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Full text of "Hearings regarding shipment of atomic material to the Soviet Union during World War II. Hearings"

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fARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON UN-AMEEICAN ACTIVITIES 
HOUSE OF REPEESENTATIVES 

EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS 

FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS 



DECEMBER 5 AND 7, 1949; JANUARY 23, 24, 25, AND 26, 
AND MARCH 2, 3, AND 7, 1950 



Printed for the use of the Committee on Un-American Activities 







UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
S9334 WASHINGTON : 1950 

PUBLIC 






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MAY 4 1950 



COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 
United States House of Representatives 

JOHN S. WOOD, Georgia, Chairman 

FRANCIS E. WALTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD M. NIXON. California 

BURR P. HARRISON, Virginia FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota 

JOHN McSWEENEY, Ohio HAROLD H. VELDE, Illinois 

MORGAN M. MOULDER, Missouri BERNARD W. KEARNEY, New York 

Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Counsel 
Louis J. Russell. Senior Investigator 
Benjamin Mandel, Director of Research 
John W. Carrington. Clerk of Committee 

II 



CONTENTS 



December 5, 1949, testimony of — Page 

Louis J. Russell 902 

George Racey Jordan 908 

December 7, 1949, testimony of Lt. Gen. Leslie R. Groves 935 

January 23, 1950, testimony of Lawrence C. Burman 957 

January 24, 1950, testimony of — 

Dr. Phillip L. Merritt • 979 

Charles Edward McKillips 985 

Dr. Phillip L. Merritt (resumed). 986 

Lawrence C. Burman (resumed) 1002 

Hermann H. Rosenberg 1004 

January 25, 1950, testimony of — 

Courtney E. Owens,..' 1042 

Col. Thomas T. Crenshaw 1052 

January 26, 1950, testimony of — 

Henry A. Wallace 1070 

James P. Hoopes 1 100 

March 2, 1950, testimony of Donald T. Appell 1120 

March 3, 1950, testimony of — 

Donald T. Appell (resumed) 1145 

George Racey Jordan 1153 

March 7, 1950, testimony of Victor A. Kravchenko 1175 

III 



HEAEINGS KEGAEDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATE- 
EIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DUEING WOELD WAE II 



MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1949 

United States House of Kepresentatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on un-American Activities, 

W ashington, D. O. 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 11 : 15 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Build- 
ing, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Hon. John S. Wood, chairman; 
Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison, and Morgan M. Moulder. 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens, investigator; Benjamin 
Mandel, director of research ; John W. Carrington, clerk ; and A. S. 
Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order, please. 

Let the record disclose that for purposes of this particular hear- 
ing a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. 
Moulder, and Mr. Wood has been designated. They are all present. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, the committee and its staff has been 
for some time pursuing an investigation of reported sales of uranium 
to the Soviet Government. In view of the fact that so much pub- 
licity has recently been given to the sale of this material to the Soviets, 
it appears advisable that the facts developed by the committee thus 
far be brought to the attention of the American public. I would like, 
therefore, to call as the first witness this morning, Louis J. Kussell, 
senior investigator for the committee. 

A review of the file pertaining to the matter of the uranium ship- 
ments to Russia indicates that there is some disagreement or conflict 
in statements made by various persons examined or interrogated dur- 
ing the course of the investigation conducted in connection with this 
matter. It therefore appears advisable that this morning's proceed- 
ings be confined to the subject of the shipments of uranium and 
uranium compounds to the Soviet Government, and such other mat- 
ters that we may be able to develop through another witness if he 
appears. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. Mr, Russell, will you stand up and be sworn. 
You solemnly swear the evidence you give this subcommittee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God ? 

Mr. Russell. I do. 

901 



902 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC :MATERIAL 

TESTIMONY OF LOUIS J. RUSSELL 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please state your name? 

Mr. Russell. Louis J. Eusseli. 

Mr .Tavenneb. You are employed by the committee as its senior in- 
vestigator, are you not? 

Mr. Russell. I am. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you had occasion to make an investigation of 
reported sales of uranium to the Russian Government during the pe- 
riod of your employment by the committee ? 

Mr. Russell. I have. 

Mr. Tavenner. That investigation related, did it not, to the sales 
of uranium which were made to the Russian Government from sources 
within this country? 

Mr. Rltssell. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. How many sales of uranium were made to the Soviet 
Government according to the facts developed by your investigation? 

Mr. Russell. Three that we know of. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did the Russians first become interested in 
the purchase of uranium or uranium compounds within the United 
States? 

Mr. Russell. In February 1943, according to documents which the 
staff of the committee has examined. 

Mr. Tavenner, What officials of the Soviet Government were prin- 
cipally interested in the Russian attempts to obtain uranium or ura- 
nium compounds ? 

Mr. Russell. There were several. One of them was V. Finogenov 
of the Soviet Purchasing Commission; and N. S. Fomichev of the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission; N. S. Stepanov of the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission ; and a General Rudensky, Col. A. N. Kotikov 
was the ultimate recipient of the uranium material. He too, was at- 
tached to the Soviet Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Russell, at this point would you relate the 
details of the first two shipments of uranium compounds to the Soviet 
Government ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. Regarding the issuance of the export licenses 
for uranium compounds, the committee received a letter from the 
United States State Department from which I will quote. However, 
since the letter contains controversial material as well as confidential 
data, I will read only the first paragraph. This paragraph discloses 
that certain export licenses for the shipment of uranium materials to 
the Soviet Union were granted, according to the records of the Lend- 
Lease Administration and the successor to that agency, the Foreign 
Economic Administration. 

This is a letter addressed to Donald T. Appell. a member of the in- 
vestigating staff of the Un-American Activities Committee, from the 
Department of State. 

Mr. Moulder. What is the date of the letter? 

Mr. Russell. June 11, 1948. [Reading:] 

Reference is made to your visit to the Department of State, on behalf of 
the House Committee on Un-American Activities, with reference to a reported 
shipment of some black uranium oxide to the Soviet Union in 1943. The 
Department of State had nothing to do with this transaction. However, the 
records of the Division for Soviet Supply of the Office of Lend-Lease Admin- 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 903 

istration ami its successor agency, the Foreign Economic Administration, which 
have been absorbed by the Department of State, indicate that in March 1943 
two export licenses were granted, one for 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 
220 pounds of uranium nitrate and the other for 500 pounds of urano-uranic 
oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate. The records also indicate that an 
export license was granted in April 1943 for 25 pounds of uranium metal, and 
that in November of tiie same year an export license was granted for 1,000 
grams of heavy water which I believe is also of interest to your committee. 
Notations and memoranda of the Lend-Lease Administration, included in the 
records, indicate that there was some consultation between representatives of 
the War Department, FEA, and Lend-Lease on the granting of export licenses 
for the uranium materials. These records do not, however, include any actvial 
contemporary communications from the War Department. 

As to the shipment of the material to the Soviet Union, the fol- 
lowing testimony was given to the committee by Herman R. Rosen- 
berg, of Chemator, Inc., New York City. This concern occupied a 
position similar to that of a broker in the uranium transactions with 
the Soviet Government : 

On February 1, 1943, we received an inquiry from the Government Purchas- 
ing Commission of the Soviet Union, Washington, D. C, Mr. N. S. Fomichev, 
for 220 ix)unds uranium oxide (U30S), 220 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl 
nitrate, U02 (NO3)2+6H20), and 25 pounds uranium metal. 

We had previously sold to the Russians approximately four or six small 
lots of various chemicals, during 1942 and 1948, aggregating a few thousand 
dollars. This was a very minor part of the regular business done by us during 
the war years with various Allied purchasing commissions which then offered 
the only opportunity to continue "our export business with those countries which 
they represented, and the United States Treasury Department l)uying lend-lease 
supplies. 

This inquiry was the first we had ever received for uranium products from 
any customer. Accordingly, we had first to find manufacturers and dealers 
in this line, whom we contacted for the purpose of obtaining information about 
this article and to get quotations. We were able to obtain at least one offer for 
each of the products. 

We also called the War Production Board, New York City, group 2, to 
inquire about regulations covering these products and were told that order 
M-2S5 of January 26, 1943, had just been issued which, however, merely pro- 
hibited the use of uranium chemicals in certain domestic industries, like glass, 
ceramic, and pottery and that said order said nothing regarding export. If the 
material is destined for war use by the Russians this order definitely did not 
apply. For further details we were referred to their Washington miscellaneous 
minerals division. In reply to our formal inquiry, addressed to this division, 
Mr. Park, Assistant to R. J. Land, confirmed that the Russian uranium require- 
ment was not subject to regulation M-285. In this connection, Mr. Fomichev 
advised us that the material was not required for any of the uses restricted by 
regulation M-285 but was urgently needed for Russian military puriwses. Spe- 
cifically, the uranium salts were represented by the Russians to be needed for 
military medical purposes and the uranium metal for .their war industry to 
harden steel used for gun barrels. This information, together with its source, 
we submitted to the War Production Board with our aforesaid inquiry. 

Accordingly, on February 3, 1943, we invited the Russian Mission to submit 
to us their firm order for the uranium oxide and the m-anium nitrate. Yet, it 
was not until the middle of March 1943 that such formal order was received 
by us. In the meantime the Lend-Lease Administration, through Mr. Moore, a 
subordinate of General Wessen of that agency, had approved the transaction, 
advising us on March 8, 1943, that "no further clearance will be necessary except 
the usual export license." Upon advice on March 11, 1943, of the Soviet Com- 
mission of the receipt of such export license, we placed on March 15, 1943, our 
own order for the 200 ( rather than 220) pounds uranium oxide and 220 pounds 
uranium nitrate with S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo. On March 
23, 1943, this company shipped the material directly to "Col. A. N. Kotikov, 
Resident Representative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission of 
the Soviet Union in the United States of America, Air Service Depot of the Air 
Transport Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont." 



904 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

As for the uranium metal, no quotation was ever made by us on this Inquiry, 
due to diflBculties encountered in supplying this material from our expected 
source, the Fairmount Chemical Co. 

On March 19, 1943, the Soviet Government advised us that they reqiaired 
several tons of uranium nitrate and uranium chloride (preferably uranium 
oxychloride, otherwise tri-, tetra- or pentchloride) or urano-uranic oxide, 
which inquiry was passed on to S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., who answered 
on March 25, 1943, that they could only offer 500 pounds each of urano-uranic 
oxide and uranium nitrate and further deliveries only if they received the raw 
materials. We passed this offer on to the Soviet Commission subject to receipt 
of the necessary export license and other permissions. 

On April 1, 1943, the Soviet Commission asked us to "reserve" 500 pounds of 
each product as offered by us and on April 5, 1943, they confirmed the order 
subject to receipt of export license. This license (No. 1643180) was issued only 
on April 26, 1943. By that time the Shattuck Co. had withdrawn their offer 
as of April 22, 1943, because the material had been sold to "their regular cus- 
tomers." This made it necessary to secure substitute material from the Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp., New York City, to have the export license amended 
as of April 29, 1943, to conform to the change in product and price ; and to obtain 
and place the new sales and purchase contracts with the Russian and Canadian 
parties, respectively. 

Even though we had been advised by the Russians at the outset that, contrary 
to the first uranium transaction, this deal did not come under lend-lease, they 
advised us on April 12, 1943, that Mr. Moore had granted the necessary approval 
of the transaction as a cash purchase. With respect to regulation M-2S5 we 
obtained an affidavit from the Russians stating that theoxide will be used in the 
manufacture of ferro-uranium compounds which in turn will be used in the 
production of armaments and that the uranium nitrate will be used for medical 
pui-poses directly connected with the war. This affidavit we sent on to our sup- 
pliers who shipped the materials consisting of 500 pounds of black uranium oxide 
and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, directly from Port Hope, Ontario, Canada, 
to the afore-mentioned Colonel Kotikov. 

The gross invoice value of both of the uranium deals, described herein, was 
$4,400, on which our gross profit is estimated at $50O-$600. Both transactions 
were handled, and payment made on behalf of the Russian Government by 
Amtorg Trading Corp., New York, N. Y. 

On August 5, 1943, Mr. Fomichev* inquired, among various other chemicals, 
about uranium compounds. He said that they asked the WPB if not another 
10-15 tons could be located for them. The Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. 
told us that they are not allowed any longer to quote on uranium compounds ; 
we should approach the WPB but the best way would be that the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Ministry of Munitions and 
Supplies. This we passed on to the Soviet Purchasing Commission and had no 
further dealings in any uranium products since. 

Mr. Waltek. Wlien was this statement made, Mr. Russell ? 

Mr. EussELL. It was made on June 28, 1948. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Russell, according to this testimony by Mr. 
Rosenberg, export license covering the shipment of uranium com- 
pounds to the Soviet Government was granted and the material was 
shipped to Colonel Kotikov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ; is 
that correct? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was this material, or the uranium compounds, 
actually flown to the Soviet Union, as far as your investigation dis- 
closed ? 

Mr. Russell. The staff as of this date has been unable to locate 
the actual manifests covering the uranium shipments to Russia. It 
was reported that atomic materials were sent out of the country as 
ordinary chemicals and that it would be a difficult if not fruitless task 
to attempt to identify any particular manifest covering a shipment 
of atomic material. However, oral information received by the com- 
mittee reflects that the uranium compounds were flown from the bases 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 905 

at Great Falls, Mont., to Fairbanks, Alaska, and then to Russia. The 
export license for the first shipment of uranium to Russia reflects 
that the ultimate destination of the atomic material was to be Rasno- 
import, Ul. Kuibysheva, Moscow, U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have told the committee about your investi- 
gation relating to the action of the broker in the sale of this uranium? 

Mr. RussELii. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Drd you conduct a further investigation of the 
sellers of the uranium ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. In connection with the second shipment an in- 
vestigation was made and it was determined that after the first ship- 
ment was made from the United States the Manhattan Engineering 
District, under General Groves, cut off all sources of supply of 
uranium material in the United States. However, the source from 
which tlie Russians obtained the second shipment of the 1,000 pounds 
of uranium compounds was a Canadian source. The principal offi- 
cer of this company was investigated by the committee. However, it 
developed that this person had been the subject of a criminal investi- 
gation by the Canadian Government in connection with the sale of 
uranium and radium products. The criminal case was, according to 
our investigation, dropped and a civil suit instituted by the Canadian 
Government in New York City against the individual involved. The 
records of the civil case were impounded by a Federal court in New 
York City after a settlement of more than $1,000,000 was effected by 
the Canadian Government. Following the impounding of the records, 
the committee issued a subpena calling for the production of these 
records by a firm of attorneys in New York City. After this subpena 
was served, the American State Department advised through a letter 
addressed to the committee that the Canadian Government had re- 
quested that the investigation of the person involved in the second 
shipment be deferred insofar as the production of the court records 
were concerned, in the interest of the national security of Canada. 
Because of this request and the fact that the subject of the investi- 
gation was at the time in Paris, France, the staff discontinued its 
investigation, but the investigation has now been reactivated in view 
of the fact that the subject has returned to this country. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation show that export licenses 
covering the shipment of other atomic materials to Russia were 
granted ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes, The documents that the committee examined 
reflect that program license No. 339 for the shipment of heavy water 
to Soviet Russia was granted. The amount called for by the license 
was 1,000 grams or 41 pounds, valued at $3,250. This license was 
granted sometime between October 1 and December 31, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the heavy water actually shipped to Soviet 
Russia, as far as you could determine ? 

Mr. Russell. The staff was unable to locate the shipping manifest 
applying to this particular license. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Was there any peculiarity surrounding the pur- 
chase orders issued by the Russian Government in connection with 
its application for export license covering uranium oxide? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. One witness interrogated during the course of 
the investigation said that on the invoice submitted to lend-lease for 



906 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

approval by the Russians there would be a list of perhaps 30 or 40 
different nonessential chemicals. The request for uranium would be 
placed near the end of the list. This witness stated he surmised the 
Kussians submitted the invoices in this manner hoping the purchase 
order would be approved by lend-lease without a careful check being 
made because the other articles set forth in the invoices were non- 
essential items. 

Mr. Tavenner. During the period that these licenses were being 
requested, and in some cases issued, the fact that the United States 
was working on atomic development was a closely guarded secret, 
was it not ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Therefore, it appears that the Russians knew in 
February 1943 that this country was engaged in atomic development, 
does it not ? 

Mr. Russell, Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation reflect that the shipment 
of uranium compounds to the Soviet Union was approved by the 
Manhattan Engineering District? 

Mr. Russell. There is a great deal of controversy concerning 
whether the Manhattan Engineering District actually approved the 
shipment of uranium material to Soviet Russia. However, in a letter 
dated November 18, 1946, addressed to a Government official, Gen. 
Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan Engineering District, it is 
stated : 

Early in 1948 the Russian purchasing commission placed an order with a 
private firm in this country for 220 pounds of uranium nitrate and 200 pounds 
of uranium oxide. The individual who arranged this purchase for the Russian 
purchasing commission is not known. I have reason to believe that the material 
was flown to Russia in a lend-lease plane. When the Manhattan Engineering 
District became cognizant of this purchase efforts were made to stop the ship- 
ment. These efforts were discontinued when we ascertained that the transac- 
tion had already been completely arranged. Shortly after this incident the 
Manhattan Engineering District arranged f<u- prohibitions to be placed on the 
export of uranium and for the Manhattan Engineering District to be informed 
of all inquiries concerning uranium. The liaison established was instrumental, 
insofar as we know, in stopping subsequent shipments of uranium ores. * * * 

Mr. Tavenner. What reasons were advanced, during the course 
of your investigation, as to the reasons the Russians were interested in 
obtaining uranium and securing information as to the sources of 
supply ? 

Mr. Russell. There were several reasons advanced. One was that 
the Russians were working on the atomic bomb themselves; two, the 
Russians' had received information that the United States was work- 
ing on the development of the atomic bomb, and, through the place- 
ment of orders for uranium compounds and uranium itself, they 
could ascertain whether uranium was considered a strategic element 
by the United States Government, thereby securing in effect some 
verification of the report that we were engaged in the development 
of the atomic bomb; three, the Russians hoped to determine whether 
tlie United States was using all of the uranium output and, if it was 
determined that none was available for export, they would be pro- 
vided with some indication of the extensiveness of the United States 
atomic program; four, another reason advanced was that the Rus- 
sians wanted to ascertain the sources of supply for uranium avail- 
able to the United States. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 907 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. Mr. Russell, there have appeared in the press and 
over the radio statements relatin<r to the transfer of quantities of 
uranium to Russia during 1943. Have you endeavored to secure the 
presence here of the major who made those statements? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. I have been informed that he will appear at 
12 : 30. 

Mr. Tavenner. 12 : 30 today ? 

Mr. Russell. Today. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the course of his statements the name of the late 
Harry Hopkins was mentioned. I would like to ask you whether, 
during the course of your investigation, any information came to your 
attention, or to the attention of any other member of the investi- 
gating staff, to your knowledge, that the late Harry Hopkins was 
involved in the transmittal of uranium to Russia ? 

Mr. Russell. To the best of my knowledge his name was never 
brought up. Another name was brought up. I would prefer to fur- 
nish that name in executive session. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter. 

Mr, Walter. AVhcn did you first start this investigation, Mr. Rus- 
sell? 

Mr. Russell. Approximately May or June 1948. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, you and your staff have been en- 
gaged in a continuous' investigation of this matter ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes; off and on. 

Mr. Walter. And at no time during the course of this very thor- 
ough investigation was there any indication that the late Harry Hop- 
kins had anything to do with tJie shipment of this material ? 

Mr. Russell. His name was never brought to my attention, and I am 
certain it was never brought to the attention of the other investi- 
gators, 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison. 

Mr. Harrison. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder. 

Mr. Moulder. No questions. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you had an opportunity yet to interrogate or 
question the party who is to be here at 12 : 30 ? 

Mr. Russell. We have not. I have only talked to him on the 
phone. 

Mr. Tavenner. And made arrangements for his presence? 

Mr. Russell. That is true. 

Mr. Walter. Who is that man, Mr. Russell ? 

Mr. Russell. His name is Major Jordan. I am not familiar with 
his first name. 

Mr. Walter. And he assured you that he would be here at 12 : 30 ? 

Mr. Russell. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Has he been subpenaed ? 

Mr. Russell. He has not been subpenaed, but I was promised he 
would appear. 

Mr. Wood. Have you had any opportunity to subpena him? 

Mr. Russell. No. He was out of the city at the time I called him. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. Any further questions? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 



908 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand at recess until 12 : 30. 
(Thereupon, at 11 : 45 a. m., a recess was taken.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order. 

Let the record show that the subcommittee heretofore appointed by 
the chairman are all present — Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, Mr. Moulder, 
and Mr. Wood. 

Are you ready to proceed ? 

Mr. Ta\tjnner. Yes, sir. As the next witness I would like to call 
Mr. Jordan. 

Mr. Wood. Major Jordan, will you stand, please, and be sworn. 
You solemnly swear the evidence you give this subconmiittee will be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 

Mr. Jordan. I do, sir. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE RACEY JORDAN 

Mr. Tavenner. You are Mr. George Racey Jordan ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe a subpena was served on you today re- 
questing your presence here today ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have received such a subpena. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the original subpena in evidence, 
and ask that it be marked "Jordan Exhibit A." ^ 

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted without objection. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your residence, Mr. Jordan ? 

Mr. Jordan. Well, I have an apartment in New York City at 307 
East Forty-fourth Street. I have a country home in Pennsylvania 
and own a ranch in the State of Washington, 80 acres on the water 
front. 

Mr. Tavenner. It has come to the attention of the conxmittee that 
you recently made a statement relating to the sale of uranium and 
the transfer of uranium to Russia. We would like to ask you to tell 
us about that situation fully, but before doing so I would like to get 
a few facts regarding yourself. I believe you were an officer in the 
United States Army or Air Force ? 

Mr. Jordan. I was a major in the Air Corps. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the Air Corps. During what period of time 
were you a major? 

Mr. Jordan. I was a major after the Russians got me promoted. 
I was a captain to start with. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where were you stationed ? 

Mr. Jordan. Originally I was ordered to duty on May 4, 1942, to 
United Nations Depot No. 8 at the Newark Airport, where we were 
sending Russian lend-lease material to Russia by boat. 

Mr. Tavenner. How long had you been in the service prior to that 
time ? 

Mr. Jordan. That was the first duty I was given upon entering the 
service. I was a member of the American Legion and they needed 
me as a liaison officer. 



1 See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 909 

Mr. Tavenner. You were a veteran of World War I ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I was in the old Eickenbacker outfit, in the 
One Hundred and Forty-seventh Aero Squadron, under Billy Mitchell. 

Mr. Tavenner. Prior to your enlistment in World War II, in what 
business were you engaged ? 

Mr. Jordan. Merchandising and selling advertising. I was adver- 
tising manager for Euppert Brewery, and Schaefer Brewery before 
that, and Piel Brewery before that. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. How long were you stationed in NeAV Jersey? 

Mr. Jordan. I reported for duty on the 10th day of May 1942, and 
when the Eussian movement was not making much progress in getting 
material to Eussia by boat, we shifted to Great Falls, Mont., to fly 
the material, and I went there January 1, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time you were stationed in New Jersey, what 
is a proper description of your position and your outfit? 

Mr. Jordan. Four days after I. arrived at Newark they made me 
acting executive officer of the airport. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who was your superior officer? 

Mr. Jordan. Col. Eobert L. Eockwell. 

Mr. Tavenner. At whose direction were j^ou ordered to shift station ? 

Mr. Jordan. Colonel Eockwell appointed me assistant to Col. 
Anatole N. Kotikov, stationed at Newark. He had a number of Eus- 
sian expediters with him of the purchasing connnission, and I was 
contact officer between the Eussians and (V)mmanding Officer Eock- 
well. After the Eussian movement became greater than facilities at 
Newark could afford, and the boats going to Murmansk were being at- 
tacked out of Norway, when we lost 21 out of one convoy of 34, it was 
too much for lend-lease and they decided t-o try something else. We 
attempted to fly some medium bombers from South America to Africa, 
but by the time they got across Africa to Tiflis the motors had to be 
taken down and they were not much use to the Eussians, and they were 
not able to get enough on boats in Africa to get to the Eussia lines, and 
Mr. Harriman and Mr. Hopkins of lend-lease had promised a gi'eat 
movement of planes, so we finally tried to fly them. We thought if we 
started at Great Falls, Mont., and used the old Gore Field routes we 
could establish a route provided the Eussians could provide a similar 
route through Siberia. 

In August 1942 Col. L. Ponton de Arce opened the air route and a 
few planes started through. I have the shipments and the number. It 
ran about five the first month of A-20's, the so-called Havocs. 

Mr. Tavenner. "Wliat was the first month? 

Mr. Jordan. August 1942. They went through all right, and 
quickly, and it was decided that that would be a good route to fly them 
in a pipe line. So we changed our entire operations to Great Falls, 
Mont., and started setting up an Air Force operation on Gore Field at 
Great Falls. 

Col. Eoy B. Gardner, a First World War veteran, a flier, my im- 
mediate superior, went out there and established the route, and when 
he got the thing kind of going he sent for the Eussian contingent and 
myself, and General Farthing at Newark Airport ordered the whole 
Eussian movement sent to Great Falls, and I had very special orders, 
orders that gave my activities priority even over the American Air 
Force. It was a little difficult for a captain to get things, sometimes,, 



910 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

and I used to show these orders. This order is known as a Presidential 
directive. It says : 

The President has directed that "airplanes be delivered in accordance with 
protocol schedules by the most expeditious means." 

Would you like to see it ? That was from General Arnold to Gen- 
eral Frank, and General Frank sent it to Great Falls and suggested 
that Captain Jordan "who was recently assigned to your station be ap- 
pointed*' for the purpose of expediting the movement. 

Mr. Tavenner. May we have a copy of that order ? 

Mr. Jordan. You may. 

Mr. Tavenner. Before you were transferred to Great Falls, did you 
have anyone assisting you in your particular duties in New Jersey^ 

Mr. Jordan. We had hundreds. 

Mr. Tavenner. In what capacity did those hundreds of people work 
with you ? 

Mr. Jordan. Well, more under the direction of Colonel Gardner, 
who was a captain at that time. We received the airplanes from the 
various factories and we treated them so that we could put them on 
the surface of freighters and the salt water would not corrode the 
motors so that when they arrived at Murmansk they could be used. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understood you were liaison officer at Newark? 

Mr. Jordan. I was acting executive officer, but directed most of my 
efforts to seeing that Colonel Kotikov got living quarters and food 
and automobiles and everything else they needed, because we had 
been instructed to give them attention and priority in all their needs. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were any persons assigned to you as assistants 
purely in connection with your work as liaison officer? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I didn't speak Russian and had an interpreter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who was the interpreter? 

Mr. Jordan. David Stone. 

Mr. Tavtenner. David Stone? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you Imow where he lives ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. He was one of several interpreters. The Rus- 
sians hired an interpreter by the name of Jurist, J-u-r-i-s-t, and he was 
such an excellent interpreter that we gradually used the Russian in- 
terpreter rather than the American interpreter. His name was Simeon 
Jurist. We gradually had different employees who were hired for 
the purpose of assisting us with the Russians, stenographers and vari- 
ous people of Russian extraction who could speak and type in Rus- 
sian. Do you wish their names ? 

Mr. Tavenner. No; unless some of those persons went with you 
to Great Falls. If they did, I would like to have their names. 

Mr. Jordan. The only one who went on to Great Falls was Mr. 
Jurist, Simeon Jurist. 

Mr. Tavenner. He was a Russian national? 

Mr. Jordan. He is an American, I believe, but the Russians suc- 
ceeded in hiring him before we did. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where is he now, do you know? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; I am sorry. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Have you seen him at any time since 1943 ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have never seen him since, although I received a let- 
ter from him. The secretary, who I believe was an American, Margo 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 911 

Stowe, I wanted to take her to Great Falls as a stenographer and 
i uterpreter, but it was not possible at that time. 

Mr. Wood. You say you had a letter from Mr. Jurist ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. Would you care to see it? 

Mr. Wood. Where was it written from ? 

Mr. Jordan. Alaska. 

Mr. Wood. What part of Alaska? 

Mr. Jordan. Fairbanks. 

Mr. Wood. How long ago was that? 

Mr. Jordan. It was just before I left the service sometime. 

Mr. Wood. Was he in the service, or did he have a civilian status? 

Mr. Jordan. He had a civilian status. 

Here is a letter dated March 30, 194:o, from Jurist to me, written 
from Fairbanks. I haven't read it for some time, but you can have it. 

Mr. Wood. May we retain this letter a sufficient length of time to 
have it photostated and then return it to you. Major!! 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. Here is another one. You see, I kept these records 
in case you might need them. Here is another one. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the letter of March oO, 1943, reference is made 
to a Lieutenant Silver, I believe. 

Mr. Jordan. He was liaison officer in Fairbanks between Russians 
and Americans under Major Mortimer. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was he stationed at any time at Great Falls? 

Mr. Jordan. No. He was always at Fairbanks. 

Mr. Wood. Do you know where he is now ? 

Mr. Jordan. I am sorry, I don't. 

Mr. Wood. Do you know if he is still in the service ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. I don't. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is Lieutenant Silver's first name? 

Mr. Jordan. Just a moment. I will have to look up the officers at 
Great Falls and Fairbanks. 

Mr. Moulder. What is the date of that letter ? 

Mr. Tavenner. March 30, 1943. 

Mr. Jordan. His name was Phillip Silver, assistant supply officer of 
the Three Hundred and Eighty-fourth Base Headquarters Squadron. 
He is married and his serial number is 9564291. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the letter of April 19, 1943, addressed to you 
from Simeon Jurist, reference is made to Captain de Tolly. 

Mr. Jordan. Nicholas S. de Tolly. He is an American citizen, 
American officer, a fine flyer, and he taught the Russians how to fly 
our planes. 

Ml'. Tavenner. Was he stationed at any time at Great Falls? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes ; as my assistant. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where is he now^ ? 

Mr. Jordan. Military attache to Moscow, to the best of my knowl- 
edge. His great grandfather defeated Napoleon in 1814. He is quite 
important to the Russians. He made a hit with them. 

Mr. Wood. For purposes of identification you had better identify 
those leters, had you not ? 

Mr. Tavenner. We will identify the three letters from Simeon 
Jurist to Capt. George Jordan, dated, respectively, March 30, 1943, 
April 19, 1943, and September 25, 1943, as Jordan exhibits B, C, and 
D, and I offer them in evidence as exhibits by those numbers. 



912 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. They will be admitted, with the understanding that when 
they are photostated the originals will be returned to the witness.^ 

Mr. TA^•ENNER. Major Jordan, describe to us your duties at Great 
Falls, please. 

Mr. Jordan, I think it would be easier if you would let me read my 
orders, which I tried to follow : 

1. In connection with the movement of aircraft to U. S. S. R. through your 
station, it is directed that j'ou appoint an officer who will be charged with the 
following duties : 

(a) Inspect aircraft upon arrival, to determine — 

(1) Condition. 

(2) Status of regular equipment. 

(&) Install special flight equipment as requested by Russia. 

(c) Receive and store special flight equipment furnished for this movement. 

(d) Report any shortages of regular equipment to United Nations Branch, 
Overseas Section, and take necessary action to have them supplied. 

(e) Furnish United Nations Branch, Overseas Section, with daily report 
covering arrivals and departure of these aircraft and status of those held on 
field. 

(/) Coordinate activities of Air Service Command, Air Transport Command, 
and Materiel Command which affect this entire movement of aircraft. 

iff) Receive and transmit messages and requisitions from Fairbanks. 

(h) Coordinate and expedite air freight movements for U. S. S. R. from Great 
Falls and Edmonton. 

2. It is recommended that Captain Jordan who was recently assigned to your 
station be appointed for this purpose. 

By command of Major General Frank : 

C. P. Kane, Colonel, Air Corps. 

Mr. Ta\-enner. Wliat assistance did you have in the performance 
of your duties at Great Falls? 

Mr. Jordan. I started out with a few, and it grew. The air-freight 
movement was getting heavier, and in 1943 important Russian people 
used to go through with 5 or 6 suitcases. I didn't stop them at that 
time because I though maybe it was legitimate. B'ut when they started 
sending the suitcases without people I got interested, and sending 50 
suitcases M'ith armed couriers didn't seem proper, and didn't have 
diplomatic immunity as far as I could see. I let the first two or 
three batches go through, and inquired of the State Department and 
the War Department whether the bags had diplomatic immunity. 
I couldn't get an answer from the State Department, but I did out of 
the War Department, and they said I was to be helpful to the Russians 
in every way. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. Do you have a copy of those communications? 

Mr. Jordan. The telephone calls I made daily to the War Depart- 
ment are a matter of record. The particular complaint that I had was 
the number of suitcases that seemed to be arriving Avith just armed 
guards, and I couldn't reconcile them as belonging to diplomatic im- 
munity status, and I spoke to the security officer on the field and he 
agreed with me that it looked like they were taking advantage of us, 
and maybe we ought to ask the Inspector Genei-al for an inspector. 

Mr. Wood. Who was the security officer on the field ? 

Mr, Jordan. Lt. Col. George F. O'Neal, 

Mr. Tavenner. How many security officers were on duty there ? 

Mr. Jordan. If you are talking about Gore Field, Colonel de Arce, 
the commanding officer, had one or two different security officers, and 

^ See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 913 

when we consider the freight depot where I was working was under a 
separate command that was under Colonel Meredith, his security offi- 
cer was Lieutenant Colonel O'Neal. AVe were interlopers on the field, 
and the Russian movement was one thing that grew until it took over 
the whole business. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall Colonel Meredith's first name? 

Mr. Jordan. Colonel Meredith's first name was Russell, Russell L. 
Meredith. 

Mr. Wood. With whom did you carry on the daily conversations 
with the War Department. 

Mr. Jordan. I called Col. W. W. Goodman, who, it will be noted, is 
mentioned in the Presidential directive as the officer I was to com- 
municate with daily, and Colonel Goodman communicated with the 
purchasing agency direct. 

Mr. Tavexner. Your inquiry relating to the baggage that you 
thought did not have diplomatic clearance was by telephone, or by 
word of mouth, and not by written communication ; is that right? 

Mr. Jordan. I went to Washington for the purpose of seeing the 
officers who were my superiors, and there were several questions I had 
in mind. One was this particular amount of baggage, and another was 
the number of shortages that were appearing on the planes. I person- 
ally reported to the Inspector General. I understand he doesn't re- 
member me, but I told him about this, and I suggested we ought to 
have this matter looked into. According to my diary, I called on him 
on the 8th of January. I have a note in my diary on January 8 : "Went 
to Washington to Colonel Page's office.'' He was Chief of the Interna- 
tional Section. Then I have a note : "I saw General Jones." I asked 
General Jones for an inspector, and on the 25th in my diary I have a 
note that Lt. Col. Robert H. Dahm from the Inspector General's Office 
appeared at the field. We went into everytliing. * 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. What was the result of the Inspector General's visit, 
or his agent's visit ? 

Mr. Jordan. He went back to Washington and there was a kind of a 
long period. In the meantime. I had been complaining some more, and 
on March 3 I have a notation 

Mr. Wood. What year is that? 

Mr. Jordan. That is the year 1944. All of this diary is 1944. On 
March 3 I have a note that 10 inspectors arrived from General Jo7ies' 
office. They went into everything. 

Mr. Ta\t5nner. Did they make a written report ? 

Mr. Jordan. I wouldn't know. It wouldn't come to me. I would 
never see that report. I have been informed they did make a report, 
but I have never seen it and don't know for certain. 

Mr. Walter. Do you know who the 10 inspectors were? 

Mr. Jordan. I do not, sir. I have the names of some of the inspec- 
tors as they arrived, but that particular 10 I do not have. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you give us the names of those inspectors who 
did appear there from time to time, as far as you know ? 

Mr. Jordan. Maj. Bernard Hahn, H-a-h-n, arrived. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. When? 

Mr. Jordan. I think he must have been one of the group that ar- 
rived, because I have 10 inspectors arrived on March 3, then I have 
the note that Major Hahn departed on March 17, so he is apparently 



914 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

one of those who arrived on March 3 and he departed on the 17th. I 
went to hnich with him and knew him very well. 

Mr. Moulder. Where was the investigation ? 

Mr. Jordan. Great Falls, Mont. 

I have a note April 7, 1944, Friday, that a Maj. Fred A. Farrar, air 
inspector, arrived. I showed him around and introduced him to the 
Russians at the hangar, and the next note says Colonel Kotikov de- 
parted for Washington. I think he was being annoyed with all this 
inspection, so he went to Washington immediately. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is there anything else you can report to us regard- 
ing the action of the Army regarding your complaint centering 
around the appearance of the suitcases without diplomatic immunity? 

Mr. Jordan. Well, sir, the Army left it pretty nnich up — Do you 
refer to the Army or to the Air Force ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Take both. Take first the Army. 

Mr. Jordan. The Army had their own method of inspecting, and 
I wouldn't know what their decision was. The Air Force I was more 
familiar with. I can't tell you which officer or how, but I was told 
that higher authority was passing on these things and that my job 
was simply to expedite them and not to cause so much ruckus about 
them. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you tell us your experience with the State De- 
partment ^ I understand you reported the matter to the State De- 
partment. 

Mr. Jordan. Well, I went to Washington on that trip and walked 
up and down the corridors of the State Department trying to find 
somebody who would tell me they had diplomatic immunity. I was 
passed from one room to another. The impression I got from the 
State Department was that I was being too officious, and I would be 
better off if I helped expedite the movement and did not spend so 
much time in Washington. So I decided to go back to Great Falls 
and let the matter rest. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did any person in the State Department make such 
a statement to you ? 

Mr. Jordan. I saw a John Hazard, the chief of the entire outfit, and 
he told me everything was known in Washington and that they under- 
stood thoroughly what was going on, and there wasn't anything for 
me to worry about ; that 1 should help the Russians all I could, and 
that they were thoioughly aware of everything that was going on. 

Mr. Moulder. What was the date of that ? 

Mr. Jordan. The 8th day of January 1944. 

Mr. Tavenner. Could you determine the source of any of this 
material, as to whether it was brought from Washington, New York, 
or various places ? 

Mr. Jordan. You mean the air freight ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. I am speaking now of the suitcases. Do you 
know the origins of shipment of any of those suitcases ? 

Mr. Jordan. On February 28, 1944, Major Hayes, of the American 
Air Force flew plane 6052 with two Russians and 3,628 pounds of mail 
from Gravelly Point. I asked liim where the mail came from, and 
he said it arrived in a black limousine from the Russian Embassy, and 
he flew it to where I took over. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us your experience with suitcases. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 915 

Mr. Jordan. The suitcases started early in 1943 in small numbers, 
and I remember one officer gomrr through with quite a large number 
of suitcases early in 1944, and he had so many of them I was beginning 
to wonder if I was doing the right thing in my job to allow a man 
to take so many suitcases through. A notation in my diary says Col. 
Pavel Berizine and Colonel Yakiv came through with a large number. 
I think that amount of suitcases is what caused me to decide that I 
had better be })repared for the $64 question if anybody ever asked 
me what was in the suitcases, and I made up my mind that the next 
time 1 would open some of these suitcases. 

Mr. Tavenner. What action did you take with regard to the suit- 
cases ? 

Mr. eToRDAN. Well, sir, I could always tell when suitcases were going 
to arrive, because one of the cargo planes would be put on the line and 
left unloaded, and the mechanics Avould tell me the Russian colonels 
had told them to leave a plane empty for a very special assignment. 
The Russians could not give orders, and those people would come to 
me and say : "The Russian colonels have asked us to do this. Will you 
give the order?'' I would give an order for a cargo plane to be put 
in readiness, waiting for special cargo. 

I could always tell that cargo would arrive in the middle of the 
night, because that is the way they do things. The Russians are 
very close with their money. They don't spend anything they don't 
have to. I used to have to pick their checks up at the officers' club 
where I ate with them. In fact, we assigned three slot machines 
where the profits went to pay the checks of the Russians. 

This night the Russians, much to my surprise, invited me to Great 
Falls for a chicken dinner. There was a lot of vodka. It happened 
I didn't drink. They suggested a toast to Stalin, Molotov, Roosevelt, 
and everybody else. I was suspicious, but I had left word at the 
control tower if a plane came in to call me at the restaurant, and 
a call came there, and I went to the field and two armed Russians 
were standing over the suitcases. One of them tried to keep me out 
of the plane. The suitcases were black, cheap, patent leather, with 
white rope sash cord tied around them and gobs of red sealing wax 
over the knots. They screamed diplomatic immunity, and I said: 
"That doesn't look diplomatic to me." I ripped the cords off and 
opened about one-third of them. I had one of our own guards stand, 
with a rifle on his shoulder so they would know I had a little pro- 
tection. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you have assistance in that work at that time ? 

Mr. Jordan. There were mechanics and freight loaders there. We 
had a night force. One of the reporters told me they had found a 
man in Great Falls who claimed he was there and saw me open them. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is his name ? 

Mr. Jordan. Just a moment. I have a list of all the employees, 
their names and addresses. [Looking at list.] What I thought was the 
address is the date they joined the depot. His name is Marcus McCann, 
and he joined our depot the first of March 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell his name, please? 

Mr. Jordan, Marcus, M-a-r-c-u-s, McCann, M-c-C-a-n-n. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Do you know his residence ? 



916 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Jordan. No. It does not give his address. It gives the date he- 
arrived at the depot. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you permit us to have this list of employees? 

Mr. Jordan. I certainly will. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked 
"Jordan Exhibit E." ' 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted with the understanding it will be 
photostated and the original returned to the witness. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to introduce at this time copies of the 
orders, dated January 1, 1043, and January 9, 1943, respectively, as 
"Jordan Exhibit F" and "Jordan Exhibit G." * 

Mr. Wood. Let them be admitted with the same understanding. 

Mr. Walter. Major, do you remember the date on which you opened 
those suitcases? 

Mr. Jordan. I had a very active and busy life out there. I opened 
a number of suitcases on a number of occasions. To try to pin it 
down to the exact date is a little difficult. 

Mr. Harrison. You didn't note it in your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir. I think I miglit have noted something like 
that in my diary, except that it might have happened in December 
1943, just before I started this diary. It was cold enough for the 
fillings to drop out of your teeth at that time, about 20 below zero,, 
and I wouldn't have time to make notes in the middle of the night 
of that type. I have no notes in my diary of opening suitcases, be- 
cause that didn't seem to me to be so important at the time. The data 
I have in my dairy is dates of arrival ancl dates of departure and things 

of that kind. 

Mr. Tavenner. What did you find in these suitcases? 

Mr. Wood. The ones you speak of that you opened in the middle of 
the night, were they the first ones you opened^ 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I had an envelope in my pocket. Gentlemen,. 
I only opened these suitcases for my own protection. I was a sergeant 
in the First World War and had been trained to be in a position, if I 
was ever inspected, to tell the inspectors the situation in my own little 
particular job, and I was worried to some extent over a long period 
of time as to what would happen to me if the FBI or anybody asked 
me what was in those suitcases. I made some notes for my own bene- 
fit. I jotted on the back of an envelope the things in the suitcases. To 
me it meant large masses of folders, and in these folders were various 
papers and tilings. I can read from my notes and elaborate as to what 
I saw, but each note just says one word, and that one word to me means 
a whole suitcase. 

Mr. Harrison. Were those notes made at the time ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. The notes were made on the back of an envelope 
I had in my pocket, and I had a hand flashlight. Then when I got in 
a hangar where it was warm I made all the notes on one piece of 
paper. I will be glad to read some of the notes to you if that will 
answer your question. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, I think that will serve the purpose. Before 
that I want to ask you this : I notice from the newspaper account of 
your interview over the radio that you named several persons in the 

2 See appendix. 
* See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 917 

State Department who you thought were implicated in irregularities 
of one type or another. 

Mr. Jordan. I didn't name anyone. 

Mr. Tavenner. You did not give their names. You spoke of them 
by letters. 

Mr. Jordan. That was the interviewer's idea. He said to call them 
"Mr. X" and "Mr. Y." 

Mr. Tavenner. You may have had some good reason for not making 
public those names, and if you prefer the committee, I believe, will 
hear those names in a closed session, if there is any reason why you 
do not wish to make them public. 

Mr. Jordan. I must again tell you that I only made these notes 
privately, and they were simply notes to remind me — You see, I 
opened about one-third of the suitcases, and I sometimes would just 
open a suitcase and note the general contents and go to the next one, 
because I wanted to get the job done as soon as possible. 

In one particular suitcase there was one particular thing that 
attracted my eye, and I did open that suitcase full length and try 
to examine it, although, frankly, it didn't mean anything to me at the 
time. I would rather, if you don't mind, not mention any names, but 
just tell you the kind of general material that I saw in the suitcases. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you object to telling the committee in closed 
session the information, not to be released until such time as the com- 
mittee determines ? 

Mr. Jordan. Not whatever. I think I am doing everything I can 
to be hepf ul, and I wish to give everything I know, because the small 
piece of information I happen to have, I have been informed, is the 
key to other information. 

Mr. Tavenner. With that understanding, just proceed with a 
description of the material, and we will hear in a closed session, with 
the chairman's approval, as to the identity of the parties. 

Mr. Jordan. This piece of paper starts off with the word "Notes" 
and it says : 

"Always just 50 black suitcases each load with 2 or 3 couriers. Usually 
about 3 weeks apart. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am sorry. Will you repeat that ? 
Mr. Jordan. The top of the j^aper, as I had written it that night, 
says: 

Notes. Always just 50 black suitcases each load with 2 or 3 couriers. Usually 
about 3 weeks apart. 

Mr. Tavenner, That is what you wrote at the time ? 

Mr, Jordan, Yes. I am reading you the notes that I wrote. 

Mr. Tavenner. And that you wrote at the time ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes; that I wrote at the time to refresh my memory 
later. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did vou actuallv make the w^ritten memo- 
randum ? 

Mr. Jordan. That was gathered from three or four envelopes. I 
put it on this one sheet. 

Mr, Harrison. Wlien did you write it on that sheet ? 

Mr. Jordan. Maybe a couple days after I wrote it on the envelopes. 
I consolidated what was on the envelopes. 



918 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Harrison. You destroyed the envelopes? 

Mr. Jordan. I threw them away, yes. The second note says : "Pa- 
pers were always cut close.*' The first suitcase I opened had a large 
book on how to ship four-legged animals; how many sheep and calves 
and veal would go in a car ; and the rate on shipments of animals from 
every city in the United States to every other city. The book was 
about that big [indicating]. 

Mr. Harrison. Information similar to publications put out by 

Mr. Jordan. The railroads. The next suitcase was full of infor- 
mation from Tass. The next suitcase was full of information from 
Amtorg Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Harrison. Wliat do you mean by information? 

Mr. Jordan. Mostly made up of catalogs. My curiosity as to those 
catalogs was interesting, because I worked for McGraw-Hill Co. at 
one time and recognized the names of many of the hrms. This is what 
I mean [producing catalog]. This type of catalog would be in the 
suitcase, just like that. Years later I have another catalog from Rus- 
sia that shows you what has happened [producing another catalog]. 
There is the Russian catalog. 

Mr. Tavenner. Give us the date of publication of the first catalog 
you presented. 

Mr. Jordan. I am showing you this as a sample. In other words, 
this is an American catalog, and here is the Russian catalog. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where the same thing is reproduced? 

Mr. Jordan. Where the same thing is reproduced in Russian, and 
many of the catalogs were completely reproduced in Russian. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Jordan. The next note that I have here — and at that time none 
of these things meant very nuicli to me. I didn't know the meaning 
of some of them. My next note says "Panama Canal Commission 
Maps." There were a couple suitcases about the Panama Canal. 

Mr, Tavenner. What was the type of information about the Pan- 
ama Canal, maps or magazines? 

Mr. Jordan. They were mostly maps, and markings on the maps. 
It looked to me they had been public, and they could have gotten them 
easily. 

My next note says, "Oak Ridge." 

Mr. Wood. At that time had you ever heard of Oak Ridge? 

Mr. Jordan. Xo. I didn't know what it was. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us more about Oak Ridge. What was the 
significance of that memorandum as to Oak Ridge ? 

Mr. Jordan. The reason that I noticed this particularly, and the 
reason I looked at it more, was because it had a memorandum on the 
front from the White House, and it said in handwriting on the White 
House stationery, it said : 

Had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves. H. H. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know who Groves was? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir. I do now. 

Mr. Taat.nner. Did anyone see that document besides yourself, 
that you know of ? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russians were the only other persons. The Amer- 
ican guards were standing outside the door of the plane. 

Mr. Moulder. May I ask a question ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 919 

Mr. Wood. Yes, sir. Mr. Moulder. 

Mr. Moulder. To whom was this note addressed ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have been asked that question before, and it is very 
difficuh for me to remember, because I didn't really attach much im- 
portance to it ; but I would like to tell you that something else hap- 
pened that makes me think I know. I remember 2 or 3 days later 
asking Colonel Kotikov w^ho a Mr. Mikoyan w^as. 

Iklr. Tavenner. How do you spell that ? 

Mr. Jordan. M-i-k-o-y-a-n, I believe. Colonel Kotikov told me he 
was one of the three most important men in Russia. I am sure I asked 
Colonel Kotikov who INIikoyan was because I had seen the name and 
was trying to be cagey with him. I had never heard the name before. 

Mr. Moulder. How did you observe that note ? Was it outside the 
suitcase? 

Mr. Jordan. No. I had opened the suitcase. 

Mr. Moulder. Was it lying loose in the suitcase ^ 

Mr. Jordan. No. It was in an envelope or folder. 

Mr. ]\IouLDER. Did you have to open an envelope to see this note ? 

Mr. Jordan. I had' to open a folder, and the folder had an elastic 
band around it, and there were blueprints and things in the folder, 
and the note was on the front of the blueprints. 

Mr. Moulder. How many folders did you observe in the suitcase? 

Mr. Jordan. They telescope like an accordion. They were all one. 

Mr. Moulder. How many did you examine ? 

Mr. Jordan. I looked through the suitcase perfunctorily. 

Mr. Moulder. How many folders did you examine ? 

Mr. Jordan. The suitcase was full of folders. 

Mr. Tavenner. This letter you spoke of, was it typewa-itten ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. It w^as in handwriting. 

Mr. Tavenner. It was addressed to a person ? 

Mr. Jordan. It was addressed to a person of some kind. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date when you found that letter, as 
near as you can tell? 

Mr. Jordan. I don't know. It was in the period of the winter of 
1943 and 1944 and spring of 1944, because that is when I started 
opening suitcases. 

INIr. Tavenner. Describe a little more clearly how you happened to 
find that particular letter. Were all the files opened in such a way 
you could see the contents of the files? 

Mr. Jordan. They were black suitcases, and the entire suitcases were 
full of folders. After I had opened all sorts of folders it was all the 
same material, practically, so it didn't make too much of an impression 
on me. I was looking for morphine at the time because we had been 
missing morphine and I was looking for drugs. The maps and 
various things I saw, I just made a check of every fourth or fifth 
suitcase. I was doing what we call in the Army spot-checking. I 
made no attempt to make an inventory, and I only did this for my 
own benefit, so that if anybody ever asked me what was in the suitcase 
I could say, "They were full of maps and material on blast furnaces, 
concrete mixers, oil machinery, and so on." 

Mr. Walter. When were these suitcases delivered to the field ? 

Mr. Jordan. On a number of different dates. 

Mr. Walter. This particular incident, the ones you opened? 



920 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Jordan. The ones I opened, I can't tell you, because I opened 
several loads. 

Mr. Harrison. You mentioned no dates in your notes ? 

Mr. Jordan. There is no date here as to the suitcases I opened, 
although I have dates of arrival of planes. 

Mr. Harrison. You have that in your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Why did you note one thing in your diary and not 
the other thing ? 

Mr. Jordan. Because I started the diary in 1944 and opened some 
suitcases in 1943. 

Mr. Harrison. You opened suitcases in 1943 and 1944 ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. And you started keeping your diary in 1944? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. And you made notes about suitcases 

Mr. Jordan. There is no note in here about suitcases. The notes in 
here are plane arrivals and the numbers of the planes and the pilots. 

Mr. Harrison. But you did not note suitcases in your diary? 

Mr. Jordan. There were about a million pounds of freight on our 
field all the time. I opened so much different freight that I did not 
make a note of suitcases particularly. 

Mr. Harrison. Did the Russians report you to your superior com- 
mand for opening suitcases over their protests ? 

Mr. Jordan. They said I would be removed immediately. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you hear anything from your superior officers ? 

Mr. Jordan. Never. I don't think the Russians reported it. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand you, the suitcases came at night and 
were removed immediately from where they were unloaded to other 
planes ? 

Mr. Jordan. Just a moment. Sometimes if the planes had pilots 
and were ready to go we would move the suitcases directly from one 
plane to another, but many times we took them and put them in a 
warehouse, and the couriers would stretch their blankets over them 
and sleep on them. One guarded while the other slept, and they 
never would let them out of their sight. They came prepared to sleep 
on top of the suitcases. 

Mr. Walter. Then how would it have been possible to put in the 
suitcases the narcotics you said you thought might be in them? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russians were alone with the suitcases at night, 
and we had been missing a great deal of morphine from our first-aid 
kits. We had stockrooms full of first-aid kits, and they were being 
rifled, and the suitcases were in the same building and same rooms, 
and I thought it possible these couriers were the culprits. 

Mr. Moulder. You say you were attending a party that the Rus- 
sians had prearranged for you to be present, a chicken dinner, I 
believe? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. And there they offered you drinks of vodka ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. How long were you there ? 

Mr. Jordan. It wasn't exactly a party. It was a straight dinner. 
We had to eat every night, and we went together. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 921 

Mr. Moulder. How far was it from the airport ? 

Mr. Jordan. About 4 miles. 

Mr. Moulder. And you had left instructions to be called ? 

Mr. Jordan. I had a staff car at the restaurant with a driver. 

Mr. Moulder. And when you opened the suitcases the Russian armed 
guards were there ? 

Mr. Jordan. They were always with them. 

Mr. Moulder. And this particular suitcase where you found the 
note, you say the note was in a folder ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. Loose in a folder ? 

Mr. Jordan. The entire suitcase was full of folders. 

Mr. Moulder. I am referring to this one where you found a note. 
You said it was addressed to someone whose name you couldn't re- 
member, but it stated, "I had a hell of a time getting this from 
Groves." Was there more on the note ? 

Mr. Jordan. There was a great deal more. 

Mr. Moulder. Was it on one sheet ? 

Mr. Jordan. Two sheets. It was attached to some maps. 

Mr. Moulder. Did you inspect what it was attached to ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have some notes on that. 

Mr. Moulder. Do you have your notes on that ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat was that? 

Mr. Jordan. I have a memorandum to myself to look up words on 
maps that are labeled "Oak Ridge, Manhattan Engineering Depart- 
ment or District," I believe it was. 

Mr, Wood. Had jou ever heard of the Manhattan Engineering 
District before that time ? 

Mr. Jordan. Never. The words I noted were "Uranium 92; neu- 
trons; protons; energy produced by fission"; and I had a note to look 
up the word "cyclotron." I took those words off a memorandum in 
the suitcase. 

Mr. Tavenner. Off of which particular memorandum in the 
suitcase ? 

Mr. Jordan. It is very difficult to tell which one. I took some of 
the words off the maps and some off the letters in the suitcase, and 
some came off the backs. As far as I remember, I put down words 
so that I could identify them if anybody asked me. 

Mr. Tavenner. W^ere any of those words taken off the map or 
plat to which the leter you referred was attached? 

Mr. Jordan. I believe they were all taken off maps. 

Mr. Tavenner. In this particular suitcase it was all maps? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. What type of maps ? 

Mr, Jordan. They looked like engineering maps. They looked like 
duplicates of engineering maps, the kind that are photostated. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you see any secret or confidential stamp, or 
classified stamp, on them? 

Mr. Jordan. All the places where the word "secret" had been placed 
had been cut out with a pair of scissors. In fact, in the suitcases from 
the State Department there was folder after folder after folder where 



y22 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

every single one had been cut off. If I had found the word "secret," 
I would have grounded the plane. 1 never did find it, but the place 
was there where it had been cut off at the top and bottom. 

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of papers from the State Department. 
Were such papers in this particular suitcase where the letter was 
found ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. Agriculture and Commerce and State each had 
their own suitcases. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us about these suitcases. 

Mr. Jordan. They simply had the words ''Commerce" and "Agri- 
culture." There was one suitcase on the Dnnetz Siberia; oil ma- 
chinery; scientific data from Iron Age; and shipping data. 

Mr. Harrison. These notes you are reading from now were made 
in 1944? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. And were copied at one time from envelopes? 

Mr, Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Why didn't you copy them in your diary instead of 
that loose sheet of paper ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is why I believe they were written in 1943, be- 
cause I didn't keep a diary in 1943. 

Mr. Harrison. You mean these notes you hold in your hand were 
made in 1943 ? 

Mr. Jordan. I believe they were made at the end of 1943. 

Mr. Harrison. And you didnH open suitcases in 1944? 

Mr. Jordan. I did. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you makes notes of it ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have one note in my diary which seems to be of the 
kind you are asking about. I opened one batch of suitcases and 
this is what I said 

Mr. Harrison. This is a bound book made at the time '. 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. Here is a note in my diary that says: "C-47, 
No. 2940, departed today with 3,800 pounds of mail, 50 suitcases." I 
went through those suitcases, and in every suitcase there were oil- 
refinery maps, the entire load. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is the date of that entry you have just re- 
ferred to? 

Mr. Jordan. 27th of March, on Monday. 

Mr. Tavenner. 1944 ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Going back to your original memorandum, you 
referred to State Department documents? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Describe them in more particularity. 

Mr. Jordan. I am sorry I can't give you more of a minute descrip- 
tion. I just remember generall}-. By referring to my notes I can 
remember I saw a lot of official looking photostats that had the word 
"Secret" cut off. There were entire suitcases full from the State and 
Agriculture Departments. 

Mr. Tavenner. How did you know they were from the State and 
Agriculture Departments ? 

Mr. Jordan. I ran my hand through the folders to see if the wdiole 
suitcase was the same thing. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 923 

Mr. Tavenner. What was there about the documents that indicated 
to you they were from the State or Agriculture Departments ^ 

Mr. Jordan. The heading on the letterheads. 

Mr. Tavtinner. Were they letters or documents, do you know?^ 

Mr. Jordan. I am guessing now. They were all mixed up. They 
were different kinds of things. I only opened every third or fourth 
suitcase. If I had a State Department suitcase I would skip the next 
two or three, and the Russians would follow me and try to put the 
cords back together. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed with your notes and explain everything 
they call to your attention. 

Mr. Jordan. The only explanation I can give is that I simply 
jottecl down the type of folder I was looking at in one of the suitcases. 
To give you a minute description would be impossible. 

Mr. Moulder. Just read your notes. 

Mr. Jordan. Another load of suitcases from Aberdeen Proving 
Ground had folders on Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Cuba; maps of 
the United States, automobile maps, "marked strangely," I have. 
The maps were the kind you get at an automobile station. They 
had been trimmed and cut, and on the maps were marked where our 
industrial plants were. 

Mr. Wood. You say they had marked on these maps places where 
our industrial plants were located. Did you know that or ascertain 
it later? 

Mr. Jordan. I mean by the markings, for instance, at Pittsburgh 
they would have ''Westinghouse" and "Blaw-Knox" and things like 
that. They had every city in the United States and everything was 
marked. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you report that to anybody at the time? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I told Colonel Gardner and Colonel O'Neal and 
several other officers what I had done. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you report to them what you had seen ? 

Mr. Jordan. I remember making a talk downtown at Great Falls, 
Mont., to some people who asked me to tell them about the Russians. 
I remember telling them about the silly things I saw in the suitcases 
about four-legged animals and maps, and I thought my apprehension 
about the suitcases was unfounded. 

Mr. Harrison. About when did you make that public speech? 

Mr. Jordan. Early in 1944. 

Mr. Harrison. Was it reported in the local press? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I believe the newspaper made an editorial of it. 

Mr. Harrison. Do you have a copy of it? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. It appeared in the Great Falls Leader. 

Mr. Harrison. This editorial says how highly you regarded Soviet 
Russia. It doesn't say you found these things in suitcases. Was any 
record made of your having made a statement at the time as to these 
things you discovered in the suitcases? 

Mr. Jordan. I mentioned the four-legged animals as an example 
of the infantile things the Russians thought were important, and 
that we were risking lives to get through. It seemed to be innocent 
material. 

Mr. Harrison. There is nothing about that in this editorial. 

Mr. Jordan. This covers the date I made the speech, April 20, 1944. 



924 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Walter. Were the usual diplomatic pouches being sent through 
that station ? 

Mr, Jordan. Not that I know of. 

Mr. AV ALTER. By that I mean pouches from Government to 
Government ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. Walter. None of them passed through Great Falls? 

Mr. Jordan. Not that I know of. If they did they were accom- 
panied by a diplomatic courier, which is different. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. What statement did the Russian officer make to you 
about sending this material ? 

Mr. Jordan. He asked if I would wait before opening any more 
until I could be instructed by the War Department, and he told me 
I would be removed if I opened any more. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then tell us what occurred. Did you wait until you 
got instructions? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir. I continued to open them. 

Mr. Tavenner, Did you ever receive instructions ? 

Mr. Jordan. Never. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Proceed if you have any further statements there. 

Mr. Jordan. Well, I had just come to the part wliere there were 
sealed envelopes from Lomatkin. He was a police official we subse- 
quently threw out of the country. Then they had long lists of names, 
just common ordinary names. 

Mr. Harrison, Would you object to filing the original of that memo- 
randum for the record ? 

Mr, Jordan, I promised to do that in another session. 

Mr, Wood. In a closed session ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr, Harrison, That has the names in it? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Can you give us additional light on matters relating 
to these suitcases ? 

Mr. Jordan. I think I know what you are interested in. I received 
many communications from Washington by phone to do various 
things. You see, we had around a million pounds of freight all the 
time in Great Falls waiting for removal, and anything the Russians 
wanted priority on I had to give the order, so instead of the piece of 
freight arriving and going to the end of the pile and waiting several 
weeks, by giving an order from the office I could have the people take 
that piece of freight and put it immediately on another plane and send 
it to Moscow. 

The Russians got to the point where everything had priority, so I 
was very busy much of that time trying to select priority over another 
priority, because the plane space was very limited. Finally it got so 
bad that I decided to send freight on the medium bombers. We didn't 
have enough C-47 transport planes to carry the freight, and I started 
sending it on the bombers. Then the Russians wanted everything to 
go on the bombers because they were faster. 

It was at that point that the Russians inaugurated the practice of 
phoning the Embassy and handing me the phone while they were 
talking to the Embassy and telling me to expedite a certain piece of 
freight. So it was nothing unusual for me to be handed a telephone, 
and Colonel Kotikov, who spoke very little English, would say : "Here. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 925 

Get this straight." And I would make a note of the particuhir piece 
of freight I was to expedite when it arrived, which might be 2 weeks 
later. 

Mr. Tavenner. From whom did you receive those orders ? 

Mr. Jordan. General Piskounov or Gromov or various people in 
positions of authority talking to Colonel Kotikov. There would be 
something terribly important about a certain piece of freight, and I 
would be called upon to do a special job of expediting on a special piece. 

That was occurring every day. In one of the telephone calls Colonel 
Kotikov said tlie Embassy had something very important that had 
to do with bomb powder, and would I expedite this particular ship- 
ment, and I agreed to, because that was my job, to help them expedite 
things. He had on a piece of paper on his desk things to be expedited, 
and I saw the word "uranium" and what he called bomb powder was 
actually uranium. He had it marked "uranium." I did not know what 
uranium meant and had no inkling at the time it would ever be im- 
portant. I just knew that that particular shipment I had to expedite. 
The first shipment of uranium that was so expedited came from 
Denver. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the approximate date? 

Mr. Jordan. I can't tell you that. I remember 420 pounds came 
from a firm in Denver. 

Mr. Wood. Do you remember the name of the firm? 

Mr. Jordan. Mr. Wood, I would like to keep my memory and what 
I now laiow separate. I know now the name of the firm and every- 
thing else, but I didn't know it at the time. So if you are asking me 
if I knew then, I did not know. I simply knew it came from Colorado. 
Now I know the name of the firm. Do you want me to give it to you. 

Mr. Wood. Is there any reason why you shouldn't ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. S. W. Shattuck Co. It was addressed to Colonel 
Kotikov. 

Mr. Wood. Did you open up any of those shipments of uranium ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. They had armed guards with automatic machine 
guns on them. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you see anything about the shipment to indicate 
whether or not a license had been granted by any authority to make 
such a shipment? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir. I was not high enough up in the echelon to 
have anything to do with the authority of things. I was simply where 
the load came on the plane, and my only importance was simply that I 
selected the particular piece of freight to go on a particular plane. 

Mr. Walter. Did you make a note in your diary of the shipment of 
uranium ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; because it was not important to me. 

Mr. Walter. Was the shipment made about the time you were 
making the entries in the diary, that is, sometime in 1944? 

Mr. Jordan. Undoubtedly. We made 13 copies of everything. I 
am sure the War Department can find one of them. 

Mr. Walter. I am talking about this shipment of uranium. Was 
that made in 1944 ? 

Mr. Jordan. Sir, I don't know. 

Mr. Walter. The reason I say 1944 is because that was when you 
were making the entries in your diary. 



926 SHIPMENT or ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Jordan. I didn't put in my diary the reports to the War Depart- 
ment. We covered many, many details in our reports to the War 
Department. The accountability was in Dayton. When I signed the 
shipments over to the Eussians, the Russians had charge. 

Mr. Walter. I am directing your attention to the shipment of 
uranium. Did you make a note of that in your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; I never made any such note. I never made a note 
of any kind that had to do with uranium or anything like that. I 
only know I was called on the telephone on innumerable occasions and 
told to expedite certain things, and at the time those certain things 
went through they looked to me like anything else. It happens now 
I know what heavy water is. 

Mr. Walter. You have no way of knowing when that shipment of 
uranium went through ? 

Mr. Jordan. We had a 1,200-pound shipment that went through 
from Canada. That is the one Mr. Hopkins mentioned to me and said 
to expedite it and not mention it to my superiors. 

Mr. Harrison. Wlien was that? 

Mr. Jordan. In the spring of 1944. 

Mr. Harrison. You say Mr. Harry Hopkins called you on the tele- 
phone ? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir, I will say it again. The Russians continu- 
ally called their own embassy. While they were talking to their 
embassy, they would on many occasions hand the phone to me and 
an American personality would come on the phone and ask me if I 
would allow the Russians to pick a certain shipment and expedite that 
certain shipment. There was nothing unusual about it. 

Mr. Harrison. You say you talked to Mr. Hopkins on the telephone 
about this particular shipment? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian told me there was a special shipment 
being handled in a very special way, and not to mention it, and I got 
on the phone. When I got on the phone he said, "Mr. Hopkins speak- 
ing" and asked if I had received the pilots I had asked for. I said I 
had. He said, "There is a certain shipment Colonel Kotikov will point 
out to you, and keep this very quiet." 

Mr. Harrison. Mr. Hopkins said that? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. When was that? 

Mr. Jordan. Two or three weeks before the shipment came through. 

Mr. Harrison. "V^Hiat j'ear? 

Mr. Jordan. 1944. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you note that in your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. There was nothing important to note. 

Mr. Harrison. How often did Mr. Hopkins call you ? 

Mr. Jordan. That was the only time. The Russians talked to him 
more often. 

Mr. Harrison. How many times did you talk personally to Mr., 
Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. Once. 

Mr. Harrison. Yet, although you were keeping a diary, you made/ 
no note of it in your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. That was not important. 

Mr. Moulder. How did you know it was Mr. Hopkins?  



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 927 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian, Colonel Kotikov, told me it was Mr. 
Hopkins. 

Mr. Moi'LDER. But you personally don't know if it was Harry Hop- 
kins or not ; do you? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes ; I am pretty certain it was. It would have to be 
Mr. Hopkins, because we had phoned Mr. Hopkins 2 or 3 days before, 
asking for some pilots, and he asked if we had received the pilots. 

Mr. Moulder. You say you were talking to the Embassy? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian was talking to the Embassy. 

Mr. Moulder. And he told you someone at the Embassy whose name 
was Harry Hopkins wanted to talk to you ? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian colonel said I would receive instructions 
from Mr. Hopkins ; yes. 

Mr. Moulder. What did he say ? 

Mr. Jordan. I don't remember exactly what he said, but I knew 
from the conversation I had with him that I w^as to expedite this 
particular shipment, and the particular shipment came through and 
it was uranium. I don't think anybody but Mr. Hopkins would talk 
to me about uranium. 

Mr. Moulder. I am trying to corroborate that it was Harry Hop- 
kins, other than what the colonel said to j^ou. 

Mr. Jordan. The colonel spoke to Hopkins quite frequently. 

Mr. Moulder. How do you know that ? 

Mr. Jordan. Because of the conversations that he would have. 
When we needed pilots or something we couldn't get from the Army, 
and there was no way of getting them and it was impossible to break 
down routine, the Russian would say : "We will call Hopkins." And 
then they would get them. 

Mr. Moulder. Were you there when he called? 

Mr. Jordan. On several occasions. I placed the calls, probably. 

Mr. Moulder. How did you place the calls for Harry Hopkins? 

Mr. Jordan, We placed the call to the Embassy or the Purchasing 
Commission at Washington. 

Mr. Moulder. You said he would call Harry Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is correct. 

Mr. Moulder. And that you placed the call for him. When you 
placed a call, did you place it for Harry Hopkins? 

Mr. Jordan. No; for General Piskounov. We would tell him to go 
see Harry Hopkins. 

Mr. Moulder. You didn't call Harry Hopkins, then? 

Mr. Jordan. We made the call to the Embassy to get the authority 
to do things. It always came from Hopkins. 

Mr. Moulder. You are assuming that? 

Mr. Jordan. We knew it. 

Mr. Moulder. How did you know it? 

Mr. Jordan. From the day the movement started at Newark we 
dealt with Hopkins. 

Mr. Moulder. In an interview with Fulton Lewis, in response to a 
question he asked you with reference to Hopkins, you said : "He gave 
me instructions over long-distance phone to expedite certain freight 
shipments." 

Mr. Jordan. That is correct. 

Mr. Moulder. And you also made the statement, which is a very 
serious one, that Hopkins told you "to keep quiet and say nothing 



928 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

about them, even to my superior officers, and not to leave any records 
of them." 

Mr. Jordan. That is correct. 

Mr. Moulder. So far in answering our questions you haven't spe- 
cifically testified you ever had a telephone conversation with Hopkins 
himself. 

Mr. Jordan. I said a moment ago I had a telephone conversation 
with Mr. Hopkins'. 

Mr. Moulder. You said the colonel said he was talking to Mr. Hop- 
kins at the Embassy ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. Did you talk to Mr. Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. The telephone was handed to me and I talked to him. 

Mr. Wood. Did you know him personally ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; I never met him. 

Mr. Wood. You never saw him face to face ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. Harrison. The reason you think it was Hopkins is that he made 
a statement about pilots that no one but Hopkins would know? 

Mr, Jordan. Yes; and he did get them, and there was a shortage 
of pilots. 

Mr. Harrison. Do you know when Mr. Hopkins died ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; I don't know anything about it. 

Mr. Harrison. Was it after the bomb was exploded at Hiroshima? 

Mr. Jordan. I am sorry. I don't know a thing about Mr. Hopkins. 

Mr. Harrison. Of course, when the bomb was exploded you knew 
what this meant about uranium ? 

Mr. Jordan. I did. 

Mr. Harrison. Were you still in the military service at that time? 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. Harrison. The war was still on ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, but my work was finished. 

Mr. Harrison. When the bomb was exploded and you realized the 
significance of what this was all about, did you report it? 

Mr. Jordan. I spoke to Colonel Gardner, my superior, about it on 
the occasion of the dropping of the bomb, and told him my suspicion 
was we he had sent some uranium through, but I kept hearing the 
Russians were 10 years away from having the bomb, and didn't think 
too much about it. 

Mr. Harrison. When did it dawn on you that it was significant? 

Mr. Jordan. Wlien President Truman announced the Russians 
had the bomb. 

Mr. Harrison. Up to that time you didn't think there was anything 
significant about the White House telephoning you to send that 
uranium through and not tell your superiors about it? 

Mr. Jordan. When you say uranium, I only knew it as a shipment. 

Mr. Harrison. But you knew what it was after the explosion of 
the bomb ? 

Mr. Jordan. After the explosion of the bomb ; yes. 

Mr. Harrison. You have allowed 4 years to go by before you said 
anything about it? 

Mr. Jordan. I haven't come forward with anything. The FBI 
sought me out. I haven't come forth with any story yet. I haven't 
sought this. The FBI and others came to me and asked if I was at 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 929 

Great Falls and did anything suspicious come through, and I told 
them. 

Mr. Walter. When did you tell them you shipped the suspicious 
boxes through? 

Mr. Jordan. I said in the spring of 1944. 

Mr. Walter. When did you leave the military service? 

Mr. Jordan. In September 1944. 

Mr. Walter. Do you remember when the bomb was dropped on 
Hiroshima ? 

Mr. Jordan. I believe August 1945. 

Mr. Walter. That was after you were out of the service? 

Mr, Jordan. A year, yes. 

Mr. Walter. You have just stated you spoke to your superior offi- 
cer, Colonel Gardner, at the time the bomb was dropped ? 

Mr. Jordan. He was out of the service and so was I. 

Mr. Harrison. Mr. Hopkins lived several years after that bomb was 
exploded, did he not? 

Mr. Jordan. I am sorry. I don't know anything about Mr. 
Hopkins ? 

Mr. MoxjLDER. I w^ould like to ask further questions about this tele- 
phone conversation. Did you ever place a long-distance telephone call 
to Harry Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. Never did. 

Mr. Moulder. Did Harry Hopkins ever place a long-distance tele- 
phone call to talk to you ? 

Mr. Jordan. Not to me. 

Mr. Moulder. You stated a while ago you had placed calls for Colo- 
nel Kotikov? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. That he didn't speak English ? 

Mr. Jordan. I said he spoke very poor English. 

Mr. Moulder. And you say he told you it was Harry Hopkins he 
was talking to at the Embassy ? 

Mr. Jordan. It is not a matter of hearsay. You see. Colonel Koti- 
kov, from May 1942 straight through called his Embassy two or three 
times a clay, and he would say something seemed important enough to 
call Hopkins. 

Mr. Moulder. But you never had a telephone conversation with 
Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. Colonel Kotikov spoke to Hopkins and he handed the 
telephone to me. 

Mr. Moulder. He couldn't speak English but was carrying on con- 
versations with Hopkins ? 

Mr. Jordan. He was carrying on conversations with the Russian 
Embassy in Russian. 

Mr. Walter. Do I understand Hopkins was at the Russian Em- 
bassy ? 

Mr. Jordan. There was nothing unusual about Colonel Kotikov 
calling his Embassy. He called several times a day. He spoke in Rus- 
sian when the other man spoke in Russian. 

Mr. Walter. This call you are referring to was placed by you to 
the Russian Embassy ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian contingent had no authority to make long- 
distance telephone calls on the field. So I was kept busy putting in 



930 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

the calls to our operator. I would say I wanted to talk to a Michigan 
number in Washington, and I wanted it to be collect, because I didn't 
want the Kussians running up a bill on my department. Then I would 
hand the telephone to Colonel Kotikov. 

Mr. AValter. That telephone call you are talking about was placed 
to the Russian Embassy ? 
Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. And presumably Harry Hopkins spoke from the Rus- 
sian Embassy? 

Mr. Jordan. Oh, no. He spoke from the board, apparently. Koti- 
kov would say to me : "I tliink this is important enough for jae to call 
Hopkins again." Wlien we used the expression among ourselves "We 
will call Hopkins" it meant we were pressing the button of authority to 
get things done. It didn't mean myself or Kotikov would talk to 
Hopkins, but we would start the chain of events, and it would happen 
instantly. You can't get 20 pilots immediately when there is a scarcity 
of them unless somebody in authority sends them to you. 

Mr. Walter. There can be no doubt in your mind that this suspi- 
cious shipment you saw was made in 1944 according to your records? 
Mr. Jordan. I have no record of this particular shipment. The 
Army would have records. 

Mr. Walter. You said a while ago you were certain it was in 1944? 
Mr. Jordan. Spring of 1944. 

Mr. Walter. As a matter of fact the record shows the export licenses 
were granted in 1943 ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is for the shipment from Denver? 
Mr. Walter. I am talking about three shipments for which export 
licenses were granted. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. What was the quantity of uranium in this ship- 
ment ? 

Mr. Jordan. It is difficult for me to sit here and answer questions 
about minute details when I was working from 5 : 45 in the morning 
until 11 at niglit almost daily. We started in in January 1943 and 
worked until September 1944 and much of this is telescoped in my 
mind together. It is difficult for me to tell you exactly when, but 
I know it was done, and I know it went through. We had carboys 
of heavy water we could hardly move that went through. 

Mr. Tavenner. How many shipments of heavy water went through ? 
Mr. Jordan. I would suggest you ask General Groves. 
Mr. Tavenner. To your knowledge, was there only this one ship- 
ment of uranium or more, to the best of your recollection?- 

Mr. Jordan. To the best of my recollection there were 2,500 pounds, 
roughly. 

Mr. Wood. In only one shipment? 

Mr. Jordan. No. There was one shipment from Canada and one 
shipment from xVrmy Ordnance and one from Denver. 
Mr. Wood. You recall those three distinctly ? 

Mr. Jordan. There were so many priority shipments the Russians 
had that it is hard for me to pick out the ones you are interested in. 

INIr. Tavenner. Other than the shipment from Canada, were all 
the shipments from this Shattuck Co. ? 

Mr. Jordan. I don't think so. Some came from Army Ordnance. 
Mr. Tavenner. Some came from Army Ordnance? 
Mr. Jordan. Yes. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 931 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat shipping point ? 

Mr. Jordan. The War Department records will show that. 

Mr. Tavenner. If you recall ? 

Mr. Jordan. I don't recall these special shipments. I can't pin 
point them for you. I know they did happen, and I know other im- 
portant priority shipments happened almost daily. We have the 
records complete out there as to when and where and how they 
happened. 

Mr. Walter. But there is no question in your mind but that these 
shipments came from Army Ordnance? 

Mr. Jordan. Some of them, yes, sir. 

Mr. Moulder. May I ask a question ? 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder. 

Mr. Harrison. I wonder if you will give me that editorial again 
from the Montana paper? 

(The editorial referred to was handed to Mr. Harrison.) 

Mr. Jordan. The colonel of the field had been invited to make a 
speech, and he couldn't make it so he asked me to make it for him. 
He wrote them a letter and said I would appear in his stead. 

Mr. Moulder. I want to go back to the time you were searching the 
suitcases. The sheet of paper on which you transcribed notes from 
envelopes, did that sheet cover days when you were not keeping a 
dairy ? Did that cover different occasions ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. How many occasions? 

Mr. Jordan. I don't know specificall}^ 

Mr. Moulder. Then you kept this same loose sheet over a period of 
weeks ? 

Mr. Jordan. It has been folded in my diary. 

Mr. Moulder. You were not keeping it in your diary, then ? It was 
a loose sheet of paper you kept on your person or in your office ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have complete records of everything that happened 
to me at Great Falls. 

Mr. Moulder. I am refering to this one sheet that covered several 
occasions. 

Mr. Jordan. I kept it right here. 

Mr. Moulder. In that book there ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. And you made those notations on that sheet at dif- 
ferent times ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. From envelopes on which you wrote while you were 
in the plane? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Moulder. In your interview with Fulton Lewis that was broad- 
cast, you were describing this occasion and said that with the as- 
sistance of a hand flashlight you went through about one-third of the 
50 suitcases, or around 18 suitcases ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. And you told him it was 15 below zero at the time 
and you made notes of what you found when you went through the 
suitcases, with the aid of this flashlight. Did you have somebody 
with you ? 



932 SHIPMENT OF ATOIsnC MATERIAL 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian guards. There were lights on the plane. 
I only used the flashlight when I needed it. The lights on the plane 
were sufficient to identify the contents. 

Mr. Moulder. And you made your notes after you left the plane ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; in the plane, on the envelopes. 

Mr. Moulder. Then you transcribed those notes on a loose sheet? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall the origin of the uranium from 
Canada ? 

Mr. Jordan. The only way I know was from a paper that Kotikov 
had, and a Russian courier came with the shipment. I have a list of 
over 500 Russians, and I have made a mark after some of them, and 
opposite this particular one I marked "CC," which means Canadian 
courier. 

Mr. Tavenner. You said you surmised it was of Canadian origin? 

Mr. Jordan. Because of the particular courier who came only from 
Toronto. I am looking for his name. 

Mr. Tavenner. And you also said because of a paper which the 
Russian commanding ofiicer had? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. He had papers on everything, and I used to see 
them on his desk, but never got hold of them. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you see from his papers that this shipment 
came from Canada? 

Mr. Jordan. I believe his papers showed that, but I can't definitely 
testify to that, but the Canadian courier would clinch it. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. How much was in that shipment? 

Mr. Jordan. I think over 1,000 pounds. 

Mr. Tavenner. When was the shipment from Canada received with 
reference to the other shipments ? 

Mr. Jordan. To tell you the month is most difficult for me. It 
seems the shipment was in the spring of 1944, and the shipment before 
that 

Mr. Tavenner. Forget about the others, but was this the first or 
last shipment ? 

Mr. Jordan. You want the sequence of the shijDments? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is right. 

Mr. Jordan. I believe the Colorado shipment was first, and the 
Canadian shipment would be second, but I am hazy on that. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were there other shipments received after the re- 
ceipt of the Canadian shipment? 

5lr. Jordan. The heavy water, are you referring to that as the 
Canadian shipment? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Jordan. The carboys of heavy water came along later in sepa- 
rate loads. 

Mr. Tavenner. How many loads, do you know ? 

Mr. Jordan. It is very difficult for me to tell how many. I know 
they had great difficulty in loading them. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is not the shipment of the Canadian uranium 
you were speaking of ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were there shipments of uranium passing through 
your field which originated at places other than Canada after you 
received the Canadian shipments ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 933 

Mr. Jordan. I believe the other shipments came from Army 
Ordnance. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. With respect to time, were they before or after you 
received the Canadian shipment ? That may be of some importance. 

Mr. Jordan. I am not definite about that, but my memory seems to 
be it was after the Canadian shipment. 

Mr. Tavenner. In this office in which you say the Russian com- 
manding officer had his desk, and you had yours close by, were there 
other Russians in that office ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. about eight. 

Mr. Tavenner. Any other Americans? 

Mr. Jordan. I was the only American except the secretary. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who was the secretary? 

Mr. Jordan. One was a WAC, Georgia Bean, who lives in Mead- 
ville, Pa. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were there any other secretaries you had who can 
throw some light on this subject ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have a list of the employees who did the work out 
there, who actually handled the business, I only handled the paper 
work. I also have a list of the freight that went through and the 
poundage. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have the poundage of the particular ship- 
ments ? 

Mr, Jordan. They are included. 

Mr. Tavenner. We are not interested in that. We want to And 
out facts about your statement, and to corroborate those facts wherever 
they can be corroborated. That is why I am asking you to give us all 
the basic information jow can which will enable us to investigate the 
correctness of your statement. 

Mr. Jordan. I am perfectly frank in telling you there are a lot of 
holes in my statement that I am unable to fill in because I was only 
in one spot. 

Mr. Tavenner. If you are having difficulty in locating the list of 
employees, you can give it to us later. 

Mr. Jordan. I will give it to you later. 

Mr. Wood. Any further questions in open session ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you take your diary and go over it with one of 
the investigators of our staff? 

Mr. Jordan. I will be glad to. I have a list in the diary of the 
planes that arrived with suitcases, their numbers, and the pilots. 

Mr. Tavenner. Your appearance before this committee is the first 
time you have spoken to any member of this committee or its staff 
regarding these matters? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Any other questions before we go into executive session ? 

Mr. Tavenner. No. 

Mr. Wood, The committee will go into executive session. 

(Thereupon, the subcommittee went into executive session.) 



HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATE- 
RIAL TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1949 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D. C. 

A subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Build- 
ing, Hon. Francis E. Walter presiding. 

Committee members present : Representatives Francis E. Walter, 
Burr P. Harrison, and Morgan M. Moulder (arriving as indicated 
hereinafter). 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis 
J. Russell, senior investigator ; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, 
investigators ; Benjamin Mandel, director of research ; John W. Car- 
rington, clerk ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will be in order. 

Because of the large atendance this morning, the Chair is going 
to insist that there be no talking, and as little smoking as possible. The 
quarters are cramped, and too much smoking, of course, will make it 
unpleasant. 

General Groves, will you raise your right hand and be sworn. You 
swear the testimony you will give in the matter now in hearing will 
be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? 

General Groves. I do. 

Mr. Walter. The Chair will state for the record that when the com- 
mittee recessed on Monday a subcommittee consisting of Mr. Harrison 
and myself were appointed to conduct the hearings today, and Messrs. 
Harrison and Walter are present. 

TESTIMONY OF IT. GEN. LESLIE R. GROVES 

Mr. Walter. Will you state your name, please. General ? 

General Groves. Leslie R. Groves. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Tavenner. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Groves, when and where were you born ? 

General Groves. Albany, N. Y., August 17, 1896. 

Mr. Tavenner. Without going into too much detail, will you fur- 
nish the committee with a brief resume of your military record ? 

General Groves. Appointed to West Point, Presidential appoint- 
ment in 1916; graduated November 1, 1918; entered the Corps of En- 
gineers as second lieutenant ; served at various places in this country 
and in Hawaii and Nicaragua. 

935 



936 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL. 

Had a considerable amount of duty in Wasliington. Graduated 
from the Army Engineer School, both courses, Command and General 
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kans., and Army War College in 
Washington. 

Was on War Department General Staff starting in 1939 ; left the 
General Staff in July of 1940 to become a si^ecial assistant to the 
Quartermaster General on matters concerning construction. Was pro- 
moted to major on July 1, 1940, and was made temporary colonel in 
November of 1940. At that time, I took over what might be termed 
the operations concerning military construction of the United States. 
xYfter the work was transferred to the Corps of Engineers, I went 
back in the Corps of Engineers, where I was Deputy Chief of Con- 
struction, and our operations during the war until the time I was re- 
lieved in September 1942 approximated about 8 billion dollars' worth 
of construction. At that time the construction peak was over, although 
there was still a great deal of work to be done, and I was assigned to 
take charge of the INIanhattan project, or, in other words, the develop- 
ment of the atomic bomb. 

I remained on that duty until the work was turned over to the Atomic 
Energy Commission by act of Congress on January 1, 1947. 

I was then ordered to duty, after a short period, as commanding 
general of the Armed Forces Special Weapon Project, a joint Army- 
Navy-Air command that was responsible for trying, to the best of its 
endeavor, to see that the armed forces would be ready to use atomic 
bombs in case of need. 

I was also made a member of the Military Liaison Committee to the 
Atomic Energy Commission. 

I was made lieutenant general in January 1948, applied for retire- 
m.ent soon after that, and was retired from the Army on February 
 29, 1948. 

Mr. Tavexner. General Groves, j^ou were in charge of the develop- 
ment of the atomic bomb almost from the inception of that project; 
were you not? 

General Gro\tes. Almost from the inception, speaking of it as when 
the serious effort really started. There had been a tremendous amount 
of work done on it before that, but not the major effort. 

Mr. Tavenner. You remained in charge of the project until after 
the bomb was utilized during the war ? 

General GRO^TS. Yes, and for a considerable time after that. 

Mr. Ta^'enner. General Groves, the committee realizes that a man 
in a responsible position such as the one you occupied during the 
development of the atomic bomb must have secured a great deal of 
information concerning the atomic bomb which raises questions of 
national security, and if, in the asking of these questions, it occurs to 
you that we have gone beyond the bounds, and that national security 
is involved, you, of course, will say so. 

General Groat^s. I won't hesitate at all. 

Mr, Ta's^nner. And in that event we would like to hear that testi- 
mony in a closed session. The committee also realizes that, with all 
the time that has elapsed since the occurrences we desire to speak of, 
you may find it necessary to refresh your memory by reference to 
documents. If that is true, we want you to know you shall have an 
opportunity to examine those documents. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 937 

General Groves. I have no document with me, because I didn't know 
what you were going to ask me. 

