privatize the logistics
support that you war fighters currently rely on, on our depots. A
number of people in the Pentagon have contended that there are
savings ostensibly available to the military from privatizing our
depot functions. Out of the data I have seen, it suggests that this
privatization is not really the panacea that they might believe, and
for instance, GAO has reported in two different studies — and I
have them here, one in December 1994 and one just last week —
that the cost of operating the Aerospace Meteorology and Guidance
Center, which is, as you know, a small, specialized depot that was
ordered closed and privatized by the 1993 BRAC will be some $456
million to $600 million more expensive to operate over the 5-year
period from fiscal year 1996 to 2000 than would have been the case
had it continued to operate as a Government depot.
542
Likewise, when DOD commissioned the independent firm Coo-
pers & Lybrand in 1994 to determine the most cost-effective loca-
tion for maintaining the F1D2 engine, which powers the Air Force
F-117 stealth fighter. Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, was
found to be significantly less costly than was the private contractor
that originally designed and built this engine. By moving this
workload from a private contractor to a public depot in 1995, the
Department was able to save itself and our taxpayers millions of
dollars.
Now, these are just a couple of examples, but there are many
other instances where it can be shown that depots not only ensure
greater readiness, but also provide significant savings to the Gov-
ernment and the taxpayer. I would hope that each of you, as serv-
ice Chiefs, would carefully review these reports before you let your-
self be led or pushed down this privatization path for depots, be-
cause I think you can make a lot better use of these dollars in the
things you need and what you have been telling us you need today
than wasting them in this privatization effort.
My one question is, and I will start with you. General Krulak,
because I know, as our Nation's top marine, a critical issue for you
is readiness — and I am hearing from each of you that readiness is
so important — could you comment on the Marine Corps' perspective
on privatizing our depots and the implication for the readiness of
your forces?
And I would like an answer from each of you on that question.
General Krulak. Yes, ma'am, I can answer that question, and
you hit the nail right on the head.
For us, readiness is critical, and it has to be responsive. We find
ourselves often needing to make changes, needing to make quick
fixes, and having the ability to do that, as the commandant, is very
important to me.
At the same time, we have equipment that is not unique across
the services. The LAV is something that is just the Marine Corps';
the AAV, just the Marine Corps; the truck that we have, the LVS,
is solely a Marine Corps item. So it is critical to us that we be able
to deal with those items of equipment rapidly and that we keep it
within, quote, the family.
So although there are areas that I do believe can be privatized,
the privatization of something like an Albany, which looks to the
East Coast Marine and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, in
Barstow, which is looking towards the 1st Marine Expeditionary
Force, I am not sure that would be good for the readiness of our
Corps.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
General Fogleman.
General Fogleman. Well, clearly, readiness needs to be the top
consideration when you deal with the issue of privatization.
Interestingly enough, readiness cuts both ways on this issue, be-
cause clearly in the case of a situation where you have a militarily
unique asset, you cannot even find, or you will pay a tremendous
price to have a private firm maintain that. An example, for in-
stance, would be C-5 landing gear.
Clearly, the landing gear facility we have at Hill Air Force Base
is, for all intents and purposes, the only place in the Nation that
543
you would be able to get that done, and so we would not look to
privatize such an operation.
On the other hand, if we go buy engines from a commercial ver-
sion of an engine and put it on our aircraft, it appears here as
though we may get much better readiness out of having that in pri-
vate hands. But clearly, as we look at the issue of privatization,
readiness must be our first consideration, and the fact that we may
be able to save some money or close an installation ought to be sec-
ondary.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
Admiral Boorda.
Admiral BooRDA. Let me answer that this way. We have just
gone through a gut- wrenching exercise of BRAC. It has been over
several — I think four — different iterations, and in the Navy — and I
mean the Department of the Navy — Chuck and I, we have reduced
from eight shipyards down to four, two on each coast of the United
States, two nuke capable, two large nuclear capable, and we have
gone from six depots in both our services down to three, a fixed-
wing one on each coast and one helicopter depot. I think we are
there for a little while, and we need to let this settle out.
We are still spending money to close what we are closing, and
so the idea that we move workload out of the last three depots, the
one in your district included, right now we have to see a compelling
case that says we are going to save money.
I don't know how you can do much better than cut it by half. We
have cut it by half, and now we need to have time to let that work.
And by the way, it costs investment money to cut, so we need some
time to let that happen, too.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
General Reimer.
General Reimer. I would echo that readiness is the litmus test
in this particular area.
Just speaking from the Army's standpoint, I don't necessarily
think that privatization for privatization's sake is good. I think
there are a couple of issues here that need to be identified. One is,
I think we have to identify those core competencies that work. That
is absolutely essential that we do, and we have to make that deter-
mination, and we are in the process of doing that.
The second thing is, I think we have to do that as efficiently as
we possibly can. So I think the opportunity for privatization makes
us all more efficient.
I visited some of the Army depots. They have great work forces
over there. They need to be more efficient. They are willing to be
more efficient. I think we have to, when we address this problem,
try to make sure we get the most readiness out of every dollar you
give us, and that is what we are pledged to do.
In that regard, I would just like to respond on the civilian end
strength. There are some things v/e need to look at that inhibit us
from doing that, things like the 60-40 rule, the Davis-Bacon Act,
the A-76. All of that has to be looked at to see what is appropriate
and not appropriate as we strive to become the most efficient orga-
nization possible.
Mrs. Fowler. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
544
The Chairman. Thank you, ma'am.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Tejeda.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank and welcome each and every one
of the commanders who are here.
Each of you have spoken about the increased operational tempo
of our forces, and I believe this committee does and should recog-
nize that our military is engaged in today's world. You have made
that clear. I thank you, and I look forward to working with each
of you this year.
General Krulak, I applaud your initiatives within the Marine
Corps that challenge the current mind-set with a vision to the fu-
ture. The Marine Corps should be proud of your leadership, and we
are certainly pleased to have you before us today.
I have a brief question. Since you have already mentioned cold
weather gear and tents, I would like to hear about Marine Corps
housing and barracks.
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
It is no secret that the barracks in some locations in the Marine
Corps are more than substandard. I went with my godchild into his
barracks. He is a lance corporal in the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines
in Hawaii, and I was appalled at »vhat he was living in. "Appalled"
is probably a mild word for it. We have some problems.
We are building some barracks, we are building some homes, we
are doing some whole-house rehab, but it is not to the level that
either I, as the commandant, or you, as a public servant, would be
very pleased about. It is simply a matter of available money. We
are doing everything that we possibly can.
We have received help from the Hill. It has been greatly appre-
ciated. We have received help from the Department. But we are not
where we ought to be.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you, general.
General Fogleman, you thanked this committee for last year's
plus-up in MilCon, and I would like to know if you need more help
this year for what is happening there.
General Fogleman. Well, we again have presented a constrained
MilCon budget to the Hill, and, clearly, as we look out at the pro-
grams that are coming down the road, if they were to be acceler-
ated, particularly as we look at things like our barracks, those
would be appreciated.
Mr. Tejeda. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Torkildsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to thank the distinguished witnesses for their testi-
mony today. I will just start off with a brief statement and then
ask a few very specific questions for Admiral Boorda.
I will echo the comments of my colleague on the F/A-18 upgrade.
I think it really is a key part of our defense, and, as you do, I ap-
plaud the fact it is on time and on budget. It is essential to say
that about, I think, any acquisition program, and I just want to
echo those earlier comments.
For General Fogleman, I also applaud your comments on quality
of life issues. Clearly, the most valuable resource we have in the
545
military is our personnel, and asking them to make sacrifice after
sacrifice has to be tempered with giving them decent living condi-
tions. Specifically, in my own district, at Hanscom Air Force Base,
I applaud the Air Force's commitment to upgrading housing there
and am glad to see that moving forward and want to see it com-
pleted as soon as possible.
For specific questions, for General Reimer: According to the
Army Times, the Army is planning to heavy up the 2d Armored
Cavalry Regiment and has all the major equipment assets on hand
to support conversion except for 16 Longbow Apache attack heli-
copters. Is this correct? And does the Army need additional
Longbow Apaches to make the 2d ACR an effective heavy force?
And can the OH-58D Kiowa effectively perform the attack heli-
copter mission of the 2d ACR?
General Reimer. No decision has been made on the heavying up
of the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, for the first answer. That is
something that is under advisement. We are looking at that, and
there has not been a final decision made on that.
The issue really is that the 2d ACR is one of two armored cavalry
regiments in the Active component. There is one also in the Re-
serve component.
As you look at the different war plans and the different opportu-
nities to employ armored cavalry regiments, there seems to be
growing emphasis or the desire to have more armored cavalry regi-
ments than what we currently have. So it is an issue that is being
worked right now but has not come to me for decision, and I have
not made a recommendation to the Secretary.
If the decision was made to heavy up the 2d Armored Cavalry
Regiment, it is not as clean as just a number of Longbow Apaches.
There is a plus-up that is required in terms of end-strength that
is very difficult for us to figure out how to do.
In other words, we would have to take something down in order
to build something else up. That is a difficult hurdle to get over.
That is a whole new array of equipment that is required for heavy
armored cavalry as opposed to light. These are issues that have to
be factored in.
So, first of all, no decision; second, it is something we have to
look at very, very hard.
Mr. TORKILDSEN. Another question, General: The Army, in its
Crusader program, I believe, has told the Congress that it offered
improved mobility and range and firepower advantages over the
liquid propellant gun.
How did the range in firepower of the liquid propellant gun and
the solid propellant gun compare? And does the Army believe the
advantages alone justify the cost of that program?
General Reimer. The range on a liquid propellant is estimated
to be about 47 kilometers. The range of a unit-charged solid propel-
lant is about 40 kilometers. So there is a range differential between
liquid and solid propellant.
The issue is whether you can weaponize liquid propellant at the
time frame we need it to be weaponized. That is an issue now, that
is working, that is very close to resolution. We have had an Army
Science Board look at that. It is starting to work its way through
the decision process, and we have to make a decision as to whether
546
we think we can bring it on if the risk is such or if we have to go
to the unit-charged soHd propellant.
Mr. TORKILDSEN. Thank you.
For General Krulak, a couple of brief questions. I understand
that current doctrine indicates the Marine Corps needs an addi-
tional or additional maritime prepositioning ships to fulfill its mis-
sion requirements.
Is this true? And if so, how many ships do you believe the Ma-
rine Corps would need?
General Krulak. We have a requirement for three additional
MPF ships. We are calling them MPF-E, for Enhancement. They
will carry such things as an expeditionary airfield, some of Mike
Boorda's bulldozers, et cetera, from a Seabee battalion, a fleet hos-
pital, things along this line that would be used not only for major
regional contingencies in crises, but, equally important, if you had
a disaster relief requirement, they would also play there.
Mr. TORKILDSEN. And following up on that, I understand that the
acquisition strategy for these ships has the potential to fulfill the
Marine Corps' requirements without upfront funding and to send
much of this work to U.S. shipyards.
Have you considered a built-in charter acquisition strategy to ful-
fill this requirement?
General Krulak. We have right now $110 million — that is
through the good auspices of Mike and his people — out for bid here
within the next couple of months. We had hoped to have that ship
on bid by August of this year.
Tied into that is the opportunity to get a second ship tied to that
same contract, and the money is not there now, but that is the sen-
sible and cost-effective way to go.
Mr. TORKILDSEN. OK. I thank you for your answers and yield
back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Fort Worth, TX, Mr. Geren.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Our junior colleague, Mr. Montgomery, is gone. I wanted to
thank him for acknowledging the service of the 301st in Bosnia.
They came home very proud of what they did over there, fine serv-
ice, and it really was heartwarming to be on the tarmac last Sun-
day and see them get out of those aircraft and see the children run
up and jump up in their arms and welcome them home.
It really performed wonderful service for our country, and it cer-
tainly made me and our community proud to be able to be home
for the 301st and support them in their efforts. And, General
Fogleman, we certainly thank you for the leadership you have
given in helping to bring about and integrate the Air Force Re-
serve's total force concept.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know how many years we are going to
have to listen to the Marines talk about how they don't have Gore-
Tex boots and Gore-Tex tents and Gore-Tex rain gear. With acqui-
sition reform, I suggest we give the Commandant a catalog and gift
certificates.
General Krulak. Sir, that was my second point.
Mr. Geren. And let us get that behind us. It certainly seems
that those are, particularly with the successes we have had with
547
acquisition reform, and that was exciting to hear how the JDAM
missile has come down from $40,000 to $14,000. What a wonderful
credit to the military and to the Congress, working together to help
spend the taxpayers' money better, and in such a short period of
time to achieve that.
I wish that the general public knew more about that success. We
always hear about the failures in the acquisition process, and that
is a tremendous success. It means so much to us, and I think the
Congress and all of you deserve a real pat on the back for bringing
that about, and I was glad to hear of it. I was not aware of such
a tremendous reduction in the price.
I would like to ask a question of the Commandant in regard to
the V-22. You have said the current buy rate is ludicrous and dan-
gerous and we need to get on with it. There are concerns that, at
the current rate of production and the switch from the AMB to the
lower eight initial production, that we are actually going to have
some downtime there and going to lose some of the skilled people
that will be necessary to bring that on.
If you could expand a little bit on your comments earlier and
help educate us on how best to spend the money in bringing that
program on.
General Krulak. Yes, sir. If we continue with the buy rate as
it currently exists, the final aircraft will hit the fleet in the year
2023— 2023— a 27-year procurement. The CH-46, which is the
same helicopter that I flew as a second lieutenant, flew in as a sec-
ond lieutenant in Vietnam, will be 50 years old. It is my belief that
we need to ramp that up. I think that if we went at 36 a year, we
would find that we would save 11 years and $8 billion.
To me, to have people flying around in a 50-year-old aircraft in
the year 2023, when we could have had it 11 years earlier and $8
billion cheaper, it just does not make sense to me.
Mr. Geren. Save $8 billion over the course of the buy?
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Geren. Thank you. I appreciate that.
General Fogleman, you touched on the inadequacies in the
TACAIR area and didn't go into much detail. Could you talk a little
about that, specifically in regard to the need for F-15's and 16's,
and look at the kind of shortfall that you anticipate in advance of
the J AST coming on stream?
General Fogleman. Yes, sir. First, if I could, I would like to back
up just a second and talk to this issue of the priority that it has
in the budget and why this is potentially going to become an issue
here in the near term.
If you go back over the last 30 or 40 years, what you discover
is, within the Department of Defense we sort of modernize in cy-
cles, and so if you even go back to the bleak days of the late 1970's,
when we clearly had a hollow force, the 1970's happened to be a
period of time in which we were modernizing TACAIR.
The Navy was spending a lot of money on F-14's at that time.
That was really when they were starting to ramp up. The Air
Force, the AV-8 was coming into the 1970's; the Air Force was
starting to bring on the F-15, the F-16, and soon the A- 10.
So if you were to go back and look at the budget— and I have had
my people do that— it would look like it was disproportionate. But
548
if you go to the 1980's, then you find very Uttle money relatively
spent on TACAIR because that was the period of time in which we
were funding strategic programs, both Navy programs and Air
Force programs, D-5's and the subs, and we had rail mobile mis-
siles and the B-2 and all, B-1, all these programs.
Then, as we got into the early 1970s, we started to focus on our
lift, if you will, both sealift, airlift. But, clearly, we brought our
overall procurement down tremendously in recognition of the end
of the cold war.
So where we are now is at a period of time where we have to
modernize TACAIR for all the services. If we don't make this in-
vestment now, if we don't start to — if we don't follow through on
the programs that we have started, we are going to be in a tremen-
dously poor posture at the end of the first decade of the 2 1st cen-
tury, because by that time the F-14 will have been around for
nearly 40 years; the F-15, the same.
I first flew the F-15 in 1976. So it is an airplane that has been
around a long time.
Now, we have upgraded it, clearly; but as we look out at the
threats we see a world in which you are getting much more capable
surface-to-air missile systems. One of the things that the end of the
cold war has done for us is we have been able to get access and
see some of these systems that the other side has built and we
have discovered that they have systems that are like our Patriot
system, very, very capable against aircraft; and so it drives us then
to look at a revolutionary way of approaching this.
So we clearly believe that the F-22 is a revolution in the way
you approach air warfare; and coming out of the F-22 is the tech-
nology for the propulsion, for the avionics, for the maneuverable
stealth that will give us all the joint strike fighter at an affordable
cost. So what we have to struggle with is how much near-term
TACAIR do we need to bridge that point until we can start fielding
this next generation of TAC fighters. We see the TAC — see the
JAST and the F-272 coming on, the F-272, probably in the year
2004 the first operational unit; the JAST start going to the oper-
ational units in 2008.
So out of that what you see is a requirement to sustain your
force structure. Whether we like it or not, we crash so many air-
planes every year. It is a function of the number of flying hours per
year. Our safety rates have been driven down tremendously, but in
our case we crash about 1.3 aircraft per 100,000 flying hours. So
we can project for a given size force about how many of them we
are going to lose over the next 10 to 15 years.
The aircraft that you need to buy to replace those losses are
called attrition reserve airplanes. In some cases, they are not being
made any more. Mike Boorda cannot buy any more F-14's, so he
has to replace them with the F/A-18's, whatever. I still have the
luxury of being able to buy a few F-16's, F-15's.
So what we are talking about in terms of the near term is
TACAIR support.
Mr. Geren. If I could do a quick follow-up. If you could talk
about the numbers you need to meet that attrition rate over the
next decade before we see the 22 and the joint strike fighter com-
ing on.
549
General Fogleman. In the F-15, we have computed we need
about 18 airplanes. We got six last year. We have six in this budg-
et. We could clearly use a few more. And if we got six next year
we would be in pretty good shape.
In the F-16 area, we have computed that if we are going to sus-
tain the F-16 force out through the introduction of the joint strike
fighter we need about 120 airplanes.
Mr. Geren. Mr. Chairman, if I can say something to Admiral
Boorda in closing?
Fort Worth is the home of the NAS Fort Worth, and with Cap-
tain Cannon and Captain Beaver down there, they have done a re-
markable job of bringing about the joint operations out there. I
just — in front of the committee, I would like to commend them for
their excellent work. It is not easy to get everybody to work to-
gether, and they have shown an incredible level of diplomacy and
skill in keeping everybody pulling in the same direction, and I just
wanted to commend them in your presence they have done an ex-
cellent job.
They will be moving on to other assignments, but our community
has appreciated having them, and they have put together a re-
markable experiment out there in what was Carswell Air Force
Base. Now it is NAS Forth Worth. I wanted to commend them to
you.
Admiral BooRDA. Thank you. I will be sure to let them know you
said that.
The other piece is a joint reserve base, and it truly is a total force
base, and I think it is working well.
Mr. Geren. They have done an excellent job of getting everybody
to work together and making the joint reserve base work. I don't
think without their probably diplomacy more than anything else
could they have pulled it off. But they have done a great job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. We are going to try to get one more in before we
break for a vote.
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In order to accommo-
date one of my colleagues who has a pressing engagement a little
later, I am going to yield to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ed-
wards.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Dellums.
In respect to my colleagues and the time — General Reimer, I
know you have to leave. I think before my time would have been
up, I will put in writing to you comments and questions in regard
to force structure. I would just like to simply say I think there is
bipartisan concern on this committee in regard to cutting the Army
below 495,000 soldiers, and my questions would be related to that,
and I will put those in writing.
Mr. Edwards. The comment, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to
make, if I could — I think this has been a productive hearing today;
but I would like to address to my friend, Mr. Weldon, for whom I
have the greatest respect, and with him I will be working on a bi-
partisan basis to try to plus-up areas of defense that we would like
to see more spending in. I would also comment that in my 5 years
here I have never heard the Secretary of Defense referred to as
550
hypocritical, and I think that tone is not one that lends itself to bi-
partisanship that we have traditionally had on this committee, and
I hope we will continue that.
Mr. Weldon. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Edwards. As soon as I finish making my comment, be glad
to.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
Mr. Edwards. What I would like to say to my friend, Mr.
Weldon, is if we look — I think we are in a difficult problem, where
on both sides of the aisle we are trying to deal with the effort of
balancing the budget. You and I both would like to spend a lot
more in defense, but we also have to balance the budget, and I
would just point out to the gentleman that the budget resolution
that you voted for the 7-year budget plan actually spends less on
defense in the outyears of that 7-year budget than President Clin-
ton has proposed.
I would not suggest anyone — I wouldn't even use the term hypoc-
risy in talking about those comparisons. So what I would say is I
think we need to recognize we all favor a strong defense.
The gentleman and I have worked together on a lot of programs,
and we will continue to do so. There are some program cuts here
that concern me, and I hope we can plus them up. But I think the
tone of our deliberations needs to be in a bipartisan basis.
Second, if we are going to get into partisan attacks on this ad-
ministration in this year's budget, I think, in fairness, we should
point out that the Republican budget 7 years out actually cuts
more than President Clinton would want to cut from defense. But
rather than get getting into that extended debate I would just say
I would like for this committee to work on a bipartisan basis. Let
us try to find money wherever we can to support concerns that the
gentleman is very passionate about, and I share his concerns
Mr. Weldon. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Edwards [continuing]. In those areas.
If there is time left, I would be glad to. It is Mr. Dellums' time.
Mr. Weldon. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Dellums. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. Weldon. I used the word "line" because that is exactly what
I meant. When someone criticizes us for adding $7 billion in the
acquisition accounts last year and then comes in last week and
shows us a chart which Mr. Hunter asked to put back up again at
my request and then takes credit for that same $7 billion outlay
in terms of acquisition funds, that is hypocritical to me.
In terms of the President's budget, everyone knows that the out-
year cuts are in the sixth and seventh year. That is great. Because
if Clinton wins he will not be in office, so he will leave it for some-
one else to deal with.
It is gobbledygook, hogwash. Nobody buys that logic.
Let me say in closing, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
to enter into the JCS review of capitalization. We have seen the
muzzle on the military being able to tell their story; and, Mr.
Chairman, I want to ask you — it is my
Mr. Edwards. I want to reclaim my time and simply say that I
think adding the terms the gentleman added to the ones he already
551
used do not contribute to the productive work of this committee,
and I hope we can find a better way to work together.
I could talk about the hypocrisy of criticizing this administration
for this year's defense budget when you voted for a budget that
cuts more than the President would cut in several years from now.
We could carry on that fight later.
I would just say I would like us rather to work together on a bi-
partisan basis, even though it is a Presidential election year. I
think if we do that and make our comments without using those
kinds of adjectives, I think we can do a lot better. Thank you.
Mr. Dellums. Yield back to the Chair.
The Chairman. We are all brothers in the same lodge.
Mr. Weldon. Mr. Chairman — may I make one additional re-
quest, please, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Weldon. I would ask that the chairman consider a discus-
sion Mr. Hunter and I had about asking for the Joint Chiefs' rec-
ommendations to the Secretary of Defense for funding for this fiscal
year and, if necessary, request a subpoena be issued to get those
documents for this committee to analyze.
I thank the Chairman.
The Chairman. We are going to break for a vote and come right
back, if the gentlemen can wait for us.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have been very much impressed with your forth-
rightness, your professionalism, and your competence. Thank you
for being here, and I personally sleep better at night knowing that
you are where you are.
Let me first, without taking more time to reiterate, associate my-
self with the remarks of Congressman Weldon. I think he is right
on target, and I want to associate myself with his remarks.
I know that I and all of the committee share your concerns that
we have adequate funding for readiness, for modernization, and for
quality-of-life issues. I personally have some concern that the pro-
jected end strengths are adequate to accomplish the missions that
we say we need, may need to accomplish, like two MRC's nearly
simultaneously and so forth. I just doubt that that end strength is
adequate to do that.
But I have a concern in two areas — one involves submarines, the
other intercontinental ballistic missiles. I understand that, last
year, the Russians launched six submarines that— their best sub-
marines; and they are pushing the envelope even further in those
that are on the drawing boards, run at least as fast and deep, as
quiet, as any of ours and maybe more so.
I know from — I know that you know from some classified docu-
ments that Russian subs are now coming closer to our coast than
they ever came, they are staying longer, and if they drop deep and
run slowly we lose them for days at a time. We cannot track them.
I know. Admiral Boorda, in your statement you referenced the
attack subs and the need there. I am concerned that the submarine
part of our Navy is inadequately funded, that this remains a very
critical threat that I don't think most of our citizens are aware of.
552
The other area is BMD. When our citizens learned in focus
groups and so forth that we cannot protect them against even a
single intercontinental ballistic missile they had three responses.
The first response is they are disbelieving. That cannot be true.
We couldn't have had this technology this long and not be able to
defend ourselves against even a single intercontinental ballistic
missile like a Miiammar Qadhafi could easily acquire — and it
wouldn't take him a decade to do it, either. Their next response is
that they would be appalled that we would do this to them, and
then they are angry.
I am concerned that our budget contains inadequate funding in
these two areas that represent increased threats that I don't think
we anticipated as little as 2 or 3 or 4 years ago. I think that the
reality of the potential of these threats has not yet become appar-
ent to the big majority of our citizens, and I would just like your
comments relative to my concern in these two areas.
Admiral Boorda. Well, I will do submarines and let someone
else do missile defense. That is probably fair.
With respect to submarine warfare — or really antisubmarine
warfare, the way you are talking about, but I think you mean
both — it is very hard to discuss that in a complete way anyway, but
in a broad-brush way, in a nonclassified hearing. I am not saying
that as a copout, but so many of the capabilities now are of a na-
ture that we would want to keep them in a classified hearing, and
I know your technical competence is as good or better than mine
on these subjects. So it is probably something we need to do in a
classified way.
I think we need to think about and I would agree with you that
we can use more funding. That was that was my No. 1 priority for
this year, without doubt my No. 1 priority.
I think we need to, when we have those more detailed discus-
sions, think about what it is we want the submarine piece of anti-
submarine warfare — and it is just a piece, it is a very important
one, perhaps the most important but only one of them — what it is
we want it to do and be sure we design it to do that.
For example — and it is hard to keep this on an unclassified
basis — how deep the submarine goes may be important but how
deep the weapon sensors can sense and the weapon can go deter-
mines how much volume that submarine controls in the world. It
is not where it is; it is where the things it deals with are.
So sometimes you want to make trades in technology and in
space and wait to get the advantage in a way that seems at initial
discussion to be counterintuitive. It is the kind of discussion that
Mr. Hunter and I and others have been having because, as you
well know, the answer is not always the intuitive answer.
What you say about the Soviets, the ex-Soviets, the Russians, im-
proving their submarine force is true; but we need a more detailed
and more classified discussion of the matter.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. We will look forward to that.
Admiral BoORDA. Yes, sir.
General Reimer. I will comment on the ballistic missile defense,
and I am sure Ron will also want to comment something on that.
I think what I would say in terms of the 1997 Army budget is
that it is a budget that is as balanced as we can make it. It is not
553
without risk. There is some risk associated with what we have sub-
mitted here, and it is just a matter of not having the resources to
cover everything.
As we work the ballistic missile defense issue, we have tried to
look at it from the standpoint of the threat. We have tried to em-
phasize the threat that we saw as the most likely threat, the most
advanced threat, and that was basically theater missile defense.
I agree with you there is a threat in intercontinental ballistic
missiles. I think the Army has a great deal of experience in terms
of the air deference or the missile defense. I think we have about
40 years of experience at Huntsville. They have developed a pro-
gram we are working with BMDO to basically comply with the de-
ployment readiness program in which they have developed — basi-
cally to develop that capability and then field it within 3 more
years.
I think that is where we are. It is a matter of resources and bal-
ance, as far as I am concerned.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
General Fogleman. Well, I find myself in an interesting position.
Because if I stand back realistically and objectively and look at the
issue of missile defense, national missile defense, theater missile
defense, et cetera, I cannot argue with the priorities that we have
established. Because, clearly, the highest threat that we see is in
the theater arena.
On the other hand, it certainly appears to me it is not a question
of if we will have a national missile defense but when, ^^^len we
have it, it is generally, hopefully, going to be driven by the threat
and the ability then to respond to that threat as we see that threat
emerging.
The hardest question I guess to address is when do we think this
credible threat will exist from the rogue nation or from uncon-
trolled elements of some national missile force, et cetera. Clearly,
that has got to be addressed; and there is — a consensus has to be
reached on that on that issue.
When you start to look on the larger sense — and I would not
make myself an expert on national missile defense, but it clearly
looks like if you want to have a comprehensive system ultimately
it ought to be space-based. But, clearly, from the technology stand-
point and political standpoint and from a lot of other standpoints,
that may not be possible.
So if you were to go look at what looks possible and affordable
and may be effective against what would be the near-term threat
it would probably be a land-based system against this limited rogue
threat. That would probably then, de facto, be an interim system;
and so, if it were going to be an interim system, you would prob-
ably want to expend as few resources as you possibly could to come
up with an effective defense against the specific threat that you are
trying to address.
I think part of the American public's frustration with missile de-
fense is that we cannot afford to stay in the hobby shop business.
They want us to produce something. So we need to be looking for
how we can get the best buy for the Nation once that threat is
identified and the decision made to field it.
554
That is generally where we come from. We don't argue with the
overall priority. We were part of the prioritization process. We said
tier first, national second. The issue is, what are the resources?
What is the timing required?
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Might I suggest, Mr. Chairman, we schedule a classified hearing
so we can explore this in more detail?
The Chairman. We are going to have one, yes.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have been sitting reflecting on the exchange just before the vote
between Mr. Edwards and Mr. Weldon, and I must say I am sad-
dened by it. This committee has a great bipartisan tradition. It has
always been, certainly prior to my membership in the Congress,
one of the star committees here. I think it would be a tragedy if
it degenerated into partisan bickering, first.
Second of all, I hope that this year will not find us again, as we
did last year, playing catchup with the appropriators, and I think
that could be a byproduct of partisan bickering.
So I would urge you to assert leadership and to carry on this
wonderful tradition that we have and to make sure that we are col-
laborating in the interest of a strong defense, which I think every
single member of this committee — certainly this member — sup-
ports.
Turning to the witnesses, I am a defense hawk, as you know; and
I represent the district where more defense space programs occur
than any others; so I am very interested in everything General
Fogleman has to say.
But also my district is home to the F-18 production; and, Admi-
ral Boorda, I just wanted to mention to you, as you talked about
ramping up and transitions and so forth, that the F-18 E/F produc-
tion is now starting. That is wonderful, but I understand that there
may be some lag in the assembly line between the C/D and the E/
F production. I would urge you to do everything you can to be sure
that doesn't happen, because that will impair our effectiveness and
costs in getting that program done.
So I just wanted to note that for you.
I have one question for each of the others.
General Reimer, you mentioned when you were asked by Chair-
man Spence about your wish list, that situational awareness was
a critical thing you would want to provide more funds for.
I am certainly aware that in the gulf war some of our casualties
were suffered from friendly fire. I am aware that you are looking
for technology that will inform you who is friendly and who is not
and that you are very taken with the Battlefield Combat ID Sys-
tem [BCIS].
My question is, is this system or more of these on your wish list?
I understand they are not very expensive per tank, but in order to
put them on the battlefield you have to have one in every single
tank.
General Reimer. As you suggest, the ability to identify friend
and foe on the battlefield is absolutely critical. We fought the gulf
war in a very aggressive manner, and we had some fratricide we
555
shouldn't have had. I don't think we will ever be able to eliminate
that, but we have to have the goal of eliminating all of it. We are
in the process of doing that.
I was at Fort Polk at the training center just a couple months
ago. I was there for a Tactical Operations Center [TOC], where we
had an Italian commander putting out patrols, platoon patrols. Be-
cause of the situational awareness he had available to him, he was
able to know that one of those patrols was 500 meters from where
he wanted it, so he simply picked up the radio and said move 500
meters.
That was an operational decision and an operational benefit that
he gained from situational awareness, but the ability that a tanker
has to know where your wing men are and the ability to know
where everybody in that friendly force really is will just change the
way we fight ground combat.
So, yes, it is something we would like to accelerate and get out
as soon as we possibly can.
Ms. Harman. I would note for you that Mr. Weldon and I had
a briefing by TRW, one of the manufacturers, of the capability of
the system; and it shows up in the view scope of the tank. There
is a dot that indicates it is friendly, the tank you are looking at.
So I would urge you and urge us to move on with this so we
never again have any of the tragedies that occurred in the gulf
war.
Moving along here, to General Krulak, I understand that you are
interested in nonlethal weapons development. This is something
that I am intensely interested in, because I think it not only can
help you folks in a war situation but I also think it can help — the
spillover can help law enforcement which has, as you know, always
an interest in using weapons of this kind, and there are now these
centers for law and technology around the country.
I am just wondering if you could talk for a second about some
of the combat implications of nonlethal warfare and how you will
participate in the DOD nonlethal warfare effort.
General Krulak. Yes, ma'am, we are very interested. We are
calling it less than lethal but nonlethal, less than lethal. One of the
struts of the umbrella we call Sea Dragon, which is a series of ex-
periments, is tied directly to less than lethal. We are — those experi-
ments are ongoing now at both Quantico and out with Lt. Gen.
Tony Zinzi.
We see a less than lethal as another tool in the tool kit that any
combatant commander will want to take into conflict in the 21st
century. Again, you go back to the type of warfare that we may be
experiencing in this chaotic century that is coming. I think you are
going to need to have something in your arsenal that is not totally
lethal all the time, because you are going to run into instances
where you are just not going to want to use a bullet when you
can — and you can see what I am talking about.
But some of the instances in Somalia, what we are seeing now
in Bosnia, particularly in urban terrain where you are close in and
you have civilians mixed with the combatants, it is just something
you have to have. By not having that option or that capability, in
fact, you put your people in more danger than if you didn't have
it.
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Ms. Harman. I totally agree.
Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up; but can I say one thing to
Admiral — General Fogleman before I relinquish the niicrophone?
The Chairman. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Harman. I want to tell you I am so proud to have the L.A.
Air Force Base in my district; and I am proud of what you do, espe-
cially for our space program.
I want to make one comment to you. You were talking, in answer
to the Chairman's question about your wish list, about the dangers
of extending old systems. I agree with that. I think one of the old
systems you have got is the B-52, which is already 40 years old.
By the time it is retired, it will be 70; and I am always quipping
that it would qualify for social security.
I am one of the majority of this committee that thinks we ought
to have more B-2's in our future. I don't want to push that with
you now, sir. I don't think that would be a productive line of ques-
tioning. But I do think that the B-2 is a much preferable bomber
to retaining the aged B-52 in our fleet, and I just wanted to say
how strongly I support the President's initiative to have the roles
and missions initiative expanded and add some membership and
look at this question again. I am very hopeful we can work out a
better resolution of this.
Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pick up a minute on something my good friend Mr.
Skelton said back here. Some of you heard me say this quite often
before, but I don't think we can tell you enough, and that is the
issue of the quality of our folks that we have serving under you all.
As General Fogleman and General Krulak know, I spend a good
deal of time at Robins and Moody and USMC Albany and try to
make an effort to talk to our enlisted personnel. I recently com-
pleted a tour of all the Georgia bases and spent a good deal of time
at Kings Bay, including an extremely educational trip on that sub-
marine, and had some good educational visits at Benning and
Stewart and Gordon; and to you four folks I just want to commend
you on your continued good job of recruiting the very finest that
we have to offer in this country. We need to continue to tell you
that because it is so important.
Admiral, I will have to tell you I was totally amazed at the train-
ing that those 18- and 19-year-olds have gotten and the way they
can operate that sophisticated equipment. I didn't know until I got
there, but one of those men is from my hometown, and his fifth
grade teacher was my mother. So I knew he had a good foundation,
but you all have done a good job of continuing his progress there.
Admiral BooRDA. Could we have a list of other kids she taught,
please?
Mr. Chambliss. Absolutely.
In spite of what I think — I think you are doing the right things,
particularly in light of the budget restraints within which you have
had to work over the last several years; and the folks under you
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are doing the right things. I continue to be concerned about this
issue of procurement and modernization.
General Krulak, I particularly want to address a question to you
with respect to the KG- 130, because I understand the Marine
Gorps has a valid requirement to replace the aging active duty KC-
130 tanker tactical transport fleet. Given the possibility that Gon-
gress will provide for more procurement dollars to the Marine
Corps, have you looked at the new G-130J in the context of a mod-
ernization plan and how high of a priority would you attach to that
plan?
General Krulak. Yes, sir; it is an extremely good aircraft. It is
far more capable than the 34-year-old aircraft that makes up 50
percent of our force right now. The other 50 percent is about 19
years old.
This is an area where the reservists have the newest aircraft in
the Marine Gorps arsenal, which is not bad. That is good. But we
are really long in the tooth, so to speak, with our G-130 fleet.
The J has capabilities that current aircraft do not have. It obvi-
ously goes faster, has a better refueling capability. The cockpit is
arranged for night vision devices, and the uses thereof of a very
good aircraft. We obviously did not have the money in the current
program to buy that. If the money were available, we would cer-
tainly buy it.
Mr. Ghambliss. So if we can find some money you could use
some more of those?
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ghambliss. OK. That is all I have, Mr. Ghairman.
The Ghairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Taylor, from Mississippi.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Ghairman.
I appreciate all four of you staying around as long as you have
and particularly Admiral Boorda.
It is a shame Mr. Geren isn't here, but after your testimony in
behalf of the DDG class and the LPD and LHD, he said "this ad-
vertisement was paid for by the shipbuilders of south Mississippi".
But we are grateful for your kind words for those things that are
built in south Mississippi, and I certainly hope you keep their good
work in mind when you decide which company will — which people
will build the LPD- 17.
I want to brag on you a little bit. The other local shipbuilders
have given me rave reviews on your acquisition reform changes
that you have made, particularly Trinity Marine and the barracks
barges. They say it is like doing business with the private sector,
which is one of the greatest compliments any branch of the military
can receive.
I would want to pose this question to the group — and I rnean it
as no offense to my colleague from Pennsylvania. I think he is very,
very sincere in his concerns about our national missile defense.
But I want to point out some numbers that I was given. That is,
roughly from 1982 to the present, this Nation has spent or will
spend at the end of this year about $44 billion on national missile
defense. Admiral Krulak makes a compelling case even for things
like boots and Gore-tex uniforms. I have heard all of you make very
compelling cases for the need to modernize your equipment before
558
you start falling out of the sky or our 141's start having wings fall
off.
Given that $44 billion and the — I will put it in shipbuilding
terms which I feel like I know best — that would represent 55
DDG's that could have been in the fleet. That would represent bet-
ter than 35 LHD's that could have been added to the fleet. I am
sure General Krulak in short order could have told me how many
of his aging aircraft he could have replaced for that money.
Given the fact we only have a dollar and we have to make a deci-
sion to spend that dollar here or there, given all these things and
the needs you have presented to this committee, when it comes to
missile defense are we spending too much, are we spending too lit-
tle or are we doing it about right, given the technology that exists
today and the capabilities that we can actually go out and buy or
try to buy? It is a very sincere question. I mean it. Because I know
my friend has some concerns, but how do you see all of that and
how do you see this year's defense needs with regard to that? I
want to open it up.
Mr. Reimer. I simply would say that that is the issue all of us
collectively are wrestling with, the balance of the programs across
the years. There is never enough money to do everything we want
to do. There is always the risk associated with every budget that
we recommend. I am sure there is a risk associated with the budg-
et that you will finally approve. It is a difficult situation, and I
think we just have to keep addressing that from the standpoint of
where you get the greatest return on your investment.
Given the dollars that we had available, I think the budget that
we in the Army submitted, we worked the balance as best we
could. I am satisfied with that balance. That is all I can say. If
more money is coming, we would have to rework the issue in terms
of what the priorities are.
Mr. Taylor. General — excuse me. Admiral Boorda.
Admiral Boorda. That is all right. I just finished 40 years in the
Navy. I have two to go, but I would like to start over again.
It is a balance issue, as has been said; and you could, in this pro-
gram, could spend more money. There is no question about that.
But it is not just balanced between all the other programs, which
is real hard for us to do, because I can find a lot of things I need
to spend more money on. It is also balanced, once they have set a
number within the program itself, how much for national and how
much for theater.
Then when you get into theater missile defense within the Navy,
for example, there are two systems; and you have to decide which
one or ones of them you are going to push. So it is not just one
decision of balance. It is a whole lot of decisions of balance that re-
sult in a program that changes every year.
We need a couple of things in this program that we are trying
to get. One is, whatever the funding level is going to be, we need
to get some stability in it so that we don't keep stretching things
out; and, as Ron said, we need to build something instead of just
doing plans.
Second, if we are going to be limited in money, like we obviously
are, then we have to do some priorities about where we do it. Be-
cause for us, obviously, being able — when we rely on sealift and
559
airlift to get troops to where they need to be — and that is the strat-
egy today — then we better be able to protect seaports and airfields,
because somebody will shoot; and they will only get more accurate
and more longer ranged and lethal over time.
So that causes some priority changes this year. You have a lim-
ited amount of money, and you have to make decisions about which
way it goes and then what the biggest problems are — not what are
all the problems but which ones will you try to solve. That is kind
of how we ended up.
Could we spend more money? Of course we could.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to announce we are going
to try to get through by 1300 because people have other commit-
ments. So if we can consider that in answering questions and in
asking questions, I would appreciate it.
General Fogleman. Again, Mr. Congressman, my colleagues
have identified the issue of where missile defense fits within the
overall balance of the missile defense program and the balance be-
tween national and theater within national itself. Clearly, we are
part of that discussion in terms of how the funding would be allo-
cated to balance within that line.
I would come back and tell you I share the frustration on having
spent $44 billion and not having something to show for it. So what
I would again come back to is the point, from my perspective, if the
decision is made to go do this, we would not be wise, in my view,
to start replicating command and control facilities, operational ca-
pabilities, et cetera. We ought to leverage off what we have and le-
verage off the money we spent that would allow us to put some-
thing into place along the time lines we all agreed to, so-called 3-
plus-3 program that has been briefed by Paul Kaminiski, et cetera.
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
General Krulak. Very briefly, sir, I would probably, one, say we
need to take a look at the risk that is involved on which direction
we go. Here specifically in the national missile defense I go back
to my basic premise that the poor man's nuclear is some kind of
chemical or biological system and that the risk of that is probably
greater than the risk of a rogue state firing something at us. Again,
I believe it is something we need to debate nationally, because I
think it is that important.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, could I make a very brief statement?
The Chairman. Please, we are trying to get through.
Mr. Taylor. I hope you will get a book that addresses these mat-
ters, Andrew Jackson Higgins, the man that built the boats that
won World War II. He speaks very, very favorably of your father.
You are the second generation to push for reform within the
Krulak family.
General Krulak. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham. Thank you. I have met General Krulak's dad.
He is not a man to mess with.
I would say to both generals that I wore an Army Air Corps tie
especially for this occasion.
I think sometimes this is probably the most bipartisan committee
that I have ever served on as far as helping the services. I think
sometimes when we say something the way we say it or the attack
38-160 97-20
560
mode we are in appears partisan or something, so I am going to
try to make my point, but I am going to try to sound nonpartisan
in doing it.
I would like the Chiefs to think about — I think this is something
you will have to reflect on, and I feel it is important that when you
look at an administration's history and lack of support for the mili-
tary it is an issue when it carries over to current actions and fu-
ture projections that affect this committee's ability to operate in a
bipartisan way to help you with the things you just testified to.
Let me be specific. First, I would say the only real heartburn
that I have is with Secretary Perry in chastising us for adding the
list that you told us that you really needed and you are going to
give us new lists. I am going to tell you I am going to do everything
I can — and I am sure this whole committee will do everything they
can — to help you with that, both Republicans and Democrats, and
I thought it was an unfair shot by the Secretary.
I personally think the Bottom-Up Review was done backwards.
It was to justify cuts, not with what we needed with the $177 bil-
lion cut in 1993.
I also predict that if the current administration is elected that
you will see a redo of a Bottom-Up Review and that you will be
asked to cut end strength even more.
That is personal. I feel that.
I think you will be asked to justify one MRC. I see that coming.
I know that is why there are some people in the Pentagon looking
at just that fact.
Let me tell you why I think that you are kind of set up for that.
In the President's balanced budget, 7 year, scored by CBO, 90 per-
cent of the discretionary cuts come in years 6 and 7. This is the
same period in which the President plans to increase procurement
to $60 billion from $39 billion in 1991. That is just not believable.
We can't do that at the same time.
First, if we take a look at what the President's defense budget
relies on to pay for it, he relies and says that inflation will not go
any higher than 2.5 over the next 7 years. That is not going to hap-
pen.
Second, that the BRAC savings will pay for it. We know good and
well that the environmental costs, the clean-up costs and all of
those cases, you have to eat the overhead. There is great cost there.
There will not be a lot of savings out of there. There will be some.
Acquisition reform, as you reduce the number of units that you
produce, whether it is tent pegs or JASTS or F-22's that industry
has testified is straight line budgeting so they don't have to lay off
people and retool, but that will cost more money.
So I doubt and I think the administration's budget is setting ev-
erj^hing that you are talking about — not what you have but what
you need — in jeopardy. I think it is in jeopardy for this committee
to try and have to deal with those issues.
I took a look at some other things in which the cost — when we
were asked to pay for Haiti and Bosnia and Somalia, all of those
costs. We get a limited budget; and those excursions come out of
defense, from the limited budget that you already have. I person-
ally feel that Bosnia will cost us more than $2 billion, and we are
561
already seeing about how you are having to already take money out
of your accounts to pay for Bosnia.
In the future — I know the U.N. and NATO are broke. Who will
pay for that? The President said the primary nation-building
source will be Europe, but that also leaves us in the United States
to pick up that tab as well.
I look at the operations costs. Admiral Boorda, you talked about
going from one place to another or operating out of Aviano or de-
ploying TAD forces. All that costs operational dollars out of your
budget and TEMPO as well. For you to modernize and continue to
do those things will put national security in jeopardy.
I think one thing that is overlooked is retention. I talked to not
just one service but a lot of your kids and your aviators. Michael
Pitt, and I served in Top Gun. I know he is embarrassed now. He
is still in the service and doing his education job now. I see the
young man back there in the Air Force, but a lot of these kids are
bailing out of the service because of the pressures and the family
separation we are putting on them. That means quality people.
We have tried to help you with retention, but you are losing a
lot of that experience, and it is a concern. I would ask members on
both sides to look at some of these things that will affect this com-
mittee I think realistically, not as a partisan measure but some-
thing that is significant to national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, let me join my colleagues in commending each of you for
the quality of the leadership that you bring to the forces that you
lead and to share with you our pride in the quality of those forces.
The next thing that I want to do is to observe not in a partisan
sense but with a large measure of sadness that this defense budget
reflects a level of cynicism that I find very, very disheartening. You
have told us in your testimony today that your O&M accounts are
funded in this budget at minimum levels.
You have told us that in the context of General Krulak's very,
very telling observation that we live in an era that is replete not
with instability but on circumstances bordering on chaos, and those
circumstances seem to be magnifying as we move further from the
downfall, the breakup of the Soviet Union into this new world dis-
order. That would seem to me to be something that would chal-
lenge us to do more rather than doing minimums.
If you are doing minimum O&M funding in this budget but you
are being pressed, short term at least, to pay for unfunded contin-
gencies such as Bosnia — and heaven knows what others will arise
in the course of this fiscal year — ^you are going to be putting your-
self under an enormous amount of stress and distress. I have al-
ready heard rumbles in some of the facilities in my district where
they have a workload that badly needs to be done but no assur-
ances of the money to retain the personnel to do it, even to the ex-
tent of having to go through substantial furloughs. This is a poor
way for you to be required to operate.
I want to inquire and will be inquiring on how the Department
of Defense is managing short term and longer term the costs of the
Bosnian contingency and other contingency operations.
562
Which then brings me to the incredible mismatch between the
requirements that you feel are militarily important to us in pro-
curement in order to have modernization and recapitalization of
our forces. We are inviting, without those procurement dollars, a
degradation in our readiness that is going to be very damaging to
our national security and which is going to break the back of the
forces, the splendid forces that you now lead.
The operational tempo, personnel tempo cannot be sustained in-
definitely at unacceptable levels. You can only do that over a short-
er period of time.
Two other items that need to be reflected on and haven't really
been mentioned today, not in the context that is needed — the utili-
zation of Reserve forces to help resolve your operational tempo,
your personnel tempo problems in the active service. I commend
you for the fact that you are using that resource.
But I also have to say you must be very sensitive to the fact that
these people are reservists. They are there in case the Nation goes
into a state of war and they are called into the service of their
country for a more extended engagement. They are not going to
stay in those Reserves if they have to leave their employment and
their families, two, three, four times a year, because that ain't the
reason that they became members of the Reserves. So you are
going to have to watch that side of that equation.
Something else that hasn't been mentioned today and was the
focus of the hearing yesterday and some very alarming aspects of
it was the area of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the
teeth of all the evidence of proliferation of capability and a GAO
report that is in draft — but I don't know that it is officially dissemi-
nated— that reflects the failure of the Department of Defense to
have fully met the challenge that proliferation entails, even to the
extent of evidence that we lack the vaccine that we ought to be in-
jecting into our forces before they are deployed, that we lack the
protective clothing that is the latest that has been developed in the
quantity in which it is needed, that even in gas masks we are lag-
ging in procurement of the latest and the best available to us.
Even — as one of my colleagues mentioned to me a week or two
ago who served in the Persian Gulf, that we don't even have sound
research on or the consequences of multiple injection of vaccines
and in what combinations you can do that without it perhaps being
materially debilitating to the health of the troops.
To the extent we don't have research in that going on, it ought
to be something that is put on a very, very fast track with the best
we can do. Because it is unthinkable that we would be lacking in
the quantity of vaccines and that we won't even know what vac-
cines can be given in what combinations without their having ad-
verse effects.
Thanks for your attention, and we look forward to working with
you as best we can.
The last injunction, so many have said today that we will be in-
creasing this defense budget. I pray that we will. But I can also
tell you I am extremely doubtful we will be able to raise it as much
as it needs to be raised.
There are other forces, other committees, other elements in the
Congress, and certainly with an administration that permits you to
563
make only minimum requests for O&M and deficient requests in
procurement, there are limitations upon as much as we would be
able to get done.
Thank you again.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Gentlemen, I am still trying to get through, and we have passed
the time. We have about three more people who are anxious to say
something or ask something or make a statement. So if you could
bear with us a few more minutes.
I know. General Reimer, you have another commitment you have
to make. So feel free, when you have to go, just go ahead.
If the rest of you could delay lunch for a few minutes, I would
appreciate it.
Mr. Buyer, who promised to be concise in his statements.
Mr. Buyer. Yes, sir. And, general, feel free to go — after my ques-
tions.
A lot of us here on the committee we get to work with, often, the
senior level staff, and we don't get to see a lot of the senior NCO's
and — unfortunately. Nor do we get to interact with the field com-
manders. That can be unfortunate. We should get out to do that.
I want to make a note that a couple of individuals that I have
dealt with personally here in the last several years are, in fact, re-
tiring. General Lanoue, and his deputy, Tom Temple, have served
you very well and served the Army very well; and I wish them
well.
Yesterday we had our meeting with your personnel chiefs; and,
General Krulak, if you can find a warrior with a big heart that is
as good as General Christmas, go look for him. I mean, he is an
exceptional individual; and we have enjoyed working with him.
General Krulak. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Buyer. The questions that I have — let me move to the sce-
nario of the Pacific rim, with Taiwan — if it has been covered, I
apologize — but to help me with regard to the operations.
I know, Admiral Boorda, you mentioned about the ships that are
at sail. Tell me about what we are doing with our allies in the Pa-
cific rim. Are we just sending our two aircraft carriers over there?
Not only with you, but the Air Force — South Korea, with Japan.
What are others doing? From Australia? I mean, we are the super-
power; but there are regional powers that we must seek respon-
sibility from for stability with regard to that region. So, please
Admiral BoORDA. Let me tell you what is happening at sea, and
we will go from there. Because our forces are mobile and ready,
they are available for national command authority — and by that I
mean the Secretary of Defense and the President — to make an
early decision even as they are talking to others. I think that is im-
portant. I think that is what you have seen here.
Let me shift gears on you and talk about the gulf war for a mo-
ment. That was exactly what happened there. We responded, and
they did consultations and came up with answers. Right now, we
are in the "we are responding mode".
Mr. Buyer. So is the United States moving out by ourselves at
the moment?
Admiral Boorda. We are able to do that quickly, so that is what
we are doing.
564
Mr. Buyer. I compliment the President on the action he has
taken. I do battle with the President as Commander in Chief and
his domestic agenda a lot, but let me compliment the President. I
think his actions were correct.
But for me to assume that we are communicating with other re-
gional powers for stability, as of right now you are not aware that
we are?
Admiral Boorda. No, you have the wrong witnesses for that.
Mr. Buyer. I have the wrong witnesses for that. No, I don't have
the wrong witnesses. I won't ask you matters of policy. I am asking
whether or not you are acting with any other navy from any other
country, yes or no?
Admiral BoORDA. We personally, the Joint Chiefs, no.
Mr. Buyer. Army?
General Fogleman. We are not. The Joint Chiefs are not. You
are asking us at this level if we are
Mr. Buyer. Are our armies, navies
Admiral Boorda. Yes.
Mr. Buyer [continuing]. Interacting with other countries with re-
gard to Taiwan?
General Krulak. The Commander in Chief and the Pacific Com-
mand are involved in that.
General Fogleman [continuing]. With components we provide to
him.
Mr. Buyer. I didn't mean to ask that in a cavalier way. Maybe
I am not asking it right. What other countries will provide a secu-
rity blanket for Taiwan or is the United States the only one doing
this?
Admiral BoORDA. Right now we can't answer that question, not
because that isn't going on but that is exactly why we have, under
Goldwater-Nickles, the unified command. Joe Purra is doing that
work now and will come and report to us in the next day or so. He
will be here.
Mr. Buyer. So I am premature in the question.
Admiral Boorda. Yes, sir.
General Krulak. He is due back tomorrow or the next day.
Mr. Buyer. I have an interest in that.
The other real quick question — Mr. Chairman, I will be — ^is the
committee has a very good interest — ^and I know in our Acquisi-
tions Subcommittee — on chemical de-mil. I just want to focus you
and your staff that if we are going to play this out, $100 billion is
out of the question. So it definitely needs a rethink and relook and
more investment in alternative technologies is the sense from not
only myself but from members of the committee. I am just firing
a flare out there for you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Joe Scarborough from Pensacola, FL.
Mr. Scarborough. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the generals and the admiral-who-wants-
to-be-a-general for being very patient this afternoon for sitting
through this and being caught in the crossfire of sorts. I certainly
understand you are in a difficult situation; but, unfortunately, our
Founding Fathers gave us a messy system. That is why we have
565
a balance of powers, and I commend you all for sitting in the cross-
fire for as long as you have. I think you are doing a great job.
Because I am timid and laid-back and don't speak my mind as
much — I won't be as blunt as Curt Weldon in his assessment of the
situation earlier on — certainly we have felt that frustration, at
least on this panel, and understand the difficult situation you are
in.
I would ask a few specific questions, first of General Fogleman,
just regarding an update on the situation, the BRAC situation, and
ask if you are aware — I know you have an awful lot on your mind
at all times; but, obviously, as you know, BRAC was to downsize
and to help us become more cost-effective and efficient with our
dollars.
There was a move, obviously, of EC testing facilities from Eglin
out west to Nellis despite the fact there was testimony before the
BRAC Commission and, in fact, a statement from General Davis
who sat on the BRAC Commission that actually there would be no
cost savings to be derived from moving EC from Eglin to Nellis
and, in fact, there would be an increase in costs because of the
move.
I want to give a quick update on information we are getting
that — in fact, that is playing out, that Nellis is working out the
way General Davis predicted. A contractor who previously con-
ducted tests last December has now been informed that missions
at Nellis will require 2 hours duration on the F-15 deployment to
complete work that had previously taken 1.5 hours. AJso, that
Nellis now imposes a surcharge on this particular contractor to
cover the costs of having to bring up the range on Saturday.
Added to this, the contractor was informed the only way to get
the missile flyover data within a week would be for Nellis to sched-
ule overtime for data reduction.
We have also been told the Nellis range does not want to run si-
multaneous ground and air tests because it tires the operators, and
the only way they could handle the schedule is to fly four times on
Saturday as well as fly on the range's normal days off. All this re-
sulted in approximately a 40- to 45-percent increase in costs for F-
15II operating expenses.
Needless to say, these were problems that, obviously, the BRAC
Commission did not take into consideration when they made their
recommendation to move EC from Eglin.
I bring this up because it is my understanding the Air Force,
under the guidance of General Powell, has completed a study on
how to cut the costs of development and operational costs and that
Generals Fasilio and Ralston were briefed.
What I would like to know is why this report has not been re-
leased to the R&D subcommittee and to ask when a briefing for the
staff might be scheduled on this issue?
General Fogleman. Clearly, you have greater information on
this issue than I have.
Mr. Scarborough. OK.
General Fogleman. The overall decision on movement of the
electronic combat assets not only involved a cost issue but a syner-
gism issue. We had fragmented assets at Eglin. We had a complex,
566
full-up integrated complex at Nellis. It became sort of the center
of excellence for the country for this kind of thing.
If the information that you have — I will be glad to take — and go
look into this — as to the report which we requested General Powell
to conduct, that report has not reached my level yet; but I will tell
you that we will not in any way try to slow it down. If the commit-
tee is interested in receiving that or members are interested in re-
ceiving briefings on that, we will make them available.
Mr. Scarborough. I am sure you would. I just wanted to bring
this to your attention and note that when it comes across your desk
if we could get a briefing on that it would be appreciated.
Let me ask General Boorda a question regarding the Penguin
antiship missiles. I understand you all have procured 101 of those
and that the fleet inventory objective is at least 193 and obvi-
ously
Admiral BoORDA. Sorry, I didn't understand the first part of
that.
Mr. Scarborough. I understand the Navy has procured
Admiral Boorda. I got it.
Our issue is cost, not requirements, on the Penguin. I under-
stand that the company is trying to get the costs down. It is purely
a cost issue. The missile has grown or is of such a cost that we
can't afford to buy any more.
Mr. Scarborough. Is your goal still 193?
Admiral BooRDA. We would like to have had 193 of those mis-
siles. You are absolutely right on your numbers. We simply can't
afford any more at this price.
Mr. Scarborough. OK. I have no other questions.
Again, I would like to compliment all of you for being here today
and all the good work you have done over the past year.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Moving right along, Mr. Cunningham has a question for the
record for General Krulak.
Mr. Cunningham. Actually, I have several questions for the
record. It deals with JAST and the importance of making sure that
that is on time along with F-22 and the others. I would like to sub-
mit those to the Chiefs and also for you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. McHale is next.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon. I thank you not only for your patience but for
your candor. You have been asked very difficult questions, and
within the proper limits that we have in a democracy under our
Constitution you have given unvarnished answers to some very
tough questions. That is what this is all about. Thank you for that.
General Reimer, my first question is for you.
Recently, the transfer of most of the Army's, if not all the
Army's, reserve combat capability to the National Guard was ac-
complished while cross-transferring to the Army Reserve the prin-
cipal elements of the combat service support. When we enacted the
policies that sustain the 2 MRC strategy, we included in that plan-
ning the essential element that there would be 15 enhanced readi-
ness brigades in the National Guard that would be ready to fight
and deployable within 90 days after the initiation of the second
MRC.
567
When Secretary West was here, he said, of the 15 brigades, 12
are deployable. In straightforward language that tries to draw from
you a candid assessment of the war fighting capabiHty of those Na-
tional Guard brigades, are we asking too much of our soldiers in
the National Guard without having provided to them the peacetime
training that makes them not only deployable but combat ready?
My concern is based on historic mistakes we have made where
in the past we have counted on units to perform certain missions
and have then sent extraordinary men with great leadership into
combat suffering unnecessary casualties because in peacetime we
had not given them the training that they needed.
So we are counting on those 15 enhanced readiness brigades. Are
we training them to fight?
General Reimer. Let me start if I can, Mr. Congressman, on a
very good question in terms of the Army.
I would start from the standpoint that the points that I have
been making here concerning the stress that the Army is under, in
terms of the operational pace and TEMPO that we are working
under, is absolutely true for Reserve component also. We fund
them for about 39 days, training days a year. They spend far more
than that doing their job, and they do it well.
In terms of the 15 enhanced brigades — and the Secretary is abso-
lutely correct also that the 12 are deployable, which means they
are C-3 status or above. The other three are undergoing transition.
Basically, that has to do with the modernization of the brigade, so
we list them in a nondeployable C-5 status which doesn't reflect
so much readiness as it does reflect modernization. Hopefully,
when they come out of the chute, so to speak, they will be back to
the C-3 status again, basically.
As far as are they ready to fight, in my terms I think we have
done an awful lot since Operation Desert Shield. We learned a lot.
The fact that we mobilized them taught us a lot of what it takes
to train and get ready and make sure we don't send soldiers un-
trained into battle.
I am comfortable with the 90 days. That is what it will take. We
have become more realistic in terms of training, in terms of en-
hanced brigades. We want to train them at the company and pla-
toon level. We enhanced the enhanced brigades by putting in about
45 or so active component soldiers who now live and work with
that enhanced brigade.
I think that is a great system. It is a little more like the Marine
Corps which I admire very much in terms of the way they have
done theirs. I think it gets us into that area and provides full-time
support.
In addition. Congress has told us to put 5,000 people under title
XI in to them to help train and assist Reserve components. We will
complete that. There is a funding issue there, but that will be com-
pleted, and we will make it work.
I will say to you I am comfortable, given all of that, the enhanced
brigades can be counted on, given a 90-day postmobilization train-
ing period.
Mr. McHale. We want to do all we can but not in an aggressive
way. But I want to work with you in every way I can to provide
that training to produce superb soldiers who, frankly, need to have
568
the best peacetime replication of combat in order to be ready when
the time comes. That requires not just a speech from us but the
resources you need to run them through the NTC and so on in
order that they can be effective in combined arms.
General Krulak, my second and final question is for you. In Jan-
uary, I went to Camp Lejeune and put on a set of units, spent time
with Lt. Col. Mike Regnor. Mike is the BLT commander that will
deploy later this year. When they go out, Colonel Regnor will have
AAVs that date to the early 1970's and CH-46 helicopters that
date to the 1960's.
What I would ask you to do is take Colonel Regnor, project him
or his successor out to the year 2010. Give us your thumbnail
sketch of why it is important for the Marine Corps to have an over-
the-horizon attack capability and describe for us, if you would, why
the AAAV is so much better than the AAV and the V-22 so much
better than the CH-46. If you can put it in human terms, in terms
of how those pieces of equipment will dramatically change the way
in which the Marine Corps fights in the year 2010.
General Krulak. Yes, sir.
The Marine Corps has gained a great reputation on the ability
to storm ashore, fight their way up a beach and, in the case of, say,
Iwo Jima, up a mountain. The problem with that is it is with great
loss of life.
Maneuver warfare, which is the doctrine that we fight by, basi-
cally tasks us to go where the enemy isn't. By having the capabili-
ties that you have articulated — we call it the triad — the triad of the
V-22, the AAAV, and the LCAT — ^you expose the littorals to the de-
gree they are not capable of being exposed with systems that go at
7 knots across the water.
The AAAV will go across the water in excess of 30 knots. Equal-
ly, if not more important, when it hits solid ground it will have the
mobility of an MlAl tank. It will have a nuclear, biological, and
chemical over-pressure system. It will have composite armor that
will stop any round up to but not including a main battle tank
round. It is just a tremendously capable fight vehicle.
The V-22, a tremendous range, travels in excess of 250 miles per
hour. It is a leap in technology. It is far safer, far more capable
than anything we currently have in the U.S. arsenal right now.
It will, in fact, change warfare, in my opinion. It will give us the
capability — from the standpoint of self-deployability, the numbers
of C-17's that would be required to carry helicopters are now going
to be freed up to do something else that is a lot more important
to me and to Denny. So it has just got a great capability that is
going to expand the battlefield and certainly make it safer.
For Mike Regnor in the year 2020 it will mean that his people
will not have to go into the teeth of the enemy, that they will have
the flexibility to go where he isn't, and when they get there they
are going to win.
Mr. McHale. General, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Talent.
569
Mr. Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity in
this outstanding hearing. I have two brief questions, and I just
want to make a brief statement before then.
I went on this committee in 1993, and it has been an excellent
committee and wonderful experience for me. I think almost every-
body on this committee feels the same way. It was pretty obvious
even to a newcomer like myself in 1993 that the Bottom-Up Review
end strength was not adequate to accomplish the national military
strategy with an acceptable margin of risk. I sat in on a sub-
committee hearing of Mr. Skelton that proved that beyond doubt
with regard to the Army component.
In any event, we are not funding the Bottom-Up Review strategy
which makes that observation a little irrelevant.
What Mr. Weldon calls hypocrisy I have seen over the years as
a kind of institutional helplessness, an inability to escape that par-
adigm and to do anything about it. It is like being in a family
where there is destructive behavior and the family as a whole is
just not capable of confronting it.
I say that because what is unendurable to me sometimes is the
sense that, at some point, all of this may really matter, that we
may ask these people to do something that, even as good as they
are and as hard as they try, they can't do. In the end that history
will just let us all down.
I have two questions, one following Mr. Bateman's comments re-
garding the Reserves.
I spoke at an ROA dinner, and we have great Reserves in St.
Louis. They are outstanding people. I just want to emphasize — and
if I can't get your reaction to this, maybe General Reimer would
be the one. Because most of the people were Army. My brother is
in the Army and happens to be a Lieutenant Colonel in the Re-
serves.
Ike Skelton says that there was a sign in his kitchen growing up
which he has remembered. It was: When mom ain't happy, ain't no-
body happy.
I can tell you my sister doesn't like some of the demands being
made. At that dinner they mentioned the group of surgeons back-
filling in Germany and delivering babies. It is not war. If it was
war, these people would do anything, but it is sort of a quasi.
I just hope you all are anticipating that you can't keep relying
on these Reserves under the same conditions under which they en-
tered the Reserves 10 years ago. They won't do it. I really think
they are going to quit, not because they want to, because the pres-
sure from back home and from their employers is too great. If you
want to comment, I would appreciate it.
For Admiral Boorda, an interest of mine but of great national in-
terest, too, the F-18 C's and D's. Can you, in the intermediate
term, man a fully capable flight deck without more C and D pur-
chases somewhere along the line? You will have 50 planes out
there, but are they going to have the capability you need if you
can't replace the C's and D's?
Admiral BooRDA. I will do mine quick because it will just take
a couple of seconds.
570
If you look at the list that we have been asked to present and
I will present for the record, you will find that I think it makes
sense to go ahead and finish the buy of C's.
C's are what I need, and also that will let me retire some aircraft
earlier that I really should retire. That blends well — is reasonably
low cost when compared to something else, and it blends in well
with the start-up of the E and F line that we are now experiencing.
I can do that in good conscience because last year we asked for
24 from the administration, and we funded 12. We did that to our-
selves. You added six, and there are still six more to go. So I think
we are doing something that makes decent sense.
General Reimer. I want to respond to inquiries. Before I do that,
Mr. Chairman, may I ask your permission, after I respond, to
leave? I hope my answer won't be that bad, but I would like to re-
spond to that.
The Chairman. Of course, General.
General Reimer. That is a very valid issue. As I mentioned ear-
lier, there is a great deal of stress on America's Army, active U.S.
Army Reserve and Army National Guard; and we are working our
people very hard. I understand that stress. I have talked to those
people, and I know that it is sincere.
I have to say, however, though, that there is an equal number
of people that are telling us to use the Reserve more, find better
ways to use the Reserve. The facts are that in the U.S. Army we
have constructed the Army to be America's Army. We cannot go to
war without the Reserve component. We have to have USAR, we
have to have the Army National Guard with us, and we have to
have them to do the things that we are doing in Bosnia right now.
There are certain pieces of the force structure that can only be
found in the Reserve component. So when we called up 3,500 Re-
serve component personnel to go to Bosnia to flesh out the force of
20,000, it reflected that some of those had to go in to in-country
and some of them were there to backfill and provide an adequate
quality of life to soldiers who were with families who were saying
good-bye to their soldiers, and we couldn't leave them high and dry
over there.
So that is kind of where we are, and we are trying to work the
right balance. I am very concerned about the long-range impact of
what this will do to the Reserve component. We will have to watch
that carefully. But I cannot say to you or anybody else that we will
not be using the Reserves more. I think we will have to.
Mr. Talent. I think it makes great sense to use the Reserve. It
is one of the ways you all have covered. But I am flagging for you
from the grassroots what I am hearing, and I think it is something
we will have to deal with in the longer term.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, and the clean-up hitter,
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
briefly make a few observations since I have tried to listen very
carefully to virtually all the testimony.
First, there have been, on several occasions, allusion to the Bot-
tom-Up Review by a number of our colleagues. If many of you will
recall, early on my observation was that I thought the Bottom-Up
571
Review was a first cautious step away from the end of the cold war
than it was a bold step into the post-cold war world.
If you recall, in a colloquy between myself and Secretary of De-
fense Perry, in response he said, we are indeed looking at the world
through a glass darkly as partial answer — in partial response to
agreeing with this gentleman that the Bottom-Up Review docu-
ment should be seen as a dynamic document and not a static docu-
ment.
I would suggest to my colleagues that, rather than attempting to
regard the Pentagon's continued reassessment, given their knowl-
edge about the world, we should be encouraging that they continue
to constantly update their view of the world as we experience it
and gain greater knowledge and thereby continue to refine the Bot-
tom-Up Review document. The day that that is perceived as the
bottom-line bible is the day that we cease to think.
I think General Krulak said it in a very graphic and pointed
way. Spend a great deal of time worrying about modernizing weap-
ons, but modernize your mind. And in order to modernize your
mind, one has to continue to view the world in a dynamic fashion.
Second observation that I would make is that our witnesses testi-
fied to, and as a number of my colleagues observed, that the oper-
ation and maintenance account in this fiscal year has been funded
at the minimal level. However, what was testified to and either not
observed or certainly not engaged was the observation that one or
several of the witnesses made and that was that the threat to that
minimal balance of operation and maintenance funds, the threat
was unknown, and thereby unfunded future contingencies — nobody
has picked up on that.
This gentleman has said to you on a number of occasions over
the last few years, we cannot escape the reality of unknown, un-
funded future contingencies. We will have to continue to grapple as
diligently as we can and I believe on a good government basis, good
planning basis, how we address the issue of unknown future con-
tingencies.
Final observation, Mr. Chairman, and I will conclude.
With respect to the modernization account, because there is a
great deal of attention focused on readiness, near-term and long-
term modernization being an important aspect of long-term readi-
ness, one or several of my colleagues, maybe you, Mr. Chairman,
and you pointed out in your opening statement that you will in-
crease the budget.
Then a question was raised to all of our distinguished witnesses,
if you raise the budget, if you increase the budget, where would
you fund it? Very interesting. All of these people said, don't give
us any new programs. If you are going to do anything, look at the
5-year planning document; and if you are going to do anything,
help us save some resources by accelerating the buy, bringing for-
ward programs.
Final observation. Part of that is what comes through very clear-
ly both from the Secretaries and now from the service Chiefs is
that they are very comfortable with the 5-year plan, the programs
that are embodied in the 5-year plan. But if you are going to do
anything about increasing it, as I keep saying, you don't have to
be a rocket scientist on this committee to realize that you guys are
572
going to plus-up the account. The question is, do you do it by add-
ing big-ticket items that only begin to challenge their priorities in
the outyears or do you do it within the framework of some continu-
ity and some significant planning?
Given the testimony of the witnesses, it appears as if they are
saying don't give us these new programs or don't throw a lot of
money out there across a whole range of ideas and hope that
maybe two or three of them might hit in the bull's-eye that they
have laid out.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would just appreciate your indulgence in
making those three observations. These are issues we have to con-
tinue to contend with, and I appreciate your generosity.
I will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
One concluding observation I might have along those same lines,
too,
I think the main point that we have been trying to make — or at
least a lot of us — is that to say that in the future at some time,
5 or 6 years from now, is when we are going to try to catch up on
modernization is really unrealistic. That is somebody else's watch.