Mr, Tavenner. As you know, General, there has been a great deal 
of publicity in the papers recently concerning certain statements 
made by Maj. George Racey Jordan, formerly attached to the United 
States Army at Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont. In the light of these 
public accusations, the counnittee conceived it to be its duty to make 
public certain facts which were ascertained from an investigation 
started in 1948, and also to obtain first-hand such evidence as Major 
Jordan was able to produce before this committee. 

Major Jordan said in his testimony here that uranium had been 
shipped from the United States to Soviet Russia during the period 
the United States was engaged in the actual task of developing the 
atomic bomb. Will you tell the committee, please, how many ship- 
ments of uranium to Soviet Russia actually took place, within your 
knowledge ? 

General Groves. Within my knowledge ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Or from knowledge acquired by you. 

General GR0\Tis. Knowledge acquired at the time or since then? 

Mr. Tavenner. Both. 

General Groves. All right. 

Mr. Tavenner. First tell us how many shipments were made, from 
knowledge acquired by you, regardless of the date that you obtained 
that knowledge. 

General Groves. As far as I know, there was a shipment — at least, 
I believe this to be the case. I don't know that the shipment was 
actually made. I wasn't there; but, as far as we could determine at 
the time, a shipment of 200 pounds, plus or minus, of uranium oxide 
went through. I don't know whether this was uranium oxide or not. 
The Russians used different names for it. But, as far as I could tell, 
it was uranium oxide. 

There was also, at the same time, a shipment of 220 pounds of nitro- 
urano, which is a very complex uranium salt. That shipment, as far 
as I know, went through in the spring or late winter of 1943. It 
started with a letter of request from the Russians and various verbal 
requests which, as far as I have been able to determine, were made 
to the lend-lease organization. There was one letter that I have seen, 
signed by a Russian named Fomichev, and I think you have a record 
of that. That letter also said that they would later ask for 8 tons 
of uranium oxide and for 8 tons of uranium chloride. 

Tliis shipment went through, as far as I have been able to deter- 
mine, in this way : I believe, as I say, that it went. It was placed 
through a firm in New York City called Chematar. The letter was 
signed by a man named Rosenberg. Apparently they were acting for 
the Russian purchasing agency, either Amtorg or the other purchasing 
agency. 

JNIr. Tavenner. May I interrupt you just there? How many ship- 
ments were there in all ? 

General Groves, I don't know, because we don't know how many 
leaked through. The ones I have heard of are these, and then there 
has been a great deal of reference to two later shipments of somewhere 
in the vicinity of 1,000 pounds of oxide which were supposed to have 
originated in Canada and been shipped through Great Falls. But I 



938 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

cant' find any record that we knew of that at the time or later, until 
certain things had been said before this committee. 

So that the only shipments I have knowledge of that were actually 
made — I am not talking about attempts to get shipments through — 
were these two, one of 200 pounds and one of 220 pounds. There was 
an attempt to get 25 pounds of uranium metal, which, as far as I know, 
was never obtained. 

Mr. Tavenner. Let us get back to the shipment of the quantity sold 
to the Russians through the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co. of Denver. 
The records we have obtained from the State Department show that 
that sale took place on March 23, 1943, or at least a license for its 
export was issued by the Lend-Lease Administration at that time. 
Will you proceed and give us all the details that you are acquainted 
with relating to that shipment, which I believe was the first shipment? 

General Groves. As far as we know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

General Groves. That shipment was urged by the Russians con- 
stantly over a considerable period. There was no way they could 
obtain this material without tne support of the United States authori- 
ties in one way or another. They had to have an export license. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did the Manhattan Engineering District first 
acquire knowledge that the Russians desired that shipment ? 

General Groves. I should say that it was sometime along probably in 
February of 1943. We knew that prior to that time the Russians were 
engaged in espionage on this project. I knew it personally, I should 
say, within about 2 weeks or a month from the time I took control. 
In this instance the approach was always made to various subordi- 
nates in my organization through subordinates in lend-lease. 

Mr. Walter. Was that at Oak Ridge, General ? 

General Groves. No ; that was in Washington. Oak Ridge at that 
time was not established as an operation. The Manhattan District, 
when it was established, was established in New York City, and in 
July 1942 it was so named. In August 1943, approximately, it was 
moved to Oak Ridge as the headquarters. I believe that is the correct 
date. 

Mr. Walter. And at that time was Oak Ridge operating ? 

General Groves. Oak Ridge was under construction. As to operat- 
ing, whether we were producing any material, I would say "No," but 
that is from memory. That is an easy date to find out, as to when 
the first material was produced, but I would say offhand it would have 
been considerably later than that. 

Mr. Walter. Sometime in 1944, would you say ? 

General Groves. Yes ; at least 1944 before we started to produce any 
material that would be suitable for use in the bomb. The first electro- 
magnetic unit was finished sometime early in 1944, as I remember. It 
is an easy date to find. The gaseous diffusion plant did not go into 
operation until about April 1945. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understood you to say it had come to your attention 
that there had been some efforts at espionage that you knew of prior 
to the time of the Russians desiring uranium. Did I correctly under- 
stand you ? 

General Groves. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Explain further, please. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 939 

General Groves. Well, I will have to be excused for a minute while 
I check on this Presidential directive. 

Mr. Walter. What is the date of that directive? 

General Groves. The Department of the Army circular is dated 
August 11, 1948. The directive was August 5, 1948. 

Mr. Walter. I would like to inform you. General, that this morning 
I conversed with one of the Secretaries of the Army and was informed 
that that directive had been rescinded and a new one issued shortly 
after Mr. Forrestal left the Department of the Army. 

General Groves. Well, I asked yesterday to obtain the latest in- 
structions, and this is what was handed to me. Unless I could see a 
copy of it, I would have to be bound by this, as an officer of the Army. 

The President's directive said this : "* * * no investigative data 
of any type, whether relating to loyalty or other aspects of the in- 
dividual's record, shall be included in the material submitted to a 
congressional committee." I think that is the only thing that is 
applicable; and, subject to that, if you can give me your question 
again, I think I can maybe answer it in part. 

Mr. Tavenner. I asked you to explain the efforts at espionage to 
which you referred as your having had knowledge of at the time this 
request by the Russians was made for the shipment of uranium. 

General Gro\-es. There were efforts, very serious efforts, made at 
Berkeley, Calif., of which I believe your committee has the complete 
story. Insofar as it has been published, I have found nothing at 
variance with my knowledge of the facts in that case. 

There were certain efforts made at Chicago, but those were discov- 
ered at a later date. There were efforts being made — at least, efforts 
that we were suspicious of — ^that were occurring in New York City 
at that time or a trifle later than that. We had deep suspicions about 
various efforts that were made. In other words, we had enough evi- 
dence of espionage to convince any intelligent, prudent man that 
espionage was going on ; that it was being carried on under the direc- 
tion of officials of the Russian Embassy, and that every effort would 
be made by them to discover what we were doing. 

Mr. Tavenner. This committee is familiar with the situation you 
describe as existing at Berkeley, Calif. As to the other matters, do 
you consider that further information comes within the purview of 
restricted data? 

General Groves. No. I think that you have also had testimony 
concerning the situation at Chicago. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

General Groves. That developed a little bit later than this, as I 
recall. You have the exact dates. A great deal of it has been pub- 
lished in the papers. There again, I found nothing that I noticed 
that was at variance with the facts. 

You may recall that at the time I testified in executive session there 
was a considerable dispute between myself and various members of 
the committee as to the identity of one particular man at Chicago, and 
I believe that was straightened out to your satisfaction — that there 
was no question as to who it was. Other than that, I know of no case 
that I have been made aware of where the committee, with respect to 
Russian espionage, has made known to me anything that was not 
correct, in my opinion ; and that, I felt at the time, was rather minor, 



940 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

in that it was a case of two men known to be guilty, and just a question 
of whether one was a little more guilty. You thought he was. I 
didn't think he was that bad, but he was still so bad and black m his 
disloyalty to this country that it didn't make much difference. It is 
like a murderer who committed 29 murders against one who com- 
mitted 30. ,-,.■, 1 • ^1 • XT X 

As to the espionage in New York, I don't think that is anything that 
should be discussed in public hearings because I don't believe you have 
developed that as fully as you may wish to do so, and I am afraid I 
would spoil your development if I talked about it. 

Mr. TAM3NNER. Havc you answered the question as to when the 
Manhattan Engineering District first learned of the Russian request 

for uranium? , , ^ • -r. i n 

General Groves. No. I said that ]t was probably m February ot 
1943. As to how I found out, various people in Lend-Lease, particu- 
larly, as I recall, General Wesson and Mr. Moore, were in touch with 
Capt. Alan Johnson of my office about the shipments of these materials. 
They were also in toucl/at various times with representatives of the 
Manhattan project's offices in New York, and I believe Colonel Cren- 
shaw and Captain Merritt were the ones there, and I believe you have 
heard them and know their stories. Just when it was brought to my 
attention, I don't know, but I am reasonably certain — in other words, 
a thousand to one — that Captain Johnson reported to me this was 
going on, and I told him there was nothing doing, we were not going 
to permit it. 

That word got to Lend-Lease and General Wesson called me on 
the telephone. I know there were many telephone calls between Gen- 
eral Wesson and myself on that subject. There was a great deal of 
pressure being brought to bear on Lend-Lease, apparently, to give the 
Russians everything they could think of. There was a great deal 
of pressure brought to give them this uranium material. 

As far as I could tell with reference to these two shipments, the 
200 pounds and 220 pounds, the shipment was either made before I 
learned of it personally and could stop it, or it was so far along I 
couldn't stop it without attracting undue attention to the fact it was 
being shipped. I believe it was the latter. In other words, various 
things that had been said and done, and the promises that had been 
made by Lend-Lease, were such that it would have been adverse to 
our security, our desire to keep the project under cover, to have at 
that time taken it away from the Russians. That, as far as I know, 
is the correct analysis of the situation. It was after that time that 
other efforts were made to obtain material. 

I know, for example, that I approved the action of Lend-Lease in 
approving certain materials for shipment, I think in the amount of 
about 500 pounds each of various compounds, sometime in the spring 
of that year. 

Mr. Tavenner. Just one moment. General Groves. This first ship- 
ment you told us about, was it actually axDproved by the Manhattan 
Enginering District ? 

General Groves. That is something I can't find out, whether it was 
actually approved or not. I have given you the story of what could 
have happened. Either it was approved in advance and was so far 
along it could not be stopped without injuring our security, or it was 
already gone when I learned of it. I think it was the first. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 941 

Mr. Moulder. That was 200 pounds ? 

General Grov-es. Two hnndred pounds uranium oxide and 220 i 

pounds nitro-urano. 

Mr. Ta\^nner, By ''injuring our security" do you mean tipping off 
the Russians as to the importance of the materials ? 

General Groves. Exactly. And I knew it not only would tip off the 
Russians, but would create in Washington a great deal of interest in 
why we were able to stop the shipment to Russia, and it would result 
in more people in Washington talking about something they had no ";.■ 

business to talk about. 

I believe there were two units of 500 pounds. You will find in . • 

Lend-Lease a statement that I approved that shipment. I believe that •,, . 

is correct. At the time the shipment was approved we knew they fv 

couldn't get that material. 

Mr. Walter. Was that the shipment identified by the license No. 
1643180? 

General Groves. I can't answer as to that. It was a shipment of 
500 pounds of each of two different compounds, one of which I think 
was oxide and the other nitrate. 

Mr. Walter. Five hundred pounds black uranium oxide and 500 
pounds uranium nitrate ? 

General Groves. That would be the one. 

Mr. Walter. How bulky a package would 500 pounds of black 
uranium oxide be? 

General Groves. It wouldn't be very bulky, I don't think, but I would 
have to look it up. I don't know what the specific gravity was, but 
I would say it would be a little lighter than iron in the oxide form, 
perhaps 25 percent lighter than iron, so it would be rather a small 
package. 

Mr. Tavenner. Referring again to this first shipment, had any 
arrangement been made prior to that time or about that time by which 
the Manhattan Engineering District would be notified of any request 
that the Russian Government would make regarding the shipment of 
uranium? 

General Groves. Yes. There had been arrangements made at that 
time. If you will recall the dates, we started in September of 1942, 
and this was in January of 1943, and it was not possible to put into !•• 

operation all the safeguards that we wanted to put in and did put in P 

later. That was handled througli a junior officer in New York until 
such time as all the things could be cleaned up. 

To go on with the two 500-pound lots, I think it is important to 
realize that at that time we didn't feel there were any such materials 
on hand. If there were, we wanted to know about it. We wanted to 
know if the Russians could fulfill this order or get it filled. We wanted ?;. 

to know, first, if we had overlooked any supply of uranium in this |v... 

country; and, second, we wanted to know if any was slipping out of 
our hands, and we thought if the Russians could find it we wanted to 
know it. We had no expectation of permitting that material to go out 
of this country. It would have been stopped. 

You have received a memorandum from Mr. Gullion of the State 
Department dated June 11, 1948. and I would like to ask you to insert 
in the record at this place the last paragraph on page 11 of that 
enclosure, because I believe it is very pertinent to this question of the 
500 pounds. 



942 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Have you found it ? 
Mr. Russell. Yes. 

General Groves. Will you read it, or do you want me to read it? 
It winds up with the statement that General Wesson smiled. 
Mr. Russell (reading) : 

A curious development on this entire matter occurred recently when Mr. 
Fomicliev called Mr. Hoopes and stated that in view of the lapse of time since 
the submission of export license applications for iirano-uranic oxide and uranium 
nitrate, the Soviets were now having difficulty in locating a source of supply. 
Mr. Hoopes communicated this to General Wesson, who only smiled. 

General Groves. I think that shows the result of the work. That is 
from the Lend-Lease chronological diary, as I undei^tand it. 

With respect to the uranium metal, the 25 pounds at that time were 
still authorized. We didn't stop their shipment for a very good reason. 
We were anxious to know if anybody in this country knew how to 
make uranium metal. We had been unable to make it successfully up 
to that time, and if anybody could make it we wanted to know how he 
did it and whether he could make it for us if he could make it for 
the Russians. We were willing that the Russians have 25 pounds, if 
we couldn't stop it, on the ground that it would be worth more than 
that to us to find out how to make uranium metal. As you know, we 
did find it out later, at a terrific amount of delay and trouble. We 
would have loved to find it out at that time without so much trouble. 

From the spring of 1943 no shipment went to Russia tnat we knew 
of at the time or since then until certain testimony was brought out 
before this committee. Then, for the first time, I became aware of the 
shipments that had been referred to as having come originally from 
Canada. 

Mr. Tavenner. This second shipment to which you have re- 
ferred 

General Groves. You mean the 500 pounds? 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Yes. 

General Groves. It was never made. 

Mr. Tavenner. It was never actually made ? 

General Groves. No. They never found the material. So that 
checked with what we had discovered, or thought we knew, that it 
was not available. 

I think it is important for you to realize that for some 20 years 
prior to the war an average of more than 100 tons of uranium oxide 
were used commercially every year. It was in the hands of chemical 
supply houses in small lots all over the country. That is the reason I 
believe the Russians were able to find these small quantities of 200 and 
220 pounds, and those are small quantities. 

Mr. Tavenner. As a basis for further questions relating to those 
shipments, and for the purpose of clearing the record, the files fur- 
nished the committee by the State Department reflect that on January 
29, 1943, Mr. W. C. Moore in the office of the Lend-Lease Administra- 
tion received a letter signed by N. S. Fomichev, in charge of chemicals 
for the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in 
the United States of America, in which Fomichev stated that he had 
just received a request from the U. S. S. R. for 25 pounds of uranium 
metal, 220 pounds of uranium oxide, and 200 pounds of uranium 
nitrate, and requested that the products mentioned be shipped to the 
Soviet Union on the first available ship. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 943 

On February 15, 1943, Mr. Moore replied to Mr. Fomichev that his 
office had been informed that uranium — 
is a critical item and its use is strictly limited in the United States. 
Moore stated that — 

* * * in allocating our limited supply of this material we must consider only 
the most vital applications. In order that our Government may make a decision 
favorable to your request, may I suggest that you support it with a precise 
statement as to its operational use. 

On March 6, 1943, Hermann Rosenberg, of Cheraatar, Inc., who acted 
as a broker in the first sale of uranium to the Russians, wrote to Mr. 
Moore and stated : 

We have reported to you during our today's telephone conversation the fol- 
lowing business which is set to be transacted and have noted that we are per- 
mitted to transact same. 

Mr. Rosenberg then quotes the uses to which the uranium com- 
pounds are to be placed and indicutts tluit liie supplier is the S. W. 
Shattuck Chemical Co., of Denver, Colo., and that the purchaser is 
the Government Purchasing Connuission of the Soviet Union in the 
United States of America. The last paragraph stated : 

We trust that this is the information you require and thank you for your 
statement that you will treat same strictly confidential. 

There are several other items of interest regarding this particular 
transaction which will be inserted in the record at a later date. How- 
ever, one memorandum is of particular interest, which states as follows : 

Mr. Fomichev, of the Government I'urchasing Commission of the Soviet Union, 
called to say that beside the Chematar Co. — 

that is, Mr. Rosenberg's company — 

New York City, he had another source of uranium metal. This was the Manu- 
facturers Chemical Co., New York City, which could supply the metal immediately, 
apparently out of stock. 

Quoting further from that letter : 

It appears that "WPB authorization" is necessary if a legitimate transaction 
is to be accomplished, otherwise the metal would have to be purchased on the 
black market. 

General Groves, do you know anything about black marketing in 
uranium ? 

General Groves. No. I never engaged in it, and I think I probably 
bought more than anyone else did. 

Mr. Tavenner. You had to compete with the Russians, who were 
also attempting to obtain it. Do you have any knowledge of any 
character relating to black-market dealings of anyone else in uranium ? 

General Groves. I can't recall any, but I know of one individual who 
would have engaged in it if he possibly could have. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, that is a rather indefinite statement. 

General Groves. We wouldn't have engaged in it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you learn of any black market transactions ? 

General Groves. I can't recall of any, and I think the reason was 
that there wasn't any uranium in the country to amount to anything. 
It was very small. You could pick up 5 or 10 pounds, something of 
that kind, but you couldn't get anything large enough to be of value. 

Mr. Walter. At that time were you making every effort to get all 
the uranium available'^ 



944 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

General Groves. Yes, sir. We started on that basis as soon as the 
Army took over the project. That was the first thing done. The 
question is raised, if you are trying to get material by the ton, will you 
l3uy it by the half ounce, if you have to have it by the ton to be of 
value. 

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of a shipment made from Canada. 

General Groves. Yes. 

Mr. TA^^:xNER. Rather, the origin was Canada, but the shipment 
was made through Great Falls ? 

General Groves. That is what I have been told. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did you first learn that that shipment had 
been made ? 

General Gro\t:s. I believe, although I am not positive, I believe 
that the first inkling of that came as a result of some work of the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. 

(Representative Moulder arrives in hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. You first learned of it from this committee? 

General Groves. Yes; in a hearing or from one of your investiga- 
tors. I believe the first inkling came from the committee or the 
committee staff, who naturally would ask me what I knew about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did j^ou subsequently make an investigation to de- 
termine whether that was correct ? 

General Gro^tss. No ; I don't believe so, because by that time I was 
no longer responsible for atomic bomb matters. I had no staff. I 
believe at that time I was retired and had no staff of any kind. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was this sale of uranium the transportation of 
which originated in Canada — that is, 500 pounds of uranium oxide 
and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate — sold to the Russians by the 
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp, through the Chematar Co. of 
New York City? 

General Groves. I don't think so, I remember it as 1,000 pounds 
each, I believe. That is all the information I obtained, I believe, from 
some member of your committee or staff. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. You have no way of knowing, from your inde- 
pendent knowledge, whether that is the same shipment you learned 
about from this committee ? 

General Groves. No ; but it certainly had no export license that re- 
ceived the concurrence of the Manhattan District. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to read to you the following letter dated 
April 17, 1943, addressed to the Lend-Lease Administration, attention 
of Mr. James Hoopes, which is signed "Thomas T. Crenshaw, Lieu- 
tenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Assistant," relating to this Cana- 
dian shipment. 

General Groves. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. April 17, 1943. The letter states : 

This office has been referred to you as being familiar with the status of requests 
from the Russian Government for uranium compounds and metal. It is under- 
stood that you will act for Mr. Moore during his absence. 

Copy of letter from the AVar Production Board, regarding available supplies of 
ferro-uranium, is enclosed. We had previously advised the War Production 
Board that we would not be interested in obtaining this material and therefore 
would suggest that you contact Mr. Punderson direc-tly in order to make sure 
that the material is still available. In addition to the quantities indicated here, 
this office is cognizant of another small lot of ferro-uranium totaling approxi- 
mately 65 pounds. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 945 

If the Russian Purchasing Commission is interested in this material from the 
standpoint of experimental worlc on alloys as they have previously stated, the 
ferro-uranium should serve their purpose as well or better than uranium salts. 
It is suggested that it might be advisable to attempt to secure a commitment 
from them as to any jjarticular specifications which must be met if they decide 
to accept ferro-uranium ; it would be preferable to obtain this information 
before making the enclosed analysis available to them. 

It is requested that we be kept advised as to the progress of the negotiations 
regarding this material. If they refuse to accept the ferro-uranium, kindly 
notify us as we have one alternate proposition which might perhaps be offered 
as a solution to the present difficulty. 

General Groves. Could I ask you for that chemical analysis they 
gave ? Do you have that as an enclosure ? 

Mr. Tavenner. We will secure it for you. That was a letter signed 
by Thomas T. Crenshaw, lieutenant colonel, Corps of Engineers, assis- 
tant. 

(The chemical analysis requested was handed to the witness by Mr. 
Russell.) 

General Groves. All right. You can go ahead if you wish. 

Mr. Tavenner. Continuing with the correspondence relating to this 
matter, a letter dated April 23, 194:3, addressed to Lieutenant Colonel 
Cren.shaw and signed by Mr. Hoopes, state since the receipt of Colonel 
Crenshaw's letter of April 17 he, Mr. Hoopes, understood that General 
GroA^es has advised General Wesson that the particular request for 
500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate can 
be approved. Mr. Hoopes said that — 

The Soviet Commission is being advised accordingly. In addition, it has been 
agreed that an application for 25 pounds of uranium metal would be entertained 
if submitted. 

I assume that General Groves will post you on any details regarding his deci- 
sion. 

If there are further inquiries from the Soviets on these or related materials, 
we will let you know. 

Now, is that shipment the shipment vou referred to a little while aso 
as being the shipment that was not approved? 

General Groves. I believe that if you examine the files a little more 
in detail, you will find I turned down the ideas of Colonel Crenshaw 
in this respect, and it was not approved by me. 

Mr. Walter. When did that occur '^ 

Mr. Taatdnner. The date of this letter is April 23, 1943. 

Mr. Walter. Tlie fact of the matter is. General, that both of the 
shipments that were made, and those that were authorized but which 
you intended would never be made, all occurred in 1943 in the early 
spring ? 

General Groves. That is correct. 

Mr. Harrison. Could it have been possible that anj^ shipments were 
made in 1944? 

General Groves. Not if we could have helped it, and not with our 
knowledge of any kind. They would have had to be entirel}^ secret 
and not discovered. It was right after this incident — the one that 
started with the Fomichev letter of January 29, 1943, that talked 
about the 200 and 220 pounds — it was right after that that the gen- 
eral blockade was put into effect, and I don't think any of it got 
through. I don't think the ferro-uranium was shipped, 

Mr. Walter. And at that time the Army had control of the entire 
supply ? 

99334—50 4 



946 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

General Groves. We had control of everything we could find out 
about. Nothing was published to tell everybody they had to turn in 
any uranium they had, but we had almost complete control. 

Mr. Walter. So if there had been any shipments made in the spring 
of 1944, they would have been made from the supply the Army had? 

General Groves. Had or knew about, or they might have been made 
from some supplies we knew nothing about. But I believe a check 
will show this ferro-uranium shipment was not actually carried 
through, and that I reversed Colonel Crenshaw on it. 

Mr. Harrison. If Mr. Harry Hopkins knew about it, you surely 
would have known about it, would you not? 

General Groves.. Not necessarily. 

Mr. Walter. Did Mr. Hopkins ever make an attempt to obtain 
blueprints or maps or other papers with respect to the development 
of the atomic bomb from you ? 

General Groves. From me directly? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

General Groves. No. 

Mr. Harrison. There is testimony before this committee, which 
you probably read in the paper, to the effect that a map of Oak Ridge 
was shipped to Russia, accompanied by a note on White House sta- 
tionary, written in longhand, which note said : "I had a hell of a time 
getting this from Groves." Did anyone in the White House get such 
map from you, whether he had a hell of a time getting it or not? 

General Groves. Not from me that I was aware of. If they got 
it they would have had to get it from somebody on my staff or some- 
one to whom I had for some reason given a map in connection with 
some discussion or something of that kind. I doubt very seriously if 
any such thing was done legitimately by anyone. I know it was not 
done by anyone in my office. I am sure of that. 

Mr. Walter. How many people on your staff had access to maps? 

General Groves. I would say a very large number would have had 
access to a map of Oak Ridge. Without knowing just what is claimed 
to have been on that map, I can't tell you whether the stor}'^ is true 
or probably isn't true. If you have that, I would be glad to look at 
it and possibly suggest to the committee in executive session some 
questions that might be looked into with respect to it. 

Mr. Walter. You knew the men on your staff who had access to 
these maps? 

General Groves. No. I had over 600,000 people em])loyed on the 
project. 

Mr. Walter. I am talking about your staff. 

General Groves. The staff in Washington was very, very small, but 
they were not the ones who would have had those maps. If you 
are talking about topographical surveys of the Oak Ridge works, 
they would not have been marked secret. Maps of barracks or resi- 
dential buildings would not have been marked secret, and I don't 
know, but this could very easily have been a map showing a lay-out 
of certain residential construction, firehouses, or office buildings. It 
could have been almost anything. So that if it was not marked secret 
or restricted or confidential, it wouldn't mean necessarily that any 
information that we were trying to hold secret was getting out. 

It is true that throughout the project many matters were handled 
as nonsecret, and handled perfectly openly, that, if people could have 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 947 

put them all together, they would have had a tremendous amount of 
information. Actual bomb parts were made by some manufactur- 
ing companies in their plants, and they were made without any secret 
or confidential mark being put on them. Of course, they were shipped 
and reshipped and everything done to cover tracks, but it was neces- 
sary to take a great many chances of security. Those chances were 
taken deliberately, because the primary purpose was to bring the war 
to a close earlier than it otherwise would have been. That was the 
mission, and that mission was accomplished. The secrecy, or guarding 
from the Russians, particularly, a great deal of it was on our own 
initiative and in accordance with a Presidential directive to me to 
keep everything as secret as possible. But I believe those of you who 
were in Washington at that time realize that suspicion of Russia was 
not very popular in some circles. It was popular at Oak Ridge, and 
from 1 month of the time I took over we never trusted them one 
iota, and from that time on our whole security was based on not let- 
ting the Russians find out anything. We were not worried about 
Germany or Japan. We were worried about Russia. 

Mr. Walter. At any time did any of your officers tell you that pres- 
sure had been brought to bear on them to furnish Harry Hopkins with 
confidential plans or maps? 

General Groves. No ; and I think to clear the matter up definitely 
I would like to add to that answer a little. At no time, to the best of 
my recollection and belief — and I am sure I would have remembered 
it — did I ever meet Harry Hopkins, talk to him on the phone, receive 
any letters from him or write any to him, or have any dealings with 
anyone who pretended to be talking for him. There may be letters 
on file that are contrary to that, but if there are, they were of a routine 
type. I can find no one from the people who were the closest to me 
during that period in the office who remembers any such contact. I 
do know, of course, that Mr. Hopkins knew about this project. I 
know that. But as far as any dealings with me or, as far as I know, 
with any members of my staff, they didn't occur. 

Furthermore, I think it is important to realize that our organiza- 
tion, both in Washington and in New York, was so closely knit, and 
things were under such a tight centralized control, that I can't imag- 
ine any request or effort by Mr. Hopkins along that line ever occur- 
ring without my knowledge, unless someone in the office was lacking in 
the integrity he should have had, and we never discovered that in our 
organization. 

He could have gotten it from one of the scientists who we know were 
giving information to Russia, but I don't believe he got it from anyone 
who was from my immediate office, or anyone in charge, first, Colonel 
Marshall, and then General Nichols. 

Mr. Harrison. You said there was a great deal of pressure on 
Lend-Lease to ship uranium to Russia. Can you tell us who exerted 
the pressure? 

General Groves. No; I can't tell you who exerted the pressure on 
Lend-Lease. Of course it could have been internal pressure. At any 
rate, we saw every evidence of that pressure, and I believe your files of 
the Lend-Lease diaries will show how they repeatedly came back. It 
was evident from reading the diaries that we didn't want this material 
shipped, yet they kept coming back and coming back. 



948 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

The first conversation I had was, I believe, with General Wesson, 
and I made it very plain we did not want it shipped. iVs you know,. 
General Wesson is not well. It has been impossible for me, since thi& 
thing first came up, to have any discussion with him at all. I don't 
believe he would remember much about it. He was handling hun- 
dreds of things every day. I believe it is fair to say that he immedi- 
ately passed that on to his subordinates, and his subordinates were 
fully aware that we did not want this material to be shipped abroad, 
and this continual pressure to ship it was certainly coming from some- 
where. Either it was coming internally, from ambitious souls, or it 
was coming externally. 

I am sure if you would check on the pressure on officers handling all 
supplies of a military nature during the war, you will find the pres- 
sure to give to Russia everything that could be given was not limited 
to atomic matters. 

There was one incident that occurred later. I was reminded this 
morning by one of my former people of how delighted we w^ere 
when we managed to get some material away from the Russians. 
It was a major accomplishment. And the only thing we got away 
from them was time. We were very anxious, in connection with the 
gaseous diffusion plant, to get certain equi])ment. If it had not been 
obtained, that plant would have been delayed in its completion. 
The Russians had a plant on the way. Of course when I say they had 
it, you know who paid for it. That plant, some of it was boxed 
and on the dock when we got it. and I can still remember the diffi- 
culties we had in getting it. 

One of the agreements we had to make was that we would replace 
that equipment, and use all our priorities necessary to get it replaced 
quickly. The agreement even said this : 

Said equipment and materials to be essentially the dupliciite of all material 
under the previous procurement number. 

That particular plant was oil-refinery equipment, and in my opin- 
ion was purely postwar Russian supply, as you know much of it was. 
I give you that as an example of what people interested in suppl}'^- 
ing American troops had to contend with during the war. 

Where that influence came from, you can guess as well as I can. 
It was certainly prevalent in Washington, and it was prevalent 
throughout the country, and the only spot I know of that was dis- 
tinctly anti-Russian at an early period was the Manhattan project,, 
and we were. There was never any doubt about it from sometime 
along about October 1942. I believe the people there just a few 
days before I was were anti-Russian a little before I Avas. They just 
learned about it sooner, that is all. 

Mr. Harrison. Learned about espionage activities ? 

General Groves. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. In your answer to the chairman's first question as 
to whether or not the late Harry Hopkins had attempted to obtain 
any documents or material from you, you used the word that he did 
not "directly." 

General Groves. That means that it never came to my attention 
in any way, and I believe if the approach had been made to anyone 
in a position to furnish those documents legally and properly, it would 
have been called to my attention. They wouldn't even send a docu- 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 949 

ment to the White House if the President called for it without asking 
me if it was all right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there any occasion that was reported to you 
when any quantity of secret material or drawings had been removed 
from the files ? 

General Groves. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would you have known of it if such a thing had 
occurred in any quantity ? 

General Groves. Yes ; and I think I would have known of it if one 
particular paper had been missing and discovered to be missing. 
Those things were normally reported to me. There were a few in- 
stances where it was not reported to me, but those were cases of officers 
in the field well removed from my influence, you might say. 

Mr. Tavenner. You may have already answered the question in 
answer to questions by Judge Harrison, but was there any time during 
your administration of this project that any higher official of Gov- 
ernment attempted to use pressure on you, when you recognized it as 
such, for the delivery of documents or for the shipping of uranium 
destined for Russia ? 

General Groves. Nothing except what I have already told you 
about the lend-lease operation. General Wesson did not put pres- 
sure on me. General Wesson could not have put pressure on me. But 
that did not keep his subordinates from constantly bringing it up. 

There are two kinds of pressure in Washington. One is the kind 
that comes from above, that you realize what it is. The other kind is 
constant hammering, repeating and repeating, in the hope that you 
wear down or that something slips. If you run an office of some size, 
eventually something is going to slip. Nobody has a thousand batting 
average. I believe it was the hope of the people who kept pushing and 
pushing that they might catch me out of town, or that some day I 
would say to give it to them to shut them up. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am talking about the kind of pressure that you 
say you know what it is about. 

General Groves. No, there was not. Any time I discussed my feel- 
ings about the Russians with any higher officer of the Government in 
the executive branch, I never had any signs of any disagreement with 
what I said. There was not even any indirect pressure, such as say- 
ing, "After all, you are unreasonable about the Russians," I am 
talking about the executive branch. 

Mr. Tavenner. A moment ago I was asking you about the licensing 
for the shipment of uranium, and the records which we have seen 
indicate that permission was at first denied to grant a license for the 
shipping of that quantity of uranium of which we spoke. 

General Gro\'es. You are referring to which one, the first ship- 
ment ? 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. No, the second; and that later it was reactivated. 

General Groves. And finally granted ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, I want to ask you. 

General Groves. If you mean by granted, consented to by us or 
by me, I can tell you no very definitely. I can find no record of it, 
and can find no record in my memory, and my memory is still reason- 
ably satisfactory, and I am sure it was not done. If somebody got 
my signature, I would like to see that signature, and I don't mean 
a photostat, either; I mean the original document. 



950 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. As far as you know was it ever granted ? 

General Groves. As far as 1 know it was not granted with the 
knowledge of any member of the Manhattan project. If it was done, 
it was done with the knowledge I did not approve. There was one 
instance where it was assented tq by Colonel Crensliaw, and that was 
later revoked. 

You must realize I am in a position where I no longer have any 
control over those records. I have had no control since January 1, 
1947, when they were turned over to other agencies of the Government. 

Mr. Tavenner. If the license was granted notwithstanding your 
disapproval, who would have had authority to make that decision ? 

General Groves. Whoever issued the license. As far as I know, 
there was nothing that required a countersignature. They may have 
been told to get my consent, but as far as I know it did not require 
countersigning. As far as I know, I never saw an export license in 
my life. 

Mr. Tavenner. The last letter I read stated that an application 
for 25 pounds of uranium metal would be entertained if submitted. 
Is the committee's information correct that 2 pounds of this metal 
were shipped to the Russians and the shipment approved by the Man- 
hattan Engineering District because the metal was so impure that it 
was known the Russians could not use it for atomic purposes? 

General Groves. I don't know. We were willing to consent to the 
export license for 25 pounds of uranium metal because we were very 
interested in knowing if anyone knew how to make the metal. The 
metal that was shipped was not doctored ; it was simply not well made, 
and it did not indicate to the Russians what we wanted to get. It was 
2 pounds of uranium metal, and that is all there was to it. The}^ 
might as well have had 2 pounds of oxide so far as determining what 
we wanted. If they took it as the type we were using, they would have 
had a delay. I would have been willing to let them liaA^e 2 pounds of 
inferior metal. 

Mr. Tavenner. As far as you know, the Russians didn't ask for the 
completion of the 25-pound order after receiving the 2 pounds? 

General Groves. No. After approving the shipment of this 25 
pounds, I was told they got a little of it, and some comment to the 
effect "we would like to see the Russians when thev try to use that in a 
pile." 

Mr. Tavenner. General, I would like you to read a memorandum 
addressed to William C. Moore by J. Hoopes, and ask if you desire 
to make any comments on it. 

General Gro\^s. Mr. Hoopes was Mr. Moore's assistant, wasn't he ? 

Mr, Tavenner. Yes. Suppose you look at it and read it and make 
such comment as you care to make on it. 

General Groves (after examining document). I believe that con- 
firms what I was trying to tell you earlier, and you wouldn't quite 
agree I was right. In other words. Colonel Crenshaw's consent to this 
export license was definitely overruled by me. and General Wesson 
was so informed and agreed to it ; and in its place the application for 
500 pounds of each kind of materials to be sent to Russia was approved, 
with the idea of smoking them out and seeing if they could get it. 
This has reference to General Wesson's smiling when they said they 
were unable to get the material. So I think that will clear up the 
matter and show that my testimony was correct. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 951 

Mr. Walter. General Groves, did you ever know Major Jordan? 

General Groves. As far as I can remember, I have never met liim 
or known him at any time, but I have met so many people I can't 
remember definitely. 

Mr. Walter. Have you ever heard of any complaints that he made 
sometime in 1944 concerning the shipment of this strategic material 
you were in charge of ? 

General Groves. Not in respect of material I was in charge of, but 
reading the papers and listening to the radio on the first two nights — I 
didn't listen last night — I gain the impression that what he was com- 
plaining of at the time was not the shipment of uranium, but the 
tremendous shipments going to Russia. I never heard any complaints 
from him, but I heard some Washington complaints from a lot of offi- 
cers as to why on earth we were stripping the United States to give 
Russia materials, particularly materials not for war purposes but for 
later activities, commercial and engineering equipment that they could 
not possibly use to win the war. That was common talk among officers 
of the Arniy and Navy who were working on allocation committees on 
automobiles, trucks, steel, and things of that kind. That is what they 
told me, and not what I knew of my own knowledge. I used to see 
them every day as they came out of meetings, and I would get some 
rather indignant statements from them. 

Mr. Moulder. What use would Russia have for 2 pounds of uranium 
metal ? 

General Groves. The only use would be, it would tell them what we 
were trying to do, and it would give them a small amount for laboratory 
purposes. They may not even have been able to make metal as good 
as they got. 

Mr. Moulder. Is it your contention that such quantity as was 
shipped was for the purpose of deceiving them in their efforts to know 
what was going on ? 

General Groves. No. I said the reason for approving the metal 
shipment was essentially to find out if anybody in this country knew 
how to make metal satisfactory to us. 

Mr. Moulder. I thought you said it would not give them informa- 
tion of value. 

General Groves. It was the wrong kind, but we wanted to find out 
if anybody in this country could make it satisfactory to us. 

Mr. Moulder. Repeating, you state very definitely and emphati- 
cally that no pressure was exerted from the executive department of 
our Government upon you or any person in your employ ? 

General Groves. With respect to my anti-Russian attitude, you 
might say. That was the statement I made. The other statement was 
made that I never had any pressure that I know of from Mr. Hopkins. 
I may have had some contacts from his office when I was on construc- 
tion, but I don't recall any, and they were just routine and I wouldn't 
have known of them. 

Mr. Tavenner. With regard to this 500 pounds of uranium oxide, 
can you give us some idea as to how many pounds of pure uranium 
could be extracted from it ? 

General Groves. Oh, my, I am no longer supposed to know anything 
about atomic energy. One of your staff ought to be able to tell you. 
This is just a guess, but I would say 80 percent. That is easy to find. 
You can find it. 



952 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Can pure uranium be extracted from uranium 
nitrate ? 

General Groves. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would the furnishing of this amount of uranium 
nitrate and uranium oxide to Russia which was contemplated, of 500 
pounds each, be of any value for experimental purposes? 

General Groves. Any amount would be of value in certain experi- 
mental work. That is, in anything to do with chemistry. After all, 
we designed and practically built the Hanford plant for separating 
plutonium and uranium wdien we had one-millionth of a pound of 
plutonium. The chemistry part could be very well handled. 

But when it came to making a pile there wasn't enough for that. You 
couldn't even have run an experimental pile such as was used at the 
University of Chicago. I will not tell you in open session how much 
would be needed to make a pile such as was used at the University of 
Chicago, but Joliot-Curie has said how much he had to operate in 
Paris, and I think it is reasonable. 

Mr. TA^^3NNER. How much did he say ? 

General Groves. My recollection is it was something in the order 
of a ton. 

Mr. Walter. The amount was considerably in excess of the amount 
shipped ? 

General Groves. Oh, yes ; in other words, this w^oukl be like trying 
to make something in the way of a kitchen product wdiere we needed 
three cups of flour and only had one, if you had to make your loaf of 
bread of a certain size, and that is what you have to do with this. 

Mr. Tavenner. You might have a smaller loaf and still use it for 
experiments, coudn't you ? 

General Groves. Due to the way uranium reacts in fission, you have 
to have a certain amount to work with. You have to have enough 
before you can tell anything about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Groves, the committee has received infor- 
mation that a certain quantity of heavy water was requisitioned by 
the Russians, and that an export license was granted for this ship- 
ment. Do you know if it was actually shipped ? 

General Groves. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the licensing of the shipment approved by the 
Manhattan District? 

General Groves. Not as far as I know. Do you know the date? 

Mr. Tavenner. Between October 1 and December 31, 1943. 

General Groves. I just can't imagine that being granted. I am a 
little in doubt as to whether there was any heavy water to be obtained 
in this country at that time. I would have to check our production fig- 
ures to know. I believe it was reported in the Saturday Evening Post 
regarding the Earl of Norfolk's journey to France, that a supply of 
heavy water was taken at the same time, and that su]inly was brought 
later to Canada, first at Montreal and then at Chalk River. The next 
amount of heavy water was manufactured under contract for us, and if 
that escaped from our control we would be very much disappointed to 
think it got out. 

Mr. Tavenner. During what period were you having it manufac- 
tured for you ? 

General Groves. I will have to do some thinking on that. I don't 
recall when tiie first amount was produced. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 953 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you furnish us with that information, as well 
as the names of the firms manufacturing it? 

General Groves. I will if it is not secret information, but I think 
it would be better to ask somebody who has access to my old files. I do 
not have access to my files, which are now in the Atomic Energy Com- 
mission. 

Mr. Walter. If any had been shipped you would have known about 
it, would you not ? 

General Grovt:s. If it had been called to the attention of the Man- 
hattan District I would have known of it, and I can't conceive of 
consenting to it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Why not? 

General Groves. I didn't want tliem to have it. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is the value of heavy water? 

General Groves. As a moderator, just as graphite is used as a mode- 
rator in the Hanford pile. If the Hanford pile had failed, we were 
ready to design a heavy-water pile. We knew the Germans were des- 
perate to get heavy water from Norway, and my thought was if the 
Germans found heavy water so important, it would be very embarras- 
ing if we had to wait a year or two to make it. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Other than the heavy water being manufactured 
specifically for the Manhattan Engineering District, was there a large 
quantity of it available in tlie United States? 

General Gro\tes. Not that I know of. It could be made, of course, 
and with a very small amount of effort, in a college laboratory, but 
you would have a drop or so. When it was first discovered I don't 
know how much was made. But it is a very expensive variety of water 
to make. 

To go on, and to anticipate your question that you are trying to 
frame, I think, the story I have read in the paper is that large carboys 
like you buy mineral water in, 5-gallon carboys, at least, marked 
heavy water, were shipped to Russia through Great Falls. 

If the Russians actually got that much heavy water and paid their 
own money for it, I don't think they got value received. I think some- 
body just labeled it heavy water. I don't think you could tell the 
difference between heavy water and plain water, just looking at it. 

Mr. Moulder. How long would it take to make the quantity of 
heavy water it was said went through Great Falls, Mont? 

General Groves. It depends on the plant. If you were going to 
make it, you would have to put maybe $5,000,000 in the plant, and it 
would cost you maybe $10 or $15 a pound; of course a pound is a 
pint ; so I just can't imagine anybody getting it. 

Mr. Moulder. To go through that process would take considerable 
time? 

General Groves. Yes. It is just like somebody would tell me they 
shipped a dozen Hope diamonds. 

Mr. Walter. Was there any company in the United States at that 
time, in 1944, equipped to manufacture that quantity of heavy water ? 
General Groves. Not that I know of, and I am sure if there had 
been we would have had them under contract. It requires a tre- 
mendous amount of power in one form or another to do it. The 
Norwegian plant was hooked to an enormous hydroelectric plant to 
get the water. They merely passed it through and separated it by 
the electrolysis method. 



954 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Walter. Do you know what the capacity of the Norwegian 
plant was ? 

General Groves. Before it was damaged it didn't even then produce 
very much, and we kept it damaged during the war. But it is a very 
small amount. If you poured it into a glass you would be sure you 
got every last drop out of that glass. In other words, if you wish me 
to comment on the report that there were many of these 5-gallon jugs 
going through, I would say, "Somehow, I can't believe that is so." 
I don't say they might not have been labeled heavy water. It is just 
like the diamonds. 

Mr. Walter. Maybe somebody was paying for heavy water and 
not getting it. 

General Groves. Maybe so, and if so I know who was paying it. 

Mr. Tavenxer. We have a report indicating that a license was 
granted for the shipment of heavy water to Russia of a value of $3,250, 
and apparently it was 41 ounces, or it may have been 41 pounds, but 
we think it was 41 ounces. 

General Groves. I would think it was 41 ounces, too. 

Mr. Tavenner. Ounces? 

General Groves. Yes. 

Mr. Russell. Last night we were doing some figuring, and we also 
figured 41 grains and grams. 

General Groves. I would say it was probably 41 ounces. They 
might have been able to get 41 ounces. 

Mr. Walter. What was the date of that license? 

Mr. Tavenner. Between October 1 and December 31, 1943. Was 
the Manhattan Engineering District consulted about the granting of 
that license ? 

General Grox-es. I don't think so. At that time I would have 
bought the 41 ounces, but I wouldn't have paid $3,250 for it unless I 
had to, but without any question at that time I would have bought it 
if it had beeii pure. It probably was not pure. It is very difficult to 
get it pure, and it is very easy to contaminate it. 

Mr. Tavenner. What other Government agencies besides the Man- 
hattan Engineering District had access to reports concerning the 
progress of the atomic bomb development? 

General Groves. No other agencies. There were individuals in 
other agencies who did. 

Mr. Tavenner. You say there were individuals in other Govern- 
ment agencies who had access to the reports ? 

General Groves. Yes. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. Explain that. 

General GR0^-ES. There were very few reports by the Manhattan 
district. We didn't have time to write reports, and we didn't write 
them unless there was some need for them. I believe four or five 
reports were written. The people who had access to them were : The 
Chief of Staff, General Marshall ; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, 
and an assistant who handled that work, Mr. Bundy ; Rear Admiral 
Purnell of the Navy ; Admiral King of the Navy ; General Starr of 
the Army, who, with Admiral Purnell, was on the Military Policy 
Committee; General Somervell, if he asked to read it, had a right to, 
through General Starr. 

Then there were Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant. Dr. Conant was one 
of my two chief advisers, so he was in and out of the project. And 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 955 

Dr. Bush was so close to it he might well have been considered as being 
in it, but he wasn't under me, of course. 

Then there was the President of the United States; and only one 
report, the second report that was made, which was made, I believe, 
August 21, 1943, was shown to the Vice President. That was the only 
report that was shown to the Vice President. 

As you will recall from the history, the original committee appointed 
by President Roosevelt to look into this question of atomic energy and 
the possibility of its working, when it got beyond the scientific stages, 
when it looked like it might be of interest, was made up — and this is 
from memory — of the Vice President (and there is no doubt about 
that one) ; Secretary of War Stimson; General Marshall; Dr. Bush; 
and Dr. Conant. They were a sort of super committee. 

Later, when I was placed in charge of the work, the Military Policy 
Committee was formed to see that everything was going as they wished 
it to. I have given you the names of those on that committee. This 
Military F'olicy Committee probably operated under the committee 
I have previously named which included Mr. Wallace. For example, 
this morning I looked at one report to refresh my memory on one date, 
and that report was headed : "To Vice President Wallace ; to Secre- 
tary of War Stimson ; and to General Marshall." It was signed by 
me for the Military Policy Committee. It was not necessary for Dr. 
Bush and Dr. Conant to see it after they had approved it. That report 
was the only one I ever showed Mr. Wallace, and as far as I know it 
was the only report ever shown to him. 

Mr. Walter. What was the date of that report ? 

General Groves. It was dated August 21, 1943. It was written that 
day by myself with General Nichols' assistance. We wrote it very 
hurriedly, because we had just learned that President Roosevelt was 
going to discuss atomic energy matters with Mr. Churchill at Quebec, 
and I didn't want the President to go up there without knowing what 
was going on. 

The report was written, given to General Marshall by General 
Nichols, who acted as courier. Unfortunately, it got there too late, 
and the various decisions were reached at Quebec without the benefit 
of this report. 

After it came back to me it was shown in turn to Secretary Stimson ; 
to General Marshall, who had already seen it; and to Vice President 
Wallace. That is the only time I think Mr. Wallace saw any of those 
reports. The first one, I think he was out of the country. After that, 
well, they weren't shown to him. 

Mr. Walter. Did Mr. Wallace ever bring any pressure to bear on 
you to make shipments to Russia? 

General Groves. Not on me directly. I don't know what pressure 
he might have brought on somebody else who, in turn, brought pres- 
sure on me, but at no time did Mr. Wallace bring any pressure to bear 
on me directly, and at no time was I aware that any indirect pressure 
was brought to bear by him, 

Mr. Moulder. Or any requests? 

General Groves. No. He was divorced from this project. Why he 
chose to divorce himself from this project, I don't know, but he was 
practically divorced from this project. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he ever express an opinion to you as to why he 
divorced himself from it ? 



956 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

General Groves. No. The one time I took this rejDort to him, the 
only thing I remember about that is that I had. to wait quite a while 
to see him, which was very annoying, because I had an appointment, 
and I didn't think the people he was seeing were very important to the 
war effort. I then showed him the report. He read it. We may 
have had a brief conversation, but that was all, and I decided that 
was the last time I was going to shoAv him a report. I may have men- 
tioned it to the Secretary of War, that I wasn't going to show Mr, 
Wallace any more of those reports, or I may not have bothered to 
tell the Secretary. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know from what atomic installation Dr. 
Alan Numi May, who was convicted in England as a result of the ex- 
posure of the Canadian spy ring, secured the uranium which he turned 
over to the Soviet Government ? 

General Gro\tes._ No. I don't recall whether I ever did know, but I 
think his history is very clear. It doesn't make any difference — yes, 
it does make a difference, too. As far as I recall he obtained uranium, 
and it was separated uranium 235, the purity of which was near the 
top, and he also obtained a sample of uranium 233, also in nearly pure 
condition, I believe. I believe he obtained that from the laboratory 
that he was then working in, which was the Montreal laboratory. I 
don't believe it had moved to Chalk River yet, but it was the same 
laboratory whether they had moved or not. 

He might have obtained it at Chicago, in which case he would have 
had to out-and-out steal it or get it through somebody in sympathy 
with his aims. 

It was my belief he obtained it at the Montreal laboratory and that 
he obtained it by means of false reports. I think he extracted some 
of it before the experiment started and reported greater losses through 
the chemical process than he had. 

It is possible he got it at Chicago in collusion with someone there. 
I believe your records show he spent a great deal of time at Chicago. 
He made a request to visit there which was turned down by me. Not 
that I liad any suspicion of Dr. May. I don't recall ever meeting him. 
I know I did, but I don't recall. But I didn't see any reason why he 
should be down there getting information I didn't think he should 
have. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think you have answered all the questions I had 
in mind asking you. 

Mr. Walter. Any questions ? 

Mr. Harrison. No questions. 

Mr. Moulder. No further questions. 

Mr. Walter. General, this committee is deeply indebted to you for 
this very fine statement. Thank j'ou very much. 

General Groves. It is a pleasure to be here. 

(Thereupon, the committee adjourned.) 



HEAKINGS REGxVEDINCt SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



MONDAY, JANUARY 23, 1950 

UxiTED States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D. C 

PUBLIC HEARINGS 

morning session 

The committee, met pursuant to call, at 10 : 45 a. m. in room 226, 
Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood, Burr 
P. Harrison, John McSweeney, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. 
Nixon, Francis Case, and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator; Courtney Owens and Donald T. Appell, 
investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. The record will show 
that there are present Mr. Harrison, Mr. McSweeney, Mr. Moulder, 
Mr. Nixon, Mr. Case, Mr. Kearney, and the chairman. 

Mr. Counsel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call Mr. Burman, Mr. 
Lawrence Burman. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Burman, will you hold up your right hand and be 
sworn. You solemnly swear the evidence you will give this committee 
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God ? 

Mr. Burman. I do. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Burman was formerly employed 
by the Manhattan Engineering District and is presently employed by 
the United States Atomic Energy Commission. He testified before 
the committee on Tuesday, June 29, 1948, in connection with uranium 
sales made to the Soviet Government. We would like now to ask him 
some further questions. 

TESTIMONY OF LAWEENCE C. BURMAN 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name ? 
Mr. Burman. Lawrence C. Burman. 
Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ? 
Mr. Burman. In New York City, February 19, 1912. 
Mr. Ta^t5nner. What is j^our present address? 
Mr. Burman. Five hundred and forty-one East Twentieth Street, 
New York 10. 

957 



958 SHIPMEJNT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present occupation? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I am director of the Licensing Division of the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would you please furnish the committee with a 
i-esume of your employment background, including any service in 
the United States Army which you may have had? 

Mr. Burman. Yon want that now? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Burman. I was graduated in 1937 as a chemical engineer from 
the City College of New York. I was employed by the du Pont Co. 
in Wilmington, Del., in 1937 and 1938 ; and by Baker c*»c Co. in Newark, 
as a chemical engineer as well, in the years 1939, 1940. and 1941. In 
November of 1941 I was sent to War Production Board as a specialist 
in precious metals, where I was employed from November 1941 to 
November 1942. In November 1942 I activated a Reserve conmiission 
and was assigned to Manhattan District. I was with Manhattan Dis- 
trict as a Reserve officer from November 1942 until December 1946. 

Mr. Tavenner. When were you with the War Prodriction Board? 

Mr. Burman. From November 1941 to November 1942. It was 
0PM part of that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is the full title of 0PM? 

Mr. Burman. It was Office of Production ^lanagement from No- 
vember 1941 to January 1942, then it was War Production Board, the 
same entity, after January 1942. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the character of your employment with 
the War Production Board? 

Mr. Burman. I was in charge of r;\re metals, the principal of which 
was the platinum group, and uranium was a minor metal assigned 
to that branch. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your connection with that branch of War Pro- 
duction Board have anything to do with your assignment to Man- 
hattan Engineering District? 

Mr. Burman. I think it did, partially. 

Mr. Tavenner. In what capacity did you serve with ]Manhattan 
Engineering District ? 

Mr. Burman. I was in charge of procurement of special materials, 
special chemicals, for a time, and because of mj' familiarity with War 
Production Board procedures, when Manhattan District took over 
from War Production Board the responsibility for uranium control 
we did that, keeping the guise of War Production Board, pretending 
I was a War Production Board employee still, when necessary, but 
actually I was an officer in Manhattan Engineering District. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then all the restrictions and controls which were 
placed by War Production Board on the use of uranium were actually 
handled through the Manhattan Engineering District ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes; the Manhattan District recommended all the 
actions taken by War Production Board, and the Manhattan District 
actually exercised the control. 

Mr. Tavenner. But it was the action of War Production Board 
rather than Manhattan Engineering District that controlled ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes; the War Production Board referred it to us. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. What agencies of the Government were concerned 
with purchases and exportation of uranium compounds ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 959 

Mr. BuRMAN. So far as purchases, only Manhattan District was 
concerned. There were no restrictions on buying and selling of ura- 
nium compounds under War Production Board regulations except 
that the p>urchase of uranium for coloring ceramics was prohibited. 
That is, no glass-manufacturing company or pottery-manufacturing 
company could purchase uranium to color pottery with. 

Mr. Ta'\t:nner. When did that restriction become effective? 

Mr. BuRMAN. In January 1943, 

Mr. Tavexner. In what way was Manhattan Engineering District 
concerned with the purchase of uranium ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. It bought all of the uranium that was required for 
the Government atomic-energy project. 

Mr. Tavenner. Through the influence of Manhattan Engineering 
District, w^ere any controls set up other than the one you mentioned 
I'cgarding the general purchase of uranium by the public or by foreign 
countries? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Aside from the limitation on the purchase of uranium 
for ceramic use, there was an export control exercised then through 
the Board of Economic Warfare. That is, an export license would be 
required from the Board of Economic Warfare to send uranium out 
of the country. 

Mr. Tavexner. What other Government agencies, if any, were con- 
cerned with either the sales or the exporting of uranium, besides War 
Pi'oduction Board, Manhattan Engineering District, and Bureau of 
Elconomic Warfare ? 

Mr. BuRMAX. None that I can recall. 

Mr. Tavex^xer. In what way was the Lend-Lease Administration 
concerned in the problem of handling uranium ? 

Mr. BuRMAx. Only to the extent that Lend-Lease may receive orders 
irom Allied countries for transfer of uranium. If they were to re- 
ceive a request from any of the Allied countries — in this case, of course, 
it was from U. S. S. R. — it w^ould be handled in Lend-Lease as any 
other lend-lease procurement would be handled. If a nation requested 
through Lend-Lease uranium procurement, it would be processed 
through Lend-Lease. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. I have understood that the Bureau of Economic 
Warfare was the licensing agency for the right to export uranium? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I think that is correct ; yes. It was also the practice, 
however, of the Board of Economic Warfare, to consult with other 
interested agencies in the event they had some item which was of 
obvious interest, and in this case, as I recall it, the Board of Economic 
Warfare and Lend-Lease all channeled their requests for information 
and advice to the War Production Board. I don't believe BEW acted 
independently in all cases, but I can't say that for a certainty. I don't 
know. 

Mr. Ta\t3xner. Are you sufficiently acquainted with procedure to 
state whether or not it was necessary to obtain approval from Lend- 
Lease if it was a cash purchase of uranium which was being made, and 
application for export license was made to the Bureau of Economic 
Warfare? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I wouldn't know that at all, sir. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Even in the case where it was necessary to consult 
Lend-Lease because of the materials being furnished as against lend- 



if 



960 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

lease quotas, do you know whether or not it still required that the 
export license be issued by the Bureau of Economic Warfare? 

Mr. BuRMAx. My belief is that it would require it. 

Mr. Taat:nxer. jNIr. Burman, in March 1943, the Soviet Government 
Purchasing Commission apj^lied for export licenses to export uranium 
and uranium compounds to the Soviet Union. Are you familiar with 
details concerning the sale of 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 
pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet Government early in 1943? 

JNIr. Burman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us what you know about that transaction. 

JNIr. Bueman. The Manhattan District was just then starting to 
exercise its control over uranium which it didn't own itself, and we 
were suddenly confronted with a lend-lease order for that quantity 
of material which had been processed, we understood, through lend- 
lease channels, and a potential supplier had been consulted and it had 
been determined that the supply was immediately available for delivery 
by this supplier. I believe someone, as an afterthought, suddenly de- 
cided to consult War Production Board to see if it was all right, it not 
being generally known that uranium was anything more than of normal 
interest. When War Production Board was consulted, they sent the 
information on to us at Xew York, to the Manhattan District, and it 
was finally decided, after, I believe, considerable consultation, that the 
project had gone so far, and it was known the material was available 
at this company in Denver, that it wovdcl be rather pointing a finger 
at the matei'ial if the license was refused at so late a elate, and General 
Groves then authorized the issuance of the license through his own 
office, and the material was quickly shipped. 

Mr. Ta\'enxer. Manhattan Engineering District first acquired 
knowledge of that transaction through the War Production Board; is 
that what I understand you to say? 

Mr. BuR]\rAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Do you know whether or not the Bureau of Economic 
Warfare, or Lend-Lease Administration, at that time, knew that there 
was an active uranium project any place within the United States 
Government ? 

Mr. Burman. I couldn't say at all as regards the Board of Economic 
Warfare, but Lend-Lease must certainly have been a little surprised by 
the sudden importance of so small an order in Government circles. It 
would certainly hint broadly that the material had more than ordinary 
value. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there anything in your negotiations, or those of 
any other official of jNIanhattan Engineering District, with Lend-Lease 
officials, indicating that they did not know prior to that time that this 
material was of strategic importance ? 

Mr. Burman. There was nothing to indicate that they knew it was 
of any special importance, to the best of my memory, and I believe 
that that is the case. 

Mr. Tavenner, After you learned of the first sale of uranium prod- 
ucts to the Russian Government, do you recall what arrangements were 
placed in effect in the United States bv the Manhattan Engineering 
Disti-ict to control the sale of uranium products to the Soviet Govern- 
ment? 

Mr. Burman. Yes. We took rather strong measures after that to be 
sure that we had material where we could put our hands on it. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 961 

Mr. Ta\'enner. What were those arrangements ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. For one thing, we arranged with a contractor, not 
using the Manhattan District name, for this contractor to pnrchase 
all he could of stocks of uranium in the hands of pottery manufac- 
turers and anywhere else where it might be subject to resale. This 
contractor bought material from the chemical companies and 
scrounged around in industry to collect odd lots. 

Mr. Taa^xner. Who was that contractor ? 

]\Ir. BuRMAN. Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh. Vitro was 
the prime source of uranium in that they had for some years processed 
uranium ores from the Colorado area. We entered into a gentle- 
men's agreement that they would sell no uranium except to Manhat- 
tan District, and they were under contract with the district at the 
same time for a variety of work. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you discover at any time in the future that 
they had violated that gentlemen's agreement by selling uranium to 
other purchasers? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. So far as we know they never did. As a matter 
of fact, they ceased their own operations at that time with uranium 
and worked exclusively in that business for the district. The Shat- 
tuck Chemical Co., in Denver, was also a processor of uranium ores, 
and, representing myself as War Production Board, and I guess Dr. 
Merritt talked to Shattuck as well. Mr. Potter, of Shattuck, agreed 
they would not make any deliveries of uranium anywhere without 
the permission of the War Production Board, ostensibly, and as far 
as we know Mr. Potter niade no shipments that were not approved 
in advance thereafter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Could you legally demand that no sales of uranium 
be made by Shattuck at that time ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No, we could not. It was a cooperative measure on 
their part. Mr. Potter had his inklings as to the potentialities of 
uranium, because of his acquaintanceship with the material and what 
he had read earlier in the press in the pre-Manhattan District days. 
He knew of the potentialities of uranium 235, and he agreed not to 
make shipments that were not approved in advance. 

Mr. Tavenner. When was that agreement reached? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Immediately after the 200- and 220-pound shipments. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the matter handled with Mr. Potter by letter, 
by telephone, or by personal interview ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Both by letter and telephone to start with, and 
followed up by personal visits periodically thereafter. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am not certain that I heard the date when that 
agreement was reached with Mr. Potter ? 

Mr. Burman. It was immediately after the 200-pound and the 220- 
pound order was placed with Shattuck, right after the delivery was 
made. The first information which we gave to Mr. Potter when it was 
decided that the 420-pound shipment would go forward, was to tell 
Mr. Potter that he might find it difficult in the future to get any 
export licenses for other shipments of uranium out of the country. 
We had also talked to him by telephone and had his verbal agreement 
not to do anything until somebody from War Production Board 
stopped to see him, and War Production Board was ourselves. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am trying to fix more definitely the time when 
that agreement was reached. 

99334—50 5 



962 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. BuRMAN. I can't give the exact date. It was either February 
or March 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you certain that it was prior to the time that 
the matter regarding another export license was raised by Lend- 
Lease ? 

Mr. BuRMAX. I am certain that it was. 

Mr. Taat:nner. Did the Manhattan Engineering District en- 
deavor to interview other suppliers of uranium and warn them against 
shipping out of the United States? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We had a contractual arrangement with the repre- 
sentatives of the Belgian producers, and while I can't say definitely 
that there was a written agreement for them not to sell elsewhere, I 
feel pretty certain that some agreement did exist. The Manhattan 
District purchased, in early 1943 or late 1942, the stock of material 
which was lying in the warehouses here which might have gone to the 
ceramic trade, since the Belgians were shipping to the ceramic trade 
in those days. 

Mr. Tavexner. What was the name of the Belgian company? 

Mr. Burmax. In 1942 they had one representative known as the 
Central Trading Co., which was dissolved, and later the work was 
taken over by the African IMetals Corp. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Then I understand the ^Manhattan Engineering 
District acquired their supply in the United States? 

Mr. BuRMAX. Their warehouse stock of ceramic-type uranium 
compounds. There was also the Canadian source of material. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Before we come to that, let me ask you : Can you 
be positive that the Belgian company was interviewed regarding 
the supplying of uranium compounds for the export trade? 

Mr. BuRMAX. I can say positively because I am certain it was done, 
but I myself did not do it. 

Mr. Tavexxer. WTio did do it, in your opinion ? 

Mr. BuRMAx. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you the full details 
of that. 

Mr. TA^^:xxER. You were about to mention another supplier. 

Mr. BuRMAX. The Canadian Eadium & Uranium Corp., which is 
a United States company, was sales representative of Eldorado Min- 
ing & Refining Co. The Eldorado Mining & Refining Co. is the 
producer of uranium at Great Bear Lake. In the same manner in 
which we had purchased these other miscellaneous types of ceramic 
uranium, we had made a contract with Canadian Radium & Uranium 
to i)ick up their warehouse quantity of uranium oxide and nitrate, 
and so forth, and the contract had a provision in it whereby the district 
A\ould have first call for the period of a year against any other 
uranium that that company had to sell of the same types. 

Mr. Tavexxer. What was the date of the contract ? 

Mr. BuRMAX. In March 1943. I can't tell you the exact date in 
the month, but I am sure it was in March 1943. 

jNIr. Tavexxer. Is that contract accessible to you ? 

Mr. BuRMAX. Yes. It is in the Commission files, however. 

Mr. Tavexxer. Could you produce it for the committee? 

Mr. BuRMAX. I don't know whether I am able to do so. It is a 
classified document. It is still classified secret. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 963 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to ask you to investigate that and 
see if it can be declassified and turned over to this committee, and 
advise me of the result of your inquiry. 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; I will do so. 

Mr. Tavekner. I would like for you first to identify the date a, 
little more definitely if you can. 

Mr. BuRMAN. I know it is in March 1943, and to hazard a guess as 
to the date, I would say about the 27th. 

Mr. Tavenner. The contract is between the Manhattan Engineering 
District and what other party ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Who were the ofhcials of that corporation at that 
time? 

Mr. BuRiviAN. Mr. Boris Pregel was the president of the company. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know the names of other officials of the 
company ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Alexander Pregel was vice president. Beyond that, 
I can't recall any other officers of the company. 

Mr. Tavenner. Had that company, prior to March 1943, furnished 
quantities of uranium to Manhattan Engineering District? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. We bought it wherever we could find it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you continue in your purchases from that cor- 
poration after March 1943 ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Well, we continued to have relations with that com- 
pany, but they were reduced from time to time in their scope until 
they practically vanished. I can't tell you over what period of time 
that was. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did j^ou confer with this company, the Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp., or its president, Mr. Boris Pregel, or its 
vice president, Mr. Alexander Pregel, regarding the shipment of 
uranium compounds out of this country ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not myself in direct contact with Mr. 
Pregel. I believe Dr. Merritt can give you that information, because 
it was his responsibility to deal with Mr. Pregel. 

Mr. Tavenner. I see. I was asking you what arrangement or ar- 
rangements were made to stop the flow of uranium to foreign coun- 
tries during the war period, and you told me about those two arrange- 
ments, the interviewing of Shattuck Co. and other suppliers. Now, 
I notice on the export license of this shipment from the Shattuck Co. 
that the supplier was Chematar, Inc. 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you interview that company? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No: we did not. 

Mr. Tavenner. Why didn't you ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We didn't think we could learn anything that we 
didn't already know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, they were acting certainly as an agent or 
as a broker for the purchase of this material. It seems to have been 
of importance to have consulted with them likewise. 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. The Chematar Co. was in contact with War 
Production Board in Washington, the branch which was ostensibly in 
control of uranium, and was pressing for approval of the license, and 






964 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

we did receive copies of the correspondence and learn the information 
we needed. What we were interested in most was where it was going. 

Mr. Tavenner, Yes; but yon were not protecting the outflow by 
merely learning what was in their correspondence. I am asking what 
arrangements were made to stop the export of uranium. 

Mr. BuRMAN. In the case of the 420-pound order it was agreed it 
should be permitted to go forward. We had the material blocked 
through the available sources of supply, we thought. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any action taken by Manhattan Engineering 
District with other Government agencies designed to control the ex- 
l^orting to a foreign country of uranium compounds ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We did have a Washington office. The officer in 
charge of that office was in contact with all of the Washington bureaus. 
I can't say what steps he took, but he was the man in direct contact 
w4th Lend-Lease and presumably with BEW when any cases of this 
sort arose, and we felt that so far as raw materials went, we had it 
stopped at the source. 

Mr. Ta-stenner. Who was the individual in the Washington office 
to whom you refer ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Col. A. C. Johnson. 

Mr. Tavenner, He has testified before this committee, has he not ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe he has. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were any arrangements made with any Govern- 
ment agency by which the Manhattan Engineering District was to be 
notified in the event of the filing of an application for license or for 
approval of a license for the shipment of uranium ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson had such an arrangement. 
Where the word "uranium" would pop up in various Government 
offices, I believe there was a tickler in the case to notify Johnson. 

Mr. Tavenner. You say you believe so. That is rather important. 
What actual knowledge do you have of that ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I know that when anybody was looking for uranium 
he either wound up in Colonel Johnson's office or in our office in New 
York, and would be referred there by the War Production Board, by 
field offices, or by the other agencies. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you familiar with the details surrounding the 
issuance of another export license for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate 
and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, which was issued to the Soviet 
Government ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I know of it now. I was not aware of it when I testi- 
fied earlier. 

Mr. Tavenner. You did not know at the time that such a license had 
been issued ? 

Mr. Burman. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know at the time that an application had 
been made by this Soviet Purchasing Commission for the issuance of 
such a license ? 

Mr. Burman. No; I didn't. I had known of at least one earlier 
request that was floating around Lend-Lease for Si/o tons of material. 
I know that was turned down. I did not know of the request for a 
1,000-pound license. 

Mr. Ta\"enner. Did you learn during the course of your employ- 
ment that during the month of April 1943 a plan was discussed within 
Manhattan Engineering District by which a license would be approved 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 965 

to export uranium, with the idea of testing out the So^det Commission 
in its ability to locate the material ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I didn't know of it then, but I have heard of it now and 
have seen some of the records. 

Mr. Tavenner. I assume, then, from your answers, that you had no 
conference with any official of Lend-Lease or the Bureau of Economic 
Warfare relating to that particular license ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is right. I may add at this point, this was only 
a part-time job which took about 5 percent of my time, and that we were 
busy on many other production problems. This job had only been 
acquired because of the earlier War Production Board contracts. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Regardless of the fact that you were not acquainted 
with any effort to obtain the issuance of this particular license for the 
500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, were 
you aware of any pressure being brought on yourself or other members 
of the staff of the Manhattan Engineering District by officials of the 
Lend-Lease Administration or officials of the Bureau of Economic 
Warfare to issue licenses ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not aware of any such pressure at any 
time. The only, it might be called pressure, was a series of telephone 
calls in relation to the 420-pound order from the War Production 
Board and Lend-Lease, and Chematar was in touch with War Produc- 
tion Board by telephone periodically, and War Production Board in 
Washington would call us in New York to get something done. 

Mr. Tavenner. To do what ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. To get something done. 

Mr. Tavenner. That came from War Production Board ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That came from the War Production Board office 
which was theoretically in charge of uranium, but since they were 
sitting in the middle tliey would transfer these urgent requests from 
Chematar or Lend-Lease to us. 

Mr. Tavenner. State more fully what you mean by saying you 
were urged to get something done. 

Mr. BuRMAN. To get a decision one way or another, because this 
had been hanging fire for a considerable time, much longer than ordi- 
nary. I believe they were about to issue the original license when it 
was held up because they were trying to get a decision out of Man- 
hattan District. 

Mr. Nixon. That is the license for the 420 pounds ? 

Mr. Burman. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who were the individuals from whom telephone 
calls were received from Lend-Lease and any of the other Government 
agencies ? 

Mr. Burman. I don't recall specifically talking to any of the Lend- 
Lease people myself, but the Chematar people had been in, telephone 
contact with Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks in War Production Board, and 
Mr. Parks, through error, I believe, gave Mr. Rosenberg of Chematar 
my telephone number in New York. The Manhattan District as such 
tried to stay out of those things, it was not to be known that Manhat- 
tan District was directly involved, so that I, myself, I don't believe 
talked to any of these gentlemen. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether that occurred at some time 
quite a few months later than the transaction we are talking about? 



966 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. BuEMAN. No. It was in the February 1943 period in relation 

to tlie 420 pounds. 

INIr. TA\T.]srNER. "V\niat was the nature of your telephone conversation 
with Mr. Rosenberg or Chematar? 

Mr, BuRMAN. I didn't actually receive that telephone call. I was 
away and another officer, as I recall, talked with him and told him that 
was a mistake of some sort, that he had Lieutenant Burman's tele- 
phone number only because Burman used to be with War Production 
Board. That cut off short any idea that Lieutenant Burman of New 
York was interested in uranium. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who was the person who took the call ? 

Mr. Burman. I believe it was Colonel Crenshaw. 

Mr. Tavenxer. 1 was asking you if you knew the names of officials 
in the various Government agencies who called your office with regard 
to the releasing of this first shipment. 

Mr. Btjrman. I don't recall just who telephoned, but we did receive, 
through War Production Board in Washington, correspondence from 
Lend-Lease and Chematar. Chematar correspondence was in the 
name of Mr. Rosenberg, and Lend-Lease correspondence in the name 
of Mr. Moore, I believe ; that is the only name I can recall ; I believe 
there was somebody else corresponding on the subject. 

Mr. Tavenner. But as to telephone calls, have you any recollection? 

Mr. Burman. I assure it was the same gentlemen. I don't know, 
since I didn't talk to them. 

Mr. Tavenner. AVere you conscious, at any time after this first 
transaction was closed, of any unusual activity, or any activity, with 
regard to the officials of other agencies in urging approval of ship- 
m.ents of uranium to any allied power ? 

Mr. Burman. No, sir; none. 

Mr. Case. To what are you referring when you refer to an 8^-ton 
request that was turned down ? 

Mr. Burman. There was a U. S. S. R. request through Lend-Lease 
channels for 81/9 tons of uranium material which was processed by 
Chemical Warfare Service. 

Mr. Case. When was that request made ? 

Mr. BuRMi\N. Shortly after the 420-pound shipment and prior to the 
date of the 1,000-pound shipment. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, we have a rather complete record on 
that transaction which will be introduced later. 

Mr. Case. You asked if he knew of any other activity and he said he 
didn't recall any. 

Mr. Burman! I am sorry. That request did go through War Pro- 
duction Board channels, and that was, as I recall, refused, and the 
information was passed to Lend-Lease through our Washington office. 

Mr. Case. And who turned it down ? 

Mr. Bukman. I assume it was turned down by General Groves, since 
Colonel Johnson was immediately on General Groves' staff and 
handled such matters. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not, as a result of General 
Groves' recommendation, the Secretary of War, to whom the matter 
had in the meantime been referred, made the final decision refusing to 
release the shipment? 

Mr. Burman. I just don't know, sir. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 967 

Mr. Tavenner. In the course of your employment with the Man- 
hattan Engineering District, did any fact or circumstance come to your 
knowledge and attention which indicated that any pressure was being 
brought to bear by any Government official, or by any person out of 
the Government, on your staif to approve the shipment of uranium 
compounds out of the country? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We had no such information at all, sir. We know 
of no such pressure. 

Mr. Tavenner. After this first shipment that you referred to from 
the Shattuck Co., were any other shipments made of uranium, to your 
knowledge? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Only the 1,000-pound shipment which we later 
learned of. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did you first learn of the shipment of the 
thousand pounds? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We had heard about it here in June 1948 and went 
back and checked more fully with the Canadian authorities, their 
records on the case, and we learned that a Canadian export license 
was actually issued and that the material was shipped. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. What was the source of supply of the corporation 
you refer to as the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Their source of supply was the Canadian Great Bear 
Lake mines. Eldorado Gold Mine Co. was the company; Eldorado 
Mining & Refining Co., it later became. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the Eldorado Gold Mine Co. make a report of 
any character that you are familiar with that would show the ship- 
ment that you have referred to ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. That is a company which is entirely in Canada 
and would not make such a report. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not such a report was 
made by the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of shipments ema- 
nating from Eldorado mines ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We have checked our files, the old War Production 
files, and can say that there is no report by Canadian Radium of that 
shipment. 

Mr. Tavenner. At least you did not know of it at the time you 
were employed by Manhattan Engineering District? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any contact made with Eldorado Gold Mines 
with reference to supplying material to governments other than the 
United States and Canada ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know. I believe there was, but Dr. Merritt 
can tell you that. 

Mr. Tavenner. AVhen you said you first learned here that the 
1,000-pouncl shipment had been made, what did you mean? 

Mr. Burman. We just had no information on it in the New York 
office up to that time. All of the activity that we have talked over 
was carried on out of New York for the Manhattan District. It 
wasn't always possible to Imow what the Washington office was think- 
ing or doing. 

Mr. Tavenner, You have since confirmed the fact that the shipment 
was actually made ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes, sir. 



968 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know of any other sales of uranium to the 
Soviet Government, other tlian the two which we have mentioned? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. There was a small shipment of uranium metal 
which was permitted to go to Russia about the middle of 1944. At the 
time that the order had been first placed for the 420 pounds of uranium 
compounds, the same order carried a request for 25 pounds of uranium 
metal. I understood that 25 pounds of uranium metal were also au- 
thorized for shipment, but as far as we knew at that time there was 
no uranium metal available in the United States that they could 
lay their hands on. That was the fact of the matter. But the order 
was placed, eventually, with A. D. McKay, a well-known supply house 
in New York which specializes in rare minerals and metals. McKay 
accepted the order conditionally, that he would ship it if he could 
get it made somewhere, and for a year and a half he tried to have it 
made. It is rather a difficult process and requires specialized equip- 
ment. In all of his efforts to have it made, acting as a representative 
of the War Production Board, I was looking over his shoulder all 
the time. He finally did succeed in having about 4.5 pounds of rather 
poor uranium metal made by a laboratory in Cleveland. We had a 
sample of the uraniinn metal analyzed, and it was far poorer than if 
they had taken just pure uranium oxide to start with and not tried to 
make the metal. 

We told McKay we would have no objection to his shipping a 
small sample of this metal as representative of what was available in 
the United States, and he actually shipped a kilogram — that is, 2.2 
pounds — against the 25-pound order. The rest of the material he 
kept in his stock and sold in gi'am quantities, which he reported to 
War Production Board monthly, to universities and other laboratories 
in the country. 

Mr. Tavenner. The Soviet Purchasing Commission did not file a 
repeat order ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That was the last we heard of uranium metal from 
that point. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Burman, have you been apprised of the fact 
that there was a sale of 45 pounds of uranium nitrate to the Soviet 
Government in June 1944? 

Mr. Burman. Xo, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know of any sales of heavy water to the 
Soviet Government ? 

Mr. Burman. No. Our office had no contact with heavy water 
distribution ; that is, my own office did not. 

Mr. Tavenner. What office would have been consulted, if any had 
been, in the Manhattan Engineering District ? 

Mr. Burman. General Groves' office. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who, in particular, in that office would have received 
knowledge of such a request ? 

Mr. Burman. Colonel Johnson, I am sure. 

Mr. Ta^^nner. Were there any restrictions imposed upon the export 
of heavy water by the Manhattan Engineering District through its 
connection with War Production Board ? 

INIr. Burman. I just don't know, sir. I am not familiar with the 
manner in which the heavy-water sales were handled. 

Mr. Tavenner. Isn't that a matter which would have normally 
come under your supervision had it occurred ? 



T'v;.: 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 969 

Mr. BuRMAN. No ; it wouldn't. Our office was essentially a uranium- 
procuring and processing office in New York. 

Mr. Tavexner. Can you tell us whether there is any difference 
between uranium metal and fused uranium metal? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; there is some. Most of the early uranium metal 
appeared in the form of powder, and when the powder was melted 
later it came out in the form of globules, vrhich was known as the 
fused metal. It was easier to remelt the fused globules than the 
powder. The powder would flash into flames in the air. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of the shipment to I''" 

Soviet Russia of fused uranium metal ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe the kilogram — that is, 2.2 pounds — was in }, ' 

the form of fused metal, but no other shipments, however. %,- 

JNIr. Tavenxer. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. |^^>V 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison ? '• '  

Mr. Harrison. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Mc Sweeney ? 

Mr. IMcSwEENEY. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder? 

Mr. Moulder. No, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon ? 

Mr. Nixon. As I understand it, in your position you generally had 
knowledge of requests for material of this type, the 420-pound and 
1,000-pound shipments. Would you assume in your position you 
generally would be informed of such shipments? 

Mr. BuRMAx\ The 420-pound shipment was being handled through 
our War Production Board contacts, and I would know of that. 

Mr. NixON. Your office was not* a clearinghouse for all shipments, 
necessarily ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. 

Mr. NixoN. You came into the 420-pound shipment because your 
office was informed ? 

Mr. BuRMAN^. No. We came in it because War Production Board 
was questioned about the advisability of shipping it, and they got 
in touch with the New York office. t 

Mr. NixoN. Why was it the 1,000-pound shipment was not handled 
in the same way? 

Mr. BuRMAN. It had never, so far as we knew, gone through War ;.' 

Production Board channels or ourselves in New York. 

Mr. NixON. It had gone through private channels ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. I beileve it may have gone directly from Lend- 
Lease to General Groves' office, and that the War Production Board 
was not consulted. 

Mr. Nixon. You said you learned of this shipment for the first time 
when? I am referring to the 1,000-pound shipment. 

Mr. BuRMAN. June 1948. 

]\Ir. Nixon. At that time what was your position ? 

ISIr. BuRMAN. I was with the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Mr. Nixon. The Atomic Energy Commission ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. You don't mean the Atomic Energy Commission did 
not learn about it until then; do you? Was this their first knowledge 
of this 1,000-pound shipment? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 



!'■'..■ 



970 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Nixon. They had not known of it before then ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Were you surprised to learn of it then ? 

Mr. BuEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. You were surprised? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. Why ? 

Mr. BrRMAN. Because we never suspected the shipment had taken 
place. We thought we would have known had it taken place, and we 
thought we had the Canadian supply shut off back in 1943. 

Mr. Nixon. In other words, if this shipment had gone through 
your office you would have disapproved it ; would you not, apparently^ 
from what you said ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I myself would have disapproved it; but in a case 
of tliat sort it still would have been referred to General Groves' office. 

Mr. Nixon. But, as you understood the policy, the policy after the 
420-pound shipment was to shut off all available sources of supply so 
that additional shipments could not be made ? 

Mr. BuEMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. What agencies in the United States, if any, did have 
the responsibility for clearing the 1,000-pound shipment? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe the Board of Economic Warfare issuing the 
license, would have the final responsibility. 

Mr. Nixon. The Board of Economic Warfare did issue a license? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. You can testify to that of your own knowledge ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Who in the Board of Economic Warfare handled the 
matter; do you know? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I do not know. 

Mr. Nixon. Was any memorandum or other order issued, for in- 
stance to BEW, that Manhattan Engineering District should be in- 
formed of such shij)ments? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe Colonel Johnson's office did have that under- 
standing with BEW. 

Mr. Nixon. Yet BEW apparently cleared the shipment without con- 
sulting Colonel Johnson's office? 

Mr. BuRMAX. No. It was our understanding it was approved by 
Colonel Johnson's office with approval by General Groves; that Gen- 
eral Groves did approve the license for shipment of 1,000 pounds with 
the belief that we did have all the sources of supply cut off. 

Mr. Nixon. When did you first find out about the 1,000-pound ship- 
ment, from what source? 

Mr. BuRMAN. From right here. 

Mr. Nixon. From the Committee on Un-American Activities? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. One other question. You are an expert, of course, and 
most of us are laymen. As far as the use of uranium for commercial 
purposes other than for the manufacture of atomic energy and atomic 
products, do I understand that 420 pounds would be considered to be 
a large order or a small order ? In what category would you place it? 

Mr. BuRMAN. It would not be large enough to excite any attention. 
The consumption of uranium in 1942 for nonatomic purposes in the 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 971 

United States was between 150 and 200 tons for the year, so that 420 
pounds woukl be rather small. 

Mr. Nixon. Has the Atomic Energy Commission established whether 
the Soviet Union, prior to 1943, obtained shipments of that size or less 
than that size from the United States, prior to the time the orders 
were issued not to approve such shipments? 

Mr. BuEMAN. It would be very unlikely that they would get it from 
the United States, since the United States was not a producer of the 
material. The material was more readily available from Belgium 
a;id Canada. 

Mr. Nixon. I would seem to me, that in the investigation the 
Atomic Energy Commission has been making, that would be a rele- 
vant point : how large the orders were in the past. I believe you have 
indicated you were interested in knowing whether the Soviet Union 
at that time was as far along in the development of the atomic bomb 
as we were ? 

Mr. BuRiNiAN. We did ask for records of sales of domestic com- 
panies for a number of years prior to 1943. 
Mr. Nixon. What did you find out ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. There was no evidence of any purchases in the United 
States. 

Mr. Nixon. There was no evidence of purchases prior to 1943 in the 
United States? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. So it would seem to me this sudden interest in the pur- 
chase of uranium would have some definite significance ? 
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; it would. 

Mr. Nixon. This turning down of the Si/o-ton order, who did the 
turning down ? General Groves ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe General Groves' office. 
Mr. Nixon. Did your office have anytliing to do with that? 
Mr. BmjMAN. I believe we referred it to General Groves' office, hav- 
ing received information on it through the trade and through the War 
Production Board. 
Mr. Nixon. Through the trade ? 
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. That they wanted 8I/2 tons? 
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. And you proceeded to forward that information to Gen- 
eral Groves' office ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Who was attempting to obtain this for the Soviet Union, 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. I believe it was through Lend-Lease. There 
was no private company handling it. 

Mr. Nixon. The American agency seeking to expedite the shipment 
was Lend-Lease? 
Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Did BEW have anything to do with that? 
Mr. BuRMAN. I don't believe so. 
Mr. Nixon. With expediting? 
Mr. BuRMAN. No. 
Mr. Nixon. I understand it was 8i/^ long tons ? 



972 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know if it was Syo long or short tons. It was 
of one of the uranium compounds, not of metal. 

Mr. Nixon. What contacts were made with your office by Lend- 
Lease to get clearance for the Si/^-ton shipment ; do you recall ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe they went to the Chemical Warfare procure- 
ment office, and either the New York or Pittsburgh office of Chemical 
Warfare procurement got in touch with Vitro and also managed to 
find INIanhattan District, but we gave them no information. 

Mr. Nixon. Eight and one-half tons would be a significant amount 
to purchase? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; it would be. 

Mr. Nixon. But you indicate that you don't know of any particular 
individuals who were contacting you in regard to that shipment? 

Mr. BuR3iAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. Initially did General Groves approve tliat 420-pound 
shipment quickly, or did he make aii}^ efforts to stop it? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I can't answer that, sir, because I don't know the 
period of time before the decision was made. There were so many 
other things that we were doing that this was really not of great 
importance. 

Mr. Case. But it was your understanding that the decision to let 
it go was made on the basis that things had gone so far that to stop 
it would direct attention to its importance ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. And then it was that you took steps to prevent anything 
like that happening again ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Case. And as far as you were concerned, you said you took steps 
that you thought would result in future requests turning up in your 
office or Colonel Johnson's office ? 

Mr. Burma N. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. Did anybody turn up in your office who was making 
requests, subsequently ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I can't quite recall any particular cases that were 
turned up by name. We did have requests for the export of uranium 
metal to a number of countries. 

Mr. Case. To a number of countries ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. I think Great Britain wanted a small amount 
for laboratory work which was outside of their own atomic energy 
efforts; that is, they were private companies wanting uranium metals 
for what they said was chemical analysis. Those may have been 
requests that they had received from elsewhere. They may have 
been feelers from elsewhere. 

Mr. Case. What happened to those requests ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Any information of that sort we did receive was 
passed along to the Washington office, and if they thought it was worth 
while I am sure they turned it over to Intelligence. 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not an}- shipments were made 
to Great Britain ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe there was a very small shipment in 1944 or 
1945 out of this McKay quantity. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 973 

Mr. Case. That was this four and a fraction pounds? 

Mr. BuKMAN. Yes ; of which 2.2 pounds went to Russui. 

Mr. Nixon. From press accounts I understand that this quantity 
of uranium metal sent to Russia was defective, and that it was sent 
for that reason? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Did you deliberately send it to Great Britain for the 

same reason ? t i , i • i 

Mr. BuRMAN. It was for commercial purposes. We didn t think 
it was much good and didn't care where McKay sold it. It repre- 
sented a poor stock of material, and if that was available without too 
much trouble it avoided attention being directed to the material. 

Mr. Case. Were there any other shipments to Great Britain ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I don't think so. 

Mr. Case. You spoke of requests from other countries. What other 
countries? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I don't recall. They were all for trivial quantities. 

Mv. Case. Did any other requests come to your attention from the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Mr. Burman. I don't recall any. There were certainly none for 
uranium metal after the kilogram shipment. 

Mr. Case. Was this request for uranium metal renewed at any later 
date? 

Mr. Burman. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Case. Not to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Burman. No, sir. 

Mr. Case. There may have been but not that you know of? 

Mr. Burman. That is right. 

Mr. Case. In your steps to prevent any further shipments outside 
the United States following your knowledge of this 42U-pound order, 
did you make any efforts to control shipments through Lend-Lease? 

Mr. Burman. I feel pretty certain that Colonel Johnson's office 
had a contact in Lend-Lease who would bring to his attention anything 
on uranium that would come through that office. 

Mr. Case. Did you contact the BEW to put them on guard in any 
way? 

Mr. Burman. I am sure Colonel Johnson's office did the same there. 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether Lend-Lease supported the 8%- 
ton request? 

Mr. Burman. I don't know whether they supported it, but they 
circulated the request for it. The degree of their action I can't say. 

Mr. Case. Isn't is strange Lend-Lease would circulate this request 
if they had been put on guard ? 

Mr. Burman. They might just as well have circulated the request 
and taken whatever action with Colonel Johnson's office they had 
agreed to take. Refusing to circulate it would have aroused the sus- 
picion of the Russian Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not Lend-Lease sought to secure 
the approval of the Chemical Warfare Service? 

Mr. Burman. I believe Chemical Warfare Service was handling 
the requisition as a service for Lend-Lease. I don't believe they had 
any interest other than that. 



y74 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. Did I understand you to say that this shipment of 1,000 
pounds subsequently, which you didn't know about until June 1948, 
did have the approval of the Manhattan District ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. General Groves approved that. 

Mr. Case. And you testified that he approved it because he thought 
the sources of supply had been shut off and that the order could not 
be filled? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is my understanding. 

Mr. Case. But you were not personally connected with that 
shipment ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I was not in on the decision. 

Mr. Case. You were, however, in touch with the sources of supply ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. Did you yourself think you had all sources of supply 
shut off? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, we did. With regard to Canadian Radium & 
Uranium Corp., I was not the direct contact there. Dr. Merrittt was 
in touch with Mr. Pregel of Canadian Radium & Uranium. 

Mr. Wood. Any further questions ? 

Mr. Case. Are you personally familiar with approval for that 
second shipment ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. Case. What makes you think General Groves approved it ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. General Groves has testified to that effect and we 
have reviewed the correspondence in our old Manhattan District files 
and found some that indicated it. 

Mr. Case. But all that you have said with regard to the approval 
of this second shipment is second-hand information so far as you are 
concerned ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney ? 

Mr. Kearney. No questions. 

Mr. Moulder. I would like to ask a question. 

Mr. Wood. IVIr. IMoulder. 

Mr. MoTTLDER. Was there any secret formula by which uranium 
metal was manufactured, or was it generally known throughout the 
world how to make it at that time ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. There were a number of processes that were known 
but Manhattan District, I don't believe, has ever disclosed the method 
used by the district and now by the Commission. 
• Mr. Moulder. It was then a secret ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. The process used by the district was not disclosed. 
We considered that secret information. 

IVIr. Moulder. Was it known in other countries how to make uranium 
metal, not by that process but by other processes ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Moulder. It had many other uses other than the development 
of atomic energy ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Uranium metal had very few uses. It was consid- 
ered as a means for alloying steel, but there were much more effective 
metals for alloying steel than uranium, which has approximately the 
same qualities as nickel when used for that purpose. 

Mr. Moulder. You mentioned private companies in England using 
it for commercial purposes ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 975 

Mr. Btjrman. Small quantities were used for experimental purposes. 

Mr. Moulder. Didn't you mention that approximately 150 tons a 
year were consumed in this country for coimnercial purposes? 

Mr. BuRMAN. That was not in the form of uranium metal. 

Mr. Tavenner. You referred to General Groves as having agreed 
to the shipment of 1,000 pounds, and you referred to his having testi- 
fied to that effect. As a matter of fact, what General Groves testified 
was that he agreed eventually that the license be issued in order to 
ascertain whether or not the Kussians could locate a supply in the 
United States. Do you recall that? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes, 

Mr. Tavenner. The records further show that after the issuance of 
the license the Russian Purchasing Commission advised Lend-Lease 
that due to the great delay in the issuance of the license their sup- 
plier had withdrawn the offer. Do you recall that ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I believe that was Shattuck Chemical Co., with whom 
they had placed the order at first. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. BuRMAN. And you have refreshed my recollection on that a bit. 
They did withdraw it on the ground their offer had not been picked up. 

Mr. Tavenner. And the evidence further shows that when that 
report was made to General Wesson, of Lend-Lease, he significantly 
smiled when it was stated that the supplier could not furnish the 
material. Do you recall that testimony? 

]Mr, BuRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Groves further testified that he knew 
nothing about the shipment from Eldorado mines until he appeared 
before this committee in 1948, just as you have testified. Wliat basis 
do you have for stating that General Groves agreed to the shipment by 
Eldorado mines? 

Mr. BuRiMAN. If I implied that, it was not intended. He author- 
ized the export license, but I don't know that anyone ever authorized 
the actual shipment of the material through Canadian Radium & 
Uranium. 

Mr. Nixon. If he had authorized the shipment, the Atomic Energy 
Commission would not have had to wait until June 1948 to learn of it 2 

Mr. BuRMAN. That is true. 

Mr. Tavenner. The agreement which you referred to as having 
been executed between Manhattan Engineering District and the Cana- 
dian Radium & Uranium Corp. provided, as I understood you to say, 
that no shipments would be made by that corporation within a year, 
or just w^iat was that agreement? 

Mr. BuRMAN. According to the terms of the agreement, Manhattan 
District would have first option to purchase any material other than 
that covered in the contract in the event Canadian Radium & Uranium 
had any. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 20 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

afternoon session 

(The hearing was resumed at 2 :45 p. m.) 
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 



976 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

For the time being the record will disclose that the hearing is pro- 
ceeding before a subcommittee composed of Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison^ 
Mr. Velde, and the chairman. 

Mr. Tavenxer. Mr. Burman, will you resume the stand, please? 

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BUEMAN— Resumed 

Mr. Burman, when recess was taken I was asking you a question 
relating to this alleged contract between Manhattan Engineering 
District and Canadian Kadium & Uranium Corp. 

Mr. Burman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am not going to ask you to attempt to rely on your 
memory regarding the exact terms of that agreement because we are 
expecting to have it produced. 

Mr. BurmajST. I understand it will be ready about 3 : 30 this after- 
noon. 

Mr. Tavenner. 3 : 30 this afternoon ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Assuming that this agreement does provide, as you 
indicated it may, that an option was given to Manhattan Engineering 
District to purchase uranium which may be available for other pur- 
chasers, were you notified at any time that other purchasers had re- 
quested uranium from this company ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes ; I believe the records do show that we were asked 
to comment on an order for 8 or 8I/2 tons of uranium nitrate and an 
equal quantity of uranium chloride. We were asked to make sugges- 
tions to Canadian Radium in response to an inquiry they received for 
export to the U. S. S. R. 

Mr. Ta^tenner. Did that inquiry come to Manhattan Engineering 
District by letter ? 

Mr. Burman. I don't recall whether it came by letter or verbally. 
Our records show that we replied by letter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have a copy of that letter ? 

Mr. Burman. I don't have a copy of it, but I have a telephone tran- 
scription of it which we received during the noon hour today. Mr» 
Merritt has it, if I could get it from him. 

Mr. Wood. You mean it was read over the telephone? 

Mr. Burman. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you receive the telephone conmiunication your- 
self, or Mr. Merritt ? 

Mr. Burman. Mr. Merritt received it and read it off and I copied it 
at the same time. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think since we are on this subject it would be well 
for you to get it at this time. 

Mr. Burman. Very well. [After producing paper :] Do you want 
to hear it ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Burman. The letter was dated February 19, 1943, and was 
addressed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., at 630 Fifth Avenue, 
New York: 

We understand that you have had a call from Captain Fliegel of Chemical 
Warfare Service, 292 Madison Avenue, New York, in regard to a request for 
8 long tons of uranium nitrate and 8 long tons of uranium chloride. In. 
answer to this inquiry please state that none is available except in experimental 
quantities. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 977 

Under no circumstances is any information to be given to any such inquiry 
to the effect tliat this ofiiee is interested. It is suggested that your Canadian 
office be advised to refuse information as to any inquiries. 

Mr. Wood. By whom is it signed ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. By Colonel Crenshaw. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Will you produce the office copy or a photostat of 
the office copy and deliver it to the senior investigator of this com- 
mittee? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; I think we can do that. 

Mr. Ta\-enner. Did you receive any other report or inquiry from 
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. or Eldorado Mines regarding 
uranium which you were entitled to receive under the option which 
you stated existed in the contract? 

Mr. BuRMAN. I don't know of any other. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have shown you what purports to be an excerpt 
from a report made of uranium sales by Eldorado Mines during the 
year 1943. 

Mr. Burman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Taa^nner. Have you made a search of the files maintained 
by Manhattan Engineering District to determine whether or not such 
a report is in your files? 

Mr. Burman. Yes; I have just recently made a search for that par- 
ticular document, and we haven't been able to find it in the Man- 
hattan District files or the War Production part of the Manhattan 
District files. 

Mr. TA^^5XNER. Is there a possibility that a record of that report 
may be in the files of the War Production Board ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes ; there may be, but if it did get to War Produc- 
tion Board in Washington a copy would have been sent to us in New 
York by our contact in War Production Board. 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe that is all I am going to ask, Mr. Chair- 
man. 

Mr. Wood. Any questions ? 

Mr. Harrison. I understand that after you had written that letter 
to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., without further report to you, 
this corporation did sell uranium to Russia? 

Mr. BuR^tAN. That is our understanding; yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Without your knowledge. You didn't have any 
knowledge of it until 1948?' 

Mr. Burman. That is correct. 

Mr. Harrison. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde? 

Mr. Velde. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. I think, Mr. Counsel, in the light of the persistence of 
these bells [bells indicating either quorum calls or calls for roll-call 
vote on floor of House] this afternoon, we had better give up the icl^ea 
of continuing further with this hearing, and meet a little earlier in 
the morning. Let's see if we can't get here at 10 o'clock tomorrow 
morning, until which time the committee stands adjourned. 

(Thereupon, at 2: 55 p. m. on Monday, January 23, 1950, an ad- 
journment was taken until Tuesday, January 24, 1950, at 10 a. m.) 



99384 — 50- 



HEAEINCtS EEGAEDrnG SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEEIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DUEING WOELD WAE II 



TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1950 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D. C. 

PUBLIC HEARINGS 

MORNING SESSION 

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 :30 a. m., in room 
226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) pre- 
siding. 

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood, Rich- 
ard M. Nixon, Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. 
Kearney. 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator ; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, 
investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, di- 
rector of research ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

Let the record show that there are present Mr. Nixon, Mr. Case, 
Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call as the first wit- 
ness Dr. Phillip L. Merritt. 

Mr. Wood. Dr. Merritt, will you raise your right hand and be sworn. 
Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give the committee shall be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Dr. Merriti. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF DE. PHILLIP L. MERRITT 

Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, will you please state your full name? 

Dr. Merritt. Phillip L. Merritt. 

Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born ? 

Dr. Merritt. I was born in Duluth, Minn., February 8, 1906. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present occupation ? 

Dr. Merritt. I am assistant manager of the Raw Materials Opera- 
tions Office of the Atomic Energy Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you please furnish the committee with a 
resume of your previous employment? 

Dr. Merritt. I graduated from the University of Minnesota in 
1928. I then spent about a year and a half in Africa as a geologist. 
I returned to the United States in 1929, went to Columbia University, 

970 



980 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

where I studied geology, and obtained a doctor's degree in goology 
in 1933. 

I tlien went to Colombia, South America, for 2 years as a geologist 
for the Colombian Government. I returned to the United States in 
1936 and took up employment with the American Cyanamid Co. 

Mr. Wood. Will you speak a little louder ? I didn't hear the last. 

Dr. Merritt. I was with the American Cyanamid Co. from 1936 
until 1942, when I was commissioned as a captain in the Army and 
was assigned to the Manhattan project. I stayed with the Manhattan 
project until January 1947, when the Atomic Energy Commission took 
over the project, and I am now with the Commission. 

Mr. Velde. When were you first assigned to the Manhattan project? 

Dr. Merritt. October 26, 1942. 

Mr. Tavenner. While you were employed by the Manhattan En- 
gineering District, what were your specific duties? 

Dr. ]\1erritt. I was involved in the procurement of raw materials 
for the Manhattan District, principally uranium. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were inquiries from various Government agencies 
regarding uranium cleared through your office, or j^our hands? 

Dr. Merritt. Not necessarily. Most of them were cleared through 
the Washington office, through Colonel Johnson's off.ce, although we 
did obtain knowledge of them from time to time. 

Mr. Tavenner. When questions were presented by other Govern- 
ment agencies relating to the licensing, for instance, of uranium for 
export, were you requii-ed to give consideration and make recommenda- 
tions with regard to such matters? 

Dr. jSIerritt. I think that Mr. Burman had more close contact with 
the actual licensing. I was in the same office and oftentimes was 
involved in the matter, although that was not a principal duty of mine. 

Mv. Tavenner. Were j^ou well acquainted with what transpired with 
regard to the negotiations pertaining to the licensing of uranium for 
export ? 

Dr. Merritt. Fairly well acquainted; yes. 

Mr. Taat.nner. Did you hear the testimony yesterday of Mr. Law- 
rence C. Burman outlining the required procedure for the purchase 
of uranium compounds during the war period for export? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes; I did. 

Mr. TAAa:NNER. Can you give us any additional light on the general 
procedural requirements ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so. I believe Mr. Burman covered the 
subject very thoroughly. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the Chemical Warfare Service of the United 
States Army authorized to make uranium compounds available to the 
Russian Purchasing Commission? 

Dr. Merritt. There was one instance where they were apparently 
assigned the job of procurement, probably by Lencl-Lease. I believe 
the procurement involved 8 tons of uranium oxide and 8 tons of nitrate. 
I think that was it; I am not quite certain. They did contact our 
office to see if it was available, and they were told that we were not 
directly involved in the subject of uranium ; we had been dabbling in 
it, in the alloy materials, but knew nothing of it. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was done for security reasons ? 

Dr. Merritt, For security reasons, yes. 

Mr. Wood. Just who was it took that matter up with you ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 981 

Dr. Merritt. I recall two ofRcers in New York. I believe Captain 
Fliegel was one, and I believe there was a Captain Clark. I believe 
1 spoke to one of them on the phone once. I believe Colonel Crenshaw 
carried on most of the negotiations with them. The statement I made 
about dabbling in uranium was one I believe Colonel Crenshaw made 
to one of the ofRcers. 

Mr. Wood. What agency did they represent? 

Dr. Merritt. Chemical Warfare Service. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of the United States Army? 

Dr. Merritt. Of the United States Army, yes. 

Mr. Taa^nner. Just what was the procedure, from the standpoint of 
the Chemical Warfare Service, as far as you know, in the handling of 
Russian requests for uranium? 

Dr. IMerkitt. Apparently they were assigned this job, I suppose, by 
Dend-Lease, and various officers attempted to secure the material for 
Lend-Lease. We had reports, I believe, from the Cleveland office. 
They had contacted one of our officers there and attempted to buy the 
material. He contacted us directly. And I believe there were reports 
they contacted someone in Pittsburgh. They were just trying to buy 
it on behalf of Lend-Lease. I don't believe they realized the signifi- 
cance of the material. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the Treasury Department of the United States 
Government authorized to make uranium or uranium compounds 
available to the Russian Purchasing Commission ? 

Dr. Merritt. Not that I know of. We had a report yesterday of 
45 pounds being sold to Treasury by Eastman Kodak as a commercial 
transaction. We have the record on that in the War Production Board 
files in New York. It was reported only as a commercial transaction. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that reported as a transaction after the trans- 
:action had been consummated? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. It was reported in a report of July 28 by East- 
man Kodak. I believe the transaction took place in June 1944. They 
were required to make a quarterly report. 

Mr. Nixon. Did I understand you to say you had a report yesterday ? 

Dr. Merritt. We conhrmed it yesterday, or, rather, this morning. 
We understood yesterday from the testimony that there were 45 
pounds shipped. 

Mr, Nixon. You didn't know it before that ? 

Dr. Merritt. We did not know it was shipped to the Russians, no. 

Mr. Nixon. In other words, you learned it for the first time in these 
hearings yesterday ? 

Dr. INIerritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. That 45 pounds had been shipped in this manner ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tav-enner. I believe after I asked the question yesterday you 
liad the records of your office searched ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. And you found in the course of that search that 
there had been a domestic sale to the Treasury Department? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the case of a domestic sale of that type, was it 
the procedure that you be consulted ? 

Dr. Merritt. It was not required under the regulations for a sale of 
that type to be asked about in advance. 



982 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. You, of course, as I understand, have no knowledge 
of what was later done with that shipment to the Treasury ? 

Dr. Merritt. We have no knowledge whatever. 

Mr. Wood. Do the records of your office reflect what happened to it ? 

Dr. Merritt. They reflect that it was shipped by Eastman Kodak 
to Treasury Procurement, and that is all. 

Mr. Wood. That is as far as your records go ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is as far as our records go. 

Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, you, of course, know that in March 
1943 the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in the United 
States succeeded in purchasing 200 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 
pounds of uranium nitrate, which material was shipped from Great 
Falls, Mont., to Moscow ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. How did Manhattan Engineering District first ac- 
quire knowledge of this proposed sale and shipment ? 

Dr. Merritt. Through the records of the War Production Board. 
As I recall, the War Production Board was notified of this, and they 
immediately notified us of the proposed shipment. 

Mr. Wood. Before it was made ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. There has been considerable testimony relating to 
the procedure followed in that original shipment, and I will not ques- 
tion you further relating to those details, because they have been 
covered pretty fully. But I would like to ask you this : Wliat officials 
of the War Production Board, the Bureau of Economic Warfare, or 
Lend-Lease conferred with you or members of the staff of the Manhat- 
tan Engineering District with regard to the clearance of that ship- 
ment ? 

Dr. Merritt. Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks of the War Production 
Board, I believe, were aware of this; I believe we conferred with 
tliem. I believe, in lend-lease, Mr. Moore and Mr. Hoopes. And no- 
one, as far as I know, in the Bureau of Economic Warfare. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the attitude of those who conferred with 
you or your staff regarding the propriety of making this shipment, 
which is the first shipment — the material obtained from the Shattuck 
Co.? 

Dr. IVIerritt. I believe, so far as the Manhattan District staff was 
concerned, they were opposed to it, but the arrangements seemed to 
have progressed so far that it would have been inadvisable to stop it 
at that point. We would have been giving away more than we would 
have been saving to stop it at that time, so it was decided by General 
Groves, I believe, to let the shipment go. 

Mr. Tavenner. My question was more about the attitude of those 
dealing with the Manhattan Engineering District, rather than of the 
staff itself. 

Dr. INIerritt. There was a great deal of persistence in trying to get 
a decision on it, I know that — many, many phone calls. Whether they 
actually favored the shipment or not I couldn't say, but there were a 
lot of phone calls in connection with it — a persistence of phone calls to 
get a decision. 

Mr. Tavenner. You say a persistence in getting a decision ? 

Dr. ]\Ierritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there an effort made to influence that decision? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 983 

Dr. Merritt. That, I couldn't say. I had very little contact with 
the officials involved. Most of that contact was carried on by Colonel 
Crenshaw or Colonel Johnson. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not at that time, which 
was in March 1943, tlie War Production Board and Lend-Lease Ad- 
ministration knew that a uranium project was being conducted by the 
Manhattan Engineering District? 

Dr. Mekritt. War Production Board, of course, was aware of it ; at 
least, Mr. Lund and Mr. Parks were aware of it. Whether or not the 
Lend-Lease people were aware of it, I can't say. I believe they were 
aware of it at a later date, but whether they were aware of it then, I 
don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. What measures were taken by Manhattan Engineer- 
ing District to control the distribution of uranium products, or their 
sale, after the approval of this first shipment, which was the Shattuck 
shipment ? 

Dr. Merritt. After the initial War Production Board regulations 
went into effect in January, we then began a program of purchasing 
all available uranium from chemical supply houses, ceramics pro- 
ducers, and other people who had stocks for legitimate reasons. We 
carried the program out largelj^ through contractors, in order to keep 
the Manhattan District name out of the transactions. 

We made a contract with Vitro Manufacturing Co., of Pittsburgh, 
Pa., which at that time was a small producer of uranium and a con- 
sumer of uranium, to purchase odd lots of the material from various 
people for resale to us. We made a contract with Harshaw Chemical 
Co. to buy what stocks they had. They were involved in the project 
and we made a direct contract with them. We made a contract with 
the African Metals Corp. to buy what stocks they had. We never made 
a contract with Shattuck, but w^e had an agreement with them that 
they would not sell to foreign people or other people without our 
knowledge. 

Mr. Tavenner. When was that agreement reached ? 

Dr. Merritt. After the shipment. 

Mr. Tavenner. After they had made their first shipment ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. They were a very small supplier, really. Then 
we made a contract with Boris Pregel as agent for the Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp. 

Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you some questions about that later. Who 
else did you confer with? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall any other companies. Those are the 
principal companies, I believe. 

Mr. Tavenner. Chematar, Inc., is shown by the record to have been 
the supplier of some of this material, acting, probably, as agent — 
unquestionably acting as agent — for others. Did you endeavor to 
make any arrangement with them by which they would not engage 
in sales to foreign countries? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; we did not. 

Mr. Tavenner. You spoke of a contract with Boris Pregel. Aside 
from the contract, did you confer with him or any other representative 
of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. to ask their cooperation in 
not selling to any other country ? 

Dr. Merritt. We sent them a letter which was reported here yester- 
day. I do not recall any specific conference with them. Many other 



984 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

people talked to them besides me. I presume we assumed, with the 
contract, that should be sufficient to protect ourselves. 

Mr. Tavenner. The letter to which you referred I believe bore a 
■date in February ? 

Dr. Merritt. February 19. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. So that was done prior to the occasion of the sale 
by the Shattuck Co. ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. With regard to the contract that you mentioned, we 
endeavored yesterday to obtain a copy of that contract. We under- 
stand that it has the rating of "secret," and we were unable to get the 
contract, but our agent was permitted to copy certain things from 
the contract. He has copied the first page of the contract, the caption 
of the contract, and an article dealing with the phase of the matter that 
we are concerned with. I hand you this extract from the contract and 
ask you to look it over and state whether or not you can identify it as 
an excerpt from the contract. I will have to prove the accuracy of 
it later. 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. I can identify it as an excerpt from the con- 
tract. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. Did you take part in the preparation of the con- 
tract, and were you familiar at the time with the character of it? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Will you read it, please? 

Dr. Merritt (reading) : 

This Contract entered into this 27tli day of March 1943, by the United States 
OF America (hereinafter called the "Government"), represented by the Contract- 
ing Officer executing this contract, and Boris Pregel, Agent, of the City of New 
York, in the State of New York (hereinafter called the Contractor), witnesseth 
that the parties hereto do mutually agree as follows : 

Article I — Scope of this Contract. — The Contractor shall furnish and deliver 
immediately f. o. b. New York, New York, at such point or points as designated 
by the Contracting Officer, in suitable containers furnished by the Contractor, 
approximate quantities of materials at their respective prices, as follows : 

Per unit 

1. (a) 2,875 Units of P56 $3,895 

(b) 2,300 Units of M21 3. 10 

(c) 2,000 Units of L33 4.10 

2. In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned, 
the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one (1) year, from the 
date hereof, the initial right to purchase from time to time any or all of the 
P56, M21, and L33 received by the Contractor. 

Mr. Tavenner. It is noted on the face of the contract that there is 
an undisclosed principal, and it is noted that certain terms were used 
which I assume were code terms ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain the reason for that? 

Dr. Merritt. It was our practice to code all contracts so that people 
who handled the contract for payment purposes, and anyone else who 
might come in contact with the contract, would not be aware that the 
materials were actually uranium that we were dealing in. It was a 
general practice to code all contracts. The code was then explained 
in a separate letter which was made a part of the contract. 

Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you to state whether or not one of the 
code numbers indicated covered uranium oxide, black uranium oxide, 
and uranium nitrate? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 985 

Dr. Merritt. Yes; P56 was explained in the secret letter as being 
black uranium oxide, L33 was explained as being uranium nitrate, 
and M21 was sodium uranate. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Will you explain why there is an undisclosed prin- 
cipal involved in this contract ? 

Dr. Merritt. The principal involved in the contract was Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Co., a company which had been involved in and 
was identified witli the sale of uranium. For security reasons the 
company was not disclosed in the contract because it possibly would 
have disclosed what the contents of the contract were. The secret 
letter which accompanied the contract was addressed to Boris 
Pregel, agent, and to Canadian Radium & Uranium Co. The secret 
letter disclosed what a unit meant; it disclosed what the symbols 
meant ; also it disclosed that the principal in the contract was Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Co., and that Boris Pregel personally was not 
held liable. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the secret letter also contain a provision that 
the corporation was liable for all acts of its agents under the terms 
of this contract ? 

Dr. INIerritt. As I recall, it did ; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Has a search been made for a copy of that secret 
letter since this matter first arose yesterday ? 

Dr. Merritt. We have the letter in New York. 

Mr. Tavenner. The letter is in New York ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you produce a photostatic copy of it and 
make it available to the senior investigator ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. The date of that contract is March what ? 

Dr. Merritt. March 27, 1943. 

Mr, Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to inter- 
rupt the testimony of this witness and call to the stand Mr. C. E. 
McKillips, an investigator of the committee. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. 

(Witness Merritt temporarily excused.) 

Mr. Wood. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give the com- 
mittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Mr. McKillips. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES EDWARD McKILLIPS 

Mr. Tavenner. State your full name? 

Mr. McKillips. Charles Edward McKillips. 

Mr. Tavenner. You are an investigator of the Committee on Un- 
American Activities ? 

Mr. McKillips. I am. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you yesterday copy from the contract of March 
27, 1943, the excerpt which I now hand you ? 

Mr. McKillips. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is that a true and correct copy of what purports to 
be an excerpt ? 

Mr. McKillips. That is a true and correct copy. 



986 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Wlio signed the agi^eement ? Who were the parties 
to the sijznatiire ? 

Mr. McKiLLiPS. A J. C. Marsliall, colonel, Corps of Engineers, 
contracting officer. One of the witnesses was Alexander Pregel, and 
another witness was H. B. Kearney. 

Mr. Tavexxer. I desire to offer this excerpt in evidence, and request 
that it be marked "McKillips Exhibit 1." 

]\Ir. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

Mr. Kearney. ISIr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, the legal procedure here. I don't 
know how a piece of paper like this could be accepted in evidence in a 
court of law. 

Mr. Wood. The contents of the paper, as I understand, are being 
tendered as being a correct transcript of an original document in the 
possession of the agency representee! by the witness Merritt, and with 
the identification that has been made of it, I think it is proper for 
admission, although if a question is raised about it, we can go in execu- 
tive session. Do you make an objection, or did you make that as an 
observation ? 

Mr. Kearney. T make it as an observation, and for the present I 
will withhold an objection. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. It will be admitted. 

(The excerpt nhoxe referred to, marked "McKillips Exhibit 1," is 
hereinafter incorporated in the record.)^ 

Mr. Ta\-enner. That is all, Mr. McKillips. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. PHILLIP L. MERRITT— Eesumed 

Mr. Tavenner. AVlien was the first shipment made to Manhattan 
Engineering District under this contract? 

Dr. Merritt. Our records indicate that the first receipt was May 
20, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that the quantity provided for in the original 
terms of the contract? 

Dr. Merritt. There may have been a slight variation of 50 pounds 
here or there on some of the substances. The quantities are approxi- 
mate, as you notice, and I think there was a slight variation in the 
weights. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Evidence has been introduced before the commit- 
tee that the JNIanhattan Engineering District acquired quantities of 
uranium from the Canadian corporation prior to the entering into 
of this contract. 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. The last paragra]>h of the excerpt from the con- 
tract, McKillips exhibit 1, reads as follows : 

The Contractor gives to the Government for a jieriod of one year, from the date 
hereof, the initial right to purchase from tim4 to time, any or all of the P-56, 
M-21, and L-So, received by the Contractor. 

Was Manhattan Engineering District afforded an opportunity to 
exercise its initial right under this contract to purchase all the ura- 
nium received by the contractor? 

° See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 987 

Dr. Merritt. Apparently it was not, although there were delivered 
on June 4, 1,900 pounds of sodium uranate under the option. That 
additional quantity was delivered 2 weeks after the initial delivery. 

Mr. Tavp:nner. It is noted Eldorado mines is not a party to this 
I contract ? 

Dr. Merkitt. That is right. 

Mr. TA^^':NNER. It is also noted that the contract refers to the 
'material which the contractor receives? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Ta-vt^tstner. Do you know what the relationship was between 
the contractor, that is, the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and 
Eldorado mines ? 

Dr. Merritt. At that time, as I understand it, Canadian Radium 
 & Uranium Corp. was the sole sale agent for Eldorado mines. That 
is my understanding. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. Do you recall whether or not the Manhattan Engi- 
neering District was advised at any time that this material was avail- 
•able if it desired to purchase it? 

Dr. Merritt. I do not recall being so advised, and I found nothing 
in the records that would so indicate. 

Mr. Tavenner. When I say "this" material, I am referring to the 
material which was actually sold to the Russian purchasing com- 
mission. 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. I found nothing in the records which would 
indicate so, and I have no personal recollection of its having been 
offered. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Did the Manhattan Engineering District, to your 
"knowledge, waive its right to purchase any or all materials which 
may come into the hands of the contractor, which, of course, is the 
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp.? 

Dr. Merritt. Insofar as I know that right was never waived. There 
is nothing to indicate so in the records that I can find, and I don't 
recall anything. 

Mr. Taat^nner. You have learned during the course of these hear- 
ings that the uranium which was sold by Eldorado mines to the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission was sold through the Canadian Radium & 
Uranium Corp.? 

Dr. Merritt. So I understand, yes. At least, it was carried on 
their books. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was it the practice of Eldorado mines to make 
annual reports to the jSIanhattan Engineering District or the War 
Production Board showing the sales of uranium made during the 
q^receding year? 

Dr. Merritt. Not the Eldorado mines. Eldorado mines is a foreign 
company and there was no requirement that they report to us as 
Eldorado mines. 

Mr. Tamsnner. Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. make 
such report ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe that we have a record of some earlier trans- 
actions prior to 1943. We received them for information purposes, 
"to find out who were utilizing uranium. I believe at a later date some 
records of sales were given. I am not thoroughly familiar with that. 

Mr. Ta^^nner. You are not positive whether such a record was 
filed for the year 1943 ? 



988 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Dr. Merritt. I understand it was not filed for 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Or, at least, the report has not been located ? 

Dr. Merritt. At least it has not been located, yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. It is anticipated that evidence will be introduced 
showing that the purchase price of the products purchased by the 
Russian Purchasing Commission from Eldorado mines was as fol- 
lows: Uranium nitrate, $2.36 a pound; black uranium oxide, $2.55 
a pound. 

How do those prices compare with the contract price provided for 
similar products in McKillips exhibit 1? 

Dr. IMerritt. They are slightly in excess, although not a great deal 
higher. These prices are about the commercial prices at that time. 
Our prices were less than the commercial prices. These are about 
the commercial prices, I would say, at that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then there was no excessive profit by reason of the 
sale as it was handled ? 

Dr. Merritt. No, not a great deal. 

]Mr. Tavenner. Over what you would have paid? 

Dr. Merritt. A little bit. I would say these were 50 or 40 cents a 
pound higher than we would have paid, in that order, but nothing 
exorbitant. 

Mr. Tavenner. Dr. Merritt, are you familiar with the details sur- 
rounding the issuance of the second export license, that is, the license 
for 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide, 
which was issued in April 1943 to the Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Dr. Merritt. I am not familiar with all the details on the actual 
issuance of the license. 

Mr. Tavenner. Let me ask you this : The files of Lend-Lease Ad- 
ministration reflect that on April 14, 1943, a letter was written by Mr. 
William C. Moore, of the Lend-Lease Administration, to Mr. N. S. 
Fomichev, in charge of chemicals. Government Purchasing Commis- 
sion of the Soviet Union, advising him that his application for the 
issuance of an export license to export 500 pounds each of uranium 
nitrate and uranium oxide had been denied. However, the files also 
indicate that export license 1643180 was subsequently issued to tha 
Soviet commission on April 26, 1943. Can you explain why the li- 
cense which was denied by Lend-Lease on April 14 was subsequently 
issued ? 

Dr. Merritt, I don't know if I have a good explanation of it. I can 
surmise, if you care for me to do that. I really don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't want surmises about it, but can you give us 
any facts relating to the matter which the committee could use for its 
information? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe that after the date of the original letter by 
Mr. Moore we had a very finn commitment from Shattuck, who had 
this order before it at the time, that they would not deliA''er under it. 
This order was placed with Shattuck, I believe, early in April — I am 
not quite certain of the date — and sometime in the latter part of April 
Mr. Potter told me that they would not deliver under this order. 
Whether that had anything to do with the change, I don't know. 
We then were quite certain we had every source blocked up. It may 
have been that we felt it all right to give them the license because- 
we thought we had every source blocked up. I don't know. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 989 

Mr. Tavenner. When were negotiations conducted between the 
Manhattan Engineering District and other Government agencies re- 
garding this change of attitude about the license, do you know ? 

Dr. Merritt. I didn't have anything to do with those negotiations. 
I believe General Groves or Colonel Johnson or perhaps Colonel Cren- 
shaw could tell you more about that. I was not too much involved with 
other agencies, at my level. 

Mr. Tavenxer. Are you acquainted with James P. Hoopes, for- 
merly associate liaison officer, and finally liaison officer, in the Office 
of Lend-Lease Administration, Division for Soviet Supply? 

Dr. Merritt. No. I have seen his name on letters, but have never 
spoken to him to my knowledge. 

Mr. Tavenner. Can you state whether or not you had a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Hoopes on or about April 22, 1943 ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall. I recall speaking to Mr. Moore, but 
not Mr. Hoopes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Whether you thought you were speaking to Mr. 
Hoopes or Mr. ]\Ioore, do you recall whether or not you advised the 
official in Lend-Lease that pressure had just been brought to bear on 
General Groves to release the 1,000 pounds? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall stating that, Mr. Tavenner. 
]\Ir. Ta\-enner. Independently of your recollection of the telephone 
conversation, did any fact come to your attention, or were you told by 
any member of your staff, that pressure of any description was brought 
t o bear on General Groves to change the decision about the issuance of 
the license for this particular shipment ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall that at all. There was a great deal of 
pressure for a decision, I know that, but whether there was any indi- 
vidual pressure or not, I wouldn't know the person, I am sure, who 
might have brought it. 

Mr. Nixon. Wliat do you mean by a great deal of pressure for a 
decision ? 

Dr. Merritt. This thing had been going along for quite a while, and 
these people wanted to get it decided one way or another so that Lend- 
Lease could be given an answer. 

Mr. Nixon. I assume Lend-Lease was trying to get it expedited. 
This doesn't mean they were trying to get an adverse decision ? 
Dr. Merritt. I don't know. 

Mr. Nixon. Do I understand you to say Lend-Lease was interested 
in getting negative decisions on shipments they were trying to ex- 
pedite ? 

Dr. Merritt. I was involved with Lend-Lease very little. 
Mr. Nixon. But it seems obvious that Lend-Lease was interested 
in expediting shipments rather than getting them turned down? 
Dr. Merritt. Maybe so. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know tlie names of officials of Lend-Lease 
who conferred with anyone in your office regarding this shipment ? 
Dr. Merritt. The only names I recall are Moore and Hoopes. 
Mr. Tavenner. Did any official in the Bureau of Economic War- 
fare confer with anyone in your office regarding this shipment, to 
your knowledge ? 

Dr. Merritt. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the War Production Board membership in- 
volved in any way with this particular license? 



990 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Dr. Merritt. That, I don't know. I presume they were aware of 
it, but I don't know. They may have been aware of it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did any person other than an official of one of the 
Government agencies that I mentioned confer with j'ou or any mem- 
ber of your staff with regard to expediting the approval of this parti- 
cular license? 

Dr. Merritt. Not that I know of. 

Mr. Nixon. Why do you say there was a great deal of pressure if 
none of these people talked to you ? 

Dr. Merritt. There were a lot of phone calls from our office in 
Washington and from us to them. 

Mr. Nixon. What do you mean by "to them" ? 

Dr. Merritt. To our Washington office. 

Mr. Nixon. You are speaking of your own interoffice communi- 
cations ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. Colonel Crenshaw carried on most of them, 
I presume, with Colonel Johnson. 

Mr. NixoN. And the reason for that was that the heat was on from 
Lend-Lease? 

Dr. Merritt. It was not on me. 

Mr. Nixon. You said there was a great deal of pressure for a 
decision? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Nixon. So you knew it was something more than an ordinary 
case ? 

Dr. IVIerritt. Surely, 

Mr. Nixon. This was a case where you thought it was top priority 
to get something done ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Because of the pressure that was coming. Is that 
correct ? 

Dr. Merritt. I think so, Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Case. You say Colonel Crenshaw handled the negotiations ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe he conferred with officials of Lend-Lease Ad- 
ministration on the subject. I know he did. 

Mr. Case. You don't think Colonel Crenshaw initiated the conversa- 
tions with Lend-Lease? 

Dr. Merritt. No. It probably came the other way. I am sure 
Lend-Lease initiated the conversations. 

Mr. Case. So you think there was a great deal of pressure on Colonel 
Oenshaw, and that it came from Lend-Lease? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better 
than I could. 

Mr. Case. But you know the telephone calls to Colonel Crenshaw 
came from Lend-Lease? 

Dr. Merritt. I know he conversed with them quite often, and I am 
sure Colonel Johnson did, too, in Washington. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there anyone employed in the Washington 
office in addition to Colonel Johnson? 

Dr. Merritt. There were a good many people there. I don't know 
their names. He and his staff handled this particular type of thing. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wlio composed his staff ? 

Dr. Merritt. I can't remember their names, it has been so long. 
He was our principal contact. He had many other people there. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 991 

Mr. Ta\tenner. When did you state that you had your conference 
with the Shattuck Co. and secured the agreement that they would not 
ship any more uranium 'i 

l3r. Merritt. It was in the Latter part of April that I had a tele- 
plione conversation with tliem. I do not know the exact date. I 
believe a memorandum I have was dated April 29 to the effect I had 
conversed with them, presumably in the last few days. 

Mr. Tavenner, The files of Lend-Lease disclose, as shown by evi- 
dence already introduced, that the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
advised Lend-Lease that the delay in issuing the license was so great 
that the supplier had canceled the order. Do you recall having heard 
that i 

Dr. Merrttt. Yes ; that is correct. Mr. Potter, in the early conver- 
sations, said he had a feeler for the order — I believe that is the way 
he put it — but tliat nothing else had come through and that he would 
be willing to tell them at that point that he had no more supply. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, at the time of your conference with 
Potter the order had not been turned down by him or withdrawn ? 

(Representative Walter enters hearing room). 

Dr. MERRi'n\ Early in April I probably talked to him. I believe 
I talked to liim personally the latter part of March or early in April. 
1 don't know if he had the order at that time or not. He probably did. 

Mr. Tavenner. When you learned that the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission advised they could not obtain the material from their sup- 
plier, was it considered that the strategy of handling the thing had 
been successful? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. We felt we had been successful in blocking the 
sale. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was done about withdrawing the license which 
had been authorized to be issued and which you now know was issued? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't think anything was done. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was normally the life of such a license? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't know what the life was of a Lend-Lease or 
BEW license. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliatever the period of its life may be, it existed 
as a constant threat, did it not, during that period ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. Still, we felt we had all sources completely 
blocked and it didn't make any particular difference if there was a 
license outstanding. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you learn that very soon after the Shattuck Co. 
witlidrew its offer the Soviet Purchasing Commission filed a request 
with Lend-Lease to amend this license? 

Dr. Merritt. I didn't know of that. 

Mr. Tavenner. You didn't know of that? 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. You mean as far ^.s you know the Manhattan Engi- 
neering District was not advised that an application had been received 
to amend the license? 

Dr. Merritt. As far as I know. I was not aware of it. Whether 
someone else was or not, I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then you don't know of your own knowledge 
whether or not it actually was amended ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 



992 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Had you known that on the 29th of April, 1943, 
this license was actually amended to show a different constituency of 
chemical analysis of the material sought to be exported, wouldn't it 
have acted as a red flag to you, and you would have known immediately 
that the material was available ? 

Dr. Merritt. Probably so. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is there any other conclusion? 

Dr. Mekritt. That is probably correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Did I understand you to say earlier that the original 
license had come to your attention? 

Dr. Merritt. The original license itself never came to my attention. 
i think probably we were aware something was going on, but I never 
saw the license and I don't believe I was aware it was actually issued. 

Mr. Nixon. Wlio was aware of it ? 

Dr. Merritt. I think the Washington office must have been aware 
of it. 

Mr. Nixon. Your Washington office? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. I think General Groves testified he was aware 
of it. 

Mr. Nixon. As to the amendment of the original license, was your 
Washington office informed of that ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't know. They should have been aware of it. 

Mr. Nixon. That is the point. In other words, the amendment 
should have been made 

Dr. Merritt. Clear to them. 

Mr. Nixon. Clear to them ? 

Dr. Merritt. Surely. 

Mr. Nixon. If they had been made aware of the amendment, they 
would not have found out about the shipment for the first time last 
year? You didn't find out about the shipment until last year? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right, here, in June 1948. 

Mr. Nixon. In other words, the fact that the office which had 
jurisdiction over the original license, your Washington office, was 
not informed of the amendment, indicates it might have been a highly 
irregular procedure ? 

Dr. Merritt. If they were not informed, yes. I can't say whether 
or not they were informed. 

Mr. Tavenner. During the course of the time that the matter of 
the issuance of the license was pending, was the question of furnish- 
ing a substitute material to the Russians considered ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. There was some thought at one time, and cor- 
respondence, I believe, between Colonel Crenshaw and perhaps Mr. 
Hoopes. I have read the correspondence recently. I didn't know 
about it at the time. But we had located some uranium steel alloy. 
There wasn't much of it. It had been made years before, I believe, by 
the Latrobe Steel Co. There was .some thought at one time of letting 
them have that useless material rather than what they wanted. Our 
correspondence showed there was some negotiation along that line, but 
it stopped and nothing happened about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall talking to Mr. Hoopes about a sub- 
stitute ? 

Dr. Merritt. The correspondence was all between Colonel Crenshaw 
and Mr. Hoopes, I believe, on that. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 993 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not the substitute material 
which you proposed giving to the Russians would have been adequate 
for the purposes for which the Russians said they wanted to use the 

material ? . 

Dr. Merritt. I am not a metallurgist. I believe it was quite useless 

material. 

Mr. Tavenner. You think it may have been useless even for the 
purpose for which they said they wanted it? 

Dr. Merritt. It is possible. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. You don't know ^ 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, you are not answering the question 
in the aflirmative or negative? 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Walter. Why was consideration given to the sending of worth- 
less material ? 

Dr. Merritt. I think Colonel Crenshaw could answer that better 

than I could. 

Mr. Walter. You were in on the discussions as to the sending of this 
worthless material, were you not? 

Dr. Merritt. No; I was not. I read the correspondence. 

Mr. Walter. You have just testified from the correspondence? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Walter. Did the correspondence indicate the reason why con- 
sideration was given to the sending of worthless material? 

Dr. Merritt. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you confer at any time with General Groves 
regarding the issuance of this license ? 

Dr. Merritt. Not with General Groves personally ; no. 

Mr. Velue. Did you confer with any member of the security office 
other than General Groves ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe Colonel Johnson and Colonel Crenshaw car- 
ried on all our conversations. 

Mr. Case. When you said there were negotiations to let "them" have 
the worthless material, whom did you mean ? 

Dr. Merritt. The Russians. 

Mr. Case. Then you understood there was a determined effort on 
the part of the Russian Purchasing Commission to obtain uranium? 

Dr. Merritt. Apparently ; yes. 

Mr. Walter. Whose decision was it to send worthless material? 

Dr. Merritt. I think General Groves. 

Mr. Walter. The hnal decision would have been his? 

Dr. Merritt. I think so; yes. 

Mr. Case. That is, if tlie matter came to him ? 

Dr. Merritt. If the matter came to him. 

Mr. Case. Did the BEW submit to General Groves any request for 
export licenses for the shipment of uranium? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't know whether it did or not. 

IVIr. Case. In your attempt to corral the sources of supply and dis- 
tribution of this material, did you make any contact with BEW? 

Dr. Merritt. I recall having one meeting with Dr. Bateman and 
some members of his staff on uranium. It had nothing to do with 
export ; it had to do with possible foreign sources and some way they 
could assist us in our procurement program. 

99334—50 7 



994 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. But there was no conversation on the exporting of it ? 

Dr. IVIerritt. I don't believe these people were involved in export 
control. 

Mr. Case. Who was Dr. Bateman? 

Dr. Merritt. He was professor of geology at Yale. 

Mr. Case. What position was he holding at that time ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall exactly. He was in charge of some sort 
of foreign procurement, I believe. 

Mr. Case. With whom? 

Dr. Merritt. With the Board of Economic Warfare. It was on 
procurement. 

Mr, Wood. You were aware, were you not, Doctor, at all times dur- 
ing these transactions, that material of this character could not be 
exported from this country without an export license issued by BEAV? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe so, yes. 

Mr. Wood. Wliy was it you felt impelled to block up all sources 
of supply if in fact none of it could be shipped out without an export 
license '( 

Dr. Merritt. We felt we could control it. 

Mr. Wood. Were you apprehensive a license might be issued without 
your knowledge? 

Dr. Merritt. We wanted this material ourselves. 

Mr. Wood. But you were aware the material could not be shipped 
out of the country without a license, and that the license would have 
to be issued by an agency of the United States Government which pre- 
sumably was as much interested in preserving the security as you were, 
so why didn't you rely on them ? 

Dr. IVIerritt. I think we were trying to do those things ourselves. 

Mr. Wood. There was, in fact, a license issued and amended without 
your knowledge? 

Dr. Merritt. Apparently so, yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not heavy water was 
shi]3ped to Bussia 

Mr. Nixon. Excuse me. Am I correct in the assumption from your 
testimony that this transaction in regard to the shipment of 1,000 
pounds was a well-known transaction in your office and in the office in 
Washington, it was discussed by telephone and otherwise, because of 
the efforts being made to get decision? 

Dr. IVIerritt. I think so, yes'. 

Mr. Nixon. It was a transaction which was out of the ordinary? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Nixox. And for that reason, I suppose the fact that this ship- 
ment had. actually been made as a result of an amended order which 
apparently did not come to your office was quite surprising ? 

Dr. Merritt. It was, Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. Mr. Burman's testimony yesterday was that you learned 
for the first time in 1948, from this committee, that this shipment had 
actually been made as a result of an amended license ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. It means, in other words, that this amended license 
went around the ordinary channels, assuming it did not go through 
your Washington office? 

Dr. Merritt, Assuming it did not go through our Washington 
office and ordinary channels; yes. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 995 

Mr. Nixon. And these people who were attempting to get the order 
filled, Lend-Lease, could not have helped being aware of the fact there 
was considerable discussion and resistance in your office to having the 
license issued? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know what the procedure was for issuing 
export licenses? 

Dr. Merritt. I do not know the procedure. We were not involved 
in the actual licenses. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. And I assume it was not the practice for these 
licenses to clear through your office? 

Dr. Merritt. Not through our New York office ; no. 

Mr. Case. Did you take any steps, other than this talk with Dr. 
Bateman, to be informed of the issuance of licenses for the shipment 
of materials of this tj^pe out of the country? 

Dr. Merritt. No. Anything like that would have been handled by 
Colonel Johnson in the Wasliington office. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not heavy-water ship- 
ments were made to Russia during the war years ? 

Dr. Merritt. I was never involved in the subject at all in any way. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know what controls were set up governing 
the shipment of heavy water ? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; I do not. Heavy water was out of my province 
entirely. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter? 

Mr. Walter. Did your office have any direct responsibility, other 
than a desire to preserve this strategic material, in the issuance of 
export licenses? 

Dr. Merritt. That is all. 

Mr. Walter. You had no responsibility at all in that regard ? 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Wood. That was the responsibility of BEW, wasn't it ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. I will pass this time. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. Dr. Merritt, as I understand, you stated you had started 
out trying to buy all the uranium on the market ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And you first made a contract with Vitro? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Was that a firm contract, that, if they had any to sell or 
acquired any, they should come to you ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall the exact terms of that contract. We 
worked closely with them, and I am sure nothing could have gone 
wrong in any way with that company. We had full confidence in. 
them. I don't recall the exact terms of the contract. 

Mr. Case. No sale, as far as you know, w^as made by Vitro to anyone 
except yourself, acting for the Manhattan District ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Case. What steps did you take with Shattuck to insure that 
their sales would be entirely to the Manhattan District ? 



996 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Dr. Merritt. We never bought any uranium from Shattuck at all. 
They were a very, very small supplier, and their sales, I believe, at a 
later date, were well controlled through the War Production Board. 
Their sales were for essential domestic purposes. 

Mr. Case. You said you had a firm commitment from them. Wliat 
was that firm commitment? 

Dr. Merritt. That they would refuse any foreign orders, and I 
believe that they would keep us informed on other ordei-s they had. 

Mr. Case. Was that by letter, contract, or telephone conversation? 

Dr. Merritt. Personally, I had one telephone conversation with 
them. I think Mr. Burman visited them many times during the war, 
I had very little contact with them after that one telephone con- 
versation. 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not there Avas any written 
understanding with them? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; I don't know. 

Mr. Case. In any event, this firm commitment, which you don't 
know if it was put in writing or not, was made after the shipment 
of the 420 pounds? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Case. What was Mr. Potter's connection with Shattuck? 

Dr. Merritt. He is president, I believe, of Shattuck Chemical Co. 

Mr. Case. Earlier in your testimony you referred to an effort to 
control purchases of all ceramics, I believe. Did you say that? 

Dr. Merritt. Uranium for ceramic coloring; yes. We purchased a 
good deal of uranium from ceramic companies. 

Mr. Case. From pottery companies ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. That is the transaction we handled through 
Vitro. 

Mr. Case. Keferring to your contract with Boris Pregel, did that 
contract require the contractor to notify you and tender to you any 
of the three materials mentioned which they had or might acquire? 

Dr. Merritt. That is the way I would interpret it ; yes. That was 
the intention. 

Mr. Case. It could have been a contract merely that Manhattan 
would be willing to buy, but did it also provide they must offer to 
Manhattan any of these materials they had or might acquire? 

Dr. Merritt. The wording is: 

In addition to the materials contracted for in section (1) above mentioned, 
the Contractor gives to the Government for a period of one year, from the date 
hereof, the initial ri.s:ht to purchase from time to time, any or all of these three 
materials received by the Contractor. 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether or not the contract provided any 
methods for implementing that right? 

Dr. Merritt. Except presumably they would notify us when they 
received anything. 

Mr. Case. You don't know if the contract was specific on that 
point ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't believe it was specific on that point. 

Mr. Case. Under that contract, would you understand that Man- 
hattan would have the right of refusal beifore any of these materials 
were released for sale elsewhere ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 997 

Mr. Case. Were you offered this material which later the Canadian 
Kadium & Uranium Corp. sold elsewhere ? 

Dr. Merritt. We were not offered this material so far as I aan 
aware. 

Mr. Case. State again what the relationship was between Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp. and Eldorado Mines. 

Dr. Merritt. It was my understanding that at that time Cana- 
dian Radium & Uranium Corp. had a contract whereby they were 
exclusive sales agents for Eldorado. That agreement is no longer 
in existence, but it was at that time. 

Mr. Case. At that time they had the same exclusive right to the 
products of Eldorado Mines that Manhattan had to the materials 
which Canadian Radium & Uranium acquired? 

Dr. Merritt. So I understand. I have never seen the agreement, 
but I understand that is correct. 

Mr. Case. Except that the contract between Manhattan and Cana- 
dian Radium & Uranium was not limited to material that Canadian 
Radium & Uranium might get from Eldorado mines? 

Dr. Merritt. Anything they might get from anybody. 

Mr. Case. Were any penalties or forfeitures provided for failure to 
give jNIanhattan this first right to buy ? 

Dr. Merritt. Not that I recall. 

Mr. Case. I find that it is difficult, without the transcript of the 
other hearings, to keep all these separate shipments in mind, but I 
would like to ask you two questions with regard to those that come to 
my mind. The first question is whether or not you knew of these ship- 
ments or sales prior to the disclosures made in the hearings before 
the Committee on Un-American Activities, and, if so, when you 
learned of them, first in regard to the shipment of the Shattuck mate- 
rial, the 420 pounds, in March 19-i3 ? 

Dr. Merritt. I knew of that at the time of shipment. 

Mr. Case. You knew of that at the time of shipment? 

Dr. Merritt. Surely. 

Mr. Case, When did you first hear of the request that was made for 
8 or 81/2 tons by the Russian Purchasing Commission in 1943? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe we first heard of it early in February 1943. 

Mr. Case. Was that request made to Lend-Lease or to Chemical 
Warfare? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe to Lend-Lease. I believe we had our infor- 
mation from the War Production Board, but I believe they got it 
from Lend-Lease. 

Mr. Case. When did you first learn that the request was renewed 
in 1944? 

Dr. Merritt. Renewed? 

Mr. Case. Yes ; that 8-ton request. 

Dr. Merritt. I didn't know it was renewed. 

Mr. Case. Wlien did you first learn of this 1,000-pound item that 
was involved in this license and amended license of April 1943 2 

Dr. Merritt. Before this committee in closed session on June 29, 
1948, 

Mr. Case. And you didn't know until this morning that the export 
license had been amended ? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; I didn't. 



998 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. And when did you first hear of the MacKay shipment 
of 2.2 pounds of uranium metal ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe at the time of shipment I was aware of that. 

Mr. Case. When did you first learn of the 45 -pound shipment of 
June 1944, that was purchased by the Treasury ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yesterday. 

Mr. Case. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde. 

Mr. Velde. That 45 pounds of uranium, was that what you call pure 
uranium ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe it was uranium nitrate. 

Mr. Velde. How much actual ore would that represent ? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe uranium nitrate is about 50 percent uranium ; 
about half of that is metal ; the actual U content would be about half 
of that. 

Mr. Velde. So that the uranium ore would be about 90 pounds ? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; about 20 or 25 pounds of uranium element in the 
shipment of nitrate. 

Mr. Velde. We have been discussing the shipment of 1,000 pounds 
that was made from Great Falls, Mont. How would you describe 
that? 

Dr. Merritt. I believe 500 pounds of that was oxide, and would 
probably run about 97 percent, calculated as uranium oxide ; and the 
other 500 pounds would be about half that. I am not quite certain. 

Mr. Velde. Would you say this 45 pounds of uranium, compared 
to the 1,000-pound shipment, would be insignificant? 

Dr. Merritt. It would be very small compared to the 1,000-pound 
shipment, surely. 

Mr. Velde. You mentioned previously that you felt you had the 
entire output of uranium in the country tied up by contract? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. Did you have the feeling you also had the entire output 
of the Canadian Government tied up ? 

Dr. Merritt. We had a good many contracts with them. I don't 
l)elieve at that time they were exclusive, they could sell to other people, 
but I don't believe they did in any quantities. 

Mr. Velde. Are there any companies or individuals who control 
uranium in Canada, other than the Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp.? 

Dr. Merritt. No. All uranium is controlled through Eldorado, 
which is a crown company owned by the Government. 

Mr. Velde. By the Canadian Government? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. It is a crown company. I think that was 
acquired back in 1944 from the private company that held it prior 
to that time. 

Mr. Velde. Have you had any contract directly with an agent of 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission ? 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Velde. Or has anybody in your immediate office force? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't believe anybody did that I know of. 

Mr. Wood, Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. Kearney. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 999 

Mr. Nixon. You said you were not concerned with the fact there 
might be an export license outstanding for this material, because of 
3'our feeling you had the sources pretty well tied up ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. On this 1,000-pound shipment which was made, and 
the other shipment which apparently was made without your knowl- 
edge, do I understand those shipments were made from concerns 
whose outputs you had not tied up ? 

Dr. Merritt. The 1,000 pounds were shipped, apparently, from 
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., which we thought we had tied up. 

Mr. Nixon. I can't quite understand that. When you say that you 
had it tied up 

Dr. Merritt. Through this contract. 

Mr. Nixon. Through this contract? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. And yet the same company makes the shipment. Do 
I understand that under the contract Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp. gave you the exclusive right to purchase uranium ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Would that shipment be a violation of the contract? 

Dr. Merritt. I am not a lawyer, but as a layman it would look 
that way. 

Mr. Nixon. Could this have been due to failure to understand the 
contract on the part of Mr. Pregel and other officials of the company, 
or had such conversations been had at the time of the entering into of 
tlie contract that they knew what you were trying to do? 

Dr. Merritt. The wording is very clear, I think, and it should have 
been clear what we were trying to do. 

Mr. Nixon. The wording and the negotiations preceding the mak- 
ing of the contract ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. This was not a case where you were dealing with a con- 
tractor on the other side who was not aware of the very serious nature 
of this contract insofar as the security of this country was concerned? 

Dr. INIerritt. I think he should have been aware of it. 

Mr. Nixon. And if under the circumstances the shipment was made, 
and if that shipment was a violation of the contract, it would appear 
then that tliere was a deliberate act which was considerably more than 
a violation of a business contract? 

Dr. Merritt. I suppose so. 

Mr. Walter. As a matter of fact, the Canadian Government 
brought suit against these people and recovered from them for a 
violation of contract; didn't it? 

Dr. jNIerritt. There was a suit which extended over a long number 
of years between the two, and it was finally settled out of court, I 
understand. 

Mr. Case. Between what two ? 
Dr. Merritt. Canadian Radium and Eldorado. 
Mr. Nixon. You understand, Mr. Chairman, the point I am trying 
to make goes farther than the money value our Government or the 
Canadian Government could recover for violation of contract. I think 
the committee should explore why, under those circumstances, the ship- 
ment was made. 



1000 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. Did you rely upon the laws of the agency to make the con- 
tract by Pregel control Canadian Radium & Uranium, or did Pregel 
in his contract with you set forth his ability to control the actions 
of the Canadian Radium & Uranium Co. ? 

Dr. Merritt. We relied on him pretty much. He advised us that 
he was sole sales agent. So, it was not necessary, if that was true, 
to insert similar clauses in other contracts. 

Mr. Case. What steps did you take to determine if he was the sole 
sales agent ? 

Dr. Merritt. We had attempted prior to that time to deal directly 
with Eldorado, and were told by officials of Eldorado they could not 
deal with us, but only Mr. Pregel. 

Mr. Case. Pregel was president of the Canadian Radium & Ura- 
nium Corp. ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And he signed this contract as president of Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp. ? 

Dr. Merritt. He signed as agent, I believe, and they were hooked 
up in the secret letter. 

Mr. Case. And the contract made the secret letter a part of it ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct, yes. 

Mr. Wood. Any other questions? 

Mr. Nixon. I understood you to mention Vitro, and I believe you 
said you dealt so closely with them that you had no concern over 
the possibility that that company would violate a contract ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall whether we had a similar clause in our 
contract with them. 

Mr. Nixon. Did you work closely with Mr. Pregel as well? 

Dr. Merritt. We worked with him closely to a point, and then 
had no further dealings with him later on. 

Mr. Nixon. Prior to the time this shipment was made, you had 
been working with him rather closely ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Did you work with him yourself? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes ; I did. Other people worked with him, too. 

Mr. Nixon. Was there any question but that he himself knew why 
the Government was tying up this material? 

Dr. Merritt. There is no question in my mind but that he knew. 
He was aware of the Manhattan project. 

Mr. Nixon. And he knew why you made this contract? 

Dr. Merritt. I assume so. 

Mr. Case. And he was the sole sales agent. So, if he arranged a 
sale with another party, he did so knowing of the significance of the 
sale? 

Dr. Merritt. I suppose so. 

Mr. Walter. You relied entirely upon the representation Mr. Pregel 
made to you with respect to his ability to control the output in 
Canada? 

Dr. Merritt. We had contact with officials of Eldorado also. 

Mr. Walter. They refused to do business with you ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is right. 

Mr. Walter. Then, as I understand it, you relied entirely on the 
representation Mr. Pregel made to you of his ability to control the 
Canadian output? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1001 

Dr. Merritt. At that time ; yes. 

Mr. Case. In your contact with Eldorado, did they confirm that 
Pregel had sole control over their output ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't recall. Our contracts were largely with Cana- 
dian Radium & Uranium. 

Mr. Case. Why did you go to Pregel after you had talked to Eldo- 
rado? 

Dr. Merritt. They told us to. 

Mr. Case. They told you that because he was the one in charge of 
their output ? 

Dr. Merritt. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Did you have the same relations with Pregel up until 
the time of the contract that you had with Vitro? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Nixon. I am trying to establish whether there was any reason 
for you to be apprehensive that such a shipment might be made ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't think so. We had been associated with the 
other people over a long period of time, and they had our full con- 
fidence. They were people of our kind. 

Mr. Walter. Of course, that is only your own conclusion. Wliat 
do you base your conclusion on ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't know. 

Mr. Wood. Dr. Merritt, when the 1,000-pound shipment was finally 
made from the Canadian company, had that material been offered to 
you under your contract? 

Dr. Merritt. No ; it had not, that I am aware. 

Mr. Wood. W^as there any time during the period of the development 
of the Manhattan Engineering District that any of your organizations 
you had under contract offered any of their material to you that you 
'didn't take it? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't believe so. 

Mr. Wood. If this 1,000 pounds shipped to the Russians had been 
offered to you, would you have taken it? 

Dr. Merritt. Surely. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time when you were endeavoring in the early 
part of 1943 to block foreign shipments of uranium compounds, did 
you confer with the officials of Eldorado mines in Canada regarding 
that matter? 

Dr. Merritt. I have no recollection of conferring with them re- 
garding the matter at all. We advised Mr. Pregel to so advise them, 
I believe, in a letter which was placed in the record yesterday. 

Mr. Tavenner. You dealt with their agent regarding the matter? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Rather than dealing with the officials directly? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. After this contract went into force in March 1943, 
do you know whether Eldorado mines continued to sell small quan- 
tities of uranium to various private purchasers or to industry for com- 
mercial purposes ? 

Dr. Merritt. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall whether Manhattan Engineering 
District was advised or requested to agree to the sale of uranium by 
Eldorado mines to other purchasers than to Manhattan Engineering 
District, for commercial purposes ? 



1002 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Dr. ISIerritt. There may have been some later on that were 
approved. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. You have no personal knowledge of that ? 

Dr. Merritt. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who would have personal knowledge of that ? 

Dr. Merritt. Mr. Burman may. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Burman may ? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I may recall him to ask him that question. Was 
the Canadian Government requested to cooperate in this matter? 

Dr. Merritt. Yes ; they were, at a later date. 

Mr. Tavenner. How late? Too late? 

Dr. JSIerritt. Too late, I believe. They, I think, took over the com- 
pany officially in eTanuary 1944, acquired all the stock at that date, and 
controlled it from then on. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Thank you very much, Doctor, for your courtesy and 
assistance to the committee. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to recall ]\Ir. Burman for one question. 

Mr. Wood. I believe you were sworn yesterday ? 

Mr. Burman. That is correct. 

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE C. BURMAN— Resumed 

(Having been duly sworn by the committee on the day previous, 
January 23, 1950, was at this point recalled.) 

Mr. Taa^nner. 'My. Burman, after the contract of IMarch 27, 1943, 
between INIanhattan Engineering District and Boris Pregel, agent, 
were sales made by Eldorado mines of small quantities of uranium 
compounds for commercial purposes, to your knowledge ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes ; they were. 

JNIr. Tavenner. They were ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Did Eldorado mines, or the agency, Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp., inform Manliattan Engineering District 
of that fact? 

Mr. Burman. Yes. They each were approved in advance. 

(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. They were approved in advance ? 

Mr. BunMAN. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Which was it, Eldorado mines or Canadian Radium 
& Uranium Corp., that asked for the approval ? 

Mr. Burman. Canadian Radium & Uranium, and deliveries were 
made directly from Eldorado mines at Port Hope to the approved re- 
ceivers. There were a series of shipments, for example, to a company 
known as Keystone Carbon Co., St. Mary's, Pa., which manufactured 
a special type of electrical resistor for aircraft. The district did not 
care to interfere with essential needs for uranium, and were willing 
to authorize these shipments where the need was approved. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. But where prospects of such sales occurred, you 
were consulted ? 

Mr. Burman. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. And permission given in advance ? 

Mr. Burman. Yes, sir. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1003 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe you have already answered the question 
that no permission was sought in the case of the 1,000 pounds which 
were sold to the Russian Purchasing Agency ? 

Mv. BuRMAN. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you at any time, or did any other member of 
your staff, confer with Eldorado mines direct regarding this matter; 
that is, the provisions of this contract ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No. I was not engaged in negotiations on the con- 
tract. 

Mr. Tavexner. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Any questions ? 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, for some period of time Man- 
hattan project dealt with Pregel because Eldorado refused to deal 
directly because Pregel was their agent. Is that correct ? 

INIr. BuRMAX. That is my understanding. 

Mr. Walter. AVliy did Manhattan then insist at a later date on 
dealing with Eldorado instead of following the instructions given 
originally? 

Mr. BuRMAN". That is rather difficult to answer. 

]\fr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. BuRMAN. We were directed at a period later in 1943 — I can't 
specify just what the date was — to taper off direct contractual re- 
lations with Mr. Pregel. 

IVIr. Walter. T\'Tio directed you to taper off ? 

INfr. BiTJMAN. Those were directions from General Groves. 

INlr. Walter. Did General Groves indicate any reason why yoit 
should discontinue dealing with Pregel ? 

JNIr. BuRMAN. I didn't receive those directions myself, so I can't 
answer. 

Mr. Walter. You were in conference where Mr. Pregel was dis- 
cussed, were you not ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Not very often, since I was not in direct contact with 
Mr. Pregel. 

Mr. Walter. You knew why General Groves was desirous of deal- 
ing directly with Eldorado and discontinuing dealing with Pregel, 
did you not? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir; I am afraid I didn't. 

Mr. Walter. When you learned of the shipment of the 1,000 pounds, 
did you discuss that with Eldorado? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No, sir. 

Mr. Walter. Did anybody, that you know of? 

Mr. BuRMAN. We didn't discuss it with Eldorado, ])ut Dr. Merritt 
did talk with officials — let me change that. I think Dr. Merritt talked 
to Mr. Bennett, who, I believe, is an official of Eldorado. 

Mr. Walter. And he protested to Eldorado that the terms of the 
contract had been violated? 

Mr. BuRMAN. No; Dr. Merritt asked for information from Mr. 
Bennett as to the transaction, but the contract that was violated was 
with Canadium Radium & Uranium Corp., and not Eldorado, and the 
company existing now as Eldorado is not the same as existed in 1943, 
since the Canadian Government now controls it. 

Mr. Walter. This shipment of 1,000 pounds was made before the 
Canadian Government had any direct control over Eldorado? 

Mr. Burman. Yes. 



1004 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't know if it is clear as to the time when Dr. 
Merritt had this conference with Mr. Bennett that you referred to. 

Mr. BuEMAN. That was after the information was obtained from 
the committee that the 1,000-pound shipment had taken place. 

Mr. Tavenner. So that was sometime in 1948 ? 

Mr. BuRMAN. Yes ; after June 1948. 

Mr. Tavenner. After June 1948 ? 

Mr. Btjrman. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Any questions? 

(No response.) 

Mr. Wood. Thank you very much. 

(Whereupon the witness was excused.) 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. I would like to call Mr. Hermann H. Rosenberg. 

Mr. Wood. Will you hold up your right hand and be sworn? Do 
you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Have a seat. 

TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG, ACCOMPANIED BY 
MANFRED WOLKISER, ATTORNEY 

. Mr. Tavenner. Wliat is your full name, please? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Hermann H. Rosenberg. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you accompanied here by counsel? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Will counsel please state his name and address for 
identification purposes in the record ? 

Mr. WoLKiSER. Manfred Wolkiser, 70 Pine Street, New York City, 
general counsel of Chematar, Tnc, chemical wholesalers. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, when and where were you born ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I was born April 21, 1902, in Berlin, Germany. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you a naturalized citizen of the United States? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ta-s^nner. When did you come to the United States ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. In March 1939. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wlien were you naturalized? 

Mr. Rosenberg. In August 1945. 

Mr. Taat^nner. In what type of business enterprise were you en- 
gaged in Germany ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. In the chemical trade. It is the same kind of busi- 
ness I am engaged in now, and as a matter of fact it is the same organi- 
zation I have been with for the last 30 years. This company I am 
associated with now, of course, has been incorporated in the United 
States after our arrival in this country, but it is actually a continua- 
tion of our business on the other side. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have testified previously before this commit- 
tte, I believe ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes; I did, 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, when did you first confer with the 
Russian Purchasing Commission relative to the acquisition of uranium 
compounds? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1005 

Mr. EosENBERG. Witliiii the course of regular business with allied 
purchasino; commissions during the war, which was practicjilly the 
only possibility of continuing business with the overseas countries with 
which we dealt in peacetime, we had contact also with the Russian 
Purchasing Commission by phone and occasional visits to Washington 
when we saw the other allied purchasing commissions also, and it was 
the end of January 1943 when we got an inquiry from the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Regarding uranium ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Ta\t;nner. It was the latter part of January 1943, that you had 
your first contact with them regarding uranium ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. TA^^5NNER. Had you had transactions with the Russian Purchas- 
ing Commission prior to that time ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. According to my best knowledge and belief 
Ave had about five very minor transactions in industrial and fine chemi- 
cals with them after the outbreak of war in 1941, since December 
1941, and in 1942, aggregating a couple thousand dollars, I would say, 
according to my memory ; a very minor amount. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would you tell us the nature of your first confer- 
ence with the Russian Purchasing Commission relating to uranium? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I do not remember having had any correspondence 
wnth them, but according to my recollection we hacl quite a number 
of telephone conferences with them. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you receive a letter ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; we received inquiry by a letter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have the letter? We will save time if you 
have the letter ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We have not all our correspondence with any of our 
customers for those years. 

Mr. Wood. The question was asked you if you have that letter? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No ; I have not that letter, but I have the confirma- 
tion of that letter, and may I explain the reason for not having the 
original letter but having a copy of our letter ? The practice in our 
company is that we have shipping files — that means files pertain- 
ing to the particular shipment — and a regular file in which an extra 
copy of our correspondence is kept. We have disposed of all the ship- 
ping files up to, as far as I remember, 1943 or 1944, unless there is 
correspondence in those particular shipping files of later years, while 
we have, of course, kept the less voluminous files in which not all 
the shipping correspondence was collected. So we have the copies 
of our correspondence in many cases where we do not have the incom- 
ing correspondence which was a part of the shipping files. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you produce at this time the letter confirming 
your first communication from the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
relating to uranium ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes [producing copy of letter]. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think it would save time if I read this in evidence. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify something in my mind 
at this point ? 

Mr. Wood. Yes. 



1006 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Walter. As I understand, in order to avoid an accumulation 
of useless papers, it is the practice of your company to destroy corre- 
spondence after keeping it for a certain period of time 'i 

Mr. RosENEERG. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Why did you destroy the inquiry to you and retain 
your reply to the person who sent the inquiry ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We received, of course, incoming correspondence 
in one copy, while we make two copies of our outgoing correspondence. 
One copy goes in the so-called shipping file, which naturally is being 
destroyed periodically, while the other copy of our outgoing corre- 
spondence is kept in the general file. 

Mr. Walter. Why would you keep a copy of your letter when it 
doesn't relate to anything at all ? 

Mr. Wolkiser. May I please 

Mr. Walter. No. I am asking him. 

Mr. Rosenberg. The files which pertain to the actual shipments 
have quite a volume and our ojSice is comparatively small. We keep, 
of course, all the incoming and outgoing invoices. 

Mr. Wood. Do you desire to read tliis copy into the record, Mr. 
Tavenner ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection you may do so. 

Mr. Tavenner (reading) : 

Februaky 2, 1943. 

The Government Purchasing Commission op the Soviet Union in the U. S. A., 
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C. 
(Attention Mr. N. S. Fomichev.) 

Gentlemen : We acknowledge to have received yesterday your inquiry of 
January 28 concerning uranium metal, urano-uranic oxide, and nitrouranyl. 

We are preparing an interesting proposition, including uranium metal, for 
you and shall communicate with you within the next few days. 

The majority of the inquired items could be shipped promptly. 

Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please 
give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by 
phone, before you make your final decision. 
Very truly yours, 

By Hermann Rosenberg. 
Chematar, Inc., 

Mr. Wood. What is the date of that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. February 2, 1943. I offer the letter in evidence and 
ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 1." 

Mr. Case. Mr. Rosenberg, I notice there is a mark across the type- 
written part of the signature. Does that mark have any significance? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. That is my initial. 

Mr. Case. That is your initial ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And you put that initial there yourself? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Case. That is your characteristic manner of putting your initial 
on a carbon copy? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. No objection. 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
1," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^ 



« See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1007 

Mr. Tavenner. What action did you take after receiving the in- 
quiry for uranium compounds? 

Mr. Rosenberg. As was customary during the "war years, we in- 
quired of War Production Board, Chemical Information Section, 
Group 2, in New York, whetlier there was any restriction as to the 
material involved. I approached, on the same day we received the 
inquiry, January 29, 1943, group 2 of the War Production Board in 
New York, and got the information that just a few days before, as a 
matter of fact on January 26, 1943, an order was issued restricting this 
particular merchandise to certain uses. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that order M-285 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. M-285; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Rosenberg. We were told that this order prohibited the use of 
uranium compounds in glass, ceramics, pottery, and so on, but that it 
did not say anything about export and was apparently not applicable. 
As to details, we were referred to the Miscellaneous Minerals Division 
of the War Production Board. 

Mr. Tavenner. What quantity of material did the Russian Purchas- 
ing Commission show an interest in obtaining? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Two hundred and twenty pounds of uranium ni- 
trate; 220 pounds of uranium oxide; and 25 pounds of uranium 
metal. 

Mr. Tavenner. After conferring with group 2 of the War Pro- 
duction Board, what did you do? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We had been promised a copy of the restriction 
order, and apioroached in the meantime, by phone and wire, a number 
of possible suppliers of this material. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have copies of your letters and telegrams to 
possible suppliers? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. We sent one telegram to the Shattuck 
Chemical Co. in Denver, Colo., and had telephone conversations with 
the rest of the companies we knew of at that time, because they were 
located in New York. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of your telegram to the Shat- 
tuck Co. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. January 29, 1948. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. You acted very promptly, because you acted prior to 
acknowledging receipt of the request? 

Mr. Rosenberg, Yes. Pi'eceding this inquiry we must have received 
a telephone call from the Russians, because in this telegram to the 
Shattuck Chemical Co. we say : 

For Allied Government order being not subject WPB Order M-285 please 
wire quotations * * * 

Shall I go one ? 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't think it is necessary. What is the date of 
your wire to the Shattuck Co. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. January 29, 1943. 

Mr. Walter. I think the telegram should go in the record in its 
entirety. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer the telegam in evidence and ask that it be 
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 2." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 



1008 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen- 
berg 2,'' is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ' 
Mr. Tavenner. And I will read it : 

January 29, 1943. 
S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., 

Denver, Colo.: 

For Allied Government order being not subject WPB order M-285 please wire 
quotations including export packing 25 pounds uranium metal, 220 pounds 
uranium oxide U30S, 220 pounds uranium nitrate. Indicate earliest possible 
delivery time and what quantities available from stock we pay against delivery. 
Please let specifications follow by air mail. 

Chematar, Inc., 
40 Exchange Place, Netv York, N. Y. 

Mv. Kearney. INIay I ask a question there? 

Mr. Walter (presiding in temporary absence of ISIr. Wood). Yes. 

Mr. Kearney. Was that telegram sent after the receipt of the in- 
quiry from the Russian purchasing agency? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; the day following the date of the inquiry, 

(Representative Wood returns.) 

Mr. Tavenner. What other evidence do 3'ou have in the way of 
copies of telegrams or letters regarding inquiries made of othen 
suppliers ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. As I said, these other suppliers were located in 
New York City, so we merely had telephone conversations with these 
companies, and made a record of the telephone quotations. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you say you made a record of the telephone 
conversations? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Of these telephone conversations, since we Avere not 
familiar with these items and we had no other record of the telephone 
quotations. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. When did 30U prepare this statement of telephone 
messages ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. On January 29, 1943. Here is a second one of 
February 1, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence the two reports of 
telephone conferences, the first bearing date January 29, 1943, which 
1 ask to have marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3," and the second bear- 
ing date February 1, 1943, which I ask to have marked "Exhibit 
Rosenberg 4." 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, whom were the telephone conversa- 
tions with ? 

Mr. Wood. I am asking coimsel to develop it a little further. 

Mr. Tavenner. Exhibit 3 shows you made inquiry of A. MacKay & 
Co. Is that correct? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. And the reply that you received, according to this 
memorandum, was that the company had made 20 poiuids which were 
supposed to be ready, and another 5 pounds could be ready in a week ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. That is of uranium metal. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is of uranium metal ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. These letters refer to these products [in- 
dicating] . 

' See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1009 

Mr. Tavenner. I see. That related to uranium metal. Then you 
asked questions regarding uranium oxide and uranium nitrate? 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 
Mr. Tavenner. And you were given prices ? 
Mr. Eosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. You also conferred with Fairmount Chemical Co. 
on that date? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. And you conferred with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. on 
that same date? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. You conferred with du Pont, with a Mr. Sellger 
of du Pont? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. You were advised that du Pont could not furnish 
you any material, that it was all requisitioned by the United States 
Government ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. They offered the material. We were offered 220 
pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate for 
prompt delivery. 

Mr. Tavenner. You conferred also with Mallinkrodt? 
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, a chemical supplier of fine chemicals in smaller 
quantities, according to my knowledge, for laboratory and other 
similar uses. 

Mr. Tavenner. You also conferred with a company the name of 
which I cannot read. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Merck & Co., M-e-r-c-k. To them applies the same 
I said about Mallinkrodt, while du Pont is an industrial supplier in 
larger quantities. 

Mr. Tavenner. A. MacKay & Co. advised that they could only fur- 
nish you with black uranium oxide? 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Fairmount Chemical Co. could not supply the ura- 
nium oxide, and stated that early the next week it would quote you 
regarding the uranium nitrate? 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. advised that uranium oxide 
was all they could offer, and it was yellow UsOs ? 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 
Mr. Walter. Wliat are the dates, Mr. Tavenner ? 
Mr. Tavenner. January 29. 
Mr. Walter. What year ? 
Mv. Tavenner. 1943. 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Tave-nner. Here is a notation in regard to your conference 
with B. F. Drakenfeld & Co. : 

Althoiigh he was willing to quote after I gave him the message from WPB, his 
principals did not permit him to quote for. export, but he said we sliould commu- 
nicate with the following importers: African Metal Co., 41 Broad Street, New 
York, N. Y. ; Raymond Luber, Bridgeport, Conn. 

Did you communicate with African Metal Co.? 
Mr. Rosenberg. According to the memorandum of February 1, 
1943, 1 did; yes. 

993.34 — 50 8 



2010 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Du Pont, as stated, made you a quotation for the 
220 pounds of uranium oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Tavenner. The other organizations referred to there were 
unable to quote ? 

;Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. ; 

Mr. Wood. Does the memorandum show the names of the individ- 
uals in these organizations with whom he had these conversations? 

Mr. Tavenner. It does. In one instance it does not give the name 
of the person speaking, and that was the first instance of A. MacKay 
& Co. 

Mr. Walter. How many companies indicated their ability to quote 
on uranium? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Do you mean on uranium metal or uranium 
compounds ? 

Mr. Walter. Both. 

Mr. Rosenberg. May I read 

Mr. Walter. Just the number. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Uranium metal, two ; uranium oxide, two ; uranium 
nitrate, two; and a third one promises to quote early the next week. 
May I mention this is only part of our investigation at that time. 

Mr. Walter. What is the name of the person with whom you talked 
when you conferred with the first organization ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. A. MacKay & Co. ? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Rosenberg. It is 7 years back, but I remember one name of a 
gentleman who I ever talked to with this company, Mr. King, and I 
suppose Mr. King was also in this particular instance the one I 
talked to. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, before that is entered I would like to see it. 

Mr. Ta-st.nner. With regard to exhibit 4, which is a record of tele- 
phone calls for February 1, 1943, it shows that du Pont, giving in 
parentheses the name of the person with whom you spoke, made a 
quotation to you on sodium uranate, showing the complete analysis. 
That was not part of this inquiry from the Russians, was it? 

(Witness makes oif-the-record statement to Mr. Tavenner.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Let's get it on the record. You have stated to me 
there was a mix-up about the material quoted ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Material inquired about. This being the first time 
we were in contact with this material, we were confused as to the 
product the Russians actually wanted. These reports bear out this 
confusion. We had talked the previous day with companies familiar 
with this material, so I followed on February 1 with conversations 
with du Pont and African Metals to find out what type of uranium 
oxide the required product actually is, and I found out there was the 
yellow grade and the black grade, and from the communications that 
followed subsequently with Shattuck Co. I remember now that at 
that time I was informed there was a green grade, which was the 
one we actually purchased and delivered from Shattuck Co. to the 
Russians, and which, I have been told, was the purest grade avail- 
able, purer than the yellow and black grades. And so on February 1 
we got information from du Pont, Mr. Sellger; and from African 
Metals Corp., Mr. Deschepper, about these unclear questions. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1011 

Mr. Ta^^nner. At the bottom of this report I find this notation : 

The packing of the material would not cause them any difficulties, since they 
would have to pack the merchandise in their original packing as it is, merely in 
an outside case. 

What were you referring to there? Packing for export? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, for export. I told them this material was for 
an allied country, and they said it was no trouble to pack for export. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you notify them of the country to which the 
material was to be shipped ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. No, because as brokers we are not much interested 
in bringing our suppliers and our customers together. 

Mr. Case. Page 2 of exhibit 3 is headed: "Telephone reports re- 
garding uranium. January 20, 1943." The first item starts with: 
''WPB (Murrayhill 3-2520 group 2)." Does WPB there stand for 
War Production Board? 

Mr. EosENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. Case. The note which follows in this typewritten carbon copy 
reads : 

There is an order of January 26 M-285 merely prohibiting the use of uranium 
chemicals in the domestic glass, ceramic, and pottery industries and says noth- 
ing regarding export. Besides, no effective date is given yet. If it is for war 
use by the Russians, this order definitely does not apply. He sends us two 
copies. For details we might communicate with their Washington Miscellaneous 
Minerals Division. 

Does that represent a summary of the statements by the representa- 
tive of the War Production Board with whom you talked at this tele- 
phone number ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. Ycs. . 

Mr. Case. Do you recall his specifically saying that "If it is for war 
use by the Eussians, this order definitely does not apply" ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. I do not recollect the exact words he used 7 years 
ago, but I dictated this 5 minutes after the conversation, and at that 
time I am sure that I got the right gist of the conversation. I have a 
copy of that order right here. 

Mr. Case. Do you recall with whom you talked at the War Produc- 
tion Board? 

Mr. EosENBERG. There is an information board, group 2, with which 
we always conferred when materials unknown to us were inquired from 
us during wartime, and only on the strength of this telephonic infor- 
mation did we approach these suppliers. 

Mr. Walter. So that your contacts with the War Production Board 
were not with any particular person. You merely called the general 
information board ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. At that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. You discovered later that it was necessary to obtain 
an export license in order to ship it abroad ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. It was our general knowledge at that time that every 
product going out of this country required an export license to be 
procured by the actual exporter. 

Mr. Tavenner. Didn't you consult Mr. Alexander Pregel and Mr. 
Boris Pregel at that time regarding prices for delivery of uranium 
oxide ? 

Mr. Eosenberg. At some later date we did that. 



1012 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavexxer. How much later, and do you have the record of that 
telephone call? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I do not have a record of that telephone call, but I 
have a record of the conversation with these gentlemen at the time 
of the purchase from the Canadian company. 

Mr. TA^'ENNER. I am talking about the time you put through your 
first successful effort to sell uranium. Didn't you inquire at the time 
you made these inquiries, or shortly thereafter, the price at which 
r*regel could furnish the same material ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose so, and I have possibly also a note about 
this conversation. However, since we make notes of conversations in 
cases where we have new and otherwise not confirmed information, 
there was no necessity at that particular time to make a memorandum 
about any other conversations. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Before we get to that, let us find out a little more 
about the initial contact you niade with Mr. Pregel about it. When did 
you talk to him about the delivery of this first order of uranium? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I have seen INIr. Pregel, according to my best recol- 
lection, only once in my life, and that was during the second part of 
April 1943. I have had several telephone conversations with him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Answer specifically my question. At the time or 
about the time that you made inquiries from these various suppliers, a 
record of which you have, did you not also make the same type of in- 
quiry from Mr. Pregel and, if so, when? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose so. I cannot tell you from my notes 
when that was. 

Mr. Tavenner. But it is your positive recollection that you did 
ask him to quote you the price for delivery of 220 pounds of uranium 
oxide and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir; to my best knowledge and belief I con- 
tacted him at that time also. 

Mr. Tavenner. Why didn't you make a memorandum of that tele- 
phone conversation ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Tavenner, I did not say I have not made it. 
I do not have it. I did not even look for it at this time. There is a 
possibility if I go through our old records of 19-13 I might be able 
to find a memorandum about this conversation. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. You think you have a memorandum about it? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I think so. There is a good possibility. 

]Mr. Tavenner. Well, you Iniew before you came here that the name 
of Mr. Pregel was going to be involved, was bound to be, in connection 
with these transactions, because you later represented him, and I would 
have thought you would be particularly careful to bring memoranda 
pertaining to him rather than concerns we have heard of for the 
first time. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I did not know until I left New York Saturday that 
Mr. Pregel would be a special subject of this hearing. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like you to furnish us a memorandum of 
that telephone convereation if you can locate it. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I certainly will if I can locate it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat was the result o'f your telephone conversation 
with Mr. Pregel, and I should ask you which Mr. Pregel you spoke to ? 

Mr. Resenberg. I spoke to a Mr. Alexander Pregel ; and I can say 
that until I heard it during this hearing and understood from news- 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1013 

paper reports, I did not know there was a Mr. Boris Pregel, to whom 
I have never talked, to my knowledge. I remember once when I called 
Mr. Alexander Pregel was out of town and I talked to another Mr. 
Pregel who might have been his brother. 

Mr. Tavenner. I will ask you questions about that later on. What 
were you advised about the availability of this material by Mr. Alex- 
ander Pregel when you called him about the time you called these 
other supplier ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I can answer that question if I find a memorandum 
about this conversation. 

Mr. Ta\'t:nner. Did he make a quotation to you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. According to my recollection he did. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. How did that quotation compare with other prices? 

Mr. Rosenberg. It must have been more expensive, if I received it, 
because we did not consider it until we could not get this merchandise 
from Shattuck Co. any more. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you satisfied now from your recollection that 
Mr. Pregel repoited he had the stocks on hand that you desired and 
could make delivery of it? 

Mr. Rosenberg. According to my best knowledge and belief he 
quoted at that time, but at too high a price. 

Mr. Tavenner. Can you fix the month you had that conversation 
with him? 

]\lr. Rosenberg. About that same time, early February 1943. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg. It was definitely not on the same date I made these 
telephone reports, because all the calls made on that date appear on 
this piece of paper. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. As a result of these calls that you placed, you finally 
made a deal with Shattuck? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. I now offer exhibit Rosenberg 3 and exhibit Rosen- 
berg 4 in evidence. 