That is another administration, and you cannot find another ad-
ministration to do all these things. By not doing them now and
hoping somebody else will do it later on and making it look like we
are going to do it later on — we are trying to do it right now and
do these things that are in the plan as soon as we can and make
sure they are going to be done and not put them off for somebody
else.
Thank you very much, gentlemen. You have made a very signifi-
cant contribution to our hearing, and we appreciate it and apolo-
gize for keeping you this long.
[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The following questions were submitted for the record:]
Question For Each Of The Chiefs
The Chairman. I would like to pick-up where I left off last year at this hearing.
I suspect that none of your budgets contain everything you believe is necessary to
meet your service specific requirements, or to meet the demands of the national
strategy at the lowest levels of risk.
I also recognize the political reality that each of you must officially "support" the
President's budget regardless of your shortfalls. However, I would expect each of
you, as the senior officer in uniform in each of your services, to be willing and able
to express a personal opinion in response to the following hypothetical question.
If each of your services were to receive an additional $1.5-$2 billion in the FY
97 budget as a result of congressional action on the Budget Resolution, where would
you deem it most critical to apply these funds and why?
Please feel free to respond generally, but I would also like some prioritized and
specific examples.
Also, and only if necessary, please qualify your answers based on two different
assumptions:
First, that an add of this magnitude will be sustained over the next five years
and.
Alternatively, that an add of this magnitude will only be sustainable for the next
2-3 years, after which point the Administration's budget becomes the "high water
mark."
I plan to follow up in writing with each of you so you will be given further oppor-
tunity to expand upon the answer you give this morning.
573
UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
March 26, 1996
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman, House National Security Committee
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request to provide detailed infonmation should the Army
receive additional funding, I have provided you with both updated executive-level
charts and a prioritized list as attachments. While we support the President's
Budget and recognize it provides the best balance with the available resources,
the attached charts graphically show our needs and the Army's focus should we
get additional funds.
Preliminary summary data charts were provided last week in an effort to
define the parameters of need; those being modernization, infrastructure
revitalization, and readiness. The updates enclosed maintain the same
parameters, but reflect some refinement of the detail.
We are helping ourselves meet this dilemma through a concerted effort to
become more efficient, but are most appreciative of any assistance you can
provide. We are pursuing a series of initiatives designed to maximize the use of
our resources. We intend to gamer savings from efficiencies to help pay for a
force structure commensurate with our missions, stabilize quality of life
programs, and increase investment in modernization.
Sincerely,
Dennis J. Reimer
General, United States Amny
Chief of Staff
Attachments
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592
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
18 March 1996
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to provide a written response
to questions you asked during the 13 March 1996 hearing before
your committee.
You asked me what priorities for program increases I would
recommend if additional funding were to become available as a
result of Congressional action. As I testified, my priority
would be to recapitalize our Navy by funding approved programs we
deferred in order to protect near term readiness . I have
enclosed a summary of these programs in response to your request
for prioritized and specific examples.
As always, I appreciate the leadership you and the Committee
continue to show on this important issue.
Sincerely,
f^JD
J. M. BOORDA
Adn/iral, U.S. Navy
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Chairman, House National Security Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515-4002
Enclosure
Copy to:
The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Ranking Minority
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B
19 March 1996
Dear Mr. Chairman,
As per your request at the hearing before your committee
on 13 March 1996, you requested a list of items we would
pursue should additional dollars be provided for defense
spending. Accordingly, I am providing the attached list of
programs which have already received budget scrutiny and
could be pulled forward to field important capabilities
earlier and to save dollars through more cost effective
procurement profiles.
This list has also been provided to the Senate Armed
Services Committee in response to the question of how we
would use an additional $2 Billion dollars should it become
available.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
committee and for your support of our armed services.
Ve^rv Respat^tfullv,
1/
General, U.S./Mirine Corps
Commandant of £he| Marine Corps
The Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman
House Committee on National Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-4002
595
U.S. MARINE CORPS READINESS ENHANCEMENTS
As the Secretary of Defense has stated, the DoD budget strikes a 'prudent balance
between immediate military needs, such as high readiness and troop morale, and long-term
investments, such u basic scientific research and the modernization of weapons and eqwpment."
The Marine Corps budget supports U2d££ - a Marine Corps capable of meeting today's burgeoning
operational requirements. Should additional dollars be provided above the budget request
accounts, we would recommend pulling other readiness, modernization and infiastructure
investments to fi«e up room for essential modernization for tomorrow and the dav after tomorrow
in FY 1998 and beyond.
In keeping with the Secretary's goal to begin a modernization "ramp up," our
modernization requiremems are constructed upon four of the Secretary's five basic objectives: To
continue "leap-ahead" technology, to expand cost effective upgrades of existing systems; to
continue enhancements to power projection capabilities; and, to ensure battlefield dominance.
Specific programs which support these objectives are as follows:
In order to continue "leap-ahead" technology, we would accelerate the development of
highly sophisticated new warfighting capabilities such as:
MV-22 (Moves IOC to the left by procuring extra $302.0M
aircraft in FY 97 and providing advance
procurement for extra aircraft in FY 98.)
AAAV $ 20.0M
Commandant's Warfighting Lab S 40.0M
Telecommunications Upgrades S 18. 8M
Non-Lethal Weapons S 3.0M
Bio-Chcm Defense Unit S 3.0M
We would expand cost effective upgrades of the following existing systems:
AV8.B $ 56.0M
Medium Tactical Vehicle Reman (MTVR) S 3.0M
LW 155 Howitzer $ 4.0M
ANyTPQ-36 Radar Upgrades $ 3.8M
Aviation Simulators $ 60.0M
Mobility Enhancements $ 28.3M
We would continue to enhance power projections capabilities by procuring:
MPF(E) $250.0M
F/A-18D $255.0M
KC-130J $196.0M
CH-53E $ 64.0M
596
The following programs would help ensure continued battlefield dominance:
Javelin $ 20.0M
JTF Headquarters $ 1-7M
Training Devices $ 58.2M
Combat Operations Centers $ 6.0M
Ammunition $ 98.0M
Intelligence Upgrades S 17.3M
Wide-area mine clearing $ 2.5M
Other miscellaneous equipment $ 9.8M
Other beneficial readiness and infi-astnicture items with can be pulled forward inchide:
IniUal Issue $ 35.7M
Ammo Rework $ 5.0M
Maintenance of Real Property $193.0M
Recruiting and Advertising $ 4.7M
Base Operations $ 40.0M
JTF Headquarters $ 5.0M
Riverine Program $ 3.0M
Combat Operations Center $ 5.0M
Commandant's Warfighting Lab $ 8.0M
Corrosion Control $ lO.OM
Personnel Support Equipment $ 26.0M
Off £>uty Education $ 4.5M
MWR Support $ 3.4M
Child Care $ 3.5M
Military Constniction (Active) $ 97.4M
Military Construction (Reserve) $ 23. IM
Family Housing Improvements S 6.0M
Family Housing New Construction S 72.0M
Reserve O&M Support S 7.SM
$ 2.031 B
597
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
ofnce OF THE CHNV or tTArr
WASHIfMTON. DC
i 2IIM11996
HQ USAF/CC
1670 Air Force Pentacon
Wuhinfton, DC tOSSO-1670
The Honorable Floyd D. Spence
Cludmuui, Committee on
National Security
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20616
Dear Mr. Chairman
In responding to the request of the Committee, I have enclosed a list
of prioritized unfunded Air Force requirements for your information. As I
have testified to your committee, should any additional ftmdinf be
available for Air Force procurement, bringing forward existing
requirements would represent the best n4e of ftanding. As agreed with the
HNSC Staff Director, Mr. Ellis, the Air Force will provide supporting
rationale for these items in direct discussions with your stafL
Thank you for your support of Air Force programs. We very much
appreciate your interest in continued modernisation of our force structure
and look forward to working with you in nTintsli]jn#4j{n Air Force as the
world's premiere air and space force.
General,
Chief of Staff
598
l< rneniis« usi l»M|
/U0/Y1JA*
JCTARS
fracurastwo a/e in FY t7 tnd tddMenal OUM aupport In PY 01
F.1BE ^>2-* >*7.1 0.0 0.0
FY 97 tadudM 2 MSEa Md long iMd ItMM for • MBE* In FY M IM8.8M)
F.te U.4 144.3 IBI.e 172.7
FY 97 induda* 2 F-ie* Mid long l«*d itanu for 9 F-16« in FY 98 ItlO.OM)
OPSSp.e«S««m.nt W.l 20.0 40.9 38.0
lner««M* InMal praeuramant laM for OPS UF ffom 2 <p 3 in FY97: and 1 to 3 In FY98/00/01
3S.9
S2.S
4S0.0
708.0
141.9
403.6
6.8
0.0
6 AWACS Extend Santnr 72.9 93.0 78.3 107.0
Cstands AWACS to 2026. RanevMM ilrfianM. awlonie* and ettiaf aircraft ayatama
9 AWACS RaEngina 109.0 247.0 284.0 266.0 277.0 1.163.0
IteanflinM •■ 33 U.S. AWACS ba.twaan FY9843
7 RC-136 fUEngma 148.2 124.5 133.3 136.1
Coniplataa RC-136 taangWng (2/6/8/6/6 Uta par yaarl. inataladon compiaM in FY 02
8 Unli16 .73.9 173.1 110.0 66.0
9anior Span: Sanaor-to-ahoetar/Unk 16 en F-19 and F-16E. RJ flaat. 8-1 and tanninala In Mod Ak Ops Cantft
9 C-130J 4M.6 299.2 306.5 404.9 327.7 1,745.8
ProeuTM 6/6/6/6/6 a/e li aaaodatad nipport aqidpmant. 8uya ABCCC. WC-130 li EC-130 fc tmg asaau
10 Pradaien Ouidad IMuna 114.6 121.1 166.6 188.7 194.3 785.2
Funda SFW/P3I. JASSM w/ 8-1 li 8-2 intagraden. JOAM iMMlaa It kits. CALCM. Q8U-28 It AGM-130
11 60KLoadaf 23.1 24.3 12.3 9.8 -1.6
Procuraa 20 add'l loadara In FY97 li 16 In FY98. Condnuaa aconomie precura rata to prog compiation
r AirSft Oofonaivo Sys 22.3 26.1 17.2 0.0 0.0
Complates InataOation of Aktft Oafansiva Syatema on C-130 aircraft, Inlcuding AMQ ti AFR
13 JFACC Sit Awara Sys (JSASI 9.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Providas JSAS capafaOty to NAF/CC's and saiact<d Joint forea conunandars for battia spaes awaraness
14 JPATS 19-4 11-6 45.6 86.6 93.2 256.3
Buys out JPATS proeuramant in FY 04 vica FY 09 (22/40/60/60/60/60 va 18/ 18/24/30/36/361
16 Raptaeamant Vahida Eqp 140.0 206.0 185.0 196.0 220.0 94S.0
SUyaar fix of vaMda program to fli siMrtagaa and raplaea aging ndasien oMcal vatMaa
16C-6IMods 2.1 33.6 18.0 -4.9 0.0
Funtfa cHtie^ C-6 meda: angina, autopiot. draa. AHJ. OPS. MAOARs, SELCAL. ate
17 BC-1S5CIU-1fin8)llodllIerton •'•7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Porndta simuttanaous medficatien of a/e. Oa»»arr of 2nd a/c accaiaratad from FY 01 to FY 99
18 Sand 1.6 17.0 24.1 108.9 94.4 92.8
Funda ECM Sand 1.5 for F-16E iias ACC, PACAF & USAFE convnandar'a aiipport
19 -nwatar Mssia Dofanaa 8«.5 69.1 68.7 41.5 0.0 245.8
Fiatda Combat Intagra Capabaty, RJ madum wave R Acq, and F-1 5E TMO Eagle & Sensor Mods
545.9
412.0
67.9
64.6
2r /
45.8
63.7
337.2
74.9
91.0
20 Theater Oepioyabia Cemm 70.3
Oecraaaaa airtft requhament to meet two MRC obiectlve
21 Baaa Info Infrastnictura 70.5 75.1 77.1
Mraatrueture upgradea to 44 baaes (FY 97-8: 98.8: 99-10: 00-11; 01-7)
22 Abn Comm liHagiaUon/Equlppaga 12.0 10.0 10.0
Pievidaa eemm/ground Integration for CtNC auppert aircraft
88.6
93.2
408.0
599
23 mr-220€ EngkM «7.B ^.O M.t 47.t
Mod* old«r F-16A-0 wiflinM IF100-100 to -2200 bi MCAT Md U8AR (• S^AmI
■ Hetning (Oennal 1t2.0 168.0 121.0 100.0 M.O
■uyi out p«fman«nt party Mfitral latttnM by FY M, KmiIm donna, and boglna buyfctf out dafldt.
26 Information Protactlen 81.0 67.6 8.6 0.0 0.0
Providas initial ba«a (aval bifonnation protactian for unatnicturod thraat.
26 Tuition Aasiatanco 9.6 14.2 16.0 16.1 17.7
FuAy aupports 75% tuition raimburaamant rata
27 Housing (MFHI 143.6 167.8 148.6 163.0 176.4
Bbninataa inadaquata houaing evar 20 yaar paiiod/atepa growth of daf arrad mx
28 MOLCON 166.0 279.0 169.0 160.0 137.0
Providaa fundhig to eorract addMond CFA rtafirlanclaa
29 OAMA 21.2 46.6 67.3 64.0
Funda aacura veica and UHF 8ATC0M for 73 AF80C and 33 AMC aircraft
30 A-10 Training Oavica 8.6 7.8 8.1 0.0
Funds A-10 unit^iaval low coat aimulator eapabOty (no aim eurrantlyl
31 KC-10/KC-13S Sim Upgr 63.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Acealarataa upgrada of KC-10/KC-136 viaual and motion tyatama
TOTAL
284.8
67S.0
147.0
72.5
790.4
900.0
46.3 234.4
0.0 25.5
0.0 63.0
2.840.3 Z890.5 Z436.0 Z5t8.0 Z127.5 1X872.7
600
Mr. Hanskn. As a war fighter do you personally believe that a strong and efficient
organic depot maintenance capability is necessary to support combat readiness?
General FoGE.KMAN. Yes. Historically, our Air Logistics Centers have made key
contributions to Air Force Readiness. We advocate continuance of that tradition by
sizing DOD depots in accordance with the core methodology. The core methodology
ensures retention of the essential core organic capabilities necessary for the Services
to meet their wartime mission, including all combat readiness requirements.
Mr. Hansen. How important was depot support in Desert Storm?
General FOGI.EMAN. Very important. Both our Air Logistics Centers and our com-
mercial depot sources provided key support during Desert Storm. At Ogden Air Lo-
gistics Center, for example, the depot's production surge in support of the war effort
yielded 1775 additional components for F-4, F-16, F-15, A-10, F-111, C-141, and
C-5 aircraft. Ogden's efforts helped achieve near record mission capable rates for
the F-4 and F-16 aircraft during the conflict. Ogden personnel deployed to the Mid-
dle East to provide aircraft battle damage assessment, on site engineering support,
and aircraft repair actions. There are numerous other examples of effective combat
support provided by Ogden, the other four Air Logistics Centers, and contract depot
locations.
Mr. Hansen. It is important to future readiness to ensure that those maintenance
"Centers of Excellence" that we retain, be properly work loaded to ensure cost effi-
ciency and technical proficiency, in peace time and war?
General Fogleman. Yes. We seek to optimize workload at the Centers in con-
sonance with other mission requirements. Core capabilities remain our most impor-
tant consideration in retained depots. They ensure the existence of sufficient depot
maintenance capability to permit the Services to meet their wartime missions. As
a secondary, but very important consideration, the new core computation process
also provides for adding the necessary workloads to ensure both cost efficiency and
technical proficiency.
Mr. Hansen. Does the Air Force intend to move the "core" workload to those fa-
cilities, where like capabilities and facilities already exist, to help eliminate the
nearly 50% excess capacity that exists in the remaining ALCs as recommended by
the BRAC?
General Fogleman. The workload currently performed at closing Air Logistics
Centers that is ultimately identified by the Air Force as necessary to sustain core
capabilities will be moved to other organic DOD depots.
Mr. Hansen. Will the depots be allowed to compete for other workloads as re-
quired by Title 10 2469?
General FOGLEMAN. On March 31, 1996, the Office of the Secretary of Defense
submitted to Congress a document entitled "Policy Regarding Performance of Depot-
Level Maintenance and Repair." Under that proposed policy, organic depots can
compete with private sector sources of repair when there does not appear to be ade-
quate competition for specific Department of Defense (DOD) workloads within the
private sector. The DOD believes that where private sector competition exists, it will
provide the Department with the best value source for its accomplishment. In other
cases, organic depots can and should vie for the workload.
Mr. Hansen. Are the Air Logistics Centers fully certified to compete under Sec-
tion 2469 and if not, what is the Air Force plan to ensure compliance with this re-
quirement?
General Fogleman. The new depot policy represents the first fully supportive
guidance on depot competition since the Deputy Secretary of Defense suspended
such competitions in May 1994. We anticipate that once this policy becomes final-
ized, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will provide instructions on the certifi-
cation procedures necessary for our depots to enter these competitions. At that time,
we will move aggressively to ensure our remaining depots meet the certification cri-
teria.
601
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602
Mr. DORNAN. What is your opinion on ramping up production of the V-22 in order
to accelerate fielding of this revolutionary aircraft to front line Marine Units?
General Kruij\K. In terms of economics, modernization, and operational capabil-
ity, there are several advantages associated with increasing the production rate.
With increased funding, a procurement rate of 24-36 MV-22s per year could save
the taxpayer as much as $6 to $8 billion (using inflation indices as reflected in the
FY96 budget), or $4.4 to $5.4 billion (using the lower inflation indices as reflected
in the FY97 budget). This procurement rate would allow for completion of delivery
of the MV-22 to the fleet 11 years earlier than the current procurement plan.
Accelerated modernization would reduce our strategic C-5/C-17 airlift, require-
ments due to the V-22's inherent global self-deployment capabiUty. This would also
result in improved force closure.
In terms of operational capability, it will enhance our warfighting capabilities in
support of forward presence/crisis response missions. Additionally, its speed and mo-
bility will increase aircraft and assault force survivability. The V-22 is one of those
major advances in technology that rarely occur and bring with them a major step
forward in capability.
Mr. DoilNAN. Is this your number one priority for any funding added to the budg-
et?
General KiiULAK. Yes, the MV-22 remains the Marine Corps' highest acquisition
priority.
Mr. DoRNAN. What exactly would you personally like to see in terms of ramping
up production in FY-97?
General Krui-AK. Should additional funds be made available for this program, we
would like to see increased procurement funding of $232M in FY97. This would in-
crease the FY97 production rate by two aircraft, for a total of six vice four. Addition-
ally, we would recommend adding $70M to provide Advance Procurement funds to
support a more efficient FY98 production quantity of 12 aircraft vice the presently
planned quantity of 5.
Privatization
Mr. Browdkr. The Defense Department's new interpretation of core would leave
depot-level maintenance of new weapons systems in the hands of the private sector,
and the Department's plans to increase privatization and outsourcing of depot-level
maintenance would send the workload from closing depots to the private sector.
With no new work coming into the organic depot system, how do the Services plan
to keep the remaining depots cost efficient and competitive?
General Rrimkr. The Department's plan for new weapons systems is essentially
the same as with any other weapons system with respect to core. Core depot main-
tenance capability requirements are established to meet essential wartime surge de-
mands, promote competition, and sustain institutional expertise. The most signifi-
cant revision to the core policy was the inclusion of the opportunity to evaluate and
subsequently utilize commercial sources of depot-level support where risk can be
mitigated and best value obtained. As new systems are acquired, it is important to
consider both the need for core capabilities in the public sector and the potential
to obtain full spectrum contractor support. However, all options for private sector
support are subordinate to any core depot maintenance capability requirements
identified in the support analysis for new weapons systems. Once the core capability
requirements are met, the remaining workload must be accomplished such that best
value is attained. This will involve consideration of not only the private sector, but
also efficient peacetime use of the established core capability requirements. It may
also involve having organic depots compete with the private sector when it is deter-
mined that competition from the private sector is inadequate.
Mr. Browdkr. Why are the Services willing to accept the readiness risk that will
come with the loss of a ready and reliable source of repair to support the
warfighter?
General Rkimbr. The Services are not willing to take unacceptable risks to readi-
ness. As part of the process for determining the core capability requirements. Serv-
ices must conduct a risk assessment of the private sector capabilities to determine
if it can provide the required privatization capabilities with acceptable risk, reliabil-
ity and efficiency. Workload will be available for competition in the private sector
only after these criteria are met.
Mr. Browdkr. Deputy Secretary White has stated that the services may keep the
savings they achieve from privatization and use them to fund procurement. Why are
the services willing to risk modernization on the as yet unproven concept of privat-
ization?
603
General Rkimkr. It is not a question of risking modernization on the success of
privatization. Within the budget authority we have been given, we cannot afford to
fund modernization at the expense of other priorities, nor can we afford lower fund-
ing levels for those other priorities. Savings found, from whatever source, will be
reinvested to fund all Army priorities, including the modernization accounts.
Dkpot Maintp:nanck Privatization
Mr. BUOWDKR. The Defense Department's new interpretation of core would leave
depot-level maintenance of new weapons systems in the hands of the private sector,
and the Department's plans to increase privatization and outsourcing of depot-level
maintenance would send the workload from closing depots to the private sector.
With no new work coming into the organic depot system, how do the Services plan
to keep the remaining depots cost efficient and competitive?
Admiral BooRDA. First, we do not plan on sending all depot maintenance work
on new systems or all workload from closing depots to the private sector. Assign-
ment of work to the private sector will be based on DoD's approved CORE methodol-
ogy which requires an assessment of private sector capabilities to accomplish those
workloads that are not required to support organic industrial base capabilities. If
the private sector can provide the required capability to acceptable risk, reliability,
and efficiency, consistent with CORE policy, the workload should be made available
to the private sector. Otherwise, if the workload is determined to be a mission-es-
sential CORE capability in support of JCS contingency scenario(s), it should be ac-
complished in organic depots.
Second, our CORE capability requirements shape the minimum amount of organic
facilities, equipment, and skilled personnel that we maintain as a ready and con-
trolled source of technical competence. By sizing our remaining organic depots to
CORE, we ensure that our depots will be operated in the most cost-effective and
efficient manner possible.
Mr. Browdkr. Why are the Services willing to accept the readiness risk that will
come with the loss of a ready and reliable source of repair to support the
warfighter?
Admiral Boorda. The Navy has sized and structured a depot maintenance pro-
gram that includes both public and private sector sources of repair. We conduct a
thorough analysis of depot maintenance support needs, review the risks associated
with those needs, and structure our programs accordingly. The analysis conducted
to determine CORE capability requirements addresses risk and industrial base ca-
pabilities, including those of the private sector. In those cases where we determine
that risk management requirements demand it, organic capabilities are retained.
However, it is the overall combination of public and private sector sources that pro-
vides the desired depot maintenance support program.
Mr. Browdkr. Deputy Secretary White has stated that the Services may keep the
savings they achieve from privatization and use them to fund procurement. Why are
the Services willing to risk modernization on the as yet unproven concept of privat-
ization?
Admiral BooRDA. We do not regard privatization as an unproven concept. We
have been relying on the private sector since our inception, not only for construction
and maintenance of our weapons systems but also for the provision of a wide variety
of support functions. Navy has successfully outsourced all types of commercial ac-
tivities ranging in size and complexity from ship and aircraft repair to maintenance
of large building complexes to child care centers and bachelor quarters. We have
50,000 workyears of commercial type work already contracted. The Commission on
Roles and Missions Report (CORM) (May 1995) and a Center for Navy Analysis
Study (1993) both report findings that competition for outsourcing saves money
(20%-30%). Their findings are compatible with Navy's competitions of 29,000 posi-
tions using OMB Circular A-76 procedures in the 1980s which resulted in signifi-
cant savings (20%-309r of original cost) with about half of the competitions resulting
in conversions to contract. This outsourcing has been accomplished without any deg-
radation of our readiness. It is critical that we free up resources for equipment mod-
ernization by dramatically reducing our support costs, and outsourcing is an excel-
lent tool for doing just that.
Mr. Browdkr. The Defense Department's new interpretation of core would leave
depot-level maintenance of new weapons systems in the hands of the private sector,
and the Department's plans to increase privatization and outsourcing of depot-level
maintenance would send the workload from closing depots to the private sector.
With no new work coming into the organic depot, how do the Services plan to keep
the remaining depots cost efficient and competitive?
604
General Fogleman. Actually, the new depot policy states that a decision on plac-
ing new weapon systems in the private sector remains "subordinate to any core
depot maintenance capability requirements." As such, the remaining organic depots
will see future workload resulting from the core requirements inherent in new
weapons systems. Under the proposed policy, the depots may also compete for work-
loads with inadequate commercial sources.
Mr. Browder. Why are the services willing to accept the readiness risk that will
come with the loss of a ready and reliable source of repair to support the war fight-
er?
General Fogleman. The private sector has demonstrated an ability to support
some depot workloads at an affordable cost without risking readiness. The new
depot maintenance policy advocates using the private sector only in those instances
where savings can be achieved without risking readiness.
Mr. Browder. Deputy Secretary White has stated that the services may keep the
savings they achieve from privatization and use them to fund procurement. Why are
the services willing to risk modernization on the as yet unproven concept of privat-
ization?
General FOGLEMAN. The services feel strongly about the need to reduce any un-
necessary infrastructure to generate savings for modernization. In order to assess
the potential savings achievable through privatization, our approach has been to
prototype a variety of workloads at Sacramento and San Antonio. Our future privat-
ization actions will be guided by instances in which our savings projections prove
justified.
Mr. Browder. Why are the services willing to accept the readiness risk that will
come with the loss of a ready and reliable source of repair to support the war fight-
er?
General Krulak. We are not willing to put our readiness at risk, we believe such
a risk is minimized by the retention of our CORE competency capabilities.
Mr. Browder. Deputy Secretary White has stated that the services may keep the
savings they achieve from privatization and use them to fund procurement. Why are
the services willing to risk modernization on the as yet unproven concept of privat-
ization?
General Krulak. The Marine Corps alone cannot modernize its force through the
savings from privatization. However, as Secretary White has pointed out, the sav-
ings from privatization, other acquisition reform efforts, and infrastructure reduc-
tion, including BRAG closures, should "provide" enough funding within DOD's total
topline to support modernization efforts.
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Mrs. Fowler. General Reimer, at General Joulwan's request the Joint STARS
system was deployed in support of our forces in Bosnia. What is the Army's perspec-
tive on how the system is supporting our forces on the ground there?
General Reimer. JSTARS is a highly capable system and the deployment in sup-
port of Operation Joint Endeavor has proven this again. The soldiers and airman
of the JSTARS team have accomplished their mission well. Both the air and ground
segment of the JSTARS system make a powerful team providing real time Moving
Target Indicators (MTI) and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) directly to the coni-
mander on the ground. The concern for minefields and the very severe terrain limit
what soldiers on the ground can accomplish. While that same severe terrain chal-
lenges the capabilities of JSTARS due to radar masking, the system has been an
invaluable tool in covering remote and dangerous areas in both day and night. Mis-
sions have included monitoring convoys, rail lines, refueling points, weapons collec-
tion points, known artillery/mortar sites, ferry crossings and even helicopter move-
ment. It is important to note that some of the most successful missions are ones
that show no activity. Lack of movement in an area is critical intelligence as well.
One concern raised was the restrictions caused by only having two operational air-
craft. This is insufficient to fully satisfy the numerous requests from the U.S.,
French and British units JSTARS supports.
Mrs. Fowler. When President Clinton visited Bosnia in January, he told the
troops at Tuzla Air Field that "The people around . . . know that our JSTARS air-
craft are patrolling high above the clouds, tracking the smallest movements." Can
you comment on the value of JSTARS in protecting our troops in Bosnia?
General Reimer. It's hard to quantify the direct impact of JSTARS on the force
protection of our troops supporting Operation Joint Endeavor. There was a lot of
concern over possible reaction to our initial deployment of forces into the area. As
the 1st Armored Division moved into Bosnia over the Sava River, JSTARS was used
extensively to monitor any movement threatening the convoys or reacting to them.
605
Once established in country, JSTARS provided commanders with an abiUty to mon-
itor areas in severe terrain and those considered too dangerous due to landmines.
This provided the commanders with an alternative to deploying soldiers in harm's
way. Commanders quickly recognized the necessity of consolidating soldiers in a few
secure areas and responding when necessary. JSTARS played a major role in the
ability of commanders to adopt this force protection strategy. The night capability
of JSTARS further enhances this value. JSTARS also successfully links to the
friendly fire support system (TACFIRE) providing the capability to quickly fire on
enemy forces observed by JSTARS. Fortunately, such firepower has never been re-
quired but the capability has direct impact on force protection.
Mrs. FowLKR. Admiral Boorda, the cornerstone of the Navy's Airborne Early
Warning Fleet is the E-2C Group 11 aircraft. In fact. Navy E-2Cs have dem-
onstrated their enormous importance to the Fleet once again with their contribu-
tions to Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.
Originally, your budget called for production of four E-2Cs in FY97, but that
number has now declined to two aircraft. Would additional funds for a third and
fourth aircraft assist in achieving the Navy's all E-2C Group II inventory objective,
as well as appreciably reduce unit cost?
Admiral Boorda. Yes, by providing funding for two additional aircraft in FY 1997
the Navy will reach its Group II inventory objective sooner than if only two aircraft
are produced. The unit cost reduction when buying four E-2C aircraft vice two air-
craft is approximately $13.2 million per aircraft.
EA-6B
Mrs. FowLKR. Admiral Boorda, the Congress continues to be concerned about the
level of progress that has been achieved with regard to the Electronic Warfare capa-
bilities of Fleet aviation — especially since the Navy has been designated to provide
all support jamming, on a joint Service basis. The current EA-6B Prowler retains
a 1960's vintage tactical jamming system, raising serious questions about whether
it can defeat modem surface-to-air threats and help to ensure U.S. air superiority.
What is the status of the EA-6B upgrades directed by the Congress in the FY96
DoD bills? What is the total amount requested in FY97 for EA-6B upgrades? To
what extent does the Navy anticipate further refinements in its plans for upgrading
the EA-6B, and when will those refinements be fully determined and available for
Congressional consideration? What is the timetable for completing the work on this
critical EW system?
Admiral BoORDA. The first modification addressed in the FY96 Defense Author-
ization Act included $100 million to modernize up to 20 older EA-6B Block 82 air-
craft to the newer Block 89 configuration to offset Air Force EF-lllA retirements.
The Navy will go on contract by the third quarter 1996 for these modifications with
the first aircraft being delivered in 1997. The second modification included $40 mil-
lion to procure 60 band 9/10 transmitters. Upon completion of operational testing,
the Navy will exercise an option on an existing contract in July 1996. Finally, the
third modification addressed in the Act included $25 million for 30 USQ-113 en-
hanced radio countermeasures sets. The Navy has migrated prior ADVCAP ALQ-
149 technology into the USQ-113 and expects to award a contract in May 1996.
With regard to FY97, the Navy requested zero dollars for EA-6B upgrades. How-
ever, the Navy does plan on upgrading the EA-6B to ICAP-3 which will replace
1960's vintage receiver with current technology. A study was initiated to examine
current technology capabilities and will be completed later this quarter. The Navy's
goal is to have ICAP-3 operational by 2003.
Mrs. Fowler. What is the Air Force perspective on how the system (Joint STARS)
is performing in this terrain (Bosnia) and in the Peacekeeping mission?
General Fogleman. Our assessment of the recently completed deployment of the
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) to support Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR is that the personnel and equipment performed admirably. The
statistics were impressive, even more so when considering that we took
preproduction aircraft to support real-world operations. We flew 100 percent of the
tasked operational missions, achieving an 80 percent mission-capable rate and an
86 percent time-on-station rate.
JOINT ENDEAVOR was the first deployment of the complete JSTARS to include
the Ground Station Modules, allowing direct interface with ground commanders,
and a near-production capable E-8C, with far more advanced processing, display
and communications capabilities that the JSTARS deployed to support Desert
Storm.
The rugged Bosnian terrain and dense foliage proved challenging, but not insur-
mountable obstacles. Through the use of terrain modeling tools, we were able to
606
identify the most advantageous orbit positions for different sectors of the country
and modify these orbits as needed to meet the taskings of units as they arose.
JSTARS also proved invaluable in the peacekeeping mission. Ground commanders
were able to use high-resolution JSTARS imagery to monitor and track ground force
activities, and to demonstrate to all sides that treaty violations would be both de-
tected and responded to.
We are extremely satisfied with JSTARS performance in Bosnia and we've
learned a number of valuable lessons that we will be able to exploit as we build
up the 93rd Air Control Wing at Robins AFB, GA.
Mrs. Fowler. Given that Joint STARS will likely continue to be deployed, much
as AWACS, wherever the U.S. responds to contingencies, do you believe the cur-
rently planned buy of 20 aircraft will be sufficient?
General Fogleman. A force of 20 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
(JSTARS) aircraft will support anticipated taskings. JSTARS is another among our
small fleets of high operational tempo, highly specialized aircraft, such as the Air-
borne Warning and Control System (AWACS), the Airborne Command, Control, and
Communication (ABCCC), RIVET JOINT, U2, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
and others. These systems will support two major regional conflicts through the ju-
dicious use of limited assets. We must combine the capabilities of AWACS, ABCCC,
U-2s, RIVET JOINT, UAVs, and all our Theater Air Control System assets with
available JSTARS aircraft to form an effective battle management/Command, Con-
trol, Communication, Computer, IntelUgence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
team.
Comanche Program
Mr. Everett. The Comanche represents the future of Army aviation, especially
in terms of the modem digitized battlefield. The Comanche is the "quarterback" or
the eyes of the battlefield for the Army. Is Comanche's role still integral to the suc-
cess of the digitized battlefield?
General Reimer. The RAH-66 Comanche is a key "Force XXI" system as it con-
stitutes the technological core to meet digital battlefield requirements. It will self-
deploy; see the battlefield (night, adverse weather) in sufficient space and time to
allow ground force dominance; maintain total battlefield awareness for the ground
commander; reduce fratricide; and possess a small support/maintenance footprint.
Comanche connects sensors, shooters, and joint tactical commanders in the mgital
environment. The information based force will be supplied a system that possesses
the capability to receive and transmit a three dimensional situational picture of the
battlefield, connect to the joint digital architecture, and deliver precision fires
throughout the width and depth of the battlefield.
Mr. Everett. Over the past ten years, the Comanche program has been delayed
or pushed to the right at least three times. Correct me if I am wrong, but these
program delays have all been budget driven; there have been no technological or
programmatic problems to warrant these delays? If more funds were available for
the Comanche, would the Army be able to move the initial operating capability
(IOC) up to 2003, where it was before the last stretch-out?
General Reimer. It is true that the restructures and delays of the Comanche pro-
gram were budget driven. Comanche has been a successful development program
with no known high risk technical challenges remaining. With sufficient funding,
technically this program could be restored to the fiscal year (FY) 2003 IOC. The
Army has considered this option. However, due to current funding constraints and
near-term operational requirements, and higher priorities the Army has chosen to
continue witii the FY 06 IOC program. This still provides us with an acceptable de-
velopment program. Restoration of an FY 03 IOC would require the following addi-
tional funds in the future years defense program:
[Escalated in millions of dollars — fiscal year]
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
RDTE
Procurement
199
445
370
270
240
60
360
Mr. Everett. Admiral Boorda, last week you were quoted in Aerospace Daily as
being interested in looking at the Army's Blackhawk helicopter to perform the
Navy's vertical replenishment mission. The idea of purchasing non-developmental
item sounds good to me; could you expand on this for the committee?
607
Wouldn't this save dollars by purchasing an existing aircraft, with only minor
modifications?
What issues have to be resolved before the program can go into the procurement
stage?
How quickly do you need to replace your existing fleet?
Does the FY97 Budget Request provide adequate funding for this program?
Admiral Boorda. The recent Vertrep Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA) indicated that procurement of an airframe common to the Navy's current
inventory of H-60's, such as the CH-60, could result in life-cycle savings of over
$600 million in manpower and force structure.
The only issue to resolve is obtaining sole source authority to purchase the CH-
60 so that a contract can be written between the Navy and Sikorsky Aircraft Cor-
poration to build a CH-60 Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) modification package
to be used for procurement against the Army Multi-Year V contract. This is the
same method the USAF used to purchase their H-60's for subsequent modification
to the MM/HH-60G.
The Navy is currently short of inventory requirements by 19 aircraft (a problem
that will only worsen). Remaining Service Life is being depleted rapidly, and CH-
46 aircraft are becoming logistically difficult to support.
There is currently no funding for this program in FY97. There is funding begin-
ning in FY98 to commence initial replacement for the CH-46D.
Personnki. Issuks
Mr. WA'rrs. General Reimer, I'd like to thank you for being here today. It has
been my pleasure to work with you and be a personal witness to your courage and
leadership.
I would like to focus on the Arm/s continuing drawdown of personnel. I, along
with many of my colleagues, are concerned that the Army maintain a sufficient
number of personnel to fight and win the battles that lie ahead. Others too are in-
terested in the plight of the Army's manpower levels. I believe this week's Army
'Times cover story deals with this very issue. The article in that newspaper discusses
some of the logical outcomes of a downsized force; namely stress and anxiety.
But, I want to take a moment to discuss reduced capability that may naturally
come from a downsized force structure. I'm not certain we will be able to answer
the call if the Army continues its reductions to a level of 475,000 soldiers.
What is the appropriate end strength for you to meet mission requirements? Is
475,000 sufficient? Is the 475,000 figure being driven by budget constraints or re-
quirements?
General Reimer. Active Army end strength of 495,000 represents the minimum
level for a force of 10 active component (AC) divisions to be able to execute the Na-
tional Military Strategy (NMS) at an acceptable level of risk. Our rigorous Total
Army Analysis process validated the capability, and attendant risks, of the 495,000
AC force to execute two Major Regional Contingencies as required by the NMS. To
my knowledge, the warfighting and sustainment capabilities of a 475,000 AC force
have never been modeled or analyzed in any way. Reduction below 495,000 may be
possible in the outyears. Ongoing initiatives, such as institutional Army re-engineer-
ing and heavy division redesign, may allow end strength to be reduced below
495,000 in the outyears; however, those initiatives have not yet been completed and
fully analyzed. Consequently, we are not prepared to make that assumption and be-
lieve that reductions below 495,000 would have unavoidable readiness implications.
In fact, below 495,000 the ability of the AC to execute the NMS becomes problem-
atic, particularly given our current operational deployments. At lower levels, the
Army would, depending upon the circumstances, require more time and resources
to win the conflict. The cost to the nation would almost certainly be higher. For that
reason, we feel that 495,000 is the right AC end strength to execute the NMS.
End Strength
Mr. Wa'H-S. Is the Army being stressed by current requirements?
General Reimer. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has experienced a 300
percent increase in the number of soldiers deployed away from home station. The
average length of time the soldier in a tactical unit is deployed away from home,
either in training or contributing to a contingency operation, has increased signifi-
cantly. For example, in fiscal year 1995, the Active Army routinely had over 21,000
soldiers deployed to over 60 countries on any given day. Factoring in the deployment
of soldiers to Bosnia, this daily average has now increased to about 40,000. While
we are able to meet current operational requirements, any increase in missions or
decrease in the Army's end strength would exacerbate this already high personnel
608
tempo, degrading readiness, and, with it, our warfighting capability. Furthermore,
in the long run we could lose our experienced soldiers, noncommissioned officers,
and officers due to the stress of these deployments.
MODKHNlZA'riON PKOOKAM
Mr. Waits. What level of procurement do you feel is necessary to sustain an ade-
quate modernization program?
General Rkimkh. The Army has significant shortfalls in Research Development
Acquisition (RDA) accounts due to chronic underfunding in the past. The Army re-
quires $14 to $16 billion annually in its modernization accounts in the Future Years
Defense Program to fund them at a level commensurate with other Army programs.
Funding for full recapitalization would require annual resources in the $15 to $20
billion range. We are only funded for approximately $11 billion in FY 97.
Additional Funds
Mr. Wa'ITS. If you were given more funds, what would you spend them on?
General Reimer. Should we receive additional funds, we would spend them on
modernization, infrastructure revitalization, and near-term readiness. A full expla-
nation of where we would spend the additional funds has been provided separately
to the committee at the request of the Chairman.
Javrijn
Mr. TuOitNBKRRY. I understand that the Marine Corps is funding the Javelin mis-
sile for the first time in FY97. Please describe the benefits of this weapon system
to the Marine Corps, the reasons the Marine Corps has requested funding, and the
level of funding for FY97 and future years?
Finally, if more money were available, would you accelerate funding for the Jave-
lin missile?
General Krulak. The benefits of the Javelin, formally the AAWS-M, include an
increased range (2000m), increased lethality against all current and future armored
threats (to include explosive reactive armor and active protection), increased prob-
ability of hit and kill, and increased gunner survivability due to the use of "fire-
and-forget" technology and the Javelin's low launch signature. Its soft launch capa-
bility allows the Javelin to be fired from enclosures which will enhance Military Op-
erations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The reusable com.mand launch unit (CLU) will
provide the infantry battalion with a state-of-the-art, thermal sight/observation de-
vice.
The reason the Marine Corps has requested funding is that the Javelin provides
the Marine Corps with a lethal medium antiarmor weapon system which will re-
place the aging Dragon system. The Dragon system is only marginally effective
against older main battle tanks, and is not capable of destroying modern or future
tanks.
The procurement funding profile for the Javelin is as follows:
[In millions of dollars!
Fiscal year 97 28.2
Fiscal year 98 77.3
Fiscal year 99 119.2
Fiscal year 00 114.1
Fiscal year 01 100.7
If more funding were made available the Marine Corps would accelerate procure-
ment of this important capability.
Mr. Chambliss. I feel compelled to follow up on some of the questions raised by
my colleagues on the issue of Privatization. For the record, I would like to echo the
sentiments of many here on this Committee who believe that privatization must be
considered in the spirit of efficiency and savings. However, I would argue privatiza-
tion of our organic maintenance capability, even where it is shown to achieve mar-
ginal savings, is not in the interests of our national security. There are simply too
many risks and challenges to the readiness of our force. In a time when this admin-
istration is asking our brave men and women to do more with less, we must not
compromise the quality and availability of the weapons and systems for our
warfighters.
General Krulak, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, this nation's "911" force,
you have indicated that the readiness of your force is priority one. At the present
time, it is estimated that as a percentage of maintenance workload, the Marine
609
Corps performs 85-90 percent of that work organically, or in house. Is it your opin-
ion as Commandant that this mix is appropriate and, therefore, critical to your
present state of maximum readiness?
General Krulak. Historically, the amount of Marine Corps work performed in our
Multi-Commodity Maintenance Centers has been approximately 857f . This percent-
age can vary for a number of reasons; funding, operational commitments, support
requirement priorities, interservicing, and contracting out to the private sector.
At issue however, is not the percent of workload retained in house, but rather, the
capability required as CORE competencies. It is the retention of CORE capabilities
in our organic depots that will minimize risk to readiness. As such, we will review
our CORE capability to ensure we remain prepared as our nation's force of choice.
Mr. Cfi AM BLISS. I understand that recently Undersecretary of Defense White sent
a "carrot-on-stick" memo to each of the Service Secretaries which, in effect, tells ya'll
that any savings achieved as a result of privatization in your respective service
would be available to you for modernization or any other purpose you deem critical.
General Krulak, given your outspoken feelings about the importance of your or-
ganic maintenance capability, are you of the opinion that your organic maintenance
dollars are currently best-spent in providing reliable, ready systems and weapons
for your Marine Corps personnel?
General Krulak. We believe our FY96 dollars are being well spent. We contin-
ually analyze those factors that impact our ability to maintain CORE capability at
the lowest cost and adjust accordingly.
60/40
Mr. Jones. General Krulak, what do you believe the impact of depot privatization
will have on the readiness of the Marine Corps? How do you feel about the penta-
gon's draft plan to remit all savings associated with depot privatization back to each
of the services?
General Krulak. The impact on readiness is minimal as long as we retain CORE
competency capabilities. The retention of CORE enables us to remain prepared as
our nation's force of choice. Wherever we identify opportunity for savings through
privatization it must be tempered with caution that savings will occur slowly and
may not always be measured in terms of dollars. I applaud the initiative to pass
along privatization saving to the services.
Mr. Jones. General Krulak, I know that the Marine Corps KC-130 aircraft are.
an integral part of Marine Air Ground Task Force operations. I also know that the
majority of these work horses in the active forces are nearly 40 years old. What do
you envision to be the most cost effective way for the replacement of this aircraft
for the Marine Corps?
General Kruiak. The KC-130 has been a valued workhorse for the Marine Corps
since we accepted our first KC-130F in March, 1960.
Our active duty KC-130F and KC-130R aircraft average 34 and 19 years of age,
respectively. In fact, the KC-130Fs are the oldest aircraft in the Marine Corps in-
ventory. It is critical that we address the replacement issue in the near term.
Fortunately, the new KC-130J has already been developed for the USAF and
meets our refueling requirements. With its increase in speed and range, its new
"glass" cockpit and night vision enhancements, and its improved air refueling sys-
tem, this aircraft will provide the Marine Corps with a modern air to air refueler
and tactical transport aircraft well into the 21st century. The acquisition objective
for the KC-130 J is 51 aircraft to replace the KC-130F and KC-130R. A cost effec-
tive approach to this initiative would be to procure 4 KC-130J's per year at an an-
nual cost of approximately $196M.
Mr. Jones. General Krulak, the committee notes that the DoD budget requests
procurement of 10 remanufactured Harriers this year. Could you briefly summarize
this program and tell me if the procurement of 10 aircraft provides for efficient
rates?
General Krulak. The remanufacture of Day Attack Harriers to the Night Attack/
Radar configuration is a viable and cost effective alternative to new aircraft procure-
ment. Remanufacture significantly increases the combat effectiveness of the AV-8B
as a multi-mission platform, while necking down from three to two configurations
currently in the fleet. The remanufacture of day attack will reduce attrition, en-
hance survivability, increase combat capability, standardize configuration and ex-
tend service life. The remanufacture will incorporate a new fuselage, radar/avionics,
and a Rolls Royce— 408 engine. The recent cost analysis conducted by the Cost Anal-
ysis Improvement Group (CAIG) price the cost of remanufacture at 77% of the cost
of a new production aircraft.
610
A $56M funding enhancement will support an additional two AV-8B Remanufac-
tured aircraft (total of 12) to ramp to a more efficient production rate. Additionally,
with a three or a four year multi-year contract in place, another 5-7% savings in
recurring flyaway costs would occur.
AN/ALQ-165 Performance in Bosnia Theater
Mr. Jefferson. The DoN requested and was granted permission to deploy the
ALQ-165 (ASPJ) in Bosnia. It is our understanding that the in-country commanders
made this request because the present F-18C/D system does not provide protection
against the threat! s) of interest. How has the system been performing in theater?
Admiral BoORDA. Performance of the system deployed on F/A-18C/Ds is reported
as good. Reliability is three times the OPEVAL requirement.
F-14D Testing
Mr. Jefferson. The DoN has been in formal testing of the ALQ-165 (ASPJ) in
the F-14D for the past several months. Based on the positive testing results to date,
the DoN has issued contracts for the aircraft racks (Smith's Industries) and aircraft
modifications (Northrop Grumman). When do you anticipate these tests to be com-
pleted, and if successful, what are your deployment plans?
Admiral Boorda. F-14D testing with AN/ALQ-165 should be completed by the
end of April. The first twelve F-14Ds with ASPJ installed will deploy in May aboard
the USS Carl Vinson.
Commonality of Bosnian Threat of Interest
Mr. Jefferson. It is our understanding that the threat in Bosnia that resulted
in the in-country commander requesting the ALQ-165 (ASPJ) is a threat system
type that is operational in many, if not all of the countries that you have developed
contingencies for. Is this an accurate assessment?
Admiral BooRDA. The ALQ-165 (ASPJ) responds/counters that threat and is used
in conjunction with the other active/passive systems and tactics to defeat this
threat.
AN/ALQ-165 Integration Into Finland and Switzeri^nd F/A-18C/B Aircraff
Mr. Jefferson. International countries have a high opinion of the ALQ-165
(ASPJ). In spite of the U.S. decision to terminate the program, countries like Fin-
land and Switzerland have contracted for the ALQ-165 to protect their F-18C/D.
We further understand that several other countries are inquiring to have ASPJ for
their F-18C/D platforms and the Republic of South Korea is in the final stages of
negotiation to install the ALQ-165 into its F-16C/D platforms. Please advise us of
the FMS integration status of the ALQ-165 into Switzerland and Finland F-18C/
D aircraft.
Admiral BoORDA. Integration of the AN/ALQ-165 with the weapons systems of
the F-18C/D for Finland and Switzerland is progressing well. Integration with the
final release of the aircraft mission computer load and flight testing is scheduled
to be completed in the fourth quarter 1997.
Possible AN/ALQ-165 Deployment Plan
Mr. Jefferson. We are committed to providing our fighting force with the best
equipment to insure survivability. Based on performance to date, it is our under-
standing that for the type/location of conflicts that the DoN must be prepared for
requires a system, for the F-18C/D, with the capabilities of the ALQ-165 (ASPJ).
Since the production line has been restarted for the international countries, now
may be the time for the U.S. to economically obtain additional ALQ-165 systems.
If additional ALQ-165 systems were provided, please provide us with a Navy carrier
and Marine forward deployment ALQ-165 installation and deployment plan.
Admiral Boorda. We currently are outfitting two F/A-18C/D squadrons with
ASPJ in the Bosnian Theater with a portion of our previously procured systems. The
remainder of our on-hand systems will outfit our F-14D aircraft. Seventy-two sys-
tems would outfit an additional six deployed F/A/18C/D squadrons. Along with the
F-14Ds, this would approximate the number of squadrons deployed during normal
fleet operations.
Mr. Jefferson. The DoN requested and was granted permission to deploy the
ALQ-165 (ASPJ) in Bosnia. It is our understanding that the in-country commanders
made this request because present F-18C/D system does not provide protection
against the threat(s) of interest. How has the system been performing in theater?
611
General Krulak. Sir, your information is correct. The performance of the ASPJ
deployed on F/A-18C/D's is very good. Although the ASPJ, has not completed pro-
gression through the normal research and development pipeline, it provides signifi-
cant and measurable improvements over the ALQ-126B. It did complete an abbre-
viated evaluation prior to its deployment to Bosnia and all deficiencies were satis-
factory resolved. The Marines in Aviano are able to conduct every assigned mission
with enhanced survivability against projected threats. Rehability of the ASPJ has
been three times the OPEVAL requirement.
Mr. Jkfferson. The DoN has been in formal testing of the ALQ-165 (ASPJ) in
the F-14D for the past several months. Based on the positive testing results to date,
the DoN has issued contracts for the aircraft racks (Smith Industries) and aircraft
modifications (Northrop Grumman). When do you anticipate these tests to be com-
pleted and, if successful, what are your deployment plans?
General Krulak. Sir, since we do not operate the F-14 aircraft, I have referred
this question to the Navy. It is my understanding, however, that the F-14D testing
with the ALQ-165 (ASPJ) should be completed by the end of April 1996. The first
twelve F-14D's with ASPJ installed are scheduled to deploy in May 1996 aboard
the USS Carl Vinson.
Mr. Jkffrrson. It is our understanding that the threat in Bosnia that resulted
in the in-country commander requesting the ALQ-165 (ASPJ) is a threat system
type that is operational in many, if not all of the countries that you have developed
contingencies for. Is this an accurate assessment?
General KitULAK. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jkfferson. International countries have a high opinion of the ALQ-165
(ASPJ). In spite of the U.S. decision to terminate the program, countries like Fin-
land and Switzerland have contracted for the ALQ-165 to protect their F-18C/D.
We further understand that several other countries are inquiring to have ASPJ for
their F-18C/D platforms and the Republic of South Korea is in the final stages of
negotiation to install the ALQ-165 into its F-16C/D platforms. Please advise us of
the FMS integration status of the ALQ-165 into Switzerland and Finland F-18C/
D aircraft.
General KRULAK. Sir, it does not come under my direct preview, however, it is
my understanding that the integration of the ASPJ with the weapons systems of
the F-18C/D for Finland and Switzerland is progressing well. Full integration with
the final release of the aircraft mission computer load and flight testing is scheduled
to be completed in the 4th quarter 1997. I have referred this question to the Navy
for further elaboration.
Mr. Jkffkrson. We are committed to providing our fighting force with the best
equipment to insure their survivability. Based on performance to date, it is our un-
derstanding that for the type/location of conflicts that the DoN must be prepared
for requires a system, for the F-18C/D, with the capabilities of the ALQ-165
(ASPJ). Since production line has been restarted for the international countries, now
may be the time for the U.S. to economically obtain additional ALQ-165 Systems.
If additional ALQ-165 systems were provided, please provide us with a Navy carrier
and Marine forward deployment ALQ-165 installation and deployment plan.
General KRULAK. Sir, with $200 Million in FY97, approximately one hundred
forty-four systems could be procured for installation in Marine Corps F/A-18C/Ds
with spares and upgrades to the ILS system to support the increased installation
quantities. This would allow outfitting 12 F/A-18C/D squadrons. Outfitting only
peacetime forward deployed squadrons will not provide enough assets to ensure
warfighting capability.
FISCAL YEAR 1997 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZA-
TION ACT— JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUN-
CIL (JROC)
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 27, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:07 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd D. Spence (chair-
man of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
The Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
I want to welcome Greneral Ralston and the four service Vice
Chiefs this afternoon. Let me also congratulate General Ralston on
his recent appointment as Vice Chairman and thank him for his
willingness to assume the hot seat so soon after coming on board.
We really are pleased to have you with us, gentlemen. We under-
stand who you are and what you do and where you come from. And
it is a real pleasure to have you with us.
I want to also welcome the Joint Requirements Oversight Coun-
cil, or JROC, to its inaugural hearing before the Congress. This
year marks the 10th anniversary of the enactment of the landmark
Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act. It is only fitting that
this year also marks the fulfillment of the legislation's objective to
empower the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to provide clear and
concise advice to the Secretary of Defense on critical resource allo-
cation questions. To accomplish this goal, the JROC has been
transformed into the Chairman's instrument to mold competing
service priorities into a joint military perspective on issues central
to the annual defense budget debate.
This development, of course, has not occurred without some
measure of controversy — controversy within the Pentagon as the
JROC makes judgments and recommendations that can run
counter to individual service priorities, and controversy on Capitol
Hill as recommendations made by the JROC do not conform with
the administration's budget priorities in all respects.
While this situation may make some people uncomfortable, to me
this discomfort means that the JROC is doing its job, providing
useful military advice to the civilian leadership it is entrusted to
serve. For that reason, I considered it critical for the committee to
have an opportunity to learn about the new role of the JROC and,
more importantly, to understand the rationale underlying its rec-
ommendations.
(613)
614
Of direct relevance to the current defense debate is the rec-
ommendation contained in the Chairman's program assessment to
begin addressing the modernization shortfall by increasing procure-
ment budgets to $60 billion per year by fiscal year 1998. That is
more than $20 billion above the administration's pending request
for the procurement accounts in fiscal year 1997.
I find it ironic that this recommendation became public last fall
at the same time that the President was threatening to veto the
defense bill because they added money to the administration's re-
quest, most of it for procurement.
As we discovered when the fiscal year 1997 budget was pre-
sented earlier this month, the administration has rejected the
JROC recommendation and instead has proposed to cut procure-
ment spending. Meanwhile, the recommended $60 billion in annual
procurement spending will not be reached under the administra-
tion's plan until after the turn of the century on somebody else's
watch.
These figures by themselves are largely meaningless without a
better understanding of the analytical context from which they
emerge. Therefore, it is my hope that today's hearing will shed
some light on the two critical questions of this debate: Why $60 bil-
lion? And why by fiscal year 1998?
Three weeks ago. General Shalikashvili testified before this com-
mittee that if we don't commit ourselves to a $60 billion procure-
ment target, we will never meet it. I agree. But that commitment
should be more than just a paper one at the tail end of a 5-year
budget plan. It requires addressing the modernization problem
here and now, as Congress did last year and this committee will
once again attempt in the months ahead.
I look forward to our discussions today in the hope that it will
help all of us to better understand the importance of these critical
questions.
Before I recognize the witnesses, I would first like to recognize
my friend, Mr. Montgomery, who is filling in for our ranking Demo-
crat, Mr. Dellums, for any comments he might like to make. Mr.
Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Dellums is coming back from California, having voted out
there yesterday, and I join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming our
distinguished witnesses to this hearing.
This is the first occasion for this committee to receive firsthand
information on how the Chairman of JCS is working to put in place
a process that will help us get the best defense for the resources
available. The input of our witnesses will help us to understand the
requirement. While understanding the process is important to us,
we also are interested in the results of your efforts so far. So I look
forward to your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Montgomery.
First of all, I want to apologize for the lack of attendance. We
don't have any votes until later on this afternoon, and other sched-
ules have pre-empted many of the people from coming this after-
noon. But we have the real hard-working members here that would
be pleased to hear from you. The Chair understands that General
615
Ralston plans to make the formal presentation on behalf of the
group and that Vice Chiefs will participate in the question and an-
swer period to follow.
Without objection, any prepared remarks you have will be sub-
mitted for the record, and you can proceed as you would like. Gen-
eral Ralston, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF GEN. JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, VICE CHAIR-
MAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND CHAIRMAN,
JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, ACCOM-
PANIED BY GEN. RONALD H. GRIFFITH, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY; ADM. JAY J. JOHNSON, VICE CHIEF OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS; GEN. RICHARD D. HEARNEY, ASSIST-
ANT COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS; AND GEN.
THOMAS S. MOORMAN, JR., VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
AIR FORCE
General Ralston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting the
Vice Chiefs and me to be with you today. I would first like to say
that the JROC is a remarkable success story in large part because
of the strong leadership that each member of this committee has
provided, both in resolve and in personal dedication to the national
security.
As you mentioned, the Groldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, a decade
ago, was a clear catalyst for us in the military to begin the process
to what we have today with respect to jointness and a joint consid-
eration of military requirements.
I have followed this process from the beginning. The concept of
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council was first identified in
1983 by the Defense Science Board. The Board saw a clear need
to form a body which had the responsibility to oversee the manage-
ment of joint requirements.
In response, the Joint Chiefs formed the Joint Requirements and
Management Board in March 1984 to monitor and advise the Joint
Chiefs on the development and acquisition of large dollar defense
items. They designed the Vice Chiefs of the military services and
the Director of the Joint Staff as Board members, with the chair-
manship rotating among the four Vice Chiefs.
As the process grew within the Department of Defense, more de-
tailed guidelines were laid out in a 1986 directive, describing a
more rigorous process for acquiring defense equipment and calling
for formal judgments by the Joint Chiefs on the validity of major
military requirements before they entered the full acquisition proc-
ess.
Today's JROC owes much to the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two
particular respects: First, it directed the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs to advise the Secretary of Defense on joint military require-
ments; and, second, it created the position of the Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, who has since been delegated the chairmanship
of the JROC.
General Herres was the first Vice Chairman and the initial
Chairman of the JROC. Admiral Jeremiah, the second Vice Chair-
man, raised the prominence of a joint perspective in setting mili-
tary requirements. He sponsored new efforts to identify what the
military would require in the next century, and through his strong
616
leadership, he showed that the JROC could harmonize service re-
quirements and maintain our Nation's lead in military technology
as the defense budget declines.
Admiral Owens, the third Vice Chairman, made several contribu-
tions to influence the significance of the JROC. He increased the
amount of time the JROC spent in session, had the JROC delibera-
tions much closer to the needs and perspective of the unified com-
manders in chief, and established a stronger, analytical foundation
for JROC discussions. Most importantly, he increased the JROC's
contribution to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the Chairman
formulated his advice on programming defense resources.
The latest codification of the JROC was the 1996 Defense Au-
thorization Act, signed into law in February of this year. The act
was significant to us in the military because it formally established
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Chairman of the
JROC, and he in turn was given the authority to delegate that po-
sition to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs if he so desired. The
act went further in assisting the Chairman to identify and assess
joint requirements by directing him to consider joint alternatives to
defense acquisition programs proposed by the individual military
services or defense agency. This helps the Secretary of Defense as-
sign resources within the levels he sets in his defense planning
guidance. And, of course, it moves the Chairman more directly into
the mainstream of Defense Department programming.
Two of the most important outputs of the JROC process contrib-
ute to the Chairman's duties in identifying and assessing require-
ments. The first is the Chairman's program recommendation, or
CPR, that is submitted to the Secretary of Defense each year. And
the second is the Chairman's program assessment, or CPA, submit-
ted after the service and defense agencies have forwarded their
programs to the Secretary of Defense.
It is within the context of this military advice that the Chairman
and the Secretary of Defense have addressed the military's recapi-
talization requirement. As indicated in the earlier testimony, the
goal of approximately $60 billion per year in procurement would
better balance the defense program, across readiness, force struc-
ture, recapitalization, and infrastructure. This implies a major re-
source shift that will take time to implement.
We support the Secretary's commitment to increase procurement
spending toward this goal as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, I have brought with me a few charts that I would
like to share with the committee, and they will show the process
as a whole and help to explain the JROC role throughout that proc-
ess.
Mr. Chairman, I believe you and the members have a hard copy
of this briefing in front of you that you may want to follow as we
go through.
I would like to talk to you about four aspects of the JROC, and
as you see them listed on this chart, one has to do with the acquisi-
tion processes, one has to do with the defense programming of re-
sources, another has to do with the interface with our unified com-
manders in chief in our services, and, finally, I will end up on the
joint warfighting capability assessments.
617
First of all, on the acquisition processes — and I am not trying to
make everyone here experts on this process today, but I will try to
simplify it for you. We have four major aspects that the JROC
interfaces in the acquisition process. First of all is mission needs
statement. A mission needs statement is a fairly short document,
about five pages long; it is written in broad operational terms, and
the services usually write these. They will come forward to the
JROC for validation. A recent example is one that said we see an
operational need for a power projection platform sometime in the
next century. We are not saying how long it should be, how big it
should be, but this is the forerunner probably of the next genera-
tion of carrier. But right now it is stated in broad operational
terms. The JROC just validated that mission needs statement
within the past couple of weeks.
Key performance parameters: For any system that we may be in-
terested in fielding, there are certain performance parameters that
really drive the design of the weapons system. Let's take a generic
tank, for example. You might say that that tank needs to be able
to go 300 kilometers on a tank of gas. That is the type of thing that
would be determined as a key performance parameter so that the
acquisition community can design their system around those pa-
rameters.
An operational requirements document is a more detailed version
of all the operational requirements that you might have, fleshed
out in pretty good detail, comes back to the JROC, the JROC vali-
dates that, and that is given to the acquisition community as their
guiding light, if you will, to field a weapons system.
Finally, the Defense Acquisition Board is co-chaired by the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and by the Under Secretary of De-
fense for Acquisition. And that is an important part of that board
that makes all the acquisition decisions for the Department of De-
fense, is that the Vice Chairman can represent the users, the
warfighters on that board and to make sure that the requirements
are, in fact, satisfied.
In addition to the acquisition processes that we have talked
about, the JROC is heavily involved in the defense programming
business. For example, we have planning guidance, the service and
agency programs; I will talk about recapitalization and then bal-
ance.
Next slide. First of all, the defense planning guidance is a docu-
ment that links the national military strategy to the defense pro-
gram. This is put out annually to all the defense agencies and to
the services by the Secretary of Defense and is the overarching
planning guidance that the Department has. And the JROC plays
a major role with input into that through the Chairman's program
recommendations .
That planning guidance provide fiscal targets. It tells the serv-
ices how much they can expect for their top line, and they work
their priorities within that number. And it directs certain priorities
to the services and agencies.
The Program Objective Memorandum, or POM, as it may be re-
ferred to, is the service's budget as it is formulating it. The service
then, given their top line from the defense guidance, portrays all
of their needs in a prioritized fashion. It says, OK, given this
618
amount of money, this is what we as a service think are our high-
est priority items. That POM is briefed to the JROC. All the service
POM's are briefed to the JROC, and the JROC then kind of grades
that POM, if you will, to see that it supports the things that the
Chairman said needed to be supported in his program rec-
ommendation. And then if the services didn't support that, the
JROC could then go back to the Chairman and make a rec-
ommendation for an alternate budget. And that provides the base-
line for our joint assessments that I will talk more about later.
I would like to spend a moment on recapitalization. There are
really three parts of recapitalization, and the first is replacement.
Replacement is the replacement of a truck — if you have wrecked a
truck or if you have crashed an airplane, you replace that with a
like item.
Modernization, on the other hand, is bringing a new system on
board that usually would have greater capabilities, would be up-
graded with the latest technology.
And, finally, commonality. Many times we will try to bring on
new equipment that is common across all the services that would
give us a lower operating cost, that would allow us to save dollars
through that means.
Many times these three are lumped together under a title of
modernization, and when we talk modernization, I believe we are
more accurately talking about a combination of all three of these.
To give you something with real equipment on it, if you replaced
an F-18 with a C or D, that would be a replacement. Moderniza-
tion would be an F-18E and F, which has greater capability that
comes on board. And commonality might be the joint strike fighter,
where we are looking for all three of the services to come together
around a system that would meet our needs.
Next, balance and proportion. The JROC has tried to seek a bal-
ance among these four items that you see here. First of all, you
have got to have the right force structure in order to do the na-
tional military strategy. Given that you have got that force struc-
ture, you need to make sure you have got enough funds for readi-
ness, that it is, in fact, ready to be employed. Modernization that
we have just talked about is an important aspect of the future
readiness, and, of course, you have got to have the infrastructure
to support that.
Next I would like to talk about the joint integration aspects of
the JROC. We deal very closely with the services, and the primary
interface with the service, as you see here today, each of the service
Vice Chiefs is a member of the JROC. They bring that service per-
spective to every meeting that we have. We also go to the unified
commanders in chief. They put together what is called an inte-
grated priority list. If we go to the Pacific, to PACCOM, CINCPAC
has a list of items from 1 through X that he needs the services to
support him on. And we go twice a year to the CINC's, to each one
of them, to make sure that we have got a good dialog and that we
understand what their requirements are and what their priorities
are.
We work joint concepts of operations. An example of this is when
we went through a pretty tough decision not long ago in our tac-
tical jamming world where we had EA-6B's and EF-lll's. And in
619
order to save some dollars, the EF-111, the decision was made to
retire the EF-111 rather than upgrade that. But that required a
new concept of operations whereby we could use the Navy and Ma-
rines EA-6B's to support Air Force land operations. That is an ex-
ample of a joint concept of operations that the JROC worked on.
Joint readiness: The services are responsible for their individual
service readiness piece to make sure their battalions are ready to
go or their squadrons are ready to go or their ships are ready to
go. But there is more to readiness than that. The commanders in
chiefs, the joint force commanders, have to make sure that they
have the command and control mechanisms, that they have the
proper staffs, that they have all of the enablers that we talk about
to allow them to successfully conduct an operation. And this is one
of the things the JROC pays great attention to when we go and
talk to the CINC's: Do we, in fact, have all those enablers that the
unified CINC's need to do their job?
Last, I would like to talk to you about the joint warfighting capa-
bility assessments, or JWCA's, as they are called. This is a pro-
gram that we think gets a lot of joint leverage. These JWCA
teams — we have a lot of issues, and we assign each of these issues
to a team. That team is composed of people from the joint staff,
from each of the services, from the offices of the Secretary of De-
fense, whoever can bring expertise to that particular area.
The Chairman's program recommendation, I mentioned that in
my remarks a moment ago. But the Chairman's program rec-
ommendation is his advice to the Secretary of Defense. It comes not
only from what the JROC might recommend, but it is discussed
with the CINC's and with the other chiefs. He has to balance prior-
ities among the commanders in chief. We have nine unified CINC's
out there, and as you might imagine, they are all pretty focused on
their area of responsibility. When you are in a constrained environ-
ment, someone has to make tough choices, and there is where the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs steps in and does that. He also makes
sure that we have got the right warfighting capabilities to carry
out our national strategy, and he looks at that balance I talked
about a moment ago between readiness, force structure, moderniza-
tion, and infrastructure.
After the services submit their programs, then the Chairman
does his program assessment. Again, this is his personal advice to
the Secretary of Defense on how well did the services and the de-
fense agencies support the recommendations that he had made in
the CPR and the warfighting CINC's. He provides alternative
budget proposals, and that is out of the legislation that the commit-
tee provided us with that directly tasked the Chairman to provide
alternative programs other than what the services have done, and
that fulfills his responsibility under the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
Next slide. Finally, here is a chart to try to show that this is a
continuous process. You can enter this at any time during the year.
It is always ongoing. We always have the acquisition processes on-
going. The defense programming follows somewhat of a calendar
cycle because it needs to match up with our fiscal years, but the
planning guidance comes out — came out last week, as a matter of
fact. Then the services and agencies will submit their POM's later
in May. We will review that during June and July, get out to the
620
CINC's in the July time period, and then we will report back to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the August time period, and then
he will provide his assessment probably in the September time pe-
riod to the Secretary of Defense on his assessment of the service
programs.
Over here, this is a continuous operation when we stay in touch
with the CINC's to make sure that we adequately represent their
views in the Washington arena. And, finally, these joint
warfighting capability assessments are ongoing all the time. This
is the engine, if you will, that supplies the rest of the JROC with
the information that the JROC needs to make decisions.
Next slide. Mr. Chairman, that is all that I have in the way of
opening remarks. I have tried to capture it here on this slide of
where we are, and I certainly welcome your questions or any of the
committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]
621
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF
CHAIRMAN, JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
BEFORE THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
MARCH 27, 1996
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
622
INTRODUCTION
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before your committee
concerning the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and
the role it plays in shaping military requirements within the
Department of Defense. Born at the height of the U.S. -- Soviet
confrontation in the mid-1980s to help judge the validity of Cold
War military needs, the JROC has evolved and expanded its scope
over the past two years, to a point that it now plays an
important role in supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's military advice related to defense planning, programming,
and budgeting. These remarks will provide some background on the
JROC itself, and address its corresponding focus and processes.
The Goldwater- Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986
directed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to
advise the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on the priorities of
military requirements. It also made the CJCS responsible for
assessing the extent to which the program recommendations and
budget proposals of the military departments and other components
of the Department of Defense conform with the priorities
established in strategic plans and the priorities of the
Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) . Furthermore, it directed
the CJCS to submit to the SECDEF alternative program
recommendations and budget proposals within projected resource
levels and guidance provided by the SECDEF, in order to achieve
623
greater conformance with these priorities. Likewise, Goldwater -
Nichols created the position of vice Chairman to support the CJCS
in undertaking these responsibilities.
In 1994, General Shalikashvili directed the Vice Chairman to
expand the charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
(JROC) to more fully support him in addressing these statutory
responsibilities. The JROC correspondingly established its
attendant Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process,
including greatly increased involvement by the CINCs and Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) . We believe that this process, now
concluding its second year, has been successful in supporting the
CJCS's military advice to the SECDEF. We appreciate this
committee's efforts in codifying, effective January 31, 1997, the
JROC's important mission in the 1996 Defense Authorization Act.
This act is significant to us in the military because it formally
establishes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the
Chairman of the JROC, and in- turn gave him the authority to
delegate that position to the vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
(VCJCS) if he so desires. It also specifies the composition of
the JROC to include, as appropriate, a full General or Admiral
from each Service. The JROC is currently composed of the VCJCS,
the Army and Air Force vice Chiefs of Staff, the vice Chief of
Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine
Corps. The act itself went further to codify the JROC's
38-160 97-22
624
assistance to the CJCS in identifying and assessing requirements,
as well as considering alternatives to acquisition programs.
Taken together, these initiatives have formalized the role of the
JROC with respect to military requirements and the defense
progreun,
JRCX: FOCUS
Chaired by the VCJCS, the JROC assists the CJCS by:
(1) identifying and assessing the priority of joint military
requirements including existing systems and equipment to meet
the national military strategy.
(2) considering alternatives to any acquisition program that
has been identified to meet military requirements by
evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the
program and of identified alternatives.
(3) assigning joint priority among existing and future
programs meeting valid requirements, and ensuring that the
assignment of such priorities conforms to resource levels
projected by the SECDEF through defense planning guidance.
(4) Overseeing the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment
process and reviewing all JWCA findings and recommendations.
(5) Ensuring emphasis is placed on the needs and deficiencies
of the CINCs, while ensuring interoperability, reducing
625
paralliel and duplicate development efforts, and promoting
economies of scale where applicable.
The JROC today operates in a challenging environment for
several reasons. First, our forces are facing the combination of
increased personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) and readiness requirements
for operations that span the spectrum from 2 nearly- simultaneous
major regional conflicts (MRCs) to regional engagement. Second,
we are addressing the recapitalization of our Bottom-up Review
(BUR) Force capability. Third, the JROC is incorporating
insights from the revolution in technology, particularly as it
relates to our joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (ISR) ; Command, Control, Communications, and
Computer (C4); and precision force capability, to envision future
warfighting applications. Fourth, we are confronting, in this
post-Cold War era, threats that are less well-defined; and
consequently, are applying joint capabilities -based approaches to
enhance the more traditional threat -based paradigms for
determining requirements. Taken together, these considerations
imply an environment where joint oversight is increasingly
important in efficiently using our defense resources and ensuring
we sustain the military capability to successfully execute the
National Military Strategy (NMS) .
626
Requirements Oversight
Much of the JROC process is as it was in earlier years. The
Council remains formally a part of the acquisition process within
the Department of Defense. As such, it provides the primary
interface between the military's perception of needs and the
Department's decision-making sequence for meeting such needs.
The JROC oversees the requirements generation process and mission
need determination to ensure that it is linked to our military
stratecry. The JROC Chairman is the final military authority
responsible for validating the military's need for some new
materiel capability- -certifying, in essence, that a nonmateriel
solution is not feasible. The JROC then validates the key
performance parameters and their associated objective and
threshold values as reflected in operational requirements
documents, and provides appropriate recommendations to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. This
validation is done within the context of fulfilling mission needs
to eliminate capability deficiencies for our CINCs, while
striving to achieve interoperability, reduce unnecessary parallel
or duplicative development efforts, and promote economies of
scale. In addition, the JROC conducts prograim reviews between
formal acc[uisition milestones to ensure system performance meets
original mission needs.
627
The position of vice Chairman is the critical link between
this system that generates and validates military requirements,
and the management process for Major Defense Acquisition Programs
(MDAPs) since he also serves as Co-Chairman of the Defense
Acquisition Board. This access provides him the ability to
transfer insights, military judgment, and technical or economic
acquisition considerations across both fora.
Joint Assessments
The JROC has tackled this tough challenge head-on- -spending
approximately 30 hours per month assessing the spectrum of
existing military capabilities and the Department of Defense's
proposals to advance them. Correspondingly, we expanded the
JROC's focus beyond merely acquisition-related oversight, to
assessments of our joint warfighting capabilities in ten distinct
areas: Strike; Land and Littoral Warfare; Strategic Mobility and
Sustainability; Sea, Air and Space Superiority; Deterrence and
Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Command and
Control; Information Warfare; Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance; Regional Engagement and Presence; and. Joint
Readiness. Yet, this is a living process whereby the domains of
these assessment teams may shift to support a particular issue.
In essence, the process is designed to be comprehensive in scope.
628
JWCA findings and recommendations are not restricted to the
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) . Examining and recommending
program alternatives within joint warfighting capability areas
requires careful scrutiny of empirical data, appropriate
application of analytical processes, and most importantly, sound
military judgment. Accordingly, the team's recommendations focus
on specific enhancements to joint readiness and better approaches
to satisfying our joint warfighting requirements.
Furthermore, we have engaged the CINCs and Joint Chiefs in
executive discussions of these assessments with a view toward
building consensus among the uniformed military leadership on the
JROC's recommendations concerning the defense program. These
assessments strive to identify opportunities to leverage service
capabilities, enhance joint interoperability, and eliminate
unnecessary duplication. All in all, this process has created a
positive, collegial environment of trust, teamwork, and joint
knowledge -building that has immensely enhanced our input to the
CJCS in his development of military advice to the SECDEF.
629
JROC PROCESS
Under Sections 153, and 163 of Chapter 5, and Section 181 of
Chapter 7, Title 10 United States Code, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is charged to provide advice and assistance to
the Secretary of Defense in the development of written policy
guidance for the preparation and review of the program
recommendations and budget proposals of Department of Defense
(DOD) components. The CJCS is also tasked to advise the
Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program
recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments
and other components of DOD conform to established strategic
plans and CINC warfighting priorities. Additionally, the CJCS is
responsible for submitting alternative program recommendations
and budget proposals to achieve greater conformance with these
priorities.
As the principal military advisor to the National Command
Authorities and the CINCs' spokesman, the Chairman approaches the
assessment of military needs from a joint warfighting perspective
to ensure that the nation effectively leverages Service and
Defense agency capabilities, while minimizing their limitations.
These assessments may involve joint readiness, military
requirements, and plans for recapitalizing joint capabilities.
The JWCA process, with JROC oversight, is one of the mechanisms
the Chairman uses for conducting such assessments. The Joint
8
staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment
(J- 8) is appointed by the JROC Chairman as the JROC Secretary.
The Secretary supports the JROC and the CINCs in the execution
and integration of the JWCA process and its associated
administrative procedures. The JROC Secretary also provides
periodic updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
to ensure communication and harmonization of effort between the
JWCA process and other Department of Defense activities.
Directors of various Joint Staff directorates are appointed
by the JROC Chairman to serve as JWCA sponsors . Each JWCA
sponsor is directly responsible to the JROC for establishing
appropriate team organization and assessment measures of
effectiveness; employing appropriate assessment methodologies;
collecting necessary data; and defining assessment domains. JWCA
sponsors are further charged to identify deficiencies and
strengths in joint warfighting capabilities, and provide the JROC
specific prograun recommendations for each.
The JWCA process examines key relationships and interactions
among warfighting capabilities to identify opportunities for
improving joint effectiveness. Each JWCA team is composed of
warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff,
unified commands. Services, OSD, Defense agencies, and others as
required to conduct continuous assessments within their
respective domains, as directed by the JROC. The JWCA teams
631
assess areas with capability deficiencies, unnecessary
duplication, or exploitable technologies; as well as areas where
we may prudently accept some risk. Therefore, the net sum of
JWCA recommendations can be at least approximately balanced, in
fiscal terms, to support resource levels and planning guidance
provided by the SECDEF.
The resulting JWCA findings and recommendations are
presented to the JROC for its consideration. Against this
context, a goal of the JWCA process is to bring knowledge to the
"four- star' military forum. The JROC is therefore instriimental
in helping the Chairman forge consensus and explore aew
alternatives through more extensive, open, and candid assessments
of joint military capabilities and requirements by the unified
commands. Services, and Joint Staff. The JROC devotes a
significant commitment of time to formal, separate discussions
cunong the CINCs and JCS centered on their efforts to identify
joint military requirements and assess our capabilities to meet
them. Specifically, the JROC as a body, accompanied by the flag
or general officer leaders of the JWCA teams, travels to the
Combatant Command Headquarters twice a year to build knowledge
and exchange perspectives with the CINCs and their respective
component commanders and staffs, first hand. The insights gained
during these exchanges are crucial in incorporating the CINCs
Integrated Priority Lists and other mission requirements with the
10
632
Services' other efforts to assist in developing a defense program
that effectively supports a joint perspective. Consequently, the
JROC process facilitates integrating efforts associated with the
development of joint military capabilities across the Department
of Defense.
The CJCS draws from the resulting JWCA findings and
recommendations, as well as other inputs from the Joint Chiefs
and the CINCs, to fulfill his statutory responsibilities in
providing military advice to the SECDEF. The Chairman's Program
Recommendations (CPR) and the Chairman's Program Assessments
(CPA) form the basis for fulfilling the CJCS's program and budget
advisory responsibilities to the SECDEF. They are supported by
both the deliberate planning process and the JWCA process, but
are produced and delivered separately from other Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and Joint Strategic
Planning System (JSPS) documents.
The CPR, delivered early in each Program Objective
Memorandum (POM) cycle, provides input to the planning and
programming process, before completion of the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG) . The CPR provides the Chairman's personal
recommendations to the SECDEF for his consideration when
identifying priorities and performance goals in the DPG. These
recommendations represent the Chairman's view of programs
important for creating or enhancing joint warfighting
11
633
capabilities. The Secretary, after considering the CJCS's
reconanendations, publishes the DPG to create a frame work for
identifying relative priorities among established and emerging
capabilities and providing measurable performance goals for
attaining them. Notwithstanding, the CPR alerts the SECDEF and
Services to the Chairman's views regarding what he, as the senior
military advisor, envisions should be reflected in the Service
and Defense agency programs when s\ibmitted.
The CPA was initiated by Admiral Crowe to meet the statutory
responsibilities of the CJCS concerning advice on the
prioritization of military requirements. The CPA also fulfills
the Goldwater - Nichols intent of providing alternative progrcun
recommendations which better satisfy strategic and CINC
priorities. Each year, the JWCA teams assist in assessing the
Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) of the military departments
and other components of the DOD, and the preliminary prograim
decisions made regarding the defense program. The CJCS
incorporates their resulting recommendations, together with the
insights of the JROC, CINCs, and Joint Chiefs, as a foundation
for his Program Assessment. The CPA, delivered near the end of
the program review cycle, provides the CJCS's personal assessment
of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency POMs. It
therefore provides comments on the risk associated with the
programmed allocation of defense resources. The CPA also
12
634
includes an evaluation of the extent to which the POMs conform
with the priorities established in strategic plans and the CINCs'
requirements. Where applicable, the CJCS will make specific
alternative program recommendations and budget proposals to the
SECDEF which more adequately reflect strategic and CINC
priorities.
CONCLUSION
The JROC serves a critical role in supporting the CJCS in
executing his responsibilities to assess the defense program and
provide military advice to the SECDEF. It continues to provide
the joint uniformed military's input on the development of
material solutions for modernizing, replacing, and achieving
commonality for equipment across our joint force structure. The
JROC therefore serves two key functions: one associated with the
validation of mission needs and performance pareuneters for
acquisition proposals; and one related to the assessment of joint
warfighting capabilities.
The JROC approaches their requirements oversight and
capability assessment charter with a goal of providing
recommendations to the CJCS that will ensure the best defense for
the resources available. This body presents the Joint Chiefs
with reasoned insights based on the knowledge and military
judgment of a "four star" cross -Service forum supported by a
13
635
comprehensive joint assessment process. Our ability to transcend
and adjust the interests of separate military services, combatant
commands, and agencies is key in achieving resource allocations
that produce an overall defense capability that represents far
more than the stun of its parts. In short, we are jointly
balancing readiness, recapitalization, and resources to maintain
our relative military capability today, and well into the future.
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650
The Chairman. Thank you very much, general. I can see by your
presentation you have been busy and expect to be busier in the fu-
ture, I guess. You do us a tremendous service by what you have
been involved in.
Just to kind of set the stage, let me ask a question, if I might,
to start these proceedings out. At the beginning of this Congress,
this committee, I think, in a bipartisan way, and by extension, the
Congress in a bipartisan way, decided that we had been cutting
back too much in our military, I think. I think it is fair to say that
this committee in a bipartisan way, because of the actions we have
taken, have determined that our defenses are underfunded, that we
aren't funding the kind of defense that we are supposed to have.
And so we decided to do something about it and ran into a little
trouble along the way, but nonetheless, we have been able to last
year add about $7 billion to the administration's request and have
some of our critics call it pork because we added things to the
budget — plus-ups they call it — that were not asked for in the budg-
et even though we knew that you had asked for it, the services,
and had been turned down for it.
This year, if things go as we plan, we hope to add about $13 bil-
lion in plus-ups to the budget in an effort to do something about
the shortfall we had in funding, and especially in procurement.
That brings me down to the question I wanted to ask you about.
We have talked a good bit — and I referred to it in my opening re-
marks— about the $60 billion that the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, working with you folks, has decided needed to be added to
the budget by fiscal year 1998 to avoid, in the words of many, fu-
ture combat readiness problems.
In spite of this problem, we find it has been put off until the year
2001, well after the administration, as I said before, under any sce-
nario, has left office. I don't think we can will this to somebody else
like you do in civilian life and hope that it will be carried out by
somebody else. We just don't know. Nevertheless, it will be too late
anyway to catch up at that future time.
So I would like to ask each of you to answer these questions
along those lines. Do you support the conclusion attributed to Gen-
eral Shalikashvili that it is necessary to increase the procurement
funding to a level of $60 billion by fiscal year 1998 in order to avert
a reduction in future combat readiness? And is it your professional
judgment that the necessary savings can be achieved through ac-
quisition and management reform and BRAC to adequately recapi-
talize the procurement accounts beginning in the next year or two?
Then, finally, do you support using deeper reductions in force
structure as a future bill payer to achieve the increased level of
procurement spending?
Why don't we start with you. General Ralston?
General Ralston. First of all, Mr. Chairman, with regard to your
first question on do I support the Chairman's view, as I understand
the way that the JROC arrived at this number, they took the size
of the Bottom-Up Review force structure that we have, and as in
any business where you would depreciate your assets over the
years, you have to look at what you need to do to recapitalize that
force. If you add up what each of the services require, that comes
out to about $60 billion a year.
651
We would all like to see that $60 billion as soon as we could get
it. We do have fiscal constraints, and what we have tried to do, the
JROC, is recommend a balanced program within those fiscally con-
strained dollars that we have, looking at readiness, force structure,
recapitalization, and infi*astructure. So in that view, I believe that
we are consistent with the Chairman's statement.
With regard to can we do it through acquisition reform efforts
and privatization, I believe that there are certainly dollars avail-
able through some means that we can get some of that. It will also,
I believe, require an increase in real dollars, as well, to get there,
is my personal view.
Last, do I support reductions in force structure as a way to do
that? I do not see any way that we can reduce our current force
structure and still do the national military strategy as it has been
outlined for us.
The Chairman. Does anyone disagree with that assessment?
Would you individually like to add any comments?
General Moorman. I would only add one thing to the Vice Chair-
man's discussion on where you might look for savings, and because
it involves what we are about in the JROC, I thought I would un-
derscore it, and that is they look at joint warfighting for duplica-
tion of effort or redundancies and where we might not be doing
things as efficiently. This may result in savings in systems that are
redundant, for example. I think there is a lot of gold to be mined
in that area and I think that is a significant role for the JROC.
The Chairman. Does anyone else wish to comment?
General Griffith. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to underscore
that this $60 billion goal that was discussed at length within the
JROC contact, the forum, again, it is one that we certainly support.
I would also say that we do believe that there are ways that we
can help ourselves in this context and that has been very much a
part of the deliberations within the JROC. What is it that we can
do in terms of joint warfighting approaches that will eliminate
redundancies, where possible, the efficiencies that have been talked
to.
I would say within the Army we are very aggressively pursuing
efficiencies that will allow us to put more money into our own pro-
curement accounts. I would not suggest to you that they are suffi-
cient to fix our program, but I do think that there are efficiencies
that could be made. The privatization approach, we think has
promise to allow us to garner dollars to put back into our procure-
ment accounts.
I would just like to say from the Army's point of view, sir, that
we believe that the force structure of the U.S. Army would not be
an approach that we would go to to generate more dollars for pro-
curement willingly.
The Chairman. I assume that in your deliberations and the de-
liberations when you arrived at this $60 billion, that those things
were considered, most of these savings that we were talking about,
and I am sure those things were discussed and all the pennies you
could find were scraped up in a pile and you still need beyond that,
and that was the point we are trying to make. We are trying to
help you help yourself, and so we need your advice and counsel in
helping us do this.
652
Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our wit-
nesses again.
I point out that the active forces are very much relying on the
National Guard and Reserve and I give you these numbers. Sev-
enty percent in the Army of the artillery and nearly half— listen to
this, Mr. Chairman — nearly half of the Army's combat power now
will be in the Army National Guard, so it is a total force out there
working.
In the Air Force or the Air Guard or Air Reserve, 60 percent of
all the airlift is now in the National Guard. The tactical fighter air-
craft, about 40 percent of that is in the Air Guard.
In the Marines, about a third of the Marine combat is in the Re-
serves, am I correct on that?
Admiral Hall. Close on that, sir.
Mr. Montgomery. In the Navy— I am very proud of the Navy —
they are finally using reservists all over the place, in the air, on
the ships, on the active ships, as well as putting them on Reserve
ships.
So my question is, are we prepared, on your chart you used. Gen-
eral Ralston, are you prepared to really do a realistic acquisition
program in the POM's that you pointed out, in the POM process
for the Reserve? We have to keep adding money every year on pro-
curement and we plus up numbers that come over from the Presi-
dent and from the Defense Department.
But the Reserves are so involved now that you have to send us
some realistic figures over here and maybe we can do a better job.
Overall, the Reserves get about nine percent of the monies from ac-
quisition, appropriations, construction, however you want to put it,
and they have all these missions. So my question is, are we going
to get a true value from POM process?
General Ralston. Let me defer that to the individual services,
but before I do, certainly as the JROC reviews the service POMs,
that is one of the things we look at, is a balance across all the serv-
ices and the components, between Active and Reserve. I think I
would rather let the services speak for themselves on their POMs.
Ron.
General Griffith. Sir, you point out very correctly the Reserve
components play an enormous role with the smaller Active forces
and I would tell you most particularly that is true in the Army.
Mr. Montgomery. General Griffith, some of us cannot quite hear
you.
General Griffith. Excuse me, sir. Again, I state that the Re-
serve component is playing a very large role, particularly with the
smaller Active forces. As you well know, we have Reserve compo-
nent forces deployed all over the world. For a long time we used
Reserve components for a lot of our support operations in Central
and South America. They are now in Bosnia. They are very much
involved in that theatre. A lot of our military-to-military operations
now in the old East Bloc are being supported very superbly by our
National Guard forces.
Sir, you are aware that the Army has recently launched a series
of initiatives, and you pointed out that 70 percent of the artillery
force of the Army is in the National Guard. We have a very aggres-
653
sive program to modernize that artillery. We intend to put the
Palladin. We are trying through the program, by the end of the
program, to have all of our artillery brigades in the National Guard
modernized with the Palladin. We are putting MLRS into those bri-
gades.
As you well know, sir, one of our high priority systems in the
Army is trucks, not very glamorous, but very, very important to
land forces. A lot of what we need to modernize our Guard and Re-
serve forces are, in fact, through less glamorous systems like
trucks, and I will tell you that we intend to resource to the fullest
of our capabilities the Reserve components with those trucks as we
bring them on.
We also have a recent initiative where we are moving air defense
organizations out of the Active Force into the National Guard. We
envision, again, by the end of the 5-year defense program time
frame that we will have all of our National Guard air defense units
replace the old systems, the Hawk, the Chaparral, and to have or
replace them with the modern Avenger system.
So, sir, I would tell you our commitment is to supporting the
Guard and Reserve forces to the fullest extent possible with the re-
sources available to us. They will certainly be resourced commensu-
rate with how they will deploy into the fight. Many of the Reserve
component units are deployed into theatre before Active forces, and
for equipping, they stand higher on the priority list for equipping
than do Active Forces who deploy after those Reserve units.
So, sir, I think we have it in balance. We obviously would like
to move to a more aggressive modernization program, but we think
that the modernization program we have is pretty substantial, Mr.
Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. I congratulate you. You are one of the few in
the last 20 years who are now using the Reserves. But really, my
question was in the POM process, are you going to really send us
the need up here for equipment procurement, technicians, and so
forth?
General Griffith. The answer is yes, sir.
Mr. Montgomery. All right.
Mr. SisiSKY. Would the gentleman yield for a minute? I think
what Mr. Montgomery is really talking about, every year, the serv-
ices depend on Mr. Montgomery to put in a bill for the Reserves,
from $800 million to $1 billion and then even more. Mr. Montgom-
ery, as you know, is retiring and I think what he is worried about
is the services have been depending on him to do it and he does
it every year. I have been here 14 years and he has done it for 14
years. I do not know what he did before.
But I think that is what he is asking, whether the services will
put the money in rather than doing it from up here. Is that a fair
statement?
Mr. Montgomery. That is very fair.
Mr. SiSlSKY. I know you do not want to boast.
General Griffith. Sir, I understand the question very clearly
and I will tell you that we are committed to doing just that. The
prioritization process within the Army resources the earliest de-
ploying unit, and among some of the very earliest deploying units
654
are the Guard and Reserve units, and they will be equipped in that
priority framework.
Mr. SisiSKY. I will just say one more thing. Every time he sub-
mitted something, it was MLRS in there, and you said it is 70 per-
cent of the artillery, so obviously it has done some good. But we
want to be sure that the Department of Defense puts it in rather
than somebody up here doing it.
Mr, Montgomery. That is correct. We do need some help. My
package is very kind. It is not that big and we do need the Active
Forces to carry some of these, like MLRS, C-9's for the Navy Re-
serve, and you are helping us some like that, but we want to be
sure. We hear a lot about POM's and most of us really do not know
how it works, but you refer back to where the POM did this or the
POM did that and we want to be sure that the total force is in-
cluded in the POM, is I guess what I am trying to say.
General Moorman. Mr. Montgomery, perhaps I could say some-
thing from the Air Force's perspective, and we talked about this at
the hearing on the Reserve Forces Revitalization Act. From an Air
Force outlook, as you know, the Director of the Guard and the head
of the Reserves sit at the table Vv^hen we develop our program.
While the percentage might look a little low in new procurement,
the Air Force as a corporate body procures equipment for the
Guard and then transfers that equipment to the Guard and the Re-
serves. As a consequence, the Guard and the Reserves in the Air
Force fly the most up-to-date equipment, B-l's, they will fly C-
17's, the most up-to-date F-16's, and they get new missions like the
Polar mission for the 130, the Arctic mission.
What this means is that the Air Force, when it deploys, it de-
ploys as a total force and the CINC's do not know whether it is a
Guard, Reserve, or an Active unit that is meeting that commit-
ment.
So in the sense of the POM, you have the Air Force's commit-
ment that we will continue to fund the Guard and the Reserves
well and provide them, therefore, the best possible equipment, sir.
General Kearney. Sir, if I might, the Marine Corps, you men-
tioned 30 percent, and that is fairly accurate, sir, of the combat
power in the Marine Corps that is resident in the Reserves. We
fully appreciate their contribution, not only what they did in Desert
Storm but what they do for us on a day-to-day basis. You may re-
call when I appeared before you last week recounting the exercise
in Norway led by a Reserve brigadier general and 4,000 Reserves
that just concluded last week. They are full participants, and I
would say here today we certainly appreciate what you have done
for the Reserves throughout the services.
They are also full participants in the development of the POM
process. They are there from the start through the finish and are
active members and are heard, and like the other services, we work
hard to ensure commonality of equipment so when we do have to
fight or train together, there is common equipment and we have
that ability to work as a total force that we are dedicated to.
You may also remember last week that General Richard men-
tioned moving money from the regular accounts into the Reserve
accounts last year to buck them up somewhat. So there is no doubt.
655
sir, that we are committed to a total force approach in the Marine
Corps.
Admiral Johnson. And you know, sir, it is very much that way
in the Navy. You alluded to it. We talked about it a little bit last
week. We simply do not and cannot do our jobs anymore without
the Reserves. We realize that. They are fully invested with us. Ad-
miral Hall and his team sit at the table throughout the whole pro-
gramming and planning process as we develop our POM.
We have Reserve units that are forward deployed virtually all
the time. Today, we have the Helicopter Combat Support Squadron
4 out in Norfolk, VA. The Reserve squadron embarked on U.S.S.
George Washington over in the Persian Gulf. Why? Because they
have the newest HH-60's and we do not have enough of them in
the regular force. So they make a definite contribution. The EA-
SE'S deploy routinely on Theodore Roosevelt, two times running
now over in Bosnia, so we are very much committed to that and
I personally do not see that changing at all, sir.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hefley.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much, and thank you gentlemen for
being here today. I particularly want to welcome Tom Moorman to
the committee today. We miss you out in Colorado Springs, Tom.
We would love for you to come back and join your family out there.
General Moorman. Thank you.
Mr. Hefley. Let me say from the standpoint of military con-
struction, which I have maybe the most input into, I am glad to
hear you say what you did about the Reserves and Guard and so
forth. We, in military construction, we are making the assumption
that if you do not put it in your priority list, in your budget for the
Guard and Reserve that it is not a priority with you.
We are trying to get away from the old way of doing it, where
Mr. Montgomery or someone else has to put it in up here, as Mr.
Sisisky said. So if it is important to you, put it in there. We want
to be helpful to you. If it is not important to you, if it is not in
there, we are making the assumption that you have made that de-
cision.
I was very interested in the charts. General, and the process all
looks great, the way it is supposed to work. It looks great. The De-
fense Department is good at process, we know that, and you have
worked out a great process. But I guess from a practical stand-
point, I am interested in how well this works from a war-fighting
perspective.
I do not know if any of you have read the book "Pentagon," I
think it was Alan Drury. Just very briefly, it is the story of a small
South Pacific island which was taken over by an enemy and we
were not going to let that happen and how the Pentagon goes about
solving that problem. The basic conclusion was the Pentagon can-
not get here from there. This was before Goldwater-Nichols, and I
know many things have changed, but we found that out pretty
much in Grenada that we did not talk to each other and we could
not get there from here. We were much better in Panama and the
Persian Gulf.
38-160 97-23
656
Is it working today, the joint efforts? Can you interchange equip-
ment? Can you interchange radio frequencies? Can you make it
work today in a joint effort?
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me take that. To address the first
part of your question, one of the things that has been a change,
and this is a change in the last 2 years, quite frankly, is where the
JROC goes twice a year to all of those nine commanders in chiefs
and sits down and makes sure that we understand fully what they
need to do their job out there in the field. We do not sit here inside
the Beltway and hope to get it right from here, and I think that
has been a positive influence on the JROC and I think that our
programs are better because of it.
With regard to our ability to interoperate and communicate with
each other, a very recent decision on the part of the JROC was to
try to come up with a standard digital data link that all the serv-
ices would be on, whether it was tanks or airplanes or ships, so
that they all could communicate. That standard was selected as
Link 16. That is the first time that that has been done, and that
was in the Chairman's program recommendation that he made to
the Secretary of Defense. It was accepted, and now the services are
required to program and put that in their POM so that, in fact, we
are all able to communicate all the time.
So are we there yet? No, sir, we are not there yet. Are we work-
ing toward it? Yes, sir, we are working toward it.
Mr. Hefley. Is there a commitment on the part of each of the
services, do you think, to that as a goal, away from the parochial
aspect of the individual services?
General RALSTON. Let me let each service Vice Chief answer
that.
Admiral JOHNSON. I would say, Mr. Hefley, and I am the newest
member of the JROC, I have been here all of 3 weeks, but I came
from the fleet, from the field, and I would just say that from the
perspective of a fleet commander, the way we train, the way we
certify, the way we send our forces forward now is like it has never
been before. What makes the difference is the joint application to
our profession.
We still maintain specific service core competencies, but com-
plimenting that, we train in a joint environment in a way where
we do, in fact, exchange equipment and understand the process to-
gether like we have never done before. So I think that is powerful
in terms of readiness but it also is very educational for the forces
in the field.
We do not do anything from a Navy perspective. We do not do
anything sending forces forward now where they have not been
trained in joint applications before they go. We also make the
statement when we are forward with our battle groups and our am-
phibious ready groups that every single day when you are forward
deployed you either operate in a joint environment with other serv-
ices, a combined environment with other countries' services, or
both, and that is the reality. So we are very much committed to
that as a service.
General Hearney. Sir, if I might, I have been involved in this
process for some time and I go back to Joe's chart where he talked
about replacement, modernization, and commonality. This group, I
657
think I could say without hesitation, is committed to working to-
ward commonaHty, and that means not just interface boxes but
where we have the same equipment and we can talk across the
battlefield.
A benefit of this group is that we take that back to our individual
services and drive it from a Vice Chief standpoint. There are some
real good examples. Joe gave you one about the JTID's, Link 16,
but there are a number of others. There is a logistics system and
common identification of logistics system and transportation. There
is the common UAVs and the ground stations. There is the muni-
tions, combat ID.
These would not have happened, I do not think, unless we had
had this group. I see nothing but positive spinoffs from the JROC
plus it has backings of the services to ensure that we have that
commonality.
General MOORMAN. Mr. Hefley, it is nice to see you, sir.
Let me just reinforce what my colleagues have said. Both the As-
sistant Commandant and I have been doing this now for about a
year and a half. The process is this joint warfighting capability as-
sessments, where you look at all these functional areas in a joint
context. As we meet together, 10 to 15 hours a week, and as you
take these briefings, over time, it leaps out at you where there are
inefficiencies or where there are areas that need to be improved
from a joint context.
We work on that and make recommendations, and our paths are
really twofold. General Hearney mentioned one of them and Gen-
eral Ralston mentioned the other. I would like to bring them to-
gether in a synergy.
One, from the services' perspective, it is now absolutely clear
that the thing you want to fund is the thing that improves
jointness. You can see that in every service POM, the priority that
we put on systems that improve the warfighting capability of the
individual CINC's.
The other area where that gets influenced is when we go and
visit the CINC's, as General Ralston said. We give them the same
briefings. It is very interesting to watch their maturation in this
process and how their requirements over time have adapted to the
JROC and the JWCA and conversely. What I mean by that is they
identify their needs in something called an integrated priority list,
or an IPL. It is very interesting to watch the JROC process and
what we thought was important versus what the individual CINC's
IPL's.
So I think jointness is growing. I do not think any of our services
think parochially anymore; we all think joint. I think the JROC, it
is a work in process, but that is what the JROC is bringing to you,
I think.
Mr. Hefley. Thank you very much.
General Griffith. Sir, I would just add briefly, agam, I have
been in the JROC now, sir, about 10 months. I would just tell you
very simply, if a service brings a system into that forum, the ques-
tion will be posed very pointedly, how does this system fit on the
battlefield? In that discussion is the question, does this system
need to share information with other joint systems or other ele-
ments of the force that are, for example, not Army forces?
658
If the answer to that question is yes, then I can assure you, sir,
that system will not be validated unless it is demonstrated that the
information sharing can occur in a joint context. It is a very rigor-
ous review and very tough to get through there and will not get
through if it does not meet the joint interoperability question, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here.
General Ralston, it is my understanding that of the top 10 DOD
investment program priorities that I assume JROC reviewed, not
a single one of those is an Army program. It seems to me one of
the lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm was that despite the
tremendous work of our Air Force, ultimately, it took soldiers on
the ground to fight that war. In fact, I believe the vast majority of
Saddam Hussein's tanks were still operating when we started the
land war there. It also appears that our national policy is to be
sending more deplo3mients of Army soldiers to Rwanda, Haiti, Mac-
edonia, Bosnia.
Considering the fact that the Army is now the eight largest army
in the world, so there are seven others, perhaps eight other nations
that have a larger army than us, it seems to me the only way our
soldiers are going to have a fair fight — and I never want them in
a fair fight, I want them to have the unfair advantage — are we not
jeopardizing the lives of those Army soldiers by investing so much
of our limited resources into research programs that do not directly
assist our Army soldiers? I know it is all related, but is the Army
getting its fair share of research and development funds, in your
opinion?
General Ralston. Let me best address that by having the Army
Vice Chief start off and then maybe I will add to it.
General Griffith. Sir, as you indicate, if you look at the weap-
ons systems in the Defense Department, I think you get to No. 13
before you hit an Army system and I believe that Army system is
the Crusader, our new artillery weapons system.
Quite frankly, we are cheaper than the other services because we
are more dependent on people than we are on weapons systems.
But, of course, systems are important to us.
Sir, I would say, as is the case with every other service, we think
that the procurement needs of the Army are greater than we can
afford to resource right now. Sitting in the JROC, I would tell you
that I think that our story is well received. In fact, I would say
over the last couple of years, probably one of the most effective
spokesmen for the Army has been Adm. Bill Owens, the former
Chairman of the JROC, and we appreciated that support greatly.
He, while we were incapable of doing so, apparently he gained a
lot of support for Army trucks, and so we appreciate that support.
I would say that I think that the system of the JROC will ensure
over time that there is a balance among our forces because I think
this body really believes that we have to have effective joint forces
that can fight across the spectrum. So I have great confidence in
what this forum can do, sir, in addressing all the service require-
ments.
659
But again, I would acknowledge that our No. 1 system is No. 13
and that we believe that we have some system requirements that
at this time we are not capable of resourcing at the level we would
like to.
Mr. Edwards. Could I also ask General Griffith or General Ral-
ston, has the Army's percentage of our research and procurement
programs decreased over the last 5 to 10 years as a percentage of
the total defense procurement and research programs, or is the
Army's piece of the pie
General Griffith. The answer is, yes, sir, it has.
Mr. Edwards. It has.
General Griffith. Sir, I have to come back for the record and
tell you specifically to what extent. I believe there was a time
where the Army received about 24 percent of the TOA. We are now
at about 23 percent TOA.
Mr. Edwards. I guess I will just conclude with this statement
and not ask for a response. It seems with the Army having gone
from 18 to 10 active duty divisions, our now being only the eighth
largest army in the world, with an Air Force and Navy that I be-
lieve are clearly far superior in technology to any other nation in
the world, I just hope our leadership at the Pentagon and col-
leagues on this committee will be sensitive to the needs of helping
that soldier out there.
My concern about this process intrinsically, without casting dis-
persions on anybody, is that when you talk about an aircraft car-
rier, a B-2, or some other major Navy or Air Force systems, you
have a — I know I am stepping on sensitive grounds here, those
wonderful aircraft carriers — you have a tremendous built-in sup-
port organization, from contractors and subcontractors and elected
officials all over the country interested in good defense and in jobs
in their districts, whereas you start talking about munitions and
trucks and uniforms and guns for Army soldiers, it is not a fair
fight. I hope this committee will be sensitive to that.
Mr. Hunter. Would my friend yield for 1 second?
Mr. Edwards. Absolutely.
Mr. Hunter. I think you make an excellent point, my friend
from Texas. That is one reason we plussed up ammunition ac-
counts and truck accounts last year, although to my understanding,
I do not know a member on the committee that has truck plants
in his district or ammunition plants in his district. There may be
some, but I am not, as the chairman of the Procurement Sub-
committee, do not know exactly where they are at.
I do know that we are short of equipment. We gave those to you.
We did not get any response back from you that we were happy
to get them and we got beaten up on by the DOD generally for add-
ing what they called pork to the bill, but we did add ammunition
and trucks because you folks have an instant need for them.
I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Edwards. And I will conclude by thanking the subcommittee
chairman, because I think that was an example of this committee
looking at a real need, whether there was political support for it
or broadbased national support, and doing what I thought was the
right thing. I thank the chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
660
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Chambliss.
Mr. Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Ralston, you talked about your method of acquisition
and the way you get together with your nine Chiefs and what not
before you reach a decision and seeing what the needs are. Does
that process reach all the way down to that enlisted personnel
down there to fmd out what the real needs of those folks are, too,
and is there any structure in place to do that? Do you leave it to
each individual branch? How does that work?
General Ralston. Let me talk overall, and then perhaps the in-
dividual service Vice Chiefs can add to that.
Let me go back to my previous assignment when I was at Air
Combat Command. One of the things as we put together the infa-
mous POM that we talked about there is the services put together
their budgets. We go down to the lowest level. We go down to the
squadron level where they are talking to the lowest sergeant and
airman down there and we build from the grassroots up, if you
will, what the requirements are across the board. That comes up
to the wings, the numbered Air Forces, ultimately up to the major
command, in the case of the Air Force.
Then it was our job to articulate as best we could to our Air
Force Air Staff in the Pentagon what we needed for the individual
airman and sergeant and airplane and all across the board, wheth-
er it was housing, whether it was equipment, whether it was pay,
whether it was a retirement. We tried to articulate as best we
could those needs and then that is aggregated up at the Air Staff
level.
I will let the other services talk to their particular processes.
General Hearney. Sir, that is exactly right. It is done the same
way in the Marine Corps and I think this is best reflected in that
one of the Commandant's highest priorities is individual equipment
for his Marines.
General Griffith. I would say, sir, in the very top priority needs
of the U.S. Army and the top priorities from a resourcing perspec-
tive are soldier systems. We place those at the very top. So I think
that, yes, sir, the answer is that the soldier, the airman — I think
we all view that the capabilities of all our forces are the soldiers
and sailors and the airmen in the field and that our obligation is
to make sure that they are adequately resourced. I think that is
a central focus all the time, sir.
Admiral JOHNSON. I would just underscore that from the Navy's
perspective, as well. It gets back to my earlier comment to Mr.
Hefley. When we operate out in the fleet, the investment down in
the deck plates, the lessons that are learned, the things that they
need, there is a formal process whereby those things get fed into
the system and become part of the whole procurement strategy. So
we are very much attuned to the needs of the individual sailor.
General Moorman. I would just echo what my colleagues have
said and just say one other thing. I think we would also say that
whenever you hear from a service Chief or a service Secretary, all
of them will begin with saying that the most important asset that
we have is not our equipage but our people. Consequently, the
funding of people programs and quality-of-life programs are every
661
bit as important as we work our POM process, because we all know
that we have to be able to continue to attract folks and retain those
folks and we owe them to be the best equipped and the best fed
and the best housed. It is a very important priority, sir.
Mr. Chambliss. The other thing, General Ralston, sort of a two-
part question. You were talking earlier about the fact that we
downsized to where we are. I am wondering whether or not you all
have discussed the fact that we are about as low as we can afford
to be from a force structure standpoint and if we are to be able to
maintain that two-MRC scenario, can we afford to go any lower?
Second, if we cannot, how in the world can we look down the
road and anticipate cutting the Defense budget without cutting
back on our ability to maintain that two-MRC scenario and also
without continuing to end the research and development and pro-
viding of our forces with the absolute top equipment?
General RALSTON. Yes, sir. With regard to your first question, I
believe the services are in agreement and I will ask them to com-
ment if anyone disagrees with that, that through all of our analy-
sis, all of our modeling, all of our war gaming, and all of our mili-
tary is that as long as we have the national military strategy of
two MRC's, we cannot further reduce the force structure that we
have today.
Second, to maintain that force structure we have talked about,
we have to strike the right balance between today's readiness and
tomorrow's readiness of the modernization and of the infrastruc-
ture to support that. We have tried very hard for a balanced pro-
gram and I believe that it is not possible to reduce the Defense
budget further and keep that balance between force structure,
readiness, modernization, and infrastructure that we need.
Does anyone want to add to that?
[No response.]
The Chairman. The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to address this distinguished panel
and I agree with the focus of their mission, to bring the services
together in an integrated fashion, especially with regard to pro-
curement. It makes all the sense in the world, especially in this
time of finite budgets.
One of the questions I wanted to ask was in reference to the
DOD-released report today on the funding of submarine moderniza-
tion plan and particularly to ask all of you what role you played
and the JROC played in the conducting of that report that was is-
sued by the Defense Department in compliance with section 131 of
the Fiscal Year 1996 Defense Authorization Act. Have you seen it,
or were you participating in it?
General Ralston. Let me ask Admiral Johnson to talk to that
first.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir. Mr. Kennedy, I have not seen the re-
port. I will be happy to get an answer for you for the record.
Mr. Kennedy. OK. Would JROC play a role in the Secretary of
Defense report that would be coming out? Would not JROC play a
role in that, or not, because it is not interagency or interservice?
General Moorman. I also am not familiar. I do not think any of
us are familiar with that particular report that you reference, Mr.
662
Kennedy. But in one of our JWCA's, one of our joint warfighting
capability assessments, is air, sea, and space superiority. That is
clearly in the sea superiority area, so it is certainly within the pur-
view of the JROC. But on that specific one, I have to say I have
not seen it.
Mr. Kennedy. I would ask for your comments in response to it
when you do see it and would be interested in your reaction to the
summary and its conclusions.
I would also like to ask you about the special operations forces
budgets in respect to what you do. I know they have their own
budgets. I would be anxious to hear, though, how you might do
what you do already in reference to them.
General Ralston. One of the CINC's that we go and talk to each
cycle, of course, is CINC SOC, Special Operations Command. Much
of the items that are funded, procurement items for Special Oper-
ations Command, certainly the major end items, are handled by the
services. Then in the Program 11 budget are those things that are
unique to special operations.
For example, if you are talking about CV-22's for Special Oper-
ations Command, if it happened to be the Air Force portion of that,
that is in the Air Force's budget, and then special operations would
have that delta over and above that. But the JROC, in fact, looks
at that. Those are discussed and we do have a very good dialogue
with the CINC.
Mr. Kennedy. I would ask you to take a look at, in that vein
that you just spoke about, there is an item in there that was made
aware to me by GAO that they are forced to buy that does not fit
into their special procurement budget for a coastal patrol craft that
to them would cost them $23 million to buy it, $40 million to own
it, and they have an outward projection that it is going to cost a
great deal more than that. It is unique in that it has not been
funded by SOC in the past but they find themselves having to fund
it now and they think with their OPTEMPO as high as it is, it is
going to really cost them in terms of their own ability to procure
their needed special equipment and the like.
So if you could look at that, it is coastal patrol No. 14, I am told,
and if you could get back to me on that, I would appreciate it.
Admiral Johnson. I will take that, Mr. Kennedy, and get back
to you.
Mr. Kennedy. Finally, General Ralston, if you could talk a little
bit about the ACTD that was a big interest to your predecessor.
Admiral Owens, and what role you think that will play as it goes
forward in helping you do your job by testing out these advance
concepts to find out which ones are the most promising concepts
and the like.
I just would highlight the countermine technology that was one
of the things that was part of this advanced concept technology
demonstration that is now proving itself to be very important. In
fact, we had a hearing before this and the committee was very in-
terested in how we get into procurement and acquisition of weap-
ons or technologies that would allow us to address this
countermine problem. I think this was a major focus of the ACTD
Program and I think it highlights the importance of that program
663
as we are now trying to rush out and buy this stuff for our soldiers
in the field.
General Ralston. Yes, sir. There are, as you know, a number of
ACTD's. One of the things that I have talked to Dr. Kaminski, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, about is a greater role
on the part of the JROC in determining which ACTD's we do and
which CINC's we would assign those to. He is in complete agree-
ment with that and has asked for our help. So the JROC will be
very much involved as we prioritize those ACTD's and try to deter-
mine which ones have the best promise of supporting our
warfighting CINC's.
Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have somewhat the same concerns that Mr. Hefley expressed
and that is that the diagrams look good but some of the practical
application, I guess, from where I sit, I have more questions about.
Part of it, or a big portion of it is whether we have the resources
or whether we are asking for the resources in order to do the job
that is required. I notice under the planning guidance slot one of
the points is, links national military strategy to defense program,
and from where I sit, it looks like they are a long way apart on
what our strategy is, what our requirements are, and then what
the budget requests come out to be.
I realize that this is probably not a fair question to be asking you
all because political considerations get into the decisions on what
the budget requests are, but it makes me wonder, for example, can
we fulfill our strategy of two major contingencies at this time?
Not too long ago, there were numerous press accounts of people
expressing opinions saying we could not duplicate the Persian Gulf
war again if required to do so. It does not take much digging
around to see the strains that are being caused today by Bosnia
and the resource requirements that are required to do that job
properly. It also makes one concerned that if something serious
breaks out somewhere else, could we meet it?
I guess I would like to ask, can we fulfill that strategy today, and
second, to what extent do you all spend your time trying to make
the most out of what we have versus trying to figure out what we
need and focusing on the requirements and then what gaps are cre-
ated if we do not get what we need?
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me try that first. First of all, with
regards to your question, do I believe that we can meet the na-
tional military strategy of two MRC's, my personal opinion to that
is yes, with the force structure that we have. Our force structure
today, I will tell you, is very busy. Having just returned from the
field, our PERSTEMPO, our OPTEMPO is high, and that is true
across all the services and across the National Guard and the Re-
serve components of our various services.
So there is not a lot of excess there by any means. It is very
tight. But I do have to answer that I do believe that our current
force structure will support two MRC's.
664 ..
With regard to the second part of your question, we spend a lot
of time on both aspects of that. What are our needs, and that is
when we go to the CINC's, to the war fighters, to our war fighting
commands to ask them what their needs are. We tried to work that
through the acquisition cycle that I talked about, validating those
mission needs statements, validating those operational require-
ments documents, making sure that they are, in fact, joint and that
they are interoperable. That is one piece of it.
The second piece is, given that we do have a fiscal constraint,
then how do you prioritize within that fiscal constraint? That is
also a very important part of it. But I do not want to say that we
do one at the exclusion of the other. We try to do both, and I would
ask the other services to help me with that.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me follow up with just maybe a subpart
of that. Do you then, if the fiscal constraints are such that you can-
not meet the requirements, do you then report back up through the
chain of command and say, here is what we cannot do because of
the political decision that you made?
General Ralston. Yes, that is true, and let me give you an ex-
ample that we talked about at the very first here. Looking at the
force structure that we have, the national strategy that we have to
support, the JROC made the decision that in order to adequately
recapitalize that force, we needed about $60 billion. We took that
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs took that to the Secretary of Defense, and I believe that is
a positive example of how that goal was established.
Again, we can talk about how soon you can get there versus the
constraints, but that was a case of exactly as you are talking about,
where the services came together at the JROC, the JROC made
that recommendation to the Chairman, and on to the Secretary of
Defense.
General Moorman. Mr. Thornberry, I would just add, and it is
not necessarily a JROC purview, but in our Vice Chiefs role, we
participate. You commented on, can you meet the two MRC's? The
Defense Department, the uniformed services particularly, have
spent an awful lot of time in the last year and a half looking at
readiness, a tremendous amount of emphasis on readiness against
your ability to meet two MRC's.
In fact, the whole leadership of the Defense Department meets
once a month in something called the Senior Readiness Oversight
Council to assess that for all services. Then there is a joint readi-
ness which is unique. We had not done that before. So we are
tracking that on a monthly basis with quantitative methods and
whatever.
There are areas, and General Ralston mentioned that we have a
tremendously high OPTEMPO. There are specific areas where we
have reduced OPTEMPO , for example, on particular weapons sys-
tems, because of the strings on our people. Then we have tried to
turn around in the POM process, and you all have helped us out,
for example, in reconnaissance, to get more force structure.
So my purpose of raising that is there is a terrific amount of em-
phasis on readiness to meet two MRC's at this point.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Sisisky?
665
Mr. SiSlSKY. Thank you, gentlemen. I was not going to mention
the carrier except that my friend down here mentioned it. I remem-
ber the Bottom-Up Review where they said, and they were very
honest, we may not be able to put a carrier in a given area maybe
1 or 2 months. Now I am hearing we are 5I/2 months. We cannot
even get money for CVN-77 yet out of the Navy budget, which I
deem pretty important for a couple of reasons which I will not go
into now. But it seems to me that you ought to look at maybe the
13th carrier, not the 12th carrier.
And I understand what the Air Force has done and I applauded
the Air Force when the Secretaries were in there with landing in
Jordan to back up the Mediterranean, and that was a good move,
but I am always frightened of depending on foreign countries to
house us with the rules and regulations. We know some of the
things in the past that happened.
But I just think that you ought to be looking at this, and you
mentioned OPTEMPO. I just heard last week that 58 percent of
the entire U.S. fleet is at sea and on station there. How is that re-
ducing OPTEMPO? You have the Army spread everywhere. The
Marines are floating. I doubt very seriously when we closed the So-
viet Union that we had that much of OPTEMPO that is going right
now, all over this world, it is happening.
So I just think maybe you need to look at something like that,
but the other thing that I really want to talk to you about. General
Ralston, you mentioned, as everybody does, of saving money in pri-
vatization. There are serious concerns on my part of what is hap-
pening to the civilian part of the Pentagon. I have gone there. I
have said it at every meeting that I could say, just that absolute
privatization may not be the greatest thing and it may not be the
greatest savings.
I was at a hearing the other day and they talked about the Nor-
folk Naval Base. They want to privatize the entire Norfolk Naval
Base and I asked the civilian leadership, what in the hell do you
think the base is there for? They said, "What do you mean?" I said.
It is war, w-a-r. That is what you guys are there for. You are to
protect and defend against war.
But I use an example. As I understand it, the Military Academy
at West Point in their doctrine teaches Napoleonic wars and some-
body sent me a passage from that that Napoleon was surprised
that the King of France had privatized all the teamsters, the guys
that do the horse and buggy and carrier things. All of a sudden,
he was not surprised because at the first cannon shot, they all
jumped off their wagons and ran back.
Michelle Pfeiffer said the same thing in that movie with Robert
Redford. He says, "What do we need to get married for?" She said,
"What do you mean?" "We live together. We see each other all the
time." She said, "I just want to legalize it." There is another line
in there.
That is what worries me about privatization, and there are some
things we can privatize. Our Readiness Subcommittee privatized
things last year on a pilot basis. I am not opposed to that. But I
am worried that if the military does not speak up, that this thing
is going to be floating down all kinds of things in depots and every-
thing else. I just think it is a mistake. There are certain things
666
that you can privatize, and sooner or later, I think the military is
going to have to speak up.
The savings that you talk about — I will give you an example.
Last week, we had the Department of Energy in here and they
were talking about privatizing and what a great thing this is. I
said. The huge contract that was let at Savannah River, I said, how
many bidders did you have on it? One. There was one bidder.
I just get a little worried. They talk about the shipyards. I do not
want anybody to have a corner on the market. The 60-40 split is
a myth because you are allocating now rather than splitting, as you
should be right now, to keep everybody, hopefully, alive.
But I would just hope that you realize that there are forces at
work now to privatize everything. I said, go ahead and privatize
the pilots on the Air Force planes. Let civilians fly on them and see
how long they last. But I am serious about that and I am very con-
cerned, not for my district, not for my State, but purely national
security, and I mean that sincerely.
General Ralston. Yes, sir, Mr. Sisisky. I do not believe that you
would have any argument from anyone at this table here today. I
believe that we all believe that there are things that you can do
privatized that make sense, but there are an awful lot that you
cannot. Of course, the real secret here is trying to figure out which
fall into which category.
The Chairman. The gentleman added the other day, what if they
go on strike after you privatize them? Where do you go from there?
Mr. Bateman.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As someone whose
highest attained military rank was one silver bar, it is quite an
array of 20 stars that I am looking at, and obviously very impres-
sive.
General Ralston, we certainly wish your tenure at the Air Com-
bat Command had been longer, but we are very proud of the fact
that you have been elevated to the status that you now occupy. We
are sure that you will serve the Nation extremely well there, as
you have in other positions.
Let me just express a sense of frustration that I feel from hear-
ing your presentation. General Ralston. You laid out for us a very
cogent, very logical process by which to inventory and determine
the Nation's military requirements. The thing that is disturbing is
as valid as the process seems to be, at the end of the day, some-
thing other than the national security parameters seem to be driv-
ing the equation much more than those considerations.
The request of your predecessor in JROC, Admiral Owens, is
validated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but we are not act-
ing upon that and we are clearly, it seems to me, forewarned that
there are significant problems ahead for our services because we
are not acting for it.
The gentleman from Rhode Island brought up the matter of the
Navy's submarine program. While I have not been able to read it
thoroughly, I have just been skimming through it, the report that
was issued yesterday or last night on the Navy submarine pro-
gram, a report mandated by the 1996 authorization bill, was a
clear outline of what the program ought to look like.
667
The report, instead of submitting a fleshed-out option from last
year's authorization bill on a program agreed to by the administra-
tion, by the Secretary of Defense, and by the Navy, was not funded
in the President's fiscal year 1997 budget request. The report indi-
cates that it is not funded and in terms of what I read in the re-
port, we do not anticipate funding it.
If you want to fund it, you are going to have to do it but we are
not going to include it within the defense budget. That, to me, is
a very, very mysterious proposition and just one example of how
your valid processes somehow do not seem to get implemented in
the practical, real world where you translate things into.
What are the minimum requirements of the defense budget?
Even to include something that the Secretary of the Navy, the
Chief of Naval Operations described as their No. 1 priority? It was
not in the fiscal year 1997 budget request. We now have the report
and they are not saying, increase the request to reflect what is nec-
essary to implement the program. They are saying, it is a valid
program. We ought to have it, but we cannot fund it. It seems to
me that as valid as this process is, we are not getting the right an-
swers at the end of the day.
General Ralston. Mr. Bateman, the only thing I can say to that
is that we, all the services, have valid needs. There is no question
about that. The part that we have to live with, though, is eventu-
ally someone establishes a top line of the budget and then what we
fall back to is to do the best job we can to prioritize within that
top line. I know that that leaves all the services short at times over
what they would like to have, but nevertheless, the facts are at the
end of the day, we have to meet that top line that is given to us.
Mr. Bateman. My quarrel is not with you at the table today. My
quarrel goes, I think, to another level of the Defense leadership
and ultimate decisionmakers. But if you believe what you tell us
your needs are and it includes things as critical as some of the
things not done and you ignore some of the very clear warnings you
have given to us as to the consequences of further delaying and de-
laying and delaying the recapitalization of the Armed Forces, the
danger signs are clearly there. I think it is going to be our respon-
sibility to make up for the misjudgments that others are making
in terms of the sizing of the Defense budget.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gene Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to take a cue from the Commandant, and rather than
my colleague out here who asked for $5 billion at a time, I want
to followup on an observation the Commandant made to many of
us last year in December. When asked if he could have anything
he wanted, he asked for $50 million for Goretex uniforms for his
troops.
I am just curious, has that acquisition been made? That would
be my first question. And No. 2, is that something unique to the
Marines or is that something that all the combat infantry folks in
the Army are also seeking?
He also asked for the opportunity to kind of go around the acqui-
sition process to speed things up, and again, I was curious if that
had been done and if not, why not.
668
General Hearney. Sir, that money did go to individual equip-
ment. That remains one of our priorities, as we mentioned earlier,
to equip the individual Marine soldiers in the field because that is
our core competency, our core capability that we will never ignore.
As far as speeding the process up, I think we would all like to
speed the process up iri alL^of our acquisition procurement pro-
grams and move then! tp^the^eft, if at all possible.
Mr. Taylor. General- Griffith, I am curious. Is that a standard
part of the Army tnventory? Why would the Marines need it and
the Army not, or did you all have it already?
General Griffith. I think the Army is in pretty good shape. The
individual equipment that you are talking about is always some-
thing that we are concerned about, ensuring that we have an ade-
quate stockage for emergencies like Bosnia.
But, for example, I will talk about the Bosnia deployment. We
have ensured that all the soldiers over there have the very best of
equipment, individual equipment, to include up to three sets. We
have given every soldier three sets of thermal-lined boots because
of the very harsh conditions, because of the mud, the snow, and so
forth. We have ensured that we have given them the insulated un-
dergarments. We have ensured that every soldier has the Goretex
outer garments that you are talking about, in fact, two sets of
Goretex outer garments.
So I am not sure if that is the difference between the Army and
the Marine Corps, but I think that I could give you full assurance
that we do not deploy soldiers anywhere without adequate individ-
ual clothing and protective gear.
Mr. Taylor. General Hearney, if I could follow up on that, I had
a conversation with one of your sergeants from the 8th and I unit.
He was telling me in December that a number of them were flown
out to A.P. Hill, just sort of refresher training, and a cold snap
went through and he was telling me how I think three or four
members of his unit were frostbitten.
I am curious. Is that because of poor equipment or was it improp-
erly used or had those uniforms not — it was strange that this took
place within a couple of days of the Commandant coming to Ike
Skelton's office and making that request.
And, of course, I can also understand that at this time, these
people are mostly in a ceremonial unit and you want to send your
best equipment to Bosnia and wherever the guys are on the front
line, but I was just curious if something like that could be pre-
vented in the future.
General HEARNEY. Obviously, we equip our forward deployed
forces first with the best equipment. Then it comes down as you
get farther away from the forward operating forces. You catch me
off" guard about the 8th and I. I live there. I have not heard that
story from the commander, but I will certainly check on it. It is dis-
tressing to hear that we have three of our marines with frostbite
in a local ceremonial unit that went to the field.
Mr. Taylor. But you are telling me that the $50 million, the uni-
forms have been acquired and they are out in the field?
General Hearney. In the process of procuring, yes, sir, and we
are very appreciative of that.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
669
The Chairman. Thank you.
In that connection, I might inform the committee I have been
getting letters of thanks from marines and others, too, about the
Goretex material we have been getting for them. It is good to know
it is getting down there to those folks.
Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a comment?
The Chairman. Yes, Mr. Kennedy.
Mr. Kennedy. I would just echo what you said a moment ago
and what Congressman Taylor said, that we ought to continue with
that procurement. It seems like it is so important, as demonstrated
out there in the field now, and the reaction that we have gotten,
I know I have gotten, has just been incredible. I just know that we
will continue on. I am glad that we did what we did last year and
we will support the initiative to continue that in this next year's
budget.
The Chairman. We are going to count on you doing that. We are
going to be trying to do more of it, too.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much.
I would like to follow up on the line of comments and questions
of Sonny Montgomery, General Montgomery. The Guard and the
Reserves, of course, are a very important part of our warfighting
potential. There are obviously economies in having a part of our ca-
pacity there. I understand that for some areas, we maintain an in-
dividual at one-third the cost in the Guard and Reserve as what
the individual would cost as a member of the regular force.
There are some downsides to this, however. Obviously, the train-
ing may not be at the same level so the fighting effectiveness may
be down a little, and it takes some time to integrate.
In these days of tight budget constraints, how do we know that
we have the right mix of Guard and Reserve to the Active Forces?
Obviously, we could have a larger potential force if we had more
in the Guard and Reserve, and you would trade that off against the
time penalty for integrating the Guard and Reserve into the fight-
ing force. You may have some detriment in effectiveness of train-
ing. How do we know that we have the optimum mix, and are we
there?
General RALSTON. Let me try that first and then I would like to
have all the services comment on that.
It is a very valid question. It is a tough issue. I do not know that
we have it exactly right. There are a lot of factors that go into it,
as you mentioned, the readiness, responsiveness part versus the
cost. There is also the overseas basing issue. In the active force, we
primarily send active people overseas. They have to have a rotation
base to come back to in the States. If they do not have that, then
you have a problem. You send the active folks overseas and they
stay there forever. So that is part of the equation as you try to do
that.
I will speak for my former service here. That works out to be
about a one-third/two-thirds mix, because if you have a third of
your forces overseas, you need to have a third of them in the Active
in the States and another third in the Air National Guard or the
Air Force Reserve. That seems to work pretty well in terms of the
dynamics of being able to support that force. That is not the only
670
measure of merit, but that certainly is one of the major factors that
goes into it. I would like to have the other services comment on
that.
General Griffith. Sir, I would never suggest that we are opti-
mal. I do not think we are that good to figure out precisely what
is correct. I would tell you that at least within the Army, we have
worked very, very hard to try to ensure that we have the right mix
and that we are using our Reserve component forces appropriately,
and I will give you a couple of examples.
Earlier, we talked that we came out of the gulf war with at least
the Army was convinced that we did not have enough artillery. We
did a major study, a lot of senior former general officers, to include
General Schwartzkopf, participated in that study. We determined
two things. No. 1, we did not have enough artillery, and No. 2, that
this was a skill and a function that was very well performed by the
Reserve component forces. We had two National Guard artillery
brigades in the gulf war.
We have moved to a larger artillery force in the Army. Seventy
percent of that force is in the National Guard. As I mentioned ear-
lier, we are putting air defense — we think that the air defense, a
single-function area like air defense is a skill that can be taught
more readily in the limited training periods that the Reserve com-
ponents have and it is a skill that we can rely on our Reserve com-
ponents to provide for the force. On the other hand, maneuver we
think is a different issue, and so we depend less on the Reserve
components for maneuver.
So I would say that our efforts have been to ensure that we have
a blend that capitaUzes on the strengths of the various components
of the force. We think we have it pretty close to right.
I would also just mention that when you look at the ability to
get to a theater quickly, I think we would all agree that you need
a level of Active Forces to do that. If we are going to deploy Re-
serve component forces quickly, it has to be in those skills that can
be practiced and learned in a more limited training period.
Transportation units, we envision deploying transportation units
from the Reserve right out of their home stations right into the
theater. We envision with our artillery and air defense, probably a
period of 2 weeks to 30 days of training prior to deployment. When
you get into the maneuver forces, then you are talking 90, 120
days.
Again, I would not suggest it is perfect or optimal, but I would
suggest that we have thought about it a great deal and I think we
are comfortable with how we are using the Reserve components in
the Army, sir.
General Hearney. Sir, in the Marine Corps, under the base
force, we were on the way to 39,000 reservists. Thanks to Congress,
we were leveled off at 42,000. We have what I would call now a
reasonable mix of ratio of Reserves to regulars. The Reserves are
fully integrated in a total force approach. They are being used time
and time again.
Is that exactly right? I think it is a bit early to tell. We will have
to go down the road a bit to see if that is the correct number. But
at this point in time, we certainly do not want to go lower than
that with the commitments that we have for the total force.
671
Admiral JOHNSON. And I would say from the Navy, sir, that we
probably are not at optimum mix right now. I am not sure what
that is, but the strength of the way we are operating now in terms
of the one force total force, as you have heard articulated already,
is that by working together every time we operate, which is the
way we do it now, we iterate the process in such a way that we
get better and make the contributions that the Reserves have more
relevant to the operational forces today.
So I think there is real merit in the way it is being done right
now and we have changed a lot of the Reserve component mission
mix to make it more relevant to the requirements today. We are
probably not there yet, like everybody else, but I think the way we
are working together lends itself to making it much better than it
has ever been before.
General Moorman. Sir, General Ralston spoke a little bit to the
Air Force and the total force. One thing that you mentioned that
I picked up on was the idea of training and how quickly we can
integrate and whether that was a factor in whether you employ the
Guard and Reserve versus the active.
In the Air Force, we now have gone to a model wherein we evalu-
ate the Guard and Reserve activities with the same people to the
same standard. So it gets back to a transparent activity in the Air
Force. Our IG's come in and look at them and test them the same
way we do the active.
On the other hand, I would echo what the rest of the folks at this
table have said. I would not say that we are absolutely at the opti-
mum because I have seen in the last 5 to 10 years a lot of fluid-
ness. That is, we are constantly evaluating that mix and that mis-
sion mix. One of the things that I would point out in the Air Force,
at least, is we see more missions gravitating to the Reserve and the
Guard and I think that is very healthy.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. It certainly stretches our
few dollars and makes them go further, the extent to which we can
use them effectively. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. McHale.
Mr. McHale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I regret that my friend and colleague, Mr. Taylor,
had to leave prior to this moment. He asked some superb questions
earlier regarding the Goretex equipment and the frostbite casual-
ties that had been brought to his attention.
If Gene were here, and for the record, I will insert this, just a
few days ago, I spoke with Col. John Sattler, who is the command-
ing officer of the 2d Marine Regiment. That regiment has received
some of that Goretex material and it has been well utilized and
deeply appreciated by the marines in Colonel Sattler's regiment.
They just came back from over a month at the Mountain Warfare
Training Center at Bridgeport, CA, where in extremely rugged con-
ditions, often approaching zero degrees, at altitudes of about 7,000
or 8,000 feet, for over a month, they used that Goretex equipment,
and John told me when I talked to him that he came back and not
a single marine in that period of time experienced any frostbite
casualty.
I think that is an extraordinary record, and as General Hearney
follows up on the instances brought to his attention, I think it is
672
important to recognize that largely as a result of the efforts under-
taken by Mr. Kennedy on this committee, we are able now to de-
ploy a large number of marines and soldiers to the field, take good
care of them despite harsh conditions, and bring them home safely.
I think Colonel Sattler's regiment is a prime example of that.
General Ralston, I read through your testimony and I am going
to give you a challenge that no one else has been able to meet. Try
and make me smart, if you would. I read through your testimony
and on page 3 it indicates that the JROC assists the chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff by overseeing the joint warfare capabilities
assessment process and reviewing all JWCA findings and rec-
ommendations. On page 6, significantly, you state, "We expanded
the JROC's focus beyond merely acquisition-related oversight to as-
sessments of our joint warfighting capabilities in ten distinct
areas," and you go on to list them. Then finally, on page 9, "The
JWCA process examines key relationships and interactions among
warfighting capabilities to identify opportunities for improving joint
effectiveness."
As I read through your testimony, I got a pretty good feeling for
how that operates at the flag and general officer level. How does
it operate at the muddy boots level? When we have an integration
of joint warfighting capabilities, how do you assess at the oper-
ational level how well it is working?
I will give you a quick example. Last year, I was in the field with
a marine unit where F-14 Tomcats were brought in in a close air
support mission. I spoke with a marine colonel last year who was
deployed with his regiment, a portion of his regiment, and Air
Force jets were used in close air support of the maneuver elements
within that relevant and there was some understandable oper-
ational frictions in terms of differences as to how the two services
operate.
My question to you is. How do you examine in the field how well
a joint operation has been conducted? Do you have a systematic ap-
proach down at the operational level to determine whether or not
a joint warfighting capability really works?
General Ralston. Yes, sir. Let me try to answer that this way.
As you well know, for every exercise that we have, there is a les-
sons learned process that you go through, the hot wash and so
forth, and these lessons learned are forwarded up through the com-
ponents to the CINC's and then to the Joint Staff. Within the Joint
Staff, for example, our J-7, one of their tasks, and they have a divi-
sion there that maintains the lessons learned from all of our joint
exercises and each one of those is scrubbed and the J-7 is an inte-
gral player on these JWCA teams, both at the action officer level
and at the flag officer level.
In addition, the CINC's are involved in these JWCA processes
that we have. So CINC ACOM or CINC PACCOM would have a
representative out there and any problem that they determine
through one of their exercises or through a real-world operation,
and we have enough of those going on right now, is, in fact, docu-
mented and fed back up through the process to us.
Mr. McHale. Are you satisfied that that flow of information real-
ly works effectively? I do not presuppose the answer to my ques-
tion. My concern is that there might be a theoretical discussion at
673
a flag or general officer level that is not concretely linked to what
is happening in the field.
When you talk about the lessons learned, are you personally con-
fident that the information coming back fi-om the field, when an F-
14 is used in close air support, is someone really looking at that?
When a B-1 comes in in support of a regimental maneuver ele-
ment, is someone examining that? When we deploy a unit overseas
and Marines are not working with Marine fighter pilots but, in
fact, Air Force fighter pilots in an attack mode, are we really look-
ing at those operational exercises to draw from them in an effective
way the lessons learned, and are we communicating those lessons
learned back up to the policy makers who then debate the options?
General Ralston. Let me say that I personally believe that cer-
tainly the vast majority are. I will not tell you that 100 percent of
all the things that we should know about, we know about at this
level. But I do believe that the process is in place to do that and
I have personally witnessed examples where we have made deci-
sions at the very senior levels to make changes in our equipment.
For example, close air support, in our doctrine we want to make
sure that the Marine fighter pilot, the Navy fighter pilot, the Air
Force fighter pilot, and the Army troop on the ground who is going
to receive that close air support are all using the same format, the
same standards. That is one of the things — ^I talked about Link 16
earlier — that is one of the things that has led all the services to
embrace that as a common means of communication.
Mr. McHale. I am encouraged by your response and I am abso-
lutely certain that it is accurate. I have some friends in the various
services who do not all have four stars, and when I am talking to
the colonels and lieutenant colonels and the majors and the cap-
tains, I sometimes hear a friction that I hope comes up to your
level so that the real-world challenge of integrating our services
comes to your attention in the context of actual operations, that it
is not just a theoretical examination.
Mr. Chairman, I think General Kearney has a comment and
then I will obey my red light.
General Kearney. Sir, I assure you it is not theoretical at all
and we are working those problems.
Mr. McKale. Good.
General KEARNEY. General Ralston gave you the example of Link
16. You can put that in terms of a common battlefield picture that
we are trying to build across the services, to include Link 16, the
combat identification, no matter what service it is. It takes a bit
of time, though, to put those programs in place so that muddy boot
actually sees the result. But I assure you that it is being addressed
and we are putting programs in place to ensure that.
Mr. McHale. Gentlemen, I am encouraged by your responses.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Buyer.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think my colleague from Pennsylvania's questions are very
good. Trying to figure out the inner workings of the Pentagon has
been a challenge of mine for the last 3V2 years. I am almost kind
674
of reminded of the story — ^you guys probably have heard this be-
fore— I will pick on the lieutenant colonel down here for a moment.
This new lieutenant colonel goes over to the Pentagon and he is
fresh out of the field, never been to Washington, DC, before, just
loved being in the field. They wanted to put him in the Pentagon
before they sent him as a legislative liaison. So his first week in
the office, he is just going nuts. He does not have much hair left,
but he is pulling out what hair he has.
Mr. Abercrombie. I know the feeling.
Mr. Buyer. You know the feeling? Well, he cannot grow a beard.
So the following week, he takes his desk out of his office and he
puts it out there with his aides and assistants and he is still going
crazy.
The third week, he moves his desk and puts it in the hallway
and he is still going crazy in the Pentagon.
The fourth week, he takes his desk, and lo and behold, it is now
found in the men's restroom. All of his colleagues and peers and
superiors are pretty worried about this young, fresh lieutenant
colonel, fresh out of the field, but they decide not to really confront
him but to send the psychologist down to go talk to him.
So the psychologist goes down and he knocks on the door of the
restroom and said, "May I come in?" He said, "Yes, you can come
into my office." He said, "You know, there are a lot of people here
in the Pentagon who are very concerned about you. Colonel, and I
have to just come out and ask the question. Why have you moved
your office here to the men's restroom?" And he says, "Frankly, sir,
this is the only place I have found where the men thoroughly know
and understand what they are doing." [Laughter.]
Now, the only reason I said that is I want to make three points.
I was here during Sonny Montgomery's questioning and I heard
each and every one of you say that you are going to look out for
the Guard and Reserve, yet I participated in a hearing where the
Guard and Reserves involved with the Laughlin bill saying, I have
to move to three stars so I can gain access to different meetings
because if I do not gain access to certain meetings, we do not get
taken care of when they are divvying out the money.
So No. 1, I have a disconnect.
I am also faced with another disconnect as I sit here on this com-
mittee and that is. General Ralston, you say that — and as a matter
of fact, the rest of the table nodded their head with regard to the
$60 billion as a goal and that BRAC and streamlining the process
will not get you there with regard to your needs of procurement.
The huge disconnect between what your needs and your goals are
and that of the budget that has been sent over here, and that of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and what his needs are
and what a disconnect.
General Griffith, when you say to this committee with regard to
modernization that the budget is substantial, do you mean that
which budget has been sent over to us or that of the goal? I want
you to please explain the disconnect to me.
The third point I have to make is with regard to General Krulak.
He comes over here and he testifies with regard to procurement
and says that the buy rate of the V-22 is ludicrous and dangerous.
675
Now, Admiral Johnson, you take care of the Naval aviation assets
for the Marine Corps, right?
Admiral JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. Buyer. So I want you to explain that to me, why the Marine
Commandant is going to tell us that that procurement rate is ludi-
crous and dangerous — those are pretty powerful words — and if, in
fact, it is, then it needs to be corrected. So please do not tell us
here on this committee that everything is hunky-dory and fine if,
in fact, there is a problem.
I am sure the Commandant of the Marine Corps has been catch-
ing some grief with regard to that comment, but let me stand here
and congratulate him with regard to the courage of his honesty
with the committee. We are not your enemy, guys. We are your
friends and we want to be helpful with regard to the needs.
I will turn it over to you.
General Griffith. I will be happy to respond. I think what I
said, Mr. Buyer, was that the commitment that the Army has
made to modernization of Guard and Reserve is substantial. I
stand behind that, sir.
As I can demonstrate, I think, and I think that my colleagues
from the Reserve components would agree, the Army has made a
very determined commitment to put modern artillery systems, the
Palladin, the most modern artillery system we have, into the Re-
serve components and we are going to have that done by the end
of the POM.
The active Army is taking out of our own structure air defense
Avenger units to the corps and we are putting those into the Na-
tional Guard. We think by the end of the POM we are going to be
able to ensure that all of the obsolete air defense systems in the
National Guard are removed, that the Hawk is gone, that the
Chaparral is gone, and that the air defense units of the National
Guard are going to be equipped with Avenger units.