Mr. Wood. They will be admitted. 

(The documents above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 3" 
and "Exhibit Rosenberg 4," are hereinafter incorporated in the 
record.) ^ 

Mr. Tavenner. T would like for you to tell the committee at this 
time what your procedure was, and what your procedure became, in 
the handling of these uranium transactions : That is, how you made 
your contracts, how they were handled before the licensing agency, 
and the general plan under which these licenses were obtained and 
the contracts consummated. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I would like to say at the outset that the export- 
license part was not our business, since we were not the exporters of 
this material ; but I can give information which I got in the course 
of this transaction about these export-license applications by the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am going to change my question. I believe it is 
going to take too long to answer. Tell us just what you did in this 

* See appendix. 



1014 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

transaction with Sliattuck after you received their offer, or their 
commitment ? 

Mr. Rosenberg, We received their quotation the same day we had 
inquired. We received this bj^ wire. We passed this on to the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any record of your letter or telegram 
passing that information on? 

Mr. Rosenberg. May I use notes which I made about these details? 

Mr. Tavenner. That will be satisfactory. That seems to be a pre- 
pared memorandum you have there? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; from the files, which I could locate, plus the 
deductions which you could make from these files, as, for instance, 
from that letter of February 2, 1 deduced we had received an inquiry 
on February 1. 

Mr. Case. You have already submitted, and there have been placed 
in evidence, copies of notes made, you stated, at the time the telephone 
conversations were had with these possible suppliers ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Case. In the letter of February 2, 1943, already placed in evi- 
dence, you invite the Russian Purchasing Commission to communicate 
with you by telephone should they have to place their order before 
your offer is in their hands. 

]\Ir. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Did they communicate with you by telephone ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. They had no reason to, because on February 4 we 
sent them our quotation. 

Mr. Case. How did you find out the quantities they wanted ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. They gave us the quantities, apparently, by phone, 
and confirmed it by that letter which we received on February 1, 

Mr. Case. They gave you the quantities by telephone ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. Did you make notes of that telephone conversation, sim- 
ilar to these other notes that we have ? 

]\Ir. Rosenberg. There is a possibility that we did, but I do not 
have it. 

Mr. Case. You do not have that with you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That particular telephone conversation, I do not 
have a note about that here. 

Mr. Case. You stated it was not always your custom to keep the 
letters that came in, but it was your practice to prepare these tele- 
phone reports 5 minutes after the conversation? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Not always; when we were dealing with material 
that was new to us. 

Mr. Case. Didn't you make a note of the quantities they wanted? 

Mr. Rosenberg. There is a possibility I did. I do not have all my 
notes with me. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, this letter which is in evidence invites the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission to communicate by telephone, and 
since we have in evidence full notes in regard to other telephone con- 
versations, I would like to ask that the witness examine all the papers 
he has with him before he leaves under this subpena, to determine if he 
has any notes of conversations with the Soviet Purchasing Commis- 
sion, and also whether he has notes elsewhere supplying this 
information. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1015' 

Mr. Wood. If you have such notes, where would they be now ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. In New York. 

Mr. Case. Why weren't they brought here under this subpena ? 

Mr. Wood. You were served with a subpena to j)roduce all the rec- 
ords you had in this case, were you not ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No ; I was not. I brought this correspondence along 
in order to support as much as I possibly could. 

Mr. Tavenner. You understood, did you not, that I requested your 
counsel to produce all the records bearing on the transactions relating 
to uranium, whether the inquiries resulted in failure to produce any 
uranium or whether they didn't? 

Mr. WoLKiSER. May 1 answer that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

I\Ir. WoLKiSER. In our telephone conversation during the week, after 
I tried to contact you many times, you told me the subject matters in 
which the committee woiild be interested, just generally, but any 
papers and documents you mentioned only Saturday afternoon when 
I was here, and by that time my client was on his way from New York. 
But he has an awful lot of papers here, and if you take his recollection 
plus the papers, I believe that will satisfy the committee right now, 
but if not, we can still produce any papers you want. 

Mr. Tavenner. Don't you recall, when the appointment was made 
for Saturday over the telephone some earlier day in the week, that I 
specified exactly the matters we were investigating? 

Mr. WoLKiSER. You did say the subject matters, but you did not at 
that time mention any records. There was no subpena. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is right ; there was no subpena. 

Mr. WoLKiSER. The telephone calls are all over the place. This is a 
7-year-old case. 

IMr. Wood. Let's get along with the testimony. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Proceed. You were telling us you had a telephone 
conversation on February 4. 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. We wrote a letter on February 4. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Do you have that letter witli you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I am sorry ; I do not. But that letter I have, and 
I can submit it. because from that letter I quote here, so I must have it. 

Mr. Wood. Will you submit it when you return to your office ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. On February 4 we wrote the Russian Pur- 
chasing Commission that one of the oldest United States producers, 
Shattuck, informs us that black material only contains UsOg. The 
pure material is green, which we offer, 99.5 percent uranium, at $4.50, 
only impurities being traces of iron and what dust might possibly get 
in during handling. Both products now offered practically chem- 
ically pure. Confirming agreement to communicate with each other 
as soon as either advised by WPB in consequence of our request for 
authorization. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then what followed ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We had called on February 3, preceding this letter, 
a Mr. Owen, of WPB, Miscellaneous Minerals Division, who confirmed 
the information we received from group 2 in New York, and informed 
us further there is no application or authorization form under M-285. 

On February 6 we wrote to the Shattuck Co. confirming substitution 
of green uranium oxide, confirming their chemical information in that 
respect, and promised to work on these orders. 



1016 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Nothing happened until March 2, when the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission was ready to buy, and we wired to Shattuck to prepare an order 
for 200 pounds of UaOg and 220 pounds of uranium nitrate. On 
March 3 Shattuck wired their agreement. 

On March 2 we called the War Production Board, Miscellaneous 
Minerals Division, in regard to M-285. We spoke to a Mr. Park, 
assistant to K. J. Land, in charge of uranium, who advised they felt 
the Eussian requirement was not affected by M-285, prohibiting only 
the use of uranium compounds in ceramics, and so forth, but sug- 
gested 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question here? 

Mr. Wood. Yes, sir. 

Mr. I^ARNEY. I would like to ask the witness when that memoran- 
dum was prepared? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Last week. 

Mr. IvEARNEY. Then it is not a record of any telephone conversations 
made at the time of the telephone conversations? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. It was prepared for this particular purpose 
after I had been informed through our counsel what was the subject 
matter of this hearing. 

Mr. Kearney. And the information contained in that memorandum 
comes from your own records or from memory ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. It is based on our own records, which, however, 
are not complete, and in certain cases, as I mentioned an example be- 
fore, it is deductions based on correspondence we have. 

Mr. Kearney. And also from your best recollection? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Ta\':enner. I wish you would support each statement you make 
by a copy of a memorandum of telephone message, if you have one, or 
by copy of letter to which you refer. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg. If you want me to complete this file, I can do it 
very quickly by going to New York and completing it. I think it is 
hard on my office to find these old papers without my presence, but 
perhaps it can be done, but it would be better if I went and directed 
it. I am sure the information I am giving here can be supported to 
a very great extent. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understood you had your full file records with you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. If you do not, just use the records you do have and 
support each statement by the records you have here. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg. We have a rather complete file here, but I did not 
take all telephone notes along. 

Mr. Tavenner. Use what records you have and we will go into the 
other records later. 

Mr. Rosenberg. On February 5 we wrote to the Shattuck Co. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the letter of February 5, 1943, 
addressed to the S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., Denver, Colo,, ancl 
signed by Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be 
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 5." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1017 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen- 
berg 5." is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^ 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed. 

Mr. Rosenberg. On March 2 we sent the following telegram to the 
Shattuck Co. : 

For in-eparing order 200 ponnds Uthreeoeijilit [U SOS], 220 pounds nitrouranyl, 
please wire confirmation that offor including delivery times still good as wired 
January twenty-ninth. Merchandise needed for military purposes of Allied 
Government. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer that telegram in evidence and ask that it be 
marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 6." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosen- 
berg 6," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^" 

Mr. Rosenberg. On March 3 we received a telegram from the Shat- 
tuck Co. This is an original. It comes out of the general file. In 
the shipping file we have a copy. 

Mr. Wood. This is one of your original incoming communications 
of March 3 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. All the telegrams and cables in our office 
are copied because we have different departments and all get a copy. 
Telegrams, I will always have the originals, if I could locate them. 

Mr. Wood. You mean you differentiate between telegrams and let- 
ters you receive ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; because we cannot possibly copy every incom- 
ing letter. 

Mr. Wood. Did you copy this ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Why didn't you destroy the original telegram and 
keep only the copy ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Because we keep the original telegrams, of which 
we have sent copies to our so-called shipping files, in the general file, 
while the incoming letters, being put in the shipping file, there is only 
one original in our possession. 

Mr. Case. What happened to the shipping file which contained the 
originals of letters? 

Mr. Rosenberg. All our shipping files up to the year 1943 have been 
disposed of, I would say, about a year or two ago. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg (continuing). Except if we have correspondence of 
later years in the same file, then we kept them. 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question before we ad- 
journ for lunch? 

Mr. Wood. Yes. 

Mr. Kearney. May I see that letter of February 2 ? 
("Exhibit Rosenberg 1" was handed to Mr. Kearney.) 

Mr. Kearney. I call the witness' attention to the letter dated Febru- 
ary 2, 1943, addressed to the Government Purchasing Commission of 

" See appendix. 
^° See appendix. 



1018 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

the Soviet Union in the U. S. A. The last paragraph reads as follows : 

Should you have to place your order before our offer is in your hands, please 
give us a ring, so that we can submit our proposition to you, if necessary, by 
phone, before you make your final decision. 

Do you have a record of that telephone conversation ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We had no telephone conversation, according to my 
recollection and according to my files, since 2 days later we were able 
to submit the quotation. 

Mr. Kearney. You had no communication, by phone, wire, or letter, 
from the time of this communication of February 2 until Feljruary 4 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. So far as correspondence is concerned, I am able 
to develop that if I can get the complete file, which I can do in 48 
hours. 

Mr. Kearney. This file is in your office in New York City? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I am sure that copies of our correspondence can be 
developed. There might be exceptions, but I don't think so. If I had 
known that I should bring along the complete file, I could have done so. 
It would be quite a voluminous file, and I came here in connection 
with our twentieth anniversary, which we had yesterday, and I didn't 
want to bring too much stuff with me. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the original telegram produced 
by the witness, dated March 3, 1943, addressed to Chematar, Inc., and 
signed S. W. Shattuck Chemical Co., and ask that it be marked "Ex- 
hibit Rosenberg 7." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The telegram above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 7," 
is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. I will read that telegram : 

Retel IT308 and uranyl nitrate, can make deliveries as mentioned our wire 
January 29. 

Mr. Wood. The committee stands recessed until 3 o'clock this after- 
noon. 

(Thereupon, at 1 : 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

afternoon session 

(The hearing was resumed at 3 : 10 p. m.) 
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

Let the record show that there are present Mr. Walter, Mr. Harrison, 
Mr. Moulder, Mr. Velde, Mr. Kearney, and Mr. Wood, a quorum. 
Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, will you come forward, please. 

TESTIMONY OF HERMANN H. ROSENBERG— Resumed 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Rosenberg, before we proceed further, may I sug- 
gest that we will save a good deal of time if you will address your 
answers to the question asked you, unless you think there is a pertinent 
explanation you may care to make. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg, I ask if you will turn over the 
records which you have and to which you have referred to an investi- 

" See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1019 

gator on the staff of this committee to review them, and later we will 
determine whether or not it is necessary to bring yon back here and 
ask you further questions relating to those documents? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavexner. I want you to explain to the committee very briefly 
just what your procedure was in handling one of these requests from 
the Russian Purchasing Commission for the acquisition of uranium 
material. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have told us what you did in the particular 
€ase with Shattuck. After getting in touch with Shattuck, for in- 
stance, and finding that the material was available, your next step, 
as I understood, was to advise the Russian Purchasing Commission 
that the materials had been found ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, will you tell us what your next step was ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We approached by telephone the War Production 
Board. Miscellaneous Minerals Division, in Washington, to make sure 
again, after a month had passed since we got that information about 
M-285, whether the regulations were still the same, and we were told 
that this order did not apply to an export delivery to the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission, but we may inquire further from the United 
States Engineers in New York. I phoned that office, the number of 
which I got from the person I spoke to in the War Production Board 
at Washington, and I spoke to Colonel Crenshaw, who told me that a 
Lieutenant Burman had just been transferred to them from WPB, 
that uranium was not their business, but this man would know better 
than Colonel Crenshaw knew. However, in Lieutenant Burman's 
absence he would suggest we go back to WPB, Washington, and talk 
to Mr. Land's office, and if we got satisfaction there we should proceed 
according to the advice we received there. 

That is what I did. I called that office again and was told by Mr. 
Park — I never had occasion to talk to Mr. Land, but I understand 
Mr. Park was Mr. Land's assistant — that he had spoken to General 
Wesson, and that we should take up the matter with their Lend-Lease 
Department, Mr. Moore. 

That is what I did. Mr. Moore told me that he had already been 
approached by Mr. Fomichev of the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
sometime back concerning a uranium requirement; that he happened 
to know Mr. Fomichev ; and he would get in touch with him and let 
me know. That was on or about March 3. 

On March 6 I phoned Mr. Moore again and I got the permission 
which I thought we had to get for this delivery, by phone, and subse- 
quently by letter. I advised the Soviet Purchasing Commission in 
w^riting about the fact that we had been informed by Mr. Moore of the 
Lend-Lease Department that we did not need any further clearance for 
this transaction, but that the Soviet Purchasing Commission would 
have to apply for an export license, which I advised them to do. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you say you advised the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission they should apply for an export license ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That we had been advised by Mr. Moore in writing 
that no further clearance was required for this transaction except for 
the export license, which the Soviet Purchasing Commission had to 
get, and that they were familiar with the procedure. That was part 



1020 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

of that letter. That information I passed on to the Russians, inform- 
ing them that we woukl not accept the order unless and until they had 
received the export license. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did j^ou receive the export license for this first 
shipment? 

Mr. EosENBERG. We never received any export license for any deliv- 
ery to any Allied mission, because it was the Allied mission's business 
to attend to this part of the procedure, they being the actual exporters. 

Mr. Tavenner. But you would not undertake to close a transaction 
with the supplier until you were sure the export license had been 
issued ; is that correct? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Excuse me. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg. This was ^the procedure in this particular case : 
We had been notified that this product was subject to a War Produc- 
tion Boaj-d order, and we wanted to proceed with particular care and 
make sure that they received the export license before we accepted the 
order, because this particular product was covered by a WPB order, 
regardless of whether it was covered for this particular purpose by the 
order or not. 

Mr. Tam5Nner. Do you know whether such a license was issued? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. We have been told that by Mr. Moore and 
by the Russian Purchasing Commission, who gave us a number and 
the issuance date. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did that export license accompany the bill of lading 
on the shipment of the materials ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. What disposition was made of the export license 
after it was issued ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That I do not know. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Did it at any time come into your hands ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you advised by the Russians what the pro- 
cedure was as to the handling of the license ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No; we got shipping instructions from them and 
it was a domestic destination. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. That is all I am going to ask you about the Shat- 
tuck shipment. Did you receive another request for uranium after 
the first one for 220 pounds each of uranium oxide and uranium 
nitrate ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did you receive that? 

Mr. Rosenberg. On or about March 19, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you then follow the same procedure with 
Shattuck that you followed in the first case ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We sent them a telegram. We got an answer we 
should wait a few days. On March 24 we got an offer from them 
saying they could not offer what was required, because this Russian 
inquiry said that they would preferably receive uranium oxychloride, 
tri-, tetra-, or pentchloride, and Shattuck wired us they could merely 
offer 500 pounds each of the products which they had shipped before. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that satisfactory to the Russian Purchasing 
Commission, and did you attempt to close the transaction with Shat- 
tuck? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1021 

Mr. Rosenberg. We took the same stand — that we would not do 
anythinof until they had received the export license. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the Soviet Purchasing Commission agree to 
purchase the 500 pounds each from Shattuck ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes; subject to receipt of export license. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know whether that export license was 
denied at any time ; say, the 14th of April 194.3 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I know that around April 7 we were told by the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission that the export license would be 
granted by BEW and they would have it within a week. 

Mr. Tavenner. AVlio in BEW made that representation? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We had this information from the Russians, be- 
cause we had no contacts with BEW in this business. 

Mr. Tavenner. Proceed, then, to tell us whether you later learned 
that the license had been denied. 

Mr. Rosenberg. May I refer to my notes ? 

Mr. Wood. He didn't ask for any dates. Did you later learn the 
export license w^as denied? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. The Russians never told you they were having 
trouble getting the license issued? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I think they did, around the time you mentioned; 
yes. May I read a note ? 

Mr. TA^TNNER. If it is pertinent to this question. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. All right. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Wlien, on April 22, we received a telegram from 
the Shattuck Co. that they withdrew their offer, I phoned the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission and told them that. I will read this note, 
now, which refers to a conversation with Mr. Fomichev : 

Read him Shattuck's wire. He was not suiprised. They had written us their 
last letter because they were experiencing already difUculties with WPB, Mis- 
cellaneous Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agree as yet to BEW's 
giving the export license due to urgent domestic requirements. 

Mr. Tavenner. So he was not surprised when the Shattuck Co. 
withdrew its offer ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 

Mr. Ta\T':nner. Is that the first time you knew that there was diffi- 
culty in obtaining the license? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. I am not certain that I understood from your read- 
ing whether Fomichev advised you that the license had been denied ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. [Reading :] 

because they were experiencing already difficulties with WPB, Miscellaneous 
Minerals Division, Mr. Peacock, who did not agi*ee as yet to BEW's giving the 
export license due to urgent domestic requirements. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, what occurred when you advised Fomicliev 
that the offer had been withdrawn ? 
Mr. Rosenberg (reading) : 

We should try to maintain the offer of our supplier ; they, of course, cannot 
con.sider us committed toward themselves, but they will do, if still jrossible, this 
business with us and keep us posted about any further developments. We might 
try meanwhile to find some other material for them, for which the chances of 
materialization might be better, and advise them. 



1022 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavennee. Did you take the matter up with Mr. Moore or any 
other person in Lend-Lease when the offer was withdrawn ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Not at this time ; no. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat supplier did you then contact for the material 
after you were turned down by Shattuck ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I approached for advice the Fairmount Chemical 
Co. on April 22, the day w^hen we got the withdrawal from Shattuck. 
They told us that the only suppliers in the United States were Shattuck 
and du Pont, who got their stuff from Canada, and that caused me to 
get in touch the following day, April 23, with the Canadian Radium 
& Uranium Corp., Mr. A. J. Pregel. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was April 23 that you conferred with him ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. That was the only visit with him. 

Mr. TxWEnner. Did he tell you he had the material available for 
you, or what did he tell you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Tliat as far as uranium compounds are concerned, 
the United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly 
the same authorities in control of the entire production and stock. 
Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for 
Canadian material WPB would give allocation and export license 
easier, they would accept the order. 

Mr. Tavenner. If I understand you correctly, he told you if an 
export license could be obtained 

Mr. Rosenberg. Allocation and export license. 

Mr. Taa^nner. An allocation could be obtained from Canada ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. From our WPB easier for Canadian material than 
for United States material, then they would accept the order. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am not certain whether that is clear. Will you 
state again what Mr. Alexander Pregel stated, or if you have it written, 
let me read it. 

(Witness hands paper to Mr. Tavenner.) 

Mr. Tavenner. This is a memorandum dated April 23, and it 
states : 

Uranium compounds. Also as far as uranium compounds are concerned, the 
United States and Canada are considered one country, with exactly the same 
authorities in control of the entire production and stock. Nevertheless, if we or 
the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian material WPB would give 
allocation and export license easier, tliey would accept the order. 

Mr. Harrison. In other words, if they would give it easier for 
Canadian materials than for American materials; is that what you 
mean ? 

ISIr. Rosenberg. That is what I meant to bring out. 

Mr. Tavenner (reading) : 

Nevertheless, if we or the Russians want to find out whether for Canadian 
material WPB would give allocation and export license easier. 

In other words, if you could get a WPB authorization on an export 
license they would be able to get it more easily in Canada ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. The Soviets. 

Mr. Tavenner. It says "we or the Russians." Does "we" mean 
Chematar ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. What did you then proceed to do after receiving that 
information from Mr. Alexander Pregel ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1023 

Mr. Rosenberg. I informed the Russians of that development and 
received on April 26 a call from Mr. Fomichev that they had received 
a letter from the Lend-Lease Administrator saying they had approved 
the giving of an export license by BEW for the 500 pounds each of 
uranium uranic oxide and nitrouranyl; that although they had not 
received yet the actual export license, they now could place the order 
finally, and we should see what we still could do with our supplier. 
He said we could mention that they had received that advice from 
General Wesson of the Lend-Lease Administration. 

]\Ir. Tavenner. Did you know at that time that the license which 
the Russians received was the license which Lend-Lease approved for 
the original material which you were expecting to obtain from the 
Shattuck Co. ? _ . . 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is obvious, because I insisted on an amend- 
ment of the export license to make it applicable. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you see the license before it was amended ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We never saw any license, but we were advised that 
the license was amended in writing. 

Mr. Tavenner. In fact, you considered it necessary to obtain an 
amendment, because you were shipping different materials at different 
prices ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. By all means. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did you advise the Russians that that license 
would have to be amended ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. April 27. 

Mr. Ta-^tinner. What did you advise them ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I phoned them on April 27, and my telephone 
report reads like this : 

When I gave him (Mr. Fomichev) the negative reply as per Shattuck's tele- 
gram, he said that he cannot comprehend this outcome but finally accepted the 
situation as it is. 

I made him the proposition concerning Canadian material as per our today's 
letter, which he wanted to get to file the amendment of the export license. He 
now has received the export license No. 1643180, dated April 23, for 500 lbs. each, 
Chematar as supplier. 

He objected to the fact our present prices are higher than previously quoted 
for same material, which I explained was of Canadian origin. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Do I understand from that that you advised the 
Russian purchasing commission that the license should be amended? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. We wrote them a long letter about it, also, 
confirming this telephone conversation of the same day. 

Mr. Tavenner. This is a copy of the letter you wrote ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. I desire to offer in evidence that letter, dated April 
27, 1943, addressed to Mr. N. S. Fomichev, the Government Purchas- 
ing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, 
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C, signed Chematar, Inc., by 
Hermann Rosenberg, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 8." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
8,"' is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. You state in this letter that it is — 

highly advisable that you (the Russian Purchasing Commission) try to get 
through the respective amendment to your export license within 2 or 3 days. 



" See appendix. 



1024 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr, Walter. Is it stated in what respect the license should be 
amended? 

Mr. Tavenner. Without taking the time to read the entire letter, 
does it state how the license should be amended ? 

Mr. KosENBERG. Yes. 

Mr. AVooD. Let's see the letter. 

(Exhibit Rosenberg 8 was handed to Mr. Wood.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you confer with Lend-Lease about the neces- 
sity for the amendment ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. No. sir. It was none of our business. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, you had confered with them before that re- 
garding the issuance of the license. Wasn't it all the more important 
now to get the license amended promptly ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We had not connnunicated with them regarding 
the issuance of the license. We wanted to make absolutely sure that 
under this WPB order, which prohibited the use of uranium com- 
pounds in glassware, ceramics, and so forth, for domestic purposes 

Mr. Tavenner. I am talking about Mr. Moore, in particular, of 
Lend-Lease. You had been in touch with him on several occasions 
about the issuance of the license ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, did you get in touch with Mr. Moore or any 
other person in Lend-Lease about expediting the amendment, which 
was the thing that was immediately confronting you at the time you 
wrote this letter? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I do not think that we did that, and I was by that 
time under the impression that the special care which we wanted 
to give this matter was not required under the order, since the clear- 
ance was given, and since it was none of our business, anyhow. 

Mr, Wood. I believe a reading of the copy of this letter would 
clarify a good manj^ of the things we are asking about. The letter, 
dated April 27, 1943, is directed to Mr, N. S. Fomichev, the Govern- 
ment Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U. S. A., 
1610 Park Road NW., Washington, D. C. It is marked "Special 
delivery" and is re : Uranium compounds : 

Dear Mr. Fomichev : As we told you this afternoon, the plant, with which 
we had made the arran,i,"enients, subject to actual receipt of Export License, 
before they have had to dispose elsewhere of the 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide 
and 500 pounds of nitrouranyl, could not accept the oi'der any more, due to other 
arrangements they had to make during the long time until the export license 
actually came into yoiu- hands. 

We have actually done the utmost to accommodate you and were pleased that, 
in spite of the ever growing tightness of the uranium situation, we thus were 
able to submit to you the following proposition, which is to be understood of 
course subject to change until you enable us this time to make absolutely iinal 
arrangements on the basis of an export license in full conformity with our 
proposal. 

V^^e have made preparatory arrangements with Canadian supijliers, who have 
told us that under the above outlined conditions the following order could be 
accepted : 

5(X) pounds of each or 1,000 pounds of one of black uranium oxide 95/98 
percent UsOg, at .$3.10. Uranium nitrate crystals 99.5 percent pure, prac- 
tically chemically pure, at $2.85 ; both prices to be understood per pound net 
weight, including packing, f. o. b. United States point of delivery. 

Delivery within ab<mt H weeks after receipt of order indicating the luunber 
of corresponding United States export license. 
Usual terms and conditions. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1025 

To prevent a repetition of the last exi)erience, it would be highly advisable 
that yon try to get through the respective amendment to your export license 
vpitliin 2 or 3 days, what for emergency amendment of this kind has always been 
possible, and that you call us up the moment you have this export license in your 
hands. You should, furthermore, send us the necessary declaration right away, 
so that we have it on file when your final order is being given. Please find the 
wording in the draft we sent you on April 5 and change it in accordance with the 
order you want to give us now. 

We have noted that you now have received export license No. 1643180, but its 
date of April 23 shows, of course, that it could not have reached you before one 
of the last few days. 

We have made our preparatory arrangements in accordance with the quantities 
of your recent order, but we believe it possible that still somewhat larger quanti- 
ties could be secured if you would succeed in obtaining for additional quantities 
export license without too much delay. 

We sincerely trust to get your definite advice by phone not later than Friday, 
the 30th. 

Very truly yours, 

Chematar, Inc., 
By Hermann Rosenberg. 

Mr. Tavenner. You indicated in that letter that Mr. Pregel had 
advised you that there were additional quantities of uranium that may 
be made available. What did he tell you about that ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. In the report of visit of April 23 is the following 
sentence : 

They do not have any stocks, but 1,000 pounds or more of each product can 
be made up right away and within 2 or 3 weeks delivered to the desired United 
States point. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he tell you how much more than 1,000 pounds 
could be delivered ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Not to my recollection. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you also write a letter to Canadian Radium & 
Uranium Corp. in regard to your order ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. ^Do you have that letter there ? 

Mr. Rosenberg.* Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. May I see it ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes [producing same]. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the first paragraph of this letter, dated April 
27, 1943, addressed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., 630 Fifth 
Avenue, New York, you state : 

In acknowledgment of our understanding, we wish to confirm for good order's 
sake that we are working on order and export license on the basis of your follow- 
ing quotations : 

Then you give the quotations. You say you are working on the export 
license. Does that refresh your recollection now to the point that you 
can tell us the nature of the work you were doing in obtaining the 
export license? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We meant in this case our customers, whom we did 
not care to disclose to our supplier. 

JSfr. Tavenner. I desire to offer this letter in evidence, and ask that 
it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 9." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
9," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) " 

" See appendix. 

99334 — 50 9 



1026 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenxer. How soon after tlie writing of that letter on April 
27 did you receive word that the license had been amended ? 

Mr, Rosenberg. In this particular case I have a copy of the letter 
from the Soviet Purchasing Commission, because we got this letter 
in two copies and we maintained the second copy in our file. 

Mr. Tavenner. This letter, dated April 29, 1943, signed by N. S. 
Fomichev, In Charge of Chemicals, and addressed to Chematar, Inc., 
states in its first paragraph? 

Today we received an amended export license #1643180, covering 500 lbs. of 
Black Uranium Oxide, at $3.10 per lb., for $1550.00, and 500 lbs. of Uranium 
Nitrate, at $2.85 per lb., for $1425.00— total amount, $2975. 

Mr. Wood. Wliat is the date of that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. April 29, 1943. I offer that letter in evidence and 
ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 10." 

Mr. Wood. It will be received. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
10," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.)" 

Mr. Tavi:nner. Do you know how tlie Russian Purchasing Commis- 
sion was able to obtain an amendment of that license between the date 
of your letter, April 27, and the date of this letter, April 29 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you advised in any way how it was done ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you at any time see the amended license ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. It was not our business. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the transaction consummated for the purchase 
and shipment of that material? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us briefly about it. 

Mr. Rosenberg. On May 1, after having received the letter from 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission of April 29, we accepted the order 
from the Soviet Purchasing Commission ''based on export license 
No. 1643180, as amended," and on the same date we placed the order 
with the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. of New York "under 
export license No. 1643180, as amended." 

Mr. Tavenner. How and by whom were you paid for the shipment ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We were paid by Amtorg Corp. — ^Amtorg Trading 
Corp., I believe is the full name — of New York. 

Mr. Tavenner. And you remitted the money to whom, after de- 
ducting the fee for your services ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. To the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., in 
New York City. 

Mr. Tavenner. How were you paid ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. By check. 

Mr. Tavenner. By check of what organization? Did you say 
Amtorg ? 

Mr. Kearney. Were you paid by check of the Amtorg Corp. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose so. I have not seen the check, but I have 
a copy of the invoice to Amtorg. 

Mr. Kearney. Was the check payable to you or to your company ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

" See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1027 

Mr. Kearney. Did you see it? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I don't see the checks. They go to the bookkeeping 
department. 

Mr. Kearney. You personally didn't see it ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Wood. Then how did your company pay the Canadian Radium 
& Uranium Corp. ; by check ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. Do you have that check ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes; I must have the check. I have the bill of 
the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and the check must be in 
accordance with that bill. That is the shipping advice. The bill is 
in our bookkeeping department. 

ISIr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a? question ? 

Mr. Wood. Yes. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr; Kearney. Did the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. laiow 
that the Soviet Government was your customer ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. They have marked the cases "USSR." 

Mr. Kearney. You can answer my question, can't you? Did the 
Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. know that your customer was. 
the Soviet Government ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. They must have known it, because they 
have marked the cases "USSR." 

Mr. Kearney. Did they know or didn't they ? 

Mr. Rosenberg: Yes, sir ; they did, 

Mr. Harrison. And so marked their invoice ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. We even notified them. I have a letter here 
of May 21, in which I say : 

We just liad a telepbone call from the Russian Purchasing Commission, who 
are very anxious to get the merchandise at the latest in the course of next 
week * * * 

Mr. Tavenner. Let me read it, if you don't mind. This is a letter 
dated May 21, 1943, from Chematar, Inc., by Hermann Rosenberg, 
directed to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., 630 Fifth Avenue, 
New York, N. Y., attention Mr. Alexander Pregel, vice president, re 
order of May 1, 1943 [reading] : 

Gentlemen : We called you up today to ask you to find out by telegram from 
your Canadian plant whether the 1,000 pounds uranium compounds as per our 
captioned order have already been sliipped to Great Falls, Mont., or when that 
will be done. We just had a telephone call from the Russian Purchasing Com- 
mission, who are very anxious to get tlie merchandise at the latest in the 
course of next week, to make a certain conveyance for transportation to the 
Soviet Union. 

Please do not fail to let us have this advice tomorrow or at the latest Mon- 
day morning, all the more as it is today already 3 weeks since we placed this 
urgent order with you. 

Mr. Kearney. What is the date? 

Mr. Tavenner. May 21, 1943. I offer that letter in evidence and ask 
that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 11." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
11," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) " 

" See appendix. 



15 



1028 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Then, again, there is another letter written by 
Chematar, Inc., to Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., under date 
of May 1, 1943, attention Mr. A. J. Pregel, vice president [reading] : 

Gentlemen : In reference to your attached purchase confirmation, we wish 
to advise you that we are working on further orders for you from the Soviet 
Government, for which, as we told you, we are placing these orders. 

We hope that we can build up a continuous business with you and trust 
that we may count on your cooperation hereby. 

I offer that letter in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit 
Eosenberg 12." 

Mr. EosENBERG. I am paid for doing business. 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
12," is hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Ta\'enner. What other uranium requests were you working on 
at that time for the Soviet Government? 

Mr. Rosenberg. There was no other. 

Mr. Tavenner. There was no other ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Your letter says there was. 

Mr, Rosenberg. That doesn't mean that there was. I tried to 
impress my customer. 

Sir. Ta\'enner. a trade practice, you mean ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there any later time when .you did work on 
further requests from the Russian Government for uranium? 

Mr, Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. When was that ? 

]Mr. Rosenberg. May I have the opportunity of improving my pre- 
vious statement ? I have the original invoice of the Canadian Radium 
& Uranium Corp. here. 

Mr. Wood. We have a photostatic copy of it, but we will accept the 
original. We would rather have the original. All we have is a photo- 
static copy. 

Mr, Ta\t3nner. I desire to offer the invoice in evidence, and ask that 
it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 13." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The invoice above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 13," 
is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^' 

Mr. Rosenberg. We need it for the income-tax collector. 

Mr. Tavenner. We will make a copy and return the original to 
you. 

Now will you answer my question about further transactions ? The 
invoice you have just presented related to the 1,000 pounds we have 
been talking about. What other inquiries did you receive requesting 
that you obtain uranium for the Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I heard from Mr. Pregel that the Canadian repre- 
sentative of the Russians tried to cut us out, and had communicated 
with them directly, and I asked him not to offer them directly because 
we want to stay in the business. That was on INIay 25. On May 27 
Mr. Pregel told me he has talked to Toronto and they will not quote 
to the Russians. His inquiry came from Ottawa. They will try to 

^^ See appendix. 
" See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1029 

refer them to New York and then he will commimicate with us; 
Pregel will communicate with us. 

Mr. Wood. Which Mr. Pregel was that? 

Mr. EosENBERG, Alexander. 

INIr. Tamdnner. In other words, that was looking to future business 
in uranium? 

JSIr. Rosenberg. There must have been an inquiry for uranium from 
the Russians from Ottawa. 

Mr. Harrison. The next time the Russians wanted uranium, they 
went directly to the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., and that 
company, Mr. Pregel's company, notified you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't understand that. Read your memorandum 
over again. 

Mr. Rosenberg. On May 25, I have a memorandum here, that Mr. 
A. Pregel promised to call Toronto and have them refrain from quot- 
ing to the Russians. 

llr. Ta^^nner. Have who refrain from quoting? 

]Mr. Rosenberg. I depend on this memorandum. 

Mr. Tavenner. Does that mean have Eldorado mines refrain from 
quoting ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is my interpretation. 

]N[r. Harrison. As I understand, the Russians were attempting to 
avoid paying a commission to you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Unfortunately, yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Of course the American taxpayers were paying it all. 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, can I have the date of shipment of 
the 1,000 pounds ? 

Mr. Wood. The original invoice shows May 21, 1943. 

Mr. Kearney. Where was that shipped to ? 

Mr. Wood. Do you understand that this shipment of 1,000 pounds 
was delivered to the Russians at Great Falls, Mont. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. It was shipped to Col. A. N. Kotikov, resident rep- 
resentative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, Air 
Service Depot of the Air Transport Command, Gore Field, Great 
Falls, Mont., U. S. A. I have that from the shipping advice. 

Mr. Tavenner. It was shipped from Port Hope in Canada to Great 
Falls, Mont. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. I have the routing here, and it gives the 
Russian order number. 

Mr. Tavenner. Finish your statement as to what occurred regard- 
ing your conference with Pregel on May 27. 

Mr. Rosenberg. There was a telephone conversation on May 25 — two 
telephone conversations. On May 25 I have a memorandum that I 
shall call him up tomorrow morning and find out what he has ar- 
ranged. No point in our calling Toronto directly, because they would 
not take any directions from us (Chematar) and they do not act 
without approval of the New York office. 

Mr. Ta\"enner. Tell us the names of the parties whom you were 
expected to call. Whom were you going to call ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Pregel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Whom were you going to call in Canada ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I wanted to call the Toronto office. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of what? 



1030 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Rosenberg. I suppose of Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. 
I am sorry I don't remember that any more. And on May 27 Mr. 
Pregel called me back, and I think that telephone report was under- 
stood, or shall I read it again? 

Mr. Tavenner. Read it again. 

Mr. Rosenberg (reading) : 

He has talked to Toronto and they will not quote to the Russians. Since their 
inquiry was a quite vague one, there is no point in our offering them and quoting 
them prices at the present moment. 

I do not know if that was told to me or if I wrote that down for 
our company of our intention, but I have a report of June 2, when 
I spoke to Mr. Cherniakov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
because Mr. Fomichev was out of town for a time and he was taking 
charge of chemical purchases. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was next ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. A letter of the same date to the Russians. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us what occurred finally as a result of the in- 
quiries the Russians were making, which apparently started from the 
Ottawa office? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I have a letter from the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission, but it has no reference to our shipments. 

Mr. Tavenner. We want to see those letters, but we will not take 
the time to read them now, unless they have a bearing, 

Mr. Rosenberg. This letter of June 11, 1943, from the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission to Chematar says : 

In reply to your letters of May 29 and June 2 concerning uranium compound 
and radium, I wish to advise you that we communicated with the lend-lease 
authorities in order to grant the export license in case we will place an order 
for the additional quantity of the same material with your company. If the 
United States authorities will grant us an export license, we will be glad to 
discuss with you the matter in question. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you locate any additional supply of uranium for 
them ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you attempt to get any for them, or did they 
■attempt to get approval again ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. And the next time it was not forthcoming? 

Mr. WoLKiSER. I would like to call attention that this letter is signed 
"S. S. Cherniakov, In Charge of Explosive Material and Chemical 
Installation." This is the first time his name appears. 

Mr. Harrison. And, so far as you know, the shipment of May 1943 
was the last uranium that the Rusisans were able to obtain in this 
country ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. From us. 

Mr. Harrison. As far as you know, it was the last uranium they got 
from any source ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Except from what I heard in this meeting. But 
they approached us again on August 5. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Rosenberg, the letter that you have produced under 
date of June 11, 1943, which has a stamp in the right-hand corner 
"Received June 12," signed by S. S. Cherniakov, is there objection 
to leaving this letter with us ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1031 

Mr. Wood. The letter is addressed to Chematar, Inc., 40 Exchange 
Place, New York, N. Y. It is on the letterhead of the Government Pur- 
chasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of 
America, and is marked "Attention : Mr. Herman Kosenberg." The 
letter is as follows : 

Gentlemen : In reply to your letters of May 29 aud June 2 concerning uranium 
compound and radium, I wish to advise you that we communicated with the 
lend-lease authorities in order to grant the export license in case we will place 
an order for the additional quantity of the said material with your company. 
If the United States authorities will grant us an export license, we will be glad 
to discuss with you the matter in question. 
Thanking you for your cooperation, we are 
Very truly yours, 

S. S. Chebniakov, 
In Charge of Explosive Material a7id Chemical Installation. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the letter of June 11, 1943, in 
evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 14." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 14," is 
hereinabove incorporated in the record.) ^* 

Mr. Wood. I note in this letter, Mr. Rosenberg, Mr. Cherniakov says, 
"in case we will place an order for the additional quantity." That 
indicates, to my mind, that there had been under discussion some addi- 
tional quantity. It doesn't state place an order for "an" additional 
quantity, but for "the" additional quantity. Had they been negotiat- 
ing for further quantities? 

Mr. Rosenberg. The letter of June 2, addressed by me to them, says : 

We still are able to supply you with additional quantities of uranium nitrate 
and black uranium oxide, aud, since we understand that further quantities are 
inquired for the USSR, please advise us for wnat additloual quantity of either 
compound you would like to have our offer. 

That is all I know. 

Mr. Walter. To whom was that letter addressed? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Attention Mr. S. S. Cherniakov. 

JVIr. Walter. The man in charge of explosives ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. It doesn't say that, but it is marked for the 
attention of Mr. Cherniakov. 

Mr. Wood. Let's receive that letter also. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to introduce in evidence the letter of June 2, 
1943, from Chematar, Inc. to the Russian Purchasing Commission, 
and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 15." 

Mr. Wood. It will be received. 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Rosenberg 
15," is hereinafter incorporated in the record.) ^^ 

jNIr. Tavenner. You do know the quantity of materials they were 
inquiring about at that time; do you not? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I do not. 

Mr. Tavenner. Look at your memorandum of August 5. 

Mr. Rosenberg. That was later. We are talking about June now. 

I^Ir. Tavenner. Did you later find out how much they were inter- 
ested in purchasing? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I think this was later. 



" See appendix. 
^ See appendix. 



1032 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Did anything happen between June 11 and August 
5, 1943, relating to uranium ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Not according to my recollection and the files at 
my disposal. 

Mr. Tavenner. What happened August 5, 1943 ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I read from a telephone report of a conversation 
on August 5, 1943, with M. N. S. Fomichev : 

Uranium compounds. — They recently have asked WPB again to make a survey 
to the effect if not another 10-15 tons could be located for them. 

I suggested they ask Mr. Moore to communicate with us to find out whether 
our supplier could make available such or a similar quantity against allocation. 

See separate telephone report with Mr. Moore. 

Mr. Walter. Do yon remember Mr. Moore's first name ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. William C. Moore. 

Mr. Walter. You mentioned a Mr. Park a moment ago. Wlio was 
that? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Wlio? 

Mr. Walter. Park of WPB. 

Mr. Rosenberg. He was an assistant to Mr. Land. I talked to him 
on the phone. 

Mr. Walter. Do you remember his first name ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I don't remember it, but I might have it in my 
files. 

In that conversation with Lend-Lease Administrator William C. 
Moore of August 5, 1943, to which I referred, it says in the telephone 
report : 

Re uranium compounds. — There is no material available for Russians at the 
present time, and also the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corporation has reported 
to him that they have nothing available. 

Mr. Tavenner. You advised Lend-Lease on August 5, 1943, in effect, 
that you had been doing business with the Canadian Radium & 
Uranium Corp. Isn't that the effect of this telephone communication ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. May I see it again ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Maybe I misunderstood your reading of it. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I do not remember the wording. 

Mr. WoLKiSER. This is what Mr. Moore told him. 

Mr. Tavenner. You were stating what Mr. Moore said? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. I thought you were stating what you said to Mr. 
Moore. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; I told him that. How could Mr. Moore talk 
to me about the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. unless I told 
him about that company? 

Mr. Tavenner. In this telephone report you say : 

There is no material available for Russians at the present time. 

Who made that statement ? You or Mr. Moore ? 
Mr. Rosenberg. Mr. Moore. 
Mr. Tavenner (reading) : * * * 

and also the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. has reported to him that they 
have nothing available. 

That is, reported to Mr. Moore ? 
Mr. Rosenberg. That is correct. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1033 

Mr. Tavenner. Had you told Mr. Moore prior to that time that you 
had been obtaining urani^^n through the Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp.? 

]Mr. EosENBERG. I have no record of that, and I have no recollection 
of it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you at any time talk to a member of the staff 
of the Manhattan Engineering District about the obtaining of mate- 
rials from the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Since I have learned at this hearing that Lieutenant 
Burman was a member of that outfit, and in his absence I spoke to 
Colonel Crenshaw, I know I talked to that outfit. 

Mr. Tavenner. That occurred during the first shipment from Shat- 
tuck. Did you talk to them about the Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I never had any further contact with them, because 
they referred me back to WPB, and my understanding was that they 
were not interested in our business. As a matter of fact, Colonel Cren- 
shaw told me at that time that uranium was not their business. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understand. I am not talking about that conver- 
sation. Did you talk to Mr. Moore or anybody in Lend-Lease about 
the supply you had been getting from Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. This is my only record of that kind. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliy would Mr. Moore have made a statement like 
that to you if you had not discussed that corporation with him? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That is what I wanted to bring out. I must have 
told him we were in contact with that company at that time and asked 
whether we would be permitted to transact business with this company 
for the Russians; and I have another telephone report of that same 
date that might be of interest to you. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I spoke on August 5 to Mr. Pregel of the Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp. 

Mr. Tavenner. Which Mr. Pregel? 

Mr. Rosenberg. The telephone report says, "Mr. Pregel (Mr. A. G. 
Pregel out of town ) ," so it must have been the other one. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were there more than two Pregels that you know of ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I didn't even know of the second one up to that 
date. This telephone report says : 

Re uranium compounds. — They are not allowed any longer to quote or even 
give us any information. We would have to approach WPB for that. The prices 
are unchanged, but they have no material for sale. Unofficially, he would say 
there is no chance in approaching WPB at present. The proper way would be that 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission communicate with the Canadian Government 
Ministry of Munitions and Supplies; the Russians know exactly the procedure. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is what Mr. Pregel told youf 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. That he could make no further quotations ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Taxtenner. Did he tell you why ? 

Mr. Rosenberg (reading) : 

They are not allowed any longer to quote or even give us any information. 



1034 SHIPAIENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. What did the last sentence in tl\at memorandum mean : 
That the Russians would know the exact procedure ? The exact pro- 
cedure for what ? 

Mr. EosENBERG. For approaching the Canadian Government Min- 
istry of JNIunitions and Supplies. 

Mr. Wood. Did it refer to the Canadian Government or to a branch 
of the American Government ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. As I understand it refers to the Canadian Govern- 
ment, because it says : 

Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies. 

Mr. Wood. May I see that memorandum ? 

(Said memorandum was handed to Mr. Wood.) 

Mr. Wood. This memorandum reads in this language : 

They are not allowed any longer to quote or even give us any information. 

By "they" you meant the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. ? 
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 
Mr. Wood. The next sentence is : 

We would have to approach WPB for that. 

Who is "we"? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Chematar, Inc. 

Mr. Wood. And WPB is a branch of the American Government? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Wood (reading) : 

The prices are unchanged, but they have no material for sale. 

That is the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp. ? 
Mr. Rosenberg. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Wood (reading) : 

Unofficially, he would say there is no chance in approaching WPB at present. 

Wliat do you mean by "unoiScially, he would say" ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. He only could tell me his o]3inion whether there is 
any change in my approaching WPB or not. 

Mr. Wood (reading) : 

The proper way would be that the Soviet Purchasing Commission communicate 
with the Canadian Government Ministry of Munitions and Supplies ; the Russians 
know exactly the procedure. 

Mr. Ta-vt.nner. Did you convey that information to the Russians ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I don't think I did. 

Mr. TA^T.NNER. From your independent recollection, do you not 
know you passed that information on ? 

Mr. WoLKTSER. We did pass it on. 

Mr. Rosenberg. I don't recollect it, and I don't have a note here. I 
will check it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Let us check it now. It is of some importance. Do 
you have records here that disclose that? 

Mr. WoLKiSER. There was something that made me think we in- 
formed the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In 1948, when we pre- 
pared the statement for the committee, we told the committee we 
passed this information to the Soviet Purchasing Commission and had 
no further dealings. It is something he presumed he must have told 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission. In other words, he presumes that 
he notified them of the outcome of his efforts to obtain the material. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1035 

Mr. Harrison. It was the natural thing to do. 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; I owed them an answer, and I presumably did. 
I would normally do so. • v i 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you follow up to see whether the Eussians did 
obtain uranium through Canadian sources, to determine whether or 
not you were entitled to commissions on the sales ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. I didn't go that far. Incidentally, this was such 
a minor deal for us at that time. The entire business we did with 
the Russians from 1942 to 1945 was $17,500, which represented about 
21/2 percent of our total business during those years. OPA w^as in 
effect at that time. I wasn't too keen about the business. 

Mr. Kearney. You did business with them, though ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. It was a small customer. I wish we had not, now. 
I would like to mention that we have last shipped to the Russians in 
1946 $450 worth of merchandise the balance of old orders, and not a 
penny since our relations with them deteriorated. 

JVIr. Tavenner. Did you have transactions with the Russian Pur- 
chasing Commission relating to heavy water? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us about it briefly. 

Mr. Rosenberg. We got an inquiry from the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission August 23, 1943, for heavy water. 

Mr. Tavenner. How much? 

Mr. Rosenberg. One thousand grams, for research purposes. 

Mr, Tavenner, Tell us how you went about obtaining a supply ? 

Mr. Rosenberg, We were guided in this case by chemical address 
books which we use in cases where we don't know the product, and I 
found a supplier here [indicating name in address book] whom I 
must have approached, I have no note of that, but he must have 
told me that the Stuart Oxygen Co. in San Francisco was the only 
commercial manufacturer of that product. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is the name of the company ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Stuart Oxygen Co. in San Francisco. We ap- 
proached them August 24, 1943, and received an offer right away on 
1,000 grams, with an unsolicited firm offer to accept at a later date. 
We passed this quotation to the Russians, They accepted it on Octo- 
ber 21, 1943, The merchandise was ready for immediate shipment, 
and it actually was shipped on October 30, 1943. 

Mr. Wood. Actually shipped when? 

Mr. Rosenberg. October 30, 1943, We tried to get additional or- 
ders from the Russians for this product, and they said they were not 
interested, until on January 16, 1945, unsolicited, they inquired for 
anotlier 100 grams, which we purchased from the same company. 

Mr, Tavenner. To whom were those shipments consigned? 

Mr. Rosenberg. To our company in New York. 

Mr, Tavenner, T\niat did you do with them when you received 
them ? 

Mr, Rosenberg. Shipped them, unopened, to the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission in Washington. 

Mr, Tavenner. Do you know anything about the disposition of 
those shipments after that? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you given packing directions as to how this 
material should be packed for shipping? 



1036 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who ^ave the directions to you ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. The Russian Purchasing Commission told us they 
would like to have the thousand grams shipped in four boxes. Stuart 
Oxygen Co. told us what was the normal packing, and they assured us 
they knew best because they are the only commercial manufacturers 
of this product in this country and have been shipping it since 1934 all 
over the world, since it was discovered by Professor Urey, and we left 
it up to them. 

Mr. Wood. How was it packed ? 

]\Ir. Rosenberg. They were packed in four individual boxes, 250 
grams net in each box. 

Mr. Wood. Two hundred and fifty grams in each box? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. Net? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Net weight of the heavy water itself, but on account 
of its special elaborate packing, the gi'oss weight of each box was 
6.37 pounds — so that the total shipment, which just contained 1,000 
grams, or 2.21 pounds, was 41.12 pounds gross. In other words, the 
packing was almost 39 pounds. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were those four packages shipped separately? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. They were in one outside box. 

Mr. Tavenner. They were contained in one outside box? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes ; one large box. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was the condition of the shipment at the time 
you received it and at the time you sent it on to the Russian Purchas- 
ing Commission ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Unopened and unhandled. We insisted, since we 
didn't know about this product and since we didn't want to get any- 
thing they did not want, that a neutral laboratory in San Francisco 
check the merchandise and packing before it was shipped to us. 

Abbot A. Hanks, Inc., engineers, assayers, chemists, metallurgists, 
consulting, testing, inspecting, 624 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, 
Calif., gave us the following statement, sworn to by Mr. Prentiss T. 
Bee, chief chemist, dated October 27, 1943, addressed to Stuart Oxygen 
Co., 351 California Street, San Francisco, Calif. : 

Dear Sies : Our chief chemist, Mr. Prentiss T. Bee. checked the analysis of 
over 1,000 grams of deuterium oxide (D2O) which analyzed between 99.7 and 
and 99.8 percent D:;0 and checked the weighing and filling of the 40 pyrex 
ampoules, and weighing of the same after filling. Each of these ampoules contains 
more than 25 grams of D2O. 

Mr. Velde. Mr. Chairman, I w^as w^ondering if we could dispense 
with the reading of all these papers until counsel has a chance to 
examine them. It was stated at the beginning of the session that Mr. 
Rosenberg was willing to turn the papers over to the staff to go through 
them, and I think we can save time by doing it that way. 

Mr. Rosenberg. There is just one more paragraph about the packing, 
if you are interested in that. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1037 

Mr. Rosenberg (continuing reading) : 

These were all sealed in his presence, packed in cartons, and placed in mailing 
tubes, and then he put 10 ampoules, 250 grams, in each four wooden boxes, 
being packed between layers of cotton in each of the boxes. These four boxes 
were placed in one large wooden box, which was then strapped and sealed. 
Very truly yours, 

Abbot A. Hanks, Inc., 
By Hebbekt D. Imrie. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did. you give us the date of the second shipment 
of the 100 grams, and if not, will you give it to us now ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. February 7, 1945, from San Francisco to us, and 
February 14, from us to Washington, both times by railway express. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you ever advised that heavy water was con- 
sidered as a strategic material ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. We always inquired from WPB, and we 
did in this case, too, but I didn't make a record of that. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter ? 

Mr. Walter. No. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde? 

Mr. Velde. You mentioned in one of your memoranda that the Soviet 
Government could use another 10 or 15 tons of uranium oxide? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. Would that indicate to you they had already received 
10 or 15 tons? 

Mr. Rosenberg. That they were looking for them. 

Mr. Velde. That they were looking for 10 or 15 tons? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. But it would not be another 10 or 15 tons ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Vei.de. In any of your contacts with the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission, were you informed as to the use to which these uranium 
materials and heavy water were going to be put by the Russians? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Velde, Did you have any knowledge of j^our own as to what the 
uranium products were being used for ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. I am not a chemist. 

(Witness confers with his counsel.) 

Mr. Rosenberg. Uranium, yes. 

Mr. Velde. Did you know what the uranium was to be used for by 
the Russians ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. They made a statement. 

Mr. Velde. That is what I asked you. Did they tell you they were 
going to use it for a certain purpose ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. What was that purpose? 

Mr. Rosenberg. We got a declaration from them that says 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you let me read it? 

Mr. Rosenberg. Yes. 



1038 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. This is a copy of a statement by the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission : 

To Whom It May Concern: 

In reference to our order, given on April 2, 1943, Chematar, Inc., 40 Exchange 
Place, New York, N. Y., we herewith declare that the 500 pounds uranouranic 
oxide, 99.5 percent pure (green oxide), will be used for making of ferrouranium 
compounds, which in turn will be used in the production of armaments, and that 
the 500 pounds of uranium nitrate (uranyl) will be used for medical purposes 
directly connected with the present war, and that thus neither compound is used 
for any purpose which would be contradictory to the restrictions imposed by War 
Production Board Conservation Order M-2S5 on the use of uranium or uranium 
compounds. 

The Government Purchasing Commission of the 

Soviet Union in the U. S. A. 
Washington, D. C, April 19^3. 

Mr, Velde. Was the word "armaments" mentioned in there? 
Mr. Tavenner. Yes — 

will be used for making of ferrouranium compounds, which in turn will be used in 
the production of armaments. 

I desire to offer this copy of statement and attached copy of letter 
of April 5, 1943, from Chematar, Inc., to the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission, in evidence, and ask that they be marked "Exhibit Rosen- 
berg 16." 

Mr. Wood. It will be received. 

(The copies of documents above referred to, marked "Exhibit 
Kosenberg 16," are hereinafter incorporated in the record.) -"^ 

Mr. Velde. Did you or your company have a contract to furnish all 
your uranium output to the Manhattan District? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No ; we didn't even know of them. 

Mr. Velde. Did you know of any contract under which any uranium 
company had to furnish all its uranium output to the Manhattan 
project? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. ' 

Mr. Velde. Did you have any knowledge of any contract of your 
own that provided for exclusive right to all that you could produce? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 

Mr. Velde. With anybody? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No, sir. 

Mr. Velde. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is contrary to what was 
testified this morning. 

Mr. Wood. As I understand, Mr. Rosenberg's firm was not a pro- 
ducer. Did your company ever produce any of this material? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No ; we were only brokers. 

Mr. Velde. You bought this material from Chematar, Inc. ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. No ; we are Chematar, Inc. 

Mr. Velde. And the only materials you were able to get for the 
^Russians were obtained from whom ? 

Mr. Rosenberg. The first shipment from the Shattuck Co. in Den- 
Ter, and the second shipment from the Canadian Radium & Uranium 
Corp. of New York. 

Mr. Velde. And you did not know that either of those companies 
had a contract to furnish all their uranium output exclusively to the 
Manhattan District? 



*« See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1039 

Mr. Rosenberg. No. 

Mr. Wood. Any further questions? 

Mr. WoLKiSEK. Will you permit my client to read a short state- 
ment ? 

Mr. Wood. Would you mind putting it in the record, because we are 
pressed for time. We will be glad to accept it for the record. 

(The statement referred to is as follows :) 

Statement of Hermann Rosenberg, Vice President, Chematar, Inc., 

New York City 

It has been a privilege to appear and testify before this committee. My com- 
pany and I are glad to cooperate in any way possible to assist the committee in 
its work by giving you all information regarding these deals which to us were 
at the time very minor routine transactions, involving a profit of a few hundred 
dollars. 

Following my previous appearance at an executive session in June 1948, which 
received some publicity in December 1JM9, we were pleased to see that the 
press generally reported our business transactions correctly. However, we were 
somewhat disturbed by the description of one columnist who labeled Chematar, 
Inc., as "the ofhcial purchasing agent of the Soviet Government." That is of 
course not true. Such implications may well be harmful to our company and 
our business associates. 

The officials of our company are only businessmen. We are for the most part 
ciitzens of the United States by naturalization, and are sensitive to any implica- 
tions that might cast doubt upon oiu* loyalty and devotion to our country. 

It is this connection that we appreciate this opportunity to state a few 
facts and figures showing the purely incidental nature of our involvement in 
this matter. 

We have managed to build up a substantial business in our special field of in- 
dustrial chemicals, and believe our operations are wholly beneficial to the econ- 
omy of the United States. We deal in thoiisands of individual products but are 
particularly active in handling about 20 items, principally, coal-tar products, 
with a 30-year experience in this field. 

Our standing in the industrial chemical field is well established and may be 
readily checked by reference to any of the large American chemical manufac- 
turing companies with which we deal. 

During the war years our business was about SO percent with commercial 
buyers mostly in Latin America and 20 percent with military procurement au- 
thorities of the United States and our allies. Our total sales from 1942 to 1945 
were approximately $700,000, of which $17,500 were sales to the Soviet Purchas- 
ing Commission. They represented about 2% percent of our total business during 
the war years. In 1946 our total deliveries to Russian purchasing authorities 
amoxmted to $450. This was the balance of two old orders. We have made no 
sales to Russia since 1946. Our annual business since the war has amounted to 
several million dollars. 

As for the particular Russian orders of interest to the committee, they were 
for us routine orders, calling for just other common chemicals among the ap- 
proxinyately 150 different chemicals sold by us in small lots to the Russians, 
aggregating the aforesaid $17,500. 

No pressure from any source was used, or indeed necessary, to induce my 
company to fill these routine orders from the Russian Government out of readily 
obtainable supplies, in strict compliance with all applicable regulations, at a 
time when we were rushing all available supplies to our then ally. 

On the basis of this record we strongly believe there should be no reflection upon 
the business conduct of our company or its individual officers and that our ab- 
solute loyalty and complete support of our Government both during peace and 
war should be recognized and acknowledged. 

May I thank you for your courtesy in listening, 

Mr. WoLKiSER. My client has been here twice. He was here in June 
1948. We have submitted all the information, and he wanted to say it 
was a pleasure to have been here ; that he is just a businessman, not 
interested in politics, and has no particular connectionwith the Rus- 
sian Government. The statement made by one columnist that Chem- 



1040 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

atar, Inc., was "the official purchasing agent of the Soviet Govern- 
ment" is incorrect, and is not good pubhcity. 

Mr. Wood, Let us hope it will not be necessary to call him back 
again. 

Mr. WoLKisER. I hope there is no reflection on our company in any 
way. Mr. Rosenberg, as a naturalized citizen, is particularly sensi- 
tive to any suggestion of lack of loyalty. 

Mr. Wood. I think I speak the sentiment of the committee when 
I say that we understand your client is engaged in the business of 
buying and selling. 

Mr. WoLKiSER. Thank you very much for your courtesy. 

Mr. Wood, The committee will stand adjourned until 10 o'clock 
tomorrow morning. 

(Thereupon, an adjournment was taken until Wednesday, January 
25, 1950, at 10 a. m.). 



HEAEINGS KEGAKDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



wednesday, january 25, 1950 

United States House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee or the Committee 

ON Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D. C. 

public hearing 

A Subcommittee of the Committee on Un-American Activities met, 
pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m. in room 226, Old House Office Building 
Hon. John S. Wood, chairman, presiding. 

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood, Fran- 
cis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison (arriving as indicated), Harold H. 
Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator ; Courtney Owens, investigator ; John W. 
Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. 
Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. For the purpose of this hearing today a subcommittee 
has been appointed consisting of Messrs. Walter, Velde, Kearney, and 
Wood. They are all present. 

Are you ready to go forward, Mr. Counsel ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to state at this time that within the 
past 10 minutes I have had a long-distance telephone call and convers- 
ation with officials in the Atomic Energy Commission office in New 
York regarding the contract between the Manhattan Engineering 
District and the Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., dated March 27, 
1943, and I learned as a result of that call that the contract was prob- 
ably not executed and delivered until a date at least subsequent to 
May 12, 1943. The exact facts and circumstances are being investi- 
gated, and the full facts regarding that will be presented to the com- 
mittee as soon as they can be obtained and the necessary declassifica- 
tion is made of the documents w-hich would prove that. 

Mr. Walter. In other words, there was no contract for the exclu- 
sive right to this material before the export license was issued? 

Mr. Tavenner. The agreement dated March 27, 1943, could not 
have become effective as a legal document before its execution and 
delivery. The order in question was placed on May 1, 1943, though 
the date of shipment may have been after the effective date of this 
agreement, but those facts will have to be determined. I am informed 
the actual shipping date of the uranium may have been as late as 

1041 

99334—50 10 



1042 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

June, but those facts are being investigated, and the exact date of 
shipment I think will appear in the testimony of the next witness. 

Mr. Owens. 

Mr. Wood. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give this sub- 
committee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Owens. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF COURTNEY E. OWENS 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your full name, please ? 

Mr. Owens. Courtney E. Owens. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you an investigator of the Committee on Un- 
American Activities? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. 

(Representative Harrison enters the hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, considerable testimony has been intro- 
duced regarding the issuance of export licenses for shipment of 
uranium to Russia by the Board of Economic Warfare, the approval 
by Lend-Lease of the granting of such licenses, and compliance with 
Order M-285 of the War Production Board. In the course of your in- 
vestigation, did you also find that the United States Army for a period 
of time acted as a procurement agency for the purchase of chemicals 
by the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 
in a letter signed by John M. Hazard, chief liaison officer. Section of 
Soviet Supply, under date of June 16, 1942, addressed to Col. John B. 
Franks, International Division, stated that under the terms of the pro- 
posed second protocol, which had oeen delivered to the Soviet Govern- 
ment for consideration and acceptance, a considerable quantity of 
chemicals had been offered; that during the past 9 months the War 
Department had served as the procurement agency for chemicals pur- 
chased under the first Moscow protocol ; that it was anticipated that 
the War Department would continue to purchase chemicals to meet 
Soviet requirements; and it was requested that preparations be made 
to purchase chemicals in compliance with the terms of the proposed 
second protocol. 

Mr. Ta\^enner. Do you have a photostatic copy of that letter which 
you obtained from the Army? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the photostatic copy of the letter 
from Mr. Hazard in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit 
Owens 1." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 
1," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Owens, did you ascertain that the Russian Gov- 
ernment made requisition for uranium compounds in the early part of 
1943, to the Chemical Warfare Service of the Army? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. Ultimately it reached the Chemical Warfare 
Service. On March 5, 1943, Capt. W. D. Kavanaugh, CWS, Inter- 
national Branch, Operations Division, wrote a letter to N. S. Fomichev, 

21 See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1043 

Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, stating tliat its procure- 
ment office had been endeavoring to find sources of supply for uranium 
nitrate and uranium chloride in connection with Soviet requisition 
R-12045, and advised that there is no known producer of uranium 
chloride. The letter further stated that one producer had about 200 
pounds of uranium nitrate and had on hand sufficient concentrate to 
yield about 8,000 pounds at the rate of approximately 4,000 pounds per 
month, and in addition had a considerable stock of ore on which they 
could draw for future production. The letter further advised that 
it would be necessary to have the War Production Board allocate 
whatever material might be authorized for procurement, inasmuch as 
General Preference Order M-285 controlled the distribution of 
uranium compounds. 

This was in March of 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence photostatic copy of 
the letter from Captain Kavanaugh just referred to, and request that 
it be marked '^Exhibit Owens 2." 
Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 
2," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. What disposition was finally made by the Army of 
requisition E-12045? 

Mr. Owens. By letter of March 9, 1943, Col. John B. Franks, Gen- 
eral Staff Corps, birector. International Division, returned to General 
Belyaev, chairman, Soviet Purchasing Commission, Soviet requisition 
11-12045, dated February 4, 1943, and advised him that it would be im- 
possible to make available either uranium nitrate or uranium chloride. 
The Soviets ^ere further advised in this letter that the production of 
both of these items was such that no guaranty whatsoever could be 
given as to any date in the future when the material could be made 
available, even in smal quantities, and it was for this reason alone 
that the requisition was being returned to the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence photostatic copy of the 
letter dated March 9, 1943, from Col. John B. Franks, and request 
that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 3." 
Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 
3," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Oavens. It might be well to note that this requisition, of which 
we have a copy, called for 8 tons of uranium nitrate and 8 tons of 
uranium oxide. 
Mr. Wood. You say that is revealed ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, "by the requisition which will be placed in the 
lecord at a later date. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was this requisition renewed? 
Mr. Owens. Yes; it was renewed and again denied. On April 6, 
1943, Victor V. Taylor, colonel, Adjutant General's Department 
Deputy Director, International Division, addressed a letter to Maj. 
Gen. A. I. Belyaev, the same gentleman I referred to in my answer to 
the last question, chairman of the Government Purchasing Com- 

** See appendix. 
^ See appendix. 



1044 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

mission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, marked 
"Attention : Captain I. Stepanov," in which he acknowledged receipt 
of a letter of April 3, 1943, in reference to a request to present to 
the JNIunitions Assignments Committee for approval of prompt de- 
livery of 8 tons of both uranium nitrate and urano-uranic oxide. The 
Soviet Purchasing Commission was likewise advised in this letter 
that it was possible to obtain this material for assigmnent to the 
Soviet Union at that time. 

The letter of April 3, 1943, mentioned, from the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission, is in the files of the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
there is a memorandum addressed to us from the War Department. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the photostatic copy of letter 
from Colonel Taylor, dated April 6, 1943, and ask that it be marked 
"Exhibit Owens 4." 

Mr, Wood. Let it be adinitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to marked "Exhibit Owens 
4," is hereinafter included in the record.) -* 

Mr. Ta^-exner. Mr. Owens, did your investigation disclose that the 
Russians endeavored to appeal to higher authority for favorable action 
on their request for 8 tons of uranium nitrate and 8 tons of urano- 
uranic oxide ? 

Mr. 0"\VENS. Yes. A letter was addressed by Lt. Gen. L. (t. Rudenko, 
identified as chairman of the Government Purchasing Commission 
of the Soviet Union, under date of March 31, 1944, to the Honorable 
Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, in which he stated that his 
country was in most urgent need of the following materials for its 
war industry : 

1. 8 tons of uranium nitrate ; 

2. 8 tons of urano-uranic oxide; 

3. 25 pounds of uranium metal. 
The letter also states that : 

In 194.S we exerted every effort to obtain these materials through the Inter- 
national Division of the War Department, which has jurisdiction over assign- 
ments of such items. However, we were not successful in obtaining these 
materials. 

I would therefore deeply appreciate your giving this requirement your con- 
sideration with a view toward ascertaining the possibility of supplying these 
materials to us from the stocks of the War Department. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence at this time a photo- 
static copy of the letter of Lieutenant General Rudenko, bearing date 
March 31, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 5." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 
5," is hereinafter included in the record. ) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you a photostatic copy of a memorandum 
prepared by Col. J. W. Boone, acting director, International Divi- 
sion, bearing date April 7, 1944, dealing with the subject of the Soviet 
request for uranium. Will you please read it ? 

Mr. Owens. This is a War Department summary sheet dated April 
7, 1944 : 

1. Representatives of the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested alloca- 
tion of several forms of uranium in early 1943, and it is understood that they 



** See appendix. 
*" See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1045 

also requested it from the Foreign Economic Administration. The War De- 
partment turfled down the request in a letter of April 6, 1943, from the deputy 
director, International Division, Headquarters A. S. F. 

2. This problem involves important considerations not only of supply but of 
policy. For this reason an interim reply is necessary in order to allow ample 
time for thorough consideration. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the photostatic copy of memo- 
randum in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 6." 

Mr, Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The photostat of memorandum above referred to, marked "Exhibit 
Owens 6," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Walter. May I ask a question at this point, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. Wood. Yes. Mr. Walter. 

Mr. Walter. During the course of your investigation, did you find 
that the Soviet Purchasing Agency had requested licenses for ma- 
terials other than the materials you have discussed today ? - 

Mr. Owens. This does not deal, Congressman, with a request for 
licenses for export. This is a requisition for supplying it. The is- 
suance of licenses would come after that. 

Mr. Walter. I understand. Did your investigation disclose that 
the Soviet Purchasing Agency requested that they be supplied with 
materials other than those materials that were refused ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. What were those materials ? 

Mr. Owens. We have quite a long list. Did you say "and were 
refused" ? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. We were supplied with a long list of chemicals they 
requested which were not refused. The uranium was refused. 

Mr. Tavenner. What action was taken regarding the information 
contained in the summary just read by you ? 

Mr. Owens. On the 7th day of April 1944, Col. J. W. Boone, Gen- 
eral Staff Corps, Acting Director, International Division, acting for 
the commanding general, addressed a memorandum to the Chief of 
Engineers, marked "Attention : Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves," which memo- 
randum is as follows : 

7 April 1944. 
Memorandum for the Chief of Engineers (attention : Maj. Gen. L. R. Groves). 
Subject : Uranium requested by the U. S. S. R. 

1. Inclosed is a copy of a letter received from the Soviet Govei-nment Pur- 
chasing Commission on the above subject, together with a copy of a reply pre- 
pared for the signature of the Secretary of War. 

2. It is requested that information as to the supply of various forms of uranium 
and your recommendations as to the policy involved be submitted to this office 
not later than April 12, 1944, in order that materials involved can be made 
available. 

Beneath this memorandum of request for information, there appears 
a memorandum for the record only. This memorandum for the record 
only reads as follows : 

For record only : 

1. A conference of representatives of this Division and of the Production Divi- 
sion with Major General Groves on April 7 revealed that General Groves wishes 
to handle this matter in its entirety from here on, since the material requested 
is involved in the Manhattan project. Information on supply could not be ob- 



^ See appendix. 



1046 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

tained from the Chemical Warfare Service of the War Production Board be- 
cause all details are in the hands of the Chief of Engineers. 

2. It is believed that if supply is available a careful study be made of the- 
advisability of making a small allocation, instead of training down the request in 
toto, as was done last year. Since the material itself is apparently not secret, 
such a policy might better serve United States interests and might develop the 
possibility of collaboration or receipt of information which are now ruled out. 
This Division will seek to determine more about the intended use by the Soviets, 
which last j^ear was indicated as "the preparation of ferro-uranium compounds 
which in turn will be used in the production of high quality steel for armaments." 

Mr. Walter. Does the memorandum disclose who were present at 
that conference? 

Mr. Owens. No. The memorandum is addressed to the Chief of 
Engineers, attention General Groves. It implies General Groves was 
there, and that is the only name positively identified as having been 
there. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the memorandum just read, bear- 
ing date April 7, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Exhibit Owens 7." 

ilr. Wood. It will be admitted. 

(The photostat of memorandum above referred to, marked "Exhibit 
Owens 7," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the final action taken by the Secretary 
of War, as far as the records disclose ? 

Mr. Owens. On April 17, 1944, the Secretary of War addressed a 
letter to Lt. Gen. L. G. Rudenko, chairman of the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission of the Soviet Union in the United States of America, 
which reads as follows : 

The letter is on the stationery of the War Department, Washington, 
April 17, 1944, addressed to Lt. Gen. L. G. Rudenko : 

Dear General Kudenko. I regret that we find ourselves unable to comply with 
the request contained in your letter of March 31 for certain uranium compounds. 

We have made a careful review of the situation and this review indicates 
that our supply of this material is not sufficient for us to comply with your 
request. 

I assure you that I will remember your need and will inform you of any 
change in the situation. 
Sincerely yours, 



Secretary of War. 

Mr. Taa^nner. I offer that letter in evidence and ask that it be 
marked "Exhibit Owens 8." 

My. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The photostat of letter above referred to, marked "Exhibit Owens 
8," is hereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Mr. Owens, in the course of your investigation of the 
shipments of uranium and heavy water to Russia during the war years, 
did you find that the United States Air Force had conducted an in- 
vestigation in December of 1949, and January 1950, and made a re- 
port of its findings ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. Such a rej^ort of their investigation was 
made, and the committee has been given access to it. 

Mr. Tavenner. I propose, Mr. Chairman, at a later date during the 
hearings, to file this report as an exhibit, but for the present I would 
like to ask the witness several specific questions relating to the ship- 
ments of uranium and heavy water. 

^ See appendix. 
2« See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1047 

Mr. Wood. As revealed by the report ? 

Mr. Tavenner. As revealed by the report. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. 

Mr. Tavenner. What facts, Mr. Owens, were ascertained relating 
to the record of shipment of uraninm from Denver, Colo., to Russia? 

Mr. Owens. I might state that this information is the result of an 
exhaustive search on the part of the Air Force of its available files in 
Kansas City, Mo., which are the so-called dead files. This search was 
made by them. In this search there was disclosed a report of Russian 
freight shipments for the year ending December 31, 1943, which reflects 
that there was attached to UN shipping ticket 1056, elated April 3, 
1943, freight bill dated April 2, 1943, consigning four boxes of chem- 
icals, weighing 691 pounds, to Col. A.'N. Kotikov, resident represent- 
ative of the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet 
Union in the United States, Air Service Department of the Air Trans- 
port Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont. The freight bill num- 
bered 201 10 J was made out in the name of the Great Northern Railway 
Co., and indicated that the chemicals were waybilled from Denver, 
Colo., on March 23, 1943, and that the name of the shipper was Chem- 
atar. Inc., 40 Highland Place, New York City. Attached to the freight 
bill was a letter dated March 29, 1943, from Hermann Rosenberg of 
Chematar, Inc., addressed to Colonel Kotikov, enclosing the original 
railway bill of lading, covering 200 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 
220 pounds of nitrouranyl shipped from Denver, Colo. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you read the letter written by Mr. Rosenberg 
just referred to by you ? 

Mr. Owens. That is in the report, Mr. Tavenner. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, the letter of Mr. Rosenberg was 
attached to the documents that went to Great Falls? 

Mr. Owens. Attached to the freight bill. 

Mr. Walter. That letter disclosed what the contents of these boxes 
were ? 

Mr. Owens. That is right. 

Mr. Walter. That letter went to the military at Great Falls? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. It was attached to the freight bill as a part 
of the shipment. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do the records disclose that the Russians received 
this shipment of uranium? 

Mr. Oa^t:ns. Yes, sir. A tally sheet bearing date April 5, 1943, was 
located, upon which is endorsed in Russian tlie letters "VS" acknowl- 
edging the receipt of several items, including four boxes of chemicals, 
bearing shipping ticket No. US-1056 ; total weight, 691 pounds. The 
signed receipt bore on the bottom the signature of Phillip Silver, first 
lieutenant. Air Corps, who has been identified as a supply officer, sta- 
tioned at Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. Lieutenant Silver's signa- 
ture appeared beneath the Russian initials. 

Mr. Walter. Did the invoices always disclose what the contents of 
these cases were ? 

Mv. Owens. To my recollection this is the only case where a 
letter accompanied the shipment. I may be wrong, but that is my 
recollection. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the investigation disclose that records exist of 
a shipment of uranium originating at Port Hope, Ontario, and, if so, 
will you please give the pertinent facts relating thereto ? 



1048 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Harrison. This is the shipment of 1,000 pounds that Mr. Rosen- 
berg described yesterday as the Shattuck shipment? 

Mr, Tavenner. That is correct. 

Mr. Owens. An examination of the report of Russian air freight 
shipments for 19-13 reflects that on June 10, 1943, 15 boxes of black 
uranium oxide and uranium nitrate, being shipping ticket No. UN- 
1369, were received at Great Falls, Mont., and dispatched on the same 
day. This was an in-transit shipment. The shipping ticket reflected 
an order No. 21-73/C43058, and the words "Rasnoimport, soli urano, 
U. S. S. R., trans. No. 66739." The words "soli urano" have been 
ascertained to mean uranium salts. The total weight of the shipment 
was 1,585 pounds. Airway bills 465685 and 465686 dated as received 
June 10, 1943, consisted of five boxes of uranium nitrate, weighing 500 
pounds each. Airway bill 465687, dated as received June 10, 1943, 
consisted of four boxes of uranium oxide, weighing 468 pounds. Air- 
way bill 465688, dated as received June 10, 1943, was for one box black 
uranium oxide, total weight, 117 pounds. All of the airway bills re- 
ferred to contained reference to shipping ticket UN-1369, order No. 
21-73/C43058. Attached to the above-described documents was a 
freight bill of the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railway, No. 
5223, which consigned to Col. A. N. Kotikoy, resident representative of 
the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, Air Service Depot of 
the Air Service Command, Gore Field, Great Falls, Mont., 5 cases of 
black uranium oxide, and 10 cases of uranium nitrate, for a total 
weight of 1,585 pounds, waybilled from 4558 Port Hope, Ontario, on 
May 21, 1943, by means of waybill 1864 and shipped from El Dorado 
Mines, Ltd., under arms export permit No. OF1666. 

Mr. Walter. So that each of these shipments was identified as con- 
taining uranium. There was no attempt to conceal the contents ? 

Mr. Owens. The airway bills which accompanied them identified 
them as containing uranium nitrate and oxide ; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose the existence of a 
record acknowledging receipt of this shipment by a Russian repre- 
sentative ? 

Mr. Owens. The Air Force states that an examination of the retired 
files from Great Falls failed to reflect any signed receipts disclosing 
positive acknowledgement of these shipments by the Russians. 

Mr. Walter. All of these shipments were in 1943 ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. None were in 1944? 

Mr. O^VENS. Only the two we have covered so far. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the investigation disclose that records exist of a 
shipment of heavy water to the Russians in 1943 ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes, sir. An examination of Russian air freight ship- 
ments for 1943 reflects the existence of shipping ticket UN 3199, 
dated November 29, 1943, for one case of 1,000 grams of heavy water, 
weighing 41 pounds, marked for "Rasnoimport, U. S. S. R., Moscow, 
U-1, Ruybjshova-22, order No. 21-73/C43090, transportation 66771, 
heavy water, handle with care. Department of Commerce, No. 8398.98, 
case No. W-50-308." 

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation disclose the shipment of any 
large bottles of heavy water ? 

Mr. Owens. No, sir. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1049 

Mr. Walter. Did your inrestigation disclose the shipment of any 
large bottles of other substances? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. What were they? 

INIr. Owens. Carboys of sulfuric acid were shipped from Great 
Falls, Mont. 

Mr, Walter. Were they labeled "Sulphuric acid"? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you been able to determine yet the significance 
of the appearance of the Department of Commerce No. 8398.98 
endorsement on the shipping instructions ? 

Mr. Owens. No, sir. We have made several inquiries in Washing- 
ton and have been unable to ascertain the meaning of the Department 
of Conunerce number appearing on this shipment. 

Mr. Harrison. That was on the heavy water shipment? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. 

I\Ir. Harrison. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question at this point 
about this shipment of 1,000 pounds of uranium that we were on 
a minute ago? 

Mr. Wood. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Have you got any information from your investi- 
gation as to how the shippers, Canadian Radium & Uranium Corp., 
were able to get an amendment of that shipping authorization, be- 
cause as I understand. General Groves testified that he issued an order 
allowing them to purchase this, for the purpose of discovering whether 
or not they could find it in this country; then I understood from Mr, 
Rosenberg yesterday that that paper was amended so as to enable 
them to ship this 1,000 pounds out that they got from the Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp., and I would like to know if you know 
how that was done ? 

Mr. Owens. Here is what we know on the issuance of the export 
license : We know it was turned down on xlpril 14, 1943. We know 
another request was made and, as General Groves stated, they sub- 
sequently agreed to the issuance of the license to see if the material 
could be found in this country. That license was issued April 23, 
1943, and delivered on April 20, 1943, to the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission in Washington. Mr. Fomichev called Mr. Rosenberg and told 
him he had the license, and Mr. Rosenberg advised him Shattuck had 
withdrawn the offer, and he had another supplier, but the license 
would have to be amended. On April 29, 1943, he got back the license, 
amended as to commodity and price. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who got it back ? 

Mr. Owens, Mr. Fomichev, Mr, Rosenberg called Canadian 
Radium & Uranium Corp, and said that license 1643180 had been 
amended. 

Mr, Harrison, You don't know who amended it ? 

Mr, O^VENS, We know it was amended by the Board of Economic 
Warfare. 

Mr, Harrison, You don't know what official or officials did it? 

Mr. Owens. No. The files of Lend-Lease and the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare have not been made available to us. We have made a 
request for them, 

Mr, Harrison, To whom did you make the request ? 



1050 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Owens. To State Department to examine the files of the Proto- 
col Committee, Lend-Lease, and State Department files. 

Mr. Harrison. For the purpose of getting this information? 

Mr. Owens. Yes; and we have had no reply affirming or denying 
the request. 

Mr. Walter. Wlio has custody of the Lend-Lease files? 

Mr. Owens. Lend-Lease was absorbed by the Foreign Economic 
Administration, and as we understand the State Department has the 
files. 

Mr. Harrison. To whom was your request directed ? 

Mr. Owens. As I recall, to Mr. Peurifoy at the State Department 
in late December. 

Mr. Harrison. And you got no answer ? 

Mr. Owens. No answer as yet. 

Mr. Harrison. Nobody expects a reply from the State Department 
in 3 weeks, but it looks like you should get one in 2 months. 

Mr. Walter. Is that the shipment General Groves said he felt 
should be made in order not to arouse suspicion ? 

Mr. Owens. The 1,000 pounds? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Continue. 

Mr. Owens. The shipping ticket disclosed that the 1,000 grams of 
heavy water were consigned to Mr. Anisimov, in care of the com- 
manding officer, Ladd Field, Fairbanks, Alaska. Airway bill No. 
350,199 indicated shipment of the heavy water from Gore Field, Great 
Falls, Mont., to Mr. Anisimov. Attached to these documents was a 
Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the United 
States release certificate No. 366, approving for export to the 
U. S. S. R. on November 15, by William C. Moore, Division for Soviet 
Supply, Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 1,000 grams of heavy 
water, consigned by the Government Purchasing Commission of the 
Soviet Union in the United States, to Rasnoimport, U. S. S. K. 

Mr. Ta^^nner. Will you examine the release certificate signed by 
Mr. W. C, Moore, and state what the certificate purports to be? 

Mr. Owens. That release certificate is in the report. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose the existence of a 
record acknowledging receipt of this shipment of heavy water by a 
Russian representative? 

Mr. Owens. An examination to determine if the Russians had in 
fact received the heavy water disclosed a tally sheet dated December 
13, 1943, receipting for various shipments, including one of heavy 
water, bearing shipping ticket No. UN-3199. The signature on this 
document was identified as being in Russian handwriting. 

INIr. Walter. Where did that come from ? 

Mr. Owens. This tally sheet ? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Owens. From Ladd Field. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was an examination made to determine whether a 
record exists of the shipment of uranium, uranium metal, uranium ore, 
or heavy water, during the year 1944 ? 

Mr. Owens. Yes. Such an examination was made and no record of 
such a shipment was found by the Air Force. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1051 

Mr. Ta\tenner. Does the report made by the Air Force indicate that 
an examination of shipments was made for the year 1945, or not ? 

Mr. Oavens. No, it does not, but I have been advised by the Air 
Force that their examination of these files was for the entire period of 
1941 through 1945. That was a telephone message. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Rosenberg of Chematar, Inc., has testified that 
an additional shipment of 100 grams of heavy water was made to the 
Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union at Washington on the 
14th day of February 1945. Has an investigation been made regard- 
ing the export to Russia of this shipment ? 

Mr. Owens. The investigation is still being conducted. We have 
not traced that shipment of 100 grams of heavy water from the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission here in Washington. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you conducted an investigation relating to 
the sale to the Russian Purchasing Commission of 45 pounds of ura- 
nium in June 1944? 

Mr, Owens. Yes, sir. The Soviet Purchasing Commission on March 
ii, 1944, under requisition 8694, requested 63.53 long tons of various 
chemicals as specified in Form 1-A. Form 1-A lists the various chem- 
icals tliey requested, and item 9 is 0.02 long tons of uranium nitrate. 
This is a straight lend-lease transaction. 

Lend-Lease then asked the Procurement Division of the Treasury 
Department to contract to buy this uranium nitrate. The Treasury 
Department then sent out bids to various companies to bid on this 
uranium nitrate. Our information is that they sent notices to about 
a dozen companies. When the bids were received, the Treasury bought 
from the lowest bidder, being the Eastman Kodak Co. of Rochester, 
N. Y. 

The Treasury Department inspected this uranium at the Eastman 
Kodak Co. in Rochester on July 19, 1944. It met with Government 
ppecifications, and left Rochester on July 19, 1944, via McDaniel's 
Trucking Co., bound for Terre Haute, Inch, and it arrived at the 
Army Ordnance Depot at Terre Haute on July 24, 1944. 

It was shipped out from Terre Haute on July 27, 1944, in Erie 
freight car No. 97352. It was not the Erie line, but an Erie freight 
car by that number. It was bound for North Portland, Oreg., and 
arrived at North Portland, Oreg., on August 11, 1944. It was loaded 
aboard the steamship Kashirstroi on October 3, 1944, bound for Vladi- 
vostok. 

Mr. Tavenner. No further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter? 

Mr. Walter. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison? 

Mr. Harrison. No. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde? 

Mr. Velde. No. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney? 

Mr. Kearney. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Thank you very much, Mr. Owens. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to call Colonel Crenshaw. 

Mr. Wood. Colonel Crenshaw, will you hold up your right hand, 
please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give this com- 



1052 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

mittee shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help you God ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your full name, please ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Thomas T. Crenshaw. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where do you live? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Watertown, N. Y. 

Mr. Tavenner. Where were you born and what is your age? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Unionville, Mo.; age 40. 

]\Ir. Tavenner. Will you give the committee a brief resume of your 
educational and employment background? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I am a graduate of Culver Military Academy, 
Princeton University, graduate study at New York University. I 
was employed at the time of my graduation from college as an archi- 
tect. Various concurrent active tours of duty in the Army as a Re- 
serve officer. Called to active duty in August 1940, continuing until 
April 1946. Employed thereafter as an architect. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you given the course of your employment up 
until the time you became connected with Manhattan Engineering 
District? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Beyond that point. That was included in that 
period. 

Mr. Tavenner. How long were you with the Manhattan Engineer- 
ing District ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Approximately 2^/4 years. 

Mr. Wood. Between what dates? 

Colonel Crenshaw. From June or July 1942 until June 1944. 

Mr. Tavenner. Colonel Crenshaw, what position did you hold 
within the Manhattan Engineering District? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Initially I was area engineer at the University 
of California in the construction of a pilot plant, and in October of 
1942 I came to New York to start the so-called Special Materials 
Section of the Manhattan District, which was in charge of the pro- 
curement and processing of uranium and allied special materials. 

In June 1943 I was transferred to Oak Ridge as deputy district 
engineer, and continued at Oak Ridge until 1944 in various capacities, 
executive officer, and several other capacities. 

Mr. TA\rENNER. To what extent did you deal with questions arising 
in regard to the approval or consideration by Manhattan Engineering 
District of shipments of uranium ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I was in charge of that particular division and 
had full knowledge of virtually everything that went on, subject to 
Colonel Nichols' and "General Groves' approval. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was Captain Merritt in your division ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. He was. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was he a subordinate of yours ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you his immediate superior ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Mr. Burman was connected with your office also, 
was he not ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1053 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are there any other persons who occupied a position 
where they would know of the transactions relating to uranium in 
your office ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. There were a great many others who had knowl- 
edge of specific details regarding various transactions. The one next 
to myself who had authority was Lt. Col. John Ruhoff, and he suc- 
ceeded me in charge of that section when I went to Oak Eidge. 