I think every armored — I may be wrong in this, but I do not be-
lieve I am wrong — I think every armored brigade in the National
Guard today has Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks, and
I think most of those Abrams are the MlAl Abrams, the 120-milli-
meter gun Abrams.
So I think that the modernization of the force is — and I would
not disagree that we are certainly not optimal. We certainly have
needs. I would not disagree with that. But I would say that I stand
by my statement that the Army has made a commitment to mod-
ernize the Guard and Reserve to the fullest extent possible and
that modernization is and will continue to be substantial.
General Ralston. Let me try to address your second question,
the apparent disconnect between our goal and the budget. I think,
sir, that we have tried to say that in order to adequately recapital-
ize the Bottom-Up Review force structure that we have, that we
need about $60 billion a year.
We would like to get to that $60 billion a year procurement soon-
er rather than later, because the longer you delay in getting there,
then you are going to age your force that much more each year. We
have made that point clear, as clear as we can, to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs and he has forwarded that recommendation up
to the civilian leadership.
676
As you know, we probably are not getting to that $60 billion as
rapidly as we would like, but all we can do is continue to make the
case for the recapitalization of the force and to try to get there as
soon as we can.
Mr. Buyer. What is so difficult for us on this committee is when
you say the budget is substantial. We recognize that there are defi-
ciencies and we talk to commanders out on the field. Then when
we try to come up with a plus-up to meet the needs of the ones
in the field, it is exactly what the chairman said. Then we get ac-
cused of providing pork and then they try to seek some connection
with regards to, gee, is that because there is a defense contractor
in a district?
I just want to share that with you. It is a dilemma. You deal
with some real factual dilemmas. We deal with them, too. But the
nice thing about this committee, even though the Congress can get
partisan at times, with regard to this need in the force and putting
them out there, the commitment is pretty real.
General Ralston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Buyer. So we want to be helpful to you on that. If you can
help me there with the buy rate?
Admiral JOHNSON. The V-22 buy rate is a concern to the Com-
mandant. I roger that. He articulates it very well. I would just tell
you, sir, that to accelerate that buy rate would become an afford-
ability issue for us, that when you look at the rest of the things
that we have on our plate that are very important to the Navy De-
partment, we think that where we are is roughly as good as it can
be right now.
Can we accelerate it? Sure. Does it take more money? Yes. It
would take $95 million in RDT&E money to accelerate it for next
year and I would just tell you right now we have not found that
money.
Mr. Buyer. So if I can read between the lines, in order to satisfy
what the Commandant of the Marine Corps sees as a ludicrous and
dangerous buy rate for the V-22, you are unprepared in Naval
aviation to shift any monies to take care of that which may be dan-
gerous to military readiness and would be looking to the committee
to help out the buy rate of the V-22 to stabilize combat readiness?
Admiral JOHNSON. Your words, sir.
The Chairman. That is helpful.
Mr. Buyer. Thank you very much.
General Moorman. May I speak to your Reserve question? That
seemed to be the only one that was not touched. If I got the tense
of your Reserve question, Mr. Buyer, it was that the reason that
that act had recommended the promotion of the Guard and the Re-
serve folks was to get a higher level of influence and get a seat at
the table, or words to that effect.
I can only speak for the Air Force, but my sense is from an Air
Force perspective, we do not support the promotion from that per-
spective because the Guard and the Reserve folks are already at
the table and fare very well. On the other hand, the Guard and the
Reserve in all of our services are getting an increased piece of the
pie and an increased level of action and responsibility and it is for
that reason that the Air Force supported the increase in rank
structure.
677
Mr. Buyer. The other services could learn a lot from the Air
Force with regard to integration. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Ralston, on page 3 of your testimony, the second element
which you list about assisting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
and I am quoting, "considering alternatives to any acquisition pro-
gram that has been identified to meet military requirements by
evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the pro-
gram and the identified alternatives." I do not want to take that
out of context, but I want to establish that as the principal element
of my question.
Then taking into consideration that which was provided to us to
what JROC does, a mission needs statement, key performance pa-
rameters— this is in the acquisition process, trying to keep that in
mind.
Then moving to and implementing change, your recommenda-
tions then go to the Chairman to assess military requirements for
acquisition programs. Am I right so far?
General Ralston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am not trying to trick you into anything.
General Ralston. No, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. I am just trying to make sure that I am abso-
lutely on target with what you are supposed to be doing and the
principal objectives that you are trying to achieve.
Then under our diagram here where the process continues, one
of the principal warfighting requirements and capabilities assessed
is focused on joint warfighting, right?
General Ralston. Yes, sir.
Mr. Abercrombie. The reason I am asking that has to do with
a further contextual observation, if you will grant to me. This
comes from the background of the material provided to us with
your statement. I do not know if you have seen that material or
not or if you have that material.
This is provided by the committee, and I am quoting again.
"Under the enhanced JROC, the Chairman provides two principal
inputs to the budget process. At the beginning of the cycle, the
Chairman's program recommendation, CPR. This document is pre-
pared providing his advice on priorities that should be observed in
the formulating of the upcoming budget."
And then continuing to quote from the background material, "To-
ward the end of the budget cycle, a Chairman's program assess-
ment, CPA." CPR, CPA. "A document is issued which assesses com-
pliance with the resulting budget proposal with the CPR priorities."
"This process," again quoting, "was not fully in place until late
1994. Last year was the first full cycle subject to these procedures."
Are we in agreement on these points, that you have responsibil-
ity in this area?
General Ralston. Yes, sir, I believe we are.
Mr. Abercrombie. Part of the argument, not necessarily today,
but part of the discussion taking place in the committee has to do
with whether or not there is a shortfall in the expenditures that
we will budget, that we will authorize with respect to acquisitions.
678
Figures are cited up to $60 billion in acquisitions — newspaper arti-
cles, reports, classified and nonclassified are utilized. Generally,
there can be a political connotation assessed to all of these things.
The reason I am asking these questions is just recently, I was
somewhat dumbfounded to hear that a bill had been submitted
commonly called the Dole-Gingrich bill. I am not citing that for po-
litical purposes. That is the way it is reported. It has to do with
national missile defense.
Now, I will not comment on either Mr. Dole or Mr. Gingrich's ca-
pacity to be involved in submitting such a bill, but I will be frank,
and the chairman knows this and Mr. Hunter knows this, had Mr.
Hunter and Mr. Weldon's name been on the other end of that bill
as far as the House was concerned, I would be more sanguine as
to what its purpose is.
But as the chairman and Mr. Hunter are also well aware, I have
had my doubts about a national missile defense in the context of
the joint warfighting capacity and the expectation that the services
will work together wherever possible to, and I am quoting from
some background that we have now, "to identify weapons systems
they deem necessary to support their functions and to engage in
mutually supportive efforts to avoid unnecessary duplication of ef-
fort and that the expanded JROC has evolved to mitigate undesir-
able aspects which may appear in the process of attempting to do
this."
My concern is that I am unable to find, and I would like you to
tell us, if recommendations have come from the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council with respect to a national missile defense ex-
penditure or acquisition in this budget cycle and whether or not in
the context of the assessment of requirements and the mission
needs statement and so on, the bill that I am referring to was de-
veloped in conjunction or in consultation with you in this process
with respect to national missile defense system acquisitions pro-
posal.
General Ralston. Sir, I am unable to comment specifically about
the bill because I am personally unaware of any discussions along
those lines.
Mr. Abercrombie. ok.
General Ralston. But I am familiar with what I believe is the
thrust of your question there. The JROC did deliberate with regard
to missile defense, both theatre missile defense and national mis-
sile defense. The JROC did make recommendations to the Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs did
make recommendations with regard to that to the Secretary of De-
fense and that was included in the budget.
Now, with regard to the specifics of that, I would like to defer
that to General Hearney, who was there for the discussions at that
time.
Mr. Abercrombie. General, before you answer, because I see the
light is on and my time essentially is up, the main thrust of what
I am trying to accomplish here, with all respect for the process that
you have to follow, I am trying to figure out whether or not in the
context of this discussion taking place in the committee, and it is
a bipartisan discussion, it is not one conducted in a confrontational
way at all, is whether or not the presentation made by the Sec-
679
retary of Defense and others to us about the DOD's recommenda-
tions with respect to missile defense, theatre missile defense, et
cetera, is an accurate reflection of what you concluded in the con-
text of those general premises that I outlined?
General Hearney. Sir, we discussed specifically the theatre mis-
sile defense in great detail in the JROC process, and we can lay
that out for you and take the record and go through that. But in
general terms, in the development of, as you mentioned, the CPA
in 1995, it was recognized that we had to come to grips with an
affordability of the numerous systems that were being put forward
and that was done in this recommendation process that we just
went through.
We looked at those numerous systems, prioritized them, the
JWCA, joint requirements capability assessment, did an independ-
ent study on that. And we went through a neck-down prioritization
process and that is what has come up and that is what we have
heard from Dr. Kaminski.
Mr. Abercrombie. So is it an accurate statement, in conclusion
of my portion here, that the recommendations with respect to joint
development and with respect to theatre missile development,
interservice development and the theatre missile development, is
an accurate reflection of what you recommended? Is what came out
from the DOD
General Hearney. What came out, sir, is that we recognize that
there was a — the short-term or short-range theatre missile was
Mr. Abercrombie. A top priority?
General Hearney. A here and now priority, and that was the No.
1 priority that we came up with and that should be addressed now.
Mr. Abercrombie. OK.
General Hearney. The upper tier was one that could slide down
the road just a bit, but we had to fix the short-range first, and that
was the No. 1 priority, and it is a cross-service approach.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much.
Thank you for indulging me in that, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
it.
Mr. Hunter. Would the gentleman yield for just a second?
Mr. Abercrombie. I do not have the time, but if the chairman
will be indulgent further, I will be happy to.
The Chairman. It is Mr. Hunter's time anyway coming up.
Mr. Hunter. I will take it on my time.
The Chairman. You are recognized, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. I was trying to steal some more time here, Neil.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I think the bill that the gentleman mentioned is basically
a repackaging of "the national missile defense shall deploy by
2003" language that was in the bill that was passed by both
Houses and that was part of the veto justification or veto message.
It was included in the President's veto message. Because of that,
we repackaged it after the bill was scaled down to get it back
through and past the President's desk, and so they put that back
together and are running it through in another form. It goes basi-
cally to the political decision as to whether or not you deploy a na-
tional missile defense.
680
Let me just ask one question on the theatre defense. General
Luck, who was the commander in North Korea, who was not happy
with the decision to delay full development and deployment of
THAAD because he was counting on getting some early THAAD
systems in South Korea, he sent a cable to that effect to the Joint
Chiefs. Are you up to speed on that. General?
General Hearney. We ran it through all of the warfighting
CINCs, the service chiefs and the chairmen, and the recommenda-
tions went up through that chain.
Mr. Hunter. If you had the money, do you think that General
Luck's concerns should be addressed, and we should get that as
fast as possible if you were not constrained doUarwise?
General Hearney. Sir, if we were not constrained doUarwise,
there were probably a lot of things we would like to do.
Mr. Hunter. Good; let us stick with that one for a second.
General Hearney. Sir, we would take that back in and review
it on how that would fit into the prioritization process.
Mr. Hunter. So you would tell him that would give him another
look, but you are not convinced that he needs it?
General Moorman. Can I touch that?
Mr. Hunter. Sure.
General Moorman. If you will yield to me. Rich.
Mr. Hunter. I mean, it is kind of rare to get a theater com-
mander on a specific weapons system sending a cable saying please
do not kill or slow down that system. Now, the whole theory of
JROC is that you are sensitive to the needs of people in the field,
so I just wondered
General MOORMAN. What I wanted to add sir, because it is not
clear to me — and I will be frank with you; I have never asked Gen-
eral Luck directly — but there is a capability that can be available
to General Luck. It is the prototype system of THAAD, the so-
called UOEAS, and that is a system that would give him some pro-
tection against what he has. I am not sure that that was made
clear to him.
Mr. Hunter. You may want to review that and maybe get us a
better or more extensive record. But let me ask staff to pass out
for you four little sheets that I have here. They are called Procure-
ment Budget Authority, current billions, fiscal year 1995 budget,
fiscal year 1996 budget and fiscal year 1997 budget, and those, of
course, were the 5-year and 6-year budgets that were submitted by
the administration, in which they, of course, talk about the out
years. And the fiscal year 1997 budget, in 1995 — and this goes
right to what Admiral Owens talked about when he talked about
the fact that we prophesied in 1994 that procurement would be at
$63 billion. Of course, what really happened was it went to $48 bil-
lion, but we all thought it was going up. In 1995, it was going up
to $55 billion, but in fact, what really happened was $46 billion.
And he goes on down to the bottom line, which is we have got to
stop promising ourselves and start doing something.
So you have got those three budgets in front of you. The procure-
ment line is for fiscal year 1997. In fiscal year 1995, President
Clinton had it at $49 billion. In fiscal year 1996, it went to $43 bil-
lion, and in fiscal year 1997, the moment of truth, it is at $38.9
billion. Let me just ask you from your professional perspective — not
681
from a political perspective or a top-line constraint; from your pro-
fessional perspective in terms of what we need for our Nation's
military, which of those three budgets do you prefer with respect
to the 1997 and 1998 lines particularly? Could you all examine
that?
General Ralston. Yes, sir; let me start with that. And as I think
I had tried to say before, we are convinced that we need about $60
billion in procurement. We would like to have that as soon as we
can get it.
Mr. Hunter. So how does that lead you to answer that question?
General Ralston. Then that says that the line that is labeled fis-
cal year 1995 gets us there sooner than the one labelled fiscal year
1997. So from that perspective, I would prefer that.
Mr. Hunter. You would like the 1995 better?
General Ralston. Please do not put me on record as advertising
the 1995 budget.
Mr. Hunter. I understand; no, we are asking you
General Ralston. But I would have to step up and say, yes,
sooner is better than later.
Mr. Hunter. We are asking you from your professional military
perspective, which is what you bring to the table, and your honesty
is appreciated.
General Griffith.
General Griffith. First, we have said the goal is $60 billion for
procurement.
Mr. Hunter. Which of those three do you think is preferable,
then?
General Griffith. Sir, obviously the line on the 1995 President's
budget gets you there quicker.
Mr. Hunter. General Hearney.
General Hearney. Sir, there is no question that the 1995 budget
gets you there sooner.
Mr. Hunter. Admiral Johnson.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Which one do you like best?
Admiral Johnson. We want to get to $60 billion as soon as we
can, so in that regard, the 1995 is the one.
Mr. Hunter. General Moorman.
General Moorman. Same thing, sir.
Mr. Hunter. I have got, Mr. Chairman, some more questions
that I would like to ask if we can go to a second round. Aiid I un-
derstand that our time is up, but I have got a series of questions
with respect to specific systems and your interaction with the serv-
ices on those systems we would like to submit for the record if we
do not get a second round, but I do have some more questions, Mr,
Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
If I might, we were talking awhile ago about the high tempo, and
we are strung out all over the world, all of the services are full
speed ahead, and we are right down on the line. What if we laid
on two MRC's on top of that? Something has got to give, has it not?
Can we do all of those kinds of things that we are doing now and
two MRC's?
682
General Ralston. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. In my view, we could
not. One of the premises of the two-MRC strategy is that you could
not conduct all of the things we have ongoing around the world
today simultaneously with that. The force would be sized for two
MRC's and two MRC's only. That is my opinion. I invite the other
Vice Chiefs to comment.
The Chairman. Does anyone want to say anything? I was just
wondering, because I thought the same thing, you know, which
means that if something did happen right now, and we had to go
to that strategy, backing up that strategy, at least, these other
things have got to go by the board, including the problems with
Bosnia and China and all the rest, I guess. But anyway, that is an-
other question.
Mr. Taylor, I think, wanted to ask another question.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do thank you gentlemen for sticking around. I am going to ask
three questions, because I only have 5 minutes. Answer the ones
you want to.
Getting back to the ballistic missile defense, the question is not
in an ideal world if you could have everything you want. The ques-
tion is given the funds we have, what is the proper amount of
money to allocate toward that when there are so many other needs,
in your minds?
The second thing is along the line of trying to save some money.
As I visit bases, I am amazed at places like Guantanamo and Saudi
Arabia during the gulf war and even Naples, Italy, where the Navy
is renting that hospital to the tune of about $4 million a year, how
we often have to rely either on outside sources or the local economy
for things as simple as barracks, hospitals. Has your group looked
into the possibility of floating hospitals, floating barracks, floating
housing as we ramp up in places like Guantanamo only a few years
later to tear those things down or in the case of Panama, rather
than building something and having it revert to the host nation,
take it with us when it is time to go?
The third thing is that it is my understanding that the chiefs will
be coming to us again this year asking to purchase some foreign-
built RO-RO ships, I think for the Marine Corps, to have them con-
verted in an American yard to fill your immediate need for sealift.
Has your group looked at either a lashed-type barge or even a sin-
gle-hulled ocean-going barge made to roll-on/roll-off specs, capable
of carrying an M1-A2 or whatever you need to carry and then ei-
ther relying on commercial ocean-going tugs to move it around or
having some Army tugs dedicated to that purpose? If the ship is
going to spend 99 percent of its time at the dock, would it not make
sense to save on the cost of all of that propulsion equipment? And
since our Nation is very competitive on things that are, as a rule,
600 feet and smaller and particularly competitive internationally in
ocean-going barges, why not try to play to our strengths rather
than continually buying things where we have not done too well,
which is RO-RO ships? Three questions.
General Ralston. Let me take the first one, if I may.
Mr. Taylor. Sure.
General RALSTON. And if I understood your question correctly, it
was with regard to ballistic missile defense, given the dollars that
683
we have got, our priorities. And from a JROC perspective, when
the JROC looked at a combination of threat, technology, and re-
sources, it was the collective judgment of the JROC to make a rec-
ommendation to the Chairman that prioritized the way that the
Chairman recommended to the SecDef and the SecDef put it into
the budget. So I believe what you see in the 1997 budget is consist-
ent with what the JROC recommended to the Chairman given
those three factors.
Mr. Taylor. Rather than waste time calling the roll, can every-
body either shake or nod or
General Griffith. I would just like to add that the discussions
we had on theater missile defense are precisely, sir, as you de-
scribed it. It was in a framework of a TOA, of a total budget, and
it was our assessment that within that framework, within that con-
text, that we could, in fact, scale back some on the theater missile
defense commitment in terms of dollars to apply to other needed
capabilities. And the framework you describe is precisely the
framework in which we had those discussions.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you. General Griffith.
General Ralston. I would like to defer the second question to
someone who was involved in that, Tom or you or Ron, this is on
the floating hospital and floating housing.
General Griffith. I think we have got an ACTD. You are talking
about the mobs, I believe?
Mr. Taylor. I know, for example, you are building two barges at
this time for the Navy for barracks barges. My question is have you
considered, given the experience in the Philippines; given the expe-
rience in Panama, where many of the buildings that were built at
incredible expense were turned over to the host nation, in the case
of the School of the Americas only to be looted and left behind, has
much thought been given to as often as possible at seaside facilities
having a floating facility so that if our host asked us to leave, we
could just take it with us? I mean, your budget is tight. I know you
get tired of building the same thing in every country you visit only
to leave it behind.
Admiral Johnson. From a JROC perspective, Mr. Taylor, I
would defer that to my colleagues. But from a service perspective,
I would tell you that we have indeed looked at that, and as you
have mentioned, we have some barges that we have built. We have
used other means, for instance, when we had the operation going
on in Guantanamo, the refugee operation, as you are probably
aware, we used cruise ships as barracks ships, essentially, and so
we have that in our scan. Beyond that, in terms of concrete pro-
grams, I would be happy to give you something for the record, sir.
Mr. Taylor. And the third question was on the thought of in-
stead of purchasing RO-RO ships, the possibility of looking at
ocean-going barges built to a RO-RO configuration, the idea being
that rather than tying up all your money on a power plant that is
not going to be used more than 2 or 3 percent of the time — and
again, since we are competitive internationally in building ocean-
going barges, I have got to believe that you would get a heck of a
value. Have you even looked at that?
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir; I think that has been looked at. My
initial reaction to that would be one of concern with timeliness in
684
terms of getting it there when you really need it. But beyond that,
I would have to defer in terms of what the JROC has
Mr. Taylor. My last thought is in particular for your
prepositioned things. If it is just going to sit there anyway — again,
I am just asking you to take a look at it.
Admiral Johnson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. I think you would save some money.
Admiral Johnson. OK.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to your prioritization of theater missile defense, I
presume that is based on the President's $38.9 billion procurement
budget and his total Defense budget that has been proposed this
year; is that right? That is not presuming any add-ons by this com-
mittee in terms of dollars; is that right?
General Griffith. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. Will the record reflect that General Griffith did nod
on that one?
General Griffith. Again, I am not trying to equivocate on this
thing. But the point that I would make to you is that the context
of those discussions, the context of that decision, to make that rec-
ommendation was based on fiscal realities as we envision them to
be and based on looking at where we most needed dollars to meet
most critical needs.
Mr. Hunter. General Griffith, I am saying exactly the same
thing you are saying. Now, last year, you came to us with prior-
ities, and you came to us with the President's top line in procure-
ment. I looked at that and realized you did not have enough ammu-
nition in there, and you did not have enough trucks. We added
trucks and added ammo. You just thanked us for the trucks and
the ammo, and I presume that if we had enough money to also
fund more missile defense, which would protect some of your troops
in Korea against Scud-C's, that if you could get that, you would
appreciate it. And so the point that I am making is that your
prioritization of missile defense, having some money deleted from
it this year was based on the President's procurement budget this
year, his overall defense budget but the procurement and R&D
budgets being as stated in the President's budget submission, be-
cause there are almost $20 billion in difference, just in the 2 years,
fiscal years 1997 and 1998. That is the difference between what we
are really going to get now that we are down to the time when you
have got to fish or cut bait and what you folks projected to the
President and he projected in his 5-year budget in 1995. You have
got almost a $20 billion difference there.
Now, if we give you some of that extra money, I just want to
make it clear that you are not saying that you do not need addi-
tional missile defense; you are saying that given the dollars that
you are looking at this year in the President's budget, that is where
your prioritization is at; is that right?
General GRIFFITH. What I would like to say, sir, is that if given
additional dollars, I think what we would do is we would have to
come back to the JROC and say is that an area where we think
the dollars
685
Mr. Hunter. But you do not foreclose it? It may be one of your
priorities, as may a lot of other things.
General Griffith. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned an important thing on this MRC
scenario.
You are the arbiters of what we need with respect to being able
to fight two MRC's. Now, the MRC that we had in Desert Storm,
we won with very few casualties because we had overwhelming
force. We now have an Army that has gone from 18 divisions to
roughly 10; air wing equivalents in the Air Force down from about
23 to 14; the Navy from about 550 ships to about 350, give or take
a couple. If we had to fight Desert Storm today, could we be pre-
sumed to be able to win it in the overwhelming manner that we
won it in the early 1990's when we had the heavier force structure?
General Ralston. Let me take that first and then have each of
the services respond.
Mr. Hunter. OK.
General Ralston. In my judgment, yes, we could today.
Mr. Hunter. With the same low level of casualties?
General Ralston. I believe we could do it with the same low
level of casualties.
Mr. Hunter. OK.
Question, General Griffith: how many Army divisions were en-
gaged in Desert Storm?
General GRIFFITH. Seven, sir.
Mr. Hunter. How many?
General Griffith. Seven.
Mr. Hunter. Seven; if we have ten today, and you dedicated
seven to Desert Storm, how many would you then dedicate to an
MRC on the Korean peninsula?
General GRIFFITH. Sir, you would obviously
Mr. Hunter. It would be three.
General Griffith [continuing]. The arithmetic is pretty simple;
you have got three, except, sir
Mr. Hunter. Question: Could you win with overwhelming force
on the Korean peninsula with today's downsized force structure
with the three divisions?
General Griffith. Sir, if we had to go to Korea, we would have
to employ the brigades of the National Guard. We would have to
mobilize and deploy maneuver forces from the National Guard.
Mr. Hunter. So you would not be able to do it with your active
Army?
General Griffith. The full combat requirements could not be
met if we put seven divisions
Mr. Hunter. OK, full combat requirements could not be met. So
I guess what I am introducing is that there is another aspect to
not having the force structure and meeting the military require-
ments, and that is not just that we would like to get there sooner
than later but that that difference can be translated into more cas-
ualties on the battlefield.
General Ralston, you are about 100 bombers short if you look at
the Bottom-Up Review and you map that out against two MRC's.
Now, the answer to that was we are going to swing bombers from
686
one MRC to another, something we have never done before. In ask-
ing General Loh the question, he said that you could take more
casualties doing that if you happened to swing bombers out of one
theater at a time when the enemy, for example, was making an ar-
mored attack; is that accurate?
General Ralston. I would have to go back and review the record.
My understanding of what General Loh said was
Mr. Hunter. I have got his letter; I will give it to you.
General Ralston [continuing! . That it is an untested strategy;
we have not done that before, and there may be some risks associ-
ated with it.
Mr. Hunter. Yes, and he said that could be translated into addi-
tional casualties.
I have got a number of questions. Mr. Chairman, if I could be
permitted, I just have a few on some basic equipment requirements
I would like to throw out if we could.
General Griffith. Could I comment, make one other further
point, sir?
Mr. Hunter. Sure.
General Griffith. Sir, I was part of Desert Storm. I had a divi-
sion in that conflict. And I am being absolutely sincere when I tell
you that I think that we could fight that war today with a lesser
number of divisions than we fought it in 1991. I think that the
force that we fought out there is a lesser force today than it was
in 1991, a significantly lesser force. And I think our ability because
of prepo stocks in theater to close in that theater much quicker
Mr. Hunter. No, General, that was not my question. My ques-
tion went to a Desert Storm-type scenario, taking the strength of
Saddam Hussein today as it was then, not after we have won the
war and he has been knocked down. My point was two robust
MRC's, and I think that was an example of a robust MRC.
Let me ask you. General Hearney: your ammunition stocks. I un-
derstand that there is not enough ammo without pulling down re-
serve stocks for the Marine Corps to fight two MRC's; is that accu-
rate?
General Hearney. Sir, we would have to use reserve stocks to
fight two MRC's, our war reserves.
Mr. Hunter. Could you fight it with all of your war reserve?
Could you fight two MRC's even if you had all of your war reserve
available?
General Hearney. Sir, I will have to take that for the record and
get back to you.
Mr. Hunter. My suspicion is that I think from the briefings that
I have had, you would have to go into the training reserve also,
that you are shy on ammo.
With respect to Army aviation. General Griffith, are you up to
speed? Do you have sufficient Army aviation capability now to
robustly fight two MRC's?
General Griffith. Sir, I think the aviation capabilities of the
U.S. Army are probably better than they have ever been. And as
we bring on the Apache Longbow, that is clearly going to be a capa-
bility that is dramatically greater than anything we have enjoyed
on the battlefield before. I think, sir, the answer to your question
is yes. We look forward to having more Apaches into the force, par-
687
ticularly the Longbow, as we have indicated. I would tell you that
there is one concern that I have that the Congress has helped us
with, and we are trying to help ourselves with in the program, and
that is the medevac capabilities which we need to replace the Huey
and have more UH-60's to facilitate that capability.
Mr. Hunter. Do you have enough sealift capability?
General Griffith. No, sir, we do not. We need those additional —
we have not completed the Bottom-Up Review sealift structure. We
had that discussion that we are five ships short of what we require.
We think that we need those additional RO-RO's for the sealift ca-
pability.
Mr. Hunter. Do you have enough ammunition?
General Griffith. Sir, we have enough ammunition. I would
have to also answer for the record.
Mr. Hunter. I would like you to go back and look at the amount
of ammo you think you are going to need to fight two robust
MRC's. And as I understand, there are two requirements. One re-
quirement is one that comes from commanders in the field, and the
other requirement is a shaved-down requirement that comes from
the Pentagon. And I do not have the names for those two require-
ments, but I would like you to stack it up against both ammunition
standards, if you would.
General Moorman, do you have enough precision-guided muni-
tions?
General MOORMAN. Yes, we do in the budget here, although I
think you have asked us
Mr. Hunter. No, I do not mean in the budget; I mean in your
inventory. Do you have enough precision-guided munitions to fight
two robust MRC's?
General Moorman. Yes, I think we do. However, there are al-
ways needs for additional. But I think we can handle two MRC's.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me, and I have a lot of
other questions for the record that I would like to be able to sub-
mit, if I could.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Abercrombie.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Ralston, I have more of an observation to make, and you
need not comment on it now, and I am not entirely sure that this
is within your purview. But I am going to quote to you from the
introduction that you made in the hopes that this idea that I have
might be useful at some point within the context of your legislative
responsibilities, that which was established by the act establishing
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. You say that: "The
Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act made the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs responsible for assessing the extent to which the
program recommendations and budget proposals of the military de-
partments and other components of the Department of Defense
conform with the priorities established in the strategic plans and
priorities of the combatant commanders-in-chief."
All well and good. Further: "It directed the Chairman to submit
to the Secretary of Defense alternative program recommendations
38-160 97-24
688
and budget proposals." I am emphasizing budget proposals in this
with the idea of, as you say in addition: "projected resource levels
and guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense," which
amounts to the Secretary of Defense trying to figure out how do I
pay for everything that everybody wants? And we have gone
through this whole hearing today where you have had to juggle
these, where you have testified that — and I do not mean that in a
pejorative sense at all — ^you had to juggle how to come up with this.
Have you, in the process of doing all of this, considered capital
budgeting, recommending this to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
and to the Secretary of Defense that in order to accomplish particu-
larly on the procurement and acquisition side in the context of that
which Chairman Spence mentioned? Once you get into these cap-
ital projects, whether it is the barges that Gene was talking about
or submarines versus carriers — we have had that kind of argu-
ment, principally, I think, because of the incredible capital expendi-
ture that is involved in this. And that money, in terms of author-
ization, as the chairman indicated, sucks up an enormous portion
of our authorization capacity, so that in the end, we find ourselves,
as Mr. Hunter indicated as well, coming up against quality of life
issues, readiness issues and sometimes expected here in the com-
mittee to provide add ons or plus ups, which more often than not,
involve quality of life issues and some of the readiness issues sim-
ply because of this incredible capital expenditure.
And I do not think that many people across the Nation are famil-
iar with the fact that the budgeting system of the Federal Govern-
ment is different from the way they budget their families or in
their cities and counties and States, where they have a capital
budget versus an operating budget.
The reason I am going through that dissertation is that I am
really deadly serious about trying to address in good faith what the
chairman touched on and what other serious-minded members of
this committee have enumerated on many occasions. How do we
deal with the enormous capital costs and at the same time deal
with our operating expenditures and still be fair to all of the other
needs that we have in Social Security, Medicare, whatever it might
be?
Now, I do not see this as a panacea, capital budgeting, separat-
ing the capital budget from the operating budget in DOD, but I cer-
tainly see it as something that we should and could address in a
good faith fashion to see whether or not precisely because that
which the reprogramming of capital expenditures and the renewal
that takes place, bombers, no matter what they may be; missiles
that have to be replaced; carriers. If we are looking at 10 and 20
and 30 and even 40 and 50 year utilization, why can we not go to
the possibility, look to laying off the expenditure in a way that we
would with capital goods, with dishwashers and cars and houses?
We are experimenting right now, and this committee on a bipar-
tisan basis is looking at housing, where we perhaps go to the pri-
vate sector and get a public-private partnership for family housing
that will be paid off over a 30-year period just as other housing
might be. So my point is less a question to you as to whether you
approve or disapprove of the idea of capital budgeting but more of
an observation that I hope you will take into account and perhaps
689
be willing to comment on: Has capital budgeting been considered,
and if it has, what did you conclude? And if it has not been, is it
something that would come under the programming and budgeting
requirements or responsibilities that you have with respect to de-
fense planning?
General Ralston. Sir, I would like to take that for the record
and try to get you a more fulsome answer than what I could give
you today. I understand the concept you are talking about. Let me
get back to you with an answer.
Mr. Abercrombie. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Abercrombie. Mr. Chairman, I would really appreciate —
and it does not have to necessarily be to me, but I do think that
you and I and other members on a bipartisan basis have talked
about capital budgeting in the past, but it is something that really
has not come forward, and I would very much appreciate it if we
could follow up on a committeewide basis. I did not just bring it
up as a personal observation.
The Chairman. I think the appropriators have been talking
along those lines already on some things.
But if I might just for 1 minute, I was thinking while I had my
mind jogged on this thing that there are all kinds of things floating
around town, I am sure, and you must have thought about it collec-
tively and individually too. There are a lot of people trying to get
around funding, avoid funding properly our national defenses, espe-
cially the BUR strategy, the Bottom-Up Review strategy of two
MRC's. And some people are suggesting that we change that strat-
egy, move to top line or bottom line, whichever way you want to
look at it, and get a lesser strategy so that it will not cost as much.
That is coming, I know. That is the next thing coming. It is already
being suggested by some people whom I will not name right now.
I was just wondering what your thinking is on that. You must have
thought about it in your deliberation before now. What do you
think about changing the strategy?
General Ralston. Mr. Chairman, two parts to the question. No.
1, from my personal view, we in uniform have a responsibility to
tell our civilian leaders what we can and what we cannot do, and
the strategy properly comes from the elected leadership of our
country, both in the NCA and the Congress. And right now, as I
have said before, I believe our force structure is the minimum that
we can go to support our current strategy. With regard to whether
we should keep that strategy, I believe — again on a personal
view — that if we are to remain a superpower, with all of the global
responsibilities that we have, I do not see how we can do that with
anything less than our current strategy and our current force
structure.
The Chairman. Does anybody else have any thoughts on that?
Knowing that cutting the force structure is what they are aiming
at, these people who suggest that, and that is the bottom line, cut-
ting force structure; it will not cost as much, and so, we will name
the strategy something else. That is the thinking. It is coming. If
you are not already prepared for it, get prepared for it, because
that is going to be coming.
Mr. Hunter, you said you had some more.
690
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I just wanted to ask for
one other thing, first, that these three administration budgets be
inserted in the record at the place where I asked the questions
about your druthers. And so, if we could, put those in the record.
But second, you gentlemen — and I appreciate what you do. You
know, I think that in terms of all of the folks who appear before
Congress, the military leadership has a reputation as being the
best honest brokers under Republican or Democratic administra-
tions. So we appreciate you for coming up here and being candid,
even when it is a little tough sometimes. Because of the political
year that we are in, from both sides of the aisle, you get a little
fire. But let me ask you this: You give line-by-line recommenda-
tions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on systems; is that right?
General Ralston. We give recommendations to the Chairman. I
will not say that we address every system in there, but anything
that we think is worthy of the Chairman taking forward to the Sec-
retary of Defense, we make that recommendation to the Chairman.
Mr. Hunter. You are aware of the fact that we plussed up last
year's budget; we are probably — as Mr. Dellums said, you do not
have to be a rocket scientist to understand that the Republicans
are going to plus up the defense budget this year. This chairman
is dedicated to doing that; he is going to do it. The services have
given us or are in the process of giving us their lists of what they
would add if they had the extra money to do it. I want to make
sure that that is consistent with the requirements, because you
folks are the requirements experts. Have you looked at what the
services are sending up to us? Are they checking it with you?
General Ralston. First of all, the services are represented here
on the JROC by their Vice Chiefs.
Mr. Hunter. I understand.
General RALSTON. They understand what their particular service
priorities are. The JROC has not met as a body to talk about those
individual service requirements. But I would say that we have
talked and understand and agree that if there are things added to
the budget that we would hope that they are things that are al-
ready in our budget plan and that we would move those forward
so that we do not create large tails that we had not counted on that
make our problems even worse in the out years.
Mr. Hunter. Could we get your recommendations that you have
made to the Chairman on these systems? Because if we had those
recommendations, we are going to be able to look at them and tell
if they marry up with what we are getting and also tell if they
marry up with what members of this committee recommend.
General Ralston. Yes, sir; let me make sure that I do not mis-
understand or mislead you. We have not recommended to the
Chairman any recommendation with regard to lists that the serv-
ices may or may not have given to us.
Mr. Hunter. No, what I am talking about is before the final cut
is made on your budget, as I understand it, when you are building
the budget, you as the requirements leadership put together rec-
ommendations as to what you think the requirements are: x num-
ber of tanks; x number of Marine aviation units, helicopters; or
ships or whatever. You make line-item recommendations to the
Chairman; do you do that?
\ 691
General Moorman. Sir, maybe I can take that, and maybe my
colleague^ will jump in. The impression I am getting from your
question is that somehow the JROC provides a similar product that
you have requested from the services, that is, the product of your
priorities if you had more money. Let us just use that as an exam-
ple. The line-by-line
Mr. Hunter. Or just a total budget.
General Moorman. The JROC does not make line-by-line rec-
ommendations. The recommendations made by the JROC are found
in the CPA and the CPR, and they are staffed through the service
Chiefs as well as the CINC's.
Mr. Hunter. What form do they have, then?
General Moorman. They are in a letter draft form.
Mr. Hunter. I understand that. I mean what form
General Moorman. They are not in, by the way
Mr. Hunter. Do you talk about units of equipment, ships, tanks?
General Moorman. Generally, it is more general than that as op-
posed to buy this number of this piece of equipment.
Mr. Hunter. Well, I am trying to understand what you do. You
have got to have a value to the services and to the country in terms
of telling us what we need, so you do not just send a letter out say-
ing we need to be stronger this year; we do not need to be quite
as strong.
General Moorman. No, there is a good degree of specificity, but
it does not necessarily equate to X number of the certain amount
of a weapons system, for example.
Mr. Hunter. How specific does it get?
General Moorman. Areas that we need to emphasize; new areas
to have funds spent on; areas where we have shortcomings.
Mr. Hunter. So you make reports that manifest that, basically.
General Moorman. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. Can we get those reports from you?
General Ralston. Sir, those particular documents, our rec-
ommendations, to this point have been handled as internal docu-
ments, and let me explain for a moment why that is. This body
that you see here has done some very, very good work in terms of
being very open and very candid as they meet within the JROC,
and they at times have to take positions that may necessarily be
opposite of what their service would be in the interest of jointness.
We think that is a very key concept to maintaining a validity to
the JROC. There is some reluctance if those private, internal delib-
erations are then taken outside the Chairman's purview — we are
making these recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs — and he may or may not accept those recommendations be-
cause he listens to the other CINC's, the other service chiefs, and
finally makes his recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
So my personal view on this is that the committee will be better
served, and we will be better served, if we keep those deliberations
internal.
Mr. Hunter. OK; we are being real candid with each other; you
are not going to give us those. I think we would be well-served if
we knew what your recommendations were, because I think we
want to do what is right with respect to jointness and all of the
other things. So, if you have got a concern that the services are not
692
going to treat their JROC member well when they find out that he
pushed a pet rock out of the nest; I think that is overweighted. But
obviously, DOD has made a policy decision that you are not going
to, so you will not only not give us the CPA, the Chairman's pro-
gram assessment; you are not going to give us your inputs to the
Chairman with respect to your recommendations.
General Ralston. Sir, I respectftilly submit that my preference
is not to do that.
Mr. Hunter. OK; well, Mr. Chairman, I think we should try to
get them if we can under the color of law, and we should try to
get those, because I think they would be a good guidance document
for us.
Thank you, gentlemen, and thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for indulging me.
The Chairman. I understand. This is the first time, I guess, that
we have had the JROC before us, and since it is something new
we are starting out on, we might be able to have a better dialog
about these things, in any event, so we can be more helpful to one
another in what we are all trying to do.
But in any event, we do appreciate your time, and we have kept
you a long time already, and I want you to know that we appre-
ciate your contribution. You have helped us tremendously in our
work, and hopefully, we will be able to back up the words we have
been speaking this afternoon and try to help you more and make
the context that you are going to be considering in the budget be
our context budget rather than the administration's context budget.
That way, we can have a better outcome overall.
I understand what we call fiscal guidance and how it has been
given, and we understand those kinds of things, and you have to
operate in that context of the fiscal guidance given to you. We un-
derstand that. We are just trying to help make that fiscal guidance
better, and hopefully, we will be able to do that this next year.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
FISCAL ACT YEAR 1997 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHOR-
IZATION—UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
(EUCOM), CENTRAL COMMAND (CENTCOM), PACIFIC
COMMAND (PACOM), FORCES KOREA (USFK), AND AT-
LANTIC COMMAND (ACOM)
House of Representatives,
Committee on National Security,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 28, 1996.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:40 a.m. in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Floyd Spence (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
The Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Today the
committee leadership will receive testimony from the regional com-
manders in chief or CINC's, as we call them. This morning we will
hear from Gen. George Joulwan, Commander in Chief of the Unit-
ed States European Command; General Peay, Commander in Chief
of the United States Central Command. In a separate session this
afternoon, the committee will hear from Commanders of the United
States Pacific Command, the United States Atlantic Command, and
the United States Forces in Korea.
Gentlemen, let me welcome you to the committee this morning.
I look forward very much to your testimony. We meet this morning
as the committee nears the end of an intensive 5-week stretch of
hearings in oversight on the fiscal year 1997 budget request. I con-
sider it appropriate to close this phase of the process with testi-
mony from our senior field commanders who are charged with the
ultimate responsibility of executing the national military strategy
across the globe.
While those of us here in Washington tend too often to debate
the size of the defense top line and other abstractions, our regional
CINC's have a plan to train and be prepared to use military force
in defending our national interest. The harsh day-to-day reality of
this responsibility provides them with a unique perspective on the
challenges facing U.S. military forces, a perspective that is difficult
to replicate inside the beltway.
An example of this lack of real world perspective in Washington
is the ongoing debate over how best to address the worsening mod-
ernization shortfall caused by a decade of defense budget cuts and
made worse by this administration's diversion of modernization
funding to pay for shortfalls elsewhere in the budget.
(693)
694
While there is near universal recognition of the need to increase
funding for equipment procurement, the administration's long-term
budget plan continues to cling to the unlikely and unproven hope
that management and overhead reform will magically produce the
savings necessary to recapitalize the force. Making matters worse,
however, senior administration officials have begun to openly dis-
cuss the prospect of using force structure cuts below the Bottom-
Up Review levels to finance future modernization.
While this issue is not likely to be directly confronted during the
upcoming fiscal year, the President's budget proposal does start
down this perilous road by underfunding both Army and Air Force
end strength.
Given the seriousness of the issues involved in further reducing
military force structure, I think it is critical that we begin now to
explore the global implications associated with reducing the force.
Further force structure reductions have serious implications that
transcend immediate military impact. They also involve our na-
tional military strategy and the diplomatic and political commit-
ments that go with it. While these are all issues that we will have
to sort through in greater detail than time will allow today, I would
ask our witnesses to help us begin to understand what the capabil-
ity and risk trade-offs associated with further reductions in mili-
tary force structure might be. In other words, where is the give rel-
ative to your requirements today and what are associated risks?
Before I recognize the witnesses, I would like first to recognize
the ranking Democrat, Mr. Dellums, for any comments he would
like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A
REPRESNTATIVE FROM CALIFORNLV, RANKING MINORITY
MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and mem-
bers of the committee. It is with great pleasure that I join you in
welcoming General Joulwan and General Peay before the commit-
tee this morning. As the Commanders in Chief for the European
and Central Commands, they have a great deal on their plates.
Much of what they are facing reflects the new and emerging re-
quirements of the post-cold-war era. In Europe, General Joulwan
must arrange the continued realignment and purpose of the NATO
Alliance, including its work with the Partnership For Peace Pro-
gram and the discussions around NATO expansion.
The problems contained in this cluster of issues are enormous
and go to the heart of the transatlantic relationship. They raise
many questions concerning the best role the United States can play
in sustaining and enhancing European stability and what the con-
figuration of forces, training and operations will most appropriately
enhance that role.
Of course. General Joulwan is also fully engaged in managing
one of the largest peacekeeping operations in which the U.S. Forces
have fully participated. His expertise and insight on the Bosnia op-
erations will be very important to this committee's authorizing re-
sponsibilities. If these operations are, indeed, the predominant ac-
tivities in which U.S. Forces will be engaged, then we can benefit
from lessons learned concerning the training and deployment re-
695
quirements for such missions and the impact that mission has in
respect to our overall force readiness.
Finally, the European Command has geographic responsibility
for those areas of Africa that are not included in the CENTCOM
area. While there has been some minor realignment of geographic
responsibilities among the CINC's this year, as I understand it, Af-
rica still remains within the otherwise large geographically diverse
and very busy command.
In that regard, it would be useful to hear from General Joulwan
about what the work that his command is doing in Africa and his
views on whether or not the current alignment of responsibility for
the bulk of Africa is properly cited with the European Command.
With regard to CENTCOM, we continue to have the operations
that include United States troops with Iraq. Many of the mobility
pre-positioning and logistics issues with which U.S. Forces are pre-
occupied in planning find themselves played out in these ongoing
operations. In addition, forward deployment operations, especially
with aircraft carriers, create the greatest stresses on our force
structure when they are geared toward areas in the CENTCOM
area of responsibility.
I will appreciate very much hearing from General Peay regarding
his views of our ability to meet that portion of our national strat-
egy that focuses on the possibilities of a major contingency or other
conflict in the Southwest Asia Theater. How has pre-positioning
gone to date? What are the training and mil-to-mil arrangements
that we are utilizing to help bring stability to the region? What are
your views on developments in the region with regard to the Ira-
nian military plans and with regard to the United Nations effort
to root out weapons of mass destruction programs in Iraq?
Finally, Mr. Chairman, both commands have differing respon-
sibilities in areas of the Middle East that are involved in the proc-
ess of peacemaking between Israel, the Palestinians, and other na-
tions of the region. I look forward to your views on the peace proc-
ess, where it might be going, and what your respective commands
are doing to think about possible utilization of U.S. Forces in the
implementation of potential peace agreement.
I am also interested to learn of your thoughts on the current dis-
cussion that suggests that we will revisit the Bottom-Up Review
analysis. Many of us have felt that the BUR, the Bottom-Up Re-
view, no longer fully captures our national security requirements,
and we welcome this opening for your thoughts on this topic. They
would be very useful to our ongoing discussion as we reassess.
I might just add parenthetically that at one point the Secretary
of Defense, in appearing before this committee, agreed he thought
the Bottom-Up Review should be a dynamic and living document
that is updated as we gain greater knowledge in the world as it
evolves into the 21st century.
I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward
with you and my colleagues to a very interesting meeting and dia-
log with our colleagues, and with those remarks I would yield back
the balance of my time.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman for his comments. With-
out objection, the written statements of each of you will be entered
696
into the record and, General Joulwan, you might proceed as you
Hke.
STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE A. JOULWAN, USA,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Rep-
resentative Dellums, and distinguished members of the House Na-
tional Security Committee. It is a privilege to appear again before
you to report on the forward deployed — and you are going to have
to forgive my voice.
The Chairman. We understand. You are doing fine.
General Joulwan [continuing]. Forward deployed and forward
stationed U.S. European Command. I welcome this opportunity to
provide my assessment on the EUCOM theater of operation, a the-
ater that spans Europe, the Near East, the northern Africa littoral,
and Sub-Saharan Africa. Eighty-three countries and 13 million
square miles and over 1 billion people of different ethnic, religious,
and economic conditions.
At the outset, let me thank this committee, and particularly you,
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the men and women in the EUCOM
and their families for your support of our efforts in Europe and
NATO as well as in our Arab responsibilities in Africa and the
Near East. I have been appearing before this committee since 1990
and I am particularly grateful this year for the opportunity to pro-
vide you my assessments of the command. Mr. Chairman, as you
said I have a lengthy posture statement which I will enter into the
record and then briefly make a few points.
First, EUCOM is experiencing the highest operational
OPTEMPO in its history. My forces are engaged in a preventive de-
ployment in Macedonia called Able Sentry; a no-fly zone enforce-
ment against Saddam Hussein in northern Iraq called Provide
Comfort, and a NATO-led operation to enforce the Dayton Peace
Accords in Bosnia and Herzegovina called Joint Endeavor. We have
an air defense battalion in Saudi Arabia and numerous deploy-
ments in the Near East and Africa. A forward deployed and for-
ward stationed force gives the United States great flexibility and
reach and EUCOM is demonstrating its value every day.
Earlier this month, EUCOM ended the longest running airlift of
humanitarian supplies in history. JTF Provide Promise completed
over 1,200 days of support with 12,000 flights delivering over
160,000 metric tons of humanitarian supplies. Most important,
thousands of lives were saved by these brave men and women.
Operation Joint Endeavor is the first NATO-led manned oper-
ation in the history of the alliance. NATO is now committed to end-
ing the tragedy in Bosnia. Nearly 607,000 troops, of which 20,000
are Americans, are committed in this operation. The force was de-
ployed by air, sea, rail, and road during the worst Balkan winter
in this century and into the most difficult terrain in Europe.
Over 3,000 air sorties, 400 trains, and 50 ships were used in this
deployment. American troops were magnificent. They did it all,
from setting up a forward base in Hungary to putting a bridge
across a flooded Sava River, to rapidly establishing Task Force
Eagle Base at Tuzla.
697
Most significantly, U.S. forces were joined by not only the 16
NATO nations, but by more than 20 non-NATO nations who have
committed troops, access across their countries, and political sup-
port to the peace process. It is a grand coalition committed to
bringing peace to the people of Bosnia.
Let me also add that there are 1,600 Russian troops as part of
the United States multinational division in the vicinity of Tuzla.
The Russian brigade is under my command and stationed in both
Serbian and Bosnian territory. Joint patrols are being conducted
today along the flanks of the brigades with both Russian and
American soldiers. A three-star Russian general has been at my
headquarters at SHAPE in Mons, Belgium, and is my deputy for
Russian forces.
These are extraordinary times. In the past 6 months we have
had visits from the Russian Minister of Defense, Russian ambas-
sadors, Duma parliamentarians and Russian journalists. We are
engaged and need to stay engaged with the Russians. We have a
true opportunity, an unprecedented opportunity, to create a new
security relationship in Europe.
My second point, Mr. Chairman, has to do with EUCOM's en-
gagement strategy with Central and Eastern Europe. Last year, I
briefed you on the success of our military cooperation program by
both EUCOM and NATO's Partnership For Peace. In the past year,
it has dramatically improved and many of the non-NATO nations
now operational in Bosnia have been directly influenced by our
prior military cooperation efforts. Indeed, we are putting theory
into practice.
I was briefed, 10 days ago, by the Secretary General of NATO
in the vicinity of Duboj, Bosnia, by the Swedish general command-
ing the Nordic brigade and his Polish deputy commander. Both vol-
untarily praised the Partnership For Peace Program. Each said his
country was better able to interoperate with NATO as a result of
PFP.
This did not just happen. As I mentioned to this committee 2
years ago, I have taken a proactive approach to these programs.
We train together. Not just with the company activities we do, but
rather in a focused way to conduct missions together. The payoff
is what we are doing in Bosnia today. This is what I mean by
peacetime engagement, and I want to thank this committee for
your support of the Partnership For Peace initiative.
It is a low cost, high payoff program, and again we see the re-
sults on the ground in Bosnia. Most importantly, we are building
mutual trust and confidence with former adversaries and perhaps
can prevent a future crisis from erupting into conflict.
My third point has to do with the Reserve component. I would
be remiss if I did not tell this committee that we in EUCOM are
a total force. Active, Reserve, and National Guard. Over 4,200 Re-
serve component troops have been called up for Operation Joint
Endeavor and are doing a superb job. In addition, we have 21 State
partnerships with former Warsaw Pact countries.
This is an extraordinary effort. My intent is for these emerging
democracies to interact with American citizen soldiers, highly
qualified citizen soldiers who clearly portray the role of the citizen
soldier in a democratic political system.
698
As I said, we have 21 U.S. States joined in partnership with
Central and Eastern European states. For example, South Carolina
is with Albania; Texas with the Czech Republic; Ohio with Hun-
gary; Alabama with Romania; Pennsylvania with Lithuania, Illi-
nois with Poland; California with Ukraine, Tennessee with Bul-
garia; Colorado with Slovenia; Arizona with Kazakhstan; and Utah
with Belarus. I encourage your continued support for these excel-
lent programs.
Last year, Mr. Chairman, IMET allowed over 980 international
students from the theater to attend schools in the United States
and paid for 11 English language laboratories in 8 central Euro-
pean countries. This year 27 African nations and 23 Central Euro-
pean countries will participate in IMET.
The Marshall Center educates future leaders in security affairs
and defense management principles. Recently, one of their grad-
uates was assigned as the Estonian Army commander, while an-
other has been appointed as a special adviser to the Romanian
Minister of National Defense. The Czech commander in Bosnia
today is a graduate of the Army War College in Carlisle, PA, and
the base commander in Szekszard, Hungary, is a graduate of our
Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base.
But let me be clear, Mr. Chairman, EUCOM is more than just
a peacetime engagement theater of operations. Last August when
the Bosnian Serbs again shelled the marketplace in Sarajevo kill-
ing many innocent civilians, NATO's response was quick and le-
thal. In probably the most surgical air operation in history NATO
planes led by United States fighters achieved maximum damage on
nearly 70 Serb targets with very little collateral damage to civil-
ians or properties.
Even the Serbs marveled at the accuracy and skill of our pilots
and munitions. This single event led to the Dayton peace agree-
ment and hope for the people of Bosnia. And when NATO decided
to lead the coalition of forces into Bosnia, EUCOM again provided
invaluable assistance using the new C-17 strategic lift aircraft the
1st Armored Division deployed flawlessly in the theater.
EUCOM also provided intelligence fusion communications and lo-
gistic support for Operation Joint Endeavor. As a forward deployed
unified command, EUCOM works daily with our allies and new
partners. This relationship paid off as access across countries like
Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and
Switzerland was granted in a week's time. This is absolutely un-
precedented and shows the relationship that we have developed.
Now, we need to capitalize on these new relationships and as we
develop our national strategy for the 21st century, this committee
more than any other has the oversight that can influence our abil-
ity to implement the national security strategy of engagement.
Clearly, we are not the world's policemen, but it is much better to
influence an event rather than react to them.
To do that, I need the appropriated funds for the programs men-
tioned. I also have the requested supplemental funding, and I need
that sooner rather than later, in order to prevent an adverse effect
on readiness and quality of life.
The issue to me, Mr. Chairman, is how do we engage in peace-
time to prevent or deter conflict? How do we interact with allies
699
and parties to build trust and confidence? How do we leverage the
assets of our allies to join us in preventive engagement and also
in a major regional contingency?
How do you gain access to bases and logistics points? Do you con-
tinue to do that by waiting for a major regional contingency to
occur? You act now to try to deter the conflict or, if deterrence fails,
you can rapidly deploy forces because of the relationships you have
established in peacetime. Nowhere is this more possible than a
post-cold-war Europe.
The U.S. and NATO's mission in Europe did not end with the col-
lapse of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain and the demise of com-
munism. We have the unprecedented opportunity to see a Europe
whole and free from the Atlantic to the Urals. We can complete the
work done by (General Marshall in 1947.
To do so the United States must stay engaged politically, eco-
nomically, diplomatically, and militarily and we must have forces
capable of operating across the entire conflict spectrum from peace-
time engagement to high intensity conflict. And our troops and
leaders are capable of doing so, Mr. Chairman, and are demonstrat-
ing it every day in the European Command.
My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that in EUCOM people are our
most valuable asset. We must continue to provide for an adequate
quality of life for the troops and their families. The EUCOM force
is now bottomed out and stabilized. Our deployments throughout
Europe, Bosnia, the Near East, and Africa attest to the wisdom of
forward deployed and forward stationed forces. I ask for your con-
tinued support of our troops, the OPTEMPO, the MILCON, family
housing, DODDS, and morale, welfare, and recreation.
Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you at this critical point in our Nation's history. With your
support in this committee we truly have the unique opportunity to
create a better world for our children and for our grandchildren. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Joulwan follows:]
700
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COAAMIHEE
MARCH 28, 1996
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMinEE
701
miKLUULTlCW
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, I am
privileged to appear before you today to discuss the United States
European Command (USEUCOM) . Once again, I welcome the opportunity
to share my perspective on what has continued to be a theater in
transition and conflict. While Europe has changed dramatically
with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Communism,
those changes are not complete and continue to evolve. In the
USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) , where totalitarianism once
ruled, democratic governments are gaining strength and maturity.
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE
1985 1996
■ DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES
^ NON-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES
FIGURE 1
702
The Cold War is over! But, the U.S. and NATO missions did not
end with the collapse of a wall or the defeat of an ideology. A
stable and secure Europe remains a vital interest to America. The
need for a strong and flexible NATO with U.S. involvement remains
because there is still a great deal of uncertainty and instability.
In countries impoverished by Communism, fragile democracies
struggle to maintain stability within their borders. Although
Russia retains thousands of nuclear weapons, all but a handful have
been returned from the other republics of the former Soviet Union.
Thanks in part to the Nunn-Lugar Program, these remaining weapons
should be safely shipped to Russia in the near future. Even more
immediate is the ethnic and religious conflict that has laid waste
to large areas of the Former Yugoslavia. Said another way, USEUCOM
continues to be a theater in transition.
Throughout this transition. United States leadership in the
region, demonstrated by our national strategy of peacetime
engagement and military preparedness, provided the guiding
principles upon which emerging democratic nations could focus. A
few short years ago no one could have envisioned that, today the
U.S., as part of NATO, would be working side-by-side with Russia
and other former adversaries in out-of-area peace enforcement
operations. While I reported impressive accomplishments in Europe
last year, over the last twelve months, our efforts have borne
fruit of historic proportions, as today the men and women of U.S.
European Command are engaged in the largest, most complex
operational movement of military forces in Europe since World War
II. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the
success we can achieve through America's National Security Strategy
of Engagement and Enlargement. As the United States, NATO, and the
703
international community mission continues, we will have shown our
resolve and provided Bosnia with an opportunity to take hold of
their own future and break the cycle of violence.
Our success in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is not by chance. It
is the product of focused effort over the last two years by USEUCOM
and NATO. USEUCOM' s Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness, based
on the objectives in the National Security Strategy, and NATO's
Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) are the center pieces of this
effort . ■ Together we developed an operational concept to exercise
with our new partners in order to train to common standards,
procedures, and doctrine, and to be prepared to operate under NATO
command. Two years later, we are doing just that in Bosnia under
the auspices of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Many of our partner
nations' forces who trained in the PfP program have joined us in
JOINT ENDEAVOR.
Our continued leadership in NATO and engagement throughout the
region made possible the deployment of the Bosnia Implementation
Force (IFOR) . We have met our goal of closing and setting the
force at D+60. In total there have been over 2500 flights, 350
trains with 6,800 rail cars, and 50 ships supporting IFOR's
deployment. JOINT ENDEAVOR now has 30 maneuver battalions within
the three Multi-National Divisions (MNDs) , backed up by artillery,
aviation, engineers, military police, combat support and combat
service support assets . This would not have been possible without
the relationships nurtured through years of engagement. Over 30
nations, including non-NATO partners such as Russia, Poland,
Sweden, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia,
and Hungary, have deployed forces, provided basing rights and
transit agreements, or promised economic aid to this historic peace
support operation (Figure 2) .
704
Forward presence and available infrastructure in the theater
provide a platform from which the U.S. can execute regional
operations. Readiness of these forward-based forces was the
linchpin that allowed the rapid deployment of the U.S. Airborne
Battalion Combat Team from its base in Italy to Bosnia -Herzegovina.
That deployment demonstrated the flexibility and responsiveness
that a forward-based force provides. In addition, the 1st Armored
Division's deployment was primarily by rail and truck convoy from
its bases in Germany. This cut days off the deployment time and
was significantly less costly than it would have been for a
similarly equipped CONUS-based unit requiring strategic airlift and
sealift. Additionally, the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group
and Marine Expeditionary Unit maintained a continual forward-based
presence off the coast of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the U.S.
contribution to the IFOR reserve. Peacetime engagement and
military preparedness coupled with the military capabilities
inherent in forward-based forces were key elements to meeting our
U.S. objectives.
705
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO IFOR
gNATO
mNONNATO:
ALBANIA
AUSTRIA
CZECH
BANGLADESH BULGARIA
EGYPT
ESTONIA
FINLAND
FYROM
HUNGARY
INDONESIA
JORDAN
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
MALAYSIA
MOROCCO
PAKISTAN
POLAND
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
SAUDI
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SWEDEN
UKRAINE
FIGURE 2
This truly unique moment in history, this new security
paradigm, was made possible because you, our elected leaders,
support our forward-looking Strategy of Engagement and
Preparedness . Congress provided USEUCOM the resources to
accomplish our mission and ensured our forces were properly
706
equipped and trained. We must continue to build on these
successes .
With that ovei-view, I would like to focus my remarks on three
main themes. First, I must emphasize that our success is largely a
result of the forward-based, overseas presence directed by the
President's National Security Strategy. This forward-based
presence reaps the substantial benefits obtained through engagement
with the region's nations. America's continued presence in this
theater helped create a new security environment, based on
international cooperation, and will provide the opportunity to
extend stability to all of Europe.
Secondly, while USEUCOM's forward-based force is the primary
tool with which we pursue our regional objectives, they cannot do
it alone. The Reserve Components, and select units from other
unified commands, are the "special teams" that provide critical
augmentation support, allowing USEUCOM to execute a reasonable
personnel tempo, and sustain an adequate quality of life.
USEUCOM's theater strategy is a total force strategy.
Finally, our forward basing requires resources to maintain
preparedness, infrastructure, and quality of life while also
continuing our force modernization. The nation's past investment
in the USEUCOM theater made JOINT ENDEAVOR possible. At this
critical point in the history of our nation and Europe's, we can
not afford to back away from these vital commitments.
STRATEGY OF ENGAGEMENT AMD PRSPAREDNESS
The National Security Strategy of the United States provides
the framework from which we derived the USEUCOM theater strategy.
From its three primary objectives -- enhance our security, promote
707
prosperity at home, and promote democracy -- come the military
objectives of the National Military Strategy and the USEUCOM
theater Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness -- promoting
stability and thwarting aggression. The National Security Strategy
goes on to define the importance of "...permanently stationed
forces and pre-positioned equipment, deployments and combined
exercises, port calls and other force visits, as well as military-
to-military contacts..." in achieving these objectives. These
forward-based forces :
• Promote an international security environment of
trust, cooperation, peace and stability....
• Facilitate regional integration, since nations that
may not be willing to work together in our absence may
be willing to coalesce around us in a crisis.
• Enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations,
including peace operations, by improving our ability
to operate with other nations.
• Allow the United States to use its position of trust
to prevent the development of power vacuums and
dangerous arms races, thereby underwriting regional
stability by precluding threats to regional security.
• Demonstrate our determination to defend U.S. and
allied interest in critical regions, deterring hostile
nations from acting contrary to those interests.
• Provide forward elements for rapid response in crises
as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure
essential for deployment of U.S. -based forces by air,
sea and land.
• Give form and substance to our bilateral and
multilateral security commitments.
-National Security Strategy
These themes will surface repeatedly as I discuss the USEUCOM
theater in terms of our Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness.
708
ENGAGEMENT - PROMOTES STABILITY
USEUCOM's forward-based forces promote trust, cooperation,
peace, and stability through a number of avenues. U.S. leadership
of NATO is absolutely essential to promoting a viable security
environment. Numerous U.S. and NATO initiatives such as
Partnership for Peace, the USEUCOM Joint Contact Team Program, and
the Reserve Component State Partnership Program facilitate regional
integration and enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations.
The George C. Marshall European Center for Strategic Studies also
promotes an international security environment of trust and
cooperation. Finally, security assistance programs provide form
and substance to our bilateral and multi- lateral security
commitments .
Through its leadership of NATO, America promotes a collective
security environment based on trust and cooperation; a relationship
that fosters peace and stability. This is fundamental to the
vitality of developing democracies and free market economies.
Forward presence reinforces our strong commitment to the trans -
Atlantic link and makes us a European power, but one that is
uniquely unencumbered by historical anxieties and territorial
ambitions. USEUCOM uses its position of trust to prevent the
development of power vacuums and dangerous arms races, thereby
precluding threats to regional security. This leadership is
especially important as NATO grows from a solely defensive alliance
to a regional security organization.
USEUCOM builds regional cooperation and security through
Partnership for Peace and bilateral exercises that facilitate
integration throughout the region. On 13 November 1995, the Former
Republic of Macedonia became the 27th Partnership country (Figure
3) . Eighteen nations now have full-time representatives assigned
709
to the Partnership Coordination Cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) . Our forces have participated in over 36
NATO- or U.S. -sponsored exercises, including two with Russia. By
working and exercising with each other, these nations develop
common procedures through PfP that will enhance interoperability
and help overcome ancient animosities and distrust. These
initiatives enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations,
including peace operations, by improving our ability to operate
with other nations.
PFP NATIONS
PfP COUNTRIES
(in dark)
Albania
Kyrgystan
Armenia
Latvia
Austria
Lithuania
Azerbaijan
Malta
Belarus
Moldova
Bulgaria
Poland
Czech
Romania
Estonia
Russia
Finland
Slovakia
FYROM
Slovenia
Georgia
Sweden
Hungary
Turkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
FIGURE 3
The Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) is a uniquely American
program successful beyond all expectations. JCTP's in-country
Military Liaison Teams help host nations to implement human rights
guarantees, military legal codes based on the rights of the
710
citizen-soldier, professionalization of noncommissioned officer and
chaplain corps, and governmental structures that ensure militaries
remain subordinate to civilian control. The teams provide
information on how we Americans handle a whole range of challenges
in non- lethal subjects associated with military organizations in a
democratic society. As evidence of JCTP's success, host-nation
requests for JCTP events have increased six- fold in the last two
years .
No other nation possesses our unique capability to conduct the
JCTP. To begin with, despite our significant military power, we
are welcome in Central Europe because we carry no historical
baggage and clearly have no territorial aspirations on the
continent. In addition, because we are a nation of federated
states, we understand the advantages and the challenges of diverse
governments working together. Finally, coming from a nation rich
in ethnic diversity, we have demonstrated this diversity can be a
strength rather than a weakness. The United States brings unique
qualities to the JCTP.
Our American Reserve Components are an essential and unique
part of the Joint Contact Team Program, conducting one-fifth of the
JCTP events. These citizen-soldiers embody America's democratic
ideals and reinforce the concept of a military subordinate to
civilian authority. By drawing on soldiers from specific states,
USEUCOM has been able to set the stage for enduring long-terra
relationships.
In addition to the 13 JCTP countries, state National Guards
have "adopted" eight other regional countries under the State
Partnership Program. This program establishes close relations with
a total of 21 nations, including countries of the Former Soviet
Union. This further encourages the development of long-term
10
711
institutional and personal relationships between military and civic
leaders and allows more Americans to become involved directly in
helping countries transition to democracy (Figure 4) .
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM
"BRIDGE TO AMERICA"
*JCTP COUTRIES
FIGURE 4
As the State Partnership relationships mature, they are able
to contribute effectively in many ways. Exercise UJE KRISTAL
illustrates how many of the engagement programs can successfully
come together in a single exercise. This exercise, which upgraded
an Albanian regional hospital and offered Albanians clean water and
improved sanitation, was a joint -combined interoperability exercise
conducted "in the spirit of Pf P" , with Active Component SEABEES and
Reserve Components participating through the State Partnership
11
712
Program: South Carolina Army National Guard aind Marine Corps
Reserves from Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.
The low- cost high pay-off results of this exercise included
valuable training, improved interoperabililty, and enhanced
relationships with the people of Albania. Together Americans and
Albanians satisfied an urgent need while simultaneously helping to
build the foundation for the future security architecture of
Europe .
The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
contributes to regional stability by educating foreign government
officials, specifically Central Europeans, in democratic processes
and ideals. Its mission is to help educate future leaders in
security affairs and defense management principles that are
harmonious with democracy and civilian oversight of the military.
Established in June 1993, it has gained an exemplary reputation
among PfP countries and established itself as a unique institution
focused on fostering and teaching democratic ideals. In December,
the Marshall Center graduated its third class of 75 mid- to senior-
level officers and civilians from 23 Central and East European
nations. This brings the total number of graduates to 233. The
Center also holds conferences and sponsors research on defense
procedures and organizations appropriate to democratic states with
free market economies. This is a very cost effective means of
influencing future generations of regional defense leaders and for
promoting a course of development that reduces future threats.
Security Assistance programs continue to facilitate regional
integration, enhance the effectiveness of coalition operations, and
give form and substance to our bilateral and multi-lateral security
commitments. They also demonstrate our determination to defend
U.S. and allied interests in critical regions. Foreign Military
12
713
Financing (FMF) , Foreign Military Sales (FMS) , Direct Commercial
Sales (DCS) , and International Military Education and Training
(IMET) enable selected friends and allies to improve their defense
capabilities. While all of these programs are important, the IMET
program is worth particular note.
IMET, a premier component of the Security Assistance Program,
promotes military-to-military relations and exposes international
military and civilian officials to U.S. values and democratic
processes. In 1995, IMET sent 985 international students from the
USEUCOM theater to schools in the United States . IMET also paid for
11 English language leiboratories for eight Central European
countries to assist their efforts to estaiblish a solid foundation
in English -- all this at a cost of only $14 million. In 1996, 27
African nations and 23 Central European countries will participate
in the U.S. IMET program, and IMET will continue to fund English
language laboratories throughout Central Europe and countries of
the Former Soviet Union (Figure 5) .
IMET has a direct impact on most countries in this theater.
Nearly all countries have sent members to America for professional
military training. As an example, the IMET program trained twenty
percent of all flag officers in Turkey, eighty percent of the
senior leadership in Portugal, and more than 500 senior civilian
and military leaders throughout the USEUCOM theater. IMET provides
these nations familiarity with U.S. ideology, doctrine, and
equipment. It leads to closer military- to-military relationships,
favoradsle basing negotiations, eUid repeat equipment orders. Sin^jly
put, IMET serves as the centerpiece of Security Assistcuice.
13
714
FY96 IMET PARTICIPANTS
FIGURE 5
PREPAKEDNESS - THMARTS AGGRESSION
USEUCOM faces all the challenges outlined in the National
Military Strategy: regional instability, dangers to democracy and
reform, weapons of mass destruction, and transnational dangers that
threaten the emerging democracies. It is a theater in transition,
as the economic, political, judicial, and military institutions
14
715
that make democracy work continue to evolve in the former communist
nations of Europe and in many former autocratic regimes in Africa.
Still, USEUCOM must remain prepared to protect and defend U.S.
interests. The high state of readiness of USEUCOM forces serves to
deter aggression that might threaten U.S. national interests in
Europe. USEUCOM forces provide forward elements for rapid response
in crises as well as the bases, ports and other infrastructure
essential for deployment of U.S. -based forces. Combined exercises
with regional nations not only contribute to engagement and foster
an atmosphere of regional cooperation, but ensure that our forces
are prepared for potential security challenges.
Joint and combined exercises, including PfP and "in the spirit
of PfP" events, help us maintain the preparedness necessary to help
preserve the peace. Despite the rigorous demands of IFOR, we have
been able, through careful planning, to sustain a robust training
schedule for 1996, with 71 planned USEUCOM exercises. This ensures
that forces not deploying to JOINT ENDEAVOR will remain ready to
fulfill national tasking.
Our preparedness also allows the United States to use its
position of trust to prevent the development of power vacuums and
dangerous arms races, thereby precluding threats to regional
security. By backing our commitments with ready forces positioned
forward, the United States sends a clear warning of deterrence to
nations that are inclined to pursue their aims through the
destructive use of force. We also assure nations that might
otherwise seek weapons of mass destruction that their security is
better safeguarded through collective and cooperative mechanisms.
15
716
ENGAGEMENT AND PREPAREDNESS EQUALS SUCCESS
U.S. leadership, manifested through USEUCOM's engagement and
preparedness, paved the way for dramatic successes in improved
security and cooperation. JOINT ENDEAVOR, DENY FLIGHT, SHARP
GUARD, and PROVIDE PROMISE were possible only because of our long
history of positive engagement with our traditional allies which
yielded the requisite support opportunities. Non- traditional
allies have also recently supported our efforts. Albania provided
basing for our Predator unmanned aerial reconnaissance flights. In
addition to providing bases for U.S. forces at Kaposvar and Taszar,
Hungary permitted USAF AWACs overflight in support of Operation
DENY FLIGHT. Our peacetime engagement, and the resultant trust and
cooperative spirit it engenders, built regional cooperation and
helped guarantee these successes .