Mr. Tavenner. Which was in June 1943 ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know his present address ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Mallinkrodt Chemical Co., St. Louis, Mo. 

Mr. Tavenner. You are familiar with the transaction relating to 
the purchase of 420 pounds of uranium compounds from the Shattuck 
Co. and their shipment for export, are you not ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes; to the degree permitted by my memory 
over several years. 

Mr. Tavenner. After that shipment was consummated — and I will 
not ask you questions about that because it has been very fully covered 
by other witnesses— but after that time the question came up again 
regarding another proposed export license, did it not ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, it did. 

Mr. Tavenner. The State Department has furnished the committee 
copies of letters from the files of Lend-Lease, and I have here a letter 
dated April 17, 1943, signed by Thomas T. Crenshaw, directed to 
Lend-Lease Administration, attention Mr. James Hoopes. Will you 
look at that letter for the purpose of refreshing your recollection ? 

Mr. Harrison. What date is that? 

Mr. Tavenner. April 17, 1943. I will read the letter into the record 
and ask several questions about it. 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, I remember that. 

Mr. Tavenner. You recall having written that letter ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I do, 

Mr. Tavenner (reading) : 

War Department, 
United States Engineer Office, 

Manhattan District, 
'New York, N. Y., April 11, 1943. 
Lend-Lease Administration, 

Washington, D. C. 

(Attention Mr. James Hoopes.) 

Gentlemen : This office has been referred to you as being familiar with the 
status of requests from the Russian Government for uranium compounds and 
metal. It is understood that you will act for Mr. Moore during his absence. 

Copy of letter from the War Production Board, regarding available supplies 
of ferro-uranium, is enclosed. We had previously advised tiie War Production 
Board that we would not be interested in obtaining this material and therefore 
would suggest that you contact Mr. Punderson directly in order to make sure 
that the material is still available. In addition to the quantities indicated hei'e, 
this office is cognizant of another small lot of ferro-uranium totaling approxi- 
mately 65 pounds. 

If the Russian Purchasing Commission is interested in this material from the 
standpoint of experimental work on alloys as they have previously stated, the 
ferro-uranium should serve their purpose as well or better than uranium salts. 
It is suggested that it might be advisable to attempt to secure a commitment 
from them as to any particular specifications which must be met if they decide 
to accept ferro-uranium ; it would be preferable to obtain this information before 
making the enclosed analysis available to them. 



1054 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

It is requested that we be kept advised as to the progress of the negotiations 
regarding this material. If they refuse to accept the ferro-urauium, kindly 
notify us, as we have one alternate proposition which might perhaps be offered 
as a solution to the present difficulty. 
For the district engineer : 
Very truly yours, 

(Signed) Thomas T. Crenshaw, 
Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, 

Assistant. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that letter written during the period that the 
discussion was going on regarding the advisability of approving the 
issuance of an export license for the shipment of uranium ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think it was just prior to discussion of actu- 
ally issuing an export license. As I recall we considered issuing the 
license only as a last resort. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat was the purpose in offering ferro-uranium to 
the Russians instead of uranium salts ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. If they wanted to do metallurgical research, as 
they said, that should have been just the thing for tliem. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was the purpose of your making this suggestion 
to escape the decision of your exporting uranium by inducing them 
to take a substitute ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. You spoke in the last paragraph of there being an 
alternate solution in the event the substitutes were not accepted. What 
was that alternate solution? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't know what that might have been, unless 
it was the issuance of an export license. 

Mr. Harrison. Or you may have wanted to know if they would be 
satisfied with the ferro-uranium ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. We didn't think they would be, however. 

Mr. Walter. What is ferro-uranium used for ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Ferro-uranium is a uranium-bearing steel. 
Uranium is used in steel hardening and is used in ordnance. 

Mr. Wood. Armor plate? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Woods. Guns? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you learn subsequently whether the Russians 
were interested in material of this character ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. We were advised they did not want it. 

Mr. Tavenner. I show you a letter from Mr. Hoopes in reply to 
yours of the I7th. This letter is dated April 23, 1943. Do you recog- 
nize that letter as having been received ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Tavenner. I will read this letter in evidence. (Reading:) 

April 23, 1943. 
Lt. Col. Thomas T. Crenshaw, 

War Department, United States Engineer Office, 

Neio York, N. Y. 
Dear Colonel Crenshaw : I wi-sh to thank you for your letter of April lY, 
enclosing copy of a February 9 letter from Mr. Punderson of the War Production 
Board, of Cleveland, on items of ferro-uranium in stock with the Latrobe Electric 
Steel Co. 

Since the receipt of your letter, however, I understand that General Groves 
has advised General Wesson that the particular request for 500 pounds of 
urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate can be approved. The 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1055 

Soviet Commission is being advised accordingly. In addition, it has been agreed 
that an application for 25 pounds of uranium metal will be entertained if sub- 
mitted. 

I assume that General Groves will post you on any details regarding his 
decision. 

If there are further inquiries from the Soviets on these or related materials, we 
will let you know. 

Very truly yours, 

(Signed) jAitEs P. Hoopes. 

Associate Liaison Officer, 
Division for Soviet Supply. 

Mr. Tavenner. That letter is from Lend-Lease Administration. 
That indicates a decision had been reached between the date of your 
letter of April 17 and April 23 to approve an export license. Will 
you tell the committee all you know about the approval of the export 
license and the reasons for that action, if you know ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I testified in 1948 that to the best of my recol- 
lection a second shipment to the Soviets had been approved. At that 
time I stated that I believed the reason was that we didn't want to 
continue to arouse their curiosity regarding a product that had been 
previously commercially available, and therefore decided to let them 
have the second quantity. 

Since the time of that testimony I have been able to refresh my 
memory a bit and to talk to several of the other people involved, and 
I would like to enter a second possibility for that decision, and that is 
the possibility that we intended to issue the license and then perhaps 
prevent them from actually getting the material. \'Vliich of those 
possibilities it was at the time, I can't recall. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall whether steps were taken after the 
first shipment to block further shipments from suppliers ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. We knew that the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission had contacted the Shattuck Chemical Co., in Denver, re- 
garding procuring a second quantity in addition to the first 420 pounds. 

Mr. Walter. How did you laiow that ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Through our Intelligence Service, which kept 
us posted on all requests ; and also through arrangements we had with 
the War Production Board or the Board of Economic Warfare, which 
turned over to us any requests that came in for uranium, and we were 
able to block most transactions in that way. The only way we could 
block them was under the controls set up in January 1943 prohibiting 
the use of uranium compounds in the ceramics industry. Other than 
that, we were powerless to take action. 

I believe one of our men went to Denver and talked to officials of the 
Shattuck Co. and asked them not to make the second shipment to the 
Soviets. 

Mr. Walter. The Shattuck Co. informed officials of our Govern- 
ment that the request had been made to them ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is quite possible. I don't recall. Shat- 
tuck at first, I believe, said they were obligated to make the shipment, 
that they had accepted the purchase order. I believe we stalled that 
off for quite a while, with their cooperation, and finally the matter 
dragged out so long that Shattuck finally agreed not to fill the order. 
In the meantime, I understand the Soviet Purchasing Commission had 
become impatient and had gone to another source. 



1056 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time the agreement was reached to issue the 
license, or to approve the license, was it known or suspected that any 
other source had been found by the Kussians ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. There were many possible sources throughout 
the country, a great many firms. The ceramic and other industries 
had small quantities, and some had large quantities. We were at- 
tempting to secure complete listings of those stocks, but it took some 
time to trace down all those small stocks that existed over the entire 
country. 

Mr, Tavenner. The evidence introduced here shows that ISIr. Rosen- 
berg, of Chematar, Inc., received a letter dated April 22, 1943, cancel- 
ing the order by Shattuck. The license that was issued is dated April 
23. Can you tell us an3^thing to enlighten the committee on any nego- 
tiations that were made on or about that date between your office and 
Lend-Lease or any other agencies ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No, I am afraid I can't clarify that point. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you learn that Shattuck Co. had actually re- 
fused to make the shipment and had so notified the broker or agent? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't know that we were ever actually advised 
that they had notified the agent. We were advised that they had 
decided not to fill the order. 

]Mr. Harrison. And thereafter jou issued a shipping permit? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. I think the shipping permit was dated 
prior to that date. 

Mr. Haiujison. I undei-stood you to say the shipping point was 
dated January 23, Mr. Tavenner, and Shattuck said they would not 
ship it on the 22d, so the paper issued to them was a worthless piece 
of paper. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Ta\^enner. I think we will show the action taken was on the 
22d, though the paper was dated the 23d. 

Mr. Harrison. But it was a worthless piece of paper when issued ? 

Mr. Ta\tenner. I am not too certain. The time element is too clot^e 
to be certain. There is a possibility of its being too close. 

Colonel Crenshaw. I have a vague recollection — and this is entirely 
recollection — to my belief we had about decided to let Shattuck ship 
the material before they advised us they would comply with our wishes 
and not ship it. 

Mr. Walter. Wliy did you decide to let Shattuck ship it ? 

Colonel Crenshaw\ Again to alla}^ Russian suspicions as to the 
sudden disappearance of all this material from the market. Previ- 
ously it had been a commercial product, and if all the sources of supply 
suddenly dry up, somebody is going to wonder why they dried up. 

(Representative Kearney leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the purpose of trying to block the ship- 
ments if you were going to turn around and h t them go through? 

Colonel Crenshaw. We were using delaying tactics in the hope that 
sooner or later they would let the whole matt'-r drop, but they did not; 
they continually kept trying to get the supplies, and we could not stop 
Shattuck legally from making the sale. The only thing we could do 
was to prevail on Lend-Lease to refuse to issue an export license. 

Mr. Wood. In that connection, you stated awhile ago that prior to 
that time they had been offered tliis ferro-uranium and that they 
advised you they did not want it. Did that indicate to you that they 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1057 

had some purpose other than armaments that they wanted this mate- 
rial for? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. It indicated three possibilities to me. 
They were asking for uranium oxide and uranium nitrate. The rea- 
sons they gave were for research in armaments and research in medi- 
cine, which the nitrate would have been used for. They might have 
wanted the material for either of those purposes; they might have 
suspected we were doing something in atomic research and might have 
wanted to know how much we had on hand ; and there was a fourth 
possibility that they were actually getting into atomic research them- 
selves. 

Mr. Wood. But they had asked for material indicating they wanted 
it only for armament purposes ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think they indicated medicine in addition to 
armaments. 

Mr. Walter. At that time it was pretty generally known through- 
out the world that uranium could be used to make an atomic bomb? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; it was. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like for you to state more clearly what you 
know about the reasons which were the basis for the issuance of the 
license on April 23. Can you recall discussions that you had with 
any officials of MED, including General Groves, that would throw 
any light on that decision ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No; I cannot. I did not have an opportunity 
to discuss it with General Groves at the time. He was in AVashington, 
and the information was furnished him there, and he made the decision 
there, and I am sure his testimony on this matter would be clearer 
than that of anybody else and would furnish the actual reason behind 
the issuance of that license, and it would be better than the series of 
guesses I might make on the subject. 

Mr. Wood. Did you approve in your official capacity the issuance 
of that license you'-self ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall whether I did or not. It was not 
necessary for me to approve the issuance of those licenses, provided 
General Groves' office in Washington concurred. Many of these trans- 
actions were handled by Maj. Allen Johnson. 

Mr. Wood. Wouldn't it have been irregular for the license to have 
been issued and approved without consulting with you? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Not necessarily. I would have been advised 
after the fact, however. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, your purpose in resorting to these 
delaying tactics, as you put it, was solely to prevent the Russians from 
knowing that we were engaged in an atomic bomb project with the use 
of materials everybody knew could be used for that purpose? 

Colonel Crenshaw.' Ytjs; and there was a secondary reason which 
did not apply at that time. If the Russians were actually engaged 
in atomic research, it mig^t do no harm to give them small quantities 
of material that was imperfect. 

Mr. Walter. So that for the purpose of preventing them from 
knowing what the United States was doing, it was to the best interest 
to make shipments to them from time to time, was it not? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It might well have been. 



99334—50 11 



1058 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Velde. Did I understand you to say it was generally known 
throughout the world that uranium could be used to make the atomic 
bomb ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; by all competent scientists. 

Mr. Velde. You don't refer to the average citizen ? 
Colonel Crenshaw. I don't think it was known to the average 
citizen, although there had been many tabloid stories in 1940. I would 
say people generally engaged in scientific work would know, not 
necessarily physicists. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat was General Groves' attitude, so far as 
you knew it, in regard to permitting the exporting of uranium to 
Russia ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. General Groves' underlying philosophy was 
that the last thing in the world he wanted to do was to help the 
Russians in any way. 

Mr. Walter. Was he of that opinion, and did he take that attitude, 
during the period when they were doing most of the fighting ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Frankly, yes; I think he did. The Russians 
were our allies, and as to normal raw materials it was the policy to 
give them all assistance we could, but I think General Groves 
felt our work on atomic research did not fall in that category and we 
were not obligated to help them along that line. 

Mr. Wood. Do you share that philosophy ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, possibly to a stronger degree than General 
Groves and Colonel Nichols did. 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't want to ask you to speculate on what hap- 
pended at that time, but do you know of any fact that would indicate 
that a decision had been reached to let Shattuck ship this second ship- 
ment ? If so, we would like to know it. 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is pure guessing on my part. I am not 
even certain that it can be verified in the records. 

Mr. Tavenner. If it could be verified it could be proven as a fact. 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. But do you recall any fact, whether in the record 
or not, which would throw light one way or another on that point ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. We discussed it many times, "usually in- 
formally, as to the Russian situation. The ideas changed from time 
to time. For example, when the first shipment was authorized there 
was no question in my mind what the purpose was. We felt it was 
better to let them have that small quantity than raise a hue and cry. 

Mr. Wood. You say there was no ciuestion in your mind what they 
wanted it for'? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir. They may have wanted it for any of 
the four reasons I have stated or some other reason. I don't know 
what their reason was. 

Mr. Tavenner. You knew by the letter of April 23 that the license 
had been granted ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any action taken from that time on to see 
whether or not the Russians were going to procure the uranium under 
that license ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us about that. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1059 -y. 



>.-i 



Colonel Crenshaw. My first indication that t'he Russians had suc- 
ceeded in obtaining a second quantity was, I believe, a question from 
Colonel Xichols as to whether I knew anything about procurement of a 
second quantity from any one whatsoever, and I told him that I did 
not. Pie said that he had received an indication, of which he had 
no proof or other detailed knowledge, that the Russians had succeeded 
in having the second order filled. We didn't know the quantities, and 
I don't believe we were even sure where they had gotten it. It was 
more of a rumor than fact at that time. 

Colonel Ruhoff and myself did have a talk with Mr. Pregel of the 
Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp., and the results of that conver- 
sation are, again, purely from long-distance memory and pretty much 
guesswork. As I recall it, we said to Mr. Pregel : "Have you or have 
you. not filled any orders for the Russians?" I believe he replied that 
he had. 

Mr. Wood. On that point. Colonel, I grant it has been a long while, 
but that was a pretty important question, was it not ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir. 

ISIr. Wood. Can you be positive that such a conversation as that did 
take place and that you were informed it had been done ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I can be positive the conversation took places 
As to exactly what transpired in that conversation, I cannot be posi- 
tive, but I think it can be found in the records. 

]Mr. Wood. Did you obtain from that conversation the information 
that the order had been filled ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. To the best of my knowledge, yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did that conversation take place ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I believe May or June 1943. It was just at the 
time I was getting ready to go to Oak Ridge and was turning my job 
over to Colonel Ruhoff. 

Mr. Tavenner. According to your best recollection at this time 
that conversation took place and you gained information that a ship- 
ment had been made ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I believe we gained the information that a ship- 
ment had been made. 

INIr. Tavenner. How long before that conference was it that Colonel 
Nichols asked you if you knew of any source of supply ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. As soon as he asked about it we immediately got 
in touch with Mr. Pregel, and he came down to our office on Twenty- 
seventh Street and we went over the whole matter with him. 

Mr. Wood. For the purpose of the record, which Pregel was that ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Boris. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who were present in that conference besides 
yourself ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Major Ruhoff and Mr. Pregel. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is Mr. Boris Pregel ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. What do you consider is the value to the Russians 
of 500 pounds of uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I would say the value would be very, very 
slight, if any. It might have been useful for experimental purposes ; 
that is about all. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wouldn't experimental purposes have to be the 
start of an atomic enterprise ? 



1060 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes; that is correct; but they could have 
obtained that from other sources. Going to sources all over the world 
and getting 500 pounds here and there, conceivably they may have 
obtained a stock pile, but that is doubtful. 

Mr. Tavenner. But it would have been of value for experimental 
purposes ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Walter. Where else was this material available? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I understand that the Russians have rather 
extensive deposits themselves. I don't know to what extent those 
deposits have been developed. There are deposits in Tibet and Mada- 
gascar and South America; and there were extensive deposits in 
Czechoslovakia, which were in the hands of the Germans at that time; 
and there Avas a large stock pile in Antwerp which was in German 
hands at that time and not available to the Russians. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you or any person on the staif of the Man- 
hattan Engineering District know that Mr. Pregel was going to fill 
tliat order before it was filled and shipped? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Xo, sir. 

Mr. Tam^nner. The evidence is tliat some left the country on 
May — I do not have the exact date before me — but was any effort 
made to stop the shipment? 

Colonel Crenshaw. The shipment had already gone, as I recall it, 
by the time we even knew about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Had there been anv discussion, to vour knowledtje, 
with Mr. Pregel, prior to the filling of that order by him, relating to 
the filling of an order for any government other than the United 
States or Canada ? 

Colonel C'RENshav/. Yes ; there had been. I specifically remember 
a discussion of sales to the British Government, and I believe that 
discussion was prior to this shipment. I can't be positive of that 
without the records, but that, again, would be in the records. In 
addition, we didn't feel that it was particidarly necessary to discuss 
the matter, because we had been oflfered voluntarily on the part of 
Mr. Pregel all stocks of uranium and nitrate that they had in the 
Eldorado mines or elsewhere. 

]Mr. Woon. Prior to that shipment ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Prior to that shipment ; yes. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. When was that agreement reached? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I can't be positive of that. It might have been 
as early as January or February 1943. 

Mr. Wood. Was that commitment in writing or oral? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think it was in writing. 

Mr. Tav'enner. You think it was in writing? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. As early as January or February? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It could have been any time between January 
and April. 

]VIr. Wood. At the time you had your conversation with Mr. Pregel 
which you have detailed, in the presence of the officer next in command 
to you, did you have at that time the written commitment from Mr. 
Pregel giving the Manhattan District first option to any material on 
hand or that it might acquire ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1061 

Colonel Crenshaw. I believe it was in our files ; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you referring to an agreement of March 27 De- 
tween Manhattan District and Canadian Radium and Uranium Corp., 
which specified certain materials should be delivered, and giving the 
code numbers in the agreement? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. I am referring to an earlier informal 
agreement that was later expressed by that contract or by a contract 
of a later date. 

Mr, TA^"ENNER. And that earlier understanding was reduced to a 
written agreement? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think it was. I think Mr. Pregel wrote us 
a letter offering the stock and I believe stating a time limit on it. 

Mr. Wood. Categorically, can you state that there was such an 
agreement and understanding with Mr. Pregel that you should have 
the first option to purchase uranium material ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; I can. 

Mr. Tavenner. Regarding the contract of March 27, do you have 
any independent recollection of when it was actually executed and 
delivered? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No; I do not. It probably would have been 
negotiated at a considerably earlier date than the actual date of the 
contract, because those contracts were very complicated and normally 
they took a long period of time to negotiate. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. In the earlier part of your testimony you referred 
to the fact that after this first shipment arrangements were made with 
other agencies to notify you of interests shown by other governments 
in uranium? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Tell us about that, what arrangements were made 
and with whom. 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think we had arranged with both the Bmrd 
of Economic Warfare and the War Production Board to advise us of 
any interest in uranium compounds or uranium metal. 

Mr. Ta\t5nner. By the Soviet Purchasing Agency ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. By anyone. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. By anyone? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir, 

Mr, Ta\^nner. With whom were those arrangements made ? 

Colonel Crenshaw, I cannot answer that question. Mr, Burman 
handled those transactions and I believe his memory or his records 
would be rather complete on that subject. 

Mr. Ta^'enner. When the time came to consider the advisability of 
the approval of the second license, with whom did you deal in Lend- 
Lease? Who conferred with you from Lend-Lease, by telephone or 
personally or by letter? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Mr, Hoopes, and I think Mr, Moore. 

Mr. Tavenner. Any other persons? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Those were the only two at that time, 

Mr. Ta^^nner. The Board of Economic Warfare was the issuing 
agency. Did you have a conference with anyone from the Bureau of 
Economic Warfare regarding this license? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I did not personally, so far as I can recollect. 
Lieutenant Burman handled all the details of those transactions. 



1062 . SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

JNIr. Tavenner. Did you at any time confer with anyone from the 
Board of Economic Warfare, or did any other person in your organiza- 
tion, to your knowledge, with regard to this particular license? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I am sure that Mr. Burman must have con- 
ferred with them. It may or may not have been after the license was 
issued. I know that Maj. Allen Johnson in General Groves' office 
would have been the logical one to handle that particular transaction. 

Mr. Wood. This is the second quorum call. The committee will 
have to stand in adjournment until 2 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until '2 p. m. of the same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The hearing was resumed at 2 : 30 p. m.) 
Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS T. CRENSHAW— Resumed 

INIr. Tavenner. I was asking you at the close of the morning session 
about the names of officials of the Bureau of Economic Warft\re who 
conferred with you or other members of your staff relating to the sec- 
ond export license. Can you recall the names of any? 

Colonel Crenshaw. IMr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore. 

IVIr. Tavenner. ]Mr. Hoopes and Mr. Moore were in Lend-Lease. 
My question related to the Bureau of Economic Warfare. 

Colonel Crenshaw. I do not recall having any direct connection 
with anyone in BEW. That was all handled through Burman, and 
I probably talked to various individuals in the Board of Economic 
Warfare at some time, but I do not recall their names. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did persons in that organization, regardless of what 
their names may be, confer with you regarding the issuance of this par- 
ticular license ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Not to my recollection ; not directly with me, 
but they did with my particular group in Manhattan District. 

Mr. Tavenner. What members of your group ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Lieutenant Burman, I am quite sure. 

Mr. Tavenner. Any other persons whose names you can give? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Possibly Captain Merritt. 

Mr. Taa-enner. Any others ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think that would be all ; and General Groves. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. And General Groves ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of the purpose of their 
interviews and what took place? 

Colonel Crenshaav. There were general discussions regarding the 
issuance of the license, and it would have been in regard to that. Spe- 
cifically, I don't have any knowledge of what transpired. 

Mr. Taat:nner. Do you know what attitude or position the officials 
of the Bureau of Economic Warfare took with regard to the question 
of whether this license should be issued or not? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Not directly, but during the recess I was search- 
ing my memory a bit, and something occurred to my mind that has a 
bearing on this question, as well as the question you asked earlier as to 
the motive for issuing the license for the secon(i shipment. I believe 
that somewhere in the files of the district there will be found a memo- 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1063 

raiidum with my signature which indicated that General Groves had 
decided to issue' the export license because of pressure that was being 
brought to bear. That word "pressure" may have been my own word 
or it may have been General Groves' word. I don't know the implica- 
tion of it. But I am sure there is such a memorandum. 

Mr. Wood. Did you say that in your memorandum ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir. I believe that will be found in the 
files. I can't be positive about that. 

Mr. Kearney. Pressure from whom ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall. It might have been from Lend- 
Lease; it might have been the pressure from the Russians themselves 
tliat they were exerting on all possible agencies. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. A matter of that importance, don't you think you 
could tell us something about the character of the pressure? 

Colonel Ckenshaw\ No, sir. I don't recall, and I don't know 
whether the word "pressure" was my own word or whether it occurred 
in a conversation with General Groves. I didn't talk to him face to 
face, but did have telephone conversations with him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there an indication of where pressure came 
from, if it existed ? 

Colonel CRENSHA^v. No, sir. I can't clarify it further than that. 

]\Ir. Wood. You state as a fact that the term "pressure" was used in 
some connection? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is my recollection, and I believe such a 
memorandum could be found. 

Mr. Tavenner. The staff of the committee has been informed that 
there was a telephone conversation between Captain Merritt of your 
office and Mr. Hoopes of Lend-Lease, which conversation Captain Mer- 
ritt could not recall, in which Captain Merritt is alleged to have stated 
that pressure had just been brought upon General Groves to change 
his mind with regard to the approval of the license. Does that refresh 
your recollection in any way ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No ; except to the extent that it might be tied 
in with the other memorandum which I just mentioned. 

Mr. Taat.nner. In other words, the two things may be the same ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It is quite possible, yes. 

]Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall discussing the subject of pressure 
with any member of the staff ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I have no specific recollection of it except that 
that term does linger in my mind. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did General Groves ever tell you that pressure had 
been applied or exercised ? 

Colonel Crenshaw\ I cannot specifically remember. It is quite 
possible that he used the term himself. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did Captain Merritt or Lieutenant Burman ever 
refer to pressure being exercised in connection with their discussion 
of the matter ? 

Colonel Crenshaw^ No. I have no recollection of that, and I don't 
believe pressure would have been placed on them, anyway. It would 
come at the top, 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall whether or not the pressure you are 
speaking of came from within some Government agency, or without? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. You mean you have no recollection ? 



1064 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Colonel Crenshaw. I have no recollection. 

Mr. TAi'ENNER, As you look back upon that occasion now, are you 
aware of anything that you would now call pressure having been 
brought to bear upon you by any member of Lend-Lease Administra- 
tion, directly or indirectly? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. I don't think pressure would be a proper 
term to use. Lend-Lease was anxious to cooperate with the Russians. 
They were our allies. I think that was policy. Naturally, Lend- 
Lease was doing everything possible to get material for our allies. 
But I don't know of any instance when anybody attempted to exercise 
undue pressure on me. 

(Representative McSweeney enters the hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Or on any member of your staff ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Or on any member of my staff. 

Mr. Tavenner. Does that apply to BEW? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes ; the same there. 

Mr. Tavenner. And what about the War Production Board? 

Colonel Crenshaw. The same. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Did you learn during the course of your employment 
that the export license which had been issued for the 500 pounds of 
uranium nitrate and 500 pounds of uranium oxide on April 23, 1943, 
was amended on April 29, 1943 ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Was the question of amendment of the license ever 
brought to your attention by an official of the Board of Economic 
Warfare, which was the licensing agency, or the Lend-Lease Admin- 
istration ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't remember that. If an amendment was 
made it probably would have been brought to my attention, directly 
or indirectly, however. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time when you were concerned with the source 
of all material of this character in the United States, and when you 
were actively engaged in protecting it, was the question of amendment, 
which would indicate a new source of supply had been located, a very 
important matter to your group ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It would not necessarily have been, in that there 
could have been manj^ reasons for amendment. As I recall the prac- 
tice on export licensing, it seems to me an amendment was required 
even if it was a price change, so it might or might not have been im- 
portant. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. But if on the 22d of April you had succeeded in 
stopping or barricading compliance by Shattuck, then the amendment 
at a later date for any reason would show a reactivation of intei-est 
in that license, wouldn't it? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. Well, not necessarily, because it may have 
been the intent to allow that license to stand as a blanket license, giv- 
ing the Russians what we might term a fishing license to get the mate- 
rial if they could, therefore we were cooperating with them. 

Mr. Ta^-enner. When that license was prepared in the terms of the 
original contract with Shattuck Co., that was true, but when a few 
days later they changed its terms, wouldn't that indicate they had 
found a new source of supply, otherwise there woidd be no reason for a 
change ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1065 

Colonel Crenshaw. In the licensing procedure I assume that the 
exact quantity must be shown before the license could be issued. I 
don't remember that point. 

Mr. Taat:nner. It showed the description of the material and the 
price and the supplier. 

Colonel Crenshaw. Well, then, presumably that should have been 
an indication that something was going on. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would an amendment be made to an export license 
without conferring again with the Manhattan Engineering District 
where the original license had been approved ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Not unless someone in the Board of Economic 
Warfare did a lot of assuming. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. What do you mean ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is, unless they had assumed, because we 
once had authorized the license to be issued, we wanted it to stand in 
the case of changes. That seems unlikely. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the Board of Economic Warfare know of the 
general opposition of the Manhattan District to the sale of uranium 
for export ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. They must have inferred that from the diffi- 
culty in getting export licenses for the material. I don't think we 
ever stated to them specifically that we did not want to ship it to the 
Russians. I think that would have been an unwise statement to have 
made at the time to another Government agency. 

Mr. Tavenner. As far as you know, there was no reference of the 
matter back to the Manhattan Engineering District on the question 
of amendment of the license ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Not to my recollection. 

(Representative Velde leaves the hearing room.) 

Mr. Wood. If the fact that this particular export license was 
amended so as to include a different source of supply had come to 
your attention before the shipment was made and the deal closed, what 
would have been your attitude about it ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think we immediately would have tried to 
find out what this other source was, and immediately taken steps to 
block that also. 

Mr. Wood. To block it? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think we would have ; yes. 

Mr. Wood. That had been your policy before ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Wood. And wouldn't it particularly have been your policy if 
you found that supplier was under contract to you to give the Govern- 
ment first option on all material it was within its power to control? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. I think the answer to that is "Yes," 
although it needs some amplification. 

Mr. Wood. Let's see if it does. You say the source of supply that 
finally furnished this material under an amended license was under 
an agreement to you prior to the date of shipment. If it had come 
to your attention that this source of supply was seeking to sell this 
material that was under option to you to the Russians or any other 
country on which there was a ban, would you have taken any action? 

Colonel Crenshaw. We would have attempted to do so, but I don't 
know that we could have done so legally, even under the terms of the 



1066 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

contract. There are several ramifications on that which I can explain, 
if you wish. 

Mr. Wood. My purpose in asking the question was to find out what 
your attitude would have been. 

Colonel Crenshaw. We would have attempted to block it. I am 
sure of that. 

Mr. Ta\t3XNER. Assuming Chematar was the supplier through 
which both Shattuck Co. and the Canadian Eadimn & Uranium Corp. 
furnished the material, do you know whether or not the license would 
have been in the name of the agent rather than in the name of the 
actual supplier ? Do you know what the practice was ? 

Colonel Crensiix\w. No. 

Mr. Taa'enner. You don't know if it was the practice to have the 
license in the name of the agent rather than the supplier ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall that. 

(Eepresentative Kearney leaves the hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you familiar with the handling of heavy- 
water transactions ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. That was outside my department entirely. 

Mr. Ta\"enner. Whose department was that in ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Colonel Nichols himself handled most of that 
directly. 

Mr. Taat.nner. Do you know whether any requests were submitted 
to the INIanhattan Engineering project with regard to the approval of 
sales of heavy water? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I have no knowledge of any request. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was heavy water considered at that time a strategic 
material, that is, during 1943, 1944, and 1945, by Manhattan Engi- 
neering District? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It was by Manhattan District. 

]\Ir. Tavenner. Do you know if the other Government agencies 
knew of that appraisal that Manhattan Engineering District placed 
on the material? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I very much doubt it. 

Mr. Tavenner. If that information was solely the information of 
Manhattan Engineering District, what safeguard could be placed upon 
the sale for export of heavy water by the action of other Govern- 
ment agencies, if no agency but your own knew about the importance 
of it? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It would have been possible to do the same thing 
we did with uranium, that is, to require approval of export licenses, 
but that would have called attention to heavy water. 

Mr. Tavenner. All materials the Russians asked for were not sub- 
mitted to you to see whether you were interested in them, were they ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. No. But had we gone to BEW and requested 
them to advise us of any requests for licenses for heavy water, that 
would have been an indication we were interested in heavy water. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Does that mean that the matter was of such a secret 
character that you would not even want to inform the responsible 
heads of other Government agencies of the importance of the material ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is correct, unless it was considered very 
important to control it. There, again, heavy water was being pro- 
duced commercially, but it was almost a laboratory curiosity. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1067 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know how it occurred that the matter of 
uranium was first taken up with the Manhattan Engineering Dis- 
trict at the time the export license for the first shipment had been 
issued ? Was it the result of initiative on the part of the Manhattan 
Engineering District, or on the part of some other Government 
agency ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall how that matter came to our at- 
tention. I think we got a routine list of all requests for uranium 
compounds. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the character of that list? I haven t 
heard of it before. 

Colonel Crenshaw. Periodically — I don't remember how often — 
it is my recollection that either the Board of Economic Warfare or 
Lend-Lease or both submitted to us a list of all requests for uranium 
compounds. In addition, after the controls were put on the use of 
uranium in the ceramics industry, we got a list showing all uranium 
transactions in the ceramics industry, which had to be approved by 
BEW, I believe, and indirectly by us. 

Mr. Tavenner. We have located one list furnished by Lend-Lease 
in July 1943, or it may have been 1944, of transactions which had pre- 
viously occurred with regard to uranium, but was any list furnished 
at an earlier date than that ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes, sir ; I am sure that it was. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did that list relate solely to the uranium com- 
pounds, or did it relate to chemicals generally ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. To the best of my recollection it related to 
uranium compounds only. 

Mr. Tavenner. When was a report of that character first sub- 
mitted? 

Colonel Crenshaw. It must have been certainly as early as March 
1943, and undoubtedly prior to that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. At whose instance was that report filed and 
prepared ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think that was an arrangement which Mr. 
Burman was able to negotiate with Lend-Lease and/or BEW. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then from the time that request was made, those 
organizations would have known of the importance of that material ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. In all, how many requests for uranium compounds from 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the attention of the 
Chemical Warfare Service ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I can't answer that question. 

Mr. Case. How many came to your attention? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I recall only one. There may have been others. 

Mr. Case. That one was for how much and what? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I believe the exact quantities were covered in a 
letter which you showed me earlier, Mr. Tavenner. I don't recall the 
exact quantities. 

Mr. Case. Were you aware of a request for uranium materials in 
the summer of 1943 ? 



c-r 



1068 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Colonel Crenshaw. If it was prior to the 1st of July, I was no 
longer in that particular department of the district. 

Mr. Case. Prior to July 1, 1943? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Did you either hear or know of a renewal of that request 
hi 1944? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I think I have heard of it indirectly, but not in 
an official capacity. 

Mr. Case. When did you hear of it ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I couldn't answer that, sir. It must have been 
during my service with Manhattan District. It could even have been 
after that time. 

Mr. Case. Did any request for uranium compounds from any com- 
pany or any purchasing commission other than that of the Soviet 
Union come to your attention when you were connected with the 
Chemical Warfare Service ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I was not connected with the Chemical War- 
fare Service, sir. 

Mr. Case. Well, in your capacity ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Will you repeat that question ? 

Mr. Case. Did any request for uranium compounds from any pur- 
chasing commission other than that of the Soviet Union come to your 
attention while you were engaged in this work? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I don't recall any that came to the attention of 
the Manhattan District. The British, of course, were interested in this 
material, and while we had no control, all the shipments to Great 
Britain were taken up with us informally. 

Mr. Case. Shipments of uranium to Great Britain ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Yes. May I modify that "shipments" to 
"shipment." I know of only one. 

Mr. Case. Which one was that ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I believe it was made in the spring of 1943. 

Mr. Case. Do you know how much and what it was ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. Approximately 15 tons of uranium oxide. 

Mr. Tavenner. What about sales to the French Government ? 

Colonel Crenshaw. I know of none, sir. France was occupied 
at that time, and we normally would have had no transactions with 
them. 

Mr. Wood. In view of the continued persistence of the quorum bells, 
I will adjourn the committee until 10 o'clock in the morning. 

(Thereupon, at 3 p. m. on Wednesday, January 25, 1950, an adjourn- 
ment was taken until Thursday, January 26, 1950, at 10 a. m.) 



H BAKINGS EEGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEEIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DUKING WOKLD WAR II 



THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1950 

United States House of RErRESENTATiVES, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ D. C. 

PUBLIC HEARINGS 

The committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 : 30 a. m., in 
room 226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) 
presiding. 

Committee members present : Eepresentatives John S. Wood (chair- 
man). Francis E. Walter, Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, 
Francis Case, Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell and Courtney Owens, 
investigators; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, direc- 
tor of research ; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. 

If there are any Members of Congress present in the audience, they 
are invited to come up and sit W' ith the committee. 

Mr. Counsel, are you ready to proceed ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, as you are aware, soon 
after the appearance of Gen. Leslie R. Groves before this committee 
on December 7, 1949, Mr. Henry A. Wallace expressed a desire to 
appear before this committee. The committee, at its first meeting 
after that, unanimously agreed to his appearance, and Mr. Wallace is 
now here as a volunteer witness. May he be called at this time? 

Mr. Wood. Without objection on the part of the committee, yes. 

Mr. Wallace, it is noted that there are several photographers here 
from the press. It is a rule of this committee that a witness brought 
before it shall not be photographed without his permission. Do you 
object to having your picture made by the photographers? 

Mr. Wallace. No ; I have no objection, although I would prefer if 
they get them out of the way soon, because if they continue to wait 
for some abnormal posture, they create some confusion. If we could 
just get it out of the way now I would appreciate it. If they want me 
to make certain kinds of gestures, I don't mind. 

(Photographs were taken.) 

Mr. Wallace. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the stenographer 
is going to make a special effort to get the transcript of questions and 
answers ready as soon as possible, and would it be all right to circu- 
late it among the press that they can, at a certain place, get the tran- 
script of questions and answers? 

^ 1069 






1070 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. I am certain those arrangements can be made with 
the reporter. She is very accommodating about matters of that kind. 

Mr. Wallace, Certain members of the press approached me as to 
whether I would be so kind to provide that service myself, and I said 
I would in case the committee was not in position to do so. 

Mr. Wood. We must have order in the committee room, ladies and 
gentlemen, at all times. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr, Chairman, may I suggest for the sake of orderly 
procedure that the witness be sworn and I be permitted to make certain 
inquiries relating to the subject under investigation, after which the 
witness be given an opportunity to explain any matter relevant to the 
investigation which is not covered by my examination. 

Mr, Wood, If you will stand, Mr. Wallace, and be sworn, please, sir. 
Do you solemnly swear the evidence you give this committee shall be 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Wallace, I do so solemnly swear, 

TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. WALLACE 

Mr, Tavenner, Mr. Wallace, were you a member of the War Pro- 
duction Board, and, if so, over what period of time did you serve as 
a member? 

Mr. Wallace. I was a member of the War Production Board and 
the predecessor group, the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board, 
which was set up in late August or early September 19-11. I was Chair- 
man of that Board, and if it met with the desire of the committee would 
go into considerable details as to why I was made Chairman. 

That Board was replaced about January 15, 191:2, by the War Pro- 
duction Board. I remained as a member of the War Production 
Board in my capacity as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, and 
continued as a member until July 19 or 20, 1943, at which time I wrote 
a letter to Mr, Donald Nelson resigning from the Board, and on July 21 
I find in my records a letter to the President of the United States in- 
dicating why I resigned from the Board at that time, 

JNIr. Tavenner. ^^^lo was Chairman of the Board during the year 
1943 ? 

Mr. Wallace. Of the War Production Board ? 

Mr. Ta"\^nner. Yes; of the War Production Board. 

Mr, Wallace. Mr. Donald Nelson. 

Mr. Tavenner, Who were the members of the Board at that time 
beside yourself? 

Mr, Wallace, That is a matter of record. They were the heads 
of the armed services, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
State — it is a matter of the public record. There were quite a number. 
I think War Manpower was represented. I think you must have that 
■iilready in your records. 

Mr, Ta\^nner. Yes. I will just ask you this : Was there representa- 
tion on that Board of other Government agencies, such as the Office 
of Lend-Lease? 

Mr, Wallace, Yes; I am quite sure the Office of Lend-Lease was 
there, Harry Hopkins, so far as I recollect, did not sit in on the War 
Production Board meetings. 

Mr, Ta\'enner. Incidentally, I see you are accompanied by a gentle- 
man here. Are you represented by counsel ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1071 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. This is Mr. Walter Freedman, who used to be 
an attorney with the Board of Economic Warfare, dealing especially 
with the export licenses, and I have asked him to come both in that ca- 
pacity and as counsel. Freedman is spelled F-r-e-e-d-m-a-n. 

Mr. Tavenner. And what is his first name and middle initial ? 

Mr. Freedman. Walter. There is no middle initial. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. And your address? [Addressing Mr. Freedman.] 

Mr. Freedman. Washington Building, Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Tavenner. Briefly, what were your duties as a member of the 
War Production Board ? 

Mr. Wallace. When Mr. Samuel Rosenman approached me, at the 
suggestion of President Roosevelt, that I sit on SPAB — Supply, Prior- 
ities, and Allocation Board — it was suggested that my place on SPAB 
was particularly to represent those foreign countries that were not 
under lend-lease. The Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Board had 
to do with the allotment of the production of the United States. The 
Board of Economic Warfare was particularly concerned with Latin 
America, Therefore it was felt that there should be representation on 
the War Production Board of the Board of Economic Warfare. 

There was also another reason why I was on the SPAB which is 
not particularly germane to the subject under discussion today, and 
that is because there was a serious disagreement among the predeces- 
sor agency — I believe it was 0PM — between certain groups. One 
group thought we ought to stop all production of automobiles, for 
example, so that we could produce more tanks. We .were not in the 
war yet. Another group thought we should go ahead producing 
automobiles. 

The President and Samuel Rosenman came to the conclusion that I, 
by reason of my office, could step in and establish a chain of command 
that would stop the discord and make a firm policy at this time when 
we were not in the war. In other words, they invoked the prestige 
of my office to get a job done they would not get done any other way. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you devote quite a bit of time and attention to 
the duties of your office on that Board ? 

Mr. Wallace. As chairman of SPAB, I did. This was in the fall 
of 1941. I am very proud of the work that I did at that time in 
connection with Donald Nelson. I think we did a remarkable job 
that made a very great difference in the later war effort. But after 
Donald Nelson became Chairman of the War Production Board my 
activities were not so great. 

Mr. TA^nENNER. But they were great enough so that you were fa- 
miliar with the general procedural requirements regarding the trans- 
actions of the War Production Board, were they not ? 

Mr. Wallace. No. You see, the President urged me, when I took 
on both of these duties, which were not customary for Vice Presidents, 
as you well recognize, that I not get into administration details. He 
urged me not to do that in the first instance. I was, of course, enor- 
mously concerned with getting the greatest possible production, and 
when something came up in connection with rubber, for instance, in 
which I was intensely interested, I took a definite interest because 
I had a competence in the field ; but with regard to the general run of 
War Production Board activities, I did not take a detailed interest. 

Mr. Tavenner. The War Production Board was, however, vitally 



1072 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

concerned not only with the production but the control of material 
that had been produced. Isn't that correct? 

Mr. Wallace. And the Supply, Priorities, and Allocation Bof^rd 
set up the conditions under which the controls were put in effect. 

Mr. Tav^enxer. And when any matter of policy was involved in 
questions that would arise in the functioning of the Board, you were 
actJA^e and participated in those matters? 

Mr. Wallace. When they were brought up to the Board level, and 
there is always a question of what was. 

Mr. Taa-exner. Were you a member of the committee known as 
the ]Military Policy Committee ? 

Mr. Wallace. Not to the best of my recollection. You mean of 
the War Production Board? 

Mr. Tavenner. Whether it was an adjunct of the War Production 
Board or not, I can't say. 

Mr. Wallace. There was a Military Policy Committee that had to 
do with the atom bomb. That had nothing to do with the War Pro- 
duction Board. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understand. 

Mr. Wallace. No; I was not connected with the Military Policy 
Committee. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. Were you connected with that Committee in any 
way? 

Mr. Wallace. No; I was not connected with that Committee. If 
you want to go into the entire atomic-bomb matter, I can go into it 
chronologically. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; we would like to know what your connection 
was with the atomic-bomb project. 

Mr. Wallace. The whole matter of atomic energy was first brought 
to my attention by matters in public print in 1939 and 1940. In one 
of the popular magazines there was an article about U-235 in 1939 ; 
and on May 5. 1940, there was an article by William E. Lawrence of 
the New York Times; it was on the front page, and went into the 
details of U-235. 

Then it was brought to my attention in a strong way by Dr. Vanne- 
var Bush on June 29, 1940, when I was Secretary of Agriculture. He 
told me about the job that had just been assigned to him by President 
Roosevelt. Dr. Vannevar Bush and I had known each other for some 
time, we had mutual acquaintances, and I think he had respect for my 
scientific ability. So he told me of this job that had been assigned 
to him by President Roosevelt a short time previously. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was that job that was assigned to him? 

Mr. Wallace. He was assigned the job of looking into the possibili- 
ties of using U-235 to make an atom bomb. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you serve on the Committee with him ? 

Mr. Wallace. If you will allow me to go ahead with the chronology, 
I will indicate just how that worked out. 

Mr. Taatenner. Very well. 

Mr. Wallace. As I remember it, he did not come to see me again 
until July 23 of 1941, after I was Vice President. In the former meet- 
ing he had indicated that the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin was 
working very hard on this matter of making an atomic bomb. In this 
July 23, 1941, meeting, he said that it now looked much more possible 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1073 

to make a bomb than it had when he had seen me before, and at this time 
we swore each other to secrecy. And then, I guess Pearl Harbor came. 
I have these dates written down. I want to be sure of getting this 
just right. I don't want to do too much from memory on this. I 
think I had better read this off. 

It was in tlie fall of 1941 that a Top Policy Committee was formed 
composed of myself, I was the ranking member of it, I would assume; 
the Secretary of War, Secretary Stimson ; Chief of Staff, General Mar- 
shall ; Dr. Bush ; and Dr. Conant. 

This Top Policy Committee was very important in the early stage 
of the game, but had no importance after the construction really 
started. It was very important in 1941 and 1942. 

We held a meeting in my office in the Senate Office Building on 
December 16, 1941, 9 days after Pearl Harbor, w^liich was attended 
by Secretary Stimson, by Dr. Vannevar Bush, myself, and Harold 
Smith. Harold Smith was not a member of the committee, but 
Harold Smith attended in his capacity as Director of the Budget. 
The work hitherto had largely been of a research nature, and it was 
now apparent that large sums of money were going to be involved. 
This was an absolutely secret thing, and I think it is one of the 
miracles of the war that it was kept so absolutely secret; nobody 
talked; but the question was how to get large sums of money and 
yet maintain absolute secrecj'. That was the problem before this 
December 16, 1941, meeting of the top policy committee. Therefore, 
Harold Smith was present and rendered very valuable service in find- 
ing some way of getting the money. What he did, I don't know, but 
he did get very large sums of money. 

At that meeting it was decided that certain pilot plants should be 
started. Dr. I3ush came in to see me several times during 1942 with 
regard to signing reports to be transmitted to the President. 

The only two times the Top Policy Committee met that I am aware 
of were on this December 16, 1941, and on September 23, 1942. The 
only meeting I attended was the December 16, 1941, meeting. I 
just returned from out of town during the day on September 23, and 
did not attend that meeting. That was the meeting which General 
Groves attended for the first time, as I understand it. Because I 
didn't attend the meeting, I did not meet General Groves at that time. 
So far as I can determine from consulting my record, I did not meet 
General Groves until April 14, 1944. 

I talked with Dr. Vannevar Bush yesterday to confirm my recollec- 
tion, and I asked him what was his recollection of the relationship 
between the Military Policy Committee which w^as set up in the fall 
of 1942 with General Groves as the executive officer, what was the 
relationship, the chain of command, and his recollection was the 
same as mine, that General Groves was under the Military Policy 
Committee and had no business reporting to the Top Policy Committee 
unless he was so directed by the Military Policy Committee. In other 
words, the Top Policy Committee, after that second meeting on Sep- 
tember 23, 1942, really ceased to have active existence. However, if 
any matter of unusual, broad significance came up outside the field of 
military competence, I have no doubt that Dr. Bush would have con- 
sulted me. The chain of command was from Dr. Bush to me, rather 
than General Groves, unless General Groves was delegated by Dr. 
Bush or Secretary Stimson to consult me. 

99334 — .50 1 2 



1074 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

The only matter of broad policy that came up after the second 
meeting of the Top Policy Committee of September 23, 1942, had to 
do with the sharing of certain construction details of the atom bomb 
with Great Britain, That is my recollection of it. And Dr. Vannevar 
Bush came to see me about that on two separate occasions after that 
September 23, 1942, meeting. 

Mr. Tavenner. Although there were only two occasions, you state, 
when meetings of the Top Policy Committee were held, there were sub- 
sequent occasions, were there not, when the individual members of 
that committee met informally and discussed problems 'i 

Mr. Wallace. None, so far as I know. There probably were meet- 
ings, I would assume, l3etween Dr. Bush and Dr. Conant, or between 
Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, and Secretary Stimson. You see, this became, 
after September 1942, a military effort, and Dr. Bush was working 
closely with the military, and Dr. Conant, Dr. Bush's assistant, was 
working very closely with the military. Secretary Stimson, of course, 
was Secretary of War, and General Marshall was Chief of Staff. I 
was the only one not in the military activity. They may have had 
frequent meetings, but I never sat on any of them. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who was chairman ? 

Mr. Wallace. Of the Top Policy Committee ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Wallace. So far as I know, I was the ranking member. The 
first meeting was held in my office. After that, actually the man who 
was at work continuously on the problem was the man who had been 
designated by President Roosevelt on June 15, 1940, Dr. Vannevar 
Bush. He was the man who had been delegated by President Roose- 
velt to work on the problem, and he was the man who really determined 
if a meeting was to be held. He was the man who had all the contacts. 

From what Dr. Bush told me. Dr. Bush had frequent contacts w^ith 
the President, and, from what Dr. Bush told me, the President, during 
these early stages, wanted these matters cleared with me, because I 
was second in command in the Nation. Also, the President at that 
time had, I think, considerable confidence in my scientific judgment. 

I do know I talked to the President about the importance of the 
l^roject and why it was important to back it with sufficient money. 
That was in the early stages, when it was getting off the ground. My 
significance after 1942, 1 would say, in regard to this, was practically 
nil. That doesn't reflect on me or doesn't reflect on anybody else. It 
had passed out of the scientific stage into the construction stage. 

Mr. Tavenner. I am only asking for the facts. 

Mr. Wallace. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you the presiding officer at the meeting of the 
Top Policy Committee which you attended ^ 

Mr. Wallace. I can't answer that, for the simple reason I do not 
have any notes in my records in regard to tliat. It was held in my 
office, and, knowing how I act in situations of that kind, I presume it 
was an absolutely informal thing. Secretary Stimson, Vannevar 
Bush, and myself talked it over. ''We just got into a war, and the 
Germans are hard at work on this, how are we going to get this job 
done?" There was nobody there to take any minutes of the meeting. 
Harold Smith, Director of the Budget, may have taken some. He is 
dead. Secretary Stimson, I understand, is not in the best of health. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1075 

General Marshall was not there. The only one I think would have 
specific information about that meeting is Dr. Bush. 

Mr. Tavenner. The British problem you mentioned a while ago, 
what was the general character of that problem which the Top Policy 
Committee had to deal with, and when did that problem arise? 

Mr. Wallace. On December 20, 1942, Vannevar Bush came to see 
me about it, and said that there was a disagreement between ourselves 
and the British in regard to it. 

Mr. Tavenner. In regard to what ? 

Mr. AVallace. How much information should be given the British 
with regard to construction details. The British had been very help- 
ful to us in regard to scientific matters. 

Mr. Tavenner. Had the work of the Manhattan Engineering Dis- 
trict progressed at that time, in December 1942, to an advanced stage 
in the making of original plans ? 

Mr. Wallace. To the best of my knowledge I knew nothing about 
the Manliattan district until Harold Smith told me the name of the 
district in May 1945. I didn't know anything about the work as it 
progressed. As a matter of fact, I didn't want to know. This was 
back in 1941 and 1942, and all I wanted to know was that the work 
was being pushed with vigor. I had great confidence in Dr. Bush, 
felt he was a man of unique capacity, and wanted the President to push 
the work. I didn't know the name of the project or where they had 
the project, but I assumed Dr. Bush was doing his job. 

Mr. Tavenner. As a member of this Top Policy Committee, wasn't 
it your duty to determine that work was progressing and that some- 
thing was being done ? 

Mr. Wallace. Not after September 1942. Not after it passed over 

to the military. 

Mr. Tavenner. After that, on December 20, 1942, you were inter- 
viewed by Dr. Bush regarding the extent to which Great Britain 
was to be informed on policy or experiment? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. Dr. Bush came to me on December 20, 1942. 
I don't know whether he came to me to determine if there was a line 
to be followed. This thing was so secret I don't think any definite 
line was ever set up. You couldn't reduce things to writing. It is 
quite probable, knowing the way Dr. Bush and the President worked, 
that the President said to Dr. Bush: "Now, you had better go see 
Henry about this." That would be my guess. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. And your discussion at this conference was the ex- 
tent to which you would furnish materials or equipment needed in the 
manufacturing of the atomic bomb to Great Britain? 

Mr. Wallace. It never came up. Nothing of that sort ever came 

Mr. Tavenner. It was just a question of information at that time? 

Mr. Wallace. It was a question of how far the British would be 
permitted to get certain types of information. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you discuss how far the United States should 
go in giving tlie same information to the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Wallace. It never came up, nothing of that sort. 

Mr. Tavenner. Never at any time? 

Mr. Wallu\ce. Never. 

Mr. Tavenner. Gen. Leslie R. Groves testified before this commit- 
tee on December 7, 1949, that you disassociated yourself from the Man- 



1076 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEKIAL 

hattan Engineering District project. If you did disassociate yourself 
from it, when did that occur and what were the reasons ? 

Mr. Wallace, I think what I said previously is very clear, and 
General Groves obviously was not familiar with the relationship be- 
tween the Military Policy Committee and the Top Policy Committee. 
You will find, reading his testimony, that he said the Military Policy 
Committee was probably under the Top Policy Committee. He really 
didn't know, and there was no reason why he should know. Dr. Bush 
tells me there was no reason why General Groves should have ever 
come to me. But General Groves may have come because he was di- 
rected on a particular occasion by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson, or 
he may have come out of general curiosity, to see this man who was 
connected with the project in the early days. 

Mr. Tavenner. General Groves also testified that for reasons of his 
own he made five different reports, copies of which he gave to a number 
of the members of this Top Policy Committee, and he further testified 
he gave one copy to you, in person. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Wallace. That is what he testified, I believe. I am not sure 
whether he testified it or said it to newspaper men. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was the testimony before this committee. Is 
that correct or not ? 

Mr. Wallace. You have the record. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think you understand, Mr. Wallace, that I am not 
asking what our records show, but I am asking whether or not it was a 
true statement ? 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner. You don't know whether General Groves gave you a 
copy of a report ? 

Mr. Wallace. I know General Groves either testified before this 
committee or stated to newspapermen that he gave me a report in 
August 1943. He did not give me a report in August 1943 so far as 
I can ascertain. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is the question I asked you in the first place. 

Mr. Wallace. He did not. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he call at your office and discuss the matter with 
you? 

Mr. Wallace. Not in August 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. When did he call and discuss the matter with you ? 

Mr. Wallace. I have a very careful record of that. He called and 
gave me a report to sign — and my guess is it was a report that had been 
signed by the other members a long time previously — on April 14, 
1944, at 11 : 15 in the morning. On that occasion, you will remember, 
General Groves stated that he had been kept waiting, and he was very 
much annoyed at having been kept waiting, because he thought the 
people who came out of my office were not important to the war effort. 

I know that the man in my office immediately preceding General 
Groves was a Latin-American diplomat. My secretary knew nothing 
about the Manhattan project, knew nothing about General Groves, 
and she couldn't tell by looking at General Groves that he was a very 
important figure, any more than General Groves could tell by looking 
at the Latin- American diplomat, when he came out of my office, that 
he was an important figure. 

Mr. Tavenner. Any facts or circumstances surrounding that meet- 
ing which you desire to state, the committee will be glad to hear. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1077 

Mr. Wallace. The two things I have in my record made at the time 
are to this effect : First, that he gave me a report to sign ; that I read 
the report ; that it indicated to me the war would be over in 18 months ; 
and that General Groves said that he was going to chase the foreigners 
out of the uranium business. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he tell you to whom he referred as the foreign- 
ers? 

Mr. Wallace. No, he did not. 

Mr. Tavenner. What else did he discuss with you at that time, or 
you with him, relating to uranium? 

Mr. Wallace. He said nothing, and I may say that nobody ever said 
anything to me, about uranium shipments, to the best of my recollec- 
tion. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was this the only report, of the five which General 
Groves said he made, that you saw ? 

Mr. Wallace. I can find no record of any contact with General 
Groves except on this occasion. I have looked through my record and 
can find no other contact but this one of April 14, 1944.-^ 

Mr. Tavenner. Aside from your contact with General Groves, did 
you at any time see any of the five reports, other than the one you 
have testified to? 

Mr. Wallace. Dr. Vannevar Bush might possibly have brought me 
in some i-eport ; I don't know. He brought me a great many reports in 
1942. There is no reason why he should have brought me a report after 
1942. There was no reason why General Groves should have brought 
me a report in 1944. I would assume it would have been through Dr. 
Bush if I saw any others, because I knew Vannevar Bush very well. 

Mr. Tavenner. According to your best recollection, do you believe 
you did see other reports through Dr. Bush ? 

Mr, Wallace. I just don't know. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Did you at any time register a disagreement, while a 
member of the To}) Policy Committee, with the policies and function- 
ing of tlie Manhattan Engineering District, which I understand you 
did not know by name, but you knew the work was progressing? 

Mr. Wallace. No; never. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the time you were a member of the War Produc- 
tion Board and also a member of this Top Policy Committee, were you 
also Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare? 

Mr. Wallace. I was Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare 
from August 1941 until July 15, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. The Economic Defense Board was created by Execu- 
tive Order 8839, issued July 30, 1941, and the name was changed to the 
Board of Economic Warfare by Executive Order 8982 on December 
17, 1941. Did you serve in the capacity of Chairman of this Board both 
before and after its name was changed ? 

Mr. Wallace, That Board, as I remember it, was set up in the State 
Department under General Maxwell, and it had to do specifically with 
the control of the exportation of materials we thought we might need 
in the event of possible war. 

^ Mr. Wallace, at the time of the hearing, testified that he could find no record of 
any contact with fJeneral Groves except the one of April 14, 1944. In further checl^ing 
his records, he finds that when he was Secretary of Commerce — this was long after he 
ceased to be head of BEW — he asked General Groves on September 5, 1945, to make a 
talk to the Advisory Committee to the Department of Commerce on the peacetime uses of 
atomic energy. 



1078 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

There was considerable discord between Treasury and the State 
Department about certain matters, which occasioned the President 
and Budget Director Harold Smith much concern. They saw no way 
to get around this difficulty other than to call in someone who out- 
ranked Dean Acheson, who represented the State Department in this 
matter, and Secretary Morgenthau. I was called in for the same rea- 
son I was called in on SPAB, and at almost the same time. General 
Maxwell, as I remember, resigned and went into the Reg-ular Army 
activities in September 1941, and we took over. We may not have 
been known as the Board of Economic Warfare at that time, but an 
Executive order had been drawn up, it was a slightly different name, 
and we took over active control quite specifically in September, and 
General Maxwell passed out of the picture and we put in his place 
Col., now Gen., Roy Lord, a very efficient Army man, to handle 
these export problems. He carried on for about a year, at which time 
Hector Lazo took charge of the Board of Economic Warfare's Office 
of Export Control. 

Mr. Tavenner. The Executive order establishing the Board of 
Economic Warfare provides for representation of the War Production 
Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration on the Board, and 
the persons selected to represent these two agencies were required to 
be a]3proved by the Chairman. Who were the representatives of the 
War Production Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration 
approved by you in 1943 ? 

Mr. Wallace. Approved by me in 1943 ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. Wallace (to Mr. Walter Freedman). Do you remember that, 
Walter? 

I think Nollenberg sat most of the time for Ed Stettinius. There 
were provisions for alternates, and I think there was never any diffi- 
culty about selecting them. I think Donald Nelson sat for the War 
Production Board. I have forgotten who the alternate was. 

Mr. Tavenner. The Executive order establishing the Economic De- 
fense Board, later known as the Board of Economic Warfare, provided 
that its purpose was developing and coordinating policies, plans, and 
programs designed to protect and strengthen the international eco- 
nomic relations of the United States in the interest of national defense. 
The term "economic defense" was defined in part as follows : 

The term "economic defense," whenever used in this order, means the con- 
duct, in the interest of national defense, of international economic activities in- 
cluding those relating- to exports. * * * 

Among the functions and duties of the Board are to be found the 
following : 

(6) Coordinate the policies and actions of the several departments and agen- 
cies carrying on activities relating to economic defense in order to assure unity 
and balance in the application of such measures. 

(c) Develop integrated economic defense plans and programs for coordinated 
action by the departments and agencies concerned and use all appropriate means 
to assure that such plans and programs are carried into effect by such depart- 
ments and agencies. 

Then section 7 of the Executive order reads in part as follows : 

The Chairman is authorized to make all necessary arrangements, with the 
advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the respon- 
sibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set forth 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1079 

in this order, and to make final decisions when necessary to expedite the work 
of the Board. 

You, of course, at the time, were very familiar with the provisions 
of those Executive orders, I assume? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes; I was familiar with those provisions, and I 
later became very familiar with the soundness of the prophecy Harold 
Smith made on July 30, 1941, that while I had been given the re- 
sponsibility, I hadn't really been given the authority. While I did not 
keep a detailed record at that time, I do have a detailed record on this, 
that Harold Smith said : "They have given you responsibility here, 
but they have not given you authority." And he made very clear the 
point that while Dean Acheson, when he thought he was going to have 
control of this, favored being given complete authority, when it be- 
came apparent the White House wanted me to have it, he didn't want 
me to have complete authority. 

I told Harold Smith I knew these people, and it was not necessary 
for me to have com])lete authority at that time. I later found Harold 
Smith was absolutely right, that I did not have authority, and found 
it necessary to get cooperation from the departments concerned. 

Mr. Tavenner. How do you construe this language, if you say you 
did not have authority : 

Sec. 7. The Chairman is authorized to ni'alve all necessary arrangements, with 
the advice and assistance of the Board, for discharging and performing the re- 
sponsibilities and duties required to carry out the functions and authorities set 
forth in this order. * * * 

How could greater authority be given ? 

Mr. Wallace. That may appeal to the legal mind, but the history 
of the situation will demonstrate it was not sufficient, because we found 
it necessary to amend the order later on to remedy the weakness which 
existed, and we did get that amendment, and that amendment pro- 
voked great resentment on the part of varioits other agencies. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of the amendment; do you 
recall ? 

Mr. Wallace. I would say it was in the spring of 1942. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then in 1943 you did have full authority to make 
all necessary arrangements for carrying out the provisions in this 
order, by virtue of the amendment which you now refer to? 

Mr. Wallace. As a matter of fact, the amendment was then sabo- 
taged by certain of the agencies, and the President made an amend- 
ment to the amendment. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you mean that the amendment to the amend- 
ment took away the authority you had to act ? 

Mr. Wallace. In effect; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of that ? 

Mr. Wallace. I think early summer, 1942. 

Mr. Tavenner. Ex])lain a little more what you meant by stating 
that it was sabotaged by an amendment to an amendment. 

]Mr. Wallace. Simply that we did not have the full power to do 
the job ; that is what I meant. If you will examine the wording there, 
you will see that while we were directed to invite the agencies to go 
along, if there was any agency unwilling to go along, there was no 
way of enforcing it. 

Mr, Tavenner. In other words, if Manhattan Engineering District 
would refuse to agree to the issuance of an export license, you contend 



1080 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

you should have had authority to do it anyway, in a given case, just 
as an example ? 

Mr. Wallace. I am sure nothing of that sort would have ever 
come up, because the Manhattan District M^as in a class altogether by 
itself. Xothing having to do with uranium or the Manhattan project 
ever came up before the Board of Economic Warfare at any time. 

Mr. Tavenner. If the Office of Lend-I-iease Administration took 
a contrary view to the Board of Economic AYarfare regarding the 
issuance of a license, you contend you should have had authority and 
power to have exported it anyway ? 

Mr. Wallace. We had no disagreements with the Office of Lend- 
Lease with regard to exports. As a matter of fact, there was a very 
clear-cut understanding arrived at with regard to Lend-Lease Ad- 
ministration in the fall of 1941, at which time Harry Hopkins turned 
the job over to Ed Stettinius, and insisted that certain powers in 
Lend-Lease reside there and not any place else. We were not con- 
cerned with having power over the Office of Lend-Lease Administra- 
tion. That is not where we were having our difficulties. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was it with the War Production Board that you 
were having your difficulties? 

]Mr. Wallace. No. We had no difficulties with the War Production 
Board. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Why was it you were so insistent upon having final 
authority and say as to matters with which these other agencies were 
concerned ? 

Mr. Wallace. The particular difficulty we had was getting maxi- 
mum production, particularly in Latin America. We found we had 
a marked difference with the Secretary of Commerce and the head 
of the Eeconstruction Finance Corporation with regard to how this 
work ought to be done. That was the big problem involved. 

Mr. TA^T.XNER. When you say that the authority you had obtained 
by the first amendment to the order had been sabotaged, it could have 
no meaning other than that some group or individual brought about 
a change ? 

Mr. Wallace. We also had great difficulty in getting our men who 
were stimulating production, particularly in Latin America, out to 
those countries. Their visas would be held up, and for a time we 
were having very great difficulty with the State Department, This 
was largely a matter of misunderstanding, the way it turned out, 
but it was because the State Department had very strong feelings 
that the Board of Economic Warfare was getting into its province 
that the amendment to the order was changed. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was there any group or individual who did any 
act of sabotage that you recall ? 

Mv. Wallace. I think you are using the word "sabotage" in the 
wrong sense. I am referring to the weakening. I think possibly the 
word "sabotage" is unfortunate. Let us say "weakening" of the 
Executive order. 

]Mr. Tavenner. I am just trying to find out in what sense you used it. 

Mr. Wallace. I am referring to a weakening of the Executive 
order. 

Mr. Tavenner. You were also familiar with the provisions of 
Executive Order 8926 of October 28, 1941, by which the Lend-Lease 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1081 

Administrator was directed to arrange with the Board of Economic 
Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease transactions? 

Mr. AYallace. No, I am not familiar with that particular order. 

Mr. TA^'ENNER. Well, it was an order which went into effect in 
October 1941. You do know, regardless of the order, or whether or 
not you remember now about the order, that the Lend-Lease Admin- 
istrator was required to arrange with the Board of Economic War- 
fare for review and clearance of those transactions ? 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know of any case where they did. 

Mr, Tavenner. When a request was made to Lend-Lease for ship- 
ment of materials to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, your organi- 
zation was the issuing agency for the license, was it not ? 

ISlr. Wallace. I think that matter can be very readily cleared up 
by reading the statement as made by the State Department on Decem- 
ber 8. The State Department made a statement on December 7, 1949, 
which was given considerable publicity in the press. This statement 
was incorrect in certain particulars. 

Mr. Tavenner. Are you referring to a statement in regard to heavy 
water ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. My question related to uranium. 

Mr. Wallace. Yes, I know, but this covers the broad field, their 
statement of December 7. 

Mr. Case. December 7 of what year ? 

Mr. Wallace. December 7, 1949, that Secretary Acheson put out his 
original statement. This December 8 statement has a very definite 
bearing on your question. Shall I read that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. In just a moment, but does that relate to the regula- 
tions that were in effect in 1943 ? 

Mr. Wallace. I would say so, definitely. 

Mr. Ta\tenner. Before July 1, 1943? 

Mr. Wallace. I think so. I would say definitely. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like for you to make any explanation 
about that for the enlightenment of the committee that you can. 

Mr. Wallace. This is a statement of December 8, 1949, issued by the 
State Department : 

In connection with the Secretary's statement yesterday concerning the Jordan 
allegations, a review of the records of the Office of Lend-Lease Administration 
and the Foreign Economic Administration indicates that although export licenses 
for commercial items, that is, general items other than lend-lease and muni- 
tions, were actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare, the responsibility 
for approval of the license applications, including clearance with other interested 
governmental agencies rested with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and 
its successor FEA. This procedure was deemed necessary in order to concen- 
trate control of the wartime Soviet supply program in one agency. In actual 
practice up to July 1, 1943, licenses approved by OLLA were issued in routine 
fashion by BEW. After that a general license issued by BEW or its successor 
agencies became effective which required approval of tiie Office of Lend-Lease 
Administration only. 

I think that makes it very clear indeed that the relationship of the 
Board of Economic Warfare to shipments to lend-lease areas, whether 
they were of a lend-lease nature or a cash nature, was purely pro 
forma and clerical, and that there was no discretionary authority in the 
Board of Economic Warfare whatever. 

ISIr. Ta\t:nner. You make that statement regardless of the fact that 
the Executive order says arrangements should be made with the Board 



1082 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

of Economic Warfare for review and clearance of Lend-Lease 
transactions ? 

Mr. Wallace. I do make it — definitely, flatly, completely, and indig- 
nantly. 

Mr. Walter Freedman was an attorney with the Board of Economic 
Warfare at the time. He was in the Export Section of BEW. He is 
making some suggestion to me now which I don't understand the tenor 
of, but I suggest you ask him. 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no objection to your conferring with him. 

Mr. Wallace. I would prefer your having such a conierence with 
him. He was close to the technical details. 

Mr. Tavenner. You would prefer he make the explanation ? 

Mr. Wallace. Frankly, I have never seen an export license in my 
life. I would like to have you talk to him about that. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I have no objection to counsel stat- 
ing what he believes the situation was. 

Mr. Wood. If you wish to call him as a witness, you may do so. 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question? 

Mr. Wood. I would prefer that the members make notes and wait 
until counsel is through, if that is satisfactory. 

Mr. Tavenner. There is a provision in Executive Order 8926, pre- 
viously referred to, by which the master agreement with each nation 
receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions 
under which such nation is to receive such aid, was required to be 
negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board of 
Economic Warfare and the Oftice of Lend-Lease Administration. You 
recall that to be a fact ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. You referred to it earlier. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. You did advise about what materials should be 
exported to foreign countries during the period of the war? 

Mr. Wallace. No. That was not a function of BEW. 

Mr. Tavenner. What do you contend is the meaning 

Mr. Wall^vce. BEW initiated no exports except exports in connec- 
tion with the expansion of our program. 

Mr. Tavenner. My question related to master agreements nego- 
tiated by the State Department for the furnishing of aid to the various 
powers. 

Mr. Wallace. That did not come up before BEW. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the purpose of the provision of this Exec- 
utive order which provided tliat the master agreements were required 
to be negotiated by the State Department with the advice of the Board 
of Economic Warfare and tlie Oftice of Lend-Lease Administration ? 

Mr. Wallace. Down the line there may have been clearance. I was 
not aware of anything of the sort, and, as far as I recall, nothing of 
the sort came before meetings of the Board of Economic Warfare. 

Mr. Ta^^nner. As Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, 
you certainly would have known of such an important thing as the 
negotiation of an agreement for a large delivery of important materials 
to foreign countries during the war period if it occurred, would you 
not? 

Mr. Wallace. It never came to my attention. It is one of those 
things that never came to my attention. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was it not also true that Executive Order 8900, 
heretofore mentioned, required the Board of Economic Warfare to 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1083 

provide a control clearing service to which exporters may submit 
proposals for the export of materials and commodities, and further 
required that the Board of Economic Warfare shall obtain clearance 
for such proposals from the Federal agencies concerned with the 
control of exports ? 

Mr. Wallace. Let's have this question handled by Mr. Freedman 
later on. 

Mr. Tavenner. Don't you recall ? 

Mr. Wallace. No, I don't recall. 

Mr. Tavenner. This is all set forth, Mr. Wallace, in a memo- 
randum from the Board of Economic Warfare approved by you 
[handing memorandum to the witness]. 

Mr. Wallace. Mr. Tavenner, I venture to say if some 7 years from 
now you are asked for certain details of this year, your recollection 
will be as hazy as mine about precise words of this kind. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is certainly true about precise words, but I 
am asking you about the general subject of making clearance of ex- 
ports to foreign countries tlirough the agencies that control those 
exports. I Avould have thought that was a matter of such importance 
you would have recalled it. 

Mr. Wallace. It miglit have been important in the daily func- 
tioning of the executive section of the Board. I sat on the Board 
where you had these top people from the various agencies. I was not 
the executive officer of the Board. I was Chairman of the Board. 
Matters of this sort were not brought to my attention. 

Mr. Tavenner. At one and the same time you were a member of 
the War Production Board, you were a member of the Top Policy 
Committee, and you were the Chairman of the Board of Economic 
Warfare, and in any dispute of policy that may have arisen between 
tliose agencies, you were in the position of standing on both sides of 
the bargain counter, so to speak, with regard to those transactions, 
were you not 'i 

Mr' Wallace. There were no disputes that came up regarding this 
particular matter, and while it may all have been set forth, the mere 
matter of setting forth probably handled the situation. 

Mr. Tavenner. There was no other person in such a unique position 
as you were in ? 

Mr. Waij^ace. I was Vice President of the United States and had 
the relationship to the three agencies to which you refer, and I am 
very proud of having had that position. I am very proud of having 
been Vice President at that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of course it is a great honor to be Vice President 
of the United States at any time. 

Mr. Wallace, my purpose is to endeavor to develop your oppor- 
tunities for knowledge and your responsibilities relating to matters 
that w^ould normally come before the Board of Economic Warfare, 
the War Production Board, and things that occurred within Man- 
hattan Engineering District. 

Mr. Wallace. May I interpolate, with regard to things that might 
have occurred within the Manhattan District, nothing came to my 
attention as to things within the Manhattan District. 

Mr. Tavenner. I understand. You have so stated. With all this 
:background, and all these positions you have held, my sole purpose 
now is to have you tell this committee all that you know about the 



1084 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

sale of uranium for export to the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
during the war period, and by that I mean any circumstances related 
to the entire transaction, as to the fact of issuance of licenses, as to 
the policy governing it ; the committee would like to hear it. 

Mr. Wallace. Thank you very much, JNlr. Tavenner. I think the 
shortest way of handling this, at the risk of some repetition, is to read 
a short prepared statement that will take about 10 minutes to read 
it, then there can be questioning, if that is satisfactory. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is it responsive to the question ? 

]\Ir. Wallace. It is definitely responsive to the question. 

Mr. Wood. If it is responsive to the question, yes. 

Mr. Walter. Before he does that, don't you think the Executive 
orders should be made exhibits ? 

Mr. Tavenner. They appear in the Federal Register. 

Mr. Wallace (reading) : 

I have asked this committee for an opportunity to testify because I want very 
much to clear up the doubts that have been cast on my conduct in connection 
with the licensing of uranium and heavy-water shipments to Russia in 1943. 

Testimony before this committee has raised two basic questions insofar as I 
am concerned: (1) It is strongly implied, if not actually said, that I was 
responsible for the licensing of uranium and lieavy water for Russia in 1943 ; 
and (2) as a wartime Vice President, I could not be trusted with certain con- 
Mential information regarding the atom bomb. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Wallace, the first point is pertinent to the question. 
The second is not. I will ask you to confine your answer to the first 
point. 

Mr. Wallace. If I can be allowed to differ slightly with the chair- 
man on that, I would like to read from the record made by General 
Groves before this committee. There is a suggestion in the record 
oi the committee 



Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, it is apparent that the next paragraph 
deals with attacks that have been made on the witness, not before this 
committee, but bj- newspapers and radio commentators. It seems to 
me the proper thing for Mr. Wallace to do is to answer statements 
made before this committee, and not use this as a forum to answer 
statements by commentators and newspapers, over which this com- 
mittee has no control. 

Mr. Harrison. It appears to me the statement is not very long, 
and it might save time to let him read it. 

jVIr. Wood. Suppose you use whatever material you have. 

Mr. Wallace. I think that will be the shorter procedure. (Con- 
tinuing reading:) 

While it is not for me to pass judgment upon my own conduct, I state unhesi- 
tatingly that I am proud of my participation as "Vice President of the United 
States during the time when the war situation was most critical, and I am proud 
to liave been associated witli the administration whose policies were so effective 
in making available the essential materials when they were most needed. The 
attack being made on me — not only before this committee, but with even more 
violence in certain newspapers and by certain radio commentators — is, I think, 
not so much an attack on me as it is upon the Democratic Party and President 
Roosevelt. At any rate, once and for all, I want the record of this committee to 
show exactly what my participation was insofar as tliese shipments are con- 
cerned. 

Because I knew how important it was to keep secret the fact that this Govern- 
ment was exploring the possibilities of an atom bomb, I never discussed the atom 
bomb or the shipment of uranium or heavy water to any country with anyone in 
BEW — or anyone else outside of the selected group of Government officials 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1085 

directly involved — at any time until the matter was exploded in the press. The 
subject of uranium shipments was never discussed in any meeting of the Board 
of Economic Warfare which I attended, or in any contact with any member of the 
staff. The most important point to remember, however, is that shipments to 
lUissia were not the responsibility of BEW l)ut the responsibility of the Lend- 
Lease Administration, which in 1943 was under the direction of E. K. Stettinius, Jr. 

All license applications for shipments of materials to lend-lease areas which 
were filed with BEW were forwarded to the Lend-Lease Administration for 
recommendation. BEW's responsibility for these applications was limited to 
approving or denying the applications in accordance with the recommendation of 
the Lend-Lease Administration. 

Moreover, the licenses for uranium oxide and uranium nitrate are said to have 
been issued in March and April of 1943. I want to point out that I personally 
was in Latin America from March 16. 1943, until April 25 of that year. 

In any event, I knew nothing about the issuance of the licenses or the ship- 
ments until the matter was stirred up in the press in 1946. 

Within the past week I have talked to Milo Perkins, who was executive director 
of BEW, and Hector Lazo, who in 1943 was head of BEW's Office of Export 
control. I am assured by both of them that in 1943 they knew nothing about 
tne.se licenses, nor, indeed, did they know anything about the atomic-bomb project. 

With regard to the licensing of heavy water in late 1943, the shortest and most 
convincing answer is that I left BEW on July 15, 1943. Leo Crowley took over 
REW on July 16, and its name was changed to OEW. On September 25, 1943, 
OEW was merged with Lend-Lease and the new agency was called Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration. 

Secretary Acheson, on December 7, 1949. issued a statement which received con- 
siderable publicity — and which credited BEW with issuing a license for heavy 
water 4 months after it had ceased to exist. On December 8, Secretary Acheson 
realized his error, and the State Department issued a new statement which, to 
the best of my knowledge, never appeared in the press or over the radio. 

I have already read that statement, and witli your permission I 
will consider it as in the record at this point and pass it on. 

In summary, therefore, it is to be pointed out that not BEW but the Lend- 
Lease Administration, which by its activities saved so many American lives, was 
responsible for clearing all shipments to Russia. I was neither responsible nor 
aware of any of them at that time. 

Since I was not even aware, therefore, that the Russians were trying to 
obtain uranium or heavy water, it is demonstrably apparent that I could not have 
pressured someone else into issuing the license, or urged them to pressure the 
Manhattan Engineering District to consent to their issue. 

In short, and in fact, I had absolutely nothing to do with any of these 
licenses. I was not aware that they were being requested. I did not know that 
Lend-Lease recommended, after consulting with the Manhattan district, that 
they be issued, and the agency which I headed, the Board of Economic Warfare, 
had no discretionary authority with respect to them. 

Mr. Wood. Does that prepared statement stand, in the light of the 
Executive order? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes, sir; I desire that that statement stand. 

Mr. Walter. I think he misread the statement. He said he did not 
know. 

Mr. Wallace. I am sorry. I did know. 

Mr. Harrison. You read it one way and it is here another way. 
Which is corect? 

Mr. Wallace. I did not know. That is on page 6. [Continuing 
reading:] 

Now, a word must be said about General Groves' statement that he showed 
me a report in August 1943, and that that was the only report that he showed 
to me. 

Mr. AVooD. You have already gone into that. 

Mr. Wall.\ce. Yes. I think all of this matter has been covered. 



to 



1086 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

That should be — ^I did not know, by the way, on page 6. Tliere is an 
error in the mimeograph.^° 

Mr. Wood. An}^ further questions? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wallace. I think everything else has been covered that is in 
this prepared statement. I mi<rht say, if there is no objection, for 
the sake of the newspapermen we might let them use the latter part 
of this text as is given. 

Mr. Wood. This committee has no discretion or control over what 
the press does. 

Mr. TA\'EisrNER. You referred to a conference with General Groves 
in 1944 and stated that he discussed with you the matter of driving 
foreigners out of the uranium business, or something of that character. 
Just what did you say about that ? 

Mr. Wallace. All I have got in my record is just that single sen- 
tence, and that is all I remember. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is that sentence ? 

Mr. Wallace. I will try to find it precisely as I have it in my 
record. [Refering to documents.] He said how important it was to 
get the foreigners out of the uranium business. 

Mr. Tavenner. What else did he tell you about the difficulties of 
the foreigners in the uranium business? 

Mr. Wallace. Nothing, so far as I know. 

Mr, Tavenner. Is that all he said ? 

Mr, Wallace, The only thing I have a record of or recall. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the purpose of making a note of tliat 
particular statement ? 

Mr. Wallace, I made a note of various statements made to me at. 
that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were other statements made by General Groves tO' 
you at that tune ? 

Mr, Wallace, That is the only statement I have down in my diary, 
in my statement, that he submitted the report, I read it, it indicated 
to me the war would be over in 18 months. 

. Mr. Tavenner. That and the statement you just read about uranium 
constituted all the notes you made at that time? 

]Mr. Wallace. Simply how important it was to get the foreigners 
out of the uranium business. 

Mr. Tavenner. You stated you returned from Latin America on. 
April 25, 1943? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Testimony introduced in the course of these hear- 
ings indicates that the license issued for the shipment of 1,000 pounds 
of uranium compounds originating in Canada was amended on April 
29, 1943. So the fact that you had been in Latin America would have 
no validity as far as the time element is concerned. 

Mr. Wallace. I know nothing about the dates of those export 
licenses. 

Mr. Tavenner. Your absence has nothing to do with the time 
element of the amendment of the license ? 

Mr. Wallace. I just know I had nothing to do with anything of the- 
sort, that is all, 

*> Page 6 refers to page number in typed copy from which the witness was reading. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1087 



Mv. Tavexner. Was there brouglit to your attention the issuance 
of licenses for the export of uranium ? 

Mr. Wallace. Never. 

Mr. Tavenner. By any person in BEW ? 

Mr. Wai,lace. Never. 

Mr. Tavenner. By any person outside of BEW ? 

Mr. Wallace. Never. 

Mr. Tavenner. Whose responsibility was it in the Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Warfare to screen these applications for licenses or issue them? 

Mr. Wallace. Well, Hector Lazo was head of Export Control. 
Who was under Hector Lazo I don't know. Mr. Freedman may be 
able to tell you that. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you ever discuss his duties with him ? 

Mr, Wallace. That particular agency was absorbed completely 
with the problem of issuing export licenses rapidly to the trade. They 
had to issue about 8,000 a day, and it was a difficult mechanical job, 
and the trade was disgusted with the way that job had been done 
before we took over. I think at one time there were 100,000 of these 
licenses jammed up, weren't there, Walter? We had to get out from 
under that log jam. None of these questions of policy came up, 
because they were cleared more or less automatically with the execu- 
tive agencies. No question of policy ever came up to my knowledge 
to the top echelon. I took that up with Mr. Perkins and Mr. Lazo. 
Mr. Freedman, I think, can assure you from what he knows of the 
lower echelon that nothing of the sort ever came to anybody on the 
Board. 

Mr. Tavenner. It was a matter of general knowledge, however, that 
uranium was being used in this important project, and that the policy 
was not only to keep it secret, but not let anybody get hold of it ? 

Mr. Wallace. Vannevar Bush had sworn me to secrecy, and I was 
not going to talk to anybody in BEW about the thing. I didn't talk 
to Milo Perkins about it. You couldn't trust yourself to talk to any- 
body. If Vannevar Bush w^anted to know if uranium was being prop- 
erly handled, he should go to Lend-Lease or me directly, because I was 
the only one in BEW who knew about it. I am not even sure Ed 
Stettinius knew about it. The only think to do was come to me if 
they wanted to observe secrecy. They should have said: "Here, you 
hold the second highest office in Government, and you know about the 
atomic bomb. How can we get it across to these folks that do the 
licensing without getting somebody's wind up?" That would have 
been the proper course, to come to somebody who knew about the 
atomic bomb. You couldn't expect me, who had sworn myself to 
secrecy to Dr. Bush, to go to those people and say: "Look out for 
uranium." That would be tipping your hand. 

Mr. Tavenner. You were cognizant of the importance of prevent- 
ing the export of uranium from this country? 

Mr. Wallace. I never thought about it. 

Mr. Ta\T3nner. You never thought about it? 

Mv. Wallace. No. This thing had been turned over to the military. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. You recognized there was a problem of control? 

Mr. Wallace. I nevei' thought of it at all. It was not within my 
sphere of competence. 



1088 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Yon are familiar, I presume, with Conservation 
Order M-285 of the War Production Board, which provides as follows : 

The fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United States has created 
a shorta.ire in the supply of uranium for defense, for private account, and for 
export; and the following order is deemed necessary and appropriate in the 
public interest and to promote the national defense. 

That was the regidation that controlled the purposes for which 
uranium could be sold and distributed within this country. 

Mr. Wx^LLACE. I didn't know about that order until I read it in the 
press, going over the newspaper accounts of the hearing. A lot of 
these very important things take place very normally in the lowei 
echelon. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidencv 
Executive Order SSoO, of July 30, 1041. from which I read, and asL 
that I be permitted to tile as a part of the same exhibit, marked ""Wal- 
lace Exhibit 1,'" the subsequent amendments which Mr. Wallace has 
referred to. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 
(The documents above referred to, marked ''Wallace Exhibit 1," 
are liereinafter included in the record.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter. 

Mr. Walter. Was there any occasion for General Groves to ever 
report to you, or to divscuss matters with respect to the progress of 
the Manhattan project with you? 

Mr. Wallace. General Groves'" chain of command did not run to 
me. 

Mr. Walter. To whom did it run ? 

Mr. Wallace. Dr. Vannevar Bush, who was chairman of the Mili- 
tary Policy Committee. There was no reason why he should come to 
me unlei^s he was directed to do so by Dr. Bush or Secretary Stimson. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison. 

IMr. Harrison. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder. 

Mr. IMouLDER. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. I will pass. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. Mr. WaHace, you have pretty well given the background 
of your knowledge of research in the development of atomic energy, 
and indicated you had read magazine articles prior to 1940 on it, 
and also spoke of your part on the top policy group which met Decem- 
ber 16, 1941, at which Dr. Vannevar Bush and Secretary Stimson were 
present. You may have referred to a further contact you had with 
the development of the atom bomb progran but if so I missed it in 
your testimony. 

I have here a book entitled "Atomic Ener, ''or Military Purposes" 
by Henry DeWolf Smyth, chairman, depar ^t of physics, Prince- 
ton University, and consultant, Manhattai rict, United States 
Engineers. This is described as "The Official j.i^^,ort on the Develop- 

^' See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL lUoy 

ment of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States 
Government, 1940-45," and on pages 81-82 I read this paragraph : 

Report to the President by Bushj and Conant on June 17, 1942 

On June 13, 1942, Bush and Conant sent to Vice President Henry A. Wallace, 
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, a 
report recommending detailed plans for the expansion and continuation of the 
atomic bomb program. 

Mr. Wallace. I might interpolate and say I did refer in the ques- 
tioning to a meeting with Vannevar Bush on June 16, 1942, which 
was an important meeting having to do with the expansion of the 
program. 

Mr. Case (continuing reading) : 

AH three approved the report. On June 17, 1942, the report was sent by Bush 
to the President, who also approved. * * * 

Mr. Wallace. That is correct. 

Mr. Case. That is correct ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. So that you saw the report which dealt with the pro- 
gram for the expansion of the atomic bomb project? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Then, having had that connection with the development 
of the project at the outset 

Mr. Wallace. This was a pilot plant proposition at that time. 
This did not have to do with what later became the grand effort. 
It was small stuff. That was when I was still active in the program. 
My testimony was that my significance in the program ceased after 
it was kicked over to the military in 1942. 