U.S. forces in NATO also benefit from this strong relationship
in that many nations equitably share the risks and burdens of
protecting common interests. NATO proved that it can adapt to the
new security environment and remain cost effective by sharing
responsibilities across a broad spectrum of operations. The new
NATO, born out of the 1991 Rome Declaration's new Alliance
Strategic Concept, not only provides an organization capable of
defending the territory of its member states, but also fosters the
emergence of a safer and more stable Europe. Last year, when the
Bosnian Serbs ignored our demarche by shelling Sarajevo, NATO
executed Operation DELIBERATE FORCE. This precise, robust use of
airpower clearly fulfilled our political objectives and led
directly to the successful Dayton peace negotiations and Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR.
The burden of these operations did not fall upon any single
nation, but were instead spread across the entire Alliance and
16
717
beyond. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR quickly evolved well beyond a
U.S. -led NATO operation. U.S. leadership, made possible through
active engagement, pulled virtually all the nations of the region
together to achieve a common security goal . This facilitated rapid
access to lines of communication, permission for basing, and
flexible transit agreements. Thirty nations now contribute ground
troops, basing rights, transit agreements, and economic aid to the
war-torn Balkan countries. Nearly half these nations are not NATO
members, but are members of Partnership for Peace (Figure 6) .
17
718
NATIONAL FORCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO IFOR
MULTI NATIONAL DIVISIONS (MNP)
HUNGARY,
BELGRADE
MND NORTH
MND SOUTHEAST
MND SOUTHWEST
UNI TED STATES
l-KANCb
UNITED KINGDOM
RUSSIA
ITALY
CANADA
TURKEY
SPAIN
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN
PORTUGAL
CZECH REPUBLIC
DENMARK
MALAYSIA
NORWAY
UKRAINE
POLAND
EGYPT
FINLAND
JORDAN
ESTONIA
MOROCCO
LATVIA
LUTHUANIA
ROMANIA
FIGURE 6
In addition to IFOR, we have had other strategic successes,
brought about by our active engagement and sustained readiness. On
18
719
January 9, the air bridge to Sarajevo under Operation PROVIDE
PROMISE concluded. United States led five coalition nations in
this three and a half year humanitarian airlift operation.
Operation PROVIDE PROMISE lasted almost three times as long as the
Berlin Airlift of 1948 and at times provided 95% of Sarajevo's
sustenance requirements: nearly 13,000 sorties -- over 4,500 of
them flown by the U.S. Air Force -- and delivered over 165,000 tons
of supplies to Sarajevo residents. TASK FORCE ABLE SENTRY, which
deployed from Germany to Macedonia, has also been a major
stabilizing influence in the region helping prevent the spread of
the Balkan conflict.
Our relationship with Turkey provides another excellent
illustration. U.S. engagement encouraged Turkey to enforce
domestically expensive economic sanctions against Iraq. Because of
our close military relations, the Turkish General Staff has
supported Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. This multi-national operation
in southern Turkey and northern Iraq enters its sixth year in
April. A recent operational assessment concluded that PROVIDE
COMFORT is fulfilling all of its objectives: preventing suffering
in Northern Iraq; preventing further repression; weakening Saddam
Hussein's regime; and preserving the territorial integrity of
Northern Iraq. Furthermore, the multi-national coordination
procedures that developed from this operation, such as the Combined
Joint Task Force Concept, and other lessons learned from Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT, will serve us well in IFOR and future coalition
operations. American engagement in Turkey also ensures ready
access to bases that are critical for executing our Major Regional
Conflict-East contingency plans. It is significant that Turkey,
one of the few modern, secular, Moslem democracies, placed first
19
38-160 97-25
720
priority on deploying and serving in the U.S. area of
responsibility in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
Furthermore, for the first time since World War II, Russian
and U.S. forces are working together in a military operation. Our
relations with Russia's military grow closer and more cooperative
each day. As the operators work side-by-side in Bosnia, there is a
clear demonstration of U.S. capability and goodwill. Colonel
General L.P. Shevtsov, commander of the Russian forces in Bosnia
has his office in the IFOR Coordination Centre at SHAPE. This
practical co-location offers great possibilities and a concrete
example of security cooperation. It represents an opportunity to
remove some of the Russian suspicion toward the West while building
confidence in our good intentions. I believe PfP has been our most
valuable tool in remaining engaged with Russia and in consolidating
democratic gains.
Arms control illustrates success in another area of
engagement. Significant reductions in weapons have yielded
corresponding reductions in tensions. For the past nine years,
USEUCOM has been actively involved in arms control efforts.
Nowhere in the world does the level or spectrum of activity in arras
control match what is taking place in the USEUCOM theater of
operations. Our daily efforts supporting compliance with the
protocols and confidence building measures of the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty, and Vienna Document 1994 set the highest example for the
international community on how to responsibly participate in the
international security process. These arras control examples have
implications far beyond the boundaries of USEUCOM' s Area of
Responsibility (AOR) . Nations in the Middle East, Asia, and South
20
721
America, have looked to the United States, and hence USEUCOM, as a
role model for how to responsibly implement arms control regimes.
I intend to remain fully engaged and supportive of arms
control initiatives before us today, and on the future horizon,
including START I and START II, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone,
and entry- into- force of the Open Skies Treaty. I will continue to
monitor these developments closely, and carefully examine their
effect oh the capabilities of my command.
USEUCOM remains engaged in several critical operations that
enhance national security. Our successes are made possible through
sustained overseas presence. U.S. leadership and NATO provide a
regional security structure that fosters cooperation and
coordination. That structure pools the resources of many nations,
and has established forward-based infrastructure and materiel that
enable us to respond quickly to protect U.S. interests in this
region. The result has been increased security for our citizens.
FORCE STRUCTURE
U.S. forces in Europe now have a higher operational tempo than
during the Cold War. The absence of a Major Regional Conflict
(MRC) does not mean USEUCOM forces are not actively engaged. On
the contrary, USEUCOM- assigned forces from all services are
involved in major operations in the Balkans (Operation JOINT
ENDEAVOR) , Northern Iraq and Turkey (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT) ,
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (TASK FORCE ABLE
SENTRY) . In addition to these major operations, USEUCOM-assigned
forces participate in numerous smaller operations on a daily basis
and are prepared to execute potential missions throughout the
21
722
theater. As a result, forward-based USEUCOM forces work in concert
with augmentation forces from other Unified Commands, the Reserve
Components, and allied forces. We must maintain overseas presence
and and the Bottom Up Review force levels to ensure successful
Engagement and Preparedness.
■ The current USEUCOM force structure provides the essential
elements necessary to support our efforts. Downsizing from Cold
War levels in our AOR is complete. The current force structure of
approximately 100,000 makes it possible for us to fulfill our
commitments to the National Command Authority, to meet NATO
requirements, to train at the international level, and to be
reinforced quickly (Figure 7) . This structure provides inherent
flexibility and responsiveness necessary for regional missions. It
also provides critical in-theater capabilities not readily
available from the United States, such as intelligence and
surveillance, communications, theater missile defense, and other
vital capabilities. However, its relatively small size places
great demands on our service members .
22
723
FORCE LEVELS FOR USEUCOM, 1989 to PRESENT
REDUCTIONS
NAVY - 30%
AIR FORCE - 59%
ARMY - 70%
35n/prra:2
R90 R^ R92 R93 R94 R95 R96
OVERALL REDUCTION - 65%
FIGURE 7
The key to reducing USEUCOM' s personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) to
reasonable levels lies in the total force concept. USEUCOM relies
on Reservists and Guardsmen, along with forces from other unified
commands, to support Operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT and DENY
FLIGHT. Reserve Components perform highly specialized and critical
functions throughout this theater. Virtually all the Army's water
production specialists, helicopter heavy lift units, chemical
brigades, and civil affairs specialists are in the Army Reserve
Component, making augmentation a prerequisite for many
23
724
contingencies. As the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board
observed during a recent visit, USEUCOM is already using the
Reserve Components in a way that matches his vision for the future .
The total force concept is a way of life in USEUCOM.
Our Allies also fully contribute to regional security. The
U.S. -NATO relationship can be best characterized as "responsibility
sharing." But in the past few years, well-intentioned
"burdensharing" legislation initiatives have threatened to
undermine American overseas presence and put at risk U.S. regional
objectives. The apparent appeal to fiscal considerations
understates NATO's contribution to European security, masks the
threat to U.S. interests in the USEUCOM AOR, potentially degrades
U.S. leadership, marginalizes U.S. influence, and reduces America's
access to the pooled resources of other nations. We must avoid the
temptation to underestimate the European contribution to our common
security.
I remain concerned about the depth in Army forces . We must
not go below 10 well -equipped, manned, and trained active
divisions. To do so would subject the U.S. to unacceptable risks.
We must remember that it is service members on the ground executing
the flexible engagement strategy overseas that actively mold the
future security environment and prevent conflict. We need to guard
against a purely CONUS-based projection force. For the third time
this century, America could find itself in another extended
conflict that might have been averted had we remained engaged
through overseas presence . Adequate force structure is the bedrock
upon which rests the preservation of America's regional interest.
We have completed the post-Cold War downsizing and are now at a
force level that permits us to implement the theater strategy.
This reduced force level requires us to use our forces efficiently,
24
725
employing active duty and reserve augmentation forces to fill
critical operational needs, enabling theater forces to fulfill
operational requirements. We must also ensure we continue our
successful efforts to fully leverage the contributions made by our
Allies .
RESOVRCES
For Engagement and Preparedness to remain successful and to
ensure we are prepared for present and future missions, we must
balance near- term readiness with infrastructure, quality of life,
and modernization. First, readiness requires proper resourcing.
Joint and combined training exercises are the basis for promoting
stability and thwarting aggression. Through these, we ensure our
people -- soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines and civilians -- are
trained and ready to support immediate deployment to crisis
situations in our AOR, or anywhere in the world, to meet national
security objectives -- as we did when we deployed approximately
25,000 personnel in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Secondly,
infrastructure in our theater must support the full range of our
operational requirements while also providing military members and
their families facilities in which to live and work. The NATO
Security Investment Program has fully transitioned to the new
security environment. It provides America access to infrastructure
and other resources at a dramatically reduced cost by allowing us
to leverage the pooled contributions of 15 other nations. Finally,
modernization is the key to our future capability. We must ensure
that we maintain short-term readiness while preserving the
modernization required for long-term readiness.
25
726
READINESS
We must preserve readiness to be able to execute missions
concurrently while supporting ongoing operations. Throughout last
year, USEUCOM forces were continually engaged in contingency
operations such as JOINT ENDEAVOR, DELIBERATE FORCE, PROVIDE
PROMISE, DENY FLIGHT, ABLE SENTRY, and PROVIDE COMFORT. In the
past, these operations would have seriously threatened readiness
and training. However, this year's line-item funding for Operation
PROVIDE COMFORT sets an extremely important precedent for
warfighting CINCs . Along with Congress' timely Supplemental
Appropriation last year, these measures helped USEUCOM maintain the
high operational tempo while minimizing the fiscal impact on
Operations & Maintenance readiness accounts .
Operations & Maintenance dollars maintain readiness by funding
training and exercises for our forces, and sustain our busy pace of
operations. This funding allowed us to continue joint and combined
training in important exercises such as TRAILBLAZER, 48 HOURS,
POISED EAGLE, ATLANTIC RESOLVE, and AFRICAN EAGLE. These exercises
train forces to exploit the synergistic effect of employing air,
land, and sea forces in a coordinated effort. Without funding for
contingency operations, we would be forced to pay for operations
with our scarce training dollars. Your initiatives helped preserve
readiness by providing funds that in the past were siphoned away
from O&M accounts to pay for unscheduled contingency operations.
INFRASTRUCTURE
Infrastructure throughout the theater supports our people and
our ability to perform the assigned mission. Our facilities
drawdown is virtually complete and leaves USEUCOM at less than half
of its Cold War infrastructure level. While the drawdown has
26
727
forced us to make tough choices on which facilities would remain
open, we believe we have retained the capability to meet all
requirements, and allow for future consolidation and flexibility.
This does not mean, however, that we have escaped the
responsibility and requirement to continue facility upgrades and
some new construction. We must continue to invest in our military
installations both to maintain quality of life and ensure
infrastructure is in place to support our national interests.
Fewer facilities make those that remain even more important to our
continued mission readiness. Our European infrastructure and bases
provide the U.S. with access to this AOR and nearby regions that
are vital to our influence abroad. It is central to sustaining
supply lines and the ability to reinforce forward-deployed forces.
Given the age and condition of our facilities, it is imperative
that we continue to maintain, and in some cases upgrade, the
remaining infrastructure to ensure it can meet increased demands .
I want to stress the importance of the NATO Security
Investment Program (NSIP) in supporting U.S. interests. As a
revitalized program, NSIP supports more than just construction. It
supports our regional engagement by providing explicit mission
capabilities. Our Allies fund 72% of this vital program; about 28
cents of U.S. investment buys one dollar's worth of infrastructure.
The return we receive on this investment is impressive. Over the
last five years, U.S. industries have received more than $1.7
billion in high-tech contracts, including more than $100 million in
military construction contracts within the continental United
States. Recent projects include $12. 4M for runway overlay projects
at Lakenheath AB, England, and $25. 6M for parallel taxiway projects
at Incirlik AB, Turkey. With the recent approval of the Aviano AB,
Italy capabilities package, NSIP will provide $215M (U.S. share
27
728
approximately $69M) for construction of beddown facilities for two
U.S. F-16 squadrons. NSIP is also expected to fund the $30M Army
War Reserve Package South warehouse construction in Livomo, Italy.
This facility will store prepositioned, ready-to-use materiel for
U.S. forces.
However, funding shortfalls for the U.S. contribution to NATO
resulting from the FY95 rescission and a $18M reduction in the FY96
appropriation have delayed funding for U.S. embarkation projects in
CONUS and other needed projects that support power projection to
the European Theater. I appreciate the support in Congress for the
FY96 funding at $161 million, but I need your assistance to prevent
rescissions that will erode our warfighting capability and U.S.
credibility.
QUALITY OF LIFE
I place a high priority on five quality of life issues.
Military construction is one of the key factors in maintaining an
acceptable quality of life for our people. Affordable and suitable
housing for personnel overseas is especially problematic. Last
year, you approved all. quality of life military construction in
USEUCOM. This helped our commanders provide the troops and their
families with the living conditions necessary to sustain our high
operational tempo. We must maintain our commitment to our people
by investing in the infrastructure necessary to meet our mission
and quality of life needs.
Second, our military and civilian personnel deserve adequate
and fair compensation that keeps pace with the private sector.
Related to compensation is the third issue, retirement. We must
preserve a stable retirement system that does not break faith with
our people by seeking fiscal savings through the retirement system.
28
729
This would constitute a betrayal of our people's trust and may risk
serious damage to our force structure.
Next, we must provide our personnel a steady and dependable
level of medical benefits. This is particularly challenging in the
overseas environment where significant language and cultural
differences exist.
Finally, overseas service members and their families deserve
the same quality education their counterparts receive in the U.S.
Fully funded Service tuition assistance programs are required for a
professional force. DoDDS schools are also essential to USEUCOM as
it is unique in terms of needs and requirements. In this theater,
DoDDS provides logistical support for 123 DoDDS schools and 48,000
students. Some of our small schools are more costly to operate,
but are essential to our readiness posture. We must continue to
support our overseas schools with both operating funds and
construction money.
MODERNIZATION
We must also continue to modernize our forces to meet the
diverse requirements of this complex environment, but only within
the context of a viable national and theater strategy. As a
warfighting CINC, I rely on the Services to provide modem
equipment . I make my equipment modernization needs and their
significance to my AOR known to the Services, Joint Staff, and the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) .
Mobility is a high priority, vital to supporting our
Engagement Strategy. It is even more significant considering the
drawdown in Europe. Strategic lift, combined with prepositioned
materiel, is critical to fighting or supporting any major regional
conflict or contingency operation in or near the USEUCOM AOR. I
29
730
fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to buy 120 C-17s.
The C-17 delivers critically important out-sized equipment directly
to the battle front and has already proven itself in Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOR. We are also improving our strategic sealift
capability to provide heavy reinforcement and sustain theater
logistics. We require sufficient amphibious lift to support a
forced entry capability and a medium lift replacement helicopter
for the Marines and Special Operations Forces .
Capabilities derived from C*I improvements will increase
operational effectiveness through digitization of the battlefield,
thereby improving commanders' situational awareness. The Joint
Tactical Information Distribution System will improve combat
identification, reduce fratricide and increase operational
efficiency. But, we should not acquire enhanced C I with the
expectation that it will enable us to reduce overseas presence.
Only forward-based forces are capable of promoting stability,
thwarting aggression, and providing regional stability, thereby
preventing possible conflicts. However, modernized information
flow will enable Joint Task Force commanders to optimize highly
mobile future systems such as the V-22 Osprey, RAH-66 Comanche, F-
22, F-18E/F, DDG-51, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle, and
the next generation of Armored Vehicles, Tactical Trucks, and
Helicopter Fleets. JSTARS, for instance has already proven both
its capability and deterrent value in JOINT ENDEAVOR.
Air superiority plays a crucial role in sustaining USEUCOM's
warfighting credibility and its ability to project influence and
power, when and where required. Control of the air is vital as an
essential element of the fighting force and when responding to
crisis situations, providing the flexibility to restore order. The
F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter are critical investments in our
30
731
future warfighting and peacekeeping capability. We must also
continue to upgrade the multi-mission aircraft that filled the gap
left by our retiring specialized systems such as EF-111, RF-4, and
F-4G aircraft.
In USEUCOM, we face a challenging theater missile threat,
particularly in the southern region. Presently, our theater
missile defense systems are limited in protection capability and
force deployability. Just over the horizon are several new systems
in the final stages of development that address the theater missile
defense threat . We must work with and leverage our allies toward
common systems, such as Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) ,
to field these systems in the near future.
We must continue to make wise choices that preserve current
readiness, maintain infrastructure, and modernize our forces.
Because of increased peace support operations and crisis response
contingencies, I conduct many operations that cannot be foreseen.
Contingency operations are often funded at the expense of readiness
and training, but I am optimistic about recent initiatives that
specifically fund these types of operations. Infrastructure is
something we must continue to maintain and also provides an example
of the successes we can achieve by leveraging the pooled resources
of many nations. Finally, modernization affects the long-term
readiness of our forces and I am concerned that in many cases we
are paying for readiness and force structure with funds which were
originally earmarked for modernization. Funding for modernization
of key weapon systems ensures we can achieve our long-term
strategic objectives.
31
732
CONCLDSION
The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is on the cutting edge of
America's national security policy today and in the future. The
U.S. forward deployed and stationed force of about 100,000 has
demonstrated its importance in actual operations from the Balkans
to Beirut and from Northern Iraq to Rwanda. The U.S. troops in
Europe are well-trained, well-equipped and well-led. Although
operations tempo is high, readiness of the force is also at a high
level. The high professionalism of the force plus USEUCOM' s policy
of engagement and preparedness have paid off. The engagement
strategy with former Warsaw Pact nations is creating stability in
Europe as well as developing mutual trust and confidence between
former adversaries and now new partners. Russia has joined NATO
and the United States in Bosnia and is effectively integrated into
the command structure and operations. Twenty-seven nations have
joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and the USEUCOM-run
George C. Marshall Center is actively engaged in educating future
leaders of former communist countries. Already many of its
graduates are assuming positions of responsibility in the military
establishments of their nations. The NATO Alliance has
demonstrated a new vigor and vitality in planning, organizing and
executing Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR --an operation to bring peace
to the people of Bosnia who have suffered so much through four
years of war. And it is USEUCOM that is providing the important
support to the Bosnian operation -- not only in troops but also
intelligence, communications, logistics, and strategic lift. By
the forward deployment of U.S. troops in Europe, we are leveraging
our Allies to do more in their own defense and creating more stable
32
733
conditions in an area of the world that has known two world wars in
this century, and which remains critical to our national security.
As a result of steady and sure U.S. engagement in Europe, the
world is indeed a safer place. Peace has come to Bosnia. The PLO,
Jordan, and Israel are moving toward a peaceful settlement of their
decades long stiruggle and Syria may soon join them. NATO has made
overtures for cooperation with Middle East countries and several in
North Africa. Clearly NATO's engagement strategy is consistent
with the United States foreign policy and national interest. And
clearly USEUCOM's Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness is
absolutely on track with U.S. policy and vision.
In 1996 and through the remainder of this century the United
States, as the leader of NATO, has the historic opportunity to help
create, from the Atlantic to the Urals, a Europe whole and free,
democratic, stable and prosperous, with justice and respect for the
rights of individual citizens. We have an opportunity to promote
fundamental ideals and values as fragile democracies emerge. We
not only can deter war but also preserve the peace . To do so is in
the vital interests of the United States. To do so requires a
focused, engaged, active forward deployed and stationed U.S.
military force of 100,000 troops called USEUCOM. That force now
exists! USEUCOM has adapted to the challenges of the New Europe.
We must keep it trained and ready and provide adequate quality of
life for the troops and their families. I am extremely grateful
for the support of the Congress in the past and I know you will
continue to do so in the future. ONE TEAM - ONE FIGHT!
33
734
U.S. European Comm
Area of
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RESPONSIBILITY
735
736
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740
The Chairman. Thank you, General Joulwan. General Peay.
STATEMENT OF GEN. J. H. BINFORD PEAY III, USA,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
General Peay. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, it is a privilege and
honor to be with this committee to represent the servicemen and
women of the U.S. Central Command and to have the opportunity
to discuss Central Command's approach to meeting the very vast
challenges of the central region.
The 20 nations of the Middle East and Africa within our area of
responsibility comprise a region rich in culture and history and a
place of ancient rivalries that die very hard. America's vital inter-
est in the region include maintaining the flow of oil at reasonable
prices, ensuring freedom of navigation and access to commercial
markets, protecting American citizens ard property abroad, and as-
suring the security of our regional friends in the context of a com-
prehensive Middle East peace process.
Other regional interests include countering the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, WMD, deterring terrorism, stemming
the flow of narcotics in the region, encouraging democratization,
advancing economic development, and promoting respect for human
rights. Safeguarding these diverse interests is problematic. Much of
the oil must transit through narrow straits that can be very easily
interdicted.
At the same time, historic, internal, and external conflicts rooted
in long-standing religious and tribal strife, border disputes, com-
petition for resources, economic strains and exploding populations
plague the region. These conditions give rise to terrorists that em-
ploy violence to achieve political ends.
The willingness of nations such as Iraq, Iran, and Sudan to sup-
port such groups accentuates this danger. From its reorganized and
streamlined forces and refurbished military hardware, Iraq re-
mains the most dangerous near-term threat to regional peace and
stability. Iran, meanwhile, is the long-term threat striving to cap-
italize on its large oil reserves, skilled engineers and technicians,
and considerable population to control the gulf and lead the Islamic
world in the future.
Elsewhere in the region, Pakistan and India remain locked in an
antagonistic relationship that could further deteriorate, escalating
from border clashes to a fourth round of war. Tensions flowing
from Iraqi and Iranian mischief combined with other seething re-
gional hatreds are inflamed by the proliferation of chemical and bi-
ological weapons, ballistic missiles, and the ongoing efforts of such
nations as Iraq and Iran to acquire nuclear devices. Armed with
such deadly weapons, a hostile power may be able to strike unpro-
tected civilians, paralyze our governments with fear and with inde-
cision, and evade and erode the coalition resolve.
We at U.S. Central Command understand the nature of these
threats. I think we are able to identify threat capabilities and are
focused on devising appropriate countermeasures. Our efforts are
complicated by having to operate over lines of communications ex-
tending more than 7,000 miles from the United States to the gulf,
while a foe, a potential foe like Iraq is only a few hours driving
741
time, Baltimore to Richmond, in terms of impacting on Kuwait City
and surrounding the very, very important oil facilities.
In addition, our operational plans must account for limited for-
mal agreements, manifesting sensitivities to regional cultures, be
able to defeat adversaries ranging from terrorists to modem ar-
mies, navies, and their air forces and contend with some of the
world's harshest climates and terrain.
U.S. Central Command's five-pillar strategy of power projection,
forward presence, combined exercises, security assistance, and
readiness to fight attempt to address these d3niamics and focus on
creating conditions in peacetime that would produce victory in
terms of crisis or war.
I would like to elaborate on each of those pillars during the
course of discussion this morning. Through this theater strategy
Central Command promotes stability, deters aggression, limits the
intensity of conflict should deterrence fail, and fights and wins de-
cisively if and when required.
Pivotal to our ability to respond to regional threats and execute
our strategy is your continued support in some key areas. Let me
briefly address those.
First, prepositioning of equipment in the region remains a top.
It accommodates rapid deployment of forces to the region during
crisis response and their subsequent sustainment. Prepositioning
ashore is particularly important for it positions critical weapons
and equipment forward in the region. It cements in its own way re-
gional partnerships and facilitates coalitions during crisis. Recent
successes include completion of the prepositioning of an Army bri-
gade set of equipment in Kuwait and a first battalion set of equip-
ment in Qatar with much yet to do.
Work continues on finishing the prepositionings of this set and
the division base and, hopefully, prepositioning a third brigade set
ashore someplace in the region and the requisite military construc-
tion that goes with that. I ask specifically today for your support
to rapidly finish the gutter preposition set.
Second, strategic lift remains critical to projecting power into the
region. To this end, we need the rapid buyout on the C-17, the
large, medium-speed roll on-roU off ships, RO-RO, and the RO-RO
upgrade to the Army preposition equipment afloat, planned en-
hancements to the Ready Reserve Fleet, maritime preposition force,
and fast sealift ship maintenance, and program improvements to
other activities that facilitate this rapid power projection from the
continental United States.
Third, theater missile defense is a critical part of countering the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology related to the de-
velopment of nuclear biological and chemical weapons. We need a
multilayered missile defense that handles lower and upper-tier re-
quirements on land and sea and a highly mobile missile defense
that protects dispersed rapid movement ground forces Army and
Marine forces at a distance from ballistic and cruise missiles.
Fourth, improvements in air, ground, and sea strike capabilities
are needed to support the high tempo, joint and combined in the
region and to also defeat the WMD threat. Such enhancements le-
verage the complementary capabilities of each of the services and
742
America's technological advantages in long-range precision muni-
tions to mitigate the friction in the fog of war.
Fifth, limited forward-based infrastructure combined with the
great distances over which we must operate necessitate a command
control communications and intelligence architecture that allows us
to effectively and securely gather, process, distribute and display
on demand information of all types and classifications to our com-
manders and their staff.
Sixth, just as Gen. George Joulwan mentioned, international
military education and training, IMET, in foreign military financ-
ing programs provide our Nation extraordinary opportunities to as-
sist friendly states in meeting their legitimate self-defense needs
while gaining access deterring conflict and promoting stability and
democratic ideals.
Just recently General Karamount took over as Chief of Staff of
Pakistan, a Leavenworth graduate in Kansas. We appreciate Con-
gress' support during the past year to increasing funds for the
IMET program.
Seventh and last, each of the services must be of sufficient size
to simultaneously deter and fight, to carry out peacetime oper-
ational commitments, maintain readiness, and sustain first-rate
military educational institutions and training programs. While ad-
vanced technologies are a central part of our overall military capa-
bilities, it is not a panacea for solving our operational challenges.
Military success in the fog and friction of war requires such ad-
vanced weaponry be integrated with a well-crafted operational
strategy, sound tactics, well-trained, educated and supplied mili-
tary organizations, competent, expertly led soldiers, sailors, ma-
rines, and airmen.
The United States is at a historic crossroads where it has the
chance to reshape the shifting strategic landscape in the central re-
gion and perhaps contribute to ending the bloody cycle, hopefully,
of war and misery. We must remain resolute in confronting the op-
ponents of misery and despoilers of peace.
We at Central Command stand ready today to meet the chal-
lenges. I think our mission and our vision are clear. We look for-
ward to working with each of the military services, the Department
of Defense and especially the Members of Congress in the coming
months to protect America's vitals and important interests in the
central region.
Thank you, very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of General Peay follows:]
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
STATEMENT OF
GENERAL J. H. BINFORD PEAY III, USA
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
n. S. CENTRAL COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
26 MARCH 1996
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
744
FIVE PILIARS OF PEACE:
POSITIONING U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE
CENTRAL REGION
INTRODUCTION
United States Central Conmiand (USCENTCOM) is responsible for
U.S. military matters in a region of major importance to our
nation and to the entire international community. Everyday, we
face a variety of animosities and conflicts that pose multiple
threats. At the same time, we stand to gain from rewarding
economic relationships, political partnerships, and diplomatic
cooperation. Achieving such benefits hinges on mastering the
complexities of the region and addressing the road blocks to
peace and stability.
USCENTCOM' s area of responsibility consists of 20 countries
that stretch from the Horn of Africa and Egypt through Jordan and
the Gulf states to Afghanistan and Pakistan and includes the Red
Sea, Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Gulf and a large portion
of the Indian Ocean. Rich in culture and history, the region is
the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Home to 427
million people making up 17 different ethnic groups, 420 tribal
groupings, six major languages, and hundreds of dialects, it is a
place of ancient hatreds that die hard.
745
USCENTCOM's theater strategy reflects a sensitivity to these
lands and people gained through years of detailed planning and
painstakingly developed relationships with regional friends. To
consummate our national resolve, the Command has at its disposal
the full complement of capabilities of the national military
arsenal. This has been demonstrated time and again. Operation
VIGILANT WARRIOR in the Gulf in the Fall of 1994, in which U.S.
and coalition resolve deterred a repeat of the August 1990
invasion of Kuwait; Operation UNITED SHIELD in Somalia during the
Spring of 1995, in which a U.S. led combined joint task force
withdrew UN peacekeepers from that troubled land; and Operation
VIGILANT SENTINEL in Kuwait in September 1995, in which the
Command once again stood firm against Iraqi adventurism — all
are testimony to USCENTCOM's readiness and ability to employ the
right mix of military forces to achieve national goals.
USCENTCOM's theater strategy offers a method for dealing with
regional challenges and establishes the strategic, operational,
and tactical requirements that guide preparation of plans,
training of forces, and acquisition of weapons and equipment.
REGIONAI. DYNAMICS AND THREATS
The economic well-being of the United States and other
nations is dependent on assuring access to the oil buried beneath
the sands and waters of the Central Region. Some 65 percent of
the world's proven oil reserves are located in the region, which
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supplies the United States 19 percent of its needs, Western
Europe 42 percent, and Japan 70 percent. Indications are that
these numbers will climb five to ten percent over the next
decade. We ignore at our own peril the economic interdependence
among the U.S., Europe, and Japan. Disruption of oil supplies or
significant increases in the price of oil would devastate these
economic linkages and produce global financial upheaval. From
the U.S. perspective alone, the oil trade is part of a vibrant
economic relationship between the U.S. and the Middle East that
includes construction and health services, consumer goods, and
sales of military equipment. These factors underscore that
barring the development of a comparable energy source,
maintaining the flow of reasonably priced oil and ensuring
freedom of navigation and access to commercial markets are vital
interests of our country.
Other vital interests include protecting American citizens
and property abroad and assuring the security of regional allies
in the context of a comprehensive Middle East peace. The Central
Region is a dangerous neighborhood, where regional threats have
global implications. America cannot protect its interests abroad
through neo-isolationist policies or by ignoring the region.
Similarly, our nation's long standing effort to broker a
comprehensive Middle East peace between Israel and its neighbors
demands our continued presence and reassurance. Other U.S.
interests associated with this region include countering
747
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), defeating
terrorism, stemming the flow of narcotics from the region,
encouraging democratization, advancing economic development, and
promoting respect for human rights.
Safeguarding these vital and enduring interests is
problematic. Much of the oil must transit through narrow
straits — choke points that are vulnerable to interdiction.
Chronic unrest in the form of 14 internal or external conflicts
plague the region daily. Such conflicts are rooted in long
standing religious and tribal strife, border disputes,
competition for resources, economic strains, and exploding
populations.
In the context of this discord, Egypt, a cornerstone of the
American led effort to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace,
is battling political and religious extremists. These
destabilizing parties are supported by Sudan, a nation that is
sponsoring unrest throughout the area, to include Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Kenya.
Elsewhere in the region, Pakistan struggles against an array
of problems that hamper realization of its national goals. First
and foremost is its historic antagonistic relationship with
India, which is exacerbated by the long standing dispute over
Kashmir. The Kashmir dispute has the potential to escalate from
748
border skirmishes, a larger conflict, or even a fourth round of
war that could conceivably include the use of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan must also cope with widespread political corruption,
human rights violations, rampant drug trafficking, terrorism, and
poor economic conditions that threaten the country's internal
stability. Additionally, protracted civil war in Afghanistan has
plagued Pakistan with a flood of refugees and an additional
source of political upheaval. Finally, competition over access
to Central Asian Republic markets has severely strained its
relations with Iran. Taken together, these vexing, long-term
challenges indicate that Pakistan faces a difficult future.
Most significant, Iraqi and Iranian virulence exacerbate
these other sources of regional tension. Iraq has a long-
standing tradition of intimidating smaller neighbors while Iran
seeks hegemony in the Gulf.
Though it lost more than half of its conventional military
might in the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq has reorganized and streamlined
its forces and refurbished its military hardware to sustain a
sizeable army and retain its position as a regional military
power. This, combined with Baghdad's defiance of post-war United
Nations Security Council resolutions, alarms neighboring states.
As the crisis of October 1994 demonstrated, Iraq retains the
capability to mobilize and move large numbers of forces quickly
to threaten Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These factors support the
749
USCENTCOM contention that lifting UN sanctions under current
conditions will inevitably lead to Iraq's rearmament.
In the seventeenth year of its revolution, Iran strives for
control of the Gulf while also seeking to become leader of the
Islamic world. Its large oil reserves, skillful engineers and
technicians, and considerable population gives it the potential
to achieve its hegemonic ambitions. Iran has extensive weapons
development and procurement programs that have led to the
acquisition of submarines, modern attack aircraft, and anti-ship
missiles. Concurrently, Tehran has underwritten political and
religious extremists worldwide, militarized disputed islands in
the southern Arabian Gulf and has sought to torpedo the Middle
East peace process.
Tensions flowing from Iraqi and Iranian mischief, combined
with other seething regional problems, are exacerbated by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq and Iran are
just two of many nations worldwide that have been hard at work
during the last few years seeking to acquire ballistic and cruise
missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Their
quest has been eased by the willingness of nations such as North
Korea, China, and some former Soviet Republics to sell advanced
weaponry to anyone that can afford them. Furthermore, older
systems can be upgraded with purchases of "off-the-shelf"
technology. Armed with such deadly weapons, a hostile power may
750
be able to slaughter unprotected civilians, paralyze governments
with fear and indecision, and erode coalition resolve. This
situation becomes even more alarming as potential foes continue
to harden and conceal command and control, launch, and storage
sites, making it more difficult for U.S. armed forces to find and
strike them, should it become necessary.
USCENTCOM'S THEATER STRATEGY
We at USCENTCOM understand the nature of these threats and
are able to discern their capabilities. We cannot, however,
always predict threat intentions, specifically how and when these
threats will endanger U.S. interests. Under the circumstances,
we must focus primarily on threat capabilities and devise
appropriate countermeasures. We must do this in support of a
mission defined by the National Security Strategy (NSS), National
Military Strategy (NMS), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP), which includes the following elements:
* Promote and protect U.S. interests
* Ensure uninterrupted access to regional resources
* Assist friendly states in providing for their own security
and contributing to the collective defense
* Deter attempts by hostile regional states to achieve geo-
political gains by threat or use of force
751
Designing a theater strategy that satisfies this manifold
mission is an arduous undertaking. We must operate over lines of
communication extending more than 7,000 miles between the
continental United States and the Gulf. A potential foe like
Iraq, conversely, is only a few hours driving time from Kuwait
City and surrounding oil facilities. Our operational plans must
account for limited formal agreements with regional states.
Associated operations and policies must manifest a sensitivity to
regional cultures. All the while, U.S. forces must be able to
defeat adversaries ranging from insurgents to armies, navies, and
air forces armed with advanced weaponry. But they must also be
sufficiently versatile to contend with terrorists, narco-
traffickers, and environmental and human disasters. Finally,
they must be able to do all of these things in some of the
world's harshest climates and most rugged terrain.
We at Central Command have incorporated these imperatives
into our operations. We are guided in the accomplishment of the
mission by a clear vision: to be a flexible and versatile command
-- trained, positioned, and ready to defend the Nation's vital
interests , promote peace and stability, deter conflict , and
conduct operations spanning the conflict continuum; and prepared
to wage unrelenting, simultaneous, joint and combined operations
to achieve decisive victory in war.
38-160 97-26
752
In the spirit of this vision, USCENTCOM carries out a
muitifaceted strategy to address mutual security concerns of the
United States and its regional partners. This strategy focuses
on promoting peace and stability, deterring conflict, limiting
the intensity of conflict should deterrence fail, and prevailing
in combat operations when required. It provides a flexible
approach to meeting the needs of each subregion and is
particularly applicable to the Gulf states. In addition, it
capitalizes on personal relationships forged with regional
friends over the years.
While retaining the capability to act unilaterally to defend
America's interests, USCENTCOM is guided by the perspective that
our nation's long-term goals are best served by pursuing
cooperative relationships. These serve as the basis for
establishing coalitions and for deploying and employing U.S.
forces during crisis. Achieving such partnerships and building
coalitions is made possible through a long-term and flexible,
three-tiered approach to deterring aggression and fighting if
deterrence fails. The first tier, national self-defense, calls
for each nation to bear primary responsibility for its own
protection. During heightened regional tensions or hostility,
friendly states would form the second tier, collective defense.
This is reflected in the Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC)
Peninsula Shield Force. Finally, in the third tier. United
States and other extra-regional partners would join to defeat a
753
threat to the region. In addition to deterring conflict, this
three-tiered approach and associated initiatives strengthen links
between United States and friendly regional militaries — links
that promote peace and stability.
These fundamentals underpin a theater strategy comprised of
five core elements or pillars: (1) Power Projection; (2) Forward
Presence; (3) Combined Exercises; (4) Security Assistance; and
(5) Readiness to Fight. Together, these five pillars and their
interrelationships lay out the major activities that this Command
undertakes to accomplish its mission.
The first pillar, Power Projection, defines activities and
qualities of U.S. armed forces that support rapid projection of
extra-regional forces into the Central Region and their combat
positioning. Transporting these forces the long distances to the
Central Region in a timely fashion, in order to influence friends
and foes during crisis response and to support the build-up of
combat power during the lodgment phase of combat operations,
calls for aircraft like the C-5 and C-17 and ships like the
Roll-On/Roll-Off transports. It also means exploiting our
nation's ready reserve force and inventory of modern civilian air
and merchant fleets. Meeting stringent deployment schedules
entails access to and exercising overseas airfields and seaports.
Reducing the window of vulnerability to friendly forces arrayed
in defensive positions means drawing on the 14 ships carrying an
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754
Army brigade set of equipment afloat, the Air Force's three
logistic ships carrying critical supplies and ammunition, and the
Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) . This last
contingent consists of three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
(MPSRONs), each one able to support a Marine Expeditionary Force
(Forward) of over 17,000 personnel with supplies and equipment
for 30 days. With these capabilities, USCENTCOM can quickly move
Army and Marine forces by air to link up with equipment arriving
aboard prepositioned ships. Sustaining U.S. forces effectively
over long distances also means acquiring the technology and
advanced procedures that support split-based logistic operations,
logistics over the shore, a secure communications network, and an
advanced, computerized total. asset visibility capability. To
ensure that all activities are properly sequenced and priorities
established. Central Command is continuing to refine plans,
review force deployment requirements, and clarify movement
priorities. Combined, these efforts reduce the formidable time-
distance hurdles to projecting military force into the region and
the vulnerability of our logistics infrastructure to enemy
attacks.
The second pillar, Forward Presence, is the most visible
demonstration of U.S. commitment. With few permanently assigned
forces, and as the only regional unified command that is not
forward positioned in its area of responsibility, USCENTCOM
relies on forward presence to deter conflict, enhance access, and
11
755
support the transition from peace to war. This is achieved by
maintaining a balanced mix of air, land, sea, and special
operations forces, structured to provide lethal combat power
forward while minimizing the size of the U.S. footprint in the
region .
With its relatively small footprint, strategic agility and
significant combat punch, naval forces are well suited to meet
competing operational requirements. Under the command of U.S.
Naval Forces Central Command and Fifth Fleet, our naval component
regularly includes a carrier battle group, an amphibious ready
group, mine countermeasure ships, and cruise missile-equipped
surface ships and submarines. In addition to supporting recent
operations in Kuwait and Somalia, USCENTCOM's naval forces show
the flag daily, secure freedom of navigation in narrow channels,
and stand ready to confront aggression with aircraft and missile
delivered precision fires. They also enforce maritime intercept
operations pursuant to UN sanctions against Iraq, carrying out
nearly 23,000 challenges, more than 12,000 interceptions, and
nearly 10,000 boardings since August 1990.
Naval amphibious forces, the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)
and its associated Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable) or MEU(SOC), provide a robust rapid response capability.
This was demonstrated in October 1994, when ships of the Tripoli
ARG arrived in the Northern Arabian Gulf, and Marines of the 15th
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756
MEU(SOC) went ashore in Kuwait as Army forces arrived by air to
man prepositioned equipment; in March 1995, when Marines carried
out the withdrawal of UN forces from Somalia; in the Fall of
1995, when Marines went ashore at Aqaba in Jordan and were
prepared to counter possible Iraqi moves against Kuwait; and in
several other episodes where Marines stood ready to carry out
noncombatant evacuations and other types of operations.
Complementing these naval forces is a compact but lethal
package of Air Force aircraft. The 4404 Air Wing (Provisional)
conducts Operation SOUTHERN WATCH under the command of Joint Task
Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), securing the skies over southern
Iraq, carrying out operations to protect the Arabian Peninsula
and preventing Saddam's air forces from attacking Iraqi Shiites.
Its aircraft have flown over 80,000 sorties, more than 62,000
over southern Iraq alone since August 1992. In addition to these
air resources, we have recently begun deploying an Air \
Expeditionary Force (AEF) on a periodic basis. Comprised of a
combination of aircraft offering a capability roughly comparable
to that of a carrier air wing, the AEF further bolsters U.S.
forward presence.
Of particular value is JTF-SWA 's capability to orchestrate
coalition air operations. This was demonstrated in both
Operations VIGILANT WARRIOR and VIGILANT SENTINEL, in which
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757
JTF-SWA employed its advanced command and control apparatus to
pull together disparate land and sea-based aircraft and organize
them for combat operations. Armed with its potent mix of
reconnaissance, air-to-air, air-to-ground, and support aircraft,
this forward deployed air package enhances regional defensive
capabilities, promotes rapid build-up of U.S. air power during
crisis, and is able to pummel attacking enemy forces in the first
hours of hostilities.
Forward deployed Patriot batteries and special operations
teams constitute the ground dimension of forward presence. More
limited in scope than forward positioned air and naval forces,
these units are, nonetheless, an important part of deterrence.
Patriot batteries, for example, can counter enemy ballistic
missiles by safeguarding key facilities. Special operations
troops, meanwhile, serve as an important link in achieving
interoperability with regional militaries and reducing the risk
of fratricide.
Forward presence extends beyond forward positioned forces.
It includes work being done to emplace unmanned command and
control facilities in the region to compensate for the absence of
a permanently established and manned forward headquarters.
Another dimension is the prepositioning of equipment ashore in
the region. Such prepositioning is a strategic linchpin that
complements strategic lift and prepositioned stocks afloat. In
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758
addition to reducing time-distance challenges and related risks
to early deploying forces, prepositioning ashore cements the
coalition and strengthens access to regional states. In a
crisis, prepositioning
facilitates sustainment of theater forces and rapid introduction
of mechanized ground forces. These qualities further enhance the
deterrent effect of forward positioned forces.
Significant progress has been made during the last four
years in concluding Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) that
have allowed the erection of storage sites throughout the region
for Air Force bare base sets (Harvest Falcon), Navy forward
logistic sets, water and fuel distribution equipment, medical
supplies and infrastructure, support vehicles and equipment, and
rations. A main feature of this effort is the prepositioning of
an Army heavy brigade set of equipment (two armor battalions and
one mechanized infantry battalion) in Kuwait. Substantial
progress has also been made in placing a second brigade set of
equipment with a division base in Qatar, with the first battalion
task force being positioned this past January. Concepts are also
being explored to position a third brigade set elsewhere in the
region. Completion of these efforts near the end of the decade
will provide a mechanized division set of prepositioned equipment
ashore - greatly enhancing U.S. operational flexibility to deal
with the full range of threats in the region.
IS
759
The third pillar, Combined Exercises, enriches the other
elements of the theater strategy. Divided into three phases, our
exercise program mirrors the three tiered approach to regional
defense. Phase I includes relatively small scale, bilateral
activities that hone small unit and individual combat skills,
foster military-to-military relationships, and broaden access.
Using these small-scale operations as a base. Phase II builds
joint and combined force capabilities in individual countries
that improve regional collective security and enhance
interoperability among regional partners. Phase III, Theater
Unified Operations, is USCENTCOM's exercise end state and
consists of periodic joint and combined exercises involving
multiple regional militaries. Such exercises offer a rigorous
and stimulating training environment for coalition warfighting.
Together, all three phases advance power projection, bolster
forward presence, and enhance regional deterrence.
USCENTCOM is on track in achieving its goal of generating a
combined warfighting exercise capability with 14 regional states
by 2001. In FY95, for example, the Command conducted a total of
85 air, land, sea, and special operations exercises. At the same
time, these exercises reflect the Command's on-going efforts to
reduce the high level of U.S. military operational tempo. We
have decreased the number of small-scale exercises and
streamlined and consolidated others in order to carry out more
joint and multinational training activities. Recent initiatives
16
760
in Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates and Pakistan have improved basic war
fighting skills and, more importantly, strengthened access. This
trend will continue with the conduct of exercises such as BRIGHT
STAR, a biennial field training exercise conducted in Egypt;
ULTIMATE RESOLVE, a command post exercise conducted in various
Gulf states on an annual basis; and INTRINSIC ACTION, a joint,
multinational field training exercise conducted in Kuwait several
times a year. During the past year, we have witnessed continued
progress in the ground force capabilities of regional friends and
even greater improvements in their air, naval, and special
operations capabilities. We expect to see even more gains in
coming years as friendly regional militaries continue to
modernize, acquire more experience working together and with U.S.
forces, and overcome the perennial hindrances to their own
military readiness.
The fourth pillar. Security Assistance, provides another
path for improving military readiness of regional friends,
training their forces, promoting interoperability, gaining
access, strengthening military to military relationships, and
increasing over time the ability of states to provide for their
individual and collective defense. It is composed of four
elements: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing,
Mobile Training and Technical assistance field teams, and
International Military Education and Training. Each of these
17
761
activities support our aim of putting regional defensive
arrangements in place, while allowing the U.S. control over arms
transfers.
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) in the Central Region have
accounted for a large proportion of America's worldwide total:
42 percent for Fy90-FY95, with regional sales in Fy95 amounting
to $1.75 billion or 18% of the worldwide total. Most regional
friends prefer U.S. hardware and have negotiated for major
systems to include F-15 and F-16 fighters, Abrams tanks, Bradley
fighting vehicles. Patriot missiles, and Apache helicopters.
Regional friends are also purchasing a wide assortment of
military equipment, training, maintenance, and follow-on logistic
support. These sales are an important part of upgrading regional
militaries, boosting interoperability among U.S. and local
forces, and are beneficial to American industry. This effort is
buttressed by a more modest military funding program that
provides grants and transfers of excess defense articles to
regional friends. In this way, we are able to help strategically
important but economically disadvantaged countries meet
legitimate self-defense needs while broadening U.S. access.
Modern weapons alone do not produce reliable and combat
ready forces. Comprehensive training is required to mold
skilled, highly motivated soldiers and competent leaders. To
this end, the U.S. depends on 600-1,500 civilian contractors and
18
762
military personnel organized into mobile training and technical
assistance teams that operate continually in the region. Through
these teams, we improve regional military proficiency, strengthen
relationships, and reinforce our forward presence.
These efforts are supported by the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program, which enables regional
military members to study and train at American military
educational and technical institutions. The introduction of U.S.
doctrine and training to foreign leaders and their personal
contact with American military and civilian communities advance
long-term relationships while improving the technical skills of
foreign military leaders. What's more, instruction on topics
such as respect for fundamental human rights and civilian control
of the military may promote, over time, responsible defense
management and democratic values in regional states.
The fifth and final pillar of our theater strategy.
Readiness to Fight, ensures the battle staffs of USCENTCOM
headquarters and service components possess the equipment,
procedures, and skills to deploy rapidly during crisis and
conduct high tempo joint and multinational operations.
We achieve battle staff readiness through rigorous
exercises. In addition to those that it conducts in the region,
the Command engages in three others in the U.S.: INTERNAL LOOK,
19
763
a command post exercise conducted biennially involving all
components; ROVING SANDS, a joint theater missile defense command
post and field training exercise conducted biennially; and BLUE
FLAG, an air operations command p>ost exercise conducted annually.
Collectively, these exercises enhance battle staff proficiency on
all combat functions.
The Command's readiness also requires an assortment of
programs and systems that allow it to carry out military
operations in the Central Region and support the style of
fighting envisioned.
To reinforce the capabilities of our active components, we
must exploit the fullest capabilities of U.S. military reserves.
Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), Army Guard and
reserves, air guard crew members, and Naval and Marine reserves
are central to the performance of key staff functions such as air
and sea lift, port opening, air operations, civil affairs,
psychological operations, and combat service support. These
forces must be equipped, prepared, and trained for early
deployment. Given the nature of future threats, reservists can
expect early mobilization during crisis respKjnse.
Our intellectual preparation for handling future crises
requires support for our nation's individual service and joint
professional military education (PME) programs. The Army War
20
764
College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Air War College and Air
Conunand and Staff College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama;
Naval War College at Newport, Rhode Island; Army Command and
General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas; Marine Corps
Command and Staff College, and Marine Corps University at
Quantico, Virginia; and scores of other educational and technical
training centers located throughout the United States embody the
magnificence of the American military's advanced educational
infrastructure — national treasures that are the intellectual
well-spring of America's armed forces and the envy of other
nations around the world. This professional education is the
basis for an officer and noncommissioned officer corps that
thinks creatively, reasons critically, acts innovatively, and
operates decisively in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty.
Our nation's success in one military operation after another is
testimony to the excellence of the faculties that toil at these
institutions; faculties that offer a legacy of security to future
generations of Americans. No other nation can replicate our
military educational system. Success on future battlefields
dictates that we remain resolute in maintaining the high quality
of our professional military schooling.
Achieving military success in the region in the mid- and
long-term requires acquisition of counters to ballistic and
cruise missiles and WMD warheads; counters that devalue WMD
warheads and make them less attractive to hostile states. In
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this vein, we must field a lower and, when ready, an upper tier
missile defense that will protect our ships, littoral-based
forces, and critical facilities, particularly in the initial
stages of deployment and force buildup. In addition, we need a
highly mobile missile defensive system that can defend dispersed,
rapidly moving Army and Marine ground maneuver forces against
cruise and short range tactical ballistic missiles. We must also
take action to mitigate the effects of chemical and biological
weapons by fielding improved protective clothing, monitoring
devices, identification and decontamination capabilities, and
vaccines and antidotes. As the WMD threat evolves, so must our
forces and our operational concepts.
To facilitate attack operations, we support the fielding of
systems and precision munitions for all the Services that support
target detection at extended ranges, compress sensor-to-shooter
times, achieve synergism among weapons, provide rapid battle
damage assessment, and overwhelm the enemy with a cascading,
continuous, all-weather, round-the-clock pounding on the ground,
sea, and in the air.
Readiness to fight also means having advanced secure battle
management command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence architecture that support high tempo, integrated
joint and combined warfare. Associated systems broaden satellite
communications, enhance tracking of unmanned aerial vehicles and
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766
missiles, support acquisition and dissemination of accurate
flight data on enemy missile launches, and allow rapid down
linking of intelligence to front line forces. These advances
permit the services to optimize their capabilities in the milieu
in which they fight - air, ground, and sea.
To overcome long-standing impediments to countering
fratricide during air, ground, and sea operations, we must
continue efforts to make technological and procedural fixes to
ensure friendly force identification in combat.
Finally, readiness to fight means acquiring the modern
sinews of war: trucks, water purification equipment, inland
petroleum distribution systems. Navy forward logistic sites,
cutting edge medical technology, new maintenance upgrades,
advanced storage techniques, and other innovations that sustain
military operations spanning the conflict continuum.
Through USCENTCOM's Five Pillar strategy and the activities
enshrined. Central Command is establishing peacetime
relationships and infrastructure needed in crisis and war. The
functions embedded in these pillars promote regional stability,
assure access, and deter aggression. We also establish the
military conditions required to limit the intensity of conflict
should deterrence fail and, if required, fight and win
decisively.
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ACHIEVIMO DECISIVE VICTORY
Activities undertaken in the context of the Command's Five
Pillar strategy position USCENTCOM to transition smoothly and
seamlessly from peace to war. It does this in an environment
characterized by a diversity of threats. As has been described,
we know the nature of these threats and understand their
capabilities, but cannot always predict intentions. USCENTCOM's
theater strategy reflects these precepts and offers an azimuth
for achieving success. With this in mind, several points should
be emphasized:
First, we know that the threats looming in the shadows span
the continuum: from criminal organizations, terrorists, and
insurgents on the low end, to well armed, mechanized formations,
backed-up by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction
on the high end. And America's armed forces must be ready to
contend with them all.
Second, we need to understand that reassuring friends and
allies, deterring conflict, and fighting are part of a continuum.
We deter by convincing would-be aggressors that the risks of
going to war are unacceptably high. Conveying this message has
taken on even more importance as likely adversaries pursue and
acquire weapons of mass destruction. We achieve this deterrence
by organizing, equipping, and exercising premier joint and
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768
combined forces; having the national will to use them; and
coiranunicating that resolve to adversaries. in this context, each
of the Services must be of sufficient size to simultaneously
deter and fight, carry out peacetime operational commitments,
maintain readiness, and sustain first rate military educational
institutions and training programs. These are the ingredients of
credible deterrence. Credible deterrence, in turn, creates
conditions for peacetime engagement, which promotes regional
stability.
Third, we must focus on winning mid- to high-intensity war.
We acknowledge the diverse threats endemic to the Central Region
call for specially tailored packages of military capabilities.
We recognize we must fashion rules of engagement consistent with
the situation. We understand weapons and techniques appropriate
for mid-intensity war may not be relevant in operations other
than war. Still, organizations, leaders, and service personnel
that can successfully prosecute the demands of fighting in mid-
and high-intensity war will possess the discipline, flexibility,
and skills required to handle other missions at the lower end of
the conflict continuum after undergoing a brief period of focused
training.
Fourth, we must capitalize on U.S. advantages in technology,
weapons, leadership, and quality people to reduce risks to U.S.
and coalition forces. Our military forces must take advantage of
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769
the complementary capabilities found within each of the Services
to cover vast distances; strike at enemy weaknesses; launch
unrelenting precision deep strikes against the enemy's military,
industrial, and information infrastructure; conduct continuous,
all-weather joint and combined operations; and simultaneously
assault tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. The
speed, precision and flexibility associated with such operations
require that commanders exploit the advantages of the entire
battle space, maximizing the benefits derived from each service.
Fifth, we ensure that USCENTCOM's operational plans,
policies, and procedures build on the Command's peacetime
activities to address the exigencies associated with single and
dual major regional contingencies and military operations at the
lower end of the conflict continuum. With peacetime partnerships
providing a foundation, we have the means to forge coalitions and
integrate the military capabilities of all parties to confront
regional aggressors. As tensions heighten, we rely on the three-
tiered defensive arrangement established in peacetime to elicit
regional support for coalition operations and create the military
structures needed to defeat the enemy.
Sixth, we pursue operational concepts that envision rapid
buildup of U.S. and coalition combat power during crisis and the
conduct of high tempo, joint and combined operations to achieve
decisive victory. Given early warning and early deployment
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770
decisions, USCENTCOM will stand ready to initiate a series of
flexible deterrent options in cooperation with regional partners
to send a clear signal of resolve to aggressors. If these
measures prove inadequate, USCENTCOM, with coalition support,
will continue to deploy air, sea, and ground forces to defend
against attackers. If such actions fail to blunt enemy action,
the Command will deploy additional forces and launch a joint and
combined offensive to overwhelm the enemy rapidly to restore
regional stability.
Seventh, we must understand that the best tactics will not
compensate for a flawed operational strategy. Similarly,
technological advances, new weapons, and more precise munitions
will not guarantee tactical or strategic success. Armed with a
cleverly crafted operational strategy, with clearly defined end
states, we can employ good tactics to deliver victory. In such a
setting, modern technology provides superb tools to assure
victory most effectively.
Eighth, we can expect that, over time, likely foes will
develop countermeasures to our weapons. We can't re-fight the
last war. We must learn from our mistakes. We can expect the
enemy to learn from his and go to school on us. We cannot put
all of our technological capabilities in one basket. The
historic roles and missions of our armed services afford splendid
complementary capabilities that should not be discarded. At the
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same time, we should also build on our successes and change
accordingly.
Ninth, we must recognize that U.S. forces cannot escape the
fog and friction of war. Access to regional states might be
thwarted by operational situation or political considerations.
Cloud cover may obscure targets. Carriers might be out of
position. Missile defenses may not be leak proof. Logistic
shortfalls might slow down operations. We must pursue an
operational strategy during crisis that most effectively uses
available resources and offers maximum flexibility to assure
success.
Tenth, we must consider the implications of our nation's
reliance on power projection to deliver a strategic punch to
defend our interests. We must stay on track purchasing the air
and sea lift and associated equipment. We must see through the
prepositioning of equipment afloat and ashore. We must do all of
these things in order to be able to move our forces to the region
in a timely fashion.
Eleventh and lastly, we must recognize that in the end, our
triumph in a future conflict will hinge, as it always has, on the
proficiency and professionalism of our tactical organizations;
the skill, courage, and sacrifice of our fighting men and women;
and leaders who are professionally and technically competent,
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possess an impeccable code of ethics, and practice "out-front"
leadership, always. Our service men and women are our nation's
security against an uncertain and perilous future. Maintaining
the quality and morale of these service men and women requires a
supportive public and sustainment of a healthy package
of pay and compensation, medical care, retirement, and family
support — all of which ensures a satisfying standard of living.
These thoughts are embedded in USCENTCOM's vision, are
captured in the activities undertaken in our Five Pillar
strategy, and serve as the basis for the Command's input to the
individual services and joint staff.
KEY EMABLING REOUIREMEWTS
Pivotal to USCENTCOM's ability to respond to regional
threats and carry out its theater strategy is Congress's support
for the President's Budget. The most critical elements of this
include: (1) prepositioning, (2) theater missile defense,
(3) strategic lift, (4) improved stand-off strike capabilities,
(5) improvements in command, control, communications, computers,
and intelligence, (C*I) infrastructure, (6) enhancements to
airborne reconnaissance, (7) WMO protective measures, and
(8) International Military Education and Training & Foreign
Military Financing.
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Prepositioninq
Prepositioning of equipment ashore and afloat in the region
remains a top priority for Central Command. As demonstrated in
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR in October 1994 and during Operation
VIGILANT SENTINEL in September 1995, prepositioning accommodates
rapid deployment of forces to the region during crisis response
and their subsequent sustainment. Prepositioning ashore is
particularly important. This view is disputed by some who
contend that the best way to shield American military hardware
from regional dangers, particularly the evolving WMD threat, is
to minimize prepositioning ashore by prepositioning more
equipment afloat or by relying on more force projection from the
continental United States. Such approaches, however,
inadequately support our theater strategic aims. Prepositioning
ashore does far more than place critical weapons, equipment, and
supplies in the region. It "cements" the coalition and links
regional partners together to meet mutual security requirements.
This, in turn, advances regional access, encourages peacetime
engagement, and offers continuous deterrence. Finally, during
the transition to war, the ashore brigade set supports more rapid
closure of the force.
Having completed the fielding of a brigade set of equipment
in Kuwait, we are pressing forward to establish a second brigade
set with a division base in Qatar. This second set of equipment
30
774
will dramatically increase our military capability in the region,
adding flexibility and the requisite firepower and command and
control during the first days of a military operation. Qatar has
provided the land and services required to beddown the second
brigade set and is supportive of the strategic basis for the
program, with the first phase of our military construction
(MILCON) requirements funded, we need your support to complete
the remainder of the storage site. We also need support in our
efforts to preposition a third brigade set of equipment ashore in
the region, with this third set, the U.S. will enjoy the
benefits of having a full division worth of equipment
prepositioned ashore early in the next century — a clear signal
of American resolve to confront future threats.
Theater Missile Defense
The proliferation of ballistic missiles and technology
related to the development of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons prescribes the need for an advanced theater missile
defense architecture. Emphasis must be placed on establishing
a "multilayered" missile defense over the next ten years that
handles lower and upper tier requirements on land and sea. In
addition, we need to quickly field a highly mobile missile
defense to be positioned well forward to protect dispersed,
rapidly moving Army and Marine ground forces. This last system
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775
must also be able to defend against cruise and short range
tactical ballistic missiles.
Success in these efforts hinges on enhancements to theater
missile defense (TMD) fused awareness. This assures effective
flow of information among intelligence assets, decision making
facilities, warning systems, and attack means.
Strategic Lift
Strategic lift is essential to the implementation of
USCENTCOM's Strategy. The Central Region's distance from the
continental U.S. and America's relatively small forward presence
results in dependence on a modern fleet of aircraft and ships
that can quickly move forces and supplies in support of
contingencies. This has been demonstrated repeatedly, most
recently in Somalia and the Gulf.
Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR saw the first operational use of
both the C-17 and the Army Prepositioning Afloat, and both
programs met our expectations. We need your continued support
for the C-17, Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off ships (RO/RO),
and RO/RO upgrade to the Army prepositioned equipment afloat. In
addition, we must continue to fund enhancements to the Ready
Reserve Fleet, Maritime Prepositioning Force, and Fast Sealift
Ship maintenance program. Other requirements include support for
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776
total asset visibility, logistics over the shore, and strategic
aeromedical evacuation. Together, these systems will ensure that
the U.S. can meet demanding deployment schedules during crisis
response.
Improved Air. Ground, and Sea Strike Capabilities
Conducting the high tempo joint and combined operations
envisioned for the Central Region and defeating ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction requires improvements in
air, ground, and sea strike capabilities. Improvements to
current aerial resources, procurement of multi-role/advanced
systems, and acquisition of associated precision guided munitions
are integral to this effort. In addition to assuring air
superiority, such capabilities will allow the command to attack
an array of critical targets, including hardened command and
control headquarters and storage sites. On the ground,
modernization of field artillery, fielding of equipment
supporting digitization of systems, and procurement of a new
family of long-range, smart munitions offer tactical commanders
the ability to strike high priority targets quickly and
accurately. At sea, we need to enhance fire support and obtain
the next generation of long range cruise missiles. Your support
for these improvements and others proposed by the Services will
allow USCENTCOM to leverage American technological advantages in
long-range, precision munitions to mitigate the friction and fog
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777
of war to counter a broad range of threats. It also enhances the
Conunand's ability to defeat future enemy ballistic missiles and
WMD capabilities through a multifaceted approach combining
passive and active defensive measures with a robust attack
capability.
Improvements in Command. Control. Communications. Computers, and
Intelligence (CI) Infrastructure
The limited communications infrastructure in the USCENTCOM
area of responsibility and the Command's positioning in the
continental U.S. create significant command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence (C*I) challenges. We
need a C I architecture that allows us to effectively and
securely gather, process, distribute and display on demand, in
real and near-real time, information of all types and all
classifications to users at all decision making levels, whether
we are providing command and control for a Joint Task Force from
the continental U.S., while enroute to the region, or fully
deployed for a Major Regional Contingency. The timely delivery
of high quality, pertinent intelligence to the commander in the
field is central to military success.
Satellite communications are particularly important to
these efforts, offering vital strategic and tactical capabilities
that extend between the continental U.S. and the theater. It is
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through the nation's robust satellite infrastructure that we are
able to achieve marked improvements in communications,
intelligence, warning, positioning, and meteorology; all of which
are essential to leveraging U.S. advantages in weaponry.
It is important to note, however, that the level of network
connectivity needed to implement this C I infrastructure
introduces new vulnerabilities. Threats ranging from foreign
intelligence services to terrorists and criminal elements are
capable of disrupting our systems . we are in the midst of a new
era of information warfare that requires an enhanced systems
security posture. In the past, we secured classified traffic
using dedicated circuits and. specially designated computers.
Today, resource constraints demand that we optimize the
capabilities of distributed network systems. We must improve on
our ability to manage data of all security levels over common
public-switched networks. In this context, the DoD Multi-Level
Information System Security Initiative (MISSI), which is linked
to enhancements in commercial technology, shows great promise in
evolving our security solutions.
Finally, it is essential that the USCENTCOM Joint
Intelligence Center planned growth through FY97 be fully
supported for us to meet the full range of intelligence
requirements for warfighting and the overall DoD Intelligence
Production Program.
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779
Enhancements to Airborne Reconnaissance
USCENTCOM's ability to continuously monitor and assess
threat activities is an essential element of early warning of
impending conflict. While space-based systems are crucial to
this effort, not all needs can be met with satellite systems.
Consequently, they must be augmented by airborne reconnaissance
systems that are responsive to the needs of the theater
commander. Such assets offer a near real-time snapshot of
events, when combined with sound analysis and effective
dissemination, this intelligence picture facilitates speedy
judgements concerning ambiguous and unambiguous indicators of
hostilities and identification of events having mid- and long-
term strategic significance.
WMD Protective Measures
Given the mid- and long-term nuclear, biological, and
chemical dangers, we must take action now to limit the
vulnerability of our forces. This includes funding for and
stockpiling of upgraded protective clothing, antidotes and
vaccines, medical supplies, and monitoring and detection
equipment.
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International Military Education and Foreign Military Financing
The U.S. has benefited enormously from inyestments made over
the years in the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). These
programs haye provided the U.S. govermnent opportunities to
assist friendly states in meeting legitimate self-defense needs,
gain access, deter conflict, and promote stability and democratic
ideals. By promoting respect for human rights, civilian control
of the military, and democratic ideals, while enhancing self-
defense capabilities, we reduce instability that produces
regional conflicts and the associated need to commit forces to
protect U.S. national interests in the future.
COHCLUSIOW
The United States is at an historic crossroads where it has
the chance to reshape the shifting strategic landscape in the
Central Region and end the bloody cycle of war and misery.
Americans must remain resolute in confronting opponents of
stability and spoilers of peace.
We at Central Command stand ready to meet these challenges.
Since the end of the 1991 Gulf War, we have experienced
remarkable success in securing the nation's vital interests in
the Central Region, while progressing toward realization of long-
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term regional aims. We pay tribute to the magnificent work of
our service men and women. Time and again, they have overcome
adversity to achieve first-rate results, conducting combat
operations, enforcing UN resolutions, delivering humanitarian
relief, participating in combined exercises, establishing close
relations with regional friends, negotiating basing and host
nation support agreements, and devising processes and
organizations needed to implement the theater strategy in peace
and war.
Our mission and vision are clear. Success requires that
USCENTCOM be a flexible and versatile organization. We are
confident that Central Command's Five Pillar strategy and
associated activities provide a sound path for preserving U.S.
interests in this important and volatile part of the world. We
look forward to working with each of the military services.
Department of Defense, and members of Congress in the coming
months to realize our nation's goals in the Central Region.
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783
The Chairman. Thank you both and again we appreciate your
being here and your comments. You are where the action is and
that means a lot to us. Let me start off by just saying that we have
heard from the Secretaries, the Secretary himself and the service
Secretaries. We have heard from the service Chiefs, we have heard
from JROC yesterday, and all of this trying to come to some kind
of a conclusion as to what kind of a budget we will have this year
for our defenses.
In that connection, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently
came out with his program assessment wherein I suppose, based
on the information he had gathered and we verified yesterday and
the other times, too, from the service Chiefs and JROC and all the
people involved, that we should increase the level of our procure-
ment to $60 billion annually by the year 1998 to risk, as he said,
quote, avert risk future combat readiness, unquote.
In spite of these recommendations, of course, the budget pre-
sented to us by the administration postpones at least until the year
2001, and we have been hearing lately about the possibility of force
structure cuts to help arrive at this figure in the future. The dif-
ference, I guess you might say in the procurement numbers in that
$60 billion and the administration's, the difference would be about
$15 billion. If the force structure were used as a bill payer, I guess,
to close this difference, end strength would have to be reduced by
several 100,000 people.
I want to ask you a hypothetical baseline question on the esti-
mated force structure cut of one armored division, one carrier bat-
tle group, and two tactical fighter wings in order to make up the
procurement shortfalls. If that were done, what would be the im-
pact of such a cut on your ability to carry out your assigned na-
tional security mission? No. 1, and if you had to abide by such a
cut, what political or military requirements or commitments would
you have to recommend that we abandon? If you can help me with
that I would appreciate it.
General Joulwan. Go ahead.
General Peay. I strongly believe that our military is too small.
I think many times, and I will come to the specifics of your ques-
tion, sir, but I think many times we have a tendency to look at a
number of divisions, a number of air wings, carriers, and I don't
look at it that way. Perhaps I have my old service vice hat on or
something, but I think it is a case of understanding the richness
of the organization, the robustness of the organization that
undergirds all of that. And in my mind it starts with our training
institutions and our sustainment institutions.
So if you are going to have a force that our country put in the
desert 5 years ago that this committee certainly knows started 15
and 20 years ago when all of us were young captains and majors,
it starts in that training, that rich training institution. So if you
keep a certain number of divisions it is then going to be cut in the
training institution, and I am out of my lane, but my sense is as
I go around and talk to a lot of youngsters today, that instead of
perhaps simple things as having two instructors on a platform,
today you may only have one, and instead of that being a major
you may have a captain.
38-160 97-27
784
And so you start to peel away at the base that develops people
and it is also the mobilization base of your school system that
quickly, even though many things have changed, gives you the in-
surance policy if you get yourself in a major China kind of a prob-
lem or something like that down the road where our entire country
has to be mobilized, understanding that today is more of a short
war approach than a longer kind of approach to the fight.
So if you are going to grow youngsters that can sit at the table
like this today, you have to expose them to a series of experiences,
lots of time in troop units, lots of time on high level staffs, joint
staffs, and |ots of time teaching in our educational institutions.
And when you get this small, you don't have an organization like
that.
So if an IBM or an AT&T is a rich dominant organization today,
it is because it has some size to it, it is highly educated, it is tech-
nological, and it is reaching to the future. Somewhere along the
line something has to give. So I like to look at that piece of it and
then I come and tell you that you are too small on the divisional
side and 10 divisions is the minimum that we need to do.
Now, because of classification, let me talk around some things
and I will be very happy to provide it for the record. We have all
testified last year and the year before when we were here to the
two MRC need. The enhancers. And so the answer to your question
is it slides to the right. So somewhere along the line when you slide
things to the right you get at risk. It is risk. And the open point
is when it hits you earlier, then comes the risk in casualties be-
cause you don't close with the right type of force, with the right ap-
plication, and so the prosecution of your battle just takes longer to
do.
We are going to win it. There is no one here that is going to beat
us in the central region. At the end of the day we will win it, and
win it convincingly. It is how long you want to do it and what are
the casualties associated with that as you close your force and pros-
ecute the war. I think 10 divisions is the minimum we need, and
if it is a 2 MRC, we start to mix various formations of those 10
divisions to properly execute it. And I think I had probably better
leave it at that.
When the carrier is out in the gulf today — Vigilant Warrior, in
October 1994 — that is when Saddam came at us. The same thing
happened in August 1995 with Vigilant Sentinel. He reads the sig-
nals. He understands when we are not present. And forward pres-
ence gives you that kind of deterrence in those five pillars I tried
to lay out for you.