Mr. Case. I don't want to change your testimony in any respect. 
I want to get clear what the background was and the importance of 
uranium in the development of the atomic bomb project. 

Mr. Wallace. I certainly understood the importance of uranium 
in the atom bomb project. 

Mr. Case. And the importance of secrecy? 

Mr. Wallace. That is right. 

Mr. Case. With that knowledge and background, and your con- 
nection w^ith the Board of Economic Warfare, did it ever occur to 
you that the Board of Economic Warfare should take steps to prevent 
uranium and uranium compounds falling in unauthorized hands? 

Mr. Wallace. I felt, un.der my oath of secrecy to Dr. Bush, I should 
not talk to anyone in BEW about it. I might mention that at one 
time when I was with Dr. C. K. Leith of the University of Wisconsin, 
a noted geologist, I asked him where the uranium deposits of the 
world were. He was not a member of the Board of Economic War- 
fare. He was a liaison iv#n, very highly thought of in the geological 
field. I think that is t' only time the word "uranium" ever came 

up. . -ru- 

Mr. Case. Did Dr. J j, :% tell you uranium was produced in Canada ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yef;.:,£ ^^ 

Mr. Case. Did B^^^f have a list of critical items that were not to 
be exported under any consideration ? 

Mr. Wallace. I presume they did. Mr. Freedman tells me this 
was a list supplied by the War Production Board. 

99334 — 50 13 



1090 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. Were you a member of the War Production Board after 
jou became head of the Board of Economic Warfare? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. I was a member of the War Production Board 
from the time it started, January 15, 1942, until I resigned on July 
19 or 20, 1943. 

Mr. Case. Was uranium on the list of critical materials ? 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I have no idea. I looked on this 
thing as something for me to stay out of,. that it was in other hands, 
and competent hands, and it was not for me to go into, 

Mr. Case. Wasn't it your duty to supervise the issuance of export 
licenses ? 

]Mr. Wallace. We were in a negative position. Our powers were 
negative. We did not take the initiative. We were carrying out 
orders for other people. I don't remember a single case where we 
took the initiative. Nor do I recall a single case where we suggested 
that commodities be placed on the export ban. I would say it was a 
mechanical, clerical function that we exercised. That is the way the 
thing came up to us in the first place from General Maxwell. 

Mr. Case. With regard to matters that came up under Lend-Lease, 
you deferred entirely to the wishes of Lend-Lease ? 

Mr. Wallace. So far as I know, there was never any discussion 
whatsoever with regard to any exports to Russia. I don't recall a 
single case of exports to Russia, export of uranium, coming up at 
any time. Lend-Lease would stamp the applications in the lend-lease 
area field. I haven't seen one of those documents. If you would get 
hold of one of the export documents that are in Archives Building — 
I can't get hold of them, but you can — you could find out what the 
procedure was. 

Mr. Case. The statement you have made indicates that when an 
application came with the stamp of Lend-Lease, you automatically 
issued the license? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And you would not see it; people in the lower levels 
would automatically issue the license if Lend-Lease said they wanted 
it? 

Mr. Wallace. That is right. 

Mr. Case. Did you have representation in Lend-Lease ? 

Mr. Wallace, t don't think so. 

Mr. Case. You said it was under the direction of Mr. Stettinius 
in 1943 ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. It first came under his direction in the fall 
of 1941. Mr. Stettinius is dead. He had an able assistant by the name 
of Tom McCabe, now head of the Federal Reserve Board, and a man 
highly regarded by businessmen of the country. He was on the Busi- 
ness Advisory Board of the Department of Commerce. I am suro 
he could clear up this problem with you very rapidly. 

Mr. Case. Did you sit in on meetings of Lencl-Lease? 

Mr. Wallace. No. 

Mr. Case. In connection with this particular export license, it was 
brought out in testimony yesterday that when the committee sought 
to go through the Archives to get the particular license that covered 
the shipment, it could not be found. Do you know anything about 
that? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1091 

Mr. Wallace. Not the slightest. How many licenses were there ? 

Mr. Case. The others were tliere. 

Mr. Wallace. Which particular one was not found ? 

Mr. Case. The one which was missing, according to the testimony, 
was the one amended April 29, 1943, for 1,()0() pounds. 

Mr. Wallace. Where would the original be ? 

Mr. Freedman. They have to give the original to the collector of 
customs, or they couldn't ship the stuif . 

Mr. Case. What was the custom of BEW in handling these licenses 
after they were issued ? Were they permanent files ? 

Mr. Freedman. Yes. 

Mr. Case. They were permanent files ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And the property of the Government? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. If you had ever been given all the power you state you 
should have had to carry out the responsibilities placed on you, would 
you have asked for some voice in determining what mateiial should 
be exported. 

Mr. WalLuVce. Not in the export field. What we were interested 
in was in the import field. That is where we wanted the powers. 

Mr. Case. You had a list of critical materials not to be sent out of 
the country ? 

Mr. Wallace. We had a completely happy relationship with Lend- 
Lease. There was no case of conflict there. We did not feel we had 
enough critical materials coming into the country. It had nothing to 
do with the export field. We had no interest in that. 

Mr. Case. Do you recall the top personnel of Lend-Lease in 1943 ? 

Mr. Wallace. There was a man by the name of Nollenberg. Of 
course the top was Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., now passed away. I 
think Tom McCabe was his right-hand man. And there was a man, 
Van Buskirk, now, I believe, wdth the Mellons in Pittsburgh. I think 
Mr. Pratt of General Motors was there. I had very little to do with 
Lend-Lease at the time. 

Mr. Case. Do you know who had to do with requests for export 
licenses that came from the Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Mr. Wallace. I didn't learn that until I was getting ready to go to 
China via Soviet Russia along in April 1944, and I was trying to find 
somebody who would go along with me as a Russian translator, and I 
was told that there was somebody over in Lend-Lease, and I called 
up General Wesson and was informed at that time that he had 
to do with this type of activity. That was the first time I had known 
of him, so far as I can remember. 

Mr. Case. Wliat type of activity do you mean ? 

Mr. Wallace. The purchasing on lend-lease account and sending to 
Russia. 

Mr. Wood. You don't recall anything specifically having to do with 
the development of the atomic bomb ? 

Mr. Wallace. Oh, no. Why do you make a statement like that, sir ? 

Mr. Case. Because you used the words "with this type of activity.''* 

Mr. Wallace. I think your question was friendly, because you did 
not want my statement misinterpreted. I am sure it was friendly. 

Mr. Case. You said some people in the State Department felt BEW 
was getting into its province. Who were those people ? 



1092 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. "Wallace, In the first instance, Sumner Wells and Dean Ache- 
son. Later on we straightened this out very comfortably with the 
State Department, but at the beginning they felt if we sent men to 
South America to stimulate the production of quinine, or get out 
quartz crystals, or to make sure there was plenty of tin or rubber 
coming along, these men would be running around loose, not report- 
ing to the respective embassies, and that they would cross up the wires 
of the State Department, and for a Vhile there was very great delay 
in getting visas to get the men out of the country, and very great delay 
in getting messages from them. The messages that would come from 
them would lie around the State Department sometimes for a week 
or more. This was largely due to the cumbersomeness of the State 
Department machinery, but we did not understand that at the time. 

Mr. Case. Did the State Department have representation on the 
Board of Economic Warfare ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

IMr. Case. What person or persons represented the State 
Department ? 

Mr. Wallace. Usually Dean Acheson sat on the Board. Some- 
times Secretary Hull himself sat on the Board. 

Mr. Case. But most of the time it was Mr. Acheson ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Acheson opposed granting you greater power ? 

Mr. Wallace. According to Harold Smith, in January 1941 Mr. 
Acheson opposed it, yes, and I think later on when it came to this 
amendment he opposed it as well. Secretary Hull also opposed it. 
But eventually we worked out the relationship with the State Depart- 
ment on a very satisfactory basis. 

Mr. Case. Did anyone sit in for Mr. Acheson at any time in meetings 
of theBEW? 

Mr. Wallace. There may have been. I don't recall. 

Mr. Case. He may have had one of his associates or close friends 
sit in for him ? 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know. That could be verified from the 
records, of course. 

Mr. Case. I have here a photostat of a story which appeared in the 
NeAv York Times on the 22d of September 1945, which reads in part 
as follows : 

Washington, September 21. — A proposal sponsored by Secretary of Commerce 
Henry A. Wallace that the United States, Britain, and Canada reveal the secret 
of the atomic bomb to Russia was discussed at President Truman's Cabinet 
meeting today and brought about a pointed debate that ended with no decision 
after having caused the longest Cabinet session of the present administration. 

Did you make that proposal ? 

Mr. Wallace. I did not, and I have a complete record of that 
whole incident which, if you wish, I will be glad to read into the record 
at this time. 

Mr. Case. I don't care to go into it. 

Mr. Wallace. I am sure you don't want to go into it. It is relevant. 

Mr. Wood. You state you did not make the proposal ? 

Mr. Wallace. I did not, and President Truman realized I did not, 
and on his own initiative knocked it down. His attitude was magnifi- 
cent throughout. The statement the President made appeared in the 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1093 

New York Times of September 24, 1945, under a September 23, 1945, 
Washington date line : 

The President denied firmly that Mr. Wallace had insisted that the atomic 
bomb be turned over to Russia. He said Mr. Wallace took a no more active part 
In the discussion than anybody else at the meeting. 

I have a complete statement of the Cabinet meeting at the time, 
which I don't know if it would be ethical or not to make public. I 
denounced to the President himself that there had been a "lying 
leaker" in the Cabinet meeting. He agreed, and he told a subsequent 
meeting of the members of the top Cabinet at a luncheon — just the 
top Cabinet — that the man he thought had done this leaking would 
no longer sit in Cabinet meetings. 

Mr. Harrison. Are you familiar with the identity of that person ? 

Mr. Wallace. He didn't mention his name. 

Mr. Wood. Aside from that? 

Mr. Wallace. I could only guess at it, and I think that would be a 
mistake. I may say Dean Acheson also spoke to me about this, and 
said what a terrible thing it was, and I might say his guess as to who 
was responsible for this was quite different from the President's 
guess. 

Mr. Case. The proposal to share the atomic bomb with Russia was 
discussed at the meeting ? 

Mr. Wallace. It was not. 

Mr. Case. It was not? 

Mr. Wallace. It did not come up. It did not come up. 

Mr. Case. Did you oppose the idea ? 

Mr. Wallace. It didn't come up. I can read my complete record, if 
you want to know what it was. 

Mr. Case. How do you account for the story that appeared in the 
New York Times that the subject did come up ? 

Mr. Wallace. King Solomon should add to the seven things be- 
yond the wisdom of men, the things printed in newspapers. I do not 
blame the newspapers too much when they are guided by people who 
have special interests to serve. 

Mr. Case. This story in the New York Times also says : 

Mr. Wallace, it is understood, argued in support of his proposal that now is 
the time to make a real start toward a working world union through a demon- 
stration of good faith to the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Wallace. Again I say, if you want me to read my complete 
record I will be glad to read it. 

Mr. Wood. I will be glad for you to file it with the committee if you 
so desire, Mr. Wallace. We will be glad to have it filed with the 
testimony. 

Mr. K^ARNET. Will the gentleman yield? I think, in all fairness 
to the witness, there have been several questions asked as to whether 
he did make the statement which appeared in the New York paper, 
and I think the witness' statement in that connection should be made 
a part of the record. 

Mr. Wood. I said it could be made a part of the record. 

Mr. Walter. I think it should be read into the record. 

Mr. Wood. How long would it take to read it? 

Mr. Wallace. It would take, I would think, 10 minutes. 



1094 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, there are two specific questions I want 
to ask to bring this to a head, then if the committee wants to hear it, 
the witness could read his statement. 

You state definitely, first of all. that you did not make any such 
proposal at the Cabinet meeting as was reported in the New York 
Times? 

Mr. Wallace. I make that statement, and President Truman made 
the statement. 

Mr. Case. You also say that the proposal to share the atomic-bomb 
secret with Kussia was not discussed at that Cabinet meeting? 

Mr. Wallace. I think I had better consult the record and see just 
the form in which it came up. 

Mr. Wood. I understood you to say it did not come up ? 

Mr. Wallace. I said the question of sharing the atomic bomb with 
Russia did not come up. [Reading:] 

The President asked Secretary Stimson to open the meeting, which he did in 
an iinnsually comprehensive statement. He said that all the scientists with 
whom the War Department worked were convinced there was no possible 
way of holding the scientific secret of the atomic bomb, and therefore they felt 
there should be free interchange of scientifie information between different 
members of the United Nations. He said that the scientists told him that the 
bombs thus far dropped were utilizing only a very small fraction of the power 
of the atom, and that future bombs would be infinitely more destructive — per- 
haps as greatly advanced over the present bombs as the present bombs are over 
the bombs which existed prior to 1945. He said some were afraid they would 
be so powerful as to ignite the atmosphere and put an end to the world. He 
said he realized that any interchange of scientific information with the other 
United Nations would bring into the foregi'ound the problem of Russia. He 
then entered into a long defense of Russia, saying that throughout liistory 
Russia had been our friend, that we had nothing that Russia wanted. He said 
our relationship during recent months had been improving. President Truman 
agreed to this. 

Mr. Harrison. Are those the minutes of the Cabinet meeting from 
■which you have just read? 

Mr. Wallace. No. 

Mr. Harrison. It is your own memorandum? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. That is what you are reading from ? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. There is one other point Secretary Stimson 
made at the time which I think is of some interest : 

Secretary Stimson said it was conceivable that some of the other nations could 
learn the secret of the atomic bomb without any help from us within 3 years, 
and almost certainly within 5 years. 

Mr. Case. At any time have you advanced the proposal or sup- 
ported the proposal that the secret of the atomic bomb should be 
shared with Russia? 

Mr. Wallace. Wliat I said at that time, I backed up Secretary 
Stimson in his proposal and said that if we did carry out his pro- 
posal and there was an interchange with Russia of scientific infor- 
mation, there should be a proviso that our men should work in Rus- 
sian laboratories if their men worked in our laboratories. 

I came out, by the way, against sharing construction details. I 
said all scientists knew that the scientific information was known 
in many foreign nations. The men who did the work for us were 
mostly foreigners. I said there should be no interchange of know- 
how. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1095 

Let me say this to Mr. Case, and being from South Dakota I believe 
he will be interested : I am from the corn country. We have inbred 
strains of corn and chickens. We would not give them to anybody. 
We employ scientists. If the scientists discover anything they are at 
liberty to publish that. What the scientist wants is to get credit for 
having discovered something. And there is something about science 
that when somebody discovers something, somebody in another part 
of the world is almost certain to be discovering it at about the same 
time. 

There are secrets with regard to our inbreds (our know-how) which 
will benefit us for several years, but when it comes to scientific ap- 
proach what we have learned, someone else will know within a few 
juonths. Science never has and never will advance on the basis of 
compartmentalization and secrets. 

The bulk of the people, and I think most Congressmen, don't under- 
vStand the nature of science : that there isn't any secret and never was 
any secret that you could lock up and keep away from somebody else. 

Back in December of last year they lifted the ban on the articles 
published in Russian scientific magazines, and now it appears the 
Russians were abreast of the thing in the scientific world in 1940. 
That M'as not known until last December. That is what I am told. 
I haven't seen it, but a newspaperman told me he had looked it over 
and found that true. That is why this whole misunderstanding arises. 

I told the Cabinet meeting that if they were placing their confidence 
in scientific secrecy, they w^ere placing their confidence in a Maginot 
Line, and there was no security there. 

Some people said the Russians couldn't discover the atom bomb 
for 20 years. Secretary Stimson said 3 or 5 years. 

]Mr. Case. Then there was a discussion of sharing the atomic bomb ? 

Mr. Wallace. There was not. I said very clearly I was against 
sharing of know-how. I advocated we keep the secrets of constructioii 
from any nation. I advocated that with Dr. Bush. 

Mr. Case. And if blueprints of construction details got into the 
hands of some foreign power, would you regard that as unfortunate? 

Mr, Wallace. Very definitely. I would be against it in the hands 
of any power. 

Mr. Case. But not scientific information? 

Mr. Wallace. Science is universal. You can't bottle science up, 
and when you do you condemn your own Nation to backwardness. 

Mr. Case. Coming back to the basic question with which the inquiry 
was concerned, you say if export licenses were issued through BEW, 
that was purely a ministerial or clerical function, because the stamp of 
Lend-Lease would clear them automatically? 

Mr. Wallace. That is right. 

Mr. Case. And that any responsibility for the issuance of those 
licenses rests at the door of Lend-Lease and the policies determined for 
it by the State Department ? 

Mr. Wallace. It rested with Lend-Lease. I don't know whether the 
State Department determined policy. 

Mr. Kearney. Most of your problems came from the Department 
of State? 

Mr. Wallace. No, Department of Commerce and Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. The State Department made objections in the 



1096 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

spring and summer of 1942. We ironed our difficulties out with the 
State Department very satisfactorily. 

]\Ir. Case. Wasn't there a feeling on the part of Mr. Byrnes • 

Mr. Wallace. Secretary Hull, 

Mr. Case. You are anticipating the question. I think it was a pro- 
test of Mr. Byrnes against statements by you that resulted in your 
resignation from the Cabinet ? 

Mr. Wallace. That does not have to do with the immediate ques- 
tion before this committee. 

]\Ir. Kearney. The name Dean Acheson has been mentioned so much 
that I assumed most of your problems were with him ? 

Mr. Wallace. I had a friendly feeling with him, but we did have 
marked conflicts in administration. 

Mr. Kearney. During the examination by counsel here, you stated 
in words or substance that you would rather have Mr. Freedman 
answer certain questions. Was that because he had knowledge of the 
particular facts? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. He was an attorney with the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare and operated in this particular field which has to do 
with export licenses. 

Mr. Kearney. Following the line of examination by Mr. Case, 
I am going to ask you specifically, did you have anything to do at any 
time, directly or indirectly, with the expediting or issuance of any 
export license to anybody or any nation ? 

Mr. Wallace. No. I have no recollection of having entered into 
that at all, and BEW itself did not enter into that except to a very 
limited extent. 

Mr. Kearney. Can you answer my question more specifically? 

Mr. Wallace. I have no knowledge in any way, shape, or form. 

Mr. Kearney. Can you answer yes or no ? 

Mr. Wallace. No. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. In regard to the matter of expediting licenses, I under- 
stood you to say a moment ago, or your counsel said, that at one 
time you had a backlog of 100,000 license applications ? 

Mr. Wallace. I remember there was a big log- jam. I think I said 
100,000 and turned to counsel and asked him if that was about right. 

Mr. Freedman. Not quite that much. 

Mr. Nixon. And never on any occasion did you take one license 
out of the bottom of the pile and expedite it? 

Mr. Wallace. Never. I don't know what pressure might have come 
in sideways on the boys. 

Mr. Nixon. But you say that you yourself never expedited the issu- 
ance of any license ? 

Mr. Wallace. Never, at any time. 

Mr. Nixon. What about the Board? 

Mr. Wallace. The Board, which is composed of the heads of Cabi- 
net departments, is one thing. The Board met on questions of top 
policy. Then there was the executive branch of BEW under the man- 
agement of Milo Perkins, where there were, I suppose, 3,000 employees, 
and they did that work. 

Mr. Nixon. I am referring to the issuance of the licenses themselves. 

Mr. Wallace. It is a clerical job without policy on our part entering 
into it. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATEKIAL iUy/ 

Mr. Nixon. There was testimony presented to this committee on 
Tuesday by Colonel Merritt. 

Mr. Wallace. Of what organization? 

Mr. Nixon. Manhattan Engineering District in New York. He was 
in the office which had control over approving the shipments of atomic 
products — uranium and related products — abroad. He referred 
specifically to one case that he said became, I think his words were "a 
very hot case" in their department, involving the shipment of 1,000 
pounds of uranium to the Soviet Union through the firm of Boris 
Pregel ; and from his testimony it was apparent to me, and I think to 
other members of the committee, that this was an unusual case in which 
action was desired at an early date. It is difficult for me to reconcile 
that testimony with your statement that in no case did BEW exercise 
any discretion, you just took them in their order. 

Mr. Wallace. Mr. Freedman informs me that the method of han- 
dling the licenses, they were divided by countries and by products. It 
was not one pile. I know nothing about the mechanical details of 
handling them. 

Mr. Nixon. Do you recall what the backlog was, approximately, 
iu April 1943? 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know. 

Mr. Ntxon. It was large ? 

Mr. Freedman. It was always large. 

Mr. Wallace. I don't know. I know there was always pressure 
from the trade to get them coming along faster. 

Mr. Nixon. I understood counsel to say the backlog was always 
large. When did you first learn that shipments of uranium oxide, 
uranium nitrate, and heavy water were being made to Russia? 

Mr. Wallace. In 1946, when I read it in the press. 

Mr. Nixon. You didn't know of any of the shipments before that 
time? 

Mr. Wallace. No. I was informed that there was a newspaper 
t-tfort — this was in the spring of 1946 — a newspaper effort in New 
York to involve me in something of this sort. I didn't know at that 
time what it was. I was informed that this newspaper effort originated 
in Washington, that it was in the nature of a sinister plot, and that 
this sinister plot would develop later in the press. I learned enough 
in May 1946 so that I did speak to Secretary of War Patterson about 
it on May 16. 

Mr. Nixon. In your statement, on page 6, you say : "I had absolutely 
nothing to do with any of these licenses. I was not aware that they 
were being requested. I did know" 

Mr. Wallace. There is a "not" that belong in there. 

INIr. Nixon. "I did not know that Lend-Lease recommended"? 

Mr. Wallace. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. You did testify that you recognized, obviously because 
of. your broad scientific knowledge, the importance of uranium oxide 
in the development of the atomic project? 

Mr. Wallace. I recognized the importance of U-235. I didn't know 
the relationship of U-235 to uranium, but I did recognize the high 
importance of U-235. 

Mr, Nixon. You recognized the importance of the product, and 
the Board of Economic Warfare issued the licenses, but you did not 
oven know your Board issued licenses in 1943 for this material ? 



1098 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wallace. No. This was a purely meclianical proposition. 
We issued approximately 8,000 licenses a day. 

Mr. Nixon. That is all. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask one more question. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter. 

Mr. Walter, Did you attempt, either directly or indirectly, to in- 
fluence anybody in a decision to issue a license for any uranium 
product ? 

Mr. Wallace. No, sir, I did not, and I think this should be cleared 
up in the record. It is really a very small item, but General Groves 
said he did not know what indirect pressure Mr. Wallace mig-ht have 
brought on him or Manhattan project through others. Because that 
was left slightly dangling in General Groves' testimony, I would like 
to say I certainly did not. 

Mr. Walter. I think General Groves cleared that up in a letter 
we received this morning. 

Mr. Wallace. There was that little bit of testimony that was left 
dangling. 

Mr. Walter. That is all. 

^Ir. Wood. Mv. Velde. 

Mr. Velde. Were you acquainted with any of the producers of 
uranium while you were head of BEW and Vice President of the 
United States? 

Mr. Wall-vce. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. Who were they ? 

Mr. Wallace. On December 27, 1943, Boris Pregel came to see me, 
with the request I put him in touch with scientific men in the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture. He told me he was manufacturing radium at a 
plant at Mount Kisco. I don't recall that he referred to uranium 
at the time. He never said anything to me about the atom bomb 
until 3 days after it had been dropped on Hiroshima. 

The first time I met him was December 1943, and at that time he 
wanted me to put him in touch with scientific men in the Department 
of Agriculture. I called Eugene Auchter, director of Scientific Re- 
search, and asked for Mr. Pregel to meet Eugene Auchter. And I 
arranged with Mr. Pregel to get some alpha radiation, a byproduct 
of the manufacture of radium, for experimentation in my garden. 
I experimented with it in 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948. 

Mr. Velde. That was in your New York farm ? 

Mr. Wallace. No, first in Washington and subsequently my New 
York farm. 

JNIr. Velde. You knew he was a producer of uranium, and that 
uranium could be used in the manufacture of the atom bomb ? 

Mv. Wallace. He did not refer to the atom bomb until August 8, 
1945, after it had been dropped on Hiroshima. At that time he gave 
me photostats of statements he had issued to the Miami paper in 1941 
as to the peacetime and wartime importance of atomic energy. 

Mr. Velde. Would you say your relationship with Boris Pregel 
was a close relationship during that time? 

Mr. Wallace. I wouldn't say a close relationship. I knew him. 
He translated for me. When I found the F'resident wanted me to go 
to China via Soviet Asia, when the President first indicated that, 
I started trying to learn Russian. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL lUyy 

Mr. Velde. Who accompanied you to Russia at the time you made 
that trip ? 

JNIr. Wallace. Could we finish one subject at the time, or shall we 
wander all over the map ? 

Mr. Velde. I am sorry I interrupted you. 

Mr. Wallace. I merely wanted to say I had studied Russian very 
assiduously when the President told me he wanted me to go to China 
via Russia, and I had one of the teachers here in Washington. I won't 
mention his name because I don't want to prejudice him in any way. 
He is not seated in this room, I might say. 

What I wanted to do at that time, we felt Russia's part in the war 
effort was very significant, and I was going to be visiting certain spots 
in Siberia where they were seeking to produce many products that 
would save the lives of American boys, and I wanted to make some 
speeches. So I asked Mr. Pregel — because he was born in Russia and 
was driven out by the Bolsheviks in 1917, I believe — I asked if he 
would translate my speeches into Russian. I thought his translation 
would be better than that of the people I had been working with. He 
did translate them for me, and I saw him rather frequently during 
that period. 

If you have any further questions on the Pregel matter, would you 
like to ask them? 

Mr. Wood. It is very interesting, but is it pertinent here? 

Mr. Velde. Yes, I think it is, in view of the fact he has made the 
statement he did not mention the subject of uranium to anyone, and 
in view of the fact Boris F'regel was a producer of radium at the time 
and was a very close friend. 

Mr. Wood. Proceed. 

Mr. Wallace. I didn't say he was a very close friend. I first met 
Mr. Pregel on December 27, 1943. 

Mr. Velde. Did you discuss the subject of uranium with him? 

Mr. Wallace. We discussed alpha radiation. That has nothing to 
do with the bomb. It is a byproduct of the manufacture of radium. 
I don't recall discussing the subject of uranium, as such, until after 
the bomb was dropped. But we did discuss the use of this byproduct 
for agricultural purposes. Mr. Pregel did not bring up at any time 
the subject of shipments of uranium or the bomb. 

Mr. Velde. Mr. Chairman, if you prefer I will not go into the trip 
to China and Russia at this time, because I don't see that it will serve 
a useful purpose at this time. 

Mr. Wallace. With regard to this statement, I have some hesitancy 
about putting it in the record of the committee, because it involves a 
lengthy statement of what took place at Cabinet meetings, and I would 
like to clear it with someone at the White House before putting it in. 
I think probably I have put enough in the record. I may say that the 
statement that President Truman made knocking the story down in the 
New York Times was made without solicitation on my part. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of that Cabinet meeting? 

Mr. Wallace. September 21, 1945. 

Mr. Ta\t<:nner. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer in evidence 
the memorandum of the Board of Economic Warfare approved by 
Mr. Wallace to which I referred earlier, and I ask that it be marked 
"Wallace Exhibit 2." 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted. 



1100 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

(The memorandum above referred to, marked "Wallace Exhibit 
2," is hereinafter included in the record,) ^^ 

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand in recess until 2 : 30 this 
afternoon. 

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 2 : 30 p. m., Thursday, January 
26, 1950.) 

AFTER RECESS 

The committee reconvened, pursuant to the taking of the recess, 
Hon. Francis E. Walter, presiding. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will come to order. 

Whom do you wish to call first, Mr. Tavenner ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Hoopes. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Hoopes, will you raise your right hand, please? 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give before 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. HooPES. I do. 

Mr. Walter. Sit down, please. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HOOPES 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name, Mr. Hoopes? 

Mr. HooPES. James P. Hoopes. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present address? 

Mr. Hoopes. 39 Poplar Street, Douglaston, Long Island, N. Y. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. When and where were you born ? 

Mr. Hoopes. July 6, 1913, Westchester, Pa. 

Mr. Tavenner. What is your present occupation ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I am a lawyer. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would you furnish the committee with a resume 
of your past employment, including any service that you may have had 
in the United States Army ? 

Mr. HooPES. I had a commission in the Coast Artillery Reserve of 
the Army from 1933 to 1938. From March of 1942 until early Novem- 
ber 1943, 1 was employed in the Office of the Lend-Lease Administra- 
tion. At that time I entered the service of the Xavy, in November 
1943, and I was released to inactive duty in April 1946. I have been 
engaged in private practice since that time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Hoopes, will you tell us the exact nature of your 
employment and your position with Lend-Lease during 1943? 

Mr. Hoopes. I was a liaison officer in the Division for Soviet Sup- 
ply. I had to do in some measure with lend-lease requisitions for 
materials to be shipped to Russia. 

Another one of my jobs was having to do with cash purchases of 
materials to be exported to Russia. 

As a liaison officer, the main function of the job was to handle the 
Soviet requests with the various Government agencies and persons in 
the Government who were in a position to pass upon their availaiblity 
as to material, and so forth, and obtain the necessary priorities to be 
awarded if the material was to be shipped. That is about the size of it. 



^ See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 11 OX 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, now, you spoke of cash purchases and lend- 
lease purchases. Why was it necessary for you to have to deal with 
cash purchases, when you were an employee of Lend-Lease? Were 
not cash purchases handled direct through other agencies ? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir. Our office handled, during the time that I 
was there, the cash purchases for the Soviet Union, which required 
clearance for export, particularly those which required any priority 
assistance. All the requests for priority assistance or for clearance 
for export of those purchases f unneled through our office. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, what was the practice in your office when you 
received a requisition, say, from the Soviet Purchasing Commission for 
some article of merchandise, or some commodity? 

Mr. Hoopes. Do you mean a lend-lease requisition, or do you mean 
a cash-purchase application? 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, let's take both of them. Lend-Lease, first. 

Mr. HooPES. In the case of a lend-lease requisition, one of the first 
jobs that we had to do was to check to see if the material requested 
under the requisition was within the program of aid to the Soviet 
Union. 

Mr. Tai'enner. How did you ascertain that fact ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Well, the materials were set forth in the protocol that 
governed the lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union, and certain quantities 
of various materials were committed by the United States to Russia, 
and it was our first job to see if any of these requests came within the 
categories of the material that was authorized. Once we determined 
that, we checked the particular liaison officer who was handling that 
particular material. There were several liaison officers. The one 
liaison officer handling the particular material would check with the 
various members of the War Production Board and any other agencies 
that controlled that material. 

For instance, if the material was copper or a certain kind of 
machine, we checked with the people in the War Production Board 
and the branch that controlled the production and the availability 
of the supply of that commodity. We would find whether that ma- 
terial was available. We would find what sort of priority was needed 
to obtain the production and the making of it available to the Russians. 

We also checked as to the shipping, the size, the tonnage, and the 
bulk of the shipment, because it was our job to control the amount 
and to schedule the shipping. That was not my job, but we made 
a report on it. 

These requisitions, then, after we had had preliminary information 
on them, were ordinarily taken up in our Division at a requisition 
meeting, at which General Wesson presided, and they were reviewed 
and discussed. If there were some questions of policy to be deter- 
mined, those questions were brought up, and the officers would give 
a report as to what the War Production Board had to say as to the 
availability, and so on. If the requisition was ultimately passed, it 
was then forwarded to the War Production Board for routing through 
the various branches to obtain priority, and then finally it was turned 
over to the procurement agency of Lend-Lease to buy the material. 
Lend-Lease did not buy the material, but there were various Govern- 
ment agencies that did. And the requisition was given to them, and 
they purchased the material, which was generally put out on bids or 
however they saw fit to do it. 



1102 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

From that point, when the goods were ready for delivery, they 
were scheduled for shipment. That was not my particular function, 
but we followed it through. 

Mr. Tavenner. If that requisition was designed for export to a 
foreign country, to what extent was that procedure which you have 
described supplemented ? 

Mr. HoopES. I am only talking about the requisitions that were 

Mr. Tavenner. For export ? 

Mr. Hoopes. All Lend-Lease requisitions. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of course, the only ones would have been for export. 

Mr. HoopES. And the only ones we were involved with were for 
export to Russia. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, you have not mentioned anything about the 
necessity of having an export license. 

Mr. HooPES. No export license was required, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. No export license was required for any material 
which was being exported to Russia ? 

Mr. HooPEs. No, sir ; under lend-lease. There is a distinction to be 
made between lend-lease materials and cash purchases. 

Mr. Tavenner. And cash purchases. All right. 

Mr. HooPES. The lend-lease requisition itself was the shipping 
authority. Once it had gone finally through all the various stages it 
went to, and got into production, and so on, it contained authority 
to ship; the requisition itself did. And they were shipped pursuant 
to the Lend-Lease Act, and they were shipped with lend-lease funds. 
The cash purchases were handled in an entirely different manner. 

Mr. Tavenner. But you issued a certificate of release to accompany 
the material, did you not, when it was lend-lease? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. You did not? 

]Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; that was for cash purchases only. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner, Well, now, describe the situation where it was a 
cash-purchase transaction. 

Mr. Hoopes. I am not entirely familiar with the situation as to the 
procedure of cash purchases all the way through, until about July of 
1943, when the procedure changed. To the best of my recollection, 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission would send an application through 
by letter to our office, requesting an export license for shipment of 
some particular commodity or material. My only part in the picture 
at that time was the assistance for priority. If the material needed 
priority assistance, it would be accompanied by a WPB form, and then 
I got that form and checked with the Government agencies in similar 
manner to the handling of lend-lease requisitions, to see if the material 
was available, what priority it needed, and so forth. And even though 
it was a cash purchase application, these items were considered from 
many of the same lend-lease points of view, about shipping, the 
•critical nature of supply, and the comparative needs of our own Gov- 
•ernment agencies for other purposes. 

I would send the priority application to the War Production Board 
and follow it through the branches until it got its priority and was 
returned to our office. Wlien it was returned, with the necessary 
priority on it, it was my recollection that we gave approval to the ex- 
port licensing — I did not handle this ordinarily — and that the export 
license was actually issued by the Board of Economic Warfare. It 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1103 

was their clociiment. We gave our approval to it, and it already had 
its priority, and it was then returned to the Russians. It was given 
a number and a date on which it was approved ; and the export license, 
together with the priority itself, the priority certificate, was returned 
to the Russians. They in turn would turn that over to their supplier, 
who would use it in getting the material and in shipping it. 

The procedure was changed later, but up to that point I did not 
have a great deal to do with the export licensing itself. I had to do 
mostly with priorities. 

Mr. Tavenner. When you say it "was changed later," you mean at 
what date ? 

Mr. HooPES. I believe the change date was July 1, 1943. I think 
that was the effective date of the change. We worked out with the 
Board of Economic Warfare an arrangement whereby they would 
issue what was called a program license to the Soviet iQnion. Then 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission would submit to our office what 
was called a release certificate. It was a document which set forth the 
nature of the material that they wanted to purchase, their immediate 
supplier, several details about what the ingredients of the material 
were, the shipping weight, and the bulk, and so forth. They sent that 
to our office. It was up to us, then, to pass upon it and approve it for 
export under the program license. 

The program which the program license covered was the protocol. 
In other words, it was strictly tying in all Russian shipments, whether 
they were for cash or lend-lease, to the protocol, so that it was one 
program. And then one of us would sign the application, the release 
certificate, give it a number, and return it to the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission. 

Mr. Taa'enner. Let me stop you, there, a moment. 

Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. The protocol agreement that was negotiated with 
the Russian Government was negotiated with what agency of the 
United States Government? 

Mr. HoopES. I am not entirely sure. It wasn't by any specific 
agency, Mr. Tavenner. It was a document which was signed, like 
a treaty between ambassadors of the various countries. It wasn't 
just with the Soviet Government. Great Britain, I believe, and Ca- 
nada were also parties to the protocol agreement. But it was a pro- 
gram which was worked out by a top level committee composed of 
our highest Government officials, including the people from the Army 
and Navy, to decide what materials would go to Russia that follow- 
ing year. And then it was given to us. We were on what you may 
say was the lower echelon level of this job. The program was worked 
out, and it was given to us to carry out. 

Mr. Tavenner. In obtaining the priority on cash purchases, with 
whom did you deal in the War Production Board ? What officials ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Hundreds of them. 

Mr. Ta\t.nner. Would that depend upon the particular character 
of the material? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes. It would entirely. Because I not only would 
deal with the individuals who received the applications. There was 
one whole floor in the building that did nothing but receive the appli- 
cations and see that they funneled to the right branches. But then 



1104 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

I dealt with the people in all the branches that this application had 
to go by. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, let us come right to the question that we are 
concerned with, here. With whom did you deal regarding priorities 
for the export of uranium ? 

Mr. HooPES. I didn't deal with anybody regarding uranium. You 
are speaking of the particular April transactions ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Any transactions. 

Mr. Hoopes. I never had any dealing with anybody in the War Pro- 
duction Board regarding uranium. 

Mr. Ta\tnner. You did not. Do you know who, of the Lend-Lease 
officials, did have such 

Mr. HooPEs. Excuse me. Could I interpose something there, that 
may help ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. HooPES. The War Production Board wasn't always the con- 
trolling agency as far as a decision as to whether an item was avail- 
able or not was concerned. The War Production Board did issue the 
bulletins that were previously described in this hearing, setting forth 
the commodities and what agency or what person or what group 
handled that commodity ; but it might very well be that certain com- 
modities were handled by other groups than the War Production 
Board, and if that were the case, we had to deal with them. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. I understand. Well, now, do you know, from your 
contact with the handling of uranium, whether or not the War Pro- 
duction Board was consulted with regard to priorities for uranium ? 

Mr. HooPES. I understand that the War Production Board was 
consulted. It was not by me. 

Mr. Tavenner. By whom ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I believe Mv. Moore had to do with that. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, did you consult any other agency with regard 
to the export of uranium ? You or any other official of your staff? 

Mr. HooPES. Well, I am not sure who else might have consulted 
anybody else. I know that Mr. Moore was handling uranium. The 
only people that I consulted were in the office of Colonel Crenshaw 
in New York, and that was because I had a memorandum from Mr. 
Moore that there was something pending on a particular application, 
and in his absence I happened to handle that. I had understood that 
there had been considerable background of negotiations and clearance 
discussions on this particular thing, and it had reached the stage where 
I was given specific instructions about it. And when the time came, 
I contacted Colonel Crenshaw's office, imder instructions to do so. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is that the first experience that you had in any 
transaction relating to uranium ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then tell us about the negotiations that had oc- 
curred, as far as you learned of them, pertaining to this shipment, 
which I believe was the 1,000-pound shij)ment. 

Mr. HooPBS. Well, sir, I believe you have more records than I on 
that. _ I went up yesterday afternoon and saw some of the old records 
on this, which I understand were turned over to this committee some 
time ago. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1105 

Mr. HooPES. I understand that Mr. Moore had been dealing in this 
matter with the Russians and with General Groves' office and with the 
WPB. I did not acquaint myself with all the details of that, except 
to know that this particular transaction, that application for 500 
pounds of uranium nitrate and 600 pounds of uranium oxide, had been 
disapproved. I got into the picture at that time, when it had been 
disapproved by our office, and a letter had gone to the Russians advis- 
ing them that it was of a critical nature and could not be supplied. 

When Mr. Moore went away, in April — and I am not positive of the 
date — he left a memorandum for me advising that it might be possible 
to obtain some substitutes for uranium compounds, I believe. 

Mr. Walter. Have you the memorandum ? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir, I don't have the memorandum. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have any note or personal memorandum 
that you made at the time regarding this transaction ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir ; I do. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, let us start with that. 

Mr. Hoopes. I have a note on April 16, 19-1:3, and this note is in a 
little diary notebook that I kept during the course of the day's activi- 
ties, and from which I later made up daily diaries, which we sub- 
mitted to the head of our division every day, of work that went on. 
And I have a note here indicating that Mr. Fomichev called regarding 
500 pounds of uranium oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate to 
be supplied from Chematar, Inc., of New York City. My note 
doesn't say any more than that, but sometimes it didn't. The diary 
for that day I think you also have. This is the daily report that was 
typed up, dated April 17, 1943, for activities on the 16th. One of the 
items appears as follows : 

Conferred with Mr. Fomichev regarding application for export licenses for 
1,000 pounds of uranium compounds, on which Soviets had option. This request 
has definitely been turned down by this division because of strategic need of 
materials in this country. Mr. Fomichev was advised to consider the matter 
closed as to this particular reciuest, but that inquiries were being made as to 
allocation of any possible substitute materials. 

In one of the instructions that Mr. Moore had left for me — I think 
the details are in a memo, there. 

Mr. Tavenner. No, the details are not in the memo. I will read 
you this. This much does appear from the memo of April 19 : 

Uranium : This Is being handled by General Hoopes, who should be advised by 
General Wesson should matters become excessively complicated. 

Mr. HooPES. Don't you have another memo there on that, about 
that date? There was a memo that I saw yesterday that didn't have 
an exact date, but it indicated that Mr. Moore — it was to me and 
stated that it may be possible to obtain the substitutes and that Colonel 
Crenshaw's office was forwarding us a list of substitutes, and if I did 
not receive them by the following Monday I was to call Colonel 
Crenshaw's office, and then later to take the matter up with General 
Wesson. 

Mr. McSwEENEY. What are the substitutes for uranium? 

Mr. HooPES. That is in the letter, sir. I am not familiar with 
them. 

Mv. Tavenner. We have a memorandum similar to that, but that 
is in June 1043. That is the memorandum, then, that you are speaking 
of, that should have been dated in April ? 

99334—50 14 



1106 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. HooPES. Yes. It must be, sir. Because it was tied in with the 
instructions for me to carry out when Mr. Moore was away. 

Mr. Walter. Who put the date of June on, when it should have 
been April ^ 

Mr. HooPES. I don't know, sir. 

Mr, Tavenner. Will you look at the memorandum and state 
whether that is the memorandum to which you referred ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, that is it. 

Mr. Walter. When was that memorandum made? 

Mr. HooPES. I don't know when it was made, Mr. Walter. It says 
on it "June 1943," but that is obviously wrong. 

Mr. Walter. Whose memorandum is it? 

Mr. HooPES. It is from Mr. Moore to me. 

Mr. W^vLTER. To you? 

Mr. HoopES. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. This was a copy prepared by the State Department? 

Mr. HooPES. This is a copy, and perhaps in copying it they may 
have made an error as to the date. I do not know. Mr. Moore may be 
able to clear you up on the date of this memo. I don't know. 

Mr. Tavenner, AVill you read it, please ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes. This copy says : 

June 1943. 
For : J. P. Hoopes 
From : W. C. Moore. 
Subject : Urauium compounds. 

It appears that it may be possible to get ferro-uraniiim compounds, and the 
information should be sent to yon. I have talked with Colonel Crenshaw's office 
in New York and given tliem your name. If you do not get information by Mon- 
day, call them up. Mrs. Cochran has the number. 

Get sufficient specifications so that the Soviets can make decisions as to 
whether it is suitable for their needs and, if possible, quantities available. 

Captain Johnston of General Groves' office is the man in Washington who may 
be able to help you. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Well, did you follow the direction of Mr. Moore and 
call Colonel Crenshaw's office ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, I did. Evidently the list didn't come in Monday 
morning, that they referred to, and 1 called Colonel Crenshaw's office. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Hoopes, referring to that memorandum again, you 
saw the original memorandum, didn't you? 

Mr. Hoopes. I saw it in 1943, sir. 

Mr. Ta-st^nner. Did you see it recently ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. I saw the same thing that you have here, just 
a compilation of material that has a bearing on all these transactions. 
I haven't seen the original memo ; no. 

INIr. Tavenner. Do you recall, from your independent recollection, 
that the matter of substitutes arose in April 1943 ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir; I do. That is borne out by the subsequent 
correspondence which we have. 

Mr. Tavenner. I think so. 

Mr. Hoopes. It definitely ties into that. 

Mr. Tavenner. All right. So will you proceed, then ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Well, it seems that — I don't know Avhen it was received, 
but there was a letter from the Soviet Purchasing Commission to our 
office dated April 20, in which the Russians were upset about our 
having turned down this particular application previously, and they 
stated, in there 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1107 

Mr. Tavenner. Let me hand you what purports to be a copy of the 
letter, furnished by the State Department, and I ask you if that is the 
letter to which you refer. 

Mr. HoopES. That is the one I was talking about, sir; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, will you read the letter, please ? 

Mr. HooPES. This letter is dated April 20, 1943. It is addressed to : 

Major General Charles M. Wesson, 
Senior Assistant Administrator, 

Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 

515 Twenty-second Street NW., Washington, D. C. 

Deak General Wesson : We were advised by your office that our application 
of April 3, 1948, for export license for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and .500 
pounds of uranium nitrate had been declined. Needless to say this decision 
upsets the most urgent efforts of our war industries at present. 

In view of the rejection of our two requisitions for uranium compounds by the 
War Department, we hoped to obtain small quantities of uranium compounds by 
direct purchase for cash. In fact we had several propt)sitions from American 
companies. The materials were offered from the stock for immediate delivery. 
Your office was kept informed about all negotiations with those companies. 
Nevertheless, the conceivable purcliase of uranium compounds was not authorized. 

Because of the very lu-gent needs which you have always appreciated, I would 
vei*y much appreciate your reconsidering the above decision of your office, and 
to authorize us to buy 50O pounds each of the afore-mentioned uranium com- 
pounds and 25 pounds of uranium metal, for which we also have a proposition. 

Thank you for your early attention to this matter. 
Sincerely yours, 

N. S. Stepanov. 
Chief of Petroleum Products, Chemical Department. 

Mr. Taatnxer. Let me ask you one question about the letter. There 
is a statement here that — 

in fact we had several propositions from American companies. The materials 
were offered from the stock for immediate delivery. Your office was kept 
informed about all negotiations with those companies. 

Now, what information did you receive regarding companies which 
had materials in stock for delivery ? 

Mr. Hoopes. That took place during the time that Mr. Moore was 
handling this, before I got into it. 

Mr. Tavenner. You had no knowledge of it ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavi:nner. All right, sir. 

Mr. Hoopes. On the 22d of April — I gather that the letter that I had 
been expecting from Colonel Crenshaw's office with the list of uranium 
compounds hadn't arrived, because I have a note here, "Call Colonel 
Crenshaw" and then I have a note "Out" and then later "Captain 
Merritt." The number is "Murray Hill 3-1761," subject "Uranium 
compounds," and then "Captain Merritt" and then the substance of 
what he advised me : 

Said pressure had just been brought to bear on General Groves to release the 
1,000 pounds. Colonel Crenshaw is willing for Russians to have the list of 
substitutes. Please try to hold off approval of the 1,000 pounds till Russians 
have chance to see the substitute list. 

Now, after this- 



Mr. Tavenner. Just before you leave that: Did Captain Merritt 
explain anything further as to what he meant about pressure being 
brought to bear upon General Groves ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; he did not. 



1108 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Did 3^011 have any conversation with Captain Mer- 
ritt or any other member of the Manhattan Engineering District with 
regard to that statement? 

Mr. HoopES. No, sir. Captain Merritt is the only person I have ever 
talked to in the Manhattan District. 

Mr. Tavenner. All right. Proceed. 

Mr. HooPES. After this conversation, I have a note here that I spoke 
with General Wesson. I went in and talked to General Wesson. Mr. 
Moore had indicated previously that I was to take the matter up with 
General Wesson. 

In discussing with General Wesson, 1 explained to him my con- 
versation with Captain Merritt. I just indicated what I have read 
here. And General Wesson said he wanted to speak to General 
Groves. He gave instructions to his secretary to get him General 
Groves on the phone. 

I have a note here : 

Spoke with General Wesson. He called General Groves. Got Groves to say 
O. K. to export the 1,000 pounds iiraniiim compounds. Genei'al Wesson agreed to 
write Soviets approving the request. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then the decision to approve the request for the 
issuance of an export license was made at the time of that telephone 
conversation ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I would believe so, sir. 

Mr. Walter. Were you present when the telephone conversation 
took place ? 

Mr. HooPES. Mr. Walter, I don't remember. I remember distinctly 
General Wesson's giving instructions : "Get me General Groves." 

And it was generally a pretty busy office around there, and I don't 
remember whether I stayed during the conversation or not. I rather 
imagine I did not. 

Mr. Walter. It was shortly thereafter that you were informed that 
permission had been granted for the export of this 1,000 pounds? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir; it was apparently right after General Wes- 
son's conversation with General Groves, because I have tied it all in 
on the same note here. There are no intervening phone calls or any- 
thing else, so it must have been immediately after that telephone 
conversation that General Wesson gave me the instructions. 

Mr. Tavenner. And what was the date of that memorandum ? 

Mr. HooPES. This memorandum is dated April 22. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was the day on which you talked to Colonel 
Crenshaw's office ? 

Mr. HooPES. That is right, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. But spoke to Captain Merritt? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir. 

After getting these instructions from General Wesson 

Mr. Tavenner. Let me ask you this: Did General Wesson make 
any statement to you as to the reason for approving the issuance of 
this license on the 22d of April or at any later date ? 

Mr. HooPES. I don't recall exactly whether he made his statement 
to me. I assume that he did, because in my report I said something 
about the reason, in my later report. I assume that we had some brief 
conversation about it. But I don't remember all of it. I can't swear- 
to that, sir. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 



1109 



Mr. Tavenner. That was written in your report of May 31, sum- 
marizing these transactions. 

Mr. HooPES. Well, there was a report earlier than that. There was 
a report for the activities of April 22. 

No, it doesn't give that. Shall I read you my report for that ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; read from your report. 

Mr. HooPES. This is from my diary, dated April 23, 1943, for activi- 
ties of the 22d : 

Conferred with Captain Merritt in the oflSce of Colonel Crenshaw, of War 
Department Engineers, New York City, on recent list of various substitutes for 
particular uranium compounds desired by Soviets. General Wesson arranged 
with General Groves for clearance of the original Soviet application for 1,000 
pounds of such compounds, which the Soviets claim they can procure from stock. 
Prepared letter for General Wesson advising Soviets accordingly in light of their 
urgent need for this material. Export license now being put tiirough. 

Mr. Walter. As I understand it, General Wesson was opposed to 
granting the permit. It was not until after this telephone call that 
he agreed to allow it. 

Mr. HooPES. Yes; that is true. This is conjecture, because I hadn't 
been in the early negotiations about this, but we had been apparently 
advised of the tight supply of this particular material. I myself 
knew nothing of the atomic project or nothing of the strategic situa- 
tion about uranium. All the instructions I had received was that they 
couldn't get this material. And it wasn't until the conversation Gen- 
eral Wesson had with General Groves that he made the decision. 

My memo here to Mr. Moore expands that a little bit. 

Mr. Tavenner. But take the occurrences in the order in which they 
took place. 

Mr. HooPES. Well, on the 23d, the export license was approved to 
cover this request for 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds 
of uranium nitrate. 

Mr. Tavenner. I hand you what appears to be a copy of the appli- 
cation for the export license, with the notation at the foot of it by you. 
Will you examine it and state if that is a copy of the application ? 

Mr. HooPEs. I don't know. I assume it is. I mean these are ex- 
cerpts. I know that I did make such a note on it and we put the 
export license through. I don't know whether there was any other 
material than this. This seems to give the details from the export- 
license application. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, will you read it, please, into the record? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. This says : 

The following apparently copied from the export license. 
It is an application for export dated April 23, 1943. 



Order number 


Units 


Supplier 


Value 


21-73/C 43058...- 


500 pounds urano-uranic oxide 99.5 percent pure, at $4.50-. 
500 pounds uranium nitrate (uranyl) at $2.25, total gross 
weight 1,200 pounds. 


Chematar, Inc 


$3,375 



Note. — This application has been held up for some time. It has now been 
approved by General Wesson as of April 22, 1943. 

That is all that is on that note. I don't know whether this other 
note is attached to it or not. There is another note on the next page 
here. 



1110 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Ta^t:nner. What is tlio date of that note ? 

Mr, HoopES. April 22 is the date of this other note. It is a note 
appended — I will assume it is appended to the other note. It is 
addressed to Mrs. Hall, but there is no signature — no indication of 
a signature — on either one of these notes. 

Mr. Ta\'exner. Will j^ou read it? Doesn't it indicate that it was 
signed by a person ? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir ; it doesn't indicate it was signed by a person. 
It says, "Received from J. Hoopes." 

Mr. TA^'ENNER. Received from ? All right. 

Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir. It is a note to Mrs. Hall. 

General Wesson has decided that this export license be approved and issued as 
soon as possible. Received from J. Hoopes. 

Office note : Indicates license No. C-1G431S0 assigned on April 23, 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Was that license number assigned by your office ? 

Mr. HooPES. I gather that it was, sir. I do not remember that 
procedure. Mr. Moore handled the export licenses and I don't know 
whether they were numbers given to us by the Board of Economic War- 
fare which we assigned as we approved them or whether they were our 
own numbers. We put the number on the export license. I do know 
that. 

Mr. Tavexner. All right. Will you proceed? 

Mr. HooPES. Well, on the 23d, a letter was written by General Wes- 
son to Mr. Stepanov of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. Do you 
wish me to read that? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr. HooPES (reading) : 

Your letter of April 20, requesting reconsideration of your application for 
export license covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of 
uranium nitrate has received careful study. 

Having in mind tlie urgency of your needs for this material as expressed in 
your letter, I have reviewed the situation. Our supply of these uranium com- 
pounds is critical. However, I am recommending approval of your present ex- 
port license for the above quantities, whicli you state that you can iiurchase 
from stocks on hand. 

As regards the 25 pounds of lu-anium metal also mentioned in your letter, 
we shall entertain application for this material provided you can locate a source 
of supply. 

Sincerely yours, 

C. M. Wesson, 
Major Oeneral United States Army, 

S&nior Assistant Administrator. 

Mr. Walter. When was that letter, please ? 

Mr. Hoopes. The date of that letter was April 23, sir. 

Mr. Walter. And that was signed by General Wesson ? 

Mr. HooPEs. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is notifying the Soviet Purchasing Commis- 
sion of the approval of the license. 

Now, what was the nexr thing that occurred ? 

Mr. HooPES. I have a note, on April 26, of a telephone call that I 
received from Mr. Fomichev of the Commission. 

JNIr. Tavenner. That is, of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. He states : 

Option expired for uranium compounds. Will send license application for 
25 pounds uranium metal. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1111 

That is all that note says. I wrote it up a little fuller in the diary. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did 3'ou make a comment of your own at that time, 
after receiving the notice that the option had expired which the 
Russians had expected to use ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir, I did. As I understand it, or as I understood 
it at the time, it was that General AYesson and General Groves were 
skeptical as to the fact that the Russians could get this material. 
Chematar was the supplier, and Chematar was the hroker, and when 
the request was approved I believe it was approved on the assumption 
that they would never be able to fill it. And when Fomichev called 
and advised that he could no longer get it, it sounded as if the original 
assumption was correct. 

]\Ir. Tavenner. And did you not make some notation at the time, 
in your diary, with regard to that? 

Mr. Hoopes. In my daily report ? Yes, I did. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. In your daily report. Will you state what that 
was 'I 

]\Ir. HooPES. On April 27th, for activities on the 26th, I have a note 
here : 

Conferred with Mr. Fomichev, who expressed dismay at inability to locate 
uranium compounds now that the export license has been granted. This de- 
velopment seems to confirm our skepticism regarding the stock supply which 
the Russians insisted had been offered from several sources. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you communicate that information to General 
Wesson; that is, the information that you had received about the 
supply being exhausted ? 

Mr. HooPES. I assume that I did, Mr. Tavenner. I don't have a 
definite recollection of it. I did certainly in this diary, because all 
these diaries were written up as .reports of our activities and were 
funneled in to General Wesson so that he could see what had been 
going on. So I imagine I spoke to him about it. I don't have any 
distinct note of that. I don't believe I do, anyhow. That memo- 
randum of mine to Mr. Moore may indicate that, which you have in 
the record. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, do you have any other record there of trans- 
actions before you made a summary report on May 1 ? 

Mr. HoopES. I haven't any other 

Mr. Tavenner. That is, action that you were familiar with ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I don't believe so, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you have any knowledge of the issuance of an 
amended or approval of an amended license ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. I am not sure that one was amended. I know 
there has been a lot of discussion about it before this committee, but 
I don't know that there ever was an amended license. 

]\Ir. Tavenner. Well, now, right in that connection, have you seen 
a request to amend the license ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yesterday afternoon I saw this request dated April 28 
from the Russians. 

Mr. Taa-enner. Yes. Had yovi seen that before yesterday ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir ; I had not. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know of the fact that such a letter had been 
written prior to yesterday ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, sir. The request was not addressed to us. 

Mr. Tavenner. To whom was it addressed ? 



1112 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 



Mr. HoorES. Do you have a copy of it there? I took notes from 
that. Yours woukl be more complete than mine. It was addressed 
to "Mr. Thad C. Martin." 

Mr. Tavenner. That is right. 

Mr. HoopES. "Administrative Officer" or "Administrative Office" — 
I don't know which it was — "Operations Branch, Office of Exports, 
Board of Economic Warfare." 

Mr. Tavenner. I show you a letter of April 28, 1943, addressed to 
Mr. Martin, as you said. Will you read it ? 

Mr. Hoopes. It is dated April 28, 1943, addressed to : 

Mr. Thad C. Martin, 

Administration Officer, Operation Branch, 

Office of Exports, Board of Economic Warfare, 

Room 2032, Tempo U Building, Twelfth and Constitution Avenue, 
Washington, D. C. 

In reference to the above export license number — 



Dear Sib 
excuse me 



It was preceded by- 



Re : export license No. 1643180. 

Dear Sir : In reference to the above export license number, co\ ering 500 pounds 
of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate, we request that the 
license be amended as follows : 



Net weight 


Commodity 


Unit 
price 


Total 
price 


finn pnnnd.q 


Urano-uranic oxide, 95-98 percent pure 


$3.10 
2.85 


$1,550 


fiOn ponnd.<? 


TTranium Pitrafp (nitrourfl-nyl) 


1,425 








Grand total 




2,975 











By the time our application had received a decision, the supplier, Chematar, 
Inc., found it necessary to change the specification of urano-uranic oxide and 
also the prices for both materials, to which changes we gave our consent. Your 
attention to this matter will be appreciated by us. 
Very truly yours, 

N. S. FOMICHEV, 

In Charge of Chemicals. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, that letter is addressed to the Board of Eco- 
nomic Warfare, is it not ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. How is it that you have a copy of that in your files ? 

Mr. HooPES. I haven't the faintest idea. 

Mr. Tavenner. When it was testified this morning by Mr. Wallace, 
as I recall it and understand, applications were made solely to Lend- 
Lease and were never made to the Bureau of Economic Warfare. Did 
yow hear that testimony ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you so understand ? 

Mr. Hoopes. You mean you understand that that is a fact ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes; I understand that to be his testimony. 

Mr. Hoopes. Well, that was what was supposed to happen. But 
the Russians didn't always conform to all procedures, and it was quite 
possible that when they couldn't get something in one place they would 
pop up somewhere else to see if they could get it. That was one reason 
why we ultimately changed their release certificate, their export license 
procedure. It wasn't anything to do with this, but it was the idea of 
trying to get the Russians to come to one office in the Government and 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1113 

not be going all over town ; because that way there might be duplicate 
approvals, and nobody could program anything. 

Mr. Walter. May t interrupt you at that point ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Walter. When tlie approval was received, who received the 
physical possession of the export license ? 

Mr. HooPES. I believe the Soviet Purchasing Commission did, Mr. 
Walter. 

Mr. Walter. Yes. Then, if they received the possession of the 
paper authorizing the exportation of something that wasn't in short 
supply, there was no reason why that permission could not have been 
attached to something that there was a short supply of, was there? 

Mr. HoopES. Well, the export license itself had details of the com- 
modity which was to be shipped, and it went with that material. 

Mr. Walter. Yes; I understand that full well. But suppose they 
were interested in obtaining material that our Government felt they 
should not have, and they were able to find a manufacturer or a pro- 
ducer who was willing to let them have that material. It could have 
been crated, and to the crate could have been affixed this license that 
was given to them for the material that was not in short supply. 

Mr. HoopES. The export license contained the information, as I 
recall, of the supplier, and the supplier in this case was Chematar. 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. HooPES. And Chematar was purchasing it from someone else. 
Your question is whether it wouldn't have made any difference who 
Chematal' was purchasing it from; that they could use it for any 
shipment ? 

Mr. Walter. Precisely. 

Mr. Hoopes. I am not so sure of that, although I am not familiar 
enough with the old export licenses to know, sir. . 

Mr. Walter. Assuming the physical possession of the license was 
delivered over to the Soviet and they wanted to export something 
that we felt they should not export, and assuming that they could 
find somebody who was willing to do business with them, there is no 
reason why the package that that article finally got into could not 
have contained a false invoice ? 

Mr. Hoopes. That would sound so, but I am not sure but what the 
export license may have contained information as to the shipper or 
the consignor. I would have to see one of the forms. 

Mr. Walter. Well, but suppose the shipper would say that he was 
going to ship sulfuric acid, when as a matter of fact he was going 
to ship something else. "Wlio would know what was inside of the 
container after the license had been attached to it ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I suppose that there was a certain amount of control 
at all the points of export by way of examination on the part of the 
port authorities and any other people who were responsible for export. 

Mr. Walter. Yes ; but you know that none of the materials exported 
were ever examined. None of the crates or cartons were opened to 
see that they contained what the outside of the package stated they 
contained. 

Mr. Hoopes. I imagine that is true, sir. In most cases they weren't 
opened. 

I don't know how to answer your question as to items that were? 
in stock and didn't need priorities to produce. 



1114 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Walt1':r. Of course, this is perfectly gratuitous, but it certainly 
seems to me that we were very lax in our security when we delivered 
over to the Russians physical possession of the permit to export. 
Proceed, Mr. Tavenner. 

Mr. HooPES. That was not our license, understand. 
Mr. Walter. No. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. Wlien that license was apjoroved and, as the evi- 
dence in this case shows, was delivered to the Soviet Purchasing 
Agency on the 26th of April, from that moment on didn't that license 
virtually occupy the position of a check payable to bearer, so that they 
could go at any time, find the material at any time during the life 
of that license, and make a shipment under it? 

Mr. HooPES. I frankly don't know whether there were any restric- 
tions on those licenses or not as to time. On our later release certif- 
icates there were. There was a closer check on that. It expired after 
a certain time if they couldn't get it and ship it, and it would have to 
be renewed completely, 

Mr. Ta\-enner. After approval was granted by your agency, Lend- 
Lease, was there any follow-up investigation to determine whether or 
not the shipment had actually been made ? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir ; except in regard to the planning of shipping 
itself. If the item, for instance, was a large project of considerable 
bulk and weight, there was planning done as to the shipping. That 
was handled by another department in our office, and it followed that, 
to try to program that. On the other hand, there were some requests 
for specially expedited material that went in other ways,- by air. 
Sometimes medical supplies went that way. Our only follow up, 
ordinarily, was to see that the material got to its point of export and 
got on its way. If the material was approved, our job was to keep 
it going. 

Mr. TA^'ENNER. All right. Now, let me ask you this question: 
Once this license was amended and the shipment made, did not that 
shipment have to be assigned some priority in order to get out of 
Oreat Falls, Wis., on the same day on which it arrived ? 

Mr. HooPES. I don't know, sir. I had nothing to do with that phase 
of it at all. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have got no priority from War Production 
Board on this shipment? That is, Lend-Lease got no priority? 

Mr. HooPES. No. I didn't. I don't know whether it had been ar- 
ranged in any other way. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you have enough knowledge of the situation to 
be able to state whether it could have been reshipped on the same 
date as its arrival in Great Falls, without having obtained some pri- 
ority from some source ? 

Mr. HooPES. No, sir; I don't really have enough information about 
that. I didn't get into that phase of it at all. 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, in going back to the amendment, what was 
your practice about amending approvals of licenses? Was that done 
in Lend-Lease, or was it done in the Board of Economic Warfare ? 

Mr. HooPES. Well, I don't recall ever having any of them. This 
was the first export license thing that I had ever gotten into as far as 
the old type of license was concerned. I don't know what the pro- 
cedure had been. Certainly, ordinarily, if there were amendments to 
the request itself, if the Russians came to us, if it required reconsidera- 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1115 

tion or a different material, or for some other reason it required otlier 
l^riorities, we had to pass upon that. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, would you not also have been required to pass 
upon the amendment of a license once it was issued? Was it not just 
as important that you act upon the matter then as it would have been 
when you received your initial requisition? 

Mr. HooPEs. I would think so, sir. I mean, in answer to your 
question, if the Russians wanted to amend a request I think it would 
normally have to come to us, and we would have passed upon it; yes. 
I don't find any record that this request did come to us, or that we did 
pass upon it, or that it was amended. 

Is there an amended license anywhere? I mean, that we know as 
a fact? 

Mr. Tavenner. There is testimony in the record that it was 
amended on the 29th of April, the next day after this letter was ad- 
dressed to Board of Economic Warfare. 

Mr. HooPES. It may be possible, Mr. Tavenner, that the Russians 
considered this type of an amendment something which they should 
take up with the Board of Economic Warfare, because of the Board 
of Economic Warfare bulletins on the subject giving instructions as to 
the procedure in export licenses. And the change was one of reduction 
in purity and reduction in price, which ordinarily would not be one 
that the American Government would have been much interested in, 
in the general run of requests. And so it may very well be that the 
Russians assumed that that sort of thing should be handled with the 
Board of Economic Warfare. I am just surmising; I don't know. It 
apparently was not handled by our office. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Now, I understand Mr. Moore was absent from a 
date somewhere around the 17th of April until some day in May. Is 
that correct? 

Mr. HooPES. Or the latter part of April. I am not sure when he 
came back. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you make a report to him upon his return ? 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir ; I did. 

Mr. Tavenner. Setting forth in greater detail what had transpired 
with regard to these transactions ? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes ; I made a memorandum, which you have there. I 
have it in the old testimony. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have it there. It is page 10.^^ 

Mr. HooPES. I wrote a memorandum to Mr. Moore dated May 1, 
1943: 

To : William C. Moore. 
From : J. Hoopes. 

Subject : Summary of Recent Events on Application for Export License on 
Uianium Compounds. 

Lieutenant Colonel Crenshaw of the Coi*ps of Eng^ineers in New York forwarded 
to this office a list of supplies of ferrouranium which were at one time available 
at the Latrobe Electric Steel Co. After telephone conversations between Mr. 
Hoopes and Captain Merritt in Colonel Crenshaw's office, permission was obtained 
from that office to release to the Soviet Commission the information on then 
available stocks of ferrouranium as a possible substitute for the urano-uranic 
oxide and uranium nitrate application for export license, which had been denied 
by this office April 14, 1943. 



^ Page 10 refers to transcript of earlier testimony which lias not been printed. 



1116 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Befoi-e this information was turned over to the Russians, however, Mr. Hoopes 
was notified that pursuant to telephone conferences between General Wesson 
and General Groves, the previous decision was reversed by General Groves and 
General Wesson, and it was decided to allow the Soviets to proceed under the 
export license to obtain the particular stocks of 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide 
and 500 pounds of uranium nitrate previously applied for. 

General Wesson advised that actually the War Department was anxious to 
smoke out the ultimate source from which Mr. Rosenberg was going to fill this 
order. 

Mr. Hoopes was advised by General Wesson to advise the Soviet Commission 
of this new decision, pursuant to an urgent plea for reconsideration of the 
export license application made to General Wesson by Mr. Stepanov in a letter 
dated April 20, 1943. General Wesson decided that in such case it would not 
be necessary to forward to the Soviets any further information regarding ferro- 
uranium. 

Accordingly the Soviet Commission was notified by letter from General Wesson, 
April 22, 1943, that application for export license to cover the above quantities 
of urano-uranic oxide and uranium nitrate would be approved, and further that 
this office would entertain application for export license for 25 pounds of uranium 
metal, also requested in Mr. Stepanov's letter, April 20, 1943. 

Export licenses covering 500 pounds of urano-uranic oxide and 500 pounds of 
uranium nitrate. Order No. 21-73/L 43059 and 25 pounds of uranium metal, 
Order No. 21-73/C 43058, have now been issued and returned to the Soviet 
Commission. 

A curious development on this entire matter occurred recently, when Mr. 
Fomichev called Mr. Hoopes and stated that in view of the lapse of time since 
the submission of export license applications for urano-uranic oxide and uranium 
nitrate, the Soviets were now having difficulty in locating a source of supply. 
Mr. Hoopes communicated this to General Wesson, who only smiled. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Now, did the Russians agree at any time to accept 
the ferro-iiraniiiin substitutes? Was the proposition actually dis- 
cussed with the Russians, and if so, what position did they take about 
it? 

Mr. Hoopes. The proposition was discussed with them before we 
got the list from Colonel Crenshaw's office, apparently, and I believe 
they were advised that there would be a list of substitutes — or I don't 
know whether we used the term "substitutes," but other compounds 
given to them. And I believe the list from Colonel Crenshaw's office 
came in the same day that I talked to Captain Merritt on the phone. 
And since the decision of General Groves was to let them have this 
particular material, General Groves and General Wesson apparently 
decided not to go any further with the information as to ferro-uranium 
compounds. I don't believe that list was ever sent to the Russians. 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. But before that, did the Russians indicate 
that they would not accept or consider accepting substitutes ? Do you 
have that in your report ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I don't think that I have that in my report, Mr. Taven- 
ner. There were memos and letters back and forth while Mr. jNIoore 
was handling it. I don't have any personal knowledge of them. And 
I think that discussion of that kind had taken place previously, before 
I got into this picture. 

Mr. Taa-enner. Now, what officials of the Board of Economic War- 
fare were consulted by you about the issuance of this particular 
license ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I don't know of any. 

Mr. Tavenner. You approved it. It was approved on the 22d. 
A letter was sent to the Russians on the 23d advising them that you 
had approved it? 

Mr. Hoopes. Yes, sir. 



I 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1117 

Mr. Tavenner. Now, who in the office of the Board of Economic 
Warfare actually issued the license ? Do you know ? 

Mr. HooPES. 1 don't know, sir; no. I don't have, apparently, any 
records at all indicating that we had any correspondence with them 
or any talks with them at this time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Well, do you know the practice in that office suffi- 
ciently well to state who is likely to have known about the issuance 
of that license ? 

Mr. Hoopes. No, I don't, sir. I have not dealt with them on this 
at all, previously; not on this or any other applications. So that I 
don't know what the practice had been. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know of any type of pressure, directly or 
indirectly, that was brought to bear on General Groves or any member 
of his staff to change his decision about the approval of this license? 

Mr. Hoopes. No ; I don't know of any pressure that was brought to 
bear on him. 

I am not entirely sure that the pressure that Captain Merritt was 
advising me of over the phone wasn't the pressure that he suggested in 
his testimony ; that in this matter there was so much to-do about it, and 
the Eussians were agitating for a decision as to whether we were 
going to let them have the material or not, and there had been so 
much negotiations back and forth, that there was great pressure on us 
for a decision. And it may have been that General Groves was talking 
about that same thing. They wanted to get it decided as to how they 
were going to handle it. 

Mr. Tavenner. I don't have any further questions. 

Mr. McSweeney. I was in the Army, and I was rather interested 
as to your very complete records. Is that a normal course for you : 
to keep complete records of things? I was interested in your notes 
and the records that you kept. 

Mr. Hoopes. Well, yes, this is a normal course for me. I still do it, 
as a matter of fact. I had a notebook that I used during the course 
of the day, that I used for the purpose of jotting down a note if I 
<;alled someone on the phone or they called me or somebody came in. 
It was mainly for the purpose of my making up the diary to report to 
the head of our division each day. Because we saw so many people 
during the day that we wouldn't remember them. 

]\Ir. JNIcSweeney. Did you feel that a lot of telephone instructions, 
and so forth, should be recorded in your notebook ? Is that why you 
did it ? You did not like the idea of too many telephonic instructions 
coming in on an important matter ? 

Mr. Hoopes. I did it, sir, so that I would have a better record in my 
own mind. There were so many coming that something might slip 
my mind by the end of the day, when it came time to report on them. 

Mr. McSweeney. But you did receive a lot of instructions over the 
telephone, did you not, to do this and that? 

Mr. Hoopes. A great many, sir. And in the course of clearing ap- 
plications, very much work like this was done over the phone, particu- 
larly in priority work, in talking with the War Production Board and 
that sort of thing. 

. Mr. McS^vEENEY. You did have the feeling that it would be well to 
have those telephonic things made more definite in your own mind by 
taking notes on them ? 



1118 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL. 

Mr. HooPES. Yes, sir ; I did it for my own purposes, so that I could 
carry on my work easier. 

Mr. McSwEEXFA'. You had no feeling, then, that there was a conflict 
of authority or anything that might put you in an embarrassing posi- 
tion at some time ? * 

Mr. HooPEs. No, sir. It did help on many occasions, that if I talked 
to someone, for instance, in the War Production Board, that had 
agreed to approve a certain material, and, then, if the application 
reached him and he did not approve the material, I had a record that 
at least I had talked to him, and I could call him and talk to him again 
and refer him to it. They had a great many applications, too, so that 
things like that might slip their mind. So it assisted me in carrying 
on my work as a liaison officer to keep as much of a record on the tele- 
phone work that I did as I could. 

Mr. McSwEENEY. I am ashamed that I have no nice record like that, 
and I commend you for it. 

Mr. Walter. Is there anything further ? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Walter. The hearing is adjourned. There will be no hearing 
tomorrow. The other witnesses that were here have been notified 
that they are still under subpena and will be called when we next meet. 

(Whereupon, at 5 : 08 p. m., the committee recessed subject to the 
call of the Chair.) 



I 



HEARINGS REGARDING SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1950 

United States House of Representatives, 

Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington, D. G. 

public hearing 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10: 30 a. m., in room 226, 
Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present : Representatives John S. Wood (chair- 
man), Francis E. Walter, Burr P. Harrison (arriving as indicated), 
Morgan M. Moulder, Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case (arriving as 
indicated), Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present: Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel; Donald 
T. Appell, investigator; John W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Man- 
del, director of research; and A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order. Let the record disclose 
that there are present Messrs. Walter, Moulder, Nixon, Velde, Kear- 
ney, and Wood. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, since Maj. George Racey Jordan 
testified at a subcommittee hearing, the committee staff has conducted 
an investigation of the shipment by air of uranium compounds and 
heavy water through Great Falls, Mont., to the Soviet Union, and the 
circumstances under which such shipments were made. 

Mr. Courtney E. Owens, an investigator of this committee, has pre- 
sented documentary proof relating to these shipments. 

The staff has likewise investigated the circumstances surrounding 
the shipment by air, through Great Falls, Mont., to the Soviet Union, 
of cargoes with alleged diplomatic immunity from inspection and 
censorship, the alleged making of reports or complaints by Maj. 
George Racey Jordan to various governmental departments concern- 
ing such shipments, and official action taken with regard thereto. 

I desire at this time to offer Mr. Donald T. Appell, committee inves- 
tigator, as a witness on these matters and other related matters which 
his testimony will develop. 

Mr. Velde. Are we to understand this is a continuation of the hear- 
ings of last December at which the Republican members were not 
present, and this is at the request of the minority members of the 
committee ? 

Mr. Wood. It is a continuation of the hearings that we had last 
December. 

Mr. Tavenner. And also of the hearings that were conducted in 

January. 

1119 



1120 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Nixon. I understand this also bears on the same hearings as to 
which the statement was made in the press that the Jordan story was 
"inherently incredible." Is that right? 

Mr. Walter. Is that my quote? 

Mr. Nixon. That is not your quote. 

Mr. Walter. Mine was similar. 

Mr. Wood. With reference to the absence of any members of the 
committee at the time the hearing was initiated, I understand all mem- 
bers of the committee were contacted, or an effort was made to contact 
them, at the time the testimony of Major Jordan was heard. Because 
of the peculiar circumstances that existed at the time, the hearing had 
to proceed ; and at the request of the minority members we have brought 
Major Jordan back. 

Mr. Appell, do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give 
this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, so help you God? 

Mr. Appell. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. APPELL 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, are you an investigator for this com- 
mittee ? 

Mr. Appell. I am. 

Mr. Tavenner. How long have you been an investigator? 

Mr. Appell. For over 3 years. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you examined the documents obtained from 
the Departments of State and Army and the United States Air Force 
which disclose correspondence initiated by Mr. George Racey Jordan 
relative to materials passing through Great Falls, Mont., destined for 
the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes ; I have examined all available documents. 

Mr. Moulder. Wasn't the question directed to correspondence rath- 
er than documents ? 

Mr. Tavenner. I asked if, in his examination of these documents, 
he discovered any correspondence initiated by Mr. Jordan. 

Mr. Appell. Certain documents relating to these matters were pro- 
cured by the staff from the Department of the Army and the United 
States Air Force. Certain specific documents were requested from 
the State Department, some of which have been furnished and some 
of which have not been located, but I am familiar with the documents 
which have been procured. 

(Representative Harrison arrives in hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any record found of correspondence initiated 
by Major Jordan in 1943? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. The Air Force, after a search of written docu- 
ments, supplied the committee with four letters initiated by Major 
Jordan between March 1943 and June 1943. These letters dealt, in 
great part, with improving the operations of the United Nations unit 
at Gore Field and other conditions relating to Jordan's official duties. 

(Representative Case arrives in hearing room.) 

Mr. Appell (continuing). These letters, however, contained no ref- 
erence to any irregularities at Gore Field on shipments of uranium 
compounds or diplomatic cargo. Copies of these communications are 
set forth as exhibits A, B, C, and D in the Air Force report. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1121 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you find in the official records made available 
to you any reports or references to reports made by Jordan in the 
year 1944, relating to materials passing through Great Falls under 
the claim of diplomatic immunity from inspection or censorship? 

Mr. Appell. Yes ; I did. 

Mr. Tavenner. Before asking you to testify regarding these re- 
ports, I want to develop through other documents the problem of 
handling mail and baggage at Great Falls claimed to be subject to 
diplomatic immunity. Was a special request made in January 1944, 
by the Soviet Government Purchasing Commission, for additional 
transportation facilities in connection with the movement of Soviet 
diplomatic cargo ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. On January 19, 1944, Col. S. A. Piskounov, 
Chief, Aviation Department, of the Soviet Government Purchasing 
■Commission, addressed a letter to Col. H. Ray Paige, Chief, Inter- 
national Section, War Department, in which it is stated that previously 
Soviet mail was sent from Washington to Great Falls by rail, thereby 
necessitating reloading the mail three times en route to Ladd Field. 

In order to avoid these difficulties in the future, he requested two 
C-47 planes, twice a month, to be sent from Oklahoma City, from 
the number of planes allocated to the Soviet Union, to Washington, 
where the Soviet mail would be loaded and sent to Fairbanks with 
pilots and crews of the Air Transport Command. The letter indi- 
cated that one plane had been so dispatched on the ISth of January, 
and requested that another plane be made available for the 25th of 
January, and one for the 30th of January, in order that the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission could send to Moscow its complete records 
ior the year 1913. 

Mr. Tavenner. I herewith tender in evidence the letter of January 
19, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 1." 

Mr. Wood. I understand this is a photostatic copy? 

Mr. Tavenner. A photostatic copy of the letter ; yes. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 1," is 
filed herewith.) '' 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat action was taken on this request? 

Mr. Appell. On January 22, 1944, the letter was transmitted to 
Air Section Foreign Liaison Branch, G-2, with an indorsement by 
•Colonel Paige, dated January 24, 1944, as follows: "Do not concur 
in above request"' and an identical indorsement bearing the same date 
over the initials "J. S. C," and a subsequent indorsement as follows: 

"OPD will concur with J. S. C. and with ATC which is short of crews now for 
moving these aircraft from Okla. City to Fairbanks." 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the transmittal letter of January 
22, 1944, with the indorsements referred to, and request that it be 
marked "Appell Exhibit 2." 

Mr. Wood. Again, these are photostatic copies ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, they will be admitted. 
(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 2," is 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

^ See appendix. 
^ See appendix. 

99334—50 ^15 



1122 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. Was any further action taken ? 

Mr. Appell. On February 14, 1944, Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, inter- 
national officer for the American Air Force, by Col. H. R. Paige, ad- 
vised Air Section Foreign Liaison Branch, (jr-2, as follows : 

1. With further reference to the above subject and confirming phone conversa- 
tion between Major Brazeau and Colonel Paige, we have had from the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission verbal request to withdraw the request outlined in their 
letter of 19 January 1944, Ref. No. 175, which was transmitted to you by memo- 
randum on 22 January 1944. 

2. Although they promised at the time to confirm this withdrawal in writing 
they have not done so, but made their verbal withdrawal very clear and desire 
that their letter of January 1944, Kef. No. 175, be considered as canceled. 

Mr. Walter. That is, the letter requesting that planes be made avail- 
able to fly mail direct? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. AValter. And they wanted that withdrawn ? 

Mr. Appell. Withdrawn and canceled. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence a photostatic copy of that letter 
of February 14, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 3." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 3," is 
filed herewith. ) ^^ 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Was an additional request made for special trans- 
portation facilities by air? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. On February 24, 1944, the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission requested that a C-47 plane be flown from the Oklahoma 
plant to Washington by March 2, 1944, for use in transporting a Soviet 
Commission of four persons and Assistant to the Chief of Foreign 
Trade Commissariat, and 4,000 pounds of baggage from Washington 
to Fairbanks, Alaska, there to be turned over to the Soviet pilots. 

The first indorsement, by the Deputy for Administration, G-2, 
is as follows : 

This oflBce does not concur in the proposal to transport four Soviet personnel 
and 4,000 pounds of baggage and strongly recommends that the action proposed 
be not taken. 

The second indorsement, by the Commanding General of the Army 
Air Forces, called attention to the cancellation of the earlier request 
for additional transport facilities for the delivery of mail, and sug- 
gested that consideration be given for the allowance of this request, 
under date of February 29, 1944. 

And by the third indorsement, of March 6, 1944, the Deputy for 
Administration G-2 reversed his earlier recommendation and ap- 
proved the proposed transportation. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AVooD. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. The first indorsement was against the proposal? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And the second indorsement suggested reconsideration? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Who suggested the second indorsement ? 

Mr. Appell. Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers. 



^ See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1123 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence pliotostatic copies of the com- 
mimication of February 24, 1944, and the attachments annexed thereto, 
and ask that they be marked "Appell Exhibit 4." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, they will be admitted. 

(The documents above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 4," are 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. Notwithstanding the vSoviet Purchasing Commis- 
sion withdrew its request of January 19, 1944, that two planes be made 
available twice a month for the carrying of diplomatic mail from 
Washington to Fairbanks, Alaska, and that the special request for a 
plane to carry four Soviets and 4,000 pounds of baggage from Wash- 
inston to Fairbanks was not approved until March 3, did G-2 and the 
OfRce of the Commanding Officer of the Army Air Forces discover that 
such special facilities were being used by the Soviet Government dur- 
ing January and February 1944, without their previous knowledge 
and approval ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. A memorandum by Lt. Col. O. T. Jamerson. 
foreign-liaison officer, prepared for the Deputy Assistant Chief of 
Staff G-2, under date of March 7, 1944, stated that such flights oc- 
curred on January 28, February 15, February 17, and February 28, 
in which 3.563 pounds. 4,180 pounds, 4,000 pounds, and 3,757 pounds, 
respectively, of diplomatic mail, were sent through Great Falls, Mont., 
to Fairbanks, Alaska, on lend-lease planes, without previous knowl- 
edge of Army Air Forces or the Foreign Liaison Branch of Military 
Intelligence. 

Mr. Ta^'enner. How did the Army Air Forces or the Foreign Liai- 
son Branch of Military Intelligence acquire knowledge of this use of 
lend-lease planes by the Soviet Government ? 

Mr. Appell. On February 29, 1944, headquarters, Army Air Forces, 
ATC station, at Great Falls, Mont., sent Foreign Liaison a report dated 
February 19, indicatins: that on February 17 four Soviets and 4,000 
pounds of mail arrived at and departed from Great Falls. 

]\fr. Tavexxer. As diplomatic mail ? 

Mr. Appell. So stated. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether or not that report was pre- 
pared by Major Jordan ? 

Mr. Appell. No. I have been unable to obtain a copy of the report. 
The memorandum from the Foreign Liaison Office, dated March 7, 
1944, states : 

Major .Tordan. who represents Air Staff at the ATC station at Great Falls, 
is reported to have examined one of the paclvages and found it contained blue- 
prints of the A-20 plane, railroad guides showing long- and short-haul routes, and 
other technical data. 

]\fr. Tavexner. I tender in evidence a photostatic copy of the memo 
of March 7, 1944, just referred to by the witness, and ask that it be 
marked "Appell Exhibit 5." 

Mr. Nixox. Do I understand this report by Mr. Jordan was made,, 
then, in 1944, the one referred to ? 

Mr. Appell. It is included in a memorandum for the Deputy Assist- 
ant Chief of Staff, G-2, dated March 7, 1944. 



« See appendix. 



1124 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Nixon. One of the issues which is before the committee is the 
allegation that Mr. Jordan did not report these findings of his to 
any person. I want that point particularly cleared up. In other 
words, a report was made of some type, according to this memorandum 
you are reading from ? 

Mr. Appell. I can read you. the exact paragraph. Paragraph 6 
of the memorandum says : 

Meanwhile on 29 February Hq. AAF, ATC, Great Falls, Mont., sent Foreign 
Liaison a report dated 19 February (Ref. N) indicating that on 17 February 4 
Soviets and 4,000 lbs. diplomatic mail arrived at and departed from Great Falls. 

And paragraph 7 says : 

Since this oflSce had no knowledge of such an arrangement a memorandum 
was forwarded by Foreign Liaison and on 3 March to Hq. ATC (Ref. O) request- 
ing full particulars regarding any transportation arrangements made with the 
Soviets and the names of persons concluding such arrangements. Details of 
an agreement are contained in 1st Indorsement to that letter (Ref. P). It 
states that 3 flights had been consummated, namely on 28 January, 15 February 
and 28 February, none of which were previously known to this office except as 
indicated in paragraph 6 of this memorandum. This office has since been advised 
orally by ATC that baggage on these flights was diplomatic mail and the exact 
amounts were 3563 lbs., 4180 lbs., and 37.17 lbs., respectively. Major Jordan who 
represents Air Staff at the ATC station at Great Falls is reported to have 
examined one of the packages and found it contained blueprints of the A-20 
plane, railroad guides showing long and short haul routes and other technical 
data. 

Mr. Nixon. In other words, the purport of that report is that Major 
Jordan reported in 1944 that he had examined the cargoes of the planes 
at least containing this diplomatic mail, and had reported to his 
superiors the result of his examination ? 

Mr. Appell. That is what it states here. 

Mr. Moulder. I dispute Mr. Nixon's statement that there is any 
issue about that. As I recall ISIajor Jordan's testimony, he testi- 
fied he made reports. 

Mr. NixoN. I don't question that. Immediately after that hearing, 
the statement was made that the House subconnnittee had examined 
the charges — and this was one of the charges Mr. Jordan made, that he 
had made the reports — and it was indicated it was not worthy of 
belief. I wanted to bring out that this charge, at least, is supported by 
that memorandum. 

Mr. Wood. The documents, of course, will speak for themselves. 

Mr. Walter. And Major Jordon's testimony bears that out, of 
course. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, the document will be admitted in 
evidence. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 5," is 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

Mr. Case. Have you made any attempts to identify the Brig. Gen. 
B. E. Meyers who made the second indorsement on the request I ques- 
tioned you about previously ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. I identified him. 

Mr. Case. Is he the Benny E. Meyers who recently figured in a trial 
in connection with his activities in the Air Force ? 

Mr. Appell. I understand it is the same officer. 



See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1125 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, the thing concerns me a little bit, be- 
cause it is apparent that the first indorsement after this request was 
transferred to the Chief of the Air Section, Foreign Liaison Branch, 
stated very specifically : 

This office does not concur in the proposal to transport four Soviet personnel and 
4,000 pounds of baggage and strongly recommends that the action proposed be 
not taken. 