And, finally, I would just conclude and tell you that the threat
continues to change. When I testified before you last year, I laid
out one piece of the threat. I certainly think this audience knows
how that threat has changed over the past 12 months.
So I think if we are going to be the dominant leader in the world
for our youngsters in the future, we have to have rich organizations
that are made up of fighting forces, schooled forces and
sustainment forces that can be provided to CINC's so that they can
prosecute the fight.
785
General Joulwan. Let me just add, if I can, Mr. Chairman, some
comments to what General Peay has already commented on on
your question.
I think we need a balance in the force. You talked about procure-
ment. We have talked about leader development. We also have to
understand force structure, and as a forward deployed CINC I
worry about that every day. We have, as I said, the highest
OPTEMPO that I can remember in 35 years of going back and
forth to Europe. We started 10 years ago with 350,000. We are
down to 100,000. The OPTEMPO has continued. The requirements
have continued.
I think we must find a way to continue to have a technological
edge in what we need to do with first class weapon systems for our
troops as well as good, solid education and training, as well as an
adequate force structure. And if not, when we talk not just about
two MRC but also, say, six lesser regional contingencies, we start
meeting ourselves coming and going.
I was one that was fighting for 12 divisions. If we go below 10,
I think we will be putting ourselves at risk. So I think we need to
have this balance, and we are trying to work with the JROC and
others in order to develop that balance, but I would think, to use
your one division, one carrier, and two wings would, at least as far
as Europe is concerned, I think, put us at an unacceptable risk.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Just one folio wup question. I asked yesterday of the JROC folks
and others, too, I have asked, it is going around the town that one
of the best ways to cut back on force structure as a bill payer is
to abandon the two-MRC strategy. I would like to have your
thoughts on that.
Do you think it is a good strategy, a two MRC, or can we do it
with a lesser type strategy?
General Peay. Let me start off. If I can just echo his words, I
firmly believe in two MRC's. The dynamic that has changed, I don't
know if it is six, seven, eight, or nine LRC's.
I will take my region.
Sir, we start on the Far East with tensions between Pakistan
and India. The Director of the CIA will tell you that he thinks that
is the most explosive point along that hne of control as we try to,
in mil-to-mil relationships and other relationships, contain two
forces that want to field increasing missiles and their own form of
growth in the nuclear military field. An explosive front among two
nations with great hatreds that have existed over time.
I might parenthetically add to that I think we somewhat impact
on that because of our mil-to-mil relationships. I mentioned the
chief of Pakistan in my earlier comments and the way that we re-
late to him. But you move from that and move to the West and you
clearly have a much more aggressive Iran, that we can talk in
greater detail about. You have Iraq, which is the near-term threat
that could attack Kuwait tomorrow morning because of the enor-
mous hatred that exist between that irrational leader and the Ku-
waiti leadership. And then you move to the peace process that
splits our particular areas of responsibility along the seam.
The impact that those gulf countries have, which I think has
been very, very positive on the peace prospect today, that is so im-
786
portant to our country. And then on down the western side, prob-
lems of Egypt that is so important to us that is going through in-
ternal challenges. The gateway into the central region and the sta-
bility on the north-south road through the African countries down
our left hand, or the eastern side of Africa that provide ports for
access into the central region as well as providing for some stability
into the tough problems that face the central part of Africa in
terms of the way that we militarily handle those problems, and
continue to contain terrorism that reaches from Iran to training in
Sudan to export to Europe and the United States of America.
So I think I have just described a major MRC and maybe three
or four LRC's on top of the strategy that we designed sometime
ago. So I don't want to be a general that is up here beating the
desk. I don't think that is my style. But I do think that the tenor
of our times over the last 12 to 14 to 15 months may be a little
bit more serious than what it was when we developed that two-
MRC strategy several years ago.
General Joulwan. We are, Mr. Chairman, I think, involved in
how do you structure a force for a high-end contingency and then
what is the day-to-day world that you live in. And I think you must
accommodate a spectrum of conflict, as I said in my opening re-
marks. We have to figure out how to engage now in order to say
deter or prevent an MRC. We have to say we will not fight, I don't
think, an MRC alone. How do we develop relationships with allies
for access to bases for forces to fight with us? All of that is what
we have to do in peacetime. That is what I call peacetime engage-
ment. We cannot run away from that. And that takes some forces
and it takes tailoring of forces.
We have a different requirement when we talk about Central
and Eastern Europe than we do, say, with Africa. And we have to
be able to tailor forces to do that, but influence I think is going to
be very important, and if we are trying to prevent conflict or pre-
vent crisis from erupting into conflict we have to stay engaged.
So the lesser regional contingencies, the engagement strategy we
have in peacetime, very important. We need a flexible force, we
need a force we can tailor, and that is what forward deployed
CINC's do. That is what CINC's do. We need the flexibility to task
organize to mission, whatever mission we are given.
The Chairman. Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
These last exchanges certainly stimulate my desire to raise a
number of questions. Let me resist that temptation at this particu-
lar moment since I have had an opportunity to make a few opening
remarks and pose some general questions and allow some of my
junior members to engage the witnesses and I will come back a lit-
tle later in the process. That includes Sonny Montgomery as a jun-
ior member.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you.
The Chairman. Total force Montgomery we call him.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, could you tell us a little bit about how you view in
the overall mix of things, and I think you painted an excellent pic-
ture with respect to your respective areas of concern, could you de-
787
scribe to us a little bit where you put the emerging missile threat,
including both slow ballistic missiles and some of the more capable,
faster ballistic missiles that are being developed and what your
thoughts are about how we should react to protect our troops in
theater and our interests?
General JOULWAN. Let me, if I can, start on that. We think it is
a very viable threat and I think we need to address it. Theater mis-
sile defense for the European Command has a very high priority.
It also has a very high priority. Congressman, for NATO, and I
think we have a way to work with NATO in trying to look at the
long-range development of theater missile defense. It is part of the
counterproliferation initiative that NATO is undertaking.
EUCOM is in a very important advanced concept technology de-
velopment with the Department of Defense, and my goal is to try
to look at how do you go after the shooter, not just wait for the
missile to be in the air? How do you go after the shooter? And we
are conducting, in fact, at Fort Bliss this month some tests on that.
We have developed at Ramstead, in my air component, an air op-
erations center that is now deployable that combines offense and
defense inside of it, that has Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines
embedded in it, and one of the requirements I have given them is
how to go after the shooter. Let us not wait until the missile is in
the air.
So that requires a lot of intelligence fusion and testing of sys-
tems, but we are making progress. We have something called the
MEADS, the medium extended air defense system. Our allies are
picking up 50 percent of the cost of that development. So we think
it is very important. Protection of the force is very important in the
future from rogue elements that have this capability that I think
can threaten us.
Intelligence and early intelligence is extremely important and we
are working that right now. So we are fully in support of theater
missile defense.
Mr. Hunter. Just one followup on that before we go to General
Peay. Do you have the ability now to shoot down Scud-C's fairly ef-
fectively; to defend your troops in theater against Scud-C's?
General JoULWAN. Primarily, it is, to be candid, that is at the
worst end. You don't want to shoot it at the terminal end, you want
to shoot it at the midcourse, or what I like to do is go after it before
it launches.
Mr. Hunter. I agree with all those like-tos. My question is if
they fired some today, could you stop them.
General Joulwan. Only right now in the terminal phase.
Mr. Hunter. Can you stop them fairly effectively in the terminal
phase?
General Joulwan. I think so, fairly effectively. We also have
some systems we are working to go after the shooter. I would like
to privately tell you about some of those.
Mr. Hunter. Be happy to listen to them.
The faster missiles that are being developed, we know Korea is
selling ballistic missiles as fast as it produces them to any client
that wants to buy and pay hard money for them. They are develop-
ing in the Taepo Dong 2 missile a faster ballistic missile.
788
Now, General O'Neill told us that none of the theater systems we
are building now can shoot down that fast missile as it is projected
to be — its IOC is just a couple of years away according to our intel-
ligence estimates. Have you made any analysis as to what you are
going to do to handle that missile if it is fired at troops in theater?
General JOULWAN. I will have to get back to you with all the de-
tails on it, but some of the work we are doing is in line with trying
to get fast missiles. But again, I think we also should put some
work on how do we try to get it before it launches, which I think
is going to be very important.
Mr. Hunter. And I would love to talk to you about that. General
Peay.
General Peay. I think, sir, as you look at our theater, you have
the proliferation problem specifically in Iran today that is procur-
ing missiles from China and North Korea and the former Soviet
Union and maybe some others. Simultaneously with that, they are
procuring, whether it be small Chinese patrol boats or whether the
entire business of nuclear peacetime energy supposedly as it mod-
ernizes its economy, the advent of its scientists from the former So-
viet Union to work in these facilities that are right next door to
military industrial complexes. So you have education and indus-
trial pieces merging together very quickly that saves time. So you
have this dynamic of a lot of this coming together that I think
starts to close the time period that we are dealing with here.
I suspect one way you try to get at this thing is diplomatically,
to put some kind of a proliferation treaty in place, but our history
has not necessarily been that good. And, again, I am not confident
with the kinds of rogue leaders and other nation states that in our
region that we are dealing with that we don't have those kind of
communication doors to be able to do that. Although I do think we
should press in that regard with some vigor.
I have always tried to look at the defense piece of this in addition
to the offensive piece, which I certainly agree with General
Joulwan on, that has some high technology for the future. But at
the end of the day there has to be, it seems to me, an insurance
policy that lays over our troops, and I am talking the TMD piece
and I don't know that much about the NMD piece, I have not stud-
ied that recently, but I suspect the philosophy is the same. I think
it is four layered.
You want something that is upper tier. You cannot put it just in
one service, to which we just last week had the Nimitz sail out of
the gulf and go over towards the Taiwan Gulf. If we had been in
a conflict like that, if you had that upper tier just on that particu-
lar platform, what have you got then for the forces on the ground?
So I believe, and I have felt this all through this whole roles and
missions fight, that we have to have complimentary capabilities of
organizations for flexibility. So upper tier on ground and upper tier
at sea. Lower tier at sea to protect our ships that are going to be
increasingly under these fast-moving cruise kind of capabilities.
I think Admiral Redd was back in town last week and talked
about the 802 missile and what we are seeing right now on the gulf
waters. But, at the same time, we need in addition to bringing on
the PAC-3 quickly, because that gives us what appears to be a
near-term approach at this problem that we can bring on the other
789
more sophisticated systems, we need a lower tier capability for
fast-moving Army and Marine Forces that are at enormous dis-
tances.
I find it hard to understand in the fog of war, even with the best
technology, how we are going to link up the missile protection at
800-850 miles inward. Remember during the gulf war when we
had a shimal come through there in 2 of the 4 days of that fight?
How do youngsters get a short-range air defense capability of a
threat that may be no more than 30 clicks in front of it in those
kind of fog and friction parts of the war?
And then, finally, you need a C-squared system that fits over top
of all that that helps you get at attacking the thing early but al-
lows you to bring quickly the best of those three or four systems
together as you attack the threat.
Now, the challenge to all this is expensive, and I certainly under-
stand that. I do believe as we look to the future, though, with the
threats that are in our region, I think missile defense is the big
part of it, and I show on my integrated priority list that I submit-
ted to the Chairman as TMD as my No. 2 requirement. I put No.
1, prepositioned equipment, which is important to force closure be-
cause that is deterrence, but No. 2, I had air defense on my IPL.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Montgomery.
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate Mr. Dellums referring to me as a junior member. I
have only been here 30 years, but it is fine with me. I want to con-
gratulate Mr. Dellums for winning his primary election of the
Ninth District of California. He won by 85.1 percent of votes. He
will be back next year. Congratulations.
I have just two questions and brief answers, if I can. My time
is limited to less than 5 minutes. The JSTARS has done a tremen-
dous job in support of Operation Joint Endeavor. I understand that
you are bringing the JSTARS back to the United States at the end
of the month.
My question, General Joulwan, is how urgent is the requirement
for a NATO ground surveillance system, and, most importantly,
when will NATO have its own air-to-ground surveillance system
like the AWAC's for airborne early warning?
General Joulwan. JSTARS is returning the end of this month.
It has done a superb job in Bosnia. We have tried to get NATO offi-
cials on board so they could see it.
That issue for a ground surveillance system is being debated
right now. I think there is favorable disposition toward it, and I
would hope that in the near future we will get NATO to buy into
a JSTARS sort of system.
There are other competitors for it, not just the U.S. system.
There is a British system and a French system as well, but I really
think that NATO needs a ground surveillance system. They have
identified the requirement and now they need to make a decision
and I would expect that decision this year.
Mr. Montgomery. In other words, they will have to figure out
some way to get a replacement for JSTARS and you are bringing
ours home.
790
General JOULWAN. The Bosnian commitment was only for a cer-
tain period of time, sir. And that was allocated to me through the
end of March. That was a U.S. decision, not a NATO decision.
The NATO decision to procure a ground surveillance system is
under debate right now. The requirement has been established by
the military. The political authorities need to make that decision,
which I hope will be made this year.
Mr. Montgomery. OK. My next question to both our CINCPAC
commanders, you have done a really good job in both mentioning
today your using of the Reserves. Mainly, you are using the combat
support and combat service support. Over 50 percent of the infan-
try are combat units in total force and Army National Guard.
My comment and question is, I wish you would use these — ^you
are using the Air Guard and Air Reserve in combat, but you cer-
tainly need to move some of these combat units over. Let's try it.
Let's see if you can get them there, if they will work, if they can
do the job. We have spent a lot of money on combat and they have
more infantry battalions than you have in the active but you are
not moving them anywhere.
General JoULWAN. I agree, sir, and I must tell you that I had all
the adjutant generals at EUCOM a few weeks ago. We discussed
this very problem. And I assure you we are looking for ways to em-
ploy the combat force of the Guard, and one area that we can do
that, for example, is in Macedonia, and we are looking at that op-
tion.
Mr. Montgomery. Well, thank you. You can move a brigade in
before you move the first armored out, where you have them. You
are going to have to use them in a big war and so why not test
them first, General Peay?
General Peay. We will use them in our war plan. We are going
to use them.
In peacetime I have — I am the smallest forward deployed CINC,
I guess in terms of forces. I have 20,000 on a good day; 10,000,
maybe 9,500 is what my average strength is over there day-to-day.
It is not really combat kinds of things. I don't use them in that re-
gard. We can certainly look at properly using some of those during
peacetime if they can afford to go over there on rotations for ex-
tended periods of time. Airlift is expensive to do that. But let me
assure you that in our war plan, they are used, combat Guard is
used.
Mr. Montgomery. But you just said yourself earlier that you
need education; you need not reduce forces, you need to train them
as much as possible. And that is my comment. And the Red Sea —
I guess the Sinai Desert which is under your command
General Peay. No, that piece is not in my command.
Mr. Montgomery. But you have some reservists.
General Peay. Yes, sir, the Army moved as part of the Sinai
force — used the Guard and Reserve I believe effectively in that par-
ticular mission.
Mr. Montgomery. Whose command is that? I have your map
here.
General Peay. That force reports directly back to the Chairman
of Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is a U.N. kind of a force. It does not re-
port through Central Command.
791
Mr. Montgomery. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Bateman.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly thank
our two CINC's who are with us today. Your testimony is I think
extremely helpful to the committee in making some more difficult
judgments that we will have to make to try to see to it that the
fiscal year 1997 budget is something that is much more adequate
to our country's defense requirements.
You don't really need to answer this in the context of a question,
but as I observed yesterday when JROC was before us, there is
something that is defective in that remarkable but valid process of
venturing what our defense requirements are when you go through
the process and then at the end of the day get a budget submission
that is woefully below what the process would have dictated should
have come out at the end of the pipe. That is above your and my
pay grade, but we in the Congress hope to rectify some of that mis-
take.
General Joulwan, I would like to inquire about the current state
of thinking and planning as to the redeployment or withdrawal of
American forces from Bosnia. Do we have any likelihood of any
substantial American ground forces remaining there after Decem-
ber 20 of this year?
General Joulwan. Sir, my instructions are very clear from the
North Atlantic Council. One year is the commitment. That includes
U.S. forces. I have made it very clear that is mission completion
at the end of 1 year. There may be a few weeks afterwards to get
residual forces out, but that is the plan right now.
I am trying to get focused on what we can do in the next 9
months rather than what are we going to do a year from now. I
think we have had extraordinarily good success in the first nearly
100 days now, today is D plus 99, and I think we need to focus on
what we can do in the next 8 or 9 months, and we are doing that.
If we can get the former warring factions now, we have them
moved back 4 kilometers. We now are at a separation of 10 kilo-
meters, along a thousand kilometer confrontation line. If in the
next 20 to 30 days we can get the forces to move back into des-
ignated containment areas, then we will have opened up the coun-
try for the civilian agencies to operate. And that is our goal.
If that can happen, that will have influence on what we are going
to do for the next 9 months and probably will influence the inter-
national community on what we are going to do a year from now.
But my instructions in my U.S. hat, the force is out in a year. It
is also my instructions in my NATO hat.
Mr. Bateman. If I might follow up on that, I will make the state-
ment at the outset that the performance of our forces has been re-
markable in terms of accomplishing the very strictly and rather
narrow military mission they were sent there to do. But when you
look at the Dayton agreement and its assumption of a multiethnic
Bosnia, what has happened in fact in terms of the attitude of the
people and their dispositions toward one another, especially as you
look at those suburbs of Sarajevo, I see little or no grounds for opti-
mism that the Dayton accord multiethnic Bosnia is going to be a
reality.
792
Suppose we have a scenario where it is clear that there will be
a resumption of conflict after the end of a year without the pres-
ence of some residual forces?
I take it from your answer that not only is it presently antici-
pated that all of our forces will be withdrawn but all of the NATO
and other forces will be withdrawn. It would seem to me common
sense that while we would have honored every commitment that
the United States should have ever made very fulsomely with what
we have already done at the end of the year, that maybe our NATO
allies and others, in whose backyard this conflict represents a very
considerable threat to their peace, stability, and security, that they
might well continue with some logistical support from us perhaps
to maintain at least some military presence there to continue a sta-
bilization for a longer period of time than it appears it is going to
require.
General Joulwan. I really think that debate, sir, is going to take
place. How the force will be structured after a year I think will
take place, and my instructions are from the Secretary General
that we wait until after D plus 120. We want to break the spring
offensive cycle. They have had a spring offensive every year for 4
years.
If I can refer, Mr. Chairman, to this last chart, the one I have
given you, there are some who think that the military tasks have
been somewhat easy and narrow. I can assure you they have been
very difficult ones.
This shows what we have tried to do by D plus 30. We separated
that inner gray line 4 kilometers. The next one shows the 10 kilo-
meter line, and those blue dots show where we think the force has
already started to move back, if we can break the spring offensive.
If not, we are in a whole different operation. But if we can do that,
then by D plus 270, which is August-September, free elections can
be held. That will influence greatly what I think the international
community will do in the future, how we need to structure the
force. We have a peace enforcement here now; do we need some
other sort of structure to allow the civilian agencies to go in? All
that analysis has yet to be done.
I have urged not to do that prematurely because if you start talk-
ing about a follow-on force, much of the momentum and you have
to have this momentum for peace, will dry up, in my opinion. So
I am urging that you let me complete the military task, let us gear
up the civilian side, and let's see if we can create freedom of move-
ment throughout this whole country that has been at war for 4
years.
I am not sure it will in the long run work, but I think we need
to give it a try. It might be interesting that in the Sarajevo sub-
urbs, 11,000 Serbs remained even at the pressure from the Serbs
improperly telling them to leave. We are having them trickle back
now. We are trying to get electricity and water and other things
turned on through the civilian agencies while we provide this se-
cure environment.
It is a very difficult, complex mission for the NATO military and
the U.S. military. So far we have been, I think, very successful in
providing that secure environment. If we can open up this country
to let reconstruction begin, to allow refugees to return by providing
793
a secure environment with roads that are open and clear of mines,
80 percent now of the roads in Bosnia have been opened by the
IFOR force. We hope to have 100 percent open by D plus 120, by
about April 18. That is our goal. It is very complex.
That is the military mission. We are now trying to integrate that
in with the civilian mission. Then we will do an assessment to say,
where do we go from there, and that will determine, I think, by the
international community what sort of force, if any, we will have
after a year.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, gentleman.
Mr. Skelton.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is a real thrill to welcome you two gentlemen, outstanding
military leaders. We appreciate your advice and testimony.
General Peay, you spoke of our military being too small. You
spoke of the necessity for education, leader development, and, as
you know, last year this committee put a floor on the services and
insofar as Army is concerned we put a floor of 495,000. There was
testimony earlier this year from the civilian side that there is a
possibility of the Army going down to 475,000 and a comparable
drop in the Air Force. I would appreciate your thoughts on that
proposal.
General Peay. Well, sir, a little redundantly, but my rec-
ommendation to the Secretary and to the Chief of Staff of the Army
would be not to take the Army or the Air Force down any further.
I think it is a combination of things now that are difficult to meas-
ure. There are dynamics internally to the structure that you just
need today when you just do the kinds of things we are doing
today, and I think the future is going to be more demanding.
When you handle the missions today and you want to grow a
force that is the demonstrated leader in our world today that can
do the kinds of things you did during Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, then you have to have a certain amount of size and a cer-
tain amount of richness to it. And that is the force again that is
very educated, time for leaders to study. That is the force that has
ample time to serve in troop units so that our soldiers today can,
in their later years, can operate as diplomats as well as warriors.
And it seems to me that that is the thing we bring to the plate that
many other armed forces do not.
I can tell you in my 35 years of experience, and we have been
up and down four times now since I have been in uniform, that I
strongly believe today it should not get any smaller. And in fact,
and I recognize that is not possible, but I would even like to see
it larger. But I would recommend that this even out now and let
us get that very clear to our youngsters and let us get this organi-
zation fixed from top to bottom so it is first rate.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
General Joulwan, there was a recent article in the New York
Times about several people, international as well as American, urg-
ing that the United States and NATO forces be kept in Bosnia past
the 1-year limit.
I also note in addition to the push to do that, the expansion of
the military assignments of American and NATO peacekeepers
794
being diverted from their original mission to the task of rebuilding
Bosnia. I also note that many Iranians and Mujahedin are still in
Muslim Bosnia. And also I understand that there is, according to
the news reports that there is a real problem, a cornerstone of the
Dayton agreement, the continuance of the Muslim-Croat Federa-
tion appears to be crumbling.
All of these three things, four things, could well cause us to be
tempted to stay in Bosnia past Christmas. I would appreciate your
thoughts on that, sir.
General JOULWAN. Yes, sir, I think I tried to address that
many — the analysis that is being done on what the international
community is going to do in 1 year, that that is going on. I have
asked that to be on the military side to let's see where we are at
D plus 120 and the North Atlantic Council will take that up after
that time.
On the task that we have within the IFOR force, when we laid
the phasing out, phase I was the preparatory phase and the put-
ting in the logistics base in order to allow us to deploy it. Phase
II was the deployment of the force. And we did that by D plus 60;
60,000 forces on the ground. Phase III is implementation. And
there what we are doing is trying to really have freedom of move-
ment and that means opening up the country; that checkpoints and
barriers and observation posts and police checkpoints, all of that
are taken out.
Between phase III and phase IV it is called the transition to
peace, where we work with the high representative. Part of the
mission is freedom of movement. Part of the mission is how to open
these roads. So within our capabilities on a case-by-case basis we
will be providing, where we can, clearing of the roads. It helps our
movement of the IFOR as well as civilian agencies. That is part of
the mission. That is not an add-on mission.
I have said we will not guard graves or dig up graves or chase
after criminals. That we don't think is part of the mission. But in
trying to facilitate how to take this military peace and how to bring
the needed civilian side on, we can be very successful in what I just
described and not be successful in Bosnia. If the civilian side does
not kick in, I think we will not be successful.
So how do we do that? We have about 400 civil affairs from sev-
eral countries; 320 are from the United States. They have been
there since December 20. They are facilitating this work with the
High Commissioner for Refugees, with the International Commit-
tee on Red Cross, and with 120 nongovernmental organizations.
This reserve organization is doing that and they are doing an excel-
lent job. They are going to the nongovernmental organizations for
assets — engineers, medical, construction — not just to the military.
So we will balance all of that. So I don't see the dreaded mission
creep in what we are doing. At least I am going to try to prevent
that. But we need to find a way to work with these agencies. We
have to have a visualization of the refugees coming back in so they
don't run into the mine fields. We have to give them information
and intelligence sometimes, and we are doing that. That, to me, is
part of the mission, and that is how we have tried to structure this
whole year we are going to be there.
I
795
Finally, on the Federation, you are absolutely right, it is key. It
is clearly a political issue more than a military one. I think there
has to be pressure from not only the international community but
cooperation between the two ethnic groups, the Croats and the
Muslims to make it work.
We are trying to do much of that, trying to facilitate that in what
we call joint military commission meetings where all three former
warring factions show up and we talk about the issues. There is
also a joint civilian commission that does the same thing with civil-
ian agencies.
But you are absolutely right, it is fragile. I think the jury is still
out. We have to keep working at it. We are just 3 months into this.
We have 9 months to go and I think the Federation is key to suc-
cess.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Saxton.
Mr. Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I appreciate very much your being here with us this
morning, and it goes without saying that I have tremendous re-
spect for what you and all the folks that work for you do. I particu-
larly appreciate the forthcoming remarks that you have made this
morning relative to some things.
I would like to followup on what Chairman Spence and Mr. Hun-
ter talked about, the big picture with regard to our defense posture,
and I would like to do so with the help of a gentleman by the name
of Harry Summers.
It says here — actually this was published in today's Washington
Times. It says, Harry Summers is a retired U.S. Army colonel. He
is a distinguished fellow at the Army War College and a nationally
syndicated columnist.
I want to share part of what he wrote that was published this
morning with you. He says, "Don't kid ourselves." He goes on to
say, "In March 1923, then Maj. George C. Marshall, fresh from the
battlefields of the Western Front, commented on the American pro-
clivity to kid itself about the realities of military preparedness.
Tracing the histories of the American Revolution, the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection, and
World War I, Marshall noted that in a few months after a war's
end the Government ran away from the tragedies of the war and
the reasons therefore. Forgetting almost immediately the bitter les-
sons of unpreparedness, they demanded and secured the reduction
of the Army. The astonishing fact back then was that we continued
to follow the regular cycle of doing and undoing of measures for our
national defense."
The cycle repeated itself in World War II and again in the Ko-
rean war, and now in the wake of the cold war it is upon us once
more.
The most glaring example, he goes on to say, is the current win-
win military strategy in which the President says we can fight and
win two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously. At
best, he says, we have the win-hold capability, and even that, he
says, is questionable if funding does not improve.
Proof positive the United States is spending too much on de-
fenses, say the critics, is that America now shells out more on de-
796
fense than all of our NATO allies, Japan, Israel, and South Korea
combined. But he says it proves exactly the opposite. We are spend-
ing what we are precisely because our allies are spending less.
And the situation elsewhere in NATO is no better. Only 7 years
ago, he says, British military historian John Keegan reported that
Europe was awash in combat units. Now they are so thin on the
ground that the governments can scarcely meet their military com-
mitments. And the situation is getting worse.
He concludes by saying our troops are under great strain. Since
the end of the cold war, defenses have been cut by 35 percent, yet
deployments have increased fivefold. He concludes by saying, we
are kidding ourselves if we think this mismatch can be sustained.
If you would like to comment, I would appreciate it. Make me
feel better.
General Peay. Well, let me start. I think that is sort of what I
have been trying to say today about flexible organizations, flexible
professional officers and noncommissioned officers that can handle
these kinds of challenges in the future under the rubric of some
size.
Now, in the central region, the allies, our allies, our friends, even
though we don't have formal agreements like in NATO, and that
is a key piece of this business, many defense cooperation agree-
ments, many friendships that we deal day-to-day on, everything is
on a personal relationship.
Our allies are contributing, but they are not contributing in the
standard ways that we measure in military forces: Enormous FMS
sales; enormous commercial sales; spending money for oil for Korea
as part of trying to handle the nuclear payoff problem that we had
there less than a year ago. Moneys for Bosnia come out of the
central region of some of the allies. Trying to provide us in some
cases assistance in kind, money for military construction for our
prepositioned gear, and that kind of a thing. They don't have the
capability to provide equal forces, and so if we look at this thing,
we tend to measure it that they are not contributing and so it falls
back on us.
I don't think over the 20-, 25-year period with some exceptions
that you are going to find in the Gulf region, really, really profes-
sional forces that we will be comfortable with as picking up a big
part of the coalition. They will certainly contribute. They don't have
sustainment bases, don't have educational systems, so they are
buying a lot of procurement and it is our job to try to pull that to-
gether over a 20-, 25-year period. So it falls back on the United
States of America in terms of providing the military force for that.
But I think it has to be balanced that they are trying to contrib-
ute in a different way as you work through this tough problem.
If I may say so, sir, I think one of the hidden secrets, as we look
back over the next 25 to 30 years, as we look back at this period,
historians are probably going to ask the question, how did the U.S.
military, all services, take the enormous downsizing that it under-
went and hold it together and, oh, by the way, over the past 4 to
5 years we have been a little busy in that period of time, too, as
we have adjusted to a number of threats. I think that is a very,
very positive story.
797
I think Harry Summers, who I know personally, is close to the
point that we have to level this thing out now and try to stabilize
it and fine-tune it and look to the future.
There is an R&D piece to this thing, but you are going to have
to pay for that down the road. At some point these systems come
on; 15, 20 years from now. You have to start those programs or
bring those equipments on, too.
So respectfully, to this wonderful committee that has been so
supportive of us over all these years, I think we are at a point
now — there is no silver bullet in terms of how you have to come
at this problem.
General JOULWAN. Harry Summers is a good friend of mine. We
served together. I know him well. I think we — rather than kid our-
selves, I think we have to be very realistic about the world as it
is. Not as we sort of hope it is going to be, but how it is. Though
we are going down in our force structure; 40,000 of the 60,000
troops in Bosnia are other than United States. I think we have to
talk multinationalism for the future. How do we do that?
I have just been impressed, and I think I will tell all of you, the
stature of the United States wherever I visit in any NATO or U.S.
hat has never been higher. We have countries now in Eastern and
Central Europe who look to the United States as examples in both,
not only as a democratic system but how to build an army, for ex-
ample.
I think we need to stay engaged in all of this. We need to lever-
age our allies. We need to have access to these countries. We need
to have — we have their commitment in order to provide forces that
are trained to some standard that we can operate with and proce-
dures that we can operate with. That is what we find ourselves in
today.
I would say to what Harry is talking about that we need to say,
how do we provide for the common defense today? What is it that
we need? And I see a world where working with allies, leveraging
multinational forces is what we are going to have to be about. How
do we do that?
And a peacetime engagement strategy may not sound something
that is war fighting, but it is very important, I think, as we go
about providing for the strategy of the future. And how do we not
win and win and win and hold; how do we teeter; how do we pre-
vent a crisis from happening in the first place? That is going to
take a vision of what I think we do as a Nation where the most
credible nation in the world today is the United States of America.
Mr. Saxton. Without putting either of you on the spot, do you
agree with Harry's analysis here that questions the win-win strat-
egy, that we have a win-hold strategy at best and even that is iffy?
General JouLWAN. I think whenever we go in to something, sir,
we go in to win.
Mr. Saxton. I know we go in to win. My question is more about
our capability.
General Joulwan. I think our capabilities are such today that
whatever we would enter today, the United States would win.
The Chairman. Mr. Sisisky.
Mr. Sisisky. Thank you. And thank you, gentlemen, for being
here today. You know, you just said it. The world as it is. We for-
798
get. We think of the world in different perspectives. We think of
Desert Storm and we think of this, that, and the other. But in the
real reality, you are absolutely right, it is the world as it is.
As you know, General Joulwan, I travel a lot to Europe and meet
with our counterparts, and I came to the conclusion earlier, along
with the former chairman of this committee, believe it or not, who
doesn't believe in a lot of war, but Bosnia could be very important,
keeping the glue. I came to the conclusion that it is only the United
States that would have to lead. I have talked to the Germans, the
French, the Brits, everybody; it is only the United States that can
lead.
And I came out early that it was the right move by this Nation,
even though 82 percent of the public thought it was wrong. But it
is the end result, the world as it is.
I would like to have your perspective if we are successful, and
we don't know yet, you are right about civilians, what this could
mean for world peace forever. I mean, not forever because there is
never a forever, but, to me, that is the important part. This could
be peace in our time by the alliance of our allies, of going into
areas with the leadership of the United States. And I know that
is hard to sell to the public, and before you answer it I want to ask
some other questions.
General Peay, do you have any concern about the carrier leaving
for 5V'2 months? When we did the Bottom-Up Review, and I remem-
ber very carefully they recited the thing, that we may be void in
some places for a month or 2 months, I think it was that, but no-
body ever said 5y2 months or 6 months and leaving the Mediterra-
nean bare.
I don't know, that may be your area, come to think of it. But I
want to carry the Mediterranean because you have the Adriatic,
the Red Sea. You will go anywhere without having to steam to get
to a place in 6 or 7 days. But that is my question to you.
And I have to recite this again, because I have learned in the
years I have been here that unless we do something about it, I
mean let the Pentagon know and the administration know, that if
we don't keep repeating this something will happen. As you know,
the Pentagon is a place that leaks out information and rumors and
everything else, but I have absolutely been advised, not advised but
assured, that this is a true rumor of cutting the Army to 455,000
or 475,000.
And the only reason these Members are bringing this up. Repub-
lican as well as Democrats, is that we want to make sure that the
uniformed military keeps repeating — I am not talking about loud
in the papers — but that you keep the pressure on the administra-
tion that we cannot take these cuts, that you cannot take it, that
your OPTEMPO is so great and only you can do that.
I would be very honest with you, I don't like to interfere in
micromanaging the Pentagon, but I am prepared to put an amend-
ment into our bill this year that they cannot cut any more forces
without coming to this committee before they do it. I don't know
if that will stop it or what, but I just wanted you to know that the
members of this committee are concerned about it, and I will get
back to you again on the world as it is and I will let you go ahead
and respond.
799
General Joulwan. Thank you very much, sir, and I appreciate
those comments. I really think, having been back and forth now to
Europe for about 18 of the last 35 years, we have a unique oppor-
tunity for what we see in Bosnia to create a new security relation-
ship in Europe. When we are successful there and come out of
Bosnia in the way that I think is possible, you have taken from the
NATO allies all the way through the former Warsaw Pact and
other nations to include Russia that have worked together to bring
about peace where no one thought peace was going to be possible.
That relationship, I think, can do something that has not been pos-
sible in centuries, if not thousands, of years in Europe; a Europe
whole and free from the Atlantic to the Urals, and we have that
opportunity. I will not kid myself either to think that is going to
happen overnight, but the foundation can be laid for that debate
to take place.
NATO is key to that. NATO is as solidarity. NATO has kept the
peace in Europe for us since World War II. It can provide the
framework for this to continue.
I was in Israel just a few weeks ago. They are very much inter-
ested in the Mediterranean base initiative, where NATO is reach-
ing out to several of these nations, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
and others, to try to get this area of influence, as I would call it,
so that we can create a more stable world. All of that is possible.
To me, the United States is the leader in all of that. It is just
not resources or funding, it is leadership. And it is not only mili-
tary leadership but political and diplomatic and economic and the
rest.
But we have a unique opportunity and I think that — I hope we
can see that vision and try to pursue it. I am sort of optimistic as
we approach this, and with the support of this committee and with
the bipartisan support for foreign policy that can look to that vision
of the future, we could enter the 21st century a heck of a lot better
than we did the 20th century 100 years ago, and we are involved
in a place right now that was the beginning of World War I. And
we have an opportunity to prevent a crisis from developing into a
wider conflict. It is high risk, but I think it is worth the effort. But
the United States must lead and that is the world as it is.
The Chairman. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. Appreciate both of your
presence here and your testimony today. Each of you has said
things that lead me to believe that you feel that the future is going
to be more of what we have now with maybe some intensity.
You have made statements like the future will be more demand-
ing than today; that the tempo is likely to be increased doing the
kinds of things we are doing today. We are involved many places
with peacekeeping, with peace enforcement, with forward presence
for deterrence.
If this kind of activity is going to continue for the future, are you
both comfortable that we could add in each of your command areas
an MRC and support it adequately in addition to what is now going
on in the world?
General JouLWAN. I would address it this way. I think the
MRC's are illustrative planning scenarios that need to be ad-
dressed, but to have a certain pot of resources and you apply those
800
resources wherever the threat is, wherever you think it is nec-
essary to apply it, and then you task organize accordingly.
I think if we have— there is an MRC in the CENTCOM area. We
send forces to them as we did in the gulf. We sent from Europe,
90,000 of the force that took part in the gulf came from Europe.
I think we would do the same thing again and vice versa. If there
was a threat in Europe we would get forces from other parts of the
world.
I really think what you are dealing with is how to structure the
force in order to meet contingencies and how to manage risk. I
think we can handle an MRC if it came to that. I don't anticipate
one. I think right now, if we do it right, we can prevent an MRC
from occurring. But I think we could handle one in Europe right
now.
Mr. Bartlett. You are talking about one, I think our planning
indicated that maybe we could handle two of them.
General JOULWAN. I thought you meant in my area.
Mr. Bartlett. One in each of your areas.
General JoULWAN. I think we could handle — I think what we can
do now and to be very candid, the guidance is that lesser regional
contingencies and other operations we would pull forces out of that
and commit them to the major regional contingency. That is the
guidance we are under and that is what the planning would be. We
would take forces out of lesser regional contingencies to meet those
major regional contingencies.
Mr. Bartlett. So that we could not continue what we are now
doing and also support two MRC's.
General JouLWAN. That's right.
General Peay. I think we testified last year, and I will this year,
that the two MRC strategy is hinged on these, and I think the
word has been used, "enhancers"; that is your sealift, your airlift,
your theater missile defense, your precision munitions, a certain
amount of leadership development. So it seems to me, sir, the ques-
tion is what is the time of all that?
I believe we have kind of set it at the turn of the century is when
they put the two MRC strategy on the plate. We looked to try to
have these enhancements in by the turn of the century. So the
question is will it slip to this right? I don't have visibility of that
in my current job, but just like we talked air defense earlier today,
I have been pushing for air defense for 4 years and it is not here
yet. So things keep slipping to the right.
So I think against the threats in our area, we are going to win
in our AOR. We can probably, on the two MRC piece today, we can
bring the forces together and win. The question is risk. Slipping to
the right. Eventually, gosh forbid, risk involves casualties, when
you do that kind of a thing.
I want to add on to that, if I may, sir, that just like George
Joulwan talked about this peacetime engagement, and maybe that
is one of our faults here, we are both saying the same thing but
we have different names to them, in a way. In our region, with
these threats I have described that I think are getting more sophis-
ticated, the question is what are the national interests? I laid that
out a little bit. It is much more than oil. Oil is a big part of it, not
only to our economy but Europe's economy, Japan's economy and
801
the interrelationship with our country. But it is the whole business
of the impact on the peace process. And our ability over these last
3 or 4 years to stay involved with our gulf friends has had an enor-
mous input.
Look at the turn of the last 45 days, whether it is Jordan or the
amazing things that have happened here, as these gulf countries
and others have worked back to the West in terms of the peace
process and the stability of all that. That happened through a pol-
icy of engagement. And now we look to the future with these clear
threats that are coming on us. We have simply got to stay engaged,
it seems to me, for a long period of time. Engagement takes ground
forces largely.
We are trying to come up with many initiatives that work at the
operational tempos so that it is the right mixture of the carrier, the
air expeditionary force, ground exercises so that we can cover the
spectrum, provide deterrent against a near-term threat of Iraq that
is very, very dangerous today, and the clear growing threat of Iran
that is coming on us. And the whole terrorism piece of that, it
seems to me, a strong United States of America is the best deter-
rent against that particular problem.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you very much. I know my time is up. I
gather both of you are a little uncomfortable with our present
sizing and you would be very uncomfortable if it went lower. That
is a fair statement.
General Joulwan. Yes.
General Peay. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Joulwan and
General Peay, thank you both for being here and for your lifetime
service and leadership to our country. I would just like to piggy-
back on the statements made by Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Skeleton and
Mr. Sisisky and joining them in my concern about lowering the
force structure of the Army.
We can talk about all kinds of statistics, but the story I would
like to remind my colleagues is one of a soldier I met at Fort Hood
several months ago as he was deploying to Bosnia. He had missed
the birth of his first child because he was in Desert Storm, was
about to miss the birth of his second child because of his deploy-
ment to Bosnia. He did not complain, and as a good Army soldier
he was willing to do his duty. But I think in a volunteer situation,
we have all got to recognize that the best people are not going to
put up with that year, after year, after year, and the lower the
force structure the more soldiers are going to miss the birth and
the growth and development of their children and ultimately that
is going to undermine our military readiness.
General Joulwan, I would like to ask about foreign aid and also
burdensharing. General Peay, if you want to add to this, please feel
free to do so. On foreign aid, we are in a day and age where prob-
ably the most politically popular vote just about every Member of
Congress can cast is to zero out foreign aid.
Can you discuss in terms of the European context, take Turkey,
for example, or any other examples you want to use where our for-
eign aid works hand in glove with our military needs that relate
802
to defending America's national security interests. For example, if
we were to cut off all foreign aid, how would that affect our mili-
tary presence and leadership in the world?
Second question on burdensharing, again an extremely popular
issue politically, I know you have touched on this, but if you have
any additional comments to make, if someone were to say to you
today we ought to go an extra mile in terms of requiring
burdensharing on our European allies part, how would you respond
to that? What are the downsides of a very politically popular con-
cept called burdensharing?
General JOULWAN. Two very important issues, particularly as
they apply to my theater. On the burdensharing issue, we have
seen a great deal of burden shared by our European friends for
many, many years. Germany has had for nearly 40 years 500,000
foreign forces on its soil. That is about the size of Oregon. And the
TAC's and the planes and the helicopters and they accepted all of
that. They have spent about $8 billion in terms of aid to reunite
Eastern Germany and also to get the Russians out of their country,
and they are supplying a great deal of assistance to Eastern Euro-
pean countries. Other nations are doing similar, but at a less
amount.
As I said on the burdensharing, 40 of the 60,000 forces in Bosnia
are other than United States. When I looked at Sharp Guard,
which is a commitment that we had on the embargo, 85 percent of
the ships were other than United States. They were primarily Eu-
ropean. The air operation. Deny Flight, 65 percent were other than
United States. So on the burdensharing issue, I think we have seen
our allies step up.
Could they do more? Yes. Am I concerned about where their force
structure is going? As I am concerned about our own, yes. And in
my NATO hat I have been making clear statements on force re-
quirements and force goals for the alliance. I think we have to be
very clear on that. But are they sharing the burden with us? Yes.
And are they taking risk?
In Norway they have something like 1,800 to 2,000 troops de-
ployed for peacekeeping. That is out of a population of about 4 mil-
lion. That is a tremendous effort. A country like Belgium has a bat-
talion in southeastern Slavonia, plus about a battalion in Bosnia.
That is a tremendous commitment for them. And so they are doing
more.
So we need to insist on what their force goals or requirements
should be, but there is a great deal of burdensharing going on.
They are now coming to grips with conscript versus volunteer
forces as a result of this.
On foreign aid, I really think it is essential. It allows us influ-
ence and access in areas like Turkey I think that has paid great
dividends for us as well as in Greece as well as in the Middle East
where I think it buttresses the peace that we have.
A clear part of IMET, for example, that I talked about is another
very important part of that that I think is to our benefit.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Longley.
Mr. Longley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
803
General Peay, General Joulwan, I just want to begin by again
thanking General Joulwan for I had an opportunity to spend about
5 days with your staff, and I was tremendously impressed with
their capability and the range of areas that they are monitoring,
and I note some of them are here today so I would just compliment
you again.
I want to pick up on the comment you made a minute ago rel-
ative to the balance that would need to be struck between a lesser
regional contingency and a major regional contingency. As I under-
stand the normal deplo5mient schedule, when you are constituting
a force, you have a build-up in terms of training and getting ready
for deployment, and then you conduct the deployment. But once
you have conducted a deployment, then before you can deploy again
you have not only to go through a period of training, but also a pe-
riod of maintenance and regrouping and reequipping and checking
equipment and getting things back up to standards again.
I would like to ask, and not necessarily with respect to Bosnia,
I would like to make the question a little more general. Assume
that you have a force committed in a lesser regional contingency,
what type of short or long time frames are you talking about to re-
deploy that force?
General Joulwan. We are looking at that very hard right now
and with regard to Bosnia, but also every time we deploy a force.
What we are finding, which is very interesting to me, is that what
I would call the combat support and combat service support units,
which are a very important part of the force, those forces, indeed,
are better trained. They are train up, they are going to be better —
the engineers that we have, the logistics points that we have, the
helicopter pilots, the artillery even in Bosnia is doing day-to-day
training and they are probably some of the best units trained in
the world right now. So they are trained up to go fight an MRC
or some other operation would be. In fact they are better trained
now.
We have problems when we talk about armored units and Brad-
ley units, for example, and the integration of fire, which is where
the shortfall would be. We are using now a rotational policy where
we are taking some armored units back to Hungary, for example,
and firing them in tank gunnery. So that is a way of looking at the
requirement. That would mean their train-up time would be less.
When we come out of Macedonia, we are finding that it takes about
6 weeks to get a tank unit back up ready to go.
Mr. LONGLEY. There are not tanks deployed in Macedonia.
General JoULWAN. But there is a tank unit without tanks.
Mr. LoNGLEY. Personnel.
General Joulwan. Personnel. To get them trained up. We are
putting training simulators there to keep their skills up. But we
are trying to shorten the train-up time it takes to get them to do
their primary mission again.
Mr. LONGLEY. Let me be more specific, and I recognize that ter-
minology is an art form, but if you have a unit deployed with its
equipment and it leaves an area of operations, then I am assuming
that there is some amount of time required to service the equip-
ment, replace broken parts to maintain equipment.
804
You have normal personnel rotations. You have to retrain indi-
viduals, you have to get back into unit training possibly to again
maintain those capabilities and kind of rebuild that over again
even before you can give the order to say I want you to go from
point A to point B.
My question is also asked with reference to other experiences in
Desert Storm and even in Bosnia, that it took a period of almost
6 to 8 months for us to take a force from Europe that was not ac-
tively engaged and under very clear almost peacetime conditions to
move it to CENTCOM and Saudi Arabia, and that took 6 months
without any — under the most favorable conditions that one could
imagine. It took us a minimum of 2 months to deploy the force
from Germany into Bosnia.
I guess what I am suggesting is how much more time are we
looking at if we have to take that force out of Bosnia and move it
somewhere else? Not only to exit the country and regroup, but do
a number of, complete a number of steps that we frankly were not
confronted with when we first deployed the force to begin with.
And really what I am really driving at is if there is any lesson from
the gulf war that our adversaries have derived is don't give the
United States 6 months to build up its force structure. And I am
coming right to the heart of this whole MRC strategy because the
suggestion is that we have a win-hold strategy.
I am very concerned that we have a hold-hold strategy, hold-hold
and maybe win, but at least in the short-term maybe in the long
term we are going to prevail, assuming that nothing else changes.
But it seems to me that in the short-term we have at best a hold-
hold strategy because of the requirements of redeploying and re-
training, reequipping and reply deploying that force. Comment
from either of you.
General JOULWAN. I would briefly and then let General Peay, but
for example, it depends on what force you are talking, what type
unit you are talking about. I talked about it. I think the engineer
artillery logistics units can go quickly. There may be some reform-
ing that is needed, but they can move quickly, I think.
Let me give you a real example. The 3325 infantry in Vicenza,
we pulled them out in the middle of February. I got a report this
morning that April 1 they are ready to go to be the theater reserve
again. So that is about 6 weeks of regrouping, retraining, and get-
ting ready to go again.
I did deploy some of the forces from my corps to Desert Storm
in 1990. In fact, the first unit ever deployed out of NATO was an
Apache brigade and it worked for General Peay who was the 101st
Airborne Division Commander, and it deployed in very short order.
It was there in less than 30 days and it was ready to go. It went
with all its equipment ammunition, et cetera.
We can move quite quickly. We have learned a lot of lessons from
both Desert Storm and now Bosnia. We are getting better at what
we are doing, but I don't want to downplay the fact that there is
a time lag, and that is what we have to manage. It is managing
risk that I think we are involved in right now. We have a magnifi-
cent force and the strength of our force is not only its equipment,
it is its people and that is what we have to maintain, the edge. We
have to have good quality leaders and have quality troops that we
805
need in the Ai-my, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, and I am amazed
at what they can do and how fast they can do it.
Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you. General Peay.
General Peay. Sir, I think that you have to do the mathematics
involved in some force sizing, and that is what you are getting at
and that is certainly a part of it, but I do worry and that is what
I have been trying to say most of the morning today, that I look
at these kinds of things as scenarios and not strategy. They are
force sizing scenarios, and I think it is very dangerous, although
I think you have to do some of that underpinning as you try to sort
it out.
But at the end of the day, I am very, very redundant, the reason
that these young engineers can work in the high spectrum and low
spectrum, can move from Europe — General John Abrams left me
yesterday in Camp Blanding, FL, where we were doing Internal
Look, which is a big exercise in our theater. There he is working
in Bosnia as a key leader for George Joulwan and he is working
here in my exercise Thursday and Friday at Blanning.
The reason we do that is because the youngsters have served
with considerable amount of time in battalions, considerable
amount of time in schools, and considerable amount of time on
staffs at all levels. So you will build leaders of flexibility. That is
the 25-year lead that we have on everybody today, is our leader-
ship. Our people. And so we need these divisions of certain num-
bers, and I have indicated today I think we have gone about as far
down as we should go.
The piece now is can you maintain the operational and mainte-
nance accounts and the schooling accounts that allow us to keep
sending people to these kinds of career development assignments
that can lead these very small number of 10 divisions in the future.
I think that is the challenge today that is difficult to understand,
and I recognize a lot of that is trust between us as we try to indi-
cate how thin that all is, but I can tell you that despite tremendous
work at least in the one I am familiar with, and I have been to
Maxwell and talked to their schools and I have been to a lot of the
Army's schools today, and my 35 years of intuition and sensing is
that we are not the same thing there that we were in our time.
And the problem is that bubble doesn't show up in our period. That
bubble will show up 15 years from now just like the equipment
piece shows up 15 years from now.
Mr. LONGLEY. Thanks, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Mis-
sissippi, Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the
generals for sticking around for as long as they have. And particu-
larly General Joulwan, thank you for your visit last week. It was
a real honor to visit with you. This tends to be a very nonpartisan
committee. Regardless of who is running the show we try to do
what is best for the Nation's defense.
One of the issues of contention I can see coming this year, and
I think it is a serious issue is how much money do we spend addi-
tionally on missile defense. So I am going to pose a theoretical
question to you. If by some chance the Budget Committee and the
appropriators were to give this committee an additional $7 billion,
806
much as they did last year, in your expert opinions, given the re-
sponsibiUties that you have, how much of that would you devote to-
wards additional missile defense and how much of it would you put
towards other needs, like the aging helicopter fleet, the 140's, just
beans and bullets and quality of life?
General Peay. Sir, I can't in this job — I can't answer a percent-
age, but I will give you some issues.
Mr. Taylor. Give us some guidance, general.
General Peay. Let me try to give the areas I would put it on.
Two-and-a-half, three years ago, when I was Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army, I told this committee we were $11 billion short across
the POM. I had that kind of visibility across the POM.
In this job now I don't see POM's and have a fix on those, but
I can tell you here are the areas I would go for from a central
CENTCOM perspective. The first area I had on my integrated pri-
ority list I submitted to the Chairman in second tier of defense is
prepositioned equipment. Although it is in the Military Construc-
tion Committee, I am finding great reluctance to support the con-
tinuation and completion of the Qatar brigade, and I think in terms
of force closure strategy in this very important theater I am talking
about $100 million plus, $119, $120 million to put an instrument
like a prepositioned brigade in the Middle East that ensures access,
that clearly ensures deterrent and that holds the coalition together,
because you are blending the Kuwaiti brigade with the Qatar bri-
gade with exercises, the Five Pillars I discussed.
So prepositioned equipment we need to fund that set and get be-
hind us, and, frankly, we need to then start looking at where we
would put the third one.
Mr. Taylor. Would that be land-based?
General Peay. I recommend land-based because it ensures ac-
cess. It communicates with people and keeps you involved in the
region. It is not to say our wonderful air membership and wonder-
ful Navy forces that are a key piece of that are not important, but
at the end of the day, this kind of relationship is a ground piece
particularly in that culture.
The second one I have talked about today is theater missile de-
fense, and I think we have to bring that from the right and bring
it to the left because I think the threat is coming on us.
The third one is to buy out the strategic lift because we are still
talking in the quick fashion of moving against this fellow from
Iraq. Now, let me deviate a second and say that yeah, we beat him.
He is no longer 51 divisions; he is 23 divisions. Those 23 divisions
are not like ours. Half of them are in the 80 percent category,
ready to go. The others are less, but there is a dominant military
force in the region. He stands unopposed today from Baltimore to
Richmond in terms of closing that force. That is what I go home
to sleep with every night, wondering how I am going to respond to
that 7,000 miles distance.
And the final I would put in is a parcel load of a broad sort of
things. I don't know the category of it, but it gets at the readiness
pieces of O&M, recruiting, schooling, all those things that keep a
force vibrant. So that is the way I tried to lay out — we submitted
a list of 38, and there are some NBC kinds of things and clearly
we have to get on with that. There are some fratricide kinds of is-
807
sues we need to put money against. But that has to be a service
chief integration of how he does that. Respectfully, I wish I could
help you on percentages, but I don't know how to do that.
General JOULWAN. I would again defer to the larger people, the
people that work up POM's, et cetera, but I think it is important
when we look at the future that quality of life, to me, is very im-
portant, particularly in a forward-deployed theater. How we take
care of people and their families is absolutely essential and we
need to look at that.
Mr. Taylor. General Joulwan, what I would like to know is
whether or not you are giving me your representations in the order
of importance in your opinion.
General JouLWAN. Yes. And I then would have to stabilize the
overseas presence. I think it has been stressed several times in my
theater I would stabilize that. It gives us access. It leverages our
allies. It gets us into bases, and so the clear requirement for not
only forward deployed, but forward-stationed forces, to me, are es-
sential.
I would hold the force structure and not let that drop any more.
We talked about strategic mobility. I wish you could have seen the
magnificent job done by the C-17 for a forward-deployed CINC in
the middle of winter, and it was amazing that I could leapfrog a
mechanized infantry battalion when I needed to from a forward
base in Hungary straight into Tuzla, leapfrog it over because this
requirement was there, and watch in awe as people watched the
United States move its forces around.
So strategic mobility is something we need to keep at the very
top of our list as well as the theater missile defense because I think
that is going to be the requirement of the future and we need to
do predictive analysis, not wait for the train wreck to occur. We
need to do predictive analysis and counterproliferation and theater
missile defense which, to me, are key threats that are just on the
horizon.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, if I could have one quick followup.
So in your order of priorities, if I read you right, missile defense
follows fifth.
General JouLWAN. Yes.
Mr. Taylor. On your list. And General Peay, if I follow you cor-
rectly, and again these are given $7 billion like last year it would
follow second on your list after additional prepositioned equipment.
General Peay. (Nodding in the affirmative.)
Mr. Taylor. OK. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Talent.
Mr. Talent. I thank the Chairman, and I am just going to ask
both of you to try to look in the future. I know it is hard when you
are so busy with the now.
One of my concerns, and General Peay has mentioned this a cou-
ple of times, we are making decisions now that are going to affect
what our capabilities are 5, 10, 15 years down the road, and we are
doing that in the midst of a revolution in both foreign policy and
I think maybe in military technology, maybe even a military revo-
lution akin to what went on in the interwar years. It is difficult to
determine threats and what the battlefield is going to look like.
808
But give me, from your point of view now just give me a little
bit of your view, maybe your speculation, as to how different a
threat, let's say from a Saddam Hussein is likely to be in the year
2005. May not be Saddam, may be a different part of the world,
but somebody like that. What is the difference going to be in terms
of how he is going to come after us, and what, in your view, are
we likely going to have to have ready in terms of modernization in
order to be able to meet it?
Where we all tend to think in terms of large armored attacks and
formations and linear battlefields and the rest of it, isn't it quite
likely that by then he is going to have to, or whoever that threat
is going to be is going to be threatening our forward bases in an
attempt to take away maybe the system of our foundational assets
so that we don't have a secure lodgement in the area, that sort of
thing?
Give me your idea about what the threats may be. I know we
only have 5 minutes here, but I am trying to push us into thinking
in those terms. We talk about national military strategies and two
MRC. We cannot fight two MRC now. We probably don't have to.
I don't know. We spend a lot of time and effort talking about all
those things.
Give me some of your speculation, if you will, about how different
the battlefield is going to be maybe 8 or 10 years from now and
what we are doing right and what we are doing wrong in terms of
preparing for that. In the 2V2 minutes you have left.
General Peay. Well, sir, I have to go back initially and talk en-
gagement. That is what you have heard General Joulwan say
today, and I have said it a little different way. Engagement for me
is prepositioned equipment. Engagement for me is lift and getting
back. Engagement is having the right command and control organi-
zations in the country.
I am trying hard, for instance, to get an unmanned central com-
mand headquarters in theaters. In fact, our Internal Look here just
this past week we set it up at Blanning so it mirrored what we are
trying to do in-country and plug in to get back into the fight quick-
ly.
So you have an engagement piece that, hopefully, deters the
fight. We don't want to fight. You engage, you deter through
strength. You do it through the Five Pillars in our region of provid-
ing the right security assistance, readiness to fight exercises, com-
bined exercises with the coalition, power projection to get back into
the country. That is the way we deter this thing by staying in-
volved and staying engaged, and it varies across each of the
CINC's.
Does the battlefield look any different? I think it is going to be
high to low. One of our challenges is our coalitions are at different
stages. We have to keep the coalitions along with us so our tech-
nology has to relate to that, but it can't slow us down — we also con-
tinue to move to the future.
I see in our area everything from not modern armies in the sense
of us, although you can buy this stuff today, but certainly some
robustness of armies through terrorism. So you have to fight that
spectrum. I need an hour and a half with you, sir.
809
Mr. Talent. I know I should probably have maybe a private
meeting. I am just starting to think along these lines. I mean
thinking maybe in a time of tight budgets we want to buy things
that we know we can use and that is very important to do. But
maybe it is also important to keep some balls rolling out there be-
cause we don't know what is going to be important, and we don't
want to have to invent it all overnight if all of a sudden we decide,
oh, my heavens, our forward bases are not, they are vulnerable.
So you mentioned C-17, and by the way, I know it has done an
unbelievable job. We have to have a place to land them. And maybe
if I am Saddam Hussein I am going to get regional dominance. The
Air Force didn't work. He is not going to be a chief dominance in
the traditional sense that way in the air. I am going after missiles.
I am developing precise missile technology as I can to throw as
many of them as I can at us, and we will have to have assets in
place so we can land them.
General Joulwan. If I can just quickly, and I will try to do it
in 2 minutes because I think you raise a good question, but you
have a good example here, and it is a question of foreign aid as
well. We are not just going to look at Saddam Hussein from
CENTCOM.
I have an operation called Provide Comfort that is based out of
Turkey. We have access to bases there. It is a coalition effort. The
French and the British and the Turks are with us. This is leverage.
This is the world as it is. This is the thinking that we have to do.
We cannot be in a cocoon here in the United States. We have to
lead, and it is having access to those bases, access to allies, and
being able to project power in a way that you come at them from
multiple directions. And so that is, I think, what we are going to
have to do.
How do we structure that? It is going to be a combination of dip-
lomatic and political as well as military initiatives. But I think we
are moving on the right track, but it is recognizing that we have
to build these coalitions in order to have the access we need that
can hopefully prevent the fight, but if it does occur, we can move
quickly.
Mr. Talent. And certainly we don't cut modernization budgets
any more. I am sure you would both agree with that.
General Joulwan. Yes.
Mr. Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Tanner.
Mr. Tanner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I would
like to thank both of you all. I have met both of you before and I
have great admiration for your service to our country and your
dedication and your duty. I am privileged to be here this morning
to visit with you and I thank you for being here. I will be very
brief.
General Joulwan, there has been some recent reports about the
economy in Bosnia and how that might be an impediment to what
we are trying to accomplish there, and I would like you, if you
could, to comment on how you see our role in that economy.
I read your statement in the Joint Contact Team Program, the
state partnerships, our Tennessee National Guard has been to Bul-
garia, and I would like for some assessment there and then just on
810
a personal note your observation of the Russian troops we are with
now for the first time in a long time, their training and equipment
and so forth.
And finally, we are using some Reserve and Guard components
in the Joint Endeavor, and I would ask for a comment on their
training and equipment. Is it comparable, compatible, interoper-
able? We are trying to do some things on the Guard. And for Gen-
eral Peay, I had the opportunity after the Persian Gulf war to be
in Egypt and had a talk with President Mubarak and his concern
for the future seemed to focus on the rise of the fundamentalist
movement in your area of operation and I would like, if you could,
to give us a brief assessment of where we are there, and what that
entails. Thank you.
General Joulwan. Thank you, sir. If I can comment briefly on
each one of the questions that you asked, the economy in Bosnia
is a problem. It is very difficult because on the military side we are
trying to provide the secure environment so construction and revi-
talization can begin. It is slowly starting. I was there on Monday.
I talked to the leadership. You see some factories starting to build
up, but it is going to take some time.
To do it requires this environment that I am talking about that
only the military can provide. And we hope that this year we can
see some movement in the rebuilding of that economy. There is a
great effort by the World Bank in particular that has a three-vol-
ume plan that has prioritization to it, and we hope that can start
quickly.
Mr. Tanner. Sir, am I incorrect? I am worried about this 1-year
timetable, because I think the economic recovery is as big a piece
of this, maybe as the separation of the warring hostiles, and my
frustration with this is if we leave within a year before the eco-
nomic recovery has some inertia to succeed that we are going to
waste some effort.
General Joulwan. I think that will be debated in the next sev-
eral months on if there is going to be a follow-on force, what it
should be. I think it premature to get into that right now because
I think what we need to do is keep the pressure on the civilian
agencies to continue to try to do things in the next 9 months. We
have an election coming up in August in Bosnia and I think it will
be very important that there is free access, et cetera.
Let me talk, if I can, about Reserves, because I have been very
impressed with what they are doing. We have about 4,200 in the
callup, and they are spread out not just in Bosnia, but in Germany,
Hungary, Italy, and elsewhere. They are doing absolutely superb
work.
The civil affairs battalion is the glue that is holding much of this
together. There is, for example, a liaison from the civil affairs folks
to the International Police Task Force. The leader of that is a Chi-
cago policeman with 20 years as the Chicago police chief. There is
a Ph.D. criminologist that is working with the international agen-
cies. We have economists, we have lawyers that are working on the
constitution — 15 to 20 committees are influenced by these people.
It is a heck of an effort that is being made by civil affairs and par-
ticularly the United States.
811
On Bulgaria. You might like to know that on Tuesday, right be-
fore I left to come back here, I met with the President of Bulgaria.
He came to my headquarters in Mons. He visited the partnership
coordination cell. He is very pleased with the cooperation that is
going on both with the JCTP's, with the State partnership pro-
grams, but particularly with the Partnership For Peace. And he
was asking me how would we continue to do this; how do we get
seats at the Marshall Center in Garmisch. How can you help us
transition to a democratic political society? It is an exciting time
to be in Europe, and so I am very much encouraged by all of that.
On Russian troops, I was in Moscow on Saturday. That is prob-
ably why I lost my voice. I was in Moscow Saturday, met with the
leadership there. As I said in my statement, we are running and
I never thought in 35 years I would say that, running joint patrols
with the Russians in Bosnia today. There is a good relationship.
The Russians have spent a lot of effort in sending first-class sol-
diers and leaders there. I think they want to really try to reach out
and work with us. And their camp area, their bivouac area is very
good and I think the relationship is growing.
In this one area that is led by General Nash, the U.S. division
commander, we have a Turkish brigade, a Nordic brigade that in-
cludes Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lith-
uania, and Poland in the same area with the Russian and the
American brigades. Great opportunity to build for the future. And
so I look at it not just in Bosnia, but creating, I think, a new secu-
rity arrangement for Europe.
General Peay. Sir, on Egypt, as you know, they are a big, big
participant in the Middle East peace process, have been a long-time
friend of ours, not only President Mubarak, but General Tentawi
and others in the Egyptian military hierarchy, a history of good re-
lationships. Unfortunately, their country is really hit with very
marginal growth if that, and the unemployment rate is very, very
high.
Some people just said it to be 14 to 18 percent. Cairo, you see
the millions of population that are in or out between day and night,
a teeming city. In all of that there are the economic challenges, the
aspirations for better education, good health, water, food, fuel, the
Islamic fundamentalism problem. They are very, very dependent on
us for military aid.
A lot of their old Russian Warsaw Pact equipment is now on
their last legs. The moneys that we give them are proportional
somewhat to the Israeli challenge, a key to their future years from
a military perspective. I think Islamic extremism is going to con-
tinue as long as that country's leadership can't come to grips with
the people challenges that are so important.
So in the short term, I think he is in control. Long term there
is a lot of work to be done. As I mentioned earlier, it is a key coun-
try, not only for its stability of where it sits in the region, but just
on pure military access as throughput into the greater gulf region
is essential.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Geren.
Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to join in
thanking the witnesses for their testimony and for their service.
812
General Peay, if you could follow up on Mr. Tanner's last question
in a little more detail, your area of responsibility is, I think, one
of the most little-known and little-understood parts of the world
from the perspective of most of us Americans. The internal con-
flicts, I think, defy understanding for most of us and the traditions
that we draw on to understand the world around us.
In your testimony in some of your comments today you touched
on some of the problems in each of these countries. If you could just
take the little time I have and walk through your region and per-
haps an area of priorities where you think the greatest threats to
instability come. You mentioned, Egypt the problem with Sudan-
supported internal problems, the Pakistan-India strife, Iraq, Iran.
How do you prioritize the threats and in the time that we have,
if you could just give us a little more insight into where you see
the real problems on the horizon.
General Peay. Well, the near-term threat is Iraq. Its military is
not on a par with us and we are going to whip him if he comes.
It is just he is the dominant military in that region today with an
irrational leader in charge. So you have the impact on Kuwait and
you have the impact if he gets further down before we can close
on the oil fields. Iraq is the near-term threat.
Iran is growing, has long-range aspirations of being the domi-
nant factor in the region. He exploits that not only with his growth
militarily, whether it be nuclear that he is attaining supposedly
with a peaceful view, all the way through weaponization in the gulf
waters, hegemony over some of the islands that exist there and the
frustrations that causes with a number of smaller gulf countries.
Gulf leaders will tell you they have to live in that region, but
down deep they have deep, deep concerns about Iran and the fu-
ture vis-a-vis their own defense. I mentioned the explosiveness of
Pakistan and India. I have to believe down deep that although it
is explosive, that cooler heads will prevail and we can keep the lid
on that one. A lot of that is done through personal relationships
with senior military leaders.
The Iran piece and the explosion of terrorism into Sudan, train-
ing bases further into General Joulwan's area and even into our
own country in terms of groups that are sent here have to be of
concern to our Nation. You handle that through strength so it is
very, very clear that any attempt on our interest will result in a
military response that should not make that an acceptable choice
on their part.
Mr. Geren. It is incredible to me that Saddam can continue to
have the strong political position that he appears to have, consider-
ing what he has put his country through. Talk a little about his
political base and the source of his grip on the country and his
leadership with his military, whether or not his handling of the
gulf war has destroyed or threatened his credibility with military
officers?
General Peay. I think the only way that one can understand
this, and you know the long-range traditions of the Ba'ath Party
and coming from Tekrit and where that all evolved — people say
how has he managed to stay in control so long. I think it is because
he has such a dominant hold on all of his party, his thugs that are
around him as well as how that moves into his military pieces.
813
When you look at these people they have no choice. First, they
don't know, and those that know, I don't think they have any
choice but to accept this on fear. If Saddam were to be taken down,
all those around him will be tried for the same war crimes and
those things that this very ruthless dictator has put on his society
over time. So he has a definite control over his factions.
We need to be careful about that as we go through humanitarian
relief that tries to balance taking care of the Iraqi people that his-
torically have been good friends of ours and trying to handle those
challenges vis-a-vis letting him out of the bottle where he puts this
money back into acquiring more and more weapons and technology
that he puts into a military that he controls.
I don't think there is a clear answer on this one right now except
to remain resolute. We are going to go through a tough time as we
see how these U.N. resolutions come out over the next month. I
hope that we stay tough on sanctions. The Ambassador indicated
to all of us plus the Kamel defection — he is deceased now, but what
we got out of his defection in terms of what Saddam is going to do.
It is pretty well laid out in terms of his capabilities. There is no
question in my mind that he is going to pursue rebuilding his mili-
tary and continue to push throughout the gulf region his own pro-
grams, much of which involve hatred and dominance.
Mr. Geren. Is another clash between Iran and Iraq inevitable in
your opinion? Is there a way to avoid that?
General Peay. I don't see that right now. That position is always
going to be there. There are incursions in the northeast part of
Iraq, and you will see movements of forces from Iran into that bor-
der north of Basra. But in the bigger sense I don't see that as a
challenge right now. I see Iran continuing to export its own form
of terrorism as it pushes its hegemony in the gulf and its Islamic
programs and I see Iraq as near term, peace trying to get through
this period, and over time, survive our constraints and once again
be a threat in the gulf region.
The Chairman. We have a vote on and I want to recognize Mr.
Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There is a potential for
a series of votes to occur which means we may be delayed from 20
to 30 minutes. I would love to engage both witnesses about this.
This is exciting testimony, thoughts and ideas that I would like to
draw out even further, but given the logistics that we are in we
will just have to save that for another day.
I am sure that the three of us will be talking on these matters
perhaps in some other venue. With that, Mr. Chairman, I would
yield and reserve the opportunity to come back at some other point.
I may have a couple of technical questions that I would submit in
writing and ask you to respond.
The Chairman. Without objection, I thank the gentleman for his
consideration of the time.
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your input this morning. It
has been helpful in our deliberations. We have a lot of work to do
yet, but you have helped a whole lot. We hate to let you go right
now, but we better do it.
We have another meeting at 2 o'clock.
814
[Whereupon, at 12:07 p.m., the committee was recessed, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m., this same day.]
The Chairman. The meeting will please be in order.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FLOYD D. SPENCE, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, COM-
MITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
I apologize for the running back and forth, but they said a vote
was imminent within 1 minute and we got over there and they ex-
tended the time so we decided to go ahead and get started anyway,
and we are waiting on the ranking member, but he will be here
momentarily.
Gentlemen, it is good to have you with us. We have been hearing
from Secretary of Defense, the Service Secretaries, the Chiefs of
Staff of all the services, and the JROC yesterday, and this morning
we heard from two other commanders. General Joulwan and Gen-
eral Peay, and this afternoon, of course, we are pleased to hear
from you and have you here.
This afternoon's committee will continue with testimony from the
regional Commanders in Chief. Appearing before us today is Adm.
Joseph Prueher, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Command;
Gen. Gary Luck, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Korea; and sit-
ting in for General Sheehan is Vice Adm. Harold Gehman, Deputy
Commander in Chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command.
Gentlemen, let me welcome you to this committee this afternoon.
I look forward to your testimony. As I said, we have heard from
all these other people before now, but we are getting down to
where the action is now because you gentlemen are on the front
lines where things are happening and we are pleased to have you
with us for that purpose.
As I mentioned this morning, I believe it is critical to have the
senior war fighting commanders included in our initial oversight
hearings in order to give us a real world perspective on the chal-
lenges facing our military. In particular, I would appreciate all of
you sharing your views on the implications that future force struc-
ture cuts would have on your ability to execute your mission in
your respective area of responsibility. In essence, we are interested
in understanding the capability and risk tradeoffs associated with
deeper force structure cuts.
Before I recognize the witnesses, I would first like to recognize
the ranking Democratic member, Mr. Dellums, for any comments
he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD V. DELLUMS, A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My thought
is that I would ask unanimous consent to revise and extend and
place my opening remarks in the appropriate point in the record
following your opening remarks and simply join you in welcoming
our colleagues and that will give us more time to engage our distin-
guished witnesses, and with those brief remarks I would yield back
the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dellums follows:]
815
Opening Comments
Hon. Ronald V. Dellums, Ranking Democrat
House National Security CoMMmEB
Hearing with CINPAC, USFK and CINCLANT
March 28, 1996
Mr. Chairman:
It is with great pleasure that I join you in welcoming Admiral
Pnieher, the CINCPAC, General Luck, the CINC of U.S. forces in Korea
and Vice Admiral Gehman, the Deputy CINC of the U.S. Atlantic
Command.
The Pacific Command has enormous geographic responsibilities,
including ultimate responsibility for our troops in Korea. I very much
look forward to the testimony of both Admiral Prueher and General Luck
concemmg the situation on the peninsula, there perspectives on likely
developments and their views as to how the United States can continue to
make a contribution to diffusing the conflict there. In that regard, I am
especially concerned to hear of their views regarding the continuing effort
to control and cannisterize spend nuclear fuel developed in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. Before this effort was commenced, alar jn
was raised that this material could be diverted to the construction of
nuclear weapons by the North Koreans. It is my hope that this effort has
38-160 97-28
816
helped to diffuse tensions that had arisen over this issue.
In addition, the committee will certainly benefit from Admiral
Prueher's insights from the recent confrontation between the People's
Republic of China and Taiwan, and the U.S. response during those tense
days. Your view on where security arrangements in the region will go far
in helping us to answer long-run questions of force structure, deployment
and operations.
The U.S. Atlantic Command has multiple responsibilities, both as a^
area command and as a force mobilizer for all of the CINCS. I very
much look forward to hearing from Admiral Gehman regarding how the
command is juggling these competing responsibilities. In this light, I am
curious to know how the transfer of area responsibilities has impacted
planning for our mission in Haiti and for continuity of programs to the
Caribbean nations.
As I asked our witnesses this morning, I am also interested to Icam
of your thoughts on the current discussion that suggests we will revisit the
Bottom-Up Review analysis. Many of us have felt that the BUR no longer
Delluras Opening/CINCPAC/USFK/CINCLANT
Page 2. March 28. 1996
817
fully captures our national security requirements and we welcome this
(q)ening. Your thoughts on this topic would be very useful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with that I very much look forward
to hearing ^m our witnesses this afternoon.
Dellums Opening/CINCPAC/USFK/CINCLANT
Page 3, March 28. 1996
818
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Without objection, the written statements of each of the wit-
nesses will be entered in the record.
Admiral Prueher, do you want to lead off.
STATEMENT OF ADM. JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, USN,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, thank you very much. I appreciate
the opportunity to be here as well as submission of our written
statements for the record.
As you may know, I have been in command a little less than 2
months in the Pacific Command and it has been busy in that pe-
riod of time. I have learned a lot and am learning a lot as we move
along through that.
My written statement has both a regional overview in it, a sum-
mation of our strategy in the Pacific, of cooperative engagement,
and a summary of the military relations with some of the 44 na-
tions with whom we engage there, and a little bit about the impor-
tance and some statistics about the importance of the Asia-Pacific
region to the United States as it becomes critical, more critical to
our national interest.
One of the things that is already apparent to me in my short ten-
ure is the tremendous dedication of the young men and women who
are working very hard and are fully committed in the Pacific Com-
mand. They are well trained, they are well supported, and they are
equipped to tackle the tasks that the Nation has set forth for the
Pacific Command, and we have, at this point, I think, adequate
forces to carry out the missions that the Nation has assigned to us.
Our strategy in the Pacific of cooperative engagement is one in
which our military forces participate in the military portions, the
security-related portion, along with our diplomatic and economic
and political factions in the Pacific to engage the nations so that
we have a framework on which to deal during peacetime. Then we
have the ability to respond to crises, and we have a series of bilat-
eral alliances or bilateral treaties, seven of them, and then we have
a number of friendships. And we work this full time both with for-
ward presence and rotational forces and forces that are based over-
seas. This is very important to us as we move along.
One of the things that has dominated the time in the last couple
of months has been the China-Taiwan crisis, which I think you
would be proud of the interagency action that has gone on with
State Department and the Department of Defense and National Se-
curity adviser to meld the various forces and the communications
that we have in place to work with China and Taiwan, I think, to
bring it to what we all agree is an abated state for right now.
As we were talking a little earlier, I believe this is just a blip
on our relationship with China, as we engage China to neither ap-
pease them nor contain them, but engage them, or try to engage
them in a normal relationship as they emerge as the Pacific power
that they have traditionally been.
One of the things that enabled us to respond to this crisis was
our ready forces and we had forces that were trained, forces that
were prepared and they were forward deployed and able to respond
very quickly with the Independence Battle Group to respond to the
819
China-Taiwan crisis. I believe that we were able to send a meas-
ured, a balanced message both to China and Taiwan, one of firm
commitment to the area in the terms of the PRC that the United
States was committed to a peaceful process of reunification, and
also a commitment to the vicinity to our allies out there and that
we are firmly there in the Asia-Pacific region.
At the same time, sending that measured response to Taiwan
that we were there to make sure that they did not get, have their
interests run over, but to not embolden them too much more than
was necessary.
These ready forces were made up, as I mentioned, of the Battle
Group Independence and also the ship from Bunker Hill, and I
would like to go through four things that we used to look at readi-
ness and the four things are training that the people are well
trained to use the assets they have assigned; the tactics, that the
leaders and the people responsible for engaging these forces have
tactics which are sound and take advantage of both the techno-
logical and the time, rate, distance capabilities of the forces we
have; the technology itself, that we have modem technology to
apply and equipment that works, which we have very well; and the
fourth element is people. And we have qualified people working on
driving our ships, running our tanks and our soldier-sailors and
airmen and marines are all well qualified.
From our viewpoint, these four things, training, tactics, tech-
nology, and people, are the standards by which we should judge our
readiness. And if we have them, we will have good readiness. If
any one of those four things lags, our readiness will be no better
than the weakest link of those four things and that is, I think, a
good way of looking at readiness.
As to what we need, our force structure is about right. Our readi-
ness at this point is sufficiently high. The challenge facing all of
us, both at the combatant CINC's as well as the Congress and our
Department of Defense mechanisms and the people is to try to
bring into balance our future modernization or future readiness
with what we spend these days on our current readiness and our
force structure and this balance is a tough one.
In my view, I think about it as 20/20 as a combatant CINC. In
20 minutes we may get a phone call to react to something, and we
have to be prepared to do something, but also 20 years from now
we need to make sure that the people that are in our positions then
are also able to say that our forces are ready and they are suffi-
cient.
Balancing this is not necessarily, of course, an easy process, and
one of the things that I feel the combatant CINC's owe the Con-
gress and owe OSD is not just our statement of requirements, we
also owe you very careful planning so that we do not squander as-
sets as well as a commitment to the future and good stewardship
of the time, talent, assets and the people's lives that are entrusted
to us. I think all of the CINC's are certainly on board with this no-
tion.
That concludes my opening remarks, sir. I look forward to ques-
tions later.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Prueher follows:]
820
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL JOSEPH W. PRUEHER, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
POSTURE HEARING
MARCH 28, 1996
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
821
Mister Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee :
It is a sincere pleasure and honor to be here representing
the men and women of the United States Pacific Command. In this
statement, I'll highlight some compelling rationale for our
continued active engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, our
strategy for engagement, how our strategy is working, and what.
support we need to continue to be an effective force for
stability and peace.
THE ASIA- PACIFIC IMPERATIVE
Today, there is nearly universal awareness of the Asia-
Pacific region's demographic, economic, and political
significance to global affairs.
• 62V of the world's population
• 32% of the gross world product
• $270 billion foreign exchange reserves
• Oil demand of over 14.5 million barrels per day
• Home to 6 of the world's 7 largest armed forces (U.S. is
number 3)
Often lost in the flood of regional statistics is the profound
and increasing impact the region has on U.S. interests. The
Asia-Pacific region already accounts for 37V of our total two-way
trade. This is greater than our total trade with Canada and
Latin America, and it is twice our two-way trade with Europe.
822
U.S. trade with the Asia-Pacific region accounts for over 2.5
million American jobs. As the world's economic center of gravity
settles in the Asia-Pacific area, U.S. ties to the region are
becoming stronger and more interdependent . Within the next
decade, nearly 60% of world economic growth will be generated in
East Asia. With that growth, U.S. trade and investment across
the Pacific will certainly increase.
The region's future is bright and its prosperity is in the
United States' interest. There is optimism about the prospect
for continued dynamic regional economic growth and concomitant
gain in international political influence. Concurrently, the
region faces challenges and uncertainties that directly link
economics, politics, and security. Some of these include:
• current and potential nuclear powers, large conventional
forces, and smaller militaries embarked on rapid
technological modernization,
• increasing importance of shipping lanes resulting from the
expanding volume of trade and the proximity of ethnic,
ideological and territorial disputes to chokepoints,
• growing energy demand - - increased dependence on imported
oil --as previously agrarian nations industrialize and
urbanize,
• broader need and desire for multilateral cooperation driven
by expanding commercial ties,
• diffusion of advanced technologies applicable to both civil
and military production.
823
• single-party, authoritarian regimes that mask their military
capabilities and intentions, thus raising anxiety levels
among their neighbors.
Nowhere is the confluence and interplay of economics,
politics, and security as great as in the Asia-Pacific region.
The U.S. is in a unique position to be an influential partner in
this arena. Key to shaping the regional environment toward a
favorable future is maintaining a regional order of cohesive
security that facilitates cooperation across all dimensions of
international relations: economically, politically, and
militarily. A strong military dimension, one that is credible
and has the support of the American people -- the National Will
-- can create room for the economic and diplomatic dimensions to
work.
Security is the first pillar in the President's integrated
regional strategy for East Asia and the Pacific as articulated in
his National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have promulgated supporting strategies in the United States
Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region and the
National Military Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement
respectively. The binding theme is 'security through
engagement.' This theme is carried forward in the Pacific
Command's theater military strategy of Cooperative Engagement.
824
COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT
Cooperative Engagement is a well-established, winning,
military strategy. Developed by Admiral Larson, nurtured by
Admiral Macke, and a framework with which I wholeheartedly
concur, it is a comprehensive, constructive approach that guides
the employment of the entire range of PACOM's military resources
such as forces, assets, funds, and programs. One of the
strengths of Cooperative Engagement is that it has been
consistently applied over the past four years and it is therefore
well understood by the militaries of cur friends and allies
throughout the region. This consistency and predictability over
this amount of time have proven to be meaningful and reassuring.
It is also an inherently flexible strategy that serves us well
during this period of dynamic change and growth.
In peacetime, we pursue reassurance through the forward
stationing and deployment of our military forces, as well as a
broad range of military activities. The scope and depth of this
effort in 1995 was remarkable:
• 18 multilateral conferences with participants from over 36
nations
• 389 staff talks in over 34 countries
• 221 joint/combined exercises in 23 countries
• 77 humanitarian/civic action programs in 23 countries
• 718 port visits in 23 countries, a 45.9% increase over
last year's port visit days
825
Our presence and our peacetime military activities reinforce our
relationships and access with friends and allies, reassuring them
with respect to our long-term commitment, the effectiveness of
our warfighting capability, and the values and quality of our
people .
In crisis, we work to deter aggression and encourage
cooperation with our friends and allies. We work hard in the •
Pacific Command to develop innovative approaches to joint (multi-
service) and combined (multi-national) warfighting. We continue
to train our people and our warfighting forces for effective
crisis response, from minor contingencies such as PROMPT RETURN,
the repatriation of Chinese migrants from Wake Island, to
humanitarian efforts or disaster relief, such as that provided to
Japan following the Kobe earthquake in January 1995.
In conflict, we remain ready to prevail in combat. We are ,
prepared to win unilaterally if necessary -- but we prefer to act
together with allies and coalition partners who have a common
stake in regional security. Because our forces are ready for
war, we are able to remain committed to peace. The two oo hand
in hand toward our goal to prevent conflict and to foster
cooperation. Proactivity is much more effective than reaction in
pursuing our security strategy. Our engagement, combined with
forehanded planning, reduces the risk of aggression and helps to
diffuse hostilities before they erupt into open conflict. Should
deterrence fail, we remain prepared to fight and win.
826
COOPERATIVE ENGAGEMENT: PROGRESS
The following is my assessment of the theater with examples
of how this strategy is working.
• Japan The U.S. -Japan bilateral security relationship is
the cornerstone of U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific
region. Japan currently {and for the foreseeable future) casts
its strategic fortunes with the U.S., and depends upon American
security guarantees in an exclusive bilateral defense
arrangement. Japan's strong support for the non-proliferation
policies reflects the Japanese government's commitment to forego
arms exports and possession of nuclear weapons. Those who argue
that this is a one-sided arrangement are misinformed.
Tokyo's financial support for the presence of U.S. military
forces in Japan was recently reaffirmed with the September
signing of a new Special Measures Agreement that will provide for
continued GOJ Host Nation Support out to 2001. Japan supplies by
far the most generous host nation support of any of our allies.
Japan also provides a stable, secure environment for our military
operations and training. The GOJ has annually assumed an
increasing share, and will assume virtually all local labor and
utility costs of maintaining our forces this year. Japan also
funds leases for land used by U.S. forces and incurs indirect
costs such as waived land use fees, foregone taxes, tolls,
customs, and payments to local communities affected by U.S.
bases. Taken together, these categories represent contributions
of more than $4 billion annually. As part of its host nation
support, Japan also funds facilities construction under the
827
Facilities Improvement Program. This contribution is an
additional amount of approximately $1 billion. Overall, Japan
pays over $5 billion dollars in burden sharing.
The U.S. and Japan share a strong commitment to maintaining
a close, cooperative relationship that goes well beyond purely
military activities. This relationship far transcends the
visible demonstration of our humanitarian response demonstrated
during the tragic Kobe earthquake. Our partnership addresses
broader issues relating to security, including promoting
international law, coordinating foreign assistance efforts and
global burdensharing activities. Frequent bilateral U.S. and
Japanese military exercises continue to enhance the professional
development and interoperability of our militaries.
Finally, the U.S. government and the Government of Japan are
working together within the Special Action Committee for Okinawa
(SACO) to reduce the burden of U.S. force presence on the
Okinawans, while maintaining current combat capabilities and
readiness. SACO objectives are to realign, consolidate, and
reduce our facilities on Okinawa; to resolve problems related to
the activities of U.S. forces; and to address other mutual
issues. The Committee has already identified the various
planning factors impacting these efforts and is continuing to
study a number of proposals. The SACO will make its final report
to the Security Consultative Committee by November 1996.
• Korea U.S. military presence and cooperation with the
Republic of Korea (ROK) are visible reassurances of U.S.
commitment to the security of the ROK. Stability on the Korean
828
peninsula -- the hiscorical confluence of Japanese, Chinese,
Russian, Korean, and U.S. interests -- is inextricably linked to
overall regional stability.
The Nuclear Agreed Framework reached in October 1994 froze
the North Korean's nuclear program and reduced regional as well
as peninsular tensions. Even though North Korea has complied
with the provisions of the agreement, tensions rise and fall each
time negotiation of details within the agreement bog down. The
North continues to abide by the Agreed Framework's step-by-step
approach, but negotiations remain difficult. Even the modest
progress last June in the U.S. -North Korea talks in Kuala Lumpur,
obtaining Pyongyang's acceptance of a ROK-model reactor and a
primary ROK role in the Light Water Reactor Project (LWR) does
not dilute lingering uncertainty. Until the Agreed Framework is
fully implemented, we must maintain the capability to enforce
sanctions or any other economic or diplomatic measures designed
to induce North Korea compliance with the Agreement.
Though the nuclear question is prominent, the convergence of
three additional concerns -- their conventional forces, the
leadership situation, and the potential for economic collapse --
demands our vigilance as well.
North Korea's forward deployed conventional military
capability poses a serious obstacle to stability on the Korean
peninsula. North Korea retains a standing military force in
excess of defensive needs. For example, it maintains a standing
army of over one million soldiers, the majority of whom are
deployed within 100 kilometers of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) .
829
They also have a substantial large-caliber artillery capability
entrenched along the DMZ that can range Seoul. Recent forward
movements of aircraft, restructuring of ground units, and testing
of command and control systems display efforts to maintain viable
military capabilities in a forward- deployed posture.
Two years after Kim Il-Sung's death. North Korea is still
undergoing the first hereditary transfer of power under a
communist regime. The rationale for the delay in Kim Chong-Il's
formal accession to key posts is unclear, but one thing that has
not changed since Kim Il-Sung's death is the priority placed upon
regime survival. If Kim Chong-Il believes his survival is
threatened, he may resort to the military option. We must remain
prepared to defend against such an attack.
Poor agricultural techniques and severe weather contributed
to North Korean grain production shortfall. This shortfall
triggered an unprecedented appeal for foreign assistance .
Although the seriousness of this problem is open to
interpretation, we can assume that it has caused additional
stress on both the economic and political systems.
Meanwhile, the ROK is making great strides as a nation.
President Kim Young Sam's "globalization" policy has taken root
and we have seen him take steps to enhance the ROK's political
and economic interests. The ROK's relations with China, Russia,
Japan and Southeast Asia continue to improve.
In terms of relations with the U.S., the ROK clearly can no
longer be viewed as largely dependent on the U.S. South Koreans
have grown into full-fledged partners. The assumption of
830
operational control of ROK military forces, difficult burden-
sharing negotiations for ROK contributions in support of U.S.
military forces, and public demand for a review of the ROK-U.S.
Status of Forces agreement illustrate their change in attitude.
Nevertheless, continued U.S. military presence has never been
brought into question -- support remains widespread throughout
Korean society. Very clearly, our security relationship is one
of the bonds that will hold our countries together and help meet
the challenges ahead.
• China With one-fifth of the world's population, strategic
nuclear weapons, veto power on the United Nation's Security
Council, and a dynamic economy, China is definitely a world power
--a proud nation grappling with change. Our relationship with
China is one of the most important considerations for our
strategy of Cooperative Engagement.
China and the U.S. have many areas of complementary
interest. An approach that emphasizes contact and dialogue --
engagement -- offers the greatest promise for maintaining
stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Recent military contacts
include Chinese participation in the PACOM- sponsored Pacific Area
Senior Officer Logistics Seminar in September and the visit of
the USS Fort McHenry to Shanghai in January. The Chinese
military and the U.S. military have maintained contact and
provided a basis for continued dialogue even during times of
disagreement .
The People's Liberation Army is a major player in Chinese
politics and remains a main force in supporting internal
831
stability, economic progress, and external respect. That is why
our growing program of military contacts with the Chinese
military is so important. As China's future unfolds, the PLA
will continue to play a pivotal role. By engaging the PLA
directly, we can help promote more openness in the Chinese
national security apparatus, including its military institutions.
Promoting openness, or transparency, about Chinese strategic
intentions, procurement, budgeting and operating procedures will
not only help promote confidence among China's neighbors, but it
will also lessen the chance of misunderstandings or incidents
when our forces operate in proximity to Chinese military forces.
We engage the Chinese in promising regional security
dialogues designed to convey intentions and build mutual
confidence. However, the ongoing Chinese exercises opposite
Taiwan and recent missile launches to areas off the Taiwan coast
underscore the importance of our efforts. The increased emphasis
of PLA training exercises on multi-service operations reflects
China's efforts to increase its military capability. This is
coupled with Chinese purchases and construction of sophisticated
weapons systems and efforts to streamline force structure. At
present we believe China has only a limited, but increasing,
capability to project power and sustain offensive operations.
We have made it very clear to China that we are sticking to
our one-China policy and the principles set forth in the U.S.-
China communiques of 1972, '79 and '82. We have reaffirmed that
we have no intention of advocating or supporting a policy of two
Chinas, or of one China, one Taiwan. Now, the Chinese have to
832
show that they, too, want a peaceful resolution to this issue.
Conducting exercises off Taiwan prior to the 23 March Taiwan
Presidential election sends the opposite message.
We believe the best long-term approach to working with the
Chinese is cohesive, constructive engagement among the political,
economic, and security arenas. PACOM is engaged in a major role
in the security piece of this strategy.
• Russia USPACOM is particularly well positioned to support
the Chairman's Russia Program with Pacific Russia through
military contacts. Objectives are to support democratic reforms,
accelerate the deactivation of nuclear weapons, foster mutual
nuclear disarmament, encourage counterprol iteration, and lay
groundwork for collaboration in regional crises.
To accomplish these objectives, we've engaged our Russian
Far East military counterparts across the board, from all
services and all ranks. USPACOM engaged and established a solid
rapport with senior military commanders in the Russian Far East.
These exchanges triggered top-down approval of lower level
contacts amd, perhaps more importantly, the release of resources
to conduct them.
We also had success in setting up bilateral/multilateral
exercises and unit exchanges. These contacts are important for
both training value and the opportunity to engage and develop
rapport between mid- level officers -- the future leaders of our
respective militaries. They also lay groundwork for prospective
multilateral efforts such as peacekeeping and disaster relief by
enhancing interoperability. In addition to the military contact
833
program, PACOM provided one carefully tailored airplane load of
medical supplies following the earthquake on Sakhalin Island, as
well as supporting another private sector relief effort.
The next step in the evolution of our U.S. -Russia program
will be towards increasingly complex combined operations and
multilateral military contacts. Our program has bred broader
acceptance of the "new" Russian military in the region, as
evidenced by expanding military- to-military contacts between
Russia and Korea, China, and even Japan. These relationships
will help to further integrate Russia into the Pacific community.
The best measure of our success is our program has encouraged
additional downsizing and restructuring of Russian Far East
forces for defense, thus contributing to regional stability.
We could not have conducted these U.S. -Russia military
contacts without the support of Nunn-Lugar funding provided under
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. We have already reaped
tremendous benefits from this rather modest investment. As we
continue to engage the Russian military leadership, we expect
even more benefits. Continued funding of this program is
essential.
• Vietnam Two significant milestones for Vietnam in mid-
1995 were gaining ASEAN membership and opening of full diplomatic
relations. The focus of our military relationship with Vietnam
continues to be the effort to achieve the fullest possible
accounting for our POW-MIA from the war in Southeast Asia.
Vietnamese cooperation with this effort remains good, and we
834
foresee no impediments to continued progress in accomplishing
this goal.
• Canbodia It is important that we sustain our efforts to
ensure Cambodia can carry out their 1998 elections. The Khmer
Rouge threat to the government is low as the government continues
to make gains and attract Khmer Rouge defectors. However, the
level of assistance required for Royal Cambodian Armed Forces
(RCAF) reform and reorganization remains large and beyond the
capabilities of one nation. We see a definite need to continue
assistance such as demining, road building, and English language
training.
• Thailand As a treaty ally, Thailand has a long history of
collective security with the U.S. Our Joint Task Force Full
Accounting (JTF-FA) detachment in Bangkok is the anchor for
logistics support of JTF-FA detachments in Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia. Since the U.S. closure of Philippine bases, Thailand
has become the most heavily used training destination in the
region. The Joint and Combined Thai-U.S. COBRA GOLD Exercises
head the list of over 40 annual events. Our military-to-military
relationship is one of the most productive in theater.
• Indonesia Indonesia is the world's fourth largest nation
in terms of population and the world's largest Muslim nation. It
occupies a strategic position astride major international sea
lanes and has immense natural resources. Indonesia plays a key
leadership and mediating role in the region, recently completing
a 3-year tenure as the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement. Our
military forces enjoy solid professional relations, although the
835
suspension of IMET for Indonesia had been an impediment to that
relationship. The resumption cf expanded IMET this year and the
expansion of our military-to-military relations point to
positive, mutually beneficial relationship with this important
Southeast Asian nation.
• India India and Pakistan are longtime rivals due to
border disputes and ethnic differences. The two have gone to war
three times since partition in 1947 and have come close to war
many times. Our key objective is to reduce tensions in the
disputed Kashmir region. Ultimately, the long-term solution must
be an Indian- Pakistani one. We maintain a robust peacetime
engagement program that has ultimately led to broader political
engagement with India. Last year witnessed both the signing of
the "Agreed Minute on U.S. -Indian Defense Cooperation" and the
inaugural Defense Policy Group meeting here in Washington. Both
of these events build on four years of dramatic improvement and
provide an overarching framework for our future military
relations .
• The Region Overall This statement can not address every
nation that is important to us in the Asia-Pacific region.
Australia, for example, is a critical ally and traditional friend
that shares our values, interests, and world view. Australia's
participation in combined exercises, operation of joint defense
facilities, and granting of access to U.S. ships and aircraft is
absolutely essential to our forward presence. In the
Philippines, our post -bases relationship remains strong, firmly
rooted in our shared histories and a long-standing mutual defense
836
treaty arrangement. Singapore continues to provide U.S. access
to excellent naval and air facilities, while strongly supporting
U.S. forward presence. In Laos we are preparing to expand
demining and unexploded ordinance removal operations. Throughout
the region, the Cooperative Engagement strategy is effectively
advancing U.S. interests.
WHAT WE NEED
• Ready Forcea My top priority is readiness, readiness to
fight and win our Nation's wars. Warfighting is the raison
d'etre for the Pacific Command. Our forces must be ready to
execute our portion of the Bottom Up Review task of fighting two
nearly-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts. Ready forces
provide this country with a credible deterrent against challenges
to our interests; and if deterrence fails, our ready forces can
buy time or make room for the other elements of national power to
work. Our forces must also be ready to engage in other military
operations; to execute a wide range of tasks that demonstrate our
commitment and resolve.
A ready force must have quality people, realistic training,
modern technology, and sound tactics. A shortcoming in any of
these areas could jeopardize the war-winning capability of our
forces and consequently reduce its effectiveness in peacetime as
a deterrent to aggression. We must also have the capability to
mobilize and project our forces; they must have tactical,
operational, and strategic reach.
16
837
• Forward Presence We need to maintain our forward presence
not only for crisis response, but for reassurance of our
commitment to the region as well. There is no clearer signal of
our long-term commitment than the presence of our forward forces.
Our presence is welcomed. Evidence of regional support for our
engagement comes through offers for access to ship repair and
logistics facilities and periodic access to training areas and
air space. The best way to deter regional aggression, to
perpetuate the region's robust growth and promote our own
interests is through forward presence.
• Humanitarian Demining The restrictions now imposed on our
demining assistance programs inhibit our operations in Cambodia
and will undercut all mine clearance initiatives in Laos. Our
main assistance to Cambodia, to the Cambodian Mine Action Center,
has been provided through this successful program. The Lao are '
now building their national clearance program. Progress in both
countries would stall without the grant -basis for supplies and
demolitions to conduct operations after U.S. trainers depart, and
per diem and travel for our trainers. We urge you to reinstate
the authority to use Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic
Aid funds for core costs of this important humanitarian effort.
• Foreign Military Interaction We gain tremendous strategic
leverage from low-cost, high-payoff military-to-military programs
employing our key strategic advantage: our people. From
participation in technical demonstrations to multilateral
conferences to high-level visits, we will continue to maintain an
adequate level of reassurance through direct interaction and
exchange. These quality contacts are not " nice -to- have, " they
are critical activities with strategic, long-term investments of
extraordinary payoff to our interests.
• International Military Education and Training One of our
most cost effective Cooperative Engagement reassurance activities
is the training of young military leaders from the USPACOM AOR in
the U.S. The exposure to American values contributes to the goal
of a more democratic world. These foreign leaders see firsthand
the proper role(s) of the military in a democracy. Additionally,
the long- lasting friendships formed between international
classmates creates an unsurpassed opportunity for future
professional communication. As these students return home, and
ascend to positions of prominence in military and government
positions, the positive value and influence expand to an even
greater scope. If we do not make the personal contacts now with
the region's future military leadership, we forgo irretrievable
opportunities for future cooperation and influence.
• Multilateral Military Activities The conventional wisdom
has been that the Asia-Pacific region offers little potential for
multilateral activities. As economic bonds strengthen and expand
and the need for cooperative arrangements rises, that wisdom is
quickly becoming dated. In my tenure, I've already participated
in two multilateral conferences, one with the special operations
experts from the region and the other with ASEAN Regional Forum
representatives. Although not a substitute for bilateral
dialogue, there are considerable efficiencies gained in time and
money. By moving carefully, at the pace with which our allies
839
and friends in the region are comfortable, multilateral military-
activities will supplement (but noc supplant) our extensive
bilateral engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
The ASEAN Regional Forum is the principal multilateral
regional security dialogue and it has made great strides in
addressing security related topics of mutual interest, such as
confidence building, peacekeeping operations, and civil search
and rescue . As a standing forum for open dialogue and
consultation, the Regional Forum is an agent for expanded
cooperation and stability. We seek to complement our bilateral
security ties through continued support of ARF initiatives.
• Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies We have already
enhanced dialogue and cooperation among regional leaders through
several Center- supported conferences like the ASEAN Regional
Forum's Inter-sessional Meeting on Search and Rescue co-hosted by
the U.S. and Singapore governments. We expect the inaugural
session of the College of Security Studies to start later this
year. This College represents a highly- leveraged, long-term
investment in the region's future leadership. They'll study the
interrelationship of the diplomatic, political, economic, and
military policies dealing with regional security issues. By
studying together, they will develop mutual understanding and
personal relationships that will reinforce a habit of
cooperation. We appreciate the support that took the Asia-
Pacific Center from concept to reality. With your continued
interest, the Center's potential can be realized.
19
840
• Military Construction My top military construction
requirements are warfighting infrastructure and quality of life
projects. Military construction and infrastructure are key
components of Pacific Command's readiness. The infrastructure in
the Pacific is our platform for launching our Cooperative
Engagement strategy. Under the "places not bases" concept, we
have reduced our military base footprint in the Pacific. What
remains is vital infrastructure that must be properly maintained
and renewed with new facilities when mission or economics require
that capital investment. The FY97 PACOM MILCON program contains
47 projects worth about $680M (Fig A) . Our critical concerns
are:
The Army's Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) program is
critical to safe and quality construction of facilities in Japan
and Korea. The Government of Japan (GOJ) provides approximately
$1B in construction each year under the Facilities Improvement
Program (FIP) . However, FIP does not pay for U.S. government
surveillance funds to ensure facilities meet U.S. quality and
safety standards. In FY97 the Army requires a minimum of $20M in
Host Nation Support funds for the Pacific with a portion going to
fund oversight on FIP construction in Japan and a portion going
to fund oversight on Combined Defense Improvement Projects (CDIP)
in Korea. The return on this investment is 60:1; for every
dollar we spend, the host government spends $60. We also need
O&M dollars to maintain and repair facilities and MILCON dollars
for housing operations.
841
We all know the tremendous contribution made by our people
serving in Korea . These people deserve our support and count on
us to provide military construction funds to improve their living
conditions. New barracks, dining facilities, and support
facilities are still in need of MILCON dollars in excess of the
$100M annual contribution by the ROK. Due to the high inflation
rate, the increase represents only 3% real growth in the ROK •
contribution. You provided $3 5M in FY95 and FY96 to fund
critical quality of life projects. I request your continued
support of $40M in FY97 for three barracks projects on our front
line bases in Korea. Our troops there deserve support.
We are starting to correct the housing problem that our
families have endured for so long. The completion of replacement
housing is encouraging to our service and family members and a
great morale builder, but we must continue our full-court press"
to improve their quality of life. Most of the construction
budget for FY97 is dedicated to improving the family housing and
barracks in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, California and
Washington. Our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines appreciate
your commitment to improving their quality of life.
At the same time our en route infrastructure, particularly
our aging POL system, is reaching the end of its service life.
Many facilities that were constructed during the 1940-1950 time
frame are in need of major repair or replacement. Real property
maintenance accounts for essential facility repairs are "must
pay" costs that continue to escalate. Readiness is degraded by
hollow infrastructure which is what happens when our facilities
842
fall into disrepair, or when we shift O&M funds to perform
incremental maintenance on those facilities.
• People The nexus of all of our efforts, in modernization,
in the refinement of joint doctrine, and in demanding, realistic
training is our people. Quality of life is not a frill. It is
imperative to attracting and retaining the most motivated,
intelligent, and dedicated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines
in the world. By sustaining support for housing, compensation,
retirement and medical benefits, we not only send a clear message
of appreciation to service men and women in uniform today, but we
ensure that the military of tomorrow will maintain its stature as
the world's preeminent fighting force. Our strategic advantage
today is our people. Your continued support of quality of life
improvements will ensure that we hold that advantage in the
future.
CONCLUSION
With the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region having a
greater and greater impact on the our Nation's interests, it is
imperative that we continue our commitment to and engagement with
countries and militaries of this pivotal area. Cooperative
Engagement is a solid framework that works today and it has
inherent flexibility to work in the future. The regional
assessment not only highlights successes, but also provides
additional rationale for our continued engagement in this vital,
potentially dangerous area. With your support, the men and
women of the Pacific Command stand ready to contribute to the
843
security necessary for peace and prosperity well into the Twenty-
first Century -- the Pacific Century.
844
PACOM MILCON AND HOUSING PROJECTS
Warfiohtinq Infrastructure
Squadron Operations / AMU Hangar. Elmendorf AK S19.4
Upgrade Storm Drainage. Elmendorf AK S 2.1
POL Hydrant Fueling System. Elmendorf AK S18.0
Automated Field Firing Range. MCB Pendleton. CA S 4 . 0
Maintenance Facility. MCB Pendleton. CA S 9.1
Aircraft Parking Apron Expansion. MCB Pendleton. CA S 2.6
Runway Overrun Improvements. MCB Pendleton. CA S 1.4
Transportation Infrastructure. MCB Pendleton. CA S 2.3
Dredging. North Island. CA S49. 9
Ship Maintenance Facility. North Island. CA S27.0
Underwater Systems Facility. San Diego. CA S 2.0
Oily Waste Collection System. San Diego. CA S 7.1
SOF Adv Seal Delivery System Fac. Pearl Harbor. HI S12 ■ 8
Pier - Everett. WA $14-8
Road Upgrade. Yakima. WA S-L^
Quality ef Life Proiacta
Family Housing Fire Station. Eielson AK S 3.0
Replace Fam-lv Housing. 72 units. Eielson. AK S21.1
Replace Family Housing. 276 units. Lemoore. CA S39.S
BEQ. MCB Pendleton. CA SlO.l
BEO. MCB Pendleton. CA S11.8
BEO. MCB Pendleton. CA S12.5
Family Housing. 128 units. MCB Pendleton. CA $19.5
Physical Fitness Center. MCB Pendleton. CA S 4.2
Medical Clinic Edson Ridge. MCB Pendleton. CA S 3 .3
BEO and Messing Facility. San Clemente. CA S17.0
Replace Family Housing. 366 Units. San Diego. CA S48.7
Child Development Center. Twenty Nine Palms. CA S 4.0
Community Center. Twenty Nine Palms. CA S 2 .0
Housing Office. Twenty Nine Palms. CA S 1.0
Improve Family Housing. Andersen AFB Guam S 8 . 8
Improve Family Housing. PWC Guam Sll ■ 9
Improve Family Housing. NCTAMS West Guam S 6.7
Road Improvements. Helemano. HI S 4 . 0
Improvements to Family Housing. Hickam AFB HI S16.6
Replace Family Housing. Kaneohe MCB HI Sll. 9
Replacement Housing & Community Cntr. Moanaloa HI S52.6
BEO Modernization. NavSta Pearl Harbor HI S19.6
Improvements to Family Housing. Pearl Harbor HI S13 .8
Replace Family Housing. Schofield Barracks HI SIO.O
BEQ. Sub Base Pearl Harbor HI S30.S
BEO Modernization. SubBase Pearl Harbor HI S 5.4
Whole Barracks Renewal. Camp Red Cloud ROK S14.0
Whole Barracks Renewal. Camp Casey ROK S16.0
Enlisted Dorm. Osan AB ROK S 9.8
BEO. Everett. WA S10.9
Family Housing. 100 units. Everett. WA $15.0
Barracks Phase 2A. Fort Lewis. WA S49.0
FIG A
845
The Chairman. General Luck.
STATEMENT OF GEN. GARY E. LUCK, USA, COMMANDER IN
CHIEF, U.S. FORCES KOREA
General Luck. Thanks a lot, Mr. Chairman.
It is a personal and professional honor for me to be back here
to testify before this committee. This is probably going to be my
last opportunity to do it and that is kind of a happy sort of a deal
for me, too. Mr. Dellums asked me what I think I might do. I told
the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee this morning that I was
going to open a beer and bait shop and I was playing up to them
and said Alabama, but really it is going to be in Tennessee. So it
is an honor to be back here.
I am going to take the lead from Mr. Dellums and not make any
more of a statement and stand ready for your questions and say
thanks for everything you have done for me and the 700,000 ROK
and U.S. soldiers over in the peninsula.
Thanks a lot, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Luck follows:]
846
For Release Only by the
House Committee on National Security
STATEMENT OF GENERAL GARY E. LUCK
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF. ROK/U.S. COMBINED FORCES COMMAND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA
BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
28 MARCH 1996
For Release Only by the
House Committee on National Security
847
1996 CINC CFC/UNC/USFK'S
STATEMENT TO CONGRESS
MARCH 28, 1996
Mister Chairman and distinguished members of the committee:
It is a distinct honor to present you my views on the current security
situation on the Korean peninsula. I anticipate this will be my last
opportunity to share my assessments and strategic vision with you as the
Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, Combined Forces
Command and United States Forces Korea. I will address today's
potentially volatile situation on the Korean peninsula, as well as my
impressions of the ROK and the ROK-US alliance, and finally, my vision for
the future of my area of responsibility and the surrounding area.
First, I want to express my appreciation to every member of the
command, Amehcan and Korean, and for America's continued support of
our forces in Korea. Unquestionably, America's unwavering support is
singularly the most important factor in regional stability in Northeast Asia
over the past 40 years. However, this stability is fragile at best due to the
massive forces within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
38-160 97-29
848
North Korea remains a source of unpredictability and potential
danger for the region. Its excessive emphasis on its military machine at the
expense of basic ecohomic, political and social programs poses a severe
threat to its neighbors. Even with a badly deteriorating economy and years
of poor harvests, North Korea continues to give priority to its military
structure. The DPRK remains an isolated society whose centrally controlled
economy is a total failure. This lone remaining closed, militaristic, and
Stalinist society has not learned the lessons of its revisionist comrades. As
the DPRK's comrades have recognized the failures of their societies and
have turned to the "West" and a more market-oriented economy, the North
Koreans have become even more entrenched in their outdated principles.
Further, as the North Korean's economic situation worsens, their
provocative actions and rhetoric become even more threatening and
unpredictable toward the ROK.
Systemic failure, combined with this past summer's flooding, has
created severe food shortages throughout North Korea. After decades of
self-imposed isolation, its desperate food situation has caused the DPRK to
seek unprecedented assistance from outside agencies and countries.
However, this aid has fallen far short of the estimated 3 million tons still
849
required to feed its people. Compounding their dire situation is a lack of
hard currency and incredible expenditures for military capabilities and
operations, which equate to almost 30% of their GNP.
As we watch this situation and the severe food shortage develop in
the DPRK, the question is not: Will this country disintegrate? But rather,
how will it disintegrate, by implosion or explosion? And when? We worry
that in a very short period, this country will either collapse or take aggressive
actions against the South in a desperate attempt to divert attention from its
internal situation. It is entirely possible that the leadership in Pyongyang is
not, or will not, remain cohesive enough to make "rational decisions." With
all of that in mind, you can understand our concern over the volatility of their
situation.
Compounding the crisis is the DPRK's continued effort to undermine
the United Nations Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and their failure to
comply with long established protocols of the UNC Armistice Agreement. In
the spring of 1994, the DPRK announced that it no longer recognized the
MAC. Since that time, the situation has deteriorated to the point that
currently, I have no means to communicate with the military members of the
DPRK. They refuse to meet with us at Panmunjom on Armistice related
850
issues, and they refuse to talk to us on the telephone when we've called to
protest Armistice violations. At times, their duty officers have failed to
answer the phone or have told us outright they are not authorized to discuss
Armistice-related issues. This obviously would inhibit our ability to defuse a
situation should something happen along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Despite their internal situation and the other factors that I have
described, it is the DPRK's tremendous offensive military capability, its
forward posture, and its stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction which
cause my greatest concern. The DPRK's military developments are overtly
offensive and threatening. Norlh Korea is offensively arrayed across the
DMZ with a formidable force of over one million men and equipment. They
are capable of striking at the heart of Seoul without moving a single piece of
their vast arsenal fonward. Further, though we are confident the US-DPRK
Agreed Framework has stymied their nuclear efforts, they still retain the
capability to wreak mass havoc with their inventory of conventional
weapons. Most recently, their combat aircraft have been redeployed to new
locations near the DMZ, requiring only six minutes flying time to the
Republic of Korea's Blue House, the home of President Kim Young Sam, or
for that matter, to Yongsan, my headquarters and home to our largest
concentration of dependents.
851
Confronting this menace are the finest forces in the world. My
people, both military and civilian, American and Korean, are committed to
deterring aggression in our theater of operation. However, if deterrence
fails, and the adversary miscalculates, we stand ready to fight and win.
Let me take a minute to talk about the Republic of Korea and the
US-ROK alliance. The success of Northeast Asia in general, and the
Republic of Korea in particular, has its roots in the security established
through our regional alliances. Together, the Republic of Korea and United
States of America have formed a commitment, as represented in our Mutual
Defense Treaty, which has created an effective deterrence against
aggression by the DPRK. The Republic of Korea, one of Asia's greatest
success stories, has moved from a subsistence economy to advanced
manufacturing in a little over a generation. Although confronted by the
world's 4th largest Army, the Republic of Korea, aided in great measure by
our fonward presence and commitment, has developed an economy that
has grown to the 12th largest in the world. The people of Korea continually
demonstrate their commitment to the alliance. They have stood shoulder-to-
shoulder with their American brethren from the 38th parallel on the DMZ to
the jungles of Vietnam. When called upon, the Korean people have
contributed what they could, when they could, to preserve and strengthen
852
our mutually beneficial alliance. A vivid and current example is the recently
concluded multi-year burden sharing agreement signed this past November.
This agreement provides the United States government $330M in 1996 and
increases 10 per cent per year in 1997 and 1998. Last year, Korea spent
about $13.8 billion on its armed services, 3.3% of its GNP. Within this
budget, the South Korean government has continued to purchase many
advanced weapon systems from the United States. Last year alone,
through its Force Improvement Program (FIR), the Republic of Korea bought
from the United States Q37 counter battery radars, P-3 Orions, LANTIRN
night vision systems for their high performance aircraft, HARM, Harpoon,
Sparrow, AMRAAM, and TOW missiles, six CH-47 helicopters, and spare
parts for its Army, Navy and Air Force. Additionally, the ROK government
continues to upgrade its Air Forces through its Korean Fighter Program
(KFP). The KFP is a major purchase of 120 F16C/D aircraft for $5.2 billion.
To date, the ROK has received 21 of these fighters. Their total US
procurements for 1995 were worth $957.4 million. These procurements not
only contribute to American jobs but improve interoperability between ROK
and US forces. Finally, it was announced recently that between now and
853
2001 , the ROK will spend $1 1 3B In a 5-year plan to catch up with the
military might of the DPRK.
Despite these accomplishments, challenges still exist which can
hamper the ROK - US alliance. Many elements in Korean society see "the
light at the end of the tunnel." They believe that the trend of events mean
that they will, sooner or later, achieve a successful unification of the Korean
peninsula -- or at least an end to the ovenwhelming threat that they face from
the North. When that time comes, they believe, they will no longer be able
to count on a US military commitment that "balances" their armed forces.
Their lack of confidence in our long-term may have affected their force
modernization programs. The ROK strategic operational concept is a
"future-oriented defense policy," which foresees an "all azimuth" military
capability that includes a state of the art Air Force and bluewater Navy. The
apparent aims are to reduce the ROK's dependence on the US as its
security guarantor. This future-oriented defense policy sometimes conflicts
with our combined operational requirements.
The continued support by the American taxpayer in support of this
ROK-US alliance is appreciated. Specifically, your committee's support has
provided continuous funding for, and manning of, our units in the Republic of
Korea, and not only do I appreciate that, but I ask your continued support.
854
Readiness, modernization and quality of life initiatives are among my top
priorities, and funding for these areas need to be sustained for FY 97.
USFK needs money fOr facilities construction, modernization, and
infrastructure. This MILCON shortfall has truly manifested itself within
billeting and quarters. It was not uncommon in 1995 for accompanied
service members coming to Korea to have a projected 6-9 month wait for
family quarters. The impact upon morale of spending 9 months of a 24-
month tour without family members should be understandable. The $40
million MCA annual projections for FY 97, combined with anticipated ROK
costsharing programming, is approximately the nght level of funding we
require. This level of funding and a little more needs to be continued in the
out years. You can be assured that we are maximizing the use of every
resource and are continually looking for methods to maximize the return
from the resources you provide.
Another concern in our support of the alliance is the strategic lift
requirements critical to our force projection strategy. If war were to occur on
the peninsula, we would require a great deal of strategic air and sealift to
reinforce my theater of operations. The recent agreement to pre-position
equipment on the peninsula will expedite the buildup of some combat
855
power. However, I would be negligent if I did not point out that every delay
in the closure of the forces and logistics required to defeat the DPRK means
more blood will be spilled. We must maintain and improve our force
projection capabilities, particularly sealift, and I ask for your continued
support of the strategic lift program. This support will enhance our overall
air and sealift capabilities which will be both greatly appreciated and will
undoubtedly reap great benefits in case of conflict.
Theater missile defense is another key area where we must improve
our capability. DPRK missiles threaten all our major ports, air bases, fielded
ROK - US forces, and the population at large. This threat continues to
increase as North Korea pursues deployment of more SCUDs and
investment in its more advanced No Dong missiles. We have a battalion of
Patriot missiles on constant guard providing lower-tier defense of key
installations. However, even after upgrading to the "PAC-3" configuration,
these missiles cannot cover all of our critical locations. Deployment of an
upper-tier system is essential. Such a system will provide broad area
coverage, which in concert with the lower-tier system will dramatically
increase the probability of intercept. Your continued support of Theater
856
Missile Defense in the Korean theater is essential to protecting our forces
and enabling victory in the event of war.
Now, I would like to share my thoughts on the future of Northeast
Asia. The stability and prosperity of Northeast Asia are a matter of vital
national interest affecting the well being of all Americans. Within a 400-mile
radius of my headquarters in Seoul are elements of the four largest
militaries in the world. Further, the PACRIM accounts for over 38% of our
nation's trade - about $400 billion - and roughly 30% of US exports which
translate into millions of American jobs. Japan and Korea are both staunch
US allies, but their military-to-military relationships with each other are still
significantly affected by historical strains. Given the criticality of the region,
the expanse of the entire Pacific area, and the complexity of relationships in
Northeast Asia, I believe it may make sense in the foreseeable future to
consider restructuring our military commands in order to fold all of the region
under a single command to defend our interests in the area. This might be
done in several ways - a new unified command, a single sub-unified
command, or reconsidering the locations of the current components of
PACOM are just three examples. However we might choose to accomplish
this, I believe it is important that we recognize the value of personal
relationships in Asia. We will need senior representatives of the US military
857
that are located in the region itself so as to ensure continued personal
contacts with the military leaders of the various states located here.
In conclusion, Mister Chairman, I would like to emphasize that our
job is not finished in Korea. In fact, as you are undoubtedly aware, we are
currently at the most critical and volatile stage in our assurance of peace on
the Korean peninsula since the end of the Korean War. Attaining a
successful conclusion to our combined policy objectives in Korea is within
reach, but only if we continue to maintain the will and the capability to see
this through to the end with our loyal ROK allies. Change in North Korea is
inevitable. Our combined determination and preparedness are the keys to
ensuring that change is manageable and, hopefully, peaceful.
Again, I cannot overemphasize the importance of the support we receive
from both the Republic of Korea and the American taxpayers. The criticality of
Northeast Asian issues demands our long-term attention, and the status of the
Kim Jong-il regime and the North Korean threat remain real and unpredictable.
The patience and cooperation of Congress and the American people, together
with the support of our ROK allies, will enable a successful outcome to this
significant effort - peace on the Korean peninsula and continued stability in
Northeast Asia.
858
The Chairman. We might as well get started on you, I guess, Ad-
miral Gehman. We have about 7 minutes before we have to break
for this vote, so we will let you go.
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. HAROLD GEHMAN, USN, DEPUTY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
Admiral Gehman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the committee. On behalf of the Commander in Chief
of the U.S. Atlantic Command, Gen. Jack Sheehan, who is in Eu-
rope today performing NATO duties in his other hat as one of
NATO's two military supreme commanders, I do appreciate this op-
portunity to appear before you.
I do have a very brief statement which I would like to make, and
I would appreciate our formal statement being entered into the
record.
In 1996 it will be the 10th anniversary of the enactment of Gold-
water-Nichols, Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986.
I think it is appropriate that we in this room recognize that my tes-
timony today represents a direct line of thought and energy that
goes back to that fundamental change in military affairs which was
wrought by an act of Congress. Just as it was intended to I think
by the way.
In his report on the roles and missions of the Armed Forces as
required by Goldwater-Nichols, and using his enhanced authority
as empowered by Goldwater-Nichols, the then Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, authored a change in uni-
fied command plan in 1993, just 3 short years ago. That change in-
stitutionalized in the DOD hierarchy a strong advocate for the joint
way of doing business.
General Powell's revised unified command plan, or UCP as we
call it, gave command of almost all forces based in the United
States to my command, USACOM, and charged us, ACOM, with
ensuring those forces were jointly trained and integrated. By inte-
grated I mean able to operate together interoperably on the field.
He thought, General Powell thought the Nation and the Nation's
taxpayers deserved no less.
I appear before you today to report on whether the initiatives of
Congress are alive and well and whether the taxpayers are better
off for the changes we made. I do know that the image presented
by us so-called geographic CINC's is the image of the section of the
world that we represent, the section of the world wherein we look
after the Nation's interests, and USACOM is no exception.
In our geographic area, we are the commander of operations in
Haiti, commander of operations reacting to the shootdown of two
United States civilian aircraft by the Government of Cuba 1 month
ago. We have just closed up our immense and very costly operation
rescuing and housing almost 90,000 migrants in the last 4 years,
and we do, by numbers and effort at least, command the largest
antidrug operation that the United States has under way. The
thing that makes all four of these recent or ongoing USACOM op-
erations significant is their close proximity to the mainland of the
United States.
I will leave the details of these operations to the committee to
bring out, if you so choose, except to say as Admiral Prueher said
859
and as General Luck said, we are very proud of the ability of the
world's finest Armed Forces to demonstrate their capability to get
into a place like Haiti, do exactly what was asked of them without
allowing us to slip down any slippery slopes and to get out on time.
Our area of responsibility also includes 24 political entities, 13
nations, all but one of which is a democracy of some quality or an-
other, and 11 territories of the United States or of European coun-
tries. USACOM has worked hard with the international entities to
restore democracy in Haiti, and now we are watching the mid-May
elections in the Dominican Republic to do what we can to foster an
atmosphere to assure free and fair elections there.
This process never stops, and all these countries look north for
leadership and they have found it. I think that we are all aware
that all but one country are democracies.
Joint training and interoperability are relevant to the very ap-
propriate and ongoing discussions which we are going to have re-
garding force structure, OPTEMPO and modernization. It is my
command's position that we should be able to find both increases
in effectiveness and efficiencies in the joint approach to the Depart-
ment's many missions. If we cannot, we should relook at why we
have the mission.
I will be prepared to comment on both efficiencies of joint train-
ing, both from the CONUS-based forces and in the commanders
and their staffs which will lead these forces in war.
Because of your investment in USACOM, USACOM Joint Model-
ing and Simulation Center and our training facilities, we will re-
duce the cost in terms of money and people and their times away
from home station. I do invite you and your staff that have not vis-
ited our joint training facility at Norfolk, VA, and you will see that
we are conducting training that is relevant to the world as we see
it, using 21st century methods and equipment and at a lower cost
than we did 3 years ago.
On the very dubious note of closing by claiming that we can do
more with less, I hereby close and thank you for your attention.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of General Sheehan follows:]
860
For Release Only By The
National Security Committee of the
United States House of Representatives
Statement of
General John J, Sheehan, USMC
Commander In Chief
United States Atlantic Command
Before the Committee on National Security
United States House of Representatives
28 March 1996
For Release Only By The
National Security Committee of the
United States House of Representatives
861
Statement of
General John J. Sheehan, USMC
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Before the National Security Committee of the
United States House of Representatives
19 March 1996
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the House National Security
Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you. I would like to
provide you with a brief update on USACOM's evolution since the 1993
revision to the Unified Command Plan, a regional assessment and review the
Atlantic Command's:
• Role as the chief advocate of jointness and integrator, trainer and
provider of joint forces;
• Responsibilities and accomplishments (including an assessment of our
recently completed, and highly successful, operations in Haiti and at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) ;
• Extensive support for AOR disaster relief and humanitarian assistance;
• USACOM's strategic vision and goals;
• Position on readiness.
The U.S. Atlantic Command in its current form is only three years old.
Created by the 1993 revision of the Unified Command Plan, USACOM is an
advocate and manifestation of the Congressional intent for a seamless, joint
U.S. military force first proposed in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.
In the decade following the passage of the historic Goldwater-Nichols
legislation, and especially over the past few years, we have made tremendous
862
strides training this nation's military to fight as a coherent joint team. As the
drafters of that historic legislation clearly understood, no single service is
capable of doing alone what can be done jointly. We at USACOM view
jointness as our product, and the integration of service capabilities is the
process used to ensure this nation's military remains the most efficient and
effective force in the world.
Today, USACOM integrates the military capabilities of nearly all forces
based in the continental United States through its components: the Air
Combat Command, Forces Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, and the
Atlantic Fleet. USACOM now has Combatant Command (COCOM) of over
80% of the active combatant force structure in CONUS.
We need to continue the evolution and ensure National Guard and Reserve
forces are prepared to be an integral part of our worldwide contingency
operations. Reserve force structure has become increasingly important to the
employment, deployment and support of our active duty forces. As an
essential part of the total force structure, their capabilities must be relevant
for warfighting plans and contingency operations. Except for the Reserve
forces needed to carry-out service secretary responsibilities. Reserve forces
must continue to be assigned to the combatant commands as envisioned by
Goidwater-Nichols. Moreover, to ensure Active and Reserve integration.
Guard and Reserve forces require joint training and oversight of readiness
standards paralleling active force measurements.
863
USACOM, like all geographic
CINCs, retains Combatant
Commander responsibilities within
our assigned Area Of
Responsibility (AOR).
Concurrently, my NATO position
as Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic (SACLANT), reinforces
the synergistic link between the
NATO Alliance and the
increasingly important role played
by joint, CONUS-based forces.
RESPONsmnjTnrs
Area of Responsibility
Joint Force Provider
Joint Force Training and
Exercises
Assist in Joint Doctrine
Development
Military Support for Counter
Drug Operations
CONUS, Caribbean and other
AOR Disaster Relief and Civil
Disturbance Support
Operations
Expand and Improve
Partnership for Peace Training
and Exercises
Additional and enhanced tasks include:
• Identifying , training, and facilitating deployment of joint forces in
support of non-contingency operations such as peacetime engagement,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance operations;
• Providing Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Military
Assistance for Civil Disturbances within the 48 contiguous states, the District
of Columbia, and the geographic AOR;
■ Providing military support for counterdrug operations within the
continental U.S. , the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean.
864
APR Threat Assessment
The primary threat in USACOM's AOR remains regional instability.
As we have witnessed in Cuba and Haiti, economic stagnation and political
unrest can quickly turn into a flood tide of illegal migration to the United
States. These conditions or natural disasters can have similar effects in any of
the 24 island nations, U.S. or European territories in the Caribbean.
While narcotics trafficking continues in the Caribbean, increased
cooperation by DOD, law enforcement agencies, and some NATO navies
operating in the Caribbean, coordinated at USACOM's Joint Interagency
Task Force (JIATF-East) in Key West, Florida, has forced traffickers to
increasingly rely on the more complicated, but less risky, land and air routes
from Mexico into the southwest United States.
Intelligence indicates that as much as 70% of cocaine smuggled into the
U.S. is coming across the U.S. Southwest border. Therefore, the U.S.
Southwest border is a USACOM Area of Emphasis. USACOM's Joint Task
Force Six (JTF-6), located at El Paso, Texas, continues to provide valuable
support to the U.S. interagency effort to stem the flow of drugs across the
Southwest Border. Our support of Drug Law Enforcement, specifically to
Operation Valley in California's Imperial Valley by Joint Task Force -6, has
provided unprecedented success in seizing illegal drugs and capturing
traffickers.
A sizeable portion of the drugs that eventually enter the United States
still use the sea and air bridges through the Caribbean and the Eastern
Pacific. One recent at-sea seizure of 12 metric tons of cocaine from the
fishing vessel Natyle was the largest maritime seizure in history. This was the
865
result of seamless cooperation between Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and
our Joint Task Forces. Seamless operations of this type are typical of daily
ACOM counterdrug operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific and
represents one of America's forward defenses in the struggle against drugs.
Additionally, to enhance U.S. counterdrug efforts in the Caribbean, we
have increased our support to the newly established High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
The Russian Navy
Finally, we remain watchful of the Russian Navy's Northern Fleet.
In view of the uncertainties of Russia's future course, it is prudent to monitor
their capabilities as we assess our own modernization requirements. This will
ensure that we maintain our technological advantage—especially in the area
of anti-submarine warfare.
With the exception of Russian naval capability, nearly all of the challenges
to U.S. national security in the Atlantic AOR fall into the lower end of the
conflict spectrum.
USA COM Advantage
Since our primary focus remains the training, integration, and deployment
of U.S.-based forces for joint and combined operations both within and
outside USACOM's AOR, we are in continuous communication with the
other CINCs, principally, the other geographic CINCs, to understand their
threat assessments and emerging joint force training requirements.
To give you an idea of the breadth and scope of USACOM's force
866
provider role, on any given day USACOM has approximately 40 to 70 ships,
350 to 400 aircraft, and over 37,000 personnel forward deployed to support
over 18 separate operations around the globe under the command of the other
geographic CE^Cs. Each CE^C has unique force and training requirements,
and USACOM works to ensure those requirements, along with the lessons-
learned from returning units, are entered into our joint training and exercise
[Trogram to benefit future deployments.
Working closely with USEUCOM and NATO's SACEUR, for example,
we identified and deployed 6,000 Active and Reserve personnel to support
IFOR. USACOM/ACLANT also trained 462 individuals for duty on joint or
NATO staffs, including 80 civilians, at our temporary Joint Preparation and
Onward Movement Center (JPOMC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. This
combined team of NATO's ACLANT and USACOM trainers offered the
Services and Defense Agencies one-stop confirmation of individual U.S.
augmentee deployability, resolution of service specific personnel deployability
issues, and in-transit visibility of augmentees to the supported CINC. For the
first time ever, this combined team also provided tailored training for these
CONUS-based augmentees destined to Joint/Multinational staffs on subjects
ranging from NATO standard operational procedures, IFOR's command and
intelligence structure and an up-dated Bosnia situational brief to basic
personal safety issues. This processing and training minimized the in-theater
augmentee orientation/training burden on the supported CINC.
In 1995, USACOM also provided similar support for USCENTCOM and
USPACOM (specifically U.S. Forces Korea) when they required
augmentation to respond to a higher alert status in their theaters.
6
867
Regional Update
The Caribbean
The 24 sovereign nations, and
U.S. and European territories in the
Caribbean region contain significant
diversity in language, history, and
social-cultural characteristics. While
Cuba, the Dominican Republic and
Puerto Rico share a common language
and history with neighboring Spanish-
speaking nations in Central and South
America, most of the Caribbean
1995 ACCOMPLTSHMFNTS
Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from
Haiti.
Close-out of Migrant Operations
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Expanded Joint Force Training
and Exercises.
Assist in Advanced Concept
Technology and Joint Doctrine
Development
Rapid Response to Caribbean
Disaster Reliet
Improved Support for
Interagency Counter-Drug Ops.
island nations have few linguistic, cultural or security ties with "Latin
America." These nations trace their culture and history to Africa and non-
Spanish speaking Europe, while their strongest hemispheric affiliations today
are with Canada and the United States. If we are to prevent regional
instability and build common security goals among this diverse group of
nations, we must start by setting the tone within the region that we recognize
each island nation's unique history, characteristics and sovereignty.
Recently we have brought two very complex and costly operations to a
successful conclusion — our joint, combined and multi-agency operations in
Haiti and migrant operations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
868
Haiti
Our recent operations in Haiti began, on 19 September 1994, with the
introduction of U.S. forces in support of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 940. Since then, we have assisted the Haitian government in
providing a secure and stable environment to allow democracy to establish
itself in this troubled nation.
This operation has been recognized as the best case study to date in the
planning, execution, and conclusion of a multi-service, multi-agency and
multi-national synchronous operation. Forces of the U.S. Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard, non-military elements of the U.S.
government agencies, a multinational military and police force, and a host of
international non-government and private volunteer organizations all
contributed unique capabilities.
Under the command of a U.S. General, military and police forces from 26
nations — including Canada, the Netherlands, Guatemala, Bangladesh,
Pakistan and for the first time in such an operation, a combined battalion of
soldiers from the Caribbean island nations, contributed to the success of the
operation. With the exception of approximately 200 support personnel, all
U.S. forces participating in the United Nations phase of this operation will
leave Haiti by April 15th.
We have already captured many important lessons in the areas of joint
logistics, inter-agency coordination and operations, and intelligence support
for operations other than war that will benefit future U.S. and coalition
military operations.
869
Cuba
I am concerned over the recent increase in tension between the U.S.
and Cuba. The 24 February shootdown of two unarmed civilian aircraft
flying in international airspace was a clear violation of international law and
a serious setback to our efforts at reducing tension with the Cuban
government. USACOM-as the regional CINC responsible for the
Caribbean— conducted, with the U.S. Coast Guard, the interagency effort
supporting monitoring operations for the March 2nd Brothers to the Rescue
memorial flotilla.
Internally, Cuba's continued economic and political stagnation could
result in instability and the possible resurgence of illegal mass migration
should the situation deteriorate. The Cuban migrant challenge in 1994 was
the largest since the Mariel boat lift in 1980. In response, USACOM
established Joint Task Force 160 at U.S. Navy Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
in May of 1994 to support relief and processing centers for migrants. By
September, the camps reached their peak population of 47,809 migrants.
Through hard work and innovative cooperation within the U.S. interagency
and Caribbean Island Nations, we finally were able to deactivate JTF 160 in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba after processing 54, 418 migrants from May 1994
until January 1996.
The total DoD cost of the operation is estimated at approximately $480
million. Over 17,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines were assigned to
the mission, along with numerous personnel from other U.S. government
agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and private volunteer
organizations (PVOs).
870
Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance
Within the AOR, the threatened eruption of a volcano on the British island
of Montserrat, located in the leeward Antilles, created chaos and caused a
partial evacuation of the island. USACOM, in support of the British military
and the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), assisted in the
partial evacuation of the island while also providing relief supplies for
3000(+) displaced personnel. U.S. Naval forces were standing by to execute a
full evacuation of the island, if required. Disaster relief support for the
Caribbean Islands devastated by Hurricane Luis (Antigua, Barbuda, St.
Kitts, Nevis, St Martin) was the next significant support operation.
USACOM forces deployed to the stricken area to support the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance to assess and assist in the relief operations.
Disaster relief support included transportation of Dutch relief supplies to St
Martin, and assistance to distribute relief supplies on Antigua, Barbuda, St
Kitts and Nevis.
Never before has the United States been so inundated with requests for
assistance in response to numerous and varied natural and manmade
disasters. USACOM has the assigned task to conduct necessary planning,
coordination, and training to prepare DOD forces tasked to support federal,
state and local governments. The USACOM trained forces assists these
governments in their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage that
may result from major disasters and emergencies. This is categorized under
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and Military Assistance to
Civil Disturbances (MACDIS) for providing support to the 48 contiguous
United States, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
871
During FY 95, USACOM provided support for several major disasters, to
include floods in Texas, California, and the Midwest; the Oklahoma City
bombing; fires in the northwest and Long Island, as well as Hurricanes Erin,
Felix and Marilyn in August and September. In quantifying the damage
statistics for the hurricanes alone, there were 2500(+) buildings destroyed,
12000(+) buildings damaged, affecting over 4 million people, with overall
damage costs estimated in the billions of dollars.
Although the majority of DOD's involvement in support of civil
authorities for FY 95 was performed by state Army National Guard and Air
National Guard, over 1900 active duty and reserve personnel from USACOM
components responded to National level disasters and emergencies.
This year's successes in Haiti, GTMO, Military Support to Civil
Authorities, Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances, and counterdrug
operations were made possible by combining our unique charter as a joint
force provider and trainer along with our geographic responsibility for the
Atlantic AOR. The SECDEF ordered each mission...then one commander,
CINCUSACOM, was responsible for executing total mission accomplishment
with jointly provided forces already under our combatant command.
Support for the Olympics
Another major operation on the horizon for USACOM is military support
to the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. This will be a major undertaking of which
the importance of it's success cannot be overstated. In support of the 1996
Olympics, we have established a joint task force to coordinate DOD support
for the Games. USACOM, through the JTF, will assist the Atlanta
Committee for the Olympic Games. We anticipate committing, at peak
II
872
times, approximately 7000 DOD personnel (approximately 2000 active
personnel) to support the day-to-day operations of the Games and the
Paralympic Games immediately following the Olympic Games. Additionally,
plans are being prepared for all potential contingencies for man-made or
natural disasters.
Command Strategic Vision and Goals
The primary way USACOM supports the national military objectives of
Promoting Stability and Thwarting Aggression is through our first goal of
improving the joint combat capability of assigned CONUS-based military
forces. We are continually developing cost-efHcient and improved ways of
training, exercising, and deploying units and individuals capable of operating
as joint task forces in any
environment. Our requirements
-based joint training program is
founded upon clearly identified
critical tasks, conditions, and
standards required of our forces.
Our requirements-based joint
training program has three tiers.
The Tier One foundation is service
training, where soldiers, sailors,
airmen. Marines and coast
guardsmen attain their core service
competencies by training on the
service Mission Essential Tasks or
1996 Goals
Improve the Joint Combat
Capability of Assigned CONUS-
based military forces.
Improve the Competitive
Advantage of America's Armed
Forces.
Enhance Multinational
Operational Readiness.
Engage Interagency in
Contingency Planning, Training,
Exercises and Operations.
Strengthen DoD Program
Planning and Acquisition Process.
Create a Command Culture of
Quality.
873
METs. In Tier Two, units conduct field training focused on joint
interoperability between units from two or more services at the tactical and
operational level.
Finally, it is at the third level of training. Tier Three, where USACOM
adds the most value to joint training, and our forces achieve true joint
operational readiness. Tier-Three training combines simulation and
computer-assisted decision making to more efficiently train JTF commanders
and their staffs. The aggressive execution of this three-tier program is the
key to improving America's joint readiness.
The .ITASC and .loint Battle Center
USACOM 's centerpiece for joint task force operations, planning, and
staff readiness is the new Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center
(JTASQ. On the road to becoming one of the world's premier centers of
next-generation computer modeling and simulation, the JTASC is our
primary vehicle for training Joint Task Force (JTF) commanders and their
stafEs. By using the JTASC's advanced modeling and simulations technology
to train JTFs and associated staffs, we are able to reduce the costs' of exercises
by eliminating the expenditure of massive resources normally associated with
large field training exercises. We no longer have to field an army to train a
general. In addition to reducing costs, we can also reduce PERSTEMPO and
family separation time on already heavily tasked and deployed troops.
Although JTASC reached initial operational capability (IOC) this year,
during the JTASC development process, we conducted two major joint task
force exercises with our service components' three-star headquarters serving
13
874
as JTF commanders. We base these exercises on real-world scenarios using
actual threat and terrain data bases. I invite each of you to visit the JTASC
to see this success story which represents the future of joint warfare.
To date, the III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas and the II Marine
Expeditionary Force (MEF) at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina have
participated as Joint Task Force commanders in these challenging exercises.
USACOM's goal is to bring each of our three-star commanders and their
staffs to the JTASC for training once every two and a half years. This will
ensure that most staff officers will undergo JTF training at least once during
a tour of duty at a USACOM component headquarters. Even if these
component staffs do not actually deploy and fight as a JTF headquarters
staff, thousands of officers will be trained in JTF operations.
Another initiative we are working on, in concert with the Joint Staff, is
establishing a Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Joint Battle Center (JBC), and co-
locating it with the JTASC in Suffolk, Virginia. The JBC-JTASC initiative
represents a significant enhancement for this nation's ability to maintain a
competitive advantage in C4ISR, and offers many advantages to both
organizations and ultimately the forces engaged in joint operations.
Co-location of the JBC with JTASC's 24-hour operation will provide
ready access to USACOM's joint training team, exercise program,
simulations and analytical facilities. As new C4ISR concepts and equipment
evolve from the JBC, we collectively should be able to assess their relevancy
in a joint warfighting environment. Similarly, as C4ISR issues are identified
during our exercises, JBC can offer a means of quickly assessing possible
solutions. Either way, our Service components and JTF commanders and the
14
875
C4ISR JBC should benefit The ability to draw upon in-place JTASC
technology and systems, in conjunction with the USACOM warfighter's
experience, will enable the JBC to come on-line quickly and economically.
The USACOM-SACLANT Relationship
With CINCUSACOM dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander
Atlantic, USACOM is in a unique position to influence multi-national
operational readiness and improve the quality of Partnership for Peace training
and exercises. We -wiW pursue leveraging USACOM and NATO resources and
encourage other nations to participate in planning and exercising regional or
coalition response.
Our efforts in this area have already paid dividends. Last August, we
hosted the first Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercise on U.S. territory with
4300 troops from 14 PfP nations, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., along with
observers from 11 other nations, for Cooperative Nugget '95 at Fort Polk,
Louisiana. In September, we conducted exercise "Autumn Allies" which
brought 200 Ukrainian troops to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina to work with
their U.S. Marine counterparts. In October, we hosted a Russian company
from the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division at Fort Riley, Kansas for
Peacekeeper '95. It was the first time Russian and American ground troops
have trained together on U.S. soil. Today, Russia, the Ukraine and many
nations that participated in PfP and in the spirit of PfP exercises are working
side-by-side with U.S. and other NATO allies as part of the IFOR in Bosnia.
876
Supporting tha Interagency Process
Next, the command will continue to cultivate interagency relationships
and cooperative knowledge that can he capitalized upo/f in contingency
planning and execution. In an era of reduced budgets and non-traditional
military missions like disaster relief and counterdrug operations, we must
improve the interagency process to increase DoD efficiency and effectiveness
in these new areas. We also strive to cultivate good working relationships
with non-government organizations, private volunteers and private sector
capabilities in all appropriate JTF plans and exercises.
Supporting Acquisition of New Technology
Finally, USACOM will actively support the Department of Defense and
the Services' program, planning and acquisition process. This is accomplished
by active participation in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROQ
process, by drafting Joint Mission Need Statements for Future Oriented
Missions, and by developing Integrated Priority Lists.
Since USACOM has combatant command of most of the CONUS-based
force structure, we are also in the position to lead in the process oT bringing
technology from the lab to the battlefield much faster. The Advanced
Research Project Agency's (ARPA) Advanced Concept and Technology
Demonstration (ACTD) process and its relationship with USACOM is a good
example. This important effort allows for the accelerated development and
fielding of promising defense technologies, and is an integral part of
reforming and revolutionizing the acquisition process. One of our early
success stories is the Predator ACTD. While Predator remains an ACTD,
it's military utility was demonstrated in September 1995 while forward
16
A
877
deployed to USEUCOM. Predator's information played a critical role in
dismissing Bosnian Serb propaganda, CSAR attempts, and battle damage
assessment of initial airstrikes. Predators progress from initial concept to
operational capability in just over two years, demonstrates the utility of the
ACTD program. To date, USACOM is sponsoring 10 of the 21 existing or
planned ACTDs ongoing worldwide.