This position Avas finally reversed after this second indorsement by 
Brig. Gen. B. E. Meyers, or Benny Meyers, who says : 

It is also called to your atcntion that this C-47 aircraft will be one of their own 
planes from Mai'ch allocations with the crew provided by Air Transport Com- 
mand for ferrying the aircraft to Fairbanks where it will be taken over by 
U. S. S. R. pilots. 

Mr. WAL'rER. Is that indorsement by General Meyers or by some- 
body for him ? 

Mr. Case. The indorsement is : 

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces : B. E. Meyers, Brig. General, 
U. S. Army, International Officer for A. A. F. By : H. R. Paige, Colonel, Air 
Corps, Chief, International Section, Materiel Div. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Mr. Appell, in the memorandum of March 7, 1944, 
it is stated that Major Jordon is reported to have examined one of the 
packages. May I ask you what effort was made to obtain such written 
report or statement by Major Jordon as referred to in the memoran- 
dum of March 7, 1944? 

Mr. Appell. On the 2d of February 1950, Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. 
Kuter, Commanding General of the Military Air Transport Service, 
which is the successor agency of the Air Transport Command, was 
sent a copy of the memorandum of March 7, 1944, and was requested to 
furnish the committee with photostatic copies of all correspondence 
and memoranda on the approval by the Commanding General ATC of 
the Soviet Purchasing Commission's request for the transportation on 
a special mission basis, together with photostatic copies of all cor- 
respondence and memoranda on the report of Major Jodan mentioned 
in paragraph 7 above. 

Mr. Walter. Mr. Chairman, I am just looking at this order, "Appell 
Exhibit 4." I find that the indorsement by General Meyers, by Colonel 
Paige, did not give the necessary authorization, but that the third 
indorsement did, and that third indorsement is by Lt. Col. H. A. 
Ken yon. 

Mr. Wood. The witness so testified. 

Mr. Case. If I may point out, the original indorsement was by 
Colonel Kenyon, and he strongtly recommended against the proposal. 
It was after the second indorsement, by General Meyers, requesting 
reconsideration, that Colonel Kenyon finally approved it. 

Mr. Walter. What I would like to know is who Colonel Kenyon is? 

Mr. Case. His title is given on the first page. It is Chief of the 
Air Section, Foreign Liaison Branch. It apparently was the request 
for reconsideration from General Meyers that led to the reversal of the 
first position. 

Mr. Tavenner. ^-V^iat explanation was given by the Air Transport 
Command as to the furnishing of these special air-transportation 
facilities to the Soviet Government, to which you have just referred? 

Mr. Appell. General Kuter replied to the committee's letter that 



1126 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

none of the correspondence referred to in the committee's letter of 
February 2 could be found in the files of Military Air Transport 
Service in Washington or the Kansas City Record Center. However, 
documents submitted by the Department of the Army reflect that on 
March 4, 1944, Lt. Col. Laigh C. Parker, Acting Assistant Chief of 
Staff, Priorities and Traffic, Air Transport Command, advised that 
on January 28, 1943, Col. Sergi Piskounov and others of the Soviet 
Government Purchasing Commission called on the commanding gen- 
eral of the Air Transport Command and requested that assistance 
be given the purchasing commission in transporting certain personnel 
and material from Washington to Great Falls, Mont. They stated 
that these flights would probably be required at least once or possibly 
twice a month over a period of several months, each flight carrying 
approximately 3,800 pounds of cargo. Colonel Parker further ad- 
vised that the commanding general, ATC, agreed to this request. 

]Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer in evidence Colonel Parker's in- 
dorsement of March 4, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell ex- 
hibit 6." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, let it be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 6," is 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, Mr. Appell, the Soviet request for 
additional transportation facilities made on January 19, which had 
been rejected by indorsement on January 24, was still pending in 
the War Department when the Soviets made an independent request 
for such facilities from the Air Transport Command on January 28, 
1944. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes; and apparently after receiving approval from 
the commanding general. Air Transport Command, withdrew their 
request of January 19, which they had filed with the International 
Division of the W^ar Department before being officially notified that 
this request was denied. 

Mr. Tavenner. Notwithstanding the agreement by the command- 
ing general of the Air Transport Command to furnish additional 
transportation facilities, which, in fact, were furnished, did the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission make an additional request of the Interna- 
tional Section of the War Department for the use of a lend-lease plane 
for the same purpose ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. On March 14, 1944, Colonel Piskounov, of the 
aviation department of the Soviet Purchasing Commission requested 
from Col. H. R. Paige, Chief of the International Section of the War 
Department, that one C-47 airplane allotted to them on the April 
schedule be directed from the Oklahoma plant to the New York Mu- 
nicipal Airport, LaGuardia Field, on March 25, 1944, for the urgent 
delivery of approximately 4,000 pounds of cargo, which cargo was to 
be under the supervision of Mr. D. V. Murashenko, who would also 
be on the airplane. 

Mr. Tavenner. What action was taken on this request ? 

Mr. Appell. On March 17 the Deputy Chief of Staff for Ad- 
ministration, G-2, recommended that permission of the Soviet request 
be held in abeyance for the present and that the entire problem be 
referred to the United States Military Mission in Moscow for a 

** See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1127 

determination of policy. Thereafter the matter was taken up with 
the State Department, which replied on March 30, 1944, that in view 
of Ambassador Harriman's approval, together with the approval of 
General Deane, head of the military mission to Moscow, nothing be 
done to suspend arrangements which had been made between the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission and the Air Transport Command. 
Following this advice from our Embassy in Moscow, regular flights 
en lend-lease aircraft of diplomatic cargo were instituted. 

Mr. Tavenner. I tender in evidence photostatic copies of the letter 
of Colonel Piskounov bearing date of March 14, 1944, the indorse- 
ment of March 17, 1944, the State Department memorandum of March 
30, 1944, and the paraphrase of the telegram from the American 
Embassy in Moscow bearing date of March 24, 1944, and ask that 
they be marked as Appell Exhibit 7. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Chairman, may I see the exhibit? 

(The proposed exhibit was handed to Mr. Case.) 

Mr. Case. Do you know whether the General Deane mentioned here 
was our chief military liaison in Moscow at this time who has since 
written the book The Strange Alliance? 

Mr. Appell. I understand he is the same officer. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, the photostatic copies of documents 
offered by counsel will be admitted. 

(The documents above referred to, marked Appell Exhibit 7, are 
filed herewith.) ^ 

Mr. Tavenner. I am going to ask you to refer back for a moment 
to Appell Exhibit G. You stated in your testimony that Colonel 
Piskounov and others conferred with the commanding general of the 
ATC to obtain these added facilities for shipment of cargo, when a 
similar request to the War Department had been withdrawn. Who 
were the other persons who took part in that conference between 
Colonel Piskounov and the conunanding general of the ATC ? 

Mr. Appell. Lieutenant General Rudenko and Mr. E. S. Sergev. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Can you identify Lieutenant General Rudenko? 

Mr. Appell. Lieutenant General Rudenko was head of the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission in the United States. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, additional information will be ob- 
tained relating to him through other witnesses. 

Returning, now, to this plane which was requested by Colonel 
Piskounov in his letter of March 14, 1944, do the records show the 
type of cargo which the Russians planned to ship on this plane ? 

Mr. Appell. On March 15, 1944, Colonel Paige, by letter, asked the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission the use they intended to make of this 
aircraft, and on March 20, 1944, in reply to his letter, Colonel 
Kramarenko of the Soviet Purchasing Commission advised Colonel 
Paige that the plane was urgently needed to deliver drawings, con- 
tracts, and specifications for oil refinery plants to Moscow. 

Mr. Wood. What kind of refinery plants ? 

Mr. Appell. Oil. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, you have testified from the G-2 memo 
of March 7, 1944, Appell Exhibit 5, that a report was made on Febru- 
ary 19, 1944, by Headquarters, Army Air Forces, ATC, at Great Falls, 
regarding the arrival and departure of diplomatic mail at Great Falls, 



*" See appendix. 



1128 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

and that Major Jordan had examined one of the packages and found it 
contained bkieprints of the A-20 plane, railroad guides, and other 
technical data. Did you find any record of a further report or confer- 
ence in which Major Jordan made reference to the character of ship- 
ments he saw pass through Great Falls with alleged diplomatic 
immunity ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. There is a memo bearing date March 28, 1944^ 
made by a special agent, CIC, in which he states as follows : 

On 13 March 1944, while in the performance of official duties, this Agent had 
occasion to contact Major George R. Jordan, United Nations Representative at 
East Base, Great Falls, Montana. It is his duty to act as liaison man between 
the United States and any other United Nations' representatives at East Base. 
Due to the nature of operations at East Base, his activity is confined for the 
greater part to dealing with the U. S. S. R. Major Jordan stated that he was 
desirous of conveying certain information to "Intelligence Authorities." 
The following interesting infoi'mation was supplied by Major Jordan : 
The Soviet Union has made a practice of shipping freight to Moscow through 
the Alaskan Wing. This has been done for about two years. For the year 1943, 
the total freight shipped through Great Falls by the Russians was 768,254.5 
pounds. This is to be compared with 433,112 pounds that was shipped to Russia 
through East Base, Great Falls, from 1 January 1944 to 5 March 1944. 

Mr. Case, Would you read those figures again, please ? 

Mr. Appell. The total freight shipped through Great Falls by the 
Eussians in 1943 was 768,254.5 pounds. The weight of the freight 
shipped between January 1, 1944, and March 5, 1944, was 433,112 
pounds. 

Mr. Case. That is a comparison of 2 months and 5 days in 1944 
against the total year 1943? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. And in the 2 months and 5 days of 1944, there was more 
than half as much shipped as in the entire prior year? 

Mr. Appell. We intend to bring in further that the total weight 
shipped in 1944 was 1,700,000 pounds, roughly. [Continuing read- 
ing :] 

This material has been sent by members of the Consular Service, Russian Army 
Officers, Russian Engineers, and families of Russians who pass through here and 
others. The freight is diversified in nature. It includes American publications — 
for the most part newspapers and magazines. He recalled one occasion when 
the Russians shipped detailed data regarding American shipping rates and pro- 
cedure. Major Jordan questioned this and was told by the Russians that the 
Russian economic structure is patterned after the German economic system, 
.but that the Soviet Government was interested in changing it with the intention 
of copying the American economic system. Considerable American clothing is 
included in the freight. He added that, due to the shortage of personnel, the 
use of Russian-owned and operated aircraft, and the fact that a great deal of 
the freight is blanketed by diplomatic immunity, there is insufficient control over 
material shipped to Russia through East Base. 

There is an incredible amount of diplomatic mail sent to Russia throusrh Great 
Falls. On 29 .January 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2440), 3.568 pounds of mail was 
shipped to Russia. On 17 February 1944, on aircraft C^7 (2579), 4,180 pounds 
of mail was sent. On 28 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (92764), 3,757 pounds 
of mail was sent. All of this was protected from censorship by diplomatic 
immunity. It may be significant that it is not at all uncommon for the Russian 
mail or freight shipment to be accompanied by two men, who openly state that 
they are to see that the mail or freight is not examined and the diplomatic 
immunity privilege violated. One man sleeps while the other watches the parcels 
and vice versa. Major Jordan admitted, without reservation, that he knew 
notliing regarding the amount of mail or freight that a foreign country normally 
sends through its diplomatic service, but it is thought that that information 
can be readily obtained. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1129 

INIany high ranking Russian Army Officers, Civilian Representatives, members 
of tlie Russian Diplomatic Service and their families pass through this Base. The 
United States Justice Department has but two men assigned to the Great Falls 
area to handle all matters pertaining to customs and immigration in this vicinity. 
One of the men works during the day and the other at night. Anyone who passes 
through this Base, other than those in the Armed Forces of the United States, 
must go through customs. Major Jordan has seen the families of high ranking 
Russian Army Officers and the wife of former Ambassador Molitov greatly de- 
layed in passage merely because the customs officer had the duties of two or 
three men. This point is made because it is believed this condition is not con- 
ducive to desired feeling between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is 
suggested that this issue be discussed with the Justice Department. 

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, de- 
tailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence 
channels. He requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity 
•could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by 
GIG Agent— 

and here, Mr. Chairman, I will not name the Agent, because we have 
been requested not to do so by the Army — 

who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East 
Base, Great Falls, Montana. 

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted with Major Jordan ; 
that his records be scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature; and 
that he be contacted regularly. 

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due con- 
.sideration, with a view to contacting the State Deparment in order that they be 
made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken. 

Mr. Case. What is the date of that memorandum you are reading? 

Mr, Appell. March 28, 1944, and it is a report of the agent's inter- 
view of March lo, 1944, with Major Jordan. 

Mr. Case. So in March 1944 attention was drawn to these things 
and it was recommended that Major Jordan be contacted and this in- 
telligence be further developed at that time ? 

Mr. Appell. That is the recommendation of this special agent. 

Mr, Walter, Tlie principal complaint at that time was the delay 
in clearing personnel and cargo ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes ; and that there was not sufficient personnel there 
to make customs inspections. 

Mr. Nixon, xind that an undue amount of diplomatic mail was go- 
ing through ? 

Mr. Appell. That was Major Jordan's observation, 

Mr. Wood, The document speaks for itself, 

Mr, Kearney. I understood you to say Major Jordan was a repre- 
sentative of the United Nations ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. The section was referred to as the United Na- 
tions station at the base. 

Mr. Kearney. In addition to that, he had an official title in the 
United States Army Air Force ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. The section at the base that handled this was 
known as the United Nations Section. It was given that name by 

the Army. . . , , 

Mr. Nixon. Would you read that section again starting with the 

part that Major Jordan kept accurate detailed files? 
Mr. Appell. Yes, [Keading :] 

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed 
files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence chan- 
nels He reouested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity 
could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by 



1130 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

CIC Agent — , who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security 

Office, Station 5, East Base, Great Falls, Montana. 

Mr. Nixon. That is all. 

Mr. Velde. Can you give us the name of that CIC agent, or is that 
secret information ? 

Mr. Taytsnner. Mr. Chairman, we have no clearance of the 
names of the agents used in this report, and for that reason we have 
read it in evidence but have not introduced the document in evidence. 

Mr. Wood. Proceed. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, the CIC agent in the report which you 
have just read referred to a request which he received from Major 
Jordan to the effect that he, Jordan, be contacted at a time when the 
Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail. Did your inves- 
tigation show that Major Jordan was again contacted on this question ? 

Mr. Appell. The report of the United States Air Forces reflects 
that the CIC agent assigned to the Great Falls Air Base has been 
interviewed and that he has no recollection of having contacted Major 
Jordan or of having received any instructions to do so. 

Mr. Ta\^nner. Was the CIC agent's request that the State Depart- 
ment be apprised of the information furnished him by Major Jordan 
complied with ? 

Mr. NixoN. Before you leave the first point, that dealt only with 
the CIC at Great Falls: Has your investigation shown that any 
further conversation by the CIC with Major Jordan took place, in 
compliance with the request of this agent that a prolonged interview 
be had at a later time ? 

Mr. Appell. We have been unable to find any reports of intelli- 
gence officers of the Army dealing with this subject. The Air Forces 
and Army have gone to a great deal of time and trouble to cooperate 
with the committee, and have really gone all out in trying to produce 
documents, but since the separation of the Air Forces from the Army, 
the files are not available. 

Mr. Moulder. Did you find any evidence of Major Jordan having 
personally visited any of the departments here in Washington with 
reference to his complaints? 

Mr. Appell. We have been unable to find any documents or any 
information, other than these two occasions, of Major Jordan making 
a complaint about this diplomatic cargo, and complaints of that 
nature. The records show that after Major Jordan was out of the 
service he went to the State Department, and in the memorandum 
there he reported some Russian pilots bringing furs into the United 
States without paying duty. But we have been unable to uncover 
any records or reports by Major Jordan on diplomatic mail, other 
than the two we have referred to. 

(Representative Harrison leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. The conference with the State Department in which 
he mentioned the bringing of furs into this country by Russian pilots 
took place, I believe, after his separation from the service? 

Mr.. Appell. Yes. I thought I had called that to the attention of 
the committee. 

Mr. Wood. He did. 

Mr. Tavenner. I beg pardon. Let me repeat my last question: 
Was the CIC agent's request that the State Department be apprised 
of the information furnished him by Major Jordan complied with? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1131 

Mr. Appell. Yes. On office memorandum of the State Department, 
dated June 16, 1944, over the signature of W. H. A. Coleman, ad- 
dressed to Mr. Lyon, shows that on that day Mr. Bohlen requested, 
and there was furnished to him, the information supplied by Major 
Jordan under date of March 13, 1944. 

(Representative Harrison returns to hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. Under date of March 28, 1944? 

Mr. Appell. That was the date of the agent's memorandum, but 
the information was given by Major Jordan on the 13th. 

Mr. Tavenner. What recommendation was made by Mr. Coleman, 
if any, in his memorandum of June 16, 1944, to which you referred? 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Coleman, after stating it was evident that large 
quantities of nondiplomatic freight, property of private individuals, 
was being transported by lend-lease planes with diplomatic immunity, 
recommended that this irregularity be adjusted withthe Soviets, either 
in Washington or at the United States Embassy in Moscow, by sepa- 
rating the legitimate diplomatic mail under seal of the Soviet Embassy, 
and that the personal freight be subject to search and export permit, 
thereby placing both countries on a reciprocal basis. 

Mr. Moulder. Who made that recommendation ? 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Coleman of the State Department. 

Hr. Tavenner. What action was taken by the State Department? 

Mr, Appell. Charles E. Bohlen, in an office memorandum dated 
June 24, 1944, advised Mr. Lyon that a meeting should be called of all 
interested Government agencies for the purpose of discussing this 
subject. 

Mr. Tavenner. His name is spelled B-o-h-l-e-n ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Is that the man commonly referred to as Chet Bohlen ? 

Mr. Appell. I don't know. He is on foreign duty in Paris at this 
time. Mr. Coleman is deceased. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know whether the meeting of interested 
Government agencies was actually held ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. State Department records indicate that a meet- 
ing was held on Thursday, July 6, 1944, in a general conference room 
of the State Department. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, you have a record, I believe, of the 
names of those who were in attendance at this conference. For the 
sake of brevity I will not ask you to read the names of those present at 
the meeting, but will you state which agencies of the Government were 
represented ? 

Mr. Appell. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Cen- 
sorship, Military Intelligence, Air Transport Command, Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Customs, Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration, and State Department. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, were you able to obtain a copy of the 
minutes of this meeting? 

Mr. Appell. No. The State Department, after conducting an ex- 
haustive search, w^as unable to locate any minutes or memoranda deal- 
ing with this meeting. However, the documents received from the 
Army contain a memorandum for the records, dated July 6, 1944, by 
Col. L. R. Forney, who attended the meeting as a representative of 
Military Intelligence. 



1132 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence a photostatic copy of the memo- 
randum dated July 6, 1944, and ask that it be marked "Appell ex- 
hibit 8." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection, let it be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 8," is 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

Mr. Wood. If members of the committee so desire, let it be read 
into the record. 

Mr. Tavenner. That was my next question. Mr. Appell, will you 
read Colonel Forney's memorandum, but I suggest you omit any refer- 
ence to the names of individuals attending the meeting. 

Mr. Appell (reading) : 

All interested Government agencies were represented. 

It developed that there was concern on the part of the Department of State 
regarding an alleged uncontrolled passage of personnel and baggage on Russian 
planes and on ATO planes along the route indicated. In the actual discussion 
it developed that such agencies as State, Customs, and Immigration assumed, 
without justification, that it was the responsibility of the Army to take care of 
such matters. It was pointed out that such was not the case and that the Army 
had no authority or responsibility to control nonmilitary travel or to control the 
passage of diplomatic and nondiplomatic baggage over the route except in so far 
as was essential in connection with flight safety. 

The fundamental position of the War Department was pointed out to be as 
follows : It is undesirable at this time that there be any interference with the 
movements of strictly Russian military personnel in the interests of reciprocity 
we desire from the Russians in facilitating our military operations from air bases 
in Russia ; that the Army had no objection whatever to the proper government 
agencies applying the required legal controls over diplomatic and nonmilitary 
travel and baggage. It was pointed out, however, that the Army would not con- 
sent to become the agent of other government agencies in these matters. 

It also developed that the principal interested agencies such as Customs, Immi- 
gration, State, and Censorship had no idea of what was going on at the two 
places mentioned in so far as their responsibilities were concerned. They agreed 
to take steps to inform themselves and then, if necessary, consult other agencies 
involved. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did Mr. Bohlen at a later date make any recom- 
mendation as to the situation at Great Falls? 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Bohlen, in a memorandum dated June 29, 1944, 
summed up the Great Falls situation by recommending that the 
State Department informall}^ take up with the Soviet Embassy the 
matter of Soviet couriers protecting from examination packages and 
freight in addition to properly marked diplomatic packages. 

Mr. Case. May I have that date again ? 

Mr. Appell, June 29, 1944. This was before the meeting. 

Mr. Case. But it was after the date of the figures you have given 
us of the amount of mail going through ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. The date you gave us before was a March 5 date ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr, Case. When some 400,000 pounds had already gone through 
that year ? 

Mr. Appell. This deals with the so-called diplomatic cargo. The 
big bulk of the 400,000 pounds was aircraft parts and such. 

Mr. Case. Up until the June memorandum from Mr. Bohlen there 
was no attemiDt apparently to have any understanding with the Rus- 

« See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1133 

si an Embassy about inspection of this material that went through 
Great Falls? 

Mr. Appell. We will go into that. 

Mr. Wood. That would be a conclusion, anyway. 

Mr. Case. That seems to be my conclusion, anyway. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do the records of the State Department indicate 
that this matter was taken up with the Soviet Embassy, as recom- 
mended in Mr. Bohlen's memorandum? 

Mr. Appell, The next document dealing with this subject is dated 
July 28, and it is a follow-up on a conversation held with the second 
secretary of the Soviet Embassy. It is an informal memorandum 
of customs and censorship regulations regarding diplomatic and of- 
ficial mail entering or leaving the United States. It was forwarded 
to the second secretary, and with the memorandum the second secre- 
tary of the Soviet Embassy was advised that these regulations were 
to be strictly enforced in the future. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you briefly summarize the regulations referred 
to? 

Mr. Appell. The memorandum of regulations in effect notified the 
Soviet Embassy that pouches for communications addressed to con- 
sulates or other Soviet government agencies are not exempt from 
customs examination, but that any official mail in such pouches, that is, 
mail from a Soviet government agency in the Soviet Union or abroad 
to a Soviet government agency in the United States, or vice versa, will 
as a matter of courtesy not be examined or censored. It was also 
pointed out that any communications or packages in charge of a 
courier, w^hich were not sealed and clearly marked as coming ii-om the 
Embassy to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or vice 
versa, are not exempt from customs examination, and that any non- 
diplomatic packages leaving the United States should be accompanied 
by proper export permit obtained from the Foreign Economic Ad- 
ministration. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did your investigation disclose that the Soviet 
Embassy complied with these regulations after this advice from the 
State Department ? 

Mr. Appell. The only document w^hich relates to this is a report of 
an intelligence and security officer at Great Falls, Mont., dated Septem- 
ber 21, 1944, subject, Shipment of Uncensored Communications which 
reads as follows : 

Aircraft number 8643 type C-47 departed this station 20 September 1944 des- 
tined for Russia carrying one passenger of Russian nationality and 3,800 pounds 
of cargo consisting of communications that had not been censored and were not 
immune of censorship by being diplomatic in nature. 

Customs inspector checking tlie cargo said it consisted of records of the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission and other service mail, unsealed and written in Rus- 
sian as well as in English. He failed however to have them removed and sent 
to the Office of Censorship. Whether any communications neding a license fur 
export were aboard was not ascertained by this officer. 

The implication here is that anything going to Russia on aircraft sold to the 
Soviet Union is immune to censorship and of a diplomatic natiu-e. This is 
completely incorrect. The removal of communications from the United States 
prior to Censorship is a violation of the Espionage Act and the rules of the 
Office of Censorship. 

This office makes positive that Custom Officials see all out-bound aircraft by 
not clearing the American crew that fly it without abiding by AAF Regulation 
4G-2. That is our limitation. 



1134 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Moulder. Who made that report? 

Mr. AppELL. A captain of the Air Corps who was an intelligence 
and security officer, with the specific designation of travel control 
officer. 

Mr. Moulder. To whom was it directed ? 

(Kepresentative Case leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. AppELL. It was directed through through channels to the As- 
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington 25, D. C. 
Attention : Chief, CIG. 

This document contains a fifth indorsement. 

Mr. Tavenner. Would you read that, please? I believe that in- 
dorsement deals with the question of whether or not the shipment 
of materials in this manner is in violation of the Espionage Act. 

Mr. Appell. This indorsement is by the Acting Adjutant General 
of the United States Army, Robert H. Dunlap, and is as follows : 

The action being taken by Army Air Forces, as indicated by paragraph 4 of 
the basic communication, is correct and constitutes the full discharge of all 
responsibilities of the War Department in this connection. The security aspects 
of this matter have been brought to the attention of the Department of State, the 
Customs Service, Immigration Service, Office of Censorship, and the Department 
of Justice. Beyond tliat, the War Department has no autliority to act. The 
agencies mentioned have had this matter under study and investigation for 
some time and their inquiries continue. While tliey have arrived at no final 
conclusions in the matter, it is indicated that the results will be a more compre- 
hensive enforcement of existing laws and regulations than heretofore has been 
t)ie case. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, it has come to the attention of the staff 
that Major Jordan has made a public statement relating to the removal 
by him of radar equipment on a lend-lease plane being flown through 
Great Falls to the Soviet Union. In the course of your investigation, 
did you learn anything about this or other similar incidents? 

Mr. Appell. It appears that in December 194:2, Lend-Lease aircraft 
P-39's, B-25C's, and C-47's arrived at Great Falls with receiver por- 
tions of radar equipment, and that permission was granted by the 
Chief of the United Nations Branch, Dayton, Ohio, to remove such 
equipment from the aircraft at Great Falls, or from any future air- 
craft arrivals. 

(Representative Nixon leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Appell (continuing). While this was prior to Major Jordan's 
assignment at the Great Falls base, it appears from an interview with 
former Lt. Col. Charles H. Gitzinger and confirmed by the Chief of 
the United Nations Section, Dayton, Ohio, that Major Jordan advised 
Gitzinger that a plane believed by Jordan to be bearing radar equip- 
ment had arrived at Great Falls, and that Gitzinger ordered Jordan 
to remove this radar from the aircraft. These are the only incidents 
uncovered in the investigation. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the interview with Gitzinger disclose that he 
had almost daily contact by telephone with Major Jordan? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. Lieutenant Colonel Gitzinger was Chief of the 
Russian Unit of the United Nations Branch, Army Air Forces, sta- 
tioned at Wright Field, Dayton, Ohio. As Chief of the Russian 
Unit, Colonel Gitzinger was Jordan's higher authority on any prob- 
lems relating to Russian lend-lease. For this reason, Major Jordan 
was in almost daily contact with Colonel Gitzinger over problems that 
arose in Great Falls. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1135 

Mr. Tavenner. Did Colonel Gitzinger, in his interview, make any 
statement with regard to the receipt of information from Major Jor- 
dan relating to classified materials passing through Great Falls in an 
irregular or improper manner? 

Mr. Appell. Colonel Gitzinger advised that in addition to his al- 
most daily contact with Major Jordan, he also met Jordan at Wright 
Field in 1943 and 1944, and that to the best of his recollection at no 
time was mention made by Jordan of any alleged shipments by the 
Eussians of classified material through Great Falls, and specifi- 
cally 

( Representative Nixon returns to hearing room. ) 

Mr. Appell (continuing). Jordan mentioned nothing of uranium, 
neutrons, protons, or anything connected with the atom bomb pro- 
gram as we know it today. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, Major Jordan, in his testimony before 
the committee, stated that on January 8, 1944, he went to Washington 
and called upon Colonel Paige, who was Chief of the International 
Section, War Department. He also called upon the Inspector Gen- 
eral's Office of the War Department, and upon Mr. John Hazard of the 
State Department. Has your investigation verified Major Jordan's 
trip to Washington in January of 1944 ? 

Mr. Appell. There is no record in the files of the Army or Air 
Forces which reflects on the visit to either the International Section 
of the Army or the Inspector General's Office. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, did your investigation disclose that 
Major Jordan made a call upon John Hazard, who was an official of 
the Foreign Economic Administration? 

Mr. Appell. No. Mr. Hazard has advised the committee that at 
no time during his employment with the Office of Lend-Lease, or later 
its successor, the Foreign Economic Administration, did he see or have 
any conversation with or with regard to Major Jordan. 

Mr. Nixon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to go back and clear up a 
point, because I stepped out a minute. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. When I came into the room you were referring to Major 
Jordan mentioning nothing regarding neutrons and uranium to the 
officer at Dayton ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, to Colonel Gitzinger. 

Mr. NixoN. Colonel Gitzinger's interview related to what period of 
time? 

Mr. Appell. During the entire period Major Jordan was at Great 
Falls, 1943 and 1944. 

Mr. Nixon. In other words. Major Jordan, during the period 1943 
and 1944, did not mention this specific type of freight ? 

Mr. Appell. Colonel Gitzinger's statement Avas that he had no 
recollection of such mention. 

Mr. Nixon. That was before, in point of time, the first atomic 
explosion ? 

Mr. Appell. Oh, yes. 

Mr. NisoN. It was before we generally knew the significance of 
these materials? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. Major Jordan left Great Falls in May 1944. 

Mr. NixoN. This conversation to which you referred took place be- 
fore Mav 1944? 



1136 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Appell. That is rig^ht. 

Mr. Nixon. Before the first atomic bomb was exploded? 

Mr. Appell., Yes, sir. 

Mr. Walter. "What was Colonel Gitzinger's position at Dayton? 

Mr. Appell. He was in charge of the Kussian Unit of the United 
Nations Branch in Dayton, Ohio. 

Mr. Walter. And I understand Major Jordan had a similar posi- 
tion at Great Falls ? 

Mr. Appell. Major Jordan was the United Nations representative 
at that base. Colonel Gitzinger, while I am not too clear on this and 
Major Jordan would know it in more detail, was a higher authority 
than Jordan. If a plane would come through not carrying proper 
equipment, Major Jordan would call Colonel Gitzinger and say, 
"These planes are coming in and don't have proper equipment." 

Mr. Walter. In other words, Colonel Gitzinger was not the com- 
manding officer over Major Jordan? 

Mr. Appell. Oh, no. 

Mr. Walter. There was no duty on the part of Major Jordan to re- 
port unusual shipments to Colonel Gitzinger? 

Mr. Appell. I don't know. 

Mr. Kearney. As an American officer. Major Jordan would not 
be under a Russian officer? 

Mr. Appell. Colonel Gitzinger was an American officer. This is 
confusing because they refer to the unit he was in charge of as the 
Russian Unit of the United Nations' Branch. 

Mr. Kearney. In other words, in no instance was Major Jordan 
under the control of any Russian officer? 

Mr. Appell. Oh, no, sir. Those officers with whom he had dealings 
were American officers. 

Mr, Tavenner. Had you completed your answer? 

Mr. Apiell. I was dealing with Mr. Hazard's advice to the com- 
mittee that he had never met, seen, or had any discussion with or with 
regard to Major Jordan, My investigation did disclose, however, that 
Major Jordan made a call on the Foreign Economic Administration 
and did talk with one of their liaison people, although the records of 
Lend-L?ase and Foreign Economic Administration contained no 
memorandum on Major Jordan's visit. 

Mr. Tavlnner. Were you able to substantiate any of Major Jordan's 
testimony with respect to the diagrams relating to the Oak Ridge 
project and the note on White House stationery initialed "H. H.'^ 
which was the subject of his testimony. 

Mr. Appell. No documents supplied by the Army, Air Force, or 
State Department contained any reference to the material described 
by Jordan. We have been unable to find that the name "Harry Hop- 
kins" was engraved on White House letterheads by the Government 
Printing Office. We have checked many memoranda and correspond- 
ence of Harry Hopkins, and up until today we had found nothing 
signed "H. H.," all being signed "Harry L. Hopkins" and "H. L. H." 
I have been told since sitting here that in the Saturday Evening Post 
articles dealing with Harry Hopkins there is a memorandum signed 
"H, H.," but I have not seen it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did the staff investigate numerous documents to en- 
deavor to determine if there was any set practice in signing? 



I 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1137 

Mr. Appell. Yes, we did, and we also requested permission to review 
the tiles of the President's Protocol Commission, now in the custody 
of the archives in the Department of State. We were not given per- 
mission to do so. 

Mr. Tavenxer. There was also testimony by Major Jordan relating 
to copies of State Department documents that were found in one of the 
suitcases. Has any investigation been made regarding that!' 

Mr. Appell. Until such time as the committee can determine the 
subject matter and contents of these documents, there is no way I 
know of that an investigation is possible. 

Mr. Tavenner. Or until the committee has some information as to 
the source ? 

Mr. Appell. That is true. According to the testimony of Major 
Jordan, he was the only one wdio saw those documents. 

Mr. Walter. Did the State Department give you any reason for its 
refusal to permit you to examine the files regarding Harry Hopkins ? 

Mr. Appell. It was not files regarding Harry Hopkins, but files 
of the President's Protocol Commission, dealing with our relationship 
with other governments, and based on that they did not feel that any- 
one outside the State Department should go through that type of 
files. Many of the documents are highly secret, and that was the rea- 
son. The State Department did search for us, files of the Foreign 
Economic Administration, and have been very helpful and coopera- 
tive with us in regard to other materials, including supplying the 
committee with documents dealing with translations, as far as the 
State Department is concerned, of the shipment of diplomatic cargo. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the absence of any information on the character 
of the documents referred to by Major Jordan in his testimony, was 
any request made of the State Department for any documents that 
would throw any light on this subject? 

Mr. Appell. No. We had no way of knowing where to ask the State 
Department to search. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you investigate the question of whether it has 
been the practice in the past to print the name of anyone on White 
House stationery ? 

Mr. Appell. I testified that the Government Printing Office has no 
record of printing the name of anyone on AVliite House stationery. 

Mr. Harrison. Do they print all the White House stationery? 

Mr. Appell. I understand they do. 

Mr. Harrison. Do they have complete records ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. They had the plates and they went back over the 
plates. They did bring this up, that it has been known that people 
have taken the stationery, after it was engraved at the Government 
Printing Office, to a private engraver and had a name put on it. 

Mr. Nixon. That was the practice? 

Mr. Appell. No ; but they did know it occurred. 

Mr. Nixon. So it is possible that it did occur in this instance; not 
that it is probable, but it is possible ? 

Mr. Appell. We have examined many, many pieces of Hopkins' 
memoranda on "White House stationery, and on none of these did we 
see his name printed. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you do it in the period in question ? 



99334—50 16 



1138 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir; we have contacted former officers of the Gov- 
ernment with whom Harry Hopkins had correspondence, and we have 
looked at these memoranda, and none of these contain his name printed 
on them. In this examination we never found any signed with the 
initials "H. H." We found "H. L. H.," "Harry," and "Harry L. Hop- 
kins" but none "H. H." 

It was called to my attention this morning that an "H. H." memo- 
randum is published in the Saturday Evening Post. It is here if you 
want to see it. I haven't seen it. 

(At this point, the witness examines the article to which he referred 
in the Saturday Evening Post, whereupon he continues:) My testi- 
mony on this is in error. This is a memorandum by former President 
Koosevelt which is headed "H. H.," but it is not a memorandum of Mr. 
Hopkins' signed "H. H." 

Mr. Moulder. President Eoosevelt addressed him as "H. H."? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. This memorandum is initialed "F. D. R." 

Mr. Harrison. There is one signed "H. L. H." 

Mr. Appell. Yes. I have seen many documents signed that way. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, did you proceed to Great Falls, Mont., 
for the purpose of investigating the shipments of uranium and heavy 
water through Great Falls ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, I did, prior to the receipt by the committee of 
Air Force documentation on these shipments. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Will you briefly summarize your investigation at 
Great Falls? 

Mr. Appell. The majority of the information obtained from my 
investigation at Great Falls, Mont., dealt with the shipments of 
uranium and heavy water. It was on this investigation that the 
committee obtained the documentation on the Canadian shipment in 
June of 1943. 

Since the committee has previously held a hearing and put into the 
record, through Investigator Owens, the complete documentation on 
these shipments, with the permission of the chairman I will not go 
into a repetition of those shipments at this time. 

While at Great Falls I interviewed over 20 former employees of the 
subdepot of which the United Nations Branch was a part. Only three 
of those employees had any knowledge of other things, other than the 
shipment of uranium. I would like to go into that. 

Leonard E. Woods, who, from November 1942 through 1946, was a 
civilian employee of the Thirty-fourth Subdepot and assigned to the 
United Nations Branch, was interviewed. Woods advised that while 
he was in charge of loading Russian cargo and supplies on lend-lease 
aircraft, he had no occasion to examine the contents of the boxes or 
parcels being loaded. He did recall loading, from time to time, many 
cartons labeled as containing magazines, drawings, newspapers, and 
technical publications. On one occasion, in the summer of 1944, he was 
aboard a lend-lease aircraft which contained diplomatic bags, pouches, 
when the United States customs official came aboard and proceeded to 
open some of the unsealed pouches. Woods made an examination of 
the contents of the pouches with the customs official, and observed that 
one of the pouches contained what he reports in a sworn statement 
to be the complete plans of the General Electric plant at East Lynn, 
Mass., and another pouch contained plans of an electric boat, marked 
as being a boat manufactured by works in Groton, Conn. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1139 

Mr. Taatenxer. Do you have the affidavit ? 
Mr. AprELL. Yes, sir ; I have. 

Mr. Tavenner. I desire to offer the affidavit of Leonard E. Woods 
in evidence, and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 9." 

Mr. Nixon. What is the name of the person who made the affidavit ? 
Mr. Appell. Leonard E. Woods. 
Mr. Nixon. Did he work under Jordan ? 
Mr. Appell. He was a civilian employee. 
Mr. Nixon. Working at the same time as Jordan ? 
Mr. Appell. Yes ; under Jordan's section. 
Mr. Nixon. No objection. 

Mr. Wood. Without objection let it be admitted. 
(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 9," is 
filed herewith.) ^^ 

Mr. Ta\'enner. Do you also have an affidavit given to you by 
George J. Mortenson ? 
Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. I desire to offer that affidavit in evidence, and ask 
that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 10." 

Mr. Wood. Without objection it will be admitted. 
(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 10," is 
filed herewith.) ^' 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Mortenson, in his affidavit, states that he was em- 
ployed at Great Falls during the years 19-1:3 and 1944 as a civilian 
inspector of aircraft supplies. Mr. Mortenson recalls that on one 
occasion it was necessary for him to enter a C-47 plane which had been 
routed from Oklahoma City to Washington, D. C., where it picked up 
Russian personnel and cargo ; that he was refused admittance to the 
plane and was only able to secure the necessary forms from the pilot ; 
and that this plane remained at the base under constant guard, night 
and day. 

Mr. Mortenson also recalled the arrival at Great Falls of B-25 
type aircraft which contained Norden bomb sights. While these bomb 
sights were taken off at Great Falls, one bomb sight slipped through 
to Canada, where it was removed and returned by special plane to 
Washington, D. C. 

Mr. Walter. Did your investigation disclose whether the Norden 
bomb sight was ever sent through in quantity to the Russians. 

Mr. Appell. No ; it was not. The Norden bomb sight was not being 
sent to the Russians. The factory would prepare a plane for delivery 
to our people. En route from the plant the plane accidentally would 
be routed into the B-25's going to Russia under lend-lease. It would 
indicate some mistake. 

Mr. Kearney. Through mistake or otherwise, some Norden bomb 
sights got to Russia ? 

Mr. Appell, I remember a plane crashing with one on it, bu^ I 
don't know of any going through in this channel. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you also interview Capt. Harry Decker? 
Mr. Appell. Yes. Capt. Harry Decker was the traffic control officer 
at Great Falls. I have a notarized statement from Captain Decker 
which I would like to read in its entirety. 



*" See appendix. 
*3 See appendix. 



1140 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. Is that sworn to ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes ; it is. It reads as follows : 

The duties of the Intelligence and Security Travel Control Unit which I headed 
acted as liaison between the Civilian Agencies of the Government such as Cus- 
toms, Immigration, FBI, and the Armed Forces of our Government, and our 
Allies. 

In a short resume of the unit's duties, it was our responsibility to see that all 
aircraft, cargo and i)ersonneI destined for overseas shipment had proper clear- 
ance of these civilian agencies, and that all incoming aircraft and personnel also 
were routed to these agencies. 

My unit consisted wholly of U. S. Military personnel, and consequently the 
civilian agencies had to do the checking of incoming and outgoing personnel of 
our Allies. 

Before the arrival of our unit to Great Falls in July of 1944, the arrival and 
departure of aircraft was very poorly supervised, allowing cargo and personnel 
to leave and enter almost at will without proper cle;irance of the Government 
agencies. This poor supervision was caused by the lack of properly trained 
Military personnel. I would be relatively safe in saying that upon our arrival 
and setting up operations, that no aircraft was allowed to enter or leave without 
proper clearance. 

The failure of compliance of our laws then rested in the hands of the civilian 
agencies. The matter that some of the cargoes lacked proper clearance was dis- 
cussed by myself and the local Customs people many times. I requested that the 
Commissioner of U. S. Customs come to Great Falls and investigate these ship- 
ments. At a meeting held by the Commissioner (a Mr. Johnson of "Washington, 
D. C.) and the local Customs people and myself I personally requested that all 
shipments not carrying proper clearance be held at Great Falls until complied 
with. This request was carried to higher quarters in the Treasury Department 
but no action taken to my knowledge. A Mr. Weiss of the Department of Com- 
merce also came to Great Falls on the same matter and the same request was 
made of him. His answer was that it was a high echelon decision of the State 
Department, Board of Economic Warfare and the President's Committee of 
Protocol. 

The cooperation of the agencies of local level was very good. It seemed that 
the power of enforcement lay at very high levels beyond the reach of us there. 
The local Customs men inspected all cargoes including those of diplomatic nature,- 
but inspected all except those carrying the Official Russian Diplomatic Seal. 

When interviewed before affidavit was given, Mr. Chairman, Cap- 
tain Decker told us of some Russians coming into the* United States 
having in their possession maps of the east -coast defense zone in the 
United States. In requesting this affidavit I asked him to go into 
that, and this is what he said : 

The maps in question were carried by arriving Russian Aviators who were on 
their way to a school in this country. Whether it was Army or Navy, I am not 
sure. As I recollect it was a Navy School on the East Coast. The maps were 
those used by our airmen to show the active and passive defense areas of the 
East Coast. I happened on them by inspecting the map-carrying case of one of 
the aviators. He didn't mind my looking at his map-carrying case. 

This incident was reported through channels to G-2 Washington. Action 
taken unknown. I do not have in my possession any of these papers or docu- 
ments as most of these were classified and therefore the property of the Army. 

Mr. Ta\'enner. I desire to offer this affidavit in evidence, and ask 
that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 11." 

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 11," is 
filed herewith.) ^ 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. Have j'ou had an opportunity to examine Major 
Jordan's diary and other notes? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, I have. 



** See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1141 

Mr. Tavenner. As a result of your review of Major Jordan's diary, 
have you uncovered any new evidence that would be important for 
this committee to consider, in your opinion ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. Major Jordan's diary contains an entry • 

Mr. Harrison. This is in the bound book ? 

Mr. Appell. This is in the book, in Major Jordan's diary. It con- 
tains an entry under date of February 17, 1944, that Soviet couriers 
Semen Vassilenko, Leonid Rykounin, Enjeny Kojernicov, and Georges 
Nicolaiev departed with diplomatic pouches. The files of the Com- 
mittee on Un-American Activities reflect that these pouches contained 
material regarding new and secret developments in war industries in 
the United States. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, the committee 
is now in contact with a former employee of the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission who helped Semen Vassilenko pack the diplomatic 
pouches in February of 1944. 

Mr. Nixox. Do I understand that you are investigating the possi- 
bility that this particular transaction which you have described may be 
corroborated by a third party ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, by a former employee of the Soviet Purchasing 
•Commission who actually helped this man pack the pouches. 

Mr. Nixon. Pouches for this particular date ? 

Mr. Appell. Pouches for this particular date. 

Mr. Wood. Proceed. 

Mr. Appell. Other names appearing in Major Jordan's diary have 
been checked against the committee's files, and considerable evidence 
is contained on their participation in Soviet espionage activities. As 
the committee is now preparing a report on Soviet espionage activi- 
ties, I will not go into this matter in detail at the present time. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, while on your investigation at Great 
Falls, Mont., did you determine whether or not customs officials at 
Great Falls, Mont., operations ,and a statistical break-down on exports 
export declarations or for other export approval certificates? 

Mr. Appell. While in Great Falls, I was unable to obtain anything 
definite on this question. However, upon my return to Washington 
letters were addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Sec- 
retary of Commerce on this matter. 

In the letter to the Secretary of the Treasury we advised the Secre- 
tary that information in the possession of the committee indicated 
that no inspection was made at Great Falls, Mont., to determine 
whether shipments under the lend-lease program carried export decla- 
rations, and requested that the committee be advised whether ship- 
ments were checked for export declarations ; and asked that copies of 
all reports of inspections made by customs officials at the Great Falls 
operation be supplied the committee. 

In the committee's letter to the Secretary of Commerce, he was re- 
quested to furnish the committee with a copy of the report of inspec- 
tion made by a Commerce official of the Great Falls operation, to- 
gether with advice as to whether or not export declarations were filed 
with the Department of Commerce on lend-lease shipments of a non- 
military nature to Great Falls, Mont., during the years 1943, 1944, and 
1945. 

In reply to these letters, the Secretary of Commerce, Secretary 
Sawyer, submitted a report of inspection dated March 5, 1945, on 
Great Falls, Mont., operations, and a statistical break-down on exports 



1142 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

to the USSR from the customs district of Montana and Idaho, which 
district included Great Falls, Mont. 

This break-down shows that for the year 1943 no transactions were 
reported for the customs district in which Great Falls is located. For 
the year 1944 only one shipment of sodium hydroxide; and for 1945, 
15 transactions. 

The report of inspection made by Mr. Irving Weiss, referred to in 
the affidavit of Harry Decker, and who at that time was Acting Assist- 
ant Chief of Foreign Trade Division, is as follows : 

Shipments of Lend-Lease Material on ATC Planes.— I discussed with the Col- 
lector of Customs and Assistant Collector, Mr. Fallon, of the Customs Service, 
Mrs. Billyard, Chief Clerk, Priorities and Traffic Division, ATC, Captain Romney 
and Captain Henry of the War Department the procedure followed in the filing 
of Lend-Lease declarations for shipments on ATC planes. Mrs. Billyard had no 
recollection of filing any Lend-Lease declarations. She is able to identify Lend- 
Lease shipments from the information shown on the shipping papers. Since these 
shipments are consigned to the Army officer in charge at Edmonton, Canada, no 
declarations are being filed in accordance with present War Department regula- 
tions. Mrs. Billyard also described a number of other shipments for which 
declarations are not being tiled at present. These include shipments identified as 
international aid, Russian war relief. Red Cross shipments, and DOES (Depot 
Overseas Equipment Section). Captain Henry was not able to define the above 
categories. It will be necessary to contact the War Department here to deter- 
mine whether declarations are required for these shipments and to arrange for 
their filing in the War Department regulations. I attempted to get copies of the 
various types of shipping papers covering these special categories but was unable 
to do so because of the security regulations. Captain Henry suggested that we 
request Ma.ior Cohen in the Washington ATC office to obtain copies for us from 
Great Falls. It is my understanding that copies of the War Department shipping 
tickets are also filed in Washington. If reports of prior months' transactions are 
required, it may be possible to use these documents. This question should be 
discussed with Major Cohen in Washington. 

In reply to our letter to the Treasury Department, we were advised 
by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John S. Graham as follows : 

Reference is acnin made to your letter of January 25, 1950 (DTA), in which 
you state that the Committee is experiencing difficulty in obtaining copies 
of export declarations certified by the Bureau of Customs for shipments of uran- 
ium compounds and heavy water through the port of Great Falls, IMontana. An 
inquiry tiy the Committee of certain Governmental agencies failed to disclose 
export declarations on the above-mentioned shipments. It is alleged, you con- 
tinue, that no export declarations were received covering Lend-Lease shipments 
through Great Falls, Montana, and it is therefore assumed that such shipments 
were not inspected to determine whether they carried an export permit for the 
reason that these shipments were going through on United States aircraft, even 
though they were being exported to the Soviet Union. 

You ask to be advised whether shipments were checked by customs officers at 
Great FaPs for export declarations, and, if export declarations were certified by 
customs officers, the office or agency to which these declarations were forwarded. 
You also ask to be furnished with copies of all reports of inspection made by 
customs officers of the Great Falls operation as affected the Bureau of Customs. 

Export procedure, as prescribed by the Bureau of the Census, Department of 
Commerce, called for export declarations throughout the war on all Lend-Lease 
articles transported by air to Russia, except for the aircraft themselves. How- 
ever, it was expected that Collectors of Customs at some ports would encounter 
difficulty in enforcing this requirement because of the necessarily overriding 
demands of military secrecy, and this proved to be the case. It may also be noted 
that after 1942, tlie declarations were employed for statistical purposes only 
by the Bureau of the Census. The control over Lend-Lease shipments was exer- 
cised by the Lend-Lease Administration and its successor, at points before the 
merchandise reached the borders. As the collector has reported the situation at 
Great Palls to the Bureau of Customs : 

"During the war outbound aircraft, which misrht be either U. S. Army craft 
or aircraft being exported, were sometimes loaded with cargo at Great Falls. At 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1143 

times export declarations were filed, but more often a cargo manifest was sup- 
plied the customs officer on duty. This manifest was seldom a detailed list of 
objects contained in the aircraft, and more often stated simply that the load con- 
tained so many thousand pounds of military equipment or supplies. 

"It was never physically possible to check the cargo of an aircraft departing 
from Great Falls at any time, for the reason that they were loaded by military 
personnel before being: presented to customs oflicers. If an export declaration 
was filed it was certified by the customs ofticer, and if a cargo manifest was 
furnished that document was attached to the customs Form 7509 covering the 
flight. Certified export declarations were forwarded to the Section of Customs 
Statistics, Bureau of the Census, 434 Customhouse, New York. New York." Such 
inspection of Great Falls operations as Bureau of Customs officials made during 
the war was not reported on in writing, and therefore no copy of any such report 
can be furnished. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the date of that letter? 

Mr, Appell. This letter was dated yesterday — March 1, 1950. 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you received records of shipments from Great 
Falls by lend-lease aircraft? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. The United States Air Forces have furnished 
the committee with complete records of air freight shipments through 
Great Falls durin<^ the years 1943 and 1944. 

Mr. Walter. Before you go into that, do you intend to let the letters 
go in evidence ? 

Mr. Tavenner. We have not actually introduced them as exhibits, 
since they have been read into the record, but we can do so. 

Mr. Walter. I think it is important. 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence the letter of February 7, 1950, 
from the Secretary of Commerce, and ask that it be marked "Appell 
exhibit 12"; and I offer in evidence the letter of March 1, 1950, from 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury John S. Graham, and ask that it 
be marked "Appell Exhibit 13." 

Mr. Wood. Let them be admitted. 

(The letters above referred to marked respectively "Appell Exhibit 
12" and "Appell Exhibit 13" are filed herewith.) *-^ 

Mr. Tavenner. I also offer in evidence the report of inspection of 
Irving Weiss, Acting Assistant Chief, Foreign Trade Division, De- 
partment of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, dated March 5, 1945, 
and ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 14." 

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The docimient above referred to marked "Appell Exhibit 14" is 
filed herewith.) ^'^ 

Mr. Tavenner. Have you itemized the various items shipped by 
this medium during 1943 and 1944? 

Mr. Appell. The statistics furnished the committee by the Air 
Forces carry a complete break-down for the year 1944, as follows* 

Printed matter in which category is included blueprints, drawings. 

books, magazines, newspapers, office supplies, and technical publi- Pounds 

cations 104.638 

Airplane parts 1, 166,307 

Miscellaneous tools 55, 315 

Misr-ellaneous equipment 184, 236 

Explosives 5, 124 

Medical 43,618 

Routine and diplomatic mail 54, 309 

Personal items, clothing, etc 14, 155 

Total freight shipments during the year 1944 1, 717, 702 

*^ See appendix. 
■** See appendix. 



1144 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Tavenner. I offer in evidence this statistical data received 
from the Army Air Forces, which includes documentation of the 
shipments of uranium oxide and nitrate and heavy water, referred 
to in the testimony of Mr. Owens and which we said we would intro- 
duce as an exhibit, and I ask that it be marked "Appell Exhibit 15." 

Mr. Wood. Let it be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Appell Exhibit 15," is 
filed herewith.) *^ 

Mr. Kearney. Is there any further identification of the blueprints 
mentioned ? 

Mr. Appell. Newspapers to Russia, drawings; total weight. 

Mr. Kearney. I am speaking particularly about the blueprints. 

Mr. Wood. As I understand, the inquiiy is whether they specifically 
identify the blueprints. 

Mr. Appell. They do not. All we have is the total weight of the 
package. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Appell, I believe you have already stated that 
you received the cooperation of the various departments in compiling 
this information, in a very fine way ? 

Mr. Appell. On behalf of the investigators' staff, I want to sin- 
cerely thank all the departments for their wonderful cooperation in 
this matter. It would never have been possible for us to have shown 
and documented in detail these transactions without their full co- 
operation and assistance, which they gave us without hesitation. 

Mr. Tavenner. No further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Walter? 

Mr. Walter. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Harrison? 

Mr. Harrison. No, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Moulder? 

Mr. Moulder. No questions. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. I have some questions, but I don't want to ask them 
now. 

Mr. Wood. Can the committee get back at 3 o'clock ? The committee 
will stand adjourned until 3 o'clock. 

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 3 p. m. ; and at 3 p. m. the 
hearing was recessed until Friday, March 3, 1950, at 10:30 a. m.) 

*^ See appendix. 



heakinctS eegardinct shipment of atomic material 
TO the soviet union during world war II 



FRIDAY, MAKCH 3, 1950 

United States House of Kepresentatives, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Actrt:ties, 

Washingt07i, D. C. 

public hearing 

Tlie subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 30 a. m., in room 
226, Old House Office Building, Hon. John S. Wood (chairman) 
presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives John S. Wood 
(chairman), Richard M. Nixon, Francis Case (arriving as indicated) ^ 
Harold H. Velde, and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator; Donald T. Appell, investigator; Jolin 
W. Carrington, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and 
A. S. Poore, editor. 

Mr. Wood. Let the committee be in order. 

Let the record show, please, that for the time being the committee 
is operating under a subcommittee consisting of Messrs. Nixon, Velde,^ 
Kearney, and Wood. 

Are you ready to proceed, ]\Ir. Counsel ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. Major Jordan. 

Mr. Nixon. I had some questions I wanted to ask Mr. Appell. 

Mr. Wood. I would like to proceed with this witness. 

Mr. Nixon. It would be helpful if I could ask Mr. Appell a few 
questions to lay the foundation for such questions as we may want tO' 
ask Major Jordan. You have no objection, have you ? 

Mr. Tavenner. None at all. 

Mr. Wood. I have no questions to ask Mr. Appell. You may 
proceed. 

(Representative Wood leaves hearing room.) 

TESTIMONY OF DONALD T. APPELI^Resumed 

Mr. Nixon. Mr. Appell, yesterday you testified at considerable 
length from documents and memoranda, setting forth the results of 
your own investigation in this case. What I would like to do now 
is to determine w^hether the conclusions I have reached from hearing 
that mass of testimony that went into the record yesterday is correct 
or not correct. I would like to go into some of the points at issue- 
in this case. 

1145 



1146 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Of course the major point at issue is the over-all credibility of 
the so-called Jordan story. Some of those points were rather clearly 
brought out yesterday, and some I have a question on that I would 
like to clear up. 

First of all, a general question. I think immediately after the 
hearings last December the major concern of the reporters covering 
the facts brought out at the hearings then was probably fairly well 
stated by an editorial which appeared in Life magazine. I quote 
directly from that editorial : 

Competent investigators of the FBI and Military Intelligence have gone over 
this whole ground and have found nothing to substantiate the charges. 

Do you agree with that statement, that your investigation has dis- 
closed nothing to substantiate any of the Jordan charges? 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Nixon, as I testified yesterday, Army documents 
show that on the 7th of March 1944, a report was made to Air Trans- 
port Command to the effect that a shipment had gone through, and 
that one of the parcels that went through had been examined by 
Jordan and that it contained plans of the A-20 plane, long- and short- 
haul routes, and other technical data. This was reported to Wash- 
ington, although we were unable to substantiate the exact manner in 
which it was reported. 

I also testified with regard to an interview with Major Jordan on 
the 13th of March 1944, in which he advised a CIC agent of certain 
irregularities at Great Falls, and in which he requested that he be 
further interviewed in minute detail, and that he was advised this 
would be done. The records show he was not further interviewed ; at 
least, the agent who was supposed to interview him had no recollection 
of doing so. 

That shows that Major Jordan did make official reports of this 
matter. 

Mr. Nixon. But he only did it on two occasions; is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. Two occasions as far as we could find in documenta- 
tion. 

Mv. Velde. Will the gentleman yield ? 

Mr. Nixon. Yes. 

Mr. Velde. Was Major Jordan's story, as far as your investigation 
was concerned, ever discredited by any of the witnesses whom you 
contacted? 

Mr. Appell. No. As a matter of fact, I would like to read an in- 
dorsement by General Dunlap, who was Acting Adjutant General of 
the Army. 

Mr. Velde. I think the true facts should be brought out regardless 
of whom it hurts, and that was the purpose of asking that question. 

Mr. Appell. General Dunlap said this : 

The action being taken by Army Air Forces, as indicated by paragraph 4 of 
the basic communication, is correct and constitutes the full discharge of all 
responsibilties of the War Department in this connection. The security aspects 
of this matter have been brought to the attention of the Department of State, 
the Customs Service, Immigration Service, OfBce of Censorship, and the De- 
partment of Justice. Beyond that, the War Department has no authority to 
act. The agencies mentioned have had this matter under study and investiga- 
tion for some time and their inquiries continue. While they have arrived at 
no final conclusions in the matter, it is indicated that the results will be a more 
comprehensive enforcement of existing laws and regulations than heretofore has 
been the case. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1147 

The matter that was called to their attention was Major Jordan's 
statement in evidence which he gave to the CIC agent on March 13, 
1944. 

Mr. Velde. Do you recall what report the CIC agent made with 
respect to Major Jordan that was the background of this statement 
which you have just read ? 

Mr. Appell (reading) : 

There is an incredible amount of diplomatic mail sent to Russia through Great 
Falls. On 29 January 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2440), 3,563 pounds of mail was 
shipped to Russia. On 17 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (2.579) 4,180 pounds 
of mail was sent. On 28 February 1944, on aircraft C-47 (92764), 3,757 pounds 
of mail was sent. All of this was protected from censorship by diplomatic im- 
munity. It may be significant that it is not at all uncommon for the Russian 
mail or freiglit shipment to be accompanied by two men, who openly state that 
they are to see that the mail or freight is not examined and the diplomatic im- 
munity privilege violated. One man sleeps while the other watches the parcels 
and vice versa. Major Jordan admitted, without reservation, that he knew 
nothing regarding the amount of mail or freight that a foreign country nor- 
mally sends through its diplomatic service, but it is thought that that informa- 
tion can be readily obtained. 

Many high ranking Russian Army Officers, Civilian Representatives, members 
of the Russian Diplomatic Service and their families pass through this Base. 
The United States Justice Department has but two men assigned to the Great 
Falls area to handle all matters pertaining to customs and immigration in this 
vicinity. One of the men works during the day and the other at night. Anyone 
who passes through this Base, other than those in the Armed Forces of the 
United States, must go tlirough customs. Major Jordan has seen the families 
of high ranking Russian Army Officers and the wife of former Ambassador 
Molitov greatly delayed in passage merely because the customs officer had the 
duties of two or three men. This point is made because it is believed this con- 
dition is not conducive to desired feeling between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. It is suggested that this issue be discussed with the Justice De- 
partment. 

This Agent observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, de- 
tailed files and was very anxious to convey his information through intelligence 
channels. He requested that he be contacted at a time when the Russian activity 
could be outlined in minute detail and was advised that this would be done by 
CIC Agent— 

and here I do not identify the agent — 

who is currently attached to the Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East 
Base, Great Falls, Montana. 

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted with Major Jordan ; 
that his records lie scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature; and 
that he be contacted regularly. 

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due con- 
sideration, with a view to contacting the State Department in order that they 
be made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken. 

Mr. Velde. I think that material was read at some length yester- 
day. 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir. It was this information that was passed by 
the Army to the State Department. 

Mr. NixoN". What I am getting at here, your investigation shows 
first, then, that Major Jordan did, at least on two occasions, make a 
report concerning the passage of materials through Great Falls? 

JSIr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. And that he requested that he be contacted later so 
that he could outline the shipments in detail; is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir. 

(Kepresentative Wood returns to hearing room.) 



1148 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Nixo^r. Of course, in that connection, I suppose Major Jordan 

is faced with somewhat of a problem, because I recall a similar case 

I should say a case in which the committee conducted an investigation 
involving Mr. Chambers — and as I recall, Mr. Chambers had to tell 
his story five times before any cognizance was taken of his charges. 
So apparentlj^ if Major Jordan had told his more than twice he 
might have gotten the Government to do something about it. But be 
that as it may, as I see it at present the issues are five, and before 
Major Jordan goes on the stand I want to see which of the charges 
are still at issue. 

First of all, the charge was made that if the shipments were going 
through, Major Jordan should have made a report. In this regard,, 
he did make a report of the charges at least on two occasions. Is that 
correct ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes; and in respect to Major Jordan's testimony, yes- 
terday I stayed away entirely from shipments of uranium and heavy 
water. 

Mr. Nixon. The fact is that Major Jordan did report the charges; 
is that correct ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, and I also could add that we made request for 
reports of Intelligence officers signed at the base, and that these reports 
could not be located. My testimony is based on documents which we 
have received. 

Mr. Nixon. As far as you have been able to find, at least two reports 
were made? 

Mr. Appell. Yes ; that is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. I think that is sufficient, probably ; there may have been 
others; but the point of reporting by Major Jordan stands up. 

Another point that was made was whether or not he tore radar 
equipment out of C-47 planes. As I understand, this particular phase 
of his story was questioned in the article in I^ife magazine, in which 
they said that the report that Mr. Jordan ripped out radar equij)ment 
from C-47"s was preposterous, and they quoted his superior officer, 
Meredith, in that respect; aiicl it was further said that as a matter 
of fact no C-47's were equipped with radar at the time mentioned by 
Major Jordan. 

The investigation of the committee, in addition to your own, has 
shown, (1) that C-47*s equipped with radar and going to Russia did 
go through Great Falls; and (2) that Mr. Jordan specifically asked 
permission of Colonel Gitzinger in Dayton to tear the radar equip- 
ment out of a specific plane on one occasion. 

Mr. Appell. That is correct, and he received that permission from 
Colonel Gitzinger. 

(Representative Case arrives in hearing room.) 

Mr. Nixon. Then on the point of whether Major Jordan did or 
did not tear radar out of a plane, your investigation substantiates 
Major Jordan? 

Mr. Appell. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. Another point that Major Jordan made was that cer- 
tain documents were going through Great Falls under diplomatic 
immunity; that he broke into the cases, examined the documents, and 
that some of the material in there which he examined consisted of 
plans, secret material, and so on, which it would be assumed normally 
would not be regarded to be under diplomatic immunity. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1149 

I think it is quite clear from your testimony that that phase of 
Major Jordan's testimony stands up ; is that correct ^ 

Mr. Appell. Well, we do know, we are in contact with a witness, 
ii former employee of the Russian Purchasing Commission, who helped 
pack one pouch of so-called diplomatic mail that went through, and 
we know it contained material highly secretive on industrial and war 
developments. We have been unable to investigate Major Jordan's 
testimony with respect to other things because we were unable to de- 
termine the nature or contents of these documents. 

Mr. Nixon. Is it the intention of the staff, then, to present this 
witness who may be able to substantiate, at least in part. Major Jor- 
dan's testimony that secret material was going through ? 

Mr. Appell. That is correct. 

Mr. Nixon. On the point of the so-called shipments of uranium, as 
I understand the case, first, there is no question about the shipments 
going through ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Appell. As to the shipments of uranium and heavy water, 
two specific shipments of uranium oxide and nitrate and shipments 
■of heavy water have been completely documented to include even 
the number of the plane that flew the uranium and heavy water out 
of Great Falls. 

Mr. NixoN. Isn't it true these shipments were made with the knowl- 
edge and approval of our officials ? 

Mr. Appell. Export declarations on these shipments were approved 
by Lend-Lease and later by its successor organization. Foreign Eco- 
nomic Administration. 

Mr. NixoN. And in the case of one shipment, the first, General 
Groves and members of the Atomic Energy Commission learned about 
it was when this committee began its investigation; is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sr. 

Mr. Nixon. And the final point is the matter of Mr. Hopkins hav- 
ing attempted to expedite the shipments. Major Jordan's testimony 
on that was that his notes, written at the time, showed the initials 
^'H. H." on one of the consignments which he broke into. Your in- 
vestigation has shown no correspondence of Mr. Hopkins in which 
he used the initials "H. H." Is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. That which we reviewed. 

Mr. Nixon. On that point, then, you have been unable to substanti- 
ate Major Jordan's charge; is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. That is right, but with respect to documents examined 
to find out whether or not it was possible for the thing to have hap- 
pened, we only examined documents furnished us by the Army and 
Air Forces. We requested permission to review the files of the Presi-^ 
dent's Protocol Commission, now in the possession of Archives, and 
certain other documents in the custody of the Department of State, 
and we were not given permission to review these files. Mr. Hopkins 
was chairman of the President's Protocol Commission. 

Mr. Nixon. I understand that. My point is that as far as the in- 
vestigation you have been able to make is concerned, you as yet 
have been unable to substantiate Major Jordan's story on that point; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. But you have substantiated it on the four other points 
I mentioned ? 



1150 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Appell. Generally; yes. 

Mr. Nixon, That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Case. 

Mr. Case. Mr. Appell, did you look into the sio^iificance of the 
change in position taken with reference to the sending of the C-47 
airplane ^^■hich the Russians requested, in which they wanted to carry 
four passengers and 4,000 pounds of mail or other material? 

JSIr. Appell. I went into the whole record of the transactions be- 
tween the War Department, ATC, and the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission for Special Aircraft. When the thing first started, the Rus- 
sians came to the Army and expressed their difficulty in sending diplo- 
matic mail from Washington to Great Falls by rail, which necessi- 
tated reloading three times, and asked for this special aircraft. 

Their first request was turned down. It was turned down finally 
on the recommendation of General Deane, head of our military mis- 
sion in Moscow. When the Russians made the second request it was 
again sent to General Deane, and the final decision in the matter was 
based upon the recommendation of General Deane and Ambassador 
Harriman, who recommended that nothing be done to disrupt the 
arrangements which had been agreed to by the ATC. 

Mr. Case. I notice that when the change was made on that C-47. 
the approval was based on the weight being limited to between 2,500 
and 3,000 pounds. Did you look into what the pay load of a C-47 
was at that time ? 

Mr. Appell. No: but we have seen documentation of flights going 
through carrying as high as 4,100 pounds. 

Mr. Case. And how many passengers? 

Mr. Appell. Two and 4.100 pounds. 

Mr. Case. Two passengers and 4,100 pounds ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes. 

Mr. Case. Allowins: 200 pounds for each man, that would be 4,500 
pounds. The modification suggested that four people might go 
with 2,000 or 3,000 pounds. Was that the reason for the modification, 
or was there a policy involved? 

Mr. Appell. I have been unable to find that. It has been suggested 
to me that the reasons for it was because the plane was from New York 
going west, and there was a question of gas load which made them 
cut down on the weiglit of the cargo, but I do not know that for a fact. 

Mr. Case. General Deane was head of our military mission in 
Moscow. That is Gen. John R. Deane. His original recominendation 
presumably would have been on a question of policy, and later re- 
versed on a question of policy? 
, Mr. Appell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. I now have in my hands this confidential memorandum 
from which you read yesterday but which was not introduced in evi- 
dence, with identification of the names. This is the report of a special 
agent for Counter Intelligence. You will recall yesterday liaving read 
two recommendations, following the paragraph in which the agent 
observed that Major Jordan appeared to maintain accurate, detailed 
files and was very anxious to convey his information through Intelli- 
gence channels; and that he requested that he be contacted at a time 
when the Russian activity could be outlined in minute detail and was 
advised that this would be done by CIC agent so and so, who was 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1151 

attached to tlie Intelligence and Security Office, Station 5, East Base, 
Great Falls, Mont. 

Then the following two recommendations were made by the special 
agent : 

It is recommended that a prolonged interview be conducted witli Major 
Jordan ; that liis i-ecords be scrutinized for information of an intelligence nature ; 
and that he be contacted regularly. 

Did your investigation disclose that that recommendation was car- 
ried out ? 

Mr. Appell. He was not again interviewed. 

Mr. Case. He was not again interviewed ? 

Mr. Appell. No, sir, as far as the records are concerned. 

Mr. Case. Did you find any explanation of why this recommenda- 
tion was not followed? 

Mr. Appell. The agent mentioned there said he received no in- 
structions to do so. 

Mr. Case. The next recommendation was, and this is the concluding 
paragraph of this special agent's report : 

It is further recommended that the facts contained herein be given due con- 
sideration, with a view to contacting the State Department in order that they 
be made cognizant of the situation and that corrective measures be taken. 

Did your investigation disclose whether that recommendation was 
followed ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir, it was, and almost the entire report of that 
special agent was sent by Army to State Department. 

Mr. Case. That is, they were contacted ? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Case. But did your investigation determine, after they were 
made cognizant of the situation, that any corrective measures were 
taken ? 

Mr. Appell. The first action the State Department took was to 
call a conference of all interested agencies. It was held on July 6, 
1944, and the agencies represented were the Federal Bureau of Investi- 
gation; Office of Censorship; Military Intelligence; Air Transport 
Command; Immigration and Naturalization Service; Bureau of Cus- 
toms; Foreign Economic Administration; and State Department. 

Mr. Case. And wdiat was the final outcome of that? 

Mr. Appell. What transpired at the meeting, the committee has 
never been able to determine, because minutes of the meeting and 
memoranda which might have been prepared on the meeting cannot 
be located by the State Department. The only thing the committee 
has in connection with that meeting is a report dated July 6, 1944, 
by Col. L. R. Forney, who was one of Military Intelligence's repre- 
sentatives at that conference. I will be only too happy to read again 
Colonel Forney's report. 

Mr. Case. I don't know that it is necessary to read that. I would like 
to have an answer, though, to the direct question as to whether or not 
that meeting and this review by the State Department led to any 
corrective measures or any measures to give any assistance to IVIajor 
Jordan in the inspection of this cargo? 

Mr. Appell. Mr. Bohlen of the State Department advised that he 
intended to take up with the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy 
in Washington this question. Then on the 27th or 28th of July 



1152 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

there was forwarded to the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy 
an informal memorandum of customs and censorship regulations, and 
the second secretary was advised that these regulations would be 
strictly enforced, effective upon his receipt of them. 

(Representative Nixon leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Appell (continuing). The record continues on to show that in 
September 1944 they apparently were not corrected, because another 
Intelligence and Security officer reported on September 21, 1944, 
that the condition was still going on, and that while he held up planes 
and refused to permit planes to fly without the customs people looking 
at the cargo, that no inspection was made by censorship, and the 
special agent stated that in his opinion this action was a violation of 
the espionage statute. 

I have been unable to find from any documents received that any 
corrective measures were ever put into effect to actually search what 
went through Great Falls. 

Mr. Kearney. In other words, there was plenty of talk but little 
action. 

Mr. Case. "WTiose responsibility would it have been to see that 
these regulations were enforced in conformity with the notice served 
on the second secretary of the Soviet Embassy on the 28th of July ? 

Mr. Appell. Well, it would seem that the responsibility would have 
been placed in the hands of, I would say, three agencies. 

Customs had a responsibility to inspect to see that only diplomatic 
mail went through without inspection. If they found that there was 
cargo involved which should have an export license or which should 
be inspected, then they should have notified censorship, which was 
the agency with the responsibility of making examinations. If it was 
material that required export declarations, customs, under their re- 
sponsibility, was supposed to refuse permission for that cargo to 
leave Great Falls until such time as it had an export declaration. 

Colonel Forney's memorandum of July 6, 1944, stated that other 
agencies assumed that it was Army's responsibility, and Army had 
no responsibility in the matter whatsoever other than  

]Mr. Case. You referred to the report made in September in which 
the agent then called attention to the fact that the situation was 
continuing, and I believe you used the expression that apparently it 
was a violation of the Espionage Act ? 

Mr. Appell. That is what the agent said, and that was concurred 
in by the Acting Adjutant General of the United States Army. 

Mr. Case. Did the report indicate by whom the violation was made? 

Mr. Appell. The violation, as the agent stated it, was in permit- 
ting the stuff to go through without Censorship's examination. It 
didn't place the responsibility on any agency. 

Mr. Case. Did your investigation determine whether or not this 
report, concurred in by the Adjutant General, was brought to the 
attention of Customs or the State Department? 

Mr. Appell. General Dunlap, in the last indorsement of the docu- 
ment, said that the condition had been called to the attention of the 
agencies and that they were studying the question, and that it was 
anticipated regulations would be placed into effect to correct these 
conditions. The documents supplied do not indicate that this was 
done. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1153 

Mr. Case. So, somewhere all of these efforts on the part of Major 
Jordan and of the agents of Counter Intelligence to correct these 
conditions ran into a dead end? 

Mr. Appell. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Velde. Just one question with reference to these diplomatic 
pouches. Did your investigation reveal how the diplomatic pouches 
were made u]t and who was responsible for sealing them and so 
forth? 

Mr. Appell. The responsibility for sealing the diplomatic pouches 
was the responsibility of the Soviet Purchasing Commission, who 
sent them. 

Mr. Velde. No American authority had that responsibility ? 

Mr. Appell. No. The Russians prepared the so-called diplomatic 
cargo or diplomatic mail in two different ways, although it was all 
given the same treatment. In one type they placed the embassy seal, 
the seal of the government. In another type they would take a box 
or cheap patent leather suitcase, tie it with a piece of sash cord, knot 
it, and, either to keep the knot from coming undone or to see that 
nobody tampered with it, they would put some wax on that knot, but 
it bore no resemblance to a diplomatic seal. 

Mr. Velde. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. Kearney. Listening to the testimony here, it seems to me the 
•only one who did do his duty, as I see it, was Major Jordan. On two 
separate occasions, Major Jordan brought this to the attention not 
only of his superior officers, but as a result conferences were held by 
the various agencies, named by the witness, then it was dropped. 

Mr. Wood. Thank you, Mr. Appell. That is all. 

Mr. Tavenner. Major Jordan. 

Mr. Wood. Major, I don't think it is necessary to swear you again; 
but, since we are operating under a subcommittee, do you solemnly 
swear the testimony you give to this subcommittee shall be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Jordan. I do, sir. 

Mr. Wood. Have a seat. Major. 

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE RACEY JORDAN 

Mr. Wood. Major Jordan, on the 23d of January you directed a 
communication to me in which you pointed out some discrepancies in 
jour testimony before this committee, and indicated that you would 
like an opportunity to make some corrections, after having checked 
the records. On the 28th of January I made a reply to that com- 
munication and stated you would be given that opportunity. Is that 
correct ? 

(Representative Nixon returns to hearing room.) 

Mr. Jordan. That is correct. 

Mr. Wood. And I also informed you that, as a result of a public 
announcement that I made in December at the request of the minority 
members of this committee, your presence would probably be required 
again so that they would have an opportunity to examine you, they 
being absent when you were here before. 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

99334 — 50 17 



1154 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. I think in your communication you stated you desired 
to make a correction of certain dates, particularly the date of your 
telephone conversation with Mr. Hopkins. You may proceed. 

Mr. Jordan. When I testified . I had participated in a telephone 
conversation with Mr. Hopkins, I had previously told the FBI it was 
about 3 weeks before the uranium arrived. I was at a disadvantage 
the last time I was here, because I didn't know when the shipment 
had been made, and, when you pressed me as to what year it was made, 
I made an honest attempt to tell you, and said it was 1944. But later, 
when you found it was in May 1943, 1 realized my testimony had been 
in error, because the telephone call I had been discussing to expedite 
this particular shipment occurred 2 or 3 weeks before the uranium 
arrived. So, now that you have been able to pin-point the date the 
uranium arrived, I will have to match it. I did the best I could with 
my memory after 7 years. 

Mr. Case. The witness is merely changing the date and not the fact 
of the telephone call. 

Mr. Jordan. Uranium started to go through almost immediately 
after I went there and continued until the last month I was there, 
so, for me to pin-point each particular shipment in sequence, I did 
the best I could. 

Mr. Case. And all you are changing is 

Mr. Jordan. I am changing the date from 1944 to 1943. 
Mr. Case. The fact of what happened, you are not changing that 
testimony ? 

Mr. Jordan. No ; I am not. It has been called to my attention since 
that time that Mr. Hopkins was sick in a hospital at that time, and I 
have been hoping to make my testimony more correct. The uranium 
didn't arrive until the 22d of May 1943. So, it would have to be a few 
weeks before that, and I want to take this opportunity to change 
that date. 

Mr. Wood. Any other corrections ? 

Mr. Jordan. The misspelling of a Russian officer's name. I said 
Gromov, and they had Romanov. I never heard of Romanov being 
with the Soviet Government. 

Mr. Wood. Do you desire to ask the witness any further questions, 
Mr. Counsel? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes, sir. Major Jordan, when you were previously 
before the committee you told of shipments of uranium and heavy 
water which proceeded through Great Falls, Mont. If shipments 
left the United States from other ports, would any records of these 
shipments be sent to Colonel Kotikov at Great Falls ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. Colonel Kotikov worked with certain Russians 
in the Purchasing Commission, and I could tell by the people he 
worked with as to the type of materials being handled. Eremin was 
a member of the Purchasing Commission and chief of raw materials. 
Fomichev was assistant chief of chemicals. And Fomin was in charge 
of powder and explosives. Even though the chemicals might be 
shipped from Philadelphia or Portland or Seattle, when they were 
assembled and on the docks and ready to go, Kotikov would be checked 
with and would send the papers pertaining to these chemicals to 
Moscow, where they would be awaiting the arrival of the ships. 

On the left-hand side of Colonel Kotikov's desk there were many 
folders, and I would sometimes get the folders for Kotikov when he 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1155 

was talking on the telephone. He would say "chemicals" or "metals" 
and I would get the particular folder. He knew what was going 
through in practically all parts of the United States that had to do 
with industrial plants that they were collecting. They were collect- 
ing an oil refinery, and I would take out that folder when he was talk- 
ing on the telephone about that, and when it was assembled he would 
send the papers to Moscow. 

That is how it became possible for me to see the words "uranium," 
and "thorum," and "cadmium," and all the others. You never asked 
me for anything but uranium, and I never volunteered the others. 

Mr. Tavenner. We will ask you now. Colonel Kotikov occupied 
what position at Great Falls ? 

Mr. Jordan. I thought he was a perfectly ordinary officer, but I 
found out he received the highest decoration of all when he got back 
home; so he evidently was more important than I realized. He 
seemed to be this end of the pipe line; and, therefore, it is possible 
he was more important than in other locations in the United States. 
I was very close to him and very friendly with him and spoke highly 
of him, because I was trying to help him get the materials he needed. 
I understood that was what my job was. 

Mr. Tavenner. So the materials that were shipped to Kussia from 
other ports, the records of those shipments, passed through Colonel 
Kotikov's office ; is that what I understand you to say ? 

Mr. Jordan. Mr. Tavenner, I was very embarrassed when I found 
you only located 45 pounds of uranium when the papers I had called 
for 500 pounds. So I listened to General Groves' testimony, and I 
understand that while they asked for 500 pounds they were only able 
to locate 45. So when I testified in perfectly good faith they got 500 
pounds, I thought they did, but it turned out they only filled that 
particular order to the extent of 45 pounds. I took it from the papers. 

When I talked of heavy water, I saw "heavy water" on the papers. 
I have since been told there was none in the United States, and that 
what I thought was heavy water was sulphuric acid. When I testified 
I saw them loading carboys of heavy water, I was being perfectly 
honest. Now you find out it went through in different quantities. 

Mr. Tavenner. And in a different container. 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I received a letter from a Norwegian saying he 
knew heavy water came from Norway and was smuggled in this coun- 
try and went to Russia through Great Falls. It is funny, but I do 
remember seeing the word "Norge." I will be glad to give you the 
letter. 

Mr. Tavenner. We will be glad to see it. Regardless of where the 
shipment of these materials might originate, whether at some port 
such as New York or some airport such as existed in Florida, the rec- 
ords of those shipments would pass through Colonel Kotikov's office 
at Great Falls? Do I understand that to be the situation? 

Mr. Jordan. It dej^ended entirely on what he was collecting under 
orders. Radio shipments out of Newark might have gone to Ouspen- 
sky, and Ouspensky might have sent them to the Purchasing Commis- 
sion, and they might have been put in suitcases and sent through with- 
out Kotikov having them. But the plants anywhere in the United 
States would be reported to Kotikov, and when the plants were as- 
sembled he would then send them on. 



1156 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Here is an official Soviet Purchasing Commission letter and the ac- 
companying documents. I simply took that as a souvenir. But here is 
a letter showing the way the plants were assembled. When the plant 
was entirely assembled, then he would bundle it up and send it to 
Moscow. 

Mr. Tavenner. AVhen it was sent to Moscow, through what port or 
ports would it be sent ? 

Mr. Jordan. It depended on where the ships were available. Some- 
times they had to be sent from Philadelphia or New York or Seattle. 
I have been on ships at Newark with Kotikov and have watched the way 
they were loaded. I saw $100,000 of butter going abroad when we 
couldn't get it at home, and I watched how they packed the butter and 
how Kotikov checked the cases. 
.> Mr. Tavenner. Then at Great Falls you had an opportunity to re- 
view the records regarding the shipment of the various materials that 
Kotikov was interested in ? 

Mr. Jordan. I had them all in my hands. 

Mr. Ta^tenner. Do you have knowledge of the use made of thorium, 
cadmium, graphite, or aluminum tubes? 

Mr. Jordan. I did not know at the time what it was for^ I had no 
concepton of what the words "uranium," "cadmium," or "thorium" 
meant at the time ; but, now that I have seen pictures of an atomic pile, 
I recognize the various things in it as the very things Kotikov was 
collecting. I never had seen the word "cadmium" before. I see here 
that controls the heating of the atomic pile. 

I looked at my records and saw that we shipped, in 1942, 100,800 
pounds cadmium metals ; in 1943 we shipped 150,427 pounds cadmium 
metals, 72,535 pounds of cadmium alloys; and in 1944 we shipped 
533,742 pounds cadmium metals. In 1944 the cadmium alloys stopped 
cold. 

As to thorium, in 1942 we shipped 13,440 pounds ; in 1943 we shipped 
11,912 pounds ; and in 1944 not a pound. 

Mr. Tavenner. What was the amount of thorium you said was 
shipped in 1943 ? 

Mr. Jordan. Thorium, 13,440 pounds in 1942 and 11,912 pounds 
in 1943. 

Mr, Tavenner. Wliat was that last figure ? 

Mr. Jordan. 11,912 pounds in 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I have been able to produce here a 
shipper's export declaration showing the exact figure of 11,912 pounds 
of thorium nitrate shipped January 30, 1943, from Philadelphia on 
the Steamship John C. Fremont^ the exporter being Amtorg Trading 
Corp. I desire to introduce this record in evidence and ask that it be 
marked "Jordan Exhibit 4." 

]\Ir. Wood. I understand the record tendered is a photostatic copy 
of the original? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes. 

Mr, Wood. Without objection, it will be admitted. 

(The document above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 4," is 
filed herewith.) *^ 

Mr. Nixon. Do I understand you are reading from your diary at 
the present time? 

** See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1157 

Mr. Jordan. My diary consists of books and bound volumes and 
various notebooks that I kept at the time. 

Mr. Nixon. I am referring to this shipment of 11,912 pounds. 

Mr. Jordan. I am reading it from the official records the Russians 
gave me. 

Mr. Nixon. At that time ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. They were given to me later. Before I went out 
of the Army, I was afraid there would be a lend-lease investigation, 
and I asked the Russians if they would let me have the totals that 
went through, and they gave me the complete totals of everything 
Russia received in 1942, 1943, and 1944. 

Mr. Case. Everything they received where ? 

Mr. Jordan. Entirely. 

Mr. Case. In all forms of lend-lease? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. It runs into billions of dollars. 

Mr. Nixon. Do the uranium shipments appear on that? 

Mr. Jordan. No. They were not under lend-lease. They were paid 
by cash. 

Mr. Nixon. This includes only such shipments as were made under 
lend-lease? 

Mr. Jordan. It includes only such shipments as the American 
taxpayers paid for. 

Mr. Case. All shipments through every channel? 

Mr. Jordan. Every shipment that went through lend-lease out of 
the United States. 

Mr. Kearney. That is, at every port of the United States? 

Mr. Jordan. Every port. 

Mr. Kearney. Not only from Great Falls ? 

Mr. Jordan. Not only from Great Falls. So, what I have been 
able to do is refresh my memory by reading the total figures and 
checking them with what I know, and they come out right. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have told us about thorium. What record do 
you have of the shipment of cadmium ? 

Mr. Jordan. Cadmium? I just read the figures. 

I didn't read the figures on aluminum tubes. In 1942 we shipped 
them 3,463,346 pounds of aluminum tubes at a cost of $3,989,506. In 

1943 we shipped them 2,982,209 pounds at a cost of $2,491,021. In 

1944 we shipped them 7,186,172 pounds at a cost of $6,461,923, or a 
total cost of $12,942,450. 

The graphite, I have a picture of an atomic pile made up of graphite. 
According to Colonel Kotikov he was assembling graphite for fur- 
naces. 

In 1942 we shipped them 1,818,838 pounds of carbon graphite for 
furnaces, and 7,069,088 graphite for furnaces. In 1943 we shipped 
them 11,694,118 graphite for furnaces. And in 1944 we shipped them 
9,437,006 graphite for furnaces. The total cost was $4,327,101. 

Mr. Tavenner. These materials to which you have testified — that 
is, the thorium, cadmium, aluminum tubes, and graphite — could be 
used for what purposes, as far as you know? 
^ Mr. JoRDON. I only know that this article on the atomic bomb gives 
these materials as being the necessary materials to make the atomic 
bomb. I am not a technician and not a chemist. This article is in 
Life magazine (indicating publication in hand) . 



1158 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Counsel, I regret very much to have to suspend at 
this time, but it is only 5 minutes before the convening of the House. 
We will take a recess until 3 o'clock this afternoon. 

(Thereupon, at 11 : 55 a. m., a recess was taken until 3 p. m. of the 
same day.) 

AFTERNOON SESSION 

(The subcommittee met at 3 p. m.) 

Mr. Wood. The record will show that of the subcommittee conduct- 
ing this hearing there are present Messrs. Velde, Kearney, and Wood. 

TESTIMONY OF GEOKGE RACEY JORDAN— Resumed 

Mr. Kearney. Mr. Chairman, may I clarify in my own mind a couple 
of points testified to this morning by the witness ? 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. I^ARNET. I understood, Major— and you correct me if I am 
wrong — this morning you testified to the arrival at Great Falls of a 
C-47 containing approximately 50 pieces of luggage? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

(Representative Nixon arrives in hearing room.) 

Mr. Kearney. And as I recollect you read from a diary in which 
the notations were supposed to have been made on or about that time ; 
is that correct? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Kearney. Can you tell the committee regarding any Russian 
personnel that was aboard that plane ? 

Mr. Jordan. At the beginning, when I first went to Great Falls in 
1945, the material I have been complaining about arrived by freight 
at the railroad station and was brought out to the field in trucks and 
put in a warehouse and then loaded onto a C-47 which we had specially 
prepared to fly to Moscow. 

It is important to get the point why the transfer had to be made at 
Great Falls. These C-47 planes that arrived from various depots had 
to be winterized to make the flight to Moscow. They had to be spe- 
cially treated so as to operate at temperatures 50 to 60 degrees below 
zero. So everything would have to be transferred to a plane that had 
spent 4 days in the hangar being winterized. 

So it is entirely possible the freight may have arrived by train and 
been put into a warehouse, but it could not depart without my 
authority. 

When I referred to a plane ready to go it didn't mean it had just 
arrived that day with a particular load and particular couriers. Some- 
times a load would arrive with a couple of couriers, and they would 
sleep on the load, and sometimes they would switch couriers. "When 
a courier would spread out a blanket and sleep on the bags I had no 
way of knowing how the load had arrived, but when I saw it on the 
plane ready to go, they had to get my authority to depart, and that 
is when I got on the plane and inspected. 

Mr. Kearney. The particular plane you referred to this morning, 
did you examine any of the 50 pieces of luggage on that plane ? 

Mr. Jordan. I testified the last time, when you were not here, that 
I had first seen excessive baggage going through with a Russian 
general, and I let it go through. Each succeeding Russian officer had 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1159 

increasing baggage. When it got to 10 or 15 suitcases per person I 
began to become apprehensive of whether I was doing my duty ; and 
when 50 pieces came without any personnel, just 2 guards, that is when 
I felt I should be in a spot-check position and see what was in the 
suitcases. 

That was the first time I did it. I can't tell the plane or time. 

Mr. Kearney. At that time did you make a spot check of them ? 

Mr. Jordan. I opened about one-third of the suitcases. 

Mr. Kearney. Was there opposition by anyone to your opening the 
bags? 

Mr. Jordan. The two Russians tried to physically stop me, without 
touching me — tried to stop me at the door, saying it was diplomatic. 
I said, in the performance of my duty I wanted to open one or two 
of the suitcases. 

Mr. Kearney. Did you open one or two ? 

Mr. Jordan. I opened about one-third. 

Mr. Kearney. Can you tell the committee what you found in the 
suitcases ? 

Mr. Jordan. I found a very large amount of office folders, and in 
each of the folders would be duplicates of papers from various depart- 
ments of the Government. In my notes made at the time that I actu- 
ally opened the suitcases, I made a one-word note which to me meant 
the whole suitcase. Where I have a note "State Department," that 
meant an entire suitcase or perhaps two or three suitcases. The notes 
were made at the time, 7 years ago, when this was done, and I can now 
only say I have a note "Panama Canal Commission maps," and 
"Amtorg Trading Co.," and "Tass," and "State Department." 

I can't go further than to say I remember in some of the State De- 
partment papers I took a peek at one, and it was a military report. 

Mr. Kearney. Do you know where that military report came from ? 

Mr. Jordan. From Moscow. 

Mr. Kj^arney. Was that a folder ? 

Mr. Jordan. It was a folder. 

Mr. Kearney. Was there any name on that folder? 

Mr. Jordan. The names were on the front of the folders on a piece 
of white paper, clipped on to show where that particular folder's con- 
tents came from. 

Mr. Kearney. Can you give the committee the name of any in- 
dividual on the folders you saw ? 

Mr. Jordan. I saw Sayre, Hiss, and other members of the State 
Department whose names I made a note of at the time. 

Mr. Kjiarney. Can you tell the committee what was in the folder 
under the name of Hiss ? 

Mr. Jordan. I can only say they were photostats of some kind and 
seemed to be military reports. 

Mr. Kearney. Do you know where the military reports came from ? 

Mr. Jordan. I can't say where they all came from, but I would 
say frcm Moscow. 

Mr. Kearney. From whom at Moscow ? 

Mr. Jordan. The American attache out there. 

Mr. Kearney. And they were sent from the American military 
chief of our mission in Moscow to whom ? 



1160 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr, Jordan. They were sent through channels to Washington to the 
State Department, and somebody in the State Department had evi- 
dently photostated them and was sending them back. 

Mr. Kearnet. You mean to tell the committee these were the re- 
ports sent from our mission in Moscow to our own State Department 
and photostated and returned to Moscow ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is what it looked like. 

Mr. KJEARNET. They were contained in this baggage you speak of ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I was looking for morphine, to be truthful. We 
were missing morphine, and the couriers had been sleeping all night 
beside the morphine, and I thought they had been stealing it. I was 
running my hand through and had no intention of reading anything, 
but since I had opened them I wanted to make a note of what I had 
seen. I made a note "State Department" with "Secret" cut off, and 
I have a notation of Sayre, Hiss, and others. This was written that 
night. 

Mr. Kjearney. This was military information received by the State 
Department from our mission in Moscow and later returned to the 
Russians ? 

Mr. Jordan. That is what it looked like, but at the time, you must 
remember, I thought this material was going through under authority, 
and I had no idea there was anything improper about it. It looked 
to me the State Department knew what they were doing when they 
sent things to Moscow. I didn't think it was anything I should do 
anything about. 

Mr. Kearney. That sheet you are referring to now, are those notes 
made by yourself at Great Falls, Mont., on the date you spoke of? 

Mr. Jordan. They were made at the time I opened the first suitcases. 
Then I opened a number of suitcases later. 

Mr. Kearney. What I am getting at is, they are your notes made 
at that time and not some months later ? 

Mr. Jordan. They were made the night I opened the suitcases. 

Mr. Kearney. I think that will be all for the time being. 

Mr. Nixon. Let me clear one thing up before you leave this matter 
of these names that you have brought in. I think the record should 
be clear that the fact those names appeared in that correspondence and 
on those folders does not in itself indicate that either of the individuals 
named was involved in illegal activities in sending folders through the 
Russian couriers. 

Mr. Jordan. If I had known or thought it was illegal at the time, I 
would have grounded the plane. I thought it was in perfect order. 

Mr. Nixon. You are only testifying that among the things you saw 
in those folders you opened, you recall seeing those two names ? 

Mr. Jordan. I have notes on those two names. There were a num- 
ber of names. 

Mr. Nixon. You saw State Department papers? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. And you saw somewhere in those State Department 
papers the two names, Sayre and Hiss, and other names? 

Mr. Jordan. That is correct. But the fact is that the folders were 
in the suitcases in rows with elastic bands around five or six folders, 
and in the front would be a white piece of paper with "From Hiss" 
and the next batch "From Sayre" and so on. I just picked the first 
one or two and made a note to show what was in the suitcase. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1161 

Mr. NixON. I wanted the record to be clear that the testimony of 
the witness on this point rehites only to the fact that certain docu- 
ments went through with those names appearing on the folders, and in 
my opinion, certainly, which I think I should express, no inference can 
be drawn from that fact that either of the individuals named was 
involved in illegal activity. 

Mr. Kearney. I don't think from any questions I asked such an 
inference could be drawn. 

Mr. NixON. I think your questions brought out the contrary, and I 
wanted to bring out that fact. I think the facts are well brought out 
by your questions. I just wanted to high-light the same point that 
you made. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Jordan, I would like to ask you one question 
about these records. I believe you stated that in the course of your 
examination of these files you saw one record or report which origi- 
nated in Moscow. I believe you mentioned that to me earlier this 
morning for the first time; did you not? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mv. Tavenner. You had not testified about that in your former 
testimony ? 

Mr. Jordan. Mr. Tavenner, I didn't actually read the letter. I 
simply took a peek at it, and I thought at the time, whoever this mili- 
tary person was in Moscow that was reporting to the State Depart- 
ment, I wondered how he would feel if he knew the Russians had the 
report back again. Being a military man I couldn't quite understand 
it, but I let it pass. I thought it was in perfect order. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you see more than one such report ? 

Mr. Jordan. No, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then there was only one document you can recall 
that originated in Moscow? 

Mr. Jordan. I only looked at one document. They looked to me as 
if they were all of the same nature; they looked as if they were all 
alike. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is the only one you examined ? 

Mr. Jordan. The only one I was sure of. I would rather stick to 
the things I know. 

Mr. Kearney. I would like to ask another question. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. Kearney. While I was asking the previous questions I was 
mulling over in my own mind the stories that have followed your 
appearance on the stand, and I would like, for my own information 
and for the information of the committee, a direct answer to this ques- 
tion : Prior to your appearance on this stand as a witness last Decem- 
ber, did you, directly or indirectly, ever attempt to peddle your so- 
called story to any newspaper or periodical? 

Mr. Jordan. I never peddled the story. What actually happened 
was, I heard a radio broadcast that 3 ounces of uranium were missing 
and that the Government was looking for it. I made the remark to 
one of my friends that if they were looking for uranium I could tell 
them where there were a thousand pounds of it. 

This remark got to [U. S. Senator] Styles Bridges, who sent word 
to me that he wanted to see me. I spent over an hour with him. He 
said: "Are you certain you saw uranium?" I said, "Yes, sir." He 
said, "Could you be certain enough to testify?" I said, "Yes, sir." 



1162 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

He said, "I will think it over a few days and you will hear from me." 
That was October 4. 

A few days later Fulton Lewis called and said Senator Bridges 
had told him about my remark, and Fulton Lewis wanted to know if 
I would give him my story. I said I would, and he came to New York. 
I saw him at the Sherry-Netherland. He called the FBI, and for 
weeks I didn't hear anything but FBI. They came to my house, to 
my office, went through my files, photostated my diary, and so on. It 
amused me to read that the FBI had discredited my story, because 
they spent hours on end photostating everything I had. After work- 
ing on it many weeks they told Mr. Lewis their investigation was 
finished, and then Mr. Lewis agreed he would make a broadcast of it. 
But for a couple weeks there were so many FBI men in my office that 
the news leaked out, and a public relations man offered his services 
to help me get publicity out of it. First he wanted to tip off another 
commentator, and then take me to Life. I told him I was not inter- 
ested, but he had made an appointment at Life, unbeknown to me, 
and I didn't want to disappoint him. At Life they discredited me 
and said my story was too full of holes and turned it down. 

I had never peddled it. This particular public relations man at- 
tached himself to me and did these two things. Inasmuch as the story 
was turned down by two firms, I went back and rested until Mr. Lewis 
called me and went on the air. 

Immediately the story went the rounds I was paid by the Republican 
Party and peddling the story, and all of that is untrue. 

Mr. Kearney. I think for the purpose of the record I will ask the 
stenographer to read the question I asked the witness to have it 
directly answered "Yes" or "No." 

Mr. Jordan. The answer is "No." 

Mr. Kearney. The answer is "No" ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Wood, Proceed. 

Mr. Tavenner. At the close of the session this morning, Major 
Jordan, we were talking about various other materials that went into 
the manufacture of the atomic bomb that were shipped to Russia to 
your knowledge. How did you first become acquainted with the fact 
that the materials we discussed, such as cadmium, thorium, graphite, 
and aluminum tubes were used in the manufacture of the atomic bomb ? 

Mr. Jordan. Well, I first thought that I might have had something 
to do with it when President Truman announced the Russians had the 
bomb. That was the first point where I was quite certain I knew 
something. I have been increasingly interested in the atomic bomb 
since my testimony, and a few days ago I saw a complete article in 
Life magazine on the atomic bomb. This particular article in Life 
mentions the very things Colonel Kotikov was assembling. 

Mr. Tavenner. It mentions, does it not, the use of cadmium rods, 
aluminum tubes, graphite, and thorium ? 

Mr. Jordan. It shows how they are used in the atomic pile. 

Mr. Tavenner. Which issue of Life are you referring to ? 

Mr. Jordan. A recent issue. 

Mr. Tavenner. The past week? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. And was that the first time the importance of those 
particular elements came to your attention I 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1163 

Mr. Jordan. I had never known about cadmium before I saw it there. 
Mr. Tavenner. After you read that article in the recent issue of 
Life, did you then compile this data regarding the shipments ? 

Mr. Jordan. I simply looked it up, and there it was, the full 

amounts. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, I think I should state that on Jan- 
uary 19 of this year an investigator of our committee conferred with 
an atomic scientist regarding the importance of cadmium in the manu- 
facture of the atomic bomb, and he was told it was useful as a neutron 
absorber in atomic-energy work. He said he believed this particular 
item was not available in Russia. 

Major Jordan, do you know the name of the assistant of Colonel 
Kotikov at the Great Falls station? 

Mr. Jordan. He had about six different assistants. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know one by the name of Sergeant Vino- 
gradsky ? 

Mr. Jordan. Very well. I have a picture of him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline to the committee Sergeant Vino- 
gradsky's activities as far as you know them, in addition to his normal 
activities in the handling of materials that went through Great Falls. 

Mr. Jordan. I have a suspicion that, despite the fact he was only a 
sergeant and was in the warehouse practically 100 percent of the time 
checking materials, he was reporting on Colonel Kotikov. 

Mr. Tavenner. Reporting on Colonel Kotikov ? 

Mr. Jordan. I would say so ; yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell Vinogradsky, please? Do you know 
the spelling ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. I have it here. V-i-n-o-g-r-a-d-s-k-y. 

Mr. Wood. Reporting to whom on Colonel Kotikov ? 

Mr. Jordan. There was a certain Russian who went through there 
quite frequently by the name of Anisimov, A. A. Anisimov, A-n-i-s-i- 
m-o-v. He was apparently what we call a card-carrying member. I 
saw him in Alaska, Washington, Newark, Great Falls, and wherever 
he went it seemed he was gathering information on personnel. He 
was chief of personnel of all Russians in America. I was at the Pur- 
chasing Commission one day and asked who was the chief, and they 
said, "Rudenko; or do you mean Anisimov, chief of personnel?" 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know anything about Sergeant Vinograd- 
sky 'a activities away from Groat Falls? 

Mr. Jordan. I know only what he told me. His station was at Great 
Falls, but for a young sergeant — he was a young man — he made trips 
away from Great Falls, always mysterious trips. He told me he went 
to San Francisco and Portland and Newark and different places. I 
can only tell you what he told me. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did he advise you of any person he talked to in San 
Francisco ? 

Mr. Jordan. He didn't exactly advise me, but I knew the Russian 
personnel at different places, and when he would apply to go to San 
Francisco he would see Gregory Khefitz. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you of your own knowledge know anything 
about Gregory Khefitz ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, Gregory Khefitz was attached to the 
Soviet consulate in San Francisco and has been the subject of previous 



1164 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

testimony in the cases of Martin Kamen, Louise Bransten, Hanns 
Eisler, and other known espionage agents, and has played a role in 
known Soviet espionage activities. 

Did you become acquainted with a Russian by the name of Semen 
Vassilenko ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, He was the chemical expert, 

Mr, Tavenner, Will you give the spelling of his name ? 

Mr, Jordan. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-s-i-1-e-n-k-o. He departed from the 

United States February 17, 1944, in airplane No. . I will have to 

get that. He departed on February 17, 1944. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have a note of that departure date? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes ; I have. 

Mr. Tavenner. In your diary ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes; I have. When Vassilenko would arrive at the 
airport it would be a signal for Colonel Kotikov to pull out two or 
three folders on chemicals and walk down the runway where there 
were no dictographs and put the folders on the wing of an airplane 
and talk with Vassilenko an hour or so, that is, if the complete chemical 
plant had been assembled, Vassilenko had three guards with him. I 
have the names of the three guards. 

Mr. Ta\T3nner. Will you give them, please? 

Mr, Jordan. Leonid Rykoukin; Engeny Kojevnitov; and Georges 
Nicolaiev. They departed, according to my diary, on February 17, 
1944, with a load of about 4,000 pounds of special high priority diplo- 
matic mail. 

Mr. TA^^ENNER. Do you know the place of origin of the mail on that 
particular plane, or would your records show that ? 

Mr. Jordan. I know the plane came from Washington, D. C, be- 
cause Vassilenko and his guards came directly from the Purchasing 
Commission in Washington. 

Mr. Tavenner, I would like, Mr, Chairman, to introduce in evidence 
copies of documents handed us this morning by Major Jordan, and 
return the originals to him. The first is a letter written by Col. A. 
Kotikov to Col. R. C. Rockwell, Newark, N. J., bearing date July 6, 
1942, with pencil memorandum attached, which I ask be marked 
"Jordan Exhibit 5." 

Mr. Wood. You are introducing copies ? 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. Yes, sir, 

Mr, Wood. That have been made in the committee ? 

Mr. Tavenner. By the reporter. 

Mr, Wood. They will be admitted. 

(The documents above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 5," are 
filed herewith.) ^' 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like to introduce a copy of letter written 
by Alex Marquis to Mr. Jordan, dated December 8, 1949, and ask that 
it be marked "Jordan Exhibit 6." 

Mr. Wood. I understand that was likewise copied by the reporter ? 

Mr, Tavenner. Yes, 

Mr. Wood. It will be admitted, 

(The copy of letter above referred to, marked "Jordan Exhibit 6," is 
filed herewith, ) ^° 

^ See appendix. 
*" See appendix. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1165 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all I desire to ask Mr. Jordan, but I would 
like to have permission from him to photostat the record of shipments 
which he has brought here with him, together with his diary and 
notes, and return the originals to him, if he is willing for us to do it. 

Mr. Jordan. O. K. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Nixon. 

Mr. Nixon. I was wondering if it might be possible to include in 
the record the Lend-Lease memorandum which Mr. Jordan has re- 
ferred to, the memorandum in regard to lend-lease shipments. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is what I am having photostated. 

Mr. Nixon. Mr. Jordan, most of the questions which I had have 
already been answered. One question which still remains is in regard 
to your having reported these matters to your superior officers or to 
other agencies who had jurisdiction. The testimony to date has been 
that at least two reports were made by you which have been corrobo- 
rated. You heard that testimony? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. Can you add anything as to any official reports that 
you made other than those two times concerning these shipments? 
Before you answer that, let me first ask you this : The testimony was 
that the Counter Intelligence agent who first interviewed you was re- 
quested by you that you be given an opportunity to elaborate in detail 
in regard to the shipments to which you had referred. Did Counter 
Intelligence or any other agency of the Government ever approach 
you after that time and ask you to make such elaborjition ? 

Mr. Jordan. The colonel of our post, the colonel of Gore Field, 
was interviewed by a reporter, and he has a statement in the news- 
paper to the eti'ect that I had been raising the devil. Well, I can 
only say that that meant I was talking to everyone that I thought 
might be helpful in getting something done about it. He remarked 
to the reporter that the Capitol dome could have been taken for all 
Jordan could do about it. That was one officer. Several other 
officers have come forward and have made statements to indicate 
that at that time I must have done a lot of hollering. One officer 
said Jordan was always raising hell about it. H*is words were that 
he could back me up and knew I had been making a big hullabaloo 
about it. I will admit I didn't say anything about uranium, and 
I didn't say anything about State Department papers. I simply talked 
about the excessive amount of diplomatic mail going uninspected. 
That seemed to be the crux of my complaint. 

Mr. Nixon. Did you know about the atomic bomb in 1948 ? 

Mr, Jordan. No. I didn't know about the atomic bomb until it 
was dropped on Hiroshima, and I didn't know the Russians had it 
until President Truman made the announcement. 

Mr. Nixon. I would say if you had particularly singled out uranium 
in 1943 your story would be inherently incredible. Your answer to 
the question whether your request that you be given opportunity to 
go into detail in regard to the shipments to which you had referred 
was granted 

Mr. Jordan. The answer is "no." Mr. Appell said there was no 
record I went to Washington to talk about it, yet I have the official 



1166 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

order to go to Washington for the purpose of discussing movements 
of Russian aircraft through Great Falls. This is my original record. 

Mr. Nixon. I ask that this document be made an exhibit. 

Mr. Tavenner. I suggest it be marked "Jordan exhibit 7." 

Mr. Wood. I don't care to deprive Major Jordan of the original, 
but with his permission I will ask the reporter to copy it. 

Mr. Tavenner. Or he can read it in the record. 

Mr. Jordan. It is Special Order No. 3, dated January 4, 1944, 
ordering Maj. George R. Jordan to proceed by military aircraft 
from Army Air Base at Great Falls, Mont., to Washington, D. C, 
for the purpose of conferring with AAF officials on the movement 
of Russian aircraft. 

Mr. Wood. Does that comply with your suggestion ? 

Mr. Kearney. I think the signature of the officer issuing that order 
should also be made a part of the record. 

Mr. Jordan. Col. Russell L. Meredith, commanding officer of the 
air base. 

I have a note in my diary, "Washington, Colonel Paige's office," and 
he was Chief of the International Office in charge of Lend-Lease. 
Then I have another note, "Saw General Jones," and he was Chief Air 
Inspector. I si)ecifically saw him, and saw Colonel Wilson and Col. 
Vander Lugt and others, and that was followed by an air inspector, 
Colonel Dahm, arriving a few days later at the field to follow up my 
complaint, 

Mr. Kearney. What date ? 

Mr. Jordan. January 25. I took him over the base and showed 
him what I was complaining about, and he was so incensed that a 
few days later 10 air inspectors arrived. They arrived on the 3d 
of March, and one stayed there for months. These 10 were all from 
the Air Inspector General's office. And I think the security officer 
of the field, who was called in to the meeting, is sitting back there. 

Mr. Kearney. I think for the record not only the day and month, 
but the year, should be given. 

Mr. Jordan. I went to Washington January 4, 1944. I conferred 
with the Air Inspector General on January 8, 1944. On January 25, 
1944, the first air inspector arrived at the field, and on March 3, 1944, 
10 other air inspectors arrived. 

Mr. Nixon. I don't feel it is necessary to pursue that point any 
further. I think from the corroboration produced and the testimony 
just presented, it is at least clear that Mr. Jordan made a number of 
attempts to bring this information to the attention of Government 
officials. 

Mr. Jordan. At the same time I made that trip to Washington, 
Colonel Kotikov asked to go along, and he asked me how to get to 630 
Fifth Avenue, New York, which happens to be the address of some- 
body you know. 

Mr. Tavenner. Who is it ? 

Mr. Jordan. The man he wanted to see is merely a conclusion on 
my part, but he wanted to go to 630 Fifth Avenue, and I understand 
that is the address of Mr. Boris Pregel, the man who shipped the 
uranium. So I am taking it for granted his anxiety to go to that 
address was to see that man. 

Mr. Nixon. Your testimony is not in regard to Pregel specifically, 
but that he was at that address ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1167 

Mr. Jordan. Colonel Kotikov asked how to get to 630 Fifth Avenue. 

Mr. Nixon. How do you remember that specific address? 

Mr. Jordan. I knew it was Rockefeller Center, and I told him while 
he was there he ought to go to the top and see the city. He had never 
been in New York before and I was telling him how to do some 
sightseeing. 

Mr. Wood. Any other questions ? 

Mr. Nixon. Yes. The issue raised as to the memorandum in your 
diary or on this slip of paper you presented to the committee — and 
I understand the contents of that paper will appear in this record — is 
on the use of the initials "H. H." and what appeared thereafter in 
the memorandum, and it appears that issue cannot be determined 
because, assuming the initials ''H. H." refer to Mr, Hopkins, the com- 
mittee has not as yet been able to establish corroborative evidence to 
sustain your testimony on that point.^^ On the other hand, the com- 
mittee has not been able to obtain conclusive evidence that you are 
incorrect in what you say. I think, however, that a fair appraisal of 
the testimony is that on that point, at least at this stage, a question 
certainly has arisen as to whether it would have been possible, (1) that 
Mr. Hopkins could have had anything to do with such shipments; 
and (2) if it were possible, whether he actually did. 

I wonder if there is anything you would like to add to the record, 
in addition to your previous testimony, in regard to your contention 
that Mr. Hopkins did call you or that you called him in regard to 
these shipments of uranium, specifically? 

Mr. Jordan. I took it for granted, when I was here before, that 
my testimony about Mr. Hopkins would be accepted, and I didn't 
bring out a number of points that I knew and that could have gone 
along with it. 

In the first place, we had so much communication, through the 
Russians, with Mr. Hopkins that we took it for granted. I would 
like to take a second to tell you that when I was at Newark as acting 
executive officer and the Russian colonel was new, an American Air- 
lines pilot bumped into a Russian plane, causing a slight amount of 
damage, and immediately six Russians came storming in my office 
and wanted to know if I would punish the pilot; they seemed to think 
I should shoot him. I said we didn't do that. Then they wanted to 
banish the air line from the airport. I said I wouldn't do that. They 
said, "Then we will call Mr. Hopkins." 

They called Mr. Hopkins and told him this American Airlines pilot 
had damaged a Russian A-20 plane and they wanted something done 
immediately about it. 

Much to my surprise, CAA phoned a few days later and banished 
all commercial air lines from the airport. 

Naturally, when something like that happens, I was terribly im- 
pressed. One of the remaining officers on that field who was asked 
about these particular incidents made the remark that the Russians 
were in constant communication with Hopkins, and he said the Rus- 
sians talked about it. I will show you his exact words. He was my 
superior officer. 

Mr. Tavenner. Wliat is his name ? 



" See appendix. 



Mr. Jordan. Col. Roy B. Gardner. He said : 

Every time the Russians were dissatisfied with the way things were going, 
which 'was frequently, they would get on the telephone with their Embassy in 
Washington and have them contact Mr. Harry Hopliins, and all difficulties would 
be straightened out immediately. 

I asked Colonel Gardner how he knew Mr. Hopkins did the job. 
He said it was common information ; the Russians referred to it and 
so did everybod}^ else, and it was common routine information. 

Another major on the field who was questioned about my story 
remarked that at one time there were some very difficult parts that 
the factory hadn't even made yet, and the Russians said, "We will 
get them from Mr. Hopkins." So they put in a call, and his exact 
words were: 

I can recall that on many occasions — 

this is Major Starkey, engineer officer of the Army air base — 

when we were short of parts or had some difference with Col. Kotikov, Col. 
Kotikov would place a phone call to Washington and before very long Major 
Jordan would get a telephone call back and the work would be done. Major 
Jordan mentioned Harry Hopkins' name quiti- often, because Hopkins was Ad- 
ministrator of Lend-Lease at that time, and I can recall one instance when we 
were extremely short of airplane parts of one sort and Col. Kotikov called on 
the telephone and in a matter of a few days we had a good supply. It was re- 
markable in view of the fact we had been repeatedly told by Wright Field the 
parts had not yet been made. 

Mr. Nixon. At this point I think it is well to differentiate Mr. 
Hopkins" position as Lend-Lease Administrator in the expediting of 
normal shipments, and the testimony in issue, in order to get the 
proper peispective. What you have testified to up to this point is 
that Mr. Hopkins was called upon from time to time to expedite cer- 
tain shipments, and that he proceeded to take action wiiicii resulted in 
expediting the shipments. It would seem from the fact he was the 
Lend-Lease Administrator and had that responsibility, that nobody 
should be particularly surprised that that occurred. 

Mr. Jordan. Not at all. We were very glad we had a button we 
ccu]d press and get things done. 

Mr. NixoN. You yourself were interested, as you have testified, in 
getting the shipments expedited, and the fact Mr. Hopkins was called 
upon was not surprising'^ 

Mr. Jordan. No. 

Mr. NixoN. The point at issue is whether or not Mr. Hopkins also 
expedited the shipments of uranium. On thnt point considerable 
question has arisen on two scores, first, as to tiie date. You have cor- 
rected your testimony as to the date, so that the objection that has 
been previously raisinl that Mr. Hopkins could not have had a con- 
versation with you because he was in the hospital in 19-14 no longer 
applies, assuming that your recollection is correct as presently stated. 

And another point that has been raised, I understand, by those who 
are quite familiar with Mr. Hopkins' papers and his records, is that 
he could not have specifically expedited a shipment of uranium or 
knowingly done so because he individually had nothing to do with 
and knew nothing about the atomic project. Do you have any com- 
ment on that ? 

Mr. Jordan. I am burning up on that. That is a point I don't feel 
very happy about, because I have a copy of Newsweek dated Decem- 
ber 19 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1169 

Mr. Nixon. What year? 

Mr. Jordan. 1949, which was a week after I was here, in which they 
have a paragraph which has caused me a great deal of discomfort. 
It says : 

Moreover, according to Sidney Ilyman, who organized Hopkins's papers for 
Robert Sherwood, author of "Roosevc^lt and Hopkins,"' F. D. K.'s confidant didn't 
have the faintest understanding of the Manhattan Project until he read about 
the A-bomb being dropped on Hirosliima. Hynian said: "He didn't know the 
difference between uranium and geranium." It wasn't until weeks later that 
Hopkins talked with several of the atomic scientists and learned about "the 
engineering feat of production." 

Well. I bought myself a copy of Eobert E. Sherwood's book when I 
was here, and there is an item on page 154: I would like permission to 
read : 

Bush had no quick access to anyone on the higher levels of government, but 
he knew that the man to see en route to Roosevelt was Harry Hopkins and 
he accordingly went to him with his plan for a National Defense Research 
Council. Hopkins was already interested in the subject, for the Bureau of 
Standards of the Commerce Department was engaged in research, and through 
the Bureau of Patents he had received a suggestion along somewhat similar 
lines. * * * 

Then it tells how the atom bomb was conceived by Bush, taken to 
Hopkins, Hopkins took it to Roosevelt, and it says : 

Subsequently Bush, in consultation with Hopkins, drafted a letter to himself 
for the President's signature. That letter, with a few additions which provided 
for close cooperation between N. D. R. C. and the military authorities, was 
signed by Roosevelt on June 15, the day after the fall of Paris * * *. 

Then over a little further, on page 704, it says : 

It will be noted that Churchill was conducting this correspondence on the 
atomic project with Hopkins rather than with the President and he continued 
to do so for many months thereafter. 

Mr. Kearney. That date of June 15 is Avhat year? 

Mr. Jordan. 1941, at the start of the atomic project. That was be- 
fore Manhattan project was even thought of. And in 1943, when 
Churchill was ill, he conducted his correspondence on the atomic proj- 
ect with Hopkins, and it tells how Hopkins called all the scientists 
together to get the most recent report. And it is the man who wrote 
this book that says Hopkins didn't know uranium from geranium. 

Mr. Nixon. You mean Hyman wrote the book? 

Mr. Jordan. Pie organized the papers, and after Hopkins' death he 
took the papers to Robert Sherwood and Sherwood finished the book. 

Mr. NixoN. Do you have anything else to add? 

Mr. Jordan. I am very unhappy about this "H. H." and "H. L. H." 
business, because I worked under difficulty out there, and it was very 
cold when I made these notes. It must have been 15 or 20 degrees below 
zero. I had a flashlight in my overcoat pocket and a little light in the 
top of the plane, and it was difficult to see what was in the folders. The 
only reason I particularly noticed this memorandum, I was impressed 
because it was on White House stationery. I had never seen White 
House stationery before, and I wondered why it didn't have "D. C." on 
it. I own some property in the State of Washington, and this just 
said "The White House, Washington," and I started to put it back in 
the folder and I noticed it said, "Had a hell of a time getting these 
away from Groves." 

99334 — 50 18 



11 70 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

I thought, "This is important, on that piece of stationery, and I will 
make a note of it." 

And this very comiiiiUee, Mr. Chairman, has been misquoting my 
testimony. I never have said in my testimony, "I had a hell of a time 
getting these away from Groves." I said, "Had a hell of a time 
* * *" And one of the members of this committee asked General 
Groves the question, "It has been testified by Jordan that he said 'I had 
a hell of a time getting these away from Groves,' " and naturally 
Groves said Hopkins never placed pressure on him. I never used the 
work "I" and this committee has been using the "I" and it never was 
in my original testimony. 

Mr. Nixon. Is it in your notes ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. My notes say "Had." So that particular point of 
whether Hopkins put pressure on General Groves has been a very 
difficult point for me to overcome, with the press taking the small 
point and building it up. 

Mr. Nixon. As I understand it, your testimony on this point is that 
you saw a piece of White House stationery with this notation on it ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Nixon. Which said : "Had a hell of a time getting these away 
from Groves." 

Mr. Jordan. Tlie second sheet is where I saw that, and copied it. 

Mr. Nixon. And second, you recall a telephone conversation al- 
legedly held between Colonel Kotikov and somebody who is supposed 
to have been Mr. Hopkins in Washington concerning the expediting of 
one shipment of uranium, and as far as indicating any particular in- 
dividual putting pressure on General Groves is concerned, you have no 
testimony on that point: these are just the facts you are testifying to? 

Mr. Jordan. I am only testifying to the things I know of. For the 
benefit of you gentlemen who were not here before, I want to explain 
I didn't want Colonel Kotikov making telephone calls on my telephone, 
because he would stay on the telephone a half hour or an hour at a 
time, so I used to tell the telephone operator, "If any Russians want 
to make a telephone call, tell them Major Jordan must make the call." 
So when Kotikov wanted to get his Embassy, he would say, "Get my 
Embassy," and I would pick up the telephone and call collect, which 
was the point I was interested in, and get the Michigan number, and 
he would speak in Russian, and he would switch many times, sometimes 
20 or 30, and talk about different subjects ; and sometimes he would lay 
the receiver down and be gone 15 or 20 minutes to look up a certain 
part, and I would get on the phone and ask for Colonel Tavetkov or 
somebody else and talk about another matter until Kotikov came 
back. 

This particular morning he had his files out on chemical plants and 
was running his finger down and came to various shipments that had 
to be expedited. I used to sometimes lean over his shoulders and help 
him turn the pages. This particular morning he said : "Have we room 
for a thousand pounds?" I said: "No. We have about a million 
pounds' backlog now." He said : "I will make a connection for you." 

For a moment or two I think I talked to Piskounov, and then a voice 
came on the wire, "Are you my expediter out there?" and I said, "Yes," 
and he said, "This is Mr. Hopkins speaking." I was naturally very 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1171 

respectful, and he said : "I want you to expedite a certain shipment 
that is going through." 

Then he must have turned and spoken to somebody, because I could 
hear him say, "How will he know the shipment when he sees it?" as 
if he was speaking on the side to someone. I waited and then he came 
back on and said : "Jordan, Colonel Kotikov will designate that ship- 
ment to you. He will point out which shipment he wants expedited, 
but you expedite it." 

Then he said : "I want you to keep this off the record and don't dis- 
cuss it with anybody. This is something very special." 

He asked me a question : "Did you get the pilots I sent you?" We 
had been screaming our heads off for pilots, and only Mr. Hopkins 
could get them, and I said "Yes," we had, and thanked him. 

Then somebody was talking Russian and I handed the phone back 
to Kotikov. 

Generally speaking, I know that was what was said, and when the 
box arrived, it was uranium. 

Mr. Nixon. That concludes your statement on the Hopkins matter 
as far as you want to elaborate at this time ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Nixon. That is all I have. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Velde. 

Mr. Velde. I have nothing, except I want to express appreciation 
for your holding this investigation and second hearing. It is unfor- 
tunate we of the minority were not here at the first hearing, and it is 
also unfortunate certain defamatory remarks were put in the news- 
papers and over the air regarding Major Jordan's testimony, and I 
think it has done a great deal of harm to this committee in getting 
witnesses to appear. I am sure witnesses will not appear voluntarily 
and answer questions unless we give credence to the statements they 
make, and I am particularly glad of the opportunity we had to have 
this second hearing. 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kearney. 

Mr. Kjearney. One point in my own mind I want to clear up is on 
your recent testimony concerning these telephone calls. Where were 
these calls j^laced to? 

Mr. Jordan. Our desks were alongside of each other. 

Mr. Kearney. Where in Washington were they placed? 

Mr. Jordan. The Russian Purchasing Commission or the Russian 
Embassy. 

Mr. Kearney. And at the time you referred to, if that was so, Mr. 
Hopkins would have been in the Russian Purchasing Commission or 
Embassy ? 

Mr. Jordan. Not necessarily. Someone could have called him 
through the switchboard at the Embassy and he could have been 
talking from the White House or anywhere he might have been and 
the operator could have made a conference call. 

Mr. Kearney. You don't mean to imply Mr. Hopkins was at the 
Russian Embassy ? 

Mr. Jordan, No. I saw headlines that I got very chummy with 
Mr. Hopkins and« talked frequently with him. I never met the man. 



117z SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

I have no reason for saying anything that didn't happen. I only- 
tried to be helpful and give you information because I thought it was 
my duty to do it. 

Mr. Wood. Any furthere questions? 

Mr. Tavennek. Yes. In referring to the Hopkins note as you have 
described it, you said there were two pages, and what you saw written 
and have testified to was on the second page ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes, sir. 

]Mr. Taatennek. 1 don't believe you have ever told us what was on 
the first page, if anything. 

Mr. Jordan. Mi-. Tavenner, it happened 7 years ago. I can only 
say I was looking at the first page at the White House stationery, and 
flipped it over to see who signed it, and after I saw it was in long- 
hand I thought it would be a good idea to copy "Had a hell of a 
time * * *." Tlie word before "Had" is not clear in my mind. 
I believe it was some name. I can't swear to that, lie was not a 
good writer. 

Mr. Tavenner. It was written in longhand, and you believe now 
there was som.e name placed before the word "Had"? 

Mr. Jordan. I believe if it had been anything else I could have 
read, I am quite sure I would have made a note of it. I decided to 
take the tail end of it, that was all. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were both pages on the letterhead of the White 
House ? 

Mr. Jordan. No. The first paije was "Wliite House stationery, and 
I believe the second was second-sheet. 

I^Ir. Tavenner. Was there a letter written on the first sheet? 

Mr. Jordan. It was in longhand; the entire front sheet and about 
one-third of the second sheet. 

Mr. Tavenner. So it was a continuous letter ? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Of two pages? 

Mr. Jordan. Yes; and I think behind the last sheet there were a 
couple of typewritten letters, and then there was a map which I 
telescoped out and turned it around to read upside down what was on 
it, and I took my notes off the map. 

(Representative Nixon, leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. You have testified fully to that. Were the two 
pages of this letter clipped together in any manner? 

Mr. Jordan. I think they were clipped to the next couple of sheets 
and the map. 

Mr. Tavenner. You noticed this very unusual language about the 
getting of these matters from Groves. 

Mr. Jordan. I didn't know who Groves was. 

Mr. TA^T.NNER. But if it was important enough for you to write 
down that part of the letter, didn't you look at the rest of the letter 
to see what it was about ? Don't you think you would have looked at 
the rest ? 

Mr. Jordan. I think I must have, but I don't remember what it said. 

Mr. Taa^nner. You don't remember anything about the contents of 
the rest of the letter ? » 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1173 

~Mv. JoEDAi^, Except for the notation I have; that is all. 

Mr. Tavenner. I do not believe we have put in as a part of the 
record your original notes. We would like to have that photostated 
also and put in. 

Mr. Jordan. Which notes? 

Mr. Tavenner. The memorandum that you took at the time. 

Mr. Wood. Major, do you object to the committee having that sheet 
of paper photostated and return the original to you ? 

Mr. Jordan. No objection at all. 

Mr. Wood. Very well. It will be done, 

Mr. Tavenner. No further questions. 

Mr. Wood. Is there any additional statement you desire to make in 
connection with this hearing that you think w^ould be beneficial to 
this committee in its endeavor to carry out the function the committee 
was set up to do ? 

Mr. Jordan. There has been a soldier that came forward and made 
a statement about finding four dead Eussians in a plane in Alaska, 
and he mentioned that when he discovered this wrecked plane with four 
dead Russians he found blacl^c suitcases similar to the ones I desci'ibed, 
and he mentioned he found maps of the Alaska defense areas. I just 
want to make certain that the committee hooks that up with my testi- 
mony, because it happened in 1942, and if he had that happen to him 
in December 1942, it should show this committee that the suitcases were 
going through before I got there in 1943. His statement was that 
"We started looking around for souvenirs" 

Mr. Wood. Do you know who made that statement ? 

Mr. Jordan. Henry J. Cauthen of company G, Fourth Infantry 
Regiment, Nome, Alaska. 

Upon seeing some black suitcases lying on the ground we decided to open them 
lip. Two of the suitcases had been partially destroyed and were of no value, 
but three or four were lying on the ground and I opened one. These suitcases 
were black, very cheaply made, and had straps that were very light because they 
had both been opened up. When we opened it the first thing we saw was a map, 
and we found they had blueprints on the bottom. We didn't disturb the blue- 
prints but we did look at the map. This was an American engineer map made 
for the Air Corps and showed our defense area around the Nome air base. The 
map was in English but had writing in Russian and showed all our defense 
areas. A couple Russians came from Nome and took the suitcases away from us. 

There has been a lot of talk about my story being a trumped-up 
story, and I wanted this to go in to show the suitcases were going 
through long before I got to Great Falls. 

I want to add there was a Colonel Shumonsky, Stanilaus Shumon- 
sky, who came in a C^7 and he absolutely demanded that I not look 
at the plane, and I insisted. Finally I had to ground the plane. I 
told him he would never get off the ground until I saw wdiat w^as in 
the plane. 

He finally opened the door and the entire plane was loaded with 
films, canisters of films, and they were tied down with a passageway 
down the center for the pilot. I opened one film and held it to the 
light and it showed technical cams and gears, very technical, and in- 
tricate technical processes. One canister showed automobile tops 
being stamped out like doughnuts. I went through canister after 



1174 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

canister and it was the technical know-how of this country sluicing 
through, and I didn't see what it had to do with the war effort. 

Mr. Wood. Permit me to express to you the appreciation of this 
committee for your willingness to come back here and afford the other 
members of the committee, not here at the first hearing, an opportunity 
to examine you. We hope it has not caused you too much incon- 
venience. 

Anything further? 

Mr. Tavenner. That is all. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will stand adjourned. 

(Thereupon, at 4 : 30 p. m. Friday, March 3, 1950, the committee ad- 
journed.) 



HEARINGS EEGAEDING SHIPMENTS OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 
TO THE SOVIET UNION DURING WORLD WAR II 



TUESDAY, MARCH 7, 1950 

United States House of Representatia'es, 

Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Un-American Activities, 

Washington^ JD. C. 

PUBLIC HEARING 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 : 45 a. m., in room 226, 
Old House Office Building, Wasliington, D. C, Hon. Francis E. 
Walter presiding. 

Committee members present: Representatives Francis E. Walter 
and Bernard W. Kearney. 

Staff members present : Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., counsel ; Louis J. 
Russell, senior investigator ; Donald T. Appell, investigator ; John W. 
Carringlon, clerk; Benjamin Mandel, director of research; and A. S. 
Poore, editor. 

Mr. Walter. Let us have order, please. 

Let the record disclose that this hearing is being conducted by a 
subcommittee designated by the chairman, composed of Messrs. Wood, 
Kearney, and Walter, and that Messrs. Kearney and Walter are pres- 
ent, a quorum. 

Mr. Kravchenko, will you raise your right hand. Do you swear the 
testimony you are about to give shall be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I do. 

Mr. Walter. And will you [indicating Mr. Wolin] arise, please. 
Do you swear the translation that you will make of the testnnony 
given by Mr. Kravchenko shall be a true and accurate translation of 
what he says ? 

Mr. WoLiN. I do. 

TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO (ACCOMPANIED BY 
SIMON WOLIN, INTERPRETER) 

Mr. Tavenner. If the Chairman please, I would like to qualify 
first the interpreter, before asking questions of Mr. Kravchenko. 
Your name is Mr, Wolin ? 
Mr. WoLiN. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state your full name ? 
Mr. WoLiN. Simon Wolin. 
Mr. Tavenner. How are you employed ? 
Mr. Wolin. I am a free lance research worker. 

1175 



1176 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Taveistner. Will you state that again ? 

Mr. WoLiN. I am a free lance research worker. 

Mr. Tavexxer. What has been j^our experience with the Russian 
language ? 

Mr. WoLix. I was born in Russia and graduated from the faculty 
of law, of a Russian university. Here in this country I was statf 
translator in New York for a weekly magazine, and a small book 
translated b}^ me was published in New York in 1948. 

Mr. Tavenner. What positions have you held in New York? 

Mr. WoLiN. I was mostly a free lance researcher. I was assistant 
editor of that weekly magazine I was speaking of in New York, the 
New Leader. Last year I was engaged in a Government research 
project. 

Mr. Tavexner. Are you a naturalized American citizen? 

Mr. WoLiN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Kravchenko, will you state your full name, 
please ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Victor A. Kravchenko. 

Mr. Tavenner. When and where were you born? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I was born in Dnepropetrovsk, Russia, in 1905. 

Mr. Tavenner. You have an interpreter present, but you speak 
English very well and I trust that you will answer directly such ques- 
tions as you feel you can. 

Mr. Kravchenko. I will try. 

Mr. Tavenner. And call on the interpreter as little as possible. I 
believe you have a statement that you desire to make? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I do. 

JMr. WoLiN. May I read it, in order to have it clear? 

Mr. TA^T.NNER. Yes. 

(Thereupon the following statement of Mr. Kravchenko was read by 
Mr. Wolin:) 

Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, prior to testifying before your committee, I consider 
it my duty to make tlie following statement : 

When I testified before this committee once before, some persons criticized 
me severely and accused me of serving the purposes of the Republican Party. 
I desire to make my position as a witness before the committee unmistakably 
•clear. 

. I have been invited to come here, and I am glad to testify. But I do not 
wish my testimony to be regarded or used in any way as a statement for partisan 
political piu-poses. 

I am sure that you, gentlemen, will agree with me on that, in these diflScult 
times, important though party interests may be, they must needs take second 
place. It must surely be the opinion of evei-y patriotic American, be he Repub- 
lican or Democrat, that our main concern is the security of America, which 
has now become my home. 

It seems to me that it is not right to discredit today those who in the past 
have acted in accordance with the policies of the time in which they lived, and 
who scrupulously fulfilled agreements made with the Soviet Union when it was 
a military ally of the United States. 

Now, gentlemen, the relations between these two countries have radically 
changed — not through any fault of the United States, but through the fault of 
the Soviet Union — or, to put it more correctly, through the double-faced and 
dangerous Soviet policy which the Politburo concealed during the war, both 
from the people of Russia and from its ally, America. 

This was revealed only later, creating the threatening situation which exists 
today. 

This is no surprise to me personally. In the past I have written and spoken 
•often enough to my American friends about it. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1177 

The Soviet Government has legalized the system of espionage on its own 
citizenry within its own country. This espionage is conducted on a tremendous 
scale. 

AVhy should we think that in America, England, or France the Soviet Gov- 
ernment does not carry on the most active espionage for the fvirtherance of its 
military, political, and police aims to the extent w^hich our easy-going attitude 
and our lack of understanding of the core of Soviet policy permit? 

We make a fatal mistake in not grasping this. 

Soviet diplomacy is iiulivisible from the espionage activities of the Kremlin 
abroad. Every Soviet diplomat, whether he be Malik in the United Nations, 
Panyushkin in Washington, or their colleagues in Paris or London, has gone 
through extensive training along these lines, and has had wide experience. 

Espionage is one of the principal duties connected with their ofl&cial diplomatic 
work. I feel that I cannot repeat too often that every Soviet representative — 
diplomatic, military, or economic — is a potential spy. We can and must only 
consider them as such. 

It would be erroneous to judge their activities by their oflBcial actions. What 
should interest us are the actions which they perform behind the curtain of 
their oflBcial capacity, their attempts to ferret out the secrets of those countries 
to which they are the accredited i*epreseutatives. 

We must regard the representatives of the countries belonging to the Soviet 
bloc in the same way. 

Soviet espionage today is developed to a vast scale. The NKVD, the Ministry 
of War, work hand in hand, although frequently their various representatives 
do not know each other. These organizations exploit similar organizations in the 
satellite countries, and they all use Communists and fellow travelers in whatever 
country they happen to be, for their own aims and purposes. 

The Fuchs case in England is only a prelude to much which we do not know 
and which is still to come regarding the scope of Soviet espionage in America 
and other western countries. I do not doubt that many bitter surprises await us. 

Gentlemen, I am at your disposal. 

Mr. Tavennek. Mr. Ivravchenko, what positions have you held in 
the Soviet Government ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. After my graduation from the MetaUurgical 
Institute, and studying aviation, I worked in the Soviet industry as 
director of a factory, as chief engineer of a factory, as chief engineer of 
the metalktrgical trust. During the war I was head of a group of 
factories and also chief of the department of engineering arma- 
ments of the Soviet Russian Eepublic; I mean of the Russian Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic. 

Mr. Tavenner. TMiat position did you hold with the Soviet Govern- 
ment while you were in the United States ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I was economic attache of the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission from August 1943 to April 1944. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you ever a member of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes, I was a member from 1929 until April 1944.' 

Mr. Tavenner. A^Hien did you leave the employ of the Soviet Gov- 
ernment, and will you briefly outline your reasons for leaving? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I left the Soviet service in April 1944 ; the 1st of 
April, I think. My reason was very simple. During all my life I had 
great experience with the party and with the Soviet Government. My 
father and my grandfather were workmen. I always tried, when I was 
young, to believe the Communist Party would give us a better life 
than we had. I also tried to believe the Communist Party would create 
better living conditions for all people in the world. For this purpose 
in 1925 I joined the young Communist organization, the Komsomol. 
And in 1929, after service in the Red Army, I became a member of 
the party. 



1178 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

All my experience proved that the Communist Party and its policy, 
both domestic and foreign, did not serve the best interests of the 
Russian people; nor did it serve the interests of any people in the 
outside world. With every year of my experience I oecame more 
and more disillusioned. The Soviet policy always double-crossed 
my people and naturally it always double-crossed the outside world, 
during the war, especially the United States, England, and the other 
military allies. 

When — do you understand my English language ? 

Mr. Tavenner. Yes ; very well. 

Mr. Kravchenko. In 1933 I was a student at the Metallurgical In- 
stitute. It was during the period of collectivization. I visited many 
villages. I saw everything that happened during collectivization. I 
saw terror, injustice, hunger, and so on. That was the beginning of 
my disillusionment, about 1933; and every year this disillusionment 
increased. In 1936 I was purged. Well, I had much experience with 
the Soviet police, the NKVD, and I still better realized the essence of 
the Russian regime. 

During the war I tried to do my duty, to do my best as a Russian 
man, because we were at war. I worked very hard. I did everything 
I could. At the same time I was scared of the Soviet Government, 
and scared of the party, but I did my duty to help win victory over 
Germany. 

Owing to my work during the war, many documents signed by Mr. 
Molotov, Mr. Stalin, and other members of the Politburo passed daily 
through my hands. I saw every day examples of how they did their 
duty, as they called it; and I realized that the Russian people had 
nothing in common with the Communist Party and the Soviet regime. 

I also realized that I had no opportunity inside the country to do 
anything openly for my people against the Soviet Government. And 
when they sent me to the United States I decided to break with them 
and tell the people of the United States and other countries what I 
knew about the Soviet regime and about the living conditions in my 
country. 

Mr. Tavenner. "Wlien did you arrive in the United States? 

Mr. Kravchenko. In August 1943. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you meet, upon your arrival in the United 
States, Consul Lomakin, who at that time was consul of the Soviet 
Consulate in San Francisco ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; I did. We came to Vancouver from Vladi- 
•vostok on the ship Komeles. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell the name of the ship ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. K-o-m-e-l-e-s. 

Mr. Tavenner. That is the name of the ship on which you arrived? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. Whe had a few storms during our trip from 
Vladivostok to Vancouver, and we had some trouble with the Japanese 
Navy which stopped us in the open sea and searched our ship. The 
captain of the ship and the political commissar were worried. I did 
not understand wliy. 

Mr. Tavenner, Was this a Russian ship? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right, ^^^len we came to Vancouver Mr. 
Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the 
captain and the political commissar were there, and I have forgotten 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1179 

the names of three of my colleagues who also were in the cabin ; they 
all were responsible party members. There was no secret from them. 
When Mr. Lomakin came to the cabin, the captain gave to Mr. Lomakin 
a few packages [speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). All sealed. 

Mr. Tavenner. Packages which were under seal ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. He gave them to Mr. Lomakin 
and Mr. Lomakin took the packages with him and left the ship. 

The captain said : 

This is the reason I was worried. If somethiug had happened and these 
papers were seized by the Japanese or somebody else, I would be in great 
trouble. 

Lomakin came aboard. I was in the cabin of the captain, and the 
captain of the ship was scared. He was the captain and at the same 
time he was a political commissar for the Soviet government. 

Mr. Tavenner. You of course don't know anything about the con- 
tents of those papers? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't; but I know that if these were simple 
papers and had nothing to do with underground work or with con- 
spiracy, there would be no reason for the captain of the ship to take 
these papers from Moscow and hand them personally to Mr. Lomakin, 
and for Mr. Lomakin to take these papers as if he were stealing some- 
thing from somebody. Lomakin was Soviet consul in San Francisco ; 
and you must understand that from my experience with the Soviet 
Government, from what I knew about them and their methods, I im- 
mediately realized what was going on. I worked many years with 
them. There was nothing new to me in this transaction. 

Mr. Tavenner. Your purpose in coming to the United States was 
to engage in work with the Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. In what capacity? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Well, as I mentioned before, I was sent to the 
United States as an economic attache to the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you explain to the committee the set-up of the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission, that is, who controlled the activities 
in which the Commission was engaged, and any other pertinent matter 
regarding its functions which this committee would be interested in ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. First I ask your permission to explain the 
general features of the situation during the war. 

Before we came to the United States — when I say "we" I mean all 
members of the Communist Party who had more or less responsible 
duties or more or less responsible jobs — before we came to the United 
States we had received instructions from the central committee of 
the party. 

Mr. Tavenner. By "party" are you referring to the Communist 
Party? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Communist Party, of course, because in the 
Soviet Union there is only one party. From the conversations which 
I had with officials of the Central Committee of the party, we knew 
before we left for the United States that we had never been friends 
with the United States, and the central committee of the party made 
this absoluely clear. For 2 weeks we had to go from office to office 



1180 SHIPMENT OF ATOAnC JVIATERIAL 

and we were told repeatedly : ''You are going to the capitalistic United 
States. We are allies today because we need each other, but when the 
war is over and we shall have won victory — and we are sure we shall 
win it — we shall again become open enemies." [Speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLix (translating). We shall never modify our philosophy 
and our doctrine. 

Mr. Kravchenko (.speaking in Eussian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). We are allies in trouble. 

Mr. Kkavchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). But both partners know that they hate 
each other. 

Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Sooner or later a clash between the two 
is inevitable. 

Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLix (translating). Until then the Allies will remain our 
friends and we shall cooperate in our mutual interests. 

Mr. Kravchenko. "For this reason and with an eye to the future, 
we must study carefully the industry in the United States, the military 
industry, the civilian industry, all technological and industrial proc- 
esses, and we must get hold of their secrets so that we can achieve 
similar results in our country and when the time comes we will be 
ready for the fight." 

Mr. Walter. Did the Russians regard the United States as their 
enemy during the period we Mere fighting for the common cause? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Ideologically and secretly, yes. For example, 
every week we had closed party sessions in our office in Moscow. 
Somebody would come from the Central Committee or from the Polit- 
buro. He would give us a speech on the international situation, the 
war situation, and so on, and would make it absolutely clear — I men- 
tioned it in my book and it is not necessary to repeat, but I would 
like to mention that they always said and always repeated [speaking 
in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). We are Allies because there is a war on. 

Mr. Kravchenko. "But we must realize that the Americans will 
never like us and we will never like them." Also, "we will never like 
the English and the French ; I mean their political attitudes." And 
practically [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). As a practical result of all this 

Mr. Kravchenko. Every Soviet official, when he goes to the United 
States or to any other country, he alwaj^s has two duties to perform. 
These duties go parallel : One of them is an official duty. For ex- 
ample, a man comes as a simple engineer to the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission, but before he comes to the United States, the Central 
Committee of the party or some special government office or depart- 
ment, issues orders indicating where in the United States he must 
work, which factor}^ or chemical plant, or any kind of industry he 
has to watch. I am talking now about engineers, because I was one of 
them and I know their work best. I don't know what orders were 
given by the general staff. 

Now, when this man came to the United States he had to do two 
jobs at the same time. The one was open and legal, and the other 
was conspiracy. And when he went back to the Soviet Union, the 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1181 

Soviet Government would appreciate his work in the U. S. A. accord- 
ing to the secret information he had gathered for the Soviet industry 
or for the military staff. All of us had such duties. 

Mr. Walter. Is that true of the diplomats as well ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely. They are absolutely no different. 
In 1943 or 1944 INIr. Rudenko, who was chairman of the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission, had an office at 3355 Sixteenth Street in Wash- 
ington. General Serov was military attache at that time. Gromyko 
was Soviet Ambassador to Washington. Gusev, in New York, was 
head of the organization Amtorg. All these officers worked together 
[speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). It was of no imj)ortance who got the 
information. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Of course there was competition among them, be- 
cause everyone wanted the "thank you" from the Soviet Union so that 
upon his return to the Soviet Union he would receive a higher 
position. 

Mr. Walter, Do I understand the Soviet diplomatic representatives 
in the United States were engaged in espionage ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, that is their sys- 
tem. We must understand that they all received special training, for 
instance, Mr. Malik, now representative in the United Nations; Mr. 
Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador in London ; Mr. Panyushkin in Washing- 
ton, who has good experience in military intelligence. All of them — 
there is no question — all of them are members of the party. That 
comes first. Their first duty is not diplomatic; their first duty is 
to be devoted members of the party. They must do everything the 
Politburo of the Soviet Union requires, at any price. 

Now, I come back to your question. For example, the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission during the war had more than a thousand em- 
ployees. Some of them came to the United States as simple engineers, 
but in reality they were in top positions in industry or in scientific 
research. Some came as civilians, but really they were officers of the 
Navy or artillery or tank troops or the air force. 

No official of the Soviet Purchasing Commission came to the United 
States as a member of the Communist Party. If "you look at the 
records in the Department of State you will find that no party members 
came from the Soviet Union. 

This was the psychologically favorable moment for the Soviet Gov- 
ernment. We were in the midst of a war. Many American people 
paid great respect to the Soviet Army. Everybody was in sympathy 
with and liked to talk to men in Soviet military uniform. 

In the Soviet Purchasing Commission, Mr. Rudenko, Mr. Serov, 
and a few chairmen of departments were called "the Politburo of the 
Purchasing Commission." On the seventh floor of the Soviet Purchas- 
ing Commission, behind an iron door at 3355 Sixteenth Street, Wash- 
ington, D. C. — it was not in Moscow — there was a special department 
of the NKVD. Everything that came from the Soviet Union, for in- 
stance [speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating) . A secret communication. 
Mr. Kravchenko. Came to the seventh-floor department. Also, 
the seventh-floor department kept agents in every department, in 
the metal department or chemical department or aviation department. 



11 §2 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Secret material went to the special department, one of whose officials 
was Mrs. Arutunian. Her husband was son of the Deputy Commis- 
sariat of Kailroads of the Soviet Union. She also worked for this 
special department and all secret papers went through her hands. 
With this department I had some trouble, and I know what I am 
talking about. 

All of us knew about the functions of the special department, but 
we never knew who the representative of the Soviet Secret Police was 
in the Soviet Purchasing Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did I understand you to say Rudenko was re- 
sponsible to the NKVD which had its headquarters on the seventh 
floor? Is that a correct statement? 

Mr. Kravciienko. The special department formally was under Mr. 
Rudenko, because he was head of the Soviet Purchasing Commission ; 
this is natural, but [speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLTN (translating). In fact they were independent, the 
NKVD section was independent from the chief of the Purchasing 
Commission. 

Mr. Tavenner. And the head of the Purchasing Commission, Mr. 
Rudenko, was compelled to carry out certain activities that were out- 
lined by the NIvVD ? Is that a correct statement ? 

Mr. Kravciienko. This is absolutely natural. You see, he had two 
bosses. The one boss — may I make this clear — was Mr. Mikoyan, the 
member of the Politburo, and second assistant of Mr. Stalin during 
the war. Mr. Mikoyan was Commissar of Foreign Trade. During 
the war Mr. Mikoyan was in charge of lend-lease. That was his duty 
as a member of the Politburo. All supplies for the Soviet Govern- 
ment passed through the hands of Mr. Mikoyan. 

As to Leonid Rudenko, I had known him many years. We worked 
at the same factory in the Ukraine in about 1924 or 1925. Mr. Rudenko 
received orders from Moscow from Mikoyan, from the foreign office, 
from the genera] staff, and from the party. Wliat he did for one office 
or another I don't know, but the fact is that all these offices were rep- 
resented in the United States. 

At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, one day we received orders 
issued to all responsible members of the Communist Party. It was 
after work, after 5 o'clock. The office door was closed, and Mr. Serov 
came in with several sheets of paper containing orders from Mikoyan 
to Mr. Rudenko and to all members of the party in the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission. These orders made it absolutely clear that we 
had to find out all secret information about the industrial develop- 
ment in the United States, and especially in the military industry, and 
Mr. Mikoyan said [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). We shall appreciate you according to 
your ability to comply with this order. 

Mr. Kravchenko. This document was read to us and we were asked 
to sign a statement that we knew about this order and that we would 
make every effort [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). To fulfill it. 

Mr. Kravchenko. This was what I saw, what I knew. It was 
absolutely clear ; there was no mistake about it. 

Mr. Tavenner. What effect did this order have upon the activities 
of the Russians who were members of the Soviet Purchasing Com- 
mission ? 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1183 

Mr. Kravchenko. First I will mention a few names and give you 
a practical example of what they did. 

One day I saw big books like this, approximately [indicating] 
which contained many pictures of the aviation industry, the special 
machines, special details, and so on. There were pictures and blue- 
prints [speaking in Eussian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Three large volumes. 

Mr. Kravchenko. This material was signed by General Belayev, 
Alexander Rostartchouk, and Engineer Khinuichin. General Belayev 
was chairman of the Soviet Purchasing Conunission ; Alexander Ros- 
tartchouk was head of the metal section; and Engineer Khinuichin, 
who came to the United States as a simple engineer actually was 
[speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Was doctor of technical sciences. 

Mr. Kravchenko. And was working on research at an institute in 
Moscow in that capacity. He came to the United States as a simple 
engineer. 

How they obtained those pictures and blueprints, how they found 
all this information about the development of aviation in the United 
States, I don't know. I just saw these documents; I saw the signa- 
tures ; and I know General Belayev took them when he flew to Moscow. 
This is the first example. 

Second example : I can't mention a certain name in open session 
of the committee. I have some good reason for that. But I know 
this: Two Navy captains obtained information on the production of 
American submarines, on technological processes and details and on 
the perspective of development of the submarine industry. That is 
the second example. 

The third example: From 1925 or 1926 I have know Semen Vasi- 
lenko. Semen Vasilenko, now in the Soviet Union, is head of the 
whole production of pipes and tubes in the Soviet Union, as part of 
the metallurgical industry. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you repeat that ? 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). He is head of the production of pipes 
and tubes in the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you spell that name? 

Mr. Kravchenko. S-e-m-e-n V-a-s-i-1-e-n-k-o. Semen Vasilenko. 
I knew him many, many years. Vasilenko was a member of the 
party; he had been a member of the Ukrainian Government and was 
[speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. Wolin (translating). Was awarded a Stalin premium. 

Mr. Kravchenko. And also he had a few decorations. He came to 
the United States for the sole purpose of finding some special infor- 
mation about the metallurgical and tube industry and miiltary 
industry. 

One day in February 1944, I don't remember the date, Vasilenko, 
myself, and Vdovin got ready to fly to the Soviet Union [speaking in 
Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Six large bags. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you state that over again ? 

Mr. WoLiN (translating) . Six large bags. 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right ; and Vasilenko took the six bags 
to the Soviet Union [speaking in Russian] . 

Mr, Wolin (translating). I saw that material. 



1184 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Kravciienko. Some of this material was about the production 
of planes and the new technological processes; some was about ar- 
tillery; some was about new technological processes in metallurgy; 
some was about [speaking in Eussian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). The possibilities of industrial develop- 
ment. 

Mr. Kearnet. Would the witness mind repeating that ? 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Among this material there was also an 
outline of the possibilities of industrial development. 

Mr. Kravchenko. I mean the perspective ; for example, what was 
planned 5 or 10 years ahead ; what the plans for the present are ; and 
so on; also the plan in perspective for the general development of 
industry. Do you understand ? 

I know all this material was found in an unofficial way. What could 
be the reason for Mr. Vasilenko, a former member of the govern- 
ment, or for somebody else, to do work as a plain workman ? [speaking 
in Russian.]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). They were working as plain workmen. 

Mr. Kravchenko. We closed the door. Nobody could see this 
material. And Vasilenko took this material and flew to the Soviet 
Union. 

Now, one more example. At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944, 
Vassili Sergeiev was deputy of Mr. Mikoyan. Mr. Sergeiev came 
to the United States. He had meetings here and saw many respon- 
sible industrial people and so on. He brought from Moscow another 
order about [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Various types of information which 
should be obtained. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Sergeiev [speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Sergeiev gathered the heads of the de- 
partments and explained what kind of material they are expected to 
get at any price. 

Mr. Kravchenko. I must make it clear, Mr. Chairman, all depart- 
ments of the Soviet Purchasing Commission — aviation, transporta- 
tion, all of them — were working for this purpose. We transferred 
to the Soviet Union not just this one package; we transferred to the 
Soviet Union dozens of tons, of material, and not just by airplane. We 
also were using Soviet ships that came from lend-lease for the Soviet 
Union, and they called this material super lend-lease. [Laughter.] 

Well, it is true. And they sent material by these ships for the only 
reason, that the Soviet Government never believed in peace between 
these two countries. They worked very hard to prepare themselves. 
They understand very well that a new war, if it comes, will be a great 
technical war, much more so than the last war, and they know very 
well that the United States is a great industrial country. They must 
find all material they can, all kinds of information [speaking in 
Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). To be on a level with this country in its 
military and industrial developments; also, to be up to date. 

Mr. Walter. Do you know how this super lend-lease material was 
concealed before it was put aboard the ships ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Lomakin [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Lomakin simply could come to any boat, 
or anybody else could come, and bring whatever they wanted. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1185 

Mr. Kravchenko. And any captain and any sailor could go ashore 
to New York or Philadelphia or Baltimore. They did as they pleased. 
How could you check on them? I saw in New York Soviet ships 
[speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). We brought this material on the ship. 

Mr. Kravchenko. \Y1io cared what we took. Had we taken the 
Empire State Building and put it on a ship, nobody would have cared. 
That is true. I know ; I saAv that. Nobocly opened boxes and checked. 
1 witnessed it. [Speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). I saw dozens of times how Soviet boats 
Avere loaded, and I know^ what I am talking about. 

Mr. Walter. So no check was made, and these packing cases con- 
taining plans and blueprints were freely passed on the ships with other 
lend-lease material ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. You see, Mr. Chairman, it was absolutely natural 
during the war. In the United States, as in many countries in the 
world, there was much respect for the Red Army. It was a natural 
feeling. I am talking now about the policy and psychology of the 
Soviet Government. They did everything against the United States 
during the war, and now [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Why should they change? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. 

Mr. Kearney. Were any of these packages under diplomatic seal? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. Vasilenko flew to the Soviet Union with all 
[speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). This luggage. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; possessed diplomatic immunity ; and Vasi- 
lenko was not an exception. Everybody who went back always took 
something with him under diplomatic immunity. And during the 
war the Soviet Government received plenty of airplanes from the 
United States. These airplanes were flown by Soviet pilots to the 
Soviet Union. It was part of our activity during the war. 

Mr. Kearney. Did you ever help load any of those packages ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; for the very simple reason that, if I said 
I wouldn't help, what would have happened? If I said I wouldn't 
help Mr. Vasilenko, why [speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). I would never survive to come here. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Any suspicion by the authorities of the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission or by the Embassy or by the NKVD people 
in the United States would entail grave danger. 

Mr, Kearney. I Avould like a direct answer to the question : Did you 
ever help load any of these packages ? 

Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating) . Do you mean secret material? 

Mr. Kearney. Yes. 

Mr. Kravchenko. If I did myself ? No. [Speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). But that was known; it was not kept 
secret. 

Mr. Kravchenko. I was in the party from 1929, and I knew many 
Soviet officials who had graduated from college with me. We sat in 
the same college, in the same room, for many years. Sometimes they 
spoke of what they had found, but they never said how this was done. 
And when we talked to Vasilenko he would say : "It is much better if 

09334—50 19 



118o SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

we never speak about it. If the United States stops me, I will be 
resiDonsible for my own action only." 

Mr. Tavenner. If I understood you correctly, Vasilenko packed 
these six bags behind closed doors ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Were you there when they were packed ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. I was helping him. 

Mr. Tavenner. You helped him pack them ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. We worked like simple workmen because 
they didn't trust anybody. 

Mr. Tavenner. Then you did actually assist in packing that sort 
of material ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Tavenner. You probably misunderstood the Congressman's 
question. 

Mr. WoLiN. His question was of loading. This is packing. 

Mr. Kearney. He helped pack them, but did not help load them ? 

Mr. WoLiN. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you recall the month and year in which Vasi- 
lenko flew those packages to Moscow ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't remember exactly the date, but I remem- 
ber very well it was in February 1944. 

Mr. Tavenner. February 1944 ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Chairman, it was the testimony of Maj. George 
Racey Jordan, from his diary, that Vasilenko came through Great 
Falls on the I7th of February en route to Moscow with diplomatic 
mail. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Everybody was using diplomatic passports. 
For example, I knew prominent captains of the Soviet navy fleet. All 
of them had diplomatic passports, and when we came to Vladviostok 
some of them put on civilian clothes and came to the United States as 
civilians. 

Mr. Kearney. Although they were naval officers ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; and with six or seven decorations. 

Mr. Tavenner. In the course of your testimony you mentioned the 
name of Alexander Rostartchouk. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes. 

Mr. Tavenner. How mas he employed ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Eostartchouk was chairman of the metal depart- 
ment of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. 

Mr, Tavenner. Do you have any knowledge of any secret material 
gathered by him ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I saw material on aviation. I saw that material 
and his signature. 

Mr. Walter. Did you ever fly back to Russia ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. From the United States ? 

Mr. Walter. Yes. 

Mr. Kravchenko. No. I preferred to fly to New York. 

Mr. Tavennerr. Was any of the material which was collected by 
Rostartchouk or signed for by him included in those pouches which 
Vasilenko took to Russia in February 1944 ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. No. Vasilenko's material was quite different 
from that of Rostartchouk. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1187 

Mr. Tavenner. But this material was taken to Russia ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. 

Mr. Tavenner. By the same general method ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. From the point of view of diplomatic immunity, 
yes, but different persons were used, because the aviation information 
was taken by General Belayev. 

When General Belayev came to the Soviet Union after what he had 
done here, Mr. Davies, former American Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, was with General Belayev in Stalingrad and they kissed each 
other. I am 99 percent sure of this. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Prof. Paul Emelianenko ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I do. He was graduated from the Metallurgical 
College at which I studied. He is a very well-known scientist in the 
Soviet Union. He was also a corresponding member [speaking in 
Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Of the Academy of Science. 

Mr. Kravchenko. He came to the United States. I have known 
him since about 1931. [Speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLiN (translating) . He was also a recipient of a Stalin prize. 

Mr. Tavenner. What part did he play in obtaining information for 
the Purchasing Commission ? 

Mr. I^jiavchenko. Well, when Emelianenko was in Washington 
he spent about 75 or TO percent of his time visiting many cities and 
many factories in the United States. 

Mr. Tavenner. Just a minute. Are you talking about Emelianenko ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. I am talking about him. He spent 
about 70 percent of his time traveling to many cities and many fac- 
tories in the United States. Because he was a very good scientist, his 
special duty was to find out what new technological processes and what 
new kinds of machinery were used in the United States of America. As 
a prominent scientist, if he saw something a few times he knew how 
to copy it. He worked here a few months, then he flew to the Soviet 
Union in the middle of April 1944. He did a great job because he 
has really a brilliant brain and brilliant experience. 

Mr. Walter. The committee will stand in recess until 2 : 30. 

(Thereupon, at 12 : 10 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, a recess was 
taken until 2 : 30 p. m., of the same day.) 

after recess 

(The hearing was resumed at 2 : 30 p. m., Hon. John S. Wood 
(chairman) presiding. 

Mr. Wood. The committee will be in order, please, and the record 
will disclose that there are present Messrs. Walter, Moulder, and 
Wood. 

TESTIMONY OF VICTOR A. KRAVCHENKO— Resumed 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr, Kravchenko, did you know Nicolai Kolybalov ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes; I know Nicolai Kolybalov since 1938. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline to the committee his background, 
his assignment to the Soviet Purchasing Commission, and any other 
knowledge you have regarding his activities while with the Soviet 
Purchasing Commission ? 



1188 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

(Representative Kearney enters hearing room.) 

Mr. Kravchenko. Nicolai Kolybalov is a professional engineer. 
At the end of 1938 or beginning of 1939 he was assistant to the head of 
pipe industry in Siberia, and I know him very well. He came to the 
United States toward the end of 1943 as a representative of some 
industrial commissariat, and he returned to the Soviet Union about 
beginning of 1914. I met Nicolai Kolybalov last March in Paris. 
We had an argiunent before the court. Frankly, I don't understand 
why Nicolai Kolybalov should come to the United States in his pro- 
fessional capacity; I don't understand why they sent him, because 
he is a very bad engineer, but in the Soviet Purchasing Commission 
[speaking in Russian] . 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). He traveled to see industrial plants and 
collected technical information. As far as I can remember, he had 
to receive machines and give his expert opinion. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Under the agreement between the United States 
and the Soviet Union during the war. [Speaking in Russian.] 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). I have no knowledge of what he was 
actually doing. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Fedor V. Vdovin ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Fedor Vdovin was the man who helped me pack 
secret information for Vasilenko when the latter flew to the Soviet 
Union. 

Mr. Tavenner. The committee is in possession of information that 
indicates that Fedor Vdovin was in the pipe-tubing section of the 
Soviet Purchasing Commission and that he devoted his energy to 
obtaining aluminmn tubing which could be used in the atomic devel- 
opment. 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't know for what purpose Fedor Vdovin 
asked the United States for aluminum tubes, but he was working in 
this section and he received many tubes. I don't know what his pur- 
pose was, whether for atomic energ;\^ or for any other purpose. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know Col. Stanislaw Shumousky? 

Mr. Kravchenko. No ; I don't know him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Did you know a person whose first name is Zot, 
Z-o-t, L. Chepurnykh ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Maybe I know him, but it is very difficult to 
remember names. 

Mr. Tavenner. Mr. Kravchenko, on March 9, 1944, Vassili Serge- 
iev, accompanied by his wife, Nina, Petri Makiev, Valentina Batanova, 
and Anatoli Baranovsky, departed from Great Falls, Mont., on a 
plane, and had in their custody a number of wooden boxes. Will you 
outline the background of Vassili Sergeiev ? 

Mr. KJRAVCHENKO. I workcd with Sergeiev from 1925 up to 1931. I 
worked with him in a metallurgical factory in the city of Dnepropet- 
rovsk. He was a member of the party. He graduated from the Lenin- 
grad Metallurgical Institute. Afterward he worked a few years in 
Germany as metallurgical attache and at the end of 1943 or beginning 
of 1944 he came to the United States as assistant commissar of foreign 
trade. His wife Nina studied with me in 1930 at the Aviation 
Institute. 

When Sergeiev came to the United States, as I mentioned before, 
he brought special orders from Mr. Mikoyan, and these orders were 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 11 89 

discussed in closed party sessions of the Soviet Purchasing Commis- 
sion. 

Sergeiev inspected many departments of the Soviet Purchasing 
Commission. He liad the right to do so. He also discharged some 
officials whom he considered not too loyal to their duty, and Sergeiev 
flew to Soviet Russia [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). He had a great deal of luggage and of 
course enjoyed diplomatic immunity. 

Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). But what material he possessed in that 
luggage is unknown. 

Mr. Tai-enner. Do you know how he obtained diplomatic immu- 
nity? 

Mr. Kravchenko (speaking in Russian). 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). During the war, as you know, many So- 
viet employees came with diplomatic passports, and so did Sergeiev. 
He was Assistant Commissar of Foreign Trade and it was absolutely 
natural that he should have a diplomatic passport when he came to 
the United States. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know Petr Makiev ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't remember him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Valentina Batanova, do you know him? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Valentina Batanova is a woman. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know her? 

Mr. Kravchenko. No. . 

Mr. Ta^^nner. Anatoli Baranovsky? 

Mr, Kravchenko. No. 

Mr. Tavenner. You do not know him ? 

Mr. IvRAVCHENKO. I dou't know him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Do you know an engineer with the Soviet Purchas- 
ing Commission named Khimuchin? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I know him. 

Mr. Tavenner. Will you outline his background and connection 
with the Soviet Purchasing Commission? 

Mr. Kravchenko. He came to the United States as an ordinary 
engineer although he is a scientist. Before he came to the United 
States he worked in a scientific aviation institute in Moscow. His 
duty in the United States, as I mentioned before, I saw this material 
[speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). He had obtained considerable material 
concerning the aviation industry. 

Mr. Kravchenko. He was working in a separate room, and about 
60 percent of the people inside the Russian Purchasing Commission 
didn't know what he was doing. But when I saw the big record he 
was signing on the aviation industry in the United States, and when 
this material was taken by General Belayev to Moscow under diplo- 
matic immunity, I understood what Kliimuchin had been doing. 

Mr. Tavenner. I believe you told us that while living in Russia 
you were the manager or head of a manufacturing plant ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is right. 

Mr. Ta\t:nner. How many employees were in that plant, approxi- 
mately ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Sometimes 1,000, sometimes 3,000, sometimes 
more, sometimes less. 



J.J.J7U oxiirivarjiN J. \jr AiUiVLiu iviAi. rjniAJj 



Mr. Tavenner. Was the labor-union situation in that plant typical 
of the other plants in Russia at that time ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Yes ; absolutely. 

Mr. Ta^^nner, Was the labor union in that plant free to engage in 
collective bargaining with management over the matter of rates of 
compensation for services ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. No. In the Soviet Union there are two kinds 
of remuneration for labor. One is based on time, the other on piece 
work. All skills in the Soviet Union are listed in a special book. 
This book contains a list of all the industries and wages for both time 
and piecework. Now, the local labor union never decides what wages 
the workmen must receive from the factory. I mean [speaking in 
Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). They take part only in cases when a 
scale of wages is being modified. 

Mr. Kravchenko. In my experience of many years with factories 
in the Soviet Union, I can say no labor union boss in a factory ever 
came to my office and said : "Will you please pay more to Mr. So and 
So." He can't ask me that for two reasons: First, he himself is a 
member of the party, and he laiows I can't make any decision con- 
cerning wages. 

Second, he knows very well what our policy in the factories is, 
and although I am manager and he is labor-union boss, both of us 
work for the interest of the party first, and the interests of the work- 
men come second. 

And third, he knows very well that all rates of wages are fixed by 
the top level of the Government, and our job is just to explain to the 
workmen how much they must receive and how much they must 
produce. 

Mr. Taat^nner. In other words, the decision was made by high eche- 
lons in Government ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. The decision was made before the union man 
came to my office, and he knew that very well. He also knew that all 
our work in the factory, the norm of output, the conditions of 
the material, and the price of this material had been discussed pre- 
viously by our factory party meeting. We called the factory party 
cell "Little Politburo," and the union man knew I would pay much 
more to every workman, but I couldn't do that. 

Mr. Tavenner. And you could not do it for what reason ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. For a very simple reason : I had from the Gov- 
ernment the prices of tubes and metal and everything. I also had 
a statement of how many workmen I must use and how much I may 
pay them. And I could do nothing on my own initiative. 

Mr. Wolin has just mentioned that the labor union plays an active 
part when we change the norm of production. What part do they 
play ? I will give you an example. 

In a factory employing 1,000 workmen, 300 workmen produce, say, 
130 percent, 500 workmen produce 75 percent, and the rest produce 
something in between. 

Wlien the Government decides to change the norm of production 
for every workman, it never proceeds from the average output of 
approximately 90 percent. It always bases its decision on a higher 
norm, for example, 120 percent. This 120 percent is then assigned 
for all of them, so that wages are very profitable for the Government, 
but not for the workmen. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1191 

Thus, changing the norm of production, the Government always 
gets a greater profit because before increasing wages, it increases 
the norm of output. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words, there cannot be any decision made 
by management and labor except that which is made by the Gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. None. The same orders are issued by the party 
organization, by management, and by the labor union at the same 
time. 

Now, before we talked to the workmen, we had a session of the 
party committee on the factory. At this meeting the secretary of the 
party, the boss of the labor union, and management received the 
same order. 

Then we discussed what was to be done in the factory, and the work- 
men must accept what we said. The "politburo" of the factory 
consists of seven or nine persons. We decided Avhat we had to do and 
we said to the Labor union boss: "You must do this; you must do 
that." AVe said to management : "You do so and so." 

I would come to my office and invite all the engineers and the ad- 
ministration personnel to come to my office. 

At the same time, the labor-union boss would gather his little 
bosses. 

The party secretary would invite all active party [speaking in 
Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). The organizers. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Party organizers. Everybody would receive in- 
structions as to what he must do and how he must do it. After the 
decision of the "politburo" was made we opened party meetings for 
all members of the party and we said to them: "We have received 
orders from the commissariat or the party. We have discussed this 
subject at a closed session of the party committee. And we must 
make the following decision." 

We discussed it for a few hours, and every member of the party 
knew that on the next day we would have an open meeting of members 
of the party, members of the young Communist organization, and all 
workmen who were not members of the party. The director of the 
factory would say a few words ; so would the secretary of the party 
say a few words, and the union representative [speaking in Russian]. 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). Nobody will have the courage to say 
anything against the resolution of the party committee. 

Mr. Kearney. Wliat ha]:)pens if they do? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't say there is no opportunity to discuss it 
in a closed party session. But when all was decided and we went to 
the open meeting, if somebody voiced opposition, some member of the 
party would say : "It is not true what he said, because we work at the 
same place and the same hours and I produce so and so much. He is 
lazy or doesn't pay attention to his machine." Another member of 
the party would get up and also discredit the opponent and what he 
had said. 

Mr. Kearney. What happens ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Nothing will happen, but if you discredit a de- 
cision of the Government, for example, if you say the Government de- 
cision is against the interest of workers, you will be arrested. 



1192 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Wood. You will be what ? 

Mr. Kravchknko. You will be arrested. You can't say anything 
against a Government decision, for the very simple reason they will 
accuse you as an agitator or propagandist against the Government 
and against the interests of the workmen. 

Mr. Kearney. Assuming a workman has been arrested, what hap- 
pens to him in an individual case ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. That is very difficult to say. I published one 
book, and I am now going to publish another book, and I try to ex- 
plain this question. If they arrest you they will look at all your past, 
who was your father, who was your mother, who is your sister and 
brother, where they are, what they are doing, what is your social 
past, what you did 10 years ago, what you said against the Soviet 
Government. They will look at all secret files, and if they find some- 
thing they will produce it and they will accuse you. 

For example, I knew a man, a foreman, his name was Dubinsky. 
He was a very good foreman. He worked 35 years, had great experi- 
ence and was a very good man, and when the factory needed his help 
he worked 24 hours without going home to see his family. He was 
very sincere and a very good worker. He didn't say anything directly 
against the Government. He just said once : "The pay is not sufficient 
and we work under difficult conditions." 

It was enough. WTiat did he get? They looked at his past — I was 
horn in 1905 — they found that in 1905 this Dubinsky belonged to some 
political movement which was against the Bolsheviks and in 1936 — 
31 years later, he was arrested. I don't know where he is now. 

You see the situation, I will give you an example. I started my 
work as a metalworker in 1921. I did not come from a rich or 
aristocratic class. I came from a very simple family, and I knew very 
well that after I graduated from the institute and became a member 
of the party, I had not just my duty as a Russian engineer; I realized 
my social duty to my people, because I was one of them, and because 
after so many years life was terrible. We couldn't do anything good 
even if we tried. 

In 1939 I came to a new factory. We built that factory by our 
blood and our tears. We paid everything we had for foreign 
machinery. We bought it in the United States, England, and else- 
where. I came to this factory to work, and found these people [speak- 
ing in Russian] , 

Mr. WoLiN (translating). In the bitter Ural winter they lived in 
unheated barns. 

Mr. Kravchenko. There was not enough bread, no meat, no shoes, 
nothing. And I was asked to produce 100 percent with these people. 
How could they do it? And sometimes I didn't get out of the factory 
for 3 days and nights. And after I did my best as a citizen of my 
country and sometimes had no time to sleep during 3 days' work, they 
arrested me. 

I found similar conditions in villages where peasants worked day 
and night. They can't come in at 8 o'clock in the morning and work 
until 5 o'clock. They must work until sunset and they work very 
hard. 

That is why I broke with the Soviets. I give you human reasons. 
If you want me to give political reasons, that is something else. 



SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 1193 

Mr. TA\T:]srNER. I have before me an article entitled "Collective 
Contracts in the U. S. S. R. for the year 1947," written by V. V. 
Kuznetsov. Do you know the author of this article ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. I don't know him personally but I know who 
he is. 

Mr. Tavenner. There appears in this article, in capital letters, in the 
body of it, this statement : 

The collective contract is a bilateral agreement made by tlie management 
on the one hand and by the trade-union committee of the enterprise, repre- 
senting all the workers, on the other hand. 

Mr. Kravchenko. First of all, the Soviet labor union at the factory 
never represented the real interest of the people. If it does, we shall 
hear of a real revolution in the Soviet Union. "Wlien we made a con- 
tract we did what the party committee asked us to do. 

Mr. Tavenner. In other words there was no bilateral agreement 
whatever ; it was merely what the Government stated they should agree 
to? 

Mr. Kravchenko. This is fiction for people outside the country and 
for many idiots inside the country ; 99 percent or 95 percent of work- 
men in Europe or in any country in the world don't know what a 
Soviet labor union is. They don't know what the Soviet regime is. 
They don't know either its domestic or foreign policy; they know 
nothing. 

The policy of the Soviet Government in the labor-union problems is 
very smart. Wliat Mr. Kuznetsov said for people abroad, that is 
one side of the picture. What Mr. Kuznetsov did in his own country 
against the interests of Russian workmen, that is the other side of 
the picture. That is typical of the double talk of the Soviet Govern- 
ment before their owii people. 

Mr. Tavenner. Is the statement I read to you a correct statement? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Absolutely not ; absolutely not. How is it pos- 
sible ? How can the labor union decide about the wages of the work- 
men ? 

Mr. Moulder. I think he very clearly covered that a while ago. 

Mr. Tavenner. All right. 

Mr. Kravchenko. We had the plan ; it stated how much we must 
produce; how much it should cost per piece, per ton, or per pound; 
how many tons of steel we must use ; how many tons of ore ; how many 
workmen should produce 1 ton of metal ; how much the ton must cost ; 
all the details. 

(Representative Kearney leaves hearing room.) 

Mr. Tavenner. I want to ask one more question before introduc- 
ing these photographs. Were the laborers in your factory free to 
change their place of employment or quit work ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. No. I had to determine their fate — where they 
must w^ork, what they must produce, and what wages I must pay them. 

Mr. Tavenner. I would like for you to look at these photographs 
and identify the persons whose pictures appear there and, with your 
permission, I would like to photostat these and return the originals 
to you. 

Mr. Kravchenko. Please. 

Mr. Tavenner. I show you a photograph marked "No. 1." Will 
you identify the persons who appear in that photograph? 



1194 SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIAL 

Mr. Kravchenko. This is Romanov, who was head of the metal 
department. This is Vasilenko, Semen Vasilenko, whom we were talk- 
ing about. 

Mr. Tavenner, Will you identify the persons who appear in this 
photograph marked "No. 2" ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. General Rudenko, chairman of the Soviet Pur- 
chasing Commission. By the way, Rudenko is not a real general. 
He is a political general. He received a decoration in Stalingrad, 
not because he was a hero; the hero was the simple Russian soldier 
who died for our country but not for this regime, and Mr. Rudenko 
received the decoration. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. Will you identify the persons who appear in photo- 
graph No. 3 ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. Nicolai Kolybalov. 

Mr. Tavenner. And No. 4? 

Mr. Kravchenko. The same Vasilenko. 

Mr. TA^^:NNER. And photograph No. 5 ? 

Mr. Kravchenko. General Rudenko and Romanov. 

Mr. TA^^NNER. Mr. Chairman, I desire to offer these photographs 
in evidence as Kravchenko exhibits 1 to 5, inclusive, and ask permis- 
sion to substitute photostats and return the originals. 

Mr. Wood. The photostats will be admitted. 

(The photostats of photographs above referred to, marked "Krav- 
chenko Exhibits 1 to 5 inclusive," are filed herewith.) ^- 

Mr. Wood. Mr. Kravchenko, permit me to express the appreciation 
of the committee for 5^our appearance. 

The committee will stand adjourned subject to call. 

(Thereupon, at 4 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1950, an adjournment 
was taken.) 

"2 See appendix. 
X 



(: 



3 iiili.. 

3 9999 05445 2048 



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