Non-lethal Weapons
USACOM is also working to focus industry, technical centers, policy
makers, military planners and law enforcement agencies on real world
operational requirements and experience regarding non-lethal technology.
USACOM has deployed simple non-lethal capabilities for riot and crowd
control in our operations in both Haiti and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
changing realities brought about by the end of the Cold War have
demonstrated that we need new tools for the increasing number of missions
where deadly force can often be counterproductive and traditional riot and
crowd control equipment and procedures needlessly endangers our troops.
These other-than-war missions are becoming much more complex — as in the
case of Bosnia — and require more sophisticated, non-lethal/Iess-lethal
capabilities to protect our forces, prevent an unnecessary escalation in the
level of violence, and enable mission success.
It is important that we invigorate existing non-lethal research,
development, and acquisition activities by providing an operational
requirements perspective to various initiatives. USACOM will continue to
challenge industry, DoD, the R&D Laboratories and other agencies to work
with us to address these issues. We will further expand our close working
17
878
relationship with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition
and Technology, in pursuing an ACTD in the area of non-lethal weapons.
Readiness
A visit to USACOM or its components would demonstrate that we have
a high quality military force. Our components' forces are capable of
executing the missions required of them. However, to fully examine the issue
of present and future readiness, one must look at three separate factors:
current readiness, force structure and recapitalization.
People remain the linchpin of readiness. Our soldiers, sailors, airman, and
Marines are, and will continue to be, the deciding factor on the battlefield, or
in contingency operations. If we are to maintain the high level of quality
currently in the Armed Forces, we must be willing to compensate our military
personnel for the unique and demanding service they perform for our
Nation. In return for their sacrifice , our service members deserve adequate
pay, affordable and accessible medical benefits, the preservation of the
retirement system, and safe, adequate housing.
Within the strictures of the fiscal reality, we need to engage at the
highest levels in a serious debate on the proper balance among the competing
demands of force structure, readiness, and recapitalization. We need to more
fully explore the various tradeoffs between these broad defense needs. For
while no one can deny the need for a recapitalization process that will permit
the services to procure required future systems, we need to broaden the
discussion beyond force structure versus recapitalization. It is time to review
the size and numbers of headquarters as well as the size of the defense
l«
879
agencies. Our headquarters and agencies should not grow while force
structure shrinks.
Conclusion
We believe the current force levels can sustain adequate combat capabilities
and readiness provided we improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the
total force structure. Enhanced joint force training is a critical part of this
effort. USACOM will continue to measure and evaluate joint training
exercises, readiness and experimental technology to ensure U.S. forces are
getting the most for their training dollar.
Combat capabilities achieved through joint force integration will continue
to be a major focus of our ongoing readiness efforts at USACOM. As we
move into the 21st century and continue to face a changing and increasingly
challenging national security environment, our ability to integrate all
Services' capabilities (Active, Reserve and National Guard) will be a major
determinant in our ability to field a credible force to win this nation's wars.
38-160 97-30
880
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
The U.S. Atlantic Command in its current form is only three years old.
Created by the 1993 revision of the Unified Command Plan, USACOM is an advocate and
manifestation of the Congressional intent for a seamless, joint U.S. military force first
proposed in the landmark Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act
of 1986.
In the decade following the passage of the historic Goldwater-Nichols legislation, and
especially over the past few years, we have made tremendous strides training this nation's
military to fight as a coherent joint team. As the drafters of that historic legislation clearly
understood, no single service is capable of doing alone what can be done jointly. We at
USACOM view jointness as our product, and the integration of service capabilities is the
process used to ensure this nation's military remains the most efficient and effective force in
the world.
Today, USACOM integrates the military capabilities of neariy all forces based in the
continental United States through its components: the Air Combat Command, Forces
Command, Marine Forces Atlantic, and the Atlantic Fleet. USACOM now has
Combatant Command (COCOM) of over 80% of the active combatant force structure in
CONUS.
RESPONSIBILITIES
Area of Responsibility
Joint Force Provider
Joint Force Training and
Exercises
Assist in Joint Doctrine
Deveiopment
Military Support for Counter
Drug Operations
CONUS, Caribl>ean and other
AOR Disaster Relief and Civil
Disturt>ance Support
Operations
Expand and Improve
Partnership for Peace Training
and Exercises
1995 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Witlidrawal of U.S. Forces
from Haiti.
OoscHiut of Migrant
Operations in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Expanded Joint Force
Training and Exercises.
Assist in Advanced Concept
Technology and Joint
Doctrine Development
Rapid Response to Caribbean
Disaster Relief.
Improved Support for
Interagency Counter-Drug
Ops.
881
Command Strategic Vision and Goals
The Dfimarv way USACOM supports the
national mUitarv objectives ofPromotine
Stability and Tkwartine Aeeression is throueh
our first eoal of improving the joint combat
capability of assigned CONUS-based military
forces. We are continually developing cost-
efficient and improved ways of training,
exercising, and deploying units and individuals
capable of operating as joint task forces in any
environment Our requirements
-based joint training program is founded upon
clearly identified critical tasks, conditions, and
standards required of our forces.
Our requirements-based joint training
program has three tiers. The Tier One
foundation is service training, where soldiers,
sailors, airmen. Marines and coast guardsmen
attain their core service competencies by
training on the service Mission Essential Tasks
or METs. In Tier Two, units conduct field
training focused on joint interoperability
between units from two or more services at the ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^_^^
tactical and operational level.
Finally, it is at the third level of training. Tier Three, where USACOM adds the most
value to joint training, and our forces achieve true joint operational readiness. Tier-Three
training combines simulation and computer-assisted decision making to more efficiently
train JTF commanders and their staffs. The aggressive execution of this three-tier
program is the key to improving America's joint readiness.
1996 Goals
Improve tiie imnt Combat
Capabiiity of Assigned CONUS-
based military forces.
Improve tiie Comp^itive
Advantage of America's Armed
Forces.
Enhaace Multinational
Operational Readiness.
Engage interag<»icy in
Contingency i^anntng^ Trainings ■
Exercises and Operations.
Strengthm BoB Program
Planning and Acquisition Process.
Create a Command Culture of
Quality.
The JTASC
USACOM's centerpiece for joint task force operations, planning, and staff
readiness is the new Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC). On the
road to becoming one of the world's premier centers of next-generation computer modeling
and simulation, the JTASC is our primary vehicle for training Joint Task Force (JTF)
commanders and their staffs. By using the JTASC's advanced modeling and simulations
technology to train JTFs and associated staffs, we are able to reduce the costs of exercises
by eliminating the expenditure of massive resources normaUy associated with large field
training exercises. We no longer have to field an army to train a general. In addition to
reducing costs, we can abo reduce PERSTEMPO and family separation time on already
heavily tasked and deployed troops.
882
The USACOM-SACLANT Relationship
With CINCUSACOM dual-hatted as the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic,
USACOM is in a unique position to influence multi-national operational readiness and
improve the quality of Partnership for Peace training and exercises. We will pursue
leveraeine USACOM and NATO resources and encourage other nations to participate in
planning and exercising regional or coalition response.
Supporting the Interagency Process
The command will continue to cultivate interaeencv relationships and cooperative
knowledee that can be capitalized upon in contingency plannine and execution. In an era of
reduced budgets and non-traditional military missions like disaster relief and counterdrug
operations, we must improve the interagency process to increase DoD efficiency and
effectiveness in these new areas. We also strive to cultivate good working relationships with
non-government organizations, private volunteers and private sector capabilities in all
appropriate JTF plans and exercises.
Supporting Acquisition of New Technology
USACOM will actively support the Department of Defense and the Services'
program, plannine and acquisition process. This is accomplished by active participation in
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process, by drafting Joint Mission Need
Statements for Future Oriented Missions, and by developing Integrated Priority Lists.
Since USACOM has combatant command of most of the CONUS-based force structure,
we are also in the position to lead in the process of bringing technology from the lab to the
battlefield much faster. The Advanced Research Project Agency's (ARPA) Advanced
Concept and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) process and its relationship with
USACOM is a good example. This important effort allows for the accelerated development
and fielding of promising defense technologies, and is an integral part of reforming and
revolutionizing the acquisition process.
Retuliness
A visit to USACOM or its components would demonstrate that we have a high
quality military force. Our components' forces are capable of executing the missions
required of them. The current force levels can sustain adequate combat capabilities and
readiness provided we improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the total force structure.
Enhanced joint force training is a critical part of this effort USACOM will continue to
measure and evaluate joint training exercises, readiness and experimental technology to
ensure U.S. forces are getting the most for their training dollar.
Combat capabilities achieved through joint force integration will continue to be a major
focus of our ongoing readiness efforts at USACOM. As we move into the 21st century and
continue to face a changing and increasingly challenging national security environment,
our ability to integrate all Services' capabilities (Active, Reserve and National Guard) will
be a major determinant in our ability to field a credible force to win this nation's wars.
883
The Chairman. It is a good place for us to break for this vote
and we will try to vote and come right back. If you can stand by,
we would appreciate it. Thank you.
[Brief Recess. 1
The Chairman. The meeting will please be in order.
We have to apologize for all this running back and forth, but the
inmates are out of control over there on the floor and we are hav-
ing votes every 5 minutes it looks like, and 10 minutes in between
the debate. The decision is trying to be made whether to come back
or not at all. But I am going to start again and see if we can get
a few things on the record anyway.
Let me start off with Mr. Bateman.
Mr. Bateman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to our dis-
tinguished witnesses for my absence. It is part of the craziness that
seems to have struck Capitol Hill today. I think it must be the full
moon or something.
Not having heard your opening statements, I am just going to
make a general comment and then any observations you want to
share I would love to have you respond.
Yesterday we heard from JROC, this morning we heard from two
of your fellow CINC's, and in each instance they pointed out areas
of grave concern about the future capability of our military, in
large measure concerns founded in modernization, recapitalization
of our forces.
It has been made clear to us that the budget that has been sub-
mitted to us is not a budget that really reflected the concerns of
JROC as to what our legitimate military requirements are. And
while I and others have not quarreled with the allocation of re-
sources within an inadequate budget, it seems rather clear to many
of us, if not most, that this budget is totally driven by consider-
ations other than our national security requirements.
We especially want to know from you, the war fighters, what im-
plications you see in the funding line and profiles for this year's
budget and the budgets for the next ensuing years as planned on
your capabilities to discharge your significant role in executing our
national military strategy.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Bateman, thank you for your comments.
Up until about 7 weeks ago I was a member of that obscure group
known as the JROC, and I think from my current vantage point
and from that one the issue we are trying to grapple with is bal-
ance.
Our current force structure from the CINC's view, we think, is
about right. Our readiness is good. So what we have to do, if we
take the modernization piece of other budget, which is not enough
to fund future readiness, if we take modernization and say that
equals future readiness and we think about the future, we need to
figure a way to apply additional funds to that.
From my point of view, the figure that is bandied about and that
Admiral Owens came up with of about $60 billion in procurement
in order to modernize the force, I think is again about the right
number, plus or minus a standard deviation. The point is to try to
affect that balance. If we had additional funds moving forward, we
have the right things in the budget. Given that we cannot afford
everything, if we could accelerate some of the things that have
884
been deferred in the budget I think that is what we would mostly
like to see, sir.
General LuCK. Sir, I am sort of out on the end of the bench on
this one. I am not quite sure how all the numbers come together
and everything, but I will tell you one thing, if we are going to
have a certain way of doing business in the world, and I think we
should be a world leader, and if we have to stay involved here,
there and every other where to be that world leader, and to assert
our rightful position, in my view, then we are going to have to have
the capability to do that, usually vested in the military. My sugges-
tion would be that force structure wise we should not get a bit
smaller than we are now and that there are some things that we
need to attend to to keep us the best military in the world.
I have been here a long time and I have seen it both ways. I like
this way better. That is my position on it, sir.
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Bateman, we recognize the agony of this
allocation dilemma we are in. From USACOM's point of view, we
feel strongly that the support of our readiness today, the support
of our troops and support of our requirements to do our job today
and tomorrow has to be our number one priority. Because we,
USACOM, have to provide all these other CINC's forces on a daily
basis.
We are concerned also about mortgaging the future by not fund-
ing modernization accounts, but we have to live within the — we
have to balance the numbers that we are given.
The only point that I can add to the discussion that has not been
already said here is when we look at this dilemma, we do offer that
we don't like to see the argument couched into terms of wouldn't
you be willing to trade force structure for modernization. It is a lit-
tle more complex than that, we offer.
For example, there are a lot of infrastructure, there is a lot of
headquarters that have never been drawn down. There is lots of
support agencies that are very large. And so we do offer that the
argument not be couched in terms of would you recommend trading
20,000 troops for helicopters. I don't think that is a fair way of ar-
guing it.
Mr. Bateman. Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me. Cer-
tainly, there is no premise in my observations that suggest we
ought to have a further drawdown in the force structure. While I
have heard others say that that might be a way to get to where
they think we have to go, I am not one of those who think we can
draw down anymore if we are going to maintain the operational
tempo that we are presently maintaining, which is higher than it
was during the peak of the cold war. That, to me, would be un-
thinkable.
And Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge me further, I want to
ask General Luck in particular whether or not he foresees signifi-
cant risk in the area of ballistic missile defense, given the sensitiv-
ity of the area of your responsibility?
General LuCK. Sir, as you know, the North Koreans have Scud
B and C capability, and they have shown a posture that they would
more than likely use that were a confrontation to result on the pe-
ninsula. We know, clearly, that those are not very accurate weap-
885
ons. We know clearly that you have to shoot a bunch of them to
hit a point target with it, et cetera, et cetera.
Having said all that, that doesn't make me feel a lot better, and,
therefore, I want to do everything I can to reduce that risk. Be-
cause the truth of it is that risk seems like a nice word, but what
that really translates to is loss of lives, is what it means. That real-
ly bothers me when you are talking about it in those terms.
So, yes, I am very concerned about theater missile defense. Not
only for the United States forces that I am charged to command,
but 95 percent of my command is Korean and I am concerned
about them, too, as well for the same reasons. So it is a high prior-
ity for me, yes, sir.
Mr. Bateman. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your indulgence. I
have some more questions, but in deference to others, if I can't get
them in a later round, I will submit them for the record. And they
deal with whether or not you have sufficient stocks and protective
gear and masks for nuclear biological and chemical weapons.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Peterson.
Mr. Peterson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Pays off to come back
after a long break. Takes them a long time to get down to this
level, I can tell you.
If I can follow on. General Luck, in the last question, because it
is clear that we have a bigger concern about where we put our
money, both R&D and in deployment, on this missile defense issue.
Very important, obviously. We have somewhat of a disconnection
between perhaps my colleagues on the right and the left on wheth-
er or not we really pour into the theater missile defense, which is
what, frankly, I would like to do, versus the national missile de-
fense issue.
Are you all in this game at all to talk to that? Because you do
have, it seems to me, it is an offset here. It is a little bit to what
you didn't want to talk about that you couldn't say that, well, we
are going to have a force here and then we have to give up that.
But I think that there is some big bucks here we are talking about,
and there are some out year potentials that we can buy out, I
think, if we will do some present value now on this and then do
this in a stream as to what we are going to get ultimately.
So I would like to hear perhaps all three of you address this,
given, I think, that most of the committee would support very
strongly a major enhancement in the investment of the theater
missile defense issue.
General LuCK. Since for some reason I have gotten positioned at
the center of this whirlwind, let me, first of all, tell you how I got
there. I sent in a classified message, my disillusionment with the
fact that it had lost its prioritization here in the resourcing busi-
ness. What I stated clearly in that message, which was secret and
was in the Washington Post the next day, that message I sent was
stating a requirement. That requirement won't change unless there
is some change in the threat.
So the requirement is there. How that gets resourced is the di-
lemma, and I have to tell you that resourcing happens back here
and that resourcing is much harder to do than to determine the re-
quirement. So I can't really speak to that, and I think the dilemma
886
of resourcing is being done very well given what they have to work
with.
And I suspect that is where the argument begins and that is
probably exactly where I need to get out of the argument for lack
of competence.
Is that a fair answer, from my perspective?
Mr. Peterson. It is fair, but, clearly, your command has the
most immediate threat.
General Luck. Absolutely.
Mr. Peterson. In regard to the development of a theater missile
defense.
General LuCK. Yes, sir.
Mr. Peterson. And as you know, we have come in with a budget
that is a severe low ball I think on the THAAD system, that is, the
one that would be most appropriately deployed into your area of re-
sponsibility. And that is kind of where I am coming to.
I think maybe my colleagues would agree that we are not going
to be able to handle leaving that number as it is because if we see
the potential and the threat that you are sitting under — I would
like to hear from the other CINC's on that.
Admiral Prueher. Mr. Peterson, I want to address that in the
context of your first point, about some overlay with national missile
defense and theater missile defense.
The urgent requirement not only in Korea but in other spots, the
most urgent requirement I think we have is the lower tier system,
and I will try to talk in terms of requirements rather than particu-
lar pieces of hardware. The second one is the upper tier system,
which has a considerably broader envelope and considerably more
capability, of which THAAD is one. And then there is a seaborne
upper tier as well as the land based, and that is also a requirement
and that would help out the issues in Korea as well as a lot of
other places.
That ties into some capability to play in the national missile de-
fense arena as well, but that theater missile defense is the more
urgent requirement for us right now with the threats we face. And
so just those points, it is an acceleration of the upper tier land, and
sea based would be beneficial to us and then there is some overlay,
as one talks about the national and the upper level — upper tier
theater missile defense.
Admiral German. Mr. Peterson, this is a matter of some serious
concern and I don't need to talk about the threats around the
world. War game after war game after simulation after simulation
has shown us that no one system will defeat an enemy who is
using ballistic missiles. It will be a synergy of lots of systems. You
have to defeat the transporter retrolaunchers. You have to get
these things in their coast and boost phase, you have to get them
in their terminal phase, and you also have to defend the area.
For USACOM, theater missile defense improvements were No. 2
on our integrated priority list we sent into the Chairman; No. 2 in
our modernization area. I think you are well aware that in the
lower and the terminal point defense systems — I agree with Admi-
ral Prueher, we should talk about requirements and capabilities
here, not programs. What we are really doing is we are modifying
existing systems.
887
Mr. Peterson. Right.
Admiral Gehman. Which is probably the best we can do in the
near term.
In the case of larger systems, area defense systems or maybe
even maybe the national system, we are talking about technology
that doesn't exist now. The one thing that we do know from war
game after war game and simulation after simulation is that the
system will have to be an open system. It will have to be a system
which can take changes in technology that we don't even know
about today.
So for that reason we think that in taking care of the point de-
fense, terminal defense, lower systems is a first priority because
not only is the larger threat still a couple years away, but we don't
even know what to build yet for the bigger system.
Mr. Peterson. I thank you for your responses, and I thank you
for the time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry I
couldn't have been here for your testimony. Let me follow the line
of questioning of the last two members.
You mentioned, General Luck, that North Korea had Scud mis-
siles. Have they nothing more sophisticated than that; and if they
now have nothing, isn't it reasonable that if they had a will to they
could procure something that goes pretty far beyond the capability
of Scud?
General LuCK. Sir, they are working on it. We know that. Scud
B and C is about the best credit we give them at this time. I don't
know of any other informed sources that have come to me that say
they have anything else. So that is the kind of missile we are deal-
ing with, yet that is plenty for me to deal with because any longer-
range missiles wouldn't be an add-on, it would just be more.
Mr. Bartlett. I understand.
It is my understanding that China now has the capability of
launching synchronous satellites. I think transferring that tech-
nology to the military arena would indicate that they certainly
have the capability of placing a payload anywhere they wish at any
time they wish on the surface of the globe.
Is that a reasonable assumption?
General LuCK. Yes, sir. But there we just skip from North Korea
to China, and I agree with you on that. I don't give that credit to
North Korea yet but certainly to China.
Mr. Bartlett. Could they, with money, acquire that capability
from China?
General LuCK. With money they could, sir, but I don't think it
is money they have.
Mr. Bartlett. There are now, as I understand it, 25 countries
that are developing weapons of mass destruction and some of them
certainly have the means, like Iran, to acquire the means of deliv-
ery of these weapons. With this realization, what kind of priority
do you think this committee ought to place on theater missile de-
fense and on national missile defense?
General LuCK. I will speak for my area. I think the highest prior-
ity should be placed on theater missile defense for the Republic of
Korea and the forces that are there.
888
Admiral Prueher. I will address it, sir. I think in ranking those
two priorities, theater missile defense is here and now a problem
we have to grapple with real time, and the longer range, I think,
should be something we are working on as well. But the highest
priority should go to theater missile defense, sir.
Admiral Gehman. We certainly agree. Theater missile defense
first, not only because the threat is closer and more real, but I
think it is a few years before countries — we have some time on the
larger ones. But also we know what we are doing.
Mr. Bartlett. Well, that threat is here and now. The other
threat is not presently here in the Third World kinds of nations.
There is an intelligence assessment that it would take them 10
to 15 years to develop that kind of capability. You know, if I want
a new automobile, I am not going to set up a factory to build it.
I am going out to buy one. And I don't understand why we should
even consider that these Third World nations, that these rogue na-
tions are going to rely on their ability to build intercontinental bal-
listic missiles that would cost them far, far more money and take
a whole lot longer than it would simply to go and buy the tech-
nology or buy the actual missiles, and they certainly are presum-
ably available on the world market.
With that kind of recognition, aren't we really measuring the
possibility of this kind of threat in a relatively few years rather
than a decade or so?
Admiral Prueher. The possibility certainly exists, sir. I can't
fault your logic at all. In the pecking order of things, we have, from
our vantage point, have a real-time threat with the theater world
and the other one could be accelerated if there were transfers of
technology amongst the nations.
Mr. Bartlett. In focus groups across the country, very few
Americans recognize that we have no defense against even a single
intercontinental ballistic missile. Their first response is disbelief
and then they are appalled that after spending $265 or $70 billion
a year for a long while now that we have no defense against even
a single intercontinental ballistic missile and then they are angry
that we are not now doing something about it and that we have
not done something about it.
I think that in terms of priority, if we were to enlist the judg-
ment of the American people, that they are likely to put a fairly
high priority on being able to protect against at least one or a few
intercontinental ballistic missiles such as could be presumably
launched from a rogue nation like Iran in the not too distant fu-
ture. And of course if we are — there is no research that is going to
bring us to that goal that is not going to hasten the attainment of
theater missile defense. So these are not mutually exclusive goals
or they are not different goals, it is just that you go a little further
a little faster to get to the national missile defense.
Admiral German. Yes, sir, and from a military perspective we
view both those threats as genuine threats that we are concerned
about. We, of course, are talking about a situation where we cannot
have everything that we would wish to have and we have to
prioritize things. So we prioritize the theater threat first because
it is nearer and closer and also we kind of know more about what
to do about it.
\ X
889
Mr. Bartlett. If we could get additional monies in the budget,
you would not be opposed, you would support them going into these
areas, first theater missile defense and then national missile de-
fense?
Admiral Gehman. The larger area, which I guess would lead to
a national missile defense system, currently is funded for research
and development. That is because, my understanding of the tech-
nology, we have some more learning to do before we know what to
build.
Mr. Bartlett. Hadn't we better get on with it, considering the
potential?
Admiral Gehman. I believe we are getting on with it.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you all very much. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. I might just say to my colleague, unless I am
missing something, we have been spending several billion dollars
over the last several years. So in some way, either directly or inad-
vertently, to communicate nothing is being done in that regard,
seems to me, flies in the face of reality, and I think the record
should reflect that.
Mr. Bartlett. We need to get the message out to the American
people that we just aren't there yet; that it is a difficult problem.
What they don't want to see is us letting down now and not con-
tinuing with the efforts.
Mr. Dellums. I appreciate the gentleman's comments.
Admiral Prueher, let me start with you. Is there any reason to
believe that the PRC has changed its nuclear doctrine in any man-
ner that would threaten the U.S. interests or regional neighbors?
Admiral Prueher. No, sir, we have no reason to think they have
changed it.
Mr. Dellums. How would you characterize the PRC's moderniza-
tion program? Is it overly aggressive, destabilizing to the region or
not something — I want to place that in some context, please.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. The PRC, we think, is certainly
growing. Their economy has grown at the rate of about 9 percent
for each year for the last decade.
To talk about a culture as old as China as an emerging nation
is not correct, but they are certainly an economically — they can af-
ford to do a lot more than they have been able to do in the last
few years.
The PLA, their armed forces, is a very powerful influence in
China, and they are modernizing. What they have demonstrated is
the intent to get a military power to match their intent to be a
power in the Asia-Pacific region and, in fact, to be a global nation.
Right now their status is such that their modernization is at a
relatively low level so far. However, they have the largest army in
the world. They have the second largest air force in the world in
terms of numbers, not in terms of capability, but in terms of num-
bers of aircraft, they are a powerful nation.
Their modernization is, they are dealing with the Russians, they
are dealing with other countries, they are trying to modernize their
forces. They were very impressed by what the coalition forces did
during the gulf war. I think that was a wake-up call for the Chi-
890
nese, and they are modernizing in the sense of technically and
tactically. They have 113 divisions of troops.
As they modernize, they are at a level now that is low. They
have the economic engine going to give them the wherewithal to
make an investment, and they are making an investment in mod-
ern forces, and they are going to be a power in the region with
whom we will have to reckon one way or another, and we would
like to reckon with them as equals or a responsible, productive na-
tion.
Mr. Dellums. How do you assess the current China threat to re-
gional security and stability, as you have experienced? I know you
have only been on site for a couple of months.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir, but we have a couple of data points
in that amount of time.
Mr. Dellums. You might include in that, what do you perceive
as the long-term trends as you look out.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, sir. I think what we have seen in the last
6 weeks has been a blip in a long-term trend. I think what we hope
is that China will emerge and be, in a sense, a contributor to re-
gional stability.
However, I think the United States forward presence in the area
is welcomed by all comers over there as an offset to any particular
nation gaining hegemony in that area, and there is an apprehen-
siveness about China as they emerge and what their intentions are
and what they will do in the area.
One can say that they are taking reasonable steps to protect
their borders, that that could be an expansion as well; we don't
know yet. So what we see in the long haul is China wanting to
have modern forces so that they can influence what goes on in the
region and also become a global power.
Mr. Dellums. That is a good segue into my next question, which
is, from your perspective, how does the China slash Taiwan rela-
tionship impact upon bilateral relationships between the United
States and Japan, for example?
Admiral Prueher. The China-Taiwan relationship, of course,
with our view, the United States view is, there is one China; Tai-
wan and China will find agreement under some means by peaceful
means. That is our commitment to Taiwan, and we recognize it as
such.
The response in this latest incident with the friction between
China and Taiwan, I think, strengthened our relationship with
Japan. I think Japan was reassured that the United States-Japa-
nese alliance and the United States commitment to the area was
strong when they saw our response to this. So in that way, I think
the China-Taiwan issue in the short haul has strengthened the
Japan-United States relationship.
There is the potential for Japan and China to be regional com-
petitors. Hopefully, that will be an economic competition and will
occur in a stable security environment. So the Japan-United States
security relationship is very important to that second feature, sir.
Mr. Dellums. I would make one observation, and I will ask you
to comment.
As I have looked back at China, with thousands of years of his-
tory, they seem to have been extremely patient about how to deal
891
with Taiwan and have said if it takes 20, 30, 50 years, so be it;
but there are imperatives, and those imperatives are that you, the
United States, continue to maintain the view of one China and that
no American troops, mihtary troops, are placed on the soil of Tai-
wan.
It would seem to me that the Chinese have been very patient in
this regard, but there are a couple of imperatives there that they
would look at and view with some alarm and great concern. I
would like you to comment as to what you perceive to be the effi-
cacy of that. If you don't think that is correct, that is fine, or would
you wish to elaborate? But I throw that out.
Admiral Prueher. First, more from study than experience so far,
the Chinese legendary habit of patience is certainly far more than
we are attributed to in this Nation, and I think they are patient
and will wait in terms of generations for things to occur. That is
not to say they will not try to certainly nudge them in the right
direction.
The issue of the United States recognizing one China and not
committing troops to the soil of Taiwan — and there are some other
conditions associated with that as well — I think is certainly the
Chinese view.
Part of our reaction to this latest crisis was trying to recognize
that view of one China, to make sure that our commitment to Tai-
wan and actually a commitment to a peaceful reunification process,
rather than to either player, was well-known, to make sure that
that was firm, at the same time trying to transmit that what we
did with our forces and our rhetoric as well did not embolden Tai-
wan, or skew our efforts in a way that created this, what I think
was a very measured response on our part.
I think we can do that. I think we need to do that. We are com-
mitted to one China. I think there are a lot of things that we have
in common and there are a lot of things that China and Taiwan
have in common rather than focusing so much on the differences.
If we can skew the focus to the common interests, maybe we can
better serve a peaceful reunification.
Mr. Dellums. General Luck, my first question is, what is the
current status of the agreed nuclear framework with North Korea?
General LuCK. The current status is that the framework is via-
ble. Aspects of it have been executed or are expected to be exe-
cuted, and as we see it from our position over there, that is going
along very well, all of those aspects that we expected from it.
Mr. Dellums. I am sure you and I would agree that the North
Korean forces that are deployed against United States and South
Korean forces at this point are impressive, but my question is, as
you perceive it — and I know you raised the issue of economic con-
cerns on more than one occasion and also today — as to whether or
not the North Koreans can continue to maintain that level of de-
plo3aTient capability given their economic circumstance at this
point? I would like you to comment to that.
General LuCK. Sir, I think it is common knowledge that their
economy is in trouble. The exact amount of trouble and the exact
spin-off from that is hard to know because it is a closed society, but
we do know it is in a downturn, and I have heard 3-percent all the
way up to 1 1-percent negative GNP.
892
That notwithstanding, the fall of the Soviet Union and the open-
market capitalistic bent of the People's Republic of China have also
worked against North Korea in terms of their ability to field a cred-
ible force.
What I am talking about here, twofold, is, No. 1, economically
they are having more and more trouble keeping that first-class
force supported; second, they don't have the marketplace to go get
those hardware items or the parts that it takes to keep them run-
ning that they used to have. Their relationship has disappeared
with the Soviet Union and has changed completely with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, have also worked against them.
I can't tell you, oh, 2 years and that is it, but I can tell you that
the inevitability of their capacity to wage successful war is going
down.
Now, Mr. Dellums, I would be telling you a fib if I didn't say
even any kind of war on that peninsula is going to be hard to bear
up under and the trauma that spills from that will not be some-
thing any of us will want to happen. Therefore, we need to continue
to stay strong and stay vigilant and maneuver this thing out as
best we can from the aspect of the great Korean people and work-
ing what we can to make sure that things stay stable.
The Chairman. We are down to 5 minutes. We will come back
and you can finish on that.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, sir, and thank you for your response.
If you wanted to elaborate further when we come back.
General Luck. No, sir. I was just wondering if you had more.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The meeting will please be in order.
Mr. Dellums had not completed his questioning, I don't think,
but he is not here right now, so I might just go ahead and throw
one out for you in the meantime.
I have been thinking about all this — well, here he is right now.
I was going to launch off on that other question, but you pick up
on what you had been going.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You recall my last question. Let me come at it in a slightly dif-
ferent way to elicit a slightly different response from you — maybe
elicit.
Is the threat from North Korea, from your perspective, more
acute or less acute due to the economic realities that you addressed
in your comments to my previous question?
General Luck. I would say it is more acute from the standpoint
that the regime's survival is the No. 1 priority of the leadership in
North Korea. As we have watched other Communist nations stum-
ble, crumble and fall, they have set a pattern for this that we have
watched, and they do it in phases, and there are any number of
indicators by phase that you can identify and observe as you go
through this, and we are watching, based on that format, the busi-
ness that is going on in North Korea. We see it as a very dangerous
time because of the unpredictability that weaves its way in and
through all of that.
The other side of it is that there is that inevitability that they
will eventually implode or explode unless they are propped up by
\
893
some outside nation that I can't see doing so at this point in the
very near future.
Now, I can't put a time frame to that, but I would tell you that
at this period of time what we would consider to be sound, relevant
logic may not pertain if regime survival appears to be very impor-
tant, and the only real option they have anymore is their military,
and they might choose to exercise it.
That is why I say I think it is a very difficult time, a very dan-
gerous time, sir.
Mr. Dellums. In your capacity, you have had the opportunity to
get up close to the South Korean Army, assess their capability, et
cetera, so I have prepared three questions in that regard. What is
your estimate of the military potential of the ROC army?
General Luck. Sir, as you know, Combined Forces Command —
in effect, I have around 700,000 Republic of Korea soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines that work for me on a day-to-day basis. In
fact, they are part of my command.
With the exception of technological and hardware items of the
numbers I would like to see them have, from a force aspect, I think
they will fight and fight very well, and I regard them very highly
as professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. They do have
some shortfalls in their equipment and in some of their tech-
nologies because of their past abilities to afford to do more.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you very much.
I would like to now turn to Admiral Gehman.
General Luck. Sir, there was one point: When you were chair-
man of this committee, you questioned me one time, I think, about
whether we were getting enough food and such. I would like — Ike,
would you stand up, sir? I would like to tell you that the food is
OK. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dellums. Very poignant.
Admiral Gehman, let me ask you this question. The capacity of
the Bottom-Up Review forces to execute the two MRC strategy has
continued to be a dominant theme in this committee, a great deal
of discussion around this issue.
From previous hearings, we have learned that our ability to pro-
vide properly trained and equipped forces to the theater CINC's in
a timely manner is dependent upon planned enhancements and
modernization. In fact, you folks made that point very strongly last
year, as I recall the hearing.
Some argue that even with planned enhancements and the dual
commitment of forces both to theater crisis response and to oper-
ations other than war would prevent you from being able to dis-
engage the forces and redeployment to a crisis area in a responsive
manner.
Will you describe how you visualize making forces available to
support the MRC's in a manner where they might be involved in
operations other than war?
The reason why I ask that question is because I think it is im-
portant to give you an opportunity to lay out, from your perspec-
tive, factually what would happen. There is a great deal of specula-
tion here, and I would like to give you the opportunity to set the
record straight from your perspective on this matter.
894
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir, Mr. Dellums. You are exactly right.
And I will kind of work this backwards. There are forces in Bosnia
today which are earmarked for MRC's around the world. That is
not a secret. Our forces in peacetime, when there is not an MRC
going on, are busy all the time. So it is not a shock to us, or it does
not disturb us, that forces which are going to go to these MRC's
are employed around the world.
The question of the enhancements is critical to our ability to sup-
port two nearly simultaneously MRC's. There is no question that
we can do one MRC without too much difficulty. It is the second
MRC. The force enhancements are important.
The Chairman and the Secretary of Defense in public testimony
have said that our force structure, the Bottom-Up Review, the bot-
tom-up force structure, permits us to do two nearly simultaneously
MRC's with some risk. The force enhancements reduce the risk.
Failure to procure the enhancements increases the risk.
If we got all of the enhancements, the strategic airlift, the strate-
gic sealift, all of the C4I, the command and control enhancements,
everything that we had envisioned, it still would not guarantee suc-
cess of two MRC's. What it does is, it reduces the risk.
Now, the thing that I have been encouraged about is, we have
looked very, very, very carefully, in excruciating detail, of how my
command. United States Atlantic Command, is responsible for get-
ting 80 percent of America's combat power out of town and over to
Korea or to Iraq, Kuwait, or the Persian Gulf, or wherever they are
required.
There are a couple of things which have encouraged me. The first
one is, in my experience, the analysis of the amount of risk in-
volved has been the most frank and blunt that I have seen in my
32 years of military experience. Such initiatives as joint readiness
reporting, which only started 18 months ago; the Chairman is ap-
prised by us CINC's in a most clear way of the risk factors.
We have done, which I think is new, very, very serious war gam-
ing and simulations of things we didn't used to war game. We used
to always war game force on force. We used to always war game
battles. We very seldom war gamed ports or railroads or airfields
to see if we could get to the battle. We are now doing that in a
very, very serious way.
So the answer to your question, a short answer to your question,
with all that background, is, the force structure, the bottom-up
force structure, can execute two nearly simultaneous MRC's with
some risk. The risk can be slightly mitigated by force enhance-
ments or it can be made more risky by failure for us to procure and
achieve those force enhancements.
Mr. Dellums. Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I have one
additional question, and this is a more generic question that per-
haps all three of you might want to comment upon.
I don't think one has to have great mystical powers to realize
that this committee will increase the top line on this year's military
budget.
Can I construe from your responses to the questions that have
been posed, that is, if you had additional dollars, what you would
do? Can I construe from your comments that what you are saying
is two things: If you are going to do it, give us what we need; and
895
if you are going to do it, bring some programs forward that were
funded in the out years rather than give us some things we don't
need or that are not on our hst? Is that a fair comment?
I would appreciate it if all of you would comment on that.
Admiral German. I would not be surprised if the different
CINC's answer that question differently, because the CINC's, by
their regional focus, look at things slightly differently.
For myself, since we don't envision us having military operations
in our area of responsibility, which requires 8 army divisions and
15 Air Force fighter wings, for us, additional funds, if there were
additional funds, our priorities would be the exact same priorities
that we have signaled to the Secretary of Defense, readiness today.
Today's readiness is our No. 1 priority.
If there are any deficiencies — right now we are maintaining read-
iness, and we are maintaining our readiness at a high level, but
if unforeseen contingencies or some other expense were to eat into
our readiness accounts, that would become our No. 1 priority.
Our second priority, USACOM, would be modernization, and it
would be, indeed, moving programs that are in the program and
simply moving them forward.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you.
General Luck.
General Luck. Sir, these would be title 10 responsibilities, obvi-
ously, but our recommendations into that would be a myriad of
suggestions.
Pulling things forward is one thing, but I would say you might
want to get some starts on others that you had to drop off some
time ago when you began to pick and choose against the target we
had been given.
So I would say move some things forward, maybe go back and
get some things that you had to cut out, and in the readiness.
But through all of that, the thing we have been paying the
OPTEMPO bill, the training bill with that shoe box that should be
looking after quality of life, and we have to get back and fill that
shoe box back up and look after our infrastructure.
What I mean by that is those things in the community that are
necessary for people who live in that community to live properly:
Sewer lines, not very impressive but important; power; lights; all
of those kind of things that you have to have in a city, you have
to have in a community, a military community; and you have to
have the right kind of housing and things that our soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines deserve.
So I think it would be a broad look I would have. I would bring
some things forward, I would get some things faster and make sure
I had my readiness right, but then I would get after those things
that we have deferred, deferred maintenance to keep our training
and readiness where it is.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Prueher. I think. General Luck, speaking certainly
from what I saw last week in Korea, the quality-of-life issues are
certainly key there and there are a lot of initiatives going on.
Some of those — but more directly, to answer your question, I
think if there were extra money, we do not want to have things im-
posed that we don't need, and there are things in the budget that
896
have been deferred. We had a significant discussion on TMD ear-
her, where the upper tier systems are deferred. Those things hke
that to bring forward would be our highest priority, sir.
Mr. Dellums. So that there are at least three areas where all
three of you tend to agree: Near-term readiness; and if I under-
stand you, Admiral, one of the concerns you have is the threat of
unforeseen, unplanned, therefore unfunded contingencies that,
when they happen, tend to be drawn out of O&M funds, which af-
fects your near-term readiness.
So readiness, near-term readiness, is significant; quality of life is
a major issue; and theater defense, because the threat is now and
present and you want to respond to that. So those are the three
major areas. Even though you know, you point out, that in the spe-
cific, each CINC would respond differently there, at least those
three generic areas are on your priority list.
Admiral German. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dellums. Thank you; and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your generosity.
General Luck. One follow-on point. You are the one, I think last
year, that brought this up, and if these words were not yours, I
think they were pretty close. You made the point that near-term
readiness was all right because we had borrowed against midterm
readiness, and that is what we have done, and that is what my
suggestion is about. We owe it to you to make sure near-term read-
iness is right, and how we do that is by borrowing against other
programs that have gone short for a while. That is my view.
So what this would do, I think, is work the midterm and long-
term readiness, these extra dollars, and I think we — again, the
services, under their title 10 hat — would put those in the right
pews, I hope.
Mr. Dellums. I appreciate that.
One of the things that obviously becomes apparent for us in this
committee is how we grapple with the issue of unplanned, unfore-
seen, therefore unfunded contingencies, and it has been my argu-
ment that it is not good government to have gone through all that
budgeting process and then not have at least some capacity to re-
spond to these unfunded contingencies without going into O&M,
therefore affecting near-term readiness. So that is something we
have to grapple with here as a policy issue and how we address
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, members.
The Chairman. Let me try one on you while I am in the mood
right now.
Some of us on this committee and in Congress are trying to stop
what I call the hemorrhaging of our military from cutbacks which
we feel have been already too great, and we are concerned because
there is a real threat out in the world and we have to prepare for
it. The concern is that the American people, indeed, the Congress
itself, doesn't realize the nature of the threat, how serious it is, and
our capability or incapability to deal with it in a sufficient way, I
think.
In making our case to the American people and through the Con-
gress for the need for these things, we have to point out what the
threat is, the nature of the threat, the real threat, and it is de-
897
fleeted, our arguments are deflected, and watered down. Indeed,
they are scorned in some quarters by people who deny these things:
That is really no threat, not a great one anyway; we are not cutting
too much; we are in good shape; and all these kind of things. Ev-
erything is put into a certain context, though, so we can make it
look that way.
For instance, the problem of theater and national missile de-
fense. Of course, some of us are in favor of putting together a na-
tional missile defense because there is a real threat of a rogue mis-
sile, an accidental launch, just one missile that we cannot defend
against, and some people say, well, because we have the high prior-
ity of the theater missile defense, we should not do anything about
that. I can't buy that.
When you give me your answers, which are usually in the con-
text that somebody has asked you, you say, well, my priority is the
theater missile defense. Agreed. But what is wrong with doing both
of them, as we tried to do last year? We provided the funds. We
provided architecture, as a matter of fact, for theater missile de-
fenses. It was turned down.
As a matter of fact, the new policy coming out of the Pentagon
rearranged the theater missile defenses, as you know, General
Luck, cut back on the THAAD, stretched out over 2 years the funds
we put in there for development of theater missile defense, further
delaying it, and shot down the whole national missile defense, dis-
regarding the fact that there is that real threat today not only from
that one rogue missile, accidentally launched — oops, I pushed the
wrong button — from China.
They say, well, we can't have a national missile defense because
it violates the ABM treaty with the Soviet Union. We don't have
an ABM treaty with China, and China has ICBM capability and
has said recently, in a veiled threat sort of way, that they could use
it against Los Angeles if we are messing around with Taiwan too
much.
The rogue missile defense capabilities, rogue nations, the intel-
ligence community, the NIE, the estimate says 10 or 15 years, in
a certain context, and that is used as a way of deflecting the argu-
ment.
They ignore completely the argument and the fact that, as Mr.
Bartlett brought out, you can acquire by buying the missiles them-
selves mobile ICBM's, I guess, and build your own. You have not
got to do it as an indigenous capability with these rogue nations.
Weapons of mass destruction can be put together in laboratories in
low tech and inexpensive ways.
You don't have to be a superpower to wage the horrors of mass
destruction warfare on people. You can put them on cruise missiles,
shorter range ballistic missiles, and it brings everybody in the
world really under the gun of mass destruction warfare without
even resorting to ICBM's. You can fire cruise missiles from aircraft,
from boats, ships, submarines, what-have-you. I see where China
sold these missile boats to Iran recently.
So having said those things, I want to put it in a context and ask
you if today — and we will get down to specifics in Korea — General
Luck, today, not sometime in the future when we have a defense,
today, if a cruise missile, a ballistic missile, or some kind of missile
898
was launched at us carrying BC, what would be the result of that
type of an attack? And not just from Scuds that we think about
back in the gulf war. They have now the upgrade, which is good,
and they also have Nodong and other type missiles too.
What is our defense against those things? Do we have, for in-
stance, protective clothings, antidotes, vaccines, medical supplies,
monitoring devices, all these things sufficient to handle that kind
of a thing and the thousands and thousands and thousands of cas-
ualties resulting?
And don't anybody tell me about retaliation preventing people
from doing that in this day and time. They don't worry about retal-
iation.
Let me leave it there with you in that context, and explain to me
how well prepared we are to defend against this threat. Does any-
body want to take it on?
General LuCK. I will take it on, but I wouldn't call it taking it
on. I find it hard to argue with your premise, and of course that
is the day-in, day-out thing that we deal with, is the capacity of
the enemy, or the threat, to do just that. And the capacity to de-
fend against that, in my area of the world, is not very good, what
we have available to us to use, but still scares the hell out of me.
There is no question that if they use chemical or biological weap-
ons, we will have our hands full in that part of the world.
I won't comment about the other parts of the world, although I
don't know that there would be a lot of difference. But where I am
situated, the passive protection against that, for the whole of the
peninsula, is not good. For the United States Forces, Korea, it is
very good.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, even detection of these kind
of things.
Let us take it on down to other areas. The Atlantic Command,
or the Pacific. Even detecting these types of threats before they are
made real with the range of cruise missiles being what they are
and the shorter range ballistic missiles, how can we deal with that?
Admiral Prueher. Let me address that, sir.
First, I also join in not disagreeing with your premise. The detec-
tion is something that needs a lot of work, and in the weapons of
mass destruction world, that needs quite a bit of effort.
We had the discussion, which was started off by Mr. Peterson
and then Mr. Bartlett, and we got into this area of discussion. We
sort of pitted the theater missile defense against a national missile
defense in something of an either/or type discussion, which I be-
lieve there is a lot of overlap. In terms of VIN diagrams, there is
considerable overlap in guidance systems, and it comes down to the
missile propulsion technology and the warhead intercept type
things that are for another forum.
But as we work on the lower tier defensive systems, which is
stepping-stoned, then to an upper tier, which is then a stepping
stone perhaps to a national defense system — the research on war-
heads, the research on leap technology, the research on impact
technology and seekers — there is a lot of work that is certainly ap-
plicable to a national missile defense system. It is involved in the
ABM treaty discussion, and this is something that needs sorting
out.
899
But I think that our stated emphasis on theater missile defense
has in mind that a great deal, probably 60 or 70 percent, is applica-
ble then to trade on to a national missile defense system. I think
we, maybe, came across as an either/or type of argument, which I
don't think was anyone's notion, sir.
Admiral Gehman. I would certainly agree with your premise.
One of the things you didn't mention, of course, which I know you
would agree with, is that weapons of mass destruction is a cheap
man's way to get big pretty fast. It doesn't take a lot of money to
invest in some of these things.
We are very serious about it and we are very serious about de-
feating it. I think we have to think, when we are talking about how
to deal with this, it is important that we have to deal with it as
an entire system. That is we have to talk about the manufacture
of weapons of mass destruction, the transfer of chemicals and tech-
nology across state borders, we have to talk about where the stuff
is stored and whether or not we can detect where it is stored and
then the means of delivery. So pretty soon you are into whether or
not unmanned area vehicles help out against weapons of mass de-
struction; and they do. They do all of that.
And then of course, finally, is the capability of our Armed Forces
to operate in a dirty environment. Here we are talking about per-
sonal protection gear, mop gears, detection stuff, antidotes, medi-
cine, treatment, cleansing decontamination, and all those kinds of
things. But we would not say that the entire answer is in the ter-
minal end of this, that is, in the ability to detect any one of these
things. All of these are very, very important. We take it very seri-
ously. And it is likely to be — it is as likely as anything else to be
the next threat we face.
The Chairman. Thank you. That was the point I was trying to
make, gentlemen.
And I just appreciate people trying to help us to enlighten people
as to the seriousness of the situation rather than trying to down-
play it so everyone will say, don't worry about it. All the people out
there in the uniforms are saying the same thing, no problem, we
can handle it and all that kind of stuff. That is being said, in es-
sence, by the answers that have to be given in a certain context.
You see what I am talking about? They use that, then, that cer-
tain context that you are given to answer in, to come back and de-
flect the whole thing. That is the problem we are dealing with.
I said the other day in a speech that we have had all kind of en-
emies in the world to fight in the past wars and all the rest, and
we have been successful in doing it. But the enemy we have to
fight today is ourselves. Complacency and the fact that people
won't admit to the fact that since we don't have a shooting war
going on right now, there are no threats out there. That is the
enemy. Those kind of thinking people are our enemies today to deal
with among ourselves.
Mr. Taylor. I am sorry, Mr. Pickett was first.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, let me welcome you today. I guess it has been sort
of a disjointed afternoon. If it hasn't been for you, it has been for
me, and I hope my questions have not already been propounded to
you.
900
Admiral Gehman, since you are a neighbor of mine, I had a cou-
ple of items I was going to ask you about the Atlantic Command,
and it follows on top of some of the discussion about recapitaliza-
tion that has been had here today and to recognize that that will
continue to be a problem for the military.
I know that you and General Sheehan are doing an excellent job
there in the work that you have the responsibility to undertake,
but within constrained budgets that you have to operate, do you
feel like we are moving in the right direction as far as the effort
toward jointness is concerned?
Are we really going to save something by going in this direction
or are we just adding another layer of management as far as the
military is concerned?
Admiral German. As I indicated in my opening remarks, Mr.
Pickett, if we didn't think we were going to create some efficiencies
and some increases in effectiveness here, we ought to stop what we
are doing.
The answer to your question is yes; in two ways. We think that
there are tremendous efficiencies in the joint training program. The
joint training program, in case some members may not be aware,
is a $400 million a year project. That is big change and we have
proposed to the Chairman, which he has now under review of some
ideas of better ways to do that.
Also, I am pretty sure that Mr. Goldwater and Mr. Nichols, when
they started this revolution, that they intended that some people
put their minds to whether or not the future operations of the De-
partment of Defense wouldn't benefit in increases in effectiveness
by being more joint. We happen to think that very strongly, and
we have become kind of the advocates, not the only advocates, but
that has been given to us to focus on, so we think that there are
tremendous increases in effectiveness at no increase of cost.
I could name a few. One of the ones we have been bandying
around here this afternoon continuously is theater missile defense.
Theater missile defense is a quintessential joint operation. There is
no single gadget.
I mean, THAAD is not going to do it by itself. THAAD has to be
cued by sensors and directed by interoperable data systems and
command and control systems, or Navy AEGIS, or boost phase
interceptors, or airborne lasers. None of those systems are going to
work by themselves. They are going to work in a joint environment.
So USACOM thinks by making that joint environment interoper-
able, we are both saving money and making the combat effective-
ness of the Armed Forces go up measurably. That is a long answer
to say we think we are doing some good.
Mr. Pickett. So you think some additional efficiencies can be
gotten out of the system if we continue to move toward more highly
integrated jointness programs?
Admiral Gehman. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman
think there are and they have challenged USACOM to come up
with a couple of them, particularly the one I mentioned before, is
efficiencies in the joint training regime, which not only is dollars,
by the way, but one of the — according to a recent survey, the third
biggest reason why servicemen are away from home so much is to
go to joint training exercises. In other words, we have met the
901
enemy and we is them. So it is not only just money but it is also
personnel tempo.
Mr. Pickett. A month or so ago, maybe a couple of months ago,
there was some discussion, or not discussion, there was some ac-
tion taken to transfer a part of the area of responsibilities from the
Atlantic Command to the Southern Command. I recall that General
Sheehan at the time didn't think that was a particularly good idea.
Do you have any comments on that or is that something that is
an accomplished fact episode and no need to talk about at this
point. We are concerned about it because we are concerned about
effectiveness.
Admiral Gehman. USACOM is on record as opposing this
change, which is under review by the Secretary of Defense, so I am
not speaking out of school here. Both the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman know that we oppose this impending change.
Frankly, I am not going to discuss the pros and cons of it be-
cause, frankly, we are at a loss to figure out why anybody is push-
ing this. It involves increasing our overhead structure at a time
when the Department of Defense is getting smaller; it involves tak-
ing what is purportedly your chief advocate of the joint way of
doing things and turning him into a maritime-only CINC.
It essentially repeats the errors that we made in the 1970's and
1980's, when we had two other four-star commands who were the
chief advocates of jointness, the old Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force and the old Strike Command, both of which failed for the
same reasons. They took the chief advocate of jointness and took
all his horsepower away. So we are against it and we are on record
against it.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have another question but I will wait for the
next round on that.
The Chairman. That will be fine.
Mr. Longley.
Mr. Longley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask a question, and I will tend to keep it some-
what broad, but of course there is a great concern about how we
are committing our forces and there was a suggestion in this morn-
ing's testimony that depending on the scale of priority that a situa-
tion might evolve where a lesser regional contingency would be ter-
minated in favor of redeploying forces for a more favored serious
regional contingency.
Again, there are some concerns with not only the deployment
schedules but the heightened operations tempo. And, frankly, in
the Congress, there is not a very solid understanding of the impact
of the deployment cycles on readiness, specifically the fact that
when you deploy a unit it means you have another unit ready to
take its place and a predecessor unit that needs to be retrained and
reequipped before it can be capable of being deployed again.
What I am leading up to is that as the recent China-Taiwan con-
frontation seemed to illustrate, we deployed two carriers to send a
message to the Chinese at the same time causing one carrier to
leave the gulf to head for the western Pacific and another carrier
to leave the Mediterranean, particularly the Adriatic, to go over the
gulf.
902
Given the movement of carriers, it was interesting this morning
to hear, I beUeve it was General Joulwan or General Peay comment
that — I think it was General Peay — that twd of the prior crises in-
volving Iraq involved periods of time when your carriers had left
the gulf.
Having given an extended preface, I would be interested in your
comments relative to the reliability of our ability to move forces be-
tween theaters, and to what extent our capabilities are or could be
significantly impaired by the presence of multiple contingencies at
the same time. For instance, if when the carriers were deployed to
off of China, we faced a risk obviously in the Middle East or in Iraq
and we left troops in Bosnia without air cover, or at least without
carrier cover. I would be concerned on the scale of risk to what ex-
tent we are, frankly, being spread quite thin. I guess I will leave
that open-ended.
I will also add to this, as a veteran of 16 months of service in
the Far East, and one who served with one of the two Marine units
that surrendered on Corregidor, I have some feelings about being
10,000 miles away from the United States and the risks that pre-
sents to our forces.
Admiral Prueher. Let me take that on, sir, as the PACOM com-
mander and also as one who spent the majority of my operational
life on aircraft carriers. One of the things that is nice about carrier
battle groups and naval forces is their mobility and relatively good
staying power. In a joint environment we have things that can get
there very quickly, without much staying power, and then we have
things that can get there quite quickly, with medium-range staying
power, such as ships, and if we resupply them they can stay a long
time, and then things that take longer, such as ground troops or
certain types of large ground troops and tanks and things like that,
that if they were not in the area would take longer to get there,
but then we have the logistics trains that follow that would enable
them to stay.
The versatility of naval forces puts them in that sort of, what I
call, the linebacker category. They can get there pretty quick and
they can stay a fairly long time and bring a pretty good punching
power with them. And that is what is connoted by moving an air-
craft carrier or battle group somewhere.
If we had those in each of our major theaters in the Mediterra-
nean and CENTCOM or in the Pacific, and we could have one in
each of those theaters all the time, it would require more carriers
than we now have or more than the Bottom-Up Review force, if we
are able to do that, to do the refit and keep them there and the
air wings.
So what we have with 11 plus 1 carrier battle groups enables us
to have one in most places most of the time, and then we need to
readjust, which is the example you just brought up with the China-
Taiwan issue, and then there has to be a decision made, OK, where
can we as a Nation afford to take some risk by not having one
there.
So that is the balance we talked about before. It is a cost-effec-
tiveness balance that we play with the carriers and it is a very val-
uable asset. It is an interesting thing that most CINC's would like
903
to have a carrier and have one there all the time. We are not budg-
eted that way.
And I think the Bottom-Up Review force, it is correct, as you
mentioned from this morning, we would then have to make choices
on the things that we could take on if we had a lesser regional con-
tingency going on concurrent with two major regional contin-
gencies. And we have to make those choices.
Mr. LONGLEY. Thank you.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to apologize to the Admirals and General Luck, we
have had a series of pretty controversial votes and I apologize for
my absence.
My question would first go to General Luck.
General, if you would, please, and then I will ask a couple of
questions. The first would be, I realize that you have a number of
immediate threats at your command, I have been told about 10,000
artillery tubes on the North Korean side, about somewhere be-
tween 90,000 and 100,000 special forces on their side, in your testi-
mony you say half of their billion-man army is within striking dis-
tance of the DMZ, a short distance of the DMZ 689. So my question
to you is in the threats that you face, where do their theater mis-
siles fit into that as being the biggest threat, one of the biggest
threats? If you had to put a pecking order into things you feel like
need to be addressed, where would that fit in?
General LuCK. Clearly, put that in about the second category. To
me, the No. 1 worrisome aspect of the outfit of the north are the
artillery tubes and we have trouble understanding exactly how
many there are, but whether you choose the number 11, 608 or 15,
142, either of those numbers scares the hell out of me, so I just sort
of take one in between and say they have a lot of artillery and a
lot more than we do.
So that one scares me because they also can fire chemical and
biological stuff from those warheads.
Mr. Taylor. Do they have that ability right now.
General Luck. Absolutely.
Mr. Taylor. OK.
Tell a dumb Congressman something; how much trouble would
it be to take it the next step and make that a nuclear round, is
this, is that something the Soviet arsenal, that given the right set
of circumstance, they could get their hands on?
General Luck. The technology certainly is there but I have to tell
you we don't know enough about them to — I couldn't say. But I am
pretty sure they probably have chemical weapons, artillery, and the
Scuds.
Mr. Taylor. And biologic.
General Luck. Not certain about that. But they have the capac-
ity to have biological. We know that.
Mr. Taylor. Because there is a very sincere debate going on
here.
General Luck. Sure, there is.
Mr. Taylor. Regarding missile defense.
General Luck. Yes, sir.
904
Mr. Taylor. One of the things I have to wrestle with is that
since about 1983 the Nation has spent approximately $40 billion
trying to get to a missile defense and yet we are not there. I don't
know how close we are but we are not there. That same $40 billion,
admiral, could have bought about nine carriers, down my way
could have built 50 DDG— 51's. I see marines back there. Some-
where between 40 to 60 amphibs, the big ones, and a lot of dif-
ferent things we could have done with helicopters.
The question is could that money — I know we are Monday-morn-
ing quarterbacking — could that money have been better spent? Was
it a wise investment?
And the next question is should the budgeteers be able to find
us some money like they did last year? I think last year at the last
minute they upped the budget by about $7 billion. Would you peg
in your needs a need to improve missile defense, or would you have
other needs ahead of that, and could you articulate them?
I know Mr. Dellums has asked this question, I was not here for
the whole question, that is why I am asking it again.
General LuCK. I will answer that with respect to me and I will
let somebody else throw in. My idea about this missile defense is
a requirement, and sometimes we get requirements and resourcing
mixed up. A requirement is there. Whether or not you can afford
it against the whole menu of other things is a resourcing decision
in the title 10 arena.
Mr. Taylor. I am asking for your priorities, given that at best
we might get another $7 billion. At best.
General LuCK. The requirement is there. I am not in the
resourcing business. I am really not. I would be out of my lane to
give you an answer.
Mr. Taylor. But if we are given an additional $7 billion, would
you put it at the highest part of your list, would you put it second,
third, on your needs?
General LucK. It would certainly be very high in Korea, sir. Very
high.
Mr. Taylor. Is there anything higher?
General LuCK. Yes, sir, the counterfire issues. We are really con-
cerned about that because of that number of artillery tubes I told
you about.
Mr. Taylor. Admiral, you want to comment on that?
Admiral Prueher. Yes. On the missile defense issue, it is also
very high on our list. Looking at our integrated priority list from
the CINC's, of the things we put in our top pecking order, there
are thousands of things that go into what are on our lists and we
come up with three or four handfuls that are on our integrated pri-
ority list that are high priority.
The point is we don't want 100 percent of No. 1 to the exclusion
of No. 3, or to the exclusion of No. 789, for that matter. I don't
know what 789 is, but so theater missile defense is right now a
high thing on our priority list. It is one of those we talked about
earlier that if there were extra money it is one of those things, the-
ater or upper tier — theater missile defense is one of those things
that has been deferred. It is out into the 2002 timeframe. It is one
of those we would like to bring forward.
Mr. Taylor. Mr. Chairman, could I have one quick followup?
905
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Taylor. We don't have a big crowd. I want to open this up
to the panel. From your experience, it is my understanding that in
the Soviet arsenal was a nuclear artillery round. Just for my infor-
mation, how far could they shoot that?
General LuCK. Kilometers, probably 30 at the outside. Probably
something less than that. The best artillery man around is sitting
right up behind you.
How far could they shoot it?
Mr. Tademy. Thirty kilometers.
General LuCK. Thank you. You are a good man.
Mr. Taylor. So of your 38,000 men that you have, how many of
them are within 30?
General Luck. We have about 750,000. I have both the Republic
of Korea and the peninsula.
Mr. Taylor. Well put. Of your American command, how many
are within 30 kilometers of the border, of the DMZ?
General LuCK. I would say, conservatively, 20,000. But more im-
portantly, the city of Seoul, with 14 or 15 million people, a lot of
whom are American citizens and are also within that range.
Mr. Taylor. OK.
Admiral Gehman. Mr. Chairman, can I go back to the question
of theater missile defense and whether it is 1, 1-A, 1-B? The ques-
tion was, where does it fit in, and I will give you an example.
An example where most of the CINC's have come in with a mod-
ernization requirement, which is higher than theater missile de-
fense, is combat identification. The ability to prevent fratricide be-
tween our own forces. There is an initiative we need to work hard
on, and most CINC's brought that in higher than theater missile
defense.
Mr. Taylor. Thank you. Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Luck, you will pardon me for being out during a great
deal of the testimony, but you were talking about when your cable
on THAAD was discussed here and I am sure elsewhere in this
city, so I came in just as you were saying when you were asked
what was really important, and you said sewer lines. I thought at
that point you had really been worked over to the point where
there would never be missile defense again.
But let me ask you, so we get it straight, if you are fired on with
a salvo of Scud-B's, could you stop them today? Could you shoot
them down?
General Luck. We could shoot them down where we have the ca-
pacity, and that is where we have our Patriot missile batteries and
the PAC-3.
Mr. Hunter. So you have some limited defended areas?
General LucK. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. How about Scud-C's? They are supposed to be up-
graded a little bit.
General LucK. Yes, sir, we still feel like we have the techno-
logical capacity to do that at those points where we have the
906
Mr. Hunter. OK.
How about the so-called No Dong missile, the 1,000-kilometer
missile?
General Luck. Sir, I don't give them credit for having it, but if
your question is if they had it, what could we do?
Mr. Hunter. It is in development.
General LuCK. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Have you looked at its velocities and
General Luck. No, sir, I have not, but I can do that and get you
an answer on the record, or off the record, or whatever you want
to call it.
Mr. Hunter. I asked a question of General O'Neill last year, if
anything that we had in this theater missile defense inventory
could handle the Taepo Dong H, which is the 3,500- to 4,000-kilo-
meter missile that is being developed, his answer was no. That was
including the entire array, which I asked him, and which presum-
ably includes Navy upper tier.
A number of members have asked you if there are not other dan-
gers in the theater. Obviously, there is with a huge artillery fan.
If you could stop those artillery shells in midflight, you would want
to have that system developed, wouldn't you?
General Luck. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Hunter. So if you could stop missiles in midflight, you
would like to have that developed, too.
General Luck. Absolutely.
Mr. Hunter. Let me presume and just ask you a question. If you
look at last year's budget, you will notice that we gave, we funded
virtually everything that was requested by the administration and
then we added money to missile defense. We also added ammo, we
added trucks, we added some tanks, we added some sealift, airlift,
and aircraft. So if you presume that you got everything that has
been asked for in this year's budget, I understand that adding on
to missile defense, getting it to you quickly or moving it to the left,
as the Admiral says, meaning we get it faster, would be important
to you? Is that an accurate statement?
General LuCK. It absolutely is, sir. But it is a little out of context
for me to jump back and forth between resourcing and require-
ments. The requirement, as I mentioned, is there. The resourcing
happens back here. And I have to tell you, honestly, I don't under-
stand all there is to know about how they go about that, sir.
Mr. Hunter. Well, join a big crov/d, General.
But what I am telling you is to presume that this committee is
going to give the resources; that we are not going to put you in a
position to make you compete against what is on your budget be-
fore us.
Because if we do what we did last year, is we will fund all of that
and then we will fund additional things. So if we don't put you in
a position of having to say that you are going to sell the troops
short on things that you have on your grocery list already for this
committee, is it then an important thing if I could to move missile
defense to the left, so into speak, that is to get it quicker, if we
don't put you in the position of having to compete it off of other
things?
907
General Luck. Given those assumptions, I would wholeheartedly
agree.
Mr. Hunter. Admiral Gehman.
Admiral Gehman. Yes, sir. We had said earlier when you were
not in the room that our No. 1 priority is the readiness of our
forces today, which includes quality of life. And assuming that the
unplanned contingencies and readiness were properly funded, going
after something like theater missile defense would be very high on
our list.
Mr. Hunter. Admiral Prueher.
Admiral Prueher. Yes, it would be important to us to have thea-
ter. If you take the popular position of a war-fighting CINC, it is
I want everything now. So the closer we come to that, the better
we like it, but then realizing we cannot do that.
Mr. Hunter. I want to ask you something about these missiles.
I was reading about Billy Mitchell and how he was trying to force
this Nation to come to the idea that we lived in an age of air
power, and he did the unthinkable. He went out and sunk a bunch
of ships, including a captured German ship with aircraft. In what
was supposed to be a kind of a benign air power demonstration he
actually sunk these babies and raised hell with the shipbuilders.
For that we court-martialed him.
My impression is we live in an age of missiles. I have never seen
this country more discombobulated or our military leadership more
worried than when those Model T Scuds hit our troops in Desert
Storm. That was the one thing we couldn't deal with.
Can I get just from your personal point of view, do you have a
sense of urgency about that? Do you see the North Koreans build-
ing these missiles? They sell them to Iraq and to Libya.
You see China continuing to build missiles. You see these mis-
siles, as Mr. Weldon often points out, the Soviets are selling mis-
siles and missile technology on the world market for hard dollars,
do you think we are meeting, generally meeting this emergence
into the age of missiles with all of the urgency we should have?
And the reason I say that is right after Desert Storm, boy, we
were really worried in the House of Representatives and the Senate
we whipped up legislation immediately and passed it with all the
big names, Sam Nunn and everybody else, to the effect we were
going to have, by golly, a missile defense by 1996. And each month
that passed after our troops got the hell kicked out of them by
those Scuds, we tended to find other priorities and we went back
to the sewer systems and the other things that took our time and
took our resources. Now it is 1996, and we have not done any of
the great things we promised to do immediately after Desert
Storm.
So just from a personal perspective, because you are going to be
graded ultimately by history on not only how well you ran your
troops and your CINC's, but how well you talked to the American
people and your political leadership about emerging threats, do you
think we are meeting this new age of missiles with adequate ur-
gency? A personal opinion.
Admiral Prueher. My personal opinion is we need to be doing
more on that subject, sir.
908
General LuCK. My personal opinion, having flashed around
under those things for 9 months over there, is that what is on that
warhead is critical. If we give people credit to put chemical or nu-
clear on that warhead, the risk goes up even more than it does con-
ventionally. So the longer we wait for that eventuality to happen,
the tougher the consequences will be. But the conventional Scud C
or B does not present that big an issue because of its inaccuracy.
But with any other kind of warhead, it sure does.
Admiral Gehman. We agree this is a recognized priority, a recog-
nized requirement of high priority.
Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. That was why I was putting that in
context a while ago about putting those B, C, some kind of other
warhead on those Scuds. And you have a different kind of problem.
General Luck. Yes, you do.
The Chairman. And, also, I noticed, too, you talking about. Gen-
eral, the context again, where you had these defenses that you
have, such as they are, and the number that you have. And we
could talk about that for a while, too, even though you have a suffi-
cient number of defensive systems, whether they upgrade Patriot
or not, and whether those upgraded Patriots can handle the threat
even of the conventional warheads.
Mr. Pickett, you wanted a second round.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question I had has to do with the perception in the western
Pacific about the resolve of the United States to stay engaged and
stay committed to that part of the world.
It has been some time since I have visited there, but when I did,
I don't recall any other countries feeling very confident that the
U.S. commitment would remain, and every single one of them was
convinced that, if it did remain, that the quality and quantity of
it would be diminished.
I would like to hear from Admiral Prueher and General Luck, if
you could throw light on where you think we are in this regard as
far as the perception among the western Pacific countries as to how
committed the United States is to maintain its presence there.
Admiral Prueher. One, it is critically important to the countries
there. Their economic prosperity that has been heralded for a great
number of the countries over there, including China, a lot of that
has been enabled by the relative security stability that has been
provided by this Nation in the western Pacific, in the Asian Pacific
region.
They care a lot about our being there to be a flywheel, as it were,
to offset any regional hegemony amongst the other potential pow-
ers there.
I have just been on the job about 6 weeks, but people express a
lot of concern always about, they look at our level of commitment.
What has become the watchword is the about 100,000 people that
the United States has committed to the area. Since we have set
that up as the criteria, they watch that like a hawk.
I would say that as a result of the China-Taiwan crisis and our
response to it, not just with the first carrier battle group but with
the second, the people in the area have been greatly reassured of
909
the U.S. commitment to the area, not only of peaceful process but
our interest in the Asia-Pacific area.
I know that they feel better about it now than they did 6 weeks
ago. We need to keep this reassurance going up. I think it is cer-
tainly in our national interest to be there, sir.
Mr. PICI^ETT. General Luck.
General Luck. Sir, I couldn't agree more. Since Joe Prueher got
out there, confidence has gone up.
Admiral Prueher. I didn't intend to imply cause and effect.
General LuCK. The alliance between the Republic of Korea and
the United States is strong, and our commitment there is pretty
evident by virtue of the 37,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and ma-
rines that are stationed there along with a substantial number of
commercial people that are investing their time and energies in
that country as well.
Mr. Pickett. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Dellums. If we have come to the end of the hearing, I would
like to thank our distinguished witnesses for their testimony. I
think this has been valuable testimony.
I hope that many of my colleagues who, for a variety of reasons,
could not be here read the record, because I think their responses
have been very straightforward on a number of questions.
Finally, I would like to say with some trepidation that I recog-
nize that the issue of missile defense is a significant question. It
has been put to these gentlemen and virtually all of the witnesses
that have come before us.
I am a mature guy. I understand. I have been around the barn
several times, so I understand that this is a significant issue, and
I believe that we ought to debate it with as much intelligence and
fervor and dedication to significant policy that we can.
I know that in some quarters this is an emotional issue. I know
you, Mr. Chairman, feel fervently about this matter. I would just
caution that a sensible beauty of our country is that we can handle
and tolerate differences on critical issues; that we, from different
perspectives, bring our intellect, our belief system, our views to
bear; and that worst case is that we become political opponents.
Words have great power, and I would caution the use of the word
"enemy," because in the context of a free and open society there are
no enemies. Just because they have a different political perspec-
tive, that they may be political opponents, that is OK. We can have
worthy opposition, and let's slug it out, and at the end of the day
come to consensus of what is in the best interest of our people.
That is fine.
But I have fear and concern when the term "enemy" gets used
because we tend to disagree with someone else. I think we ought
to drop that from our nomenclature certainly as we go about the
business of developing a national agenda for the American people.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Maybe I should have used another word, "adversary" or some-
thing like that. I don't want to let caution ever keep me from trying
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to defend American lives. I don't think we ought to have any cau-
tion at all in defending American lives.
Mr. Dellums. On that we have no problem. I am concerned
about the use of the term "enemy." That can be grossly mis-
construed. The beauty of our country is, we don't tend to label peo-
ple.
The Chairman. I will grant you that.
Gentlemen, we appreciate your contribution today. You made a
very real contribution to our dealings here. We have to hear from
others before we wrap it up and go into markup. That will be com-
ing shortly. In the meantime, good luck in what you are doing; and,
General Luck, good luck to you too in setting that beer and bait.
General Luck. Thank you. I will keep some beer cold for you.
The Chairman. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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